



PLATO  
CLITOPHON

S. R. SLINGS

*CAMBRIDGE*  
*CLASSICAL TEXTS AND*  
*COMMENTARIES*

37

CAMBRIDGE CLASSICAL TEXTS AND  
COMMENTARIES

EDITORS

J. DIGGLE N. HOPKINSON J. G. F. POWELL  
M. D. REEVE D. N. SEDLEY R. J. TARRANT

37

PLATO: CLITOPHON



PLATO  
CLITOPHON

EDITED WITH INTRODUCTION,  
TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY

BY

S. R. SLINGS

*Professor of Greek Language and Literature,  
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam*



CAMBRIDGE  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

PUBLISHED BY THE PRESS SYNDICATE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE  
The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK

40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain

Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa

<http://www.cambridge.org>

© Cambridge University Press 2004

First published in printed format 1999

ISBN 0-511-00410-9 eBook (netLibrary)

ISBN 0-521-62368-5 hardback

## FOR HANNEKE

οὐδεις γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑαυτῶι ζῆι  
καὶ οὐδεις ἑαυτῶι ἀποθνήσκει.  
ἔάν τε γὰρ ζῶμεν  
τῶι κυρίωι ζῶμεν·  
ἔάν τε ἀποθνήσκωμεν  
τῶι κυρίωι ἀποθνήσκομεν·  
ἔάν τε οὖν ζῶμεν ἔάν τε ἀποθνήσκωμεν,  
τοῦ κυρίου ἔσμεν.



# CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	page ix
<i>Abbreviations</i>	xiii
INTRODUCTION	I
I Prolegomena to the dialogue	I
I.1 Introduction	I
I.2 Summary and analysis of composition	5
I.3 Is the <i>Clitophon</i> unfinished?	10
I.4 The <i>Clitophon</i> as a Short Dialogue	18
I.5 The characters of the dialogue	35
II Meaning and authenticity	58
II.1 Philosophical protreptic in the fourth century BCE	59
II.2 Protreptic in the <i>Clitophon</i>	93
II.3 Protreptic in Plato	127
II.4 Elenchos in the <i>Clitophon</i>	164
II.5 Justice in the <i>Clitophon</i>	180
II.6 The meaning of the <i>Clitophon</i>	209
II.7 Date and authenticity	215
TEXT AND TRANSLATION	235
COMMENTARY	261
APPENDICES	
I The ending of Aristotle's <i>Protrepticus</i>	336
II Note on the text	340



## CONTENTS

BIBLIOGRAPHY	345
INDEXES	352
1 Literary and philosophical index	352
2 Grammatical index	353
3 Index of Greek words	353
4 Index of passages cited	355

## PREFACE

An earlier version of this book was a privately published doctoral dissertation of the Free University at Amsterdam (Academische Pers, 1981). At the time, I intended to produce a less provisional edition of it as soon as possible. My aim was to give the *Clitophon* a more secure position within the development of ancient philosophical protreptic.

However, other duties prevented me from realising this project. It was not until 1995 that I had the opportunity of studying protreptic once again (cf. my paper 'Protreptic in ancient theories of philosophical literature'). By then, it was clear to me that the most I could hope for was an opportunity for publishing a revised edition of the 1981 thesis.

For this reason, I owe a lasting debt of gratitude to my friend and colleague, Professor Jaap Mansfeld of the University of Utrecht, who very kindly suggested to the editors of the series 'Cambridge Classical Texts and Commentaries' that they should take a revised version of the book into consideration; likewise to the editors of CCTC for accepting it. I feel particularly privileged that this is the first commentary on a Platonic text to appear in this distinguished series.

The board of the Faculty of Letters of the Free University at Amsterdam financed the computerising of the book. It has been a particular stroke of luck that my pupil, Ms Josselijn Boessenkool, consented to undertake this laborious task. If it had not been for her unequalled competence and precision, the publication of this edition would have taken up much more time and required much more labour. I am very grateful that the board of the Fondation Hardt pour l'étude de l'antiquité classique allowed me a four-week sojourn in the summer of 1997, which permitted me to lay a solid foundation to the book as it presently is.

## PREFACE

For the same reason, I thank Professor David Sedley, who very graciously enabled me to work at the Cambridge University Library for a couple of days in October 1997.

I have greatly profited from a number of conversations with Professor Sedley. Professor James Diggle sent me a number of highly salutary notes, which have stimulated me to think some of the problems through once again.

My former colleague Dr Pauline Allen corrected the English of the first version of this book; Professor Sedley has suggested numerous improvements for this one. I am, of course, responsible for such blemishes as remain. During the final stages, Pauline Hire, Susan P. Moore, Caroline Murray and my colleague Dr J. G. M. van Dijk have been extremely helpful in drawing my attention to various mistakes and inconsistencies.

But above all, I am grateful to two scholars of the Free University. The late G. J. de Vries taught me most of what little I understand about Plato and Platonic Greek. Professor D. M. Schenkeveld (emeritus) supervised my thesis, and if the exposition of my views throughout this book is even passably understandable, most of the credit should go to his acute observations, and his constant insistence on his *promovendi* making clear what they want to do, why they want to do it, and how they do it. If this book had not already been dedicated to the memory of someone else, it should certainly be dedicated to him. I'm very proud to be his successor in the chair of Greek in the University which we have both been honoured to serve for most of our lives.

The first version of this book appeared under the title *A Commentary on the Platonic Clitophon*. As will be clear from section II.7.3 of the Introduction, I no longer have any strong doubts about the authenticity of this work, even though I still cannot shake off all my misgivings. But I now feel that the grounds for my doubts are rather weak, and I have no compunction in presenting this revised version as

## PREFACE

*Plato: Clitophon*. I am particularly grateful to Professor Sedley, who was instrumental in bringing about this change of mind. But no matter if this dialogue is authentic or not, the most important question is its literary and philosophical intention – while rereading what I wrote seventeen years ago, I have felt that my interpretation of it did not require major changes.

Indeed, when I compare the *Urtext* of this book with the vast amount of work on Plato published during the nineties, I feel sustained by the fact that most of my conclusions are shared by many excellent Platonists today, even though only a tiny minority of them have, I suppose, bothered to read what was after all a minor book on a minor and suspect dialogue.

My dissertation contained a separate chapter on the MSS of the *Clitophon*. I have decided to suppress this – a highly condensed version is here presented as ‘Appendix II’. At the time, I did not have photographs of all MSS at my disposal (see my paper ‘Supplementary notes’). The textual tradition of the *Clitophon* is hardly different from that of the *Republic*, for which we now have the brilliant monograph of my pupil, Dr G. J. Boter (*The Textual Tradition of Plato’s Republic*). It is very gratifying that my thesis should have started a spate of fundamental studies on the MS transmission of Platonic dialogues – nearly all of these studies are based on the first version of the present book, which obviously found its way into most of the major academic libraries throughout the world. But a rehash of my work as published in 1981 would be pointless in 1999. I have, however, made a fresh collation of ADF – from photographs, unfortunately, not from these MSS themselves. This re-examination has prompted me to change the apparatus in quite a few places.

A short time ago, the *Clitophon* was being described as a ‘jewel’ – admittedly in my hearing, and by someone who had read the first version of my commentary. I am just as

## PREFACE

aware as anyone that it is not an unflawed jewel. Yet I hope that this book will contribute to its being considered worthy of being inserted in the crown – if not, that it will be taken as a serious and in some aspects unique representative of fourth-century philosophical literature.

*Amsterdam*

S. R. S.

## ABBREVIATIONS

- Ast F. Ast, *Platonis quae exstant opera . . . recensuit, in linguam Latinam convertit . . . F.A.* IX (Lipsiae 1827), 354–65
- Bekker I. Bekker, *Platonis dialogi Graece et Latine* II 3 (Berolini 1817), 465–74 (with Ficinus' translation)
- Bertini G. M. Bertini, 'Saggio sul Clitofonte', *RFIC* I (1873) 457–80
- Burnet J. Burnet, *Platonis opera* IV, Oxonii 1902
- Bury R. G. Bury, *Plato, with an English Translation* (London–Cambridge (Mass.) 1929), 311–27
- Ficinus see Bekker
- Gildersleeve B. Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek* (New York 1900–11)
- Gonzalez F. J. Gonzalez, 'Clitophon', in: J. M. Cooper–D. S. Hutchinson, *Plato, Complete Works* (Indianapolis 1997), 966–70
- GP<sup>2</sup> J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford 1954<sup>2</sup>)
- Hermann C. F. Hermann, *Platonis dialogi* III (Lipsiae 1851), 459–64; VI (Lipsiae 1853), 330–1 (scholia)
- HGPh W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1962–78)
- KG R. Kühner–B. Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Zweiter Teil: Satzlehre* (Hannover–Leipzig 1898–1904)
- LSJ H. G. Liddell–R. Scott–H. Stuart Jones, *A Greek–English Lexicon* (Oxford 1940<sup>9</sup>)
- la Magna G. la Magna, *Platone, Clitofonte, con introduzione e commento* (Naples 1935)
- Modugno G. Modugno, *Platone, le Opere tradotte e di-*

ABBREVIATIONS

- chiarate ad uso di ogni persona colta* XIX  
(Aquila 1930), 129–49
- MT W. W. Goodwin, *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb* (London 1912<sup>3</sup>)
- Müller H. Müller, *Platon's sämtliche Werke. Übersetzt von H. M., mit Einleitungen begleitet von K. Steinhart* VII 1 (Leipzig 1859), 47–74
- New Approaches* A. Rijksbaron (ed.), *New Approaches to Greek Particles. Proceedings of the Colloquium Held in Amsterdam, January 4–6, 1996, to Honour C. J. Ruijgh on the Occasion of his Retirement* (Amsterdam 1997)
- Orwin C. Orwin, 'Cleitophon [or, Exhortation]', in: T. L. Pangle (ed.), *The Roots of Political Philosophy. Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, Translated, with Interpretive Studies* (Ithaca–London 1987), 111–16
- PW A. Pauly–G. Wissowa et al., *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart 1893–1978)
- Sartori F. Sartori, *Platone, Dialoghi* v (Bari 1956) 2–10
- Schanz M. Schanz, *Platonis opera ... edidit M.S.* IX (Lipsiae 1885), 90–5; 102–3 (critical appendix)
- Schleiermacher F. Schleiermacher, *Platons Werke* II 3 (Berlin 1809), 453–64 (translation); 534 (notes)
- Schw.–D. E. Schwyzer–A. Debrunner, *Griechische Grammatik, II Syntax und syntaktische Stilistik* (Munich 1950)
- Souilhé J. Souilhé, *Platon, Œuvres complètes* XIII 2 (Paris 1930), 163–90
- SSR G. Giannantoni, *Socratis et Socraticorum reliquiae* (Naples 1990–1)
- Stallbaum G. Stallbaum, *Platonis dialogi; textum ad*

## ABBREVIATIONS

- idem Codicum ... recognovit G.S. ...* VIII (Lipsiae 1825), 227–34 (text); XII (Lipsiae 1825), 496–9 (critical apparatus)
- Steinhart see Müller
- Susemihl F. Susemihl, *Platon, Werke in 40 Bändchen* v 3–6 (Stuttgart 1865), 507–29
- Two Studies* C. M. J. Sicking–J. M. van Ophuijsen, *Two Studies in Attic Particle Usage: Lysias and Plato* (Leiden 1993)
- Waterfield R. Waterfield, ‘Cleitophon’, in: id., *Plato, Republic* (Oxford 1993), 462–8
- de Win X. de Win, *Plato, Verzameld werk* v (Antwerpen–Baarn 1978<sup>2</sup>) 469–75 (translation); 495 (notes)
- Zuretti C. O. Zuretti, *Platone, Dialoghi* v (Bari 1915), 3–21





# INTRODUCTION

## I PROLEGOMENA TO THE DIALOGUE

### 1.1 Introduction

Whereas a commentary on the *Clitophon* requires no justification – for there is none in either Latin or any of the three major European languages of our time, its scale as offered here does call for an excuse. The *Clitophon* has often been dubbed a ‘riddle’, and so it is. Its authorship is dubious – a decision as to its authenticity would seem to depend mainly on the interpretation of its meaning. Its meaning is therefore a problem prior to (and more interesting than) its authorship. In this connection several questions come to one’s mind.

The *Clitophon* is mainly an attack on Socrates. Is this the Athenian philosopher who inspired a great number of thinkers, was ridiculed by Aristophanes and other comedians and was eventually put to death, or is he the literary character who plays the central part in many fourth-century philosophical texts of a genre called λόγος Σωκρατικός from Aristotle onwards?

This Socrates is said to be an expert in what is called προτρέπειν (I shall translate this throughout the book by ‘exhort’, for lack of a better equivalent). How does this statement relate to several works, called Προτρεπτικός, by pupils of the Athenian philosopher, to an interesting passage of Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (1.4.1) which is programmatic for the whole of the rest of that work, and finally to certain passages in Plato where this activity of Socrates’ is described or hinted at? As a corollary, what is the relation of these passages to Plato’s literary production as a whole?

The criticism is uttered by one Clitophon, who we are told is at the same time rather enthusiastic about the teaching of Thrasymachus. In Book 1 of Plato’s *Republic*

this character appears as a companion and defender of Thrasymachus. To what extent is this significant for the interpretation of *Republic* 1 and *Clitophon*? What further light is shed on this problem by the similarity of statements in the *Clitophon* about the result (ἔργον) of justice to statements about justice in *Republic* 1?

Clitophon gives an extensive report of his questioning Socrates' companions and refuting them. What is this method of interrogation and refutation; how close does it come to methods observed in other Socratic literature and what are the implications of the similarity for the intention and philosophical provenance of our dialogue?

I have tried to answer these questions without any regard to the problem of authorship. Unless I have gravely deceived myself, it is possible to explain the *Clitophon* from the *Clitophon* itself; such other Socratic texts as I have deemed profitable to take into account have been used either to test the hypotheses formed on the basis of the *Clitophon* alone, or, occasionally, to answer questions for which I found no satisfactory answers in the text of the dialogue. In general, I do not think that this strictly 'ergocentric' method is imperative in Plato – on the contrary, the written work is called an εἰδότηων ὑπόμνησις in the *Phaedrus*, so that in genuine dialogues a comparative method of interpretation seems to be called for. However, the authenticity of the *Clitophon* has been doubted by many eminent scholars from the early nineteenth century onwards; I have therefore left aside the attribution of the dialogue to Plato, which normally in literary analysis one is obliged to take into account. It has become a platitude to say that in cases of disputed authenticity the *onus probandi* lies with those who want to dispute it – in fact, this is far from being a dogma<sup>1</sup> – but one should not add to the bur-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the remarks in *Pseudepigrapha* 1 (*Entretiens Hardt* 18 (1971), 12 (R. Syme); 149 (G. J. D. Aalders), where an exception is made for texts

den by forming hypotheses based on related texts transmitted within the same Corpus.

The Introduction and the Commentary together contain my interpretation of the *Clitophon*; the questions raised above will be found treated there. Because I find the questions difficult and rather involved, the arguments for my answers take up a fair amount of space and are scattered throughout the book. Therefore I shall outline here, without further argument, such sense as I can make of this dialogue.

The *Clitophon* is essentially a condemnation not of Socrates, nor of another philosopher, but of a specific branch of Socratic literature, to wit philosophical protreptic in its pre-Aristotelian, ethical form. The speech put into Socrates' mouth is a parody<sup>2</sup> (as Aspasia's speech in the *Menexenus* is generally supposed to be), in which various motifs of this genre are used; it is a parody of thoughts, not of one particular writer. The author is careful not to hit at the core of Socratic philosophy; it is the uselessness of protreptic preaching which is the target, not its ethical values. The choice of Clitophon, admirer of Thrasymachus, as the main character suggests how dangerous protreptic can be.

belonging to a genre which as a whole is open to suspicion. If there is indeed such a genre as the Short Dialogue (section I.4), these remarks are relevant for the *Clitophon*. – K. Dover, *Marginal Comment* (London 1994), 139 speaks of 'the disastrous principle "presumed genuine until proved spurious"', but gives no arguments for this somewhat extreme view.

<sup>2</sup> I have not tried to define this term. Though I am aware of its deficiencies, I think the following definition is satisfactory, and any rate for *Clit.*: 'Parodie ist Nachahmung mit Polemik gegen den Nachgeahmten' (R. Neumann, 'Zur Ästhetik der Parodie', *Die Literatur* 30 (1927–8) 439–41; for criticism, cf. W. Karrer, *Parodie, Travestie, Pastiche* (Munich 1977), 36–41). My use of the term is therefore much more traditional than that of some recent theoreticians, notably Bakhtin. Cf. P. Morris (ed.), *The Bakhtin Reader* (London 1994), 102–22. Bakhtin's influence is notable in A. W. Nightingale, *Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the Construct of Philosophy* (Cambridge 1995), esp. 6–8; 148–9.

Clitophon's interrogation of Socrates' companions and – to a lesser extent – of Socrates himself serves a double purpose: it proves that mere exhortation towards justice does not lead to knowledge of justice (various discussions of justice are taken over from Socratic literature, not exclusively protreptic literature; these borrowings are not meant to suggest that Socratic theories about justice are worthless); at the same time it is shown that elenchos, not exhortation, leads to insight (and thereby to knowledge).

The author's judgement on the respective effectiveness of exhortation and elenchos is identical to Plato's standpoint. The use of elenchos in the *Clitophon* is typically Platonic. Moreover, the author implies that he assents to an important aspect of Plato's concept of justice, namely that the true politician is he who renders his fellow-citizens more just. In short, the author's intention is to show that his opinion of Socratic literature conforms in every respect to the views found in Plato's literary production, which is, by implication, recommended as a better alternative for protreptic.

In the Commentary, I have endeavoured not only to elucidate questions connected with structure, intention, expression and textual transmission (in so far as these matters have not been treated systematically in the Introduction), but also to furnish material for settling the questions of authorship. I have adduced many parallels for words, phrases and constructions which in themselves needed no illustration, in order to show how these idioms relate to the usage of Plato, to whom the *Clitophon* is ascribed. As I found that, on the whole, the language of our dialogue is very similar to Plato's, I saw no point in increasing the bulk of annotations by referring (more than occasionally) to parallels found in the works of other authors of this period. It goes without saying that apart from the *TLG* CD-ROM, Brandwood's *Word Index* (but also Ast's *Lexicon*) has been an invaluable support.

In a limited number of cases, I was unable to refrain from treating questions of grammar and lexicon on a more general scale, even though a commentary is not necessarily the best place for having one's say on such matters.

## I.2 Summary and analysis of composition

The nineteenth-century division into chapters (Roman numerals), which was abandoned in Burnet's edition, has been reintroduced because on the whole it does justice to the structure of the *Clitophon*.

### A. PROLOGUE (406a1–407a4)

**I.** Socrates says someone told him that, in a conversation with Lysias, Clitophon had criticised Socrates' intellectual guidance and praised that of Thrasymachus. – That is not quite right, Clitophon answers; in part I have indeed not praised you, but in part I did do so. He offers to expound his position. – Socrates gives him the opportunity, hoping to benefit from his words.

### B. CLITOPHON'S REPORT (407a5–410b3)

(I) CLITOPHON'S PRAISE (407a5–408c4)

#### (a) **Introductory words (407a5–b1)**

**II.** Clitophon says that he has been struck whenever Socrates delivered a certain speech like a *deus ex machina*:

#### (b) **Socrates' protreptic (407b1–408b5)**

(*first part*; 407b1–e2) 'Men do not act as they should, because they focus all their attention on amassing wealth, but neglect to provide their sons, who will inherit it, with the knowledge how to use it justly; they do not find them teachers of justice, if such there be, nor have they taken care of themselves similarly in the past. They and their children have followed the traditional curriculum, and

they are none the less vicious in matters of money – therefore present education is to be condemned. Discord in the world stems from disharmony, not musical but spiritual. When men say that injustice is the consequence not of bad education but of a free choice, they contradict themselves, as they also think that injustice is hateful to the gods. If man is mastered by his pleasures, he is so involuntarily. Consequently each individual and each state ought to care more in this respect than they do now.’

**(III.** Interrupting his report, Clitophon again states his admiration, 407e3–4.)

*(second part; 407e5–8)* ‘Those who care only for their bodies and neglect their souls act likewise: they neglect the ruling part.’

*(third part; 407e8–408b5)* ‘What one cannot handle, one should leave alone, so with the senses and the whole body; likewise, one who cannot handle his own lyre will not be able to handle his neighbour’s. Finally, one who does not know how to handle his soul had better leave it alone and cease to live, or at any rate be a slave and hand over the rule of his mind to an expert.’ These experts are identified by Socrates with those who have learned politics, which is identical to judication and justice.

**(c) Concluding words (408b5–c4)**

**IV.** Clitophon quite agrees with this and similar speeches and considers them very suitable for exhortation and very useful.

(2) CLITOPHON’S CRITICISM (408c4–410b3)

**(a) Introduction (408c4–409c1)**

Therefore he asked those companions whom Socrates esteemed most how Socrates’ exhortation is to be followed up, supposing that exhortation itself is not the goal of life. After Socrates’ fashion, he offers an analogy: one who had exhorted them to the care of the body would reproach them on the grounds that they care only for agrarian

products instead of the arts which improve the body. Which art is it that improves the soul?

**V.** The man who seemed best equipped answered that this art is none other than justice. Clitophon wished to hear more than a name. Medicine has a double effect, the production of new doctors and health (of which the latter is a result of the art, not art itself), and likewise carpentry can be divided into doctrine and result. Similarly justice will on one hand produce new just men, on the other it must have a result of its own. What is the latter?

**(b) First definition of the result of justice (409c1-d2)**

This pupil answered ‘the beneficial’, others, ‘the fitting’, ‘the useful’, ‘the profitable’. Clitophon replies that all these epithets are also valid for the results of each of the arts, such as carpentry; but the meaning of these epithets will be defined by the arts in question; let the result of justice be defined similarly.

**(c) Second definition of the result of justice (409d2-410a6)**

**VI.** Finally the most elegant answer given was: to effect friendship in the cities. Friendship was said by this man to be always a good, so that the friendships of children and animals (which as a result of a debate he concluded were more often harmful than beneficial) had to be excluded: real friendship was concord. Being asked whether concord was unanimity in opinion or knowledge he rejected the former, as being often harmful. At this point those present were able to accuse him of circular reasoning: medicine, too, is concord in this sense, but unlike the arts, justice has still failed to grasp the object of its knowledge; its result is yet unclear.

**(d) Third definition of the result of justice (410a7-b3)**

**VII.** Then Clitophon asked Socrates himself, who answered that the special result of justice was harming one’s



enemies and benefiting one's friends. Subsequently it turned out that justice never harms anyone.

### C. CLITOPHON'S VERDICT (410b3–e8)

#### (a) Criticism (410b3–c8)

Having endured this a long time, Clitophon has given up. He thinks that Socrates is still the best in exhorting others to justice but either he can do nothing more, like a layman who can eulogise steersmanship – this is not Clitophon's view, but either Socrates does not know what justice is or he is unwilling to impart his knowledge to Clitophon. That is why Clitophon visits Thrasymachus and others: he is at a loss.

#### (b) Last appeal (410c8–e5)

If Socrates is prepared to stop exhorting him and act just as if, having exhorted Clitophon to the care of the body, he were going to explain the nature of the body and the treatment pertaining to it, then let it happen. Clitophon agrees that the care of the soul is all-important and says he has uttered his criticism with this intention. He implores Socrates to do this so that he can stop partly praising, partly blaming him.

#### (c) Summing-up (410e5–8)

Socrates is invaluable for those who have not been exhorted; for those who have been, he is almost a stumbling-block in their attainment of the core of virtue and becoming happy.

For the relation between content (as analysed here) and form, cf. section 1.4.2(5).

Among other attempts<sup>3</sup> at schematisation of the structure

<sup>3</sup> By far the most satisfactory is that of Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 3–5: 'Einleitung' (406a–407a). 'Hauptteil', divided into 'I. Was Kleitophon an Sokrates lobenswert findet' (407a–408c); 'II. Was Kleitophon an Sokrates zu tadeln findet' (408c–410b), 'Schluss' (410b–e)).

of the *Clitophon*, that by Geffcken ('Rätsel', 436) deserves closer investigation because of the conclusions he draws from it. He considers Clitophon's report of Socrates' speech, which he denies to be ironical (section 1.5.3), to be the prooemium, constructed so as to make Clitophon appear an equitable critic; the interrogation of Socrates' pupils is the narrative part, followed by 'eine philosophierende Erörterung, die den Satz von der Nichtigkeit der blossen Protreptik endgültig beweisen soll' – I am not quite sure whether 408d1–6 or 410b6–c2 is meant; finally Socrates is addressed directly for the second time (from 410a7 onwards?), and is now 'more than once sharply criticised'. This disposition is said (437) to correspond exactly to the ἔργον τοῦ ῥήτορος as defined by Theodectes of Phaselis: προοιμιάσασθαι πρὸς εὐνοϊαν, διηγῆσασθαι πρὸς πιθανότητα, πιστώσασθαι πρὸς πειθῶ, ἐπιλογίσασθαι πρὸς ὀργὴν ἢ ἔλεον.<sup>4</sup> The individual traits of the *Clitophon* are manifest also in Theodectes. According to Geffcken, the *Clitophon* is unmistakably an Aristotelising text, and Theodectes was a friend of Aristotle and was influenced by him. Finally, the *Clitophon* is a riddle, and

This schema is taken over by Brünnecke ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 451–2; cf. Blits, 'Socratic teaching'), who besides distinguishes three protreptic speeches, as Kesters (*Kérygmes*, 39–44) after him. Souilhé (163–4) places a dichotomy at 408e2; the first part is about protreptic, the second about justice. Kunert (*Necessitudo*, 4) recognises two parts, the first dealing with Socrates, the second (from 408b5) with his so-called pupils. The return to Socrates at 410a7 is explained 'non ex veritatis sed ex artis quasi scaenicae, qua in dialogo opus est, rationibus' – this solution (if it deserves the name) is rightly rejected by Pavlu (5 n. 1).

<sup>4</sup> *Oratores Attici* II 247 Sauppe; on the problems concerning the versions and ascription of this fragment, cf. Geffcken, 'Rätsel', 437 n. 1; Radermacher, *Artium scriptores*, 203. – Geffcken's analysis of the dialogue as a judicial accusation was foreshadowed by Brünnecke, who makes Socrates the accuser and Clitophon the defendant in a fictitious slander suit ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 452–7). This idea was taken over by Orwin: 'we might regard this dialogue as a kind of counter-*Apology*' ('Case against Sokrates', 744). See section II.3.4 n. 272.

Theodectes is, in his dramas, fond of riddles. Geffcken concludes (439) that Theodectes (rather than a pupil of his) is the author of the *Clitophon*.

Quite apart from the dubious quality of the remaining arguments, I am unable to make sense of Geffcken's analysis of the *Clitophon*; if the pattern of rhetorical κατηγορία is followed at all, I would suggest A as prooemium, B as a very lengthy narrative, C (a–b) as roughly equivalent to πίστις and C (c) – the closing sentence – as epilogue (section I.3.2).

### 1.3 Is the *Clitophon* unfinished?

#### 1.3.1 *Historical Survey*

Socrates' silence after Clitophon's plaidoyer does not seem to have caused especial surprise in antiquity. One explanation of it is known to us. It is attributed by Proclus to Πτολεμαῖος ὁ Πλατωνικός, who identified the missing fourth person of the *Timaeus* (17a1) with Clitophon: τοῦτον γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ μηδ' ἀποκρίσεως ἤξιῶσθαι παρὰ Σωκράτους.<sup>5</sup> This Platonist Ptolemy, who is mentioned also by Iamblichus,<sup>6</sup> again in connection with

<sup>5</sup> Procl. in *Tim.* 7b = 1.20.8–9 Diehl; apparently Clitophon was thought to have stayed away through pique (slightly different A.-J. Festugière, *Proclus, Commentaire sur le Timée I* (Paris 1966), 48 n. 6). Proclus does not think much of the identification: τὸ δὲ Κλειτοφῶντα [sc. λέγειν] παντελῶς ἄτοπον· παρῆν γὰρ οὐδὲ τῆι προτεραίᾳ Σωκράτους διηγουμένου τίνα εἶπεν ὁ Κλειτοφῶν (namely in the *Republic*, 340a3–b8), *ibid.* 1.20.18–20 Diehl. An ingenious distortion of Ptolemy's view is given by Yxem ('Über Platon's Kleitophon', 13–14): the *Republic* is in fact Socrates' answer (on the premise that Ptolemy must have regarded the eighth tetralogy as a whole, so that Clitophon was in fact one of the persons to whom Socrates reported the *Republic*); ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ κτλ. is taken to mean 'not at any rate in the *Clitophon* (but in the *Republic*)'. This theory is taken over by Susemihl (508).

<sup>6</sup> Apud Stob. 1.49.39 = 1.378 W.; cf. Festugière, *Révélation*, III 218 and n. 2.

the *Timaeus*, has been identified beyond doubt by A. Dihle<sup>7</sup> with Ptolemy al-gharib, the biographer and bibliographer of Aristotle.

There are no ancient readers known to us who explained the absence of an answer as an indication that the *Clitophon* was left unfinished. One reader at any rate says by implication that it was finished, to wit Plutarch, who was well acquainted with it,<sup>8</sup> yet writes about the *Critias* ὡς γὰρ ἡ πόλις τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸ Ὀλυμπίειον, οὕτως ἡ Πλάτωνος σοφία τὸν Ἀτλαντικὸν ἐν πολλοῖς <καὶ> καλοῖς μόνον ἔργον ἀτελὲς ἔσχηκεν.<sup>9</sup>

From the sixteenth century onwards, the notion that Socrates' answer is lacking because the *Clitophon* is a torso becomes widespread. As far as I have been able to investigate, the first to propose this theory was Jean de Serres (in Stephanus' edition); de Serres probably advanced it to counter the hypothesis found as early as Ficino that the *Clitophon* is not authentic.<sup>10</sup> An alternative hypothesis explained Socrates' silence as due to a subsequent curtailment in the transmission: the dialogue was not *imperfectus* (de Serres) but *mutilatus*.<sup>11</sup> In the course of the nineteenth century and at times in ours, some scholars have sought

<sup>7</sup> 'Der Platoniker Ptolemaios', *Hermes* 85 (1957) 314–25; PW s.v. Ptolemaios 69), 1859–60.

<sup>8</sup> He twice paraphrases *Clit.* 407c6–d2 with express mention of Plato: 439c and 534e. If *Περὶ παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς* is authentic, the beginning of the protreptic speech (407b1–4) was quoted literally by him (4e).

<sup>9</sup> *Sol.* 32.2; I see no reason for Madvig's τὸ Ἀτλαντικόν: the *Critias* is referred to with its regular sub-title.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. P. O. Kristeller, 'Marsilio Ficino as a beginning student of Plato', *Scriptorium* 20 (1966) 41–54 at 44 n. 12.

<sup>11</sup> So A. Boeckh, *In Platonis qui vulgo fertur Minoem eiusdemque libros priores De Legibus* (Halis Saxonum 1806), 11 (cf. Souilhé, 171 n. 1): Boeckh does not subscribe to this idea himself; he adduces Ptolemy and Plutarch (cf. *supra*) as proof that even the most ancient MSS had no more text than ours have.

to reconcile themselves to Platonic authorship by having recourse to the idea of an unfinished sketch, found after Plato's death among his papers.<sup>12</sup> To name just a few: Boeckh,<sup>13</sup> Grote,<sup>14</sup> Th. Gomperz,<sup>15</sup> A. E. Taylor,<sup>16</sup> O. Wichmann.<sup>17</sup>

Usually, this theory is connected with the supposition that the *Clitophon* was originally intended as a prooemium to the *Republic*, but that half-way Plato changed his mind and used the alleged dialogue 'Thrasymachus' instead.<sup>18</sup> An interesting alternative was put forward recently by E. de Strycker:<sup>19</sup> Plato abandoned the *Clitophon* because he had expressed the same ideas better in the *Euthydemus*.

As the *Clitophon* itself gives, in my opinion, enough in-

<sup>12</sup> In itself, there is no objection to this possibility: when D. L. says that according to some the *Laws* were transcribed by Philip of Opus ὄντας ἐν κηρῶι (3.37), hardly anything can be meant but a publication of a (finished or nearly finished) book found among Plato's 'papers' – it does not matter whether or not we believe the story, but those who spread it around obviously did not think it absurd (cf. for the problem G. Müller, *Studien zu den platonischen Nomoi* (Munich 1951), 8–11 and (unduly sceptical) van Groningen, 'ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ', 13). Secondly, the *Critias* is not likely to have been published during Plato's life – an unfinished *Clitophon* would provide a parallel for it.

<sup>13</sup> *Index Lectionum der Universität Berlin 1840*, 7.

<sup>14</sup> *Plato*, III 19–26. 'The case against Sokrates has been made so strong, that I doubt whether Plato himself could have answered it to his own satisfaction' (21).

<sup>15</sup> 'Platonische Aufsätze, 1', *SAWW* 114 (1887) 763.

<sup>16</sup> *Plato* 12: either unfinished or spurious.

<sup>17</sup> *Platon, Ideelle Gesamtdarstellung und Studienwerk* (Darmstadt 1966), 150–1.

<sup>18</sup> So most scholars quoted in the previous notes; cf. also F. Duemmler, *Zur Composition des platonischen Staates* (Basel 1895), 5 n. 1 = *Kleine Schriften* (Leipzig 1901), I 232 n. 1: after replacing *Clit.* by *Republic* 1, Plato decided to publish the former as a provoking prelude to the *Republic*; K. Joël, 'Der λόγος Σωκρατικός', 64–5; H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 285–6 n. 2; D. G. Ritchie, *Plato* (London 1902), 25.

<sup>19</sup> *De kunst van het gesprek* (Antwerpen–Amsterdam 1976), 10; cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 133 n. 17.

dications to decide whether or not it is finished, I shall treat the question without having regard to its authorship.

### 1.3.2 *The problem*

The *Clitophon* as we have it certainly does not give the impression of being an unfinished text. The closing sentence μή μὲν γὰρ προτετραμμένωι σε ἀνθρώπωι ὧ Σώκρατες ἄξιον εἶναι τοῦ παντός φήσω, προτετραμμένωι δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι (410e5–8) provides everything we should expect from it: it recapitulates the appreciation of Socrates' activities as expounded by Clitophon in the two major sections of the dialogue, yet it does so in slightly stronger language than Clitophon had used before – this is to be expected in a peroration (ἄξιον . . . τοῦ παντός; σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμπόδιον); it ends up in a beautiful climax in the last clause τοῦ πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι, in which the key-word εὐδαίμονα comes as a sort of shock: although in fact the whole dialogue had been concerned with the way one achieves happiness, the word-group εὐδαίμων, -μονία etc. was not used before (cf. also Comm. ad loc.); there is besides a clear, though seemingly artless, antithetical structure. Apart from that, the last sentence is tied up inextricably with the last but one (cf. Comm. on 410e5 γάρ), in which the prologue is repeated almost word for word (406a2–3 ὅτι Λυσίαι διαλεγόμενος τὰς μὲν μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβὰς ψέγοι . . . a6–7 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπήνουν σε, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν – 410e4–5 ἵνα μὴ καθάπερ νῦν τὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ σε πρὸς Λυσίαν . . . τὰ δὲ τι καὶ ψέγω). The end of the text clearly looks back to the beginning.<sup>20</sup>

Besides, even if one does not accept Geffcken's analysis

<sup>20</sup> Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 5; Geffcken, 'Rätsel', 430 n. 1.

of the *Clitophon* as a rhetorical κατηγορία in all details (section 1.2), its disposition (exordium – narrative – accusation proper – epilogue), in which the introductory conversation corresponds, in my opinion, to the exordium of a judicial speech, shows a reasonable similarity to the pattern of a normal law-court accusation; consequently this disposition indicates a finished whole.

Now, these considerations in themselves do not disprove the possibility that something like a speech for the defence was originally intended by the author,<sup>21</sup> for even if Clitophon's accusation was intended to be answered, we should still expect it to be framed in the way it is and to end the way it does.

Therefore, we shall do better to start with hypothetical questions. If an answer by Socrates was intended, how was it prepared for – if at all – in the text of the dialogue that was actually written down? How would the figure of Socrates in such an answer correspond to the characterisation in the text? What would Socrates have been able to say in order either to deny the charge or to accept and explain it? These are questions which cannot be answered without giving at the same time an interpretation of the *Clitophon*. On the other hand such an interpretation is possible only

<sup>21</sup> This point is overlooked by Brünnecke ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 453), the only scholar who has adduced fundamental arguments against the torso theory (Roochnik, 'Riddle', 135–6 argues against individual hypotheses based on the assumption). – We may safely discount the possibility of mutilation of the text posterior to its publication in a more complete form (section 1.3.1) even if Boeckh's argument (n. 5 to that section) does not hold water. If the mutilation was mechanical, the chances of its occurring right at the place where Clitophon's *requisitoire* ends are infinitesimal; if it was intended, we have to imagine a fanatically anti-Socratic reader cutting away, say, half of his copy of the *Clitophon* so as to provide it with an anti-Socratic tenor. Furthermore, we have to assume that it was precisely this copy or one of its descendants which eventually found its way into the Corpus Platonicum, unchecked against other copies. I shall not waste more words on the possibility.

if we are certain that the text as it stands responds to the author's intention. In answering them we are entering a special case of the hermeneutic circle.

(1) Socrates' reaction to Clitophon's opinion of him is foreshadowed in what he says after Clitophon has offered to give a detailed account of what he had praised and criticised in Socrates' διατριβαί: Ἄλλ' αἰσχρὸν μὴν σοῦ γε ὠφελεῖν με προθυμουμένου μὴ ὑπομένειν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς γνοῦς ὅπῃ χεῖρων εἰμὶ καὶ βελτίων τὰ μὲν ἀσκήσω καὶ διώξομαι, τὰ δὲ φεύξομαι κατὰ κράτος (407a1–4). What Socrates says is in effect this: 'In offering to report your praise and blame you have offered to make me a better man [ὠφελεῖν; cf. Comm. ad loc.]. For, of course, if I have learnt about my better and weaker points, I shall strengthen the former and abandon the latter.' Socrates makes two assumptions (cf. section 1.5.2), one typical of him (knowledge of what is good leads automatically to doing what is good), the other highly ironical: Clitophon's praise and blame (οὐκ ἐπήϊουν – καὶ ἐπήϊουν, 406a5) correspond infallibly to Socrates' weaker and stronger points (χεῖρων – βελτίων). With this second assumption Socrates makes it impossible in advance to defend himself: Clitophon is the one who knows in what respect his διατριβαί deserve praise and blame, and all that is left to Socrates is to listen demurely. In this interpretation, Socrates has no option but to remain silent: he has – ironically – placed Clitophon above himself (as he does with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Euthyphron, Hippias etc.) and he cannot break the irony (he never does).<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Irony is mainly or exclusively a trait of *Plato's* Socrates (cf. W. Boder, *Die sokratische Ironie in den platonischen Frühdialogen* (Amsterdam 1973), 23–5) and our author at any rate handles the dialogue in Plato's way (section 11.4); I therefore feel justified in making this general observation, based on undoubtedly authentic dialogues, even if the authorship of this dialogue is dubious.



Some other features of the text reinforce what may be concluded from the sentence 407a1–4. Clitophon's praise of the protreptic speech is unmistakably ironic (407a6 πολλὰ κίς ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων; 408b6–7 λόγοις ... παμπόλλοις καὶ παγκάλως λεγομένοις; section 1.5.3). It is hard to see why the author should have worked in the irony if he intended to make Socrates wash himself clean of the allegations.

In the summing-up and the epilogue Clitophon makes a 'last appeal' to Socrates to start telling him all about the care of the soul, despite the dilemma stated previously by him ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν (410c5–6). The sentence ἐπεὶ εἶ γ' ἐθέλεις σὺ τούτων μὲν ἤδη παύσασθαι πρὸς ἐμὲ τῶν λόγων τῶν προτρεπτικῶν, οἷον δέ ... καὶ νῦν δὴ ταύτῳ γιγνέσθω (410c8–d5) and the clause καὶ σου δεόμενος λέγω μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖν (e3) seem to me to indicate that Clitophon is not quite serious in stating the dilemma – he may just have used it to incite Socrates to stop exhorting him and others and get down to business. It is, however, obvious that if Socrates did get down to business, Clitophon's attack would have been implicitly justified; so curiously enough these words, which on the surface seem to point towards an answer, in fact preclude such an answer.

(2) With these remarks we have already approached the second question, namely how an answer by Socrates would square with the character of Socrates as outlined in the text. There are in fact two quite different characters parading under that name (section 1.5.2). The first is the Socrates sketched by the author in the opening conversation: formal in his first, ironical in his second ῥῆσις. The second is Socrates the preacher, depicted by Clitophon, who moreover states expressly that Socrates had uttered a statement about justice which on closer examination had proved untenable (410a8–b3). These two characters can coexist within the framework of one dialogue so long as

they remain on separate levels (see section 1.5.1), but they cannot occur at the same level without either of them proving false. Such a confrontation would be bound to take place if Socrates were to answer the charge. This answer would belong to the direct dialogue, so it would be up to the ironical Socrates of the prologue, who forgoes any claim to knowledge, to defend the exhorter,<sup>23</sup> who has made a false statement about justice, and who has therefore made himself guilty of what is elsewhere called ἐπο-  
 νείδιστος ἀμαθία (*Apology* 29b1–2). I doubt if even a clumsy writer would fail to realise the impossibility of this task.

(3) As to the content of such a defence, an ironical Socrates who admits to knowing nothing and goes on to explain his way of philosophising (like the one in the *Theaetetus*) would clash with the one who humbly places himself under Clitophon's guidance, even if it were possible for him to explain away the deficiencies of the pompous preacher who is lacking in knowledge. True, Clitophon leaves open the possibility that Socrates, though admittedly a good exhorter, does not possess knowledge of the subject towards which his exhortations are directed: νομίσας σε τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δρᾶν, δυσὶν δὲ θάτερον, ἢ τοσοῦτον μόνον δύνασθαι, μακρότερον δὲ οὐδέν (410b4–7) . . . ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν (c5–6). This may have been intended as an opening for a defence. What beneficial function could have been attributed to an exhorter without knowledge? Plato's *Apology* provides the answer: there Socrates repeatedly testifies to his lack of knowledge and rather suddenly appears as an exhorter (29d4–e3). But this time the exhortation is inseparably tied

<sup>23</sup> When Brünneke says ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 456) that the Socrates of this dialogue could only have answered the charge with a new protreptic, he fails to distinguish between the two levels.

up with the expulsion of conceit, in other words with *elenchos* (29ε3–30α3); section II.3.3). Could this combination of absence of knowledge, exhortation and *elenchos* have been used in the *Clitophon* as a defence of Socrates? The answer is no. Clitophon himself does not possess knowledge and does not pretend to possess it, so *elenchos* is pointless in this case. What is more, there *is* *elenchos* in the *Clitophon*, but it is directed *against* Socrates and his companions, and Clitophon is the one who uses it (section II.4).

There is only one answer left to Socrates once Clitophon has finished: an admission of guilt and a promise to mend his ways accordingly. But as this promise has already been made (τὰ μὲν ἀσκήσω καὶ διώξομαι, τὰ δὲ φεύξομαι κατὰ κράτος 407α3–4), Socrates had to remain silent: any answer would have been trivial. Socrates' silence is not a sign of superiority (cf. Ptolemy, section I.3.1) or of a fundamental difference between him and Clitophon, which makes discussion impossible (so Roochnik, 'Riddle', 140–3) – he has been beaten at his own game. The structure of the *Clitophon* was therefore intended from the beginning.

## 1.4 The *Clitophon* as a Short Dialogue

### 1.4.1 *The question of genre*

One of the first things that strike the reader of the *Clitophon* is that it is so short. While this has some obvious advantages for the commentator, it also presents him with the problem of generic difference. If we take the epic genre as an analogon, we observe that in the course of Greek literature a subdivision develops for which bulk is the criterion. The most plausible hypothesis about the length of the oral epic before Homer's time is that it did not last much longer than the average listener could toler-

ate;<sup>24</sup> maybe the poems of Hesiod and the data about the number of books of various epics of the Cycle give us an idea. If this is right, the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were considerably longer than previous epics used to be. At this point a decision must be made: is the difference in length an irrelevant factor or does it go hand in hand with a number of structural differences, for instance a more complicated plot, more attention to character, more, lengthier and better-structured speeches etc.? If the answer is affirmative and the differences are significant, it is useful to assign the new lengthy epics to a special sub-genre, which is now well-known under the name of Monumental Epic. One of the most important criteria is the possibility of compression. We are told that long South Slavic epics can be compressed into one-sixth of their actual length without great damage;<sup>25</sup> the Homeric epics cannot. Therefore the latter are monumental, the former are just long.

A similar case can be made for *Republic* and *Laws* as Monumental Dialogues rather than abnormally long dialogues. Perhaps also the unfinished trilogies *Sophist* – *Politicus* – ‘*Philosophus*’ and *Timaeus* – *Critias* – ‘*Hermogenes*’ might be fruitfully analysed as belonging to this sub-genre.<sup>26</sup> It is not the place here to enter into details.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> This may have fluctuated considerably according to the occasion, the composition of the audience and, of course, the quality of the singer. Cf. A. B. Lord, *The Singer of Tales* (Cambridge (Mass.) 1960), 14–17, on the South Slavic parallels.

<sup>25</sup> D. Wender, ‘Homer, Avdo Mededović, and the elephant’s child’, *AJPh* 98 (1977) 327–47 at 339.

<sup>26</sup> This is true *a fortiori* if M. W. Haslam is right in claiming that *Sophist* and *Politicus*, and *Timaeus* and *Critias*, are single dialogues that were split up in the course of the transmission of Plato, ‘A note on Plato’s unfinished dialogues’, *AJPh* 97 (1976) 336–9.

<sup>27</sup> Among the most prominent features of the monumental dialogue would be: full treatment of the subjects encountered and related ones, even when this would appear unnecessary – e.g. the proof of immortality in *Republic* 10: mention of immortality is of central importance to the *Republic* (it is the precondition of one of the rewards

As a counterpart of the Monumental Epic we are confronted with the Epyllion. It is not easy to find the common denominator for the various representatives of this sub-group (most of them are partly or wholly unknown to us), the more so because we shall be tempted to introduce as typical features of the Epyllion what are in fact general characteristics of Hellenistic narrative poetry. Fortunately, there is no need to pursue the matter further, but for one aspect. The Epyllion is often considered an invention of Hellenistic poets, and the creation of the sub-genre typical of that era. There is no compelling reason for thinking so.<sup>28</sup> In fact, the Hesiodic collection of Ἡοῖαι is little else than a string of epyllia, the *Aspis* belongs here, and some Homeric Hymns are closely related (one may also think of narrative choral songs like Bacchylides 17).

As an analogy to the Epyllion, Carl Werner Müller has

of justice), but a proof is superfluous after what had been said earlier about the theory of forms; frequent digression within the discussion, after which the main line of thought is resumed; virtual absence of arguments *ad hominem*; virtual absence of those short-cuts which are created by making a partner willingly grant a highly debatable point; virtual absence of elenchos as purification, cf. section 11.3.1 (even in the case of Thrasymachus); absence of concentric reasoning (section 11.5.1); frequent deliberations about questions of method; frequent reflections about the results that have been achieved so far. Most of these features are closely connected which each other; some of them will be typical of other dialogues as well – especially *Phlb.*

<sup>28</sup> I agree with M. L. West ('Erinna', *ZPE* 25 (1977) 95–119, esp. 116–19) that Erinna, whose Ἡλακάρη belongs to the sub-genre, is certainly not an 'unsophisticated teenage girl'; I disagree when he thinks it necessary to assume that 'Erinna' was really a pseudonym of a mature poet, though I can see his point and he has an unknown ancient authority (cf. Ath. 283d) behind him; but when he brings down the *floruit* of Olymp. 107 (352–48 BCE) which we have on the authority of Origenes (= Hieronymus and Syncellus) to 'the end of the fourth century or very early in the third' he is biased; besides, Erinna was imitated by Anyte and Nossis (West, 114 and n. 36) and commemorated by Asclepiades (xxviii G.–P.) – all of whom belong to the late fourth or early third centuries.

introduced the notion of *Kurzdialog*.<sup>29</sup> As a criterion of length he uses the *Spuria* transmitted under Plato's name minus *Axiochus* and *Eryxias* (but including the *Alcyon*); this leads to an upper limit of 6, a lower limit of 1¼ pages OCT (320 n. 4).<sup>30</sup> He gives good reasons for thinking that 25 short dialogues were attributed to Aristippus (320–1 n. 5): Diogenes Laertius 3.83–4 (*SSR* IV A 144) Τοῦ δὴ Κυρηναϊκοῦ φιλοσόφου φέρεται βιβλία τρία μὲν ἱστορίας . . . ἐν δὲ ἐν ᾧ διάλογοι πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν, οἶδε . . . [there follow 23, not 25, titles]. Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ διατριβῶν αὐτὸν φασιν ἕξ γεγραμέναι, οἱ δ' οὐδ' ὄλως γράψαι (there follows a whole different list). The best explanation seems to be to assume that two titles have been lost, that διάλογοι is used in a very loose sense (among the titles are Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπιτιμῶντας ὅτι κέκτηται οἶνον παλαιὸν καὶ ἑταίρας and Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Ἀρήτην τὴν θυγατέρα<sup>31</sup>) and that all titles refer to very short pieces.<sup>32</sup> Some authors in antiquity thought Aristippus' philosophical productions were confined to these pieces and to six books of diatribes.<sup>33</sup> It is of course preferable to suppose that Diogenes' list is a sort of contamination of the one volume with its 25 short dialogues with a subsequent list of other

<sup>29</sup> I shall translate it for the moment as 'short dialogue' until the question whether this is a separate literary genre is treated; as a genre it will be referred to as 'Short Dialogue'. – J. Bompaigne (*Lucien écrivain* (Paris 1958), 562–85 and passim) uses the word 'petit dialogue' to refer to the various collections of Διάλογοι (νεκρικοί, ἑταιρικοί etc.) but denies the existence of a direct link between these and the Socratic dialogue (312).

<sup>30</sup> But cf. section I.4.2(7).

<sup>31</sup> Cf. *Ep.Socr.* 27 Köhler and E. Mannebach, *Aristippi et Cyrenaicorum fragmenta* (Leiden 1961), 81.

<sup>32</sup> An average of 3½ pages OCT according to Müller's reckoning (*Kurzdialoge*, 321 n. 2). Mannebach is aware of the problem, cf. 79 n. 1.

<sup>33</sup> These are also mentioned in the second list given by D. L. (2.85, *SSR* IV A 144) as well as by Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F 259 = Aristipp. fr. 122 M., *SSR* IV A 146).

philosophical works.<sup>34</sup> We must conclude that there was a collection of 25 short dialogues (or 23 short pieces, including dialogues) attributed to Aristippus, just as there were similar collections of short dialogues attributed to Crito (17), Simon (33) (ascribed also to Phaedo and Aeschines of Sphettos),<sup>35</sup> Simmias (23) and probably Glaucon.<sup>36</sup>

Müller considers the short dialogue a secondary and later development of Socratic literature. He adduces two arguments: All the transmitted *Spuria* already formed part of the Corpus Platonicum at the time of the tetralogical edition (*Kurzdialoge*, 32–41);<sup>37</sup> the author of that edition put

<sup>34</sup> On the analogy of D. L. 2.121 (*SSR* VI B 42) διαλόγους γέγραφεν [sc. Crito] ἐν ἐνὶ φερομένους βιβλίῳ ἑπτακαίδεκα, τοὺς ὑπογεγραμμένους (there follow 17 titles), cf. 2.122 (*SSR* VI B 87; Simon); 124 (*SSR* VI B 63; Glaucon); *ibid.* (Simmias), one should rather expect a complete list of 25 titles and suppose that this list got somehow mixed up with a list of works of greater bulk. This would do more justice to Diogenes' actual words.

<sup>35</sup> D. L. 2.122 (*SSR* VI B 87) σκυτικούς αὐτοῦ [sc. Simon] τοὺς διαλόγους καλοῦσιν; *id.* 2.105 (*SSR* III A 8) διαλόγους δὲ συνέγραψε [sc. Phaedo] γνησίους μὲν [2 titles] καὶ δισταζόμενον [several titles and alternative ascriptions] σκυτικούς λόγους· καὶ τούτους τινὲς Αἰσχίρου φασίν.

<sup>36</sup> D. L. 2.124 (*SSR* VI B 63) Γλαύκων Ἀθηναῖος· καὶ τούτου φέρονται ἐν ἐνὶ διάλογοι ἐννέα [not short ones, apparently] . . . φέρονται καὶ ἄλλοι δύο καὶ τριάκοντα, οἱ νοθεύονται (presumably, though not necessarily, in one volume and therefore short dialogues).

<sup>37</sup> The idea that a tetralogical list presupposes an edition ordered that way, though obviously false, seems to be ineradicable – it lies at the bottom, among other things, of H. Tarrant's totally misguided views of Thrasyllus as an editor of Plato (*Thrasyllan Platonism* (Ithaca–London 1993)). J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text* (Leiden 1994), 59–60; 199 is, to my mind, no doubt right in supposing that Thrasyllus wrote an introduction to Plato, for which, following Usener, he conjectures the title τὰ πρὸ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως τῶν Πλάτωνος δογμάτων (98). As Thrasyllus must have written a book on Plato in any case (which we know because D. L. quotes from it), the hypothesis that he also produced an edition of Plato is uneconomical. The earliest testimony for the tetralogical list is probably Varro, *L.L.* 7.37 (43 BCE; *pace* Tarrant, 75–6); the earliest indication of a tetralogical edition is Hippol. 1.19.21, who quotes *Clit.* 407d4–8 with the words καὶ λέξις τούτου [that evil actions are in-

the ὁμολογουμένως νοθευόμενοι in an Appendix and (since five out of seven dialogues in the *Spuria* are short dialogues) indicated thereby that short dialogues were not considered Platonic (42–4). The *Clitophon*, which is certainly a short dialogue (6 pages OCT), is only an apparent exception: it was assigned a place within the eighth tetralogy before the *Republic* because of its subject-matter. The basic premise of this argument is improbable (especially for the *Alcyon*) and not subject to proof;<sup>38</sup> if the short dialogues were indeed rejected because of their length, this proves at most that the author of the tetralogical list did not consider them Platonic, but his opinion is not proof; the argument about the *Clitophon* is special pleading. See section I.4.2(7).

Secondly, Müller argues (*Kurzdialoge*, 321–2), since one group of short dialogues, the σκυπτικοὶ διάλογοι, was ascribed to Simon the Cobbler, who was a mere literary figure, they cannot have been earlier than Simon's first appearance in Socratic literature, which is in Phaedo's dialogue *Simon*. By the same token, the short dialogues ascribed to Crito, Glaucon and Simmias are adespota which were provided with authors who likewise are well-known figures from Socratic dialogues (though this time they are also undoubtedly historical persons, one of whom – Simmias – is even credited with two epigrams on Sophocles and perhaps one on Plato).<sup>39</sup> It is not clear what Müller thinks of the authorship of Aristippus' collection.

voluntary] ἐμφανεστάτη ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείαι. This is hardly the purposeful expression of a view that the *Clitophon* is part of the *Republic*, as Heidel thinks (*Pseudo-Platonica*, 47 n. 5). It is an interesting slip, best explained if we think of a complete Plato which contained both *Clitophon* and *Republic* (or part of it). In other words, Hippolytus or his source consulted an edition of Plato in which the dialogues were grouped in tetralogical order (cf. Alline, *Histoire*, 124, where a similar confusion in Stobaeus is indicated as well).

<sup>38</sup> Cf. my review of Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 211–12.

<sup>39</sup> *AP* 7.21; 22; 60.



We are presented here with a conglomerate of hypotheses started off by Ast and C. F. Hermann, dependent on the one unprovable supposition that Simon the Cobbler was not a real historical figure.<sup>40</sup> We have nowadays learned to accept what was highly questionable one century and a half ago, namely that all dramatic figures conversing with Socrates in Plato's works correspond to historical figures in Socrates' time<sup>41</sup> and there is no reason why other Socratics should have resorted to imaginary figures.

It is another matter whether these collections of short dialogues really belong to the authors with whom they are connected. The circumstance that there are three different ascriptions for the Cobbler's Dialogues, whereas of the short dialogues ascribed to Glaucon Diogenes bluntly states νοθεύονται (2.124), does not inspire confidence any more than Sotion's and Panaetius' silence about the volume with 25 dialogues ascribed to Aristippus.

All this, however, is not quite to the point. Müller is unable to prove that short dialogues were not written in the first half of the fourth century. The allegation is obviously false. For one thing, Müller himself dates the Pseudo-Platonic *Sisyphus* in the fifties of that century (*Kurzdialoge*, 94–104). I am inclined to agree with him that Aristotle knew this dialogue,<sup>42</sup> therefore a date later than 350 seems unlikely. But there is a much more important point. Let us once again turn to Cobbler's Dialogues. Diogenes has a remark about their origin which may be illuminating: 2.122 οὔτος [sc. Simon] ἐρχομένου Σωκράτους ἐπὶ τὸ ἐργαστήριον καὶ διαλεγομένου τινά, ὧν ἐμνημόνευεν ὑπο-

<sup>40</sup> A healthy reaction is displayed by Hirzel, *Dialog*, I 102–5; Hobein in his PW articles Simmias (4) and Σίμων (6). Archaeological claims that Simon's workshop has been identified are discussed by Kahn, *Dialogue*, 10 and n. 19.

<sup>41</sup> Dodds *Grg.* 12 and n. 5; the Eleatic visitor is the exception which proves the rule.

<sup>42</sup> *Kurzdialoge*, 91: *EN* 1112a21–3 – *Sis.* 388e2–389a4; cf. my review, 212.

σημειώσεις ἐποίητο. This may or may not be fiction (I think it is), but it gives at least an indication of how the σκυτικοὶ διάλογοι were presented, namely as reports from memory of what Socrates had allegedly discussed. One is immediately reminded of Xenophon here, whose major Socratic writing, though ostensibly a defence of Socrates against various attacks, nevertheless justly carries the name Ἀπομνημονεύματα. Now Xenophon certainly did not hear all conversations contained in the *Memorabilia* personally, but the fiction is that he did: 1.4.2 λέξω δε πρῶτον ἅ ποτε αὐτοῦ ἤκουσα περὶ τοῦ δαιμονίου διαλεγομένου πρὸς Ἀριστόδημον and *passim*.<sup>43</sup> In antiquity the conclusion drawn from such introductory formulae was that Xenophon made notes of real conversations of the historical Socrates: Diogenes 2.48 καὶ τὸν τεύθειν ἀκροατῆς Σωκράτους ἦν [sc. Xenophon]. καὶ πρῶτος ὑποσημειωσάμενος τὰ λεγόμενα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἤγαγεν, Ἀπομνημονεύματα ἐπιγράψας. These words are strikingly similar to the statement about Simon. It is not too bold to suppose that if similar conclusions were drawn the material was similar, in other words, that the Cobbler's Dialogues and the conversations reported in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (and *Symposion*) belong to the same group of literature. The only difference between them is that whereas the short dialogues 'remembered' by Simon bear separate titles, Xenophon (instead of calling 1.4 Περί θεῶν, 2.1 Περί ἐγκρατείας and so on) arranged them, in the case of the *Memorabilia*, within the framework of a larger text with an apologetic character.<sup>44</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Cf. 1.3.1 τούτων δὴ γράψω ὅποσα ἂν διαμνημονεύσω and Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 94; *HGPh*, III 345. That this is indeed fiction was proved by H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 26–31. Cf. Kahn, *Dialogue*, 29–35; 393–401.

<sup>44</sup> Whether or not the short dialogues ascribed to Crito, Simmias, Glaucon and Aristippus were of the same type of ἀπομνημονεύματα we cannot know, but for the first three collections the names of the

Not only, therefore, were short dialogues written during the first half of the fourth century, but quite a number of them have even been preserved, and should be used in order to decide whether or not the Short Dialogue is in fact a separate sub-genre of the dialogue, like the Monumental Dialogue.<sup>45</sup> It will be understood that a thorough examination of the material, which alone will enable us to reach such a decision, falls outside the scope of this book. As a δεύτερος πλοῦς, I shall collect in the next section such general features of the short Platonic *Spuria* and Xenophon's Socratic conversations as have been observed by other scholars,<sup>46</sup> and compare them with the *Clitophon*. If there is consistency, the case for the Short Dialogue as a literary genre will have been settled provisionally.

#### 1.4.2 *Short dialogues and the Clitophon*

(1) Short dialogues are almost exclusively<sup>47</sup> duologies; one of the partners is Socrates,<sup>48</sup> the other is sometimes anonymous,<sup>49</sup> but usually his name is given so that he is identifiable for the contemporary reader, if not always for us. More data about Socrates' partner are only provided

authors certainly suggest it; one may even go further and draw a direct line from Xenophon's fictive presence via Aristotle's dialogues to Cicero, as is done tentatively by Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 94.

<sup>45</sup> Müller's attitude is ambiguous: 'In der Tat kann von einem Genos des Kurzdialogs höchstens per analogiam die Rede sein' (*Kurzdialoge*, 320).

<sup>46</sup> In the main, Müller and Gigon. I have stressed elsewhere – review of Müller, 211 – the insufficiency of Müller's treatment of the short Platonic *Spuria* in this respect; I must add here that a typology of Xenophon's Socratic conversations is an urgent *desideratum*.

<sup>47</sup> In X. *Mem.* a silent third is sometimes present (e.g. 1.3.8–13; cf. 1.2.30); X. *Smp.* is in this respect as anomalous as Plato's *Smp.* Silent persons are also implied in [Pl.] *Sis.* and perhaps [Pl.] *Just.*; cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 129–30; 130 n. 1.

<sup>48</sup> Except in *Demod.* 2–4 (for the numbering, cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 107, n. 1; 262ff.). *Demod.* 1 is no dialogue.

<sup>49</sup> In [Pl.] *Just.*; *Virt.* (but cf. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 192–3); *Demod.* 2–4.

when they are functional. Thus in the *Sisyphus* we learn that Sisyphus is a σύμβουλος of the archons of Pharsalos (387b7–c3), because the author needed a starting-point for the discussion on (εὔ) βουλευέσθαι. The *Clitophon* conforms. Clitophon is called ‘son of Aristonymus’ in order that we may identify him, but the rest of his *curriculum vitae* is passed over – even his age is not hinted at (section I.5.3 n. 3), except for the fact that he is apparently not too old for Socrates’ and Thrasymachus’ συνουσία.

C. W. Müller explains this feature, which seems only a natural one in short dialogues, as a conscious device to provoke ‘Selbstidentifikation’ of the reader with Socrates’ partner, and to make him concentrate on the subject-matter. This, he argues, is easier ‘wenn er Alkibiades heisst’.<sup>50</sup> Though we must all confess to a complete ignorance about the contemporary reader’s reception, his explanation does not look very probable. My personal feeling is that ‘Selbstidentifikation’ will have been mainly the effect of the questions asked of Socrates’ partner, no matter how anonymous he was.

(2) Apart from the scarcity of ‘external’ data about the characters in short dialogues, there is usually little or no characterisation, whether in actual utterances or in stylistic markers. (Of course, when Xenophon ascribes to Socrates’ interlocutors certain qualities of character which are the topics of the ensuing conversations – for instance Aristippus’ ἀκράτεια in 2.1 – this cannot count as characterisation.) In this respect, the *Clitophon* is apparently different inasmuch as there certainly is some degree of characterisation, especially in the prooemium (sections I.5.2; I.5.3). On the other hand, this characterisation plays a very important part in the author’s message, whereas in longer

<sup>50</sup> *Kurzdialoge*, 323; cf. especially n. 1, where it is suggested that the ‘kleinbürgerliche Milieu’ of the Cobbler’s Dialogues has a similar effect.

dialogues personal features are usually much less important for the interpretation of the dialogue. Within the area of short dialogues the *Clitophon* is (in this respect) the exception which proves the rule.

(3) Parallel to this lack of individualisation there is normally a virtual absence of situational context, of 'scenic background'.<sup>51</sup> Inasmuch as the short dialogue is at the same time a 'dramatic' (two-level) dialogue (section 1.5.1), this is quite normal: among longer dramatic dialogues *Phaedrus* and *Laws* are the only ones to have any scenic background to speak of.<sup>52</sup> The only situational information in the *Clitophon* is contained in Socrates' opening words – these are the *point de départ* of the conversation; the words μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντες (406a10; cf. Comm.) are necessary to explain a marker of formal style (section 1.5.2). In 'indirect' (three-level) short dialogues one would a priori expect some scenic background, but it is again virtually confined to essential data, usually put together at the beginning of a conversation, e.g. Lamprocles' unfilial attitude towards Xanthippe or Pistias' workshop.<sup>53</sup> In *Clitophon's* report there is no situational context worth mentioning.

Not only are the characters in short dialogues usually robbed of their individuality, one could say the same of the conversation. Generally speaking, it is more abstract, more schematic than in longer dialogues. A number of

<sup>51</sup> Cf. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 322; Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 94.

<sup>52</sup> This may be explained as due to a desire to bring in a situational context combined with dissatisfaction at the three-level dialogue (cf. section 1.5.1) as expressed in *Tht.* – I discount *La.* because its situational context is the starting-point for the dialogue. *Sis.* is the only dramatic short dialogue which has anything in the way of scenic background (387b1–5) but it serves as explanation for Sisyphus' absence, the reason for which is his function of σύμβουλος explained above. The *Alcyon* is too late (cf. my review of Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 213) to take into account.

<sup>53</sup> *X. Mem.* 2.2.1 and 3.10.9 respectively; 2.8.1 is rather exceptional. *X. Smp.* is again – cf. n. 47 – anomalous.

peculiarities of short dialogues can be brought under this denominator.

(4) Many short dialogues start immediately (or almost immediately) with a full statement of the problem; often the final sentence corresponds to this statement, giving a comprehensive formulation of the result.<sup>54</sup> A comparison of the *Meno* (the only longer dialogue which begins immediately with the problem) with *Περὶ ἀρετῆς*, which is an extract of it, is instructive.

*Meno* (70a1–4): Ἐχεις μοι εἰπεῖν ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄρα διδακτὸν ἢ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητόν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλωι τινὶ τρόπῳι;

*Περὶ ἀρετῆς* (376a1–2): ἼΑρα διδακτὸν ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδακτὸν ἀλλὰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἄνδρες ἢ ἄλλωι τινὶ τρόπῳι;

*Meno*'s question is here shorn of its personal traits (and of the ἀσκητόν alternative, which does not come up in the *Meno* anyway),<sup>55</sup> but apart from that the openings are closely similar. At the end of *Περὶ ἀρετῆς*, however, the conclusion is summed up: οὕτως ἔοικεν οὔτε διδακτὸν εἶναι οὔτε φύσει ἀρετή, ἀλλὰ θεῖαι μοίραι παραγίγνεται κτωμένοις (379d9–10). The *Meno* ends differently: ἐκ μὲν τοίνυν τούτου τοῦ λογισμοῦ ὦ Μένων θεῖαι μοίραι ἡμῖν φαίνεται παραγιγνομένη ἢ ἀρετή οἷς παραγίγνεται (100b2–4);<sup>56</sup> this statement is followed by a proviso that the result is not definitive until it has been established what exactly ἀρετή is (this question is not touched in *Περὶ ἀρετῆς*), and the *Meno* ends with goodbye and a reference to persuading Anytus.

<sup>54</sup> Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 323.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. Bluck on 70a2 ἀσκητόν; Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 198; section II.2.3.1.

<sup>56</sup> C. W. Müller (*Kurzdialoge*, 217) should not have compared *Virt.* 379d9–10 to *Men.* 99e4–100a2.

The difference is clear: whereas Plato is contented with restating the outcome (θείαι μοίραι) in itself (not at the absolute end of the *Meno*), the anonymous author of *Περὶ ἄρετῆς* fits the outcome in with a renewed statement of the alternatives of the opening question, which terminates the dialogue.

In Xenophon, the correspondence of opening and end is usually shifted to the general framework into which the short dialogues are fitted, e.g. *Memorabilia* 1.5 begins Εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐγκράτεια καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρὶ κτῆμά ἐστιν, ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι προυβίβαζε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιαύδε (a speech follows). (1.5.6) τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ἔτι ἐγκρατέστερον τοῖς ἔργοις ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἑαυτὸν ἐπεδείκνυεν.<sup>57</sup>

We have already seen (section 1.3.2) that the crucial elements in the prologue of the *Clitophon* are repeated in the last sentence but one. Similarly, the interrogation of Socrates' companions after Clitophon's methodical remarks is encircled by parallel sentences: 409b8–c1 τὸ δ' ἕτερον, ὃ δύναται ποιεῖν ἡμῖν ἔργον ὁ δίκαιος, τί τοῦτό φαμεν; εἰπέ. 410a4–6 τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν ὅποι τείνουσά ἐστιν διαπέφευγεν, καὶ ἄδηλον αὐτῆς ὅτι πότε ἐστὶν τὸ ἔργον. It may be observed that the conclusion is given in a condensed form; logically speaking ὁμόνοια alone can be subject of the ὅποι clause whereas the referent of αὐτῆς is δικαιοσύνη only; the condensation has the literary advantage of establishing a reference to the introductory question.

(5) Not only do beginning and ending correspond in short dialogues, also half-way one often finds markers of transition, new stages in the argument etc., or alternatively

<sup>57</sup> The participle λέγων is concomitant ('while he used to say this'), not causal, so that it is left to the reader to draw the conclusion that he actually made people self-controlled by his speeches on the subject; cf. Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 150.

notable absence of such markers, so that a transition is rendered more obvious by its abruptness. Fluent transitions from one stage of the argument to the next are rare. This has been noted by C. W. Müller for the short *Spuria* ('Das formale logische Gerüst der Argumentation tritt in vielen Kurzdialogen stark hervor' (*Kurzdialoge*, 323)) as well as by O. Gigon for the conversations in the *Memorabilia* ('genaue bis überscharfe Disposition'<sup>58</sup>).

In the *Clitophon* there are several clear markers of transition, such as the announcement of the report in Ἀκούοις ἄν . . . γὰρ (407a5; Comm. ad loc.); the interruption in the report of Socrates' speech (407e3-4) underlines the end of its first part (section II.2.2). The sentence 408b5-c4 not only marks the end of the speech but also terminates Clitophon's praise, as is shown by a comparison with the next sentence, in which an oblique reference to the *Euthydemus* announces disappointment (Comm. on 408c4-7). For the marking use of irony as framework of the speech, cf. section I.5.3. The second and third definitions of the ἔργον of justice are both introduced by clauses containing the participle τελευτῶν, 'finally' (409d2; 410a7).

On the other hand, we find several abrupt transitions, one even in the middle of a sentence: the third part of Socrates' speech is marked off from the second only in that both begin with a distributive temporal clause: καὶ ὁπότεν αὖ φῆις (407e5); καὶ ὅταν λέγηις (e8) – cf. the use of τελευτῶν as a similar marker – but there is no main clause to follow either of them (Comm. on 407e5-8). Likewise, after Clitophon's methodical distinction between ἔργον and δίδαγμα and his request to define the latter in the field of justice, the transition to the answers given to him (οὗτος μὲν ὡς οἶμαι τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο κτλ., 409c1-2) probably contains both an anacoluthon (Comm.

<sup>58</sup> *Memorabilien I*, 94; cf. *HGPh*, III 342 (on X. *Smp.*).



on 409a7 εἰπόντος δέ μου) and an asyndeton. Finally there is to my mind some degree of abruptness in the introduction of the sentence which closes Clitophon's report and introduces his verdict on Socrates: ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἄπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλὰ πολὺν δὴ ὑπομείνας χρόνον λιπαρῶν ἀπείρηκα νομίσας κτλ. (410b3-4); the particle δέ is rather weak for a major transition. This incongruence of form and content may be explained by the author's wish to give a minimum of attention to the ignorance displayed by Socrates himself (section I.5.3).

There is what may be called a fluent transition between Clitophon's verdict on Socrates and his last appeal to stop exhorting him and others and get down to business. The positive side of the balance is stated right away (410b4-6 νομίσας σε τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δρᾶν); for the negative side Clitophon hesitates between inability or unwillingness (b6-c6), which is why he visits Thrasymachus and others, out of sheer embarrassment (ἀπορῶν, c8). This last word is explained by a (causal) ἐπεὶ clause which introduces the last appeal. Only in the final sentence of the dialogue is the balance struck definitively.

(6) One feature which the *Clitophon* has in common with the short Platonic *Spuria* but which is virtually absent from Xenophon, is what C. W. Müller calls 'die radikale Beschneidung der Spontaneität des Dialogpartners' (*Kurzdialoge*, 323). In the short *Spuria*, which are all 'direct' dialogues, this is contrived by short answers which almost always conform to the intention of the questions, and if not, are still so harmless that they do not constitute real objections.<sup>59</sup> In the *Clitophon*, this phenomenon is paralleled

<sup>59</sup> They are throughout in the type of discourse called 'Question and reply' by Thesleff (*Styles*, 35-41; this is the normal form of elenchos in all Platonic dialogues).

by the ‘dummy’ status of Socrates’ companions in Clitophon’s report of his interrogating them: the answers are given in *oratio obliqua* and there is no sign of anything in the way of discussion. See further section 1.5.3.

(7) I may be permitted to subjoin an observation of my own. Short dialogues are rarely what Thesleff (*Styles*, 34) calls ‘pedimental’. There is no central<sup>60</sup> episode which is stylistically marked off from the neighbouring parts and which philosophically speaking constitutes the dialogue’s culmination. Such episodes are Diotima’s speech in the *Symposium* and the Sun–Line–Cave conglomerate in the *Republic*.<sup>61</sup> There are no such central culminations in the short Platonic *Spuria*; nor have I found anything in Xenophon’s ‘short dialogues’ which can be regarded as such. The two central parts of the *Clitophon* are each trichotomised (section 1.2); as a consequence of this structure a climax is absent. The dialogues<sup>62</sup> in the Platonic corpus in which no pedimental structure is found are *Crito*, *Alcibiades*

<sup>60</sup> Not necessarily (or even normally) precisely in the middle of the text; cf. Thesleff, *Styles*, 167 and n. 2.

<sup>61</sup> See further Thesleff, *Styles*, 34 and the literature quoted n. 2; his analyses of various dialogues, 95–158; 167–8. His conclusion is that among the authentic dialogues (*Hp.Ma.* is rejected, as it also is by C. H. Kahn, ‘The beautiful and the genuine: a discussion of Paul Woodruff’s *Plato, Hippias Major*’, *OSAPh* 2 (1985) 261–87) *Cri.* is the only dialogue without a central culmination. Pedimental structure sometimes goes hand in hand with a protreptic concluding episode, e.g. a myth, as in *R.*, *Phd.*, *Grg.* (Thesleff, *Styles*, 168; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 187–96). There is such an episode (the ‘last appeal’) towards the end of *Clit.* and of many conversations in *X. Mem.* (e.g. Prodicus’ speech, 2.1.21–34). – Thesleff (*Styles*, 168 n. 1) suggests that *Clit.* combines central culmination with protreptic conclusion but I do not perceive the former.

<sup>62</sup> I discount *Ap.* (which creates a problem for Thesleff, cf. *Styles*, 34 n. 3 and 119) for the simple reason that it is not a dialogue and ought not to be treated like one. The same holds for the *Letters*, of which only *Ep.* 7 has an obviously central episode, namely the philosophical digression.

2, *Erastai*, *Theages*, *Hippias Maior*, *Clitophon*, *Minos*, *Περὶ δικαίου*, *Περὶ ἀρετῆς*, *Demodocus* 2–4. With the exception of *Hippias Maior*, these are all relatively short dialogues; none of them is longer than 15 pages (Stephanus). Short dialogues which do have a central culmination of some sort are *Hipparchus*, *Ion*, and *Sisyphus*. It appears that absence of pedimental structure is normal in short dialogues; also that the line which separates authentic works from *Dubia* and *Spuria* cuts across the distinction of short dialogues with and without pedimental structure.

This last fact is a decisive argument against C. W. Müller's theory that Plato could not have written short dialogues such as the *Clitophon*.<sup>63</sup> It seems certain to me that the Short Dialogue is a separate genre and that the *Clitophon* belongs to it – the above observations point that way, although I would have been glad of more factual confirmation regarding point (5). Now, it is structure, not number of pages, which determines whether or not a particular dialogue belongs to this genre. To determine the precise maximum length seems pointless, though obviously there must be one (it would be absurd to call the *Hippias Maior* a Short Dialogue; the absence of pedimental structure in it must be otherwise explained<sup>64</sup>). Consequently, if we can credit Plato with the *Crito* (which at least by the criterion of pedimental structure is a Short Dialogue), there is no reason why we should deny to him such Short Dialogues as *Clitophon*, *Minos* etc. on account of their shortness, though we may feel compelled to do so on other grounds.

<sup>63</sup> *Kurzdialoge*, 43–4; 320–1; 324–5. Cf. section I.4.1 and my review, 211–12.

<sup>64</sup> Either as a sign of inauthenticity (cf. n. 61) or as due to a very early date of origin.

## 1.5 The characters of the dialogue

1.5.1 *Levels of discourse*

If a literary text contains speech,<sup>65</sup> there are normally two levels of discourse.<sup>66</sup> First, there is what may be termed the ‘lower’ level: here the text constitutes the discourse, and the author and his public are the communicants. Second comes the ‘higher’ level, where the speech is the discourse, and the literary figures who speak and listen are the communicants. The number of levels is augmented if within the upper-level discourse there is again speech. This is the case with Plato’s indirect dialogues.<sup>67</sup> In the *Republic* for example, the lower-level discourse is between Plato and his readers, the first upper-level discourse between Socrates

<sup>65</sup> Throughout this section, ‘speech’ is used as a neutral term, denoting the uttering of words *per se*. ‘Discourse’ refers to speech as addresses by one person to another (sometimes I have, for stylistic reasons, substituted the vaguer term for the more exact one). ‘Communication’ includes discourse as well as non-linguistic facts and events accompanying discourse. ‘Public’ is meant to be understood as what is normally called the ‘ideal reader’. In the absence of a full-blown theoretical model for the interpretation of the Platonic dialogue, I have devised this framework – a synthesis of various and not very modern theories of narrative text stripped of everything but the barest essentials (cf. esp. W. Schmid, *Der Textaufbau in den Erzählungen Dostoevskys* (Munich 1973), 20–30 and the literature quoted there). This was done mainly in order to give a satisfactory account of the role of Socrates in the *Clitophon* – it will be seen that level-distinction yields no very impressive results in the case of Clitophon himself. I have found this model rather satisfactory in studying the introductory scenes of *Smp*.

<sup>66</sup> Except in the case of various types of monologue.

<sup>67</sup> This does not mean that two-level dialogues are necessarily ‘dramatic dialogues’; Socrates’ conversations reported by Xenophon are often two-level dialogues. Plato consciously avoids this type: rather than reporting in the two-level style, e.g. “ἀλλὰ παρήμι,” ἔφη ὁ Φαίδρος “ἀλλ’ ἐρώτα.” μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐνθένδε ποθὲν ἦρξαστο (cf. *Smp*. 199c1–2), he uses the complicated four-level discourse.

and his unknown listener(s), the second upper-level discourse between Socrates and Thrasymachus, Glaucon etc. At times there is a fourth, even a fifth, level, for instance Er's report of his journey to the underworld and the proclamation of Lachesis' *προφήτης* within that report. The *Parmenides* has five levels from 127d6 onwards, the *Symposium* four from 174a3 onwards.

In the interpretation of literary texts which have more than one level of discourse, only one vertical link between levels is admissible: the downward relationship of one level to the one immediately below.<sup>68</sup> In order to determine and clarify the nature of this relationship the notion of 'level-content' will be used here. All discourse presupposes at least two communicants, one at least at either 'end'. We do not study their communication adequately by analysing only what they say; we must also reconstruct the intention of their words, their reactions, if any, to the communication (at the lower level this is what is usually called 'reception'),<sup>69</sup> whereas descriptions of literary figures while in discourse should be taken into account as well.<sup>70</sup> All these elements, together with the discourse proper, constitute the content of a given level of discourse.

We can now set up a principle for studying the downward relation: two adjacent levels are linked by the identity of the level-content of the higher to the discourse of the lower level. Other vertical relations between adjacent

<sup>68</sup> One level may temporarily have zero realisation, as usually in the second half of the *Parmenides*. In that case one may say in practice that there is a downward relation of one level to the second or even third next.

<sup>69</sup> Cf. H. R. Jauss, *Literaturgeschichte als Provokation* (Frankfurt 1970), esp. 231–51; D. W. Fokkema–E. Kunne-Ibsch, *Theories of Literature in the Twentieth Century* (London 1978), 136–64. I am not concerned here with the diachronic dimension which the term possesses in modern literary theory.

<sup>70</sup> Whether they do or do not belong to the same level as the discourse itself is debatable but does not need to be discussed here.

levels are inadmissible and invalid. If an author communicates a text containing discourse, the only link between the (higher-level) communication within the text and the (lower-level) communication of author and public is the fact that (higher-level) textual discourse plus accompanying features together constitute the (lower-level) discourse of the author, in other words, the text. Assuming partial vertical relations between elements of the higher-level and lower-level communications invariably causes a short-circuit in literary analysis: for example, if a certain passage from the textual discourse is lifted from its level-content and related directly to assumed elements of the author's intention,<sup>71</sup> or if one participant in textual discourse is identified with the author.

As an illustration of this principle, let us consider the *Republic*. Here the lower-level discourse (in other words, the communication of Plato and his readers) is identical to the content of the first upper level, which consists of Socrates' narrative of the conversation he has had the previous day plus a few accompanying facts, e.g. that he relates it to an anonymous audience which he does not apostrophise and which does not react, that it is Socrates who relates it, etc. Now, short-circuit is caused e.g. by lifting a certain passage, say the proof of immortality in Book 10, out of its context and promoting it to an independent part of the author's message, in this case to the status of Plato's best argument on the subject at the time he wrote the *Republic*,

<sup>71</sup> A good case is Aristophanes' hiccups in *Smp.* Many interpreters connect this directly with an element in Plato's message (e.g. derision of Aristophanes), whereas the only acceptable method of analysis is to relate the passages in which the hiccups are mentioned to the whole of the dialogue – only then can an acceptable explanation be found (e.g. along the lines suggested by Friedländer, *Platon*, III 16: 'Indem Platon den Schluckenanfall erfindet, um den Aristophanes zum vierten statt zum dritten Redner zu machen, sind wir aufgefordert, ihn und seine Rede für einen Augenblick dort zu denken, wo er sie eigentlich hätte halten sollen').

or worse still, by simply identifying the literary character called Socrates with Plato. There is never a one-to-one relationship between one communicant of the higher-level discourse and one of the lower-level, even when they bear the same name or behave in the same way, or when the lower-level communicant refers to a higher-level communicant in the first person singular.<sup>72</sup>

So far we have illustrated the principle of identity of higher-level content to lower-level discourse and that of absence of other vertical relations only for the level of author and public; it also applies to distinct levels within a text. The content of the second upper level (in the *Republic*: Socrates' conversations, his reactions and those of his partners, the scenic background) is identical to the discourse of the first upper level (the report given by Socrates to his anonymous audience). The Socrates who tells the story is to be kept strictly apart from the Socrates who argues with Thrasymachus and projects a city with Glaucon and Adimantus. It stands to reason that the more important the first-upper-level communication of a particular dialogue, the more imperative it is to distinguish between communications of the first and second upper levels. (In the *Republic* the distinction is therefore relatively trivial, since there can hardly be said to be communication between the narrating Socrates and his silent audience.) In

<sup>72</sup> A classical case is the 'poet's I'. The communication between a poet and his public consists of a text, a number of concomitant features (such as a title, an author's indication, a situational context) and the interpretations, reactions etc. of the audience, if recoverable. If within the text a person calls himself 'I', there is upper-level discourse. Now this (upper-level) I is part of the level content (i.e. the text), which is the only thing which the poet is communicating. The ego and the poet belong to different levels. Whether or not the upper-level I is identified with the poet is a problem belonging to the interpretation(s) by the audience of the poet's intention. This is not to ignore the problem by splitting up the poet and the I but to put the poet's I where it belongs: in the (contemporary) reception of his poetry.

some dialogues, notably the *Euthydemus*, failure to distinguish between the levels in which a character is introduced as a participant in discourse can lead to gross errors of interpretation.<sup>73</sup> In all dialogues with more than two levels of discourse, attention should be paid to possible incongruences of homonymous characters in different levels.

In the *Clitophon* the second upper level consists of Clitophon's description of Socrates' protreptic speech and his own reactions to it and his questioning of Socrates' companions and of Socrates himself. It runs from 407a5 ἐγὼ γάρ to 410b4 ἀπειρήκηκα and is neatly sandwiched between introductory conversation and Clitophon's summing-up and last appeal, which (together with the content of the second upper level) constitute the first upper level.

### 1.5.2 *Socrates*

In the Platonic corpus, the necessity to distinguish between homonymous characters at different levels of discourse is probably nowhere more obvious than in the case of the Socrates figures in the *Clitophon*. As I have indicated above, these figures are characterised quite differently even to the point of mutual exclusion (section 1.3.2(2)). I may add here that the double character of Socrates is one of the main arguments for interpreting the *Clitophon* as a literary rather than a philosophical 'pamphlet', in other words, that the attack is directed at the literary character, not the historical person (section 1.1), since an attack on the historical Socrates would have been effective only if Socrates were

<sup>73</sup> Such as the one contained in the following statement by O. Apelt: 'Tritt den Sophisten Euthydemus und Dionysodorus gegenüber die Ironie des Sokrates mehr als ein Spiel der Klugheit auf, so zeigt sie sich von ihrer liebenswürdigsten Seite gegen seinen Freund und Gaugenossen Kriton' (*Platon Euthydemus* (Hamburg 1922<sup>2</sup>), 19; cf. also 21 n. 1. Otherwise Apelt offers a couple of useful remarks on the functioning of level distinction in *Euthd.*).



depicted with at least some consistency. It is in a way the most important argument inasmuch as it is wholly text-immanent – the methodological requirement that the *Clitophon* should be explained from itself has been satisfied.

Let us start with the Socrates of the first upper level, who manifests himself in the opening words, in his willingness to accept Clitophon's spiritual guidance and also in his silence at the end of Clitophon's speech. Thesleff (*Styles*, 157) says that Socrates 'is perhaps deliberately made stiff and formal'; for his two ῥήσεις this statement is correct. The opening words (406a1–4) Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἄριστωνύμου τις ἡμῖν διηγείτο ἔναγχος, ὅτι Λυσίαι διαλεγόμενος τὰς μὲν μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβὰς ψέγοι, τὴν Θρασυμάχου δὲ συνουσίαν ὑπερεπαινοῖ are unique in the *Corpus Platonicum*. Usually the first sentence of a dialogue<sup>74</sup> contains a vocative form. Exceptions are the *Cratylus* (where the vocative form is postponed for a few lines only), the *Symposium* (where Apollodorus' audience is too unimportant to become individual – it serves only to comment briefly on Apollodorus' character), the *Ion* (where τὸν Ἴωνα χάρειν is equivalent to a vocative) and the unauthentic dialogues *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Περὶ δικαίου*, *Περὶ ἀρετῆς*, where Socrates starts firing questions immediately.<sup>75</sup> The *Hippias Maior* and the *Menexenus* begin with names in the nominative, 'sozusagen als halb Abwesender präsentiert'.<sup>76</sup> This is half-way between a normal opening and Socrates' words in our dialogue, which introduce Socrates' partner in the accusative case in a sentence which provides all the 'scenic' background needed (the ambiguous ἡμῖν – cf. ad loc. – is made explicit by Clitophon: μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντες 406a10), and which states at the same time the subject of the dialogue.

<sup>74</sup> Excepting three-level dialogues where the audience of a narrator at the first upper level remains silent: *Chrm.*, *Ly.*, *R.*

<sup>75</sup> Cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 129–30; section 1.4.2(1).

<sup>76</sup> J. Svennung, *Anredeformen* (Uppsala 1958), 422.

The purpose of this singular exordium<sup>77</sup> is twofold: it states the subject-matter of the dialogue right at the beginning (as we have seen, this is normal practice in the Short Dialogue, section 1.4.2(4)) and it gives (as several scholars note) a highly formal character to Socrates' words. Quite apart from the indirect address there is the addition of the father's name, the disjunction of the proleptic accusative and the ὅτι clause,<sup>78</sup> the use of ἡμῖν for ἐμοί and the substitution of μετὰ Σωκράτους for μετ' ἐμοῦ. It appears from Clitophon's answer that he takes Socrates' formality as dissimulated pique (δηλὸς εἶ μεμφόμενος μὲν μοι, προσποιούμενος δὲ μηδὲν φροντίζειν 406a8–9). As Yxem saw ('Über Platon's Kleitophon', 14), Clitophon retorts the formality towards the end of the dialogue: θὲς τὸν Κλειτοφῶντα ὁμολογοῦντα (410d5).

I find Socrates' answer to Clitophon's words not so much formal as (ironically) humble; of course the two are compatible. A (possibly) formal trait is the fact that its two main clauses are nominal; the doublet ἀσκήσω καὶ διώξομαι is ironically formal and κατὰ κράτος is overt irony; ἀλλὰ . . . μὴν is certainly not a very formal idiom (cf. ad loc.), and the first person plural is abandoned.

The formality of the opening in itself could point to various states of mind. Clitophon had supposed that they concealed irritation; we are now invited to take them as

<sup>77</sup> The first parallel in Greek literature is Luc. *Lexiphanes*. This can be no argument against authenticity (so, among others, Schleiermacher, 453), because there is sufficient justification for the third person opening from the text itself. – Pavlu's explanation ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 7–8: Κλειτοφῶντα . . . ὑπερεπαινεῖ is the theme as set by the teacher; the pupil, obviously being too lazy to frame a beginning of its own, took it over verbatim) is ingenious but τις ἡμῖν διηγείτο ἔναγχος is inexplicable on these lines.

<sup>78</sup> The order proleptic accusative – main clause – subordinate clause is more typical of the written than of the spoken language, cf. my analysis in 'The birth of a written language: An exercise in the pragmatics of the Greek sentence', *CPh* 87 (1992) 95–109, esp. 105–8.

announcing Socrates' familiar deference towards his alleged betters. Synesius is partly right (though I think he rather missed Socrates' irony) in saying Κλειτοφῶν δὲ καὶ ἔλοιδόρησεν αὐτὸν ἐν Λυσίου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ<sup>79</sup> καὶ τὴν Θρασυμάχου συνουσίαν προὔτιμησε· Σωκράτης δὲ οὐδὲ πρὸς τοῦτο παρώξυντο, ἀλλὰ καὶ<sup>80</sup> τοῦτο Κλειτοφῶν κακῶς οἶεται (*Dio* 57d–58a = 2.170.12–16 Terzaghi).

A good parallel to these words of Socrates' is his invitation to Euthyphro: Πειρῶ δὴ καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ οὕτω διδάξαι . . . ἵνα καὶ Μελήτῳ λέγωμεν μηκέθ' ἡμᾶς ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ἀσεβείας γράφεσθαι, ὡς ἱκανῶς ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ μεμαθηκότας τά τε εὐσεβῆ καὶ ὄσια καὶ τὰ μὴ (12ε1–4). The same two assumptions which Socrates makes in the *Clitophon* are present here: (a) Euthyphro is able to teach Socrates; (b) having learned what things are εὐσεβῆ, Socrates will no longer be guilty of ἀσέβεια. Compare the analysis of 407a1–4 in section 1.3.2(1). There is a difference in situation: Euthyphro had been pompous and patronising all along, and Socrates had used his irony towards him almost from the beginning (compare the sentence just quoted with 5a3–9). Here Clitophon had said nothing that showed a pretension that he could make Socrates a better man (ὠφελεῖν); therefore the irony is slightly out of tune.<sup>81</sup> I think that the author had, nevertheless, a good reason to make Socrates ironical: he had to make clear somehow that Clitophon's attack was not directed at the historical Socrates, but at a literary character, namely the central figure of Socratic protreptic writings. His introduction of the ironical Socrates, who was typical of Plato (section 1.3.2 n. 22), at the first upper level shows that he was aware

<sup>79</sup> In Lysias' house? No. Even the ancients do not always read carefully: cf. Comm. on 406a2 Λυσία διαλεγόμενος.

<sup>80</sup> καὶ probably determines the complete sentence: 'that is precisely where Clitophon understands him wrongly' – the reference is to *Clit.* 406a8–9 προσποιούμενος δὲ μηδὲν φροντίζειν.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. also the more explicit passage *Ap.* 26a2–8.

of the existence of another, better, Socrates.<sup>82</sup> Within the limits set by the dialogue as a literary genre, this was the best he could do.

Clitophon's misunderstanding of Socrates' mood is functional: it appears at once that Socrates is not irritated, as he thought him to be; by constructing this misunderstanding the author draws extra attention towards the ironical Socrates and in doing so provides an extra key to the intention of the *Clitophon*. In its turn, the formality of Socrates' first words can be better understood now: Clitophon's faulty diagnosis δῆλος εἶ μεμφόμενος μὲν μοι had to be based on an opening which admitted of this interpretation but which also left room for the subsequent appearance of the Platonic Socrates.

If this analysis is right, the author constructed the prooemium very carefully indeed. His choice of the Short Dialogue certainly did not hamper him in clarifying the intention of this dialogue through an ably managed, if sketchy, characterisation.

Socrates' silence at the end of the dialogue has been explained in another connection (section I.3.2(3)). The consequence of this silence is that the Platonic Socrates of the first upper level is hinted at in the prooemium and vanishes from sight after 407a4. As the author wanted to criticise a non-Platonic Socrates by means of Platonic methods of argument, this was a desirable side-effect. It also means that the content of the second upper level has virtually ceased to function as discourse in the first upper level since one of the two communicants of the first upper level is fading away into a 'dummy' element. After the prooemium, Clitophon's role resembles that of the 'poet's I'; his description of Socrates' speech and his own reactions, and

<sup>82</sup> It is immaterial whether or not the author thought that the literary character Socrates as found in Plato was a true image of the historical figure. Personally I am not even sure Plato thought so.

of his subsequent questioning, is destined not so much for the first upper-level Socrates to react on them, as for the readers of the dialogue to interpret them – in other words, after the prooemium Clitophon becomes a narrator similar to Socrates in, say, the *Republic*.

On the second upper level, the character called Socrates remains rather sketchy and abstract (like the first upper-level namesake) for all the space devoted to him. We learn that he repeatedly (cf. Comm. on 407a6 πολλάκις) delivers a certain exhortatory speech, which is quoted in full, as well as other similar speeches (408b6 ἑτέροις τοιούτοις); furthermore, that he gave a definition of the result of justice which proved wrong – it is hinted that he repeatedly failed in that way (410b3–4 ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἄπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλὰ πολὺν δὴ ὑπομείνας χρόνον). Stylistically he is left uncharacterised, even in the protreptic speech; Thesleff (*Styles*, 157–8) finds no trace of ‘conscious burlesque’ in it. Though the opening words ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὦνθρωποι; refute his statement in its absolute form, it is true that there are hardly any Gorgianisms (no poeticisms after ποῖ φέρεσθε, no isocola or rhetorical antitheses), although there certainly are quite a few rhetorical features in the larger sense of the word (cf. Comm. on 407b1–e2). But are we justified in expecting burlesque? Plato’s parodies ran always true to nature (a signal example is, of course, the alleged speech by Lysias in the *Phaedrus*) and if, for example, Socrates’ first speech in the *Phaedrus* is full of burlesque whereas this one is not, we must recall that the former is a parody of an epideictic speech, a genre to which protreptic speeches did not belong (cf. nn. 109 and 111). One must also bear in mind that the author wishes to point out the danger of protreptic literature – a Gorgianic Socrates would lose contact with reality and would therefore become less dangerous.

The most un-Platonic feature of this Socrates is not his exhorting others instead of questioning them – exhorting

others is one of the two aspects of Socrates' φιλοσοφεῖν mentioned in the *Apology* (29d5), though Plato rarely depicts him doing it (cf. section II.3.3)<sup>83</sup> – nor this exhortatory speech in itself (as we shall see, all the elements of the exhortations reported in the *Apology* return in the speech in the *Clitophon*, cf. sections II.2.3.1 and 2): what is really un-Platonic is his addressing this speech to a crowd. In the *Apology*, Plato takes care to stress that the exhortations are directed at individuals (cf. 29d5–6 ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενος τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν;<sup>84</sup> 36c5 ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν).<sup>85</sup> We do find it occasionally in other Socratic literature: Xenophon reports two exhortatory speeches addressed to an audience of more than one person: 1.5 (note ὧ ἄνδρες) and 1.7,<sup>86</sup> but even there, the audience consists of his companions.

<sup>83</sup> In principle, one might therefore accept Rutherford's claim (*Art of Plato*, 100) that the Socrates of the *Clitophon* is the Platonic Socrates throughout. In the *Apology*, the protreptic Socrates is, I suggest, Plato's comment on the elenctic Socrates (see section II.3.3), and the same could be true – again, in principle – of the protreptic Socrates in the *Clitophon*. But among other things, Rutherford's interpretation fails to account for the fact that Socrates' exhortatory speeches are addressed to crowds.

<sup>84</sup> The position of τε proves that ὅτῳ depends from παρακελευόμενος as well as from ἐνδεικνύμενος, so that the ὅτῳ clause is a restrictive apposition to ὑμῖν (cf. Adam ad loc.).

<sup>85</sup> Cf. Th. Meyer, *Apologie*, 102–3 and n. 107; de Strycker–Slings, *Apolo-gy*, 133; 151.

<sup>86</sup> That these speeches are exhortatory appears from their position in Book 1: at 1.4.1 Xenophon states that Socrates was capable of προαγαγεῖν as well as προτρέψασθαι not only through his elenctic questioning (ἔρωτων ἤλεγχεν) but also in view of ἃ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι. 1.4 and 1.6 are examples of ἔλεγχος as a means of making better (i.e. προαγαγεῖν: cf. 1.4.19 and 1.6.14). 1.5 and 1.7 are examples of speeches addressed to his συνόντες; cf. 1.5.1 ἐπισκεψώμεθα εἴ τι πρὸς βίβασε λέγων εἰς ταύτην τοιάδε: ὧ ἄνδρες κτλ.; 1.7.1 ἐπισκεψώμεθα δὲ εἰ καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἀποτρέπων τοὺς συνόντας ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπεν; 1.7.5 ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἐδόκει καὶ τοῦ ἀλαζονεύεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν τοὺς συνόντας τοιάδε διαλεγόμενος; cf. Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 151. I disagree with the analysis of Gigon

If my interpretation of the *Clitophon* as an attack on protreptic *writings* is correct, this remarkable feature is understandable: like Socrates, the written λόγος addresses itself to a crowd consisting both of *color che sanno* and of those who have no business with it (ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἐπαῖουσιν, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, *Phaedrus* 275e1–2). What at first sight appears to be a gross deviation from Plato's literary practice, is from this point of view in complete harmony with it (see sections II.3.5; II.6).

I do not intend to go beyond Socrates, the literary character appearing in the works of Plato, Xenophon and others, to Socrates the historical figure, the Athenian philosopher who died 399 BCE. The *Clitophon* is so exclusively dependent on the former that the interesting question whether the latter was indeed at times an exhorter towards virtue<sup>87</sup> is irrelevant for its interpretation.

### 1.5.3 *Clitophon*

The first upper-level character of this name is more easily grasped than his opponent Socrates is at this level. When accosted with what he takes as irritation, Clitophon explains his position quietly, tells Socrates to his face that his attitude is taken by him as irritation, and misplaced irritation at that, and offers to talk the matter out. When Socrates reacts with irony, this young man attacks him immediately with his own weapon (though he is more obviously ironical than Socrates; see Comm. on 407a6 ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων). That Socrates is treated ironically by one

(*Memorabilien* I, 121; 151), who takes 1.4–5 as illustrations of 'belehren', 1.6–7 as illustrations of elenchos, and with that of Erbse, 'Architektonik', 323–7, who interprets 1.4–2.1 as examples of Socrates' (protreptic–didactic) λέγειν throughout. Cf. section II.1.4.1.

<sup>87</sup> So especially H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 296–305 and passim; on the value of the *Clit.* for the historical figure 286–7. More recently: R. Cushman, *Therapeia* (Chapel Hill 1958), 3–29; L. Rossetti, 'Θεράπεια in the minor Socratics', *ΘΠ* 3 (1974) 145–57.

who is obviously younger is pretty unique.<sup>88</sup> Irony at the same time constitutes the framework of the reported speech.<sup>89</sup> The report is announced in 407a5–b1, interrupted in 407e3–4 and terminated in 408b5–c4: the first of these sentences is full of irony, in the second only a couple of stylistic markers indicate it (cf. Comm. on 407e4), in the third, it is clearly present (less so than in the first but decidedly more than in the second sentence; cf. Comm. on 408b5–c4). This fluctuation goes parallel with the degree of burlesque in the speech itself: rather heavy in the first sentence (ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὤνθρωποι;) practically absent from the last sentence of the *oratio recta* and the first one of the *oratio obliqua*; present to some extent in the closing sentence of the whole speech (cf. Comm. on 408a4–b5).

In the rest of Clitophon's report, I detect irony only in the introduction of Socrates' companions (408c5–7 τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τε καὶ συνεπιθυμητῶν ἢ ἐταίρων σῶν ἢ ὅπως δεῖ πρὸς σέ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀνομάζειν); also in the case of the two anonymous companions of Socrates who volunteer an answer to questions of Clitophon: 409a4 ὁ δὴ δοκῶν αὐτῶν ἐρρωμενέστατος εἶναι and 409d3–4 ὁ δὲ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν (cf. ad loc.). There is no irony elsewhere in the report (with the possible exception of 410b5 κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων). The summing-up and last appeal are in deadly earnest.

The consistency of this character (an unabashed young<sup>90</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Cf. Steinhart (51); Bertini (457–8), who wrongly consider this a mark of inauthenticity.

