



3 2044 012 138 087



HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY



in honor of

ARCHIBALD CARY COOLIDGE

1866 - 1928

Professor of History

Lifelong Benefactor and  
First Director of This Library



○

# VERITAS VICTRIX

BY

WILLIAM TAYLER Esq.

*Late Commissioner of Patna.*

“I STAND HERE FOR JUSTICE.”

*Merchant of Venice.*

London :

WILLIAM RIDGWAY, 169, PICCADILLY, W.

1878.

## P R E F A C E.

---

IT is with no ordinary feelings of gratitude that, after a painful and protracted struggle of more than twenty years, I am able to point to the impartial verdict of history, twice repeated, in final and conclusive vindication of my official administration as Commissioner of Patna during the appalling crisis of the rebellion of 1857.

An unprecedented accumulation of evidence has now established, not only the importance of the measures which I adopted, but the utter unsoundness of every sentiment, opinion and dictum recorded by Mr. Halliday.

The men whom he publicly declared to be "innocent and inoffensive" have been unanswerably proved to be determined and uncompromising traitors, whose names were in the black books of the Government. The leader whom I arrested, and against whom he maintained there was "no cause of suspicion," is now, with others of his sect, imprisoned for life in the Andaman Islands! The men whom Mr. Halliday publicly dishonoured as suspected traitors have

been since publicly honoured for their acknowledged loyalty !

My entire administration, which Mr. Halliday declared to have been a cause of "public scandal and discontent," has received the hearty and high approval of all those who witnessed my proceedings at the time, and whose lives were at stake, and the warm encomiums of a numerous body of the most distinguished statesmen, subsequently recorded ; while two of the high officials in the Supreme Government who concurred in my condemnation in 1857, have since acknowledged their error, and one, Sir John Low, has expressed in writing his deep remorse.

This gratifying evidence has been ratified by the unanimous verdict of the public press, both in India and England, and finally confirmed by the impartial testimony of two independent historians ; the one, himself political secretary to the Indian Council, with all the public records placed at his disposal ; the other, a distinguished author, who was in Calcutta at the time of the mutiny, and intimately acquainted with the facts, which he gave to the public in the far-famed "Red Pamphlet," published in 1857.

When, to escape further sufferings from the heartless persecution with which I had been visited, I determined to resign the service in

which I had laboured for twenty-eight years, I ventured to record the following words when intimating my intention to Government:—

“ That the trials which have assailed me have been allowed by an overruling Providence for some good and gracious purpose I devoutly believe; that truth and right will eventually triumph I will not allow myself to doubt, and, whether the justice of our rulers hereafter may or may not vouchsafe reparation for the wrongs which I have suffered, or recompense for the service which I have been permitted to render, I shall not, I trust, be wanting to myself in the public vindication of my name, the establishment of truth, and the exposure of the unworthy machinations, to which my sufferings are principally to be attributed.”

This prediction has, as far as public testimony goes, been fully vindicated. “ Truth and right,” as far as public opinion is concerned, have triumphed. My life has been mercifully spared to witness the results which I never doubted, and now, whether justice be done, is in the hands of the authorities, who are responsible to the Queen and the country for righteous dealing—the prevention of wrong, and the support of truth.

WILLIAM TAYLER.

# L E T T E R S.

---

*Copy of LORD DERBY'S remarks in the House of Lords, 1857.*

Then there is another gentleman whose conduct has not received the sanction of the Government—I mean Commissioner Tayler of Patna. His conduct has been disapproved by the Government, but the papers appear to me to show that he had a more enlarged view of the crisis, a keener sense of the danger and a better idea of the remedy than the Government itself. (Hear, hear.)

---

*Summary of evidence recorded at the time by residents of the Province and others.*

*Extract from the "MOFUSSILITE," 1858.*

“ The correspondence is very extensive, and it will be impossible in our limits to note the substance of a twentieth part of it. But two or three illustrations will show its varied nature.

“ Mr. Yule, the Commissioner of Bhaugulpore, declares his opinion that if the whole country from Patna to Malda is preserved from rising, it is due to Mr. Tayler, and to him alone.

“ The Roman Catholic Bishop, writing in his own name and that of all his congregation, declares that to Mr. Tayler, and to him alone (under Providence), they attributed the safety of their lives and property, and that, therefore, he would live for ever in their hearts.

“ The Protestant Missionary, who has resided for a quarter of a century at Patna, and is known to be intimately acquainted with the natives, expresses identically the same sentiments, adding, that he thanks God he does not serve such a master as the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

“ Civilians, military men, chaplains, missionaries, merchants, indigo planters—all these classes give their written testimony, and express their belief, that the preservation of Patna and Behar belongs to Mr. Tayler, declaring in most unqualified terms their concurrence with his past, and their confidence in his future, conduct.”

---

*Letter from the* REV. ALEXANDER DUFF, D.D.

Calcutta, February 18th, 1858.

MY DEAR SIR,

I have to apologise for being so long in answering the note which you so kindly addressed to me on leaving Calcutta for Patna. Let me at once say that the delay has arisen from no want of sympathy with you or your policy—quite the reverse. I avow myself one of those who watched the whole of your proceedings during the terrible months of the crisis, and noted them with unqualified approbation. According to the current phrase, I regard you as “the right man in the right place, and at the right time,” and now that your own narrative of



events sets forth authentically the whole of your doings, and the reasons by which you were guided, I can only say that I have risen from the perusal of your narrative and correspondence with my feeling of approval and admiration vastly enhanced.

In pp. 19 and 20 of the "Narrative" you have recorded your views of the nature and origin of the great revolt or rebellion. They are views to which I was led, in substance at least, to give expression as far back as May last. Need I say then how thoroughly, how intensely I accord in them? You have I believe, hit the very truth, and for the manly Christian courage which has enabled you to embody them in writing, I for one not only honour you, but with my whole heart thank you. By so doing you have rendered an important service to the cause of truth and righteousness in this land; and when the days of a crooked, selfish, patchwork policy—a policy, too, as shortsighted and ruinous as it is selfish—are numbered, you and others who, like you, have honestly tried to probe the grievous national sore to the bottom, in order that it might be more effectually healed, must rise to the surface and be borne along by the approving plaudits of the wise and the good.

After all this, I need scarcely add that I regard you as a thoroughly ill-used man. Writing to an influential friend in Scotland the other day, a friend who is sure to make use of my remarks, I

could not help saying, that if there was a man living who deserved the honour of British knighthood at the hands of his Sovereign, that man was Mr. Commissioner Tayler. But instead of this, what shall I say? Indeed words fail me to give expression to my sense of the unmerited indignity which has been offered to you.

But, my dear Sir, your "Narrative" shows that you have learned to put your trust in the God of Providence, and that you are not ashamed to own your faith in Christianity. In this I rejoice more than I can tell you, and I am sure, sooner or later, in your case, the gracious assurance will be verified—"Them that honour Me, I will honour." Cheer up, therefore, and wait God's good time for deliverance.

Yours very sincerely,

ALEXANDER DUFF.

---

*Letter from* GENERAL SIR JOHN LOW, G.C.B.,  
*late Member of the Supreme Council in India.*

1, Onslow Square, March 24th, 1867.

MY DEAR TAYLER,

I have read the several papers that you have sent for my perusal with deep interest. The feeling of interest has been, to some extent, of a painful kind to me, personally. I allude now to the accusation against you, of having written to Major Eyre, to urge him not to

advance direct against the rebels then surrounding Arrah ; because I well remember my having, as a member of Lord Canning's Council, concurred with his Lordship in the censure which he passed upon your conduct on that point ;—it is true, however, that even now, considering the sort of information that was then before the Council, I think it was quite a natural decision for us to record that censure ; but it has since been proved—*incontestably proved*—that the data on which that decision was based were quite incorrect ! And if I had been still in India when the real fact was laid before the Supreme Council, that your letter was only an unofficial one, not addressed to Major Eyre at all, but to Mr. Bax, in answer to an unofficial one from him, and sent open by you to General Lloyd, for the latter to deal with as he might think fit, I feel sure that I would readily have stated officially that, in my opinion, you were entirely blameless in that matter respecting Major Eyre, which to my mind, at that time, was by far the most serious accusation against you. I say this chiefly in justice to *myself*, because my testimony on that point can be of no value to you, after the complete and, to you, the very honourable approbation of your measures, that was, as I find, recorded in a despatch from the Court of Directors in Leadenhall Street.

In regard to the terrible insurrection against us in 1857, I have always thought that, although

our Hindoo Sepoys were the most numerous of our *active* enemies, yet that by far the most *dangerous* enemies—being the most persevering, the most able, and the most influential—were Mohammedans; just as was the case at Vellore, Hyderabad, and Kurnool, during the early part of my experience in India; and the despatch from the Court of Directors, describing the peculiar difficulties and importance of your position at Patna; the public trials of the Patna Wahabee conspirators by Sir Herbert Edwardes, and his late letter to you,—all combine to prove indisputably (at least, that is my honest opinion) that you had to deal with the most dangerous of all our Mohammedan enemies in 1857.

From the clear light that since that time has been thrown upon the conduct of Patna Mohammedans during that eventful year, and before it, and also subsequent to it, I am decidedly of opinion that those Wahabee chiefs and their relatives were more dangerous to us than Feroze Shah, Khan Buhadur Khan of Bareilly, and any thousand of our *Sepoy* Mohammedans, all put together! I sincerely believe that your skilful and vigorous management of the disaffected population of Patna was of *immense* value to the Government of India, and that in the last few months of your Commissionership, commencing with the arrest of the three Wahabee conspirators, and the disarming of the greater portion of the inhabitants of the Patna city,

your services were of more vital importance to the public interests than those of many officers, both civil and military, during the whole period of their Indian career, in less critical times, who have been rewarded—and justly rewarded—by honours from the Queen; while your services, by an extraordinary combination of unlucky circumstances, have hitherto been so overlooked. In Oriental phrase, “what more need I write?”

Believe me, my dear TAYLER,

To be

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed) J. LOW.

For W. TAYLER, Esq.,  
&c., &c., &c.

---

BRIEF EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS WRITTEN BY RESIDENTS OF THE PROVINCE, AND OTHERS AT THE TIME OF MY REMOVAL IN 1857-8.

---

MR. (now SIR GEORGE) YULE, *Commissioner of Bhagulpore, the neighbouring Division to Patna.*

July, 1857.

If that city (Patna), and all the districts round about down to Malda, escape an outbreak, *we shall have to thank you alone for it, I believe*; and this is the general opinion among those most concerned, and who ought to know best.

MAJOR NATION, *commanding the Local Battalion at Patna.*

September 2nd, 1857.

I cannot help expressing to you my extreme regret that Government has seen fit to remove you from your appointment. Your energy and coolness were producing such good effects, that I, and many others, thought *that these provinces were entirely indebted to your exertions for having been kept quiet so long.*

---

LIEUT.-COLONEL ROWCROFT, *commanding 8th N. I., Dinapore.*

September 5th, 1857.

I consider *the zealous, active, and energetic performance of your arduous duties mainly contributed to the tranquility which prevailed in the city of Patna and the districts around throughout the three very critical and anxious months of May, June, and July.*

---

C. E. DAVIES, ESQ., *Landholder and old Resident of Behar.*

September 7th, 1857.

*To you, under the mercy and guidance of a gracious Providence, we owe the safety of the province, the quiet possession of Bengal, our hold of the highways to the north-west, and the enjoyment of life and property.*

---

W. KNOTT, ESQ., *an able and distinguished Un-  
covenanted Deputy Collector, Patna.*

September 7th, 1857.

*I can conscientiously assert that it is to your energy and tact, by the blessing of God, we owe also the safety of our property. Had "panic" interfered with your counsels, Patna, nay, the whole of your division, would have fallen into the hands of rebels.*

---

W. H. URQUHART, ESQ., *Sub-Deputy Opium Agent.*  
(To a Friend.)

September 9th, 1857.

The facts brought forward by him (Mr. Tayler), in elucidation of the causes which led to the conclusions he came to, and which he acted up to with true Christian fortitude, are clear, manly, and convincing.

---

E. WHITCOMBE, ESQ., *Resident Railway Engineer,*  
*Patna.*

September 9th, 1857.

As you are aware, I expressed my confidence in you by offering to execute unhesitatingly anything you might ask me to do. *There is no other man in India, except the now celebrated Lawrence, Havelock, Neill, and Holmes, to whom I would have so bound myself.*

---

*From the entire body of the non-official Christian Residents of Patna.*

September 10th, 1857.

When the whole of Patna was nearly shipwrecked, at the moment when the rebels rose at Dinapore; and before that, when the mischievous machinations of Peer Ali and his accomplices had endangered not only our own city, but nearly the whole province, who opposed and braved the storm?—whose were those wise, far-seeing and statesmanlike plans which saved us then? And who so kindly and considerately threw open his house to receive the Christian populace at the hour of the greatest peril? With one voice, we answer it was you; and were it not for you, and for your exertions, which cost you many an anxious day and sleepless night,—were it not for the highly prudent measures adopted by you to nip the spirit of rebellion in its bud,—*were it not for the politic orders that you passed to secure (and which did secure) the safety of the province, Behar would ere this have become a scene of anarchy and confusion.*

---

*From a large body of the most respectable Native Citizens of Patna.*

November, 1857.

Had you not, by your labour and exertions, kept down the disaffected and evil-doers, *the*



*whole of the districts under your jurisdiction would have been ruined, and all the well-disposed inhabitants have fallen victims to the rebellious and the wicked.*

---

REV. L. F. KALBERER, *German Missionary, who had resided twenty-one years at Patna.*

November 13th, 1857.

But there is a consolation for you in this that you have done your duty towards your fellow-countrymen and saved the lives of many, and probably the lives of thousands of natives. Had you been dismissed under circumstances for neglect of duty, the cup would have been bitter, for you would not have had the sympathy of all those who know what measures you have adopted for our safety.

---

RICHARD FOLEY, ESQ., *Merchant of Patna, who left the District when I was removed.*

November 20th, 1857.

It is no wish of mine to offer comments on the proceedings of your Government; but this far I will say, and so will all the residents both of Patna and Dinapore, *that it is to your energetic measures Patna owes its safety.*

---

R. SOLANO, Esq., *Indigo Planter and Landholder, possessing extensive property in the Patna Division.*

November 28th, 1857.

*That the safety and tranquillity of Patna has been due entirely to your severe but just and well-judged measures; it is needless for me to mention, for every one in Behar knows this fact.*

---

*Indigo Planters of Tirhoot, 1857.*

We are thankful that the great crisis was passed before your removal; for now, although the credit due to you, and to you alone, may be given to another, *the benefit of your able administration is ours.*

---

BISHOP ATHANASIVS ZUBER, *Roman Catholic Bishop of Patna.*

February 20th, 1858.

