



Michel Schooyans

# The Totalitarian Trend of Liberalism

Translated by  
Rev. John H. Miller, C.S.C., S.T.D.

**THE TOTALITARIAN TREND  
OF LIBERALISM**

**BY  
MICHAEL SCHOOPYANS**



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Maison Mame, 1995  
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Cover art by Chris Pelicano

ISBN 1-887567-05-4

Published by

Central Bureau, CCVA  
3835 Westminster Place  
St. Louis MO 63108

Printed by  
St. Martin de Porres Lay Dominican Community

"I am inclined to think that  
if faith be wanting in a man,  
he must be subject; and if  
he be free, he must believe."

de Tocqueville  
*Democracy in America, II*  
(New York: Knopf, 1945) 22.

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# INTRODUCTION

Right off, it would be appropriate to cut short any misunderstanding regarding the title of this work. The liberalism of which we are speaking here is not simply an economic system or a sort of political regime. It is above all a state of mind, itself the result of an anthropology that we will have to examine carefully. This state of mind is characterized by an ensemble of presuppositions about man, society and the world; this anthropology inclines one to make individual liberty the be all and end all of man.

It is first of all this *original liberalism* with which we are concerned in this work. The state of mind that underlies liberal options in the economic and political order offers advantages that are important to acknowledge. How can we deny that the liberal climate favors the affirmation and blossoming of the individual conscience? How can we not be aware of the fact that this climate directs the spirit of initiative and enterprise? How can we underestimate its stimulating influence on scientific research, technical progress, material well-being? Is there a context which better permits our maintaining alert our critical vigilance before the suffocating supervision of the State?

Nevertheless, this liberalism, as effective as it may be, rests upon two axiomatic presuppositions curiously eluding criticism: *materialism* and *individualism*. Now these two presuppositions have as a corollary a truncated vision of social relationships. One tends to reduce them to relationships of force, relationships of struggle in opposition to men eager to appropriate goods and increase their profits.

Add to that a no less truncated conception of liberty; this is confused with the total autonomy, pure and simple, of the individual, regarding himself, others and values.

The complex political economic system resulting from these premises is provided with a very convenient justification. It takes on the form of a *postulate* according to which rival special interests finish by

attaining a harmony that achieves the general interest and assures justice. But such a postulate is inadmissible: it leads to a totalitarian trend that issues in the crushing of the weakest by the strongest.

This trend is totalitarian in its nature, its end and its means. In its *nature*, for it attacks the *Ego* of the weak, in the twofold physical and psychic dimension of the *Ego*; in its *end*, for it aims at consolidating and extending the domination of the affluent on a planetary scale; in its *means*, for it utilizes the most diverse scientific and technical disciplines, making an especial appeal, today, to demography and biomedical techniques. This ideology is instilled in every milieu without exception and in doing so makes use of the most modern and effective propaganda techniques.

We can understand spontaneously and without difficulty how the socialist ideology feeds totalitarian projects. Often denounced, contemporary history moreover offers many examples of this trend. But one expression of totalitarianism can hide another one. The developed Western world, fortified in its attachment to liberty and satisfied in having thwarted the strategies of some despots, spontaneously thinks itself immunized against every totalitarian project that could arise from within. It cannot imagine totalitarianism except as coming from outside. The thought of a threat of colonization, it thinks, doesn't concern but the Third-World.

It believes it is vaccinated against such a threat. Its vigilance is, therefore, immobilized, inhibited and paralyzed. In one sense it is alienated, for it does not take into account — it cannot take into account — the fact that the totalitarian peril to which it is exposed sinks its roots in the political and economic system of which it is heir, beneficiary and agent.

Our intention is to assist in this difficult awakening of awareness, for it involves the future of human society. We want to show that the toleration dynamic, issue of a perversion of liberalism, benefits, if we dare to say so, from unexpected collusions, even in international organizations, and that it produces *new slaves*.

\* \* \*

Our exposition will follow different steps. First, we will point out some particularly revealing data about the world situation from the last twenty-five years. Taking into account the fact that after the putsch of August 1991, nothing will remain the same as before, we will inquire into the East-West cleavage and show why it is logical that the North-South cleavage is more important today. It will thus become clear that the theme "total war" has been reinterpreted: it was first applied to East-West relations; but now it is indispensable

for comprehending the North-South relations and the change in the nature of international organizations.

The signs of the totalitarian trend will clearly appear at the end of this inquiry, and we will analyze them in the *second section*. There we will examine, first of all, the link between the foundation of liberal ideology and "*bad development*." We will do the same for socialist ideology: what are the links between it and "*pseudo-development*"? Following this twofold examination, we will indicate the link that exists, on the one hand, between these two ideologies, these two models of truncated development, and, on the other hand, underdevelopment.

In the *last section* we will try to outline a path of hope. For, on the theoretical level, the liberal model is more easily corrected than the socialist model. And the reason is simple: it is a question of the different conception we observe in these two currents regarding the place and role of man in society. Certain central themes of existential phenomenology and personalism, will be particularly fruitful at this stage of our project. They will allow us to understand why man has no reason to yield to a fatalism justifying every reactionary current — and why it is not in vain that he retains in his heart the hope of liberation.<sup>1</sup>

\* \* \*

In finalizing this work, we have benefited from the critique and suggestions of many colleagues who have let us profit from their competence. Especially do we wish to thank Mr. Fernand Bézy, lawyer and economist, professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, Miss Isabelle Borremans, political scientist, Miss Marie Hendrickx, theologian and philosopher, Dr. Philippe Schepens, surgeon, and above all Mr. Benoît Patar, philosopher and economist. Without their friendly collaboration and encouragement, this study would not have seen the light of day.

This work is not, first of all, the result of a careful enquiry into the works of learned specialists. It is above all the extension of direct contact with men to whom the author has contracted a debt of gratitude.

It is only right to acknowledge that our first field of experience was Latin America, especially Brazil. But we have always had equally in mind the concrete situations of Asia, Africa and Europe.

If one should lose sight of the constant reference to this diversified background, the following pages will lose much of their significance.

September 8, 1991

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<sup>1</sup> We have gone into these problems in *Démocratie et libération chrétienne. Principes pour l'action politique* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1986).

# FOREWORD

## TO THE SECOND EDITION

This edition is different in important ways from the first. First of all, it includes the reproduction of a personal letter addressed to the author by His Holiness, Pope John Paul II after the publication of the first edition. Besides, in the first section, the statistical data has been updated on the basis of the most recent available sources. The same is true of the bibliography. One chapter devoted to the Gulf War and to South Africa has been omitted, because it was no longer as topical as it was five years ago. One will also notice in the last section new references incorporated into the text; they refer the reader to the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* of March 25, 1995. Finally, the text of the first edition in its entirety was reprinted after being revised and corrected.

Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium  
October 23, 1995



To Reverend Michel Schooyans,  
Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain-la-Neuve

It is a pleasure for me personally to address these cordial thanks for sending me, in filial homage, your book entitled *La dérive totalitaire du libéralisme*.

In this study, you have the merit of presenting a personal analysis and of explaining clearly the consequences of an organization of life in society which would reduce the common good to an ensemble of economic and material relationships, to the detriment of all humanist, cultural and religious considerations.

May your pertinent analyses, supported by competent personalities, lead your readers -- especially Christian ones -- to restore everywhere in the world a social justice worthy of the name, by means of public and private institutions capable of promoting the dignity of persons and respect for communities! To this ardent wish, I am happy to join a special Apostolic Benediction for you, those dear to you as well as your collaborators.

From the Vatican, December 9, 1991

John Paul Papa II

# PART I

## A WORLD IN CRISIS

Let us try to disengage the broad traits of the world's evolution as compared to what it was about a quarter of a century ago. What are the "old" problems that are always arising? What are the problems that were hidden or ignored in the middle of the sixties and are forcing themselves more and more on our attention? What are the "new" problems?

These questions arise in different settings which we will view successively: countries on the way to development, industrialized countries, communist countries, international relations.

The numerical data that we will present does not presume to be the most recent; it is given in order to indicate and illustrate the scope of the problems. The moral and political argumentation that we will develop is, nevertheless, not based on this data and doesn't depend on it.

## CHAPTER I

# COUNTRIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT

### Some Encouraging Facts

In a *very general* fashion what do we observe?<sup>1</sup> We see a great *inequality* among countries under development and great differences within each particular country.<sup>2</sup> At the cost of much difficulty, some countries have made a start (Brazil, South Korea, Taiwan, Nigeria);<sup>3</sup> others stagnate (the greater number of them); others are sinking or regressing (many countries in Africa).<sup>4</sup>

We are also witnessing the emergence of regional arrangements of *solidarity* which can be very beneficial to the development of people. These new arrangements of solidarity are appearing in Latin America, and they are perceptible already in Africa. One notices also an increase in trade among nations of the Third-World.<sup>5</sup>

Sensitivity is sharpened on account of some problems which, without being totally new, have taken on new proportions. We feel ourselves responsible for the destiny of the human community in its entirety. We feel ourselves more and more concerned with what happens, for example, in the middle East, in Ethiopia, in Afghanistan, in Bosnia, in Rwanda, etc. This sentiment of responsibility goes hand in hand with the *heightened sense of solidarity*.

In circulating information better, the *media* have contributed to consolidating this twofold sentiment of responsibility and solidarity. The two decades of development — those of 1960 and 1970 — organized by the UN have influenced opinion in the same direction.

Nevertheless, information doesn't suffice to consolidate this twofold sentiment. We also need above all an *education of the moral sense*. Numerous publications and personalities on all shores endeavor to awaken consciences.

In the Catholic world, the teaching of the Church and the personal involvement of innumerable Christians in efforts for justice have played a prime role in the moral education of consciences in matters of justice. The list of recent recipients of the Nobel Prize for Peace is revealing enough in this question. Under the impetus of the sovereign pontiffs since John XXIII and of Vatican Council II with its Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, is clear how many bishops, priests and laymen have become involved with determination in efforts for justice, peace and development. The direct influence of the social doctrine of the Church is particularly perceptible in some non-violent "revolutionary" movements that can be observed notably in Haiti and in The Philippines. Ever since *Populorum progressio* (1967), the audience for this social teaching has gone well beyond the limits of the institutional Church. It has contributed toward reinforcing her moral authority beyond her visible boundaries.

### *Several Reasons for Anxiety*

Alongside these encouraging indications, we must, alas take note of some reasons for preoccupation: hunger continues to wreak havoc.<sup>6</sup>

There is still a lot to do in order to stimulate *food-producing agriculture* in order to respond to elementary needs and to insure self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. The projects of "the green revolutions" have often been a failure. To that is added drought or floods, erosion of the soil, decrease in the fertility of the land.

Agricultural policy is generally oriented toward exports and favors *cultivation for income*. This aims at profit rather than the satisfaction of alimentary needs. To this kind of cultivation is usually tied the problem of single-crop farming. And this exposes the producing countries to the risks of the world market. Thus the Ivory Coast, where the production of cocoa predominates, suffers from the competition of new producers, for example Indonesia. Furthermore, in a general way, the prices of tropical products are low on the international markets.

Research aiming at ameliorating the food varieties (cereals, sorghum, rice, etc.) is plentiful, but its slow in being applied.

On top of the often mediocre yield of the soil are frequently added a lack of land and an anarchical utilization of the soil. What results is an accelerated rural depopulation.

First among the causes of the *deficit in foodstuffs* appear urban concentration and the importation of foodstuffs at prices subsidized in the countries of origin. A policy of foodstuffs at low prices has the effect of putting pressure on salaries.



The *international difference in costs* can also create a problem. In itself, this is good; but this difference can become a catastrophe if, as is not rare in the Third-World, one allows enterprises to monopolize the manual labor and unscrupulously exploit it. The mechanism that consists in making good use of comparative advantages is good for the international community. However, it frequently happens in developing countries that these comparative advantages are the result of conditions arising from a humiliating life and conditions of degrading work for the populations concerned.

Problems in *health* tend at times to become worse. In the choice of health systems, one generally favors curing over preventing. Within the same country regional *disparities* are marked. Thus city dwellers more easily have access to better care than the rural population.

One notices an upsurge in *maladies peculiar to the poor* (among others, tuberculosis, cholera and malaria); little is done to purify drinking water, to improve hygiene and preventive medicine in general. AIDs is in the process of wreaking havoc everywhere, but it especially affects different countries of the Third-World (Kenya, Zaire).

The rate of *infant mortality* (children less than a year old) remains high. It goes like this: Ethiopia: 120 per thousand; Mali: 104; Nepal: 102; Malawi: 134; Niger: 123; Rwanda: 117; Bolivia: 58; Indonesia: 64; Nigeria: 72; Thailand: 35; Brazil: 58; Mexico: 34; Italy: 7.4; Belgium: 7.6; Japan: 4.3; Switzerland: 5.6.<sup>7</sup>

*Life expectancy* at birth often remains low. In 1995, it was 50 years in Ethiopia; 46 in Sierra Leone; 60 in Bolivia; 65 in The Philippines. In countries with higher revenues it was 74 years; 77 in Belgium; 78 in Canada; 78 in France.<sup>8</sup>

According to the World Bank (1994), *the number of inhabitants per doctor* in 1990 was: 32,500 in Ethiopia; 57,310 in Burkina Faso; 24,600 in India; 40,610 in Rwanda; 17,650 in Senegal; 8,120 in The Philippines; 4,840 in Morocco; 4,360 in Thailand; 590 in Germany; 350 in France; 420 in the United States.<sup>9</sup>

*Illiteracy*, which was thought to have been arrested, reverses itself but slowly, particularly in the female population. One can only guess the innumerable and distressing consequences of that. Again according to the World Bank (1994), the number of illiterate adults in 1990 was as follows: In Sub-Sahara Africa, out of 543 million inhabitants, 50% of the total population and 62% of women were illiterate; in Latin America, out of 453.2 million, 15% of the total population and 18% of women; in southern Asia the number was 55% and 69%, while that of the entire world was 35% and 45%.

Let us cite a few examples from the Third-World, always from the same source. Out of a population of 101.9 million inhabitants in Nigeria 49% were illiterate and 61% of all women; in Morocco, with a population of 26.2 million, 51% and 62%; in Egypt, out of a population of 54.7 million, 52% and 66%; in Brazil, out of 153.9 million, 19% and 20%; in Mexico, out of 85 million, 13% and 15%; in China, out of 1,162.2 million, 27% and 38%; in India, out of 883.6 million, 52% and 66%; in Pakistan, out of 119.3 million, 65% and 79%; finally, in Iran, out of 59.6 million, 46% and 57%.<sup>10</sup>

*Devastation of the environment* is often caused by an unbridled cupidity. Two examples will illustrate this ecological disaster. In some countries, there occurs a savage deforestation: this is not followed by a galloping desertification but by a reforestation with eucalyptus just as savage. Besides exhausting the soil, such species cause the fauna to flee, in particular the birds — all this profoundly disturbing the ecosystem. Elsewhere, the gold-bearing silt of certain rivers is treated with mercury, and the result is that the fish are struck with mercury poisoning.

The bourgeoisie of Third-World countries are often *isolated from the masses*, and remain very submissive to the influence of wealthy countries. The information that fills the minds of this fraction of the population is itself an instrument of neocolonization.

Their way of thinking and living imitate the attitudes and habits of the "metropolis". They generally give in to ostentatious consumerism and pay too little attention to the common good.

The available revenue per household is very unevenly distributed; thus it appears in the table using the data available at the time of the 1993 report's publication.<sup>11</sup> Among other things, one will notice that in Brazil (1989) the poorest 20% have but 2.1% of the revenue.<sup>12</sup> If we take into consideration the wealthiest ten percent, we see that this group gets 51.3% of the revenue! We are going to cite some data extracted from the 1993 report.<sup>13</sup>

**TABLE 1**  
*Percentage of household revenue by revenue brackets*

	YEAR	POOREST FIFTH	RICHEST FIFTH	RICHEST TENTH
Bangladesh	88-89	9.5	38.6	24.6
India	89-90	8.8	41.3	27.1
Kenya	81-83	2.7	60.9	45.4
Pakistan	91	8.4	39.7	25.2
Rwanda	83-85	9.7	38.9	24.6
Indonesia	90	8.7	42.3	27.9
Philippines	88	6.5	47.8	32.1
Thailand	88	6.1	50.7	35.3
Peru	85-86	4.9	51.4	35.4
Brazil	89	2.1	67.5	51.3
Mexico	84	4.1	55.9	39.5
Venezuela	89	4.8	49.5	33.2
Spain	80-81	6.9	40.0	24.5
Italy	86	6.8	41.0	25.3
Belgium	78-79	7.9	36.0	21.5
France	79	6.3	40.8	25.5
Japan	79	8.7	37.5	22.4
United States	85	4.7	41.9	25.0
Switzerland	82	5.2	44.6	29.8

### *The Emergence of New Problems*

In the course of the last two decades many problems have arisen with a new acuteness.

The Muslim world has shown a real desire for openness. That doesn't mean that it isn't less true that *Muslim integralism* justifies genuine anxiety, sadly confirmed only recently.

The greater part of the Third-World has been affected by *inflation*. This constitutes, so to speak, a perpetual and unjust taxation, in the sense that it affects relatively more the poor strata of the population, whose nominal revenues adapt less quickly to increased prices.

Despite the obscure intentions that animated those who declared war on it, the production and consumption of drugs have assumed alarming proportions.<sup>14</sup>

Numerous are the countries of the Third-World that are governed by a personal or collegial dictatorship. Most of the time these

dictatorships are "simple," in the sense that they aim at preserving the privileges and wealth of a mafia which maintains itself by means of fear and corruption. In such dictatorships, the headmen are not concerned what their subordinates do, say or think, *so long as* their own privileges are not questioned. These dictatorships are always accompanied by an unbridled corruption that reaches, like a cascading flood, all the strata of the population.

During the last decades, different Third-World countries, in particular Latin America, have experienced dictatorial regimes of a totalitarian tendency. Such regimes are distinguished from "simple" dictatorships by a political doctrine that is generally "organicist": men have no reality except as members of the state which transcends them and to which henceforth they must submit without argument. In such regimes personal ability to judge and freely decide is erased.<sup>15</sup> It is in the very logic of these regimes to install forms of civil religion. This kind of dictatorship, alas, is flourishing in our century, and it expresses, among other things, the doctrine of national security<sup>16</sup> under different forms.

These two forms of dictatorship, simple or totalitarian, always facilitate the takeover of nations by dominant foreign powers. And this takeover uses above all two main means: ideology and corruption. Varying versions of the doctrine of national security, or of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, are regularly utilized by external powers as spearhead for *ideological colonization*. As for corruption, it has grown so widespread that it requires a special examination.

Of all the evils suffered by developing countries, the worst is in fact corruption. This phenomenon must be seen in its global cultural context. Notably it must take into account customs, ethnic solidarity and underdevelopment itself.

The phenomenon of corruption is universal we know, but in most of the Third-World countries, it reaches proportions of a moral and political catastrophe with negative economic consequences.<sup>17</sup>

The type of corruption we are considering here is that which consists in using political and administrative power for personal gain. It works above all in two ways: either in diverting toward private profit funds belonging to the public; or in making people pay for services one must render freely in the exercise of duties for which he receives remuneration. In this precise case, it is a question of *misappropriation*.

This kind of behavior is seriously unjust for two reasons. In the first place, the performance of public functions should be directly ordered toward the common good. Secondly, practiced on a grand



scale, as is the case most frequently, such behavior is the source of considerable and revolting inequities.

Moreover, corruption tends to spread. Frequently subordinate functionaries aren't paid because the monies destined for their remuneration are diverted to higher levels of the hierarchy. What do they do, then, these subordinates? They sell their signatures in their office. The same holds true for teachers who sell grades and diplomas.

It is very difficult to react. From within? But where corruption is rampant, the tendency is to compromise everybody and thus to buy the silence of the very ones who could contest it. From outside? But immediately one will be blamed for interference in the internal affairs of a "sovereign" country.

Furthermore, corruption has direct effects on *international* relations. Corruption leading to corruption, transactions aren't concluded without great bribes. Governments and individuals are thence confronted with the dilemma: to abstain or cooperate with crooks.

### *Some Complex Demographic Situations*

Third-World countries are equally caught up in *complex demographic situations*.<sup>18</sup>

The *world population*, counted in millions, appears as follows, according to the United Nations:<sup>19</sup>

**TABLE 2**  
**World Population**  
(in millions)

YEARS	AFRICA	LATIN AMERICA	ASIA & OCEANIA	EUROPE & CEI	NORTH AMERICA	WORLD
1950	222	166	1,391	573	166	2,518
1990	643	488	3,139	787	276	5,292
2000	867	538	3,743	818	295	6,261
2050	2,265	922	5,640	866	326	10,019
2075	2,727	1,024	5,919	851	319	10,840

According to the World Bank (1994), the United States counted 250 million inhabitants in 1990, and it is estimated that there will be 297 million in 2010; India: 850 and 1170; Brazil: 149 and 194; Mexico: 82 and 114; Indonesia: 178 and 231; Nigeria: 96 and 164; Bangladesh: 110 and 153; Russia: 148 and 152; China: 1,1134 and 1,1348.<sup>20</sup>

The growth rates, some claim, are such as to neutralize in part the encouraging results obtained from economic growth.

The governments of poor countries can only with difficulty put under way, within the time limits which should be brief, the networks of health and medical aid, as well as the indispensable infrastructures, notably in the field of education.

One notices a generalized falling off of the annual population growth rate. According to J. C. Chesnais, the maximum rate of 2.9% had been reached between 1960 and 1965 in Latin America; 2.5% between 1970 and 1975 in Asia; and it will be 3.1% between 1990 and 2000 in Africa.<sup>21</sup>

The World Congress on population held in Mexico in 1984 had already brought to light some numerical data requiring rectification but whose size will hardly change.

They counted 4.8 billion men in the world; 2000 there will be some 6.2 billion. Now 4.8 billion of this population will live in the Third-World, and 50% of this population in the Third-World will be less than 25 years old. We are witnessing a massive demographic expansion of the Third-World by 2000: four-fifths of the world's population will be found in the Third-World.

If one is sometimes justified in speaking of overpopulation in the cities of the Third-World, we must acknowledge that generally it isn't the same in the hinterland of the countries in question.

We are in agreement that a generation from now some cities, already huge today, will have become gigantic. Some say that in 2010 Mexico City will have 18 million people, São Paulo 25 million, Bombay 24 million, Shanghai 22 millions, etc.<sup>22</sup> This disordered but remediable growth of the big cities is the bearer of problems that will be difficult to control, in particular in the area of delinquency.

For roughly thirty years we have seen governments promote without scruples campaigns of birth containment, basing their actions on inadmissible motivations founded first of all on the utility and convenience of the powerful, and having recourse to methods requiring a moral condemnation without any ambiguity. Used in political science, the word "containment" means "curbing"; applied to demography, it means "brake," "control."

The United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) offers the most recent available numbers concerning the percentage of married women of an age to conceive but using modern means of contraception. According to this source, the percentages for the various countries run like this: Uganda: 3%; India: 36%; China: 80%;

Kenya: 27%; Indonesia: 47% Jamaica: 57%; Hong Kong: 75%; Morocco: 36%; Dominican Republic: 52%; Cameroon: 4%; Honduras: 35%; Columbia: 55%; Brazil: 57%; Mexico: 45%; Low countries: 76%; France: 64%; Japan: 57%; Norway: 72%; United States: 69%.<sup>23</sup>

Among the *inadmissible motives*, let us point out *eugenics*: following in Galton's (1822-1911) steps, one sees it as a matter of intervening to favor the procreation of the most talented, that is, of those who succeed, and in parallel fashion, to prevent the procreation of the poorest, that is, those who fail. Racism, which has currently new phases, is no stranger to this eugenics.<sup>24</sup>

Some *methods* calling for clear moral condemnation are put to use on a large scale with an effrontery without precedent. Some governments organize massive campaigns of sterilization and abortion. This violence done to physical integrity is generally preceded and/or accompanied by violence done to the freedom of vulnerable human beings, from whom one extorts "consent".<sup>25</sup> It has even been established that infanticide, which we believed had been erased from the surface of the globe, has reappeared and that girls are the chief victims.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>1</sup> P. Jean-Yves Calvez has published a very good work: *Tiers-Monde . . . Un monde dans le monde. Aspects sociaux, politiques, internationaux* (Paris: ed. Ouvrières, 1989).

<sup>2</sup> The reports of the World Bank now make a distinction among "countries of weak revenue," those of "intermediate revenue" (these are divided into two brackets), "exporters of petroleum with an elevated revenue," "industrial countries with a market economy," and the few "countries of Europe and the East with planned economies."

<sup>3</sup> On Latin America see Carlos Ominami, *Amerique latine. Les ripostes à la crise* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1988); on Asia see Jean-Luc Maurer, and Philippe Regnier, *La nouvelle Asie industrielle. Enjeux, stratégies et perspectives* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1989); on Africa see Pierre Pradervand, *Une Afrique en marche. La révolution silencieuse des paysans africains* (Paris: Plon, 1989); Achille Mbembe, "L'Afrique noire va imploser," *Monde diplomatique* 433 (April 1990) 10 ff.

<sup>4</sup> This comes out of the Tables (200 and 202) of the *Report on Development in the World 1990* (New York: World Bank). This whole *Report* is centered on the theme of *poverty*.

<sup>5</sup> This explained by François Vellas in *Les échanges Sud-Sud* (Paris: Economica, 1987).

<sup>6</sup> See the *Report on Development 1990*, Table 29). In *Le Monde diplomatique* René Dumont reaffirms the fact that "food production no longer keeps pace." See also the article of Eric Fottorino, "La faim sans fin," *Le Monde*, April 30, 1989.

<sup>7</sup> According to the *World Population Data Sheet 1995* of the Population Reference Bureau in Washington, D.C.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> According to the *World Development Report 1995* (Washington: World Bank) Table 27.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* Table 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* Table 30.

<sup>12</sup> On this subject see Louis Duchesne, *Le marché et la justice. À partir d'une lecture critique des encycliques* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1987) 109-111.

<sup>13</sup> See Table 30.

<sup>14</sup> See the articles of Michel Klare, "De la guerre contre la drogue à la guerre tout court," *Le Monde diplomatique* 432 (March 1990) 41 ff; and of Christian de Brie, "Ces banquiers complices du trafic de drogue," *Le Monde diplomatique* 433 (April 1990) 24 ff.

<sup>15</sup> On totalitarianism see especially Jean-Jacques Walter, *Les machines totalitaires* (Paris: Denoel, 1982). See also some of the "classics" such as: J. L. Talmon, *Les origines de la démocratie totalitaire* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1966); Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1958); Claude Lefort, *L'Invention démocratique. Les limites de la domination totalitaire* (Paris: Fayard, 1981); Claude Polin, *Le totalitarisme* (Paris: PUF, 1987).

<sup>16</sup> We have studied the Brazilian version of this doctrine in *Destin du Brésil. La technocratie militaire et son idéologie* (Gembloux: Duclot, 1973). See also Joseph Comblin, *Le pouvoir militaire en Amérique latine. L'idéologie de la sécurité nationale* (Paris: Delarge, 1977).

<sup>17</sup> See the work published by Pierre Péan, *L'argent noir. Corruption et sous-développement* (Paris: Fayard, 1988). Cf. L. Duquesne de la Vinelle, *Le marché et la justice*, 124, whom we follow closely here.

<sup>18</sup> Collection under the direction of Claude Julien, "Démographie, développement, démocratie. . . et immigration," *Le Monde diplomatique* 434 (May 1990) 15-22 (see 22). Cf. also P. Bourcier de Carbon, "Demain le Tiers-Monde: population et développement," *Tiers-Monde* 94 (1983) 235-471; Jacques Vallin, *La population mondiale* (Paris: La Découverte, 1986). The review *Vivant univers* (Namur) devoted no. 379 (Jan-Feb. 1989) to a file on demography. More specialized is the study of Agnès Chevallier et Véronique Kessler, "Economies en développement et défi démographique. Algérie, Egypte, Morocco, Tunisie," *Notes et Etudes documentaires* (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1989). As we have done thus far, we will use the *Report 1990* of the World Bank; for a more thorough study one must cf. the United Nations' publication, *World Population Monitoring 1989*, which includes a *Special Report: The Population Situation in the Least Developed Countries* (New York: UN, 1990) 3-33.

<sup>19</sup> This according to the UN's *Long-range World Population Projections 1950-2050* (1992) Table 6. We cite the median projections. See also Table 3.

<sup>20</sup> According to *World Population Projections* (Washington; World Bank, 1994) Table 7, 18-21.

<sup>21</sup> The foreseen evolution of annual population growth rates by continent from 1850 to 2010 is indicated by J.C. Chesnais, *La revanche du Tiers-Monde* (Paris: Lafont, 1987) 176 ff. Cf also *Report 1990*, Table 26.

<sup>22</sup> According to *World Population Monitoring 1993* (New York: UN, 1994) Table 10.

<sup>23</sup> According to *Estado de la poblacion mundial 1995* (New York: UN Fund for Population. See that Tables on 67-70.

<sup>24</sup> Francis Galton is the author of *Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into Laws and Consequences* (London, MacMillan, 1869).

<sup>25</sup> Among his followers it is more and more a question of "sterilizing the mentally ill." Dr. J. Y. Nau devoted a column in *Le Monde* of March 20, 1991, 15 ff.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. I-Chuan Wu-Beyens, "Socioeconomic discrepancies and fertility control in the Peoples Republic of China," *Revue des pays de l'Est* (Brussels) n. 2 (1987) 1-51; on infanticide see 43 ff. There is a good file on the question by Drs. Marie and Alfred Mascarenhas in the review *News Exchange* of the World Federation of Doctors Who Respect Human Life (H. Serruyslaan 76/3, B 8400 Oostende); see n. 98 (Dec. 1987) 5-19. See above all John S. Aird, *Foreign Assistance to Coercive Family Planning in China. Response to Recent Population Policy in China* [by Terence Hull], (Canberra, 1992); the famous North American demographer recently presented a new study entitled *Family Planning, Women and Human Rights in the Peoples Republic of China*, pro manuscripto 34 Taipei, September 1995.

## CHAPTER II

# THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

In the middle of the "Golden Sixties," an ill-founded optimism inclined many circles to believe that prosperity and expansion would necessarily and indefinitely grow. This atmosphere that, in certain circles, bordered on euphoria was to end in disillusionment. The date that proved to be the turning point was 1968. From then until now developed countries have seen unexpected problems arise. The branches of the tree called "development" bear rotten as well as marvelous fruit. Some readjustments were urgently required. The encyclical *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis*, for example, invites us to call such unbridled and unbalanced growth that turns on itself "over-development."

## A Prodigious Dynamism

It is enough just to glance at the evolution of real revenue per inhabitant in some big areas of the world to realize the fantastic dynamism of some countries called developed. From around \$4,400 (US \$) in 1950, North America went close to \$8,400 in 1984; for Europe from \$2,000 to \$6,000, while Latin America went from \$1,000 to \$2,000, and Africa from \$500 to \$800.<sup>1</sup>

Jean-Claude Chesnais summarizes the world situation of 1985 as follows:

Translated into terms of purchasing power of the dollar at international prices, the world production can, in 1985, be valued at around 10,000 billion dollars. Two thirds of this wealth is produced in the developed world. . . . With 23 and 21% of the total

respectively, the two greatest economic groups are the overseas Anglo-Saxons (the U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and Western Europe; Japan comes next with 8%. Taken together, the various developed countries of the free world, with a population equivalent to one sixth of humanity, furnish more than half (52%) of the world's production, while the developed socialist economies have a relative weight of 15%, comparable to that of Asia without China. Latin America has an economic weight which does not go beyond that of Japan alone (8%). As regards China, according to an evaluation, its economic measure would be but slightly superior to that of the African continent and slightly inferior to that of Japan.<sup>2</sup>

Still according to the same specialist, the percentage of world production due to Africa would be in the order of 4.8%; to China 5.8%. For the entirety of the developing world, counting some 3,669 billion inhabitants, or 75.8% of the world's population, the proportion would be 33.1%. For the entirety of the developed world, counting some 1,173 billion inhabitants, or 24.2% of the world's population, the proportion would be 66.9%.<sup>3</sup>

### Lost Illusions

The prodigious performance of the developed world does not, however, justify abandoning all clarity regarding its realizations.

Around 1968, when the optimism of the "Golden Sixties" was predominant, among the young a political, social, "Third-World," "anti-imperialist" awareness was born, or rather consolidated. However, these same young people soon discovered that they were the first victims of a society of abundance. They dreamed of full employment and the improvement of the standard of living. False prophets had told them that they ought to want everything right away, including sex. They foundered in individualism and anarchy, and every form of authority was called into question. Although the youth of today have not experienced this crisis, they still carry its wound. They wonder how one can insert himself into a society that is always in crisis; they are worried about their future and haunted by the specter of unemployment. In 1991-1992, 19.5% of the young could not find work in France; 34.4% in Spain and 13.7% in the U.S.<sup>4</sup>

Adults also give up these illusions to the degree that they experience the consequences of the actual crisis. One simple indication will illustrate the scope of this crisis. According to the 1994 report of the United Nations Development Program (PUND), 10.2% of the active population of France was unemployed; in the U.S. 7.3%; in Italy 10.5%; in Spain 18.1%.<sup>5</sup>

There is also sad evidence that the wealthiest countries fail to reduce the pockets of poverty in which sometimes a significant proportion of the population stagnates.<sup>6</sup> Abbe Pierre frequently reminds us of this.

With reason, then, one draws our attention to the problems of the Fourth-World, in which are found all those who remain on the edge of the circulation of production and consumption, social legislation, organization of mutual assistance, etc. Along the same lines, one can point out the persistence of a rate of illiteracy which the mentally handicapped and others do not suffice to explain.

Over and above AIDS, three new problems cry for attention since 1968.

The first is *terrorism*. Sometimes it is seen as a means of seizing power; sometimes it is envisaged as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the authorities. It is either "revolutionary" or "reformist." In any case, it hurts the innocent and by means of it violence prevails over law.

The second is *drugs*. They have a double malice: on the one hand, they alter and degrade the personality of those who use them; on the other hand, they are a powerful factor of social dissolution. Drugs are one of the most formidable elements responsible for the dismantlement of the family; they are also, more generally, one of the most powerful agents destructive of human society. Here the wealthiest societies allow themselves to be trapped. The problem of drugs is, in fact, written large on the whole framework of the market; to balance the demand and the offer, it was necessary to dilute culture. Moreover, drug production must be inscribed in the general framework of specialized cultures in order to obtain the best price for their production.

Finally, it is appropriate to sound the alarm regarding the "ruining" of the environment due especially to pollution.

## Demographic Questions

The developed countries have demographic problems different from those of the

Third-World, but they are all the more grave because they are hidden by the unilateral insistence determined to denounce what they wrongheadedly call "the demographic explosion" of the Third-World. The "demographic decline" of the developed countries is then thinly veiled.<sup>7</sup>

Let us point out that in 1950 15.6% of the world's population was to be found in Europe; in 1990 the proportion was about 9.4% and

we can foresee that it will be 4.9% in 2050. In North America we have respectively 6.6%, 5.2%, 3.3%; in Latin America 6.6%, 8.5%, 9.2%; in Africa 8.8%, 12.1%, 22.6%; in Asia 54.6%, 58.8%, 55.9%.<sup>8</sup>

Next let us consider a fall of the gross birth rate, that is to say, of the "annual number of live births per thousand inhabitants." In the developed countries the fall of this rate sometimes prevents the replacement of the population. In 1970 and in 1991 the gross birth rate was respectively 47 and 44 in sub-Saharan Africa; 49 and 47 in Zambia; 56 and 47 in Malawi; 52 and 40 in Rwanda; 53 and 37 in Kenya; 46 and 36 in Bolivia; 51 and 43 in Nigeria; 43 and 29 in Ecuador; 21 and 17 in Brazil; 35 and 24 in Mexico. In the industrialized countries the situation was the following: 20 and 10 in Spain; 15 and 12 in Belgium; 17 and 15 in Canada; 16 and 14 Great Britain; 17 and 13 in France; 18 and 16 in the U.S.; 19 and 11 in Japan; 14 and 10 in the Federal German Republic.<sup>9</sup>

Between 1960 and 1992 the evolution of the total fertility rate, that is, the median number of children per woman, is not less revealing. In Denmark it went from 2.54 to 1.76; in former Federal Germany from 2.37 to 1.30; in Great Britain from 2.72 to 1.79; in Belgium from 2.56 to 1.56; in France from 2.73 to 1.73; in Italy from 2.41 to 1.25; in Spain from 2.86 to 1.23.<sup>10</sup> Now, taking into account the actual death rate, one normally needs a rate of 2.1 to replace the population and to keep the pyramid of age balanced.

Let us observe also the impressive differences in the proportion of young people according to regions. According to the *World Population Data Sheet 1995*, 32% of the world's population is younger than 15; in the rich countries, this proportion is 20%; in the poor countries it is 38%. It is 45% in Africa; 34% in Latin America; 33% in Asia; 22% in the U.S. and 20% in Europe. According to the same source, 6% of the world's population is 65 years old; in the rich countries this proportion is 13%; in the poor 4%; it is 3% in Africa; 5% in Latin America; 5% in Asia; 13% in the U.S. and 13% in Europe.<sup>11</sup>

No less suggestive is the study of the *projected increase of population*.<sup>12</sup> This study leads the World Bank to make the estimates listed in Table 3.



**TABLE 3<sup>13</sup>**  
*Increase of Population*

Region	Population (by million of inhabitants)		
	1995	2010	2025
<b>Countries with Low Revenue</b>			
<u>Africa</u>	719	1,056	1,431
Burundi	6	9	14
Egypt	58	73	86
Ethiopia	57	92	140
Malawi	9	15	21
Morocco	28	36	43
Nigeria	111	164	217
Uganda	19	30	45
<u>Latin America</u>	475	585	686
Brazil	161	194	224
Mexico	90	114	136
<u>Asia</u>	3,443	4,194	4,860
China	1,199	1,348	1,471
India	934	1,170	1,370
Indonesia	193	231	265
Pakistan	130	187	243
<b>Countries with High Revenue</b>			
Canada	28	32	35
U.S.A.	263	297	323
<u>Europe</u>	731	742	744
Germany	81	79	75
Belgium	10	10	10
France	58	61	62
Great Britain	58	60	61
Switzerland	7	7	7

Increased life expectancy, due to various factors, has modified the *proportion of aged persons* in developed societies.<sup>14</sup> The increased life expectancy raises two types of problems.

Insertion of aged persons into their natural milieu, especially the family, is often problematic. In families, aged persons are often perceived as obstacles to the professional realization of its members who are of work age. They are put in institutions, something that entails separation from their families.

Some responsible policy-makers have, moreover, raised the question of the cost of aged persons in developed societies. Put in another way, the question is whether maintaining the elderly alive is profitable for society, or whether "economic imperatives" recommend turning to euthanasia.<sup>15</sup>

Industrialized countries have a number of problems due to *migration*.<sup>16</sup> During the years of prosperity, the industrialized countries imported from poor countries, and sometimes from their former colonies, docile but little qualified laborers. Little was done to avoid setting these immigrants apart and thus giving rise to a caste of "descendants of immigrants." Little was done to integrate these men and women as full citizens. Whence it results that the crisis of which we have just spoken entailed among the immigrants an unemployment due to which they are particularly destitute.

This unemployment, of which the indigenous are also victims, has aroused among them an animosity that is frequently colored with a barely veiled racism. Frequently immigrant workers are treated in a humiliating manner or even sent home, although they have been established in the industrialized countries for a long time and their children have been educated there.

By reason of their very special living situation, immigrants are not only hesitant about integration, but they affirm their cultural and religious difference. In turn, this difference is accentuated by the ghetto phenomenon.

However, a new problem sharply emerges. Whether, for example, in the U.S.A. with the Latin Americans, or in Russia with the Moslems from Asia, or in western Europe with the immigrants from the Maghreb, we see a *great difference in the birth rates and in the total fertility rate*. Although these rates bend and sometimes collapse among the various nations, they remain comparatively high among the immigrants. The latter are poor and often more motivated than the nations in which they reside. Everything leads us to believe that little by little they will occupy the influential positions in the industrialized countries. Moreover, once the towns become under-inhabited and the factories are worked below their capacity, due to lack of workers or the market, we must expect that the immigrants of yesterday will attract their compatriots. No rule, no law, no manner of intimidation will manage to restrain the pressure of this young population of foreign origin, nor prevent it from occupying the places left empty by the fall of the birth rate among the indigenous population. This gives rise to the need to reconsider the *right of communication* and the *universal destination* of material goods.

## Erosion of the Meaning of Personhood

The breakthrough of biotechnologies have raised new problems on which we have already lightly touched above regarding euthanasia. By reason of their effect on human society, these problems must also be considered from the viewpoint of social morality. They hinge on a couple of points.

The unconditional respect for every human being from conception to death-it is the idea of *universality* which is in question here. Despite the *Declaration on the Universal Rights of Man* (1948), despite the *Declaration of the Rights of the Child* (1959), despite *Recommendation 874* of the European Council in 1979, despite all the converging conquests of philosophy, of law and of science, we are forced to acknowledge that before the primordial right to life all human beings are far from being equal.<sup>17</sup>

Throughout the period we are considering, abortion has been liberalized in practically every western country. According to official statistics, here are some examples showing the ratio of the number of abortions to births in many countries of the European community. According to the data relative to 1990, there were in France 22.4 legal abortion to 100 live births, the number of abortions rising to 170,428; in Italy 28.4% and 161,386; in Holland 9.3% and 18,384; in England 24.7% and 197,104; in Denmark 32.5% and 20,589; in Spain 9.3% and 37,231; in Greece 9.9% and 10,145.<sup>18</sup> For these European countries alone, that gives us for 1990 a total of 615,267 declared legal abortions. A more detailed study of Italy reveals that in 1984 for every 1,000 live births there were 605.9 abortions in the Piedmont, 644.6 in Val d'Aosta, 670 in Liguria and 757.8 in Emilia-Romagna.<sup>19</sup>

On November 20, 1989, the United Nations unanimously adopted the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*. After long discussions, citing the *Declaration of the Rights of the Child* of 1959, the Preamble happily retained the idea that juridical as well as non-juridical protection is necessary for the child before and after birth. It remains to be seen if all the nations are going to ratify this convention and whether it will remain a dead letter.<sup>20</sup>

In any case, following the campaigns to liberalize abortion, in a similar fashion, maneuvers were begun to legalize euthanasia. Practicing it in defiance and leaving the authorities dumbfounded, the fact ended in introducing a change of law. Thus it appears from the studies of Dr. Philippe Schepens that Holland has in this regard the lugubrious privilege of being the pioneer but it wasn't isolated.<sup>21</sup>

The *separation* of the two traditional ends of marriage (and not only Christian marriage), the happiness of the spouses and the procreation of children, is heavy with formidable consequences.<sup>22</sup> It opens the door to the break-up of the family and to the introduction of a third element into the most intimate interpersonal relationship. The *totally effective control* of parents over their progeny (e.g., the choice of gender) anticipates the totally effective control of society over parents.

Finally, in our opinion, the major problem that summarizes all the others is the *erosion of all sense of the human person*. Erosion of the meaning of person, as a being for relationship, open to the other, as a substantial unity of body and soul, which is not merely a psychic matter but a spiritual reality.

Hence, we will, in the third part of this work, explain this reduction of the person to the condition of a simple individual; this refusal to consider man as anything more than a body with a mind is the perverse trend that the "developed" countries are exporting to the Third-World.

In this regard, we can speak, as it were, of a Manichaeian double dissociation of body and mind from the human person in his spiritual dimension. It is not so much the body that is made foreign to the soul, or the soul detached from the body, but both the soul and body are detached from the mind. This double cleavage points up the essential alienation of man; it makes the body and mind the locales of total amorality.

If the body is considered independently of personality, one can do what he wishes. The practices contemplated will be morally indifferent, or, what amounts to the same thing, they will obey a situation ethics. Whence the confusion between love and pleasure, the practice of sterilization, abortion, total experimentation, "cannibalization" of bodies in view of the "savage" removal and grafting of organs without the consent of the victims; whence the procreative fury, on the one hand, and "liberating" euthanasia, on the other.

If the soul, the mind, are considered independently of personality, why not allow indoctrination, programming-reprogramming, depersonalization through the use of drugs or psychiatry?

Thus torn apart in his depths, depersonalized man is no longer capable of a relationship promoting humanity with another person. He is *totally* alienated.

<sup>1</sup> According to J. C. Chesnais, *La revanche*, 193.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 187, my emphasis.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 188.

<sup>4</sup> According to PUND, *Rapport mondial sur le développement humain* 1991, Table 36, 202.

<sup>5</sup> According to the *Human Development Report* 1994, published by PUND, Table 29, 185.

<sup>6</sup> *Le dossier de l'Europe*, n. 4/87, published in Brussels in February 1987 by the Commission des Communautés Européennes; its title is *La communauté lutte contre la pauvreté*.

<sup>7</sup> Regarding "the demographic decline in Europe," see the dossier published by Guy Herzlich in *le Monde* (economy) of April 25, 1989. The same author published two other articles concerning our question: "La France féconde mais vieillissante," Nov. 12, 1988; "L'Obsession démographique," May 17, 1990. One should also see Alfred Sauvy, *L'Europe submergée. Sud-Nord dans 30 ans* (Paris: Bordas, 1987). See Gérard-François Dumont about the "great demographic changes," *Le monde et les hommes* (Paris: Létéec, 1995).

<sup>8</sup> According to the UN, *Long-range World Population Projections 1950-2150* (1992), Table 7, 24.

<sup>9</sup> World Bank, *World Development Report* 1994, Table 26, 212.

<sup>10</sup> According to EUROSTAT, *Statistiques démographiques* 1994, Table E-10, 99.

<sup>11</sup> Population Reference Bureau, *World Population Data Sheet*.

<sup>12</sup> According to *Report* 1990, Table 26, 150 ff.

<sup>13</sup> According to *World Population Projections 1994-1995* (Washington: World Bank, 1994); see Table 7, 18-21. And see our Table 3 above.

<sup>14</sup> For France see Gérard-François Dumont who, with the collaboration of Pierre Chaunu, Jean Legrand and Alfred Sauvy, published *La France ridée. Echapper à la logique de déclin* (Paris: Livre de poche, 1979); Alain Gillette, *Accueillir les personnes âgées. Archipel médico-social* (Paris: Moniteur, 1989).

<sup>15</sup> The problem of abortion is euphemistically called "sorrowful"; that of euthanasia is qualified as "delicate." On this problem see the stunning reflections of Jacques Attali, "la médecine en accusation," in Michel Salomon (ed.), *L'avenir de la vie* (Paris: Seghers, 1981) 263-279. On the same problem Philippe Schepens, general secretary of the World Federation of Doctors Who Respect Life, composed two well documented dossiers concerning above all, but not solely, euthanasia: "L'euthanasie en Hollande." These dossiers were published in *News Exchange* n. 97 (Oct. 1987) and n. 99 (April 1988). These publications are available in both French and English.

<sup>16</sup> *Le dossier de l'Europe* n. 13/85, published in Brussels in August-September 1987 by the Commission des Communautés Européennes, concerns the immigrants in the European community.

<sup>17</sup> On this subject see Alfred Sauvy, *Coût et valeur de la vie humaine* (Paris: Hermann, 1978).

<sup>18</sup> According to EUROSTAT, *Statistiques démographiques* 1994, Table E-16 and E-17 101.

<sup>19</sup> According to Franco Angeli, *XX Rapporti/1986 sulla situazione sociale del paese predisposto dal CENSIS col patricinio del CNEL* (Rome, 1987) Table 8, 318.

<sup>20</sup> This convention was supposed to have been signed by January 1996. One will find more details in our work, *L'avortement enjeux politiques*, 27 and 51-52 (in the first edition, 1990). In *Le Monde Diplomatique* n. 413 (August 1988) 21 to 23, Claire Brisset assembled a dossier devoted to "wrecked childhood."

<sup>21</sup> See note 15 above.

<sup>22</sup> We analyze these problems in *Power Over Life Leads to Domination of Mankind* (St. Louis: Central Bureau, CCVA, 1996). See also Jacques Testart (ed.) *Le magasin des enfants* (Paris: Bourin, 1990).

## CHAPTER III

# COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

Despite the evolution of the countries in the East and despite the Gulf War, the world continues to be marked by two cleavages that have a direct influence on the development of nations. The first cleavage, that of East and West, is relatively well known; we will limit ourselves, therefore, to reviewing it rapidly in this chapter. In spite of the collapse of the communist regimes, this review is indispensable for understanding what is happening now. The second cleavage, that between North and South, we will study in the next chapter.

### **Freedom Under Surveillance**

In the European communist world, 1968 constitutes a landmark. The "Springtime of Prague" gave Brezhnev an opportunity to explain the doctrine called "limited sovereignty," which is nothing but an embodiment of the Leninist doctrine of "communism in only one country." Armed with this doctrine, Moscow proceeded to what one called, by way of euphemism or irony, "normalization." We know, however, that things did not delay in moving.

In Poland, the "Solidarist" movement began to organize in 1980. As was to be expected, it too ran up against the "normalizers." But it illustrates above all the surprising effectiveness of Catholic social teaching, even in particularly delicate situations.

In the USSR, Gorbachev gave birth to a new climate justifying real hope. The demonstrations, even the riots that occurred in various regions, heralded some of the difficulties to be encountered by the ruling group. The new legislation about religion, adopted in 1990, indicated a clear relaxation of the pressures brought to bear on believers.

We can make similar observations regarding China, which seems to have eliminated the Maoist heritage in part. The protest movements organized in 1987-1988 by students in Shanghai, Peiping and Canton deserve to be studied with great attention. Besides, we know that China conducts a policy of coercive control of birth and toward this end does not hesitate to have recourse to merciless methods.

In a general way, the credibility of the Marxist model of development is in *full collapse* everywhere. Among the reasons that explain this fact, we should keep in mind the failure of the Soviet regime to offer a better standard of living to its population; this failure is the reverse side of the militarization of industry and the economy. Now we know better the nature and scope internal repression took. And finally there were the direct (Afghanistan) or indirect (Africa and Nicaragua) interventions in other countries.

Wherever a communist regime had been established, it ended with *basic problems* that are well known: hegemony of the communist party, totalitarian ideology, the transcendence of the State over its citizens, degradation of the feminine condition, scorn for human rights, and notably the right of free communication, as well as the right to religious freedom. We will return at length to these problems.

### The East-West Cleavage

Despite obvious attempts at dialogue and collaboration, the East-West cleavage constituted a *major obstacle* to the development of nations. It diverted resources which, rather than being used for development, were employed in an unbridled armaments race. If a country of bloc A wished to assist a Third-World country, that was enough for the countries of bloc B to consider themselves dispensed from giving any aid. The recent evolution of the international situation has further brought to light the fact that *disarmament* costs, in certain cases, more than the production of weapons.

Nonetheless, it was incorrect for countries of the East to claim no responsibility for the underdevelopment of the Third-World by reason of the fact, as they boldly say, that the USSR had no colonial past. The obligation to assist these countries is not based only, or even principally, on the duty of repairing the injustices of colonization.

The industrialized countries of both East and West have exported their ideologies and their conflict to the Third-World. And from that there resulted a number of *civil or fratricidal wars* which partially survived the East-West rapprochement. A few examples will suffice: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua — to say nothing of Serbia, Cuba, Vietnam or South Africa.

<sup>1</sup> On the crisis of nationalities and its origins, see the works of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, in particular *Le grand défi* (Paris: Flammarion, 1987); *La gloire des nations* (Paris: Flammarion, 1990). A real reference work was written by Romain Yakemtchouk, *Les républiques baltes et la crise du fédéralisme soviétique* (Brussels: Institut Royal des Relations Internationales, 1991). On Gorbachev, see Jacques Baynac, *La révolution gorbatchévienne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Francine du Plessis-Gray, *Les oubliées de la Perestroïka* (Paris: Presses de la Renaissance, 1990). See also the work of Mikhael Stern, *La vie sexuelle en URSS* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979).

<sup>3</sup> From among the abundant publications devoted to Gorbachev, let us point out only Virginie Coulloudon, *Génération Gorbatchev* (Paris: Lattès, 1989).



## CHAPTER IV

# RELATIONSHIP AMONG COUNTRIES UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

### **“Two Blocs” and Imperialism**

The nineteenth century has seen the emergence, in both facts and awareness, of the “social question” within industrial societies: the inequalities among rich and poor has taken on the proportions of a scandal. The twentieth century marks the emerging in both facts and awareness, of the global “social question”: the inequalities among rich and poor countries have taken on the dimensions of a scandal. In fact, if nothing can justify by right some men being kept in sub-human conditions, nothing can justify that for nations either. A fundamental inequality among nations as well as among individuals must be recognized. Now it is patent that each of the two blocs practiced different forms of imperialism and neo-colonialism. And thereby these blocs contributed to maintaining countries under development in a precarious situation. Despite the clear generosity of those who contributed toward it, international aid is, very often, but a “leaf from the vine” camouflaging the interplay of interests — as we can see in the Middle East.

It is, therefore, urgent that the rich nations become aware of their moral responsibility. Negatively, on the one hand, the moral responsibility of the rich nations is involved in the desolate situation in which the Third-World finds itself. Positively, on the other hand, the moral responsibility of the rich nations is committed to the future of destitute nations. To honor this double responsibility implies particularly that rich nations work without delay toward the establish-

ment of a true political and juridical international order endowed with effective instruments of action.

The moral responsibility of the rich nations is involved in a particularly sharp fashion in the area of commercial and economic relations, as well as in the field of armaments. However technically complex this last item may be, we must recognize that investment in weaponry would find a better use in various area on which development depends.

### **Interdependence and Solidarity**

Along the same lines, it becomes more and more imperative to rediscover and value, on both the international and interindividual levels, the idea of *solidarity* together with its classic corollaries: natural sociability of man, right of communication, limits and sense of the right to property, the common good, the universal destination of goods. The priority of genuine emergencies, therefore the poor. Besides, solidarity is a concern to which our contemporaries are especially sensitive. It has become more and more usual to affirm that for the realization of greater fairness among nations unequally developed, it is necessary to establish a relationship of sharing among them. But this theme must itself be founded on that of *interdependence*.

Development will not be authentic or lasting unless each one receives his share — this for solidarity — and each lends his support on the material, cultural or simply human level — this for interdependence. We have a common task: we must aid each other and exercise solidarity; whatever each does has implications for all the others; we all need each other and must welcome this interdependence, not merely submit to it.

Here again a moral call goes out. It is not only a question of recognizing the other in alleviating his poverty; it is also a matter of recognizing him still more fully in his own richness, or recognizing him by being willing to receive what he has to offer.

### **From the East-West Cleavage to the North-South Cleavage**

Since the 1960s, paralleling the growth of the sentiments of interdependence and solidarity, we have also beheld a shifting of accent in this matter of dominant cleavage. Little by little the North-South cleavage became more important than the East-West cleavage.

We can follow John Paul II as he invites us to “understand better the contrasts existing in the northern part of the world, that is, the

East and West, as cause, and not the last, of the retardation or stagnation of the South." In fact, the opposition "between two *conceptions* of development even of men and nations" which we find, in the North, between East and West, is also transferred to the South among countries under development, "and this contributes to widening the gap already existing on the economic level between *the North* and *the South* and which is a consequence of the distance separating the two more developed worlds and those less developed."<sup>1</sup>

Prisoners of the situation inherited from the Second World War, the two blocs are at once on the defensive, worried about their security, and on the offensive, tempted by imperialism. The methods employed are different, but on this point their mentalities tend to converge. "Each of the two blocs deeply harbors in its own way a tendency towards imperialism. It is this abnormal situation, the result of a war and of an unacceptably exaggerated concern for security, which deadens the impulse towards united cooperation."<sup>2</sup>

"Seen in this way, the present division of the world is a *direct obstacle* to the real transformation of the conditions of underdevelopment in the developing countries."<sup>3</sup> Once again we are just following the words of the Pope.

### **The Bad Distribution of the Gross National Product**

Poverty doesn't have only shortage as its cause, but the bad distribution of revenues, and more precisely their concentration in the hands of a minority.

In order to illustrate and confirm the inequalities existing in the world of today, we are going to refer to the data provided by World Bank. We will consider only the richest group of countries (I), the poorest group (II) and the intermediary group (III). The bad distribution of the gross national product (GNP), that is so obvious, manifests the "violence of the structures," whose necessity we must reject. Let us recall also that by GNP we mean the value of the total ensemble of goods and services produced by a country during a given year. If we subtracted the costs from the GNP, we would have the net national product, something more difficult to calculate.

**TABLE 4<sup>a</sup>**  
*Distribution of the GNP*

	Number of Countries (a)	Number of Inhabitants	% of Subtotal	Total GNP (b)	% of Subtotal	GNP per Inhabitant (c)
I. The Richest Group	23	828	15.2	18,348	79.3	22,160
II. The Poorest Group	42	3,191	58.7	1,244	5.4	390
III. The Intermediary Group	67	1,419	26.1	3,533	15.3	2,490
Total	132	5,438	100	23,125	100	25,040

(a) in millions

(b) in millions

(c) in U.S. \$

We can also mention data published in 1988 by the Union of Swiss banks.<sup>5</sup> This concerns prices, salaries and purchasing power.

