

that each of the stages previous to the highest is really involved in a self-deception, in that it believes itself to be something other than it really is; so that an understanding with it regarding its proper place will drive every lower form of knowledge beyond its limits up to a higher stage of knowledge. For this reason the method that is here pursued is the same that Schelling, following Fichte's example, had pursued in his *Transcendental Idealism*: it is shown that upon every higher stage there is given for consciousness itself what, upon the lower, had been only for us, the contemplators, *i.e.*, what it previously was only in itself. Hegel constantly recognised that the discoverer of this (dialectical) method was Fichte; his own merit is not only to have applied it in much greater detail, but particularly to have supposed the essence of the same to lie much less in the fact that it aims at syntheses, which, as Fichte's example shows, easily become diminutions of opposition, but rather in the fact that, if opposition is negatived, that which is negatived does not vanish *puré*, but is at once annulled and preserved (*aufgehoben*), or becomes a "moment." Inasmuch as Hegel shows by this method that, if the mind would not misunderstand itself, it cannot rest before it has raised itself to the absolute standpoint, it may, since it has been shown above that as regards the position of philosophy he antagonized Fichte and Schelling, be likewise said that he had conceded both to be right; with Schelling, he grants that not all but only the select few, *i.e.*, those who begin to reflect upon their standpoint, attain to philosophy. Of these, however, he asserts with Fichte, that they are (not morally but logically) bound not to rest before they attain to absolute knowledge. Up to this point the difference which Hegel in the *Phenomenology*, Schelling in the *Transcendental Idealism*, and Fichte in his *Pragmatical History of Intelligence*, had supposed to exist between them appears to be not very great. But now there appears a moment that might, perhaps, likewise have hovered before the minds of his two predecessors, but which they had not, like himself, emphasized: the stages which the consciousness of the individual subject passes through, have already been passed through by the universal mind, this great individual in which the individuals appear, as it were, as accidents, and have shown themselves in its development as individual historical phenomena which, now, the individual passes through in itself, as "one

who studies a higher science again passes through the preparatory branches without dwelling upon them." If, now, Hegel shows that the individual mind, when it refuses to remain lodged in an unsolved contradiction, must progress from consciousness to self-consciousness, from this to (the law-discovering and law-giving) reason, from this to (the ethical) spirit, from this to (art and) religion, finally from this to absolute knowledge, in which last the content of thought, the absolute Spirit, is freed from the form of objectivity, which it has for the religious idea, he presents these six stages as at the same time forms through which humanity (the world-spirit) has passed; and the presentation acquires a feature in the highest degree original by the fact that frequently merely the repetition of the world-historical course in the individual consciousness, now again precisely this or that world-form, hovers before the author's mind, when seeking to show the transitory or partial character of a stage of view. The *Phenomenology* shows, therefore, through what forms humanity passed before absolute knowledge was attained in it, and through what conditions the individual must pass before it can arrive at absolute knowledge. Upon this stage of comprehensive knowledge, which has all earlier stages for its presupposition, that knowledge which upon the preceding stage was felt, believed, etc., *i.e.*, what had existed there as (its) substance (ruling it), is known as the act of the subject; this change into the subject is then knowledge. Science is, therefore, comprehended history, the Recollection and the Calvary of the absolute Spirit, to which only out of the cup of this realm of spirits mantles its infinity.

3. The fundamental science, which Hegel calls *Logic*, but remarks at the same time that it may equally well be called Metaphysics or Ontology, begins with the determination, produced by the *Phenomenology*, which in so far may be termed as regards this subject the First Part of the investigations, to comprehend, or to think purely (not with an object or a presentation before the mind). It has for its subject what, according to Schelling's expression, which was adopted by Hegel, is the *prius* of Nature and Spirit, or God, as alpha and not as omega, in short, what in the System of Identity was called the Absolute, or Reason. But where Schelling's *Authentic Exposition* held a definition to be sufficient, Hegel deemed a whole science necessary, which

closes with what Schelling had begun with, namely, with the position that the Absolute, or Reason (instead of these terms Hegel usually employs *Idea*, frequently also *Logos*, which explains the name Logic), is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity. The passage from the determination to think purely (which recalls Fichte's fact-act) to the just-mentioned result of the foundation-science, yields thoughts of such a character that, because the opposite of objectivity had vanished in absolute knowledge, they are likewise objective relations. Since the entire system of them is called reason (*Idea*), they may be termed relations of reason. Hegel calls them Categories, and means thereby not only, as did Kant, subjective conceptions of the understanding, but, like Krause, essentialities. They are the universal relations of reason, which, because they govern every rational system may be called souls of all reality; but because they are only the laws that govern everywhere the same, are not affected by the distinction of nature and spirit, they are abstractions, so that Logic introduces us into a realm of shadows. It is necessary to enter such a realm, because the problem of all sciences, of recognising reason in the various spheres, can be solved only if we know, first, *what* reason is, and, secondly, *how* to find it. Logic teaches both, and teaches only this: it teaches the former by the thought-determination of reason, which is not completed until the end is reached; it teaches the latter by the fact that it is the theory of method. Hence it is the real *philosophia prima*. Hegel's definition of logic, that it is the science of the *Idea* in the abstract element of thought, implies that it considers the truth (not merely its form), but as it takes form in abstract thought, hence not as perceived (nature), nor as it knows itself (spirit). As regards, now, the content of the Hegelian Logic, it falls into three parts, the first two of which, as they first appeared, were taken together, as objective logic, as distinguished from the third, the subjective, — a distinction which Hegel afterwards dropped. In correspondence with the position which Hegel assumes towards the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge, he develops in the *First Part* the various forms of Being (qualitative, quantitative, and modal), and closes with a reconstruction of the System of Identity, as also a reference to Spinoza. For both these deniers of all mere ideality (*Sollen*) there is in fact nothing that transcends Being. In entire opposition thereto, the

Second Part, which treats of *Essence* (likewise in three sections: Essence as such, Appearance, Actuality), closes with that category which was for Fichte the most important, Reciprocity (*vid.* § 312, 3), that full development of transient causality, which the pantheist Schopenhauer combats, just as Spinoza had antagonized causality. It is the thought of the Must in contradistinction to Being which in the second Part of the *Logic* is explained as the highest, the real absolute. The process does not end there; rather, the *Third Part*, as uniting the two main thoughts of the other two parts, transcends them. By the term conception (*Begriff*) in the wide sense, which he applies to this Part as its title, Hegel designates, that is to say, inner, self-active Nature, or essence impelling itself into Being, hence what he calls also subjectivity. (Conception, Objectivity, and Idea are the headings of the three sections.) Here now, particularly in the first section, is especially maintained the point of view (as already by Schelling, after the *Bruno*, and also by Wagner and Krause) that the forms of thought treated in formal logic, Conception, Judgment, Syllogism, have at the same time the meaning of real relations, so that we judge only because and as objectivity is a judgment, syllogize only as it is a syllogism. This is carried through the individual forms of judgment and figures of the syllogism. Through the conception of teleological connection, which proves to be the highest objective relation, just as the syllogism had been the highest subjective relation, Hegel makes the transition to the highest category, or, what means the same thing, the totality of all. This is the Idea, and the Idea as it is with the stages of immediacy and mediation behind it, as the absolute, self-mediating Idea. By *Idea* is to be understood self-end, final end; by absolute *Idea*, not the final end which has yet to be realized (as with Fichte), just as little the real, hence accomplished end (as with Schelling), but the self-realizing final end. It is the real absolute. It is reason; and is this, only as the self-connectings of the relations of reason, as their passage into one another, or as their dialectic. In the dialectic of the Idea, the course of reason, consists the actual logic, which we perceive, for example, in the world; the *science* of logic is merely an accompaniment of this (hence method, *μέθοδος*); and as it has taught us, in the first place, what reason is (self-realizing end), just so, secondly, it has taught us what the way is by which

it is discovered (the dialectical method). The Idea as absolute is the only subject of philosophy, which has only to recognise it again in the various modes of its existence. Hence logic is not the whole of science, but its universal, pure part. But it contains implicitly what the other parts should contain, so that it may in so far be called the formal and they the real parts of the system; which, however, is not to be understood as if logic treated only the form of the real; rather is the absolute which it treats, reason, the Logos, the true and only actual. It is therefore clear why Hegel prides himself most upon the *Logic*, as wholly his own work. In it he had given the logical foundation which according to him was wanting to the system of Schelling, with which as the latest and most perfect he was in the habit of closing his lectures on the history of philosophy.

4. Following the *Logic* is the *Philosophy of Nature*, which presents the Idea or the Absolute, the growth of which in us the *Logic* had treated, as an accomplished external existence, as unchangeable order. Although in this Part Hegel appears least independent, inasmuch as the three parts of the Philosophy of Nature—Mechanics, Physics, and Organics—correspond entirely to those parts in the work of Schelling, there is here nevertheless a synthesis of the System of Identity and the Science of Knowledge. With the former, he maintains that nature is Idea, reason, an absolute, but with Fichte, and in opposition to Schelling, who was inclined to a deification of nature, he sees in nature an inadequate phenomenon of reason, the Idea only in its being-out-of-itself, and takes seriously what Schelling had said in the Doctrine of Freedom, viz., that nature is the transition-point which spirit reaches beyond. Its real goal is therefore, that by becoming transformed in knowledge it should give spirit the conditions for existence and development. This, to a certain extent, as Hegel confesses, teleological point of view, according to which nature exists to become known, is frequently so emphasized that it appears as if it existed solely for that. Not, it is true, an antipathy of nature, as with Fichte, but still a disparaging view of it, is the consequence of this. Impatience at the fact that so much is still unknown makes him free with the charge that nature is too weak to exhibit reason everywhere, that much is accidental and wholly without meaning. To the “pranks of nature,” of which formerly Bacon had spoken,

there appears here, as counterpart, the fact that Hegel is annoyed when a nebula is again analysed, etc. In harmony with this rather unjust estimate of nature, is Hegel's unfairness towards the Empiricists, and, among the Philosophers of Nature, those who had set the greatest store by Empiricism, viz., towards Steffens, and above all Oken. If he had paid to the latter in the *Philosophy of Nature* the honour which in his *Philosophy of Religion* he rendered to Franz Baader much would be different. Reverence for Kepler, and friendship with Goethe, occasioned the attacks upon Newton, which Hegel himself in the successive editions of the *Encyclopædia* softened by withdrawing the most acrimonious expressions. In no direction has Hegel left so much to be done as in the *Philosophy of Nature*, and in no direction has his school accomplished less. As regards that in which Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature*, above all, falls short of the requirements set by himself, and the fact that there appears here frequently a corresponding but diametrically opposed one-sidedness, as in Krause,—on this point there are some remarks in the critical observations which, in my often-mentioned larger work, §§ 47–52 of which set forth the system of Hegel, I have appended to the account of his *Philosophy of Nature* (§ 49). The *Philosophy of Nature* closes with the consideration of death, in which the inadequateness of the individual to universality permits the individual to perish in the interests of the latter. This is, however, only one side, the abstract; at the same time, it is thereby said, that the distinction of the universal and the individual has disappeared, a unity of both is posited in which the former is with itself, *i.e.*, thinks. Therewith is posited the conception of Spirit, and the destiny and tendency of nature to destroy itself, like the phoenix, and to come forth as spirit, attains fulfilment. Spirit, inasmuch as it makes nature its presupposition, is the power over it, is as its end prior to it, sees in it its own reflex,—which is just what the *Philosophy of Nature* affords.