One must have lived on the spot, and been loaded with responsibilities, in order to understand the difficulties of your position and judge of the expediency of your measures. I, and with me, *all my congregation, are of opinion that we owe the safety of our lives and property, next to God, solely and exclusively to your strenuous exertions, and shall, therefore, ever gratefully remember you.*

---

CAPTAIN ALEXANDER, *Executive Officer, Dinapore.*

August 28th, 1857.

I have read Tayler's defence, and think it most complete. I have thought from the first that he has been most unjustly treated. Whatever may be done by his successors, *for the last four months Patna owes its tranquillity to his energetic measures*; and for my own part I should feel more confidence in Tayler alone than in Solomon himself with a Mahometan assistant.

---

REV. M. BURGE, *Chaplain, Dinapore.*

August 14th, 1857.

We can only hope with you that a fair hearing may be given to Mr. Tayler, and that Government may yet find out their mistake in discarding the valuable services of one whom *all acknowledge* to have acted with more zeal and judgment than most, or perhaps all, whose abilities have been taxed during this present year of horror.

---

E. WOODCOCK, Esq., C.S., *Collector, Patna.*

September, 1857.

In my judgment your acts, from the commencement, appear to have been dictated by sound judgment, calm deliberation, and acknowledged ability; and, as an old friend, it is hardly necessary to say how much I share the very general sorrow for the severe displeasure of Government under which you have lost your appointment.

R. KING, ESQ., *Deputy Opium Agent, Patna.*

People may say what they like ; *but there can be no doubt that the peace of this large city has been all along preserved by Mr. Tayler's decisive and most justly rigorous measures* for the punishment of those who dared to raise their hands against the Government.

---

*Petition presented by the respectable Citizens of Patna to the Lieutenant-Governor, dated August 6th, 1857.*

Representation of the servants of the beneficent Master, high in dignity. May he ever reign and prosper !

We devoted servants (of the State) do with great pleasure offer our congratulations on the expulsion of the rebels of Arrah, and give thousands of thanks to William Tayler, saheb bahadoor, revenue commissioner, *for his excellent management of this city (Patna) and successfully dealing with the conspirators of this place.* We are gratified and delighted with the good management and extreme diligence of the gentleman above alluded to, and offer him our thanks. Up to this present moment we are in every respect enjoying peace and tranquillity. Such management, if continued, will increase our happiness and comfort, and completely exterminate all rebels against the Government.

---

W. ROBERTSON, Esq., C.S., *Tirhoot.*

September 8th, 1857.

There are not, I am happy to say, two opinions here; we are all of one mind, and no one will hesitate a moment in backing up your order, both as required by the State, and for the saving of European lives.

---

W. McDONELL, Esq., V.C., *Magistrate.*

September 6th, 1857.

Living as I was with you at the time, and consequently knowing what was going on, I felt confident that when people heard your side of the case they would see that you did not act without good reason: your defence is an admirable one, and must carry weight with it.

---

W. TANNER, Esq., *Merchant, Patna.*

March 4th, 1858.

According to my idea, every Christian in these districts—indeed, I may take a wider range, and say the country—owes you a debt of gratitude *for the judgment and the resolution with which you grasped the difficulties and dangers that at one time beset us, and that but for being met, as they were met by you, might have ended in a serious calamity to the State and in the destruction of many a poor Christian.*

---

THE FOLLOWING LETTERS, THOUGH NOT WRITTEN BY RESIDENTS OF PATNA, ARE FROM THE PENS OF MEN WELL QUALIFIED TO SPEAK WITH AUTHORITY ON SUCH A SUBJECT :—

LOUIS JACKSON, ESQ., *Judge of Rajshahee, now Judge of the High Court.*

I don't know any one in the service whom I would have chosen rather than yourself for this union of the *suaviter* and the *fortiter* ; and, having more than one native correspondent on the spot, I have always been assured, that your administration in matters of police had been marked by caution in receiving intelligence, as well as decision in acting upon it when worthy of confidence.

---

REV. ALEXANDER DUFF.

February 18th, 1858.

After all this, I need scarcely add that I regard you as a thoroughly ill-used man. Writing to an influential friend in Scotland the other day, a friend who is sure to make use of my remarks, I could not help saying, *that if there was a man living who deserved the honour of British knighthood at the hands of his Sovereign, that man was Mr. Commissioner Tayler.* But instead of this, what shall I say ? Indeed, words fail me to give expression to my sense of the unmerited indignity which has been offered to you.

---

BRIEF EXTRACTS FROM LETTERS, WRITTEN WITHIN THE LAST FEW YEARS (SINCE MY RETURN TO ENGLAND IN 1867) BY DISTINGUISHED PUBLIC OFFICERS AND STATESMEN, INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME GOVERNMENT IN INDIA, WHO AT THE TIME WERE INDUCED BY MISREPRESENTATIONS TO CONCUR IN MY REMOVAL. MEMBERS OF THE INDIAN COUNCIL AND OTHERS.

---

COLONEL BLANE, *Military Secretary to the Governor-General of India.*

January 19th 1867.

I have read your memorial, of course; it appears quite unanswerable, and makes out one of the strongest cases it is possible to conceive.

---

SIR BARTLE FREERE, G.C.S.I.

October 5th, 1867.

It has now been proved beyond all doubt by the judicial inquiries by Sir H. Edwardes, that your general management of affairs at Patna, your mode of dealing with the Wahabee leaders, and the check thus given to their treasonable plottings, were, as far as human judgment can estimate, the means of saving the province from insurrection.

---

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE, BART., M.P.

December 9th, 1867.

I think the usage you have received has been most grossly unjust, and am free to express my opinion that a simple recognition of your service now is no measure of the debt due to you. In common justice you ought also to be recouped for the fines imposed on you.

---

SIR HERBERT EDWARDES, K.C.B.

January 22nd, 1868.

What concerns you personally, however, is not the *imperial* but the *provincial* question. The Wahabee trials of 1864, at Umballa, and 1865, at Patna, disclosed—or rather brought to judicial proof, in courts of law, before the whole of India, what had only been imperfectly known previously, and most unaccountably pooh-poohed and smothered by the Bengal Government, viz., that for *years* the Wahabee followers of Syed Ahmed had spread a net-work of propagandism over the Bengal province—firstly, to restore the purity of Islam in India; and secondly, as a logical consequence, to undermine and subvert the infidel power of the English.

The centre of this truly bitter and formidable political conspiracy was Patna. You lived there and knew what was going on. *You acted on your knowledge and paralysed the whole of the Wahabee sect, by seizing their leaders at the very moment when they could and would have struck a heavy blow against us.*



The Bengal Government was determined not to believe in the Wahabee conspiracy, and punished you for your vigour. Time has done you justice, shown that you were right, and hanged or transported the enemies whom you suspected and disarmed.

---

SIR R. MONTGOMERY, K.C.B., *late Lieut.-Governor of the Punjaub.*

February 7th, 1868.

Sir Andrew Waugh had given me your *Patna Crisis* to read, and I perused it with great pleasure.

It showed that you had quickly appreciated the circumstances of the mutiny, and that you acted with great vigour, *and in so doing checked the spirit of disaffection which was ready to burst forth at Patna.*

---

T. PARRY WOODCOCK, ESQ., *Retired Bengal Civil Service.*

February 15th, 1868.

I have read with great interest the several pamphlets you were good enough to leave with me; and I have risen from their perusal with a deep sense of the injuries consistently and perseveringly heaped upon you, and with a profound hope that truth will (it must!) prevail, and that you will meet with the just reward, however tardily, *which the ability, courage, and energy you have exerted in your country's cause have so well deserved.*

HON. GERALD TALBOT, *late Private Secretary to Lord Canning.*

February 19th, 1868.

I can, of course, have no sort of objection to repeat what is a very *sincere conviction*, that if Lord Canning had seen the papers which you now have to produce, and been made the acquainted with subsequent progress of events, he would most likely have changed his opinion as to the treatment you have experienced; and if he had changed his opinion, a man of his noble character would have been forward to say so, and to do you justice.

---

GENERAL SIR JOHN LOW, G.C.B., *late Member of the Supreme Council in India, 1868.*

I sincerely believe that your skilful and vigorous management of the disaffected population of Patna was of *immense* value to the Government of India, and that in the last few months of your Commissionership, commencing with the arrest of the three Wahabee conspirators, and the disarming of the greater portion of the inhabitants of the Patna city, *your services were of more vital importance to the public interest than those of many officers, both civil and military, during the whole period of their Indian career, in less critical times, who have been rewarded—and justly rewarded—by honours from the Queen; while your services, by an extraordinary combination of unlucky circumstances, have hitherto been so overlooked. In Oriental phrase, “ what more need I write ? ”*

GENERAL LE G. JACOB, K.C.S.I.

April 2nd, 1868.

If Sir Stafford Northcote have an honest heart, he cannot read your papers *without a sense of indignation at the treatment of one who did so much to meet the horrors of the great rebellion.*

---

SIR ARTHUR COTTON, K.C.B.

May 16th, 1868.

I have been reading the various documents in your pamphlet, and I can hardly say I am surprised at your case, having seen so many similar in essential points during my long service in India, some incredibly bad ; *but I really don't think I have ever known one as flagrant as yours.*

---

MAJOR-GENERAL COLIN MACKENZIE, C.B.

May 25th, 1868.

When I reflect on the sagacity, pluck, self-command, and working power, physical and mental which you displayed while making head against literally fiendish odds at Patna, and an opposition equally trying in quarters where you might have reasonably expected hearty support, I am, in spite of all my experience, amazed at what has befallen you, and at the undeserved humiliation of your present position, which forces you to defend *conduct which commands the deep respect and admiration of all unprejudiced men.*

---

KER BAILLIE HAMILTON, ESQ., C.B., *Late Governor-in-Chief of the Leeward Isles.*

May 27th, 1868.

It is quite clear from the correspondence, and from the testimony recorded by so many eminent Indian statesmen, that (as was at first declared by all who were not your personal enemies), by obtaining amidst unusual difficulties *correct* political information, and by carrying out the measures you thereupon adopted with ability, energy, and promptitude, *you saved your province.*

---

MAJOR EVANS BELL.

July 11th, 1868.

The collection of letters is deeply interesting, and two or three of them are of historical value. Sir John Low's noble admission of his own error ought alone to secure you that signal reparation for such unjust treatment, and that marked recognition of your great services, which cannot, I trust, be delayed much longer.

---

R. D. MANGLES, ESQ., JUN., *Bengal Civil Service, V.C.*

October 4th, 1868.

I can bear my humble testimony to the vigorous and judicious measures which you adopted at Patna, *and which, beyond question, saved that city.* I have always been surprised that your services have never been recognized; but I hope that justice may be yet done to you.

J. A. DORIN, Esq., *Member of the Supreme Government in India in 1857.*

12th October, 1868.

True, time has shown that *he (Mr. Halliday) was wrong and that you were right*, and for your sake I am rejoiced that it is so.

---

HON. E. DRUMMOND, *late Lieut.-Governor of the N.W. Provinces, now Member of the Indian Council.*

4th August, 1868.

I have always, however, considered (whether you were right or wrong in your general policy, of which there might be very well two opinions at the moment, *though subsequent events have triumphantly proved that you were right*) that you were very unjustly and ungenerously treated in being disgraced when you had acted to the best of your judgment, and had fairly earned a share in the honours conferred on many less deserving actors in the perilous crisis of the mutiny; and I need not add that I should rejoice if the injustice could be repaired.

---

SIR ARTHUR PHAYRE, K.C.B.

18th June, 1868.

From a careful perusal of the whole of the documents, I am deeply impressed with the conviction, that *the prompt and vigorous measures adopted by you during June 1857, prevented an outbreak by the disloyal portion of the inhabitants of the city of Patna.*

## EARL OF HOME.

June 16th, 1868.

I am much obliged to you for the pamphlet. I thought your case complete before; but certainly the letters you print are remarkably strong, and it would seem impossible that any one, certainly one naturally kind-hearted, as you believe Sir Stafford Northcote to be, can set aside *such overwhelming testimony*.

---

R. V. BOYLE, Esq., C.S.I.

9th July, 1869.

When I consider these things, how you have been treated for your eminent services while Commissioner of Patna, how you have been wronged, how you were degraded instead of being honoured, and how even yet neglect and injustice are unredressed: *I cannot but feel that until you have been made K.C.S.I., it would be most painful to me to wear, in your presence, the decoration which I have so gratefully received from Her Majesty.*

---

SIR ARTHUR COTTON, K.C.S.I.

December 4th, 1872.

I quite agree with your friend that it makes me ashamed to allow myself to be called a K.C.S.I., when a man, who was a hundred times more deserving of it, is ruined and deprived of it. No words can express too strongly the realities of the case.

W. J. FITZWILLIAM, Esq., *late Member of the  
Legislative Council of India.*

October 26th, 1868.

I have read with great interest your narrative of events as connected with your removal from the Patna Commissionership in 1857; the more so as it fully confirms the opinion of myself and the majority of the Christian inhabitants of Calcutta at that period, "*that your removal was a cruel injustice to yourself, and most discreditable to those who were the cause of it.*"

---

COLONEL T. RATRAY, C.S.I., *Commanding the  
Sikh Regiment at Patna.*

July 22nd, 1869.

Living in your house as I was during the most eventful period of the crisis at Patna, and being therefore in hourly communication with you, I consider myself capable of giving an opinion regarding the high courage evinced by you at that most trying time, deserted almost, as you were, by those officials who should have been your chief support. *Had you not suppressed the Wahabees as you did, all Patna would have been up, which would have tried the fidelity of the Sikhs, possibly more than would have been good for them or for us; but your great energy and pluck in arresting the Wahabee chiefs, not only terrified the disaffected, but caused our friends to respect and fear you.*

From GENERAL SIR SYDNEY COTTON, K.C.B.

November 4th, 1872.

It is only a wonder that we have held India so long as we have done, on the miserable policy of such men as Halliday. I sincerely hope that your own case will be properly dealt with in the end.

---

From MAJOR-GENERAL SIR G. BALFOUR, M.P.

December 13th, 1872.

When in India I fully understood from those who were acquainted with your proceedings that you had rendered good service at Patna in the crisis of 1857, and in return for those services you had been punished instead of being rewarded.

---

From P. G. E. TAYLOR, Esq., Ret<sup>d</sup> B.C.S.

December 21st, 1872.

Any one who knows the whole story, so thoroughly well as I do, can only have one opinion of the *detestable injustice* with which you have all along been treated.

---

From J. BELL, Esq., *Barrister at Law.*

December 17th, 1872.

I hope the quotation as to "*Magna est veritas et prevalebit*" is not always in your case to be read and written in the future tense, and I know I speak the feelings not only of your friends, but also of many personally unacquainted with you, in expressing a hope, that there may be no longer delay in recognising your great merits, and harsh wrongs.



From C. B. DENISON, Esq., M.P.

August 30th, 1873.

The Pamphlet and Standard article bring back vividly to my mind what (are to me) familiar facts. I have never changed my opinion, formed in India in 1857, that you were the victim of error, intrigue, and misrepresentation, and a flagrantly ill-used man by the Bengal Government of that day.

