Immanuel Kant

Critique of Pure Reason

Translated by
Werner S. Pluhar

Introduction by
Patricia W. Kitcher

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CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

Unified Edition

(with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions)

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to the Memory of

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Founder of Hackett Publishing Company

Encourager, Supporter, and Friend

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CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Whereas interest in Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is gratifyingly wide-spread, rather less so—not surprisingly—is the fluency in German (especially in Kant's German) that one requires in order to read the work in the original. Thus most readers of the *Critique* outside of the German-speaking countries continue to depend on reliable translations. There seems to be general agreement that the most reliable *English* translation, on balance, has thus far been Norman Kemp Smith's, published originally in 1929.[1] The very fact that his translation has held this lofty position for so many decades testifies to Kemp Smith's remarkable achievement as a translator.[2] On the other hand, the same decades—as might be expected—have also permitted Kant scholars to discover in his translation a considerable number of deficiencies of various types and degrees of seriousness;[3] and

[1]Other English translations are those by Francis Haywood (1838), J. M. D. Meiklejohn (1855), and F. Max Müller (1881). For further information, see the bibliography in the back of this volume.

[2]In contrast, Kemp Smith's *Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (London: Macmillan, 1918; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1992), although still widely read, has lost much of its influence. In the present translation Kemp Smith's *Commentary* is nonetheless cited regularly in footnotes, along with selected other secondary sources.

[3]These include various types of mistranslations of terms or parts of sentences, defective and sometimes inconsistent interpretations of Kant's intended meaning (as discernible from the context or from the work as a whole), and even outright omissions of words, phrases, and whole sentences. Less well known is the degree to which Kemp Smith's translation tends to "sanitize" Kant's *style*, in places where enhancement of readability is not an issue. When Kant expresses himself in a dramatic, or witty, or deliberately casual manner, Kemp Smith usually expunges all such signs of flair, by substituting standard philosophical language and

thus there has gradually arisen a demand for Kant's *Critique* to be translated into English yet again.

This new translation of the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*—Kant's *magnum opus* on epistemology and metaphysics—has profited immensely from various contributions made by two eminent Kant scholars: Professor James W. Ellington (himself a translator of Kant, of considerable renown), and Professor Patricia W. Kitcher. Ellington's contributions are indicated variously below. Kitcher's contribution is her superb introduction to this volume. In it, she provides a roadmap to Kant's abstract and complex argumentation by firmly locating his project in the context of eighteenth-century—and current—attempts to understand the nature of the thinking mind and its ability to comprehend the physical universe.

The present translation itself is based on the *Critique's* first and second editions—respectively of 1781 and 1787 and known as editions A and B—as these appear in the standard edition of Kant's works, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, issued by the Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co. and Predecessors, 1902–). In that *Akademie* edition, B occupies volume 3, and A insofar as it deviates from B is contained in volume 4; the editor for both is Benno Erdmann. This translation presents A and B—with their page numbers on its margins[4]—either simultaneously, or successively, or B as text and A as a footnote,[5] depending on the degree of variation between the two editions in a given portion of the work. Where A and B themselves have variant readings, I have considered them all, but I indicate only the more significant ones, as seems appropriate for a translation. Apart from a few exceptions, all of which are footnoted, the translation follows the original in the paragraphing and in the use of typographical emphasis and parentheses (likewise in the omission of quote marks), but deals more liberally with such other punctuation marks as dashes, colons, semicolons, and so on.

My foremost aims in this translation are high degrees of both accuracy and readability. To achieve such accuracy, I rely heavily—apart, of course, from very careful interpretation of the original—on terminological consis-

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erasing any hint of drama. Indeed, Kant's reputation as—in the *Critique*, at any rate—an uninspired writer is due less to the work itself than to this method of translation.

[4]Because translation frequently alters the sequence of words (and sometimes of larger linguistic units), the page breaks assumed for A and B in this volume can only approximate those in the original.

[5]Footnotes containing Kantian materials are clearly distinguished from translator's footnotes, as I explain below.

tency. Thus technical terms in the original are, as far as possible, translated always by the same English term;[6] and this English term is never used, without alerting the reader, to render some other expression. E.g., the English verb 'to determine' (similarly for the noun) is used always to translate *bestimmen*, never such other German verbs as *ausmachen* (which, in the sense that approximates 'to determine,' means 'to establish' or 'to decide'). The term 'pure' always renders *rein*, never such nontechnical terms as *bloß* ('mere'); and so on. And although the word 'thing' is indeed used—for lack of an alternative—to translate both *Ding* and the nearly synonymous *Sache*, this fact is indicated in a footnote whenever the two German terms occur in the same context; the same applies to 'existence' as rendering both *Existenz* and the synonymous *Dasein*; and so on. Likewise, *Beziehung* is translated by 'reference' (or, in some contexts, by 'respect') and not—unless so indicated—by the less specific 'relation' (which normally renders *Verhältnis, Relation*); *deutlich* is translated by 'distinct,' not by 'clear' (which renders the German *klar*, a term with a different meaning); *Kritik* is translated always by 'critique,' never by the far from synonymous 'criticism.' The same terminological consistency extends, *a fortiori*, to technical *distinctions* in the original. E.g., the English word 'real' (similarly for the noun) is used only for Kant's technical term *real*, never for his likewise technical but far from synonymous term *wirklich*, which means 'actual'; and 'to demonstrate' is used only for Kant's technical term *demonstrieren*, never for *beweisen*, which means 'to prove' (nor for any other such terms).[7] Likewise, Kant's *Erkenntnis* (similarly for the verb) is translated always as 'cognition,'[8] never as 'knowledge,' which renders *Wissen*. The

[6]In contexts where the same original term has a significantly different meaning—e.g., where *Bestimmung* means not 'determination' but 'vocation'—the original term is given in a footnote.

[7]Translating *wirklich* (without alerting the reader) both as 'actual' and as 'real' (similarly for the nouns) creates illusory distinctions. See, e.g., Kemp Smith's rendering of A 491–95/B 519–23, esp. A 495/B 523. Moreover, using 'real' (without alerting the reader) to translate both *wirklich* and *real* erases a Kantian distinction, and is thus able to create illusory contradictions. Consider, e.g., the result of Kemp Smith's ambiguous use of 'reality' at A 853–54 = B 881–82. Similarly, Kemp Smith's liberal use of 'to demonstrate' for terms other than *demonstrieren* (such as *beweisen, erweisen, zeigen*, etc.) frequently creates illusory inconsistencies; see, e.g., A 733–36/B 761–64, where Kant's very definition of 'demonstrations' (*Demonstrationen*) immediately follows, and indeed even includes, loose uses of 'to demonstrate' (for *zeigen*) and 'demonstrable' (for *erweislich*) that *conflict* with the definition given there.

[8]Or, in a few identified cases, as 'recognition'

two German terms are by no means synonymous, and hence translating both as 'knowledge' leads to grave inaccuracies, including illusory contradictions.[9]

To enhance readability, I use various grammatical and terminological devices to clarify the original sentences and their interconnections as far as this can be done without impairing accuracy. One such device[10] consists in dividing up most of Kant's notoriously long sentences—a task that can be quite difficult, especially when the sentences are conditional in form. Another consists in replacing Kant's frequently ambiguous uses of 'the former . . . the latter' or 'the first . . . the second' by the appropriate referents.[11] Yet another consists in interpolating[12] (or, in the less urgent cases, supplying in footnotes) individual words or short phrases that will assist readers—especially those less experienced—in recognizing connections, transitions, or contrasts that are, in my view, plainly *intended* in the original but are left rather less explicit and clear there. E.g., such words as 'thus' or 'for' are sometimes inserted to clarify the transition to what is in fact intended as a consequence or as a premise; 'but' is sometimes substituted for 'and' (or vice versa) if the result renders Kant's intended meaning more clearly in English; or a word in the singular may be changed to the corresponding plural (or vice versa) when the singular might sound strange or misleading in English; and so on. All the *philosophically important* interpolations, and *only* these, are marked by brackets. Marking *all* interpolations by brackets would, as I have come to believe as a result of a special minisurvey con-

[9]See, e.g., Kemp Smith's contradictory rendering of A 818 = B 846, and then the further contradiction between it and his translation of A 828–29 = B 856–57. In some cases, for lack of a good alternative, I do use the word 'knowledge' to translate another Kantian term, *Kenntnis* or *Kenntnisse*—e.g., when using the more literal 'acquaintance' would result in convoluted constructions—and in a few cases I similarly use 'to know' for the verb *kennen*. But all these cases (except for a few thoroughly nontechnical ones) are identified in footnotes.

[10]Of course, readability is aided also by the fact—which I would not, however, call a *device*—that I, too, employ most of the technical English vocabulary that has traditionally been used in translating Kant. In cases where my translation of a technical Kantian term breaks with tradition—e.g., in my use of 'presentation' (exceptions noted) rather than 'representation' for *Vorstellung*—I explain and defend my choice in a footnote. In addition, the German equivalents for the most important Kantian terms are given in footnotes at the beginning of major portions of the work.

[11]Deciding which referents are appropriate is frequently a matter of considerable interpretation—as, indeed, is translating any Kantian text.

[12]I.e., inserting, substituting, or altering.

ducted on this very issue,[13] be both unnecessary and, for many readers, injurious to readability—as would, I believe, abandoning the interpolations themselves.

This volume is copiously annotated. Kant's own footnotes as well as notes containing Kantian passages from A that differ from B are distinguished from translator's footnotes by their larger print, by bold footnote and reference numbers, and by the absence of brackets around these Kantian materials. Translator's footnotes use the smaller print, have no bold numbers, and are bracketed. When a footnote containing Kantian materials has a footnote in turn, this latter note is referenced by a lowercase *letter*, and its number in references is the same as that of the original note but is followed by this lowercase letter.

The translator's footnotes, a substantial number of which I owe to James Ellington, are intended to assist readers—especially those less experienced—in a variety of ways. A large number of these notes (many contributed by Ellington) offer explanatory comments of various kinds. Others provide translations—all of them my own—of Latin or other foreign expressions, indicate variant readings, and so on. A considerable number of translator's notes (many again supplied by Ellington) contain references to other relevant passages in the *Critique*; others provide relevant information pertaining to other Kantian works; still others give references to various authors—in particular, references (contributed *mostly* by Ellington) to secondary sources regarding various topics in the *Critique*. Another large number of footnotes (all my own) is terminological. Of these, the longer ones explain or defend my translations of certain German terms. The short ones give the original German terms whenever an original term has been translated rather freely or is otherwise of special importance or interest; whenever terminological relationships between adjacent terms in the original have either been lost or (seemingly) been created in translation; or whenever either the same German term is translated by different English terms or different German terms are translated by the same English term

[13]The minisurvey was conducted on my behalf by Hackett Publishing Company. It was sent to eleven noted Kant scholars (named below, in my acknowledgments), all of whom graciously responded. The results were communicated to me by the publisher. Upon careful consideration of these philosophers' arguments on both sides of the issue (some of which appropriately involved the concerns of students), I found myself persuaded to adopt the present policy concerning bracketed interpolations.

in the same context.[14] The German terms are usually given in such footnotes *not* as they appear in the original, but as they can be found—by interested readers—in a modern German dictionary: viz., in their modern spelling, and the verbs in the infinitive, the nouns in the nominative, etc.

References provided in this volume are given as follows. Page references in the tables of contents—the main table from B (as expanded to include auxiliary materials of this volume) and the short table from A (which precedes Kant's Introduction)—are to the pagination of the present volume. In footnotes, references to the text of the *Critique* are given as 'A' and 'B' followed by the page numbers in those editions, which appear on the margins of this translation. Similarly, references to footnotes give the A and B page containing the footnote's reference number, and then the footnote's number (or number and lowercase letter) preceded either by 'n.' or by 'br. n.' ('ns.' or 'br. ns.' in the plural)—respectively, for *notes* containing Kantian materials, or *bracketed notes* provided by the translator. References to other works by Kant are to the *Akademie* edition, and are given as 'Ak.' followed by volume and page numbers and, as applicable, by 'n.' for a note.[15]

At the end of this volume will be found a selected bibliography, a glossary of the most important German terms in the *Critique* along with my translations of them, and an index.

Acknowledgments: In the course of my work I frequently checked the translation by Norman Kemp Smith, and occasionally also those by F. Max Müller and by J.M.D. Meiklejohn, as well as the abridged translation by Wolfgang Schwarz.[16] I wish to express my immense gratitude to Professor James W. Ellington not only for the contributions already mentioned, but especially for his careful reading of the entire manuscript and for his highly valuable criticisms. I am greatly indebted to Professor Patricia Kitcher for having written such a splendid introduction to this volume. I address sincerest thanks to the various members of Hackett Publishing Company for their splendidly professional and very friendly collaboration at every stage of this project. With regard to the previously mentioned mini-

[14]The purpose in these latter two cases—as I indicated above in discussing accuracy—is to alert the reader that a terminological distinction in the translation has no counterpart in the original, or vice versa.

[15]References in this volume's index are given, as indicated there, in a slightly abbreviated form.

[16]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason—Concise Text* (Aalen: Scientia, 1982).

survey concerning bracketed interpolations, I am grateful to the following Kant scholars for providing me with their valuable (and in some cases generously elaborate) feedback and advice: Professors Henry E. Allison, Karl Ameriks, Richard E. Aquila, Stephen Engstrom, Anthony C. Genova, Mary Gregor, Salim Kemal, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Geoffrey Payzant, Timothy Sean Quinn, and Jay F. Rosenberg. My warmest and deepest gratitude belongs, once again, to my wife and colleague, Professor Evelyn B. Pluhar, who has contributed substantially to this project on several levels.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Reading the *Critique*

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) is usually regarded as the most important figure in the history of Modern Western Philosophy. *The Critique of Pure Reason* (1781, 1787) is his *magnum opus*. It is a very difficult book to read, much less understand. Professor H. J. Paton of Oxford compared following the "windings and twistings" of the argument of the central portion of the book, the "Transcendental Deduction," to crossing the Great Arabian desert,[1] and he was one of Kant's most sympathetic interpreters.

The contemporary reader faces four different challenges in grappling with this text. The most obvious is Kant's language. Even a gifted translator cannot evade Kant's deliberate introduction of new and complex terms to present his theories. There is a point to this terminology. By using unfamiliar language, Kant alerts his readers to the fact that his words have special and very precise senses that must be carefully understood if his theories are to be understood. A second challenge arises from the sheer difficulty of his topics. As St. Augustine observed long ago, we all know what time is until we are asked. Exactly the same point could be made about Kant's other central topics: space, mathematics, causation, and the subjects and objects of knowledge.

The first two problems are compounded by a third: the interconnectedness of Kant's theories. As we will see (p. lv–lvi), Kant believed that all of

[1] *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*. New York: Humanities, 1936, vol. I, p. 547.

knowledge had to fit into an interconnected whole, because the test of truth of any particular claim was its ability to relate to other, independently established, claims. Since he practiced what he preached, his discussions of some hard problems, time, for example, anticipate other hard problems, such as the nature of causation, so that his accounts of time and causation will be not only consistent, but mutually supporting. Although the virtues of this method are obvious, the result is that the work needs to be understood as a whole and that many early discussions are unclear until reread in the light of later discussions. The fourth challenge is common to historical texts, but somewhat worse with the *Critique.* Kant shared an intellectual context with his original audience. Just as a contemporary writer would not have to mention Einstein's name in considering the implications of relativity theory, there was no need for Kant to mention Newton or Leibniz in discussing questions about the nature of space or Hume in defending the unity of the self or the necessity of causation. This problem is more severe in Kant's writings, because he was more concerned to present his own theories in a systematic fashion than to engage in point-by-point debates with opponents. As a result, other thinkers are usually not mentioned, even though their work provided the context for Kant's own reflections on a particular topic.

In sum, reading Kant is unusually difficult because he does not supply an adequate historical context, he uses unfamiliar terms, and he aims to present a systematically unified solution to a group of very hard problems. My purpose in this introduction is to try to lighten some of those burdens. Although I will discuss the major sections of the *Critique* in order, my remarks will often be informed by material that is available only later in the text. One aim is to familiarize readers with some of Kant's hard topics, partly by supplying historical context and partly by relating them to contemporary intellectual projects. I will also introduce readers to Kant's most important terminology, both by situating it in his distinctive ways of looking at particular issues and by supplying contemporary equivalents where possible. The *Critique* is a bit like a jigsaw puzzle, in that, once some pieces are in place, it becomes progressively easier to figure out what other pieces must look like. My hope is that readers will achieve a sufficient grasp of some key terms and issues, which can then serve as anchors for developing a more comprehensive understanding.

No introduction and no teacher can turn Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* into easy reading. Would-be students of Kant must be prepared to exert considerable intellectual effort if they hope to read this book with a tolerable degree of understanding. Like doing a difficult jigsaw or crossword puzzle, there is also a great deal of intellectual satisfaction in unraveling the mysteries of the *Critique*. For most people, however, that is hardly the point. In achieving some mastery of Kant's thought, readers put themselves in a position to understand many of the deepest currents in the history of ideas since Kant, including developments in our understanding of science, religion, literature, and the human mind itself. They also add an incredibly valuable tool to their own capacities to understand such complex phenomena, the ability to see them through Kant's eyes. Although I agree with standard complaints about the obscurity of the text, my own view of Kant's philosophical analyses echoes that expressed by one of his early admirers, the great German writer Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, who compared the experience of reading a page of Kant to the feeling he had when entering a brightly lit room.[2]

2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem

Kant wrote two somewhat different versions of the *Critique*, one in 1781 and one in 1787. Following standard practice and this translation, I refer to passages in the first by "A" and the pages in the standard German edition, and passages in the second by "B" and its paging in the same edition.

On the most general level, the topics of the *Critique of Pure Reason* are epistemology and metaphysics. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. Typical issues include the extent of human knowledge, its degree of certainty, and its sources of evidence and justification. A long-standing dispute in epistemology concerns whether all knowledge is gained through sensory experience or whether we are born with some "innate" knowledge. Metaphysics is concerned with basic questions about the nature of reality: what caused the universe? what is the nature of space and time? are all events caused? is all of the furniture of the universe composed of one kind of substance, matter, or are some things "immaterial"?

Kant touches on all of these epistemological and metaphysical topics at one point or another in the *Critique*, although some are much more prominent than others. Unlike his predecessors (and some successors!), he also

[2]A conversation reported by A. Schopenhauer, *Lexicon der Goethe Zitate, herausgegeben von Richard Dobel,* Zürich: Artemis, 1968, p. 444.

considers the relation between epistemology and metaphysics. One of Kant's basic messages in the *Critique*—perhaps his most basic—is that philosophy errs when it tries to draw metaphysical conclusions about the way the world is apart from our knowledge on the basis of epistemological arguments about how we do or must acquire knowledge of the world.

Kant prefaces the *Critique* with a lament about the sad state of metaphysics. But his program for reform is thoroughly epistemological. It is only by working our way to a better understanding of the sources and limits of human knowledge that we will be able to figure out what metaphysical questions can fruitfully be asked. In the Introduction, Kant sharpens the focus of his inquiry to three central questions. To understand the importance of these questions, consider the following three knowledge claims, one from mathematics, one from Newtonian physics, and one from metaphysics:

(1) The sum of the interior angles of a triangle equals 180°.

(2) At sea level, an unsupported object will fall at a rate of 9.8 m/sec^2.

(3) All events are caused.

Although the third claim may seem a little strange, perhaps a little bold, the first two should be completely familiar from high school science and mathematics. What Kant noticed was that all three of these claims are a little strange, and strange in the same way. Consider the second. Although it lacks the word "all," the claim is meant to be a universal generalization; it is not that some particular object will fall with that acceleration, but that any and all past, present, and future objects will accelerate at exactly the same rate. But how could we know that? Obviously, we have not seen every single object in the universe behave in this manner. The universality is explicit in the third claim, but it is equally present in the first as well as in the second. The first statement does not merely claim that a particular triangle (such as the illustrative one drawn on the blackboard by a geometry teacher) has this property; it claims that they *all* do.

One of Kant's major points in the Introduction is that there is an apparent problem with our knowledge of universal claims, such as those encountered in mathematics, science, and metaphysics: how is it possible? Kant notes another odd feature of these claims. This feature can be seen most easily by considering a contrasting sort of claim, for example, "all the coins in my wallet are silver-colored." Even though this claim is universal in form, there is no problem about how it could be established. I could simply check them all. But that is not the only difference between this claim and a law of physics or mathematics. Although the claim about the contents of my wallet is true, it is true by sheer coincidence. There is nothing about being in my wallet that makes coins silver-colored. By contrast, it has seemed to many people (and especially to Kant), that there is nothing accidental about all earthly objects accelerating at 9.8 m/sec^2. If an object is released near the earth's surface, then it *has* to fall at this rate, because it is a law of nature. That is why the claim can be made about all past, present, and even future objects. Kant expresses this difference between claims such as the one about my wallet and the laws of physics and mathematics by saying that the former are "**contingent,**" meaning that they just *happen* to be true, and the latter are "**necessary,**" meaning that they *have* to be true (B 2–6).

What Kant calls the "**genuine universality**" of laws of nature and mathematics (as opposed to the accidental universality of the claim about the coins in my wallet) is directly related to their necessity. It is precisely because these laws are thought to be necessary that they apply to all past, present, and future objects. A future object will fall at this rate, because it *has* to. The properties of genuine universality (hereafter "universality, " which is also Kant's usage) and necessity are also related in that neither can be established by sensory evidence. As David Hume (1711–1776) argued (and hence Kant did not bother to), the observation of past objects and events can only tell us that a generalization has been true in the past, it can never show that it *had* to be true, or that it will be true in the future. There is a serious problem, then, about how we could ever know the truth of universal and necessary claims. To signal their odd status, Kant describes such claims as "***a priori.***" This is a complex concept for Kant, and we can now understand three of its interrelated meanings. A claim is "***a priori***" for Kant if that claim cannot be established by appeal to sensory observation or past experience and if that claim is necessary and universal. The contrasting term is "***a posteriori,***" which indicates that a knowledge claim is based on the evidence of the senses, and hence is neither necessary nor (genuinely) universal (B 2–6).

Philosophers prior to and after Kant have offered a possible solution to the problem of *a priori* knowledge claims. The suggestion is that these claims are true because of the meanings of the words they contain. To take what has always been the parade case, the idea is that a claim like "all bachelors are unmarried" is universally and necessarily true—any future bachelors will also have to be unmarried—because of the meanings of the words or, as Hume put it, because of the relations between the "ideas" 'bachelor' and 'unmarried'. Kant takes note of this tradition, when he introduces the notions of "**analytic**" and "**synthetic**" judgments (A 6/B 10). An "**analytic**" judgment is one in which the predicate concept (or term) is "thought in" the subject concept. By contrast, the subject concept of a "**synthetic**" judgment does not "contain" the concept used in its predicate. The suggestion would be that we know that all past, present, and future bachelors will *have* to be unmarried, because the idea of being unmarried is part of (or thought in or contained in) the idea of being a bachelor. In this way, the problem of *a priori* knowledge is solved for those judgments that are both *a priori* and analytic. We know that these claims are true, because as soon as we grasp the idea "bachelor", for example, we understand that it involves being unmarried.

If the claims of science, mathematics, and metaphysics are all analytic, then the apparent problem of their *a priori* status disappears. But it is exactly here that Kant makes one of his most original contributions. His point is very simple. If analytic claims are true just by virtue of the relations among *our* ideas, then they would not seem to have any relation to the world around us. The great weakness with the "analytic" solution to the problem of *a priori* knowledge is that, if they only describe the relations among our ideas, then it is totally mysterious how the laws of mathematics and physics (at least) can be so remarkably useful in predicting the future course of actual events. Further, if the laws of science and mathematics are a matter of our ideas, then, seemingly, we could change them simply by adopting new ideas. Because it trivializes the status of these subjects (and metaphysics), Kant rejected the analytic solution. This led him to his famous formulation of the central problem of the *Critique*: **How are synthetic *a priori* knowledge claims possible?** That is: how is it possible for us ever to be justified in making the universal and necessary claims that occur in mathematics, science, and metaphysics once we recognize that these claims cannot simply be a matter of the relations among our own ideas? (B 19ff.)

His strategy for resolving the problem was to examine how knowledge is possible in general. Although he agreed with the Empiricists that all knowledge begins with experience (A 1/B 1), he wanted to inquire whether all aspects of knowledge derive from sensory evidence or whether some aspects arise from our minds' ways of dealing with sensory experience (B 1–2). His project is to try to determine the necessary conditions for any knowledge at all and, in particular, to determine whether any of these necessary conditions come from the mind itself. A fourth meaning of "***a priori***" for Kant is "in the mind prior to the perception of any object" (B 41). More precisely, his strategy is to try to show that the universal and necessary (and hence *a priori*) claims of mathematics, science, and metaphysics owe their special status to the fact that certain conditions, which are necessary for knowledge in general, lie *a priori* in the mind and enable it to deal with sensory experience.

To anticipate, his conclusion will be that some claims of metaphysics, mathematics, and science are universally and necessarily true of all the objects of which we can ever have any knowledge, because those claims reflect the ways in which our minds work—and must work—if we are going to be able to have any knowledge at all based on the evidence presented to our senses. This was an entirely novel way to try to demonstrate the truth of knowledge claims, as Kant well realized. Perhaps somewhat immodestly, he compared his revolution in epistemology to the Copernican revolution in astronomy. Still, the analogy is helpful. Copernicus reversed the usual perspective by considering whether the earth moved around the sun, rather than the standard view that the sun and all the celestial bodies revolved around the earth. The standard view in epistemology is that our knowledge claims can be vindicated only by showing that our thoughts about objects conform to what the objects themselves are like. Kant offered a new perspective. He urges us to consider vindicating our knowledge claims by inquiring whether the objects of which we can have knowledge must conform to our ways of knowing (B xvi–xvii).

Because of the unusual nature of his enterprise, Kant gave it a special name: "**transcendental**" philosophy. The goal of transcendental philosophy is to investigate the necessary conditions for knowledge with a view to showing that some of those necessary conditions are *a priori*, universal and necessary features of our knowledge, that derive from the mind's own ways of dealing with the data of the senses. The term "**transcendental**" has often been a source of confusion, because it includes three not obviously related ideas: (1) the idea that some conditions are necessary for knowledge and (2) the idea that some claims are *a priori*, in stating universal and necessary features of the world, and (3) the idea that some features of our knowledge are *a priori*, in the sense that they do not derive from sensory evidence, but from our minds' ways of dealing with sensory evidence. What is distinctive about Kant's philosophy is his belief that some of the necessary conditions for knowledge are also *a priori*, in all four senses of that term: they are universal, necessary, cannot be established by sensory experience, and reflect the mind's ways of dealing with sensory experience; the term "**transcendental**" constantly draws attention to that complex doctrine.

3.
Transcendental Aesthetic: The Science of Sensory Perception

A. Perception. Kant begins his inquiries with an assumption that there are (at least) two quite different mental faculties involved in achieving knowledge, sensibility and understanding, or, in contemporary terminology, perception and conception (A 19/B 33). Although the distinction between these faculties is as pervasive now as it was in Kant's day, it is nonetheless problematic. To my knowledge, no one has ever been able to say exactly what the difference between the two faculties comes to. The general idea is that perception involves the sense organs and conception involves concepts, but it is an open question whether our concepts constrain or influence perception, and it may well be that some concepts essentially involve perceptual images. Kant did not intend his use of this distinction to settle any of these psychological questions. Rather his assumption of two faculties rests on epistemological (and ordinary psychological) grounds. His epistemological point is that we can have knowledge of the world around us only if we have some faculty for taking in information about that world and some faculty for drawing useful connections between past, present, and future bits of sensory information. Failing that, we could never use our experience with objects to enable us to understand how they and similar objects will behave in the future. Kant's distinction also honors ordinary usage. At least at first glance, there appears to be a significant difference between *seeing* a beautiful garden and *having the thought* that it would be more pleasant to sit in a beautiful garden while reading.

Although it has other important topics, as we will see, the central topic of the first part of the *Critique*, the Transcendental Aesthetic, is what Kant called the "science of *a priori* sensibility" (A 21/B 35). What he meant is that, true to his transcendental approach, he is going to investigate perception, which is a necessary condition for knowledge or cognition, to determine whether it contains any *a priori* elements that are themselves necessary for knowledge. At this point it is critical to recall the multiple meanings of "*a priori.*" We are looking for elements which are necessary and universal features of perceptual experience and which do not derive from sensory experience. How are we to find such features?

To understand Kant's method, we need some further terminology. Let us take "presentation" to be the most general term for any mental state that is about an object. A perception of a beautiful garden, a judgment that "Socrates is wise," or a belief that "Emma Woodhouse was clueless" would all be presentations of, respectively, a beautiful garden, Socrates and wisdom, and a fictional person with an unfortunate character trait. Kant's method is to start with a presentation of, for example, a body, and then to subtract the conceptual elements (such as the thought that bodies can resist force), and then to subtract those elements of the presentation that can be derived from the senses, such as color and hardness. Whatever remains, if anything, would have to be the faculty of perception's own contribution to the presentation (A 20–21/B 34–35).

This method of "isolating" the *a priori* contributions of the faculty of perception is both more and less difficult than it may appear. As already noted, since it is not clear exactly what the perception/conception distinction involves, it is not obvious how to subtract away the conceptual elements. Oddly, the second subtraction, of the elements contributed by the senses, is more straightforward. Kant could take advantage of the work of his predecessors, who had noticed that the retina of the eye that receives visual stimulation could not contain any information about depth. To see their point, think of vision geometrically. The retina can register information from only one point on any given line of sight. For example, if you look at a pencil pointing away from you, then you can see only the eraser. That end of the pencil will occlude all the rest. But the same is true for each of the lines of sight. Whatever you see "first" along each line of sight will block out anything else on that line of sight. Hence, depth itself—which is the distance from the eye along the lines of sight—cannot register on the retina. To recall a familiar concept from geometry, a retinal image is a planar projection of the seen object. Now, without depth information, it is also impossible to determine either the length or the width of an object. If you tilt the pencil slightly, so that you can see the other end, but still hold it at almost 180° to your eye, then it will make a very short projection on your retina, whatever its actual length, and the same is true for width that is "foreshortened" by an odd visual angle. Since the retina cannot supply depth information, it cannot inform us about the length or width of objects either; that is, it cannot provide information about their "extension" (or extent) in space or their shape (since shape is constituted by length, width, and depth) (A 20–21/B 34–35). Hence Kant concluded that an object's shape or spatial configuration is a property contributed by the faculty of perception itself.

This conclusion is strange, because we certainly seem to see the shapes of objects. Kant is not, however, denying that our perceptions of objects include lots of information about their shapes. What he is denying is that this information comes straight in through our visual organ. His claim is that, unlike colors, which are directly registered on the retina (in the cones), the perceptual faculty must *interpret* the two-dimensional information on the retina as a three-dimensional array. Perhaps the best way to understand his view is to think about "planar projections," that is, the two-dimensional shape of the shadows of solid objects. As you may recall from geometry, differently shaped solid figures can have the same planar projection. Given just a planar projection, it could be interpreted as the projection of many different three-dimensional shapes, even though many shapes would also be ruled out as possible interpretations. I believe that this is Kant's point: the sensory information registered on our visual organ constrains, but does not determine, a three-dimensional visual image; the production of that image requires work from the faculty of perception. In contemporary terminology, Kant's claim would be that the sensory data on our retinas must be processed by our perceptual systems before the visual perception of a house, for example, is possible. Since this processing results in a perception with spatial properties, Kant describes space as the "**form of pure intuition**" (or "perception," in contemporary terminology), meaning that all perceptions will have spatial properties, because these properties are the result of "**pure**" (that is, not from the senses) processes that lie *a priori* in our perceptual faculty (A 20/B 34).

Many contemporary cognitive scientists would agree with Kant that visual images do not emerge simply from retinal data, but require a great deal of processing by the visual system. Kant goes on, however, to draw some quite startling philosophical conclusions. His first concern is to argue that the spatial properties of objects are not dispensable features of them. On the contrary, they are necessary conditions for any knowledge or cognition of objects. (**Knowledge** is usually thought to require justified true belief; **cognition** is a weaker relation, such as perceiving an object or distinguishing that object from others.) He offers a straightforward epistemological argument. It is not possible to have any knowledge or cognition of an object without being able to distinguish that object from all others. Failing the ability to separate that object from others, it would not even be clear which object the knowledge or cognition is about. As Kant observes here (A 23–24/B 38–39), but makes clearer later with an example, it is not possible to distinguish one object from all others, a drop of water, for example, from all others, unless that object is located in space (A 263/B 319). The idea is roughly that the spatiality of an object allows us to keep track of it through space and hence to distinguish it from any qualitatively alike objects. Although this argument about the necessity of spatiality for distinguishing objects has been much debated, there is fairly general agreement that Kant has at least made a good case for the claim that the spatial features of objects are necessary for any knowledge of them. His further claims remain highly controversial.

B. Space, Time, and Mathematics. Beyond the "science of *a priori* perception," the Transcendental Aesthetic is essentially concerned with two apparently unrelated issues, the nature of space and time and the synthetic *a priori* status of mathematics. Although both are large issues, I will try to provide some sense of the problems that Kant was addressing and of why he thought they had anything to do with perception. For many years before Kant wrote the *Critique,* many of the best minds in Europe had been seriously engaged in a debate about the nature of space and time. Very roughly, the followers of Isaac Newton (1642–1727) believed that space, for example, was a preexisting container into which objects were placed (either by God or by natural forces). The key point was that space did not depend on the existence of objects; it was real independently of whether any objects occupied it. In sharp opposition, the followers of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716) regarded space as nothing more than a system of relative positions among objects. On their side, the Leibnizians had the important point that space could not be seen directly; all we ever see are objects in space, not space itself. The Newtonians thought they had science on their side. Although space could not be directly perceived, it had to exist, because forces are real, which meant that acceleration had to be real, which meant that distance through space and time had to be real. Beyond the question of space's dependence on objects, particular problems about the infinite extent and infinite divisibility of space and time had also arisen, problems to which Kant returned in a later portion of the *Critique* (the Antinomies). Kant himself had tried to defend Newton in an early paper,[3] but he was highly dissatisfied with

[3]"Concerning the ultimate foundation of the differentiation of regions in space" (1768), in *Kant's Precritical Writings*, G. B. Kerford and D. E. Walford, trans. and eds., New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968· 36–43

his own solution. In the *Critique*, he appears to have given up any hope of resolving questions about the nature of space and time by appeals to observation or scientific theory. Still there is the obvious fact that objects appear to be in spatial relations to each other and to the perceiver. Kant's solution to this debate is to maintain that space is the *a priori* form of human perception. As such, it is (1) real, in the sense that all the objects of which we will ever have any cognition will be spatial; but it is also (2) ideal, in the sense that we have no idea whether objects have spatial properties independently of our spatial perceptions of them (A 26–30/B 42–45). This is one of the first conclusions of "**transcendental idealism**," Kant's own name for his philosophical system, and we need to pause and consider it carefully to avoid some standard misunderstandings.

Recall that one of Kant's main themes is that we should not hastily draw metaphysical conclusions from epistemological premises. All of the points we have considered are epistemological. One premise (which is cast in serious doubt by contemporary physics) is that neither observation nor scientific theory can reveal the nature of space. Another is that spatial properties appear necessary for the differentiation of objects. A third is that the senses cannot by themselves supply spatial information. Since these premises all concern our ways of knowing about space, we are in no position to draw conclusions about what space is like in itself (A 42/B 59–60). This is important to bear in mind, because readers are often tempted to assume that, since Kant claims that the spatial features of perceived objects arise in part through the effects of our own perceptual system, then they are somehow figments of the imagination; objects are not really spatial, space is not real; these are things that we merely imagine. That is not Kant's considered position. His claim is that, insofar as we are able to have knowledge of objects, we must perceive them as spatial, and this is partly accomplished through the processes of the perceptual system itself. By his own theory, he is in no position to determine whether objects do or do not have spatial properties "before" we perceive them, or independently of our perceptions of them, although sometimes he seems tempted to speculate on this question (A 42/B 59–60). The thesis of transcendental idealism is that what we know of objects depends in part on our ways of knowing them. To claim that Kant believes that objects are not *really* spatial is to suggest that he thinks that we can find out something about objects apart from our ways of knowing them—but that contradicts his own central doctrine!

A second possible source of confusion concerns the "contribution" of the perceptual system. The idea would be that if spatial features come from the perceptual system, then they must not be real. Again, however, this is not Kant's position. The "pure form of intuition" does not simply make up spatial properties for objects; rather it interprets sensory data (Kant's **sensations** [A 20/B 34]) in a three-dimensional spatial array. The data constrain the interpretation, just as a particular planar projection constrains the range of objects of which it might be a projection. On Kant's theory, your perception of a garden would be an interpretation of your (visual) sensations, but it is not especially arbitrary: it is constrained by the sensations; Kant assumes that the human visual system is uniform, so that way of interpreting sensory data will be common to all sighted people; and, finally, he argues that some spatial interpretation of sensory data is necessary for any, however limited, cognition of objects.

To recap: Kant argues that all the objects of which we can have any cognition will have spatial features, because those features are a reflection of the way we do and must process perceptual data, if any cognition is to be possible. With this one theory, he provides solutions to both the problem of how we perceive a three-dimensional world via two-dimensional sense organs and to the question of how science can treat all past, present, and future objects as standing in spatial relations to each other, even though we seem unable either to observe space directly or to infer to its existence from our scientific theories. As if this were not enough, Kant also expects his theory that space is the form of intuition to solve one more important problem: the status of mathematical claims.

C. Kant's Doctrines. We have already considered the problem. Kant claims that the laws of mathematics, in particular, the theorems of Euclidean geometry (henceforth "geometry") are both synthetic and *a priori.* They are necessary and universal, but they are not just a matter of the ideas in our heads, but adequate descriptions of the world we encounter. How, then, could we ever know, for example, that all the triangles that we will ever encounter will have the property that the sum of their interior angles is equal to 180°? Kant argues that there is only one possible solution to the necessary and universal applicability of geometry to the world we experience: Euclidean geometry is the geometry of the form of human perception (B 40–41). The theorems of geometry are accurate descriptions of the world we encounter through perception, because the human perceptual system interprets sensory data in a three-dimensional Euclidean spatial grid. That would explain why the space of the geometers is also the space of Newtonian physics.

Like most commentators, I have concentrated on Kant's discussions of space, because they are both more developed and more intuitive, but the Transcendental Aesthetic also offers parallel arguments about time. Again the opening claim is that time is not directly registered in our senses. Although this may seem to be strange claim, since you may feel that you have a "sense" of time, ask yourself what sense that might be. As further confirmation of the problematic character of perception of time, note that many sportscasts impose a clock on the television screen to inform viewers of how much time is passing. If we could simply detect the passage of time, that would not be necessary. Because we cannot take in temporal information directly through our senses, Kant again claims that the temporal properties require processing by our perceptual system, although he will not explain until much later (the Analogies of Experience, see p. xlix ff.) the sort of data that permit us to interpret the world we experience in temporal terms.

Although both claims are surprising, Kant's position that the existence of time can be established neither by observation nor by science has seemed much less plausible to his readers than the comparable claims about space. As he acknowledged, the phenomenon of change seems to imply that time is real (A 36–37/B 53–54). Much of science is concerned with characterizing the changes effected by natural processes, and it does not seem possible to make sense of the notions of change or process without assuming the existence of time. If an object O lacks a property P (say, a tree not having leaves in the winter) and then acquires P (its leaves come out in spring), seemingly we can avoid contradiction—O both has and lacks P—only by taking account of the temporal differences. Worse still, Kant's epistemological theory itself describes cognitive processes, namely, the interpretation of sensory data through perceptual (and, as we will see, conceptual) processes. How can we make sense of Kant's own theory of the origins of our knowledge of spatial properties, for example, without assuming the passage of time?[4]

Before turning to the next major section of the *Critique*, it will be useful to take stock of what has happened in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant has argued that space and time are the *a priori* forms of human perception, meaning that the spatial and temporal properties of the objects we perceive do not derive from sensory data, but from our minds' own ways of inter-

[4]The apparent inconsistency between Kant's claim about the ideality of time and his own epistemological theory has been examined in detail by P. F. Strawson in *The Bounds of Sense*, London: Methuen, 1966.

preting sensory data. He has also argued that we can have no cognition at all of objects unless we interpret the data of our senses in spatial and temporal terms. So these *a priori* aspects of presentations are also necessary for cognition, and this is our first piece of transcendental knowledge. By Kant's lights, we now understand the *a priori* origin of the spatial and temporal aspects of presentations, and so we understand why those aspects are *a priori* in the sense of being universal and necessary aspects of the world we encounter in perception (A 56/B 81). Kant's hope that his arguments about the necessary conditions for cognition in general might finally resolve issues about the nature of space and time and the applicability of Euclidean geometry to the world we encounter in experience has been dimmed by recent developments in science and mathematics. However, his basic insight that cognitive achievements such as perception are a conjoint product of sensory data and the mind's ways of interpreting those data probably seems more plausible now, in light of recent developments in cognitive science, than it did to his contemporaries.

4.
The Transcendental Analytic: The Rules by Which We Think

A. The Metaphysical Deduction

In moving from the Transcendental Aesthetic to the Transcendental Analytic, we move from our perceptual to our conceptual faculties. Recall Kant's basic position that cognition requires that we integrate the information brought in through the senses so that objects may be classified together as similar. A presentation that can be applied to more than one object, e.g. "dog," Kant calls a "concept" (A 68/B 93). Concepts are required for any and all cognition, because they indicate similarities across objects. The **Transcendental Analytic** is about *a priori* concepts, that is, concepts that apply universally and necessarily throughout the objects we encounter, and which lie *a priori* in our thinking faculty, which Kant calls the "understanding" (although at a later point, he also discusses a second type of thinking faculty, "reason," see below p. liv ff.). The goal of this long and complex section of the *Critique* is to argue that we possess various *a priori* concepts, which are necessary for cognition in general. He gives these *a priori* concepts that are necessary for cognition a special name: "**categories.**" Although they approach this topic from somewhat different angles, the three main sections of the Transcendental Analytic, the "Guide" (often referred to, as I do in this section, as the "Metaphysical Deduction"), the Transcendental Deduction, and the Principles of Pure Understanding, are all intended to advance the common goal of demonstrating that certain *a priori* concepts must be used if any cognition at all is to be possible.

How could we ever determine which among all our concepts might be necessary for all cognition? We might look for the most common concepts, but this approach struck Kant as too haphazard to be likely to lead to success. Instead, he believed that he had found a clue to the discovery of all such concepts. He observed that what we use concepts for is making judgments. Even the simplest classification, such as "that is a chair," is a judgment with a subject "that" and a predicate "chair." His idea was that if we could reduce all the many forms of judgment to a few basic kinds (which include all the rest as special cases), then that might give us a clue about the most fundamental types of concepts (A 68–70/B 93–95). Kant was encouraged in this project by his belief that the job of determining the basic forms of judgment had already been carried out by Aristotle, so this resource was at hand for his own endeavors.

There has been much debate about the adequacy of the table of judgments (A 70/B 95), and about the accuracy of Kant's claim that the table comes from Aristotle. Perhaps the most fruitful way to approach Kant's table of judgments is not to worry about whether all the details are correct, but to consider whether the general idea of basic forms of judgment—forms that would have to be used for any cognition to be possible—makes sense. At first glance, it might seem that all we would need for some cognition would be affirmative judgments: "this is a chair," "that is a table," and so forth. Seemingly, this is how small children begin their cognitive careers, substituting pointing for the demonstrative ("this"), using the presence of the chair to stand for its own existence ("is"), skipping the article ("a"), and just announcing "chair." To get some feel for Kant's position, consider whether it is plausible to believe that a two-year-old pointing at a chair and saying "chair" actually has the knowledge, "this is a chair." One of Kant's points is that even an apparently simple **affirmative judgment**, "this is a chair," is not very simple. In particular, he would argue that small children should not be regarded as affirming "chair" of chairs unless they at least have the capacity to deny it, to recognize that the table is no chair. In cognitive development, the use of negation probably comes after one-word "affirmations" such as "chair." Kant's point is not about psychological development, however, but cognitive achievement. His plausible, if debatable, position is that putative cognizers are incapable of real **affirmation** unless they have the capacity for **negation**. To have the capacity to make negative judgments is just to have the concept of negation, however, so by the same reasoning, any cognizer must have this category.

Let us consider just a couple of other key categories. Kant believed that cognizers must be able to make particular judgments. They must be able to single out some one thing that is the subject of their judgments: *this* chair. As in the case of affirmation and negation, Kant reasoned that a would-be cognizer could not really understand the concept of one thing—a unitary thing—without also being able to understand the concept of more than one thing, the concept of plurality. Further, he recognized that these two concepts, unity and plurality (A 80/B 106), were required for a cognizer to understand what a concept was. Since concepts are presentations that can apply to more than one object, it is at least not obvious how a person could understand a concept *as a concept*, without also understanding the concepts of "one thing" (**unity**) and "more than one thing" (**plurality**) of a kind.

Merely classifying objects would provide little, if any, knowledge, unless we could also recognize that they have common attributes. For example, a chair and a table might both be made out of wood, and hence be similar in an important respect. But making the judgment "the table is wooden" requires that we be able to recognize that an object, a table, can have attributes, or properties, and this, in turn, requires something like the concept of subject (a bearer of properties) and the concept of property, or as Kant calls them, in an older vocabulary, the concepts of "**substance**" and "**accident**" (A 80/B106). As a final example, Kant recognized that we would have very little knowledge unless we recognized relations among properties, in particular, the dependence of some properties on others. Hence **hypothetical judgments** also seem required, judgments such as "*if* a match is struck, *then* it will light," "*if* metal is left in water, *then* it will rust," and so forth. Although this is more controversial than the previous cases, Kant will argue that the ability to make hypothetical judgments itself requires the concept of **cause** and **effect**. As we will see below, his claim is not that the property mentioned in the antecedent (the "if" part) is the cause of the property mentioned in the consequent (the "then" part), but rather that some causal knowledge is required to support any claim that one sort of property is connected to another.

For these and other reasons, Kant believed that there were basic forms of judgment that were required for even the most minimal knowledge of the world, and hence that certain concepts, the categories, were necessary for experience. Kant's own term "guide" suggests that this section was not meant to provide conclusive proof of the existence of the categories, but simply to acquaint readers with these possibly key concepts and to give them some idea of how and why they might be central to all cognition.

B. The Transcendental Deduction

Apparently, this section is intended first to explain what a transcendental deduction is and then to offer such a deduction for the concepts (the categories) introduced in the previous section. Unfortunately this appearance is quite misleading. Readers find this section confusing, in part, because "the transcendental deduction of the categories of the understanding" does not offer a transcendental deduction of any of the categories! Most of the categories are not even mentioned in this section. Not surprisingly, readers are often at a loss to figure out what Kant is doing in this dense and sometimes repetitive line of argumentation. Kant himself was dissatisfied with this chapter and totally rewrote it for the 1787 edition. Although some commentators favor the earlier and others the later version, my own view is largely the same as Kant's: the differences between the editions mainly concerns the order of exposition. The one important difference—and significant advance of the "B" over the "A" edition—comes at the end, at § 26. I will discuss both versions of the transcendental deduction together, moving freely between them, except for some final comments about § 26 of the B edition.

Section I, which is common to both editions, fulfills its stated purpose of characterizing a **transcendental deduction**. Kant explains what a transcendental deduction is by drawing an analogy with a legal deduction (A 84/B 116). Unfortunately, this type of legal argument is no longer used, so the analogy does not help contemporary readers. In eighteenth-century Prussia, lawyers tried to establish legal rights to a piece of property, for example, by constructing a deduction which traced the current claim back to its origin, thereby revealing the legitimacy of the claim.[5] What is at issue in the transcendental deduction are not the rights of various individuals to

[5]Kant scholars owe their present understanding of legal deductions, and so their present understanding of transcendental deductions, to a relatively recent paper by Dieter Henrich, "Kant's Notion of a Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First *Critique*, in Eckart Förster, ed. *Kant's Transcendental Deductions*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989: pp. 29–46

particular properties, but the rights of all cognizers to use various concepts (A 85/B 117).

The concepts in question come from metaphysics, and here, at last, we return to the problems with which we began. Certain concepts had been criticized by the Empiricist philosophers, John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753), and David Hume, in particular "substance" and "cause," on the grounds that their origins could not be traced back to the senses. Implicit in their criticism is the assumption that if a concept can be traced back to sensory data, for example, the use of the concept "dog" to our sensory encounters with dogs, then there is no question about the applicability of the concept. "Dog" applies to those objects that give rise to the sensory data that lead to the formation of the concept "dog." Such concepts thus have an "**empirical deduction**" (A 85/B 117). Locke and Berkeley had argued that "substance" and Hume had argued that "cause" could not be traced back to sensory data. These concepts are not *a posteriori*, derived from sensory experience, but *a priori*, not derived from experience, so it is not clear how or whether they can be legitimately applied to the objects of our experience. The purpose of a **transcendental deduction** is to establish the legitimate use of these concepts in science and metaphysics, by tracing their origins back to the necessary operations of the understanding in combining sensory information in a way that makes it usable in cognition. The deduction reveals them to be legitimate by showing that they are indispensable for any cognition at all (A 92–93/B 124–26). Put slightly differently, the goal of a **transcendental deduction** is to show that certain concepts that are *a priori*, in the sense that they cannot be derived from sensory data, are necessary for all cognition, and so are *a priori* in the sense that they describe universal and necessary features of all the objects of which we can ever have any knowledge. To use Kant's central example: the concept of cause cannot be traced back to particular features of sensory experience, but the claim that all events have causes is universally and necessarily true of all the events of which we can have any cognition. Or so he will argue in the Second Analogy.

We are now in a position to appreciate a second reason for the legendary difficulties of the "Transcendental Deduction" (besides the fact that this chapter does not present a deduction of the categories) and to understand what this section is trying to accomplish. Its purpose is to set the stage for a transcendental deduction, by trying to determine the necessary operations of the mind in achieving cognition. This is an incredibly difficult project, one that we cannot carry out with much confidence even today.

Contemporary readers may well feel that, without the resources of current cognitive science, Kant's project is actually hopeless. Oddly, however, he had some resources available that are little used by contemporary researchers. Today it is common to approach cognition by starting with the early stages of perception. Kant started at the other end of the process, with cognitive products like judgments and inferences. He also asked a very different sort of question, a normative question: What sorts of processes would be necessary for us to achieve *sound* judgments and inferences? In contemporary terminology, where much current research is descriptive and "bottom-up," Kant's approach was "top-down" and normative. He tried to analyze the sorts of processes that were necessary for genuine cognition to be possible.

Kant's own description of the transcendental deduction characterized it as having two sides, a "**subjective**" and an "**objective**" side, with the latter being the more crucial (A xvi–xvii). The purpose of the "**objective**" side is to explore the conditions that must be met by our presentations for any of them to qualify as knowledge of objects. Alternatively, it is an exploration of the necessary conditions of objective knowledge itself, how, for example, we are able to claim that "I know that the table is wooden," as opposed to saying merely that "the table *seems* wooden *to me*." Although, as we will see below, the "**subjective**" side is also extremely important, Kant well realized that he was in no position to offer psychological hypotheses about the actual mechanisms that make objective knowledge possible. Rather, the purpose of the **subjective deduction** is to describe in a very general way the *sorts* of cognitive processes that were required for knowledge of objects. As we will also see below, one of Kant's constant themes is that the Empiricists' all-purpose psychological mechanism—the **association of ideas** that were experienced together in time and space—is inadequate to explain any, however minimal, cognition of objects (e.g. A 112).

Kant did not refer to the "processing" of information, but to the combining or "**synthesizing**" of the contents of presentations. In this case, however, the contemporary equivalent of "processing information" for "synthesizing [the contents of] presentations," captures his meaning very well. Although I will alternate among the three expressions, "processing information," "combining presentations," and "synthesizing presentations," readers should not be misled by the last expression. "**Synthesis**" and the corresponding adjective "**synthetic**" do not mean the same in this context as the term "synthetic" encountered earlier. In the context of the deduction, Kant is referring to the processing of information; in the Introduction, where he lays out the problem to be solved in the deduction, he refers to a property of a judgment—the fact that its predicate is not part of its subject concept. His view is that all judgments, analytic and synthetic, are produced through the synthesizing of presentations.

Kant's most important claim on the subjective side of the transcendental deduction is that the subject of cognition must be unified. As noted (above, p. xxvi), Kant often failed to supply the historical context of claims, and this is one of the most egregious cases. Students of the history of philosophy will recall that David Hume had denied that the human mind possessed any sort of unity. In his memorable phrase, the mind is nothing but a "bundle of perceptions," each of which could exist perfectly well on its own, without any other mental states at all.[6] Although Hume's successors were appalled by this counterintuitive claim, they found it very hard to refute. Kant's approach was entirely novel. As he foreshadows at A 107, what he will argue is that the unity of the mind is necessary, because without such unity there would be no cognition at all. To see his point, think of the operation of combining information and, in particular, think of the contents of a resultant mental state or presentation in which, as Kant puts it, "we . . . draw many possible cognitions into one" (A 69/B 94). This state could not exist in independence of the earlier presentations whose contents were combined in it, for without them, it would lack all content (A 116). So Kant maintains—in direct contradiction to Hume—that for even the simplest cognition to be possible, the mind must have a synthetic unity, namely, a connection among its states brought about by operations of synthesis.

The unity of the self is a very important theme for Kant, and he signals its importance by giving his doctrine a special and extraordinarily complex name— **the "transcendental unity of apperception**." What he means by this is that the synthetic unity of the self, explained above, is transcendental, because it is a necessary condition for the possibility of cognition, and because this concept, the "I," the thinking self, is *a priori* (B 132). On the latter point, he was in complete agreement with Hume: There is no sensory impression of a self. Against Hume, he argues that "I" is still a legitimate concept that applies to objects in the world (namely, the subjects of knowledge), because such subjects are necessary for any cognition at all. The "apperception" piece of this doctrine adds yet another complex-

[6]David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 251.

ity. "Apperception" is often presented as equivalent to "self-consciousness." Unfortunately, the illumination provided by such a gloss is quite limited, because it was far from clear in the eighteenth century—and it is far from clear now—what either a "self" or "consciousness" is. As a first start, we might note that it follows even from the small piece of Kant's analysis of cognition that we have considered so far that anyone who investigates the bases of cognition must recognize the existence of selves. So some type of self-recognition appears to have been established, at least for epistemologists. Notice, however, what the combination of information from different mental states involves: using information from an earlier state in a later state and hence a kind of awareness of that information. In arguing for the necessity of various kinds of syntheses for cognition, Kant will also be arguing for the necessity of a continual self-consciousness in the sense of a constant use of information contained in earlier states of the subject. Although I do not pretend that the following is a complete account of Kant's doctrine of the **transcendental unity of apperception**, perhaps it is a start. By this phrase, Kant meant to refer to the constant access to and use of the contents of earlier presentations that is necessary for the production of presentations that achieve a cognitive relation to objects, including perceptions, classifications, judgments, and inferences.

Having given some sense of the main event of the subjective deduction, I will briefly discuss just a few of the key turns in the objective deduction. Because it is usually considered to be the most basic form of cognition, Kant begins the A version by describing the "synthesis" that is required by **perception**. His claim is (again) that perception itself cannot be a simple matter of receiving visual information on the retina. To begin to understand his argument in this section, it is important to realize (as he and his predecessors realized) that the retinal image is constantly changing as we move our heads and bodies. How, then, do we perceive the world as we do, as a collection of stable objects in spatial relations to each other? Kant's claim is that even for perception, we must combine information from our successive, fleeting presentations to create a stable perceptual image. Now consider looking at a large building, such as a cathedral. You might look first at the doors, then at the spire, then at the rose window, and finally at the walls. To create a stable perceptual image of the cathedral, you somehow rearrange that material so that the spire is presented as being at the top, the rose window as embedded in the walls above the door, and so forth, regardless of the order in which you take in this information. Kant's second point is that, not only does perception itself require the synthesis of presentations, it requires combining them by some principle other than the law of association, because all that psychological law would produce would be a repetition of the data of sense in the order in which they were received. To form a perception of the cathedral, however, the sensory data must be given some order other than the order of sensing (A 120). Notice, however, that Kant did not offer a psychological hypothesis about how the requisite order is produced; his claim is simply that merely to perceive spatially arrayed objects, the contents of presentations must be combined according to some principle other than the law of association.

Knowledge also requires that we form presentations of objects, and Kant offers a very interesting analysis of this apparently simple task. How can a presentation be about an object? That is, how could the various characteristics contained in one presentation all belong to one object? Suppose, for example, that I have a presentation of my computer as a hard, white, rectangular solid. How can I know that there really is an object with these characteristics? As Kant notes at A 104–5, we can never make this determination by comparing my presentation to some object outside of my cognition which "corresponds" to the presentation, because I have no access to anything outside of my cognition. If I look at the computer again, that will just give me a fresh presentation, not an object corresponding to it, or to my earlier presentation.

Yet we seem to be able to distinguish between objects that are really there, such as my computer, and objects which are not, such as the dagger Macbeth thought he saw, but later realized that he had only imagined. How? Since we cannot make this distinction by checking our presentations against nonpresented objects that correspond to them, Kant saw no alternative but to infer the use of internal standards for making the objective/[merely] subjective distinction. In the A edition, he suggests that it is our concept of an object itself that supplies the standard. If that concept includes the idea that objects do not go in and out of existence, for example, then that would allow Macbeth to dismiss the dagger as a mere phantom (A 199ff.). In the B edition, Kant claims that we can make judgments about objects only by appealing to principles associated with the categories: the "principles of the objective determination of all presentations" (B 142). To take the most important category for Kant, causation, the idea is that the way we determine which presentations present real objects and which are merely subjective is by trying to situate the objects and properties presented in a presentation in the causal structure of the world. Those contents that can be understood causally present real objects; those whose contents have no place in a comprehensive causal account of the world would are unreal.

Although Kant's suggestion that we distinguish the real from the imaginary by a (tacit) appeal to causal considerations has some initial plausibility, he did not offer any detailed arguments in the Transcendental Deduction chapter that the production of judgments of objects requires the use of internal principles indicating causal relations. As already noted, despite its misleading title, he did not provide a transcendental deduction for any of the categories in this section. There are merely suggested links between the need to integrate information in some way other than the law of association for various cognitive tasks to be possible and the idea of categorial principles that might be used to mediate the required integration. Still, he may have shown something that was quite important in the epistemology of his time and is still important in the epistemology and cognitive science of our own. Even quite simple kinds of cognition require that information be combined in the mind by some principles beyond the association of ideas. And even if he has not established the necessity of any category, he has made significant progress on a central project of **transcendental idealism**. In arguing that we must use internal standards in sorting out objective reality from subjective phantasm, he has given plausibility to his shocking claim that the order and regularity we observe in nature is our own (A 125–28/B 163–64)—because what we count as part of the natural world is a reflection of our own internal standards that are necessary for cognition.

At the end of the B edition (§ 26, B 159ff.), Kant considered an integration that was left in too-soft focus in A, the integration, not of information, but of the faculties of perceiving and thinking. In essence, he asks himself a blunt, but crucial, question: What is the relation between the many syntheses of the understanding just discussed in the Transcendental Analytic and the analysis of the perceptual forms of intuition described in the Transcendental Aesthetic? Like much of the *Critique*, § 26 has been the subject of intensive interpretive efforts, and the following should be regarded as merely one way of making sense of this difficult passage. We know from the Transcendental Aesthetic that the spatial and temporal features of our perceptual arrays are not simply given in our sensory data; the perceiving of one object as behind another or one event as after another requires some sort of interpretation by the perceptual system. Kant's startling proposal is that the spatial and temporal ordering of objects in perception is carried out by syntheses that are somehow directed by the categorial principles of the understanding (B 161). To use his own example, we place our perception of ice after our perception of water in time, because we recognize that the ice resulted from a causal process—freezing— performed on the water (B 162). He does not argue for this claim in § 26; that argument will come in the Second Analogy, where he maintains that the only way we could order events in time is by interpreting them as part of a system of causal relations. Here he is merely giving an example of a possible connection and arguing that, if it were the case that the temporal and spatial ordering of events and objects in perception arose through categorial principles, then the categories would have to apply to all the objects and events of perception. This is so, because we would not be able to perceive objects and events in spatial and temporal arrays at all, and hence would have no cognitive relations to them, unless the categories applied to them.

C. THE ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES

The purpose of this section is twofold. First, Kant attempts to provide temporal interpretations of the categories in the Schematism section. In essence, he is trying to explain how concepts such as actuality, substance, and cause relate to the temporal features of the world. So, for example, he suggests that a **substance**, one of the basic constituents of reality, would exist at all times, as opposed to an event, which occurs only at a particular time, or to nonbasic entities (e.g. bridges) which exist for some time and then fall apart (A 143/B 182). As many readers have noticed, the symmetry between space and time seems to be given up in this section, and the succeeding discussions focus on temporal issues at the apparent expense of problems of spatial position.

The second goal of the Analytic of Principles is to argue that certain principles are universally and necessarily true throughout the world of our experience, because they reflect the mind's own ways of integrating information, which ways are necessary for any cognition of temporal properties. (Recall that the cognition of temporal properties is itself necessary to any cognition at all, above p. xxxviii.) At this point, the reader may wonder whether Kant is ever going to provide an argument for the necessity of the categories themselves. His strategy in the Principles Chapter is, however, to argue for that very point, by arguing for the principles. If he could establish the principles of the first two analogies, for example, "in all variation . . . substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased" (B 224), and "all changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect" (B 232), then he would have shown the legitimacy of using the scientific-metaphysical concepts of "substance" and "cause"! As do most commentators, I will focus on Kant's famous defense of the causal principle in the Second Analogy, because, by his own testimony, this was the issue that inspired his transcendental approach, and it is also the most carefully argued part of the Principles Chapter.

Although Hume's name is not mentioned in either version of this section, from the beginning, Kant's readers have understood that his purpose was to vindicate the causal concept after Hume's devastating attack. One reason for the immense interest in the section is that it presents a relatively rare opportunity in the history of philosophy of seeing two major philosophers in direct conflict over a central philosophical issue. Hume's attack on the causal concept concerned the issues of universality and necessity. He recognized that, as people normally use the concept of "cause," to say that a pool of water caused a piece of metal to rust is to imply that if any similar metal object were placed in the same wet circumstances, it too would rust. Put another way, Hume recognized that even singular causal claims were implicitly universal. He also believed that causal claims carried with them an element of necessity. It is no lucky coincidence, but a law of nature, that objects with the constitution of metal *have* to rust when put in contact with any stuff with the constitution of water. Hume's objection to the use of a causal concept that implied universality and necessity was straightforward. No amount of experience with objects can tell us how they *have* to behave or how they *will behave* in the future. All we have ever observed is the "constant conjunction" between metals immersed in water and rust. Hence all we are entitled to assert is that there has been a constant conjunction of these properties. We have never seen a necessary connection between these two states.[7]

Kant's "reply to Hume" was to argue that we could have no cognition of events, of objects changing by acquiring or losing a property, unless we used a concept of causation that included both the offending and related (see above, p. xxix) properties of universality and necessity. In briefest summary, this is Kant's argument.[8] Whether we are perceiving an unchanging

[7]Hume, *Treatise*, pp. 78–82, 155–72.

[8]Although this has been a very difficult argument to interpret, many current scholars believe that Paul Guyer has recently produced a definitive analysis For more details, see *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, Chapter 10

house or a boat moving downstream, all of our presentations are successive (B 234). With the house, for example, we might first look at the roof, then at the windows, then at the door; with the boat, first we see it at a position upstream, then we see it in intermediate locations; finally we see it further down the stream. In both cases, our presentations are changing and successive, but only in the case of the boat do we perceive an event, a change *in the object*. His claim is that we can recognize a change in our presentations as a presentation of change *in objects* (as the presentation of an event) only if we also recognize the existence of some causal force (A 191–95/B 236–41). That is, we recognize that the boat has moved downstream, because we assume that a current or a motor or the wind has caused that change in location and that, given such a force, *any and all* boats would *have* to move. By Kant's lights, it is the very universality and necessity of causal connections that entitles us to claim that we have perceived actual change in objects and not mere changes in our own subjective presentations.

Although this argument may seem counterintuitive, it helps to recall the scientific context. Debates over the Copernican hypothesis had emphasized the problem of distinguishing real from apparent motion. This problem is resolved in Newtonian mechanics, by maintaining that real motion is that brought about by some force on the body. One way to look at Kant's argument is as a defense of this Newtonian position. In essence, what Kant is arguing is that it is only by appeal to causes that one could distinguish real motion from a subjective impression of motion, because that is the only way one could ever recognize any kind of change at all.

With the Principles Chapter, Kant takes himself to have completed most of the positive work of the *Critique*. He hopes that he has shown that and how the *a priori* generalizations of mathematics (e.g. Euclidean geometry) and some of the important *a priori* principles of science and metaphysics (the conservation of substances, the principle that all events have causes) are both universally and necessarily true of all the objects of which we can have any cognition, because they reflect processes that lie *a priori* in the mind and that are required for integrating sensory information into cognitions of objects. Before turning to the negative doctrines of the Transcendental Dialectic, he pauses to survey the position to which he and (he hopes) his reader have been led.

One way to understand that position is as a synthesis (in yet a different sense!) of the Empiricist and Rationalist epistemologies that preceded him. Like the Empiricists, Kant believed that all knowledge depended on the taking in of information through the senses. He firmly rejected the Rationalist doctrine of innate ideas, but he elaborated and expanded on Leibniz's cryptic claim that nothing is innate in the mind except the mind itself.[9] What Kant has argued is that certain ways of combining information are innate in the mind, because if they were not, then the data taken in by the senses would not lead to cognition, even very basic forms of cognition, such as the perceiving, classifying, and judging of objects. His method of arguing for such claims is not to run psychological experiments nor (obviously) computer simulations of mental processes, but rather to look at the normative requirements of cognition: perception is supposed to inform us about the properties of objects in our environment; judgments are supposed to be about properties, objects, and the relations among them, and not merely about our own impressions. The claim is that our perceptions and judgments could have these characteristics only if they were formed according to our own internal standards, standards that enable us to distinguish, for example, changes in our own presentations from the presentation of change in objects.

At one level, Kant's claim should strike contemporary readers as more plausible than it did his own generation of scholars. It is a familiar idea in contemporary cognitive science that the perceptual system, for example, must have some means of sorting out movements in objects from the movements of the perceiver. Kant, however, went further than most cognitive scientists are willing to venture, at least for the present. He claimed that because of the ways in which our minds must operate in order to achieve basic cognition, certain principles are universally and necessarily true of all the objects and events of which we can have any cognition at all. In this way, he believed that he had given real plausibility to some of the "necessary truths" claimed by the Rationalists and firmly rejected by the Empiricists, on the grounds that observation and experience could never establish necessity.

Kant was concerned in his concluding remarks in the Transcendental Analytic to avoid possible misunderstandings of his position. His claim is only that the objects and events of which we can have cognition must be interpreted by us as having certain properties, including spatial, temporal, and causal properties. He has established—and could establish—no conclusions whatsoever about what objects are like independent of our cog-

[9]G. W. Leibniz, *New Essays on Human Understanding,* abridged edition, Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, trans. and eds., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982: 110–11.

nitive relations to them, including whether such objects do or do not have spatial, temporal, or causal properties. To highlight this important point, Kant again adopted a specialized vocabulary, characterizing the objects and events to which we have or can have cognitive relations as "**phenomena,**" and objects understood as independent of any cognitive relation to us as "**noumena**" (A 235ff./B 294ff.). Although there has been much debate in the past over this issue, most current scholars do not take "**phenomena**" and "**noumena**" to indicate two different kinds of objects, but rather two different ways of regarding objects, either as objects as we perceive and understand them or as objects existing independently of any cognitive relation we might have to them.[10] The concepts of "phenomena" and "noumena" are important for Kant, because the central positive and negative claims of Transcendental Idealism can be expressed in terms of them: Our knowledge is a reflection of both sensory evidence and our own ways of knowing objects and hence is only of phenomenal objects; we can know nothing whatsoever of noumenal objects, objects as they are in themselves apart from our ways of knowing. Hence our metaphysical knowledge is restricted to universal and necessary properties of phenomenal objects; we cannot achieve metaphysical knowledge of noumena by engaging in epistemological reflections on what objects must be like for us to know them—or in any other way.

5.
Transcendental Dialectic: The Source of Metaphysical Error

Nearly three hundred pages into the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant finally turns to the topic of reason. His goal in the Transcendental Dialectic is to show that all of the metaphysical errors into which previous philosophies have fallen have a common source in the nature of the faculty of reason itself (A 293ff./B 349ff.). In particular, disputes about the nature of the soul, the fundamental properties of the universe, and the existence of God will all be traced to the deceptive illusions of our capacity for reason. Despite the announced negative intentions of this part of the *Critique*, however, it also presents a fascinating account of the necessary positive contributions of our faculty of reason to knowledge, especially scientific knowledge.

[10] This understanding of the phenomenal/noumenal distinction has been defended in great detail by Henry Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

"**Reason**" is the name that Kant gave to our capacity for drawing inferences (A 303/B 359). We make inferences, or reason, every day of our lives. If you wake up in a dark room, you immediately infer that it is not yet morning. This apparently simple assumption is actually quite complex. How do you know that it is not 8:00 A.M.? You reason: if it were 8:00 A.M., then the sun would have risen, and it would be light. But how do you know that the sun would have risen by that hour? At this point, you might appeal to two quite different facts, the fact that it always has risen, or the fact that the earth revolves on its axis in a regular way during a twenty-four-hour period, and that the part of the earth you are on would be facing the sun at 8:00 A.M. As he did in the earlier, positive part of the book, Kant wants to try to understand how this kind of cognition, knowledge through inference, is possible.

To take Kant's own example (A 321–22/B 378), how can we *infer* that Caius is mortal? He reasons that this would be possible only if we can find some concept, e.g. "man," that applies to Caius and which itself implies the property of mortality. So, we must seek a classification, in this case "man," that appears in a general principle "All men are mortal" that permits the inference to be drawn (in the previous example, the principle would be either "the sun rises every morning" or "the earth rotates on its axis every twenty-four hours"). Notice, however, that the explanation is still far from complete. How can we assert that "all men are mortal"? Again, we would have to find some "higher" classification, "mammal" perhaps, and a "higher" principle, such as "all mammals are mortal." In turn, we would need to find some still higher principle, perhaps "all animals are mortal," through which we could establish that "all mammals are mortal" and so on, advancing to ever-higher principles.

Kant drew a positive and a negative moral from the need of reason to embed one inference in an ascending series of inferences (or "syllogisms" in his terminology [A 331/B 388]). The positive moral, which is presented, after several long negative sections, in the section "On the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason," is that inference is possible only if our concepts are systematically related, so that it is possible to find ever-higher principles. In the inference about Caius, we can find a higher principle only because "man" is a species of the genus "mammal," which is itself a species of the genus "animal," which is itself a species of the genus "living thing," and so on. Kant drew two important conclusions: (1) inference is possible only because our concepts stand in hierarchies related as species and genera; (2) the variety of nature is so great that if we formed concepts as the Empiricists suggest, just by linking properties that are frequently found together in experience, our concepts would lack the systematic interconnection necessary for inference. Hence the faculty of reason must actively seek systematically interrelated concepts (A 657/B 685).

At the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic, Kant introduced the discipline of "**transcendental logic,**" contrasting it with both **general** and **applied logic** (A 55/B 79). Although the issue is contested, I think that we are now in a position to understand what he was talking about. The purpose of **transcendental logic** is to explain how it is possible for the forms of syllogism described in general logic (e.g. All A's are B's, x is an A, therefore, x is a B) to be applicable to the actual objects of experience. We now have part of the answer: we can use logic to gain knowledge (through inference) of actual objects, because our reasoning capacity seeks hierarchically related concepts—ever-higher genera, and ever-lower species. Kant illustrated this seeking in discussions of several examples, earth, air, fire, and water (A 646/B 674), the fundamental powers of the mind (A 649/B 677), and the acids and alkalis of the chemists (A 652/B 680). As he notes, when scientists observe a great variety, as in chemical compounds, they seek to reduce that multiplicity to the fewest kinds with the largest scope; but when there are differences, they also seek to divide them into ever more fine-grained subspecies, until all the differences are accounted for (A 656/B 684). Thus, the laws and concepts of any science will be systematically interrelated, as indeed they must be. For both layman and scientists determine the truth of their theories, not just by looking at sensory data, but also by seeing how well those theories fit into the most unified theory of the largest number of phenomena (A 647/B 675).

