

Correspondence on Infallability

— BETWEEN —

A FATHER JESUIT


— AND —

GENERAL ALEXANDER KIREEFF.

(An Eastern Orthodox.)

1896.

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This translation is respectfully dedi-

cated to the Right Honorable

W. E. GLADSTONE.

PREFACE TO THE TRANSLATION.

The most serious misfortune that has befallen the Christian world since the beginning of our era, is undoubtedly the great schism between Rome on the one hand, and Constantinople, Jerusalem, Alexandria and Antioch, on the other, and no greater blessing can be conceived than the reconciliation of these Churches after their long separation.

During the period of disunion, how much energy has been wasted in controversy, energy that might have been devoted to the service of mankind. How much blood has been shed in the name of eternal goodness! How many tears have flowed! What follies have been perpetrated in the name of eternal wisdom! All of which might have been avoided.

Is it surprising then that earnest and sincere Christians should have been constantly devoting themselves to the solution of the great problem of the reunion of the Churches? Since the very commencement of that important and inauspicious rupture, men on both sides have tried to come to an understanding. At first, it was not an impossibility; the questions of doctrine and ritual that divided the Churches were not of real importance; and the primacy of the Bishop of Rome was accepted without protest. Unhappily, however, a serious difficulty presented itself at the very outset of the negotiations: The West had transformed a local *opinion* into a Dogma of the Church as a whole. I refer to the "Filioque." The ensuing subsequent difficulties were great. Dogma being the very essence of revealed truth, it could neither be modified nor accepted with reservations, it is absolute truth, and as such, admits of no variation. Unity of doctrine is a *conditio sine qua non* of the Unity of the Church, and consequently also of intercommunion "in sacris." Wherever there is contradictory dogmatic teaching, there must also be separate Churches, which cannot be united. Churches may be altogether self-governed, may have different rites,

different liturgies, independent hierarchies, and yet form but one Catholic Church, providing that as to dogma they are the same. Such was the position of the Churches of the West (Africa, France, England) during the first centuries of our era, such too is still the relation to each other of the Churches of the East. Dogma must be the same in every Church. Whatever latitude may be granted to freedom of thought, it must never be permitted to transgress these limits, to do so, would not be charity towards each other, but unfaithfulness to one's Church, yea, to the eternal truth which she represents.

The simple elementary truths which were so much to the fore in the attempts at reconciliation in the ninth century, were thrust at a later day into the back-ground, by considerations of an altogether secondary nature. The only point which should have been discussed at the commencement of the difficulties between Rome and the East, was the "Filioque" that dogma was the only thing that separated us. Instead of which, time was spent on other subjects, and meanwhile the quarrel grew hotter.

At a later period, the negotiations between Rome and the East, assumed a less Christian character. The results of the Councils of Lyons or Florence were above all else political treaties, designed and indeed almost undisguisedly to promote purely utilitarian interests. But the Greek people, more honest than their representatives rejected all such overtures, notwithstanding the growing danger of an Ottoman invasion, they never sanctioned the concessions of their leaders preferred the enslavement of their *political* country, to that of their moral country (i. e., their Church.) Accordingly we now witness its revival.

After the fall of Constantinople, Moscow's turn came. It was to Russia that Rome began to turn her thoughts, but with still less success. To what shall we attribute this failure? What was its chief reason, and what can be done to remedy the mischief? It is impossible to answer these grave questions in a few short pages, but, as I have already said, the parties concerned should

think only of serving the interests of religion and of God, ignoring everything else. As there is an individual egoism which is opposed to charity, so there is a national and ecclesiastical egoism, which, though nobler in form, none the less impedes the progress of truth. One must forget one's self and remember that truth must never be sacrificed. Only questions of dogma, upon which an understanding is essential and compromise inadmissible should be discussed, all other matters should be left aside. But if we compare this method of procedure, with that which has been followed down to the present day, we shall easily understand why the efforts put forth at Lyons or Florence only resulted in widening the gulf of separation. Not till the Congress held by the Old Catholics were rules observed on both sides, which were fitted to bring about a union of the Churches. The grand idea of the restoration of religious unity will never be abandoned by the Christian world; it will not disappear as long as the sentiment lives in the human heart.

I have often been told; "You, like many, are busy with this great work of bringing about a union of the Churches; your end is good but your means are defective; you have chosen the wrong road: instead of appealing to the Pope, you appeal to the old Catholics. Compared with the 'pulsillus grex' of the old Catholics, the Pope is an enormous force." The answer is easy:—to unite with the Pope is to submit body and soul to a Master who has set himself above law, both human and divine. The old Catholics stretch out a brotherly hand:—the Pope offers his slipper: To submit to the Pope would doubtless be to yield to a great power; but it would also mean to identify one's self with a great error. As far as power is concerned, we are, thank God, satisfied with what we possess already. What we seek is not power, but truth; and the truth is with the old Catholics.

A. KIREEFF.

PALACE PAVLOVSK,
March 22d, 1893.

INTRODUCTION.

One of my friends, an Englishman, who has just gone over to Rome, recently asked me several questions relating to my religion and Church; and expressed surprise at the hostility which we Russians manifested towards Catholicism; at our "obstinacy" in refusing to submit to the Pope and to acknowledge the recently formulated Dogmas.

I answered that we felt no hostility whatever towards the true, the ancient Catholicism; that such hostility had no "raison d'être;" that for nearly a thousand years we Orthodox had been one with the Western Church, and had acknowledged the primacy (*inter pares*) of the Bishops of Rome; but, I added, the Western Catholic religion, which at the beginning was absolutely identical with our own, in course of time, underwent very serious modifications.

Note 1.—I have frequently been asked if I denied progress (so dear to our contemporaries) in matters of religion. "Must not religion," I am asked, "advance like everything else?" "Truth develops and consequently dogmas which are truths, must also develop."

This question of progress in matters relating to religion, is too important and too complicated for a mere casual treatment. I shall simply indicate some of its elements. When the Church is threatened with a new Heresy; when her Dogmas are attacked, then it becomes unquestionably her duty to speak out, to proclaim the truth. Any such solemn proclamation, freely made by the representatives of the Church, in an Oecumenical Council, and ratified by the universal assent of Christians, becomes "*ipso facto*" a Dogma. In this respect, we are justified in speaking of the doctrine of the Church as progressive. At the same time it needs to be borne in mind that if any Independent Church, however great its importance, takes upon herself to inaugurate dogmatic progress, without securing the consent of the Universal Church, she is in danger of going

Gradually new dogmas were introduced, the very last of which, namely the Infallibility of the Pope, gave rise to quite a revolution in the Western Church. This new "dogma" is the negation of the very idea of the Church—an idea which was formerly identical in both Churches—and now it constitutes an impassable gulf between them.

My friend wishes to know if I felt equal to the task of committing these answers to paper, of further developing them and of defending them against a learned Roman Catholic with whom he was acquainted? I gladly consented, adding at the same time, that most probably my opponent and myself would continue to hold our own opinions. I agreed to the proposal all the more readily because I thought there could be no better means of acquainting myself with the newest and most convincing arguments which Infallibilists had at their disposal. I imagined also, that if our correspondence were some day to be published, it might be of interest to those who are engaged in the study of theology and ethics.

A letter (p. 10) in which I briefly stated my views, was actually sent to the learned Catholic; he acknowledged the same and put various questions to me, which I answered. An epistolary controversy thus ensued,

astray; (the immaculate Conception); but there is yet another kind of progress possible in the Church—the kind of which the Eastern Church, more than any other has sought to make. Instead of attempting to introduce new dogmas, she does her best to bring about the acceptance and full comprehension of the truths contained in the already existing dogmas. It is her aim or wish, that these truths should be well understood and well assimilated by her children, and that they should become the constant rule of their conduct. Is this problem too restricted, too easy? Humanity might be congratulated, if the truths already in our possession, were firmly anchored in our hearts. Our Church seeks rather to influence the hearts of believers, than to control their outward conduct.

which, with the consent of my adversary, I herewith publish. As it was obviously impossible, in a few letters, fully to criticise each other's opinions, I decided to confine myself to one particular question, which constituted the crucial point, the very centre of our controversy; which in reality forms the culminating point, the focus of the whole of Catholic Dogmatic Theology, viz., *the Infallibility of the Pope and his personal character*. For the future all controversies between Roman Infallibilists and Orthodox Catholics (whether Eastern or Western) must need revolve around this central point of the now Romish theology; and until this question of infallibility is satisfactorily settled, no conclusion can be reached.

I venture to believe, that our discussion has made this point sufficiently clear. I am only printing summaries of the letters of my respected adversary, the Rev. Father X. They are however sufficiently complete for the purpose in view and have been first submitted to him for his approval. My own are published *in extenso* and almost without a change.

Note 2.—I have even retained various repetitions which were inseparable from the controversial form of the work.

I have simply added some quotations and explanations in order to make them more intelligible for those who are not in the habit of reading theological works.

I have already mentioned that the Dogma of Infallibility has opened up an unfathomable gulf between the Church of the East and that of the West. This assertion needs to be in a certain sense modified. The Dogma unquestionably throws insurmountable difficulties in the way of a re-union of the Churches; yet negatively speaking it may prove of great service, and that in the following way: The Philosophy of History teaches us, that a perfectly just idea—a truth corresponding to the deepest necessities of the human soul—may become false, if applied in such an exclusive manner as to injure other truths which in the general

economy of things are necessary for its regulation and equilibrium.

In a case of this kind, the abnormal development of such an idea will neither be arrested, nor reduced to its proper limits, unless it is allowed to develop to its full logical conclusion, and unless this logical conclusion, thanks to the exclusive application in question, is shown to be an absurdity. Now this is just what has taken place with regard to the conception of authority in Roman Catholicism. The idea itself corresponds to a need of our religious consciousness, it has therefore a "raison d'être." But since the great schism of the ninth century, the West, forgetting the legitimacy and necessity of the correlate conception of religious liberty, has applied itself exclusively to the development of the principle of authority, which has arrived at a form answering to its illegitimate development in the Papacy.

Notwithstanding the courageous and noble opposition of those who felt it laid upon them to defend the truth as Christ bequeathed it, the principle of authority ended by taking possession of the whole of the Western Church and transformed it by degrees, first into Romanism, then into Ultramontanism, still later into Jesuitism, and finally into Infallibilism.

Such were the logical results of a false application of the principle of authority, considered as the sole basis of Christian truth. But the full extent of the falsity of the conception would only become manifest when it reached the absurdity of infallibilism. Down to the year 1870, it was possible to be in doubt as to the full extent of the mischief, to hope that a reform of Catholic doctrine could be effected by conciliatory measures; and that the principle of liberty would again be restored to its rightful place. As Rome had not yet gone the full length, it was, however, possible for its errors to be re-nounced; *the deductions drawn by the polemical writers of the Orthodox, might have still been charged with exaggeration*; but now, there is no more room for doubt. The syllogism is complete and it turns out to be a

sophism. As the premises from which the conclusion was drawn were false, there is nothing left for Romanism but to retrace its steps. It is in this sense, that I regard the proclamation of Infallibility as having a redeeming feature:—it is good because it is the boundary line of evil and error.

I take the liberty of dedicating this correspondence to my friends the old Catholics, who, with so much disinterestedness, learning and skill, have defended the ideas which it is also my desire to serve, with the power and means at my disposal.

The old Catholic movement is a protest of the Christian consciousness against the confiscation of the infallibility with which the Saviour endowed his Church in favor of one man,—a man who aims at becoming the absolute monarch of every human soul.

If it please God, the Old Catholic Church, which is making slow but sure progress, will bring about a union between the Churches of the East and of the West. Every day finds us nearer to each other; in fact, we already occupy identical ground “in necessariis.”

(See the Catechism of the Christian Catholics of 1889.)

Our English friend acted the part of intermediary between the Rev. Father X. and myself; it was to him that our letters were addressed.

I should like to add one more remark of importance:—As this controversy has been carried on in my own name, at “my own proper risk and peril” so to speak, without consulting any of my co-religionists, I assume the sole responsibility, for all that I shall advance.

ALEXANDER KIREEFF.

PAVLOVSK,

March 25th, 1891.

LETTERS ON THE INFALLIBILITY OF THE POPE.

SUMMARY OF GENERAL KIRKEFF'S LETTER TO MR. X.¹

Let me explain the reasons why an Orthodox Christian cannot dream of reconciliation with *infallibilistic* Catholicism. I assert that the proclamation of the new dogma of the infallibility of the Pope has completely overturned the true idea of the Church ; that it has effaced every vestige of liberty in the Church of Rome; and that it has transformed the children of the Church, into slaves of the Pope.²

Note 1.—This letter was written in English.

Note 2.—The following is the formula of the new dogma as it is found in the dogmatical constitution of the Council. (Sessio IV. July 18th, 1870). “Docemus et divinitus revelatum dogma esse definimus: Romanum Pontificem, cum ex cathedra loquitur, i. e. cum omnium Christianorum Pastoris et Doctoris munere fungens, pro suprema sua Apostolica auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa Ecclesia tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in beato Petro promissam, ea infallibilitate pollere, qua divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina dei de vel moribus instructam esse voluit, ideoque ejus modi Romani Pontifices definitiones ex sese non autem ex consensu Ecclesie irreformabiles esse.”

That is to say:

“ We teach and define as a revealed dogma, that when the Roman Pontiff speaks *ex cathedra*, that is to say, when by virtue of his apostolic authority, he discharges his functions in his capacity of pastor and teacher of all Christians, and when he defines a doctrine which is to be obligatory (held) on the entire Church (universal), he enjoys the infallibility with which the Divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed, in setting forth doctrine relating to matters of belief and morals; so that the decisions of the Roman Pontiff are unchangeable of themselves (ex sese) and do not require the consent (ex) of the Church.”

The liberal party in the Catholic Church has ceased to exist. The theological studies of the laity, which were already hampered by the prohibition to read the Holy Scriptures, cannot but suffer still more under this new regime. (The study of canonical law has now of course only an archæological interest; the study of ethics is perhaps still less needed). I appealed amongst others, to Father Beck, the General of the Jesuits, whom I had the honor of visiting at Fiesole. The conversation which I had with the celebrated General, justly called the Black Pope, was in the highest degree interesting for myself; and it absolutely confirmed my ideas as to the future of the liberal party in the Catholic Church. He said to me: "The Vatican Council has given a definitive character to theology (Romish)."¹

Such is actually the one sole foundation of the whole of Romish theology, of the morals and dogmas of the Roman Catholic world.

Note 1.—I venture to think that the famous General was not quite correct in this respect; a further step remains to be taken. It is difficult to admit infallibility without sanctity; these two qualities are inseparable; the Church is infallible, but then it is also holy. The proclamation of the sanctity of the Pope is the final step which the doctrinal science (?) of Rome will logically take; the proclamation of the holiness of the Pope will be its "corrallary." Its psychological necessity has long since been anticipated in ultramontane circles. It was so in the case of the Deacon Ennodius (one of the fore-runners of infallibility in his "Apologeticus," A. D. 501 or 502). This idea of mine is neither exaggerated nor absurd. Was not the very idea of Infallibility once regarded not only as criminal, but even as absurd. Now it has come to be looked upon as logical: later on, Augustin Triumphus gave expression to the opinion, that whilst it was not right to accord the worship of *latria*, of divine adoration to the Pope, yet he might claim the worship of *dulia*; because the latter belongs to the Saints. He further added, that the power of the Pope necessarily implied Holiness.

The late liberal party is "o sciocco o cieco" (either foolish or blind). Later on I remarked, that although I was a layman and self-taught, I was ready to uphold my theses in opposition to the learned Father X.; that this exchange of ideas with a professional man, amply supplied with documents, and having at his disposal the most recent, the strongest, in a word, the best arguments in favor of Infallibilism would be a great advantage to myself. Finally, I added, that I was willing to submit our discussion to the arbitration of a third person, who might be a fair and learned Protestant. (Unfortunately the latter did not take place). I concluded by referring to the history of the Council of 1870, where exactly the most learned and influential of the bishops (Hofell and Dupanloup amongst others) protested energetically against the exorbitant pretensions of the Pope, (i. e. of the Jesuits) and only yielded to reasons which had nothing in common with theology.

Such are the contents of the letter which I wrote to our English friend; this letter was shown to Father

We find identical views in Hildebrand (Gregory VII.) who maintained that the Popes inherited the holiness of Saint Peter. The future promoters of this doctrine will be at no loss whatever to discover (as was in the case of Infallibility) facts dating back to a remote antiquity. For example, they will be able to say: "The Eastern Patriarchs, in addressing the Popes, always make use of the term 'Your Holiness.'" The same expression was employed also by heretical Monarchs, as for example, the Emperor William I., of Germany or the Czar of Russia, when they addressed the Vicar of Christ. Is it not a sufficiently convincing proof, that even those enemies of our Holy Church did not venture to omit this formula? . . .

Such were the arguments, advanced by the Roman Curia in order to prove that Infallibility had been believed and admitted in all ages and by every one: analogous arguments will certainly be employed to prove the necessity of defining the Holiness of the Holy Father.

X., have been revised and are of unquestionable authenticity.

FIRST LETTER OF FATHER X (SUMMARY).

August 2d, 1890.

The ideas expressed by M. Kireeff find many adherents amongst those who are not members of the Catholic Church. Our Catholic principles are altogether different.

They are as follows :

Every Catholic ought to be convinced that there exists a supreme truth revealed by God, to which the human mind should unconditionally submit itself.

This truth is deposited in the Catholic Church. All Catholics, but especially the bishops, must use diligence that it be preserved intact and promulgated.

Every Catholic is allowed to study science; he may even do so diligently. The Church has always wished this. Notwithstanding, limits exist even for science—namely the doctrine of the Church. But the field open to it is extended whoever teaches contrary to what is contained in Church dogma is corrected by the bishops or the Pope.

The infallibility of the Pope is far from being absolute (ebensowenig). Just as far as the independence of science; both are fictions (undinge-non-entities). Why put them side by side ?