5. The *Philosophy of Spirit* forms the Third Part of the system. Spirit also is, like nature, Idea, Reason, Absolute. It is such, as being-with-itself, as conscious freedom, hence adequate, absolute form. First in order is Hegel's *Doctrine of Subjective Spirit*. (The name *psychology*, which is commonly applied to this science, he uses only for the last part of the same.) The few propositions in which

Schelling had expressed himself on psychology, prove that he, like Spinoza, counted it as a part of natural science, that to him the soul is the Idea of a certain body, etc. Fichte, on the contrary, had conceived spirit only as Ego, and had attributed to it, this potentiation of the monad of Leibnitz, a negative relation to nature as the mere limit of the Ego. Hegel, who in the First Part treats spirit in its natural character, expressly declares at the conclusion of the same, that now we step beyond the limits of Spinozism; just so he declares that in the Second Part (Phenomenology of Consciousness) we find ourselves wholly in the Fichtean standpoint, since here spirit is considered only as it is—Ego distinguishing itself from nature. Just as in the *Logic*, so also here, there is in addition to these two parts a third part (psychology), which shows that the negative position which spirit as Ego assumes towards objectivity, is also not the highest, but that this presents it as it is when again in alliance with objectivity, reconciled to it, and has thereby attained to true freedom, which is the essence of spirit (even the subjective); partly because it, as knowledge, finds itself in it, partly because it, as volition, enters into it and fills it with itself; hence as the synthesis of that which the Anthropology and Phenomenology had presented.

6. The same mediating and reconciliatory position towards his predecessors is taken by Hegel in his *Ethics*, or, as he terms it, the *Doctrine of Objective Spirit*. Pantheism, the metaphysics of which reaches the result that the individual creature is a nullity, must, as the example of all consistent pantheists proves, come, in ethics, to the sacrificing of the subject to the whole. Such is the case with Spinoza in his theory of the State, which recalls Hobbes; such is the case with Schelling in his omnipotence of the Executive, and his fanatical enthusiasm for the imperial despot. Fichte, on the contrary, like the whole eighteenth century, gave to the subject the highest place, but in doing so his exaltation of the individual bordered on Jacobinism; and in his ethics conscience occupies the highest place. Hegel, retaining Kant's separation of the legal and the moral, assumes a sphere in which the individual subject is entirely subject to ethical powers, which is the sphere of *Right*, which pitilessly neglects to inquire after the individual person. Nevertheless, he himself does not mean, in this sphere, that right be conceived

as a limitation of freedom. Rather is it the reality of that: what *is* limited by right is only arbitrary will. But just so he shows that *morality* has for its highest principle conscience, this subjective power in which the good is united with the possibility of evil, and which Hegel could treat the more briefly in his *Philosophy of the State*, since the inner dialectic of this principle had been so fully treated in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. As to the assumption of a sphere above these two, which had been separated by Kant, a hint had really been given by Kant himself, which suggests even the name to be chosen for it,—the Doctrine of Right and Virtue. Later, Kant prefixed a common title, and called them together *Metaphysics of Morals*. Instead of a mere title, we have in Hegel an integral, with him the leading, chapter of Ethics, the Doctrine of Social Morality, which (upon the basis of such expressions as *moral certainty*, etc.) he distinguished from individual morality in such a way that the latter is made to rest only upon a subjective obligation. Here, now, are treated only such ethical institutions as suffer equally much if they are regarded merely as legal and if they are regarded as only moral, the Family, Civil Society, and the State; hence what Schleiermacher had called Goods (§ 315, 8). In all these communities there is shown to be rationality, *i.e.*, justification or ethical necessity; so that, therefore, they do not need another, *e.g.*, a religious, sanction; for religion, since in general it had not thus far appeared in his system, can, wherever it is in question, be considered only by a digression. It was above remarked that Hegel in his treatise on Natural Right places in the forefront the conception of ethical organisms, after the manner of the ancients. When his *Philosophy of the State* appeared, the subjective view of Natural Right greatly prevailed; and although Hegel himself now conceded much more than formerly to the right of subjectivity, his theories are, nevertheless, too much in contrast with what was taught by the school of Fries, and by other schools, not to have been decried as inimical to freedom. Even among its readers of to-day many will find too old-fashioned his declaring it a more ethical initiation of marriage if the parents' than one's own inclination makes the choice; not liberal enough his defending corporations and guilds, or his requiring that those who constitute the authority in communities, and not chosen representatives, should represent them in the chambers, etc., Here

Hegel deviates from the true position, just as much perhaps on the one side, as Krause does on the other. Of all ethical organizations, that which is treated with most exactness is the State, in which the family and the community have their truth, hence also their ground. As a youth Hegel had shared the revolutionary views of Rousseau and Fichte; then came a time later when he, like Schelling, could characterize the Emperor as "the world-soul." He advanced beyond both, and the period of restoration, of which his first lecture delivered in Heidelberg almost serves as a schedule, appeared to him as the highest approximation to the Idea of the State that had as yet been attained; because here the sovereignty of the State, actualized in the yet living Monarch, appeared reconciled with the privilege of the individual citizen, who obeys laws the grounds of which he perceives and approves. Whether this takes place formally through conference, or materially by voluntary observance, makes no essential difference. That Hegel regards the *Philosophy of History* as a part of the theory of objective spirit has its reason in the fact that he, like Kant, regards the history of the world as primarily only the development of the rational State. So long as it is nothing more than this, to treat of it in the *Philosophy of the State* as an appendix to the theory of the State, is entirely proper. But in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, which were published from students' lecture-notes (Wks., xi.), Hegel has introduced in the account of the Judgment which is passed regarding nations, and in which the lesser freedom must make place for the higher, so that the world-historic sceptre passes from one people to another, so much that does not concern the essence of the State, and so much, too, not only that could, since it appears again later (in the *Æsthetics* and the *Philosophy of Religion*), properly have been omitted, but anthropological and psychological matter, without which the history of the world is not to be comprehended—that one cannot avoid the thought that he would have done better to separate the Philosophy of History from the Ethics, and to have added it to Psychology and Ethics as the Third Part of the doctrine of the Finite Spirit. In the presentation of history, Hegel fuses the anthropological view (of Herder), according to which humanity passes through the four periods of life, with the political view (Kantian), that humanity passes from the condition in which only one is free to that in which

all are, and thus gives an account of the four kingdoms of the world—the (Oriental) despotism, the (Grecian and Roman) republic, and (Germanic) freedom, the political form of which is monarchy.

7. Hegel, precisely as Schelling, knows that the restless praxis which rules in the ethical sphere, and allows of no attainment of the goal, cannot, as Fichte had supposed, be the highest, but that there must be a sphere in which passion, without which nothing whatever can be accomplished, must cease, and where the subject does not yield to the course of circumstances in cold resignation, but Psyche washes from her wings the dust gathered there in disagreeable labour. This sphere is that in which the subject knows itself as reconciled with the universal powers, natural as well as spiritual; and which, because the subject is delivered from fear, just as those powers are from their wrath, displays the *absolute Spirit*, a term by which is meant, therefore, a relation of spirit to spirit, or spirit that is reconciled with spirit. Such absoluteness, now, Schelling rightly saw in the enjoyment of art, and Hegel therefore treats, in the *Lectures on Æsthetics* (Wks., x. pp. 1, 2, 3) of Art as the first manifestation of enjoyed harmony, *i.e.*, of the absolute Spirit. The work of art as the representative of the beautiful displays the absolute in sensuous existence, the Idea as existing, and is an appeal to the responsive breast, a summons to the mind, to which it affords not only theoretical knowledge, not only practical satisfaction, but raises it above both forms of finitude to the highest enjoyment. This the work of art does, as well where it represents symbolical (oriental, sublime) beauty, as where it represents classical (real) beauty, and, finally, where it represents romantic (spiritual, modern) beauty. The various forms of Art embody themselves in the individual arts; so that within each there are again repeated the three forms, the—even in order of time—first, symbolic art, architecture appearing as symbolic in the monument, as classical in the house of God, the temple, as romantic in the dome or house of the people, etc. The romantic arts, music and painting, present between them the relation of the symbolical (architecture) and classical (sculpture), and repeat themselves in the art *par excellence*, which is the totality of art, and hence appears everywhere—poetry; which, being pictorial in the epic, musical in lyric poetry, reaches perfection in the drama, although at the same time it points to a higher sphere.

8. This sphere, to which Hegel, therefore, otherwise than did Schelling in the period of their association, assigns a position above art, is religion, and the *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (Wks., xi. xii.) so connect themselves with those on Æsthetics that they show first that it is necessary to pass over to a higher form of consciousness, in which the sensuous element has given place to the inward life of the emotional nature; what art revealed in external sensuousness (annulled dissonance), exists as inner presence in thought and inwardness of sensation. As is required by the term *Philosophy of Religion*, which is formed similarly to the terms *Philosophy of Right*, and *Philosophy of Art*, Hegel designates as its object, Religion, *i.e.* not God (alone), but the existence of God for the religious consciousness. This last means with him absolute spirit, of which, therefore, God is only the one side. Hence the proposition so much decried, The Absolute Spirit requires the finite spirit, is perhaps a triviality, but certainly is no heresy. This being for consciousness, or self-revelation, belongs to the essence of God, as shining does to the light: He is this *actus*; and the *Philosophy of Religion*, therefore, treats God not as a spirit beyond the stars, but as the spirit in all spirits, in the depths of which, consequently, the ground of religion and its development must be found. This is done in the *Philosophy of Religion* as follows. In the *First Part* of it, the conception of religion is determined. Since religion is consciousness, but in consciousness are to be distinguished the known and the knowing, the former is first considered, *i.e.*, God, and it is shown that the first essential element in this conception is that which, regarded as absolute, leads to Spinozism, but beyond which it is necessary to pass to the religious relation, *i.e.*, to the distinction of God from human consciousness, and from its being as related to God. Here, now, the various forms of the religious consciousness, feeling, intuition, presentation are treated *in extenso*, and it is shown of the last that by its contradictions it contains a reference to religious knowledge, the subordinate forms of which, the immediate and the demonstrative, are sublated in the highest, speculative knowledge, in which religion is perceived as knowledge had by the Divine Spirit of itself through the mediation of the finite spirit. At this point is taken up the investigation of Cultus, as the practical carrying out of the religious relation, and of self-union with God.