<sup>89</sup> This belongs to the second upper level, but I treat it here because (a) it would be pedantic to sever Clitophon's reported (second upper-level) reaction to Socrates from his (first upper-level) reaction in direct speech, (b) the role of irony at both levels for both characters is crucial for the interpretation, (c) some of Clitophon's statements in the report do belong to the first upper level, cf. 407e4; 408c1–4.

<sup>90</sup> The epithet is more or less traditional; I use it because a young man would be more interested in the relative values of συνουσία of Socrates and Thrasymachus than an older one, and also because in the



man, who, when struck, hits back hard) is the more amazing since it is fully conditioned by the development of Socrates' character at this level as set out in the previous section. Some scholars draw a parallel between Clitophon's behaviour here and that of Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1. If this is meant to imply that Clitophon's audacity is due to the influence of Thrasymachus, the proposition is of a doubtful value (literary characters have no existence outside a literary text). Though one should read πορεύομαι and not πορεύσομαι at 410c7 (cf. ad loc.), which means that Clitophon is at the moment a pupil or visitor of Thrasymachus, the words καὶ ἄλλοσε suggest that he is not going to be an orthodox disciple.<sup>91</sup> Brünnecke ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 463 n. 38) asks: 'Liegt nicht in dem "καὶ" usw. schon der Nebengedanke "Thrasymachos [*sic*] ist möglicherweise unfähig"? Erscheint nicht damit der Ausblick auf etwas Höheres, auf die Akademie?' The answer to the first question is affirmative (despite Souilhé's scepticism, 180 n. 3). If one assumes – reasons for which shall be given below and in section II.5.5 – that the *Clitophon* was written after *Republic* 1, the reader knows that Clitophon will find no knowledge (and a couple of very objectionable ideas) about justice in Thrasymachus' teaching. As Clitophon is obviously the hero, not the villain, of the dialogue, an allusion that he is not walking towards his doom is necessary. The allusion is reinforced by ἀπορῶν (410c8), which suggests dissatisfaction with Thrasymachus and the unnamed others. (Brünnecke's second question suggests too much. The Academy could have been symbolised only by Socrates, who stays condemned. The 'Ausblick auf etwas Höheres' is in fact provided by Clitophon himself.)

*Republic* the younger pair Polemarchus–Clitophon matches the older pair Socrates–Thrasymachus.

<sup>91</sup> Note the use of πορεύομαι πρὸς τινὰ instead of the technical φοιτάω: Clitophon is apparently not a regular pupil.

In harmony with this dissatisfaction is Clitophon's 'last appeal' (410c8–e5). We have seen (section 1.3.2(1)) that on the lower level (that of the author framing a text) this appeal is destined to remain fruitless. Yet on the level with which we are now concerned, the appeal is quite sincere. Clitophon's words remain crisp (cf. esp. 410d4–5 καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτόν γιγνέσθω<sup>92</sup>), but there is no more irony. Likewise, irony is absent from Clitophon's final appraisal of Socrates' exhortation (410d5–e1): when again he shows his agreement with it (especially with its first two parts, witness τῶν . . . ἄλλων d6) the irony of the report (ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων; θαυμαστώως ὡς ἐπαινῶ; παμπόλλοις καὶ παγκάλως λεγομένοις) is absent. The purpose of the *Clitophon* (to translate this first-upper-level feature in terms of the lower level) is to deride protreptic Socratic literature, not to suggest that the statements found in that literature are nonsense. This appraisal of these statements had to be made clear somehow, and when the author keeps irony and earnest wide apart from each other, he does manage to make it clear<sup>93</sup> (see also section II.4.3).

Let us now pass to the second upper-level Clitophon, who appears in two different settings. In a conversation with Lysias<sup>94</sup> he is said to have blamed Socrates and

<sup>92</sup> For the imperative, cf. 409a3; d2 as discussed below. The anacoluthon contained in 410c8–d5 brings the advantage that the logical sequel ('I would gladly return to you'), which is rather too humble, can be replaced by a (more characteristic) command. I have for some time entertained the thought that the two anacolutha 410b6–c5 and c8–d5 have quite a different characterising function: entering the stage of summing up his criticism to Socrates' face, Clitophon gets cold feet and starts stammering. But there is no shyness in Clitophon's report of his discussions with Socrates (410a7–b4 ἀπίρηκα) nor in the rest of his appeal and his final conclusion (d5–e8).

<sup>93</sup> For another way of showing agreement with statements first derided, cf. sections II.4.2; II.6.

<sup>94</sup> It is clear that Clitophon and Lysias had not been alone, cf. 410e4–5 πρὸς Λυσίαν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους: someone had to report Clitophon's criticism to Socrates. It was necessary for the author to insert

praised Thrasymachus.<sup>95</sup> This is subsequently corrected: Clitophon had both praise and blame for Socrates. The correction causes the dialogue to concentrate on Socrates; Thrasymachus vanishes from sight to reappear only towards the end of the dialogue.<sup>96</sup> Yet it is significant that he has been mentioned: the reader will interpret Clitophon's philosophical career in connection with Thrasymachus' name (cf. below).

Clitophon reappears at this level when questioning Socrates' companions and Socrates himself. His character resembles the first upper-level Clitophon, but the accents are different. Irony is present in his apostrophe ὦ βέλτιστοι . . . ὑμεῖς (408d1–2), which at the same time echoes Socrates' apostrophe ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὠνθρωποι (cf. ad loc.), perhaps in the plural ἀποδεχόμεθα (408d2; cf. ad loc.), but hardly anywhere else. On the other hand, the crisp tone is more marked. All his questions (408d1–409a3; 409a7–c1; c4–d2) end up in an imperative: λεγέσθω, εἰπέ, λεγέσθω; of these, the first two are remarkable inasmuch as they are used as self-contained sentences following a question (this is rare in Plato's authentic works; cf. Comm. ad 409a3 λεγέσθω). There is a note of impatience towards the pupils

the detail that the criticism was uttered in a private conversation: without the words Λυσίαι διαλεγόμενος (406a2) the meaning could be that Clitophon uttered his evaluation of Socrates and Thrasymachus before a large audience.

<sup>95</sup> Strictly speaking this is not the second but the third upper level: τις ἡμῖν διηγείτο represents the second.

<sup>96</sup> One may compare formally Alcibiades in *Smp.*: his name is mentioned in the first announcement of [a] participants, [b] scene and [c] subject of the dialogue in 172a7–b3 τὴν Ἀγάθωνος συνουσίαν καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων [a] τῶν τότε ἐν τῷ συνδείπνῳ παραγενομένων [b] περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν λόγων τίνες ἦσαν [c]. Though Alcibiades makes his appearance only late in the dialogue, by mentioning him here Plato causes him to be latently present for the reader throughout the text. Cf. Friedländer, *Platon*, III 4.

which can be expected from someone who is none too reverent towards the master.

The way in which Clitophon manages the questioning is stated by himself to be after Socrates' manner (ἐπανηρώτων, πυνηθάνομενος τίς ὁ μετὰ ταῦτ' εἶη λόγος, καὶ κατὰ σὲ τρόπον τινὰ ὑποτείνων αὐτοῖς, 408c9–d1). The participle ὑποτείνων, which has not been understood hitherto, means 'demonstrating', 'leading on' (cf. ad loc.), and refers to the analogy from the care of the body (408e3–409a2). Only in this way can the words κατὰ σέ be fully understood. It is not just Socratic questioning which Clitophon has in mind, but a very specific feature of it, to wit the use of analogies as steps in ἐπαγωγή. Analogy is used as profusely by the second-upper-level Clitophon (apart from the one already mentioned, cf. 409b1–6, the distinction of ἔργον and δίδαγμα in medicine and carpentry; c7–d1, the meaning of συμφέρον, δέον etc. as applied to the ἔργα of carpentry) as by his first-upper-level namesake<sup>97</sup> (cf. section II.6).

At the lower level, the reader is supposed to infer from the signal κατὰ σέ that Clitophon will play the part which in other dialogues is normally assigned to Socrates – this expectation in the reader (which will be fulfilled completely) is strengthened by the use of a curious device. Instead of asking right away what he asks at 408e2–3 (πῶς ἄρχεσθαι δεῖν φάμεν δικαιοσύνης πέρι μαθήσεως;) Clitophon makes a curious detour by first putting forward a dilemma: is exhortation to virtue an end in itself or is the pursuit of virtue the logical consequence of a completed exhortation? The phrasing of the first horn of the dilemma may help in explaining why it has been put forward at all: ἡμῖν παρὰ πάντα δὴ τὸν βίον ἔργον τοῦτ' ἔσται, τοὺς

<sup>97</sup> It is probably this feature which earned Clitophon the epithet 'verbose', accorded by Thesleff, *Styles*, 157.

μήπω προτετραμμένους προτρέπειν, καὶ ἐκείνους αὖ ἐτέρους (408d5–6). This suggests a *regressus ad infinitum* (henceforth to be called ‘circular regress’), and more particularly, the circular regress found in the *Euthydemus* in Socrates’ second conversation with Clinias as carried on with Crito: οἱ τί ἔσονται ἡμῖν ἀγαθοὶ καὶ τί χρήσιμοι; ἢ ἔτι λέγωμεν ὅτι ἄλλους ποιήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι ἐκείνοι ἄλλους; ὅτι δέ ποτε ἀγαθοὶ εἰσιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἡμῖν φαίνονται (292d8–e1).

In the *Euthydemus* the phrasing is a consequence of the application to men of the circular regress, which is characteristic of that dialogue (as of the *Charmides*): the only ἀγαθόν is σοφία; the result of σοφία must be an ἀγαθόν (in this case ἀγαθούς ποιεῖν); therefore the result of σοφία is σοφία.<sup>98</sup> The circular regress results in an aporia, which is formally recognised as such (νῆ τὸν Δία ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς πολλήν γε ἀπορίαν ὡς ἔοικεν ἀφίκεσθε, 292e6–7; sections II.3.4; II.4.3).

A similar circular regress is found further on in the *Clitophon*: 410a2 περιεδράμηκεν εἰς ταῦτόν ὁ λόγος τοῖς πρώτοις. In that place the regress is highly functional as a means of reaching aporia (signalled as in the *Euthydemus*: 409e10 Ὅτε δὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἀποροῦντες); it will be examined in section II.4.3. Here, a circular regress is logically out of place. Socrates’ προτρεπτικός had been an exhortation *to* something (stated in so many words: 408d2–3 τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπήν ἡμῶν ἐπ’ ἀρετήν); a complete regress is not reached unless it is proved (*quod non*) that the end of an exhortation is exhortation itself.

It may be argued, however, that this circular regress has a very good artistic function: it introduces Clitophon’s questioning of Socrates’ pupils, just as the regress terminates it. Though this may seem a curious way of using a

<sup>98</sup> See also *R.* 505b5–c4 and Adam’s note; Goldschmidt, *Dialogues*, 79–81.

device of Platonic elenchos for what could be called a programmatic purpose, it makes clear once more that Clitophon is going to behave in a typically Socratic way. This may even be narrowed down to ‘a typically Platonic way’: whereas the use of analogy is generally Socratic, the use of circular regress is more specifically Platonic. Besides, both subject-matter (protreptic) and formulation recall the passage from the *Euthydemus*. The author takes the trouble to make it clear that this Clitophon is the real Socrates, and in passing shows that he has a good idea of what the Platonic method is all about.<sup>99</sup>

Clitophon’s respondents at this level are hardly more than an anonymous group, though they are most highly valued by Socrates himself (408c8). Some of them acquire substance for the sake of the discussion. As we saw, they are introduced with some irony, and they dissolve into nothingness as soon as the author has no more use for them. The author underlines this status of Clitophon and his ‘dummy’ partners in the manner of reporting. Clitophon’s own words are in *oratio recta* throughout, whereas his opponents are reported in the most formal *oratio obliqua* with a preference for optatives and infinitives. There is no *dialogue*.<sup>100</sup> Typically, in the discussion about friendship as the result of justice (which would have required direct speech from Clitophon and indirect speech from the opponent), the confrontation is avoided by leaving unmen-

<sup>99</sup> Xenophon occasionally makes use of Platonic traits, e.g. in *Oec.* 19.15 ἄρα ἔφην ὦ Ἰσχύμαχε ἡ ἐρώτησις διδασκαλία ἐστίν; ἄρτι γὰρ δὴ ἔφην ἐγὼ καταμανθάνω ἢ με ἐπηρώτησας ἕκαστα· ἄγων γὰρ με δι’ ὧν ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι, ὁμοία τούτοις ἐπιδεικνύς ἃ οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἐπίστασθαι ἀναπείθεις οἶμαι ὡς καὶ ταῦτα ἐπίσταμαι (cf. Guthrie, *HGPh*, III 337, who overlooks the fact that the answer to these questions is negative). But compared with him, our author has a far better understanding of Plato’s handling of the dialogue.

<sup>100</sup> Hence probably the statement (409b1) ἰατρικὴ πού τις λέγεται τέχνη, where the more normal questioning form (cf. ad loc.) would smack of dialogue.

tioned who asked the questions (hence 409d6 ἐρωτώμενος; 9 ἐπανερωτώμενος; συνέβαινε ... αὐτῶι; e5 ἐρωτώμενος; 6 ἠναγκάζοντο), so that the discussion can be reported in *oratio obliqua* throughout. The definitive refutation is in direct speech (410a3–6), but (a) it marks the end of a major part of Clitophon's report; (b) it is the group as a whole (οἱ παρόντες, 410a1) which is speaking. In harmony with the general tendency of the report is the curious twist in the sentence εἶπέν μοι ... δικαιοσύνην (409a5–6; cf. ad loc.): a ὅτι clause instead of the accusative and infinitive after εἶπέν μοι would already have bordered on direct speech and broken the pattern of anonymity.

The situation is different in the report of Clitophon's discussion with Socrates. As was the case with the last pupil, it is not stated directly that the questions are asked by Clitophon, but here the whole report of the discussion has been cut out; only the outcome (and the principal argument) are mentioned in the most impersonal form possible: 410b1–3 ὕστερον δὲ ἐφάνη βλάπτειν γε οὐδέποτε ὁ δίκαιος οὐδένα· πάντα γὰρ ἐπ' ὠφελίαι πάντας δρᾶν. Of course, Clitophon would have no need to report in full a conversation which Socrates probably remembered as well (though the next sentence implies repeated conversations). Yet by reporting it as drily as possible he contrives a minimum loss of face on Socrates' part. At the author/reader level the shortness of the whole episode provokes a concomitant reaction: attention is focused more on the shortcomings of the companions, less on those of Socrates himself (see also sections II.4.2 and 3).

Having examined the functioning of the literary character Clitophon at both upper levels in this text we may proceed to the only other Platonic text in which he plays a role, the *Republic*. He is named there, as here, with his father's name, among those present at 328b7, and the word order seems to suggest that he was in the company of Thrasymachus and one Charmantides of Paeania. We

meet him again, and for the last time, after the first phase of the debate of Socrates and Thrasymachus. Socrates has forced Thrasymachus to admit that leaders sometimes err in perceiving what is for their own benefit, so that sometimes τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀσύμφορον (339e7) is just. Polemarchus breaks in with (unnecessary) assent and Clitophon reacts immediately with an unkind personal remark. In the following skirmish the gist of Socrates' remark is repeated and Clitophon tries to save Thrasymachus by suggesting that by 'the stronger's interest' Thrasymachus had really meant 'that which the stronger believes to be in his own interest' (340a1–b8). Thrasymachus rejects this amendment and finds another way out: the ruler (= stronger), *qua* ruler, does not err – when a ruler errs, he is strictly speaking not a ruler (340c6–341a4). It is clear that the Polemarchus–Clitophon episode serves two purposes. (a) It glosses over the argument once again; (b) it gives Plato the opportunity to offer two different solutions for Thrasymachus without making the situation dramatically improbable (Plato could not very well have made Thrasymachus utter both possibilities himself). Consequently, Clitophon's function is wholly explicable from the needs of the dialogue itself – his role in the *Clitophon* does not in any way illuminate his role in the *Republic*.

On the other hand, the choice of Clitophon as the main character in our dialogue is certainly more illuminating if *Republic* 1 is taken into consideration. Wishing to be instructed in justice, towards which Socrates is constantly exhorting others, Clitophon was disappointed when he turned towards Socrates' pupils and Socrates, and he expects much from Thrasymachus. The reader who is acquainted with the *Republic* knows that Thrasymachus will corrupt him beyond healing. The author's intention seems clear enough: Socratic protreptic is the more dangerous as it drives honest and intelligent young people into the arms of false teachers like Thrasymachus. (The function, in this



respect, of the words καὶ ἄλλοσε, 410c7, and of Clitophon's last appeal has been treated above.) If the *Clitophon* predates *Republic* I, the character of Clitophon in the latter is not influenced by the former; if it is the other way round, there certainly is an important extra point in the message of the *Clitophon*. From a dramatic point of view, the order *Republic* I – *Clitophon* makes much more sense than the reverse one. As we shall see (section II.5), a comparison of the definitions of the ἔργον of justice in the *Clitophon* with statements in *Republic* I points the same way.

Finally a few words on the historical Clitophon, if indeed Clitophon, son of Aristonymus, is identical to the Athenian politician who in 411 (probably early May) proposed that a committee consisting of the ten πρόβουλοι and twenty others (such a committee had already been proposed by Pythodorus) should not only bring in proposals for the safety of Athens but should also examine Clithenes' πάτριοι νόμοι; Clitophon thought (or professed to think) that these were not democratic. The story is told by Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 29.3); the Pythodorus decree is alluded to by Thucydides (8.67.1).<sup>101</sup> A second time Clitophon is mentioned in the constitutional struggle between the surrender of Athens (April 404) and the institution of the Thirty (September 404). Aristotle (34.3) opposes δημοτικοί and γνῶριμοι (oligarchs) and among the latter distinguishes on the one side members of ἑταιρεῖαι and returned fugitives, who were radicals (ὀλιγαρχίας ἐπεθύμουν), on the other, those not united in ἑταιρεῖαι who strove after the πάτριος πολιτεία. A number of politicians of this conviction are mentioned; among them are Anytus (who was subsequently banished together with Thrasybulus, and

<sup>101</sup> Cf. J. Bibauw, 'L'amendement de Clitophon', *AC* 34 (1965) 464–83; M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law: Law, Society, and Politics in Fifth-Century Athens* (Berkeley–Los Angeles 1986), 369–72; M. A. Levi and P. J. Rhodes on *Ath. Pol.* loc. cit.

with the latter restored democracy in 403) and Clitophon; the head of this party (προειστήκει δὲ μάλιστα) was Theramenes. Clitophon's association with Theramenes in this period is also hinted at in the *Frogs*, where Euripides claims as his disciples Clitophon and 'Theramenes the smart' (967).<sup>102</sup> The Clitophon named in a fragment of Lysias' speech Ὑπὲρ Δεξιῶ ἄποστασίου (fr. 26 Scheibe) as involved in a process may or may not be identical to the politician.

Orwin ('Case against Socrates', 743–4) raises the interesting point that Clitophon's track-record as an Athenian politician fits his role in *Republic* 1: there, he is the representative of legal justice. 'He asserts what Socrates gets Thrasymachos to deny, that the will of the rulers is beyond appeal. . . . In never wavering from his interested attachment to legal justice, he is the sole character in the *Republic* who stands first and last for the city as it is. That is another way of formulating his obvious enmity toward Socrates, the questioner par excellence of the authority of the laws of the city.' The point should certainly be taken by future commentators of *Republic* 1, but I do not see that it is relevant to its derivative, the *Clitophon*. For the latter, it is plainly false to speak of Clitophon's 'enmity' towards Socrates – also, there is no indication in our dialogue of Socrates' questioning the laws of the city.

The question whether or not the historical Clitophon had anything to do with Thrasymachus is immaterial for the interpretation of the *Clitophon*, because the association

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Ostwald, op. cit. (n. 101), 469–72. Remarkably enough, Phormios, who is named (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3) as another member of Theramenes' party, is classed by Aristophanes (with one Megaenetus) as disciple of Aeschylus (965). 'Es geht also die Schilderung des Euripides nicht auf den Unterschied in der politischen Richtung, sondern vielmehr in Character und in der Lebensanschauung' (L. Radermacher, *Aristophanes' 'Frösche'* (Vienna 1954<sup>2</sup>), 282). But the vicissitudes of the war may have united in 404 politicians who were diametrically opposed in the spring of 405.

belongs to the data of *Republic* 1. Commentators on the *Republic* have not bothered to pursue the question; only Souilhé has given the matter any amount of thought (167–9).<sup>103</sup>

We know too little about the ages of Clitophon (born before 430) and Thrasymachus (dates quite uncertain but he is probably referred to as a teacher of rhetoric in Aristophanes' *Δαιταλῆς* (fr. 205.8 K.–A.), which was produced in 427) to pass judgement on the value of the datum (absent from the *Republic*) that Clitophon was young enough to be the pupil of Thrasymachus. As Thrasymachus is usually associated in our sources with members of the older generation of sophists (Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias), this seems perfectly possible.

## II MEANING AND AUTHENTICITY

In this second section of the Introduction I shall try first to draw a picture of philosophical protreptic in the fourth century BCE (II.1), secondly to confront the results with Socrates' speech reported in the *Clitophon* (II.2). Given the lack of an up-to-date comprehensive treatment of philosophical protreptic in antiquity (the only monograph on this subject is Hartlich's dissertation from 1889, 'De exhortationum . . . historia'), I am forced to sum up the re-

<sup>103</sup> His answer is affirmative, for two main reasons: (1) A number of Clitophon's associates named at Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3, including Theramenes himself, are known to have been interested in rhetoric and to have had connections with sophists. For Clitophon, the context of the *Frogs* passage, especially 954–8, makes this plausible; yet it must be borne in mind that at least one of Clitophon's fellow-oligarchs, Anytus, proved himself vehemently opposed to the sophists. (2) The *πάτριος πολιτεία* is advocated in a fragment of Thrasymachus (78 B 1 = Radermacher, *Artium scriptores*, 74, line 14); but it is rather a vague slogan, and the speech is probably epideictic, or perhaps, as some scholars assume with too much confidence, it was written for a client (cf. *HGPh*, III 296; Ostwald, 367).

sults of my studies on this subject; considerations of space forbid any kind of extensive argumentation.

It may be thought that in thus concentrating on protreptic literature I am begging the question: one might expect a proof of my thesis that the Socrates who is made the target of our dialogue is not the philosopher himself but more or less a symbol of protreptic. The answer to this objection may be found partly in the analysis of the characterisation of Socrates in the *Clitophon* (section 1.5.2), partly in the comparison of that work with protreptic literature which is contained in section II.2 of this Introduction.

As the *Clitophon* has been transmitted among the works of Plato, the attitude of that philosopher to protreptic will be studied next (II.3); it will be shown that Plato's alternative to protreptic is the dialogue, especially the complex of interrogation and aporia which he calls ἔλεγχος. It has therefore been necessary to explore the use which is made of elenchos in the *Clitophon* (II.4). The statements about justice in our dialogue will be treated separately (II.5).

The conclusions reached in this and the previous sections will be summed up in order to determine the author's intention (II.6); only then can the question of authenticity be settled (II.7).

## II.1 Philosophical protreptic in the fourth century BCE

### II.1.1 Definitions

A text may be called protreptic if its design is to cause a change in the behaviour of those for whom it is destined, or if within the text one character endeavours to cause such a change in another character or characters. Thus, Isocrates' *Philippus* is an appeal to that king to benefit the Greeks by uniting them and leading them against the Persians; we are entitled to call it a protreptic text because of Isocrates' announcement that he is going to send Philip

λόγον ... οὐκ ἐπίδειξιν ποιησόμενον οὐδ' ἐγκωμιασόμενον ... ἀλλὰ πειρασόμενόν σε προτρέπειν (5.17; cf. 116). Similarly, Socrates' two conversations with Clinias reported in Plato's *Euthydemus* may be called protreptic: their aim is to convince Clinias of the necessity of caring for wisdom and virtue (278d3-5) and thereby to impel him to acquire them (cf. 282d1-2); again the text itself characterises the first of these conversations as an 'example of protreptic speech' (282d4-6).

In a stricter sense, 'protreptic' is applied to texts which are intended to impel the readers to pursue a certain study, or in which a character or characters are impelled to do so. The pseudo-Isocratean pamphlet *Ad Demonicum* refers to certain 'protreptic speeches' which exhort people to (presumably) rhetoric (1.3-4); again, Isocrates makes some disparaging remarks about philosophers who by exhorting others to virtue (τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην προσποιουμένων προτρέπειν) try to acquire pupils (ἐπαγαγέσθαι τινὰς ... εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν ὁμιλίαν; 15.84-5).

I call 'philosophical protreptic' all protreptic texts in the two senses defined above which belong to philosophical literature, in other words: philosophical protreptic in the wider sense includes all texts written by philosophers or inspired by philosophy which aim at a change of conduct in the readers or characters of these texts (usually in the field of ethics); philosophical protreptic in the stricter sense denotes the texts which incite to the study of philosophy.

From the hellenistic period onwards, the distinction between philosophical protreptic in the wider and in the stricter senses corresponds to a well-established difference in genre: in the wider sense, it is represented mainly by the diatribe,<sup>104</sup> in the stricter sense by what is normally called

<sup>104</sup> I am fully aware of the dangers inherent in this term, which are pointed out at length in Th. Schmeller's stimulating study *Paulus und*

protreptic *tout court*.<sup>105</sup> But in the fourth century BCE this distinction does not obtain, witness the last passage of Isocrates quoted above: here the exhortations are to specific virtues (wider sense), but their aim is stated at the same time to be to induce readers to the pursuit of philosophy (stricter sense). The *Euthydemus* confirms this: the wider and stricter senses are often juxtaposed (e.g. 275a6 φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἄρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι). Inasmuch as in Socratic philosophy theory and practice (knowledge and right action) coincide, the blurring of this distinction is hardly surprising.

Another distinction which in the course of my study I have found profitable is that between ‘explicit’ and ‘implicit’ protreptic (both in the wider and the stricter sense of ‘protreptic’). Any argument, description of behaviour, apology, myth or other type of philosophical text can be designed to cause its readers or characters to change their moral conduct or to pursue philosophy. I call ‘explicit protreptic’ all texts which purport to state, prove or convince by other methods that one must adopt a certain line of behaviour or pursue philosophy; all texts which have a similar intention but in which these aims are achieved indirectly will be called ‘implicit protreptic’. Thus, in the first conversation of Socrates and Clinias mentioned above, Socrates starts from the ἔνδοξον that all men desire to be

*die ‘Diatribē’*. *Eine vergleichende Stilinterpretation* (Münster 1987) 1–54; the problem is of course that nearly every piece of non-technical philosophical prose is given this label by many modern scholars. Furthermore, there is no ancient theory of the diatribe, as there is of protreptic. Yet explicit exhortation to virtue or to specific virtues unquestionably existed. For a recent attempt at delimitation of the term, cf. D. M. Schenkeveld, ‘Philosophical prose’, in: S. E. Porter, *Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. – A.D. 400* (Leiden 1997), 230–47; bibliographical data in notes 134 and 135 to his p. 230.

<sup>105</sup> Though a diatribe by Epictetus is quoted by an author as late as Stobaeus as Ἐκ τῶν Ἀρριανοῦ Προτρεπτικῶν ὁμιλιῶν (4.33.28 = 5.807 W.-H.; fr. 11 Schenkl), cf. Hartlich, ‘De exhortationum ... historia’, 310.

happy and via various (not always very convincing) steps arrives at the conclusion that in order to be happy one must try and acquire wisdom, i.e. philosophise. This is explicit protreptic. On the other hand, the analysis of philosophy as a preparation for death in the *Phaedo* (64a4–69e5) is an example of implicit protreptic. It has been considered ‘protreptic’ both in antiquity (Iamblichus) and in modern times (Festugière, *Protreptiques*, 71–99), but the conclusion that philosophy is necessary in order to obtain happiness is here left to the reader.<sup>106</sup>

It is not always easy to draw the line between explicit and implicit protreptic. This is especially the case in what I have elsewhere<sup>107</sup> called ‘protreptic dialogue’. In this sub-genre, a person is convinced by Socrates that his way of life is wrong or that he does not possess enough (philosophical) knowledge to reach the goals set by himself, or even to lead a reasonably decent life. The dialogue ends with a conversion scene, in which Socrates’ partner mends his ways and becomes a follower of Socrates. I consider this group of texts to belong to explicit protreptic: even if some of the means employed (interrogation, refutation, aporia) belong to implicit rather than explicit exhortation, the cleft between this group and true implicit protreptic is much deeper, because eventually the change in conduct is depicted in the text.

A final distinction must be made between protreptic literature as a general way of influencing the conduct of others and another type of literature which consists of a series of concrete rules of conduct. The pseudo-Isocratean *Ad Demonicum* is a good case in point, not only because it exemplifies the latter species but also because it makes the distinction itself. Having set himself off from the writers of

<sup>106</sup> Schenkeveld (cf. n. 104), 204–13 analyses various philosophical texts from the post-classical age as (implicitly) protreptic.

<sup>107</sup> ‘Aeschines’ Miltiades’, 305–6. Cf. section II.1.3(6)–(8).

protreptic speeches in the manner quoted above, the author continues: Διόπερ ἡμεῖς οὐ παράκλησιν εὐρόντες ἀλλὰ παραίνεσιν γράψαντες μέλλομέν σοι συμβουλεύειν, ὧν χρῆ τοὺς νεωτέρους ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τίνων ἔργων ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ποίοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις ὀμιλεῖν καὶ πῶς τὸν ἑαυτῶν βίον οἰκονομεῖν (I.5). The distinction is not between εὐρόντες and γράψαντες,<sup>108</sup> but between παράκλησιν (= protreptic) and παραίνεσιν (advice). Following (with Hartlich, ‘De exhortationum . . . historia’) the distinction made by Pseudo-Isocrates, I shall call the general type ‘protreptic’, the concrete type ‘paraenesis’.<sup>109</sup>

In order to avoid cumbersome circumlocutions, I shall henceforward call ‘protreptic’ what is above defined as explicit protreptic, unless the context makes it obvious that the word is otherwise used.<sup>110</sup>

### II.1.2 *Protreptic among the sophists*

Whereas no one can deny that some texts written by sophists are protreptic (for instance the fragments usually

<sup>108</sup> Cf. I.3 τοὺς προτρεπτικούς λόγους συγγράφουσι; Hartlich, ‘De exhortationum . . . historia’, 222, quoting Harpocration παράκλησις ἀντὶ τοῦ προτροπή.

<sup>109</sup> Gaiser, *Protreptik*, uses ‘Protreptik’ for what I call ‘protreptic in the stricter sense’ and ‘Paränese’ for ‘protreptic in the wider sense’; he is usually, but not always, concerned with explicit protreptic. I have not adopted this terminology because it causes unnecessary confusion: the distinction between protreptic and paraenesis (as found in Pseudo-Isocrates) is observed throughout antiquity (section II.1.4.2 n. 164) and in many modern studies. – Paraenesis is the continuation in prose of the poetic genre known as ὑποθήκαι, on which cf. L. Kurke, ‘Pindar’s sixth *Pythian* and the tradition of advice poetry’, *TAPhA* 120 (1990), 85–107, esp. 90–5.

<sup>110</sup> I shall not discuss statements on προτροπή and προτρέπειν in the orators (notably Isocrates) and the theories of rhetoric (Aristotle; Anaximenes of Lampsacus). The latter deal with προτροπή only as a part of forensic oratory and shed no light on *Clit.* Only in an isolated case (Appendix 1) have I compared specimens of non-philosophical protreptic in order to settle a point of detail – even there, the outcome is negative.



referred to as the Anonymus Iamblichī), it will remain a question of conjecture whether the sophists inaugurated, as a separated genre, explicit protreptic in the stricter sense. Many scholars acknowledge that we have hardly any data to go by, yet they tend to regard the assumption that the sophists did indeed create such a genre at least as plausible.

Three possible types of sophistic protreptic deserve mention here. First, the 'epideictic' speech, mentioned by Plato as typical of the sophists.<sup>111</sup> On the basis of a passage from the *Euthydemus* (274d4–275a3) Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 46–7) arrives at the following fixed pattern of this type of 'Werberede': (a) virtue can be taught; (b) the speaker is the best teacher of it. But he overlooks the fact that proving this is said in so many words to be the 'result of the same art' (274e3–5), in other words: persuading (protreptic) is a by-product of the normal way of demonstrating the sophist's art.

Secondly, a speech in which the claim that ἀρετή can be taught is defended would be a possible type of sophistic protreptic, as it was the most current objection to the sophists' trade that ἀρετή cannot be taught (section II.2.3.1). Gaiser's analysis of Protagoras' myth and λόγος (*Protagoras* 320c8–328d2) as protreptic (*Protreptik*, 38–40) is plausible enough,<sup>112</sup> but there is no proof that such a defence should

<sup>111</sup> Cf. esp. *Hp.Ma.* 282b7–8, where Gorgias, Prodicus and Protagoras are mentioned (and Hippias implied); Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 35) is wrong in concluding that the distinction made there points to two different types of speeches (protreptic and instruction): an ἐπίδειξις is a specimen of the sort of instruction which awaits the prospective pupil (cf. Tarrant ad loc.; Dodds on *Grg.* 447a6; O. Kraus, *Neue Studien zur Aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Halle 1907), 68–81).

<sup>112</sup> The thesis that virtue can be taught was defended in Posidonius' *Protreptici* (fr. 2 E.–K.; W. Gerhäuser, *Der Protreptikos des Poseidonios* (Munich 1912), 7) and it may have occurred in protreptic literature far earlier than that.

be assigned the status of a protreptic genre.<sup>113</sup> All the same, we must remember that Clitophon refers to a speech by Socrates which states that virtue can be taught (408b7) and that he includes it among the speeches which he considers to be προτρεπτικωτάτους (408c2).

Another, better attested, type of protreptic is the 'eulogy of the art'. Protagoras' defence of sophistic (*Protagoras* 316c5–317c5; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 37–8),<sup>114</sup> Polus' highly rhetorical encomium of τέχνη in general (*Gorgias* 448c4–9), and Gorgias' eulogy of rhetoric (456a7–457c3; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 40–2) may be considered under this head.

An interesting passage in the *Clitophon* shows that eulogy and protreptic are related, if not identical. Analogically to one who praises steersmanship without being an expert at it, one may reprove Socrates ὡς οὐ μᾶλλον ὄντι δικαιοσύνης ἐπιστήμονι, διότι καλῶς αὐτὴν ἐγκωμιάζεις (410c3–4). The protreptic speech reported by Clitophon, as well as the two alluded to by him (408b6–c1 ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετῆ καὶ πάντων ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ μάλιστα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι) are exhortations, not eulogies. This shows that our author either ignores or implicitly rejects the distinction made by fourth-century rhetoric between ἔπαινος and προτροπή.<sup>115</sup>

In this respect, the author shares the position of Plato, who likewise does not distinguish between praising justice and exhorting others to justice: λέγουσι δέ που καὶ παρακελεύονται πατέρες τε ὑέσιν καὶ πάντες οἱ τινων κηδόμενοι, ὡς χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην ἐπαινοῦντες ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῆς εὐδοκιμήσεις (*Republic* 362e4–363a2; cf. 363d4–5).

<sup>113</sup> Cf. *Dialex.* 6 = 2.414.1–26 D.–K., esp. the words καὶ οὐ λέγω ὡς διδακτὸν ἐστίν: this laudable reserve is not in keeping with a protreptic speech.

<sup>114</sup> There is again an interesting parallel from Posidonius' *Protr.* (fr. 284 E.–K.). Cf. Hartlich, 'De exhortationum ... historia', 283–91; Gerhäuser, op. cit. (n. 112), 16–31.

<sup>115</sup> Arist. *Rh.* 1358b8–13; *Rh. Al.* 1421b18–9 and 1425b36–7.

Of course, the shift from προτρέπειν to ἐγκωμιάζειν was influenced by the choice of steersmanship as an analogy for justice, but a person who attached much value to the distinction would not have chosen this analogy. Faced with the question what προτρέπειν would amount to in the field of the τέχνηαι, our author could think of nothing better than eulogy. The analogy from protreptic to bodily care (410d1–4) confirms this: Clitophon says not προτρέπειν εἰς γυμναστικήν but περὶ γυμναστικῆς. This shows not only that protreptic speeches *sensu stricto* which exhorted people to the arts (like Galen's Προτρεπτικός) were unknown to the author, but also that for him the most natural form of exhortation to a τέχνηη was an ἐγκώμιον τέχνης.

The apologetic nature of the passages mentioned above may serve as a link between sophistic protreptic and the pseudo-Hippocratic Περὶ τέχνης, which is an (implicitly protreptic) defence of the τέχνηη status of medicine, and which is full of sophistic τοποί. A passage from Plato's *Sophist* (232d9–e1) indicates that Protagoras wrote an apology for all arts.<sup>116</sup>

Similarly, a eulogy of ἀρετή may be (implicit) protreptic; the fragments known as the Anonymus Iamblichi may be analysed as such.

I conclude that explicit protreptic in the stricter sense did not exist among the sophists as a fixed genre, though some implicit types (mainly eulogy) may be tentatively considered forerunners of explicit protreptic as found among the Socratics.

<sup>116</sup> Though it is usually taken as referring to criticism of all arts (*HGPh*, III 44 n. 41). 232d6–7 ἄ δεῖ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτὸν τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀντειπεῖν can only mean 'what the craftsman himself ought to answer to everyone' (cf. Campbell ad loc.; Th. Gomperz, *Die Apologie der Heilkunst. Eine griechische Sophistenrede des fünften vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts* (Leipzig 1910<sup>2</sup>), 169–70). Arist. *Met.* 998a3–4 is no evidence, as it does not refer explicitly to a separate book.

II.1.3 *The protreptic corpus*

In order to study the relationship of the *Clitophon* to philosophical protreptic, we must first draw up an inventory of protreptic texts. Since it is easy to recognise that Socrates' protreptic speech, reported in that dialogue, is explicit, not implicit, protreptic, we may confine this inventory to explicit philosophical protreptic both in the wider (ethical) and the stricter sense. Besides, if one wishes to settle the question whether protreptic existed in the fourth century BCE as a fixed genre, as it did unquestionably in later times,<sup>117</sup> a study of all texts which are possibly implicitly protreptic will lead us nowhere.

In ancient literary composition a genre is characterised by two kinds of features. First, the general set of elements which together distinguish one genre from another and which enable us to decide whether a given text belongs to one genre or to another; second, the set of more or less traditional ideas, motifs, *topoi*, or whatever we call them, that are common to the majority of (but not necessarily to all) representatives of the genre.<sup>118</sup> In fourth-century phil-

<sup>117</sup> As against M. D. Jordan's scepticism ('Ancient philosophic protreptic and the problem of persuasive genres', *Rhetorica* 4 (1986) 309–33), I claim that protreptic is to be considered a separate genre of philosophical literature in the fourth century for the following reasons: (1) three philosophers wrote books entitled Πρωτρεπτικός; (2) both *Euthd.* and *Clit.* deal with philosophical protreptic: it must have been more than an isolated phenomenon; (3) Demetrius (section II.1.4.2) appears to describe the different species of the genus protreptic; his examples belong to the fourth century; (4) the protreptic texts collected in this section constitute a rather coherent fund of motifs (used extensively in *Euthd.* and *Clit.*): such a coherence is best explained as due to the influence of generic composition. Points (2)–(4) are ignored by Jordan, whose agnosticism is also due to his failure to distinguish between implicit and explicit protreptic (cf. section II.1.1). In the fourth century at least, protreptic seems to be a genre in content rather than in form (though we know little of the form of the works called Πρωτρεπτικός).

<sup>118</sup> Cf. F. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh 1972), 6.



accuses mankind of neglecting the real values for human life and states that a better ἐπιμέλεια is necessary; this is an internal criterion. Both criteria have their disadvantages. If a word like προτρέπειν is used in commenting on a text, that does not necessarily mean that that text was regarded as belonging to the genre protreptic;<sup>122</sup> if on the other hand a text (or part of it) appears to exhort its readers, it may in fact have a wholly different intention.<sup>123</sup> Still, given the scantiness of data in the area, we cannot afford to be too particular.

I consider the following texts to constitute a corpus of philosophical protreptic.

(1) Antisthenes, Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικός πρῶτος δεύτερος τρίτος περὶ Θεόγνιδος δ'ε';<sup>124</sup> lost, apart from one uninformative sentence. This work has been regarded as the source of Socrates' speech in the *Clitophon* (section II.2.1.1).

(2) Aristippus, Προτρεπτικός (fr. 121 Mannebach; *SSR* IV A 144); lost (see section II.1.4.2 n. 165).

(3) Aristotle, Προτρεπτικός. I follow Düring<sup>125</sup> in ad-

<sup>122</sup> For instance, Aristid. *Or.* 46 [3], 576 = 1.485.21–2 Lenz–Behr ὁ δ' ἦν χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ προτρέψαι (in Aesch. *Alc.*) is not sufficient evidence for including Aesch. *Alc.* in the corpus (though some of his other comments are).

<sup>123</sup> E.g. Pl. *Prt.* 320c8–328d2; cf. section II.1.2.

<sup>124</sup> Περὶ δικ. καὶ ἀνδρ. may be a separate title referring to a different work (so Hirzel, 'Protreptikos', 72 n. 1; Natorp in *PW* s.v. Antisthenes 10), 2543; the punctuation of the MSS (of D. L. 6.15–18; facsimiles in A. Patzer, *Antisthenes der Sokratischer* (diss. Heidelberg 1970), 272–6) is too haphazard to go by. Elsewhere the work is called Προτρεπτικοί or Προτρεπτικός (fr. 7; 18 A–C Caizzi; *SSR* V A 11; 63–4). See section II.1.5 and n. 168.

<sup>125</sup> I use Düring's section numbers throughout in references to specific passages, as the fragments as printed in Ross's edition are too long to be useful. Gigon prints the whole extract from Iambl. *Protr.* as fr. 73 (*Aristotelis Opera* III: *Librorum deperditorum fragmenta* (Berlin 1987), 302–13) under the heading 'τόποιοι προτρεπτικοί'; this seems excessively cautious to me.

mitting as part of this work the extracts contained in the sixth to twelfth chapters (inclusive) of Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, as well as an Oxyrhynchus papyrus (666 = *CPG* 24.6), which overlaps with an extract from Stobaeus ascribed to Aristotle (B 2–5 Düring), with a few exceptions.<sup>126</sup> Both the title and the content warrant inclusion in the corpus, especially Aristotle's framing the course of his thought so as to end repeatedly in the conclusion that one must philosophise (B 5; 96; 110 Düring).<sup>127</sup> This is typical of protreptic in the stricter sense (compare the end of the first protreptic conversation in the *Euthydemus*, 282d1–3). For further details, cf. Appendix 1.

<sup>126</sup> The following passages I do not consider part of *Protr.*: B 52 Düring, which is not from Iambl. *Protr.* (cf. Comm. on 410e8); B 7–9, which is in my opinion a condensation of the two protreptic conversations from Pl. *Euthd.*, set off from each other and from the following by Iamblichus' favourite formula of transition  $\xi\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\iota\upsilon\nu\nu$ ; other transitional passages contained in B 10; 15; 22; 31; 37; 38; 41; 43; 45; 46; 54; 59 ( $\xi\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\iota\upsilon\nu\nu$ ); 63 ( $\xi\tau\iota\ \tau\omicron\iota\upsilon\nu\nu$ ); 78; 92; 93 (cf. Iambl. *Protr.* 90.16 des Places); 97; 104. I am highly sceptical about B 23–8, which comes between an excerpt of Pl. *R.* (Iambl. *Protr.* 62.17–64.23 des Places) and an un-Aristotelian piece of dubious origin (66.12–28) rejected also by Düring; I am also dubious about B 29–30 which follows this latter piece and seems to constitute its natural sequel. Iambl. *Protr.* 58.20–59.2 is a doublet of 71.22–6 (= B 59), cf. Hartlich, 'De exhortationum . . . historia', 247. B 104–10 are sometimes ascribed to the *Eudemus* (cf. A. P. Bos, *Cosmic and Meta-cosmic Theology in Aristotle's Lost Dialogues* (Leiden 1989), 17 n. 6) but I will treat them as part of *Protr.* – the decision will be justified in Appendix 1. Bos' theory that *Eudemus* and *Protr.* are the same work ('Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: are they really two different works?', *Dionysius* 8 (1984) 19–51) is partly immaterial to my argument; it would be imprudent to use the *Eudemus* as a whole for the protreptic corpus. Whether or not *P. Vindob.* 26008 preserves fragments of Arist. *Protr.* (so G. W. Most, 'Some new fragments of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*?', in *Studi su Codici e Papiri Filosofici: Platone, Aristotele, Ierocle* (Studi e Testi per il Corpus dei papiri filosofici greci e latini, 6; Florence 1992), 189–216) is not a question that has to be decided here, as these fragments do not contain protreptic motifs found elsewhere.

<sup>127</sup> I agree with Düring that other occurrences of φιλοσοφητέον must be ascribed to Iambl., not to Arist. (25–6).

(4) Plato, *Euthydemus* 278e3–282d3; 288d5–292e7; 306d6–end. See section II.3.4 and n.283.

(5) Plato, *Apology* 29d7–e3; 30b2–4; 36c5–d1 (Socrates' protreptic speeches). See section II.3.3.

(6) Aeschines of Sphettos, *Alcibiades*. I use the fragments (I–6 and *Vest.* 1–3 Kr. = 1–11 D.; *P. Oxy.* 1608; *SSR* VI A 41–54) only; not the derived texts,<sup>128</sup> which are protreptic dialogues in their own right: (7) and (8) below. We learn most about the intention of this dialogue from a passage in Aelius Aristides (Ἐπὲρ τῶν τεττάρων, 572–6 = I.484.7–485.23 Lenz–Behr) where it is compared with the pseudo-Platonic *Alcibiades* 1; more precisely, Aristides compares the effectiveness of Socrates' handling of Alcibiades in either dialogue. In Plato (Aristides did not doubt the authenticity of *Alcibiades* 1; nobody did in antiquity), Socrates leaves room for Alcibiades' arrogance because he had said that he was 'wedded to ignorance' (118b6) but added that most politicians suffer from the same evil (118b9–c1); this is unsuitable because Alcibiades was so arrogant that he would have criticised even the twelve Olympians;<sup>129</sup> therefore the thought that he did not stand alone in his igno-

<sup>128</sup> X. *Mem.* 4.2; [Pl.] *Alc.* 1. See Dittmar, *Aischines*, 120–44; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 77–95; B. Ehlers, *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros* (Munich 1966), 10–25; Effe, 'Charmides', 199–203. Gaiser uses also X. *Mem.* 3.8–9 and 4.6 (71–7; 86–7) and should have used I.1.16; I am prepared to accept his conclusion (especially on account of Pl. *Chrm.* 164a9–b6, which may derive from Aesch. *Alc.*, cf. below), but cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 137–8 on X. *Mem.* 4.6.5–6 – in any case as neither X. *Mem.* 3.8–9 nor 4.6 is protreptic, I cannot use them here. B. Ehlers (11 n.) rightly warns against rashly using X. *Mem.*; indeed 4.2.12–19 goes back to the source of [Pl.] *Just.* (C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 134–9) and 4.2.19–20 to Pl. *Hp.Mi.* (Maier, *Sokrates*, 54–6). Effe gives plausible reasons for the assumption that *Chrm.* 164c7–end is intended as a refutation of Aesch. *Alc.*; he should have added the parallel *Chrm.* 171d8–e5; 172d7–10 – Aesch. *Alc.* fr. 1 Kr. = 8 D. (*SSR* VI A 50) and *Alc.* 1 117c6–e5; 132c4–6. But again, *Chrm.* is not a protreptic text.

<sup>129</sup> Aesch. *Alc.* *Vest.* 1 Kr. = fr. 5 D. (*SSR* VI A 46).



rance was comforting. In Aeschines, Socrates reduces Alcibiades to tears by his eulogy of Themistocles, in which he does not speak evil of that politician,<sup>130</sup> so that he may not be spoiled any more than he already is: Alcibiades does not even come near to Themistocles as far as training is concerned. And besides, Socrates heightens the effect of his words in an appropriate way,<sup>131</sup> for he has said in the eulogy of Themistocles that not even he had acquired sufficient knowledge; in this way, the possibility of an arrogant reaction on Alcibiades' part is suppressed, and his despondency – and at the same time his dependence on Socrates – is increased.

Evidently, Aristides regards both dialogues as protreptic, inasmuch as Socrates tries to persuade Alcibiades that he falls short of the standards of (moral) education which are necessary for the prospective politician. Even if the verb προτρέψαι had not cropped up in his analysis we would have been justified in adding Aeschines' *Alcibiades* to the corpus. Compare the definition of 'protreptic dialogue' (section II.1.1).<sup>132</sup>

<sup>130</sup> Aristid. 46.576; the statement seems to be contradicted by *P. Oxy.* 1608.1–5; 36–48.

<sup>131</sup> Καὶ προσέτι συμμέτρως ἐπέτεινε τὸν λόγον, 1.485.19. Following Immisch, Krauss (63–4) thinks that the dialogue ended in a climax, on account of the following words εἶπε γὰρ που κτλ., which they take to refer to what Socrates said in the absence of Alcibiades. But the words οὐδὲ ἐκείνῳ ἢ ἐπιστήμῃ οὔσα ἤρκεσεν, ἀλλ' ἐνεδέησεν are a paraphrase of a sentence from the eulogy of Themistocles (fr. 1 Kr. = 8 D. (*SSR* VI A 50); p. 270.48–51 Dittmar, *Aischines*). What Aristid. means is that in Aesch. Alcibiades is reduced to tears because of his inferiority to Themistocles, and that on top of this Socrates shows (ἐπέτεινε τὸν λόγον) that even his admired example had not been equal to the vicissitudes of fate.

<sup>132</sup> In 'Aeschines' Miltiades', 305–8, I have tentatively reconstructed Aesch. *Milt.* as a protreptic dialogue. Though I shall occasionally refer to it, there is no sufficient ground in the fragments preserved from this dialogue to warrant its inclusion in the protreptic corpus. Besides, *Milt.* almost certainly did not have a conversion scene and quite certainly not a final conversion scene.

(7) Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2. An over-confident young man, Euthydemus, standing at the beginning of a political career (1; 11) is twice brought to ἀθυμία (23; 39) through Socrates' proof of his ignorance (12–23; 31–9); he becomes a close follower of Socrates, as that is, he thinks, the only way to become an ἀνὴρ ἀξιόλογος (40). In its entirety, this text is definitely protreptic, yet it contains various motifs not originally of a protreptic nature (it has been established that the author borrowed from an unknown but probably not protreptic dialogue about justice, as well as from Plato's *Hippias Maior*).<sup>133</sup>

(8) Pseudo-Plato, *Alcibiades 1*; the only protreptic text from the pre-Christian era which has been preserved unmutilated (the next one which we encounter is Clement's *Protrepticus*). Alcibiades, about to embark on a political career (105a7–b1), will have to show the Athenians what is just and unjust in politics (109b5–c12), but he has never learned the difference (112d7–113c7). As a second line of defence, Alcibiades states that what is just is rarely useful (113d1–8), but Socrates proves that the just is always useful (114e7–116d4). Alcibiades is ignorant (as most politicians are) and needs an ἐπιμέλεια (118b4–119b1). The right ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ is possible only through self-knowledge (124b7–129a10), which is identical to knowledge of one's soul or σωφροσύνη (129b1–133c20). Only with this knowledge is true statesmanship possible (133c21–135b6); until this knowledge has been acquired, one has to have oneself led by a better man, in this case Socrates (135b7–e5), the only true lover of Alcibiades (131c5–e5).

<sup>133</sup> Cf. n. 128. It is only when this chapter has material in common with other texts from the protreptic corpus that we are on safer ground, especially in 4.2.1–7 (cf. *Alc. 1* 106e4–112d10 and Aesch. *Alc.* fr. 1 Kr. = 8 D. (*SSR* VI A 50) on Themistocles' preparation for politics) and in the adage γυνῶθι σαυτόν (4.2.24–30, cf. *Alc. 1* and Aesch. *Alc.*; Effe, 'Charmides'). The enumeration of so-called ἀγαθὰ (4.2.31) which are subsequently proved to be sometimes evil (32–6), recurs in *Euthd.*, cf. section II.2.2 n. 188.

The synopsis will make it clear that this dialogue is explicitly protreptic. Alcibiades' need of ἐπιμέλεια is stressed repeatedly (119a9; 123d3; 124b7; d4; 127e9) and his despair increases accordingly (124b7–9; 127d6–8). We saw that Aristides regarded the dialogue as protreptic.<sup>134</sup>

I shall explain elsewhere (section II.3.5) my reasons for not assuming that Plato ever wrote a protreptic dialogue; this is my main reason for regarding *Alcibiades 1* as unauthentic (I admit it is a subjective one). Linguistic evidence, which cannot be discussed here,<sup>135</sup> sustains the rejection, as do certain pieces of un-Platonic doctrine.<sup>136</sup>

I do not accept as protreptic the *Epinomis* (Einarson, 'Epinomis', passim; Festugière, *Protreptiques*, 101–56), because it

<sup>134</sup> When the author of the *Anonymous Prolegomena* (Hermann, *Platonis Dialogi*, 6.217) says that the σκόπος of *Alc. 1* is not Alcibiades' φιλοτιμία but human φιλοτιμία in general (περὶ τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίας σκόπον ἔχει τοῦ ἐλέγξαι. ἔστι γὰρ ἐκάστωι ἡμῶν οἷον Ἀλκιβιάδειος φιλοτιμία), he means in fact that *Alc. 1* is a protreptic dialogue. Olymp. in *Alc.* 142 (= 92 Westerink) divides the dialogue into three parts, the second of which (119a8–124a7) he calls 'protreptic'; this is precisely the part where Alcibiades' need of ἐπιμέλεια is first stressed and developed (the break at 124a7 is motivated by the first mention of the Delphic maxim, which inaugurates the third, 'maieutic' part). Cf. also Procl. In *Alc.* 13.16–14.16 = Iambl. In *Alc.* fr. 2 Dillon.

<sup>135</sup> Some stylistic tests, notably the occurrence of τί μήν; (5 times in 25 pages Didot, once in every 5 pages; cf. *Pm.* 1: 8.2; *R.* 1: 5.6; *Lg.* 1: 5.4; *Th.* 1: 4.1; *Phdr.* 1: 3.5; *Sph.* 1: 3.3; *Plt.* 1: 2.2; *Phlb.* 1: 1.8; the expression is absent from all pre-*Republic* works but for one occurrence in *Ly.*; cf. Lutosławski, *Plato's Logic*, 104; data corrected after H. von Arnim, 'Sprachliche Forschungen zur Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge', *SAWW* 169.3 (1912) 31) indicate a late date of composition, whereas a comprehensive analysis of all formulas of assent (P. Friedländer, *Der grosse Alkibiades*, II (Bonn 1923), 57–8) shows closest affinity to *Men.*, *Euthyphr.*, *Ly.*, *Grg.* (my personal impression is that the style of *Alc. 1* differs *toto caelo* from that of Plato's later dialogues; the absence of monologue, apart from the 'central culmination' (section 1.4.2(7)) 121a3–124b6, seems to confirm this). This conflicting evidence is best explained as due to inauthenticity.

<sup>136</sup> I may refer to C. A. Bos, *Alcibiades maior*, esp. 70–3 (magic); 55–63 (αὐτό τὸ αὐτό); 88–90 (dogmatism). – Bos rightly claims that if *Alc. 1*

fails to meet the criteria stated above (it is certainly implicitly protreptic, and it contains a number of protreptic motifs). There is no exhortation to σοφία, φρόνησις or ἐπιστήμη, but the subject of the investigation is what σοφία consists in. As Einarson rightly remarks, this search is ‘in the manner of the second discourse in the protreptic of the *Euthydemus*’ (‘Epinomis’, 279), but a counterpart to the first discourse, which alone would make the *Epinomis* a protreptic text, is absent.<sup>137</sup>

Likewise, I do not include any material from Xenophon’s *Memorabilia* (apart from 4.2), even though some passages have the general property of exhortation (in the wider sense). Xenophon himself opposes the speeches and conversations from 1.4 onwards to protreptic (see section II.1.4.1); besides, including them would blur the line between protreptic and paraenesis; it would mean also that the corpus would contain so many heterogeneous texts that it would cease to be useful as a basis for studies in protreptic.

Not belonging to the corpus, but associated with it, are a number of passages from Plato’s dialogues, in which there is explicit exhortation. Following Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 37 and passim), I shall call them ‘protreptic situations’ (I do not distinguish between protreptic and paraenetic situations, as Gaiser does). These passages are not part of our inventory of protreptic texts because they are not detachable from their contexts (as are the protreptic conversations in the *Euthydemus*); they are not marked as protreptic

is authentic it must be a late work (83–7); he bases this judgement primarily on the doctrines of *Alc. 1*. On grounds wholly different from mine he concludes: ‘The most important aim of *Alc. 1* is protreptic to philosophy’ (54; my translation).

<sup>137</sup> By the same token, I think it highly dangerous to reconstruct the plan of Arist. *Protr.* from that of *Epin.* (Einarson, ‘Epinomis’; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 218 n. 20). It is a priori unlikely that an explicitly protreptic text like Arist. *Protr.* has the same structure as an implicitly protreptic one.

(our external criterion, cf. above). Among protreptic situations, I reckon:

- (1) *Gorgias* 456a7–457c3 (Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 40–2; section II.1.2);
- (2) *ibid.* 526d3–end (Gaiser, 190–2);
- (3) *Laches* 178a1–190b5 (Gaiser, 114–18);
- (4) *Phaedo* 114d1–115a2 (Gaiser, 194–6);
- (5) *Protagoras* 316c5–317c1 (Gaiser, 37–8; section II.1.2);
- (6) *ibid.* 320c2–328d2 (Gaiser, 38–40; section II.1.2);
- (7) *ibid.* 352e5–357e8 (Gaiser, 42–4; 132–4);<sup>138</sup>
- (8) *Symposium* 173c1–d7 (cf. Comm. on 407b1 Ποῖ φέρεσθε);
- (9) *Republic* 621b8–d3 (cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 217).

I shall use some of these passages occasionally when analysing the protreptic speech in the *Clitophon*; they do not justify Gaiser's claim that the structure of the Platonic dialogue is derived from a fixed pattern of sophistic protreptic (see section II.2.5).<sup>139</sup>

For the preamble to the laws in *Laws* 5, cf. section II.2.2. The exhortation from beyond the grave in *Menexenus* 246d1–248d6 belongs to rhetorical, not philosophical, protreptic.

<sup>138</sup> Rather a piece of argument in the form of a protreptic speech. Cf. Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 8–9; following Susemihl, 511–12), who derives the first part of Socrates' speech in *Clit.* from this passage; this does not do justice to *Clit.*, but one of his parallels is interesting (cf. Comm. on 407b5 διδασκάλους). The author of *Clit.* may have perceived the protreptic character of the *Prt.* passage and used a few phrases (esp. 357e4–8). I cannot believe, however, that Ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὄνθρωποι was inspired by 353a3 etc. ὦ ἄνθρωποι; also the proof that wrongdoing is involuntary was certainly not borrowed from *Prt.*

<sup>139</sup> I have not used passages which are protreptic only inasmuch as a partner of Socrates is encouraged to go on with the discussion, e.g. *Chrm.* 166c7–e2; *Euthphr.* 11b6–e4; *Grg.* 481c5–482c3; 486e5–488b1; *Hp.Ma.* 295a1–c1; *Hp.Mi.* 372a6–373a8; *La.* 193e8–194c6; *Men.* 79e7–81e2; 86b6–c7; *Phd.* 89c11–91c6.

II.1.4 *Early theories of philosophical protreptic*

Apart from the texts collected in the previous section, we have to examine two passages which betray reflection on philosophical exhortation and are relevant to the *Clitophon*. Though one is considerably later than the fourth century BCE, analysis seems to me imperative; we shall be able to decide later what is relevant and what is not.

I reserve a separate treatment of Plato till later (section II.3); explicit statements on προτροπή are not found in his works anyway.

II.1.4.1 *Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.4.1*

Having dealt with, presumably, Polycrates' Κατηγορία Σωκράτους in 1.1–2, Xenophon goes on to a counter-attack and proves that far from being harmful, Socrates was even highly beneficial to his companions<sup>140</sup> τὰ μὲν ἔργωι δεικνύων ἑαυτὸν οἷος ἦν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διαλεγόμενος (1.3.1). The first point is shown in 1.3, the second from 1.4 onwards; but Xenophon sees fit to insert a separate preface concerning Socrates' discourse. As this preface contains statements regarding exhortation made both by Xenophon and by some others, I shall treat it rather fully here, the more so since it has been taken as a reference to the *Clitophon*:<sup>141</sup> Εἰ δέ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὥς<sup>142</sup> ἔνιοι

<sup>140</sup> On the unity of 1.1–2 and the following chapters, cf. Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 93–4; Erbse, 'Architektonik', 319–22; 337–40; M. Treu, PW s.v. Xenophon (6), 1777–8.

<sup>141</sup> Bertini, 458–60; 465–9; Kunert, *Necessitudo*, 13–17; H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 43; Erbse, 'Architektonik', 323–5.

<sup>142</sup> Jacobs' conjecture οἷς, approved by Bertini, 458; Maier, *Sokrates*, 42 n. 1; Kesters, *Kérygmes*, 126; Erbse, 'Architektonik', 322 n. 37 is superfluous, as τεκμαίρομαι is often used without a complement (LSJ s.v., Α Π 1); the distinction between τινες and ἔνιοι makes sense even if ὥς is retained: 'If there are people who think [...] as some have actually said': τινες may refer to the readers or listeners of the person(s) called ἔνιοι. A papyrus from the third or fourth century CE (*P. Lit.*

γράφουσί τε καὶ λέγουσι<sup>143</sup> περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν ἀνθρώπους ἐπ' ἀρετὴν κράτιστον γεγονέναι, προαγαγεῖν δ' ἐπ' αὐτὴν οὐχ ἰκανόν, σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἃ ἐκεῖνος κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα<sup>144</sup> τοὺς πάντ' οἰομένους εἰδέναι ἐρωτῶν ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ λέγων συνημέρευε τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσι, δοκιμαζόντων εἰ ἰκανὸς ἦν βελτίους ποιεῖν τοὺς συνόντας.<sup>145</sup>

*Lond.* 149; cf. E. C. Marchant, *Xenophontis Opera Omnia*, t. 2 (Oxonii 1921<sup>2</sup>), praefatio) reads ὡς like all MSS.

<sup>143</sup> These words seem to be a more or less fixed combination in polemical writings, cf. Hp. *VM* 1; Pl. *Th.* 162e1.

<sup>144</sup> It is very improbable that κολαστήριον means 'punishment' (LSJ, s.v. κολαστήριος II 3; only this place adduced), because words in -τήριον denote either instruments (ποτήριον) or places (δεσμωτήριον) or religious actions (θυτήριον), cf. P. Chantraine, *La formation des noms en grec ancien* (Paris 1933), 62–4. I would rather interpret the phrase κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα as 'as a means of correction' – the formation would then be analogous to some members of the third group like λυτήριον, καθαρτήριον. In this context, 'correction' and 'punishment' are different things.

<sup>145</sup> Owing to a syntactic ambiguity, there are two possible theories on the number of types of discourse distinguished by Xenophon. 'They must examine not only A but also B' can be interpreted either as 'they already examine A but must also examine B' or as 'they examine neither A nor B and must examine both'. Since the participle σκεψάμενοι has the modal value of the main verb δοκιμαζόντων, we should expect μή, not οὐ, even in the first case, cf. Pl. *Prt.* 336c4–6 διαλεγέσθω ἐρωτῶν τε καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, μὴ ἐφ' ἑκάστη ἐρωτήσει μακρὸν λόγον ἀποτεινῶν; A. Oguse, *Recherches sur le participe circonstanciel en grec ancien* (Paris 1962), 246–7. In the first interpretation, these people look only at Socrates' refutations of others and consider these instances of his exhorting others to virtue – in other words there are two types of discourse: protreptic–elenctic and what may be called didactic (so Joël, *Der echte . . . Sokrates*, I 457; Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 119; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 30 and n. 31; Erbse, 'Architektonik', 323–4). On the other hand, there is nothing in this text to prevent us from distinguishing three types of discourse: protreptic, elenctic and didactic (E. Edelstein, *Xenophontisches und Platonisches Bild des Sokrates* (Heidelberg 1934), 94–5). As the words are intended as an announcement of the following conversations and speeches at any rate up to and including 2.1 (Erbse, 'Architektonik', 325–6), only an examination of the whole work and of parallel statements can take us further.

As I have already shown (section 1.5.2 n. 86), this preface is followed by two pairs consisting each of an ‘elenctic’ conversation (1.4; 1.6) and a ‘didactic’ speech (1.5; 1.7) addressed to Socrates’ συνόντες (so named 1.7.1; 5). The first ἔλεγχος is a conversation with Aristodemus who does not believe in the gods (1.4.2), the second with Antiphon the sophist – both qualify for the sobriquet τοὺς πάντ’ οἰόμενους εἰδέναι; at the end of either chapter the usefulness for the listeners is stressed (1.4.19 τοὺς συνόντας ἐδόκει ποιεῖν ... ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνοσίων κτλ.; 1.6.14 ἐδόκει ... τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἐπὶ καλοκάγαθίαν ἄγειν). Evidently, in 1.4.1 three types of Socratic discourse are distinguished: explicit protreptic (not exemplified), ‘didactic’, ‘elenctic’.<sup>146</sup> This ‘didactic’ discourse amounts to paraenesis (section II.1.1), as may be seen from 1.5 and 1.7.

When we examine Xenophon’s use of the word προτρέπειν,<sup>147</sup> it becomes clear that the distinction made in 1.4.1 between προτρέπεσθαι and προάγειν represents a line of thought which Xenophon temporarily adopts, but

<sup>146</sup> A parallel signalled by H. Maier (*Sokrates*, 42 n. 2) in the eulogy of Socrates which closes the *Mem.* (4.8.11) could be used for both interpretations, though the way in which προτρέψασθαι gradually becomes what in 1.4.1 is called προαγαγεῖν (cf. next note) is an argument for a bipartition of Socratic discourse at 4.8.11 and a trichotomy at 1.4.1.

<sup>147</sup> In the recapitulation of his defence of Socrates against the indictment (1.2.64), there is an opposition between παύων and προτρέπων: ‘he made an end to their evil desires’ as opposed to ‘he instilled in them a longing for virtue’. Obviously, προτρέπω is more than ‘to exhort’ here – it is perhaps better paraphrased as ‘by exhorting to cause someone to do’, and this is the sense in which the word is used throughout *Mem.*, except at 1.4.1. The introductory and closing remarks in the chapters following 1.4 betray a curious telescoping of προάγειν and προτρέπειν: 1.5.1 προυβίβαζε ... εἰς ταύτην; 6.14 ἐπὶ καλοκάγαθίαν ἄγειν; 7.1 ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι προέτρεπε; 2.1.1 προτρέπειν; 4.5.1 προετρέπετο ... πρὸς ἐγκράτειαν (cf. πρακτικωτέρους ἐποίη; the verb προάγειν is not found after 1.4.1). The distinction made initially is gradually given up, with προβιβάζειν and ἄγειν acting as intermediaries.



which is wholly alien to him – as we shall see (section II.5.3), this is not the only time he does so. From I.7.1 onwards προτρέπειν is precisely what had been called προαγαγεῖν at I.4.1.<sup>148</sup> Already in Xenophon, there is an ambiguity in the notion of protreptic which may be perceived more clearly in Stoic theory.<sup>149</sup>

Does the passage under discussion prove that Xenophon knew protreptic as a separate genre? It is certainly not stated in so many words: if some people write that Socrates can only exhort others, that does not mean that there were Socratic exhortations – the words τεκμαιρόμενοι may even seem to tell against the assumption that these existed. Yet when Xenophon invites these critics to examine Socrates' elenctic and didactic discourse he implies that they had hitherto paid attention only to other types of discourse, and it would seem that protreptic speeches are the only possible ones left.

If so, one may tentatively conclude that for Xenophon, 'protreptic' was mainly accusatory exhortation; his instances of Socrates' 'didactic' discourse bear the stamp of advice which Demetrius considers typical of him (section II.1.4.2). The trichotomy accusation, advice, elenchos re-

<sup>148</sup> This becomes obvious as soon as we translate προτρέπειν by 'to exhort' – it makes nonsense of the statements quoted in the previous note. Intuitively I would say that προτρέπειν, like ἀποτρέπειν and πείθειν, has a terminative *Aktionsart*: it denotes an action which aims at a certain goal and has the attainment of this goal for its natural conclusion (cf. Erbse, 'Architektonik' 323). Normally, reaching the goal would be expressed by an aorist form, carrying out the action by a present or imperfect form (cf. I.2.29 Κριτίαν ... ἀπέτρεπε. (30) τοῦ δὲ Κριτίου ... οὐδὲ ἀποτρεπομένου and 4.7.5 ἰσχυρῶς ἀπέτρεπεν). But there may be other determining factors in the context, such as the presence of a plural object, which encourage the present/imperfect even when the goal is attained. Certainly Gigon (*Memorabilien I*, 119–20) is wide of the mark when he translates προτρέψασθαι by 'Aufmerksam-Machen'.

<sup>149</sup> Cf. *SVF* 3.682 μόνον δὲ προτετραφθαι τὸν σοφόν in comparison with 3.761 πρὸς ἕτερα τινὰ μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς προτρέπεται ἢ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν.

curs in Demetrius and in Plato (section II.3.1); Xenophon appears (as the latter do not) to limit protreptic to accusation, because these examples of 'didactic' discourse (I.5; I.7) would appear to us already to border on protreptic speeches.

Certainly attested is the existence of the criticism that Socrates is successful in exhortation but cannot actually lead people to ἀρετή. This is quite specifically the charge levelled against him in the *Clitophon*, as summarised especially in the final sentence (410e5–8 μὴ μὲν γὰρ προτετραμμένωι σε ἀνθρώπωι ὧ Σώκρατες ἄξιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς φήσω, προτετραμμένωι δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι). The impression that Xenophon is actually referring to the *Clitophon* is rather strong. We cannot escape from it by pointing to a text in Cicero adduced by Grote (*Plato*, III 23; *De Oratore* I.47.204 *ut Socratem illum solitum aiunt dicere, perfectum sibi opus esse, si qui satis esset concitatus cohortatione sua ad studium cognoscendae percipiendaeque virtutis; quibus enim id persuasum esset, ut nihil mallent se esse quam bonos viros, eis reliquam facilem esse doctrinam*), because in this passage (presumably a quotation from a lost Socratic dialogue<sup>150</sup>) there is not a trace of criticism.

Nor again is it possible to cast doubt on the relationship between our passage and the *Clitophon* on account of Xenophon's ἐνιοι:<sup>151</sup> it is normal in polemic of this time not to name one's opponent but to call him 'some people' (cf. section II.7.3 of this introduction). So for instance, when Aristotle says (*Politics* 1327b38–40) ὅπερ γὰρ φασί τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φύλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι τῶν

<sup>150</sup> It would fit in quite well in Aesch. *Alc.* between fragments 10 and 11 D. – The parallel Cic. *Ac.* I.4.16 (section II.1.4.2) may suggest that these words are Cicero's own invention, but *solitum aiunt dicere* definitely excludes that possibility.

<sup>151</sup> Grote, *Plato*, III 23; Pavlu, 'Pseudoplat. Kleitophon', 18–9; Souilhé, 178.

γνωρίμων, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνωστὰς ἀγρίους he is quoting directly from Plato, *Republic* 375c1–2.<sup>152</sup> Besides, even if ἔνιοι is taken at face value, it does not exclude the *Clitophon*.

Whereas it may therefore be regarded as certain that the relationship between the *Clitophon* and the preface of Xenophon 1.4 is more than a coincidence (the minimum assumption being that both texts independently preserve a current opinion about Socrates, so Hartlich, 'De exhortationum ... historia', 229–30; Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 19), it does not follow that Xenophon has the *Clitophon* in mind. There remains the possibility that the *Clitophon* is a compilation ('ein Cento aus Texten Platons und anderer Sokratiker', Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 119) and drew among others on the writing which prompted Xenophon's remark (so Gigon; alternatively, it might derive directly from Xenophon, which is essentially the position taken up by Carlini, 'Dialoghi pseudoplatonici'). We shall not be able to judge this possibility until we have compared the parallels which make up the supposed cento and on that basis can form a theory on the intention of the *Clitophon* (sections II.2.4; II.6; II.7.3(4)).

In the meantime the point may be raised here that if indeed Xenophon was inspired by the *Clitophon*, he can hardly have regarded that dialogue as Platonic. The critics of Socrates state their opinion on the basis of an inference (τεκμαίρομενοι), not through first-hand knowledge. This is a highly curious statement if it concerns the major Socratic of the day, who had (to all appearances) been a follower of Socrates rather longer than Xenophon himself. But it is perhaps possible that by ἔνιοι Xenophon actually means the literary character Clitophon. The issue will be treated in section II.7.3(7).

<sup>152</sup> Cf. 1330a1 – R. 416d3–7 and H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (Berlin 1961<sup>2</sup>), 598–9.

II.1.4.2 *Demetrius*, Περὶ ἔρμηνείας 296–8

At the end of his treatment of τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον ἐν λόγῳ (a type of statement or even of whole text in which what we would nowadays call the ‘illocutionary value’ is different from the denotational value), Demetrius offers a more general illustration of how one can convey the same messages in different types of text:

(296) Καθόλου<sup>153</sup> δὲ ὡσπερ τὸν αὐτὸν κηρὸν ὁ μὲν τις κύνα ἔπλασεν, ὁ δὲ βοῦν, ὁ δὲ ἵππον,<sup>154</sup> οὕτως καὶ πρᾶγμα ταῦτὸν ὁ μὲν τις ἀποφαινόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν<sup>155</sup> φησιν ὅτι δὴ “ἄνθρωποι<sup>156</sup> χρήματα μὲν ἀπολείπουσιν τοῖς παισίν,

<sup>153</sup> Demetrius means: apart from the problems of εὐπρέπεια and ἀσφάλεια discussed in the previous sections.

<sup>154</sup> Cf. Cic. *De Or.* 3.45.177; Plin. *Ep.* 7.9.11; Quintil. 10.5.9; Hieron. *Ep.* 53 (*sic*).3 = 3.10.26–11.2 Labourt; J. E. B. Mayor, ‘Demetrius περὶ ἔρμηνείας and Pliny the Younger’, *CR* 17 (1903) 57.

<sup>155</sup> One may doubt whether this means ‘accusing’ (stating – ἀποφαινόμενος (cf. 279) – that people do wrong amounts to accusing them) or ‘affirming’; the translators are divided (W. Rhys Roberts, *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge 1902): ‘in the way of exposition and asseveration’; cf. D. C. Innes in D. A. Russell–M. Winterbottom (eds.), *Ancient Literary Criticism* (Oxford 1972), 215; G. M. A. Grube, *A Greek Critic: Demetrius On Style* (Toronto 1961): ‘in the pointed and accusatory manner of Aristippus’; D. C. Innes in S. Halliwell, *Aristotle Poetics*; W. H. Fyfe–D. Russell, *Longinus On the Sublime*; D. C. Innes, *Demetrius On Style* (Cambridge, Mass.–London 1995)). The comment on the third manner ἠθικῶς (‘tactfully’) καὶ ἐμμελῶς καὶ οὐχὶ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν (297) seems to contrast the third with the first manner, which is an argument for ‘accusing’. If the example of the first manner was really borrowed from the *Clitophon*, that is another argument (cf. 407a7 ἐπιτιμῶν). Finally, if my hypothesis that Demetrius is speaking here about three modes of protreptic is right, then Epictetus’ identification of προτρεπτικός χαρακτήρ and ἐπιπληκτική χώρα (3.23.33–4; 3.21.18–9; cf. n. 164) is a third argument.

<sup>156</sup> ὅτι δὲ ἄνθρωποι the MS, “οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι Spengel, ὅτι οἱ ἄνθρωποι most editors. For the construction φημί ὅτι, which is not found in classical Greek (cf. my discussion in ‘Aeschines’ Miltiades’, 303), cf. Demetr. 6; 23; 138.

ἐπιστήμην δὲ οὐ συναπολείπουσιν τὴν χρησομένην τοῖς ἀπολειφθεῖσι.” τοῦτο δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ λόγου Ἀριστίππειον λέγεται.

ἕτερος δὲ ταῦτο ὑποθετικῶς<sup>157</sup> προοίεται, καθάπερ Ξενοφῶντος τὰ πόλλα, οἷον ὅτι “δεῖ γὰρ οὐ χρήματα μόνον ἀπολιπεῖν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν παισίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τὴν χρησομένην αὐτοῖς.”

(297) τὸ δὲ ἰδίως καλούμενον εἶδος Σωκρατικόν,<sup>158</sup> ὃ μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν ζηλῶσαι Αἰσχίνης καὶ Πλάτων, μεταρρυθμίσει ἂν τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ προειρημένον εἰς ἐρώτησιν ὧδέ πως, οἷον· “ὦ παῖ, πόσα σοι χρήματα ἀπέλειπεν ὁ πατήρ; ἢ πολλά τινα καὶ οὐκ εὐαρίθμητα; – πολλά ὦ Σώκρατες. – ἄρα οὖν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἀπέλιπέν σοι τὴν χρησομένην αὐτοῖς;” ἅμα γὰρ καὶ εἰς ἀπορίαν ἔβαλεν τὸν παῖδα λεληθότως καὶ ἠνέμνησεν ὅτι ἀνεπιστήμων ἐστί, καὶ παιδεύεσθαι προετρέψατο· ταῦτα πάντα ἠθικῶς καὶ ἐμμελῶς, καὶ οὐχὶ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον τοῦτο ἀπὸ Σκυθῶν.

(298) εὐημέρησαν δ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τότε ἐξευρεθέντες τὸ πρῶτον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐξέπληξαν τῷ τε μιμητικῶι καὶ τῷ ἐναργεῖ καὶ τῷ μετὰ μεγαλοφροσύνης νουθητικῶι.

Speaking more generally, just as the same bit of wax is moulded by one man into a dog, by another into an ox, by a third into a horse, so with regard to the same subject-matter one man will state as an accusation ‘people leave their wealth to their children, yet they don’t leave with it the knowledge how to use their legacy’; this type of discourse is called Aristippean.

Another will express the same thought as an advice, as normally in Xenophon: ‘People should not . . .’

The Socratic type in the stricter sense of the phrase, one which was apparently adopted especially by Aeschines and Plato, will reformulate the same subject-matter as a question, for example ‘My boy, how much wealth . . .?’ In this way the

<sup>157</sup> Normal philosophical terminology for ‘advising’, cf. J. Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* (Berlin 1885), I 262–71. LSJ, s.v. (‘by way of suggestion’) seem to overlook this.

<sup>158</sup> ‘The Socratic manner in the stricter sense of the word’, i.e. typically Socratic, as opposed to the manners of all those who may for one reason or another be included in Socratic literature in general. Certainly not ‘the peculiar manner called Socratic’ (Grube).

speaker has at the same time brought the boy into aporia without the latter realising it, has reminded him that he is ignorant, and has exhorted him to have himself instructed. And all this in a personal and harmonious manner, not as the saying goes 'in the Scythian mode'.

This type of speech met with great success when it was first invented, and they made a deeper impression than the others through their truth to life, their vividness and their man-of-the-world criticism.

In the analysis of this passage it is generally overlooked that it is a sort of epilegomenon to the treatment of τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον. We have to do not so much with three genres of philosophical literature or even of philosophy, as with one idea which can be framed in three different ways, each connected with a Socratic author (or in the latter case authors).

Now, it would seem that the idea as stated in the first form is considered by Demetrius to be of a protreptic nature. So much can be derived, I think, from his comment on the 'typically Socratic' manner: if this manner is 'not after the proverbial Scythian fashion',<sup>159</sup> then something else must be, and this can hardly be anything but the first manner. If, then, the speaker in the third manner is said to bring about aporia and to exhort his addressee to education *at the same time*, I understand Demetrius to mean that in the first manner there is a harsher sort of protreptic without aporia. This impression is reinforced by his remark that Socratic writings in the stricter sense became immensely popular and μάλλον ἐξέπληξαν (were more shocking) on account of (among other things) τῶι μετὰ μεγαλοφροσύνης νουθετικῶι (admonition with nobility, man-of-the-world criticism); apparently, the first type of discourse had less effect and, while being equally admonishing, lacked nobility. These comments closely resemble

<sup>159</sup> Cf. 216 for a parallel expression.

those contained in 279, where Demetrius states that questions sometimes achieve more δεινότης than statements (καθάπερ γὰρ εἰς ἀπορίαν ἄγει τὸν ἀκούοντα ἐξελεγχόμενῳ εἰκότα καὶ μηδὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι ἔχοντι).

The three types distinguished by Demetrius and his comments on the first and third types coincide to a remarkable degree with statements found in Plato's *Sophist* (section II.3.1); the tripartite division is partly akin to the one found in Xenophon.

It may be thought strange that the interpretation of the Socratic dialogue (at any rate the aporetic dialogue) as having a protreptic intention was already existent in antiquity (quite probably as early as the third century BCE<sup>160</sup>). Yet Demetrius is not our only witness for this concept. The related but not identical view that Plato's dialogues had a protreptic effect on many is stated in so many words by Dicaearchus.<sup>161</sup> And the conviction that the writings of the Socratics and especially of Plato give us an essentially protreptic picture of Socrates is expressed in Cicero's *Academica Posteriora* (I.4.16).

The Socrates of aporia and elenchos (*ut nihil affirmet ipse, refellat alios*) is there said in so many words to be protreptic

<sup>160</sup> Though scholarly opinion about Demetrius' date is very divided, there seems to be a consensus nowadays that his doctrines reflect 'an early stage . . . in the development of Greek literary theories' (D. M. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius On Style* (Amsterdam 1964), 117). Cf. D. C. Innes in S. Halliwell et al., op. cit. (n. 155), 313–21.

<sup>161</sup> Quoted by Philodemus (*Acad. Ind.*; *PHerc* 1021 col. I.11–15), cf. K. Gaiser, *Philodems Academica. Die Berichte über Platon und die Alte Akademie in zwei herkulanensischen Papyri* (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt 1988), 148; T. Dorandi, *Filodemo, Storia dei Filosofi: Platone e l'Accademia* (Naples 1991), 125; προετρέψατο μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρους ὡς εἰπεῖν ἐπ' αὐτὴν διὰ τῆς ἀναγραφῆς τῶν λόγων. Cf. K. Gaiser, 'La biografia di Platone in Filodemo: Nuovi dati dal PHerc. 1021', *CErc* 13 (1983) 53–62. Gaiser goes far astray when he claims Dicaearchus' support for his own esoteric views (*CErc*, 61–2). More generally, the passage is often taken to say that the *intention* of Plato's dialogues was protreptic, which is obviously false.

(*omnis eius oratio tantum in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis [= προτρέπειν] consumebatur*), and the emphasis is so clearly on Socratic writings that it is beyond reasonable doubt that we have here a glimpse of the same theory of the protreptic character of Socratic literature that is found in Demetrius. We happen to know that this part of Cicero's book was derived from Antiochus of Ascalon (most probably from his *Sosos*).<sup>162</sup> In this case, Cicero's often-quoted words 'ἀπόγραφα *sunt* etc.' should be taken seriously; it is not implausible that they refer precisely to the *Academica*.<sup>163</sup>

We may connect Antiochus' description of the Socratic dialogue as an exhortation to virtue with the Middle Academic view of Plato and Socrates as sceptics: what may have been taken by others as dogmatism in the form of question-and-answer (and therefore may have been a cause of embarrassment for Arcesilaus and his followers) might conceivably have been explained away as protreptic. There is a slight indication for this possibility in the same passage from Cicero, when Antiochus' exposé of the history of dogmatism continues: *ita facta est, quod minime Socrates probabat, ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae* (I.4.17).<sup>164</sup>

<sup>162</sup> Cf. I.4.13 (*scripserit*); 14; 12.43; *Att.* 13.12.3–4; 16.1; 18.3; 21.4; *Fam.* 9.8.1. See A. Lueder, *Die philosophische Persönlichkeit des Antiochus von Askalon* (Göttingen 1940), 12–13; J. Glucker, *Antiochus and the Late Academy* (Göttingen 1978), 419; id., 'Socrates in the Academic books and other Ciceronian works', in B. Inwood–J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's Academic Books* (Leiden 1997), 58–88, esp. 71–5.

<sup>163</sup> *Att.* 12.52.3; Glucker, *Antiochus*, 406–12.

<sup>164</sup> For reasons of space I cannot discuss various texts from Epict. (esp. 3.23.33–4; 3.21.18–19) in which philosophical discourse in general is trichotomised. These passages have been related to Demetrius' three εἶδη by E. G. Schmidt, 'Die drei Arten des Philosophierens. Zur geschichte einer antiken Stil- und Methodenscheidung', *Philologus* 106 (1962) 14–28; A. Carlini, 'Osservazioni sui tre εἶδη τοῦ λόγου in Ps.-Demetrio, De eloc. 296sg.', *RFIC* 96 (1968) 38–46. The main



Whatever the origin of the theory found in Demetrius and Antiochus, it must be stressed that it is not a theory concerning philosophical protreptic in its totality. Exhortation to philosophy (protreptic in the stricter sense) is not touched upon. It may, however, be maintained that the passage from Demetrius is the outcome of a process of reflection on ethical protreptic; the similarity to the theory contained in Plato's *Sophist* suggests that there existed a theory in which three types of moral exhortation were distinguished: accusation, advice, elenchos. It is impossible to pass judgement on the connection of the first type with Aristippus; the advising type (which comes close to, and is probably identical with, paraenesis) is rightly connected with Xenophon, especially with what we have called 'didactic'. Demetrius' example starts with the verb δεῖ; the frequency of this word in Xenophon (as compared to Plato) has often been observed (statistics in Joël, *Der echte ... Sokrates*, I 467). Grouping together Plato and Aeschines under the heading of interrogation and aporia is only superficially right: implicit and explicit protreptic have not been sufficiently distinguished in this theory (see further section II.3.5).

Demetrius' example ἄνθρωποι χρήματα μὲν ἀπολείπουσιν τοῖς παισίν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ οὐ συναπολείπουσιν τὴν χρησομένην τοῖς ἀπολειφθεῖσι is strongly reminiscent of the opening of Socrates' speech in the *Clitophon*, cf. es-

stumbling-block is Demetrius' εἶδος ὑποθετικόν; this cannot be identified with any of the three χαρακτῆρες of Epict. See further my paper 'Protreptic in ancient theories of philosophical literature'.

– If Demetrius considered elenchos part of protreptic, his second εἶδος (what I have defined in section II.1.1 as paraenesis) must have been likewise regarded as part of protreptic. There are some parallels, cf. Posid. fr. 176 E.-K.; Schol. ad Demosth. 1.24 = 8.66.16–67.6 Dindorf, though normally protreptic and paraenesis are kept apart in ancient theory: Stob. 2.44.14–5 W.-H. (Eudorus); Aristo, *SVF* I.356–7; Plu. 798b; Clem. Al. *Protr.* 11.113.1; *Paed.* 1.1.1.1; cf. also [Isoc.] 1.5 and section II.1.1.

pecially τῶν δ' ὑέων οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσετε <\*\*\*> ὅπως ἐπιστήσονται χρῆσθαι δικαίως τούτοις (407b3–4; as we shall see, these words are a combination of two protreptic motifs found first in the *Clitophon* – section II.2.3.1). If this were the only verbal resemblance between the two texts, any explanation would do.<sup>165</sup> But it can be shown that elsewhere Demetrius draws upon the *Clitophon*;<sup>166</sup> therefore, I submit the hypothesis that in this passage he depends on our dialogue as well.

<sup>165</sup> Most scholars suppose that Demetrius' words, being presented as an instance of the εἶδος Ἀριστίππειον, are in fact a quotation from Aristippus (fr. 21 Mannebach; *SSR* IV A 148); if this were true, the *Protrepticus* would have been a good guess. Cf. P. Natorp, *PW* s.v. Aristippos 8), 905; L. Radermacher, *Demetrii Phalerei qui dicitur De elocutione libellus* (Leipzig 1901), 121; W. Rhys Roberts, *op. cit.* (n. 155), 258; W. Nestle, *Die Sokratiker* (Jena 1922), 35. Cf. contra: Dittmar (*Aischines*, 115 n. 48) and G. Giannantoni, *I Cirenaici* (Florence n.d. (1958)), 67–8. Carlini (cf. previous note) first proposed the *Clitophon* as the source; this is accepted by D. C. Innes in S. Halliwell et al., *op. cit.* (n. 155), 519 n.

<sup>166</sup> 232: ὁ δὲ γνωμολογῶν καὶ προτρεπόμενος οὐ δι' ἐπιστολῆς ἔτι λαλοῦντι ἔοικεν ἀλλ' ἀ<πὸ> μηχανῆς (the insertion of ἀπό (Ruhnkenius–Cobet) is necessary, as διὰ μηχανῆς λαλεῖν makes no sense). The combination of protreptic and the expression ἀπὸ μηχανῆς is striking. This expression is applied metaphorically to (1) people who act from a higher level than their surroundings, cf. Alexis fr. 131.5–9 K.–A.; (2) unexpected help, cf. Schol. *Clit.* 407a8 (wrongly of course); *Paroem.* 1.210; 2.21; 2.297; *An. Bachm.* 2.336–7; D. 40.59; *P. Hamb.* 656.12–3 (cf. Gomme–Sandbach ad loc.); Men. fr. 226 K.; 278 K.; Luc. *Herm.*, 86; *Philops.* 29; Aristid. *Or.* 31.14 K.; Hld. 10.39.2; Eust. 1.300.4 v.d. Valk; *An. Ox.* 3.206.18; (3) people who deliver protreptic speeches, cf. *Clit.*; D. Chr. *Or.* 13.14 (depending on *Clit.*, section II.2.1.1); Them. *Or.* 26.320d (depending on *Clit.*, section II.2.1.2); Demetr., loc. cit; perhaps Aristid. *Or.* 28.54 with a reminiscence of *Clit.* (cf. M. Davies, 'Alcman fr. 106 again', *RhM* 135 (1992) 94). There is a good reason to suppose that (3) was not a widespread usage. D. Chr. quotes the phrase with the express addition of ὡς ἔφη τῆς. Besides, both Ps.–Plu. 4e and Them. loc. cit. misunderstood the expression in *Clit.*, supposing that it was meant in sense (1). As (3) was used for the first time in *Clit.*, not in a source, if any (section II.2.1), Demetr. is directly or indirectly dependent on that dialogue.

II.1.5 *The development of philosophical protreptic*

In the fourth century, explicit philosophical protreptic appears to have been the domain of Socratic philosophers (if Aristotle may be included among them). As I have already remarked (section II.1.1), this explains why exhortation to virtue and to the care of the soul (ἐπιμέλεια; the most central concept of fourth-century protreptic, cf. II.2.2 n. 188) coincides with exhortation to philosophy (that these were identical was noticed by Dio Chrysostom, 13.28: καὶ οὕτως δὴ παρεκάλει [Socrates] πρὸς τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ προσέχειν αὐτῶι τὸν νοῦν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν.<sup>167</sup> ἦιδει γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο ζητοῦντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιήσουσιν ἢ φιλοσοφῆσουσι. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ὅπως τις ἔσται καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν). In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates asks the eristics to show by their exhortation that it is necessary σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι (278d2–3); he first gives a demonstration of his own, of which the outcome is ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν (282d1).

Still, the accent may have been put by various writers on either. If Antisthenes' first three Προτρεπτικοί were indeed entitled Περί δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας, his exhortation was primarily ethical, and the sub-title Περί Θεόγνιδος certainly points that way.<sup>168</sup> Philosophy is not named

<sup>167</sup> καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν (usually bracketed) is indispensable. The first γὰρ is only explicable if in the preceding sentence ἐπιμελεῖσθαι and φιλοσοφεῖν have been identified.

<sup>168</sup> Presumably Antisthenes used some lines from Theognis as a starting-point for protreptic discussions. It is interesting to note that in his Περί τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι, Chrysippus (Plu. 1039ef = *SVF* 3.167) mentions Antisthenes' dictum δεῖν κτᾶσθαι βούν ἢ βρόχον (fr. 67 Caizzi; *SSR* v A 105 – to the parallels collected by Caizzi, p. 111, add *Clit.* 408a4–7; Arist. *Protr.* B 110 Düring) together with a correction of two lines of Theognis (175–6), which (in their corrected form) point the same moral, though it must be stressed that Plutarch considers the correction to be Chrysippus' own.

in Socrates' protreptic speeches in the *Apology* (nor, for that matter, in the *Clitophon*). The anonymous critic or critics reported by Xenophon criticised Socrates for being able only to exhort others to ἀρετή. The protreptic dialogue exhorts to ἐπιμέλεια, philosophy is mentioned, if at all, only in passing.<sup>169</sup> Finally, Isocrates' criticism (15.84–5; section II.1.1) seems to ignore exhortation to philosophy (in the stricter sense).

On the other hand, Aristotle's *Protrepticus* is a clear specimen of philosophical protreptic in the stricter sense, to which protreptic was to be restricted eventually. This is clear not only from the frequency of the word φιλοσοφητέον but first and foremost from its content. 'The 'wisdom' of the *Protrepticus* is . . . not so much the science of virtue of the Socratic dialogue as a theoretical science dealing with nature, truth, and things divine' (Einarson, 'Epinomis', 265–6). Since the Socratics (including Plato) held, as Aristotle did not, that virtue may only be attained through the possession of ethical knowledge (whatever its nature), this specialisation, which we find from Aristotle onwards, is natural. Once the Socratic paradox 'virtue is knowledge' has been abandoned, exhortation to virtue and exhortation to philosophy become two different things. The first protreptic conversation of the *Euthydemus*, by which Aristotle was strongly influenced (cf. Einarson, 'Epinomis', 264–5), foreshadows this transition. Though the scarcity of our material does not inspire much confidence, it appears to me a likely hypothesis that protreptic to philosophy sets in later than, and develops out of, protreptic in the wider, ethical sense. This development is illustrated by the different use of the phrase 'using one's soul' in the *Clitophon* and in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, cf. Comm. on 408a5 ψυχῆι . . . χρῆσθαι.

<sup>169</sup> X. *Mem.* 4.2.23; no occurrence in *Alc. 1*; its absence from the fragments of Aesch. *Alc.* says nothing.

It would appear, although we are here on thin ice, that a difference in form runs more or less parallel to this difference in content. Ethical protreptic, perhaps, had mainly an accusing character. Xenophon probably restricts protreptic to accusation and of Socrates' protreptic speeches reported in Plato's *Apology* one at least (29d7–e3) is clearly reprobatory. When we learn that Antisthenes' Προτρεπτικοί were among his most rhetorical works (D.L. 6.1), it is possible to infer that rhetoric and accusation went hand in hand in these works (as they do in the *Clitophon*). Even the protreptic dialogue seems to support this hypothesis: though it employs elenchos and is opposed as such (together with Plato's dialogues) to accusing protreptic by Demetrius, there is always a central moment of reproof. The diatribe, successor of ethical protreptic,<sup>170</sup> quite often has an accusatory character.

This character would seem to be inconsistent with philosophical protreptic in the stricter sense, and the facts bear this out. The first protreptic conversation in the *Euthydemus* and Aristotle's *Protrepticus* seek to convince by argument, not by (negative) statements (ἀποφαινόμενος) or thundering speeches (κατηγορῶν).<sup>171</sup>

Much more could be said about the subject; more will be said on Plato's evaluation of protreptic. The relationship between Aristotle's *Protrepticus* and Plato's theory and practice of protreptic (both explicit and implicit), the phil-

<sup>170</sup> Cf. the dangers with this term as set out in section II.1.1 n. 104. The fact that the diatribe is not a separate genre in ancient theories of philosophical literature may explain why theories of protreptic always treat protreptic as ethical, as I point out in my paper 'Protreptic in ancient theories' (cf. section II.1.4.2 n. 164).

<sup>171</sup> The role of Demetrius' advising 'character' is difficult to grasp, because it blurs the distinction between protreptic and paraenesis. Pl. *Ap.* 36c5–d1 seems to belong under this heading, as do some passages from the general preamble to the laws (*Lg.* 726a5–727b4; 729a2–b2). See also on 407d8–e2.

osophical considerations which prompted Aristotle to take up a genre which his teacher had condemned, the difference in using protreptic motifs between Aristotle and his predecessors, the structural similarities and differences between the protreptic dialogue and the protreptic conversations in the *Euthydemus*, and the light these may shed on the reconstruction of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, are promising objects for further research. But as we are concerned here with the interpretation of the *Clitophon*, I shall now turn to that dialogue (section II.2; the place of the *Clitophon* within the development discussed will be treated in section II.7.1).

## II.2 Protreptic in the *Clitophon*

I use as a working hypothesis the assumption that Socrates' protreptic speech is intended as a parody. It has been shown already (section I.5.3) that Clitophon's report of it is surrounded by clear marks of irony – these and Clitophon's own evaluation of Socrates' exhortation (410b6–7 τοσοῦτον μόνον δύνασθαι, μακρότερον δὲ οὐδέν) constitute the justification for this hypothesis. A definite judgement must wait until Plato's attitude towards protreptic has been studied (section II.3).

We must ask at the outset whether one item in the protreptic corpus is being parodied throughout, or various motifs from various protreptic texts are being mixed together into a protreptic *pastiche*. The question cannot be answered with absolute certainty, as our knowledge of protreptic literature is limited. There are, however, strong *prima facie* indications for the second alternative, so much so that the burden of proof lies with those who claim that the *Clitophon* derives from one specific source. I shall first discuss two such claims, then study the structure of the protreptic speech; subsequently I shall make observations

on the various protreptic motifs as we encounter them within the speech.

### II.2.1 *The Clitophon derived from one source*

#### II.2.1.1 *The Clitophon and Dio's thirteenth Oration*

In the thirteenth *Oration*, Ἐν Ἀθήναις περὶ φυγῆς, Dio relates how during his exile he came to be regarded as a philosopher and many urged him to utter his views on moral problems (13.10–12). Therefore he referred ἐπὶ τινα λόγον ἀρχαῖον, λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τινος Σωκράτους, ὃν οὐδέποτε ἐκεῖνος ἐπαύσατο λέγων [cf. Comm. on 407a6 πολλάκις] πανταχοῦ τε καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας [cf. section 1.5.2 ad fin.] βοῶν καὶ διατεινόμενος [‘straining his voice’; a misunderstanding of 407a8 ὑμνοῖς; cf. ad loc.] ... ὥσπερ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός, ὡς ἔφη τις [see note 174] ... καὶ ἡξιούν, ἂν ἄρα μὴ δύνωμαι ἀπομνημονεύεσθαι ἀκριβῶς ἀπάντων τῶν ῥημάτων μηδὲ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας, ἀλλὰ πλεόν ἢ ἔλαττον εἶπω τι, συγγνώμην ἔχειν (13.14–15 – these words smack of excessive modesty; they could be an excuse for almost any degree of modification).

The speech which follows, up to 13.17 ἀμεινον οἰκήσειν τὴν πόλιν, reads as a close paraphrase of *Clitophon* 407b1–c2 μεμαθηκότας – after that, it has little in common with our dialogue; it goes on and on, developing the same theme of the insufficiency of the present curriculum up to 13.28. A second speech follows, presented as Dio's own imitation of Socrates' speech; its central theme is a motif found also in the *Clitophon*, but carefully left out of the first speech: the search for teachers of justice.

Following a suggestion made by Hirzel,<sup>172</sup> von Arnim claimed that both Dio and the author of the *Clitophon* use one of the three *Protreptici* of Antisthenes. As Dio mentions the battle of Cnidus (13.26), this source must have been

<sup>172</sup> *Dialog*, I 118 n. 1; cf. K. Joël, ‘Der λόγος Σωκρατικός’, 64–5.

written after, and not long after, 394 BCE. Dio is thought to follow Antisthenes closely, whereas the *Clitophon* offers a short recapitulation.<sup>173</sup>

Probably the most decisive argument against von Arnim's thesis is the presence of various reminiscences of the *Clitophon* throughout the thirteenth *Oration*. The characterisation of Socrates as a θεὸς ἀπὸ μηχανῆς is the most important and destructive one: this expression must, as von Arnim admits, have been used by Antisthenes himself. What seems a highly functional element of ridicule in the *Clitophon* now becomes, at best, a clumsy indication of eulogy.<sup>174</sup>

I have indicated other parallels in the critical apparatus. Two of the results of justice as defined in the discussion of Clitophon and Socrates' pupils (τὸ συμφέρον and ὁμόνοια) are referred to in Dio 13.19; probably, too, the closing words of the *Clitophon* are echoed in Dio 13.35. If all this was already in one source of the *Clitophon*, we are driven to

<sup>173</sup> *Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa* (Berlin 1898), 256–60. The similarity of Dio 13 and *Clit.* was first seen by Hartlich ('De exhortationum . . . historia', 314–15) and P. Hagen, 'Zu Antisthenes', *Philologus* 50 (1891) 381–4. J. Wegehaupt, *De Dione Chrysostomo Xenophontis sectatore* (Gothae 1896), 56–64 had argued extensively for direct dependence of Dio on *Clit.* Von Arnim's hypothesis (adopted by Joël, *Der echte . . . Sokrates*, I 483–5; Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, II 545; H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 287 n. 1) is nowadays usually accepted in treatments of Antisthenes or Dio (R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* (Uppsala 1948), 171–3; Caizzi, *Antisthenis fragmenta*, 92–3; K. Döring, *Exemplum Socratis* (Wiesbaden 1979), 86 n. 20; 90 n. 25; P. Desideri, *Dione di Prusa* (Messina–Florence 1978), 220–1; 253 n. 3), while authors on *Clit.* dismiss it (Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 10–11; Geffcken, 'Rätsel', 430–1) or ignore it altogether (e.g. Brünnecke, 'Kleitophon wider Sokrates'; Souilhé); only H. Thesleff, *Studies in Platonic Chronology* (Helsinki 1982), 206 accepts it, without arguments.