Catholics who are unwilling to submit to the judgment of the Pope and of the bishops (in questions relating to Faith) cease to be Catholics. There are

different tendencies in the Church, (e. g. a liberal and a conservative tendency) but both are circumscribed and kept within strict limits by the principle of the authority of the Church. He who renounces this principle, takes up the Protestant point of view; in other words, that of "religious nihilism." In all questions which are not dogmatically defined, the Catholic Church allows perfect freedom of thought.

There are various degrees of certainty in matters which have not been dogmatically decided.

ANSWER OF GENERAL KIREEFF TO THE FIRST LETTER OF FATHER X.

August 2d.

While thanking you for the interesting letter of Father X. allow me to call your attention to some ideas to which you gave utterance at the outset of our controversy. You expressed the hope, that what you were pleased to style our contest, our battle (a row) would not last long. You are extremely mistaken on this point; the matter is much too difficult and complicated for that.

A battle or tournament would be indeed a very easy and simple means of settling theological difficulties. This was the plan in olden times (Eck, Molanchton). In still earlier days, still simpler means were employed. Theological difficulties were settled in a very elementary manner. For example, Simon de Montford, at the command of Pope Innocent III., effected the conversion of the Albigenes; the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was not

more complicated either, though more recent. Things can no longer be managed so quickly and simply nowadays. As regards yourself, you do not form even an approximate idea of the numerous difficulties one encounters, in the attempt to solve what appears to be simple theological problems. When the subject is grappled seriously every detail, every iota, has to be taken into account and studied. Were it not so, one might content one's self with a few discussions or a number of pamphlets. You have most probably seen the enormous rooms of the public library at St. Petersburg :—well, the larger portion of them, is filled with theological works. No, if one is determined earnestly and conscientiously to solve the difficulties which a question of this description presents, it cannot be done by means of a few pamphlets, or one or two theological tournaments.

I will now pass on to the thesis of Father X. For some centuries the mode of conceiving the power and teaching function of the Church was absolutely identical in both Churches (the Orthodox Church of the East and the Catholic Church of the West). Soon after their separation certain difficulties of view or opinion, became noticeable—opinions, however, which might have been freely discussed, and which were not of an absolute dogmatical character. They did not affect the unity of the Church.

Let us recall to mind, the manner in which Pope Leo III. acted, although he himself sympathized with the *filioque*, he was careful not to convert a private opinion into a dogma obligatory for the human mind. This Pope so well understood his duty as guardian of the doctrine revealed by Christ, that he even opposed the threatening wishes of the powerful Charlemagne, who liked to occupy himself with theology (more in fact than was necessary).

The Pope as everyone knows, expressed himself most emphatically against the illegal introduction of the *filioque* into the creed. (What a pity that his infallible successors did not follow the example of their infallible

predecessor): This answer of Leo III. was unquestionably a decree "ex cathedra." The point in question was a matter of doctrine; the whole Western Church awaited the decision. The Eastern Church was also interested in it; for at this period the question had been everywhere freely discussed. But the wise Leo, refused to turn a matter of opinion into dogma. Such was the course of events.

Gradually things changed; and since the fatal date of 1870, the Western view concerning the power, and teaching functions, has completely changed. Since the proclamation of the doctrine of Infallibilism in the year 1870, from the Catholic point of view we are no longer schismatics or Photians, but heretics. Heresy consists in the acceptation of an error as a dogma; or in the non-acceptance of a dogma which the Church believes to be true, and we Easterns reject the fundamental doctrine of the actual Church of Rome, the dogma which is the predilection of Jesuits. (The famous Sallabus was drawn up under the superintendence of a Jesuit, Father Schrador).

More than once I have been accused of widening the gulf between the Eastern and the Western Church, of accentuating the differences, instead of trying to minimise or ignore. "Has not our History" I was asked, "already sufficiently emphasized these points? Why recall them afresh? Would it not be better to remove their sting? You are an advocate of the idea of a possible union of the Churches:—do you expect to further it, by accentuating so strongly the questions which divide us? By pushing logical conclusions to such extremes? If left alone, these differences, important though no doubt they are, would in time be forgotten." Such a method of reasoning is a proof of trifling sentimentalism; it may be the outcome of kindly feeling; but surely this is not an evidence of a deeper understanding of theological problems. Wishes like these are altogether naive; these combinations are absolutely opportunist. Opportunism is admissable solely in political and social questions, where to-day's truth

may become to-morrow's lie; but certainly not in questions where absolute truth must and ought to reign.

This mode of treating religious truths, cannot in the long run lead to good; what is more, it evinces a complete ignorance of religious things; or what is even worse, indicates an indifference which is in no respect Christian. In speaking thus, I do not wish to insinuate that every believing Christian ought to be hostile to everyone who is heterodox; I am no friend of the *odium theologium*; but at the same time, my Christian conscience forbids me to hide or deny my opinions; and on no account could I sacrifice my convictions for a peace which could neither be true nor lasting (faul). Bernard of Clairvaux, a great Saint, truly said: "*Melius est ut scandalum oriatur quam ut veritas relinquatur.*"

Sometimes people object:—Religious truth; where is it? what is it? do you claim to have found it? Most certainly I do: am I not a Christian? To discuss this important question thoroughly would no doubt lead us too far; I shall therefore limit myself to what follows. An altogether different thing is the steadfastness of a belief which allows of no compromise; from the fanaticism of a Torquemada who would destroy a whole nation because it refuses to submit to his beliefs; or of a Calvin, who though himself a Protestant, and consequently admitting the right of the free interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, caused Servetus to be burned at the stake, because he expounded these same Scriptures differently. But if a man is a believing and convinced Christian, he ought for that very reason to be kind and considerate towards the whole world; to help his neighbor in every way, be he heterodox, Jew, Pagan or Atheist. But this in no way implies an obligation to deny one's opinions or hide one's religious convictions. Can love to one's neighbor make one unfaithful to truth? That would be either double-faced cowardice, or selfishness adorning itself with fine sentiments. It was just in this way that the bishops of the Vatican Council tried to give a reason for their mode of action. There certainly were amongst them, men of learning

and culture; they formed an imposing minority, the minority which rejected the new dogma and which had the power to rescue Christian truth. Unhappily, however, these men fell a prey to selfishness and cowardice. Gradually they forsook the truth, "in order," as they said, "not to grieve the Holy Father, who clung so firmly to his doctrine." This was certainly not the outcome of Christian love or Christian convictions.

I shall take the liberty of adding one or two reflections. The infallibilistic Catholic Church is a politic social structure, which has been shaken to its very foundations. It no longer retains its power which was once so great; its thunders no longer re-echo in the world, as they did in the middle ages. But it is still a mighty power,—a power too, which dreams neither of abdicating, nor of consenting in any way to relax the rigor of its theories, for the purpose of facilitating the conclusion of peace. Quite the reverse; whilst growing weaker, she heightens her claims. Far be it from me to wish to assert that Rome is wrong in acting thus; not at all—she is only consistent; nor do I wish to deny the important services which she has rendered in the past; or the good, which, notwithstanding the falsehoods of the Vatican, she is still actually doing. Even now, there are many Catholics who are penetrated by the old Christian Spirit; amongst many of them, the spirit of sacrifice is developed to a high degree. The errors of the Vatican doctrine, have not altogether eradicated the remainder of the Christian Spirit. Discipline in all its strictness is still maintained. I grant all this; but it would be all the greater folly on our side to lay down our arms in the hope of satisfying Rome by overtures of peace; or of being able to arrange our differences in an amicable manner, etc. . . . They must be men of little clear insight, who can believe it possible for Rome to sacrifice the smallest portion of her claims, or to treat more leniently those whose ideas differ from her own. These are only childish illusions. Rome *appears* more lenient because she has

grown *weaker*, because she can no longer enforce her will and principles, as once she did. There is not a single Crusader at her disposal, capable of marching against Alby, Jerusalem or Constantinople: but the principles of Boniface, Hildebrand and of Innocent, are still to the fore at the Court of Rome. They still inspire the decrees of the Vatican and have lost none of their implacable character. *Theoretically* speaking, they are more pronounced than ever; and that because the decrees of Rome now cannot be reformed and are absolute; they keep the soul of the Roman Catholic in eternal bondage. An appeal to a Council or even to a Pope, better instructed (*melius informatum*), is no longer possible. Is this the kind of antagonism that one can hope to relax or disarm? Can one expect to induce her to moderate her claims by acting with forbearance and consideration? No; that were too naive. Let those who believe it glance at the Syllabus. (1.)

But to return to the thesis of my respected antagonist.

We, orthodox, also believe:

1. That there exists revealed truth, to which every man must submit.

2. That if anyone desires membership in a Church, his freedom of thought must certainly be restricted by that Church's dogma. But for all that, we do not prohibit either the study of the dogma, or its criticism by the intellect; quite the contrary, we know that certain doctrines transcend our comprehension, that we cannot

Note 1.—For example, the Syllabus condemns the following proposition: *Romanus Pontifex potest ac debet cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum recenti civilitate sese reconciliare et componere.* (That the Pope is able and ought to make concessions to progress and liberty §880). Now the Syllabus (as also the Encyclica of 1864) is approved by the Pope and is imposed on every Christian, consequently on the whole Church. It is impossible to find anything more completely *ex cathedra* than the Syllabus.

grasp their full meaning; but we hold none that are self-contradictory.

3. We also believe that the guardian of these truths is the Church, *as Jesus Christ constituted it*. Thus far, that is to say, as long as we are dealing with questions of principle; as long as we only make use of general terms; so long can we go along with the Roman Catholics. Unhappily, however, as soon as we begin to apply the principles and formulate concrete statements, one discovers a disintegrating element pervading the whole Roman Catholic system of doctrine, an element which puts the possibility of an agreement quite out of the question. This element is the infallibility of the Pope which strains every nerve to usurp the infallibility of the Church. This new difficulty has increased for Protestants also, the difficulty of reunion with Rome. Leibnitz would certainly never have entertained the idea of any understanding under existing circumstances (since 1870). At the time of Bossuet the Infallibility of the Pope would never have been proclaimed; at that period the stakes would have been too high.

The relation between ourselves, the Orthodox and Protestants, is of an altogether different character. Our chief stumbling block is that Protestantism is split up into different sects, some of which are extremely latitudinarian; so much so, as scarcely to deserve the name "Christian." Yet they constitute a part of the Protestant world, and consider themselves on an equality with those who are more at one with the Church Universal. In fact, these sects cannot be cut off from the Protestant communion. Their rights, their legal position are identical. Unfortunately too, the Anglican Church offers us the same difficulty; the Established Church comprises not only those who are conservative but also those who are conservative, but also those who are absolutely anarchical, whose doctrine is widely different from that of the Universal Church (Low Church and Broad Church). When Protestants reproach Roman Catholics for their Pope, the latter justly reply,

that amongst them, every member of the community is his own Pope, his own interpreter and judge of the Word of God. In fact, whilst Roman Catholicism lays exclusive emphasis on the principle of authority, Protestantism, falling into the opposite error entirely denies it and substitutes for it the principle of absolute liberty.

Protestantism is an exaggerated protest against the authority which has become the exclusive principle of Roman Catholicism; whereas both these principles should be represented in the Church and complement and balance each other. This benevolent influence ceased to be wielded after the rupture between the Eastern and Western Churches; a rupture which had for its immediate result the establishment of an ecclesiastical monarchy over the whole of the Roman Patriarchate. The West lacked the power necessary to keep the Pope in check; he was strong not only in himself, but in the division and strife of his enemies. After a stubborn war, the Papacy (having become the plaything of the Roman Curia) remained mistress of the situation and frustrated the generous efforts of those who would fain have reformed the abuses which prevailed in the Church and who were anxious to save the principle of liberty. By degrees, reform became more and more impossible. Now, that reform is out of the question, revolution is resorted to; the order of things in the established system is overthrown. Those who enter on a course like this, always go too far. This was what unhappily happened to Protestantism. Luther's attempts to reform the abuses of the Church, failed completely; the impetuous reformer plunged accordingly into a revolution and overshot the mark; the principle of authority was abolished, in a large part of the territory of the Western Church, that of liberty was alone left intact; but could not be kept within legitimate bounds. Thus the centre of gravity of the power and doctrine of the Church, which with ourselves (the Orthodox Eastern Church) has its seat in the conscientiousness of the Church, as represented by the Oecumenical Councils;

amongst Roman Catholics (since 1870) has its seat in the consciousness (*Bewusst sein*) of the Pope; whilst among Protestants, (whether liberal or conservative) it is seated in the consciousness of the individual.

But matters in the West did not rest there. A terrible struggle commenced; Luther's too strong re-action called forth the counter revolution of Loyola—that powerful, sinister and implacable genius. The mighty figures of those two giant foes, well represent the two opposing directions of Western religious thought: The German Luther, prototype of absolute liberty; the Latin Loyola, that of absolute authority. Towards these two different tendencies, we, the Orthodox of the East hold one and the same relation. We believe that each of these antagonists affirms and develops one half of the Christian truth, to the neglect and misapprehension of the other half, which is equally important, and quite as indispensable as the first. Neither side, however, sees, or wishes to see, or is perhaps able to see the error into which it has fallen.

Is it not the historical mission of the Orthodox East, *to point out the way which will lead to a reconciliation of these opposing tendencies?* Is it possible to conceive of a higher a holier calling? "But," interposes the offended West, "have you risen to the height of this great and terrible problem? Do you believe yourselves called and able to solve it?" We answer: "*It is not ourselves who can solve it, but the Christian truth which we have humbly and carefully sought to guard: this Christian truth which possesses and directs us.*"

The disciples of John, the apostle of love, will bring together again the disunited disciples of Peter and Paul, then will be brought about the true and holy unity which its divine founder desired for His Church. But if such is the vocation of our Eastern Church, is it not also that of the Old Catholic Church? which though weak in numbers, is strong in the knowledge and convictions of her children. For, as has already been stated, we are agreed in the matter of doctrine. The principles of authority and liberty, as amongst ourselves,

so also amongst the Old Catholics, are allowed to complement and balance each other; as was the case in the still united ancient Church. At that time, the Christian life was regulated by the Oecumenical Councils, which consisted of *representatives of the faithful*, expressing the infallible consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) of the Church. They were not simply a parliament of ecclesiastical princes, legislating on doctrinal questions according to their good pleasure (or even sometimes absolutely dumb when they ought to have spoken and spoken with authority.)

As I am touching the question of the relations between the Orthodox Church, Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, I shall take the liberty of going a step further. Down to the year 1870, we were much nearer in point of doctrine, to the Roman Catholics, than to the Protestants (more especially in our conception of the idea of the Church). Since the proclamation of the dogma of Infallibility, this is no longer the case. Every trace of liberty in Romanism, has been obliterated: an understanding between them and ourselves is therefore no longer possible.

Our relations to Protestants may be different; an understanding between us is not impossible, since every Protestant *may and can* believe with us, both in the principle of authority and that of liberty; it is not a question of principle that divides us. Protestants, it is true act individually; and no one of them has a right to speak in the name of the entire fellowship; but I have more than once met with the following way of regarding the matter (among Protestants of sincere faith and moderate views). A Protestant is *able* and has a right to be in accord with a member of the Orthodox (Greek) Church. A Catholic neither can nor dare; for in so doing, he would be unfaithful to his dogma; he would be excommunicated "*lata sententia*." Here lies the real difference in our relations respectively to Protestant and Catholics.

Father X. asserts, that Catholics all concern themselves about the safety and propagation of this truth

(revealed by God); further, that every Catholic is at liberty to occupy himself, yea, even diligently with Scientific pursuits. (It seems to me however, that these two assertions do not tally with the prohibition to the poor laity) to read the Holy Scriptures. The true Roman Catholic is no longer permitted to inquire into truth for himself; to look at it with his own eyes; or to grasp it with his own intelligence. Is it not his duty, first of all, to make the "Sacrificio dell 'Intelletto'" (sacrifice of the intellect)? Doctrine is imposed on him by Rome. He takes no part whatever in its definition, in its defence (at the Oecumenical Council through the medium of his bishops) and the Councils themselves are but the remnants, the vestiges of an absolutely antiquated fashion of looking at things—a fashion that has gone out of use.

Objections, it is true, are not raised against the study of mathematics or of chemistry . . . Difficulties begin when we come to theology and philosophy,—these two sister sciences which most profoundly interest men, which determine their morals and which show them the way wherein they should walk.

How is it possible for the Roman Catholic to guard and uphold revealed truth, if he may only read the original code which contains it, after asking and obtaining the permission of his Bishops? Is it anything less than a flagrant contradiction? Do you believe that the greatest geniuses of the last centuries, Newton, Leibnitz and Kant, could have spoken so nobly and truthfully about religion, unless they had been in the habit of reading the Holy Scriptures from their youth? It seems to me that a guardian who has no knowledge of that which he has to guard, is not much of a guardian. The works of St. Alphonsus Liguori, which have just recently been approved by the Roman Curia and which evidently correspond to what it believes to be true and moral (in any case a strange choice), can hardly take the place of the Word of God. But these are only incidental questions.

The chief point under discussion is only lightly

touched upon in the letter of Father X ; by way of compensation however, in a very categorical manner. He says: "There is no such thing as the absolute personal infallibility of the Pope; it is a non-entity (Unding)." This is absolutely true; it is an utterance which I can cordially subscribe; but actual *Roman* Catholics have no right to think so. The Orthodox Catholics of the East; the Old Catholics; the Anglicans; the Protestants; and those among Roman Catholics, who either will not or cannot give an exact account of the real bearing of the new dogma may do so. These last call themselves liberal Catholics and would like to settle the difficulties which this doctrine presents, according to their taste, in their own way; they want to philosophize away its real sting.