Therein is contained a double self-surrender, grace from one side, sacrifice from the other, which are united, in that God dwells in the self-renouncing self-consciousness. Hence the culminating point of the cultus is constant self-surrender to the moral community, *i.e.*, the life in the State, the relation of which to religion can be discussed here for the first time. To the *Second Part* of the *Philosophy of Religion* Hegel has given the superscription, Definite Religion. As the First Part had treated of the essence or conception of religion, so this Part treats of it as phenomenon, or, as it objectifies itself, *i.e.*, as it gradually approximates the complete realization of its conception. Hegel cannot call this Part, Philosophy of Mythology, as Schelling later calls it, because he treats also of the forms of religious consciousness which do not take cognizance of myths and are not regarded by Schelling as religion, and, again, such as no longer have myths. The first characterization is true of the lowest of religions, which Hegel treats under the heading Natural Religion, the religion of magic, in which the individual man mastered by his desire comes in the moment of need to feel himself to be and act as if he were absolute power itself. Schelling will concede religion to neither the savage peoples nor the Chinese, whom Hegel here treats of. The second characterization finds application in the Jewish religion, which, as the religion of sublimity, Hegel treats of before the (Grecian) religion of beauty and the (Roman) religion of conformity to end; of course in such a manner that in the transition to the Christian religion he refers back to it. The *Third Part*, entitled Absolute Religion, treats of religion in that form which in its manifestation has become adequate to its essence, its objectivity to its conception, hence the real or true (ideal) religion. Since in this religion the essence of religion, the reconciliation of God and man, forms the real content, itself becomes known, it is the revealed religion; whereas the fact that it is the revealed religion, *i.e.*, comes into consciousness as something positive, appears as that which is unessential, since it is not to remain positive but to become changed, by the witness of the Spirit, into something rational. (These propositions may be compared with what Schleiermacher [§ 315, 6] and Lessing [§ 294, 16] have said.) This religion of truth and freedom appears in the Christian. Corresponding to the three *momenta* which Hegel's *Logic* distinguishes in the Conception (universal, par-

ticular, individual), the process of investigation here takes such a form that, in the first place, God is considered in His eternal Idea and for Himself; and, then, it is shown that reason is contained in that form of consciousness in which the religious consciousness conceives God, not as a mere object but as the process of self-distinction and the sublation of the distinction, as which God is called love or holy trinity, makes himself objectivity, and thereby knows himself. Here absolute religion is extolled on the ground that it is not satisfied with merely superficial distinctions, but allows these distinctions to deepen into separate persons, not, of course, mutually exclusive, but (as in the love of the family) sinking into one another. But further, and, in the second place, the Idea is known in the element of consciousness and presentation, *i.e.*, as it appears in the character of finitude. Inasmuch as the other, which, in God and being held by unity is the Son, enters into real separation from and disunion with God, it becomes a reality outside of and without God, is discharged from God as an independent and free being. It is the world of the finite, which is therefore not the same with the Eternal Son of God, as He is not the same with it. What was one in God, appears, with the separation from God, as the duality of nature and the finite spirit, to which latter the former, which is only a passing moment, a gleam of lightning, something relative and null, appears extended as a spatial, sensible world, which of itself has no relation to God, but is only brought into such a relation by man, inasmuch as he has in nature the means whereby, both where he sees in it a means of the revelation of God, and where he transcends it (particularly his own natural man), to raise himself to God. If he does not do this, if he allows nature to rule in himself and remains the natural man, he is evil. Since this consists in self-seeking, which is not possible without knowledge, apprehension (knowledge) is really the forbidden fruit; obviously it is also alone that which makes man capable of raising himself above his mere being-for-self, a two-sidedness which that mythical account which narrates of the first man what is true of man in general, recognises when it represents the eating of that fruit as counselled by the tempter, but the progress thereby made as acknowledged by God. The real union is in that consciousness of reconciliation which is as far removed from abstract humility as from abstract self-conceit,

a reconciliation that is for the subject primarily a presupposition, hence is presented to him as accomplished. To all, without distinction of character, it, like everything else, is accessible only when it exists as a something perceptible to the senses; thus it is this one God-man, whose history (not whose theory, for this by the later communion has been, in part, modified and, in part, set aside) exhibits the reconciliation between God and man as real. Then the death of this one displays the transition to that status in which the reconciliation which has become certain in him has universal spiritual presence. Such it is to be considered, in the third place; *i.e.*, the Idea is to be considered in the element of the communion. (This section also bears such relation to the two first, which considered the sovereignty of the Father and the Son, that in it the sovereignty of the Spirit is discussed.) Inasmuch as the reconciliation no longer exists as external, but has become inward, the true return of Christ has come to pass, the Comforter has come. The individual soul has thereby acquired the character of being a citizen in the Kingdom of God, a character that does not correspond to the present, and hence is conceived at the same time as future also, so that immortality becomes a settled doctrine in the Christian religion. The communion arises by the fact that what had appeared in Christ is changed into what is spiritual, in which, although the sensible forms the beginning-point, there is contained a negative relation to the former. The external attestation afforded by the transcendence of spirit over nature, where faith heals cripples, gives place to the more essential one afforded by the testimony of the spirit, to faith which consists in the circumstance that the spirit which exists in the individual consciousness constantly accumulates itself out of it; out of the ferment of the finite the spirit is exhaled, which is real in the communion and searches the depths of the Godhead. The Church, the reality of the communion, exists through the theory of faith. This has its origin in the Church through the instrumentality of science, and is promulgated by a class of teachers, and embraces, through baptism, even the child, which, now, finds already prepared for it reconciliation as well as speech, morals, etc., and has by living to learn the meaning of it. The heart of life in the Church is sacrifice; hence the Sacrament, which is recognised in its truth only in the Lutheran conception of it. But the

Church is further realized in such a manner that it permeates the whole Ethical World, the forms of which now become divine institutions, permeated by religion. At the same time religion enters into relation with thought. The negative relation between the two produces, on the one side, the "enlightened" Deism which is scarcely to be distinguished from Islamism; on the other, Pietism, which reduces the Church to atoms. In philosophy, which opposes both, and (which it is the merit of the Schoolmen to have attempted) sees in the essential dogmas of the Christian Church—trinity, incarnation, etc.—a rational content, orthodoxy has now taken refuge. But those who profess it form but a handful, and it is left to the rest who find themselves in that state of division to determine how they will find their way out of it.

9. As the *Æsthetics* closed with a reference to religion, so the *Philosophy of Religion* closes with noting that religion leads to a division in thought, which *Philosophy* alone is able to resolve. It, or Science, forms, therefore, the third and highest form in which the absolute spirit exists. (This is only an apparent deviation from Schelling, to whom philosophy and science were not the same, but the former was just as much art and virtue [religion] as knowledge.) It is with explicable sarcasm that Hegel was accustomed to mention those who, when the exposition had reached this point, supposed that now for the first time (as if in a philosophy of philosophy) that which was peculiar and distinctive had been reached. Rather has everything already been treated, and it only remains to complete by a survey of it the circle of the system, so that its presentation becomes an *Encyclopædia*. If, that is to say, religion fallen into discord with thought (as, for the rest, the *Phenomenology of Spirit* had already shown) leads to speculative, free thought, but logic had begun with the determination to realize such thought, then the end of the *Philosophy of Religion* coincides with the beginning of the *Logic*, and the requirement laid down by Fichte that the system be a circle is fulfilled. If we survey it as a whole, it appears that in the *Logic* the Idea (Reason) is considered as it is in and for itself; in the *Philosophy of Nature* it is considered in its external, from itself self-alienated, existence; finally, in the various parts of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, both in the theory of the finite spirit and in that of the absolute spirit, reason (Idea) is exhibited in the various forms

of its freedom, of which the highest is that in which it frees itself from all division, is reconciled and knows itself to be free. Since it is everywhere the absolute Idea which has been considered, the system is Absolute Idealism; since absolute Idea and reason are the same, we have called it Panlogism. But philosophy is not given merely with the knowledge of its organic character, but presupposes also a knowledge of how it came by this; hence in the system of Hegel the *History of Philosophy*, since in it philosophy is comprehended and reason is exhibited in the course of its development, becomes an integrant part of philosophy. It brings together beginning and end in so far as it is shown that what the present age possesses as self-conscious rationality results from the labour of all preceding generations, inasmuch as what each of these expressed as its world-view and wisdom is preserved, and is contained demonstrably, in the philosophy of the present, *i.e.*, the thought-comprehension of the substance of our age. Hegel boasts that in his *Logic* no category has been overlooked which any philosophy has ever declared to be the highest. (He has even supposed that he could point out in the order of time in which they prevailed the same succession as his *Logic* follows,—a thing that he soon abandoned.) Here, as in his *Phenomenology*, Hegel defines the relation of philosophy to other forms of spiritual activity as follows: it first makes its appearance where a breach with actuality has taken place, where a certain form of life has become old; it paints grey in grey, and finds in the ideal sphere the reconciliation which is no longer presented in actuality. Particularly with religion, it enters first into a relation of harmony, then into one of opposition, and at last into that in which philosophy does full justice to the content of religion, as does the philosophy of the present age, which originated within Christianity. Since Hegel's treatment of the *History of Philosophy* became known to the world only through his lectures (Wks., xiii., xiv., xv.), which were gathered from students' lecture-notes of various periods, it shows a great want of proportion as regards completeness. *Greek Philosophy*, from Thales to the Neo-Platonists, extends into the third volume, the *Medieval Period* is run through with "seven-league boots," *Modern Philosophy* occupies, it is true, a much greater number of pages, but is the most hastily treated part. In the period of the latest German philosophy,

Jacobi's merit is stated to lie in the fact that he has revived Spinoza, of whom Hegel had said in the preceding period, Either Spinoza, or no philosophy; but also, it is true, that Leibnitz's principle of individuation remedies a defect of Spinozism, and hence makes it whole. Fichte, as the perfecter of the subjective in Kant's philosophy, and Schelling as opposed to him, are characterized as the latest philosophers. The fact that the latter's Doctrine of Freedom is always placed among the earlier works, as if it were in entire agreement with them, proves that Hegel always understood Schelling in the sense of his later works; hence also the saying, Schelling has united the subjectivity of Fichte with the substantiality of Spinoza. What he misses in Schelling is logical foundation and dialectical development. The result is stated thus: Our standpoint is the apprehension of the Idea, the knowledge of the Idea as spirit, as absolute spirit, which is thus opposed to another spirit, the finite, and the principle of this spirit is to apprehend; so that, the Absolute Spirit comes to be spirit for the finite in a series of forms which is the true kingdom of spirits; a series which is not a plurality of isolated units, but constitutes the moments in the One, the present spirit, the pulse-beats of which that plurality proves to be.