<sup>174</sup> Besides, the words ὡς ἔφη τις in Dio are, as always in this author, a reference to an utterance of a character within a literary text, not to a comment made by its author. Cf. 24.3 (= 2.347.23–4 de Budé) with Pl. *Euthd.* 305c6–7 (Prodicus); 1.13 (= 1.3.25–6) with Pl. *R.* 421b3 and 345c5 (Socrates); 18.4 (= 2.315.19–20) with Pl. *Phdr.* 242c3–5 (Socrates).



the assumption that the whole of the *Clitophon* is an extract of a larger but wholly similar work. In that case, von Arnim's thesis cannot be falsified any more and should therefore be abandoned.

If the whole of 13.16–27 is in essence (apart from rephrasing on Dio's part) a fourth-century text, there are some features which seem strange at best, whereas they are perfectly plausible if regarded as Dio's own variations on a fourth-century theme (to wit, the *Clitophon*). At 13.24 the Persians are praised for their education because they thought it disgusting to strip and to spit in public – would any fourth-century Greek have considered the observance of these taboos a mark of παιδεία?<sup>175</sup> Towards the end of the speech (13.27–8), philosophy is defined as the science of living the life of a καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; this is predominantly a concept of later Stoicism.<sup>176</sup> In 13.28 Dio says that Socrates eschewed the word φιλοσοφεῖν. It so happens that it is absent from the *Clitophon* (as are φιλόσοφος, -ία), and Dio was an acute reader. All the same, the dissimulation of the term φιλόσοφος is typical of practical philosophy of Dio's own time.<sup>177</sup>

I therefore conclude that Dio used the *Clitophon* for the nucleus of his Socratic speech, and embellished it with various motifs culled from everywhere.<sup>178</sup>

<sup>175</sup> It would fit in well with Dio's time, cf. Plin. *NH* 7.19.80: Antonia minor is said *numquam expuisse*.

<sup>176</sup> Cf. Sen. *Ep.* 117.12; 95.7; 90.27.

<sup>177</sup> Epict. *Diss.* 3.21.23; 4.1.113; 4.8 passim, esp. 17; *Ench.* 46.1; cf. 23. See too D. Chr. 13.11.

<sup>178</sup> Similarly, 3.1; 29–42 purports to be a Socratic dialogue. 3.1 is derived from *Grg.* 470d5–e11, the continuation is evidently Dio's own invention. Cf. (contra) Wegehaupt, op. cit. (n. 173), 64; Höistad, op. cit. (n. 173), 182–9; Döring, op. cit. (n. 173), 105–6. At 1.66–83, Dio has integrated Prodicus' allegory of Heracles at the crossroads, borrowed from X. *Mem.* 2.1.21–34, into a much larger passage of his own making (contra: Höistad, op. cit. (n. 173), 150–6).

II.2.1.2 *The Clitophon and Themistius' twenty-sixth Oration*

In a fair number of publications, H. Kesters has stated and defended his conviction, that what we know as Themistius' twenty-sixth *Oration* is in fact a work from the fourth century BCE, intended as an attack on a first version of the *Phaedrus*<sup>179</sup> and on a proto-*Republic*.<sup>180</sup> Plato is supposed to have answered this attack in supplements to *Phaedrus* and *Republic* as well as in *Protagoras* and *Clitophon*.

Kesters' theories cut across the consensus concerning the chronology of Plato's writings, and require the assumptions that Themistius introduced the names of e.g. Aristotle, Epicurus and Carneades in order to 'modernise' his fourth-century source, and that he also modified line-ends in order to get clausulae which do not violate Meyer's Law.

Themistius gives a slightly condensed and modified version of Socrates' protreptic speech as reported in the *Clitophon*. According to Kesters, this version is the original one; what we read in the *Clitophon* is Plato's quotation of it.

Now, both *Clitophon* and Themistius change from direct to indirect speech at the end of the first part of the protreptic λόγος. In the *Clitophon*, where Socrates is being confronted with his own words, the indirect speech naturally depends on the second person singular (καὶ ὁπότεν αὖ φῆις . . . καὶ ὅταν λέγηις, 407e5; e8). In Themistius, on the other hand, the second person singular would seem to be the result of Themistius' carelessness in adapting the quotation from the *Clitophon*: the direct speech is put into the mouth of Philosophy herself, who is nowhere apostrophised. Kesters tries to save his case by postulating an impersonal use for the second person singular (*Antisthène* 80),

<sup>179</sup> To wit, up to 272 of *Phdr.* as we now have it.

<sup>180</sup> Consisting of Books 2–4 and maybe 8–9 of our *Republic*.

but in contexts where there is no true dialogue this use seems to be non-existent in Greek.<sup>181</sup>

Secondly, it is precisely in the protreptic speech, which Themistius has in common with the *Clitophon*, that there are several grave infractions of Meyer's Law, which is elsewhere in the twenty-sixth *Oration* (as in all of Themistius' works) rigidly observed.<sup>182</sup> Kesters' explanation of this state of affairs<sup>183</sup> shows how shaky his whole theory is: Themistius, who allegedly rephrased the whole of a speech by Antisthenes (or another fourth-century author), refrained from doing so in this passage because he knew it was present also in the *Clitophon*: in order to cover up his alleged plagiarism he treated the protreptic speech as if it were a quotation from Plato, and he did so by not applying Meyer's Law precisely there.

No further comment is needed, but I would like to say that Kesters' interest in the *Clitophon* has also led to positive results. He was, to give one example, the first scholar to note that the plan of the third part of Socrates' speech was derived from *Republic* 1 (discovered independently by Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 143 n. 156); cf. section II.2.3.3.

### II.2.2 *The structure of the protreptic speech*

The composition of Socrates' protreptic speech is curious, inasmuch as it shows a remarkable lack of congruence

<sup>181</sup> Cf. KG I 557 Anm. 3; Schw.-D. 244; Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, I 109-10. The instances adduced from ps.-X. *Resp. Ath.* are to be explained from the semi-dialogical character of the work; cf. also *R.* 557e2-558a2.

<sup>182</sup> 1.134.5 (Downey-Norman) ὑμῖν ἔσται; 12-3 νῦν παιδεύσεως; 21 τοῦτου χρῆσιν; 135.4 ἔστιν ἄρα. In parts which do not correspond verbatim to the *Clitophon* there are no infractions; 1.134.21-2 χρῆσθαι φαρμάκοις appears to have been preferred to φαρμάκοις χρῆσθαι (cf. *Clit.* 407e10 ὀφθαλμοῖς χρῆσθαι) in deference to this rule, for which cf. E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig 1923<sup>4</sup>), II 922-3.

<sup>183</sup> *Platoons Phaidros als strijdschrift*, Leuven 1931, 64 n. 45.

between expression and content. If one looks at its form, there are clearly two distinct parts, viz. 407b1–e2 and e5–408b5 (section 1.2). These are set off from each other not only by the fact that the former is in *oratio recta*, the latter in *oratio obliqua*, but also by the use of (progressive) αῦ and the phrase τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ in 407e5. An examination of what Socrates is actually saying seems to confirm this division at first sight: there is hardly any relation between the direct speech and the reported (apart from ἕτερόν τι . . . τοιοῦτον 407e6–7, which refers back to the previous section; cf. ad loc.). But the part in *oratio obliqua* is far from being a unity: by far the greater part of it deals with the principle that you must leave alone what you cannot handle (stated 407e8–9, worked out in the rest of the speech) – yet the words which precede the statement of this principle have no connection whatsoever with it: the words καὶ ὁπότεν . . . ἐσπουδακέναι (407e5–8), though not even separated from the following by sentence end (cf. ad loc.), constitute an entirely independent whole, which has nothing to do with the last part any more than with the first part of the speech. As far as I know, Brünnecke ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 451–2) and Kesters (*Kérygmes*, 39–44) are the only ones to observe the tripartite form; the speech is usually stated to be bipartite (so Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', esp. 11).

It is not very hard to see why the *oratio recta* is abandoned at the end of the first part. Socrates had been vituperating all mankind for being interested only in wealth (407b2–3 χρημάτων μὲν περί τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ἔχετε) – he could not very well go on to accuse them at the same time of attaching too much importance to the ἐπιμέλεια τοῦ σώματος, which is the subject of the second part (e5–8). Yet the author apparently wished to make this accusation within the same speech (e5 τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ; hence I suspect that ὁ λόγος οὗτος (408a4–5) refers to the whole speech, not to the last part beginning with καὶ ὅταν λέγηις,

407e8), instead of making Clitophon report three separate speeches by Socrates, so the provisional end at e2 and a few words of appreciation before the speech went on in a reported form were necessary to mask the discontinuity.

Our author must have had rather a strong reason for lumping together three unrelated exhortations into one speech. This reason I take to be his wish to give the speech a structure which itself reflects a theme not unknown to protreptic literature: the hierarchic scale of values  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha - \sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha - \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ . This scale is worked out extensively in *Alcibiades 1*, where  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  is equated with Man himself (130e8–9  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \kappa\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon\iota \gamma\nu\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\alpha\iota \delta\epsilon \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\tau\acute{\alpha}\tau\tau\omega\nu \gamma\nu\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha\iota \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}\nu$ ), body is  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$  (131a2 and passim), wealth  $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\iota \pi\omicron\rho\rho\omega\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omega \tau\tilde{\omega}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$  (131c1; cf. a11) or  $\tau\acute{\alpha} \tau\tilde{\omega}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$  (133e1–2; cf. d8; d12). It is reflected in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (B 2 Düring – elsewhere only body and soul are opposed: B 17, B 59). This trichotomy of values is genuinely Platonic;<sup>184</sup> a very similar one ( $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha - \tau\iota\mu\acute{\eta} - \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ ) is one of the key doctrines in the *Apology*<sup>185</sup> and the *Phaedo*.

There is in Plato one passage which also is constructed so as to reflect this trichotomy. I refer to the first part of the general proem to the laws concerning mankind in *Laws* 5. This passage, the protreptic character of which has been

<sup>184</sup> Cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 137–8, on *Ap.* 30a7–b4, a passage which belongs to the protreptic corpus as defined in section II.1.3; *Phlb.* 48d8–e10, where it is coupled, as in *Alc. 1*, with the Delphic maxim; *Mx.* 246d8–e7; *Lg.* 697b2–6 – where, incidentally, Iamblichus found his division into  $\pi\rho\tilde{\omega}\tau\alpha, \delta\epsilon\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\alpha, \tau\rho\acute{\iota}\tau\alpha$  (*Protr.* 59.5–6 des Places), which precedes an extract from *Clit.*; 743e3–6; *Ep.* 8 355b2–6. Cf. also Arist. *Protr.* B 52 Düring (which I reject, cf. section II.1.3 n. 126). In these places the order is clearly a hierarchy; there are many more places where  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\alpha\tau\alpha, \sigma\tilde{\omega}\mu\alpha, \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  are simply juxtaposed, cf. Meyer, *Apologie*, 98 n. 92; Gauthier–Jolif on *EN* 1098b12–14.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 135–40 and the references given there; 233–5.

stressed by several scholars,<sup>186</sup> is announced at the end of Book 4 as follows: τὰ περὶ τὰς αὐτῶν ψυχὰς καὶ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς οὐσίας (724a7–8). The proem itself starts off with reflections on the soul (726a1–728c8), continues with the body (728c9–e5) and wealth (728e5–729b2). The last passage ends with the value of riches for children (παισὶν δὲ αἰδῶ χρή πολλήν, οὐ χρυσὸν καταλείπειν) and Plato continues with other precepts on the behaviour towards the young, friends and relations, the πόλις, strangers, and finally a long sermon on personal behaviour (730b1–734e2). Though the structure of the general proem is more complex than that of the protreptic speech in the *Clitophon*, it is clear that Plato started this preamble with a pattern identical to that of our protreptic speech (cf. especially the announcing words), though in inverse order, and appended the rest of what he had to say after he had mentioned the young.

The similarity in pattern could be a coincidence but for the words already quoted: παισὶν δὲ αἰδῶ χρή πολλήν, οὐ χρυσὸν καταλείπειν (729b1–2). These words stand at the very end of the trichotomic pattern in the general proem whereas nearly the same thought is found at the beginning of Socrates' protreptic speech. (Cf. sections II.2.4 and n. 234; II.7.1(2).)

Although the trichotomy is usually said to be traditional (or even Pythagorean and 'Orphic'), there is no indication that it did not originate with Plato or Socrates. Of course, the identification of ψυχή with man himself is not novel (cf. *HGPh*, III 467–70), but the higher status of the body as compared with wealth certainly is (Meyer, *Apologie*, 98 rightly says: 'Von Bedeutung ist, dass Körper und Besitz

<sup>186</sup> Wilamowitz uses the term 'Predigt', *Platon*, I 545–6; 553–4; cf. Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 214–17; T. J. Saunders, *Plato, The Laws* (Harmondsworth 1970), 187, who alone gives a correct articulation of this preamble.

nicht als slechthin wertlos dargestellt werden – das wäre kynisch –’. The statement is just as valid if one substitutes ‘Pythagorean’ or ‘Orphic’ for ‘kynisch’).<sup>187</sup>

Our author used the trichotomy as a formal pattern for Socrates’ speech, to be filled in with various protreptic motifs. Thus, under the head of χρήματα a number of thoughts on wealth, justice, education are brought together into a rather coherent argument – all of these thoughts occur elsewhere in protreptic literature. What is said in the short passage on σῶμα returns in *Alcibiades 1* and elsewhere. The last part of the speech combines the motif of ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι with several themes of the Alcibiades dialogues.

I think we have discovered here an important feature of our author’s method of parody: he uses patterns taken over from other Socratic literature in order to furnish them with protreptic motifs unrelated to this patterns. We

<sup>187</sup> In other protreptic literature, the external ἀγαθά are lumped together indiscriminately and opposed to the ἀρετὴ τῆς ψυχῆς. So in the *Apology*, which has a formula ἑαυτὸν – τὰ ἑαυτοῦ (36c5–6) related to, but incompatible with, the trichotomy ἑαυτὸν – τὰ ἑαυτοῦ – τὰ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ found in *Alc. 1*. (Of course, two versions of the trichotomy are also found in the *Apology*, cf. above.) The *Euthydemus* contrasts a whole set of ἀγαθά (which afterwards prove αὐτὰ καθ’ αὐτά . . . οὐδενὸς ἄξια, 281d8–e1), τοῦ πλουτεῖν (279a7); ὑγιαίνειν, καλὸν εἶναι, τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἰκανῶς παρεσκευάσθαι (a8–b2); εὐγένεια, δύναμεις, τιμαί (b2–3), σώφρονα εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀνδρεῖον (b5; tacitly dropped later on because they would upset the conclusion 281d8–e1 quoted above) with σοφία. X. *Mem.* 4.2.31–5 proposes ὑγιαίνειν, σοφία (‘cleverness’; Daedalus and Palamedes are given as examples of σοφοί), εὐδαιμονία (sources: κάλλος, ἴσχυς, πλοῦτος, δόξα etc.) as ἀγαθά, but they appear to be κακά as well – the whole passage is meant as a proof that Euthydemus does not possess self-knowledge (30: ὀπόθεν δὲ χρὴ ἄρξασθαι ἐπισκοπεῖν ἑαυτὸν) and constitutes a parallel to the discussion in *Alc. 1* (cf. Dittmar, *Aischines*, 140; 155; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 83–6; 93). Arist. *Protr.* B 4 Düring makes πλοῦτος, ἴσχυς, κάλλος depend on the state of one’s soul. A highly sophisticated version of this dichotomy ‘external ἀγαθά – ἀγαθά of the soul’ is found Pl. *Lg.* 631b6–d1 (cf. O’Brien, *Paradoxes*, 180–5).

shall see that he does the same thing *en détail* in the speech (cf. sections II.2.3.1 and II.2.3.3). Yet there is some kind of unity between the parts: they all end on the keynote of ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς, the central concept of Socratic exhortation: 407d8 καὶ δεῖν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς νῦν πλείω ποιεῖσθαι; 407e7 τοῦ μὲν ἄρξοντος ἀμελεῖν; 408b2 παραδόντι τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας ἄλλωι (the concept of the politician–educator).<sup>188</sup>

### II.2.3 *Protreptic motifs in Socrates' speech*

#### II.2.3.1 *First part*

The pattern in which the opening sentence of Socrates' exhortation is cast is the outstanding one of accusing protreptic (section II.1.5): 'you care about the pseudo-Values x, y, not about the true Values p, q'. This is the form Plato chose for reporting Socrates' exhortations in the *Apology*: χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελούμενος . . . φρονήσεως δέ . . . οὐκ ἐπιμέληι οὐδὲ φροντίζεις (29d9–e3).

In fact, the resemblance in wording and construction between these passages is striking:

*Apology*: χρημάτων μὲν (a) οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελουμενος (b)  
ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα (c);

*Clitophon*: χρημάτων μὲν πέρι (a) τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν  
ἔχετε (b) ὅπως ὑμῖν ἔσται (c).

<sup>188</sup> This repetition of ἐπιμέλεια reinforces my opinion that ὁ λόγος οὔτος (408a4–5) denotes the whole speech, not the third part. – For ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ (τῆς ψυχῆς) as protreptic motif, cf. Pl. *Ap.* 29e1–3; 30a9–b2; 36c5–8; *Euthd.* 275a6; 306e2–3; *Clit.* 408b7–8; Arist. *Protr.* B 34; 53 Düring. It is especially prominent in the Alcibiades dialogues: Aesch. fr. 8.52 D. = 1 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 50); X. *Mem.* 4.2 (where it refers to special training in politics: 4; 6; 7); *Alc. I* 119a9; 120b6; c9–d1; d4 (this is still political, cf. 124b3); from 124b7 on the discussion centres on the precise nature of the ἐπιμέλεια. The place of the Delphic maxim in this connection (X. *Mem.* 1.2.24; *Alc. I* 129a2) is probably derived from Aeschines (Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 78 n. 82; 87; 94; Effe, 'Charmides', 202). See *HGPh*, III 467–73; Comm. on 410c8–d5.



Note especially the anticipation of χρημάτων (πέρι), which in either place is put into focus by lifting it from the ὅπως clause.

It is therefore probable that the author of the *Clitophon* had in mind not just pieces of accusing protreptic as exemplified in *Apology* 29d7–e3, but the *Apology* itself.

Imitation of the *Apology* is also found in Clitophon's comment on Socrates' speeches ἀτεχνῶς ὡσπερ καθεύδοντας ἐπεγείρειν ἡμᾶς (408c3–4), where verbal resemblances indicate dependence on the famous comparison of Socrates with a gadfly: ἀτεχνῶς [!], εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ . . . δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι [!] ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος (30e2–5) and ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες [cf. καθεύδοντας] ἐγειρόμενοι (31a4–5).<sup>189</sup> Conscious imitation is the more probable since in the *Apology* (as here) the simile applies to Socrates' exhortations (the words ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων, 30e7, point backwards to Socrates' report of his protreptic practice; cf. 30a1 ὀνειδιῶ; a8 πείθων; cf. Comm. on 408e5).

It must be stressed that whereas our author parodies the general form of protreptic as found in the *Apology* (in the sentence 407b1–8), its content is not aimed at; the Socratic values φρόνησις, ἀλήθεια, the best state of the soul (*Apology* 29e1–2) are left unmentioned (and therefore unharmed) in the parody. However, the author knew very well that the best state of the soul was the object of Socrates' protreptic, for Clitophon's subsequent discussion with Socrates' pupils (esp. 408e3–409a3) carefully brings out the point (cf. 408e9 ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τὸ σῶμα; 409a3 τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ; for a similar manner of saving Socratic principles while attacking them on the surface cf. Comm. on 407d2–e2).

On the pattern of accusatory protreptic derived from the *Apology*, our author imposed three different protreptic

<sup>189</sup> Cf. Phaedo ap. Sen. *Ep.* 94.41.

motifs – this accounts for the remarkable structure of the opening sentence: opposed to the pseudo-Value (wealth) is not a true Value (such as φρόνησις), but a derived one (the care for one's sons). This combination of unrelated form and content is typical, cf. section II.2.2 ad fin.

These three motifs, all of which are present also in the *Euthydemus*, are the following:

- (1) The amassing of wealth is useless without the knowledge how to use it. See *Euthydemus* 280b8–d7;<sup>190</sup> this is an illustration, but a more or less compulsory one, of the general principle (to recur in the third part of the protreptic speech in the *Clitophon*, section II.2.3.3) that what one cannot handle should be left alone.
- (2) It is better to leave wisdom to your children than money. This is found in the *Euthydemus*, both in the first conversation of Socrates and Clinias (282a7–8) and in the final conversation of Socrates and Crito, which is a 'protreptic situation' (306e1–3; sections II.1.3; II.3.4 n. 283). As has already been noted, the thought is also found in the protreptic proem of *Laws* 5 (729b1–2; section II.2.2).
- (3) One should have not only one's children instructed in wisdom, but also oneself. This is the closing remark of the *Euthydemus*, 307c3–4.<sup>191</sup>

The combination of (1) and (2) is absent from the *Euthydemus* and seems to be an innovation of the *Clitophon*. This is one of the reasons for the supposition that Demetrius (296; cf. section II.1.4.2) derived the combination from the *Clitophon* itself.

The link between motifs (1) and (2) is laid in an inge-

<sup>190</sup> Cf. also X. *Mem.* 3.9.4; 4.6.11 (Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 74–7); *Oec.* 1.8–14; Pl. *Men.* 87e5–88a5; *Erx.* 397e3–10 (rather speculative Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 62–3); Aeschines fr. 36 D. = 17 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 75), cf. Dittmar, *Aischines*, 203–5.

<sup>191</sup> Cf. Pl. *Prt.* 357e5 (see on 407b5 διδασκάλους); *Lg.* 804d4–6.

nious way. The normal expression (ἐπίστασθαι) χρῆσθαι ὀρθῶς is changed to ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι δικαίως in (1), and wisdom to δικαιοσύνη in (2). In this way, justice becomes the focus of Socrates' exhortation (cf. 408b5), so that Clitophon's interrogation more or less automatically concentrates on justice and its results (409a6 and passim).

The teachers of justice are dragged in so as to connect (1)–(2) with (3) – as we shall see, cf. Comm. on 407b5 διδασκάλους, they are abandoned as soon as they have done their duty – and (3) in its turn was necessary in order to divert the attention from the sons (who had been given a prominent place in the opening antithesis χρημάτων μέν ... τῶν δ' ὑέων, 407b2–3) to the addressees of the speech themselves; in this way the protreptic speech can resume its accusatory character. Apart from 407c1–2 ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑμῶν, the sons are not mentioned again in the speech; already at 407c5 they are left out of account: οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε οἵτινες ὑμᾶς παύσουσι κτλ.

The teachers of justice were necessary for the connection of (1)–(2) and (3). Now, whether or not there were indeed teachers of ἀρετή was a hotly debated question; therefore the parenthesis 407b5–7 εἴπερ μαθητόν ... ἱκανῶς was necessary to delude Socrates' audience into accepting their existence for the moment. This parenthesis is consequently a more or less necessary proviso.

The same proviso occurs in a parallel development in Socrates' protreptic discussion in the *Euthydemus*: 'We cannot become happy unless by the correct use of things, which can only be provided by wisdom. Therefore we should pursue wisdom with all our might' – Εἰ ἔστι γὰρ ὧ Κλεινία ἦν δ' ἐγὼ ἡ σοφία διδασκτόν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις (282c1–3).

Another point which the two places have in common is that they both omit one of the three conditions, which either alone or in conjunction account for the presence of ἀρετή (σοφία, δικαιοσύνη). In its fullest form this theory,

which has been termed 'trias paedagogica' (φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη),<sup>192</sup> is found at the beginning of the *Meno*: ἄρα διδασκτὸν ἢ ἀρετή; ἢ οὐ διδασκτὸν ἀλλ' ἀσκητόν; ἢ οὔτε ἀσκητόν οὔτε μαθητόν, ἀλλὰ φύσει παραγίγνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλω τινὶ τρόπῳ; (70a1-4). Apart from the last four words, which announce an original Platonic alternative,<sup>193</sup> *Meno* confronts Socrates with a problem which had been discussed for at least half a century.<sup>194</sup>

*Meno*'s three mutually exclusive possibilities are in fact the three conditions which Protagoras held necessary for anyone who wished to profit from sophistic teaching. This didactic theory was laid down in the *Megas Logos* (supposedly a προτρεπτικός<sup>195</sup>): φύσεως καὶ ἀσκήσεως διδασκαλία δεῖται, ἀπὸ νεότητος δὲ ἀρξαμένους δεῖ μανθάνειν (fr. 3 D.-K.).<sup>196</sup> In a more elaborated form, we encounter it in the Anonymus Iamblichi (fr. 1 D.-K.), whose fragments, again, may or may not be part of a protreptic speech. The Anonymus states expressly that this doctrine of the three conditions applies in every area (ἐάντε σοφίαν ἐάντε ἀνδρείαν ἐάντε εὐγλωσσίαν ἐάντε ἀρετὴν ἢ τὴν σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς), and indeed it is found in the areas of medicine<sup>197</sup> and rhetoric.<sup>198</sup>

<sup>192</sup> Cf. C. P. Gunning, *De sophistis Graeciae praeceptoribus* (Amsterdam 1915), 132.

<sup>193</sup> It refers, of course, to the θεία μοῖρα alternative given at the end of the *Meno*; the alternative is added to the list Arist. *EN* 1099b9-11, cf. Gauthier-Jolif ad loc.; integrated into the theory 1179b20-3.

<sup>194</sup> A good synopsis of the history of the problem is given by C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 220-48; O'Brien, *Paradoxes*, 144-6. On μελέτη cf. F. Hieronymus, *MELETH, Übung, Lernen und angrenzende Begriffe* (diss. Basel 1970). Of the older literature P. Shorey, 'Φύσις, μελέτη, ἐπιστήμη', *TAPhA* 40 (1909) 185-201; Gunning, op. cit. (n. 192), 132-8 are still valuable.

<sup>195</sup> So H. Gomperz, *Sophistik*, 175; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 59 n. 44.

<sup>196</sup> Cf. Pl. *Prt.* 323c5-8.

<sup>197</sup> Hp. *Lex* 2.4.338 Litré.

<sup>198</sup> *Isoc.* 13.17; an allusion to this programme at Pl. *Phdr.* 269d4-6, cf. De Vries, *Comm. on Phdr.*, p. 16 and ad loc.; E. Heitsch, *Platon, Phaidros* (Göttingen 1993), 163 n. 341.

But of course, its most spectacular aspect was the teachability of the ἀρετή πολιτική; this implied a strong opposition to the traditional views on this point, which had been formulated at their sharpest by Pindar.<sup>199</sup> This opposition called forth a popular but quite un-Protagorean antithesis φύσει: ἐξ ἐπιμελείας καὶ ἀσκήσεως καὶ διδασχῆς.<sup>200</sup> True sophists never held that ἀρετή could be acquired by instruction *alone* (cf. also *Dissoi Logoi* 6.11 ἔστι δέ τι καὶ φύσις), and Isocrates, who goes out of his way to deny the existence of a didactic method ἥτις τοῖς κακῶς πεφυκόσιν πρὸς ἀρετὴν σωφροσύνην ἂν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐμποιήσκειν (13.21) either misunderstood the issue<sup>201</sup> or misrepresented it on purpose, as Theognis had done before him.<sup>202</sup>

At any rate, it is clear that by the time Isocrates wrote Κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν, from which I quoted just now, the three necessary conditions of Protagoras had become mutually exclusive in the field of ἀρετή; it was possible to hold that you could acquire ἀρετή *either* by instruction, *or* by training, *or* by natural ability. Isocrates' own position is intermediate: given natural ability, ἀρετή is acquired by training, not by instruction.<sup>203</sup>

Such was the *status quaestionis* when the *Meno* was written. Now it is self-evident that anyone writing a προτρεπτικός will have to prove or take for granted that virtue (or any other goal of protreptic) comes by teaching or training, not φύσει. (Sometimes, the proof in itself may constitute a προτρεπτικός; section II.1.2.) This is where *Euthydemus* and

<sup>199</sup> O. 2.86–8; 9.100–4; N. 3.40–2; cf. Theogn. 429–38; F. Heinemann, *Nomos und Physis* (Basel 1945), 98–101; W. Jaeger, *Paideia* III 113–14 (Engl. ed.).

<sup>200</sup> Pl. *Prt.* 323c8–324a1; an argument from *vulgaris opinio*.

<sup>201</sup> He may have been misled, like some modern scholars, by *Grg.* 460b1–7, cf. O'Brien, *Paradoxes*, 92–3.

<sup>202</sup> Loc. cit. (n. 199).

<sup>203</sup> 13.21; the training is διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἐπιμέλειαν; cf. Democ. fr. 242 D.–K.; Pl. *La.* 179d6–7.

*Clitophon* part company. In the *Euthydemus*, the possibility that wisdom comes to men only ἀπὸ ταῦτομάτου (= φύσει, 282c2) is excluded by a literary trick: Clinias declares that he is willing to accept the teachability of wisdom, c4–5. This willingness is of course indispensable for protreptic, and Socrates' exaggerated relief (c5–8) shows that Plato was well aware of the fact. The third possibility (namely that wisdom can be acquired by training) is passed over for artistic reasons: in itself it could have been mentioned here without impeaching the final conclusion (ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν, d1), but the emphasis has to lie on teaching, as Socrates intends Euthydemus and his brother to take over where he has stopped (e1).

On the other hand, the author of the *Clitophon* had to resort to other means in order to dispose of the φύσει alternative. He does so by assuming as self-evident the existence of instructors and then dealing at some length with the alternatives of teaching and training (note the repeated amplification μελετητὸν τε καὶ ἀσκητὸν . . . ἐξασκήσουσιν καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν). In fact, the alternatives are as immaterial here as they are in the *Euthydemus*, but they must cover up the fact that the existence of instructors was rather questionable in the first place,<sup>204</sup> and that with the alternatives μαθητὸν – μελετητὸν the possibilities had not been exhausted. Not quite an elegant way of getting round an obvious flaw in the argument, but after all this is a parody; at any rate, the author of this passage knew quite as well as Plato did that the Pindaric point of view has to be eliminated in one way or another if you want to write a protreptic speech at all.

When, having analysed these parallel passages from *Euthydemus* and *Clitophon*, we compare the use either dialogue makes of the 'trias paedagogica', the intrinsic similarities

<sup>204</sup> Cf. *Men.* 89e4–7 and the discussion which follows till 96b6–9; *Prt.* 319c7–320b3; *Dial.* 6.3; 6.7–8; Theognis, loc. cit.

appear to surpass the differences. In the *Euthydemus*, Plato can afford to mention the φύσει alternative once, because he is writing a dialogue; it is not ruled out by argument and never mentioned again. The μελετή alternative, which is immaterial, is left out. The author of the *Clitophon* has to conceal the φύσει alternative, as he is not writing a dialogue but reporting a speech (it is mentioned in the analogy with the body, 410d4); in order to do so, he has to take great pains over the μελετή alternative, though, again, it is immaterial to the argument and does not come up again.

There remains the question of sources. In this case *Euthydemus* 282c1–3 is certainly not the only source for 407b5–7, as the *Clitophon* mentions μελετή. Of course, the *Euthydemus* may have been one of the sources here (as it probably was, considering the three shared motifs in this sentence and the third part of the speech; see also Comm. on 408c4–7), but in that case our author must have had a good insight into the underlying motives which had prompted Plato to write down and leave out what he did. It is at any rate easier to suppose that Plato and our author – if not identical – had the same way of dealing with the ‘trias paedagogica’ when writing a προτρεπτικός.

Next, the relation of our passage to the opening of the *Meno*. No argument whatever can be based upon the fact that, at both places, διδακτόν and ἀσκητόν are offered as alternatives; as was argued above, they had been at least from 390 onwards. The only possible argument is from similarity of expression. And even here no case can be made from the parallel order διδακτόν – οὐ διδακτόν ἀλλ’ ἀσκητόν (*Meno*), μαθητόν – μελετητόν τε καὶ ἀσκητόν (*Clitophon*), since naturally the most startling alternative is put first in either case. The only similarity left is the use of the neuter verbal adjectives (διδακτόν, μαθητόν, ἀσκητόν *Meno*; μαθητόν, μελετητόν, ἀσκητόν *Clitophon* 407b5–7 – διδακτόν 408b7). The choice of these adjectives

might seem to indicate dependence,<sup>205</sup> but does it prove it? The choice of the neuter is just an indication of good fourth-century Greek.<sup>206</sup> Besides, it had been customary to use verbals in -τόν when discussing the issue from the very start,<sup>207</sup> so in fact, both form and content are already formulaic in the *Meno* as well as in the *Clitophon*. Under these circumstances, dependence of the *Clitophon* on the *Meno* (so e.g. Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 7) is impossible to prove.

In the second sentence (407b8–c6), the author uses the motif of inadequacy of present-day education. This motif belongs mainly to the protreptic dialogue: *Alcibiades 1* 107a1–9 Πότερον οὖν ὅταν περὶ γραμμάτων Ἀθηναῖοι βουλευῶνται, πῶς ἂν ὀρθῶς γράφοιεν, τότε ἀναστήσει αὐτοῖς συμβουλευσῶν; – μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε. – ἀλλ' ὅταν περὶ κρουμάτων ἐν λύραι; – οὐδαμῶς. – οὐδὲ μὴν οὐδὲ περὶ παλαισμάτων γε εἰώθασι βουλευέσθαι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίαι. – οὐ μέντοι.<sup>208</sup> Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.4 Παρ' οὐδενὸς μὲν πῶποτε ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι οὐδὲν ἔμαθον, οὐδ' ἀκούων τινὰς εἶναι λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν ἱκανοὺς ἐζήτησα τούτοις ἐντυχεῖν . . . ὅμως δὲ ὅτι ἂν ἀπὸ ταύτομάτου ἐπίημι μοι συμβουλεύσω ὑμῖν (a reference to κίθαρίζειν ἢ αὐλεῖν ἢ ἵππευεῖν in 4.2.6). These two passages probably derive from Aeschines' *Alcibiades*.

The *Clitophon* differs from these parallels in that the parody does not especially envisage making one's appearance in the assembly; it goes so far, on the other hand, as to ascribe discord and war to insufficient education. Thus the

<sup>205</sup> Arist. *EN* 1099b9–10 – who is certainly dependent on *Men.* – uses μαθητόν, ἔθιστόν, ἀσκητόν.

<sup>206</sup> διδακτός only *Erx.* 398d7; μαθητός *Virt.* 376c4; παραδοτή D. L. 4.12 (Xenocrates).

<sup>207</sup> διδακτόν *Dialex.* 6; Isoc. 13.17 etc.; μαθητόν *Dialex.* 6; ἐφικτόν Democr. fr. 59 D.–K.; ποιητόν, ἐνθετόν, Theogn. 435; παρασκευαστόν Pl. *Prt.* 319b2–3, παραδοτόν, παραληπτόν *Men.* 93b4–5.

<sup>208</sup> This passage was probably used by D. Chr. 13.17–19, cf. section II.2.1.1.



irony of Xenophon and *Alcibiades 1* becomes dark cynicism here.<sup>209</sup>

When protreptic literature rejects traditional education (or at least claims its insufficiency), it reduces the notion of education to school-education (very outspokenly here, cf. & δὴ παιδείαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι τελέαν ἡγησθε, 407c2–3). This is pure propaganda: no Greek would have admitted that a child's education takes place only, and is finished, within the walls of a class-room.<sup>210</sup>

As this theme is being developed in the *Clitophon*, we encounter an idea occurring elsewhere in protreptic passages, but only in those from Plato or written under his influence. The improvement at which protreptic aims concerns not only individuals but also states (407c8 καὶ πόλεις πόλεσιν, e1–2). In the *Apology*, Socrates exhorts others to take care μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως (36c8 and de Strycker–Slings ad loc.; cf. 30b4; Wolff, *Apologie*, 28). Similarly, the theme is found in the *Alcibiades 1*: Οὐκ ἄρα τειχῶν οὐδὲ τριήρων οὐδὲ νεωρίων δέονται αἱ πόλεις ὧς Ἄλκιβιάδης, εἰ μέλλουσιν εὐδαιμονήσῃν, οὐδὲ πλήθους οὐδὲ μεγέθους ἄνευ ἀρετῆς (134b7–9; just as, in the individual, strength, beauty, riches do not contribute to happiness).

### II.2.3.2 *Second part*

The minor importance of the σῶματος ἐπιμέλεια *vis à vis* the care of the soul is a well-known protreptic theme. The *Alcibiades 1* provides the nearest parallel (ψυχὴ – ἀρχουσα, σῶμα – ἀρχόμενον: 129e3–130b4; ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς –

<sup>209</sup> Other parallels: Pl. *La.* 179a4–7, in a protreptic situation (section II.1.3; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 111); Aesch. Socr. fr. 37 D. = 11 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 77) and my 'Aeschines' Miltiades', 306. – The study of music was mentioned (in an unknown connection) in a *Protrepticus* by Chamaeleon (Ath. 184d = 1.402 Kaibel).

<sup>210</sup> Cf. *Prt.* 325c6–d7; 326c6–d8; *Ap.* 24d9–25a11, cf. Burnet on 24d11 and de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 108–12; *Men.* 92e3–6; *Lg.* 858d6–9; Arist. *EN* 1180a1–12.

τοῦ σώματος: 132c1–6); others are found in the *Apology* (30a8–b2) and Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δ' ἄρχεται B 59 Düring; cf. B 17; 23; 34).<sup>211</sup> I may refer also to my reconstruction of Aeschines' *Miltiades*.<sup>212</sup>

There is, besides, a host of parallels outside strictly protreptic texts.<sup>213</sup> See further section II.2.2.

### II.2.3.3 *Third part*

The general principle of this part of Socrates' exhortation, ὅτῳ τις μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, κρεῖττον ἔσῃ τὴν τούτου χρῆσιν, is significantly frequent in protreptic literature: it recurs in the *Euthydemus*, Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2, Aeschines' *Alcibiades* (probably), and Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, and it is already found in the Anonymus Iamblichi.

In these texts, the principle is found stated in two variant forms, which are related but not identical: (a) what one cannot handle should be left to others;<sup>214</sup> (b) what one cannot handle in the right way should be left alone or it will prove evil.<sup>215</sup> Our author's procedure is interesting in that he applies both versions (in the order (b)–(a)) to the human

<sup>211</sup> Cf. B 108–10; E. de Strycker, 'On Fragment 5a of the *Protrepticus*' in Düring–Owen, *Aristotle and Plato*, 76–104, esp. 88–9.

<sup>212</sup> 'Aeschines' *Miltiades*', 306.

<sup>213</sup> E.g. Pl. *Lg.* 896c1–3; *Ti.* 34c5; *Phd.* 79e9–80a5; *R.* 353d3–7; e4; *Epin.* 980d6–e2; *X. Mem.* 4.3.14.

<sup>214</sup> Pl. *Chrm.* 171d8–e5; 172d7–10 in what is probably a refutation of Aesch. *Alc.* (Effe, 'Charmides', 204–7; see section II.1.3 n. 128); Aesch. *Alc.* fr. 8.15–6 D. = 1 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 50) may be an illustration or reminiscence of a general statement of the principle occurring in the lost part of the text – Effe should have mentioned this parallel; *Alc.* 1 117c6–e5; 132c4–6.

<sup>215</sup> Anon. Iambli. 3.1 = 2.401.16–19 D.–K.; Pl. *Euthd.* 280e3–281e2; Arist. *Protr.* B 4 Düring – cf. also B 8, but I doubt whether this fragment is Aristotelian; cf. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, 62–6. *X. Mem.* 4.2.25–9 belongs closely with *Chrm.* and *Alc.* 1 (cf. Effe, 'Charmides', 204–7; the words ἀναμάρτητοι γίγνονται (26) which Effe compares with *Chrm.* 171d6–7 ἀναμάρτητοι ... ἂν διεξῶμεν (207 n. 1), have another parallel in *Alc.* 1 117e4–5 ἀναμάρτητοι ζῶσι), yet no mention is made of leaving things to *others*, while there is a reference to abstention (ἀπεχόμενοι, 26).

soul, thereby making Socrates exhort his listeners to death and slavery. (A similar combination is found in the preamble to the laws, *Laws* 732a6–b2.)

Before the interest focuses on the soul, the principle (in form (b)), is applied to the human body (ὄφθαλμοῖς χρῆσθαι ... ὡσὶν ... σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι) and the sphere of tools and possessions (λύραι χρῆσθαι ... ἄλλωι τῶν ὀργάνων οὐδὲ κτημάτων οὐδενί). As was seen by Kesters (*Antisthène*, 78 n. 1) and Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 143 n. 156), the same order occurs in the discussion of ἔργον and ἀρετή at the end of the first book of the *Republic* (352d8–353e11).

In the discussion of ἔργον:

ἰδεῖν – ὄφθαλμοῖς (352e5),  
 ἀκούειν – ὡσὶν (e7),  
 ἀποτέμνειν – δρεπάνωι (353a4).

And after ἔργον and ἀρετή have been connected (353a9–b3):

ὄφθαλμῶν ἔργον/ἀρετή (b4–7),  
 ὠτῶν ἔργον/ἀρετή (β8–11),  
 πάντων πέρι τῶν ἄλλων (b12–3).

The relation of ἔργον and κακία:

ὄμματα (b14–c8),  
 ὠτα (c9–11),  
 τᾶλλα πάντα (d1–2).

From 353d3 onwards the results are applied to the human soul.

Moreover, we find δρέπανον associated with ἀσπίς and λύρα as examples of tools in an earlier attempt to define justice (333d3–6). As the conclusion of the whole passage (justice is the ἀρετή ψυχῆς 353e7) recurs in the *Clitophon*

(409a2–6), the inference is inevitable that the plan of this part of Socrates' speech is borrowed – along with the figure of Clitophon and many important features of the second part of the *Clitophon* – from the first book of the *Republic*.<sup>216</sup> The reverse process (borrowing by Plato from the *Clitophon*) can be excluded, if only because – as we shall see presently – the lyre is clearly a *corpus alienum* in the *Clitophon*. A common source is not altogether impossible, but I fail to see to what purpose Plato should have taken over the order eyes – ears – tools – soul in *Republic* I from such a source; apart from that, the description of justice as ἀρετὴ ψυχῆς which is common to both *Republic* I and *Clitophon* would then belong to this source as well; but this description is foreshadowed by 348c2–6; 350c4–d5 in *Republic* I.

The way in which the general principle ὅτῳ τις μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, κρεῖττον ἔαν τὴν τούτου χρῆσιν is applied to the field of τέχνη (408a1–4) is peculiarly incongruous. One expects a statement to the effect that a man who cannot handle his lyre should not handle it, or alternatively, should leave it to others. When instead of this Socrates is reported to say that a man who cannot handle his own lyre will clearly be unable to handle his neighbour's, and vice versa, his words are not to the point. Gaiser's explanation 'von der politischen Abzweckung des Logos her . . . zu verstehen' (*Protreptik*, 143 n. 156) is more a palliative than a cure.<sup>217</sup> Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 11) compares *Alcibiades* I 133e4–5 ὅστις δὲ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων που ἂν ἀγνοοῖ κατὰ ταῦτά (which

<sup>216</sup> The similarity in order in *Alc.* I 126a5–b10 σῶμα – ὄμματα – ὄτα – πόλις is much less striking and probably a coincidence – if the order was not itself copied from *Republic* I, as Adam (ad *R.* 353c) supposes.

<sup>217</sup> Gaiser's reference (ibid.) to *Ly.* 209a4–210a8 (where Socrates explains to Lysis that others will leave certain things to him when they will think him better qualified than they are themselves) says little or nothing, even if the lyre is mentioned at 209b5 and the neighbour (in another context) at c7 – there is no question of the neighbour's lyre.

leads up to the statement that such a man can never be a good politician, eg). Though I cannot accept his general hypothesis that the whole of *Clitophon* 407e5–408b5 (i.e. the second and third parts of Socrates' προτρεπτικός) is a condensation of the end of *Alcibiades 1* (from 130a onwards, see below), this parallel may indeed shed some light on our sentence. It looks probable that the example of the neighbour's lyre was borrowed from some protreptic source and squeezed into this context; the pattern bodily parts – tools – soul (taken over from *Republic 1*) offered an occasion to drag it in but apparently the author did not realise (or care) that it was out of place. This tallies with, and considerably reinforces, our conclusion regarding the author's method (cf. section II.2.2). At the same time, we may have here a valid argument against Plato's authorship. While one should not, I think, underestimate the extent to which Plato incorporates material from other Socratics in his dialogues, the very fact that we can hardly ever locate such foreign material proves that he was very careful in adopting it, if he did so at all. (On the other hand, if the protreptic speech in *Clitophon* is a parody, as I think it is, this argument loses much of its force: Plato may not have been as careful here as he normally was.)

It is not too bold to suppose that the first part of the argument: ὅστις γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἐπίσταται τῆι ἑαυτοῦ λύραι χρῆσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῆι τοῦ γείτονος, was, in the context from which it was borrowed, a step towards a definition of the requirements of a politician; the next step may have been something like 'a man who cannot manage his own household, will be unable to manage the affairs of the city', or possibly, 'a man who cannot master his own soul (cf. 408a5), will be unable to govern those of his fellow-citizens', cf. *Alcibiades 1* 133e4–5 quoted above.<sup>218</sup>

<sup>218</sup> I do not see the relevance of D. Chr. 10.19–22 adduced by Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 11 n. 3.

On this supposition, the source of the words concerning the neighbour's lyre may have to be looked for somewhere in the sphere of the Alcibiades dialogues; we cannot go beyond that.

The reversed statement (οὐδὲ ὅστις μὴ τῆι τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲ τῆι ἑαυτοῦ) does not make sense in this interpretation; perhaps it is a (rather feeble) attempt to adjust the argument to this context (it is necessary that the things which people cannot handle belong to themselves).

Concerning the words καὶ τελευτᾷ δὴ καλῶς ὁ λόγος οὗτός σοι (408a4–5), I agree with Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 12) that they should be taken quite literally: they refer to the ending not just of Socrates' speech as reported by Clitophon, but of one out of several works which belong to the protreptic corpus and which may have been used throughout the parody. On Pavlu's assumption that this part of the speech was dependent on the end of *Alcibiades 1*, this 'beautiful ending' could refer only to the second part of the sentence (from a7 εἰ δέ τις onwards), as there is no mention of death being preferable in that dialogue. Yet within this sentence, the weight is on the first part; the second is added as an (apparent) afterthought; besides, the general principle had been so formulated as to lead up naturally to the preferability of death, while it would have been equally possible to mention the idea of leaving things to others (version (a)) in the general statement – this would have laid the emphasis on slavery, the final motif of *Alcibiades 1*. The words καὶ τελευτᾷ δὴ καλῶς ὁ λόγος οὗτός σοι are indeed meant to ridicule the final passage of some protreptic work, but not, or at any rate not in the first place, *Alcibiades 1*.

The reason why I am confident that these words mean more than just the end of the reported speech is the intriguing circumstance that of the only two examples of the fourth-century protreptic literature which are more than an extract (such as Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2) or a hand-

ful of tiny fragments, one (*Alcibiades 1*) ends with an exhortation to slavery; the other (Aristotle's *Protrepticus*) with the alternatives 'either philosophy or death' (cf. Appendix 1). The slavery motif is found at the end of *Alcibiades 1* (135b7–c11; cf. esp. c2 πρέπει ἄρα τῶι κακῶι δουλεύειν and 10 αἰσθάνη δὲ νῦν πῶς ἔχεις; ἐλευθεροπρεπῶς ἢ οὔ;). In Xenophon, having proved that Euthydemus has no knowledge of just and unjust, Socrates continues (4.2.22): οἴσθα δὲ τίνας ἀνδραποδῶδεις καλουμένους; and specifies: ἄρ' οὖν τῶν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια μὴ εἰδόντων τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτ' ἐστίν; At the end of the conversation, Euthydemus takes leave νομίσας τῶι ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι (39). It can also be shown that the motif played an important part towards the end in Aeschines' *Alcibiades*.<sup>219</sup>

An allusion to this motif is also present in the *Euthydemus*: οὐδὲν αἰσχροῦν . . . ἔνεκα τούτου [sc. γίγνεσθαι σοφόν] ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ δουλεύειν καὶ ἐραστῇι καὶ παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳι (282b3–5). It is especially the reference to lovers (cf. b2) which makes one suppose that Plato had Aeschines' *Alcibiades* in mind when he wrote these words (cf. fr. 11C D. = 4 Kr. (SSR VI A 53) διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγγανον

<sup>219</sup> See Cic. *Tusc.* 3.32.77: *Quid enim dicimus, cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quidquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiulum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflicaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret.* On account of a fragment from Aeschines' *Alcibiades* (fr. 9 D., cf. ii Kr.; SSR VI A 51) κλάειν [sc. Alcibiades] θέντα τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ τὰ γόνατα ἀθυμήσαντα (cf. X. *Mem.* 4.2.39 πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων; Aug. *Civ. D.* 14.8 = 425.102–5 Dombart–Kalb) this story was regarded by Dittmar as a synopsis of this dialogue (*Aischines*, 99–103; fr. 6 D.; not in Krauss; SSR VI A 47). Even though a *baiulus* is not necessarily a slave, the fact that in the same passage from X. *Mem.* 4.2 which was quoted above, the δημιουργοί are said to be ἀνδραποδῶδεις (22; cf. *Alc. 1* 131a9–b9) makes it probable that Aeschines made Alcibiades concede that his condition was not very different from that of a slave, as Euthydemus does in Xenophon and Alcibiades in *Alc. 1*. In fact, this similarity is one of the major arguments for the hypothesis that both *Alc. 1* and X. *Mem.* 4.2 reflect (partly) Aeschines' *Alcibiades*.

ἐρῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου; *Alcibiades 1* 131e1–132a2 οὐτ' ἐγένεσθ' ὡς ἔοικεν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τῷ Κλεινίου ἐραστῆς οὐτ' ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ εἷς μόνος, καὶ οὗτος ἀγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκου καὶ Φαιναρέτης κτλ.).<sup>220</sup>

Commentators on the *Euthydemus* usually refer to *Symposium* 184c4–7 νενόμισται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν, ἐάν τις ἐθέλη τιναθεραπεύειν ἡγούμενος δι' ἐκεῖνον ἀμείνων ἔσεσθαι ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν τινα ἢ κατὰ ἄλλο ὅτιοῦν μέρος ἀρετῆς, αὕτη αὖ ἢ ἐθελοδοουλεία οὐκ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι οὐδὲ κολακεία (cf. 185b1–5), but even there Alcibiades is present: R. G. Bury has shown<sup>221</sup> that all speeches in the *Symposium* foreshadow Alcibiades' speech – this particular passage points forward to 218c7–d5, where Alcibiades tells Socrates that he is willing to grant him his favours in order that he (Alcibiades) will attain the best possible state of mind.<sup>222</sup> This is clearly putting into practice the theory about ἐθελοδοουλεία from Pausanias' speech;<sup>223</sup> immediately before the speech about ἐθελοδοουλεία there is probably a reference to Alcibiades in the words τὸ ὑπὸ χρημάτων καὶ ὑπὸ πολιτικῶν δυνάμεων ἀλῶναι αἰσχρόν, 184a7–8.

The examination of parallels for the slavery motif in the *Clitophon* shows that this motif has, so to speak, two different aspects. One is the conclusion that owing to lack of (moral) knowledge a person is no better than a slave (Aeschines' *Alcibiades*; Xenophon; *Alcibiades 1*; a possible reminiscence in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* B 53 Düring), the other that such a person should have himself led by others (*Clitophon*; *Alcibiades 1*; *Euthydemus*; *Symposium*) – the presence of

<sup>220</sup> The first part of the sentence in *Euthd.* also contains a well-known protreptic motif: 282a7 καὶ παρὰ πατρός ... τοῦτο ... παραλαμβάνειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρήματα; cf. section II.2.3.1.

<sup>221</sup> Comm. on *Smp.* lx–lxiv.

<sup>222</sup> Cf. Aeschines, *Alc.* fr. 11c D. = 4 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 53) διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίω ποιῆσαι.

<sup>223</sup> καταδεδουλωμένος, 219e3, does not belong here, contrarily to what Bury suggests, p. lxiii.



an ἐραστής in *Euthydemus* and *Symposium* made me suppose that this second ‘aspect’ also occurred in Aeschines’ *Alcibiades*. This supposition strengthens my hypothesis that the general protreptic motif ‘what one cannot use should be left to others’ was stated in that dialogue; it would seem plausible that Aeschines connected it with the ‘second aspect’ of the slavery motif: ‘the ἀμαθεῖς should have themselves led by σοφοί’. If this is true, it must be more than a coincidence that both these thoughts are found in close connection also in the *Clitophon*.<sup>224</sup>

Whereas the comparison of politicians to captains is in itself a commonplace (cf. Comm. on 408b2–5), there is one interesting parallel from the protreptic corpus:<sup>225</sup> *Euthydemus* 291d1–3 ἀτεχνῶς κατὰ τὸ Αἰσχύλου ἰαμβεῖον μόνη [sc. ἡ πολιτική] ἐν τῇ πύμνῃ καθῆσθαι τῆς πόλεως, πάντα κυβερνῶσα καὶ πάντων ἄρχουσα πάντα χρήσιμα ποιεῖν [sc. ἐδόκει]. This passage provides a counterpart to the identification of κυβερνητική and πολιτική in the *Clitophon*. Besides, just as it is not immediately clear in our dialogue to what purpose one should have oneself led by someone who knows the art of governing human beings (cf. Comm. on 408b1–2), so the *Euthydemus* in vain tries to make out what effect πολιτική has on the citizens. This search ends up in aporia: the ‘kingly art’ makes people σοφοί and ἀγαθοί (292c4–5), but this statement breaks down on the question in what respect they will be all that.

<sup>224</sup> In two places in Plato, the motif ‘death is preferable’ is combined with the slavery motif: *Grp.* 483b2; *Smp.* 215e4–216a2. A case might be made for the dependence of the latter passage on Aeschines, *Alc.* (cf. the parallel discussed above); if this were true, there could be little doubt that the ‘beautiful ending’ of *Clit.* reflects the last set of arguments in Socrates’ exhorting of Alcibiades in Aeschines. But such a case could never be conclusive.

<sup>225</sup> *Alc.* I 125d10–e6 is a mere coincidence: the art of the captain is used there as an analogical example (along with χοροδιδασκαλία, e3), when Socrates and Alcibiades try to establish the qualities required of a good governor.

Probably, the subsequent identification of πολιτική with δικαιοσύνη and δικαστική in the *Clitophon* is therefore to be connected with the (rather elusive) discussion of the βασιλική τέχνη in the *Euthydemus*, and with the more substantial treatment in the *Politicus*.<sup>226</sup>

Let us note at the outset that at this point the *Clitophon* is fundamentally different from the Alcibiades dialogues. In Aeschines, Alcibiades accepts Socrates' guidance (fr. 10 D. (*SSR* VI A 52) *cum se Alcibiades ... Socrati supplex esset ut sibi virtutem traderet*) but not because Socrates is an expert at ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητική, let alone πολιτική etc. Socrates expressly says so fr. 11a D. = 3 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 53): ἐγὼ δ' εἰ μὲν τινι τέχνῃ ὤμιην δύνασθαι ὠφελῆσαι, πάνυ ἂν πολλὴν ἔμαυτοῦ μωρίαν κατεγίγνωσκον· νῦν δὲ θείαι μοίραι ὤμιην μοι τοῦτο δεδόσθαι; explained by fr. 11c D. = 4 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 53) διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγχανον ἔρων Ἀλκιβιάδου οὐδὲν διάφορον τῶν Βακχῶν ἐπεπόνθειν ... καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος ... ὁμῶς ὤμιην ... διὰ τὸ ἔρᾶν βελτίω ποιῆσαι.<sup>227</sup>

Similarly, in *Alcibiades 1* Socrates' own ignorance is repeatedly stressed (112e1–113c4; 124b10–d5; 135d3–7). In Xenophon *Euthydemus* ends up becoming a companion of Socrates', ἔνια δὲ καὶ ἐμιμείτο ὧν ἐκείνος ἐπετήδευεν (4.2.40). Socrates does implant some kind of knowledge: ἐξηγεῖτο ἃ τε ἐνόμιζεν εἰδέναι δεῖν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν κρᾶτιστα εἶναι. This is typically Xenophontean (cf. 4.7.1), but even this deviation from Socratic ignorance as expressed by Aeschines is a long way from ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητική.

This means that, whereas up to 408b2 the *Clitophon* had been following the Alcibiades-dialogues, the author now

<sup>226</sup> It may be important that the identification of πολιτική and βασιλική recurs in X. *Mem.* 4.2.11 (and 2.1.17; cf. Gigon, *Memorabilien II*, 49–50).

<sup>227</sup> For the influence on the pseudo-Platonic *Theages*, cf. Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 99 n.

suddenly leaves this area. It is not hard to understand why he should have done so. In Aeschines and in *Alcibiades 1*, Alcibiades hands over τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας to Socrates, who is able to impart the right ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ to him because of his love. Obviously this would not do for a parody of a protreptic Socrates addressing a crowd. At the same time the references to Socrates' ignorance had to be suppressed in this speech, because it is the *raison d'être* of our dialogue that Clitophon should find out for himself that Socrates is ignorant.

Evidently, the author of the *Clitophon* had to find another person to have the 'rudder of the mind' handed over to. This would have to be someone who did know how to 'use his soul' and who was able to make others know this as well. Now, if the author had made Socrates advertise himself as possessor of such knowledge and teacher of it, this would have crippled the rest of the dialogue, quite apart from the question whether or not he rejected in principle (as Plato and Aeschines did) giving the figure of Socrates a teaching role: Clitophon could not very well have proceeded to interrogate Socrates' disciples when Socrates would have proclaimed himself as a teacher.

On the other hand, there could not have been a direct reference to other teachers of the knowledge how to use one's soul (such as the teachers of justice in 407b5) because then there would have been no point at all in Clitophon's quest among Socrates' disciples. Therefore the person to whom Socrates' audience is exhorted to hand over the 'rudder of their souls' should, for artistic reasons, remain a vague figure, not too clearly identifiable with Socrates or any other person or persons. This is, I think, rather cleverly managed by dragging in Plato's ideal politician, who is able to make his fellow-citizens better men. In this way one essential aspect of the *Alcibiades* dialogues (βελτίω ποιῆσαι, Aeschines, *Alcibiades* fr. 11c D. = 4 Kr.; *SSR* VI A

53) is carried on in a different form: we are exhorted to turn to the politician for the ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς.

This Platonic concept of the politician–educator is of course well-known.<sup>228</sup> Yet it may be useful to remember that the politician’s art in the *Euthydemus* is said to make people σοφοί and ἀγαθοί (292c4–5). Though Plato creates a circular regress (cf. section 1.5.3) at this stage, this is clearly a positive result,<sup>229</sup> and the statement as such fits in with the function of πολιτική in the *Clitophon*. If we add to this the parallel use of the captain metaphor, the case for dependence of *Clitophon* on *Euthydemus* is strengthened. It should be borne in mind, however, that the aim of the βασιλική συμπλοκή in the *Politicus* is to establish in the citizens’ souls ἀληθῆς δόξα μετὰ βεβαιώσεως concerning τὰ καλὰ, δίκαια, ἀγαθὰ and their opposites (309c5–d4), which is essentially the same doctrine in a more elaborated form.

There is, in this connection, another point to consider. In the *Gorgias* it is made quite clear that the ideal politician is no one but Socrates himself: 521d6–8 οἴμαι μετ’ ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν.<sup>230</sup> To what degree is it probable that here too, Socrates himself is meant by τῶι μαθόντι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν? For reasons I have expounded above the author is purposely no more explicit. But as the concept of the politician–educator is typically Platonic, and as Socrates seems to be portrayed as such at least in the *Gorgias*,

<sup>228</sup> It lies, *inter alia*, at the bottom of the condemnation of the ‘Four Men’ in the *Gorgias*, cf. 503b6–c3; 504d5–e3; 515a4–e4; 521d6–e1 and Dodds ad loc.; cf. also *Prt.* 319a3–5 δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν τὴν πολιτικὴν τέχνην καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι ποιεῖν ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας; *Men.* 100a1–2.

<sup>229</sup> Cf. esp. Taylor, *Plato*, 99; T. H. Chance, *Plato’s Euthydemus: Analysis of What Is and Is Not Philosophy* (Berkeley–Los Angeles 1992), 253–4 nn. 42–5.

<sup>230</sup> Cf. Dodds ad loc.; a similar claim is made at *Plt.* 293a2–4.

there might be a hint for the *bon entendeur*. This may be the more probable in that the identification of politics with δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη, which immediately follows in the *Clitophon*, seems, among the authentic works, to be found in the *Gorgias* only (see section II.5.4).

#### II.2.4 Conclusions

The protreptic speech in the *Clitophon* is constructed with the help of a number of patterns, furnished with more or less unrelated thoughts. As we saw, the patterns are derived (with one exception) from other texts of the protreptic corpus; the thoughts are nearly always found in extant protreptic literature – usually with such a frequency that it is justified to speak of protreptic motifs (only the proof of the involuntariness of wrongdoing is more or less original, cf. Comm. on 407d2–e2).

For this part of our dialogue, at any rate, it is correct to speak of a cento (Gigon, *Memorabilien I*, 119), and more precisely, of a cento of protreptic texts. Of course, many thoughts expressed in Socrates' protreptic speech are found also in texts which are not explicitly protreptic (or even not protreptic in any sense), but the fact that almost every single thought does have one or more parallels within the corpus of explicitly protreptic texts is sufficient proof that a cento of protreptic texts was precisely what the author wished to compile.

The only serious objection to this statement on his intention is the pattern of the third part of the speech, which was borrowed from *Republic* I. As we shall see (section II.5), the definitions of the result of justice come from the same source. *Republic* I is certainly not an explicitly protreptic text.<sup>231</sup> If it were, there would be no further problem in

<sup>231</sup> 'The first book of the *Republic*, at least after Thrasymachus' equation of justice with the advantage of the strongest is proved incorrect,

establishing the intention of the *Clitophon* as a whole: our dialogue could then without more ado be regarded as a demonstration that explicit protreptic gets us nowhere. In fact, however, there are good reasons to assume that the author of the *Clitophon* referred his readers to *Republic* 1 precisely in order to suggest that the only answer to Clitophon's criticism is implicit protreptic as used in the Platonic dialogue (sections II.4.5 and II.5.5).

I do not venture to suggest, however, that by using a pattern derived from *Republic* 1 in the third part of Socrates' speech he intended to convey the same message. Indeed, the similarity in pattern would escape any but the most acute readers and even they would not know what to do with it.<sup>232</sup> I rather believe that our author took over the pattern for his own convenience; eventually, a good reader would know that *Republic* 1 was not his target, so that no real harm was done.

Of the various protreptic texts used in this cento,<sup>233</sup> two can be identified positively: the protreptic passages from

may well be called a προτρεπτικός λόγος' (Grube, 'The *Cleitophon* of Plato', 305). I wonder where Grube places the conclusion of Thrasymachus' refutation. Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 126–8) analyses the whole of *Republic* 1 as a protreptic λόγος, and considers that 'der Protreptikos im "Kleitophon" im besonderen auf den "Thrasymachus" hin geschrieben ist' (143). Gaiser's failure to distinguish between explicit (Gaiser: 'sophistic') and implicit protreptic makes his conclusion too facile and impossible to accept.

<sup>232</sup> The choice of the pattern of *R.* 352d8–353e11 cannot be interpreted as yielding an underlying positive message as can the description of justice as a τέχνη for the soul's ἀρετή (section II.4.1) or the distinction between ἔργον and διδασκαλία (section II.4.2), both of which refer the reader to *Republic* 1.

<sup>233</sup> I have phrased this paragraph with an eye to the most extreme hypothesis: that Plato did not write *Clit.* If the same man wrote *Ap.*, *Euthd.* and *Clit.*, it is rather superfluous to think of sources. On the other hand, the readers are referred to *Ap.*, *Euthd.* as well as to *Republic* 1. Obviously, this has some bearing on the problem of authorship: does Plato refer to other works of his in the same way as *Clit.* points back to the three works mentioned? See section II.7.3(4) and n. 297 to section II.3.5.

Plato's *Apology* and *Euthydemus*. There are obvious reminiscences of either outside the protreptic speech as well (*Apology*: 408c3–4, see section II.2.3.1; *Euthydemus*: 408c4–7, cf. Comm. ad loc.). It is futile to raise the question of sources every time we meet a parallel from either of these works – the *Euthydemus*, in particular, itself contains many common protreptic motifs (though its protreptic is far more original than that of the *Clitophon* was intended to be); there may be a case, though, for the general principle of the third part of Socrates' speech (ὅτῳ τις μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, κρεῖττον ἔαν τὴν τούτου χρῆσιν, 407e8–9): when one compares the parallels for this particular version of the motif (section II.2.3.3 n. 215), it would not seem improbable, given the fact that our author knew the *Euthydemus*, that he got it from there.

Next, it is clear that one or more of the Alcibiades dialogues have been used, but that is as far as one can go. More particularly, I see no reason for assuming (as Pavlu does, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 11–12) that our author copied the *Alcibiades 1*, and the words καὶ τελευτᾷ δὴ καλῶς ὁ λόγος οὕτως σοι (408a4–5) do not refer to the end of that dialogue.

It is evident that the trichotomy of Socrates' speech is related to the general preamble of *Laws* 5, and that one of them must depend on the other, but there is no good reason why the *Clitophon* could not have been the source here.<sup>234</sup> Finally, there are many motifs which the *Clitophon* and Aristotle's *Protrepticus* have in common but there is no evidence for one depending on the other.

There is a great deal of ridicule in the speech, but it is

<sup>234</sup> The musical metaphor at *Lg.* 729a4–b1, which immediately precedes the words παῖσιν . . . καταλείπειν, is probably better explained as a reminiscence of *Clit.* 407c6–7 than the other way round – again (see previous note), if the same hand wrote both dialogues, there is no problem. Other parallels: 729a1–2 – *Clit.* 407c8–d1; e1–2; 729a2–4 – *Clit.* 407b2–4.

ridicule of manner (namely, of explicit protreptic) – we observed that the author takes care not to hit at the core of Socratic philosophy (section II.2.3.1; Comm. on 407d2–e2). Also, we saw that on the two occasions where politics come into Socrates' speech, the point of view is Platonic (sections II.2.3.1 ad fin.; II.2.3.3 ad fin.). So far, the conclusions agree with the result of the analysis of the characters in the dialogue (sections I.5.2; I.5.3.): there is nothing un-Platonic, let alone anti-Platonic, in this speech.

### II.3 Protreptic in Plato

In the *Apology*, Plato presents us with a Socrates whose main concern appears to be what we have defined as explicit protreptic: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μήτε οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται (30a7–b2).

On the other hand, little explicit protreptic is to be found elsewhere in Plato; not enough to warrant such a strong statement. If Plato really thought of Socrates primarily as an exhorter to virtue, he had little desire to depict him explicitly as such in the dialogues. But there is a good case for interpreting the *Apology* as 'Besinnung auf das Sokratische Gespräch' (Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 30). If so, Socrates' claim that he 'does nothing else but persuade' must somehow be true of Socrates' role in Plato's dialogues, or even of the Platonic dialogues as such.

It will be clear, therefore, that Plato's attitude towards ethical and philosophical exhortation is crucial not only for the (relatively minor) problem of the intention of the *Clitophon*, but also for the interpretation of the Platonic dialogue. It might even be maintained that the problem of the *Clitophon* is essentially that of the dialogue in general.

With this statement, the limits of the present investiga-



tion are set. The questions, what considerations, philosophical or otherwise, prompted Plato to adopt the Socratic dialogue for saying what he had to say and how he uses this vehicle of his thoughts, are obviously too complicated to be treated comprehensively, or even satisfactorily, in connection with a minor dialogue of dubious authenticity. I must confine myself to a more or less superficial account of my opinion on these problems, and in order to avoid, at least to some degree, total subjectivity, I am further forced to refer as much as possible to passages from those very same dialogues whose meaning as dialogues is the core of the problem, that is to say: avoiding the Scylla of subjectivity means getting into the Charybdis of circularity. I have some hope, nevertheless, that this section will contribute to understanding Plato as much as to grasping the intention of the *Clitophon*.

Plato nowhere discusses προτροπή ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν or ἐπ' ἀρετήν. Apart from the *Clitophon*, these phrases occur only in the *Euthydemus*, in which dialogue he gives merely a demonstration, not a discussion, of exhortation. I believe, however, that elements of a theory of protreptic may be found in two more or less explicit discussions of elenchos: the sixth definition of the *Sophist* and the midwifery episode in the *Theaetetus* (II.3.1). It can be shown that these discussions concern Socrates' own procedure as depicted in Plato's dialogues (II.3.2) and that they harmonise with Socrates' statement in the *Apology* quoted above (II.3.3) as well as with the demonstration of προτροπή found in the *Euthydemus* (II.3.4). On this basis, Plato's attitude towards protreptic can be reconstructed in relation to his use of the dialogue (II.3.5).

### II.3.1 *Elenchos and μαίευτική*

In the diaeretical process from which the sophist will eventually emerge as 'a purifier of the soul from conceits

that block the way to understanding' (*Sophist* 231e5–6;<sup>235</sup> summing-up of the sixth definition), the Eleatic visitor concludes that there is a special form of ignorance, to be countered by a special form of instruction. This special form (called ἀμαθία; δοξοσοφία 231b6) consists of believing that one possesses knowledge without really possessing it (229c1–9), and it is to be countered by παιδεία (c11–d4). There are two methods of παιδεία, admonition (νουθετητική) and elenchos.

Admonition may take the form either of angry reproof or of more gentle advice (τὰ μὲν χαλεπαίνοντες, τὰ δὲ μαλθακωτέρως παραμυθούμενοι, 230a1–2); it is old-fashioned and 'yields little result for much pains', because the person subject to it, owing to his ἀμαθία, does not consider himself to be in need of instruction (229e4–230a10).

Elenchos, as identified and described next,<sup>236</sup> is a process in which various subsequent stages may be distinguished: insistent questioning (διερωτῶσιν), testing opinions (ἐξετάζουσι) with the result that they prove to be the result of ἀμαθία,<sup>237</sup> confronting them with each other (τιθέασι παρ' ἀλλήλας), showing them to be contradictory (ἐπιδεικνύουσιν αὐτὰς αὐταῖς . . . ἐναντίας; 230b4–8). The results of elenchos are anger with oneself (and shame, d2), a firm conviction that the opinions are wrong (c3 βεβαιότατα), gentleness towards others – in short, a frame of mind which is the best and the most σώφρων (d5). Elen-

<sup>235</sup> Throughout this section I have gratefully used F. M. Cornford's translations: *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London 1935).

<sup>236</sup> On the passage 230b4–d4, by far the best commentary is to be found in Goldschmidt, *Dialogues*, 29–31. – I disagree with G. Vlastos ('The Socratic elenchos', *OSAPh* 1 (1983) 27–58, reprinted in *Socratic Studies* (Cambridge 1994), 1–37, at 2 and n. 8) that George Grote was the first to apply the term 'elenchos' to Socrates' method of investigation in the earlier dialogues. To my mind, it is clear from this passage that Plato himself was the first to use the word in that sense.

<sup>237</sup> This is not expressed, but the addition of ἄτε πλανωμένων (= having the conceit of wisdom), 230b5, points that way. Cf. Diès (Budé text): 'vérifiant aisément la vanité d'opinions aussi errantes'.

chos is followed by instruction, which cannot be applied until the subject has been rid of all ἀμαθία (c4–d4). It is a purification which concerns τὰ μέγιστα (e1)<sup>238</sup> and results in true happiness (e3–4).

Especially the last two statements make it clear that elenchos is intended to make the subject ready for philosophy, in other words that it is a form of protreptic. If Plato<sup>239</sup> rejects νοουθητική, this means that he prefers implicit to explicit protreptic (elenchos versus νοουθητική). If this identification of expulsion of ἀμαθία with protreptic is correct, three types of protreptic are distinguished in this text: reprobatory (χαλεπαίνοντες), advising (παραμυθούμενοι) and elenchos. As we have already seen (section II.1.4.2), this trichotomy recurs also in Demetrius, as does the favourable judgement on elenchos as opposed to the two types of explicit protreptic.<sup>240</sup>

<sup>238</sup> This phrase, as always in Plato, refers to the highest values concerning man, cf. Goldschmidt, *Dialogues*, 27 n. 6 (and Index s.v.); Meyer, *Apologie*, 89; de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, on *Ap.* 22d7.

<sup>239</sup> Most scholars agree in taking the sixth definition as a constructive piece of Platonic doctrine, not just as a more or less playful illustration of the diaeretic method, like the other definitions. On account of the Eleatic visitor's hesitation to connect sophistry with elenchos (230e6–231b8; resulting in the compromise ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστική, 231b8) and of the similarity of elenchos to μαίευτική (to be studied below), this seems to be the best interpretation. Cf. Cornford, *op. cit.* (n. 235), 180–2; *HGPh*, v 128–9.

<sup>240</sup> In Plato, elenchos is novel and achieves much more than the old-fashioned way; in Demetrius, aporetic interrogations met with great success once they had been invented (298) and 'shocked more', that is to say, accomplished more. It is clearly the aporetic dialogue which Demetrius has in mind: the two elements aporia and lack of knowledge are mentioned explicitly (297), and the exhortation to get oneself educated (παιδεύεσθαι προετρέψατο) is what the elenchos passage in Plato is all about (cf. esp. 229d2; 230e2). – I cannot discuss here the origin of the trichotomies in Demetrius and Plato; the most prudent course appears to be to assume that the *Sph.* passage started off a process of reflecting and theorising about the Socratic dialogue and Socratic literature, of which the passage in Demetr. provides an illustrative and instructive example.

Here a methodical objection might be raised. The *Sophist* passage deals with oral exhortation in its three forms, Demetrius describes three types of protreptic literature. Are we justified in extending what Plato makes the visitor say about admonition and elenchos as παιδεία to written λόγοι, in other words, does Plato also reject νουθητηκῆ in written form (represented by Aristippus and Xenophon in Demetrius) in favour of the dialogue, or at any rate the aporetic dialogue? I think the answer must be affirmative, if it can be shown that what Plato proposes here as an alternative for oral exhortation is a procedure which he elsewhere uses for Socrates' interrogatory method as depicted in his dialogues, and for theorising about that method.<sup>241</sup> In other words, if elenchos as outlined in the *Sophist* is identical to Socratic questioning, both in theory and in practice, we must infer that what is here said about νουθητητικῆ also reflects Plato's attitude towards accusatory and advising protreptic in written form. If Plato does not indicate this more explicitly, that may be accounted for sufficiently by the plan of the *Sophist*: he is not giving a comprehensive treatment of παιδεία in oral and written form, but he uses παιδεία as one more illustration of the method of diaeresis (the description of elenchos is proportionally speaking already very extensive as it is).

More than any other Platonic dialogue, the *Theaetetus* shows us Plato as reflecting on the *principia* of his literary

<sup>241</sup> Kahn, *Dialogue*, 97–8 (cf. 20–1; 111; 170–1) claims that elenchos was originally a test of persons, not of views, and that only later on did Plato use elenchos to test views. The distinction may help us to understand what makes the Alcibiades dialogues (Aeschines and ps.-Pl. *Alc.1*) stand apart from Platonic dialogues (cf. section II.3.5). The claim is valid for the *Apology* only on a superficial reading (cf. section II.3.3). But it seems clear to me that what is described and identified as elenchos in the *Sophist* is a testing of persons and of views at the same time, and I would maintain that for Plato it was never anything else.

ways and means.<sup>242</sup> Besides, this dialogue is quite clearly presented as itself putting into practice what it contains in the way of theory: soon after the start, Socrates interrupts the interrogation with a lengthy justification of his manner of interrogation, whereas the dialogue closes with a reference to this episode, showing that Socrates had been interrogating Theaetetus along these very lines (210b<sub>4</sub> ἢ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν κτλ.; cf. 148e<sub>7</sub>–8). On account of this reference we are allowed to combine the ending of the *Theaetetus* (210b<sub>4</sub>–d<sub>4</sub>) and the μαιευτική episode proper (150a<sub>8</sub>–151d<sub>3</sub>): together they constitute the theoretical framework (Socrates as intellectual midwife); the discussions coming between these two passages are an illustration of Socrates' midwifery put into practice.

In the two passages referred to, the word ἔλεγχος is not used,<sup>243</sup> but there are sufficient reasons for identifying elenchos and μαιευτική. Socrates' ability to 'prove by every possible test (βασανίζειν) whether the offspring of a young man's thought is a false phantom or instinct with life and truth' (150c<sub>1</sub>–3) is in essence and function identical to 'testing opinions' (ἐξετάζειν), the second stage of elenchos (cf. 210c<sub>2</sub> τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν); the interrogative form is of course a second point of agreement. Even more striking is the similarity of the results of μαιευτική and elenchos: Theaetetus 'will be more gentle and more agreeable (ἡμερώτερος) to his companions' (210c<sub>2</sub>–3), the subjects of elenchos 'become more gentle towards others' (*Sph.* 230b<sub>9</sub>–c<sub>1</sub>). Theaetetus will henceforth 'have the prudence (σωφρόνως) not to fancy you know what you do not know' (210c<sub>3</sub>–4), which is what elenchos is all about. Besides,

<sup>242</sup> Apart from the passages to be discussed, cf. the introductory conversation on direct versus reported dialogue (143b<sub>5</sub>–c<sub>6</sub>) and the 'Apology of Protagoras' on the correct manner of interrogation (167c<sub>7</sub>–168b<sub>6</sub>).

<sup>243</sup> Probably for the simple reason that it would be out of keeping with the midwife metaphor.

Theaetetus' comment in the *Sophist* on having this conviction as a result of elenchos, that it is σωφρονεστάτη τῶν ἐξέων (230d5), clearly echoes Socrates' σωφρόνως.<sup>244</sup> One cannot but agree with Diès, when he says 'ce qu'on oppose à cette méthode d'admonestation ... c'est directement la méthode dont le *Théétète* a donné et le nom et l'illustration continue ... avec les résultats qui sont ici décrits de la même manière qu'à la fin du *Théétète*'.<sup>245</sup>

The identification of μαιευτική and elenchos, and therefore of μαιευτική and implicit protreptic, enables us to understand better what Plato's views on protreptic are, because the μαιευτική episode is much more extensive than the rather schematic description of elenchos given in the *Sophist*. At the same time, since the *Theaetetus* itself clearly purports to give a demonstration of elenchos/μαιευτική, we are justified in analysing as Plato's written implicit protreptic those dialogues which exhibit the same 'elenctic' character as the *Theaetetus*. That a major part of Plato's *œuvre* is protreptic was suggested already by Demetrius and Antiochus of Ascalon (section II.1.4.2), and this notion was the starting-point for Gaiser's interpretation of the Platonic dialogue.<sup>246</sup> I believe that the μαιευτική epi-

<sup>244</sup> If I have read H. North, *Sophrosyne*, 183 correctly, the antithesis of δοξοσοφία and σωφροσύνη is not found outside *Sph.* (not so explicitly, anyway), but for the *Tht.* parallel, which she does not mention.

<sup>245</sup> Edition of *Sph.*, *Notice* 272. Cf. M. F. Burnyeat, 'Socratic midwifery, Platonic inspiration', *BICS* 24 (1977) 7–16, at 9: 'The midwife figure signals a return to the aporetic [*sic*] style of those early dialogues and to the Socratic method which is the substance of that style.' (Burnyeat claims that the method of the 'middle period' is different – his implicit claim that *Tht.* belongs to the 'last period' is at variance with the results of stylometry, cf. n. 261 to section II.3.2, and Kahn, *Dialogue*, 44–5.)

<sup>246</sup> Cf. also H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 281–3; Kuhn, *Sokrates*, 75–9; H. J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1959), 33; 463; 470–1; H. Gundert, *Der Platonische Dialog* (Heidelberg 1968), 49–50; E. N. Tigerstedt, *Interpreting Plato* (Stockholm 1977), 75; 141 n. 114. If I agree with Gaiser that the interpretation of (a series of) dialogues

sode, in combination with the elenchos episode (neither of which is used by Gaiser<sup>247</sup>), provides a strong support for this interpretation.

At this point, a caution is necessary. Nearly all Platonic dialogues contain a great deal of discussion, and thereby exhibit traits of elenchos as described in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. It would be foolish, however, to interpret the *Parmenides* or the *Philebus*, let alone the *Laws*, as implicit protreptic: if we did, we would be forced to stretch the term ‘protreptic’ so far that it would be pointless to use it at all. Evidently, we must try to find a criterion by which to separate protreptic from non-protreptic dialogues (not excluding the possibility that in otherwise non-protreptic works, protreptic passages may occur). To draw this line, a closer examination of the  $\mu\alpha\iota\epsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$  episode in comparison with the description of elenchos is necessary.

If implicit protreptic is to be at all successful, one needs a certain state of mind to start with. This state of mind is referred to (within the symbolism of midwifery) as ‘being pregnant’ (148e7; 151b2). Those who do not meet this condition, will not be helped by protreptic (151b1–6).<sup>248</sup> On the other hand, ‘pregnancy’ is more than the conceit of knowledge (though the latter is included in it), and by the same token  $\mu\alpha\iota\epsilon\upsilon\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$  has a wider application than  $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\gamma\text{-}$

as protreptic is a fruitful approach, that does not in any way imply assent to the theory of an unwritten, esoteric doctrine. See section II.3.5 and n. 309.

<sup>247</sup> Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 111) denies that the elenctic method has still a protreptic aim in *Tht.* But the *Sph.* passage proves that his antithesis ‘sachliche Untersuchung’: ‘protreptische Werbung’ is too rigid, and so does the fact (not taken into account) that *Tht.* is an aporetic dialogue.

<sup>248</sup> We do not meet this condition in *Sph.* (though it does not conflict with the statements found in *Sph.*), but it recurs in *Phdr.* 276e6 in a passage which uses the same pregnancy metaphor as *Tht.*: a  $\psi\chi\eta\ \pi\rho\sigma\eta\kappa\upsilon\sigma\sigma\alpha$  is the minimum requirement. See also *La.* 200c7–d3 and *Comm.* on 410c6 οὐκ ἔθελειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν.

χος has in the *Sophist*:<sup>249</sup> not only can the intellectual midwife liberate from δοξосоφία (150c2; 210b4–10), but he is also able to call up true knowledge (γόνιμὸν τε καὶ ἀληθές, 150c3; d7–8; 210c1–2). Both processes are brought to completion by the same method of interrogation and testing, in other words, by elenchos.<sup>250</sup>

Apparently, elenchos serves a twofold end: it leads Socrates' partners to aporia by delivering them from false opinion (implicit protreptic) and it helps them in a more positive way, namely in the acquiring of true knowledge. This latter aspect of elenchos is only hinted at in the *Sophist* (230c9–d1 τῶν προσφερομένων μαθημάτων; it is not said, but neither is it denied, that the μαθήματα are likewise the result of elenchos).

The double function of elenchos explains why Socrates<sup>251</sup> employs it throughout Plato's dialogues: he could use the same method for reaching aporia and for conducting philosophical investigations. The latter can be fruitful only through elenchos: questioning and testing the answers. I shall illustrate this twofold use of the same method in the next section; for the moment, we must stop to consider what we have so far learned about protreptic and elenchos.

<sup>249</sup> In *Sph.* Plato needs elenchos as a means of κάθαρσις (230c4; d3; d7–9; e1) and therefore concentrates on δοξосоφία and its removal: the sophist is defined as a species of the genus καθαρτής (231e6). That does not necessarily mean that elenchos is restricted to κάθαρσις, and therefore this divergence in the description of μαιευτική in *Tht.* and of elenchos in *Sph.* does not tell against their identity.

<sup>250</sup> Socrates' question at *Euthd.* 274d7–e5 should probably be interpreted in this light: the same method is used for protreptic (in this case, explicit protreptic) and for teaching ἀρετή. Compare also Clinias' surprising progress (*Euthd.* 290e1–291a7 and Méridier's note) with *Tht.* 150d2–6 (below, section II.3.4).

<sup>251</sup> I do not say 'Plato' because I have analysed until now only the upper-level role of Socrates in *Tht.* and of the Eleatic visitor in *Sph.* and am going to apply this analysis presently to the upper levels of other dialogues. A translation into terms of the lower level will be attempted in section II.3.5.



Elenchos is said in the *Sophist* to be a means of purification concerning τὰ μέγιστα; in other words, it makes men ready for the care of the soul, and it achieves the aim better and faster than admonition. In the *Theaetetus* we see Socrates justify himself by means of an extensive description, and subsequently an application, of elenchos. This dialogue ends up in aporia and Theaetetus emerges from the process more or less<sup>252</sup> purified. In other words, elenchos has for its (first) natural conclusion the final state of aporia: only in that state are men ready for the care of the soul, or as the *Sophist* has it, for μωθήματα.<sup>253</sup>

In this sense, the various conversations reported in Plato's dialogues appear to be implicitly protreptic, at any rate those conversations or parts of conversations that lead to the final aporia and in applying elenchos remove in Socrates' partners what the *Sophist* calls 'the opinions that obstruct learning' (230d2–3). The aporetic discussions and the aporetic parts of 'constructive' discussions are suggested to be Socrates' alternative for the explicit protreptic condemned in the *Sophist*.

It will be clear from the preceding analyses that I disagree with those scholars who apply a rigid distinction between elenchos and 'later' forms of dialogical discourse in Plato, and reserve the concept of elenchos for the procedure applied by Socrates in the aporetic dialogues. This assumption lies at the bottom of such important works as

<sup>252</sup> It is not said in so many words that the purification is complete, but the possibility is left open (210b11–c4).

<sup>253</sup> In *Tht.* Socrates denies throughout that he possesses knowledge himself (150c8–d2; 210c4–6). This is perhaps only 'une ruse de l'ironie socratique, expliquée clairement par le texte du *Sophiste*' (Goldschmidt, *Dialogues*, 82). But it is also true in the sense that philosophical knowledge is based on contemplation of the Forms, and therefore contains an intuitive moment: even if Socrates possesses knowledge, he is unable to impart it completely to others; he can only pave the way for it. – For the identity of exhortation to the care of the soul and to philosophy, cf. sections II.1.1; II.1.5.

R. Robinson's *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford 1953<sup>2</sup>), which systematically opposes elenchos and dialectic, and Vlastos' *Socrates*, for whom the Socrates of elenchos is an entirely different philosopher from the Socrates of later works.<sup>254</sup> I think that the differences must not be over-emphasised. *Ad hominem* refutation, dialectic, diaeresis, hypothesis<sup>255</sup> are all different forms of testing, and therefore of elenchos. I do not wish to deny that there is an evolution in philosophical method,<sup>256</sup> but the theoretical framework as set out in the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus* justifies a unitarian approach. How valid the approach is, will be tested in the next section.<sup>257</sup>

### II.3.2 *Elenchos in practice*

From the two passages discussed in the previous section, a theory has been reconstructed which may serve as a starting-point for developing a model for the interpretation of the Platonic dialogue. Our first task is now to test the hypothesis that elenchos as analysed above is indeed the pattern of Socrates' interrogation in the Platonic dialogue.

Within the limits of this book, one illustration must serve as proof. Moreover, I can hardly select even one dialogue and analyse it in its entirety. Fortunately, there is

<sup>254</sup> Cf. C. H. Kahn, 'Vlastos' Socrates', *Phronesis* 37 (1992) 233–58. Kahn rightly points out (248–50) that elenchos in the stricter sense is not present in all 'early' dialogues and appears also in 'later' dialogues (the interrogation of Agathon in *Smp.*, and *R.*, Book 1).

<sup>255</sup> Cf. Kahn, 'Did Plato write Socratic dialogues?', 318–19 on hypothesis in the *Protagoras*.

<sup>256</sup> On later dialogical techniques, cf. C. Gill, 'Afterword: Dialectic and the dialogue form in late Plato', in C. Gill–M. M. McCabe, *Form and Argument in Late Plato* (Oxford 1996), 283–311.

<sup>257</sup> The result of the test will have to show whether the passages from *Sph.* and *Tht.* only reflect Plato's later, modified, views of his earlier work (so, for example, J. Laborde, *Le dialogue platonicien de la maturité* (Paris 1978), 369) or give a true account of elenchos as practised in all dialogues.

one passage in Plato's works which suits the purpose in an ideal way, to wit the mathematical passage of the *Meno*.<sup>258</sup>

In the first place, Socrates' interrogation of the slave is in the last resort<sup>259</sup> his reply to Meno's complaint that Socrates has numbed his mind (79e7–80b2); Socrates shows that being numbed can be beneficial as it is a sign of progress (84a3–c9). Therefore we can expect a priori that the mathematical passage contains an implicit justification of Socrates' method, just as the *μαίευτική* episode contains its explicit justification: Socrates' questioning is exemplified here *in nuce*.<sup>260</sup>

Secondly, *Meno* and *Theaetetus* are rather wide apart chronologically. *Meno* belongs to the large and diffuse group called the early dialogues,<sup>261</sup> whereas *Theaetetus*

<sup>258</sup> I do not analyse *Tht.* (as would perhaps have seemed logical) because *Tht.* is an aporetic dialogue and therefore cannot illustrate the second function of elenchos, and because an analysis of *Tht.* would prove only that the *μαίευτική* episode is the theoretical model for *Tht.* itself, not for other dialogues (and because *Tht.* is too long). – Stokes, *Socratic Conversations*, 11–25 uses the passage to analyse the type of questions asked by Socrates and to illustrate the importance of the dialogue form as a factor in the interpretation of Plato; he does not, however, distinguish between the various stages of the interrogation.

<sup>259</sup> The mathematical passage is usually taken for what it is ostensibly: a proof of the theory of ἀνάμνησις. But even if Plato believed that the passage proves this theory (I neither think it does nor believe Plato thought so, cf. Bluck's Comm., 11), the theory itself is brought in only to defeat Meno's pessimism, cf. 86b6–c2. This is not to belittle the importance of this doctrine for Socrates' behaviour in the dialogues – I agree, against many modern interpreters, that ἀνάμνησις is the ultimate explanation for *μαίευτική* (cf. Bluck on *Men.* 84d1; *HGPh*, v 73 n. 2).

<sup>260</sup> If this is right, the first part of Socrates' interrogation of the slave must also reflect the first part of Socrates' conversation with Meno in the *Meno* itself. That this is indeed the case is shown by H. H. Benson, 'Meno, the slave boy and the elenchos', *Phronesis* 25 (1990) 128–58.

<sup>261</sup> These include *Phd.*, *Smp.*, *Cra.*, of which it is often falsely claimed that stylometry has proved that they belong to the 'mature period'. In fact, no stylistic features have been found which unite these three

comes late in the middle period, after 369; the distance may be fifteen to twenty years. If it can be shown that the *Meno* passage gives a precise illustration of the theory put forward in *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*, the theory will become much more acceptable as an overall pattern for the dialogues.

Besides, Socrates intersperses his interrogation with comments, which (as we shall see presently) enable us to determine the various stages of elenchos as applied here.

First, Meno's slave is asked the length of the sides of a square with an area of eight square feet. It is established that he thinks that the sides must be four feet long (82b9–e3). This is the stage called διερωτᾶν and ἐξετάζειν in the *Sophist*. The slave still thinks he knows what in fact he does not know (82e5–9): he is guilty of δοξοσοφία.<sup>262</sup>

Next, this opinion is tested against the slave's (correct) opinion that the square of four is sixteen and thereby he is proved to be wrong (82e14–83c3); this corresponds to τιθέναι παρ' ἀλλήλας and ἐπιδεικνύναι αὐταῖς ἐναντίας.

The slave offers an alternative opinion: the sides of the square must be larger than two feet, and smaller than four, so his second answer is that they are three feet long. Again, this opinion is confronted with his (correct) opinion that the square of three is nine; the slave realises that these opinions are mutually exclusive and now confesses his ignorance (83c4–84a2). He has, therefore, been delivered from the conceit of knowledge and he recognises the aporia (84a7–b1). The 'opinions that obstruct learning' have

with the works of the second group, *R.*, *Prm.*, *Tht.*, *Phdr.* Cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 16 n. 29; my review of Brandwood, *Chronology*, 540–1; Kahn, *Dialogue*, 44–5. For a possible stylometric link of *Phd.* and *Cra.* with the second group, cf. my note on *R.* 425a10, 'Notes on *Politeia*, iv', 405.

<sup>262</sup> Here as in *Tht.* (previous section, n. 253) it is stressed that Socrates does not teach (82e4–5; 84c11–d2; 85d3–4); here too, the statement is questionable, but not really relevant to the method of elenchos (though very much so to the theory of ἀνάμνησις).

been removed, and he is now ready for μαθήματα (cf. 84b9–c7).

In the third phase the slave arrives (under Socrates' guidance) at the conclusion that the sides must have the length of the diagonal of a square with sides two feet long (84d3–85b7). This part of the conversation corresponds to the μαθήματα of the *Sophist*. Socrates goes out of his way to underline that this method has remained the same: he has confined himself to questions (84c11–d2; 85b8–9; d3–4), even when the slave is about to find the correct answer.<sup>263</sup>

The structure, then, of the whole passage may be summed up as follows. To the slave's conceit of knowledge, elenchos is applied repeatedly, until he has reached the stage of aporia, that is, until he knows that he does not know. To aporia, elenchos is again applied, until he has reached true knowledge.<sup>264</sup> This last stage is not illustrated completely in the *Meno*, because it is a lengthy, repetitive process, but it is predicted that the slave will reach it if the process is applied (85c10–d1).

Aporia is a necessary and sufficient condition for 'attempting to search or learn' (84c4–5); in other words, one who is 'thrown into aporia' will automatically 'feel a desire

<sup>263</sup> Again, it is hard to be convinced by these words of Socrates, but that is not the point at issue.

<sup>264</sup> Cf. P. Stemmer, *Platons Dialektik. Die frühen und mittleren Dialoge* (Berlin–New York 1992), 241: 'Die Vorstellung, dass Platons Methode im *Menon* von einer destruktiven (sokratischen) in eine konstruktive (platonische) Vorgehensweise umschlägt, ist verbreitet [some references in n. 78]. Teilt man diese Sicht der Dinge, liegt es nahe, im zweiten Teil des Sklavengesprächs den Text zu finden, in dem die neue konstruktive Dialektik zum ersten Mal vorggeführt wird. Doch diese Deutung des Sklavengesprächs und des *Menon* ist unzutreffend. Platon konzipiert hier nicht eine neue konstruktive dialektische Methode.' Ibid., 245: 'Ein Elenchos, an dessen Ende eine unumstößliche Antwort steht, realisiert den anamnetischen Prozess mit seinen beiden Teilen.' But I disagree with Stemmer's claim that anamnesis equals elenchos. Cf. n. 259.

to know' (cf. 84c5–6). With aporia, therefore, the aim of implicit protreptic has been reached; what follows is not protreptic any longer, but (philosophical) investigation.

We see that the elements of the description of elenchos from the *Sophist* as well as its double function as set out in the *Theaetetus* recur in this miniature of a constructive dialogue. The stages of initial ἀμυθία and of its final expulsion are contrasted in the same way, and partly in the same words, as in the *Sophist*.<sup>265</sup>

We had concluded that *Theaetetus* and *Sophist* suggest that Socrates' use of elenchos in order to reach aporia and thereby to fertilise the soil for implanting true knowledge is his particular protreptic manner (in Plato). This conclusion is fully backed up by the *Meno* passage: Plato's aporetic dialogues and parts of dialogues must be interpreted as showing Socrates exhorting his partners implicitly to the care of the soul.

### II.3.3 *Implicit and explicit protreptic in the Apology*

It has often been remarked<sup>266</sup> that in the *Apology*, after the interrogation of Meletus (24c4–28a2), the traits of Socrates' portrait become different. There is a renewed description of his activity<sup>267</sup> (now for the first time called

<sup>265</sup> I shall not enter here into another characteristic detail of Socratic elenchos: that it is 'searching together' (*Men.* 84c11; cf. 80d4; 90b5; *Prt.* 330b6; *Grg.* 506a4; *Cra.* 384c2; *Tht.* 151e5; 157d1–2; *Phdr.* 276e7), in other words, that the aporia extends to Socrates as well, cf. section II.3.1 n. 253.

<sup>266</sup> I give a number of references taken more or less at random: Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, II 82–4; H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 114; Wolff, *Apologie*, 25–8; R. Hackforth, *The Composition of Plato's Apology* (Cambridge 1933), 112–17; Meyer, *Apologie*, 93–4 and n. 76.

<sup>267</sup> The points of agreement between the two episodes are listed by Hackforth, op. cit. (n. 266), 114–15. The later passage is partly at a higher level than the earlier one: from 29c5 to 30c1 there is (imaginary) discourse between Socrates and his judges; within this discourse, two of the protreptic speeches are yet one level higher. Even

φιλοσοφείν, 28e5; 29c9; d5) with the emphasis on the two major moments of examination and conviction (ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, 29e5), but this time these are preceded by exhortation and followed by taunt (ὄνειδιῶ, 30a1; cf. Comm. on 408e5).

The exhortation is of the reproving type; consequently, initial exhortation and final reproof have the same content: the object of ὄνειδος is ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος, 30a1–3 – this is a slightly exaggerated paraphrasis of the exhortation ᾧ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ᾧν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνη ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα, καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῆι οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; (29d7–e3).<sup>268</sup>

In the rest of the *Apology*, the emphasis is definitely on that part of Socrates' activity which is referred to with the words παρακελεύεσθαι (29d5) and πείθειν (30a8; cf. e7 ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὄνειδίζων) – these words are identified in the passage 31b1–7: πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς . . . ταῦτα παρεκελεύομεν. In fact, it is even suggested that persuasion/exhortation is the only form of Socrates' philosophical activity (30a7–8 οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων κτλ.; cf. b4–7).

so, the points of agreement referred to just now, as well as the fact that this extra level is not consistently present, permit us to take these passages side by side.

<sup>268</sup> I take it that in 29d4–6 (οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενος τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν), ἐνδεικνύμενος refers to ἐξέτασις and ἐλεγχοσ (in the terminal sense of conviction of ignorance – Hackforth (loc. cit.) points out that ἐνδεικνύμενος lacks a complementary clause like it has 23b7) and that παρακελευόμενος covers both the initial incitation and the final taunt, and that consequently φιλοσοφῶν is coordinated with its two principal aspects.

Socrates' exhortations (apart from the passage quoted in full also 30b2–4; 31b4–5; 36c5–d1) are pieces of explicit philosophical protreptic. If more confirmation is needed, it may be pointed out that ἐπιμέλεια, which is the key-word of Socrates' exhortations here, occurs in Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in a very similar context<sup>269</sup> and quite often in the *Euthydemus*,<sup>270</sup> cf. section II.2.2 n. 188.

First, we have to ask ourselves why Plato did not mark this exhorting Socrates more clearly as protreptic (he does so clearly enough in the *Euthydemus*). I think the structure of the *Apology* explains that. Plato had made Socrates choose the Delphic oracle for his central theme; this serves admirably in conjuring up a picture of a Socrates devoted to ἐξέτασις and ἔλεγχος in order to check the truth of the oracle, framed so as to refute the old accusations and enmities. In the defence against the accusation of ἀσέβεια the description of Socrates examining others (called already τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν at 23c1) is worked out (28e4–6 τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάπτοντος . . . φιλοσοφοῦντα με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἑμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους), but the more positive aspect of exhortation towards virtue and the best state of the soul is smuggled in at the same time in order that Socrates' practice may appear more positively beneficial to the Athenians. If Plato had over-stressed this protreptic aspect of the Socrates he is creating, he would have ended up by depicting not one Socrates, but two.

Another, bigger, problem is the fact that an explicitly exhorting Socrates is hardly ever to be met within Plato's dialogues. For those who hold the *Apology* to be a true

<sup>269</sup> B 53 Düring ἢ μὴν ἀνδραποδῶδες γε τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀξιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήματα ζητεῖν, τῶν δὲ καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι τὸ παράπαν; cf. B 34.

<sup>270</sup> Cf. especially 275a1–2 κάλλιστ' ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν.



account of what Socrates actually said before his judges,<sup>271</sup> there is no problem; they can say with Jaeger: 'From the *Apology* we know that the real Socrates tried above everything to exhort his fellow-men to practise "virtue" and "the care of the soul"' and conclude with him that Plato tried something different.<sup>272</sup> But since we have already seen that elenchos and protreptic are tied together in Plato's dialogues, an attempt at harmonisation of the dialogues and the *Apology* is at least worth trying, the more so because our analysis of the dialogues so far does not suggest that Plato tries something all that different.

Besides, as we have already seen, there is contradiction not just between the explicitly exhorting Socrates of the *Apology* and the implicit protreptic practised by Socrates in the dialogues, but at least as strong a contradiction within the *Apology* itself. After Socrates has first limited his activity to elenchos in order to check the truth of the Delphic oracle, he cannot very well go on saying that he does nothing else but exhort his fellow-citizens to the care of the soul.

In fact, I believe that this latter contradiction can be solved only with help of the analysis of elenchos as implicit

<sup>271</sup> This is not the place to argue this question; I can only refer to de Strycker-Slings, *Apology*, 1–8. For an intelligent defence of the 'historical' interpretation, cf. *HGPh*, iv 72–80. The gradual, cleverly managed change of the purely 'elenctic' Socrates into a Socrates who uses elenchos side by side with explicit protreptic reminds me too much of Socrates' fallacious behaviour in the dialogues to be able to accept *Ap.* as historical. Certainly, Plato defends Socrates against the charges of Anytus and his colleagues, but which Socrates is he defending? First and foremost, the Socrates of his dialogues, who uses elenchos in order to reach aporia, and in doing so exhorts his partners to the care of the soul in what is, according to *Sph.*, the most efficient way.

<sup>272</sup> *Paideia*, 2.91–2 (Eng. ed.). I wholly agree that 'Plato wants to push his readers forward to the knowledge of virtue'; evidently, my interpretation of the intention of the Platonic dialogue (section II.3.5) does not necessarily conflict with a historical interpretation of *Ap.*

exhortation to the care of the soul, that is, to philosophy. If this analysis is applied to the *Apology*, the only difference between the *Apology* and the dialogues is that between explicit and implicit protreptic. In the *Apology*, Socrates applies the method which is rejected in the *Sophist* as old-fashioned and as ‘yielding little result for much pains’, in short, *νουθετητικῆ*. At the same time he also practises its alternative, *elenchos*. There is only one way to reconcile the two, namely to assume that Socrates’ explicit exhortations in the *Apology* are not based on the historical Socrates but on a literary trick of Plato.