But they are not true Catholics; they are *illogical and heretical*; they are too late. The Vatican Council settled the question in a very definite and irrevocable manner; the infallibility of the Pope is based upon a rock, and is therefore immovable. In fact, what else could this Council be said to have defined, if not personal infallibility? *Non-personal* infallibility (Pope and Church combined) had long been accepted in the Western Church; was admitted even by Bossuet; and its reiterated proclamation would certainly not have called forth such opposition in the heart of the Western Church. But this non-personal infallibility had not reckoned with the Ultramontane party; that party was not satisfied with it; it wanted its own "non autem ex consensu ecclesiae;" and it has most assuredly got it. From its own standpoint, we must admit it to be perfectly right. The Infallibility of the Pope, following unavoidably on the establishment of his monarchy (in the Church) is only a perfectly logical development of the primordial Romish lie. The party which upheld this idea, marched slowly but surely. At the Council of the Apostles, presided over by St. James, no one certainly dreamed of personal infallibility; it was the Church which, in conformity with the promise of the Saviour was to decide (*sine consensu Papae*). After the separation of the

Churches, the primacy of the Patriarch of Rome gradually developed into a monarchy. That was the beginning of the lie; we watch the formation of a Papal party and enter upon the second period, that of the infallibility of the Church "*cum consensu Papae*"; then follows the *third* period, that of the infallibility of the Pope "*cum consensu ecclesiae*;" lastly we arrive at the fourth and last, that of the infallibility of the Pope, "*sine consensu ecclesiae*."

The most astounding of all sophisms is finally completed; This idea of primacy changing into infallibility, —an idea which has played so great a part in history, and which for a thousand years dominated that of Western Europe,—developed in an absolutely logical manner and ended in absurdity. For the sake of avoiding misunderstanding, I hasten to add, that throughout the following pages, I speak solely of infallibility as regards questions in which the *Pope speaks as Pope*; and not as regards those which he decides in his capacity as a private individual. I think it necessary to emphasize this point; I do not assert that the Pope claims infallibility in private matters; but I do maintain, that since the year 1870 he claims to be infallible when matters of doctrine and morals are in question. He is no longer obliged to ask the opinion of any Council whatsoever; according to the new theory, Councils are and were altogether superfluous. The Comte de Maistre, a well-known apologist of infallibilism far more outspoken than any of the present times and one who did not shrink from the conclusions which might be drawn from his premises, says in all his letters: "Popes had no reason for calling councils; they only did so out of complaisance towards the Emperors." This is a very daring assertion,—one to which I shall have occasion to refer later on; in the meantime, before closing my reply and letter, I shall take the liberty of asking a question which has regard to Canonical law and which bears upon the theory of Infallibilism. It is this; Popes, as well as all other Bishops, used formerly to be elected by the community, and this was a perfectly canonical precedent; but later

on they were frequently forced upon the Church by Emperors or by women; as for example, by the beautiful Marosia (Note 1.)

Matters are not really managed in this way; the Pope is elected by several ecclesiastics (Cardinals), who may not only be ignorant men, but even heretics and prevaricators (my honored adversary would scarcely maintain that Cardinals are infallible?). They do not become more infallible, when united together in a conclave: how then can these fallible men communicate infallibility to another man; or force the Holy Spirit to communicate it to him? One can only *transmit* that which one actually possesses. Three Bishops, or in case of necessity, one only, can give to another the divine grace of the episcopate, *which they themselves possess*; but whence does the Pope derive the so-called grace, of his so-called infallibility? Is the *election* of the Pope an eighth sacrament? As a *candidate* for the papal chair he might be a heretic. Pope Innocent III. (an authority on whom even the most inveterate Infallibilists will scarcely cast doubt) admits that even a Pope may be a heretic, and therefore liable to deposition by his diocesans or his Church: much more ought we to allow such a possibility in the case of a bishop; how then is it possible then for him in a trice, to become not only *non-heretical*, but even infallible? Such questions rise unbidden and ask for a solution which cannot be refused.

A. KIRIEFF.

PAVLOVSK,
August 7th.

Note 1.—I am not quoting these well-known historical facts in order to lay blame on the Romish Church. It is not an argument which I would care to make use of in my controversy. To relate anecdotes about an Alexander Borgia, would indeed be a *testimonium paupertatis argumenti*. I only wish to illustrate my idea.

We too, in the East, have had to accept poor Bishops, but it was not so much a matter of importance, because our Bishops *are not infallible*. I also wish to call attention to the fact, that the ordination of Bishops is a sacrament, like any other. Is the election of the Pope also a sacrament? the 8th? By whom was it instituted?

The following is what this Pope said: Sermo III de Consecratione Pontificis (Migne 217, p. 664).

Propter causam vero fornicationes, Ecclesia Romana (The reference is probably to the diocesan Church of Rome, which elected its bishops) *potest dimittere Romanum Pontificem*. Fornicationem non dieo carnalem, sed spiritualem. . . . *id est propter infidelitatis errorem*, "The Church of *Rome* (we are not at present speaking of the Universal Church united together in an Oecumenical Council, but of the small Diocese of Rome) could thus dismiss and depose its bishop because of infidelity; meaning by this rather unceremonious term, used by the Popes, *an error in matters relating to faith*, an error of doctrine. Is not this example sufficiently convincing? (it certainly is not the only one). Can one still conscientiously defend infallibility?

SECOND LETTER OF FATHER X. (SUMMARY.)

August 15th.

Father X. lays down the principles according to which the questions touched upon in General Kireeff's answer, may be explained.

Christ, says Father X., has given Eternal Truth to His Church. He has promised that, by the Holy Spirit's help, this truth shall never fail. This truth is the object of faith, and is in the first instance seated in the consciousness (*Bewusstsein*) of believers, i. e., of the Church. In this sense, every one is a keeper and guardian (*Wachter*) of the truth, first, those who accept and guard it in simple faith, then, those who, according to the importance (*Maass* tab-scale) of the position they occupy in the Church, teach and diffuse it, watching carefully that foreign elements shall not be introduced into the teaching of the Church. The bishops are the representatives of the different parties in the Church, with regard to (*Bezug*) the faith of their subordinates (*Untergebenen*), and are at the same time guardians and protectors (*Beschützer*) of this faith. But they represent this Church only in conjunction with their supreme head (*Oberhaupt*) the Pope, out of this union (community) they are also separated (*ausgeschieden*) from the Church. But the Pope has a further advantage over the rest of the bishops, that, in accordance with the word of Christ (I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not) and in his capacity as supreme teacher (*Lehrer*) of the truth revealed by God, he is able of himself (*Ex sese*) to give irreformable definitions of dogma (infallible) without depending on the Church's assent. That is to say, in such decisions, he remains always in harmony (*concordance*, *Uebereinstimmung*) with the truth which lives in the Church, he can never place himself (*stehen*) in opposition to the tradition of the Church, he can never be opposed to all (*alle*) the rest of the bishops. The head

and the members, as long as it is their purpose to form one body, can never be separated. If they are separated, the body ceases to exist. If this is what is meant by personal infallibility, an arbitrary meaning (*Nach Willkür*) is evidently given to the expression. Theology has not yet settled the disputed question (*Streitfrage*), whether the Pope can be also personally (*auch persönlich*) mistaken in matters relating to faith, but this is only a secondary question (*nebenschliche*). The Pope never decides questions of dogma under the influence of a pretended (*vergeblich*) inspiration, but always after having obtained (*verschafft*) through the medium of councils (*oecumenical*), the moral conviction that this or the other doctrine (*Lehre*) is conformable to the collective mind of the Catholic world (*Gesamtbewusstsein*). But the decisions of the Pope are not the outcome of this moral conviction, the chief role appertains to the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, says Father X., all the difficulties which M. Kireeff raised, are solved.

Father X., then passes on to reply to the following questions:

1. M. Kireeff wishes to know what the decisions of the Vatican Council were? My answer is — that between the Pope on the one hand in his capacity as supreme teacher in questions relating to faith, and the Church on the other, there could be no discord (*Zwie-spalt*). According to Catholic doctrine, the Pope as supreme teacher, represents the mind, the faith of the Church (*des Kirchlichen Glaubensbewusstseins*). Who represents the mind of the Russian Church? asks Father X.

2. De Maistre is not an authority.

3. What would have happened, supposing a heretic had been elected Pope? asks M. Kireeff. I answer with Mgr. Bishop Fessler, secretary to the Vatican Council, that such a case is highly improbable, (*hochst-unwahrscheinlich*), but should it ever occur, God would intervene in a special manner (*besonderer Beistand*) to keep the Church and Pope from an heretical de-

cision (*Ausbruch*). Father X., further adds, that history supplies not a single case of a heretical Pope.

4. There ought to be in the Church, an infallible organ (*Amt charge*) relying upon God's help. He who denies the existence of such an office (*Lehramt*) takes up altogether different ground from the Catholic doctrine.

Father X., concludes his letter with supplementary remarks regarding questions of fact.

"The massacre of Saint Bartholemew and Beziers," he says, "cannot be laid at the doors of the Catholic Church."

No Catholic is forbidden to read the Holy Scriptures, every one is directed to do so under wise guidance. Whither has the reading of the Holy Scriptures led Protestants and also certain Russian sects? asks Father X. Truth must be found in the living tradition (of the Church). Father X., is surprised that General Kireeff should think that God's word could only be known to us through the medium of the Bible, M. K. must surely believe that the Russian Church is a depositary (*Tragerin*) of revealed truth. Further, have many Russians read the Bible? has he done so himself?

Finally, Father X., says, "I should like to know whom General Kireeff would appoint arbitrator (*aufstellen mochte*) of religious and philosophical opinions (*Ansichten*) relating to the religious sphere."

Note 1.—Such is the letter of the Reverend Father X. It is remarkable in more than one respect. I do not wish to accuse my adversary of being consciously Jesuitical, but his letter is full of mental reservations, of answers and objections to questions which were not asked. He provides loopholes for himself and raises questions which are irrelevant to the present controversy, unless he ~~hopes~~ ^{hopes} to entrap me into making a false logical step, into committing a blunder. No, I feel sure, that he means sincerely all that he says, without perfidious afterthought, but it is strange to note, how little capable Roman Catholics (infallibilists) are, of discussing and defending clearly, simply and

truthfully, these new theories. It is not a theologian who reasons, but a diplomatist who pulls the wires. I have also felt it to be my duty to quote the German of many of the terms which Father X., employs. (End of note.)

ALEX. KIRIEFF.

GENERAL KIRIEFF'S ANSWER TO THE SECOND
LETTER OF FATHER X.

(August 15th 1890).

In at least one respect, my honorable antagonist and myself are agreed; unless we alter our mode of discussion, I can foresee no end to our controversy. Evidently I fail to express myself clearly, as the Reverend Father X., seems not to understand either my answers or my counter-questions. At the outset we kept alongside of each other, our point of departure was the same (the doctrine of the undivided Church) we both affirmed that Christian doctrine is derived from two sources, namely, the written word of God, and the Tradition, both equally true and authoritative. The latter (tradition) is the sum total of what the Christian world has everywhere and at all times, held to be true *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est*). By the expression *all*, we understand mainly the Oecumenical Councils, as well as the Fathers of the Church *when they agree* in their opinions. But having admitted this much, there is an end to our agreement.

Thenceforth we parted to meet no more. Father X., says, "Over and above the ordinary members of the Church, on every one of whom it is incumbent to guard the truth, the Pope can (according to the words of the Saviour, 'I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not') decide questions of dogma, (unchangeable with absolute truth) in his capacity as supreme teacher of revealed truth, and that, moreover, independently *ex consensu ecclesiæ* (consent of the Church), in his own name, *ex sese*. First of all, I shall take the liberty of remarking that Father X., makes (unintentionally no doubt) a slight alteration in the text of the Vatican definition, when he writes, that the Pope *is able* to give infallible decisions, the original text is clearer and more explicit. But this is a matter of no importance, the important point is, that my opponent believes it proved and indisputable that the words of the Saviour addressed to Saint Peter, confer the gift of infallibility on the Pope of Rome, whereas this is the very thing to be proved, this is the point under discussion, and the "*onus probandi*," the duty of proving it, devolves on Father X. Much has been written on this subject and so far as I know, the Fathers of the Church never arrived at a unanimous decision on the question, according to the idea of the infallibilists. These words should not be taken absolutely—not even with regard to the Apostle himself, still less with regard to his so-called successors, for immediately after addressing them to Saint Peter, the Saviour speaks of his future apostacy. (Luke xiii., 34.) Is it not quite clear that the promise did not absolutely guarantee even the faith of the Apostle himself? (it vacillated). So too with regard to the exhortation of the Saviour to Saint Peter "to establish and strengthen his brethren in the faith." This also cannot be taken in an unconditional sense, because we know that he did not always obey it, and that he misled the brethren at Antioch, on a most important canonical question, the question viz., whether old Testament laws were equally binding on Christians and Jews. Saint Paul charges Saint Peter with being

unfaithful to the truth of the Gospel (Gal. II, 11-14), "when I saw that they walked not uprightly, according to the truth of the Gospel, I said unto Peter" . . .). This passage has frequently been expounded by the Fathers of the Church in an anti-infallibilistic sense. But to proceed further, Father X., continues, "That is to say, in these decisions, the opinion of the Pope never departs from conformity with the truth which dwells in the Church and will never place himself in opposition to the tradition (of the Church) etc." . . . This seems to me, to be a most precarious gloss, the legitimacy of which ought to be proved, though my opponent makes no attempt whatever to supply the proof. Instead of that, he tries to support his ideas, by an "illustration" (an illustration frequently used by the Ultramontanes) drawn from the comparison, of the Church with a body, whose head is the Pope. That a comparison, so materialistic, may serve as an *illustration*—an awkward one, at the best—I am willing to allow, but it is not surprising that theologians should use it as an *argument* and take it literally?

It is met within the early Church, among the Fathers (e. g. Augustine and Cyprian), but taken symbolically. They never conceived it so grossly, neither did they dream of a head in the material sense, their idea of religion was too high, too ethereal, for that. One cannot fail to see that the practical Roman spirit, so proxically juridical, has unquestionably had, and still has, a disastrous influence on the minds of those who lack philosophical or religious *elan*. Even the term employed to express the relations between God and His creature—the word "religion," has a material and juridical character. "*Religion*" comes from the word "*religare*," to bind. The terms used by the East are more idealistic. The Russians call it "*Vera*" which means faith, in Greek it is "*Hysebeia*," piety. This same materialistic way of looking at things shows itself still more clearly in the doctrine of punishments and rewards, which is treated with so much minuteness in Ultramontane theology. Only the mind of an advo-

cate, of a lawyer, could have invented and developed the theories of purgatory and indulgences. Only legislators could have introduced a system of accounts so minute, detailed even to a crown or to a genuflexion—into the relations of God and man, an account-keeping which really transforms the sanctuary of forgiveness into a banking establishment, at which alms are received, debts paid, advances made, etc. This materialistic element has turned the development of the idea of unity in the Western Church into an altogether materialistic channel. A member of the Western Church (I speak of those who are inclined to judge matters in a materialistic way) wishes to have over his Church, a material head, whom he can see and handle, otherwise he can neither grasp nor understand it. That which he cannot see with his bodily eyes has no reality for him, as if a moral head, as if the *symbol* of unity, were not sufficient. Is the only possible head, or chief leader of a State for instance, one in the form of a material person? Were this the only possibility a Republic could never have a chief. "*Nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu,*" says the materialistic philosopher, this also applies to *Ultramontanists*, a head, a chief, who cannot be seen and felt, whose slipper cannot be kissed, has no existence for them. This tendency to treat theological questions in a juridical manner, and a marked preference for the study of law, were peculiarly characteristic of the Roman theologians, particularly in the Middle Ages. Law preponderated greatly over Theology. Theology flourished in France, in Italy it was law. Even Innocent IV. founded a school of law at Rome. Theology did not supply materials for the building up of an all-powerful Papacy, and so they turned to law. When Theology lacked arguments, they betook themselves to jurisprudence, which was not so particular in its choice of means. Pseudo-Isidore, Gratian, Pseudo-Cyril—everything was utilized. There was at first no lack of protests, Roger Bacon, for example, says (*Opus Tertium, Rerum Britannicarum Medii ævi Scriptores*, London,

1859, p. 84-85). All wisdom was contained in the Holy Scriptures. *Nunc non est ita, nam plus laudatur in Ecclesia Dei unus jurista civilis, licet solum sciat jus civile et ignoret jus canonicum et theologiam, quam unus magister in theologia et citius eligitur ad ecclesiasticas dignitates.* (i. e. Nowadays the Church is readier to commend a lawyer if he only know civil law and be ignorant of canonical law and theology, than a master in theology, and he has a greater chance of being raised to ecclesiastical dignities). Further on he regrets the abuse of the law, which has encroached upon theology, etc. These words are all the more remarkable, as the relations between the Pope and R. Bacon were notoriously of a friendly character. But it was not only theologians who complained of this state of affairs, poets and thinkers too were of the same mind, thus Dante says (Canto ix, vi. 35, Paradiso).

Per questo l'Evangelio e i dottor magni
Sono derelitti: e solo ai decretali
Si studia si, che pare a lor' vivagni.
A questo intende il Papa e i cardinali
Non vanno il lor' pensieri a Nazarette
La dove Gabriel a perse l'ali.

That is why the Gospel and the great teachers are forsaken, only the decretals are studied now, so much can be gathered from the margins (of their books). The Pope and the Cardinals have come to an understanding as to this, their ideas do not go to Nazareth, where the Angel Gabriel unfolded his wings."

But let us return to the theses of my honored adversary, he says:

1. That every Christian should teach the truth according to the position he occupies in the Church. As the Pope occupies the highest position, he is in possession of a gift which the others do not share, viz., *Infallibility*.

2. "That the Pope possesses it according to the words of Christ to Saint Peter, "I have prayed for thee, etc." . . .

3. That this gift consists in this, that the Pope when pronouncing infallible decrees, remains (*bleibt*) in conformity of opinions with the Church.