Everything that has since occurred has only served to confirm and intensify my opinion.

If the Government of India have seen their way to reward your native subordinate, Mowla Buksh, who was wrongfully and unrighteously disgraced in 1859, they owe it all the more to you (who were held responsible) to do you complete though tardy justice. "*Aide toi-même et le Dieu t'aidera.*"

Persevere a little while longer, and I venture to hope that you will have the satisfaction of seeing yourself *righted* and your enemies covered with confusion.

From SIR VINCENT EYRE, K.C.S.I.

November 15th, 1873.

I should sincerely rejoice to see your merits as a public officer adequately recognised, now that subsequent events have thrown a flood of light upon what was obscure. It is never too late to mend an unjust decree.

*From* COLONEL FRENCH.

December 2nd, 1873.

Until to-day I have not had time to read the pamphlet, and now, having done so, I am really astonished. You will not I hope have to write one more line on the harsh treatment you have received.

---

*From* COLONEL A. RATHBONE to CAPTAIN  
W. C. PALMER.

December 16th, 1873.

What I have never seen, and never known, and but for my having read this little work could never have imagined, is, that after the affair was over, when passions had time to cool, and when there was so universal a "consensus" on the part of every one as to the manner in which he had been treated—retired Members of Council, retired Members of the Legislative Council, high Indian civilian officials, military officers who were in a position to understand Mr. Tayler's acts and appreciate them, merchants and planters dwelling on the spot, or in its neighbourhood, native Christians who were living under his protection, together with clergymen of all religious denominations, agreeing perhaps upon no other point, but entirely in harmony on this one, the Government should still continue to refuse redress for the wrong it had inflicted.

*From T. AITCHINSON, Esq.*

September 4th, 1873.

Surely the House of Commons must insist on your having redress. Such a claim is a scandal to the country.

---

*From COLONEL BRERETON.*

September 4th, 1873.

I am glad for your sake, and in the cause of justice, that the time has arrived for publicity. What a mean affair human nature is!

---

*From A. WALTER, Esq.*

September 4th, 1873.

I am convinced your case is one of the strongest imaginable, and that no one can answer you.

---

*From C. RIVERS WILSON, Esq.*

October 5th, 1873.

I can have no hesitation in stating the opinion I arrived at, and which is shared by so many eminent men and competent judges—that you rendered signal services to your country, under circumstances of great emergency, for which it is matter of astonishment that fitting recognition should not have been made.

---

THE HON. R. ELLIS, C.B., *Member of the Madras Council (since appointed Member of Indian Council).*

October 2nd, 1873.

I, of course, having been in India during 1857 and 1858, am familiar with the story of Patna, and of your courage and good judgment.

I do not at all despair that justice will at last be done to you. I know no act which would be more appreciated in India than an open and honest recognition of your services by the Government.

---

COLONEL CHAS. HARVEY, *Superintendent of Thugue Department.*

September 21st, 1865.

You have now dispelled the shades in which the matter was enveloped, and have yourself emerged from the cloud in a manner so glorious that it may be said of this pamphlet that you have succeeded by it. "*Non funum ex fulgore, sed ex fumo dare lucem.*"

---

DR. LONG.

July 28th, 1875.

Also in the Mahomedan disaffections at the time of the mutiny, you were one of the few minds awake to the emergency. You were awake when Bengal officials slumbered in a fools' paradise.

Now the Wahabee plotting and its revelations have shown your wisdom in raising a warning cry, though many regarded it like that of Cassandra's.

C. GRAHAM, Esq., *Retired B. C. S.*

September 10th, 1876.

I got your pamphlet when in London, and read it with much interest.

Had old John Company existed, you would have had justice done you long ere this.

---

DAVID WILSON, Esq., *leading Merchant of Calcutta.*

June 6th, 1874.

I have now perused it, and must say I am astounded at the treatment you have received at the hands of Mr. Halliday and the Bengal Government. There cannot be now two opinions as to the great service you rendered to all the European population and the Government cause, by your shrewd and vigilant mind, and your prompt action in arresting such firebrands of the rebellion, thereby saving the lives of every European in your district, and checking the spread for the time of that fearful mutiny.

---

J. H. STOCQUELER, Esq., *late Editor of the Calcutta*  
"ENGLISHMAN."

October 24th, 1871.

Although I have not seen "Our Crisis," I gather quite enough from the other works to feel the utmost scorn and indignation that such men as Mr. F. Halliday and Mr. Samuells should have

been permitted to continue in the service after their atrocious behaviour towards you and their exhibitions of a fatuous belief in the continued loyalty of the Sepoys and the people.

None are so blind as those who will not see. If I were not writing to *you* I should express myself in terms of the warmest admiration of your courage and sound judgment in a most critical emergency.

---

*From* SIR D. MACLEOD, K.C.B.

June 20th, 1871.

I am truly rejoiced to read what you say in regard to Kaye's mention of you in his history. It is most gratifying, and, as he is a thoroughly honest man, you may well be proud of his appreciation of your conduct as gathered from a full scrutiny of the documents relating thereto.

---

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR DIGHTON PROBYN, V.C.,  
K.S.I.

October 10th, 1873.

Thanks for your letter, pamphlets, &c. The article in the *Standard* I saw and read with interest and joy the day it was written. I wish you every success. If I could help you I would, but your claims are strong, and "Right" will out at last.

---

J. F. LEITH, Esq., Q.C.

July 2nd, 1877.

I need scarcely say that I do most sincerely also hope that your appeal to Lord Salisbury may, as you expect, end in a favourable result, to you in all respects,—not only in vindicating your conduct on the occasion as right, but in giving you some compensation for your long suffering and trials of patience and temper during so many years past.

---

*From* COLONEL HARDY.

March 17th, 1876.

Permit me also to congratulate you, or rather to express my own satisfaction at finding, from reading Kaye's third volume, that something like historical justice has at last been done you, after the strange and cruel and shameful injustice you were subjected to in the mutiny time.

---

*From* SIR GEORGE CLERK, K.C.B., *late Member of the Indian Council.*

August 24th, 1876.

Of course Sir Frederick Halliday must long ago have seen that all your measures were right, especially in dealing with "*Islam*" during the rebellion miscalled "*Mutiny*."

I cannot imagine that Lord Salisbury, or any one in his present position, could admit for a

moment any motive as justifying such a scandal as your removal and degradation living any longer.

Five minutes deliberation on your case and as many words would surely suffice to suggest to Sir Frederick to take the manly course, and recommend a mode of revision calculated to relieve you from a sense of injury long endured.

---

*From* GENERAL F. COTTON, C.B.

April 15th, 1877.

If Lord Salisbury is all he has the credit for being, and there is justice in the world, your prayer must be answered in your favour.

It is too terrible to think that such a prayer for justice should be necessary.

---

*From* DR. ALEXANDER DUFF, D.D.

June 16th, 1877.

Earnestly trusting that in the end you will have that justice done to you which all along I felt to be your due.

---

*From* A. GOODALL, Esq. *Inspector General of Hospitals, Madras.*

Is it possible that such services as yours could have been brought to the knowledge of the Secretary of State for India, and up to this hour no apparent notice has been taken?

The thing is incomprehensible.



## EXTRACTS.

—◆—

*From* SIR J. KAYE'S "SEPOY WAR." (*Vol. iii.*)

The chief civil officer of the division was Mr. William Tayler, of whom mention has already been made. A man of varied accomplishments and of an independent tone of thought and speech, he had studied the native character, as only it can be rightly studied, with large-hearted toleration and catholicity of sentiment. Fully alive to the melancholy fact of the great gulf between the two races, he had often dwelt, in his public correspondence, on the evils attending the self-imposed isolation of his countrymen, and the want of sympathy, and therefore the want of knowledge, in all that related to the feelings of the people, of a large majority of official and non-official Englishmen in India. Nearly two years before the outbreak of the mutiny, he had reported to Government that, "owing to sundry causes, the minds of the people in these districts are at present in a very restless and disaffected state, and they have generally conceived the idea that there is an intention on the part of the Government to commence and carry through a systematic

interference with their religion, their caste, and their social customs." Utterances of this kind are never very palatable to Government; and Mr. Tayler was regarded in high places, if not actually as an alarmist, as a man who suffered his imagination to run away with him; and, although it is impossible to govern well and wisely without it, nothing is more detestable to Government than imagination. So it happened that Mr. Tayler had fallen into disrepute with some above him, and had excited the resentment of some below him. He was a man of strong convictions, not chary of speech; and there was small chance at any time of a division under his charge subsiding into the drowsy, somnolent state which gives so little official trouble, and is therefore greatly approved.—Pp. 69, 70.

There was not a man in the country more disposed towards strenuous action than Mr. William Tayler. The instructions which he issued to his subordinates all through the months of June and July were of the most encouraging and assuring kind. He exhorted all men to put on a bold front, to maintain their posts, and to crush all incipient sedition with the strong arm of authority. It was in these words that he wrote to the chief civil officer of Tirhoot, and all his directions to others were in the same strain: "I don't think that you are in danger. The Sepoys, if they rose, would not go so far out of their way. Your own Budmashes, therefore, are all you have to fear.

If you look sharp and raise your extra Police—keep your Sowars in hand—stir up your Darogah—tell that little Rajah to send you men in different parts to help you—keep a look-out at the ghauts, and at the same time quietly arrange for a place of rendezvous in case of real danger, where you may meet; all will go right. . . . Make everybody show a good face—be plucky, and snub any fellows who are impudent. If any people talk sedition threaten them with the rope, and keep a look-out on the Nujeebs. Try and form without any fuss a body of volunteers, mounted gentlemen, so that in case of any extremity they might all meet and pitch into any blackguards. If anything really bad were to happen, the branch volunteers should come into Patna and join the main body, and we would keep the province till assistance should come. These are only probabilities, so don't tell people they are anticipated. The word for Tirhoot is just now 'All serene.'" And it was, doubtless, the true policy to betray no fear, but be thoroughly awake to and prepared for all possibilities of surrounding danger.—Pp. 76, 77.

It is not to be questioned that up to the time of the mutiny of the Dinapore regiments, the whole bearing of the Patna Commissioner was manly to a point of manliness not often excelled in those troubled times. He had exhorted all his countrymen to cling steadfastly to their posts. He had rebuked those who had betrayed their

fears by deserting their stations. His measures had been bold; his conduct had been courageous; his policy had been severely repressive. If he had erred, assuredly his errors had not leaned to the side of weakness. He was one of the last men in the service to strike his colours, save under the compulsion of a great necessity. But when the Dinapore regiments broke into rebellion—when the European troops, on whom he had relied, proved themselves to be incapable of repressing mutiny on the spot, or overtaking it with swift retribution—when it was known that thousands of insurgent Sepoys were overrunning the country, and that the country, in the language of the day, was “up”—that some of the chief members of the territorial aristocracy had risen against the domination of the English, and that the predatory classes, including swarms of released convicts from the gaols, were waging deadly war against property and life—when he saw that all these things were against us, and there seemed to be no hope left that the scattered handfuls of Englishmen at the out-stations could escape utter destruction, he deemed it his duty to revoke the orders which he had issued in more auspicious times, and to call into Patna such of our English establishments as had not already been swept away by the rebellion or escaped without official recall. In doing this he generously took upon himself the responsibility of withdrawal, and absolved all

the officers under him from any blame which might descend upon them for deserting their stations without the sanction of superior authority. It was not doubted that if there had been any reasonable ground of hope that these little assemblies of Englishmen could hold their own, that they could save their lives and the property of the Government by defending their posts, it would have been better that the effort should be made. But their destruction would have been a greater calamity to the state than their surrender. It was impossible to overvalue the worth of European life at that time, and the deaths of so many Englishmen would have been a greater triumph and a greater encouragement to the enemy than their flight. It was the hour of our greatest darkness and our sorest need. We know now how Wake and Boyle and Colvin and their comrades in the "little house" held the enemy in check, and how Vincent Eyre taught both the Sepoy mutineers and the Shahabad insurgents that there was still terrible vitality in our English troops. Of this William Tayler knew nothing. But he had palpably before him the fact of Dunbar's disaster, and he believed that nothing could save the little garrison at Arrah. The probabilities at the time were that the Dinapore regiments, with Kower Singh and his followers, having done their work in that direction, would move, flushed with conquest and gorged with plunder, upon Gyah and other stations, carrying

destruction with them wheresoever they might go. What the Commissioner then did was what had been done and what was being done by other authorities, civil and military, in other parts of the country; and it was held to be sound policy to draw in our scattered outposts to some central point of safety where the enemy might be defied. In this I can perceive no appearance of panic. If Tayler had not acted thus, and evil had befallen the Christian people under his charge, he would have been condemned with a far severer condemnation for so fatal an omission.—Pp. 161, 162, 163.

But the Bengal Government was not at that time in a temper to overlook any failure on the part of Mr. William Tayler. He had given dire offence to his superiors by his "high-handed" mode of conducting the duties of his office. Not only was it his wont to do his work in his own way without consulting any one—to do it first and to write to Government afterwards; but sometimes, in the hurry and crush of overwhelming business, did it without reporting it at all; and this irritated superior authority. The same thing was being done on a larger scale elsewhere; but Patna was comparatively near to Calcutta, and Calcutta had not yet released itself from the coils of the Red Tape. Those were days when men—the best of our men—the men, indeed, who saved the country, thought more of doing than of writing. But Bureaucracy was still fain

to assert that there could be no duty on the part of a public functionary more urgent than that of reporting his proceedings to Government. It is not too much to say that if this duty had been generally recognised we should have lost India.

Happily, such instances as these are few—if, indeed, there be any other of a like character; or there might be a fear that, warned by the fate of William Tayler, if a great storm should again overtake us, the masters of our vessels might be found sitting quietly in their cabins, with their pens in their hands, minuting and recording, asking leave to save the ship after the most approved fashion, and trying to still the troubled waters with the oil of official correspondence.—  
Pp. 163, 164.

But the story of Mr. Tayler's disgrace would be incomplete, if one special reason alleged for his condemnation were not noticed and examined. It was said at the time that the Wahabee conspiracies of which he spoke were phantoms of his imagination. Time sets all things right—whether by illustrating truth or by unmasking imposture. The Commissioner of Patna was said to have ill-treated innocent Wahabee gentlemen. It is hard for a man who has been stripped of fame and fortune to wait patiently, during long years, for his vindication. Mr. Tayler did not wait patiently; but he waited long, and the vindication came. It was patent in rebellions and wars; in secret plots and open

assassinations. It was pronounced by high courts and solemn tribunals. It was proved that there was a network of Wahabee conspiracy all over the land, and that "the centre of this truly bitter and formidable conspiracy was Patna." Pp. 164, 165.