Plato had to make clear somehow that Socrates’ *elenchos* is not just destructive but leads to care about ‘φρόνησις, truth and the best state of the soul’ (29e1–2). Since he is writing what purports to be a speech for the defence, he could not very well have pointed out, as he does in the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus* (and illustrates in the *Meno*), that *elenchos*, by bringing its subjects to *aporia*, is beneficial for them inasmuch as they will be ready for *μαθήματα*. If Plato had stated that in so many words, he would have destroyed Socrates’ case, which is essentially based on his professed ignorance. True, Socrates the midwife is ignorant too, but he at least can distinguish, by some divine gift, between false and true offspring. Socrates could not have claimed such a divine gift in the *Apology*.

The only way left for Plato, if he wanted to show that *elenchos* is protreptic, was to do precisely as he did: to concentrate first on the ‘elenctic’ Socrates and later to combine him with an explicitly protreptic Socrates. The second portrait is not intended as a true-to-life account of part of Socrates’ philosophical activities, but as a commentary on the first. Plato did not want his readers to believe that Socrates actually went around accusing total strangers of not caring for their souls, but wanted to indicate the effect of Socrates’ questioning. Through practising *elenchos* Socrates forces his interlocutors to account

for their opinions and actions, and to mend their ways accordingly; it is elenchos which keeps people awake, and thus it is god's gift to the city (30e1–a9).<sup>273</sup>

It was left to the reader to combine the two portraits, and the more he was acquainted with Plato's dialogues, the easier this task would be. The *Apology*, then, is essentially a defence of the dialogue. Take away the oracle and the quest among politicians, poets and craftsmen from the first portrait, and the explicit protreptic of the second, and what you're left with is a consistent description of elenchos as analysed in the *Sophist* and the *Theaetetus*, with the manner of the former and the results of the latter portrait.<sup>274</sup>

There is an awkward passage near the end of the *Apology* which confirms the interpretation presented here. After Socrates is sentenced to death, he predicts to those who voted for the death-penalty that far from being rid of having to account for their lives,<sup>275</sup> there will be many more people who will force them to an account (39c6–d1

<sup>273</sup> In this analysis Orwin's view that the *Clitophon* is a counter-*Apology* is acceptable. Just as in the *Apology* the second Socrates explains the first, so in the *Clitophon* Clitophon's own manner of questioning is a tacit correction of Socrates' explicit protreptic. The difference is of course that in the *Clitophon*, the opposition is between two different characters, which I can only account for if the *Clitophon* has a polemic intention.

<sup>274</sup> H. H. Benson, 'The dissolution of the problem of the elenchus', *OSAPh* 13 (1995) 45–112, reaches a similar conclusion along roughly similar lines. In the first portrait, he sees Socrates' disavowal of knowledge as the central trait (50–1), in the second, the concern for the soul (51–2). In a subsequent analysis of *Euthphr.*, *La.*, *Chrm.*, these key features prove to play a major part (53–63) – some subsidiary features which he perceives in the *Apology* are likewise present. His conclusion is that all three dialogues 'display the key features of the method Socrates describes himself as employing in the *Apology*' (65). I part company with Benson when he distinguishes between a Socratic and a 'newly emerging Platonic understanding of the Socratic method' (50).

<sup>275</sup> With 39c7 διδόναι ἔλεγχον; d1 ἐλέγχοντες cf. 29e5 ἐλέγξω; similarly 39d4 ὀνειδίζειν – 30a1 ὀνειδιῶ; e7 ὀνειδίζων. Cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 206–8.

νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἴομενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι· πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες).

Now this prediction makes sense only if it refers to something that had already taken place or was taking place at the time when Plato wrote the *Apology*.<sup>276</sup> Since there is no evidence whatsoever of any of Socrates' pupils ever addressing people in the streets and on the marketplace, the reference must be to Socratic writings. Critical invectives against the Athenians (and the condemnation of the four politicians in the *Gorgias*) do not qualify either,<sup>277</sup> as such writings do not force their readers to give an account of their conduct in life. But the written elenchos, as illustrated in Plato's dialogues, does just that. As H. Maier puts it: 'die Apologie ist ein Manifest, das Plato . . . an die Athener richtet. Er präsentiert sich und die Freunde hier ganz formell vor der Öffentlichkeit als die Erben und Nachfolger des Sokrates, als seine Testamentsvollstrecker, die im Begriff stehen, in die Arbeit des Meisters einzutreten.'<sup>278</sup> I do not subscribe to the suggestion contained in

<sup>276</sup> I do not accept de Strycker's answer (which he found unsatisfactory himself) that 'Plato let himself be carried away by his own inspiration so that he is not fully aware of the implications of what Socrates says in 39c1-d9' (de Strycker-Slings, *Apology*, 210). De Strycker could not accept the interpretation offered here because he regarded the elenctic and the protreptic portraits of Socrates from the *Apology* as simply complementary, whereas I have argued above that the second portrait shows the effects of the first. (I was not at liberty to put my own views forward in this respect in de Strycker-Slings, *Apology*.)

<sup>277</sup> So H. Erbse, 'Zur Entstehungszeit von Platons "Apologie des Sokrates"', in *Ausgewählte Schriften* (cf. Bibliography), 341-63, esp. 355-6.

<sup>278</sup> *Sokrates*, 106; similarly Burnet on *Ap.* 39c8. I disagree with these two scholars when they make the words refer to other Socratics as well: Plato is the only Socratic whose dialogues are written elenchos. The words πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες refer to Plato's dialogues only: as they were written down and widely read, they could reach a wider audience than Socrates could have reached.

these words that the *Apology* is programmatic in the sense that it announces dialogues that are yet to come, but I do strongly believe, and I hope I have proved, that the *Apology* is the charter on which the dialogues are founded.<sup>279</sup>

#### II.3.4 *Protreptic in the Euthydemus*

The *Euthydemus* is a three-level dialogue in which there is protreptic discourse on the second upper level, and even switching from the second to the first upper level (290e1). Its intention can only be grasped if we interpret the messages of all level-contents downwards – certainly we commit a grave error of method (which in this case is bound to bring about a completely wrong result) if we single out the protreptic parts and identify them with Plato's intention. As I have put it elsewhere,<sup>280</sup> the *Euthydemus* is not a protreptic dialogue, but a dialogue about protreptic.

Obviously, I can state here only the main features of what I consider to be the meaning of the *Euthydemus*; considerations of space preclude any argumentation.<sup>281</sup>

Plato wishes to show the difference between Socrates' elenchos and eristic argument (with which no doubt it was often identified, as it is by the anonymous interlocutor<sup>282</sup>); this was the more urgent because in all his dialogues Socrates employs fallacious arguments not very dissimilar

<sup>279</sup> I do not of course pretend that with this analysis a full statement on the intention of the *Apology* has been given; on the other hand, I feel reasonably confident that no one can explain the *Apology* satisfactorily if this aspect of its meaning is neglected.

<sup>280</sup> 'Aeschines' Miltiades', 307–8.

<sup>281</sup> I find myself in agreement with most of what Guthrie says about *Euthd.* (*HGPh*, IV 274–83) and with Sprague, *Fallacy*, 1–33. Cf. also Rutherford, *Art of Plato*, 111–20.

<sup>282</sup> If he is really Isocrates, as I think he is, one may compare Isoc. 13.1–8. Plato's epilogue probably intends to show that Isocrates' brand of φιλοσοφία is inferior even to the eristics, inasmuch as the latter practise philosophy and he something of less value (306a1–c5).

from (only less obvious than) the eristic dilemmas and fallacies (cf. *HGPh*, IV 275–6). By constantly juxtaposing Socrates' and the eristics' questioning, Plato forces his readers to compare them. As Socrates is successful where the eristics are not, Socratic elenchos is shown to be superior. The field in which the two types of elenchos compete is explicit philosophical protreptic. Both methods fail to achieve their aim (Socrates' elenchos results in *aporia*), but Plato is able to show that as a method of implicit protreptic, Socrates' elenchos does pave the way for true knowledge; the eristic method brings only confusion.

Since we are concerned here with Socratic elenchos, I shall study only the two conversations of Socrates and Clinias.<sup>283</sup> The first conversation (278e3–282d3) is called 'a model of protreptic argument' (282d4–6), and comes under the head of explicit philosophical protreptic: it ends in the conclusion that in order to reach happiness, one needs σοφία; since σοφία can be taught (cf. section II.2.3.1), one must try to acquire it – in other words, one must practise philosophy (282d1 ἀναγκάϊον εἶναι φιλοσοφεῖν).

The second conversation of Socrates and Clinias, half-way carried on by Socrates and Crito one level downward, is presented as a continuation of the first (288c6–d2). It is essentially an attempt to determine what kind of σοφία is necessary. The search ends up in *aporia* (292e6–293a1).

It would not seem unreasonable to doubt that this passage should be considered protreptic, as the first conversation had already reached the goal of philosophical pro-

<sup>283</sup> There are some features in the final conversation of Socrates and Crito (306d2–end) which justify its interpretation as explicit protreptic. Crito complains that he would like to give his son a philosophical παιδεία, but that the representatives of philosophy are repulsive to him (N. B. προτρέπω 307a2). Socrates tells him to leave them alone and examine philosophy itself. This passage is the continuation of Socrates' two protreptic conversations: the search for the specific σοφία was a fiasco, but Crito has been exhorted none the less to keep pursuing σοφία (φιλοσοφεῖν).

treptic. On the other hand, it is clear that φιλοσοφεῖν had not been used in its technical sense at the end of the first conversation, but had been re-etymologised as ‘to strive after σοφία’ (the allegedly Pythagorean but in point of fact originally Platonic use of the word<sup>284</sup>). A more precise determination of the notion σοφία is therefore a necessary addition to the first conversation.

At the same time, one must realise that we do not have a pure and simple specimen of explicit protreptic but one bearing Plato’s stamp, and set up so as to serve his own purposes. (This holds also for the first conversation: the elements which bring about the aporia at the end of the second had been carefully prepared there.)<sup>285</sup> As it is precisely these purposes in which we are interested at present, it is logical to concentrate on this episode (the most important elements of the first conversation have been studied in sections II.2.3.1 and 3). I shall comment on two remarkable features which are typical of Plato’s use of elenchos.

First, directly at the beginning of the conversation the σοφία looked for is assumed implicitly to be a τέχνη (with ἐπιστήμη serving as *trait d’union*; 288d8–289c8). Introducing the concept of virtue as a τέχνη is a well-known feature of the early Platonic dialogue; the concept invariably causes the main aporia, as it does here. Because σοφία is a τέχνη, it must have an ἔργον (291e1); this ἔργον must be ὠφέλιμον (292a8) and therefore ἀγαθόν (292a11; cf. Comm. on 407a1 ὠφελεῖν). Now, in the first conversation, it had

<sup>284</sup> Cf. W. Burkert, ‘Platon oder Pythagoras? Zum Ursprung des Wortes Philosophie’, *Hermes* 88 (1960) 159–77; esp. 172–4.

<sup>285</sup> (1) The statement that σοφία is the only ἀγαθόν (281e3–5). (2) The identification of σοφία and ἐπιστήμη (281a2–b6), while at the same time σοφία is used as ‘wisdom’ (281b6; d8; e4 and esp. b7 νοῦν μὴ ἔχων; besides, the question whether σοφία can be taught (282c1–2) is pointless if σοφία means ‘knowledge’). This identification enables Socrates in the second conversation to replace σοφία by ἐπιστήμη (288d8 etc.) and even by τέχνη (289c2 etc.).

been proved that σοφία itself is the only ἀγαθόν (281e3–5); consequently, the only ἔργον of σοφία is σοφία (292d8–e1; cf. section 1.5.3). The discussion has resulted in a circular regress (291b8–c1), and therefore in aporia (292e6–293a1).

As Goldschmidt has suggested (*Dialogues*, 79–80), a passage from the *Republic*, in which a similar circular regress is signalled, points to the way of avoiding it. The more enlightened people (τοῖς κομψοτέροις) think the good is wise knowledge (φρόνησις). They cannot tell us what kind of knowledge, but are forced to say knowledge of the good (505b5–10). Still, every soul pursues the good as ultimate end, divining that it is something, yet perplexed (ἀποροῦσα) and unable to grasp what it is (505d11–e2). These statements occur at the beginning of the discussions of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ; only the assumption that such a Form exists can break through the circularity entailed by identifying φρόνησις (σοφία) and ἀγαθόν. If Goldschmidt is right in reading the *Euthydemus* in the light of this passage – and I have no doubt that he is – the σοφία looked for in the *Euthydemus* is not, perhaps, knowledge of the Forms, but in any case knowledge of a higher order than technical knowledge.

The distinction of levels of knowledge is part of the philosophical message not only of the *Euthydemus* but of allaporetic dialogues. ‘Plato wants to make us understand that we had wrongly identified ethical knowledge with the technician’s skill’ (E. de Strycker).<sup>286</sup> In the background lies Plato’s idiosyncratic version of the Socratic paradox ‘Virtue is knowledge’: so it is, but knowledge of a very

<sup>286</sup> ‘De eenheid van kennis en liefde in Socrates’ opvatting over de deugd’, *Bijdragen, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie en Theologie* 27 (1966) 214–28 at 217 (my translation); cf. Kuhn, *Sokrates*, 30–5; J. Hirschberger, *Die Phronesis in der Philosophie Platons vor dem Staate* (Leipzig 1932), 61–2 and passim; O’Brien, *Paradoxes*, 17–18; Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, 289–91 and passim.



specific character, not the knowledge found in the arts and sciences.

This interpretation of Plato's use of the τέχνη analogies is at variance with the one commonly held: that Plato, in his early period, really believed that the knowledge which is (or produces) virtue is not different from technical knowledge, and that he believed this because he was still under the influence of Socrates' teaching. In my opinion (which it would take me too far afield to argue at any length here,<sup>287</sup> but which I have to state because an important part of my interpretation of the *Clitophon* and of the dialogue as such depends on it), Plato never believed such a thing, even if Socrates did. There is no positive evidence that the theory of Forms was already part of Plato's philosophy when he wrote his first dialogues, but certainly the theory that virtue is knowledge reposing on a deeper insight of things, knowledge of another order than technical skill, is necessary if one wants to understand why he wrote these dialogues at all. Only this special knowledge can attain the concept of ἀγαθόν which is essential in defining the virtues under discussion. As Goldschmidt puts it: 'Là est la raison décisive de l'échec des six dialogues [*Laches*, *Charmides*, *Hippias Maior*, *Euthyphron*, *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*]. Les parties de la vertu, l'amitié, le bonheur, on ne peut les définir que si l'on parvient à définir le Bien avec lequel toutes ces Valeurs paraissent à un moment donné se con-

<sup>287</sup> Instead, I may perhaps be allowed to refer the reader to R. Kent Sprague, 'Plato's unitarianism or what Shorey said', *CPh* 71 (1976) 109–12; Kahn, 'Did Plato write Socratic dialogues?'; Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, esp. 280–95. Kahn, *Dialogue*, 38–42; 59–70 and passim, denies that there is any fundamental break in Plato's views between the aporetic dialogues and the *Republic*. My view that the aporetic dialogues are a separate sub-genre (review of Brandwood, *Chronology*, 541) is completely compatible with what Kahn says about his tentative grouping of the dialogues of the 'first period' on p. 48.

fondre. Or ce Bien, nulle part Platon n'en entreprend la définition. Mais il nous indique qu'à vouloir ... s'entêter dans cette tentative, on finit par tourner en cercle' (*Dialogues*, 80).<sup>288</sup>

A second point of interest is the remarkable effect which Socratic elenchos has on the young Clinias. He has been stimulated by Socrates' questions, so much so that he volunteers good reasons for rejecting the λογοποιική τέχνη and the στρατηγική as candidates for the art of happiness for which he and Socrates are looking (289c8–290d8). His progress prompts Crito to interrupt Socrates' report: Crito is unwilling to believe that it was Clinias who made these clever remarks. It is unique for a first upper-level character (other than Socrates) to comment on second upper-level discourse in such a way. If Crito does so here, it is in order to mark the more clearly Clinias' astonishing progress.

In the ensuing conversation of Socrates and Crito, there is one element in particular which puts this progress in its proper light. Socrates supposes that maybe one of the gods (τις τῶν κρειπτόνων, 291a4) uttered these words, and Crito ironically<sup>289</sup> agrees. Now, there is a sentence in the μαιευτική episode of the *Theaetetus*, which provides the best commentary on this passage. 'Those who frequent my company at first appear, some of them, quite unintelligent [cf. *Euthd.* 279d7–8]; but as we go further with our discussions, all who are favoured by heaven (οἷσπερ ἄν θ θεὸς

<sup>288</sup> Cf. D. L. Roochnik, 'Socrates' use of the techne-analogy', *JHPH* 24 (1986) 295–310, esp. 303–7, who claims that the τέχνη analogies have a twofold dialectical function: exhortation and refutation. I would go one step further and identify the two (cf. next section).

<sup>289</sup> When Crito says (291a6–7) τῶν κρειπτόνων μέντοι τις ἔμοι δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γέ, he thinks of Socrates. That, however, does not affect the point. Cf. Hawtrey ad loc.; T. A. Szlezák, 'Sokrates' Spott über Geheimhaltung (Zum Bild des φιλόσοφος in Platons Euthydem)', *AuA* 26 (1980) 75–89 at 84. Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, 237 and n. 118, misses the irony in Crito's words.

παρείκη) make progress at a rate that seems surprising to others as well as to themselves' (150d2–6).<sup>290</sup>

Elenchos, then, so signally succeeds where other methods (eristic, and – one may add – explicit protreptic) fail, that Socrates can only ascribe its success to divine intervention. What Plato wants to do in the *Euthydemus* is in some respects similar to his intention in the *Apology*: he destroys the claims of explicit protreptic (by making the conversation end up by turning around), but shows at the same time that implicit protreptic is a successful alternative. Besides, implicit protreptic can, as explicit protreptic cannot, suggest a solution for the philosophical problem of virtue and knowledge.

### II.3.5 *Protreptic and dialogue*

Until now I have tried to restrict the analysis of the passages as far as possible to the upper levels of the texts in which they occur (where I have deviated from this principle, I did so in order to make some points which for practical reasons were better made in connection with the discussion of particular works). Now all that is said or implied about protreptic and elenchos at the upper level or levels must be translated into terms of the lower-level communication between Plato and his readers. In other words, Plato's theory of protreptic must now be reconstructed (in relation to other elements of his philosophy) from the dialogues, more specifically, from the passages discussed.<sup>291</sup>

<sup>290</sup> See Méridier on *Euthd.* 291a6. I do not wish to imply that the readers of *Tht.* could understand this sentence only in the light of *Euthd.* (it explains itself sufficiently), but I maintain that as in both passages Plato wanted to make clear how elenchos works, he had recourse in both to the motif of divine intervention.

<sup>291</sup> In doing so I shall inevitably become guilty of causing a 'short circuit' (section 1.5.1), yet I feel justified for the following reasons.

Plato rejects explicit philosophical protreptic because it is ineffective. Not only is it unable to establish philosophical knowledge in the reader (that is not its claim), but it also fails to convince him that the care of his soul, or philosophy (for Plato, as for Socrates, these notions are identical) is necessary for his life to be at all worth living. The cause of its failure is man's  $\delta\omicron\lambda\omicron\sigma\sigma\omicron\phi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ : most people feel that they do already possess knowledge and do care about their souls. Both in Plato's day and in our own, most people like to believe that their behaviour is (most of the time) in accordance with fixed ethical norms (which is probably true), and that these norms are mutually consistent and consistent with the rules of conduct prescribed in their society (which is hardly ever true). For these people, then, reprobatory admonition like Socrates' speech in the *Clitophon* is useless, because they feel it does not apply to themselves. By the same token, a protreptic dialogue like *Alcibiades 1* fails to achieve its end, because most people think they are better than Alcibiades.

These statements are the result of a fairly easy transposition of statements found in Plato's works; they are plausible enough, yet they do not bring us very far. While we can understand why Plato did not incite his readers explicitly to virtue or philosophy, his reason for writing dialogues is not transparent. In the *Sophist*, the Eleatic visitor

(1) The passages discussed so far yield a coherent picture of protreptic and elenchos, though they come from different texts and different periods in Plato's life. This consistency of different texts makes it plausible that they reflect a consistent attitude of their author. (2) If I do not always describe the functions of the passages within their upper-level communication, that does not necessarily mean that I have lifted them from their contexts regardless of these contexts; whenever I felt it possible to elucidate the relation of the passages to the whole of the intentions of the works in which they occur, I have tried to do so in a few words. (3) I see no other practicable way; when Plato started to write dialogues, the dialogue was still in its infancy, so genre-comparison does not help us here.

rejects admonition in oral παιδεία, and we can apply this to writing and take Plato to reject explicit protreptic. But when the visitor proposes elenchos as a better alternative, the correspondence of the two levels seems to end: a teacher is able to prove a pupil ignorant by ‘elenctic’ questioning, but a written work cannot do the same for the reader. As Socrates points out in the *Phaedrus* (275d5–9), books cannot answer questions; they certainly cannot ask them.

Now, it does indeed appear that Plato thought oral παιδεία (elenchos followed by μαθήματα) the best, if not the only, way to acquire philosophical knowledge. All writings lead to δοξοσοφία (*Phaedrus* 275b2),<sup>292</sup> so a written form of elenchos is a self-contradictory thing. The problem of what writings are preferred by Plato to protreptic merges into the vexed question why Plato wrote at all. Predictably, the process of theorising about Plato’s work has brought us to the end of the *Phaedrus*.<sup>293</sup>

The written λόγος is the illegitimate brother of the spo-

<sup>292</sup> The words χαλεποὶ συνεῖναι (*Phdr.* *ibid.*) should be compared with *Sph.* 230b9–c1; *Tht.* 210c2–3.

<sup>293</sup> Again, considerations of space here prohibit an extensive analysis of that difficult passage. If in the following paragraphs I give the impression that I have picked out a few phrases from *Phdr.* to suit my purposes, I can only say that the impression is false. I do not take *Ep.* 7 into account because it has already been taken as the basis of Goldschmidt’s analysis of all dialogues (*Dialogues*, 3–12) and because I doubt its authenticity. For fuller treatment, I refer to two recent studies: Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, 21–37; 286–92; M. Isnardi Parente, ‘*Phdr.* 274c ss., o il discorso orale come autoelenchos’, in L. Rossetti (ed.), *Understanding the Phaedrus. Proceedings of the II Symposium Platonicum* (St Augustin 1992), 108–21. A fruitful attempt to account for the passage as an explanation of the dialogue form in the light of Plato’s philosophical views is made by C. Schildknecht, ‘Knowledge that the mind seeks: the epistemic impact of Plato’s form of discourse’, *Ph & Rh* 29 (1996) 225–43. – On the relationship between *Phdr.* and *Ep.* 7, cf. C. Gill, ‘Dogmatic dialogue in *Phaedrus* 276–7?’ in Rossetti, *op. cit.*, 156–72.

ken λόγος (276a1–2),<sup>294</sup> so it is reasonable to assume that the written and the spoken elenchos stand in the same relationship. That the dialogue is Plato's written elenchos is suggested by the analysis of the questioning of the slave in the *Meno* (cf. section II.3.2). But what exactly does the metaphor of illegitimacy entail? Phaedrus echoes Socrates by another metaphor: the written λόγος is the εἶδωλον<sup>295</sup> of the spoken λόγος (276a–9). The dialogue is an imitation of the discussion, and it is a dead thing, whereas discussion is ἔμψυχος. This brings us a step further, but does Plato write dialogues only because he wanted to imitate the discussions, which cause real knowledge? Surely, there must be more profit for the reader than the idea, gratifying though it may be, of assisting mentally at a Socratic conversation?

Fortunately, Plato gives us more than metaphors. There are three serious objections to written works: they cannot answer questions, they get into the hands of those who have no business with them, and they are unable to defend themselves (275d4–e5). The spoken word is free from these blemishes (276a5–7).<sup>296</sup>

These words are to be taken quite seriously, and there is no reason whatever to suppose that Plato wanted to except his own writings from this verdict.<sup>297</sup> But at the same time

<sup>294</sup> De Vries (ad loc.) wrongly says that γνήσιος is not used of brothers, cf. *Ar. Av.* 1654; 1659; cf. νόθος, *Pi. O.* 7.27.

<sup>295</sup> There is a conscious play on two meanings of the word: 'image' and 'phantom' (cf. ζῶντα καὶ ἔμψυχον), hence ἔν . . . λέγοιτο δικαίως.

<sup>296</sup> The words μετ' ἐπιστήμης (276a5) are opposed to the inability of the written word to answer questions, and therefore to impart knowledge; cf. 276c9; e7–277a1.

<sup>297</sup> I doubt that T. A. Szlezák is right in claiming that 'trotzdem will man immer wieder die Dialoge wegen ihres erzieherischen Wertes vom negativen Urteil über die Schrift ausnehmen' (*Platon und die Schriftlichkeit der Philosophie. Interpretationen zu den frühen und mittleren Dialogen* (Berlin–New York 1985), 18 n. 16) – the references which he gives do not confirm this sweeping statement. The fact that *Phdr.* 276e2–3 (δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἄλλων ὧν λέγεις περί μυθολογούντα)

we must note that further on Socrates says that a writer who knows the true relation of speaking and writing deserves the name ‘philosopher’ (278c4–d6). As Plato was aware of the disadvantages of writing listed above, he must have taken trouble to minimise them. This is precisely what is accomplished in the dialogue. There is necessarily ‘a great deal of play’<sup>298</sup> (277e6) in the written λόγος, and Plato’s dialogues are full of it.<sup>299</sup>

At this point, a short excursus is in order about fallacies in Plato: if anything, they qualify as play.<sup>300</sup> They fall into three different classes.

(1) Conclusions which Plato may well have thought are not fallacious at all. This applies especially to what one might

is an obvious reference to the *Republic* (376d9 μυθολογοῦντες; 501e4 μυθολογοῦμεν – both in crucial transitional passages) makes it quite clear that the dialogues deserve all the negative qualifications which are given to the written word in general (the verb is used in the same way in two key passages of the *Laws*, 632e5 and 752a1). The reference to *R.* was first found by W. Luther, ‘Die Schwäche des geschriebenen Logos. Ein Beispiel humanistischer Interpretation, versucht am sogenannten Schriftmythos in Platons Phaidros (274 v 6ff.)’, *Gymnasium* 68 (1961) 526–48 at 536–7. Cf. Szlezák, 14; Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, 31–2 and n. 39–40; Kahn, *Dialogue*, 374; R. Ferber, ‘Warum hat Platon die “ungeschriebene Lehre” nicht geschrieben? Einige vorläufige Bemerkungen’, in L. Rossetti, op. cit. (n. 293), 138–55, at 146–7, who points at the qualification of the second half of the *Parmenides* as ‘play’ (137b2; at the beginning of the second half). The end of the *Phaedrus* itself is marked similarly: 278b7 οὐκοῦν ἤδη πεπεισίσθω μετρίως ἡμῖν τὰ περὶ λόγων (virtually: ‘this must be the end of the dialogue’; cf. Rowe ad loc.).

<sup>298</sup> παιδιάν . . . πολλήν must denote here lack of seriousness; at 276d2 (παιδιᾶς χάριν) the word παιδιᾶ means rather ‘pastime’ (De Vries, *Comm. on Phdr.*, 18–9). There is a slight inconcinnity between the two passages: why could not someone devote his leisure to writing a completely serious book? Evidently because books can never be quite serious, but that does not follow from 276d1–8.

<sup>299</sup> Cf. G. J. de Vries, *Spel bij Plato* (Amsterdam 1949); H. Gundert, ‘Zum Spiel bei Platon’, in id., *Platonstudien* (Amsterdam 1977), 65–98.

<sup>300</sup> While analyses of single fallacies, real or putative, are legion, there is surprisingly little literature on the role of fallacies in Plato. Most

call the ‘logic of opposites’.<sup>301</sup> This is quite a common type of argument, both among the Greeks and nowadays, though it is in fact fallacious: if *P* is true of *S*, then the opposite of *P* is true of the opposite of *S* (e.g., *S* = pleasure, *P* = good: if so, pain is evil). For the theory, cf. Arist. *Cat.* 13b36 ἐναντίον δέ ἐστιν ἀγαθῶι μὲν ἕξ ἀνάγκης κακόν; *Top.* 114b6–15; *Rh.* 1397a7–19. Plato uses it frequently, e.g. *Grg.* 507a5–6 (cf. Sprague, *Fallacy*, 90–1, who in vain tries to defend the argument). There is an instance in the *Clitophon* at 407d6–7, cf. note on 407d2–e2.

(2) Plato may have used the fallacy on purpose, to reach aporia the faster.<sup>302</sup> I do not believe that this is particularly frequent; possible instances include the two refutations of

scholars tend either to deny their existence altogether, so very eloquently Vlastos, *Socrates*, 132–56, or to limit it to instances in dialogues like *Prt.*, where Socrates is thought to beat the sophist at his own game; many others blandly assume that Plato is a poor logician. For more fundamental discussions cf. R. Robinson, ‘Plato’s consciousness of fallacy’, *Mind* 51 (1942) 97–114; Sprague, *Fallacy* and its discussion by M. A. Stewart and R. K. Sprague, ‘Plato’s sophistry’, *ProcAristSoc* Suppl. 51 (1977) 21–44 and 45–61 respectively; G. Klosko, ‘Criteria of fallacy and sophistry for use in the analysis of Platonic dialogues’, *CQ* 33 (1983) 363–74. H. Teloh, *Socratic Education in Plato’s Early Dialogues* (Notre Dame 1986), frequently uses fallacy to substantiate his claim that Socrates is depicted as a constantly failing educator. I disagree, but I subscribe whole-heartedly to Teloh’s further claim that ‘a Socratic dialogue should stimulate the reader to desire to break the *aporia*, and solve the problem; it should make the readers want to engage in dialectic’ (p. 5) – this is identical to my own view of the aporetic dialogue as Plato’s written protreptic. – On the fallacies in *Euthd.*, cf. M. M. McCabe, ‘Persistent fallacies’, *ProcAristSoc* 94 (1994) 73–93.

<sup>301</sup> Not to be confused with what G. Klosko calls the ‘contrary-contradictory fallacy’, ‘Toward a consistent interpretation of the *Protagoras*’, *AGPh* 61 (1979) 125–42, esp. 131–4 (οὐ δίκαιον treated as identical to ἄδικον). Plato was clearly aware that this is a fallacy, cf. *Prt.* 331d1–e4; *Smp.* 201e8–202a3.

<sup>302</sup> Cf. Stokes, *Socratic Conversations*, 449: ‘Each argument contains reasoning which, taken (as it often is) as a straightforward unilinear development, is rich in fallacious argument. Each in turn, when considered as a conversation, has proved rich in confusions, not so



Polemarchus in *Republic* I (331e1–336a8), cf. section II.5.3. and n. 356.

(3), not necessarily incompatible with (2): in cases of fallacy through ambiguity, Plato may have intended to suggest to his readers that the ambiguity contains a deeper truth (for example in the case of εὖ πράττειν ‘to act well’ and ‘to fare well’). ‘In such cases Plato appears to be *asserting* by implication.’<sup>303</sup> Cf. section II.5.3 as referred to under (2). It is particularly interesting that this type of fallacy is frequently found when Plato tries to prove the most basic assumption of his ethics, that no one does evil willingly; cf. note on 407d2–e2.<sup>304</sup>

Apart from fallacies, the importance of play, understood as a way to avoid the dangers of the written word, can be seen in the use of myths, but especially in the structure of many dialogues, in which many thoughts and arguments are left unfinished and many loose ends remain (again, especially because of the fallacies). The role of the questioner, who in principle is not committed to the truth of the outcome of the questioning, prevents readers from deriving knowledge from an authority.<sup>305</sup> Above all, there is the *aporia*, which implies, but none too clearly, the solu-

much on Socrates’ lips (though Socrates is fallible) as on the respondents’. Socrates has played on those confusions and used them to elicit discordant replies to his questions.’ Cf. K. McTighe, ‘Socrates on desire of the good and the voluntariness of wrongdoing: Gorgias 466a–468e’, *Phronesis* 29 (1984) 193–236, esp. 226–7.

<sup>303</sup> Bluck on *Men.* 77b5; cf. Comm. on 407d2–e2. Cf. Klosko, *op. cit.* (n. 300), esp. 368–9.

<sup>304</sup> On a special type of fallacies caused by ambiguity, cf. D. Evans, ‘Platonic arguments’, *Proc.AristSoc* Suppl. 70 (1996) 177–93.

<sup>305</sup> This function of the dialogue is argued for, on grounds quite independent, it seems, from the *Phdr.* passage, by M. Frede, ‘Plato’s arguments and the dialogue form’, in J. C. Klagge–N. D. Smith, *Methods of Interpreting Plato and his Dialogues* (OSAPh Suppl., Oxford 1992), 201–19, esp. 206; 211–14.

tion of the problem of ethical and technical knowledge (section II.3.4).

Such writings will not cause the conceit of knowledge in those who are not naturally endowed for philosophy. They are, to some extent at least, able to answer questions, if a reader takes the trouble to think through what is suggested in them, and by the same token they are capable of defending themselves.

If this is true, Plato's dialogues could only be completely understood by those who were already fairly conversant with his thoughts (either through contact with Plato himself or through reading a number of his more 'constructive' dialogues),<sup>306</sup> but that is precisely what is indicated by stamping the written word as a 'reminder of those who know' (278a1).<sup>307</sup> At the same time, we can understand why Socrates indicates that the philosopher must have 'more precious things than those which he has put together in writing' (278d8–9): because the written word is a second-rate medium, he will only suggest, not expound.<sup>308</sup> That does not mean that he will have esoteric doctrines, not put

<sup>306</sup> Cf. Kahn, 'Did Plato write Socratic dialogues?', 315–19; Erler, *Sinn der Aporien*, 283–6.

<sup>307</sup> Cf. 275d1; 276d3–4. Plato seems to distinguish between those who have 'discovered' philosophical knowledge themselves and those who acquire it under spiritual guidance of someone else (*Prm.* 135a7–b2; cf. *Phdr.* 278a7 εὐρεθεῖς). In the case of the latter, one can imagine that writing as ὑπόμνησις is useful, the more so as acquiring philosophical knowledge is, to Plato at any rate, a long and gradual process. – There is some irony at 276d3–4, but not at the two other places mentioned above. At 276d3–4 the writer himself is meant, at the other two his spiritual kinsmen; that may account for the irony.

<sup>308</sup> Cf. M. Frede, *op. cit.* (n. 305), 216: 'Obviously one can think that certain views and arguments deserve reflection even if one does not endorse them. But the dialogue form even allowed Plato to present his own views and his own arguments without endorsing them in a way which, he thought, would not be justified.'

down in writing.<sup>309</sup> It means rather that he will not expose his doctrines to misunderstanding by stating them in full. For example, the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις as described in the *Meno* is a genuine part of Plato's philosophy, but the geometrical passage is not a proof for it, nor does Plato relate this doctrine (at least not in the *Meno*) to other aspects of his philosophy, the soul's immortality and the theory of Forms. Likewise, the *Euthydemus* suggests the existence of a superior knowledge of the Good, but we do not hear there of the Form of the Good, or indeed of Forms at all. But those who know will understand what Plato is talking about.

In this sense, the dialogue is Plato's written elenchos. It avoids δοξосоφία, because it does not teach (not explicitly). If it ends in aporia, that is as close as Plato can bring his reader to the healthy state of knowing that one does not know. If the reader does not already know what Plato thinks, he will be baffled, and will either turn away (in which case he will belong to those who have no business with philosophy) or he will be stimulated to think about the problem himself, that is to say, he will have been exhorted implicitly to the care of his soul. Socrates' method of starting from definitions (often demonstrating what is and what is not a definition) will show him how to tackle problems. If by thinking through what Plato says the reader will grasp Plato's meaning, he will have acquired some μάθημα; in that case written elenchos, too, will have achieved its double purpose. To quote Goldschmidt once again: 'Le dialogue veut former plutôt qu'informer' (*Dialogues*, 3).

Of course, this theory does not exhaust the meaning of all of Plato's works. As I have said above (section II.3.1),

<sup>309</sup> If writing is an εἰδόντων ὑπόμνησις in the sense explained above, there can be no esoteric doctrines: how can one be reminded of such a secret knowledge by writings which have nothing to do with such knowledge?

some dialogues are protreptic, some less so or not at all. Yet the tentative line drawn between aporetic and constructive reasoning on the higher level of Socrates and his partners appears to be valid also on the lower level of Plato and his readers: the aporetic dialogues, and the aporetic parts of other dialogues, are Plato's alternative for explicit exhortation, in other words, they are Plato's protreptic.<sup>310</sup>

I conclude with a comparison of the Platonic dialogue, as analysed in these sections, with the protreptic dialogue of the *Alcibiades* type. In both types there is exhortation and both make use of elenchos. Goldschmidt's analysis of the *Alcibiades I* proves that this dialogue has the basic scheme of Plato's dialogues (though he has to admit that in one respect it is quite different; *Dialogues*, 323). I take *Alcibiades I* as representative of the protreptic dialogue.

The protreptic dialogue contains aporia (*Alcibiades* 'is wedded to extreme ignorance', 118b6), but it is not an aporetic dialogue. In aporetic dialogues, one opinion after another is refuted, until Socrates' partners have been

<sup>310</sup> Though I agree with Gaiser that a group of Plato's dialogues is to be analysed as protreptic, his method differs considerably from mine. Gaiser starts from a reconstruction of the structure of the sophistic προτρεπτικός λόγος and recognises elements of this structure in the dialogue (cf. Thesleff, *Styles*, 57 and n. 1). From the presence of these elements he concludes that Plato's earlier dialogues have a protreptic character. I believe that the passages which contain explicit protreptic have rather an auxiliary function: they may strengthen the appeal to the reader, but this appeal is made primarily by the implicit protreptic of elenchos (whose strength is, of course, also recognised by Gaiser, cf. esp. *Protreptik*, 18: 'So ist bei Platon . . . mit der protreptischen Umkehr von Scheinwissen zum Eingeständnis des Nichtwissens . . . der wesentliche Schritt der philosophischen παιδεία selbst getan'). For instance, the explicit protreptic at the end of *Euthd.* (section II.3.4 n. 283) may be taken as indicating that in spite of eristic, philosophy is necessary in order to reach happiness; the passage perhaps serves not to discourage the reader but to make him think about it for himself (αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βρασνίσας, 307b8).

purged of all conceit of wisdom. The process of purging itself constitutes the proof that these partners are lacking in the care of their souls; this is never pointed out in so many words. Alcibiades, on the other hand, is purged of one false opinion (τὰ δίκαια are not identical to τὰ ὠφέλιμα, 113d5–116d4), and that is sufficient evidence for his total ignorance. He needs ἐπιμέλεια αὐτοῦ (119a8–124b9), and Socrates will show him the right way for it (124b9–135d10).

The aporetic dialogue is able to stimulate the reader to think about ethical problems, and thereby to take care of his soul; at the same time it contains the germ of a solution of these problems, inasmuch as it suggests that ethical knowledge is knowledge of a higher order. The protreptic dialogue does nothing of the sort, because it is not really concerned with ethical problems. Alcibiades is convicted of ignorance, and the area of his ignorance happens to be ethical, but it is Alcibiades' ignorance, not the ethical problem, which is the focus of interest.

The protreptic dialogue is a branch of explicit protreptic which uses elenchos. Alcibiades is exhorted and converted; the reader does not profit from Socrates' elenchos. Plato could never have written anything like the *Alcibiades I*, because he never loses sight of the reader, whom he wishes to exhort by implication. Therefore, Demetrius was partly right in grouping together Aeschines and Plato under the common head of 'specifically Socratic type' of protreptic in interrogative form, but he never did perceive the unbridgeable gulf between explicit and implicit protreptic, which separates Plato from all the other Socratics we know.

#### II.4 Elenchos in the *Clitophon*

We saw that elenchos leading to aporia constitutes Plato's implicit protreptic. The *Clitophon* seems to imply rejection

of explicit protreptic and contains interrogation, refutation and aporia. Therefore we must study now its use of elenchos (if I use the Greek word, that does not mean that the method is stamped Platonic a priori; there is elenchos also in the protreptic dialogue).

The formal features of Clitophon's report of his interrogation have been studied in connection with characterisation (section I.5.3): the use of analogies and the 'programmatically circular regress' at 408d5–6. I shall concentrate here on the content of the analogies (virtue as a τέχνη; II.4.1), on the distinction between ἔργον and δίδαγμα within the analogy (II.4.2), on the final regress and the aporia (II.4.3).

Clitophon's report of his refutation of Socrates himself is abridged to a degree which makes analysis of that refutation impossible. This section will deal only with his refutation of Socrates' companions; it can be shown that the end of that refutation is at the same time the end of elenchos as used in the *Clitophon*.

The manner of refutation is not completely separable from its subject-matter (in this case: the definitions of the result of justice). I have thought it more profitable to study this subject-matter separately (section II.5); this choice entails in some cases anticipation of the results of that study.

#### II.4.1 *The art of the soul's perfection*

When Clitophon has been convinced by Socrates' protreptic speeches that ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς is necessary, he asks a number of companions how one has to proceed. In his question he uses the words ἀρετή and δικαιοσύνη indiscriminately to refer to the goal of the exhortation – below, I shall try to show that this identification reflects a Platonic point of view.

The question is illustrated by an analogy from bodily care; this analogy forces the whole subsequent discussion

to start from the assumption that there is a τέχνη concerning the best state of the soul. When the brightest brain of the lot identifies this τέχνη with justice, he is responding in the normal Platonic way to inductive reasoning, but two points deserve attention. Hitherto, justice and ἀρετή had been treated as identical, so that the statement that justice is the art of the soul's ἀρετή (409a2–6) introduces a novel element. Secondly, as the discussion develops, it is suggested that justice is not in the full sense of the word a τέχνη (cf. Comm. on 409a3 τὴν . . . τέχνην).

Suggesting by means of analogy that a particular virtue is a τέχνη is a procedure so common in Plato that it hardly needs illustration. In *Republic* I the procedure is applied to Simonides' 'definition' of justice (to be treated in section II.5.3: 332c5–7 ὃ Σιμωνίδη, ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδούσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρικὴ καλεῖται; which leads to d2–3 ἡ οὖν δὴ τίσιν τί ἀποδιδούσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο;). As we saw (section II.3.4) the purpose of these analogies is to prepare the main aporia, and thereby to show the way to better understanding of the nature of ethical knowledge.

So far as the aporia is concerned, the *Clitophon* conforms. The circular regress at the final stage of the interrogation of Socrates' friends is caused by the analogy of justice and τέχνη. The arts have, *qua* knowledge, an easily definable object; on the other hand, when justice is said to produce friendship, and friendship is equated to 'concord in knowledge', the object of this knowledge remains in the dark. The ἔργον of justice, and therefore justice itself (note 410a5 δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν!) cannot be defined (see further section II.4.3). The procedure is strictly Platonic; especially the aporia of the *Euthydemus* is closely parallel.

No comparable use of the τέχνη analogy (in order to reach aporia) is found elsewhere in the Platonic *Dubia* or *Spuria*. When these analogies are used there, it is in a

more general way, namely to prove or disprove a specific argument. In the *Alcibiades 1*, for example, the difference between σῶμα and ἄνθρωπος is inferred from the difference between the tool and its user.<sup>311</sup> Of course, this more general way of using the τέχνη analogies is also found frequently in Plato's genuine works, for instance in the second stage of Socrates' argumentation against Polemarchus to be analysed in section II.5.3.

There is one important difference between the use of τέχνη analogy in Plato's earlier dialogues and in the *Clitophon*: in the former, the analogy is not stated explicitly, whereas it is in the *Clitophon*. There is only one parallel for the question καὶ νῦν δὴ τίνα φαμέν εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ τέχνην; (409a2–3): in the *Euthydemus*, Clinias is asked to name a τέχνη, namely the one needed for attaining happiness (288d9–e2, cf. 282c8–d2), but no τέχνη is found. The explicitness of the procedure in the *Clitophon* makes the misleading character of the τέχνη analogy far more obvious than is usual in Plato.

The object of justice as a τέχνη is said to be 'the ἀρετή of the soul' (409a3). This is a rather uncommon phrase, which I have not found outside Plato and Aristotle.<sup>312</sup> Analogous to 'the ἀρετή of the body', which is found slightly more often<sup>313</sup> it has two distinct uses, namely to denote a particular quality of the soul, e.g. φρονῆσαι,<sup>314</sup> or to refer to what may be roughly translated as 'the good condition' of the soul, for instance when it is said in the *Republic* that the 'good' soul (ψυχὴ ἀγαθή) by virtue of its ἀρετή makes the body as 'good' as possible.<sup>315</sup>

<sup>311</sup> 129c5–e7; cf. Arist. *EN* 1161a34–5; *EE* 1241b17–18; *Protr.* B 59 Düring. *X. Ag.* 3.1 uses a similar one: τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετὴν.

<sup>313</sup> *Grg.* 479b3–4; 499d6–7; 504c8–9; 517e8–518a1; *R.* 403d2–3; 518d10; Arist. *Rh.* 1369b21; 1361a2; 6; b21; *Protr.* B 46 Düring.

<sup>314</sup> *R.* 518e2; cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1361a4–5; 7; 1362b13–14; *Protr.* B 46 Düring.

<sup>315</sup> 403d3–4; cf. *Grg.* 506d5–6; *Lg.* 961d5.



At one place in the *Republic* the phrase is used for the conception of justice as a harmony of the soul: ὁμονοητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμσοσμένης τῆς ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἄν αὐτὸν (the oligarchical man; 554e4–5). Here the attributes of the soul clearly point back to the definition of justice at the end of Book 4 (443c9–444a2), in which the just man is said to be ἡρμσοσμένον (443e2). Yet it is only an oblique reference: though the ‘true ἀρετῆ of the soul’ is obviously identical to justice, this is not said in so many words.

Only in *Republic* 1 do we find a normal equation of justice and the ἀρετῆ of the soul. Socrates wishes to refute Thrasymachus’ claim that the unjust live better than the just (352d2–4). He does so by introducing the notion of ἔργον which in this context means ‘function’, not ‘result’ (sight and hearing are the ἔργα of eyes and ears, 352e5–10). Next, everything which has an ἔργον also has an ἀρετῆ (353b2–4); without its proper ἀρετῆ nothing can fulfil its ἔργον well (353b14–c2). The ἔργα of the soul are caring, ruling, thinking, and above all, life (353d3–10). Without its proper ἀρετῆ a soul cannot fulfil these ἔργα.<sup>316</sup> According to Socrates, it had already been established that ἀρετῆ of the soul was justice (353e7–8), therefore without justice one cannot live well.

Now, in a number of places in *Republic* 1, justice and ἀρετῆ had been identified, first in Socrates’ discussion with Polemarchus (335c4; cf. section II.5.3 and n. 356), later in his refutation of Thrasymachus’ statement that the unjust are both wise and good (348d3–6), which had resulted in its contrary (350c10–1 ὁ μὲν ἄρα δίκαιος ἡμῖν ἀναπέφονται ὦν ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ κακός); in Socrates’ report this result is reformulated as τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν (350d4–5). Soc-

<sup>316</sup> The analogy ἀρετῆ of the eye – ἀρετῆ of the soul is imitated at *Alc.* I 133b1–10, where the soul’s ἀρετῆ is identified with σοφία.

rates is therefore guilty of negligence in adding the genitive ψυχῆς at 353e7–8.<sup>317</sup>

It is clear that in associating justice and the soul's ἀρετή our author follows the *Republic* – whether the explicit statement in Book I or the doctrine of the later books is hard to decide. In making the soul's ἀρετή the *object* of an art subsequently identified with justice, he diverges from the *Republic* and moves into the atmosphere of the *Gorgias*, where justice is the corrective art concerning the soul, analogous to medicine in the same way as lawgiving is analogous to gymnastics (464b7–8). Clitophon's statement that Socrates often identified πολιτική, δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη is understandable from this doctrine only (sections II.2.3.3; II.5.4): the good politician makes his fellow-citizens better men. In the *Gorgias*, as well as in the *Republic*, the concept of justice as an orderly state of mind is found (504d1–3); the difference between this concept and that of justice as object of a τέχνη is mainly that between theory and praxis: the *Republic* asks what justice is, the *Gorgias* how it can be created and furthered. At one place in the *Gorgias*, the soul's ἀρετή as that of other things is said to be the result of (among other things) τέχνη (506d5–8), but the similarity is not close enough to make it plausible that our author had this particular passage in mind.

At any rate, the conception of justice as (knowledge producing) the best state of the soul, not as a specific way of behaving towards others (οὐ περὶ τὴν ἕξω προᾶξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, *Republic* 443c10), is clearly present in the *Clitophon*, although the author does not make use of it in refuting the positions taken by Socrates' disciples and Socrates himself.

<sup>317</sup> Socrates could easily have made the point that since human ἀρετή is either of the body or of the soul, and justice is not ἀρετή of the body, therefore it must be ἀρετή of the soul. Obviously, Plato does not take the arguments he puts into Socrates' mouth too seriously; otherwise he would have made him justify the addition of ψυχῆς along these lines.

The reason why he does not do so is evident: the discussion was intended to end up in *aporia*. As we saw, the technical concept of virtue is a well-known Platonic method of creating *aporia*. But the author does more than just adopt a Platonic device: when the object of the τέχνη in question is stated to be the soul's ἀρετή he indicates (as he had done towards the end of the protreptic speech) that he has completely grasped the implications of Plato's theory of justice, and that he agrees with it.

#### II.4.2 *The result of justice*

Having forced the discussion to start from the assumption that justice is a τέχνη, Clitophon proceeds to impose a new restriction on his partners. The effects (τὰ ἀποτελούμενα) of a τέχνη are said to be twofold: to cause new men to become τεχνῖται and to execute its specific task. The latter is clearly and unambiguously distinguished from τέχνη as such (ἔστιν δὲ τούτων θάτερον οὐκέτι τέχνη 409b3–4; cf. δι τὰ ξύλινα ... σκεύη ... ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη) and is called ἔργον (b5; 6; c1 etc.). The former, though called (with a rare term) δίδαγμα at b6, is not completely distinguished from τέχνη itself, as can be seen already from the wording ἔστιν δὲ τούτων θάτερον οὐκέτι τέχνη [obviously, the other part is], τῆς τέχνης δὲ τῆς διδασκούσης τε καὶ διδασκομένης ἔργον. The second analogy makes this quite clear: 409b5–6 καὶ τεκτονικῆς δὲ κατὰ ταύτᾳ οἰκία τε καὶ τεκτονικὴ [viz. as taught and learned] τὸ μὲν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ δίδαγμα. So, the emphasis is not on the distinction between the two effects (ἔργον and δίδαγμα), but on the one between τέχνη and ἔργον (for the reason why the latter distinction was introduced, cf. below).

If the distinction between ἔργον and δίδαγμα is secondary, why did the author find it at all necessary to make it? He could have restricted himself to stating the obvious,

that a τέχνη is different from its object or result; this would have made it sufficiently clear that Clitophon is asking not for a definition of justice but for a delineation of its ἔργον. That apart from this ἔργον it is also a quality of justice that it can impart itself to others (b6–7 τῆς δὴ δικαιοσύνης ὡσαύτως τὸ μὲν δίκαιους ἔστω ποιεῖν) is interesting in itself, but not to the point.

The only justification, as far as I can see, is that the opposition ἔργον:δίδαγμα serves to prove the thesis which Clitophon had ascribed to Socrates, that πολιτική, δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη are identical (408b3–5). This is a simplification of a doctrine elaborated in *Gorgias* and *Politicus* and alluded to also in *Euthydemus*: the just politician makes his fellow-citizens better men (sections II.2.3.3; II.5.4). The curious way in which the τέχνη analogy is constructed here is to my mind designed for picking up and establishing this point: the two products of medicine are (1) new doctors, (2) health; likewise for carpentry and the other arts. By analogy, the two products of justice are (1) new just men, (2) the ἔργον which is to be defined. When producing new just men is first called δίδαγμα and then identified with τέχνη itself, this means that justice is its own teaching-matter, in other words, that justice is knowledge. The analogy implies that justice can be taught. This is in keeping with the wording of the end of the protreptic speech: τῶι μαθόντι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν κτλ. (408b2–3). It is also implied by Clitophon when he asks Socrates to stop exhorting him and get down to business (410d1–5; cf. also 408e2–3 πῶς ἄρχεσθαι δεῖν φάμεν δικαιοσύνης πέρι μαθήσεως – more neutral 410c5–6 ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε [sc. τὴν δικαιοσύνην] ἢ οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἔμοι κοινωνεῖν). It appears that the author does not wish to cast doubt on the statement that virtue can be taught (408b7), just as – in general – he makes no distinction between virtue and τέχνη. Whether he actually thought that justice is knowledge and can be taught is another

matter. Perhaps the imperative ἔστω indicates scepticism. But however that may be, the author wanted to state at this point that justice can be taught, and to underline what he had reported previously as a Socratic doctrine, that those who have learned it are the true politicians, inasmuch as they are able to teach it themselves.

When Clitophon at this point of the dialogue constructs his own argument in a way which indirectly supports a motif from the speech which he had reported in a vein of parody, this can only mean that the author makes him except this doctrine from the ironical treatment which had been given to other themes in the speech. The reason why the author should have done that must be that he wanted, if not to subscribe to this doctrine, at any rate to indicate that it was to be taken seriously.

So much for the notion of διδασκαλία, which, as we saw, is not relevant to the progress of refutation. We must now ask why the distinction between τέχνη and ἔργον was introduced; the question is the more relevant because (as we shall see, section II.4.3) the distinction is an impediment rather than a contribution to the final circular regress.

It may seem that the author employed this device in order to work in answers which were suitable material for an easy refutation: yet I do not think this to be true. Of the three definitions of the ἔργον of justice two appear in *Republic* I as definitions of justice itself, whereas in view of Aristotle's treatment of the relation of justice and friendship (section II.5.2.) 'friendship in the cities' would not have been absurd as a definition of justice. It follows that our author must have had another reason for avoiding the question 'What is justice?' and introducing the ἔργον.

In order to trace this reason, we must realise that the introduction of ἔργον is possible only because justice had been forced into the framework of τέχνη. As we saw, our author (whether or not he himself was Plato) shared Plato's view that justice is not so much a series of actions

as a state of mind. Bearing this in mind, let us compare the third definition, which (as we shall see) was borrowed from *Republic* I. In the *Republic*, benefiting one's friends and harming one's enemies had been presented as a definition of justice, whereas later on it appeared that the just man never harms anyone. This is a negative result, although we shall see that it is in fact a point of view which was defended emphatically by Plato. I think that our author had no quarrel with Plato concerning this point of view, but, since (like Plato) he considered justice to be adequately defined only as a healthy state of the soul (caused, but this is not said or implied in the *Clitophon*, by knowledge of the Form of the Good), he could not accept 'never harming anyone' or 'benefiting everyone' as an adequate definition of justice. This is where the introduction of ἔργον comes in positively. Given his conviction that justice is a state of the soul, the author could not accept the result of Socrates' discussion with Polemarchus as a definition, but he certainly could accept it as a description of the practical manifestation of this state of the soul.

In other words, the introduction of ἔργον in the *Clitophon* criticises the source of the third definition from the Platonic point of view which, as I have tried to establish, was also that of the author of the *Clitophon*: while 'benefiting everyone' (πάντα γὰρ ἐπ' ὠφελίαι πάντας δρᾶν, 410b2–3) is not an acceptable definition of justice, it is a satisfactory description of its ἔργον. In this light, the fact that the *Clitophon* reformulates the outcome of the debate in *Republic* I (οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδένα ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ὄν βλάπτειν, 335e5) in a positive way, becomes highly significant.

To put it more sharply: under the disguise of an aporia reached repeatedly in *Clitophon*'s sessions with Socrates himself, the author, by introducing the notion of ἔργον, makes it clear that, seen in its proper light, the result is positive when two and two are put together. This rather

oblique statement of agreement is in perfect keeping with our author's way of agreeing between the lines with statements which are criticised on the surface.

It is more than a coincidence that it is precisely the third definition which is shielded by the distinction τέχνη: ἔργον. As we shall see (section II.5.3), the notion that the just man never harms anyone, though presented as a negative result in *Republic* I, is in fact an important tenet of Plato's philosophy. We might therefore say that when *Clitophon* turns towards Socrates *himself*, the reader is meant to infer that the discussion now turns on a basic item of Plato's thought; if the outcome of the discussion leaves Socrates virtually unharmed (section I.5.3), this can only mean that Plato's thought is left unharmed.

If I am right, this interpretation all but annihilates what is often considered the main argument against authenticity: that it is Socrates himself who tells Clitophon that it is the ἔργον of justice to help friends and harm enemies, and that Clitophon refutes this. Of course, the Socrates of *Republic* I, or for that matter of any Platonic dialogue, would never have said such a thing. But those readers of the *Clitophon* who were acquainted with *Republic* I knew that the definition was proposed there by Polemarchus and refuted by Socrates – when in the *Clitophon* they encountered a better refutation than the one given in *Republic* I, they must have understood that Socrates (in other words Plato himself) was not attacked. Yet the question remains whether Plato was really capable of exposing the literary character Socrates to such a misunderstanding (see section II.7.3(6)).

It seems to me superfluous to trace the origin of the commonplace notion that the ἔργον of a τέχνη is distinct from the τέχνη itself. In Plato, it is found in the *Charmides* (I66a3–5 ἀλλὰ τόδε σοι ἔχω δεῖξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἐκάστη τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ τυγχάνει ὄν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης), and, with less emphasis on their

distinctness, in the *Euthydemus* (292b<sub>4</sub>–5; d<sub>1</sub>–2) and *Republic* I (332e<sub>3</sub> etc.; esp. 351d<sub>9</sub>); as we saw earlier (section II.4.1), the word ἔργον is used there also to denote the specific ‘function’ (335d<sub>3</sub>; 352d<sub>9</sub> etc.) of things (heat) and living beings (horses) which are not a τέχνη. The opposition ἔργον:δίδαγμα (or anything like it) is not found elsewhere. There is an interesting parallel from Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*: εἰ γὰρ ἔσται [sc. ἡ φρόνησις] ποιητική, ἕτερα ἑτέρων ἔσται, ὥσπερ οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίας, ἣτις οὐκ ἔστι μέρος τῆς οἰκίας (B 68 Düring), but there is no direct connection with the *Clitophon* – Aristotle is rather correcting the *Euthydemus* passage here (Einarson, ‘Epinomis’, 272 n. 32; Düring, 241).

#### II.4.3 *Aporia and progress*

The circular regress at the end of Clitophon’s discussion with Socrates’ companions is arrived at by the following steps:

- (1) Justice is knowledge and has a result.
- (2) Its result is ὁμόνοια.
- (3) Ὅμόνοια is shared knowledge.
- (4) The result of justice as knowledge is knowledge.

The regress found at the end of Socrates’ second conversation with Clinias in the *Euthydemus* (section II.3.4) is very similar:

- (1) Wisdom is the only ἀγαθόν and has a result.
- (2) Its result must be an ἀγαθόν.
- (3) The only ἀγαθόν is wisdom.
- (4) The result of wisdom is wisdom.

As we saw, the circular regress in the *Euthydemus* may be interpreted as suggesting that the basic principle (wisdom has a definable result because it is a τέχνη) is wrong: ethical knowledge is knowledge of a higher order than technical



knowledge. The *Clitophon* may be taken to point the same moral, but there are some difficulties. The regress in the *Euthydemus* invalidates the basic analysis of wisdom as a τέχνη directly; the one in the *Clitophon* does not invalidate it: if it turns out that to define the result as ὁμόνοια creates a regress, it is proved at the most that we had wrongly defined ὁμόνοια (step 3), or the result of justice (step 2). The *Euthydemus* therefore contains a fairly clear message as to the nature of ethical knowledge; the *Clitophon* may be taken as conveying the same message, but this is far from necessary.

Besides, the distinction between τέχνη and ἔργον, which the author goes out of his way to emphasise (section II.4.2) only complicates matters. If Clitophon had asked for definitions of justice itself, the circular regress would have shown the way towards a better understanding of ethical knowledge far more clearly:

- (1) Justice is ὁμόνοια.<sup>318</sup>
- (2) Ὅμόνοια is shared knowledge.
- (3) Justice is knowledge.

In that case we would have had a circular regress similar to the one in *Republic* 6 (the good is knowledge of the good; section II.3.4) and the message would have been the same. Evidently the author of the *Clitophon* did not perceive this possibility, or he did not intend to suggest the true nature of justice as knowledge more clearly.

Now, we saw that the description of justice as a τέχνη concerning the soul's ἀρετή (section II.4.1) implies assent to the conception of justice as an harmonious state of mind. In the *Republic*, this state of mind depends ultimately on knowledge of the Form of the Good.<sup>319</sup> When the *Clitophon*

<sup>318</sup> This would have been a plausible definition, cf. sections II.4.2 and II.5.2.

<sup>319</sup> Cf. esp. *R.* 505a2–4; R. C. Cross–A. D. Woozley, *Plato's Republic. A Philosophical Commentary* (London 1964), 126–7.

ends up by defining the result of justice, that is, the art of the soul's perfection, as knowledge, this definition may be taken as a sign that our author subscribed to this view. In any case, it is not necessary to assume that he did not completely grasp Plato's theory of justice just because he does not direct his readers' attention to it (Plato does not do this himself in the *Euthydemus*, either).

Moreover, we have seen that the distinction between justice and its ἔργον, which obstructs the readers' view of justice in itself (in relation to the theory of Forms), helps them to understand the idea of justice as 'aiming always at benefiting all' (410b2–3; section II.4.2). As the *Clitophon* appears, on the surface, to attack the *Republic*, a signal that the reader is to understand the whole discussion of justice as being in harmony, not in conflict, with that of the *Republic* is far more urgent than a pointer to the theory of Forms. Nobody can expect the whole of the *Republic* to be present in a Short Dialogue which deals with the inadequacy of explicit protreptic, but I hope I have shown that there is no contradiction between *Republic* and *Clitophon*.

In the *Clitophon*, the circular regress is explicitly marked as such (410a2 περιεδράμηκεν εἰς ταῦτόν ὁ λόγος τοῖς πρώτοις). This is normal Platonic practice; compare for example Socrates' words in the *Euthyphro* ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνητι ὅτι ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περιελθὼν πάλιν εἰς ταῦτόν ἤκει; (15b10–c1; cf. κύκλωι περιιόντα ποιῶν, 15b10). Similar explicit statements are found in *Lysis*, *Hippias Maior*, *Charmides*, *Euthydemus*;<sup>320</sup> they always refer to the final aporia. The argument has ended where it had started; the result of elenchos is negative (apart from its purifying aspect). Usually the aporia coincides with the end of the dialogue, where it does not, it is stated in so many words that there is an aporia (409e10 ἀποροῦντες in our dialogue; cf. the

<sup>320</sup> *Ly.* 222d1–3; *Hp.Ma.* 303e12–3; *Chrm.* 174b11; *Euthd.* 291b8–c1; Goldschmidt, *Dialogues*, 75.

*Euthydemus* as quoted in sections 1.5.3; II.3.4). I infer that with the interrogation of Socrates' companions, the elenchos in the *Clitophon* has come to its natural end; the discussion of Clitophon and Socrates is only apparently negative (section II.4.2).

One aspect of elenchos as used in the *Clitophon* has to be mentioned, though I do so with some diffidence. We have seen from the *Theaetetus* and the *Euthydemus* that Socratic questioning, even when the outcome is negative, is at any rate a stimulus for independent thought, so much so, that in either of these dialogues the motif of divine intervention is used to underline the marked progress in the intellectual capabilities in Socrates' partners (section II.3.4). I think an echo of this progress may be perceived in Clitophon's words οἱ παρόντες ἴκανοὶ ἦσαν κτλ. (410a1); why does Clitophon stress the bystanders' *ability* to criticise their comrade? The words ἴκανοὶ ἦσαν are a bit odd anyway, and they induced an anonymous reader from antiquity (or the early Byzantine era) to change them into ἐπεχείρησαν,<sup>321</sup> which hardly makes sense. Their ability may be the consequence of Clitophon's elenchos; they had all been interrogated and had given the string of definitions τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δέον, τὸ ὠφέλιμον, τὸ λυσιτελοῦν, so the refutation had concerned all of them. In fact, they constitute one amorphous group (section 1.5.3) and are treated as such. The boundaries of a Short Dialogue are narrow; if our author wanted to indicate the beneficial function of elenchos, he could hardly have done better.

In our analysis of the characterisation of Socrates and

<sup>321</sup> Written in the margin as a variant reading (γρ.) by the first scribe of A (Paris. gr. 1807); doubtless a conjecture (the hypothesis of a correction of a mechanical error in copying – ἴκανοὶ having been replaced by a dittography of the first part of the following ἐπιπλήττειν – may be dismissed confidently).

Clitophon (section 1.5) we concluded provisionally that the author of the *Clitophon* has a good understanding of Plato's use of the dialogue. The study of his use of elenchos bears this out completely,<sup>322</sup> and it also shows that elenchos is handled in the same way as it is in Plato.

One question remains to be discussed. Plato's aporetic dialogues are implicitly protreptic (section II.3). Can this be said as well of the *Clitophon*, which likewise contains aporia? This question can be answered best if we compare *Clitophon* and *Euthydemus*. Both deal with the value of explicit exhortation, and both show that it does not reach its goal. In the *Euthydemus*, the possibility of a negative side-effect, of the reader turning away from exhortation (and thereby from philosophy) for good, is obviated by a final passage exhorting again, explicitly, to philosophy (section II.3.4 and n. 283). In this respect the *Clitophon* is again similar. Clitophon's last appeal takes up the core of Socrates' exhortation (410d5–e1 θὲς τὸν Κλειτοφῶντα ὁμολογοῦντα ὡς ἔστιν καταγέλαστον τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, ψυχῆς δὲ . . . ἡμεληκέναι), and we saw that here he is completely serious (section 1.5.3; the next sentence, 410e1–3, makes no sense at all if the present one is not intended seriously). Even those readers who had not understood the implications of our author's frequent allusions to the *Republic*, the *Euthydemus* and other works of Plato, are not allowed to walk away with the idea that all this talk of caring about the soul is nonsense.

If, therefore, the *Euthydemus* is a dialogue about protreptic, which employs elenchos as well as explicit protreptic in order to convey a positive message, the same must be maintained of the *Clitophon*.

<sup>322</sup> This, at least, will have to be recognised even by those who find themselves unable to agree with all details of the interpretations presented in this and the previous sections.

II.5 Justice in the *Clitophon*

In this section the three subsequent definitions of the ἔργον of justice in the *Clitophon* will be compared with similar statements from other Socratic literature; my aim is to determine their provenance and the light this provenance may shed on the intention with which the *Clitophon* was written.

I have not attempted to examine the place of these definitions within the development of Greek popular or philosophical ethics. It can be shown that the *Clitophon* is, for these definitions, wholly dependent on other sources which are for the greater part still extant. Our dialogue is therefore not a contribution to that development (nor does it pretend to be); the role justice plays in it is thoroughly secondary: it serves as a means of proving ignorance, not to further knowledge.

To be sure, at some places a 'positive' thought about the role of the just statesman is implied (sections II.2.3.3; II.4.1); likewise, the concept of justice as the best state of the soul, or at any rate as a sort of knowledge leading up to that state, can be read between the lines (section II.4.1) as is also the case with the author's verdict on the third definition (section II.4.2). While these ideas may give us a clue as to the author's philosophical background, they have no bearing on the explicit statements about justice which are reported and refuted by Clitophon. Therefore I have left them out of account in the discussions of the three definitions.

Finally, Clitophon's statement that Socrates identifies politics with judication and justice (408b<sub>4</sub>-5) belongs here.

II.5.1 *Beneficial, fitting, useful, profitable*

As is also the case in a fair number of Plato's dialogues, the series of subsequent definitions is *concentric*: each defini-

tion is an improvement upon the former, and constitutes a closer approximation of the object of the search, which may or may not be reached. Thus, in the *Charmides*, σωφροσύνη is defined first as acting calmly (159b2–6), then as αἰδώς (160e3–5), then as doing τὰ ἑαυτοῦ (161b6), next as doing what is good (163e8–11), finally as knowing oneself (164d4) – this definition is amended subsequently to ‘knowledge concerning itself and the other kinds of knowledge’ (166e5–6) and the search ends up in aporia. The progress is first from external behaviour to a mental state (αἰδώς), next from a general formula to a description in terms of relations towards others (doing τὰ ἑαυτοῦ), next from particular to general (doing what is good), then again from external to internal (knowing oneself) and finally from concrete to abstract (knowledge of knowledge).

In the *Clitophon*, the reasoning is concentric only to a certain extent: the main aporia is reached after the second, not the final (third) definition. It conforms, however, in that the first definition (in this case a string of definitions) is the farthest from the object of search, and the easiest to refute. As we have seen (section II.4.2), the theoretical framework serves to suggest a positive result in the case of the final definition. Evidently, the author needed concentric reasoning; if not, he would not have made Clitophon address Socrates’ companions before asking Socrates himself.

As it seems a priori improbable that τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δέον, τὸ ὠφέλιμον, τὸ λυσιτελοῦν occurred independently as definitions of justice or the ἔργον of justice in different Socratic writings, the different pupils of the upper level are probably not to be ‘translated’ into different Socratic authors in the message of the lower level. At most, τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ δέον<sup>323</sup> may have been separate definitions, though both in the *Clitophon* and in the *Cratylus* these words are used as synonyms (cf. Comm. on 409c5).

<sup>323</sup> ‘the fitting, the right thing’, cf. Comm. on 409c5.

It is therefore not surprising to find a virtually identical series of adjectives in *Republic* 1, without the terms of the series being divided among separate persons. Thrasy-machus, having accused Socrates of never answering a question himself, asks him to define τὸ δίκαιον: καὶ ὅπως μοι μὴ ἐρεῖς ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ὠφέλιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὅτι ἂν λέγησι· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀποδέξομαι ἐὰν ὕθλους τοιούτους λέγηις (336c6–d4).<sup>324</sup>

The first three terms occur, in identical order, in the *Clitophon*; τὸ κερδαλέον is absent,<sup>325</sup> and τὸ συμφέρον opens the series instead of closing it. The order of *Republic* 1 is slightly more logical in that there may be a difference in meaning between the first and the second term of the series, but not between the second and the rest.

Yet another parallel is provided by the *Cratylus*, where Hermogenes, asked what words in the field of ethics are left unetymologised, answers ταῦτα τὰ περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλόν, συμφέροντά τε καὶ λυσιτελοῦντα καὶ ὠφέλιμα καὶ κερδαλέα καὶ τάναντία τούτων (416e2–417a2). There is little ground for assuming a connection with the *Clitophon* – even if the latter were authentic, the parallel would mean little more than it does for *Republic* 1: we have here nothing but an occasional instance of self-repetition. The absence of justice from the context in the *Cratylus* passage robs it of its significance for our investigation.

Leaving aside this third parallel and concentrating on

<sup>324</sup> This parallel appears to have been first pointed out by Steinhart, 54–5.

<sup>325</sup> According to Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 15) because its meaning is pejorative ('übervorteilend, verschlagen, verschitzt'): Clitophon's refutation uses carpentry and medicine as analogies, in which arts there is no room for 'the cunning'. Pavlu's basic premise is false: κερδαλέος means 'cunning' only if applied to persons, words or plans (LSJ s.v. 1); otherwise it is neutral.

the passages from *Clitophon* and *Republic* 1, we must inevitably conclude that the two passages cannot be independent of each other; we must therefore choose between dependence of *Clitophon* on *Republic* 1, dependence of *Republic* 1 on *Clitophon*, or dependence of both on a common source.

(1) If the *Clitophon* depends on *Republic* 1 (which is the common assumption), the borrowing of the series might imply that Thrasymachus is there taken to mean that the answers precluded by him were in fact those usually given by Socrates. Whether or not this is a correct interpretation of the *Republic* passage (cf. infra (2)), is immaterial; this meaning could be (and has been<sup>326</sup>) read into it. Alternatively it might be supposed that our author gladly adapted the string of definitions which he found in *Republic* 1 because it suited his purpose ideally: he wished to illustrate that Socratic exhortation does not lead to knowledge, only to ὄ-θλοι. In neither hypothesis is there real criticism of *Republic* 1, because the string of definitions is not defended there.

(2) If we suppose that Plato was inspired by the *Clitophon* passage when writing *Republic* 1, Thrasymachus' words would indeed mean that the definitions he refuses to accept are Socratic. They would also imply assent to the tenor of the *Clitophon*. Either the string of definitions in the *Clitophon* would become an original invention, which one does not expect there, or we would have to look for a source elsewhere.<sup>327</sup> The only way to test this supposition is to examine its contribution, if any, towards understanding the *Republic*.

The result is, in my opinion, negative. Thrasymachus'

<sup>326</sup> Cf. Zuretti: 'Trasimaco non vuole che Socrate gli risponda che il giusto è il *déon* . . . sapendo, si vede manifestamente, che quelle erano le idee della scuola Socratica' (17); see also Tucker ad loc.

<sup>327</sup> For a highly fanciful relation between *Clit.* and *Just.*, cf. H. Gomperz, *Sophistik*, 166-7; C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 149 and my review of Müller, 214.



exclusion of the series δέον, ὠφέλιμον, λυσιτελοῦν, κερδαιλέον, συμφέρον is countered by Socrates in an analogy: if you ask how much twelve is and add that the answers  $2 \times 6$ ,  $3 \times 4$ ,  $6 \times 2$  and  $4 \times 3$  will not be accepted, you preclude any answer (337a8–b5). The only logical way out is for Thrasymachus to give his own definition of justice. The whole episode has been carefully constructed in such a way that Thrasymachus can plausibly begin by accusing Socrates of never answering (336c2–6) and end up giving an answer himself. The assumption that the forbidden answers were in fact given in Socratic (or other) literature is irrelevant for the interpretation of *Republic* 1; similarly a reference to the accusation contained in the *Clitophon* is out of place – Thrasymachus' objections to Socrates' method of question and answer have little or nothing to do with Clitophon's point that Socrates can only exhort others and is unable (or unwilling) to impart knowledge (cf. Comm. on 410c6 οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν). Priority of the *Clitophon* to *Republic* 1 is therefore unlikely.

(3) The main argument offered sub (2) against the *Clitophon* as the source of *Republic* 1 holds good also for the assumption of a common source for both: the episode in *Republic* 1 can be explained from itself, nothing is gained by assuming that the definitions were borrowed. For the *Clitophon*, this assumption would involve an additional difficulty, as one would have to suppose that the characters Clitophon and Thrasymachus were borrowed from *Republic* 1 even though the string of definitions was not.

Therefore I shall discard the assumption, and proceed from hypothesis (1), that the *Clitophon* is in this respect dependent on *Republic* 1.

Clitophon's refutation of the string of definitions gives a strong impression of having been borrowed (cf. Comm. on 409c4–d1; c6–d1); his source was identified by Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 15) with *Republic* 1, 346a6–c4,

where every art is said to have an ἰδίᾳ ὠφελία, for instance health (medicine), safety in sailing (steersmanship). There is in fact little similarity. If the ὠφελία of *Republic* 1 is equated with the ἔργον of the *Clitophon*, the *Republic* passage tries to define the particular ἔργον of each art and to discard accidental ἔργα (such as earning money), whereas the *Clitophon* tries to prove that general notions like συμφέρον, δέον etc. are inadequate descriptions of the ἔργον of justice because they apply to the ἔργα of every art.

### II.5.2 *Friendship in cities*

This definition is ascribed by Clitophon to a companion ὃς δὴ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν (409d3–4). The adverb is usually taken as a general description of the style or manner of reasoning of a particular Socratic author, be it Plato himself,<sup>328</sup> Xenophon<sup>329</sup> or Antisthenes.<sup>330</sup> But there can be no doubt that if the author had intended this, he would have said κομψότατα ἔδοξε λέγειν (cf. Comm. on 409d3–4). The adverb marks a higher stage in the concentric reasoning, and nothing more.

Of course this does not mean that the definition of the ἔργον of justice as φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ποιεῖν was not borrowed from some Socratic<sup>331</sup> source. There are several

<sup>328</sup> Schleiermacher, 534; Steinhart, 55 and 72 n. 25.

<sup>329</sup> Yxem, 'Über Platon's Kleitophon', 21–2, who refers to X. *Mem.* 4.4.5–25, in which conversation there is indeed a passage dealing with ὁμόνοια, cf. n. 334.

<sup>330</sup> Kunert, *Necessitudo*, 9; Kesters, 'Authenticiteit', 182–3; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 146 n. 161.

<sup>331</sup> E. Bignone, *Studi sul pensiero antico* (Naples 1938), 66–97 = C. J. Classen (ed.), *Sophistik* (Darmstadt 1976), 493–516 (I quote from the second work) considers the *Clit.* passage to be derived from *Περὶ ὁμονοίας* by Antiphon the Sophist (509–11): Antiphon is alleged to have said that 'the natural base for the good is always to be beneficial, never to harm' (extracted from 87 B 58 D.–K.; cf. 505–6) which is compared to *Clit.* 409d6–7 τὴν φιλίαν ἀγαθὸν τ' ἔφη εἶναι καὶ οὐδέποτε κακόν. Secondly, Antiphon equates νόμος and δόξα (87 B

parallels, but before we examine them, the refutation of this definition in the *Clitophon* itself claims our attention.

The specific result of justice is stated to be not just friendship, but friendship in the cities. The addition is ignored in the subsequent discussion: when the friendships of children and animals are excluded on the ground that they are more often harmful than beneficial (409d6–e1), this means that it is friendship *tout court* which is the target, since the friendships of children and animals cannot possibly be brought under the head of ‘friendship in the cities’. The exclusion of these friendships and the resulting equation of φιλία and ὁμόνοια appears therefore more or less superfluous, because ὁμόνοια is first and foremost a political concept, so that the words φιλία ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν already refer to little else but ὁμόνοια (cf. Comm. on 409e4 ὁμόνοιαν).

It seems therefore that the definition does not match the first part of its refutation. The simplest explanation of this disagreement is that they do not come from the same source: the definition has all the appearances of being derived from a discussion of justice, whereas its refutation makes more sense if it was borrowed from a treatment of the nature of friendship. The latter part of this supposition is reinforced by the exclusion of children and animals (cf. Comm. on 409d7–8), the curtailing of part of the argument for this exclusion (cf. Comm. on 409d9) and the superfluous καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργον (409e8; cf. ad loc.). As we saw (section II.5.1 ad fin.), the same discrepancy is to be observed in the refutation of the first set of definitions.

44.2 D.–K.); this, Bignone thinks, is a *reductio ad absurdum* of Protagoras’ theory that δίκαιον = δόξα πόλεως (500–1); consequently Antiphon must have thought that justice is ἐπιστήμη (510), just as in *Clit.* ὁμόνοια (which Bignone wrongly alleges to be identified with justice) is called ἐπιστήμη (409e9). The parallels are not convincing, and besides, they are not real, but reconstructed ones; incidentally, the fragments on which they are based are not from Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς, but from Ἀλήθεια. Cf. *HGPh*, III 150 n. 1.

The association of justice and political friendship/concord is more or less a commonplace in fourth-century philosophical literature. There is, again, a parallel in *Republic* I,<sup>332</sup> in Socrates' refutation of the thesis that injustice is stronger than justice (351a2–352d2): δοκεῖς ἄν ἡ πόλιν ἢ στρατόπεδον ἢ ληιστὰς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος ... πρᾶξαι ἄν τι δύνασθαι, εἰ ἀδικοῖεν ἀλλήλους; – οὐ δῆτα ἦ δ' ὅς ... – στάσεις γάρ που ὤ Θρασύμαχε ἢ γε ἀδικία καὶ μίση καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν ... ἄρα εἰ τοῦτο ἔργον ἀδικίας, μῖσος ἐμποιοῖεν ὅπου ἄν ἐνῆι κτλ. (351c8–d9). It is easily seen that the statement that justice causes concord and friendship in cities and other collectives is not given here as a definition of justice or its ἔργον; in fact, justice and its effect are mentioned only as counterpart to a parallel statement (which is taken for granted) about injustice; this statement is then applied to injustice in two persons (351e3–4) and finally to injustice in one person (351e6–7; 352a5–8) – this addition is meant to anticipate the parallelism of justice in the state and in the soul treated in Book 4. The concepts of friendship and concord are not used in relation to justice in that book,<sup>333</sup> though there is an oblique reference in the definition of injustice as στάσις (444b1).

Therefore, if the criterion stated above (section II.5.1) is applied, there is nothing gained for the interpretation of the *Republic* if we assume that the sentence στάσεις γάρ που κτλ. was borrowed from the *Clitophon* or any other source.<sup>334</sup>

<sup>332</sup> Discovered, it seems, by Kunert (*Necessitudo*, 9–11).

<sup>333</sup> ὁμοδοξία is used to refer to σωφροσύνη 433c6, cf. 442d1.

<sup>334</sup> A more remote parallel is X. *Mem.* 4.4.16; 4.4 is essentially a series of unconnected arguments for the statement that τὸ δίκαιον is τὸ νόμιμον; 4.4.16 is a eulogy of concord. The only link with the second definition of justice in *Clit.* is that it too is found in a defence of a definition of justice.

The concepts of justice, friendship and concord play an intricate role in a passage in the *Alcibiades 1*, where Socrates makes Alcibiades admit that he does not know the ἐπιμέλεια proper to him (124e1–127d8). Socrates establishes that the ἀρετή he as well as Alcibiades strives after is that of the Athenian καλοί κάγαθοί (124e16), which consists of being able to rule in the city (125b9). This ability is the effect of εὐβουλία (125e6), more precisely, εὐβουλία regarding the welfare of the city (126a4). Socrates then asks which conditions must be present and which ones absent for a city to fare well: ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ ὧς Σώκρατες, ὅταν φιλία μὲν αὐτοῖς γίγνηται πρὸς ἀλλήλους, τὸ μισεῖν δὲ καὶ στασιάζειν ἀπογίγνηται. – ἄρ' οὖν φιλίαν λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν ἢ διχόνοιαν; – ὁμόνοιαν. – διὰ τίν' οὖν τέχνην ὁμοιοῦσιν αἱ πόλεις περὶ ἀριθμούς; – διὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. – τί δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται; οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτήν; – ναί. – οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἕκαστος; – ναί (126c1–12). The same questions are asked with regard to the arts of measurement and weighing, after which Socrates asks: ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστὶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ, καὶ τίς αὐτήν τέχνη παρασκευάζει; (126d8–9). Alcibiades says that he is talking about the friendship and concord which connect parents and sons, brothers, and man and wife. Socrates forces Alcibiades to admit that, since concord between man and wife cannot be about typically masculine or feminine arts, wives are not loved by their husbands, and vice versa, in so far as they do τὰ αὐτῶν (127a14–b4). Similarly, cities are not well ruled when everyone does τὰ αὐτῶν, while on the other hand they can be well ruled only if friendship is present (cf. 126c1–3). As doing τὰ αὐτῶν equals doing δίκαια, this leads up to the paradoxical conclusion: τὰ δίκαια οὖν πραττόντων ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν πολιτῶν φιλία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται πρὸς ἀλλήλους (127c8–9). Alcibiades is forced to confess to his ignorance.

Some elements in this highly sophisticated argument are common to *Alcibiades 1*, *Republic 1* and *Clitophon*, others have

obviously been taken over from the *Republic*. The application of ὁμόνοια to the state, the private citizens and the individual occurs, as we saw, in Book I; concord within the individual was functional there, while it is quite beside the point in this discussion. Secondly, the equation of τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν with δίκαια πράττειν is typical of the *Republic* exclusively; traditionally τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν is given as a definition not of justice but of σωφροσύνη.<sup>335</sup>

On the other hand, there are certain similarities between *Alcibiades 1* and *Clitophon* which one will look for in vain in the *Republic*. The equation of φιλία and ὁμόνοια is presented in both as a separate step in the argument, while in the *Republic* the words are associated without question. The difference between the two is that in the *Clitophon* the equation is reached by a process of elimination, whereas in *Alcibiades 1* Socrates makes Alcibiades choose between ὁμόνοια and διχόνοια as equivalents of φιλία. One might say that the *Alcibiades 1* takes for granted a conclusion which is the outcome of a debate in the *Clitophon*.

A second point is the epistemological character which in both dialogues is attributed to ὁμόνοια (and by implication to φιλία). In either case, this intellectualist conception of ὁμόνοια is used as a means to reaching aporia, although in a dissimilar way: in the *Clitophon* it is concluded that describing ὁμόνοια in terms of knowledge does not clarify the concept at all, while in *Alcibiades 1* some sort of answer

<sup>335</sup> *Chrm.* 161b6; *Ti.* 72a4–6, note εὖ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται. Cf. C. J. Classen, *Sprachliche Deutung als Triebkraft platonischen und sokratischen Philosophierens* (Munich 1959), 99–101; *HGPh*, iv 165–7. The statement ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν (*R.* 433a8–b1) is obviously a hoax: nowhere else in Plato's dialogues (discounting *Alc. 1*) do we find a similar statement about justice, while other authors tend to associate τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν and σωφρονεῖν, cf. esp. *Lys.* 26.3; 5; *Ar. Nub.* 1006–7 and Van Leeuwen's note; Gomme on *Th.* 1.32.4; North, *Sophrosyne*, 96–8; 136–7; 173–4 n. 49.

is given as to the object of *ὁμόνοια* – it is this answer which eventually causes the *aporia*. There is even a slight verbal resemblance: *Clitophon* 410a4–5 τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν ὅποι τείνουσά ἐστιν διαπέφευγεν – *Alcibiades* 1 126d8–9 ἦν δὲ δὴ σὺ λέγεις ὁμόνοιαν, τίς ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κτλ. Again, what is argued in the *Clitophon* is tacitly assumed in *Alcibiades* 1: that *ὁμόνοια* consists of shared knowledge. The concept of *ὁμοδοξία* is absent from the latter dialogue.

The epistemological character of *ὁμόνοια* is wholly absent from Plato's authentic works and expressly denied by Aristotle, cf. *Comm. on* 409e5 *ὁμοδοξίαν ἢ ἐπιστήμην*. Obviously these similarities cannot be a coincidence. Since the *Clitophon* is much more explicit on both points than the *Alcibiades* 1, it is not very logical to assume, with Susemihl (513–14), Heidel (*Pseudo-Platonica*, 47 n. 2) and others, that the former is dependent on the latter. As I have already stated, the argument in the *Clitophon* shows traces of having been curtailed from a source lost to us.<sup>336</sup> The *Alcibiades* 1 would seem to depend either on the *Clitophon* or on this source (besides undoubtedly using the *Republic*). Three arguments can be put forward in favour of the former hypothesis (the *Alcibiades* 1 uses the conclusions of this source in their – curtailed – form for which the author of the *Clitophon* appears responsible; both *Alcibiades* 1 and *Clitophon* treat *φιλία* primarily as a political concept, whereas the source would seem to be a discussion of the 'what is x?' type; the verbal resemblance pointed out above). See further section II.7.1(3).

Finally, the association in Aristotle of justice and friend-

<sup>336</sup> *Euthd.* 292b4–7, quoted by Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 145 n. 159) in this connection, seems irrelevant to me: here a number of possible results of statesmanship (*πλουσίους τοὺς πολίτας παρέχειν καὶ ἐλευθέρους καὶ ἀστασιάστους*) are rejected because these results are not morally good but morally neutral.

ship<sup>337</sup> deserves a brief mention, though friendship is not mentioned in discussion of justice in Book 5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (or in the corresponding part of the *Magna Moralia*). Conversely, however, justice is rather prominent in the sections on friendship in all three *Ethics*. They are said to have the same subjects and objects<sup>338</sup> and therefore to increase at the same time.<sup>339</sup> There are as many kinds of friendship as there are of justice;<sup>340</sup> in short, as the *Eudemian Ethics* puts it, they are nearly identical (ἢ ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἢ ἐγγύς τι, 1234b30–1). These and similar statements indicate a line of thought closely related to the association of justice and concord quoted above (and Comm. on 409e4 ὁμόνοιαν). The following passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* is especially significant: ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰς πόλεις συνέχειν ἢ φιλία, καὶ οἱ νομοθεταὶ μᾶλλον περὶ αὐτὴν σπουδάζειν ἢ τὴν δικαιοσύνην· ἢ γὰρ ὁμόνοια ὁμοίων τι τῇ φιλίᾳ ἔοικεν εἶναι, ταύτης δὲ μάλιστα' ἐφίενται καὶ τὴν στάσιν ἔχθραν οὔσαν<sup>341</sup> μάλιστα ἐξελάνουσι (1155a22–26).

<sup>337</sup> Aristotle uses φιλία to denote two different things. (1) Amiability, the persons possessing which quality are stated to be the intermediate of ἄρεσκοι and δύσκολοι (*EN* 1126b11–20). While these persons are called φίλος without reserve at *EN* 1108a27, at *EN* 1126b19–20 it is said ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα φιλία. Its treatment in *EN* seems to imply that it is an ἀρετή (but cf. 1127a14–17, which may be taken to express an uncertain feeling). In *EE* (1233b29–34) and *MM* (1193a20–27), which are parallel, φιλία is clearly 'friendship'; at the same time in *EE* (1234a24) φιλία is flatly denied to be an ἀρετή, while in *MM* (1193a37–8) it is doubted. (2) Friendship, which differs from (1) through the addition of στέργειν (*EN* 1126b22–3): it is therefore a πάθος (ibid.; 1105b22). Whether or not φιλία in this sense is an ἀρετή is left open in *EN* (1155a3–4 ἔστι γὰρ ἀρετή τις ἢ μετ' ἀρετῆς).

<sup>338</sup> *EN* 1159b25–6: ἔοικε δέ . . . περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἢ τε φιλία καὶ τὸ δίκαιον; cf. *EE* 1241b11–12; *MM* 1211a7–8.

<sup>339</sup> *EN* 1160a7–8.

<sup>340</sup> *EE* 1241b15; *MM* 1211a8–9; cf. *EN* 1161a10–11.

<sup>341</sup> Often translated as if ἔχθραν were an adjective, e.g. 'la discorde, son ennemi', Gauthier–Jolif.



At the same time, it must be borne in mind that Aristotle is here speaking not about the πρώτη φιλία, the one which is based on the good, but about friendship based on mutual interest.<sup>342</sup> Significantly, the notion of κοινωνία is very prominent in his discussion of friendship related to justice; this word is used by him to denote any group based on the achievement of a κοινὸν συμφέρον. In analysing the relation of friendship and justice Aristotle comes close to the utilitarian conception of friendship as found, for example, in Xenophon.<sup>343</sup> This analysis is therefore traditional; it has even been called 'archaic'.<sup>344</sup> Consequently we must not expect it to shed special light on the *Clitophon*, nor is there any reason to assume influence of this dialogue on Aristotle.

Some points in Clitophon's refutation of the definition can be connected with elements of Aristotle's ethical theories, for instance, the exclusion of the friendship of children and animals (cf. Comm. on 409d7–8; d9–e1) and the relation of ὁμόνοια and ὁμοδοξία (cf. Comm. on 409e5 ὁμοδοξίαν . . . ἢ ἐπιστήμην). I fail to see how these slight resemblances warrant Geffcken's conclusion that the author of the *Clitophon* was 'Aristotelisch denkend' (434–5).<sup>345</sup> He appears to have overlooked the fact that Aristotle uses ὁμοδοξία in a different sense from the *Clitophon*; even so, if Clitophon's adversary rejects the identity of ὁμόνοια and ὁμοδοξία, as does Aristotle, the rejection cannot possibly be used for determining the philosophical outlook of the author of the *Clitophon*.

<sup>342</sup> Cf. *EN* 1160a10; 1162b21–3; *EE* 1242a6–7; 11–12.

<sup>343</sup> *Mem.* 2.2–10; cf. Gauthier–Jolif II 2, 657. Cf. n. 334.

<sup>344</sup> Gauthier–Jolif, loc. cit.; 696.

<sup>345</sup> His suspicion that the definition of the result of justice as friendship in cities originated from Aristotle – he quotes (435 n. 1) *Pol.* 1262b7–8 (where justice is not named) and could have quoted with more point *EN* 1155a22–6 – is the more unfounded as Aristotle's thoughts on this point are wholly traditional.

Given the traditional character of the association of justice and political friendship (it is also found in the myth of the *Protagoras*, where αἰδώς and δίκη are called πόλεων κόσμοι τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φιλίας συναγωγοί, 322c3; in fact it could very well be sophistic in origin<sup>346</sup>), there is no cogent reason to assume that this definition was taken over from *Republic* 1. At most, it could be argued that cumulative evidence makes it plausible (if Plato wrote the *Clitophon* there is no problem). I have already argued that the refutation was separately borrowed from a work lost to us.

### II.5.3 *To benefit friends and harm enemies*

There can be no reasonable doubt that Plato was the first Greek writer to attack the traditional Greek idea that it is right and just to benefit one's friends and harm one's enemies.<sup>347</sup> Even in the fourth century this maxim is a solidly embedded rule of conduct: one of the defendants in the *Corpus Lysiacum* (9.20) states as his opinion that it is 'prescribed' (τετάχθαι), much as a speaker in an unknown Euripidean drama had called it a νόμος.<sup>348</sup>

<sup>346</sup> It is ascribed with no questions asked to Protagoras by Guthrie, *HGPh*, III 149; 175. Cf. Anon. Iambl. 3.6 τοῦτο γὰρ [sc. ὁ νόμος and τὸ δίκαιον] τάς τε πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὸ συνοικίζον καὶ τὸ συνέχον; E. *Supp.* 312–13.

<sup>347</sup> Whether he or Socrates was the first *thinker* to do so will not be discussed here – the claim that Antiphon preceded Plato has been disposed of by Guthrie, *HGPh*, III 112–13. See n. 331 to the previous section. Cf. Vlastos, *Socrates*, 179–99 and 297–300. – Professor Sedley draws my attention to a number of anecdotes in which Socrates amends the maxim (Plu. 218a, *SSR* I c 488, but the ascription to Socrates is probably an interpolation; Them. *Or.* 7, 95ab, *SSR* I c 489; *Or.* 34, II 230.10–231.6 Downey–Norman, *SSR* I c 490). There is of course no telling how old they are; they may well have been inspired by Plato.

<sup>348</sup> Fr. 1091 N<sup>2</sup>. For an analysis of the position of this rule within the wider field of popular morality see M. Whitlock Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics*

At least two Socratics felt no compunction in adopting this rule of life:<sup>349</sup> the anonymous author of the dialogue of which *Περὶ δικαίου* is an extract,<sup>350</sup> and Xenophon, who states this rule of life quite often,<sup>351</sup> although he also says of Socrates δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδέν, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ (*Mem.* 4.8.11). Dover<sup>352</sup> cannot be right in connecting this with the notion that ‘on occasion to ignore a wrong, and to be seen to ignore it, puts one at a great advantage over an adversary’. The sentence must be read in its context, the final eulogy of Socrates which closes the *Memorabilia*: Socrates was so pious that he never did anything without the gods’ consent, so just that he did no one any harm (not even a small one!), so ἐγκρατής that he never preferred the agreeable to the good, so φρόνιμος that he never made any mistake in judging between good and evil. In order to make Socrates as saintly as possible, Xenophon momentarily adopts a moral standard which is not his own (in fact Platonic influence seems unmistakable here); the unfortu-

(Cambridge 1989), 26–59. Cf. K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford 1974), 180–4, and for a repertory of places from older Greek literature, F. Dirlmeier, *Φίλος und φιλία im vorhellenistischen Griechentum* (Munich 1931), 28; add Archil. fr. 23.14 W.; Sapph. fr. 5.6–7 V. Of course the Greeks recognised as well as we do that in many cases clemency even towards enemies is the best policy (Dover, *op. cit.*, 184); this is reflected in a saying, ascribed to Pittacus (D. L. 1.75), συγγνώμη μετανοίας κρείσσων, of which an alternative version, συγγνώμη τιμωρίας κρείσσων (*ibid.*) seems to me to reflect a much later attitude.

<sup>349</sup> From texts like *Top.* 113a2–5 and *Rhet.* 1367a20–2 (cf. 1363a20–1) it cannot be deduced that Aristotle subscribed to it as well.

<sup>350</sup> 374c4–d3; cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 167–8. Since Müller has shown that X. *Mem.* 4.2.12–9 is derived from this dialogue, not from Aeschines’ *Alcibiades* (134–9), the statement in 4.2.16 can no longer be attributed to Aeschines.

<sup>351</sup> *Mem.* 2.1.28 (‘Prodicus’); 3.14; 6.35; *An.* 1.3.6; 9.11; *Cyr.* 1.4.25; 6.31; *Hiero* 2.2.

<sup>352</sup> *Op. cit.* (n. 348), 184.

nate addition of μηδὲ μικρόν shows that this line of thought is unfamiliar to him.

A passage from Isocrates probably is a direct attack on Plato's rejection of the rule; it is usually considered to reflect the *Gorgias*: 12.117–18: δυοῖν γὰρ πραγμάτων προτεινομένοις μὴ σπουδαίοις, κρείττω τὴν αἴρεσιν εἶναι τοῦ δεινὰ ποιεῖν ἑτέροισι ἢ πάσχειν αὐτούς καὶ τοῦ μὴ δικαίως τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ φεύγοντες τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην ἀδίκως Λακεδαιμονίοις δουλεύειν. ἄπερ ἅπαντες μὲν ἂν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἔλοιπτο καὶ βουλευθεῖεν, ὀλίγοι δ' ἂν τινες τῶν προσποιομένων εἶναι σοφῶν ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν φήσαιεν.<sup>353</sup>

There are two passages in Plato in which this traditional rule of conduct is explicitly rejected.<sup>354</sup> In the introduction to the *prosopopoiia* of the laws in the *Crito*, Socrates states with great emphasis that to do injustice is always evil and that therefore to retaliate against injustice is evil too (49c10–11 οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὅτιοῦν πάσχηι ὑπ' αὐτῶν). It is repeatedly stressed that this has always been Socrates' opinion (49e1–2 ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πάλαι οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ; cf. a6–7) and that the contrary opinion is the one usually held (d2 οἷδα γὰρ ὅτι ὀλίγοις τισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει;<sup>355</sup> cf. b2; b9–10). The gap between Socrates and normal Greek opinion is unbridgeable (d3–5 οἷς οὖν οὕτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τούτοις οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τούτους ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν ὁρῶντας ἀλλήλων τὰ βουλευόμενα).

<sup>353</sup> Cf. C. Eucken, 'Leitende Gedanken im isokrateischen Panathenaios', *MH* 39 (1982) 43–70, esp. 51–2.

<sup>354</sup> In a number of passages the rejection is implicit, e.g. *Grg.* 508d6–e6. The opposition ἀδικεῖν: ἀδικεῖσθαι is of course a major theme of the *Gorgias*, but it is too far removed from Clitophon's formulation to be regarded as its source.

<sup>355</sup> The future may be interpreted as an indication that Plato, writing after Socrates' death, feels that he stands alone in his conviction.

Though formally this passage has the normal dialectical structure of question and answer, it is in fact a long and emotional statement of opinion. The premise on which this opinion is based appears unobtrusively at the end of the opening sentence of the passage: τό γε ἀδικεῖν τῶι ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν τυγχάνει ὄν παντὶ τρόπῳ (49b4–5).

On the other hand, there is rather too much argument, for the taste of many Platonists, in the discussion of Socrates and Polemarchus in *Republic* I. Starting from a dictum of Simonides that ‘giving everyone his due’ is just (or the just, 331e3–4), Polemarchus is induced to ‘interpret’ this as a definition of justice; τὸ τοὺς φίλους ἄρα εὔ ποιεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; – δοκεῖ μοι (332d7–9). The definition is refuted twice; we need not go into the first refutation, which leads up to the absurdity that the just man is a thief (334a10), because Polemarchus refuses to accept it, while at the same time clinging to his definition (τοῦτο μέντοι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ἔτι, ὠφελεῖν μὲν τοὺς φίλους ἢ δικαιοσύνη, βλάπτειν δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς, 334b8–9). After a slight modification (335a9–10 τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα εὔ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ’ ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὄντα βλάπτειν) the second refutation sets in: (1) harming a horse or a dog means making them worse in their particular ἀρετή, likewise (since justice is a (or the) human ἀρετή) harming a man means making him more unjust (335b6–c8); (2) musicians or skilled horsemen cannot make men unmusical or bad riders by music or the art of riding, likewise the just cannot make men unjust by justice (c9–d2); (3) it is not the function (ἔργον) of heat to chill or of dryness to moisten but of their opposites, likewise it is not the function of the good man to harm but of his opposite, and since the just man is good, it is not his function to harm anyone but that of the unjust man (d3–13).

I shall not go into the questionable analogies and the ambiguous use of βλάπτειν (i. ‘to treat badly’, cf. κακῶς

ποιεῖν; 2. 'to make worse', cf. Comm. on 407a1 ὠφελεῖν).<sup>356</sup> I am convinced that there is a fallacy and that it was intended; the two meanings are very effectively employed in the *Apology* (30c8–d6), and besides the ambiguity points a moral which is relevant for the *Republic* as a whole: true evil for man is to be damaged in his soul (cf. section II.3.5 on this function of fallacies).<sup>357</sup> For our purpose it is more relevant to note that for artistic reasons the whole episode is presented as a discussion with a *negative* result (33ba9–10 εἶεν ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐφάνη ἡ δικαιοσύνη ὄν οὐδὲ τὸ δίκαιον, τί ἂν ἄλλο τις αὐτὸ φάιη εἶναι; This question is not answered because Thrasymachus breaks in), not as a positive statement as in the *Crito*, although a positive result might have been reached easily: if it is the function of the unjust man to harm, then it could be argued that the just man's actions are always beneficial. That much is suggested by the addition of the superfluous third stage of the argument (335d3–13), and it is found stated explicitly in the *Clitophon*: 410b1–3 ὕστερον δὲ ἐφάνη βλάπτειν γε οὐδέποτε ὁ δίκαιος οὐδένα· πάντα γὰρ ἐπ' ὠφελίαι πάντας δρᾶν (see section II.4.2).