To this I answer:

Ad. 1. There is not the slightest resemblance between the teaching power possessed by Christians generally and the power which the Vatican Council attributes to the Pope. There is no likeness between these two talents. On the contrary, there is a difference not only of *quantity*, but also of *quality*. The power attributed to the Pope is of an altogether different character from that which every Christian possesses, namely that of teaching *infallibility*—a power, which according to the words of the Saviour and to Orthodox Eastern doctrine, has only been given to the entire Church, the Church as a whole. There is the same difference between these two gifts, as there is between any given number, no matter how great its value, and the Infinite. It is easy to see that there is a breach of continuity between these two ideas or conceptions. The Early Church, before the rupture, and the Eastern Church, always understood this difference, these two terms could only have been confused by men destitute alike of true faith and philosophical culture. A number, however great its value, is always a finite number, such also is the power of understanding and teaching religious truth, which appertains to Christians generally. The infinite has no limitations, such too is the supernatural and superhuman power which Christ conferred on the Church in its entirety. And, I repeat, the United Church never transferred this privilege to any of her members, no matter how profound his learning or how great his saintliness. There is not the slightest indication in Holy Scripture to warrant the supposition that even the Apostles enjoyed this prerogative. Quite the reverse. But this is transgressing the limits of our controversy, the sole aim of which is to elucidate the character of the infallibility attributed to the Pope, not to prove its illegality and absurdity. I again repeat—according to Romanists, the teaching

power of the Pope is infallible, whereas that of other men is not so, and the two therefore differ qualitatively.

Ad. 2. There is no logical connection between the words which the Saviour addressed to the Apostle Peter and the so-called infallibility of the Pope.

(a) Neither in that text, nor any where else in Holy Scripture is there a question of Pope, Patriarch or any other Primacy.

(b) The Saviour speaks of the wavering (*wanken*) faith of Saint Peter—a wavering, which manifested itself in the most obvious manner, not only in his personal character, but also in his doctrine. Notwithstanding this, Christ assigned to him, conjointly with John, James and Paul, a high position and a vast sphere of action. The threefold denial of Peter was counteracted by the Saviour's threefold exhortation and by His prayer. Such is the explanation given by the early Fathers of the Church. The majority express themselves very positively, in a sense directly opposed to that of the infallibilists, especially the most recent infallibilists who overpass all bounds and are driving under full sail towards the absurd.

Ad. 3. This point is intended to be a more detailed explanation of the decree of 1870. Let us consider it more closely. It is impossible to study the doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope too carefully. It is now and will be henceforth the corner-stone of the whole doctrinal system of Rome. Theoretically speaking, it is of infinitely greater importance than the "filioque" (which was the beginning of the doctrinal division of the Churches), practically speaking, it is much more important than the theory of indulgences, which cost Rome the most civilized part of her flock. I confess that I fail to understand how the explanations given by Father X., can be applied to the original text of the Constitution. In this text, which is perfectly clear and distinct, it is said and laid down, that the Pope when he speaks in his capacity as teacher of the Church, that is, to use the term agreed on, "ex cathedra," gives

irreformable i. e. infallible decisions. Nothing more is added, there is not a word of that which Father X., adds to it—there is no stipulation that the Pope shall remain in harmony of opinion with the Church, nor that he shall not contradict the tradition of the Church. What my honored adversary says on this subject, would no doubt be very convenient and comforting for the Catholics, but unfortunately nothing of the sort is to be found in the new dogma—quite the reverse. The opinion of the Church is dismissed in the most positive and peremptory manner.

The doctrine of the infallibility of the *Pope in conjunction with the Church* was held in the Western Church (e. g. by the Gallicans). But at a later period, as is well known, it was set aside, that too in the most positive manner, by the Vatican Council. What justification then has Father X., for trying to introduce this new point of view, in his explanations? On this occasion, as also on many others he evidently reasons in the following manner (it is the way the Ultramontanes follow when they run short of arguments based on Holy Scripture, or on the *consensus Patrum*, on the agreement of the Holy Fathers). The Church is a body, and every body must have a head, now in this case, the head is the Pope (1), and if the two have to live, nay even to exist, they cannot be separated or disjoined. Is this sufficiently clear and simple? But again, we are concerned with theology, and not with anatomy. This manner of reasoning is false, it is inapplicable to the subject under consideration, for it is too materialistic, it is inapplicable not only to theology, as I said before, but even to politics, which certainly have to do with very tangible and material questions. My antagonist, no less than the rest of his colleagues, forgets that what is true of a zoological organism, can only be applied to the Church in an allegorical sense, for the simple reason, that the Church is not an animal, but a mystical organism, whose head is Christ.

Note 1.—Jesus Christ does not suit them. He no longer satisfies them.

But this is not sufficiently tangible for Papists, whatever they cannot see, feel and touch, does not exist for them. A Mystical Head does not suffice us, they say, we need someone who can speak materially, someone who can teach us with an audible voice, where is this mystic head? It is as though we heard the disciples of Christ, still entangled in the bonds of matter, saying . . . "Shew us the Father and it sufficeth us." As if nothing had taken place since then, as if we had not been taught the spiritual doctrine of the Saviour, as if He had not died for our sakes, as if the letter which killeth, had not been replaced by the life-giving spirit. And Romanists dare to speak of progress. But what is strangest of all, is, that these arguments are repeated at a time, when on all hands, societies without a visible head, are springing into existence, societies which, from the Roman standpoint, being without head, are incapable of life. Leaving political States or Republics altogether aside, do we not see societies of every description, learned, charitable, economical and financial, existing without material head? Do Romanists imagine that a Church has less vitality than an academy, a university, or a republic? Does Father X., cling to the naive arguments of Saint Thomas Aquinas, on Monarchy in the Church? It is true, that amongst the early Fathers of the Church, we find more than one hyperbole, more than one comparison and allegory such e. g. as father, head, pillar, foundation of the Church, etc., but it would never enter into the head of any man with a knowledge of Scripture and Church History, *discussing the subject bona fide*, to take expressions of the kind literally and make them the basis of juridical laws. A third rate special pleader might try to base material rights on expressions of piety, love, or respect, found in some letter written by the parties to a suit, but not so a serious controversialist. Yet it is just the way of Roman controversialists to have recourse to such arguments, a fact which corroborates what I said regarding the deleterious influence of Roman jurisprudence on Roman Catholic theology.

The defenders of Papism answer, Christ it is true, did not speak of Popes, but neither did he speak of Bishops or Patriarchs. This is an argument which we, Orthodox, are quite willing to accept. These titles are not found in the Gospels, and these dignities were instituted by the Church, they cannot therefore claim divine right, but only ecclesiastical right, the right of the Pope is the same as that of all the rest. We are also quite willing to admit his rank, yea even his primacy *inter pares*, but only as having been instituted by the Church.

In the constitution of 1870, then, there is no trace of that which Father X. imports into it. No reference is made either to the infallibility of the Pope *in conjunction with that of the Church*, or to the *union of the Pope with the Church*,—a union which would produce this new collective infallibility, (*Gesammtunfehlbarkeit*) nor to the reunion of both these infallibilities, (Pope and Church). There is no mention of anything, but the personal infallibility of the Pope. My antagonist adds, that the question whether it is possible for the Pope personally to err in a matter of faith, though incidental and of little moment, has not yet been theologically settled, and that it is still a matter of controversy (*Streitfrage*). Is my antagonist speaking seriously? does he not see that the whole future of the Western Church depends on the solution of this problem, which however cannot be said to be any longer a question, inasmuch as it has been settled,—in the most indubitable manner, *negatively*, by Orthodox and Protestant Theology, *affirmatively*, in 1870, by the Vatican theology. Down to the year 1870, this infallibility was most emphatically denied by learned Catholics, now it can no longer be denied, for the wording of the new constitution is categorical and irrevocable, and it is precisely to the person of the Pope, acting independently of anything, the Church may think or say, (*non ex ejus consensu*) that infallibility is ascribed. This is the vice which holds the Roman theology in its grip, and which sooner or later will altogether strangle it.

Father X. asserts, that Popes never announce decrees under the influence of a pretended "inspiration," but always after arriving at a moral conviction that the doctrine under consideration expresses the mind of the Church as a whole (*Gesamtbewusstsein*), and that the doctrine called for the degnition given. Nevertheless, he adds, the truth, the infallibility of the decisions of the Pope do not depend on this moral conviction, for it is the Holy Spirit who plays the chief role (*die Hauptrolle*).

After this explanation, adds Father X., all M. Kireeff's doubts ought to vanish.

Alas, quite the reverse. New doubts associate themselves to the old ones. To begin with, what do the words mean.—"A Pope never decides, etc.?" But my adversary and myself are not engaged in discussing a fact, a possibility, the power possessed by the Pope of issuing decisions, but his pretended right of issuing them without the consent of the Church, of prescribing and defining dogmas, without seeking to know what the Church thinks of them. Nothing that Father X. has said on the matter, constitutes an answer to my arguments, we are not concerned with a question of history, but with a question of right. The point of importance is to know, not what the Popes have done, or are doing, but what they have *the right* to do, by reason of their infallibility since 1870.

"It is not an inspiration," says Father X., "it is the help of the Holy Spirit." But in what does this help consist? What is this role? Does the Holy Spirit point out the truth to the Pope? Does he morally compel him to proclaim it? In any case, the Holy Spirit according to this theory, no longer acts on and in the Church, but concentrates His activities upon a single individual, the Pope. "Chief role," says Father X., but where the Holy Spirit acts, there is no possibility of, no room for, other influences, there are no "secondary" roles.

To my question—"What then has the Vatican Council defined?" Father X. answers,—it has decreed that

discussions (Zwiespalt) can no longer arise between the Pope and the Church, and now the Pope, in his capacity as supreme teacher, has become the expression of the mind of the Church. But once again,—*where is this to be found in the constitutio dogmatica?* It lends to these statements of Father X. not the slightest support. We find there that the Pope proclaims dogmas “*non ex consensu Ecclesiae,*” but “*ex sese.*” Evidently then, under such conditions, no dissension or conflict can possibly arise, when one of the parties possesses the privilege of speaking infallibly, and the other restricts itself to humbly registering what the first says, dissension is obviously impossible.

Father X. wants to know how we settle such questions in our Church. Just as they did in the Undivided Catholic Church of Old. We are only bound by the written word of God deposited in the Scriptures, and by the decisions of the true Oecumenical Councils. Our *dogmas*, are those of the Undivided Church, the very same as those which were recognized by the Old and true Western Church of the first ten centuries, down to the epoch when this Church separated itself entirely from the East, and began without valid reasons to introduce new dogmas into her system, thus corrupting the old doctrine which, as it would seem, she found insufficient to lead humanity to salvation. It is no part of my purpose to submit the pretended dogmatical *progress* of the West, to historical or theological criticism. I shall content myself with saying, that the dogmas of the *Filioque*, of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, of Indulgences, and especially the *latest* one of infallibility (which neither the Council of Florence, nor even that of Trent, thought of) are the true reasons for the disunion of the Churches. All now depends on whether the Western Church (at present the Pope) is willing to retrace its steps. If it were to declare these dogmas non-obligatory, and convert them into mere opinions, the *beginning* of the union would have been made. We shall not object to concede to it the primacy, with all the privileges therein involved.

An understanding can be brought about in no other way, and the partisans of the union of Florence have only to say so to themselves.

I had believed that the ideas of de Maistre received the support and the highest approval of the Curia,—Father X's denial surprises me exceedingly.

Father X., in speaking of the possibility of the election of a heretic to the see of Rome, boldly asserts, "God will preserve any such heretic from a heretical decision." How exact he is. Unfortunately this has still to be proved. Is not the vicious circle in this reasoning quite apparent? "God will always preserve the Pope from error. Why? because if He did not do so, the Pope would be fallible, whereas he is infallible. He is infallible, because he is under the protection of God." And so on. One used to argue more closely. Gregory VII. himself said, that if a Pope were a heretic, the community had only to depose him. This was plain and true. Father X., is certainly quite right in counting upon God's help, but this help was promised and given to the Church not to the Pope, above all, not to the Pope when he wants to govern the Church without the Church, and when he himself might be either a heretic or a child. The story of the Popess Joan is probably a pure invention (when a woman of influence desired to rule the Church, she had only to appoint as Pope an individual who suited her), but is the election of a child less monstrous than that of a woman?

"The Church cannot be held responsible for Beziers and Alby," says Father X. That I allow, but certainly the Pope, for he it was who ordered the Crusade, he sent his legates with the armies of the crusaders, in order that they might keep him acquainted with all that was done, and *finally he gave large indulgences to Simon de Monfort and his warriors.* Is it possible to deny these well known historical facts?

We come at last to the question of the reading of the Holy Scriptures by the laity. Has a Roman Catholic

the right to read the Bible without previously asking permission? Yes or no?

Like my adversary, I also believe that the Bible is not sufficient by itself (*nicht ausreicht*), and that it is good for everyone to read the Word of God, but the Reverend Father adds, that it should be done under wise direction (*Führung*). This is not precise. This method of reading appears to me to contain a masked prohibition. The reading of the Scripture can only influence the heart of man for good, when it is free. True, mistakes may be made, false conclusions may be drawn from that which is read, but there can be no moral progress without liberty, nor unfortunately without the risk of falling into error. He who cannot venture on such reading without a director of his mind, will not advance far.

The "*Magister dixit*" is good for children, but the time comes when a Christian may and ought to be a man. I can imagine the indescribable astonishment which the Evangelists and Apostles would have felt, if one had told them that their writings, up to a certain point, would be put on the "*Index librorum prohibitorum*."

My adversary asks not without a certain irony, a rather personal question—he wants to know whether many Russians have read the Bible? and *whether I have done so myself?* I can answer, that now when reading has made such rapid progress amongst the people, *many of them read* the New Testament. During the last fifteen or twenty years, elementary schools (for the people) have increased immensely; thousands of copies of the Gospels have been printed; and the peasant who has learned to read, has certainly read the Sacred Scriptures. *How many* of them are there? asks Father X. I should be at a loss to answer this question; but at all events there are many more than in the countries which are *par excellence* Catholic e. g. Italy, Spain and especially Paraguay, where Jesuits have long held undisputed sway. As for myself personally, I read and study the word of God as

much as a layman, a poor self-taught man, can possibly do.

I shall now try to sum up what I have said regarding the central point of our discussion. I must say that the arguments of my honored adversary have in no wise convinced me. It seems to me that he has failed to prove that the infallibility of the Pope does not differ from that of the Church; and that whatever has been accorded to the Church has also been accorded to the Pope. Up to the year 1870 infallibility was an *opinion* open to dispute; now it is so no longer—it is a *dogma*. He who rejects it, becomes *ipso facto* a heretic, and is anathematised *lata sententia*. Still further, this infallibility is absolutely *personal*; it belongs to the *Pope*. What then is a personal thing or faculty? Surely that which belongs specifically to some one; which is his faculty, his particular gift—that which he possesses in his own right. If any one exercises a right which belongs to himself alone which is not shared by another—a right which he can use according to his own will, without consulting the opinion or will of others (as for instance the Pope, without the consent of the Church) then this right, this privilege is *personal*.

The amplification, elucidation of the rights of the Pope, permitting him of himself and independently of the *consent of the Church*, to pass decrees, is so clear, so precise, that I cannot understand how anyone, unless he is blind can fail to see its exact force. I imagine that Roman Catholics, if they cannot deny it, try at least to lessen its import by means of Jesuitical quibbles; but it cannot be done in good faith: I simply appeal to common sense, to a dictionary and a grammar. The authors of the Constitution knew perfectly well what they were about and what they wanted to attain; they did not say: *ex sese non autem ex consultatione, ex inquisitione*, etc., no that was insufficient, that appeared too much of an anodyne; they said: "*without the consent.*" Not only might the Church be left unconsulted, but even, if, having been consulted, it ven-

tured to refuse consent, it might be passed over without notice. And yet the hope expressed of being able to revive, to keep alive the little liberty which was left to the Church after the publication of the Immaculate Conception and the Syllabus? Quite involuntarily, there came to my mind the rather hard, but true, words, spoken to me by the general of the Jesuits, Father Beck, during the audience which he granted to me.

(Sd.) A. KIRÉEFF.

CHATEAU PAVLOVSK,

1-13th September, 1890.

THIRD LETTER OF THE REV. FATHER X.

(OF 4 16 SEPTEMBER 1890. SUMMARY.)

M. Kireeff imagines that I confound the two infallibilities (that of the Pope and that of the Church) after the manner of the Gallicans; and that I have contradicted the decisions of the Vatican Council. This is not correct. The Gallicans affirmed (1682, Article IV.) that in the decisions of matters of faith, the Pope takes the preponderating share, that his decrees affect all the Churches, taken as a whole or individually; but that nevertheless, his judgment is not irrevocable, until the Church gives its consent. "In fideli quoque quæstionibus summi Pontificis esse partes, ejus que decreta ad omnes et singulas Ecclesias pertinere, nec tamen irreformabile esse ejus judicium nisi ecclesiæ consensus accesserit." This, says Father X., is a contradiction whereas there is none in the "Vaticanum." (!)

Note 1.—Certainly there is none: but there would be one if the explanations of Father X. were correct. There is no *inner* contradiction in the wording of the Vatican decisions; *but the whole is contradictory to the word of God and the tradition of the Church.* There is the difficulty.

The Vaticanum decrees: "Romanum pontificem *ea* infallibilitate pollere *qua* divinus Redemptor ecclesiam suam instructam esse voluit. Ideoque ejusdem Romani pontificis definitiones ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesiae irreformabiles esse." That is to say, the Gallicans affirmed that the decrees of the Pope were not unalterable, unless the consent of the Church had been given (*nisi accesserit*); the Vaticanum states that the Pope possesses (*pollere*) the same infallibility (*ea infallibilitate*) as that with which the divine Redeemer willed to endow (*instruere*) His Church. That is why (*ideoque*) the decrees of the Roman Pontiff are unalterable in themselves (*ex sese*) and not (*ex*) the consent of the Church. And so, says the Reverend Father X., the infallibility of the Church and that of the Pope, are one and the same thing (*eins und dasselbe*); the Church and the Pope together constitute a unity (*einheit*). The Pope in his declarations (*Erklärungen*), expresses the truth which dwells in the Church.

It follows from this that the Gallican doctrine is false. The centre of gravity lies in the first part of the Vatican definition, and not in the second, which is merely the result of the principle established by the definition (*des aufgestellten Princips*), and which has regard to a special case, namely, Gallicanism.