But the work of retribution was not then complete. There was yet another arch-conspirator to be brought to the judgment-seat. This was the Moulavee Ahmed-oollah, of Patna—brother of the above-mentioned Yahiya Ali. He was one of the three Wahabee Moulavees whom Commissioner Tayler had arrested in his\* dining-room in June, 1857—and was their spokesman on that occasion. After Tayler's degradation, Moulavee Ahmed-oollah was fondled by the Government officials of Bengal. He might have been seen shaking hands at Belvedere with the Lieutenant-Governor, in the presence of the Viceroy. It was said that the inoffensive Wahabee gentlemen, whom Tayler had arrested, were mere "book-men;" and for awhile they laughed among themselves at the pleasant credulity of the English. But when Captain Parsons, in

\* Some misunderstanding has been caused by this word, and enemies have endeavoured to show that I had asked these men to dinner! and arrested them when my guests at table! The simple fact is that all my public work was done, for secrecy's sake, at my house, and my "dining room" was my office! This has been explained by Sir J. Kaye, in a note to the second edition of his third volume.



1864, swept up a number of these Wahabee martyrs, and carried them off to Umballah to be tried for their lives, on charges of high treason, the position of Ahmed-oollah—the official pluralist, high in honour, drawing the money of the State—did not seem quite so secure. It was doubtful whether the good fortune, which had compassed him for so many years and enabled him to laugh at his enemies, would much longer sustain him in prosperity. Parsons came down to Patna, and for two months was helping the Magistrate, Ravenshaw, to hunt out evidence against the harmless "bookman." Nothing could be clearer or more convincing than the fact that he had aided and abetted the making of war against her Majesty the Queen. He was tried at Patna, before Mr. Ainslie, the Sessions Judge, and convicted mainly upon the evidence of one of his fellow-conspirators, who had been tried and sentenced at Umballah. The Sessions Judge awarded the punishment of death; but the High Court commuted it to transportation for life and confiscation of property. So the honoured guest and favoured friend of the Patna Commissioner and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal was sent to the Andamans, where he had the satisfaction of seeing the Viceroy of India assassinated by a brother-convict.—Pp. 168, 169.

*From* COLONEL MALLESON'S "HISTORY OF THE  
INDIAN MUTINY." (*Chap. ii.*)

But it was at the great station of Patna, the Mahomedan capital of the country east of Benares, that the strain was most severely felt. This city, containing 300,000 inhabitants, a large proportion of whom were Mahomedans, is situated on the right bank of the river Ganges, three hundred and eighty miles north-west of Calcutta, and ten miles east of the military station of Dinapore.

Patna owed its importance partly to its traditions; partly to the fact that it was the capital of one of the richest provinces in the country; partly likewise to its being the head-quarters of the Wahabees—the extreme Mahomedan party in India. It was ruled by a Commissioner, corresponding directly with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. Subordinate to it and to its Commissioner were the districts of Gyah, to the South, with a chief town of the same name, fifty miles distant; of Shahabad, comprising the country between the Ganges, the Karamnasa, and the Son, and having as its capital Arrah, about thirty-five miles to the west of Patna; of Sarun, with Chapra, forty miles to the north, as its capital; of Chunparun, with Moteeharee, as its chief station; and Tirhoot, between Nepaul and the Ganges, represented by the civil station

of Mozuffarpore. In these stations the magistrate represented the executive power.

The station of Dinapore was garrisoned by three Native Infantry Regiments, the 7th, 8th, and 40th, by one company of European and one of Native Artillery, and by Her Majesty's 10th Foot. Dinapore was the head-quarters of a division, and its divisional commander was Major-General Lloyd, an officer who had rendered excellent service in his day, and who, but four years before, had been selected by Lord Dalhousie to suppress the Santhal insurrection—a task which he had accomplished with judgment and discretion. His command at Dinapore was extensive in its range. To the north it included all the country to the foot of the Nepal hills; to the east it reached Berhampore; to the south Hazaribagh and Rampur. The troops protecting this vast extent of country were, with one exception, massed at Dinapore. That exception was the 12th Regiment of Irregular Cavalry, commanded by a most distinguished officer, Major Holmes. This corps was stationed at Sigaoli, about a hundred miles to the north of Dinapore.

The province of which Patna was the capital, was, I have said, one of the richest in the possession of the English. It owed its importance partly to the fact that for several years it had been the chosen ground for the development of native industry by English land-

holders working with English capital; partly, and to a far greater extent, to the circumstance that the native landowners were, as a rule, men of ancient lineage and of large estates.

Before the arrival of reinforcements from Persia, Ceylon, and Barma, the European regiment at Dinapore was the only English regiment in the long line between Calcutta and Lucknow. Having in view the extent of country it had to guard, its proximity to the influential city of Patna, to the fact that many of the native landowners of Behar were men commanding a large following, it still seems strange that the expedient so successfully adopted at Lahore and other places—the expedient of disarming the native troops—was not early resorted to here. The postponement of such a measure necessarily chained the European troops to the station of Dinapore, leaving all the other districts in the Patna division to shift for themselves.

It was from no lack of knowledge of the danger of leaving arms in the hands of the sepoys, that the Government of India hesitated to give the order to disarm them. The Commissioner of Patna, Mr. William Tayler, had been unremitting alike in impressing his courageous spirit on the disaffected, and in keeping the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal well informed of the general aspect of affairs. As this gentleman's name will figure somewhat conspicuously

in the following pages, it is fit that I should introduce him here.

Mr. William Tayler was a member of the Bengal Civil Service. He was a gentleman and a scholar, possessing great natural abilities which he had lost no opportunity of cultivating, an elegant mind, and a large fund of common sense. To these should be added the greater gifts, during a crisis such as that of which I am writing, of a nerve not to be shaken, a clear view, and a power to decide rapidly and correctly in difficult circumstances. In the prime of life, courteous in manner, loyal to his Government, ready to hear the opinions of all, yet resolved to act on those which best commended themselves to his understanding, he was just the man whom a Wellesley or a Napier would have detached as his lieutenant to command a difficult position.

The mutinous spirit displayed early in the year by the sepoys at Berhampore, and later by those at Barrackpore, had not been unnoticed by Mr. Tayler. As the pro-consul of a province which had as its capital the city of Patna, the head-quarters of the chiefs of the Wahabees, it had devolved upon him to watch every vibration in the political system, so strangely agitated since the beginning of the year. Mr. Tayler, with a forecast surer than that of Mr. Secretary Beadon, had detected in the action of the 19th Regiment of Native Infantry and in the scarce-concealed sympathy with that action of the

regiments stationed at Barrackpore, the germs of a very contagious political disease, and he had deemed it not at all improbable that, if not wholly eradicated by the measures of Government the disease might gradually spread upwards. Never for a moment did he believe in the "passing and groundless panic" theory of Mr. Beadon. But not even Mr. Tayler, astute and far-seeing as he was, had imagined that the contagion would be communicated, as if by magic, to the upper provinces, passing over the intermediate divisions, to attack the body politic, suddenly, in its very heart.

When, therefore, the catastrophe of the 10th of May occurred at Meerut, it took not less by surprise the Commissioner of Patna than every other official in India. But Mr. Tayler was equal to the occasion. He summoned the European inhabitants of the place to deliberate on the means to be adopted to avert the crisis from Patna. Rejecting the timid counsel offered him shortly before by the judge,—who then, or a little later, took refuge in the opium godown,—to despatch the Government treasure to Dinapore and to be prepared on the first alarm to follow it thither, Mr. Tayler briefly stated to those present his information, his apprehensions, and his hopes, and then added that if they had confidence in him, he was prepared to assume the entire responsibility, and to act as he might consider necessary. In reply the Europeans

present voted by acclamation confidence in their Commissioner. Thus armed, Mr. Tayler prepared for the inevitable emergency.

On the 7th June the crisis seemed to arrive. Intimation was received that evening from Dinapore to the effect that the native regiments were in a state of excitement, and that a rise was apprehended that very night.

Mr. Tayler determined at once to make of his own house a fortress for the whole station. He drove to the nearest residents, and sent messengers to those further off, begging them to accept his hospitality during the crisis. In less than an hour his house was crowded by men, women, and children, from all parts of Patna. The house, however, was garrisoned by the Station Guards, who were all natives. Could they be trusted? Suddenly the discovery of a letter passing between them and the sepoys at Dinapore showed Mr. Tayler that his guards were in league with the disaffected regiments.

Fortunately, a body of Sikhs newly raised by Captain Rattray, were then within forty miles of Patna. Mr. Tayler had sent expresses a day or two before to summon these men. They arrived at the early dawn. For the moment, then, Patna, was safe. The several residents returned to their homes.

A full report of this threatened outbreak made to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal had not the effect of inducing the Government of India

to order the disarming of the men from whom the outbreak had been apprehended. Major-General Lloyd, then commanding at Dinapore, had passed all his service in a sepoy regiment. He had witnessed the fidelity of the native soldier under trying and difficult circumstances, and, fortified by the opinion of the several commandants of regiments, he still clung to his belief in their loyalty. He shut his eyes too closely to the fact that of the three native regiments under his command two had already shown a mutinous disposition. Like so many officers, good honest men, who had spent their lives amid the sepoys, he could not bring himself absolutely to mistrust them,—to recommend their disarming, equivalent, in his opinion, to their dishonour. His confidence in his own judgment was increased by the fact that on the 7th of June—about the period when so many other regiments had risen ; when he had been positively informed that his regiments would certainly rise ; and when an opportunity had been offered them of seizing some £200,000 of money belonging to the Government, as they believed, but slightly guarded—those regiments had remained passive. On the 2nd of June he had reported to the Government his belief that the regiments would remain quiet, “ unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them,” and five days later he reiterated the same opinion.



The Government, then, had before them the report of the Commissioner of the danger incurred at Patna on the 7th of June, and the opinion of the Major-General commanding the division that the native troops would remain quiet, " unless some great temptation or excitement should assail them." Having in view the composition of the native society at Patna, the isolation of the stations dependent upon it, the vast wealth of the province, the Government must, I think, be held guilty of fatuity in trusting, at such a crisis, to the chance that no great temptation or excitement would assail the sepoys. Neither at that time nor later would there have been any difficulty in disarming the sepoys at Dinapore. The 10th Regiment was on the spot, and detachments of European troops were constantly conveyed past the station in steamers.

The only defence of the inaction of the Government with which I am acquainted, relating to this particular period, the first week of June, is to the effect that Lord Canning had " not merely to consider what was locally or individually best but what was most generally conducive to the interests of those under his charge." It has been urged that the result of disarming might have been " dangerous in the extreme to our people in other parts of the country where sepoys abounded, and not a detachment of Europeans was to be seen " : that

the Governor-General "was looking anxiously for the arrival of fresh reinforcements when the game would be more in his own hands ; but in the then destitute state of the Lower Provinces, it seemed to him and to the members of his Council to be sounder policy to temporise.\* But these and similar arguments will not bear examination. Nothing that might have been done in the way of disarming could have produced results so disastrous as those which actually followed the inactive policy of the Government of India, and which I am now about to record. It may likewise be added that when Lord Canning had fresh reinforcements at his disposal, he still refused, in the manner hereafter to be described, to order the disarming of the sepoys.

To return to Patna. The report brought by Captain Rattray of the reception accorded to his Sikh soldiers by the inhabitants of the city and the districts in its vicinity, was not of a nature to allay the apprehensions which his profound acquaintance with the province had excited in the mind of Mr. Tayler. Those soldiers, he was informed, had been constantly reviled on their march towards Patna, taunted with the part they were taking, accused of being renegades to their faith, and asked whether they intended to fight for the infidel or for their religion. When they entered Patna the high priest of the Sikh temple

\* Sir John Kaye, vol. iii. p. 65.

in the city refused to admit them to the sacred shrine, and wherever they were seen they met the most palpable evidences of the hatred and contempt of the population.

Private inquiries which Mr. Tayler instituted at this time soon brought to his mind the conviction that secret mischief was brewing. He learnt, too, that conferences of disaffected men were held at night, though in a manner so secret and so well guarded, that proof of meeting was rendered difficult, the capture of the plotters impossible.

The alarm meanwhile was increasing. The judge of Patna, the opium agent, and some others, left their houses with their families and took refuge in the opium godown. It spread likewise to the districts. Mr. Wake, the magistrate of Arrah, afterwards so distinguished for his gallantry in the defence of that place, wrote to Mr. Tayler on the 11th, informing him that many of the railway *employés* and other Europeans had run away from his district in a panic, and had taken refuge in Dinapore.

Under these trying circumstances Mr. Tayler acted with vigour, with judgment, and with decision. He stood out prominently amongst his compeers. He hid nothing from his superiors. The details of the crisis through which his division was passing were, therefore, well known in Calcutta. And when post after post brought to the capital accounts of the risings at Benares,

at Azimgurh, in Central India and in the North-Western Provinces, the question rose naturally and involuntarily to the lips :—" How is it that Patna is quiescent ?" Patna was quiescent simply because one man, Mr. William Tayler, the Commissioner of the Division, was a brave and determined man, ready to strike when necessary, and incapable, even under the darkest circumstances, of showing hesitation or fear.

The metal of which his character was formed was soon to be further tested. The disaffection among the Dinapore troops, and in the districts, being daily on the increase, Mr. Tayler directed the removal of the moneys in the treasuries of Chapra and Arrah into Patna, thus bringing the coin under his own eye. He controlled with a firm hand the movements in his six districts of officials, some of whom had actually left their stations under the conviction of an impending attack. Every day the post and messengers brought him intelligence of disaffection on the one side, of apprehension on the other ; of plots to murder, of plots to burn, of plots to rise in revolt. He was informed, moreover, that Kúnwar Singh, a powerful landowner, whose estates in the vicinity of Arrah were peopled by a martial tenantry devoted to their chief, was making secret preparations to seize the first opportunity to revolt.

Mr. Tayler did not, at the moment, credit the reports about Kúnwar Singh individually. He was

well aware that to all the disaffected nobles and landowners of the districts only two opportunities, or one of two opportunities, would prove sufficiently tempting. These were, the mutiny of the native regiments at Dinapore, and the rising of the population of Patna. It was clear that a successful mutiny at Dinapore would be instantaneously followed by the rising of Patna; equally so that a successful rising at Patna would precipitate the mutiny of the native troops. Mr. Tayler was, however, confident that if allowed by the Government unfettered action, he could maintain order in Patna so long as the native troops at Dinapore should remain quiescent. Thus, in his view, all, for the moment, depended on the quiet attitude of the sepoys.

So many symptoms, amongst others intercepted correspondence, seeming to show that the native troops were only watching their opportunity, it appeared to Mr. Tayler imperatively necessary that they should be disarmed with as little delay as possible. He endeavoured to impress his views in this respect on Major-General Lloyd. But in this he was unsuccessful. Major-General Lloyd held to the views I have already quoted, and declared repeatedly to Mr. Tayler that he was in direct communication with Lord Canning on the subject, and that he would carry the province through the crisis without resorting to the supreme measure of disarming.