**TABLE 5**  
*Prices, Salaries and Purchasing Power*

	Prices without Interest Rate	Gross Salaries	Gross Purchasing Power	Prices for Food	Service Commodity
Zurich	100	100	100	100	100
Bogota	47.3	9.7	20.5	34.5	47.3
Bombay	43.0	4.1	9.6	32.2	4.3
Brussels	73.0	67.3	92.2	59.7	73.0
Caracas	53.9	14.8	27.4	29.4	53.9
Frankfurt	76.1	72.7	95.5	63.8	76.1
Lagos	52.9	3.0	5.7	60.2	52.9
London	80.2	57.9	72.2	53.9	80.2
Madrid	77.3	28.7	37.2	67.4	77.3
Manila	48.5	3.7	7.6	37.6	48.5
Mexico	44.0	4.4	10.1	30.4	44.0
Milan	74.5	51.8	69.5	64.0	74.5
Montreal	67.9	64.7	95.3	58.4	67.9
New York	79.9	67.9	85.0	71.7	79.9
Paris	76.2	43.9	57.6	65.4	76.2
Rio de Janeiro	43.5	7.1	16.2	30.0	43.5
São Paulo	45.5	8.0	17.6	27.9	45.5
Tokyo	158.6	67.2	42.4	187.1	158.6

## Demographic Containment

On the level of relations among developed countries and those that are developing, some other facts recently drew the attention of political scientists and moralists. Anxiety over the number of people appears at the top of the list.

### *Anxiety over the Number of People*

Some publications, often more sensational than convincing, alert public opinion to the threatening shortage of energy and raw materials as well as the "demographic explosion."

The demographic growth of the Third-World is, they say in substance, the obstacle par excellence to its development; it is also perceived as the major danger hanging over the developed countries, whose populations are getting old and whose birth rates are very low; in fact it is regarded as a "menace to the environment."

It is not certain that it was with a touch of British humor that the Duke of Edinburgh himself wrote: "For some twenty-five years now I've been noticing that, while the improvement of the chances of human survival owe much to the honor of specialists in science and technology, the explosion of the human population which has resulted from it has become the radical cause of the deterioration of the natural environment, and that this explosion is responsible for the extinction of wild species of plants and animals." His Highness hastens to recommend demographic restriction, particularly among the poor. "The difficulty, in effect, rests on the fact that the countries which have the greatest need to face this problem are normally the less financially endowed."<sup>6</sup>

It is in within this context that world campaigns have been undertaken at great expense to curb the birth rate. These campaigns are practically always conducted with the consent or complicity of the Third-World governments.<sup>7</sup> They benefit from resources and means without precedent, provided by national and international organizations, public and private.

From 1952 to 1991, the capitals determined to reduce demographic growth around the world are ever on the increase. Here are some of the sources, with the sums they've spent on this project expressed in millions of U.S. dollars.<sup>8</sup>

**TABLE 6**  
*Financial Sources for Demographic Containment*

Source	Amount for 1991 (millions of U.S. \$)
Developed Countries	
Australia	5,282
Austria	0,425
Belgium	5,971
Canada	28,887
Denmark	24,164
Finland	25,555
France	2,119
Germany	75,716
Italy	1,587
Japan	63,074
Holland	39,550
New Zealand	0,429
Norway	53,562
Sweden	42,233
Switzerland	6,771
Great Britain	46,680
United States	352,371
Total for Developed Countries	774,400
Private Organizations	
Rockefeller Foundation	11,4
MacArthur Foundation	9,12
Population Council	7,6
Others	47,9
Agencies of the UN other than United Nations' Fund for Population	101,5
World Bank (aid via loans)	354
Grand Total	1,305,9
Source	Total 1952-1991 (million in constant 1991 US\$)
Developed Countries	8,194,4
Agencies of the UN other than FUNPA	454,1
Private Organizations	1,070,8
World Bank (aid via loans)	1,404,4
Total	11,123,7

In the United States, the money comes in great part from taxation, and its allocation is organized by AID (Agency for International Development of the State Department). AID sends this aid either directly to the beneficiaries, or to international organizations, or to non-governmental organizations very active in the Third-World.

The Population Crisis Committee draws up two tables showing without equivocation the budgets devoted by AID (in millions of US\$) to demographic containment. From them we take the following examples:<sup>9</sup>

**TABLE 7**  
*Budget of the Different Programs of Aid's  
Central Bureau for Population  
Estimates for 1991*

Divisions	Budget in Millions US \$
Demographic Policies	
Demographic and health studies	5.2
Initiatives in demographic policy	3.3
Demographic statistics	5.1
Evaluation of new projects	2.0
Research	
Population Council: Development of contraceptives	5.6
Strategies for improving maternity	7.9
Natural family planning	2.3
International family health	8.4
Research/development of contraceptives	4.2
Information and Training	23.3
Family planning services	
Association for voluntary surgical contraception	13
Pathfinder International	8.6
Others	36.1
Provisioning and support of programs	
Providing contraceptives	19.9
Logistics	6.4
Others	11.2
Total	162.5

Our second example indicates the destination and the volume of the funds allocated by AID to the programs relative to population.

**TABLE 8**  
*AID Allocations*  
*Funds for Population Control*  
*Allocated by AID, 1965-1991*  
 (millions in US\$)

	1965-70	1971-75	1976-80	1981-85	1986-90	1991 Estimate
AID Office of Population/Other Central Programs	\$57.0	257.1	432.1	512.2	623.7	162.9
Africa Bureau	3.3	31.6	20.4	70.7	188.6	69.3
Population Acct.	3.3	31.6	20.4	54.1	63.2	-
Development Fund for Africa/Sahel						
Development Fund	-	-	-	15.3	125.4	69.3
Economic Support Funds (primarily for Egypt & Pakistan)	-	-	-	1.3	-	-
Asia/Near East Bureau (s)	64.3	129.7	206.3	437.3	380.2	70.0
Population Acct.	64.3	129.7	179.8	329.1	270.8	38.9
Economic Support Funds	-	-	26.5	108.2	109.4	31.1
Latin American & Caribbean Bureau	33.6	58.6	34.2	78.4	134.6	20.3
U.S. Contribution to UN Population Fund	7.0	90.0	139.4	176.5	-	-
Total	165.2	567.0	832.4	1,271.1	1,327.1	322.5

Particularly interesting, to conclude, is the report published in 1993 by Population Action International.<sup>10</sup> This report contains a credit list congratulating those countries that contributed the most to population control; it also presents a black list of the ones that could have "done better." Nevertheless, the principal interest of this publication lies in the very explicit declarations found in it. One will be able to judge from some samples: "the U.S. Congress is the only one to include the amount for population aid in the budget for external aid" (14). "A handful of countries furnish almost all the assistance in population matters" (19). "In 1991, ten countries contributed up to 96% of the total assistance in population matters" (10). "With the exception of the funds furnished by the U.S., 60% of the contribution given for population had been routed through the UN in 1990" (21). "The World Bank was able to attract gifts of money for population by developing big projects suitable for financing derived from multiple donors" (23). "A reinforcing of the Fund of the United Nations for



Population (FUNAP) and of International Planned Parenthood (IPPF) would create the confidence which donors need to increase their donations" (25). "Both the FUNAP and the World Bank could enlarge their roles by increasing the request for assistance in population matters which countries address to donors" (26).

### The Security of the Wealthy is Threatened?

The growth of developing countries is perceived as a menace to the security of developed countries.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, an open confrontation between these two worlds is considered inopportune. To face the "danger" coming from the Third-World, developed countries prefer to appeal to the idea of the rights of man which is well received. Developed countries will, therefore, offer to collaborate in the promotion of the Third-World, *on condition* that their development will take place under the control and in dependence on the former.

This position, inspired by neo-liberalism, involves various corollaries. Let us point out just one: the developed countries will resort to *protectionism* and "bilateralism": they will carefully screen imports coming from the agriculture and the industrial parks of the Third-World.

The problem of *surplus*, and therefore of superfluity, becomes more and more worrisome. The fact that some people continue to go hungry while others waste their food surplus or don't know what to do with it cries to heaven for vengeance. But the problem of surplus goes beyond farming and food questions. It raises the more fundamental problem of sharing in knowledge and technique and come all the way around again to *the* fundamental question of the universal destination of the goods of the earth.

In 1985, Canada had a surplus production of meat; Europe of the Twelve and Japan, butter; Europe, vegetables, Europe, the U.S. and Canada, cereals.<sup>12</sup>

During the "golden sixties," optimism was appropriate. Progress was on the march. The resources of technology little by little resolved all the problems, including those in countries recently decolonized. But since then, one often remarked that colonization survived the acquisition of independence or its consolidation.<sup>13</sup> In fact, there where political independence was acquired, there where states enjoyed a formal sovereignty, new forms of domination appeared.

As we have indicated above, the technologies exported to the Third-World by the developed countries are strictly controlled. Their

use in the Third-World consolidates, on the technological plane, a dependence which, besides, is already verified.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, since the poorly qualified manual labor of the Third-World is relatively cheap, it is easy to put competition to work among the various countries. To that should be added the fact that certain processing industries are exported to the Third-World due to the pollution which is considered inadmissible at home.

The bourgeoisie of developing countries find themselves in a situation of ambiguity that arises often. Certainly they are interested in the development of their own nation; they are also involved with the countries that buy raw materials and furnish goods and services. Already exposed to internal corruption, they also share in it on the international level.<sup>15</sup>

These same bourgeoisie are the privileged target of all the machinery of ideological colonization and cultural alienation. The "elite" are affected in their ability to judge and decide, and, deprived of their autonomy, they are taken over by external centers of decision making, for which they become the relay.

Furthermore, the problem of the computer merits special attention. The computer opens up to humanity unheard of potential on the level of living together well. Its proper usage can hasten the dissemination of basic information. It can contribute toward relieving men of mechanical and dull labor processes; it can promote better government of human society.

Yet for a long time we know that technological progress often masks a will to power which men do not dare own up to. The sudden development of the computer is going to upset the relations among developing countries by accentuating existing inequalities.

It also disrupts the relations between developing countries and those already developed. In fact, by its complexity and the limitless range of applications but above all, by the cumulative dynamism it unleashes, the computer is going to widen still more the distance between developed and developing countries, more so than all the great prior discoveries have done. Some new possibilities, absolutely unheard of, spring up in the most diversified kinds of application. Including the military; problems of *productivity* are going to be profoundly disrupted, the same goes for the management of resources, equipment and men.

In conclusion, then, let us state that societies that hold on to the power of the computer will consolidate and, and above all, tighten the grip they already hold over the rest of the world.

- <sup>1</sup> Cf. the encyclical *On Social Concerns*, 22, 21.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* To illustrate his teaching on solidarity, John Paul II addresses the problem of the debt (19, 24, 43), to which the Pontifical Council Justice and Peace devoted a remarkable document, cf. *At the Service of the Human Community: An Ethical Approach to the International Debt*, January 27, 1986. See also the excellent dossier of François Jean, *La dette. Catastrophe ou change?* (Paris: Economica, 1987). On the development of international sensitivity regarding the debt, see the dossier "La stratégie du développement. Un réalisme à risque," *le Monde* (April 4, 1989) 99 ff. See also the *Report 1988*, Table 16, 286 ff.
- <sup>3</sup> Cf. *On Social Concerns*, 22. These problems are taken up again in the encyclical *Centesimus Annus*, 16-18, 35.
- <sup>4</sup> According to the *World Development Report 1994* published in Washington, D.C., by the World Bank. See Table I, 162 f, which can be completed by Table Ia, 228.
- <sup>5</sup> See Union of Swiss Banks, department of economic policy: *Prix et salaires dans le monde. Comparaison internationale et pouvoir d'achat*, publication n.108 in the Union's series of studies on economic, banking and monetary questions (Zürich 1988). We quote from the data taken from Tables appearing on 4, 5, 7, 9, 12.
- <sup>6</sup> See Duke of Edinburgh, "Population Crisis," *The New Road* (London), n.16, Oct-Dec. 1990, 1 ff. The same issue contains an article of Jacqueline Sawyer, "The Population Explosion," 4 ff.
- <sup>7</sup> By way of example let us cite the article of Jacques Vallin, "Démographie. Maîtriser la croissance," *Jeune Afrique* n.1457 of Dec. 7 1988, 57 f.
- <sup>8</sup> According to FUNPA, *Global Population Assistance Report 1982-1991*, Table 2, 10 et figure 4, 13. See also Julian L. Simon, *L'homme, notre dernière chance. Croissance démographique, ressources naturelles et niveau de vie* (Paris: PUF, 1985) Table 21, 317. He himself directs the reader to Lois E. Bradshaw and Cynthia P. Green, "A Guide to Sources of Family Planning Program Assistance," *Population Reports*, March 1977, series J. 272-278. Simon has also published *Population Matters* (New York: Transaction Publishers, 1990).
- <sup>9</sup> Tables 7 and 8 come from the same source: *U.S. Population Assistance: Issues for the 1990s* (Washington: Population Crisis Committee, 1991). Our Table 7 was arrived at on the basis of Annex 3 appearing on 48, while our Table 8 reproduces Table 3 from 20 of this same publication.
- <sup>10</sup> See *Global Population Assistance. A Report Card on the Major Donor Countries*, edited by Population Action International (previously called Population Crisis Committee) Washington, 1993.
- <sup>11</sup> This thesis is widespread among Western circles, especially the Anglo-Saxons. For example, it is expressed with tranquil cynicism by Stephen D. Mumford and Elton Kessel, "Role of Abortion in Control of Global Population Growth, in the *Termination of Pregnancy* issue of the review *Clinics in Obstetrics and Gynaecology*, vol. XIII, 1 (March 1986) 19-31. This study, one should be clear, was in part sponsored by the Center for Research on Population and Security, Research Triangle Park, North Carolina. Mumford had previously published a particularly interesting work, *American Democracy and the Vatican: Population Growth and National Security* (Amherst, NY: The Humanist Press, 1984). Cf. *Infra*, note 28 of Ch. 5 of this work.
- <sup>12</sup> According to the *Diagrammes*, 20. One can also refer to *l'Eurobaromètre*, special "Agriculture," on *Les Européens et leur agriculture*, a résumé published in February 1988 by the Commission of European Communities (Brussels) See especially 3 and 5, as well as the annex 3, 3, devoted to attitudes about surpluses. Two of the best works on the question are due to J. P. Charvet, *Le désordre alimentaire mondial. Surplus et pénuries* (Paris: Hatier, 1987) and *La guerre du blé. Bases et stratégies des grands exportateurs* (Paris: Economica, 1988).
- <sup>13</sup> See the classic work of Eduardo Galeano, *Les veines ouvertes de l'Amérique latine* (Paris: Presses Pocket, 1991).
- <sup>14</sup> See Sidiki Diakité, *Violence technologique et développement* (Paris; Harmattan, 1985).
- <sup>15</sup> Cf. *supra*, 4 and 6 f.; and *infra* 88 f.

## CHAPTER V

# INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE STRATEGIES OF FEAR

Before concluding Part I, we are going to give more attention to four significant documents issued by prestigious international organizations: the World Bank; and three other special agencies of the United Nations: the Program of the UN for Development (PUND), the Fund of the UN for Population Activities (FUNPA) and the World Health Organization (WHO). We will add a secret document whose dissemination has only recently been authorized by the White House. Our examination will confirm and illustrate that, alongside numerous other public and private organizations, some international institutions, one of whose primary reasons for existence is to work toward development, are deeply involved, in the name of a liberal conception of the market, in world campaigns seeking to curb demographic growth in the poor countries by every means possible.

If we take into account the close ties existing among these four organizations, and, in addition, the programs conducted by other specialized institutions, we can wonder whether the entire UN isn't risking being swept along down a slippery slope. Thus the closeness of the ties among the World Health Organization, UNICEF, PUND, FUNPA — without speaking of the FAO — is such that these "specialized" institutions have a series of "common" objectives, among others access to family planning services.<sup>1</sup>

The investigation in which we are engaged has a twofold interest. On the one hand, it reveals that, within the framework of the present big international organizations, some of the most wealthy countries of the West have considerable weight on account of their economic, financial, industrial, scientific, technological and media power.

On the other hand, this examination makes one think that, by reason of this very factual situation, the decisions taken by the UN and its specialized institutions risk reflecting the options more in accord with the interests of the wealthy countries than with those of the countries receiving aid. These rich countries, so prompt to "assist" poor countries when it comes to putting a brake on their demographic growth, clearly show less zeal to aid them, for example, when it comes to improving their educational networks. It was because of a UN resolution that the military operation in the Gulf was undertaken, an operation without precedent that cost about a billion dollars a day.

The problem is that the international institutions that are out front on the worldwide plane are deeply penetrated by the spirit of liberalism. As we shall see, they even invoke this spirit to determine their demographic policies and to promote the corresponding campaigns.

We will have the opportunity to examine the problems caused by these practices. We will limit ourselves here to presenting critically four typical reports before starting Part II.

## **Two Reports of the World Bank**

### *A Glance at a Boxed Bulletin*

We begin by introducing here, without any commentary, a reproduction of a boxed bulletin appearing on 102 of the *Report 1990* of the World Bank published in Washington, D.C.

## BULLETIN 5.6

### Buffaloes of Family Planning and Vasectomy Festivals in Thailand

Thailand is the theater of one of the most successful and effective family planning programs in the world. The media, economic incentive and community participation are made to work toward increasing the use of contraceptives.

The original initiative, thought up by Thailand, underlines the immediate practical advantages of a drop in fecundity and uses methods combining humor and boldness. The organization of the program is ensured by a Non-Governmental Organization, the Association for population and Community Development (PDA), with the support of the Ministry of Public Health.

The community services of family planning (CBFPS), a program of PDA, had been started in 1974 and now reach more than 17 million people, or a third of the country's population. The key message is that population growth and a low standard of living, on the one hand, and family planning and economic advantages, on the other, are linked. To get this message across, it is necessary to break the taboos that surround birth control. Carnivals of birth control, contests of inflating condoms, lotteries, bazaars and weddings have served as opportunities to promote family planning with fun.

Vasectomy races take place on labor day and the king's birthday. In 1983, a team of 40 doctors and 80 nurses accomplished a record number of 1,190 vasectomies on the feast day. The PDA also promises free, easy and effective vasectomies in its dispensaries and mobile units. From July 1980 to June 1984, 25,412 vasectomies were thus performed.

Households that commit themselves to practicing family planning can also rent buffaloes for half the usual price to work their fields — buffaloes of family planning, in a way. The people are encouraged to sell their produce through CBFPS at prices around 30% higher than they can obtain through ordinary channels, and to buy their fertilizer and seed at 30% less than they would pay on the regular market. A similar program proposes that villagers who practice contraception be charged lower freight for the transport of their produce to market, or suckling pigs at no charge.

In 1985, about 60% of Thai couples practiced one or other form of contraception. The synthetic index fell from 6.1 in 1965-70 to 2.8 in 1985, while the mean was 4.1 for countries of intermediate revenue in the lower bracket.

### *"The Challenge of Development"*

The *Report on Development in the World 1991*, published by the World Bank,<sup>2</sup> opens with the statement: "More than a billion human beings, or a fifth of the world's population, do not have even a dollar a day to live on — the standard of living of two hundred years ago in Western Europe and the United States . . . Nevertheless, there is no reason to despair. During the last forty years, many developing countries have progressed at an impressive rhythm . . . That said, for many countries, the result are slight, so slight that among some of them the standard of living has in fact fallen over the course of the last thirty years" (1). The problem is all the more serious in that developing countries are expanding demographically (1).

Whence the questions: Why is there such a disparity? What should developing countries do? What can the international community do?

Advanced in the Summary (1-13), these questions receive answers developed in the whole of the report. More precisely, to face up to the problematic situation in which human society finds itself, the report goes on to examine the "interaction between the state and the market." It quickly appears that the report is a plea for a market envisioned in a distinctly liberal fashion. "A consensus is in the process of forming in favor of a strategy of development in harmony with the market . . . The report indicates the complementary routes markets and governments can take to act in concert. If the markets are able to play their role, they're allowed to do so, the economy will profit, and its gains will be substantial" (2).

This market requires, as far as the world is concerned, economic integration for all and free movement: "World integration of the flow of goods, services, capital and manual labor entails . . . enormous advantages: it favors competition and efficiency and gives to all poor countries access to basic knowledge in medicine, sciences and technology" (3). In order to make this great market a possibility, answers are indispensable, and "what these answers might be . . . constitutes the body of the report" (4).

If the report acknowledges that, "taken in the broadest sense, to develop means to improve the quality of life," it "is interested principally in economic development, a notion already very broad in itself" (4). This development is based on "a human investment well conceived"; its motivating force is "the increase of productivity" (5), and it is accelerated by the international flow of goods (9). The report, then recommends to *industrialized countries* to lift commercial

restrictions" (12), to "open their markets (9); to *industrialized countries and multi-lateral organisms* to "increase their financial support," to reduce the debt (12), to "support reforms" in developing countries and to contribute toward curbing the deterioration of the environment in them" (13); and to *developing countries* to invest in the human person," to "create a climate more secure for enterprise," to "open economies to exchange and international investments," to "minimize budgetary deficits" and to "control inflation" (13).

After having thus described the great lines of an integrated world market, the report draws the necessary conclusions regarding the state and public powers. Faced with the market, the role of the state is presented in a particularly restrictive fashion. "Economic theory and practical experience lead to the conclusion that interventions [of the state] will probably have a positive effect if they go along with the direction of the market" (5 ff.). It is certainly granted that governments can be led to "supply for eventual weaknesses of the market" (5). But the role of the state will be, above all, of a juridical and institutional order. "In the determination and protection of property rights, in the establishment of the juridical, judicial and regulatory apparatus, . . . as well as in the protection of the environment, the state's action stands at the very heart of development" (5).

All in all, the ideal is that the state intervene in the market "only as the last resort. The market must be allowed to go its way, unless there is manifest advantage in having the state take action. That is notably the case when it concerns "public goods" which are generally not part of the private sector's activities, like basic education, the infrastructure, the struggle against poverty, the regulation of the population and the protection of the environment" (6). "Public goods deserve the state's attention because on them depends society's ability to be a *commercial* society.

Therefore, the state is at the service of the proper functioning of the market. It is not anticipated that the state should intervene to prevent or correct distortions. Political power is subsumed under economic power; it is secondary to it; it is not ordered toward the government of the nation — government in the old sense of "directing" and "leading." It must limit itself to being a technical organ at the service of the market, whose spontaneity is automatically considered good and must be respected. By means of these fundamental restrictions, the report considers the relationship between the state and the market from different viewpoints. We have already pointed out what was said about the security of enterprise (8), about world integration of economies (10). Nevertheless, "there is nothing more solid



upon which to base enduring human development than human investment properly conceived" (5). This human investment is fully justified: "Whether it be the action of the public sector or the private, [it] often yields extremely high economic profit" (7). "The requirements of "public goods" are such that we cannot in general leave to the market, in developing countries, the charge of securing for the people — particularly the poorest — a minimum of instruction . . . care of health, nutrition and the services of family planning" (7).

This last point receives special attention in the report. A grave difficulty risks compromising the emergence of the integrated world market and the economic growth which is its corollary. The fact is that "the developing world's part in the increase of world manual labor for the next twenty-five years will be 95% (1). The report even admits, without giving in to a feeling of catastrophe, that "in the time it takes to read the present paragraph, one hundred babies will be born — 6 in the industrial countries and 94 in the developing countries. There we have a world challenge. Whatever may be the future prospects of industrial economies, the prosperity and long-term security of the world — by the solid force of numbers — depend on development" (181).

Finally, the report suggests how economic liberalism, that animates its conception of the market, can evolve into an authoritarian, even, ultimately, totalitarian liberalism. In fact, precisely in regards to family planning, the texts envisages conflicts between the "public goods" and particular or private goods (cf. 68-71). "Fertility is the fruit of *individual* decisions — that raises the question of knowing how such decisions can come to be prejudicial to society as a whole" (68; our emphasis). "The impact of demographic increase on the cultural milieu is another source of divergence between the costs borne by society and those borne by *individuals*" (69; our emphasis). Now, these "public goods," or if one prefers, "common utility," must be the concern of the state, but as we have seen, in the final analysis, these "public goods" will be determined in function of the market; consideration of individuals and their rights being relegated to second place. We are going around in circles then: economic liberalism invoked here does not limit itself to using the state, but uses the state to subject individuals. In the two cases, this is done for the profit of the integrated world market.

Let us summarize. In practice, the World Bank thinks of development in terms of economic growth. Among numerous obstacles to this growth the increase of the population in poor countries stands out. This increase, they argue, must be restrained so that economic

growth will be possible, to protect the environment, to ensure prosperity and security on a worldwide scale. We are then justified in wondering whether the World Bank is not, as the other international institutions we are going to examine, taking part in setting up a strategy which will soon be at issue: the strategy of fear.

### *A Report of PUND on Human Development*

The second document which invites our attention is the report published in 1991 by the Program of the UN for Development (PUND).<sup>3</sup>

#### *A Mine of Information*

This report offers a mine of information concerning development, and it has made an effort to treat the data in an original way. This report has the merit of underlining the primary importance of the human factor in development. "Men, women and children must be at the center of attention, development being organized around them and not the inverse" (1).

Numerous examples and suggestions are given which show that, far from having to give in to fatalism, men can take charge of their development. "Human development is clearly possible as shown by the real progress achieved during the last three decades. To judge from basic indications such as life expectancy and teaching adults to read, development has seen some success" (1). Development depends, then, first of all on men themselves, and the report points out a liberating fact when it affirms that "very frequently it is political inertia and not lack of resources that is the real cause of lessening human life's value" (12).

#### *"Demographic debts" and other Debts*

In several places, the report brings up the problem of regulating population (e.g.: 14, 27, 29, 31, 36, 40, 61, 82). The text goes so far as to insist that "the pressure exercised by population on the rare possibilities of development and social services would continue to be felt even if the effort to regulate demographic growth becomes more rigorous." And it concludes: "Political action concerning public and private expenditures is necessary in order to meet these challenges" (5).

The plea for regulating population is less apparent here than in the FUNPA and WHO documents, which we will examine later. But it is no less present. For example, the notion of "demographic debt" arises: "Each generation should take care of its present needs, with-

out contracting debts which it cannot repay: financial indebtedness, social debts due to insufficient social investments, demographic debts due to an unregulated growth of the population and ecological debts from the fact of having exhausted natural resources" (3). As the report of the FUNPA will do, the PUND is fixed on the horizon of the year 2000 for its objectives: "The human objectives for the year 2000 . . . must embrace primary education, care of basic health and family planning for all"(12), this last qualification leaves one perplexed.

### *The Market and the "New Human Order"*

It is easy to understand why the PUND doesn't enter into very developed considerations concerning family planning: other specialized institutions have this charge. On the other hand, the report is more explicit about the market and " 'positive' liberties," or freedom "of acting" reminiscent of Adam Smith (19). Box 1.2 , dedicated to the "indicator of human liberty" (21), as well as the commentary which accompanies it (20 f.), offer us a schematic exposition of the concept of liberty such as presented by the liberal tradition.

It is this concept of liberty which inspires, in turn, the concept of the market, also entirely liberal, which we will discuss in detail following our exposition.<sup>4</sup> This liberal concept of the market provides the fundamental inspiration of the two central chapters of the report: in Chapter 5, entitled "To Conceive the Reforms" (78-86), and Chapter 6, "A New Human Order" (87-96). The theme of the "invisible hand" — so dear to Adam Smith — is taken up again on (78), where it recalls with fervor "the theory of the state more current in our day, namely that the state should favor development rather than try itself to ensure development by way of the public sector's undertakings or by directly furnishing social services" (78). Revealing a rather special perception of the realities of the Third-World, the report asserts again that "individuals are generally the best defenders of their own interests, that is, if they are permitted to exercise this role" (79; text's emphasis).

The strategy for "a new human order" also gives a good role to the liberal market. "One of the essential questions to resolve, about elaborating this strategy [of development] is the role of the market. Governments realize more and more that a certain number of activities should be left to the private sector and they should withdraw from them" (88). As for industrialized countries, they have the task of helping to stimulate world commerce and economic growth, to bring about peace and stability in the world and to protect the envi-

ronment — something that will avoid the migration of populations in search of a better economic situation" (89).

According to the report, industrialized countries are thus justified, by reason of their wealth, to serve as policeman of the world and to contain the migratory surge of the growing population of the Third-World. The new international order, which the report extols, "would recognized that we all belong to one same community living on a planet that is becoming more and more populated." And the text we've just quoted goes on to say: "*This interdependence implies more than economic ties. The dangers that threaten our environment respect no national boundaries, and poverty is the driving force hidden behind most of these dangers*" (89; our emphasis).

The magnitude of this hidden danger is, moreover, made more precise: "The demographic equilibrium of the planet is being rapidly modified. The percentage of the world population living in the South should reach 84% in 2025, while it was only 68% in 1980." And the report adds with a disarming candor: "Of all the babies born last year [1990], 93% were born in the Third-World" (91).<sup>5</sup>

In a publication that must yield to diplomatic omissions, it is impossible to be more clear and explicit. The message is crystal clear: the increasing populating of the planet, due to the demographic surge of the poor, endangers world security, which the industrialized nations need; consequently they feel justified in guaranteeing the free functioning of the market.

We will discuss in detail this typically liberal and *globalist* vision of the market. For the moment let us limit ourselves to a terse statement which seems not to have been taken sufficiently into account by the authors of the report: the drama of the poor is that they are not involved in the market; the big problem of underdevelopment is the non-existence of an authentic market . . .

### ***A Report of the FUNPA on World Population***

The third document will hold our attention longer. It concerns the report made public on May 13, 1991 by the Fund of the UN for Population Activities.<sup>6</sup> It is devoted to the "state of world population."

#### ***Two Intertwined Lines of Thoughts***

This report assures us that the world population comes to 3.4 billion men, that it will reach 6.4 billion in 2001 and 8.5 billion in 2025. It asserts that "the international community is unanimous in recogniz-

ing that a better equilibrium of growth and distribution of the population is an integral part of a strategy for survival and development" (6). The objectives of research had been settled in 1989 at the time of the International Forum (supposedly known) on the Population of the XXth century, bringing together participants from seventy-nine countries. This assembly adopted the Amsterdam Declaration which was disturbed "by the rapid growth of world population, especially in developing countries" (6). This declaration has since "been confirmed by the General Assembly of the UN and by the international strategy for development for the fourth decade of the UN for development" (6). In the same climate there took place in September of 1990 the world Summit for children (10). The editors indicate, moreover, that it is the world plan of action regarding population, determined upon at Bucharest in 1974, "that still guides international action" (4).<sup>7</sup>

As always, two lines of thought intertwine "justifying" family planning: one by reason of "personal need" (7 f.), the other by reason of demographic necessity (6 ff.). The latter discourse is Malthusian, the former neo-Malthusian. The first "justification" asserts the right of family planning (12-21); it mentions consideration regarding the woman, the infants, education, religion, etc. nonetheless, despite the place given to "justification" for "personal need," it is the second "justification" that is the most important. "The multiplication of services for family planning has. . . become a priority objective of the international program for development, an end in itself as well as a way of promoting other ends of development" (6).

Research on these objectives coincides with putting an "effective program" to work (22-23). This program will appeal to political authorities, national as well as international, to non-governmental organizations, to the media, to men, to pharmaceutical enterprises, etc. But, above all, it "must offer a broad choice of contraceptives" (30), chemical, mechanical or surgical; natural methods don't come up. Devoted to the "last born of contraceptives," a box informs us that "the pharmaceutical industry estimates that the cost of putting one sole new product on the market to be 200 million dollars" (31). As it happens, FUNPA, as WHO, praises the merits of "Norplant," a subcutaneous implant contraceptive system" (31). The RU 486 is hardly mentioned, but allusion is made to it, for example when reference is made to "new approaches to post-coital contraception" (32).

What is envisioned is clearly explained: "The objectives for the year 2000 are realistic. They are within our reach, but only if, during the next ten years, the modern and freely accepted service of family

planning reach 1.5 billion people in developing countries. To this end, it is necessary that during the next ten years two billion people begin to plan their family or adopt more effective methods of contraception. Expressed in percentages, the objective is modest, since it is a question of going from an actual rate of contraceptive use of 51% to a rate of 59% from now until the end of the century. Nevertheless, on the whole it requires that the number of couples having recourse to family planning increase by 50%, going from 381 million in 1990 to 567 million at the end of the century" (1). During the same period, and always in developing countries, "the global rate of fertility — a synthetic index of the mean number of births per woman [married and of an age to procreate] — [which] is now about 3.8" will have to drop to 3.3 (6 and 43). Various recommendations are proposed to attain these objectives. Governments, in particular, should "eliminate legislation and discriminatory practices regarding women and girls or which restrict their rights" (43).

#### *What the Word "To Double" Means*

The FUNPA's report on *The State of World Population* is above all a plea for strengthening the financing of the programs for family planning. This appeal shows how organizations of this type are sensitive to the cutbacks made by president Reagan and Bush in the government's contributions to organisms suspected of favoring abortion.<sup>8</sup>

The present level of resources annually devoted to family planning is between 4 and 4.5 billion dollars (38). Now, always according to the report, "the estimates for the costs of population programs indicate that it will probably be necessary to double the annual expenditures to bring them to 9 billion dollars from now until the end of the decade. Half of these funds would be furnished by international organizations and programs of bilateral aid. FUNPA's portion, in its capacity as the principal distribution network of international financing, would be raised to one billion dollars" (10). It is made clear from the beginning that "the realization of the objectives fixed for the year 2000 will entail a global cost — for the governments, the users of contraceptives and the international community — about 9 billion dollars *per year from now until the end of the century*" (1; our emphasis).

The report also tells us that "at present, developing countries probably bear two thirds of the total expenditures, that is to say, some 3.5 billion dollars, while external aid furnishes 675 million dollars a year" (38). Still "at present, ten countries provide around 95%

of all the international aid for population concerns" (39). Among these ten countries figure the United States (with 10% of the funds), Germany, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, the Low Countries, Great Britain and Sweden. "International aid for population activities, all sources taken together, the World bank included, in 1988 rose to 675 million dollars" (39).

However, what does "to double the resources" from now until the year 2000 mean? First of all that means an increase of external resources contributed to the program. Alongside the various countries — among them Finland (40), from which, curiously comes Norplant (31) — which have already announced increases in their financial aid, "the World Bank and other lending institutions would be disposed to raise their contribution to 500 million from now until 2000." As far as FUNPA itself is concerned, it "hopes to dispose of a budget of 500 million dollars from now to 1994, and of one billion dollars in 2000, as against 212 million in 1990" (4, 40). This billion, whose payment is foreseen by FUNPA, will be included in the 4.5 billion of the total international aid foreseen.

Furthermore and above all, that means that in the matter of family planning, developing countries will find themselves in a situation much worse than they are in already. Using a euphemism, the report is actually saying that, in these regions, "the investments for the population question will increase and the developing countries will have to bear a larger proportion of the costs" (38). It is clear, this means that the developing countries are the victims of an appalling evil because they have themselves been made to finance to a great degree the campaigns of contraception and "contragestion" (premature abortion)<sup>9</sup> and of sterilizations conducted among them . . . . Themselves paying up to 3.5 billion dollars of a present total of 4 or 4.5 billions, these countries provide not two thirds, but 80% of the costs.

However, the increase of external intervention, recommended by FUNPA, is going to aggravate still more this tragedy. In fact, in this matter of the policy of demographic containment, the grip wealthy countries have on poor ones is already exercised according to two methods. This action is indirect, in the sense that — not to speak of corruption — the rich countries have powerful means of applying pressure on decision makers in the poor countries. But this action is also direct by the supply of external resources being raised, in 1988, to 675 million dollars.

What the report means is that in the eyes of wealthy nations, the poor ones are not going fast enough in their campaigns, and the rich

nations use this as an argument to justify increasing their intervention. As we shall see in an instant, this "will have" to be multiplied by a coefficient of 6! Security and survival, they argue, require this intervention and make it urgent!

In any event, whether these campaigns come from within or from outside the poor country, they are entirely inadmissible. However, what doesn't seem to be taken into account by wealthy western circles is that, coming from outside, their intensified intervention is going to awaken among the poor both the perception that their country is the victim of domination and, above all, a lively awareness of their humiliated dignity. This demands an explanation.

### *Toward "Demographic Dependence" of the Third-World*

The new element which is not really made explicit in the report is that the next few years will place these countries in structural "demographic dependence" on those outsiders who finance the campaigns for family planning. One can perceive this very well, if he follows attentively what the report says.

In effect, the report says that the governments of these developing nations will still have to provide, in the year 2000, an annual contribution of 3.6 billion dollars (40, 44). One can foresee, then, that this contribution will be an on-going thing, that it will remain at its present level, since it corresponds to what is provided at present (38). To this contribution will be added 500 million dollars coming from those who use contraceptives, but we can foresee that the expense of the private sector, that is the users, will go beyond the present 500 million to 1 billion dollars in 2000.

What is especially stupefying, and the report is careful to emphasize it, is that international aid (41), more precisely annual external aid to developing countries (38), will rise from 675 million to 4.5 billion. And in the next ten years, this aid will then become six times more important than it was in 1990. It will be equal to the cumulative contributions of the Third-World governments (3.5 billion) and of the "private sector" (40) or of the "users of contraceptives in developing nations" (44) (1 billion). The inevitably violent impact of this aid will reinforce in a disquieting manner the *direct* control exercised by the providers of "aid" to the targeted populations.

And so, when the report tells us that the "cost of the demographic programs" or "the annual expenses" (10) will go from 4.5 in 1990 to 9 billion dollars in 2000, it seems to be very simply affirming that the costs of the programs will double (1, 38, 40, 44). In reality, this assertion hides some other facts about which the report is suspi-



ciously discreet. *This affirmation conceals a decision of a policy nature.* The report means that those who have furnished external aid have unilaterally modified their contribution to family planning in the Third-World. An extremely important *quantitative* change, since their aid is, not doubled, but multiplied by six! It is a *qualitative* change as well, in this sense that by reason of its volume, this sixfold increased aid proclaims that the poor — whether countries or couples — risk being soon deprived by the rich of all autonomy and freedom in the control of their fertility.

### *A Report of WHO on Human Reproduction*

In order to attain the objectives they seek, the promoters of demographic curbing must dispose, as we have seen, of a "broad choice of contraceptives."<sup>10</sup> The panoply of these methods — chemical, mechanical, surgical, etc. — is unfolded and discussed in a special report of WHO that appeared in 1990.<sup>11</sup> It shows clearly the direct involvement of the World Health Organization in the worldwide campaigns for family planning.

#### *The "Acceptability" of the Programs*

We learn from this report that the program of research on human reproduction disposed of direct financing amounting to 43.5 million dollars in 1988-1989 (3). It is pointed out that "induced abortion is one of the oldest methods of birth control. They estimate that every year from 50 to 60 million women seek to end an undesirable pregnancy" (49, 58).

The key word in the report is *acceptability*; the theme comes up numerous times (e.g.: 19, 24, 27, 29, 36, 51, 53, 56, 71, 72, 98, 109). Since the potential users of the range of contraceptives and contragestives are not generally sick, they have to be made to accept the procedures made available and disseminated under the aegis of WHO. It is also necessary for such a vaccine to be presented in attractive packaging (28) that will lure consumers. This concern with "acceptability" connected with enticing presentation is explained above all by the fact that the products are destined for very broad distribution. It emerges from the report as a whole that this distribution must be aimed especially at the Third-World; the manner in which they go about making contraception accepted in developing countries is moreover carefully explained (56 f.)

A few points in this report should be taken note of. First of all, it is a question of abortion. We already know that, according to this re-

port, there would have been between 50 and 60 million a year in the world, of which 30 to 40 million took place in countries where abortion had been legalized (49, 58). Understood that they affirm that "induced abortion is not a method of family planning" (37), they nonetheless observe "a tendency which has endured for a long time and extends worldwide in favor of the liberalization of laws concerning abortion" (36). Besides, the report regrets that too many women don't have access to "an effective contraceptive and to abortion that is safe" (75).<sup>12</sup> WHO's program, in the determination of which IPPF intervenes (77 and 117), is, then, concerned with this problem.<sup>13</sup> In many cases, terminating a pregnancy is associated with significant risks for the woman. The program has conducted research into the safety and effectiveness of medical procedures for terminating pregnancies as alternatives to the surgical interventions used today" (78). At the head of these "medical procedures" produced by Schering laboratories (the ZK 98-734 and 98-299) (38), there figures among the alternatives the famous RU 486, to which reference is made several times (4, 25, 38-40, etc.). Abortion, WHO assures us, is not a method for limiting births, but RU 486 — whose abortive efficacy is celebrated everywhere — can be used for this. The reader will surely appreciate that. It is also pointed out that during the first year it was available in France, this product had been responsible for some 40,000 premature abortions, "which represents about a third of the total abortions done in France in a year" (38).

This incoherence between the declared position concerning abortion, on the one hand, and the new alternative chemical products, on the other, is but apparent. In effect, the predominant approach up until fifteen years ago asserted that the classic "pill" had only a contraceptive effect; it prevented conception; it did not entail abortion. Understood; that left open another question: that of knowing whether contraceptive behavior did not lead to abortifacient conduct.<sup>14</sup>

The novelty that appears in the research described in the WHO report is that, IUD's action aside (25 f., and 47), many present pills have the capacity of producing three distinct effects. The first is *contraceptive*, that is, it prevents fecundation. The second has a blocking effect: by modifying the composition of the cervical mucous, the "contraceptive" substance precludes the passage of the spermatozoa into the uterus and the Fallopian tube to find the ovum. The third effect is *antinitatory* (or "contragestive"), that is, it provokes a premature abortion.

The first two effects are preventative; the action is a priori; it pre-

vents the conception of a being. The third *follows* conception; its action is a posteriori; it destroys an already conceived being. But for obvious physiological reasons, only one of these effects is produced. Sometimes the pill works as a priori; sometimes it acts a posteriori. Either conception has not taken place, and the effect is preventative; or conception has taken place, and the effect is antinidatory or "contragestive." Nevertheless, in whichever case, one doesn't have a way of knowing exactly what happens. It can happen that a drug provokes a *simulation* of "normal menstruation" (19, 21, 53): it can make physiology lie!

From the viewpoint of morality, it results that the woman, never truly knowing where she is in the process, finds herself totally dispossessed of all moral responsibility, both in regards to the child she could have conceived as well as to her partner. Efficacy joined to total ignorance in which she is kept indicates her total alienation: she is the object of a determined, pitiless chemical process.

In sum, WHO's report gives rise to disquieting questions regarding coherence. It intertwines two lines of thinking. On the one hand, doubtlessly in the hope of disarming adversaries of abortion, it asserts that it "cannot be envisaged as a method of birth control," while on the other hand, the agency supports the use of pills producing this effect.<sup>15</sup>

Finally, more recently WHO has given an account of the research conducted, within the framework of its program, in view of the production of anti-pregnancy vaccines, whose distribution has already been denounced in the Philippines, in Tanzania, in Mexico and in Nicaragua.<sup>16</sup>

### *To Further Involve the Nations Concerned*

A third observation is necessary: it concerns the agents of these campaigns. Quoting the conclusions of a group of experts who proceeded to an "evaluation of the external impact of the program," the report states: "For the future development of the program. The group of experts feels that the developing countries should be more involved in the cooperation of research institutions with the pharmaceutical industries and with competent service in the matter of the national program of human reproduction — and this for testing and marketing contraceptive products manufactured on the spot. This will equally require a governmental decision regarding the reinforcement of the pharmaceutical industry in developing countries and the development of the analytical chemistry and quality control of contraceptive products" (86). Many pointers are provided as to how to

organize concretely the objectives of research (12 ff.) The indispensable ecological touch is also present. They are not concerned about hormonal force-feeding of women, but will "try to protect animals from needless experimentation" (13).

In summary, WHO understood well that, in order to bring fruition its design, it is indispensable for it to be able to count on people in place. For that it will be necessary to find researcher (89), to consult influential politicians (92), while dealing with religious sensitivities (87, 107). It is also necessary to calm the communities in which one hopes to work (56). Finally, alluding to the campaigns against RU 486 in the developed nations, the report reminds us of the formidable effectiveness of boycotts, a threat that always hangs over certain products (17).

### *Two Presuppositions Common to the Three Documents*

We should notice that two presuppositions underlie the three documents we've just examined; neither of the presuppositions has ever been discussed in the least. They are regarded as axioms.

The first axiom holds that man's sexual behavior is not subject to any moral constraint at all, neither before or after marriage. All other areas of human action are subject to discipline, to codes of conduct, the sole exception: sexual behavior. Before sex, individual human conduct is not truly able to be disciplined or held responsible. Hence, in order to deal with the inconveniences that can result from this unbridled conduct, we need products or procedures subject to the exclusive criteria of usefulness and total efficacy.

The second axiom sees in "contraception, the central piece in the puzzle of development."<sup>17</sup> That is what justifies," they say, instituting the means for containment we know of and "in consequence" their "morality." It is regarded as blindingly evident that there are too many men on the earth, too many men in the Third-World, and that the situation is going to get worse in poor countries and that harmful consequences will result for all humanity.

The first axiom is above all perceptible in WHO's report, while the second is very apparent in FUNPA's report. FUNPA's report and that of WHO avoid foundering in pathos. But beyond cold "scientific objectivity, we can recognize without difficulty the characteristic traits of what we have called "the ideology of demographic security."<sup>18</sup>

### *The United Nations: Blatant Abuse of Power*

As a conclusion to the preceding, a general conclusion seems

necessary: the three specialized institutions of the UN are engaged in spreading a strategy of fear. They have obviously *conferred together with a view to dividing the tasks*. To PUND falls the responsibility of determining the *goal to research*: that is the world market supported by the World Bank and guarantor of the new human order. To FUNPA it belongs to determine the *methods* to use for attaining this end; in the first place stands generalized demographic planning. As for WHO, it is incumbent upon it to perfect the products that will issue in universal distribution of contraception and "contragestion." But let us look at things more closely.<sup>19</sup>

### *Some Tendentious and Suspicious Things*

First of all, one is surprised to state that the FUNPA wants to reinforce and orchestrate the world campaign for demographic containment, when this agency itself quotes several times the conclusion of the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) which maintain there is enough food in the world!<sup>20</sup>

A similar observation must be made regarding life expectancy. Despite the disquieting data cited above, we must acknowledge the fact that never in human history has life expectancy at birth been so high, whether in developed countries or developing countries. Now how can it be doubted that we have the best global indication about the quality of human life? If this increase in life expectancy appears clearly in the statistics of our diverse institutions, the latter doesn't seem to pay it the attention it deserves.<sup>21</sup>

We wind up, however, faced with two basic questions: are the statistics of these agencies true? Are they reliable? Isn't this data tendentious or falsified in a way that allows one to invoke it precisely to "justify" the policies of demographic "monitoring"?

As they are defined, it is not to be excluded that demographic policies lead to a certain way of collecting the data, treating it and presenting it. The process normally expected would thus be inverted: one would not first have reliable data clarifying policy decision, but programs for curbing the population "legitimized" by suspect data.

The question raised here is all the more crucial in that the great international institutions have arrogated to themselves a quasi-monopoly in the matter of demographic knowledge. By perfecting an ingenious world network, these institutions, disposing at will of exceptional means, can ensure themselves of the services of quality demographers, whose freedom of research and expression as well as independence of mind risk being compromised. It is urgent, then,

that demographers not comprised by the system organize themselves to proceed scientifically to a critical examination of the data currently imposed and admitted, and of the policies built on this foundation.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, from our analyses, and in particular from the examination of the report of FUNPA, many other conclusion of great importance emerge.

### *A Usurped Authority*

One is at once shocked to see these institutions determine demographic policies, create the means to execute them, distribute these means on an international level, ensure themselves of the support of scientific and commercial organizations, and finally collect the funds from public powers and private organisms to arrive at these ends.

Whence the question: by what title and with what authority do the FUND, FUNPA, and other organization like UNICEF<sup>23</sup> (which FUNPA's report quotes), arrogate to themselves the right to proceed in such a way?<sup>24</sup>

The answer to this question flows from the very nature of the United Nations and leads us to wonder whether we are not purely and simply before *a typical case of the abuse of power*. In reality, on the point we are examining, the FUND, the FUNPA, the WHO — and doubtless the other organizations seeking "a series of common objectives" — take advantage of the moral authority of the UN and usurp its prestige. These agencies proceed *as if* they had received a mandate from the UN in view of these actions. Now the UN *itself has no competence to confer such a mandate on any of its agencies*. The delegates who sit in the UN represent there sovereign states; they are in no way bearers of a representative mandate conferred by the human community somewhat in the fashion of members of parliament representing the nation in a democratic state. The UN is an assembly constituted by members states.

### *The UN: Inter-state or Supra-state?*

Founded by governments, bringing only state together, the UN is, for this obvious reason, not a *supra-state*, but an *inter-state* organism that does not have, for example, the right to sign treaties. Now the demographic policies promoted by agencies like the FUNPA, WHO and others, push the UN toward taking a dangerous turn on the level of law and international policy. If the UN itself does not attend to defending its identity, then *it risks changing its nature*. In fact, the demographic policies put into effect by the agencies depending

on it induce in it a change of extreme gravity. With contempt for the principle of subsidiarity, the FUND, the FUNPA and the WHO act *as if* the UN was a supra-national and supra state organization (and not inter-state) empowered to exercise a sort of sovereignty over the individual states. These agencies ask the UN to stand behind their own abuses of power, but to reach this end, they must push the UN itself to abuse its own power by exceeding its mandate!

The way these agencies have proceeded will end by seriously calling into question the legitimacy of the UN's power. The UN will wind up being manipulated to serve as a cover for an international technocratic minority. And that is confirmed by what the Gulf War already demonstrated, namely that the UN can be used by the most powerful. With scorn for the sovereign states that assemble in it, the UN risks becoming in fact a supra-national and supra-state authority which the strong will use for "monitoring,"<sup>25</sup> that is for watching and controlling and planning the population of the globe. Such was certainly neither the spirit nor the letter of the San Francisco Charter (1945)!

A report like that of FUNPA gives evidence of the risk that the UN will little by little be transformed into a iron sword of "the ideology of demographic security, a totalitarian stage of imperialism."<sup>26</sup> If the UN should go this disastrous way, it will automatically ruin all the hopes for justice and peace which were its origin and from which it draws its *raison d'être* and legitimacy. By letting itself be manipulated by its specialized agencies, with which it is perhaps in connivance, the UN makes it bit by bit impossible to apply its positive help to a just solution of the problems of development in the world.

The kind of behavior that we are denouncing here is typical of technocratic power which self-invests itself with a consistently exorbitant mission, neither more nor less, to determine the interests of the human race. This power has as its objective to back up the population policies decreed by institutions that have no right to make decisions in this area, still less to put them into practice. In reality, the attitude of these institutions is entirely inadmissible because it is identified, in its deeds, with the seizure of power by force: that offered by finance, science, the media and institutional machinery.

This abuse of power, which is advantageous to the big world powers, doesn't only affect the UN. It also afflicts other organizations, like the World Bank and the IMF, to the degree in which they collaborate (as it is explicitly recognized) with the specialized agencies of the UN in putting into effect their demographic policies.

This same abuse of power equally affects individual states. In

fact, the specialized agencies — decidedly treating the law with the same constant offhandedness — proceed here in two ways. On the one hand, as they dispose of resources, they threaten individual governments with the game of rewards and sanctions. On the other hand, they encroach upon the rightful sovereignty of states by beating the directors over the head with the help of “scientific” publications aimed at solidifying the persuasion already influencing them.<sup>27</sup>

It only remains for these agencies to use as an argument the subsidies granted to these states, and accepted by them, to reject the accusation of interference that could be used against their action.

### *From Bad to Worse*

In summary, among other documents we could study, the reports of FUNPA and WHO manifest a will of pitiless efficacy, again resulting from an implacable determination. A recent event shows us the potential of this will for power: we see it in the “surgical precision” of the bombing achieved not long ago of Iraqi targets.

Thus, in the cases we have studied, it’s a matter universalizing the process of going from bad to worse. From the evil of the campaigns led by those responsible in the Third-World against their own population, they hurried to begin a graver evil by increasing the importance of intervention on the part of wealthy countries. And these countries have already succeeded in persuading the poor societies that they had to contribute to their own mutilation, and they ensure that the poor countries will contribute up to 80% of the costs of this operation. However, imperialism now outdoes itself. The wealthy countries, having become interventionists — as the Gulf War showed — and impatient, now propose themselves to proceed to this great enterprise of castration.

### *A Secret and Revealing Document*

Finally, a secret document, reserved to the White House, dating from 1974, but made public in 1989, sheds precious light on the whole project we’ve examined in this chapter.<sup>28</sup> It’s a question of a study coordinated by Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state under president Gerald Ford. In the following year, the United States established a “bureau for population affairs,” organized also by Henry Kissinger. At Z. Brzezinski’s suggestion, activities of this bureau were supposed to be given high priority.

This report, actually applied by the Bush government, considers it indispensable to the security of the U.S. to implement a policy of



demographic control in countries of the Third-World. The means are: chemical contraception, sterilization, the IUD, abortion, etc. In the execution of this program, thirteen countries become the object of special attention by reason of the political and strategic importance they represent for the U.S. They are Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Mexico, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. It is also subtly brought out that "the United States can help minimize the suspicion of giving in to an imperialist motivation that could be found as the basis of the support it gives to population activities. For that, it is necessary to emphasize that the North American position flows, as it happens, from facts like the right of the individual to determine freely and responsibly the number of children he desires, and the fundamental right of poor nations to social and economic development."

This document relates or confirms several things.

First of all, this program had been started in 1965 and was sustained by the North American agency for international development (USAID). The U.S. and USAID also played an important role in the creation of the Fund of the United Nations for Population (FUNPA).

Most of the recommendations found in the report of 1991, which we have analyzed, already appear as well in this document. USAID, besides, has helped private organisms to realize effectively their programs of demographic containment. Such is the case of the Pathfinder Fund and the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF).<sup>29</sup>

From that point to thinking that the U.S. would use these various organisms to put into effect its program of demographic containment, it is but a step that some have already taken. Others go even further: why, they wonder, would the U.S. not also use other organisms — such as, for example, the World Bank, the PUND, the WHO, or even the UN itself — to conduct its policy in this area?<sup>30</sup>

### Conclusion of the First Part

At the end of this examination, some general conclusion emerge. The world today continues to be haunted by fear. Men are led to believe that their *security* is threatened. Fear characterizes the poor as well as the wealthy, individuals as well as nations, the South and North, the East and the West. Poor counselor, fear vitiates relations among men and nations. It inclines one to look upon the other, others, as a menace, as an enemy.

Those responsible for disseminating information — governments, political organisms, international associations, cultural and

religious institutions, have the urgent duty to put things in their proper perspective and prevent distrust from being elevated to the status of dogma and systematically dominating all decision. They have to make possible a future of balanced and just relations.

In many circles of the Third-World and developing countries, there exists — and is sometimes reinforced — the temptation to regard *underdevelopment as a fatal phenomenon*, definitive and irreversible.

This conviction engenders despair among poor people and cynicism among the rich. It is urgent that we denounce this paralyzing determinism, this immobilizing fatalism that is without foundation. We must reaffirm that man is in charge of his history, of society and of nature, thanks to his intelligence, his free will, his creative imagination, his sociability.

Today the *weight of public opinion* is noticeably greater than a quarter of a century ago. Even if it is sometimes badly enlightened or even deceived, this public opinion has also become clearly more sensitive to certain moral problems.

The media, which we often reproach, not without reason, for conditioning this opinion, can equally contribute toward forming it and echo its concerns before governments, international organizations, public or private. Thus public opinion, more attentive than ever to some moral problems has equally more influence than ever on decision makers.

The rest of this work will deal with the spread of the liberal ideology and the means for curbing it.

<sup>1</sup> See 44 of FUNPA's document, which we cite in note 6. Recent history of the action of the UN and its agencies in the question of population is described with some complacency by Stanley P. Johnson in *World Population and the United Nations*, Cambridge University Press, 1987. This is completed by Jason L. Finhle and C. Allison McIntosh (ed.), *The New Politics of Population. Conflict and Consensus in Family Planning* (New York: the Population Council, 1994); Gita Sen, Adrienne Germain, Lincoln C. Chen (eds.), *Population Policies Reconsidered. Health, Environment and Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994). One can also consult the classic work of Carl Djerassi, *The Politics of Contraception* (New York: Stanford Alumni Association, 1979). Especially representative of the positions of the UN is the discourse of Robert S. McNamara, "Une politique démographique mondiale pour promouvoir le développement humain au XXe siècle given on Dec. 10, 1991.

<sup>2</sup> World Bank, *Report on Development in the World 1991. The Challenge of Development*, Washington, 1991.

<sup>3</sup> *Le Rapport mondial sur le développement humain 1991* was published for PUND in Paris: Economica, 1991.

<sup>4</sup> See *infra*, Part II, Chapter 1 and 2.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Above, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> Prepared by Dr. Nafis Sadik (ed.), the report on *The State of World Population 1991* was published by FUNPA in New York, 1991. This report is presented in a luxurious folder that also contains resumés, flashes, documents and photos for the use of journalists. Distributed gratis, this document was destined for a very broad public distribution. On the back cover is a photo of the national football team of Cameroon, and it states: "Thanks to family planning they are all winners: fathers, mothers, children." According to a proven formula, the competence of these players in sports was transferred to demographic questions which are not their responsibility, and the supporters are subjected to a conditioning such as to associate football players and family planning. See the criticism of this report, "Un rapport démographique de ONU contesté" by Jean Legrand in *Europe Today* (Brussels), n. 76, June 17, 1991 3 f. The most revealing work published by FUNPA is the *Inventory of Population Projects in Developing Countries Around the World* (New York, 1993); it contains 730 pages.

<sup>7</sup> The importance of these documents we are presenting and discussing here was shown by recent international events: the conference in Rio on the environment and development (1992), the year of the family (1994); the Cairo world conference on population (1994); the world conference on woman in Beijing (1995).