As Kant well realized, the need of reason for systematically interrelated concepts might well go unfulfilled. Nature might be a mess, with no discoverable regularities. To recall some earlier examples, if cinnabar were sometimes red and sometimes black (A 100), if currents sometimes moved boats and sometimes left them at rest, if men sometimes died and sometimes lived forever, then there would be no general principles upon which reasoning could be based. Unfortunately, the fact that reason needs nature to be systematic cannot make it so. Instead, Kant described the situation as one in which reason "projects" (A 647/B 675) or "presupposes" (A 650/B 678) or "demands" (A 651/B 679) a systematic unity of nature, because without such unity "we would have no reason at all, [and] . . . without reason, no coherent use of the understanding, . . . and [hence] . . . no sufficient mark of empirical truth" (A 651/B 679). Reason's critical contribution to knowledge is to seek systematic unity in nature, thereby providing a criterion for the truth of theories and enabling the concepts of the understanding to serve in inferences about the properties of not-yet-experienced objects.

Metaphysical error results when we confuse our "projecting" of the order of nature with the discovery of such an order. Alternatively, error arises through the confusion of a principle of the systematic unity of nature which merely **regulates** our search for laws of nature with a metaphysical principle describing what nature is like. Although the issue is delicate, Kant wants to contrast the **regulative** principle that we much search for systematic unity with **constitutive** principles such as "all objects occupy a Euclidean space." There are at least two important differences between these principles. First, the principle about space does not concern nature as it is in itself, but simply nature insofar as we are able to have knowledge of it. Second, whereas we could have no cognition at all unless we perceived objects in spatial relations, the **regulative** principle of reason requires only that we seek systematic unity; it does not and could not require that we grasp the complete systematic interconnection of all natural phenomena.

Kant maintains that we incorrectly infer the existence of God as a first cause, because reason demands that any causal explanation be completed, by finding the cause of the cited cause, and then the cause of that cause, and so on. This, however, is simply a mistake. We are wrongly inferring a metaphysical conclusion about the existence of a first cause of the universe from an epistemological argument about the need to look for higher principles.

Although Kant was concerned to reveal the systematic character of metaphysical error in the Transcendental Dialectic, he also wished to engage some pressing issues of the day. To give some sense of these discussions, I will briefly consider what he regarded as the three fundamental metaphysical questions: the immortality of the soul, freedom of the will, and the existence of God.

In the Paralogisms chapter, Kant took on and essentially eliminated the then-contemporary discipline of "Rational Psychology." The project of **Rational Psychology** was to determine the properties of the soul, by determining what souls had to be like in order to think. In some ways, this project is very directly related to Kant's own efforts in the subjective deduction (see above p. xliv ff.). He was also concerned to determine what a subject of knowledge had to be like to be capable of cognition. Unlike his Rationalist predecessors, however, Kant came to realize the inherent limitation of his method (A 399). Consider the following prototypical argument from Rational Psychology (cf. A 351ff.). Any thinking thing must be unified and without any separate parts. For if thinking were distributed, say by having a different part of the brain represent each of the different words of the verse "Let me not to the marriage of true minds admit impediments,"[11] then there would be no subject who grasped the meaning of the whole verse. Hence, a thinking soul cannot have separate parts; but if something lacks parts, then it cannot be destroyed; hence the soul is immortal. Kant realized that so dramatic a metaphysical claim could not be extracted from the highly abstract description of the thinking self warranted by the premises. We know from his own analysis of thinking in general that the subject of thought must possess a synthetic unity, but "that unity is collective and can . . . refer just as well to the collective unity of the substances cooperating on the thought . . . as it can to the absolute unity of the subject" (A 353). Rational psychology is a hopeless enterprise, because it is not possible to infer the constitution of a thinking thing from an abstract description of the requirements of thought.

In the Antinomies chapter, Kant returned to the puzzles about the nature and extent of space and time. He also tackled one of the most vexing of all metaphysical questions, the problem of **free will and determinism** (the Third Antinomy). An **antinomy** is a conflict of arguments that arises when two contradictory claims, P and not-P, can both be defended by reasoning that seems completely cogent. Something must be wrong, because, by the law of noncontradiction, it is not possible for both P and not-P to be true. Still, both arguments appear to be solid. Kant regarded the perennial philosophical dispute between determinism and free will as just such an antinomy. On the side of determinism, we have (among other considerations), Kant's own argument from the Second Analogy that we can have no cognition of events that are not caused. On the side of free will are weighty ethical considerations, some of which Kant presents with great force in his two major works of ethics, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788, often referred to as the "Second Critique"). The basic idea is that we can be responsible for an act only if we were free not to do that action at the time of the acting. If all events are caused, however, then apparently there is a chain of causes culminating in that moment of acting that determines the act.

[11]Shakespeare, Sonnet 116.

Kant's highly controversial solution was to suggest that claims of free will and determinism might both be true (A 538ff./B 566ff.). Even though any phenomenal event cognized by us must stand in causal relations, that consideration tells us nothing about that event regarded noumenally, apart from the necessary conditions for our knowledge. For all we know, the event could be free in itself. Kant maintained that the issue of whether there is any freedom of the will could not be decided by theoretical considerations; those tell us only that events, insofar as we can understand them, stand in causal relations; theoretical reason is and must be silent on the question of whether events are free independently of our ways of knowing about them (A 551– 58/B 579–86). Thus he regarded the *Critique of Pure Reason* as leaving the door open on this question, which could then be decided not on theoretical considerations, but on practical ones about how we should act. In the Second Critique and the *Groundwork*, Kant argues that the ability to act ethically requires us to think of ourselves as acting independently of any foreign cause. Although scholars are divided over the plausibility of Kant's solution to the free-will issue, the importance of his ethical theories is granted by all. As they have been for many years, current discussions of ethics have been dominated by two main schools of thought, the Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and Kantian ethics.

The final major topic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is **Rational Theology**, proofs for the existence of God (A 571ff./B 599ff.). Along with his frequent rival, David Hume, Kant offered searching criticisms of the standard methods of "proving" the existence of God. Between them, Hume and Kant largely put an end to the field of Rational Theology as a serious intellectual endeavor, thereby changing the face of religion. As with free will, Kant's position was that this question has not been and cannot be settled by speculative reason. For him, as for almost all subsequent theologians, religious belief can never be a matter of intersubjective proof, but only of faith. As he noted way back in the Preface (B xxx), one of his goals in the *Critique* was to save religion from speculative metaphysical arguments that are indulged only because people like their conclusions: he will "annul *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*."

In the wake of the Scientific Revolution, one of the great philosophical projects of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to try to understand the extent and bases of human knowledge. Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* represents the fullest flowering of this endeavor, because it seeks to explain the possibility of all knowledge, from the simplest perception to the most sophisticated scientific theory. Its still shocking conclusion is that all knowledge, even that which seems the most direct and elementary, must be a conjoint product of sensory evidence and the mind's own principles for dealing with evidence. Although the arguments about the requirements of knowledge are highly abstract, the issues to which they are directed have enormous practical importance. Who and what are the arbiters of knowledge? science? religion? common sense? Are quantitative sciences better sources of knowledge than qualitative and, if so, in what ways? Are some issues beyond the realm of science and, if so, why?

Although these problems began with the Enlightenment, they continue to dominate the Western intellectual landscape—and to roil the allegedly placid waters of colleges and universities. If the standards of all intellectual disciplines, from literature to psychology to physics, are our own human standards, then how can any claims be objective? If there is no truly objective knowledge, free of all taint of human influence, then how can any claim or theory be regarded as better than any other? In explaining the importance of his reflections on ethics, Kant noted that although innocence is a glorious thing, the sad fact is that it cannot long maintain itself and is easily led astray.[12] His point is no less true in epistemology than it is in ethics. As children, we probably start by believing everything that we see and hear. Then doubts may be raised, when we recognize the vast scope of some of our scientific claims and our inability to rely on anything beyond our own rational standards for weighing evidence. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is the perfect antidote to epistemological naiveté. In coming to grips with this deep and difficult book, readers learn to appreciate the complexity of the human capacity for knowledge, its inevitable weaknesses, and its equally inevitable strengths.

Patricia Kitcher
University of California, San Diego

[12]Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Lewis White Beck, trans., New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959, p. 21.

Critik der reinen Vernunft

von

Immanuel Kant

Professor in Königsberg.

Riga,

verlegts Johann Friedrich Hartknoch

1781

Critique
of
Pure Reason

by

Immanuel Kant

Professor in Königsberg

Member

of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin

Second edition, with occasional improvements

Riga

Johann Friedrich Hartknoch

1787

Critik
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reinen Vernunft

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Immanuel Kant,
Professor in Königsberg,
der Königl. Academie der Wissenschaften in Berlin
Mitglied.

Zweyte hin und wieder verbesserte Auflage.

Riga,
bey Johann Friedrich Hartknoch
1787.

B ii

BACO DE VERULAMIO

INSTAURATIO MAGNA. PRAEFATIO.

De nobis ipsis silemus: De re autem quae agitur, petimus: ut homines eam non opinionem, sed opus esse cogitent; ac pro certo habeant, non sectae nos alicuius, aut placiti, sed utilitatis et amplitudinis humanae fundamenta moliri. Deinde, ut suis commodis aequi . . . in commune consulant . . . et ipsi in partem veniant. Praeterea, ut bene sperent, neque Instaurationem nostram ut quiddam infinitum et ultra mortale fingant, et animo concipiant; quum revera sit infiniti erroris finis et terminus legitimus.[1]

[1][This motto was added in B. It is a quote from the preface (published in 1620) to the *Instauratio magna* (*Great Instauration*) by Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Baron Verulam, Viscount St. Albans, lord chancellor of England, philosopher, and man of letters. The complete second sentence of the motto, with Kant's omissions restored, reads: "*Deinde, ut suis commodis aequi, exutis opinionum zelis et praeiudiciis, in commune consulant, ac ab erroribus viarum atque impedimentis, nostris praesidiis et auxiliis liberati et muniti, laborum qui restant et ipsi in partem veniant.*" The entire passage (with Kant's omissions inserted in the first four pairs of brackets) translates as follows:

> About myself I am silent. But regarding the matter at hand, I ask people to consider it not an opinion, but a work; let me assure them that I endeavor to lay the foundation not for any sect or dogma, but for the benefit and greatness of humanity. Moreover, I ask that people, in their own interest, [give up the rivalries and prejudices regarding opinions and] be mindful of the common good; [and that] they themselves, [being now freed and protected by the safeguards and aids I have provided against errors and impediments in the methods,] also take part [in the tasks that remain]. Finally, I ask them to have confidence, and not to imagine and construe my Instauration as something [unending or] infinite and suprahuman, when it is in fact unending error's end and proper boundary. (All translations given in footnotes are my own, though I do not say so on each occasion.)]

To his Excellency B iii

The Royal Minister of State Baron von Zedlitz[2]

My Lord, B v

To do one's share to further the growth of the sciences is to pursue an interest that is also *your Excellency's* own; for your interest in the sciences is linked to them quite closely not only through your exalted position as a patron of them, but also through your more intimate relationship to them as a lover and enlightened expert. It is because of this that I avail myself of the one means to some extent in my power, of showing my gratitude for the gracious confidence with which *your Excellency* honors me in assuming that I can make some contribution toward that aim.

To the same gracious attention with which *your Excellency* has honored B vi
the first edition of this work do I now dedicate this second edition also, and along with it all the other concerns of my literary vocation, and remain with the deepest reverence,[3]

Your Excellency's

Humble, most obedient servant,

IMMANUEL KANT

Königsberg,
April 23, 1787[4]

[2][Karl Abraham Freiherr von Zedlitz (1731–1793) served in various capacities, including high chancellor and minister of justice, under Frederick the Great (and later under Frederick William II). He was also in charge of school affairs.]

[3][In the place of this paragraph, A has:]

> Whoever delights in the speculative life will find, as [the answer to] one of his temperate wishes, that the approval of an enlightened and competent judge strongly encourages him to engage in efforts whose benefit is great, though remote and hence quite unrecognized by the eyes of ordinary people.
>
> To such a judge and to his gracious attention I now dedicate this work, and commit to his protection all the other concerns of my literary vocation, and remain with the deepest reverence, . . .

[4][In A, the date of the dedication is March 29, 1781.]

PREFACE

A vii

[FIRST EDITION][5]

Human reason has a peculiar fate in one kind of its cognitions:[6] it is troubled by questions that it cannot dismiss, because they are posed to it by the nature of reason itself, but that it also cannot answer, because they surpass human reason's every ability.

Our reason falls into this perplexity through no fault of its own. Reason starts from principles[7] that it cannot avoid using in the course of experi-

[5][For an extensive commentary on this Preface of the first edition, see Hans Vaihinger's *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (New York and London: Garland Pub., Inc., 1976), vol. 1, 81–157. This is a reprint of the original edition published by W. Spemann of Stuttgart in 1881, on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the publication of the *Critique's* first edition. (For Vaihinger's comments on the title page, motto, and dedication, see *ibid.*, 73–80.) Vaihinger provides extensive interpretation (as well as criticism) and indicates the many historical influences on the development of Kant's critical philosophy. His interpretation of Kant's thought has come to be dubbed the "patchwork theory." This theory found a prominent exponent in Norman Kemp Smith, who defends it in his *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'* (2d ed., New York: Humanities Press, 1962 [1923]). Although the patchwork theory has since fallen into disfavor, it exerted considerable influence on Kant scholarship, which is the reason why its sources are indicated in footnotes to this translation. (For Kemp Smith's comments on the Prefaces to editions A and B, see *ibid.*, 8–25; for his comments on title, motto, and dedication, see *ibid.*, 1–7.)]

[6][*Erkenntnisse.* This translation consistently renders *Erkenntnis* as 'cognition' (and in a few identified instances as 'recognition'), never as 'knowledge.' The reason is that on Kant's view certain cases of practical cognition (*Erkenntnis*), such as that of God, *are not* instances of knowledge (*Wissen*), but of rational (moral) faith. See, e.g., B xxi and xxx, A 633–34 = B 661–62, and A 828–29 = B 856–57. Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 467, 469–70, 472, and 475, and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 4 together with 137.]

[7][*Grundsätze.* I am rendering as 'principle' both *Grundsatz* and *Prinzip*, because it seems to me that Kant uses the two interchangeably (in this work and in others—see esp. the *Logic*,

ence, and that this experience at the same time sufficiently justifies it in using. By means of these principles our reason (as indeed its nature re-
A viii quires it to do) ascends ever higher, to more remote conditions. But it becomes aware that in this way, since the questions never cease, its task must remain forever uncompleted. Thus it finds itself compelled to resort to principles that go beyond all possible use in experience, and that nonetheless seem so little suspect that even common human reason agrees with them. By doing this, however, human reason plunges into darkness and contradictions; and although it can indeed gather from these that they must be based on errors lying hidden somewhere, it is unable to discover these errors. For the principles that it employs go beyond the boundary of all experience and hence no longer acknowledge any touchstone of experience. The combat arena of these endless conflicts is what we call *metaphysics.*

There was a time when metaphysics was called the *queen* of all the sciences; and if the will be taken for the deed, then she did in fact, because of the superior importance of her subject matter, deserve that title of honor. The tone in vogue[8] in this era, however, has made it fashionable to treat her with total disdain; a matron who, outcast and abandoned, laments like
A ix *Hecuba: Modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens . . . nunc trahor exul, inops.*—Ovid, *Metamorphoses.*[9]

Initially her reign, administered by the *dogmatists,* was *despotic.* But since the legislation still bore the traces of ancient barbarism, her reign was

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Ak. IX, 110), contrary to what Wolfgang Schwarz has argued in a book in which he translates and largely paraphrases parts of Kant's first *Critique:* Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason—Concise Text* (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1982). Schwarz claims (*ibid.,* 263) that at B 356 (A 299) Kant makes a "decisive distinction" between *Grundsätze* and *Prinzipien.* But in fact the distinction made there is between understanding as our power of *Regeln* (i.e., rules, not *Grundsätze*), and reason as our power of *Prinzipien* (principles). Moreover, just a little bit later, and still in the same context, Kant very plainly feels free once again to switch from *Prinzipien* (in the next two paragraphs) to *Grundsätze* (in the paragraph after that). The switch is perfectly casual, with no suggestion whatever that a distinction is being made. Schwarz also holds (*ibid.,* 268) that Kant makes a distinction between *Objekt* and *Gegenstand.* Here too I remain unconvinced, and am rendering both terms as 'object.' I should add, in fairness to Schwarz, that in terminological matters such as these I have come to soften (though not abandon) the position I took in a paper whose main purpose was to defend my rendering of one key term: "How to Render *Zweckmäßigkeit* in Kant's Third Critique," in *Interpreting* Kant, ed. Moltke S. Gram, 85–98 (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1982).]

8[*Modeton.*]

9[The quote is from xiii, 508–10, and says: "A moment ago I was ruling supreme in the world, a woman of might through all my sons and daughters . . .; now I am powerless, dragged into exile, . . ."]

beset by civil wars and thus gradually degenerated to complete *anarchy;* and the *skeptics*, a kind of nomads who loathe all steady cultivation of the soil, tore up from time to time the civil society. Luckily, however, the skeptics were few in number, and thus they could not prevent the dogmatists from trying again and again, though without following any consistent plan, to plant that society anew. In modern times, it did seem at one point as if all these conflicts would be brought to an end and the legitimacy of the claims of metaphysics decided upon once and for all, through a certain physiology of the human understanding (whose author was the illustrious **Locke**). It turned out, however, that although the alleged queen's descent was traced back to the rabble, i.e., common experience, which should have made her pretensions rightly suspect, she yet continued to uphold her claims, because that *genealogy* was in fact a fictitious one falsely ascribed to her. Thus everything[10] lapsed back into the obsolete, worm-eaten *dog-* A x
matism, and thence into the disdain from which this science was to have been rescued. And now, after all paths (as people are persuading themselves) have been tried in vain, there prevails in the sciences a weariness and utter *indifferentism,*[11] which is the mother of chaos and night—yet is also the source, or at least the prelude, of their approaching reform and enlightenment after ill-applied diligence has left them dark, confused, and useless.

For it is futile to try to feign *indifference*[12] concerning inquiries whose object *cannot* be *indifferent* to human nature. Moreover, however much those alleged *indifferentists* try to disguise themselves in a popular tone by changing the language of the school, they inevitably fall back—insofar as they think anything at all—into metaphysical assertions, the very assertions they claimed to despise so much. Yet this indifference—which occurs at the very time when all the sciences are flourishing, and which involves precisely those sciences whose knowledge,[13] if such could be obtained, we would least of all forgo---is a phenomenon that deserves our attention and A xi
reflection. It is evidently the effect not of the heedlessness but of the matured *judgment*[14] of our age, which is no longer willing to be put off with

[10][I.e., metaphysics.]

[11][*Indifferentismus.*]

[12][*Gleichgültigkeit.*]

[13][*Kenntnisse.*]

[14]Now and then one hears complaints about the shallow way of thinking in our age and the decline of solid[a] science. But I fail to see how the sciences that rest on a

seeming knowledge.[15] And it is a call to reason to take on once again the most difficult of all its tasks—viz., that of self-cognition—and to set up a tribunal that will make reason secure in its rightful claims and will dismiss
A xii all baseless pretensions, not by fiat but in accordance with reason's eternal and immutable laws. This tribunal is none other than the critique of reason itself: the *critique of pure reason.*

By critique of pure reason, however, I do not mean a critique of books and systems, but I mean the critique of our power of reason as such,[16] in regard to all cognitions after which reason may strive *independently of all experience.* Hence I mean by it the decision as to whether a metaphysics as such is possible or impossible, and the determination of its sources as well as its range and bounds—all on the basis of principles.

Now, this is the path—the only one that remained—which I have pursued, and I flatter myself to have found on it the elimination of all the errors that had thus far set reason, as used independently[17] of experience, at variance with itself. I have certainly not evaded reason's questions, by pleading the incapacity of human reason. Rather, I have made a complete

well-built foundation—such as mathematics, natural science, etc.—in the least deserve this reproach. On the contrary, they are upholding their ancient reputation for solidity, and in the case of natural science even surpass it. Now, the same spirit would be found operative in other kinds of cognition as well, if care had first been taken to correct their principles. In the absence of such correction, indifference, doubt, and—finally—strict critique are, rather, *proofs* of a solid way of thinking. Our age is properly the age of critique, and to critique everything must submit. *Religion* and *legislation* commonly seek to exempt themselves from critique, religion through its *sanctity* and legislation through its *majesty.* But in doing so they arouse well-deserved suspicion and cannot lay claim to unfeigned respect; such respect is accorded by reason only to what has been able to withstand reason's free and open examination.

[a][Or, possibly, 'thorough': *gründlich.*]

[15][*Scheinwissen.*]

[16][*des Vernunftvermögens überhaupt.* I render *Vermögen* (and likewise *Kraft* in this sense) as 'power' (sometimes also as 'ability') rather than as 'faculty,' in order to dissociate Kant's theory (of cognition, desire, etc.) from the traditional *faculty psychology.* (See also A 51/B 75 br. n. 22.) My point here is to keep the Kantian powers, which are simply abilities, from becoming *reified,* i.e., turned into psychological entities such as compartments, sources, or agencies "in" the mind. Hence when this translation presents Kant as speaking of the power of judgment (or of thought, concepts, desire, and so on), what is meant is simply an ability—a "faculty" only in *that* sense. In such expressions, moreover, 'power' is never used to mean anything like *strength* or *forcefulness* (of judgments, concepts, desires, and so on.)].

[17][*-frei.*]

specification of them according to principles, and, upon discovering the locus[18] of reason's disagreement[19] with itself, have resolved them to its full satisfaction. To be sure, my answers to these questions have not turned out A xiii to be such as a raving dogmatist's thirst for knowledge might expect. Nothing but magical powers —at which I am no adept—could satisfy that kind of thirst for knowledge. Presumably, however, this was also not the aim of our reason's natural vocation. The duty of philosophy was, rather, to remove the deception arising from misinterpretation, even at the cost of destroying the most highly extolled and cherished delusion. In that activity, I have made comprehensiveness[20] my major aim, and I venture to say that there should not be a single metaphysical problem that has not been solved here, or for whose solution the key has not at least been provided. In fact, pure reason is so perfect a unity that, if its principle were insufficient for the solution of even a single one of all the questions assigned to reason by its own nature, then we might just as well throw the principle away; for then we could not fully rely on its being adequate to any of the remaining questions either.

As I am saying this, I think I perceive in the reader's face an indigna- A xiv tion, mixed with contempt, at claims that seem so vainglorious and immodest. Yet they are incomparably more moderate than the claims of every author who offers us the most common program, wherein he purports to prove, say, the simple nature of the *soul,* or the necessity of a first *beginning of the world.* For whereas he promises to expand human cognition beyond all bounds of possible experience, I humbly confess that this is wholly beyond my power. Instead I deal solely with reason itself and its pure thinking; and to gain comprehensive acquaintance with my reason I need not search far from myself. For I encounter it within myself, and common logic already provides me with an example [which shows] that all simple acts of reason can be enumerated completely and systematically. Here, however, the question arises as to just how much I may hope to accomplish with reason once all the material and assistance provided by experience is taken away from me.

So much about *completeness* in achieving *each* of the purposes[21] set for us, and *comprehensiveness* in achieving *all* of them together—purposes set

[18][*Punkt.*]

[19][Literally, 'misunderstanding': *Mißverstand.*]

[20][Ausführlichkeit. See A 727 = B 755 incl. n. 105, and cf. A 732 = B 760.]

[21][Or 'ends': *Zwecke.*]

for us not by this or that precept, but by the nature of cognition itself, which is the *matter* of our critical inquiry.

A xv Two further items, concerning the *form* of the inquiry, must be regarded as essential demands that may rightly be made of an author who ventures upon so slippery an undertaking: *certainty* and *distinctness*.

As regards *certainty*, I have bound myself by my own verdict: that holding *opinions* is in no way permissible in this kind of study; and that whatever in it so much as resembles a hypothesis is contraband, which is not to be offered for sale at even the lowest price but must be confiscated as soon as it is discovered. For, any cognition that is to hold[22] a priori proclaims on its own that it wants to be regarded as absolutely necessary. So does, but much more so still, a determination of all pure a priori cognitions; for it is to be the standard and hence is itself to be the [prime] example of all apodeictic (philosophical) certainty. Now, whether I have in this work achieved what I am here promising is left entirely to the reader's judgment; for the author should only submit grounds, and should not pronounce on their effect on his judges. But in order to keep those grounds
A xvi from being weakened by something through no fault of his own, the author may surely be permitted to draw attention himself to those passages that, although they serve only a subordinate purpose, might occasion some distrust. He may thus be in time to block the influence that a reader's slightest qualms concerning such a point might have had on his judgment regarding the work's main purpose.

I know of[23] no inquiries more important for exploring the power that we call understanding, and for determining at the same time the rules and bounds of its use, than those that I have undertaken in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of *Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding*.[24] They are also the ones that have cost me the greatest effort—but, as I hope, an effort not unrewarded. This study, however, which is designed to go to some depth, has two sides. The one side refers to the objects of pure understanding and is intended to establish and make comprehensible the objective validity of understanding's a priori concepts, and precisely because of this pertains to my purposes essentially. The other side seeks to examine pure understanding itself as regards its possibility and the cognitive powers underlying it in turn, and hence seeks to

[22][*feststehen*.]

[23][*kennen*.]

[24][See A 84–130, and cf B 116–69.]

examine it in a subjective respect. And although this latter exposition[25] is of great importance for my main purpose, it does not pertain to it essentially. For the main question is always this: what, and how much, can understanding and reason cognize independently of all experience? rather than: how is our *power of thought* itself possible? This latter question is, as it were, a search for the cause of a given effect, and to that extent there is something about it resembling a hypothesis (even though in fact, as I shall show on another occasion, it is not so). Thus it seems as if in this case I have permitted myself to hold an *opinion*, and that the reader too must hence be free to hold a different *opinion*. On this point I must ask the reader in advance to remember this: should my subjective deduction have failed to produce in him the full conviction that I expect it to produce, yet the objective deduction, with which I am concerned above all, will still acquire its full force; perhaps what I say on pages [A] 92 to 93 is even sufficient for this all by itself. A xvii

As regards *distinctness*,[26] finally, the reader has a right to demand, first, the *discursive* (logical) *distinctness* arising **through concepts**, but then also an *intuitive*[27] (aesthetic) *distinctness* arising **through intuitions**,[28] i.e., through examples or other illustrations *in concreto*.[29] For discursive distinctness I have provided sufficiently. This pertained to the essence of my project. But it was also the incidental cause of my inability to comply with A xviii

[25][*Erörterung*.]

[26][*Deutlichkeit*. Distinctness must not be equated with clarity (*Klarheit*). The Cartesian notions of clarity and distinctness had been refined by Leibniz as follows: An idea is clear if we can (without doubt) distinguish it from all other ideas, though we may not know by what characteristics we do so. An idea is distinct if it is clear in all its parts (characteristics) and their combination, so that it can be distinguished from all other ideas explicitly, by abstraction (from the sensible detail) and definition. Now Kant does not here define *distinctness*. (But see the end of this note.) Moreover, he expands the notion by allowing not only for a logical (discursive, i.e., conceptual) but also for an intuitive (aesthetic, i.e., sensible) distinctness. But the upcoming passage does show that Kant means rather more by *distinctness* than he does by *clarity* as defined by him, in Leibnizian fashion, at B 414 n. 273. On clarity and distinctness in Kant, see his *Logic*, Ak. IX, 58–65, and cf. 33–35, 38–39, 140, 145; see also the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 137–38.]

[27][*intuitive*.]

[28][*Anschauungen*.]

[29][In the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* (Ak. XX, 226n) Kant says: ". . . [L]ogical distinctness and aesthetic distinctness are as different as day and night, and aesthetic distinctness [may] occur even if we do not present [*vorstellen*] the object through concepts at all, i.e., even if our presentation is an intuition and hence sensible." See also below, A 41–44/B 59–62. (As regards my rendering of *vorstellen* as 'to present,' see B xvii br. n. 73.)]

the demand for intuitive distinctness—a demand that, though less strict, is still legitimate. As my work progressed, I was almost constantly undecided as to what to do about intuitive distinctness. Examples and illustrations always seemed to me necessary, and thus they actually did appropriately find their place in my first draft. But I soon discerned the magnitude of my task and the multitude of topics that I would have to deal with. And being aware that through this magnitude and multitude alone my work would already expand enough if treated in the dry, merely *scholastic* way, I found it inadvisable to enlarge the work still further through examples and illustrations. These are necessary only from the *popular* point of view, and there is no way to adapt this work for popular use. The genuine experts in this science have less need for such simplification, which, though always agreeable, might here even have had consequences running counter to my purposes.
A xix
It is true that Abbot *Terrasson* tells us that if the size of a book were measured not by the number of its pages but by the time required to understand it, then we could say about many books *that they would be much shorter if they were not so short.*[30] On the other hand, if we are concerned with the [distinctness and] comprehensibility of a voluminous whole of speculative cognition that yet coheres in one principle, then we could just as legitimately say that *many books would have turned out much more distinct if they had not been intended to be quite so distinct.* For the aids to distinctness, while helpful[31] in *parts* of a book, are often distracting in the book as a *whole.* They keep the reader from arriving quickly enough at an overview of the whole; and with all their bright colors they do cover up and conceal the articulation or structure of the system, even though that structure is what matters most if we are to be able to judge the system's unity and sturdiness.

I think the reader might find it rather appealing to unite his efforts with those of the author, when the author has an opportunity to carry out, in accordance with the plan here put forth, a major and important work in a com-

[30][Jean Terrasson (1670–1750), apart from his activities in the church, was also a professor of ancient philosophy. Kant's quote is from a German translation of Terrasson's *La Philosophie applicable à tous les objets de l'esprit et de la raison* (*Philosophy as Applicable to All Objects of Spirit and Reason*), published posthumously in 1754. The German translation (Berlin, 1762) bears the title *Philosophie nach ihrem allgemeinen Einflusse auf alle Gegenstände des Geistes und der Sitten* (*Philosophy According to Its General Influence on All Objects of Spirit and Morals*); Kant's quote is from p. 117.]

[31][Reading, with Rosenkranz and Erdmann, *helfen* for *fehlen* ('are missing,' or, at best, 'are missed').]

plete and yet lasting manner. Now metaphysics, according to the concepts A xx
of it that I shall be providing here, is the only one among all the sciences that may expect such completion, and may expect it within a short time and through a small though concentrated effort. It may expect such completion as will leave to our descendants nothing more than the task of arranging everything in the *didactic* manner according to their aims, yet without their being able to increase the content in the least. For such a work of metaphysics[32] is nothing but the *inventory*, put in systematic order, of all the possessions that we have through *pure reason*. Here nothing can escape us, because what reason brings forth entirely from itself cannot hide, but is brought to light by reason itself as soon as we have discovered its common principle. For cognitions of this kind arise from pure concepts alone; they cannot be influenced —viz., expanded and increased—by anything taken from experience, or even by *particular* intuition that might[33] lead to determinate experience.[34] And the perfect unity of this kind of cognitions makes the mentioned unconditioned completeness not only feasible, but also necessary. *Tecum habita, et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.*— Persius.[35]

Such a system of pure (speculative) reason I myself hope to provide un- A xxi
der the title of *Metaphysics of Nature*. That system, though not half as voluminous as this critique, is to be incomparably richer in content. But first the critique had to establish the sources and conditions of the possibility of that system, and needed to clear and level a ground that was entirely overgrown. For this critique I expect from my reader the patience and impartiality of a *judge;* but for the system, the consideration and support of an *assistant*. For however completely all the *principles* for that system are set forth in the critique, the comprehensiveness of the system itself requires also that no *derivative* concepts be missing. These cannot be estimated a priori, but must be discovered gradually. Similarly, whereas in the critique[36] the entire *synthesis* of concepts was done exhaustively, in the sys-

[32][*es*, which can refer only to 'work' above.]

[33][*sollte*.]

[34][Without itself as yet being such experience.]

[35][From the *Satires* of Aulus (or Etruscan *Aules*) Persius Flaccus (34-62 A.D.), Roman poet and satirist, Satire iv, 52: "Live in your own house, and you will realize how sparsely it is furnished."]

[36][*dort*.]

tem[37] we require in addition that their *analysis* also be done exhaustively—though all of that is easy and more entertaining than laborious.

Now I just need to add a few comments concerning the printing. Because the beginning of the printing was slightly delayed, I was able to see
A xxii only about half of the proof sheets. I am now finding some misprints in them. They do not disturb the meaning, except for one misprint that occurs on p. [A] 379, fourth line from the bottom,[38] where we must read *in kind* [*specifisch*] instead of *skeptically* [*sceptisch*].[39] The antinomy of pure reason, from p. [A] 425 [426] to p. 461, has been set up, in the manner of a table, in such a way that whatever belongs to the *thesis* runs continuously on the left side; and what belongs to the *antithesis,* on the right side. I have arranged the antinomy in this way in order to make it easier to compare thesis and antithesis with each other.[40]

[37][*hier.*]

[38][In the original German edition.]

[39][The two German terms are given in their older spelling here, to show the similarity between them. They are now spelled *spezifisch* and *skeptisch*.]

[40][*Satz* and *Gegensatz* here, *Thesis* and *Antithesis* just above.]

PREFACE B vii

[SECOND EDITION]

Whether someone's treatment of the cognitions pertaining to reason's business does or does not follow the secure path[41] of a science—this we can soon judge from the result. If, after many preparations and arrangements have been made, the treatment falters as soon as it turns to its purpose; or if, in order to reach that purpose, it repeatedly has to retrace its steps and enter upon a different path; or, again, if the various collaborators cannot be brought to agree on the manner in which their common aim is to be achieved—then we may rest assured that such an endeavor is still far from having entered upon the secure path of a science, but is a mere groping about. We shall indeed be rendering a service to reason if we can possibly discover that path, even if we should have to give up as futile much that was included in the purpose which we had previously adopted without deliberation.

Logic has been following that secure path from the earliest times. This B viii
is evident from the fact that since *Aristotle* it has not needed to retrace a single step, unless perhaps removing some of its dispensable subtleties, or setting it forth in a more distinct and determinate way, were to be counted as improvements of logic, even though they pertain more to the elegance of that science than to its being secure. Another remarkable fact about logic is that thus far it also has not been able to advance a single step, and hence is to all appearances closed and completed. It is true that some of the moderns have meant to expand logic. Some of them have inserted into it *psychological* chapters on the different cognitive powers (e.g.,

[41][*Gang* here, *Weg* just below.]

on our power of imagination, or on ingenuity). Others have inserted *metaphysical* chapters on the origin of cognition, or the origin of the different kinds of certainty according to the difference in the objects (i.e., chapters on[42] idealism, skepticism, etc.). Still others have inserted into logic *anthropological* chapters on prejudices (as well as their causes and remedies). But all these attempts to expand logic are the result of ignorance concerning the peculiar nature of this science. We do not augment sciences, but corrupt them, if we allow their boundaries to overlap. But the boundary of logic is determined quite precisely by the fact that logic is a
B ix science that provides nothing but a comprehensive exposition[43] and strict proof of the formal rules of all thought. (Such thought may be a priori or empirical, may have any origin or object whatsoever, and may encounter in our minds obstacles that are accidental or natural.)

That logic has been so successful in following the secure path of a science is an advantage that it owes entirely to its limitations. They entitle it, even obligate it, to abstract from all objects of cognition and their differences; hence in logic the understanding deals with nothing more than itself and its form.[44] Reason naturally had to find it far more difficult to enter upon the secure path of science when dealing not just with itself, but also with objects. By the same token, logic is a propaedeutic and forms, as it were, only the vestibule of the sciences; and when knowledge[45] is at issue, while for the judging of such knowledge we do indeed presuppose a logic, yet for its acquisition we must look to what are called sciences properly and objectively.

Now insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori. Moreover, reason's cognition can be referred to the object of that cognition in two ways: either in order merely to *deter-*
B x *mine* the object and its concept (which must be supplied from elsewhere), or in order to *make it actual* as well. The first is reason's *theoretical*, the second its *practical cognition.* In both the pure part, i.e., the part in which

[42][I am repeating 'chapters on' on the assumption that *dem* was meant to go with another *von*, as used by Kant with the psychological chapters and again with the anthropological ones, in place of the *über* to which he switched for the metaphysical chapters. Conceivably, *dem* could be construed as going with *nach*, with *Objekte* translated (rather loosely) as 'projects' and referring (a bit oddly) to idealism and skepticism (which are not usually considered "projects").]

[43][*darlegen.*]

[44][Kant's views on general logic are to be found primarily in his *Logic* and his *Reflections on Logic*, in volumes IX and XVI, respectively, of the *Akademie* edition of Kant's writings.]

[45][*Kenntnisse.*]

reason determines its object entirely a priori, must be set forth all by itself beforehand, no matter how much or how little it may contain. We must not mix with this part what comes from other sources. For we follow bad economic procedure if we blindly spend what comes in and are afterwards unable, when the procedure falters, to distinguish which part of the income can support the expenditure and which must be cut from it.[46]

Two [sciences involving] theoretical cognitions by reason are to determine their *objects* a priori: they are *mathematics* and *physics*. In mathematics this determination is to be entirely pure; in physics it is to be at least partly pure, but to some extent also in accordance with sources of cognition other than reason.

Mathematics has been following the secure path[47] of a science since the earliest times to which the history of human reason extends; it did so already among that admirable people, the Greeks. But we must not think that it was as easy for mathematics to hit upon that royal road— or, rather, to build it on its own—as it was for logic, where reason deals only with itself. Rather, I believe that for a long time (above all, it was still so among the Egyptians) mathematics did no more than grope about, and that its transformation into a science was due to a *revolution* brought about by the fortunate idea[48] that occurred to one man during an experiment. From that time onward, the route that mathematics had to take could no longer be missed, and the secure path[49] of a science had been entered upon and traced out for all time and to an infinite distance. This revolution in the way of thinking was much more important than the discovery of the passage around the celebrated Cape.[50] Its history, and that of the fortunate man who brought this revolution about, is lost to us. But *Diogenes Laërtius*[51] always names the reputed authors of even the minutest elements of geometrical demonstration, elements that in ordinary people's judgment do not even stand in need of proof; and Diogenes hands down to us a story concerning the

B xi

[46][Reading, with Erdmann, *von welchem* for *von welcher.*]

[47][*Weg*, also translated as 'road' and as 'passage' just below.]

[48][*Einfall.*]

[49][*Gang.*]

[50][The Cape of Good Hope.]

[51][Author of the only extant continuous account of the lives and doctrines of the main Greek philosophers. He is thought to have flourished (where is not clear) in the early part of the third century A.D. His work is known under various titles, such as *The Lives of Philosophers*, *Lives and Opinions of Famous Philosophers*, and several others.]

change that was brought about by the first indication of this new path's discovery. This story shows that the memory of this change must have seemed exceedingly important to mathematicians, and thus became indelible. When the *isosceles triangle* was first demonstrated, something dawned on the man who did so. (He may have been called *Thales*,[52] or by some
B xii other name.) He found that what he needed to do was not to investigate what he saw in the figure, nor—for that matter—to investigate the mere concept of that figure, and to let that inform him, as it were, of the figure's properties. He found, rather, that he must bring out (by constructing the figure) the properties that the figure had by virtue of what he himself was, according to concepts, thinking into it a priori and exhibiting.[53] And he found that in order for him to know anything a priori and with certainty about the figure, he must attribute to this thing nothing but what follows necessarily from what he has himself put into it in accordance with his concept.

Natural science took much longer to hit upon the high road of science. For only about a century and a half have passed since the ingenious *Bacon*, Baron Verulam,[54] made the proposal that partly prompted this road's discovery, and partly—insofar as some were already on the trail of this discovery—invigorated it further. This discovery, too,[55] can be explained only by a sudden revolution in people's way of thinking. I shall here take account of natural science only insofar as it is founded on *empirical* principles.

Something dawned on all investigators of nature when *Galileo* let balls, of a weight chosen by himself, roll down his inclined plane;[56] or when *Tor-*

[52][Thales of Miletus (in Asia Minor), who was considered one of the Seven Wise Men of ancient Greece, flourished around 585 B.C. He has been regarded, since early antiquity, as the founder of the Ionian school of natural philosophy, and is generally credited with having introduced geometry to Greece. Cf. Diogenes Laërtius (preceding note), i, 22–44.]

[53][*darstellen.* This term (similarly for the noun) has traditionally been rendered most often as 'to present.' I believe that 'to exhibit' conveys Kant's meaning rather better. (In a few places, all marked by bracketed insertions, Kant uses *Darstellung* in a nontechnical sense, as meaning exposition.) In this translation, 'to present' is used instead to render *vorstellen.* My reasons for this rendering are given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[54][See above. B ii br. n. 1. Emphasis on 'Verulam' deleted.]

[55][Like the one in mathematics: B xi.]

[56][The point of Galileo's experiment was to disprove the Scholastic view that heavy bodies fall faster than light ones, by verifying his own theory that the distance covered would be proportional to the square of the time and independent of the weight.]

ricelli[57] made the air carry a weight that he had judged[58] beforehand to be equal to the weight of a water column known to him; or when, in more recent times, *Stahl*[59] converted metals into calx and that in turn into metal, by withdrawing something[60] from the metals and then restoring it to them.[61] B xiii What all these investigators of nature comprehended[62] was that reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own plan;[63] and that reason must not allow nature by itself[64] to keep it in leading strings, as it were, but reason must—using principles that underlie its judgments—proceed according to constant laws and compel nature to answer reason's own questions. For otherwise our observations, made without following any plan outlined in advance, are contingent, i.e., they have no coherence at all in terms of a necessary law—even though such a law is what reason seeks and requires. When approaching nature, reason must hold in one hand its principles, in terms of which alone concordant appearances can count as laws, and in the other hand the experiment that it has devised in terms of those principles. Thus reason must indeed approach nature in order to be instructed by it; yet it must do so not in the capacity of a pupil who lets the teacher tell him whatever the teacher wants, but in the capacity of an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer the questions that he puts to them. Thus even physics owes that

57[Evangelista Torricelli (1608–1647), Italian physicist and mathematician. He was first to create a sustained vacuum, and he invented the barometer.]

58[*gedacht*.]

59[Georg Ernst Stahl (1660–1734), German physician and chemist. He developed the phlogiston theory of combustion, which offered the first comprehensive explanation of combustion and of such related biological processes as respiration, fermentation, and decay. The theory dominated chemical thought for almost a century, until its replacement by Lavoisier's oxidation theory of combustion.]

60[The "something" was thought to be phlogiston. On the phlogiston theory of combustion (cf. previous note), the processes involved are these: Metals, when heated, lose phlogiston and become calces (or calx, in the singular), kinds of ashy powder now known to be oxides. Calces, when heated with charcoal, reabsorb phlogiston and become metals again. (The original phlogiston having been scattered and lost, the new phlogiston absorbed by the calx comes from the charcoal, which is especially rich in phlogiston.)]

61I am not here following with precision the course of the history of the experimental method; indeed, the first beginnings of that history are not well known.

62[As a result of the mentioned experiments.]

63[Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 384.]

64[*allein*.]

B xiv very advantageous revolution in its way of thinking to this idea:[65] the idea that we must, in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature, seek in nature (not attribute to it fictitiously) whatever reason must learn from nature and would know nothing of on its own. This is what put natural science, for the very first time, on the secure path of a science, after it had for so many centuries been nothing more than a mere groping about.

Metaphysics is a speculative cognition by reason that is wholly isolated and rises entirely above being instructed by experience. It is cognition through mere concepts (not, like mathematics, cognition through the application of concepts to intuition), so that here reason is to be its own pupil. But although metaphysics is older than all the other sciences, and would endure even if all the others were to be engulfed utterly in the abyss of an all-annihilating barbarism, fate thus far has not favored it to the point of enabling it to enter upon the secure path of a science. For in metaphysics reason continually falters, even when the laws into which it seeks to gain (as it pretends) a priori insight are those that are confirmed by the commonest experience. Countless times, in metaphysics, we have to retrace our steps, because we find that our path does not lead us where we want to go.
B xv As regards agreement in the assertions made by its devotees, metaphysics is very far indeed from such agreement. It is, rather, a combat arena which seems to be destined quite specifically for practicing one's powers[66] in mock combat, and in which not one fighter has ever been able to gain even the smallest territory and to base upon his victory a lasting possession. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the procedure of metaphysics has thus far been a mere groping about, and—worst of all—a groping about among mere concepts.

Why is it, then, that in metaphysics we have thus far been unable to find the secure path of science? Might this path be impossible here? Why, then, has nature inflicted on reason, as one of reason's most important concerns, the restless endeavor to discover[67] that path? What is more: how little cause have we to place confidence in our reason, when in one of the most important matters[68] where we desire knowledge reason not merely forsakes us, but puts us off with mere pretenses and in the end betrays us! Or if we have only missed the path thus far, what indication do we have that

[65][*Einfall.*]

[66][*Kräfte.*]

[67][*nachspüren.*]

[68][*Stücke.*]

if we renew our search, we may hope to be more fortunate than others before us have been?

I would think that the examples of mathematics and natural science, which have become what they now are by a revolution accomplished all at once, are sufficiently remarkable to [suggest that we should] reflect on the essential component in that revolution, viz., the transformation of the way of thinking that became so advantageous for them; and as far as is permitted by the fact that they, as rational cognitions,[69] are analogous to metaphysics, we should [there] imitate them with regard to that transformation, at least by way of an experiment. Thus far it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to objects. On that presupposition, however, all our attempts to establish something about them a priori, by means of concepts through which our cognition would be expanded, have come to nothing. Let us, therefore, try to find out by experiment[70] whether we shall not make better progress in the problems of metaphysics if we assume that objects must conform to our cognition.[71]— This assumption already agrees better with the demanded possibility of an a priori cognition of objects—i.e., a cognition that is to ascertain something about them before they are given to us. The situation here is the same as was that of *Copernicus* when he first thought of explaining the motions of celestial bodies.[72] Having found it difficult to make progress there when he assumed that the entire host of stars revolved around the spectator, he tried to find out by experiment whether he might not be more successful if he had the spectator revolve and the stars remain at rest. Now, we can try a similar experiment in metaphysics, with regard to our *intuition* of objects. If our intuition had to conform to the character of its objects, then I do not see how we could know anything a priori about that character. But I can quite readily conceive of this possibility if the object (as object of the senses) conforms to the character of our power of intuition. However, if these intuitions are to become cognitions, I cannot remain with them but must re-

B xvi

B xvii

[69][I.e., cognitions by reason.]

[70][*versuchen*.]

[71][Cf. Walter Watson, *The Architectonics of Meaning: Foundations of the New Pluralism* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 5–9.]

[72][Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543), the Polish astronomer, reinvented the heliocentric hypothesis. The hypothesis had been advanced previously by Aristarchus, a Greek astronomer of the third century B.C. But his work was lost a few decades after he wrote it, and we know about it only through other writers' testimony that itself was not recovered until long after the time of Copernicus.]

fer them, as presentations,[73] to something or other as their object, and must determine this object by means of them. [Since for this determination I require concepts, I must make one of two assumptions.] I can assume that the *concepts* by means of which I bring about this determination likewise conform to the object;[74] and in that case I am again in the same perplexity as to how I can know anything a priori about that object. Or else I assume that the objects, or—what amounts to the same[75]—the *experience* in which alone they (as objects that are given to us) can be cognized, conform to those concepts. On this latter assumption, I immediately see an easier way out. For experience is itself a way of cognizing for which I need understanding. But understanding has its rule, a rule that I must presuppose within me even before objects are given to me, and hence must presuppose a priori; and that rule is expressed in a priori concepts. Hence all objects of expe-
B xviii rience must necessarily conform to these concepts and agree with them. Afterwards, however, we must also consider objects insofar as they can merely be thought, though thought necessarily, but cannot at all be given in experience (at least not in the way in which reason thinks them). Our

[73][*Vorstellungen*. The traditional rendering of *Vorstellung* (similarly for the verb) as '*re*presentation' suggests that Kant's theory of perception (etc.) is representational, which, however, it is not (despite the fact that Kant sometimes adds the Latin *repraesentatio*). For one thing, *vorstellen*, in the Kantian use of the term that is relevant here, is not something that *Vorstellungen* do; it is something that *we* do. Moreover, *vorstellen* as so used never means anything like 'represent' in the sense of 'stand for.' Even an empirical intuition, e.g., does not stand for an object of experience (let alone a thing in itself), but rather enters into the experience which that object of experience is. (Because 'presentation' too is slightly awkward, I have in some contexts replaced it— if clarity could be enhanced at no risk of distortion—by 'conception' or 'thought'; similarly for the verb.) Presentations, as the term is here used, are such objects of our direct awareness as sensations, intuitions, perceptions, concepts, cognitions, ideas, and schemata. See A 320/B 376–77 and A 140/B 179. The German term *darstellen* (similarly for the noun) has traditionally been rendered most often as 'to present.' That rendering, besides being somewhat unclear, obviously becomes especially harmful if *vorstellen* is simultaneously rendered as 'to represent.' In this translation *darstellen* in Kant's technical sense of the term is rendered as 'to exhibit,' which is clear and in no way misleading. (In a few places—all clearly identified—Kant uses *Darstellung* in the nontechnical sense of 'exposition.') The terminological adjustments described here are not entirely new. I already made them in translating Kant's third *Critique:* Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans., with an introduction, Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). I have since discovered that Wolfgang Schwarz had chosen even earlier to render *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' in his 1982 translation of parts of the first *Critique:* see above, A vii br. n. 7.]

[74][As do the intuitions.]

[75][Because the objects under discussion are objects of our experience, i.e., objects as experienced (objects given to us in experience).]

attempts[76] to think these objects (for they must surely be thinkable) will afterwards provide us with a splendid touchstone of what we are adopting as the changed method in our way of thinking, viz., that all we cognize a priori about things is what we ourselves put into them.[77]

This experiment[78] is as successful as was desired. It promises that metaphysics will be on the secure path of a science in its first part, viz., the part where it deals with those a priori concepts for which corresponding objects adequate to these concepts can be given in experience. For on the B xix
changed way of thinking we can quite readily explain how a priori cognition is possible; what is more, we can provide satisfactory proofs for the laws that lie a priori at the basis[79] of nature considered as the sum of objects of experience. Neither of these accomplishments was possible on the kind of procedure used thus far. On the other hand, this deduction—provided

[76][*Versuche.*]

[77]This method, then, which imitates that of the investigator of nature, consists in searching for the elements of pure reason in *what can be confirmed or refuted by an experiment.*[a] Now the propositions of pure reason, especially if they venture beyond all bounds of possible experience, cannot be tested by doing (as we do in natural science) an experiment with their *objects.* Hence testing such propositions will be feasible only by doing an experiment with *concepts* and *principles* that we assume a priori. In that experiment we must arrange [to use] these concepts and principles in such a way that the same objects can be contemplated from two different standpoints:[b] *on the one hand,* for the sake of experience, as objects of the senses and of the understanding; yet *on the other hand,* for the sake of isolated reason that strives to transcend all bounds of experience, as objects that we merely think. Now if it turns out that contemplating things from that twofold point of view results in harmony with the principle of reason, but that doing so from one and the same point of view puts reason into an unavoidable conflict with itself, then the experiment decides in favor of the correctness of distinguishing the two points of view.

[a][*Experiment.*]

[b][*Seiten.*]

[78][*Versuch.* The experiment intended to find out whether we may not do better in metaphysics if we assume that the objects of our cognition must conform to our cognition, rather than the other way round.]

[79][*Grund.* With a few exceptions, I am rendering this term as 'basis' rather than as 'ground.' For one thing, the corresponding 'based on' is much less awkward than is 'grounded in.' Above all, however, the 'ground' terminology tends to suggest a logical relation. The 'basis' terminology is broader, almost always appropriately so. E.g., a *Bestimmungsgrund,* i.e., a basis determining something, can be all sorts of things.]

in the first part of metaphysics[80] —of our power to cognize a priori[81] produces a disturbing result that seems highly detrimental to the whole purpose of metaphysics as dealt with in the second part:[82] viz., that with this power to cognize a priori we shall never be able to go beyond the boundary of possible experience, even though doing so is precisely the most
B xx essential concern of this science. Yet this very [situation permits] the experiment that will countercheck the truth of the result that we obtained from the first assessment of our a priori rational cognition: viz., that our rational cognition applies only to appearances, and leaves the thing[83] in itself uncognized by us, even though inherently actual. For what necessarily impels us to go beyond the boundary of experience and of all appearances is the *unconditioned* that reason demands in things[84] in themselves; reason—necessarily and quite rightfully—demands this unconditioned for everything conditioned, thus demanding that the series of conditions be completed by means of that unconditioned. Suppose, now, we find that the unconditioned *cannot be thought at all without contradiction* if we assume that our experiential cognition conforms to objects as things in themselves, yet that *the contradiction vanishes* if we assume that our presentation of things, as these are given to us, does not conform to them as things in themselves, but that these objects are, rather, appearances that conform to our way of presenting. Suppose that we find, consequently, that the unconditioned is not to be met with in things insofar as we are acquainted with[85] them (i.e., insofar as they are given to us), but is to be met with in them [only] insofar as we are not acquainted with them, viz., insofar as they are things in themselves. If this is what we find, it will show that what we assumed initially
B xxi only by way of an experiment[86] does in fact have a foundation.[87] Now,

[80][I.e., in the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic of this *Critique*, A 19–292/B 33–349.]

[81][I.e., legitimation of the claim that we have such a power.]

[82][I.e., in the Transcendental Dialectic, A 293–704/B 349–732.]

[83][*Sache*.]

[84][*Dingen*.]

[85][*kennen*.]

[86][Viz., that our power of a priori cognition can inform us only about appearances, but can never take us beyond the boundary of possible experience and allow us to cognize the thing in itself.]

[87]This experiment[a] of pure reason is very similar to that done in *chemistry*, which is called sometimes the experiment of *reduction*, but generally the *synthetic pro-*

once we have denied that speculative reason can make any progress in that realm of the suprasensible,[88] we still have an option available to us. We can try to discover[89] whether perhaps in reason's practical cognition data can be found that would allow us to determine reason's transcendent concept of the unconditioned.[90] Perhaps in this way our a priori cognition, though one that is possible only from a practical point of view,[91] would still allow us to get beyond the boundary of all possible experience, as is the wish of metaphysics. Moreover, when we follow this kind of procedure,[92] still speculative reason has at least provided us with room for such an expansion [of our cognition], even if it had to leave that room empty. And hence there is as yet nothing to keep us from filling in that room, if we can, with practical *data* of reason; indeed, reason summons us to do so.[93] B xxii

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cedure. The *analysis* of the *metaphysician* has divided pure a priori cognition into two very heterogeneous elements, viz., such cognition of things as appearances, and of things in themselves. The [metaphysician's] *dialectic* recombines the two so as to yield *agreement* with reason's necessary idea of the *unconditioned*, and finds that this agreement can never be obtained except through that distinction, which is therefore [a] true one.

[a][*Experiment* here, *Versuch* just below.]

[88][I.e., the realm of objects considered as things in themselves rather than as objects of sense.]

[89][*versuchen*.]

[90][I.e., make the concept determinate, give it content by means of attributes or "determinations" (cf. A 23/B 37 br. n. 30) of this unconditioned.]

[91][See below, B xxiv–xxv.]

[92][I.e., the use of practical reason.]

[93]In the same way,[a] the central laws governing the motions of the celestial bodies provided with established certainty what *Copernicus* had initially assumed only as a hypothesis, and at the same time provided proof of the invisible force (*Newtonian* attraction) that links together the world edifice. That force would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had not dared, in a manner that conflicted with the senses but yet was true, to seek the observed motions not in the celestial objects but in the spectator. The transformation in the way of thinking [in metaphysics] which I set forth in the *Critique* is analogous to the Copernican hypothesis. Here in the preface I likewise put it forth only as a hypothesis, even though in the treatise itself it will be proved, not hypothetically but apodeictically, from the character of our presentations of space and time and from the elementary concepts[b] of the understanding. Here I put it forth as a hypothesis in order merely to

The task, then, of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in the described attempt to transform the procedure previously followed in metaphysics, by subjecting metaphysics to a complete revolution, thus following the example set by the geometricians and investigators of nature.[94] The critique is a treatise on the method [of the science of metaphysics], not a system of the science itself. Yet it does set down the entire outline of meta-
B xxiii physics, including the bounds of this science as well as its entire internal structure. For pure speculative reason has a twofold peculiarity. First, it both can and ought to measure what its own ability is according to the different ways in which it selects objects for its thought. For in a priori cognition nothing can be attributed to objects except what the thinking subject takes from itself. Second, pure speculative reason also can and ought to enumerate completely and on its own the various ways it has of posing problems to itself, and thus to set down in advance the entire outline for a system of metaphysics. For, as regards its cognitive principles, it is an entirely separate, self-subsistent[95] unity in which, as in an organized body,[96] each member exists for the sake of all the others, and all exist for the sake of each one. In this unity no principle can safely be taken in *one* reference unless we have also investigated it in [its] *thoroughgoing* reference to our entire pure use of reason. But [as a consequence of this unity of pure speculative reason] metaphysics is also exceptionally fortunate in a way that is denied to all other rational sciences dealing with objects (as distinguished from *logic*, which deals only with the form of thought as such): Once metaphysics has been brought by this critique onto the secure path of a science, it is able to encompass[97] completely the entire realm of the cognitions pertain-
B xxiv ing to it. Hence it can complete its work and put it aside for the use of posterity, as capital that can never be increased. What enables metaphysics to complete its work is that it deals merely with principles, and with the restrictions on their use as determined by these principles themselves. Moreover, being a basic science, it is also obligated to achieve this com-

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draw attention to the first attempts at such a transformation; and such attempts are always hypothetical.

[a][As Kant has just described in the case of metaphysics.]

[b][I.e., the categories.]

[94][See Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 35.]

[95][*für sich bestehend.*]

[96][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 373–74.]

[97][*befassen.*]

pleteness; regarding metaphysics we must be able to say: *nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.*[98]

But, it will be asked, what sort of treasure is this that we mean to bequeath to posterity, in leaving them a metaphysics that has been purified by critique, though thereby also made durable? A cursory survey of this work will leave one with the impression that such a metaphysics benefits us only *negatively*, viz., by instructing us that in [using] speculative reason we must never venture beyond the boundary of experience; and this instruction is indeed its primary benefit. But this benefit becomes *positive* as soon as we become aware that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its boundary do not in fact *expand* our use of reason; they unfailingly *narrow* it, as we find when we examine them more closely. For these principles, which properly pertain to sensibility, do actually threaten[99] to expand the bounds of sensibility until they include[100] everything, thus threatening even to displace the pure (practical) use of reason. B xxv Hence a critique that restricts speculative reason is, to that extent, indeed *negative*. But because, by doing so, the critique also removes an obstacle that restricts— or even threatens to annihilate—the practical use of reason, its benefit is in fact *positive* and very important. We see this as soon as we become convinced that there is a use of pure reason which is practical and absolutely necessary (viz., its moral use). When used practically, pure reason inevitably expands and reaches beyond the bounds of sensibility; and although it does not require for this any help from speculative pure reason, it must still be assured against interference[101] from it in order not to fall into contradiction with itself. To deny that this service rendered by the critique has a *positive* benefit would be like saying that the police provides no positive benefit; after all, one might say, the main task of the police is only to put a stop to the violence on whose account citizens must fear each other, in order that everyone may carry on his business calmly and safely.

[98]["Thinking that nothing was done as long as anything remained to be done." The quote is from the (unfinished) *De bello civili* (*On the Civil War*) by the Roman poet Lucan (Marcus Annaeus Lucanus, A.D. 39–65), ii, 657. The poem, which is also called *Pharsalia* (after the battle at Pharsalos described in Book vii), deals with the contest between Julius Caesar and the Senate, and the person referred to in the quote is Caesar. Actually, instead of *reputans* (thinking) the original has *credens* (believing), and instead of *si* it has *dum* or possibly *cum* (a switch that does not affect the meaning here).]

[99][If used in the way described.]

[100][*über.*]

[101][*Gegenwirkung.*]

Now in the analytic part of the critique I shall prove that space and time are only forms of our sensible intuition and hence are only conditions of the existence of things as appearances, and that, furthermore, we have no concepts of understanding, and hence also no elements whatever for the
B xxvi cognition of things, except insofar as intuition can be given corresponding to these concepts. That will prove, consequently, that we cannot have [speculative] cognition of any object[102] as thing in itself, but can have such cognition only insofar as the object is one of sensible intuition, i.e., an appearance. And from this it does indeed follow that any possible speculative cognition of reason is restricted to mere objects of *experience*. On the other hand, it must be noted carefully that this [conclusion] is always subject to this reservation: that we must be able at least to *think*, even if not [speculatively] *cognize*, the same objects also as things in themselves.[103]
B xxvii For otherwise an absurd proposition would follow, viz., that there is appearance without anything that appears. Now let us suppose that the distinction, necessitated by our critique, between objects of experience and these same objects as things in themselves, had not been made at all. In that case the principle of causality, and hence nature's mechanism as governing the determination of [the exercise of] that causality, would definitely have to hold for all things as such[104] [construed] as efficient causes. Hence I could not, without manifest contradiction, say of the same being, for example the human soul, that its will is free and yet is subject to natural necessity, i.e., not free. For I would be taking the soul *in the same sense*

[102][*Gegenstand* here, *Objekt* just thereafter.]

[103]In order for me to *cognize* an object I must be able to prove its [real] possibility (either from its actuality as attested by experience, or a priori by means of reason). But I can *think* whatever I want to, even if I am unable to commit myself to there being, in the sum of all [logical] possibilities,[a] an object corresponding to the concept.[b] All that is required in order for me to think something is that I do not contradict myself, i.e., that my concept be a [logically] possible[c] thought. But I require something further in order to attribute objective reality to a concept (i.e., real possibility, as distinguished from the merely logical possibility just mentioned). However—and this is my point[d]—this something further need not be sought in theoretical sources of cognition, but may also lie in practical ones.

[a][On the distinction between logical and real possibility, see A 391/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[b][If there is such an object, then its concept has objective validity, i.e., the concept (and the object as well) has also *real* possibility.]

[c][I e., thinkable. Cf. the etymology of 'logical.']

[d][*eben.*]

[104][I.e., including things in themselves: *überhaupt*. See br. n. 106, just below.]

in the two propositions, viz., as a thing[105] as such[106] (thing in itself); nor, without prior critique, could I help taking it so. Suppose, on the other hand, that the *Critique* is not in error when it teaches us to take the object in *two different senses,*[107] viz., as appearance and as thing in itself; and that the deduction of the *Critique*'s concepts of understanding is correct, so that the principle of causality applies to things only in the first sense,[108] viz., insofar as they are objects of experience, but that these same objects are not subject to that principle when taken in the second sense.[109] On these suppositions, no contradiction arises when we think the same will in both these B xxviii
ways: in its appearance (i.e., in its visible acts), as conforming necessarily to natural law and as to that extent *not free*; yet on the other hand, *qua* belonging to a thing in itself,[110] as not subject to that law, and hence as *free.*[111] Now as regards my soul when considered from this second standpoint, I cannot *cognize* it through any [use of] speculative reason (let alone through empirical observation); nor, therefore, can I in this way cognize freedom as the property of a being to which I attribute effects in the world of sense. For otherwise I would have to cognize such a being as a being determined with regard to its existence and yet as not determined in time (which is impossible, because I cannot base such a concept on any intuition). Nevertheless, [although I cannot in this way cognize my freedom,] I can still *think* freedom. I.e., at least my presentation of freedom contains no contradiction, if we make our critical distinction between the two ways of presenting (sensible and intellectual), and restrict accordingly the pure concepts of understanding and hence also the principles that flow from them. Now let us suppose that morality necessarily presupposes freedom (in the strictest sense) as a property of our will; for morality adduces a priori, as

[105][*Ding* here. *Sache* just below.]

[106][*überhaupt*. In this translation, I render this term almost always by 'as such,' and only occasionally by 'in general' (or 'generally'), because this latter rendering can too often be misread as an *adverb* modifying some nearby verb. See, for some early examples, A 61/B 86, A 66/B 90, A 69/B 94, B 115, A 111, B 140, B 143, B 146, B 159. And although 'as such' is needed also to translate *als solch-*, this latter use is readily identifiable by means of its placement or its insertion in commas.]

[107][Or 'significations': *Bedeutungen.*]

[108][*Sinn.*]

[109][I.e., as things in themselves]

[110][A soul.]

[111][See below, A 444–51/B 472–79.]

data of reason,[112] original practical principles residing in reason, and these
B xxix principles would be absolutely impossible without the presupposition of freedom.[113] But then suppose that speculative reason had proved that freedom cannot be thought at all.[114] In that case the moral presupposition[115] would have to yield to the other [supposition].[116] For this other [supposition]'s opposite involves a manifest contradiction[117] (whereas the opposite of freedom and morality[118] involves no contradiction, unless freedom has already been presupposed[119]). Hence *freedom*, and with it morality, would have to give way to the *mechanism of nature*. But in fact the situation is different. All I need for morality is that freedom does not contradict itself and hence can at least be thought; I do not need to have any further insight into it. In other words, all I need is that freedom [in my act] puts no obstacle whatever in the way of the natural mechanism [that governs] the same act (when the act is taken in a different reference). Thus the doctrine[120] of morality maintains its own place, and so does natural science. But this would not have happened if the critique had not instructed us beforehand about our unavoidable ignorance regarding things in themselves, restricting to mere appearances what we can *cognize* theoretically. This same exposition of the positive benefit found in critical principles of pure reason can be produced again in regard to the concept of *God* and of the *simple*

[112][Cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 31.]

[113][Cf. *ibid.*, Ak. V, 28–33, 47–50, and also 3–4, 42, 93–94, 105, 161.]

[114][Viz., as ruled out by the necessary mechanism of nature.]

[115][Of freedom, as presupposed by morality.]

[116][That freedom cannot be thought.]

[117][Which would thus prove the original supposition, viz., that freedom cannot be thought. The opposite (or denial) of this supposition is that freedom *can* be thought, which would contradict a necessary mechanism that (as would have been proved by speculative reason) rules out freedom.]

[118][*deren.*]

[119][Here the opposite (or denial) is that there is no freedom and hence no (possibility of) morality, which would not contradict a necessary mechanism, obviously not even one that ruled out freedom. Hence here the opposite or denial cannot prove the original supposition, viz., of freedom as presupposed by morality. A contradiction would arise only if we had already presupposed freedom: freedom would contradict both its own denial and that of (the possibility of) morality.]

[120][*Lehre*, also translated as 'science' just below.]

nature of our *soul*; but for the sake of brevity I shall omit it. Thus[121] I cannot even *assume God, freedom*, and *immortality*, [as I must] for the sake of the necessary practical use of my reason, if I do not at the same time *deprive* speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For in order to reach God, freedom, and immortality, speculative reason must use principles that in fact extend merely to objects of possible experience; and when these principles are nonetheless applied to something that cannot be an object of experience, they actually do always transform it into an appearance, and thus they declare all *practical expansion* of reason to be impossible. I therefore had to annul *knowledge* in order to make room for *faith*.[122] And the true source of all the lack of faith[123] which conflicts with morality—and is always highly dogmatic—is dogmatism in metaphysics, i.e., the prejudice according to which we can make progress in metaphysics without a [prior] critique of pure reason.[124] B xxx

Although,[125] therefore, it cannot be difficult to leave to posterity the bequest of a metaphysics drawn up systematically in accordance with a critique of pure reason, yet such a metaphysics is a gift that is not to be despised. For consider merely how reason is cultivated generally by pursuing the secure path of a science, as compared to its baseless groping and careless roaming-about when there is no critique. Consider also our youth with their desire for knowledge, who can then make better use of their time than they can under the usual dogmatism. That dogmatism encourages them quite early and strongly to reason with ease about things of which they un- B xxxi

[121][By the same reasoning that has just been used.]

[122][*Glaube*. It is *knowledge* (*Wissen*), not *cognition* (*Erkenntnis*), that is being "annulled" (*aufheben*). Strictly speaking, what is annulled is the *claim* to knowledge; Kant is adding a touch of drama. As for *Glaube*, the term can mean either faith or belief. As the present context makes clear (cf. A 820–31 = B 848–59 incl. br. n. 113), Kant's *Glaube*, in the full sense of the term, is incompatible with knowledge (though not with cognition; cf. above, A vii br. n. 6). As these terms are used in English, faith is usually considered incompatible with knowledge, whereas belief normally is not (but is even included in standard definitions of knowledge). Hence Kant's *Glaube*, in the full sense of the term, must be rendered as 'faith.']

[123][*Unglaube*.]

[124][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 472: '. . . [A] person who lacks faith is one who denies all validity to those rational ideas [of God and immortality of the soul] because there is no *theoretical* foundation for their reality. Hence such a person judges dogmatically. A person's dogmatic *lack of faith* is incompatible with his having a moral maxim prevail in his way of thinking. . . ."]

[125][I am starting a new paragraph where the original merely inserts a dash between sentences.]

derstand nothing and into which, moreover, neither they nor anyone else in the world will ever have any insight. It may even encourage them to seek to invent new ideas[126] and opinions and thus to neglect the study of well-founded sciences. Above all, however, [we see the value of] such a metaphysics if we take into account the inestimable advantage of putting an end, for all future time, to all objections against morality and religion, and of doing so in the *Socratic* manner, viz., by the clearest proof of the opponents' ignorance. For there has always been some metaphysics in the world; and some metaphysics will presumably continue to be found in it, but with it also a dialectic of pure reason, because a dialectic is natural to pure reason. Hence the primary and most important concern of philosophy is to deprive metaphysics, once and for all, of its detrimental influence, by obstructing the source of its errors.

Despite this important change in the realm of the sciences and the *loss* that speculative reason must suffer in what it has thus far imagined to be
B xxxii its possession, the situation remains entirely as favorable as ever with regard to the universal human concern, and with regard to the benefit that the world has thus far obtained from the teachings of pure reason. The loss affects only the *monopoly of the schools*; in no way does it affect the *interests of the people*. Let me ask the most adamant dogmatist whether any of the following proofs have ever been able, after emerging from the schools, to reach the public and exert the slightest influence on its conviction:[127] the one that proves our soul's continuance after death from the simplicity of substance; or the one that proves the freedom of the will as opposed to universal mechanism by means of subtle but ineffectual distinctions between subjective and objective practical necessity; or the one that proves the existence of God from the concept of a maximally real being ([or] from the contingency of what is changeable and the necessity of a prime mover).[128] I take it that these proofs have never reached the public and influenced it in that way; nor can they ever be expected to do so, because the common human understanding is unfit for such subtle speculation. Rather, the conviction spreading to the public, insofar as it rests on rational grounds, has had to arise from quite different causes. As regards the

[126][*Gedanken.*]

[127][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 476.]

[128][Cf. A 604–6/B 632–34. Although the concept of the maximally real (or 'supremely real': *allerrealst*) being applies also to the ontological proof, Kant may here have in mind only the cosmological proof.].

soul's continuance after death, the hope for a *future life* arose solely from a predisposition discernible to every human being in his [own] nature, viz., the inability ever to be satisfied by what is temporal (and thus is inadequate for the predispositions of his whole vocation). As regards the freedom of the will, the consciousness of *freedom* arose from nothing but the clear exhibition of duties in their opposition to all claims of the inclina- B xxxiii
tions. Finally, as regards the existence of God, the faith in [the existence of] a wise and great *author of the world* arose solely from the splendid order, beauty, and provisions manifested everywhere in nature. Indeed, not only does this possession [of convictions held by the public] remain undisturbed, but it even gains further authority through what the schools are [here] being told:[129] viz., that on a point dealing with the universal human concern they should not claim to have a higher and more extensive insight than that which can be attained just as readily by the great multitude (most worthy of our respect); and that they should therefore confine themselves solely to the cultivation of these universally comprehensible and for moral aims sufficient bases of proof. Hence the change[130] affects merely the arrogant claims of the schools, who would like to be considered in these matters (as they are rightly considered in many other matters) as the sole experts[131] and guardians for truths whose key they keep to themselves, telling the public only how to use them (*quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri*).[132] On the other hand, a more legitimate claim of the speculative B xxxiv
philosopher is nonetheless being taken care of here. He remains always the exclusive trustee of a science that is useful to the public without its knowing this: viz., the critique of reason. For that critique can never become popular; nor does it need to be. For just as finely spun arguments for useful truths never make it into the heads of the people, so do the equally subtle objections against those arguments never occur to them. The school, on the other hand, inevitably gets involved in both the arguments and the objections, as does anyone who advances to [the point where he can] speculate. Hence the school is obligated to investigate thoroughly the rights of specu-

[129][*belehrt.*]

[130][In the realm of the sciences.]