Mr. Tayler's position was rendered a thousand

times more difficult by the fact that in addition to a disaffected city under his very eyes to disaffected districts within ranges varying from thirty to a hundred miles, to disaffected land-owners controlling large portions of those districts, he had within eight miles of his own door three native regiments, pledged, as their correspondence showed, to mutiny, and only watching their opportunity. It is difficult to realise the enormous responsibility thus thrown upon the shoulders of one man. Other positions in India were dangerous, but this was unique in the opportunities of danger which threatened it, in the number of the lives, in the amount of treasure, in the extent of country, devolving upon one man, almost unaided, to guard. Without a single European soldier, and with only a few Sikhs, at his disposal, Mr. Tayler was responsible for the lives of some hundreds of Europeans scattered over the province, for a treasury in his own city containing more than £300,000, and in the districts of still more, for opium of the value of millions, for his own good name, for the credit and honour of his country. And now all around was surging. Any moment might bring revolt and mutiny to his door.

I have said in my description of Mr. Tayler that he possessed great natural talents which he had cultivated. In the course of his reading he had not been slow to observe that in great crises, when two armies, or two political parties, are

sitting armed opposite to each other, each watching its opportunity, success almost invariably inclined to the leader who struck the first blow. The time had now arrived for him to consider whether he was not himself placed in a position in which he would be justified in dealing at the disaffected chiefs a blow which would paralyse their movements—a blow not accompanied by bloodshed, but one strictly of self-defence. The measure he contemplated may, in one sense, be termed a measure of disarming. He was not strong enough, indeed, to disarm at the moment the inhabitants of Patna by depriving them of their weapons, but he could disarm their counsels of wisdom by apprehending and confining their trusted leaders. It was a bold and daring idea, requiring strength of nerve and resolution to carry through ; but the necessities were pressing, the dangers were threatening, a general rising in Patna might be fatal. Mr. Tayler resolved to anticipate those dangers, to render impossible or fruitless that rising, by acting in the manner I have indicated.

Accordingly he struck. Private information had satisfied Mr. Tayler that the chiefs of the disaffected natives were the Wahabee Múlvís. These men were the leaders of the most bigoted Mahomedan party in the world, and as such commanded implicit obedience from the mass of Patna Mahomedans, holding in their hands the strings of the contemplated movement. Promi-

ment amongst these Múlvís were three men, Sháh Mahomed Hussén, Ahmad Ullá, and Waiz-úl-Haqq. To seize these men openly would have provoked the outbreak which Mr. Tayler was careful to avoid. But it was necessary for the public peace that they should be secured. Mr. Tayler, therefore, requested their presence, and the presence of others, to consult on the state of affairs. When the conference was over he allowed the others to depart, but detained the three men I have named, informing them that in the then existing state of affairs it was necessary that they should remain under supervision. They politely acquiesced, and were conducted to a comfortable house near the Sikh encampment where suitable accommodation had been provided for them.

The act of Mr. Tayler in arresting, without warning them that he intended to arrest them—in a word by enticing them to his house—men of whose guilt he had evidence amounting, in his mind, to certainty, and who, if left at large, would have so organised the outbreak that it should coincide with the rise of the sepoys—has been compared, in principle, to “the treacherous assassination of Sir William Macnaghten by Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan.”\* It is difficult to apprehend how the writer could have mistaken the striking difference between the two occur-

\* Sir John Kaye, vol. iii. p. 84.



rences. Mahomed Akbar and Sir William Macnaghten were representatives of two nations, the one at war with the other: at the conference at which they met, Mahomed Akbar had guaranteed in the most solemn and sacred manner the life of his guest. Yet Mahomed Akbar shot Sir William Macnaghten dead. Mr. Tayler, on the other hand, represented the governing power of the land; the Múlvís were the avowed subjects of that power; they were not Mr. Tayler's guests; they went to his house to hear the voice of the Government they served; and that voice ordered them to remain in honorary confinement so long as the crisis might last. They were subjected to no humiliation: to no disgrace. Simply the power of endangering the lives of others was taken away from them.

This act occurred on the 19th of June. It was followed up by the arrest of Múlví Médhi, the patrolling magistrate of the city, strongly suspected of connivance with the disaffected. The next day, the 20th, the rank and file having been overawed by the seizure of their chiefs, Mr. Tayler issued a proclamation calling upon all citizens to deliver up their arms, within twenty-four hours, on pain of being proceeded against; and another, forbidding all citizens, those excepted who might be specially exempted, from leaving their homes after nine o'clock at night.

These several measures were to a great extent

successful. The disaffected were deprived of their most trusted leaders; several thousand stand of arms were peaceably delivered up; nightly meetings of the conspirators ceased. As a first practical result, the judge, Mr. Farquharson, the opium agent, Mr. Garrett, and others, left their refuge at the opium godown, and returned to their houses. The second was the sudden diminution of the symptoms of disaffection throughout the districts under Mr. Tayler's orders.

But the crisis was not over. Three days later a corporal of the native police, Wáris Ali by name, was arrested at his own station in Tirhoot, under most suspicious circumstances. Upon his person was found a bundle of letters implicating in the rebellious movement one Ali Karím, an influential Mahomedan gentleman, residing nine miles from Patna.

Mr. Tayler at once despatched the magistrate of Patna, Mr. Lewis, to arrest this gentleman, placing at his disposal a party of Sikh cavalry. But Mr. Lewis, listening to the voice of the native official who was to accompany him, resolved to act without the cavalry. The same friendly voice which had proffered this advice, warned Ali Karím of the magistrate's approach. When Mr. Lewis came in sight of his intended victim, the latter was mounted on an elephant. Mr. Lewis had at his disposal a small pony gig—and his legs. As Ali Karím turned at once

into the fields, he was enabled easily to baffle his pursuer, and to escape.

The order which Mr. Tayler's bold measures had thus restored was maintained without interruption till the 3rd of July. The disaffected had been thoroughly cowed. In the interval, however, reports of the massacre at Shahjehanpore, of the fall of Cawnpore, of Futtehpoore, and of Furruckabad, came to reanimate their hopes. The attitude of the sepoy regiments continued doubtful.

But on the evening of the 3rd of July the long-threatened Patna rising occurred. Thanks, however, to the energetic measures already taken by Mr. Tayler, it occurred in a form so diluted that a continuation of the same daring and resolute policy sufficed to repress it. It happened in this wise. At the period on the 3rd already indicated, some 200 Mahomedan fanatics, led by one Pir Ali, a bookseller, noted for his enthusiasm for his religion and his hatred of the English, unfurled the green flag, and summoning by beat of drum others to join them rushed, calling upon Allah, towards the Roman Catholic Church, situate in the very heart of the city. On the news of this movement reaching Mr. Tayler, that gentleman directed Captain Rattray, attended by the magistrate, to march down with 150 Sikhs, whilst for the protection of the residents he put into operation the same precautions which had been adopted on the 7th of June, he himself

going in person to the houses nearest to his own.

Meanwhile, and before the Sikhs had reached the spot, Dr. Lyall, the assistant to the opium agent, hearing the uproar, and thinking that his presence might overawe the rioters, had galloped to the scene of action. As he approached the crowd several shots were fired at him. By one of these he was killed.

The sight of a fallen European stimulated the fanaticism of the crowd, and produced on them the effect which the taste of blood arouses in a hungry tiger. They pushed onwards with renewed enthusiasm, their numbers being augmented at every step. In a very few minutes, however, they found themselves face to face with Rattray's 150 Sikhs. Between the opposing parties, far from sympathy, there was the hatred of race, the hatred of religion; on the one side the newly aroused fanaticism, on the other the longing for opportunity to repay many a covert insult. It can well be imagined what followed. There was not a moment of parley. The rival parties instantaneously clashed, and, in a few seconds, the discipline and bayonets of the Sikhs suppressed the long-threatened Patna rising.

The next day, and the day following, the city was searched for the ringleaders of the outbreak. Thirty-one were apprehended. Amongst these were Pír Ali, the actual leader, and Shekh

Ghasita, the confidential servant of Lútf Ali Khán, the richest banker in the city.

Of the thirty-one men who were apprehended, fourteen were tried and executed without delay. With them likewise was hanged the Wáris Ali referred to in a previous page. Two—the two above named—were remanded for further examination.

Facts seemed to speak strongly against them. It was clearly proved that Pír Ali was a main agent for promoting a crusade against the English; that for months he and the Shekh Ghasita above mentioned had engaged and kept in pay numerous men who should be ready, when called upon, to fight for their religion and the Emperor of Delhi. But these operations had required a large outlay. Pír Ali was poor. His associate, Ghasita, was the hand of the great banker. But though it might have been fairly presumed that the great banker was implicated, no proceedings were, for the moment, taken against him.

The two men, Pír Ali and Ghasita, were tried and hanged. Lútf Ali, arraigned subsequently on the charge of harbouring a mutinous sepoy, and acquitted by the judge on the ground of insufficient evidence, was promptly released, and shortly afterwards was welcomed and honoured as a martyr by the successor of Mr. Tayler!

But the outbreak was suppressed. It had been premature. As Pír Ali admitted, Mr. Tayler's

strong measures had forced his hand and compelled him to strike before he was ready. But for those strong measures the conspiracy would have been silently hatched until the outbreak at Dinapore should have given it the signal for explosion.

Whilst Mr. Tayler, thus, in spite of the all but superhuman difficulties in his path, maintained order in the most disaffected city still under British rule in India, and the districts immediately contiguous, Major Holmes, commanding the 12th Irregular Cavalry, acting in concert with him, and pursuing the same system, prevented an outbreak in the frontier district of Sigaoli. It is true, indeed, that Major Holmes still believed in his native soldiers, and equally true that up to the moment of their actual outbreak—almost simultaneous with that at Dinapore—they had shown no symptom of disaffection. But this belief on the part of Major Holmes was so generally shared by the officers of the Bengal army, that it should attract no surprise. It was natural that the officers should believe in men with whom they had been associated twenty, thirty, and forty years; who had followed them unhesitatingly through the snows of Kabal; whose forefathers had served with goodwill in the expeditions against Egypt, and the Isles of France and Bourbon; and who had protested against the indignity of being suspected. That was natural enough. But it

was not natural that the Government, raised above the passions and prejudices of regimental officers, should more than share their sympathies. With the far wider scope open to their view the Government possessed means, not available to the officers, of testing the truth of the lip-service so freely proffered by the men. It is impossible to say how much loss of life, how much misery, how much evil would have been avoided had the Government of India not refused to take from the native troops of the Dinapore division the arms, which their own sepoy-trained Major-General had assured them, would be loyally used only if no great temptation or excitement should assail them !

Still, order was maintained. The means employed to assure that order, whilst they gained for Mr. Tayler the confidence of the English planters and traders throughout the province, were not at all to the taste of the Government of Bengal. Of that province, Mr. Halliday, of the Bengal Civil Service, was Lieutenant-Governor. It is scarcely to be doubted that if Mr. Tayler and Mr. Halliday could have changed places ; if the former had been Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, and the latter Commissioner of the Patna division, whilst the affairs of Bengal would not certainly have suffered, the nature of the rule at Patna would have been widely different. I am unwilling to re-open wounds which have partly closed, but

no sane man who was in Behar at the time doubts that whilst the policy of Mr. Tayler, condemned by Mr. Halliday, saved Patna ; the policy of concealing from the public view facts which it was of vital importance that the public should know,—of coquetting, so to speak, with armed rebels,—advocated by that gentleman, and employed so uselessly elsewhere, would, if followed, have played the game of the disaffected. The Patna rising, so easily suppressed by Mr. Tayler, would have been indeed a red day in the calendar of Mr. Halliday.

I repeat, under Mr. Tayler, order was maintained, under most difficult circumstances, in Patna. About Patna, then, so long as he should remain there, no apprehension was felt. But the case was not so with respect to Dinapore. There, the sepoys remained armed and trusted. In spite of intercepted letters, of men occasionally caught in mutinous acts, the Government continued to trust to the chance that "no great temptation or excitement" would induce them to rise.

Far different was the feeling of the European community of Calcutta. These had important interests in Behar, large districts of which were watered and fertilised by their capital. These interests seemed to depend entirely on the good behaviour of the sepoys. To many of them it was a question of wealth or poverty, to those on the spot of death or of existence. In Mr. Tayler they had absolute confidence. His measures



had warded off one danger. But the other still remained, clear, vivid, threatening; ready to burst forth at any moment; safe to encounter no opposition capable of restraining it for an hour.

\* \* \* \* \*

To return to Patna. If the effect of the revolt of the Dinapore sepoy, the mutiny of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, and the defeat of Dunbar's force, had been to neutralize all the prudent measures taken up to that time by the Commissioner of the Patna Division, the effect of Eyre's victory was to restore the confidence which the three events alluded to had so severely shaken. In taking, then, a comprehensive glance at the province of Behar at this particular moment, we see, standing out from the mass, two prominent figures in whose presence all the others, the garrison of Arrah alone excepted, are completely effaced. These two figures are Mr. Tayler and Major Eyre. In spite of unparalleled difficulties Mr. Tayler had, up to the 25th of July, saved Behar. The Government of India and Major-General Lloyd then suddenly stepping in, neutralised to a great extent his stupendous exertions, and allowed the province to drift to the very verge of destruction. Major Eyre, dropping, as it were, from the clouds, warded off that impending destruction. Those who had caused the danger were thus blotted out from the public view. The wisdom and daring of Mr. Tayler, the energy and deter-

mination of Major Eyre, had atoned for the feebleness and timidity of the leaders who did not guide.

But there was an intervening period which, for the right understanding of the subsequent action of the Governments of India and of Bengal, it is necessary that I should notice. I mean the period which elapsed between the mutiny of the native troops at Dinapore and Sigaoli and the relief of Arrah by Major Eyre.

The mutiny of the native troops had been an event to try to the utmost Mr. Tayler's hold on the province of which he was pro-consul. He had heard the Major-General commanding the division talking seriously of intrenching himself at Dinapore. There was no assistance, then, to be looked for from that quarter. In the other direction, his right-hand man, Major Holmes, had been murdered by his own soldiers, and to those soldiers, about five hundred in number, the lives of the Europeans and the treasuries all over the province, might at any moment fall a prey. We have seen how Mr. Tayler behaved under these almost desperate circumstances; how he had posted to Major-General Lloyd to implore that officer to send out at once a force to attack the rebels. It certainly was not Mr. Tayler's fault that the force despatched at his earnest instigation should have been badly commanded and disgracefully beaten.

But the fact that that force was disgracefully

beaten added enormously to the difficulties of Mr. Tayler's position. The chances that Arrah would almost immediately fall seemed reduced to a certainty. What could fifteen Europeans and fifty Sikhs effect against six thousand trained sepoys, and a large body of irregular troops? Granted even—in itself, if Eyre had been beaten, an impossible assumption, for the rebels would then have captured the guns necessary for their purpose—that the position at Arrah was impregnable, the supplies of food and of powder were very limited. But for Major Eyre, the fears of every one in the province regarding the Arrah garrison must have been speedily realised; and it was not given to Mr. Tayler more than to any one else to feel assured that amid the detachments steaming up the Ganges one would certainly be commanded by the very man for the occasion, by the Dumouriez, who, in the silence and solitude of Gwalior, had trained himself to be prepared for any emergency. The defeat of Captain Dunbar's force, then, seemed to leave the lives and the treasuries of Behar more than ever at the absolute mercy of the revolted soldiery.