He says that infallibility is a grace inherent in the office of Pope (*eize Amstgnade*). The person of the Pope is infallible solely in consequence of his office (*blos in Folge*); it is organically incorporated (*eingegliedert*) in the organism of the Church. But, he adds, one ought not to designate anything personal, which is only attributed to the holder of an office. In official acts, in declarations (*Erklärungen*) which have not the character of a decision (*Aussbruch ex cathedra*), the Pope can give expression to opinions which may be amended (*verbessert, improved upon*), in books, etc., (¹) that is to say, in all such cases, they are not infallible. Other theologians however deny it with reference to

Note 2.—It is plain that Father X. is referring to Pope Sixtus V., and his translation of the Bible.

official declarations. (We shall see that these latter are right and not Father X.) It is contrary to usage (Sprachgebrauch) to call anything personal, which only belongs to someone in virtue of his office.

Father X. is surprised that M. Kireeff should think Thomas Aquinas naive; that is a quality which he has not discovered in him before. In answer to General Kireeff, who speaks of the election of a woman or of a child to the Papal chair, Father X. says, that he bases his faith on the words of the Saviour addressed to Saint Peter ("On thee will I build my Church"); and that he firmly believes, that who ever may be seated in the chair of Peter (even though it be a child or a sinner), God will still be the ruler of the Church, and the faith will never have to suffer in consequence.

He further adds, history confirms our conviction, that faith has never had to suffer owing to a bad choice of Popes. (1)

The Catholic Church remains (*steht da*) and is seen to be a *moral power*; but what has happened to those who separated themselves from it? Have the Churches of the East fulfilled this mission of culture (*Kultur aufgabe*)? Have they understood it? And Protestantism—is it to be envied in its disintedration (*Selbstauflosung*)?

Note 1.—Are these words to be understood "cum grano salis?" Does my adversary believe that he knows more about it than the Fathers of the Third Œcumenical Council of Constantinople (Vth Session of 28th March, 681)?

N. B. I shall content myself with this quotation, as I do not wish to be drawn into a discussion of the fallibility of the Popes. That would carry us too far. The aim of our controversy is to determine the precise nature of the decree of 18th March, 1870 (Vatican).

GENERAL KIREEFF'S ANSWER TO THE THIRD
LETTER OF THE REV. FATHER X.

(Of 4th September).

No indeed, we are not of the same opinion as regards infallibility. For myself and many others, it is a stumbling block; it does not appear to be so for my adversary. It is plain that we shall never be able to effect a compromise. The matter seems quite simple to the Reverend Father; and he is surprised that I find it quite otherwise. But that the matter is not so plain and clear, is superabundantly proved by the energetic opposition which the definition of the new dogma aroused amongst the Bishops assembled at the Vatican; and the opponents (more than 200) were just the most enlightened and learned. After an obstinate struggle and after more than fifty of the opponents of the dogma had withdrawn from the Council, the rest laid down their arms; though the arguments which they had advanced against the new dogma *were not refuted*. After their submission, they took good care not to explain the reason of it. The desire not to grieve the Holy Father, to avoid a rupture, are not arguments worthy of theologians—still less of Christians; for no one has a right to act in opposition to his conscience.

No, I cannot accept the arguments of the Reverend Father X. He says: "M. Kireeff believes that I accuse him of wishing to confound the two infallibilities (that of the Pope and that of the Church), like the Gallicans; and that *I am setting myself in opposition to the Vatican Council, which attributed infallibility to the Pope, without taking into consideration, that which the Saviour gave to the Church.*" The Reverend Father is correct; that is just my humble opinion. It seems to me that the contradiction between the ideas of the Council of 1870 and those of Father X., is evident. When I asserted that he accepts Gallican ideas on this

point, I had in mind his desire to identify the Pope and the Church in relation to the graces and rights which are accorded to them; but I quite admit that Gallicans were not infallibilists and that Father X. does not wish to be a Gallican. I also acknowledge that there was false reasoning in Gallicanism; particularly in that, up to a certain point, it recorded the gift of infallibility to the Pope. Gallicans hoped to escape from the difficulty, "to blunt its edge," by indissolubly uniting the Pope and the Church. That was a mistake, a contradiction; the point of view of the early Church is not identical with that of the Gallicans; still less so, with that of the infallibilists. That is quite certain. But since 1870, these discussions have only an archæological interest. The Vatican Council finally settled the question, by adding to its definition the explanatory words: "ex sese," (of himself) *and not by the consent of the Church.* And this is what the "progress" amounts to. But before returning to our principal question, I shall take the liberty of answering some of the incidental questions raised by the Reverend Father X.

We are of the same opinions with regard to Gallicanism (although our starting points differ).

I shall not stop to consider the prohibition of the reading of the Gospel; that has not yet become a dogma of the Romish Church, and may still be withdrawn by a Pope, "*melius informatus.*" But is it really possible for one who studies the history of the early Church or even reads the Epistles, to defend this mode of looking at the matter?

I do not remember having said that Saint Thomas Aquinas was naive, that would have been a very regrettable *lapsus calami*; I thought I only referred to his reasoning (on the monarchy) as naive; and to his idea that a monarchical form of government was best, even for the Church. Naive arguments are sometimes advanced by writers who are far from being themselves naive. The great Doctor of the Middle Ages was certainly not naive himself; it is a pity that in his

opuscules *Contra Græcos, Saracenos, etc.*, he puts them on the same footing (he knew Greek so imperfectly;) above all, that he should have accepted without criticism, the nonsense of the false Decretals.

I must say that I should find it more difficult to imagine a child seated on the Papal throne, than a wicked man. Does the Pope then not need to have a personal faculty of judgment, of understanding? Is he only an infallible "speaking machine;" a kind of telephone which transmits to humanity dogma pronounced by the Holy Spirit? I don't think that Popes like Innocent III. or Gregory VII. would have felt flattered by an occupation of this kind. What could the members of the Roman Curia have been thinking of, to dress up a child with a tiara? . . . An infallible child. Does not that sound strange? At the same time, from the point of view of a non-Vaticanist Christian, it is quite as difficult to believe in an infallible man, as in an infallible child. Both are demi-gods, or rather gods as well as men; and therefore men-gods. . . . Till now I thought there was only one God.

At last Father X. drives me into a corner and uses an argument "ad hominem." He says: The Catholic Church is there, still stands erect; it is a power; and what has become of those who forsook it? Had the Eastern Orthodox Church fulfilled its mission? Has it understood what it should have done for the culture of humanity? That is a very big question, thrown out by my adversary quite incidentally, and put very vaguely. One might discuss it from various points of view: for instance from the point of view of the influence which the Church should exercise on the morality of her children. . . . Well, I certainly believe that in this respect we are not worse off than the countries where Catholicism is the master, for example Italy and Spain. The question might also be considered from the point of view of the relations between the State and the Church. In the West these do not seem to be of a remarkably sincere and tender kind?—the Pope, at all events, does not seem satisfied with them. But the

chief point undoubtedly is that of dogma. Roman Catholics are unquestionably richer in this respect than we are; you have things which we do not possess; you have the *filioque*; you have indulgences, you have the Immaculate Conception; finally you have infallibility. You have lost the cup, however; but that is a question of rite, (!) still a right instituted by Jesus Christ. Yes, you have all this and you are satisfied. So be it. All the better if this contents you; but it still remains to be seen whether all this has bettered your morals and promoted your intellectual development. There seems to be a diversity of opinion on this subject (Cardinal Manning for instance, believed, that, thanks to the proclamation of the "Immacula," he could more easily understand the relations existing between the persons of the Holy Trinity.) We Orientals believe that it is not by *increasing the number* of dogmas that the moral and intellectual progress of a people can be furthered, but by doing our utmost that the existing dogmas may be thoroughly *understood and assimilated by the children of the Church*. . . . To me, these seem to be conquests, moral conquests; more precious than any of mundane, outward and formal character; it is to such objects that our energies should be consecrated. Far be it from me to deny the great services which the Romish Church has rendered to the Christian world, especially in the East, for example, in the time of the Iconoclast Emperors: it would be childish and unjust to do so. But where do we actually stand? Father X. lays emphasis on the power of Rome. Her power is undoubtedly still great; but what is power considered in itself?

My adversary makes too much of it, and seems to confound it with right and truth; which are different things. One of the greatest statesmen of our times sets a high value on power and strength; and he may have been right in politics, but not in theology. Was

Note 1.—True: instead of it you have got various kinds of new scapularies, etc.

not Mohammedanism for several centuries a great force? Materialism is also a great force—a force, by the way, which gains ground in the West (especially in the Roman Catholic countries, more so even than in Protestant countries).

What numbers of unbaptised children there are in the West. How many marriages, which have only been sanctioned by the civil authorities! True, it is difficult to bring statistics for all these things. The Reverend Father speaks of those who have left the Romish Church. I shall only make one remark on that subject. Those who leave our Church, our Schismatic “Raskolniki,” are nearly all ignorant and little civilized: but what about those who have abandoned the Church of Rome? In the IXth and Xth Centuries, at the time of the separation of the Churches, the Eastern Church was unquestionably the more civilized, the more educated of the two; but she “forsook,” as Father X. expresses himself, the Romish Church. Later on came the great Reformers, Abailard, Wicliffe, Huss, Luther, Melancthon, the Port Royalists . . . can these men be accused of having been the less enlightened? Will the Reverend Father X. try to prove that modern Protestant theologians are less in earnest, less learned than the infallibilistic theologians? I do not believe that he will dare. And since 1870, is it not the most scholarly section of Roman Catholic theologians that has left Rome and rejected the new dogma? I am speaking of the old Catholics. As regards *our* Church, in particular, I assert that its influence on our people is far greater than is credited in the West; and that this influence, far from diminishing, is visibly growing, which certainly is not the case with the Romish Church. But let us come to our chief question.

The centre of gravity of the decisions of the Vatican council remarks Father X., is to be found, not in the second clause of the formula, but in the *first*; for the *second* has regard only to a special case. These are the words, says he “Romanum pontificem ea infallitate

pollere, qua divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam . . . instructam esse voluit (first clause.)” The Council declares that the Pope enjoys the infallibility, (*ea*, the very same) with which the Saviour equipped His Church. “Ideoque ejusdem Romani Pontificis definitiones ex sese, non autem ex consensu Ecclesiae, irreformabiles esse.” (second clause). Wherefore, (ideoque) his decisions are unalterable (infallible) in themselves, and not of the consent of the Church.

This is an easy way of explaining the texts; but it has one fault, it is arbitrary and false. What is its foundation? It has absolutely none. Quite the reverse. The second clause, connected with the first by the word “*ideoque*” (for this reason in the same manner as “*ideireo*,”) is only an inference says Father X., from the first,—its corollary, its development. On the contrary, it is just the most important part of it—the one that contains the novelty in the dogma. The first is merely a starting point (false, it is true,) whose logical issue is “*non autem ex consensu Ecclesiae.*” It is just the words, “*ex sese, non autem,*” which renders it impossible for any one whose mind has not been confused and hypnotised by a long course of sophisms, to accept the dogma of 1870. The defenders of infallibilism perceive this, and in all manner of ways, try to minimise its import. They have their document, this precious document, which delivered the Western Church into their hands with the little remaining liberty it still possessed; but for the time being, they make no use of it; it would be too much. Bye and bye men must become accustomed to the absurdity. Given the proper time and place it will be brought out and put in force; for the present it is mentioned as little as possible. Several young Roman Catholics with whom I happened to speak of the dogmatical constitution of 1870, did not even suspect its meaning; the original text had never been quoted to them. Many others answered good-naturedly, “Infallibility? I don’t believe in it. Who does believe in it?” These unhappy people had no idea

whatever, that from the moment of uttering these words, they were excommunicated *lata sententia*. No, a dogma of such importance and force will not let you off easily. As long as it was merely an opinion, it could be discussed, a more inoffensive meaning could be put on it, that is now impossible, the Jesuit Fathers edited well and knew what they were about. If the Church, says Pius IX, is not of my opinion, so much the worse for her; since 1870, I have the right and the power to pay no attention to it. No, my very Rev. Father, these words are not an amplification (*Zusatz*), especially aimed at the Gallicans or Liberals. For any one who has read the text attentively and who has not yet made the "Sacrifisio dell intelletto," for anyone who is still capable of reasoning, and who has a little knowledge of Latin, these words are of terribly grave import. If one could only put logic and grammar under lock and key! Unfortunately that it is impossible. Voltaire says somewhere, "There are devils who refuse to be cast out by any exercism whatsoever, not even, for instance, by that of logic! This cynical pupil of the Jesuits, this great blasphemer, was right in his affirmation. Until the "sacrifisio" is made, men will not be able to believe the new dogma.

Infallibility, says Father X., is a grace inherent in the office of Pope (*Amtsgnade*) its bearer is doubtless a person, but it is only by reason of his dignity or office, and of his being as such incorporated in the organism of the Church, that he is infallible. Everyone of us knows, that the Pope, even in acts and declarations having regard to faith and morals, but which have not the character of decrees pronounced *ex cathedra*, may give expression to opinions which can be altered, which are not infallible, especially when they are contained in books (*Büchern*). Other theologians however, assert that the Pope is infallible, when his decisions relate to dogma and morals, and are formulated *ex officio* (*amtliche*) even though they are not decisions *ex cathedra*. It is contrary to usage, to call anything personal, which only belongs to a man in virtue of his

office. Such is the argument of my honorable antagonist. This clever and captivating exposition is followed by a quotation from Cano, in which this theologian tries to identify the authority of the Church with that of the Pope, and according to custom, the Pope is compared to the head, and the Church to the body. Father X. exclaims, "If, even after this, M. Kireeff cannot accept my mode of looking at the subject, I am at the ends of my wits (meiner Weisheit.)"

No, I do not accept it, it is just this adroit argument that prevents me. Let us look at the matter a little more closely.

My adversary states that infallibility is a grace inherent in the office (Amtsgnade) of Pope. That is correct, but as this virtue belongs to the Pope, as his office is inherent in him and tied to his person, and *as all other human beings are, as a matter of fact, excluded from this grace, the gift must be a personal gift, and this right a personal right.* I do not mean to say that it belongs to the person independently of his office, but I do say, that it belongs to the Pope personally. Let us now see, whether he can dispose of this virtue at his own pleasure, whether, in the use which he is able to make of it, he is in any way restricted by conditions "independent of his own will" to which he is bound to submit. The whole question rests here. A discussion which did not resolve this aspect of the difference between papists and their opponents would be an absolutely useless war of words without aim or object. Father X. asserts that the Pope is incorporated (einverleibt) in the Church, that his infallibility is united (blended "verschmolzen") with that of the Church, that they are one, &c., &c.

All this would be very good, but for the decree of the 18th July, 1870, or at least if that decree had been less clearly worded. The terrible words, "non autem ex consensu ecclesiae" have absolutely and irretrievably separated the Church from the Pope, prior to this definition, one might have had recourse to the allegory (somewhat gross and materialistic) of the body and its

head, now this course is not open to us, the head alone is worth anything. During the first centuries, the Church was *everything*, she was infallible, her *mystical head* was Christ, there was no other (this is still the view of the Orthodox Church of the East.) By degrees, in the West, the Pope, not content with the Primacy *amongst equals*, a Primacy which was universally admitted, exalts himself and gets hold of power at the expense of the Church. At the same time, he is still bound to the Church, and still shares with her the supernatural gift of infallibility, for several hundred years moreover, this was the ground on which theories were built up and views were set forth which though often self-contradictory, were still lawful. Now, nothing more of the kind! The head is everything, the body nothing. The gift of infallibility has never confiscated by the head, the body provides the nourishment, e. g., Saint Peter's pence, but it has not a word to say. To me it seems, that for an unprejudiced mind, the position is quite clear. There still remains the important question of guarantees. Let us see what there is in it. The Rev. Father X. recalls the conditions of an infallible proclamation by the Pope. The gift of infallibility only acts, he says, when the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*! That is a common phrase amongst so-called Liberal Catholics, it is a "limitation" of the papal power, a "guarantee" against the abuse of this power, they say! Under this masque they hope to get infallibility accepted. There are some embarrassing and inconvenient things in the past history of the Popes (Honorius, Liberius, Vigilius, &c., &c.) But a stroke of the pen and all is arranged. Everything that perplexes is cleared away, none of the embarrassing things were utterances *ex cathedra*!

To be sure the means would be good, if they were admissible! Unfortunately this is not the case! The text of the dogmatical constitution is there, present arms, speak out, from that text no inference of the kind can be drawn. It is written, When the Pope speaks *ex cathedra*, that is to say, as the supreme teacher of the

Church, and when he declares to her his ideas on questions of dogma and morals, he speaks *infallibly*. This is all, yes, but that includes everything, permits everything! As supreme teacher of dogmas, he cannot speak in one way to the whole Church in a different way to an individual Christian, for dogmas are absolute truths. Whatever the Pope says about doctrine or morals cannot vary, whether he addresses one individual, or ten or a hundred, or thousands. Absolute truth cannot vary, what is truth for one cannot be falsehood for another, otherwise one would contradict oneself and give utterance to nonsense. Everything *a Pope says (has said or will say) on this subject is absolute truth, and must be believed on pain of excommunication!* A decree, a decision is *ex cathedra* according to the subject to which it relates, and not according to certain formalities and ceremonies subsequently invented. The expression itself is comparatively recent, it was altogether unknown in the Early Church, as much unknown as the infallibility of the Pope! I repeat,—the decree of 1870 has been vigorously thought out and considered, it leaves room neither for action, nor for conclusions one would like to draw, its point of steel cannot be bent. Messieurs les Jesuits are good dialecticians and do not shrink from the conclusions that may follow from their writings.

My honored adversary affirms that it is contrary to usage (Sprachgebrauch) to say that a faculty is personal, when it only belongs to a person on the ground of the position he occupies. Even if this were the case, I should still prefer logic to usage. No! The Vatican infallibility is and remains a personal endowment, because it belongs solely to the Pope, and because above all, it depends on no other person but himself. My antagonist rightly remarks that these questions have been discussed for centuries, yes, most certainly, but in 1870, the dogma was at last defined and proclaimed, the Romish sophism reached its culmination. It is *logical*, it is *rigid* and *new!*

I should be obliged to the Reverend Father, if he would give me the title of the latest and best work on the subject of our controversy, one, however that is not based on new writings, or on dialectical combinations and deductions, but on the Word of God and the *consensus Patrum* (the unanimous opinion of the Fathers of the Church).