[131][*Kenner.*]

[132]["What he is as ignorant of as I am he wants to appear to be the only one to understand." I am grateful to Francis E. Sparshott for identifying this quote (and to Geoffrey Payzant for knowing whom to ask). It is from Horace's *Epistles*, II, i, 87. The original text actually has *ignorat* instead of (the synonymous) *nescit.*]

lative reason, in order to forestall once and for all the scandal that sooner or later must become apparent, even to the people, from [all] the controversies—the controversies in which, when there is no critique, metaphysicians (and, as such, finally also the clergy) inevitably become entangled, and which thereafter even corrupt their teachings. Solely by means of critique can we cut off, at the very root, *materialism*, *fatalism*, *atheism*, freethinking *lack of faith*, *fanaticism*, and *superstition*, which can become harmful universally; and, finally, also *idealism* and *skepticism*, which are dangerous mainly to the schools and cannot easily cross over to the pub-
B xxxv lic. If governments do indeed think it proper to occupy themselves with the concerns of scholars, they should promote the freedom for such critique, by which alone the works of reason can be put on a firm footing. Promoting such freedom would conform much better to their wise care for both sciences and people than does supporting the ridiculous despotism of the schools. The schools raise a loud cry about danger to the public if one tears up the webs they have spun, even though in fact the public has never taken notice of these webs and hence can never feel the loss of them.

Critique does not stand in contrast to the *dogmatic procedure* that reason follows in its pure cognitions; for that procedure is science (and science must always be dogmatic, i.e., it must always do strict proofs from secure a priori principles). Rather, critique stands in contrast to *dogmatism*. Dogmatism is the pretension that we can make progress[133] by means of no more than a pure cognition from concepts (i.e., philosophical cognition) in accordance with principles—such concepts and principles as reason has been using for a long time—without inquiring into the manner and the right by which reason has arrived at them. Hence dogmatism is the dogmatic procedure followed by reason *without prior critique of its own ability*. The contrast, therefore, is not one that is meant to support a garrulous
B xxxvi shallowness with claims to the name of popularity; let alone one to support skepticism, which makes short work of all metaphysics. Rather, critique is the preliminary operation necessary for promoting a metaphysics that is well-founded and [thus] a science. Such a metaphysics must necessarily be carried out dogmatically, and systematically according to the strictest demand, and hence carried out in a way that complies with school standards (rather than in a popular way). For this demand cannot be remitted, because metaphysics promises to carry out its task entirely a priori, and therefore to the complete satisfaction of speculative reason. Hence in car-

133[In metaphysics]

rying out some day the plan prescribed by the critique, i.e., in [composing] the future system of metaphysics, we shall have to follow the strict method of the illustrious *Wolff*, the greatest among all the dogmatic philosophers.[134] He was first to provide the example (through which he became the originator of the—not yet extinct—spirit of thoroughness in Germany) as to how one is to take the secure path of a science: viz., by establishing principles in a law-governed way, determining concepts distinctly, trying for strictness in proofs, and avoiding bold leaps in inferences. He was, by the same token, superbly suited to transfer into that secure state such a science as metaphysics is—provided it had occurred to him to prepare the ground[135] in advance by a critique of the organ,[136] viz., pure reason itself. B xxxvii
His failure to do so must be imputed not so much to him as rather to the dogmatic way of thinking [characteristic] of his age; and for this failure neither the philosophers of his own period, nor those of all the previous ones, have any [grounds] to reproach one another. Those who reject Wolff's method and yet simultaneously also the procedure of the critique of pure reason can have in mind nothing but [the aim of] shaking off the fetters of *science* altogether,[137] thus converting work into play, certainty into opinion, and philosophy into philodoxy.[138]

As regards this second edition, I wanted, as is proper, to seize this opportunity in order to remedy as much as possible any difficulties and obscurity, from which many of the misinterpretations may have arisen that acute men—perhaps not without my fault—have hit upon in judging this book. I have not found anything to change in the propositions themselves and in the bases used for proving them, nor in the form and completeness of the plan. This is due partly to the long examination to which I had subjected them before submitting the book to the public, and partly to the character of the matter itself, i.e., the nature of a pure speculative reason. For pure speculative reason has a true structure.[139] In such a structure every-

[134][Baron Christian von Wolff (1679–1754), German mathematician, natural scientist, and, above all, rationalist philosopher of the enlightenment. He is the author of numerous writings. Although his work follows the tradition of Descartes and Leibniz, he developed his own philosophical system within that tradition.]

[135][*Feld.*]

[136][I.e., instrument. See A 61/B 86.]

[137][*gar.*],

[138][Pursuit of a creed.]

[139][*Gliederbau.*]

thing is an organ, i.e., everything is there for the sake of each member, and
B xxxviii each individual member is there for the sake of all,[140] and hence even the slightest defect,[141] whether it be a mistake (error) or an omission, must inevitably betray itself when we use that plan or system. I hope, moreover, that this system will continue to maintain itself in this unchangeable state. What entitles me to this confidence is not self-conceit, but merely the fact that this [unchangeable state of the system] is evident from the following experiment: We obtain the same result whether we proceed from the minutest elements all the way to the whole of pure reason, or proceed backward to each part when starting from the whole (for this whole also is given by itself, through reason's final aim in the practical sphere);[142] and the result is the same because any attempt to alter even the smallest part immediately gives rise to contradictions, not merely in the system, but in human reason in general. On the other hand, much remains to be done as regards the [manner of] *exposition,*[143] and in this regard I have tried to make improvements by providing this new edition. Some of these improvements are meant to remedy the misunderstanding concerning the Aesthetic, especially the concept of time; others, the obscurity in the deduction of the concepts of understanding. Yet other improvements are meant to remedy the supposed lack of sufficient evidence in the proofs of the principles of pure understanding; and others still, finally, to remedy the misinterpretation of the paralogisms advanced against rational psychology. That is how far the alterations extend that I have made in the manner of exposition. (I.e., they
B xxxix extend only to the end of the first chapter of the Transcendental Dialec-
B xl tic.)[144] I did not extend them further because there was not enough time,

[140][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 376.]

[141][In the plan displaying that systematic structure.]

[142][Cf. B 7, B 395 ns. 222 and 222b, A 747 = B 775, and A 798 = B 826. See also the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 206, and cf. 168, 255, 257, 259, 262, 268, 341, 344, 353, 473.]

[143][*Darstellung*.]

[144]Only one of my alterations could I call, properly speaking, an addition, and even it concerns only the kind of proof I offer. It consists—see p. [B] 275—in a new refutation of psychological *idealism*, and a strict proof (also, I believe, the only possible proof) of the objective reality of outer intuition. However innocuous idealism may be considered to be (without in fact being so) as regards the essential purposes of metaphysics, there always remains this scandal for philosophy and human reason in general [if we accept idealism]: that we have to accept merely on *faith* the existence of things outside us (even though they provide us with all the material we have for cognitions, even for those of our inner sense); and that, if it occurs to

and also because with regard to the remainder I had not come upon any misunderstanding by competent and impartial critics.[145] Although I cannot B xli

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someone to doubt their existence, we have no satisfactory proof with which to oppose him. Since there is some obscurity in the expressions I used in that proof, from the third to the sixth line,[a] I request that the passage be changed to the following: "*But this permanent something cannot be an intuition within me. For all bases determining my existence that can be encountered within me are presentations; and, being presentations, they themselves require something permanent distinct from them, by reference to which their variation,*[b] *and hence my existence in the time in which they vary, can be determined.*" I suppose some will object to this proof by saying: But all I am conscious of directly[c] is what is within me, i.e., my *presentation* of external things, and hence we still have not established whether or not there is anything corresponding to it outside me. However, through inner *experience* I B xl
am conscious of *my existence in time* (and hence also of its determinability in time), and that is more than to be conscious merely of my presentation. But this consciousness of my existence (and of its determinability) in time is the same thing as *empirical consciousness of my existence,*[d] and that can be determined only by reference to something linked with my existence that *is outside me.* Therefore this consciousness of my existence in time is linked, by way of identity,[e] with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me; and hence what inseparably connects what is outside me with my inner sense is experience rather than invention,[f] [outer] sense rather than my power of imagination. For outer sense is in itself already the referring of intuition to something actual outside me; and the reality of outer sense, as distinguished from imagination, rests only on our linking outer sense inseparably, as we are doing here, with inner experience itself, viz., as the condition of the possibility of inner experience. [This empirical consciousness of my existence contrasts with] the *intellectual consciousness* of my existence that I have in the conception *I am,* which accompanies all my judgments and acts of understanding: if with that intellectual consciousness of my existence I could at the same time link a determination of my existence through *intellectual intuition,*[g] then this determination would not include necessarily the consciousness of a relation to something outside me. But in fact I am unable to do so. That intellectual consciousness of my existence does indeed lead the way; but the inner intuition in which alone my existence can be determined is sensible intuition, and is tied to the condition of time. But this [kind of] determination [of my existence], and hence inner experience itself, depends on something permanent to which I must regard myself as related by way of contrast; and anything permanent is not within me and hence is to be found only in something outside me. Hence the reality of outer sense is linked B xli
necessarily with the reality of inner sense, and this [link] makes experience as such possible. In other words, I am conscious with just as much certainty that there are things outside me that have reference to my sense, as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time. On the other hand, for which of my given intuitions there actually are objects outside me that correspond to them, objects that must

B xlii name these critics and praise them as they deserve, they will doubtless find on their own the places where I have taken their suggestions into account.[146] The improvements do, however, involve a small loss for the reader, a loss that I could not prevent without making the book rather too voluminous: I had to omit or abbreviate various materials that, while not required essentially for the completeness of the whole, will yet be missed by many readers as possibly useful for some other aim. I had to do this in

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hence be attributed not to the power of imagination but to outer *sense*, as belonging to it, must be established in each particular case. It must be established—and here the proposition that there actually is outer experience must always lie at the basis—in accordance with the rules by which experience as such (even inner experience) is distinguished from imagination. We may add to this a comment: The presentation of something *permanent* in one's existence is not the same thing as a *permanent presentation.* For although—like all our presentations, even those of matter—the presentation of something permanent[h] may be quite mutable and may vary greatly, it yet refers to something permanent. Hence this permanent something must be a thing that is distinct from all my presentations and is external. The existence of this thing is included necessarily in the *determination* of my own existence, and [together] with it amounts to only a single experience; and this experience would not take place even inwardly if it were not (in part) outer at the same time. As to how this occurs, we cannot explain that any further, just as in general we cannot explain further how what is constant[i] is thought by us [as constant] in time, with the concept of change arising from the simultaneity[j] of what is constant with what varies.

[a][Of the original text of the proof (i.e., its third sentence), B 275.]

[b][*Wechsel.* See B 224 br. n. 45, and cf. A 187/B 230.]

[c][*unmittelbar.* The literal meaning of this term is 'immediately' in the sense of 'without mediation.' But because 'immediately' also has its temporal sense (as 'right away'), which would frequently mislead, 'direct' (with *mittelbar* rendered analogously as 'indirect') is almost always preferable.]

[d][*Dasein* here and immediately below, *Existenz* just thereafter. Similarly further on in this note.]

[e][*identisch.*]

[f][*Erdichtung.*]

[g][Intellectual intuition is what an intuitive understanding would have, whereas we do not: our intuition is sensible, and our understanding is discursive, i.e., conceptual. See B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[h][Leaving *diese.* Presumably Kant avoided saying *jene* because it could have been taken to refer back to *Anmerkung* ('comment').]

[i][*stehend.*]

[j][*Zugleichsein.* See B 257 br n. 209.]

[145][*Prüfer.*]

[146][In making the alterations I mentioned above.]

order to make room for my new exposition, which, as I hope, is more comprehensible now. Basically, my exposition changes absolutely nothing in the propositions or even in the bases used for proving them. But now and then the way in which it departs from my previous method of setting forth the material is such that I could not have accomplished this exposition by means of mere interpolations. I hope that this small loss, which anyone who so wishes can make up anyway by comparing this edition with the first one, is more than made up by the fact that the new version is more comprehensible. I have been pleased and gratified by what I have seen in various published writings (including reviews of some books, as well as separate treatises). I saw there that the spirit of thoroughness in Germany has not faded away, but has only been drowned out for a short time by the tone in vogue, whereby people employ in their thinking a freedom that befits B xliii
[only] a genius.[147] And I saw that courageous and bright minds have gained mastery of my *Critique* despite its thorny paths—paths that lead to a science of pure reason which complies with school standards, but which as such is the only science that lasts, and hence is exceedingly necessary. These worthy men have that happy combination of thorough insight with a talent for lucid exposition (the very talent that I am not aware of in myself), and I leave it to them to perfect my treatment of the material, which here and there may still be deficient as regards lucidity of exposition. For although there is in this case no danger of my being refuted, there certainly is a danger of my not being understood. As for myself, although I shall from now on be unable to enter into controversy, I shall pay careful attention to all suggestions, whether from friends or opponents, in order to use them in the future when I carry out the system of metaphysics in accordance with this propaedeutic. In the course of these labors, I have advanced considerably in age (this month I reach my sixty-fourth year).[148] I must therefore spend my time frugally, if I want to carry out my plan of providing the metaphysics both of nature and of morals,[149] and thus con-

[147][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 310, 317.]

[148][Completing his sixty-third year on April 22, 1787.]

[149][The *Metaphysics of Morals* appeared in 1797. The case of the metaphysics of nature is less clear. In 1786, one year *before* the publication of this Preface, Kant had already published the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. It is not clear in what respect he considered that work, as conjoined with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as falling short of a metaphysics of nature. (Cf. Kant's remarks in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 205, 214–15.) Even in the *Critique of Judgment*, published in 1790, he speaks of the metaphysics of nature as a project still to be undertaken or completed (Ak. V, 170) Perhaps the missing

firm the correctness of my critique of both speculative and practical reason. Hence I must rely on the help of those worthy men who have made
B xliv this work their own, expecting them to clear up the obscurities in it that could hardly have been avoided initially, as well as to defend it as a whole. Any philosophical treatise can be tweaked in individual places (for it cannot come forward in all the armor worn by mathematical treatises), while yet the structure of the system, considered as a unity, is not in the slightest danger. Few people have the intellectual[150] agility to survey such a system when it is new, but fewer still have the inclination to do so, because they find all innovation inconvenient. Again, in any work that for the most part uses language freely, we can easily dig up seeming contradictions if we tear individual passages from their contexts and compare them with one another. In the eyes of those who rely on the judgment of others, such seeming contradictions cast an unfavorable light on the work; but they are quite easily resolved by someone who has gained command of the idea as a whole. Moreover, if a theory is internally stable, then any action and reaction that initially portend great danger will in time serve only to smooth away the theory's unevennesses; and in a short time they will even provide the theory with the requisite elegance, if those who deal with it are men of impartiality, insight, and true popularity.

Königsberg, in the month of April, 1787.

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part was the projected *Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics*, on which Kant worked until a year before his death and which appeared (in unfinished form) in what is now called the *Opus Postumum* (Ak. XXI and XXII). Cf. James W. Ellington, "The Unity of Kant's Thought in His Philosophy of Corporeal Nature," 135–219 (esp. 213–19) in Book II of his translation of the *Prolegomena* and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Immanuel Kant, *Philosophy of Material Nature* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1985).]

[150][*des Geistes.*]

CONTENTS[151]

A xxiii

A xxiv

[151][This is the table of contents in A. For the rather longer table in B, see the beginning of this volume.]

INTRODUCTION B 1

[SECOND EDITION][152]

I.[153] ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PURE AND EMPIRICAL COGNITION

There can be no doubt that all our cognition begins with experience. For what else might rouse our cognitive power to its operation if objects stirring our senses did not do so? In part these objects by themselves bring

[152][Textual differences between the Introduction in B (which has seven sections) and the one in A (which has two) are indicated in footnotes. For two extensive commentaries on Kant's Introduction, see Hans Vaihinger's *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, vol. 1, 158–496, and Nonnan Kemp Smith's *A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,'* 26–78 (both works cited above, Ak. vii br. n. 5. The interpretation of Kant's Introduction provided by Vaihinger and Kemp Smith is now generally regarded as flawed. For a plausible (and more sympathetic) alternative interpretation, see Herbert James Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936 [1970]), vol. 1, 57–90.]

[153][Sections I and II in B replace the first two paragraphs (and section heading) from Section I in A. The Introduction in A starts as follows:]

INTRODUCTION [FIRST EDITION] A 1

I. The Idea of Transcendental Philosophy

Experience is, without doubt, the first product to which our understanding gives rise, by working on the raw material of sense impressions. That is precisely why experience is our first instruction, and why, about presentations.[154] In part they set in motion our understanding's activity, by which it compares these presentations, connects or separates them, and thus processes the raw material of sense impressions into a cognition of objects that is called experience. *In terms of time*, therefore, no cognition in us precedes experience, and all our cognition begins with experience.

But even though all our cognition starts **with** experience, that does not mean that all of it arises **from** experience. For it might well be that even

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as it progresses, it is so inexhaustible in new information—so much so that if the lives of all future generations are strung together, they will never be lacking in new knowledge[a] that can be gathered on that soil. Yet experience is far from being our understanding's only realm, and our understanding cannot be confined to it. Experience does indeed tell us what is, but not that it must necessarily be so and not otherwise. And that is precisely why experience gives us no true universality; and reason, which is so eager for that [universal] kind of
A 2 cognitions, is more stimulated by experience than satisfied. Now, such universal cognitions, which are at the same time characterized by intrinsic necessity, must be independent of experience, clear and certain by themselves. Hence they are called a priori cognitions; by contrast, what is borrowed solely from experience is, as we put it, cognized only a posteriori, or empirically.

Now, it turns out—what is extremely remarkable—that even among our experiences there is an admixture of cognitions that must originate a priori, and that serve perhaps only to give coherence to our presentations of the senses. For even if we remove from our experiences everything belonging to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts, and judgments generated from these, that must have arisen entirely a priori, independently of experience. These concepts and judgments must have arisen in this way because through them we can—or at least we believe that we can—say more about the objects that appear to the senses than mere experience would teach us; and through them do assertions involve[b] true universality and strict necessity, such as merely empirical cognition cannot supply.[c]

[a][*Kenntnisse.*]

[b][*enthalten.*]

[c][The text of A continues with the first paragraph in Section III of B.]

[154][*Vorstellungen*. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

our experiential cognition is composite, consisting of what we receive through impressions and what our own cognitive power supplies from itself (sense impressions merely prompting it to do so). If our cognitive power does make such an addition, we may not be able to distinguish it from that basic material[155] until long practice has made us attentive to it B2
and skilled in separating it from the basic material.

This question, then, whether there is such a cognition that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses, is one that cannot be disposed of as soon as it comes to light,[156] but that at least still needs closer investigation. Such cognitions are called *a priori cognitions*; they are distinguished from empirical cognitions, whose sources are a posteriori, namely, in experience.

But that expression, [viz., *a priori*,] is not yet determinate enough to indicate adequately the full meaning of the question just posed. For it is customary, I suppose, to say of much cognition derived from experiential sources that we can or do partake of it a priori. We say this because we derive the cognition not directly from experience but from a universal rule, even though that rule itself was indeed borrowed by us from experience. Thus if someone has undermined the foundation of his house, we say that he could have known a priori that the house would cave in, i.e., he did not have to wait for the experience of its actually caving in. And yet he could not have known this completely a priori. For he did first have to find out through experience that bodies have weight and hence fall when their support is withdrawn.

In what follows, therefore, we shall mean by a priori cognitions not those that occur independently of this or that experience, but those that occur *absolutely* independently of all experience. They contrast with empirical cognitions, which are those that are possible only a posteriori, i.e., through experience. But we call a priori cognitions *pure* if nothing empirical whatsoever is mixed in with them. Thus, e.g., the proposition, Every change has its cause, is an a priori proposition; yet it is not pure, because change is a concept that can be obtained only from experience. B 3

[155][I.e., raw material: *Grundstoff*.]

[156][*Anschein*.]

II. We Are in Possession of Certain A Priori Cognitions, and Even Common Understanding Is Never without Them

What matters here is that we find a characteristic by which we can safely distinguish a pure cognition from empirical ones. Now, experience does indeed teach us that something is thus or thus, but not that it cannot be otherwise. **First**, then, if we find a proposition such that in thinking it we think at the same time its *necessity*, then it is an a priori judgment; and if, in addition, it is not derived from any proposition except one that itself has the validity of a necessary proposition, then it is absolutely a priori. **Second**, experience never provides its judgments with true or strict *universality*, but only (through induction) with assumed and comparative universality; hence [there] we should, properly speaking, say [merely] that as far as we have
B 4 observed until now, no exception is to be found to this or that rule. If, therefore, a judgment is thought with strict universality, i.e., thought in such a way that no exception whatever is allowed as possible, then the judgment is not derived from experience, but is valid absolutely a priori. Hence empirical universality is only [the result of] our choosing to upgrade[157] validity from one that holds in most cases to one that holds in all, as, e.g., in the proposition, All bodies have weight. But when universality is strict and belongs to a judgment essentially, then it points to a special cognitive source for the judgment, viz., a power of a priori cognition. Hence necessity and strict universality are safe indicators of a priori cognition, and they do moreover belong together inseparably. It is nevertheless advisable to make separate use of the two criteria, even though each is infallible by itself. For, in using them, there are times when showing the empirical limitedness of a cognition is easier than showing the contingency of the judgments based on it; and there are times when showing the unlimited universality that we attribute to a judgment is more convincing[158] than is showing the judgment's necessity.

Now, it is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such judgments [as we are looking for, viz.], judgments that are necessary and in the strictest sense universal, and hence are pure a priori judgments. If we want an example from the sciences, we need only look to all the propo-
B 5 sitions of mathematics; if we want one from the most ordinary use of un-

[157][*willkürliche Steigerung.*]

[158][*einleuchtend.*]

derstanding, then we can use the proposition that all change must have a cause. Indeed, in this latter proposition the very concept of a cause so manifestly contains the concept of a necessity in [the cause's] connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the rule[159] [governing that connection], that the concept of a cause would get lost entirely if we derived it as *Hume* did: viz., from a repeated association of what happens with what precedes, and from our resulting habit[160] of connecting presentations (hence from a merely subjective necessity). But we do not need such examples[161] in order to prove that pure a priori principles actual[ly exist] in our cognition. We could, alternatively, establish that these principles are indispensable for the possibility of experience as such, and hence establish [their existence] a priori. For where might even experience get its certainty if all the rules by which it proceeds were always in turn[162] empirical and hence contingent, so that they could hardly be considered first principles? But here we may settle for having established as a matter of fact [that there is a] pure use of our cognitive power, and to have established what its indicators are. However, we can see such an a priori origin not merely in judgments, but even in some concepts. If from your experiential concept of a *body*[163] you gradually omit everything that is empirical in a body—the color, the hardness or softness, the weight, even[164] the impenetrability—there yet remains the *space* that was occupied by the body (which has now entirely vanished), and this space you cannot omit [from the concept]. B 6
Similarly, if from your empirical concept of any object whatever, corporeal[165] or incorporeal, you omit all properties that experience has taught you, you still cannot take away from the concept the property through which you think the object either as a *substance* or as *attaching* to a substance (even though this concept of substance is more determinate than that

159[Cf. Robert Paul Wolff, *Kant's Theory of Mental Activity* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1973), 121–25.]

160[Or 'custom': *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* V, Pt. I, and cf. VII, Pt. II. Cf. also below, B 19–20, 127. Kant knew Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* only indirectly, through citations (translated into German) from James Beattie's *Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth,* of 1770.]

161[Examples from the sciences or from ordinary understanding.]

162[I.e., even the higher-order rules.]

163[*Körper.*]

164['even' omitted in the fourth original edition (1794).]

165[*körperlich.*]

of an object as such[166]). Hence you must, won over by the necessity with which this concept of substance forces itself upon you, admit that this concept resides a priori in your cognitive power.

III. Philosophy Needs a Science That Will Determine the Possibility, the Principles, and the Range of All A Priori Cognitions[167]

Much more significant yet than all the preceding[168] is the fact that there are certain cognitions that [not only extend to but] even leave the realm of
A 3 all possible experiences. These cognitions, by means of concepts to which no corresponding object can be given in experience at all, appear to expand the range of our judgments beyond all bounds of experience.

And precisely in these latter cognitions, which go beyond the world of sense, where experience cannot provide us with any guide or correction,
B 7 reside our reason's inquiries. We regard these inquiries as far superior in importance, and their final aim as much more sublime,[169] than anything that our understanding can learn in the realm of appearances. Indeed, we would sooner dare anything, even at the risk of error, than give up such treasured inquiries [into the unavoidable problems of reason], whether on the ground that they are precarious somehow, or from disdain and indifference.[170] These unavoidable problems of reason themselves are *God, freedom, and immortality*. But the science whose final aim, involving the science's entire apparatus, is in fact directed solely at solving these problems is called *metaphysics*. Initially, the procedure of metaphysics is *dogmatic;* i.e., [metaphysics], without first examining whether reason is capable or incapable of so great an enterprise, confidently undertakes to carry it out.

[166][The concept of an object as such does not include even (the property or "determination" of) permanence. Cf. A 242–43/B 300–301.]).

[167][The text of A continues, together with that of B, just below The section number and heading were added in B.]

[168][I.e., than the fact that we have a priori cognitions as described. In A this sentence starts with 'But'; 'than all the preceding' added in B.]

[169][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 245, 264.]

[170][Remainder of paragraph added in B. For its content, cf. A 337/B 395 n. 222, A 798 = B 826, and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 473.]

Now, suppose that we[171] had just left the terrain of experience. Would we immediately erect an edifice by means of what cognitions we have, though we do not know from where? Would we erect it on credit, i.e., on principles whose origin is unfamiliar to us? It does seem natural that we would not, but that we would first seek assurance through careful inquiries that the foundation had been laid. In other words, it does seem natural that we would, rather,[172] long since have raised the question as to just how our understanding could arrive at all these a priori cognitions, and what might be their range, validity, and value. And in fact nothing would be more natural, if by the term *natural*[173] we mean what properly and reasonably[174] ought to happen. If, on the other hand, we mean by this term what usually happens, then nothing is more natural and comprehensible than the fact that for a long time this inquiry had to remain unperformed. For, one part of these [a priori] cognitions, viz.,[175] the mathematical ones, possess long-standing reliability, and thereby raise favorable expectations concerning other [a priori] cognitions as well, even though these may be of a quite different nature. Moreover, once we are beyond the sphere of experience, we are assured of not being refuted[176] by experience. The appeal[177] of expanding our cognitions is so great that nothing but hitting upon a clear contradiction can stop our progress. On the other hand, we can avoid such contradiction by merely[178] being cautious in our inventions—even though they remain nonetheless inventions. Mathematics provides us with a splendid example of how much we can achieve, independently of experience, in a priori cognition. Now, it is true that mathematics deals with objects and cognitions only to the extent that they can be exhibited in intuition. But this detail is easily overlooked because that intuition can itself be given a priori and hence is rarely[179] distinguished from a mere pure concept. Cap-

A 4

B 8

171[*man.*]

172['rather' added in B.]

173[Instead of 'by the term *natural*', A has 'by this term.']

174[*vernünftigerweise.*]

175['viz.' (*als*) added in B.]

176[A has 'contradicted.']

177[*Reiz.*]

178['merely' (*nur*) added in B.]

179[*kaum.*]

A 5 tivated[180] by such a proof of reason's might, our urge to expand [our cognitions] sees no boundaries. When the light dove parts the air in free flight and feels the air's resistance, it might come to think that it would do much
B 9 better still in space devoid of air. In the same way *Plato* left the world of sense because it sets such narrow limits to[181] our understanding; on the wings of the ideas,[182] he ventured beyond that world and into the empty space of pure understanding. He did not notice that with all his efforts he made no headway. He failed to make headway because he had no resting point against which—as a foothold, as it were—he might brace himself and apply his forces in order to set the understanding in motion. But [Plato is no exception]: it is human reason's usual fate, in speculation, to finish its edifice as soon as possible, and not to inquire until afterwards whether a good foundation has in fact been laid for it. Then all sorts of rationalizations[183] are hunted up in order to reassure us that the edifice is sturdy, or, preferably, even to reject altogether[184] so late and risky an examination of it. But what keeps us, while we are building, free from all anxiety and suspicion, and flatters us with a seeming thoroughness, is the following. A large part—perhaps the largest—of our reason's business consists in dissecting what concepts of objects we already have. This [procedure] supplies us with a multitude of cognitions. And although these cognitions are nothing more
A 6 than clarifications or elucidations of what has already been thought in our concepts (although thought as yet in a confused way), they are yet rated equal to new insights at least in form, even though in matter or content
B 10 they do not expand the concepts we have but only spell them out. Now since this procedure yields actual a priori cognition that progresses in a safe and useful way, reason uses this pretense, though without itself noticing this, to lay claim surreptitiously[185] to assertions of a quite different kind. In these assertions, reason adds to given concepts others quite foreign to them, doing so moreover[186] a priori. Yet how reason arrived at these con-

[180][A has 'encouraged.']

[181][A has 'puts such manifold obstacles in the way of.']

[182][*Ideen.*]

[183][*Beschönigungen.*]

[184]['even,' along with 'preferably' and 'altogether' (*auch . . . lieber gar*), added in B.]

[185][*erschleichen.*]

[186]['moreover' (*und zwar*) added in B. The addition helps to remove an ambiguity in the German text of A: it helps to separate 'a priori' from *Begriffen* (concepts) and thus keeps the expression from seeming to modify that noun.]

cepts is not known; indeed, such a[187] question is not even thought of. Hence I shall deal at the very outset with the distinction between these two kinds of cognition.

IV.[188] ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS

In all judgments in which we think the relation of a subject to the predicate (I here consider affirmative judgments only, because the application to negative judgments is easy afterwards[189]), this relation is possible in two ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A as something that is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B, though connected with concept A, lies quite[190] outside it.[191] In the first case I call the judgment *analytic*; in the second, *synthetic*.[192] Hence (affirmative) analytic judgments are A 7
those in which the predicate's connection with the subject is thought by [thinking] identity, whereas those judgments in which this connection is thought without [thinking] identity are to be called synthetic. Analytic judg- B 11
ments could also be called *elucidatory*.[193] For they do not through the predicate add anything to the concept of the subject; rather, they only dissect the concept, breaking it up into its component concepts which had already been thought in it (although thought confusedly). Synthetic judgments, on the other hand, could also be called *expansive*.[194] For they do add to the concept of the subject a predicate that had not been thought in that concept at all and could not have been extracted from it by any dissection. For

[187][Instead of 'such a,' A has 'this.']

[188][This number absent in A, where the heading is that of the second subsection of Section I.]

[189]['afterwards' added in B.]

[190][*ganz*, presumably intended for emphasis only, and not for a contrast between complete and partial exclusion.]

[191][Cf. J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145–47.]

[192][Emphasis in both terms added in B.]

[193][Emphasis added in B.]

[194][*Erweiterungsurteile;* emphasis added in B. I prefer to translate *erweiternd* as 'expansive' rather than as 'ampliative.' My reason is that the corresponding verb, *erweitern*, is rendered better as 'expand' than as 'amplify,' because the latter term might (to contemporary readers) suggest increase in *force*.]

example, if I say: All bodies are extended—then this is an analytic judgment. For I do not need to go beyond[195] the concept that I link with the word body in order to find that extension is connected with it. All I need to do in order to find this predicate in the concept is to dissect the concept, i.e., become conscious[196] of the manifold[197] that I always think in it. Hence the judgment is analytic. By contrast, if I say: All bodies are heavy[198]—then the predicate is something quite different from what I think in the mere concept of a body as such. Hence adding such a predicate yields a synthetic judgment.[199]

[200]*Experiential* [201] *judgments, as such, are one and all synthetic.*[202] For to base an analytic judgment on experience would be absurd, because in

[195][A has 'outside.']

[196][*bewußt* in A, *mir bewußt* in B. The latter conforms better to German grammar, but adds nothing to the meaning.]

[197][Of component concepts.]

[198][In the technical sense of 'heavy,' as meaning no more than 'having weight'; cf. B 2, B 4. 'All bodies have weight' lacks the copula 'are' and hence would, in the present context, create a nusleading contrast to 'All bodies are extended.']

[199][Cf. Lewis White Beck, "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic?" in *Kant-Studien*, 47 (1955), 168–81; reprinted in Beck's *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), 74–91. Cf. also Moltke S. Gram, *Kant, Ontology, and the A Priori* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 43–82.]

[200][This paragraph in B replaces the following two in A:]

Now, this shows clearly: (1) that analytic judgments do not at all ex-
A 8 pand our cognition, but spell out and make understandable to myself the concept that I already have; (2) that in synthetic judgments, where the predicate does not lie within the concept of the subject, I must have besides this concept something else (X) on which the understanding relies in order to cognize nonetheless that the predicate belongs to that concept.

In empirical judgments, or in judgments of experience,[a] it is not difficult at all to find this X. For here this X is the complete experience of the object that I think by means of a concept A, the concept amounting only to part of the experience. For although in the concept of a body as such I do not at all include the predicate of heaviness,[b] yet the concept designates the complete experience [of a body] by means of part of it; hence I can add to this part, as belonging to it, further parts of the same experience. I can begin by cognizing the concept of a body analytically through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all

its case I can formulate my judgment without going outside my concept, and hence do not need for it any testimony of experience. Thus the [analytic] proposition that bodies are extended is one that holds[203] a priori and is not an experiential judgment. For before I turn to experience, I already B 12
have in the concept [of body] all the conditions required for my judgment. I have only to extract from it, in accordance with the principle of contradiction, the predicate [of extension]; in doing so, I can at the same time become conscious of the judgment's necessity, of which experience would not even inform me. On the other hand, though in the concept of a body as such I do not at all include the predicate of heaviness,[204] yet the concept designates an object of experience by means of part of this experience; hence I can [synthetically] add to this part further parts, of the same experience, in addition to those that belonged to the concept of a body as such. I can begin by cognizing the concept of a body *analytically* through the characteristics of extension, impenetrability, shape, etc., all of which are thought in this concept. But then I expand my cognition: by looking back to the experience from which I have abstracted this concept of body, I also find heaviness to be always connected with the above characteristics; and so I add it, as a predicate, to that concept *synthetically*. Hence

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of which are thought in this concept. But then I expand my cognition: by looking back to the experience from which I have abstracted this concept of body, I also find heaviness to be always connected with the above characteristics. Hence experience is the X that lies outside the concept A and makes possible the synthesis of the predicate B of heaviness with the concept A.

[a][See br. n. 201, just below.]

[b][In the technical sense of 'heaviness,' as meaning no more than 'weight.' See just above, br. n. 198.]

[201][*Erfahrungs-* ('of experience,' literally). The German noun has no corresponding adjective. In translating Kant, the proper English adjective corresponding to 'experience' is 'experiential,' which in Kant is not synonymous with 'empirical.' Whereas experience is indeed empirical (insofar as it includes sensation), *perception* (which includes sensation) is empirical (viz., empirical intuition) without as yet being experience. In order for perception to become experience, it must be given the synthetic unity provided by the understanding's categories. See A 183/B 226 (cf. B vii, 12, 161) and the *Prolegomena*, Ak IV, 297–98.]

[202][The beginning of this paragraph, through 'inform me,' is taken almost verbatim from the *Prolegomena*: see Ak. IV, 268.]

[203][*feststehen*]

[204][See br. n. 200b, just above.]

experience is what makes possible the synthesis of the predicate of heaviness with the concept of body. For although neither of the two concepts is contained in the other, yet they belong to each other, though only contingently, as parts of a whole; that whole is experience, which is itself a synthetic combination[205] of intuitions.

A 9
B 13
In synthetic judgments that are a priori, however, this remedy[206] is entirely lacking. If I am to go beyond[207] the concept A in order to cognize another concept B as combined with it, I rely on something that makes the synthesis possible: what is that something, considering that here I do not have the advantage of looking around for it in the realm of experience? Take the proposition: Everything that happens has its cause.—In the concept of something that happens I do indeed think an existence preceded by a time, etc., and from this one can obtain analytic judgments. But the concept of a cause lies quite outside that earlier concept and[208] indicates something different from what happens; hence[209] it is not part of what is contained[210] in this latter presentation. In speaking generally of what happens, how can I say about it something quite different from it, and cognize as belonging to it—indeed, belonging to it necessarily[211]—the concept of cause, even though this concept is not contained in the concept of what happens? What is here the unknown = **X** on which[212] the understanding relies when it believes that it discovers, outside the concept A,[213] a predicate B that is foreign to concept A but that the understanding considers nonetheless to be connected with that concept?[214] This unknown cannot be experience. For in adding the presentation of cause to the presentation of what happens, the above principle does so not only with greater universality than experience can provide, but also with the necessity's being ex-

205[On (linking) or combination (*Verbindung*), assembly (*Zusammensetzung*), and connection (*Verknüpfung*), see below, B 201 n. 30.]

206[I.e., experience.]

207[A has 'outside.']

208['lies entirely outside that concept and' added in B.]

209[Instead of 'hence,' A has 'and.']

210[*ist . . . gar nicht mit enthalten.*]

211[This insertion added in B.]

212[Instead of 'unknown = **X**,' A has 'the **X**.']

213[Literally, 'concept of A' (in this case).]

214['that the understanding considers' added in B.]

pressed; hence it does so entirely a priori and on the basis of mere concepts. Now, on such synthetic, i.e., expansive, principles depends[215] the whole final aim of our speculative a priori cognition. For, analytic prin- A 10
ciples are indeed exceedingly important and needed, but only for attaining B 14
that distinctness in concepts which is required for a secure and extensive synthesis that, as such, will actually be a new acquisition[216] [of cognition].[217]

V.[218] ALL THEORETICAL SCIENCES OF REASON CONTAIN SYNTHETIC A PRIORI JUDGMENTS AS PRINCIPLES[219]

1. *Mathematical judgments are one and all synthetic.* Although this proposition[220] is incontestably certain and has very important consequences, it

[215][More literally, 'rests': *beruht.*]

[216][A has 'addition' (*Anbau*, as for a building).]

[217][A adds, but B omits, the following paragraph:]

> Hence a certain mystery lies concealed here.[a] Only by solving it can we make our progress in the boundless realm of understanding's pure cognition secure and reliable. Thus, with the requisite universality, we must uncover the basis on which synthetic a priori judgments are possible; we must gain insight into the conditions that make each kind of a priori judgments possible; and we must [properly] define[b] this entire cognition (which constitutes a type of its own), not merely mark it by drawing a cursory circumference around it: we must define it completely—in a system, and in a manner adequate for any use—in terms of its original sources, its divisions, its range and bounds. So much, for now, as regards what is peculiar about synthetic [a priori] judgments.
>
> [a]If so much as raising this question had occurred to any of the ancients, this question by itself would have created mighty resistance, up to our own time, against all systems of pure reason. It would thus have saved [philosophers] all those vain attempts that they undertook blindly, without knowing what they were in fact dealing with.
>
> [b][*bestimmen.*]

[218][Sections V and VI added in B. The text of A continues together with that of B in B's Section VII.]

[219][*Prinzipien.*]

[220][*Satz.*]

seems thus far to have escaped the notice of those who have analyzed[221] human reason; indeed, it seems to be directly opposed to all their conjectures. For they found that all the inferences made by mathematicians proceed (as the nature of all apodeictic certainty requires) according to the principle[222] of contradiction; and thus they came to be persuaded that the principle of contradiction is also the basis on which we cognize the principles[223] [of mathematics]. In this they were mistaken. For though we can indeed gain insight into a synthetic proposition according to the principle of contradiction, we can never do so [by considering] that proposition by itself, but can do so only by presupposing another synthetic proposition from which it can be deduced.

We must note, first of all, that mathematical propositions, properly so called, are always a priori judgments rather than empirical ones; for they carry with them necessity, which we could never glean from experience.
B 15 But if anyone refuses to grant that all such propositions are a priori—all right: then I restrict my assertion[224] to *pure mathematics*, in the very concept of which is implied that it contains not empirical but only pure a priori cognition.

It is true that one might at first think that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytic one that follows, by the principle of contradiction, from the concept of a sum of seven and five. Yet if we look more closely, we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing more than the union of the two numbers into one; but in [thinking] that union we are not thinking in any way at all what that single number is that unites the two. In thinking merely that union of seven and five, I have by no means already thought the concept of twelve; and no matter how long I dissect my concept of such a possible sum, still I shall never find in it that twelve. We must go beyond these concepts and avail ourselves of the intuition corresponding to one of the two: e.g., our five fingers, or (as *Segner* does in his

[221][*Zergliederer*.]

[222][*Satz*.]

[223][*Grundsätze* On my use of 'principle' to translate both *Prinzip* and *Grundsatz*, see above, A vii br. n. 7. Although *Satz* is usually translatable as 'proposition,' in *Satz des Widerspruchs* it, too, comes out as 'principle.' Yet no distortion results in Kant's meaning. On the other hand, such distortion would result if *Grundsatz* were, here or throughout, rendered in some other way, which would create an illusory contrast with *Prinzip*.]

[224][*Satz*.]

Arithmetic[225]) five dots. In this way we must gradually add, to the concept of seven, the units of the five given in intuition. For I start by taking the number 7. Then, for the concept of the 5, I avail myself of the fingers of my hand as intuition. Thus, in that image of mine, I gradually add to the number 7 the units that I previously gathered together in order to make up B 16
the number 5. In this way I see the number 12 arise. That 5 *were to be added* to 7, this I had indeed already thought in the concept of a sum = 7+5, but not that this sum is equal to the number 12. Arithmetic propositions are therefore always synthetic. We become aware of this all the more distinctly if we take larger numbers. For then it is very evident that, no matter how much we twist and turn our concepts, we can never find the [number of the] sum by merely dissecting our concepts, i.e., without availing ourselves of intuition.

Just as little are any principles of pure geometry analytic. That the straight line between two points is the shortest is a synthetic proposition. For my concept of *straight* contains nothing about magnitude, but contains only a quality. Therefore the concept of shortest is entirely added to the concept of a straight line and cannot be extracted from it by any dissection. Hence we must here avail ourselves of intuition; only by means of it is the synthesis possible.

It is true that a few propositions presupposed by geometricians are actually analytic and based on the principle of contradiction. But, like identical propositions, they serve not as principles but only [as links in] the B 17
chain of method. Examples are a = a; the whole is equal to itself; or (a+b)>a, i.e., the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these principles, although they hold according to mere concepts, are admitted in mathematics only because they can be exhibited in intuition. [As for mathematics generally,] what commonly leads us to believe that the predicate of its apodeictic judgments is contained in our very concept, and that the judgment is therefore analytic, is merely the ambiguity with which we express ourselves. For we say that we *are to*[226] add in thought a certain predicate to a given concept, and this necessity adheres indeed to the very concepts. But here the question is not what we *are to* add in thought to the given con-

[225][Johann Andreas von Segner (1704–1777), German physicist and mathematician at Jena, Göttingen, and Halle. He is the author of several significant works, and introduced the concept of the surface tension of liquids. The work mentioned here, as translated from the Latin, is his *Anfangsgründe der Arithmetik* (*Elements of Arithmetic*). See the second edition (Halle/Saale: Renger, 1773), pp. 27, 79].

[226][*sollen.*]

cept, but what we *actually* think[227] in the concept, even if only obscurely; and there we find that, although the predicate does indeed adhere necessarily to such[228] concepts, yet it does so not as something thought in the concept itself, but by means of an intuition that must be added to the concept.

2. *Natural science (physica)*[229] *contains synthetic a priori judgments as principles.* Let me cite as examples just a few propositions: e.g., the proposition that in all changes in the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unchanged; or the proposition that in all communication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal to each other. Both propositions
B 18 are clearly not only necessary, and hence of a priori origin, but also synthetic. For in the concept of matter I do not think permanence, but think merely the matter's being present in space insofar as[230] it occupies space. Hence I do actually go beyond the concept of matter, in order to add to it a priori in thought something that I have not thought *in it.* Hence the proposition is thought not analytically but synthetically and yet a priori,[231] and the same[232] occurs in the remaining propositions of the pure part of natural science.

3. *Metaphysics* is to *contain synthetic a priori cognitions.* This holds even if metaphysics is viewed as a science that thus far has merely been attempted, but that because of the nature of human reason is nonetheless indispensable. Metaphysics is not at all concerned merely to dissect concepts of things that we frame a priori, and thereby to elucidate them analytically. Rather, in metaphysics we want to expand our a priori cognition. In order to do this, we must use principles which go beyond the given concept and which add to it something that was not contained in it; and, by means of such synthetic a priori judgments, we must presumably go so far beyond such concepts that even experience[233] can no longer follow us; as in the proposition: The world must have a first beginning—and others like

[227][Deleting the emphasis in 'in thought' and 'think' (*denken* both times).]

[228][*jenen.*]

[229][Physics.]

[230][*durch.*]

[231][An alternative reading is: 'Hence the proposition is not analytic but synthetic, and yet is thought a priori, . . .' The reading I have adopted seems to go better with 'in' in the last clause.]

[232][*so.*]

[233][Actual *or possible* experience.]

that. And hence metaphysics consists, at least *in terms of its purpose*, of nothing but synthetic a priori propositions.

VI. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF PURE REASON B 19

Much is gained already when we can bring a multitude of inquiries under the formula of a single problem. For we thereby facilitate not only our own business by defining it precisely, but also—for anyone else who wants to examine it—the judgment as to whether or not we have carried out our project adequately. Now the proper problem of pure reason is contained in this question:

How are synthetic judgments possible a priori?[234]

That metaphysics has thus far remained in such a shaky state of uncertainty and contradictions is attributable to a sole cause: the fact that this problem, and perhaps even the distinction between *analytic* and *synthetic* judgments, has not previously occurred to anyone.[235] Whether metaphysics stands or falls depends on the solution of this problem, or on an adequate proof that the possibility which metaphysics demands to see ex-

[234][(In the original this sentence, unlike the next two similar ones below, is not set off as a separate paragraph.) The question could also be translated thus: 'How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?' I.e., 'a priori' can be construed either as an adverb modifying 'possible' or as an adjective modifying 'judgments.' Kant himself seems to have construed it one way in some contexts, the other way in other contexts.]

[235][The problem, roughly, is this: In the case of *analytic* judgments (judgments whose truth depends solely on the meanings of their terms, i.e., on the content of the concepts involved) it is easy to see how such judgments can (by which Kant means 'can legitimately') be made a priori (independently of experience). But the truth of *synthetic* (nonanalytic) judgments depends on *more* than their meaning (conceptual content). An example is the judgment (see B 17) that in all changes in the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unchanged. This judgment is clearly not analytic, but asserts something (not merely conceptual) about the world (and hence about any possible experience that we may have of it). How then can we make such judgments a priori? Kant's answer lies in his "Copernican revolution" (B xvi–xviii). We can make synthetic judgments a priori insofar as objects of experience (which are the same thing as object-experiences) must conform a priori to what we contribute to experience (and hence to them), instead of experience's conforming a priori to totally independent objects (things in themselves) by means of some preestablished harmony. By the same token, as Kant will show in the Transcendental Dialectic (A 293–704/B 349–732), synthetic a priori judgments that *go beyond* all possible experience (make assertions about things in themselves) cannot be justified (legitimated) theoretically at all (though they may still be justifiable *morally-practically*).]

plained[236] does not exist[237] at all. *David Hume*[238] at least[239] came closer to this problem than any other philosopher. Yet he did not think of it nearly determinately enough and in its universality, but merely remained with the synthetic proposition about the connection of an effect with its causes (*prin-*
B 20 *cipium causalitatis*).[240] He believed he had discovered that such a proposition is quite impossible a priori.[241] Thus, according to his conclusions, everything that we call metaphysics would amount to no more than the delusion of a supposed rational insight into what in fact is merely borrowed from experience and has, through habit, acquired a seeming necessity. This assertion, which destroys all pure philosophy, would never have entered Hume's mind if he had envisaged our problem in its universality. For he would then have seen that by his argument there could be no pure mathematics either, since it certainly does contain synthetic a priori propositions; and from such an assertion his good sense[242] would surely have saved him.

In solving the above problem we solve at the same time another one, concerning the possibility of the pure use of reason in establishing and carrying out all sciences that contain theoretical a priori cognition of objects; i.e., we also answer these questions:

How is pure mathematics possible?

How is pure natural science possible?

Since these sciences are actually given [as existent], it is surely proper for us to ask **how** they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved
B 21 by their being actual.[243] As regards *metaphysics*, however, there are grounds on which everyone must doubt its possibility: its progress thus far has been

[236][I.e., how synthetic judgments are possible a priori.]

[237][*stattfinden.*]

[238][Cf., for this passage, B 5 above and B 127 below.]

[239][*noch.*]

[240][Principle of causality.]

[241][Or: 'that such an a priori proposition is quite impossible.']

[242][*Verstand.*]

[243]This actuality may still be doubted by some in the case of pure natural science. Yet we need only examine the propositions that are to be found at the beginning of physics proper (empirical physics), such as those about the permanence of the[a] quantity of matter, about inertia, about the equality of action and reaction, etc., in order to soon be convinced that these propositions themselves amount to a *physica pura* (or *physica rationalis*).[b] Such a physics, as a science in its own right, surely

poor; and thus far not a single metaphysics has been put forth of which we can say, as far as the essential purpose of metaphysics is concerned, that it is actually at hand.[244]

Yet in a certain sense this *kind of cognition* must likewise be regarded as given; and although metaphysics is not actual as a science, yet it is actual as a natural predisposition[245] (i.e., as a *metaphysica naturalis*[246]). For human reason, impelled by its own need rather than moved by the mere vanity of gaining a lot of knowledge, proceeds irresistibly to such questions as cannot be answered by any experiential use of reason and any principles taken from such use. And thus all human beings, once their reason has expanded to [the point where it can] speculate, actually have always had in them, and always will have in them, some metaphysics. Now concerning it, too, there is this question:

How is metaphysics as a natural predisposition possible?[247] B22

i.e., how, from the nature of universal human reason, do the questions arise that pure reason poses to itself and is impelled, by its own need, to answer as best it can?

Thus far, however, all attempts to answer these natural questions—e.g., whether the world has a beginning or has been there from eternity, etc.—have met with unavoidable contradictions. Hence we cannot settle for our mere natural predisposition for metaphysics, i.e., our pure power of reason[248] itself, even though some metaphysics or other (whichever it might be) always arises from it. Rather, it must be possible, by means of this predisposition,[249] to attain certainty either concerning our knowledge or lack of knowledge of the objects [of metaphysics], i.e., either concerning a decision about the objects that its questions deal with, or certainty concern-

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deserves to be put forth separately and in its whole range, whether this range be narrow or broad.[c]

[a][*derselben.*]

[b][Pure, or rational, physics.]

[c][This Kant did in his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786), Ak. IV, 465–565.]

[244][*vorhanden.*]

[245][*Naturanlage.*]

[246][Natural metaphysics.]

[247][In the original, this question is embedded in the paragraph.]

[248][*Vernunftvermögen.*]

[249][I.e., our power of reason.]

ing the ability[250] or inability of reason to make judgments about these objects. In other words, it must be possible to expand our pure reason in a reliable way, or to set for it limits that are determinate and safe. This last question, which flows from the general problem above,[251] may rightly be stated thus:

How is metaphysics as science possible?[252]

Ultimately, therefore, critique of pure reason leads necessarily to science; the dogmatic use of pure reason without critique, on the other hand,
B 23 to baseless assertions that can always be opposed by others that seem equally plausible,[253] and hence to *skepticism*.

This science, moreover, cannot be overly, forbiddingly voluminous. For it deals not with objects of reason, which are infinitely diverse, but merely with [reason] itself. [Here reason] deals with problems that issue entirely from its own womb; they are posed to it not by the nature of things distinct from it, but by its own nature. And thus, once it has become completely acquainted with its own ability regarding the objects that it may encounter in experience, reason must find it easy to determine, completely and safely, the range and the bounds of its use [when] attempted beyond all bounds of experience.

Hence all attempts that have been made thus far to bring a metaphysics about *dogmatically* can and must be regarded as if they had never occurred. For whatever is analytic in one metaphysics or another, i.e., is mere dissection of the concepts residing a priori in our reason, is only a prearrangement for metaphysics proper, and is not yet its purpose at all. That purpose is to expand our a priori cognition synthetically, and for this purpose the dissection of reason's a priori concepts is useless. For it shows merely what is contained in these concepts; it does not show how we arrive at such concepts a priori, so that we could then also determine the valid
B 24 use of such concepts in regard to the objects of all cognition generally. Nor do we need much self-denial to give up all these claims;[254] for every meta-

250[*Vermögen.*]

251[The problem as to how (in general) synthetic judgments are possible a priori: B 19.]

252[In the original, this question forms the end of the preceding paragraph.]

253[*ebenso scheinbare.* The basic meaning of *scheinbar* is 'seeming.' Sometimes this term is taken negatively, as meaning 'illusory'; but at other times Kant takes it positively, as meaning 'plausible.' For this latter meaning, cf. A 502/B 530, A 703/B 731, A 784 = B 812; also A 46/B 63, A 289/B 345, A 399.]

254[Of dogmatic metaphysics.]

physics put forth thus far has long since been deprived of its reputation by the fact that it gave rise to undeniable, and in the dogmatic procedure indeed unavoidable, contradictions of reason with itself. A different treatment, completely opposite to the one used thus far, must be given to metaphysics—a science, indispensable to human reason, whose every new shoot[255] can indeed be lopped off but whose root cannot be eradicated.[256] We shall need more perseverance in order to keep from being deterred—either from within by the difficulty of this science or from without by people's resistance to it—from thus finally bringing it to a prosperous and fruitful growth.

VII. IDEA AND DIVISION OF A SPECIAL SCIENCE UNDER THE NAME OF CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON[257]

From all of the above we arrive at the idea of a special science[258] that may be called the *critique of pure reason.*[259] For[260] reason is the power that provides us with the *principles*[261] of a priori cognition. Hence[262] pure reason is that reason which contains the principles for cognizing something A 11

[255][*hervorgeschossenen Stamm.*]

[256][Although 'root' and 'eradicate' have the same origin, *radix,* and 'eradicate a root' may sound odd to an etymologically attuned ear, all of that applies to the respective German terms, *Wurzel* and *ausrotten.* Indeed, all four terms come from the same root!]

[257][The text of A continues, together with that of B, just below. The section number and heading were added in B.]

[258][Instead of the remainder of the sentence as given here from B, A has 'that may serve as [a] critique of pure reason.']

[259][A adds, but B omits, the following two sentences:]

> Now, any cognition is called *pure* if it is not mixed with anything extraneous. Above all,[a] however, a cognition is called absolutely pure if no experience or sensation whatsoever is mixed into it, so that the cognition is possible completely a priori.
>
> [a][*besonders.*]

[260][A has 'Now.']

[261][Emphasis added in B.]

[262][The inference relies on the two sentences from A that Kant just omitted in B, regarding them as understood.]

absolutely a priori. An *organon*[263] of pure reason would be the sum of those
B 25 principles by which all pure a priori cognitions can be acquired and actually brought about. Comprehensive application of such an organon would furnish us with a system of pure reason. Such a system, however, is a tall order; and it remains to be seen whether indeed an expansion of our cognition is possible here at all,[264] and in what cases it is possible. Hence a science that merely judges pure reason, its sources, and its bounds may be regarded as the *propaedeutic* to the system of pure reason. Such a propaedeutic would have to be called not a *doctrine* but only a *critique* of pure reason.[265] Its benefit, in regard to speculation,[266] would actually only be negative. For such a critique would serve only to purify our reason, not to expand it, and would keep our reason free from errors, which is a very great gain already. I call *transcendental* all cognition that deals not so much with
A 12 objects as rather with our way of cognizing objects in general insofar as that way of cognizing is to be possible a priori.[267] A *system* of such concepts[268] would be called *transcendental philosophy.* But, once again, this [system of] transcendental philosophy is too much for us as yet, here at the beginning.[269] For since such a science would have to contain both analytic cognition and synthetic a priori cognition, in their completeness, it has too broad a range as far as our aim is concerned. For we need[270] to carry the analysis only as far as it is indispensably necessary[271] for gaining insight, in their entire range, into the principles of a priori synthesis, which is all
B 26 that we are concerned with. What we are now dealing with is [not such a science, but only] this inquiry, which properly speaking can be called only a transcendental critique, not a doctrine. For its aim is not to expand the cognitions themselves, but only to correct them; and it is to serve as the touchstone of the value, or lack of value, of all a priori cognitions. Ac-

[263][Emphasis added in B.]

[264][A has 'whether indeed such an expansion of our cognition is possible at all.']

[265][Emphasis in 'propaedeutic,' 'doctrine,' and 'critique' added in B.]

[266]['in regard to speculation' added in B.]

[267][A has 'as rather with our a priori concepts of objects in general.']

[268][I.e., a system of a priori concepts of objects in general; see the preceding note. Emphasis in 'system' and 'transcendental philosophy' added in B.]

[269]['as yet' added in B; 'once again' refers back to the point made earlier in this paragraph, that a system of pure reason is a tall order.]

[270][*dürfen.*]

[271][Instead of 'necessary' (*notwendig*), A has 'needed' (*nötig*)]

cordingly, such a critique is a preparation: if possible, for an organon of those [cognitions]; or, should the [attempt to produce an] organon be unsuccessful, at least for a canon of them. Such a canon would, at any rate, some day allow us to exhibit, analytically as well as synthetically, the complete system of the philosophy of pure reason, whether that system were to consist in expanding the cognition of pure reason or merely in setting boundaries for it. That such a system is possible—and, indeed, that it cannot be overly wide-ranging, so that we may hope to complete it entirely—can be gathered even in advance from the following: What here constitutes the object[272] is not the nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but the understanding that makes judgments about the nature of things, and A 13
even this understanding, again, only in regard to its a priori cognition. Moreover, the understanding's supply of a priori cognition cannot be hidden from us, because, after all, we need not search for it outside the understanding; and we may indeed suppose[273] that supply to be small enough in order for us to record[274] it completely, judge it for its value or lack of value, and make a correct assessment of it.[275] [But my readers must not B 27
expect to find in this critique more than the mentioned preparation.] Still less must they expect here a critique of books and systems of pure reason, but should expect the critique of our power of pure reason itself.[276] Only if we use that critique as our basis do we have a reliable touchstone for assessing the philosophical content of old and new works in this field. Without such critique, unqualified historians and judges[277] pass judgment on[278] other people's baseless assertions by means of their own, which are just as baseless.[279]

Transcendental philosophy is the idea of a science for which[280] the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan *architectonically*, i.e., from

[272][Of our inquiry.]

[273][*allem Vermuten nach.*]

[274][*aufnehmen*, as in an inventory.]

[275][Remainder of the paragraph added in B.]

[276][Cf. A xii.]

[277][*Richter.*]

[278][*beurteilen*]

[279][In A, what follows forms the second section of the introduction and is headed thus: **II. The Division of Transcendental Philosophy**.]

[280][A has 'is, at this point [*hier*], only the idea for which.']

principles, with full guarantee of the completeness and reliability of all the components that make up this edifice. Transcendental philosophy is the system of all principles of pure reason.[281] That this critique is not itself already called transcendental philosophy is due solely to this: in order for this critique to be a complete system, it would have to include a comprehensive analysis of the whole of human a priori cognition. Now, it is indeed true that our critique must also put before us a complete enumeration of all the root concepts[282] that make up that pure cognition. Yet the critique refrains, and properly so, from providing either the comprehensive analysis of these concepts themselves, or the complete review of the con-
A 14 cepts derived from them. [There are two reasons for this.] First, this dis-
B 28 section of concepts would not serve our purpose; for it lacks that precariousness which we find in synthesis, [the precariousness] on account of which the whole critique is in fact there. Second, taking on the responsibility for the completeness of such an analysis and derivation (a responsibility from which we could, after all, have been exempted in view of our aim)[283] would go against the unity of our plan. On the other hand, this completeness in the dissection of the a priori concepts yet[284] to be supplied, as well as in the derivation [of other concepts] from them, can easily be added later: provided that first of all these [concepts] are there, as comprehensive principles of synthesis, and nothing is lacking[285] as regards this essential aim.[286]

Accordingly, the critique of pure reason [in a way] includes everything that makes up transcendental philosophy; it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy. But the critique is not yet that science itself, because it carries the analysis [of a priori concepts] only as far as is required for making a complete judgment about synthetic a priori cognition.

The foremost goal in dividing such a science is this: no concepts whatever containing anything empirical must enter into this science; or, differently put, the goal is that the a priori cognition in it be completely pure.[287]

281 [This sentence added in B.]

282 [*Stammbegriffe*.]

283 [Parentheses added.]

284 [*künftig*.]

285 [A has 'lacking in them [*ihnen*].']

286 [Of supplying these concepts, as such principles.]

287 [For the distinction between 'a priori' and 'pure,' see B 3.]

Hence, although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality[288] are a priori cognitions, they still do not belong in transcendental philoso- A 15
phy. For they do of necessity also bring [empirical concepts] into the for- B 29
mulation of the system of pure morality:[289] viz., the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, etc., all of which are of empirical origin. Although the supreme principles and basic concepts of morality do not lay these empirical concepts themselves at the basis of their precepts, they must still bring in such pleasure and displeasure, desires and inclinations, etc. in [formulating] the concept of duty: viz., as an obstacle to be overcome, or as a stimulus that is not to be turned into a motive.[290] Hence transcendental philosophy[291] is a philosophy of merely speculative pure reason. For everything practical, insofar as it contains incentives,[292] refers to feelings, and these belong to the empirical sources of cognition.

If, then, the division of the science being set forth here is to be performed in terms of the general viewpoint[293] of a system as such, then this science must contain in the first place a *doctrine of elements*, and in the second a *doctrine of method*, of pure reason.[294] Each of these two main parts would be subdivided; but the bases on which that subdivision would be made cannot yet be set forth here. Only this much seems to be needed here by way of introduction or advance notice: Human cognition has two stems, viz., *sensibility* and *understanding*, which perhaps spring from a common root, though one unknown to us. Through sensibility objects are *given* to us; through understanding they are *thought*.[295] Now if sensibility were to contain a priori presentations[296] constituting the condition[297] un- B 30

[288][*Moralität* here, *Sittlichkeit* just below.]

[289][Whereupon the system is *no longer* pure, though it is still a priori.]

[290][Instead of 'For . . . turned into a motive,' A has 'For the concepts of pleasure and displeasure, of desires and inclinations, of the power of choice [*Willkür*], etc., all of which are of empirical origin, would there [*dabei*] have to be presupposed.']

[291][*Philosophie* here, *Weltweisheit* just below.]

[292][Instead of 'incentives' (*Triebfedern*), A has 'motives' (*Bewegungsgründe*, more commonly called *Beweggründe*.]

[293][*Gesichtspunkt.*]

[294][In A, 'doctrine of elements' and 'doctrine of method' are doubly emphasized (by bold print).]

[295][Emphasis in 'given' and 'thought' added in B.]

[296][*Vorstellungen*. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[297][A has 'conditions.']

der which objects are given to us, it would to that extent belong to tran-
A 16 scendental philosophy. And since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given to us precede the conditions under which these objects are thought, the transcendental doctrine of sense[298] would have to belong to the *first*[299] part of the science of elements.

[298][I.e., in effect, of sensibility: *Sinnenlehre.*]

[299][Emphasis added in B.]

CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

{A 17 B 31}

I

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS

{A 19 B 33

PART I

TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC[1]

§ 1[2]

In whatever way and by whatever means a cognition[3] may refer to objects,[4] still *intuition* is that by which[5] a cognition refers to objects directly,[6] and at which all thought aims[7] as a means.[8] Intuition, however, takes

[1][See B 35 n. 23. Cf. also Hans Vaihinger, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, vol. 2, 1–123; Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* likewise at A vii br. n. 5, 79–166; and Herbert James Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 93–184.]

[2][Numbering of subsections added in B.]

[3][*Erkenntnis.* For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6.]

[4][*Gegenstände*, in this case. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[5][Literally, 'the one by which' (where 'one' is in the feminine gender in the original): *diejenige, wodurch.* I am taking *diejenige* to refer forward to *Anschauung*, rather than backward to *Art* (the other feminine noun in this context), in which case we would have to read: 'still *intuition* is the way [in which and the means] by which.' (The bracketed insertion would be needed inasmuch as 'way by which' [*Art, wodurch*] does not make sense, whereas 'means by which' [*Mittel, wodurch*] does.)]

[6][*unmittelbar*; see B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[7][*abzweckt.* Although *Zweck* means ('end' or) 'purpose,' *abzwecken* here is synonymous with *abzielen* ('aim'), in line with the etymology of *Zweck* (cf. English 'tack') as connected with a target (*Ziel*).]

[8][I.e., as a means to such cognition.]

place only insofar as the object is given to us; but that, in turn, is possible only—for us human beings, at any rate[9]—by the mind's being affected in a certain manner. The capacity (a receptivity[10]) to acquire presentations[11] as a result of[12] the way in which we are affected[13] by objects is called **sensibility**. Hence by means of sensibility objects are *given* to us, and it alone supplies us with *intuitions*. Through understanding, on the other hand, objects are *thought*, and from it arise *concepts*. But all thought must, by means of certain characteristics,[14] refer ultimately to intuitions, whether it does so straightforwardly (*directe*) or circuitously (*indirecte*);[15] and hence it must, in us [human beings], refer ultimately to sensibility, because no object can be given to us in any other manner than through sensibility.

B 34 The effect of an object on our capacity for presentation, insofar as we
A 20 are affected by the object, is *sensation*. Intuition that refers to the object

[9][This qualification added in B. The point is that other beings might have an intuition that is intellectual (and as such spontaneous, self-active) rather than sensible (and hence passive, a mere receptivity): see B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[10][I have inserted 'a' before 'receptivity' in order to make clear that Kant is not *equating* receptivity with capacity. He rather uses the term 'capacity' synonymously with 'power': see A 51/B 75, and cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 177.]

[11][*Vorstellungen.* My reason for translating *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' rather than as 'representation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[12][*durch.*]

[13][In his working copy of edition A, Kant adds this handwritten note: 'unless intrinsically [*an sich*] the presentation [*Vorstellung*] is itself the cause of the object.' See *Nachträge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*Supplementary Entries to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*), ed. Benno Erdmann (Kiel: Lipsius & Tischer, 1881), xi. Gerhard Lehmann, in his own edition of the *Nachträge*, indicates that Kant's note is added to the word 'affected': "Nachträge zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft" ("Supplementary Entries to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"), in the *Akademie* edition's *Vorarbeiten und Nachträge* (*Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*), part of the *Nachlaß* (Posthumous Writings), Ak. XXIII, 44 The note seems to go with the qualification, added in B, 'for us human beings, at any rate,' and thus suggests a contrast with how "objects" would be "given" in the case of a being with an intuitive (rather than discursive, i.e., conceptual) understanding, i.e., with an understanding whose presentations would be intellectual (rather than sensible) intuitions. See B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[14][This insertion added in B. Kant's word for 'characteristic' (which in some contexts I also render as 'mark') is *Merkmal*. A characteristic is a partial presentation insofar as it is considered as cognitive basis (or ground) of the whole presentation. See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 58. See also J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145.]

[15][*geradezu oder im Umschweife*; the Latin terms mean 'directly,' 'indirectly.' Cf *On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff*, Ak. XX, 279–80.]

through sensation is called *empirical* intuition. The undetermined[16] object[17] of an empirical intuition is called *appearance*.

Whatever in an appearance corresponds to sensation I call its *matter;* but whatever in an appearance brings about the fact that the manifold of the appearance[18] can be ordered in certain relations[19] I call the *form* of appearance. Now, that in which alone sensations can be ordered and put[20] into a certain form cannot itself be sensation again. Therefore, although the matter of all appearance is given to us only a posteriori, the form of all appearance must altogether lie ready for the sensations a priori in the mind; and hence that form must be capable of being examined apart from all sensation.

All presentations in which nothing is found that belongs to sensation I call *pure* (in the transcendental sense of the term). Accordingly, the pure form of sensible intuitions generally, in which everything manifold in experience is intuited in certain relations, will be found in the mind a priori. This pure form of sensibility will also itself be called *pure intuition.* Thus, B 35
if from the presentation of a body I separate what the understanding thinks in it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., and if I similarly separate from it what belongs to sensation in it, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., I am still left with something from this empirical intuition, A 21
namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which, even if there is no actual object of the senses or of sensation,[21] has its place in the mind a priori, as a mere form of sensibility.

There must, therefore, be a science of all principles of a priori sensibility;[22] I call such a science *transcendental aesthetic.*[23] It constitutes the first B 36
part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, and stands in contrast to

[16][Or 'indeterminate': *unbestimmt.* Kant is here giving his less frequently used characterization of an appearance. He usually treats appearances as objects of *experience* and thus as determined (determinate), viz., by the forms of thought (categories), by the forms of intuition (space and time), and by the matter of intuition as contributed by sensation.]

[17][*Gegenstand;* likewise earlier in this and the preceding paragraphs.]

[18][On 'manifold,' see B 203 br. n. 38.]

[19][A has 'brings about the fact that the manifold of the appearance is intuited as ordered in certain relations.']

[20][*stellen.*]

[21][*der Sinne oder Empfindung.*]

[22][See H. E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 81–114. See also H. W. Cassirer, *Kant's First Critique* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954), 23–51. Also J. N. Findlay, *Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Hermeneutic Study* (Ox-

that [part of the] transcendental doctrine of elements which contains the principles of pure thought and is called transcendental logic.

A 22 Hence in the transcendental aesthetic we shall, first of all, *isolate* sensibility, by separating from it everything that the understanding through its concepts thinks [in connection] with it, so that nothing other than empirical intuition will remain.[24] Second, we shall also segregate from sensibility everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing will remain but

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ford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 95–114. And see T. D. Weldon, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), 104–127.]

[23]The Germans are the only people who have come to use the word *aesthetic*[*s*] to designate what others call the critique of taste. They are doing so on the basis of a false hope conceived by that superb analyst, *Baumgarten:*[a] he hoped to bring our critical judging of the beautiful under rational principles, and to raise the rules for such judging to the level of a science. Yet that endeavor is futile. For, as regards their principal[b] sources, those rules or criteria are merely empirical. Hence they can never serve as determinate[c] a priori laws to which our judgment of taste would have to conform; it is, rather, our judgment of taste which constitutes the proper touchstone for the correctness of those rules or criteria. Because of this it is advisable to follow either[d] of two alternatives. One of these is to let this new name *aesthetic*[*s*] become extinct again, and to reserve the name *aesthetic* for the doctrine[e] that is true science. (In doing so we would also come closer to the language of the ancients and its meaning: among the ancients the division of cognition into αἰσθητά καὶ νοητά[f] was quite famous.)[g] The other alternative would be for the new aesthetic[s] to share the name with speculative philosophy; we would then take the name partly in its transcendental sense, and partly in the psychological meaning.[h]

[a][Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714–1762), philosopher in the Leibnizian tradition and disciple of Wolff (see B xxxvi br. n. 134). He introduced the term 'aesthetics' in a sense close to the modern one. Kant himself later found a way to base the critique of taste on a priori principles; his aesthetic theory forms the first part of the third *Critique*, published in 1790. Kant there reacts to the aesthetic theories prevalent at the time, including that of Baumgarten. See the references to Baumgarten and others in the index to my translation of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (cited above, at B xvii br. n. 73).]

[b][‘principal’ (*vornehmst*) added in B.]

[c][‘determinate’ added in B.]

[d][‘either’ added in B.]

[e][Called ‘aesthetic’ here.]

[f][*aisthētá kai noētá* (Latin *sensibilia et intelligibilia*), i.e., the sensible and the intelligible.]

[g][Remainder of Kant's note added in B.]

[h][Given to it by Baumgarten.]

[24][I.e., everything conceptual supplied by the understanding is to be taken away so that one is left with nothing more than what belongs to intuition This in turn is then to be separated into what belongs to sensation (as included in empirical intuition), on the one hand, and pure intuition, on the other.]

pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is all that sensibility can supply a priori. In the course of that inquiry it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition, which are[25] principles for a priori cognition: viz., space and time.[26] We now proceed to the task of examining these.

[25][*als.*]

[26][See Gottfried Martin, *Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1955), 11–41]

B 37

TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

Section I

Space[27]

§ 2
METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION[28] OF THIS CONCEPT[29]

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we present objects as outside us, and present them one and all in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another are determined or determinable. By

[27][Cf. Hans Vaihinger, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, vol. 2, 123–367. For references to Paton, see above, B 1 br. n. 52; for references to Kemp Smith, see above, A vii br. n. 5. Cf. also Christopher B. Garnett, Jr., *The Kantian Philosophy of Space* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 164–235; and cf. Arthur Melnick, *Space, Time, and Thought in Kant* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 5–11, 189–205, 466–481. See also J. W. Ellington, *op. cit.* at B xliii br. n. 149, translator's introduction to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* xi–xv.]

[28][The metaphysical exposition investigates the nature of the presentation of space and shows that this presentation is given a priori. The transcendental exposition of space (in § 3) shows that and how from the a priori presentation of space something else that is a priori follows—viz., synthetic a priori cognitions (propositions of geometry). Cf. the *Prolegomena*, Ak. IV, 263–64, 284–85; also below, A 86–88 and B 133–34.]