<sup>8</sup> FUNPA's report does not give details about the origin and importance of the funds. The "Reagan effect" appears in WHO's report (cited in note 11), especially 130, Table 1 and 129.

<sup>9</sup> The word "contragestive" mimes the word "contraceptive." See E.E. Baulieu, *Génération pilule* (Paris: Jacob, 1990) 112 f, 181, 196, 198 f. 203, 285.

<sup>10</sup> See *supra*, and the following note.

<sup>11</sup> See World Health Organization, *Research in Human Reproduction. Biennial Report 1988-1989* (Geneva: WHO, 1990). One can also refer to previous reports, especially that of WHO, *Onzième rapport annuel. Programme spécial de recherche, de développement et de formation à la recherche en reproduction humaine* (Geneva: WHO, 1982). See also Part III, Chapter I, note 11.

<sup>12</sup> On the connection between abortion and the decline in the fertility rate, see our work, *L'enjeu politique de l'avortement* 136 f.

<sup>13</sup> The International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) has its seat in London and brings militant associations together for family planning. See, for example, *L'IPPF à l'oeuvre*, report published by the International Bureau of IPPF, London, 1982. See also note 29 in this chapter.

<sup>14</sup> This is the sense of Pierre Simon's reflection, *De la vie avant toute chose* (Paris: Mazarine, 1979) 96 ff. We too study this problem in *L'enjeu politique de l'avortement*, 81 f.

<sup>15</sup> On WHO's role in producing RU 486, see E. E. Baulieu, *Génération pilule*, cited in our note 9.

<sup>16</sup> See *Challenges in Reproductive Research. Biennial Report 1992-1993* (Geneva: WHO, 1994), esp. 43, 67, 71 f., 124-128. On these vaccines see the bibliography published in the *British Medical Bulletin*, n.49, 1 (1993) 88-99.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Document n.10 of FUNPA's report.

<sup>18</sup> On this subject see our work *L'enjeu politique de l'avortement*, 157-176.

<sup>19</sup> One will be able to go more deeply into this critique by referring to Betsy Hartmann, *Reproductive Rights and Wrongs. The Global Politics of Population Control and Contraceptive Choice* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987); Germaine Greer, *Sexe et destinée* (Paris: Grasset, 1986) esp. chs. 11 to 14; Michael Cook (ed.), *The New Imperialism. World Population and the Cairo Conference* (Crows Nest, Australia: Little Hills Press, 1994). The voice of the Third-World is expressed notably in M. C. Asuzu (ed.),

*Family Planning, Birth Control and Western Imperialism* (Ibadan University, Nigeria, 1992).

<sup>20</sup> This statement appears many times, for example, in *Estado de la población mundial*. 1990, esp. 2, 3, 7-9, 11, 15, etc. Here, for example, is what is said on 8 of this report: "On the world level, there does not appear to be any lack of land theoretically apt for the production of foodstuffs, including a final stabilized population of 14,000 million inhabitants. The study of FAO/FUNPA of 1982 on the capability of demographic sustenance, which appears to be unique in its genre up to the present time, estimated that the land of developing countries — excluding China — would be capable in theory of feeding by itself alone a population of 33,000 million inhabitants."

<sup>21</sup> Cf. For example, FUNPA, *Estado de la población mundial*. 1990, 3; World Bank, *Report on Development in the World 1991*, passim.

<sup>22</sup> This work of demystification was taken up by Franco Bandini under the title "Errore di demografia," in *Il Sabato* (Milan) of July 6, 1991, 41-42.

<sup>23</sup> UNICEF takes care of the educational section of these policies. This aspect of its activity is again recalled in the brochure entitled *Un seul monde* widely distributed in June 1991 in Brussels by this specialized institution.

<sup>24</sup> Let us note in passing that, different proportions respected, some analogous questions already arise in the same areas on the level of the European Community.

<sup>25</sup> We are alluding to *World Population Monitoring 1989* published by the UN.

<sup>26</sup> See Ch. 16 of our work *L'enjeu politique de l'avortement*.

<sup>27</sup> In Belgium, Miet Smet, then secretary of state for the environment, had distributed to all the members of parliament, in June 1991, a work devoted to the threats that "demographic explosion" posed for the planet. This work was edited by Lester R. Brown, *L'Etat de la planète 1991* (Paris: Economica, 1991). Sponsored by the Rockefeller Trust, this report on "the new world order," by being distributed to the Belgian politicians, received a subsidy of 300,000 Belgian Francs (about \$10,000 US \$) made by S. A. Ecover, whose detergents wash whiter than white. In a contribution without ambiguity, Jodi L. Jacobson explains in this volume why and how to "Faire face au problème de l'avortement," 183-213.

<sup>28</sup> This document, coded NSSM-200/1974, bears the title *Implications of Worldwide Population Growth for U.S. Security and Overseas Interests*. Circulating in various forms, this text is found in the violently anti-Christian work of Stephen D. Mumford, *The Life and Death of NSSM 200* (Research Triangle Park, NC 27709, 1994) 45-186. Similar theses are presented in a more diplomatic manner by Gerald O. Barney, *The Report to the President: Global 2000* (Arlington: Seven Lock Press, 1991 [first edition in 1980]); and in *Changing Our Ways*, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1994.

<sup>29</sup> Among the significant publication of IPPF there is *Vision 2000. Inverting in the Future* (London: IPPF, 1993); *Cuarenta Años salvando vidas con planificación familiar* (New York: Federación internacional de planificación de la familia, Región del Hemisfero occidental. 1994); *Informe Anual 1994* (*ibid.*).

<sup>30</sup> To put in better perspective the questions we are touching on here, see James Perloff, *The Shadows of Power. The Council on Foreign Relations and the American Decline* (Appleton, WI: Western Islands Publishers, 1990); William F. Jasper, *Global Tyranny . . . Step by Step. The United Nations and the Emerging New World Order* (*ibid.* 1992); Graham Hancock, *Lords of Poverty. The Power, Prestige and Corruption of the International Aid Business* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1989). In French, one will note Jacques Paternot, *Le cartel des spoliateurs. Un plan Marshall peut-il sauver le Tiers-Monde?* (Paris: Criterion, 1992); also Jean-Christophe Rufin, *L'Empire et les nouveaux barbares. Rupture Nord-Sud* (Paris: Jean-Claude Lattès, 1991).

## PART II

# UNDERDEVELOPMENT, BAD DEVELOPMENT, PSEUDO-DEVELOPMENT

The study we have thus far presented has shed light on the lasting importance of the two cleavages: East-West first, then North-South, and the relationship between the two. In the second part of our expose we wish to explore more closely this complex connection.

During the last decades, the greater number of moralists held, at least implicitly, that the countries of the Third-World should, in strict justice, be able to reach a development similar to what is true of industrialized countries. From that follow various recommendations bearing especially on the duty of cooperation.

Today, however, it appears that we have to dig further. The approach we are undertaking here is aimed at showing that what constitutes the obstacle to development in the Third-World is an erroneous conception of development among the governments. This conception gives rise to the bad development which is found in the western industrialized countries, and to the pseudo-development which we find in countries under communist rule.

More precisely, the big obstacles to the development of the Third-World are to be looked for in two constructs presented with the pretense of rationality, economic on the one hand, and political on the other. Now these two constructs are the artificial product of *ideological deceptions* which must be unmasked. The first of these constructs revolves around the themes of the individual and the market; the

second around the themes of society and the state. Each of these constructs lead to a particular form of *juridical positivism* and of *organicist monism*. These two forms *gravely compromise the very possibility of establishing social justice*.

In our opinion, one of the primary tasks of criticism today should consist in making a clear-cut distinction between these two themes. It is this approach that we are going to outline in some of its major points.

## CHAPTER I

# THE CONFUSION BETWEEN LIBERTY AND LIBERALISM

### Brief Remarks on Liberty and Justice

#### *Liberalism: First an Anthropology*

As we begin our development of this theme, it is appropriate to recall clearly that the liberal tradition is characterized above all by an anthropology that exalts man as an individual, his sacred right to private property, his individual liberties. It is foremost liberty that characterizes man.<sup>1</sup>

The human individual is regarded as *totally autonomous*, and this in two senses: one may be called more subjective; the other more objective. In the first sense, man and he alone is totally master of his existence; he does not depend on anybody, nor is he responsible for another except to the degree that his sovereign will consents in letting itself be determined by someone different from himself. Whence the second sense: this sovereign will, this liberty without limits, will determine in a totally autonomous fashion what is good or bad, what *has* value and what *is* a value for the individual in question. The moral norm will strictly coincide with the determination of the subjective will — the norm necessarily reflecting the special interest of the individual. The individual thus ends by erecting his own conduct into a moral norm.<sup>2</sup>

We see right away that this conception of liberty entails the precursory sign of *anarchism*: the “law” which the totally subjective will accepts is connected with nothing else than the will which positively determines its content. Thus the liberal tradition paradoxically leads to juridical positivism’s inclination always to sanction the force of

the strongest. There is no longer place for reference to objective realities, including other individuals whom each individual should take into account. Human reason is not excluded, but it is mutilated; it is reduced to being a faculty for comparing the advantages or inconveniences of such and such a decision, it is reduced to *measuring the utility* of such and such conduct. It is no longer the faculty that enables each man to discern the true and the false, the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, and to consent to one or the other by a voluntary act of free assent. The idea that, thanks to reason, men could better understand what they are, dialogue and discover the foundations of their sociability has hardly any bearing here. Reason is at the service of individual interests; it is no longer open to universality. It is no longer the faculty thanks to which men can comprehend what distinguishes them and what brings them together.

One is also prevented from finding for sociability any other but an individual foundation — something really contradictory. Deprived of all reference to any other thing but their liberty, if individuals want to live together, they have no other resource but to have recourse to conventions, occasional consensus, contracts. Issuing only from anarchic wills, their declarations will express only the interests of the contracting parties. Man's rights themselves will not escape this ravaging positivism. If in such a society and at such and such an epoch of history we agree one day to proclaim them or proclaim about them, why would we prevent ourselves from modifying their content or meaning to fit our interests? Now the latter change according to the circumstances of time and place and according to alliances that can always be terminated because they are based on utility and self interest. In brief, the trend of liberalism ends in *aporia* in the ancient meaning of the word, that is a dead end. Starting with the axiom developed by Locke, at the beginning men are free and equal; they end with practical consequences that make it impossible to think of and will liberty and equality as values for all men. The only thing that remains is the "*legitimizing*" discourse that presents the original axiom less as a horizon than as a mirage.

### *Force, the Measure of Liberty?*

Strangely enough, the "masters of suspicion," perhaps without intending it, have contributed toward reactivating and rehabilitating this liberal vision of man, solidly anchored in modern philosophy.<sup>3</sup>

For example, Sartre, is hardly reputed to be a representative of the liberal tradition. Yet, it is in his work, contemporary with us, that the liberal current finds one of the most characteristic theoretical expression:



My liberty . . . is not an added quality or a *property* of my nature; it is very precisely the stuff of my being . . . One couldn't find for my liberty limits other than itself . . . Liberty is exactly the nothingness that *has been* at the heart of man and which impels the human reality to *make itself* instead of *being* . . . For the human reality, to be is to *choose itself*; nothing comes to it from outside, neither from inside, that it can *receive* or *accept*. It is entirely abandoned, without aid of any sort, to the insufferable necessity of making itself to be, down to the least detail. Thus liberty is not a being: it is the being of man, that is, his nothingness of being.<sup>4</sup>

Then the door is open to an interpretation in which liberty is envisaged in terms of force before which nothing should or would be an obstacle. This interpretation is characteristic enough of the liberal tradition. The idea of individual force underpins the idea of liberty: my strength is the measure of my liberty. Whence a consequence that cannot be ignored: "No grill is necessary; hell is others."<sup>5</sup> The liberty of the other, based on force, is opposed to mine and is its limit; it cannot but trigger my aggressivity. How, then, can we escape from a conception of man whose dignity is geometrically variable? The idea of moral *equality* of men is compromised in its very principle. Liberalism quickly hastens to make explicit the consequences flowing from like premises. Whence follow, in politics, the opposition to any absolutism, to any despotism, and also the distrust in principle of the state, though indispensable. From such premises also follows, in economics, the opposition to all interventionism. Liberty cannot be limited by the public powers; they must rather broaden the field of its exercise, notably by favoring exchange.

During its history, Western Europe and America have known different forms of liberalism. The great classic liberal current, with "absolute liberalism" culminating toward the middle of the nineteenth century, is itself the concluding point of a complex philosophical, political and economic history.

The seventeenth century had already seen flourish a conception of education and of Christian life tending toward advocating observances and recommending good works. It is the epoch in which some theologians develop a morality of a privatizing tendency, rather unrelated to devotions and dogma. Education for social justice are, to a certain point, rendered less perceptible by reason of the insistence on the necessity of good works. The lasting influence of Molina (1535-1600), a Jesuit theologian, should be mentioned here. His doctrine accentuates the role of individual liberty, imparting a corresponding orientation to a whole concept of Christian pedagogy,

and thereby to public life.<sup>6</sup> Nor is it surprising, as well, to find that the liberal *spirit* was already present, before the letter, in mercantilism and Colbert's invitation to become rich. Why should we not expect to find it again later, from the sixteenth century on, during the colonial conquests and the exploitation in which it resulted?<sup>7</sup>

The French Physiocrats, for their part, contributed since the eighteenth century, to acclimatize the idea of "natural laws," setting up a natural and harmonious order for which the "legal despot" ensured respect since he was enlightened. Now the pivotal point of this natural order is the right of property.

In brief, the history of the West is marked by recurrent outbreaks of absolute liberalism, allergic to the intervention of public powers in the economic and social fields. As we shall see, contrary to current assertions, this absolute liberalism has not at all disappeared, and it inspires new forms of anarchism. In some countries of the Third-World, by reason of the weakness of the state, this liberalism has even remained savage toward the state, so to speak.

In the contemporary Western world, the heirs of liberalism acknowledge, in a way, that public powers have a role as "indirect employer." The state was founded to intervene in economic and social life; nevertheless, it must respect and ensure respect for the play of free competition as well as the private character of business. The original spirit of liberalism survives in contemporary neo-liberalism. It continues to prosper in international relations. In our present society, from the moral point of view, liberalism saves appearances only because — up until now — it is tempered by Christian morality.

We should, then, examine the forms in which the permanence and vigor of the liberal tradition today can be perceived.

### *The Person and Justice*

However, before pursuing a reflection which will treat head-on the problem of justice, it could be useful to recall very succinctly a few classical distinctions. We traditionally distinguish *general* justice which orders the actions of the individual to the common good, and *commutative* justice which regulates exchanges between individuals according to arithmetical equality. It is the justice involved in contracts; it ignores the differences in the condition of the individuals. The just price of a piece of merchandise is one in which there is equality between the sale price and its cost increased by a normal profit. Commutative justice is found, not only between individuals, but also in the relations between states.

*Distributive* justice regulates the relations between society and its members and distributes goods, costs and penalties proportionately as people merit. Given equality of work, the father of a large family pays less in taxes than a celibate.

Social justice is that which tends to bring about a society whose members work toward a common project. The end toward which the whole social body tends requires, on the one hand, respect of persons for each other, and on the other, acceptance by persons of duties toward society and by institutions of society of duties toward persons. Proceeding on the basis of a deepening of the requirements of distributive justice, social justice gives concrete form to *general* justice and then *concrete* content to the demands of the common good. Social justice, then, is that which a society strives to ensure by means of public and private institutions in view of promoting the dignity of persons and respect for human communities.<sup>8</sup>

## The Market and its Ideological Reduction

### *The Obscuring of Liberty*

Today we can assert that a complex of difficulties without precedent spreads, beginning with the West, throughout the whole of human society.<sup>9</sup> These inextricable difficulties have their source in the continually fostered confusion between liberty, an essential dimension of human existence, and liberalism become an ideology. From that follow no less resolvable difficulties regarding justice. Everything is orchestrated in such a fashion as to make us believe that the only way of advocating economic and social liberty would be to subscribe to this *liberal* or *liberalist ideology*. This belief in a sort of monopoly of liberalism is a delusion, but we can easily understand why it is propagated. Nothing, in effect, is more necessary to individuals gathered together in society than the right to liberty. This right is translated concretely through the possibility of each one having the initiative freely to create, to build. In fact, it's plain for all to see that liberty exists on a double level, social as well as individual.

Carefully cultivated, this confusion between liberty and liberalism breeds a perversion of minds. These tend to combine human liberty and the liberal (or liberalist) ideology with which it is identified. This corruption of meaning is at the origin of all the misunderstandings. If it were liberalism that allows liberty to be what it is, that is, if it exalted in a privileged fashion this constitutive dimension of human existence that liberty is, then one should admit that, in the East-West confrontation, it came out the victor and all the praises would

be called for. On the other hand, if liberalism were to advocate a bad use of liberty, if it relied on the irrepressible aspiration for liberty in order to create a falsified mystique of this same liberty, then we should claim that *it wasn't under its aegis* that the totalitarian dictators of the East were overthrown, *but in spite of it*.

In this case, then, liberalism is an ideology that we should demystify with the same vigor as we did the communist ideology. This ideology is presented as a current of structured and efficacious thought that intervenes in the faculty of judgment, the will and in consciences. This ideology that intrudes in the discourse about the whole of nature and that superimposes itself in the most diverse practices, finishes by obscuring liberty and paralyzing its exercise. Its name — *liberalism* — which seems to pay homage to liberty, is an impostor that only masks a sham. Its goal, as for every ideology, is to “justify” and “legitimize” injustice by means of a perfidious appeal to liberty and by taking over the instruments (political, economic, financial, social, demographic) whose use authentic liberty normally reserves for itself.

By reason of its ideological nature, it is very clear, then, that liberalism cannot but lead to totalitarianism. It cannot but exclude, by force or constraint as necessity requires, all that does not meet the special interests it hides. The discourse of those who burn incense before it is at once mendacious and violent. In brief, since it too is fake coin, liberalism isn't worth any more than tyrannical Marxism: they are twins. And history confirms what we are saying: like Marxist socialism, liberalism has been and is still at the origin of an imposing number of totalitarian, dictatorial or authoritarian regimes, especially fascist ones.

### *Ideological Description of the Market*

“Liberalist” ideology gives way, one can expect, to an ideology of the market. Now, in its turn, the market gives way to an equivalent confusion like that between liberty and liberalism. In effect, we must carefully distinguish the market, on the one hand, as a special and limited *regulator*, whose functioning is subject to certain laws and rules, and, on the other hand, as an ideological description which is of special interest to us here.

*As a regulator*, the existence of the market cannot be questioned. When we speak of the market as regulator, we want to say that it is endowed with mechanisms that make it regular, discipline it, moderate it, coordinate it so that the actions of those who participate in it are harmonized in serving the end toward which the whole of the ac-

tivity is ordered. Once supply is faced with demand, a merchant mechanism goes to work. Certainly it can happen that there is a lack of supply or demand regarding goods, but when someone offers something to someone who wants it, there is a market and the setting of a price.

In fact, the real problem is to know how supply and demand are constituted, or if one wishes, how the problem of solvency is posed and regulated. In a regime of perfect competition, supply is constituted by a plurality of people participating; in a regime of imperfect competition, it is constituted by the participation of a few people of unequal importance. In this last case, it can happen that there is no market, and it is precisely then that abuses are possible. It is above all in a system of monopolistic supply that the structuring of the supply poses a problem, for in this case, the position of the supplier is often expressed in a restricting manner. Some enterprises, for example, can have a monopoly for the production of electricity which today has become indispensable. And the companies can fix the price of electricity the way they wish and demand ways of payment that please them. Default in payment results in the electricity being cut off. In this case, supply overcomes demand, and there is almost an absence of a market. In democratic countries, to avoid abuses that this situation can bring about, political power, reflecting the demands of the electorate, intervenes. Such intervention, then, appears today as a necessity in order to limit economic power and safeguard the market.

From this first viewpoint, then, one must say that where there is a market, exchange takes place by means of money. But greedy profit-seeking can compromise the setting of prices in conformity with justice. In the Third-World, many have hardly anything to exchange, and that is why there is but a limited market. But there is means of bringing it about that everyone will have something to offer on the market. It is here that the crucial character of the problem of justice appears: it is when no market exists that all the abuses are possible. Thus, from this first viewpoint, absolute "laissez faire, laissez passer" is incompatible with the formation of markets. Moreover, it appears that the relative absence of a market added to the endemic weakness of political power are at the heart of the drama that goes on in the Third-World

*As an ideological description*, the market is used as a delusion by liberalism. What is of concern here is, not the market as regulator, but an unbridled liberty of action. All restriction on this liberty is regarded as harmful. Public powers must leave it alone; for an even

greater reason it is necessary to oppose any new political institution — for example, an international one — that would have the mandate to moderate the freedom of enterprise and control cartels.

Along with the confusion between liberalism and liberty appears, then, the confusion between free enterprise and liberalism. A condition indispensable to economic development, free enterprise is confused with the *laissez faire mystique*. In reality, liberalism as an ideology is the spirit of unbridled enterprise, one without any moderating element. It is the freedom of an enterprise regarded as beyond the complex framework in which human existence is lived, where economic liberty is one expression, among many others, of human liberty. This is equally manifested in political, scientific, cultural and religious life. Briefly, authentic free enterprise is the will to respect freedom of initiative in the economic domain, on condition that this freedom not be disassociated from the other areas in which the liberty essential to man must be able to express itself.

As though so much confusion is not enough, the liberalist ideology of the market still carefully maintains a dangerous deception: the law of supply and demand is the panacea for all ills. A market can properly function, but that does not imply in any way that the distribution of goods among those who participate in it will automatically be more just. To say that it is necessary to allow the forces of the market to work is correct, if by that we mean that it is necessary to form a genuine market, that is, a situation in which supply and demand tend to be equivalent and one does not absorb the other.

### *Liberalist Scientism*

As a regulator, the market, then, is a natural reality which, as such, is independent of the liberal ideology. By that fact, then, one has a basis for speaking of rules that govern the market and even — why not? — natural laws of the market.

But liberalist ideology hastens to describe this natural reality of the market by changing it into a sort of idol.<sup>10</sup> Thirst for the absolute is quenched by this idol. And religion risks being replaced by the market; all reference to the transcendent is little by little erased.<sup>11</sup> At the same time the very notion of human dignity vanishes.

Liberalist ideology “sacralizes” the market in some way, as others “sacralize” Society, the Species or the State! Starting with this “sacralization” of the market, the natural laws of the market surreptitiously change status. And this change signals very precisely the triumphant emergence of a *liberalist scientism*. These “natural laws”

— now corrupted — are elevated to the dignity of so-called “moral” laws. These laws are used to “legitimize,” “justify,” allegedly moral conduct. The perversion of ideologically reducing the natural laws of the market (as regulators) to “natural laws” raised to “moral norms” resides, once again, in the fact that the liberal ideology proceeds by way of antiphrasis, as is customary with any self-respecting ideology. *Liberalist ideology has the word liberty say the contrary of what it means.* In fact, the moment natural laws, by a semantic trick, are changed into “moral” laws, liberty is chased from moral action in the name even of the pseudo-liberty of which liberal ideology proclaims itself the herald! As in every ideology, liberal ideology restores, in effect, a moral determinism: morality, in the economic field, then, consists in subscribing to the “necessary” laws which govern the economy. Authentic liberty and morality find themselves expelled from the economic field. It is necessary that this ideological line of thinking seems to exalt liberty in order to be able to empty it of its object. At the end of this hoax, the goal sought is fully attained: immoral conduct is “justified” by rerouting the natural laws that govern economic life. *The moral qualification of economic conduct is dictated by the liberalist ideology.* Furthermore, like all ideologies, liberalist scientism brings about a pseudo-morality that entirely invades the field of morality once liberty has *nothing more to do*.

Finally, *this liberalist scientism* chases out all subjectivism. The “natural laws” of the market, henceforth an expression of a kind of economic physics, are perfectly “objective,” “anonymous,” impersonal.” The people who speak of these “laws” take good care to mask themselves. And for good reason: behind the mask of a morality which they deceitfully confer upon them, the “laws” in question have as their function to conceal the special interests of those who proclaim them.

In this denunciation of the market, we have no intention of denying the real character of the laws that set the economic process in motion. On the other hand, we deny that this reality can serve as a support for the injustices that one tries to cover up. Thus it is perfectly true that supply coupled with demand sets the price of a commodity of primary necessity at such and such a level. But in no case does this mechanism justify making this commodity inaccessible to the general population — a procedure to which supporters of the liberal ideology adapt perfectly. The solution obviously does not consist in falsifying a price, which is the real one, but in acting *freely*, especially on the political plain, so that supply corresponds to demand on a level more affordable to the general public. An example: if the supply and demand for water makes it precious in a desert place, that doesn't

keep those who have nothing with which to buy it from being very thirsty. The same thing, for example, for medicine and instruction. One must, then, by using responsible liberty, work out a means for changing the mechanism and lowering the price of water and making this commodity more available. On the one hand, it would be absurd to blame the price which is but a simple result; yet such is the attitude of many politicians. On the other hand, it would be equally absurd to try to make people believe that this price — just because it was naturally determined — is a reality that must be accepted without trying to change it; yet such is the language typical of the ideologies of (neo-) liberalism. To “justify” the inequality of exchanges, they invoke the “necessary” character of some economic situations, and, that done, they mask the injustices involved.

In the example of water we’ve just given, the market is envisioned within the particular framework of just any nation. But the necessity of *working out* a means for making the supply correspond to the demand on a more affordable level has repercussions in the framework of international relations. In this framework also, it is necessary to act freely, first on the political plain so that supply will be of such a *quality and quantity* as to correspond to the immense demand at a more affordable level for the general population.

We must also remark that, if economic liberty is an indispensable condition for the good running of economic activity and for social justice, it is also an insufficient condition — something liberal ideology ignores. This needs a word of explanation.

Economic liberty is indispensable, for when it is attacked one empties reality. From the moment one begins to tamper with the economic mechanism, one tends to produce substitute solutions more serious than the injustices which these solutions are thought to remedy. The communist model especially has collapsed because it had to misunderstand this mechanism. In sum, it is the same with economic liberty as with individual liberty: it doesn’t make you virtuous, but without it it’s impossible to be virtuous.

Economic liberty is still *insufficient*, for it doesn’t spontaneously establish the relationships of justice that all of society has the right to expect and the duty to effect. To believe or make others believe that economic liberty left to itself will arrive at resolving social inequalities, is to suppose that knowledge of inequalities necessarily produces their correction. Basically that is a gnostic attitude. Besides, it is not astonishing that, in this century in which we lack courage and in which the taste for asceticism has yielded to hedonism, we prefer to succumb to a strange scientism and appeal to the fetishism of



knowledge for its own sake. It is false to think that the free play of economic mechanisms and the awareness of the inequalities which they reveal are enough to correct the injustices the signs of which are displayed by these mechanisms. It is dumb to think that, only by virtue of its reality, economic liberty engenders justice or that its requirements are honored by the sole magic of the work contract. Nor is it less stupid to hold that, on the political level corresponding to the economic level which has been envisioned here, justice is automatically born of the social contract already thought up by Rousseau.

Thus under cover of promoting the economy of the market — with the regulating mechanisms proper to it, its laws, its freedom of enterprise — liberal or liberalist ideology promotes in fact an ideological notion of the market, unrelated to reality but useful to those who produce it. It is this concept and it alone that we are going to analyze more closely in order to lay bare its inevitably totalitarian nature.

<sup>1</sup> Let us point out here a useful initiation to liberalism and socialism, with which we will be dealing in the following pages: Louis Salleron, *Libéralisme et socialisme, du XVIIIe siècle à nos jours* (Paris: CLC, 1978). See also Pierre Manent, *Histoire intellectuelle du libéralisme* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1987); Pierre Birnbaum and Jean Leca (eds.), *Sur l'individualisme. Théories et méthodes* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1987). As for philosophical works one will consult Alain Renaut, *L'ère de l'individu. Contribution à une histoire de la subjectivité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); Claude Polin with Raymond Polin, *Le libéralisme. Espoir ou Péril* (Paris: Ed. de la Table Ronde, 1984); Roy C. Macridis, *Contemporary Political Ideologies* (Boston: Little Brown, 1986).

<sup>2</sup> For some decades now, contemporary philosophy has made an inestimable contribution to our reflection on *personalism* (Ebner, Rosenzweig, Buber, Marcel, Mounier, etc.). It is significant that today it is connected with reflections on individualism. On this subject see Pierre Lemieux, *La souveraineté de l'individu* (Paris: PUF, 1987); Richard Sennet, *Les tyrannies de l'intimité* (Paris: 1979); C. B. McPherson, *La théorie politique de l'individualisme possessif de Hobbes à Locke* (Paris: Gallimard, 1976). Number 264 of *Magazine littéraire* of April 1989 is entitled *L'individualisme. Le grand retour*.

<sup>3</sup> Following especially Paul Ricoeur, one calls "Masters of suspicion" Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, and often W. Reich, H. Marcuse and a few others.

<sup>4</sup> Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'être et le néant. Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1955) 514-516; emphasis in the text.

<sup>5</sup> *Idem*, *Huis clos* (Paris: Gallimard, 1944).

<sup>6</sup> See the suggestive analysis of "Situação histórica do catolicismo no Brasil," proposed by Joseph Comblin in *Revista eclesiástica brasileira* XXVI, n. 3 (1966) 574-601.

<sup>7</sup> On these questions see the classic works of Emmanuel Wallerstein: *The Modern World-System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); *The Modern World-System*.

II. *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy* (New York: Academica, 1980).

<sup>8</sup> The expression "social justice" is often used but rarely explained. Without going too far back, one of the first studies devoted to it was written by P. M. Gillet, *Conscience chrétienne et "justice sociale"* (Paris: Revue des Jeunes, 1922). See under this title, "Justice" in the *Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique* of Paul Foulquié (Paris: PUF, 1962).

<sup>9</sup> Here is a summary bibliography on the question: Pierre Rosenvalon, *Le libéralisme économique. Histoire de l'idée de marché* (Paris, 1989); M. Flamant, *Histoire du libéralisme* (Paris: PUF, 1987); M. Novak, *Une éthique économique* (Paris: Cerf, 1986); Id., *Démocratie et bien commun* (ibid. 1991); Serge Christophe Kolm, *Le contrat social libéralisme* (Paris: PUF, 1985); Id., *Démocratie et bien commun* (Paris: PUF, 1991); Gerard Debreau, *Théorie de la valeur. Analyse axiomatique de la valeur* (Paris: Dunod, 1960); Joseph Stiglitz and Frank Mathenson, *New Development into Analysis of Market Structure* (London: Macmillan, 1986). Among the leading figures dealing with this question, we must mention Friederich A. von Hayek, Nobel Prize winner, to whom we owe *The Constitution of Liberty* (Chicago: Regnery, 1960), and Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman who, with Rose Friedman, published *La liberté du choix* (Paris: Belfond, 1980). More so than the "neo-liberal" current properly so-called, the "neo-conservative" current claims the classical theses of liberalism close to absolute liberalism. Two names can be cited here: Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Robert Nisbet as well as the review *The Public Interest* published in New York. On the special and concrete case of the Reagan administration see Jean Pisani-Ferri, *L'épreuve américaine. Les Etats-Unis et le libéralisme* (Paris: Syros, 1988); Marie-France Toinet, Hubert Kempf and Denis Lacorne, *Le libéralisme américain. L'Etat et marché* (Paris: Economica, 1989). One should not overlook the classic of E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful. Economics as if People Mattered* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975). A different approach is taken by Rene Dumont in *Un monde intolérable. Le libéralisme en question* (Paris, 1988). Let us point out also the good article that appeared in Brasil and written by Sílvia Dobrowolski, "O Liberalismo: exame de sua ideologia e de suas deficiências," *Revista brasileira de Estudos políticos*, published by the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte), n. 66, (January 1988) 161-202, with a bibliography 200-202. One can also refer to Philippe van Parus, "Quelle réponse cohérente aux néo-libéralismes?" in *Economie et humanisme*, n. 306 (March-April 1989) 41-52, as well as to the report "Logiques marchandes. Action publique," in n. 64 of *Contradictions* (Brussels) 1991. Finally, one can refer to the synthesis of Karl H. Peschke, *Social Economy in the Light of Christian Faith* (Trier: Paulinus, 1991).

<sup>10</sup> See the column of Bernard Maris, "Dieu existe, c'est le marché," *le Monde* June 18, 1991.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Marcel Gauchet, *Le désenchantement du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985).

## CHAPTER II

# NEW IDEOLOGY, NEW IDOL

We must draw attention to the fact that we have arrived at a crossroads in our discussion. From now on we are going to treat the market more as a natural reality with its regulating mechanisms. We are going to delve into the ideological concept which liberalism gives it. It should be clear, then, that we are going to concentrate on *liberal scientism*, with the aim of laying bare its inevitably totalitarian nature. We will use interchangeably the expressions "liberalist ideology" or "liberal ideology" to designate the new ideology; for the new idol we will use the expression "liberalism interpretation of the market" or other equivalent ones.

## From Science to Scientism

### *An Exaggerated Economism*

In sorting out the connotations of scientism characteristic of this ideology, one takes up again the expression "natural laws of the economy." From there on, one makes the connection and says that the market has its "laws," to which one must bend since they are "necessary." These "laws" yield "theories" that are called "scientific."

The liberal tradition has thus enthroned a idolatrous conception of the market. The study of the economy leads to an exaggerated economism which, in the name of "scientific reason" and the demands of effectiveness, is inclined to expel the morally creative imagination and to make the economy inhuman. One has arrived at the point of no longer taking into account the fact that economic thought is only a science that, as all sciences, must contain what it claims and guard itself against being taken for what it can never be: scientism.

The economy, then, no longer has anything to do with morality, since the ideology teaches that the economy, in the end, is subject to the inflexible "laws" of this new idol: a market re-interpreted, or more precisely a victim of the abuse of language. Nor does one take into account any longer that the enthronement of this idol is born of an unmentioned ethical option: each one has rights only in proportion to his strength, and the political and juridical institutions will be established accordingly. They are oriented toward the emergence of the strongest. The dominant concern is, not the *common good*, but the *particular good* of those who "succeed" in the great competition of individuals. All the *talk* about the *rights of man* and their universal extension ends by being nothing but hypocrisy: everything is built upon the negation of such extension. And it is this negation that the liberal ideology hides. Thus, as all ideologies, liberal ideology uses the lie in the service of a particular form of violence. The same holds true for all the liberalist *talk* about development. Failing to consider that man is *of another order* than the many measurable material parameters, and that he transcends all of them, one identifies growth and development. The most prestigious international organizations, with their impressive statistics and reports, all powerfully contribute to this confusion.

### *The Relationship of Forces*

From these premises it follows that the economic relations established among men are relationships of forces. A selection is operative in which the strongest necessarily prevails. Moral considerations are set aside to the advantage of those relative to effectiveness and utility of certain individuals. The role of the prince consists in judging the play of individual liberties in such a way that wealth will reward the effectiveness of the most able.

Because of these premises the liberal economic tradition seeks the juridical and political arrangements that reflect the interests and convenience of the economically strong. The very idea of *free competition*, inseparable from that of the market, is interpreted as founded upon an economic "necessity" that destines some to success others to poverty.<sup>1</sup>

To cap it all, they appeal — sometimes by misinterpreting the text — to the famous "invisible hand" of Adam Smith.<sup>2</sup> The neoliberalist mystique seizes upon it to make people believe that total economic liberty necessarily makes for harmony and peace. This hand would have to be endowed with magic power: it would make the welfare and interests of individuals and of society coincide spon-

taneously. Social justice would be established at the end of an equilibrium born of the free play of opposed economic forces. In certain respects, this theme recalls that of the "pious lie" which Plato invoked to "justify" social stratification by appealing to a typology of souls; some of iron, some of silver or gold.<sup>3</sup> Here liberalism proceeds *as if* the demands of justice were satisfied by exercising only one kind of justice, commutative. And that gives too little consideration to the distinction between distributive and commutative justice, and to the relation of both to general justice and social justice.

## **Perversion of Economic Relationships and Social Injustice**

### *The Dropouts of Expansion*

Injustice, or rather the injustices, of the economic system derived from liberal ideology are but the consequence of a fundamental perversion of economic relationships, the perversion itself a product of individualism, utilitarianism and materialism. It is at this basic level that injustice must first be denounced.<sup>4</sup>

For not having paid enough attention to this perversion, moralists have not sufficiently noticed the *cause* of these injustices, which they justly denounced, it is the so-called scientific quality of the laws of *bronze*<sup>5</sup> governing the economy. They certainly advocated the practice of justice, but they took for granted that justice had to be practiced within the framework of market economy whose reinterpretation by liberalism ideology they did not take into account. They said that all must be offered an equal chance for personal realization. They brought considerations relative to distributive justice to bear: "To each according to his needs." They nevertheless forgot that this reference to distributive justice was itself untruthful: it's obvious that the poor had, had to have, fewer needs than the rich and in any case that they had less to exchange. One left to "charitable" initiative, to the "gratuitous" gesture, the solution — necessarily chancy — of the problems that in fact pertained to justice.

Two safety valves had, nonetheless, been foreseen to prevent some abuses. On the one hand, we were assured that those who remained poor deserved to be helped by others; and they invoked the idea of superfluity. On the other hand, those who succeeded were invited, not only to be generous and give alms, but in their actions to put the common good before their own.<sup>6</sup>

When all is said and done, the moralists made up their minds

about the existence of poverty. They tried to soften its harshness, but they hardly asked themselves to what degree the primary cause of this poverty should have been sought in the profound, but little apparent, injustices. It was still with this frame of mind, for example, that on the eve of World War II, Walter Lippmann recommended that public authorities take care of the destitute people caused by capitalist society, without however going so far as to acknowledge before such authorities a duty of intervening in order to remedy the structural causes of the misery of which the dropouts of expansion were victims.

Thus the idea of examining the *social cost* of the standard of living to which the wealthy had access occurred to no one. No more than is done today, did one explore the *correlation* existing between the poverty of the one and the wealth of the other, or very timidly. In any case, one expected that more just relations would spontaneously be born of the interplay of liberties. It was hardly a question of going back to the perverse anthropologies making these injustices *necessary*. Hobbes, for example, certainly figured on the theologians' black list, but that was above all because they suspected him, not without reason, of materialism and atheism. One gave little thought to the possibility of there being a link between his materialism and his political thought. Since he lived during the religious wars, one was hardly moved by his famous *Homo homini lupus* (Man is a wolf toward man), nor of *Bellum omnium contra omnes* (War of all against all), and one did not suspect the significance that liberalism would soon discover in these aphorisms. For the rest, attention was not awakened to the fact that his anthropology was on the way to becoming one of the most important sources of modern liberalism. Despite an obvious reference to Cromwell, one saw hardly any special reason to examine critically the socio-political repercussion of his work.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the dominant, even exclusive, concern of *commutative* justice called for a conception of the state comparable to this narrow concern. The state would be a "policeman" among those participating in the market-society. Its intervention would be reduced to what was strictly necessary. One would scarcely ask it to be concerned with distributive justice. Even less would one ask its concern for social justice or the common good. Acknowledging in it no competence of this kind, one wouldn't give it any power for this purpose. If the liberal tradition had taken more account of the requirements of distributive justice, it would have been led to see the indispensable intervention of the prince in the development of this justice. The intervention of the prince would have appeared necessary, even for recti-



fying the merciless play of commutative justice. For even the requirements of this justice are not honored in the market as conceived by liberalism ideology.

Thus, if it had taken more seriously the rightfulness of the requirements of commutative and distributive justice, the liberal tradition would have been led to accede to the rightfulness of the requirements of social justice.

### *Development, A Moral Problem*

We can draw some lessons from the observations above.

Criticism of liberal systems must be made, not only on the level of concrete injustices that are observed, but also by going beyond these. Its chief reaction must bring it to the liberal system itself and, in the final analysis, to the ideology that underlies it and prompts people to consent to its essential injustice. In order to defeat liberal ideology, the moralist concerned with the person must, then, must give priority attention to all that in this ideology obscures the most basic liberty of man. For if one reduces human liberty to an autodetermination relying on power, the liberties are incompatible with one another, the liberty of some being necessarily checked by the stronger liberty of others. Criticism of this ideology cannot neglect to call each one first to be free in relation to himself.

In the traditional perspective, there are rich (nations) and poor (nations). Whence the necessity of a little binary analysis of development and its social dimensions. Just as the poor can get out of their poverty, so poor nations can lift themselves to the level of rich nations. The world community must apply itself to helping them do so. The idea of catching up is very near. It is necessary, *they say*, to denounce the injustices that characterize the relations between developing countries and industrialized countries, condition developing countries to lift themselves to the level of developed countries.

All that is not without interest on condition that one remains aware that, on many points, development, as we understand it today, is a bad development, that this bad development has ultimately the same source as under-development, and that this source compromises the make-up of the whole liberal system. It is important to take into account that the world "social problem" is essentially a moral problem, not only because of the revolting inequalities, but more so because the claim that the market has a character that "cannot be ignored" is in fact a fiction. As we have seen in the preceding chapter, neither the market nor prices are realities to which we must be resigned as though they could not change. Nonetheless this is what the

liberalist ideology does. For it, mechanics of the market and of prices are considered as "necessary," "untouchable," only because one absolutizes a liberty that is identified with force and therefore is opposed to the just requirement of equality. In fact, this liberty-power has above it another liberty: to use or *not to use* the power, to choose to use what little power one has for the good of others. Every man has this liberty to distance himself from egoism, from his instinct to possess, to dominate, even if he has the power to do so, in order to acknowledge another in his dignity, his value, his aspirations, which have as much right to be satisfied as "mine," even if the other is weaker than I. Such liberty doesn't act against equality; it tends of itself to realize equality in justice.

In summary, under the disguise of exalting liberty, liberalist ideology defeats human liberty under its two fundamental aspects. If one looks at things from the side of the poor, liberalist ideology defeats *liberty of action* or execution; it "justifies" physical or juridical constraints, and "legitimizes" forms of structural violence. If one looks at things from the side of the wealthy, liberalist ideology erects an obstacle to *liberty of decision*. According to this ideology, man is not truly capable of directing himself, or making decisions, independently of his passion; he is necessarily subject to them. The more powerful are not responsible for their superiority, especially since it is in the latter that the "legitimacy" of their power is found.

<sup>1</sup> On the weaknesses of the Western model and their repercussions in the Third-World see François Partent, *La ligne d'horizon* (Paris: *La Découverte*, 1988). Cf. also Jean-Pierre Dupuy, *Le sacrifice et l'envie* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1992). On competition see Michael Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (London: Macmillan, 1990).

<sup>2</sup> Paul Farra devoted an interesting column to this theme, "La main invisible ou la Providence," *le Monde* March 22, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Plato, *Republic*, III, 414c-415d.

<sup>4</sup> The moral problems posed by the recent evolution of liberalism will have to still hold the attention of Christians. See the acts of the colloquium held in Paris September 29-30, 1986, and published by IPIE-CDS-PPE under the title *Les démocrates chrétiens et l'économie social du marché* (Paris: Economica, 1988; see especially the contribution of Henry Bussery, "La doctrine sociale catholique et le libéralisme économique," 31-40. One may refer also to J.-Y. Naudet, *L'Eglise et l'économie de marché face au collectivisme* (Paris: UNI, 1987); Jacques Delcourt, "Éthique et économie," in the work edited by Patrick de Laubier, *L'enseignement social chrétien* (Fribourg: University of Fribourg, 1988) 101-138. See also André Piettre, *Les chrétiens et le libéralisme* (Paris: France-Empire, 1987). On the Protestant side see Paul Tillich, *Political Expectation* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

<sup>5</sup> Formulated by the German sociologist, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825 - 1864), it claimed that the worker's salary would be higher than the vital minimum.



<sup>6</sup> During a session of the House of Commons, May 21, 1988, Margaret Thatcher gave a vibrant plea in which, following the example of Adam Smith, she invoked Holy Scripture to justify her liberal policy. See the article of Dominique Dhombres in *le Monde*, May 26, 1998.

<sup>7</sup> Many studies drew attention to the fourth centenary of Hobbes' birthday. Among those which clarified our proposition, let us mention Frank Lessay, *Souveraineté et légitimité chez Hobbes* (Paris: PUF, 1988); Yves-Charles Zarka, *La décision métaphysique de Hobbes. Conditions de la politique* (Paris: Vrin, 1988).

## CHAPTER III

# CORRELATION BETWEEN UNDERDEVELOPMENT AND BAD DEVELOPMENT

Thanks to the analytical instruments presently at our use, one is justified in thinking that the problems of justice concerning the relationships between developed countries and developing countries must be examined first of all on two levels. First, the problems of the Third-World have their origin in the very heart of the developed countries. Then the bad development of the West entails disastrous consequences for the poor countries in the Third-World and the bad development of industrialized countries that we are going to examine.<sup>1</sup>

### **Liberal Ideology is Mercantile**

#### *The Underdevelopment of Third-World Countries*

Today it is established that the Third-World countries are those which have supported the costs of the dominate western development model more than they have received benefits from it. This situation is manifested in several criteria, of which the most revealing have been largely taken up in the first part of our expose.

Some of these criteria, besides, are measurable: hunger, illiteracy, mortality, etc.; the inequalities of possessing, of knowing, of practical know-how;<sup>2</sup> dependence, that is, the inability of rejecting the decision of the strongest; the impossibility of having access to common resources; the inability to control their own destiny; the privation of the right of self-determination. Let us again recall the pitiless destruction of the ecosystem.

#### *The Bad Development of Western Countries*

As regards the western model, it is distinguished by different

characteristics that attest to its prodigious dynamism:<sup>3</sup>

- Production and increase of productive forces; multiplication and diversification of goods and services.
- Intensification and organization of trade brought about by the division of labor. Presently, this organization is in effect on a worldwide scale following the conception that the liberalists, that is, zealous promoters of the liberal or liberalist ideology, have of the market.
- Increase of consumption not only for obtaining an extra supply of useful things but also for determining social status.
- Political and social organization: distribution of wage earners, extension of the nation- state.
- Tendency to spread, to bring about its imitation, finally to dominate the planet.

Extraordinary performance, therefore, in terms of production, growth, exchange, consumption, standard of material life.

The prodigious dynamism of developed countries must not let us lose sight of its *counterpart*:

- Creation of a *new category of poor people* swollen by a horde of perpetual debtors. Add to this category the unemployed.<sup>4</sup>
- The effrontery of a *mafia* in action via many branches; the "parallel," but by definition uncontrollable power of clubs and secret societies.
- *Waste*: first of resources that sometimes assumes the proportions of massive destruction; only a small number of rejects is recycled. But our society entrusts producing to the private sector and to the public sector the trouble of eliminating - wasting also an important portion of what is produced; this portion is based on consumption, itself stimulated by needs induced via perpetual, exaggerated advertising.<sup>5</sup> Related to this is the imbalance between public and private transportation.
- *Ineffectiveness* of development which can be measured by balancing the costs against the advantages, or, if one wishes, the resources used against the results achieved. Sometimes national accounting adds the costs to the product: the repair of damage from automobile accidents is credited to the national product!
- *Obscuring* of knowledge within a society and above all on the international level, even to the point of preventing the expansion of universities! Pombal who forbade the printing

press in the colonies is not dead! We must add to that the fantastic possibilities of *influencing opinion* and leading people to consent to their own servitude.

- The necessarily *unequal* character of development in a market economy. This point is so decisive for our reflection that it calls for special explanation.

The dominant rule in the development of western liberal tradition is the *law of the market*, it is *mercantile logic* which is translated into the formation of a system of pricing. And it is this law that governs the private appropriation of goods and services traded through the intermediary of *money*. Money thus becomes the instrument par excellence for the satisfaction of needs, as well as that of profit, the accumulation of capital and finally of remuneration of work.

Now, as we have seen, for the liberalists, the market is a "natural" institution; it goes without saying that it is what it is, a totally "objective" reality, with its own laws, the "natural laws of the economy"; prices are imposed and one must not try to resolve the problems they cause.

However, one can pose a few questions about this.

A great part of trade eludes the market. Two examples can be cited. First, even international commerce, intracompany trade represents a significant percent of transactions. Then, very importantly, the overall functioning of the public powers (providing administrative, social and military services) is in no way reducible to market principles; there is neither supply or demand in the mercantile sense. Hence, the capital question: *what logic governs the determination of the needs* that will be satisfied and in what order of priority? The question has repercussions all the way to the universities: what logic influences the decision about programs of research?

In the liberalist market economy properly so-called, what determines the quantity and variety of goods produced is, not the needs of people, but the demand that can be paid for, that is, only those needs matched by purchasing power. It follows that the poor do not have access to decisions regarding production; they have but limited access to goods produced, and they are excluded from capitalist credit channels and restricted to the limb of the market.

In the liberalist market economy, then, we are witnessing a phenomenon of accumulation and concentration; redistribution, to the extent in which it is operative, is made on the side in the form of *aid* to the less favored.<sup>6</sup>

## Consequences of Bad Western Development

Now we must analyze the repercussions of the western model of development. This analysis must be done on three different levels: on the level of so-called developed countries, on the level of developing countries, and finally on the level of all countries together.

### *On the Level of Developed Countries*

We have already mentioned some of these consequences: waste, unemployment, ruining of the environment, etc. There are, however, new facts of primary importance to which we must be alerted. These facts boil down to one: *the destruction of the idea of universality*. By that we mean that the equality of dignity, the very heart of all democratic thought, is not acknowledged for all mankind. We are going to explain this point more.

The right to private property has today become the primordial right, so much so that, in virtue of the "liberalist conception of the market," it prevails over the right of every man to liberty and the conditions for the effective exercise of this liberty. Moreover, as we shall see further on, today, in the convulsive manifestations of liberal ideology, this right of private property prevails over the right to physical integrity, even to life itself. Let us look at this more closely.

In effect, for liberalists, in virtue of the "necessity" of the market and the logic of competition, only a powerful minority has access to the effective exercise of this right to property. All the relationships of *man to things* — and, as we shall see, *to other men* — are overshadowed by this primordial right which excludes even the idea of universality and, therefore, of reciprocal acknowledgment. It's *having* that determines *being*. Man's rights are thought of in terms of having and not of being: according to the famous formula, "I am what I have." In the liberalist logic of the market, it is strictly impossible that all men be equal as regards the right to property, which is primordial. The exercise of this right is the privilege of the minority which prevails in the more or less regulated jungle of the market. In an interview given to the magazine *Figaro*, the thinking of David Rockefeller was summarized in an especially eloquent formula: "The rights of man, yes; but commerce first." And so *ethics must be subject to economic practice* — as it must be subject to medical practice, besides.

In sum, by reason of its characteristic ideology, liberalist democracy doesn't really differ in its essence from ancient democracy. The

latter sought a "justification" for the inequality among men in the differences of souls, of function, of status, etc. To these *differences* among men must correspond political *inequalities* which political society must take in account and respect. Liberal democracy assumes the same principle of inequality but bases it on differences of economic force and technology.<sup>8</sup>

*Man himself, in his existence, is reduced to a thing; he's been made an object. The relations among men are no longer relations among subjects, among persons. It is no longer only things that are the object of appropriation and instrumentalization; it is also men. They are thingafied. The value of man is measured by his usefulness in the market: again, having appears as the measure of being.*

In the original liberal tradition, this usefulness was and still is measured by criteria linked to human *activity*: what does he produce, what does he consume, what profit does he yield? Today, the step has been taken that puts *man at the very heart of his existence on the scale with other goods*. One chooses between the child and consumption; studies of the market are made to see whether it is profitable or not to prolong the life of old people, of deviants, of the handicapped. Is their existence profitable for society? Can they find employment? Man has no right to existence unless he is useful in the mechanics of the market. Is it useful, for example, for the medical world to maintain the life of the incurably ill?<sup>9</sup>

Recently, the president of a representative assembly suggested a very bold measure of social economy. He wanted all pregnant women to undergo amniocentesis. If a malformed fetus were discovered in any of them, they would be faced with a dilemma: either abort the fetus or bring it to term and keep it. In the latter case, however, the public coffers would not be used in any way to help the parents care for and rear their child.

One sees there how new problems arise that limit operational research wherever human existence is reduced to being just one parameter among others.

One will notice also *a change of relationship of man to his own body*. The latter itself is treated as a thing, and this in two ways.

On the one hand, if he has the power to do so, the individual makes an instrument of his body. All the better for this individual if he can exercise without reserve his right of private property over this corporeal thing that is useful to him. The individual, then, will treat his body as a source of the maximum individual pleasure which he can get out of it and demand the same treatment from medicine and society. The doctor, in particular, will have to "give pleasure" to his

clients. We recognized here one of the central themes developed by the hedonist tradition, especially by the neo-Malthusian current, which sees the relationship to the body from the *viewpoint of a master*.

On the other hand, he who is strongest induces the weakest to look upon their bodies from the *point of view of the slave*. And he can do this in two ways.

First, he can proceed with a *hedonist* option. Here we allude, not only to all the present manifestations of permissiveness, but also to eroticism with its network of charters and clubs. It is notorious, for example, how in the Orient children and adults of both sexes are provided for grazing to lustful clients coming from rich countries. These can satisfy their most lurid passions with prostitution mixed with violence.<sup>10</sup>

But the strongest will also be able to treat the bodies of others in a utilitarian fashion, which is of more direct interest to us. If the individual isn't strong enough to impose his will during life's competition, his body will be less and less at his disposal, after and even before his death. The body is exposed to "cannibalization."<sup>11</sup> "Cannibalization" means taking an old machine apart in order to recover from it parts that are still usable. Thus some old cars contain parts that will serve in the repair of another car and keep it in running condition.

Now the term has been applied to the human body, sometimes in a context of horror. The press related from time to time that in Muslim countries women are condemned to be stoned for adultery. What is not well known is that during the war between Iraq and Iran the blood of some culprits was mostly drained out to be transfused into the wounded . . .

In a general fashion, the human body tends to be looked upon as a reservoir of spare parts which society or "stronger people" can use. The meaning of the body as an integral part of the person is blunted. On the one hand, in many Western countries, recent laws presume that, as soon as death has arrived or the person is declared dead, the body is at the disposition of society. Let us understand well: it is not a matter of calling into question the use of grafting nor the existence of computerized networks watching for "good donors" in accident victims. But the almost total absence henceforth of legal protection of the deceased's body and the sometimes doubtful and risky conditions under which transplants are obtained justify real worries. On the other hand, the poor of the Third-World sell their blood or their kidneys to international commercial channels.

Thus in the spirit of liberal ideology, it is not necessary to show

consideration for the body of a poor person. Whether he engages in commerce with his body in prostitution, or sells some of its organs, the poor person bows before the interpretation of the law of the market given by liberals, and he attests to the fact that he looks upon his body from the viewpoint of a slave. In either case, only the spectre of AIDS gives pause to reflect.<sup>12</sup>

In summary, cannibalization has begun on the level of individuals: in a first stage, they are interchangeable to the extent in which they correspond to the requirements of the means of production. It is logical that cannibalization will be extended from individuals to their organs.

### *On the Level of Developing Countries*

Among the consequences entailed by the liberalist cult of the market in countries of the Third-World, several points deserve to be made; they are all linked to the function of multinational companies.<sup>13</sup>

We must first speak of an autochthonous bourgeois minority being bought by the Western business century. The process is known, but it is ingenious enough to spend a little time on it.<sup>14</sup>

It happens that this minority represents but 5% of the population but retains nearly half of the revenues. This "elite," as they often call themselves, gives in to imitating people; it immerses itself in ostentatious consumerism. Their consumerism will take on all the "signs" that often insolently express a very high social status; yet these signs reveal the inequalities that call for correction. The middle class is not formed or doesn't express itself. National savings are not accumulated or rather are amassed badly; disposable capital is exported to mother countries or financial paradises.

It gets worse! On the internal level, this minority controls the *decisions* relative to production and directs the economy *to serve their own particular interests*. Now this minority will find no profit in an economy that aims at satisfying the essential needs of a population which, by definition, is mainly poor. It wants to increase its own wealth, the exterior signs of its success and of its power. It turns economic life away from its natural principal end, the production of goods according to the basic needs for living of *all* men.

We are witnessing, then, a twofold process: the monopolization of production and the diverting of the economic dynamic, which normally has, nonetheless, a double trait: responding to primary needs and ameliorating the conditions of labor.



It is for these reasons that this kleptocratic minority organizes the nation's production for the sake of profits that are found, above all, outside the country. It will sell, then, to foreign markets the natural resources that too few local workers are apt to value. (In passing, let us remember that, with the exception of sources of energy, these natural resources tend to run out.) The minority will also organize the production of manufactured goods and even of equipment for export: "We have to get our money back at any price."

Obviously the development of exports, when they are diversified, is an excellent thing for a country. It can entail reasoned enterprises, a lessening of unit prices, a raise in salaries, a reduction of parasitical manual labor, etc. Since part of what is produced is consumed locally, a more affordable price for local consumers will follow, as well as an improvement in the standard of living and a greater ability to import. That is exactly what happens in countries like Belgium or Switzerland. Unfortunately, that is not what happens in the Third-World. Products offered for export are distributed locally very little or poorly, and the advantages flowing from such production are monopolized by a kleptocratic minority drugged by the mania to concentrate revenues.

On the level of big exploitation, agriculture will be organized with the same objectives in mind. This example is particularly instructive. Two extreme, apparently contradictory, cases can be presented. On one side, one will decree that "one hectare of land is needed per head of cattle." One will not see that it is possible to have a moral duty to improve productivity, but will be opposed to all agrarian reform and expel from the estates the peons who have become supernumerary as a result of a decision to exploit those who are not taken into account.<sup>15</sup> On the other side, always in the Third-World, one will mechanize excessively. But this will be done for the same reasons and with the same disastrous consequences for the peasants living in poverty. In the two cases mentioned here, decisions about production are dictated by the lure of gain, by the habit of concentrating revenues, and by indifference to the rights of the poor to the land and to subsistence.