A. KIREEFF.

26th September.

FOURTH LETTER OF THE REV. FATHER X.

(SUMMARY).

The Gallicans, says the Reverend Father, withstood the Church and the Pope, in teaching that the decisions of the Pope only become irrevocable and infallible after the adhesion of the Church. If this adhesion is not given, the decisions of the Pope become null and void; the judgment, the opinion of the Church prevails. This is false, says the Reverend Father.

The decree of the Vatican affirms, in principle, that the infallibility of the Church and that of the Pope are one and the same thing, wherever the latter in his capacity as supreme teacher of Christianity, issues an official decision (amtliche) obligatory on all. It was on this position the Council took its stand, when it affirmed that the decisions of the Pope are infallible without the consent of the Church: for inasmuch as the infallibility of the Pope and that of the Church are one and the same thing, they cannot contradict each other (Widerspruch). That the second clause of the definition, says the Rev. Father X. is a deduction (Folgerung) directed against the Gallicans, is clearly

proved by the work "ideoque" (!). I do not understand why M. Kireeff maintains so persistently that the Pope must be infallible when he speaks at all (überhaupt) regarding doctrine and morals? The definition, let us grant, does not exclude this view of the matter, and there are certain Catholic theologians, who wish to vindicate even this right for the Pope. But as the Council never contemplated the formulation of a decision on this view, it simply defined in what capacity (Eigenschaft) and under what conditions the Pope is absolutely infallible; namely, when he speaks *ex cathedra*; and when he decides what is to be believed by the whole Church. The Rev. Father lays special stress on this point. He explains his idea, by comparing the Pope to a judge. It is competent for a judge he says, to have a private (privatim) opinion and express it; so for the Pope, when an undefined point is in question; yea, even when it is connected (Zusammenhang) with a dogma. If the Pope makes known his opinion, it will be an important indication (Fingerzeig), but such an opinion is not obligatory.

It goes without saying (selbstverständlich) that there is a difference between a person and the dignity held by a person; every one recognizes that, a declaration (Ausspruch) which is not *ex cathedra* and not official (nicht amtlich), is not obligatory, is not binding (nicht bindend). What the Pope does not decide *ex cathedra*, is not a dogma. A question may even be discussed which is opposed to the ideas of the Pope and remain undecided; thus for example, the question as to the state of the souls after death. It was not definitely decided by Pope John, yet in reality it is decided.

The standpoint of the Gallicans is definitely condemned in the second clause of the definition, *ideoque*, &c.

The Council of the Vatican defined the doctrine of the infallibility of decisions *ex cathedra*, as (wie) it was accepted by the Greeks and Russians at the Council of Florence (!?). It is not a new doctrine as M. Kireeff thinks.

In support of this opinion, Father X. cites the famous sentence—"Roma locuta est, causa finita est."

In M. Kireeff's place, he says, I should not have quoted the so-called Old Catholics. Does he think that Professors Huber, Reinkens, Schulte, (Doellinger contradicted himself) are the coryphæi, the cream of German Catholic science?

M. Kireeff is acquainted with Catholics who do not admit Infallibility, and nevertheless wish to remain Catholics. I do not count that a crime. For certainly they are not under obligation to admit the infallibility which M. Kireeff discovers in the dogmatical constitution of 1870. But if the Pope were to say to one of them: "My child, you must modify (berichtigen), correct your ideas in this or that way," he would submit to this indication, without the necessity of its being made an infallible decision; every child of the Catholic Church knows that the Pope is the supreme teacher of the Church. That many Catholics are completely ignorant of the words "sine consensu Ecclesiæ," I quite believe. They are not specially referred to, because in teaching the Catechism, it is impossible to go into Gallican questions. It is also possible, that even if they have learned this section (Stelle) they may have forgotten it.

No one is anathematised without preliminary trial.

The Rev. Father X. asserts with regard to Pope John (1), that even though a child, he possessed infallibility in virtue of his office (Amt), and that if there had been any necessity for the exercise (Bethätigung) of the gift of infallibility, the Holy Spirit would certainly have guided him in the decisions he would have taken. M. Kireeff would do well to be careful when he has recourse to historical arguments.

1st October, 1891.

Note 1.—No doubt Pope John XII. is here referred to. He was deposed by the Council of Rome, but subsequently resumed his office.

ANSWER TO THE FOURTH LETTER OF THE
REV. FATHER X.

October 1st.

This letter of General Kireeff's includes numerous annotations by Father X. These annotations are given in full; though occasionally replies are added by M. K.

My journey to the Crimea has prevented me from replying immediately to my honored adversary's letter.

I suppose that to-day's answer will close our controversy, for, unless we are to embark on the high seas of theology, we shall be unable to say anything more on the subject under discussion; we could only repeat what has been already said, for our correspondence has had but one object in view, viz., that of clearing up the very important, though very special question, as to the personal character of the infallibility of the *Sunmus Pontifex*.

After first replying to the incidental questions raised by my adversary, I shall try to sum up our whole discussion.

So then the Gallicans, who in Father X.'s argument, play the part of scapegoat, which must suffer for the evil-doings of the Vatican, are not as I thought them, merely a reminiscence of old times, men who are dead and buried. It was not the Gallicans whom the Vatican aimed at overthrowing, but the Liberals in general; for they still exist in the Roman Catholic Church. Rome's great enemy is religious liberty and its partisans. It is with them that the Vatican Council quarrelled; it is they who within the limits of its dominion, have been definitely overthrown. Her enemies are those who refuse to forget and misunderstand the many passages of Scripture where the principle of liberty is unmistakeably affirmed—those who know and

believe that the principle of liberty is as important as the correlative principle of authority—those who know that without liberty one can only be a slave to the Popes and not a son of the Church, and that without liberty, love itself is but a vain word. It is they who are actually the irreconcilable enemies of infallibilism; and it is only now, after the proclamation of the new dogma that Rome insists, in terms which admit of no reply, on the "*Sacrifizio dell' Intelletto.*" These are the enemies whom Rome fears, not the Gallicans (never of much importance), nor the politico-religious nihilists.

Both Father X. and myself are dissatisfied with the Gallicans, but Father X. accuses them of having lessened the power of the Pope; and myself of having exaggerated it. Nevertheless, I cannot help thinking that it will be difficult to set aside without further ceremony or consideration, men like d'Ailly, Gorson, Bossuet, Fleury, all Port-Royalists (who on this question, reasoned like the Gallicans), and finally the celebrated Sorbonne itself. I cannot pass silently by a fact worthy of notice, namely, that the Gallicans, supported in this respect by the most learned corporation of the world (la Sorbonne), were able for centuries freely and publicly to profess a doctrine absolutely opposed to that which was promulgated in 1870, without bringing upon themselves the anathema of Rome. How does this fit in with the *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ad omnibus creditum est?* The fact of the novelty of this "dogma" and that it has found few believers, is further proved by another circumstance reported by Theiner, namely that down to 1793, the Catholic Bishops of Ireland were in the habit of signing a formula, which affirmed that it was not of "faith" to recognize the Pope as infallible.

We need not discuss the question of Thomas Aquinas. If I applied the term "naive" to *himself*, it was a *lapsus calami*, which I regret, but if my words referred to his argumentation, I hold to my description. Great men may have naive ideas, are not the politico-economical opinions of Plato on riches, very

naïve? and those of Shakespeare on geography? My respected antagonist says that in speaking of a child who was Pope, he had in mind John, who wore the tiara at eighteen years (which in itself is rather awkward for infallibilism). But I was thinking of Benedict IX., to whom the Cardinals gave the tiara when he was only ten years old. Does that not seem too absurd? A boy of ten years, as infallible doctor, teaching the truth to humanity, upholding the Church of God. My antagonist undoubtedly guarantees the infallibility of the little Pope? Yes, he will reply, but only his *official* infallibility, that which belongs to his office. Very good, the opinions of His Holiness on his toys and sweets are not of importance for the Catholic world, which could not conform to them. Happily in this respect, it is free, perfectly free. That we understand. Still, infallibility exists for questions of dogma, and the little lad settles infallibly important questions of theology as well as of morals. On this point, I own that scepticism gets the upper hand of me. The theory of the *ex opere operato* is really carried to a great length. You seem not to take the *personality* of the Pope into consideration at all, when he acts *ex officio*? Is that a matter of absolute indifference to the Holy Spirit, whose it is to confer infallibility on this very person? To me it is quite impossible to follow this train of thought. . . . The Pope is dead; a new one has to be elected. . . . The Holy Spirit awaits the decisions of Cardinals. . . . Is it really to be believed that the choice is a matter of indifference to Him? Among the Cardinals who manufacture the Pope, there are good men as well as rogues. They must elect a Pope. Out of a number of candidates they are of different kind, here is a saint, there a child; further on a lover of Marosia, and then one of Theodora. . . . At last after many *pourparlers*, the Pope is elected by the Roman community, or by the Conclave, or is dictated by an Emperor or by one of these ladies. . . . The Holy Spirit submits to the choice and bestows on the chosen one the gift

of infallibility. Is not all this incomprehensible, strange, awful? In order to accept this, it is really necessary to have submitted one's intelligence to a special training. You have no right to object that the same may occur at the ordination of any other ecclesiastic, for not one of them possesses the gift of infallibility, which in the case under consideration is just the stone of stumbling. And how could the election of a little boy have been valid? Is there no minimum age for a Pope? But let us leave this infallible head of the Roman Catholic world resting in the arms of his nurse, and pass on to the other matters. I am obliged to the Rev. Father for the advice he gives me to be careful as regards historical illustrations. His opinion, that the Church is strong on the historical side, is true, I never doubted it, I further agree with him when he says that one ought not to support dogmas by rationalistic proofs (Vernunftsbeweise). Still it seems to me, that the so-called development of the dogma has been marked by this very fault. For example in the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Virgin, rationalistic arguments played a greater part than the study of the Scriptures or that of the Church Fathers who are far from approving of it (see Saint Bernard of Clair vaux, who I believe is a great authority). (1)

The Rev. Father X. quotes in support of his theses as to the absolute supremacy of Rome (which it appears, must not be confounded with Infallibility), the

Note 1.—Remark of Father X., M. Kireeff should find no difficulty in accepting the dogma of the Immaculate Conception; for it is recognized by the Russian Church (sic).

General Kireeff's answer. By no means. Our Church observes the festival of the conception of the Holy Virgin, but that has nothing in common with her immaculate conception. Our Church also observes the feast of the conception of St. John, on the 23d of September.

famous saying of Saint Augustine ("Roma locuta est, causa finita est.") (Rome has spoken, the cause is settled.) It is notorious that the text of this is mutilated; and it quoting in, the Rev. Father seems to set little value on the advice he gives to me to use historical arguments circumspectly. It is notorious that this saying ascribed to Saint Augustine, is not his at all, and that it does not fit into the passages as a whole of which it forms part. One has only to read the passage in order to see that Saint Augustine's idea was something quite different, he never looked upon the decisions of the Pope of Rome as definitive. (2).

Note 2. Observations of the Rev. Father X. The words of Saint Augustine in many of his writings are plain, his manner of treatment is well-known, and it is useless to put detached sayings, found in his works on the rack. The words quoted are found in *Sermo* 131, n. 10. *Answer.* I had no need to "put words on the rack," in order to prove that Saint Augustine was not an infallibilist. As usual, learned Papists try to introduce the acknowledgement of his infallibility into phrases where the Holy Father is simply referred to with deference, respect, submission (all which were due to the Patriarch of the first bishopric of Christendom. This is the method of bad lawyers, a procedure which would be absolutely immoral, were it not (often) unconscious. All students of theology, are aware of the exaggerations of style the hyperboles which were in use, for example, during the Middle Ages. What pretensions might not be based, for example, on the titles given to certain doctors of the Church, angelicus, seraphicus, &c. Yet the Church did not regard them as the equals of angels or seraphim. The famous sermon 131, treats of the question of the Donatists. Saint Augustine, in speaking of the decrees of the Councils of Carthage and Milene, says "jam enim de hac causa duo concilia missa sunt ad Sedem Apostolicam: inde etiam rescripta venerunt. Causa finita est: utinam finiatur error." The question had been raised

According to Saint Augustine this decision could only be given by the Universal Church, not by the see of Rome. I am referring to what he says with regard to the decrees of Pope Melchiades (Miltiades). I do not understand what my respected opponent means by quoting the Council of Florence, for it will certainly not supply him with arguments in favor of infallibility, in fact the subject was not mentioned there at all. The precedence of the Pope, his authority, his rights as Primate and the power which the Church had conferred on him, were discussed, but no one spoke of infallibility. Would my Reverend antagonist like to make the rather desperate attempt. (1) to identify his

in the West, especially in Africa. Evidently the decision of the Pope was of the highest importance, and would turn the scale either on one side or the other; but Augustine knew perfectly well that that was not the definitive decision; that it had not been given by Rome; but by Œcumenical Council. He says so expressly in his forty-third letter (chap. vii., par. 19). The Donatists had already been condemned (and rightly so) by Pope Melchiades; and as they persisted "in suo schismate" Augustine says to them, If you are not satisfied with the decisions of the Roman judges (the Pope), "*restabii adhuc plenarium Ecclesie universæ concilium, ubi cum ipsis iudicibus causa posset agitari, ut si male iudicasse convicti essent (those judges of Rome) eorum sententiæ solverentur*" (there is still open to you the plenary court of the Universal Church, where the cause could be debated with the judges themselves, so that, if these judges should be convicted of having judged wrongly, their sentence could be cancelled)." I should think this is perfectly plain.

Note 1.—Remark of Rev. Father X. There would be nothing desperate in the attempt. These are ideas which are all connected (hängen zusammen), besides, did not the Council of Florence call the Pope "teacher of the whole Christian world?"

Answer of General K. It would be better to indi-

authority, his power, &c., &c., with infallibility? It could not possibly succeed, they are altogether different things. Moreover, how could infallibility have been mentioned at the Council of Florence? The memory of the Council of Constance was still too recent; the deposition of the Popes by that Council was an incontestable and uncontested fact, no less so, the confirmation by Pope Eugenius of the famous IVth session. It was too early. Jesuits only came on the scene a century later. Infallibility made its first appearance at the Council of Trent—that too in a very timid way. As for the decisions of the Council of Florence—they were still less recognized in Russia than elsewhere. We Russians look upon this Council as a repetition, under less *disagreeable* aspect of the brigandage of Ephesus. From our Orthodox standpoint the Bishops forming a Council, are not *legislators*, but only *representatives* of the faith of their diocesans. “*Concilium non est ipsamet Ecclesia*” says a learned Catholic, “*sed ipsam tantum representat. Episcopi, illi qui concilio adsunt, legati mittuntur ab omnibus.*” And further on, “The Bishops are *ejusmodi legati omnium ecclesiarum, procuratores quibus nefas esset procuracionem sibi creditum tantillum excedere.*”⁽¹⁾ All this, Father X. knows better than I do and remembers it. Pope Nicholas himself said expressly, “*Quæ de fide sunt, nom solum ad clericos, verum ad laicos et ad omnes omnino pertinent christianos.*”

cate the passages more definitely, in any case, this title could not serve as a dogmatical basis for infallibility, seeing that on many of the Church Fathers even more hyperbodical titles were conferred. Besides the title of teacher of the *entire Church*, and that of infallible teacher, are by no means identical.

Note 1.—The Council is not the Church itself, but only its representative. The Bishops who are present at a Council are sent there by all the faithful, so that the bishops are the delegates of all the Churches, they are procurators, mandatories, who may not in any way go beyond their mandate.

(Matters of faith belong not only to the clergy, but to all the laity and to all Christians without exception (omnino) (²).

What the Bishops affirm in Council needs to be confirmed by the Church. Everybody knows that the theses of Florence were rejected by the orthodox (Ecclesiastics and Laity) of the Grand Duchy of Moscow. (³) It is true, the union of Florence was subsequently introduced in Western Russia (forcibly and with the help of the Polish Government). The Jesuits took the matter into their clever hands. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they were the life and soul of the Polish State and had recourse to skilful seductions, corruptions the most refined, as also to means the most gross, the most violent and the most tyrannical (the Orthodox Churches were let to the Jews, &c. (⁴)

Note 2.—I sincerely hope, adds Father X., M. Kireeff is not in earnest when he quotes Pope Nicholas as an opponent of infallibility.

Answer. Quite seriously, even to Pope Nicholas, the infallibility of 1870 would have seemed something new.

Note 3.—By whom and by what right? demands Father X. What about the Council of Lyons?

Answer. Of course by the right which the Church possesses of controlling the actions of her representatives.

Note 4.—Will General Kireeff, says Father X., even refute the history of the union by Pelezz? The "Uniates" were very happy in the Catholic Church, one knows how they became Orthodox again. Was it to increase liberty and love? The Russian Popes of the countries formerly Uniate, and of the Baltic provinces, are they pupils of these bad Jesuits?

Answer. I think it will be much more awkward for my Reverend adversary to refute the work of Professor Koyalovitch on the "Union," than for me that of Father Pelezz.

Fortunately, they had no lasting influence over the Russians. The efforts of the Jesuits had only one result—the fall of Poland. But this belongs to the domain of politics.

There is still another incidental question, the *anathema*. My opponent states that the anathema can only be pronounced after trial. I admit it because Father X. says so, but I know all the same that the anathema "*lata sententia*," exists to the present day. (1)

Besides the matter is logical, if I reject a dogma, if I do not accept a dogma, which my Church clearly and emphatically affirms, I am *ipso facto* anathematised. It would go against my conscience to remain member of a Church which recognizes an untruth as a dogma, or one which I consider to be such. For myself at least, that would be a moral impossibility. Why should I wait for legal proceedings when my conscience tells me that I neither may, nor can accept such and such a dogma? I am not a child like the Pope Benedict.

I have not reached the culminating point of our controversy.

What did the dogmatical constitution of 1870 decree "(session IV of the Vatican Council)? I answer, the *personal infallibility* mulla, clear though it be as sunlight, and drawn up by a skillful and learned man, altogether differently. Is it not strange? still stranger, however, is it, that this decree" is seemingly also differently understood by the Catholic World, by some in an elastic, by others in a rigid sense. My honored adversary takes it in the first sense. Let us see if this is possible.