Now, for those lives and for those treasuries, Mr. Tayler was responsible to the Government of which he was in Behar the representative. The danger was great, the emergency was unparalleled. The rebel army led, as was known, by a powerful and influential landowner, flushed

with victory, and provided to a certain extent with guns which had been exhumed from that landowner's estate, was awaiting only the fall of Arrah to overrun the province. The recent defeat had reduced the Dinapore garrison to absolute inaction.

Rumours from the district were rife to the effect that the Dúmraon Rájá, whose estates extended along the line of road from Arrah to Baksar, had joined or was about to join the rebels in Patna, the local police were distrusted, the Sikhs were for the most part employed on guard duties ; very few even of them were available for any purpose outside the station.

In four out of the five districts the means of defence were even less. These districts as already stated, were known under the names of Shahabad, Gyah, Sarun, Tirhoot, and Chumparun. Arrah, the capital of the district of Shahabad, was virtually in the possession of the rebels ; at Gyah, also, the chief station of its district, there were indeed one hundred Sikhs and forty-five European soldiers ; Mozuffarpore, the chief station of Tirhoot, was undefended, whilst Chapra and Moteeharee, the capitals respectively of the districts of Sarun and Chumparun, had been abandoned by the European officials in consequence of the pressure of the mutineers.

It was at Gyah and Mozuffarpore, then, that the greatest danger was to be apprehended.

The position of these stations rendered them peculiarly liable to attack. They were exposed to the first brunt of the fury of the mutineers, and they had no sufficient means to resist them.

It must always be remembered that, at the period of which I am writing, the fall of Arrah was considered certain. Equally certain, that a catastrophe of that nature would be promptly followed by a rising of all the disaffected through Behar. The question which the Commissioner of Patna had to solve, then, was this : whether he should trust to the seemingly impossible chance of Arrah being relieved, and, in that case, risk the lives of the officers under his orders, and the treasure under their charge ; or, whether he should prepare himself to meet the coming danger, by drawing in his too widely extended line, and massing his forces in a central position.

Had Mr. Tayler been a timid or a vain-glorious man, he would have shrunk from the responsibility of withdrawing his officers from the positions assigned to them by the Government. But being cool and resolute, ready to assume responsibility when the public weal was endangered, and endowed with a remarkable clear vision, Mr. Tayler adopted the sensible course of directing the officials at Gyah and Mozuffarpore to retire upon the central position of Patna.

Mr. Tayler well knew that, serving a Govern-

ment which judged only by results, and which had already displayed a desire to judge him harshly, the responsibility which he was thus taking upon himself was enormous. But with the knowledge which he possessed, that Gyah was filled with men waiting only their opportunity to rise ; that the jail there alone contained eight hundred prisoners ready to commit any enormity ; that the fall of Arrah would certainly prove the signal for an attack on Gyah, he felt that but one course was possible, and that course he adopted.

The order to the officials at Gyah and Mozuffarpore authorised them to withdraw their establishments to Patna, bringing with them the coin in the treasury, unless by doing so their personal safety should be endangered.\*

This order was transmitted on the 31st of July, after Mr. Tayler had become cognisant of the disaster which had befallen Captain Dunbar's expedition.

Mr. Tayler's order was acted upon with the

\* The purport of Mr. Tayler's order could not be mistaken. It was clear that, in the presence of danger of an attack from an overwhelming body, with which their small force should be unable to cope, Mr. Tayler took upon himself the responsibility of saving the lives of his subordinates, even at the risk of abandoning the money, if the attack should take place, or if, in the opinion of his subordinates, it should be so imminent as not to admit of taking the usual measures for removing the treasure. In a word he relieved his subordinates of the responsibility of uselessly sacrificing their lives in attempting to defend money-bags which they could not save.

best results at Mozuffarpore. The residents there, utterly unprotected, and endangered further by the presence of a detachment of the 12th Irregular Cavalry, had been very apprehensive of a rising, and had some days before vainly implored Major-General Lloyd to detach a few European soldiers for their protection. They, therefore, hailed Mr. Tayler's order as their sheet-anchor. Having no troops to form an escort, they were unable to take the public money with them. They left it, therefore, in the Treasury, and moved upon Patna. During their absence the detachment of the 12th revolted, and attacked the public buildings. The rebels were, however, driven away by the native officials and the police, who, encouraged by the wealthy and influential Hindu traders and bankers of the place, the safety of whose property depended on the maintenance of British authority, remained loyal to the hand that fed them. When, a few days later, the European officials returned to the station, they found that order had been maintained in all the public buildings, and that the mutineers, baffled in their attempts upon the treasury, had vented their fury upon one or two private houses.

The case was far different at Gyah. The magistrate of that district was Mr. Alonzo Money. This gentleman had, three days before, recorded his opinion that, whilst nothing was to be feared from the townspeople, two causes of apprehension

yet existed, viz. the inroad of any large number of the Dinapore mutineers, and the approach of the 5th Irregular Cavalry. In any case he declared his intention to defend the station and the treasure to the utmost.

Two days subsequently to the despatch of this letter Captain Dunbar's detachment was surprised and beaten by the mutineers. Mr. Money received a letter informing him of this catastrophe the following day; but the messenger who brought that letter conveyed to him likewise an order from his Commissioner, Mr. Tayler, to fall back with the European residents and troops upon Patna, bringing with him the treasure, unless by so doing the personal safety of the European residents should be endangered.

On receiving these instructions Mr. Money summoned the European civil officers of the station to advise him as to the course he should follow. Unfortunately timid counsels prevailed, and there was no Tayler present to override them. In vain did some of the residents entreat Mr. Money to remain at the station till carts could be procured to convey the treasure. He would not. But, acting as he considered the emergency required, he decided to obey that portion of Mr. Tayler's order which directed a retirement on Patna,—but to abandon the treasure.

No sufficient explanation has ever yet been afforded as to this extraordinary abandonment.



The station was not then threatened. Mr. Money had previously recorded his conviction that the forty-five Europeans, the hundred Sikhs, and the new police at his disposal, were more than sufficient to ward off danger on the part of the townspeople. A company of the 64th Regiment was within a few miles of the place. Mr. Tayler's order had been written, Mr. Money could not fail to see, solely with reference to danger to be apprehended from without—to the inevitable consequences of the fall of Arrah. The instructions not to abandon the treasure unless the personal safety of the Europeans should be endangered, would justify its abandonment in case an attack should be made upon that treasure by irresistible force. It certainly conveyed no authority to abandon the treasure when it was yet unthreatened, when no danger was to be apprehended from the townspeople, before any attempt had been made to remove it, and when a sufficient body of troops to escort it was at hand.

However, Mr. Money, in consultation with the members of the station he had summoned, arrived, after due deliberation, at this decision. He and they and their escort started at six o'clock that very evening, leaving behind them a jail filled with prisoners, and £80,000 of Government money.

Some idea of the un-English character of this step would seem at a very early period of the

retreat to have struck one of the members of the party. This was Mr. Hollings, of the opium department. As this gentleman rode further and further from Gyah the conviction continued to gain strength in his mind that he and his fellow-countrymen were committing a very disgraceful act. At last he could bear it no longer. He rode up to Mr. Money and imparted to him his doubts and his misgivings.

Mr. Money was the officer directly serving under the Commissioner of Patna, and the responsibility of the retreat from Gyah, however much he may have acted upon the opinions of others, really lay with him. He had moved off the troops and the other residents, leaving behind him the Government money. But, now, the arguments of Mr. Hollings seemed to convince him that in so acting he had acted wrongly. Instead, however, of ordering back the troops—an act which lay entirely within his competence—Mr. Money determined to return to Gyah with Mr. Hollings, leaving the troops and the others to pursue their way.

No greater condemnation of the part he had taken in leaving the station could be pronounced than this thus passed by Mr. Money upon himself. His return, too, would appear, at first glance, a very Quixotic proceeding. If the money could not be saved, and the station could not be maintained, when Mr. Money had under his orders a force of 150 Europeans and Sikhs,

what could he expect to accomplish when aided solely by Mr. Hollings?

But Mr. Money after all risked but little. He was well aware that within easy call of Gyah there was a detachment of the 64th Regiment, and almost his first act after his return was to summon that detachment to join him. The question might perhaps be asked, why he had not summoned it before he abandoned the station?

Mr. Money found the station still quiet, but he was by no means at his ease. He distrusted the men who surrounded him. The distrust, however, did not inspire him with prudence. The following morning he showed his hand to every native official by openly burning the Government stamped paper, thus proving to the natives of Gyah that he had returned solely to baulk them of their anticipated plunder.

Fortunately for Mr. Money before any open manifestation of the public discontent had taken place the company of the 64th returned (2nd of August). Mr. Money then feeling himself strong, collected carts upon which to load the treasure. On the 4th the treasure was loaded and sent off under the guard of the 64th detachment. Mr. Money intended to accompany the party, but returning to his own house to save a few things of value he was suddenly startled by hearing the yells of the prisoners whom the native station guards had just then let loose from the jail.

Mr. Money had but just time to mount his horse, fortunately kept saddled, and to join the detachment.

The question had arisen as to the direction which the convoy should take. Had Mr. Money decided to march upon Patna, he would yet, though in a clumsy and vacillating manner, have obeyed the instructions he had received from his official superior. But he would appear to have been misled by false reports as to the danger of traversing the short distance which lay between Gyah and that station. He decided, therefore, to move the Europeans, so urgently required in the north-west, from the field of action, and to undertake the far longer journey to Calcutta. The detachment, after repulsing outside Gyah the hap-hazard onslaught of the released prisoners, reached Calcutta unmolested.

It is clear from the above plain story that whilst the conduct of Mr. Tayler in directing a general concentration of his subordinates on Patna, in the face of the blow delivered at British *prestige* on the banks on the Son, was marked by a statesman-like prudence and a thorough comprehension of the vital interests at stake, the action of Mr. Alonzo Money was dictated by a vacillating spirit, and by an unstable and impulsive nature. It is clear that, if Mr. Alonzo Money had carried out literally the orders of his official superior, though he might have gained no sensational triumph, he

would have brought the treasure from Gyah safely into Patna. Indeed it may be confidently asserted that, in saving the treasure even as he did save it, he carried out, though in a style peculiarly his own, Mr. Tayler's orders. To himself, as a free agent, history will accord no peculiar merit. He imperilled the success of his superior's schemes by abandoning the treasure when he quitted the station, in the face of the orders he had received to bring it with him if he could do so without endangering the lives of his coadjutors ; he imperilled the success of his superior's schemes by returning with one companion to the station, after having advisedly denuded it of the European and Sikh troops ; and, finally, he disobeyed his superior's orders and risked the whole policy of the Government by taking down the treasure to Calcutta, instead of moving it to the adjoining station of Patna. Fortune greatly befriended him ; for Fortune changed a gross dereliction of duty, a disobedience to orders which would have subjected a soldier to a court-martial—into a sensational triumph almost unparalleled. For a very brief space, and in the eyes of a very few, though a very influential body of men, Mr. Alonzo Money became the hero of Behar.

Let us see now how it was that he became so.

The Government of India and the Government of Bengal had been terribly frightened by the story of the successful revolt of the Dinapore

sepoys, and of the defeat of Captain Dunbar's detachment. The Government of India, mistaking severity for vigour, showed the extent of their terror by at once directing that their agent—the man upon whom they cast the responsibility properly belonging to themselves—that Major-General Lloyd should be tried by a court-martial. That Government had their scape-goat handy. Mr. Halliday, representing the Government of Bengal, was in a different position. He had, indeed, a score to settle with Mr. Tayler, because Mr. Tayler had maintained a bold and resolute front, and had preserved order in his province by measures not altogether approved of by the Lieutenant-Governor. But Mr. Tayler had been too successful to be touched. He had saved Patna. To remove him how, when Behar apparently was at the mercy of the victorious mutineers, was not to be thought of—even by Mr. Halliday.

Suddenly, however, the scene changed. A God-like mortal shone through the mist, dispersed the black cloud, annihilated the revolted sepoys, removed all apprehension at once and for ever regarding the safety of Behar, and left it free to Mr. Halliday to exercise to the fullest extent his undoubted right of patronage—and of revenge.

Major Eyre virtually reconquered lost Behar. He restored the province to the position in which Mr. Tayler, unaided, had maintained it, until the

Government of India and Major-General Lloyd had contrived to plunge it into danger. But in the short interval the Gyah episode had occurred. Whilst Arrah was yet trembling on the verge of destruction, Mr. Tayler had issued the withdrawal order. Eyre saved Arrah. But before the results of Eyre's great feat of arms had become known, Mr. Alonzo Money, first disobeying then half obeying the directions of his Commissioner, was, by his vacillating and impulsive action, converting a plain act of duty into a sensational drama, of which he, for a few brief moments, was the star-bespangled hero.

For to Calcutta, immediately after the news of Eyre's great triumph, came, in a distorted and inaccurate shape, the intelligence of Tayler's withdrawal order. The danger was now over; the tears in the council-chamber of Belvedere were dried up; a feverish exaltation followed. It was necessary that some proof should be given that energy had not died out in Bengal. Mr. Tayler's withdrawal order furnished the opportunity. Forgetting, or choosing not to remember his transcendent services, the fact that he had never despaired of the safety of his division, that he had baffled the counsels of the mutineers, and had suppressed, unaided, the rising of Patna; that he had been the rock on which every hope in Behar had rested; that he had cheered the despairing, stimulated the wavering, roused to action even the faint heart

of the soldier; forgetting, or choosing not to remember, these great achievements, the Government of Bengal, acting in concert with the Government of India, seized upon his withdrawal order to dismiss Mr. Tayler from his post, to consign the saviour of Behar, in the very morning dawn of the triumph which he had prepared, to signal and unmerited disgrace.