It is, therefore, proclaimed in vain that such and such a country of the Third-World figures among the first ten industrial world powers. Such a rank is achieved thanks to exports. Now it happens that exporting attests to the precarious state of the internal market due to the internal rarity of paying customers; it is not rare that such a state shows that national production is more in the service of demand that *can be paid for* from outside the country than the will to respond to

great internal needs.

*There is, therefore, a direct relationship between the marginalization of the poor and dependence on the outside.* But this relationship is still more subtle than one habitually thinks. It goes like this: failing to integrate the poor into national society, the local "elites" must inevitably be inclined to sell raw materials and manufactured products outside the country. The poor are deprived of the normal advantages entailed by external trade. In this way a *structural* process of alienation of the economy based upon alienation of the poor in the nation's society is consolidated.

And so the "elite" is scarcely interested in expanding the internal market. If one adopts their point of view, one will understand that they complain of "higher" taxes imposed on the revenues of the fringe of the population able to pay. The members of this elite are discontented because they believe that the taxes they have to bear serve to help economically nonproductive beings. But this sentiment is only very partially founded, because the poor have in fact only a reduced access to public services. Moreover, in a general way, in developing countries, this fiscal obligation works above all by way of indirect taxes that hit the poor much more so than the rich.

The problem we are discussing certainly involves a capital economic dimension; but it is above all a moral drama.

I was recently in a developing region and visited a city which everyone knew to have some two million inhabitants. I asked my friend, an analyst attentive to our problems: "How many inhabitants are there in your city?" He gave this disconcerting reply: "About 150,000." My friend had a reason for saying this: he was speaking ironically to set in relief the fact that, in his city, only a minority was truly important; the "others" didn't count!

There we have indeed a drama, more moral than economic, in developing countries: a considerable proportion of mankind doesn't count. We again come upon our problem of "universality." Men having nothing are nothing; they belong to category of *Unmensch*.<sup>16</sup> Doing nothing of commercial value, this majority really has no existence, no status. On the fringes of economic circles, why should they be remunerated? At the most, from time to time, a gesture is made: some help arrives. Marginalized by institutions, this category of men doesn't participate in political life. Some, not being taken account of by the civil state, they don't even have existence in the eyes of the administration. Rights provided for by the Constitution don't concern them, in the best of cases, but in a purely formal fashion. As for the dominant minority, it lives in the colonial era: their eyes turned

toward the princely courts of the past, or toward what is less worthy of being imitated in the great metropolitan centers of rich countries. They co-opt among their peers leaders who afford an official cover for those who without scruples swindle a population without defense.

It is time to remember that in some countries the fortune of this minority originated in *domains*, "commanderies," "benefices" bestowed by kings on captains or high functionaries during the colonial era. These *encomiendos* or *repartimientos* have certainly evolved, but today they prolong, structurally, one of the major injustices of the colonial conquest.<sup>17</sup>

### *The Silent Partners*

Heir and beneficiary of this anachronistic injustice, today's bourgeoisie consent willingly to take over the forces of domination established in the wealthy countries. These latter, already having broad possibilities of direct intervention in the political or economic life of developing countries, also intervene in them by setting up dictatorial regimes or in supporting them.

Direct or indirect, open or discreet, such interventions have different but converging goals: to protect the interests of the transnational club of the powerful. As a corollary, they ensure the connivance of the local bourgeoisie to strengthen the transnational club's control of the affluent over the poor populations, regarded as useless and harmful, and on the work market. The poor, why worry about them?

Let us remember that organizing these clubs is not a new idea. It goes back to a very discreet counselor of Woodrow Wilson, Colonel Edward Mandell House (1858-1938), who was Wilson's silent partner and adopted a new practice in international relations. He entertained direct relationships with Balfour, Paderewski, Clemenceau, etc. The activity of this "gray eminence" soon inspired the activity of the henceforth institutionalized "gray eminences."

Already in 1919 the House succeeded in bringing together in Paris influential personalities from the United States, Great Britain and other western countries. This was the seed from which sprang the Council of Foreign Relations whose seat is in New York. Theoretically private, the influence of this Council on the external policies of the U.S. has been considerable. David Rockefeller is the president of the Council.

During World War II (1939-1945) various proposals which led to

the formation of the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund were elaborated in this Council. It was also out of this Council that the Bilderberg Circle came in 1954; its foundation was aimed at establishing an association of influential Europeans. Among the first theoreticians of this group we find Charles D. Jackson as well as David Rockefeller and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

In 1969 the latter outlined the basis and objectives of the Trilateral Commission.<sup>18</sup>

Its creation was actually proposed by David Rockefeller in 1972 during a meeting of the Bilderberg Circle, but its foundation properly speaking came about in 1973. The Trilateral Commission brings together some hundred discreet and influential people. The prospectus of the group and its "global", "worldwide" design had been explained in 1969 by Brzezinski.<sup>19</sup> It came down to this: organizing the developed countries — the U.S., Western Europe and Japan — in a trilateral entity to ensure their views in the government of world affairs. For them it is a question of security before the soaring of poor populations.

It is in this circle that limits to economic growth and limits on democracy were seriously proposed. The problem was perfectly summarized by Samuel P. Huntington: "We must come to acknowledge that there are potentially desirable limits to economic growth. There are also potentially desirable limits to the indefinite extension of democracy."<sup>20</sup>

It appears more and more clearly that these "informal" groups — I mention only two as examples — exercise a discreet but determining influence on the fundamental orientation and major decisions of the large national and international organizations, public as well as private. The activity of these groups is even made possible by some elitist and sometimes secret societies. Ranking first among these is Freemasonry, of which — let it be said in passing — George Bush is a member.<sup>21</sup> To the extent in which these societies are secret, they distort the loyalty of democratic action play and ruin the idea of *universal* solidarity. What presents a problem is that the members of these groups systematically hide an essential aspect of their personality, the unrevealable motivations that animate them, the clandestine bonds that link them. There is a permanent will to fool people about the real identity of the one who speaks, to lie by omission.

### *Toward the Liberal Alternative*

They are frequently devoted to "legitimizing" these interventions, known or hidden, by invoking the need to "contain" the influ-

ence of the antagonistic bloc (read communist) in the Western hemisphere. The reader will, of course, recognize the allusion to the doctrine of national security. This aims at protecting the nation-state and only those who benefit from its services.

Under varied forms, this ideology is always very widespread in the Third-World. Despite perestroika, it often survives even where it is not longer apparently "sponsored" by the military. From being military, a regime can in fact become civil. But it is not rare that, in this case, the military continues, in the wings, to hold the reins of power by letting civilians assume the responsibilities which its exercise involves. This shrewd strategy allows the military to remain in a stand-by position of vigilance in order to ward off any eventuality.

In this way the permanence of a doctrine particularly convenient for the wealthy minority is assured, since it allows them to direct to "communists" the well founded calls for more justice and participation.

This process of relays goes together with a gush of corruption, which it is not necessary to take up again here.<sup>22</sup>

Let us conclude, then, that the liberalist ideology of the market is not only the cause of the domination by the strongest in the central cities as well as in the periphery; it is also its deceitful "legitimization." This ideology appeals to the idea of security: we must guarantee the political condition that allow market laws to deploy their effectiveness, that is, to function without any restraint. Furthermore, it is not by accident that Hobbies is found as the common source of liberal ideology and the ideology of national security.

Thus market ideology inevitably results in a dilemma: either liberalism becomes more democratic but its essence ends being changed; or in the absence of restraint and abandoned to its dynamic, it follows its natural inclination which makes it tend toward totalitarianism.

The bourgeoisie has a regrettable tendency to forget some lessons from its own history. This one, for example: that the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 did not prevent France from foundering, four years later, in the Terror. Nor did it arm France against the Napoleonic delirium, which sank Europe in fire and blood with the pretense of placing it under the Empire of Lights.

<sup>1</sup> One can refer to this proposition in the works of Fernand Bézy, *Evaluation globale de l'aide communautaire au Rwanda* (Brussels: Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1978); "La transformation des structures économiques à Madagascar (1960-1978)," *Cultures et développement* t. XI, n. 1 (1979), 83-116; *Accumulation et sous-développement au Zaïre* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 1981); "Le nouvel ordre économique international et les relations Nord-Sud," *Etudes sur le développement intégré* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Catholic University of Louvain, 1985) 15-38; "Réflexions sur l'histoire des relations Nord-Sud," *Louvain* (Louvain-la-Neuve) January 1989, 11-13; *Rwanda. Bilan socio-économique d'un régime 1962-1989* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Catholic University of Louvain, 1990).

<sup>2</sup> On the worldwide inequalities among the various "worlds" and in this one, see Pierre George, *Géographie des inégalités* (Paris: PUF, 1981). See also our treatment above, Ch. 1, Table 1 and Ch. 4 Table 4.

<sup>3</sup> This dynamism and its consequence for the Third-World have been put in relief by Edem Kodio in *L'Occident. Du déclin au défi* (Paris: Stock, 1988), as well as by Serge Latouche, *L'occidentalisation du monde* (Paris: La Découverte, 1989).

<sup>4</sup> On unemployment, cf. Edmond Malinvaud, *Un réexamen de la théorie du chômage* (Paris:

Calmann-Lévy, 1982); R. Salais, N. Baverez and B. Reynaud, *L'invention du chômage* (Paris: PUF, 1996); Anne-Marie Grogner, *La productivité. Progrès social ou source de chômage?*

Paris: Dunod, 1984).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Ernest Dichter, *Handbook of Consumer Motivations. The Psychology of the World of Objects* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); Vance Packard, *La persuasion clandestine* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1958); Jean-Noel Kapperer, *Les chemins de la persuasion. Le mode d'influence des médias et de la publicité sur les comportements* (Paris: Dunod, 1984).

<sup>6</sup> On this subject cf *supra* Part II, Ch. II: *The Dropouts of Expansion* and *infra* Part II, Ch. V: *Indebtedness*.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Figaro Magazine* Nov.2, 1985, 96-99.

<sup>8</sup> See Robert Reich, *L'économie mondialisée* (Paris: Dunod, 1993).

<sup>9</sup> One can refer to this proposition in the work of Jacques Attali, *L'ordre cannibale. Vie et mort de la médecine* (Paris: Grasset, 1979); see also the interview with Attali in note 16 of Ch. II of Part I.

<sup>10</sup> On the condition of women in Asia one can refer to Marianne Katoppo, *Compassionate and Free. An Asian Woman's Theology* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981); Yayori Matsui, *Women's Asia* (London: Zed Books, 1989). See also note 3 of Ch. VI, Part II.

<sup>11</sup> In this sense the word was acclimatized in French by Jacques Attali, see note 3 of this chapter. In this area, the escalation of monstrous practices is perhaps seriously in progress, even if the information advanced by the press has to be confirmed. The latter announced recently the existence of associations organizing the adoption of poor and even handicapped infants; the rumor has been insistently spread about that sometimes these infants are stolen from their mother. Moreover, according to a tenacious rumor, some of these infants would be destined for dismembering in order to provide fresh organs to specialized companies. Very curiously, this rumor has also come at almost the same time from Paraguay, Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, China, Cuba and Colombia. This rumor has been consistent enough to justify an inquiry on the part of the Commission on Human Rights of the UN. Cf. the press conference held at Geneva by Asbjørna Eide, expert of the UN, related in *La Libre Belgique* (Brussels), August 10, 1988. The same agitation in Italy, according to *El País* (Madrid), Sept. 24, 1994. On Paraguay cf. *Le Monde*, August 11, 1988; on Guatemala see *New Exchange* (cited in note 26 of Ch. I Part I), n. 94, (February 1987) 20. *Le Monde* returned several times to this matter which requires more clarity; see, e.g., August 6, October 23 and November

24, 1988; May 8, 1992; September 3, 1994 (China); August 17, 1985 (Colombia); etc. Attention is called for to the lines separating adoption, slavery, prostitution, dismembering, etc. See the dossier "Ils font des enfants pour en tirer des 'pièces de rechange'," *Europe Today* (Brussels) n. 78 (July 1, 1991) 12 f.

<sup>12</sup> See for example the file compiled by Anne Jeanblanc, "Sang: un commerce qui fait peur," *Le point* n. 799 (January 11, 1988), 54-60.

<sup>13</sup> The cause of multinationals as an expression of liberal capitalism is pleaded notably by Robert Hessen, *In Defense of the Corporation* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1979), as well as by George Gilder, *Wealth and Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1981).

<sup>14</sup> On the behavior of the "elite" in the Third-World see AHMED Baba Miské, *Lettre ouverte aux élites du Tiers-Monde* (Paris: Sycamore, 1981).

<sup>15</sup> An analysis of the Brazilian peons can be found in Olivier Colombani, *Paysans du Brésil* (Paris: La Découverte, 1987).

<sup>16</sup> This category was brought into focus by Naziism. Among the theoreticians who elaborated it are Karl Binding (lawyer) and Alfred Hoche (doctor), authors of work, too often passed over in silence today, devoted to *Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Leben* (Leipzig, 1920). An english translation of it was published in *Issues in Law and Medicine* (P. O. Box 1586, Terre Haute, IN 47808-1586) vol. VIII, n. 2 (Fall 1992) 231-255 (Binding's text) and 255-265 (Hoche's text). See also the work of Stephen Trombley, *The Right to Reproduce. A History of Coercive Sterilization* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), on Binding and Hoche 145 ff. On these same authors see Fredric Wertham, *A Sign for Cain. An Exploration of Human Violence* (New York; Warner Paperback, 1973) 157 ff; Robert J. Lifton, *Les médecins nazis* (Paris: Laffont, 1989) 65-67, 79, 130.

<sup>17</sup> On the *encomiendas* see E. Wallerstein, *The Modern World System. Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974) 9-94 and passim. On the attitude of the Church concerning an aspect of the problem we are touching on here see Jean Dumont, *L'Eglise au risque de l'histoire* (Limoges: Criterion, 1982), esp. the chapter devoted to "L'Eglise, oppresseur des Indiens d'Amérique?" 111-167.

<sup>18</sup> On the Trilateral Commission see Hugo Assmann (ed.), *A Trilateral. Novo fase do capitalismo mundial* (Petropolis: Vozes, 1979). See also the works of Perloff and W. Jasper in note 30 of Ch. V of Part I.

<sup>19</sup> See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages. America's Role in the Technetronic Era* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970); the edition is dated as of 1969. Cf. also George Valance, *Les maîtres du monde. Allemagne, Etats-Unis, Japon* (Paris: Flammarion, 1992).

<sup>20</sup> See the astonishing work of Michael Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy. Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: University Press, 1975).

<sup>21</sup> According to the article of Antonio Socci, "Loggia-glasnost," in *Il Sabato* (Milan) April 14, 1990, 46-48.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. *Supra*, 6 f.

## CHAPTER IV

# WHERE DOES THE MALTUS QUESTION STAND?

Historically speaking, Malthus (1766-1834) wasn't perhaps as anti-birth as we so often hear, and the specialists in his work have obvious reason to shed light on this point. However, as frequently happens, Malthus was not able to control the use made of his work. It is not, therefore, excluded that those who used this work have over interpreted, slanted or even deformed the thought of the celebrated demographer. Let us be clear here that we are not engaged in the historian's work. What interests us is the way in which Malthus' work was perceived and the use — be it deformed — to which it was put by the liberals. If one loses sight of this prior statement of method, serious misunderstandings could soon result.

### **Man in the Planetary Supermarket**

In a society pervaded with the evils that we have mentioned, the implacable liberal logic of the market is made *general and extended to the entirety of human relations*. Competition is pushed to such a point of exacerbation that all the relationships among men are plagued by the dominant, even exclusive, concern of survival. Individuals and groups feel themselves *threatened on every side*.<sup>1</sup>

#### *The Starving and Destitute*

The wealthy see the poor as a threat to their subsistence: what someone else has I am deprived of. They remain prisoners of the Malthusian perspective: the (food) resources are what they are, and man has hardly the possibility of increasing their quantity. They



feign ignorance of the fact that the discoveries made over a century ago, in all vital areas of research, have changed the very *nature* of the problem of poverty.<sup>2</sup>

This is particularly flagrant in the field of foodstuffs: agronomists have changed the *nature* of hunger. This is no longer a problem of poverty, itself tied to the mediocrity of output which man would not have had control of. All these technical problems are solvable, indeed solved — and with what mastery! — by agronomists. One must take in account always that we are talking about surplus: what is lacking is a paying clientele. And so the problem of hunger appears essentially linked at present to political will.

And that is at once *encouraging* (for it means that humanity henceforth has control of the problem) and *disquieting* (for it appears evident, better than in Malthus' time, that human beings can refuse to put their discoveries and technology at the service of the entire human community). By dint of highlighting reference to the "natural laws of the market," to the "scientific" laws of the economy, to its "necessity" and "determinism," the liberal tradition contributed toward hiding the *political* nature of development. It played down the importance, nonetheless fundamental, of deliberation, decision making, man's essential intervention — briefly responsibility.

What do we, in fact, see in Third-World countries? One holds as essential Malthus' diagnosis and cultivates, because of the market's biased ideology, the anachronism of the situation described by the famous Anglican pastor. What do they do? They apply to this situation, which technically speaking, is radically changed, the remedies aimed at urgently curtailing births among the poor by having recourse to very sophisticated means. *The technique is put to work for the control of the poor — the famous "check" of the poor — not for their improvement.* At the same time, the ideology continues to entertain a fear which, on the capital point of survival, is henceforth void of all basis. The wealthy, thinking themselves threatened, seek the expansion of their power. Consequently, they arm themselves, and their measures involve a repertoire that goes from private militia to a "health" network organized on a worldwide scale in order to select, to "contracept," to sterilize, to "contragest," to abort.<sup>3</sup> In such a society what triumphs is the law of the mightiest; the *appetite for society*, so natural to man, is frozen: the law of the jungle alone rules.

### *Misfortune for the Useless!*

Now, just as the law of the market, for the liberals, ends in developed countries by giving man the same weight as other goods,<sup>4</sup> so

this same law ends in Third-World countries *by giving men the same weight as the conveniences of national and big city consumers*. They don't reason from the needs of poor populations, or from their legitimate aspirations, or from their rights, and even less from the obligations of strict justice that the wealthy should have toward the poor. One asks how can we *calibrate* quantitatively and soon qualitatively this poor population, in such a way that it will suffice for the service of consumers without letting the poor step over a threshold where it might besiege the table found all prepared. . .

Thus, from another angle, we see the link that exists between the unemployed of countries said to be developed and the "unwelcome" ones who people the Third-World. What defines both is their "uselessness" in the immense supermarket that has become worldwide. For the liberal ideologues confuse society and the market. From the market as the governing factor, the nonproductive, in the broad sense of the term, are necessarily excluded. Besides, it wouldn't be normal or just for the parasites to be remunerated; which clearly means we have to work in order to live. But what the liberals forget in their ideological representation of the market is that society has a duty to sustain the involuntarily or accidentally nonproductive, which is quite another thing from maintaining parasites. One can be destitute for very diverse reasons. In virtue of the well known principle of subsidiarity, society must take care that the nonproductive of today can reach the point as soon as possible of ensuring their own sustenance. The principle of subsidiarity cannot allow for making general a system of dependence, even less of exclusion, an insult to human dignity. Liberal ideology is wrong in reducing society to an immense market, the place of unbridled greed.

In the best Malthusian tradition, some liberals are not embarrassed by these distinctions. They identify nonproductive people with parasites. Without delay, they insist that the nonproductive people, *whoever they may be*, must be treated in the same fashion. It follows, for example, that, for them, the involuntarily unemployed, as the other unwelcome people, have no right to be helped.

The security of the wealthy, admitted as consumers because they can pay, requires in effect containing the poor population within the limits defined in terms of their usefulness to the affluent, not in terms of the inalienable rights of the poor. It is even necessary to keep these poor people from awakening their awareness lest they be incited to seek their liberation. Alienated they are; alienated they remain!

Thus in the market ideology, *the demands of justice are reduced to those of commutative justice alone, which overruns the whole field of ethics.* The idea of distributive justice and, for greater reason, that of social justice are absent from the Malthusian horizon. Such is the poisoned heritage that the former colonizers, snug in their big cities, have left to the bourgeoisie of the Third-World.

### *The Apologue of the Banquet*

The liberal ideology of the market already underlay the famous *Apologue of the Banquet*, which Malthus expounded only in the second edition (1803) of his *Essai sur le principe de population*.<sup>5</sup> Here is the text:

He who is born in a world already occupied, if he cannot obtain the wherewithal to subsist from his parents from whom he has the right to demand it, and if society has no need of his work, does not have the least right to claim the least bit of food; and in fact he is in the way in this world. At the great banquet of nature, there is no place laid for him at all. Nature signals to him to go away, and it will not delay in executing its command, if he does not win the pity of the guests. If they rise and make a place for him, many other intruders will present themselves asking for the same favor. Once the news gets around that they give help to all comers, the room will soon be filled with a crowd begging for the same. The order and harmony of the feast will be troubled; the abundance that reigned before will change to scarcity; and the happiness of the guests will be destroyed by the spectacle of misery and humiliation displayed all around the room and by the unwelcome clamor of those who are with reason furious at not finding the help they had been led to hope for. The guests recognize too late their error of opposing the execution of the strict orders the mistress of the feast had given against the admission of all intruders, for, wishing abundance to reign among all the guests and knowing the impossibility of treating a limitless number of individuals, she had humanely refused to admit newcomers to her already full table.<sup>6</sup>

In this text there neatly appears the priori anthropological and ethical choices that form the foundation of the market ideology: all do not have the same rights; the only ones who have rights are those who are strong enough to impose themselves; might makes right. What governs the relations between the guests and the poor, who, like Lazarus, jostle around and compete for the table, is simply the logic of the market. They say that there is, not only a scarcity, but also a severe penury of foodstuffs; nature has provided only for a limited

number of individuals, and the more robust, the strongest have access. They make clear, in a generalizing Malthusian and soon Darwinian perspective, that nature wanted to bring about a selection of the "best" through the "struggle for life." The same nature that chose not to provide enough food for everybody also wanted the strongest to have access to it. By means of this reductive reference to nature, Malthus, then, puts in parentheses what man has as his own: his intelligence and free will through which he can free himself from fatalism and act on nature. On the contrary they *reverse the roles*: man's action must consist in helping nature work its pitiless selection!

Malthus was logically faithful to himself in declaring immoral parochial laws aimed at aiding the poor. Those who claim to help the poor by maintaining the market economy go against logic and accentuate this immorality; they cannot but disturb the whole system. Malthus did not even foresee their being able to recover enough superabundance for "help" even at the end of a tortuous process.

### **Control of Life, Control of Death**

Let us note, in short, that already with Malthus, the final stake in competition is, not simply foodstuffs, but *life* itself which foodstuffs condition.

#### *Destructive Competition*

Competition, which on a first reading has as its objective access to foodstuffs, manifests on a second reading that it aims at life itself. The natural selection, that operates thanks to the struggle for life, reveals that the concern for security in nourishment is but the expression of the fundamental concern for security of life or existence. If I, being the strongest, have control over foodstuffs, I have by that fact control over the life of others. Here clearly is shown the possible connection between the use of agronomy, on the one hand, and the biomedical and demographic sciences, on the other.

Let us go still further: if I am master, if foodstuffs have become the object of my private appropriation, I can use them and abuse them; I can destroy them, and this in two ways: by consuming them or by wasting them. What constitutes the characteristic of a master is the power to act, the ridiculous power to destroy, to destroy arbitrarily, for pleasure, to assert oneself: we're very close to the world of Sade. If this power extends over others, if I perceive another as my property, as an extension of myself, I can use him and abuse him. I can destroy him. Among others, the genocide of Indians in many regions of Latin America tragically illustrates our expose.

Now it is a contradiction for aspiration to mastery to limit itself: mastery logically involves an aspiration to totality. There is none but total mastery; as Nietzsche had seen, the very idea of shared or limited mastery is unacceptable. Such aspiration drives out even the idea of reciprocity : the master is the measure of himself and others.

We must, therefore, conclude that the spiral that involves the master's monopolizing foodstuffs entails the exercise of domination over others' lives, whether mediately, precisely by way of foodstuffs, or directly, by attacking their physical or psychological integrity. Mastery over life or mastery over death: two different ways of speaking of the same domination of men.<sup>7</sup>

### *The Dilemma of the Master*

This logic of competition till death has been analyzed by an illustrious contemporary of Malthus, namely Hegel, in his famous dialectic of the master and the slave. Today, the totalitarian trend of liberalism offers a gripping illustration of the Caesar-like vision of the world and history, developed by Hegel, in which the lord alone is free. We know that the first moment of the dialectic unfolds the struggle of the master and the slave, and the triumph of the master. Now, since this takes place at the very beginning, Malthus sees the relation of the master to the slave from the viewpoint of the master. He needs the slave to consume, that is, to annihilate or destroy what the slave produces, and the slave is stripped of it, "alienated" from it. Now the thirst for consuming on the part of the master has no limit: the more he consumes and destroys the more this thirst is re-kindled and aroused. The master then has more and more need of the slave to remain master. He cannot wish that the slave no longer remains a slave: the slave is necessary to the master. Now the more the slave produces the more he might become aware of his dignity and the more, consequently, he becomes dangerous to the master. The slave cannot grow in awareness of his being except to the detriment of the master's being.<sup>8</sup>

Understood that in this philosophical perspective *being is not shared*, there is no place at all for participation in sharing being. Therefore, the slave cannot be perceived by the master except as a threat blocking the expansion of the master's self, as hostile to the master. Master and slave have no sharing of existence at all, or any acknowledgment of liberty. The same goes for possessing: whatever the slave would have is the measure of the master's plundering.<sup>9</sup>

To remain master, he must necessarily accept the dilemma: either as master to live on the level of Caesar, to impose himself; or to run

the risk of dying. The master cannot perceive the slave but as a condition of his own free existence and/or as a threat of death constantly hanging over this free existence itself. All the while thinking of the state, Hegel thus pushed to its convulsive point his reflection on the prototype of the individual of modern times: the "conquering bourgeois," direct ancestor of the superman driven, like him, by the ethic of the lord.<sup>10</sup> Hegel assures us, besides, that the Caesar-like destiny of states would obey the same logic: and contemporary history brings us the cruel confirmation of that. Liberal ideology has the same deep roots as the philosophies of death. It doesn't have a future because it exalts the power to destroy.

## A Logic of Exclusion

### *Security as the Foundation of Rights*

It is this same logic of competition till death, always seen from the viewpoint of master, which, first applied by Malthus to the field of foodstuffs, is now *extended to all economic an social goods*, to knowledge, to know-how, to the very rights of man — in short, to human life in all its dimensions.

Thus market ideology brings forth today bitter fruit: the obsessive fear for demographic security. What is reinterpreted are the two famous themes of Hobbes: *Homo homini lupus* and *Bellum omnium contra omnes*. More explicitly, the central underlying thread of thought here is very simple: "We the wealthy are in danger of death. Hence all is permitted and therefore legitimate. We find ourselves in a state of war with the poor. Consequently, faced with the necessity of survival, there is no longer freedom of choice: we must eliminate the rights of others, of those who are a menace to us. More precisely, there is an inexorable demographic determinism that makes the poor multiply and besiege the wealthy. There is, therefore, necessarily hostility between the rich and the poor. The poor must be combated in the name of our right to live (and to possess). *Our security is the basis of our right.*"<sup>11</sup> For a greater reason it would be evil to aid my enemy." Instead of speaking of the rights of others that must be recognized, freely and mutually, the rich figure out their interests and as a consequence calibrate the eventual rights of others — or rather their non-rights.

We are witnessing a violent and security-conscious regression that bars the way to any appeal to free recognition. An eminently reactionary attitude, for doesn't the poor populations emergence, with the force they manifest, compel the wealthy and the rich nations to

review their characteristic discriminatory and egotistical conception of justice and right?

Let us remember that the relative rarity of goods is at the psychological origin of the market's institution, and more precisely of the interpretation given it by the liberal tradition. The spectre of the relative rarity of goods which we need engenders a feeling of insecurity, and to ward off this problem, one devotes himself to concentrating wealth (especially patrimonial wealth), and this concentration in turn causes poverty. Now that scientific and technological progress has made it possible to resolve the problems of survival and subsistence as much as one wishes, one inhibits this very wish by encouraging among the wealthy the deceitful conviction that they find themselves in the precarious situation of the guests gathered at the Malthusian banquet.<sup>12</sup>

The Malthusian theme of hunger has been inflated and one has substituted for relative scarcity the scare of destitution which it is "natural" for the strongest to try to escape. To aggravate the dramatization of this penury, they also present affairs as though everyone wanted the same things at the same time!

But he who says penury also says insecurity. There is, they say, an inevitable *disproportion* between men and goods, between needs and the possibility of satisfying them. The conclusion to be drawn is clear. In the foodstuff market envisaged by Malthus, the rich have access to a loaded table, not the poor though. In the *general market*, the paying population has access to a broad range of goods, products, moreover, that serve their needs, their desires, their security, their will to power, the symbolism of their social status. The poor do not have access to these goods. Nothing, in fact, is free in any sense of this term; everything is sold, is bought, is paid for: man attains his full stature only with his ability to pay. The citizen, is the bourgeois able to pay, whose political role is prorated on the basis of his economic power and regulated by suffrage by qualified property holders. This situation points to the ruination of the idea of universality. Consecrated for a long time in the West by law, it *practically* persists in all the Third-World countries.

### *A Perversion of International Relations*

To make official the trend we have just described, liberal market logic involves a perversion of international rights and relations. In fact, it is the same with relations among societies as with relations among individuals: evolution is accomplished by way of the natural selection whose effectiveness can be reinforced by the voluntaristic intervention of man.

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) devoted himself to showing that some societies, some social *organisms*, adapt and succeed where others fail, cease to be useful, atrophy and disappear. Thus were set forth the biological "justifications" of liberalism, not within nations, but among nations. Here we are going to find once again the market in all its splendor. We will limit ourselves to a few very brief remarks that will permit us to get a glimpse of some of *contemporary imperialism's* mechanics.<sup>13</sup>

The liberal market logic sanctions the success of the strongest, of those who, in one way or another, can *meet the price*. The *agreements* concluded within the framework of this logic will inevitably reflect the interests of the strongest; one is often able to speak of "leonine," or one-sided, contracts. "Just" is the price paid for such goods in a market of free competition dealing first of all in essential goods. This means that the *very idea of justice is related to a relationship of unequal forces* and that the definition of justice will result from the voluntary determination of the strongest. Thence follows the definition of liberty and its content: liberty par excellence will be that of commerce and competition, with their corollary, the right of free circulation of goods. Now in its exercise, this liberty of competition is always the expression of the will solely of the party able to say *yes* or *no*. All talk about the rights of man and peoples to arrange their own affairs will not come into play here except as a "fig leaf" hiding the reality of the relations among unequal forces. This phraseology is contradictory, besides: in the framework of liberal ideology, one cannot declare at the same time his attachment to the liberal market economy and to the universal extension of the rights of man. The presuppositions are incompatible.

In the relations among peoples, attention will not be directed first of all to the rights of all men and their most elementary needs. In fact, on the international level also, it will be necessary to look toward guaranteeing the proper functioning of the market. Unequal international relations simply continue, then, the unequal relations within nations, which facts consecrate and law sanctions.

### *To Celebrate the Golden Calf*

We must conclude that, in a general fashion, the liberal market ideology presses toward excluding from the economic circuit and public life those who do not produce, who can't pay, and who cost. Under the banner of liberal ideology, we are hurtling toward a society from which the poor and feeble will be excluded.

How will that translate in practice? In industrialized countries,



one has recourse above all to abortion and progressively to euthanasia. The idea of *distress*, so often invoked in this context, camouflages the wish to make the utility and interests of one individual prevail over the existence of another individual. In developing countries, one is no longer content — if we may so express ourselves — with letting the mechanisms maintaining hunger at the chronic level act “naturally.” One proceeds with campaigns less and less discreet, often mixed with blackmail and sometimes coercion, promoting abortion and sterilization. In some factories of Latin America, women are required to present a medical certificate of sterilization when they apply for employment.<sup>14</sup>

*The proper functioning of the liberal market demands means of fail-safe efficiency.* That is why we can no longer depend on natural selection operated by positive and negative brakes which Malthus favored.<sup>15</sup> In the spirit of Galton, we must establish, even impose, *artificial selection*. This will be applied to such and such a segment of the population which accurate demographic studies will have designated as a target by reason of its poverty; it has recourse to modern techniques offering an effectiveness free of risks.

When all is said and done, the same liberal market ideology strives, both in developed and developing countries, urgently to plan the production of men. From before their birth children are already merchandise. *One produces men according to an arithmetic of utility or pleasure*, without taking into account the needs, less still the rights of all, beginning with the right to life. In this option, the notion even of parasite has returned: the parasites are, not the more or less lazy rich, but the poor.

In short, with its *pitiless conception of the market*, liberal ideology leads to subordinating man to things, to making things sacred, and, therefore, to sacrificing man's dignity to them. Those who live according to this logic make of their existence a celebration of the Golden Calf, and, with different rituals, it is to this same idol that the weakest — beginning with women — are sacrificed in the Third-World as well as in industrialized countries.

<sup>1</sup> On the question which we are about to discuss see Ester Boserup, *Evolution agraire et pression démographique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1970); Idem, *Population and Technology* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981); Fernand Bézy, *Démographie et sous-développement* (Louvain-la-neuve: Catholic University of Louvain, 1974); Idem, “Démographie: frein ou moteur du développement?” *Bulletin des facultés catholiques*

de Lyon, n. 56 (July 1979) 19-29. Cf. also the works of J. L. Simon as well as Peter Bauer, *The Development Frontier* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); and *Population Growth and Economic Development: Policy Questions* (Washington: National Academy Press, 1986). From his side, Friedrich A. von Hayek also saw in the growth of population a factor of development and prosperity. See *The Fatal Conceit. The Errors of Socialism* (London: Routledge, 1988), of which a Spanish translation exists: *La fatal arrogancia. Los errores del socialismo* (Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1990). Special mention must also be made of the summary elaborated by José Manuel Casa Torres, *Población, desarrollo y calidad de vida. Curso de geografía de la población*, I (Madrid: RIALP, 1982).

<sup>2</sup> The position of the Catholic Church on demographic problems has been expounded in the brochure of the Pontifical Council for the Family, *Evolutions démographiques. Dimensions éthiques et pastorales* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> On the inevitable relationship between Malthus' theses and the trend toward violence see f. Wertham, *A Sign for Cain*, 99-113.

<sup>4</sup> See above Ch. V of Part I.

<sup>5</sup> This famous Essai had been published for the first time in 1798 without the author's name. He benefitted from the excellent translations of Eric Vilquin, *Essai sur le principe de population* (Paris: PUF, 1980). On the celebrated work of Malthus see Jacques Dupaquier, "Avez-vous lu Malthus?" *Population* (Paris), n. 2 (1980) 279-290. See also William Petersen, *Malthus. Le premier antimalthusien* (Paris: Dunod, 1980).

<sup>6</sup> This is taken from William Goodwin, *Recherches sur la population et sur la faculté d'accroissement de l'espèce humaine*, translated from the English by F. S. Constancio (Paris: Aillard, 1821) II, 361-363. An abridged version of *Apologue du banquet* can be found on 10, note 2 of Vilquin's translation.

<sup>7</sup> See our book *Power over Life Leads to Domination of Mankind* (St. Louis: Central Bureau, 1996). See also Jacques Attali, *Au propre figure. Une histoire de la propriété* (Paris: Fayard, 1988) 490-510.

<sup>8</sup> See the expose of Franz Grégoire, *Etudes hégéliennes. Le points capitaux du système* (Louvain : Nauwelaerts, 1958) 57-61.

<sup>9</sup> The reflection we propose here can obviously be developed in different ways. It would be particularly interesting to have recourse to the analysis of *mimicry* (the mechanism of imitating and of rivalry) done by René Girard in order to proceed to an interpretative reading of the North-South relationship. In turn, this reading would lead to a renewed reading of the relationships between God and man: wishing to imitate God, man ends by projecting the image of a God jealous of his creature. This "promethean" and "lordly" vision of man — made possible by, among others, Hegel and Nietzsche — results in the revolt of man against his finiteness and leads to seeking in death the supreme expression of his freedom. Of the works of René Girard we mention here *Le bouc émissaire* (Paris: Grasset, 1982) and *Quand ces choses commenceront Entretiens avec Michel Treguer* (Paris: Arléa, 1994). There is some treatment of this subject in our work *Bioethics and Population* (St. Louis: Central Bureau, 1997) questions 142-144.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Charles Morazé, *Les bourgeois conquérants* (Paris: PUF, 1957).

<sup>11</sup> This is one of the theses underlying the works of S. D. Mumford and E. Kessel; see note 11 of Ch. IV of Part I. The argumentation of these authors means to show that, by reason of the morality it advocates, especially sexual morality, "the Vatican" (as they say) constitutes a major menace to the security of the United States.

<sup>12</sup> See the bibliography at note 8 Ch. IV, Part I and note 19 of Ch. 1 Part III.

<sup>13</sup> We have analyzed in more detail some forms of contemporary imperialism in *Destin du Brésil. La technocratie militaire et son idéologie* (Gembloux: Duculot, 1973); see esp. Cf. 6 104-123. Above all, see our work *L'avortement*, 157-176. On imperial-

ism cf. the following works: Albert Szymanski, *The Logic of Imperialism* (New York: Praeger 1981); A. P. Thornton, *Doctrines of Imperialism* (London: Wiley, 1965); Harry Magdoff, *The Age of Imperialism. The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969).

<sup>14</sup> In the *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) of October 29, 1989, Márcia Turcato mentions various enterprises that, according to the Syndicate Employees, demand proof of sterilization. Marie-France Cros has also pointed out the "Sterilization forcées au Brésil," *La Libre Belgique* (Brussels) of September 2-3, 1989.

<sup>15</sup> According to Malthus, the positive brakes are those that diminish the population once this becomes too high (malnutrition, disease, unhealthiness, etc.); the negative brakes are those that prevent the population from growing (late marriage, celibacy, etc.). See Malthus, *Essai . . .* Chapters IV and V, 41-46 and note 2 on 44.

## CHAPTER V

# TO BE A SLAVE TODAY

A prophetic task is incumbent upon us today. It consists in *denouncing the fantastic mystification* built up by the liberal market ideology, according to which no restraint intervenes to moderate its merciless character.

## A Stunning Spiral

### *Materialistic Fatalism*

We must first denounce the materialistic fatalism that forms the pivotal point of the market ideology. This ideology postulates a conception of man that expects each individual to seek inevitably his own highest profit, the most he can get. In this fundamental respect, the liberal market ideology *denies man's liberty*.

This denunciation positively calls for a re-evaluation of the primacy of being over having. Thus it would be interesting to become more aware of the different perceptions of poverty according to which societies of Catholic tradition and societies of Protestant tradition acted.<sup>1</sup> Whatever might be the conclusions to which such an inquiry would lead, it is necessary to take into account the fact that *to have* feeds division. Already St. Thomas noted that material goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time, and that it is for this reason that they are a source of disputes. And he added that spiritual goods, on the contrary, do not diminish when they are shared by many. Here it becomes clear why it is urgently necessary to go beyond the materialism that contorts western societies enough to make them ready to establish more fraternal structures.

Along the same lines, one understands better why and how, under cover of exalting liberty and initiative, the liberal ideology leads

to the death of human liberty — to the death of man. Hegel, in his famous dialectic of the master and the slave, showed that man the consumer becomes a slave of the things he consumes.<sup>2</sup> He added that, from this angle, the slave, producer of the goods offered to the master for consumption, winds up being the master of the master. When he reinterprets this dialectic, Marx goes from the consideration of the ancient slave to that of the modern proletariat. The proletariat is that which has nothing but its ability to work and its offspring. The poor of our contemporary era are those without offspring who have only their ability to work, exploited or not. Therein the contemporary poor person is prefigured in ancient society in the two modalities — symbiotic or parasitic — which the institution of slavery took.<sup>3</sup>

A celebrated text of Proudhon deserves being remembered in this regard:

If I had to reply to the following question: "What is slavery?" and replied with only one word: "It's *assassination*," my thought would be understood immediately; I would not need a long discourse to show that the power to take away from man his thought, his will, his personality, is a power over life and death, and to make a man a slave is to *assassinate* him. Why, then, can I not reply the same way, "It's *theft*," to another question, "What is *property*?" without being certain of not being understood, although the second is not but the first transformed?<sup>4</sup>

However, beginning with the analyses of Hegel, reflection on slavery has been pushed much further. In contemporary society as in past societies, the master is the slave; he is alienated. To the extent that he consumes, that is, destroys, the master becomes more and more a slave to his needs and desires. The master is swept along in a dizzying spiral that arouses his voracity. The "fronts" on which he feels threatened by the poor are various.<sup>5</sup>

### *Indebtedness*

In the ideological shackle in which, by hypothesis, it is understood that everyone fatally wishes always to have more, in which the rich wish to have and the poor risk incorporating the behavior of the rich, these rich people obviously cannot but be perceived as oppressors by the poor, and the poor cannot but be perceived as a menace by the rich. The rich like the poor are confined in the same vicious circle.

In this process of self-worshipping expansion on the part of the master, the poor — individuals or peoples — are allowed to enter in so far as they produce for the master and remain alienated from

what they produce. They cannot, therefore, benefit from the process of expansion of which they are nonetheless the principal agents.

It is not enough, therefore, to say that the technical possibility of solving the basic problems, such as that of hunger, is of no interest to the master; he is *interested in hindering* the resolution of these problems on a *universal* level. There again we see a demand of market logic, which also inclines the master strictly to limit *aid to an appropriate amount*. In effect, it is this logic, and not the requirements of justice, that prompts the master not to give aid except where it is *useful* to him, and where it is accompanied by the assurance that, in some way or other, it will return, with interest thrown in, to those who have furnished it.

More precisely, whatever may be envisaged on the internal or international level, this aid has dangerous perverse effects. Thus, examined closely, the "social" measures are shown to be "anti-social." Whether it be in the area of housing or food, of medicine or education, aid *hides* an appreciable amount of remuneration due to the poor in strict justice. One *concedes* under the form of aid what one should pay by reason of a *right* to live with dignity. For those who practice it, this way of proceeding presents considerable advantages: it permits them to exercise a constant pressure on salaries; it reduces taxes, for the aid assures fiscal tax relief for the benefit of those who grant it; it assures submission of an apathetic manual labor; it guarantees stability of a particularly docile electoral clientele.

The absurdity of these situations thus created appears especially flagrant, on the international level, in the discussions about the Third-World's *indebtedness*.<sup>6</sup> At first glance we can only wonder what sense there can be in reclaiming from the poor, whom they claim to want to help, reimbursement of sums which never reached them and which they are by definition incapable of raising. When loans are given to the Third-World countries, it is the wealthy of these countries who profit from them, but the contracted debt has to be reimbursed by everybody. And so, this problem of the debt does not concern the poor; it involves solely a fraction of the population of the Third-World that reaps profit from external loans.

We must, then, remark that discussion about the indebtedness too often masks the fact that many of the problems could and should be resolved by the leaders of the Third-World and by those who profit from the paleo-colonial situations of these regions. From the point of view of the Third-World, it is first at this level that the moral problems of indebtedness arise. If there had been more morality among the affluent of the Third-World, one could envisage without

difficulty that these countries would be set free of their obligation of reimbursement.

Moreover, it is necessary to inquire about the use of the loans. Do they generate jobs? Do they favor the production of goods of basic necessity? What relation is there between the loans and the hiding of capital in fiscal paradises? We wind up thinking that by reason of their aiding poor countries the wealthy creditor nations are in connivance with the rich people of the poor countries in an effort to maintain the internal situation, and in particular the sociopolitical status quo regarding the power of the local "elites."

## Monetary Imperialism

### *Falsification of Trade Relations*

Indebtedness is, however, but one of the most glowing expressions of a deeper phenomenon which we can call monetary imperialism. In fact, with a realistic suspicious conscience we can accuse the countries of the Third-World of squandering their goods and going into debt, when at the same time, by reason of the bias of a perverted monetary system, the wealthy people are not denied the ability to live on credit. At the present time, the amount of debt accumulated by only one country, the U.S., surpasses by far the total debt of the Third-World. How could that happen? The answer is simple: *by falsifying relationships of trade expressed in money*. From the moment the metal standard (gold) was replaced, by means of an arbitrary system in which the dollar was declared inconvertible (Nixon's decision in 1971) and the equivalent of gold, the greatest economic power on the planet was given the dreamy opportunity of intervening in the world without any inconvenience and to go into debt without suffering. That is imperialism in one of its most deceitful forms.

The United States, in effect, enjoyed an enormous advantage and, with it, its stooges (Japan, Great Britain, France and Germany): that of being able to build up deficit budgets by borrowing. Since these loans were made in dollars, it sufficed (and it always suffices) to pump more money into the economy without effective compensation (gold, products of commerce, etc.), and the nasty trick was played. During this time, poor countries had to borrow, but on different conditions. Often by reason of bad management and, above all, the encouragement toward consumption and defense provoked by wealthy countries (states as well as big businesses), these poor countries had to go into debt to the detriment of their goods, their natural resources and especially their populations as we are showing



in detail in this work. They didn't have the choice of paying in escudos, cruzeiros or zaires. For imperialism follows this profoundly disastrous contradiction in that it demands of others what it itself cannot guarantee. In these conditions, it is not astonishing that the countries of the Third-World today refuse to reimburse their debt, when they behold the bad example given by their creditors who themselves are insolvent!

Hence, one will understand very easily that the international monetary situation is at an impasse and that imperialism which caused it is faltering. The god dollar, prodigiously multiplied, becomes an unstable sign on which one no longer confers a magic value but only an uncertain probability. Without a return to equity, without the suppression of the debtor casts, no solution is possible.

### *The Curse of Inflation*

After all that has been explained about monetary imperialism, one will understand without difficulty that inflation, which is tied to it, must be considered as one of the worse plagues of the century. Liberal ideology accommodates to it to a certain point and even courts it. Inflation is, for all that, at the basis of the profound injustices that, in turn, reflect directly on population policies. *The connection between monetary imperialism, inflation and anti-birth policies forms the most formidable delayed-action bomb of our time.* If nothing is done quickly to remedy this worldwide disorder, we can be assured of a collapse whose vehemence will be without precedent in history. The population policies are generally put into practice without taking into account the demographic consequences provoked by monetary imperialism and its corollary, inflation.

In effect, in a healthy economy, founded on justice, the monetary sign should never be left to the discretion of the prince, for he always has the tendency to abuse it. In Greek antiquity, he used devaluations to finance the wars, and, to the same end, the kings of France used and abused the tax revenues.

Now inflation is flight in advance. When the outlook acts on the present in service of the desire to give birth to a better future, here we stand before an inverse attitude: one sacrifices the future to the present and *elsewhere to here*. The men of today charge the coming generation to arrange things now by falsifying the signs which serve to take reality into account and by tampering with the mechanisms that serve to regulate trade.

In current language, one has a tendency to identify inflation with a rise in prices. This manner of speaking is at once ineffectual and



perverse. Ineffectual, because it makes impossible a true analysis of the inflationary phenomenon and still more the remedies this calls for. Perverse, because this manner of speaking insinuates that in virtue of a magic power which would be inherent in it, inflation automatically bring about its own correction!

Now, inflation is not the rise in prices; it is the driving force behind this rise. It is because governments and individuals want to pay their creditors with fake monetary signs that makes inflation possible. In reality, as we have seen, the market is constituted by the meeting of supply and demand. It is still necessary that supply and demand be able to exist in a real state. Now, supply and demand are never just the addition of all the supplies and all the individual demands expressed in money. The condition *sine qua non* in order to have justice, is that the numbers used to express the decisions regarding production and consumption be accurate. Now, if the conventional signs on which rests every evaluation of needs continually varies, it is impossible ever to know where one is going. In such a situation, the worker, the new Sisyphus, is definitively insolvent. Inflation represents for him a totally unjust perpetual tax. In effect, at the moment when he receives his remuneration for work that he's already done, the monetary sign with which he is paid by way of salary and which should express the true value of his work, is itself already devalued. Here the lie runs to the aid of injustice.

This practice of inflation gives to the creator of the signs the advantage of always being ahead of him who will use this instrument. And the creator of the sign will act all the more easily as the sign itself, relieved both of its metallic support (gold, silver, etc., which are difficult to reproduce) and above all of its real compensation (the assets to which it is supposed to correspond), is multiplied at the request of the debtor!

There and then a permanent *structural* injustice is established, such as can be seen in healthy economies but where the monetary sign is in full ruin. Brazil and Argentina are eloquent examples of the problem: globally speaking, their economies are relatively healthy, but their monetary signs have been falsified. Thus Brazil, which justly prides itself on being one of the biggest industrial world powers, has an economy which would permit it to make its money healthy. But, on this socially decisive point, it is the victim of a chronic lack of political will. What happens, then to, these two countries — and to some others? They are obliged to use the silver of more "loyal" foreign monies, to make their transactions. On account of that, they find themselves at the mercy of other nations, and remain prisoners of the trap of monetary imperialism.

In effect, once a language changes its meaning, discourse hides something else, the same symbol is subreptitiously used to mean different concepts, the same word is loaded and masks the difference among the realities to which it refers: from the moment one can no longer trust symbols because crooks corrupt them and ruin conventions, all social equilibrium is shaken. That is the triumph of con men, wooden tongues and corrupted language that prepare the conditions for dictatorship.

And so a new ravaging aspect of liberal scientism appears. It does not limit itself to enthroning a *juridical* positivism, consecrating the discretionary will of the strongest. It does not limit itself to establishing and "*economicist*" positivism, "justifying" the market's being the site par excellence of pitiless selection. It also enthrones a *monetary* positivism. Here again appear the nominalist roots of liberal scientism. The value of money, divorced from reality, is determined by the prince, at the pleasure of his utility and interest . . . *Signa sunt ad placita*: the symbols vary at the pleasure of the prince — they are made to please.

*"To Incorporate the Image of the Oppressor"*

However, on a second level of reflection, we see the link between the indebtedness of the Third-World and the demographic policies to which it is due. Some poor are in fact useful, and indebtedness is an excellent occasion to bear down on them — while other poor people are downright useless and therefore harmful.

Perpetual sword of Damocles, the spectre of indebtedness comes to reinforce the need to limit the poor. Those who are useful will have to be kept at the *edge* of consumption, for if they were allowed to consume beyond a certain measure, the poor would quickly grow in awareness of their dignity. It will also be necessary to reduce to a minimum the tolerable quota of useless poor people. When the death squadrons eliminate the beggars and tramps, they disclose the permanence of violent structures. Today, however, these structures prefer the efficiency of modern methods placed at their disposal by biomedical techniques. In their most sophisticated version, the death squadrons are often men dressed in white.

In any case, it will be necessary to bear down on the poor and maintain among them a climate of vital insecurity. They must be led to consent to their own slavery. This slavery will be sealed by medical violence which will deprive them of the *only* possibility they would have of growing in the awareness of their dignity: that of producing, that of becoming pro-creators of other human beings for

whom they would be responsible.

In sum, for the poor of the Third-World, to consent to their own servitude is to be led, according to the expression of Paulo Freire, "to incorporate the image of their oppressor."<sup>7</sup> In plain language, they must ratify the "liberal" and materialistic logic of the Western headquarters.. This logic is that of not sharing having and then being. In developed societies accepted sterility often proceeds from a refusal to share. The *deliberately* single child is frequently such, because the criterion prevailing over all others is the refusal to share having. One forgets that what is lacking to many children is a brother or sister with whom they could live in fraternal communion.

The poor of the Third-World are put on notice not to transmit life — "for their own good," they are made to believe; whereas in fact, it is above all not to "disturb the feast," that of the wealthy. The poor person is thus led to regard himself as his masters see him; to identify *their* utility with his own *good*; to allow himself to be bewitched by their ideology. The poor person is managed in body and sexuality.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the classic work of Max Weber, *L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme* (Paris: Plon, 1964). Complete this by reading the work of Elise Marienstras, *Les mythes fondateurs de la nation américaine* (Paris: Maspéro, 1977).

<sup>2</sup> See Ch. IV: *The Master's Dilemma*.

<sup>3</sup> Briefly, the *symbiotic* slave is treated a little like a minor but shares the life of the master; the *parasitical* slave is one who is assigned to degrading tasks and is treated like a thing. See Ch. VII note 2.

<sup>4</sup> Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *Qu'est-ce que la propriété?* reprinted in Maxime Leroy, *Les précurseurs français du socialisme de Condorcet à Proudhon* (Paris: Ed du Temps Présent, 1948) 413 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Among the historical works devoted to slavery see I. And I. - L. Vissière, *La traite des Noirs au Siècle des Lumières* (Temoignages de négriers) (Paris: Métailié, 1982); Louis Sala-Molins, *Le Code noir ou le calvaire de Canaan* (Paris: PUF, 1987). See also Sydney Mintz (ed.), *Esclave = facteur de production. L'économie politique de l'esclavage* (Paris: Dunod-Bordas, 1981). We greet also the reprint of the reference work published in 1847 by Henri Wallon, *Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité* (Paris: Laffont, 1988). Cf. also Hugh Honour, *L'image du Noir dans l'art occidental* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989). The review *Vivant Univers* (Namur) devoted its n. 381 (May-June 1989) to *L'esclavage aujourd'hui*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. *Au service de la communauté humaine. Une approche éthique de l'endettement international* (Paris: Cerf, 1987); Jean-Claude Berthélemy, *L'endettement du Tiers-Monde* (Paris: PUF, 1990).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Paulo Freire, *L'éducation: pratique de la liberté* (Paris: Cerf, 1971); *Pédagogie des opprimés*, followed by *Conscientisation et révolution* (Paris: Maspéro, 1974).

## CHAPTER VI

# MEDICALIZING SOCIAL PROBLEMS? THE CASE OF BRAZIL

It is useful to offer here a concrete example. We could take the case of China which is becoming better and better known.<sup>1</sup> Still in the communist world, we could report the case of Vietnam, where the policy of birth control is especially implacable.<sup>2</sup> We could also analyze the case of India.<sup>3</sup>

### **Sterilization en Masse**

However, we prefer to discuss the case of Brazil, for this country seems to have, on the world level, the lugubrious privilege of presently being the twofold world champion: in the number of abortions and in the fight against fertility.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Abortions: 10% of the World Total?*

Let us begin with a news flash on abortion. According to the data received from the World Health Organization, of the 40 million abortions done in the world, 4 million would occur in Brazil, some 10% of the world total.<sup>5</sup> Whatever can be said about the reliability of these numbers, specialists of WHO emphasize that these abortions take place "under bad circumstances." From that they draw an argument for clamoring for the legalization of this intervention as well as for advocating prevention of abortion, thanks to the campaigns for contraception and sterilization. Judging from the number of abortions, we must quickly insist, besides, that the campaigns — already in full swing — are of but modest effectiveness.

### *The Fight Against Fertility*

We are going to examine now more closely what is happening in the fight against fertility.<sup>6</sup>

By the total reproduction rate we mean here "an estimate of the median number of infants born live per woman between the age of 15 and 49 years old, in a hypothetical grouping of women having had their infants according to a totaling of the rates of reproduction according to age."<sup>7</sup>

Published in July of 1988 by the prestigious and official Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), the study which we are using reveals that in 1960 this rate was 6.28; in 1970 5.76; in 1980 4.35; in 1984 3.53.<sup>8</sup> This means that in twenty-four years (1960-1984) the reproduction rate fell 43.8%; just during the period from 1970 to 1980 it fell 24.5%.<sup>9</sup>

The demographers of IBGE don't hesitate to regard this fall all the more preoccupying since the fall of the reproduction rate observed since 1980 in the poor bracket of the population was, not the consequence of conscious family planning, but the result of sterilizations on a grand scale.<sup>10</sup>

The results published by IBGE concerning married woman from 15 to 44 years old are moreover stupefying. In the following table there is shown the proportion of married women, between 15 and 44, who use anti-conception methods, according to states and regions. Added is the proportion of women sterilized out of the total number of married women.<sup>11</sup>

**TABLE 9**  
**Anticonception Methods and Sterilizations**

State & Regions	Using an anti-conception method	Proportion of Married Woman			Sterilized
		Pill	Other	Sterilization	
Brazil	64.5	38.8	19.0	42.2	27.2
Rio de Janerio	70.4	35.8	16.5	47.7	33.6
São Paolo	70.7	34.9	20.5	44.6	31.5
South	72.7	54.9	19.7	25.4	18.3
Northwest	52.8	33.0	19.1	47.9	25.3
North & Center-West	61.9	21.8	10.3	67.9	42.0
United to the Federation					
Pernambouc	56.5	26.9	12.9	60.2	34.0
Goiás	66.4	23.2	6.2	70.6	46.9

Whatever the cause, the sterilizations come under the penal code. Precisely for this reason, some of these interventions are effected "by way of a non-taxable and illegal higher cost, paid by the patient" (53). On the other hand, some of these interventions are brought about through the aid of the state. The proof is that 43% of the sterilizations performed in all of Brazil have been free and done in public hospitals of the National Institute of Medical Aid and Social Prevention (INAMPS).<sup>12</sup> In the state of Maranhão, 58% of the sterilizations were free; this proportion rose to 72% in Piauí and reached 75% in Rio Grande del Norte.<sup>13</sup>

According to the data whose study is not yet complete, public hospitals, dependent on the official INAMPS, have intervened in 37% of the sterilizations done in the state of Piauí; 41% in the state of Pernambuco; 57% in the state of Rio Grande del norte. These three states figure among the poorest in the Federation.<sup>14</sup>

This especially alarming panorama has been confirmed by Marcia Turcato: "Nearly half of the sexually active female population residing in Brasilia and whose purchasing power goes from middle to lower class has been sterilized within the last two years. The index of women using contraceptive methods reached 48.4% and is higher in the country. The index of female sterilizations in the capital, which has a population of 1.8 million, surpasses that of the state of São Paulo (38.4%) and that of Rio de Janeiro (41.4%), where the greater part of the female population is concentrated."<sup>15</sup>

There are still more astonishing facts. In a brochure that was widely distributed by the government services of the state of São Paulo, female and male sterilization is presented with a satisfaction that is badly disguised. "It is good to remember that vasectomy and tubal ligation are not yet clearly normalized in our country. Until the present, the norms concerning sterilization are found limited in the Penal Code and the Code of Medical Ethics, but these must be revised when the codes are modified."<sup>16</sup> It is clear that, as was done elsewhere, they are provoking a change in customs before a change in law. Here the public powers themselves are pushing for a change in customs and their spirit, for this must precede the change in laws. From time to time — a question of taming opinion — propositions aiming at making sterilization licit have been placed before the national congress. One of them has been submitted by deputy Neslon Seixas.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, as an anticonceptive method(!), sterilization is officially banned in Brazil. However, the least that we can say is that it is covered up by public authority and that it is even performed on a grand scale in public hospitals, frequently almost exclusively on the poor.