Note 1.—Even in a case of anathema "*lata sententia*," the *fact* of the fault must be legally established, unless it be matter of public notoriety. It is quite the regular thing (*in der ordnung*) for one who does not find things to his taste, to go his own way.

Observation of Father X.

Let us look at the matter more closely.

With regard to this new so-called infallibility of the Pope, I maintain.

1st. That it is a divine gift, absolutely personal (although attached to the dignity of Pope) belonging exclusively to the Pope, and that he does not share it with anyone else (²).

2nd. That in practice, it suppresses the infallibility of the Church, because it is a gift, a grace, which exists and which is applied, not only without needing any confirmation, but also without requiring any assent, any ratification, yea, even without the consent of the Church. (¹)

3rd. That it is a new dogma, clearly defined, stated with precision which has not been believed either *semper*, or *ubique*, or *ab omnibus*. (²)

4th. That Christ who bestowed infallibility on His Church as a divine faculty, did not say a word about infallible patriarchs (consequently not the Patriarch of Rome) it follows therefore, that all the prerogatives of these dignitaries are of Ecclesiastical, not of divine right. (³)

Note 2.—It is the expression of the infallibility of the Church. FATHER X.

Note 1.—I have nothing to add to what I have said before, because M. K. is not able to understand the Church as a living organism.

FATHER X.

Note 2.—The antiquity of this doctrine has been proved many times, latterly by Hettinger (Fundamental Theology) where the proofs in support are collected.

FATHER X.

Note 3.—Countless people (unzählige) have seen in the passages which relate to our question, evident proofs of the doctrinal authority of St. Peter and his successors—therefore also (mithin) of his divine right. Is it possible to maintain the quite subjective opinion, that these proofs of His divine right are not supplied

5th. That Christ in speaking to Saint Peter, did not utter a single word about infallibility. The well-known passages in St. Matthew, St. Luke and St. John, cannot be understood to mean the infallibility of St. Peter; still less that of his successors at Rome (why not then his successors at Antioch, this oldest Bishopric?)

6th. That the Bishop of Rome, according to ecclesiastical law, was the first Bishop of Christendom and that he represented its unity. (4)

If this Bishop should choose to return to the *dogmas* of the early undivided Church, (I speak solely of dogmas) he would be recognized by all of us as *Primus inter pares*. The Slave world would have been able to release him from the straits to which he is reduced, just as the German world did of yore. They know this well enough in Rome. (1).

by these passages? Against such a "sic volo, sic jubeo," arguments are of no avail. Such an attitude puts mutual understanding out of the question.

FATHER X.

No, on such a basis an understanding certainly is impossible. But even here, my respected adversary, whose good faith I do not dream of questioning, tries to confound things altogether different *namely* divine right and ecclesiastical right, and prerogatives of the Primacy, of precedence, with infallibility.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 4.—It was not in Rome that the unity of the Church was abolished.

FATHER X.

It is at Rome however, that it has been made impossible, in that the tyranny of a single individual has been substituted for it.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 1. Is M. K. dreaming of a Roman Empire of the Russian nation?

FATHER X.

No, indeed we are not *thinking* of such a thing, if it

7th. That this perfectly legitimate (richtige) "primal" power has little by little, in the West, been transformed, in an absolutely unjust manner, into infallibility.

As the last five points have been treated and elucidated by great scholars, (2) I shall pass them over, but I wish to add a word about the first two (which constitute the very subject of our controversy.) According to infallibilistic theologians, the Saviour gave to His Church the gift of infallibility, or rather, as the Church and the Pope are one, they can affirm of the Pope what they affirm of the Church and transfer the gift of infallibility to the former. This is the line along which the idea of Infallibility developed (3).

The Petitio principii stares one in the face. The thing to be proved, namely the identity of the Pope and the Church, is assumed as proved, yet it never can be proved. (The foundation of this reasoning, of this *petitio principii*, is found in the text of the Vatican decree.) But they go much further, as we shall see; they reduce the Church to Zero.

The infallibility which we find in the Gospel, is that of the Church. (4) The Saviour promised to be forever

is a question of *dreams*, we should have dreamt of something far grander, but I do not think I am very far wrong in believing that the Court of Rome does not look at this question from quite the same point of view as my honorable opponent.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 2.—Are these great men perchance "Old Catholics?"

FATHER X.

They and many others besides whose competence my adversary would find it very difficult to deny.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 3.—Ubi Petrus ibi Ecclesia.

FATHER X.

At Antioch ?

A. KIREEFF.

Note 4.—As also that of its teacher (Lehrer.)

FATHER X.

with His Church, consequently this Church can never be subject to error, and it is infallible. It is also holy.

These are the two gifts which the Saviour bestowed upon it. (1) Hence its absolute authority in matters of faith. "Ask the Church," he said, "and if he disobey the Church, let him be to you as a publican or heathen.") When one compares the little that is said about St. Peter in the New Testament, with that which has just recently been said about him by the *Vaticanum*, one is surprised at the difference between the two. There is a difference not only of quantity, but also of quality, between the commencement and the end of the history of the Catholic Church.

That the primitive organization of the Church was synodical that it was ruled by Councils, is well enough known. (2) The New Testament says nothing whatever of any sort or exclusive hierarchical power. The Churches mutually supported and taught each other. The administrators of the Apostolical Churches most certainly possessed greater authority than those of other Churches (3) in consequence of their founders

Note 1.—M. Kireeff advances certain positions which he would have difficulty in proving.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 2.—This organization is unknown to many, doubtless it has been invented, in order to set the Holy Synod of Russia on its legs.

FATHER X.

It seems to me that the fact of the organization of the Early Church having been Synodical or Conciliary, is amply proved by the history of the Council of the Apostles and the Elders held at Jerusalem, not to mention other grounds. But I imagine that this Council, lending as it does no countenance to infallibilism, is not constantly present to the memory of Father X.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 3.—But of what use then are teachers and authority? Is not the community there? the community from which the Apostles and Bishops originally

having been appointed to teach by Christ Himself. But how has it been possible for this vocation, addressed to bishops in general, to be changed into an *infallible* teaching faculty, possessed by one only, to the exclusion of all others (even whilst admitting that this one was the most powerful, the foremost, &c., &c.?)

I can easily understand why the Liberal (*) Catholics should wish to take the sting out of personal infallibility. But they are not likely to succeed. We are quite aware that the best Catholic theologians (not however, the most consistent or most logical) try to struggle against the dogma of infallibility, but the opposing (†) party will be completely victorious all along the line, in fact, they have already gained the victory. I do not believe that the Romish Church will gain anything by this victory, quite the reverse, for we already see many Catholics yielding to utter indifference, in order to escape the intolerable burden imposed on them by the decree of 1870. For example, there never were before so many unbaptised children, so many civil marriages (in Latin countries) as there have been since the year 1870. It is true, those who remain faithful to the Holy See, will form an army on which it can absolutely rely, but whether souls will be brought to Christ in this way, is not so certain. In order to avoid the difficulties which personal infallibility has created, Father X. emphasises the pronoun *ea*, found in the text of the dogmatical constitution, *Romanum*

received their authority? It seems to me that M. Kireeff expressed himself to this effect in an earlier letter.

FATHER X.

No, that is not the case.

A. KIREEFF.

Note 4.—I must tell General Kireeff that there are only Catholics and non-Catholics.

FATHER X.

Note 1.—I know nothing of the existence of such a party.

FATHER X.

pontificem ea infallibilitate gaudere qua divinus Redemptor Ecclesiam suam instructam esse voluit. Because the word *ea* is there, says the Rev. Father, we must assume (annehmen) that it is exactly this same infallibility, the infallibility namely, of the Church, that was given to the Pope, that *consequently* (?) the Pope and the Church possess one and the same identical gift, and that as the infallibility is identical, it cannot contradict itself—there can be no disagreement between infallibility in the person of the Pope and infallibility in the Church. Unfortunately it is not so, not at all so. I have already had occasion to remark, that the Council of 1870, forgot to prove first of all, that the Pope enjoys (gaudet) in general any infallibility at all, and secondly, that the Church and the Pope are only *one*. Neither the one nor the other is true. My honorable adversary involuntarily plays with words. The word *ea* cannot be taken in the sense which he gives to it. One might at the utmost take it to mean *equal*, different persons are spoken of as having the *same* power, two judges, for example, have the *same* right, the right to inflict punishment. (?) But such refinements in the treatment of this word, are of no value, even if *ea* had the signification of *same* and not of *equal*, &c., it would not affect the question, for this infallibility of the Church whatever it was, has been confiscated for the benefit of the Pope. This is clearly shown by the words “*ex sese, non autem ex consensu Ecclesiæ.*” Let us allow that two persons (in the present case, the Pope and the Church) possess the same (eam) power, the same force, the same faculty, &c., but that the right, the possibility of using them only belongs to one of these two persons, without regard (*sine consensu*) to what the other may say or think. Is it not evident, is it not absolutely plain, that this power, this force, &c., would belong exclusively to

Note 2.—I have at least the same right to defend my position as General K. has to attack it, for he adduces no grammatical proofs in support of the view he advocates.

REV. FATHER X.

the first person (the Pope), and that for the other (the Church) only one course would be open, namely, to submit in every respect? Is not its confiscation evident? The Rev. Father denies the fact, but he forgets to give reasons for his denial. Like the Vatican Council, he forgets to prove that the Church and the Pope are only one and the same thing—that they are *one*. He finally asserts that the “*non autem ex consensu Ecclesie*” is only a figure of rhetoric, directed against the Gallicans. No, the “*sine consensu Ecclesie*,” is of much greater importance, has a far deeper meaning. Is it credible that a Council should have been convened, simply for the satisfaction of saying hard things of the poor Gallicans, long since dead and buried?

No, they had more serious work than that to do at the Vatican. These words constituted a new point of departure (Wendepunkt) for the whole of Catholic doctrine (yea, also of life . . .); and if little is said about this matter to the students of Romish theology, it is because it is feared and with good ground, that a brain which has not yet made the *sacrifizio dell' intelletto*, will not be able to accept such an absurdity.

The difference between the Catholic Church as it once was and the actual Church of the present, is a difference of principles. The Church used to have the right of deposing a Pope for heresy. (1)

Note 1.—General Kireeff would do well to study the introduction to the “History of the Councils” by Hefall.
REV. FATHER X.

The right of deposing the Pope for heresy, is a well-established fact; it is a fact which has the confirmation of Popes themselves. The question “*si (Papa) in haeresim incidit deponi possit*” used to be settled affirmatively. Thus Pope Innocent III. (an authority at any rate equal to Hefall) a potentate who certainly was profoundly convinced of his own greatness and rights, says in all his letters (Migne T. 217, p. 660, *Sermo de consecratione Pontificis*), *Propter causam vero fornicationis Ecclesia Rōmana potest dimittere*

Formerly the Church was mistress, now the Pope is the master. Formerly a Council was at the head of the Church, now the Roman Pontiff. Is it possible after all this, to speak of the famous *ea* of the identity of the rights possessed by the two parties? It cannot be done—not even in the most moderate, the most minimizing sense. The text of the dogmatical constitution is there, strong and immovable as a rock, defiant alike of evasion and compromise.

My honorable adversary speaks of the conditions under which a Pope may make use of his infallibility. "It is an infallibility inherent in the office of Pope (Amtliche)," he says, it is an endowment *ex cathedra*. (Was *ex cathedra* ever spoken of in the early Church?) Father X. apparently attaches considerable importance to these terms, he regards them as guarantees against encroachments, illegalities on the part of bad Popes. *As for myself, I do not believe that these so-called guarantees are worth a farthing, in my view, they guarantee absolutely nothing.*

Romanum Pontificem, fornicationem non dico carnalem, sed spiritualem, id est propter infidelitatis errorem (the Church of Rome may depose the Roman Pontiff for the error of infidelity, an error of faith). He adds, it is true, Ego tamen facilenon crediderim ut Deus permitterit Pontificem Romanum contra fidem errare (I could not easily believe that God would permit a Roman Pontiff to err in matters of faith). But that in no wise alters the view of Innocent III. regarding the right of the Church and the possibility that a Pope may err. My opponent, indeed, seems to know more. Pope Innocent says that it would be difficult for him to admit the possibility of error, the Rev. Father X., accordingly, positively and emphatically declares it to be impossible that God should permit it, like M. Fessler, he can answer for it. Pope Innocent seems to me to have been, nevertheless, a very important personage, and what is more, he was infallible (1870). *What a pity that he should not have thought of it.*

A. KIRIEFF.

The Pope is not infallible as a private individual, says my opponent, but in his official capacity (Amtsmann), *it is only when he speaks ex cathedra* and not when he speaks as a private individual that he is infallible. M. X. seems even to believe that the Fathers of the Vatican Council inserted this clause in order to prevent the Ultramontanes from giving the Pope too many rights, too much power. If this is really the case, then the liberal members of the Council have been very easily satisfied, and I do not suppose that the Jesuit party, who had the chief control of the debates, raised much opposition to *such guarantees*. These guarantees, *these conditions, these limitations are absolutely useless, for their application and fulfilment depend on the Pope himself. They therefore put no difficulties in the way of application and cause no inconvenience.* In what way need they restrain him or prevent him from proclaiming whatever he wishes? There is not a word or hint in the text requiring the fulfilment of any formalities or removal of any difficulties. It is simply said, when the Pope speaks *infallibly (ex cathedra) when he speaks as teacher of the whole Church*, that is all. Is that a guarantee?

My Reverend opponent imagines a conversation between a good and amiable Pope and a good and amiable Catholic, who has certain doubts, on certain difficult theological points. The discussion, needless to say, ends to the satisfaction of both parties, but let us assume the possibility of a Catholic who is of a critical turn of mind, and less easy to please—the conversation would last much longer. The Pope has decided a question of dogma or morals, but not *ex cathedra*, and his decision does not seem fair to the Catholic in question. He declares that he cannot accept the *private* opinion of His Holiness, “that is my right,” he says, in the full consciousness of his moral freedom. The Pope continues to urge his opinion. The “Son” persists in his obstinacy. “Am I not the Pope?” says His Holiness, with a certain sharpness of tone. “Undoubtedly,” honestly replies the Catholic, “I know that,

but that does not signify. The opinion of your Holiness is altogether erroneous, I reject it, because it is contrary to Holy Scripture, to tradition, to logic. I repeat it is false and I cannot accept your instruction." "Am I not infallible?" exclaims the Pope angrily. "Dare you refuse to admit it? do you object to follow my guidance?" "Pardon, Holy Father," answers the Catholic, "matters cannot be settled so easily and quickly. Your statements and commands are not obligatory, I shall not listen to you—nay more, *I have no right to do so*. Your Holiness has no doubt forgotten the guarantees which the Vatican Council granted to us, your subjects, you forget that you are speaking to me only as a private individual and not as *Pope*." "Ah yes, I forgot," says the Holy Father smiling; "you refer to the celebrated *ex cathedra*. Well, so be it. Listen to me: In my capacity as teacher of the whole Church, therefore *ex cathedra*, I repeat all that I have said and command you to accept my opinions without discussion." (1) "Oh," cries the Catholic joy-

Note 1.—M. K. forgets that the Pope when he speaks as teacher of the Church, does not speak to individuals (einem einzelnen).

FATHER X.

And why not? It would be absurd to dispute the Pope's right to communicate absolute truths to a *part* of the Church, to the half, the quarter, or to a single individual. How this gift would be multiplied were such the case? Is not even a single human soul by itself, worthy of benefitting by the gift of infallibility? Is it true that it ought not to trouble itself about a thing so small? What about the parable of the hundredth stray sheep? What about common sense? Are not all taught through the medium of one? What is true for *one*, is true for *millions*. Are there absolutely different truths. And then the epistles? My adversary has forgotten a great many things.

A. KIREEFF.

fully, "now everything is changed, what appeared false, now appears true and conformable to Scripture, to tradition and to common sense." Such in fact, *might* be the end of the discussion, but what of the sheep refused to be led in this kindly manner? I know some who would answer and who have answered, "Non, potius mori quam foodari." (?) It seems to me that all Popes would be exposed to the temptation to speak in the way represented in the above discussion, especially a *believing* Pope, a Pope *convinced of his own infallibility*. One does not need to be a profound psychologist to understand that this must be the case, whenever the Pope is a man imbued with the idea of duty and the love of truth, when he is convinced of its necessity for the welfare of his neighbor, when he is at heart (if not in intelligence) a true pastor, a father. *It is impossible for a man who always has it in his power to be right, if he is consistent, (1) not to take advantage of it* if he is convinced of the soundness of his claim, he will act on it *optima fide*, without troubling himself about logic.

Is it not evident that the so-called guarantees which are said to be found in the text of the constitution of

Note 2.—There have always been men who applied this adage to themselves, who have taken their own way. Time has swept them away or will do so.

FATHER X.

Fortunately my adversary has the future tense for his consolation. I shall not try to dissuade him. It seems to me, however, that the past and especially the present, should make him think, is not the proclamation of infallibility a measure *in extremis*?

A. KIREEFF.

Note 1.—General Kireeff does not see that there is no true logic save in the Catholic Church, or if he likes amongst the Socialists.

FATHER X.

This idea of Father X. is very good, extremes meet. I have often seen it.

A. KIREEFF.

1870, are altogether illusory and childish, fit to put off naive people, whose conscience it is desirable at slight cost to bribe and lull to sleep. It still remains to be remarked that this *ex cathedra* condition is an absolute novelty. Nothing was known of it in the early Church, it was invented later on, when new and extreme measures were required, when the Catholic world had to be prepared for swallowing the new and extreme dogma of Infallibility. It is affirmed that the Pope speaks *ex cathedra* when he speaks to the whole Church. Where is this said? On what is it based? The Popes of the first six centuries nowhere allude to it in their Bulls. Nay, still more. The most important documents (after the Gospels and the Acts) are the Epistles. Do we find there the slightest allusion to any such condition? Quite the contrary. We are repeatedly and expressly told that this or that Epistle is addressed to this or that particular Church, or to this or that group, nay, even to an individual man. Are the Epistles less important than the Bulls? Is the doctrine there taught, less obligatory? Is all this disputable? The importance of what the Pope says, does not depend on the number of persons to whom he speaks, but on his subject. If I am not mistaken, this condition, (this so-called guarantee) *ex cathedra*, was not invented till towards the end of the sixteenth century. I repeat, when the Pope speaks of dogma or of morals, he speaks *ex cathedra*, as the Vicegerent of God and to the whole Church. One of my compatriots who was drifting into Roman Catholicism (if he has not already landed there) to whom I showed these arguments, answered after a minute's thought: "You might be correct in theory, (²) but in practice no difficulty can arise, because the Pope is infallible. If he maintains what he says, (whatever it may be) and if he gives it the *ex cathedra* sanction of his authority, every one of his ideas must be right." I do not know if my adversary who is a greater expert and argues more seriously,

Note 2.—The theory is altogether wrong.