On the following grounds I consider it proven that the third definition of justice in the *Clitophon* and its rejection were derived from *Republic* I:

- (a) It is unlikely, as far as our knowledge goes, that the definition was rejected by any other Socratic but Plato;

<sup>356</sup> The equivocation is less obvious because in the case of horses and dogs the first meaning goes hand in hand with the second (so the application to humans may seem a correct induction) and also because of the dubious identification of justice and human ἀρετή. Cf. H. Telle, *Formen der Beweisführung in den platonischen Frühdialogen* (Bonn 1975), 62–8, esp. 65–6.

<sup>357</sup> I disagree with Tucker's explanation (note on *R.* 335c) that men grow worse when they are hurt or made miserable, for which Simon. 542.14–16 *PMG* is quoted: Plato would have emphatically denied that this is necessarily true.

some phrases in the *Crito* seem to indicate this. If derived from Plato's works, it must come either from *Republic* I or *Crito*.

- (b) The rejection is presented in the *Clitophon* as the negative outcome of the discussion of a definition; this tallies with the situation of *Republic* I but not with the *Crito* passage.
- (c) The reason given for the rejection in the *Clitophon* (the just man always acts to the benefit of everyone) is implied (and its negative counterpart stated) in *Republic* I, whereas in the *Crito* a different ground is given (unjust action is evil for the man who commits the action).
- (d) The *Crito* does not speak of benefiting friends or harming enemies, but of acting unjustly or wrongly *per se* (ἀδικεῖν, ἀνταδικεῖν, κακουργεῖν, ἀντικακουργεῖν, κακῶς ποιεῖν ἄνθρώπους), whereas the opposition is found both in the *Clitophon* and in *Republic* I. The verbs βλάπτειν and ὠφελεῖν are absent from the *Crito* passage.

Even though the author of the *Clitophon* (for reasons which have been discussed in section 1.5.3) omits to report the argument following the definition, but for the bare essential statement πάντα γὰρ ἐπ' ὠφελίαι πάντας δρᾶν (410b2–3), this statement suffices to establish that in the case of the third definition the refutation comes from the same source as the definition itself. It is frivolous to discuss the possibility of *Republic* I depending here on the *Clitophon*, or of either on a common source.

#### II.5.4 *Politics, judication, justice*

About the words ἦν δὴ σὺ πολιτικὴν ᾧ Σώκρατες ἐπονομάζεις πολλάκις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὴ ταύτην δικαστικὴν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην ὡς ἔστιν λέγων (408b4–5) much unnecessary confusion has been created. That Pavlu declared that this

identification was not to be found in the authentic works of Plato ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 13) is not surprising, considering his superficial knowledge of Plato, which makes him elsewhere condemn as 'läppische Beispiele' (II n. 2) the sequence eyes – ears – whole body which is actually taken over from Plato (cf. section II.2.2.3). That this identification of judication and justice was denied by Plato in *Gorgias* 464, as Brünnecke says (459 n. 29) and Souilhé repeats (186 n. 1),<sup>358</sup> is due to misunderstanding and lack of interpretative precision. Nor can I believe that this identification has anything to do with the right of the stronger (Brünnecke and Souilhé, loc. cit.).

What is actually said in the *Gorgias* is that πολιτική is about the εὐεξία of the soul (464a1–b4). Socrates proceeds to distinguish two parts of the care of the body, γυμναστική and ἰατρική (b4–7) and then he says τῆς δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς γυμναστικῆς τὴν νομοθετικὴν, ἀντίστροφον δὲ τῆι ἰατρικῆι τὴν δικαιοσύνην (b7–8). Surely, this must mean that δικαιοσύνη at 464b8 is the corrective part of the politician's art, i.e. judication, in the same way as ἰατρική is the corrective part of the science of bodily welfare,<sup>359</sup> as appears quite clearly, if not from this passage alone, from 520b3 ὅσωιπερ νομοθετικὴ δικαστικῆς (sc. κάλλιον ἔστιν) καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἰατρικῆς.

In the *Clitophon*, πολιτική is said to be identical to δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη; in the *Gorgias*, there are two μόρια of πολιτική, one of them is called δικαιοσύνη and δικαστική. It is out of the question that the *Clitophon*

<sup>358</sup> He seems to have been misled by *Grg.* 520b2–3, not mentioned by Brünnecke.

<sup>359</sup> Besides, one branch of the direct tradition and a number of witnesses of the indirect tradition (see Dodds' apparatus) read δικαστική(ν) instead of δικαιοσύνη(ν) at 464b8; c2; 465c3. If this is not the correct reading, it is in any case the correct interpretation (Dodds on 464b8 could have strengthened his case for δικαιοσύνη as the original reading by pointing at 478a5–b1, where both δίκη and δικαιοσύνη are used for δικαστική).



exhibits traces of an un-Platonic doctrine in this respect. We can go a little further than that. In his later dialogues Plato does indeed separate δικαστική from πολιτική; judication is an ancillary (ὑπηρέτης) of the βασιλική τέχνη in the *Politicus* (305b1–c8); the separation is foreshadowed by *Gorgias* 520b3 quoted above.<sup>360</sup> It would seem, therefore, that the author of the *Clitophon* took his identification of politics and judication over from the *Gorgias*, and brought it in as a reference to the educative role of the politician in that dialogue.

The whole of this interpretation must now be set against a totally different construction put upon the *Clitophon* passage ever since C. F. Hermann:<sup>361</sup> it is explained as a borrowing from the pseudo-Platonic *Erastai*.

In an attempt at a definition of philosophy, Socrates there proves (1) that justice is the same thing as σωφροσύνη: the art of punishment is identical to the art of improving others (137c6); this art is also the one which distinguishes between good and evil subjects (137c9–11). Applied to human beings, the art of punishment is δικαστική (137d12), identical to δικαιοσύνη (137d14; no reason is given); the art of discerning between good and bad men implies knowing if one is oneself good or bad, or simply knowing oneself, which is σωφροσύνη (138a1–8). (2) This δικαιοσύνη/σωφροσύνη is next identified with πολιτική (cities are well governed if there is right punishment; 138b7–10), βασιλική and τυραννική (138b15–7). (3) A philosopher should be the best man in all separate arts which constitute this complex, therefore philosophy is identical

<sup>360</sup> Cf. X. *Mem.* 2.6.38, where a clear distinction, along the lines of *Plt.*, is made between judges and politicians. That Xenophon knew the *Plt.* was argued by H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 59–61; cf. contra *HGPh*, III 440 n. 1 (but differences between Xenophon's and Plato's conceptions of dialectic do not disprove dependence).

<sup>361</sup> *Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg 1838), I 426 n. 231.

to the complex of arts established in (2) (138d1–139a5; the argument is rather confused in detail).

Pavlu is obviously right when he says ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 13) that the *Clitophon* cannot possibly be the source of the *Erastai*, whose author found the inspiration of his identification of πολιτική, βασιλική, δεσποτική and οικονομική in the *Politicus* (258e8–11);<sup>362</sup> the identification of δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη probably derived from the above-quoted passages from the *Gorgias*, and perhaps also from 476d8–478b1.<sup>363</sup> It follows that either the *Clitophon* depends on the *Erastai* or they borrowed the identification of δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη from the *Gorgias*.

Now, the *Erastai* is certainly a sort of protreptic dialogue which defends philosophy against the claims of the liberal arts (though it is perhaps better to say that it tries to define the exact place of philosophy with regard to the liberal arts), and the author of the *Clitophon* may have decided to use this particular representative of the genre to end Socrates' protreptic. This would probably imply that my interpretation of ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητική as the educative role of the politician (found in *Gorgias*, *Euthydemus*, *Politicus*; cf. section II.2.3.3) has to be given up: to be sure, mention is made of βελτίστους ποιεῖν in the *Erastai* (137c1–d1) but this seems to have no connection with either δικαιοσύνη/δικαστική or πολιτική; it serves only as a link between right punishment and the ability to distinguish between the good and the bad (the argument hinges on 137c9–11 πότερον ἢπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, αὐτῆ<sup>364</sup> καὶ γινώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηροὺς, ἢ ἕτέρα τις;).

<sup>362</sup> Guil. Werner, *De Anterastis dialogo Pseudoplatonico* (Darmstadt 1912), 51.

<sup>363</sup> Werner, op. cit., 58; Souilhé, 122 n. 3; 123 n. 2.

<sup>364</sup> I prefer αὐτῆ (Schanz; αὐτῆ TW) to ἡ αὐτῆ δὲ (B), αὐτῆ δὲ (D), because (a) apodotic δὲ after a relative clause is rare; (b) when it does occur, it always follows a demonstrative (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 178).

Though this consideration does not constitute a real objection, perhaps the following observations do. In the first place, πολιτική is not directly connected with δικαστική in *Erastai* as it is in *Gorgias* and *Clitophon*; it is just identified with the moral cluster δικαιοσύνη/σωφροσύνη (once δικαστική has been identified with δικαιοσύνη at 137c14 it does not turn up again, not even in the long series of identical τέχναι, 138c9–10). Consequently, πολιτική, inasmuch as it is identical to δικαιοσύνη, is the art of right punishment in *Erastai*, cf. esp. καὶ αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν – . . . – καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὕτη ἐστίν (138b7–10). It is a far cry from this to πολιτικὴ ἀς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴ.

Another consideration may be the question why the author of the *Clitophon* selected precisely the triad πολιτική, δικαστική and δικαιοσύνη from *Erastai*. One can understand why σωφροσύνη was not named (the whole of the *Clitophon* is concerned with δικαιοσύνη; a second cardinal virtue would have diverted the attention from it). The omission of βασιλικὴ and τυραννικὴ may perhaps also be accounted for, but one wonders why οἰκονομικὴ and δεσποτικὴ were left out, when either of them, in combination with πολιτικὴ, would at the end of the whole speech have harmonised quite nicely with the end of the part in *oratio recta* πάντ' ἀνδρα ἰδίαί θ' ἅμα καὶ δημοσίαι συμπάσας τὰς πόλεις (407e1–2). On the other hand, the hypothesis that our author selected πολιτικὴ, δικαστικὴ and δικαιοσύνη from the *Gorgias* makes much more sense. Here, πολιτικὴ, the θεραπεία τῆς ψυχῆς (cf. 464b5–6) is said to have two parts, one of them δικαιοσύνη/δικαστικὴ, the other νομοθετικὴ. Obviously, the latter would not do in the context of the *Clitophon*; all the others were retained and made good sense.

A third, and to my mind decisive, point is the fact that the author of the *Clitophon* further on goes out of his way to propose the distinction between ἔργον and δίδαγμα

(which complicates his use of the τέχνη analogy). The only purpose of this distinction is that it establishes the point that the just politician makes his fellow-citizens more just (409b6–7 τῆς δὴ δικαιοσύνης ὡσαύτως τὸ μὲν δίκαιους ἔστω ποιεῖν). This procedure is understandable if we suppose that the doctrine of the politician–physician of the *Gorgias* and other dialogues was retained by our author as a piece of ‘constructive’ philosophy (cf. further section II.4.2). This doctrine is absent from the *Erastai*.

Apart from the parallel under discussion, the two dialogues have hardly anything in common.<sup>365</sup> There is, besides, little to connect the *Erastai* with the protreptic corpus: the γνῶθι σαυτὸν motif is the only major similarity, but precisely that has evidently been taken over from the *Charmides*;<sup>366</sup> the opposition φιλογυμναστία: φιλοσοφία (133e3–5) is only indirectly transposed into the opposition body: soul (134d4) – no rejection of care for the body here!

This parallel between *Clitophon* and *Erastai* is evidently of great importance for the origin of the *Clitophon*. The date of the *Erastai* is highly uncertain;<sup>367</sup> the work is almost unanimously rejected (cf. Souilhé, 107–10). If the *Clitophon* depends on the *Erastai*, it is impossible to maintain the former’s authenticity, and it could hardly be dated before c. 330.<sup>368</sup> As I can make more sense of the *Clitophon* if I do not take the *Erastai* into account (especially because of

<sup>365</sup> *Clit.* 408a1–4 – *Amat.* 137e4–138a3; *Clit.* 407c1 – *Amat.* 132d1–2; these are hardly parallels.

<sup>366</sup> Werner, op. cit. (n. 362), 22–3.

<sup>367</sup> Werner detects influence of *Alc.* 1 (27) and *Phdr.* (24), apart from the parallels from *Ptt.* and *Chrm.* discussed. He interprets *Amat.* as an Academic attack against Peripatetic πολυμαθία, which – as is usually the case with Platonic *Dubia* and *Spuria* – is a mere guess.

<sup>368</sup> If Werner is right (cf. previous note) in deriving *Amat.* from the *Alc.* 1, which latter is usually dated (by those who do not accept it as Platonic) around 340 – section II.7.1 n. 395 (and by some of those who do accept it as authentic, in Plato’s last period), then *Amat.* itself can hardly be prior to 330.

the third argument adduced above), I shall disregard the parallel.

### II.5.5 *Conclusions*

One of the three definitions in the *Clitophon* can be proved to derive from *Republic* 1; another is most likely to derive from it; the third has at least a good parallel in a passage from the same book. Obviously there is a close relationship between these two works. When we take into account the choice of the character Clitophon and of Thrasymachus as his teacher, we can hardly evade the conclusion that the readers of the *Clitophon* were meant to grasp the author's intention in the light of the *Republic*.

Before we can proceed to reconstruct it ourselves, a question must be raised to which the contemporary reader knew the answer whereas we do not: was *Republic* 1 ever published as a separate dialogue?<sup>369</sup> If it was, the *Clitophon* contains a clear message: when Socratic literature tries to go beyond mere protreptic, it achieves nothing, witness the 'Thrasymachus' (or whatever name may be given to *Republic* 1 as an isolated dialogue). This hypothesis, which automatically dates the *Clitophon* between the publication of *Republic* 1 and that of *Republic* 2–10, was first put forward by H. Oldenberg<sup>370</sup> and adopted among others by Kunert (*Necessitudo*, 11; 18–22), Grube ('The *Cleitophon* of Plato',

<sup>369</sup> I leave out of account the possibility – which is far from improbable – that *Republic* 1 was written separately by Plato, but not published until he decided to incorporate it (whether or not with adaptations) into the whole of the *Republic*; cf. (e.g.) Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II 184. A polemical text like the *Clitophon* could not possibly deal with an unpublished sketch.

<sup>370</sup> *De sacris fratrum Arvalium quaestiones* (Berlin 1875), 53: 'Platonem primum de republica librum separatim edidisse censeo, quo edito priusquam ceteri libri emissi sunt, scriptus est Clitopho dialogus pseudoplatonicus.'

305), Friedländer,<sup>371</sup> Julia Annas<sup>372</sup> and, with some reservations, Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 147 n. 162).<sup>373</sup>

It is not necessary for us to decide whether the assumption of a separately published ‘Thrasymachus’ is tenable or not;<sup>374</sup> we may confine ourselves to working out the consequences which this assumption has for the interpretation of the *Clitophon*. Before we start doing so, one point must be stressed.

No matter how one thinks about the degree of identity of the hypothetical ‘Thrasymachus’ and *Republic* I as we have it (for example, the introductory conversation between Socrates and Cephalus makes little sense in a separate dialogue, but serves admirably as a prefiguration of the just man as described in the later books), two out of three definitions which the *Clitophon* would, on this hypothesis, have borrowed from the ‘Thrasymachus’ are derived from contexts where there is a rather clear reference to views expounded in the later books of the *Republic*: the parallelism of justice and injustice in the state and in the soul is stressed in the passage from which the second definition in the *Clitophon* derives (section II.5.2)<sup>375</sup> and the argument that no just man harms anyone is constructed in such a way that for the *bon entendeur* the true meaning of ‘to harm’ (which plays such a prominent part in the proof of the immortality of the soul in Book 10) could not be missed (section II.5.3). Therefore, even if a ‘Thrasymachus’ was

<sup>371</sup> *Platon*, II 45–6; 287.

<sup>372</sup> *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford 1981), 17.

<sup>373</sup> The message is slightly different if *Republic* I is itself considered to be a ‘protreptic’ dialogue, so Grube (‘The *Cleitophon* of Plato’, 305) and Gaiser (*Protreptik*, 126–8; 143). Cf. section II.2.4 n. 231.

<sup>374</sup> Cf. C. H. Kahn, ‘Proleptic composition in the *Republic*, or why book I was never a separate dialogue’, *CQ* 43 (1993) 131–42; J. R. S. Wilson, ‘Thrasymachus and the *thumos*: a further case of prolepsis in *Republic* I’, *CQ* 45 (1995) 58–67. The debate continues.

<sup>375</sup> Cf. Kahn as quoted in the previous note, pp. 138–9.

really published separately, and if the *Clitophon* was dealing with it, it was at any rate a dialogue in which a good deal of what Plato later said about justice in the *Republic* could already be read between the lines (justice is a harmonic state of the soul; to commit injustice is to disrupt this harmony).

Now there are two possibilities: either Plato himself wrote the *Clitophon* between the publication of the 'Thrasymachus' and *Republic* or someone else did. If it was Plato himself, one may well ask why he chose a dialogue of his own, and one which contained pretty much of his theory of justice, in order to make the point that Socratic literature does not teach anything about justice. (Of course, this question remains open if Plato wrote the *Clitophon* after the whole of *Republic*; it will be treated below.) Certainly, one cannot maintain that Plato 'felt the need for criticism of his work in general and [*Republic* I] in particular' (Grube, 'The *Cleitophon* of Plato', 306; similarly Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 146-7), because, as we saw (section II.2), the first part of the *Clitophon* does not criticise Plato's work at all.

If, on the other hand, the *Clitophon* was written by someone other than Plato, prior to the publication of the whole of the *Republic*, the author, in picking all his definitions from the putative 'Thrasymachus', would show himself as critical of this dialogue as he is of explicit protreptic. How then, do we reconcile this attitude with his evaluation of Plato's implicit protreptic, which he adopts (section II.4) and with his implicit subscription to some Platonic tenets, one of which is found in the 'Thrasymachus' itself (section II.4.2)?

It is clear that dating the *Clitophon* between *Republic* I and the whole of the *Republic* brings nothing but confusion; we had better abandon the possibility, which would remain extremely speculative in any case. Of course the hypothesis of a separately published 'Thrasymachus' is itself

not affected by the consequences (or rather absence of them) which it has for the *Clitophon*.

Before we start interpreting the relationship of *Clitophon* and *Republic*, one further point must be borne in mind. We are accustomed to think of Book I of the *Republic* as a self-contained entity, not just because of indications in the text of the *Republic* (e.g. 357a1–2 ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα εἰπὼν ὤμιην λόγου ἀπηλλάχθαι· τὸ δ' ἦν ἄρα ὡς ἔοικε προοίμιον) but first and foremost because in our copies of the *Republic* it is printed as such. However, it is not until the first century CE that we hear of a division into ten books;<sup>376</sup> another one into six books was perhaps used by Aristophanes of Byzantium.<sup>377</sup> At any rate, it is certain that Plato himself did not divide the *Republic* into books.<sup>378</sup> Consequently, if a text makes extensive use of (part of) the *Republic* and of characters found there, the contemporaneous reader is invited to interpret this text in the light of the *Republic* as a whole, not of a particular book of the *Republic*, because there were none.

Once this is realised, it is out of the question that the second half of the *Clitophon* is meant as an attack on the *Republic*, unless one resorts with Wilamowitz to the slightly

<sup>376</sup> Thrasyllus apud D. L. 3.57.

<sup>377</sup> Alline, *Histoire*, 15–17.

<sup>378</sup> Obviously, the whole of the *Republic* is too long to be contained in one roll, and an anecdote told by Gellius perhaps suggests that the *Republic* was published in instalments (14.3.3 – this cannot apply to a separate ‘Thrasymachus’). But there is no indication whatsoever that for any author of the classical period the physical end of a roll had to coincide with a major transition in the text. – Cicero’s statement *quoniam in singulis libris utor prooemiis ut Aristoteles in iis quos ἐξωτερικούς uocat* (*Att.* 4.16.2) probably means no more than that Aristotle introduced some of his exoteric works with dedicatory prooemia (we know this for a fact in the case of *Protr.*, cf. A 1 Düring); it does not necessarily mean that Aristotle divided his exoteric works into books, each with a separate prooemium (so wrongly Th. Birt, *Das antike Buchwesen* (Berlin 1882), 472).



absurd view that ‘der Verfasser hat sich die Mühe nicht gemacht, den Staat durchzulesen’ (*Platon*, I 386 n. 1) – we must apparently suppose that he wrote for a public as lazy as himself.<sup>379</sup> As I have stressed repeatedly, our author understands quite well what Plato’s dialogues are all about; he also knows Plato’s conception of justice (section II.4.1) and how could he have acquired that knowledge unless it was (and this is the minimum requirement) by reading the *Republic*, and the *Gorgias* besides? If indeed the author wished to communicate the thought that Socratic exhortation to justice does not lead to knowledge of justice, the clumsiest thing which he could possibly have done is what he actually does: to direct his readers’ attention to the one Socratic dialogue in which there is a very extensive and positive answer to the question what justice is and what its effects are.

What, then, did he wish to communicate? The best answer I can think of is that by choosing his definitions from the *Republic*, in which dialogue a well-reasoned definition of justice is eventually given, our author tried to indicate that his criticism is not aimed at Plato. This might seem a paradox: the definitions which Clitophon turns down are borrowed from the same dialogue which (as I think) for our author constitutes a positive contribution to the question what justice is. Yet the examination of the contexts of these definitions in *Republic* I has shown that they are not presented as serious answers there. In other words, precisely because the argument in the first episode of the *Republic* is presented as provisional, our author could borrow the definitions, since his public was bound to know that

<sup>379</sup> A similar objection applies to Rutherford’s far more sophisticated interpretation of Clitophon as someone who ‘wants a solution, an answer, “Truth” on a plate’ (*Art of Plato*, 100; cf. Blits, ‘Socratic teaching’, 332 ‘an answer he can memorize’). If there is any dialogue that shows that for Plato there is no such thing as truth on a plate, it is the *Republic*.

eventually Plato could and did give an answer to Clitophon's question.

It would have been easy for the author to prove the inadequacy of explicit protreptic by picking out various definitions of justice together with their refutations from all sorts of Socratic literature. Instead, he chose to concentrate on one work (a procedure which entailed the difficult task of looking for suitable refutations elsewhere), in order to make clear again that he was in no respect critical of Plato.

In the past, many scholars have tried to match the various pupils in Clitophon's report with different Socratics. I do not believe this to be a fruitful approach. Yet on one point it is unmistakably correct: the figure of Socrates in the dialogue is meant to symbolise Plato, both in the prelude (section 1.5.2) and in the third definition (section II.4.2). For the author of the *Clitophon*, Platonism was the only acceptable form of Socratic philosophy and the Platonic dialogue the only truly Socratic dialogue.

## II.6 The meaning of the *Clitophon*

Socrates' companions have listened to his protreptic speeches, as Clitophon has, but although Clitophon says that these speeches 'wake us up, as it were, from our sleep' (408c3-4), the pupils show no sign of having been aroused. The speech reported by Clitophon has been an exhortation to justice, and Clitophon goes out of his way to underline this (408e2); yet when Clitophon asks them to name the 'art of the soul's perfection', it takes the most intelligent of them (409a4) to answer the question. Subsequent interrogation proves that their ideas about the result of justice are little more than vague slogans.

Now, the reader of Socrates' speech will have had no trouble in recognising it as a farrago of patterns and motifs from protreptic literature; he is meant to take the dumb-

ness of Socrates' companions as a criticism of this genre: it does not achieve its aim, to wit, making its readers better men by explicitly exhorting them to virtue. The author of the *Clitophon* clarifies his intention by surrounding the report of the speech by clear markers of irony, by Socrates' own inability to give a correct answer, and by Clitophon's last words: those who have been explicitly exhorted cannot become virtuous and happy unless a wholly different method is applied; besides, as protreptic does not, and cannot, teach, they run the risk of falling victim to dangerous ethical theories, such as those of Thrasymachus. I do not wish to imply that the *Clitophon* contains an absolute rejection of protreptic as such: Socrates is 'worth the world' to those who have not yet been exhorted (410e5–6). Yet the explicit character of protreptic entails its lack of success. The criticism of the *Clitophon* is identical to that of the *Sophist*: explicit protreptic 'achieves little for much toil'.

Clitophon's interrogation of the companions serves a double purpose. It illustrates the criticism by showing how even the brightest among them (409a4; d4) crumble before a few simple questions. Simultaneously, it suggests to the reader that there is another method, which *can* lead to virtue, namely elenchos as practised in Plato's aporetic dialogues.

The characteristics of the aporetic dialogue are all present: analogy, equation of virtue and τέχνη, concentric reasoning, aporia caused by circularity, and possibly progress (if my interpretation of 410a1 ἰκανοὶ ἦσαν – section II.4.3 – is correct). The author of the *Clitophon* could not contrast protreptic literature and Socratic elenchos as clearly and explicitly as eristic and Socratic παιδεία are contrasted in the *Euthydemus*, because he chose to make Socrates a symbol of protreptic and therefore could not make him stand for elenchos at the same time. Yet he takes a great deal of trouble to make it obvious to his

readers that Clitophon's interrogation is a specimen of the aporetic dialogue. There is, for instance, an abundant use of analogies (408e3-409a2; b1-5; b5-6; c4-d1; 410a3-4; b7-c2; d1-4) and there are two circular regresses (408d5-6; 410a2-6). Justice is said in so many words to be a τέχνη (section II.4.1). The degree to which these characteristics are stressed goes beyond normal practice in Plato's aporetic dialogues, but that is sufficiently explained as being due to the author's wish to indicate that Clitophon's technique is elenchos as used by Plato. Some features in the text reinforce this message, especially Socrates' irony (section I.5.2) and the words κατὰ σὲ ... ὑποτείνων αὐτοῖς (408d1; section I.5.3).

The intention of the *Clitophon* therefore has two aspects: explicit protreptic is condemned, implicit protreptic (more precisely, elenchos as a means of reaching aporia) recommended. In formulating the meaning as I do here, I find myself in partial agreement with Joël (*Der echte ... Sokrates*, I 483-4), Brünnecke ('Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 457-60) and Souilhé (177-9), with the proviso that where these scholars speak of 'Antisthenes', I would wish to substitute 'protreptic'.<sup>380</sup> I have not seen the second aspect of its

<sup>380</sup> I rather agree with Heidel's remark: 'Clitopho says in effect: *Take the Alc. I for granted; what follows then?*' (*Pseudo-Platonica*, 47 n. 2; Heidel's emphasis), but again I would extend 'Alc. I' to 'protreptic'. Stefanini, *Platone*, I 207 offers two sensible arguments against a purely anti-Antisthenean tenor of *Clit.*: (1) the rhetoric (said to be typical of Antisthenes' *Protr.*, D. L. 6.1; section II.1.5) does not cease with Clitophon's report of Socrates' speech; (2) there are no typical Antisthenean traits in the protreptic speech. I may add that the allusions to (perhaps) Aesch. *Socr. Alc.* and (certainly) Pl. *Ap.*, *Euthd.* do not tally with such a tenor, though Antisthenes' *Alcibiades* and *Protr.* may have been among the set of texts which the author of *Clit.* condemns. I cannot follow Stefanini when he takes *Clit.* as a criticism made by Plato himself of the aporetic dialogues of his earliest period (similarly Grube, 'The *Cleitophon* of Plato'; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 144-7): aporia is an indispensable element of elenchos and as such is recommended, not rejected, in the *Clitophon*.

meaning discussed anywhere: when Brünneke (458–9) says that the *Republic* is the author's alternative for Antisthenes' 'oberflächliche Protreprik', he is partly right (cf. section II.5.5), but he overlooks the role of elenchos in the *Clitophon*.

I have argued (section II.3) that the aporetic dialogue is Plato's alternative to explicit protreptic. The reasons why explicit protreptic is condemned in the *Clitophon* are Plato's reasons, and the alternative is Plato's alternative. If I have correctly understood the intention of the *Clitophon*, the work was written from an unambiguously Platonic point of view.

In constructing this pamphlet as he chose to do, our author ran the risk of being seriously misunderstood. Socrates he made the symbol of protreptic literature, but as Clitophon is made to attack him, the dialogue could easily be interpreted as an attack on Socratic philosophy. When he parodies Socrates' little protreptic speech from the *Apology*, he does not hit at the values to which Socrates exhorts his fellow-citizens there (section II.2.3.1). The proof that wrongdoing is involuntary is a parody, but not of Socratic ethics (cf. Comm. on 407b2–e2). The distinction between ἔργον and δίδαγμα entails the Socratic paradox that virtue can be taught, and justifies the statement from Socrates' speech that justice and politics are identical (section II.4.2).

Similarly, the *Clitophon* might have been interpreted as an attack on the *Republic*; its protagonist and its definitions of justice were borrowed from that Platonic dialogue as every reader who knew it was bound to see. Here, too, efforts are made to indicate that far from criticising the *Republic*, the author recommends this work as providing the ultimate solution of the question what justice is. He does so by reformulating in a positive way the conclusion that justice is not harming anybody (section II.4.2), by pointing at the notion of justice as the best state of the

soul (section II.4.1), and by taking his definitions from the abortive discussions in the first book, which are said to be unsatisfactory in the *Republic* itself (354a13–c3; 357a1–b4; 358b2–4 etc.; section II.5.5).

Finally, the allusions to literary texts (apart from the *Republic*, we can identify the *Apology* and *Euthydemus* as far as Plato's works are concerned, one of the Alcibiades dialogues by an author other than Plato or pseudo-Plato – section II.2.4 – and there may have been many more) may themselves have served as so many indications that the *Clitophon* is a literary, not a philosophical pamphlet. The exaggerated picture of a rhetorical, preaching Socrates may have strengthened these indications.

Yet, when all is said and done, one wonders whether the means of attack was well chosen. Did the author have no other way of conveying his message than by having Socrates victimised by an admirer of Thrasymachus? How certain could he be of being correctly understood? There are only two testimonies from – later – antiquity (Ptolemy and Synesius, cf. sections I.3.1 and I.5.2) about the meaning of the *Clitophon*: they show that it was not correctly understood. Likewise, the popularity of Socrates' protreptic speech in later antiquity suggests that this speech was taken quite seriously. In itself, this does not say much: if, as most scholars hold,<sup>381</sup> the *Menexenus* was a parody, nobody in antiquity appears to have understood its intention.<sup>382</sup> But the fact that from Schleiermacher onwards many sensible scholars have considered the *Clitophon* an attack on Socrates, and even on Plato, does indeed show that to a certain extent the form of this dialogue obscures its meaning (though the virtual disappearance of fourth-century protreptic, and indeed of all Socratic literature

<sup>381</sup> But cf. M. Dirat, 'L'éloquence de Platon dans le Ménexène', *Atti dell'Accademia Pontaniana* 40 (1991) 327–43.

<sup>382</sup> On the ancient views on *Mx.*, cf. Méridier (Budé ed.), 76–7; K. Oppenheimer, *Zwei attische Epitaphien* (Berlin 1933), 68–70.

apart from Plato and Xenophon, contributes largely to its meaning being obscured).

To what extent is the intention of the *Clitophon* different from that of the *Euthydemus* (section II.3.4)? An answer to this question is indispensable for solving the problem of authenticity, because, as Cobet says,<sup>383</sup> 'Plato sua repetere non solet'. I may remind the reader at this point of de Strycker's opinion (section I.3.1 and n. 19) that Plato did not complete the *Clitophon* because he had already expressed the same ideas better in the *Euthydemus*. I may add that both in the protreptic speech (sections II.2.3.1 and 3) and in Clitophon's handling of elenchos (section II.4.3), the author was rather strongly inspired by the *Euthydemus*, and that the sentence which connects the two parts of Clitophon's report can be understood only as an allusion to a similar sentence in the *Euthydemus* (Comm. on 408c4-7).

The intentions of the two dialogues are not identical. The *Euthydemus* first and foremost contrasts Socrates and eristic (and takes Isocratean instruction in its stride); it suggests a solution for the problem of ethical knowledge (and may suggest the theory of Forms). The problem is rather whether the intention of the *Clitophon* is wholly included in that of the *Euthydemus*, or to put it differently, whether the *Clitophon* brings anything new<sup>384</sup> that is not already to be found in the *Euthydemus*.

I think the answer to the latter question must be affirmative. The author of the *Clitophon* contrasts explicit protreptic and elenchos and shows that the result of protreptic is negative and that of elenchos positive. This contrast is to some extent present in the *Euthydemus*, but rather less clearly. Socrates' conversations with Clinias are specimens of explicit protreptic and of elenchos at the same time: the

<sup>383</sup> 'Platonica', *Mnem.* II 2 (1874) 369-85, at 370.

<sup>384</sup> If the *Clitophon* was written by Plato, he wrote it considerably later than the *Euthydemus*; cf. sections II.7.1 and 2.

subject-matter is protreptic, the method elenchos; as explicit protreptic, the conversations fail to reach their aim, as elenchos they do not (Clinias does not acquire knowledge, but he does make a great deal of progress). The reason why explicit protreptic is rejected in the *Sophist*, its lack of success and its failure to remove *δοξοσοφία*, are illustrated in the *Clitophon* and cannot be illustrated in the *Euthydemus*, because after all Socrates' method is indeed successful there.

Secondly, the *Clitophon* is, as the *Euthydemus* is not, concerned with the phenomenon of literary protreptic and, more generally, with the problem of the best form of philosophical literature. The objections raised against the written λόγος in the *Phaedrus* (section II.3.5) recur in the *Clitophon*. Socrates' protreptic speeches are directed to crowds, that is to say, protreptic literature may be read by anyone (section I.5.2 ad fin.), whether or not his frame of mind makes him fit for exhortation; he may turn away from philosophy completely, or from Socratic philosophy (in which case he may fall into the hands of the sophists, as Clitophon does). Socrates fails to give a satisfying answer to Clitophon's question: the written work, in this case protreptic literature, cannot answer questions. Socrates must remain silent after Clitophon's *requisitoire*: writings, including protreptic writings, cannot defend themselves.

Therefore, the *Clitophon* is closely related to (and relies on) the *Euthydemus*, yet it does have an intention of its own, a message which runs parallel to that of the *Euthydemus* but is not identical to it.

## II.7 Date and authenticity

The problems of date and authorship of the *Clitophon* are tied up inextricably, so that it would appear to be artificial to treat them separately. If the work is authentic, Plato's death is its *terminus ante quem*, and application of the less



unreliable stylometric tests would suffice to date it in relation to his other works. Yet those who doubt its authenticity are entitled to a treatment of all the data relevant for its time of composition (II.7.1). Language and style are among these data, but as they are also crucial for settling the problem of authorship they will be treated separately (II.7.2) before this problem can be discussed (II.7.3).

### II.7.1 Date

I have already indicated (sections II.2.4; II.5.5) various texts on which the *Clitophon* can be shown to depend. The latest of these is Plato's *Republic*; the *Clitophon* must have been published,<sup>385</sup> let us say, after 370 BCE (*HGPh*, IV 437). The following texts must be considered for settling a *terminus ante quem*:

- (1) Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.4.1, cf. section II.1.4.1. I think it very likely that Xenophon refers to the *Clitophon*, but I see no way of proving it beyond doubt. As the *Memorabilia* is at any rate later than the *Republic*,<sup>386</sup> there are no chronological problems.
- (2) Plato, *Laws* 728e5–729b2, cf. sections II.2.3.1 and II.2.4 (and n. 234). Priority of the *Clitophon* is not unlikely but definitely unprovable.

<sup>385</sup> I take it for granted that the date of its publication virtually coincided with that of its completion, whatever may be meant by 'publication' (for two unsatisfactory answers, cf. B. A. van Groningen, 'ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ', 8–10 (and contra: C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 24–5 n. 1); G. Ryle, *Plato's Progress* (Cambridge 1966), 21–54). There is good evidence at *Phdr.* 275d9–e3 that Plato considers it normal that a work, once it has been written, is made available for everyone who wishes to get hold of it (but not invariably so, cf. *Prm.* 128d6–e1).

<sup>386</sup> 3.5 presupposes the period of Theban hegemony (cf. M. Treu, *PW* s.v. Xenophon 6), 1776); 4.5.11–12 and 4.6 appear to have been inspired by one or more Platonic dialogues in which the method of διαίρεσις was outlined, most probably *Plt.* (H. Maier, *Sokrates*, 57–61), cf. n. 360 to section II.5.4.

- (3) *Alcibiades* 1 126c1–d10, cf. section II.5.2. Priority of the *Clitophon* seems quite likely, but is again not subject to proof.
- (4) Chrysippus, *SVF* 3.761 (= Plutarch 1039d–e). An attack on Plato is given by Plutarch as an example of Chrysippus' inconsistency: ἐν δὲ ταῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀντιλογίαις ἥκιστα φροντίζει τοῦ μηδὲν εἰπεῖν ἐναντίον ἑαυτῶι καὶ διάφωνον. ἐν γοῦν τοῖς Περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπιλαμβανόμενος λέγοντος ὅτι τῶι μηδέ<sup>387</sup> μαθόντι μηδ' ἐπισταμένωι ζῆν λυσιτελεῖ μὴ ζῆν, ταῦτ' εἶρηκε κατὰ λέξιν· “ὁ γὰρ τοιοῦτος λόγος καὶ ἑαυτῶι μάχεται καὶ ἥκιστ' ἐστὶ προτρεπτικός . . . πρὸς ἕτερά τινα μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς προτρέπεται ἢ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν . . .” καὶ μὴν οὐχ ἕτερα δεῖ βιβλία διειληῆσαι τοῦ Χρυσίππου τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνδεικνυμένους μάχην (there follow three quotations in which Chrysippus says or implies that death is preferable to being evil or foolish).<sup>388</sup>

<sup>387</sup> As μηδέ . . . μηδ' cannot mean 'neither . . . nor' (LSJ, s.v. οὐδέ A II 2), this would seem a clear instance of 'emphatic' οὐδέ (μηδέ), cf. Comm. on 409e2 οὐδέ; μὴ (two MSS, reported by H. Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia*, XIII 2, Cambridge, Mass.–London 1976) is *lectio facilior*.

<sup>388</sup> Von Arnim and the editors of Plutarch before Cherniss refer to Pl. *Grg.* 512a2–b2, so too Geffcken, 'Rätsel', 439 n. 3; Hartlich ('De exhortationum . . . historia', 278) proposes *Euthd.* 281b4–e1 in combination with 288e4–289b3, 'qua ex ratione effici cogique potest ut, qui vita uti nesciat, melius non vivat', but nothing of this is in the text of *Euthd.* (Hartlich saw very well that what 'effici cogique potest' from *Euthd.* is stated in *Clit.*, which he goes on to quote, but he is silent about the possibility of Chrysippus quoting *Clit.*, which he regards as spurious). The hypothesis that Chrysippus quoted *Clit.* was put forward by Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 19; cf. Souilhé, 169; Kesters, 'Authenticiteit', 180–1; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 141 n. 154. An extensive argument for this hypothesis is given by R. Westman, 'Chrysipp 11,761 und der Dialog Kleitophon', *Eranos* 59 (1961) 89–100. Some of his grounds are not cogent: ἥκιστ' ἐστὶ προτρεπτικός – *Clit.* 408c2 προτρεπτικώτατους τε ἡγοῦμαι is an attractive parallel, but no proof: Chrysippus may very well have taken a statement

In many places throughout his works, Plato states as his opinion that for some people it is better to die than to continue their lives.<sup>389</sup> The only passages deserving serious consideration are those in which it is said that it is better to die (a) ‘if one cannot handle one’s soul’ (*Clitophon* 408a5–6), (b) ‘if one lacks justice and virtue in general’ (*Laws* 661c1–5), or (c) ‘if one’s soul is in a bad state’ (*Gorgias* 505a2–b1; 512a2–b2; *Crito* 47e3–7; *Republic* 445a5–b1).

Judged from a Platonic point of view, (a), (b) and (c) are more or less identical; they are equally far removed from Chrysippus’ τῶι μηδὲ μαθόντι μηδ’ ἐπισταμένωι ζῆν. As ἐπίστασθαι (μανθάνειν) ζῆν is not Platonic,<sup>390</sup> it is impossible to maintain that Chrysippus took one of the six texts quoted above in order to reformulate it in yet another Platonic way. Nor do these phrases (or nominalisations of them) occur in the *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*,<sup>391</sup> apart from the passage under discussion; therefore we may also exclude the possibility that Chrysippus expresses what he found in one of the six passages mentioned in the language of his own philosophy.

Consequently, there is only one way left: to find out which particular text from Plato’s works induced Chrysippus to use the wording he did use. There can be no

from Plato and considered it from a protreptic point of view (91–2). The fact that the words occur in Περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι leads us nowhere, since this work did not confine itself to protreptic writings proper: it quoted Tyrtaeus and Theognis (*SVF* 3.167).

<sup>389</sup> *Grg.* 483b2; *La.* 195d1–2; *Phd.* 62a4–5; *Hp.Ma.* 304e2–3; *Mx.* 246d5; *Ap.* 38a5–6; *Smp.* 216a1; *Chrm.*, 164b7–8; *Th.* 176a8–b1; *R.* 410a3–4; *Lg.* 735e3–5; 854e1–7; 862e1–863a2; 926b4–6; 942a1–4; *Ep.* 7 340c4.

<sup>390</sup> *Chrm.* 173d3–4 comes closest, but the statement ἐπιστημόνως ἄν πράττοντες εὔ ἄν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν is, typically, broken down by the question τίνος ἐπιστημόνως; (d8–9).

<sup>391</sup> Compare *SVF* 3.256 with *Chrm.* as quoted in the previous note. In later Stoicism, the phrase ἐπίστασθαι (μανθάνειν) ζῆν would have been less abnormal; cf. section II.2.1.1 and n. 176.

doubt that the *Clitophon* passage, (a), has the best chances, since it is the only one in which one finds the verb ἐπίστασθαι. Now this passage contains the application to the soul of the general protreptic proposition ‘if one does not know how to use a thing, it is better not to use it’. As in this application ‘not to use (one’s soul)’ is explained by ‘not to live’ (τὸ ἀγεῖν ἡσυχίαν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ μὴ ζῆν, 408a6), it is possible<sup>392</sup> to explain the condition ὅστις ψυχῇ μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι (408a5) as ‘whoever does not know how to live’, which is exactly what Chrysippus says. I therefore conclude that this is the passage he had in mind, and that he understood it as described.

The proof will not be complete unless all other texts are excluded. In (b) there is little to justify jumping from ‘if one lacks justice and virtue’ to ‘if one does not know how to live’; though it might be argued that ‘to lack justice and virtue’ implies ‘not to know justice and virtue’, this is still not the same thing as ‘not to know how to live’, a formula which, as shown above, is neither Platonic nor Chrysippean.<sup>393</sup> The remaining four texts, (c), start from the analogy of body and soul, all stating as a premise that life is not worth living if one’s bodily constitution is bad. It is hard to see how Chrysippus could have twisted this reasoning into his ‘not to know how to live’.

It is therefore certain that the *Clitophon* existed and bore Plato’s name by the time Chrysippus wrote Περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι. We know nothing at all about the date of this latter work, so we shall have to be content with that of Chrysippus’ death as *terminus ante quem* for the *Clitophon*.

<sup>392</sup> But far from necessary, cf. Comm. on 408a5 ψυχῇ . . . χρῆσθαι.

<sup>393</sup> The occurrence of ἐπιζῆν both in *Lg.* 661c5 and in Chrysippus’ refutation must be a coincidence. Besides, Plato does not exactly say in this passage that it is better not to live, but that life is the greatest evil if one possesses all so-called ἀγαθὰ without justice and virtue, ἔλαττον δέ, ἂν ὡς ὀλίγιστον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρόνον ἐπιζῶηι.

This philosopher died during the 143rd Olympiad<sup>394</sup> (208/4 BCE).

The *Clitophon* was written between 370 and the end of the third century BCE. At what time within this period is it most likely to have been composed?

The answer to this question depends necessarily on the view taken of the intention of our dialogue. Those who think that the meaning of the *Clitophon* is exhausted when it is stamped as a ‘cento’ or even a ‘school exercise’ will have no problem in dating it to the end of the fourth or the beginning of the third century (Pavlu, ‘Pseudopl. Kleitophon’, 19–20) or even to the middle of the third century (Carlini, ‘Dialoghi pseudoplatonici’, 55–7). On the other hand, those who regard it as an attack on the historical Socrates usually tend to assign to it a very early date (often combined with the hypothesis of a separately published ‘Thrasymachus’).

If my interpretation of the *Clitophon* as a pamphlet attacking Socratic protreptic is right, it stands to reason that such a pamphlet makes sense only in a period in which Socratic philosophy and the λόγος Σωκρατικός do not belong to the past. This seems to exclude a third-century date; quite possibly, protreptic of a mainly ethical character continued to be written in the third century, but it

<sup>394</sup> D. L. 7.184. – I shall make no use of the inclusion of *Clit.* in the tetralogical list, which probably existed already in 45 BCE (Alline, *Histoire*, 112; section 1.4.1 n. 37). I believe one can make out a good case for priority of the tetralogical list to the trilogies of Aristophanes of Byzantium, but as this scholar lived somewhat later than Chrysippus, it would be useless to do so here (see Kesters, ‘Authenticiteit’, 163–7). All speculations about tetralogically arranged Academy editions dating from the time of Arcesilaus or even Xenocrates are destined to remain fruitless. – Conversely, F. Ueberweg’s argument that the *Clitophon* is not attested before Thrasyllus ‘also überhaupt auf eine völlig unzureichende Weise bezeugt’ (*Untersuchungen über die Echtheit und Zeitfolge platonischer Schriften* (Vienna 1861), 201) is refuted if my claim that it is used and ascribed to Plato by Chrysippus is correct.

would have been pointless for the author of the *Clitophon* to make Socrates the symbol of that type of protreptic if he wrote it in that century, as the Socratic schools (apart from the Academy and Peripatos) and Socratic literature had become virtually extinct by then.

Perhaps we can go a little further than that. As we saw, it is possible to trace a line of development in fourth-century protreptic which runs from the reprobatory, ethical type to the quietly arguing philosophical protreptic in the stricter sense as foreshadowed by the *Euthydemus* and represented by Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (section II.1.5). Now, Socrates' speech as reported in the *Clitophon* is a clear example of the older type of protreptic; apart from the accusing tone of the speech (see also on 408e5) and the absence of the word φιλοσοφία and its cognates, the way it uses certain protreptic motifs indicates that it is closely related to the older type of protreptic and has not much in common with protreptic in the stricter sense (cf. Comm. on 408a5 ψυχῆι . . . χρεῖσθαι).

Of course, interest in ethical protreptic did not cease to exist at once, witness the post-Platonic *Alcibiades I* (usually dated 350–340<sup>395</sup>), but the *Alcibiades I* is a protreptic dialogue and as such belongs to the interrogative type of protreptic set off by Demetrius (and Plato) from the accusatory type. In fact, accusatory protreptic as parodied in the *Clitophon* does seem to become less important after the first generation of Socratics: both Plato and Demetrius consider it ineffective in comparison with the interrogative type and Plato calls it 'old-fashioned' (a criticism echoed by Demetrius when he says that the protreptic dialogues 'met with great success once they had been invented';

<sup>395</sup> H. Arbs, *De Alcibiade I qui fertur Platonis* (Bonn 1906), 64–5; E. de Strycker, 'Le premier Alcibiade', in J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient* (Brussels 1945), 101–22 at 121; R. S. Bluck, 'The origin of the *Greater Alcibiades*', *CQ* n.s. 3 (1953) 46–52, esp. 51–2; C. A. Bos, *Alcibiades maior*, 100–12.

sections II.1.4.2; II.2.1). All these data seem to point to not too late a date in the fourth century (discounting for the moment the parallels adduced sub (1)–(3), I would say that our evidence, scanty though it is, does not encourage going beyond, say, 330).

This hypothesis is reinforced by the positive side of our author's message: the aporetic dialogue as used by Plato is recommended as an alternative to explicit protreptic. Now, the *Theaetetus* (written after, but not long after, 369; *HGPh*, v 61–2) is Plato's last aporetic dialogue, and after Plato the philosophical dialogue completely loses its implicitly protreptic function: during the last decade of Plato's life Aristotle was already publishing dialogues in which the injunctions of the *Phaedrus* (section II.3.5) seem to have been completely ignored, and in which discussion replaces elenchos. In this respect, too, it seems natural to date the *Clitophon* not very long after its *terminus post quem* of 370.

Taking all in all, I submit that the *Clitophon* was written after the *Republic*, and certainly before the end of the third century BCE. If I have interpreted its meaning correctly, it cannot be later than *c.* 350–330; if indeed Xenophon refers to it, as I think very likely, it was written towards the end of the seventies or during the sixties of the fourth century BCE.

### II.7.2 *Language and style*

Two major problems confront everyone who wishes to use linguistic evidence for settling a question of authenticity. First, he has only limited access to the corpus (in this case, Plato's undoubtedly authentic works) against which he is checking a given text (the *Clitophon*): his tools (the TLG CD-ROM, indices, grammars, commentaries, specialised studies) normally enable him to settle questions of lexicon satisfactorily, but questions of syntax, notably of sentence structure, are as a rule far less easily answered. There is,

for example, no method, short of reading the whole corpus, of answering the question whether Plato can be credited with the structure *oratio obliqua – recta – obliqua* observed in the sentence εἶπέν μοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην εἶναι, ἦνπερ ἀκούεις σὺ λέγοντος ἔφη Σωκράτους, οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ διακαιοσύνην (409a5–6; cf. ad loc.).<sup>396</sup>

The second problem is how to interpret the data collected. If one has discovered a fact of language not recurring in the corpus, it must next be decided whether or not it is a sign of inauthenticity. Only in a minority of cases is the decision easy and will it be accepted generally (for example, the use of ἕως as a preposition in *Alcyon* 4),<sup>397</sup> but usually matters are more complicated and some degree of subjectivity is inevitable. Thus, I see no problem in the (metaphorical) use of φεύγειν κατὰ κράτος in the *Clitophon* (407a3–4), given the fact that elsewhere in the corpus we find φεύγειν ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος and βίαι οἴχεσθαι φεύγων (cf. ad loc.), but others may think differently. Again, the use of λεγέσθω following a direct question at the end of an utterance (409a3) has no parallel in Plato (cf. ad loc.); I think it may be accounted for sufficiently by the parallel use of εἰπέ (λέγε) and ἀποκρίνου as well as by its function of characterising Clitophon, but there is no way of proving that this is indeed a sufficient explanation.

I discuss in the commentary alleged signs of inauthenticity which I cannot accept as such; they are 406a10 φάυλως; 407a4 κατὰ κράτος; b6 ἔξασκεῖν; 408c6 συνεπιθυμητῶν; 409a3 λεγέσθω; b6 δίδαγμα; d9 συνέβαινε; b8 καταμελετήσαι; c4 διότι; d5 θές.<sup>398</sup> It goes without saying

<sup>396</sup> And even if one has read the whole corpus, the parallels collected will have to be weighed carefully, as no two sentences are identical – this is essentially the second problem. My own method consisted of using the tools referred to above, supplemented by extensive but not systematic consultation of the whole corpus.

<sup>397</sup> Cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 289 and n. 6.

<sup>398</sup> See also section 1.5.2 for the formality of Socrates' opening words; 1.5.3 for Clitophon's irony.



that I have raised the question of authenticity far more often myself; it has been treated sometimes explicitly, but as a rule implicitly.<sup>399</sup>

There are only two idioms which to my mind can be regarded as evidence that Plato did not write the *Clitophon* (neither of these has been noticed before): 408e4 *προνοεῖν* and 409e1 *τὰ πλείω*; to these could possibly be added 410b6–7 *μακρότερον* (Steinhart), about which I cannot make up my mind. This is not a very impressive total: six pages (OCT) taken at random from Plato's undoubtedly genuine works (especially his later works) will certainly yield no fewer traits which would have to be considered marks of inauthenticity, had it not been certain that Plato wrote them.

What is quite certain in any case is that there are no possible linguistic objections against the date assigned to the *Clitophon* on grounds of content in the previous section. Of the idioms mentioned, *προνοεῖν* is common in the fourth century BCE, *τὰ πλείω* 'more often' is rare in Greek but occurs in Thucydides, as does adverbial *μακρότερον*.

Another possible way to test the authenticity of the *Clitophon* is to examine its language with regard to the development of Plato's use of language.<sup>400</sup> Various stylometric tests have contributed to establishing a rough chronological classification of the dialogues; we should expect a work ascribed to Plato to exhibit more or less consistently the traits of one period (cf. section II.1.3 n. 135).

<sup>399</sup> See especially on 407a1 *ἀλλ' . . . μὴν*; d5 *οὔν δή*; 408d1 *ὑποτείνων*; d4 *ὄν*; 409e8 *ὠμολογήκει*; 410b1 (curtailed report); d2 *δεῖν*; e7–8 *ἐμπόδιον τοῦ . . . γενέσθαι*.

<sup>400</sup> This was done by Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, 93–4, who concludes that *Clit.* comes closest to the dialogues of the latest period (*Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Ti.*, *Criti.*, *Lg.*) and to *Epin.*; a supplement in the form of a study of clausulae is provided by Brünnecke, 'Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 473–7. Both scholars arrive at the same conclusion as I do.

Now, not all stylometric criteria that have been proposed can stand closer scrutiny.<sup>401</sup> Besides, a majority of those which can pass muster cannot be applied to the *Clitophon* because of their nature (for example, answer formulas) or because they are based on proportions (for example, the relative frequency of ὥσπερ and καθάπερ; cf. note on 408b1). The *Clitophon* is far too short for such tests to be of any value.<sup>402</sup>

There remain, however, phenomena which we do not find at all in Plato before a certain period. Thus, Plato invariably writes δῆλον ὅτι, never δῆλον ὡς, until the *Republic*, in which dialogue two instances of δῆλον ὡς are found against forty-seven of δῆλον ὅτι. There is nowadays a general consensus about which dialogues were written after the *Republic*; in most of these (except *Theaetetus* and *Parmenides*) we find δῆλον ὡς side by side with δῆλον ὅτι.<sup>403</sup> Consequently, if the *Clitophon* (which has two occurrences of δῆλον ὡς, none of δῆλον ὅτι) was written by Plato, it cannot have been written before the *Republic* (cf. Comm. on 407a2).

Similar phenomena are the use of ὄντως (for τῶι ὄντι) at 409e3; ἕτερος as a variant for ἄλλος (409c2); σαφέστατα qualifying the copula (409e4); the aorist of φάναι (409e9) and the accumulation of articles at 409a3 – none of these are found before, and some only after, the *Republic*. Besides,

<sup>401</sup> Cf. Brandwood, *Chronology* and my review, esp. 540 (on Natorp) and 540–1 (on μέντοι vs. τοῖσιν). For a more general critique, cf. C. M. Young, 'Plato and computer dating', *OSAPh* 12 (1994) 227–50.

<sup>402</sup> For these reasons, the following tests should be rejected, apart from ὥσπερ/καθάπερ, σχεδόν/σχεδόν τι (cf. Comm. on 408c1), ἀληθῶς/ὡς ἀληθῶς (cf. Comm. on 409e3–4; ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς may be valid, because ὄντως/τῶι ὄντι is valid), and the frequency of various clausulae. The clausula – ∪ ∪ – ∪, which is avoided in *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Lg.* (cf. Brandwood, *Chronology*, 168–73), is not found before full stops in the *Clit.*, but the work is so short that this may very well be accidental.

<sup>403</sup> Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, 2–3; 58; Lutosławski, *Plato's Logic*, 123; Brandwood, *Chronology*, 65; 77; table 10.2.

the commentary will show that for many peculiarities of syntax, lexicon and idiom parallels can only be given from later works of Plato.<sup>404</sup>

It is possible to narrow this dating down even further. Two scholars have counted instances of hiatus in the *Clitophon* independently: Brünnecke, 'Kleitophon wider Sokrates', 467–8 and H. Raeder in his review of Pavlu, 'Pseudopl. Kleitophon', *BPhW* 30 (1910) 1503–4. Both applied the criteria of objectionable hiatus as set out by G. Janell (cf. Brandwood, *Chronology*, 153–7 and table 17.2). Brünnecke reports 8.33 instances per (Didot) page, Raeder 'etwa 7'. This result would put the *Clitophon* securely into the last period – the number is slightly higher than that of most works of that period (the figures range from 4.7 for *Lg.* to 0.4 for *Plt.* – *Phdr.*, the middle-group dialogue with the lowest count, has 23.9),<sup>405</sup> but the *Clitophon* is so small that such a variation should be accepted.<sup>406</sup> In this case, the results cannot be ascribed to accident: if in a random distribution one finds between 46.0 and 31.2 instances of hiatus per Didot page (*Ly.* and *Cra.* respectively),<sup>407</sup> even a text of 3.6 Didot pages is a large enough sample.

I will try to say as little as possible about the general style of the *Clitophon* in this connection. There are some markers of what Thesleff calls 'Onkos style' (*Styles*, 77–80), which is virtually equivalent to what is normally called

<sup>404</sup> The relative frequency of such parallels as come from the *Laws* is adequately explained by the length of the *Laws*, and should not be taken as an indication that the *Clitophon* belongs to Plato's latest works, even though I think it does belong there, cf. next paragraph. The relative rarity of parallels with *Republic* shows that the *Clitophon* is later, which we already knew.

<sup>405</sup> But some books of *Lg.* have a higher rate of hiatus than *Clit.* if lengthy legal passages are included.

<sup>406</sup> In the *oratio recta* part of Socrates' speech hiatus is avoided altogether, cf. note on 407b1–e2, but this can influence the outcome only marginally.

<sup>407</sup> I discount the figures for *Phdr.* and *Mx.* as these include long stretches of rhetorical prose.

'late style', notably a tendency to expand sentences and a tendency to deviate from normal word order. But, as Thesleff rightly remarks (79), the danger of subjectivity in assigning part of a text to this style is greater than in the case of any other of Plato's styles, and it must be stressed that some other typical features of the late style are absent (anaphora, archaic and poetical words, interlaced word order). Personally, I find the style of the *Clitophon* most related to that of the *Parmenides* (mainly on account of its aridity), but this is a totally subjective judgement. (On the style of the protreptic speech, cf. section 1.5.2.)

In any case, the language of the *Clitophon* is definitely more closely related to that of the *Republic* and later dialogues than to works dating from before this period, and consistently so. This consistency would certainly seem to cancel out the few marks of inauthenticity that my investigation has brought to light; it is in itself a strong argument in favour of authenticity. Besides, the close relationship between the language of the *Clitophon* and that of Plato's later dialogues agrees completely with the post-*Republic* date at which we arrived on grounds of content.

Therefore, the conclusion must be that there is no hard linguistic or stylistic evidence against the authenticity of the *Clitophon*.

### II.7.3 *Authenticity*

The following arguments may be advanced in favour of the authenticity of the *Clitophon*.

(1) The *Clitophon* is written from a wholly Platonic point of view; it rejects explicit protreptic (and recommends the Platonic dialogue) for the same reasons as Plato does. Moreover, the author shows a deep understanding of what message Plato wished to impart by writing dialogues and what his motives were; one wonders how many of his fol-

lowers had such an understanding. Plato's most intelligent pupil, Aristotle, did not know what the dialogue was all about.

(2) The language of the *Clitophon* shows little that can be used as a mark of spuriousness; in an author whose language is so varied as Plato's this amounts to saying that no linguistic case against authenticity can be made. Besides, its language is such that it can be placed without hesitation within the development of Plato's style. This place, moreover, is in harmony with its content: the *Clitophon* belongs in the same group as the *Sophist*. If, as I think likely, the *Sophist* is the first of the six undoubtedly genuine dialogues contained in this group, the data on hiatus suggest that within this, the latest group, the *Clitophon* immediately precedes the *Sophist*. The *Sophist* shows a renewed interest in the conceptions which lie at the base of Plato's use of the dialogue. Clitophon's rejection of explicit protreptic and his practising elenchos as an alternative to it reflects a point of view which is entirely identical to the Eleatic Stranger's rejection of  $\nu\omicron\upsilon\theta\epsilon\tau\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\eta}$  and his recommendation of elenchos. The *Clitophon* must be later than the *Republic*, to which it alludes frequently, and stylometry bears this out, since the *Republic* belongs to an earlier group than (*Clitophon* and) the *Sophist*.

(3) The *Clitophon* has been transmitted among Plato's works and belonged to the corpus of these works at any rate at the end of the third century BCE. In combination with arguments (1) and (2) this argument makes the burden of proof for inauthenticity an extremely heavy one.

The following arguments may be considered to tell against the authenticity (I list only such arguments as I can take at all seriously myself).

(4) The author relies heavily on other Socratic writings; it is perhaps not an exaggeration to call the *Clitophon* a

‘cento’ as Gigon did (*Memorabilien I*, 119). Extensive use of protreptic literature is only to be expected in the protreptic speech, and in the discussion of justice the same holds for employing dialogues on the nature of justice (*Republic* 1, as well as two other sources for the refutations of the first and second definitions of the result of justice). But apart from these passages, there are allusions to the *Euthydemus* at 408c<sub>4</sub>–7 and 410b<sub>4</sub>–6, and one to the *Apology* at 408c<sub>3</sub>–4 (cf. section II.2.3.1). Even though we do not know to what extent Plato uses material from other authors, we can be certain that he never refers his readers to other works of his own on such a scale. In other words, though a cento may be excused by the intention of the *Clitophon*, on the one hand it is a cento even where we do not expect it to be, on the other, Plato never wrote another cento derived to a large extent from his own works, and it is doubtful whether he can be credited with this one. It should be stressed in this connection that ‘recycling’ of Platonic passages is typical of most Platonic *Dubia*.

(5) Apart from the fact that foreign material was incorporated, the clumsy manner in which it is at times adapted to the context is not in keeping with Plato’s manner of writing. In the third part of the protreptic speech, the example of the neighbour’s lyre makes no sense (section II.2.3.3). The refutation of the first definition (ad 409c<sub>4</sub>–d<sub>1</sub>) and that of the second (section II.5.2) do not tally with the distinction made previously between τέχνη and ἔργον. The quotation from the *Euthydemus* in 408c<sub>4</sub>–7 makes non-sense of the sentence in which it occurs (though it is better understood if the reader knows the context of the words from the *Euthydemus*). Apart from that, the author’s style suddenly becomes succinct and even obscure when he is refuting philosophical theses (ad 409c<sub>6</sub>–d<sub>1</sub>). By contrast, the ἐπιτάφιος in the *Menexenus*, the only other longer passage in the Platonic corpus for which large-scale use of other published literary material may be assumed, exhibits

no traces of deficient adaptation (at any rate, I have not found any myself nor have any been detected, to the best of my knowledge, by others).

(6) The *Clitophon* contains, on the surface, an attack on Socrates (and runs the risk of being taken as an attack on Plato himself). No matter how much pain the author took to clarify his intention, he exposed Socrates to this attack willingly (see further section II.6) – one may well doubt if Plato was capable of doing this. Grube ('The *Cleitophon* of Plato', 303) and Guthrie (*HGPh*, v 388 n. 3) point to the attack in the *Parmenides*, but there a young Socrates is censured benevolently by a very old Parmenides; here an older Socrates is treated with irony and attacked without scruples by a younger Clitophon. Can Plato really have ascribed to Socrates the view that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies, a view which Socrates so eloquently rejects in the *Crito*?

(7) If Xenophon does indeed quote from the *Clitophon*, which I think very likely, his wording, 'as some people write and speak about him τεκμαιρόμενοι – on the basis of inferences', may indicate that he did not regard our dialogue as Plato's work (see section II.1.4.1 ad fin.). As he wrote the *Memorabilia* not very much later than the *Clitophon* itself seems to have been written (ten to fifteen years at most), this strongly suggests that the latter was not written by Plato.

In previous discussions of the authenticity, only arguments (2) and (3) have been used in favour of the authenticity, (2) especially by Brünnecke (476–7), (3) by most scholars. Against the authenticity, (4) was used by Gigon (*Memorabilien I*, 119) and (6) has been the main reason for rejecting the *Clitophon* from Schleiermacher onwards. The partisans of either position have rarely bothered to go into the arguments for the other side. (As my interpretation of the meaning of the *Clitophon* is essentially a new one, I disre-

gard here many arguments based on other interpretations that have been proffered.)

Consequently, we shall have to examine the arguments given here from both sides. Those who reject the authenticity will be able to deal with arguments (1) and (2) only if they assume that the *Clitophon* was written by someone very close to Plato; someone who not only understood completely Plato's aims in writing dialogues and rejecting protreptic, but also the niceties of his use of elenchos; someone, moreover, who had adapted himself so much to Plato's manner of writing that even his use of language faithfully reproduces that of Plato in his last period; someone who avoids hiatus to the same extent as Plato did when he wrote the *Sophist*, in which he deals with the very same problems that are raised in the *Clitophon*. Such an author is too much of a hypothetical construct to be at all acceptable: he is so much a lookalike of Plato that it is more economical, indeed far more plausible, to identify him with Plato. Argument (3) is in itself no problem for someone who believes in an intelligent pupil: a work by such a pupil, written probably in Plato's lifetime, could easily have slipped into a collection of Plato's works made after his death.<sup>408</sup>

On the other hand, the defenders of the work's authenticity must accept, with regard to argument (4), that Plato, for once, chose the combined forms of cento (a dangerously vague term) and Short Dialogue for conveying his message, and that he indulged in borrowing from his own work (explicable for the protreptic speech and *Clitophon's* interrogation) even beyond what was absolutely necessary. But how strong is the case for the opposition really? The allusions to Plato in the *Dubia* are of a different nature

<sup>408</sup> It is out of the question that such an author can be considered a forger; this holds for most of the authors of Platonic *Dubia* and *Spuria*, cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 17–18. Only the *Epinomis* and the *Letters* are forgeries if they are spurious.



from those in the *Clitophon*. In the *Dubia*, they are on the whole very obvious, so much so that it is often easy, even for readers with a superficial knowledge of Plato, to identify specific passages from the authentic works which they elaborate on. The allusions in the *Clitophon* which I mentioned are of a different nature. The *Apology* passage is alluded to in a rather unobtrusive way – and I feel that Plato in his old age must be permitted such a thing. The allusion to *Euthd.* 274e8–275a2 at *Clit.* 410b4–6 is even less obtrusive. I do have some problems with *Clit.* 408c4–7, which I cannot understand unless it is a hidden reference to *Euthd.* 283a1–7, but it is a good maxim in classical scholarship that ‘once is never’.

Argument (5) will have to be disposed of by assuming that the *Clitophon* was composed in haste (a convenient route of escape, used often in the case of the *Seventh Letter*), and that Plato, once the *Clitophon* had been jotted down, did not trouble to revise it more thoroughly. It should be noted, however, that clumsiness is a highly subjective concept. Some recent scholars treat Plato as if he were the epitome of clumsiness. The appeal to the *Menexenus* is not valid: there Plato could draw upon a long oral and literary tradition of ἐπιτάφιοι, and we know from the *Apology* that Plato was influenced by the generic conventions of this kind of speeches (cf. de Strycker–Slings, *Apology*, 235–8).

The attack on Socrates – argument (6) – may be compared to that of the *Parmenides*; it may be argued that as some element in Plato’s dialogues has to be the biggest cause of offence, logically, if we athetise the *Clitophon* because of the attack, we are forced to athetise the *Parmenides* next, and so on.

Argument (7) could be answered in different ways. If the *Clitophon* was written by Plato, he and Xenophon may have independently reacted to accusations made against Socrates in the polemics of the time – each in their own sepa-

rate ways. If so, Xenophon did not know the *Clitophon*. Alternatively, as Professor Sedley suggests to me, Xenophon may have thought that Plato endorsed Clitophon's criticism of Socrates: it is fair to say that Clitophon infers (cf. τεκμαίρομενοι in Xenophon) that (the literary character) Socrates is incapable of going beyond protreptic. Or perhaps Xenophon thought Plato did not endorse Clitophon's criticism, but actually means Clitophon when he says ἔνιοι, just as Aristotle can say τινές when he means Plato (cf. section II.1.4.1 and n. 152 of the Introduction). This is in harmony with what little we know of other interpretations of the *Clitophon* from antiquity, those of Ptolemy (cf. section 1.3.1) and Synesius (section 1.5.2). But if so, I do not quite understand Xenophon's τεκμαίρομενοι, which better suits authors of texts whose authority Xenophon tries to undermine than characters within texts.

I would gladly leave the choice between the two positions to my readers. If they value the opinion of someone who has lived with this little work on and off for the past thirty years, I must say that unless I am entirely mistaken about the intention of the *Clitophon* (but that still leaves (2) unexplained), the argument needed to disprove (1)–(3) – the intelligent pupil – is utterly weak and suspect. Arguments (4) and (7) can be countered without too much trouble. The only objections against authenticity that I consider really serious are (5) and (6). But they are, to my mind, less problematic than the assumption of an intelligent pupil would be. Besides, it seems fair to say that (5) and (6) cancel each other out to a large extent: the more you stress the clumsiness of Clitophon's attack, the less Socrates is really harmed.

In other words, the hypothesis required to explain points (1)–(3) is very weak and far-fetched when compared with the explanations of (4)–(7) which can be given if the authenticity is accepted. Therefore, although not without

hesitation,<sup>409</sup> I accept the *Clitophon* as a genuine work of Plato. I repeat what I said at the beginning of the Introduction, that I consider the authenticity problem a minor issue compared with the problem of the meaning of this dialogue.

<sup>409</sup> Paul Shorey writes (*What Plato Said* (Chicago 1933), 658) that as a doctorand in Munich in 1884 he maintained the thesis that the *Clitophon* is authentic: 'I doubt it now.' From what Shorey goes on to say it becomes quite clear that he regards the *Clitophon* as spurious. Over the years my position has become the exact opposite: the balance which I have drawn in this section causes me to claim that the *Clitophon* is, after all, authentic. But I am less confident a scholar than Shorey had the right to be.

# TEXT AND TRANSLATION



## CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM

- A Cod. Parisinus graecus 1807, s. ix exaratus, cuius imaginem luce expressam contuli.
- A<sup>2</sup> eiusdem codicis manus veteris qui dicitur di-orthotae, eadem atque manus prima.
- A<sup>3</sup> eiusdem codicis manus fere aequalis. sunt qui Arethae attribuant.
- A<sup>4</sup> eiusdem codicis manus admodum recentior.
- A<sup>5</sup> manus Constantini Hierapolis metropolitae, s. xii.
- D Cod. Marcianus graecus 185, s. xii exaratus, cuius imaginem luce expressam contuli.
- D<sup>2</sup> eiusdem codicis manus recentiores, s. xiv non anteriores.
- F Cod. Vindobonensis Suppl. gr. 39, s. xiii vel xiv exaratus, cuius imaginem luce expressam contuli.
- F<sup>2</sup> eiusdem codicis manus recentiores, s. xv non anteriores.
- Pa Cod. Parisinus graecus 1809, s. xv exaratus, qui Clitophonis partem tantum continet (usque ad pag. 408d3). hic codex quamvis e cod. A derivatus lectiones alterius testis, cum Themistii textu Platónico cognati, hic illic continet. imaginem luce expressam contuli.
- Va Cod. Vaticanus graecus 2196, s. xiv exaratus, cuius imaginem luce expressam contuli. cum Pa arto vinculo cognatus; eiusdem testis atque cod. Pa vestigia praebet.
- ω Codicum ADFVa (Pa) consensus.
- X<sup>r</sup> lectio in rasura scripta.
- X<sup>s</sup> lectio supra lineam scripta.
- X<sup>m</sup> lectio in margine scripta.

## CONSPECTUS SIGLORUM

$X^{pl}$	lectio per litteras perscripta.
$X^p$	lectione primae manus punctis deleta
$X^1, X^2$	manus prima, altera (etc.).
$X^x$	incertum quae manus





## ΚΛΕΙΤΟΦΩΝ

**406** Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου τις ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο ἕναγχος, ὅτι Λυσίαι διαλεγόμενος τὰς μὲν μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβὰς ψέγοι, τὴν Θρασυμάχου δὲ συνουσίαν ὑπερ-  
παινοῖ.

**5** – Ὅστις ᾧ Σώκρατες οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευέ σοι τοὺς ἐμοὶ περὶ σοῦ γενομένους λόγους πρὸς Λυσίαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπήνουν σε, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δῆλος εἶ μεμφόμενος μὲν μοι, προσποιούμενος δὲ μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἥδιστ' ἂν σοι διεξέλθοιμι αὐτοὺς αὐτός, ἐπειδὴ  
**10** καὶ μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντες, ἵνα ἥττόν με ἡγήῃ πρὸς σὲ φά-  
λως ἔχειν. νῦν γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀκήκοας, ὥστε φαίνει πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχειν τραχυτέρως τοῦ δέοντος· εἰ δέ μοι δίδως παρ-  
ρησίαν, ἥδιστ' ἂν δεξαίμην καὶ ἐθέλω λέγειν.

**407** – Ἄλλ' αἰσχρὸν μὴν σοῦ γε ὠφελεῖν με προθυμου-  
μένου μὴ ὑπομένειν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς γνοὺς ὅπῃ χεῖρων εἰμί

---

406a1–407a4 resp. Synes. *Dio* 57d–58a = 2.270.12–16 Terzaghi.  
407a1 resp. D.Chr. 13.15 = 1.233.3 de Budé.

---

Tit. Πλάτωνος (add. D) Κλειτοφῶν ἢ προτρεπτικός AD: Κλειτοφῶν F κθ  
A: om. DF τὰ τοῦ διαλόγου πρόσωπα Σωκράτης Κλειτοφῶν A: om. DF

406a1 τίς ω 2 μὲν om. PaVa 3 ψέγει F (ut vid.) corr. F<sup>xpl</sup> ξυν- F  
(συν- et Synes.) ὑπερπαινοῖ AD: ἐπαινοῖ D<sup>2p</sup>: ὑπερπαινεῖ FVa  
5 ante ὅστις alium interloc. ind. A: ante a7 ἐπεὶ DF post ὅστις lac. stat.  
Schanz: ὅστις <ῆν> Hermann: ὅσ<ός> τις ('ille "quidam" tuus') Bury: ὡς τις  
Richards 7 τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν bis scrips. D corr. D<sup>2p</sup> ἐπειδὴ δὲ PaVa  
8 μηδέν] μὴ PaVa 9 φροντίζειν] εἰδέναι A<sup>xm</sup> 10 ὄντε A<sup>4pl</sup>, D<sup>2</sup> (ut vid.)  
11 φαίνει ADF: -ῆι A<sup>4t</sup> πρὸς με DF 12 τοῦ δέ- bis scrips. et lineola  
corr. D ante εἰ alium interloc. ind. F εἰ δὴ F 13 ἥδιστ' ἂν] ἥδιστα  
F 407a1 ante ἄλλ' alium interloc. ind. ADF με om. PaVa

## CLITOPHON

socr About Clitophon, the son of Aristonymus, someone **406**  
told us the other day that in his conversations with Lysias  
he criticised his sessions with Socrates and was full of  
praise about his contact with Thrasymachus.

clit Someone who wasn't giving you a correct report of <sup>5</sup>  
what I said about you to Lysias. Some things in you I  
didn't praise, other things I did. Now, since you're ob-  
viously cross with me, although you're pretending you  
don't care, I would certainly be glad to give you my own  
detailed account of what I said, the more so since we are <sup>10</sup>  
alone. That way you won't be so convinced I'm on bad  
terms with you. As it is, you may not have heard the whole  
truth, so it looks as if you're more irritated with me than I  
deserve. If you allow me to speak freely, I'd be delighted  
to take the opportunity – I'm ready to tell you all.

socr Why, it would indeed be disgraceful of me not to put **407**  
up with it when it's you who offer to help improve me.

καὶ βελτίων, τὰ μὲν ἀσκήσω καὶ διώξομαι, τὰ δὲ φεύξομαι  
 5 κατὰ κράτος.

– Ἀκούοις ἄν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ᾧ Σώκρατες σοὶ συγγιγνό-  
 μενος πολλάκις ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων, καὶ μοι ἐδόκει παρα-  
 τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κάλλιστα λέγειν, ὅποτε ἐπιτιμῶν  
 b τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὡσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεὸς ὕμνοῖς  
 λέγων· ‘Ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὠνθρωποι; καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε οὐδὲν τῶν  
 δεόντων πράττοντες; οἵτινες χρημάτων μὲν πέρι τὴν πᾶσαν  
 σπουδὴν ἔχετε ὅπως ὑμῖν ἔσται, τῶν δ’ ὑέων οἷς ταῦτα

a3 sq. resp. Jul. Or. 4a = 1.2.12 sq. Bidez.

a7 resp. D.Chr. 13.16 = 1.233.7 de Budé.

a8–408b2 cf. Them. Or. 320d–321c = 2.134.3–135.6 Downey–Norman.

a8–c2 cf. D.Chr. 13.14–17 = 1.232.21–233.21 de Budé.

a8–b1 cf. Epict. 3.22.26 = 267.6 sq. Schenkl.

a8 resp. Jul. Or. 4a = 1.2.11 Bidez; Ps.-Plu. 4e = 1.8.4 sq. Paton–Wege-  
 haupt; Tim. Lex. s.v. τραγική σκηνή; Demetr. Eloc. 232; Philostr. VA  
 6.11 = 1.220.18–20 Kayser.

b1–c4 cf. Ps.-Plu. 4e = 1.8.5–8 Paton–Wegehaupt.

b1 cf. Lib. Or. 18.123 = 2.288.9 sq. Foerster; Olymp. in Grg. 112.26 sq. Wes-  
 terink; Corp.Herm. 7.1 = 1.82.3 Nock; ps.-Luc. Cyn. 18 = 4.145.11–12 Macleod;  
 Schol. Luc. Iupp.trag. 36 = 71.21 Rabe

4 ἀνὰ κράτος van Herwerden post κράτος alium interloc. ind. F 5  
 ante ἀκούοις alium interloc. ind. AF σοὶ AD: om. F -γιν- D 6 post  
 πολλάκις dist. DF ἐδόκει D 8 ἐπὶ ω: ἐκ Them. Iul.: ἀπὸ D.Chr.  
 Demetr. (ut vid.) μηχαν.τραγ. ω cf. Epict.: transp. Them. Iul. Tim. μη-  
 χανῆς ω Them. D.Chr. Demetr. cf. Philostr.: σκηνῆς Epict. Iul. Tim.  
 τραγικῆς] τρα A<sup>17</sup> θεοῖς F corr. F<sup>28</sup> ὕμνοῖς Baumann: ὕμνοις DF: ὑμεῖς  
 AD<sup>2P</sup>F<sup>28</sup>: ὕμνεις Ven.189 Mal.D.28.4 Flor.85.6 b1 post λέγων init. orat.  
 ind. A ποῖ – ἀγνοεῖτε] ἄνθρωποι ἀγνοεῖτε D.Chr. (PY), *textum praeb.*  
 D.Chr. (UBM) ποῖ φέρεσθε post vocativum transp. Epict. Ps.-Plu. Olymp.  
 Aristid.: ante voc. hab. Lib. Corp.Herm. Schol.Luc. Plu. (a) Him. Them.  
 Aen.Gaz. Procop. Const.Porph. ποῦ Ps.-Plu. Olymp. (ποῖ omnes ceteri  
 exc. Luc. et Plu. (b)) ὠνθρωποι ω D.Chr. (UBM) Schol.Luc. (disertim): ἰώ  
 ἄνθρωποι Epict.: ᾧ ἄνθρωποι Ps.-Plu. Corp.Herm. Plu. (b) Them. Lib.: ἄνθρω-  
 ποι D.Chr. (PY) Olymp. καὶ del. Cobet: ἢ Ast (cf. Procop. Const.Porph.):  
 πῶς susp. Schanz μηδὲν D.Chr. 2 κτήσεως ante πέρι add. Ps.-Plu.  
 τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ἔχετε AD<sup>2P</sup> cf. Iambl.: τὴν περιπᾶσαν σπουδὴν ἔχετε  
 D: πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχετε F: σπουδὴν ἔχετε ἅπασαν Them.: πᾶσαν  
 ποιεῖσθε σπουδὴν Ps.-Plu. 3 υἰέων ω Ps.-Plu. Them. ταῦτα ω Ps.-  
 Plu. Them.(ΣΨ): αὐτὰ Them.(ΑΛ)

## CLITOPHON

Obviously, once I realise what my bad and good points are, I'll devote all my energy to the one, and I'll avoid the other like the plague.

CLIT All right then. You know, Socrates, when I used to 5  
keep your company I was often stunned by what I heard  
from you, and I thought you put things better than any  
other, every time you disparaged mankind like a god in a  
tragedy in your lengthy sermons: 'Where are you rushing b  
to, you human beings? Don't you know that all your  
actions are beside the point? It's money you do your very  
best to get, while you couldn't care less if your sons, to

5 παραδώσετε \*\*\* ὅπως ἐπιστήσονται χρῆσθαι δικαίως τούτοις, οὔτε διδασκάλους αὐτοῖς εὐρίσκετε τῆς δικαιοσύνης, εἶπερ μαθητόν, εἰ δὲ μελετητόν τε καὶ ἀσκητόν, οἵτινες ἐξασκήσουσιν καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν ἱκανῶς, οὐδέ γ' ἔτι πρότερον  
 c ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἐθεραπεύσατε. ἀλλ' ὀρῶντες γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑμῶν ἱκανῶς μεμαθηκότας, ἃ δὴ παιδείαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι τελείαν ἠγησθε, κᾶπειτα οὐδὲν ἤττον κακοὺς γιγνο-  
 5 μένους περὶ τὰ χρήματα, πῶς οὐ καταφρονεῖτε τῆς νῦν παιδεύσεως οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε οἵτινες ὑμᾶς παύσουσι ταύτης τῆς ἀμουσίας; καίτοι διὰ γε ταύτην τὴν πλημμέλειαν καὶ ῥαιθυμίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ποδὶ πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἀμετρίαν, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῶι καὶ πόλεις πόλεσιν ἀμέτρως καὶ

---

(b1) resp. Plu. (a) 246a = 2.233.16–17 Nachstädt–Sieveking–Titchener; Plu. (b) 439 c = 3.124.3 Pohlenz–Sieveking; Philostr. *VA* 1.17 = 1.18.6 Kayser; Him. *Or.* 20 [66].6 = 236.50 Colonna; *Epiph. haer.* 69.23.2 = 3.172.32 Holl–Dummer; *Aen. Gaz. Theophr.* 85.900b Migne = 16.14 Colonna; *Procop. Pers.* 1.18.17 = 1.93.14 Hauray; *Const. Porph. Ins.* 33.1.

b1–3 cf. *Iambl. Protr.* 59.12–5 des Places; resp. *Demetr. Eloc.* 296 = *Aristipp. Fr.* 21 Mannebach.

b1 sq. resp. *D.Chr.* 13.13 = 1.232.6 de Budé; *Aristid. Or.* 24.55 = 2.70.7 Keil. b5–7 resp. *D.Chr.* 13.32 = 1.239.8–10 de Budé.

c4–6 resp. *Aristid. Or.* 24.55 = 2.70.9 Keil.

c6–d2 cf. Plu. (a) 439 cd = 3.124.5–10 Pohlenz–Sieveking; Plu. (b) 534e = 3.361.9–13 Pohlenz–Sieveking.

c7 resp. *D.Chr.* 13.19 = 1.235.1 de Budé; *id.* 13.27 = 1.237.25.

---

4 παραδώσετε ω Them. *D.Chr.*: καταλείψετε Ps.-Plu. *lacunam statui*: οὐδεμίαν ποιείσθε ἐπιμέλειαν Them.: μικρὰ φροντίζετε Ps.-Plu.: cf. ἡμελήκατε *D.Chr.*: ἀμελεῖτε καὶ post τούτοις Stephanus (ut vid.) e Ficino ἐπιστήσονται *D<sup>28</sup> Them.(ΑΛ<sup>2</sup>)* δικαίως ω Them.: ὀρθῶς *Iambl.*: ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως *D.Chr.* τούτοις om. Them. post δικαίως dist. *DF* 6 μαθητόν] -ο- *A<sup>11</sup>*: -τῶν Pa εἰ δὲ] εἶτε F ἐξασκήσουσι *DF* 7 γ' ἔτι *ADFVa*: γέ τι Pa: γε Them. ci τε (et Them.) om. *D* 2 ἀρετῆς] -τῆς *A<sup>11</sup>* 3 εἶναι om. PaVa Them. τελείαν Them. ἠγεῖσθε F Them. κᾶπειτα (et Them.)] κάπειτ' *D* κακοὺς *ADFVa* Them.(ΣΨ): κακῶς Pa Them.(ΑΛ) γιν- Them.(ΑΛ) 4 πῶς] ὁμως *Hermann* 6 καίτοι γ(ε) Plu.(a) γε ω Them.(ΣΨ): τε Them.(ΑΛ) 7 ἀλλ' οὐ ω Them.(ΣΨ): καὶ οὐ Them.(ΑΛ) τὴν τοῦ ποδὸς Plu.(a) et (b)

whom you'll be leaving it, won't know how to use it in a just way. You don't find them teachers of justice, if it can 5  
 be learned, that is – or, if it can be acquired by training or exercise, people to exercise or train them adequately. Indeed, earlier on you never had yourselves taken care of that way. Yet you see that in reading and writing, music c  
 and physical exercise you yourselves and your children have had an adequate education – and this you regard as a complete education in goodness –, but that nevertheless you prove none the better in matters of money. So how 5  
 can you not despise the present education system, and why is it that you're not looking for people to put an end to this lack of harmonious breeding? It's actually when people are out of tune with this standard and negligent of it, not when the foot doesn't keep in step with the lyre, that brother behaves towards brother, and cities towards cities

d ἀναρμόστως προσφερόμεναι στασιάζουσι καὶ πολεμοῦντες τὰ  
 ἔσχατα δρῶσιν καὶ πάσχουσιν. ὑμεῖς δέ φατε οὐ δι' ἀπαι-  
 δευσίαν οὐδὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἀλλ' ἐκόντας τοὺς ἀδίκους ἀδίκους  
 εἶναι, πάλιν δ' αὖ τολμαῖτε λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ θεομισῆς  
 5 ἢ ἀδικία· πῶς οὖν δὴ τις τό γε τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἐκὼν αἰροῖτ'  
 ἄν; "Ἦττων ὃς ἂν ἦι φατε τῶν ἡδονῶν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο  
 ἀκούσιον, εἴπερ τὸ νικᾶν ἐκούσιον; ὥστε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου  
 τό γε ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ, καὶ δεῖν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς  
 e νῦν πλείω ποιεῖσθαι πάντ' ἄνδρα ἰδίαι θ' ἅμα καὶ δημοσίαι  
 ζυμπάσας τὰς πόλεις."

Ταῦτ' οὖν ὧ Σώκρατες ἐγὼ ὅταν ἀκούω σου θαμὰ  
 λέγοντος, καὶ μάλα ἄγαμαι καὶ θαυμαστώως ὡς ἐπαινῶ.  
 5 καὶ ὁπόταν αὖ φῆις τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ, τοὺς ἀσκοῦντας μὲν  
 τὰ σώματα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἡμεληκότας ἕτερόν τι πράττειν  
 τοιοῦτον, τοῦ μὲν ἄρξοντος ἀμελεῖν, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἀρξόμενον  
 ἐσπουδακέναι, καὶ ὅταν λέγηις ὡς ὅτῳι τις μὴ ἐπίσταται  
 χρῆσθαι, κρεῖττον ἔαν τὴν τούτου χρῆσιν· εἰ δὴ τις μὴ

d4-8 = Hippol. *Haer.* 1.19.21 = 80.86-90 Marcovich

e5-8 = Stob. 3.4.53 = 3.233.13-16 Wachsmuth-Hense.

e5-7 resp. Iambl. *Protr.* 59.15-16 des Places.

e8-408b1 = Stob. 3.1.58 = 3.23.22-24.12 Wachsmuth-Hense; resp. Iambl. *Protr.* 59.16-17 des Places.

d1 προσφερόμεναι AD: προσφέρομεν, αἰ F corr. F<sup>2pl</sup>: διαφερόμεναι fere Plu.(a)  
 et (b): προσφερόμενοι Ast 2 κακὰ post ἔσχατα add. Plu.(a) δρῶσι  
 DF τε καὶ Plu.(a) et (b) 3 τοὺς ἀδίκους om. F 4 πάλιν αὖ PaVa  
 (txt. Hippol.) 5 ἀδικία] κακία Hippol. post ἀδικία alium interloc. ind.  
 D γε om. Hippol. ἐκὼν om. Hippol. αἰροῖτ'] ἐροῖτ' D: αἰροῖτ'  
 D<sup>2pl</sup> 6 ὃς ἂν ἦι] ὡς ἂν ἦ F (ἦ in εἰ mut. F<sup>2s</sup>, ἦ F<sup>2m</sup>): ὅσα δὴ Hippol. 7  
 εἴπερ - 8 ἀκούσιον om. D suppl. D<sup>2m</sup> τρόπου] λόγου Hippol. 8 ἀδι-  
 κεῖν <εἶναι> olim conieci, textum habet Hippol. ὁ om. Hippol. αἰρεῖ]  
 ἐρεῖ Hippol. (καταλαμβάνει A<sup>2m</sup> est scholium) εἰ θ'] δ' F 2 ζυμπάσας  
 τὰς πόλεις delenda susp. Schanz post πόλεις finem orat. ind. A, alium  
 interloc. ind. D 3 ἐγὼ ὧ Σώκρατες ἐγὼ F, prius ἐγὼ punctis del.  
 F<sup>2</sup> θαμὰ A: θαμὰ F: θαῦμα F 5 μὲν om. Them. 7 ἄρξοντος ADF<sup>2s</sup>  
 Stob. Them. (ΣΨ): ἄρξαντος FPaVa Them. (ΑΛ) 8 τίς DF 9 εἰ δὴ  
 ADVa: εἰ δέ F: εἰ δ' εἴ Pa: om. Stob.

without measure or harmony, feuding and making war and committing and suffering the worst outrages. Now, you claim that it's not lack of education or ignorance that makes the unjust unjust, but that they are so of their own free will – yet at the same time you have the gall to say that injustice is wicked and an abomination to the gods. So how would anyone choose such an evil willingly? Well, you say, because he is overcome by desires. Isn't that involuntary, then, seeing that to overcome them is voluntary? Therefore in either case it stands to reason that injustice is involuntary, and that each man should take greater private care, and likewise all cities greater public care, than they do at present.'

As for *these* things, Socrates, when I hear you say them so often, I am full of admiration and I praise them immensely. And when again you go on to say that those who train their bodies and neglect their souls do something similar: they neglect the part that is going to rule and devote themselves to that which is going to be ruled; and when you say that what one doesn't know how to use



10 ἐπίσταται ὀφθαλμοῖς χρῆσθαι μηδὲ ὧσιν μηδὲ ξύμπαντι τῷ  
 σώματι, τούτῳ μήτ' ἀκούειν μήθ' ὄραν μήτ' ἄλλην χρεῖαν  
 μηδεμίαν χρῆσθαι τῷ σώματι κρεῖττον ἢ ὀπηιοῦν χρῆσθαι·  
 408 καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὡσαύτως· ὅστις γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἐπίσταται  
 τῇ ἑαυτοῦ λύραι χρῆσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τῇ τοῦ γείτονος, οὐδὲ  
 ὅστις μὴ τῇ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδὲ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ, οὐδ' ἄλλωι τῶν  
 ὀργάνων οὐδὲ κτημάτων οὐδενί. καὶ τελευτᾷ δὴ καλῶς ὁ  
 5 λόγος οὗτός σοι, ὡς ὅστις ψυχῇι μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι,  
 τούτῳ τὸ ἄγειν ἡσυχίαν τῇ ψυχῇι καὶ μὴ ζῆν κρεῖττον ἢ ζῆν  
 πράττοντι καθ' αὐτόν· εἰ δέ τις ἀνάγκη ζῆν εἴη, δούλωι ἄμεινον  
 b ἢ ἔλευθέρωι διάγειν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸν βίον ἐστὶν ἄρα, καθάπερ  
 πλοίου παραδόντι τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας ἄλλωι, τῷ μαθόντι  
 τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν, ἣν δὴ σὺ πολιτικὴν ὦ  
 Σώκρατες ἐπονομάζεις πολλακίς, τὴν αὐτὴν δὴ ταύτην δικα-  
 5 στικὴν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην ὡς ἔστιν λέγων.

5 Τούτοις δὴ τοῖς  
 λόγοις καὶ ἑτέροις τοιούτοις παμπόλλοις καὶ παγκάλως λεγο-  
 μένοις, ὡς διδακτὸν ἀρετὴ καὶ πάντων ἑαυτοῦ δεῖ μάλιστα  
 c ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν οὐτ' ἀντεῖπον πώποτε οὐτ' οἶμαι μή-  
 ποτε ὕστερον ἀντεῖπω, προτρεπτικωτάτους τε ἡγοῦμαι καὶ

408a5–7 resp. Plu. 1039de = 6.2.16.22–17.9 Pohlenz–Westman = Chrysippus  
*SVF* 3.761.

b1–5 = Stob. 4.6.8 = 4.240.10–14 Wachsmuth–Hense.

b5–c2 = Stob. 3.1.60 = 3.25.13–16 Wachsmuth–Hense.

10 ὡσὶ DF 11 μήτ' A: μήτε DF Stob. 12 μηδεμίαν μὴ χρῆσθαι  
 Stob. 408a1 καὶ δὴ καὶ] καὶ δὴ Stob. ὡς αὐτως A ut semper γὰρ  
 δὴ F Stob.: γὰρ ἂν D: γὰρ ἂν δὴ AF<sup>2m</sup> ἐπιστῆται A<sup>3m</sup> et A<sup>5s</sup> 4 τελευ-  
 τὰ F 7 post πράττοντι rasuram duobus signis repletam hab. A εἴη  
 om. Stob. b1 διάγειν τῷ τοιούτῳ ω Stob. Them. (ΑΛ): τῷ τοι.δ.  
 Them.(ΣΨ) post βίον dist. F Them. et finem facit Stob. 2 παρα-  
 δίδόντι Them. τῳ Gasda 3 τῶν ἀνθρ. om. Stob. ἣν δὴ ὦ Σώκρ.  
 πολιτ. Pa 4 δὴ] δὲ F Stob. δικαστικὴ ... δικαιοσύνη Richards 5  
 τε om. F add. F<sup>xs</sup> post λέγων finem orat. ind. A 6 καὶ ἑτέροις – καὶ  
 om. Stob. παγκάλλως F c2 μήποτ' ἔς ὕστερον F<sup>2p1</sup>, incertum quid  
 antea habuerit: μήποτε ὑπὲρ ὧν Stob. δς προτρ. Schanz τε ADFVa:  
 τε γὰρ Pa: δὲ Richards

would be better left alone – thus, if someone doesn't know <sup>10</sup>  
 how to use his eyes or his ears or his whole body, for such  
 a person not to hear or to see or to make any other use of  
 his body is better than to use it no matter how. And it's the **408**  
 same with technical abilities: a man who doesn't know how  
 to use his own lyre will obviously not be able to use his  
 neighbour's lyre either, and a man who can't use someone  
 else's lyre won't be able to use his own – or any other in-  
 strument or possession. And so this argument brings you to <sup>5</sup>  
 a fine conclusion: for a man who doesn't know how to use  
 his soul, to leave his soul idle and not to live is better than  
 to live according to his own lights; and if he must live at  
 all costs, he is better off spending his life as a slave rather <sup>b</sup>  
 than as a free man, and handing over the rudder of his  
 thinking to somebody else, who has learned the art of  
 steering human beings – this art which you often call poli-  
 tics, Socrates, and which you claim is precisely the same as  
 judication and justice. <sup>5</sup>

These speeches and others of the kind, so numerous and  
 so beautifully formulated, that goodness can be taught and  
 that of all things one should care most for oneself, I don't <sup>c</sup>  
 think I've ever said a word against them, nor will I in the  
 future, I suppose. I regard them as very suitable for ex-

ὠφελιμωτάτους, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ καθεύδοντας ἐπεγείρειν  
 ἡμᾶς. προσεῖχον δὴ τὸν νοῦν τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἀκουσόμενος,  
 5 ἔπανερωτῶν οὐ τι σὲ τὸ πρῶτον ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τῶν  
 ἡλικιωτῶν τε καὶ συνεπιθυμητῶν ἢ ἐταίρων σῶν, ἢ ὅπως δεῖ  
 πρὸς σὲ περὶ αὐτῶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὀνομάζειν. τούτων γὰρ  
 τοὺς τι μάλιστα εἶναι δοξαζομένους ὑπὸ σοῦ πρώτους  
 ἐπανηρώτων, πυνθανόμενος τίς ὁ μετὰ ταῦτ' εἴη λόγος, καὶ  
 d κατὰ σὲ τρόπον τινὰ ὑποτείνων αὐτοῖς, “ὦ βέλτιστοι”  
 ἔφην “ὑμεῖς, πῶς ποτέ νυν ἀποδεχόμεθα τὴν Σωκράτους  
 προτροπὴν ἡμῶν ἐπ' ἀρετῆν; ὡς ὄντος μόνου τούτου,  
 ἐπεξελεῖν δὲ οὐκ ὄν τῶι πράγματι καὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέως,  
 5 ἀλλ' ἡμῖν παρὰ πάντα δὴ τὸν βίον ἔργον τοῦτ' ἔσται, τοὺς  
 μήπω προτετραμμένους προτρέπειν, καὶ ἐκείνους αὖ ἑτέρους,  
 ἢ δεῖ τὸν Σωκράτη καὶ ἀλλήλους ἡμᾶς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπανερω-  
 e τᾶν, ὁμολογήσαντας τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπῳ πρακτέον εἶναι, τί  
 τοῦντεῦθεν; πῶς ἄρχεσθαι δεῖν φαμεν δικαιοσύνης πέρι  
 μαθήσεως; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἡμᾶς προύτρεπεν τοῦ σώματος  
 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, μηδὲν προνοοῦντας ὀρῶν καθάπερ  
 5 παῖδας ὡς ἔστιν τις γυμναστικὴ καὶ ἰατρικὴ, κᾶπειτα ὠνεῖ-  
 διζεν λέγων ὡς αἰσχρὸν πυρῶν μὲν καὶ κριθῶν καὶ ἀμπέλων  
 ἐπιμέλειαν πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ σώματος ἔνεκα

c3 sq. cf. Procl. *Theol.Plat.* 3.23 = 3.83.17 sq. Saffrey–Westerink.

c6 cf. Poll. 3.69.

e1–410b3 = Stob. 3.9.64 = 3.405.10–407.26 Wachsmuth–Hense.

4 τὸ AFVa: om. D: τὸν Pa 5 οὐ τι] ὁ τις (ut vid.) F<sup>2m</sup> σε ADF 6  
 σὺν ἐπιθυμητῶν D ἑτέρων F -αι- F<sup>2s</sup> 7 post ὀνομάζειν lac. susp.  
 Schanz 9 ἐπανηρόμην PaVa di ὑπό τινων F 2 νυν scripsi: νῦν ω:  
 secl. Hermann 4 δὲ delendum susp. Schanz (vel post τούτου lac. statuen-  
 dam putat) δὲ AF δ' D ὄν scripsi: ἐν ω: ἐνι Bessarion: ἐ<στι>ν olim  
 conici τελέως αὐτό Va 5 παρ' ἅπαντα D 6 ἐκείνοις Va ἑτέ-  
 ρους] -έ- A<sup>1r</sup>, -αι- a.c. (ut vid.) 7 δεῖ] δὲ F corr. F<sup>xpl</sup> Σωκράτην  
 FVa τοῦτ'] τότ' F ἐπερωτᾶν AD ei τί om. D add. D<sup>1pl</sup> 2  
 τοῦντεῦθε F δικαιοσύνης ] τίνος Gallavotti περι D -έ- D<sup>2</sup> 3 πρού-  
 τρεπε F 5 ὠνείδιζε F 6 ἀμπέλων D corr. D<sup>2</sup> 7 καὶ ὅσα – 9 τέχνην  
 om. D verbis 4 μηδὲν – 5 ἰατρικὴ iterum positis

horting people and very useful – they simply wake us up from our sleep. So I paid close attention in the hope that I would hear what was coming next; I did not put my 5 questions to you first, Socrates, but to some of your contemporaries and your fellow-aspirers or comrades or whatever that sort of relationship to you is to be called. Those among them who you think are really good I questioned first, and I asked them what issue was coming next; I imitated you, after a fashion, in hinting at the answer. d ‘My excellent friends,’ I said, ‘now, in what way do we understand the exhortation to goodness that Socrates is addressing to us? Is it all there is, and is it impossible to pursue the matter any further and grasp it completely? Is it 5 to be our lifelong duty to exhort those who have not yet been persuaded by exhortation and theirs in turn to exhort others? Isn’t this rather the time to ask Socrates and each other, since we have agreed that goodness is man’s very e duty, what comes next? What do we say is the way to start learning justice? Suppose someone were exhorting us to care for our bodies, and he had noticed that we hadn’t the faintest idea that there is such a thing as physical training 5 and medicine, as if we were mere children. If he were then to reproach us and say that it is disgraceful to devote all one’s care to wheat, barley and vines, and to all other

διαπονούμεθά τε καὶ κτώμεθα, τούτου δ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν  
 τέχνην μηδὲ μηχανὴν ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τὸ σῶμα  
 10 ἐξευρίσκειν, καὶ ταῦτα οὔσαν, εἰ δ' ἐπανηρόμεθα τὸν ταῦθ'  
 409 ἡμᾶς προτρέποντα 'Λέγεις δὲ εἶναι τίνας ταύτας τὰς τέχνας;'  
 εἶπεν ἂν ἴσως ὅτι γυμναστική καὶ ἰατρική. καὶ νῦν δὴ τίνα  
 φάμεν εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ τέχνην; λεγέσθω.'