We learn from other data that the median age of sterilized Brazilians is 30 years old. In 23.6% of the cases, the operation is done after the birth of the second child; in 47% after the birth of the third. The same source affirms that 72% of the tubal ligations are done at the time of a Cesarean section:<sup>18</sup> evils never come one at a time — at least for the patients.

It is useless to ask for the free and enlightened consent of the poor. Most of the time they do not even know what is happening to them, and/or a mockery of consent is extorted from them. To do this one takes advantage of the fact that they find themselves in a state of shock in which they are in no condition to make a truly free and personal decision.<sup>19</sup> Such is obviously the case with women who are sterilized when they give birth. Moreover, physical aggression is aggravated by mental aggression, which aims at joining violence and lying: when massive mutilation of the poor corresponds to the interest of the rich, the latter make the poor believe that they must let themselves be sterilized “for their own good.”<sup>20</sup>

### *A Global Project: To Curb Men*

These campaigns of sterilization fit into a much larger framework: demographic planning. The least that one can say is that, faced with such projects, the present government does not have the same reservations as preceding regimes officially expressed. Brazilian authorities are perfectly aware of the numerous projects, directed above all by the United States, having as their objective demographic curbing in Brazil. The leaders of numerous states or municipalities of the Federation, as well as many private institutions, receive toward this end considerable subsidies, coming from public or private organizations. These subsidies are allocated, above all, for the control of poor populations. They are also used for the massive spread of contraception, employing all the methods (chemical, mechanical and surgical), as well as the formation of corps of agents or investigators in the matter of demographic planning.

According to a study made by the Association for Life of Brasilia, the resources coming from outside the country (above all from the U.S.) would reach “approximately 7 billion US dollars a year, given solely for family planning tied to the use of contraceptives, sterilization and training of personnel. Not included in this sum is all the money that USAID (US Agency for Development) designates for family planning.” The same study estimates that USAID’s contribution amounts to 8 billion dollars a year. Again the same source indicates that “at the same time, the total money for aid coming from the



UN's program for development channeled via WHO, OIT, FAO, UNICEF, UNIDO, etc. — aid given to more than fifty projects in all sectors of Brazil — was 6,357,800 US dollars in 1986."<sup>21</sup>

## The Doctors: Shame and Courage

### *Doctor Accomplices*

Some doctors raise their voice and organize in order to form a group whose objective is the defense of the values connected with human life, and more especially to protect the poorest people.<sup>22</sup>

But alongside them, doctors are not lacking who perform sterilizations. These doctors are impelled by two kinds of motivation, which are sometimes combined.<sup>23</sup> Some give into the attraction of monetary gain; others are salaried and are more attentive to the interests of their employer than to those of patients. Besides, it is not rare that costly laparoscopes are freely put at the disposal of the medical corps, while other elementary medical equipment is cruelly lacking. Doctors are even invited to take training courses in specialized centers in order to learn the new techniques of sterilization and to familiarize themselves with the devices used for this.

A good proportion of doctors participate in the sterilization campaigns with a knowingly bad conscience. They say, for example, "If I refuse to participate, I will lose my livelihood and that of my family." Or again, "I have no choice." Or again, "I simply execute the orders given me." In sum, they plead irresponsibility. This was precisely the reproach brought against the accused at the Nuremberg trial: to have obeyed unjust and immoral commands. When one is properly formed and informed, to invoke lack of responsibility constitutes rather an aggravating circumstance: it is an *ad hominem* argument. This is always the major grievance against war criminals who are brought to trial late for imprescriptible crimes against humanity.

Already in the sixteenth century, Boethius explained that there was no slavery but voluntary slavery. His analysis found a gripping confirmation in the experience of Stanley Milgram.<sup>24</sup> The whole question comes to this: does the doctor consent to making himself sub-oppressor: *in whose service* is he practicing medicine?

Now is the time to remember that international opinion has been for years carefully prepared for the launching of the abortifacient product called RU 486. By reason of the dangers to the women that its use presents, they assure us that using the product is strictly regulated. Nevertheless, as Dr. Jean-Yves Nau perceptively remarks, "it



remains to be seen whether the use of this abortifacient product will be the same in industrialized countries and in developing countries with high birth rates. Or whether, in other words, the authorization to put it on the French market was not an indispensable prelude to the commercialization of RU 486 in Third-World countries."<sup>25</sup>

Celebrated precedents — among them the famous Depo-Provera — show that societies of high scientific and technological skill can put into production drugs whose use is practically forbidden in the sources but widespread on the "periphery."<sup>26</sup>

### *"Nutritional Dwarfism"*

It is surprising to learn that during the period in which the birth rate in Brazil fell, particularly in the northeast, there developed in the same region another phenomenon publicized by Dr. Meraldo Zisman.<sup>27</sup> In a study dating from 1987, this doctor from Recife provided evidence of *nutritional dwarfism*, that is, "atrophy that results from nutritional deficiency."<sup>28</sup> For lack of proper feeding, infants have neither the normal size or weight. And so this researcher asserts that, "for three generations at least, the median size of Brazilians living in the sugar cane region has not stopped getting smaller. The median size today is 1.62 meters for men and 1.51 meters for women."<sup>29</sup>

Dr. Zisman also reports that, in the poor population the mean weight of the newborn is lessening, while it remains constant in the wealthy population. In 1966-1967, the mean weight of the newborn in hospitals dependent on Social Prevention was 3.145 kg. In 1976-1977, the weight went higher. In 1983-1984, it went down to 3.050 kg. For 1990, projections indicate that it should be around 2.950 kg, that is the maximum weight of the newborn of a pygmy race.<sup>30</sup>

It is difficult not to compare this data with that relative to sterilizations. As we know, reasons of social order are invoked to "justify" sterilization as a method of contraception. A woman is sterilized, for example, after two children, "to give them better living conditions" they say. Now, for the same period and for the same region, one comes to two parallel conclusions. On the one hand, we observe a fall in the rate of fecundity due, first of all, to the high rate of sterilizations. On the other hand, we see a decline in the median weight of the newborn. The least we can say is that there is no reason to advance the hypothesis according to which the decline in fecundity would perhaps have a beneficial effect on the mean weight of the newborn . . .

We will conclude that there is a double error of injustice in medicalizing economic, social and political problems. It is not on

doctors that the solving of problems of illiteracy, housing and employment rests. By allowing more freedom to doctors, by immunizing them against all sanction — even by using a part of the medical corps to put into effect such program — the public powers and the national “elite” will escape only with difficulty the suspicion of bad faith. To the degradation that mutilation *in se* constitutes is added the practical denial of the most elementary right to the conditions of a decent life. It is to insult the poor to make their sterilization appear as the necessary prologue of their development, of their liberation and of their happiness.

### *Perceptiveness and Determination*

The nutritional dwarfism analyzed by Dr. Zisman appears here as one of the many phenomena expressing the violence of structures.<sup>31</sup> This violence cannot but be accentuated by the campaigns aiming at the curbing of the poor population rather than at helping them get out of their poverty. The complicity of doctors in these campaigns brings shame to the medical profession. But for this profession as well as for all those who have power it is also a source of shame to have to acknowledge, as was done at the XXVIth Brazilian Congress of Pediatrics held at Belo Horizonte (Minas Gerais) in October of 1989, that “more than half the children under 15 live in houses without running water, and a third of them live in domiciles without sanitary installations; that half the children registered in first grade do not reach second grade and 78% of these leave school after the third year; that from 80,000 to 100,000 Brazilian children under 5 die every year from gastroenteritis or diarrhea; that 650 children die every day from illness due to malnutrition and bad living conditions; that 80,000 children have illnesses that can be prevented with vaccines, and that the most current ones are poliomyelitis and measles; that 13% of Brazilian newborns weigh less than 2.5 kg at birth; that out of 1,000 living children 68 die before reaching their first year and that 1 child out of 100 dies before reaching one month.”<sup>32</sup>

By denouncing this situation with perceptiveness and determination, Dr. Jose Maria da Silveira, president of the Sociedade Mineira de Pediatria, contributed to putting the gravity of the violence exerted by structures in its proper perspective. His words could only clarify better the cruelty of the programs aimed at using medicine to curb the poor population.

The statements of the famous pediatrician are reinforced still more by the data furnished by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) for the same time period. According to this

data, in 1975 67% of the Brazilian population suffered from lack of nutrition. Hunger touched above all the children and the salaried living in the rural areas. Even in São Paulo, the wealthiest city of the country, 25.9% of the children are undernourished, and 35.6% of them suffer from anemia, sometimes severe (14.7%).<sup>33</sup>

The ridiculous character of these programs becomes even clearer with the recent data on the inequality of income. Still according to the numbers furnished by the IBGE, the active economic population of Brazil is a strong 59.5 million workers. Now 46% of this population, that is, 27.9 million workers, earn only two "minimum salaries" each month (that is about one hundred dollars); 24% of this same population, that is, 14.8 million workers, earn but one minimum salary each month (that is around fifty dollars).<sup>34</sup>

### *Natural Planning and a Critical Awareness*

The attitude of the "elite" of the Third-World vis-à-vis methods of *natural* family planning reveals completely their state of mind. This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of this subject, but some observations are nonetheless necessary.<sup>35</sup>

We know that, despite their acknowledged effectiveness when properly used, these methods are almost unanimously denigrated or ignored by the leaders of the Third-World and/or those who can influence them. This discrepancy between the established efficacy of these methods and the non-receptive attitude they show to every project aiming at making them more widespread is obviously explained by diverse factors. The pharmaceutical laboratories and a good part of the medical profession scoff at them, less because of their failure rate which some people attribute to them than because of the enormous loss of revenue their use would entail.

But there is a deeper reason that will help us understand the fleeting parallelism between the elimination of illiteracy and the natural control of fecundity.

Paulo Freire has shown clearly that to teach an adult to read is to educate him or her "for liberty."<sup>36</sup> Teaching a person to read cannot be reduced merely to giving him the ability to read and write. It is passing from naive awareness to critical awareness: it is the discovery, by everyone, of his capacity for personal judgment, of free will, of responsibility. The adult able to read takes charge of himself and is ready, after deliberation, to make decisions to act with his fellow human beings. Such an adult is by definition capable of calling into question the society in which he lives and of transforming it: he is then "dangerous" for the keepers of the status quo, for he has

learned to reflect. An adult subjected to a purely mechanical kind of reading, on the contrary, by reason of his having learned how to read, is more exposed to the enslaving conditioning and clips of strong ideological content inculcated by the media.

The parallel with natural family planning leaps to the eye. A woman (or man) who lives her sexuality in a naive fashion is exposed to all the alienating conditioning. Inversely, a woman (or man) who lives her sexuality in a reflective manner learns very naturally to exercise her faculty of judgment and her responsibility *in every sphere* of her existence. A couple that learns naturally to control their fecundity necessarily passes from a "naive" practice of sexuality to an exercise of it that is deliberate and responsible. They are spouses who *together* discuss, deliberate, decide, project. But watch out! By educating themselves and each other in the particular area of sexuality, spouses become educated in critical awareness and in responsibility in all the other dimensions of their existence. Like learning to read properly understood, natural control of fecundity is "education for liberty." On the contrary, contraception reduced to a technique, as effective as it may be, makes those who have recourse to it more exposed to the enslaving conditioning and especially the ideological flashes with which the means of mass communication deluges them.

The conclusion that follows from all that is simple: the profound reason why natural family planning is denigrated and rejected by the "elite" of the Third-World and the big countries is not first of all of the medical order. It is essentially of the political order. A poor person, whether he learns to read or learns to control his fecundity, is inevitably called to investigate his condition. If in these two areas he attains an education respectful of the person, in the end he will be perceived as dangerous to the establishment . . .

<sup>1</sup> On this subject see I-Chaun Wu-Beyens, "Socioeconomic Discrepancies" cited in note 26 of Ch. I., and above all *Politics in the People's Republic of China. The Case of Fertility Control 1949-1986*, a doctoral dissertation in political science of 764 pages presented to the Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, March 1987. Among the abundant material concerning the population in China, the work of John S. Aird stands out: see note 26 of Ch. I.

<sup>2</sup> This policy and its consequences have been analyzed by Lam-Thamh-Liem in his article "La planification familiale au Viet-nam," *Population* 42, n. 2 (1987) 321-335.

<sup>3</sup> On India see Elizabeth Bumiller, *May You Be the Mother of a Hundred Sons. A Journey Among the Women of India* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1991) esp. Chapter V and XI.

<sup>4</sup> Let us mention here the work of Delcio da Fonseca, *Estado e População; Uma História do Planejamento Familiar no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, Rosa do Tempos and UN

Population Fund, 1993); Maria Lucila Milanesi, *O aborto provocado* (São Paulo: Livraria Pioneira Editora, 1970). Senator Odacir Soares courageously called attention to these questions in his brochure *População e Soberania Nacional* (Brasília: Sénat fédéral, 1995).

<sup>5</sup> See for example the dossiers devoted to this problem in *Folha de de São Paulo* of November 1990 and in *Diário do Nordeste* (Fortaleza) of November 25, 1990.

<sup>6</sup> This comes from a study of 66 pages published with the help of UNICEF and the Pan-American Organization of Health. Its title is *Perfil estatístico de crianças e mães no Brasil. A situação da fecundidade; determinantes gerais e características da transição recente*. It was prepared by Celso Cardoso da Silva Simoes and Luiz Antonio Pinto de Oliveira and published by the Brazilian Foundation of Geography and Statistics (Rio de Janeiro, 1988). Cf. also Maria Irene Szmrecsanyi, *Educação e fecundidade* (São Paulo: Hucitec and the University of São Paulo, 1988). See also Jose Maria Arruda, Naonni Rutenberg, Leo Morris and Elizabeth Ferraz, *Pesquisa nacional sobre saúde materno-infantil e planejamento familiar. Brasil 1986* (Rio de Janeiro: Sociedade Civil Bem-Estar Familiar no Brasil and the Instituto para desenvolvimento de recursos, 1987). A good collection on Brazil was published by J. Domingo and A. Gauthier under the title *Le Brésil. Puissance et faiblesse d'un géant du Tiers-Monde* (Montreuil: Bréal, 1988).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. *Perfil estatístico*, 25.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 25 and 32.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* 29 and 31. See also the dossier in which this problem is discussed: *Folha de São Paulo* (March 8, 1990) C-1.

<sup>10</sup> According to the weekly bulletin *Câmara informa* (Brasília) n. 644, August 20-24 1990, "deputy Ervin Bonkoski stated that in the last years more than 20 million Brazilians have been sterilized." On this question see *Relatório final da Comissão Parlamentar Mista de Inquérito* (Brasília, 1992). This report has been devoted to "the impact of the mass sterilization of Brazilian women." The Commission was presided over by deputy Benedita da Silva; its reporter was senator Carlos Patrocínio; note especially in this report "if we take into consideration the methods used by Brazilian women of child-bearing age, we see that sterilization represents 44%; that is the most widely used method; it is followed by the pill which represents 41%" (7). Sterilization is often treated like a taboo, and the media often black out the subject. Nonetheless, it is important to call attention to the reference work by S. Trombly, *The Right to Reproduce. A History of Coercive Sterilization* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988); it has important bibliography on the question in 126-271. See also R. Palmer (ed.) *La stérilisation volontaire en France et à travers le monde* (Paris: Masson, 1981); also the article of J. Y. Nau in *Le Monde* March 20, 1991, 15 ff.

<sup>11</sup> Our source is *Perfil estatístico*, Table 12, 50 and Table 13, 52.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* 54.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the weekly *Isto é Senhor* (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), n. 984 of July 25, 1988, 36.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. the daily *Folha de São Paulo* of July 21, 1988, 1-17; cf. also Oswaldo Reis, "Saúde investigará esterilização em massa," *Jornal de Brasilia* of July 15, 1990, 13. It is true that the poorest of the poor in part escape these campaigns. That partially explains the relative growth of the black population, some of whom represent the poorest and are strangers to the channels of activity and thus up till now are hardly touched by the campaigns for curbing births.

<sup>15</sup> Márcia Turcato, "Esterilização atinge 48.4% da mulheres em Brasília," *Jornal do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro) of October 29, 1989.

<sup>16</sup> See the widely distributed brochure *Como planejar a família* edited Fundação Victor Civita (São Paulo: Sistema unificado e descentralizado de Saúde do Estado de São Paulo, under the patronage of Governo Quêrcia, 1988). Our cited text comes from 28.



<sup>17</sup> Cf. M. Turcato, *Esterilização* as in note 15.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the weekly *Veja* (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) n. 1001 (November 11, 1987) 79.

<sup>19</sup> On this form of coercion see S. Trombley, *The Right to Reproduce*, 175-213.

<sup>20</sup> See for example the article, "Mulheres lutam por uma saúde melhor," *Jornal do Comércio* (Recife), August 27, 1989.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Associação Pró-Vida de Brasília, *Levantamento dos projetos de agências internacionais para planejamento familiar no Brasil*. 1985-1988 (Brasília, 1989). Directed by Dr. Humberto Vieira, the same association returned to the question of the financing of these campaigns in a study entitled *Projetos de população*. 1988-1990 (Financiados por organismos internacionais e instituições não governamentais) (Brasília, 1991). See also the *Inventory of Population Projects*, especially 59-67 devoted to Brazil.

<sup>22</sup> Dr. Talmir Rodrigues is one of those who sounded the alarm; see for example "Aumenta o número de esterilização; onde vamos parar?" *O São Paulo*, November 24-29, 1989. See also the interview with senator Darcy Ribeiro in *Veja* (São Paulo) of April 10, 1991.

<sup>23</sup> The widespread use of biomedical personnel for political ends is a characteristic of our century. On the German Nazis, the reference work comes from Alexander Mitscherlich and Fred Mielke, *Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit. Dokumente des Nürnberger Ärztenprozesses* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1962). On Japan, cf. Peter Williams and Daniel Wallace, *La guerre bactériologique* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1991). See also S. Trombley, *The Right to Reproduce* as in note 10; Robert Jay Lifton, *Les médecins nazis*; Benno Mueller-Hill, *Elimination by Scientific Selection of Jews, Gypsies and Others. Germany 1933-1945* (Oxford: University Press, 1988); Robert N. Procter, *Medicine Under the Nazis* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988). See also the various works of Yves Ternon and Socrate Helman, especially *Les médecins allemands et le national-socialisme* (Tournai: Casterman, 1973); let us point out in particular Ternon's *L'Etat criminel. Les génocides au XXe siècle* (Paris: Seuil, 1995).

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Boethius, *Le discours de la servitude volontaire* (Paris: Payot, 1976). Stanley Milgram related his experiences in *Soumission à l'autorité. Un point de vue expérimental* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1984). These experiences inspired the famous central sequence of the film *I come I care*. The reflection we offer here was deepened by appealing to the theme of the "sub-oppressor" developed by Paulo Freire. See also our *Democratie et libération chrétienne* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1986) 238 ff.

<sup>25</sup> Article of Dr. Jean-Yves Nau in *Le Monde* of September 25 and 26, 1988, 6. For the follow-up on the polemic see especially *Le Monde* of October 27, 28, 29, 30-31 of 1988, March 15, 1989, etc. The same Dr. Nau returned to this matter in "Avorter à domicile," *Le Monde* of June 21, 1989. A memorable debate took place regarding RU 486 on television: Professors Jerome Lejeune and Etienne Baulieu faced each other. The text of the debate was published in *L'Homme nouveau*, n. 956 (October 16, 1988) 10 and ff. Presented as the inventor of RU 486, Etienne Baulieu explained the history, motivation and ends of his discovery in *Génération pilule* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1990). See also B. Harradine, *The Ethics of International Bureaucracies. Abortion and the Human Reproduction Programme* (Canberra, 1990).

<sup>26</sup> On these questions and on the use of biomedical research see our Part I, Ch. V, A Report of the World Health Organization on Human Reproduction and notes 10-16. On the relations between biology and politics see *Biology as a Social Weapon* (Ann Arbor, MI: Burgess, 1977). On the "biopolitics" of the US, that is, the use of biomedical and demographic resources for political and economic ends see H. Gutman, *Work, Culture and Society in Industrializing America* (New York: Vintage, 1977); and above all D. Noble, *America by Design. Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).

<sup>27</sup> See Meraldo Zisman, *Nordeste pigmeu. Uma geração ameaçada* (Recife: Vasconcelos, 1987); this work contains an important bibliography. Some recent data has been published on this subject by *Folha São Paulo* of March 7, 1990, C-3. This data was extracted from a study of UNICEF. In this article one reads: "Malnutrition

touches 5,024 million children of less than five years of age in Brazil. That corresponds to 31% of the population in this age bracket. The Northeast region is responsible for more than half of the number of undernourished children: 2.63 million . . . In the northeast region, the child mortality index is 136 per thousand in the under five age bracket . . . Malnutrition associated with diarrhetic diseases is responsible for a third of these deaths." One also learns from this text that malnutrition, taken in isolation, is responsible for only 8.4% of deaths for the whole country. Must we not say that this situation is avoidable?

<sup>28</sup> M. Zisman, *Nordeste pigmeu*, 13.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* 15.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. *ibid.* 169 ff. and graphs 1 and 2 on 197 and 5 on 201.

<sup>31</sup> We allude here to Johann Galtung; the "tension" between the actual state of a society and its potential state is the measure of structural violence. When a newborn has the hope of a life span of 35 years under such conditions and another of 70 under different conditions, this difference of life span is tied to different conditions: the social, political and economic environment which we call precisely structural. We will return to this problem later on.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. "Mortalidade infantil no Brasil envergonha médico," *Estado de Minas* (Belo Horizonte), October 13, 1989.

<sup>33</sup> See in "Serie debate e crise do Estado," the dossier "Produção de alimento cresce menos que população," *Folha de São Paulo*, October 18, 1989.

<sup>34</sup> Data reprised by *O Povo* (Fortaleza) of October 27, 1989. On the inequalities in distribution of income see Table 1 in Part I, Ch. I.

<sup>35</sup> Of the abundant literature on the question we will cite Anthony Zimmermann (ed.) *Natural Family Planning* (Milwaukee: de Rance, 1980); Gabriele Bonomi, "I metodi naturali per un amore e una procreazione responsabili," special number of *La Coppia* XIV, n. 82-83-84, 1982, published by the Centro studi pavese di sessuologia, Via Def. Sacchi, 13, Pavia. The most practical work on this matter is that of Mercedes Arzu Wilson, *Love and Fertility* (Dunkirk, MD: Family of the Americas, 1986). See also Anna Capella, *Selon la nature. La méthode Billings* (Turin: BBE, 1988). Address of the Billings Family Life Center: 27 Alexandra Parade, North Fitzroy, Victoria 3068, Australia.

<sup>36</sup> We have examined closely this contribution of Paulo Freire in *Démocratie et libération chrétienne* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1986) 209-249.

## CHAPTER VII

# A WIDESPREAD "SCIENTIFIC" SEGREGATION

### From One Kind of Slavery to Another

#### *The Slave: Symbiotic and Parasitic*

We have grounds today for pointing to the survival of two forms of slavery that go back to ancient society.<sup>1</sup> As M. Lengellé has shown, there existed two kinds of slavery: one "symbiotic" the other "parasitic."<sup>2</sup> The *symbiotic* slave "lived" with his master; he was part of the "domestic" framework; he had an economic (in every sense of the term) role as well as a pedagogical one, often very elevated. The *parasitic* slave was truly subhuman. He was the object of unscrupulous exploitation; he was, so to speak, a beast of burden, went without instruction and was confined to heavy and vile labor.

This situation has lasted well into the modern, even contemporary, era. Thus, for example, the conflict between slave-holders and abolitionists was the principal and direct origin of the Civil War in the United States (1861-1865). How could the cotton and tobacco be cultivated without slaves? The United States has never healed this wound in its history. The cleavage masters-slaves still has repercussions today, even if racist considerations have taken on a relatively greater importance than the formerly highlighted economic ones. Nonetheless, after a passing respite, we have to expect that the masters-slaves cleavage will come to a new phase of exasperation as the Latin-American immigrants will have become very numerous and, with the Blacks, will be perceived as a menace by the famous "WASPs."<sup>3</sup>



Latin America never had an Abraham Lincoln, and we have no choice but to observe that slavery continues there in fact even if under a milder form. Certainly, it must be pointed out that the slavery of Blacks has not resulted — up to the present time — in the racism that we deplore in other places; it resulted in interbreeding. But the descendant of the Latin American slave is poor and illiterate. In its historical and contemporary forms, slavery is one of the direct causes of the underdevelopment seen in Latin America.

The case of Brazil is again especially interesting. The whole traditional economy, essentially rural, was built on slavery. Hence, the big land owners could not accept the abolition of it decreed by Princess Isabella in 1888; they preferred to overturn the monarchy and establish the republic. Although this decree was made in the name of order and progress, we must recognize the fact that the true progressives were not necessarily those who believed themselves to be such.

If such is today the situation in Latin America, we hardly risk making a mistake in asserting that the situation should be more grave in many Asian and, above all, African countries.

Despite solemn proclamations, today one still continues to refuse to emancipate the poor for the same fundamental motives that have been historically invoked against the abolition of slavery. The basis of economic society in antiquity, slavery continues under new forms today among the poor. Just as in antiquity the master dealt with two kinds of slaves, so today the master deals with two categories of poor people. But, as we are going to see, the condition of these two types of poor people is, in certain respects, less enviable than was the situation of the two kinds of slave in antiquity.

### *What Optimal Production?*

That underdevelopment of the Third-World and bad development of Western countries were two mishaps of a perverse conception of the liberal market ideology we already know. This conception of the market inspires a whole ideology which, in two similar versions, bad development and underdevelopment, constitute the point of obstruction in the whole Western conception of development. It leads to a confusion, carefully maintained by the most prestigious international organisms, between growth and development.

A fifth of humanity possesses almost everything competent manpower, financial means, knowledge and know-how, organization, culture, creative ability, equipment and consumption, decision making ability. This minority but dominant fraction of humanity is permeated with the liberal ideology. This minority prides itself on its successes;

they are in fact spectacular. But it has become extremely urgent that this same minority examine itself regarding the *rest* of humanity.

For some time it has been asserted that the prosperity of the minority has its "cause" in the exploitation of the poor remainder of the population. This vision of things is certainly not lacking foundation. We must, nonetheless, remark that, in the traditional ways of exploiting the poor, there generally remained a rudimentary form of interpersonal relationship. This relationship remains even in the very frequent situations of *social racism*. This latter is characterized, in the Third-World, by an inadmissible disproportion between the remuneration paid to helpers coming from the big centers — concretely the White people — and that paid to their local colleagues with the same training and responsibility. This excessive disproportion is not justified either by the incontestable right to some compensation or by the difference in competence, supposing that this difference is recognized.<sup>4</sup>

Now the world society we see emerging is one from which the interpersonal relationship in exploitation in some way disappears. We are assisting at the establishment of a society founded on *widespread segregation*. This segregation rests on a twofold "scientific" foundation one *economic*, the other *biomedical*; the means by which the two interact being provided by *demography*. The biomedical techniques are put at the service of man's quantitative and qualitative production. This production must reach an *optimal* point determined in the light of market "laws." Now the poor can be an obstacle to the good functioning of the market. By their very existence, the poor reveal limits and even a partial check to achievements inspired by the corresponding ideology. Since it is not possible to exploit everybody, one needs at least to curb and contain them that is the a priori condition of tranquillity, of security, of peace . . .

It is, therefore, false to say that, on a worldwide level, South Africa was the last bastion of apartheid. Without doubt we must rejoice that the institutionalized segregation has been the object of opposition in this country. But one would be mistaken if he drew the conclusion from South Africa's evolution that apartheid is dead in today's world. The reality, alas, is more nuanced. From one point of view, the apartheid of South Africa is an archaic phenomenon on the way out, *but* from another point of view, this is a warning signal from which it would be fatal not to learn a lesson. On the international level, in fact, new forms of segregation are emerging and are even freely expanding.<sup>5</sup>

More precisely, two new modes of segregation are appearing and coincide with the two types of slavery symbiotic and/or parasitic.

On the one hand, in fact, Latin America as well as Asia and Africa experience symbiotic slavery, which reminds us of the situation of Blacks in South Africa, where they were indispensable to the economic prosperity that benefited the Whites above all. Yet, on the other hand, also known in those regions is a parasitic slavery that recalls other African areas sadly famous. It is true that the "pressure" put on their media by the wealthy results in a almost total blackout of information regarding this subject.

We didn't have to wait for certain theologians — Jewish, Christian or Moslem — to "justify" ancient slavery,<sup>6</sup> as they do abortion and euthanasia. Some philosophers, among the most illustrious, are involved in doing that; politicians, lawyers, leaders and merchants have done the rest. Alas, these ancient "justifications must again be recalled if we wish to understand the actions of some closed societies.<sup>7</sup> But new "justifications" are born and produce right under our eyes some otherwise ingenious concrete expressions like those that inspire the Osmins and Bajazets. Not that we are assisting at a consolidated *restoration* of slavery; worse, we are witnessing the institution of a new kind of slavery. On a worldwide level we see accentuated a cleavage, pretending to be scientific but in reality only scientist, between two types of men who they would have us believe are ontologically different. Affirming this difference relieves the strongest of all obligation toward the weakest, driven to the periphery of human society. Thus, right alongside a wealthy humanity, we see growing an exploited society and, something new, a separated, "segregated" society.

## Colonial Illusion

### *Awakening conscience among the Wealthy and Educating the Poor*

From all that there neatly emerge pressing tasks for all those who seek to build up a more just and humane society.

It is necessary, first of all, to get the minority "elite" of the Third-World to throw off their blindness of which they are prisoners; they are also in need of "sensitizing their conscience." In order to open their eyes it will be useful to point out to the "elite" that it will take only a few demagogues, supported by experienced organizations, to mobilize and stir up the poor. We need to provoke a decisive but liberating shock the "elite" must pass through in order to be disposed to the idea of justice in all its dimensions.

Presently the poor constitute a human tide without leadership or voice. Now what do we observe here and there? Unable to read the

signs of the times, the "elite" barricade, or better, imprison themselves in their sumptuous mansions transformed into bunkers; they install themselves in a foreign land in a way while staying at home. They provide themselves with private militias, control the police, they compromise themselves with the army. The "elite" scorn the humble.

On the periphery of a big city in the Third-World there lived some truck farmers working lands without title to the property. They who furnished the city with vegetables recently demonstrated to get proper titles. It was a demonstration very worthy of honest workers; their cause couldn't have been more just. But they were received like malefactors by a detachment of soldiers armed for combat. Obviously that cannot last for long, no more than the physical elimination of those whose presence and action in the countryside bother entrepreneurs who have no scruples, who are crazed by the enticement of fabulous profits. In default of more fundamental arguments, like the fear of God's judgment, those misguided despots on the threshold of the 21st century should at least remember 1789 and take into account that similar situations cannot be eternally prolonged.

Next, it would be useful for the metropolitan leaders to realize that, in supporting the wealthy minorities of the Third-World, they prolong against the current of history a dwindling communism. We willingly concede that here our argument is still very "tactical," but for that very reason it has a better chance at first of being understood than other more fundamental ones . . .

Finally and above all, it is urgent that men of good will return to one of the most hardy traditions of Christian times to be concerned for the poor and compel society to be concerned. Like all social problems that have been neglected, the number and often the proportion of poor people do not stop growing. The elite minority draws the conclusion that it is necessary to make birth control widespread among the poor.<sup>8</sup> They overlook or ignore the historical fact often stressed by F. Bézy, namely, that "the reduction of the birth rate has always been the consequence never the cause of development." They also continue to overlook the fact that famines have not spared underpopulated regions. The most prestigious institutions of the world continue to neglect such facts. When it is a question of the relation between underdevelopment and population, they turn to the most summary single causality one that assures them that "two times fewer Rwandis equal two times better nourished Rwandis." All this "erudition" to reach the conclusion: it is necessary to curb demographic growth by any means.<sup>9</sup>

### *The Thermometer and the Temperature*

One believes that by influencing the population to curb itself one will influence the political, economic and social structures for the better and make them more just. One forgets that demographic growth of poor countries is an *indicator* not the cause of very profound social problems. Also, it isn't accidental that instead of speaking of demographic growth one speaks a times of demographic "inflation." Between "inflation" as a demographic phenomenon and inflation as a monetary phenomenon there is really an analogous relationship: the one and the other are alarming *symptoms* of very profound but remediable problems in society. However, liberal ideology has succeeded in inculcating public opinion and in the leadership classes with a prodigiously fallacious argument that demographic growth as well as monetary inflation were *causes* of underdevelopment. Of course, this ideology is free to entertain the illusion that if one influences what is in reality an effect (that is, the two analogous phenomena) there will follow a retrospective effect on what is the *real* cause (that is, a disastrous management of men and resources). One prefers to attack the thermometer rather than examine the source of the temperature it indicates. It is the very prototype of the "reverse image," of the antiphrase and perhaps even behavior based on bad faith. It is all the more grave in that every action founded on this "reverse image" of reality is headed toward a stalemate. And moreover the original diagnostic error (involuntary or deliberate) lets the real causes multiply their disastrous effects.

And so one arrives at making widespread and commonplace and even imposing practices that are totally disrespectful of persons. Morally inadmissible, these measures, taken with strong support of specious arguments and disseminated with the great support of subsidies, are also socially ineffectual. Nothing astonishing about that, since they rest on diagnoses of a distressing simplism. In fact, these measures are the final outcome of a chronic carelessness of which the poor are in no way responsible. In the liberal tradition's world, too few developing countries tackle with determination the education of the poor and of women. Instead they proceed immediately to measures of expediency. Now it is solidly established that teachers have played a key role in the recent history of the West. Wherever they resolutely tackle basic education on a grand scale, men rapidly progress in their quality of life, their competence at work and in their mastery of fertility. The elementary education of women, especially, is very effective on these three levels. Most of the "elite" of the Third-World are lulled by illusions regarding their natural resources, whose flow, globally, tends to decrease. Composite materials are not

of less value than mineral sources. Genetic engineering has made the old methods of cultivating and breeding obsolete. For these reasons wealthy countries as regards minerals depend relatively less on the Third-World than two or three decades ago.

This colonial illusion has, however, a long life. But it is precisely because the education of the poor has been neglected that these countries have lacked citizens capable of appreciating these resources as well as consumers able to profit from them. Let one consider the extreme examples of Switzerland and Zaire. We know what results: Third-World countries intervene but partially in the exploitation of their own natural resources, and most of the time they exploit them by obtaining help from others or they export them to countries capable of adding an increased value.

### *A Simplistic Naturalism*

The task doesn't end there for anyone who would promote the project of basing society on something other than pure power. Even if, as regards the essential, one subscribes to proposals a little less disconcerting than we have just exposed, he will soon perceive new indispensable tasks. Let us begin by pointing out some leads that could be explored.

Let us point out, first of all, that the liberal market ideology proceeds from a despairingly pessimistic anthropology:<sup>10</sup> man is irredeemably evil and a prisoner of his passions. The exercise of political power and the interventions of the ruler in economic and social life are confined to the limits of their usefulness. They are concerned, above all, with checking the natural and radical malice of men. In the jungle of human society, it pertains to the ruler to curb the effect of the radical perversion of his subjects. Here we see that liberal ideology enthrones a notion very restrictive of political power and its concerns for guarding the common good and establishing justice!

It would be interesting to look upon the market ideology as a *new naturalism* consistent with the Stoic tradition about the order of the world. The world would have its forces and these forces their laws. One must accept both and conform his conduct to them. Justice consists in each playing the role destiny marks out for him. The legislator's intervention consists in reestablishing the cosmic order disturbed by men. It would moreover be easy to show that this vision of the world and man's place in the universe is profoundly *materialistic*, and that this paganism makes it incompatible with Christianity. Let us note for now that the ideology of the state, such as developed in the Soviet sphere, is paradoxically rooted in the same vision of the cosmos.<sup>11</sup>



This vision of the world, of man and of their relationship is open to severe criticism from the philosophical viewpoint, for it makes the human subject the slave of things: it inverts the relation of subject and objects. Thereby it annihilates all idea of liberty or at least of real liberty: man is, like the beasts, subject without respite to his instincts. His only superiority rests in choosing how he will appease them.

Very schematically, the logic that underpins this conception of liberty could be expressed in this way: "Since I have the money, I can choose between buying a car now or a house later. But I don't have the choice I can choose between consuming and not consuming." Liberal ideology, in effect, exacerbates the instinct to acquire: production is at the service of this instinct. This ideology, therefore, needs advertising, for without it there will be no consumption and without destructive consumption — that is, wasteful consumption — no production of *a certain type*. Market ideology, then, requires permanent stimulation of this form of concupiscence which is the desire to acquire things not necessary for life. It follows that this state of perpetual stimulation obscures attention to the basic needs of others and to the strict rights that others have to the satisfaction of their elementary needs. This ideology subordinates the rights of all men to the production of material goods *for some*. It rests on a fatalism reducing man to being the toy of fate of which he is the object.

Faced with such unacceptable theses, we must reaffirm the right of every man to life and physical integrity, the right of every man to life with dignity and liberty, the necessity of positive law to promote the inalienable rights of every man, that means the idea of universality, the necessity for the political powers to apply themselves to the promotion of the common good.

From the Christian point of view, we must take up and affirm again, before this *neo-pagan* conception of the world, the Church's teaching on creation in which man's position is central. Man is rooted in creation and emerges from it: he is both guest and agent. Inasmuch as he is a person endowed with intelligence and free will, he is the image of a provident and loving God who calls each to an eternal destiny. With that it is proper to reaffirm the freedom of man relative to his inclination to evil, and especially to the insatiable desire to possess. Every man has the freedom to place a limit to exercising his power: Christ, first in the desert (Mt 4:1-11), then in the Garden of Olives (*ibid.* 26:53), has given him the example.

In sum, it is urgent to take up again a critical analysis of the idea of the market and of the juridical and political constructions this idea inspires.

<sup>1</sup> See above, Ch. V.

<sup>2</sup> See Maurice Lengellé, *L'esclavage* (Paris: PUF, 1962). Recall also the works cited in Ch. V, note 5.

<sup>3</sup> WASP: "White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant." That is the part of the population that boasts about being the "Elite" of the U.S. See E. Marienstras, *Les mythes fondateurs de la nation américaine* (Paris: Maspero, 1977) 283-291. Cf. further Jean Béranger and Robert Rougé, *Histoire des idées aux USA du XVIe siècle à nos jours* (Paris: PUF, 1981).

<sup>4</sup> It is true that politicians on the periphery sometimes have incomes appreciably higher than those of their colleagues at the "center." But that goes back to the problem of structural violence, even to corruption.

<sup>5</sup> We will return to this problem later.

<sup>6</sup> See L. Sala-Molins, *Le code noir ou le calvaire de Canaan* (Paris: PUF, 1987). If theologians who today defend abortion want to see what future generations will think of them, it will be enough for them to read *Le code noir* and the work of Alberto Placucci, *Chiese bianche, schiave neri* (Turin: Gribaudo, 1990). Many wealthy Christians, including Catholic priests and bishops, consider slavery a "social fact" which cannot be called into question, even if some concede that the master must see to it that the slave lives "in good conditions." A sort of semantic acrobatics was at play anticipating that used by partisans of abortion today. The parallel between the two languages is striking. Be the judge: 1) The Black is not a person; the unborn infant is not yet a person. 2) The slave is the property of his master; the unborn infant is the property of its mother. 3) The master can buy, sell, kill the slave; the mother can keep or kill her unborn infant. 4) Abolitionists should not impose their morality on slave-masters; the defenders of life should not impose their morality on mothers desirous of aborting. 5) Slavery is legal; abortion is legal. This parallel could be pursued by comparing the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in *Dred Scott v. Stanford* consolidating slavery and *Roe v. Wade* and *Doe v. Bolton* legalizing abortion. Let us remember that after the Civil War the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was needed to free the slaves, and the 14th was needed so that they would be acknowledged as citizens. See the article "Dred Scott" in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* VII, 671 f.; and the *Book of the Year 1974* (Chicago 1974) 729.

<sup>7</sup> Eric Vilquin, translator of Malthus, devoted an important article to "La doctrine démographique de Platon" it appeared in the *European Demographic Information Bulletin* (The Hague) XIII, n.1 (1982) 1-19.

<sup>8</sup> See F. Bézy, *Rwanda. Bilan socio-économique d'un régime. 1962-1989* (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut des pays en développement, 1990) 47 and 54. See also the data present in Tables 6 and 7 in our Ch. IV, Part I.

<sup>9</sup> Since the publication of his sensational book, *L'homme, notre dernière chance. Croissance démographique, ressources naturelles et niveau de vie* (Paris: PUF, 1985), Julian Simon has often returned to these problems. Cf. especially his authoritative study, *Population and Development in Poor Countries* (Princeton University Press, 1992). See also "life on earth is getting better not worse," *The Futurist*, August 1983, 7-14; "Why do We Still Think Babies Create Poverty?" *The Washington Post*, Sunday, October 13, 1985; "The War on People," *The Futurist* March-April 1985, 50-53. In French cf. Sylvie Brunel (ed.), *Tiers-Monde. Controverses et réalités* (Paris: Economica, 1987); see especially the contribution of Jean-Claude Chesnais, "La croissance démographique, frein ou moteur du développement," 119-176.

<sup>10</sup> See *infra*, Part II, Ch. IX, *Manichaeism Determinism*. Cf. also the classic work of Richard H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (New York: Penguin Books, 1947). In this regard, the liberal ideology is close to the pessimistic conception of man found in Luther and Calvin.

<sup>11</sup> See Part II, Ch. VIII.



## CHAPTER VIII

# MARIXSM-LENINISM AND PSEUDO DEVELOPMENT

We will examine in this chapter the principles which inspired the Marxist-Leninist conception of development. For different reasons this chapter will be more brief than the preceding ones. First of all, we will in the main return to the evolution of the eastern European countries' situation to draw important lessons from them. Moreover, the relative brevity of this chapter is justified by the fact that the western world's public opinion has been better informed about the difficulties posed by Marxist-Leninism, but that it is hardly awake to the difficulties inherent in the liberal ideology.

Nevertheless, despite the changes that have taken place in the eastern countries and the upheavals that occurred since August 1991 in the USSR itself, it is important to keep in mind the fundamental themes that inspired the Soviet ideology. If one should lose sight of them, one will scarcely comprehend the recent developments of the communist world, nor the stakes involved in those changes. Another reason, and not the least, justifies this examination: in many regions of the Third-World, the communist ideology could still be "very precious" to the interests of the dominant liberal powers, so ready to invoke any doctrine about national security.

The object of this chapter will, then, be limited. Essentially, we will have in view the Leninist ideology in which grows the properly Marxist tradition and a lot of Russian traditions. This complex current calls for the severe criticisms developed many times. They concern the *theoretical* foundations of Leninism, "scientific, historical and dialectical materialism," or on their practical applications — the gulag, the control exercised over the eastern countries, the expan-

sionist aims, etc. In the light of seventy-five years of history, the reservations that this current raises are easily perceptible to the western conscience, less evidently the case for the liberal ideology.

## From One Ideology to the Other

Besides, reflection on one of these ideologies is of such a nature as to throw light on the other one. Examination of the Marxist-Leninist ideology in its classic content will prepare us to understand better, in a last step, the points of convergence between this ideology and the liberal ideology.

### *Some Common References*

First of all, in the Marxist conception of class struggle, we find two themes already encountered in the market logic: the relationship of force and materialism. Marx remains attached to these two pillars of the liberal ideology, which he nonetheless criticizes. Lenin confirms and illustrates this "attachment" when, far from getting rid of the state ideology, he gives it a formulation incomparably more voluntarist than that developed by the liberal tradition criticized by Marx. Among the liberals, the state must protect the good functioning of the market. With Lenin, the state is at the service of class struggle. On one and the other side, what counts is the relationships of force and materialism.

The two themes just recalled constitute the *common* foundations of the market ideology and the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the state. For Marx, force is capital: it's possessing. And force is finally the sole value. The bourgeois of 1789 were right because they were the strongest; the proletariat will be right because in virtue of historical necessity, governed by the scientific laws of dialectical materialism, they will become the strongest.

This consideration of force is, in fact, the pivotal point about which revolves Marx' "scientific" socialism. Thereby his socialism is distinguished from *utopian* and *sentimental* socialism. Naturally, to popularize such a "scientific" argumentation, the Marxists had to translate it into terms of "rights" or "demands of justice." But this purely tactical formulation must not make us forget that, for Marx, *the justice of the cause* — bourgeois then proletariat — *is based on force*.

To bring about the triumph of their cause, the proletariat must become conscious of their belonging to a class, an awareness of which they gain thanks to the activity of a party enlightened by the "scientific" doctrine of Marxist-Leninism Enlightened, organized

and united, the proletariat will be able to engage in the struggle, necessarily victorious, against bourgeois capitalism.

This revolutionary project should have been obliged to eliminate the state. But history, to which the Marxist-Leninist "scientific" doctrine had to adapt, showed, on the contrary, for communism to impose itself and endure, it had necessarily to count on a strong state. In this regard, Marxist-Leninism was inspired by the Hegelian idea according to which political society, in its genesis as well as in its "future," has its necessary laws — those of Reason.

### *Lenin and "Scientific" Reasoning*

With Lenin, Marxist ideology is the expression par excellence of "scientific" reasoning. Wisdom recommends that man consent freely to its necessity, for in default of that, violent coercion will be legitimate. The conscience and voluntarism of those who are enlightened supply for the lack of wisdom proven by those who do not spontaneously understand historical necessity. We find once again the old idea, particularly Stoic, of necessary submission to the world Order.

Here Lenin introduces a decisive change in the Marxist idea of ideology. For Marx, ideology always constitutes a superstructure: it connotes the idea of the inversion of reality, deliberate concealing, alienation, bad conscience bad faith, dupery, error, lying, false representation, etc. Briefly, Marx is extremely severe on all ideologies and none of them escapes the criticism he replaces them with.

Lenin takes up Marx' critique on all points: he thunders anathemas, then, against the use of pernicious ideologies, among which he points to reformism, trade unionism, Catholicism, etc. However, on one capital point his conception of ideology fundamentally differs from that of Marx. For Lenin, in effect, among all the ideologies there is one, *only one*, that escapes the merited criticisms to which the others succumbed. This ideology, of course, is the Marxist ideology. It imposes itself by reason of its indisputably total scientific character. This ideology imposes itself, not as one key, but as the only possible key that takes into account, without any remaining problems, the history of the world, its present situation, its future. If the world is the place of exploitation of man by man, it is because men have lost the key which, in one movement, allows them to comprehend the only reality, material reality, to understand the laws which govern it, to act in the service of the future of which they are the bearers.

To remedy this age-old blindness, which is at once the consequence and cause of a disastrous alienation, we need an enlightened minority to reveal to the masses, tempted by false ideologies, what

their true condition is, what they must want and what they must do. This minority will obviously be the party, although it cannot be what it should be without the enlightened nucleus, without this collegial minority which, armed with the scientific Marxist ideology, knows what the meaning of history must be. In this regard, the party apparatus is in some way the means to echo throughout all institutions the "scientifically" based decisions of the minority. Finally, it is this minority alone which really counts. It is the real "pedagogue": it is the one that fathers the *nomenklatura* which profits from the system. If necessary, this minority could create an illusion of consenting to the disappearance of the party as an apparatus. That, nonetheless, could not be done except under very strict conditions. It would be necessary, on the one hand, for the minority to keep the privilege of power, itself attached to its "scientific knowledge," and, on the other hand, the faltering apparatus of the party must be succeeded by an organizational apparatus more efficient and better adapted to the needs of the hour.

Thus the USSR before the putsch, strong in scientific ideology, was able to vary tactics without losing the course assigned to it by a "scientifically" determined strategy. It counted on being able to become, under the leadership of the knowledgeable ones, a powerful state, which, by its very strength, would crown the defeat of internal enemies and would be an effective springboard toward the victory of scientific Marxist-Leninist ideology the world over.

## From State to Internationalism

### *Madness and Alienation*

In fact, the market ideology appeared like an attempt aimed at legitimizing the practice of total, free competition: in this case, the ideological "legitimation" came a posteriori. Up until recently, the Soviet ideology proceeded in an inverse fashion, so to speak: it proceeded a priori. One invoked, they assured us, a construction adorned with all the prestige of scientific reasoning. And from this a priori position, they deduced what should be tomorrow's society in virtue of "scientific" necessity. It was up to individuals to cooperate with the inescapable advent of this radiant society; to collaborate with this grandiose design was even the sovereign expression of freedom.

One will observe that, in the case we are examining here, the "justifying" ideology invaded intelligences and wills. It's the Spartan ideology of pseudodevelopment, of deceitful development. The

party, depository of scientific ideology, says what men must think, what men must want. Men are dispensed from all effort of personal judgment and from every project whose responsibility they would assume. Not consenting to this ideological schema is a sign of mental alienation, and therefore deserves to be treated like a case of *ordinary folly*. Right will be an appendix of the ideology and will have only a secondary relationship to the concern for justice and promotion of man's rights. The law will not be at the service of persons; it will be at the service of the state and of its administration — and these will be at the service of the party.

### *War and Politics*

Lenin reinterprets, not only the Marxist conception of ideology, but also the Marxist conception of socialism.

With Marx, in effect, we still find Feuerbach's idea of generic humanity whose individuals are but partial and ephemeral manifestations. Heir of this idea, Marx finds in this monism one of the foundations of his conception of international solidarity uniting all workers.

Lenin reinterprets this theme. The world revolutionary project, which must gather all men together, starts with a national revolutionary project. Capitalism must be attacked at its weakest link, Russia, which will become the springboard for world revolution. Now, in order to consolidate this platform, the party must — certainly with an international vocation — provide the USSR with a very structured and efficient state apparatus that will be the executor of the party's will.

For Lenin, the Marxist international project is, then, for strategic as well as tactical reasons, reduced to the dimensions of a particular state. Nothing prevents this project from surviving internal organizational changes, even profound ones. The permanence of the design may even require these changes, provided that the mediation of this particular state is preserved, for this mediation is an historical necessity in order for the world revolution to take place when the moment arrives. Once the victory of socialism in this country is consolidated, it will be necessary for this country to consolidate its power in order to perform, in turn, its international revolutionary mission. In the inevitable confrontation between liberal capitalism and "scientific socialism," very diverse power factors will intervene: military, economic, political and above all ideological. The war will be total.

As Clausewitz observed, "War is the continuation of politics but by other means." Inversely, politics is the continuation of war. That is what Marshal Chapochnikov brought out: "Peace is the continuation

of the struggle but by other means." The synthesis between national vocation and an international one comes about under the form of an imperial project engrafted on the Russian tradition. It is in being faithful to its national vocation that the USSR, led by an enlightened minority, will bring the Russian messianic vocation to fulfillment, finally scientifically based and therefore necessary with an historical necessity. This necessity, at once scientific and historical, is provided by the ideology, which must be protected from all deviation, from all leftism, from all reformism, from all subjectivism, from all opportunism, from all hysteria, etc.

The party is inseparable from an ideological magisterium. It will use every means it judges necessary, including coercion or violence, to bring about the triumph of ideological orthodoxy and orthopraxis, which are inseparable. Men, already reduced to the condition of individuals in the machinery of the state, will be led to distrust themselves: in them resides the gravest threat to revolutionary necessity. The enemy, Mao clarified, is first what we carry about within ourselves: it is therefore necessary to cultivate a distrust of ourselves. Disagreement, deviation, ideological plurality: it's this primordial evil that must be combated even before the incarnation of these forms of evil in concrete societies. Individuals must free themselves from their subjective and personal faculty of judgment: they must learn not to think. For the party, seeking what is true, also knows what is good for the state and therefore what its members must want.

Thus, in this grandiose project, individuals are obviously swallowed up, and even, if we may say, doubly swallowed up. They are engulfed by the state and the *internationale*. Individuals are at the service of this organism, the state, of which the party has need in order to bring the revolution to a worldwide level.

### *An Imposed Fraternity*

Among the individuals contained by the state, there is but a purely organicist solidarity. In the state, the individual is worth what he's worth when he performs the function that falls to him in the social mechanism. Lenin himself compared society to a factory, and orchestra, a machine. A machine operates well when all its parts work together: by acting on such and such a command, I must certainly obtain such and such a result. The same in a factory, the same with the state. Individuals are so many depersonalized pieces or parts in the great machine of the state. The organicist solidarity as appears here is purely utilitarian: the usefulness of an individual to the state

is defined and decided by the enlightened minority. The drama of the Soviet state was that, rejecting the reality of the nation and the person, it condemned itself to invent an ersatz fraternity: a fraternity without father (even without fathers). This ersatz is the necessary issue of the voluntarism of the party chiefs, not of free recognition on the part of the citizens.

To appreciate the present situation of the Soviet Union, or rather what remains of it, we cannot, therefore, limit ourselves to an examination of the present phenomenon. It is not, in effect, unthinkable that the party is continued by a caste of molded technocrats of the same ideological attitude. The tree of evil has perhaps been cut down, but its roots are always there. In any case, whether it's Mr. Gorbachev, Mr. Eltsine or other leaders, we must never forget that practically all of them were formed in the same school. Anyhow, we must wonder on what rests the "legitimacy" of the authority they exercise. One doesn't erase in a few years the totalitarianism solidly rooted in a long secularized tradition of despotism.

<sup>1</sup> On *L'histoire du marxisme* see the two-volume work of Leszek Kolkowski, I: *Les fondateurs, Marx, Engels et leurs prédecesseurs*; II: *L'âge d'or de Kautsky à Lénine* (Paris: Fayard, 1987).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Tibor Szamuely, *La tradition russe* (Paris: Stock, 1974); Alain Besançon, *Les origines intellectuelles du léninisme* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1977); Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Le malheur russe* (Paris: Fayard, 1988); Claudio Sergio Ingerflom, *Le citoyen impossible. Les racines russes du léninisme* (Paris: Payot, 1988); Andre Siniavski, *La civilisation soviétique* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1989).

<sup>3</sup> On this subject see the studies of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, especially *Ni paix, ni guerre* (Paris: Flammarion, 1986).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Lenin, *Que faire?* (1902) in *Oeuvres choisies en deux volumes* (Moscow: Langues Etrangères, 1954) I, 236-240 and passim. We study these various problems more closely in *Démocratie et libération chrétienne* esp. 84-108.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. A. Besançon, *Les origines* 7-26. See also the work of Georges Labica, *Le marxisme-léninisme* (Paris: Bruno Huisman, 1984). We examine this problem in a more detailed manner in *Démocratie et libération chrétienne*, 84-108.

<sup>6</sup> See our work *Destin du Brésil*, 50-71 and passim.

<sup>7</sup> Numerous studies have appeared on Mr. Gorbachev. We mention, among others: Michel Tatu, *Gorbatchev. L'URSS va-t-elle changer?* (Paris: Le Centurion, 1987); Lilly Marcou, *Les défis de Gorbatchev* (Paris: Olivier Orban, 1990). See also B. Coulloudon, *Génération Gorbatchev* (Paris: Lattès, 1989); J. Baynac, *La révolution gorbatchevienne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).



## CHAPTER IX

# AN IDENTICAL STAKE: THE DESTRUCTION OF MAN

The preceding chapters are suggestive enough in their indications that we are able to perceive the *common* fundamental problem posed by the two dominant ideologies we have considered and by the impasse to which both lead.

### Scientism and the Disintegration of the Person

From one and the other we have to do with an *organicist materialism* that does not hesitate to have recourse to lies in order to *legitimize* itself. The two ideologies represent modernized forms of *scientism*: all questions regarding man, the meaning of his existence, human society, etc., must be resolved in the light of the sole "scientific" laws that control the liberal market economy or that are provided by Marxist-Leninism.

Now these two forms of scientism, and hence these two ideologies, leave untouched the problem of the person's value. Must this value be based on what the person materially brings to society or on his intrinsic dignity? The problem is respect for the person, considered from both the static as well as dynamic viewpoints. More precisely, the question is to know whether the person is envisaged, on the one hand, in his integrity (is he complete, is anything lacking in him?), and on the other, in his integration (are all the actions of his parts coordinated?)