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would have recourse to a *petitio principii* so flagrant as this. As I have already said, I am not discussing the basis of the new dogma, I only wish to prove its absolutely personal character and the nullity of the pseudo-guarantees, with which it has been surrounded—my aim is to overthrow the arguments of the “liberal” Catholics.

Father X. tells me he cannot understand why I refuse to distinguish the personality of the Pope from his official position (his function). For the simple reason (as stated above) that it depends on this person to assume his *State uniform ex cathedra whenever he chooses and at no cost whatever to himself*. The comparison which my antagonist draws between the Infallible Pope and a judge, is to me altogether incomprehensible. He says, a judge may express his private opinion on this or that case, that will, more or less, help to guide the litigating parties, but his opinion is only obligatory, only becomes law, when he pronounces it as judge, in his official capacity. In a matter which has not yet been settled, but which may be related (Zusammenhang) to some dogma, the Pope can give me an official rectification (Berichtigung), that would be an exceedingly important indication for myself, but nothing more. So long as the decision is not official, I do not become a heretic by refusing to accept it. Why cannot General K. draw a distinction between the person and office of the Pope, a distinction which is rightly recognised in all other spheres? I can answer, just because the Pope is a complete exception, inasmuch as a quality is attributed to him, which is shared by no other, viz., infallibility. Can Father X. not see that a judge is a *slave to the law*? He may consider it stupid, false, iniquitous, nevertheless it remains his sovereign, it is above him, he cannot alter it. It is not so with the Pope. (1) He is placed above the law. (2)

Note 1.—The Pope as well as the judge, is bound (by whom? A. K.) to follow a certain line of conduct.

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Note 2.—This is false. THE REV. FATHER X.

Whatever suits or pleases him, he regards as just and *whatever he considers just*, is law (or at any rate may at once be made law). There is no code to bind a Pope. To this some reply, no Pope would wish to act arbitrarily, he will consult his conscience, his understanding, &c. &c. Exactly so, but that in no wise affects my assertion. I do not in the least mean *that he would knowingly do wrong, consciously* talk nonsense, on the contrary, I admit that he will desire the good and the true, but it remains none the less a fact, that it depends on him to decide what is true and good, that he is absolutely autonomous in this choosing, and that it rests with him to transform *whatever he believes as true, or true, into a dogma*, whether it be the grandest of truths or the most foolish of whims. We are concerned not with what he is going to do, but with what he has it in his power to do. *Will and imagination meet and combine in his omnipotence whether he think much or little, or not at all*, or what he intends to say or decree. There is no guarantee that can preserve Catholicity from falling into error—error too, adopted, as I readily grant, *optima fido*.

Let us consider this grave question, which is the keystone of the whole of the present system of papist doctrine, a moment longer, let us look at it from the psychological standpoint. A judge finds an imperative category, not in his own thoughts, in himself, but elsewhere, (') in the will of another person, who has prescribed this law, he may not be able to share the ideas, the will of the legislator, on the contrary, as far as lies in his power he may try to modify them, to get him to accept his own ideas, of the truth of which he is certain, he may combat the ideas contained in the code of whose errors and falsity he is convinced, he may be absolutely certain of these things, but when he has to judge or act, he must needs apply the code, no matter how defective it seem to him, for he has neither the

Note 1.—Just like the Popé.

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means nor the power of doing anything else; it is his business to carry out the articles of the code, not his own ideas. What does the Pope do? With him there is neither struggle, nor dualism, nor division of will, as in the case of the judge. The position which the Rev. Father X. pictures, is impossible in the case of the Pope, *when he is convinced of the truth of an idea, he can experience none of the difficulties which harass and trouble the mind of the judge*, and which cause him to hesitate. Now is it possible for there to be in the Pope *a struggle between his own ideas and those of others?* Is he not judge as well as lawgiver? The judge may say, the law is iniquitous, foolish, immoral, but I cannot help it, I must apply it, for I am not its master. What passes in the mind of the Pope? If he believes that the existing law is false or defective, *he alters it*, that is all. Who or what can prevent him? Can it be the thought that his convictions, his way of looking at the matters, are false, defective or foolish. It is psychologically impossible. What *appears* true to myself, is true for me, *my error is never an error* for myself, for if I find that my opinion is erroneous, I simply adopt another, its opposite. I may at the very same moment, possibly be mistaken, but I do not believe it, *and cannot believe it*, a man always believes himself to have the truth, if he suspects or even imagines that he sees them to be erroneous, he modifies them without a struggle, without difficulty, always remaining "master of the situation." As soon as he has seen good to alter his opinion, it is the new opinion that is the truth — infallibly correct too, as well as obligatory on the whole of Catholicism, he proceeds to proclaim it as such, that too, without the slightest difficulty, without the trouble of a Council. What can prevent the Pope from making such a proclamation? Absolutely nothing; he neither should nor can remain silent, as soon as he perceives a new truth. In politics, considerations of expediency may compel a man to keep silence, but not in religion, for who would allow that divine truth should ever be hidden from humanity, on the plea of

its being useless or perhaps even injurious? What mad sacrilege. Divine truth may often be incomprehensible to man, it may transcend his understanding, this is unquestionable, but it can never be false and useless, still less injurious. The Rev. Father refers to a question which remained for a long time unsettled, viz., that of the state of souls after death, but what does that prove? There are many similar ones. The Pope may also be in doubt, but as soon as ever a thought comes to him, on no matter what question, which he believes to be truth, he proclaims it and it becomes a dogma, both for himself and for the entire Catholic world. He *ought* to proclaim it. (1) The Pope would be a sinner if he did not proclaim truth, if he deprived humanity of it.

I have often heard it said, "Since 1870 the Pope has been infallible without the consent of the Church; that is a considerable time, and yet he has not yet proclaimed a single new dogma." To begin with, this is not altogether correct. No doubt the theory of the necessity of the temporal power has not yet taken the form of a dogma, but the Popes Pius IX and Leo XIII have many times advanced ideas which lead one to believe that it is not very far off. Baronius would supply some very good material in support of this position, he declares those to be heretics, who deprive Rome of the temporal sword. (2)

But this is not the point. What we have to consider is not the fact of the proclamation of a dogma, but the possibility, the right of proclaiming one. The terrible thing is, this dogmatism of Damocles, which at any

Note 1.—It is impossible to reply to all these ideas, these inferences in a few words; they are the outcome of an altogether wrong view of the Church, of its origin, of its manner of belief, of its teaching, &c., &c.

FATHER X.

Note 2.—Catholics do not require Baronius to inform them that the Church has also temporal power.

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moment (as in 1870) may legally overthrow that which remains of truth in Roman Theology. This it is, which makes the acceptance of the new dogma, a moral impossibility. Simple and childlike souls, it is true, may console themselves with the thought that the Holy Father will never abuse his power (*) but childlike souls are beooming more and more rare.

And now one word more about the Dissidents, those who have separated themselves from the Holy See. The Rev. Father X. speaks disdainfully of the so-called Old Catholics: why "*so-called*" they are such *by right*. He says that I ought not to mention them, and why not? This would be an easy point to discuss, if my adversary wished it. The facts, the history of Old-Catholicism are easily studied, everything took place *coram populo*, openly, and the greater number of those who brought this movement about are still living, with the exception of the celebrated Doellinger. I have the honor of knowing them, and my relations with these distinguished men, constitute the happiest memories of my life, and it is just because I know them, that I venture to believe that M. X., does not know them. (1) That is the reason why he can speak so lightly of them.

The Rev. Father X. says that Doellinger contradicts himself. I think he would find it difficult to maintain this position—at any rate, with regard to the question which decided the fate of Old Catholicism, viz., Infallibility. I have heard Doellinger affirm, that during the

Note 3.—Because the Church is guided by the Holy Spirit. Those who do not believe in His guidance, may believe themselves men who have attained their full development.

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Note 1.—Unfortunately I know these men only too well, not merely in their writings, but because I have come in contact with them (in Austria), that is why I can form a better judgment of them than General Kireeff.

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whole of the time that he was professor of theology, he had in his lectures never ceased to combat the infallibilistic theories. He rejected the dogma of 1870, just because he did not wish to contradict himself. For the forty-seven years of his professorship he taught his pupils the very opposite—that too with the assent of the highest authorities. And even if Doellinger had contradicted himself, the Rev. Father X. ought not, as it seems to me, to reproach him too severely. Does he not remember certain contradictions in the history of the Catholic Church? Has he forgotten the *Retractationes* of St. Augustine (relating for example, to his way of expounding the famous words of Christ to St. Peter)? Has he forgotten the still more notable example of a Pope, who in order to exculpate himself for his dogmatical contradictions, recalled the example of St. Augustine and St. Peter who had been guilty of similar contradictions. (3)

Note 2.—Pope Vigilius, in order to excuse his dogmatical contradictions cites St. Augustine who retracted his own writings and corrected what he had said (*scripta propria retractasse, distaque sua correxisse*). As for myself, he says, by the definition contained in the present lecture, I cancel what has been done, whether by myself or by others, in defence of the three chapters (*Quæ vere aut a me, aut ab aliis ad defensionem trium capitulorum facta sunt præsentis jujus scripti nostri definitione evasuumus*). (Letter to Eutychlos, see Mansi ix., p. 413.) But he is not content with stating the fact; he explains it. "The devil is to blame for all this. Scandala," says he, "*quæ humani generis inimicus in universo mundo exci tavit, nullus ignorat*." (Nobody can be ignorant of the scandals which the enemy of mankind has given rise to in the world.) *Adea ut unum quemque propositum suum ad subvertendam Dei ecclesiam quo-cumque modo implire satagentem, non tantum suo nomine, sed etiam nostro etque alioem diversa tum loquendo, tum scribendo componere impulerit, &c.* (In such wise, that in trying to overthrow the Church of God by one of his schemes,

If the Rev. Father wished, he could easily convince himself of an important matter, namely, that the dogmas of the Old Catholics are those of the *early Church*, and that consequently they are perfectly correct, in calling themselves Old Catholics. It would be difficult for Mr. X. to prove that men who accept the doctrine of the first seven Oecumenical Councils and profess the *quod semper, quod ubique &c.*, do not think as Catholics ought to think, as Catholics of the first centuries did think. (1) No one, at any rate, up to the present, has done so successfully. Father X. may be thinking of certain relations between the Old Catholics and Anglican Liberals (who, it must be owned, form an integral part of the "Established Church"), but they are simply personal friendly relations which have no dogmatical character.

Father X. ought to remember Pope Liberius, who was in close relationship with the Arians. The Old Catholic Church is old, because of its dogmas, though in a certain sense it is still in process of formation.

not content with acting in his own name, he used ours also as well as that of others, and he drove us so far, alike in speech and in writings, &c.

All this then is the devil's work. (Where then all this time was infallibility?) But his influence was not lasting. Christ came and dissipated all confusion from the mind of the Pope (infallible?) (*omni confusione a mentibus nostris remota*). He restored peace to the Church (*Ecclesiam ad pacem revocavit, &c.*). You must allow that this is a characteristic avowal, could an infallibilist have spoken thus? Evidently not. The Pope certainly believed neither in the infallibility of St. Augustine, nor in his own.

Note 1.—According to this, all who refuse to accept one of the seven Oecumenical Councils, might also have called themselves Old Catholics, on the pretext that the Council had introduced innovations, which their representatives (the Bishops) had not authorised.

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Her theologians are inquiring into the relations which they hold to the other Churches. That is not a contradiction. (*)

It is well known that Doellinger more than once proposed to the Infallibilists a public discussion of the new dogma. *They never consented*, and yet Doellinger declared himself ready to accept the new dogma, if its legitimacy could be proved to him. No one took up the challenge. (The "Anti-Janus" of Hertzenroetter was certainly no reply.)

I take the liberty of reminding my adversary of his promise to point out to me the best work (written since 1870) in defence of infallibilism, one which will prove the weakness of my arguments and the erroneousness of my Orthodox beliefs. Such a work would be equally valid against the Old Catholics for as regards dogma, we occupy the same ground. I am acquainted with the few works written in Russian or by Russian perverts; but they are conceived in a spirit of hatred and misunderstanding relatively to my Church, evince little learning, and contain, I must say, but little truth. The work which I am asking Father X. to mention to me, would need to prove and that very clearly (the new dogma merits this because of its importance), the following theses:

1. That the Saviour, in exhorting the Apostle Peter to strengthen his brethren in the faith, conferred on

Note 2.—M. Kireeff, what logic. Is this the Old Catholic Church, and yet scarcely founded, and yet still in process of formation. The great teachers of this Church are still studying the other Churches.

REV. FATHER X.

Yes, the Old Catholics wish to take part in the great and sacred work of reuniting the Churches, and they are investigating the conditions under which this reunion would be possible, what Rome has spoiled for ten centuries, cannot be made good in a score of years. Yes, certainly, the matter demands investigation.

M. KIREEFF.

him a special privilege and right of teaching—a greater capacity and power of teaching than on the other Apostles (Paul, James, John), a fact which would serve as a basis for the infallibility of his teaching. (1)

2. That the Apostle St. Peter was appointed *infallible* head of the Church, by the Saviour, and recognized as such by the Apostles.

3. That the exclusive right of St. Peter was made over exclusively to his successors, to the exclusion of the other Apostles, nay more, exclusively to those residing in Rome and nowhere else (for example, Antioch).

4. That this is by divine right and not by ecclesiastical right; and is according to the clearly expressed will of the Saviour.

5. That the prominent position and the undisputed rights of primacy (amongst equals) belonging to the Pope of Rome, involve (involvunt) and comprise infallibility, that therefore the early Primacy and the new infallibility are identical—both quantitatively and qualitatively.

6. That the Pope has the right of infallibility defining a dogma without the consent of the Church, and not *vice versa*, the Church without the consent of the Pope.

7. That it does not depend on the Pope (that he has not the right) whether he shall transform this or the other of his opinions into dogma, by conferring upon it *ex cathedra* character according as he believed it to be true and just. That in order to prevent illegalities and errors on the part of the Pope, there exist guarantees clearly laid down in the dogmatical constitution of the 18th of July, 1870. It ought further to be pointed out, who is responsible for the carrying out of these guarantees.

8. That this has always been believed, everywhere

Note 1.—This matter has been proved in many works, for example, Hettinger "Letter to Natalis Alexander."
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and by all (semper et ubique et ab omnibus creditum est).

With this, I think we can close our controversy. I do not know whether my adversary has found my answers sufficiently clear and fair. As far as I am concerned, the correspondence has been of great service, for it has made me acquainted with the basis, and the newest and strongest proofs which infallibilism can adduce in support of a cause which I take the liberty of characterizing as desperate.

Kindly let the Rev. Father X. know, that I shall look with impatience for the title of work referred to above, and that I beg to thank him for having condescended to enter into controversy with a layman—one too who is self-taught—a controversy moreover, which can scarcely have had very much interest for him.

A. KIREEFF.

CHATEAU DE PAVLOVSK,
29th December, 1890.

EPILOGUE.

My adversary to whom I sent the summaries which I made of his letters, in order that he might verify them himself, has honored me with the following final remark.

I am sincerely convinced, that even works like those of Hefell, Hettinger, &c., would fail to convince M. Kireeff. In order to judge, one must thoroughly investigate the history of the Church, especially that of the Councils (!) One must live in the Church, one must feel with the Church, and this is just what M.

Kireeff is not in circumstances to do. From his standpoint of Russian Orthodoxy, he can only regard the Catholic Church with enmity, the only thing he is able to do is to look for proofs in support of his own view, and that impairs the vision. Hence the search in the history of the Church for passages which furnish him support; hence his joy when he believes himself to have discovered something of the kind. That explains the sympathy at first sight inexplicable, which men occupying absolutely different standpoints, feel for each other, for example, Jansenists, Old Catholics, Russians and Protestants of all kinds, as soon as it is a question of opposing the Catholic Church. (1) The imposing organism of the Catholic Church enlarges the ideas of its members, it is quite a different matter with members of other Confessions.

Such are the honest, frank remarks of my adversary, and I thank him for them. He speaks as a learned Romish Ecclesiastic ought to speak, he does not dissemble his ideas, he does not spare his adversary, his profession of faith is drawn up like a declaration of war! So be it! It is pleasanter to enter into controversy with an opponent of this kind, than with sentimental people who neither have the spirit nor the courage to say:

"Yes, we are enemies!" Yes, unfortunately we are, and we shall remain such, until Rome shall have modified her present dogmatic position. Can it last long? Will thinking humanity long be able to endure the new dogma? Infallibilists, I speak of the intelligent ones, are perfectly alive to the peril, they understand the difficulty of the position and would fain blunt the sharp point of the new dogma and minimise its import, they understand that if it were imposed upon humanity in its full "splendor," with all its

Note 1.—This is very easily accounted for by the fact that all have, or have had, to defend themselves, in one or the other respect, against the encroachments of Rome.

logical results, and if it were seen to involve, as it actually does, the entire negation of moral liberty and human dignity, humanity would turn away from it, as the more discerning and honest Old-Catholics have already done. That is the reason why Vaticanists say so little about it,—why they exhibit it so carefully veiled, why they disguise it as much as possible, and why *per fas et nefas*, they do their utmost to lessen its significance. *But their efforts are vain.*

ALEXANDRE KIREEFF.

CHATEAU DE PAVLOVSK,
25th March, 1893.



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