Ὁ δὴ δοκῶν αὐτῶν ἐρρωμενέστατος εἶναι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπο-  
 5 κρινόμενος εἶπέν μοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην εἶναι, ἥνπερ ἀκούεις  
 σὺ λέγοντος ἔφη Σωκράτους, οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ δικαιοσύνην.  
 εἰπόντος δέ μου "Μὴ μοι τὸ ὄνομα μόνον εἶπης, ἀλλὰ ὧδε.  
 b ἰατρική πού τις λέγεται τέχνη. ταύτης δ' ἔστιν διττὰ τὰ  
 ἀποτελούμενα, τὸ μὲν ἰατροῦς ἀεὶ πρὸς τοῖς οὔσιν ἐτέρους  
 ἐξεργάζεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ὑγίειαν· ἔστιν δὲ τούτων θάτερον οὐκέτι  
 τέχνη, τῆς τέχνης δὲ τῆς διδασκούσης τε καὶ διδασκομένης  
 5 ἔργον, ὃ δὴ λέγομεν ὑγίειαν. καὶ τεκτονικῆς δὲ κατὰ ταῦτά  
 οἰκία τε καὶ τεκτονική τὸ μὲν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ δίδαγμα. τῆς δὴ  
 δικαιοσύνης ὡσαύτως τὸ μὲν δίκαιους ἔστω ποιεῖν, καθάπερ  
 ἐκεῖ τοὺς τεχνίτας ἐκάστους· τὸ δ' ἕτερον, ὃ δύναται ποιεῖν  
 c ἡμῖν ἔργον ὁ δίκαιος, τί τοῦτό φαμεν; εἰπέ.'

οὔτος μὲν ὡς  
 οἶμαι τὸ συμφέρον ἀπεκρίνατο, ἄλλος δὲ τὸ δέον, ἕτερος δὲ

409c2 resp. D.Chr. 13.19 = 1.235.2 de Budé.

9 τὸ σῶμα del. Baumann 10 ἐπανηρώμεθα F corr. F<sup>pl</sup> 409a1 εἶναι τί-  
 νας F: εἶναι τίνας A: εἶναι τινὰς D (corr. D<sup>2</sup>) Stob. 2 εἰπέιν Stob. δὴ  
 τίνα Stob. 3 λεγέσθω om. Va (add. man. sec. i. m.) post λεγέσθω fi-  
 nem orat. ind. A 4 αὐτὸν F -τῷ F<sup>2pl</sup> 5 εἶπεν] εἰ- bis scrips. D in fine  
 paginae (del. et D et D<sup>2</sup>): εἶπέ F μοι om. Stob. ἥνπερ ἀκούσης  
 Stob. 6 ἔφη oblitt. D<sup>2</sup> ἄλλον F<sup>2s</sup> 7 δ' ἐμοῦ D (δέ μου et  
 Stob.) εἶπης μόνον Stob. ἀλλ' DF ὧδε A: ὧδε F: ὦ δὲ D: ὠδί  
 Stob. b1 που τίς AD: ποῦ τις F ἔστιν A -i- A<sup>4</sup>: ἐστὶ DF τὰ om. F  
 2 αἰεὶ AD (ἀεὶ et Stob.) 3 ὑγίειαν F ἔστι DF 4 τῆς δὲ τέχνης Va  
 5 ὑγίειαν F ταῦτά A: ταῦτα D Stob.: ταῦτά F 6 τεκτονικῆς Stob.  
 7 τὸ om. A add. A<sup>2</sup> extra lin. 8 ἐκεῖ τοὺς] ἐκείνους AF<sup>2s</sup> τὸ A<sup>1r</sup> ci  
 τοῦτο φάμεν ω οὔτος] ουτως A (ut vid.) corr. A<sup>2r</sup> 3 ἐπανήκειν F -κ-  
 oblitt. F<sup>2</sup>: ἐπανῆα Schanz δ' DF: δὴ A Stob.

things we try to acquire at great cost for the sake of the body, yet when it comes to the best possible condition of the body, not to try to find an art or any means whatever to achieve it, even though there is one; and if we asked the man who was exhorting us to this “Well, what do you say these arts are, then?” he would say, presumably, “Physical training and medicine.” Well, in this case, too, what do we say is the art which presides over the goodness of the soul? Let’s have an answer.’

The one who was thought to have the sharpest brain gave an answer to the question. He told me that this art ‘which’, he said, ‘you hear Socrates talking about’, was none other than justice. I said: ‘Don’t give me just its name, but do it this way. There is of course an art called medicine. Its effects are twofold; one to produce always new doctors in addition to those that are already there, the other health. Now the second of these is no longer an art itself, but a product generated by the art which teaches and is taught – that which we call health. In the case of carpentry, too, there are the house and carpentry along the same lines; the one is the product, the other the teaching-matter. Likewise, let one product of justice be to make just men, as in the other cases the various craftsmen. But the other thing, the product which the just man is able to make for us, what do we say that is? Tell me.’

This man, I think, replied ‘the useful’, another ‘the fitting’, a third ‘the beneficial’, and another ‘the profitable’.

τὸ ὠφέλιμον, ὃ δὲ τὸ λυσιτελοῦν. ἐπανήειν δ' ἐγὼ λέγων  
 ὅτι “Κάκεϊ τά γε ὀνόματα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν,  
 5 ὀρθῶς πράττειν, λυσιτελοῦντα, ὠφέλιμα καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα·  
 ἀλλὰ πρὸς ὅτι ταῦτα τάντα τείνει, ἐρεῖ τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάστη  
 τέχνη, οἷον ἢ τεκτονικὴ τὸ εὔ, τὸ καλῶς, τὸ δεόντως, ὥστε  
 d τὰ ξύλινα φήσει σκευὴ γίγνεσθαι, ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη.  
 λεγέσθω δὴ καὶ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὡσαύτως.”

Τελευτῶν  
 ἀπεκρίνατό τις ὦ Σώκρατες μοι τῶν σῶν ἐταίρων, ὃς δὴ  
 κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἶη τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης  
 5 ἴδιον ἔργον, ὃ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς, φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν  
 ποιεῖν. οὗτος δ' αὖ ἐρωτώμενος τὴν φιλίαν ἀγαθὸν τ' ἔφη  
 εἶναι καὶ οὐδέποτε κακόν, τὰς δὲ τῶν παίδων φιλίας καὶ  
 τὰς τῶν θηρίων, ἃς ἡμεῖς τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἐπονομάζομεν, οὐκ  
 ἀπεδέχετο εἶναι φιλίας ἐπανερωτώμενος· συνέβαινε γὰρ αὐτῶι  
 e τὰ πλείω τὰς τοιαύτας βλαβερὰς ἢ ἀγαθὰς εἶναι. φεύγων  
 δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδὲ φιλίας ἔφη τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι, ψευδῶς  
 δὲ ὀνομάζειν αὐτὰς τοὺς οὕτως ὀνομάζοντας· τὴν δὲ ὄντως  
 καὶ ἀληθῶς φιλίαν εἶναι σαφέστατα ὁμόνοιαν. τὴν δὲ  
 5 ὁμόνοιαν ἐρωτώμενος εἰ ὁμοδοξίαν εἶναι λέγοι ἢ ἐπιστήμην,  
 τὴν μὲν ὁμοδοξίαν ἠτίμαζεν· ἠναγκάζοντο γὰρ πολλοὶ καὶ  
 βλαβεραὶ γίγνεσθαι ὁμοδοξίαι ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ φιλίαν  
 ἀγαθὸν ὠμολογῆκει πάντως εἶναι καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργον·

d1-e10 resp. Iambl. *Protr.* 59.17-20 des Places.

e4 resp. D.Chr. 13.19 = 1.235.3 de Budé.

4 κάκεϊ A: κακεῖ DF (-ἀ-) D<sup>2</sup>: ἐκεῖ Stob. ταυτ' A -ῦ- A<sup>2</sup> ἔστιν A corr.  
 A<sup>2</sup> ἐν om. D 5 τᾶλλα F om. Stob. 6 ἐκάστη ἢ Stob. 7 ἢ] τί  
 Va d1 φύσει A<sup>2s</sup> (vel A<sup>5</sup>) ἔστι F 2 ὡσαύτως - 4 δικαιοσύνης om. D  
 suppl. D<sup>2m</sup> post τελευτῶν alium interloc. ind. F 3 τῶν ἐταίρων τῶν  
 σῶν Va ὃς] ὡς Stob. 4 κομψότητα Va 5 πόλεσι DF 6 οὗτος]  
 -ος A<sup>1r</sup> (ουτσοσ a.c.?) τ'] τι F fortasse recte 7 post φιλίας add. ἐπα-  
 νερωτώμενος F<sup>2m</sup> 8 θηρίων] ἐταίρων H. Müller 9 αὐτον F (ut vid.)  
 -ῶ(v) fecit F<sup>2pl</sup> e2 οὐδέ] οὐ D 5 ἀνερωτώμενος F λέγει Va 7  
 ὁμοδοξία om. Va 8 ὠμολ. πάντως ἀγαθὴν Va

So I retraced my steps and said: 'In the other area, too, these names play a part in each of the arts, acting cor- 5  
rectly, doing what's profitable, beneficial and so on, but the aim of all these actions will be stated by each of the arts individually, as its distinctive trait. For example car-  
pentry will mention right, proper and appropriate action, aiming at, she will say, the production of wooden equip- d  
ment, which of course isn't art itself. So let me have a similar answer about the distinctive trait of justice.'

Finally, Socrates, one of your comrades gave me an answer which was thought the smartest. He said that the proper product of justice and of no other art was to 5  
achieve friendship in cities. Upon further questioning he declared that friendship was good, never bad. What we call the 'friendships' of children and animals he didn't admit to be friendships when he was asked about that, for he was forced to the conclusion that they were more often e  
harmful than good. In order to avoid that he claimed that they weren't friendships at all, and that those who call them that do so wrongly. Real and true friendship was in actual fact concord. When he was asked whether by con- 5  
cord he meant unity of opinion or knowledge, he rejected unity of opinion; for he said that there must necessarily be many harmful cases of unity of opinion among men, while he had already admitted that friendship was good and the



ὥστε ταῦτὸν ἔφησεν εἶναι ὁμόνοιαν, [καὶ] ἐπιστήμην οὔσαν,  
 10 ἄλλ' οὐ δόξαν. ὅτε δὴ ἐνταῦθα ἤμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἀποροῦντες,  
 410 οἱ παρόντες ἱκανοὶ ἦσαν ἐπιπλήττειν τε αὐτῶι καὶ λέγειν ὅτι  
 περιδεδράμηκεν εἰς ταῦτὸν ὁ λόγος τοῖς πρώτοις, καὶ ἔλεγον  
 ὅτι “Καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ὁμόνοιά τις ἐστὶν καὶ ἅπασαι αἱ τέχναι,  
 καὶ περὶ οὗτου εἰσὶν ἔχουσι λέγειν· τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην  
 5 δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν ὅποι τείνουσά ἐστιν διαπέφευγεν,  
 καὶ ἄδηλον αὐτῆς ὅτι πότε ἐστὶν τὸ ἔργον.”

Ταῦτα ὦ Σώκρατες ἐγὼ τελευτῶν καὶ σὲ αὐτὸν ἠρώτων,  
 καὶ εἵπές μοι δικαιοσύνης εἶναι τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν  
 b τοὺς δὲ φίλους εὔ ποιεῖν. ὕστερον δὲ ἐφάνη βλάπτειν  
 γε οὐδέποτε ὁ δίκαιος οὐδένα· πάντα γὰρ ἐπ’ ὠφελίαι πάν-  
 τας δρᾶν.

Ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλὰ πολὺν δὴ  
 ὑπομείνας χρόνον [καὶ] λιπαρῶν ἀπείρηκα, νομίσας σε τὸ  
 5 μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ’ ἀνθρώπων  
 δρᾶν, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἢ τοσοῦτον μόνον δύνασθαι, μα-  
 κρότερον δὲ οὐδέν, ὃ γένοιτ’ ἂν καὶ περὶ ἄλλην ἡντιναοῦν  
 τέχνην, οἷον μὴ ὄντα κυβερνήτην καταμελετῆσαι τὸν ἔπαινον  
 c περὶ αὐτῆς, ὡς πολλοῦ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀξία, καὶ περὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων τεχνῶν ὡσαύτως, ταῦτὸν δὴ καὶ σοὶ τις ἐπενέγκοι  
 τάχ’ ἂν περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὡς οὐ μᾶλλον ὄντι δικαιοσύνης

9 εἶναι: D καὶ (et Stob.) del. Bekker: post εἶναι transp. Ast: καὶ δικαιο-  
 σύνην Hermann: καὶ φιλίαν Bertini, Baumann ὁμοιοίαι ὡς ἐπιστ. οὔσαν  
 Bury: ὁμόν. καὶ ἐπιστ. οὐ δόξαν οὔσαν Geffcken 10 post δόξαν finem  
 orat. ind. A ἤμεν] ἢ μὲν D ἀποροῦντες delendum putat Schleierma-  
 cher 410αι ἱκανοὶ ἦσαν] γρ. ἐπεχείρησαν A<sup>2m</sup> τε A: τὲ DF: om. Va  
 3 ἢ om. D (habet Stob.) ὁμόνοια ω ἐστὶ F 5 ὅποι Bekker: ὅπου ω  
 (et F) Stob. ἐστὶ DF -φευγε F 6 ποτ’ ἐστὶν A (ἐστὶν A<sup>4</sup>): ποτ’ ἐστὶ  
 F: ποτέ ἐστὶ D post ἔργον finem orat. ind. A, alium interloc. ind. D 7  
 σεαυτὸν A (corr. A<sup>4</sup>) F Stob.: σε αὐτὸν D (δὲ D<sup>2</sup>) 8 εἵπας Stob. δι-  
 καιοσύνην Va b2 οὐδέν· ἅπαντα Stob. ὠφελίαι A -εἰ- A<sup>4</sup>DF Stob.  
 πάντας] παντὸς Bury 3 δὲ] γὰρ F 4 καὶ del. Baumann λιπαρῶν A  
 νομίσασε D corr. D<sup>2pl/s</sup> σε ADF: σὲ A<sup>4</sup>: δὲ Va τὸ] -ω D<sup>xs</sup> 6 δε F  
 8 οἷον om. F add. F<sup>2s</sup> καταμελεῖσαι D corr. D<sup>2pl</sup> c2 σοὶ τίς DF 3  
 ὄντι] ὅτι D

product of justice. His conclusion was therefore that concord was the same thing, being knowledge and not opinion. As we had arrived at this point in the argument and didn't see a way out, the bystanders were enabled to get at him because the argument had come full circle and got back to where it had started. They said: 'Medicine is a kind of concord, too, as all the arts are, yet they are able to say what they are all about. But this justice or concord of yours hasn't the faintest idea what its aim is, and it is totally unclear what its product is.'

That's why at long last, Socrates, I asked you the questions yourself, and you told me that it was a typical property of justice to harm enemies and benefit friends. Later, however, it turned out that the just man never harms anyone, as all he does to everybody is to their benefit.

This I had to endure not just once or twice but over quite a long period; I have now given up persisting. I think you are better than anybody else at exhorting people to care about goodness, but one of two things must be true: either you can do only that and nothing that goes any further – which could also happen in the case of any other art; for example without being a steersman one might train oneself in making eulogies about how valuable the steersman's trade is for mankind, and likewise for the other arts. The very same complaint might perhaps be lodged against you in the field of justice – people might say that you are

ἐπιστήμονι, διότι καλῶς αὐτὴν ἐγκωμιάζεις. οὐ μὴν τό γε  
 5 ἐμὸν οὕτως ἔχει, δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ  
 οὐκ ἐθέλιν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν.

Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ πρὸς  
 Θρασύμαχον οἶομαι πορεύομαι καὶ ἄλλοσε ὅποι δύναμαι,  
 ἀπορῶν· ἐπεὶ εἴ γ' ἐθέλεις σὺ τούτων μὲν ἤδη παύσασθαι  
 d πρὸς ἐμὲ τῶν λόγων τῶν προτρεπτικῶν, οἷον δὲ εἰ περὶ  
 γυμναστικῆς προτετραμμένος ἢ τοῦ σώματος δεῖν μὴ ἀμελεῖν,  
 τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἂν τῷ προτρεπτικῷ λόγῳ ἔλεγες οἷον τὸ σῶμά  
 μου φύσει ὄν οἷας θεραπείας δεῖται, καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτόν  
 5 γιγνέσθω. θῆς τὸν Κλειτοφῶντα ὁμολογοῦντα ὡς ἔστιν κατα-  
 γέλαστον τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, ψυχῆς δέ,  
 e ἧς ἔνεκα τᾶλλα διαπονούμεθα, ταύτης ἡμεληκέναι· καὶ τᾶλλα  
 πάντα οἷου με νῦν οὕτως εἰρηκέναι τὰ τούτοις ἐξῆς, ὡς καὶ  
 νυνδὴ διῆλθον.

καὶ σου δεόμενος λέγω μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖν,  
 ἵνα μή, καθάπερ νῦν, τὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ σε πρὸς Λυσίαν καὶ πρὸς  
 5 τοὺς ἄλλους, τὰ δέ τι καὶ ψέγω. μὴ μὲν γὰρ προτετραμμένῳ  
 σε ἀνθρώπῳ ὧ Σώκρατες ἄξιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς φήσω,  
 προτετραμμένῳ δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμπόδιον τοῦ πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς  
 ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι.

---

410e7 sq. resp. D.Chr. 13.35 = 1.240.7 sq. de Budé.

---

7 οἶμαι A<sup>3m</sup> πορεύομαι A<sup>2s</sup>F<sup>2s</sup> ὅποι Bekker ὄπη(1) ω 8 γε θέλεις  
 F d2 ἦ] ἢ D 3 τὸ<sup>1</sup>] τῷ FVa ἐφ' ἐξῆς D σῶμα DF 4 ὄν] ὄν  
 D ταῦτόν γιγνέσθω del. Hermann: ταῦτόν γίγνοιτ' ἂν H. Müller 5  
 post ὁμολ. alium interloc. ind. D ἔστι DF εἰ τᾶλλα<sup>1</sup>] -ᾶ- F καὶ - 2  
 εἰρηκέναι om. F suppl. F<sup>2m</sup> 2 οὕτως] ὄντως (ut vid.) F<sup>2</sup> ὡς scripsi: ᾶ  
 ω 3 νῦν διεξῆλθον Va νῦν δὴ ADF/ καὶ σοῦ ω 4 ἐπαινῶ] -ῶ  
 erasum D 5 δ' ἔτι F μὴ μὲν] μή με D corr. D<sup>2s</sup> 6 ἀνθρώπῳ] ἄνω-  
 θεν F<sup>2s</sup>

subscr. (τέλος Πλάτωνος add. D) Κλειτοφῶν ἢ προτρεπτικός AD: Κλειτοφῶν  
 F

none the more an expert in justice just because you make fine eulogies about it. Mind you, that's not what I think, 5 but one of two things must be true: either you know nothing about it, or you don't wish to share it with me.

That's precisely, I think, why I go to Thrasymachus and wherever else I can, because I'm at a loss. If you're prepared to stop these speeches of exhortation to me, and just d as, if in the area of physical training I had been convinced by your exhortations that I shouldn't neglect my body, you would go beyond exhortation and tell me what kind of thing my body is by nature and what kind of treatment it therefore needs – in this case the same thing must happen. 5 You can take it that Clitophon agrees that it is ludicrous to care for other things, but when it comes to the thing which e we go to all the trouble for, the soul, to neglect that. Believe me that all the other things which I've said, beyond agreeing to that, I meant this way, as I've illustrated just now.

I beg of you to do just that, so that I won't have to do as I do now – partly praise you before Lysias and others, but 5 partly criticise you as well. For I will maintain, Socrates, that for a man who isn't yet persuaded by your exhortations you are worth the world, but for someone who is you're actually almost a stumbling-block for reaching complete goodness and so becoming truly happy.



# COMMENTARY



## COMMENTARY

**Title:** The simple Κλειτοφῶν of F, a MS going back to a popular edition in antiquity, is more trustworthy than the complex of title, sub-title and classification found in the more learned MSS D and above all A. On the sub-titles in general, cf. M. Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften* (Hildesheim 1965), II 514–15; R. G. Hoerber, ‘Thrasylus’ [*sic*] Platonic canon and the double titles’, *Phronesis* 2 (1957) 10–20; A. Carlini, *Studi sulla tradizione antica e medievale del Fedone* (Rome 1972), 29. Even if some of them were original (Aristotle quotes from *Mx.* with the words ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳι, *Rh.* 1415b31; both Callimachus (*Ep.* 53 G.–P. = 23 Pf.) and the author of the spurious *Thirteenth Letter* (363a7) use the well-known Περί ψυχῆς for the *Phaedo*), it is improbable that all dialogues had double titles right from the beginning. The division according to characters has been claimed by J. A. Philip (‘The Platonic corpus’, *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 296–308, esp. 301–4) to be a product of the fourth century BCE, as it reposes on διαίρεσις (this is an interesting hypothesis; it must be noted – as Philip fails to do – that the *Spuria* have no such classificatory sub-titles). But Philip overlooks the possibility that Thrasylus or Dercyllidas or someone else applied the diaeretical classification to the tetralogical list, which cannot belong to the fourth century, as it includes the patently late *Alc.* 2.

**προτρεπτικός:** Hirzel, ‘Protreptikos’, 62–3 and Hoerber, *op. cit.* (previous note), 13 want to supply ἀνὴρ, not λόγος. But ἐπιτάφιος for *Mx.* shows that these alternative titles can occasionally serve to designate what was regarded as the main characteristic of the dialogue; similarly, ἐριστικός for *Euthd.*

**406α1 Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνόμου:** the main character of the dialogue (‘Discourse Topic’) is introduced at the very beginning. Together with the ὅτι clause, the content of the dialogue is thus stated straight away. This is characteristic of short dialogues, cf. *Intr.*, section 1.4.2(4). For the formal manner of address, cf. section 1.5.2 and n. 77, for the historical person cf. section 1.5.3.

**ἡμῖν:** some interpreters have a tendency to deny that in Plato ἡμεῖς can refer to one person only, though *Plt.* 257d3–258a2 τοῦ δ’ [sc. Σωκράτους τοῦ νεωτέρου] ἡμῖν [= Socrates] ἡ κλήσις ὁμόνυμος οὔσα καὶ ἡ πρόσρησις παρέχεταιί τινα οἰκειότητα proves that it can (see also *Euthphr.* 12e2–4). Cf. L. Reinhard, *Anakoluthe*, 139 n. 1; C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 130 n. 1 (contra); Jowett–Campbell, *Republic*, II 195 (pro; no examples). Here the singular is chosen by Schleiermacher and Susemihl.



For general discussions cf. KG 1 83–4; Schw.–D. 243; Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, 1 98–101. See too on 408d2 ἀποδεχόμεθα. – Only with μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντες (a10) does it become clear that ἡμῖν is in fact = ἐμοί. See Intr., section 1.5.2.

**a2 Λυσίαι διαλεγόμενος:** for the importance of this detail, cf. Intr., section 1.5.3 n. 94. The words do not mean that the criticism was uttered in Lysias' house, as many readers have supposed, starting with Synesius (section 1.5.2 n. 79). Why exactly Lysias' name was chosen is hard to say; Wilamowitz' statement '[Kleitophon] wird dem Sokrates nur ein bedingtes Lob erteilen, wenn er mit Lysias redet: dieser Zug weist auf den Phaidros' (*Platon*, 1 386 n. 1) is far-fetched. Perhaps it was because of Lysias' connection with some participants in the conversation of *Republic* 1, where he is a silent partner. But even if this supposition is right, it could only serve to refer the reader of *Clit.* to *Republic* 1 if this reader knew of the roles played there by Thrasymachus and Clitophon, who are named in this very sentence.

**a2–3 τὰς ... μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβάς:** while the connection of διατριβή with an attributive prepositional phrase is frequent enough, ἡ μετὰ τινος διατριβή happens to be absent from Plato's works (διατριβῶ μετὰ is found *Phd.* 59d5; cf. *Lg.* 794c5). But the idea could not have been otherwise expressed: τὰς Σωκράτους διατριβάς (cf. *Ep.* 7 329b2; *Phdr.* 227b10–11; *Ep.* 5 322a2) is too ambiguous, because it could also be taken as λόγοι (cf. *Ap.* 37d1 and Burnet's note). – The omission of μέν in PaVa (against ADF) is perhaps defensible in itself (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 165), but here the style seems to me to demand μέν. The PaVa reading can be explained as an error caused by homoiarcton.

**a3 συνουσίαν:** this refers to basically the same thing as διατριβάς. I do not see how la Magna's claim that τὰς ... διατριβάς 'le conversazioni filosofiche' is opposed to τήν ... συνουσίαν 'l'insegnamento' can be justified. συνουσία is used for Socratic conversations at *La.* 201c2; *Prt.* 335c3 etc; cf. 407a5 σοὶ συγγιγνόμενος. The switch to the singular is necessary because συνουσίαι (like ὁμιλίαι) denotes relationships to different people.

**a3–4 ὑπερπαινοῖ:** it would be out of character for Socrates to say that Thrasymachus gets more praise than he deserves. In Plato, the word means not 'praise too much' but 'praise very much' (as also *Ar. Eq.* 680). In *Euthd.* 303b2 Socrates would fall out of his role if he condemned the jubilations explicitly; in *Lg.* 629d8 there is no question at all of Tyrtaeus' unduly having praised war and heroes; here it might be either. Most translators (apart from Ficinus, H. Müller, De Win, Waterfield) opt for 'too much'. – FVa have ὑπερπαινεῖ, but change

from optative to indicative is very rare in reported speech in Plato (Riddell, 'Digest', §283; add *Mx.* 240d6–7; cf. *KG* II 363; 556).

**a5 "Οστις:** there are two different ways of explaining the construction: (1) assuming an ellipse of ἦν with ὅστις for ὅστισοῦν (for the latter cf. note on 408c6 ὅπως δεῖ) as in *R.* 353c5 ἦτις ἦν δ' ἐγὼ αὐτῶν ἡ ἀρετή (cf. Tucker ad loc.); *Ar. Ra.* 38–9. Τίς τὴν θύραν ἐπάταξεν; ὡς κενταυρικῶς ἐνήλαθ', ὅστις (Stanford ad loc. unnecessarily assumes an aposiopesis; Dover compares elliptic εἴπερ 'if at all'); cf. also *Grg.* 508d5 ὁ δὲ δὴ ἐμὸς [sc. λόγος] ὅστις, πολλακίς . . . ἦδη εἴρηται. So usually the older translators from Ficinus onwards, and recently Orwin and Gonzalez. (2) Taking the ὅστις clause as an addition to the sentence spoken by Socrates ('Someone who did not give you the right story'): ὅστις is the usual relative after τις. So H. Müller (reading τίς in the previous sentence), la Magna, and most twentieth-century translators. Such a lively idiom is not in keeping with the author's style in general, but it may contribute to characterising Clitophon's unabashed attitude towards Socrates in that he comes straight to the point in his very first words, in a sentence tacked on to Socrates'. On balance, I prefer (2). At any rate there is no need to assume corrupted transmission (lacuna Schanz; ὅστις ἦν Hermann; ὡς τις H. Richards, *Platonica*, 157; ὁ σ<ός> τις ('your somebody') R. G. Bury, *PCPhS* 166–8 (1937) 2 and 'Notes sur le texte de Platon', *REG* 52 (1939) 23–35 at 33).

**a7 τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν:** one of the clearest examples of καὶ stressing the statement that A is true in some cases preceded by the statement that A is not true in other cases ('partly I *did* praise you'). Some of the examples quoted in *GP*<sup>2</sup> 321–3; 585; W. J. Verdenius, review of *GP*<sup>2</sup>, 250–1 belong here (the interpretation of καὶ at *Phdr.* 238d6 and *Phd.* 62a1 given by Verdenius, 'Notes on *Phaedrus*', 273 (cf. 'Notes on Plato's *Phaedo*', *Mnem.* 11 (1958) 193–243 at 197) supposes that καὶ combined this value with that of 'still' – I would rather believe that 'still' is not expressed in Greek in such cases). A good parallel is *Hdt.* 3.10 οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὕεται τὰ ἄνω τῆς Αἰγύπτου τὸ παράπαν· ἀλλὰ καὶ τότε ὕσθησαν αἱ Θῆβαι ψακάδι; cf. *Arist. Met.* 1043b25ff. οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι . . . ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἔστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι ('but what you *can* do is to make clear the quality'). It must be noted, however, that in such contexts Greek can easily do without an emphasising particle, cf. *Phdr.* 230d4–5 τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν μ' ἐθέλει διδάσκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἀνθρωποῖ.

**a8 προσποιούμενος δέ:** although, as in every μὲν/δέ complex, the two clauses are presented as parallel, there are some cases where in practice the μὲν-clause carries the weight and the δέ-clause is hardly

more than a concession: the reason why Clitophon is eager to explain his remarks is only Socrates' blaming him, not Socrates' dissimulation. προσποιούμενος δέ is therefore roughly equivalent to καίπερ προσποιούμενος (so nearly all translators). Cf. *Grg.* 454b9–c1 ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ θαυμάζηις ἐὰν καὶ ὀλίγον ὕστερον τοιοῦτόν τί σε ἕτερον ἀνέρωμαί, ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν δῆλον εἶναι, ἐγὼ δ' ἐπανερωτῶ ('which seems obvious in spite of my persistent questions'); *R.* 342d2–3 συνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι; *Men.* 71d7–8 (cf. Bluck ad loc.); *GP*<sup>2</sup> 370; Headlam–Knox on Herod. 3.18. The opposite (the δέ-clause bears the weight) is more frequent, especially when the antithesis is preceded by a negative (cf. Thompson on *Men.* 91e; *GP*<sup>2</sup> 370; KG II 232–3; Stallbaum on *Euthd.* 289c; *Grg.* 464a).

**μηδέν:** μή negates the infinitive after προσποιείσθαι, cf. X. *Hippiarch.* 5.15. – μή for μηδέν (PaVa) is barely possible: οὐδέν with φροντίζειν is very frequent in Plato.

**α9 αὐτούς αὐτός:** the juxtaposition is intentional, as appears from the sentence-final position of αὐτός, which is quite rare in Plato; the effect is well explained by la Magna: 'contrapposto all'ignoto, che li ha riferiti οὐκ ὀρθῶς'. In most other instances the effect is rhetorical. Many examples from the *Letters* and *Laws* are quoted by Novotný on *Ep.* 7 343c5. At *Tht.* 197b11 and c5 it is precise, not rhetorical diction which is aimed at. *Grg.* 448c7–8 ἄλλοι ἄλλων ἄλλως is parody, but (e.g.) *R.* 603b4 φαύλη ἄρα φαύλωι συγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γενυνᾷ ἢ μιμητικὴ is not. Cf. Bluck on *Men.* 89e2.

**α9–10 ἐπειδὴ καί:** 'the more so because'; καί expresses that a second reason is being adduced (the first was Socrates' indignation). Cf. *Chrm.* 154e6–8 πάντως γάρ που τηλικούτος ὧν ἤδη (first reason) ἐθέλει διαλέγεσθαι. — Καὶ πάνυ γε ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ ἔστιν φιλόσοφος (second reason); *R.* 612d7 (first reason ἐπεὶ δὴ . . . εἰσὶ d3); *Tht.* 153a5 (first reason: Homer's authority, a1–3); *Hp.Ma.* 288c4 (first reason πῶς γὰρ ἄν . . . μὴ καλὸν εἶναι c2–3); possibly *Smp.* 188e4. This use of καί is perhaps to be explained as due to an inversion, καί qualifying the ἐπεὶ clause (which it cannot precede). If so, καί is simply the Focus particle (cf. Eng. 'also', 'too').

This idiom is to be distinguished (as *GP*<sup>2</sup> 297 fails to do) from the far more common use of καί stressing the familiarity or self-evident character of the facts mentioned in the ἐπεὶ (ἐπειδὴ) clause, cf. *Euthd.* 285b7–c3 εἰ δὲ ὑμεῖς οἱ νέοι φοβεῖσθε, . . . ἐν ἐμοὶ ἔστω ὁ κίνδυνος: ὡς ἐγὼ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πρεσβύτης εἰμί ('since I am, after all, an old man') παρακινδυνεύειν ἔτοιμος. Here we have rather to do with καί as a modal particle (cf. German *ja*) – for the distinction between connective, modal and Focus particles, cf. Wakker, *Conditions and Conditionals*, 303–7.

This second use is present in most of the Platonic examples quoted by *GP*<sup>2</sup> (but at *Thl.* 157a2 and 187b5 καί just means ‘also’); it is one particular sub-group of what has been called ‘consecutive’, ‘semi-consecutive’ or ‘conclusive’ καί; cf. S. Trenker, *Le style KAI* (Assen 1960<sup>2</sup>), 36–7; W. J. Verdenius–J. H. Waszink, *Aristotle on Coming-to-be and Passing-away* (Leiden 1966<sup>2</sup>), 3–4; 64–5; W. J. Verdenius, ‘Notes on *Phaedrus*’, 270; 275; id., review of *GP*<sup>2</sup>, 250; De Vries on *Phdr.* 227c7 (and cf. Index s.v. καί — consecutive). Verdenius wisely restricts the term ‘consecutive’ to cases of καί as a consecutive *coordinating* particle, where (in other words) the consecutive link between the two coordinated clauses is not expressed in Greek. De Vries applies the word also to *adverbial* καί (Focus or modal particle) with a similar nuance. It is questionable whether the latter can occur outside certain well-defined contextual groups (relative, causal, consecutive clauses; following demonstratives and certain adverbs such as διό, ἄτε etc.). Cf. notes on 410b4 καί; c6 καί; e3 καί.

**α10 μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντες:** both ὄντε and ὄντες are possible (for the plural, cf. *La.* 187a6 αὐτοὶ εὐρεταὶ γεγονότε; *Ly.* 212a2 οἷοί τ’ ἔστων; *Euthd.* 303c4 μακάριον σφῶ). ὄντες is read by AF and (it seems) D; ὄντε (A<sup>4</sup>D<sup>2</sup>, both hands without any authority) is almost certainly a correction rather than the authentic reading. – See on 406a1 ἡμῖν for the justification of the clause. Cf. also *Alc.* 1 118b5. In a similar situation in the *Menexenus*, a similar phrase has more point: ὥστε κἂν ὀλίγου, εἴ με κελεύοις ἀποδύντα ὀρχήσασθαι, χαρισαίμην ἄν, ἐπειδὴ γε μόνω ἔσμεν (236c11–d2); still more poignant is the threat ἔσμεν δὲ μόνω ἐν ἐρημίαι, ἰσχυρότερος δ’ ἐγὼ καὶ νεώτερος (*Phdr.* 236c8–d1).

**α10–11 πρὸς σὲ φαῦλως ἔχειν:** for φαῦλος used for being on bad terms with a person cf. *Lg.* 922d6–7 ὁπόσοι περὶ ἐμὲ φαῦλοι καὶ ὅσοι ἀγαθοὶ γεγόνασιν (this parallel shows that Orwin’s ‘that I have a low opinion of you’ is beside the point). I do not see why this use ‘seems strange at best’ (Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 8). For other adverbs in this construction, cf. α11–12 πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχειν τραχυτέρως; *Ap.* 34c8 αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρὸς με σχοίη.

**α11–12 πρὸς ἐμέ:** the reading of A; πρὸς με (FD) is equally possible, cf. *Phdr.* 236d6; J. Vendryes, *Traité d’accentuation grecque* (Paris 1945<sup>2</sup>), 103.

**α12 τραχυτέρως:** cf. Adam on *R.* 343e3 μοχθηροτέρως; R. Kühner–F. Blass, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache, Erster Teil: Elementar- und Formenlehre* (Hanover 1890–2), 1 577.

**εἰ δέ:** δὴ (F) is only apparently better than δέ (AD): Clitophon repeats what he had said in α9, and there is no opposition between οὖν γὰρ . . . τοῦ δέοντος and what follows. Bury reads δέ but translates ‘so’. But after a γὰρ clause οὖν not δὴ is the normal particle to pick up the inter-

rupted line of thought, and F is notoriously unreliable so far as particles are concerned, cf. G. J. Boter, *Tradition of Republic*, 106–7.

**αι3 ἤδιστ' ἄν δεξαίμην καὶ ἐθέλω:** for the change from potential to indicative, cf. *Grq.* 481c3–4; Gildersleeve 1 178.

**407a1–4 Ἄλλ' αἰσχρὸν ... κατὰ κράτος:** for the purport of this sentence as well as for its ironical character, cf. *Intr.*, section 1.3.2(1); 1.5.2.

**αι Ἄλλ' ... μὴν:** assentient, 'expressing ... readiness to accept a proposal' (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 342); 'by all means' (Gonzalez). In this collocation ἄλλὰ seems to me to have its normal function at the beginning of an answer, namely to brush aside whatever objections, reserves or qualms the partner has raised (cf. L. Basset, 'Ἄλλ' ἐξόλοισθ' αὐτῷ κόαξ. Réexamen des emplois de ἄλλὰ à la lumière de l'énonciation dans *Les Grenouilles* d'Aristophane', *New Approaches*, 75–99, esp. 83–9, 'rupture discursive'; here, Clitophon had given Socrates the choice between listening and not listening to him; Socrates radically excludes not listening). The basic function of μὴν as a modal particle is probably to assert something no matter what the partner in the conversation may think (and thus by implication to preclude possible disbelief, cf. G. C. Wakker, 'The discourse function of particles: some observations on the use of μάν/μὴν in Theocritus', in M. A. Harder et al., *Theocritus* (Groningen 1996) 247–63, esp. 252); 'Emphasis and affirmation. Some aspects of μὴν in tragedy', *New Approaches*, 209–31. I think Denniston is wrong in considering ἄλλὰ μὴν a combination (with a value of its own) rather than a collocation (each particle keeping its own function): the basic value of μὴν 'explains its affinity with ... ἄλλὰ' (C. M. J. Sicking in *Two Studies*, 55).

The split form is somewhat exceptional; the only prose authors who split ἄλλὰ μὴν at all are Xenophon and Plato (J. Blomqvist, *Greek Particles in Hellenistic Prose* (Lund 1969), 65), and even in these, the only words to separate the combination are οὐ (οὐδέ, οὐ πηι, οὐτι) and the interrogatives except for a few places in the Platonic corpus (this passage; *Lg.* 960e1 ἄλλ' ἔστι μὴν δυνατόν; *Ion* 541a7 ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνο μὴν δοκεῖ σοι (μὲν TW); *Sph.* 240b9 ἄλλ' ἔστι γε μὴν πῶς). The situation is the same in the case of the more or less synonymous collocations ἄλλὰ μὲν-τοι (cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 410–2) and ἄλλὰ μὲν δὴ (cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 394–5; the split form *Phd.* 78a10). No argument against authenticity can be made from the fact that Plato does not elsewhere split ἄλλὰ μὴν unless it is adversative; the separation of ἄλλὰ and μὲν δὴ quoted from *Phd.* occurs in exactly the same context as ἄλλὰ ... μὴν here in *Clit.* Besides, 'not elsewhere ... unless' means in fact 'three times' (not counting οὐ etc. and τίς etc.), which is too small a number for argument.

Why did the author choose to split ἄλλὰ μὴν? Certainly not for poetic diction, though poets do separate these particles. Rather, I think, to give extra emphasis to Socrates' willingness to listen: 'Why, a shame indeed would it be ...' (the same explanation will hold for the disjunction of ἄλλὰ and μὲν δὴ at *Phd.*, loc. cit.).

**γ****ε**: ironically restricts αἰσχρόν κτλ. to Clitophon: 'it would be a disgrace not to accept *your* offer'. It may be objected that ἄλλὰ μὴν is followed by γε more often than not (Blomqvist, op. cit. (previous note), 65; cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 119; for ἄλλὰ ... μὴν ... γε cf. *R.* 441d8; *Lg.* 906e5; *Sph.* 255a4). But the natural explanation of this is that the collocation ἄλλὰ μὴν attracts words or phrases with focal properties, and one of the main functions of γε is to mark focality on a clause-initial constituent.

**ὠφελεῖν**: the passage gains in clarity if one realises that for Plato, this word implied 'to make better', cf. *Ap.* 24e4–10 οἶδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἳοί τε εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν; – (...) – Εὖ γε νῆ τῆν Ἦραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων (see also *Hp.Ma.* 296e7; *Euthd.* 292a8–11; Aesch. Socr. fr. 11c D. = 4 Kr. (*SSR* VI A 53); cf. my paper 'Plato, Cratylus 417c', 47 and n. 23); in fact, the verb had replaced ὀφέλλειν in Ionic-Attic (cf. my paper 'The etymology of βούλωμα and ὀφείλω', *Mnem.* 28 (1975) 1–16, at 9), as Plato was well aware (*Cra.* 417c7–8). In using this word, Socrates suggests that Clitophon's report of his criticism will ameliorate his διατριβαί, a suggestion which is worked out in δῆλον γὰρ κτλ. The slightly offended mentor of the opening words now turns humble pupil (ὠφελεῖν is often said of teachers, especially in *Hp.Ma.* and *Thg.*). See Intr., section 1.3.2(1).

**μ****ε**: omitted in PaVa, but ὠφελεῖν used absolutely is rare with a personal subject (*E.* *IA* 384; *Pl.* *Ap.* 24e10).

**a2 ὑπομένειν**: cf. *Grg.* 505e3 οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος.

**γ****άρ**: explains ὠφελεῖν ('I say "help (make better)" because ...'), cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 66; 'I call it a favour because ...' (Waterfield).

**δῆλον ... ὥς**: This collocation occurs twice in *Clit.* (cf. 408a2); δῆλον ὅτι is absent. δῆλον ὥς is not found in those works of Plato which are prior to *R.* 2–10, whereas δῆλον ὅτι is found 131 times (cf. Intr., section 11.7.2 and n. 403). In this case the length of the dialogue is immaterial; cf. note on 409e3–4. If proportions are involved the case is entirely different, cf. note on 408b1 καθάπερ; 408c1 σχεδόν.

**a3 καὶ βελτίων**: καὶ ('respectively') is often found in one of two coordinations (or in both), when a relation between the two first and the second members is implied. Cf. *R.* 617e3–4 ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἦν τιμῶν καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει. This is one group out of various unrelated idioms often lumped together as

‘disjunctive καί’, which is certainly not a separate value of καί as a connective particle. τε καί is so used 409b6 οἰκία τε καί τεκτονική; *R.* 332d5-6.

**a3-4 τὰ μὲν ἀσκήσω καὶ διώξομαι, τὰ δὲ φεύξομαι κατὰ κράτος:** remarkably parallel in wording is *Grg.* 507d1-2 σωφροσύνην μὲν διώκτεον καὶ ἀσκητέον, ἀκολασίαν δὲ φευκτέον ὡς ἔχει ποδῶν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν.

**a3 ἀσκήσω ... διώξομαι ... φεύξομαι:** not modal; the Socratic paradox ‘virtue is knowledge’ is present. Cf. *Intr.*, section 1.3.2(1).

**διώξομαι ... φεύξομαι:** cf. *Thl.* 176b4 πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν (this parallel may have been noticed by the Emperor Julian, who offers a conflation of it with *Clit.* 407a8; cf. note on a8 μηχανῆς).

**a3-4 φεύξομαι κατὰ κράτος:** ‘wol schwerlich ein platonischer Ausdruck’ (Schleiermacher, 534). But cf. *Smp.* 216a6-7 βίαι ... οἴχομαι φεύγων; *Grg.* quoted above. ‘In hac iunctura veteribus usitatus est ἀνὰ κράτος. Idem valet de verbis ἐλάυνειν et διώκειν’ (H. van Herwerden, ‘Platonica’, *Mnem.* 11 15 (1887) 172-86, at 177). In Plato, κατὰ κράτος (*Lg.* 692d8; 698d1) is found exclusively.

**a5 Ἀκούοις ἄν:** cf. *Plt.* 269c4 (introducing the myth of the two eras); *R.* 608d11 (introducing the proof of the soul’s immortality), and Stallbaum’s note.

**γάρ:** as in *Plt.* quoted in the previous note; *Prt.* 310a7-8 ἀλλ’ οὖν ἀκούετε. τῆς γὰρ παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί; *GP*<sup>2</sup> 59; cf. I. J. F. de Jong, ‘ΓΑΡ introducing embedded narratives’, *New Approaches*, 175-85. This is only one manifestation of γάρ marking a PUSH, i.e. a transition to a subsidiary stretch of discourse; cf. my ‘Adversative relators between PUSH and POP’, *New Approaches*, 101-29, esp. 101-4. In the present case, the narrative is embedded in evaluative statements (Clitophon’s praise and blame), and the discourse occasionally reverts to them (‘POP’): 407e3-4; 408b5-c4; 410b3.

**ὦ Σώκρατες σοί:** vocatives do not count as separate clauses, as is proved by e.g. *infra* 409d3 ἀπεκρίνατό τις ὦ Σώκρατες μοι; *Phlb.* 54b2 λέγ’ ὦ Πρώταρχέ μοι (so rightly Diès); *R.* 337e4 Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἔφην ἐγὼ ὦ βέλτιστέ τις ἀποκρίνοιτο (it is senseless to print “, ὦ βέλτιστέ, τις”, cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, 11 339 n. 1). The same holds for parentheses such as ἔφην, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, οἶμαι etc., cf. *Prm.* 137b6 τίς οὖν εἰπεῖν μοι [not μοι] ἀποκρινεῖται; *Thl.* 147b2-3 ἢ οἶει τίς τι συνήσιν τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν τί ἐστιν; *Phlb.* 16c5-6 θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις ὡς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί ποθεν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη (not ποθεν); *Phd.* 87a8 τί οὖν ἂν φαίη ὁ λόγος ἐτι ἀπιστεῖς κτλ. (to print a comma before ἂν, as most recent editors do, is perverse); *Lg.* 772e7-773a1 ὦ παῖ τοῖνυν φῶμεν

ἀγαθῶν πατέρων φύντι κτλ.; K. J. Dover, *Greek Word Order* (Cambridge 1960), 13 and n. 1; Schw.–D. 60; Gifford on *Euthd.* 278c6; Riddell, 'Digest', §295. I have therefore omitted the commas which usually surround them in our texts, but a comma is probably to be retained after a vocative at the beginning of a sentence (cf. Schw.–D., loc. cit.). – Verdenius' counter-argument ('Notes on *Clitophon*', 143 and 146 n. 2) that here 'the vocative is closely connected with the pronoun', whereas in cases like 408b3 ἦν δὴ σὺ πολιτικὴν, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἐπονομάζεις (Verdenius' punctuation) it 'interrupts the construction' is clearly circular.

It is another problem whether the pronoun should here be taken as enclitic or not. I have followed AD in printing σοῖ, because I have the – admittedly subjective – feeling that σοῖ συγγιγνόμενος is a separate colon rather than forming one information unit with the preceding ἐγὼ γάρ ᾧ Σώκρατες.

**σοῖ συγγιγνόμενος:** the participle denotes the general period of time during which the repeated action of the main verb took place: 'when I used to keep you company'.

**α6 πολλάκις:** belongs to ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων. This word, the imperfect tenses, ὁπότε, the verb ὑμνεῖν and the (conjectured) iterative optative in this sentence, as well as ὅταν (ὁπότεαν) + subj. and θαμά in 407e3–5, clearly indicate that the speech to be reported presently was often held by Socrates (cf. also 410d1 τῶν λόγων τῶν προτρεπτικῶν). In the same way, Socrates' protreptic maxims in the *Apology* are customary (29d6–7 λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα; 30a7ff. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων . . . λέγων ὅτι κτλ.); cf. X. *Mem.* 1.7.1 ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείσθαι προέτρεπεν· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἔλεγεν κτλ. An explanation of this peculiarity of Socrates' need not bother us here, as it is perfectly possible, even probable, that the author of *Clit.* took it over from *Ap.* (cf. Intr., section 11.2.3.1). Since the exhortation described in the *Apology* is personal, the repetition is more logical there than it is in the *Clitophon*, cf. Intr., section 1.5.2. It is also tempting to connect Socrates' statements on the theory of Forms: ἀ θρυλοῦμεν αἰεὶ (*Phd.* 76d7–8; cf. J. Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* (London 1930<sup>4</sup>), 308 n. 3); δ ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὄνειρώττω (*Cra.* 439c7); πολλάκις ἀκήκοας (*R.* 505a3) with his insistence in *Ap.* on his having often uttered the exhortations he quotes. See also note on 408b3–4.

**ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων:** for the ironical value cf. *Smp.* 198b5 τίς οὐκ ἂν ἐξεπλάγη ἀκούων; *Phdr.* 234d1. Other marks of irony are: ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός, ὑμνοῖς. Cf. Intr., section 1.5.3 and n. 88. The use of the past tense seems to imply that Clitophon no longer frequents Socrates. This is a strong argument in favour of the reading



πορεύομαι at 410c7 (q.v.). The present tenses in 407e4 do not contradict the supposition (cf. note on καὶ μάλα . . . ἐπαίνῳ).

**a6–7** *παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κάλλιστα*: a more *recherché* variant of κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων (cf. note on 410b4–6), 'praeclarissime omnium' (Ficinus).

**a7–8** *ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις*: on the singularity of Socrates' addressing a crowd, cf. Intr., section 1.5.2; for the exact reference of τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, cf. note on 407b1 ὄνθρωποι; if indeed τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is more or less equivalent to τοῖς θνητοῖς, there is no reason for printing a comma after ἀνθρώποις (as all editors do).

**a8** *ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός*: cf. Intr., section II.1.4.2 and n. 166. The *tertium comparationis* is the superior knowledge which delivering admonitory speeches presupposes (so Demetrius). The irony touches on the raw spot: Socrates appears to be lacking in such a knowledge. The comparative clause should, in my opinion, be taken with ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, not (with H. Müller, Susemihl, and others) with ὑμοῖς – only thus can τοῖς ἀνθρώποις be fully understood: it is equivalent, not to τοῖς πολλοῖς as it is e.g. *Prt.* 352e5; *Smp.* 189c4, but to τοῖς θνητοῖς.

The comparison may have been suggested to the author by the famous scene in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where Socrates 'enters' the stage in a basket hanging on a μηχανή and behaves (and is treated) like a deity (see Starkie's and Dover's notes on 213–26). This scene was remembered in later times, for περιφερόμενον (*Ap.* 19c3–4) is an unambiguous reference to it.

**μηχανῆς**: Timaeus' *Lexicon Platonicum* has a lemma τραγική σκηνή which Ruhnkenius in his edition (ed. nova cur. G. A. Koch (Leipzig 1828)) connects with this passage. He concludes that there was an ancient *varia lectio* σκηνῆς attested also in some imitations of *Clit.*, to wit, Epict. 3.22.26 ἐπὶ σκηνῆν τραγικὴν ἀνερχόμενον λέγειν τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους "ἰὼ ἄνθρωποι, ποῖ φέρεσθε κτλ." and Jul. *Or.* 1.2.11–13 (= 4a) ὥσπερ ἔκ τινος τραγικῆς σκηνῆς . . . προαγορεύειν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι σπύδειν μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν, φεύγειν δὲ τὴν πονηρίαν (cf. note on 407a3 διώξομαι . . . φεύξομαι). The reading of the MSS is backed up by Dio, Themistius and probably Demetrius. ἀπὸ σκηνῆς would mean: from the roof of the stage-building (σκηνή); cf. T. B. L. Webster, *Greek Theatre Production* (London 1956), 11–12 (this harmonises more or less with the data given by Tim., Suid. (τ 891) and other lexicographers). If this is correct (Billerbeck, *Kynismus*, 82 wishes to identify σκηνή and μηχανή), ἀπὸ μηχανῆς is slightly better (the gods appearing at the end of tragedies may have spoken from either the roof or the crane, cf. Webster, op. cit., 12–13) in that Socrates did speak ἀπὸ μηχανῆς in the *Clouds*.

**ὑμνοῖς:** ὕμνεις, the reading of *Mal.*, *Flor.* c and *Ven.* 189, is certainly a conjecture – they are indirect copies of F – arising from the confrontation of ὕμνοις (DF) and ὑμεῖς (A). The only possible readings are ὕμνεις and ὕμνοῖς. I prefer the latter. Since the reference is to a repeated action of Socrates’ (cf. note on 407a6 πολλὰκις), the optative is decidedly better (the indicative is rare in distributive temporal clauses, cf. KG II 451, and absent from the Platonic corpus altogether). ὕμνοῖς (Baumann) is a correction of the DF reading rather than a conjecture. – ὕμνεῖν used for an often repeated statement: cf. England on *Lg.* 653d6 (and his Index); LSJ, s.v., II. When so used, it often has depreciatory overtones (e.g. *Prt.* 317a6). It can also be used for a long statement not repeated, likewise in a depreciatory manner (e.g. *Euthd.* 297d3–4 ὅποτε σοι ταῦτα ὕμνηται, referring to b9–d2; Gifford’s explanation is beside the point). As it has been made clear at any rate that Socrates’ speech, which is about to be reported, was delivered repeatedly (cf. note on a6 πολλὰκις), Clitophon may well mean that this speech is too long. D. Chr. (Intr., section II.2.1.1), ps.-Plu. 4e and Epict. 3.22.26 (cf. Billerbeck, *Kynismus*, ad loc.) misunderstood this word and took it to mean ‘shout’.

**b1–408b5 Ποῖ φέρεσθε . . . λέγων:** for the structure of the speech, cf. Intr., section II.2.2.

**b1–e2 Ποῖ φέρεσθε . . . τὰς πόλεις:** the gist of the argument is clear enough: mankind neglects its duty by focusing all its attention on amassing wealth instead of using it rightly (b1–8). Present education does not provide just use (b8–d2). Justice can be acquired (d2–8) and therefore should be acquired (d8–e2).

The author’s desire to allude to as many protreptic themes as he can possibly manage impairs clarity. Thus, the sons and the teachers are introduced in the first sentence, to be dropped later on (cf. Intr., section II.2.3.1 and note on 407b5 διδασκάλους). The relative obscurity of the first sentence is probably due to this desire, not to inability (he was writing a parody in any case, so no great harm was done by a little less clarity).

Apart from the opening words, the style is rhetorical to a limited extent only (cf. Intr., section I.5.2; notes on b6–7 μελετητόν . . . ἐκμελετήσουσιν; b8–c6 ἀλλ’ ἀμουσίαις; c6 ἀμουσίαις; c6–d2 καίτοι . . . πάσχουσιν; d4 αἰσχρὸν καὶ θεομισές; d6 ἥττων ὃς ἂν ᾗ; e1–2 πάντ’ ἄνδρα . . . συμπάσας τὰς πόλεις). There is conscious avoidance of hiatus (not counting slighter cases or such as may be eliminated by crasis or elision), whereas there are two instances of hiatus surrounding the first part of the speech (407a6 μοι ἐδόκει; e3 ἐγὼ ὅταν, which is obviously deliberate, cf. note on 407e3 ταῦτ’ οὖν . . . ἀκούω); cf. Brünnecke, ‘Kleitophon wider Sokrates’, 468.

**β1 Ποῖ φέρεσθε:** this is a tragic diction, cf. *S. El.* 922 οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅποι γῆς οὐδ' ὅποι γνώμης φέρη; *TGF adesp.* F126.1 ποῖ μεταστρέφεισθ' ὦ κακοί; *Ar. Av.* 1638 ὦ δαιμόνι' ἀνθρώπων Πόσειδον, ποῖ φέρει; in a protreptic situation (Intr., section 11.1.3) Apollodorus says of himself περιτρέχων ὅπηι τύχοιμι (*Smp.* 173a1). Cf. also *Isoc.* 12.88 ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅποι τυγχάνω φερόμενος.

**ὄνθρωποι:** taken by Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 8; cf. Carlini, 'Dialoghi pseudoplatonici', 37) as imitation of Socrates' refutation of οἱ πολλοί in *Prt.* 352e5–357e8, in which the apostrophe – naturally – is rather frequent (353a3; c5; e5; 354a3; e3; 356c2; 357a5). In itself this is hardly convincing, as Socrates is certainly not speaking as a θεός ἐπὶ μηχανῆς in *Prt.*, which Pavlu seems to imply (cf. Intr., section 11.1.3 n. 138), yet it must be noted that ὄνθρωποι is not the normal way to address a group (ὦ ἄνδρες is; in fact, Xenophon reports a protreptic speech by Socrates, beginning ὦ ἄνδρες, *Mem.* 1.5.1). Of course, the use of ὄνθρωποι is an automatic consequence of Socrates being ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, in exactly the same way as ὦ ἄνθρωποι in *Prt.*, where Socrates endeavours to πείθειν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ διδάσκειν (352e5–6), but that is not a real argument for adopting Pavlu's interpretation. On the contrary, if τοῖς ἀνθρώποις above is equivalent to τοῖς θνητοῖς, ὄνθρωποι indicates the continuation of Clitophon's ironical comparison into the actual report of Socrates' words. Socrates would then be speaking ὡς αὐτὸς . . . τὰ τῶν θεῶν φρονῶν καὶ ὑπερηφανῶν τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων (Schol. ad *Ar. Nub.* 223 ὦ 'φήμερε, in a scene which the author of the *Clitophon* may well have had in mind, cf. note on a8 ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός). Cf. *Ap.* 23b2 (Apollo to mankind); *Smp.* 192d4 (Hephaestus ditto); cf. Festugière, *Révélation*, iv 130 and n. 5. Elsewhere the persons are at least godlike, cf. *Cra.* 408b1 (the νομοθέτης); *Prt.* 343e6 (Pittacus). *Prt.* 314d6 is rudeness, like ὦ ἄνθρωπε.

If this explanation is accepted, it follows automatically that ὄνθρωποι and probably ποῖ φέρεσθε are not to be looked for in the source (if any) of which this speech is supposed to be a parody, as the words form part of the parody itself (cf. Intr., section 11.2.1.1).

The form ὄνθρωποι is confirmed by the scholiast on Lucian as well as by Epict. 3.22.26 ἰώνθρωποι (so the *Bodleianus*, which is the archetype of all MSS; Billerbeck, *Kynismus*, ad loc. rightly interprets this as ἰὸν ἄνθρωποι, cf. *Men. Sam.* 580); ὦ ἄνθρωποι (pseudo-Plutarch 4c; Themistius 320d; *Herm.* 7.1; Libanius 18.123) is no evidence for the contrary – I suspect that of the two variant readings in Dio Chrysostom 13.16 the shorter version ἄνθρωποι ἀγνοεῖτε is what Dio wrote, the longer ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὄνθρωποι καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε being the result of contamination from a Plato MS. Of course, the crasis adds to the lofty tone. Pseudo-

Plutarch, Epictetus and Olympiodorus, *In Grg.* 112.26 place ποῖ φέρεσθε after the vocative. For Epictetus, the inversion can be explained as due to an intermediate quotation in some diatribe or other, but as ps.-Plutarch clearly borrows it from *Clit.* directly, and Olympiodorus quotes it ἐν τῷ Κλειτοφῶντι, it may be an old variant (so Schenkl, 'Überlieferung des Themistius', 112) – it is at any rate a slightly inferior one: the apostrophe coming after the question is a greater deviation from word order and therefore more expressive. – Epictetus' ἰώ may reflect a deviation common to the Cynic diatribe, cf. D. L. 6.32. At 4.8.27 (how Socrates did and did not address crowds), where the similarity in phrasing may suggest a reminiscence of *Clit.* (μὴ ἀγνοεῖτε; ὑμῶν κυκωμένων καὶ θορυβουμένων περὶ τὰ μηδενὸς ἄξια), he has ὧ ἄνθρωποι. How unreliable indirect witnesses are in this respect appears from Eus. *adv.Hier.* 42 (11 600 Conybeare) ὧ ἄνθρωποι . . . ποῖ δὴ φέρεσθε in a patent imitation of *Herm.* 7.1 ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὧ ἄνθρωποι.

**καί:** between a rhetorical question and a sentence which can be a statement as well as a question (a question-mark somewhere after πράττοντες is suggested *GP*<sup>2</sup> 312; immediately after πράττοντες would be the best place for it). A good parallel is S. *OT* 415 ἄρ' οἴσθ' ἄφ' ὧν εἶ; καὶ λέληθας ἐχθρὸς ὧν κτλ., where λέληθας κτλ. is certainly a statement, and a fairly close one Ar. *Av.* 1033 οὐ δεινά; καὶ πέμπουσιν ἦδη ἴπισκόπους κτλ. – where πέμπουσιν κτλ. can be either. Several explanations can be thought of: (a) as a rhetorical question is cognitively synonymous with a statement, καὶ serves merely to connect two statements (so some commentators at S., loc. cit., see Kamerbeek ad loc.). This interpretation looks too mechanical to me; a rhetorical question remains a question and should be treated like one; the same objection holds for Verdenius' suggestion ('Notes on *Clitopho*', 143–4) that καὶ is here 'motivating' ('and therefore') – quite apart from the problem whether such a use of καὶ is not rather a consequence of the semantic properties of the connected clauses. The case is different for καὶ linking an exclamation and a statement, e.g. *Phd.* 116d5. (b) καὶ is emphatic and stresses the next verb. This is probably valid for the passage quoted from *OT*, cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 321, and may be right here. 'Yea, verily we know not etc.' (Bury). It is less probable for Ar., loc. cit., because there is no particular reason for πέμπουσιν to be stressed (the weight of the clause lies on ἴπισκόπους – it can of course be maintained that καὶ stresses the verb plus its object); (c) καὶ connects two questions, both more or less rhetorical. This is excluded at *OT*, loc. cit. and unsatisfactory at *Av.*, loc. cit., since the former question is in a way explained by the latter ('Isn't it terrible that they are already sending inspectors etc.?'). On the other hand, it is acceptable here: as the first question is a *Wortfrage*, the

second one a *Satzfrage*, asyndeton would be rather harsh. (d) καί serves to introduce a surprised or indignant question (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 311–12). I think this is the right explanation for *Av.*, loc. cit., but it is too much an idiom of the dialogue to be appropriate here.

I prefer (c) to (b) because καί stressing a verb seems to be rare at the beginning of a sentence (cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 321). Yet I cannot help feeling that καί is a little odd. Of the conjectures that have been offered, asyndeton (Cobet, ‘Ad Themistii orationes’, 430) and πῶς (Schanz) are not better. ἦ (Ast) is, but confusion of ἦ and καί is as unusual in majuscules as it is trivial in minuscules (cf. J. Diggle, *Euripidea* (Oxford 1994), 198) – the imitations in Procopius and Constantinus Porphyrogenetus do not, I think, suffice to justify its adoption here. Perhaps ὠνθρωποι;” καί “ἀγνοεῖτε κτλ. (no question) should be considered; given the fact that the author did not use quotation marks, one may wonder if his readers could understand the sentence if so articulated – an argument that cuts both ways, I suppose. That καί is omitted by PY (Dio) is a consequence of their lacking ποῖ φέρεσθε and should not be treated as evidence for Cobet’s deletion (cf. Schenkl, ‘Überlieferung des Themistius’, 113).

**b1–2 ἀγνοεῖτε . . . πράττοντες:** this can refer both to the duties of the τεχνικός (the soldier, *R.* 469d2; the doctor, *Chrm.* 164b3) and (as here) to man’s moral duties (*X. Mem.* 3.8.1; the identity of ὠφέλιμα ποιεῖν and σωφρονεῖν is established through equivocal use of τὰ δέοντα πράττειν *Chrm.* 164a9–b6). Burnet is too one-sided when he says: “‘the right thing’”, what is wanted in given circumstances, not “‘our duty’” which would rather be τοῦ προσήκοντος’ (note on *Arist. EN* 1094a24 τοῦ δέοντος). Aristotle himself gives (*Top.* 110b10) τὸ δέον as an example of an ambiguous word, capable of meaning both τὸ συμφέρον and τὸ καλόν. In the *Cratylus*, δέον and ζημιῶδες are antonyms (418a4–419b4). As ζημιῶδες means ‘harmful’ (it is juxtaposed with βλαβερόν at 417d8), δέον would appear to differ hardly, if at all, from ὠφέλιμον and the other terms in the list of definitions of the ἔργον of justice at 409c2–3. In its turn, the association of ὠφέλιμον and ἀγαθόν (cf. note on 407a1 ὠφελεῖν) explains how Plato could say δέον καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ λυσιτελοῦν καὶ κερδαλέον καὶ ἀγαθόν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ εὔπορον τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται (419a5–8). The phrase οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πράττειν recurs at *Isoc.* 3.25, and, more significantly, πράττειν τῶν δεόντων τι is found in *Arist. Protr.* β 2 Düring, though in a different context (cf. Einarson, ‘Epinomis’, 274 and n. 44).

**b2–8 οἵτινες . . . ἐθεραπεύσατε:** three different protreptic motifs have been crammed into this sentence which (even allowing for a probable corruption of the transmitted text) cannot be called lucid and probably was not intended to be (cf. note on 407b1–e2). See *Intr.*, sec-

tion 11.2.3.2. The sentence is further complicated by the parenthesis 407b5–7 εἴπερ μαθητόν . . . ἰκανῶς.

**b2 οἴτινες:** after questions and statements expressing indignation, admiration etc., introducing clauses which provide the reason for these affects – not in LSJ, no examples in KG (cf. 11 399), but quite a normal idiom, cf. X. *An.* 2.5.39 οὐκ αἰσχύνησθε . . . ; οἴτινες κτλ.; *Mem.* 2.1.30 τί ἡδὺ οἶσθα . . . ; ἦτις κτλ.; *Hdt.* 6.12.3; 121.1; 123.1; 7.99.1 Ἄρτεμισίης . . . μάλιστα θῶμα ποιεῦμαι . . . ἦτις κτλ.; *Ar. Nub.* 168; *And.* 1.67; ‘ὄστις apparait . . . comme un intensif du simple ὅς signalant à quel degré éminent l’antécédent est concerné par le procès subordonné; son rôle est de manifester en somme la responsabilité de l’antécédent dans l’actualisation de ce procès’ (Monteil, *Phrase relative*, 144, who gives numerous examples – but only of first and second person antecedents – 143 n. 2; 144 nn. 1–3, cf. also C. J. Ruijgh, *Autour de τε* épique (Amsterdam 1971), 329).

ὄστις may be reinforced by γε: *Ar. Thesm.* 706 and Van Leeuwen ad loc. Equally usual but better known in these contexts is ὅς γε. For examples of simple ὅς so used, cf. *MT* §580.

**b2–3 χρημάτων . . . ἔσται:** for the construction, cf. *Euthd.* 306d9–e2. The ὅπως-clause is on the analogy of σπεύδειν; χρημάτων περί belongs to it, and is made part of the main clause by anticipation (prolepsis), cf. Kühner on X. *An.* 1.1.5. See Intr., section 11.2.3.1 for the parallel *Ap.* 29d9–e1.

τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν: this, backed by Iamblichus, is rather strong (‘utter’, ‘utmost’, cf. Verdenius, ‘Notes on *Clitopho*’, 144), πᾶσαν τὴν σπουδὴν (F) weaker. Ps.-Plutarch’s πᾶσαν σπουδὴν has no authority, nor has Themistius’ σπουδὴν ἅσασαν. Elsewhere in the Platonic corpus we find ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ *Phdr.* 248b6; *Phlb.* 15a6–7; πᾶσα ἡ σπουδὴ *Ly.* 219e7–8; *Lg.* 628e4.

**b3 τῶν δ’ ὑέων:** the opposition is not χρημάτων vs. τῶν ὑέων but χρημάτων . . . ὅπως . . . ἔσται vs. τῶν ὑέων . . . ὅπως ἐπιστήσονται χρῆσθαι . . . That amounts to saying that τῶν ὑέων is an anticipated part of the ὅπως-clause; therefore the presence of a *verbum curandi* from which the clause is to depend seems imperative. Now, our MSS do not provide such a verb (the reading ἀμελεῖτε καί between τούτοις and οὔτε (b4–5) is a conjecture of uncertain origin (Stephanus?); it is not in any MS (*pace* Burnet), though it is retained by most editors). Moreover, the indirect tradition, which unanimously does offer a verb, shows a bewildering variety as regards its identity. Thus Dio’s ἡμελῆκατε (from 407e6?), pseudo-Plutarch’s μικρὰ φροντίζετε, Themistius’ οὐδεμίαν ποιείσθε ἐπιμέλειαν (from 407d8–e1), warrant only one conclusion: they did not have a verb in their texts any more than we have.

Can we follow Burnet and do without a verb at all? The following arguments tell against this.

(a) The absence of a verb creates a false antithesis  $\chi\rho\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu\text{:}\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$ , which, moreover, is only half-complete, as  $\tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu\ \sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\tau\epsilon\text{:}\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \delta\iota\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon$  is a very lame opposition indeed. The antithesis is further weakened by the anacoluthon  $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \delta\prime\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu\ \dots\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$ .

(b) If indeed the structure of this sentence is modelled on *Ap.* 28d7–e3, as I have argued in *Intr.*, section 11.2.3.1, we should certainly expect a *verbum curandi* here.

(c) Whereas anacolutha are rather frequent in Clitophon's report, they would be strongly out of character in this *pastiche* (cf. Thesleff, *Styles*, 69 n. 2).

(d) If  $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \delta\prime\ \acute{\upsilon}\acute{\epsilon}\omega\nu$  as well as  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$  depend on a *verbum curandi*, the future  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\omicron\nu\tau\alpha\iota$  becomes normal, whereas it is exceptional (though not impossible, cf. KG 11 374.1; 384.4), if, as our MSS have it,  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$  is an adverbial (final) clause instead of a complement clause. Hence an incidental change to the impossible form  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\eta}\sigma\omega\nu\tau\alpha\iota$  in some secondary MSS of Plato and some MSS of Themistius.

(e) If  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$  is an adverbial clause depending on  $\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ , the repetition  $\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\omega\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma\ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\varsigma$  is rather inane; it becomes quite unobjectionable if another verb is inserted.

(f) Though hardly counting as an argument in itself, the unanimous feeling of Dio, pseudo-Plutarch, Themistius and Iamblichus that a verb meaning 'to neglect' is missing, may strengthen (a)–(e).

I conclude, as Schenkl has done without arguments ('Überlieferung des Themistius', 112–13), that we find ourselves before a very old lacuna in the text. To fill it in, we shall have to find a verb or verbal phrase opposite in meaning to  $\tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \pi\acute{\alpha}\sigma\alpha\nu\ \sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\tau\epsilon$  and capable of being constructed with both the personal genitive and a  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma$  clause, preferably one which is found with an anticipated genitive and a  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma$  clause at the same time within the Platonic corpus. Likely candidates are  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ ,  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}$ ,  $\phi\rho\nu\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$ ,  $\mu\epsilon\mu\nu\eta\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  and periphrastic constructions of the type  $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha\nu$  ( $\sigma\pi\omicron\upsilon\delta\eta\nu$ )  $\pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  ( $\acute{\epsilon}\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$ ), all of course preceded by a negative;  $\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu$  is less likely as it does not appear to govern a  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma$ -clause. As a periphrasis has already been used in the sentence, a simple verb seems better. Of the verbs mentioned, only the first three are found with a personal genitive anticipated from a  $\omicron\pi\omega\varsigma$  clause in Plato ( $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\mu\epsilon\lambda\acute{\epsilon}\iota\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  *Ap.* 29d9–e1; e1–3; *Grg.* 520a4; *Euthphr.* 2d1–2;  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\acute{\iota}$  *R.* 345d2;  $\phi\rho\nu\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\zeta\epsilon\iota\nu$  *Ap.* 29e1–3). Therefore,

though it would be foolish to exclude the possibility of another verb, I shall restrict myself to these three.

The next problem is where to place the lacuna. Three places are possible for an οὐκ ἐπιμελεῖσθε (οὐ μέλει ὑμῖν, οὐ φροντίζετε): after ἕων, παραδώσετε and τούτοις. By far the best place stylistically is after παραδώσετε; if the verb came after τούτοις (so Schenk, 'Überlieferung des Themistius', 112–13), its distance from τῶν ἕων would make the sentence too harsh, and besides, the order genitive – verb – ὅπως-clause is found in four out of the five instances quoted; in the fifth – *Ap.* 29e3 – the ὅπως-clause precedes the verb only in virtue of its shortness, and because τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται is basically one phrase, 'the best possible state of the soul', on a par with φρονήσεως and ἀληθείας. This order is characteristic of formal prose, cf. note on 406a1 Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου.

The precise form of the negative can be determined by the following οὔτε ... οὐδέ γ'; it seems that οὐ ... οὔτε does not occur in Plato (let alone οὐ ... οὔτε ... οὐδέ γ') but there are a few instances of οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὐδέ (*R.* 426b1–2 οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὐδ' αὖ ... οὐδέ ... οὐδέ ... οὐδέν; 429e3 οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὐδέ οὔν; 499b2 οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὐδέ γ' and Adam ad loc.; 608b5–6 οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὔτε ... οὐδέ γε; *Th.* 148e3–5 οὔτ' ... οὔτ' ... οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ'), so οὔτε is what one expects to have stood here.

Of the three possibilities, παραδώσετε <οὔτε φροντίζετε> has the advantage of palaeographical probability (the same sort of probability will of course hold for any of the verbs if one reads <οὔτε...> after τούτοις). I do not have the courage to print οὔτε φροντίζετε: it is euphonically not satisfying. But I can think of nothing better, and it may be backed up by ps.-Plu. μικρὰ φροντίζετε (which cannot be right because οὔτε is indispensable).

**b4 παραδώσετε:** possibly modal ('you will have to bequeath', so Schleiermacher, Susemihl, H. Müller), cf. Magnien, *Futur grec.* II 221–2; cf. note on 407e7 ἄρξοντος ... ἀρξόμενον.

**δικαίως:** normal in protreptic contexts is ὀρθῶς: *Euthd.* 280e3–281a8; cf. *Men.* 88e1; Arist. *Protr.* B 84 Düring. Hence Iamblichus writes ὀρθῶς (he had been paraphrasing the protreptic parts of *Euthd.* shortly before) and Dio ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως. But there is good reason for the deviation, cf. *Intr.*, section II.2.3.1.

**b5 διδασκάλους:** it is a strange thing to see Socrates advertising on behalf of the professional teachers of virtue (the sophists), and it is clear from their gradual disappearance from the speech that they have been needed momentarily but not throughout the protreptic (which is, after



all, a Socratic, not a sophistic one). Immediately, their existence is questioned (εἴπερ μαθητόν) and they are given understudies in the form of anonymous persons οἵτινες ὑμᾶς παύσουσι ταύτης τῆς ἀμουσίας, c5–6), and after the argument about free will they have lost their personality and we are back again in commonplace Socratic terminology (δεῖν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς νῦν πλείω ποιεῖσθαι, d8–e1). When the presence of διδάσκαλοι is so manifestly unasked for in the rest of the parody, one wonders why they are mentioned at all, especially as the parenthesis εἰ δὲ μελετητόν . . . ἰκανῶς b6–7 was inserted with the express purpose of diverting the attention from the question whether there were or were not teachers of justice, cf. Intr., section II.2.3.1. I have offered a possible reason in that section; one may also think of influence of a protreptic source: X. *Mem.* 4.2.1–7 stresses the futility of looking for teachers of the normal curriculum but not of politics (cf. the same section).

Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 8) drew attention to *Prt.* 357e4–8, where Socrates reproaches the common herd for not sending their sons or going themselves to the teachers of the ἐπιστήμη ἡδονῆς, the sophists. Indeed, the whole *Prt.* passage has rather a protreptic ring about it, cf. Intr., section II.1.3 n. 138; Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 42–4.

**εὕρισκετε:** rather conspicuous by its durative (here 'conative') *Aktionsart*, which is not the usual one; in older Greek οὔτε . . . εὕρισκετε would have meant 'you cannot find' (cf. τ 158). It is, however, a genuine Platonic idiom, cf. *Lg.* 664a4; see also *Men. Epit.* 142 (cf. Verdenius, 'Notes on *Epitrepontes*', 24). It goes without saying that only forms of the present and imperfect can be so used.

**b6–7 μελετητόν . . . ἐκμελετήσουσιν:** such examples of chiasmus as are given from Plato by Riddell ('Digest', §304) and Denniston (*Greek Prose Style*, 74–7) hardly suggest that the figure in itself is a marker of rhetorical style (so Thesleff, *Styles*, 69; 82). Normally chiasmus is used more or less automatically if the information in the first of a pair of clauses is too compact to be presented in the parallel order. Cf. below, on e1–2 θ' ἄμα καί. Here, however, the information is not compact at all: μελετητόν and ἀσκητόν are virtually synonymous. Therefore this instance of chiasmus does have rhetorical overtones. Cf. my paper 'Figures of speech and their lookalikes: two further exercises in the pragmatics of the Greek sentence', in E. J. Bakker (ed.), *Grammar as Interpretation, Greek Literature in its Linguistic Context* (Leiden 1997), 169–214, esp. 184–91.

**b6 ἀσκητόν:** cf. Thompson on *Men.* 70a2.

**b6–7 ἐξασκήσουσιν καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν:** the preverb serves to give

the verbs perfective ('confective') *Aktionsart*, cf. Schw.–D. 266–9; note on 410b8–9. ἐξασκεῖν is new in this meaning, ἐκμελετᾶν occurs at *Hp.Ma.* 287a5. It is naïve philology to consider ἐξασκήσουσιν a mark of inauthenticity (Geffcken, 'Rätsel', 433 n. 5). – The futures, being on a par with the ὅπως clause of b4, are probably modal, cf. Magnien, *Futur grec*, π 219 (though his parallel *Hdt.* 3.40.4 is rather different); 'people to train them', Orwin, cf. Gonzalez. Cf. notes on c5 and on e7 ἄρξοντος ... ἀρξόμενον.

**b7** **ικανῶς**: underlines the perfective *Aktionsart* as at *R.* 606a4–5 τοῦ δακρῦσαι τε ('have a good cry' – a very unusual use of the aorist of this verb) καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἱκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι. Cf. c2 below.

**γ' ἔτι**: Themistius' γε (conjectured here by Schanz) and Pa γέ τι may indicate a common source (cf. Appendix II). Yet γ' ἔτι is clearly *lectio difficilior*. ἔτι here means 'in the past', cf. W. J. Verdenius, 'Notes on Plato's *Meno*', *Mnem.* 10 (1957) 289–99 at 296; Bluck on *Men.* 93a6; when preceding πρότερον (here and *Hdt.* 3.64.4) it does little more than strengthen it (not 'already before'; so Bertini). Bury and Zuretti take ἔτι πρότερον as apposition to the whole clause ('that which comes first'), which is unlikely without the article. Waterfield's 'moreover' suggests that he takes οὐδέ ... ἔτι as the negative counterpart of ἔτι δέ, but there are no parallels for this in Plato.

**b8** **ἐθεραπεύσατε**: the causative component (as usually) not expressed (cf. my paper 'Plato, Cratylus 417c', 43 n. 8): 'you have had yourselves treated' (so, more or less, Schleiermacher). This verb often refers to instruction of any kind in Plato. The origin of the reference is metaphorical: as doctors tend the body, so teachers tend the mind (cf. esp. *Chrm.* 156b3–157c6 and *Prt.* 312c1 with Adam's note; further *Prt.* 325c1; *Smp* 184c4; *Cra.* 440c5; *R.* 403d7).

**b8–c6** **ἀλλ' ... ἀμουσίας**: whereas the first sentence of the speech was loaded with different proreptic motifs, this one contains but one: the present curriculum is inadequate, inasmuch as it does not teach the just use of wealth. This topos is manifestly used here to make room for the *reductio ad absurdum* in the next sentence; in itself it is superfluous, as the preceding reproof, 'you don't see to it that your sons learn how to use their money justly', implies 'the education which you *have* given to your sons does not teach them to use their money justly', which is the essence of this sentence. Its form is inversely proportional to its content: the wording is rather ponderous, especially the opening (γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑμῶν, carefully embedded between ὀρῶντες and ἱκανῶς μεμαθηκότας).

**b8–c1** **γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν**: cf. *Prt.* 312b1–2

παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ . . . καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; *Alc.* 1 106e6 γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν; cf. 118c8–d4; *Men.* 94b5; *Chrm.* 159c3–d2; very extensively but with a more positive appraisal in Protagoras' protreptic, *Prt.* 325d7–326c3. What μουσική amounts to is best illustrated from *Alc.* 1 108c7–8 τὸ κιθαρίζειν καὶ τὸ ἄειδειν καὶ τὸ ἐμβαίνειν ὀρθῶς (cf. 108a5–6). Playing the *aulos* is mentioned along with the curriculum at *Alc.* 1 106e7; X. *Mem.* 4.2.6 mentions κιθαρίζειν, ἀυλεῖν, ἵππεύειν. Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 9) uses the similarity of *Prt.* 312b1–2 and our place to prove the dependence of Socrates' exhortation on *Prt.* As traditional education always consists of the three subjects in Plato, this is not cogent.

**c1–2 ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑμῶν:** the order (the inverse one of b3 τῶν δ' ὑέων – 8 ὑμᾶς αὐτούς) reflects the decreasing importance of the children, cf. Intr., section II.2.3.1.

**c2 δῆ:** this particle denotes a high personal commitment to the utterance by the speaker, and presupposes one in the addressee, cf. J. M. van Ophuijsen in *Two Studies*, 82. The personal commitment in the speaker may be ironical (thus in effect a distance is created), especially in the report of other people's opinions or statements. Cf. note on 408a4 καὶ . . . δῆ.

**παιδείαν ἀρετῆς:** *Lg.* 643e4 τὴν . . . πρὸς ἀρετὴν . . . παιδείαν, but cf. *R.* 606e3–4 παιδείαν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων.

**c3 εἶναι:** omitted by PaVa Them. (against ADF); quite possibly rightly; cf. 408c2.

**ἡγήσθε:** being *lectio difficilior*, this should be preferred to F's ἡγεῖσθε (on F's tendency to normalise Plato's language cf. Dodds' Comm. on *Grg.*, 46–7) even though it is backed by Themistius. Both the present and the perfect occur in Plato.

**c3–4 κακοὺς γιγνομένους περὶ τὰ χρήματα:** understand ὑμᾶς αὐτούς, hardly τοὺς παῖδας as well; κακοὶ γιγνόμενοι would be slightly more regular but (a) the reflexive pronoun (c1) makes the accusative possible here, (b) the nominative would be ambiguous as it might be taken as coordinated with ὀρώντες (b8). – For γίγνομαι 'prove', cf. W. J. Verdenius, 'Notes on Hippocrates *Airs Waters Places*', *Mnem.* 8 (1955) 14–18 at 16; Dodds on *Grg.* 496a6; Adam on *R.* 459a; 575e; De Vries on *Phdr.* 232c8; 269b6; for κακοὺς . . . περὶ *c. acc.* cf. *R.* 449a2–4 κακάς . . . περὶ τε πόλεων διοικήσεις καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῆς τρόπου κατασκευῆν. The accusative of respect is more normal.

**c4 πῶς οὐ:** usually = *nonne* (cf. LSJ s.v. πῶς II 7), here = *qui fit ut non*, 'how can you fail to despise' (Gonzalez; cf. Ar. *Pax.* 472 πῶς οὖν οὐ χωρεῖ τοῦργον; cf. Van Leeuwen on Ar. *Av.* 278). There is no need for Hermann's ὅμως; his argument 'neque enim ratio inconstantiae ex-

quiritur, quasi eam objurgator non intelligat' (III, xxviii) overlooks the fact that this is a rhetorical question.

**c5 οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε οἴτινες ὑμᾶς παύσουσι:** for the construction cf. *Prt.* 348d4–5 ζητεῖ ὅτῳ ἐπιδείξῃται καὶ μεθ' ὅτου βεβαιώσεται (this would seem the best reading if Burnet's apparatus can be trusted; for the changed construction, cf. KG I 223.5). For the vagueness of the relative clause cf. note on 407b5 διδασκάλους. The future is modal, cf. b6–7; Magnien, *Futur grec.*, II 219–20.

**c6 ἀμουσίας:** as often, this is not lack of cultural education but of moral knowledge (it refers to κακοὺς γιγνομένους περὶ τὰ χρήματα). There is, however, some poignancy in the choice of this word: for all its μουσική, present education produces only ἀμουσία. Placed at the end of the second sentence, this word announces the sarcasm of the third – the need of a periphrastic turn for διδάσκαλοι has brought about a rather fine by-product. Cf. *Alc.* I 120b3.

**c6–d2 καίτοι ... πάσχουσιν:** the aim of this sentence is twofold: to give room to the sarcastic remark and to work out – again rather ponderously – the results of absence of education in justice (already referred to in c3–4 κακοὺς γιγνομένους περὶ τὰ χρήματα). Obviously, it adds nothing really new to the argument; in fact, the objection raised in the next sentence (ὕμεις δέ φατε κτλ.) is directed against the preceding sentence, not this one (cf. note on d2–5). A conspicuous redundancy in expression makes up for this lack of content, while serving as well to underline the sarcasm and pessimism: πλημμέλειαν καὶ ῥαιθυμίαν; καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῶι καὶ πόλεις πόλεσιν (instead of καὶ ἀδελφοὶ καὶ πόλεις ... ἀλλήλαις); ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀναρμόστως; πολεμοῦντες; καὶ πάσχουσιν. There is a slight similarity in wording (probably fortuitous) to X. *Mem.* 4.4.8 (in a conversation about justice): παύσονται δ' οἱ πολῖται περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἀντιλέγοντές τε καὶ ἀντιδικοῦντες καὶ στασιάζοντες, παύσονται δ' αἱ πόλεις διαφερόμεναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ πολεμοῦσαι.

**c6 καίτοι ... γε:** adversative, more precisely 'inverted denial of expectation': the preceding is true even though you would not expect it to be because of the following: he is unhappy καίτοι he is rich, cf. my analysis in *New Approaches*, 122–4 (slightly different B. Jacquinod, 'Sur le rôle pragmatique de KAITOI', *New Approaches*, 131–49). The split form of this collocation (cf. note on a1 ἀλλ' ... μὴν) is much more frequent than *GP*<sup>2</sup> 120 suggests, cf. *ibid.* 564. KG II 152 rightly distinguish between καίτοι γε and καίτοι ... γε – in this case one might translate 'yet this is the πλημμέλεια and ῥαιθυμία ... which causes...' Plutarch's καίτοι γε at 439c is not backed up in his second quotation, 534e.

**c6–7 διὰ γε ... ἀλλ' οὐ:** διὰ τε ... καὶ οὐ (AL of Themistius) is not

Greek: adversative τε (...) καὶ οὐ occurs only in polar expressions such as πολλάκις τε κοῦχ ἄπαξ (S. *OT* 1275; cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 513). See note on 409d6–7 ἀγαθόν τ' ... καὶ οὐδέποτε κακόν.

**c6 ταύτην τὴν πλημμέλειαν:** of proving κακοὺς περὶ τὰ χρήματα; repeating ταύτης τῆς ἀμουσίας in a rather otiose way. The words are found coupled *Lg.* 691a7, where (as here) the musical association of πλημμέλεια is present (cf. England ad loc.).

**c6–7 ῥαιθυμίαν:** of not looking for a διδάσκαλος.

**c7 διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ποδὶ πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἀμετρίαν:** the prepositional phrases are carefully embedded between article and noun, as 406a6 τοὺς ... λόγους; 409a3.

**ἐν τῷ ποδί:** instead of τοῦ ποδός (so Plutarch): not the ἀμετρία which is present in the foot but the one (= πλημμέλεια) which is present in bad handling of wealth.

**c8 ἀδελφῶι ... πόλεσιν:** connect with στασιάζουσιν, not with προσφερόμεναι, cf. note ad loc.

**c8–d1 ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀναρμόστως:** used with the same *double entendre* as ἀμουσία and πλημμέλεια (c6). Bury's 'without measure or harmony' is perfect.

**d1 προσφερόμεναι:** 'behave oneself' (LSJ s.v. β 1 4), qualified by ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀναρμόστως; not 'clash together' (Bury, Sartori, Orwin, Waterfield), because in the military sense it would mean 'attack physically', which is rather odd with στασιάζουσι. It must be noted, though, that Plutarch understood it in this sense, as appears from his change of the preverb to δια-. A reciprocal middle is out of the question in both meanings discussed: προσφέρεσθαι is passive. The masculine form, proposed by Ast, is not only unnecessary, but probably ungrammatical (cf. Gildersleeve, II 207–8; there are, however, rather more exceptions than it would appear from his collection of examples, cf. Schw.–D. 605).

**στασιάζουσι:** here not of internal discord of states.

**πολεμοῦντες:** includes, but is not restricted to, war between states: it takes up στασιάζουσι (the two verbs are coupled in *Euthphr.* 8a1–2).

**d2–e2 ὑμεῖς δέ ... πόλεις:** virtue comes by teaching or training, or sophistic and Socratic exhortation is useless. Both in the *Euthydemus* and in the *Clitophon* the authors grasp this point but carefully circumvent the necessity of proving it (see Intr., section II.2.3.1). But after the rather extensive criticism of common opinion in b8–d2, rich more in words than in thought, some sort of proof is now necessary. As the preceding sentences have dealt with vice rather than virtue, the point which Socrates sets out to prove is that vice disappears by teaching or training, in other words that vice is ignorance (cf. οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν οὐδὲ δι' ἄγνοίαν). The only thing which he contrives to establish is that wrong-

doing is involuntary. This is by no means the same proposition (cf. O'Brien, *Paradoxes*, 16), but evidently the latter is taken here to imply the former. The proof, which neglects the possibility that vice may be due to lack of training, consists of two separate arguments.

(1) (a) Injustice is committed either through ignorance (οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν οὐδὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν) or willingly (ἀλλ' ἐκόντας); (b) injustice is evil (πάλιν δ' αὖ . . . ἡ ἀδικία); (c) no one does evil willingly (πῶς οὖν δὴ . . . αἰροῖτ' ἄν;); *conclusion* (not stated): therefore injustice is committed through ignorance. This proof is immediately invalidated because (c) is challenged (ἦπτων . . . τῶν ἡδονῶν).

(2) The challenge is disproved by a rather less valid argument: (a) people commit injustice either unwillingly (Socrates' view) or when overcome by desire (the view of the masses); (b) to be overcome is involuntary (οὐκοῦν . . . ἐκούσιον); *conclusion*: therefore, in either case (ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου) people commit injustice unwillingly (τό γε ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ).

Argument (2) could be regarded as a sophism *a dicto secundum quid*: to do something which is ἀκούσιον in some respect is not the same thing as to act ἄκων (cf. Sprague, *Fallacy*, 6). (In the first version of this book, I thought (2) was in fact a sophism. But I now believe that this criticism has more to do with the formulation of the argument than with its validity. Of course the vulgar reading of (b) contradicts the conclusion of (1), but that does not reflect on the validity of (2).) (b) itself is arrived at through an argument involving opposites which the author may well have considered valid. Cf. *Intr.*, section II.3.5 and n. 301.

Plato frequently sets out to prove the Socratic paradox οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει (or its implication that no one wishes evil), e.g. *Men.* 77b6–78b2; *Grg.* 467c5–468c8; *Prt.* 352e5–357e8, and his arguments are never very cogent. I am sorry to make such a claim, which will seem preposterous to many scholars. Of course, this commentary is not the place to deal with the gigantic literature on these passages – I have to confine myself to what seem to me the most important objections. Meno could have answered 'Yes' at 78a5 and besides, Socrates' question 77d4–6 implies an equivocation: κακός – morally evil : κακός – harmful; Socrates' question at *Grg.* 468a5–6 is framed as a dilemma, suggesting that neither end nor means is evil; again the meaning of ἀγαθόν is not quite clear, cf. Dodds' note, p. 235 (a); the argument in *Prt.* is valid only if ἀγαθόν = ἡδύ and κακόν = ἀνιάρων, cf. 351b3–d7; 353c9–355a5.

Yet the fallacies Plato employs in these passages reveal a great deal about his ethical principles (cf. section II.3.5), whereas here the fallacious argument (if it is fallacious) is contrary to the spirit of the Socratic dictum in that this dictum is a pregnant formulation of the conviction

(shared by Plato) that lack of self-restraint is in fact lack of knowledge. Again, it is not a basic principle of Socrates' and Plato's ethics which is subjected to Clitophon's ridicule but rather a perversion of it; the real Socrates (at least what the author considered to be the real Socrates) is kept out of harm's way (cf. *Intr.*, sections II.2.3.1; II.6).

It is very interesting to note that argument (2) closely resembles what is once or twice called παρασυνημμένος (Schol. in Arist. *APr* = Arist. *Protr.* A 2 Düring; cf. M. Frede, *Die stoische Logik* (Göttingen 1974), 100: if  $a, b$  & if not  $a, b$ ; either  $a$  or not  $a$ ; therefore always  $b$ ). Ancient logicians quote two examples of this argument: *Tht.* 170e7–171c7 (which is rather more complex) and Arist. *Protr.* A 2–6 Düring, cf. Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, 38–9. Another example: [Pl.] *Demod.* 384c1–d2; cf. C. W. Müller, *Kurzdialoge*, 264.

**d2–3 οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν οὐδὲ δι' ἄγνοϊαν:** not just a rhetorical repetition. δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν points back to the διδάσκαλοι (b5, cf. ad loc.) and does not have here the association 'ignobility' ('inopia humanitatis', Ast, *Lexicon*, s.v.) which it usually carries in Plato. ἄγνοια is the more general word, commonly used in discussing the maxim (e.g. *R.* 382b8; *Phlb.* 22b7; *Lg.* 863c1; cf. ἀμαθία *Prt.* 357d1; *R.* 350d5; on the question whether ἄγνοια and ἀμαθία differ, cf. O'Brien, *Paradoxes*, 193–6).

**d3–4 ἐκόντας τοὺς ἀδίκους ἀδίκους εἶναι:** the second ἀδίκους might have been missed (cf. *Men.* 89b1–2 εἰ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἐγίγνοντο – b9–c1 οὐ φύσει οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ γίγνονται; see Bluck's note on 89a6; add *Prt.* 325b4, where no correction of the text (ὡς θαυμασιῶς γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοὶ <ἀγαθοὶ>, Hirschig) is necessary; likewise *Smp.* 183b7 ἀφροδίσιον γὰρ ὄρκον οὗ φασιν εἶναι (ὄρκον <ὄρκον> Hertz). But the omission (in F) of τοὺς as well as of ἀδίκους makes one suspicious. Cf. *Lg.* 860d1 οἱ κακοὶ . . . εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί.

**d4 πάλιν δ' αὖ:** this 'pleonasm' is quite normal in Plato, cf. Ast, *Lexicon*, s.vv. πάλιν and αὖθις and esp. *La.* 193d6, where, as here, two inconsistent opinions are contrasted.

**αἰσχροὺν καὶ θεομισέας:** cf. *Lg.* 879c3; 838b10. In combination with τολμάτε, this coupling of synonyms makes the sentence rather heavy with sarcasm, cf. note on c6–d2.

**d5 οὖν δή:** cf. des Places, *Particules de liaison*, 85–7; *GP*<sup>2</sup> 468–70. Though both οὖν δή and δή οὖν are practically confined to Plato (and Herodotus), these combinations cannot be used for questions of authenticity: in the other *Dubia*, οὖν δή occurs two or three times in *Alc.* 1 (cf. des Places, 86), three times in *Epin.* (879d2; 984b2; 991b5), four times in the *Letters* (*Ep.* 2 310e4, *Ep.* 7 326e5; *Ep.* 8 353c4; 355a5), once in *Min.* (321d1); δή οὖν is found at *Epin.* 989d2. Neither is found in the *Spuria*.

**τό γε τοιοῦτον κακόν:** cf. *Ap.* 25e4 τοῦτο <τὸ> τοσοῦτον κακόν; Gildersleeve, II 269–70.

**d6 ἦττων ὅς ἄν ἦι:** for the postponement of the relative, cf. Deniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 48–9 who gives examples from *Lg.* only; but cf. *Ap.* 19d7 περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν; Adam on *R.* 363a6; *Phdr.* 238a4; my note on *R.* 390b6–c1, ‘Notes on *Politeia* III’, 345–7. Here the postponement splits the phrase ἦττων τῶν ἡδονῶν.

The relative clause should not be explained as quasi-causal (Waterfield, Gonzalez) or quasi-temporal (Souilhé) or quasi-conditional (De Win) but as a – necessarily elliptical – answer to the preceding question: ‘Any man [sc. would choose such an evil], who...’ (Bury).

Of course, there remains a slight inconcinnity between question and answer (διὰ τὸ ἦττων εἶναι or ἡττώμενος would have been more normal, or τίς ... ἐκὼν αἰροῖτ’ ἄν (so translated by Bertini, cf. 471 n. 1) in the preceding question), but it is covered up by the hyperbaton ἦττων ὅς, which therefore aims at a special, focalising effect. The distinction between ὅς ἄν and ὅστις ἄν (KG II 426) proves rather theoretical.

**καὶ τοῦτο:** as well as ignorance.

**d7 εἴπερ:** ‘precisely in the case that...’ (cf. Wakker, *Conditions and Conditionals*, 319–20); contrast εἴπερ μαθητόν b5–6, where Wakker’s alternative paraphrasis ‘exclusively in the case that...’ applies. The clause gives the reason for thinking that ἦττων εἶναι is ἀκούσιον.

**ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου:** = πάντως, cf. England on *Lg.* 938c3. For the function of these words (‘in either case’), cf. the analysis of the argument, note on d2–e2.

**d8 τό γε ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ:** Plato construes the phrase ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ (cf. Jowett–Campbell on *R.* 607b3; Burnet on *Cri.* 48c7) in three ways: (a) with modal adverb (*Cri.*, loc. cit.; *Prm.* 141d6); (b) with a personal noun as object (*R.* 607b3); (c) with accusative and infinitive, as in the next clause καὶ δεῖν κτλ. (*R.* 440b5; 604c7; *Phlb.* 35d6; *Lg.* 663d7).

Consequently, one expects τό γε ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον εἶναι here. It seems hazardous to explain our construction as an ellipse of εἶναι: εἶναι can be omitted with δοκεῖν and νομίζεω etc. but rarely with other verbs, cf. KG I 42. However, a nominal construction is found with the semantically related συμβαίνω, which develops into a copula: *Grg.* 479c8 συμβαίνει μέγιστον κακὸν ἢ ἀδικία; *R.* 329d6; *Lg.* 671c1 (cf. England ad loc., who points out that συμβαίνω may be followed both by εἶναι (*Prm.* 134b1) and by ὦν (*Euthd.* 281e3)). The double accusative construction may therefore be defended. Cf. 408c2–4, where the construction of ἡγοῦμαι with two predicative accusatives is followed by an accusative and infinitive. I withdraw the conjecture τό γε ἀδικεῖν <εἶναι> ἀκούσιον ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ, which I submitted in the first version of this work.



**d8–e2 καὶ δεῖν . . . τὰς πόλεις:** though it has not been proved that injustice is ignorance (only that it is involuntary) these words presuppose that it is. One may point out that ἐπιμέλεια is useless once it is acknowledged that being overcome by desire is an alternative cause of injustice, as in fact Socrates has done, but after all this is parody. Rather conspicuously, the moral consequences of the argument (and therefore of the whole speech) are coordinated with the conclusion within the same sentence: the protreptic can thus be framed ὑποθετικῶς (Demetrius' words, *Intr.*, section II.1.4.2) and is no longer ἀποφανόμενος καὶ κατηγορῶν. Similarly, 408a4–b1 (end of the third part of the speech).

**d8 ἐπιμέλειαν:** the directly reported speech very neatly ends with the signal theme of all Socratic exhortation; cf. *Intr.*, section II.2.2 n. 188; note on 410c8–d5.

**e1–2 πάντ' ἄνδρα . . . ζυμπάσας τὰς πόλεις:** rhetorical effect is caused by the climax πάντ' . . . ζυμπάσας, not by the chiasmus, for which cf. next note. For the thought cf. *Intr.*, section II.2.3.1 ad fin.

**θ' ἅμα καί:** this collocation is found only rarely before the latest period (e.g. *Chrm.* 155a6; *R.* 436d5). It is very frequent in *Lg.*: over twenty times. For the postposition of τε (one would have expected πάντα τ' ἄνδρα κτλ.) cf. *Lg.* 798a6–8 περὶ τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διανοίας τε ἅμα καὶ τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν φύσεις. There is no parallel in Plato for the chiasmic construction with this collocation, but it is natural enough: both πάντ' ἄνδρα and ἰδίαί carry emphasis (and perhaps there would have been a slight break in the clause, which accounts for the postposition of τε); from ἰδίαί, the opposite is derived as starting-point for δημοσίαι ζυμπάσας τὰς πόλεις. This is the most frequent cause of chiasmus: in such cases it is wrong to consider it a figure of speech. Cf. above, on b6–7 μελετητόν . . . ἐκμελετήσουσιν.

**e3 Ταῦτ' οὖν ὧ Σώκρατες ἐγὼ ὅταν ἀκούω:** the left-dislocation (removal from subordinate clause) of both ταῦτα and ἐγὼ is unique in the Platonic corpus. For ταῦτα this is easy to understand, as it plays an important thematic part in the cohesion of Clitophon's whole report: it refers back not only to the preceding speech but also to Clitophon's praise as last mentioned at a6. Of course ταῦτα is object of ἄγαμαι and ἐπαινώ as much as of λέγοντος. For ἐγὼ preposed, cf. *Ap.* 21b2 ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας (the oracle) – here the ὅταν clause seems to have been used instead of a participle in order to indicate the repetition of the speech. Cf. also *Cri.* 54d3–4 ταῦτα ᾧ φίλε Κρίτων εὐ ἴσθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν (the speech of the Laws). There is hiatus after ἐγὼ, but then again so would there have been if the pronoun had been placed in the ὅταν clause.

**θαμά:** cf. note on 407a6 πολλάκις. Strictly speaking this word is in-

compatible with ὅταν ἀκούω: what the author meant is not ‘any time I hear you saying this often’ but ‘any time I hear you saying this, which is often’. It is theoretically possible, but extremely forced, to detach θαμὰ λέγοντος from ἀκούω σου and explain it as a participle of circumstance; we should better accept it as a contaminated construction, cf. *R.* 393b7–8 ὅταν τὰς ῥήσεις ἐκάστοτε λέγηι.