10. To the fortunate position of the harvester which was above (§ 328) assigned to Hegel, the good-fortune was also added that, just as the first steps of those who intended to carry him out were heard before the door, and the first signs indicated that even upon the basis laid by him dispute was possible, he died. He lived to see the culmination of his doctrine, and the existence of a completely formed School, which in the *Berliner Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik*, called into life by him, as well as in their own works, sought to maintain the principles of his philosophy in the most varied spheres. Among those whose activity Hegel still lived to witness are to be mentioned, of the Jena period, GEORG ANDREAS GABLER (born July 30th, 1786, in Altdorf; Hegel's successor, after 1835, in Berlin; died in Teplitz in the year 1853), who in his *Text-Book of Philosophical Propædæutic*, Erlangen, 1827, has set forth in a clear light the points of *Hegel's Phenomenology* which could be of service for introduction to philosophical study. In Heidelberg there was an enthusiastic pupil of Hegel, HERMANN FRIEDRICH WILHELM HINRICHS (born in 1794, in Karlseck, in the Duchy of Oldenburg;

originally a jurist; in 1822 professor of philosophy in Breslau, after 1824 in Halle; died Sept. 17th, 1861, in Friedrichsrode in Thuringia), whose *Religion in its Inner Relation to Science* (1822) Hegel introduced with a preface which occasioned a sensation by a bitter attack on Schleiermacher, and who in the year 1825 published his *Lectures on Goethe's Faust* (delivered in Halle), in which what is admirable has been overlooked because of its bombastic style and of certain particulars. To the *Outlines of the Philosophy of Logic* (1826) is also to be added the *Genesis of Knowledge* (1835), which appeared, of course, after Hegel's death. The later works of Hinrichs, in which he attempts to write in a more readable style and for a larger public, viz., *Schiller's Poems* (1837), *Political Lectures* (1844), have much less scientific value than the *History of the Philosophy of Right and the State* (1848-52), which obviously is more a collection of materials for a book than a book. In the year 1852 appeared his *Kings* (an attempt to present the various forms of the kingdoms that have appeared in history, as moments of the complete modern kingdom), and his *Life in Nature*. He was labouring on a great work on the History of the Earth when death removed him. In Berlin, there was one of the first to ally himself with Hegel, LEOPOLD VON HENNING, who published in 1824 a little book, *Principles of Ethics*; at the same time he contributed much, as *Docent* and as editor of the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, to the spreading of Hegel's doctrine. Later he passed over entirely to the political sciences, and died as ordinary professor in the University of Berlin in the year 1866. Also KARL LUDWIG MICHELET (born in Berlin on the 4th of Dec., 1801; after 1829 extraordinary professor of philosophy in Berlin) was originally a jurist, but early went over entirely to philosophy, in which he was active, first in the sphere of Ethics, as is proved by his *Ethics of Aristotle* (1827), and his *System of Morals* (1828). He gave, even in the life-time of Hegel, lectures on the most modern philosophy, out of which originated his work to be mentioned later. HEINRICH GUSTAV HOTH (born in Berlin May 22nd, 1802; died as professor there, Dec. 24th, 1873), likewise originally a jurist, passed, under Hegel's guidance, over to philosophical and particularly æsthetic studies, the fruits of which he first embodied in a romance (*The Unknown*) which was printed only for a few friends, until they later appeared entirely recast in his *Preliminary Studies to Art*

and Life (Stuttgart, 1835). *The History of Painting in Germany and the Netherlands* (2 vols., Berlin, 1842-43), as also the *School of Painting of Hubert Van Eyk*, besides *German Predecessors and Contemporaries* (2 vols., 1855-58), belong to a later period. His reviews in the *Berliner Jahrbücher* are justly very highly valued. Another writer on æsthetics of the Hegelian School is HEINRICH THEODOR RÖTSCHER, who first attracted attention by his work cited in § 13, note 9, and § 60 lit., and gave occasion for attacks upon Hegel relative to the standpoint of Socrates, but later devoted himself entirely to æsthetics, particularly to dramaturgic works. Somewhat older than the last-named was EDUARD GANS (born March 22nd, 1798), who, after having studied law in Göttingen and Heidelberg, and in the latter learned to know Hegel, allied himself closely with him in Berlin, where he taught after 1820. After 1825 he was ordinary professor of law, a post which he retained until his death, May 5th, 1839. He effected more for the spread of Hegel's ideas by his brilliant productions, and by the founding of the *Berliner Jahrbücher*, in which he had a larger share than any other, than he did by his *Right of Inheritance in its Historical Development* (4 vols., 1825-1835). His lectures on the *History of the last Fifteen Years*, in Raumer's Historical Memorandum Book (1833-34), already touch upon the points in which he had come to differ from Hegel. Connected with him are SALING (*Justice in its Historical Development*, 1827), and SIETZE (*Fundamental Conception of the History of the Prussian State and Right*, 1825). In the relation not of pupils but of friends of Hegel stand the two men who first applied his ideas to theology, Daub and Marheineke. CARL DAUB (March 20th, 1765 to Nov. 22nd, 1836), the founder of Protestant speculative theology, occasioned the call of Hegel to Heidelberg, and when the latter went to Berlin, remained his truest, most appreciative friend. Of his (unfortunately bombastically written) works it is particularly his *Judas Iscariot* (1816-18), his *Treatise on the Logos*, as also *The Dogmatic Theology of the Present Age* (both in 1833), that make it intelligible that Hegel could entrust to him with such confidence the office of correcting and revising for the press the *Encyclopædia* in its second edition. The lectures that were published after his death make still more apparent his agreement with Hegel. PHILIPP CONRAD MARHEINEKE

(May 1st, 1780 to May 31st, 1846) showed in the second, entirely revised, edition of his *Dogmatics* (1827) how thoroughly he had studied the system of his friendly colleague, and by his lectures led many theologians to Hegel. More decisive, almost, as regards the position of Hegel's system with reference to theology, than the works of these two men, whose method of presentation did not facilitate comprehension, was a non-theologian, CARL FRIEDRICH GÖSCHEL (born Oct. 7th, 1781, in Langensalza, for a long time counsellor of the provincial court in Naumburg, later, as president of the Consistory, partly in Berlin, living partly in Magdeburg, died on the 22nd of Sept., 1861, in Naumburg), who, in an anonymous work, very highly esteemed by Daub (*On Goethe's Faust and its Continuation*, Leipsic, 1824), had already shown his acquaintance with Hegel's works, published in the year 1829 his work, signed only by his initials, *Aphorisms on Non-Knowledge and Absolute Knowledge*, which Hegel welcomed with a "grateful pressure of the hand," and from which he borrowed literally certain statements to insert in his Encyclopædia as his own. Göschel at the same time applied the principle of this philosophy to legal subjects, as appears from his *Scattered Leaves* (3 vols., 1832-42). His later works will be discussed further below. Also the first works of JOHANN KARL FRIEDRICH ROSENKRANZ (born on the 23rd of April, 1805; after 1833 professor of philosophy in Königsberg), who was attracted to Berlin by both Schleiermacher and Hegel, but who gradually allied himself wholly with the latter, appeared during Hegel's life. There were, not only the smaller literary historical works, and the *History of German Poetry in the Middle Ages* (1830), with which connect themselves, later, the *Handbook of a Universal History of Poetry*, but also his admirable review of *Schleiermacher's Theory of Faith*, and his *Encyclopædia of the Theological Sciences* (1831). An almost idolatrous follower of Hegel, at first, was JOHANN GEORG MUSSMAN, who died as professor in Halle, after the earlier slavish dependence had given place to just as morbid a cavilling with the theory of the master. His *Text-Book of the Science of the Soul* (1827), as also his *Outlines of the Universal History of Philosophy* (1830), present the first applications of Hegelian principles to Psychology and the History of Philosophy, upon which first at a later period other and better ones based themselves. That the greatest physiologist of our century, JOHANNES

MÜLLER (July 14th, 1801 to April 28th, 1858) had, while studying in Berlin, listened to Hegel's lectures not merely out of a calculating worldly prudence, is best proved by his clever *Outlines of Lectures on Physiology* (Bonn, 1827), which the Hegelians, who appear to lay great stress upon including many names in the School, are wont to pass over, whereas they count among their number Schultz-Schultzenstein, who might never have reckoned himself with them. Even when Müller had entered upon an entirely different path, he showed himself to be philosophically well-trained by the fact that he preferred not to raise questions that can be answered, if at all, only by philosophy, rather than to try them by the retort or the microscope.

§ 330.

CONCLUDING REMARK.

1. In my work, here mentioned for the last time: *Entwickelung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant*, the criticisms, which follow the order of presentation of the individual disciplines (Criticism of the Logic § 48, 7; of the Philosophy of Nature § 49, 6; of Psychology § 50, 8; Ethics § 51, 5; Æsthetics, Philosophy of Religion, and History of Philosophy, § 52, 3, 5, 7) have given the objections which, according to Hegel's own premises, can be made to his system. They appeared to me, and appear to-day even, not to be of a kind to make it a duty really to abandon the system. The agreement, that appears upon a review of the six Divisions in which the third period of modern philosophy is here treated, with the result there (§ 53) given, need not therefore cause surprise. In the *first*, the three problems of modern philosophy were stated (§ 296), and it was shown how Kant had begun the solution of them all (§ 298-302). In the *second* (§ 306-308), it was shown how the first of the problems apparently solved in Kant was presented by Reinhold and his opponents *de novo* for solution. In the *third* and *fourth* divisions, it was shown that Fichte (§§ 310-313) and Schelling (§§ 317, 318) succeeded even better with this solution, and in such a way, indeed, that the Science of Knowledge and the System of Identity, by their opposition, brought forward the second problem that was to be solved. Further, in the *fifth* division (321-323),

among those who not only rejected, like Herbart and Schopenhauer, those two one-sided systems, but sought also to reconcile them, appeared Schelling, who had meanwhile become a theosophist; so that in his person alternated the two world-views, the reconciliation of which had been the third problem of modern philosophy, and which, as the *sixth* division (§§ 324-328) proved, had meantime, in Oken and Baader entered into the most complete opposition to one another. The course which the latest philosophy has passed over, and the reason why the title of Concluding Systems, was given to its last division, may be represented to the eye in a table; regarding which it should be remarked that the sign =, is intended to indicate combination, the sign ||, on the contrary, opposition, and that the §§ mentioned refer to the present *Outlines*:

| | | | |
|--|--------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| <p>I. Realism = Idealism. <i>i.e.,</i> Locke and Hume = Leibnitz and Berkeley. §§ 280-282 = §§ 288 and 291.</p> | <p>Kant, §§ 298-302.</p> | <p>Critico-Realistic Dogmatism. Critico-Sceptical Idealism. <i>i.e.,</i> Reinhold. Maimon and Beck. § 307. § 308.</p> | <p>(Krause, § 327.)</p> |
| <p>II. Idealism = Pantheism. <i>i.e.,</i> Eighteenth Century } = { Seventeenth Century. §§ 274-294 = §§ 264-273.</p> | | <p>Critical Individualism. Critical Pantheism. <i>i.e.,</i> Science of Knowledge. System of Identity. §§ 311-313. § 318.</p> | <p>Hegel, § 329.</p> |
| <p>III. Cosmosophy = Theosophy. <i>i.e.,</i> Antiquity = Middle Ages. §§ 15-115 = §§ 116-256.</p> | | <p>Modern Naturalism. Modern Theosophy. <i>i.e.,</i> Oken. Baader. § 325, 2, 3. § 325, 5-9.</p> | |

2. Krause's assertion that his theory may be designated by all the names of schools hitherto in use; or, Hegel's, which comes to the same thing, that his system has taken up into itself all earlier systems, has been, as regards the latter, really confirmed even by opponents of the system, if one takes them altogether. There is scarcely a standpoint that would not

have been given out as the Hegelian, by those occupying some other. (Confused heads have employed, at one and the same time, very inconsistent terms of abuse, and have talked of atheistic pantheism, *i.e.*, wooden iron). Pupils and adherents of course assent to that saying of their master, and the above-given table is designed to afford, in a synoptical manner, a basis for such assent. But therewith is also justified, what was pointed out at the very beginning of these *Outlines* (§ 10) to be inevitable, that this exposition carries the colours precisely of the Hegelian school, inasmuch as every transition from one system to another has been regarded as necessary, so soon as there appeared developed or realized in a following system what the earlier had been in itself, or really,—a presupposition that coincides with the acceptance of what Hegel calls the dialectical method. But, conversely, the attainment of the point aimed at justifies the historian, who so regards it, in laying aside his pen, if indeed it does not oblige him to do so. If, in spite of the fact that regard for my own convenience counsels the opposite, this is not done, and there is here really attempted what the preface to the last volume of my larger work held in prospect in the year 1853, namely, an account of the movements in the sphere of philosophy since Hegel's death, it is prompted by the conviction that if, from the ferment in which philosophy has been since that time there is to result a clear and invigorating beverage, the clarification must begin at a certain point. To contribute to such a clarification by showing, at least in one point, that apparently quite different tendencies may yet move in one and the same direction, is the aim of the immediately following §§, which, because they neither rest upon a complete investigation of a daily-increasing material, nor—what is the most important and the permanent element in a work—can be so positive in their statements as is possible where one reads history backwards, will not be included, in a continuous series, with the foregoing development, but joined to it as an Appendix.