#### *Man in His Integrity*

Liberal ideology "justifies" men being left out of the benefits of growth. Making perverse use of economic reasoning, liberal market



ideology "justifies," that is, shows that it is inevitable and proper for whole categories of men not to have access, cannot even desire to have access, to goods even indispensable to the satisfaction of elementary human needs. This fatalism refers us directly back to the cosmological conception of justice that was dominant in antiquity.

What is directly in question here is the *physical* integrity of men: whether we think of hunger, illness, mortality, etc.

Now, after this reference to materialism, we must refer to the *lie*. In fact, what is equally in question, *mediately*, is man's *psychic* integrity, to the extent to which, invoking the laws of mercantile economy to their detriment, one leads the poor to consent to their servitude: that is "inevitable." One subordinates, then, the promotion of human rights to a certain economic "necessity," when one should precisely call this necessity into question in the name of human rights and a sane conception of the market. More precisely we must make better use of these laws in order to put more justice into trade.

Communist ideology "justifies" men being kept out of every deliberation and decision. In the name of supposed scientific laws, in which sociopolitical reasoning is considered expressed, this ideology "justifies," that is, shows that it is inevitable and proper for entire categories of men not to have anything original, anything personal to contribute to society, since the latter is "scientifically" guided by enlightened leaders, who for this reason alone are invested with a *secular messianic role*.

What is directly called into question here is the *psychological* integrity of men whose capacity for personal judgment and free will is frozen.

Now, right after this reference to the *ideological lie* comes the reference to *materialism*. In effect, what is *mediately* called into question is also man's *physical* integrity to the extent that they invoke, in the presence of those subordinated, presumed laws claiming that revolution is an imperative of history. They thus lead them to place their lives at the disposal of the state or to consent to their deprivation, in order to prepare for the revolution which — we are told — will bring about the material well-being of all.

### *Man in His Integration*

In question is not only the physical and psychological integrity of the person, but also his integration.

These two ideologies break up the substantial unity of man by denying his personal dimension. Man is reduced to the condition of

an individual who has no longer any thing spiritual: he is no longer but a body and a mind, disjointed one from the other because deprived of a spirit. Moreover, made one dimensional by this very privation, individuals are interchangeable in society. Here we find, then, the cannibal regression explained above.<sup>1</sup> One will wish to lay his hand on man through each of the two component parts which are still recognized in him.

In the case of liberalism, the first object of seizure and contempt is man in his body, and thereby it reaches his mind. In the case of communism, the first object of seizure and contempt is the mind and thereby it reaches his body. In both cases, one seeks man's entire neutralization, his depersonalization. The only ones to escape this generalized cannibalization of individuals and the species are those who produce "legitimizing" ideologies and who, for that very reason, constitute the new caste of lords. In the first case, the affluent consider it natural that numerous human beings are deprived of all participation in possessing and therefore of being. In the second case, the "enlightened" leaders see it as natural that numberless human beings are deprived of all participation in thinking and therefore in possessing.

Moreover, forgetfulness of the properly spiritual dimension of man, of this irreducible center of his personality that cannot be limited to body or mind, or even to the ensemble of the two, brings about the resurgence today of two famous historical currents: Catharism and Gnosticism.<sup>2</sup>

In fact, the body, detached from the person, becomes the center of amorality: and hence its relation to Catharism. As for the mind, detached also from the person, it becomes the seat of a deceitful "illumination": and hence the relation to the Gnostic tradition. Must we recall that this double separation allows the creation of a new alliance between violence and lying?<sup>3</sup>

The agent of this detachment is precisely the ideology whose function it is to manufacture the lie *in order* to mask the violence. Masters offer slaves the ideological potion. Ideology will offer the *imaginary joys* thought to eclipse the *real miseries* of life. Thanks to the virtues of this ideological opium, slaves will end up not being conscious of their servitude. For a greater reason they will not put up a fight against the oppression of which they are victims.<sup>4</sup>

Thus the ideology of the state dangles the illusion of equality, but it offers only a bauble: uniformity. The liberal ideology also dangles the illusion of freedom, but it offers only the bauble of license.

### *Organicist Monisms*

These two ideologies are exemplary cases of *organicist monisms*: for the liberal ideology as well as for the communist ideology the primordial reality is society envisaged as a battlefield composed of individuals who cannot survive except in confrontation with other individuals. Of equal strength, individuals are interchangeable and ideological indoctrination confirms them in this belief.

More precisely, the human being has no dignity except by reason of his strength which assigns him a place on the hierarchical scale of human beings. The dignity of the individuals is thus conditioned by the usefulness and function that fall to him in society by virtue of nature's decree. And so much the worse if nature has not provided a place for him. . .

Hence, one can wonder whether the totalitarian trend of liberalism wasn't already present — if not as promise at least as possibility — in the first article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen in 1789. This article says in fact; "Men are born and remain free and equal. Social distinctions can be based only on *common usefulness*."<sup>5</sup> This trend risks being precipitated and "legitimized" by state sponsored "morals," concocted by national committees on ethics made part of the new democracies.<sup>6</sup>

Thus natural monism — which considers human society *truly* an organism whose members are not only different by unequal — calls for a "cannibal" conception of individuals and their relationships. Reciprocally, a conception that sees man only as a simple individual and not as a person, leads directly to an organicist conception of society in which the inequalities of dignity and rights must correspond to the differences.

In sum, the two ideologies that we have studied necessarily result in Manichaeian societies in which there are the bourgeois and the proletariat, a *nomenklatura* and worker ants, an oligarchy and the oppressed, a metropolis and a periphery; a center and some satellites, etc.

## **The Plus-Value and the New Slaves**

### *Alienation: the Order of Being and that of Having*

Should one be astonished if, onto the primordial alienation in the order of *being* alienation in the order of possession is engrafted? We must remember in this regard that analysis made by Marx touching on the plus-value in the liberal society of his time.<sup>7</sup>

According to Marx, the plus-value is the difference between the price one pays to maintain the work force (that is, the workers in their production capacity) and the value which this force produces in a unit of time that corresponds to the price paid. According to the author of *Das Kapital*, the value produced is always higher than the price paid; this difference is the plus-value. He claims that capitalism tends to pay the work force, that is, the worker insofar as he generates value, on the level of the cost of replacing this same work force. The plus-value, then, is definitely the difference between the salary paid and the value produced by the worker. The profit is the plus-value from which one deducts the value of investment, that is the net plus-value. The rate of profit, then, is the relation between the plus-value. The rate of profit, then, is the relation between the plus-value. The rate of profit, then, is the relation between the plus-value per worker and the necessary investment per worker. This rate of profit tends to the downswing, for the capitalist, says Marx, needs to invest more and more to face competition. And since the investments are more and more onerous, the capitalist concentration of the means of production is all the more necessary.

Although it may be attractive, this Marxist conception of the plus-value is no less hotly contested. This conception starts, in effect, with the presupposition that the value of goods depends exclusively on the individual who produces it, taking into account certainly the technical means used by him. Now the value of an exchange, the monetary value (which is but the value of exchange stipulated in money) depends not only on the energy expended by a worker; it also depends on the value of its use joined to the median time necessary to produce such goods. The value of an exchange, then, is composed of three elements: value of use of the goods produced, the amount of median labor needed in this operation, the technical level and condition in which these goods are produced. This last element is in fact the value added by *business*. In fact, the very notion of work time must include the time needed to organize this time and the intellectual work serving to ensure its success.

It is, therefore, false — and besides, appalling — to maintain the assertion that a worker's median enrichment is *impossible*. It is not true to say that the worker always produces more than he receives (on an average), as the Marxist analysis assumes. On the other hand, it is always true to say that he sometimes receives *more* than he produces. If this wasn't so, the collective enrichment such as experienced for a century, including regions beyond "developed" countries, would be inexplicable. Even if one admits that some "developed" countries have benefited and do benefit from the exploitation

of the Third-World, it must not be emphasized less that the collective enrichment comes from another source.

Historically speaking, the peasant and laboring population of countries that are today wealthy have been the victim of flagrant injustice which is presently still found in Third-World countries. This injustice rests on two factors: the lack of instruction and the situation of structural illegality regarding the worker in relation to the value of the product. Formerly, in the "developed" countries, industrial organization gave to the goods produced by the worker a survalue disproportionate to its basic value. That is why we must take note of the structural inequality that allows the capitalist to take possession of an unequal part of the social product of the business. The requirements of commutative justice were not even honored. However, once the worker is better instructed and qualified, this originally unequal part tends to be reduced and structural injustice tends to lessen.

Today, in developed countries, the injustice to be corrected is located much more on the level of social distribution of the collective product rather than on the salary level. The drama of the Third-World, carefully concealed by liberal analyses, is that these two factors of injustice are amplified: what concerns instruction and what affects salary are situated on the level of social distribution of the collective product.

To these two factors, which, moreover, continue to work their disastrous effects, should still be added a third: the catastrophic effect of the wars which, essentially aiming at destruction, curb collective enrichment. They prevent the increase of goods destined for the universality of men. Thus, alongside their violence, is revealed another aspect of their "malice," which moralists emphasize all too little: they are also a *theft* that wounds the human community in its entirety, and it is clear that this theft affects the poor relatively more than the wealthy. Wars and their preparation are not only the expression of direct violence; they also increase *structural violence*. They wound the human community head on; there is no longer any way of honoring the requirement for a more just social distribution of the collective product to the extent that wars precipitate a general impoverishment. They divert to destructive purposes the resources that the will of men could direct toward the establishment of greater social justice and, therefore, to the common good. The militarization of the USSR's economy would suffice to illustrate this subject. However, the remark we make here is valid, not only for wars conducted or to be conducted by the military, but also and equally for the wars of a new kind which we are analyzing especially in this work, and which puts new weapons to work among others, biomedical and demographic.

*Slave and Proletariat*

This web of facts is always very suggestive for understanding of the present reality of slavery, such as it exists especially in the Third-World. An inflexible expression of the pitiless liberal ideology, sometimes heir, moreover, of the commandery system, the interest of the owner allows only so many symbiotic slaves as will be useful in maximizing his profits. But, in order for the bronze law to play well in his favor, he must at the same time, tolerate the existence of a certain proportion of parasitic slaves. By their miserable existence, by their fear of death that haunts them, parasitic slaves exercise a constant and negative pressure on the salaries of the symbiotic slaves. The result of this situation is that the slave, even the symbiotic one, enjoys no real liberty before the owner. He is tied to him by the very necessity of his survival and that of his family. He is a proletarian in the strict sense, that is, he has nothing but his offspring. He cannot choose his master or his work.

The situation of the citizen in the Marxist-Leninist society is basically different. Slavery is even engraven in the very structure of that society. The latter transcends the citizen. The state and the administration are at the service of a party, or more precisely of a special type of nomenklatura.<sup>8</sup> Taking over for this minority, the state rules all and ultimately poses as the sole master, as the only employer. As a result the citizen is a slave for life. He is not attached to a plot of land or an estate; he belongs to the state. From the moment of his birth he is snatched up by the state, not for a determined or indeterminate period, but for the whole of his existence. The work contract that binds the citizen to the state is a contract for life: whatever the citizen does, he does as a member of the state. Moreover, the ideological lie that "legitimizes" the citizen's subjection presents the nomenklatura, the state interposing itself as master, with the advantage of monopolizing the plus-value stolen from the citizens. There we find ourselves on the spinning wheel . . .

*The Two Faces of the Kleptocracy*

Thus, corresponding to the two ideologies, we have in both a kleptocracy in the true sense of the word: a government of thieves. The one — the liberal — profits from its wealth to exercise power; the other — the Marxist-Leninist — profits from its power to raid the wealth of the state. In both cases, a minority steals from the majority what the majority has a strict right to. These oligarchies have set up appalling structures of domination for the oppressed, inclining the latter to see no means of liberation except the chancy route of revolution.

It is under this twofold form that the ancient institution of slavery, somewhat refined, was extended worldwide. Masters are on one side; slaves on the other. And, as in antiquity, the latter are of two kinds corresponding to the two types of usefulness: "symbiotic," definitively infantilized by sharing the crumbs fallen from the masters' tables, and the "parasitic," without real humanity, whose very existence is left to the master's discretion.

We must, in fact, observe that, by reason of the reading which he gives to the Marxist conception of ideology, Lenin moves away from the *Marxist* reading of the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the slave. As one has often remarked, Marx reads this famous dialectic from the viewpoint of the slave and, thanks to this reading, he reverses Hegel's perspective of the lord. Despite appearances, with Lenin, it is the original Hegelian perspective to which one returns. Just as in the liberal ideology one needs a master to dictate the "scientific" laws of the market, of competition, etc., so in the Leninist ideology we must have a master together with a "pedagogue" — a party — to indicate the "scientific" laws that preside over the relations of production to historical evolution and to translate for the state organization the practical demands required by these laws.

## One World Approach and Internationalism

If we envisage their repercussions on the level of international relations, we observe that our two ideologies offer, each in its own way, a pseudocoherence to societies which identify with them. Internal to these societies, the liberal market ideology on the one hand, that of the state on the other, are supposed to assure the cohesion of the group. To question the liberal ideology or to question the ideology of the state are two disquieting expressions of nonconformism, probably of deviance, perhaps of "alienation." The two ideologies inspire two different models for empirical societies, but they are closed societies. Closed in what sense? In the sense that society A is different and distinguished from society B precisely by reference to a dominant ideology, to which one imputes the benefit of consensus! Yet society A cannot envisage society B except as a potential or actual menace hanging over its security. Each of the two societies corresponding to our two ideologies must perforce consider itself the only possible model.

### *Protectionist Expansionism*

The "scientific" quality with which these two ideologies identify calls for the will to extend each model to all the world and humanity.

This extension will, then be necessarily in conflict, but it will be presented in terms of interest and usefulness.

In this way the liberal ideology will envisage the world like the place par excellence of free trade, and like the ideal place of unconditionally free communication, both necessary for the market. The editors of the World Bank's *Report on Development in the World in 1984* calmly see the world economy from the viewpoint of the strongest.<sup>9</sup> They envision the market from a globalist, worldwide perspective. They don't even hesitate to draw from this special vision the consequences which, according to them, involve the plan for demographic containment of the Third-World.<sup>10</sup>

In fact, the liberal ideology, at the same time as it consolidates the skittish particularism of wealthy people, incites them to conduct — by means of interposed international organizations — imperial policies that “justify” their special interest. And so the criterion dominant in international politics will be the will of power. Free competition will have to be able to be engaged in, they assert; but it will be exercised only in favor of the strongest. This logic of power and force imposes then, on the strongest the acceptance, not only of the very principle of a merciless expansionist dynamic to the detriment of the weakest, but also unhesitatingly puts to work the corollary of protectionism “justified” by the circumstances. Such would be the case if, by chance, himself drawing the same conclusion from the market laws, a weak person emerged menacing, by that very fact, the security and profit of the strongest.

This liberal logic is pushed to its ultimate consequences by some western internationalists. In the United States, for example, it finds one of its clearest expressions in the *one world approach* and globalism of Brzezinski.<sup>11</sup> Ever since the end of hostilities of the Gulf War, these two themes were found regularly in the discourses of George Bush regarding the “new world order.” New interpreter of the old North-American messianism, and also theorist of the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski, elaborated a worldwide *corporatist* project. This project aimed at guaranteeing, under the direction of the United States, the oligopoly of power among the most developed nations, all the while integrating, in a dependent fashion, those which aren't so developed and whose sovereignty *must be limited*. In some way, this imperial project involves a justification of the two forms of slavery *extended to the nations* — *symbiotic*: all the world's producers are invited to consent to the leadership of the great industrialized powers; *parasitic*: a demographic control is foreseen for those populations that are bulky, useless and perceived as potentially dangerous.<sup>12</sup>



Regarding the Leninist ideology that prevailed for so long a time, it also allows ancient Russia to redefine its old imperial project, as it brought it up-to-date. In the light of this ideology, the world appeared like a place where the socialist ideology must implant itself. Before a world deep in capitalist darkness and a proletariat abused by perverse ideologies, the communist party of the Soviet Union, after having made the Marxist-Leninist ideology triumphant in Russia, should have pursued its pedagogical and magisterial mission over the entire world.<sup>13</sup>

The springboard of this enterprise was none other than the USSR itself: it was necessary to consolidate the Marxist-Leninist victory before being able to unfold the internationalist dimension essential to this ideology itself. A powerful Soviet Union was needed, a strong Soviet state, as the base for this world mission.

Thus Marxist internationalism was translated by Lenin who reinterpreted it in terms of *interest*: that of a party and a nomenklatura; and in terms of *usefulness*: that of a particular nation. The dominant criterion in international politics is again the will to power, requiring internally "democratic centralism."

This party, this nomenklatura, or some new technocracy have, then, put forward the Marxist-Leninist "scientific" ideology in order to win over the outside world. Consented to or imposed, adherence to this ideology should have entailed submission to the ukases of Big Brother so that the radiant march toward a classless society, if not a stateless one, could go forward. No matter if the "proletarian solidarity" binding together the "brother countries" was toppled: they could be treated as one treats "countries of a different regime" and maintain them in the orbit of "proletarian internationalism."

Once again, the logic of strength and force that works in favor of a collegial minority's seizing power, imposed on this same minority, superior in force, the principle of an expansionist dynamic and as a corollary a protectionist one. Confronted with those who resisted the "scientific" ideology, it was necessary to practice preventive or oppressive ideological protectionism. In that case, the imperatives of ideological orthodoxy were invoked to justify violence. For deviance from "scientific laws" signals the emergence of a threat hanging over the security of the strongest. The same protectionist requirement was translated in the need to limit the sovereignty of nations, and any apparent concession of this point deserved to be regarded as suspect.

Finally, given the way the guardians of ideological orthodoxy interpreted it, the international requirement was so pressing that it also justified recourse to trickery as well as force since it had to do with making the Cause triumph.

### *Toward a New World Directorate*

Thus the two ideologies feed two imperial projects presenting similar characteristics. What triumphs here, what *must* triumph, is the political positivism that expresses the will of the strongest. The demands of justice are chased from the international horizon. Beyond variations in tactics and different strategies, the only thing that remains is the *Realpolitik*.

Finally emerging is a terrifying perspective for all the others: that of a directorate in which societies, inspired by rival ideologies, would agree, over and above the things that divided them, on what was essentially common to them: *usefulness* and *interest*. Inspired perhaps by Kireievsky and de Tocqueville, Brzezinski initiated this perspective. Furthermore, in the absence from now on of any counter balance, some indications appear to signal its emergence.

For these two blocs, these two kinds of society, would not hesitate to go to war — but only if it were useful; war by proxy, that is, by nations that interpose themselves, often takes care of the matter. The same for peace. One maintains peace if it is one's *interest* is involved, without that it is "undesirable," for peaceful coexistence must itself be useful. Two dominant societies cannot cease being antagonistic except by uniting against common enemies.

Thus chased from the relationships among men and among intermediary groups, moral concern is chased from relations among states and nations. What's astonishing about internal and external peace being precarious? It rests on fear, not on a plan of coexistence of diverse liberties. Despite the efforts employed by politicians, philosophers and moralists, despite a string of bitter experiences, despite the immense clamor of the exploited poor and humiliated captives, despite the silent cry of those aborted, the moans of those mutilated and the death rattle of those euthanized, men continue to tie themselves to a merciless society of the kind so often described by the ancients.

## **Totalitarianism: To Create New Men**

### *Manchiaean Determinism*

The presuppositions of the socialist ideology of the state and those of the liberal market ideology are in the end the same, in the following sense: 1) Man is not free vis-à-vis his acquisitive instinct: to possess is synonymous with happiness; 2) But at the same time, hoarding of goods is experienced as soiled with guilt and accompanied by a bad conscience, inasmuch as the poor and excluded *are there* like living reproaches.

The *liberalist ideology* works in conjunction with these two irreconcilable presuppositions by denying the sinful character of hoarding: "It's God (or nature) who gives more goods to some than to others." Whence comes, by way of corollary, the denial of equality of men. Original sin appears as a radical point of departure that determines all the conditions of actual existence, but it falls *radically* outside of our grasp and hence ends by being forgotten. The Protestant doctrine of predestination, which depends on that of original sin (and an original sin having *radically* corrupted human nature), is extended to earthly life.<sup>14</sup> Material prosperity, property, becomes the sign of election. Every obstacle to the freedom of competition checks predestination or blocks the process of natural selection. Such a check appears like the actual sin par excellence. The same idea is preserved when, in a secularizing perspective, "God" is replaced by "nature," "predestination" by "selection."

The communist ideology, for its part, emphasized the culpability of hoarding to the extreme, implicitly likened to original sin. This insistence goes so far as to reject the very idea of private property. "Property is theft," Proudhon assures us.<sup>15</sup> Now this ideology also considers happiness as having, as possessing. This ideology thinks it can triumph over original sin and reestablish the earthly paradise by a forced redistribution of goods then by denying man's freedom.

On one side and the other, this is shipwreck for human freedom, shipwreck of man's liberty regarding himself and his instinct to possess in liberalism, shipwreck of his liberty before society and the state with communism. Moreover, there is no longer place for fraternity except for what is imposed, the same as being born dead. More precisely, the stake of both ideologies is fundamentally the same: *the destruction of man in what constitutes his originality, his specificity.*

*It is in this sense that these two ideologies must be denounced as totalitarian, even if we are spontaneously less sensitive and above all less attentive to the totalitarian direction entailed by the liberalist ideology. We use the term totalitarian here in the sense given by recent studies of this problem: What totalitarianism aims at and what characterizes it is destruction of the ego the destruction of personality.*<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, these same studies show that if these ideologies have such an audience today, it is because they can rely on the instinct for death which we carry about in us, and which inclines us to despise ourselves even to the point of accepting our own destruction. It isn't without reason that women are beginning to react vigorously against the grip on feminine sexuality held by men of science.<sup>17</sup>

However, we have reason to go more deeply into this diagnosis. Contemporary totalitarianism doesn't limit itself to willing my destruction. After having cannibalized man, it also strives to reconstruct him afterwards with the help of biomedical and psychiatric disciplines.<sup>18</sup>

Thus one sees immediately what politicians and moralists are being questioned about. The two dominant ideologies present the common trait of attacking personality, the person in his integrity and integration. Those who take seriously freedom, the constitutive originality, the spiritual dimension of man, cannot fail to cause fear in those who base their domination contempt for and destruction of this spiritual dimension.

Actually, we are above all sensitive to the problems raised by the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and, despite the collapse of the system, we must remain vigilant. Furthermore, we must exercise equal vigilance in regard to the totalitarian direction with which the liberal ideology is pregnant. We believe that by deepening the joint critique of these two dominant ideologies we will be able make progress in reflecting on the mechanisms and structures of oppression — and in prevailing over both.

The two ideologies which we have examined have this in common: as they lead to the destruction of the person they also result in the destruction of the social body. The two ideologies are inverse expressions of the same Manichaeian determinism. Both necessarily bring about polemic relations among men. This aggressive determinism appears at the *beginning* of the liberalist ideology: that is the idea behind competition-selection; it appears at the *end* of Marxist-Leninist ideology: that is the theme of class struggle.

The two ideologies express, in inverse fashion, the relationship between violence and lying. In the first case, one goes from violence to lying; in the second case one goes from lying to violence. Power comes from money in the first case; power aims for money in the second.

The two ideologies wish to create two kinds of new men: the one is envisioned more as a *consumer*; the second is regarded more as a *producer*. In the first case, relations among men are dominated by the fear experienced before other men; in the second case, the relations among men are dominated by the discredit and contempt they experience in themselves. This destruction of the relationship among men and within man himself is clearly also destructive of the whole social tissue and delivers man in to the grasp of the strongest.

### *Deprogramming-Reprogramming*

Finally, one thing is striking today more than formerly — a subject not less worrisome — *man is threatened, not only in his existence, but also in his nature*. New totalitarian thrusts make their appearance here and there where one did not believe possible.

We have ended by piercing the perverse value of the Leninist ideology and the fruits it produced. We ended by recognizing, in particular, that the terror under Stalin was not at all an accident along the way, but it was already inscribed in the very system of Lenin, in theory as well as in practice. The Maoist experience, whose repercussions still reach us, attests to the formidable permanence of Leninsim in its Chinese variant.<sup>20</sup> All of that is today relatively well known to western public opinion: the latter, become more critical of the perverse effects of propaganda, has hardly any further illusion about the essential nature of the rare communist regimes that continue to exist.

What is more astonishing is the nearly general lack of attention and concern when faced with the fruits that the liberal market ideology can and in fact does produce. Without doubt, concrete societies laying claim to this tradition have often shown that they were capable of using juridical and institutional instruments precisely to plot the tyrannical directions of these societies. As we have emphasized from the beginning, the liberal tradition does not necessarily tend toward totalitarianism, and in that it is appreciably distinguished from the Marxist-Leninist tradition. Nonetheless, as de Tocqueville hastened to remark already a hundred years ago — no liberal society is immunized against these tendencies.

Today more than ever these prophetic denunciations appear well-founded. Alas, we must even emphasize these denunciations, for it is now insufficient to say that the liberal ideology is pregnant with a despotic menace, of *ordinary* despotism; we must assert that it can produce a *totalitarianism* of which the Leninist tradition no longer has the catastrophic monopoly.

Our century is confronted with two totalitarian and homologous ideologies. And they are the instruments par excellence of the physical *and* mental deprogramming of man. They endeavor to separate the mental from the corporeal, the psychic and physical from the spirit; to alienate these two component parts from personality. Two ways of taking man apart: two contemporary forms of materialism!

Here we are also confronted with two ways that permit the reprogramming of man, and even to the fashioning of a "new" man

adapted, as perfectly as possible, to the society one wishes to establish, a man standardized like a perfectly manufactured product.

In the communist society, this "new man" is mentally invaded, colonized, destructured, and finally remodeled by means of the ideological lie that exposes him, now disarmed, to all the violence. Lenin made no secret of it: "we must be engineers of souls."

In the society dominated by the liberal ideology, this "new man" appears more and more like the fruit of "bio-engineering." Man must be a product of quality corresponding to the "norms" fixed in a voluntarist manner, otherwise he will be rejected. More explicitly still, man is not only a product, he is *one product among others*. The economic laws of the market will be taken into account in order to determine if this biological product is worth the trouble of being fabricated or kept in existence. The methods of fabrication will vary also according to the strict norms of effectiveness corresponding to rigorously scientific criteria. The margin of free will that continues to exist will itself be extenuated into a voluntarism placed at the service of an aberrant cult of economic laws. The common good itself will be reduced to a network of economic and material parameters, to the contempt of every humanist, cultural and religious consideration.

### *Neither Chance or Necessity*

We are thus brought to a simple conclusion which summarizes all that we have seen.

If everything is left to chance or if everything is left to necessity, man has nothing to do, since his creative freedom is no longer engaged in anything. The very idea of conscience is threatened with shipwreck. On the contrary, we hold that man is endowed with reason and will, and that these are called to be exercises in field of justice. It is proper to man to imagine, to construct, to establish justice.

In this regard, it is normal for public power to broaden its intervention, both on the state level as well as the level of international institutions. The effectiveness of these interventions of the "indirect employers" is more and more important to the establishment of justice.<sup>21</sup> However, we must not forget that the establishment of justice doesn't happen spontaneously. The "prince" too can lose sight of the common good and manage public matters in favor of special interest.

It is also as equally unthinkable to expect that social justice will be established thanks to the magic of an invisible hand harmonizing special interest as to expect that this same social justice will be set up in virtue of the pretended necessity immanent in history.



*Toward a Synthesis of the Dominant Ideologies?*

The fact that, for the first time, a meeting of the Trilateral Commission was held in Moscow, in January of 1989, deserves to be looked into with the greatest attention. It manifests the interest Moscow actually has in the ideas formulated in the circles particularly representative of the liberalist ideology in its most recent forms.<sup>22</sup> Since the Soviet ideology no longer can render the "legitimizing" and "dissimulating" services expected of an ideology, the Moscow leaders, touched by a crisis of conscience, are inclined to take an interest in other ideologies capable of ensuring the same services.

Some informal, even secret, western groups are disposed to make up for this ideological void in Moscow. From its very origins, the Trilateral Commission, for example, included the communist world in its design. Freemasonry had to establish a European center in a historical castle in Giecz near Poznan and hold there its big international meeting in 1993. At present the lodges are reorganizing in the eastern countries. Other "clubs," more or less closed, are multiplying and curiosity is growing about the ideas they are spreading.<sup>23</sup> There is no doubt but that these groups are trying to send the message that the ideas they are developing and propagating in the media could take over for the failing Soviet ideology.

Now, beyond the profound kinship that exists between the liberalist and Soviet ideologies, one fact deserves to be brought out. Neither the communist nomenklatura nor the neo-liberal international "elite" truly believes in the ideologies they propose. If necessary the two ideologies could even continue to present themselves as opposed, inasmuch as this antagonism is confined to the level of ideological discourse. For one of the essential functions of ideology is to conceal the subjects who benefit from its services.

It is precisely here that the problem gets harder to solve. In fact, the interest of the nomenklatura and those of the liberal "elite" are no longer as antagonistic as they used to be. Certainly, these two minorities each have particular interests to defend. But the moment has come for both of them to wonder whether the convergence of their common interests doesn't leave in second place the divergences based on their particular interests. Now from the moment when the balance leans in favor of a community of interests, it goes without saying that a new alliance is formed that tends to unite in a sort of common front the nomenklaturist and the neo-liberal "elite."

It is hardly difficult to foresee what type of minority can be born of this alliance and what ideology it will provide. It will be a minor-

ity organized into a veritable mafia with the ambition to rule political life, economic life, the media, scientific research, technology and finally morality and religion. One can even foresee that to all the ways of taking action this mafia will be able to add the massive use of synthetic drugs, once the production of natural drugs has been brought under control or eliminated.

As for the ideology that this mafia will furnish itself, it is all too easy to describe its broad lines.<sup>24</sup> This ideology will perforce have as its function to conceal the interests of the mafia in question, as well as the subjects who make it up. *The hard kernel of this ideology will be constituted by the alliance of a biomedical and demographic scientism with a juridical positivism taking the place of morality.*

This scientism will overshadow the economic scientism that is the hard core of liberalist ideology as well as of official Marxist-Leninist ideology. The synthesis of these two ideologies, rivals before, will thus be able to take place. The epitome of refining, so to speak, will be attained when, having interiorized this ideology, men who are strangers to the mafia will practice a sort of physical and psychic self-violence. The violence they will do to themselves or let be done to them will be accepted because it will be "legitimized" by an ideological line of thought of the "scientist" type with connotations at once economic, biomedical and demographic.

We must add that this ideological line of thought, totally pagan in its foundations, will issue in an application, itself also totally pagan in its *means* and *ends*. It follows that whatever can demystify this ideology's lie and denounce the violence of this mafia will be declared an enemy and treated as such.

To conclude, a new liberalist nomenklatura is in the process of invading national and international institutions. Though in principle the idea of the intervention of state planning is repugnant to it, this new nomenklatura will not fail to use public institutions to impose its own planning. This planning involves the production of men according to the strict criteria of solvency and "security." It aims, in the long run, at establishing a *liberalist* market as wide as the world.

<sup>1</sup> See above 124-125.

<sup>2</sup> Gnosis means the knowledge with which the heterodox Gnostics, who appeared at the beginning of Christianity (2nd-3rd centuries), claimed to be illuminated, an esoteric knowledge superior to what the simple faithful or churchmen had access to. This knowledge, connected with ancient religions as well as Christianity, was



regarded as leading to salvation. The Gnostics affirmed the existence of two antagonistic principles of everything that exists: God, the principle of good, matter the principle of evil. This dualism will again be reinforced by the Manichaeans (3rd century), for whom there existed two worlds irremediably opposed, that of light and that of darkness. The morality of the Gnostics, extremely rigorous at the beginning, sank into licentiousness. Cathar signifies pure. The Catharists were spread throughout the middle of France and Italy in the 11th and 12th centuries. They owed much to the Gnostic and Manichaean traditions, in particular their dualism. One cannot be saved except by the *consolamentum* or spiritual baptism. The perfect receive this during their life, and are bound to a rigorous morality, while the simple faithful receive it at the moment of their death. As for those who are saved, that is the *elect*, they are not subjected to any morality. See the article "Manichaeism," by Julien Ries, the *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, IX, col 153-160. See also Igor Chafarévitch, *Le phénomène socialist* (Paris: Seuil, 1977) esp. Part I devoted to chiliastic socialism (15-96).

<sup>3</sup> On this alliance see Hannah Arendt, *Du mensonge à la violence. Essais de politique contemporaine* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1972); Igor Chafarévitch, as in note 2. We touch on this problem in our *Power Over Life Leads to Domination of Mankind* (St. Louis: Central Bureau, 1996) 56-57.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Thought* (London: Harrap, 1971) 764.

<sup>5</sup> Our emphasis. See also articles 6 and 17.

<sup>6</sup> On this subject see Christine Boutin, *Une éthique sans citoyen* (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1991).

<sup>7</sup> It is commonplace to recall that Marx was directly inspired by Ricardo in his economic analysis of the plus-value.

<sup>8</sup> See Michael Voslensky, *La nomenklatura. Les privilégiés en URSS* (Paris: Belfond, 1980).

<sup>9</sup> This Report was published by the World Bank in Washington in 1984.

<sup>10</sup> The second part of the Report is entitled *Evolution démographique et développements*. 58-237. See, for example, 58-64; 135-142; 147-149; 188; 205; 211-213.

<sup>11</sup> See above One World Approach and Internationalism.

<sup>12</sup> See Ch. VII, *The Slave: Symbiotic and Parasitic*.

<sup>13</sup> On the international communist movement see Lilly Marcou, *Les pieds d'argile. Le communisme mondial au présent. 1970-1986* (Paris: Ramsay, 1986). On the relations of the USSR with the Third-World see Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Ni paix ni guerre* (Paris: Flammarion, 1986).

<sup>14</sup> This doctrine of predestination, analyzed by Max Weber, has been above all developed in the Calvinist tradition. It is clearly less emphasized in the Lutheran and Anglican traditions.

<sup>15</sup> See Ch. V, *Materialist Fatalism*.

<sup>16</sup> See Jean-Jacques Walter, *Les machines totalitaires* (Paris: Denoël, 1982).

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, A. M. de Vilaine, La Gavarini, M. Le Coadic (Eds.), *Maternité en mouvement. Les femmes, la reproduction et les hommes de science* (Montreal: Saint-Martin, 1986).

<sup>18</sup> To the works by J. J. Walter and S. Milgram one may add Christian Delacampagne, *Figures de l'oppression* (Paris: PUF, 1977); see esp. the chapter devoted to the "Discours psychiatrique," 9-26, and to "Pouvoir médical," 27-47; and Olivier Reboul, *L'endoctrinement* (Paris: PUF, 1977).

<sup>19</sup> On this subject see Jacques Baynac, Alexandre Skirda and Charles Urjewicz, *La terre sous Lénine. 1917-1924* (Paris: Le Sagittaire, 1975).

<sup>20</sup> On Mao see Ross Terril, *Mao. A Biography* (New York: Harper & Row, 1980); Stuart Schram, *The Thought of Mao Tse-Tung* (Cambridge: University Press, 1988).

<sup>21</sup> See Part II, Ch. I, *Force, Measure of Liberty?* The "indirect employer" is the one who intervenes to determine the conditions under which employers and employees

will be able to effect a contract. Cf. John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens* n. 17.

<sup>22</sup> We will have to come back to the recent evolution observed in the USSR. In fact, contrary to the reasons habitually given, this evolution is due more to simple people than to those governing. Cf. below Part III, Ch. II, *From Yalta to the Putsch*.

<sup>23</sup> See the article by A. Socci, "Loggia-Glasnost," *Il Sabato* (Milan) April 14, 1990, 46-48; on clubs see Pt. II. Ch. III, *Silent Partners*; and "Gorbachev. Nouvelles à l'Est," in *30 Jours* (Paris: July 7, 1990), 19; on Freemasonry see Alain Rollat, "La franc-maçonnerie ressuscité à l'Est," *Le Monde* July 10, 1990; Gianni Cardinale, "Du communisme à la franc-maçonnerie," *30 Jours* August-September 1990) 34-37. See also the enigmatic work of E. Chevarnadze, *L'avenir s'écrit liberté* (Paris: Jacob, 1991). In the U.S., freemasonry more than in Europe, is careful to respect religion, especially the Catholic Church. Religion can, in effect, be useful for the government of the city, and one doesn't fail to try to use it toward this end.

<sup>24</sup> See on this subject our work *L'avortement: enjeux politiques* Ch. XVI, entitled "La sécurité démographique, stade totalitaire de l'impérialisme," 157-176.

# PART THREE

## WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

We have taken up the question of development by calling special attention to the demographic issue, because it is on this level that the totalitarian trend of liberalism is particularly revealed. Certainly, we don't wish to ignore the complexity of population questions. But we criticize the presuppositions with which they are discussed and the methods used to solve them.

Now it is to say too little to claim that the "scientific" justifications of conservatism of a liberal bent do not stand up to criticism. This criticism itself suggests why and how it is possible to ward off and *overcome* the present totalitarian trends. *Surmounting them is possible if we restore to man his ability to intervene creatively in the world, society and history.*

In order to throw light on this prodigious capacity, in this third part we must call on all the resources that philosophy, theology and political science offer us.

## CHAPTER I

# BORN FOR LIBERTY

In spite of real difficulties and periods of crisis, the developed western world has for decades known a growing prosperity and has always been expanding. Western society is that part of the world that is wealthy, that has succeeded and that continues to give proof of a dynamism that nothing can place in doubt. In one sense, it is this society that is "marginal" in relation to societies "less developed"! Certainly, we must pay tribute to the sincere and disinterested movements of generosity of which the West is capable! But no one can deny the logic that prevails in the "first" world, or the deleterious tendencies induced by this logic. The trends that we denounce can seem schematic. However, we are but laying bare, in all their harshness, the consequences of the choices brought on by what we have called the liberalist market ideology. The principles that inspire almost all of the West's conduct on a worldwide scale are engraved in the pure liberal tradition under its most negative aspect.<sup>1</sup>

## **We Must Reject an Organicist Conception of Society**

### *"Man" a Product*

As the developed West understands it, humanity is a vast organism of which members unequal in strength, competence and dignity form part. Among these members, there is perforce competition, selection, struggle for life. This organicist conception of society leads to a corresponding conception of the *market* and its corollary, *profit*. Human society is a market in which competition bears the name rivalry. Now, since human society is confronted with penury, the ultimate stake of this rivalry is survival. And that fraction of humanity is des-

tinged to survive whose superiority and strength is attested to by success. This superiority is translated by the term *solvency*. Thus the future of the human species demands that we watch primarily over the security of the strongest. This organicist vision of world society that we are summarizing in this paragraph before pursuing our reflection has been inspired by many authors.<sup>2</sup>

The essential demand of promoters of this mercantile organicism is *economic liberalism*. We know that this demand is already found in *national* societies inspired by liberalism. But this same claim is now broadened to *worldwide dimensions*: let us allow capital, raw materials and merchandise to circulate freely. This view curiously presupposes that things are more capable than men of organizing society! Following the example of what happens among men in individual societies, they say, out of this same free circulation will be born more just relationships among nations.

However, for the liberalist ideology, both on the international and national levels, the laws that govern the market are in the end regarded like the laws of *biological* nature, imitating those that rule the life of organisms. There will be justice among nations if among them the *natural laws* of the market are allowed to act — the same thing that, they say, ensures spontaneous justice within individual nations.

At the basis of this approach, we have no difficulty in discovering a realization a radicalization and a generalization of the liberal thought in which the *Malthusian* tradition is anchored: today a merciless law — more merciless than even the bronze law of salaries — indicates that there are too many men and not enough resources, not only of foodstuffs, but of *all kinds*. They go even further: we have seen that in the present world market man is often himself considered and used like *one* element that, not only has the function of producing and consuming (CA 36b. 39e, 49c), but *is produced* and even whose existence is subordinated to market imperatives.

In its most radical forms, contemporary neoliberalism, then, develops a practical synthesis between economic and biological considerations worked out by Malthus. The impact of these latter considerations, for the rest, were made more promising since the nineteenth century by the contributions of Galton and Darwin. Furthermore, genetic determinism invoked by Galton was combined with the structural determinism analyzed by Galtung; we are fatally subjected to one and the other.<sup>3</sup>

The synthesis that emerges, then, is an exemplary expression of *illuminist naturalism*:

for the liberalist ideology, the market is ruled by the *natural* laws of the economy that are reducible to the *natural* laws of biology. The to-and-fro transfer between economic determinism and biological determinism is accomplished without difficulty. This transfer is fatal and of a natural necessity. Most people in the West are not aware of this process. All the while seeking to alleviate some of its deadly effects by timely, even admirable actions, they actually contribute to making it work.

### *Perfidious Double-Talk*

It goes without saying that one avoids addressing to the poor a discourse so obviously abrupt as the one we've just summarized. This discourse is layered over with another of a typically ideological nature whose essential function is to conceal the true motivations.<sup>4</sup> This second discourse is of the *neo-Malthusian* type. It aims at making the poor interiorize the materialistic and hedonistic ethic of the wealthy. The slaves look at themselves with the eye of the master. The typical argument goes like this: *just as* excessive births impoverish (see what happens among slaves), so curbing births will lead to wealth (see what happens among masters). Curbing births and sterility opens the way to riches; if you want to be rich, then, you must accept its conditions: sterility. This sterility should be so arranged as not to impose it; rather one should lead people to accept it and even to arouse the desire for it. The talk about everyone's rights is supposed to elicit free assent of the poor person, but it hides the motivations and intentions of the very ones who do all this talking. It is not rare that feminist movements actively participate — but unknowingly — in this process of concealment, and that they become thus objective accomplices in the very oppression they seek to combat. Everything, or almost everything, has been said on this subject in the famous file of George Roy Hill, *Swindle*. Those who have been swindled are not supposed to realize that they have been the victims of crooks who cheated them.

The meaning and impact of this statement on sterility will vary profoundly, then, according to the milieu that expresses it and the milieu invited to accept it. The hedonist ideological talk, that claims to open to slaves the door to pleasure, conceals the violence to which these slaves are invited to consent (CA 23c, 25c). Moreover, the hedonism they dangle before their eyes is presented like the door to riches. To cap it all, they will even greatly emphasize the fact that the wealthy refrain from having many children. They will impute, then, their riches to the birth control they practice, whereas the principle

behind this wealth, the truly causal relation is the *inverse*. It is because they are wealthy that they refuse to run the risk of sharing.

Thus, in the two cases, both among the poor as well as among the rich, the same hedonist morality produces perverse effects. These are, for all that, entirely different for the rich and for the poor — the latter are swindled.

Two kinds of ideological positions overlap and join, then, but they have the same objective: to lure the poor and subjugate them, alienate them from their powers of judgment and personal decision making, to mutilate them in their bodies. On the one hand, we are in the presence of a seductive hedonist approach that arouses sensibility and even sensuality. On the other hand, one has on hand a posture, that pretends to be "scientific": biological considerations apparently objective are advanced to explain definitively wealth as well as misery, *to say that one and the other are just*, since they correspond to the nature of things and men.

### *New Technocrats*

From this "scientific" posture flows, they say, the necessity of appealing to men of science to resolve the economic and social problems. They will enthrone, then, new technocrats. The demographer will have here a role of primary importance, for it is he who will have to formulate the admissible relationship between a given population and the resources at its disposal. And since, according to the doctrine, there will always be a disproportion between these two factors, the doctor will put to work the techniques available for containing the poor population within the proportions "scientifically" admissible (CA 39c). It is obvious that on the precise point of abortion, the attitude and practice of liberalist scientism joins the practice of Soviet scientism. In fact, in the East European countries the right to abortion was in no way a "right" of women that was "recognized"; it was before all else a particularly effective means of putting into practice an imperative demographic policy.<sup>5</sup>

Apart from natural selection effected already by nature and artificial selection practiced by the doctor to help nature execute its design more effectively, they repeat *there is nothing* to do, or hardly; we are quasi impotent before the phenomenon of underdevelopment. Poverty as well as riches are natural phenomena and inevitable. The doctor who *knows* that obviously cannot intervene in the market mechanisms: for him that would be impossible, inopportune and in any case useless. On the other hand, if he cannot act on the level of poverty, he can do so on the level of the poor. With his techniques, he



can curb the poor, contain them within the limits determined as admissible; he can help nature to select the best — defined according to “scientific” criteria.

“He *can*,” they told us. But this *ability* is quickly presented or perceived as a *duty*. The doctor who accepts these ultraliberal theses soon obligates himself to care for this organism, society.<sup>6</sup> They do not hesitate to booby-trap the expression “social security,” and instead of their meaning protection that society offers to individuals, twist it to mean that society must protect itself against individuals. They proceed to a distorting of its sense entirely analogous to the proposition about “laws of social defense.” The good health of society or of the species is presented as a guarantee of the optimal benefit to the people as a whole. In taking care of the social body, the doctor will engage in a work of *public health*. Medicine will be at the service of “demographic security.” Since the intruders will have been contained, they will not come to “squat” on the market, and with total security the solvent members of the social body will be able to continue to feast. Aid to the “parasites,” we are assured, is in any case immoral; it is not justified unless those who are able to provide it recycle it to their advantage: that is what they do, in fact, under the form of profits.

Contemporary medicine has become gangrenous through the influence exercises over it by a Kantianism of the most summary and pernicious kind. “Do your duty,” the categorical imperative prescribes. But in the final analysis, there is always an autonomous subject who decides what this duty is, that is, the duty of the doctor. Before such an autonomous subject — the doctor himself or the doctor’s boss — a human being in difficulty, a woman, the unborn infant, the sick, the poor are always weaker. They are, therefore, exposed to being victims of another’s or others’ duty. While we’re at it, the heirs of Nietzsche will be very explicit: another can always be sacrificed to my interests. The concept of the “fundamental norm” developed by Kelsen will soon contribute to corrupt rights. Wait just a little while: the duty of the state will become the duty of the State!<sup>7</sup>

We understand well that the dissemination and putting into practice of this ideology, of which we are here but revealing the underlying cynicism, requires accomplices who must be sought outside the world of biomedical and demographic sciences. We will limit ourselves here to suggesting some types of accomplices.

The *media* is the first. By every means, including if necessary, the rigging of statistics, it is advisable to bombard public opinion relentlessly.<sup>8</sup> It must repeat and repeat that the poor are poor because they



are too numerous and have too many children. Language with emotion highly charged must be used and every occasion seized upon to inculcate this "evidence" in the minds of the public.

Then *lawyers* follow. The fact is known that a well conducted modification of legislation can be perceived as a legitimation of the most aberrant behavior. A certain manipulation of rights can anesthetize the moral conscience. Binding was a past master of the art of making seem "legitimate" monstrous practices concealed by law.<sup>9</sup> His intellectual posterity has by far surpassed the circle of those who regard themselves as his heirs.

This perversion of rights is reflected in *education* and is reinforced still more by the influence, diffused but still profound, of Rousseau. The total individual liberty that the Geneva philosopher demanded in *Emile* required a moderating element which he went on to define in the *Social Contract*. Now, by eliminating God from the horizon of politics, Rousseau brought transcendence to the earth; he secularized Calvinist theocracy. By restoring civil religion, he reduced politics by confining it to the sphere of pure immanence (CA 25c). For law, the legislator does nothing more than record the choices fixed sovereignly by the majority (CA 44b, 46b; EV 68, 70 f.). There soon arise the obligation, *civilly religious*, to obey the law for the sole reason that it but expresses the general will, reputedly infallible. In brief, both Hobbes' pact of submission as well as the pact of association of Rousseau lead to the sacralization of society laicized beforehand.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, Rousseau himself gave a striking illustration of his twofold theory concerning individual liberty and civil religion: after having begotten children he hastened to entrust them to public assistance.

Finally, complicity of *politicians*. They too must be indoctrinated, using if necessary reports displaying impressive scientific apparatus. Through politicians one will have access to national and international organisms and, therefore, to centers of decision making as well as to financial resources.<sup>11</sup> Thereby one will be able to put pressure on private organizations and noticeably to influence decisions regarding research and production (CA 36bd, 47b). The case of RU 486 provides a beautiful example of what we are saying. It shows that, to the shame of some nations, among them France and Germany, public powers authorize and finance programs whose sole purpose is to industrialize the death of the innocents (CA 39c).<sup>12</sup>

### *Predestination Reinterpreted*

As a result of our analysis, the neoliberal ideology appears as a construction of such perversity that is all the more cunning as it re-

mains often unwitting and whose ravages are far from being evaluated. Neither the wealthy nor the poor have the least "scientific" reason to want to change whatever it may be in their respective conditions: they received it from nature. If the destiny of the one diverges from the destiny of the other that is in virtue of a decree of nature. We find here, then, a totally naturalist reinterpretation of the doctrine of predestination.

This ideology affords the most reactionary conservatism *justifications* pretending to be scientific. It confirms the masters in their conviction that their cause is *just*, since it is nature that conferred upon them a superiority of force and success. It would, then, be *unjust* for the masters to call into question the status quo and to venture on the hazardous road of justice already denounced as *antinatural*. This ideology imprisons the poor in the conviction that their situation is also *just*, since it is nature that willed them to be inferior to the wealthy.<sup>13</sup> The poor, then, have no reason to be astonished at their poverty, or to want out of it, even less to revolt against it. They have such little hope of a future that they must cooperate with Nature by refusing to prolong their useless existence by means of an offspring that would do nothing else but precipitate the *degeneration of the species*.

Although it is not admitted explicitly, it is easy to notice the striking kinship between this ideology and the thought of Nietzsche:

- the same fear of seeing the weak win over the strong;
- the same fear of contamination of the strong by "impure" races;
- the same obsession with *racial hygiene* by means of eugenics and/or the elimination of the handicapped;
- the same wish to *eliminate* the weak: "Let the weak and unsuccessful perish! The first principle of our 'philanthropy.' And we must help toward that!"
- the same hatred of Christianity, because, with its morality of slavery, it exploits — they claim — the resentment of the weak toward all that is strong, healthy and beautiful;
- the same hatred of God, because He has chosen what is "weak and foolish in the eyes of the world" (I Cor 1:2).

Thus the idea that the Good News should be announced to the poor and humble is totally incompatible with the *warrior ethic*, the same name given by the aristocracy to itself.<sup>14</sup>

## Beyond Neoliberalism

The very weakness of this ideology suggests the possibility of substantially amending it.

### *In the Service of Structural Violence*

In effect, what this ideology denies is something absolutely essential. This ideology denies that the *social environment* has a real importance. This denial had already been developed by Darwin's cousin, Francis Galton, theoretician of eugenics and inventor of the term.<sup>15</sup> It follows that is basically useless to wish to modify this environment. Even if politicians succeeded in transforming it, it would result in no benefit for individuals or the species. What counts is innate: Galton assures us that "genius is hereditary."

Thus *neoliberal ideology* justifies, for the profit of the rich, the strictest status quo. It *justifies* what Johannes Galtung called "*structural violence*."<sup>16</sup> More precisely, a twofold violence is at the service of structural violence: the physical violence done to bodies as well as that done to minds (what is called the lie). What is to be understood by that? "When the potential is higher than the actual and the actual is *inevitable*, then we are in the presence of violence."<sup>17</sup>

There are economic, political, social, etc. situations that *could be otherwise on condition* that men want it and devote themselves to transforming them. Infant mortality, life expectancy, as variable as societies, attest to the importance of the environment as well as the possibility of intervening in it, but they also show the extent of the violence exercised by structures upon men. However, to change things, it is necessary to choose: it is difficult, for example, to reconcile the promotion of luxury medicine reserved for the affluent minority and the rise of public health in poor countries.<sup>18</sup>

The same holds true for the area of foodstuffs: with the agromonic resources presently available, it is possible suitably to nourish double or triple the present population of the world. But it is necessary to want to do so, to organize and harmonize our efforts. As for the reverse, the example of Brazil is once again very significant. One proceeds with a savage deforestation of the Amazon basin for the profit of a few magnates: one damages nature. After that one proclaims coldly that there are too many men — as it happens, the poor — in relation to the resources! In both rich and poor countries, therefore, convergent measures must be taken that will obviously not please everybody (CA 37f; EV 10c).<sup>19</sup>

In a general way, the numbers provided by the World Bank cited above<sup>20</sup> show the extent of what today's structural violence is. These numbers are enough to give one an idea of the imperceptible manner in which neoliberal ideology trends toward totalitarianism (CA 42c, 46b, 49c; EV 72). This ideology is a "fig leaf" justifying total war of

the rich against the poor: a war in which the poor are targeted in the name of quantitative and qualitative imperatives.

Here we touch upon a new fundamental difficulty that liberal ideology raises. Everything happens as if those who hold this ideology have not dared admit that demographic growth could be the cause of wealth, *and that this is the very reason* why it is perceived as a menace by those presently wealthy. It is this thesis, the inverse of that spread of the ideological gnosis, that they must carefully conceal and nip in the bud.

Whence it is easy to see how, in its totalitarian trend, neoliberalism reinforces some major characteristics of national-socialism:

- the same *organicism*, induced by the very excesses of libertarian individualism;
- the same *racism*, which defines master and slave “biologically” and “justifies” the master’s subjugation of the slave;
- the same cult of violence: the individual is as violent as society for the simple reason that nature is violent;
- the same *corporatism*, extended on a worldwide scale: the human species is more real than individuals, and the latter must, in the social body, accept the more or less noble function assigned to them by nature;
- the same *messianism*: a minority “enlightened” by “scientific” laws claim they are invested with the mission to rule humanity;
- the same *ideological superstructures*, elaborated to “legitimize” the will to power of the strongest, all the while hiding their intervention;
- the same *use of rights as instruments*, reduced to furnishing a disguise for the lords’ will to power;
- the same *manipulation* of the media, including scientific information, to inhibit personal ability to judge and make free decisions;
- the same *utilization of biomedical resources* to exercise physical violence, to which the ideology will be forced to make people consent in the name of the social body’s health;
- the same *Manichaeism* finally, that established a “natural” typology of friends and enemies, and sinks into an obsessive fear for survival and security.

### *Man’s Constructive Intervention*

It is, however, relatively easy to demystify this ideology as already suggested by the dismantling to which we have just subjected

it. It is this task of demystification that we are going to suggest here. First of all, we must remark that, despite its apparent sophistication, the neoliberal ideology that we have analyzed in regard to the typical case of population policies remains profoundly Malthusian. It displays a consistent faithfulness to the basic axiom that ensured Malthus glory and a following. Now this axiom presents a good example of *monocausality*. It affirms that it is in virtue of a *general and absolute law* that there are always and everywhere too many men in relation to the alimentary resources or all resources. As they have often remarked, and F. Wertham has especially emphasized, we're dealing with an abstract statement floating outside of time and space.<sup>21</sup> All the other factors of development seem suddenly to evaporate. Having set down as a principle that the sole possible cause of a lack of foodstuffs and other resources is the excessive poor population, they see it as necessarily following that this sole possible cause is also the real cause. A beautiful example of begging the question!

Hence, our second remark: we must shed light again on the *many constructive ways that man can intervene* so often emphasized by contemporary existential phenomenology.

Man, in fact, controls *nature*. He is not inserted in nature in the manner of an animal ruled by programmed conduct. He springs forth from it; he must constantly reinvent his relationship to the world according to the circumstances of time and place. By their constant evolution, sciences and techniques attest to this creativity in man that is always alert (CA 32, 38a). To freeze this creativity is to make sloth a virtue. To stimulate in man his inventiveness, especially through education, is to enable him to liberate himself from the determinisms highlighted by the liberal tradition.

Man also has control of the political structures of society. According to some, of course, the violence of structures would be the consequence of nature's violence. On this point, the neoliberal ideology, let us remember, is the twin sister of the Marxist ideology.

It is here that we are going to see certain limits to the analyses of Galtung, but also their "fecundity." In his analysis of structural violence, the famous irenically inclined author is inspired by the Marxist tradition and of the determinism inherent in the Marxist conception of history and production. Marxist determinism is in some way nothing but the reverse reading of liberal determinism, against which Marx wanted to react, and which is supposed to express itself in the "natural laws" of the market.

Now, for more than a century, the liberal ideologues devoted

themselves to criticizing this determinism found in Marx, and which should truly be denounced in the name of man's constructive ability. They present Marx's thought as paralyzing human liberty, liberty being, according to the famous formula of Engels, "the knowledge of necessity." But despite appearances, the criticism the liberal ideologues aimed at Marx itself proceeds from a determinism that is the inverse of the one developed by Marx. They say the laws of nature must be respected in wanting the best to prevail. And it was against this determinism that Marx, on his side, argued justly, but badly. His argumentation was an *ad hominem* one and ultimately ineffective. His critique could not succeed because the author of *Das Kapital* was wrong in opposing his determinism to that of the ideologues of the liberal bourgeoisie. However, the determinism of the latter was anterior to that of Marx. Thus the author of *Das Kapital* should be given the credit of having pointed the finger — however maladroitly but without denouncing it explicitly — at the naturalist determinism of liberal ideology and the point of obstruction inherent in it.

In sum, both determinisms are homologous. Here they are expressed in terms of competition, there in terms of polemics; here in terms of "mastery," there in terms of slavery. In fact, we are dealing with one and the same determinism, but it is seen from different angles: the error is anthropological in either case.

Thus analysis of structural violence proposed by Galtung proved to be thus a bearer of unsuspected fecundity. Not only does it permit us to understand better why the liberal ideology leads to "structural violence"; it also enables us to understand why the Marxist ideology heads in the same direction. And above all, this analysis allows us to understand better the destiny that restricts these two ideologies and involves both of them in engendering structures of violence, that is, in giving birth to monsters.