**e4** καὶ μάλα ἄγαμαι καὶ θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπαινῶ: καὶ . . . καὶ coupling semantically related verbs, the parallel structure, μάλα (instead of πάνυ or σφόδρα, cf. H. Thesleff, *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek* (Helsingfors–Copenhagen 1954), 56) all point to ‘pathetic style’ (Thesleff, *Styles*, 70–1); θαυμαστῶς ὡς (colloquial, cf. D. Tarrant, ‘More colloquialisms, semi-proverbs and word-play in Plato’, *CQ* 8 (1958) 158–60 at 159) indicates that this is irony (cf. note on 407a6 ἐξ-επληττόμην ἀκούων; Intr., section 1.5.3). ἐπαινῶ does more than just amplify ἄγαμαι: it also points back to 406a7 τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν. The introduction of the speech was in the imperfect tense with the distributive optative for the subordinate clause – its conclusion is in the present and the distributive subjunctive (cf. also 408c2 ἤγοῦμαι); Clitophon wishes to express that his admiration for Socrates’ speeches has not ceased, now that he is a pupil of Thrasymachus. Apart from this there is also a technical cause: the ‘semi-indirect discourse’ of 407e5–408b5, had it been introduced by ὅποτε αὖ φαίης . . . ὅτε λέγοις . . . ἐτελεύτα, would have lost its lively character. Cf. *Smp.* 180b1 θαυμάζουσι καὶ ἄγανται.

**e5–8** καὶ ὁπότεν . . . ἐσπουδακέναι: this is the second of the three parts of Socrates’ speech (cf. Intr., section 11.2.2); after χρήματα, σώματος ἐπιμέλεια is now censured. This part is set off from the first one in a very clear way: by the intervening appraisal ταῦτ’ οὖν . . . ἐπαινῶ (e3–4) and by the change from direct to reported speech. On the other hand, there is hardly any clear transition between the second part and the third. Just how fluid the transition is can be established only after the structure of this sentence has been elucidated.

As it is printed in our texts, we have a temporal protasis without a main clause to follow it. We can supply one easily enough: an equivalent of the preceding ἄγαμαι καὶ . . . ἐπαινῶ. It is impossible to attach the sentence to these very words by explaining καὶ (e5) as ‘so too’ (Bury; cf. Souilhé and many other translations – I take it these translations are due to embarrassment, not to misunderstanding; la Magna’s note ‘integra: Καὶ ἄγαμαι καὶ ἐπαινῶ σε, ὁπότεν’ does betray just such a misunderstanding), as we would then desire a particle to coordinate ταῦτ’ . . . ὅταν ἀκούω and ὁπότεν αὖ φῆις (καὶ δὴ καὶ would have served the purpose).

Besides, the case is not isolated: the next sentence, though more complicated, is essentially parallel: καὶ ὅταν λέγηις κτλ. has no apodosis; the anacoluthon is here less harsh because the speech reported is much longer and it is only natural that from 408a1 καὶ δὴ καί (or at any rate from a4 καὶ τελευτᾷ) Clitophon should have abandoned the formality of the nominal ὡς clauses. In fact, 408b5–c4 τούτοις δὴ τοῖς λόγοις . . . ἐπεγείρειν ἡμᾶς is the – long expected – equivalent of ἄγχαμα καὶ . . . ἐπαινῶ which was needed.

It would seem, then, that we are dealing with two subsequent anacolutha; the first one very harsh, the second tolerably justified. A reduction is desirable and as a matter of fact only the full stop which is printed after ἐσπουδακέναι stands in its way. A colon or a comma would improve the text by totally removing the first anacoluthon.

If this solution is accepted, the transition from the second part of Socrates' speech to the third is not very noticeable; it is marked only by a renewal (slightly varied) of καὶ ὁπότεν αὖ φῆις. There is a good reason for this lack of markers of transition. Obviously, the author did not have very much to say on the subject of σώματος ἐπιμέλεια, so the best he could do was to lump this (second) part and the third part of the speech together in one *allegro* sentence. When we assume that the second and third parts were separated from each other by a full stop, both this full stop and the absence of an apodosis to follow καὶ ὁπότεν αὖ φῆις κτλ. would make the lack of proportion between the second and the third part too obvious.

For the question why indirect report was chosen for these two parts, cf. Intr., section II.2.2; for parallels in thought to the second part, see Intr., section II.2.3.2.

**e5 τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ:** cf. *Phlb.* 34d8–9 τὸ δ' ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα λέγειν; *Ti.* 30c2 τὰ τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἡμῖν λεκτέον. Not adverbial as e.g. *R.* 460d8. Cf. note on 410d3 τὸ ἐφεξῆς.

**e6–7 ἕτερόν τι πράττειν τοιοῦτον:** viz. οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων (b1–2) – caring for inessential things. La Magna makes the phrase refer to the final part of the first speech only, but this brings in irrelevant information.

**e7 τοῦ μὲν ἄρξοντος:** Souilhé prints τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἄρξοντος against the consensus of ADF Themistius Stobaeus, on the sole authority of *Ven.* 189 and W, both secondary MSS. The particle is superfluous (explanatory asyndeton, for which cf. W. J. Verdenius, 'Notes on *Epitrepontes*', 17–18; to his references add England's Comm. on *Lg.*, index s.v. 'asyndeton, explanatory').

**ἄρξοντος . . . ἀρξόμενον:** the futures indicate that Socrates refers to

physical training as part of the education of the young. I prefer this explanation to taking the futures as modal, ‘that which is destined to rule’ (so la Magna and most translators), or even ‘that which should rule’ (Gonzalez), because I doubt that a substantive future participle can be modal in this type of context. At any rate the examples adduced by KG I 175.c (where futures are listed which denote that the subject ‘vermöge seiner Beschaffenheit oder nach Lage der Verhältnisse’ *can* or *must* execute an action, cf. also Kühner on X. *Mem.* 3.4.4; Stallbaum on Pl. *Mx.* 235d; id. on *R.* 524c; Magnien, *Futur grec*, II 46–57) tend to suggest that a substantive future participle (type οὐδ’ ὁ κωλύσων πάρα) can occur in this way only when a word denoting presence, absence, need is in the immediate vicinity. The conditions in which a modal future can occur have never been thoroughly studied; the phenomenon has been too often approached from the point of view of a Western European language (e.g. Gildersleeve, I 115: ‘The future . . . is either *shall* or *will*’) or from Latin (e.g. J. Humbert, *Syntaxe grecque* (Paris 1960<sup>3</sup>), 176–7; 297). Magnien’s *Futur grec* is too biased and besides recognises only the modality of volition (though in his translations those of possibility and destination inevitably crop up). – For the thought, Cobet, ‘Ad Themistii orationes’, 430 compares Hdt. 7.162.1 ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, ὑμεῖς οἴκατε τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἔχειν, τοὺς δὲ ἀρξομένους οὐκ ἔξειν.

**e8 ἐσπουδακέναί:** in classical prose, verbs expressing states, if their meaning involves having an opinion of sorts, normally have a perfect with the same meaning. It may or may not be true that the perfect has an ‘intensive’ value. Cf. my paper ‘Het perfectum van Griekse toestandswerkwoorden’, in S. R. Slings–I. Sluiter (ed.), *Ophelos: zes studies voor D. M. Schenkeveld* (Amsterdam 1988), 61–76.

**e8–408b5 καὶ ὅταν . . . λέγων:** see Intr., section II.2.3.3. for the general principle and its applications; for the anacoluthon contained in this passage, cf. note on 407e5–8. Somewhere in this passage the hypotactic force of the first ὡς ceases to exist. εἰ δὴ (eg) probably started as a parenthesis giving a few applications of the general principle stated just before.

**e8–9 ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι:** short for ἐπίσταται ὀρθῶς χρῆσθαι, cf. *Euthd.* 289a2 and passim.

**e9–12 εἰ δὴ . . . χρῆσθαι:** cf. *Euthd.* 281d1 καὶ ἀμβλὺ ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων [sc. ἐλάττω ἂν πράττοι and therefore ἐλάττω ἂν ἔξαρμαρτάνοι etc.] μᾶλλον ἢ ὄξύ; the same principle applied to the same field of human ability. Use of eyes and ears as the *first* example is slightly awkward (the question of how one can make a bad use of one’s eyes and ears at all is not, and could not easily be, answered); it is not

insignificant that it is actually the *last* example in *Euthd.* The awkwardness stems from the author's wish to cling to the pattern body – tools – soul (cf. Intr., section 11.2.3.3).

**11–12 μήτ' ἄλλην χρεῖαν μηδεμίαν χρῆσθαι:** for the construction cf. *Lg.* 785b7; 868b7.

**408a1 καὶ δὴ καί:** transitional, not marking a climax, cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 256 (where *Cra.* 419b2 does not belong: the whole discussion from 418a5 onwards was meant to prepare the etymology of ζημιῶδες).

**a2 δῆλον ὤς:** cf. note on 407a2.

**a4–b5 καὶ τελευτᾷ ... λέγων:** stylistically this sentence is a little more lively than the preceding ones: note the (slightly ironical) interaction created by δὴ (three times) and ἄρα; καλῶς; the absence of the article before ψυχῆι (a5), which gives a solemn effect (Thesleff, *Styles*, 81); the postposition of ἄρα; the rudder/steersman metaphor. See Intr., section 1.5.3.

**a4 καὶ ... δὴ:** this is a collocation of connective καί and δὴ marking (with some degree of irony) a report or quotation as well-known or even subscribed to by the speaker (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 233–5; cf. 407c2 and note) rather than the combination καί ... δὴ which indicates that 'the addition ... is an important one' (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 253).

**a4–5 ὁ λόγος οὗτος:** the entire speech (not 'this argument', so la Magna, Waterfield) is meant, cf. Intr., section 11.2.2.

**a5 σοι:** the dative should be compared with *Hp.Mi.* 363b2–3 ἡ Ἰλιάς κάλλιον [cf. καλῶς here] εἶη ποίημα τῶι Ὀμήρωι ἢ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια (cf. *KG* 1 429); *R.* 335e2 τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῶι (sc. Simonides; cf. Jowett–Campbell, *Republic*, 11 186); *Euthd.* 287e1 ὅτι μοι νοοῖ τὸ ῥῆμα (which disproves Stallbaum's note on *R.*, loc.cit.); the dative of the author in quotations (type Ὀδυσσεὺς λέγει Ὀμήρωι; *KG* 1 422) is a related but more stereotyped idiom.

**ψυχῆι ... χρῆσθαι:** we are left in the dark as to what exactly is meant by this phrase – surely Waterfield's 'how to use his mind' is entirely beside the point, as it fails to explain καὶ μὴ ζῆν. Quite probably the author did not go to much trouble to clarify the thought, because the phrase is an automatic result of applying the general principle ὅτωι τις μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι κτλ. to the general scheme which he found in *Republic* 1. On the other hand, he must have had something in mind, as he chose both the principle and the scheme for the sake of parodying the 'beautiful ending'. The end of the sentence reveals his intention: the phrase ὅστις ψυχῆι μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι is picked up by τῶι τοιοῦτῶι (b1); consequently the man who does not know how to use his soul should surrender himself τῶι μαθόντι τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν which is equaled with πολιτικὴ, δικαστικὴ and δικαιο-

σύνη. That is to say ‘using (= rightly using) one’s soul’ amounts to learning (cf. τῶι μαθόντι) justice.

This is in harmony with the tenor of the first part of the speech, as well as with the subsequent discussion on the ἀρετή of the soul (cf. especially 409a2–6). For Chrysippus’ interpretation, cf. Intr., section II.7.1 (4).

The phrase ψυχῆς χρῆσις is used in a completely different sense by Aristotle (*Protr.* B 90–1 Düring): ‘there are many ways of using one’s soul but the truest (κυριωτάτη) is philosophy (ἡ τοῦ φρονεῖν ὀτι μάλιστα)’. This is a good illustration of the wide gap between Aristotelian protreptic (foreshadowed in the *Euthydemus*), which appeals to the intellect and emphasises theoretical knowledge, and protreptic in the traditional Socratic way, which is first and foremost ethical (cf. Intr., sections II.1.5; II.7.1). The author of *Clit.* and Aristotle use the same protreptic motif (ἐπίστασθαι χρῆσθαι) and in the same area (ψυχῆ), quite probably independently from each other. The discrepancy is instructive for the history of philosophical protreptic and the place of *Clit.* in it.

**a6 ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν τῇ ψυχῇ:** in Plato, ἡσυχία in connection with the soul is normally *tranquillitas animi* (*R.* 583c7–8; *Lg.* 791a3–4; *Prt.* 356e1); it may also denote slow intelligence (*Chrm.* 160a1–2) and mental laziness (*Th.* 153b11–c1). The way in which the expression is used here is apparently a novel one (it had to be glossed by καὶ [explanatory] μὴ ζῆν). There is a conscious play upon the double function of the soul as the seat of thinking (called διάνοια a few lines below) and as the principle of life. Cf. Arist. *Protr.* B 83 Düring καὶ ζῆν ἄρα μάλλον φατέον . . . τὸν ἐνεργοῦντα τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ μόνον ἔχοντος; Pl. *R.* 353d3–10 and Tucker’s note. – For the dative (of respect) with ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, cf. *Lg.* 653d8.

**a7 πρᾶττοντι καθ’ αὐτόν:** these words point forward to the second alternative (they are to be contrasted with παραδόντι . . . ἄλλωι); ζῆν by itself would have been sufficient. – κατὰ with a reflexive pronoun (‘all by oneself’; cf. KG I 480; Classen–Steup on Th. 1.79.1) is usually reinforced with αὐτός in Plato, but cf. *Grg.* 505d9 λέγων κατὰ σαυτόν (not ‘after your own fashion’, as suggested by Bury on *Smp.* 199b1). A similar expression in a similar context *Lg.* 732b2 αὐτοὶ πρᾶττοντες.

**εἰ δέ τις ἀνάγκη ζῆν εἶη:** cf. *R.* 378a4. A vague reference to rejection of suicide, which was of course well-known to be Platonic, if only from *Phd.* 61c9–62c8. For other testimonies which are important for the history of this rejection, cf. P. Boyancé, ‘Note sur la φρουρά platonicienne’, *RPh* 37 (1963) 7–11; J. C. G. Strachan, ‘Who *did* forbid suicide at *Phaedo* 62b?’, *CQ* 20 (1970) 216–20; *HGPh*, I 310–11. – The optative in the εἰ clause is combined with a present indicative of an expression

denoting propriety in the main clause; cf. *MT* §§502; 555; my review of N. van der Ben, *The Charmides of Plato* (Amsterdam 1985), *Mnem.* 41 (1988) 409–14 at 412. εἴη is omitted by Stob., a defensible reading, but the optative conveys a nuance of uncertainty which is in harmony with the context.

**b1 ἄρα:** Denniston's classification of this occurrence under ἄρα expressing surprise (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 36) is not precise enough; it is what is usually called 'referential' ἄρα, 'used to direct attention to the fact that the speaker is not uttering his own thought' (Jowett–Campbell, *Republic*, II 208; cf. des Places, *Particules de liaison*, 268–72; KG II 324), a specialisation of the general value of ἄρα to denote a distance between the speaker and his utterance (cf. J. M. van Ophuijsen in *Two Studies*, 82). Its place at the end of a clause is curious but not unparalleled in Plato: *Hp.Ma.* 283b2–3 τοῦτου δ' ὅρος ἐστὶν ἄρα; *Lg.* 709e3 τί μετὰ τοῦτ' εἰπεῖν ὀρθῶς ἐστὶν ἄρα; It cannot be a coincidence that in all three cases ἄρα is preceded by ἐστὶν. See also *Prt.* 355b4–5 ἐὰν μὴ πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι χρώμεθα ἄρα, where many editors prefer the Byzantine conjecture ἄμα.

**b1–2 καθάπερ . . . ἄλλωι:** for the expression cf. *Lg.* 775b3; *R.* 488c2. The thought recurs at *Alc. I* 117c9–e6, cf. esp. τί δ' εἰ ἐν νηϊ πλείοις . . . τῶι κυβερνήτῃ ἐπιτρέψας ἂν ἡσυχίαν ἄγοις . . . (εἰ) ὅταν δέ γέ πού τινες μὴ οἴωνται εἰδέναι [sc. ὅτι πράττουσιν], ἄλλοις παραδιδόασιν (in *Chrm.* 171d8–e5 and *Lg.* 732a7–b2, where the same thought is formulated, no mention of steersmen is made). All these parallel passages deal with handing over what one does not know how to use in order to avoid ἀμαρτήματα; our place and *Alc. I* 135b7–d10 concern persons turning over themselves to others, without it being made very clear what we are to understand by that. At the end of *Alc. I* Alcibiades promises that he will from now on follow Socrates like a παιδαγωγός (135d10) and make a start with δικαιοσύνης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; it would seem that what is there called τὸ ἄρχεσθαι . . . ὑπὸ τοῦ βελτίονος (135b7–8) amounts to becoming a close companion of this better man. What is meant in *Clit.* is determined by the exact reference of τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητικὴν (Intr., section II.2.3).

**b1 καθάπερ:** found in this place, and at c4; 409b7; 410e4, ὥσπερ 407a8; 408c3; e3. The general value of this stylometric criterion (discovered by Dittenberger, 'Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der Platonischen Dialoge', *Hermes* 16 (1881) 321–45 at 337–9; Brandwood, *Chronology*, 19 and table 4.3) is beyond doubt. Yet in this case I am inclined to share Souilhé's scepticism (180): the *Clit.* is too short for us to rely on criteria based on ratios; cf. Intr., section II.7.2.

**b2 τὰ πηδάλια τῆς διανοίας:** Greek ships of the classical age had

a pair of steering oars, hence the plural as in *Plt.* 272e4. Cf. J. S. Morrison–R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships 900–322 B.C.* (Cambridge 1968), 291–2 and General Index s.v. ‘steering oar’. The expression is modelled on τὰ πηδάλια τοῦ πλοίου.

**ἄλλωι, τῶι μαθόντι:** A. Gasda, *Kritische Bemerkungen zu Themistios* (Lauban 1886–7; *non vidi*) proposes ἄλλωι τῶι μαθόντι. But the article is necessary after ἄλλος; cf. de Strycker–Slings on *Ap.* 33d7; my note on *R.* 434b2, ‘Notes on *Politeia*, IV’, 415.

**b2–5 τῶι μαθόντι . . . λέγων:** for the comparison of a politician to a steersman (announced b1–2), cf. K. M. Kaiser, *Das Bild des Steuermannes in der antiken Literatur* (Erlangen 1954); for Plato: P. Louis, *Les métaphores de Platon* (Rennes 1945), 155–6. See further Intr., section II.2.3.3.

**b3–4 ἦν δὴ . . . πολλαίαι:** Bury takes ἦν as predicative: ‘which is the name that you, Socrates, frequently give to politics’ (cf. Orwin; Pavlu, ‘Pseudopl. Kleitophon’, 12: ‘Socrates nennt also die Politik häufig so [κυβερνητική]’). I doubt whether this is possible in Greek (ὅ or ἦ would certainly be more normal). But these scholars saw the difficulty: why would Clitophon state in so many words that Socrates used to call the leading of men politics? The answer may be found in the interpretation of πολιτική that I have given in Intr., section II.2.3.3: when the metaphor in τὴν . . . κυβερνητικὴν is translated into plain language, the statement makes good sense: ‘the leading (educating) of men, to which you often refer with the word πολιτική’ – this implies that Socrates used the term in a different sense from that used by most Greeks; we know for a fact that he did so, to wit in *Grg.*, *Euthd.* and *Plt.*

πολλαίαις can mean that this concept of politics is found in more than one Socratic text, or that it is a particularly important piece of Socratic (in this case, Platonic) doctrine. Cf. note on 407a6 πολλαίαις.

**b3 δὴ:** not, I think, the ironic δὴ used in referring to other people’s opinions, as at 407c2 and 408a4 (cf. notes), but simply an indication that this is knowledge shared between Clitophon and Socrates (cf. J. M. van Ophuijsen in *Two Studies*, 85), or perhaps indicating that Clitophon agrees with Socrates (personal commitment of speaker and addressee, cf. on 407c2). Similarly in the next line and at 409b5 (see note).

**b4–5 τὴν αὐτὴν . . . λέγων:** a highly unusual word order. To my mind, the most normal order would be τὴν αὐτὴν δὴ ταύτην λέγων ὡς ἔστιν κτλ. The order as we have it is determined (a) by the author’s wish to emphasise the idea ‘the very same art’ (which – quite normally – causes anticipation); (b) by his inclination to make neat parcels of dependent clauses (cf. note on 407b8–c6 ἄλλ’ . . . ἀμουσίαις), hence the final position of λέγων. The consequence is that not only the subject but also the nominal predicate of the subordinate clause is anticipated. This



is rather unusual in Greek, cf. KG II 580, Anm. 5. Of the two examples given there, E. *IT* 951–2 is textually uncertain and even if the transmitted text is retained, it admits of another construction. On the other hand, A. *Th.* 19–20 ἐθρέψατ' (sc. Earth) οἰκητῆρας ἀσπιδηφόρους πιστοὺς ὅπως γένοισθε πρὸς χρέος τόδε (M. Schmidt's πιστοί θ', accepted by Page, is definitely unlikely) seems to me a virtually certain example of prolepsis of the nominal predicate: Verrall's 'in order that ye might be formed (...) against (with a view to) this occasion' gives more semantic weight to γένοισθε than this verb can bear in Greek; Hutchinson's discussion ends up in aporia; West accepts the transmitted text. I have found one case of prolepsis of subject and part of the nominal predicate in Plato: *Lg.* 639a2–3 εἴ τις αἰγῶν τροφήν καὶ τὸ ζῶιον αὐτὸ κτῆμα ὡς ἔστιν καλὸν ἐπαινοῖ κτλ. It would seem that H. Richards' opinion 'there is no possible construction for the accusative' is mistaken, and his proposal to read δικαστική τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη (*Platonica*, 157; cf. M. Schmidt's conjecture at A. *Th.*) superfluous.

**δικαστικὴν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην:** cf. Intr., section II.5.4.

**b5–c4 Τοῦτοις ... ἡμᾶς:** the parallel duplications in παμ(πόλλοις) ... παγ(κάλως) (cf. note on b6); οὔτ' ... (πώ)ποτε ... οὔτ' ... (μή)ποτε; (προτρεπτικω)τάτους ... (ὠφελιμω)τάτους indicate that irony is present, cf. Intr., section I.5.3.

**b6 παγκάλως:** a favourite vehicle of Platonic irony, cf. Festugière, *Protreptiques*, 28 n. 2. In combination with πάμπολυς: *Hp.Ma.* 286b3–4 παμπόλλα ... καὶ πάγκαλα.

**b7 διδακτὸν ἀρετή:** cf. Intr., sections II.1.2; II.2.3.1.

**b7–8 πάντων ... ἐπιμελεῖσθαι:** this had been the recurrent unifying motif of the speech reported by Clitophon. It is of course the central motif of all Socratic protreptic. See Intr., section II.2.2 n. 188; note on 410c8–d5.

**c1 σχεδόν** instead of σχεδόν τι (also 410e7) has been considered a mark of late style (Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, 3; Lutosławski, *Plato's Logic*, 124; Brandwood, *Chronology*, table 10.2); even so it is found in *Ap.*, *Cri.*, *Chrm.*, *Grg.*, *Phd.* With οὔτ' ... πώποτε: not 'hardly' (Bury and Orwin; cf. H. Müller; Bertini; De Win) but 'probably never', 'I dare say never' ('serve ad attenuare in certo qual modo, e non senza una tinta d'ironia, la recisa affermazione che segue', la Magna), with the usual understatement, cf. LSJ, s.v. σχεδόν, II 2; England on *Lg.* 649a2; Stein on *Hdt.* 5.19.2. An extreme example is *Men. Aspis* 420–1 ἀδελφός – ὦ Ζεῦ, πῶς φράσω; – σχεδόν τί σου τέθνηκεν.

**c1–2 οὔτ' οἶμαι μήποτε ὕστερον ἀντίπω:** even now that I have turned my back on you and gone over to Thrasymachus.

**c2 τε:** Richards' δέ (*Platonica*, 157) and Schanz' <ὄς> προ-

τρεπτικωτάτους τε are unnecessary. There is nothing against οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . τε (KG II 292); in these contexts, τε does not necessarily introduce an opposition, cf. Hdt. 1.42.1; X. *An.* 4.4.6; *Cyr.* 2.3.6. τε γάρ of Pa (τε Va) is probably conjectural, though in view of the status of that MS the conjecture may be an old one.

**ε3 ἀτεχνῶς:** a colloquial word (D. Tarrant, ‘Colloquialisms, semi-proverbs, and word-play in Plato’, *CQ* 40 (1946) 109–17 at 114–15), slightly out of character in this formal sentence; it marks the following simile the more sharply (the usual function of the word in Plato: cf. Burnet on *Phd.* 59a5; 90c4; England on *Lg.* 923a3; D. Tarrant, op. cit., esp. 115 (d)).

**ε3–4 ὡσπερ . . . ἡμᾶς:** there can be no doubt that the author was thinking of *Ap.* 30e2–5, cf. Intr., section II.2.3.1.

**ε4–7 προσείχον . . . ὀνομάζειν:** this is an odd sentence at first sight. The first clause (προσειχον . . . ἀκουσόμενος) gives the impression that Clitophon is waiting for Socrates to deliver other speeches in which he will go more deeply into the matter of ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς (which had been the refrain of the speech reported). But this impression is flatly contradicted by the next participle (ἐπανερωτῶν). It might seem that the relation between main and concomitant action has been inverted (‘I asked my question while being very attentive’), but this goes far beyond the type of inversions listed KG II 98–9.

The only way I can account for this confusion is to explain it as an imitation of *Euthd.* 283a1–7. There Socrates has finished his protreptic conversation with Clinias (similarity in situation): τῶι δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔσομένωι πάνυ σφόδρα προσείχον τὸν νοῦν [. . . Dionysodorus begins] καὶ ἡμεῖς πάντες ἐβλέπομεν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὥς αὐτίκα μάλα ἀκουσόμενοι θαυμασίους τινὰς λόγους (similarity in wording). Now what actually happens is that Dionysodorus’ (and his brother’s) arguments are utterly disappointing. I take it that the author wanted to give a hint that what Clitophon is going to hear is equally disappointing. If indeed the author wanted to allude to the situation of *Euthd.* 283aff. the sentence remains of course a confused one, but we have noticed before that our author is quite willing to sacrifice clarity of thought and expression when he has an opportunity for working in more literary allusions, even though they are not worked in very well (cf. Intr., section II.2.3.3 (neighbour’s lyre) and note on 407b2–8). See section II.7.3(5) for the relevance of this habit for the problem of authenticity.

This interpretation has of course some important consequences. The sentence could only be understood by those who had read (and were fairly conversant with) the *Euthydemus*. This means that the author did more than just draw from a general store of protreptic themes (of

course I do not wish to deny that he did): one of his sources was actually the *Euthydemus* itself. Cf. note on 410b4–6.

**c4 τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα ὡς ἀκουσόμενος:** note the inverted word order. The participle is probably not final (so la Magna and most translators), if it is indeed an imitation of *Euthd.* 283a6–7: ‘Ma io stava [*sic*] attento nella speranza di udire ciò che viene in seguito’ (Bertini), cf. Ficinus.

**οὗ τι σέ:** see Intr., section II.5.1.

**c5–6 τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν . . . σῶν:** on the partitive genitive as object instead of the accusative (τέμνω τῆς γῆς for τέμνω τὴν γῆν), cf. KG I 345; Schw.–D. 102–3; ‘genitivo partitivo, dipendente da un τινάς sottinteso’, la Magna – I doubt that the second half of this explanation is linguistically correct. Examples in Plato are rare, but cf. *Lg.* 906d ἄν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπονέμηι ‘provided one gives them a part of their unjust gains’.

**c6–7 συνεπιθυμητῶν . . . ὀνομάζειν:** an allusion (a rather broad one) to Socrates’ denial of having μαθηταί (cf. *Ap.* 33a4–5 οὐς δὴ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμούς μαθητὰς εἶναι). This is generally Socratic, cf. X. *Mem.* 1.2.3 καίτοι γε οὐδεπώποτε ὑπέσχετο διδάσκαλος εἶναι τούτου; Aeschines, *Alc.* fr. 11c D. = 4Kr. (*SSR* VI A 53). Both Plato and Xenophon avoid the word μαθητής when speaking of Socrates’ companions. Yet, when in *Tht.* and *Sph.* Plato theorises about Socrates’ work, it is difficult to see the difference (apart from the question of payment). Cf. Th. Meyer, *Apologie*, 134 n. 195.

**c6 τε καί . . . ἤ:** not (as is usually the case with τε (...) καί . . . καί or καί . . . τε (...) καί, cf. KG II 251) coupling ἡλικιωτῶν and συνεπιθυμητῶν as against ἐταίρων, but the opposite: Socrates’ coevals are opposed to his ‘pupils’ (συνεπιθυμητῶν ἢ . . . ἢ . . .).

**ἡλικιωτῶν:** not many of Socrates’ companions were in fact of his age: Crito (*Ap.* 33d10; *Cri.* 49a9) is the only one for certain; Chaerephon (ἐμός . . . ἐταῖρος . . . ἐκ νέου, *Ap.* 20e8–21a1; he appears to be co-owner of the φροντιστήριον in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, but not consistently, cf. Dover’s Comm., xxxiii; xcv) possibly so.

**συνεπιθυμητῶν:** a hapax word, contaminated from συνόντες, συνδιατρίβοντες (the usual Socratic surrogate for μαθηταί) and ἐπιθυμητής, which Plato never uses absolutely (unlike ἐραστής) but always with the genitive of an abstract noun or phrase (e.g. *Euthphr.* 14d4 ἐπιθυμητής . . . τῆς σῆς σοφίας). But Xenophon does use it this way, and, what is more, applies it to Socrates’ followers: *Mem.* 1.2.60 ἐκεῖνος [sc. Socrates] γὰρ πολλοὺς ἐπιθυμητὰς . . . λαβὼν οὐδένα πώποτε μισθὸν τῆς συνουσίας ἐπράξατο. Half-way between this absolute use and Plato’s practice stands X. *Ap.* 28 where Apollodorus is called ἐπιθυμητής . . . ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοῦ (sc. Socrates). Better known, of course, is ἐραστής,

which is used by Plato both for the sophists' pupils and for companions of Socrates (*Smp.* 173b3–4 Σωκράτους ἐραστής ὢν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν τότε). Curiously enough, Xenophon eschews this reference of the word ἐραστής. συνεπιθυμητής is quoted from Plato by Pollux, *Onom.* 3.69.

The formation is more allusive than precise. It ought to mean 'fellow-admirer' (in the sense of συμμαθητής and συμφοιτητής) but obviously it does not. There is no good reason to consider this *ad hoc* creation a mark of inauthenticity (Steinhart, 72 n. 39; Susemihl, 516 n.; Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, 49 n. 8; Geffcken, 'Rätsel', 433 n. 5; Thesleff, *Styles*, 15 n. 2).

**ἑταίρων:** referring to pupils; sometimes also to teachers (cf. *Men.* 79e6, where Gorgias is meant).

**ὅπως δεῖ:** 'we should expect ὅπως δὴ δεῖ or ὅπως ἂν δέηι' (H. Richards, *Platonica*, 157). This is partly right: ὅστις (etc.) is not frequently equivalent to Lat. *quicumque* (Monteil, *Phrase relative*, 131–3); yet it does occur: *Cri.* 50a6–7 εἴτε ἀποδιδράσκειν εἴθ' ὅπως δεῖ ὀνομάσαι τοῦτο; *Hp.Ma.* 282d4; *R.* 346c5; 353c5; *Lg.* 633a9; 674c2; 919d7; 925e2; *Grg.* 503e6 – esp. the phrase ὁπόθεν καὶ ὅπηι χαίρετον ὀνομαζόμενοι and its numerous variations (Stallbaum on *Euthd.* 288b1). Cf. note on 406a5.

**ε7 πρὸς σέ:** 'in relation to you'; Ast: 'quomodocumque eorum ad te rationem [relationem?] appellari oportet'. Cf. X. *Mem.* 4.2.15 ἐγὼ σε . . . ὑπελάμβανον πρὸς τοὺς φίλους μόνον ταῦτα ἐρωτᾶν ('I thought you were putting these questions only in relation to your friends').

**γάρ:** ἐπανηρώτων resumes the thread of the narrative after the digression τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν κτλ. A resumptive particle (δὴ, οὖν, τοίνυν) would perhaps seem more normal. But γάρ is used because it marks the return to the narrative level, after the authorial comment ἢ ὅπως . . . ὀνομάζειν. In other words, it is here used in its typical function of push particle, cf. my remarks in *New Approaches*, 101–4; note on 407a5 γάρ. The sentence provides the justification for προσεῖχον τὸν νοῦν: 'I paid good attention . . . For I first questioned your best students.' To some extent γάρ mitigates the incongruence we detected in the preceding sentence, but it does not iron it out altogether.

**ε8 τοὺς τι:** this (or perhaps τοὺς τί) should be printed, not τοὺς τί, cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II 339 n. 1.

**δι κατὰ σέ:** cf. Intr., section 1.5.3.

**ὑποτείνων:** 'propounding' (Bury), 'je leur présentais mes difficultés' (Souilhé), 'die Sache angreifend' (Schleiermacher), 'ita praefatus quaestionem exposui' (Ficinus, cf. *la Magna*) – evidently this word has embarrassed translators. It should be connected with ὑποτείνεσθαι, which occurs at *Grg.* 448e8; *Tht.* 179e2. LSJ s.v. ὑποτείνω, II 2: 'lay or put before one, present, suggest'; for *Grg.*, loc. cit., 'propose a question'.

Let us start with the passage from *Tht.* ‘We should examine more closely the doctrine of universal flux; there seems to have been quite a battle about it – In Ionia it is even becoming very popular right now; Heraclitus’ school are strenuous defenders.’ – Τῶι τοι ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε μᾶλλον σκεπτέον καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. There is no question to pose here; nor do I see how the Heracliteans can be said to present or suggest anything – the meaning is clearly: ‘they have demonstrated themselves how this doctrine is built up ἐξ ἀρχῆς’. Excellently Schleiermacher: ‘so wie sie ihn [den Satz] eigentlich vorzeichnen’.

A similar interpretation in *Grg.*, loc. cit., is much more satisfactory than the one given by LSJ. Chaerephon has asked Polus what one should call Gorgias if he possesses the same τέχνη as Herodicus (doctor), or Aristophon (painter). What should we rightly call him? Polus starts off with an encomium on τέχνη. Socrates intervenes: Polus should have said what exactly Gorgias’ τέχνη was. ὥσπερ τὰ ἔμπροσθέν σοι ὑπετίνατο Χαιρεφῶν καὶ αὐτῶι καλῶς καὶ διὰ βραχέων ἀπεκρίνω, καὶ νῦν οὕτως εἶπέ τις ἢ τέχνη καὶ τίνα Γοργίαν καλεῖν χρὴ ἡμᾶς. To my mind, ὑπετίνατο (which refers to the analogies which Chaerephon had used) is not ‘submitted’ but ‘shown (by his previous questions how to answer this one)’, ‘hinted’. Stallbaum tries to connect the two notions: ‘interrogando et disputando proponere eoque aliquem sensim ad aliquid perducere et quasi ὑποτιθέναι s. ὑποβάλλειν εἰ quid respondendum sit’ (ad loc.; similarly Dodds), but the parallel quoted from *Tht.* shows that the notion of ‘proponere’ is secondary.

The same holds for E. *Or.* 915: (an anonymous person had proposed to stone Orestes and Electra) ὑπὸ δ’ ἔτεινε Τυνδάρεως λόγους τῶι σφῶ κατακτείνοντι τοιοῦτους λέγειν. On the analogy of *Grg.*, loc. cit. I submit that λόγους ... τοιοῦτους is object of ὑπὸ ... ἔτεινε (and λέγειν epegetic infinitive): ‘T. had inspired these words into him’; ‘T. had led him on to say these words’ (‘suggested’ is too weak). Whether or not 916 is deleted is immaterial for the meaning.

The way ὑποτείνειν is used in *Clit.* is similar to the situation in *Grg.*: Clitophon asks a forthright question, illustrates it by using an analogy from the care of the body (408e3–409a2) and thereby shows them how to answer it. The meaning is therefore ‘demonstrating’, ‘inducing’: ‘Indem ich nach deiner Weise die Antwort ihnen gewissermassen an die Hand gab’ (H. Müller); ‘dando loro, alla tua maniera, una spinta’ (Zur-etti). In *Grg.* and *Tht.* the middle voice is used; in E. *Or.* and *Clit.* the active. It is quite normal for abstract compounds of which the verbum simplex has a concrete meaning to waver between active and middle; in Plato (e.g.) ὑπερβάλλω, -βάλλομαι; προτίθημι, -τίθεμαι; προτρέπω, -τρέπομαι.

**d1–2 ὦ βέλτιστοι . . . ὑμεῖς:** as Socrates had started off his speech with an apostrophe borrowed from tragic diction, so Clitophon opens his with an imitation of one. σύ occurs rather often after a vocative in tragedy (πάνδυρτε σύ A. *Th.* 969 (ῶ) δύστηνε σύ, S. *Ph.* 759; E. *Andr.* 68; ῶ κάκιστε σύ, E. *Andr.* 631; etc.) and in comedy (ῶ βδελυρὲ καὶ ναίσχυντε καὶ τολμηρὲ σύ, Ar. *Ran.* 465; ῶ βέλτιστε σύ, Eub. fr. 105.1 K.–A.; Damox. fr. 2.17 K.–A.; Lyn. fr. 1.11 K.–A.), but I have found no instance of ὑμεῖς used that way, nor an instance of either σύ or ὑμεῖς following a vocative (where the vocative alone would suffice) in Plato. Nearest to this comes *Euthd.* 303c4 ῶ μακάριοι σφῶ τῆς θαυμαστῆς φύσεως (which is different because of the genitive). – For the punctuation, cf. note on 407a5 ὦ Σώκρατες σοί.

**d2 νῦν:** in the MSS, bracketed by Hermann and Modugno, and indeed there is little point in a temporal adverb; at best ‘now that we have been aroused [c3]’ – this may be what Ficinus meant by ‘deinde’ – or ‘in the present circumstances’, Verdenius, ‘Notes on *Clitopho*’, 144 (his comparison of this passage with 409a2 and 410d4 is not illuminating, since in those places ‘now’ is completely satisfactory). Probably νῦν should be read. Brandwood (*Word Index*, s.v.) gives five instances of it (not counting δὴ νῦν) but no doubt there are many more (see Dodds on *Grg.* 451a3), since Burnet (on whose text the *Word Index* is based) was extremely reluctant to print νῦν, accepting it after ἴθι, δεῦρο, δὴ only. I have found νῦν used in questions with (at most) a vague temporal reference in *Sph.* 253c6; *Lg.* 630b8; 835d1.

**ἀποδεχόμεθα:** ‘understand’, cf. Ast, *Lexicon*, s.v., ad fin. If this is a deliberative question, the present indicative is surprising (though not excluded, cf. A. W. McWhorter, ‘A study of the so-called deliberative type of question (τί ποιήσω;); as found in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides’, *TAPhA* 41 (1910) 157–67 at 165: ‘even a present indicative may sometimes appear in a question, approaching the deliberative type; cf. in Latin, *quid ago?* So τί λέγομεν; [cf. *Lg.* 652a5]’); cf. the very frequent use of φάμεν in questions in Plato. But it is quite possible that Clitophon includes himself only for the sake of (ironical) politeness (cf. *Tht.* 210b4 ἢ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν ῶ φίλε; Jowett–Campbell, *Republic*, II 195–6; Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen*, I 42–4): in fact, ἀποδέχεσθε is meant. Verdenius, ‘Notes on *Clitopho*’, 144 suggests that this is ‘a parody of Socrates’ preference for the plural’ – he may well be right.

**d2–3 τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπὴν ἡμῶν:** for collocation of subjective and objective genitives cf. *R.* 329b1 τὰς τῶν οἰκείων προπηλακίσεις τοῦ γήρωσ; 537c2–3 οἰκειότητος . . . ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων (kinship of the studies); *KG* I 337. – προτροπή is a hapax in the Platonic

corpus (it is a worthless Byzantine conjecture at *Lg.* 920b2), but that cannot be an argument against authenticity: given the fact that the author started the sentence the way he did, with πῶς . . . ἀποδεχόμεθα he had no option but to use the action noun. That it is not elsewhere used in Plato is due to the fact that Plato seldom discusses exhortation explicitly. The word is also found in Democritus and Aristotle.

**d3–6** ὡς ὄντος μόνου τούτου, ἐπεξελεθῆν δὲ οὐκ ὄν τῶι πράγματι . . . , ἀλλ' . . . ἑτέρους: ABA structure, cf. Dodds on *Grg.* 452e6 (and Index s.v. *aba* structure); de Strycker–Slings on *Ap.* 40b4–6; J. Th. Kakridis, *Der thukydeideische Epitaphios* (Munich 1961), 29. For the purpose of this dilemma, cf. Intr., section 1.5.3. This structure is disjunctively opposed to what follows (d7 ἢ δεῖ κτλ.), hence a comma after ἑτέρους is better than a question-mark.

**d4** ὄν: a verb meaning 'it is possible' is necessary, as was seen by Bessarion – I take it that his proposal ἔνι was supposed to mean this. The more original meaning 'to be present in' is out of place and seems to require the article with the infinitive (cf. *R.* 431e4). As a matter of fact, ἐνεῖναι meaning 'to be possible' is found only once in the genuine works of Plato (*Lg.* 646d6), though it is well-established already in the fifth century and occurs frequently in Plato's contemporaries – it seems that Plato consciously avoided this usage at least until his old age (among the *Dubia* it recurs at *Ep.* 12 359d2). As long as Plato's authorship is not excluded beyond doubt, we should be hesitant about excepting ἔνι. Ficinus translates the transmitted text: 'an quasi solum hoc exstet, prodire vero ad opus (. . .) minime'. But the coordination of τούτου and the infinitive without article seems strange and ἐν does not elsewhere follow ἐπεξέρχομαι or -εἰμι.

Therefore, the best solution seems to me to suppose that an original ὄν was corrupted to ἐν. I wonder if the corruption to ἐν has not also caused a syntactic harmonisation: in other words, if the original text was ἐπεξελεθῆν δὲ οὐκ ὄν τῶι πράγματι or τὸ πρᾶγμα. Both constructions are attested in Plato. With the dative it would have meant 'to pursue the matter' (cf. *R.* 366e8; *Ly.* 215e1), with the accusative 'to go through the matter; to investigate it completely' (cf. LSJ s.v.v. ἐπέξειμι III 2; ἐπεξέρχομαι II 3). It so happens that the context (especially the following words καὶ λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέως) admits of both possibilities, though perhaps the dative would be slightly preferable from a stylistic point of view. Besides, the dative has the advantage of providing an easier explanation for the corruption.

In the first version of this book, I proposed ἔ(στυ)ν for ἐν, which was endorsed by Gonzalez. My new proposal has two advantages over the

former: (1) ὄν as an accusative absolute ('it [not] being possible') is syntactically on a par with the preceding ὄντος, as logically it should be: both are modified by ὡς; (2) ὄν better explains the corruption to ἐν than ἔστιν does. KG II 89 quotes ὄν thus used (= ἐξόν, δυνατὸν ὄν) at D. 50.22; I have not found a parallel in Plato. For ὡς modifying first ὄντος then ὄν (but as a copula, not a substantive noun, as in my proposal), cf. R. 604b10–c1 ὡς οὐτε δήλου ὄντος ... οὐτε ... ἄξιον ὄν κτλ.

**λαβεῖν αὐτὸ τελέως:** τελέως αὐτό Va against ADF has weak authority.

**d6 ἐκείνους:** against this reading of ADF, Schanz adopted ἐκείνοις, found in Va, possibly an old reading in view of the status of that MS, but cf. Riddell, 'Digest', §185; Jowett–Campbell, *Republic*, II 240. After the infinitive προτρέπειν, the thought changes to 'it will be inevitable' or the like.

**d7 τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπανερωτᾶν:** on account of τί τοῦντεῦθεν, 'ought we to ask ... the further question' (Bury; cf. H. Müller; la Magna) is less likely than 'sollen wir nicht ... nun auch des weitern ausfragen' (Schleiermacher; so most translators). – ἐπερωτᾶν (A) is not found elsewhere in *Clit.* and is therefore probably false.

**εἰ τοῦτ' αὐτό:** the author is apparently indifferent to precise pronominal reference. His meaning is clear enough: d3 τοῦτου: τὸ προτρέπειν; d4 αὐτό: τὸ πρᾶγμα = the object of προτροπή ἐπ' ἀρετήν; d5 τοῦτ': τοὺς μήπω προτετραμμένους προτρέπειν; εἰ τοῦτ' αὐτό: the object of προτροπή. This object can be equated with ἀρετή – as the analogy e3–10 suggests, ἀρετή is to be taken as the best state of the soul. Cf. next note and note on e8 τούτου ... αὐτοῦ.

**e2–3 δικαιοσύνης περί μαθήσεως:** for περί with the genitive instead of the simple genitive (used here perhaps to avoid two subsequent genitives), cf. England on *Lg.* 676c6 (and Index s.v. περί c. gen.). δικαιοσύνης takes up ἐπ' ἀρετήν (d3); at 408a3 we find again τῆι τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῆι. This is understandable: Socrates had been exhorting his audience to the ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς, a point which Clitophon had grasped (cf. e7 ἐπιμέλειαν πᾶσαν ποιῆσθαι; 410b4–6 σὲ τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δρᾶν; 410d5–e1), but in the first part of the protreptic speech the emphasis had been put rather strongly on δικαιοσύνη. There are two possibilities: either the author of *Clit.* wanted to imply that δικαιοσύνη and ἀρετή are identical (cf. 410e7–8 πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα), that is, that δικαιοσύνη is the best state of the soul, or he takes δικαιοσύνη as the τέχνη which is necessary in order to reach ἀρετή (cf. the analogy γυμναστική καὶ ἰατρική: ἀρετῆ τοῦ σώματος:: δικαιοσύνη: ἀρετῆ τῆς ψυχῆς which lies at the bottom



of the next sentence). Cf. Intr., section II.4.1. Gallavotti's τίνος περί μαθήσεως ('Miscellanea', *RFIC* 63 (1935) 508–13 at 511), cf. 409a2–3, is therefore superfluous.

**e3–409a2 ὥσπερ ... ἰατρική:** logically, this is one sentence (Schleiermacher; Bertini), though all editors print a full stop after οὔσαν (e10). Theoretically δ' after εἰ at e10 is superfluous (cf. KG II 487–8), but only theoretically, as the first εἰ clause (containing many dependent clauses) is very long. Cf. note on 410d5–e1.

**e3 προύτρεπεν:** cf. note on e5.

**e4 προνοῦντας:** this verb, though quite common in Xenophon and the orators, is evidently avoided by Plato and Aristotle. It is found only once elsewhere in the Platonic corpus (*Cra.* 395c7–8, in the etymology of Πέλοψ; it is coupled with προῖδειν after the fashion of the *Cra.*; it may be important that Plato uses the deponent form προνοηθῆναι). Here it does not have its usual meaning 'to foresee', 'to provide', but 'to realise beforehand', which in Plato usually is προγιγνώσκειν (with a ὅτι clause, as here, *Ti.* 70c2–3). The use of προνοεῖν instead and, besides, in the active form may be a sign of inauthenticity. Cf. note on 408d1 ὑποτείνων.

**e5 κᾶπειτα ὠνείδιζεν:** κᾶπειτα does not mark off two distinct stages, exhortation (προύτρεπεν) and reproof (ὠνείδιζεν): the imaginary persuader starts his 'protreptic' because he finds fault with his objects in the first place (μηδὲν προνοοῦντας ὁρῶν κτλ.). Consequently, exhortation and reproof are the same thing here (cf. 408e3–4 τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι – 6–10 αἰσχρὸν πυρῶν μὲν ... ἐπιμέλειαν πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθαι. . . , τούτου δ' αὐτοῦ μηδεμίαν τέχνην μηδὲ μηχανήν, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστον ἔσται τὸ σῶμα, ἐξευρίσκειν). As a matter of fact, what is given here as reproof is a mirrored condensation of Socrates' protreptic speech reported by Clitophon, with some verbal similarities (407b2–3 χρημάτων μὲν περί τήν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ἔχετε – 408e6–7 πυρῶν μὲν ... ἐπιμέλειαν πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθαι; 407b5 οὔτε διδασκάλους ... εὐρίσκετε – 408e8–10 μηδεμίαν τέχνην ... ἐφευρίσκειν). This is a good indication that for our author 'protreptic' meant 'accusatory protreptic'. – κᾶπειτα at times connects two hardly distinguishable aspects of the same action, as *Cra.* 411b6–8 οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυκνὰ περιστρέφεισθαι ζητοῦντες ὅππῃ ἔχει τὰ ὄντα εἰλιγγιῶσιν, κᾶπειτα αὐτοῖς φαίνεται περιφέρεσθαι τὰ πράγματα. προύτρεπεν is apparently meant to be interpreted as 'if someone were going to exhort'.

One is reminded of the structure of Socrates' protreptic method in the *Apology* (29d5–30a3): first exhortation (παρακελευόμενος, d5); if people contradict, examination (ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, e5); if they do not meet the standards, reproof (ὄνειδιῶ, 30a1).

In *Ap.* too, the content of  $\delta\upsilon\epsilon\iota\delta\iota\zeta\epsilon\upsilon\upsilon$  is not very different from the exhortation, cf. *Intr.*, section 11.3.3 and n. 268. It is possible that our author had this passage in mind when writing these lines; we saw (cf. section 11.2.3.1) that he probably used the protreptic passage 29d7–e3 for his parody. A verbal reminiscence may be *Clit.* 408e9  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma \acute{\omega}\varsigma \beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota \tau\omicron \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$  – *Ap.* 29e2  $\tau\eta\varsigma \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \delta\pi\omega\varsigma \acute{\omega}\varsigma \beta\epsilon\lambda\tau\iota\sigma\tau\eta \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ .

**e7 και ὅσα:** ‘and for all other things which’, cf. 410a3; *Tht.* 145a9; *Sph.* 219a10; *Phlb.* 46a8.

**e8 διαπονούμεθά τε και κτώμεθα:** ‘which we labour to acquire’ (Bury; so Sartori, Zuretti, la Magna, Orwin, Gonzalez). For this type of hendiadys in Plato (denied by Riddell, ‘Digest’, §324) cf. *R.* 328c1–2; 429e6 with Adam’s notes, and the very numerous cases listed by England’s *Comm. on Lg.*, Index s.v. hendiadys. For  $\delta\iota\alpha\pi\omicron\nu\omicron\mu\epsilon\theta\alpha$ , cf. 410e1.

**τούτου . . . αὐτοῦ:** Professor Sedley draws my attention to the parallelism of this phrase with  $\epsilon\iota \tau\omicron\upsilon\tau' \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}$ . As the collocation points forward to the  $\delta\pi\omega\varsigma$  clause here, the two phrases cannot be co-referential, but they are strictly parallel. This strongly suggests that  $\tau\omicron\upsilon\tau' \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}$  at  $\epsilon\iota$  refers to the best state of the soul, in the same way as the phrase here refers to the best state of the body, and this is borne out by 409a3  $\tau\eta\eta \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota \tau\eta\iota \tau\eta\varsigma \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma \acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta\iota \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta\nu$ . Cf. on e1.

**e8–9 μηδεμίαν τέχνην μηδέ μηχανήν:** though of course  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$  and  $\mu\eta\chi\alpha\eta\eta$  are very often coupled where one would be sufficient (cf. *Lg.* 831d4–5), here both words retain their original meaning: ‘to find out whether there is an art, or, failing that, any means whatever of improving physical condition’ (cf. Waterfield and Gonzalez). Perhaps the caution which caused the addition of  $\mu\eta\delta\acute{\epsilon} \mu\eta\chi\alpha\eta\eta\nu$  was inspired by 407b5–7  $\omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon \delta\iota\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \dots \acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\acute{\rho}\iota\sigma\kappa\epsilon\tau\epsilon \dots \acute{\epsilon}\iota\pi\epsilon\rho \mu\alpha\theta\eta\tau\omicron\nu$  –  $\epsilon\iota \delta\acute{\epsilon} \mu\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\tau\eta\tau\omicron\nu \kappa\tau\lambda$ .

**409a1 δέ:** ‘denotes that the information he [the speaker] already possesses is inadequate’ (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 173; the instances quoted from *Lg.* and *Plt.* all begin  $\acute{\lambda}\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\upsilon\iota\varsigma \delta\acute{\epsilon} +$  interrogative).

**a3 τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ τέχνην:** cf. *Intr.*, section 11.4.1; justice is here for the first time stated (without argument as in *Republic* 1 332d2–3) to be a  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$ , cf. a5; d5; 410b7–8. This is a formal expedient, necessary for the arguments by analogy and the final circular regress (sections 11.3.4; 11.4.3). Hitherto Clitophon had been more cautious (cf. note on 408e8–9) and even further on it is clear that he does not regard justice as a true  $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$  (cf. note on 409c4; 410a3; c1–2); for justice as the  $\acute{\alpha}\rho\epsilon\tau\eta$  of the soul, cf. also on 408e2. – For the accumulation of articles, to the two examples quoted by KG 1 611 (*Sph.* 254a10; *Plt.* 281a8) add *Phdr.* 269c9–d1  $\tau\eta\eta \tau\omicron\upsilon \tau\omicron\omega\iota \delta\upsilon\tau\iota \rho\eta\tau\omicron\rho\iota\kappa\omicron\upsilon \tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\iota \pi\iota\theta\alpha\nu\omicron\upsilon \tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta\nu$ ; *R.*

511c5–6 τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης . . . θεωρούμενον; *Hr. Decent.* 17 τοὺς ἐς τὰ τῆς τέχνης εἰλημένους; *De Arte* 1 τὸ τὰ τῶν πέλας ἔργα ( . . . ) διαβάλλειν; [Aesch.] 1.12 τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν τῶν παιδῶν ἡλικίαν οὔσιν. Normally Plato takes some care to avoid it, e.g. *Smp.* 182d3–4 διὰ τὴν τῶν θεμένων τῆς ψυχῆς ἀργίαν.

**λεγέσθω:** ῥήσεις ending in a direct question followed by an imperative form of λέγειν (so too 409c1 εἰπέ) are rare in Plato. The only instances in the authentic works are *Prt.* 353a4–6 Ἦ Πρωταγόρα τε καὶ Σώκρατες . . . τί ὑμεῖς αὐτό φατε εἶναι; εἶπατον ἡμῖν; 357c8–d1; *Grg.* 470a4 λέγε; *Men.* 74a1 εἰπέ; *Chrm.* 165e2 ἴθι οὖν εἰπέ. As *Grg.* 462d10–11 must be otherwise explained (see Dodds ad loc.; cf. also 463c6 ἐρώτα – c8 ἐρωτῶ δῆ), φάθι is not used by Plato in this way. There are three parallel cases of ἀποκρίνου: *Grg.* 474c8; 515c3; *Hp.Ma.* 288e4. There is no parallel for λεγέσθω so used, except *Phlb.* 16d8 τίς αὐτή; λεγέσθω μόνον, where the addition of μόνον, to my mind, makes all the difference (cf. the frequency of λέγε μόνον, ‘please, go on’, in the later dialogues).

The idiom is relatively frequent in the *Dubia* and *Spuria*: *Thg.* 123c12 (εἰπέ); *Min.* 318a7 (φάθι); and especially *Just.* 373b4 (εἰπέ); c1 (ἀπόκριναι); c2 (φάθι). I discount cases where the imperative is not actually the end of an utterance, e.g. *Ap.* 25c6–7 (after a question) ὦ τάν, ἀποκρίναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ; cf. 25d2; *Grg.* 463a5; *Lg.* 665b3. This use of λεγέσθω is no good argument for inauthenticity (pace Thesleff, *Styles*, 15 n. 2), the less so because Plato uses λεγέσθω as a variant for λέγε in other contexts, e.g. *Lj.* 204e7 λεγέσθω . . . οὔτινός ἐστιν. It is in keeping with Clitophon’s character (cf. *Intr.*, section 1.5.3), and an incidental preference for an idiom not used elsewhere can be found in any work of Plato or anybody else (cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> lxiii–iv and n. 3).

**a4 ἔρρωμένεστατος:** this word is used of persons elsewhere only in *Grg.* 483c1; e5, where it refers to Callicles’ ideal of the ‘strongest’ (cf. *R.* 564d7). ἔρρωμένος τῆι ψυχῆι occurs in Xenophon (*An.* 3.1.42; *Hell.* 3.4.29), but always denotes bravery (cf. *Cyr.* 3.3.31). But cf. *Ti.* 89e8, where it is used of parts of the soul, and the phrase ῥώμη τῆς ψυχῆς (*Plt.* 259c8; *X. Mem.* 4.8.1); cf. also *Prt.* 311b1.

**πρὸς ταῦτα:** with ἀποκρινόμενος (‘a questa mia domanda’, la Mag-na), which is not just a pleonasm of εἶπε here, as it is at *Prt.* 314d6; 355d5; *Lg.* 897d4. See on 410e3 δεόμενος λέγω.

**a5–6 εἰπέν μοι . . . δικαιοσύνην:** the change from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio recta* (ἦν περ ἀκούεις σὺ λέγοντος ἔφη Σωκράτους) and back again (οὐκ ἄλλην ἢ δικαιοσύνην) can be roughly paralleled from *R.* 364b5–c5: ἀγύρται δὲ καὶ μάντις . . . πείθουσιν ὡς ἐστι παρὰ σφίσι δύναμις . . . ἀκείσθαι . . . ἐάν τέ τινα ἐχθρὸν πημῆναι ἐθέληι, μετὰ σμικρῶν δα-

πανῶν . . . βλάψει . . . , τοὺς θεοὺς ὡς φασιν πείθοντές σφισιν ὑπηρετεῖν (cf. Adam ad loc. and 1.128). Yet it would, in my opinion, be difficult indeed to find anything really like our text: infinitival *oratio obliqua*, with a dependent clause in *oratio recta* (with change of person) in between (cf. Intr., section II.7.2).

Of course, a change from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio recta* is in itself not very noteworthy (cf. KG II 565–6), though there are rather fewer examples in Plato than one would suppose (L. Reinhard, *Anakoluthē*, 87–8; add *Chrm.* 158c5–d6; 159b1–6; *Smp.* 178a7–9). A change from *oratio obliqua* to *oratio recta* coinciding with transition from main to dependent clause (as here) is found infra 409c6–d1; *Alc.* 2 148e3–149a1, X. *An.* 1.3.14; 16; *Hell.* 1.1.28; *Cyr.* 7.3.13; 8.3.3 – in the last two examples ἔφη is inserted as here (cf. φήσει 409d1, φάναι *Alc.* 2 148e5).

The return to *oratio obliqua* is understandable: ταύτην τὴν τέχνην εἶναι ἥνπερ ἀκούεις . . . οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ δικαιοσύνη would be too harsh. The difficulty could not possibly have been circumvented by using a different word order: the best place for οὐκ ἄλλη(ν) ἢ δικαιοσύνη(ν) is at the end of the sentence. On the other hand, it would have been quite normal to use a ὅτι-clause instead of an accusative and infinitive after εἶπέν μοι – in that case the change of person would have been hardly noticeable.

We must conclude, then, that the author deliberately inserted the clause in *oratio recta* for a stylistic reason. Cf. Intr., section 1.5.3.

**a7 εἰπόντος δέ μοι:** if a full stop is printed (as is usually done) after εἶπέ (c1), the genitive absolute is pendent. The closest parallels are Hdt. 3.53.3–5 ἀπικομένης δὲ ταύτης καὶ λεγούσης: “ὦ παῖ . . . [8 lines of *oratio recta*] . . .” ἢ μὲν δὴ τὰ ἐπαγωγότατα . . . ἔλεγε πρὸς αὐτόν, where the intervening direct speech, as here, causes an unmitigated anacoluthon. Less harsh: X. *Cyr.* 6.3.17 εἰπόντος δὲ Κύρου ὅτι τοῦτων μὲν εἶη ἄλις, “ἅ δὲ καιρὸς ἡμῖν εἰδέναι, ταῦτ’” ἔφη “διηγοῦ, ὦ Ἀράσπα· κτλ.”, where the anacoluthon is softened by transition to *oratio recta*; similarly *Hell.* 4.8.9 λέγοντος δὲ τοῦ Κόνωνος (ὡς) . . . , “καὶ τοῦτο οὖν” ἔφη “σὺ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναίοις κεχαρισμένος ἔσῃ . . .”; at *Hell.* 7.4.4 εἰπόντος δὲ Δημοτίωνος ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ὡς ἡ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀρκάδας φιλία καλῶς αὐτῶν δοκοίη πράττεσθαι, τοῖς μέντοι στρατηγοῖς προστάξει ἔφη χρῆναι ὅπως καὶ Κόρινθος σώα ἦι τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων the change to ἔφη + accusative and infinitive has the same effect. No such softening is attempted here, as the author deliberately chooses to employ the *oratio recta* for stylistic reasons (cf. Intr., section 1.5.3). Alternatively, if we print a comma after εἶπέ, there is no grammatical difficulty, but the style is not improved, though our author does not eschew lengthy sentences in themselves. A full stop after

εἰπέ causes asyndeton in the next sentence, but this cannot be an objection (cf. on 410a7). Indeed, if so, all three definitions of the ἔργον of justice start with an asyndeton: c1; d2; 410a7. Mainly on the strength of this argument, and also of the roughly parallel anacoluthon ὀπόταν αὖ φῆις τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ . . . καὶ ὅταν λέγηις . . . καὶ τελευτᾷ δὴ καλῶς ὁ λόγος οὗτός σοι κτλ. (407e5–408a5, cf. note ad loc.). I prefer the pendent genitive, as does la Magna without arguments.

**δέ μου:** so AF Stob., as against δ' ἐμοῦ (D) as at *R.* 338a4 εἰπόντος δέ μου (AF; δ' ἐμοῦ D) ταῦτα. MS authority counts for little in these matters, but there is no opposition between the cleverest pupil and Clitophon.

**b1–6 ἱατρική . . . διδαγμα:** cf. Intr., section II.4.2.

**b1 ἱατρική πού τις λέγεται τέχνη:** the familiar procedure to start an argument by asking if (or stating that) the concept with which the argument deals is more than a name and corresponds to something existent. The most familiar type is ἐπιστήμην που καλεῖς τι; (*Grg.* 495c3–4); variants are ἡ δικαιοσύνη πράγμα τί ἐστίν ἢ οὐδὲν πράγμα; (*Prt.* 330c1); φαιμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αὐτὸ ἢ οὐδὲν; (*Phd.* 65d4–5); ἡγούμεθά τι τὸν θάνατον εἶναι; (*Phd.* 64c2); λέγεις δέ τινας . . . τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὖ ζῆν, τοὺς δὲ κακῶς; (*Prt.* 351b3–4); οἴσθα τινας ἀνθρώπους ἀχαρίστους καλουμένους; (*X. Mem.* 2.2.1; cf. 4.2.22). Cf. Burnet on *Phd.* 64c2; Bluck on *Men.* 75e1; Stallbaum on *Cra.* 399d2–3. For the stating instead of the questioning form, cf. Intr., section 1.5.3 n. 100.

**που:** cf. C.M.J. Sicking in *Two Studies*, 57–61. The particle obviously presents a statement as a surmise, and also has an interactional value – hence its virtual absence from the orators. I think that the interaction is better described as an appeal to the addressee to accept the surmise as actual fact for the time being than as a sign of ‘leaving room for difference of opinion’ (Sicking, 61 – this does not account for the strong appeal in οὗ τί που questions), hence its frequency in Plato for stating the obvious (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 491; Sicking, 61).

**b2 ἀποτελούμενα:** Bury translates both this word and ἔργον (b5) as ‘effect(s)’. There is something to be said for this (though it brings him into trouble at b6–c1): both ‘new doctors’ and ‘health’ are products of medicine; the term ἔργον was traditionally reserved for the latter (cf. *Chrm.* 165c10–d2; *R.* 346d1–6), so another word had to be found to denote both.

**b3 ὑγίειαν:** sc. ἐξεργάζεσθαι; often translated as if it were a nominative (Schleiermacher, H. Müller, Bertini, Orwin), but that would equate ἀποτελούμενα and ἔργον, thereby making the clause ὁ δὴ λέγομεν ὑγίειαν (b5) superfluous.

**b4 τῆς διδασκούςης τε καὶ διδασκομένης:** cf. *Plt.* 304c4–5 (ἐπιστήμης) τῆς μανθανομένης καὶ διδασκούςης. For the passive of διδάσκειν with a non-personal subject cf. *Phdr.* 269c2; 278a2.

**b5 δῆ:** according to Denniston's treatment of δῆ in relative clauses, this should mean 'precisely that which we call health' (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 218–19). The particle can be better understood both here and at d1, when we take it as 'of course' ('bekanntlich', KG II 126–7; cf. Schw.–D. 562; J. M. van Ophuijsen in *Two Studies*, 85; note on 408b3), its most fundamental semantic value.

**καὶ . . . δέ:** introducing a new instance (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 202) cf. *Ly.* 215e7. On this combination, cf. A. Rijksbaron, 'Adverb or connector? The case of καὶ . . . δέ', *New Approaches*, 187–208, esp. 201–3. 'For καὶ = "also" to be acceptable [in the cluster καὶ . . . δέ] the states of affairs of the two clauses or sentences must be identical or similar, while the entities involved are different' (201–2): this applies in the present case, although Rijksbaron regards it as an exception to the normal behaviour of καὶ . . . δέ, in which, as he shows, καὶ is rarely the equivalent of 'also'.

**τεκτονικῆς:** the genitive depends on τὸ μὲν . . . τὸ δέ, and should be taken as partitive. Another possibility is to supply τὰ ἀποτελούμενα (Bertini; Bury) but then τὸ μὲν ἔργον, τὸ δὲ διδασκαλία would be an appositive sentence – it seems better to take ἔργον and διδασκαλία as predicates. The construction of the next sentence supports my interpretation of this one. – The concrete products of τεκτονική are said to be a house at c6 and wooden equipment at d1. The translation 'carpentry' is one-sided, in that a τέκτων also builds houses (cf. *Lg.* 793c2–5; *Plt.* 280c9 οἰκοδομικῆι καὶ ὅληι τεκτονικῆι).

**b6 τε καί:** 'respectively', cf. note on 407a3 καὶ βελτίων.

**διδασκαλία:** though found in Hippocrates, the tragedians, Aristophanes (cf. Starkie on *Nub.* 668) and Xenophon (*Eq.* 6.13; 9.10), the word is avoided by Plato, who uses μάθημα throughout. The choice of the rarer word was probably inspired by the need to stress the aspect of teaching, unmarked in μάθημα. διδασκαλία and διδασχῆ, both used by Plato, would mean 'the act of teaching', whereas the word required here is to mean 'object of teaching', 'what's taught' (Gonzalez), which (though the borderline is not always strongly drawn) is properly διδασκαλία. There is no reason to use this word as an argument against authenticity (pace Thesleff, *Styles*, 15 n. 2).

**b7 ἔστω:** 'let us assume that etc.' Cf. *Phlb.* 14a8 (in your opinion there are many heterogeneous kinds of knowledge. I am willing to take that as a starting-point for the discussion) πολλὰ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθω; *Hp.Ma.* 295c2–3; *Phdr.* 246a6 (cf. De Vries ad loc.);

MT §254. This use of the imperative should be distinguished from cases where the imperative points to surrender (*R.* 351d7 ἔστω . . . ἵνα σοι μὴ διαφέρωμαι; e8; 352a11 etc.; *Smp.* 201c7; *Euthphr.* 9d1; *Alc.* 1 106c2).

**b8 ἐκεῖ:** cf. *Smp.* 187c3.

**τεχνίτας:** τεχνικούς would be more in keeping with Platonic usage, but cf. *Sph.* 219a5. Maybe (as there) the rarer word was chosen because it is more precise than τεχνικός (τεχνίτης or δημιουργός, one who has a τέχνη for profession; τεχνικός, one who has the knowledge or the capacity for a profession; cf. A. N. Ammann, -IKOΣ *bei Platon* (Freiburg (Schweiz) 1953), 240–6).

**εἰ ἔργον:** logically speaking, this is an apposition of τὸ δ' ἔτερον, 'attracted' into the relative clause (KG II 419–20, where most examples concern appositions *following* relative clauses; cf. R. J. A. Lagas, *Syntactische Perseveratie- en Anticipatie-Verschijselen* (Amsterdam 1941), 127–39).

**εἰπέ:** cf. note on 409a3 λεγέσθω. – Clitophon addresses either the ἔρρωμενέστατος of a4 or all the pupils, cf. *Euthd.* 283b4 εἰπέ μοι ἔφη ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι; *Prt.* 311d6 (and Adam ad loc.); cf. Van Leeuwen on *Ar. Frogs* 39.

**c1–3 οὔτος . . . λυσιτελοῦν:** cf. *Intr.*, section II.5.1.

**c2 ἕτερος:** continuing ἄλλος as *R.* 439b10; after the earliest dialogues ἕτερος is often used as a variant of ἄλλος, cf. C. Ritter, 'Unterabteilungen innerhalb der zeitlich ersten Gruppe Platonischer Schriften', *Hermes* 70 (1935) 1–30, esp. 13–16; Brandwood, *Chronology*, 224–5.

**c3 ἐπανήειν:** 'I went back' (sc. to the τέχνη analogies); 'ritornava a' miei esempi' (Bertini). The word is often used in Plato for tackling a problem anew, after a first attempt has failed (*Prm.* 142b1–2 (introduction to the 'second hypothesis') βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τῆν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανέλθωμεν, ἐάν τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιοῦσιν ἀλλοῖον φανῆι;). As a rule, this meaning is more clearly determined by the context, e.g. through addition of πάλιν, αὖθις, an adverbial phrase introduced by ἐπί, etc. The absence of such a determinant has led most translators astray.

The form ἦειν lies at the base of the readings at *Ly.* 206e1 προσήει T, προσείη B; elsewhere the MSS have ἦια (Schanz, *Platonis Opera*, VII p. xiii).

**δ':** so DF; A Stob. have δή. Our author is addicted to δή (an argument which could be used either way). Perhaps δ' is better as it creates a parallel between two pairs of question and answer: (1) Q. δ' (409a7), A. asynd. (c1); (2) Q. δ' (here), A. asynd. (d2). Cf. note on 406a12 δή.

**c4–d1 κάκει . . . τέχνη:** this is a clumsy argument. Clitophon could have carried his case by pointing out that the qualifications συμφέρον, δέον etc. apply also to the ἔργα of the arts. Instead he transforms them into qualifications of the performance of the artists; τὸ δέον now be-

comes ὀρθῶς πράττειν, τὸ ὠφέλιμον is taken up as ὠφέλιμα (πράττειν) and so on. The vague words κάκει τά γε ὀνόματα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν cover up the transition. In the example from the carpenter's art, he should have said that the ξύλινα σκεύη are *themselves* συμφέροντα, ὠφέλιμα; instead, adverbs (qualifying πράττειν) are used. The relative clause ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη seems to be inappropriate: it had been made clear enough that the products of an art are distinct from the art itself (b3–5); the repetition of the statement is pointless because neither the pupils' answers nor their refutation by Clitophon had at any moment implied that art and object are identical.

The words make far more sense if they are taken as a refutation of συμφέρον, δέον etc. as definitions not of the ἔργον of justice but of justice itself. If your opponent says 'justice is the useful', it is tolerably appropriate to answer: 'But the operation of every art can be described as useful; useful action in carpentry results in the production of wooden equipment. But this result is distinct from carpentry itself (ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη), therefore "useful" is an inadequate description of what carpentry is. So you cannot use the word as a definition of justice either.'

I conclude that Clitophon's answer was not a free invention, but a truncated adaptation of a passage from a (probably Socratic) dialogue now lost, in which one of the virtues (not necessarily justice) had been defined by means of a substantivated neuter adjective (not necessarily τὸ συμφέρον or τὸ δέον or any of the adjectives used here). This passage was put in a totally different framework, the search for the ἔργον of justice. As before, we see that the adaptation is not a success. Cf. Intr., section II.5.1. (Pavlu ('Pseudopl. Kleitophon', 15) refers to the ἰδία ὠφέλια of R. 346a6–8; c2–3; which has a different function and does not explain the distortion in *Clit.*)

**c4 κάκει:** 'in the other area', namely that of the arts, as opposed to justice. ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν τεχνῶν is not a pleonasm, but a sort of distributive apposition. The formulation makes it clear that the author thought of the τέχναι as one block opposed to ἀρεταί (specifically justice), not of justice as yet another analogue to the several arts which had been named. Cf. note on 409a3 τὴν ... τέχνην.

**c5 ὀρθῶς πράττειν:** represents τὸ δέον of c2, for the exact meaning of which, cf. note on 407b1–2 ἀγνοεῖτε ... πράττοντες.

**c6–d1 ἀλλὰ ... τέχνη:** puzzling in syntax and meaning, this sentence has been interpreted by the translators in many different ways. I take πρὸς ὅτι ταῦτα πάντα τείνει as an indirect question, depending on ἐρεῖ (so Schleiermacher); τὸ ἴδιον as a predicative apposition ('as its distinctive trait', cf. R. 379c6–7 τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀλλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια); τὸ εὔ, τὸ καλῶς, τὸ δεόντως (sc. πράττειν) as object of ἐρεῖ, not



of φήσει; ὥστε as a sort of equivalent of τείνειν πρὸς τό (τὰ ξύλινα . . . γίγνεσθαι), cf. Souilhé. 'But the aim of all these actions will be stated by each of the arts individually, as its distinctive trait. For instance, carpentry will mention right, proper and appropriate action, aiming at (she will say) the production of wooden equipment, which of course is not art itself.' When one keeps τὸ ἴδιον as object, other possibilities are: (1) to supply πρὸς τοῦτο before ἐρεῖ (H. Müller, Bury, Orwin, Gonzalez – if I understand their translations correctly); but the function of πρὸς in πρὸς ὅτι is not the same as in this πρὸς τοῦτο; (2) to take τὸ ἴδιον as antecedent of (πρὸς) ὅτι (Bertini), which is unnatural word order. ἐκάστη τέχνη (Ven. 184) makes τὸ ἴδιον subject of ἐρεῖ, but the subject of φήσει is ἡ τεκτονική, given as an example of 'every art'. It cannot be a coincidence that at the two places where the author has to disprove a position (the other is the argument against voluntariness of wrongdoing, 407d2–8), his reasoning and expression become terse, even cramped; elsewhere his style is rather the contrary (cf. further Intr., sections 11.7.2; 11.7.3(5)). One explanation might be that he was not talented enough to retain the easy flow of his expression when the subject-matter became really difficult. On the other hand we should not overlook the possibility that the falterings arose from curtailing arguments which he found in a source. There is nothing in the free-will passage to prevent us from assuming a source for the argument (though there is no other reason to assume one); at this place the existence of a source has already been surmised on other grounds (cf. note on c4–d1). The similarity in wording between this sentence and 410a3–6 does not exclude condensation of a source.

**c6 ἐρεῖ:** for personification of the τέχνηαι, cf. infra 410a4–5; *R.* 342a1–d1, and in general Dodds on *Gr.* 464c5–d3; T. J. Saunders, *Notes on the Laws of Plato* (London 1972), 30.

**c6–7 ἐκάστη τέχνη:** for ἕκαστος without the article in Plato, cf. Gildersleeve, 11 322. If we could trust the distinction made by KG 1 634 and others (ἐκάστη τέχνη 'each art', ἐκάστη ἡ τέχνη 'every single art'), the article would perhaps be better. But cf. *Men.* 72a3, where πρὸς ἕκαστον ἔργον seems to contradict the canon ('with reference to each separate function', W. K. C. Guthrie in M. Brown (ed.), *Plato's Meno* (Indianapolis–New York 1971), 19). As the direct tradition unanimously omits the article (against Stobaeus), it is the best policy not to print it.

**c7 τὸ εὖ, τὸ καλῶς, τὸ δεόντως:** the last adverb goes back (via c5 ὀρθῶς πράττειν, cf. ad loc.) to τὸ δέον. The other two are introduced because they are in fact more relevant to the carpenter's art than 'profitably' or 'beneficially'. The change in terminology is immaterial to the argument.

**d1** ξύλινα ... σκεύη: cf. *Thl.* 146e1–2, where τεκτονική is defined as ἐπιστήμη τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας; cf. note on b5 ΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΣ.

**φήσει:** parenthetical; indicates transition to direct speech; cf. 409a6 and the examples quoted on 409a5–6 and on a7 εἰπόντος δέ μου. For φήσει in a parenthesis cf. *Thl.* 165c6; 166c2; *Phdr.* 272b2 etc.

**d2** τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης: if anything is to be supplied at all, ἴδιον rather than ἔργον (Ficinus, H. Müller, Waterfield), cf. d4–5 τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἴδιον ἔργον, where the emphasis is on ἴδιον.

**d2–e10** Τελευτῶν ... δόξαν: for the *oratio obliqua*, cf. Intr., section 1.5.3. Note that the reporting tense of the argument is the imperfect throughout (except, for obvious reasons, ὠμολογῆκει at e8) until the conclusion ὥστε ... ἔφησεν is reached. Cf. note on 410a7–8.

**d2** Τελευτῶν: probably we are to infer that Clitophon skips a few definitions. Cf. note on 410b1 ὕπερον δὲ ἐφάνη. The words δς δὴ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν, ‘whose answer was considered the cleverest’ (see ad loc.), imply that other answers (apart from the series τὸ συμφέρον, τὸ δέον etc.) had been given.

**d3** τῶν σῶν ἐταίρων: ADF Stob., τῶν ἐταίρων τῶν σῶν Va. Our author has a strong preference for what Gildersleeve calls ‘first attributive position’ (II 280–2; 286–7); 408c6 is a special case.

**d3–4** ὅς δὴ κομψότατα ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν: most translators and interpreters take this clause as a description of a permanent quality of this pupil, ‘who was reputed to be a most accomplished speaker’ (Bury); in other words, they fail to remark the *aorist* infinitive. κομψότατα ... εἰπεῖν means that this particular statement was the smartest (so Ficinus, Susemihl, Modugno, Waterfield, Gonzalez). Consequently, it is impossible to take these words as an allusion to a specific member of the Socratic circle, cf. Intr., section 11.5.2.

Both δὴ and κομψός indicate irony; for the latter, cf. De Vries on *Phdr.* 227c7 (and for a restriction, id., *Miscellaneous Notes on Plato* (Amsterdam 1975), 6).

**d5–6** φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ποιεῖν: cf. Intr., section 11.5.2.

**d6–7** τὴν φιλίαν ἀγαθόν τ’ ἔφη εἶναι καὶ οὐδέποτε κακόν: cf. *Chrm.* 159c1 οὐ τῶν καλῶν μέντοι ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν; introducing, as here, the refutation of a definition, cf. note on d9–e1; e4–10. For more parallels and for the syllogistic method which lies behind it, cf. *HGP*, IV 165 and n. 2.

ἀγαθόν τ’ ... καὶ οὐδέποτε κακόν: τε ... καὶ οὐ coupling opposites (cf. note on 407c6–7; *GP*<sup>2</sup> 513), here split as at *Phd.* 68b1. (But there the intervening word belongs closely to the one preceding τε – maybe here τι (F) is right.)

**d7–9 τὰς ... τῶν παίδων φιλίας ... ἐπανερωτώμενος:** τῶν παίδων and τῶν θηρίων are subjective genitives (contra Steinhart, 55; Susemihl, 523–4 and 529 n. 11; Bertini; ‘pederasty and bestiality’ Waterfield – Modugno’s ‘amicizie dei fanciulli colle bestie’ is highly improbable because of the repeated article). Children and animals are excluded from friendship as they are from courage in *La.* 197a6–b1 οὐ γὰρ τι ὦ Λάχης ἔγωγε ἀνδρεῖα καλῶ οὔτε θηρία οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν τὸ τὰ δεινὰ ὑπὸ ἀνοίας μὴ φοβούμενον, ἀλλ’ ἄφοβον καὶ μῶρον· ἢ καὶ τὰ παιδία πάντα οἶμι με ἀνδρεῖα καλεῖν, ἃ δι’ ἄνοιαν οὐδὲν δέδοικεν; cf. Arist. *EN* 1116b25; 32–1117a1 (Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 146 n. 161, is certainly wrong in saying that in the *Laches* the exclusion is ascribed to Prodicus: only the distinction between ἀνδρεῖα and θρασέα (197b6–c1) belongs to him, cf. d1–5).

In Aristotle, friendship of the young (not necessarily children) is not primary friendship, because it is based on pleasure instead of the good: *EN* 1156a31–2 ἢ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι’ ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ, cf. *EE* 1236a38. Primary friendship cannot occur in animals, but friendship based on pleasure and on common interest can: *EE* 1236b5–7 αὕτη [sc. ἡ πρώτη] μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνον ὑπάρχει φιλία ... αἱ δ’ ἄλλαι καὶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις. From all these passages it appears that the exclusion of children’s and animals’ friendship in *Clit.* is a more or less normal step in Socratic discussions about virtues and virtue-like qualities. For a school of thought which has as its basic tenet that virtue is knowledge (or at any rate reposes on knowledge of some kind), this is a very natural step to make. Aristotle, too, frequently couples children and animals as inferior in his ethical discussions (cf. F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik* (Berlin 1963), 379; note on 409d9–e1). Though he does not belong to the Socratics inasmuch as he does not subscribe to the moral paradoxes, his treatment of these subjects inevitably contains many strains of thought that go back to discussions in Socratic schools and writings. Cf. R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und aristotelische Ethik* (Berlin 1929), 204–5, who wrongly identifies the ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς φιλία (e3–4) with Aristotle’s primary friendship. See F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik* (Berlin 1956), 514–15. For the question whether this exclusion of children and animals was found by our author in the source from which he quoted or made by him on his own initiative, cf. Intr., section 11.5.2. The parallel from the *Lysis* (211d6–213a3) which was adduced by Steinhart (55; 72 n. 27); Susemihl (513); Heidel (*Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 7) is irrelevant (so Kunert (*Necessitudo*, 3) and, for once, Pavlu (‘Pseudoplat. Kleitophon’, 16)).

**d8 ἃς ἡμεῖς τοῦτο τοῦνομα ἐπονομάζομεν:** for the double accusative (of external and internal object), cf. *Cra.* 406a3–6; *Lg.* 892b7.

**d8–9** οὐκ ἀπεδέχετο εἶναι φιλίας: for the accusative and infinitive cf. *Thl.* 207c6–7.

**d9–e1** συνέβαινε . . . εἶναι: the reason why children's and animals' friendships are excluded. Cf. *La.* 192c3–d8 'Not every καρτερία is ἀνδρεία, for ἀνδρεία is always good [cf. note on 409d6–7 τὴν φιλίαν . . . κακόν] but καρτερία μετ' ἀφροσύνης is βλαβερὰ καὶ κακοῦργος.' It is not easy to see why friendship of animals is more often harmful than beneficial. Indeed, Aristotle quotes examples of beneficial friendship among animals (*EE* 1236b9–10). Hence H. Müller would read ἐταίρων ('Parteigenossen') for θηρίων (74 n. 6). The thesis that friendship of children and of animals is harmful more often than not is stated to be the result (συνέβαινε . . . αὐτῶι, cf. ad loc.) of a discussion which Cleitophon does not report but to which he alludes with ἐπανερωτώμενος ('having been subjected to further (ἐπ-) interrogation'). Now another glance at the *Laches* passage just quoted may give us an idea how this discussion established that friendship of animals and of children is mostly harmful. Children and animals are irrational in their feelings, and the irrational, for the Socratic, is harmful on principle. Cf. Arist. *EE* 1224a29; 1236a2; *EN* 1152b19–20; 1153a28; 31. Indeed, friendship being ἀγαθόν, it can only be a rational thing, hence its subsequent identification with ὁμόνοια in the sense of ἐπιστήμη (e4–10).

I can hardly believe that the author wanted his readers to reconstruct this argument for themselves; it seems much more likely that the words τὰς δὲ τῶν παιδῶν . . . ἀγαθὰς εἶναι represent the argument which he found in his source and for some reason or other chose to pass over (possibly because he did not want the intellectualist conception of friendship to come in before e5, where it makes the circularity of the argument – which he added himself, cf. Intr., section II.4.1 – more obvious).

**d9** συνέβαινε . . . αὐτῶι: this phrase was suspected by Steinhart (72 n. 39) on the ground that it departs from the meaning it has elsewhere, and comes close to 'in den Sinn Kommen'; cf. also Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 8. Indeed, when we take συνέβαινε in its usual meaning, as we are bound to do ('as a result of the argument he was forced to say', Bury), there is something the matter: 'La proposizione che amicizie siffatte . . . siano dannose, non era quella che conseguiva (συνέβαινε) dalle premesse' (Bertini, 477 n.; he proposes to read τὰς φιλίας for τὰς τοιαύτας: 'Le amicizie sensuali e brutali sono sempre dannose; ma tali amicizie sono le più frequenti; dunque si può affermare . . . che . . . le amicizie siano per la maggior parte dannose'). The solution was found by Grube, 'The *Cleitophon* of Plato', 307 n. 1: '[it] seems natural as Cleitophon is giving the conclusion of an argument which it is not the place to repeat'. Cf. note on 409d2; 410b1. The dative as *Gr.* 498e10; *Phil.* 35c3.

**ει τὰ πλείω:** comparative and adverbial; whether it should be taken as temporal ('more often', so Ficinus, Ast, Souilhé) or quantitative ('for the greater part', so Schleiermacher, Bury) is rather an academic question. Thucydides is the only other author to use τὰ πλείω as a comparative adverbial adjunct (1.13.5; 4.64.1 – in the first passage a temporal interpretation is possible, in the latter excluded), though he normally uses the phrase (like τὸ πλέον) as a more *recherché* alternative for τὰ πολλὰ, 'mostly'. In the only parallel I have found in the orators, τὰ πλείω is only semi-comparative and semi-adverbial (D. 44.16 οὐκ ἄν ἠνωχλοῦμεν τὰ πλείω, 'we should not trouble you further', cf. E. *Med.* 609), developed from phrases like τὰ πλείω λέγειν (Isoc. 5.63). In the only other dialogue in the Corpus Platonicum which presents adverbial τὰ πλείω (*Alc.* 2), it is not comparative (at 144d6 and 146e2 it is opposed to ὀλιγάκις; at 146d5 it is even followed by μᾶλλον ἤ). In the genuine works, τὰ πλείω is only found as a nominal phrase used as subject or object ('that which is more', R. 438c1; *Prm.* 153a6; or 'the greater part', R. 330a7). This idiom may be a mark of inauthenticity.

**ει-2 τὰς τοιαύτας . . . τὰς τοιαύτας:** our author does not often substitute τοιοῦτος for an attributive phrase (407d5; cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 78), but τὰς τῶν παιδῶν καὶ τὰς τῶν θηρίων three times in a row would offend even Greek ears. Cf. Jowett–Campbell, *Republic*, II 193.

**ει βλαβεράς . . . ἀγαθός:** practically antonyms since ἀγαθός and ὀφέλιμος are practically synonymous (cf. note on 407a1 ὀφελεῖν).

**ει2 τὸ τοιοῦτον:** having to admit that some friendships are harmful and consequently that his statement that friendship is always good was wrong.

**οὐδέ:** just as καί as a Focus particle can have an inclusive value ('also'), a scalar-inclusive value ('even') and a non-inclusive scalar value ('actually' – marking a word or phrase as simply the highest point on a scale, 'a ladder of which only the top rung is clearly seen', *GP*<sup>2</sup> 317), one would a priori expect adverbial οὐδέ to have the same three values. Here an inclusive or scalar-inclusive value (a climax) is excluded by the context ('they are not even friendships', Schleiermacher), which requires an absolute statement: 'they are not friendships at all' (most translators from Susemihl onwards). This 'emphatic' use of οὐδέ is often ignored; Denniston admits it for Herodotus (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 197–8; 583); a host of examples (most of them to be interpreted differently) are quoted from Homer by J. M. Fraenkel, 'Οὐδέ Homericum', in *Album gratulatorium in hon. H. van Herwerden* (Utrecht 1902), 55–64, esp. 61–2; De Vries on *Phdr.* 261a4 gives some carefully chosen instances; id., 'A propos de Platon, *Théétète* 167d6', *Mnem.* 32 (1979) 163–4; Verdenius, 'Οὐδέ "not at all"', *ibid.*, 164.

This idiom deserves closer investigation; no problem is solved by stating that οὐδέ can ‘mean’ ‘not at all’. For some groups of examples οὐδέ can be explained as the negative of emphatic καί, e.g. in causal and consecutive clauses; in other cases, οὐδέ may be the negative of καί as used e.g. at 406a7 τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπήνουν (cf. ad loc.): οὐδέ would then stress the statement that A is not true in some cases, this statement being preceded by the statement that A is true in other cases (so *Phdr.* 264a5–6: a good orator starts from the beginning, but Lysias οὐδέ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τελευτῆς ἐξ ὑπτίας ἀνάπαλιν διανεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸν λόγον). At this place, the preceding statement that A is true in other cases (specifically, that adults’ friendships do deserve the term) may be said to be implied by the context: cf. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 583 (on Hdt. 8.25.2); Dover on *Ar. Nub.* 8.

Another explanation might be that οὐδέ emphasises that a statement is not true, contrarily to what some people think about it. Cf. Theoc. 6.34 (quoted by De Vries, *Comm. on Phdr.*; cf. ‘Theocritea’, *Mnem.* 20 (1967) 435–9 at 436) καὶ γὰρ θην οὐδ’ εἶδος ἔχω κακόν, ὧς με λέγοντι (the falseness of what is said about Damoetas’ appearance is stressed); cf. Plutarch’s work Ὅτι οὐδ’ ἠδέως ζῆν ἔστιν κατ’ Ἐπίκουρον (contrarily to Epicurus’ pretensions). I must add that a definitive explanation of οὐδέ in our passage is not possible until the general conditions in which non-inclusive, emphatic οὐδέ can occur have been defined exhaustively. Some of De Vries’ most convincing examples (e.g. *R.* 328c6 οὐδέ θαμίξεις) fall outside the borders of the contextual groups outlined above.

Among instances not quoted by De Vries but probably to be classified under the general heading of ‘emphatic οὐδέ’ are *R.* 587c3; *Euthd.* 302c1 (De Vries, ‘Notes on *Euthydemus*’, 53); *Lg.* 876b3; 891d2; *Euthphr.* 15c3 οὐδέ (T; οὐ βδ) might be defended as *lectio difficilior*. *R.* 329a8 τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζῶντες belongs to a contextual class described by Denniston under ‘not even’ (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 196) but certainly bordering on ‘not at all’. Outside Plato: *S. Ant.* 731; *OC* 590; 1429; *E. El.* 981 and Denniston ad loc.; *Lys.* 20.8; *X. Smp.* 4.23; *Mem.* 3.5.24; *Men. Aspis* 415; *Dysc.* 962; *Call. H.* 2.106; *Ep.* 17.1 (Pf.). See *Intr.*, section 11.7.1 n. 387. Cf. also οὐδέ- = οὐ- in οὐδέπω, οὐδέποτε.

**ψευδῶς:** as here, the adverb means ‘mistakenly’ in Plato, cf. *Phlb.* 40d2.

**e3 οὕτως:** one would have expected τοῦτο, but cf. *Prm.* 133d5.

**e3–4 τὴν . . . ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς φιλίαν:** the two adverbs are juxtaposed as *Sph.* 263d4; *R.* 585e1; *Epin.* 986d2; nowhere else in the corpus. The phrase is treated as a marker of late style by Ritter, *Untersuchungen*, 93 and Lutoslawski, *Plato’s Logic*, 110; 175 (I have not been able to locate

the occurrence in *Phlb.* mentioned 110). This is probably right, as ὄντως (instead of τῶι ὄντι) does not appear until *Republic* 5 and becomes frequent only from *Sph.* onwards (M. Schanz, 'Zur Entwicklung des Platonischen Stils', *Hermes* 21 (1886) 439–59, esp. 440–3; Lutosławski, *Plato's Logic*, 120; Brandwood, *Chronology*, 34–5 – I disregard the conjecture ὄντως (*Ven.* 184) for οὐτως at *Euthd.* 305e5; cf. G. J. de Vries, 'Notes on *Euthydemus*', 55; perhaps the double construction of ἔχειν, resulting when οὐτως is read, is supported by *E. Med.* 732 (cf. Page ad loc.), or οὐτως may be 'ut dicis' (Ficinus), cf. *Chrm.* 162d4. At *Cra.* 413e1 ὄντως is read by δ, ὄντος by βT; the word is omitted altogether in the new OCT). – ἀληθῶς for ὡς ἀληθῶς is found occasionally in earlier dialogues but again starts occurring with some frequency only with *Sph.* (M. Schanz, op. cit., 443–5; Lutosławski, *Plato's Logic*, 120; Brandwood, *Chronology*, 36). Cf. Intr., section II.7.2 n. 402.

For the adjectival use of ὄντως and τῶι ὄντι cf. *Phdr.* 260a1–3; of ἀληθῶς and ὡς ἀληθῶς *Phd.* 109e7–110a1.

**e4 εἶναι σαφέστατα ὁμόνοιαν:** cf. *Sph.* 228d7–8 νόσος ... σαφέστατα ὄν, where (as here) there is an antithesis between a false name and true nature; 244a2; 259a8. This adverb is not found reinforcing the copula before *Sph.*

**ὁμόνοιαν:** in classical Greek, ὁμόνοια is above all a political word; this appears very clearly from Aristotle's description of its use (*EN* 1167a26–b4; cf. esp. b2–3 πολιτική δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἢ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ καὶ λέγεται cf. *EE* 1241a32–3); it is confirmed by the first occurrences (Th. 8.93.3 ἐκκλησίαν ποιῆσαι ... περὶ ὁμονοίας; And. 1.73; 76; 106; 140; Democr. fr. 255 D.–K.; cf. esp. X. *Mem.* 4.4.16). At the same time, it is found closely associated with φιλία, e.g. *R.* 351d5–6; *Plt.* 311b9.

When friendship of animals and of children has been discarded (and – as might have been expected – that of women neglected), men's φιλία are left. In themselves these may cover a wide range of sentiments (quite apart from the fact that 'men' can be divided into 'Greeks' and 'barbarians', 'slaves' and 'free men'), but the qualification ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν (d5) inevitably brings up ὁμόνοια. In fact, in the Greek phrase φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ποιεῖν, ὁμόνοιαν could have been substituted for φιλίαν without any essential change in meaning (considering that ὁμόνοια was according to Aristotle usually said to be πολιτική φιλία); cf. esp. the parallel from *Republic* 1 quoted above. The whole discussion now appears to be carefully framed so as to end up in a conclusion which had been its starting-point. Cf. Intr., section II.5.2.

**e4–10 τὴν δὲ ὁμόνοιαν ... δόξαν:** the argument consists of two syllogisms:

- (1) (a) ὁμόνοια (= φιλία) is either ὁμοδοξία or ἐπιστήμη (e5);  
 (b) it is not ὁμοδοξία (= 2);  
 (c) therefore it is ἐπιστήμη (e9–10).  
 (2) (a) φιλία (= ὁμόνοια) is always good (e7–8; cf. d6–7);  
 (b) ὁμοδοξία is sometimes evil (e6 ἤναγκάζοντο κτλ.);  
 (c) therefore φιλία is not ὁμοδοξία.

The order of the logical steps is (1a); (1b) because (γάρ) (2b) and (2a); therefore (ὥστε) (1c).

Syllogism (2) is another example of the argument ‘A is not B, for A is always good and B (sometimes) is not’; cf. note on 409d6–7 τὴν φιλίαν ... κακόν; dg–ei.

**e5 ὁμοδοξίαν ... ἢ ἐπιστήμην:** Aristotle seems to imply that ὁμόνοια had been stated to be identical to ὁμοδοξία, unity of opinion (*EN* 1167a22–4). This intellectualist conception of ὁμόνοια is present at our passage; in the discussion *Alc. 1* 126c6–127d5 it is used to prove Alcibiades’ ignorance (Intr., section 11.5.2). Aristotle offers two arguments against ὁμόνοια being taken as ὁμοδοξία: (1) unity of opinion can occur between people who do not know each other (*EN* 1167a23–4), while friendship cannot (1155b34–1156a3) and ὁμόνοια is φιλικόν, a ‘sentiment of friendship’; (2) unity of opinion can be about theoretical things as well as about practical ones (cf. *MM* 1212a19), but friendship cannot be about theoretical things (*EN* 1167a24–6, cf. *EE* 1241a16–18).

Aristotle’s terminology is slightly different from the one used here. He uses ὁμοδοξία to refer to agreement about νοητά (this much can be inferred from the conclusion περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ δὴ ὁμονοοῦσιν, *EN* 1167a28–9) regardless of the distinction δόξα: ἐπιστήμη; the verb ὁμογνωμονεῖν covers agreement on theoretical and practical things, i.e. ὁμοδοξία and ὁμόνοια. Plato’s use of the words ὁμοδοξία (*R.* 433c6; *Plt.* 310e9–10) is identical. The author of *Clit.* restricts the term ὁμόνοια to what Plato and Aristotle call ὁμοδοξία (had he not done so, it would have been too obvious that the argument does not hold water), and uses ὁμοδοξία to refer to agreement in opinion as opposed to shared knowledge.

As two persons may or may not agree on things about which they have δόξα but must necessarily agree on things of which they possess ἐπιστήμη, the opposition ὁμοδοξία: ἐπιστήμη is, in this context, a logical one.

**λέγοι:** against this reading of ADF Stob., Va has λέγει. But elsewhere in this part of the dialogue, the optative is used (408c9; 409d4) with the easily explained exception of 410a2. Contrast the report of the protreptic speech; cf. also the optatives of 406a3. See Intr., section 1.5.3.



**e6 μέν:** the contrasted idea is expressed by the ὥστε clause in e9; a natural anacoluthon.

**ἤτιμαζεν:** of rejecting an alternative, as *Euthd.* 292e2.

**e6–7 ἠναγκάζοντο . . . γίγνεσθαι ὁμοδοξία:** the construction is the passive transformation of ἀναγκάζω with accusative and infinitive (cf. LSJ, s.v., 4) ‘to say (think) that necessarily . . .’, as if = ἀναγκαῖον λέγειν (νομίζειν). Cf. *Tht.* 196c1–2 ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδῶς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα. Whether this use of ἀναγκάζειν is really different from the supposed meaning ‘to prove’, as Stallbaum says (ad *Cra.* 432c8–d1), remains doubtful. See also Adam on *R.* 490c9.

**γίγνεσθαι:** probably not the copula (so Zuretti, la Magna, Gonzalez), as it is unnatural to sever πολλάί from καὶ βλαβεραί.

**e8 ὠμολογήκει:** the pluperfect denotes that the admission made in the past is relevant to the present situation. As Plato seldom compresses the report of an argument, it is not surprising that the pluperfect active of this verb is not found elsewhere in the corpus.

**καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργον:** these words are not relevant for the present argument, as can be seen from its formalised arrangement (cf. note on e4–10). I take it that the author wishes to underline that everything which had been said of φιλία is true also of ὁμόνοια – this explanation may help us to reach a decision on the textual problem of the next line.

**e9–10 ὥστε ταῦτόν ἔφησεν εἶναι ὁμόνοϊαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην οὔσαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ δόξαν:** so the MSS and Stobaeus. I see only one way of making sense of the words as they are transmitted, and that is to take ὁμόνοϊαν as subject of ταῦτόν εἶναι and καί as an adverb: ‘His conclusion was, then, that concord was the same thing [*sc.* as friendship], being besides knowledge, not opinion.’ But I do not think that καί as a Focus particle can occur with participles unless they are substantive (excepting poetic καί = καίπερ). The same goes for Verdenius’ proposal (‘Notes on *Clitopho*’, 145) to take καί as ‘and that’ (German ‘und zwar’) – this seems impossible to me when a predicative participle follows. Therefore the text must be corrupt.

Some translators (Ficinus, Sartori, Souilhé, De Win) ignore οὔσαν so that the phrase very neatly renders the conclusion of the first syllogism (cf. note on e4–10): ὁμόνοϊα is ἐπιστήμη. But (a) it is not easy to see how οὔσαν could have crept in, (b) this does not explain the addition of καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἔργον (see previous note). Point (b) may be argued also against Geffcken’s ὁμόνοϊαν καὶ ἐπιστήμην, οὐ δόξαν οὔσαν (‘Rätsel’, 436 n. 1) – which could be defended palaeographically if one assumed that οὐ δόξαν was omitted owing to homoiarcton and inserted afterwards in the wrong place with help of ἀλλ’ (the most normal coordinator in contexts of the type ‘A, not B’). A few editors assume a lacuna

after καί. C. F. Hermann reads ὁμόνοιαν καὶ <δικαιοσύνην>, rightly rejected by Susemihl (524 n.): the discussion is not about justice but about the ἔργον (409e9–10) of justice. (410a4–5 τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν does not contradict this: see on 410a5 δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν.) Better is Baumann's ὁμόνοιαν καὶ <φιλίαν>, which had occurred independently to Bertini (477–8 n. 1); materially the same is Bekker's deletion of καί: both solutions give a text which says that ὁμόνοια is identical to friendship and (a form of) knowledge.

The latter two conjectures make concord the topic of the clause. Opposed to them are two other conjectures which make Socrates' comrade say that friendship is identical to concord and (a form of) knowledge. Ast places καί before ὁμόνοιαν (in a footnote; his text is that of the MSS): 'quare idem esse dixit atque consensionem quippe quae scientia, non opinio esset.' R. G. Bury ('Notes on some passages in Plato and Marcus Aurelius', *CR* 32 (1918) 147–9 at 148) very ingeniously changes καί to ὤς and ὁμόνοιαν to ὁμονοίαι (dative).