INDEX TO VOLUME SECOND.

The larger numbers refer to the sections (§§), the smaller to the paragraphs. The asterisks indicate the chief sections and paragraphs. Vol. III. contains an index to the entire work.

A.

Abbt 294, 11.
 Abicht 303, 3.
 Aepinus 317, 1.
 Ainsworth 281, 5.
 Albertus Magnus, 289, 3.
 d'Alembert 285, 3*. 4. 293, 6.
 Amelot 290, 12.
 Anaxagoras 301, 6. 302, 6.
 Anaximander 325, 4.
 Ancillon 304, 9.
 Andala 268, 2.
 André 270, 8.
 Andreae 268, 2. 4.
 Anne of England, 288, 1.
 Annet 285, 1.
 Anselm 315, 14.
 Anton, Ulrich 288.
 d'Argens 294, 2. 10.
 Aristotle 267, 2. 5. 270, 7. 272, 2. 3.
 282, 9. 290, 8. 9. 14. 294, 6. 296, 4.
 298, 1. 303, 4. 305, 13. 307, 6.
 308, 6. 325, 6. 326, 4.
 Arnauld 267, 3. 268, 1. 8. 270, 1. 2.
 288, 1. 2.
 Arnold, G. 293, 3.
 Arouet, *v.* Voltaire.
 Ast 319, 2*.
 Auerswald 303 Lit.
 Augustine 268, 1. 302, 1. 6.
 Autenrieth 319, 2.
 Avenarius 272, 1.
 Averroës 264. 272, 2. 3. 288, 3.
 303, 2.

B.

Baader 302, 4. 315, 2. 319, 5. 6.
 323, 1. 325, 1. 4. 5-8*. 326, 1. 2.
 327. 328. 329, 4. 330, 1.

Bachmann 329, 1.
 Bacon, Francis 277, 2. 282, 3. 285,
 1. 2. 5. 290, 14. 294, 11. 15.
 Bähr 321, 9.
 Bahrdt, 293, 1. 5.* 7.
 Barach 277, 3 Lit.
 La Barde 268, 3.
 Bardili 307, 1*. 314, 2.
 Barni 303, 5.
 Bartholmess 277, 4 Lit. 294, 1 Lit.
 Basedow 294, 7*. 8. 294, 15. 300, 10.
 Basnage 289, 5.
 Bauer, Bruno 293 Lit.
 Baumeister 290, 2. 297, 1.
 Baumgarten, A. 290, 10*. 11. 19. 291,
 1. 292, 2. 293, 4. 9. 294, 8. 10. 11.
 297, 1. 300, 11. 301, 2.
 Baumgarten, S. 272, 19. 293 4. 5*.
 294, 11.
 Bayle 267, 5. 277, 3*. 281, 2. 284.
 2. 285, 2. 286, 1. 2. 288, 2. 7. 8,
 289, 5. 293, 6. 294, 14. 16.
 Beattie 292, 4.
 Beauvais, Vincent of 272, 5.
 Becher 288, 5.
 Beck 299, 5. 300, 3. 303, 6. 308,
 7-10*. 309, 2. 311, 2. 314, 1.
 318, 1. 319, 1. 320, 3. 330, 1.
 Beckers 317, 3.
 Beeckmann 266.
 Béguelin 294, 4.
 Bekker, Balth. 268, 2.
 Beneke 292, 311, 1.
 Benson 291, 2 Lit.
 Bentley 285, 1.
 Berengar of Tours 294, 5. 12. 13.
 Berg, Fr. 319, 1.
 v. Berger 322, 1. 2*. 4. 7. 323, 4. 324.
 Bergmann 288, 1 Lit.

Berkeley 282, 3. 283, 3. 6. 286, 3.
 291, 2. 4-7*. 292, 1. 4. 7. 294, 3.
 6. 16. 296, 4. 298, 5. 299, 6. 7.
 303, 2. 308, 8. 11. 309, 1. 310, 3.
 312, 2. 315, 1. 321, 2. 330, 1.
 Bernhards 311, 1.
 Bernoulli 294, 4.
 Berthold-G. 285, 1. Lit.
 Berulle 268, 3. 270, 1.
 Biedermann 293 Lit.
 Biester 294, 10. 11.
 Bilfinger 290, 9. 10.
 Blasche 325, 4.
 Blumenbach 317, 1.
 Boccaccio 294, 15.
 Bodin 280, 7.
 Bodmer 294, 4.
 Böhme, Jacob 268, 1. 293, 3. 319,
 2. 323, 1. 3. 324. 325, 5. 6. 7. 8.
 Böhmer 272, 1 Lit. 6.
 Böttger 289, 2.
 Boineburg 288, 1. 289, 3.
 Bolingbroke 285, 1. 2.
 Bolzano 305, 12-14*. 15.
 Bonaparte 314, 4. 317, 4.
 Bonnet 283, 5-8*. 297, 7. 294, 4.
 8. 11. 14. 15. 298, 2. 3. 304, 4.
 Borelli 268, 5.
 Born 303, 3.
 Bornträger 303, 3.
 van Bosch 303, 5.
 de Bosses 288, 2.
 Bossuet 268, 3.
 Bouillier 266 Lit.
 Bourdin 266. 268, 1.
 Bouterweck 305, 1. 2*. 314, 1. 319, 1.
 Braniss 315, 10 Lit.
 Brastberger 303, 3.
 Bredenberg 272, 13.
 Breithaupt 290, 10.
 Breitinger 294, 4.
 Brenneisen 289, 5.
 Brinkmann 294, 11.
 Brown, Peter 283, 2*. 291, 5.
 Brown, Thomas 292, 5.
 Brucker 290, 1. 2. 293, 4.
 Bruno, Giordano 264. 272, 1. 288,
 2. 304, 3. 325.
 Buckle 282, 9.
 Buddeus 289, 5. 290, 12. 293, 3.
 Büttner 290, 3.
 Buffier 268, 3.

Buffon 285, 4*. 5.
 Bufolini 283, 10.
 Burdach 319, 2.
 Burggraf, 290.
 de Burgh 272, 1.
 Buridanus 288, 6.
 Burke 303, 2.

C.

Cabanis 286, 4*.
 Cagliostro 234, 10.
 Caird 303, 5 Lit.
 Calderon 318, 5.
 v. Calker 305, 7.
 Caloprese 268, 5.
 Camerer 272, 4 Lit.
 Campanella 288, 2.
 Campe 293, 7.
 Cardanus 294, 16.
 Carpov 290, 9. 14.
 Carpoz 289, 5.
 Carus 292; 7 Lit.
 Cassini 294, 3.
 Cavendish 317, 1.
 Charron 267. 277, 2. 294, 14.
 Chassebœuf 284, 6.
 du Chatelet 285, 2.
 Chaudois 303, 5.
 Chaumeix 288, 3.
 Chauvain 268, 4.
 Chemnitz 289, 3.
 Chevreuil 270, 1.
 Chouet 268, 5. 294, 6.
 Christina of Sweden 266. 267, 7.
 Chubb 285, 1.
 Cicagnora 283, 10.
 Cicero 260, 13. 301, 6. 321, 7.
 Clarke 268, 5. 281, 1. 2*. 3. 4. 282,
 7. 284, 1. 288, 1.
 Clauberg 268, 4*. 290, 4.
 Claudius 304, 6.
 Clerselier 266. 268, 2.
 Clodius 304, 7.
 Colerus 272 Lit.
 Collier 291, 2. 3*. 5.
 Collins 281, 2. 285, 1*.
 Comte, August 283, 3.
 Condé 268, 3.
 Condillac 283, 1. 3-4*. 6. 7. 284, 1.
 287. 288, 5. 290, 8. 291, 5. 294,
 5. 11. 14. 16. 320, 3.

Conz 290, 9.
 Copernicus 294, 4.
 Cornelio 268, 5.
 Cosmann 290, 6.
 Costa 283, 10.
 Courcelles 266.
 Cousin 270, 4. 5. 292, 6. 317, 3.
 Cramer 299, 9.
 Cras 303, 5.
 Creuz 292, 7*. 294, 9.
 Crusius 290, 13*. 294, 6. 297, 1.
 300, 6. 10.
 Cudworth 267, 2. 278, 1. 3*. 280,
 1. 288, 9.
 Cuffeler 272, 13*.
 Cumberland 289, 3.
 Cuper 272, 10.
 Cusanus, v. Nicolaus.
 Cuvier 318, 4. 319, 1. 322, 2.

D.

Dalgarno 288, 5.
 Dante 318, 6.
 Danzel 294, 10 Lit. 11 Lit.
 Darjes 290, 14.
 Darwin 292, 6.
 Daub 329, 10*.
 Daubenton 285, 3. 6.
 du Defand 285, 4.
 Degerando 303, 5.
 Democritus 272. 288, 2.
 Derham 293, 4.
 Descartes 265. 266—267*. 268, 2.
 3. 4. 269, 1. 3. 270, 2. 7. 271, 272,
 1. 2. 3. 17. 273, 1. 3. 275. 277, 3.
 4. 278, 2. 3. 4. 280, 1. 2. 3. 282, 2.
 285, 5. 288, 1. 2. 4. 5. 289, 2. 290,
 2. 6. 12. 14. 291, 1. 3. 292, 5. 294,
 9. 297, 1. 301, 6. 321, 8. 9. 324,
 325, 6.
 Deurhof 272, 13.
 Diderot 285, 3. 286, 1*. 3. 5. 292, 3.
 6. 293, 8.
 Dilthey 313, 7 Lit.
 Dinet 268, 3.
 Dioscurus 302, 1.
 Dippel 293, 3.
 Dodwell 281, 2.
 Döllinger 319, 2.
 Dohm 294, 10.
 Doria 268, 5.

Dubois 285, 2.
 Duclos 285 3.
 Duns Scotus 268, 1.
 Dutens 288 Lit.
 Dutertre 270, 8.

E.

Eberhard 294, 11*. 13. 303, 2. 305,
 1.
 Eckhart, Master 319, 5. 325, 6.
 Eckhof 294, 9.
 Edelmann 293, 3*. 4. 5.
 Ehrhard 319, 2.
 Elizabeth of the Palatinate, 266.
 267, 7.
 van den Ende 272, 1.
 Engel 294, 11*. 16. 297, 9. 299, 6.
 Engelhard 290, 9.
 Epicurus 288, 2. 290, 14. 292, 1.
 d'Epinay 285, 9.
 Erath 290, 9.
 Erdmann, B. 293, 2 Lit.
 Erdmann, E. 259 Lit.
 Ernst August 288, 1.
 Eschenmayer 317, 3. 318, 8. 319, 3*.
 4. 5. 323. 2.
 d'Espinasse 285, 4.
 Euclid, the Mathematician 290, 14.
 299, 1.
 Eugen, Prince 288, 1.
 Euler 294, 3. 4. 299, 9. 317, 1.
 Ewald 303, 2.