[29][Number and heading of subsection added in B.]

means of inner sense the mind intuits itself, or its inner state. Although inner sense provides no intuition of the soul itself as an object, yet there is a determinate form under which alone [as condition] we can intuit the soul's A 23 inner state. [That form is time.] Thus everything belonging to our inner determinations[30] is presented in relations of time. Time cannot be intuited outwardly, any more than space can be intuited as something within us. What, then, are space and time? Are they actual beings? Are they only determinations of things, or, for that matter, relations among them? If so, are they at least[31] determinations or relations that would belong to things intrinsically also, i.e., even if these things were not intuited? Or are they determinations and relations that adhere only to the form of intuition and hence to the subjective character of our mind, so that apart from that character B 38 these predicates cannot be ascribed to any thing at all? In order to inform ourselves on these points, let us first of all give an exposition of the concept of space.[32] Now, by *exposition*[33] (*expositio*) I mean clear (even if not comprehensive) presentation of what belongs to a concept; and such exposition is *metaphysical* if it contains what exhibits the concept as *given a priori.*

1. Space is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from outer experiences. For the presentation of space must already lie at the basis[34] in order for certain sensations to be referred to something outside me (i.e., referred to something in a location of space other than the location in which I am). And it must similarly already lie at the basis in order for me to be able to present [the objects of] these sensations as outside and *alongside*[35] one another, and hence to present them not only as different but as being in different locations. Accordingly, the presentation of space cannot be one that we take from the relations of outer appearance by means of experience; rather, only through the presentation of space is that outer experience possible in the first place.

[30][*Bestimmungen.* The term usually means, roughly, 'attribute'; yet in this work it is important to keep visible the term's connection with 'determine,' 'determinate,' etc.]

[31][*doch.*]

[32][A has 'let us first of all examine space.' Also, remainder of paragraph added in B.]

[33][*Erörterung.*]

[34][*zum Grunde liegen.*]

[35]['and *alongside*' added in B.]

A 24 2. Space is a necessary a priori presentation that underlies[36] all outer intuitions. We can never have a presentation of there being no space, even
B 39 though we are quite able to think of there being no objects encountered in it. Hence space must be regarded as the condition for the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent on them. Space is an a priori presentation that necessarily underlies outer appearances.[37]

3.[38] Space is not a discursive or, as we say, universal concept of things
A 25 as such; rather, it is a pure intuition. For, first, we can present only one space; and when we speak of many spaces, we mean by that only parts of one and the same unique space. Nor, second, can these parts precede the one all-encompassing space, as its constituents, as it were (from which it can be assembled); rather, they can be thought only as *in it*. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and hence also the universal[39] concept of spaces as such, rests solely on [our bringing in] limitations.[40] It follows from this that, as far as space is concerned, an a priori intuition of it (i.e., one that is not empirical) underlies all concepts of space. By the same to-

[36][*zum Grunde liegt.*]

[37][A here inserts the following paragraph:]

> 3. On this a priori necessity rests the apodeictic certainty of all geometric principles and the possibility of geometry's[a] constructions. For if this presentation of space were a concept acquired a posteriori, drawn from general[b] outer experience, then the first principles for determining [things] in mathematics would be nothing but perceptions. Hence they would have all the contingency that perception has; and it would then precisely not be necessary for there to be only one straight line between two points, but this would be something that experience always teaches us. By the same token, what we take from experience has only comparative universality,[c] viz., through induction. Hence all we could say is: as far as we have been able to tell until now, no space has been found that has more than three dimensions.
>
> [a][*ihrer.*]
> [b][*allgemein.*]
> [c][*Allgemeinheit.*]

[38]['4' in A.]

[39][*allgemeine.* This concept is "universal" in the same sense in which the principles of geometry are. Cf. below, A 47/B 64.]

[40][*Einschränkungen.*]

ken, no geometric principles—e.g., the principle[41] that in a triangle two sides together are greater than the third—are ever derived from universal concepts of *line* and *triangle;*[42] rather, they are all derived from intuition, and are derived from it moreover a priori, with apodeictic certainty.

4.[43] We present space as an infinite *given* magnitude. Now it is true that every concept must be thought as a presentation that is contained in an infinite multitude of different possible presentations (as their common characteristic[44]) and hence the concept contains these presentations *under itself.* But no concept, as such, can be thought as[45] containing an infinite multitude of presentations *within itself.*[46] Yet that is how we think space (for all parts of space, *ad infinitum*, are simultaneous[47]). Therefore the original presentation of space is an a priori *intuition*, not a *concept.*[48] B 40

[41][*Grundsatz.*]

[42][Emphasis in both terms added.]

[43][In the place of this paragraph, A has the following:]

> 5. We present space as given as an infinite magnitude. A universal concept of space (which is shared by a foot as it is by an ell) cannot determine anything as regards magnitude. If the boundlessness in the progression of intuition did not carry with it a principle[a] of the infinity of intuition, no concept of relations would do so.[b]
>
> [a][*principium.*]
>
> [b][I.e., carry with it a principle of space as an infinite magnitude.]

[44][See A 19/B 33 br. n. 14.]

[45][‘as if,’ literally.]

[46][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 143–45.]

[47][*zugleich.*]

[48][But, as Kant has indicated, from this original intuition of space concepts can be formed, including such concepts as those of empirical space, relative space, Euclidean space, mathematical space. Cf., for example, the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 481–82, where Kant talks about empirical space and absolute space.]

§ 3[49]
TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION[50] OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE

By a *transcendental exposition* I mean the explication of a concept as a principle that permits insight into the possibility of other synthetic a priori cognitions. Such explication requires (1) that cognitions of that sort do actually flow from the given concept, and (2) that these cognitions are possible only on the presupposition of a given way of explicating that concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet a priori. What, then, must the presentation of space be in order for such cognition of space to be possible? Space must originally be
B 41 intuition. For from a mere concept one cannot obtain propositions that go beyond the concept; but we do obtain such propositions in geometry (Introduction, V[51]) This intuition must, however, be encountered in us a priori, i.e., prior[52] to any perception of an object; hence this intuition must be pure rather than empirical. For geometric propositions are one and all apodeictic, i.e., linked with the consciousness of their necessity—e.g., the proposition that space has only three dimensions. But propositions of that sort cannot be empirical judgments or judgments of experience;[53] nor can they be inferred from such judgments (Introduction, II[54]).

How, then, can the mind have an outer intuition which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined a priori? Obviously, this can be so only insofar as this intuition resides merely in the subject, as the subject's formal character of being affected by objects and of thereby acquiring from them *direct presentation*, i.e., *intuition*, and hence only as form of outer *sense* in general.

Our explication of the concept of space is, therefore, the only one that makes comprehensible the *possibility of geometry* as a [kind of] synthetic a priori cognition. Any way of explicating the concept that fails to make

[49][The following passage, to the end of B 41, added in B.]

[50][Cf. above, A 22/B 37 br. n. 28.]

[51][B 14–18, specifically 16.]

[52][*vor,* which means 'before' only when used temporally, unlike here]

[53][See B 11 br n. 201.]

[54][B 3–6.]

this possibility comprehensible, even if it should otherwise seem to have some similarity to ours, can be distinguished from it most safely by these criteria.[55]

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ABOVE CONCEPTS {A 26 B 42

(a) Space represents[56] no property whatever of any things in themselves, nor does it represent things in themselves in their relation to one another.[57] That is, space represents no determination of such things, no determination that adheres to objects themselves and that would remain even if we abstracted from all subjective conditions of intuition. For determinations, whether absolute or relative, cannot be intuited prior[58] to the existence of the things to which they belong, and hence cannot be intuited a priori.

(b) Space is nothing but the mere form of all appearances of outer senses; i.e., it is the subjective condition of sensibility under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Now, the subject's receptivity for being affected by objects[59] precedes necessarily all intuitions of these objects. Thus we can understand how the form of all appearances can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, and hence given a priori; and we can understand how this form, as a pure intuition in which all objects must be determined, can contain, prior to all experience, principles for the relations among these objects.

Only from the human standpoint, therefore, can we speak of space, of extended beings, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can—viz, as far as we may be affected by objects—acquire outer intuition, then the presentation of space means nothing whatsoever. B 43
This predicate is ascribed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., A 27
only insofar as they are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity which we call sensibility is a necessary condition of all relations in which objects are intuited as outside us; and if we abstract from these

[55][The criteria numbered (1) and (2) at the beginning of this subsection.]

[56][*vorstellen,* clearly not in the sense of the mental activity of *presenting* discussed at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[57][As Leibniz claimed when he said that space involves nothing but the relations among the monads (things in themselves).]

[58][*vor.*]

[59][*Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* just below.]

objects, then the form of that receptivity is a pure intuition that bears the name of space. We cannot make the special conditions of sensibility to be conditions of the possibility of things,[60] but only of the possibility of their appearances. Hence we can indeed say that space encompasses[61] all things that appear to us externally, but not that it encompasses all things in themselves, intuited or not, or intuited by whatever subject. For we can make no judgment at all about the intuitions of other thinking beings, as to whether they are tied to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are valid for us universally. If the limitation on a judgment is added to the concept of the subject [term], then the judgment holds unconditionally. The proposition, All things are side by side in space, holds under[62] the limitation: if these things are taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If I here add the condition to the concept and say, All things considered as outer appearances are side by side in space, then this rule holds universally and
B 44 without limitation. Accordingly, our exposition teaches[63] that space is *real*
A 28 (i.e., objectively valid) in regard to everything that we can encounter externally as object, but teaches at the same time that space is *ideal* in regard to things when reason considers them in themselves, i.e., without taking into account the character of our sensibility. Hence we assert that space is *empirically real* (as regards all possible outer experience), despite asserting[64] that space is *transcendentally ideal*, i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we omit [that space is] the condition of the possibility of all experience and suppose space to be something underlying things in themselves.

Besides space, on the other hand, no other subjective presentation that is referred to something external could be called an a priori objective presentation.[65] For from none of them can we derive synthetic a priori propo-

[60] [*Sachen* here, *Dinge* repeatedly thereafter.]

[61] [*befassen.*]

[62] [A has 'only under.']

[63] [Adopting the fourth edition's substitution of *Erörterung lehrt* for the earlier *Erörterungen lehren.*]

[64] [A has 'asserting at the same time.']

[65] [In the place of the remainder of this paragraph, A has the following:]

> Hence this subjective condition of all external appearances cannot be compared with any other [subjective presentations referred to something external]. A wine's good taste does not belong to the objective determinations of the wine and hence of an object, even of an object con-

sitions, as we can from intuition in space (§ 3[66]). Hence, strictly speaking, ideality does not apply to them, even though they agree with the presentation of space inasmuch as they belong merely to the subjective character of the kind of sense involved. They may belong, e.g., to the sense[67] of sight, of hearing, or of touch,[68] by [being] sensations[69] of colors, sounds, or heat. Yet because they are mere sensations rather than intuitions, they do not allow us to cognize any object at all, let alone a priori.

The only aim of this comment is to forestall an error: it might occur to someone to illustrate the ideality of space asserted above by means of examples such as colors or taste, etc. These are thoroughly insufficient for B 45

sidered as appearance, but belongs to the special character[a] of the sense in the subject who is enjoying this taste.[b] Colors are not properties[c] of the bodies to the intuition of which they attach, but are also only modifications of the sense of sight, which is affected in a certain manner by light. Space, on the other hand, as condition of external objects, belongs necessarily to their appearance or intuition. Taste and colors are in no way necessary conditions under which alone objects[d] can become objects of the senses for us. They are linked with the appearance only as contingently added effects of the special[e] character of our organs.[f] That is, moreover, why they are not a priori presentations, but are based on sensation—[a thing's] good taste, indeed, being based even on feeling[g] (the feeling of pleasure and displeasure), as an effect of sensation. Nor can anyone have a priori a presentation either of a color or of any taste. Space, on the other hand, concerns only the pure form of intuition and hence includes no sensation whatever (nothing empirical); and all kinds and determinations of space are capable of being presented a priori—indeed, they must be capable of this if concepts of shapes and of [spatial] relations are to arise. Through space alone is it possible for things to be external objects for us. A 29

[a][*Beschaffenheit.*]
[b][Or 'that wine.']
[c][*Beschaffenheiten.*]
[d][*Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* just below.]
[e][Or 'particular': *besonder.*]
[f][*Organisation.*]
[g][*Gefühl.* Cf. br. n. 68, just below.]

[66][First part of the subsection, B 40–41.]

[67][*Sinn.*]

[68][*Gefühl*, the basic meaning of which is 'feeling ' Cf.. A 29 (see B 44 n. 65) incl. br. n. 65c.]

[69][*Empfindungen.*]

this, because they are rightly regarded not as properties of things, but merely as changes in ourselves as subjects,[70] changes that may even be different in different people. For in this case, something that originally is itself only appearance—e.g., a rose—counts[71] as a thing in itself in the empirical
A 30 meaning of this expression,[72] a thing in itself that in regard to color can nonetheless appear differently to every eye. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand, is a critical reminder. It reminds us that nothing whatever that is intuited in space is a thing[73] in itself, and that space is not a form of things, one that might belong to them as they are in themselves. Rather, what we call external objects are nothing but mere presentations of our sensibility. The form of this sensibility is space; but its true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not cognized at all through these presentations, and cannot be. Nor, on the other hand, is the thing in itself ever at issue[74] in experience.

[70]['as changes of our subject,' Kant says literally.]

[71][*gelten.*]

[72][Cf. A 45/B 62, also B 69 incl. br. n. 175.]

[73][*Sache* here, *Ding* two sentences earlier and again (in the plural) hereafter.]

[74][*gefragt*]

TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

B 46

Section II

Time[75]

§ 4
METAPHYSICAL EXPOSITION[76] OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME[77]

1. Time is not an empirical concept that has been abstracted from any experience. For simultaneity[78] or succession would not even enter our perception if the presentation of time did not underlie them a priori. Only on the presupposition of this presentation can we present this and that[79] as being at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at different times (sequentially).

[75][Cf. Hans Vaihinger, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, vol. 2, 368–441. Cf. also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 20–26. For references to Paton, see above, B 1 br. n. 152; for references to Kemp Smith, see above, A vii br. n. 5.]

[76][Cf. A 22/B 37 br. n 28.]

[77][Number and heading of subsection added in B.]

[78][*Zugleichsein.* See B 257 br. n. 209.]

[79][*einiges.*]

A 31 2. Time is a necessary presentation that underlies all intuitions. As regards appearances in general, we cannot annul time itself, though we can quite readily remove appearances from time. Hence time is given a priori. All actuality of appearances is possible only in time. Appearances, one and all, may go away; but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be annulled.

B 47 3. This a priori necessity, moreover, is the basis for the possibility of apodeictic principles about relations of time, or for the possibility of axioms about time in general. Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but sequential (just as different spaces are not sequential but simultaneous[80]). These principles cannot be obtained from experience. For experience would provide neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty; we could say only that common perception teaches us that it is so, but not that it must be so. These principles hold as rules under which alone experiences are possible at all; and they instruct us prior to experience, not through it.

4. Time is not a discursive or, as it is called, universal concept; rather,
A 32 it is a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time; and the kind of presentation that can be given only through a single object is intuition. Moreover, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous could not be derived from a universal concept. The proposition is synthetic, and [therefore] cannot arise from concepts alone. Hence it is contained directly in the intuition and presentation of time.

5. To say that time is infinite means nothing more than that any deter-
B 48 minate magnitude of time is possible only through limitations [put] on a single underlying time. Hence the original presentation *time*[81] must be given as unlimited. But if something is such that its parts themselves and any magnitude of an object in it can be presented determinately only through limitation, then the whole presentation of it cannot be given through concepts (for they contain only partial presentations[82]), but any such presentation[83] must be based on direct intuition.

[80][Cf. the end of § 2, B 40.]

[81][Emphasis added in B.]

[82][A has 'for in their case the partial presentations precede.' Cf. the end of § 2, B 40. See also J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145.]

[83][*ihnen* A has *ihre* instead, so that this last clause reads: 'but [any such presentation] must be based on its direct intuition.']

§ 5[84]
TRANSCENDENTAL EXPOSITION[85] OF THE CONCEPT OF TIME

I may refer for this exposition to No. 3,[86] where, for the sake of brevity, I put among the items of the metaphysical exposition what in fact is transcendental. Let me add here that the concept of change, and with it the concept of motion (as change of place), is possible only through and in the presentation of time; and that if this presentation were not (inner) a priori intuition, no concept whatsoever could make comprehensible the possibility of a change, i.e., of a combination, in one and the same object, of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., one and the same thing's being in a place and not being in that same place). Only in time can both of two contradictorily opposed determinations be met with in one thing: viz., *sequentially.* Hence our concept of time explains the possibility of all that synthetic a priori cognition which is set forth by the—quite fertile—general theory of motion. B 49

§ 6[87]
CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE CONCEPTS

(a) Time is not something that is self-subsistent[88] or that attaches to things as an objective determination, and that hence would remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of our intuition of it. For if time were self-subsistent, then it would be something that without there being an actual object would yet be actual.[89] But if, on the second alternative, time A 33
were a determination or order attaching to things themselves,[90] then it could not precede the objects as their condition, and could not a priori be cognized through synthetic propositions and intuited. But this a priori cogni-

[84][This whole subsection added in B.]

[85][Cf. A 22/B 37 br. n. 28.]

[86][In § 4, A 31/B 47.]

[87]['§ 6' added in B]

[88][*für sich selbst bestehen.*]

[89][As in the case of Newton's absolute space.]

[90][As in the case of Leibniz, who held that time involves nothing but relations among the monads (things in themselves).]

tion and intuition can take place quite readily if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which alone any intuition can take place in us. For in that case this form of inner intuition can be presented prior[91] to the objects, and hence presented a priori.

(b) Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuiting we do of ourselves and of our inner state. For time cannot be a determination
B 50 of outer appearances, [because] it does not belong to any shape or position, etc., but rather determines the relation of presentations in our inner state. And precisely because this inner intuition gives us no shape, do we try to make up for this deficiency by means of analogies. We present time sequence by a line progressing *ad infinitum*, a line in which the manifold constitutes a series of only one dimension. And from the properties of that line we infer all the properties of time, except for the one difference that the parts of the line are simultaneous whereas the parts of time are always sequential. This fact, moreover, that all relations of time can be expressed by means of outer[92] intuition, shows that the presentation of time is itself intuition.

A 34 (c) Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances generally. Space is the pure form of all outer appearances; as such it is limited, as a priori condition, to just outer appearances. But all presentations, whether or not they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as determinations of the mind, belong[93] to our inner state; and this inner state is subject to[94] the formal condition of inner intuition, and hence to the condition of time. Therefore time is an a priori condition of all appearance generally: it is the direct[95] condition of inner appearances (of our souls), and
B 51 precisely thereby also, indirectly, a condition of outer appearances. If I can say a priori that all outer appearances are in space and are determined a priori according to spatial relations, then the principle of inner sense allows me to say, quite universally, that all appearances generally, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations of time.

[91][*vor.*]

[92][*an einer äußeren.*]

[93][*gehören*]

[94][*gehören unter.*]

[95][*unmittelbar* (analogously for 'indirectly' just below) See B xxxix br. n. 144c]

If we take[96] objects as they may be in themselves—i.e., if we abstract from the way in which we intuit ourselves inwardly, and in which by means of this intuition we also take into[97] our power of presentation all outer intuitions—then time is nothing. Time has objective validity only with regard to appearances, because these are already things considered[98] as *objects of our senses.* But time is no longer objective if we abstract from the A 35 sensibility of our intuition, and hence from the way of presenting peculiar to us, and speak of *things as such.*[99] Hence time is merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (an intuition that is always sensible—i.e., inasmuch as we are affected by objects); in itself, i.e., apart from the subject, time is nothing. Nevertheless, time is necessarily objective in regard to all appearances, and hence also in regard to all things that we can encounter in experience. We cannot say that all things [as such] are in time; for in the concept of things as such we abstract from all ways of intuiting B 52 them, while yet this intuition[100] is the very[101] condition under which[102] time belongs in the presentation of objects. If now we add the condition to the concept, and say that all things as appearances (objects of sensible intuition) are in time, then this principle has all its objective correctness and a priori universality.

Hence the doctrine we are asserting is that time is *empirically real*, i.e., objectively valid in regard to all objects that might ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object that is not subject to the condition of time can ever be given to us in experience. On the other hand, we dispute that time has any claim to absolute[103] reality; i.e., we dispute any claim whereby time would, quite[104] without taking into ac- A 36 count the form of our sensible intuition, attach to things absolutely,[105] as a

96[*nehmen.*]

97[More literally, 'encompass in': *in . . . befassen.*]

98[*annehmen.*]

99[Or *'things in general'*: *Dinge überhaupt.* My reason for (usually) rendering *überhaupt* in this way is given at B xxvii br. n. 106.]

100[Reading *diese* for the *dieser* found in B as B appears in the *Akademie* edition.]

101[*eigentliche.*]

102[As added to the concept of a thing as such.]

103[*absolute.*]

104[*auch.*]

105[*schlechthin.*]

condition or property. Nor indeed can such properties, properties belonging to things in themselves, ever be given to us through the senses. In this, then, consists the *transcendental ideality* of time. According to this view,[106] if we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, then time is nothing, and cannot be included among objects in themselves (apart from their relation to our intuition) either as subsisting[107] [as such an object] or
B 53 as inhering [in one]. But this ideality of time is not to be compared, any more than is the ideality of space, with the subreptions of sensations.[108] For in their case we presuppose that the appearance itself in which these predicates[109] [allegedly] inhere has objective reality.[110] In the case of time, such objective reality is entirely absent,[111] except insofar as this reality is merely empirical, i.e., except insofar as we regard the object itself as merely appearance. See, on this, the above comment, in SECTION I.[112]

§ 7[113]
ELUCIDATION

Against this theory, which grants that time is empirically real but disputes that it is real absolutely and transcendentally, I have heard men of insight raise quite unanimously an objection. I gather from this great unanimity that the objection must occur naturally to every reader who is not accustomed to contemplations such as these. The objection is the following.
A 37 Changes[114] are actual. (This is proved by the variation[115] on the part of our own presentations—even if one were to deny all outer appearances,

[106][The transcendental idealism of time, properly speaking.]

[107][*subsistierend.*]

[108][I.e., (instances of) their surreptitious substitution for, and thus confusion with, something in the object, as discussed above: A 28-30/B 44–45. See also A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n. 14, and cf. A 791–92 = B 819–20.]

[109][I.e., the colors, sounds, etc., surreptitiously treated as properties of the object.]

[110][Whereas the colors, sounds, etc., do not.]

[111][And is here treated as such, subreption thus being precluded.]

[112][See the end of the section on space. A 28–30/B 44–45.]

[113]['§ 7' added in B]

[114][*Veränderungen.*]

[115][*Wechsel.* On variation and change, see B 224 br n. 45, and cf. A 187/B 230.]

along with their changes.) Now changes are possible only in time. Therefore time is something actual. There is no difficulty in replying to the objection. I concede the whole argument. Time is indeed something actual, viz., the actual form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner experience; i.e., I actually have the presentation of time and B 54
of my determinations in time. Hence time is to be regarded as actual,[116] though not as an object but as the way of presenting that I myself have as an object. Suppose, on the other hand, that I could intuit myself without being subject to this condition of sensibility, or that another being could so intuit me; in that case the very same determinations that we now present as changes would provide a cognition in which the presentation of time, and hence also that of change, would not occur at all. Hence time retains its empirical reality as condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality must, by the reasons adduced above, be denied to time. Time is nothing but the form of our inner intuition.[117] If we take away from time [the qualification that it is] the special condition of our sensibility, then the concept of time vanishes as well; time attaches not to objects themselves, but A 38
merely to the subject intuiting them.

But what causes this objection to be raised so unanimously, and raised, moreover, by those who nonetheless cannot think of any plausible objec- B 55
tion against the doctrine that space is ideal, is the following. They had no hope of establishing apodeictically that space is real absolutely; for they are confronted by idealism, according to which the actuality of external objects is incapable of strict proof. By contrast, the actuality of the object of our inner sense[118] (the actuality of myself and of my state) is directly evident through consciousness. External objects might be a mere illusion; but the object of inner sense is, in their opinion, undeniably something actual. They failed to bear in mind, however, that both of them, though their actuality as presentations is indisputable, still belong only to appearance. Appearance always has two sides. One is the side where the object is regarded in itself (without regard to the way in which it is intuited, which is

[116][Construing *wirklich* as an adjective, rather than as an adverb modifying 'to be regarded'.]

[117]I can indeed say: My presentations follow[a] one another. But that means only that we are conscious of them as being in a time sequence[b]—in accordance, i.e., with the form of inner sense. Time is not, on that account, something in itself, nor is it a determination attaching to things objectively.

[a][*folgen.*]
[b][*-folge.*]

[118][Reading *unseres inneren Sinnes* for *unserer inneren Sinne* ('of our inner senses').]

precisely why its character always remains problematic).[119] The other is the side where we take account of the form of the intuition of this object. This form must be sought not in the object in itself, but in the subject to whom the object appears. Yet this form belongs to the appearance of this object actually and necessarily.

Time and space are, accordingly, two sources of cognition. From these
A 39 sources we can draw a priori different synthetic cognitions—as is shown above all by the splendid example that pure mathematics provides in re-
B 56 gard to our cognitions of space and its relations. For time and space, taken together, are pure forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make synthetic propositions possible a priori.[120] But precisely thereby (i.e., by being merely conditions of sensibility), these a priori sources of cognition determine their own bounds; viz., they determine that they apply to objects merely insofar as these are regarded as appearances, but do not exhibit things in themselves. Appearances are the sole realm where these a priori sources of cognition are valid; if we go outside that realm, there is no further objective use that can be made of them. This [limited] reality of space and time leaves the reliability of experiential cognition otherwise untouched; for we have equal certainty in that cognition, whether these forms necessarily attach to things in themselves or only to our intuition of these things. Those, on the other hand, who assert that space and time—whether they assume these as subsistent or as only inherent—are real absolutely must be at variance with the principles of experience itself.[121] For suppose they decide to assume space and time as subsistent[122] (thus taking what is usually the side of the mathematical investigators of nature): then they must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsistent[123] nonentities[124] (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything actual) only in order to encompass everything actual. Or suppose they assume space and time
A 40 as only inherent (thus taking the side to which some metaphysical natural

[119][For Kant's view that things in themselves are (thought of as) what appears, see B xxvii.]

[120][Or 'make synthetic a priori propositions possible.' See B 19 br. n. 234.]

[121][For Kant's discussion of these two alternatives, representing (respectively) the Newtonian and the Leibnizian views, cf. the beginning of the preceding subsection, A 32–33/B 49 See also the references given at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27.]

[122][*subsistierend*]

[123][*für sich bestehende*.]

[124][*Undinge*: 'nonthings,' literally, with absurdity implied. See A 292/B 348 incl. br. n. 149.]

scientists belong). Here space and time count[125] for them as relations of appearances (occurring concurrently or sequentially)—relations abstracted from experience but, as thus separated, presented confusedly. If they take B 57
this second side, then they must dispute that the mathematical a priori doctrines are valid for actual things (e.g., things in space), or at least that they are apodeictically certain. For a posteriori there is no such certainty at all. According to this second opinion, the a priori concepts of space and time are only creatures of the imagination,[126] and their source must actually be sought in experience: the relations[127] are abstracted from experience; and the imagination has made from them something that, while containing what is universal in these relations, yet cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has connected with them. Those who assume space and time as [real absolutely and] subsistent do gain this much: they make the realm of appearances free[128] for mathematical assertions. On the other hand, these very conditions[129] create great confusion for them when the understanding wants to go beyond the realm of appearances. Those, on the other hand, who assume space and time as [real absolutely but as] only inherent gain on this latter point. I.e., they do not find the presentations of space and time getting in their way when they want to judge objects not as appearances but merely as they relate to the understanding. But they can neither indicate a basis for the possibility of mathematical a priori cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid a priori intuition[130]), nor bring the proposi-
tions of experience into necessary agreement with those a priori math- A 41
ematical assertions. Our theory of the true character of these two original B 58
forms of sensibility provides the remedy for both [sets of] difficulties.

Finally, transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, i.e., space and time. This is evident from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility presuppose something empirical. This holds even for the concept of motion, which unites the two components.[131] For [the concept of] motion presupposes the perception of something mov-

[125][*gelten.*]

[126][*Einbildungskraft* here, *Einbildung* just below.]

[127][Of space and time.]

[128][Which on the opposing view just mentioned it was not.]

[129][The self-subsistent space and time as being eternal and infinite.]

[130][To which to appeal]

[131][Space and time.]

able.[132] But in space, considered in itself, there is nothing movable; therefore the movable must be something that we find *in space only through experience*, and hence must be an empirical datum. Similarly, transcendental aesthetic cannot include among its a priori data the concept of change. For time itself does not change; rather, what changes is something that is in time. Therefore the concept of change requires the perception of some existent[133] and of the succession of its determinations; hence it requires experience.

B 59

§ 8[134]
GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC[135]

I.[136] In order to forestall any misinterpretation of our opinion regarding the
A 42 basic character of sensible cognition as such, we must first explain as distinctly as possible what that opinion is.

What we have tried to say, then, is the following. All our intuition is nothing but the presentation of appearance. The things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being. Nor do their relations in themselves have the character that they appear to us as having. And if we annul ourselves as subject, or even annul only the subjective character of the senses generally, then this entire character of objects and all their relations in space and time—indeed, even space and time themselves—would vanish; being appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but can exist only in us. What may be the case regarding objects in themselves and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains to us entirely unknown. All we know[137] is the way in which we perceive them. That way is peculiar to us and does not necessarily have to apply to all beings, even

[132][Namely, matter. See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak IV, 469–72.]

[133][*Dasein*, which usually means 'existence.']

[134]['§ 8' added in B.]

[135][Cf. Hans Vaihinger, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, vol. 2, 441–548.]

[136][Number added in B.]

[137][More literally, 'are acquainted with'· *kennen*. I am using 'know' in this context for the sake of consistency with my rendering (for which there is no manageable alternative here) of *unbekannt* as 'unknown' just above, and of *bekannt* as 'known' near the end of this paragraph]

though it applies necessarily to all human beings. Solely with that way of perceiving are we dealing here. Space and time are its pure forms; sensation as such as its matter. Only that way of perceiving can we cognize a priori, i.e., prior[138] to all actual perception, and that is why it is called pure intuition. Sensation, on the other hand, is that component in our cognition on whose account it is called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The forms [of intuition] attach to our sensibility with absolute necessity, no matter of what kind our sensations may be; the sensations can differ very much. Even if we could bring this institution of ours to the highest degree of distinctness, that would still not get us closer to the character of objects in themselves. For what we would cognize, and cognize completely, would still be only our way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility; and we would always cognize it only under the conditions attaching to the subject originally: space and time. What objects may be in themselves would still never become known to us, not even through the most enlightened cognition of what alone is given to us, viz., their appearance. B 60 A 43

Hence we must reject the view[139] that our entire sensibility is nothing but our confused presentation of things, a presentation that contains solely what belongs to them in themselves, but contains it only by way of[140] an accumulation of characteristics[141] and partial presentations that we do not consciously discriminate. For this view falsifies the concept of sensibility and of appearance, thus rendering the entire doctrine of sensibility useless and empty. The distinction between an indistinct and a distinct presentation is merely logical and does not concern the content.[142] No doubt the concept of *rightness*[143] as employed by common sense[144] contains just the same as can be extricated from it by the most subtle speculation, except that in its common[145] and practical use one is not conscious of the diverse presentations contained in that thought. But that does not entitle us to say B 61

[138][*vor.*]

[139][Held by Leibniz.]

[140][*unter.*]

[141][Or 'marks': *Merkmalen.* See A 19/B 33 br. n. 14.]

[142][Cf., for this discussion, the First Introduction to Kant's *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. XX, 226n. See also above, A xvii br. n. 26.]

[143][*Recht.*]

[144][Literally, 'sound understanding': *gesunder Verstand.*]

[145][*gemein.*]

A 44 that the common concept is sensible and contains a mere appearance. For rightness cannot be an appearance at all; rather, its concept lies in the understanding,[146] and we present by it a character of acts (their moral character) which belongs to them in themselves. On the other hand, when a *body* is presented in intuition, this presentation contains nothing whatever that could belong to an object in itself. It contains, rather, merely the appearance of something, and the way we are affected by that something. This receptivity of our cognitive capacity is called sensibility; and even if we were to see through that appearance and to its very bottom, yet this receptivity remains as different as day and night[147] from cognition of the object in itself.

Hence the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolff,[148] by considering the distinction between what is sensible and what is intellectual as a merely logical one, has imposed an entirely wrong point of view on all investigations about the nature and origin of our cognitions. For plainly the distinction is transcendental, and does not concern merely the form of these cognitions,
B 62 i.e., their distinctness or indistinctness, but concerns their origin and content. Hence sensibility does not merely fail to provide us with a distinct cognition of the character of things in themselves; it provides us with none whatsoever. And once we remove our subjective character, then the presented object, along with the properties contributed to it by sensible intuition, is not to be found anywhere at all; nor can it possibly be found, because this subjective character is precisely what determines the form of that object as appearance.[149]

A 45 It is true that we commonly make this distinction about appearances: we distinguish what attaches to their intuition essentially and holds for the sense of every human being in general, from what belongs to that intuition only contingently by being valid only for a special position of this or that sense, or for the special organization of that sense, but not valid for the relation of [the intuition to] sensibility in general. We then speak of the first kind of cognition as presenting the object in itself, and of the second as presenting only its appearance. This distinction, however, is only empiri-

[146][And not in intuition.]

[147][*himmelweit.*]

[148][See xxxvi br. n. 134.]

[149][This is exactly what is involved in Kant's Copernican revolution. See B xvi–xvii.]

cal.[150] If (as is commonly done) we fail to go beyond it and do not (as we ought to do) regard that empirical intuition in turn as mere appearance, in which nothing whatever belonging to some thing in itself is to be found, then our transcendental distinction is lost. We then believe after all that we cognize things in themselves, even though in the world of sense,[151] how- B 63
ever deeply we explore its objects, we deal with nothing whatever but appearances. Thus it is true, e.g., that when during a rain accompanied by sunshine we see a rainbow, we will call it a mere appearance, while calling the rain the thing in itself. And this is indeed correct, provided that we here take the concept of a thing in itself as meaning only something physical. We then mean by it something that in general[152] experience, and in all its different positions in relation to the senses, is yet determined thus, and not otherwise, in intuition. But suppose that we take this empirical something as such, and that—without being concerned about its being the A 46
same[153] for the sense of every human being—we ask whether it presents also an object in itself (not whether it presents the rain drops, for these, as appearances, will already be empirical objects). In that case our question about the presentation's relation to the object is transcendental, and the answer is: Not only are these drops mere appearances; rather, even their round shape, and indeed even the space in which they fall, are nothing in themselves. They are, rather, mere modifications, or foundations, of our sensible intuition. The transcendental object, however, remains unknown[154] to us.

Our second important concern in this transcendental aesthetic is that it should not merely gain some favor as a plausible hypothesis, but should be as certain and indubitable as can possibly[155] be demanded of a theory that is to serve as an organon. In order to make this certainty fully evident, let us select some case that can render the validity of this organon obvi- B 64
ous[156] and can serve to clarify further what has been set forth in § 3.

[150][Cf. A 29/B 45, also B 69 incl. br. n. 175.]

[151][Parentheses around 'in the world of sense' removed.]

[152][*allgemein*.]

[153][*Einstimmung*.]

[154][*unbekannt.*]

[155][*jemals.*]

[156][Remainder of sentence added in B.]

Suppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and are conditions of the possibility of things in themselves. We then find, in the first place, that we encounter a large number of synthetic a priori propositions about both space and time—above all about space, which we shall therefore investigate here as our prime example. The propositions of ge-
A 47 ometry are cognized synthetically a priori and with apodeictic certainty. And so I ask: From where do you obtain such propositions, and on what does the understanding rely in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way [to arrive at truths] than through concepts or through intuition. But these concepts and intuitions are both given either a priori or a posteriori. The a posteriori ones, i.e., empirical concepts as well as the empirical intuition on which they are based, can yield only such synthetic propositions as are likewise merely empirical, i.e., propositions of experience. As such, these propositions can never contain necessity and absolute universality; yet these are what characterize all geometric propositions. The first and sole means of arriving at such cognitions is a priori, through mere concepts or through intuitions. From mere concepts, however, we clearly can obtain no synthetic cognition at
B 65 all, but only analytic cognition.[157] Just take the proposition that two straight lines cannot enclose any space and hence do not permit [construction of] any figure, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and of the number two. Or take the proposition that three straight lines permit [construction of] a figure, and try similarly to derive it from these mere concepts. All your endeavor is futile, and you find yourselves compelled to have recourse to intuition, as indeed geometry always does. Hence you give
A 48 yourselves an object in intuition. But of which kind is this intuition? Is it a pure a priori intuition or an empirical one? If it were an empirical intuition, then it could never turn into a universally valid proposition, let alone an apodeictic one; for experience can never supply anything like that. Hence you must give your object to yourselves a priori in intuition, and base your synthetic proposition on this object. Now suppose that there did not lie within you a power[158] to intuit a priori; that this subjective condition were not, as regards its form, at the same time the universal a priori condition under which alone the object of this (outer) intuition is itself possible; and that the object (the triangle) were something in itself, even apart from any relation to yourselves as subject. If that were so, how could you say that

[157][Cf. the *Prolegomena*, Ak. IV, 268–74.]

[158][*Vermögen*.]

what necessarily lies in [or belongs to] your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle must also belong necessarily to the triangle itself?[159] For, after all, you could not add to your concepts (of three lines) anything new (the figure) that would therefore have to be met with necessarily in the object, since this object would be given prior to your cognition rather than through it. Hence you could not synthetically a priori establish anything whatsoever about external objects if space (and similarly time) were not a mere form of your intuition, an intuition that a priori contains conditions[160] under which alone things can be external objects for you—these objects being nothing in themselves, apart from these subjective conditions. Therefore the following is not merely possible—or probable, for that matter—but indubitably certain: Space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition. Hence in relation to these conditions[161] all objects are mere appearances, and are not given to us in this way on their own. And that is why much can be said a priori about these objects as regards their form, but not the least can ever be said about the thing in itself that may underlie these appearances.[162] B 66 A 49

II. This theory, according to which both outer and inner sense are ideal and hence all objects of the senses are mere appearances, can be confirmed superbly by the following observation. Whatever in our cognition belongs to intuition (excluding, therefore, what are not cognitions at all, i.e., both the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the will) contains nothing but mere relations: of places in an intuition (extension), of change of places (motion), and of laws according to which this change is determined (motive forces). But what is present in that place, or what effect—besides the change of place—it produces in the things[163] themselves, is not given to us by [what belongs to intuition]. Now through mere relations we do not, of course, cognize a thing in itself. Hence our judgment must surely be this: since through outer sense we are given nothing but mere relational presentations, outer sense can, by the same token, contain in its presentation only the relation of an object to the subject, but not the intrinsic character belonging to the object in itself. The same applies to inner intuition. B 67

[159][*an sich selbst.*]

[160][Or 'which contains a priori conditions.']

[161][Or, possibly, 'to our intuition.']

[162][Remainder of the Transcendental Aesthetic added in B]

[163][Kant uses *Ding* (in the plural) here, *Sache* just below.]

For not only does the proper material in it, with which we occupy our mind, consist in presentations of *outer senses;* but the time in which we place[164] these presentations, and which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and underlies, as formal condition, the way in which we place them within the mind, already contains relations: of succession, of simultaneity, and of what is simultaneous with succession (the permanent). Now, presentation that can precede all acts of thinking anything is intuition; and if this intuition contains nothing but relations then it is the form of intuition. But this form does not present anything except insofar as something is being placed within the mind. Therefore this form can be nothing but
B 68 the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity—viz., this placing of its presentation—and hence affected by itself; i.e., it is an inner sense insofar as that sense's form is concerned. Whatever is presented through a sense is, to that extent, always appearance. Hence either we must not grant that there is an inner sense at all; or we must grant that the subject who is the object of this sense can be presented through it only as appearance, and not as he would judge himself if his intuition were self-activity[165] only, i.e., if it were intellectual intuition.[166] What underlies this whole difficulty is this: how can a subject inwardly intuit himself? But this difficulty is shared by every theory. The consciousness of oneself (apperception) is the simple presentation of the *I;*[167] and if through this consciousness by itself all the manifold in the subject were given *self-actively*, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. But in man this consciousness requires also inner perception of the manifold given in the subject beforehand; and the way in which this manifold is given in the mind—viz., without spontaneity—must, for the sake of marking this distinction, be called sensibility. If the power[168] to become conscious of oneself is to locate (apprehend) what lies in the mind, then it must affect the mind; and only in that way can it produce an intuition of itself. But the form of this intuition lies
B 69 at the basis beforehand in the mind; and this form determines, in the presentation of time, the way in which the manifold is [placed] together in the

[164][*setzen.*]

[165][*Selbsttätigkeit,* also translatable as 'spontaneity' (which I prefer to use for *Spontaneität*—cf. just below).]

[166][See B 72.]

[167][Emphasis added, to improve the readability of this single-letter word (as used in this way). This improvement is usually more obvious than it is here.]

[168][Or 'ability': *Vermögen*]

mind. And thus this power does not intuit itself as it would if it presented itself directly and self-actively; rather, it intuits itself according to the way in which it is affected from within, and hence intuits itself as it appears to itself, not as it is.[169]

III. I am saying, then, that the intuition of external objects and the self-intuition of the mind both present these objects and the mind, in space and in time, as they affect our senses, i.e., as they appear. But I do not mean by this that these objects[170] are a mere *illusion.*[171] For when we deal with appearance, the objects, and indeed even the properties[172] that we ascribe to them, are always regarded as something actually given—except that insofar as the object's character[173] depends only on the subject's way of intuiting this given object in its relation to him, we do also distinguish this object as *appearance*[174] from the same object as object *in itself.*[175] Thus when I posit[176] both bodies and my soul as being in accordance with the quality of space and time, as condition of their existence, I do indeed assert that this quality lies in my way of intuiting and not in those objects in themselves. But in asserting this I am not saying that the bodies merely *seem*[177] to be outside me, or that my soul only *seems* to be given in my self-consciousness. It would be my own fault if I turned into mere illusion what I ought to class with appearance.[178] This is not, however, what hap- B 70

[169][These topics will be fully explored in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432. See also B 152–59.]

[170][*Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* just above and just below.]

[171][*Schein.*]

[172][*Beschaffenheiten.*]

[173][*Beschaffenheit.*]

[174][*Erscheinung.*]

[175][In Kant's usual (transcendental) sense of this expression, rather than in its empirical sense (found, e.g., at A 29/B 45 and A 45/B 62).]

[176][*setzen.*]

[177][*scheinen.*]

[178]The predicates of the appearance can be ascribed to the object itself[a] in relation to our sense: e.g., to the rose, the red color or the scent. But what is mere illusion B 70
can never be ascribed as predicate to an object, precisely because illusion ascribes to the object taken *by itself*[b] what belongs to it only in relation to the senses or in general to the subject—an example being the two handles initially ascribed to Saturn. If something is not to be met with at all in the object in itself, but is always to be met with in the object's relation to the subject and is inseparable from the pre-

pens if we follow our principle that all our sensible intuitions are ideal. On the contrary: it is when we attribute *objective reality* to those forms of presentation that we cannot prevent everything from being thereby transformed into mere *illusion.* For suppose that we regard space and time as properties that, as far as their very possibility is concerned, must be found in things[179] in themselves. And now reflect on the absurdities in which we then become entangled, inasmuch as [we then have] two infinite things that must not be substances nor anything actually inhering in substances, but
B 71 that yet must be something existent—indeed, must be the necessary condition for the existence of all things—and must moreover remain even if all existing things are annulled. If we thus reflect on this supposition, then we can hardly blame the good *Berkeley* for downgrading bodies to mere illusion. Indeed, even our own existence, which would in this way be made dependent on the self-subsistent reality of a nonentity such as time would be, would be transformed along with this time into nothing but illusion—an absurdity of which no one thus far has made himself guilty.

IV. In natural theology we think an object [viz., God] that not only cannot possibly be an object of intuition for us, but that cannot in any way be an object of sensible intuition even to itself. [When we think of God in this way,] we take great care to remove the conditions of time and space from all his intuition. (All his cognition must be intuition rather than *thought*, which always manifests limits.) But what right do we have to do this if we have beforehand turned[180] space and time into forms of things in themselves—such forms, moreover, as are a priori conditions of the existence of things and hence would remain even if we had annulled the things

sentation of the object,[c] then it is appearance. And thus the predicates of space and time are rightly ascribed to objects of the senses, as such; and in this there is no illusion. Illusion first arises if, by contrast, I ascribe the redness to the rose *in itself,* or the handles to Saturn, or extension to all external objects *in themselves,*[d] without taking account of—and limiting my judgment to—a determinate relation of these objects to the subject.

[a][*selbst.*]

[b][*für sich.*]

[c][Keeping the original *ersteren*, which Erdmann changes to *letzteren*, so that we would have to read 'presentation of the subject.']

[d][*an sich.* The expression is actually used adverbially here (and probably also just above), as modifying 'ascribe.' Although 'in themselves' (etc) does not lend itself to adverbial use, switching to a different term here (e.g., 'intrinsically') would impair clarity.]

[179][*Sachen* here, *Dinge* just below.]

[180][*machen.*]

themselves? For as conditions of all existence in general, they would have to be conditions also of the existence of God. If we are not to make[181] space and time objective forms of all things, then we are left with only one alternative: we must make them subjective forms of our kind of intuition, inner and outer. Our kind of intuition is called sensible[182] because it is *not original.*[183] I.e., it is not such that through this intuition itself the existence of its object is given (the latter being a kind of intuition that, as far as we can see, can belong only to the original[184] being). Rather, our kind of intuition is dependent on the existence of the object, and hence is possible only by the object's affecting the subject's capacity to present. B 72

There is, moreover, no need for us to limit this kind of intuition—intuition in space and time—to the sensibility of man. It may be (though we cannot decide this) that any finite thinking being must necessarily agree with man in this regard. Yet even if this kind of intuition were thus universally valid, it would not therefore cease to be sensibility. It would remain sensibility precisely because it is derivative (*intuitus derivativus*) rather than original (*intuitus originarius*), and hence is not intellectual intuition. For the reason just set forth, intellectual intuition seems to belong solely to the original being, and never to a being that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (an intuition that determines that being's existence by reference to given objects[185]). This last remark, however, must be considered as included in our aesthetic theory only as an illustration, not as a basis of proof.

[181][*machen.*]

[182][Rather than intellectual.]

[183][*ursprünglich.* On intellectual (original) intuition (and the intuitive understanding that would have it), see B 138–39, 145, A 166/B 207 incl. br. n. 67, A 249–52, B 307–9, A 256/B 311–12, and A 279–80 = B 335–36, and cf. B xl incl. br. n. 144g, B 68, 135, 149. See also the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. 402–8, and cf. 418. For the way in which the concept of an intellectual intuition (and of an intuitive understanding) unites Kant's three *Critiques* in one system, see the Translator's Introduction to my translation of that work (above, B xvii br. n. 73), lxxxvi–cii.]

[184][*Ur-*.]

[185][Cf. B 275-79.]

B 73

CONCLUDING THE TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC

Thus in our pure a priori intuitions, space and time, we now have one of the components required for solving the general problem of transcendental philosophy: *How are synthetic propositions possible a priori?*[186] When in an a priori judgment about space and time we want to go beyond the given concept, we encounter[187] what cannot be discovered a priori in the given concept, but can indeed be so discovered in the intuition corresponding to that concept and can be combined with it synthetically. Because of this,[188] however, such judgments can never reach beyond objects[189] of the senses, and can hold only for objects of possible experience.

[186][Cf. B 19 incl. br. ns. 234 and 235.]

[187][In the a priori intuition.]

[188][The judgment's dependence on intuition and the merely synthetic connection to the concept.]

[189][*Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* just below.]

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS

{A 50 B 74

PART II

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC[1]

Introduction
Idea of a Transcendental Logic

I
ON LOGIC AS SUCH

Our cognition[2] arises from two basic sources of the mind. The first is [our ability] to receive[3] presentations[4] (and is our receptivity[5] for impressions); the second is our ability[6] to cognize an object[7] through these presentations

[1][See Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 167–542.]

[2][*Erkenntnis*. For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6.]

[3][*empfangen.*]

[4][*Vorstellungen.* My reason for translating *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' rather than as 'representation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[5][*Rezeptivität.*]

[6][Or 'power': *Vermögen.* See A 19/B 33 incl. br. n 10 and A xii br. n. 16.]

[7][*Gegenstand*, in this case See A vii br. n 7]

(and is the spontaneity of concepts[8]). Through receptivity an object is *given* to us; through spontaneity an object is *thought* in relation to that [given] presentation (which [otherwise][9] is a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts, therefore, constitute the elements of all our cognition. Hence neither concepts without an intuition corresponding to them in some way or other,[10] nor intuition without concepts can yield cognition. Both intuition and concepts are either pure or empirical. They are *empirical* if they contain sensation (sensation presupposes the actual presence of the object); they are *pure* if no sensation is mixed in with the presentation.[11] Sensation[12] may be called the matter[13] of sensible[14] cognition. Hence
B 75 pure intuition contains only the form under which something is intuited,
A 51 and a pure concept contains solely the form of the thought[15] of an object as such.[16] Only pure intuitions or concepts are possible a priori; empirical ones are possible only a posteriori.

Let us give the name *sensibility* to our mind's *receptivity*,[17] [i.e., to its ability] to receive[18] presentations insofar as it is affected in some manner. *Understanding*, on the other hand, is our ability to produce presentations ourselves, i.e., our *spontaneity* of cognition.[19] Our *intuition*, by our very nature, can never be other than *sensible* intuition;[20] i.e., it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. *Understanding*, on the other

[8][I.e., the self-activity (cf. B 68 incl. br. n. 165) of using concepts in thought and cognition and of expanding them to frame new ones.]

[9][I.e., apart from that thought, whereby this determination enters into our cognition of the object.]

[10][*auf einige Art*.]

[11][I e., the intuition or concept.]

[12][*Empfindung*.]

[13][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 189, 203, 294, 325–26. See also the *Prolegomena*, Ak. IV, 284, 324, and cf. 306, 307, 309.]

[14][*sinnlich*.]

[15][Literally, 'of the thinking': *des Denkens*.]

[16][*überhaupt*; see B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[17][*Rezeptivität*.]

[18][*empfangen*.]

[19][For the contrast between understanding and sensibility, see the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 140–46, and cf. 196–99, 220.]

[20][Only an intuitive understanding (ours is discursive, i.e., conceptual) can have *intellectual* intuition. See B 72 incl br. n. 183.]

hand, is our ability to *think* the object of sensible intuition. Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us; and without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind. Hence it is just as necessary that we make our concepts sensible[21] (i.e., that we add the object to them in intuition) as it is necessary that we make our intuitions understandable (i.e., that we bring them under concepts). Moreover, this capacity and this ability[22] cannot exchange their functions. The understanding cannot intuit anything,[23] and the senses cannot think anything. Only from their union can cognition arise. This fact, however, B 76
must not lead us to confuse their respective contributions;[24] it provides us, rather, with a strong reason[25] for carefully separating and distinguishing A 52
sensibility and understanding from each other. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility as such, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of the understanding as such, i.e., logic.

Now logic, in turn, can be done from two points of view,[26] either as logic of the understanding's general[27] use or as logic of its special[28] use. The logic of the understanding's general use contains the absolutely necessary rules of thought without which the understanding cannot be used at all.[29] Hence it deals with the understanding without regard to the difference among the objects to which the understanding may be directed. This logic may be called elementary logic. The logic of the understanding's special use, which may be called the organon of this or that science, contains the rules for thinking correctly about a certain kind of objects. The schools usually make this logic a preface to the sciences, using it as a propaedeu-

[21][Cf. *Versinnlichung* in the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 351, and in the First Introduction to that work, Ak. XX, 223.]

[22][I.e., sensibility and understanding. More literally, Kant says 'these two abilities or capacities.' The adopted rendering construes capacity as passive (as sensibility is) and *ability* (or *power*) as either active (like understanding) or passive. See also A xii br. n. 16.]

[23][See br. n. 20, just above.]

[24][To cognition.]

[25][*man hat große Ursache*.]

[26][See H. J Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 188–235.]

[27][*allgemein*, which also means 'universal.']

[28][*besonder*, which also means 'particular.']

[29][*gar kein Gebrauch . . . stattfindet*.]

tic, even though in terms of the progression[30] of human reason it comes last: reason does not arrive at this logic until long after the science is done and needs only finishing touches that will correct and perfect it. For if we
B 77 are to state the rule as to how a [particular] science can be brought about, then the objects of that science must already be familiar to us to a fairly high degree.

A 53 Now general logic is either pure or applied logic. In general logic we abstract from all empirical conditions under which we exercise our understanding. We abstract, e.g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of imagination, from the laws of memory, from the force of habit, from inclination, etc.; hence we abstract also from the sources of prejudices,[31] and indeed from all causes generally that give rise, or may be alleged to give rise, to such and such[32] cognitions. For these empirical conditions concern the understanding only as applied under certain[33] circumstances, and becoming acquainted with these circumstances requires experience. Hence a logic that is *general* but also *pure* deals with nothing but a priori principles. Such a logic is a *canon of understanding* and of reason, but only as regards what is formal in our use of them—i.e., we disregard what the content may be (whether it is empirical or transcendental). A *general logic* is called *applied*, on the other hand, if it is concerned with the rules of the understanding as used under the subjective empirical conditions taught[34] us by psychology. Hence such a logic has empirical principles, although it is general insofar as it deals with our use of the understanding without distinguishing the understanding's objects. That is also the reason why applied general logic is neither a canon of the understanding as such nor an
B 78 organon of special sciences, but solely a cathartic for the common understanding.[35] In general logic, therefore, the part that is to constitute the pure doctrine[36] of reason must be separated entirely from the part that is to con-
A 54 stitute applied (though still general) logic. Only the first of these parts[37] is,

[30][*Gang.*]

[31][On prejudice, see the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 75–81, and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 294.]

[32][*gewisse.*]

[33][*gewissen.*]

[34][*lehren.*]

[35][I.e., common sense.]

[36][*-lehre.*]

[37][Pure general logic.]

properly speaking, a science, although it is brief and dry and thus is such as the exposition of a doctrine of the understanding's elements is required to be in order to comply with school standards. In such pure general logic, therefore, the logicians must always have in mind two rules:

1. As general logic, it abstracts from all content of the cognition of understanding and from the difference among the objects of that cognition, and deals with nothing but the mere form of thought.

2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles. Hence it does not (as people have sometimes come to be persuaded) take anything from psychology; and therefore psychology has no influence whatever on the canon of the understanding. Pure general logic is demonstrated doctrine, and everything in it must be certain completely a priori.

What I call applied logic is a presentation of the understanding and of the rules governing its necessary use *in concreto*, viz., its use under the contingent conditions attaching to the subject, conditions that can impede B 79
or promote this use and that are, one and all, given only empirically. (This definition of applied logic is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the expression, according to which applied logic should contain certain exercises for which pure logic gives the rule). On my definition, applied logic deals with attention; attention's being impeded and the consequences thereof; the origin of error; the states of doubt, of having scruples, of conviction, etc.[38] Pure general logic relates to applied general logic as pure morality relates to the doctrine proper of virtue.[39] Pure morality[40] contains merely the A 55
moral[41] laws of a free will as such; the doctrine of virtue examines these laws as impeded by the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which human beings are more or less subject.[42] The doctrine of virtue can never serve as true and demonstrated science; for, just like applied logic, it requires empirical and psychological principles.

[38][On attention, see the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 206–8, cf. 212; cf. also the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. XX, the n. on 226–27. On the origin of error, see the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 53–57. On doubt and scruples, see *ibid.*, 83–84. On conviction (and persuasion), see *ibid.*, 73, and the *Critique of Judgment*, 461–63, cf. 477.]

[39][Kant's Doctrine of Virtue (Ak. VI, 375–493) is Part II of his *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 203–493. For its relation to pure morality, see *ibid*, 205, 211–28, 374–413.]

[40][*Moral.*]

[41][*sittlich.*]

[42][See the Doctrine of Virtue, Ak. VI, 375–493, and cf. the *Anthropology*, Ak VII, 251–82.]

II
On Transcendental Logic

General logic, as we have shown, abstracts from all content of cognition, i.e., from all reference of cognition to its object.[43] It examines only the logical form in the relation that cognitions have to one another, i.e., only the form of thought as such. But (as the Transcendental Aesthetic establishes) there are both pure and empirical intuitions; and hence we might well find
B 80 it appropriate to distinguish also between pure and empirical thought of objects. In that case there would be a logic[44] in which we would not abstract from all content of cognition. For a logic containing merely the rules governing the pure thought of an object would only[45] exclude all those cognitions that have empirical content. Such a logic, moreover, would also deal
A 56 with the origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that origin cannot be attributed to the objects, whereas general logic has nothing to do with the origin of cognition. Rather, general logic examines[46] presentations, whether these have their basic origin[47] a priori in ourselves, or are given only empirically; and it examines these presentations merely in terms of the laws according to which the understanding, when it thinks, uses them in their relation to one another. Hence general logic deals only with that form of the understanding which can be imparted to the presentations, whatever their origin may be irrespective of that form.

And here I shall make a comment; it extends its influence to all subsequent contemplations, and hence must be remembered carefully. We must not call just any a priori cognition transcendental, but must call transcendental (i.e., concerning[48] the a priori possibility or the a priori use of cognition)[49] only that a priori cognition whereby we cognize that—and how—certain presentations (intuitions or concepts) are applied, or are pos-

[43][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* (in the plural) just below.]

[44][Viz., transcendental logic.]

[45][*bloß*, as added by Adickes.]

[46][*betrachten.*]

[47][*uranfänglich.*]

[48][I follow Adickes in adding *betreffend* and in changing, accordingly, *der Gebrauch* to *den Gebrauch*]

[49][Cf. B 25.]

sible, simply[50] a priori. Hence neither space nor any a priori geometric determination of it is a transcendental presentation. Rather, we may call transcendental only the cognition that these presentations are not at all of empirical origin, and the possibility whereby[51] they can nonetheless refer a priori to objects of experience. Similarly, the use of space regarding objects in general[52] would also be transcendental. But if the use of space is limited to objects of the senses only, then it is called empirical. The distinction between the transcendental and the empirical belongs, therefore, only to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the reference of these cognitions to their object. B 81 A 57

We shall expect, then, that there may perhaps be concepts referring a priori to objects. Not being pure or sensible intuitions, but being merely acts of pure thought, they would be concepts, but such concepts as originate neither empirically nor aesthetically.[53] In this expectation, then, we frame in advance the idea of a science of pure understanding and of rational cognition,[54] whereby we think objects completely a priori. Such a science would determine the origin, the range, and the objective validity of such rational cognitions. It would have to be called *transcendental logic*. For it deals merely with the laws of understanding and of reason; yet it does so only insofar as this logic is referred a priori to objects—unlike general logic, which is referred indiscriminately to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions. B 82

III
ON THE DIVISION OF GENERAL LOGIC INTO ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC

What is truth?[55] is the ancient and famous question with which people meant to drive logicians into a corner, trying to get them to the point where

[50][*lediglich.*]

[51][*wie.*]

[52][Objects of experience (which includes sensation) and objects of pure geometry.]

[53][I.e., concepts originating neither from empirical intuition nor from intuition generally.]

[54][Or 'cognition of reason': *Vernunfterkenntnis.*]

[55][In A, this question is doubly emphasized (by bold print).]

either they must let themselves be caught in a pitiful circle,[56] or they must
A 58 confess their ignorance and hence admit the futility of their whole art. In asking logicians this question, these people took for granted, and they presupposed, the explication of the name *truth*,[57] viz., that truth is the agreement of cognition with its object. They demanded to know, instead,[58] what is the universal and safe criterion of the truth of any cognition. [They failed to see, however, the absurdity of their own question.]

To know what question one should, reasonably, ask is already a great and necessary proof of one's sagacity and insight. For if the question is in itself absurd and demands answers that are unnecessary, then it not only embarrasses the person raising it, but sometimes has the further disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener: it may prompt him to give ab-
B 83 surd answers and to provide us with the ridiculous spectacle where (as the ancients said) one person milks the ram[59] while the other holds a sieve underneath.

Thus if truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must here[60] be distinguished from others. For if a cognition does not agree with the object to which it is referred then it is false, even if it contains something that might well hold for other objects. Now a universal criterion of truth would be one that is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of their objects. But while in such a universal criterion of truth we thus abstract from all content of cognition (i.e., from its ref-
A 59 erence to its object), yet truth concerns this very content. Clearly, therefore, asking questions about a mark for the truth of this content of cognitions is quite impossible and absurd; and hence one cannot possibly give an indicator[61] of truth that is sufficient and yet universal at the same time. Now we have already earlier called the content of a cognition its matter.[62] Hence we shall have to say that no universal indicator can be demanded

[56][*Diallele*. For these first four paragraphs of subsection III, cf. the *Logic*, Introduction, VII, Ak. IX, 49–57. For the circle referred to here, see *ibid.*, 50.]

[57][I.e., in effect, the definition. Emphasis added.]

[58][*aber*.]

[59][Reference works characterize this saying as a Greco-Roman proverb quoted (e.g.) in Samuel Hieron, *Works* (1616), i, 586; and in John Hales, *Several Tracts* (1656), 40. Milking of rams is mentioned also in Vergil's *Eclogues*, iii, 91.]

[60][Literally 'thereby': *dadurch*.]

[61][Or 'criterion': *Kennzeichen*.]

[62][See A 50/B 74.]

for the truth of cognition in terms of its matter, because such an indicator would be intrinsically contradictory.

As regards cognition in terms of its mere form (setting aside all content), on the other hand, and thus as regards a logic insofar as it puts forth the universal and necessary rules of the understanding, it is equally clear B 84 that such a logic must in these very rules set down criteria of truth. For whatever contradicts these rules is false, because the understanding is then[63] in conflict with its own universal rules of thought, and hence with itself. These criteria, however, concern only the form of truth, i.e., the truth of thought as such, and are to that extent quite correct. But they are not sufficient. For even if a cognition accorded completely with logical form, i.e., even if it did not contradict itself, it could still contradict its object. Therefore the merely logical criterion of truth, viz., a cognition's agreement with the universal[64] and formal laws of understanding and reason, is indeed the *conditio sine qua non,*[65] and hence the negative condition, of all truth. But A 60 logic cannot go any farther than this; it has no touchstone by which it can discover an error that concerns content rather than form.[66]

Now general[67] logic analyzes[68] the whole formal business of understanding and reason into its elements, and exhibits these elements as principles governing all logical judging[69] of our cognition. Hence this part of

[63][*dabei.*]

[64][*allgemein.*]

[65][Indispensable (or necessary) condition.]

[66][For the remainder of subsection III, cf. the *Logic*, Introduction, II, Ak. IX, 16–21.]

[67][*allgemein.*]

[68][Literally, 'resolves': *auflösen.*]

[69][*Beurteilung.* In the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* (see Ak. XX, 211), Kant makes a distinction between *Beurteilung* and *Urteil* (judgment). He there uses the first term to stand for *reflective* judgment, i.e., judgment that tries to find a universal for the particular in an intuition (cf. below, A 260–92/B 316–49) —as distinguished from *determinative* judgment, in which an already available universal is used to determine an object. But Kant does not repeat the distinction, not even in the *Critique of Judgment* itself; nor does he consistently adhere to it. The reason for this seems to be that in German grammar adding *be-* to the intransitive *urteilen* simply turns it into its transitive analogue, *beurteilen.* (Cf., say, 'moan' and 'bemoan' in English.) Hence the English verb 'to judge,' which is both transitive and intransitive, properly renders both German verbs. It is therefore not only unnecessary, but quite misleading, to render *urteilen* by 'to judge' but *beurteilen* by some other verb (similarly for the corresponding nouns), especially by such verbs as 'to estimate,' 'to assess,' 'to appraise,' 'to criticize,' all of which already imply *evaluation*, whereas *beurteilen* does not itself (i.e., apart from special contexts) carry such an implication.]

logic may be called an analytic.[70] This analytic is at least the negative touchstone of truth, precisely because all cognition must first of all be tested and assessed, in terms of its form, by these rules;[71] this must be done before we examine these rules themselves in terms of their content in order
B 85 to establish whether they contain positive truth as regards their object. On the other hand, the mere form of cognition, however much it may agree with logical laws, is far from being sufficient to establish that a cognition is true objectively (materially). Hence with mere logic no one can venture to make judgments about objects and assert anything about them. Rather, we must first go outside logic to obtain well-based information about objects, in order then to attempt merely employing this information and connecting it in a coherent whole in accordance with logical laws, or—better yet—in order only to test the information by these laws. Yet there is something very tempting about possessing so plausible an art, whereby we give to all our cognitions the form of our understanding—even though we may
A 61 still be very empty-handed and poor as regards the cognition's content. So great is this temptation that this general logic, which is merely a *canon* for judging, has been used—like an *organon*, as it were—for the actual production of at least deceptive[72] objective assertions, and thus has in fact been misused. Now general logic, when used as supposed organon, is called *dialectic.*[73]

Although the ancients used this name *dialectic,* as standing for a science or art, in quite different senses, still from their actual use of the name
B 86 we can safely glean that dialectic was for them nothing other than the *logic of illusion.* I.e., it was the sophistical art of giving an air of truth to one's ignorance, and indeed even to one's deliberate deceptions; this was done by[74] imitating the method of thoroughness prescribed by logic as such, and by employing the topic[75] of logic[76] to paint over any empty pretense. Now

[70][Kant probably expected his readers to know that *auflösen* (cf. br. n. 68, just above) has the same root meaning as 'analyze.']

[71][I.e., the principles just mentioned.]

[72][*Blendwerk von.* Reading, with Kehrbach, *des Blendwerks* for *zum Blendwerk.*]

[73][See Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 91–95]

[74][Reading, with Erdmann, *dadurch daß* for *daß.*]

[75][*Topik.*]

[76][The topic (or topics) of (general) logic is the art, developed above all by Aristotle in his *Topics*, of discovering plausible (though not demonstrative) arguments to establish or refute a given position. This discovery is accomplished by means of general argument forms that,

we may note (as a sure and useful warning)[77] that general logic, when *regarded as an organon*, is always a logic of illusion, i.e., it is always dialectical. For general logic teaches us nothing whatever about the content of cognition; it teaches us merely the formal conditions for the agreement [of cognition] with the understanding, and these conditions are wholly inconsequential otherwise, i.e., as regards the [cognition's] objects. Hence the impudent use of general logic as an instrument (organon), in order (at least allegedly)[78] to broaden and expand one's knowledge,[79] comes down to nothing but idle chatter, where anything one wishes is—with some semblance of plausibility[80]—asserted or, for that matter, challenged at will. A 62

Such instruction is in no way compatible with the dignity of philosophy. For this reason the name *dialectic*[81] has been [redefined so that a dialectic is] included with logic as a *critique* of *dialectical illusion*;[82] and this is how we want it to be understood here as well.

IV B 87
On the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental Analytic and Dialectic

In a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (just as in the transcendental aesthetic above we isolated sensibility), and we select from our cognition merely that part of thought which has its origin solely in the understanding. The use of this pure cognition rests on the condition, however, that objects to which it can be applied are given to us in intuition. For without intuition, all our cognition lacks objects, and thus remains com-

being prepared in advance, serve as the "places" (Greek τόποι [*tópoi*], Latin *topica*) or headings to which the more specific arguments are referred. At A 268–69/B 324–25 Kant characterizes Aristotle's topic by reference to an underlying *logical* topic, which he contrasts in turn with a *transcendental* topic (cf. also A 83/B 109, A 344/B 402).]

77[Parentheses added.]

78[Parentheses added.]

79[*Kenntnisse.*]

80[Here 'semblance of plausibility' translates *Schein.*]

81[Emphasis added.]

82[*Schein.*]

pletely empty.[83] That part, then, of transcendental logic which sets forth the elements of understanding's pure cognition, as well as the principles without which no object can be thought at all, is transcendental analytic. It is at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it with-
A 63 out at the same time losing all content, i.e., all reference to any object, and hence without losing all truth. On the other hand, there is great enticement and temptation to employ these pure cognitions of understanding and these principles[84] by themselves, and to do so even beyond the bounds of expe-
B 88 rience, even though only experience can provide us with the matter (objects) to which those pure concepts of understanding can be applied. As a consequence, the understanding runs the risk that, by idly[85] engaging in subtle reasoning,[86] it will put the merely formal principles of pure understanding to a material use, and will make judgments indiscriminately even[87] about objects that are not given, or indeed about objects that perhaps cannot be given in any way at all. Properly, then, transcendental analytic should be only a canon for judging the empirical use.[88] Hence we misuse transcendental analytic if we accept it as the organon of a universal and unlimited use, and if with pure understanding alone we venture to judge, assert, and decide anything synthetically about objects as such. Hence[89] the use of pure understanding would then be dialectical. Therefore the second part of transcendental logic must be a critique of this dialectical illusion, and is called transcendental dialectic. It is to be regarded not as an art of dogmatically creating[90] such illusion (an art that is unfortunately quite prevalent in diverse cases of metaphysical jugglery), but as a critique of understanding and reason as regards their hyperphysical[91] use. We need

[83][*leer.*]

[84][*Grundsätze* here, *Prinzipien* just above. Concerning my use of 'principle' to render both *Prinzip* and *Grundsatz*, see A vii br. n. 7. In the present passage, too, Kant is clearly using the two terms interchangeably.]

[85][*leer.*]

[86][*Vernünfteleien.*]

[87][*doch.*]

[88][Of the understanding; similarly for 'universal and unlimited use' just below.]

[89][I e , as such a misuse.]

[90][*erregen.*]

[91][I.e., supranatural.]

such a critique in order to uncover the deceptive illusion[92] in the baseless pretensions of understanding and reason;[93] and we need it in order to downgrade reason's[94] claim that it discovers and expands [cognition]—which it supposedly accomplishes by merely using transcendental principles—[to the claim that it] merely judges pure understanding and guards it against sophistical deceptions.[95] A 64

TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC B 89

DIVISION I
TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC[96]

Transcendental analytic consists in the dissection[97] of our entire a priori cognition into the elements of understanding's pure cognition. The following points are what matters in this dissection: (1) The concepts must be pure rather than empirical. (2) They must belong not to intuition and sensibility, but to thought and understanding. (3) They must be elementary concepts, and must be distinguished carefully from concepts that are either derivative or composed of such elementary concepts. (4) Our table of these concepts must be complete, and the concepts must occupy fully the whole realm of pure understanding. Now, this completeness [characteristic] of a science cannot be assumed reliably by gauging an aggregate of concepts that was brought about merely through trials. Hence this completeness is

92[More literally, 'the false semblance': *den falschen Schein.*]

93[*ihrer.*]

94[*ihrer.*]

95[See Walter Watson, *op cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 71.]

96[See Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 174–424. See also Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer, *La Déduction transcendantale dans l'oeuvre de Kant* (Paris· Librairie Ernest Leroux, 1936, 1937; reprinted New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1976), vol. 2, 15–202. (Vol. 1 of the original work used the spelling *transcendentale*.)]

97[*ist die Zergliederung.*]

possible only by means of an *idea of the whole* of understanding's a priori cognition, and through the division, determined by that idea, of the concepts amounting to that cognition; and hence this completeness is possible
A 65 only through the *coherence* of these concepts *in a system*. Pure understanding differentiates itself fully not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility [generally].[98] Therefore it is a unity that is self-sub-
B 90 sistent, sufficient to itself, and that cannot be augmented by supplementing it with any extrinsic additions. Hence the sum of pure understanding's cognition will constitute a system that can be encompassed and determined by[99] an idea. The system's completeness and structure[100] can at the same time serve as a touchstone of the correctness and genuineness of whatever components of cognition fit into the system. This entire part of the Transcendental Logic[101] consists, however, of two *books;* one of these contains the *concepts*, the other the *principles*, of pure understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

BOOK I
ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

By *analytic of concepts*[102] I do not mean the analysis of concepts, i.e.,[103] the usual procedure in philosophical inquiries of dissecting already available concepts[104] in terms of their content and bringing them to distinct-

[98][I.e., even from a priori intuition.]

[99][*unter.*]

[100][*Artikulation.* Cf. A xix.]

[101][Viz., the Transcendental Analytic.]

[102][Emphasis added.]