### *To Make an Ally of Time*

To speak of man's constructive intervention is also to speak of time. In effect, the different initiatives that one can take to modify the environment do not produce their effects simultaneously. Let us use a few examples to explain. If one improves the quality of water, this measure will ultimately have a beneficial effect on infant mortality. But in its turn, the decline of the latter will not affect fecundity until later. In different terms, that means that the desire for children is not perceived in the same way when infant mortality is high or low. If infant mortality is high, couples will have the tendency to have many children, especially for their security in old age; they will have many

children so that some will survive and be able to care for them. If infant mortality is low, these mechanisms will be less in play, since, while begetting fewer children, couples will arrive at old age with as many children to sustain them as they would have had, had they lived in a context of high infant mortality.

It appears, then, that improvement in policies concerning sanitation, fiscal matters, social security, pensions, etc. contribute toward lowering fecundity. But this decline is obviously not concomitant with the application of these diverse measures.

The neoliberal ideology, then, seems to misunderstand the reality of history. Faced with the determinism and the atemporal aspect of this ideology, we need to weigh well the complexity of the role of time. If we wish to influence fecundity while respecting the requirements of justice, the actions to undertake must be handled following a certain order and account taken of a certain rhythm. The very slowness of demographic phenomena happily offers astonishing possibilities of procedures.

To act on the environment is, then, also to make an ally. It is to make a forecast in the strict sense: it is to act on the present state of the world and society in view of "hatching" at the right time a state of society that does greater honor to the dignity of every man.<sup>22</sup>

### *A Barrier to Break Through*

For over a century now, human society has been bewitched by games of mirrors from which men will free themselves only by breaking them. What is needed is to denounce this blockage, this impasse, that compromises in man the taking of initiative and responsibility. It is the barrier of these false determinisms — at once accomplices, enemies that paralyze in every way — that we have to blow up. (CA 13a, 42c).

To break through this *barrier*, means, first of all, to restore to man his political responsibility (CA 46abc, EV 90b). We have seen that political and social organizations can destroy factors and conditions favorable to development. But this does *not have* to be this way. If man is by nature called to live in society, political structures are not "natural"; they are historical, artificial in a sense.<sup>23</sup> *Solidarity* is built (CA 10c, 15e, 41bc, 43c, 51a; EV 20c, 66b). Ever since Solon, one knows that structures have as their end, among others, to restrain the immoderation of the strongest, to protect the weakest as well as solve the problems the community has to face in connection with nature. Thus the relationships of man to man are also the object of an inces-

sant reinvention that becomes concrete especially in political mediation.

The present discussion on the *rights of man*, inspired above all by Nazi and Fascist experience, can also feed a radical critique of liberalism ideology. To take seriously the proclamation of the equal dignity of all men, to reject the rights of an impersonal society obeying blindly merciless "natural" laws overshadowing those of individuals, is to call into question the very foundations of contemporary authoritarian liberalism (EV 18).

However, a special task rests urgently on us at the point of encounter between economics and politics. Neoliberalism presently not only permits but practices systematically the free circulation of capital, while it strictly regulates the circulation of persons. On this score, segregation and protectionism are the rule. If the *right of communication*, so dear to Vitoria,<sup>24</sup> were truly recognized, western society would find itself rapidly transformed and it would hasten to reconsider the whole of its relations with the Third-World, in particular regarding immigration and sharing of resources.

In any case, the promotion of man's rights as well as the struggle against the totalitarian trend of liberalism require an "effective world authority" — the expression is that of Paul VI — which would not be the simple expression of sovereign states. This power would have to be endowed with effective means enabling it to counter the imperial aims of transnational directorates that do not act forcefully in the open.

From this perspective, the positive role of the media can be considerable. They could contribute effectually to arouse and nourish, on a worldwide scale, the will to live together in peace and fraternity (CA 21a, 52b, 58; EV 93).

Furthermore, the best national and international political organizations will be able to favor the setting up of more just economic structures. It is in effect impossible, as we have seen, for more justice to arise spontaneously from a market obeying natural laws. Now, not without bad faith, do certain contemporary neoliberal ideologues sometimes invoke, explicitly or implicitly, contemporary western models in support of their cause. However, they do not hesitate to erase the fact that, in the western European context, liberalism, hard and pure, has been profoundly amended by the contribution of the Christian-social and/or socialist tradition, the latter insisting on the indispensable role of public powers to promote the rights of man.

Neoliberalism's taking over of mixed western models is perfidi-



ous and deceitful. What neoliberalism is seeking is precisely the return to the absolute liberalism of *laissez-faire*. The "justifications" it invokes cannot, moreover, lead to anything else.

Here we see clearly that it is impossible to separate the pursuit of justice on the political level from that on the economic level. We cannot take seriously the promotion of the *dignity of all men* without any discrimination apart from of the doctrine underlining the *universal destination of material, intellectual and spirituals goods* (CA 52c, 61a; EV 91b).<sup>25</sup> Now this doctrine of the universal destination of goods requires, in turn, the right of communication as well as governmental organs as this complex task demands.

Thus just as man has control of *political structures*, so also does he have control of economic structures. He can transform the conditions of economic production and the organization of distribution. Waste and penury are directly related to these conditions and this organization, and we need to talk about population precisely as related to these conditions and organization. We must do this in order to denounce with vigor the indolence of those who prefer to mutilate men, even consent to let them perish rather than to make these conditions and organization more effective in view of the welfare of *all*.

In this complex, the role of *medicine* is not to allow itself to become the vassal of the wealthy.<sup>26</sup> The doctor lets himself become an accomplice of structural violence when he places his knowledge and know-how at the service of the rich. He must refuse to subscribe to the "evidence" the masters want to inculcate and which ideology "justifies," namely, that the privileged domain, not to say unique, of his interventions among men should have as object the total control of fecundity and life. On the contrary, traditionally doctors devoted themselves to outsmarting the blindness of a sometimes merciless nature. That is why they have reserved their preferential care for those who were the most ill and weakest in order to help them recover health.

We finally come to the role of *education*. Unlike animals, man learns, must learn, how to work out his existence. To educate is to lead someone to free himself from a naive existence and to initiate an existence taken in hand by a person with developed awareness, freedom and responsibility. This is the point at which man is born of the liberty that is essential to him. It is uniquely at this point that man becomes capable of personally forging the human relationships with others and the world in solidarity. Neoliberalism keeps the poor at the very edge of this possibility: these form part, so to speak, of the "domain" of the wealthy. Now the poor are certainly called to be the ar-

tisans of their liberation, but it is necessary to break from the outside the circle that oppresses them. If, in effect, I may not deprive someone of his autonomy without committing injustice, it is a duty of justice, on the other hand, to help him exercise his liberty with the fullness of his personality. That requires a redistribution of property (CA 43c), of knowledge and know-how (CA 32d; EV 98). That implies, in liberal societies called developed, some radical reexamination.

### *The Right to Education and the Duty of Intervention*

This reflection on education needs to be made more precise and deepened, for beginning with it the poor of every country can glimpse realistically a clear affirmation of their dignity and an improvement in their standard of living.

In fact, the liberalist global project we've been analyzing in this work has this particular characteristic, namely, that it calls for a division of labor, a distribution of tasks according to the rank occupied by workers in organized production. In this sense, this globalist project postulates that we respect the waterproof cleavages among the different categories of those who are involved in an integrated process. Some tasks are repetitive, fragmented and capable of being programmed. However, this programming of the power of decision making that accompanies it evades the simple laborers: almost always both go together with capital property. In such an outmoded conception of the enterprise, it is clear that those who make decisions want to hide their knowledge, for if the simple workers had access to it, the sclerotic hierarchies would be shattered and there would be a possibility of social mobility.

This concealing of knowledge is characteristic of classical colonial societies and of all underdeveloped countries; it is also true of the "neocolonial" project, which John K. Galbraith pointed out and of which Alvin Toffler's analysis yielded better comprehension, is that it holds on to an anachronistic conception of the role of knowledge in contemporary business.<sup>27</sup>

Considered as the prerogative of those who make the decisions, knowledge provides the basis of hierarchy and "legitimizes" the bureaucracy. But to the extent that one holds on to this fixed conception of enterprise, the latter is committed not to develop while being vulnerable in the extreme.

The fully modern enterprise, on the other hand, gives first place to knowledge on *all levels* of the production system. The general extension of information, in particular, serves to contribute rapidly to

the destruction of stratification based on concealment of knowledge as well as the corresponding discrimination.

It is here that *education* appears, today more than ever before, as the exceptional opportunity for the poor of the entire world. In fact, for a long time now, their great claim referred to the access to the property of the earth as well as the material means of production. This claim was stimulated by the various types of socialism and lost nothing of its pertinence. However, because of its obstinate attachment to those great classical claims, Soviet communism contributed to delaying the perception of a new phenomenon. Little by little, it became relatively more urgent to demand a share in knowledge. In fact, by the very fact of the sophistication of the modern systems of production, their claim must today involve by preference access to knowledge. By its very nature, the latter opens itself to sharing, while by its nature material property serves as an obstacle to sharing. In the end, knowledge is called to constitute, for these reasons the very decisive equipment of which the poor have need. Thanks to knowledge, the poor will be able to proceed to a twofold challenge: an archaic structures in which they are confined and material property unfairly concentrated. Let us remember the role played by mandatory education in the development of western societies.

When all is said and done, knowledge is a part of humanity's common patrimony; to put this common property at the disposal of all men is a matter of justice. To offer to all men access to this patrimony is to honor a right inherent in the dignity of every man. Such a right that, in this precise domain, extreme need makes intervention a duty, so to speak.

<sup>1</sup> From this point on, we will incorporate into our text references to John Paul II's encyclical *Centesimus Annus* (1991). We will refer to it by means of the abbreviation CA; the number indicates the paragraph, while the small letter points out the section within the paragraph number. Likewise EV refers to the encyclical *Evangelium Vitae* (1995).

<sup>2</sup> Among the authors who have developed an organicist conception of society, we may mention Savigny, Spencer, Espinas, Darwin, etc.

<sup>3</sup> Frederic Wertham, *A Sign for Cain*; as for Galtung see note 17 of this Chapter.

<sup>4</sup> Whether we are concerned with the "total war" between East and West or the confrontation between North and South, disinformation plays a major role. See, for example, Alexandre Dorozynski, *La manipulation des esprits. . . et comment s'en protéger* (Paris: Le Prat, 1981); R. Jacquard, *La guerre du mensonge. Histoire secrète de la désinformation* (Paris: Plon, 1986); Vladimir Volkoff, *La désinformation, arme de guerre* (Paris: L'age d'homme-Julliard, 1986). See also the works of R. Bel, note 8 of

this Chapter.

<sup>5</sup> Regarding the state's taking charge of sexuality in the USSR, see Mikhael Stern, *La vie sexuelle en URSS* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1979).

<sup>6</sup> On doctors and the treatment of the social body see Y. Ternon and S. Helman, *Les médecins allemands et le national-socialisme* (Paris: Casterman, 1973); cf. also R. J. Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors*, esp. 30-35; S. Trombley, *The Right to Reproduce*, esp. "Socialism and Eugenics," 30-44, where he reports what has been said about Karl Pearson; on the case of the U.S. see, among others, 59-63, 116 ff; on England, 70-77. We should not fail to report the work of A. Mitscherlich and F. Mielke, *Medizin ohne Menschlichkeit. Dokumente des Nürnberger Ärzteprozesses* (Frankfurt: Fischer Bücherei, 1989); The way in which the Third Reich got control of feminine sexuality is explained by R. Thalmann in *Etre Femme sous le IIIe Reich* (Paris: Laffont, 1982). Dr. Pierre Simon touches on this problem in *De la vie avant toute chose* (Paris: Mazarine, 1979), esp. 16, 35, 53, 63, 84, 185, 222, 234, 256. To understand better the thought of Pierre Simon, it is useful to interpret him in the light of Konrad Lorenz' work on animal behavior. See above all the latter's *L'agression. Histoire naturelle du mal* (Paris: Flammarion, 1969). On Lorenz' thought see Edouard Herr, *La violence. Necessité ou liberté?* (Namur: Culture et Vérité, 1990) esp. 15-39.

<sup>7</sup> Kelsen himself had to flee Nazi Europe to avoid becoming a victim of the very practical applications that the Hitler regime drew from his own theory.

<sup>8</sup> See for example René Bel, *Un rapport mal fait! Recherches critiques sur le Rapport 36* duplicated (Paris, 1976); this study concerns the "Rapport de l'institut national d'études démographiques à Monsieur le ministre des Affaires sociales sur la regulation des naissances en France," which appeared in *Population* n. 4 (July-August 1966). This can be completed with Emerentienne de la Grange, Marguerite-Marie de la Grange and René Bel, *Un complot contre la vie. L'avortement* (Paris: Société de Production Littéraire, 1979); account should be taken of *Mise à jour* of December 1980. On the disinformation in the field of medicine see Dr. Patricia Sanders, *Information Médicale continue du grand public en matière de reproduction humaine* this duplicated thesis was defended on November 3, 1985, before the Faculty of Medicine of Tours.

<sup>9</sup> On Binding see note 16 of Part II, Ch. III.

<sup>10</sup> On Rousseau see especially his *Contrat Social* IV, 8; on Hobbes see note 6 of Part II, Ch. II and *infra* Part II, Ch. II, "Aigle à deux têtes."

<sup>11</sup> One of the most explicit works on this point is that of C. Dijerassi, *The Politics of Contraception* (New York: Norton, 1979). We owe to the Australian senator, Brian Harradine, a series of interviews particularly well documented, on the disturbing case of the World Health Organization. See *Ethics and Public Policy. The Ethics of International Bureaucracies. Abortion and the Human Reproduction Programme* (Canberra, 1990). Cf. also Part I, Ch. V, "A Report of WHO on Human Reproduction."

<sup>12</sup> Cf. note 25 in Part II, Ch. VI.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. F. Wertham, *A Sign for Cain*; we follow him closely.

<sup>14</sup> See for example Frederic Nietzsche, *Oeuvres philosophiques complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984) VIII, 116, 162, 216. See also Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche. Introduction à sa philosophie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978) 284. All these themes, especially that of resentment, can also be found in S. D. Mumford, *American Democracy and the Vatican*. In an article entitled "Est-ce que les hommes sont des personnes?" *Catholica* (Paris) n. 24 (February 1991) 49-58, Robert Spaemann writes: "Already in 1910 Robert Benson in his novel *The Lord of the World* (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne) described the organization of houses for euthanasia as the essential element of an anti-Christian civilization to come (50).

<sup>15</sup> F. Galton is the author of *Hereditary Genius* and *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development*. A vibrant plea for pre-natal eugenics (widely practiced in Cuba) was launched by Jenny Jordan in *Avant que de naître* (Ed. ENEA); it was honored

with a letter written by Jean Rostand and a preface of Dr. Henri Deroche.

<sup>16</sup> See for example "Entretien avec Johann Galtung," *Alternatives non violentes. Dossier désobéissance civile* (Lyons) n. 34, 1980, 66-74.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. The text of J. Galtung, "Violence, paix et recherche sur la paix," in Philippe Braillard's collection, *Théorie des relations internationales* (Paris: PUF, 1977) 297-319. This was translated from "Violence, Peace and Peace Research," *Journal of Peace Research* n. 6 (1969) 167-191.

<sup>18</sup> Claire Brisset published a good piece on this problem, *La santé dans le Tiers-Monde* (Paris: La Découverte, 1984).

<sup>19</sup> This was shown by Joseph Klatzmann in *Nourrir dix milliards d'hommes?* (Paris: PUF, 1983); see also Colin Clark, *Les conditions du progrès économique* (Paris: PUF, 1960); the first edition of this classic dates from 1940. See, by the same author, "Population et niveaux de vie," in *La Revue internationale du travail*, August 1953) 103-104.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Part I, passim.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. F. Wertham, *A Sign for Cain*, 106-113.

<sup>22</sup> Gaston Berger, *Phénoménologie du temps et prospective* (Paris: PUF, 1964).

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Henri Bergson, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion* (Paris: PUF, 1959) 1214.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Francisco de Vitoria (1492-1546), *Leçons sur les Indiens et sur le droit de guerre* (Geneva: Droz, 1966). Briefly, the "right of communication" authorizes every man to settle where he wishes as long as he respects the society which welcomes him.

<sup>25</sup> On this subject see the intervention of Msgr. Jorge Mejia during the second conference of the UN about less advanced countries (Paris, September 3-14, 1990). Entitled "The goods of creation are destined for all inhabitants of the earth," this text appeared in *Documentation catholique* n. 2012 (October 21, 1990) 917-919.

<sup>26</sup> On the costs and stakes of research related to life, see R. Gerard and C. Merger, *Procréatique et société. De l'ovule à l'étoile* (Paris: Medsi-McGraw Hill, 1989). We have touched on this problem in *Droits de l'homme et technocratie*, 55-58; and in *L'enjeu politique de l'avortement*, 37-43.

<sup>27</sup> Alvin Toffler, *Les nouveaux pouvoirs* (Paris: Fayard, 1991). On this work see Jacques Zeegers, "Les entreprises dominées par le savoir," *La Libre Belgique* of April 27, 1991. On the same problem see J. K. Galbraith, *Le nouvel Etat industriel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1967) esp. 57-107.

## CHAPTER II

# CHRISTIANS AND THE DUTY OF INVENTING

The events we have witnessed for the last dozen years and which have gathered momentum since 1989 (CA 22-29), suggests that if men of good will want to do so, they can break the bewitching mirror of which we have spoken.<sup>1</sup>

It is to this salutary and liberating task that some intellectuals have devoted themselves. The changes that we have observed in the Eastern countries obviously owe a great deal to their influence and to that of the *refuzniks*. However tenuous the flame of the spirit may have seemed from afar, it had never been extinguished. We will probably see it better still when, in the next few years, we shall have better knowledge of the unofficial artistic production of these countries. For some years already we have seen it thanks to the work of Pasternak, Mandelstam, Tsvetaieva, Solzhenitsyn, whose works are now published in Moscow. The regime was unable to crush such a glittering array of protesters as peaceful as they were effective. All of them had to face repression and some were imprisoned in the "sixth republic" described so well by Avraham Sifrin.<sup>2</sup>

Besides, we observe also that some intellectuals contributed in a decisive way toward calling the status quo into question. For example, recall the role of Kolkowski in Poland, Mircea Dinescu in Rumania, Christoph Hein of the former Democratic Republic of Germany, Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia.

In the course of the coming years, studies will certainly show that, if before Soviet communism there had been "a betrayal of scholars," this betrayal was perhaps less imputable — due proportion observed — to the intellectuals of Eastern Europe than to their Western

colleagues. The kindness show Soviet totalitarianism by Western intellectuals — theologians included — certainly even delayed the process of implosion of the system.<sup>3</sup>

Breaking the bewitching mirror is not only the work of the intellectuals, whose role we limit ourselves to recalling here. We would like to confirm the possibility of checking such misleading reflections by exposing two intertwined theses. The first can be summarized in a few words: challenging Soviet totalitarianism, internally and externally, offers a unique opportunity to denounce the totalitarian trend of liberalism. The second can also be briefly summed up: this opportunity suggests a specific role that Christians can play in inventing the future.

Despite the perilous character of any enterprise of this kind, we are going to scrutinize the signs of the time in order ultimately to draw from them teaching about the prophetic role of Christians and of the Church as an institution. Faced with the totally new situation which we are analyzing here, Christians are urged to collaborate toward inventing the future.

## The Eastern Countries

### *From Yalta to the Putsch*

At the very beginning of our reflections, it is proper to go beyond the conclusions to which our critical analyses of the previous chapter have led.<sup>4</sup> Doubtlessly, the changes in the USSR and Eastern Europe are real, profound and irreversible. A fundamental misunderstanding, but for all that widely held, must, however be cleared up. This misunderstanding concerns the effective role of the communists leaders in the changes that occurred in the East.

The currently circulated version of these changes recalls a procedure used with success by the Soviets regarding the Yalta conference (CA 23c). It is well known that from 1947, under Jdanov's impetus, a thesis began to be disseminated according to which dividing the world, especially Europe, into "two spheres of influence," had been decided at Yalta by the big powers. It is now established — the specialists have known this for a long time — that this thesis is historically insupportable. Nonetheless, this thesis was accepted by international public opinion and spread extremely well by the media.

If it is useless to expose the details of this affair, it is, on the other hand, not useless to stress that, in falsely imputing to Yalta the decision to divide the world, this thesis served the interests of the Soviet

Union and made people think that the major western powers had agreed to the annexation of these countries by the USSR. An "agreement" which obviously did not sanction an accomplished fact, since — so they claimed — this "agreement would have been anterior to the annexation of the Eastern countries by ruse and force.

If we bring up this precedent it is because an analogous process is unfolding before our eyes. The changes that occurred in the East have been habitually presented to us as coming from decisions made by governmental leaders, that is to say, by men of the apparatus. Faced with the problems left without solution by their predecessors, these leaders would have—they emphasize—given proof of their realism and foresight. In sum, a beautiful role was attributed to them in *perestroika*.<sup>6</sup>

Naturally there is no question of placing in doubt the "voluntarist" intervention of communist leaders in the changes that occurred. We could no longer underestimate the impact made on the Soviet leaders by president Reagan's "strategic defense initiative": "this nuclear umbrella" without doubt made the Kremlin leaders bend. But a few nuances deserve to be mentioned. Thus it is both false and unjust to stress the "beautiful role" of the government people to the point of concealing the fundamental and determining role of the base. By base we mean, in the spirit of Dostoyevski, the mass of the simple people whose integrity the regime never succeeded in undermining. A part from crediting a distortion of facts analogous to the one that allowed the Soviets to use a perfidious reading of Yalta, for fear of its being evaded we must proclaim a truth which has not been sufficiently acknowledged. In reality, the change in all the countries of the East came above all from the base (that is to say, nationalities and citizens), even if the governments "claim" it for tactical reasons or support it out of practical necessity. Moreover, there probably exist a serious misunderstanding between the leaders and the base regarding this matter: it is doubtful, in effect, that the leaders had truly sized up the transformations that had taken place among the mass of ordinary citizens.

Hence, if one is justified in speaking of an encounter between the changes produced at the base and the new style of government, or even the new regime, we must realize that this encounter is not without ambiguity. The role of the base is clearly more important than that of the new apparatus; one of the unknown factors that affects the future bears on the way they will articulate their respective roles, inasmuch as the action of the base does not have the same meaning as that of the apparatus.



Now to speak of the role of the base is not only to speak of the role of nationalities and intellectuals. Above all, as it happens, it is to speak of the role of religion.

### *The Role of Religion*

In the calling the Soviet system into question, the role of religions has been out in front, and it is often blended with the protesting role of intellectuals.

The Jews in the USSR have found in their religion the strength to resist the pogroms of yesterday and today.

The Muslims, especially in the republics of the Caucasus, find in their religious traditions the imperative reasons for political resistance — even armed.

The Orthodox Churches are also examining themselves on their traditional and often ambiguous relations with a regime in which they rightly see the survival of an atheistic caesaropapism. Without doubt, among the religious dignitaries, there was no unanimity regarding this regime. But the will to free themselves from a theologically unacceptable control is making itself felt more and more and, with it, the desire to fight off dishonorable secular behavior.

Equally on the Protestant side, especially in the Lutheran churches, liberating reference to the Gospel has reactivated, especially among the youth, the sense of belonging to a community of faith that is not limited to the frontiers inherited from the recent past. The events in Rumania are striking in this regard. Militant about the rights of man, Pastor Lazlo Tokes was removed by the Rumanian communist authorities. Evil overtook them, since, it was at Timisoara that things started happening that led to the end of the leader.

Catholicism is an entirely special case. We should recall here a resounding event: the visit of John Paul II to Poland in 1979. Less than a year after this visit, the world, stupefied and incredulous, learned of the birth of the union "Solidnosc" (CA 23a). That was in August 1980. Right away we were struck by the figure of Lech Walesa, his determination as serene as unshakable, his faith as intense as effective. But, whatever may be said of his personal charisma, Walesa was able to unleash the movement that became so widely known because he himself was, in some way, the expression of a people unanimous in their faith.

The Polish example gave courage to other Catholic Communities. In the USSR, Latin Catholics as well as the Uniats were strengthened by the example of the Polish neighbors, whose experience radi-

ated out and electrified Christian communities, Catholic and others, in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the Baltic countries, and in all the other countries, including Albania.<sup>7</sup>

### *Religious Liberty*

Faced with a regime that oppressed them, these Christians of the East did not choose a direct course of confrontation, even less one of violent revolution. Their primary demand was based on *religious liberty* (CA 9b, 13c, 47a). Even the right of unionist association such as *Walesa* demanded invoked religious foundations. The unionist struggle, sector-based as it was at the beginning, rapidly provoked in the Catholic world a realization of the profound meaning and ultimate import of this struggle. It concerned bringing to the light of day the rupture between atheistic totalitarianism with which the regime was identified and the lived faith proclaimed by the people. It concerned making very obvious the *alienation* of the regime from the people, of the state from the nation.

In its roots, the Polish protest presents, then, something entirely new in comparison with earlier protests. It was not a question of protesting, *first of all*, the gulag, the corruption, the lack of efficiency, etc. It's all about making religious liberty prevail in its principle and consequences. The protest of the Polish Catholics spread throughout Eastern Europe and among the Christians of the USSR for this precise reason: all the Christians realized that religious liberty was the essential liberty.

For the rest, this is confirmed by contemporary reflection on totalitarianism. Man becomes personalized in the interpersonal relationship with God. It is in this relationship of faith that man freely welcomes the God-made-man who comes to him, and it is through his personal adherence of faith to Jesus that the believer has access to the Father. It is because, through faith, each believer enters into a personal relationship with his Father that he can recognize a brother in every man. Because the act of faith is an act eminently free and reasonable, the Gospel exalts the singularity of each man, his personality. Each is invited to exercise his reason to judge situations, to dialogue in order to change viewpoints, to deliberate, to decide, to achieve. Each is invited to recognize freely the other as his equal. Because the believer is open to God, he must be open to others, to all others. And more, we do not become ourselves except because others help us to open up to ourselves.

Every form of totalitarianism wanted and wants to restrict the human being to the dimensions of a purely intramundane being,

without the capacity of opening to the transcendent or to otherness, neither to God nor to other men. They wish to imprison man in his individuality. Of this unidimensional, alienated man there remains nothing more but what is useful, or judge such, in the eye of certain people.

## The Two-headed Eagle

### *The Temporal Effectiveness of Faith*

The Christians of the East have given the world the exemplary testimony of the temporal effectiveness of faith, of *their* faith. They have rejected every form of civil religion (CA 25c). They have rejected the perpetuation of the union of , and even the confusion between, spiritual and temporal power, such as Hobbes proposed. In the manner of the early Christians, they conducted themselves as "civil atheists": they refused to adore Caesar. We want to say therewith that they have declared loud and clear that they refuse to offer worship to the mortal gods of the secular city and subscribe to the articles of its ideological creed. Some have even died as martyrs in order to witness to their faith in God, the Lord of all means (CA 24b). Solely by their conduct, these believers have revealed and manifested what was unacceptable in the Soviet regime regarding human dignity (CA 23c).

What the regime's ideologues did not immediately realize is that when the Christians demanded the right to live their religion, to express it and practice it, they struck at the heart of the two-headed Eagle by laying bare its usurpation of God's throne<sup>8</sup> through its lying and violent ideology. They thus caught Soviet communism in its own trap: they disclosed the fact that its only foundation was an ideology *pure ideology*, that plunges men into a Kafkaesque despair, deactivates their creativity and responsibility, makes them prisoners of violence.

### *From Denunciation to "Annunciation"*

These Christians not only denounced what was "lugubrious" (the word is De Gaulle's) in Soviet communism: they have above all *announced* the grandeur of the human vocation. After such a formidable awakening of conscience, it would have been ridiculous for Christians to devote themselves — as some in the West persisted in doing — to "reforming" Soviet communism or even giving it a "human face" (CA 26e). Rather they showed that Soviet communism is the road that leads nowhere.

It is precisely because the critique of the Soviet model *started with the experience of the Christian faith* that Christians of the East began to express their protests on the level of *civil liberties*. In the time-span of two generations, they have retraced an itinerary that recalls that of Christians during the terrible persecutions of Imperial Rome. Like their elders in the faith, these Christians have, in the same movement, witnessed, professed and protested. Today as yesterday, in virtue of a mystical solidarity, the putting to death of the innocent ones, as the primordial killing of the Innocent One, attests to the perversion of a usurped power (cf. Mt 2:16-18). In the name of God these Christians professed the dignity of man: their witness, their physical and/or psychological martyrdom, had to have all the effects of a protest. That is why the believer makes mortal gods tremble, all the colossi of clay feet. Now the strength of this protest would not be truly formidable were it based on just another rival ideology. In the eyes of faith, in fact, *every* pure ideology is simply a delayed unmasking; the mystifying character of *every* ideology prevents one from being used to demystify another. The force of Christian protest is so formidable because it is rooted in the experience of a lived faith and in the proclamation of the truth about man revealed by God (CA 46c, 53f; EV 42f).

And so, it is not a question of confronting one ideology with another, but of contesting every ideology in the name of an existential reference to the God of revelation. It is this reference that activates the protest of intellectuals and that explains how it extends to all the nations of Eastern Europe. Without doubt they found themselves under the thumb of the USSR, but after decades of communism were not able to alter their Christian grounding. The testimony of these believers showed that the lie and violence definitively failed to block fraternity among men or among peoples. In the name of truth, these Christians rejected the lie; in the name of peace they rejected violence; in the name of equality they protested privilege; in the name of liberty they combated oppression; in the name of justice they were an obstacle to arbitrariness; in the name of creativity they checked immobility.

The movement that started in eastern Europe is, then, in a sense more profound than what we observe today in various Soviet republics of Asia. In these latter, frequently the protest is expressed above all in the form of a desire for national independence. However, although these nations are expressing forcefully their aspiration to dispose of their own lives, it is not certain that they will involve themselves in the ways of democracy once they have won independence—supposing they do acquire it.

Certainly, religious sentiment, sometimes Muslim, often intervenes in these just nationalist aspirations. But different religious traditions though they may underpin the protests as we know them, produce different political effects. Thus one can envision the populations of central Asia, strongly influenced by Islam, restoring a political configuration rather close to that which obtained before the ascendancy of Soviet communism.

The movement observed in eastern Europe has been profound in another way: it had to do, not only with leaving the USSR's (in particular that of Russia) circles of influence and with eliminating whatever prolonged their control, but above all with freeing itself with a view toward resolutely constructing the future. At the same time, the different countries of the East aspired to reaffirm their nationality. That is why, without dreaming of restoring their past, they aspired above all today to rediscovering their roots. They have difficulty in seeing how they will be able to integrate themselves into Europe if the reference to the religious patrimony common to it is abolished (CA 50 f.).

## Uncertainties in the Ex-USSR

Though we should keep in mind the case of the USSR obviously merits a separate consideration. The very important reservations that we have made above, first perestroika then the failure of the putsch justified real hopes. Leaders as different as Gorbachev, Eltsine and Chevardnadze referred several times to the universal values that form part of the common patrimony of Europe. Also some encouraging signs have appeared in the area of religious liberty.

However, the difficulties encountered by the new leaders are considerable. First of all, history teaches us that it is sometimes less difficult to build an empire than to dismantle it. Now the Russian world has always been a militarily powerful but economically very poor empire. The present rulers have inherited an archaic system of production, a disorderly network of distribution and an ineffectual bureaucracy. It happens that they are confronted with severe strikes. They see conflicts among nations and ethnic groups aggravated; the danger of civil wars is not illusory. The common international front that the popular democracies formed has been dismantled.

After seventy-five years of the old regime, the Soviet leaders haven't always succeeded in solving the elementary problems of providing goods for current consumption. Perestroika gave birth to hopes that the leaders have great difficulty in satisfying and the putsch is stirring again. Now it is on that first of all that the leaders

are judged: in very short time the worker and the mother of a family must see improvement or the new team will be discredited. It will then be tempted to return to authoritarian ways — if they are not ousted in turn.

One sees it: causes of perplexity rush in, even if the impulse from the base confers on the change an irreversible character. Those intellectuals and believers who proceeded in an orderly fashion to the scraping of the official ideology will have every reason to remain vigilant, obviously vis-à-vis the numerous survivors of the nomenklatura. In effect, for a long time, this class of profiteers gave up believing in ideological orthodoxy. What really counts for these survivors is maintaining the caste privileges. This particular situation can certainly accentuate the tendency toward cynicism; it can provoke a rendering of accounts. It can also favor questions about the vacuum of meaning that followed dropping all ideological reference.

There remains one point, the value of which is better and better understood and which is of capital importance: it is the faith of the Russian people. Several indications allow us to think that, despite the antireligious campaigns and persecution, the faith has remained intense in the Russian people. Dostoyhevski already remarked in the nineteenth century that the Russian people had not been altered by the harmful influences coming from the West, which the Russian intellectuals had welcomed too quickly.<sup>9</sup> Doubtless, the observation of the celebrated author has retained its pertinence: the Russian people and all the Slavic people have without doubt preserved the purity of faith in the intimacy of their hearts. If this is generally true, there is great hope for Russia and the world.

## Developing Countries

### *Rage or Resignation?*

The evolution of the eastern countries could constitute a stimulus in itself for the entirety of the Third-World. That the popular dictatorships have been eliminated in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the former Democratic Republic of Germany, Bulgaria, Rumania—by ricocheting, that should shame the dictatorial regimes that hang on to power in Cuba, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, North Korea, China, Ethiopia, Laos, Mongolia along with others that should be mentioned where despots of another age continue to serve the cause of communism by claiming it to be their duty, they say, to fight against it.

In a general way, we should state with joy that several countries in which authoritarian and sometimes dictatorial regimes seemed installed for good have resolutely entered upon the way of institutional, if not real, democratization. Such is the case in Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Panama, Nicaragua, Taiwan and South Korea.

However, in the Third-World, the survival, even the vitality, of a colonial society is attested to by numerous indications. Many among them that concern health and the standard of living have been mentioned in the beginning of this work.

Let it suffice to observe here that through their *egotism*, the *local bourgeoisie*, which could and should be the driving force behind development, are oftener an obstacle to it. Giving in to their special interests, the bourgeoisie impose on the global society a yoke the perverse effects of which are above all borne by the majority of the weakest people. To cap it off, the bourgeoisie blame, rather simplistically, the idea that "it's the fault of the external debt" if nations stagnate in underdevelopment.

Other leaders in the Third-World have a different perception of things. And this perception is at the root of the events of which Iraq has been the center. Driven to despair, they recommend that their fellow citizens go the catastrophic way of militarization. For their country they advocate the making of atomic, biological and chemical weapons, and the construction of missiles with which to rid themselves once and for all of the developed countries: a perspective induced by the behavior, perceived as aggressive, of the developed countries themselves.

Now, if in western countries, the evolution of the eastern countries is followed with interest, this same evolution is observed with apprehension by the Third-World. Yet this evolution is replete with lessons for the developing countries. In effect, the economic and technological failure of the Soviet model occurred in the eastern European countries, that is to say, in contexts in which human conditions were especially favorable to its success. In these countries, the communist model had at its disposal qualified workers and an intellectual elite that was well formed. For this model, the workers and the elite were obvious assets. From that point, we can well imagine that the same communist model was headed for a failure still more bitter in the Third-World by reason of the lack of qualified workers and of well formed cadres in these regions. If in a context a priori favorable, the Soviet model ended in a resounding failure, though it had seventy-five years to show its effectiveness, how could it still be taken seriously by clear-sighted Third-World leaders?

If, then, the temptation to go to war with "rich" countries is true of only some developing countries, they are nevertheless frequently inclined to founder in a paralyzing fatalism or in resignation. Colonial practices have left their lasting mark, and they are sometimes reinforced by solidly implanted cultural traditions that impel them to believe in the idea of a predetermined order or a pre-established harmony.

An example is at hand, The caste system, as it is interpreted by the upper Hindu society, is an objective obstacle to social mobility, to development, to the idea of the equality of dignity among all men. If I am miserable in my present condition I will perhaps be happy in my next incarnation. Personal existence lived in our spatiotemporal condition is not valued. Is it necessary to be reminded that in the Christian milieu a certain "colonial" theology — sometime integralist — believe it found in "the tradition" an ideological "legitimization" for the status quo?

There exists, then, a danger common to Third-World countries and the eastern countries: it is the fear of exercising freedom, fear of responsibility, fear of risk, fear of one's creative imagination.

### *Unsuspected Spiritual Reserves*

However, there also exist, in the Third-World as well as in the East, some analogous resources charged with generous promise. In fact, in the East as well as in the South (to be brief), there exist prodigious spiritual reserves that await but the dew to blossom. We have no choice but to acknowledge that in these spiritual reserves the influence of the Gospel is solidly attested. In one of his last interviews, Sakharov made a profession of faith by appearing in the shadow of the crucifix dominating his apartment: he unveiled thereby without doubt the key of his whole commitment. Now these spiritual reserves, as different as they may be, are no less present in developing countries. There, as in the eastern countries, an intellectual minority exists that attests, protests, opposes in the name of the Gospel. Above all, there exists an anonymous mass of people which, during oppression and sometimes on the edge of humanity, succeeded in preserving intact their religious relationship their personal relationship with God, which the eastern countries, Russia, the Ukraine, the Baltic states have just demonstrated was not opium but rather a source of liberating impetuosity.

China, for its part, seems divided between the need for modernization and the fear of reforms that would definitively lay bare the inconsistency of the Maoist ideology and the institutions resulting



from it. But, however brutal may be the reactions to the movements of young protesters, however merciless may be the persecutions against Christians and especially Catholics, the days of Chinese communism are numbered.

Certainly one may count on Russia to press China to go the road of modernization that Sun Yat Sen, besides, already called for with all his heart. In any case, international aid will have to be massive in this country where a senile and cruel minority has made the whole population support the consequences of its incompetence and mistakes.

## The So-called Developed Countries

### *What Development Model?*

In the "developed" western world, the evolution that transpired in Eastern Europe has occasioned innumerable analyses. Two dominant traits can be extracted from them.

First of all, we can assert that, compared with the Soviet model, the western liberal model is better, not because it is more just, but because it is more effective. The defects of the Soviet model can be dissected: it centralizes to the extreme; being economically inefficient it condemns itself to promoting equality on the basis of universalized poverty, with the exception of the privileged people of the regime; it is incapable of raising the standard of living of the whole population and of responding to the most elementary needs of people. What a contrast with western countries in which, in addition to abundance, freedom reigns!

Freedom? As they are won't do, western leaders congratulate themselves on promoting freedom and the rights of man. They even admit to being moved at observing the progress of freedom and human rights in the Euro-oriental lands. Nevertheless, beyond this reason for satisfaction, they acknowledge without difficulty that the disruptions in the East open unheard of perspectives for expanding markets.

Then one believes he can assert that the perestroika signifies the disappearance and definitive burial of the totalitarianism resulting from the socialist current and incarnated in the communist Soviet regime. This second statement is invoked to reinforce the consequences drawn from the first one, namely, that the western countries must aid Russia to succeed on the economic level. Russia will no

longer be tempted, then, to bypass the "developed" world in order to control, in the Third-World, the sources of raw materials which the developed capitalist countries need. Hence, there will no longer be serious reason to pursue the escalation of arms production.

It is true that *within the developed world itself* there are deep problems that surface more and more clearly, for example, during the GATT meetings.<sup>10</sup> At the heart of this world even, relations among Europe, the U.S. and Japan are far from stable. Some wonder, for example, whether Japan is not in the process of reformulating, to its own profit, the Brzezinski doctrine regarding the Trilateral Commission. Would not the "elite" of Japanese society dream of emerging and imposing itself on a worldwide scope? To assume the leadership of a new directorate solidly fixed in the Far East and in the Pacific? Others wonder whether the reconciliation between the U.S. and USSR would not indicate a reversal of alliance before the hegemonic pretensions exhibited by Japan. A reversal, moreover, that equally affects Europe.

In any case, it is certain the Japanese model occasions, in the West, a profound debate in which two enterprise models and two conceptions of expansion confront one another. The first of these models would stand in the "humanist" tradition of European enterprises, in which, with the help of the public authorities, one tries to harmonize the twofold concern of efficiency and justice. The second of these models, which imperceptibly tends to eclipse the first, would be inspired by the Japanese experience. What counts in this second case is the business, conceived like an organic whole which includes even the life of the individuals involved. Only the firm counts, an objective entity, in which individual responsibility doesn't exist except in a residual state, each individual having to be an efficient member of the whole body. The business provides for all the needs of its members. And that already would suffice — always in the Japanese perspective — to "justify" the enterprise not paying but relatively low salaries, regard being had for the cost of living. But, further, by means of this policy of low salaries, the business would have their salaried people support a high proportion of the costs involved in expansion research. It is not without reason that one has spoken of "cheating" in regard to these practices, sophisticated forms of dumping. They falsify, in fact, international competition. In one sense, the joining of high quality of Japanese products and their relatively low price is not possible except by maintaining a production system and a network of research that in fact confines the employees in the vise of a gilded slavery.<sup>11</sup>

A model of this sort can hardly be developed except in an insular milieu and it is with difficulty harmonized with the cultural, political and economic traditions of Western Europe. It is, however, fascinating enough that some North American authors — Brzezinski himself — have tried to define the profile of a future “Amerinippon” and the condition of partnership with the U.S.: national security recommends envisaging diverse scenarios simultaneously.

Faced with such a possible evolution, the European community must remain extremely vigilant. For calling Soviet totalitarianism into question is going to leave the field open to the new totalitarianism of liberal inspiration, whose emergence we’ve analyzed (CA 17c). Is the world in the process of being transformed into a vast corporation directed by a new *technocratic mandarin*? The western world has perhaps better things to do than to embark on this adventure. It is in a position to put a definitive end to the twofold double bloc that cuts across the world: East and West/North and South. It is clear, in fact, that it is through a conservative reflex solidly rooted in the archaeology of the human spirit that men persist in producing as they succumb, in an unreflecting fashion, to the mirage of an indefinite expansion.<sup>12</sup> Even in countries considered as the most developed of the world, the simple problems of distributive justice have not been solved, for example, in the matter of education, health and nutrition. Unemployment and poverty continue to be realities; the threshold of solvency is constantly on the rise. These commonplace observations should stimulate the citizens of developed countries to realize that they are courting disaster if they do not stop being obsessed with the absolute imperative of expansion, and if that is not overshadowed by the passion for justice for all (CA 36d). It’s all a question of the end, of finality: power or freedom, discrimination or equality in dignity? It is in involving oneself in the *redefinition of these objectives* that it will be possible, among other things, to restudy the demographic problems, such as they are present in the North (decline of births, aging, abortion, euthanasia) or in the South (a slowed down growth in population.)

### *A Question of Moral Strength*

On condition that it has the *moral strength* to imagine a truly *generous* project of society, Western Europe can provide a decisive and original impulse to the societies of Eastern Europe. But this contribution is not separable from what Western Europe must give to the Third-World: alongside its problem where survival or life itself is in question, the inane character of objectives such as enrichment and expansion is exposed to broad daylight.

It is necessary, then to ward off, on a worldwide scale, the most violent imbalances as well as those that exist on the regional or national levels. *Europe must be brought to cast off its practical materialism and hedonism. But the call addressed to it is different depending on whether it comes from the East or the South*. In any case, Europe must refuse to play with any hybrid models.

The whole question, then, comes down to leading the western world to develop the moral strength to create a response that will measure up to the challenge facing it. The West, followed by Japan, manifests a dangerous inclination to seek it in a perilous exacerbation of the faults of liberalism (CA 4e, 17a). Just as we saw in our earlier analyses, the West has undertaken an abysmal course that leads to the restoration of the two-headed Eagle, to a new confusion of temporal and spiritual power, to a new absorption of the latter by the former.<sup>13</sup> We have seen that the Soviet model had proposed a totally secularized version of this two-headed absolutism, in which the rebel children of the Tsar, become radically atheistic, enthroned a civil religion, "legitimized" by a scientist ideology and irretrievably immured in immanence. For the rest, this restoration had been prepared for by Feuerbach and Marx, for whom, it is true, Hegel had imperially opened the way.

As soon as this two-headed monster declines, another has already arisen. Hobbes, one of the first, drew attention to its emergence and named it. He called it Leviathan; its function was to protect the condition indispensable to the free circulation of goods. It must intervene in order to allow for the "good" functioning of the market, to avoid society's remaining in the state of nature. It must also intervene to put an end to the different interpretations of the Bible, direct cause of the wars of religion. Every man must draw up with each of his kind a contract at the end of which he renounces the right to justice. Everyone being stripped of this right they possess in the state of nature, they agree to transfer this right to the hands of Leviathan. Such is the origin of this mortal god, who will determine good and evil, what is just and unjust, will punish the violation of pacts, will make of society — made purely civil — the place where relations of a free competition can unfold. The will of this mortal god is the sole source of rights. This god, then, has no account to render to his subjects. He gets his legitimacy only from usefulness: curb the natural malice of men so that trade can be more freely realized.<sup>14</sup>

Translating the Genevan Calvinist experience into totally secularized terms, Rousseau, reviving the theme of the Eagle, had already congratulated Hobbes for having joined again the two heads.<sup>15</sup>

Henceforth, the Eagle concentrates all power in its claws: Leviathan is both god and Caesar — until he stumbles upon the dawn of his own death. Nothing transcendent is above him. He is sovereign; he is *the* Sovereign. He is *absolute*; cut off from a God who would come to moderate his excess, cut off also from his subjects who, out of concern for security, are alienated and have consented voluntarily, individually and as a body, to their own slavery. There is no longer any religion but civil whose secular liturgy, celebrated in the market, is supervised completely by Leviathan (CA 40c, 42c).

## The Danger of "Ultra-Naziism"

### *Politics Subordinated to Economics*

It was indispensable to recall summarily here the genesis of this monster. We have to go back to Hobbes, who secularized *Anglicanism*, if we wish to understand why and how the liberal tradition has been able to carry within itself a totalitarian trend. The contemporary perversion of liberalism consists, as was already the case with Hobbes, in counting on fear. Since my fellow men are a menace to my good and my life, I transfer to a mortal god the many-sided concern for my security. The enterprise, or rather today the techno-structure in its most developed forms, will relieve me of the care that I must take of myself; I will be integrated into the whole of which I will no longer know the dimensions and in which power will be without any personal face. I will even see the role of the state and its political institutions diminish before the globalization of the great contemporary economic complexes. Political power, which should temper the excesses of economic and technical forces, will itself be taken over by the holder of this force. From this angle all the positive contributions of the socialist tradition will be compromised: the weakest will not be able to count on the bastion of the state, even less on that of the international organizations.

But, relieved of concern for my goods, I will also be relieved of all care for my life. The security of the latter — in quality and length — will be taken care of by a technocracy without a face, and it will determine what is appropriate for the service of the superior security of the economic organism to which I will henceforth be indebted for having and being: politics is subordinated and serves economics.

The notion of rights comes along to consecrate this perversion — this too already announced by Hobbes. Rights are nothing more than a superstructure translating, and at the same time concealing, the will of the powerful. There is no longer any place but for a juridical

positivism without reference to anything but the will which is its source. Solzhenitsyn, who knows well what a society is in which right are flouted, has reason to assert that western society is sick of its rights.<sup>16</sup> This justifies everything because everything is, in fact, justifiable, negotiable, able to be legitimized wherever rights chase out the morality of social life. Wherever we exclude reference to the objective values of truth, of good, of justice, everything — no matter what — can be a subject of consensus, and every consensus is only for a time, ephemeral, varying according to the successive needs of usefulness. The Soviet regime had put rights at the service of state ideology; western societies domesticate them by putting them at the service of the liberalist market ideology.

### *What Call? What Duty?*

The persistence of the perversion of socialism that national-socialism was can even actualize the perverse effects of liberalism.<sup>17</sup> Eichmann, they say, loved his children; they even assure us that he pretended to admire the Jews. He just had the misfortune of working in the office charged with preparing the final solution, and "he did his duty well." He was the anonymous, impersonal executor of a regime that divinized the power of race and institutionalized structural violence in the name of Aryan security.<sup>18</sup> Now, even in the liberal tradition, care and responsibility for the I risk being inhibited for the market's profit and of those who interpret the presumed interests of the sovereigns. All those who, appealing to Kant, have demobilized the empirical I; all those who, since Descartes, have misunderstood that man in his essence is a being of relatedness; all those who, following Freud, devoted themselves to ruining the image of the father; all those who, with Heidegger, have designated death as life's horizon: all of them have caused the undermining that leads to a totalitarianism that devours men.

Led by a demented minority, the German people especially did their "duty" well which, *they believed*, was imposed on them. The psychology of the German people is not in any case essentially different from human psychology in general. Societies of a liberal tradition are deluded if they think that they are forever immunized against the "call" — the *Beruf* — that transformed every individual into an irresponsible executor of a "grandiose program," the tomb of the human spirit.

Furthermore, in its totalitarian trend, neoliberalism tends to identify itself with neo-Naziism, which after all provided it with some of its theoreticians. To tell the truth, the media tosses to public

vindictiveness persons whose "neo-Naziism" is denounced with such insistence that it is sometimes suspect. Without doubt such denunciations are not inopportune, nor often without foundation. But many of these neo-Nazis, or reputed as such, are used — precisely by the media — as illusions to distract attention from real perils. For these latter cannot be limited to person more or less strange or groups of activists more or less filled with nostalgia. *The major perils lie elsewhere.* In fact, what is tragic, and what can never be denounced with enough force, is that *a new Naziism* — worse, and ultra-Naziism — *of an unheard of virulence, is in the process of being inscribed in laws, institutions, practices and even ethics.* And some of the countries that boast of being the leading lights of democracy are engaged in transforming themselves imperceptibly into leaders of this international *ultra-Naziism.*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Part I, Ch. I "Several Reasons for Anxiety."

<sup>2</sup> See Avraham Sifrin, *L'URSS: sa 16e république. Premier guide des camps de concentration et des prisons en union soviétique* (Seewis: Stephanus Edition, 1980).

<sup>3</sup> See the work of David Caute, *Les compagnons de route, 1917-1968* (Paris: Laffont, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Part II, Ch. VIII and Ch. IX.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Daniel Yergin, *La paix saccagée. Les origines de la guerre froide et la division de l'Europe* (Paris: Balland, 1980); Jacques Levesque, *L'URSS et sa politique internationale de 1917 à nos jours* (Paris: Colin, 1980); Jean Laloy, *Yalta, hier, aujourd'hui et demain* (Paris: Laffont, 1988). A more recent case of misinformation has been studied by Mihnea Berindei, Ariadna Combes and Anne Planche in *Roumanie. Le livre blanc. La réalité du pouvoir néo-communiste* (Paris: La Découverte, 1990).

<sup>6</sup> On the origins of perestroika see the work of Marc Ferro, *Les origines de perestroika* (Paris: Ramsay, 1990). See also Pierre Kende and Aleksandr Smolar (eds.) *La grande secousse. Europe de l'Est 1989-1990* (Paris: Presses du CNRS, 1991); William Echikson, *Entre Dieu et Marx. Les sociétés de l'Est* (Paris: First, 1991).

<sup>7</sup> Rene Laurentin, *Les chrétiens détonateurs des libérations de l'Est* (Paris: L'OEIL, 1991).

<sup>8</sup> See above Part I, Ch. I, note 17. The image of the two-headed eagle goes back even beyond Theodosius (347-395) and the Byzantine empire. It signifies that the temporal and spiritual powers are united in one governmental body. In the context of Christendom, this union sometimes religious authority (a theocratic regime is one which extends its authority to temporal affairs), sometimes profiting the secular power (a Caesaropapist regime is one which intrudes its temporal authority into ecclesiastical affairs). From the Renaissance on, in the context of the secularization of political power, the image of the two-headed eagle has been used again and reinterpreted to symbolize the union, under one "lay" chief, of both spiritual and temporal powers. But the union this time produces a *civil religion*, that is, a religion whose object is the cult of the City. Laws from that moment on are presented as "sacred." It is to the advantage of the state that there be no longer a separation between Church and state, nor any place for an autonomous spiritual power. The

City or the State requires the "religious" obedience of its citizens. In the *Social Contract*, IV, 8, Rousseau congratulates Hobbes for having had the audacity to unite the two heads of the eagle.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, *The Brothers Karamazov* II, VI, 3.

<sup>10</sup> On the difficulties encountered by GATT, see the chronicle of Jacques Zeegers, "Faut-il encore aider l'agriculture?" *La libre Belgique*, Dec. 8, 1990, and "Echec du GATT, guerre commerciale?" *ibid.*, Dec. 15, 1990. See also Maurice Allais, "Les perversions du libre-échange mondial," *Le Figaro*, Nov. 24, 1992: "L'intolérable diktat américain," *ibid.*, Nov. 25, 1992; "Le libre-échange, réalités et mythologie," *ibid.*, March 5, 1993.

<sup>11</sup> Frédéric F. Clairmonte explains that "The Japanese industrial policy" has never yielded to liberal practices: see *Le Monde diplomatique*, n. 432, March 1990, 18 ff. The same author has also published an article entitled "Le fondement de la 'Tax Nipponica.' La machine financière japonaise, phénoménale. . .et fragile," *Le Monde diplomatique*, n. 429, Dec. 1990 18 ff.

<sup>12</sup> For the problems we are dealing with here we have benefited from two especially suggestive works: Alain Minc, *L'argent fou* (Paris: Grasset, 1990); Fabbio R. Fallo, *Labeur et rareté* (Geneva: Tricone, 1989).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Note 8 in this Chapter.

<sup>14</sup> We are following closely Hobbes' own expressions. See *Leviathan* (Oxford, 1957).

<sup>15</sup> See *Social Contract* IV, 8.

<sup>16</sup> See Alexandre Solzhenitsyn, *Le déclin du courage* (Paris: Seuil, 1978), esp. 19 - 22. This major text gives an idea of the contribution that believers of Eastern Europe can bring to the western world. Still this contribution needs to be welcomed.

<sup>17</sup> One can say the same of fascism; see, for example, Daniel Guérin *Fascisme et grand capital* (Paris: Maspero, 1965).

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Henry V. Dicks, *Les meurtres collectifs. Une analyse psychologique des criminels SS* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1973). François Bayle, *Psychologie et éthique du national-socialisme. Etude anthropologique des dirigeants SS* (Paris: PUF, 1953). See also the works of H. Arendt and R. J. Lifton. On Eichmann see Arendt, *Eichmann à Jerusalem. Rapport sur la banalité du mal* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966).



## CHAPTER III

# A GREAT DESIGN FOR THE CHURCH

The two preceding chapters will enable us to designate two fundamental points to which action should be directed. These chapters have prepared us better to perceive the central role of moral religious factors in building tomorrow's world. The present chapter will be devoted to examining this role. More precisely, we will study the contribution, in the moral and religious order, that Catholics — and with them, all Christians — will be able to make in constructing the world of the twenty-first century. In the determination of this design, the teaching and activity of John Paul II are prophetic.

## Two Hypotheses Regarding John Paul II

### *The Current Hypothesis*

Immediately a considerable difficulty presents itself, and it is important to look at it straightforwardly. A significant number of Catholics and quite a number of theologians believe that the Church is the victim of a blockage that makes it impossible for her to play her role in the world being born. More precisely, a hypothesis is frequently being advanced to explain this paralyzing situation. *The major obstacle to the Church's action in the modern world is John Paul II himself.*<sup>1</sup> Certainly there are innumerable other impediments in the Church, but the present Pope sums them up and actualizes them in his very personality.

This hypothesis is shored up largely by considerations spread by the media. Victim of "a wet blanket," the Gospel cannot impregnate society: it is no longer "believable." John Paul II turned his back on "modernity" — a magic word. In the name of the common priesthood of the faithful, in the name of a mission received directly from the Holy Spirit, "who breathes where He wills" (Jn 3:8) and has de-

served the institutional Church, some have made it their responsibility to reprimand the Pope, lessen his authority, and offer to explain to him how he could understand his mission better.

To consolidate better this hypothesis, they accumulate the complaints, already so well known that it suffices simply to list them like chapter headings. Among the post-conciliar popes, John Paul II would be a parenthesis. Some compare him to John XXIII, Paul VI and even Vatican II. He's a Pope of the Counter-reform astray at the end of this twentieth century: in any case, he's an antimodern, heir of Pius X and Pius XII. Now, having situated him in time, they must locate him in space. And here again, "they don't go in for subtleties." He is not open, since he's Polish, how could he be open to Catholicity? "For we" — the argument is implicit — "know what Catholicity is." But when a pope is called Karol Wojtyła, there is little hope for any openness from him: Polish he is; Polish he will remain. The stature of St. Peter is reduced to that of a Pole, a process already applied to Jesus: "Isn't he the son of the carpenter"<sup>2</sup> . . . One doesn't see Jesus for what He really is: the Son of God; one doesn't see Karol Wojtyła for what he is: the Pope.

Some go even further: they try to turn the pontifical teaching against itself. The Pope has been wrong to denounce the moral decline of the West. Indeed, the fact that western society is so fascinating to eastern Europe, so impregnated with Christianity, testifies to the moral health of the West. Here the criticism aimed at the Pope rests on a *satisfecit* (it's done well), with which some theologians are so pleased with the West. Some believe they find in *Gaudium et Spes* reasonable basis for their praise of the West's global, material and moral success. In this major conciliar document the Church, in other words, has baptized the illuminist ideology of progress, a little like she baptized civil religion at the time of Constantine.<sup>3</sup>

It goes without saying that if one is at home with such an hypothesis, one is closed to any perception that does not corroborate the premises from which he started.