F.

Fabricius 293, 4.
 Fardella 268, 5.
 Faydit 270, 8.
 Febronius 294. 15.
 Féde 266. 270, 8.
 Feder 288, 1 Lit. 294, 8* 299, 6.
 303, 1. 2.
 Feller 288, 1 Lit.
 Fénelon 268, 3.
 Ferguson 292, 4.
 Ferri 283, 10 Lit.
 Ferrier 292, 6.
 Fesl 305, 12.
 Fessler 319, 2.
 Feuerbach, L. 259 Lit. 277 5 Lit.

Fichte, I. H. 310 Lit. 311, 1.
 Fichte, J. G. 281, s. 294, 7. 10. 296, 1.
 4. 299, 6. 300, 2. 10. 304, 5. 6. 305, 2.
 3. 5. 306, 9. 307, 1. 308, 1. 4. 12. 309,
 2. 3. 310-12*. 314, 1. 2. 3. 315, 1.
 2*. 5. 6. 7. 316, 1. 2. 317, 1. 2. 4. 318,
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 8. 10. 319, 1. 3. 320, 1. 2.
 321, 1. 3. 6. 7. 9. 322, 1. 2. 3. 6. 323,
 1. 2. 4. 325, 6. 326, 2. 327, 3. 328.
 329, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 9. 330.
 Filmer 280, 6.
 Fischer, J. C. 347, 5.
 Fischer, Kuno 259 Lit. 272, 6. 8. 288,
 4. 294, 15. 303, 4 Lit. 308, 6.
 Fludd 290, 12.
 Fontenelle 268, 5.
 Forberg 311, 1. 314, 2.
 de la Forge 268, 3.
 Formey 294, 3.
 Fortlage 206 Lit.
 Foucher, Abbé 270, 8.
 Foucher, Count 266 Lit. 288, 1.
 Francke 289, 5. 290, 10. 293, 3.
 Frank, Peter 319, 5. 325, 1.
 Franklin 317, 1.
 Frauenstädt 321, 9 Lit.
 Frederick III., the Elector 289, 6.
 Frederick the Great 285, 2. 286, 2.
 290, 11. 293, 6*. 294, 2. 8. 15. 300, 9.
 Frederick William III. 294, 11.
 Frederick, Duke John 288, 1.
 Friedländer 294, 11.
 Fries 305, 1. 4-6*. 7. 8. 15. 306, 2. 308,
 2. 313, 2. 314, 1. 3. 316, 1. 319, 1.
 321, 4. 329, 6.
 Frohschammer 325, 8 Lit.

G.

Gabler 329, 10*.
 Galileo 266.
 Galvani 318, 4.
 Gans 329, 10*.
 Garve 294, 6*. 8. 11. 299, 6. 303, 1. 4.
 Gassendi 267, 2. 268, 1. 3. 288, 1. 2.
 290, 12.
 Gebhardi 293, 4.
 Gedike 294, 11.
 Geismar 293 Lit.
 Genovesi 283, 10.
 Geoffrin 288, 4.
 Gérard, Abbé 289, 5.

Gerdil 268, 5.
 Geulincx 267, 8*. 268, 3. 269, 8. 270,
 6. 271.
 Gibieuf 268, 6.
 Gichtel 293, 3.
 Gilbert 319, 1.
 Gildemeister 304, 2 Lit.
 Gioja 283, 10.
 Girardin, St. Marc 292, 3.
 Gizycki 261, 5 Lit.
 Glanvil 277, 2. 3.
 Gleim 294, 14.
 Goclenius 290, 6.
 Göcking 294, 10 and Lit.
 Görres 319, 3. 6.
 Göschel 329, 10*.
 Goethe 288, 5. 293, 1. 6. 8. 294, 7. 10.
 304, 8. 314, 3. 318, 5. 6. 319, 1. 5.
 329, 4. 10.
 Göze 294, 11. 13. 15.
 Goldfuss 322, 2.
 v. Goltz 304, 6 Lit.
 Gosche 294, 12 Lit.
 Gottsched 290, 9. 11. 294, 15.
 Gournay 282, 8.
 Gousset 268, 2.
 Gratian 290, 12.
 Green 282, 2.
 Grimm 286, 3. 5.
 Grose 282, 2.
 Grosse 290, 9.
 Grotefend 288 Lit.
 Grotius 289, 3. 4. 5. 6. 290, 2. 8. 321, 7.
 Gruber 294, 11.
 Grundig 293, 4.
 Günther 319, 6.
 Guhrauer 277, 8 Lit. 288, 1 Lit.
 Gutsmuths, 293, 7.
 Gwinner 321, 8 Lit.

H.

Haller, Albr. v. 283, 9. 317, 1.
 Hamann 294, 9. 301, 3. 304, 2*. 3. 4.
 5. 6.
 Hamberger 325, 5 Lit. 9 Lit.
 Hamilton 292, 4. 6*.
 Hansch 290, 9.
 Hardenberg 315, 3.
 Harenberg 293, 3.
 Harms 296 Lit. 311, 1.
 Hartenstein 297, 3 Lit. 321, 2 Lit.

Hartley 292, 7.
 v. Hattem 272, 13.
 Hatzfeld 293, 4.
 Haüy 317, 1.
 Haym 315 Lit. 321, 8 Lit. 13. 329, 1
 Lit.
 Hebenstreit 290, 2.
 Heerebord 268, 2. 272, 1.
 Hegel 272, 4. 6. 298, 2. 290, 9. 294, 2.
 296, 4. 308, 1. 311, 1. 314, 1. 315,
 2. 7. 8. 317, 2. 318, 6. 8. 319, 3. 322,
 2. 6. 7. 323, 3. 325, 7. 8. 326, 2. 4. 6.
 328. 329*. 330, 1. 2.
 Heidanus 268, 2.
 Heineccius 290, 9.
 Heinius 294, 2.
 Henry IV. 266.
 Helvetius 284, 2-5*. 285, 4. 290, 9.
 292, 3. 293, 8. 294, 15. 300, 6.
 Henke 305, 4.
 Henning 329, 10*.
 Hentsch 292, 7.
 Heraclitus 318, 10. 320, 2.
 Herbart 301, 6. 311, 1. 315, 1. 321, 1.
 2-8*. 13. 325, 4. 326, 1. 6. 330, 1.
 Herber of Cherbury 285, 1. 293, 10.
 Herder 292, 7. 293, 1. 8. 294, 15. 304,
 8*, 4. 5. 6. 317, 1. 318, 4. 319, 4.
 325 5. 329, 6.
 Herder, C. v. 304, 4 Lit.
 Hermes, G. 308, 8-11*. 12. 15. 319, 5.
 Herzog 289, 5 Lit.
 Hettner 293 Lit. 304, 3.
 Heumann 303, 5.
 Hinrichs 329, 10*.
 Hippocrates 323, 3.
 Hirnhaim 277, 3*.
 Hobbes 264. 268, 1. 272, 9. 275, 2.
 277, 2. 280, 6. 7. 281, 5. 288, 1.
 289, 3, 4. 293, 5. 294, 5. 297, 2.
 300, 8. 329, 6.
 Hofmann, Melch. 233, 3.
 Hoffmann, F. 325, 1. 5. 7. 9.
 Hoffmann, A. J. 290, 13.
 Holbach 285, 4. 286, 3*. 4. 5. 292, 1.
 Hollmann 290, 2.
 Horch 268, 4.
 Hotho 329, 10*.
 Huet 268, 4. 277, 4*, 5.
 Hülsen 303, 2.
 Hufeland 303, 1.
 Hugo 288, 7.

Humbert 204, 4.
 Hume 281, 7. 282*. 283, 1. 284, 1. 6.
 285, 5. 287. 291, 3. 292, 4. 6. 7. 293,
 6. 294, 9. 11. 13. 296, 4. 298, 1. 5. 299,
 8, 7. 301, 1. 303, 2. 2. 304, 2. 5. 6.
 306, 2. 308, 5. 8. 309, 1. 312, 1. 316,
 1. 320, 2. 322, 6. 325, 4. 330, 1.
 Hutcheson 281, 6*. 282, 7. 284, 1.
 285, 5. 294, 14. 300, 6. 301, 1.
 Huygens 289, 2. 290, 5.

I.

Ibbot 285, 1.
 Ibn Ezra 272, 1.
 Ickstadt 290, 9.
 Iffland, 293, 7.

J.

Jacobi 272, 1. 4. 292, 2. 294, 7. 8. 9. 15.
 304, 4-6*. 7. 305, 2. 4. 5. 6. 306, 2,
 307, 1. 308, 2. 314, 1. 3. 315, 6. 317,
 3. 319, 6. 323, 3. 327. 329, 9.
 Jänichen 272, 13.
 Jäsche 297, 3 Lit. 305, 7*.
 Jakob 294, 9. 314, 1.
 Jamblichus 315, 1.
 Jaquelot 272, 13.
 Jariges, 294, 3.
 Jaucourt 285, 3.
 Jean Paul, 293, 1.
 Jehnichen 303, 3.
 Jenisch 319, 1.
 Jens 272, 13.
 Jerusalem 293, 5.
 Jodl 282, 7 Lit.
 Jöcher 293, 5.
 Joel 272, 1.
 Jonas 315, 7. 8. Lit.
 Joseph II. 293, 6.
 Jouffroy 292, 6. 303, 5.

K.

Kästner 294, 6*.
 Kahler 268, 4.
 Kant 272, 6. 280, 2. 282, 3. 283, 7.
 290, 8. 9. 10. 11. 13. 291, 6. 292, 2. 6.
 7. 9. 11. 12. 13. 293, 1. 4. 6. 294, 4. 5. 6.
 7. 9. 10. 14. 295. 296, 1. 4. 297-302*.
 303, 4. 304, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 305, 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 306, 1. 2. 6. 9. 11. 307,
 1. 2. 3. 4. 308, 1. 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
 11. 12. 309, 2. 310. 311, 1. 2. 3. 5. 6.
 312, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 313, 1. 2. 4. 5. 314,
 1. 3. 315, 1. 5. 7. 316, 1. 317, 1. 318,
 2. 3. 4. 6. 319, 1. 3. 320, 1. 2. 3. 321,
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 11. 322, 1. 2. 6.
 323, 2. 324. 325, 6. 8. 9. 326, 2.
 327. 328. 329, 3. 330.
 Kapp, F. 317, 4.
 Katharine II. 293, 6.
 Kayserling, 294, 3.
 Kehrbach 297, 3 Lit.
 Kepler 318, 8. 329, 4.
 Keratry 303, 5.
 Kielmeyer 318, 4. 319, 1. 3. 322, 4.
 King 280 Lit.
 Kinker 303, 5.
 Kircher, Athan. 288, 5.
 Kirchmann 297, 3.
 Kirwan 317, 1.
 Klein 318, 9. 319, 2.
 Kleuker 325, 5.
 Klopp 288, 1.
 Klopstock 290, 11.
 Klose 293, 3 Lit.
 Klotz, 293, 5. 294, 7. 10. 12. 15.
 Knigge 293, 8*.
 Knuber 233, 4.
 Knutzen 293, 2. 300, 2.
 Kober 234, 1.
 Köhler 290, 9.
 König 294, 3.
 Köppen 304, 7*. 319, 1;
 Körner 303, 4.
 Kollmann 319, 6.
 Kortholt 288, 1 Lit.
 Kraus 303, 3.
 Krause 326, 2. 327*. 328. 329,
 3. 4. 330.
 Kreuzhage 305, 11 Lit.
 Krüger 292, 9*.
 Krug 305, 3*. 15. 314, 1. 319, 1.
 Kuffelaer v. Cuffeler.