[103][*oder.*]

[104][*Begriffe, die sich darbieten.*]

ness; rather, I mean the hitherto rarely attempted *dissection*[105] *of the power*[106] *of understanding itself*. The purpose of this dissection is to explore the possibility of a priori concepts, by locating them solely in the understanding, as their birthplace, and by analyzing the understanding's pure use as such.[107] For this exploration is the proper task of a transcendental philosophy; the rest[108] is the logical treatment of concepts in philosophy generally.[109] Hence we shall trace the pure[110] concepts all the way to their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where these concepts lie prepared until finally, on the occasion of experience, they are developed[111] and are exhibited by that same understanding in their purity,[112] freed from the empirical conditions attaching to them.

A 66

B 91

ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

Chapter I
On the Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding[113]

When we bring into play a cognitive power, then, depending on the various ways in which we may be prompted to do so, different concepts come

105[I.e., analysis.]

106[*Vermögen*. See A xii br. n. 16.]

107[*überhaupt*. My reason for rendering this term in this way is given at B xxvii br. n. 106.]

108[The analysis of concepts mentioned above.]

109[*überhaupt*.]

110[*rein*.]

111[Or 'unfolded': *entwickelt*.]

112[*Lauterkeit*.]

113[See R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 61–77.]

to the fore that allow us to recognize[114] this power. These concepts can be collected[115] in an essay that will be more or less comprehensive, once the concepts have been observed fairly long or with significant[116] mental acuity.[117] But by this—as it were, mechanical—procedure we can never reliably determine at what point[118] that inquiry will be completed. Moreover,
A 67 if concepts are discovered only on given occasions, then they reveal them-
B 92 selves in no order or systematic unity; instead they are ultimately only paired according to similarities, and arranged in series according to the quantity[119] of their content, from the simple concepts on to the more composite. The way in which these series are brought about, despite being methodical in a certain manner, is anything but systematic.

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, but also the obligation, of locating its concepts according to a principle. For these concepts arise, pure and unmixed, from the understanding, which is an absolute unity; and hence these concepts themselves must cohere with each other according to one concept or idea. Such coherence, however, provides us with a rule by which we can determine a priori the proper place[120] for each pure concept of understanding, and the completeness of all of them taken together —whereas otherwise all of this would be subject to one's own discretion or to chance.

[114][*kennbar machen.*]

[115][And set forth.]

[116][*mit größerer.*]

[117][*Scharfsinnigkeit.* A has 'visual acuity' (*Scharfsichtigkeit*).]

[118][*wo.*]

[119][Literally, 'magnitude': *Größe.*]

[120][*seine Stelle.*]

Transcendental Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding[121]

Section I

On the Understanding's Logical Use As Such

The understanding was explicated merely negatively above, viz., as a non-sensible cognitive power.[122] And since independently of sensibility we cannot partake of any intuition, it follows that the understanding is not a power of intuition. Apart from intuition, however, there is only one way of cognizing, viz., through concepts. Hence the cognition of any understanding, or at least of the human understanding, is a cognition through concepts; it is not intuitive, but discursive.[123] All our intuitions, as sensible, rest on our being affected;[124] concepts, on the other hand,[125] rest on functions. By *function*[126] I mean the unity of the act of arranging various presentations under one common presentation. Hence concepts[127] are based on the spontaneity of thought, whereas sensible intuitions are based on the receptivity for impressions. Now the only use that the understanding can

A 68
B 93

[121][See Graham Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), 91–109. See also H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 52–62. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 115–35. Especially see H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 245–309. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 128–47.]

[122][Perhaps the reference is to the following characterization at A 65/B 89: 'Pure understanding differentiates itself fully not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility [generally].' Kant seems to have forgotten the *positive* characterization of the understanding which he provided at A 50–52/B 74–76.]

[123][See the references given at B 72 br. n. 183.]

[124][*Affektionen.*]

[125][Reading, with Adickes, *aber* for *also* ('hence').]

[126][Emphasis added.]

[127][Inasmuch as they involve such an act.]

make of these concepts is to judge by means of them.[128] But in such judging, a concept is never referred directly[129] to an object, because the only kind of presentation that deals with its object directly is intuition. Instead the concept is referred directly to some other presentation of the object (whether that presentation be an intuition or itself already a concept). Judgment, therefore, is the indirect[130] cognition of an object, viz.,[131] the presentation of a presentation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that [comprises and thus] holds for many [presentations], and, among them,[132] comprises also a given presentation that is referred directly to the object. E.g., in the judgment, *All bodies are divisible,*[133] the concept of the divisible refers to various other concepts; but, among these, it is here referred
A 69 specifically to the concept of body, and the concept of body is referred in
B 94 turn to certain appearances[134] that we encounter. Hence these objects are presented indirectly through the concept of divisibility. Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our presentations. For instead of cognizing the object by means of a direct presentation, we do so by means of a higher presentation comprising both this direct presentation and several other presentations; and we thereby draw many possible cognitions together into one. Now since all acts of the understanding can be reduced to judgments, the *understanding* as such can be presented as a *power of judgment.*[135] For, according to what we said above, the understanding is a power of thought. But thought is cognition through concepts; and concepts, as predicates of possible judgments, refer to some presentation of an as yet undetermined[136] object. Thus the concept of body signifies something—e.g.,

128[See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 143–46.]

129[*unmittelbar*. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

130[Or 'mediate.']

131[Literally, 'hence': *mithin.*]

132[Reading, with Erdmann, *diesen vielen* for *diesem Vielen* ('this multitude').]

133[Adopting the fourth edition's substitution of *teilbar* for the earlier *veränderlich* ('changeable'), in agreement with the remainder of the sentence. Kant himself made the same correction in his working copy of edition A. See Benno Erdmann's *Nachträge zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), 23.]

134[Corrected by Kant to 'intuitions' in his working copy of edition A. See the *Akademie* edition's *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries* (cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), Ak. XXIII, 45.]

135[See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 145–46.]

136[Or 'indeterminate.']

metal—that can be cognized through that concept. Hence it is a concept only because there are contained under it other presentations by means of which it can refer to objects. Therefore the concept of body is the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g., the judgment that every metal is a body. Therefore we can find all of the functions of the understanding if we can exhibit completely the functions of unity in judgments.[137] This, however, can be accomplished quite readily, as the following section will show.

[Transcendental] Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding

{A 70 B 95}

Section II

§ 9[138]
ON THE UNDERSTANDING'S LOGICAL FUNCTION IN JUDGMENTS

If we abstract from all content of a judgment as such and pay attention only to the mere form of understanding in it, then we find that the function of thought in judgment can be brought under four headings, each containing under it three moments. They can conveniently be presented in the following table.

[137] [See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 148–173.]

[138] ['§ 9' added in B.]

1
Quantity of Judgments
Universal
Particular
Singular

2
Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

3
Relation
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive

4
Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodeictic

B 96 Since this division departs in some respects, even though not in essen-
A 71 tial ones, from the customary technical apparatus[139] used by logicians, there will be some point in my offering the following safeguards against the worrisome possibility of its being misunderstood.

1. Logicians are right in saying that, when judgments are used in syllogisms,[140] singular judgments can be treated like universal[141] ones. For precisely because singular judgments have no range at all, any predicate of them cannot be referred[142] to some part of what is contained under the concept of the subject and be excluded from some other part of it. Hence the predicate of a singular judgment holds for the subject concept without exception, just as if this concept were a generally valid[143] one and the predicate held for the whole denotation[144] within the concept's range. On the

[139][*Technik.*]

[140][*Vernunftschlüsse*, which literally means 'inferences of reason.']

[141][*allgemein.*]

[142][*gezogen.*]

[143][I.e., in effect, universal: *gemeingültig.*]

[144][*Bedeutung*. Kant normally uses this term to mean either 'signification' or 'meaning,' neither of which fits here. And 'denotation' must here be taken broadly, as including not only

other hand, if[145] a singular judgment is compared in terms of quantity[146] with a generally valid one merely as [two kinds of] cognition,[147] then the singular judgment[148] relates to the generally valid one as unity relates to infinity, and hence is in itself essentially distinct from it. Suppose, therefore, that I assess a singular[149] judgment (*iudicium singulare*) not merely in terms of its intrinsic validity but also as cognition as such, and assess it in terms of the quantity that it has by comparison with other cognitions. In that case the singular judgment is indeed distinct from generally valid judgments (*iudicia communia*); and hence it then deserves a separate place in a complete table of the moments of thought as such (although it does indeed not deserve a separate place in the logic that is limited to the use of B 97
judgments merely in relation to[150] one another).[151]

2. Similarly, in a transcendental logic we must distinguish from *affirmative* judgments [not only negative ones but] also *infinite judgments,* A 72
even though in general logic they are rightly included with affirmative ones and do not constitute a separate member in the division of judgments. For general logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if the predicate is negative), and has regard only for whether the predicate is being ascribed to the subject or is being opposed to it. But transcendental logic considers the judgment also in terms of what value or content there is in this logical affirmation made by means of a merely negative predicate, and in terms of what gain for cognition as a whole is provided by this affirmation. If in speaking of the soul I had said, It is not mortal, then by this negative judgment I would at least have avoided an error. Now if I say instead, The soul is nonmortal, then I have indeed, in terms of logical form, actually affirmed something; for I have posited the soul in[152] the unlimited range of nonmortal beings. Now what is mortal comprises one part of the whole

actual but also really (as distinguished from logically) possible objects. See, on all of this, A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

145[As is done in transcendental logic (as distinguished from general logic).]

146[Literally, 'magnitude': *Größe*.]

147[I.e., as two kinds of judgments (propositions), rather than as parts of a syllogism.]

148[Reading, with Erdmann, *es* for *sie*.]

149[*einzeln*]

150[*unter-*.]

151[See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 173–74.]

152['into,' literally—unlike in the next occurrence of the verb 'posit' (*setzen*) a few lines below.]

range of possible beings, and what is nonmortal comprises the other. Hence my proposition[153] says nothing more than that the soul is one of the infinite multitude of things that remain if I take away whatever is mortal. But to say that is only to limit the infinite sphere of all that is possible, viz., to
B 98 limit it to the extent that what is mortal is separated from it and the soul is posited in the remaining space of the sphere's range.[154] But despite this exclusion [of what is mortal from it], this space still remains infinite; and even if we take away from it still more parts, this does not in the least in-
A 73 crease the concept of the soul and determine it affirmatively. Hence although such judgments[155] are infinite as regards logical range, they are actually merely limitative as regards the content of cognition as such. In view of this, they must not be omitted from the transcendental table of all moments of the thought occurring in judgments, because the function that the understanding perforns in these infinite judgments may perhaps be important in the realm of the understanding's pure a priori cognition.[156]

3. The following are all the relations of thought in judgments: (a) the relation of the predicate to the subject; (b) the relation of the ground to its consequence;[157] (c) the relation, in a divided cognition, of all of[158] the division's members[159] to one another. In these three kinds of judgments we consider, in relation to one another: in the first kind of judgments, two concepts only; in the second, two judgments; in the third, several judgments. To illustrate the second kind, take a hypothetical proposition: If there is a perfect justice, then the persistently evil person is punished. This proposition in fact contains the relation of two propositions: There is a perfect justice; and, The persistently evil person is punished. Whether these two propositions are in themselves true remains undecided here; only the im-

[153][That the soul is nonmortal.]

[154][I.e., the space (of the sphere's range) that includes whatever is nonmortal. I am following the *Akademie* edition in restoring in B the reading found in A. The unaltered B version reads: 'in the remaining range of the sphere's space,' which conflicts with what follows.]

[155][As the judgment that the soul is nonmortal.]

[156][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 173–75.]

[157][Or 'of the basis to its consequence': *des Grundes zur Folge*.]

[158][*gesammelt.*]

[159][More literally, 'of the divided cognition and of all of the members': *der eingeteilten Erkenntnis und der gesammelten Glieder*. I have adjusted my rendering to the correction provided by Kant in his working copy of edition A: *'in einem eingeteilten Erkenntnis*[,] *der gesammelten Glieder*. See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*, Ak. XXIII, 45.]

plication[160] is thought through this hypothetical judgment. Finally, to illustrate the third kind: a disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two, B 99 or of several, propositions to one another. But this relation is not one of sequence.[161] Rather, it is a relation of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of the one proposition excludes the sphere of the other; yet it is at the same time a relation of community, insofar as the two propositions together occupy[162] the sphere of the proper cognition involved. Hence the relation of the propositions in a disjunctive judgment is a relation of the A 74 parts of a cognition's sphere. For the sphere of each part complements the sphere of the other part, to yield the whole sum of the divided cognition. Take this judgment, e.g.: The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause. Each of these propositions occupies a part of the sphere of possible cognition concerning the existence of a world as such; all of them together occupy the whole sphere. To remove the cognition from one of these spheres means placing it into one of the other spheres; and, on the other hand, to place it into one sphere means to remove it from the others. Hence in a disjunctive judgment there is a certain community of cognitions. This community consists in the fact that the cognitions reciprocally exclude one another, and yet as a *whole*[163] determine thereby the true cognition; for, taken together, they constitute the whole content of a single given cognition. And this, moreover, is all that I here need to point out in view of what follows.

4. The modality of judgments is a very special function of them. What distinguishes this function is the fact that it contributes nothing to the judg- B 100 ment's content (for besides quantity,[164] quality, and relation there is nothing else to constitute a judgment's content). Rather, modality concerns only the value that the copula has in reference to thought as such. *Problematic* judgments are those where the affirmation or negation is taken[165] as merely *possible* (optional); *assertoric* ones are those where the affirmation or negation is considered as *actual* (true); *apodeictic* ones are those in which it A 75

[160] [*Konsequenz.*]

[161] [*Abfolge.*]

[162] [*erfüllen* here, *einnehmen* a few lines below.]

[163] [*im Ganzen.*]

[164] [Literally, 'magnitude': *Größe.*]

[165] [*annehmen.*]

is regarded as *necessary*.[166] Thus the two judgments (*antecedens* and *consequens*) whose relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment, and similarly the judgments (members of the division[167]) in whose interaction[168] the disjunctive judgment consists, are one and all problematic only. In the above example,[169] the proposition, There is a perfect justice, is not uttered assertorically, but is thought only as an optional judgment, i.e., one that it is possible for someone to assume; only the implication is assertoric. This is also the reason why such optional judgments, even if manifestly false, can still, when taken problematically, be conditions for the cognition of truth. Thus in the disjunctive judgment used above, the judgment *The world exists through blind chance* has only problematic meaning; viz., to the ef-
B 101 fect that someone might perhaps assume this proposition for an instant. And yet it serves us in finding the true proposition (just as indicating the wrong road serves us in finding the right one among the number of all the roads that one can take). Hence a problematic proposition is one that expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective possibility). I.e., it expresses a free choosing to let such a proposition stand[170]—a mere electing to admit it into the understanding. An assertoric proposition speaks of
A 76 logical actuality or truth; thus in a hypothetical syllogism, e.g., the antecedent occurs problematically in the major premise but assertorically in the minor premise.[171] And the assertoric proposition indicates that it[172] is already linked with the understanding in accordance with the understanding's laws. An apodeictic proposition thinks the assertoric one as determined by these laws of the understanding themselves, and hence thinks it as maintaining [this or that] a priori; and in this way it expresses logical necessity. Thus everything is incorporated in the understanding by degrees: at first we judge something problematically; then perhaps we also

[166]Just as if thought were a function of the *understanding* in the case of problematic judgments, of our *power of judgment* in the case of assertoric ones, and of *reason* in the case of apodeictic judgments. This remark must wait for its clarification until later.[a]

[a][See the beginning of the Analytic of Principles, A 130/B 169, and cf. A 304/B 360–61.]

[167][Of the cognition involved.]

[168][*Wechselwirkung*.]

[169][Of a hypothetical judgment.]

[170][*gelten*.]

[171][The major premise is of the form 'If *p*, then *q*,' the minor premise of the form '*p*.']

[172][Unlike the '*p*' serving as antecedent in 'If *p*, then *q*.']

accept it assertorically as true; and finally we maintain it as linked inseparably with the understanding, i.e., as necessary and apodeictic. And hence these three functions of modality may also be called so many moments of thought as such.

[Transcendental] Guide for the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of Understanding B 102

Section III

§ 10[173]
ON THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING, OR CATEGORIES

General logic, as we have said several times already, abstracts from all content of cognition. It expects presentations to be given to it from somewhere else—no matter where—in order then to transform these presentations into concepts in the first place. This it does analytically. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, has lying before it a manifold of a priori sensibility, offered to it by transcendental aesthetic. Transcendental aesthetic offers it this manifold in order to provide it with a material for the pure concepts of understanding. Without this material, transcendental logic would have no content,[174] and hence would be completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure a priori intuition.[175] But they belong nonetheless to the conditions of our mind's receptivity[176] under which alone the A 77

[173]['§ 10' added in B.]

[174][Von Leclair changes *würde* ('would have') to *würden*, so that this clause reads thus: 'they [i.e., the pure concepts of understanding] would have no content. . . .']

[175][On 'manifold,' see B 203 br n. 38.]

[176][*Rezeptivität*.]

mind can receive[177] presentations of objects, and which, by the same token, must always affect the concept of these objects. Yet the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold, in order to be turned into a cognition, must first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain manner. This act I call synthesis.

B 103 By *synthesis*, in the most general sense of the term, I mean the act of putting various presentations with one another[178] and of comprising[179] their manifoldness in one cognition. Such synthesis is *pure* if the manifold is given not empirically but a priori (as is the manifold in space and time). Before any analysis of our presentations can take place, these presentations must first be given, and hence in terms of *content* no concepts[180] can originate analytically. Rather, synthesis of a manifold (whether this manifold is given empirically or a priori) is what first gives rise to a cognition. Although this cognition may still be crude and confused at first and hence may require analysis, yet synthesis is what in fact gathers the elements for
A 78 cognition and unites them to [form] a certain content. Hence if we want to make a judgment about the first origin of our cognition, then we must first direct our attention to synthesis.[181]

Synthesis as such, as we shall see hereafter,[182] is the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is a blind but indispensable function of the soul[183] without which we would have no cognition whatsoever, but of which we are conscious only very rarely. Bringing this synthesis *to concepts*, on the other hand, is a function belonging to the understanding; and it is through this function that the understanding first provides us with cognition in the proper meaning of the term.

B 104 Now *pure synthesis, conceived of*[184] *generally*, yields the pure concept of understanding. By pure synthesis I mean the synthesis that rests on a basis of synthetic a priori unity. E.g., our act of counting (as is more no-

[177][*empfangen.*]

[178][*zueinander . . . hinzutun.*]

[179][*begreifen.*]

[180][*Begriffe.* See A 103 br. n. 83.]

[181][See J. W Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 142–46.]

[182][See, e.g., A 120, and cf. A 101, B 164, 233, 383.]

[183][In his working copy of edition A, Kant changes this to: 'which is a function of the understanding.' See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries.* Ak. XXIII, 45.]

[184][*vorgestellt.*]

ticeable primarily with larger numbers) is a *synthesis according to concepts*, because it is performed according to a common basis of unity (such as the decimal system). Hence under this concept the unity of the manifold's synthesis becomes necessary.

Bringing various presentations *under* a concept (a task dealt with by general logic) is done analytically. But bringing, not presentations but the *pure synthesis* of presentations, *to*[185] concepts is what transcendental logic teaches. The first [thing] that we must be given a priori in order to cognize any object is the *manifold* of pure intuition. The second [thing] is the *synthesis* of this manifold by the imagination. But this synthesis does not yet yield cognition. The third [thing we need] in order to cognize an object that we encounter is the concepts which give *unity* to this pure synthesis and which consist solely in the presentation of this necessary synthetic unity. And these concepts rest on the understanding. A 79

The same function that gives unity to the various presentations *in a judgment* also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various presentations *in an intuition*. This unity—speaking generally—is called pure concept of understanding. Hence the same understanding—and indeed through the same acts whereby it brought about, in concepts, the logical form of a judgment by means of analytic unity—also brings into its presentations a transcendental content, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition as such; and because of this, these presentations are called pure concepts of understanding applying a priori to objects. Bringing such a transcendental content into these presentations is something that general logic cannot accomplish. B 105

Thus there arise precisely as many pure concepts of understanding applying a priori to objects of intuition as such, as in the preceding table there were logical functions involved in all possible judgments. For these functions of the understanding are completely exhaustive and survey its power entirely. Following Aristotle, we shall call these functions *categories*. For our aim is fundamentally[186] the same as his, even though it greatly deviates from his in its execution. A 80

[185][*auf*: 'upon' or 'onto,' literally.]

[186][*uranfänglich*.]

B 106

TABLE OF CATEGORIES

1
OF QUANTITY
Unity
Plurality
Allness[187]

2
OF QUALITY
Reality
Negation
Limitation

3
OF RELATION
of *Inherence* and Subsistence
(*substantia et accidens*)
of *Causality* and Dependence
(Cause and Effect)
of *Community* (Interaction
between Agent and Patient[188])

4
OF MODALITY
Possibility—Impossibility
Existence—Nonexistence[189]
Necessity—Contingency

This, then, is the list of all the original pure concepts of synthesis[190] that the understanding contains a priori. Indeed, it is a pure understanding only because of these concepts; for through them alone can it understand something in[191] the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object of intuition. This division of the categories has been generated systematically from a com-
A 81 mon principle, viz., our ability to judge (which is equivalent to our ability to think). It has not been generated rhapsodically, by locating pure con-
B 107 cepts haphazardly, where we can never be certain that the enumeration of

187[*Allheit*, rendered consistently as 'allness' in this translation (even though 'totality' would *sound* better after 'unity' and 'plurality'), 'totality' being reserved for *Totalität*]

188[*Leidender*.]

189[*Dasein, Nichtsein*.]

190[In his working copy of edition A, Kant drops the words 'of synthesis.' See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*, Ak. XXIII, 46.]

191[*bei*.]

the concepts is complete.[192] For we then infer the division only by induction, forgetting that in this way we never gain insight into why precisely these concepts, rather than others, reside in the pure understanding. Locating these basic concepts was a project worthy of an acute man like Aristotle.[193] But having no principle,[194] he snatched them up as he came upon them.[195] He hunted up ten of them at first, and called them *categories* (predicaments).[196] He later believed that he had discovered five more categories, and added them under the name of postpredicaments.[197] But his table remained deficient even then. Moreover, we also find in it some modes of pure sensibility (*quando, ubi, situs,* and *prius, simul*),[198] as well as an empirical mode (*motus*),[199] none of which belong at all in this register of the root[200] [concepts] of the understanding. Again, derivative concepts (*actio, passio*)[201] are also included among the original concepts,[202] while some of the original concepts[203] are missing entirely.

Hence for the sake of [distinguishing] the original concepts, we must note also that the categories, as the true *root concepts* of pure understanding, have also their equally pure *derivative concepts*. In a complete system of transcendental philosophy these derivative concepts can by no means be omitted. In a merely critical essay, on the other hand, I can settle for merely A 82
mentioning them.

[192][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 165–73.]

[193][Emphasis removed.]

[194][For locating these concepts.]

[195][For some of the outstanding similarities (and differences) of Aristotle's and Kant's views on logic, see Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 91–95.]

[196][Substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, posture, state, action, undergoing.]

[197][The five relational categories, of doubtful authenticity, found in chs. 10–15 of the *Categories*: opposition, priority, simultaneity, motion, having.]

[198][Respectively, when (time), where (place), posture, prior (priority), simultaneous (simultaneity).]

[199][Motion.]

[200][*Stamm-*.]

[201][Action, passion (undergoing).]

[202][On Aristotle's list.]

[203][I.e., as contained in Kant's own table of categories.]

B 108 Let me call these pure but derivative concepts of understanding the *predicables* of pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments[204]). Once we have the original and primitive concepts, we can easily add the derivative and subsidiary[205] ones and thus depict completely the genealogical[206] tree of pure understanding. Since I am here concerned with the completeness not of the system but only of the principles for a system, I am reserving that complementary work for another enterprise.[207] We can, however, come close to[208] achieving that aim of completing the tree if we pick up a textbook on ontology and subordinate the predicables to the categories: e.g., to the category of causality, the predicables of force, action, undergoing;[209] to the category of community, the predicables of presence, resistance; to the predicaments of modality, the predicables of arising, passing away,[210] change; and so on. When the categories are combined either with the modes of pure sensibility or with one another, they yield a great multitude of derivative a priori concepts. Mentioning these concepts and, if possible, listing them completely would be a useful and not disagreeable endeavor, but one that we can here dispense with.

In this treatise I deliberately refrain from offering definitions of these
A 83 categories, even though I may possess them. I shall hereafter dissect these concepts only to a degree adequate for the doctrine of method[211] that I here
B 109 produce.[212] Whereas definitions of the categories could rightly be demanded of me in a system of pure reason, here they would only make us lose sight of the main point of the inquiry. For they would give rise to doubts and charges that we may readily relegate to another activity without in any way detracting from our essential aim. Still, from what little I have mentioned about this, we can see distinctly that a complete lexicon with all the requisite explications not only is possible but could easily be

[204][I.e., categories.]

[205][*subaltern.*]

[206][*Stamm-.*]

[207][Presumably the activity of producing a metaphysics of nature. Cf. above, B xliii incl. br. n. 149.]

[208][*ziemlich.*]

[209][Or 'passion': *Leiden.*]

[210][Respectively, *Entstehen, Vergehen.*]

[211][To be found below, at A 705–856/B 733–884.]

[212][*bearbeiten.*]

brought about. The compartments are now at hand. They only need to be filled in; and a systematic [transcendental] topic,[213] such as the present one, will make it difficult to miss the place where each concept properly belongs, and at the same time will make it easy to notice any place that is still empty.[214]

§ 11[215]

Concerning this table of categories one can make nice observations that might perhaps have important consequences regarding the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For in the theoretical part of philosophy this table is exceedingly useful—indeed, indispensable—for drawing up completely *the plan for a science as a whole* insofar as this science rests on a priori concepts, and for *dividing* it systematically[216] *according to determinate principles*. This is self-evident already from these facts: The table lists completely all the elementary concepts of understanding; indeed, it contains even the form of a system of them residing in the human understanding. B 110
Consequently the table directs us to all the *moments* of a projected speculative science—indeed, even to their *order*. In fact, a sample of their so directing us has already been provided by me elsewhere.[217] Here now are some of those comments that can be made about the table of categories.

The *first comment* is that this table containing four classes of concepts of understanding can be broken up, initially, into two divisions. The concepts in the first division are directed to objects of intuition (both pure and empirical), while those in the second are directed to the existence of these objects (these objects being referred[218] either to each other or to the understanding).

[213][See A 268/B 324, and cf A 61/B 86 incl. br. n. 76.]

[214][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 172–73.]

[215][The entire subsections 11 and 12 added in B.]

[216][Adopting the *Akademie* edition's reading, proposed by Vaihinger, of *systematisch* for *mathematisch* ('mathematically').]

[217][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (published in 1786, one year before the B edition of the first *Critique*), Ak. IV, 473–77, 495, 523, 551, 558.]

[218][*in Beziehung auf.*]

The first division[219] I would call that of the *mathematical* categories; the second, that of the *dynamical* categories. The first division of categories, as we can see by inspecting the table, has no correlates; only in the second division do we find correlates. This distinction must surely have a basis in the nature of the understanding.

The *second comment* to be made about the table is that the number of categories in each class is equal everywhere, viz., three; this, too, calls for meditation, because normally[220] all a priori division by concepts must be dichotomous. Add to this, moreover, the fact that in each case the third category of the class arises from the combination of the second category with the first of the same class.

B 111 Thus *allness* (totality) is nothing but plurality considered as unity; *limitation* is nothing but reality combined with negation; *community*[221] is the causality of a substance reciprocally[222] determining [and being determined by] another substance; *necessity*, finally, is nothing but the existence that is given through possibility itself. This fact, however, must by no means lead us to think that the third category is a mere derivative concept, rather than a root concept, of pure understanding. For combining the first and second categories, in order to produce the third concept, requires that the understanding perform a special act that is not the same as the act it performs in the case of the first and second concepts. Thus the concept of a *number* (which belongs to the category of allness) is not possible in every case where we have[223] the concepts of multitude[224] and unity (e.g., it is not possible in the presentation of infinity[225]). Again, combining the two concepts of a *cause* and of a *substance* does not yet provide me with an immediate understanding of *influence*, i.e., understanding of how a substance can become the cause of something in another substance. This shows that a spe-

[219][Kant actually says 'class' rather than 'division.' Similarly for the next two occurrences of 'division' just below.]

[220][*sonst.*]

[221][I.e., interaction (*Wechselwirkung*) between agent and patient (undergoer): A 80/B 106.]

[222][*wechselseitig*; cf. br. n. 221 just above]

[223][*sind.*]

[224][I e., plurality.]

[225][*das Unendliche.* Although this expression literally says 'the infinite' (which refers to *something infinite*), this is not what it means in mathematical contexts. There it means simply 'infinity.' The German term *Unendlichkeit*, on the other hand, means 'infinity' only in the most abstract sense: 'infiniteness,' 'being infinite.']

cial act of the understanding is required;[226] and thus it is with the remaining classes of categories.

The *third comment* to be made about the table of categories concerns the category of *community*, which is to be found under the third heading. This is the one category whose agreement with the form corresponding to it in the table of logical functions—viz., the form of a disjunctive judgment—is not so obvious as in the case of the others. B 112

In order to assure ourselves of this agreement, we must note the following: In all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of everything contained under the judgment) is presented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinate[227] concepts). And because the parts cannot be contained one under another, they are thought as *coordinated*[228] with rather than as *subordinated*[229] to one another, so that they determine one another not *unilaterally*[230] as in a *series*, but *reciprocally*[231] as in an *aggregate* (wherein, when one member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and conversely).

Now a similar connection is thought in [thinking] a *whole* of *things*. In such a whole, one thing is not *subordinated*, as effect, to another as cause of its existence; rather, it is simultaneously and reciprocally *coordinated*[232] with others, as cause regarding their determination (as, e.g., in a body whose parts reciprocally attract—or, for that matter, repel—one another). This kind of connection is entirely different from the one found in the mere relation of cause to effect (ground to consequence), where the consequence does not in turn reciprocally determine the ground and hence does not together with it constitute a whole (e.g., the world together with its creator does not constitute a whole).[233] When the understanding presents the sphere of a divided concept, it follows a certain procedure; it observes that same procedure when it thinks a thing as divisible. And in the divided concept the B 113

[226][To produce the category of community.]

[227][*unterordnen*.]

[228][*koordinieren*.]

[229][*subordinieren*.]

[230][*einseitig*.]

[231][*wechselseitig*.]

[232][*beiordnen*.]

[233][Inverting, with Vaihinger, the original order, 'the world's creator [together] with the world,' in order to make it agree with the order just mentioned (consequence, ground) in the last clause.]

members of the division exclude one another and yet are combined in one sphere; in the same way, the understanding[234] presents the thing's parts as being such that while the existence of each part also belongs to it alone (as a substance) to the exclusion of the others, yet the parts are combined in one whole.

§ 12

In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, however, we find an additional chapter containing pure concepts of understanding. Although these concepts are not there included among the categories, yet according to the ancients they were to count[235] as a priori concepts of objects. In that case, however, these concepts would in fact increase the number of categories—which cannot be. These additional concepts are set forth in this proposition, so famous among the scholastics: *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum.*[236] Now it is true that the use of this principle turned out to permit only very meager inferences (yielding nothing but tautological propositions); by the same token, in modern times the principle has come to receive little more than honorable mention[237] in metaphysics. Yet whenever a thought—no matter how empty it seems to be—has maintained itself for such a long time, then it deserves an inquiry into its origin, and entitles us to conjecture that it has its basis in some rule of the understanding that, as often happens, has only been wrongly interpreted.
B 114 But in fact these supposedly transcendental predicates of *things* are nothing but logical requirements and criteria for all *cognition* of *things* in general; and they lay at the basis of such cognition the categories of quantity, viz., those of *unity, plurality,* and *allness*. These categories, however, should properly be taken materially, as belonging to the possibility of things themselves. Those [philosophers], on the other hand, used them in fact only in their formal meaning, as belonging to the logical demands concerning any cognition; yet, through carelessness, they still turned these criteria of thought into properties of things in themselves. Let me explain.[238] In ev-

234[In thinking a thing as divisible.]

235[*gelten.*]

236[Any being is one, true, good.]

237[*aufstellen.*]

238[*nämlich.*]

ery cognition there are three components. First, there is *unity* of the concept; we may call it *qualitative unity*, provided that in [thinking] it we think only the unity in the collating[239] of the manifold of cognitions: e.g., the unity of the topic[240] in a play, a speech, or a story. Second, in every cognition there is *truth* as regards the consequences. The more true consequences arise from a given concept, the more indicators there are of its objective reality. We might call this the *qualitative plurality* of the characteristics that belong to a concept as their common ground (rather than are thought, in the concept, as a quantity[241]). Finally, third, in every cognition there is *perfection;* it consists in the fact that the plurality together leads back again[242] to the unity of the concept, and that it agrees fully with this and with no other concept. This perfection may be called *qualitative completeness* (totality). This shows that these logical criteria for the possibility of cognition as such only transform the three categories of quantity. In these categories, the unity in the production of the quantum[243] must be assumed as homogeneous throughout. Here, however, they are only transformed, in order to connect components[244] of cognition—even *het-* B 115

[239][I.e., the arranging and holding together: *Zusammenfassung*. Collating is intermediate between gathering together (*Zusammennehmung*) (see esp. A 99) and assembly (*Zusammensetzung*) (see, e.g., A 105, but esp. B 201 n. 30). As regards my translation of *Zusammenfassung* by 'collating,' although in the present instance 'comprehending' (or the noun 'comprehension') might seem preferable (in the sense related to 'comprehensive,' 'comprise,' and 'prehensile'), in others it could far too easily be misread to mean something like (rational) *grasping*. This ambiguity needs to be avoided all the more because I do use 'comprehend' to translate *begreifen*. My reason for translating this latter term by 'comprehend' rather than by 'grasp' is that the various derivatives of 'comprehend' (such as 'comprehension,' 'comprehensible,' 'incomprehensible,' and 'incomprehensibility') read much more smoothly than the corresponding derivates of 'grasp' ('grasping,' 'graspable,' 'ungraspable,' and 'ungraspableness'). As regards the option of translating Kant's technical term *zusammenfassen* by *different* English terms in different places, the Translator's Preface explains my reasons against such unnecessary breaches of terminological consistency. In the one place (A 841 = B 869) where *zusammenfassen* is translated not by 'collate' but by 'encompass,' the German term is clearly used in a nontechnical sense—which is precisely the reason why 'collate' would not make sense there.]

[240][*Thema*.]

[241][Literally, 'magnitude': *Größe*. Similarly a few lines below.]

[242][*umgekehrt*.]

[243][*Quantum*]

[244][*-stücke*.]

erogeneous ones—in one consciousness, using[245] as principle[246] for this connection the quality of a cognition. Thus the criterion for the possibility of a concept (rather than for the possibility of the concept's object)[247] is the concept's definition; in it the *unity* of the concept, the *truth* of everything that may be derived from it initially,[248] and finally the *completeness* of what has been extracted from it constitute what the whole concept requires for its construction. Or, again, the *criterion of a hypothesis* is the understandability of the assumed *basis of explanation*, or, i.e.: its *unity* (without an auxiliary hypothesis); the *truth* of the consequences derivable from it (their agreement with one another and with experience); and, finally, the *completeness* of the basis for the explanation of these consequences—which means that these consequences point back to no more and no less than was assumed in the hypothesis, and that they analytically a posteriori bring[249] back and agree with what was thought synthetically a priori in the hypothesis. Therefore by adding the concepts of unity, truth, and perfection to the transcendental table of categories we do not at all complement that table—as if perhaps it were deficient. Rather, while set-
B 116 ting aside entirely the relation of these concepts to objects,[250] we bring the procedure used with these concepts under general logical rules governing the agreement of cognition with itself.

[245][*durch*.]

[246][Reading *Prinzip* for *Prinzips*, which would make cognition, rather than its quality, the principle in question.]

[247][Reading, with Hartenstein, *nicht des Objekts desselben* for *nicht des Objekts derselben*)]

[248][*zunächst*.]

[249][*liefern*.]

[250][I.e., the relation implied in the categories.]

ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS

Chapter II

On the Deduction of the Pure Concept of Understanding[1]

Section I

§ 13[2]

ON THE PRINCIPLES OF A TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION AS SUCH

When teachers of law talk about rights[3] and claims, they distinguish in a legal action the question regarding what is legal (*quid iuris*) from the question concerning fact (*quid facti*), and they demand proof of both.[4] The first proof, which is to establish the right, or for that matter the legal[5] entitlement,[6] they call the *deduction.* [This term also applies to philosophy.] We employ a multitude of empirical concepts without being challenged by anyone. And we consider ourselves justified,[7] even without having offered a deduction, to assign to these empirical concepts a meaning and imagined

[1][See Paul Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 73–154. See also H. J. Paton, "The Key to Kant's Deduction of the Categories," in Moltke S. Gram, ed., *Kant: Disputed Questions* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), 247–68. Also H. E. Allison, op. cit. at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 133–72. Also Graham Bird, *op. cit.* at A 67/B 92 br. n. 121, 110–48. Also J. N. Findlay, *op cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 135–40. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 202–331. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 313–47. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 148–61.]

[2]['§ 13' added in B.]

[3][*Befugnisse.*]

[4][Legality and factuality.]

[5][*Rechts-.*]

[6][*-anspruch.*]

[7][*berechtigt.*]

B 117 signification,[8] because we always have experience available to us to prove their objective reality. But there are also concepts that we usurp, as, e.g., *fortune*, *fate*. And although these concepts run loose,[9] with our almost universal forbearance, yet they are sometimes confronted[10] by the question [of their legality], *quid iuris*. This question then leaves us in considerable perplexity regarding the deduction[11] of these concepts; for neither from experience nor from reason can we adduce any distinct legal basis from which
A 85 the right to use them emerges distinctly.

But there are, among the various concepts making up the highly mixed fabric of human cognition, some that are determined for pure a priori use as well (i.e., for a use that is completely independent of all experience); and their right to be so used always requires a deduction. For proofs based on experience are insufficient to establish the legitimacy[12] of using them in that way; yet we do need to know how these concepts can refer to objects[13] even though they do not take these objects from any experience. Hence when I explain in what way concepts can refer to objects a priori, I call that explanation the *transcendental deduction* of these concepts. And I distinguish transcendental deduction from *empirical* deduction, which indicates in what way a concept has been acquired through experience and through reflection upon experience, and which therefore concerns not the concept's legitimacy but only the fact whereby we came to possess it.

B 118 We already have, at this point, two types of[14] concepts that, while being wholly different in kind, do yet agree inasmuch as both of them refer to objects completely a priori: viz., on the one hand, the concepts of space and time as forms of sensibility; and, on the other hand, the categories as concepts of understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of these two types of concepts would be a futile job. For what is distinctive in their na-
A 86 ture is precisely the fact that they refer to their objects without having borrowed anything from experience in order to present these objects. Hence

[8][*Bedeutung*. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[9][Literally, 'around': *herum*-.]

[10][*in Anspruch nehmen*.]

[11][I.e., legitimation.]

[12][*Rechtmäßigkeit*.]

[13][*Objekte* here, *Gegenstände* just below. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[14][*zweierlei*.]

if a deduction of these concepts is needed, then it must always be transcendental.

But even for these concepts, as for all cognition, we can locate in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, then at least the occasioning causes[15] of their production. Thus the impressions of the senses first prompt [us] to open up the whole cognitive power in regard to them, and to bring about experience. Experience contains two quite heterogeneous elements: viz., a *matter* for cognition, taken from the senses; and a certain *form* for ordering this matter, taken from the inner source of pure intuition and thought.[16] It is on the occasion of the impressions of the senses that pure intuition and thought are first brought into operation[17] and produce concepts. Such exploration of our cognitive power's first endeavors to ascend from singular perceptions to universal concepts is doubtless highly B 119
beneficial, and we are indebted to the illustrious *Locke* for first opening up the path to it.[18] Yet such exploration can never yield a *deduction*[19] of the pure a priori concepts, which does not lie on that path at all. For in view of these concepts' later use, which is to be wholly independent of experience, they must be able to display a birth certificate quite different from that of descent from experiences. The attempted[20] physiological derivation A 87
concerns a *quaestio facti,*[21] and therefore cannot properly be called a deduction at all. Hence I shall name it the explanation of our *possession* of a pure cognition. Clearly, then, the only possible deduction of this pure cognition[22] is a transcendental and by no means an empirical one, and empirical deductions regarding the pure a priori concepts are nothing but futile attempts—attempts that only those can engage in who have not comprehended the quite peculiar nature of these cognitions.

[15][*Gelegenheitsursachen.*]

[16][See Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 95.]

[17][*Ausübung.* In this sentence, I am taking *der ersteren* to refer back to 'impressions of the senses.' But the term could also refer to *Materie,* in which case we would have to read: 'It is on the occasion of [our sensing] such matter. . . .' Substantively, however, the two alternative readings come to the same.]

[18][See *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. II.]

[19][I.e., legitimation.]

[20][By philosophers such as Locke.]

[21][Question of fact (rather than of legality or legitimation).]

[22][Reading, with Erdmann, *dieser es allein* for *diesen allein es*; cf. the beginning of the next paragraph.]

Yet even if it be granted that the only possible kind of deduction of pure a priori cognition is one along the transcendental path, that still does not show that this deduction is inescapably necessary. We did earlier trace the concepts of space and time to their sources by means of a transcendental
B 120 deduction, and we explained and determined their a priori objective validity. Yet geometry, using[23] nothing but a priori cognitions, follows its course securely without needing to ask philosophy for a certificate of the pure and legitimate descent of geometry's basic concept of space. On the other hand, the use of the concept of space in this science does apply only to the external world of sense. Space is the pure form of the intuition of that world. In that world, therefore, all geometric cognition is directly evident, because it is based on a priori intuition; and, through cognition itself, objects
A 88 are (as regards their form) given a priori in intuition. With the *pure concepts of understanding*, on the other hand, begins the inescapable requirement to seek a transcendental deduction—not only of these concepts themselves, but also of space. For these concepts speak[24] of objects through predicates of pure a priori thought, not through predicates of intuition and sensibility; hence they refer to objects[25] universally, i.e., apart from all conditions of sensibility. They are, then, concepts that are not based on experience; and in a priori intuition, too, they cannot display any object on which they might, prior[26] to all experience, base their synthesis. Hence these concepts not only arouse suspicion concerning the objective validity and limits of their use, but they also make ambiguous the *concept of space;* for
B 121 they tend to use it even beyond the conditions of sensible intuition—and this indeed is the reason why a transcendental deduction of this concept was needed above. I must therefore convince the reader, before he has taken a single step in the realm of pure reason, that such a deduction is inescapably necessary. For otherwise he proceeds blindly, and after manifold wanderings must yet return to the ignorance from which he started. But the reader must also distinctly see[27] in advance the inevitable difficulty of providing such a deduction. For otherwise he might complain of obscurity when in fact the matter itself is deeply shrouded, or might be too quickly

[23][*durch.*]

[24][Reading, with Hartenstein, *reden* for *redet.*]

[25][*Gegenstand* (in the plural) here, *Objekt* just below.]

[26][*vor.*]

[27][*einsehen*]

discouraged during the removal of obstacles. For we either must[28] entirely abandon all claims to pure rational insights[29] into the realm that we care about most,[30] viz., the realm beyond the bounds of all possible experience, or else must bring this critical inquiry to completion. A 89

We had little trouble above in making comprehensible how the concepts of space and time, despite being[31] a priori cognitions, must yet refer necessarily to objects, and how they make[32] possible, independently of any experience, a synthetic cognition of objects. For only by means of such pure forms of sensibility can an object[33] appear to us, i.e., can it be an object of empirical intuition. Hence space and time are pure intuitions containing a B 122
priori the condition for the possibility of objects as appearances, and the synthesis in space and time has objective validity.

The categories of understanding, on the other hand, do not at all present to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition. Therefore objects can indeed appear to us without having to refer necessarily to functions of understanding, and hence without the understanding's containing a priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find here a difficulty that we did not encounter in the realm of sensibility: viz., how *subjective conditions of thought* could have *objective validity*, i.e., how they could yield conditions for the possibility of all cognition of objects. For appearances A 90
can indeed be given in intuition without functions of understanding. Let me take, e.g., the concept of cause. This concept signifies a special kind of synthesis where upon [the occurrence of] something, A, something quite different, B, is posited according to a rule.[34] Why appearances should contain anything like that is not evident a priori. (I say *a priori* because experience cannot be adduced as proof, since we must be able to establish this concept's objective validity a priori.) Hence there is doubt a priori whether perhaps such a concept might not even be empty and encounter no object at all among appearances. For while it is evident that objects of

28[*Weil es darauf ankommt, daß.*]

29[*Einsichten.*]

30[Somewhat more literally, 'that we are fondest of': *beliebtest.*]

31[*als.*]

32[Reading, with Erdmann, *machen* for *machten.*]

33[*Gegenstand* here, *Objekt* just below, and then again *Gegenstand* (in the plural).]

34[In his working copy of edition A, Kant rephrases this to read: 'is posited a priori, i.e., necessarily, according to a rule' (or: 'is posited according to an a priori rule, i.e., posited necessarily'). See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*, Ak. XXIII. 46.]

B 123 sensible intuition must conform to the formal conditions of sensibility lying a priori in the mind, since otherwise they would not be objects for us, it is not so easy to see the inference whereby they must in addition conform to the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity[35] of thought. For, I suppose, appearances might possibly be of such a character that the understanding would not find them to conform at all to the conditions of its unity. Everything might then be so confused that, e.g., the sequence of appearances would offer us nothing providing us with a rule of synthesis and thus corresponding to the concept of cause and effect, so that this concept would then be quite empty, null, and without signifi-
A 91 cation.[36] But appearances would nonetheless offer objects to our intuition; for intuition in no way requires the functions of thought.

Suppose that we planned to extricate ourselves from these troublesome inquiries by saying that examples of such regularity among appearances are offered to us incessantly by experience, and that these examples give us sufficient prompting to isolate from them the concept of cause and thus to verify at the same time the objective validity of such a concept. In that case we would be overlooking the fact that the concept of cause cannot arise in that way at all; rather, it either must have its basis completely a
B 124 priori in the understanding, or must be given up entirely as a mere chimera. For this concept definitely requires that something, A, be of such a kind that something else, B, follows from it *necessarily* and according to an *absolutely universal rule.* Although appearances do provide us with cases from which we can obtain a rule whereby something usually happens, they can never provide us with a rule whereby the result is *necessary.* This is, moreover, the reason why the synthesis of cause and effect is imbued with[37] a dignity that cannot at all be expressed empirically: viz., that the effect is not merely added to the cause, but is posited *through* the cause and results *from* it. And the strict universality of the rule is indeed no property what-
A 92 ever of empirical rules; empirical rules can, through induction, acquire none but comparative universality, i.e., extensive usability. But if we treated the pure concepts of understanding as merely empirical products, then our use of them would change entirely.

[35][Reading, with von Leclair (a reading adopted by the *Akademie* edition), *Einheit* for *Einsicht* ('insight').]

[36][*Bedeutung*. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[37][*anhängen.*]

§ 14[38]
TRANSITION TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES

Only two cases are possible where synthetic presentation and its objects[39] can concur, can necessarily refer to each other, and can—as it were—meet each other: viz., either if the object makes the presentation possible, or if the presentation alone makes the object possible. If the object makes the B 125
presentation possible, then the reference is only empirical and the presentation is never possible a priori. This is what happens in the case of appearances, as regards what pertains to sensation in them. But suppose that the presentation alone makes the object possible. In that case, while[40] presentation in itself does not produce its object *as regards existence* (for the causality that presentation has by means of the will is not at issue here at all),[41] yet presentation is a priori determinative in regard to the object if *cognizing* something *as an object* is possible only through it. Now there are two conditions under which alone there can be cognition of an object. The first condition is *intuition*; through it the object is given, though only as appearance. The second condition is the *concept*; through it an object is A 93
thought that corresponds to this intuition. Now it is evident from the above that the first condition, viz., the condition under which alone objects can be intuited, does[42] indeed, as far as their form is concerned, underlie objects[43] a priori in the mind. Hence all appearances necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given. Now the question arises whether concepts do not also a priori precede [objects], as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, yet thought as object as

[38]['§ 14,' accidentally not added in B, was added in the third edition.]

[39][Erdmann suggests (but not in the *Akademie* edition) that we pluralize *Vorstellung* and thus read 'presentations and their objects.']

[40][*weil*, in an older sense of this word (which now means only 'because').]

[41][Cf. Kant's definition of (the will as) our power of desire: *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 9n; *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, the n. on 177–78.]

[42][Reading, with Hartenstein, *liege* for *liegen*.]

[43][The noun used by Kant is *Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* (repeatedly) earlier in the paragraph and again just below, then *Objekt* again See A vii br. n. 7.]

B 126 such.[44] For in that case all empirical cognition of objects necessarily conforms to such concepts, because nothing is possible as *object of experience* unless[45] these concepts are presupposed. But all experience, besides containing the senses' intuition through which something is given, does also contain a *concept* of an object that is given in intuition, or that appears. Accordingly, concepts of objects as such presumably underlie all experiential cognition as its a priori conditions. Hence presumably the objective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thought in it is concerned). For in that case the categories refer to objects of experience necessarily and a priori, because only by means of them can any experiential object whatsoever be thought at all.

A 94 Hence the transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has a principle to which the entire investigation must be directed: viz., the principle that these concepts must be cognized[46] as a priori conditions for the possibility of experience[47] (whether the possibility of the intuition found in experience, or the possibility of the thought). If concepts serve as the objective basis for the possibility of experience, then—precisely because of this—they are necessary. But to unfold the experience in which these concepts are found is not to deduce them (but is only to illustrate them); for otherwise they would, after all, be only contingent. Without that original
B 127 reference of these concepts to possible experience wherein all objects of cognition occur, their reference to any object whatever would be quite incomprehensible.[48]

[44][Or 'object in general.' My reason for translating *überhaupt* by 'as such' is given at B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[45][*ohne.*]

[46][Or 'recognized': *erkannt.*]

[47][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *Erfahrung* for *Erfahrungen.*]

[48][In the place of the next three paragraphs of B, A has the following:]

Now there are three original sources (capacities or powers of the soul) that contain the conditions for the possibility of all experience, and that cannot themselves be derived from any other power of the mind: viz., *sense, imagination,* and *apperception.* On them are based (1) the a priori *synopsis* of the manifold through sense; (2) the *synthesis* of this manifold through imagination; and finally, (3) the *unity* of this synthesis through original apperception. All these *powers,* besides having their empirical use, have in addition a transcendental use that deals solely with

The illustrious **Locke**, not having engaged in this contemplation, and encountering pure concepts of understanding in experience, also derived them from experience. Yet he proceeded so *inconsistently* that he dared to try using these concepts for cognitions that go far beyond any boundary of experience. **David Hume** recognized[49] that in order for us to be able to do this, the origin of these concepts must be a priori. But he was quite unable to explain how it is possible that concepts not in themselves combined in the understanding should nonetheless have to be thought by it as necessarily combined in the object. Nor did it occur to him that perhaps the understanding itself might, through these concepts, be the author of the experience wherein we encounter the understanding's objects. Thus, in his plight, he derived these concepts from experience (viz., from *habit*,[50] a subjective necessity that arises in experience through repeated association and that ultimately is falsely regarded as objective).[51] But he proceeded quite consistently after that, for he declared that we cannot use[52] these concepts and the principles that they occasion in order to go beyond the boundary of experience. Yet the *empirical* derivation of these concepts which occurred B 128
to both[53] cannot be reconciled with the scientific a priori cognitions that we actually have, viz., our a priori cognitions of *pure mathematics* and *universal natural science*, and hence this empirical derivation is refuted by that fact.

Of these two illustrious men, Locke left the door wide open for *fanaticism*;[54] for once reason has gained possession of[55] such rights, it can no longer be kept within limits by indefinite exhortations to moderation. Hume, believing that he had uncovered so universal a delusion—regarded as reason—of our cognitive power, surrendered entirely to *skepticism*.[56] We

form and is possible a priori. Above, in Part I, we talked about this transcendental use *in regard to the senses*. Let us now endeavor to gain in- A 95
sight into the nature of the transcendental use of the other two powers.

49[Or 'cognized.']

50[Or 'custom.' Cf. above, B 5 incl. br. n. 160, and B 19–20.]

51[See the *Prolegomena*, Ak. IV, 257–61.]

52[*mit.*]

53[Locke and Hume.]

54[*Schwärmerei.*]

55[*auf ihrer Seite hat.*]

56[See the *Prolegomena*, Ak. IV, 262.]

are now about to try to find out whether we cannot provide for human reason safe passage between these two cliffs, assign to it determinate bounds, and yet keep open for it the entire realm of its appropriate activity.

The only thing that I still want to do before we start is to *explicate the categories:* they are concepts of an object as such whereby the object's intuition is regarded as *determined* in terms of one of the *logical functions* in judging. Thus the function of the *categorical* judgment—e.g., All bodies are divisible—is that of the relation of subject to predicate. But the understanding's merely logical use left undetermined to which[57] of the two
B 129 concepts we want to give the function of the subject, and to which the function of the predicate. For we can also say, Something divisible is a body. If, on the other hand, I bring the concept of a body under the category of substance, then through this category is determined the fact that the body's empirical intuition in experience must be considered always as subject only, never as mere predicate. And similarly in all the remaining categories.

Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

Section II [First Edition][58]

On the A Priori Bases for the Possibility of Experience

It is wholly contradictory and impossible that a concept should be produced completely a priori and yet refer to an object, if that concept neither were itself included in the concept of possible experience nor consisted of

[57][Reading, with Grillo and the *Akademie* edition, *welchem* for *welcher*.]

[58][See J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n 22, 140–51. See also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 151–63, 235–50, 405–30. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 348–498. Also Hans Vaihinger, "The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in

elements of a possible experience. For then it would have no content, because no intuition would correspond to it; for intuitions as such, through which objects can be given to us, make up the realm, or the entire object, of possible experience. An a priori concept that did not refer to experience would be only the logical form for a concept, but would not be the concept itself through which something is[59] thought.

If, therefore, there are a priori concepts, then they cannot indeed contain anything empirical; but they must nonetheless all[60] be a priori conditions for a possible experience, for on this alone can their objective reality rest.

Hence if we want to know how pure concepts of understanding are possible, then we must inquire what are the a priori conditions on which the A 96
possibility of experience depends, and which underlie experience even if we abstract from everything empirical in appearances. A concept expressing, universally and sufficiently, this formal and objective condition of experience would be called a pure concept of understanding. Once I have pure concepts of understanding, then indeed I can think up even objects that perhaps are impossible. Or I can then think up objects that perhaps are in themselves possible but cannot be given in any experience. Such objects may be incapable of being given in experience because in [framing their concepts by] connecting those pure concepts of understanding, something may be omitted that yet belongs necessarily to the condition of a possible experience (as in the concept of a spirit); or because perhaps pure concepts of understanding are extended beyond what experience can encompass (as in the concept of God). But contrast with this the *elements* for all a priori cognitions, even for arbitrary and absurd inventions. These elements cannot indeed be taken from experience (for otherwise the cognitions would not be a priori cognitions). But they must always contain the pure a priori conditions of a possible experience and of an object of possible experience. For otherwise not only would nothing whatever be thought through these elements, but they themselves would be without data and hence could not arise even in thought.

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the First Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*," in M. S. Gram, ed., *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 23–61, cf. Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 202–331; and see H. J. Paton, "Is the Transcendental Deduction a Patchwork?," in M. S. Gram, ed., *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n 1., 62–91. See also H. J. de Vleeschauwer, *op. cit.* at A 64/B 89 br. n. 96, vol. 2, 203–415. And see R. P. Wolff, *op cit.* at B 5 br. n 159, 78–182.]

[59] ['would be,' literally.]

[60] [*lauter.*]

Now these concepts, which contain a priori the pure thought in every experience, we find to be the categories. And if we can prove that only by means of the categories can an object be thought, this will already suffice
A 97 as a deduction[61] of them and as a justification of their objective validity. However, not only[62] our power to think is engaged in such a thought, i.e., not only the understanding, but something more.[63] Moreover, the understanding itself, as a cognitive power that is to refer to objects, likewise needs to be elucidated, viz., as regards the possibility of that reference. Hence we must first examine, in terms not of their empirical but of their transcendental character, the subjective sources that make up the a priori foundation for the possibility of experience.

If each singular presentation were entirely foreign to—isolated from, as it were—every other presentation and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition; for cognition is a whole consisting of compared and connected presentations. Hence when I ascribe to sense a synopsis, because sense contains a manifold in its intuition, then to this synopsis there always corresponds a synthesis; and thus *receptivity* can make cognition possible only when combined with *spontaneity*. Now, this spontaneity is the basis of a threefold synthesis that necessarily occurs in all cognition: viz., the synthesis of the *apprehension* of presentations that are modifications of the mind in intuition; the synthesis of the *reproduction* of these presentations in imagination; and the synthesis of their *recognition* in the concept. Now, these three syntheses guide us to three subjective sources of cognition that make possible the understanding it-
A 98 self and, through it, all experience, which is an empirical product of the understanding.

PRELIMINARY NOTICE

The deduction of the categories involves very many difficulties, and requires us to penetrate quite deeply into the first bases of our cognition as such. Hence, in order to avoid the voluminousness of a complete theory and yet also avoid neglecting anything in such a necessary inquiry, I have

[61] [I.e., legitimation.]

[62] [*einzig.*]

[63] [Which, therefore, must be elucidated.]

found it advisable in the following four passages[64] more to prepare the reader than to instruct him; then, in the subsequent Section III,[65] the exposition of these elements of the understanding will first be put forth systematically. Hence the reader should not be deterred by any obscurity found in the meantime. Such obscurity is unavoidable as one begins to walk along a path that has never been walked upon before; but it will, as I hope, be cleared up in the mentioned section to the point of complete insight.

1. On the Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition

No matter from where our presentations arise, as modifications of the mind they yet belong to inner sense: they belong to inner sense whether they are produced through the influence of external things or through inner causes; and whether they have come about a priori, or empirically as appearances. A 99
And, as belonging to inner sense, all our cognitions are yet subject ultimately to the formal condition of inner sense, i.e., to time. In time they must one and all be ordered, connected, and brought into relations. This is a general comment that must be presupposed throughout what follows.

Every intuition contains a manifold. Yet this manifold would not be presented as such if the mind did not in the sequence of impressions following one another distinguish time. For any presentation *as contained in one instant* can never be anything but absolute unity. Now in order for this manifold to become unity of intuition (as, e.g., in the presentation of space), it must first be gone through and gathered together.[66] This act I call the *synthesis of apprehension.* For it is aimed directly at intuition; and although intuition offers a manifold, yet intuition can never bring this manifold about as a manifold, and as contained moreover *in one presentation,* unless a synthesis occurs in this process.

Now, this synthesis must be performed [not just empirically but] also a priori, i.e., in regard to presentations that are not empirical, because without it we could not have a priori the presentations of either space or time. For these presentations can be produced only through the synthesis of the A 100

[64] [The upcoming four passages numbered in arabic numerals and running from A 98 through A 114.]

[65] [This section, referred to again just below, runs from A 115 through A 130.]

[66] [*Durchlaufen . . . und . . . Zusammennehmung.* For the latter, see B 114 br. n. 239.]

manifold that sensibility offers in its original receptivity. We have, therefore, a pure synthesis of apprehension.

2. On the Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination[67]

There is a [natural] law whereby presentations that have often followed or accompanied one another will finally associate, and thereby enter into connection, with one another. By this connection, even without the object's being present, one of these presentations brings about a transition by the mind, according to a constant rule, to the other presentation. Now, this law of reproduction is indeed merely empirical. It presupposes, however, that appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule, and that such accompanying or following actually takes place, in conformity with certain rules, in the manifold of the presentations of these appearances. For otherwise our empirical imagination[68] would never get to do anything conforming to its ability, and hence would, like a defunct ability unknown[69] even to ourselves, remain hidden in the mind's interior. Suppose that cinnabar were now red, then black, now light, then heavy; or that a human being were changed now into this and then into that animal shape; or that
A 101 on the longest day of the year the land were covered now with fruit, then with ice and snow. In that case my empirical imagination could not even get the opportunity, when presenting red color, to come to think of[70] heavy cinnabar. Nor could an empirical synthesis of reproduction take place if a certain word were assigned now to this and then to that thing, or if the same thing were called now by this and then by another name, without any of this being governed by a certain rule to which appearances by themselves are already subject.

Hence there must be something that itself makes possible this reproduction of appearances, by being the a priori basis of a necessary synthetic unity of them. And we soon hit upon this something if we bear in mind that appearances are not things in themselves, but are the mere play of our

[67] [*Einbildung.*]

[68] [*Einbildungskraft.*]

[69] [*unbekannt.*]

[70] [*in die Gedanken zu bekommen.*]

presentations, which in the end amount to determinations of inner sense. Suppose now that we can establish that even our purest a priori intuitions provide us with no cognition except insofar as they contain a [certain] combination[71] of the manifold, viz., a combination that makes possible a thoroughgoing synthesis of reproduction. If we can establish this, then this synthesis has a basis even prior[72] to all experience and is based on a priori principles, and we must assume a pure transcendental synthesis of imagination that itself underlies the possibility of all experience (inasmuch as this possibility presupposes necessarily that appearances can be repro- A 102
duced). Now, obviously, if I want to draw[73] a line in thought, or to think the time from one noon to the next, or even just to present a certain number, then I must, first of all, necessarily apprehend[74] in thought one of these manifold presentations after the other. But if I always lost from my thoughts the preceding presentations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of the time,[75] or the sequentially presented units[76]) and did not reproduce them as I proceeded to the following ones, then there could never arise a whole presentation; nor could there arise any of the mentioned thoughts —indeed, not even the purest and most[77] basic presentations of space and time.

Hence the synthesis of apprehension[78] is linked inseparably with the synthesis of reproduction. And since the synthesis of apprehension constitutes the transcendental basis for the possibility of all cognitions as such (not merely of the empirical but also of the pure a priori ones), the reproductive synthesis of the imagination belongs to the transcendental acts of the mind; and, on account of this involvement of the imagination, let us call this power the transcendental power of imagination.[79]

[71][On (linking or) combination (*Verbindung*), assembly (*Zusammensetzung*), and connection (*Verknüpfung*), see below, B 201 n. 30.]

[72][*vor.*]

[73][Reading, with Erdmann, *ziehen* for *ziehe.*]

[74][*fassen.*]

[75][Between noons.]

[76][Of the number.]

[77][*erst*]

[78][*Apprehension.*]

[79][*Vermögen der Einbildungskraft.*]

A 103

3. On the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept

Without the consciousness that what we are thinking is the same as what we thought an instant before, all reproduction in the series of presentations would be futile. For what we are thinking would in the current state be a new presentation, which would not belong at all to the act by which it was to be produced little by little. Hence the manifold of the presentation would never make up a whole, because it would lack the unity[80] that only consciousness can impart to it. If, in counting, I were to forget that the units[81] now hovering before my mind[82] were added up by me little by little, then I would not cognize the amount's being produced through this successive addition of one [unit] to another; nor, therefore, would I cognize the number. For this number's concept consists solely in the consciousness of this unity of synthesis.

The very word *concept*[83] could on its own lead us to this observation. For this *one* consciousness is what unites in one presentation what is manifold, intuited little by little, and then also reproduced. Often this consciousness may be only faint, so that we do not [notice it] in the act itself, i.e., do not connect it directly with the presentation's production, but [notice it]
A 104 only in the act's effect.[84] Yet, despite these differences, a consciousness must always be encountered, even if it lacks striking clarity; without this consciousness, concepts, and along with them cognition of objects, are quite impossible.

And here we need to clarify[85] what we mean by the expression *an object of presentations.*[86] We said above[87] that appearances themselves are nothing but sensible presentations. But presentations in themselves must

[80][*Einheit.*]

[81][*Einheiten.*]

[82][*vor Sinnen.*]

[83][*Begriff*, from *begreifen* in the sense of 'to comprise' (but *not* in the sense of 'to comprehend' as meaning 'to grasp') Emphasis added.]

[84][I.e., in the presentation.]

[85][*sich verständlich machen*]

[86][Emphasis added.]

[87][A 101.]

not in the same way[88] be regarded as objects (outside our power of presentation).[89] What, then, do we mean when we talk about an object corresponding to, and hence also distinct from, cognition? We can easily see that this object must be thought only as something as such[90] = *x*.[91] For, after all, outside our cognition we have nothing that we could contrast with this cognition as something corresponding to it.

We find, however, that our thought of the reference of all cognition to its object carries with it something concerning necessity. It does so inasmuch as this object is regarded as what keeps our cognitions from being determined haphazardly or arbitrarily, [and as what ensures], rather, that they are determined a priori in a certain way. For these cognitions are to refer to an object, and hence in reference to this object they must also necessarily agree with one another, i.e., they must have that unity in which the A 105
concept of an object consists.

We are, however, dealing only with the manifold of our presentations. And since that *x* (the object) which corresponds to them is to be something distinct from all of our presentations, this object is nothing for us. Clearly, therefore, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the presentations. When we have brought about synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition—this is when we say that we cognize the object. This unity is impossible, however, unless the intuition can[92] be produced according to a rule through a [certain] function of synthesis, viz., a function of synthesis that makes the reproduction of the manifold necessary a priori and makes possible a concept in which this manifold is united. Thus when we think of a triangle as an object, we do so by being conscious of the assembly[93] of three straight lines according to a rule whereby such an intuition can always be exhibited.[94] Now this *unity of the rule* determines all that is manifold, and limits it to conditions that make possible the unity of apper-

[88][I.e., *as* presentations.]

[89][Presentations, as such, can be "objects of" other presentations only in the sense that these other presentations refer to them. Cf. the end of A 108.]

[90][Or 'something in general': *etwas überhaupt*. My reason for translating *überhaupt* by 'as such' is given at B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[91][I.e., the unknown (as in a mathematical equation).]

[92][Literally, 'was able to.']

[93][*Zusammensetzung*; see B 201 n. 30.]

[94][*dargestellt*. Concerning my rendering of this term, see B xvii br. n. 73.]

ception. And the concept of this unity is the presentation of the object = x, i.e., the object that I think through the mentioned[95] predicates of a triangle.

A 106 All cognition requires a concept, no matter how imperfect or obscure that concept may be. But a concept, in terms of its form, is always something that is universal and that serves as a rule. Thus the concept of body serves, in terms of the unity of the manifold thought through this concept, as a rule for our cognition of external appearances. But a concept can be a rule for intuitions only by presenting, when appearances are given to us, the necessary reproduction of their manifold and hence the synthetic unity in our consciousness of these appearances. Thus when we perceive something external to us, the concept of body makes necessary the presentation of extension, and with it the presentations of impenetrability, shape, etc.

Any necessity is always based on a transcendental condition. There must, therefore, be a transcendental basis to be found: a transcendental basis of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of all our intuitions; and hence a transcendental basis also of the concepts of objects as such, and consequently also of all objects of experience—a transcendental basis without which it would be impossible to think any object for our intuitions. For this object is nothing more than that something whose concept expresses such a necessity of synthesis.

This original and transcendental condition is none other than *transcen-*
A 107 *dental apperception.* Now there is, in inner perception, consciousness of oneself in terms of the determinations of one's state. This consciousness of oneself is merely empirical and always mutable; it can give us no constant or enduring[96] self in this flow of inner appearances. It is usually called *inner sense*, or *empirical apperception.* But what is to be presented *necessarily* as numerically identical cannot be thought as such through empirical data. A condition that is to validate[97] such a transcendental presupposition must be one that precedes all experience and that makes experience itself possible.

Now there can take place in us no cognitions, and no connection and unity of cognitions among one another, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of intuitions, and by reference to which all presentation of objects is alone possible. Now this pure, original, and im-

[95][*gedachten*, which literally means 'thought ' If we took the term in its literal meaning here, we would have to read: 'through the predicates thought [in the concept] of a triangle.']

[96][*stehendes oder bleibendes.*]

[97][*geltend machen.*]

mutable consciousness I shall call *transcendental apperception.* That this apperception deserves this name[98] is evident already from the fact that even the purest objective unity, viz., that of the a priori concepts (space and time), is[99] possible only by referring the intuitions[100] to this apperception. Hence the numerical unity of this apperception lies a priori at the basis of all concepts, just as the manifoldness of space and time lies a priori at the basis of the intuitions of sensibility.

Now this transcendental unity of apperception brings about, from all possible appearances whatever that can be together in one experience, a coherence of all these presentations according to laws. For this unity of consciousness would be impossible if the mind, in cognizing the manifold, could not become conscious of the identity of function whereby it[101] synthetically combines the manifold in one cognition. Hence the original and necessary consciousness of one's own identity is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts—these concepts being rules that not only make these appearances necessarily reproducible, but that thereby also determine an object for our intuition of these appearances, i.e., determine a concept of something wherein these appearances necessarily cohere. For the mind could not possibly think its own identity in the manifoldness of its presentations, and moreover think this identity a priori, if it did not have present to it the identity of its act—the act that subjects all synthesis of apprehension (a synthesis that is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and thereby first makes possible the coherence of those presentations[102] according to a priori rules. By the same token,[103] we shall now be able to determine more accurately our concept[104] of an *object as such.*[105] All presentations have, as presentations, their object, and can themselves in turn be objects of other presentations. The only objects that can be given to us directly are appearances, and what in these appearances refers directly to A 108 A 109

98[*Transcendental* apperception.]

99[Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *sei* for *sein.*]

100[Of space and time.]

101[Reading, with Wille, *es* for *sie*, which would refer back to the mentioned *unity.*]

102[Or, possibly, 'of that synthesis.']

103[*auch.*]

104[Reading, with Adickes, *unseren Begriff* for *unsere Begriffe.*]

105[Following the *Akademie* edition in extending the emphasis on 'object' to include 'as such.']

the object is called intuition. These appearances, however, are not things in themselves. Rather, they are themselves only presentations that in turn have their object. This object, therefore, can no longer be intuited by us, and may hence be named the nonempirical object,[106] i.e., the transcendental object = x.[107]

The pure concept of this transcendental object (which object is actually always the same, = x, in all our cognitions) is what is able to provide all[108] our empirical concepts in general[109] with reference to an object,[110] i.e., with objective[111] reality. Now this concept cannot contain any determinate intuition whatever, and hence presumably pertains to nothing but that unity which must be encountered in any manifold of cognition insofar as this manifold has reference to an object. This reference, however, is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness, and hence also of the synthesis of the manifold brought about through the mind's concerted[112] function of combining this manifold in one presentation. Now this unity must be regarded as necessary a priori (because otherwise cognition would be without an object); and hence the reference to a transcendental object, i.e., the objective reality of our empirical cognition, presumably rests on a transcendental law.
A 110 This transcendental law says that all appearances must, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, be subject to[113] a priori rules of the synthetic unity of appearances, a priori rules according to which alone their relation[114] in empirical intuition is possible. I.e., the transcendental law says: just as appearances must in mere intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time, so must appearances in experience be subject to conditions of the necessary unity of apperception—indeed, this law says that through these conditions alone does any cognition first becomes possible.

106[The object as such (*überhaupt*).]

107[Cf. A 250–51.]

108[Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *allen* for *in allen*.]

109[*überhaupt*.]

110[*Gegenstand*.]

111[*objektiv*.]

112[*gemeinschaftlich*.]

113[*stehen . . . unter*.]

114[To one another.]

4. Preliminary Explanation of the Possibility of the Categories as A Priori Cognitions

There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are presented as being in thoroughgoing and law-governed coherence, just as there is only one space and one time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of being or not-being[115] occur; when we speak of different experiences, then these are merely so many perceptions—all such perceptions belonging to one and the same general experience. For the form of experience consists precisely in this thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions; and this unity is nothing but the synthetic unity of appearances according to concepts.

A unity of synthesis according to empirical concepts would be entirely A 111 contingent. And if empirical concepts did not rest on a transcendental basis of unity, then it would be possible for our soul to be filled with a crowd of appearances that yet could never turn into experience. But then there would also no longer be any reference of cognition to objects. For cognition would then lack its connection according to universal and necessary laws. Therefore, although it would be intuition devoid of thought, yet it would never be cognition, and hence would for us be tantamount to nothing at all.

The a priori conditions for a possible experience as such are at the same time conditions for the possibility of objects of experience. Now I maintain that the *categories* set forth above[116] are nothing but *the conditions of thought in a possible experience*, just as *space and time* embody[117] *the conditions of intuition* for that same experience. Therefore the categories are also basic concepts for thinking objects as such for appearances; and hence they have a priori objective validity—which is in fact what we wanted to know.