The Government of Bengal added insult to injury. Not content with suppressing the fact that Mr. Tayler had coupled with the order for the withdrawal of the officials from Gyah a direction that they should bring with them the treasure under their charge, unless by so doing their personal safety should be endangered, Mr. Halliday did not scruple to charge with being actuated by panic \* the man whose manly

\* Mr. Halliday wrote on the 5th of August: "It appears from a letter just received from Mr. Tayler, that, whilst apparently under the influence of a panic, he has ordered the officials at all the stations in his division to abandon their posts and fall back on Dinapore. \* \* \* \* Under these circumstances I have determined at once to remove Mr. Tayler from his appointment of Commissioner of Patna." It was on Mr. Halliday's report that Mr. Tayler was subsequently described by the Governor-General as "showing a great want of calmness and firmness"; as "issuing an order quite beyond his competency"; as "interfering with the military authorities." Mr. Halliday subsequently "explained" officially, that "panic was apparent on the face of Mr. Tayler's order, and specially from his urgent and reiterated advice, if not order, to Major Eyre, not to advance to the relief which saved Arrah." With respect to this last charge it may be as well to state, once for all, that Mr. Tayler never addressed Major Eyre on the subject of the advance on Arrah. What he did do was simply this. On the evening of



bearing had been throughout an example to the whole of India. It would be difficult to produce, in the annals of official persecution, rife as they are with perversions of truth, a statement more gratuitous.\*

the day on which Mr. Tayler learned the defeat of Captain Dunbar and his detachment of upwards of 400 men, he received a letter from Mr. Bax, the magistrate with Major Eyre, informing him that Eyre at the head of 150 men was about to attempt the task in which Dunbar had failed, and asking his opinion. Mr. Tayler thereupon wrote to Mr. Bax, telling him of Dunbar's defeat, and expressing his opinion that it would be prudent if Major Eyre were to drop down in his steamer to Dinapore, take up reinforcements there, and advance thence on Arrah. Mr. Tayler did not even send this letter to Mr. Bax. He sent it *open* to Major-General Lloyd, that the General might forward it with such instructions as he might think fit to give. Who will deny that in thus expressing his opinion Mr. Tayler performed only a clear and imperative duty?

\* Sir John Kaye has thus ably summarised the arguments on this point :—" On the whole, it appears to me, on mature consideration, that the orders issued by Mr. Tayler were not of such a character as to merit the condemnation which Government passed upon them. It is not to be questioned that up to the time of the mutiny of the Dinapore regiments, the whole bearing of the Patna Commissioner was manly to a point of manliness not often excelled in those troubled times. He had exhorted all his countrymen to cling stedfastly to their posts. He had rebuked those who had betrayed their fears by deserting their stations. His measures had been bold ; his conduct had been courageous ; his policy had been severely repressive. If he had erred, assuredly his errors had not leaned to the side of weakness. He was one of the last men in the service to strike his colours, save under the compulsion of a great necessity. But when the Dinapore regiments broke into rebellion—when the European troops, on whom he had relied, proved themselves to be incapable of repressing mutiny on the spot, or overtaking it with swift retribution—when it was known that thousands of insurgent Sepoys were over-running the country, and that the

But the fiat had gone forth. Mr. William Tayler was dismissed from his post. His career

country, in the language of the day, was 'up'—that some of the chief members of the territorial aristocracy had risen against the domination of the English, and that the predatory classes, including swarms of released convicts from the gaols, were waging deadly war against property and life—when he saw that all these things were against us, and there seemed to be no hope left that the scattered handfuls of Englishmen at the out-stations could escape utter destruction, he deemed it his duty to revoke the orders which he had issued in more auspicious times, and to call into Patna such of our English establishments as had not already been swept away by the rebellion or escaped without official recall. In doing this he generously took upon himself the responsibility of withdrawal, and absolved all the officers under him from any blame which might descend upon them for deserting their stations without the sanction of superior authority. It was not doubted that if there had been any reasonable ground of hope that these little assemblies of Englishmen could hold their own, that they could save their lives and the property of Government by defending their posts, it would have been better that the effort should be made. But their destruction would have been a greater calamity to the State than their surrender. It was impossible to overvalue the worth of European life at that time, and the deaths of so many Englishmen would have been a greater triumph and a greater encouragement to the enemy than their flight. It was the hour of our greatest darkness and our sorest need. We know not how Wake and Boyle and Colvin and their comrades in the 'little house' held the enemy in check, and how Vincent Eyre taught both the Sepoy mutineers and the Shahabad insurgents that there was still terrible vitality in our English troops. Of this William Tayler knew nothing. But he had palpably before him the fact of Dunbar's disaster, and he believed that nothing could save the little garrison at Arrah. The probabilities at the time were that the Dinapore regiments, with Kower Singh and his followers, having done their work in that direction, would move, flushed with conquest and gorged with plunder, upon Gyah and other stations, carrying destruction with them wheresoever they might go. What the Commissioner then did was what had been

in the Indian Civil Service was ruined by one stroke of the pen.

And yet this man had accomplished as much as any individual man to save India in her great danger. He had done more than Mr. Halliday, who had recalled him; more than the Government which supported Mr. Halliday. With a courage as true and a resolution as undaunted as that which he showed when dealing with the Patna mutineers, Mr. Tayler has struggled since, he is struggling still, for the reversal of the unjust censure which blighted his career. Subsequent events have singularly justified the action which, at the time, was so unpalatable to Mr. Halliday. Mr. Tayler's denunciation of the Wahabee leaders, treated as a fable by his superiors, has been upheld to the full by the discoveries of recent years.\* It has been abundantly shown that, to his energetic action alone was it due that Patna escaped a terrible disaster. The suppressed words of the withdrawal order have been published to the world, and the charge of panic has been recognised everywhere as untrue.

done and what was being done by other authorities, civil and military, in other parts of the country; it was held to be sound policy to draw in our scattered out-posts to some central point of safety where the enemy might be defied. In this I can perceive no appearance of panic. If Tayler had not acted thus, and evil had befallen the Christian people under his charge, he would have been condemned with a far severer condemnation for so fatal an omission."

\* *Vide* Appendix A.

It is a curious and a very remarkable fact that of the members of the Council of the Governor-General who supported at the time Mr. Halliday's action, two have, in later years, expressed their regret that they acted hastily and on incorrect information. "Time," wrote, in 1868, one of the most prominent amongst them, Mr. Dorin, "time has shown that he (Mr. Halliday) was wrong and that you were right." Another, the then Military Member of Council, General Sir John Low, G.C.B., thus, in 1867, recorded his opinion: "I well remember my having, as a Member of Lord Canning's Council, concurred with his Lordship in the censure which he passed upon your conduct . . . but it has since been proved—*incontestably* proved—that the data on which that decision was based were quite incorrect! . . . I sincerely believe that your skilful and vigorous management of the disaffected population of Patna was of *immense* value to the Government of India, and that in the last few months of your Commissionership, commencing with the arrest of the three Wahabee conspirators, and the disarming of the greater portion of the inhabitants of Patna city, your services were of more vital importance to the public interests than those of many officers, both civil and military, during the whole period of their Indian career, in less critical times, who have been rewarded—and justly rewarded—by honours from the Queen; while your services,

by an extraordinary combination of unlucky circumstances, have hitherto been overlooked." It is not less remarkable that three ex-Governors and two ex-Lieutenant Governors of the presidencies and provinces of India have recorded similar opinions, whilst one gentleman, decorated for his distinguished conduct in the province of which Mr. Tayler was the pro-consul, has not hesitated to inform him that until Mr. Tayler should be rewarded for the conduct which saved the province, it would be too painful for him "to wear in your presence the decoration which I have so gratefully received from Her Majesty."

His comrades in India, then, and the public generally, have rendered to Mr. William Tayler the justice which is still denied him by the Government which he served so truly and with such signal success. The ban of official displeasure still blights his declining years. Whilst his rival, decorated by the Crown, has been awarded a seat in the Council of India, he "who was right when that rival was wrong," still remains in the cold shade of official neglect. Although with a pertinacity which is the result of conscious rectitude, Mr. Tayler has pressed upon each succeeding Secretary of State his claims for redress, that redress has still been, up to the latest date, denied him. It seems to be considered that the lapse of years sanctions a wrong, should that wrong in the interval

remain unatoned for. We English not only boast of our justice, but, in the haughtiness of our insular natures, we are apt to reproach the French for the manner in which they treated the great men of their nation who strove unsuccessfully to build up a French empire in India. We taunt them with having sent Lally to the block, and allowed Dupleix to die in misery and in want. But, looking at our treatment of Mr. William Tayler, can we say that, even with the advantages which a century of civilization has given us, are hands are more clean? This man saved a province. In saving that province it is possible that he saved with it districts outside his own. Yet is he not, I ask, looking at the treatment he received, is he not entitled to use, if not the very words, yet the sense of the very words employed by Dupleix in 1764: "I have sacrificed," wrote three months before he died that greatest of Indo-French administrators, "I have sacrificed my youth, my fortune, my life, to enrich my nation in Asia . . . . My services are treated as fables; my demand is denounced as ridiculous. I am treated as the vilest of mankind." To this day the treatment of Dupleix is a lasting stain on French administration. I most fervently hope, for the credit of my country, that our children and our children's children may not be forced to blush for a similar stain resting on the annals of England; that the French may never have it in their power to

return the reproach which our historians have not been slow to cast at them. In the history of the mutiny there is no story which appeals more to the admiration than the story of this man guiding, almost unaided, a province through the storm, training his crew and keeping down the foe, whilst yet both hands were at the wheel, and in the end steering his tossed vessel into the harbour of safety. Character, courage, tact, clearness of vision, firmness of brain, were in him alike conspicuous. May it never descend to posterity that in the councils of England services so distinguished were powerless in the presence of intrigue !

---

*From* COLONEL MALLESON'S " HISTORY OF THE  
INDIAN MUTINY." (*Chap. iii.*)

Calcutta may now safely be quitted. Numerous reinforcements had made her secure. The crisis which had menaced Mr. Beadon's line of six hundred miles had been successfully surmounted. Many dangers had been overcome. Benares had been threatened and restored to order ; Allahabad had been snatched from destruction ; Patna, Dinapore, and Behar, after a terrible trial had been brought again under the ægis of British protection. Who had saved that line ? Not the Supreme Government, for the action

of the Government in refusing to disarm the native troops had fomented the disorder. Not the Local Governments—the one shut up in Agra, the other hair-splitting in Calcutta. No,—four names indicate the men who saved that line to the British. North of Behar, Mr. Frederic Gubbins, of the Civil Service, the judge who virtually administered the great Hindoo city, and Colonel Neil, whose prompt and resolute action stamped out rebellion whenever and wherever it raised its head. South of Benares, Mr. William Tayler and Major Eyre. These are names to be honoured,—these are the subordinates who won the battle ; the untitled upholders of the honour, the glory, and the fair name of England. They were alike the heads that devised, the hands that executed. Associated for ever with theirs, too, in their undying glory, as supports who maintained the overburdened structure, will be the names of those whose sphere of action, though confined, was of vital importance,—the names of the members of that Arrah garrison, most fitly represented by their three leaders, by Wake, by Boyle, and by Colvin.

---



APPENDIX A. TO SECOND CHAPTER OF MALLESON'S  
 "INDIAN MUTINY."

THE entire proceedings of the Bengal Government, in respect of the Wahabee fanatics of Patna in 1857, are so extraordinary that they merit distinct and special notice.

The principal facts are now matters of history, as Dr. Hunter, who had free access to the Government archives, has given a detailed and accurate account of these remarkable men in his work on "Our Indian Mussulmans."

From his pages it may be learned "that some years ago the great Wahabee prophet, Syad Ahmad, organised a regular system of apostolic succession; that two of the khalifs or vice-regents, Inayat and Wilayat Ali, had early established a character for themselves on the frontier as fanatical firebrands; and so far back as 1847 Sir Henry Lawrence sent them as dangerous characters to their homes at Patna, where security was taken from them for their future good conduct."

In 1850 they were again found "preaching sedition in the Rajshye district of Lower Bengal, and were twice turned out of the district;" and in 1851 the vice-regents, though bound by bond and security to remain at their homes in Patna,

"were found disseminating treason on the Punjaub frontier."

And finally, in 1852, they "had established a regular organisation for passing up men and arms from Bengal to the rebel camp at Sittana."

But the most significant fact connected with this history is that on the 9th of August, 1852, only five years before the mutiny, the magistrate at Patna reported that "the rebel sect was on the increase in that city; sedition was openly preached by the principal inhabitants of this capital of a British Province. The police had leagued themselves with the fanatics, and one of their leaders, Maulvi Ahmed-oola (Ahmad Ulla), assembled 700 men in his house, and declared his resolve to resist any further investigation of the magistrate by force of arms."

Dr. Hunter then proceeds, "The British Government could no longer shut its eyes to the existence of a great treasonable organisation within its territories for supplying money and men to the fanatical camp on the frontier. During the autumn of 1852 Lord Dalhousie recorded two important minutes on the subject, and by the first he directed the internal organisation to be closely watched."

The above brief extracts from Dr. Hunter's able work, written under the most favourable auspices for the accurate ascertainment of the facts, is, I imagine, sufficient to prove to the satisfaction of the most incredulous that a

dangerous confederation existed in the country ; that the city of Patna was the head-quarters of the sect of Wahabees, and contained not only the two notorious vice-regents or khalifs, but at least one determined and desperate leader, even in the time of peace, sufficiently bold and powerful to defy the power and authority of the British Government.

And if it be inquired who this resolute traitor was, I may reply that he is the identical man whose arrest and precautionary confinement in 1857 by Mr. Tayler I have described at page 52 of this volume.

Such, then, briefly sketched, was the known and recorded state of Patna at the commencement of the mutiny and rebellion.

Lord Canning had only recently arrived, and was necessarily dependent on the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and his own secretaries for all important information.

It is fair, therefore, to assume that he was in ignorance of the character and antecedents of the Wahabee fanatics, their connection with Patna, the intrigues in which they had been detected, and, doubtless, of the open defiance with which Ahmad Ulla had resisted the warnings of the magistrate.

But what can be said to excuse, what can be imagined to explain, the ignorance, or, if not ignorance, the infatuation of the Bengal Government ?

Mr. Halliday had been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal about 1853, but for years prior to his appointment he had been secretary under ex-officio Governors, and, as is well known, exercised all the powers, though not bearing the responsibilities, of Governor. Is it conceivable that he was ignorant of all the strange and important incidents above noticed?

Was not he well aware that the prophet's vice-regents had their homes at Patna, that security for their good conduct had been taken, that Lord Dalhousie, as ex-officio Governor of Bengal, had placed on record a minute regarding them?

There had been, as related in the first volume of this history, an organised attempt at Patna in 1845 to tamper with the British sepoys, which, had the Punjaub campaign ended in failure, would doubtless have been carried out.

And it must have been evident to Mr. Halliday, as it was to all intelligent observers, that Patna was the centre of intrigue and dangers.

In the face of these facts, when Mr. Tayler, from information received, and from his own observation of certain suspicious incidents, quietly arrested and placed under precautionary surveillance the notorious Ahmad Ulla and two other leaders of the Wahabee sect, Mr. Halliday, instead of even then admitting that he had at least directed his precautionary measures towards individuals of suspected character whose names

were in the black books of the Government, coldly calls for the "proofs on which the arrest had been made," designating these men as the "Wahabee gentlemen," a complimentary appellation never before used in such a case, and evidently implying, though not openly expressing, disapprobation of the act of arrest.

Not even at that crisis did Mr. Halliday condescend to consult his records, or to communicate to Mr. Taylor the significant incidents regarding these men.