 L.
 Lachmann 294, 7. 11 Lit. 12 Lit.
 Lagrange 286, 3.
 Lambert 294, 4*. 5. 9.
 St. Lambert 284, 6.
 Lametrie 286, 1. 2. 3*. 293, 1. 4. 294, 2.

Lami, Bern. 270, 9.
 Lami, Fr. 270, 2. 8. 272. 13.
 Lange, G. S. 294, 12. 14.
 Lange, J. J. 290, 10. 293, 3.
 Lanion 270, 8.
 Laukhardt 293, 1.
 Lavater 283, 8. 294, 8. 9. 304, 5.
 Lavoisier 317, 1.
 Leblond 285, 3.
 Lechler 285, 1 Lit.
 Le Clerc 289, 5.
 Leenhof 272, 13.
 Legrand 268, 5.
 Leibnitz 267, 2. 268, 4. 5. 270. 4.
 272, 13. 283, 3. 8. 285, 2. 287.
 288*. 289, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 290, 1. 2.
 3. 4. 6. 7. 8. 9. 11. 291, 5. 6. 11. 292,
 1. 7. 293, 2. 8. 294, 2. 4. 5. 6. 9. 11.
 13. 14. 15. 296, 1. 4. 297, 1. 298, 5.
 299, 6. 7. 301, 6. 303, 2. 304, 4.
 306, 1. 307, 2. 8. 308, 4. 309, 1.
 312, 2. 315, 1. 318, 8. 320, 2. 3.
 324. 325, 4. 329, 4. 9. 330, 1.
 Lelebel 270, 8.
 Lemonnier 285, 3.
 Lentulus 268, 4.
 Leonhardi 326, 1.
 Lessing 290, 11. 293, 4. 5. 294, 4. 7. 8.
 9. 10. 11. 12-16*. 295. 300, 9. 301, 1. 6.
 302, 6. 303, 4. 304, 1. 3. 4. 314, 2.
 315, 1. 318, 7. 329, 8.
 Leuwenhoeck 285, 5.
 Levassor 270, 8.
 Lichtenberg 319, 1.
 Lichtenfels 304, 7.
 Lindemann 327, 1 Lit.
 Link 319, 1.
 Lipstorp 268, 4.
 Locke 268, 5. 270, 8. 278, 4. 280*.
 281, 1. 2. 3. 4. 282, 1. 3. 283, 1. 2. 3.
 7. 284, 1. 2. 285, 1. 2. 5. 287. 288,
 5. 7. 290, 11. 291, 5. 292, 1. 3. 4. 6. 7.
 293, 5. 6. 7. 294, 3. 4. 8. 11. 296, 1. 4.
 298, 8. 5. 299, 7. 301, 1. 303, 2.
 304, 4. 306, 1. 308, 8. 309, 1. 320,
 2. 3. 321, 8. 11. 330, 1.
 Löscher 293, 1.
 Löwe 311 Lit. 315, 2.
 Lortet 303, 5.
 Louis XIV., 288, 1.
 Lucian 294, 8.
 Lucretius 297, 1. 301, 8.

K. Ludwig of the Palatinate 289, 3.
 Lully 288, 1. 5. 290, 9. 14. 326, 4.
 Luther 260. 264. 268, 1. 325, 9.
 Lutterbeck 325, 1. 5. 8.
 Luynes, Duke of, 266. 268, 3.
 Lyons 285, 1.

M.

Maass 294, 11.
 Machiavelli 280, 7.
 Mackensen 319, 1.
 Maimon 292, 7. 305, 5. 308, 8-8*. 7.
 309, 2. 311, 1. 2. 3. 312, 4. 314, 1. 2.
 317, 1. 320, 1. 3.
 Maimonides 272, 1. 2. 294, 8.
 Mairan 268, 5. 270, 5.
 Maistre, Count 319, 5.
 Des Maizeaux 281, 2 Lit.
 Malebranche 267, 9. 268, 3. 4. 5. 270*.
 271. 272, 18. 278, 4. 280, 3. 285, 5.
 291, 2. 3. 7. 11. 294, 18. 319, 5.
 Malesherbes 284, 3.
 Mandeville 284, 2*. 3. 6. 290, 8.
 Marci 277, 3.
 Marcus, Dr., 317, 2.
 Maresius 268, 2.
 Marheineke 329, 10*.
 Marmontel 285, 3.
 St. Martin 325, 5. 7.
 Masham 280, 1.
 Maupertuis 284, 6. 293, 4. 294, 2. 3*.
 McCosh 281, 7 Lit.
 Mehmel 314, 2.
 Meier 290, 11. 291, 1. 292, 1. 7. 293,
 4. 9. 297, 1. 298, 3. 301, 2.
 Meiners 294, 6. 303, 2.
 Melanchthon 268, 1.
 Melissa 301, 1.
 Mendelssohn, Benj., 294, 3 Lit.
 Mendelssohn, Moses, 283, 8. 293, 1. 3.
 5. 294, 1. 7. 8. 9*. 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
 297, 1. 298, 3. 300, 2. 301, 1. 303,
 2. 304, 4. 5.
 Merian 294, 1*. 2. 3. 298, 2.
 Mersenne 266. 267, 2. 268, 1.
 Mesland 267, 5. 268, 3.
 Metz 319, 6.
 Meyer, J. Bona, 300, 2 Lit.
 Meyer, Ludw., 268, 2. 272, 1. 289, 2.
 Michaelis 293, 3. 324, 2.
 Michelet 329, 10*.

Milton 289, 6. 294, 10.
 Mirabaud 286, 3.
 Miran 270, 3.
 Möser 293, 6. 7. 303, 8.
 Molière 268, 3.
 Molitor 319, 5. 6*.
 Montaigne 267. 268, 1. 270, 9. 277,
 1. 2. 294, 11.
 Montesquieu 280, 7*. 282, 3. 283, 6. 7.
 284, 6. 285, 2. 293, 6. 294, 3. 300,
 9. 301, 1.
 More 268, 1. 278, 1. 2*. 4. 288, 7.
 290, 12.
 Morelly 283, 1.
 Morgan 293, 5.
 Morinière 270, 3.
 Moritz 292, 7*.
 Morteira 271, 1.
 v. Moser 293, 6.
 Moses 278, 2. 294, 15.
 Mosheim 278, 3 Lit. 293, 3.
 Müller, Ant. 304, 7.
 Müller, Jac. Fr. 290, 9.
 Müller, Joh. 329, 10.
 Mussmann 329, 10*.

N.

Naigeon 286, 1 Lit. 3.
 Neeb 304, 7.
 Nees of Esenbeck 319, 2.
 Nettelblatt 290, 9.
 Newton 281, 2. 283, 6. 284, 6. 294, 8.
 11. 297, 1. 301, 5. 319, 1. 329, 4.
 Nicolai 293, 2. 294, 1. 7. 8. 10*. 11. 12.
 13. 15. 303, 2. 305, 1. 314, 1. 319, 1.
 Nicolaus of Cusa 294, 15. 304, 2.
 Nicole 268, 3.
 Niethammer 293, 4.
 Nitsch 303, 5.
 Norris 268, 5. 270, 8. 291, 2. 3.
 Novalis 514, 4. 315, 3. 6.

O.

Oerstedt 322, 5.
 Oken 318, 9. 322, 2' 5. 7. 325, 1-3*. 4.
 5. 6. 326, 1. 2. 5. 7. 327. 329, 4.
 330, 1.
 Oldenburg 272, 1.

Oncken 282, 9 Lit.
 Origen 302, 8.
 Oswald 292, 4.

P.

Paracelsus 277, 8. 325, 6.
 Parker 268, 5.
 Parmenides 264. 273, 1.
 Parr 291, 2 Lit.
 Pascal 268, 8. 304, 4.
 Pauli, R. 268, 4.
 Paulus, Dr. 271, 1 Lit. 317, 8. 4.
 Pertz 288, 1 Lit.
 Pestalozzi 313, 4.
 Petermann 268, 4.
 Philo 294, 4. 295.
 Pichler 288, 8 Lit.
 Picot 266.
 Placentius 268, 4.
 Placius 272, 13.
 Plato 278, 2. 288, 2. 290, 18. 14. 294,
 9. 10. 296, 4. 301, 6. 308, 1. 315, 4.
 318, 9. 321, 4. 7. 323, 8. 324.
 Platner 303, 2. 305, 5. 307, 1.
 Plutarch 294, 6.
 Poelitz 297, 8.
 Poirot 272, 13. 289, 5.
 Pollat 268, 2.
 Pope 294, 14.
 Prémontval 294, 4. 9.
 Prévost 292, 6. 294, 5*.
 Price 292, 1.
 Priestley 292, 7.
 Protagoras 294, 1.
 Pütter 294, 6.
 Pufendorf 289, 8 and 4*. 5. 6. 290, 1. 2.
 8. 12.
 Pyrrho 301, 6. 302, 1.
 Pythagoras 278, 2.

Q.

Quanz 294, 10.
 Quesnay 282, 8.
 Quesnel 270, 1. 2.
 Quintus Icilius 294, 10.

R.

Raey 268, 2. 4.
 Ramus 290, 8. 4.

Raspe 288, 1 Lit.
 Regis 268, 8. 270, 8.
 Regius, H. 268, 2.
 Rehberg 297, 2. 303, 8*. 310.
 Rehmcke 347, 5.
 Reid 268. 8. 281, 7. 282, 2. 4. 292, 4*.
 5. 6. 7. 304, 5.
 Reimarus 293, 4*. 5. 6. 294, 9.
 Reimarus, Jr. 294, 9.
 Reinbeck 290, 9. 294, 8.
 Reinhard 303, 8.
 Reinhold, E. 307 Lit. 348, 2.
 Reinhold, K. L. 294, 10. 296, 8. 298,
 8. 300, 1. 303, 1. 8. 4. 5. 305, 8. 306,
 1. 2. 307*. 308, 1. 2. 8. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 11.
 309, 1. 2. 310. 311, 1. 2. 312, 1. 4.
 313, 1. 2. 314, 1. 2. 8. 315, 1. 318,
 2. 8. 319, 1. 320, 2. 8. 322, 2. 324
 325, 4. 326, 2. 330, 1.
 Rembold 304, 7.
 Rémusat 303, 5.
 Renery 268, 2.
 Retz (Cardinal) 268, 8.
 Reusch 290, 9.
 Revius 268, 2. 4.
 Rhegenius 268, 4.
 Ribbow 290, 9.
 Richelieu 296, 2.
 Ringier 290, 9.
 Rink 297, 8 Lit.
 Ritter, H. 305, 1.
 Robertson 292, 5.
 Robespierre 314, 4.
 Robinet 285, 5*. 293, 8. 294, 9.
 Rochefoucauld 284, 1.
 v. Rochow 293, 7*. 294, 10.
 Rölling 268, 2.
 Rötischer 329, 10*.
 Rohault 268, 8. 5. 281, 2.
 Romagnosi 283, 10.
 Rosenkranz 286, 1 Lit. 297, 2. 8. Lit.
 329, 10*.
 Roth 304, 2 Lit.
 Rousseau 280, 6. 285, 8. 286, 8. 292,
 2. 8*. 6. 7. 293, 1. 6. 7. 8. 294, 2. 6. 15.
 296, 2. 301, 1. 303, 4. 304, 2. 4. 6.
 320, 2. 325, 9. 329, 6.
 Royer-Collard 292, 6.
 Rübel 290, 8.
 Rüdiger 290, 12*. 13.
 Ruhnken 301, 6.