But the possibility of these categories—indeed, even their necessity—rests on the reference that our entire sensibility, and with it also all possible appearances, have to original apperception. In original apperception everything must necessarily conform to the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-consciousness. I.e., in it everything must necessarily be A 112

[115][Or 'nonexistence': *Nichtsein*. Cf. A 80/B 106.]

[116][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *oben* for *eben*.]

[117][*enthalten*.]

subject to the universal functions of synthesis, viz., of that synthesis according to concepts in which alone apperception can prove a priori its thoroughgoing and necessary identity. Thus the concept of a cause is nothing but a synthesis *according to concepts* (where what follows in the time series is synthesized with other appearances); and without such unity, which has its a priori rule and which subjects appearances to itself, no thoroughgoing and universal and hence necessary unity of consciousness would be encountered in the manifold of perceptions. But then these perceptions would also not belong to any experience, and hence would be without an object; they would be nothing but a blind play of presentations—i.e., they would be less than a dream.

All attempts to derive those pure concepts of understanding from experience and to attribute to them a merely empirical origin are, therefore, entirely idle and futile. It goes without saying[118] that, e.g., the concept of a cause carries with it the characteristic[119] of necessity. No experience whatever can give us necessity. Experience can indeed teach us that upon one appearance something else usually follows. But it cannot teach us that something else must follow[120] the appearance necessarily; nor can it teach us that from the appearance, as a condition, we can make an a priori and quite universal inference to the consequence.[121] As regards the empirical rule of *association*, on the other hand, we must indeed assume it through-
A 113 out[122] when we say that everything in a sequence[123] of events is subject to rules to the point that nothing ever happens without being preceded by something that it always follows. This rule, taken as a law of nature—on what, I ask, does it rest? And how is even this association possible? The basis for the possibility of the manifold's association, insofar as this basis lies in the object, is called the manifold's *affinity*. I ask, therefore, how do you make comprehensible to yourselves the thoroughgoing[124] affinity of appearances (whereby they are, and *must* be, subject to[125] constant laws)?

[118]['I won't mention,' literally.]

[119][*Zug*.]

[120][*folgen*.]

[121][*Folge*.]

[122][*durchgängig*.]

[123][*Reihenfolge*.]

[124][*durchgängig*.]

[125][*unter . . . stehen, und darunter gehören*.]

On my principles the possibility of this affinity is quite readily comprehensible. All possible appearances belong, as presentations, to the entire possible self-consciousness. But from this self- consciousness, taken as a transcendental presentation, numerical identity is inseparable and is a priori certain. For nothing can enter cognition without doing so by means of this original apperception. This identity must, then, necessarily enter into the synthesis of everything manifold in appearances, insofar as this synthesis is to become empirical cognition. Hence appearances are subject to a priori conditions to which their synthesis (of apprehension) must conform[126] thoroughly.[127] But the presentation of a universal condition according to which a certain manifold *can* be posited (hence posited in one and the same way) is called a *rule*; and if the manifold *must* be so posited, then the presentation is called a *law*. Therefore all appearances stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence stand in a *transcendental affinity* of which the *empirical* affinity is the mere consequence. A 114

I suppose it sounds quite preposterous and strange that nature should conform to[128] our subjective basis, apperception—indeed, that nature should in regard to its law-governedness depend on this basis. But we must bear in mind that this nature is intrinsically[129] nothing but a sum of appearances, and hence is not a thing in itself[130] but is merely a multitude of the mind's presentations. If we bear this in mind, then we shall not be surprised that we see nature in its unity merely in the root power[131] for all our cognition, viz., in transcendental apperception; we there see nature in that unity, viz., on whose account alone it can be called object of all possible experience, i.e., nature. Nor shall we then be surprised that, precisely because of this, we can cognize that unity a priori, and hence also as necessary—a goal that we would indeed have to abandon if this unity were given in itself, independently of the primary sources of our thought. For I do not know from where we might then get the synthetic propositions about such a universal unity of nature, since we would in that case have to take them from the objects of nature themselves. That, however, could be done

126[*gemäß sein.*]

127[*durchgängig.*]

128[*sich nach . . . richten.*]

129[*an sich.*]

130[*an sich.*]

131[*Radikalvermögen.*]

only empirically. Hence we could obtain from this source none but a merely contingent unity; but this unity would fall far short of the necessary coherence that we mean when we speak of nature.

A 115

Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

Section III [First Edition]

ON THE UNDERSTANDING'S RELATION TO OBJECTS AS SUCH, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF COGNIZING THEM A PRIORI[132]

Let us now present in a unified and coherent way what in the preceding section we set forth separately and individually. There are three subjective sources of cognition on which rests the possibility of an experience as such and of cognition of its objects: *sense, imagination*, and *apperception*. Each of these can be considered as empirical, viz., in its application to given appearances. But all of them are also a priori elements or foundations that make possible even this empirical use of them. [In this empirical use,] *sense* presents appearances empirically in *perception*; *imagination* does so in *association* (and reproduction); *apperception* does so in the *empirical consciousness* of the identity of these reproductive presentations with the appearances through which they were given, and hence in recognition.[133]

But all of perception (in view of its being presentation) is based a priori
A 116 on pure intuition (viz., on time, the form of inner intuition); association is based a priori on the pure synthesis of imagination; and empirical consciousness is based a priori on pure apperception, i.e., on the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible presentations.

[132][See Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n 71, 143.]

[133][Deleting the emphasis on 'recognition' that was added in the *Akademie* edition.]

If, now, we want to pursue the inner basis of this connection of presentations, and pursue it to the point at which the presentations must all converge in order that there they may first of all acquire the unity of cognition needed for a possible experience, then we must start from pure apperception. All intuitions are nothing for us and are of no concern to us whatsoever if they cannot be taken up into consciousness, whether they impinge upon it[134] directly or indirectly; and solely through consciousness is cognition possible. We are conscious a priori of the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves in regard to all presentations that can ever belong to our cognition, and are conscious of it as a necessary condition for the possibility of all presentations. (For any such presentations present something in me only inasmuch as together with all others[135] they belong to one consciousness; and hence they must at least be capable of being connected in it.) This principle[136] holds[137] a priori, and may be called the *transcendental principle of the unity* of whatever is manifold in our presentations (and hence also in intuition). Now the unity of the manifold in a subject is synthetic; therefore pure apperception provides us with a principle of the synthetic unity of the manifold in all possible intuition.[138] A 117

[134][More literally, 'influence it': *darauf einfließen.*]

[135][Reading, with Erdmann, *allen anderen* for *allem anderen* ('with everything else').]

[136][*Prinzip.*]

[137][*feststehen.*]

[138]This proposition is of great importance; we must attend to it carefully. All presentations have a necessary reference to a *possible* empirical consciousness. For if they did not have this reference, and becoming conscious of them were entirely impossible, then this would be tantamount to saying that they do not exist at all. But all empirical consciousness has a necessary reference to a transcendental consciousness (a consciousness that precedes all particular experience), viz., the consciousness of myself as original apperception. It is therefore absolutely necessary that in my cognition all consciousness belongs to one consciousness (that of myself). Here, then, is a synthetic unity of the manifold (in consciousness) which is cognized a priori; this unity provides the basis for synthetic a priori propositions pertaining to pure thought, just as space and time provide the basis for such [i.e., a priori] propositions concerning the form of mere intuition. The synthetic proposition that all the varied *empirical consciousness* must be combined in one single self-consciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic principle[a] of our thought as such. We must not, however, ignore the fact that the mere presentation *I*, in reference to all other presentations (whose collective unity makes it possible), is transcendental consciousness. Now this presentation may be clear (empirical consciousness)[b] or obscure—that does not matter here; indeed, nor does whether the

A 118 But this synthetic unity presupposes or implies[139] a synthesis; and if that unity is to be a priori necessary, then the synthesis must also be an a priori one. Therefore the transcendental unity of apperception refers to the pure synthesis of imagination as an a priori condition for the possibility of all assembly[140] of the manifold in one cognition. But only the *productive* synthesis of imagination[141] can take place a priori; for the *reproductive* one rests on conditions of experience.[142] Therefore the principle of the necessary unity of the imagination's pure (productive) synthesis prior to apperception is the basis for the possibility of all cognition, especially of experience.

Now the synthesis of the manifold in imagination is called transcendental if, without distinction of intuitions, it deals with nothing but the a priori combination[143] of the manifold; and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if it is presented as a priori necessary in reference to the original unity of apperception. Now since this original unity of apperception underlies the possibility of all cognition, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all possible cognition;

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presentation is actual. Rather, the possibility of the logical form of all cognition depends[c] necessarily on the relation to this apperception *as a power.*

[a][*Grundsatz.*]

[b][Vorländer deletes '(empirical consciousness)'.]

[c][*ruhen.*]

[139][*einschließen.*]

[140][*Zusammensetzung*; see B 201 n. 30.]

[141][Deleting the (continued) emphasis on 'synthesis of imagination.']

[142][Cf. B 156, and A 141/B 181 br. n. 90. And cf. the *Anthropology*, Ak. VII, 167: "The imagination (*facultas imaginandi*), as a power to intuit even when the object is not present, is either *productive* or *reproductive*. As productive, it is a power of original exhibition of the object (*exhibitio originaria*), and hence of an exhibition that precedes experience. As reproductive, it is a power of derivative exhibition (*exhibitio derivativa*), an exhibition that brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that we have had before." Kant then turns to a different type of "productivity" of the imagination (*ibid.*, 167–68): "The imagination, insofar as it produces imaginings voluntarily as well, is called *fantasy*. . . . [Hence] (in other words) the imagination then either engages in *fiction* (i.e., it is productive), or in *recall* (i.e., it is reproductive). But this does not mean that the productive imagination is then *creative*, i.e., capable of producing a presentation of sense that was *never* before given to our power of sense; rather, we can always show [from where the imagination took] its material." Cf. also, in the same work, §§ 31–33, Ak. VII, 174–82, and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 240.]

[143][On (linking or) combination (*Verbindung*), assembly (*Zusammensetzung*), and connection (*Verknüpfung*), see B 201 n. 30.]

and hence all objects of possible experience must be presented a priori through this form.

The unity of apperception [*considered*] *in reference to the synthesis of imagination* is the *understanding;* and the same unity as referred[144] to the *transcendental synthesis of imagination* is *pure understanding*. Hence there are in the understanding pure a priori cognitions that contain the necessary unity of the pure synthesis of imagination in regard to all possible appearances. These cognitions, however, are the *categories*, i.e., the pure concepts of understanding. Consequently man's empirical cognitive power contains necessarily an understanding that refers to all objects of the senses, although it does so only by means of intuition and the synthesis of intuition performed by imagination. Hence all appearances, as data for a possible experience, are subject to this understanding.[145] Now this reference of appearances to possible experience is likewise necessary. (For without this reference[146] appearances would provide us with no cognition whatsoever and hence would not concern us at all.) Thus it follows that pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of all experiences, and that appearances have a *necessary reference to the understanding*. A 119

Let us now show how the understanding by means of the categories coheres necessarily with appearances, and let us do so by starting from the bottom[147] upward, viz., from the empirical. What is first given to us is appearance. When appearance is combined with consciousness, it is called perception. (Without the relation to an at least possible consciousness, appearance could never become for us an object of cognition, and hence would be nothing to us; and since appearance does not in itself have any objective reality and exists only in cognition, it would then be nothing at all.) But because every appearance contains a manifold, so that different perceptions are in themselves encountered in the mind sporadically and individually, these perceptions need to be given a combination that in sense itself they cannot have. Hence there is in us an active[148] power to synthe- A 120

[144] [*beziehungsweise*.]

[145] [Reading, with Erdmann, *welchem* for *welchen*.]

[146] [Or, perhaps, 'without this possible experience': *ohne diese*.]

[147] [*unten*.]

[148] [*tätig*.]

size this manifold. This power we call imagination; and the act[149] that it performs directly on perceptions I call apprehension.[150] For the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition to[151] an *image;* hence it must beforehand take the impressions up into its activity, i.e., apprehend them.

A 121 Clearly, however, even this apprehension of the manifold would, by itself, produce as yet no image and no coherence of impressions, if there did not also exist a subjective basis for summoning up a perception from which the mind has passed to another [and bringing it] over to the subsequent ones—and for thus exhibiting entire series of perceptions. I.e., in addition to apprehension we need a reproductive power of imagination, which, by the same token, is indeed only empirical.

But if presentations reproduced one another indiscriminately,[152] just as they happen to come together, then there would again arise no determinate coherence of presentations and hence no cognition whatever, but merely an accumulation of them devoid of any rule. Hence there must be for this reproduction of them a rule whereby some presentation combines in the imagination with this presentation rather than with some other one. This subjective and *empirical* basis of reproduction according to rules is called the *association* of presentations.

But suppose that this unity of association did not also have an objective basis, a basis making the apprehension of appearances by the imagination impossible except under the condition of a possible synthetic unity of this apprehension; in that case, for appearances to yield fortuitously[153] a coherence of human cognitions would be something entirely contingent as well. For even if we had the power to associate perceptions, whether in-
A 122 deed these perceptions would be associable would yet remain intrinsi-

[149] [*Handlung.*]

[150] That the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself has, I suppose, never occurred to any psychologist. This is so partly because this power has been limited by psychologists to reproduction only, and partly because they believed that the senses not only supply us with impressions, but indeed also assemble these impressions and thus bring about images of objects. But this undoubtedly requires something more than our receptivity for impressions, viz., a function for their synthesis.

[151] ['into,' literally.]

[152] [*ohne Unterschied*]

[153] [*sich . . . schicken*]

cally[154] quite undetermined and contingent. And in case they were not associable, there could be a multitude of perceptions, and presumably also an entire sensibility, in which there would be much empirical consciousness to be found in my mind—yet found as separate and without belonging to a consciousness of myself. This, however, is impossible. For only by classing all perceptions with one consciousness (original apperception) can I say, for all perceptions, that I am conscious of them. Hence there must be an objective basis (i.e., a basis into which we can have a priori insight prior[155] to all empirical laws of the imagination)[156] on which rests the possibility—indeed, the necessity—of a law extending through all appearances: a law whereby appearances are throughout[157] to be regarded as data of the senses that are intrinsically associable and subject, in reproduction, to universal rules of a thoroughgoing[158] connection. This objective basis of all association of appearances I call their *affinity*. This basis, however, we cannot find anywhere except in the principle of the unity of apperception in regard to all cognitions that are to belong to me. According to this principle, all appearances must without exception[159] enter the mind or be apprehended in such a way that they accord with the unity of apperception. This would not be possible without synthetic unity in their connection, and hence this unity is objectively necessary as well.

The objective unity of all (empirical) consciousness in one consciousness (i.e., in original apperception) is, therefore, the necessary condition even of all possible perception; and the affinity of all appearances (whether near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in imagination that is based a priori on rules. A 123

Hence the imagination is also a power of an a priori synthesis, and this is the reason why we give it the name of productive imagination. And insofar as the imagination's aim regarding everything manifold in appearance is nothing more than to provide necessary unity in the synthesis of appearance, this synthesis may be called the transcendental function of the imagination. Hence from what has been said thus far it is indeed evident,

154[*an sich;* similarly a little further down in this paragraph.]

155[*vor.*]

156[Parentheses added]

157[*durchgängig.*]

158[*durchgängig.*]

159[*durchaus.*]

although strange, that only by means of this transcendental function of the imagination does even the affinity of appearances become possible, and with it their association, and through this association finally their reproduction according to laws, and consequently experience itself. For without this transcendental function no concepts whatever of objects would meld[160] into one experience.

For in this constant and enduring *I*[161] (of pure apperception) consists the correlate of all our presentations insofar as becoming conscious of them is so much as possible. And all consciousness belongs to an all-
A 124 encompassing pure apperception just as all sensible intuition belongs, as presentation, to a pure inner intuition, viz., to time. Now, this apperception is what must be added to pure imagination in order to make its function intellectual. For the synthesis of imagination, although performed a priori, is yet always in itself sensible, because it combines the manifold—e.g., the shape of a triangle—only as it *appears* in intuition. But through the manifold's relation to the unity of apperception, concepts—which belong to the understanding—will be able to come about, but only by means of imagination as referred to sensible intuition.[162]

Hence we have a pure imagination, as a basic power of the human soul which underlies a priori all cognition. By means of pure imagination we link the manifold of intuition, on the one hand, with the condition of the necessary unity of pure apperception, on the other hand. By means of this transcendental function of the imagination the two extreme ends, viz., sensibility and understanding, must necessarily cohere; for otherwise sensibility would[163] indeed yield appearances, but would yield no objects of an empirical cognition, and hence no experience. Actual experience consists in apprehension of appearances, their association (reproduction), and thirdly
A 125 their recognition; in this third [element] (which is the highest[164] of these merely empirical elements of experience), such experience contains con-

[160][*zusammenfließen.*]

[161][Emphasis added. Cf. 68 br. n. 167.]

[162][Vaihinger, interpolating the words 'are brought into play,' reads this sentence as follows: 'But through the manifold's relation to the unity of apperception concepts are brought into play, which belong to the understanding but are able to come about only by means of imagination as referred to sensible intuition.']

[163][Reading, with the *Akademie* edition, *würde* for *würden*, which would make *jene* refer back to 'sensibility and understanding.']

[164][Moving 'the highest' from just in front of the parentheses to just within them.]

cepts, which make possible the formal unity of experience and with it all objective validity (truth) of empirical cognition. Now these bases of the recognition[165] of the manifold, insofar as they concern *merely the form of an experience as such,* are the *categories.* Hence the categories underlie all formal unity in the synthesis of imagination, and, by means of this synthesis, underlie also the formal unity of[166] all empirical use of the imagination down to the appearances (i.e., its use in recognition, reproduction, association, apprehension). For only by means of those elements[167] can appearances belong to cognition, and to our consciousness as such, and hence to ourselves.

Hence the order and regularity in the appearances that we call *nature*[168] are brought into them by ourselves; nor indeed could such order and regularity be found in appearances, had not we, or the nature of our mind, put them into appearances originally. For this unity of nature is to be a necessary, i.e., an a priori certain, unity of the connection[169] of appearances. But how indeed could we have the ability to institute[170] a priori a synthetic unity, if our mind's original cognitive sources did not a priori contain subjective bases of such unity, and if these subjective conditions were not at the same time valid objectively, viz., by being the bases for the possibility A 126
of cognizing an object in experience at all?

We have earlier explicated the *understanding* in various ways: as a spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of sensibility); as a power to think; or as a power of concepts, or again of judgments. These expli-

[165][I.e., the concepts contained in it.]

[166][Adickes drops the genitive, reading *aller empirischer Gebrauch* for *alles empirischen Gebrauchs.* On his reading, the categories would here be said to underlie "all empirical use . . ." rather than all formal unity of that use.]

[167][Including, therefore, recognition and the concepts contained in it, and hence only by means of the categories that these concepts *are* "insofar as they concern merely the form of an experience as such "]

[168][Or: 'the order and regularity in appearances, which order and regularity we call *nature.*' Kant uses the term 'nature' both materially and formally (see B 163–65), i.e., as standing either for the sum of appearances (as at B 163 and implied, e.g., near the end of A 127) or for their (order or) unity (as at B 165 and, just below, at A 127–28). Accordingly, *Natureinheit* just below can mean either 'unity of nature' or, instead, 'natural unity' (taken as the unity that *is* nature).]

[169][I.e., synthesis.]

[170][*auf die Bahn bringen.*]

cations, when inspected closely,[171] all come to the same. We may now characterize the understanding as our *power of rules.* This criterion of an understanding is more fruitful and comes closer to its nature.[172] Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but the understanding gives us rules. The understanding is always busy scrutinizing appearances with the aim of discovering some rule in them. Rules, insofar as they are objective[173] (and hence attach to the cognition of the object[174] necessarily), are called laws. Many laws are indeed learned by us through experience. Yet these laws are only particular determinations of still higher laws. And the highest among these laws (those under which all other laws fall) issue a priori from the understanding itself. These laws are not taken from experience; rather, they must provide appearances with the latter's law-governedness, and precisely thereby must make experience possible. Hence understanding is not merely a power of making rules for oneself by comparing appearances; understanding is itself legislative for nature. I.e., without understanding there
A 127 would not be any nature at all, i.e., any synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules; for appearances, as such, cannot occur outside us, but exist only in our sensibility. This nature,[175] however, as object of cognition in an experience, with everything that this nature may contain, is possible only in the unity of apperception. The unity of apperception, however, is the transcendental basis of the necessary law-governedness of all appearances in one experience. This same unity of apperception in regard to a manifold of presentations (viz., the manifold's being determined by a single presentation[176]) is the rule, and our power of these rules is the understanding. Hence all appearances, insofar as they are possible experiences, lie a priori in the understanding and obtain from it their formal possibility; just as, insofar as they are mere intuitions, they lie in sensibility and are, in terms of their form, possible solely through it.

171[*bei Lichte.*]

172[*Wesen.*]

173[*objektiv.* In his working copy of edition A, Kant changes the beginning of this sentence to the following: "Rules, insofar as they declare existence to be necessary," . . . See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*, Ak. XXIII, 46.]

174[*Gegenstand.*]

175[I follow Erdmann in construing *Diese* as referring back to 'nature ' Vaihinger similarly replaces *Diese* by *Jene.*]

176[I.e., a manifold of intuitions proffered by sensibility is determined by [*aus*] a concept of understanding (i.e., by a category).]

Thus however exaggerated and preposterous it may sound if we say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and hence the source of nature's formal unity, such an assertion is nonetheless correct and is appropriate for the object,[177] viz., experience. It is true that empirical laws, as empirical, cannot in any way derive their origin from pure understanding, any more than the immense manifoldness of appearances can be comprehended adequately from the pure form of sensible intuition. However, all empirical laws are only particular determinations of the pure laws A 128
of understanding. Under these pure laws, and according to their standard, are empirical laws possible in the first place, and do appearances take on a law-governed form; just as all appearances as well, regardless of the variety in their empirical form, must still always conform to the conditions of the pure form of sensibility.

Hence pure understanding is, through[178] the categories, the law of the synthetic unity of all appearances; and it thereby first and originally makes experience possible in terms of its form. This, however, is all that we had to accomplish in the transcendental deduction of the categories, viz.: to make comprehensible this relation of understanding to sensibility, and by means of sensibility to all objects of experience; and hence to make comprehensible the objective validity of understanding's pure a priori concepts, and thereby to ascertain their origin and truth.

SUMMARY PRESENTATION: THAT THIS DEDUCTION OF THE PURE CATEGORIES OF UNDERSTANDING IS CORRECT AND IS THE ONLY ONE POSSIBLE[179]

If the objects dealt with by our cognition were things in themselves, then we could have no a priori concepts of them at all. For from where could we get such concepts? If we got them from the object[180] (and I shall not here inquire again how we could become acquainted with this object), then A 129
our concepts would not be a priori ones but would be merely empirical. If

[177][The object that this nature is.]

[178][*in*.]

[179][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, the n. at 474–76, where Kant says that he will make improvements for the B Deduction.]

[180][*Objekt* here and just below, *Gegenstand* above (in the plural) and again further below.]

we got the concepts from ourselves, then [they would lack objective validity. For] what is merely in us cannot determine the character of an object distinct from our presentations; i.e., such a [subjective] concept can be no ground as to why there should be a thing having[181] something like what we have in our thoughts, and why all this presentation should not rather be empty. If, on the other hand, we are indeed dealing[182] with nothing but appearances, then it is not only possible but also necessary that certain a priori concepts should precede our empirical cognition of objects. For appearances, as such, amount to an object that is only in us, because a mere modification of our sensibility is not to be met with outside us at all. Now the very conception[183] that all these appearances (and hence all objects that we can deal with) are one and all in me, i.e., are determinations of my identical self, conveys as necessary a thoroughgoing unity of them in one and the same apperception. But the form of all cognition of objects (i.e., the form whereby the manifold is thought as belonging to one object) likewise consists in this unity of possible consciousness. Therefore the manner in which the manifold of sensible presentation (intuition) belongs to one consciousness precedes all cognition of the object, as the intellectual form of that cognition, and itself amounts to a formal a priori cognition of all ob-
A 130 jects as such insofar as they are thought (the categories). The synthesis of this [sensible intuition] by pure imagination, and the unity of all presentations by reference to original apperception precede all empirical cognition. Hence pure concepts of understanding are a priori possible, and in reference to experience even necessary, only because our cognition deals with nothing but appearances. For the possibility of appearances lies in ourselves, and their connection and unity (in the presentation of an object) is to be met with merely in us. Hence this connection and unity must precede all experience and must also make experience, in terms of its form, possible in the first place. And our deduction of the categories has indeed been conducted on this basis—the one and only possible basis.

[181] [As a property]

[182] [The verb 'to deal' renders *zu tun haben* here, *sich beschäftigen* a few lines below within the parentheses, which have been added.]

[183] [*Vorstellung*.]

Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

Section II

[Second Edition][184]

Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding

§ 15
ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMBINATION[185] AS SUCH

The [uncombined] manifold of presentations can be given in an intuition that is merely sensible, i.e., nothing but receptivity;[186] and the form of this intuition can lie a priori in our power[187] of presentation without being anything but the way in which the subject is affected. But a manifold's *combination* (*coniunctio*) as such[188] can never come to us through the senses; nor, therefore, can it already be part of what is contained[189] in the pure

[184][See H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 63–105. See also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 151–57. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 1, 499–585. Also H. J. Vleeschauwer, *op. cit.* at A 64/B 89 br. n. 96, vol. 3, 13–274. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 183–202. See also the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, the note at 474–76, where Kant admits that because of criticism leveled against the deduction provided in the first edition of the *Critique* he has decided to write a new and different deduction for the second edition. The A deduction has subsequently come to be called by Kant scholars the "subjective" and the B deduction the "objective" deduction.]

[185][On (linking or) combination (*Verbindung*), assembly (*Zusammensetzung*), and connection (*Verknüpfung*), see B 201 n. 30.]

[186][In contrast to an intellectual intuition. See B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[187][-*vermögen* here, -*kraft* just below.]

[188][This reading best fits the title of the subsection. An alternative reading is: 'the *combination* (*coniunctio*) of a manifold as such.']

[189][*zugleich mit enthalten*.]

B 130 form of sensible intuition. For this combination is an act of spontaneity by the power of presentation; and this power must be called understanding, in order to be distinguished from sensibility. Hence all combination is an act of understanding—whether or not we become conscious of such combination; whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of the manifold of various concepts; and whether, in the case of intuition, it is a combination of sensible or of nonsensible[190] intuition. I would assign to this act of understanding the general name *synthesis*, in order to point out at the same time: that we cannot present anything as combined in the object without ourselves' having combined it beforehand; and that, among all presentations, *combination* is the only one that cannot be given through objects, but—being an act of the subject's self-activity—can be performed only by the subject himself. We readily become aware here that this act of synthesis must originally be a single act and must hold equally for all combination; and that resolution or *analysis*, which seems to be its opposite, yet always presupposes it. For where the understanding has not beforehand combined anything, there it also cannot resolve anything, because only *through the understanding* could the power of presentation have been given something as combined.

But the concept of combination carries with it, besides the concept of the manifold and of its synthesis, also the concept of the manifold's unity.
B 131 Combination is presentation of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold.[191] Hence

[190][Mellin thinks this should be narrowed to read 'empirical or nonempirical.' Erdmann (editor's notes, Ak. III, 587 n. 107), agrees with him on the grounds that (1) we are still within the context of Kant's discussion of sensible intuition, and (2) the principle of the synthetic unity of apperception is limited (according to B 138–39) to our (discursive) kind of understanding. However, as for (1), not only is the intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition about to be discussed explicitly in the next two subsections (as well as later), but even in the present context Kant clearly alludes to it: by the characterization of our intuition as 'merely sensible,' and even by the very general subsection heading. As for (2), what (by B 138–39) is limited to the human understanding cannot be synthesis (combination) as such. For an intuitive understanding would through its self-consciousness give objects (B 139, 145). i.e., would *give* a manifold *as already synthesized.* (Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 406–7.) What is limited to our understanding is merely the fact that for it this synthesis is *not* already part of self-consciousness but is a *special* act (B 139) on which the identity of self-consciousness is *based* (B 133–34).]

[191]We need not here consider whether the [manifold] presentations themselves are identical, so that one can be thought analytically through the other: the *consciousness* of the one presentation can nonetheless, insofar as we are talking about the manifold, always be distinguished from the consciousness of the other presentation; and what matters here is solely the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness.

the presentation of this unity cannot arise from the combination; rather, by being added to the presentation of the manifold, it makes possible the concept of combination in the first place. This unity, which thus precedes a priori all concepts of combination, is by no means the category of unity mentioned earlier (in § 10[192]). For all categories are based on logical functions occurring in judgments; but in these functions combination, and hence unity of given concepts, is already thought. Hence a category already presupposes combination. We must therefore search for this unity (which is qualitative unity; see § 12[193]) still higher up, viz., in what itself contains the basis for the unity of different concepts in judgments, and hence contains the basis for the possibility of understanding, even as used logically.

§ 16
ON THE ORIGINAL SYNTHETIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION[194]

The *I think* must be *capable* of accompanying all my presentations. For otherwise something would be presented to me that could not be thought B 132
at all—which is equivalent to saying that the presentation either would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. Presentation that can be given prior to all thought is called *intuition*. Hence everything manifold in intuition has a necessary reference to the *I think* in the same subject in whom this manifold is found. But this presentation [i.e., the *I think*] is an act of spontaneity; i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it *pure apperception*, in order to distinguish it from *empirical* apperception. Or, again, I call it *original apperception;* for it is the self-consciousness which, because it produces the presentation *I think* that must be capable of accompanying all other presentations[,] and [because it] is one and the same[195] in all consciousness, cannot be accompanied by any further presentation. I also call the *unity*[196] of this apperception the *transcendental* unity of self-consciousness, in order to indicate that a priori cog-

[192][Specifically, A 80/B 106.]

[193][Specifically, B 114.]

[194][See Walter Watson, *op. cit* at B xvi br. n. 71, 143.]

[195][*ein und dasselbe*, which grammatically can refer back only to 'the self-consciousness,' not to 'the presentation *I think*.' Hence the bracketed insertions.]

[196][Emphasis added]

nition can be obtained from it. For the manifold presentations given in a certain intuition would not one and all be *my* presentations, if they did not one and all belong to one self-consciousness. I.e., as my presentations (even if I am not conscious of them as being mine[197]), they surely must conform necessarily to the condition under which alone they *can* stand together in one universal self-consciousness, since otherwise they would not thoroughly[198]
B 133 belong to me. And from this original combination much can be inferred.

This same thoroughgoing[199] identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition contains a synthesis of presentations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness that accompanies different presentations is intrinsically[200] sporadic and without any reference to the subject's identity. Hence this reference comes about not through my merely accompanying each presentation with consciousness, but through my *adding* one presentation to another and being conscious of their synthesis. Hence only because I can combine a manifold of given presentations *in one consciousness*, is it possible for me to present the *identity itself of the consciousness in these presentations.*[201] I.e., the *analytic* unity of apperception is possible only under the presupposition of
B 134 some *synthetic* unity of apperception.[202] The thought that these presenta-

[197][Literally, 'as such': *als solcher.*]

[198][*durchgängig.*]

[199][*durchgängig.*]

[200][*an sich.*]

[201][I.e., across these presentations. I have extended the emphasis to include 'selbst.']

[202]The analytic unity of consciousness attaches to all concepts that are, and inasmuch as they are, common [to several presentations]. E.g., in thinking *red* as such, I present a property that can be found (as a characteristic) in something or other, or can be combined with other presentations; hence only by virtue of a possible synthetic unity that I think beforehand can I present the analytic unity.[a] A presentation that is to be thought as common to different presentations is regarded as be-
B 134 longing to presentations that, besides having it, also have something *different* about them. Consequently it must beforehand be thought in synthetic unity with other presentations (even if only possible ones). Only then can I think in it the analytic unity of consciousness that makes the presentation a *conceptus communis*. And thus the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point, to which we must attach all use of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and in accordance with[b] it transcendental philosophy; indeed, this power is the understanding itself.

[a][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 142–45.]

[b][Or 'in terms of,' or simply 'after': *nach.*]

tions given in intuition belong one and all to me is, accordingly, tantamount to the thought that I unite them, or at least can unite them, in one self-consciousness. And although that thought itself is not yet the consciousness of the *synthesis* of the presentations, it still presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. I.e., only because I can comprise the manifold of the presentations in one consciousness, do I call them one and all *my* presentations. For otherwise I would have a self as many-colored and varied as I have presentations that I am conscious of. Hence synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions, as given[203] a priori, is the basis of the identity itself of apperception, which precedes a priori all *my* determinate thought. But combination does not lie in objects, and can by no means be borrowed from them by perception and thus be taken up only then into the understanding. It is, rather, solely something performed by the understanding; B 135
and understanding itself is nothing more than the power to combine a priori and to bring the manifold of given intuitions under the unity of apperception—the principle of this unity being the supreme principle in all of human cognition.

Now, it is true that this principle of the necessary unity of apperception is itself merely an identical[204] and hence an analytic proposition. Yet it does declare as necessary a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, a synthesis without which that thoroughgoing identity of self-consciousness cannot be thought. For through the *I*,[205] as simple presentation, nothing manifold is given; only in intuition, which is distinct from this presentation, can a manifold be given, and only through *combination* can it be thought in one consciousness. An understanding wherein through self-consciousness alone everything manifold would at the same time[206] be given would be an understanding that *intuits.*[207] Our understanding can only *think*, and must seek intuition in the senses. I am, then, conscious of the self as identical, as regards the manifold of the presentations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all *my* presentations that make up *one* presentation. That, however, is tantamount to saying that I am con-

[203][Changed by Vaihinger to 'produced.']

[204][I.e., based, for its truth, on identity.]

[205][Emphasis added.]

[206][*zugleich*]

[207][On intuitive understanding and its (intellectual) intuition, see above, B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

scious of a necessary a priori synthesis of them.[208] This synthesis is called the original synthetic unity of apperception. All presentations given to me
B 136 are subject to this unity; but they must also be brought under it through a synthesis.

§ 17
THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SYNTHETIC UNITY OF APPERCEPTION IS THE SUPREME PRINCIPLE FOR ALL USE OF THE UNDERSTANDING

The supreme principle for the possibility of all intuition in reference to sensibility was, according to the Transcendental Aesthetic,[209] that everything manifold in intuition is subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle for the possibility of all intuition in reference to understanding is that everything manifold in intuition is subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.[210] All manifold presentations of intuition are subject to the first principle insofar as they are *given* to us. They are subject to the second principle insofar as they must be ca-
B 137 pable of being *combined* in one consciousness. For without that combination, nothing can be thought or cognized through such presentations, because the given presentations do then not have in common the act of apperception, *I think*, and thus would not be collated[211] in one self-consciousness.

[208][Or: 'that I am conscious a priori of a necessary synthesis of them.]

[209][See A 38–9/B 55–6.]

[210]Space and time, and all their parts, are *intuitions;* hence they, with the manifold that they contain, are singular presentations. (See the Transcendental Aesthetic).[a] Hence space and time are not mere concepts, through which the very same consciousness is encountered as contained in many presentations. They are, rather, [presentations through which] many presentations are encountered as contained in one presentation and in the consciousness thereof, and hence [they are presentations] encountered as composite; and consequently the unity of this consciousness is encountered as *synthetic,* but yet as original. This *singularity* of [intuition] is important when applied [to specific contexts]. (See § 25.[b])

[a][Although Kant did not there use the term 'singular,' the reference seems to be to § 2, numbers 3 and 4 (A 24-25/B 39), and § 4, numbers 4 and 5 (A 31–2/B 47).]

[b][Below, B 157–59.]

[211][I.e., arranged and held together: *zusammengefaßt* See above, B 114 br. n. 239.]

Understanding—speaking generally[212]—is the power of *cognitions*. Cognitions consist in determinate reference of given presentations to an object. And an *object*[213] is that in whose concept the manifold of a given intuition is *united*. But all unification of presentations requires that there be unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently the reference of presentations to an object consists solely in this unity of consciousness, and hence so does their objective validity and consequently their becoming cognitions. On this unity, consequently, rests the very possibility of the understanding.

Hence the principle of the original *synthetic* unity of apperception is the primary pure cognition of understanding, on which the entire remaining use of the understanding is based; and this cognition is at the same time entirely independent of all conditions of sensible intuition. Thus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, i.e., space, is as yet no cognition at all; it provides only the manifold of a priori intuition for a possible cognition. Rather, in order to cognize something or other—e.g., a line—in space, I must *draw* it; and hence I must bring about synthetically a determinate combination B 138
of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act[214] is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the concept of a line), and so that an object (a determinate space) is thereby first cognized. The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition. Not only do I myself need this condition in order to cognize an object, but every intuition must be subject to it *in order to become an object for me*. For otherwise, and without that synthesis, the manifold would *not* unite in one consciousness.

Although this last proposition makes the synthetic unity [of consciousness] a condition of all thought, it is—as I have said[215]—itself analytic. For it says no more than that all *my* presentations in some given intuition must be subject to the condition under which alone I can ascribe them—as *my* presentations—to the identical self, and hence under which alone I can collate them, as combined synthetically in one apperception, through the universal[216] expression *I think*.

212[*allgemein.*]

213[*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* just below.]

214[Of synthesis.]

215[B 135.]

216[*allgemein.*]

On the other hand, this principle[217] is not one for every possible understanding as such, but is a principle only for that [kind of] understanding through whose pure apperception, in the presentation *I think*, nothing manifold whatever is yet given. An alternative [kind of] understanding would be that understanding through whose self-consciousness the manifold of in-
B 139 tuition would at the same time be given—i.e., an understanding through whose presentation the objects of this presentation would at the same time exist.[218] Such an understanding would not require, for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the manifold. The human understanding, which merely thinks but does not intuit, does need that synthesis. But still, for the human understanding the principle[219] is unavoidably the first principle. And thus our understanding cannot even frame the slightest concept of a different possible understanding—whether of an understanding that itself would intuit; or of an understanding that would indeed have lying at its basis a sensible intuition, yet one of a different kind from that in space and time.

§ 18
WHAT OBJECTIVE UNITY OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS IS

The *transcendental unity* of apperception is the unity whereby everything manifold given in an intuition is united in a[220] concept of the object. Hence this unity is called *objective*, and must be distinguished from *subjective* unity[221] of consciousness, which is a *determination of inner sense* whereby that manifold of intuition for such [objective] combination[222] is given empirically. Whether I can be conscious *empirically* of the manifold as simultaneous or as sequential depends on circumstances or empirical con-
B 140 ditions. Hence empirical unity of consciousness, through association of

[217][Here 'principle' translates *Grundsatz*, the subsequent 'one' renders *Prinzip.* See A vii br. n. 7.]

[218][This would be an intuitive understanding, and its intuition would be intellectual. See above, B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[219][Of the synthetic unity of apperception.]

[220][Reading *in einem* for *in einen* ('into a').]

[221][Emphasis on 'unity' deleted.]

[222][*Verbindung.*]

presentations, itself concerns an appearance and is entirely contingent. On the other hand, the pure form of intuition in time, merely as intuition as such containing a given manifold, is subject to the original unity[223] of consciousness. It is subject to that unity solely through the necessary reference of the manifold of intuition to the one[224] [self], i.e., to the *I think,*[225] and hence through the understanding's pure synthesis that lies a priori at the basis of the empirical synthesis. Only the original unity of consciousness is valid[226] objectively. The empirical unity of apperception, which we are not examining here and which moreover is only derived from the original unity under given conditions *in concreto,* has only subjective validity. One person will link[227] the presentation of a certain word with one thing, another with some other thing; and the unity of consciousness in what is empirical is not, as regards what is given, necessary and universally valid.[228]

§ 19
THE LOGICAL FORM OF ALL JUDGMENTS CONSISTS IN THE OBJECTIVE UNITY OF APPERCEPTION OF THE CONCEPTS CONTAINED IN THEM

I have never been able to settle for the explication that logicians give of a judgment as such. A judgment, they say, is the presentation of a relation between two concepts. Now, I shall not here quarrel with them about one B 141
respect in which this explication is defective (although this oversight has given rise to many irksome consequences for logic): viz., that it fits at most *categorical* judgments only, but not hypothetical and disjunctive ones (since these contain a relation not of concepts but of further[229] judgments).[230] I

[223][*Einheit.*]

[224][*Einen.*]

[225][Emphasis on 'I think' added.]

[226][*gültig.*]

[227][*verbinden.*]

[228][*geltend.*]

[229][*selbst.*]

[230]The voluminous doctrine of the four syllogistic[a] figures concerns only categorical syllogisms.[b] Now, this doctrine is nothing more than the art of surreptitiously

shall point out only that this explication of a judgment leaves undetermined wherein this *relation*[231] consists.

But suppose that I inquire more precisely into the [relation or] reference of given cognitions in every judgment, and that I distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the relation in terms of laws of the reproductive imagination (a relation that has only subjective validity). I then find that a judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception.[232] This is what the little relational word[233]
B 142 *is* in judgments intends [to indicate], in order to distinguish the objective unity of given presentations from the subjective one. For this word indicates the reference of the presentations to original apperception and its *necessary unity*. The reference to this necessary unity is there even if the judgment itself is empirical and hence contingent—e.g., Bodies are heavy. By this I do not mean that these presentations belong *necessarily to one another* in the empirical intuition. Rather, I mean that they belong to one another *by virtue of the necessary unity* of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions; i.e., they belong to one another according to principles of the objective determination of all presentations insofar as these presentations can become cognition—all of these principles[234] being derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only through this [reference to original apperception and its necessary unity] does this relation

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creating,[c] by concealing immediate inferences (*consequentiae immediatae*) among the premises of a pure syllogism, the illusion that there are more kinds of inference than that of the first figure. Still, the doctrine would not on account of that illusion alone have met with special fortune, had it not also succeeded in procuring for categorical judgments an exclusive reputation, viz. as judgments to which all others must be capable of being referred[d]—which, however, is false by § 9.[e]

[a][*syllogistisch.*]

[b][*Vernunftschlüsse.*]

[c][*erschleichen.*]

[d][As their basis.]

[e][See also Kant's *The Mistaken Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (*Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren*) of 1762, Ak. II, 45–61; and cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 125–28.]

[231][Between the concepts.]

[232][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 150–73.]

[233][*Verhältniswörtchen*, the diminutive of *Verhältniswort*, which usually means 'preposition' but is here being used more literally to fit Kant's context. The German term for 'copula' is *Verbindungswort*, the diminutive of which would be *Verbindungswörtchen*.]

[234][The term used is *Prinzip* (in the plural) here, *Grundsatz* just below.]

[among presentations] become a *judgment*, i.e., a relation that is *valid objectively* and can be distinguished adequately from a relation of the same presentations that would have only subjective validity—e.g., a relation according to laws of association. According to these laws, all I could say is: When I support a body, then I feel a pressure of heaviness. I could not say: It, the body, is heavy—which amounts to saying that these two presentations are not merely together in perception (no matter how often repeated), but are combined in the object, i.e., combined independently of what the subject's state is.

§ 20 B 143

ALL SENSIBLE INTUITIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE CATEGORIES, WHICH ARE[235] CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH ALONE THEIR MANIFOLD CAN COME TOGETHER IN ONE CONSCIOUSNESS

The manifold given [which is found][236] in a sensible intuition is subject necessarily to[237] the original synthetic unity of apperception; for solely through this unity is the *unity* of intuition possible. (§ 17.) But the act of understanding whereby the manifold of given presentations (whether intuitions or concepts) are brought under[238] one apperception as such is the logical function of judgments. (§ 19.) Therefore everything manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is *determined* in regard to one of the logical functions of judging, inasmuch as through this function[239] it is brought to one consciousness as such.[240] The *categories*, however, are indeed nothing but precisely these functions of judging insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is[241] determined in regard to them.

[235][*als*.]

[236][*Das mannigfaltige . . . Gegebene.* I.e., 'manifold' is an adjective, and 'given' is a participle functioning as a noun. See also B 203 br. n 38.]

[237][*gehören . . . unter.*]

[238][*bringen . . . unter.*]

[239][Or, possibly, 'through these functions': *durch die.*]

[240][See J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 173–78.]

[241][*ist*, not *wird*. I.e., Kant is speaking about the manifold's state of being determined, not about the act of the manifold's being determined.]

(§ 13.[242]) Hence, by the same token, the manifold in a given intuition is subject necessarily to[243] the categories.

B 144

§ 21
COMMENT

Through the synthesis of understanding, a manifold contained in an intuition that I call mine is presented as belonging to the *necessary* unity of self-consciousness, and this presenting is done by means of the category.[244] Hence the category indicates that the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of one intuition is just as subject to a pure a priori self-consciousness, as empirical intuition is subject to a pure sensible intuition that likewise takes place a priori. Hence in the above proposition[245] I have made the beginning of a *deduction* of the pure concepts of understanding. Since the categories are *independent of sensibility* and arise in the understanding alone, I must still abstract, in this deduction, from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to take account solely of the unity that the understanding contributes to the intuition[246] by means of the category. Afterwards (§ 26) I shall show, from the way in
B 145 which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that the intuition's unity is none other than the unity that (by § 20, above) the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition as such; and that hence by my explaining the category's a priori validity regarding all objects of our senses, the deduction's aim will first be fully attained.

From one point, however, I could not abstract in the above proof: viz., from the fact that the manifold for the intuition must be given still prior to

[242][The *Akademie* edition, following Vaihinger, substitutes '§ 10.']

[243][*stehen . . . unter.*]

[244]The basis of proof for this rests on the presented *unity of intuition*, through which an *object*[a] is given. That unity always implies[b] a synthesis of the manifold given[c] for an intuition, and already contains this manifold given's reference to unity of apperception.

[a][Emphasis added.]

[b][Or 'includes': *in sich schließt*]

[c][Here again 'manifold' is an adjective, and 'given' is a participle that is *about* to be construed as a noun Cf. above, B 143 incl. br. n. 236.]

[245][The proposition at the beginning of § 21.]

[246][*in die Anschauung . . durch den Verstand hinzukommt.*]

the understanding's synthesis, and independently of it; but how it is given remains undetermined here. For if I were to think of an understanding[247] that itself intuited[248] (as, e.g., a divine understanding that did not present given objects[249] but through whose presentation the objects would at the same time be given or produced), then in regard to such cognition the categories would have no signification[250] whatever. The categories are only rules for an understanding whose entire power consists in thought, i.e., in the act of bringing to the unity of apperception the synthesis of the manifold that has, in intuition, been given to it from elsewhere. Hence such an understanding by itself cognizes nothing whatever, but only combines and orders the material for cognition, i.e., the intuition, which must be given to it by the object. But why our understanding has this peculiarity, that it a priori brings about unity of apperception only by means of the catego- B 146
ries, and only by just this kind and number of them—for this no further reason can be given, just as no reason can be given as to why we have just these and no other functions in judging, or why time and space are the only forms of our possible intuition.

§ 22
A Category Cannot Be Used for Cognizing Things Except When It Is Applied to Objects of Experience

Thinking an object and *cognizing* an object are, then, not the same. For cognition involves two components: first, the concept (the category), through which an object as such is thought;[251] and second, the intuition, through which the object is given. For if no intuition corresponding to the concept could be given at all,[252] then in terms of its form the concept would indeed

[247][Other than our own.]

[248][See above, B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[249][As does our understanding, which presents objects given outside of itself, viz., in sensible intuition.]

[250][*Bedeutung*. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[251]['through which an object is thought at all' would be the most literal rendering. But translating '*überhaupt*' by 'as such' as associated with 'object' clarifies the connection with what follows.]

[252][*gar*.]

be a thought; but it would be a thought without any object, and no cognition at all of any thing whatsoever would be possible by means of it. For as far as I would know, there would be nothing, and could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. Now, all intuition that is possible for us is sensible (see the Transcendental Aesthetic). Hence in us, thinking an object as such by means of a pure concept of understanding can become cognition only insofar as this concept is referred to objects of the senses.
B 147 Sensible intuition is either pure intuition (space and time) or empirical intuition of what, through sensation, is presented directly as actual in space and time. By determining pure intuition we can (in mathematics) acquire a priori cognition of objects as appearances, but only in terms of their form;[253] that, however, still leaves unestablished whether there can be things that must be intuited in this form. Consequently all mathematical concepts are, by themselves, no cognitions—except insofar as one presupposes that there are things that can be exhibited[254] to us only in accordance with the form of that pure sensible intuition. But *things in space and time* are given only insofar as they are perceptions (i.e., presentations accompanied by sensation), and hence are given only through empirical presentation. Consequently the pure concepts of understanding, even when they are (as in mathematics) applied to a priori intuitions, provide cognition only insofar as these intuitions—and hence, by means of them, also the concepts of understanding—can be applied to empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories also do not supply us, by means of intuition, with any cognition of things, except through their possible application to *empirical* intuition.[255] I.e., the categories serve only for the possibility of *empirical cognition*. Such cognition, however, is called *experience*. Conse-
B 148 quently the categories cannot be used for cognizing things except insofar as these things are taken as objects of possible experience.

§ 23

The last proposition above is of the greatest importance. For it determines the bounds for the use of the pure concepts of understanding in regard to

[253][Literally (and somewhat misleadingly), Kant says: '. . . of objects, but only in terms of their form, as appearances.']

[254][*darstellen*. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[255][Emphasis on 'intuition' deleted.]

objects just as much as the Transcendental Aesthetic determined the bounds for the use of the pure form of our sensible intuition. Space and time, as conditions for the possibility as to how objects can be given to us, hold no further than for objects of the senses, and hence hold for objects of experience only. Beyond these bounds, space and time present nothing whatsoever; for they are only in the senses and have no actuality apart from them. The pure concepts of understanding are free from this limitation and extend[256] to objects of intuition as such, whether this intuition is similar to ours or not, as long as it is sensible rather than intellectual. But this further extension[257] of the concepts beyond *our* sensible intuition is of no benefit to us whatsoever.[258] For they are then empty concepts of objects, i.e., concepts through which we cannot judge at all whether or not these objects are so much as possible. I.e., the pure concepts of understanding are then mere forms of thought, without objective reality; for we then have available no intuition to which the synthetic unity of apperception—which is all that those concepts contain—could be applied so that the concepts could determine an object.[259] Solely *our* sensible and empirical intuition B 149
can provide them with meaning and significance.[260]

Hence if we suppose an object of a *nonsensible* intuition[261] as given, then we can indeed present it through all the predicates that are already contained in the presupposition *that the object has as a property*[262] *nothing belonging to sensible intuition:* hence we can present that it is not extended or in space, that its duration is not a time, that no change (i.e., succession of determinations in time)[263] is to be found in it, etc. But yet I have no proper cognition if I merely indicate how the intuition of the object *is not*, without being able to say what the intuition does contain. For I have not then presented the possibility of there being an object for my pure concept of understanding, since I was unable to give an intuition corresponding to the concept, but was able only to say that our intuition does not hold

256[*erstrecken.*]

257[*Ausdehnung.*]

258[*hilft uns . . . zu nichts.*]

259[*Gegenstand* here, *Objekt* just below.]

260[*Sinn und Bedeutung.*]

261[I.e., intellectual intuition. See above, B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

262[*ihm . . . zukomme.*]

263[Cf. below, B 232–33.]

for it. However, the foremost point here is that to such a something not even one single category could be applied. E.g., one could not apply to it the concept of a substance, i.e., the concept of something that can exist as subject but never as mere predicate. For I do not know at all, concerning this concept, whether there can be anything whatever corresponding to this conceptual determination[264] [of substance], unless empirical intuition gives me the instance for applying it. But more about this later.

B 150

§ 24
ON APPLYING THE CATEGORIES TO OBJECTS OF THE SENSES AS SUCH

The pure concepts of understanding refer, through mere understanding, to objects of intuition as such—i.e., we leave undetermined whether this intuition is ours or some other, although it must be sensible intuition. But the concepts are, precisely because of this, mere *forms of thought*, through which as yet no determinate object is cognized. We saw that the synthesis or combination of the manifold in them referred merely to the unity of apperception, and was thereby the basis for the possibility of a priori cognition insofar as such cognition rests on the understanding; and hence this synthesis was not just transcendental but was also purely intellectual only. But there lies at the basis in us a priori a certain form of sensible intuition,[265] a form that is based on the receptivity of our capacity to present (i.e., based on our sensibility). Hence the understanding (as spontaneity)[266] can, by means of the manifold of given presentations, determine inner sense in accordance with the synthetic unity of apperception; and thus it can think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of a priori *sensible intuition*[267]—this unity being the condition to which all objects of our (i.e., human) intuition must necessarily be subject. And thereby the categories, as themselves mere forms of thought, acquire objective[268] re-

[264][*Gedankenbestimmung.*]

[265][Or: 'But there lies at the basis in us a certain form of a priori sensible intuition.']

[266][Parentheses added.]

[267][Or, possibly: 'and thus it can a priori think synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of *sensible intuition.*']

[268][*objektiv*]

ality. I.e., they acquire application to objects[269] that can be given to us in intuition. But they apply to these objects only as appearances; for only of appearances are we capable of having a priori intuition. B 151

This *synthesis* of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is a priori possible and necessary, may be called *figurative* synthesis (*synthesis speciosa*). This serves to distinguish it from the synthesis that would be thought, in the mere category, in regard to the manifold of an intuition as such;[270] this latter synthesis is called combination of understanding (*synthesis intellectualis*). Both these syntheses are *transcendental*, not just because they themselves proceed a priori, but because they also are the basis for the possibility of other a priori cognition.

However, when the figurative synthesis concerns merely the original synthetic unity of apperception, i.e., merely this transcendental unity thought in the categories, then it must be called the *transcendental synthesis of imagination*, to distinguish it from the merely intellectual combination.[271] **Imagination** is the power of presenting an object in intuition even *without the object's being present*. Now, all our intuition is sensible; and hence the imagination, because of the subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to *sensibility*. Yet the synthesis of imagination is an exercise of spontaneity, which is determinative, rather than merely determinable, as is sense; hence B 152
this synthesis can a priori determine sense in terms of its form in accordance with the unity of apperception. To this extent, therefore, the imagination is a power of determining sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of intuitions *in accordance with the categories* must be the transcendental synthesis of *imagination*. This synthesis is an action[272] of the understanding upon sensibility, and is the understanding's first application (and at the same time the basis of all its other applications) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us. As figurative, this synthesis is distinct from the intellectual synthesis, which proceeds without any imagination but merely through understanding. Now insofar as the imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also call it the *productive* imagination, thereby distinguishing it from the

[269][*Gegenstände.*]

[270][I.e., sensible or intellectual.]

[271][Of understanding.]

[272][*Wirkung.*]

reproductive imagination.[273] The synthesis of the reproductive imagination is subject solely to empirical laws, viz., to the laws of association. Therefore this synthesis contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori cognition, and hence belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology.

Now, this is the place to clarify[274] something paradoxical that must have struck everyone in reading the exposition of the form of inner sense (§ 6):[275] viz., how this sense exhibits to consciousness even ourselves only as we
B 153 appear to ourselves,[276] not as we are in ourselves.[277] For we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly *affected;* and this seems contradictory, because we [despite being active] would then have to relate to ourselves as passive.[278] And this is the reason why people in their systems of psychology usually prefer to pass *inner sense* off as being the same as the power of *apperception* (which we carefully distinguish from inner sense).

However, what determines inner sense is the understanding and its original power of combining the manifold of intuition, i.e., the power of bringing that manifold under one apperception (on which apperception the understanding's possibility itself rests). Now in us human beings the understanding is not itself a power of intuitions; and even if an intuition were already given in sensibility, the understanding cannot take it up *into itself,* in order—as it were—to combine the manifold of [what would then be] *its own* intuition. Hence when the understanding is considered by itself alone, then its synthesis is nothing but the unity of the understanding's act: the act of which the understanding is conscious as an act even apart from sensibility, but through which the understanding itself is able to determine sensibility inwardly as regards the manifold that may, in accordance with the form of sensibility's intuition, be given to the understanding. Hence it is understanding which performs, on the *passive* subject whose *power* it is, that act—under the name of a *transcendental synthesis of*
B 154 *imagination*—of which we rightly say that inner sense is affected by it. Ap-

[273][See A 118 br. n. 142.]

[274][*verständlich machen.*]

[275][I.e., A 32–6/B 48–53 in the exposition of *time* in the Transcendental Aesthetic.]

[276][*uns* here, *uns selbst* just above.]

[277][*an uns selbst;* i.e., as things in themselves.]

[278][Or 'undergoing': *leidend.* I.e., even though as intuiting we would be active, as *being intuited* we (the same subject) would simultaneously be passive.]

perception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as inner sense that, as the source of all combination, it applies rather to the manifold of *intuitions as such,*[279] and—under the name of the categories—applies, prior to all sensible intuition, to objects as such. Inner sense, on the other hand, contains the mere *form* of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in this form, and hence contains as yet no *determinate* intuition at all. Determinate intuition is possible only through the consciousness of the manifold's determination by the transcendental act of imagination (i.e., by the synthetic influence of understanding on inner sense)—the act that I have called figurative synthesis.

This [need for figurative synthesis], moreover, we always perceive in ourselves. We cannot think a line without *drawing* it in thought. We cannot think a circle without *describing* it.[280] We cannot at all present the three dimensions of space without *placing* three lines perpendicularly to one another from the same point. And even time we cannot present except inasmuch as, in *drawing* a straight line (meant to be the externally[281] figurative presentation[282] of time), we attend merely to the act of the manifold's synthesis whereby we successively determine inner sense, and thereby attend to the succession of this determination in inner sense. Indeed, what first produces the concept of succession is motion, taken as act of the subject (rather than as a determination of an object)[283] and consequently as B 155
the synthesis of the manifold in space, if we abstract from this manifold and attend merely to the act whereby we determine *inner sense* according to its form. Hence by no means does the understanding already find in inner sense such a combination of the manifold; rather, the understanding *produces it*, inasmuch as the understanding *affects* that sense. But how (inas-

[279][Sensible or intellectual.]

[280][I.e., without tracing it in thought.]

[281][*äußerlich.*]

[282][I.e., the presentation that is figurative in the external way.]

[283]Motion of an *object* in space does not belong in a pure science, and consequently not in geometry. For the fact that something is movable cannot be cognized a priori, but can be cognized only through experience.[a] But motion taken as the *describing*[b] of a space is a pure act of the successive synthesis, by productive imagination, of the manifold in outer[c] intuition as such, and belongs not only to geometry but even to transcendental philosophy.

[a][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 472, 482–83.]
[b][I.e., outlining.]
[c][*äußeren.*]

much as in addition to sensible intuition I can present, at least as possible, a different kind of intuition) can the *I* who thinks be distinct from the *I*[284] that intuits itself,[285] and yet be the same[286] as it by being the same[287] subject? And hence how can I say: I, as intelligence and *thinking* subject, cognize *my*self as an object that is *thought,* viz., I so cognize myself insofar as in addition[288] I am also[289] given to myself in intuition—except that I cognize myself, as I do other phenomena, not as I am to[290] the understanding, but as I appear to myself? This question involves neither more nor less difficulty than does the question as to how I can be an object to myself at
B 156 all, viz., an object of intuition and of inner perceptions. Yet so it must actually be, as we can easily establish if space is already accepted as being merely a pure form of the appearances of outer senses. For as regards time, which after all is not an object of outer intuition at all, we cannot present it to ourselves except under the image of a line insofar as we draw that line; without exhibiting time in this way, we could not cognize the singleness[291] of its dimension. Likewise, in seeking for all inner perceptions the determination of length of time, or again of time positions, we must always get this determination from what changeable features are exhibited to us by outer things. Consequently the determinations of inner sense must be arranged by us as appearances in time in precisely the same way as the determinations of the outer senses are arranged by us in space. Hence if concerning the determinations of the outer senses we grant that we cognize objects through them only insofar as we are outwardly affected, then we must also concede concerning inner sense that we intuit ourselves through it only as we are inwardly affected *by ourselves;* i.e., we must con-

[284][Emphasis on 'I' added both times.]

[285][The point of the parenthetical remark may be that this distinctness combined with sameness seems even *more* problematic if we consider intuition *as such*—including, i.e., the intellectual intuition of an intuitive understanding—than if we consider sensible intuition, which at least is not the intuition of an understanding Or perhaps Kant is saying merely that this issue of distinctness arises because in our case intuition and understanding are *not* united.]

[286][*einerlei.*]

[287][*dasselbe.*]

[288][To being thought.]

[289][*noch über das.*]

[290][*vor.*]

[291][*Einheit.*]

cede that, as far as inner intuition is concerned, our own [self as] subject is cognized by us only as appearance, but not in terms of what it is in itself.[292]

§ 25

B 157

By contrast, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold of presentations as such, and hence in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am not conscious of myself as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but am conscious only that I am. This *presentation* is a *thought*, not an *intuition.*[293] Now *cognition* of ourselves requires not only the act of thought that brings the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of apperception, but requires in addition a definite[294] kind of intuition whereby this manifold is given. Hence although my own existence is not appearance (still less mere illusion), determination[295] of my existence[296] can occur only in B 158
conformity with the form of inner sense and according to the particular way

[292]I fail to see how one can find so many difficulties in the view that inner sense is affected by ourselves—of which every act of *attention* can provide us with an ex- B 157
ample. In such acts the understanding always determines inner sense, in accordance with the combination that the understanding thinks, turning it into the inner intuition that corresponds to the manifold in the understanding's synthesis. Everyone will be able to perceive in himself how much the mind is commonly affected by this.

[293][Literally, 'a *thinking*, not an *intuiting*.']

[294][*bestimmt.* The intuition is not *determinate* in kind, and the inference in the next sentence does not rest on a linking of *Bestimmung* with *bestimmt.* Rather, the intuition is of a definite kind, viz., the kind described in the next sentence and in n. 296, just below.]

[295][*Bestimmung.*]

[296]The *I think*[a] expresses the act of determining my existence. Hence the existence [of myself] is already given through this *I think;* but there is not yet given through it the way in which I am to determine that existence, i.e., posit the manifold belonging to it. In order for that manifold to be given, self-intuition is required; and at the basis of this self-intuition lies a form given a priori, viz., time, which is sensible and belongs to the ability to receive the determinable.[b] Now unless I have in addition a different[c] self-intuition that gives, prior to the act of *determination,*[d] the B 158
determinative[e] in me (only of its spontaneity am I in fact conscious) just as *time* so gives the determinable, then I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; instead I present only the spontaneity of my thought, i.e., of the [act of] determination,[f] and my existence remains determinable always only sensibly,

in which the manifold that I combine is given in inner intuition. Accordingly I have no *cognition* of myself as I am but merely cognition of how I appear to myself.[297] Hence consciousness of oneself is far from being a cognition of oneself, regardless of all the categories, which make up the thought of an *object as such* through the combination of the manifold in one apperception. We saw that in order for me to cognize an object different from myself, I not only require the thinking (which I have in the category) of an object as such, but do also require an intuition whereby I determine that universal concept. In the same way, in order to cognize myself, too, I not only require the consciousness of myself or the fact that I think myself, but require also an intuition of the manifold in me whereby I determine this thought. And I exist as an intelligence. This intelligence is con-
B 159 scious solely of its power of combination. But as regards the manifold that it is to combine, this intelligence is subjected to a limiting condition (which it calls inner sense). As subjected to this condition, it can make that combination intuitable only in terms of time relations, which lie wholly outside the concepts of understanding, properly so called.[298] And hence this intelligence can still cognize itself only as, in regard to an intuition (one that cannot be intellectual and given by the understanding itself), it merely appears to itself; it cannot cognize itself as it would if its *intuition* were intellectual.

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i.e., as the existence of an appearance. But it is on account of this spontaneity that I call myself an *intelligence*.

[a][Emphasis added.]

[b][Literally, 'receptivity of the determinable': *Rezeptivität des Bestimmbaren.*]

[c][Viz., intellectual.]

[d][*des Bestimmens.*]

[e][or *determinant*: *das Bestimmende.*]

[f][*des Bestimmens.*]

[297][These matters are treated in detail in the Paralogisms: A 341–405/B 399–432.]

[298][I.e., unschematized.]

§ 26
TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE UNIVERSALLY POSSIBLE USE IN EXPERIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

In the *metaphysical deduction*[299] we established the a priori origin of the categories as such through their complete concurrence with the universal logical functions of thought. But in the *transcendental deduction* we exhibited the possibility of them[300] as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition as such (§§ 20, 21). We must[301] now explain how it is possible, through *categories*, to cognize a priori whatever objects *our senses may encounter*—to so cognize them as regards not the form of their intuition, but the laws of their combination—and hence, as it were, to prescribe laws to nature, and even to make nature possible. For without this suitability of B 160
the categories,[302] one would fail to see how everything that our senses may encounter would have to be subject to the laws that arise a priori from the understanding alone.

First of all, let me point out that by *synthesis of apprehension* I mean that assembly of the manifold in an empirical intuition whereby perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance), becomes possible.

We have a priori, in the presentations of space and time, *forms* of both outer and inner sensible intuition;[303] and to these forms the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because that synthesis itself can take place only according to this form. But space and time are presented a priori not merely as *forms* of sensible intuition, but as themselves *intuitions* (containing a manifold), and hence are presented with the determination[304] of the *unity* of this manifold in them

[299][A 65–83/B 90–116. Kant did not there use this name.]

[300][The categories as such.]

[301][*soll.*]

[302][For such cognition and prescription.]

[303][Or, possibly: 'We have, in [*an*] the presentations of space and time, *forms* of both outer and inner sensible a priori intuition.']

[304][I.e., here, property.]

B 161 (see the Transcendental Aesthetic).[305] Therefore even *unity of synthesis* of the manifold outside or within us, and hence also a *combination* to which everything that is to be presented determinately in space or time[306] must conform, is already given a priori as condition of the synthesis of all *apprehension*—given along[307] with (not in) these intuitions. This synthetic unity, however, can be none other than the unity of the combination, conforming to the categories but applied to our *sensible intuition*, of the manifold of a given *intuition as such* in an original consciousness. Consequently all synthesis, the synthesis through which even perception becomes possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience and hence hold a priori also for all objects of experience.

B 162 Hence, e.g., when I turn the empirical intuition of a house into a perception by apprehending the intuition's manifold, then in this apprehension I use as a basis[308] the *necessary unity* of space and of outer sensible intuition as such; and I draw, as it were, the house's shape in conformity with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. But this same unity, if I abstract from the form of space, resides in the understanding, and is the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous in an intuition as such, i.e., the

[305]Space, presented as *object* (as we are actually required to present it in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; viz., it contains also the *collating*, of the manifold given[a] according to the form of sensibility, into an *intuitive*[b] presentation—so that the *form of intuition* gives us merely a manifold, but *formal intuition* gives us unity of presentation. In the Transcendental Aesthetic I had merely
B 161 included this unity with sensibility, wanting only to point out that it precedes any concept. But in fact this unity presupposes a synthesis; this synthesis does not belong to the senses, but through it do all concepts of space and time first become possible. For through this unity (inasmuch as understanding determines sensibility) space or time are first *given* as intuitions, and hence the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of understanding (see § 24).

[a][*Des mannigfaltigen . . . Gegebenen.* I.e., 'manifold' is an adjective, and 'given' is a participle functioning as a noun.]

[b][*anschaulich.*]

[306][Or, possibly: 'presented [as] determined in space or time.']

[307][*zugleich.*]

[308][*liegt mir . . zum Grunde*]

category of *magnitude.*[309] Hence the synthesis of apprehension, i.e., perception,[310] must conform throughout to that category.[311]

When (to take a different example) I perceive the freezing of water, then I apprehend two states (fluidity and solidity) as states that stand to each other in a relation of time. Since the appearance is inner *intuition,* I lay time at its basis. But in time I necessarily present synthetic *unity* of the manifold; without this unity, that relation[312] could not be given *determinately* (as regards time sequence) in an intuition. However, this synthetic unity, as a priori condition under which I combine the manifold of an *intuition as such,* is—if I abstract from the constant form of *my* inner intuition, i.e., from time—the category of *cause;* through this category, when I apply it to my sensibility, *everything that happens is, in terms of its relation,*[313] *determined* by me *in time as such.* Therefore apprehension in such an event, and hence the event itself, is subject—as regards possible perception—to the concept of the *relation*[314] *of effects and causes;* and thus it is in all other cases. B 163

Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances, and hence to nature regarded as the sum of all appearances (*natura materialiter spectata*).[315] And now this question arises: Since the categories are not derived from nature and do not conform to it as their model (for then they would be merely empirical), how are we to comprehend the fact that nature must conform to the categories, i.e., how can the categories determine a priori the combination of nature's manifold without gleaning that combination from nature? Here now is the solution of this puzzle.

[309][I.e., quantity: *Größe.*]

[310][Not apprehension but the synthesis of apprehension is being equated with perception.]

[311]In this way we prove that the synthesis of apprehension, which is empirical, must conform necessarily to the synthesis of apperception, which is intellectual and is contained wholly a priori in the category. The spontaneity that brings combination into the manifold of intuition is one and the same in the two cases: in apprehension it does so under the name of power of imagination; in apperception it does so under the name of understanding.

[312][Of time.]

[313][*Relation.*]

[314][*Verhältnis.*]

[315][Nature considered materially.]

B 164 How it is that the laws of appearances in nature must agree with the understanding and its a priori form, i.e., with the understanding's power to combine the manifold as such,[316] is not any stranger than how it is that appearances themselves must agree with the form of a priori sensible intuition. For just as appearances exist not in themselves but only relatively to the subject in whom the appearances inhere insofar as the subject has senses, so the laws exist[317] not in the appearances but only relatively to that same being insofar as that being has understanding. Things in themselves would have their law-governedness necessarily, even apart from an understanding that cognizes them. But appearances are only presentations of things that exist[318] uncognized as regards what they may be in themselves. As mere appearances, however, they are subject to no law of connection whatever except the one prescribed by the connecting power. Now what connects the manifold of sensible intuition is imagination; and imagination depends on understanding as regards the unity of its intellectual synthesis, and on sensibility as regards the manifoldness of apprehension. Now all possible perception depends on this synthesis of apprehension; but it itself, this empirical synthesis, depends on transcendental synthesis and hence on the categories. Therefore all possible perceptions, and hence also ev-
B 165 erything whatever that can reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, must in regard to their combination be subject to the categories. Nature (regarded merely as nature as such) depends (as *natura formaliter spectata*)[319] on the categories as the original basis of its necessary law-governedness. But even the pure power of understanding does not suffice for prescribing a priori to appearances, through mere categories, more laws than those underlying a *nature as such* considered as law-governedness of appearances in space and time. Particular laws, because they concern appearances that are determined empirically, are *not derivable completely* from those laws,[320] although the particular laws are one and all subject to the categories. Experience must be added in order for us to become acquainted with particular laws *at all;*[321] but the a priori laws

[316][Or 'at all': *überhaupt.*]

[317][*existieren.*]

[318][*da sind.*]

[319][Nature considered formally.]

[320][The a priori laws underlying a nature as such.]

[321][*überhaupt.*]

alone give us information about experience as such[322] and about what can be cognized as an object of that experience.

§ 27
RESULT OF THIS DEDUCTION OF THE CONCEPTS OF UNDERSTANDING

We cannot *think* an object except through categories; we cannot *cognize* an object thought by us except through intuitions corresponding to those concepts. Now all our intuitions are sensible, and this [sensible] cognition is empirical insofar as its object is given. Empirical cognition, however, is B 166
experience. *Consequently no cognition is possible for us a priori*[323] *except solely of objects of possible experience.*[324]

But this cognition, which is limited to just objects of experience, is not therefore all taken from experience. Rather, as far as pure intuitions as well as pure concepts of understanding are concerned, they are elements of cognition that are found in us a priori. Now, there are only two ways in which one can conceive of[325] a *necessary* agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible, or these concepts make experience possible. The first alternative is not what B 167
happens as regards the categories (nor as regards pure sensible intuition). For they are a priori concepts and hence are independent of experience. (To assert that their origin is empirical would be to assert a kind of *gen-*

[322][*überhaupt.*]

[323][Or: *'Consequently no a priori cognition is possible for us.'*]

[324]In order to keep my readers from being troubled prematurely by the worrisome detrimental consequences of this proposition, let me just remind them that in our *thinking* the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unbounded realm. Intuition is required only for *cognizing* what we think, i.e., only for determining the object. Thus if intuition is lacking, the thought of the object can otherwise still have its true and useful consequences for the subject's *use of reason.* But because the use of reason is not always directed to the determination of the object and hence to cognition, but is sometimes directed also to the determination of the subject and his volition, it cannot yet be set forth here.[a]

[a][Kant is here referring to the practical use of pure reason in the realm of morality. Cf. A 795–819 = B 823–47, and see Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason.*]

[325][*denken.*]

eratio aequivoca).[326] There remains, consequently, only the second alternative (a system[327] of *epigenesis*, as it were, of pure reason):[328] viz., that the categories contain the bases, on the part[329] of the understanding, of the possibility of all experience as such. But as to how the categories make experience possible, and as to what principles of the possibility of experience they provide us with when applied to appearances, more information[330] will be given in the following chapter on the transcendental use of our power of judgment.