### *An Alternative Hypothesis*

However, we can follow the suggestion of Marrou and consider that the attitude necessarily preliminary to any interpretation of a work is the desire to comprehend, from within, the one who is responsible for the work. This attitude, Marrou says more precisely, requires in principle a sympathetic mind.<sup>4</sup>

By what right should we not accord John Paul II this sympathy with which we can stimulate the clarity of an analyst. Once this prin-

principle of open-mindedness is accepted, it becomes possible to envision an *alternative hypothesis*. By reason of the very will to comprehend interiorly from which it proceeds, one can expect that this hypothesis will render a better account of the spirit and work of John Paul II.

Let us formulate this alternative hypothesis briefly: few contemporary popes have gone so far in their reading of the signs of the times. Vatican Council II itself stayed just this side of John Paul II's vision. And it is because John Paul explored these signs that he is prophetic, and *it is because he is prophetic that he disturbs people*. Compared to most of his detractors, John Paul is much more ahead not behind. The difficulty which his detractors are confronted with is, then, twofold: to look at men and things with a new vision and to disavow, without losing face, the vision thanks to which they were such a great media success.

Doubtless John Paul II is the ripe fruit of a tradition which preceding popes nourished; but this tradition has been enriched by him. Going beyond pronouncements that was too closely related to peculiar occurrences, John Paul is in the process of formulating a Christian message that is particularly attentive to new questions posed by human society. He gave proof of that again in the encyclical *Centesimus Annus*.<sup>5</sup> The Pope is disconcerting, not because he is turned toward the past, but because he is building a pastoral that looks to the future.

No one before him developed with such vigor a statement on the *centrality of man in history and in the world* (CA 53-62; EV 42f). He restored to men responsibility before their fellow men, before society, before the world, before God. Though banal in the eyes of the distracted observer, this kernel is in reality decisive. It explains the insistence of the Pope on the sacred meaning of the human body and human sexuality. Whence also the great value attached to education and culture (CA 50f). Whence a new teaching about the worker, the citizen, the nation and state. Before him no one shed such light on the *dignity of the woman* (EV 99a).<sup>6</sup>

Before him no one insisted with such vigor on the need of *protecting creation* (CA 37f). Not that his teaching gives in to a cheap ecology: at the center of this ecology we always find man. It is inadmissible, he says, that a privileged minority waste resources destined for all. Whence the special responsibility for the poor and future generations. It belongs to men to manage well the patrimony the Creator entrusted to them. Whence, in particular, the respect for the generic patrimony of humanity.

In these various areas, John Paul II sought and found partners in dialogue: common action was undertaken. This is what explains the desire to diversify the forms of ecumenical dialogue, to develop inter-religious dialogue, to broaden dialogue with non-believers. (CA 60ab; EV 77b). This also explains John Paul's efforts to promote human rights.

## Religious Freedom and Alienation

### *Faith and the Dignity of Man*

The hypothesis we propose finds, however, its major confirmation in John Paul's insistence on religious liberty (CA 9b, 13c, 47a). *By putting this theme, strongly emphasized by the Council, at the heart of his teaching, John Paul II deepened the Christian perception of the signs of the times.*

It is true that many misconceptions about this circulate and are even entertained. However, these misconceptions are easily dispelled once one realizes that they proceed from a truncated perception of the Pope's intention. When the Pope pleads for religious liberty, he is not thinking only of freedom of worship: we cannot reduce on to the other.<sup>7</sup> That the Uniats, for example, may be recognized in the ex-USSR and express themselves publicly and meet: that is not yet accomplished, even if it seems hopefully on the way. However, the problem of religious freedom goes more deeply than that: *what is in question is man's dignity. John Paul thus takes up again, in a truly original manner, the problem of religious alienation* (CA 29, 49c).

*Neither in the North or South, East or West are the requirements of religious liberty honored.* Man is faced with some obstacles, different according to contexts, but which present a common trait of confining him in an *unauthentic* existence, in conditions of existence that *alienate* (CA 4c, 17a). And that explains some of John Paul's proposals that are especially disturbing, notably in his encyclical *On Social Concerns* (21), in which he stigmatizes the two models of development, that of the East and that of the West, both of which need to be reformed.

The Pope's argumentation is clear. *In the developed western world, what poses an obstacle to religious liberty and, therefore, to the full blossoming of man's dignity, is practical materialism; the lure of gain, enrichment, egotism; the desire for power, the concentration of money, power and knowledge; the merciless selection from which the weak suffer; usefulness, efficiency and interest raised to being the ultimate reference points* (CA 4lad). It is the flood of a pornography inflicted without the least restraint on homes without defense

by the godfathers of media pandering (CA 36c). Such a development inspired by these principles alienates man, does injury to his dignity. *It is the concrete expression of atheism that confines human existence to the closed horizon of death* (CA 55b).

*In the Third-World*, what poses an obstacle to religious liberty — and therefore to the full blossoming of man's dignity — is especially misery (CA 61a). St. Thomas, full of good sense, said long ago: without a minimum of well being, it is impossible for man to live virtuously.<sup>8</sup> When he is a proletarian in the strict sense, when he is alienated, deprived of food, lodging, education, culture, man runs the risk of being restricted to the sole preoccupation of immediate physical survival; he risks becoming a merciless rival to his neighbor. Incapable of opening himself to the other, he risks closing himself to God.

In socialist regimes, such as the Pope personally knew, what serves as an obstacle to the flowering of man's dignity is that men are dispossessed — *alienated* — of their capacity to judge and make decision (CA 13a). They are mentally colonized by an ideology whose intrinsic dogmatism, duly supported by a formidable propaganda apparatus, is moreover reinforced by a coercive and repressive machinery of the most perfected kind. Now, when man is emptied of himself, when he is no longer but an object in the hands of the state apparatus, he is condemned to live out his existence within the framework of an organism that dictates to its members their reasons for living, and eventually imposes on them reasons for dying.

All these problems, which we have encountered in some detail in preceding chapters, are at the heart of John Paul's preoccupations. They have dominated the entirety of the discourses given by him during his trip to Mexico in 1990. The point of the pontifical message consists in emphasizing that *only faith in Jesus Christ can in all truth, liberate men from the many prisons that alienate them from their dignity* (CA 26e). In other words, faith in Jesus Christ is the most dynamic factor for transforming society, and in consequence, for transforming society, that alienated man into a society that honors his dignity and thus opens the way to an integral practice of religious liberty. This religious liberty, then, has a double aspect. It has its seat within man insofar as he is a person: that is the subjective aspect; it needs to be acknowledged and promoted in society: that is the objective aspect.

John Paul II does not, then, consider religious freedom as one among others. It is *the* freedom that conditions all the others everywhere in the world, in the North as well as the South, in the East as well as the West (CA 17a, 29).

### *The Catholic Rooted in his Country*

This discovery is obviously linked to the personal experience of John Paul II. In his dialogue with Soviet authorities, the Pope placed the whole discussion on the highest level. He wasn't concerned about objecting *politically* to the regime, in a more or less circumventing style: for example, by supporting the claims of the victimized minorities, the Ukrainians or those in the Baltic region. He was concerned with proclaiming loudly and clearly a fundamental evangelical truth pregnant with practical repercussions — the truth that concerns the dignity of man (CA 53b, EV 31-34).

Those who blame John Paul for "mixing in politics" or for "engaging in political speech" do not perceive that the whole pontifical message is of the most primordial religious character, that it appeals to faith in and proclamation of man's dignity according to the design of God. *The political effects are the fallout that "cannot be ignored," but they are not the heart of the message.* The same is true for the ensemble of the pontifical message on sexual and family morality: at the heart of the teaching we find the Christian insistence on the dignity of man and the appeal for liberty.

The role of Christians, then, is to be witnesses to this fundamental truth about man, or more precisely, using the strong expression of John Paul II, of this truth of man. In this way Christians can manifest the demands of justice for all men. Negatively, what the Pope is saying is that the faith of Christians serves as revealer of the ideological lies so much so that it demystifies the *nomenklaturas* of whatever provenance, even in the eyes of those who are members of them.

What is striking is that John Paul is perfectly conscious of the fact that his "Polish" origin, far from being an obstacle to his Catholic vision of the world, rather commands it. Many popes throughout history have shown us joyfully that there are many Italian ways of being Catholic. In our hypothesis, John Paul II proves with no less joy that there is a Polish way of being Catholic. It was *for that* — not in spite of it — that his peers elected him. They sensed in advance that *a pope who could mediate between East and West could also mediate between North and South.*

That John Paul was straight-away conscious of the Polish roots of his Catholic and universal mission appeared very explicitly, for example, in the homily he gave on June 3, 1979, during the Mass celebrated at Gniezno, in which he identified the origins of Poland with the origins of the Polish Church. We must attend to what he said then and repeated in different ways during the same journey:

When today we go back to these very first moments [beginnings of the faith in Poland], we cannot not understand — alongside the language of our ancestors — the other neighboring Slavic languages in which the cenacle, widely open to history, began to speak. And above all, the first Slavic Pope in the history of the Church cannot not understand these languages.

And there immediately follows the key decisive for understanding John Paul II:

It is perhaps for that God chose him, it is perhaps for that God guided him in order to introduce into the communion of the Church the understanding of the words and languages that still seem foreign to ears habituated to Roman, Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, Celtic sounds. Does not the Christ want the Holy Spirit to act so that Mother Church, at the end of the second millennium of Christianity, leans with loving comprehension, with special sensitivity, toward the sounds of this human language that is intertwined with a common root, with a common etymology . . .

The Christ, does He not wish, that the Holy Spirit dispose that this Pope — who bears deeply engraved in his heart the history of his nation from its origins as well as the history of the neighboring and brother peoples — manifest and confirm in a special manner, in our age, their presence in the Church and their particular contribution to the history of Christendom. . .

The Christ, does He not wish the Holy Spirit dispose that this Polish Pope, this Slavic Pope, manifest right now the spiritual unity of Christian Europe that, thankful debtor to the two great traditions of East and West, professes "one sole faith, one sole baptism, one sole God and Father of all" (eph 4:5-6), the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ?<sup>9</sup>

### *Discernment In the Face of "Modernity"*

One will notice that, despite certain interpretations of this kind, the Pope guards himself well from making the slightest concession to a special form of panSlavic messianism. In this regard there is no ambiguity in his discourse. On the other hand, what John Paul asserts is capital for the universal Church. For her, to read the signs of the times can and must certainly mean to become attuned to the poor, as John XXIII and Paul VI already emphatically stated. John Paul II does not use less vigor in taking up this pressing invitation to becoming attuned, but he does it in a totally *original* fashion, because his invitation is rooted in the situation in which he originated.

As a result, the Pope's pronouncements are not expected: they disturb the safe routines of progressivist conformism, of

Europocentrism that scorns others, even of grouchy Gallicanism! And since they are bothersome, one tries to reduce their force and originality. *One judges it on the basis of other situations — “big city” or “peripheral” — than the one, totally new, whence they originally sprang.*

Now, the Pope says to all that, it is by reason of the very suffering that they have endured and do endure that East European societies and their Christian communities have acquired from the ordeal some astonishing spiritual reserves, shared today with the universal believing community (CA 26a). John Paul II recommends to these East European societies that they welcome with discernment the values of what one calls “modernity” (CA 27f.).

In the eyes of a certain number of Catholics, what is disturbing, even intolerable, in John Paul II, is that he has revealed the existence and persistent vitality of Europe *differently* Christian in the East.<sup>10</sup> A regime of virulent atheism, supported by a more fantastic machinery of pressure and repression never before seen, totally failed to destroy the faith and to wipe religion out. Moreover and paradoxically, because of this failure, the Soviet regime has done more than we would dare to hope for: it itself furnished the proof of its inefficiency and perversion.

John Paul II, in sum, engages in a sort of midwifery: *he brought forth from the history of Soviet communism the meaning it bore: he proclaimed that the faith of Christians revealed this meaning which the ideology used to conceal itself.* As Jesus did, he judged not: he reveals that the model is already judged.<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, John Paul prepares the Christian community to make the incredible discovery, which cannot wait, of the vitality of the Church in China. For all the indications converge: the process that the Christians of the East started is about to take form in China. With what welcome do we await their witness? What will we have to share with them?

However, the midwifery of John Paul II has equally another point of impact: Western societies thought to be developed. He invites them to examine themselves. Hasn't liberty often descended to license? Doesn't comfort conceal the worship of mammon? When in *On Social Concerns* (1987) he speaks of two models of development that need, both of the, to be corrected, he has in view the thirst for profit, the cult of efficiency, utilitarianism, and a certain secularizing and reductive conception of reason, the latter being wholly ordered toward efficiency. Under these conditions how can we seek a basis for man's rights except in a simple contract or temporary consensus?

From there flows the “unavoidable” message of John Paul II: the future of Europe results from the reactivation of its faith (CA 41b,



56b). If one is to judge from the success of the 90th *Katholikentag* held in Berlin from May 23 to 27, 1990, German Catholics are very sensitive to this theme of John Paul. It dominates, for example, the Christmas message of 1989, in which the Pope explains in substance that Europe remains profoundly marked by the Gospel and its conception of the inviolable dignity of man.<sup>12</sup> Whence, explains the Pope, flows its conception of religious freedom and the rights of man. What does the West have to offer the rest of the world, the Orient, the South? The beneficent influence that Europe will be able to exert on the rest of the world will depend on its ability to reactivate its spiritual patrimony.<sup>13</sup> And there is the reason why Christians of the West need emphatically to lend an ear to their brothers in eastern Europe. It is in this way that the circle in a way is closed.

It is, then, only at the price of a deforming interpretation that we could imagine that the Pope dreams of restoring a Christendom which was historically morally responsible for more or less obligatory baptisms, certain crusades, the Inquisition, the conquest of America and religious wars. Again, it is appropriate to add, in the name of truth and the most elementary justice, that we must credit this same Christendom with prodigious accomplishments in the temporal as well as in the spiritual order.<sup>14</sup> It would be to commit an injustice and, something more grave as it happens, to commit a blunder to put on trial the Pope's intention. The new evangelization has nothing to do with a retro-pastoral. It is true that to give rise to this new evangelization requires a singular imagination and courage. But, to motivate Christians, John Paul II emphasizes that the political and social repercussions that this new evangelization promised are *qualitatively* decisive for the human community. (CA 5 ef, 54ab).

### *Neither Theocracy nor Caesaropapism*

John Paul II, then presents himself first of all and essentially as a prophet, a missionary and a pastor. That is why without doubt some very intelligent people have some difficulty in understanding him: it's a question of his not registering on their minds. They make it impossible to understand him, in any case, if they see in him a denigrating and unjust image of a Pole who dreams of restoring in the Church universal, a theocracy or a caesaropapism, of which he knows better than anyone the ambiguities, the compromises and above all the perversities.

What he is relentlessly proclaiming is the primacy of the spiritual. Faithful to the tradition of Augustine and Pascal, John Paul knows that man is a *being of desire*, a being who is open (CA 17a, 29).

A being who cannot find his true rest and perfect joy solely in the goods of the earth, in what is destined to die. John Paul's catechesis inevitably turns on two axes. On the one hand, he proclaims *Jesus Christ*, true God, true man, the truth of man called to divinization. On the other hand, *he denounces the gnoses that inspire contemporary technocracies*. What will beget the future is, not the "laws" of a *lugubrious Diamat* (dialectical materialism), nor the "natural laws" of the market that liberalist ideology manipulates mercilessly, but our opening to the spiritual and religious (CA 60b). Whether those observers still immured in their western self-centeredness like it or not, this is the exemplary Polish experience and that of eastern Christians. With keen insight, Cardinal Lustiger pointed out already in 1982: "The events in progress in Poland are of the spiritual order. The Polish people are morally like others. But they have enough interior strength and conviction to be able to call into question an oppressive totalitarianism."<sup>15</sup>

In this regard, John Paul II is borne out by the spiritual experience of his people, but from this experience he unfolds all the implications for the whole Christian community. If "the interior strength and convictions" have produced such fruit in the East, *why would not the same factors produce similar effects* everywhere where the idols of power and money reign? How could the Pope better express himself to remind all the baptized of the demanding promises of their baptism: to be the yeast in the dough (Mt 13:33), to be the salt of the earth (Mt 5:13), to be the light of the world (Mt 5:15)?

Let the decipherers of the pontifical projects be reassured! John Paul rejects all the symbolism of the two-headed Eagle: this archetype that haunts certain imaginations is foreign to his dreams.<sup>16</sup> The reunion of spiritual and temporal power, praised by Rousseau, fatally winds up in the birth of monstrous beings. These express themselves in contemporary totalitarianism, that result from atheistic materialism or are engraved in the tradition of atheistic liberalism. Alerted by historical events and impregnated with the spirit of Vatican II, John Paul intends to avoid begetting a hybrid power, the very thing his detractors impute to him as a hidden intention, either by error or malevolence.

John Paul II is also a stranger to theocracy as well as every form of caesaropapism, laicized or not. *And he has the same reason in both cases*. One does not honor the proper autonomy of temporal power if one does not honor the proper autonomy of spiritual power (CA 45c; EV 96c). And reciprocally, one does not honor the spiritual if he fails to respect the proper autonomy of the temporal. Proper autonomy

for spiritual activity requires respect for and promotion of religious freedom. Religious liberty, in turn, is the best guarantee that temporal activity does not become *heteronomous* — which in fact happens when it falls under the domination of atheistic totalitarianism. Always alienation!

The conclusion of these reflections is, then clear. If a restoration is to be feared today, it is not that of "Christianity." The danger that threatens certain sections of the Church is that they theologially support the totalitarian trend of liberalism; a transfer of Magisterium; a *restoration of the Enlightenment*, in the light of which Christians would seek principles of discernment for welcoming the values of modernity (CA 13d).<sup>17</sup> If one should accept the hypothesis we have envisaged, it is necessary to recognize that those who today thwart John Paul's design risk having one day to face the fact that they were fooled by allies or adversaries.

<sup>1</sup> A catalog — doubtless not complete — of complaints against John Paul II has been undertaken by R. Luneau and Paul Ladrière (eds.) in *La rêve de Compostelle. Vers la restauration d'une Europe chrétienne?* (Paris: Centurion, 1989). Several authors have devoted articles to this opposition in *Teologi in rivolta* (Rome, 1990); one should retain especially the firm but serene correction made by Livio Melina, *Sentire con la Chiesa* (Rome, nd) 73-83; see also Justo Mullor, *Dios cree en el hombre* (Madrid, RIALP, 1990) esp. CH. XXI, "Tu eres Pedro," 256-273; Gustave Thils, *Foi chrétienne et unité de l'Europe* (Louvain-la-Neuve, Peeters, 1990).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Mt. 13:55; Jn 6:42.

<sup>3</sup> We study this problem in *Démocratie et libération chrétienne* 148-150 and 177-179.

<sup>4</sup> This is one of the central themes of his book *De la connaissance historique* (Paris: du Seuil, 1953).

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Part II, Ch. I, note 1.

<sup>6</sup> See the beautiful apostolic letter of John Paul II, *Mulieris Dignitatem* of August 15, 1988.

<sup>7</sup> There is available an excellent work on the juridical aspects of the problem we're treating; see Luigi Bressan, *Libertà religiosa nel diritto internazionale. Dichiarazioni e norme internazionale* (Padua: CEDAM, 1989), it contains an important bibliography.

<sup>8</sup> *De regimine principum*, I, 15.

<sup>9</sup> See *Documentation catholique* n. 1767 (July 1, 1979) 611 ff.

<sup>10</sup> On the capital role played by John Paul II in the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism see the remarkable work of Bernard Lecompte, *La vérité l'emportera toujours sur le mensonge* (Paris: Lattès, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Jn 3:18-21; 9:41; 12:47 ff.; 16:11,4: cf. Also 8:15; 15:22.

<sup>12</sup> The text may be found in *Documentation catholique* n. 1999 (Feb. 4, 1990) 102 f.; see also the *Discourse* of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger to the Cardinals of the Roman Curia, Dec. 22, 1989; the text appears as above 103-107.

<sup>13</sup> See Cardinal Ratzinger and His Excellency Damaskinos, Metropolitan of Switzerland, *L'héritage chrétien de l'Europe* (Katerini, Greece: Tertios, 1982).

<sup>14</sup> See on this matter R. Pernoud, J. Gimpel and R. Delatouche, *La chrétienté médiévale. Un modèle de développement* (Paris: Tequi, 1989).

<sup>15</sup> In *Le Monde*, December 21, 1982; see also the interview with the same cardinal in *Paris-Match* of Dec. 28, 1989.

<sup>16</sup> See Part III, Cf. II From Denunciation to "Annunciation."

<sup>17</sup> We have developed the theme "Il liberalismo filosofico: 'causa' remota del dissenso," in *L'Osservatore Romano* Nov. 2, 1990, 4.

## CHAPTER IV

# THE MISSIONARY VITALITY OF THEOLOGY

If one accepts the hypothesis which we've proposed, he sees new tasks emerge for theologians and especially for moralists. The global situation of the world as well as its foreseeable upheavals cannot be judged solely on criteria of efficiency.

### **New Tasks for the Theologian**

Nonetheless it is precisely to such criteria that supporters of liberalism have recourse when they attribute the collapse of Soviet communism to liberalism's comparatively greater efficiency. In fact, these critics have their eyes fixed on the market: the future must be mercantile! From such premises are immediately deduced some practical arrangements: for the Eastern countries considerable financial aid is found within a few weeks, while negotiations with the Third-World are prolonged interminably and concern help quantitatively and qualitatively less important. And since the so-called developed countries do not have much more than wealth and money to offer the East, they try to bewitch the East precisely with riches and money.

### *Getting Out of the Catacombs*

Taking the situation of the countries of the South and the evolution of the Eastern countries into account, theologians are now offered new fields of exploration. Several of the problems they're faced with have already been mentioned before, but some need to be made still more explicit.

Among the priority tasks, they need to study more closely the role of religion in the countries of the East stands out. It would be difficult to contest the statement that in these countries religion contributed substantially toward keeping national communities alive. In these societies religion was a rampart against the totalitarianism exercised by the communist party through control of the state machinery. The Christian religion has displayed a *civil war* of a special kind (CA 17b): one that expressed itself in a divorce between the body politic and a voluntaristic minority that presumed to rule even over the mind — between Nation and State.

What theology can show is, as we suggested above, that the same living faith could produce analogous effects in the Third-World and in the West. Religion, in fact, has been shown to be a factor of resistance to totalitarianism on the international scale as well as on the level of persons. Communists thought they had exterminated all those Catholics, all those Christians: foreigners wondered sometimes what happened to all the believers. Events showed that the Christians were there all the time, very simply *there*. Only a dew was needed to make the practical dynamism of their faith blossom into full daylight. God is present in our day, but He needs men to effect His design: there is no springtime without a sowing season.<sup>1</sup> Theologians could prepare Christians of Western Europe to welcome with modesty the message of their brothers in countries of the East and China. As a brilliant Orthodox theologian remarked, the Christians of the East are inviting us to ask ourselves if the Church of the catacombs is not, in fact, to be found in the West. If we have privatized — individualized — religion in an exaggerated way, if we are somewhat pusillanimous as we confront the world, is it not in part because our churches are empty? What their example suggests is that it is normal for Christianity to be perceived as “aggressive,” in this sense that it must go against the current of the century, today as two thousand years ago.

In the Latin American and African contexts, though different from that of Eastern Europe, the Christian religion has also marked civil society and culture. If the faith there remains alive, we can expect it to produce social and political effects analogous to those known in the East.

Theologians who have resolutely attacked structures of sin (CA 26e, 28b)<sup>2</sup> have thereby opened the way to evangelization of these very structures. Where Christianity has deeply impregnated a nation, Christians are called to evangelize the structures, to work for the emergence of a modern state, concerned for the common good and strong enough to promote it.

One of the contemporary Church's dramas is the erosion of its missionary sense, and this erosion has a direct effect on the vitality of theology. Energy is wasted in cantankerous polemics while it would serve to move mountains were it invested in mission. The fact that "missionary territories" have been reduced and native churches have flourished a little everywhere has sometimes given people the idea that the missions have seen their day. But if the *missions* keep evolving their form, *the mission* remains what it has always been: the *raison d'être* of the Church. Her vitality is gauged in part by her inventiveness of which she gives proof by discovering new fields of action. Without having to neglect in any way the traditional missionary areas, new territories open up, even if they are less clearly delimited as the old ones. Today the spirit sends the baptized on mission to all men who are blinded by the new paganism. Today the Spirit sends them on mission, not only into geographical territories, but also into institutional territories where the Gospel leaven must perform its action.

### *A Theological "Midwifery"*

In the measure in which Soviet and liberalist ideologies are correlative, we can hope that the collapse of one will bring theologians to call the other radically into question. Such calling into question is necessary already for a practical reason that is both urgent and evident. We must not let the communist debacle leave the Third-World without protection against a liberalism that is all the more arrogant in that it claims to have brought about the debacle in question - for all that, a very imprudent pretention, for the unraveling of the Soviet ideology offers the theologian an exceptional opportunity to uncover the evil of liberal ideology, which, we cannot forget, caused the historical formation of Marxist and Soviet ideology.

What believers in the East obtained in bringing about the non-violent collapse of Soviet totalitarianism, Western believers and those of the Third-World can complete by denouncing the totalitarian trend of liberalism. One may object that, contrary to what happened in the East, the problem of religious freedom doesn't hardly come up in the West or in many countries of the Third-World. We must, however, be careful and take into account the fact that where the idols of liberalism are honored, freedom is living on borrowed time.

We may wonder whether the Church at present isn't risking being caught in a pincer action between the South and the East. In these two great regions, in fact, sects (in Latin America and Africa)

and the Masonic lodges (in Eastern Europe, including the USSR) are the beneficiaries of political and financial support.<sup>3</sup> It is well known that this support is given due to the intervention of the decision making centers, or of clubs very attached to the strictest liberalist ideology. These centers see the Church as the principal obstacle to the realization of their projects. They endeavor to counter her action and strive to place even her existence in danger. In any case, it is part of the logic of the materialist trend of liberalism to bring about a religious persecution that could be more virulent than that undertaken by the communist regimes. Besides, these persecutions are perfectly foreseeable.<sup>4</sup> To confront them and successfully overcome them, everywhere the faith is the only true protection.

The theologian concerned about the Third-World can, in particular, engage in a bit of midwifery analogous to that undertaken by John Paul II. By means of an analysis of economic indicators, we knew for some years that in the East the socialist system was a failure. But this failure was concealed from the eyes of many because the Soviet regime controlled information and was very repressive. The "implosion" of the regime had been deferred by means of concealment and lies relative to the economic situation: Romania, for example, had bluffed as much as it could about its economic health. This economic failure obviously did not escape the Christians, for above all they attacked the lies that concealed it. They found a way of denouncing the totalitarian ideology in its entirety by examining the relationship between freedom and truth (CA 41d, 46d; EV 96b; Cf. *Veritatis Splendor* 84).

But theologians are able to see that the same road is reproduced elsewhere in regimes of liberal inspiration. We know, for example, that the liberal system such as obtains in the greater part of Latin American countries is an economic and social failure. This failure too, though different certainly from that of socialist countries, appears already in the economic indicators. But the collapse of this liberal system there is postponed because it is hidden by the media, the lies and the corruption. Theologians could help accelerate the awakening of awareness of liberalism's collapse. Starting with the lies that delay its perception, they could go all the way to the heart of the liberal ideology by baring its totalitarian trend.

### *A Stream of Alienations*

In this trend, liberalism produces a new and terrible formulation of the traditional scientist ideology. This ideology puts forward "scientific" considerations inspired by biomedical disciplines and de-



mography. Whether they produce this ideology or are mere agents of those who do produce it, it is in the name of this ideology that doctors perform abortions, mutilate and commit euthanasia. The mechanics of submission described by Milgam<sup>5</sup> here play a double role. The men in white can themselves submit to the authority of those producing the ideology; at the same time it is by submitting to the authority of doctors that human beings "consent" to let themselves be mutilated, aborted or euthanized. Here again the moralist finds himself challenged by this *cascade of alienations*.

It is appropriate, then, to follow through on the intention of some practical theologies by nourishing them with the Augustinian theology of desire. Concretely, this means that the aspiration for liberation cannot find its due response except in total liberation, whose keystone is Christ. It is for the theologian to make true liberation prevail, one that does not consist in making men slaves to their passions, even less in disposing them to consent to their enslavement. The theologian brings a first class specific contribution to the prevention and curbing of totalitarianism when he enlightens and nourishes the faith of God's people. The road that leads to authentic liberation passes through personal conversion as well as building up the common good.

Whence a corollary: the most precious patrimony of the poor, that with which they call out to others, is their faith. Any theology that weakens this faith would go contrary to history. Pastoral purifies and consolidates the foundations of this faith, for it is in their faith that the poor find the strength to resist oppression and to take their destiny into their own hands. We must, therefore, frankly wonder about the pertinence of secularizing theological models that are inclined to impute to objective structures the responsibility for immoral situations. The gaze of faith penetrates more deeply than the gaze of the human sciences: it reveals that, in the final analysis, it is in the heart of man that lying and violence have the seat (Cf. MT 15:18; see Jn 8:44).

### *Broadening Ecumenical Dialogue*

Still on the theological plane, the famous contribution of the sociologist Max Weber<sup>6</sup> has contributed to the study of the liberal tradition. It showed, among others things, how the Protestant tradition set in relief the individual's initiative, his liberty but also his responsibility. It is clear that by means of its austere ethic, the Calvinist tradition brought a moderating element to bear upon the excesses of unbridled individualism: austerity of living, sharing, sense of work,

creation of new wealth and therefore of employment, etc. Two tracks deserve to be explored.

First of all, how did the capitalist ethical principles evolve once they were cut off from their Protestant source? In fact, we see very soon a re-interpretation, in naturalist terms, of the Protestant ethic, particularly the Calvinist ethic. For example, differences in social standing were first imputed to the decree of the divine will. Wealth was interpreted as a sign of the unfathomable divine predilection. These themes, which would cause devastation in the North American and South African contexts, were little by little translated into biological and/or economic terms. Instead of saying that God willed that the descendants of Cham be "cursed" for having mocked their father, one would say that their inferiority was inscribed in their genetic patrimony.<sup>7</sup>

From the perspective of ecumenical dialogue and collaboration, it would be useful to analyze again the spirit of capitalism. In effect, Catholics are also responsible for the formation of this spirit of capitalism.<sup>8</sup> It would be necessary, in particular, to liberate God's word from the alienating use which liberalist ideology was able to make of it, whether under the form of a biblical fundamentalism unjustifiable in the eyes of present exegesis, whether under the form of a translation into naturalist terms.<sup>9</sup>

Secondly, in the same spirit, it will be necessary to examine the *influence exerted by Judaism* — an incontestable and greatly beneficial influence, for the immense majority of Jews obviously have striven to live and think in spirit and truth. There nevertheless remains the influence of Jewish thought, which we cannot overestimate, on the genesis of Protestant individualism as well as on the formation of contemporary liberalism in its laicized expressions. Theologians will find useful inspiration in the works of Wohlmann.<sup>10</sup> In a striking parallel between Maimonides and St. Thomas, this author has shown that Jewish thought has tended to exalt the individual, his success and eventually the salvation observance of the law assures him. The Catholic perspective, on the other hand, is much more centered on the initiative of God who addresses to all men and the whole human community a universal call to salvation.

One can see from these simple examples how ecumenical dialogue could be broadened through greater attention to an examination of the present world.

### *Stockholders and Usurers Today*

Within the framework of this dialogue, a choice place should be given to the theology of human work. A century ago the prototype of

the worker was the laborer. Today, however, the one who was, at the time of *Rerum novarum* (1891), the laborer par excellence tends to disappear in "developed" societies. His place is taken by very qualified technicians or a highly automated machinery of production. In a general way, the traditional figure of the laborer is modified: an inevitable consequence of human work's evolution and of the variable conditions in which it is done today.

It is well known that the value of work is less highly regarded in the East. Servant of the state, the sole employer, the worker is deprived of responsibility for his work. He doesn't have to answer for the good or bad use he makes of the collective productive capital, or stand behind the positive or negative effects of this work; he is not personally motivated. Productive capital and the ability of exploiting it is cruelly missing in men of the Third-World. One sees, then, how a theology of man at work deserves to be studied in the context of the East as well as of the South.

However, if it is valued less in both East and South, human work is also diminished in developed liberal societies. *Doing* is more heavily taxed than *having*.<sup>11</sup> We have already called attention to how much the concentration of revenue caused poverty. Now *this* concentration has to do, not only with revenue, but productive capital as well. Its concentration also causes poverty and what is more accentuates inequality. To express oneself schematically, one may say that this concentration is accomplished diachronically and synchronically. Diachronically, in the sense that inherited wealth passes from generation to generation, and that it is subjected to lighter taxation than that imposed on work in general, salaried work in particular. Synchronically, in the sense that productive capital is controlled by a minority of people who, practically speaking don't have to render account to their peers. And these managers or owners make decisions according to criteria which they alone define. Need we point out that in affirming its role, the technosstructure had accelerated the emergence of this new economic *nomenklatura*? Thus, with an assist from minority participation — even none — a handful of managers or owners are able to concentrate in their hands a discretionary power, so to speak.<sup>12</sup> Moreover, as this concentration of economic power provides access to wealth, the latter in turn is concentrated, begetting poverty and inequality: and here we are back where we started!

It seems, then, that the theologian is invited to reexamine the relationships between patrimonial property and/or enterprise, on the one hand, and the common good, on the other (CA 32d, 35c). Enough to astonish the moralist, serious indications are at hand to incline us

to believe that the class of parasitic stockholders survives and modernizes.

The liberalist mentality has, then, made possible the modernization, the amplification and the concealment of usury. The state's attention is distracted; fiscal services have acquired the habit of not being interested in the phenomenon of concentration; it is preferable to pay attention — and thus dispersing it — to the multitude of those without defense who live from their work alone.

## The Church and Demographic Questions

A particular task is urgently necessary for theologians: to apply all the dimensions of the Church's teaching regarding sexuality, procreation and therefore demography. The church's teaching in this regard revolves about two axes: a concern for responsible parenthood and concern for demographic questions properly so-called.

### *Contraception and Responsible Parenthood*

Regarding the first point, we will limit ourselves to suggesting briefly the social dimension of Christian morality about conjugal sexuality.

We must first take into account the fact that neo-Malthusian morality comes largely from the principles of Malthusian morality. Both these moralities aim at interest, utility and pleasure. Thus hedonist utilitarianism is reinforced still more by the support of the whole modern philosophical current that exalts the individual as the unique source of his own rule of conduct.<sup>13</sup> Thus it goes with sexual behavior: since I am the only to determine what is useful and pleasing to me, there is no longer any transgression. I alone am the one to define what is for my good.

Now, it's of consequence to observe that where this radically individualistic morality dominates, society is in grave danger of death, and that for two reasons. First, because the convulsive exaltation of the individual destroys the social tissue: others don't interest me except insofar as they are useful to me (Malthusianism!), or insofar as they ensure my pleasure (neo-Malthusianism!). Secondly, because, in the end, a society peopled with individuals following such a morality is condemned to perish through deliberate sterility. The "good" to seek is my pleasure; the "evil" to avoid is procreation. Hence the need for really effective methods for curbing the birth rate. The birth of a new being cannot but compromise my freedom and be an obstacle to its exercise. Such a morality logically ends in a civilization

of death, and we find a dramatic illustration of it in the demographic evolution of Western societies.<sup>14</sup>

Along the same lines, we must denounce the *abusive identification*, spread by the neo-Malthusian current, between contraception, on the one hand, and responsible procreation or birth control, on the other. Theologians would render a signal service to human society and the Church by denouncing this sophist confusion. For the Church, in fact, responsible procreation is inscribed clearly in with God's design.<sup>15</sup> The transmission of life associates man and woman with the creative action of God. It is an act of love, because, in marriage, it prolongs the primordial creative act of God who is all Love and therefore totally free.

The Church, then, is not for birth at any cost. She doesn't demand that Christians have as many children as possible; she asks that they have as many children as they can reasonably welcome and rear in the circumstances in which life has placed them.

For these reasons the Church cannot conceive of parenthood except as responsible, that is, as participant, in its order, in the creative freedom of God. But for this same reason, the Church teaches that contraception is not written in God's design. She insists that contraception, and for a greater reason abortion, always wounds at least one of the couple and therefore the couple itself. In most cases, it degrades or mutilates the woman (sterilization, excessive use of hormones, etc.); and sometimes degrades or mutilates the man (e.g., vasectomy); it introduces the moral wound of a lie into the very heart of the most personal human relationship. Further, the Church's teaching emphasizes the eminent moral value of human sexuality in the plan of God. For the Church, contraception reduces the riches proper to human sexuality; it strains the true liberty called for in this sexuality which is specific and irreducible to that of an animal. In more classic terms, contraception aggravates concupiscence.

What the Church has to say is in sum very simple: human sexuality is less instinctual than hedonist morality would have us think; it is responsible and controllable. Responsibility cannot be abandoned to techniques, much less delegated to technicians. And the liberty that man can gain control of in this domain with the help of grace must normally entail liberating effects in the domain of social morality.<sup>16</sup>

### *The Market for Man or Man for the Market*

It is not enough, however, for theologians to shed light on the coherence of the Church's teaching regarding responsible parenthood.

It is urgent that they pay more attention to the new and real moral problems posed by world population as well as to the demographic policies presumed to solve them.

For, contrary to what many say (sometimes with the best of intentions), the Church in no way denies the existence of a world demographic problem. On the contrary, she affirms that this problem is most grave. She even says that if everything continues to unfold with its present dynamism, we are headed straight to collapse. The most elementary observation reveals, in fact, that *in its dominant liberalist version*, the market has astonishing power to produce legions of poor people. But the Church also says that the problems posed by world demography are not of a technical order first; *they are of a moral nature*. It is precisely this assertion that disturbs people, and they reject it.

There is a serious misunderstanding in this regard that some are interested in cultivating. For many, Christians included, the Church's teaching concerning demographic problems would do well to look into her teaching on conjugal morality. The ethical problems posed by the growth or decline of populations would be essentially ruled by sexual morality. Now this way of looking at things is not satisfying to the degree that it is unilateral. *The Church's teaching on demographic questions pertains above all to social morality* which, as it happens, receives from conjugal morality a perspective proper to the latter. This merits some explanation.

In one sense, the Church reactivates today what she already essentially taught in 1891 regarding the question of labor. In *Rerum novarum* Leo XIII stated that one of the great causes of the "*undeserved misery*" of workers was the inadequate distribution of wealth and its concentration in the hands of a few. John Paul II expanded this same social teaching to worldwide dimensions in his three great social encyclicals and in numerous other documents. It is in this broader context that demographic problems are situated.<sup>17</sup> In sum, if there is a problem of this kind, it is because the "structure of sin" prevails.<sup>18</sup>

The tasks facing both demographer and Christian moralist here are both complex and exhilarating. First we need to examine, as we have mentioned, the reliability of information disseminated by the big international institutions. The quasi-monopoly they possess in the study of population makes suspect, in the eyes of some, the censorship exercised over demographic information. Whence the need to verify rigorously this data.<sup>19</sup>

Nevertheless, what must be called into question again, is *the choice and treatment of the parameters retained*. Only those parameters

in accord with the interests of the wealthy of the entire world are blown up in importance and meaning, and to insure their defense a strategy of panic is devised. Any discussion held on development is then reduced to a discussion about the market and economic growth: the market isn't made for man; man is made for the market. From that they draw the conclusion we are well aware of about demographic policies.

Now, in the research on development, it is erroneous and, what is more, immoral to emphasize, as they do, the demographic parameter and to give it priority consideration in order to draw from that an argument "justifying" a world market essentially profitable for a minority. The world market is essentially organized in service of the wealthy.

In the eyes of the Church, problems of development aren't connected first with demographic data, on the basis of which international institutions are disposed to act abusively. For her, there are certainly real problems of development and population, but these problems result from the general egotism of all those who refuse to get involved, to convert, and who do not wish to take action except on those who are precisely the most destitute. It follows, for example, that it is an aberration as well as a crime to kill children in their mothers' wombs "in order to contribute toward diminishing infant mortality."

Consistent with herself, the Church recommends that, in a broad movement of solidarity, everything be done to elevate the lives of the poor and as a consequence lower their fecundity. There is, in fact, enough food and resources for all men, enough knowledge and know-how to lift the poor out of their poverty. But, as another example, the slowness of the discussion about GATT gives one an idea of the mountain of moral weight that must be moved out of the way.

There is only one, sole radical change that is really *wanted*: the general spread of contraceptive, anti-birth, anti-life practices. The rest they don't even want to touch. They don't seriously call into question the *excessive* expense of armaments, the laughably small outlay for education, the insufficient spending on agriculture, management of the territory and health. For good measure and to confuse the issue, they combine last year's budget with that of family planning.

Well, the Church says, if you are going to continue in this way, we're headed for catastrophe, and that for two intimately connected reasons. First because to the degree that, despite all, the poor grow in knowledge, they will become more aware and end by rebelling.

Then because, sooner or later, an arrogant technocracy, which risks living as a parasite on the international institutions, also risks bringing about their implosion. Now the implosion we envisage here will have consequences dramatically different from those resulting from the implosion of the communist system: it will transform society into hell.

About all these problems the theologian has strong words to speak. Just as in other circumstances the social teaching of the Church directed emphatic criticism to the abusive ascendancy of the state, the party, the race, so is it necessary today to speak forcefully against the emergence of a supranational bureaucracy, charged by the new technocrats to monitor the world population in view of ensuring the perfect functioning of the market. The moralist is here confronted, then, with a new field for applying the principle of subsidiarity.<sup>20</sup> Today, through the international institutions which it supports, the liberalist market has undertaken to absorb the state, to alienate couples, to depose the family, to reject that nation.

Faced with the emergence of this new peril, the Church says simply but vigorously: underdevelopment and poverty have their origin in the injustices, the immorality, the incompetence, the lethargy, the corruption, the imbalance and concentration of wealth, and bad organization. But she continues right away by affirming that, confronted with this multitude of problems, there are solutions, and that these solutions have a name: respect, justice, solidarity, love.

## **The Church and the Salvation of the Human Community**

### *Beyond the Horizon of Death*

Finally, the theologian is invited to reconsider the major problem — unique in a way — of death (CA 39b; EV 12a, 19c, 24a, 26a, 76, 97d).

The restoration of the worship of humanity, thought out by Feuerbach and organized by Marx, produced the rotten fruit of Soviet communism. This "religion", which is in a way a humanism enclosed within its own immanence, ultimately and fatally had to stumble over the fact of death.<sup>21</sup> Before this promethean humanity, in front of which ideology dangled glittering mirages of a generic immortality and lyrical tomorrows, the undeniable experience of the death of the individual, or rather the death of the person, would quickly appear in challenge. The tragic destiny of man whose existence, Heidegger will decide, is doomed to death!



Confronted with this unavoidable payment due-date, man will not be deceived about the absurd destiny in which he imprisons himself unless he *takes himself for God*. At the end of a tragic confusion, he will have to see himself as master of others and all things. Whatever might come from outside himself to save him from his abandonment will be a priori denounced as a cause of alienation and produce resentment.<sup>22</sup>

Through a stupid misunderstanding, this man, experiencing his own inability to create in the full sense of the term, will affirm himself by destroying. For this nihilism entails its own form of immanent justice: failing to appropriate the divine prerogative of being master of life, man erects himself into the master of death.

Here again, we see how it would be useful to take up, beginning with an examination of their common sources, the study of the point of confluence between Naziism and contemporary liberalism.<sup>23</sup> It would be quickly seen that between the generic humanity of the socialist tradition and the organicism of the liberal tradition, there is more than a vague relationship. It would also be clear, as Hegel suggests, that from the same logic proceed the passion to consume, the passion to dominate, the passion to select, and finally the passion to destroy.

Thus the theologian is presented with a magnificent task: on the one hand, to show that on the horizon of the two trends, liberalist and socialist, the specter of death stands out; on the other hand, to propose the decisive choice: the Lord of the living (Mt 22:32), who wants none to perish (Mt 18:14):

See, I have set before you this day life and good, death and evil. If you obey the commandments of the Lord your God which I command you this day, by loving the Lord your God, by walking in his ways, and by keeping his commandments and his statutes and his ordinances, then you shall live and multiply, and the Lord your God will bless you in the land which you are entering to take possession of it. But if your heart turns away, and you will not hear, but are drawn away to worship other gods and server them, I declare to you this day, that you shall perish; you shall not live long in the land which you are going over the Jordan to enter and possess. I call heaven and earth to witness against you this day, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse; therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may live, loving the Lord your God, obeying his voice and clinging to him; for that means life to you and length of days, that you may dwell in the land which the lord swore to your fathers, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob to give

them.<sup>24</sup>

More precisely, theologians can show that this decisive choice between death and life commands an option no less decisive regarding democracy (CA 46ab; EV 70). It is important that the theologian denounces without compromise the restoration of a pagan conception of democracy. It is not at all by chance that this pagan conception is found explicitly spoken of by Renan in his preface to *L'avenir de la science*. In such a conception of democracy, the mass of human beings is at the service of a minority that has only to congratulate itself on the privileges it enjoys in the area of mind, knowledge and wealth. *Humanum paucis vivit genus* (the human race lives for the profit of a few): the ancient maxim always remains true.<sup>25</sup>

Hence, it is up to the theologian to exercise the necessary discernment in order not to credit this democracy with the endorsement of the Gospel. On the other hand, how the theologian should strive to show all men the thin line that runs between the Christian conception of democracy and the theology of the Covenant! Already from the perspective of the Old Testament, to choose life is to value human existence in its temporal dimension. This existence opens up the eternal happiness of all men without exception. By His teaching and example, Christ never stopped showing His solicitude for those whom the "elite" of His time kept in ignorance or held in contempt. He has pity on the hungry crowd, the beggars, the wounded bodies, those whom sin distracted from the right path. *The mass was and is called to happiness beginning here below and for always.*

It is these joyful tidings that pastors, theologians (of all disciplines), and all the baptized are invited to proclaimed everywhere. Prior to any consideration relative to a particular empirical regime, the Christian conception of democracy has as its specific end to make explicit the political, economic and social consequences of the new commandment, to spread a theology of solidarity that is equal to the new man.

### *The Theology of the Mystical Body*

In the world in the process of formation, the role of the Church remains, then, what it has always been: to be an instrument of the Spirit so that the new man may be born. This man, however, will not be able to be conceived of in strictly individual terms. Without doubt, Christ calls each one of us personally: for Him we are unique beings. But, probably influenced by the modern philosophies of subjectivity, different schools of spirituality have perhaps insisted too

much on the individual's part in seeking perfection. Very fortunately, thanks to the personalist current, Christian spirituality has welcomed the idea that, in the order of sanctity as well as of nature, we do not reach our fulfillment except through the intervention of others. The ideas of exchange between persons, mutual edification, of communion, themselves shaped by reference to the relations among the Persons of the Trinity, have contributed immensely to making the spiritual experience of Christians more dynamic. This contribution is particularly perceptible in the domain of conjugal spirituality.

The moment is very favorable to a deepening of the dynamic in progress. *The world in process of becoming calls for and suggests a spirituality that certainly uses the idea of the person but integrates it more into the community.* Hence, the central place of solidarity in the teaching of John Paul II. This deepening will benefit from the contribution of Trinitarian as well as incarnational theology.

From the first, because it makes clear that in God there are not simply, if we may so speak, "bilateral" interpersonal relations, but that *God is being in community.* The model of Trinitarian life is thereby particularly suggestive for the deepening of Christian social morality. This latter is invited to develop to a greater extent the idea that men are certainly called to seek their perfection on the level of interpersonal relations, *mediate or immediate*, that they are bound together. But *the call to salvation and to sanctity is equally addressed to the human community as such insofar as it is called to be the visible image of the divine community.* This perception of the communal call to sanctity allows us the better to understand the idea of the universality of salvation. To associate them with His glory, God has not only created individual persons but the human community as such.

From the second, because men, both as persons and as members of community, are created in Christ who, by becoming incarnate, has sealed — explains St. Irenaeus so admirably — the dignity of human nature and its condition. Concretely, that means that a social theology would have much to gain from reactivating the theology of the Mystical Body, somewhat neglected by theologians since the encyclical *Mystici Corporis* (1943) of Pius XII. Christ, the head, wishes, in effect, to join to Himself a concrete body of flesh and bone: He wants to seal with humanity a spousal relationship, greatly emphasized by St. Paul.<sup>26</sup> This social theology, starting from the community and including the person, would throw a new light on sacramental theology, that of the People of God, the laity and ministries. It would furthermore open new perspectives for a Christian rereading

of the liberal and socialist traditions.

### *The Church's Role of Supplying*

Whatever may be the cultural context one envisions, it appears that the Church is also pressed to *redefine in depth her role of supplying*. Traditionally, we understand by that the Church's often being found in situations in which she must provide for the inefficiency or omissions of temporal authority. Whence arise her interventions in the domains of health, aid to the poor, education, promotion of culture, etc. In our day again the Church is often called to provide supply of this type, and one would certainly not complain if she continued to do so where the situation calls for it.<sup>27</sup>

However, we need to deepen the way we are used to looking at her role of supply today. The English word we're using is especially suggestive. It gives us the idea of "furnishing," offering," "putting at someone's disposition," "providing," "provisioning," reinforcing," etc. The term suggests, then, something more than the French word *suppléance*. The Church added something that was lacking, not only in the temporal order, but also and above all in the order of grace. She offered, furnished to the baptized a supplementary motivation of the supernatural order, so that they might engage in temporal tasks justified by inadequacy on the part of the public powers.

In any case, we should observe that this idea of "supplement" was already present in the traditional understanding of the French word *suppléance*. The Church added something that was lacking, not only in the temporal order, but also and above all in the order of grace. She offered, furnished to the baptized a supplementary motivation of the supernatural order, so that they engage in temporal tasks justified by inadequacy on the part of the public powers.

It seems that the Church today can redefine her supply role in the two senses of this word. She is always invited to make up for the deficiencies or inefficacy of public powers. But she must also, more than ever, understand herself as supermotivating, all men through faith, for the performance of their temporal tasks. The faith, which bore and bears the hope of Eastern countries as well as those of the Third-World, must be propagated, nourished, strengthened by reason of the fundamental demand of justice vis-à-vis God, to whom is due all honor and glory. But if man becomes more human in this process of profound personalization which faith brings about, if he becomes a new man, if, opening himself up to God's gift, he believes in the quality of his existence, he receives by that very fact this "supplement" that supermotivates him at the moment of his self-opening.

All the studies analyzing deeply the phenomenon of development are unanimous in recognizing that in this development man is the sole agent who truly and definitively matters. The primordial role of man relegates to second place, without denying their relative importance, the roles played by the climate, the natural resources, favorable or unfavorable determinisms (CA 31-33). In making man grow in humanity, the Gospel brings its specific and decisive contribution to the development of human society (CA 5e, 55c). On the other hand, whatever is transferred, transplanted, imitated, mimed, repeated, etc. paralyzes the finding of meaning, the construction of the future, the ability to innovate. Those, then, are just so many factors of alienation: they make men strangers to themselves.

Now what the Christians of the East have begun must be, not only pursued, but broadened to the dimensions of the world. To work at the "new evangelization" is to work with the "supermotivation" that faith alone can provide. All the national communities of Europe in the East have seen their cultures exposed to destructive assaults without precedent. For totalitarianism aims at destroying, not simply the individual I, but also attacks national and cultural communities, natural and family communities — all those it wants to empty. The Church, which has taken an active part in the formation of the tissue of nations, must think of how to restore their vigor. In practice, that implies concrete things. Entire peoples, at time grazed by the temptation to discouragement, even cynicism, must be put back on their feet. They must relearn the meaning of responsible work whose value is acknowledged. They must reconstruct ruined societies, ineffective and rotten administrations, old equipment, sometimes on the border of ruin. They must fight against alcoholism, its causes and consequences, against AIDS. Further, these people must learn to turn the page, without losing their memory, and to pardon. If for this prodigious renaissance they weren't able to count on but material stimulants, as centers of Western affairs suggest, the countries of the East would have hastened toward the loss of their religious roots which nourished them during the most terrible trial of their history, and they would be powerless before new perils.

### *Lazarus in Festive Dress*

Fundamentally, it is the same in the countries of the Third-World even if the situations are extremely varied. It is clear that, if the peoples of the Third-World continue to be invited to swallow the political, cultural and technological products coming from the big centers, if they are pressured into imitating and catching up with the de-

veloped countries, from the misery they already know they will soon pass to despair and hatred.

To these people avid for recognition, that is to say, justice, the Church must announce their dignity. She has neither gold or silver to offer them, but like St. Peter (Acts 3:6), she must say to them "Rise and walk!" and reveal to them that Jesus Christ is the source, the meaning and the goal of their life. She must awaken their creativity their responsibility, and make of these oppressed people artisans of justice, love and peace.

But at the same time, in her pastoral the Church must address to the wealthy a ringing call to practice austerity. The Western life-style is morally criticizable in its inspiration. By definition, it cannot be extended to the entirety of humanity: in the end, it doesn't have a future. The Church must say to the rich that it is contrary to their dignity to brick themselves up in citadels of egotism and to close their ears to the cries of those left to perish for lack of food and above all love. This multitude of poor people will be the ones to judge us, to be precise, in this world and in the next.

It falls to the Church to cry out to the "developed" nations that they are to welcome Lazarus, not by leaving for him a few ridiculous crumbs, but in going out to meet him and dressing him in festive garments.

<sup>1</sup> See the article "Chrétiens à l'Est: une foi à renverser les régimes," *La Vie* (Paris), n. 2326, March 29, 1990, 20-52; and "Eglises et démocratie en Europe de l'Est," in *Le Monde diplomatique* n. 432 (March 1990) 12-15. See also the work of B. Lecomte, *La vérité l'emportera toujours sur le mensonge* (Paris: Lattès, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> Cf. *On Social Concerns*, 36, 37, 40, 46.

<sup>3</sup> Between the "New Age" and "One Worldism" there is a striking relationship. See Jean Vernet, *Le nouvel âge* (Paris: Targui, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> See note 14 in Ch. I Part III.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Stanley Milgram, *Soumission à l'autorité. Un Point de vue expérimental* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1994).

<sup>6</sup> See Max Weber, *L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme* (Paris: Plon, 1964).

<sup>7</sup> Cf. F. Wertham, *A Sign for Cain* (New York: Warner Paperback Library, 1973). These themes are developed by contemporary sociobiology. See on this subject Pierre Thuillier, *Les biologistes vont-ils prendre le pouvoir? La sociobiologie en question* (Brussels: Ed. Complexe, 1981); Yvette Conry (ed.), *De Darwin au darwinisme: science et idéologie* (Paris: Vrin, 1983); *Biology as Social Weapon* (Ann Arbor, MI.: Burgess Publ. Co. 1977); Charles Lumsden and Edward Wilson, *Le feu de Prométhée. Réflexion sur l'origine de l'esprit* (Paris: Mazarine, 1984); R. Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford Univ. Press, 1978).

<sup>8</sup> For a parallel between the Iberian and Catholic colonization and the Anglo-

Saxon and Protestant colonization, see the famous study of the Brazilian Vianna Moog, *Defricheurs et pionniers* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969).

<sup>9</sup> See Elise Marienstras, *Les mythes fondateurs de la nation américain* (Paris: Maspero, 1977).

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Avital Wohlmann, *Thomas d'Aquin et Maimonide. Un dialogue exemplaire* (Paris: Cerf, 1988).

<sup>11</sup> For these reflections we rely on A. Minc, *L'argent fou* (Paris: Grasset, 1990).

<sup>12</sup> This abuse was denounced in 1931 by Pius XI in his encyclical *Quadragesimo anno*, n. 113.

<sup>13</sup> See our article, "Il liberalismo filosofico: 'causa' remota del dissenso," *L'Osservatore Romano* Nov. 2, 1990, 4.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. G. F. Dumont (ed.) *La France ridée* (Paris: Pluriel, 1979).

<sup>15</sup> See *Gaudium et Spes*, n. 50 f; *Donum vitae*, n. 5.

<sup>16</sup> See note 35 in Ch. VI, Part II.

<sup>17</sup> See *Rerum novarum*, n. 1 and 2.

<sup>18</sup> See *Laborem exercens* (1981); On Social Concerns (1987) in which nos. 18, 25 f. broach the demographic questions; *Centesimus annus* (1991) in which no. 33 touches on the same question; *Evangelium Vitae* 16, 91.

<sup>19</sup> See Part I, Ch. V.

<sup>20</sup> In the word *subsidiarity* we can recognize the word *subsidy*. In Latin the word *subsidium* means aid. According to the principle of subsidiarity, it pertains to the public powers to help individuals and intermediary bodies to take the initiatives of which they are perfectly capable. It is not a question, then, of public powers substituting themselves for individuals or groups. Likewise international authorities should aid states, not substitute for them.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. the classic work of H. de Lubac, *The Drama of Atheist Humanism* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995).

<sup>22</sup> The important work here is that of Max Scheler, *L'homme du ressentiment* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970).

<sup>23</sup> See Part II, Ch. I.

<sup>24</sup> Dt 30:15-20.

<sup>25</sup> Our inspiration here is the commentary of P. Tiberghien on the encyclical *Rerum novarum* of Leo XIII (Paris: Action populaire, 1956). The Latin quotation comes from Lucain, *Pharsale*, V, 349.

<sup>26</sup> We explain this more at length in *Démocratie et libération chrétienne*, 199-201.

<sup>27</sup> See Osee 2:16-25; Ez 16; Eph 5:23-32; Gal 4:22-27; Ap 19-22.

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\$15.00

ISBN 1-887567-05-4