There are two objections to these two hypotheses. Socrates' friend had admitted that friendship is always good and the result of justice. If Clitophon goes on to report that the conclusion was (ὥστε) that friendship is identical to ὁμόνοια, this makes sense only if it had been stated previously (*quod non*) that ὁμόνοια is always good and the result of justice (the conclusion would have been a logical error to boot). Secondly, the argument is criticised by the bystanders on the ground that the concept of ὁμόνοια has not been defined clearly enough (410a3–6 καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ὁμόνοιά τις ἔστι . . . τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν κτλ.). This is not quite logical if φιλία, not ὁμόνοια, had been the topic of the last statement made before criticism is raised.

Therefore I submit that the ὥστε clause contains statements about concord, not about friendship: the reasoning thus ends with all the properties of concord which the discussion has yielded: it is always a good, it is the result of justice and it is a sort of knowledge, not agreement in opinion. The last statement would have been sufficient for the validity of the syllogism, but obviously the author wanted to outline the concept of ὁμόνοια he is dealing with as fully as possible.

We have to choose then, between Baumann's καὶ <φιλίαν> and Bekker's deletion of καί. I prefer the latter: if ταύτόν is left unspecified, it is possible to make it refer to ἀγαθόν and δικαιοσύνης ἔργον rather than to φιλίαν: 'therefore he affirmed that concord was all this, too' (cf. Zuretti 'afferma che ciò appunto è la concordia'; similarly la Magna). This brings out more clearly the function of the ὥστε clause: with καί deleted, it refers directly to all that has been said about ὁμόνοια; with φιλίαν inserted, it does so indirectly.

The interpolation of καί is easily explained: a reader not content with the statement that ‘concord is the same thing’ wanted to add ‘as knowledge’ (which is materially correct but ruins the grammar).

We shall see that the same expedient was used at 410b4 (ad loc.); I have argued (‘Plato, Cratylus 417c’, 45; 51) that interpolation of καί at *Cra.* 417c9 deteriorates an already interpolated passage, as it does at *Ap.* 26a2. καί is found interpolated at *Chrm.* 159e6; 171d7; *Phd.* 61b1; 69a8; b6; *Cra.* 398d6; *R.* 558a7. Cf. G. Jachmann, *Der Platontext* (Göttingen 1942), 286 n. 1 = *Textgeschichtliche Studien* (Königstein/Ts. 1982), 642 n. 1.

**ε9 ἔφησεν:** Plato uses the indicative aorist of φάναι sparingly and in post-*Republic* dialogues only. For its *raison d’être* here, cf. note on d2–e10.

**ε10 δή:** with δή, ‘verbal repetition or an anaphoric pronoun helps to make a notion more evident’ (J. M. van Ophuijsen in *Two Studies*, 148). When this occurs in a subordinate clause which contains no really new information, the effect is that of a major transition, cf. *Phd.* 106e1 ὁπότε δὴ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀδιάφθορόν ἐστιν κτλ. (repeating d5–7). Cf. Herodotus’ mannerism of opening a new section by means of μὲν δὴ introducing a resumptive clause, followed by a δέ clause with new information.

**ἐνταῦθα . . . τοῦ λόγου:** cf. *R.* 343a1; 588b1.

**ἄποροῦντες:** in Plato, ἀπορία is a state common to the interrogator and his target (Intr., section 11.3.2 n. 265). The participle must not be taken with οἱ παρόντες (Ficinus), because, as Schleiermacher remarks, ‘ein ἀπορῶν ist nicht ἰκανὸς ἐπιπλήττειν’ (third edition (Berlin 1861), 372). Schleiermacher himself wished to delete the participle as a corrupt dittography of οἱ παρόντες, since no ἀπορία has become visible yet. It is true that the aporia is pointed out by the bystanders, but ἀποροῦντες is a piece of comment mixed into the report. Besides, the appositional participle is supported by the similar use of ἀπορῶν at 410c8.

**410a1 ἱκανοὶ ἦσαν:** cf. Intr., section 11.4.3 for a possible interpretation of this detail (and n. 321 for the variant reading ἐπεχειρήσαν).

**a2 περιεδράμηνεν εἰς ταῦτόν ὁ λόγος τοῖς πρώτοις:** cf. *Tht.* 200c3. See Intr., section 11.4.3. The perfect συνδεδράμηκα is found at *Plt.* 266c5.

**a3 καὶ ἅπασαι αἱ τέχναι:** ‘and all (other) arts’, cf. note on 408e7; apparently justice is not included, cf. note on 409a3 τὴν . . . τέχνην.

**a4 περὶ ὅτου εἰσίν:** cf. *Phdr.* 275d1 περὶ ὧν ἄν ᾗι. The accusative seems to be more normal in Plato, cf. Ast, *Lexicon*, s.v. περὶ ad fin.

**a4–5 τὴν δὲ . . . ὁμόνοιαν:** a considerable number of translators (Ast, Zuretti, Souilhé, Sartori, De Win, Waterfield) take this as *subject* of διαπέφευγεν (with ἡμᾶς supplied as object), a construction (‘in accusativo per anacoluto’, la Magna) for which the examples collected at KG 1

330 offer no justification. I see no problem in δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν as *object* of διαπέφευγεν: medicine and all other arts are able to say what they are all about, but this one cannot find and state its subject-matter (cf. note on a5 διαπέφευγεν). Cf. 409c6 (ἔρεϊ); δι (φήσει).

**a5 δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν:** strictly speaking, justice is out of place, as the discussion had been about the ἔργον of justice. But if the ἔργον cannot be defined, neither can justice itself. Cf. note on 409e9–10; Intr., sections 1.4.2 (4); II.4.2.

**ὅποι:** Bekker's correction of MSS ὅπου: ποῖ and ποῦ (etc.) are constantly interchanged in MSS. True adverbs of place are used in classical Greek where one would expect adverbs of movement (cf. KG I 545), but almost exclusively if they are accompanied by true verbs of movement (where the end of the movement is anticipated). This is the case at *Phdr.* 228e4 (ποῦ MSS ποῖ pap.; cf. De Vries ad loc.). No such explanation is possible here. Elsewhere in the corpus, τείνειν is found combined with adverbs of movement (*Cri.* 47c5 ποῖ; *R.* 499a7 μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε; 526e2 αὐτόσε), not of place.

**τείνουσά ἐστιν:** for the periphrastic construction, cf. *Plt.* 308e10 ἐστὶ τείνοντα. To Thesleff's bibliography on the subject (*Styles*, 84) add W. J. Alexander, 'Participial periphrases in Attic prose', *AJP* 4 (1883) 291–308; J. Tiemann, 'Zum Sprachgebrauch Platos', *Wochenschr. klass. Philol.* 6 (1889) 248–53; 362–6; W. J. Aerts, *Periphrastica* (Amsterdam 1965), 5–26 (esp. 22–3). Frequent periphrasis is typical of the later dialogues (Alexander, op. cit., 305; Tiemann, op. cit.; Lutosławski, *Plato's Logic*, 100; 128). Aerts (op. cit., 22) analyses the parallel quoted from *Plt.* as 'independent' (existential, substantive) εἶναι + substantival participle. There is no need for that (Aerts is mistaken in saying that the other roads to ἀρετή are not a priori assumed) and such an analysis is out of the question here: we are dealing with the general tendency of impersonal and intransitive verbs towards periphrasis, a phenomenon quite common in fourth-century Greek. Cf. note on 410d2 προτετραμμένος ἦ.

**διαπέφευγεν:** 'it has escaped it', i.e. either 'it doesn't recall any more' (cf. *Ti.* 26b7) or 'it is for all the investigation unable to tell' (cf. *Hp.Ma.* 294e7) – preferably the latter.

**a6 αὐτῆς:** with ἔργον. For the postponement of the interrogative, cf. Denniston, *Greek Prose Style*, 48. The postponement is due to the thematic prominence of justice.

**a7 Ταῦτα:** probably adverbial: 'therefore', cf. KG I 310–11; Schw.–D. 77–8. For examples in Plato, cf. Riddell, 'Digest', §18; add *La.* 179c6; *Ap.* 23b4. Cf. further Stallbaum on *Smp.* 174a; 204a; Van Leeuwen on *Ar. Nub.* 319; Woldinga on *X. Smp.* 4.28. The asyndetic use of this idiom

seems to be unparalleled in Plato, but cf. X. *An.* 4.1.21; A. *Pers.* 165; Theoc. 15.8. It would seem that Susemihl takes ταῦτα in the same way ('Da fragte ich denn'); all other translators regard it as object. But what questions are put is clear anyway; the absence of the logical link between this sentence and the previous creates a harsh asyndeton (adverbial ταῦτα would be only formally asyndetic), and there seems to be no need for the emphasis on ταῦτα (if object) created by disjoining it from ἡρώτων.

**σὲ αὐτόν:** cf. KG I 558; *Grq.* 472b6–7. The order αὐτός + personal pronoun seems to be more frequent in Plato, cf. Stallbaum on *Euthd.* 273b.

**a7–8 ἡρώτων, καὶ εἶπες:** the contrast imperfect : aorist as at 408c9 ἐπανηρώτων; 409a5 εἶπεν and in the passage 409d6–e10 (cf. note on 409d2–e10). Of course ἐρωτᾶν is quite often found in the imperfect without any perceptible difference from the aorist, but then so is λέγειν (KG I 143–4; Schw.–D. 277–8; A. Svensson, *Zum Gebrauch der erzählenden Tempora im Griechischen* (Lund 1930), 40–2 (ἐρωτᾶν), 50–60 (λέγειν)).

The sequence is to be explained as what some modern linguists call 'Inzidenzschema' (cf. K. Strunk, 'Historische und deskriptive Linguistik bei der Textinterpretation', *Glotta* 49 (1971) 191–216, esp. 201–3): if one action is the framework within which a second action falls, the first one is expressed in Greek by the imperfect, the second one by the aorist. Cf. Hdt. 8.64.1 ἡμέρη τε ἐγίνετο καὶ ἅμα τῷ ἡλίω ἀνιόντι σεισμός ἐγένετο; KG I 157–8; Stahl, *Syntax*, 105; 126. 'We might compare the imperfect with a line one of the points of which coincides with another occurrence. This occurrence may be at any point of the line, at the beginning, at the end, or somewhere in between' (W. F. Bakker, *The Greek Imperative* (Amsterdam 1966), 24; cf. 25–7).

**a8–b1 δικαιοσύνης . . . εὖ ποιεῖν:** cf. Intr., section 11.5.3.

**b1 ὕστερον δὲ ἐφάνη:** namely in the course of a discussion not reported by Clitophon, cf. note on 409d2; d9 and Intr., section 1.5.3. Plato does not often make use of the reported dialogue to curtail the report of an argument in this way. Instances include *Euthd.* 280b1–2 συνωμολογησάμεθα τελευτώντες οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ οὕτω τοῦτο ἔχειν κτλ.; 291b1–4; *R.* 342d2–3 Συνωμολόγησε μὲν καὶ ταῦτα τελευτῶν, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠμολόγησεν κτλ.; 350c12–d1 'Ο δὲ Θρασύμαχος ὠμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ραιδίως λέγω, ἀλλ' ἐλκόμενος καὶ μόγις; *Chrm.* 169c3–d1; *Smp.* 201e6–7; 207a5–6. None of these places is quite comparable to either *Clit.* 410b1 or 409d9, but difference in genre (*Clit.* is a 'Kurzdialog') may account for that.

**b2–3 πάντα . . . πάντας δρᾶν:** for the double object, cf. *R.* 495b5–6

etc.; KG I 323–4. Bury's παντός (for πάντας; in his edition) is needless. La Magna construes πάντας as subject, but the result ('tutti fanno ogni cosa a fin di bene') is needlessly vague. There can be no doubt that ὁ δίκαιος is subject and ἐφάνη predicate, carried over from the preceding clause.

**b3–4 Ταῦτα . . . ὑπομείνας:** (1) 'having endured this (getting unsatisfactory answers)', so Schleiermacher, Susemihl, H. Müller, Gonzalez; (2) 'having waited for an answer to these questions', so Sartori and (with many variations) most other translators. In (2), ταῦτα is internal object of ὑπομείνας, but I doubt whether this construction is consistent with οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δις.

**b4 καί:** there are three reasons which in conjunction justify Baumann's proposal to delete the particle (followed by Schanz, Burnet, Bury; H. Müller translates as if καί were not there).

(1) λιπαρεῖν is elsewhere intransitive in Plato and all other fourth-century authors (D. 21.208 is a hendiadys); ταῦτα . . . ὑπομείνας καὶ λιπαρῶν could only be explained as a zeugma.

(2) The phrase οὐχ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δις ἀλλὰ πολὺν δὴ ὑπομείνας χρόνον does not go well with ἀπέιρηκα: 'I have grown tired of enduring this not once nor twice etc.' Besides, there is room for doubt whether ἀπαγορεύω can be construed with an aorist participle.

(3) The change in tense from ὑπομείνας to λιπαρῶν is puzzling. If καί is deleted, λιπαρῶν becomes a complement of ἀπέιρηκα, and its tense self-evident.

At most, καί could be retained as emphasising λιπαρῶν, but the emphasis is rather on ἀπέιρηκα (cf. *Grg.* 448a7) or as 'conclusive' or 'consecutive' (cf. note on 406a9–10), but I have seen no parallel for this use of *adverbial* καί preceding a participle.

**νομίσας:** 'having come to conclusion' (ingressive aorist), cf. *R.* 518a4.

**b4–6 τὸ μὲν προτρέπειν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων δρᾶν:** cf. *Euthd.* 274e8–275a2 ἡμεῖς ἄρα . . . τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστ' ἂν προτρέψαιτε εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν; 275a6; 278d3. The phrase looks like a conscious imitation of the sentence quoted from *Euthd.* (cf. note on 408c4–7); compare κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων – τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστ'; εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν – εἰς φιλοσοφίαν καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. Note that the word φιλοσοφία is absent from this phrase in *Clit.*, probably because the author avoided it on purpose (cf. *Intr.*, sections II.2.1.1; II.7.1).

For ἀρετῆς instead of δικαιοσύνης or ψυχῆς (cf. 408e3–409a3; 410d6–7), cf. 408d2–3 τὴν Σωκράτους προτροπὴν ἡμῶν ἐπ' ἀρετῆν. In κάλλιστ' ἀνθρώπων the genitive reinforces the superlative ('le mieux du monde', Souilhé), rather than being fully partitive (contrast

the *Euthd.* parallel: τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων κάλλιστ’), cf. LSJ s.v. ἀνθρωπος 1 3 b; Ast, *Lexicon*, s.v. ἀνθρωπος ‘superlativis apponitur ut eorum vis augeatur (Latin. *quam potest*, v.c. maxime, optime al.)’ with numerous examples; Ast and England on *Lg.* 629a6.

**b6 δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, ἢ κτλ.:** the second alternative (‘you do not want to impart your knowledge’, cf. c6) is missing: owing to the analogy of praising steersmanship the first alternative has grown so lengthy that the original construction has ceased to govern the sentence, so that δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον has to be repeated at c5.

It seems at least possible that the relative clause ὃ γένοιτ’ ἂν κτλ. (b7–c2) is treated as antecedent of ταύτῳ δὴ κτέ (c2–4). If so, this is an instance of a sentence with two main clause predicates, for which cf. Reinhard, *Anakoluthe*, 151–66; de Strycker–Slings on *Ap.* 32b5; my note on *R.* 389a3–7, ‘Notes on *Politeia*, III’, 344–5; on *R.* 432d7–e3, ‘Notes on *Politeia*, IV’, 414.

Anacoluthon caused by intervention of a comparison or an example is very frequent in Plato, cf. L. Reinhard, *Anakoluthe*, 33–57. With the pendent ἢ compare *Ap.* 40c10 καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἰσθησίς ἐστιν ... (e2) εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν κτλ.

δυοῖν θάτερον is frequently used as a clause apposition, or rather as an apposition to a pair of disjunctive clauses (‘aber eins von beiden, entweder ...’, Schleiermacher), so also at c5. Cf. *Phd.* 66e5; *Tht.* 187c1; KG I 286 A 10.

**b6–7 μακρότερον ... οὐδέν:** usually taken to be synonymous to οὐδὲν πλεόν, but perhaps ‘nothing which goes further than that’ is preferable (cf. ‘nichts Weiteres’ H. Müller; similarly Susemihl). Although of course μακρός and πολὺς tend to become synonyms, cf. LSJ s.v. μακρός 1 4 (add *R.* 363d2) and 1 5, μακρότερον never equals πλεόν in Plato, cf. *Cra.* 413a8–9 μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν, ‘going further in asking questions than is fitting’; *Plt.* 283c5; *R.* 403b7–c1 μακρότερα τούτων συγγίγνεσθαι, ‘going further than that in amorous contact’; cf. μακροτέρως at *Sph.* 258c7.

Steinhart (72 n. 39) and Heidel (*Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 8) consider the use of μακρότερον for πλεόν to be un-Platonic; this is obviously not relevant, since the two are not necessarily interchangeable in the *Clitophon*. But the fact that in Plato the comparative always has a complement in the genitive, which is absent here, should be noted.

**b7–8 περί ἄλλην ἡντιναοῦν τέχνην:** cf. note on 409a3 τὴν ... τέχνην.

**b8–c1 καταμελετῆσαι τὸν ἔπαινον περί αὐτῆς:** the verb must mean ‘to train oneself completely in’ not ‘to deliver’ (Susemihl) because (a) μελετᾶν ‘to declaim’ is used intransitively (*Phdr.* 228b6; D. 61.43), at

least in fourth-century Attic (cf. LSJ s.v. μελετάω II 1; II 5b); the verb means ‘to train oneself’ also at D. 19.255 λογάρια δύστηνα μελετήσας καὶ φωνασκήσας; at D. 46.1 ἄμα τ’ εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς ἐγχειροῦντας τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀπολογίαν εὐθέως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν μελετᾶν the adverb εὐθέως proves that training is intended (cf. the opening sentence of the speech); (b) the prefix κατα- is rather senseless if the verb refers to the delivery of a eulogy, but it has its normal function of marking perfective *Aktionsart* (cf. note on 407b6–7 ἐξασκήσουσιν καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν) if training in delivery is meant. The aorist infinitive is chosen because it harmonises with the meaning of the prefix. I cannot accept the use of this word as a mark of inauthenticity (Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 8; cf. contra Grube, ‘The *Cleitophon* of Plato’, 307 n. 1). – ἔπαινος περί τινος is frequent in Plato: *Smp.* 195a2; *Phdr.* 260c7–8; *Lg.* 687a2–3 etc. The article probably indicates that ἔπαινος is not a particular eulogy but praising in general: ‘the praise pertaining to it’. For the relationship of ἔπαινος and προτροπή cf. Intr., section II.1.2.

**c1–2** **περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν:** in view of the following sentence these words imply that δικαιοσύνη is not among them, cf. note on 409a3 τὴν . . . τέχνην.

**c3–4** **οὐ μᾶλλον . . . διότι:** ‘it is not the case that you are more knowledgeable about justice because you praise it beautifully’; ‘tu sai ben esaltarla ma ciò non implica che la conosca meglio’ (Sartori). Not: ‘because you eulogise it you are not an expert’ (so Schleiermacher, H. Müller, Waterfield; cf. De Win). – In contexts like this one, the opposition between causal and adversative adjuncts is neutralised: ‘You are none the more an expert because you can praise it’ > ‘you are not an expert even if you can praise it’. Plato often uses causal adjuncts and clauses here, cf. *Smp.* 202b2–4 οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἔρωτα ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖς μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ καλόν, μηδὲν τι μᾶλλον οἶου δεῖν αὐτὸν αἰσχρὸν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι; *R.* 346b3–6 οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον, ἔάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιῆς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν αὐτὸν πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἔνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικήν; *Sph.* 233b4–5; *Phd.* 87d1–2. *Phdr.* 244a3–5, adduced by Grube (‘The *Cleitophon* of Plato’, 307 n. 1), is only formally similar. There is no reason to assume with Steinhart (72 n. 39 – duly repeated by Heidel, *Pseudo-Platonica*, 48 n. 8) that ‘das dicht an καίπερ anstreifende διότι’ is a sign of inauthenticity. Of course, καίπερ is equally possible in contexts like these, cf. Th. 3.79.3 τῇ δ’ ὕστεραίαι ἐπὶ μὲν τὴν πόλιν οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἐπέπλεον, καίπερ ἐν πολλῇ ταραχῇ καὶ φόβῳ ὄντας.

**c4** **ἐγκωμιάζεις:** eulogy and proreptic are evidently felt to be related; cf. Intr., section II.1.2.

**c4–5** **οὐ μὴν τό γε ἔμὸν οὕτως ἔχει:** either (1) τό γε ἔμὸν adverbial



'as far as I am concerned' (here 'in my opinion', so Ficinus, Souilhé, De Win, Waterfield), cf. *Prt.* 338c5; *Grg.* 458d5; *Lg.* 688a6 (and England ad loc.) or (2) τό γε ἔμὸν subject of οὕτως ἔχει ('my position', 'I'; 'non è questa la mia affermazione', Zuretti; cf. Orwin, Gonzalez), cf. *Tht.* 161e4; *Sph.* 237b4; *La.* 188c4; *R.* 533a2; *Lg.* 643a3 (and Ast ad loc.); Van Leeuwen on *Ar. Thesm.* 105. At a number of places there is a similar ambiguity: *Chrm.* 176b2; *La.* 188c1; *R.* 345a2 (and Tucker ad loc.); *Ti.* 19d3.

If taken in the first way, Clitophon denies that Socrates has no 'technical' knowledge of justice. In the second interpretation, Clitophon underlines that his position is different from those who deny that Socrates has any such knowledge. In view of Clitophon's immediately re-stating the alternatives ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν, the second is decidedly better, unless one takes him to imply that Socrates indeed does *not* want to tell him any more (cf. note on c6 οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν). Apart from that, I have seen no good parallel for adverbial τό γε ἔμὸν in the construction that one would have to assume if (1) is accepted, whereas τὸ ἔμὸν is frequently subject of nominal predicates, or phrases (such as οὕτως ἔχει) equivalent to nominal predicates.

**c5-6 ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι σε ἢ οὐκ ἐθέλειν:** the infinitives may be explained as continuing the construction of b6 after the repetition of δυοῖν δὲ θάτερον, but are better accounted for as depending on a *verbum declarandi* implied in οὐ μὴν τό γε ἔμὸν οὕτως ἔχει.

**c5 εἰδέναι:** object δικαιοσύνην (cf. αὐτῆς in the next line). εἰδέναι with a *nomen qualitatis* as object is found e.g. at *Cra.* 384b6 (τὴν ἀλήθειαν); 425c2; 426a4-5 (τὴν ὀρθότητα); *Tht.* 163c1 (τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα); *Criti.* 109e1-2 (τὰς ἀρετάς).

**c6 οὐκ ἐθέλειν αὐτῆς ἐμοὶ κοινωνεῖν:** this possibility is certainly not 'slechthin ungeremt' as Steinhart (56) says (at 410e3 Clitophon rather clearly suggests that Socrates does know more than just to exhort others). More than once, Plato makes it clear that not everyone is fit for Socratic 'instruction', see *Intr.*, section 11.3.1 n. 248.

But I see no point in introducing the idea of psychological affinity here: it is the Socrates of explicit protreptic who is being attacked by a Clitophon who himself imitates not unsuccessfully Socrates the intellectual midwife (cf. note on 408d1 ὑποτείνων; *Intr.*, section 1.5.3); to suppose that all of a sudden the Socrates of *Clit.* turns into that of *Tht.* (and Plato in general) would make no sense at all of our dialogue.

Nor am I much attracted by the parallels *R.* 337a5-7 προύλεγον [Thrasymachus], ὅτι σὺ [Socrates] ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσοις ἢ ἀποκρινοῖο εἰ τίς τί σε ἔρωτᾷ; e1-3 ἵνα Σωκράτης τὸ εἰωθὸς διαπράξῃται: αὐτὸς μὲν μὴ

ἀποκρίνεται, ἄλλου δ' ἀποκρινομένου λαμβάνημι λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχῃ; 338b1–3 αὕτη δὴ ἔφη ἡ Σωκράτους σοφία· αὐτὸν μὲν μὴ ἐθέλειν διδάσκειν, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιμόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τούτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι; *Tht.* 150c4–7 ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνείδισαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, ἀληθὲς ὄνειδίζουσιν; *X. Mem.* 4.4.9. The fact that the reproof is made with particular insistence by Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1 might perhaps be thought to favour dependence of the *Clit.* passage, but it remains pointless unless it can be shown that Clitophon, like Thrasymachus, does not understand the rationale of Socratic questioning. In fact not only does he understand it, but he practises it on an un-Platonic Socrates. The dilemma is probably not intended quite seriously, cf. *Intr.*, section 1.3.2(1).

**κοινωνεῖν:** not διδάσκειν (cf. *R.* 338b2 quoted above) – the author is well aware of Socrates' ways and means. Cf. note on 408c6–7.

**αὐτῆς:** sc. justice, which had been left out as object of εἶδέναι, since the meaning, so close after δικαιοσύνης ἐπιστήμονι, was clear enough. Not 'knowledge' (so Bury and Orwin): even if the phrase 'to share justice with me' (or 'to let me share justice') is a little odd, it is acceptable when the Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge is taken into account. Cf. the final sentence where πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα can only refer to acquiring complete knowledge of ἀρετή.

**καί:** probably the adverb with 'conclusive' meaning (cf. note on 406a9–10; *GP*<sup>2</sup> 307–8; it is, as Denniston says, often preceded by δὴ; cf. J. M. van Ophuijsen in *Two Studies*, 149), though it might be correlative (καὶ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον ... καὶ ἄλλοσε).

**εἰ οἷμαι** is found in *parenthesi* at *Ap.* 23d8; *Tht.* 155b5; *Lg.* 788d1; 798d4. It is less likely to be a correction of οἶμαι than the other way round; besides, the consensus of ADF favours the fuller reading (the status of A<sup>3</sup> is uncertain). – The parenthesis is superfluous, cf. 408c1 σχεδόν (and note ad loc.).

**πορεύομαι:** so ADF; πορεύσομαι A<sup>2</sup>. The present is certainly better, for the following reasons:

- (1) It is a fair inference from 406a1–4 that Clitophon has already experienced Thrasymachus' συνουσία.
- (2) The imperfect in πολλάκις ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων (407a6) is understandable only if Clitophon no longer frequents Socrates' meetings. Though in reality a vacuum between Clitophon's Socratic and Thrasymachean periods would have been possible, no such vacuum is hinted at; in this literary text it therefore does not exist. See note ad loc.

- (3) The future requires ὅποι ἄν δύνωμαι, because πορεύσομαι (...) ὅποι δύνωμαι means ‘I shall go wherever I (now) can’, which is inept. Cf. *MT* §520.

Wilamowitz seems to read the present: ‘Daher bleibt Kleitophon bei Thrasymachos’ (*Platon*, I 306 n. 1). – See also Intr., section 1.5.3 n. 91.

**καὶ ἄλλοσε:** cf. Intr., section 1.5.3.

**ὅποι:** so Bekker; ὅπηι MSS; cf. *Cri.* 45c1; *Phdr.* 230e1; *Men.* 97a10 (ἄλλοσε + ὅποι); *Phd.* 82a6 (ποῖ ... ἄλλοσε); *Cri.* 51d8–e1; 52b6; *Th.* 202e7; *R.* 420a5; 486d5 (ἄλλοσε + ποι). Given these places, *Sph.* 243b5 ἄλλοθί πηι, which is suspect for other reasons (Radermacher’s ἄλλος εἴπηι is palmary), can hardly support the MSS reading.

**c8–d5 ἐπεὶ ... γιγνέσθω:** the anacoluthon is caused, like the previous one, by the intervention of an analogy (cf. note on b6). For its aim, cf. note 92 to Intr., section 1.5.3. There is no reason to change the text (H. Müller: γίγοντι’ ἄν based on the ἐθέλοις of inferior MSS and the earliest editions; C. F. Hermann deleted ταῦτον γιγνέσθω, connecting καὶ νῦν δὴ θές κτλ.), The anacoluthon is complicated by the μὲν ... δέ opposition; even the infinitive which we would expect to parallel παύσασθαι is missing. καὶ νῦν δὴ (d4) may have helped trigger the anacoluthon, as it does at *R.* 414e3; cf. my note in ‘Notes on *Politeia*, III’, 360–1. The analogy looks like a repetition of 408e3–409a3, but it is essential because it diverts attention from the question ‘What is δικαιοσύνη?’ to the need of ἐπιμέλεια, which now replaces δικαιοσύνη definitively (announced b5; referred to d2 μὴ ἀμελεῖν; d4 θεραπείας (cf. 407b8 ἐθεραπεύσατε); d6 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι; e1 ἤμεληκέναι). The final phrase πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἐλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι is neutral. The dialogue as a whole ends on the same note as the protreptic speech (see Intr., section 11.2.2 n. 188). This indicates that the author does after all attach some value to it, cf. sections 1.5.3; 11.6.

**c8 ἐπεὶ:** explains ἀπορῶν.

**ἐθέλεις:** C. F. Hermann (*Platonis Dialogi*, III p. xxviii) attributes a hypothetical force to the indicative on the basis of *Alc.* I 122b8–c3 εἰ δ’ αὖ ἐθέλεις (T Olympiod.; ἐθέλοις Bodl.) εἰς πλοῦτους ἀποβλέψαι ... , αἰσχυνθείης ἄν ἐπὶ σεαύτῳ; D. 22.55 εἰ θέλετε σκέψασθαι τί δοῦλον ἢ ἐλεύθερον εἶναι διαφέρει, τοῦτο μέγιστον ἄν εὔροιτε κτλ. (to which could have been added D. 22.51 εἰ γὰρ θέλετ’ ἐξετάσαι ... τοῦτ’ ἄν εὔροιτε προχειρότατον κτλ.). In these instances (ἐ)θέλω is followed by a verb meaning ‘to investigate’ or the like; the hypothetical force lies rather in the combination ἐθέλεις + inf. which gives the impression of an urban periphrasis (εἰ θέλετε σκέψασθαι – εἰ σκέψασθε). It would be rash to assume that here ἐθέλεις, with no such infinitive following, is also

hypothetical. The indicative is, as always, neutral as to modal value: ‘assuming that you are prepared ...’ Cf. Wakker, *Conditions and Conditionals*, 125–30.

**τούτων:** emphasised by disjunction.

**d1–2 περί γυμναστικῆς:** emphasised, cf. note on d2 προτετραμμένος ἦ; not εἰς γυμναστικὴν, cf. Intr., section II.1.2.

**d1 πρὸς ἐμέ:** depending on τῶν λόγων: the construction is a bit loose (παύσασθαι λέγων πρὸς ἐμὲ τοὺς λόγους would have been more precise).

**τῶν λόγων τῶν προτρεπτικῶν:** for the plural, cf. note on 407a6 πολλάκις.

**d2 προτετραμμένος ἦ:** the periphrasis does not denote a state (cf. δεῖν; J. Gonda, ‘A remark on ‘periphrastic’ constructions in Greek’, *Mnem.* 12 (1959) 97–112, esp. 111–12); it may have been used to emphasise another part of the sentence, cf. Hdt. 9.15.4 ἦν δὲ τὸ δεῖπνον ποιούμενον ἐν Θήβησι ‘it was at Thebes that the meal took place’ (H. B. Rosén, ‘Die “zweiten” Tempora des Griechischen. Zum Prädikatsausdruck beim griechischen Verbum’, *MH* 14 (1957) 133–54, esp. 141–7; cf. Gonda, op. cit., 97–104): ‘if it had been about gymnastics that I had been exhorted’. – Cf. Intr., section II.1.4.1 n. 147 and 148 for the semantic properties of the verb.

**δεῖν:** the infinitive is pleonastic; it is best understood if the εἰ clause is reformulated actively: προτρέπειν τινὰ τοῦ σώματος δεῖν μὴ ἀμελεῖν is hardly offensive, even though, as LSJ note (s.v. προτρέπω, II), when followed by an infinitive the verb means ‘to persuade to do a thing’ (cf. 408e3–4; cf. *Euthd.* 278d2 for a possible parallel for the meaning ‘persuade that’, though ὅπως for ὡς is a problem). Besides, the fact that the focus of the sentence is περί γυμναστικῆς (cf. previous note) gives the infinitive a more independent status than it would normally have; this facilitated the insertion of δεῖν: ‘if it had been about gymnastics that you exhorted me, viz. that it was necessary not to neglect my body’.

**d3 τὸ ἐφεξῆς:** object, explained asyndetically by an appositive indirect question as *Phdr.* 239d8–e1 τὸ δ’ ἐφεξῆς ῥητέον, τίνα ἡμῖν ὠφελίαν κτλ.; cf. note on 407e5.

**ἔλεγε:** the choice of imperfect for a past unreal condition (cf. προτετραμμένος ἦ) is a clear proof of the futility of the distinction between *irrealis* of the present and *irrealis* of the past (and past potential). This distinction was forced upon Greek syntax by grammarians steeped in Latin (where it is obviously present). If in a small majority of cases the distinction appears to hold, that is easily accounted for by verbal aspect, which in fact is the only determining factor for the choice between imperfect, aorist and pluperfect. Cf. the formulation in Stahl, *Syntax*, 302

and his examples 303; Wakker, *Conditions and Conditionals*, 144–50. The same holds for the chimerical distinction between unfulfilled wishes of the present and those of the past.

**d5–e1 θές . . . ἡμεληθέναι:** see Intr., section 1.5.3. The wording of the sentence suggests that of 408e3–409a2 ὡσπερ . . . ἰατρική: ἔστιν καταγέλαστον τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι ~ 408e6–7 αἰσχρὸν πυρῶν μὲν καὶ κριθῶν καὶ ἀμπέλων ἐπιμέλειαν πᾶσαν ποιῆσθαι; ἧς ἕνεκα τᾶλλα διαπονούμεθα ~ 408e7–8 ὅσα τοῦ σώματος ἕνεκα διαπονούμεθά τε καὶ κτώμεθα. Both sentences give a concise version of Socrates' speech, one directly, one through an analogy. – The asyndeton has perhaps explanatory force: the invitation καὶ νῦν δὴ ταῦτόν γιγνέσθω is a realistic one because Clitophon has now been exhorted to the care of the soul. Cf. note on 407e7 τοῦ μὲν ἄρξοντος.

**d5 θές:** cf. *Tht.* 191c8–9 θές . . . ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ἐνὸν κήρινον ἔκμαγεῖον; cf. *Ap.* 27c10; *Grg.* 481c1 with Dodds' note. Thesleff's contention (*Styles*, 15 n. 2) that θές is un-Platonic proves groundless.

**τὸν Κλειτοφῶντα:** the formality of Socrates' opening words is alluded to, cf. Intr., section 1.5.2.

**e1 ταύτης:** the resumption of a word within the same clause by means of an emphatic anaphoric pronoun (οὗτος, ἐκεῖνος; αὐτός is unemphatic and should not be treated under the same heading) is often colloquial (Thesleff, *Styles*, 91), but not necessarily so: emphasis is not restricted to colloquial style. See the examples collected in KG I 660–1; Stallbaum on *Chrm.* 163c7; on *Phlb.* 30d8. In Clitophon's last appeal, a colloquialism would be definitely out of tune.

**e1–3 καὶ τᾶλλα . . . διῆλθον:** 'Take it for granted that all the other things which I have now said after those were also said with that intention with which I went through them (speaking about gymnastics) just now.' The various possible constructions of εἰρηκέναι, the number of possible referents of τούτοις (cf. note on 408e1) and the number of possible antecedents of ἄ (so MSS) contribute to make this an obscure sentence.

Some translators take τούτοις as antecedent of ἄ: 'e fa conto che io abbia ora esposto così anche tutto il seguito di quanto ho esposto or ora [= just now]' (Zuretti; similarly Sartori, Souilhé, la Magna, Waterfield). τᾶλλα πάντα strongly suggests that νῦν refers to a greater part of the conversation than νυνδὴ, and νυνδὴ to something in the last part of the conversation (διῆλθον can both refer to extensive and to concise treatment; it is unlikely that ἄ καὶ νυνδὴ διῆλθον refers to the whole dialogue). This would mean that something in Clitophon's last few words is the logical antecedent of the whole conversation or at least a greater part of it (contra Modugno, who makes νυνδὴ refer to the whole con-

versation from 409a onwards). – I do not understand Verdenius' explanation ('Notes on *Clitopho*', 145–6) that  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  = 'in the present case' and that  $\nu\upsilon\nu\delta\eta$  refers to the whole speech. Waterfield's identification of  $\alpha$  και  $\nu\upsilon\nu\delta\eta$  διήλθον with the sequence eyes – ears – lyre (407e9–408a4) seems to me to stretch  $\nu\upsilon\nu\delta\eta$  well beyond what can be referred to as 'just now'. Besides, Clitophon cannot agree ( $\delta\omicron\mu\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\nu\tau\omicron$ ) that it is absurd to care for one's eyes, ears and lyre, because Socrates never said such a thing.

I can see no candidate but the sentence which contains the last analogy (c8–d5); if so, Clitophon says that his whole speech was in fact the logical sequel to what is stated in this analogy, namely that he has in fact spoken of the  $\theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$  of the soul. Though of course Clitophon's examination of the pupils has had the purifying effect of Platonic elenchos (cf. Intr., section II.3.1), a statement that Clitophon had done Socrates' job for him is inconsistent with the final appeal και  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  δὴ ταῦτὸν γιγνέσθω, and also with the clause following presently μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖν (which does not mean 'to act in the same way as I did' but 'to do what one is asked', cf. *R.* 328b1; 369b4; mostly coupled with a positive command). Another possibility is to construe εἰρηκέναι with an accusative of the object and one of the predicate (type  $\tau\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\varsigma$  λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους;). This can occur with the perfect (*Gr.* 491c6). 'By the rest of my speech [obj.] I meant just what I said just now about gymnastics [pred.],' or conversely: 'By what I said just now about gymnastics [obj.] I meant everything following the exhortation [pred.].' The latter, though inane, has at least the advantage that it suits the line of thought: 'I agree that ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς comes first. When I spoke of your telling me what  $\theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$  my body would need given its nature, I was referring to what comes next once this has been agreed upon. So please do tell me what  $\theta\epsilon\rho\alpha\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\alpha$  my soul needs given its nature; if you will do so, I shall praise you wholesale.' The disadvantages are that both  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  and οὕτως are difficult:  $\nu\upsilon\nu$  may perhaps contrast the analogy ( $\nu\upsilon\nu\delta\eta$ ) with what has now actually been intended, οὕτως ('likewise') may point back to the resemblance between exhortation towards bodily care and care of the soul.

I can make no sense of what is syntactically speaking the most natural way of construing the sentence: to make τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ... τὰ τούτοις ἐξῆς object of εἰρηκέναι and antecedent of  $\alpha$ : 'and suppose also that I have made all the other subsequent statements which I rehearsed just now' (Bury, cf. Orwin). Why does Socrates have to be told that Clitophon has told a long story? A variant (moulded on the type πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις;) is offered by H. Müller: 'und sei des Glaubens, dass ich auch über Alles daran sich Knüpfende, was ich eben erörterte, dem gemäss

mich ausgesprochen habe'; this suits the context, but would only be acceptable if in πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; the pronoun could point forwards to a subject about which no statement has yet been made ('what do you say about this?'). To the best of my knowledge, it cannot.

A number of translators modify ᾗ: 'und denke dass ich über alles Andere was sich weiter hieran anschliessen muss gerade so gesprochen habe wie ich es eben hinsichtlich des Turnens that' (Susemihl; similarly Schleiermacher). This gives excellent sense, but it is not in the Greek: sentences like ὅπερ ἔλεγον (which we translate 'as I said' but which have in fact the function of an apposition) do not occur with the plural neuter nor with synonyms of λέγω, as is shown by the survey of the material in E. des Places, *Une formule platonicienne de récurrence* (Paris 1929), 7–16.

If, however, we read ὡς instead of ᾗ all problems are solved. τὰλλα πάντα . . . τὰ τοῦτοις ἐξῆς refers then to everything which Clitophon had said following his report of the protreptic, the gist of which was given in the previous sentence (referred to by τοῦτοις); εἰρηκέναι has the resultative sense it ought to have and νῦν underlines it: 'the whole of my position as it has now been stated'; οὕτως . . . ὡς καὶ νυνδὴ διήλθον indicates in what way Clitophon's report and the remarks following upon it should be taken. καὶ after ὡς could be the inverted-place καὶ which should have followed a main-clause demonstrative (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 295–6); this is the more attractive because an adverbial καὶ in the main clause is needed and the καὶ before τὰλλα must be connective (θές – οἶου). If this is correct, Socrates is invited to take the criticism as an incitement to get down to business about justice; this squares precisely with the idiomatic μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖν in the next sentence. Though with some diffidence, I print ὡς instead of ᾗ because it is far superior to any interpretation of the transmitted text that I can think of. The weak side of this proposal is that an original ὡς is not very likely to have been corrupted to ᾗ. Perhaps a person who paid attention only to the ὡς-clause decided that its syntax was inferior inasmuch as διήλθον requires an object (not realising that the object is easily supplied from the main clause).

**e3 καί:** probably consecutive, cf. note on 406a9–10.

**σου δεόμενος λέγω:** Brandwood (*Word Index*, s.v. δεῖσθαι) wrongly classifies this under the use of δεομαι with genitive of person asked expressed and accusative or infinitive or both implied. In fact δεόμενος is used here with the personal genitive only (half-absolutely, so to speak) as *Ap.* 35b10–c1 οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν; *D.* 21.108; this usage should be contrasted with the elliptic construction of e.g. *Prm.* 136d4–5 αὐτοῦ ᾧ Σώκρατες δεώ-

μεθα Παρμενίδου (sc. διελθεῖν, supplied from d2–3 τί οὐ διήλθες ἡμῖν;). The infinitive depends on λέγω, not on δεόμενος (so Bury; for λέγω μῆ + inf. cf. *Euthphr.* 12e2); λέγω with the infinitive, being a neutral expression of volition, is qualified by σου δεόμενος: ‘I tell you to do just that please.’ Cf. *Chrm.* 155d5–6 Κυδῖαν . . . ὃς εἶπεν ἐπὶ καλοῦ λέγων παιδός, ἄλλωι ὑποτιθέμενος, εὐλαβεῖσθαι.

There is no pleonastic use of λέγω here (LSJ s.v. (B) III 7) any more than at 409a4 (see on πρὸς ταῦτα). The only possibility of making the infinitive depend on δεόμενος would be by supplying the previous sentence as object to λέγω (‘und ich sage dies dich bittend, dass du es doch ja nich anders machen mögest’, Schleiermacher). But in my opinion this would have required ταῦτα λέγω.

**e4–5 ἵνα μῆ . . . ψέγω:** cf. Intr., section 1.3.2 for the echo of the prologue.

**καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους:** cf. note on 406a2.

**e5–8 μῆ μὲν . . . γενέσθαι:** cf. Intr., section 1.3.2 for the details of this peroration.

**e5 γάρ:** explains the whole of τὰ μὲν ἐπαινῶ . . . τὰ δὲ τι καὶ ψέγω.

**e6 ἄξιον . . . τοῦ παντός:** a typically Platonic idiom; cf. Ast, *Lexicon*, s.v. πᾶς.

**φήσω:** strictly speaking, the future is justified only for the first part of the sentence (if Socrates will follow up Clitophon’s last appeal, the latter will have nothing to blame in him) but its extension is easy to account for (‘I shall always sustain etc.’ absorbs ‘but I have to add’).

**e7–8 ἐμπόδιον τοῦ . . . γενέσθαι:** ἐμπόδιος in Plato is found once perhaps with the simple infinitive (*R.* 407c4), twice with τοῦ μῆ + inf. (*Lg.* 832b1–2; 925e1–2); our construction (not in LSJ) is not found elsewhere in the corpus, but cf. τὸ ἐμποδίζον τοῦ ἵεναι (*Cra.* 419c3).

**e7 τέλος ἀρετῆς:** cf. *Mx.* 234a5 παιδεύσεως καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τέλει; *R.* 494a12 πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν.

**e8 εὐδαίμονα γενέσθαι:** the word εὐδαίμων is here used for the first and last time, cf. Intr., section 1.3.2. The premise of the protreptic argument in *Euthd.* (278e3 ἄρα γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι βουλόμεθα εὖ πράττειν; cf. 280b6 εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν καὶ εὖ πράττειν) is the final note of *Clit.* as well as *R.* (εὖ πράττωμεν). If *Clit.* were the work of a forger, he would in view of these parallels have written εὖ πράττειν (cf. *Ep.* 3 315b1–3 and – rather less obvious – *Ep.* 8 352b3). εὐδαιμονία is also the central concept of Aristotle’s *Protr.* (but v 52 Düring, not from Iambl. *Protr.*, is an adaptation of Pl. *Euthd.* 280b7–d7 as likely as not); above all, it is said to be the effect of Socrates’ exhortation combined with elenchos in *Ap.* 36d9–10. Cf. further *Smp.* 205a1–3 (note τέλος a3) and Bury’s note; *Phdr.* 277a3–4.



## APPENDIX I: THE ENDING OF ARISTOTLE'S *PROTREPTICUS*

The words ἡ φιλοσοφητέον οὖν ἡ χαίρειν εἰποῦσι τῶι ζῆν ἀπιτέον ἐντεῦθεν (B 110 Düring) are regarded by a large majority of scholars as actually the last paragraph of the *Protrepticus* (Hirzel, 'Protreptikos', 87; V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig 1886), fr. 61; W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin 1923), 102 n. 2; E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro* (Florence n.d. (1936)), 190; 97–8; Düring, 37 and 'Problems in Aristotle's *Protrepticus*', *Eranos* 52 (1954), 139–71 at 171; G. Schneeweiss, *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles* (Munich 1966), 228; S. Mansion, 'Contemplation and action in Aristotle's "Protrepticus"' in Düring–Owen, *Aristotle and Plato*, 56–75 at 67 and n. 1).

Hartlich, 'De exhortationum ... historia', 253–4; 272 and Gaiser, *Protreptik*, 218 n. 21; 220 n. 22 want to place Iambl. *Protr.* 89.7–90.15 des Places = B 93–6 Düring after this paragraph, so as to make Arist. *Protr.* end on a more exalted note, like Cic. *Hort.*, but against this speaks a formal similarity of Arist. *Protr.* B 110 Düring (ἡ φιλοσοφητέον ... ἡ ... ἀπιτέον) and the last sentence of Cic. *Hort.* fr. 115 Grilli (*si aut ... aut si ... opera et cura ponenda est*). – Flashar's attempt to attribute B 104–10 to the *Eudemus* ('Platon und Aristoteles im *Protreptikos* des Jamblichos', *AGPh* 47 (1965) 53–79, esp. 70–4; cf. O. Gigon, 'Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*' in Düring–Owen, *Aristotle and Plato*, 19–33 at 28) robs the *Protr.* of its most protreptic part (cf. C. J. de Vogel, 'The legend of the Platonizing Aristotle' in Düring–Owen, 248–56 at 252; Düring, *Der Protreptikos des Aristoteles* (Frankfurt–Mainz 1969) 110); besides B 110 is closely connected with A 2 = B 6 Düring, one of the two ascribed quotations from *Protr.*

Apart from the fact that B 110 is quite a sweeping statement and makes excellent sense as a peroration, the consensus about its position rests mainly on the following argument.

B 104–10 is an indivisible block, inspired, as Düring points out (261–2) by the *Phaedo* (64a4–70b4). There are two close parallels

between this block and the end of Cicero's *Hortensius*:

(1) B 106

... οἱ πρῶτον εὐθύς  
 φύσει συνέσταμεν,  
 καθάπερ φασὶν οἱ τὰς τελε-  
 τὰς λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἄν ἐπὶ  
 τιμωρίαί πάντες; τοῦτο γὰρ  
 θείως οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέ-  
 γουσι τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν  
 ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ ζῆν  
 ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγά-  
 λων τινῶν ἀμαρτημάτων.

B 107 πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευ-  
 ξις τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἔοικε  
 πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς·  
 ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ  
 Τυρρηνίαι φασὶ βασανί-  
 ζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἀ-  
 λισκομένους προσδεσμέυ-  
 οντας κατ' ἀντικρὺ τοῖς  
 ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπροσώ-  
 πους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον  
 μέρος προσαρμόττοντας,  
 οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ δια-  
 τετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολ-  
 λῆσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθη-  
 τικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέ-  
 λεσιν.

fr. 112 Grilli (in extremis partibus  
 Hortensii dialogi); Arist. fr. 823  
 Gigon

ex quibus humanae vitae errori-  
 bus. . . , fit ut interdum veteres  
 illi vates sive in sacris  
 initiisque tradendae divinae  
 mentis interpretes,  
 qui nos ob aliqua scelera . . .  
 poenarum luendarum causa natos  
 esse dixerunt, aliquid dixisse  
 videantur, verumque sit illud  
*quod est apud Aristotelem*  
 simili nos adfectos esse suppli-  
 cio

atque eos qui quondam, cum in  
 praedonum Etruscorum manus  
 incidissent, crudelitate ex-  
 cogitata necebantur,  
 quorum corpora viva eum mortuis  
 adversa adversis accommodata  
 quam artissime colligabantur;

sic nostros animos cum corpo-  
 ribus copulatos ut vivos cum  
 mortuis esse coniunctos.

(2) B 110 as quoted above, cf. fr. 115 Grilli (*in fine dialogi Hortensii; sermonem finiens*); Arist. fr. 825 Gigon: *Quapropter, ut aliquando terminetur oratio, si aut exstingui tranquille volumus cum in his artibus vixerimus, aut si ex hac in aliam haud paulo meliorem domum sine mora demigrare, in his studiis nobis omnis opera et cura ponenda est.* (With B 107,

cf. also *Hort.* fr. 113 Grilli: *adpendicem animi esse corpus nihilque esse in eo magnum.*)

Now it can be shown that the *Hortensius* makes an extensive use of material preserved in Iamblichus' excerpts which are assumed to derive from Aristotle's *Protrepticus* (for the material, cf. Düring 152). I may point out (to avoid misunderstanding) that like Hirzel, 'Protreptikos', 81 and n. 2; Hartlich, 'De exhortationum ... historia', 240; Rabinowitz, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, 23-7, I do not believe that Trebellius' statement *M. Tullius in Hortensio, quem ad exemplum protreptici scripsit* (*Hist. Aug. Gall.* 20.1 = 2.97.21-2 Hohl = *Hort.* fr. 8 Müller (cf. fr. 17 Grilli and Grilli's note)) means anything but 'which he modelled on the protreptic pattern', cf. Aus. *Ep.* 22 praef. *libellum, quem ad nepotulum meum ... instar protreptici luseram.*

It is certain that Cicero imitates a passage ascribed to the *Protrepticus*: A 2 = B 6 Düring φιλοσοφεῖν λέγεται καὶ τὸ ζητεῖν αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἴτε χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν εἴτε μή - fr. 54 Grilli: *cum diceret* [sc. *Hortensius*] *philosophandum non esse, nihilominus philosophari videbatur.* (Rabinowitz's scepticism, *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, 38-40, is unwarranted and his method objectionable, inasmuch as he sets up an imaginary case (B 6 and *Hort.* fr. 54 Grilli were both of them hypothetical syllogisms) which he then proceeds to destroy.) It seems evident to me that Cicero tried to improve upon Aristotle: not only raising the question (ζητεῖν), but even to answer it in the negative, is to philosophise.

If, then, the *Hortensius* was 'modelled on a protreptic pattern' (*ad exemplum protreptici*) and if Aristotle's *Protrepticus* was one of its main examples, a passage from the *Protrepticus* which we know was imitated at the end of the *Hortensius* may be plausibly located near the end of the *Protrepticus* itself.

This supposition, when viewed in the light of Clitophon's report of Socrates' peroration, automatically raises the question whether Aristotle himself was following a more or less fixed pattern of the protreptic genre in the peroration of his *Protrepticus*. Unfortunately, we have little to go on here. One may point to the eschatological speculations at the end of the *Epinomis* (992b2-c3), which are, however, a long way off from Aristotle's

drastic dilemma (and inspired by *Grg.*; *Phd.*; *R.* 10); besides, B 104–10 has a rather close parallel in the famous topos of human misery which is placed at the *beginning* of *Epin.* (973b7–974c7; cf. Einarson, 'Epinomis', 280; Festugière, *Protreptiques*, 108–15). Again, the properly paraenetic part of the *Demonicea* ([*Isoc.*] 1.13–43) ends with a reference to καλῶς ἀποθανεῖν, which says even less. The exhortation which Virtue directs to Heracles (Prodicus apud X. *Mem.* 2.1.27–33) ends with a promise of everlasting fame after death, a theme which Isocrates places right in the middle of his exhortation to Nicocles (2.36–7). By far the closest parallel to B 110 is Pl. *Ap.* 38a5–6 ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, which is found near the end of the ἀντιτίμησις – however, neither that part of the *Apology* nor the *Apology* as a whole belongs to the protreptic genre proper, though it is implicitly protreptic. Therefore, with all the provisos necessary owing to the scarcity of our material, we must hesitantly conclude that there is no evidence for a more or less obligatory reference to death as the final part of a fixed pattern for protreptic speeches – not, that is, in the fourth century. We are therefore compelled to ask whether it is not precisely the peroration of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* which is parodied in the *Clitophon*.

The relationship of these works is treated in *Intr.*, section II.7.1; it may be sufficient here to note that the wording is not particularly close (*Protr.* ἢ φιλοσοφητέον οὖν ἢ χαίρειν εἰποῦσι τῷ ζῆν ἀπιτέον ἐντεῦθεν – *Clit.* ὅστις ψυχῇι μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, τούτῳ τὸ ἄγειν ἡσυχίαν τῇι ψυχῇι καὶ μὴ ζῆν κρεῖττον ἢ ζῆν πράττοντι καθ' αὐτόν); there is rather more resemblance between the *Clit.* passage and the various parallels in Plato discussed in *Intr.*, section II.7.1(4).

On account of this unconvincing degree of similarity and the general lack of agreement of *Clit.* and *Protr.* it is safer to assume that it is not Aristotle's *Protr.* which is alluded to, but a work or works unknown. One could think of Antisthenes fr. 67 C. (*SSR* v A 105) δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον, quoted by Chrysippus in *Περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι* (*SVF* III 167, cf. *Intr.*, section II.1.5 n. 168).

## APPENDIX II: NOTE ON THE TEXT

There are three primary MSS for the *Clitophon*: A (Paris. gr. 1807, s. ix), D (Marc. gr. 185, s. xii) and F (Vind. suppl. gr. 39, s. xiii or xiv) – they are also the only primary MSS for the *Republic*. No papyri of the *Clitophon* have come to light as yet.

A and its descendants have separative errors at 407a8 ὑμεῖς (ῥυμοις FD, correct but for the accent, cf. Comm. ad loc.); 408a1 γὰρ ἄν δῆ (γὰρ δῆ F Stob. *recte*: γὰρ ἄν D); 409b8 ἐκείνους (ἐκεῖ τοὺς DF *recte*). For a description of A, cf. Boter, *Tradition of Republic*, 80–91; cf. also my paper ‘Supplementary notes’, 35–7. The hand which is traditionally called A<sup>2</sup> is in fact that of the copyist, who made changes and added readings before, while and after he added the accents and other diacritics. For the *Clitophon*, there is no reason to believe that A<sup>2</sup> checked the readings against those of another copy. Here and there in the *Clitophon* we find A<sup>3</sup>, a hand roughly contemporary to A/A<sup>2</sup>, thought by some to be Arethas’ hand. Its readings in the *Clitophon* look like simple conjectures. A<sup>4</sup> and A<sup>5</sup> are later hands of no authority.

D (and its single descendant) has a separative error at 408a1 (cf. above). As in the *Republic*, it is an independent witness of relatively minor importance. Cf. Boter, *Tradition of Republic*, 91–9. D<sup>2</sup> is a late hand, which enters readings it found in W (Vind. suppl. gr. 7; an indirect descendant of A in the *Clitophon*). Later hands are, I think, not to be found in the *Clitophon*.

F and its descendants share numerous separative errors, e.g.: 406a13 om. ἄν; 407b6 εἶ δέ] εἴτε; d3 om. τοὺς ἀδίκους; 408b4 δῆ] δέ (with Stob.); d7 τοῦτ’] τότ’. Schanz, *Platonis Opera*, ix pp. x–xv thought that Marc. gr. 189 was a gemellus, not a copy, of F for *Hp. Mi.*, *Mx.*, *Io* and *Clit.*; his theory has recently been revived by B. Vancamp (*Platon, Hippias Maior, Hippias Minor* (Stuttgart 1996), 36–9). Whatever its merits for other dialogues, the theory should almost certainly be rejected for the *Clitophon*, where Marc. gr. 189 has readings that were entered into F by a later

hand: 407d6 δς ἄν ἦ] ὡς ἄν ἦ F<sup>1</sup>: ὡσαυεὶ F<sup>2</sup> and the other members of the group, including Marc.gr. 189; 410e2 F omits a line, which is supplied by F<sup>2</sup> – in this line οὔτως looks very much like ὄντως (I am almost certain that this is actually what F<sup>2</sup> wrote), and the descendants, including Marc.gr. 189, have ὄντως.

For a description and a characterisation of F, cf. Boter, *Tradition of Republic*, 99–110. It is important to bear in mind that F is a typical representative of the cheap Plato omnibus as found in later antiquity. Although F has many uniquely true readings, it has a host of errors, and many untrustworthy variants in word order and particles. The various later hands will here be called F<sup>2</sup>; the hand which is most active in the *Clitophon* derives most of its readings from Flor. 85,6, a fourteenth-century descendant of A.

It is certain that A, D and F go back to separate copies written in majuscules; the D reading (AN for ΔH) at 408a1 suffices to prove this for D, and it is generally accepted for A and F. This means that the *Clitophon* was copied into minuscules no less than three times. Therefore conjectures based on misreading of minuscules should be rejected (cf. note on 407b1 καί). Whether or not D and F, or D and A, belong together stemmatically is a purely theoretical matter.

Among the secondary MSS, there are two which merit closer consideration: Pa (Paris. gr. 1809, s. xv (?), contains only the first half, to 408c3 προτροπήν) and Va (Vat. gr. 2196, s. xiv).<sup>1</sup> These MSS are descendants of A, and they belong closely together, as can be seen from a number of errors which they have in common against all other MSS. Yet they also exhibit readings that are not found in other Plato MSS but which recur in the MSS of Themistius, who gives an extract of the protreptic speech as an example of how philosophical oratory could be beneficial

<sup>1</sup> For the dates of these two MSS, cf. S. Martinelli Tempesta, *La tradizione testuale del Liside di Platone* (Florence 1997), who arrives at s. xiv for Pa (106–7). For Va, S. Lilla, *Codices Vaticani graeci 2162–2254* (Rome 1985), 128–9 claims that it belongs to the second half of s. xiv (earlier authorities assigned it to s. xiv–xv; cf. Martinelli Tempesta, 44).

(Or. 26, 320d–321c; II 134.3–135.6 Downey–Norman; cf. Intr., section II.2.1.2)<sup>2</sup>. In one place PaVa agree with all Themistius MSS against all other Plato MSS: 407c3 εἴναι om. PaVa Them. omnes (very possibly right); once only Pa agrees (in part) with all Them. MSS: 407b7 γέ τι Pa: γε all MSS of Them.: γ' ἔτι all other Plato MSS, including Va. PaVa (and F) agree with the two most trustworthy Themistius MSS in manifest error at 407e7 ἄρξαντος FPaVa Them. ΑΛ; Pa alone agrees in manifest error with these at 407c3 κκαῶς Pa Them. ΑΛ: κκαούς all other MSS of Plato (including Va) and Themistius. Though each separate case of agreement of Pa and Themistius might plausibly be put down as a coincidence, four cases in twenty lines of text are too much of a coincidence.

I conclude that a common ancestor of PaVa was contaminated with readings from a lost primary source, closely related to a MS that was available to Themistius. Pa has more of such readings than Va. Therefore, wherever their readings are not identical to those of A, or a further corruption of them, they deserve consideration, and I have consequently reported them in the critical apparatus, even though I have not adopted any of their readings in the text.

As to the apparatus as a whole, I have reported ADF in full, even A<sup>4/5</sup>D<sup>2</sup>F<sup>2</sup>. I have paid more attention to matters like diacritics, spelling and punctuation than is customary (I have not, however, tried to report them exhaustively). Although some copyists change these things at random, the degree in similarity can sometimes be striking: 407e11 μήτε ἀκούειν μηθ' ὀρᾶν ADF Stob.; a full stop before 408b1 ἔστιν ἄρα is shared by F and Them., and supported by Stob., who quotes 407e8–408b1 τὸν βίον in Book 3 and 408b1 ἔστιν ἄρα–b5 in Book 4. The myth that ancient prose texts did not have any diacritics or punctuation signs, which one still finds stated as actual fact, is manifestly wrong. However slight, there is always a possibility that a diacritic or punctuation sign in a primary Byzantine MS goes back

<sup>2</sup> Of the Themistius MSS, ΣΨ have obviously been corrected from a Plato MS, so the remaining primary witnesses ΑΛ give the best idea of what Themistius' text of the *Clitophon* looked like. Cf. H. Schenkl, 'Überlieferung des Themistius', 114.

to an ancient MS tradition. In matters of elision,  $\nu$  ἐφέλκυστικόν etc. I have followed A.

I have not recorded obvious errors made in the transmission of secondary sources. Thus, it is not useful to know that at 407d4 the MSS of Hippolytus have πάλιν δ' αὖ τῷ ᾄμα τε λέγειν for πάλιν δ' αὖ τολμᾶτε λέγειν (it is of course an instructive example to illustrate the misreading of majuscule script, but a critical apparatus is not there to give an extra supply of those). On the other hand, I do record at d8 that Hippolytus has λόγος ἐρεῖ for ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ on the off-chance that this is an ancient variant quoted by Hippolytus himself, though evidently an inferior one.

In general the apparatus is negative, that is, if a witness is not cited in the apparatus it agrees with the text. But this does not apply to PaVa and the indirect witnesses except Stob. If an indirect witness other than Stob. is not named at a relevant place where variant readings are recorded, this means that the witness for one reason or another can shed no light on the problem. Thus at 407c7 Themistius is quoted for καὶ οὐ: this means that ADF read ἄλλ' οὐ (so do PaVa, but it is superfluous to report that), while Plutarch's text cannot be inferred from the distorted ways in which the sentence is twice quoted by him.

*Concordance of this text (Sl) with those of Hermann (He),  
Schanz (Sz), Burnet (Bt), Bury (By) and Souilhé (So)*

Deviations in punctuation, elision, crasis,  $\nu$  ἐφέλκυστικόν and minor matters of accentuation and orthography are not listed.

406a5	ὅστις Bt By So Sl: ὅστις <ῆν> He, ὅστις * * * Sz.
10	ὄντες Sl: ὄντε rell.
407a8	ὑμνοῖς Sl: ὑμνεῖς rell.
b4	παραδώσετε * * Sl: παραδώσετε rell.
5	οὔτε Bt Sl: ἀμελείτε καὶ οὔτε rell.
7	γ' ἔτι rell: γε Sz.
c3	ἦγησθε By Sl: ἠγεῖσθε rell.
4	πῶς οὐ rell: ὁμως οὐ He.
6	καίτοι Bt So Sl: καί τοι rell.
e3	σου Sl (ADF): σοῦ rell.
7	τοῦ μὲν rell: τοῦ μὲν γὰρ So.



APPENDIX II

408c2	προτρεπτικωτάτους τε Bt So Sl: πρ. τε γὰρ He By, <ὄς> πρ. τε Sz.
8	τούς τι By So Sl: τούς τι rell.
d2	πῶς ποτέ νυν Sl: πῶς ποτέ He, πῶς ποτέ (vel ποτε) νῦν rell.
4	ὄν Sl: ἐνι rell.
6	ἐκείνους rell: ἐκείνοις Sz.
7	ἐπανερωτᾶν rell: ἐπερωτᾶν Sz.
409a7	δέ μου Sl: δ' ἔμοῦ rell.
c3	ἐπανήειν rell: ἐπανῆα Sz. δ' Sl: δῆ rell.
6	ἐκάστη He Sz By Sl: ἐκάστη ἢ Bt So.
e9	ὁμόνοιαν [καὶ] ἐπιστήμην rell: ὁμόνοιαν καὶ <δικαιοσύνην> ἐπιστήμην He.
410a5	ὅποι rell: ὅπου So.
6	πότ' ἐστίν Sl: ποτ' ἔστι(ν) rell (cum A).
b2	πάντας rell: πάντος By.
4	καὶ secl. rell: habet He.
7	ἦντιναοῦν rell: ἦντινοῦν Sz (cum D).
c7	οἶομαι Sl: οἶμαι rell. πορεύομαι Sl: πορεύσομαι rell.
d4-5	ταυτὸν γιγνέσθω rell: secl. He.
e2	ὥς καὶ Sl: ἄ καὶ rell.
3	νυνδῆ Sz Bt So Sl: νῦν δῆ He By.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Only those works are listed to which reference has been made in more than one section, or more than once in the commentary. Not listed are well-known works of reference and commentaries on Greek authors (but see Dodds, Jowett–Campbell, Kühner, de Strycker–Slings, Tucker in section B). I have adhered to these principles less strictly in section A.

### *A. Works concerning the Clitophon*

- Ast, F. *Platonis quae exstant opera ... recensuit, in linguam Latinam convertit ... F.A.* ix (Lipsiae 1827), 354–65
- Bekker, I. *Platonis dialogi Graece et Latine* ii 3 (Berolini 1817), 465–74 (with Ficinus' translation)  
*In Platonem a se editum commentaria critica* (Berolini 1823), i 472–4 (critical apparatus); ii 394–5 (scholia)
- Bertini, G. M. 'Saggio sul Clitofonte', *RFIC* i (1873) 457–80
- Blits, J. H. 'Socratic teaching and justice: Plato's *Clitophon*', *Interpretation* 13 (1985) 321–34
- Brünnecke, H. 'Kleitophon wider Sokrates', *AGPh* 26 (1913) 449–78
- Burnet, J. *Platonis opera* iv, Oxonii 1902
- Bury, R. G. *Plato, with an English Translation*, London–Cambridge (Mass.) 1929 311–27
- Carlini, A. 'Alcuni dialoghi pseudoplatonici e l'Accademia di Arcesilao', *ASNP* 31 (1962) 33–63
- Ficinus, M. see Bekker
- Gaiser, K. see B: 140–7
- Geffcken, J. 'Das Rätsel des "Kleitophon"', *Hermes* 68 (1933) 429–39
- Gonzalez, F. J. 'Clitophon', in: Cooper–Hutchinson (see B), 966–70
- Grote, G. see B: iii, 13–26
- Grube, G. M. A. 'The *Cleitophon* of Plato', *CPh* 26 (1931) 302–8
- Hartlich, P. see B: 229–32
- Heidel, W. A. see B: 46–8

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Hermann, C. F. *Platonis dialogi* III (Lipsiae 1851), 459–64; VI (Lipsiae 1853), 330–1 (scholia)
- HGPh* see B: Guthrie, v 387–9
- Kesters, H. ‘De authenticiteit van den Kleitophon’, *Philol. Stud.* 6 (1934–5) 161–89
- Kunert, R. *Quae inter Clitophonem dialogum et Platonis Rempublicam intercedat necessitudo*, Greifswald 1881
- la Magna, G. *Platone, Clitofonte, con introduzione e commento*, Naples 1935
- Modugno, G. *Platone, le Opere tradotte e dichiarate ad uso di ogni persona colta* XIX (Aquila 1930), 129–49
- Müller, H. *Platon's sämmtliche Werke. Übersetzt von H. M., mit Einleitungen begleitet von K. Steinhart* VII 1 (Leipzig 1859), 47–74
- Neumann, H. ‘The sophistry of Plato’s Protagoras and Cleitophon’, *Sophia* 35 (1967) 46–55
- Orwin, C. ‘The case against Socrates: Plato’s *Cleitophon*’, *CanJournPolSc* 15 (1982) 741–55; reprinted as ‘On the *Cleitophon*’, in: T. L. Pangle (ed.), *The Roots of Political Philosophy. Ten Forgotten Socratic Dialogues, Translated, with Interpretive Studies* (Ithaca–London 1987), 117–31 (references are to page numbers of *CanJournPolSc*)
- ‘Cleitophon [or, Exhortation]’, in: T. L. Pangle (ed.), op. cit., 111–16
- Pavlu, J. ‘Der pseudoplatonische Kleitophon’, *Jahresbericht des k.u.k. Gymnasiums* (Znaim 1909), 3–20
- Roochnik, D. L. ‘The riddle of the *Cleitophon*’, *AncPhil* 4 (1984) 132–45
- Rutherford, R. B. see B: 96–101
- Sartori, F. *Platone, Dialoghi*, v (Bari 1956) 2–10
- Schanz, M. *Platonis opera ... edidit M.S.* IX (Lipsiae 1885), 90–5; 102–3 (critical appendix)
- Schleiermacher, F. *Platons Werke* II 3 (Berlin 1809), 453–64 (translation); 534 (notes)
- Schneider, C. E. Ch. *Platonis opera ... Graece et Latine* II (Parisiis 1862), 592–5
- Slings, S. R. *A Commentary on the Platonic Cleitophon*, Amsterdam 1981 (referred to as ‘the first version of this book’)

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ‘Supplementary notes on manuscripts of the *Clitophon*’, *Mnem.*  
40 (1987) 35–44
- Souilhé, J. *Platon, Œuvres complètes* XIII 2 (Paris 1930), 163–90
- Stallbaum, G. *Platonis dialogi; textum ad fidem Codicum . . . recognovit G.S. . .* VIII (Lipsiae 1825), 227–34 (text); XII (Lipsiae 1825), 496–9 (critical apparatus)
- Stefanini, L. see B: 1 203–10; 296–9
- Steinhart, K. see H. Müller
- Stumpo, B. ‘Sull’ autenticità del Clitofonte’, *Giorn. crit. filos. ital.*  
1 (1920) 408–19
- Susemihl, F. *Platon, Werke in 40 Bändchen* v 3–6 (Stuttgart 1865),  
507–29
- Verdenius, W. J. ‘Notes on the pseudo-Platonic *Clitopho*’, *Mnem.*  
35 (1982) 143–6
- Waterfield, R. ‘Cleitophon’, in: id., *Plato, Republic* (Oxford 1993),  
462–8
- Wichmann, O. see B: 148–51
- de Win, X. *Plato, Verzameld werk* v (Antwerpen–Baarn 1978<sup>2</sup>),  
469–75 (translation); 495 (notes)
- Wolf, E. see B: 289–93
- Yxem, [E. F.] ‘Über Platon’s Kleitophon’, *Jahresbericht Friedrich-Wilhelms-Gymnasium* (Berlin 1846), 1–35
- Zuretti, C. O. *Platone, Dialoghi* v (Bari 1915), 3–21

### B. General

- Alline, H. *Histoire du texte de Platon*, Paris 1915
- Ast, F. *Lexicon Platonicum sive vocum Platoniarum index*, Leipzig  
1835–8
- Billerbeck, M. *Epiktet, Vom Kynismus*, Leiden 1978
- Bos, C. A. *Interpretatie, vaderschap en datering van de Alcibiades maior*,  
Culemborg 1970
- Boter, G. J. *The Textual Tradition of Plato’s Republic*, Leiden 1989
- Brandwood, L. *A Word Index to Plato*, Leeds 1976  
*The Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues*, Cambridge 1990
- Caizzi, F. *Decleva Antisthenis Fragmenta*, Milan 1966
- Cobet, C. G. ‘Annotationes criticae ad Themistii orationes’,  
*Mnem.* I 11 (1862) 222–66; 394–434

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cooper, J. M.—D. S. Hutchinson *Plato, Complete Works*, Indianapolis 1997
- Denniston, J. D. *Greek Prose Style*, Oxford 1952
- Dittmar, H. *Aischines von Sphettos*, Berlin 1912
- Dodds, E. R. *Plato, Gorgias*, Oxford 1959
- Düring, I. *Aristotle's Protrepticus*, Göteborg 1961
- Düring, I.—G. E. L. Owen (eds.) *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, Papers of the Symposium Aristotelicum Held at Oxford in August, 1957*, Göteborg 1960
- Effe, B. 'Platons "Charmides" und der "Alkibiades" des Aischines von Sphettos', *Hermes* 99 (1971) 198–208
- Einarson, B. 'Aristotle's Protrepticus and the structure of the *Epinomis*', *TAPhA* 67 (1936) 261–85
- Erbse, H. 'Die Architektonik im Aufbau von Xenophons *Memorabilien*', *Hermes* 89 (1961) 257–87 = *Ausgewählte Schriften zur Klassischen Philologie* (Berlin–New York 1979), 308–40 (references are to page numbers of *Ausgewählte Schriften*)
- Erler, M. *Der Sinn der Aporien in den Dialogen Platons. Übungsstücke zur Anleitung im philosophischen Denken*, Berlin–New York 1987
- Festugière, A.-J. *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Paris 1949–54
- Les trois 'protreptiques' de Platon*, Paris 1973
- Friedländer, P. *Platon*, I–II Berlin 1964<sup>3</sup>, III 1975<sup>3</sup>
- Gaiser, K. *Protreptik und Paränese bei Platon*, Stuttgart 1959
- Gigon, O. *Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*, Basel 1953
- Kommentar zum zweiten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien*, Basel 1956
- Goldschmidt, V. *Les dialogues de Platon*, Paris 1947
- Gomperz, H. *Sophistik und Rhetorik*, Leipzig–Berlin 1912
- Gomperz, Th. *Griechische Denker*, Leipzig 1896–1909
- van Groningen, B. A. 'ΕΚΔΟΣΙΣ', *Mnem.* 16 (1963) 1–17
- Grote, G. *Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates*, London 1865
- Guthrie, W. K. C. *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Cambridge 1962–78
- Hartlich, P. 'De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque scriptarum historia et indole', *Leipz. Stud.* 11 (1889) 209–336
- Heidel, W. A. *Pseudo-Platonica*, Baltimore 1896

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Hirzel, R. 'Über den Protreptikos des Aristoteles', *Hermes* 10 (1876) 61–100  
*Der Dialog*, Leipzig 1895
- Jaeger, W. *Paideia*, I Berlin–Leipzig 1936<sup>2</sup>, II–III (English edition) Oxford 1944–5
- Joël, K. *Der echte und der Xenophontische Sokrates* I, Berlin 1893  
 'Der λόγος Σωκρατικός', *AGPh* 9 (1896) 50–66
- Jowett, B.–L. Campbell *The Republic of Plato*, Oxford 1894
- Kahn, C. 'Did Plato write Socratic dialogues?', *CQ* 31 (1981) 305–20, reprinted in H. H. Benson (ed.), *Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates* (Oxford 1992), 35–52 (references are to pages of *CQ*)  
*Plato and the Socratic Dialogue*, Cambridge 1996
- Kesters, H. *Antisthène, De la dialectique*, Louvain 1935  
*Plaidoyer d'un Socratique contre le Phèdre de Platon*, Louvain–Paris 1959  
*Kérygmes de Socrate*, Louvain–Paris 1965
- Krauss, H. *Aeschinis Socratici reliquiae*, Leipzig 1911
- Kühner, R. *Xenophontis de Socrate commentarii*, Gotha 1841 (not the Teubner comm. in German)
- Kuhn, H. *Sokrates*, Munich 1959<sup>2</sup>
- Lutosławski, W. *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, London 1897
- Magnien, V. *Le futur grec*, Paris 1913
- Maier, H. *Sokrates, Sein Werk und seine geschichtliche Stellung*, Tübingen 1913
- Meyer, Th. *Platons Apologie*, Tübingen 1962
- Monteil, P. *La phrase relative en grec ancien*, Paris 1963
- Müller, C. W. *Die Kurzdialoge der Appendix Platonica*, Munich 1975
- North, H. *Sophrosyne, Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*, Ithaca 1966
- O'Brien, M. J. *The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind*, Chapel Hill 1967
- des Places, E. *Etudes sur quelques particules de liaison chez Platon*, Paris 1929
- Rabinowitz, W. G. *Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Sources of its Reconstruction* I (all published), Berkeley–Los Angeles 1957
- Radermacher, L. *Artium Scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik)*, Vienna 1951

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Reinhard, L. *Die Anakoluthe bei Platon*, Berlin 1920
- Richards, H. *Platonica*, London 1911
- Riddell, J. 'A digest of Platonic idioms' in: id., *The Apology of Plato* (Oxford 1876), 118–252
- Ritter, C. *Untersuchungen über Plato*, Stuttgart 1888
- Rutherford, R. B. *The Art of Plato. Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation*, London 1995
- Schenkl, H. 'Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Reden des Themistius', *WS* 21 (1899) 80–115
- Slings, S. R. 'Some remarks on Aeschines' Miltiades', *ζPE* 16 (1975) 301–8
- 'Plato, *Cratylus* 417c', *Mnem.* 29 (1976) 42–51
- [Review of Müller, *Kurzdialoge*], *Mnem.* 31 (1978) 211–14
- 'Critical notes on Plato's *Politeia*, III', *Mnem.* 43 (1990) 341–63
- [Review of Brandwood, *Chronology*], *Mnem.* 47 (1994) 539–41
- 'Protreptic in ancient theories of philosophical literature', in J. G. J. Abbenes et al. (eds.), *Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle: A Collection of Papers in Honour of D. M. Schenkeveld* (Amsterdam 1995), 173–92
- 'Critical notes on Plato's *Politeia*, IV', *Mnem.* 49 (1996) 403–25
- Sprague, R. Kent *Plato's Use of Fallacy*, London 1962
- Stahl, J. M. *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbuns der klassischen Zeit*, Heidelberg 1907
- Stefanini, L. *Platone*, Padova 1949<sup>2</sup>
- Stokes, M. C. *Plato's Socratic Conversations*, London 1986
- de Strycker, E.–S. R. Slings *Plato's Apology of Socrates. A Literary and Philosophical Study with a Running Commentary*, Leiden 1994
- Taylor, A. E. *Plato, the Man and his Work*, London 1929<sup>3</sup>
- Thesleff, H. *Studies in the Styles of Plato*, Helsinki 1967
- Tucker, T. G. *The Proem to the Ideal Commonwealth of Plato*, London 1900
- Verdenius, W. J. 'Notes on Plato's *Phaedrus*', *Mnem.* 8 (1955) 265–89
- [Review of *GP*<sup>2</sup>], *Mnem.* 9 (1956) 248–52
- 'Notes on Menander's *Epitrepontes*', *Mnem.* 27 (1974) 17–43
- Vlastos, G. *Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher*, Cambridge 1991
- de Vries, G. J. 'Notes on some passages in the *Euthydemus*', *Mnem.* 25 (1972) 42–55

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Wackernagel, J. *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, Basel 1926
- Wakker, G. C. *Conditions and Conditionals: An Investigation of Ancient Greek*, Amsterdam 1994
- Wichmann, O. *Platon, Ideelle Gesamtdarstellung und Studienwerk*, Darmstadt 1966
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U. von *Platon*, I Berlin 1959<sup>5</sup>, II 1962<sup>3</sup>
- Wolf, E. *Griechisches Rechtsdenken*, IV.1 Frankfurt (Main) 1968
- Wolff, E. *Platos Apologie*, Berlin 1929



# INDEXES

## I LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL INDEX

- analogy 51, 150-3, 165-7, 305  
apostrophe 40, 50  
authenticity 2-3, 4, 23, 34, 116, 222-3,  
227-33
- cento 82, 124, 229, 231  
character, literary 1, 23-4, 37-9, 39-  
58
- dialogue  
aporia 85, 120, 129-31, 136, 140-1,  
150-3, 160-3, 169-70, 177-9,  
210-11, 322  
argument 308, 313, 319  
background 28  
characterisation 26-8, 32-3, 40-3,  
44, 47-8, 50-1, 53-4  
concentric reasoning 20, 180-1  
curtailed report 313, 315, 324  
direct 17, 28  
duologue 26-7  
epilogue 49  
exordium 40-1  
framework 29-32, 136-7, 140-1  
indirect 28, 132  
monumental 19-20  
pedimental structure 33-4  
protreptic 62, 71-4, 148, 163-4  
short 18-34, 43, 263, 324  
transitions 30-2
- diatribe 60-1
- edition 12, 207, 216  
education 282
- elenchos 18, 51-2, 78, 86-7, 129-35,  
139-41, 142, 149-54, 156-63,  
164-79, 210-11  
double purpose of 134-5  
in later Plato 136-7, 140  
and *μαίευτική* 132-5  
results of 129-30, 132-3, 140-1,  
153-4, 178-9  
stages of 129, 132, 139-40, 142,  
177-8
- epyllion 20  
eristic 148-9
- fallacy 158-60, 196-7, 284-8  
forms 151-3, 162, 176-7
- genre 67-8
- interpretation  
circularity 15, 154-5  
discourse 35-9  
ergocentric 2  
identification 27  
levels of discourse 17, 35-58, 148,  
153, 154-6  
irony 15, 16, 41-3, 46-7, 122, 136, 271,  
282, 289, 296
- life, philosophy as art of 96
- paradox 15, 91, 151-3, 160, 284-6,  
314, 329
- paraenesis 62-3, 84, 88  
parody 3, 47, 93, 116, 124-7  
politician 4, 57, 122-4, 171-2, 198-204  
politeness 54, 301  
protreptic 59-60, 67, 108-9  
accusatory 80-1, 92, 142-3, 155,  
304-5  
development of 90-3, 221-2, 293  
dialogue 62, 71-4, 148, 155  
ethical 60-1, 90-2, 220-2  
eulogy 65-6, 327  
explicit 61-2, 67-76, 88, 130, 142-  
3, 155, 164, 179, 210  
of historical Socrates 46, 144  
implicit 61-2, 88, 125, 144-6  
of individuals 45  
philosophical 60-1, 90-2  
rhetorical 76  
situations 75-6  
among sophists 63-6, 107  
theories of 67, 77-89, 133-4  
tripartition of 85-6, 129-31
- regress, circular 51-3, 123, 150-3,  
175-8, 305
- rhetoric 9  
conditions 107

### 3 INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

- epideictic 64–6  
 figured speech 85  
 judicial 9–10, 14  
 peroration 13
- stylometry 133, 138–9, 224–6, 228
- tetralogies 10, 22–3, 220
- title 263  
 ‘trias paedagogica’ 107–10
- values, scale of 100–2  
 and pseudo-values 105
- virtue 151–3  
 political 108  
 teachability of 106–10, 122–3, 149

### 2 GRAMMATICAL INDEX

- ABA structure 302
- accusative  
 absolute 302  
 double 314, 324–5
- Aktionsart* 80, 280–1, 327
- anacoluthon 278, 289–90, 304, 307–8,  
 322–4, 326, 330
- aorist 185, 313, 322, 324, 325, 327
- apposition 310, 311–12, 326
- article 284, 295, 305–6, 312
- asyndeton 290, 332
- causative 281
- chiasmus 280, 288
- clausula 225
- climax 288, 289
- colloquialism 289, 297
- congruence 267, 284
- contamination 288–9
- dativus 292, 293, 315
- dual 267
- future 278, 279, 283, 290–1
- genitive 298, 301, 325–6
- hendiadys 305
- hiatus 226, 273
- imperative 50, 223, 306, 309–10
- imperfect 313, 324
- indicative 330–1
- irrealis* 331–2
- juxtaposition 266
- Meyer’s Law 98
- middle 300
- optative 264–5, 268, 273, 293–4, 319
- oratio obliqua* 53–4, 99, 289, 306–7
- oratio recta* 53–4, 99, 306–8
- parenthesis 270–1, 313
- participle 78
- passive 54
- perfect 282, 291, 320, 322
- periphrastic construction 323, 331
- pleonasm 331, 334
- plural 301
- ‘POP’ 270
- postponement 287, 288, 323
- praedicative 295
- prolepsis 277–9, 295–6
- ‘PUSH’ 270, 299
- relative 287, 299, 310
- repetition 316
- second person singular 97–8
- subjunctive 289
- topic 263, 288, 321
- verbal adjectives 110–11
- vocative 270–1
- wishes, unfulfilled 331–2

### 3 INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

- ἄγνοια 286
- αἶρεϊ, ὁ λόγος 287–8
- ἀληθῶς 317–18
- ἄλλὰ 268–9
- ἄλλὰ μὴν 268–9
- ἄλλος 295
- ἄμαθία 17, 129–30
- ἄμουσία 283

### 3 INDEX OF GREEK WORDS

- ἀναγκάζω 320  
 ἀνάμνησις 138, 162  
 ἄνθρωπος 272, 274, 325-6  
 ἀπαιδευσία 286  
 ἄρα 292, 294  
 ἀρετή 167-70, 303-4, 325  
 ἀτεχνῶς 297  
 αὐτός 324
- βασιλική 120-1, 200-1  
 βλάπτω 193-8
- γάρ 270, 299  
 γε 269, 277, 283  
 γίγνομαι 282  
 γνήσιος 156-7
- δέ 305  
 δεῖ 88, 181, 276  
 δέομαι 334-5  
 δῆ 282, 286, 292, 295, 299, 309, 313, 322  
 δῆλον ὅτι/ὡς 225, 269  
 διατριβή 264  
 δίδαγμα 51, 170-2, 202-3, 309  
 διδακτόν 106, 110-11, 171-2  
 δικαιοσύνη 4, 115, 121, 168-70, 171-5, 176-7, 180-209, 303-4, 305, 329  
 δικαστική 121, 124, 171-2, 198-204  
 διότι 327  
 δοξοσοφία 129, 133, 135, 139, 155-6, 162  
 δυοῖν θάτερον 326
- εἶδωλον 157  
 εἶπερ 287  
 ἕκαστος 312  
 ἐκμελετάω 280-1  
 ἔμον, τό 327-8  
 ἐνειμι 302  
 ἐνι 302  
 ἐνιοι 81-2, 233  
 ἐξασκέω 280-1  
 ἐξετάζω 129, 132, 139, 142-3  
 ἔπαινος 65  
 ἐπανέρχομαι 310  
 ἐπανερωτάω 303  
 ἔπειτα 304  
 ἐπεξέρχομαι 302  
 ἐπιθυμητής 298  
 ἐπιμέλεια 68-9, 73-4, 91, 103, 122, 136, 143-5, 164, 288, 294, 296, 330
- ἐπιστήμη 107-8, 150-3, 319  
 ἐραστής 298-9  
 ἔργον 51, 56, 114, 150-1, 166, 168, 170-5, 176-7, 185, 202-3  
 ἐρρωμένος 306  
 ἕτερος 225, 310  
 ἔτι 281  
 εὐ πράττω 160  
 εὐδαίμων 335  
 εὐρίσκω 280  
 ἕως 223
- ἡμεῖς 263-4  
 ἡσυχία 293
- θεραπεύω 281
- ἱκανῶς 281
- καθάπερ 225, 294  
 καί 265, 266-7, 269, 275-6, 320-2, 325, 329  
 καί . . . δέ 309  
 καί . . . δῆ 292  
 καί δῆ καί 292  
 καίτοι 283  
 κατά 293  
 κατηγορέω 83  
 καταμελετάω 326-7  
 κερδαλέος 182  
 κολαστήριον 78  
 κομψός 313  
 κρείττονες 153
- μαθητής 298  
 μαιευτική 132-5, 138  
 μακρότερον 224, 326  
 μέγιστα, τὰ 130  
 μελέτη 107-10  
 μὲν 265-6, 320  
 μήν 268-9  
 μηχανή 89, 95, 272, 305  
 μουσική 282  
 μυθολογέω 157-8
- νουθετέω 85, 129-31, 145  
 νῦν 301, 332-3
- οἶδα 328  
 οἶομαι 329

#### 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

- ὁμοδοξία 187, 190, 192, 319  
 ὁμόνοια 175-6, 185-93, 318-19  
 ὄντως 225, 317-18  
 ὅστις 265, 277, 283  
 οὐδέ 217, 279, 316-17  
 οὖν 286  
 οὔτε 279, 297
- πάγκαλος 296  
 παιδιά 158  
 παρακελεύομαι 142  
 παρασυνημμένος 286  
 πᾶς 277, 335  
 πείθω 142  
 περί 303  
 περιτρέχω 177, 322  
 πῆι 330  
 πλανάομαι 129  
 πλείω, τὰ 224, 316  
 πολλάκις 271, 295  
 πορεύομαι 48  
 ποῦ 323  
 που 308  
 προάγω 79-80  
 προνοέω 224, 304  
 προσφέρομαι 284  
 προτρεπτικός 217, 263  
 προτρέπω 1, 79-80, 331  
 προτροπή 65, 128  
 πῶς οὐ 282-3
- σαφέστατα 225, 318  
 σκηνή 272  
 συμβαίνω 287, 315-16  
 συνουσία 264
- σχεδόν 296  
 σωφροσύνη 129, 133, 181, 189, 202
- ταῦτα 323-4  
 τε 297  
 τε (... ) καί 283-4, 309, 313  
 τεκμαίρομαι 77-8, 82, 230, 233  
 τέχνη 65-6, 113-16, 121, 150-3, 165-7, 169, 170-5, 176-7, 305, 312, 322-3  
 τεχνικός 310
- ὑμνέω 273  
 ὑπερεπαινέω 264  
 ὑποθετικός 84  
 ὑποτείνω 51, 299-300
- φαῦλος 267  
 φέρομαι 274  
 φημί 83, 225, 322  
 φιλία 185-93, 314  
 φιλοσοφία 91, 96, 142, 148, 150, 221, 325  
 φύσις 107-10
- χρῆσις 113-17, 219, 292-3
- ψευδῶς 317  
 ψυχή 100, 104, 305
- ὡς 298  
 ὥσπερ 225  
 ὥστε 312  
 ὠφελέω 15, 42, 193-8, 226

#### 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

- |                               |                         |                      |              |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| AESCHINES OF SPHETTOS         |                         | ANONYMUS IAMBLICHI   | 66           |
| <i>Alcibiades</i>             | 71-2, 81, 111, 113, 122 | fr. 1                | 107          |
| fr. 9                         | 118                     | fr. 3                | 113, 193     |
| fr. 10                        | 121                     | ANTIOCHUS OF ASCALON |              |
| fr. 11a                       | 121                     | <i>Sosos</i> (?)     | 87-8         |
| fr. 11c                       | 118-19, 121, 122-3      | ANTIPHON THE SOPHIST | 193          |
| <i>Miltiades</i>              | 72, 112-13              | fr. 44               | 185-6        |
| AESCHYLUS                     |                         | fr. 58               | 185-6        |
| <i>Seven against Thebes</i>   | 19-20 295-6             | ANTISTHENES          | 211-12       |
| ANAXIMENES OF LAMPSACUS       |                         | <i>Protreptic</i>    | 69, 90, 94-5 |
| <i>Rhetoric for Alexander</i> | 1412b18-19 65           | fr. 67               | 339          |

## 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

ARISTIPPUS	21	CICERO	
fr. 121	69	<i>Academica Posteriora</i> 1.4.16-17	86-8
ARISTOPHANES		<i>Ad Atticum</i> 4.16.2	87
<i>Birds</i> 1033	275-6	<i>De Oratore</i> 1.47.204	81
<i>Clouds</i> 213-26	272, 274	<i>Hortensius</i> fr. 17	338
<i>Frogs</i> 967	57	fr. 54	338
<i>Knights</i> 680	264	fr. 112	337-8
		fr. 115	336-8
ARISTOTLE		<i>Tusculanae Disputationes</i> 3.32.77	118
<i>Constitution of the Athenians</i> 29.3	56	DEMETRIUS	
34.3	56-7	<i>On Style</i> 232	89
<i>Eudemian Ethics</i> 1224a29	315	279	86
1234b30-1	191	296-8	83-9, 105, 163-4, 221
1236a2	315	DEMOCRITUS	
1236a38-b10	314-15	fr. 242	108
1241a16-18	319	DIO CHRYSOSTOM	
1241a32-3	318	1.66-83	96
1241b17-18	167	3.1; 29-42	96
<i>Eudemus</i>	70	10.19-21	116
<i>Nicomachean Ethics</i> 1099b9-11	107	13.16-27	94-6
1116b25-1117a1	314	13.16	274, 276
1155a22-26	191-2	13.17-19	111
1156a31-2	314	13.28	90
1152b9-10	315	DIODEGENES LAERTIUS	
1153a28-31	315	1.75	194
1155b34-1156a3	319	2.121-2	22, 24-5
1161a34-5	167	2.48	25
1167a22-b4	318-19	3.37	12
1179b20-3	107	3.83-4	21
<i>Politics</i> 1327b38-40	81	6.32	275
<i>Protreptic</i>	69-70, 75, 91	DISSOI LOGOI	
A 1	207	6.11	108
A 2-6	286, 338	EPICLETUS	
B 2	100, 276	3.21.18-9	87-8
B 4	102, 113	3.22.26	272-4
B 7-9	70, 113	3.23.33-4	87-8
B 23-8	70	4.8.27	275
B 29-30	70	ERINNA	
B 34	143	<i>Distaff</i>	20
B 52	70, 100	EURIPIDES	
B 53	118, 143	<i>Orestes</i> 915	300
B 59	112-13, 167	fr. 1091	193-4
B 68	175		
B 83	293		
B 90-1	293		
B 104-10	70, 118, 336-9		
<i>Rhetoric</i> 1358b8-13	65		
<i>Topics</i> 110b10	276		
CHRYSIPPUS			
fr. 3.761	217-19		

## 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

GELLIUS		<i>Apology</i>	33, 127, 141-3, 145-6, 147-8
14.3-3	207	21b2	288
		23b2	274
HERODOTUS		24e4-10	269
3.53-3-5	307-8	28e4-6	141-3
		29b1-2	17
		29d4-30a3	17-18, 141-6, 304-5
HIPPOCRATES		29d4-6	142
<i>On the Art</i>	66	29d6-7	271
HIPPOLYTUS		29d7-e3	71, 92, 100, 103-4, 142, 145
1.19.21	22-3	30a1-3	142
ISOCRATES		30a8-b2	112-13, 127, 142, 271
1.5	63	30b2-4	71, 143
1.13-43	339	30e1-a9	146
2.36-7	339	30e2-5	104
3.25	276	30e7	142
12.117-18	195	31a4-5	104
13.17	107	31b4-5	143
13.21	108	33d7	295
15.84-5	60	36c5-d1	71, 112, 143
		38a5-6	339
		39c6-d1	146-8
LYSIAS		<i>Charmides</i>	152-3
9.20	193	154e6-8	266
fr. 26	57	161b6	189
		164a9-b6	71, 276
PHILODEMUS		164c7-end	71
<i>PHerc</i> 1021, 1.11-15	86	169c3-d1	324
		171d8-e5	71, 113, 294
PLATO and PSEUDO-PLATO		172d7-10	71, 113
<i>Alcibiades I</i>	71-2, 73-4, 126, 155, 163-4, 211, 221	174b11	177
107a1-9	111-12	<i>Cratylus</i> 408b1	274
112e1-113c4	121	416e2-417a2	182
113d5-116d4	164	419a5-8	276
117c6-e5	113, 294	419b2	292
124b10-d5	121, 164	439c7	271
126a5-b10	115	<i>Critias</i>	11, 19
126c1-127c9	188-90, 217, 319	<i>Crito</i> 47e3-7	218-19
129c5-e7	167	49c10-d5	195-8
129e3-130b4	112-13	<i>Epinomis</i>	74-5
130e8-9	100	973b7-974c7	339
131a2	100	992b2-c3	338-9
131a9-b9	118	<i>Erastai</i>	201, 203
131c1	100	133e3-5	203
132c1-6	112-13	137c6-139a5	200-4
131e1-132a2	119	<i>Euthydemus</i>	12, 39, 148-9, 152-3, 214-15
133e4-5	115-16	274e8-275a2	143, 325
134b7-9	112	278e3-282d3	71, 91, 102, 149-50
135b7-c11	118, 294	280b1-2	324
135d3-7	121	280b8-d7	105

#### 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

280e3-281e2	113	197a6-c1	314
282d1	291-2	200c7-d3	134
282a7-8	105, 119	<i>Laws</i>	19
282b3-5	118	629d8	264
282c1-3	106, 109-10	631b6-d1	102
283a1-7	232, 297-8	632e5	158
285b7-c3	266-7	639a2-3	296
288d5-292e7	71, 149-54, 175-6	661c1-5	218-19
288d9-e2	167	691a7	284
290e1-291a7	153-4	697b2-6	100
291b1-4	324	724a7-8	101
291b8-c1	177	726a1-729b2	101, 126, 216
291d1-3	120-1	729a4-b1	126
292b4-5	175	729b1-2	101, 105
292c4-5	120-1, 123	732a6-b2	113-14, 294
292d8-e1	52	752a1	158
297d3-4	273	<i>Letter, 7th</i>	156, 232
303b2	264	<i>Lysis</i>	152-3
303c4	301	209a4-210a8	115
305e5	318	211d6-213a3	314
306d6-end	71, 149	222d1-3	177
306e1-3	105	<i>Menexenus</i>	213, 232
307c3-4	105	234a1	40
<i>Euthyphro</i>	152-3	236d4-249c8	229-30
12e1-4	42	<i>Meno</i> 70a1-4	29, 107, 110-11
15b10-c1	177	77b6-78b2	285-6
<i>Gorgias</i> 448c4-9	65	79e7-80b2	138
448e8	299-300	82b9-85d4	137-41
456a7-457c3	65, 76	100b2-4	29-30
460b1-7	108	<i>Parmenides</i>	36, 230
464b7-8	199-201	128d6-e1	216
467c5-468c8	285-6	137b2	158
476d8-478b1	201	Περὶ ἀρετῆς 376a1-2	29
495c3-4	308	379d9-10	29-30
504d1-3	169	Περὶ δικαίου 374c3-d3	194
505a2-b1	218-19	<i>Phaedo</i> 61c9-62c8	293
507a5-6	159	64a4-69e5	62
507d1-2	270	64c2	308
508d6-e6	195	65d4-5	308
512a2-b2	217-19	76d7-8	271
520b3	199-201	114d1-115a2	76
521d6-8	123	<i>Phaedrus</i> 264a5-6	317
526d3-end	76	269d4-6	107
<i>Hippias Maior</i>	33-4, 152-3	274b6-278e3	156-8, 160-3
281a1	40	275b2	156
288c4	266	275d4-e5	157, 216
303e12-3	177	275e1-2	46
<i>Ion</i> 530a1	40	276e2-3	157-8
<i>Laches</i>	152-3	276e6	134
178a1-190b5	76	278a1	161
179d6-7	108	278b7	158
192c3-d8	315	<i>Philebus</i> 48d8-e10	100

## 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

<i>Politicus</i>	19	<i>Sisyphus</i> 387b7-c3	27
258e8-11	201	<i>Sophist</i>	19, 228
269c4	270	229c1-231e6	129-34
293a2-4	123	232d6-e1	66
305b1-c8	200	<i>Symposium</i>	36
309c5-d4	123	173c1-d7	76
310e9-10	319	184a7-8	119
311b9	318	184c4-7	119
<i>Protagoras</i> 316c5-317c5	65, 76	185b1-5	119
320c2-328d2	76	192d4	274
322c3	193	201e6-7	324
323c5-324a1	107-8	207a5-6	324
330c1	308	216a6-7	270
343e6	274	218c7-d5	119
351b3-4	308	219e3	119
352e5-357e8	76, 285-6	<i>Theaetetus</i>	222
357e4-8	76, 280	150a8-151d3	132-5
<i>Republic</i>	12, 19, 35-6, 37-8	150c4-7	329
Book 1	54-6, 124-5, 204-9	150d2-6	153-4
328c6	317	151b1-6	134
331e1-336a8	159-60, 173-4, 196-8	153a5	266
332c5-d3	166, 305	170e7-171c7	286
333d3-6	114	176b4	270
335c4	168	179e2	299-300
335e2	292	210b4-d4	132-5
335e5	173-4	<i>Timaeus</i>	19
336c6-d4	182-4	72a4-6	189
337a5-338b3	328-9	PLUTARCH	
340a1-b8	55	<i>Solon</i> 32.3	11
340c6-341a4	55	POSIDONIUS	
342d2-3	324	fr. 2 E.-K.	64
346a6-c4	184-5	fr. 176 E.-K.	88
350c12-d1	324	fr. 284 E.-K.	65
350d4-5	168	PROCLUS	
351c8-d9	187, 318	<i>In Timaeum</i> 7b	10
352d8-353e11	114, 168-9	PROTAGORAS	
353d3-10	293	fragments/ascriptions	66, 186, 193
362e4-363a2	65-6	fr. 3	107
376d9	158	SIMON	
433a8-b1	189	Cobbler's Dialogues	23-5
433c6	319	SOPHOCLES	
434b2	295	<i>Oedipus</i> 415	275-6
443c9-444a2	168	SYNESIUS	
444b1	187	<i>Dio</i> 57d-58a	42
445a5-b1	218-19		
501e4	158		
505a3	271		
505b5-e2	151		
554e4-5	168		
608d11	270		
612d7	266		
621b8-d3	76		



#### 4 INDEX OF PASSAGES CITED

THEMISTIUS		1.7.1	271
26, 320d-321c	97-8	2.1.17	121
		2.1.27-33	339
THEOCRITUS		2.2.1	308
6.34	317	2.6.38	200
		4.2	73
THEODECTES		4.2.1-7	280
fr. ( <i>Oratores Attici</i> II 247)	9-10	4.2.4	111-12
		4.2.11	121
THEOGNIS		4.2.12-19	71, 194
429-38	108	4.2.19-20	71
		4.2.22	118, 308
THRASYLLUS	22-3, 207, 263	4.2.25-9	113
		4.2.31-6	73, 102
XENOPHON		4.2.39	118
<i>Memorabilia</i>	25, 77, 200, 216	4.2.40	121
1.3.1	25	4.4.5-25	185, 187
1.4-1.7	45-6, 79	4.4.9	329
1.4.1	77-82, 216, 230, 232-3	4.4.16	318
1.4.2	25	4.7.1	121
1.5.1	30	4.8.11	194-5