S.

- Sack 293, 5.
 le Sage 294, 5. 304, 1.
 Salat 304, 7. 317, 4. 319, 1.
 Saling 319, 10.
 Salzmann 293, 7.
 Sanchez 267, 2.
 Say 292, 9.
 Schaarschmidt 272, 1.
 Schad 311, 1. 314, 2.
 Schalbruch 268, 4 Lit.
 Schaller 315, 10 Lit.
 Schaumann 314, 2.
 Schelling 269, 2. 294, 7. 296, 4. 301,
 6. 304, 6. 305, 2. 5. 307, 1. 311, 1.
 314, 2. 315, 1. 2. 316, 2. 317-
 318*. 319, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 320,
 1. 2. 3. 321, 1. 2. 3. 9. 323*. 324.
 325, 2. 4. 5. 7. 8. 326, 2. 5. 327. 328.
 329, 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 7. 8. 9. 330, 1.
 Scherzer 288, 1.
 Schiller 294, 7. 10. 303, 4*. 314, 3.
 318, 6.
 Schilling 290, 9.
 Schlegel, A. W. 317, 2. 318, 5.
 Schlegel, Fr. 311, 1. 314, 2. 3*. 4.
 315, 3 and 4*. 5. 6. 7. 316, 1. 317, 2.
 318, 3. 319, 6. 322, 3.
 Schleiermacher 284 Lit. 294, 1. 11.
 311, 1. 314, 4. 315, 3. 5-10*. 316,
 1. 319, 2. 321, 7. 322, 1. 329, 1.
 6. 10.
 Schlosser, C. F. 285 Lit. 4. 293 Lit.
 Schlosser, G. 293, 7.
 Schmid, Carl Chr. Ehrh. 292, 7. 303,
 1. 314, 1. 2. 319, 1.
 Schmidt, Laur. 293, 4.
 Schmidt, P. 272, 6. 315, 10 Lit.
 Schopenhauer 304, 4. 315, 14. 321,
 1. 8-12*. 13. 323, 1. 326, 1. 329, 3.
 330, 1.
 Schreiber 290, 9.
 Schubert, G. H. 319, 3. 4*. 6. 7.
 Schubert (in Königsb.) 297, 3 Lit.
 Schütz 303, 1.
 Schuler 268, 2.
 Schultz, Fr. Alb. 293, 2.
 Schultz-Schultzenstein 329, 10.
 Schulz (Zopf-) 293, 5.
 Schulze, G. E. 305, 2. 308, 2*. 309, 2.
 311, 1. 314, 2. 317, 1. 319, 1.
 Schulze, Johann 309 1.
 Schulze, Johannes 329, 1.
 Schumann 294, 12.
 Schwab 303, 2.
 Schwebing 268, 4.
 Schweizer 315, 7 Lit.
 Schwenckfeld 268, 1.
 Seckendorff 289, 4.
 Semler 293, 5*. 7. 294, 14.
 Sengler 317, 3.
 Sévigné 268, 3.
 Sextro 288, 1.
 Shaftesbury 280, 1. 281, 5*. 6. 282, 7.
 284, 2. 285, 2. 286, 1. 294, 9. 14.
 301, 1.
 Shakespeare 318, 6.
 Sherlock 285, 1.
 Sidney 280, 6.
 Sietze 329, 10.
 Sigwart, Chr. 272, 1 Lit. 6.
 Sinclair 319, 6.
 Smith, Adam 281, 7. 282, 8. 9*. 284,
 1. 6. 303, 2.
 Soade 283, 10.
 Socrates 294, 9. 296, 4. 302, 6. 309,
 1. 315, 4. 329, 10.
 Solger 315, 3. 322, 1. 3*. 4. 7.
 323, 4.
 Spalding 293, 5. 294, 15.
 Spallanzani 283, 3.
 Spedding 248 Lit.
 Spener 289, 3. 293 2.
 Sperlette 268, 4.
 van der Speyk 272, 1.
 Spicker 281, 5 Lit.
 Spinoza 161, 4. 268, 4. 5. 269, 2.
 270, 4. 272*. 273, 1. 2. 3. 277, 4. 5.
 278, 4. 280, 7. 281, 2. 282, 2. 3.
 283, 3. 288, 1. 2. 3. 4. 6. 289, 2. 3.
 290, 6. 291, 1. 292, 3. 9. 294, 6. 7. 9.
 12. 13. 14. 297, 2. 301, 1. 6. 303, 3.
 304, 3. 4. 5. 305, 2. 312, 1. 313, 6.
 314, 2. 315, 1. 2. 6. 316, 2. 317, 2.
 318, 5. 7. 9. 320, 2. 322, 2. 323, 2.
 324. 325, 6. 326, 2. 327. 329, 3. 5.
 6. 9. 12.
 Mme de Staël 303, 1.
 Stahl 317, 3.
 Stark 294, 10.
 Starke 297, 3 Lit.
 Stattler 293, 4. 305, 2.
 Staupitz 233, 1.

Steffens 315, 6. 318, 4. 5. 9. 322, 1.
 4-6*. 7. 323, 4. 325, 3. 5. 329, 4.
 Steinhart 293, 7*.
 Steuart 282, 8.
 Stewart, Dugald 292, 5*. 6. 294, 5.
 Stirling 292, 6 Lit.
 Stosch 272, 13.
 Strauss, David 285, 2 Lit. 293, 4.
 294, 15 Lit. 319, 3.
 Stryck 289, 5.
 Sturm 268, 4.
 Stutzmann 319, 2.
 Süßmilch 292, 7. 304, 3.
 Sulzer 294, 4. 5. 7. 8.
 Swedenborg 319, 3.
 Symmer 317, 1.

T.

Taubert 247, 5.
 Tauentzien 294, 12.
 Tauler 278, 4.
 Taurellus 288, 1.
 Teller 293, 5. 294, 15.
 Tencin 285, 4.
 Tetens 292, 7. 294, 9. 11. 307, 1. 2.
 Thales 329, 9.
 Thanner 319, 2.
 Thebesius 290, 9.
 Tholuck 293 Lit.
 Thomas Aquinas, 267, 2. 268, 1.
 272, 6. 273, 3. 288, 2.
 Thomas à Kempis, 278, 4.
 Thomasius, Chr., 289, 3. 5-6*. 290,
 1. 2. 3. 4. 8. 12. 293, 2. 3. 6. 9. 294, 6.
 300, 8.
 Thomasius, Jacob, 288, 1. 289, 5.
 Thomassin 270, 8.
 Thorschmidt 293, 5.
 Thümming 290, 9.
 Tieck 347, 5.
 Tiedemann 303, 2.
 Tieftrunk 297, 3 Lit.
 Tindal 285, 1. 293, 5.
 Tissot 303, 5.
 Töllner 293, 4*.
 Toland 280, 6. 281, 5. 283, 2. 285,
 1*.
 de Tracy 286, 4. 303, 5.
 Trendelenburg 272, 1. 6.
 Treuner 290, 2.
 Treviranus, 319, 2.

Trinius 293, 5.
 Troxler 319, 7. 8*. 322, 5. 325, 4.
 Trullard 303, 5.
 Tschirnhausen 272, 1. 6. 8. 289, 2*.
 3. 5. 290, 1.
 Turgot 282, 8.
 Turnbull 281, 7. 292, 4.
 Twesten 315, 7.
 Twesten, K. 303 Lit.

U.

Ulrich 303, 3.

V.

Vatet 268, 3.
 le Vayer 277, 1. 5.
 Velthusen 272, 13.
 Vico 268, 5.
 Villers 303, 5.
 van Vlooten 272, 1 Lit.
 Voëtius 268, 1. 2.
 Vogt 326, 1.
 Voigt 303, 3 Lit.
 Volder 268, 2.
 Volney v. Chassebœuf.
 Voltaire 283, 3. 284, 4. 285, 2*. 292,
 3. 6. 293, 1. 3. 6. 294, 11. 13.
 Vorländer 281 Lit.
 Vossius, Gerh. 277, 4.
 Vossius, Isaac, 277, 4.
 de Vries 272, 1. 6.


W.

Wagner, Gabr. 268, 4.
 Wagner, Joh. Jacob 319, 7*. 8. 322, 3.
 325, 4. 326, 2. 6. 327. 329, 3.
 Wagner, T. 268, 4.
 Waitz 86 Lit.
 Walcher 290, 9.
 Waldschmidt 268, 4.
 Washington. 296, 2.
 Weigel, Erh. 289, 3. 5.
 Weigelt 321, 9.
 van Weiller 304, 7. 319, 1.
 Weishaupt 293, 8*. 303, 2.
 Weiss, Chr. 305, 7*. 319, 3. 329, 1.
 Weiss, Jacob Fr. 292, 7.
 Weisse, Chr. F. 294, 10.
 Weissenborn 315, 10 Lit.

- Welsh 292, 6.
 Werner, Abr. Gottl. 322, 4.
 Wessely 294, 8.
 de Wette 304, 6. 305, 7.
 Weyland 303, 5.
 Whiston 285, 1.
 Wieland 304, 1. 306, 6. 307, 1.
 William III. 280, 6.
 William of Orange 280, 1.
 Willich 303, 5.
 Willmann 302, 6.
 Winkelmann 294, 10. 301, 6. 304, 3.
 318, 6.
 Windischmann 314, 4 Lit. 319, 5. 7.
 de Witt 272, 1.
 Witte, J. H. 308, 6 Lit.
 Wittich 268, 2. 272, 13.
 Wizenmann 304, 4. 5. 6*.
 Wöllner 297, 3.
 Wolff 268, 8. 272, 4. 287. 288, 8.
 290, 2-3*. 9. 10. 11. 12. 14. 291, 13.
 292, 7. 293, 2. 9. 6. 8. 9. 294, 2. 5.
 10. 297, 1. 298, 1. 300, 8. 4. 8. 11.
 301, 2. 303, 2. 311, 5. 320, 8. 321,
 4. 7. 326, 4.
 Wolke 293, 7.
 Wollaston 281, 3*. 4. 282, 7. 284, 1.
 Woolston 285, 1.
 Wronsky 303, 5.
 Wüstemann 290, 13.
- X.
- Xenophanes 325, 4.
- Z.
- v. Zedlitz 294, 10.
 Zeller 287, Lit.
 Zeno, the Eleatic 305, 1.
 Zimmermann 305, 11.
 v. Zimmermann, J. G. 293, 5.
 Zirngiebl 304, 6 Lit.
 Zwack 293, 8.

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