Someone might want to propose, in addition to the two sole ways[331] mentioned above, a middle course[332] between them: viz., that the categories are neither *self- thought*[333] a priori first principles of our cognition, nor again are drawn from experience, but are subjective predispositions for thinking that are implanted in us [and given to us] simultaneously with our existence; and that they were so arranged[334] by our originator that their use harmonizes exactly with the laws of nature governing the course of experience (this theory would be a kind of *preformation system* of pure reason).[335] If such a middle course were proposed, the following would decide against it (apart from the fact that with such a hypothesis one can see
B 168 no end to how far the presupposition of predetermined predispositions to future judgments might be carried): viz., that the categories would in that case lack the *necessity* which belongs essentially to the concept of them. For, the concept of cause, e.g., which asserts the necessity of a result under a presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on an arbitrary subjective necessity, implanted in us, to link certain empirical pre-

326[A generation of something by something so different from it that such generation would be an absurdity. Cf. A 835 = B 863, and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 419n.]

327[Or, i.e., theory.]

328[I.e., a system of pure reason whereby experience comes about by epigenesis. On epigenesis, and on the preformation with which it is about to be contrasted, cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 423–24.]

329[*Seiten.*]

330[*lehren.*]

331[*Wege.*]

332[*-weg.*]

333[*selbstgedachte*, i.e., thought through self-activity (spontaneously).]

334[*einrichten*]

335[I.e., a system of pure reason whereby experience is formed in advance. See br. n. 328, just above.]

sentations according to such a rule of relation. I could then not say that the effect is connected with the cause in the object (i.e., connected with it necessarily), but could say only that I am so equipped[336] that I cannot think this presentation otherwise than as thus connected. And this is just what the skeptic most longs [to hear]. For then all our insight, achieved through the supposed objective validity of our judgments, is nothing but sheer illusion; and there would also be no lack of people who would not concede this subjective necessity (which must be felt) in[337] themselves. At the very least one could not quarrel with anyone about something that rests merely on the way in which his [self as] subject is organized.

BRIEF SKETCH OF THIS DEDUCTION

This deduction is the exhibition of the pure concepts of understanding (and, with them, of all theoretical a priori cognition) as principles of the possibility of experience; the exhibition of these principles,[338] however, as the *determination* of appearances in space and time *as such*; and the exhibi- B 169
tion, finally, of this determination as arising from the *original* synthetic unity of apperception, this unity being the form of understanding as referred to space and time, the original forms of sensibility.

Only up to this point do I consider the division into subsections[339] to be necessary, because we have been dealing with the elementary concepts. Now that we want to present to ourselves the use of these concepts, the treatise may go on without such division, cohering in terms of continuity.[340]

[336][*einrichten.*]

[337][*von.*]

[338][*dieser*, which *might* refer back, instead, to 'experience.'

[339][*Paragraphen.*]

[340][*kontinuierlich.*]

TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC

BOOK II
ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES[1]

General logic is built on a ground plan that coincides quite exactly with the division of the higher cognitive powers.[2] These powers are: **understanding, power of judgment,**[3] and **reason.** Hence that doctrine[4] deals, in its analytic, with *concepts, judgments,* and *inferences,*[5] precisely in accor-
A 131 dance with the functions and order of those mental powers—the mental powers comprised under the broad sense of an understanding as such.[6]
B 170 For general logic, being merely formal, abstracts from all content of cognition (pure or empirical) and deals merely with the form of thought (i.e.,

[1][*Grundsätze.* On my use of 'principle' to render both *Prinzip* and *Grundsatz,* see A vii br. n. 7.]

[2][*Erkenntnisvermögen.* For the distinction between cognition (*Erkenntnis*) and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6. On my use of 'power' for *Vermögen,* see A 19/B 33 incl. br. n. 10 and A xii br. n. 16.]

[3][*Urteilskraft,* i.e., the power (or ability) to judge, where *Kraft* is synonymous with *Vermögen* (see the preceding note). *Urteilskraft* can be rendered correctly either as 'power of judgment' or—where no ambiguity arises—as 'judgment,' which also means *Urteil* (i.e., an individual judgment). Now in the *Critique of Judgment,* where *Urteilskraft* occurs constantly, rendering the term as 'judgment' wherever possible makes the text significantly more readable. Hence in my translation of that work (cited above, B xvii br. n. 73) I did frequently use 'judgment' to render not only *Urteil* but also *Urteilskraft.* (Cf., in that translation, 4 br. n. 4.) In the *Critique of Pure Reason,* on the other hand, *Urteilskraft* occurs so much less often that readability is not significantly hampered if, as I have done, one puts consistency first and renders *Urteilskraft* always as 'power of judgment' while reserving the term 'judgment' for *Urteil*]

[4][*Doktrin;* i.e., here, general logic.]

[5][Cf. the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 89–136.]

[6][*die man unter der weitläufigen Benennung des Verstandes überhaupt begreift.* Perhaps Kant means here the common understanding (i.e., common sense). Cf., e.g., A 472–73 = B 500–501. See also the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 294–95; the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 57; and the *Anthropology,* Ak. VII, 200, and cf. 228–29. As for my translation of *überhaupt* by 'as such,' see B xxvii br. n. 106.]

of discursive cognition) as such. Hence it can, in its analytical part, encompass also the canon of reason.[7] For reason's form has its own secure precept,[8] into which we can have insight a priori without considering the particular[9] nature of the cognition being used, viz., by merely dissecting the acts of reason into their moments.[10]

Transcendental logic, on the other hand, is limited to a definite[11] content, viz., the content of pure a priori cognitions only. Hence it cannot follow general logic in this division [including reason]. For we find that the *transcendental use of reason* is not objectively valid at all, and hence does not belong to the logic of *truth*,[12] i.e., to analytic. As a logic of *illusion* it requires, rather, a special[13] part in the scholastic edifice of doctrines,[14] under the name of transcendental *dialectic*.[15]

Thus understanding and power of judgment have in transcendental logic their canon of objectively valid and hence true use, and therefore belong in the analytic part of that logic. Reason,[16] on the other hand, when it attempts to establish a priori something about objects and to expand cognition beyond the bounds of possible experience, is altogether *dialectical*, and its illusory assertions are thoroughly unfitting for a canon; yet a canon is what the analytic is to contain. {B 171 A 132}

Thus the *Analytic of Principles* will be a canon solely for the *power of judgment*,[17] teaching[18] it to apply to appearances the concepts of understanding, which contain the condition for a priori rules. Because of this I shall, in taking as my topic what are in fact the *principles of understanding*, employ the name *doctrine of the power of judgment*, which more accurately designates this task.

[7][I.e., not only the canons of understanding and power of judgment.]

[8][Or 'prescription': *Vorschrift*.]

[9][*besonder*.]

[10][I.e., key elements.]

[11][*bestimmt*.]

[12][In A, 'logic of truth' is emphasized entire, and so is 'logic of illusion,' just below.]

[13][*besonder*.]

[14][*Lehr-*.]

[15][See Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 71.]

[16][Emphasized in A.]

[17][The canon for the understanding was the Analytic of Concepts, A 66–130/B 91–169.]

[18][*lehren*.]

Introduction
On the Transcendental Power of Judgment as Such

If understanding as such is explicated as our power[19] of rules, then the power[20] of judgment is the ability[21] to *subsume* under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether something does or does not fall[22] under a given rule (is or is not a *casus datae legis*[23]). General logic contains no prescriptions[24] whatever for the power of judgment; nor can it. For since *general logic abstracts from all content of cognition*,[25] there remains for it nothing but the
A 133 task of spelling out analytically the mere form of cognition as found in con-
B 172 cepts, judgments, and inferences, and of thus bringing about formal rules for any use of understanding. Now if general logic wanted to show universally how we are to subsume under these rules, i.e., how we are to distinguish whether something does or does not fall under them, then this could not be done except again by a rule. But for this rule, precisely because it is a rule, we need once again instruction from the power of judgment. And thus we find that, whereas understanding is capable of being taught and equipped by rules, the power of judgment is a particular talent that cannot be taught at all but can only be practiced. This is also the reason why the power of judgment is the specific [feature] of so-called mother wit,[26] for whose lack no school can compensate. For although the school can offer to a limited understanding—and engraft in it, as it were—an abundance of rules borrowed from the insight of others,[27] yet the ability to employ these rules correctly must belong to the learner himself; and in the absence

[19][*Vermögen.*]

[20][*-kraft.*]

[21][*Vermögen.*]

[22][*stehen.* Cf. the etymology of *casus* (case), just below.]

[23][Case (or instance) of a given rule.]

[24][Or 'precepts': *Vorschriften.*]

[25][In B, *abstrahiert* ('abstracts') is not emphasized, coming just after the emphasized words.]

[26][*Mutterwitz* (*Witz* alone is rendered in this translation as 'ingenuity.') Cf the *Anthropology* (Ak. VII, 139), where mother wit is said to consist in the possession of the universal and innate rules of the understanding.]

[27][*fremd.*]

of such a natural gift no rule that one might prescribe to him for this aim is safe from misuse.[28] Hence a physician, a judge, or a statesman may have in his mind[29] many fine pathological, juridical, or political rules even to the degree where he can become a thorough teacher of them himself, and will yet easily blunder in applying them. He may blunder either because, being lacking in natural power of judgment (though not in understanding), he is able to have insight into the universal *in abstracto* but is unable to distinguish whether a case *in concreto* belongs under it; or again he may blunder because he has not been sufficiently trained for this judgment through examples and actual tasks. Indeed, the fact that examples sharpen one's power of judgment is their single and great benefit. For as regards the correctness and precision of the insight of understanding, examples contrariwise commonly impair these, because only seldom do they adequately[30] fulfill (as *casus in terminis*)[31] the rule's condition.[32] Besides, examples often weaken the understanding's effort to gain insight into rules, as to their adequacy,[33] in a universal way[34] and independently of the particular circumstances of experience; hence they ultimately accustom us to use rules { A 134 B 173

[28]A lack in power of judgment is in fact what we call stupidity, and for such a handicap there is no remedy. A dull or limited mind,[a] if lacking only in the proper degree of understanding and in what concepts of understanding it owns, can indeed be equipped through learning, even to the point of erudition.[b] Yet commonly such minds tend to be wanting also in power of judgment (i.e., lacking in the *secunda Petri*[c]). Hence there is nothing unusual in meeting very learned[d] men who, in using their science, frequently reveal this lack, which can never be improved. B 173

[a][*Kopf.*]

[b][*Gelehrsamkeit.*]

[c][The reference is to the French humanist and (for some time) highly influential logician Pierre de la Ramée, 1515-1572, who Latinized his name to *Petrus Ramus*. According to Ramus, logic (which he equated with dialectic, the art of disputation) consists of two parts. The first part is invention (discovery of arguments). The second part, which came to be known simply as the *secunda Petri* (second [part of the logic] of Petrus), is (the power of) judgment, or mother wit. See the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th edition (New York: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 1911), vol. XXII, 881.]

[d][*gelehrt.*]

[29][*Kopf.*]

[30][*adäquat.*]

[31][Cases within the bounds (of the rule or concept). Cf. A 727 = B 755.]

[32][Cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 62.]

[33][*Zulänglichkeit.*]

[34][*im allgemeinen.*]

B 174 more as formulas than as principles. Examples are thus merely the power
of judgment's walker,[35] which those who are lacking in this natural talent
can never dispense with.

A 135 But although *general* logic[36] can give no prescriptions to the power of
judgment, the situation is quite different with *transcendental* logic—so dif-
ferent, indeed, that it seems to be this logic's [and thus philosophy's] proper
task to correct and secure the power of judgment, by means of determinate
rules, in the use of pure understanding. For philosophy does not seem to
be needed at all as a doctrine, i.e., for allowing the understanding to ex-
pand[37] in the realm of pure a priori cognitions. On the contrary, philoso-
phy seems ill-suited for this; for little territory or none at all has been gained
with it in all the attempts made thus far. Rather, we need philosophy as
critique, in order to keep the power of judgment from making slips (*lap-
sus iudicii*)[38] as it uses what few pure concepts of understanding we have.
This is the task for which we enlist philosophy (although the benefit is then
only negative) with all its acuteness and art of examination.

But transcendental philosophy has the peculiarity that, besides indicat-
ing the rule (or, rather, the universal condition for rules) that is given in
the pure concept of understanding, it can simultaneously indicate a priori
B 175 the case[39] to which the rules are to be applied. On this point transcenden-
tal philosophy is superior to all other didactic[40] sciences (apart from math-
ematics), and the cause of this superiority lies precisely in this: Transcen-
dental philosophy deals with concepts that are to refer to their objects a
A 136 priori. Hence the objective validity of these concepts cannot be established
a posteriori, because this [approach] would fail entirely to touch on[41] those
concepts' dignity.[42] Rather, transcendental philosophy must[43] simulta-
neously[44] set forth, in terms of universal but sufficient criteria,[45] the con-

[35][Or 'gocart' (in the original sense of the word): *Gängelwagen*.]

[36][In A, 'general logic' is emphasized entire.]

[37][Literally, 'for providing the understanding with expansion.']

[38][Lapses of (the power of) judgment.]

[39][Or 'instance': *Fall*.]

[40][*belehrend*.]

[41][*ganz unberührt lassen*.]

[42][Of referring a priori to objects.]

[43][In order to establish the objective validity of these concepts.]

[44][I e , simultaneously with the concepts themselves.]

ditions under which objects can be given in harmony with them. For otherwise these concepts would be without any content, and hence would be mere logical forms rather than pure concepts of understanding.

Now this *transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment* will comprise two chapters. The *first* chapter deals with the sensible condition under which alone pure concepts of understanding can be used, i.e., with the schematism of pure understanding. The *second* chapter deals with the synthetic judgments that under these conditions emanate a priori from pure concepts of understanding and that lie a priori at the basis of all other cognitions; i.e., it deals with the principles of pure understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT {A 137 B 176}

(or Analytic of Principles)

Chapter I

On the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding[46]

Whenever an object[47] is subsumed under a concept, the presentation[48] of the object must be *homogeneous*[49] with the concept;[50] i.e., the concept must

[45][*Kennzeichen.*]

[46][See H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 173–98. See also J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 173–86. Also J. N. Findlay, *op cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 158–61. Also M. S. Gram, *op. cit.* at A 7/B 11 br. n. 199, 83–129. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 157–81. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 334–42. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 17–78. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 161–71. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 203–23.]

[47][*Gegenstand*, in this case. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[48][*Vorstellung*. My reason for translating *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' rather than as 'representation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[49][Or, i.e., 'of the same kind': *gleichartig;* cf. the etymology of 'homogeneous.']

[50][Literally, 'with the latter [presentation]'; i.e., with the concept.]

contain what is presented in the object that is to be subsumed under it. For this is precisely what we mean by the expression that an object is contained *under* a concept.[51] Thus the empirical concept of a *plate* is homogeneous[52] with the pure geometrical concept of a *circle,* inasmuch as the roundness thought in the concept of the plate can be intuited [also] in the circle.[53]

Pure concepts of understanding, on the other hand, are quite heterogeneous[54] from empirical intuitions (indeed, from sensible intuitions generally) and can never be encountered in any intuition. How, then, can an intuition be *subsumed* under a category,[55] and hence how can a category be
B 177 *applied* to appearances—since surely no one will say that a category (e.g.,
A 138 causality)[56] can also be intuited through senses and is contained in appearances?[57] Now this question, natural and important as it is, is in fact the cause that necessitates a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment. The doctrine is needed, viz., in order to show how it is possible for *pure concepts of understanding* to be applied to appearances as such. In all the other sciences no such need arises. For there the concepts through which the object is thought in a universal way[58] are not so distinct and heterogeneous from the concepts presenting the object *in concreto*, as it is given. And hence there is no need there to provide a special exposition concerning the application of the first kind of concept to the second kind.

Now clearly there must be something that is third, something that must be homogeneous[59] with the category, on the one hand, and with the appearance, on the other hand, and that thus makes possible the application

[51][Cf. B 40; also the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 98.]

[52][Literally, 'has homogeneity.']

[53][Reading *dem ersteren* as referring to the concept of the plate rather than to the plate itself, but taking *im letzteren* to refer not to the concept of the circle but to the circle itself. Vaihinger inverts the sequence, reading *in dem letzteren . . . im ersteren* for *in dem ersteren . . . im letzteren,* which moreover leaves indeterminate whether the reference is to the plate and the circle or to the concepts of these.]

[54][*ungleichartig*, i.e., more literally, 'not of the same kind.' A emphasizes the word; B does not, except as edited (unnecessarily, I think) by Erdmann in the *Akademie* edition.]

[55][*die erste* (which should have been *die ersten*) was meant to refer to *Verstandesbegriffe* but instead anticipates the terminological switch to *die Kategorie*.]

[56][Parentheses added.]

[57][I.e., in objects of perception (see B 207, 225), which is indeterminate empirical intuition (see B 422 n. 288, cf. B 207).]

[58][*allgemein.*]

[59][Literally, 'stand in homogeneity.']

of the category to the appearance. This mediating presentation must be pure (i.e., without anything empirical), and yet must be both *intellectual,* on the one hand, and *sensible,* on the other hand. Such a presentation is the *transcendental schema.*

A concept of understanding contains pure synthetic unity of the manifold as such. Time, as the formal condition for the manifold of inner sense and hence for the connection of all presentations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now, a transcendental time determination[60] is homogeneous with the *category* (in which its unity consists) insofar as the time determination is *universal* and rests on an a priori rule. But it is homogeneous with *appearance,* on the other hand, insofar as every empirical presentation of the manifold contains *time.* Hence it will be possible for the category to be applied to appearances by means of[61] the transcendental time determination, which, as the schema of the concepts of understanding, mediates[62] the subsumption of appearances under the category. B 178 A 139

In view of what has been shown in the deduction of the categories, I hope that no one will have doubts in deciding this question: whether these pure concepts of understanding have a merely empirical use [only] or also a transcendental one; i.e., whether, as conditions of a possible experience, they refer a priori solely to appearances; or whether they can be extended, as conditions for the possibility of things as such,[63] to objects in themselves[64] (without any restriction to our sensibility). For we saw in the deduction that concepts are quite impossible,[65] and cannot have any signification,[66] unless an object is given for the concepts themselves or at least

[60][I.e., a schema.]

[61][*vermittelst.*]

[62][*vermitteln.*]

[63][*Dinge überhaupt.*]

[64][*Gegenstände an sich selbst.*]

[65][Corrected by Kant to 'that concepts are for us without meaning [*Sinn*]' in his working copy of edition A. See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries* (cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), Ak. XXIII, 46.]

[66][*Bedeutung.* Although this term (similarly for the verb) is often translated best by 'meaning,' that translation will not work in the case of concepts. For a concept without *Bedeutung* certainly need not be meaningless in the sense of being contradictory, in which case the concept would be annulled and no object for it would be even *logically* possible. Still less are such concepts meaningless in the same way as nonsense *words* are, since these do not even *have* corresponding concepts. A concept without *Bedeutung* is, rather, one that refers to no object that is either actual or *really* possible. (For the distinction between logical and real

for the elements of which they consist;[67] and that hence they cannot at all concern things in themselves (i.e., [things considered] without regard to whether and how they may be given to us).[68] We saw, moreover, that the only way in which objects can be given to us is by modification of our
B 179 sensibility;[69] and, finally, that pure a priori concepts, besides containing the
A 140 function of understanding implicit in the category, must also a priori contain[70] formal conditions of sensibility (of inner sense, specifically), viz., conditions comprising[71] the universal condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object.[72] Let us call this formal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the concept of understanding is restricted in its use, the *schema* of this concept of understanding; and let us call the understanding's procedure with these schemata the *schematism* of pure understanding.

A schema is, in itself, always only a product of the imagination.[73] Yet, because here the imagination's synthesis aims not at an individual intuition but at unity in the determination of sensibility, a schema must be distin-

possibility, see B xxvi n. 103, A 241–44/B 300–302 incl. n. 144b, A 596/B 624 n. 148, and cf. A 144/B 184, A 218–24/B 265–72, A 230–34/B 282–87 incl. n. 96, B 308, A 581 = B 609, A 610 = B 638, A 770 = B 798, A 787-88 = B 815–16.) Such a concept is thus not meaningless (except perhaps "meaningless for us," loosely speaking—see the preceding note) but is merely empty, i.e., without content. (See A 155–56/B 194–95, A 252, A 292/B 348–49, and cf. A 51/B 75, A 90/B 123.) Yet *Bedeutung* is also not translatable as 'denotation.' (For the single exception, see A 71/B 96 br. n. 144.) For not only is Kant's use of *Bedeutung* (which does sometimes stand for 'meaning') rather less specific, but 'denotation' is normally taken to include only *actual* things, not also possible ones (in whatever sense of 'possible.') By using 'signification' we get around both these problems. Above all, however, we make good sense when we say that if a concept is meaningful but refers to no (actual or really possible) objects then it *signifies* nothing. ('Significance,' the other possible noun for 'signify,' tends to suggest merely 'importance' and hence is too broad and vague.) Now, *logical* signification in a concept (A 147/B 186) is indeed meaning; but to *translate* it as 'meaning' would make the addition of 'logical' redundant, and would also conceal the contrast of it with signification in Kant's ordinary sense of the term.]

[67][A 95–96, cf. A 117 n. 138, 129; B 146, 148–49, 158, cf. B 105, 157, 165.]

[68][A 108–9, 128–30; cf. A 96, 101, 104–5, 114, B 145, 147–49, 151, 164, 166 incl. n. 324.]

[69][A 98–99, 129, cf. A 97, 107–9, 111, 115, 127–28; B 146, 148–51, 164–65, cf. B 135–36, 139, 144–45, 147.]

[70][*enthalten.*]

[71][*enthalten.*]

[72][A 98–99, 115, cf. 95–96, 111–14, 119, 123–24, 127; B 153–55, 162–63, cf. 144, 147–48, 150–52, 159–61, 164–65, 167–69.]

[73][*Einbildungskraft.*]

guished from an image.[74] Thus if I put five dots after one another, like this, ... , then this result is an image of the number five. Suppose, on the other hand, that I only think a number as such, which might then be five or a hundred. Then my thought is more the presentation of a method for presenting—in accordance with a certain concept—a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in an image, than this image itself. Indeed, in the case of a thousand I could hardly survey[75] that image and compare it with the concept. Now, this presentation of a universal procedure of the imagination for providing B 180
a concept with its image I call the schema for that concept.

In fact, it is schemata, not images of objects, that lie at the basis of our pure sensible[76] concepts. No image whatever of a triangle would ever be A 141
adequate to the concept of a triangle as such. For it would never reach the concept's universality that makes the concept hold for all triangles (whether right-angled or oblique-angled, etc.),[77] but would always be limited to only a part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere but in thoughts, and is[78] a rule for the synthesis of imagination regarding pure shapes in space. Even less[79] is an object of experience or an image thereof ever adequate to the empirical concept; rather, that concept always refers directly[80] to the schema of imagination, this schema being a rule for determining our intuition in accordance with such and such a general[81] concept. The concept *dog*[82] signifies[83] a rule whereby my imagination can trace[84] the shape of such[85] a four-footed animal in a general way,[86] i.e., without being limited to any single and particular shape offered to me by

[74][*Bild.*]

[75][*übersehen.*]

[76][I.e., mathematical.]

[77][Parentheses added.]

[78][Literally, 'signifies' or 'means': *bedeutet.*]

[79][Than in the case of *pure* sensible (mathematical) concepts.]

[80][*unmittelbar*. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[81][*allgemein.*]

[82][Emphasis added.]

[83][*bedeutet.*]

[84][*verzeichnen.*]

[85]['such' inserted, as suggested by Erdmann.]

[86][*allgemein.*]

experience, or even to all possible images that I can exhibit[87] *in concreto*. This schematism of our understanding, i.e., its schematism regarding appearances and their mere form, is a secret art residing in the depths of the
B 181 human soul, an art whose true stratagems[88] we shall hardly ever divine from nature and lay bare before ourselves. Only this much can we say: The *image* is [here][89] a product of the productive imagination's empirical abil-
A 142 ity.[90] A *schema* of sensible concepts (such as the concepts[91] of figures in space) is a product and, as it were, a monogram of the pure a priori imagination through which, and according to which, images become possible in the first place. But the images must always be connected with the concept only by means of the schema that they designate; in themselves the images are never completely congruent with the concept. A schema of a pure concept of understanding,[92] on the other hand, is something that one cannot bring to[93] any image whatsoever. Such a schema is, rather, only the pure synthesis conforming to a rule, expressed by the category,[94] of unity according to concepts as such. It is a transcendental product of the imagination which concerns the determination of inner sense as such, according to conditions of that sense's form (viz., time), in regard to all presentations insofar as these are to[95] cohere a priori, in conformity with the unity of apperception, in one concept.

Now, instead of letting ourselves be detained by a dry and tedious dissection of what is required for transcendental schemata of pure concepts

[87][*darstellen*, which traditionally has been translated most often by 'to present.' See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[88][*Handgriffe*.]

[89][Kant must mean here only empirical images, such as that of dog.]

[90][I.e., the productive imagination (the imagination insofar as it is spontaneity: B 152) also has an empirical use (and hence ability). See the reference just below to the *pure a priori* imagination in connection with sensible concepts generally (i.e., a priori sensible or empirical ones), and cf. A 94–95, 115, 120 n. 150, and B 151–52. Vaihinger here substitutes 'reproductive' for 'productive.' But the reproductive imagination is merely the imagination insofar as it is subject *solely* to empirical laws (B 152). Cf. also Erdmann's note, Ak. III, 588.]

[91][I.e., the mathematical concepts.]

[92][I.e., of a category.]

[93][Literally, 'into.']

[94][Grammatically, 'expressed by the category' could, instead, modify 'synthesis' or even 'unity.']

[95][Reading, with Adickes, *sollen* for *sollten*.]

of understanding as such, let us exhibit them, rather, according to the order of the categories and in connection with them.

The pure image of all magnitudes (*quanta*) for outer sense is space, B 182
whereas the pure image of the magnitudes of all sense objects as such is time. But the *pure schema of magnitude*[96] (*quantitas*) taken as a [pure] concept of understanding is *number*, which is a presentation encompassing conjointly the successive addition of one item to another (homogenous item).[97]
Therefore number is nothing other than the unity in the synthesis of the A 143
manifold of a homogeneous intuition as such, a unity that arises because I myself produce[98] time in apprehending the intuition.

Reality, in the pure concept of understanding, is what corresponds to a sensation as such. Therefore reality is that whose very concept[99] indicates a being [of something] (in time); and negation is that whose concept presents a not-being[100] (in time). Hence the contrast[101] of reality and negation is made by distinguishing the same time as either a filled or an empty time. Now, time is only the form of intuition, and hence only the form[102] of objects as appearances; therefore what in these objects corresponds to sensation is the transcendental matter[103] of all objects as things[104] in their own right[105] (i.e., their thinghood,[106] reality[107]). Now every sensation has a degree or magnitude whereby it can, in regard to the same presentation of an object, fill the same time—i.e., [form of] inner sense—more or fill

96[On magnitude and related concepts, cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 248–60.]

97[Literally, 'of one to one (homogeneous).']

98[I.e., synthesize. Cf. A 145/B 184.]

99[Literally, 'whose concept in itself.']

100[Or 'nonexistence': *Nichtsein*]

101[Or 'opposition': *Entgegensetzung*.]

102[I.e., without the matter.]

103[I.e., matter in the transcendental sense; cf. B 322.]

104[*Dinge*.]

105[*an sich;* i.e., here, as substances. Although Kant ordinarily uses *an sich* to mean 'in itself' or 'in themselves,' he often uses it loosely. (Cf. br. n. 99, just above.) He must be doing so here, in view of what he has just said in this paragraph. See also A 359–60, 370–73, 385–87, 390–91, B 427–28. Wille, instead, does read 'things in themselves' and inserts 'not' before 'the transcendental matter.']

106[*Sachheit.*]

107[The root meaning of 'reality' is thinghood.]

it less, down to where[108] the sensation ceases in nothingness[109] (= 0 = *ne-*
B 183 *gatio*). Hence there is a relation and coherence,[110] or rather a transition from reality to negation, which is responsible for every reality's being presented[111] as a quantum. And the schema of a reality taken as the quantity of something insofar as it fills time is precisely this continuous and uniform production of that reality in time, where[112] from a sensation having a certain degree we descend, in time, until[113] the sensation vanishes, or ascend gradually from the sensation's negation to its [actual] magnitude.

A 144 The schema of substance is permanence of the real in time; i.e., it is the presentation of the real as a substratum of empirical time determination as such, a substratum which therefore endures while[114] all else varies.[115] (Time is not in transition;[116] rather, the existence of what is mutable is in transition in time. Hence to time, which itself is immutable and enduring, there corresponds in [the realm of] appearance what is immutable in existence, i.e., substance; and only by reference to substance can succession[117] and simultaneity[118] of appearances be determined in terms of time.)

The schema of the cause[119] and of the causality[120] of a thing as such is the real upon which, whenever[121] it is posited, something else always follows.[122] Hence this schema consists in the manifold's succession[123] insofar as this is subject to a rule.

108[*bis.*]

109[*in Nichts.*]

110[Between reality and negation.]

111[*jede Realität . . . vorstellig macht.*]

112[*indem.*]

113[*bis.*]

114[*indem.*]

115[*wechseln.* See B 224 br. n. 45, and cf. A 187/B 230.]

116[*sich verlaufen.*]

117[*Folge.*]

118[*Zugleichsein.* See B 257 br. n. 209.]

119[*Ursache.*]

120[*Kausalität.*]

121[*wenn . . . nach Belieben.*]

122[*folgt.*]

123[*Sukzession*]

The schema of community (interaction),[124] or [i.e.] of the reciprocal[125] causality of substances in regard to their accidents, is the simultaneity, according to a universal rule, of the determinations of the one substance with those of the other. B 184

The schema of possibility is the harmony of the synthesis of different presentations with the conditions of time as such. (Thus, e.g., what is opposite cannot be in a thing simultaneously, but can be in it only sequentially.) Hence this schema is the determination, at some time, of the presentation of a thing.

The schema of actuality is existence within a determinate time. A 145

The schema of necessity is the existence of an object at all time.

Now from all of this we see that the schema of each category contains, and is responsible for the presentation of,[126] the following: the schema of magnitude, the production (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality,[127] the synthesis of sensation (perception) with the presentation of time—or, i.e., the filling of time; the schema of relation,[128] the relation of perceptions among one another at all time (i.e., according to a rule of time determination); finally, the schema of modality and of its categories, time itself as the correlate of the determination of an object as to whether and how it belongs to time. Hence the schemata are nothing but a priori *time determinations* according to rules; and these rules, according to the order of the categories, deal with the *time series*, the *time content*, the *time order*, and finally the *time sum total*[129] in regard to all possible objects.[130] B 185

Now, this shows that the schematism of understanding provided by the transcendental synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity in inner sense of all the manifold of intuition, and thus comes down indirectly to the unity of apperception as a function corresponding to inner sense (a receptivity). The schemata of the pure concepts of understanding are, therefore, the true and sole conditions for providing these con- A 146

[124][*Wechselwirkung.*]

[125][*wechselseitig.*]

[126][*vorstellig mache.*]

[127][The term was actually not used at A 143/B 182–83. But see A 175–76/B 217–18, and cf. A 80/B 106, along with A 70/B 95.]

[128][*Relation* here, *Verhältnis* just below.]

[129][*Zeitinbegriff.*]

[130][*Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* in the next paragraph.]

cepts with a reference to objects and hence with *signification*.[131] And hence the categories have, in the end, no other use than a possible empirical one. For, by [being] bases[132] of a unity that is a priori necessary (because of the necessary union of all consciousness in an original apperception), they serve merely to subject appearances to universal rules of synthesis, and thus to make them fit for thoroughgoing connection in one experience.

In the whole of all possible experience, however, lie all our cognitions; and the transcendental truth that precedes all empirical truth and makes it possible consists in the universal reference to this possible experience.

Yet it is obvious also that although the schemata of sensibility are what
B 186 first realize the categories, they do nonetheless also restrict them, i.e., they limit them to conditions lying outside understanding (viz., in sensibility). Hence a schema is, properly speaking, only the phenomenon of an object, or the sensible concept of an object, in harmony with the category. (Numerus *est quantitas phaenomenon,* sensatio *realitas phaenomenon,* constans et perdurabile rerum[133] *substantia phaenomenon*, aeternitas *necessitas phaenomenon,*[134] etc.)[135] Now, it seems that if we omit a restricting
A 147 condition from a previously limited concept, then we amplify[136] that concept. Thus it was supposed[137] that the categories in their pure signification—i.e., apart from all conditions of sensibility—hold for things as such, *as they are,* instead of the categories' having schemata that present these things only *as they appear;* and hence it was supposed that the categories have a signification that is independent of all schemata and that extends much farther than they do. The concepts of understanding do in fact retain a signification, even after their separation from all sensible condi-

[131][*Bedeutung*. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[132][*Gründe*. See B xix br. n. 79.]

[133][Extending the emphasis (indicated by my *not* using italics for the Latin) on *constans* ('constant') to include *et perdurabile rerum* ('and permanent of things').]

[134][Corrected by Erdmann (with deletion of commas after *aeternitas* and *necessitas*) from *phaenomena*. For the adjectival use of *phaenomenon*, see A 433 = B 461, where Kant contrasts *mundus phaenomenon* (phenomenal world)—called *mundus sensibilis* ('sensible world') at A 249 (B 305 n. 169)—with *mundus intelligibilis* (intelligible world)]

[135][Number is phenomenal quantity; sensation, phenomenal reality; the constant and permanent of things, phenomenal substance; eternity, phenomenal necessity; etc]

[136][In the sense of 'expand': *amplifizieren*.]

[137][Viz., by those who omitted the restricting condition(s).]

tions. But this is only a logical signification,[138] [where the concepts of understanding signify] the mere unity of presentations. But these concepts[139] are then given no object, and hence also no signification that could yield a concept of the object.[140] Thus, e.g., [the concept of] substance, if one omitted from it the sensible determination[141] of permanence, would signify nothing more than something that can be thought as a subject (i.e., thought without being thought as a predicate of something else).[142] Now, this is a presentation that I cannot turn into anything,[143] because it does not at all B 187
indicate to me what determinations[144] are possessed by the thing that is to count[145] as such a primary subject. Without schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the understanding for producing concepts, but they present no object. This latter signification they get from sensibility, which realizes the understanding while at the same time restricting it.

138[I.e., a meaning; see A 139/B 178 br. n. 66, end of the note.]

139[Reading *denen*, in line more with the wider context than with the grammar, as referring back to *Verstandesbegriffen* rather than to *Vorstellungen* (presentations).]

140[Corrected by Kant to 'a cognition of the object' ('object' translates *Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* just above) in his working copy of edition A. See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries* (cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), Ak. XXIII, 46.]

141[*Bestimmung*. See A 23/B 37 br. n. 30.]

142[Cf. B 149, 288–89; A 242–43/B 300–301; A 401.]

143[Such as a cognition, i.e.: *nichts machen . . . aus*.]

144[See br. n. 141, just above]

145[*gelten*.]

A 148 # TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT

(or Analytic of Principles)

Chapter II
System of All Principles of Pure Understanding

In the preceding chapter we examined the transcendental power of judgment solely in terms of the universal conditions under which alone it is entitled to use the pure concepts of understanding for making synthetic judgments. Our task now is to exhibit as systematically linked the judgments that the understanding, under this critical provision,[146] actually brings about a priori. The natural and safe guidance for this task must doubtless be given to us by our table of categories. For precisely in the categories' reference to possible experience must all pure a priori cognition of under-
B 188 standing consist; and hence the categories' relation to sensibility as such will display, completely and in a system, all the transcendental principles for the use of understanding.

Now, first, a priori principles are so named not merely because they contain the bases[147] of other judgments, but also because they themselves are not based on higher and more universal cognitions. Yet having this prop-
A 149 erty does not always exempt such principles from requiring a proof. Such a proof could, to be sure, no longer be conducted objectively; [any a priori principle][148] lies, rather, at the basis of all cognition of its object. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of creating a proof that starts from the subjective sources underlying the possibility of cognizing an object as such. Nor, indeed, does it preclude that creation of such a proof is needed;

[146][*Vorsicht*, in an older meaning of the term, which now means 'caution' or 'precaution.']

[147][Or 'grounds': *Gründe*. See B xix br. n. 79.]

[148][My emendation is almost identical to Erdmann's (Ak. III, 588), which stays closer to the text than others. Erdmann surmises that Kant continued the sentence as if he had started it by 'Such a principle could, to be sure, no longer be proved objectively ']

for otherwise the proposition would still be under the greatest suspicion of being an assertion obtained merely surreptitiously.[149]

Second, we shall limit ourselves to just those principles[150] that refer to the categories. Hence the principles of the Transcendental Aesthetic, whereby space and time are the conditions of the possibility of all things as appearances, and likewise the restriction of those principles, viz., that they cannot be used in reference to things in themselves, do not belong within our allotted realm of inquiry. Mathematical principles, similarly, form no part of this system. For they are drawn only from intuition, not from the pure concept of understanding. Yet because they are nonetheless B 189
synthetic a priori judgments, their possibility also will necessarily be considered here. We must include their possibility here, not indeed in order to prove that they are correct and apodeictically certain—a proof that they do not require at all—but only in order to make comprehensible, and to deduce, the possibility of such evident a priori cognitions.

But we shall also have to talk about the principle of analytic judgments. Moreover, we must talk about this principle in contrast with that[151] of syn- A 150
thetic judgments—the judgments that we are in fact dealing with. For this contrast is precisely what frees the theory of synthetic judgments from all misunderstanding, and lays their peculiar nature distinctly before us.

149[*bloß erschlichen*. On subreption, see A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n. 14.]

150[*Grundsätze* in this case, *Prinzipien* in the case just below, and *Grundsätze* again just after that. See A vii br. n. 7.]

151[Reading, with Mellin, *mit dem der* for *mit der*.]

The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding

Section I
On the Supreme Principle of All Analytic Judgments

Whatever our cognition may contain and however it may refer to its object, all our judgments as such are yet subject to the universal, although only negative, condition that they must not contradict themselves. For otherwise these judgments, even in themselves (i.e., even with their object left
B 190 out of account), are nothing. Yet even if our judgment has no contradiction in it, it may nonetheless link concepts in a way not borne out by the object,[152] or may link them even if no basis[153] justifying such a judgment is given to us either a priori or a posteriori; and thus a judgment, despite being free from all intrinsic[154] contradiction, may still be either false or baseless.

A 151 Now the proposition,[155] No thing can have[156] a predicate that contradicts it, is called the principle[157] of contradiction. It is a universal, although merely negative,[158] criterion of all truth. Precisely because of this, however, this proposition belongs[159] merely in logic. For it holds for cognitions regardless of their content, i.e., merely as cognitions as such, and says that the contradiction annihilates and annuls them entirely.

Yet the principle of contradiction can also be used positively. I.e., it can be used not merely to banish falsehood and error (insofar as they rest on

[152][*wie es der Gegenstand nicht mit sich bringt.*]

[153][*Grund.* See B xix br. n. 79.]

[154][*inner.*]

[155][*Satz.*]

[156][Literally, 'To no thing belongs': *zukommen.*]

[157][*Satz.*]

[158][*negativ.*]

[159][*gehören.*]

contradiction), but also to cognize truth. For *if a judgment is analytic,* whether it be negative[160] or affirmative, then its truth must always be cognizable sufficiently by reference to the principle of contradiction. For denying the reverse[161] of what already lies, and is thought, as concept in the cognition of the object will always have to be correct; but the concept itself will necessarily have to be affirmed of the object,[162] because the opposite of the concept would contradict the object. B 191

Hence we must indeed accept[163] the *principle*[164] *of contradiction* as the universal and completely sufficient *principle*[165] of all analytic cognition. On the other hand, the principle's authority and usability as a sufficient criterion of truth also do not go beyond analytic cognition. For although the fact that no cognition whatever can go against the principle without annihilating itself does make the principle a *conditio sine qua non*[166] [even] of our [synthetic] cognition's truth, it does not make it a basis determining[167] that truth.[168] Now in this work we are in fact dealing only with the synthetic part of our cognition. Hence, although we shall always take care never to act against that inviolable principle, we can never expect from it any information regarding the truth of the synthetic kind of cognition. A 152

But although this famous principle is thus stripped of all content and merely formal, there is a formulation of it that does contain a synthesis mixed in with it from carelessness and without any need whatsoever. It reads: It is impossible for something *simultaneously*[169] to both be and not be. Not only has (through the word *impossible*) apodeictic certainty superfluously been attached here, a certainty that must surely be understandable on its own from the proposition. But, in addition, the proposition is affected by the condition of time. It says, as it were: A thing, = A, that is B 192

[160][*verneinend.*]

[161][*Widerspiel.*]

[162][*von ihm*, which (in the original) would refer back grammatically to 'what already lies . . . of the object.']

[163][*gelten lassen.*]

[164][*Satz.*]

[165][*Principium.*]

[166][Indispensable (or necessary) condition.]

[167][*Bestimmungsgrund.*]

[168][See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 49–53.]

[169][Or 'at the same time': *zugleich.*]

something, = B, cannot at the same time be not-B;[170] but it may very well be both (B as well as not-B) sequentially. E.g., a human being who is young cannot simultaneously be old; but that same human being may very well be at one time young, at another time not young, i.e., old. Now since the principle[171] of contradiction is a merely logical principle,[172] it must not at
A 153 all limit its pronouncements to time relations. Hence such a formulation as the above goes wholly against the principle's intent. The misunderstanding comes merely from this: One first of all separates a predicate of a thing from the thing's concept, and afterwards connects with this predicate its opposite. That, however, never yields a contradiction with the subject, but yields one only with the subject's predicate, which has been linked with the subject synthetically; and it does so, moreover, only if the first and the second predicates are posited at the same time. If I say, A human being who is unlearned is not learned, then the condition, *simultaneously,* must be added;[173] for someone who at one time is unlearned may very well at another time be learned. But if I say, No unlearned human being is learned, then the proposition is analytic. For the characteristic (unlearnedness) now goes[174] to make up the concept of the subject; and in that case the negative proposition[175] is directly[176] evident from the principle[177] of contradiction, without there being any need to add[178] the condition, *simulta-*
B 193 *neously*. It is because of this, then, that I have above changed the formulation of the principle so that it expresses distinctly the nature of an analytic proposition.

170[*non* B (in Latin); likewise just below.]

171[*Satz.*]

172[*Grundsatz.*]

173[*dabei stehen.*]

174[*mit.*]

175[*Satz.*]

176[*unmittelbar*. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

177[*Satz.*]

178[*hinzukommen.*]

The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding A 154

Section II
On the Supreme Principle of All Synthetic Judgments

Explaining the possibility of synthetic judgments is a problem with which general logic has nothing whatever to do; indeed, general logic need not even know the problem's name. But in a transcendental logic this explanation is the most important task of all—even the sole task, if we are talking about the possibility of synthetic judgments that are a priori, as well as about the conditions and the range of their validity. For after completing this task, transcendental logic is able to fulfill perfectly its purpose, viz., to determine the range and the bounds of pure understanding.

In an analytic judgment I keep to the given concept, in order to establish something about it. If the judgment is to be affirmative, then I ascribe to that concept only what was already thought in it; if the judgment is to be negative, then I exclude from the concept only its opposite. In synthetic judgments, however, I am to go outside the given concept, in order to consider, in relation with this concept, something quite different from what was thought in it. Hence this relation is never a relation either of identity or of B 194
contradiction, so that by looking at the judgment taken by itself one cannot tell[179] that it is true, or that it is erroneous. A 155

If it is granted, then, that one must go outside a given concept in order to compare it synthetically with another concept, then something third is needed wherein alone the synthesis of two concepts can arise. But what, then, is this third something that is the medium of all synthetic judgments? There is only one sum total[180] that contains all our presentations: viz., inner sense, and its a priori form, time. Moreover, the synthesis of presentations rests on imagination; but their synthetic unity (which is required for

[179][*ihm ansehen.*]

[180][*Inbegriff.*]

a judgment) rests on the unity of apperception. Hence the possibility of synthetic judgments will have to be sought therein;[181] and since all three contain the sources for a priori presentations, the possibility of pure synthetic judgments will also have to be sought in them. Indeed, these judgments will even necessarily[182] be founded on[183] these three bases, if a cognition of objects is to come about that rests solely on the synthesis of presentations.

If a cognition is to have objective reality, i.e., if it is to refer to an object and have in that object its signification and meaning, then the object must be capable of being *given*[184] in some way.[185] For otherwise the con-
B 195 cepts are empty; and though we have thought by means of[186] them, we have in fact cognized nothing through[187] this thinking, but have merely played
A 156 with presentations. To be given[188] an object— if this is not again to mean to be given it only indirectly, but is to mean, rather, to exhibit[189] it directly in intuition—is nothing other than to refer the presentation of the object to experience (whether actual, or at least[190] possible, experience). Even space and time, however pure these concepts are of anything empirical, and however certain it is that they are presented in the mind completely a priori, would yet be without objective validity, and without meaning and signification, if we did not show that their use with objects of experience is necessary.[191] Indeed, the presentation of space and time is a mere schema that always refers to the reproductive imagination,[192] this imagination sum-

[181][Viz., in inner sense, imagination, and unity of apperception.]

[182][Reading *aus diesen Gründen notwendig* as meaning *notwendig aus diesen Gründen*, with *notwendig* (construed as an adverb rather than an adjective—'necessarily' rather than 'necessary') having been put last only for the sake of emphasis on the contrast with 'possibility.']

[183][*aus.*]

[184][Emphasis added in B.]

[185][On this and the next sentence, see A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[186][*-durch.*]

[187][*durch.*]

[188][Kant actually says 'To give.']

[189][*darstellen*, which traditionally has been translated most often by 'to present.' See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[190][*doch.*]

[191][Or, perhaps· 'if we did not show in objects of experience that their use is necessary ']

[192][Cf A 118 incl br. n. 142.]

moning the objects of experience without which they[193] would have no signification. And thus it is, without distinction, with all concepts whatsoever.

Hence the *possibility of experience* is what provides all our a priori cognitions with objective reality. Now experience rests on the synthetic unity of appearances, i.e., on a synthesis performed according to concepts of an[194] object as such of appearances. Without such synthesis, experience would not even be cognition, but would be a rhapsody of perceptions. Such a rhapsody of perceptions would not fit together in any context conforming to rules of a thoroughly[195] connected (possible) consciousness, and hence would also not fit together to agree with the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception. Hence at the basis of experience there lie, a priori, B 196
principles of its form. These principles are universal rules of unity in the A 157
synthesis of appearances; and the objective reality of these rules as necessary conditions[196] can always be shown in experience—indeed, even in the possibility of experience. Without this reference,[197] however, synthetic propositions are entirely impossible a priori.[198] For they have then no third something, viz., no[199] object in which the synthetic unity can establish the objective reality of their concepts.[200]

Hence very much concerning space as such, or concerning the shapes traced in it by the productive imagination,[201] is indeed cognized by us a priori in synthetic judgments, so that for this cognition we actually require no experience at all. Yet to cognize all this would be nothing—but would be to deal with a mere chimera[202]—if space did not have to be regarded as a condition of the appearances which amount to the material for outer

[193][Space and time.]

[194][Reading, with Vaihinger, *von einem* for *vom* ('of the').]

[195][*durchgängig*.]

[196][Of experience.]

[197][To actual or at least possible experience. Cf. the preceding paragraph.]

[198][Or 'synthetic a priori propositions are entirely impossible.' See B 19 br. n. 234.]

[199][Following Grillo's reading (as adopted by Erdmann in the *Akademie* edition) of *keinen* for *reinen*.]

[200][Following Vaihinger's interpretation of this clause. The (grammatically) possible alternative would read: 'in [*an*] which the synthetic unity of their concepts can establish objective reality.']

[201][Cf A 118 incl. br. n. 142]

[202][*Hirngespinst*.]

experience. Hence those pure synthetic judgments[203] refer— although only indirectly[204]—to possible experience, or rather to the very possibility of experience, and on this reference alone do they base the objective validity of their synthesis.

Therefore experience, as empirical synthesis, is in [regard to] its possibility the only kind of cognition that provides reality to all other[205] synthesis. By the same token, this latter synthesis, as a priori cognition, has
B 197 truth (agreement with the object) only because it contains nothing more than
A 158 what is necessary for synthetic unity of experience as such.

Hence the supreme principle[206] of all synthetic judgments is this: Every object is subject to the conditions necessary for synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.

Thus synthetic judgments are possible a priori[207] if we refer the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination, and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception to a possible experiential cognition as such, and if we then say that the conditions for the *possibility of experience* as such are simultaneously[208] conditions for the *possibility of objects of experience* and hence have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment.

[203][I.e., the synthetic a priori judgments concerning space as such and the shapes traced in it by the productive imagination.]

[204][Or 'mediately': *mittelbar*. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[205][I.e., a priori.]

[206][*Principium*.]

[208][Or 'synthetic a priori judgments are possible.' See B 19 br. n. 234.]

[208][*zugleich*.]

The System of the Principles of Pure Understanding

Section III
Systematic Presentation of All the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding[1]

The fact that principles occur anywhere at all is attributable solely to pure understanding. For pure understanding not only is our power of rules regarding what happens, but is itself the source of principles, the source according to which everything (whatever we can encounter as an object) is necessarily subject to[2] rules. For without rules there could never be for[3] appearances any cognition of an object corresponding to them. Even natural laws, when considered as principles of understanding's empirical use, carry with them at the same time[4] an expression of necessity, and hence at least the presumption of their being determined from bases[5] that are valid a priori and prior[6] to all experience. But all laws of nature, without distinction, fall under[7] higher principles of understanding, inasmuch as they only apply these higher principles to particular cases of appearance. Hence these higher principles alone provide us with the concept that contains the {B 198 A 159}

[1][See H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 106–26. See also J. W. Ellington, essay cited at B xliii br. n. 149, 186–94. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 176–90. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 343–424. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 261–72, 481–90. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 81–107. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 171–83. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 224–28.]

[2][*stehen unter.*]

[3][*zukommen.*]

[4][*zugleich.*]

[5][*Gründe.* See B xix br. n. 79.]

[6][*vor.*]

[7][*stehen unter.*]

condition and, as it were, the exponent[8] for a rule as such; but experience provides us with the case that falls under the rule.

There can in fact be no danger, I suppose, that anyone will regard merely empirical principles as principles of pure understanding—or vice versa, for that matter. For this confusion can easily be prevented by attending to the necessity according to concepts that distinguishes the principles of pure understanding, and whose lack is easily perceived in every empirical proposition—no matter how generally such a proposition may hold. But there are pure a priori principles as well that I nonetheless do not wish to assign to pure understanding as belonging to it. For whereas understand-
B 199 ing is our power of concepts, these principles are not drawn from pure con-
A 160 cepts, but are drawn (even if by means of understanding) from pure intuitions. In mathematics there are such principles;[9] but their application to experience, and hence their objective validity, still rests always on pure understanding—indeed, so does the possibility of such synthetic a priori cognition (i.e., the deduction of[10] this possibility).

Hence I shall not include among my principles[11] the principles of mathematics themselves. But I shall indeed include the principles on which their possibility and objective validity is based a priori, and which must therefore be regarded as the principles[12] [underlying] those mathematical principles.[13] They do not emanate from intuition and proceed to concepts,[14] but emanate from concepts and proceed to intuition.[15]

When pure concepts of understanding are applied to possible experience, then the use of their synthesis is either *mathematical* or *dynamical.* For this application[16] is concerned in part merely with the *intuition,* and in part with the *existence,* of an appearance as such. However, whereas the a priori conditions of intuition are thoroughly necessary in regard to a pos-

[8][I.e., as in mathematics, the indicator for an operation to be performed.]

[9][I.e., principles drawn from pure intuitions.]

[10][I.e., legitimation of the claim to.]

[11][*Grundsätze;* likewise for the next two occurrences of 'principles,' inasmuch as they translate relative pronouns referring back to the same German term.]

[12][Reading, with Mellin, *Principien* for *Principium.*]

[13][*Grundsätze.*]

[14][As do mathematical principles.]

[15][See below, A 713–27 = B 740–54.]

[16][Cf. A 162/B 201–2.]

sible experience, those of the existence of the objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves only contingent. Hence the principles of the mathematical use[17] will be[18] unconditionally necessary, i.e., apodeictic. But as for those of the dynamical use, while they also carry with them the character of an a priori necessity, they do so only under the condition of there being empirical thought in an experience, and hence they do so only me- B 200
diately and indirectly.[19] They consequently lack[20] (though without detriment to the certainty they have universally in reference to experience) that immediate[21] evidence possessed by the former kind of principles.[22] This, A 161
however, we shall be better able to judge[23] at the conclusion of this system of principles.

The quite natural instruction for setting up the table of principles is provided to us by the table of categories. For these principles are nothing but the rules for the objective use of the categories. Accordingly, the following are all the principles of pure understanding.

1
Axioms
of intuition

2
Anticipations
of perception

3
Analogies
of experience

4
Postulates
of empirical thought as such

[17][Of the categories' synthesis. Likewise for 'dynamical use,' just below.]

[18][More literally, 'read': *lauten*.]

[19][*mittelbar und indirekt*.]

[20][*nicht enthalten*.]

[21][Or 'direct': *unmittelbar*.]

[22][I.e., those of the mathematical use of the categories' synthesis.]

[23][*beurteilen*. Cf. A 60/B 84 br. n. 69.]

I have selected these names with care, in order not to leave unnoted the differences[24] regarding the evidence and the employment[25] of these prin-
B 201 ciples. But we shall soon find that, in regard both to evidence and to a priori determination of appearances,[26] the principles of the categories of *magni-*
A 162 *tude* and *quality* (if we attend solely to the form of these[27]) do differ markedly from the remaining principles.[28] For although both kinds of principles are capable of a complete certainty, in the former kind this certainty is intuitive but in the latter merely discursive. Hence I shall call the former kind the *mathematical* and the latter the *dynamical*[29] principles.[30] But we must

[24][*Unterschiede.*]

[25][*Ausübung*; i.e., in the application of the categories, as just discussed.]

[26][And thus, again, the application of the categories through the principles.]

[27][I.e., magnitude (or quantity) and quality.]

[28][Actually, Kant says: 'But we shall soon find that, in regard both to evidence and to a priori determination of appearances according to the categories of *magnitude* and *quality* (if we attend solely to the form of these), the principles of these [categories do] differ markedly from the remaining principles.']

[29][Changed by Kant to *physiological* in his working copy of edition A. See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries* (cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), Ak. XXIII, 46.]

[30]All[a] [linking or] *combination* (*coniunctio*) is either *assembly* (*compositio*) or *connection*[b] (*nexus*). Assembly is the synthesis of manifold [elements] that *do not belong to one another necessarily.*[c] E.g., the two triangles by themselves into which a square is divided by its diagonal do not belong to each other necessarily. Of this sort is also the synthesis of the *homogeneous* in whatever can be examined *mathematically.* (This synthesis can be divided in turn into the synthesis of *aggregation* and that of *coalition;* the former is concerned with *extensive* magnitudes,[d] the other with *intensive* magnitudes.[e]) The second kind of [linking or] combination (*nexus*[f]) is the synthesis of manifold [elements] insofar as they *belong to one another necessarily*—as, e.g., the accident belongs necessarily to some substance, or the effect to the cause. Hence the manifold, even if *heterogeneous,* is yet presented as combined a priori. I call this combination *dynamical* because it is not one produced by choice,[g] and because it concerns the combination of the *existence* of the mani-
B 202 fold. (This combination can be divided in turn into the physical combination of appearances among one another,[h] and metaphysical combination—i.e., their combination in the a priori cognitive power.[i])

[a][The note was added in B.]

[b][Respectively, *Verbindung, Zusammensetzung, Verknüpfung.* On *Zusammensetzung,* cf. B 114 br. n. 239.]

[c][I am including 'belong' in the emphasis (similarly in the definition of *connection* below) in order to keep *it* from being emphasized by the interruption of the emphasis. In

note carefully that I do not have in mind[31] here the principles of mathematics in the one case, any more than the principles of general (physical) dynamics in the other. I have in mind, rather, only the principles of pure understanding as related to inner sense (apart from any distinction[32] of the presentations given in that sense). It is in fact through these latter principles that the principles of mathematics and of general dynamics acquire, one and all, their possibility. Hence I name my principles mathematical and dynamical more in view of their application than for the sake of their content. I shall now proceed to examine them in the same order as they are presented in the above table. B 202

1
AXIOMS OF INTUITION[33]

Their principle[34] is: *All intuitions are extensive magnitudes.*[35]

---

the original, the term (*gehört*) comes after the entire emphasis and hence could not interrupt it.]

[d][This concerns the axioms of intuition.]

[e][This concerns the anticipations of perception.]

[f][I.e., connection.]

[g][*willkürlich.*]

[h][This concerns the analogies of experience.]

[i][This concerns the postulates of empirical thought as such.]

[31][*Augen.*]

[32][*Unterschied.*]

[33][In A, the heading and the statement of the axioms' principle read as follows:]

ON THE AXIOMS OF INTUITION

Principle[a] *of pure understanding*: All appearances are, in terms of their intuition, extensive magnitudes.

[a][*Grundsatz.*]

[34][*Prinzip.* For the axioms themselves, see A 163/B 204 incl. br. n. 48.]

[35][See Gordon G. Brittan, Jr., *Kant's Theory of Science* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 90–116. See also H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 127–47. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 162–66. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 190–96. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br n. 5, 347–49. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br n. 152, vol. 2, 111–33. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 183. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 228–31.]

Proof[36]

Appearances contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and time that underlies them, one and all, a priori. Hence they cannot be apprehended, i.e., taken up into empirical consciousness, except through the synthesis of the manifold whereby the presentations of a determinate space or time are produced. I.e., appearances can be apprehended only through the
B 203 assembly of what is homogeneous[37] and the consciousness of the synthetic unity of this manifold (this manifold[38] homogeneous). Now the consciousness of the synthetic unity of[39] the manifold homogeneous in intuition as such, insofar as through this consciousness the presentation of an object first becomes possible, is the concept of a magnitude (*quantum*). Therefore even the perception [itself] of an object as appearance is possible only through the same synthetic unity (of the given sensible intuition's manifold)[40] whereby the unity of the assembly of the manifold homogeneous is thought in the concept of a *magnitude.* I.e., appearances are, one and all, magnitudes—specifically, *extensive magnitudes,* because as intuitions in space or time they must be presented through the same synthesis whereby space and time as such are determined.

Extensive is what I call a magnitude wherein the presentation of the parts makes possible (and hence necessarily precedes) the presentation of the whole. I can present no line, no matter how small, without drawing it in
A 163 thought,[41] i.e., without producing from one point onward all the parts little by little and thereby tracing this intuition[42] in the first place. And the situation is the same with every time, even the smallest. In any such time I think only the successive progression from one instant to the next,[43] where

[36][This heading and the first paragraph of the proof added in B.]

[37][See B 201 n. 30.].

[38]['manifold.' This adjective is used by Kant mostly as a noun, but here (and in similar constructions below) it functions solely as an adjective. The term usually connotes both multiplicity and difference in kind, and is then synonymous with 'multifarious.' Of course, when 'manifold' modifies 'the homogeneous,' as it does here, then only the multiplicity connotation applies.]

[39]['the synthetic unity of' inserted, as suggested by Vaihinger.]

[40][Parentheses added.]

[41][Cf B 154.]

[42][I.e., the line.]

[43][*anderen.*]

through all the parts of time and their addition[44] a determinate time magnitude is finally produced. Since what is mere intuition in all appearances is either space or time, every appearance is—as intuition—an extensive B 204
magnitude, inasmuch as it can be cognized only through successive synthesis (of part to part) in apprehension. Accordingly, all appearances are intuited already as aggregates (i.e., multitudes of previously given parts);[45] precisely this is not the case with every kind of magnitudes, but is the case only with those that are presented and apprehended by us as magnitudes *extensively*.

This successive synthesis of the productive[46] imagination in the generation[47] of shapes is the basis of the mathematics of extension (i.e., geometry) with its axioms. These axioms express the conditions of sensible a priori intuition under which alone the schema of a pure concept of outer appearance can come about[48]—e.g., the axioms that between two points only one straight line is possible; or that two straight lines enclose no space; etc. These are the axioms that, properly speaking, concern only magnitudes[49] (*quanta*), as such.

But as concerns magnitude (*quantitas*), i.e., the answer to the question as to how large[50] something is, there are for it no axioms in the proper A 164
meaning of the term, although a variety of such propositions are synthetic and directly[51] certain (*indemonstrabilia*).[52] For the propositions which assert that equals added to—or subtracted from—equals yield equals are analytic propositions, inasmuch as I am directly conscious of the identity of B 205
the one magnitude's production with the other magnitude's production. Axi-

[44][In the root sense of this word, i.e., the putting of one item with one or more others already there: *Hinzutun*.]

[45][Parenthetical insertion deleted by Kant in his working copy of edition A. See *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries* (cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), Ak. XXIII, 46.]

[46][*produktiv*.]

[47][Or 'production': *Erzeugung*.]

[48][These axioms thus are the axioms of intuition whose principle was stated at the outset, A 162/B 202.]

[49][*Größen;* similarly (in the singular) just below.]

[50][*groß*.]

[51][*unmittelbar*.]

[52][Items not capable (and not in need) of being demonstrated.]

oms, however, are to be synthetic[53] a priori propositions. The evident[54] propositions of numerical relations, on the other hand, are indeed synthetic. Yet, unlike those of geometry, they are not universal; and precisely because of this, they also cannot be called axioms, but can be called only numerical formulas.[55] The proposition that 7 + 5 = 12 is not an analytic proposition.[56] For neither in the presentation of 7, nor in that of 5, nor in the presentation of the assembly of the two numbers do I think the number 12. (The fact that I ought to think the number 12 in *adding*[57] *the two numbers* is not at issue here; for in an analytic proposition the question is only whether I actually think the predicate in the presentation of the subject.) But although the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is synthetic, it is still only a singular proposition. For insofar as we here take account merely of the synthesis of the homogeneous (i.e., the units),[58] the synthesis can here occur in only a single way, although the *use* made of these numbers afterwards is universal. [Geometry is different in this respect.] If I say that by means of three lines, two of which taken together are greater than the third, a triangle can be drawn, then I have here the mere function of the productive
A 165 imagination, which can make the lines be drawn greater or smaller, and can similarly make them meet at all kinds of angles chosen at will.[59] By contrast, the number 7[60] is possible in only a single way, and so is the number 12, which is produced through the synthesis of 7 with 5. Such propo-
B 206 sitions, therefore, must be called not axioms (for otherwise there would be infinitely many axioms), but numerical formulas.

[53][Rather than analytic.]

[54][*evident.*]

[55][See below, A 732–34 = B 760–62.]

[56][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 46), Kant deletes both this sentence and the words *Denn ich denke* ('For [. . . do] I think'), which start the next sentence (and whose deletion leaves the sentence incomplete).]

[57][*Addition.* Cf. br. n. 44, just above.]

[58][*Einheiten.* The term also means 'unities'; but the only thing homogeneous in the synthesis of 7 and 5 are the units (of 1) composing each number. Cf the reference to fingers and dots at B 15.]

[59][*beliebig.*]

[60][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 46), Kant adds 'in the proposition 7 + 5 = 12.']

This transcendental principle of the mathematics of appearances[61] greatly expands[62] our a priori cognition. For it alone is what makes pure mathematics in all its precision applicable to objects of experience. In the absence of the principle, this applicability might not be so self-evident,[63] and has in fact been contested by many.[64] For appearances are not things in themselves. Empirical intuition is possible only through pure intuition (of space and time). Hence what geometry says about pure intuition holds incontestably for empirical intuition also. And the subterfuges whereby objects of the senses need not conform to the rules of construction in space (e.g., the rule of the infinite divisibility of lines or angles) must be dropped. For by making them one denies objective validity to space, and thereby also[65] to all mathematics, and one no longer knows why and how far mathematics is applicable to appearances. The synthesis of spaces and times, which are the essential form of all intuition, is what also makes possible A 166
the apprehension of appearance, hence makes possible any outer experience, and consequently also makes possible all cognition of the objects of this experience. And thus what mathematics in its pure use proves for that synthesis holds necessarily also for this cognition.[66] All objections against this are only the chicanery of a falsely instructed reason: a reason that er- B 207
roneously means to detach objects of the senses from the formal condition of our sensibility, and that despite their being mere appearances presents them as objects in themselves, given to the understanding.[67] If that were the case, however, then there could be no synthetic a priori cognition of them at all, and hence also no such cognition through pure concepts of space; and the science that determines these concepts, viz., geometry, would itself not be possible.

[61][The principle (of the axioms of intuition) whereby all intuitions are extensive magnitudes.]

[62][*Erweiterung*. See A 7/B 11 br. n. 194.]

[63][*von selbst erhellen*.]

[64][Literally, 'has in fact prompted much contradiction [to it].']

[65][*zugleich*.]

[66][*von dieser*, which grammatically could refer back, instead, to 'apprehension,' 'appearance,' or 'outer experience.']

[67][An understanding that would thus (intellectually) intuit things in themselves would be an intuitive understanding. (See B 307–9, and cf. B 72 incl. br. n. 183.) Kant now goes on to imply that such an understanding's cognition would never be synthetic but always analytic (and thus still a priori); this was the position of Leibniz and his followers. Kant may also be thinking of Plato, who regarded mathematical objects as noumena, known only by intellect. See below, A 313–14/B 370–71.]

2
ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION[68]

Their principle[69] is: *In all appearances the real that is an object of sensation has intensive magnitude*, i.e., a degree.[70]

Proof[71]

Perception is empirical consciousness, i.e., a consciousness in which there is sensation as well. Appearances, as objects of perception, are not pure (i.e., merely formal) intuitions, as space and time are (for these cannot in themselves[72] be perceived at all). Hence appearances contain, in addition to [pure] intuition, the matter[73] (through which something existent is presented in space or time) for some object as such. I.e., appearances contain also the real of sensation—sensation[74] being merely subjective presenta-

[68][In A, the heading and the statement of the anticipations' principle read as follows:]

THE ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION

> The *principle*[a] that anticipates all perceptions, as such, reads thus: In all appearances sensation, as well as the *real* that corresponds to it in the object (*realitas phaenomenon*),[b] has an *intensive magnitude*, i.e., a degree.
>
> [a][*Grundsatz*.]
>
> [b][Phenomenal (cf. A 146/B 186 br. n. 134) reality.]

[69][*Prinzip*]

[70][See J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 162–66. See also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 196–205. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 349–55 Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 134–55. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 183–84. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 232–38.]

[71][This heading and the first paragraph of the proof added in B.]

[72][*an sich*, used loosely, as Kant does so often (a fact that is itself worth noting and hence is deliberately left unconcealed in the translation)]

[73][*Materien* (the plural of *Materie*). Since the English term (in the sense relevant here) is not commonly used in the plural, *Materien* is translated as 'matter' in some contexts, but as 'kinds of matter' in others.]

[74][Reading, with Vaihinger, *subjektiver* for *subjektive*. (However, Kant's use of the nominative instead of the genitive in this construction would, on this reading, be more casual than erroneous.) This is not the reading adopted by the *Akademie* edition, where (cf. Erdmann's note, Ak. III, 588) Kant *seems* to characterize as "merely subjective presentation" (etc.) not sensation but the *real* of sensation. It is sensation, however, that is often characterized by Kant in this way, i.e., as subjective rather than objective presentation (A 19-20/B 34, A 320/B

tion, concerning which we can become conscious only of the fact that the subject is affected, and which we refer to an object as such. Now from em- B 208
pirical consciousness to pure consciousness, i.e., to the point where the real of that consciousness entirely vanishes and there remains a merely formal (a priori) consciousness of the manifold in space and time, a stepwise[75] change is possible. Hence there is likewise possible a synthesis in the production of a sensation's magnitude, from the sensation's beginning, i.e., from pure intuition, = 0, up to this or that[76] magnitude of the sensation. Now since sensation is in itself not at all an objective presentation, and since neither the intuition of space nor that of time is to be met with in it, sensation will indeed not have[77] an extensive magnitude. Yet it will have a magnitude (viz., by virtue of the apprehension in sensation, in which the empirical consciousness can in a certain time increase from nothing, = 0, to the sensation's given measure). Therefore sensation will have an *intensive magnitude.*[78] As corresponding to this intensive magnitude of sensation we must ascribe also to all objects of perception, insofar as perception contains sensation, an *intensive magnitude*, i.e., a degree of influence on sense.[79]

All cognition whereby I can cognize and determine a priori what belongs to empirical cognition may be called an anticipation; and this is doubtless the signification in which Epicurus used the term πρόληψις[80] A 167
But there is something in appearances that is never cognized a priori and that hence amounts to the proper difference between empirical and a priori cognition: viz., sensation (as the matter of perception); and hence it fol- B 209
lows that what cannot at all be anticipated is, properly speaking, sensation.

376, cf. B 208, just below). The real, on the other hand, is characterized as what *corresponds* to sensation (A 166, statement of the anticipations' principle, A 168/B 209, cf. A 143/B 182 incl. br. n. 107, A 175/B 217, A 581/B 609); as *cause* of sensation (A 168/B 210); and as *object* of sensation (B 207, statement of the anticipations' principle, cf. B 225, A 234/B 286, and the end of the very sentence under discussion here).]

75[*stufenartig*. Although 'gradual' has basically the same meaning (cf. its etymology), 'stepwise' is more explicit. (I am using 'gradual' instead to render the less technical *allmählich,* as well as some wholly nontechnical occurrences of *nach und nach.*)]

76[*beliebig.*]

77[*ihr . . . zukommen.*]

78[Extending the emphasis to include 'intensive.']

79[Or 'on the sense [involved].']

80[*prólēpsis*, i.e. (even in etymology) anticipation. See Diogenes Laërtius, *The Lives of Philosophers* (cf. B xi br. n. 51). x, 33]

The pure determinations in space and time regarding both shape and magnitude, on the other hand, could be called anticipations of appearances; for they present a priori what may always be given a posteriori in experience. Suppose, however, that we do find something that is cognizable a priori in every sensation, as sensation as such (i.e., even though no particular sensation may be given); this something would, then, deserve to be called anticipation[81]—in an exceptional meaning of the term. For it seems strange to say that we can anticipate[82] experience in what concerns, of all things,[83] its matter, which can be drawn only from experience. Yet such is actually the case here.

Apprehension merely by means of sensation (i.e., if I do not consider the succession of many sensations) fills[84] only an instant. Hence [sensation], as something contained in appearance whose apprehension[85] is not a successive synthesis proceeding from parts to the whole presentation, has no extensive magnitude; a lack of sensation at that same instant would
A 168 present that instant as empty, and hence as = 0. Now what in empirical intuition corresponds to sensation is reality (*realitas phaenomenon*);[86] what corresponds to the lack of sensation is negation, = 0. However, every sen-
B 210 sation is capable of diminution, so that it can decrease and thus gradually vanish. Hence between reality contained in appearance, on the one hand, and negation, on the other hand, there is a continuous coherence of many possible intermediate sensations, whose difference from one another is always smaller than the difference between the given sensation and zero, i.e., complete negation. In other words, the real contained in appearance has always a magnitude. But [this magnitude is not an extensive one], which is not to be met with in [such] apprehension; for apprehension by means of mere sensation occurs in an instant rather than through successive synthesis of many sensations, and hence does not proceed from the parts to the whole. Hence the real does indeed have a magnitude, but not an extensive one.

[81] [*Antizipation*]

[82] [*vorgreifen*, which means the same (and has even the same etymology) as 'anticipate.' There is no unambiguous alternative English term.]

[83] [*gerade*.]

[84] [Or 'occupies.']

[85] [The apprehension of (i.e., by means of) sensation.]

[86] [Phenomenal reality. Cf. A 146/B 186 br. ns. 134 and 135]

Now a magnitude that is apprehended only as unity, and in which multiplicity can be presented only by approaching [from the given magnitude] toward negation, = 0, I call an *intensive magnitude.* Hence any reality contained in appearance has intensive magnitude, i.e., a degree. And if this reality is considered as cause (whether of the sensation, or of other reality contained in appearance, e.g., a change), then the degree of the reality considered as cause is called a moment[87]—e.g., the moment of gravity. It is A 169
called this because the degree designates only that magnitude whose apprehension is not successive but instantaneous. But here I touch on this only in passing, because for now I am not yet dealing with causality.