Though the archives of Government would have shown him that these very men had for years been under suspicion, bound by sureties not to leave Patna, and compelled to give security for good conduct; that Ahmad Ulla, their leader, had openly defied the authorities, not one word of warning or caution did he vouchsafe to the officers responsible for the safety of the province and the lives of the Christian residents.

But strange as was this neglect on the part of the Lieutenant-Governor, it might be overlooked or excused as an oversight, or, at worst, unintentional negligence, but for what subsequently occurred.

Not only did Mr. Halliday fail to give intimation to his representative of these elements of danger in the great city of Patna, but, with the palpable fact before him of the outbreak at Meerut, he endeavoured to lull the Commissioner

of Patna into a state of false and dangerous security by officially informing him that he could not bring himself to believe that there was "any danger in Patna;" that the mutiny of the Dinapore sepoy in the face of the European force was "*inconceivable*."

And this opinion was recorded with respect to a city where eight years before a plot had been hatched by a band of conspirators; where cash had been distributed to the sepoy; a scroll discovered containing the names of one hundred of the principal families:—a city which was the head-quarters of the two notorious vice-regents of the great Prophet—in which Mr. Tayler himself two years before represented the existence of dangerous excitement.

But the acmé of delusion, if delusion, indeed, it was, which thus induced Mr. Halliday to cast aside the lessons of experience and deny the existence of danger where all the worst elements of danger notoriously existed, has not yet been reached. But some short time after Mr. Tayler's removal, when Mr. Tayler's successor, in a personal attack on Mr. Tayler himself, in which he endeavoured to distort and disparage that gentleman's measures, actually recorded his opinion that the Wahabee leaders, whom Mr. Tayler had placed under surveillance, were "innocent and inoffensive men," mere "book-men," against whom there was "no cause of suspicion;" and again, that he was inclined to

believe that Mr. Tayler had been induced by two native gentlemen, Dewán Mawla Baksh, the Deputy Magistrate, and Syud Wiláyut Ali Khán, a wealthy banker in the city, to arrest the Wahabees, because from their special loyalty, they (the Wahabees) stood in the way of their own treasonable designs; Mr. Halliday, in spite of all his means of information as to the real facts, actually endorsed these fatuous opinions with his official approval, sent the letter of Mr. Samuells for publication in the newspaper, and circulated it to all the Commissioners in Bengal for their information and guidance, refusing at the same time to give publicity to Mr. Tayler's refutation.

What was the issue of this controversy? That the mutiny which Mr. Halliday held to be inconceivable took place I need hardly mention, but the exposure of the incorrectness of his opinions regarding the Wahabees was reserved for a future day. The story is like a novel. Seven years had elapsed; Mr. Tayler, driven by relentless persecution, had resigned the service, but was still in India. The Wahabee leaders, who had been released when the crisis had passed, were in high favour with Government; Ahmad Ullá had been honoured with official appointments, specially introduced by the Lieutenant-Governor to the new Viceroy in Calcutta, and was basking in the sunshine of official favour.

Suddenly, and with no previous notice or

intimation, an officer arrived at Patna from the Punjaub. A clue had been discovered. With a warrant in his pocket he walked into Sadikpúr, the quarter of the Patna city where the Wahabees had their abode, entered, without being suspected, into Molwí Ahmad Ullá's house, and with the help of the police arrested the happy family all unprepared either for flight or resistance.

A series of judicial trials was then held by the distinguished Commissioner of the Punjaub, Sir Herbert Edwardes.

The result of these deliberate and impartial investigations confirmed in every respect Mr. Tayler's estimate of these dangerous and intriguing characters.

Ahmad Ullá himself was subsequently tried at Patna.

The innocent and inoffensive bookmen, upheld by Mr. Samuells with the concurrence and approval of Mr. Halliday, were proved to be confirmed and deadly traitors; the injured Ahmad Ullá was shown to be their chief leader.

It was proved that they had for years been deliberately plotting against the British Government, supplying our enemies on the frontier with men and money, and publicly preaching at Patna a crusade against the infidel.

They were convicted and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence was commuted by the High Court to imprisonment for life, principally on the ground that the Government, by its laxity,



had in some sense encouraged their treason. They were banished to the Andaman Isles, where Ahmad Ullá was under nominal confinement when Lord Mayo was murdered.

It is difficult to exaggerate the important character of this strange episode.

At a crisis of national peril we find two high officers both in different degrees responsible for the safety of a great province, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the Commissioner of Patna.

It was, I need hardly say, of the utmost importance that each should form an accurate estimate of the character and purposes of the people by whom he was surrounded and with whom he had to deal.

Mr. Halliday, the Lieutenant-Governor, with all the means of information on record before him sufficient to establish with certainty the dangerous character of the Patna Wahabees, deliberately endorsed the recorded opinion that they were innocent men, above suspicion, and officially circulated this declaration throughout his government.

Mr. Tayler, the Commissioner, forming his opinions with difficulty, without any information supplied or hinted at by the Government, acting on his own observation of passing events, his acquaintance with Mahomedan character, and the special tenets of the Wahabee sect, came to the conclusion that they were dangerous char-

acters—that their influence would probably be exerted against the Government, and, if so exerted, would be fraught with danger. Arriving at this conclusion, he at once acted wisely; avoiding opposition or resistance, he quietly and unostentatiously placed them under safe *surveillance*.

And how were the services of these two officers rewarded? Mr. Halliday, who by his ignorance, neglect, or want of judgement thus imperilled the Empire, is honoured by the marked approval of the Crown, and obtains a seat in the Council of India.

Mr. Tayler, whose judgement was correct, whose action was prompt, is removed from his post, and driven by persecution to resign the service.

And if this was the case with respect to those dangerous traitors, I find the same misconception and the same ignorance in regard to the loyal and the good.

Mr. Tayler received active and disinterested support from two (among other) respectable natives.

One, a deputy-magistrate named Maola Baksh, and the other a banker, unconnected with Government, named Wiláyut Ali Khán.

Both these men did important service at great risk to themselves, and both were specially recommended by Mr. Tayler for honour.

Both were disparaged by Mr. Samuells; and

Mr. Halliday, endorsing the disparagement, officially upheld the recorded suspicion that these loyal men had hood-winked Mr. Tayler, and induced him to arrest the Wahabees because of their exceptional and unprecedented loyalty.

Since then Dewan Mowla Baksh has been honoured with the Star of India, and Wiláyut Ali Khán has been recommended for the same distinction, and was especially introduced to the Prince of Wales during his visit to Patna, and congratulated for his service in 1857.

Thus, both for good and evil, Mr. Halliday was totally, even dangerously, wrong, though possessing all the means of correct judgment.

Mr. Tayler, with no assistance but his own vigilance and discernment, was in every respect and on every point essential to the safety of the province, right.

I need hardly dwell on the deep importance of this state of things, which is perhaps unparalleled in history.

But I cannot close this strange tale without adverting to some later incidents which give almost a dramatic character to the Picture.

I have shown Mr. Tayler, struggling against the ignorance and infatuation of Mr. Halliday, accused of persecuting innocent and inoffensive men (afterwards sentenced to death as deadly traitors), and his entire administration denounced as causing "public scandal and discontent."

I have also shewn how entirely his views,

opinions, and actions were vindicated by subsequent events, and the recorded testimony of many of the most able and distinguished Indian statesmen.

But it was left to a still later day to add a sad and tragical verification of Mr. Tayler's warnings

In 1871, the Chief Justice of Calcutta was stabbed by a Wahabee fanatic on the steps of his own court, and the following year Lord Mayo, visiting the Andaman Islands, was assassinated also by a Mahomedan.

Official optimism held the murder to have been actuated by private vengeance, without any political purpose. Mr. Tayler, however, in a memorandum which he submitted to the Secretary of State, gave cogent reasons for concluding that whatever the personal character of the actual murderer, the deed had been contrived and aided by the notorious Ahmad Ullá, whose open defiance of the authorities I have noticed, and whose treason was established in the trials before Sir Herbert Edwardes.

This man, a fact but little known, was in the Andamans at the time of the murder, and had been exerting as much influence from his prison cell as in his house at Patna.

These are the facts of the case. They appear to me equally to justify the conduct of Mr. Tayler towards the Wahabees, described in the text, and to condemn the action of the Government towards Mr. Tayler

Since the materials of this pamphlet were put together, a masterly review of Colonel Malleeson's work has appeared in *The Times* of the 20th August, and I cannot resist the gratification of appending two extracts from it here.

W. TAYLER.

---

*Extracts from the review on Colonel Malleeson's "History of the Indian Mutiny," which appeared in "The Times" of the 20th August, 1878.*

Nevertheless, though environed by dangers and difficulties, though the Sepoys at Dinapore did mutiny, and though the feebleness of General Lloyd and the defeat of Captain Dunbar on his road to relieve Arrah, threatened to cause a devastating conflagration, Mr. Tayler maintained his post and authority. To accomplish his object he was compelled to take vigorous measures, but history has proved that they were necessary and that Mr. Tayler displayed a courage, firmness, and ability which ought to have secured him instead of official ruin the praise of his superiors and the highest honours of the Crown. Colonel Malleeson describes Mr. Tayler's position in the following telling sentences:—

"It is difficult to realize the enormous responsibility thus thrown upon the shoulders of one man. Other positions in India were dangerous, but this was unique in the opportunities of danger which threatened it; in the number of the lives, in

the amount of treasure, in the extent of country, devolving upon one man, almost unaided, to guard. Without a single European soldier and with only a few Sikhs at his disposal, Mr. Tayler was responsible for the lives of some hundreds of Europeans scattered over the province, for a treasury in his own city containing more than £.800,000, and in the districts of still more, for opium of the value of millions, for his own good name, for the credit and honour of his country, and now all around was surging. Any moment might bring revolt and mutiny to his door."

\* \* \* \* \*

Again—as to himself he maintained order at Patna with unflinching firmness and uninterrupted success. Gloomy intelligence having arrived as to the state of affairs in the district, and Mr. Tayler having learnt that the first attempt to relieve Arrah had disastrously failed, he took on himself the responsibility of ordering the officials at two of the most exposed stations to come on to Patna, bringing with them the money in their treasuries, unless by so doing their personal safety would be endangered. Colonel Malleson thus states the alternatives which lay before Mr. Tayler:—

“The fall of Arrah was considered certain. Equally certain that a catastrophe of that nature would be promptly followed by a rising of all the disaffected through Behar. The question which the Commissioner of Patna had to solve then was this: Whether he should trust to the seemingly impossible chance of Arrah being relieved, and in that case risking the lives of the officers under his orders and the treasure under their charge, or whether he should prepare himself to meet the coming danger by drawing in his too-widely extended line and massing his forces in a central position.”

Colonel Malleson approves his conduct. So did not Mr. Halliday. He and Mr. Tayler had long been antipathetic. Mr. Halliday had been terribly alarmed by the mutiny at Dinapore and the failure to relieve Arrah, but when Vincent Eyre accomplished with marvellously insufficient forces the feat to which General Lloyd had been unequal, he recovered on the disappearance of danger the courage no longer wanted, and resolved to show that there was yet some vigour in the Bengal Government. He was bitterly hostile to Mr. Tayler, and now was a chance for exalting himself at the expense of his enemy. Mr. Tayler's withdrawal order furnished the excuse, and the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal embraced it eagerly :—

“ Forgetting, or choosing not to remember, his transcendent services, the fact that he had never despaired of the safety of his division, that he had baffled the counsel of the mutineers, and had suppressed, unaided, the rising of Patna, that he had been the rock on which every hope in Behar had rested ; that he had cheered the despairing, stimulated the wavering, roused to action even the faint heart of the soldier—forgetting, or not choosing to remember, these great achievements, the Government of Bengal, acting in concert with the Government of India, seized upon his withdrawal order to dismiss Mr. Tayler from his post, to consign the saviour of Behar, in the very morning dawn of the triumph which he had prepared, to signal and unmerited disgrace. . . . Mr. Halliday did not scruple to charge with being actuated by panic the man whose manly bearing had been throughout an example to the whole of India. It would be difficult to produce in the annals of official persecution, rife as they are with perversions of truth, a statement more gratuitous.”

Fortunately, history generally hurls back insults and mis-statements on the heads of those who utter them, and so it has been in Mr. Tayler's case. Two of the members of Council who supported this act of scandalous ingratitude and gross injustice have since admitted that they acted "hastily and on incorrect information." Other eminent officials have warmly testified to the splendour of Mr. Tayler's achievements. Time has likewise declared in his favour. The Moolvis arrested by Mr. Tayler were defended by Mr. Halliday, who called for proofs of their guilt, though from his antecedents and position he must or ought to have been well aware that their disaffection had long been known to Government. Mr. Samuells, Mr. Tayler's successor, spoke of them as "innocent and inoffensive men" and "mere bookmen, against whom there was no cause of suspicion." He also accused two natives who had loyally supported Mr. Tayler as traitors anxious to conceal their treason by urging the arrest of the loyal Moolvis. The chief Moolvi was given an appointment under Government, was a welcome guest at the Lieutenant-Governor's house, and in every way ostentatiously petted. A few years later it was proved that he and the other two Moolvis had long been active and dangerous traitors. They were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death, which punishment was commuted to banishment to the Andaman Islands.



Of the two loyal natives disparaged by Mr. Samuells, one has been decorated with the Star of India, the other has been recommended for the same honour, and on the occasion of the Prince of Wales's visit to India was presented to his Royal Highness. All the facts of the case, all the value of Mr. Tayler's services have been laid before successive Secretaries of India, yet Mr. Tayler still remains without redress, without the honours which he so richly earned being granted, without the amend for his persecution being accorded. Mr. Halliday is Sir F. Halliday, and member of the Secretary for India's Council, but Mr. Tayler is plain, persecuted Mr. Tayler still. Well may Colonel Malleison compare his case with that of Dupleix :—

“ To this day the treatment of Dupleix is a lasting stain on French administration ; I most fervently hope, for the credit of my country, that our children and our children's children may not be forced to blush for a similar stain resting on the annals of England ; that the French may never have it in their power to return the reproach which our historians have not been slow to cast at them. In the history of the Mutiny there is no story which appeals more to the admiration than the story of this man guiding, almost unaided, a province through the storm—training his crew and keeping down the foe while yet both hands were at the wheel, and in the end steering his tossed vessel into the harbour of safety. Character, courage, tact, clearness of vision, firmness of brain were in him alike conspicuous. May it never descend to posterity that in the councils of England services so distinguished were powerless in the presence of intrigue ! ”

WESTMINSTER :  
PRINTED BY T. BRETTELL AND CO. 51, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET,—W.

1962-30

















THE BORROWER WILL BE CHARGED AN OVERDUE FEE IF THIS BOOK IS NOT RETURNED TO THE LIBRARY ON OR BEFORE THE LAST DATE STAMPED BELOW. NON-RECEIPT OF OVERDUE NOTICES DOES NOT EXEMPT THE BORROWER FROM OVERDUE FEES.

Harvard College Widener Library  
Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 495-2413