Therefore every sensation, and hence also every reality contained in ap- B 211
pearance, no matter how small either[88] may be, has a degree, i.e., an intensive magnitude. This magnitude can always be lessened, and between reality and negation there is a continuous coherence of possible realities and of possible smaller[89] perceptions. Every color, e.g., red color, has a degree that, no matter how small it may be, is never the smallest; and this is the situation throughout[90]—with heat, with the moment of gravity, etc.

The property of magnitudes whereby no part in them is the smallest possible (i.e., no part is simple) is called their continuity. Space and time are *quanta continua,*[91] because no part of them can be given without our enclosing it between boundaries (points or instants); and hence any part of them can be given only in such a way that this part itself is in turn a space or a time. Therefore space consists only of spaces, time only of times. Points and instants are only boundaries, i.e., mere positions limiting[92] them. But positions always presuppose the intuitions that they are to delimit[93] or determine; and neither space nor time can be assembled[94] from mere posi- A 170
tions if these are considered as components that could be given even prior to space or time. Such magnitudes may also be called *flowing* magnitudes,

[87][*(das) Moment.* Cf. A 208/B 254.]

[88][*sie,* used to refer back to both 'sensation' and 'reality.']

[89][*kleiner,* which sounds just as unusual here as 'smaller' does (and as 'little' would).]

[90][*überall.*]

[91][Continuous quanta.]

[92][*Einschränkung.*]

[93][*beschränken.*]

[94][See B 201 n. 30.]

because the synthesis (of productive[95] imagination) in their production[96] is
B 212 a progression in time, and the continuity especially of time is usually des-
ignated by the term flowing (flowing by).

Hence all appearances as such are continuous magnitudes—both in terms of their intuition, viz., as extensive magnitudes, and in terms of their mere perception (sensation, and hence reality), viz., as intensive magnitudes. If the synthesis of the manifold of appearance is interrupted, then this manifold is an aggregate of many appearances and is not, properly speaking, appearance as a quantum. Such an aggregate is not produced by merely continuing the productive synthesis of a certain kind, but is produced by repeating a synthesis that always ceases again. If I call 13 thalers[97] a quantum of money, then I do so correctly insofar as I mean by this the [total] content of one mark[98] of fine silver. For this mark is indeed a continuous magnitude, in which no part is the smallest but each part could constitute a coin[99] that always contained material for still smaller coins. But if by that designation[100] I mean 13 round thalers, as so many coins[101] (whatever
their silver content might be), then my calling[102] this a quantum of thalers
A 171 is inappropriate. I must call it, rather, an aggregate, i.e., a number of
coins.[103] But since with any number there must still be underlying unity, appearance as unity is a quantum, and as such is always a continuum.

We saw that all appearances, considered extensively as well as inten-
B 213 sively, are continuous magnitudes. If this is so, then the proposition that all
change (a thing's transition from one state to another) is likewise continuous could be proved here easily and with mathematical self-evidence,[104]

[95][*produktiv.*]

[96][*Erzeugung.*]

[97][*Thaler* or (as the tenn is now spelled) *Taler*, a large silver coin issued (in different types) by vanous Gennan states from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The name (from which 'dollar' derives) is an abbreviation of *Joachimst(h)aler*, so named for Sankt Joachimst(h)al (Jáchymov, in Czech), a town in northwestem Bohemia, Czech Republic, where the silver was mined and the coin was first made.]

[98][An old European unit of weight (ca. 8 ounces), used especially for gold and silver.]

[99][*Geldstück;* 'piece of money,' literally.]

[100][*Benennung;* i.e., here, '13 thalers.']

[101][*Münzen.*]

[102][*nennen.*]

[103][*Geldstücke.*]

[104][*Evidenz.*]

were it not that the causality of a change as such lies wholly outside the bounds of a transcendental philosophy and presupposes empirical principles. For the understanding does not at all disclose to us a priori the possibility of a cause that changes the state of any things, i.e., determines them to enter the opposite of a certain given state. The understanding fails to do so not merely because it has no insight whatever into that possibility (indeed, we lack such insight in several a priori cognitions), but because changeability concerns only certain determinations[105] of appearances, viz., those that experience alone can teach us, while only their cause[106] is to be found in the unchangeable. Here, however, we have nothing available for our use except the pure basic concepts of all possible experience, among which there must be nothing empirical whatsoever. Hence we cannot, without violating the unity of the system, anticipate[107] general natural sci- A 172
ence,[108] which is built upon certain basic experiences.

Yet we have no lack of documentation[109] for our principle's great influence in anticipating perceptions, and even in compensating for their lack insofar as the principle blocks all wrong inferences that might be drawn from that lack.

For we saw that all reality in perception has a degree between which B 214
and negation there is[110] an infinite stepwise sequence of ever lesser degrees, and that every sense must likewise[111] have a definite[112] degree in the receptivity of sensations. But if this is so, then no perception and hence also no experience is possible that would prove, whether directly or indirectly[113] (by whatever circuitous path in the inference[114]), a complete lack in appearance of anything real. I.e., one can never obtain from experience a proof of empty space or of an empty time. For, first, the complete lack

[105][*Bestimmungen*. See A 23/B 37 br. n. 30.]

[106][Considered as cause as such.]

[107][*vorgreifen*. Cf. A 167/B 209 br. n. 82.]

[108][*Naturwissenschaft*.]

[109][*Beweistümer*.]

[110][*stattfinden*.]

[111][Following Erdmann's reading (not, however, given in the *Akademie* edition) of *ebensowohl* for *gleichwohl* ('nonetheless').]

[112][*bestimmt*, which also means 'determinate.']

[113][Or 'immediately or mediately.' See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[114][*Umschweif im Schließen*.]

of the real in sensible intuition cannot itself be perceived. Second, this lack cannot be inferred[115] from even a single appearance and from the difference in its reality, nor must it ever be assumed in order to explain that intuition.[116] For suppose even that the whole intuition of a determinate space or time is real through and through, i.e., that no part of it is empty. Still, every reality has its degree, which can decrease to nothing (i.e., emptiness)[117] by infinitely many steps, with the extensive magnitude of the appearance being unchanged. And hence there must be infinitely many different degrees with which space and time may be [wholly] filled; and it must be possible for the intensive magnitude in different appearances to be smaller or greater even with the extensive magnitude of the intuition being the same.

A 173

B 215 Let us give an example of this. Natural scientists[118] perceive (partly by the moment[119] of gravity or weight, partly by the moment of resistance to other matter in motion) that the quantity of matter of various kinds differs greatly even with the volume being the same.[120] Almost all natural scientists, when perceiving this, infer from it unanimously that in all kinds of matter[121] this volume[122] (i.e., extensive magnitude of the appearance) must—even if in varying measure—be empty.[123] But to whom would it ever have occurred that these investigators of nature, who are for the most part mathematical and mechanical [in orientation], would base this inference of theirs solely on a metaphysical presupposition—which presuppositions, after all, they claim to avoid so very much? For they assume that the *real* in space (I do not want to call it impenetrability or weight here, because these are empirical concepts) is *everywhere uniform*[124] and can dif-

[115][*folgern.*]

[116][*derselben*; grammatically this *could* refer instead to 'reality.']

[117][*das Leere.*]

[118][*Naturlehrer.*]

[119][See A 168/B 210 br. n. 87.]

[120][Kant treated this in detail in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786). See Ak. IV, 523–25, 532–35.]

[121][*Materien.* See B 207 br. n. 73.]

[122][I.e., the space occupied by matter.]

[123][Or 'void.']

[124][*einerlei.*]

fer only in extensive magnitude, i.e., in amount.[125] This supposition, for which they could not have had a basis in experience and which is therefore merely metaphysical, I oppose with a transcendental proof. This proof, A 174 to be sure, is not meant to explain the difference in the filling of spaces. Yet it does completely annul the supposed necessity of that presupposition whereby the difference[126] in question can be explained only by assuming empty spaces. And thus the proof has at least the merit of giving to the understanding the freedom to think this difference[127] in another way also—should explaining nature necessitate some other hypothesis to ac- B 216 count for this difference. For we then see that although equal spaces may be filled completely by various kinds of matter, so that in none of them[128] there is a point where no matter can be found to be present, yet everything real has, with its quality being the same, its[129] degree (of resistance or weight); and this degree can—without any lessening of the extensive magnitude, or amount—be smaller *ad infinitum*[130] before the real[131] passes into emptiness and vanishes.[132] Thus something that spreads[133] and fills a space, as, e.g., heat, and likewise any other reality (contained in appearance), can decrease in its degree[134] *ad infinitum* without leaving even the smallest part of this space in the least empty, and can nonetheless fill this space just as well with these smaller degrees as another appearance can with greater degrees. I do not by any means intend to assert here that this is actually how

[125][Kant has in mind natural scientists like Robert Boyle, Isaac Newton, and others, who claimed that absolutely dense (and indivisible) atoms move about in absolutely empty space (void). Kant opposed such atomism.]

[126][*Unterschied*.]

[127][*Verschiedenheit*.]

[128][Reading, with Erdmann, *jenen* for *beiden*.]

[129][Reading *seinen* for *ihren*. Kant probably thought that he had wntten 'every reality,' as he did at A 172/ B 214. On this reading, what has the (varying) degree is everything real, not the quality (which then stays the same in this respect as well). Erdmann instead reads *ihren* (despite its grammatically odd placement for that purpose) as referring to the quality (which would thus have the [varying] degree), on the ground that at Ak. III, 158, lines 9–10 (A 176/B 218) Kant equates the real with quality.]

[130][*ins Unendliche*.]

[131][Reading *es* for *sie*, for the same reason as before; see br n. 128, just above.]

[132][See A 173/B 215 br n. 120.]

[133][*eine Ausspannung*.]

[134][Literally, 'in its degrees'· *in ihren Graden*.]

kinds of matter differ in their specific gravity. Rather, I intend only to establish,
A 175 from a principle of pure understanding, that the nature of our perceptions makes such a way of explaining possible, and that people are wrong when they assume that the real [component] of appearance is the same[135] in degree and differs only in aggregation and the extensive magnitude thereof—and when they assert this, allegedly, even a priori by means of a principle of understanding.

B 217 Nonetheless, something about this anticipation of perception is always striking to an investigator of nature who is accustomed to transcendental deliberation[136] and has thus become cautious. For the anticipation arouses some concern about the claim that the understanding can anticipate[137] a synthetic proposition such as this—i.e., a synthetic proposition about the degree of everything real in appearances, and hence about the possibility of there being in sensation itself, if we abstract from its empirical quality, an intrinsic difference. And hence there remains a question not unworthy of solution: viz., how the understanding can a priori make in this matter a synthetic pronouncement about appearances, and how it can thus anticipate appearances in what is strictly[138] and merely empirical, i.e., in what concerns sensation.

The *quality* of sensation (e.g., colors, taste, etc.) is always merely empirical and cannot at all be presented a priori. But the real—as opposed to negation, = 0 —that corresponds to sensation as such presents only something whose concept itself contains[139] a being [of something], and signifies
A 176 nothing but the synthesis in an empirical consciousness as such. For empirical consciousness can in inner sense be raised from 0 to any higher[140] degree, so that the same extensive magnitude[141] of intuition (e.g., an illuminated surface) arouses as great[142] a sensation as does an aggregate[143] of much else (that is less illuminated) taken together. We can, therefore, ab-

[135][Or 'alike': *gleich*.]

[136][*Überlegung;* see A 260/B 316 br. n. 4. The term was inserted here by Erdmann.]

[137][In the original, 'can anticipate' occurs only at the end (Ak. III, 157, line 29) of a very long sentence. I follow Erdmann (see *ibid*., line 25) in repeating the expression in the present clause, which it does seem to govern as well.]

[138][*eigentlich.*]

[139][And thus indicates; cf. A 143/B 182.]

[140][*größer.*]

[141][*Größe.*]

[142][*groß.*]

[143][Having that same extensive magnitude. Cf. A 179/B 221.]

stract entirely from the extensive magnitude of appearance, and can yet present in mere sensation in one moment a synthesis of uniform ascent from 0 to the given empirical consciousness. Hence although all sensations, as such, are given only a posteriori,[144] their property of having a degree can be cognized a priori. It is remarkable that in magnitudes as such we can cognize a priori only a single *quality*, viz., continuity, and that in all quality (the real [component] of appearances) we can cognize a priori nothing more than their[145] having an intensive *quantity*, viz., the fact that they have a degree; everything else is left to experience. B 218

3
ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE[1]

Their principle[2] is: *Experience is possible only through the presentation of a necessary connection of perceptions.*[3]

Proof[4]

Experience is an empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an object through perceptions. Hence experience is a synthesis of perceptions

[144][Reading, with Mellin, *a posteriori* for *a priori.*]

[145][I.e., the appearances'.]

[1][In A, the heading and the statement of the analogies' principle read as follows:]

THE ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE

Their general *principle*[a] is this: All appearances are, as regards their existence, subject a priori to rules governing the determination of their relation to one another in one time. A 177

[a][*Grundsatz.*]

[2][*Prinzip.*]

[3][See Gerd Buchdahl, *Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 641–47. See also Arthur Melnick, *Kant's Analogies of Experience* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 48–57. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 163–66. Also M. S. Gram, *op. cit.* at A 7/B 11 br. n. 199, 130–33. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 207–14. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 355–91. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 159–83. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 184–86. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 238–48.]

[4][This heading and the first paragraph of the proof added in B.]

that itself is not contained in perception but contains the synthetic unity of the manifold of perceptions in one consciousness. This unity amounts to what is essential for a cognition of *objects* of the senses, i.e., for experi-
B 219 ence (rather than merely intuition or sensation of the senses).[5] Now, in experience perceptions do indeed come together only contingently, so that no necessity in their connection is, or even can be, evident from the perceptions themselves. For apprehension is only a compilation[6] of the manifold of empirical intuition; and we find in it no presentation of the necessity of the linked existence[7] in space and time[8] of the appearances that it compiles. Experience, on the other hand, is a cognition of objects through perceptions; and hence in experience the relation within the manifold's existence[9] is to be presented not as the manifold[10] is compiled in time, but as it objectively is in time. Time, however, cannot itself be perceived. Therefore determination of the existence of objects in time can come about only through the linking of perceptions[11] in time as such, and hence only through concepts connecting them a priori. And since these concepts always carry with them necessity as well,[12] experience is possible only through a presentation of the necessary connection of perceptions.

The three modes of time are *permanence, succession*, and *simultaneity*.[13] Hence there will be three rules[14] governing all time relations of appearances, whereby every appearance's existence[15] can be determined in regard to the unity of all time; and these rules will precede experience and make it possible in the first place.

[5][*Empfindung der Sinne*, as distinguished from sensation as meaning *feeling*. Cf. my translation of the *Critique of Judgment* (cited at B xvii br. n. 73), Ak. V, 291 incl. br. n. 19.]

[6][*Zusammenstellung.*]

[7][*Existenz.*]

[8][Putting, with Vorländer, a comma after *zusammenstellt*. Without the comma, the text translates: '. . . in the linked existence of the appearances compiled by it in space and time.']

[9][*Dasein.*]

[10][*es*, which grammatically could refer back to 'relation' instead.]

[11][*ihre*; grammatically this could instead refer back to 'objects ']

[12][*zugleich.*]

[13][*Beharrlichkeit, Folge, Zugleichsein.*]

[14][Viz., the three analogies. Cf. A 178/B 220, A 180/B 222.]

[15][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 47), Kant adds 'relation of the real in appearance.']

The general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary *unity* of apperception in regard to all possible empirical consciousness (i.e.,[16] perception) *at every time;* and since this unity underlies [empirical consciousness] a priori, the principle rests on the synthetic unity of all appearances as regards their relation in time. For original apperception refers to inner sense (the sum of all presentations); specifically, it refers a priori to the form of inner sense, i.e., to the relation in time of the manifold[17] empirical consciousness. Now all this manifold is to be united, as regards its time relations, in original apperception—for so says this apperception's a priori transcendental unity,[18] to which is subject whatever is to belong to my (i.e., to my one) cognition and hence is to be able to become an object for me. Hence this *synthetic unity* in the time relation of all perceptions, a unity *which is determined a priori,* is this law: that all empirical time determinations must be subject to rules of universal time determination. And the analogies of experience that we now want to deal with must be rules of this sort. B 220 A 178

These principles have the peculiarity that they do not consider appearances and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but consider merely [the appearances'] *existence* and their *relation* to one another in regard to that existence. Now the way in which something is apprehended in appearance can be determined a priori in such a manner[19] that the rule of the appearance's synthesis can also give[20] this a priori intuition,[21] i.e., can produce the appearance from this intuition,[22] in the case of every empirical example that comes to hand. The *existence*[23] of appearances, however, cannot be cognized a priori; and even if we could in that just mentioned way[24] B 221

16[Cf. B 160, 207.]

17[See B 203 br. n. 38.]

18[Or, perhaps, 'so says a priori this apperception's transcendental unity.']

19[Viz., something's being apprehended as an extensive or intensive magnitude can a priori be determined so as to yield constitutive principles (as in the case of the axioms of intuition and the anticipations of perception) rather than regulative principles; cf. A 179–80/B 221–23.]

20[*zugleich . . . geben.*]

21[Of extensive or intensive magnitude. I am taking *ihrer* to refer to *Erscheinung* rather than to *Art*, and am reading *a priori* as an adjective modifying *Anschauung* rather than as an adverb modifying *geben.*]

22[Reading *sie* as referring (like *ihrer*, just before) to *Erscheinung* rather than to *Anschauung a priori*, and *daraus* as referring to *Anschauung* rather than to *Beispiele.*]

23[*Dasein;* emphasis added.]

24[Of the axioms and the anticipations.]

contrive to infer some existent[25] or other, we could still not cognize it determinately, i.e., we could not anticipate what distinguishes this existent's empirical intuition from [that of] others.

The previous two principles,[26] which I called the mathematical principles because they justified applying mathematics to appearances, dealt with appearances in regard to their mere possibility; and they taught us how appearances could be produced, as regards both their intuition and the real in their perception, according to rules of a mathematical synthesis. Hence in both syntheses we can use numerical magnitudes and, with them, the de-
A 179 termination of appearance as a magnitude. Thus, e.g., I can assemble the degree of sensations of sunlight from some 200,000 illuminations provided by the moon,[27] and can determinately give that degree a priori, i.e., construct it. Those earlier two principles may therefore be called constitutive.

The situation must be quite different with those principles that are to bring a priori under rules the existence of appearances. For since existence can-
B 222 not be constructed, the principles will deal only with the relation of existence, and will be able to yield none but merely *regulative* principles. Hence finding either axioms or anticipations is here out of the question. Thus if a perception is given to us in a time relation to other (although indeterminate) perceptions, then we shall indeed not be able to say *what* is that other perception or *how great*[28] a perception it is; rather, we shall be able to say how, as regards its existence, this other perception is necessarily linked with the former perception in this mode of time. Analogies signify something very different in philosophy from what they represent[29] in mathematics. In mathematics they are formulas asserting the equality of two relations[30] of magnitudes, and are always *constitutive;* so that if three[31] members of the proportion are given, the fourth[32] is thereby also given, i.e., it can be constructed.

[25][*Dasein.*]

[26][The principle of the axioms of intuition and the pnnciple of the anticipations of perception.]

[27][Cf. A 176/B 217.]

[28][I.e., of what magnitude Cf. A 176/B 217.]

[29][*vorstellen.*]

[30][Or 'ratios': *-verhältnisse.*]

[31][Reading, with Mellin (and the *Akademie* edition), *drei* for *zwei.*]

[32][Reading, with Mellin (and the *Akademie* edition), *vierte* for *dritte.*]

In philosophy, however, an analogy is the equality not of two *quantitative* but of two *qualitative* relations. Here I can from three given members cog- A 180
nize, and give a priori, only the *relation* to a fourth, but not *this* fourth *member* itself. But I do have[33] a rule for seeking the fourth member in experience, and a mark[34] for discovering it there. Hence an analogy of experience will be only a rule whereby unity of experience is to arise from perceptions (not a rule saying how perception itself, as empirical intuition as such, is to arise). And such an analogy will hold,[35] as principle of objects (i.e., appearances), not *constitutively* but merely *regulatively*. But the same [restric- B 223
tion] will apply[36] also to the postulates of empirical thought as such,[37] which concern at once[38] the synthesis of mere intuition (the form of appearance), the synthesis of perception (the matter of appearance), and that of experience (the relation of these perceptions). I.e., these postulates are only regulative principles. These principles do not indeed differ in certainty from the mathematical principles, which are constitutive; for this certainty is established a priori in both. But they do differ from the mathematical principles in [not having the latter's] kind of evidence, i.e., their intuitive character (and hence their ability to be demonstrated[39]).

But what has been pointed out for all synthetic principles, and must be noted especially here, is this: these analogies have their sole signification and validity not as principles of understanding's transcendental use, but merely as principles of its empirical use, and hence can be proved only as A 181
principles of such use; and appearances must consequently be subsumed not under the categories taken absolutely, but only under their schemata. For if the objects to which these principles are to be referred were things in themselves, then cognizing anything about them synthetically a priori would be entirely impossible. But they are indeed nothing but appearances. And the complete cognition of appearances—which is, after all, what all a priori principles must ultimately always amount to—is merely our possible experience. Hence these principles can aim at nothing more than being the conditions for the unity of empirical cognition in the synthesis of B 224

[33][In the analogy.]

[34][Or 'characteristic': *Merkmal*.]

[35][*gelten*.]

[36][*gelten*.]

[37][See A 218–35/B 265–94]

[38][*zusammen*.]

[39][Cf. A 734–35 = B 762–63]

appearances. This unity, however, is thought solely in the schema of the pure concept of understanding. The function, unrestricted by any sensible condition, of the unity of the schema[40] [as such], as the unity of a synthesis as such, is contained in the category. Hence these principles will entitle us to assemble appearances only by an analogy with the logical and universal unity of concepts. And hence in the principle itself we shall indeed make use of the category; but in employing[41] the principle (i.e., in applying it to appearances) we shall put the category's schema, as the key to its use, in the category's[42] place—or, rather, put the schema alongside the category as a restricting condition of it called a formula of the category.[43]

A 182

A
FIRST ANALOGY

PRINCIPLE OF THE PERMANENCE OF SUBSTANCE[44]

In all variation by appearances [45] substance is permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased not decreased.[46]

[40][Reading, with Kehrbach, *dessen* for *deren.* Kant probably thought he had written 'in the schemata of the pure concepts of understanding.']

[41][*Ausführung.*]

[42][Reading, with Max Müller, *deren* for *dessen;* the contrast does seem to be with 'category.' Erdmann in the *Akademie* edition (cf. his note at Ak. III, 588) instead relates *dessen* to *Grundsatz* ('principle'). Cf. the next note.]

[43][Reading, with Max Müller, *der ersteren* for *des ersteren.* See also A 240/B 299. Erdmann (cf. br. n. 42, just above) instead relates *des ersteren* to *Grundsatz.*]

[44][In A, the heading and the statement of the principle read as follows:]

PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENCE

All appearances contain the permanent (i.e., *substance*) as the object itself, and the mutable as its mere determination, i.e., as a way in which the object exists.

[45][Or 'variation on the part of appearances.' Here 'variation' (*Wechsel*), as my use of 'by' or 'on the part of' rather than (the less active) 'of' is intended to suggest, means 'change' in the sense that includes 'exchange.' 'Change' itself is needed to render *Veränderung* (since 'alteration' suggests only partial change, i.e., *Abänderung*). 'Exchange,' on the other hand, inappropriately excludes variation other than exchange, creates too close a terminological link to 'change,' and also lacks an intransitive verb.]

[46][See H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 199–215. See also Graham Bird, *op. cit.* at A 67/B 92 br. n 121, 149–67. Also G. G. Brittan, *op. cit.* at B 202 br. n 35, 143–64. Also

Proof[47]

All appearances are in time; and solely in time, as substrate (viz., as permanent form of inner intuition), can either *simultaneity*[48] or *succession*[49] be presented. Hence time, in which all variation by appearances is B 225
to be thought, endures[50] and does not vary. For time is that in which, and as determinations of which, sequentiality[51] or simultaneity can alone be presented. Now, time by itself cannot be perceived. Hence the substrate which presents time as such, and in which all variation or simultaneity can in apprehension be perceived through the appearances' relation to it, must be found[52] in the objects of perception, i.e., in the appearances. But the substrate of everything real, i.e., of everything belonging to the existence[53] of things, is *substance*. In substance alone, and as determination,[54] can everything belonging to existence be thought. Hence the permanent in relation to which all time relations of appearances can alone be determined is

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H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 148–77. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 166–70. Also M. S. Gram, *op. cit.* at A 7/B 11 br. n. 199, 133–40. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 215–35. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 358–63. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 58–77; and *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 51–102. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 184–220. Also C. F. von Weizsäcker, *The Unity of Nature* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux: 1980), 308–26 ("Kant's First Analogy of Experience and the Conservation Principles of Physics"). Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 186–87. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 248–60.]

[47][In the place of this heading and the first paragraph of the proof, A has the following:]

PROOF OF THIS FIRST ANALOGY

All appearances are in time. Time can determine the relation within *the existence of appearances* in two ways, either insofar as appearances *are sequential*[a] or insofar as they *are simultaneous*. In respect of the first way, time is considered as *time series*; in regard to the second, as *time range*.

[a][*nacheinander*.]

[48][*Zugleichsein*.]

[49][*Folge*.]

[50][*bleiben*.]

[51][*Nacheinandersein*.]

[52]['to be found,' literally; *anzutreffen*.]

[53][*Dasein* here, *Existenz* just below.]

[54][Of substance.]

substance [contained] in appearance, i.e., the real of appearance that as substrate of all variation remains[55] always the same. Since, therefore, substance cannot vary in its existence, its quantum in nature can also be neither increased nor decreased.

Our *apprehension* of the manifold of appearance is always successive, and therefore is always varying. Hence through apprehension alone we can never determine whether this manifold considered as object of experience is simultaneous or sequential. We cannot determine this unless something underlying in experience is there *always*—i.e., something *enduring* and *per-*
B 226 *manent* of which all variation and simultaneity[56] are only so many ways (modes of time) in which the permanent exists. Hence all time relations (for simultaneity and succession are the only relations in time) are possible
A 183 only in the permanent. I.e., the permanent is the *substratum* of the empirical presentation of time itself; all time determinations are possible only in this substratum. Permanence expresses time as such as the constant correlate of all existence of appearances, of all variation and of all concomitance. For variation concerns not time itself, but only appearances in time (just as simultaneity is not a mode of time itself; for in time no parts are simultaneous, but all are sequential). If we wished to attribute to time itself a succession or sequentiality,[57] then we would have to think yet another time wherein this succession would be possible. Solely through the permanent does sequential *existence* in different parts of the time series acquire a *magnitude,* called *duration.* For in mere succession by itself existence is always vanishing and starting, and never has the least magnitude. Without this permanent, therefore, there is no time relation. Now time cannot in itself be perceived. Therefore this permanent in appearances is the substratum of all time determinations. Hence it is also the condition for the possibility of all synthetic unity of perceptions, i.e., the possibility of ex-
B 227 perience; and all existence[58] and all variation in time can only be regarded, by reference to this permanent, as a mode of the existence of what is enduring and permanent. Therefore in all appearances the permanent is the object itself, i.e., the (phenomenal[59]) substance, whereas whatever varies

[55][*bleiben.*]

[56][*Zugleichsein* here, *Simultaneität* just below.]

[57][More literally, 'sequential succession': *Folge nacheinander.*]

[58][*Dasein* here, *Existenz* just below.]

[59][*phaenomenon.* Cf. A 146/B 186 br n. 134]

or can vary belongs only to the way in which this substance or these sub- A 184
stances exist, and hence to their determinations.

I find that in all ages not just philosophers but even the common understanding have presupposed this permanence as a substratum of all variation of appearances; and they probably[60] always assume it, moreover, as indubitable. The only difference is that the philosopher expresses himself somewhat more determinately on this point than does the common understanding, by saying that in all changes in the world *substance* endures and only the *accidents* vary. Yet nowhere do I encounter so much as an attempt to prove this quite synthetic proposition. Indeed, only seldom is the proposition placed, as surely it deserves to be, at the top of the laws of nature that are pure and hold[61] completely a priori. The mere proposition that substance is permanent is indeed tautological. For merely because of this permanence do we apply the category of substance to appearance, and people ought[62] to have proved that in all appearances there is in fact something permanent wherein the mutable is nothing but a determination of its exist-
ence. Such a proof, however, can never be conducted dogmatically, i.e., B 228
from concepts, because it concerns a synthetic a priori proposition; and people never thought of the fact that such propositions are valid only in reference to possible experience and hence can be proved only by a de-
duction of the possibility of experience. It is no wonder, then, that al- A 185
though this proposition has been laid at the basis in all experience (because in empirical cognition one *feels* the need for it), yet it has never been proved.

A philosopher was asked, How much does smoke weigh? He replied: From the weight of the burnt wood subtract the weight of the ashes that remain, and you will have the weight of the smoke. He therefore presupposed as incontestable that *matter*[63] (substance) does not pass away even in fire, but that its *form* only undergoes an alteration.[64] Similarly the proposition that nothing arises from nothing was only another consequence[65] in-

[60][*werden.*]

[61][*bestehen.*]

[62][*man . . . müssen.*]

[63][Emphasis added; similarly in 'form' just below.]

[64][*Abänderung*. Cf. B 224 br. n. 45 In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 47), Kant notes, at the end of the present sentence, 'From where does he know that? Not from experience.']

[65][Or 'corollary': *Folgesatz.*]

ferred from the principle of permanence, or rather from the principle of the everlasting existence of the subject proper [contained] in appearance. For if the [component] in appearance that we wish to call substance is to be the substratum proper of all time determination, then all existence in past as well as future time must be determinable solely and exclusively by reference to it.[66] Hence we can give the name substance to an appearance only because we presuppose the existence of substance at all time. This exist-
B 229 ence at all time is not even well expressed by the word permanence, since permanence applies more to future time. On the other hand, the intrinsic necessity to be permanent is linked inseparably with the necessity always
A 186 to have been, and therefore the expression[67] may be allowed to remain. *Gigni de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*[68] are two propositions that were connected by the ancients as unseparated and that are now sometimes separated. They are separated, through misunderstanding, because of a conception that they concern things in themselves and that the first proposition might therefore run counter to the world's depending (even in terms of its substance) on a supreme cause. But there is no need for such worry. For we are here talking only about appearances[, which are] in the realm of experience; and the unity of experience would never be possible if we were to let new things originate (in terms of substance). For there would then no longer be what alone can present the unity of time, viz., the identity of the substratum, by reference to which[69] alone all variation has thoroughgoing unity. On the other hand, this permanence is nothing more than our way of presenting the existence of things (in appearance).

The determinations of a substance, which are nothing but particular[70] ways for the substance to exist, are called *accidents*. They are always real, because they concern the existence of substance. (Negations are only determinations expressing the nonexistence[71] of something in substance.) If
B 230 now we attribute a special[72] existence to this real in substance (e.g., motion, as an accident of matter), then this existence is called inherence, as

[66][*daran*.]

[67]['Principle of permanence.']

[68][That nothing can arise from nothing, nothing revert to nothing.]

[69][*woran*.]

[70][*besonder*.]

[71][Or 'not-being': *Nichtsein*.]

[72][I.e., *differentiated* or *specific* (cf. 'differentia' and 'species'): *besonder*.]

distinguished from the existence of substance, which is called subsistence. From this [attribution of a differentiated existence to the real in substance], however, arise many misinterpretations; and we speak more accurately and A 187
correctly if we characterize an accident only as the way in which the existence of a substance is determined positively. Yet by virtue of the conditions of our understanding's logical use we cannot avoid separating, as it were, what can vary in a substance's existence while the substance itself endures, and examining it in relation to what is properly permanent and radical.[73] And hence this category[74] has indeed been put under the heading of the relations,[75] but more as the condition of relations than as itself containing a relation.

Now this permanence is also the basis for the following correction of the concept of *change*.[76] Arising and passing away are not changes of what arises or passes away. Change is a way of existing that ensues[77] upon another way of existing of the same object. Hence whatever does change *endures*, and only its *state* varies. This variation, therefore, concerns only the determinations, which can cease or, for that matter, start. Hence we can say, using an expression that seems somewhat paradoxical: only the permanent (i.e., substance) undergoes change;[78] the mutable undergoes[79] no B 231
change but only a *variation*, since some determinations cease and others start.

Hence change can be perceived only in substances; and an arising or A 188
passing away taken absolutely, i.e., without its pertaining merely to a determination of the permanent, cannot at all be a possible perception. For precisely this permanent makes possible the presentation of the transition from one state to another, and from not-being[80] to being; and hence these[81] can be cognized empirically only as varying determinations of what endures. Suppose that something absolutely begins to be. If you suppose this,

[73][I.e., at the root.]

[74][Of inherence.]

[75][See A 80/B 106.]

[76][*Veränderung*. On change, variation, and alteration see B 224 br. n. 45.]

[77][*erfolgt.*]

[78][*wird verändert.*]

[79][*erleidet.*]

[80][*Nichtsein,* which also means 'nonexistence.']

[81][These states as well as not-being and being.]

then you must have a point of time in which it was not. But to what will you fasten this point of time, if not to what is already there?[82] For an empty time that would precede is not an object of perception; but if you tie this arising to things that were beforehand and that continue up to the something that arises, then this something was only a determination of what, as the permanent, was beforehand. The case is the same with passing away also; for it presupposes the empirical presentation of a time where an appearance no longer is.

Substances ([contained] in appearance) are the substrates of all time determinations. If some substances arose and others passed away, this would
B 232 itself annul the sole condition of the empirical unity of time; and appearances would then refer to two different[83] times wherein existence would be flowing by[84] concurrently—which is absurd. For there is *only one* time,
A 189 wherein all different times must be posited not as simultaneous but as sequential.

Permanence, accordingly, is a necessary condition under which alone appearances are determinable as things or objects in a possible experience. But as to what is the empirical criterion of this necessary permanence and, with it, of the substantiality of appearances, the opportunity to make the needed comments will be provided by what follows.[85]

[82][Or 'already exists'· *schon da ist.*]

[83][*zweierlei*]

[84][*verfließen.*]

[85][A 205–6/B 250–51.]

B
SECOND ANALOGY

PRINCIPLE OF TEMPORAL SUCCESSION[86] ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF CAUSALITY[87]

All changes occur according to the law of the connection of cause and effect.[88]

Proof[89]

(The previous principle has established that all appearances [forming part] of the temporal succession[90] are one and all only *changes;*[91] i.e., they are a successive[92] being and not-being of the determinations of substance, which itself is permanent. The principle has established, therefore, that there is no such thing[93] as the being[94] of substance itself as succeeding[95] its not-

[86][I.e., succession in time: *Zeitfolge.* (The term can also mean 'time sequence.')]

[87][In A, the heading and the statement of the principle read as follows:]

PRINCIPLE OF PRODUCTION

> Everything that occurs (i.e., starts to be) presupposes something that it succeeds[a] *according to a rule.*
>
> [a][*folgen auf.*]

[88][See Lewis White Beck, *Essays on Kant and Hume* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), 130–64. See also H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 216–34. Also Graham Bird, *op. cit.* at A 67/B 92 br. n. 121, 149–67. Also G. G. Brittan, *op. cit.* at B 202 br. n. 35, 165–87. Also Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 648–65. Also H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 178–201. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 170–75. Also M. S. Gram, *op. cit.* at A 7/B 11 br. n. 199, 140–66. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 237–66. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 363–81. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 78–135; and *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 163–74. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 221–93. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 187–88. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 260–83.]

[89][First two paragraphs of the proof added in B.]

[90][And hence all variation (cf. the restatement of the principle, just below): *-folge.*]

[91][Of substance.]

[92][*sukzessiv.*]

[93][*nicht . . . stattfinde.*]

[94][*Sein.*]

[95][*folgen auf.*]

B 233 being, or its not-being[96] as succeeding its existence;[97] in other words, there is no such thing as the arising or passing away of substance itself. The principle could also have been expressed thus: *All variation* (*succession*)[98] *on the part of appearances is only change;* for an arising or passing away of substance would not be changes of it, because the concept of change presupposes the same subject as existing,[99] and hence as being permanent, with two opposite determinations. After this preliminary reminder, there now follows the proof.)

I perceive that appearances succeed one another, i.e., that at one time there is a state of things whose opposite was there in the things' previous state. Hence I am in fact connecting two perceptions in time. Now connection is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here the product of a synthetic ability of our imagination[100] which determines inner sense in regard to time relation. But imagination can link those two states in two ways, so that either the one or the other state precedes in time. For time cannot in itself be perceived, and what precedes or follows[101] cannot be determined by reference to it in the object—empirically, as it were. I am, therefore, conscious only that my imagination[102] places one state before and the other[103] after, but not that the one state precedes the other in the
B 234 object. In other words, mere perception leaves indeterminate the *objective relation* of the appearances following one another. Now in order for this objective relation to be cognized as determinate, the relation between the two states must be thought as being such that it determines as necessary which of the states must be placed[104] before and which after, rather than vice versa. But a concept carrying with it a necessity of synthetic unity can only be a pure concept of understanding, which therefore does not reside in perception. Here this concept is that of the *relation of cause and effect;* of these two, the cause is what determines the effect in time, and deter-

[96][Or 'nonexistence': *Nichtsein.*]

[97][*Dasein.*]

[98][*Wechsel* (*Sukzession*). On variation and change (as well as alteration), see B 224 br. n. 45.]

[99][*existierend.*]

[100][*Einbildungskraft.*]

[101][*folgen.*]

[102][*Imagination.*]

[103][*eines . . . das andere.*]

[104][Or 'posited.']

mines it as the consequence,[105] rather than as something that [as occurring] merely in imagination might [instead] precede (or might not even be perceived at all). Therefore experience itself—i.e., empirical cognition of appearances—is possible only inasmuch as we subject the succession[106] of appearances, and hence all change, to the law of causality. Hence appearances themselves, taken as objects of experience, are possible only in accordance with this law.

Apprehension of the manifold of appearances is always successive.[107] The presentations of the parts succeed[108] one another. Whether they also follow[109] one another in the object is a second point for reflection which is not already contained in the first point.[110] Now it is true that anything, even every presentation insofar as one is conscious of it, can be called an object. Yet what this word might signify in the case of appearances, not B 235
insofar as they (as presentations) are objects but insofar as they only des- A 190
ignate an object, calls for deeper investigation. Insofar as appearances, taken only as presentations, are simultaneously objects of consciousness, they are not at all distinct from apprehension, i.e., from the taking up into the synthesis of imagination; and we must say, therefore, that the manifold of appearances is always produced in the mind successively. If appearances were things in themselves, then no human being could gather[111] from the succession of presentations how their manifold is combined[112] in the object. For we deal, after all, only with our presentations; how things may be in themselves (i.e., apart from taking account of presentations whereby they affect us), is entirely outside our sphere of cognition. Appearances, then, are indeed not things in themselves; but they are all that can be given to us for cognition. And now, whereas the presentation [as such] of the manifold[113] in apprehension is always successive, I am to indicate what sort of

[105][*Folge.*]

[106][*Folge.*]

[107][*sukzessiv.*]

[108][*folgen auf.*]

[109][*folgen.*]

[110][The first point being that the presentations of the parts succeed one another.]

[111][*ermessen.* Human beings lack the intellectual intuition (viz., of things in themselves) that an intuitive understanding would have. See B 72 incl br. n. 183.]

[112][Or 'linked': *verbunden.*]

[113][Of appearances.]

combination in time belongs to the manifold in appearances themselves. Thus, e.g., the apprehension of the manifold in the appearance of a house standing before me is successive. Now the question is whether the manifold of this house itself is successive intrinsically[114] as well; and this, to
B 236 be sure, no one will grant. But once I raise my concepts of an object to the level of transcendental signification, the house is not at all a thing in itself,
A 191 but is only an appearance, i.e., a presentation, whose transcendental object is unknown.[115] What, then, do I mean by the question as to how the manifold may be combined in appearance itself (which, after all, is nothing in itself)? Here what lies in the successive apprehension is regarded as presentation; but the appearance that is given to me, despite being nothing more than a sum of these presentations, is regarded as their object, with which the concept that I obtain from the presentations of apprehension is to agree. We soon see that, since agreement of cognition with the object is truth, the question can only be inquiring after the formal conditions of empirical truth; and we see that appearance, as contrasted[116] with the presentations of apprehension, can be presented as an object distinct from them only if it is subject to a rule that distinguishes it from any other apprehension and that makes necessary one kind of combination of the manifold. That [element] in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object.

Let us now proceed to our problem. That something occurs, i.e., that something, or a state that was not there before, comes to be cannot be per-
B 237 ceived empirically[117] unless it is preceded by an appearance that does not
A 192 contain this state. For an actuality succeeding an empty time, i.e., an arising not preceded by any state of things, cannot be apprehended any more than empty time itself. Hence any apprehension of an event is a perception succeeding another perception. But because, as I showed above by reference to the appearance of a house, this is[118] so in all synthesis of apprehension, the apprehension of an event is not yet distinguished thereby from other apprehensions. Yet I also observe that if, in an appearance containing an occurrence, I call A the preceding state of the perception and B the succeeding state, then B can in apprehension only succeed A, and simi-

[114][*in sich.*]

[115][*unbekannt.*]

[116][*im Gegenverhältnis.*]

[117][As Kant uses the term 'perceive,' 'empirically' is actually redundant.]

[118][*beschaffen ist.*]

larly perception A cannot succeed B but can only precede it. For example, I see a ship floating down the river.[119] My perception of its position lower down in the course of the river[120] succeeds the perception of its position higher up, and there is no possibility that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should be perceived first lower down and afterwards higher up in the river. Hence the order in the perceptions' succession in apprehension is here determinate, and apprehension is tied to this order. In the previous example of a house my perceptions could, in apprehension, start from the house's top and end at the bottom, but they could also start B 238
from below and end above; and they could likewise apprehend the manifold of the empirical intuition by proceeding either to the right or to the left. Hence in the series of these perceptions there was no determinate or- A 193
der making necessary the point in apprehension where[121] I must begin in order to combine the manifold empirically. In the perception of what occurs,[122] however, this rule[123] is always to be found, and through it the order of the perceptions succeeding one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) is made *necessary*.

In our case,[124] therefore, I shall have to derive the *subjective succession* of apprehension from the *objective succession* of appearances; for otherwise the subjective succession is entirely indeterminate and fails to distinguish any one appearance from some other appearance. The subjective succession by itself, being entirely arbitrary, proves nothing about the connection of the manifold in the object. Hence the objective succession will consist in the order of the manifold of appearance whereby the apprehension of the one item (viz, what occurs) succeeds the apprehension of the other (viz., what precedes) *according to a rule.* This alone can entitle me to say of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a succession is to be found in it—which means the same as that I cannot perform the apprehension except in precisely this succession.[125]

[119][*Strom*, i.e., not a stream but a (large) river.]

[120][*Fluß*.]

[121][Reading, with Mellin, *wo* for *wenn*.]

[122][As in the case of the ship floating down the river.]

[123][As to where I must begin.]

[124][I.e., the case of an event.]

[125][Or 'sequence.']

In accordance with such a rule, therefore, what precedes an event as such
B 239 must contain[126] the condition for a rule whereby this event always and necessarily follows. But I cannot go, conversely, from the event backward and
A 194 determine (through apprehension) what precedes. For no appearance goes back from the succeeding point of time to the previous one, although it does refer *to some previous one.* The progression from a given time to the determinate following time, on the other hand, is necessary. Hence because it[127] is, after all, something that follows, I must necessarily refer it to something else as such that precedes it and that it succeeds according to a rule, i.e., necessarily. Thus the event, as the conditioned, directs[128] us reliably to some condition, while this condition determines the event.

Suppose that an event is not preceded by anything that it must succeed according to a rule. Then all succession of perception would be determined solely in apprehension, i.e., merely subjectively; but this would not at all determine objectively which item in fact[129] precedes in perception and which follows.[130] We would in that way have only a play of presentations that would not refer to any object whatever; i.e., our perception would not at all distinguish one appearance from all others in terms of time relation. For the succession[131] in apprehending is in that case everywhere the same, and hence there is in appearance nothing determining this suc-
B 240 cession so that a certain[132] succession[133] is, as objective, made necessary by it. Hence I shall in that case not say that two states succeed each other
A 195 in appearance. Rather, I shall say only that one apprehension succeeds the other; and this is merely something *subjective* and determines no object, and hence cannot count[134] as cognition of any object (not even of an object in [the realm of] appearance).

Hence when we experience that something occurs, then in doing so we always presuppose that it is preceded by something or other that it suc-

[126][Literally, 'there must reside in what precedes an event as such.']

[127][I.e., the event.]

[128][*Anweisung.*]

[129][*eigentlich.*]

[130][*nachfolgend.*]

[131][*Sukzession.*]

[132][I.e., specific or particular.]

[133][*Folge.*]

[134][*gelten.*]

ceeds according to a rule. Otherwise I would not say of the object that it succeeds; for the mere succession in my apprehension, if it is not determined by a rule by reference to something preceding it, justifies no [assumption of a] succession in the object. Hence it is[135] always on account of a rule that I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, viz., a rule according to which appearances in their succession, i.e., as they occur,[136] are determined by the previous state. And the experience itself of something that occurs is possible solely and exclusively under this presupposition.

It is true that this seems to contradict all the remarks that people have always made about the course taken by our understanding. According to those remarks, it is only by perceiving and comparing the agreeing successions of events that follow upon preceding appearances that we are first led to discover a rule whereby certain events always succeed certain ap- B 241
pearances, and only thereby are we first prompted to frame the concept of cause. This concept would, on such a basis,[137] be merely empirical. And A 196
the rule whereby everything that occurs has a cause, as this concept provides it, would be just as contingent as the experience itself.[138] The rule's universality and necessity would then be attributed to it only fictitiously and would have no true universal validity, because they would be based not on anything a priori, but only on induction. But the case with this rule is the same as that with other pure a priori presentations (e.g., space and time): we can extract them as clear concepts from experience solely because we have put them into experience and hence have brought experience about through them in the first place. To be sure, this presentation of a rule determining the series of events, as a concept of cause, can have logical clarity only once we have made use of it in experience. Yet [our] taking account of this presentation, [viz.,] as a condition of the synthetic unity in time of appearances, was nonetheless the basis of the experience itself, and hence the experience was preceded a priori by this condition.

Hence we must show, in the example [of an event], that even in experience we never attribute succession (in the case of an event—where something occurs that was not there before) to the object and we never distinguish this succession from the subjective one in our apprehension, except B 242

[135][*geschehen*.]

[136][*geschehen*.]

[137][*Fuß*.]

[138][On which it is based.]

when there lies at the basis a rule that compels us to observe this order of perceptions rather than some other order; indeed, we must show that this
A 197 compulsion is what in fact makes the presentation of a succession in the object possible in the first place.

We have within us presentations of which we can also become conscious. But no matter how far this consciousness[139] may extend and how accurate and punctilious it may be, they still remain forever only presentations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind in this or that time relation. How is it, then, that we posit an object for these presentations; or how is it that in addition to the subjective reality that they have as modifications [of the mind], we also attribute to them who knows what sort of objective reality? Their objective signification cannot consist in the reference to another presentation (of what one would want to call object[140]). For otherwise the question returns: how does this other presentation, in turn, go beyond itself and acquire objective signification in addition to the subjective one that it possesses by being a determination of the mental state? Suppose that we inquire what new character is given to our presentations by the *reference to an object,* and what is the dignity that they thereby obtain. We then find that this reference does nothing beyond making necessary the presentations' being combined[141] in a certain way and being subjected to a
B 243 rule; and we find, conversely, that only through the necessity of a certain order in the time relation of our presentations is objective signification conferred on them.

A 198 In the synthesis of appearances the manifold of presentations is always successive.[142] Now, through this succession no object whatever is presented; for through this succession, which is common to all apprehensions, nothing is distinguished from anything else. But once I perceive, or assume in advance, that there is in this succession[143] a reference to the preceding state, upon which the presentation follows[144] according to a rule, then something presents itself as an event, or as something that occurs. I.e.,

[139][Of our presentations.]

[140][Reading, with Mellin, *Gegenstand* for *vom Gegenstande*.]

[141][Or 'linked': *Verbindung*.]

[142][More literally, 'always succeeds sequentially': *folgt . . . nacheinander*]

[143][*Folge*.]

[144][*folgen*.]

I then cognize an object that I must posit[145] in[146] a certain determinate position[147] in time—a position that in view of the preceding state cannot be assigned to it differently. Hence when I perceive that something occurs, then this presentation contains, first, [the presupposition][148] that something precedes; for precisely by reference to this preceding something does the appearance acquire its time relation, viz., its existing after a preceding time in which it was not. But, second, it can obtain its determinate time position in this relation only inasmuch as in the preceding state something is presupposed that it succeeds always, i.e., succeeds according to a rule. And from this results, first, that I cannot reverse the series, taking what occurs and putting it ahead of what it succeeds; and, second, that if the state that precedes is posited, then this specific[149] event succeeds unfailingly and nec- B 244
essarily. Thus it is that among our presentations there comes to be an order in which what is present directs us (insofar as it has come to be) to A 199
some preceding state as a correlate of the happening that is given. And although this correlate is still indeterminate, it does refer determinatively[150] to this happening as its consequence[151] and in the time series connects it with itself necessarily.

Suppose, then, that it is a necessary law of our sensibility, and hence a *formal condition* of all perceptions, that the previous time necessarily determines the following one (inasmuch as I cannot arrive at the following time except through the preceding one). If this is so, then it is also an indispensable *law of empirical presentation* of the time series that the appearances of past time determine every existent[152] in the following time; and that these existents, as events, do not take place except insofar as their existence[153] is determined in time—i.e., fixed in time according to a

[145][*setzen.*]

[146][Literally, 'upon': *auf.*]

[147][*Stelle.*]

[148][Cf. A 195/B 240.]

[149][*bestimmt.*]

[150][*bestimmend.*]

[151][*Folge.*]

[152][*Dasein.*]

[153][*Dasein.*]

rule—by those appearances of past time. For *only in*[154] *appearances can we cognize empirically this continuity in the coherence of times.*

Understanding is required for all experience and for its possibility. And the first thing that understanding does for these is not that of making the presentation of objects distinct, but that of making the presentation of an
B 245 object possible at all.[155] Now, this is done through the understanding's transferring the time order to the appearances and to their existence, by allotting to each appearance, as consequence, a position in time determined a priori with regard to the preceding appearances; without this position in
A 200 time the appearance would not agree with time itself, which a priori determines for all its parts their position. Now this determination of an appearance's position cannot be taken from the relation of appearances toward absolute time (for absolute time is not an object of perception). Rather, conversely, the appearances must themselves determine for one another their positions in time, and must make these positions[156] necessary in the time order; i.e., what follows[157] or occurs must succeed[158] what was contained in the previous state and must do so according to a universal rule. This results in a series of appearances that, by means of the understanding, produces and makes necessary in the series of possible perceptions the same order and steady coherence that is found a priori in the form of inner intuition (i.e., in time), in which all [such] perceptions would have to have their position.

Hence that something occurs is a perception belonging to a possible experience. This experience becomes actual when I view the appearance as determined as regards its position in time, and hence view it as an object that in the coherence of perceptions can always be found according to a rule. This
B 246 rule, however, for determining something in regard to temporal succession,[159] is that the condition under which an event always (i.e., necessarily) follows is to be found in what precedes the event. Hence the principle of

[154][*an.*]

[155][Or, possibly, 'making possible the presentation of an object as such.']

[156][Reading, with Görland, *dieselben* for *dieselbe.*]

[157][*folgen.*]

[158][*folgen auf.*]

[159][Or 'time sequence': *Zeitfolge.*]

sufficient basis[160] is the basis of possible experience, i.e., of objective cognition of appearances with regard to their relation in time sequence.[161] A 201

The basis for proving this proposition, however, rests solely on the following moments. All empirical cognition involves the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination. This synthesis is always successive,[162] i.e., in it the presentations always succeed[163] one another. In the imagination itself, however, the sequence[164] is not at all determined as regards order (i.e., as to what must precede and what must follow[165]), and the series of the presentations following one another can be taken as proceeding backward just as well as forward. But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension[166] (of the manifold of a given appearance), then the order is determined in the object, or—to speak more accurately—there is in this apprehension an order of successive synthesis that determines an object; and according to this order something must necessarily precede, and when this something is posited then the other event must necessarily follow. Hence if my percep-

[160][Or 'ground' or 'reason': Kant is reinterpreting, in accordance with the second analogy, the principle of sufficient reason (*Satz vom zureichenden Grunde*) used by Leibniz and later broadened by Wolff (to include not only the contingent). See also A 217/B 264–65 and A 783 = B 811. (I am using 'basis,' rather than 'reason,' in line with that reinterpretation; as for 'ground,' see B xix br. n. 79.) In the *Lectures on Metaphysics* (Ak. XXVIII, 551), Kant says that this principle, if taken universally ('Whatever is has its basis; therefore whatever is must be a consequence'), is false: it implies the obviously false proposition, 'If something is and has no basis then it is nothing.' Rather, Kant says, the principle must be restricted: "The relation of consequence to basis [or ground] is a relation of subordination; and things standing in such a relation make up a *series*. Hence this relation of basis to consequence is *a principle of* [*a*] *series*, and it holds only *of the contingent*." The principle thus "deals not with concepts as such, but only with the senses." It is synthetic, not analytic (as Wolff had claimed). But the principle "is possible a priori through the relation of concepts in reference to a possible experience. The principle of sufficient basis is one on which possible experience rests. A basis here is what, if something is posited, is succeeded by something else according to universal rules." A *sufficient* basis, Kant goes on (*ibid.*, 552), is one that contains *everything* that is found in the consequence. See also the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 51–53 (and cf. the "principle of basis [or ground or reason]" involved in hypothetical inferences: *ibid.*, 129).]

[161][*in Reihenfolge der Zeit.*]

[162][*sukzessiv.*]

[163][*folgen auf.*]

[164][*Folge.*]

[165][*folgen.*]

[166][Performed by the imagination as governed by the understanding. Cf. Erdmann's note at Ak. III, 589.]

tion is to contain the cognition of an event, i.e., of something's actually occurring, then it must be an empirical judgment in which we think of the
B 247 consequence[167] as determined, i.e., as presupposing in terms of time another appearance that it succeeds necessarily, or according to a rule. Otherwise, if I posited what precedes and the event did not succeed it necessarily, then I would have to regard this event as only a subjective play of
A 202 my imaginings; and if I still presented by it something objective, then I would have to call it a mere dream. Therefore the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) whereby what follows (occurs) is with regard to its existence determined in time, necessarily and according to a rule, by something preceding it—in other words, the relation of cause to effect—is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments as regards the series of perceptions, and hence is the condition of these judgments' empirical truth and therefore of experience. The principle[168] of the causal relation in the succession[169] of appearances holds, therefore, also for[170] all objects of experience ([insofar as they are] under the conditions of succession[171]), because it is itself the basis of the possibility of such experience.

Here, however, emerges a perplexity that must still be removed. The principle[172] of the causal connection among appearances is, in our formulation, limited to their [occurring in] sequence. Yet in using the principle we find that it fits also the case of their concomitance, and that cause and effect can be simultaneous. E.g., there is heat in the room which is not found
B 248 in the open air. I look around for the cause, and discover a heated stove. Now this stove, as cause, is simultaneous with its effect, the room's heat. Hence here there is between cause and effect no sequence in terms of time. They are, rather, simultaneous; and yet the law of cause and effect does
A 203 hold. The majority of efficient causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects, and the temporal succession of the effects is due only to the fact that the cause cannot accomplish its entire effect in one instant. But at the instant when the effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the cau-

[167][*Folge.*]

[168][*Grundsatz.*]

[169][*Folge.*]

[170][Reading, with Hartenstein, *von* instead of *vor* ('prior to').]

[171][*Sukzession.*]

[172][*Satz.*]

sality of its cause.[173] For if the cause had ceased to be an instant before, then the effect would not have arisen at all. It must be noted carefully, here, that what we are considering is the *order* of time, not the *lapse* of time; the relation remains even if no time has elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause and the cause's direct[174] effect may be *vanishingly brief,* but yet the relation of the cause to the effect[175] always remains determinable in terms of time. If I consider as cause a [lead] ball that lies on a stuffed cushion and makes an indentation in it, then this cause is simultaneous with the effect. But I nonetheless distinguish the two by the time relation of their dynamical connection. For if I lay the ball on the cushion, then the previous smooth shape of the cushion is succeeded by the indentation; but if the cushion has an indentation (no matter from where), then this is not suc- B 249
ceeded by a lead ball.[176]

Hence temporal succession is indeed an effect's sole empirical criterion in reference to the causality of the cause preceding it. The [totally filled] tumbler[177] is the cause of the water's rising above the horizontal plane [at A 204
the top] of the tumbler, although the two appearances are simultaneous. For as soon as water is scooped from a larger vessel with [an empty] tumbler, there ensues this: the horizontal level that the water had in the larger vessel changes to a concave level in the [partially filled] tumbler.

This causality leads to the concept of action; action leads to the concept of force and thereby to the concept of substance. Since my critical project deals solely with the sources of synthetic a priori cognition and I do not want to mingle with it dissections [of concepts], which concern merely the elucidation (rather than the expansion) of concepts, I leave the detailed exposition of these concepts to a future system of pure reason—although such an analysis can also be found in abundance[178] in the textbooks of this kind that are already familiar. What I must, however, touch upon is the empiri-

[173][*Kausalität ihrer Ursache.*]

[174][Or 'immediate': *unmittelbar.*]

[175][*der einen zur anderen.* In terms of grammar alone, *der einen* would refer not to the cause but to its causality.]

[176][Kant's point is that temporal succession decides empirically what is the cause and what is the effect. The indentation did not cause the lead ball, because it is not succeeded by the lead ball.]

[177][*Glas.*]

[178]['in rich measure,' literally.]

cal criterion of a substance insofar as it seems to manifest itself not through the permanence of appearance but better and more easily through action.

B 250 Where there is action and hence activity and force, there is also substance, and in substance alone must be sought the seat of that fertile source of appearances. That is nicely[179] said; but if we are to explain what we mean by substance and want to avoid the fallacy of circular reasoning, then
A 205 the answer is not so easy. How, from action on something,[180] are we to infer at once *the agent's permanence*—this permanence being, after all, so essential and peculiar a characteristic of substance ([as] *phaenomenon*[181])? Yet according to our previous remarks, solving the question is not so difficult after all, even though the question would be quite insoluble according to the usual way (of proceeding with one's concepts, viz., merely analytically). Action already means the relation of the causality's subject to the effect. Now any effect consists in what occurs, and hence in the mutable that designates[182] time in terms of succession. Therefore the ultimate subject of the mutable[183] is the *permanent* as the substratum of everything that varies, i.e., substance. For according to the principle of causality actions are always the first basis of all variation by appearances; hence actions cannot reside in a subject that itself varies, since otherwise other actions and another subject determining that variation would be required. By virtue of this does action prove, as a sufficient empirical criterion, the sub-
B 251 stantiality of a subject,[184] without my needing first of all to search for the subject's[185] permanence by perceptions that I have compared. Nor could proving this substantiality along this path of comparison be accomplished as comprehensively as is required by the magnitude and strict universality of the concept of substance. For, that the first subject of the causality of all arising and passing away cannot itself arise and pass away (in the realm
A 206 of appearances) is a safe inference that issues in empirical necessity and permanence in existence, and hence in the concept of a substance as appearance.

179[*ganz gut.*]

180[*Behandlung.*]

181[I.e., substance ([taken as] phenomenal). Cf. A 146/ B 186 br. n. 134]

182[*bezeichnen.*]

183[*desselben.*]

184['of a subject' added by Wille, and treated as implied in 'substantiality' by Erdmann.]

185[*desselben*]

When something occurs then the mere arising, even if we take no account of what arises, is in itself already an object of inquiry. The transition[186] itself from a state's not-being to this state, even supposing that this state contained no quality in [the realm] of appearance, already calls for inquiry. This arising, as was shown in the First Analogy,[187] concerns not substance (for substance does not arise) but its state. Hence arising is only change, and not origination from nothing. For if this origination from nothing is regarded as effect of an extraneous cause, then it is called creation; and creation cannot be admitted as an event among appearances, because its very possibility would already annul the unity of experience. If, on the other hand, I regard all things not as phenomena but as things in themselves and as objects merely of understanding, then despite their being sub- B 252 stances they can still be regarded as being dependent, in terms of their existence, on an extraneous cause. That alternative, however, would then entail quite different significations of the words, and would not fit appearances, as possible objects of experience.

Now, we do not a priori have the least concept as to how anything can be changed at all, i.e., how it is possible that one state occurring at one A 207 point of time can be succeeded by an opposite state occurring at another point of time. This [concept of how change is possible] requires knowledge[188] of actual forces—e.g., knowledge of the motive forces, or, which is the same, of certain successive appearances (as motions) indicating such forces—and such knowledge can be given only empirically. But we can nonetheless examine a priori, according to the law of causality and the conditions of time, the form of every change, i.e., the condition under which alone, as an arising of a different state, change can take place (no matter what may be its content, i.e., the state being changed); and hence we can so examine the succession itself of the states[189] (i.e., the occurrence[190]).[191]

[186][*Übergang*.]

[187][*in der Nummer A*.]

[188][*Kenntnis*.]

[189][Or 'succession of the states themselves'; but the adopted reading seems to fit the context better.]

[190][Reading, with Vaihinger, *das Geschehen* for *das Geschehene*.]

[191]It should be noted carefully that I am talking not about the change of certain relations as such, but about change of a state. Thus if a body moves uniformly then it does not change its state (of motion) at all; but it does change its state if its motion increases or decreases.

B 253 When a substance passes[192] from one state, a, to another, b, then the point of time of the second state is different from the point of time of the first, and follows it. In the same way, too, the second state as reality (in [the realm of] appearance) differs from the first, in which this reality was not, as b differs from zero; i.e., even if state b were to differ from state a
A 208 only in magnitude, the change is [still] an arising of $b-a$,[193] which in the previous state was not and in regard to which that state = 0.

The question, therefore, is how a thing passes from one state, = a, to another, = b. Between two instants there is always a time, and between two states at those instants there is always a difference that has a magnitude (for all parts of appearances are always magnitudes in turn). Hence any transition from one state to another occurs in a time that is contained between two instants, the first instant determining the state that the thing leaves and the second instant determining the state that it enters. Both instants, therefore, are bounds of the time of a change and hence bounds of the intermediate state between the two states, and as such belong also to the entire change. Now every change has a cause that manifests its causality in the entire time wherein the change takes place. Hence this cause pro-
B 254 duces its change not suddenly (i.e., all at once, or in one instant), but in a time; so that, as the time increases from its initial instant (a)[194] up to its completion (in b), the reality's magnitude ($b-a$) is also produced through all the smaller degrees contained between the first degree and the last. Hence all change is possible only through a continuous action of the causality; this action, insofar as it is uniform, is called a moment.[195] Change
A 209 does not consist of these moments, but is produced by them as their effect.

This, then, is the law of the continuity of all change. The basis of this law is this fact: that neither time nor, for that matter, appearance in time consists of parts that are the smallest; and that nonetheless, as a thing changes, its state passes through all these parts, as elements, to the thing's second state. *No difference* of the real in [the realm of] appearance is *the smallest,* just as no difference in the magnitude of times is the smallest. And thus the reality's new state grows, starting from the first state, in which it was not, through all the infinite degrees of this reality; and the differ-

[192][*übergehen.*]

[193][I.e., b minus a.]

[194][Parentheses added here and in the very next case, just below.]

[195][*(das) Moment.* Cf. A 168/B 210]

ences of the degrees from one another are all smaller than the difference between 0 and *a*.

What benefit this principle[196] may have for the investigation of nature is of no concern to us here. But how is such a principle, which thus seems to expand our cognition of nature, possible completely a priori? This question very much requires our examination, even though what the principle says is [so] obviously[197] actual and correct that we might believe ourselves to be exempted from the question as to how the principle was possible. For there is such a variety of unfounded[198] claims about our cognition's expansion by pure reason, that we must adopt as a universal principle [the resolve] to be throughout distrustful on that account, and not to believe or assume anything of the sort, even upon the clearest dogmatic proof, without documentation that can provide a well-founded[199] deduction. B 255 A 210

All increase of empirical cognition and any progress[200] of perception—no matter what the objects may be, whether appearances or pure intuitions—is nothing but an expansion of the determination of inner sense, i.e., a progression in time. This progression in time determines everything and is in itself determined through nothing further. I.e., the progression's parts are given only in time and through the synthesis of time; they[201] are not given prior to the synthesis. Because of this, every transition in perception to something that follows in time is a determination of time through the production of this perception; and since time is always and in all its parts a magnitude, every such transition is the production of a perception as a magnitude that goes through all degrees, none of which is the smallest, from zero onward up to the perception's determinate degree. From this, then, is evident the possibility of cognizing a priori a law governing changes as regards their form. For we only anticipate our own apprehension, whose formal condition, since it resides in ourselves prior to all given appearance, must indeed be capable of being cognized a priori.[202] B 256

[196][*Satz.*]

[197][*der Augenschein beweist.*]

[198][*ungegründet.*]

[199][*gründlich.*]

[200][*Fortschritt;* 'progression,' just below, translates *Fortgang.*]

[201][Reading, with Vaihinger, *sind* for *sie.*]

[202][Cf. below, A 766 = B 794, where Kant restates this point with special clarity.]

We have seen that time contains the sensible a priori condition for the possibility of a continuous progression of what exists to what follows. In
A 211 the same way the understanding, by means of the unity of apperception, is the a priori condition for the possibility of a continuous determination, through the series of causes and effects, of all positions for appearances in this time—the causes entailing[203] unfailingly the existence of the effects, and thereby making the empirical cognition of time relations valid for every time (i.e., universally) and hence valid objectively.

C
THIRD ANALOGY

PRINCIPLE OF SIMULTANEITY ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF INTERACTION[204] OR COMMUNITY[205]

All substances, insofar as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are in thoroughgoing interaction.[206]

Proof[207]

B 257 Things are *simultaneous* if their perceptions can in empirical intuition succeed one another *reciprocally*[208] (which cannot occur in the temporal suc-

[203][*nach sich ziehen.*]

[204][Or 'reciprocal action' or 'reciprocal causation': *Wechselwirkung.*]

[205][In A, the heading and the statement of the principle read as follows:]

PRINCIPLE OF COMMUNITY

All substances, insofar as they *are simultaneous*, stand in thoroughgoing community (i.e., interaction with one another).

[206][See Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 665–71. See also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 175–77. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 267–76. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 381–91. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 94–121, 130–35. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 294–331. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 188. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 283–92.]

[207][First paragraph of the proof added in B.]

[208][*wechselseitig*. More literally, Kant says: 'if the perception of one thing can succeed the perception of another *reciprocally*.']

cession of appearances, as was shown under the second principle). Thus I can carry on my perception either first with the moon and thereafter with the earth, or, vice versa, first with the earth and then with the moon. And because the perceptions of these objects can succeed each other reciprocally, I say that the objects exist simultaneously. Now simultaneity is the existence of the manifold in the same time.[209] However, time itself cannot be perceived; and hence from the fact that things are placed[210] in the same time we cannot glean that their perceptions can follow one another reciprocally. Hence the synthesis of imagination in apprehension would indicate for each of these perceptions only that it is there in the subject when the other is not, and vice versa.[211] But it would not indicate that the objects are simultaneous; i.e., that if the one is there then the other is also there in the same time, and that this simultaneity of the objects is necessary in order that the perceptions can succeed one another reciprocally. Hence for things existing outside one another simultaneously we require a concept of understanding of the reciprocal succession[212] of their determinations, in order to say that the reciprocal succession of the perceptions has its basis in the object and in order thus to present the simultaneity as objective. But the relation of substances wherein the one substance contains determinations whose basis is contained in the other substance is the B 258
relation of influence; and if this latter thing[213] reciprocally contains the basis of the determinations in the former thing,[214] then the relation is that of community or interaction. Therefore the simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience except under the presupposition that they interact with one another. Hence this interaction is also the condition for the possibility of the things themselves as objects of experience.

[209][Although this definition can be used to support translating *Zugleichsein* as 'coexistence' (similarly for the adjective), 'coexistence' and 'existence' (unlike 'simultaneity' and 'existence') are so close as to affect the definition's import; and what I render as 'exist simultaneously' in the statement preceding the definition could not have been translated in that way at all. (All of this applies to many other places in the Third Analogy and elsewhere.) I reserve 'coexistence' to render Kant's *Koexistenz*. This, too, is important, as can be seen most clearly wherever Kant *relates* coexistence and simultaneity; see A 213/B 260, A 218/B 265 n. 244, A 428 = B 456.]

[210][Or 'posited': *gesetzt*.]

[211][*wechselweise*.]

[212][*Folge*.]

[213][*dieses*, meaning this latter substance.]

[214][*in dem anderen*, meaning the former substance.]

Things are simultaneous insofar as they exist in one and the same time. But whereby do we cognize that they are in one and the same time? They are so when the order in the synthesis of this manifold's apprehension is indifferent, i.e., when that synthesis can go either from A through B, C, D, to E, or vice versa from E to A. For if the synthesis is sequential in time (in the order starting from A and ending in E), then starting the apprehension in perception from E and proceeding backwards to A is impossible, since A belongs to past time and hence can no longer be an object of apprehension.

A 212 Now suppose that in a manifoldness[215] of substances taken as appearances each of them were completely isolated, i.e., that no substance effected[216] influences in[217] another and reciprocally received influences from
B 259 it. I say that in that case their *simultaneity* would not be an object of a possible perception, and that the existence of one substance could not by any path of empirical synthesis lead to the existence of another. For if you bear in mind that the substances would be separated by a completely empty space, then although the perception proceeding in time from one substance to the other would determine this other substance's existence by means of a perception that follows, yet it could not distinguish whether objectively the appearance succeeds the first or is, rather, simultaneous with it.

Hence there must be something else, besides mere existence, whereby A determines for B—and also, vice versa, B in turn for A—their positions in time. For only under this condition can those substances be presented empirically as *existing simultaneously*. Now only what is the cause of something else, or of its determinations, determines for that something its position in time. Therefore every substance (since it can be a consequence only in regard to its determinations) must contain within itself the causality of certain determinations in the other substance and simultaneously must contain within itself the effects of the other substance's causality—i.e., they
A 213 must stand (directly or indirectly) in dynamical community—if their simultaneity is to be cognized in any possible experience. However, something is necessary in regard to objects of experience if without that something
B 260 the experience of these objects would itself be impossible. Hence for all substances in [the realm of] appearance, insofar as they are simulta-

[215][I.e., in this case, a multiplicity See B 203 br. n. 38.]

[216][*wirken.*]

[217][‘into,’ literally.]

neous, it is necessary that they stand in thoroughgoing community of interaction.

The word community[218] is ambiguous in our language; it can mean the same as *communio* or as *commercium.*[219] We here employ it in the latter sense, as meaning a dynamic community, without which even locational community (*communio spatii*)[220] could never be cognized empirically. We can easily tell by our experiences: that only the continuous influences in all positions of space can lead our sense from one object to another; that the light playing between our eye and the celestial bodies can[221] bring about an indirect community between us and them and can thereby prove their simultaneity; that we cannot empirically change place[222] (and perceive this change) unless matter everywhere makes possible the perception of our position; and that only by means of matter's reciprocal influence[223] can matter establish its simultaneity and thereby establish (although only indirectly) the coexistence[224] of objects, down to the most remote ones. Without community every perception (of appearance in space) would be severed A 214
from any other; the chain of empirical presentations—i.e., experience
—would begin entirely anew with each new object, and the previous chain B 261
could not in the least cohere[225] with it or stand to it in a time relation. By this I do not in any way wish to disprove empty space.[226] For there may be such space wherever perceptions cannot reach at all and where there occurs, therefore, no empirical cognition of simultaneity. But such space is then no object whatever for all our possible experience.[227]

The following may serve as elucidation. In our mind all appearances, as contained in a possible experience, must stand in community (*com-*

218[*Gemeinschaft.*]

219[Respectively, 'communion' ('sharing') and 'commerce' (cf. 'communication').]

220[Community (or communion, sharing) of space.]

221[Reading, in line with Kant's grammar, *können* in the next clause as going also with *bewirken* and *beweisen* ('bring about' and 'prove'). Adickes suggests that we replace the two infinitives with *bewirke . . . beweise.*]

222[*keinen Ort empirisch verändern.*]

223[On matter.]

224[*Koexistenz.* See B 257 br. n. 209.]

225[Or 'connect.']

226[Or, i.e., a vacuum: *leerer Raum.*]

227[See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 481–82, 523–25, 532–35, 563–65.]

munio) of apperception; and insofar as objects are to be presented as connected inasmuch as they exist simultaneously, they must reciprocally determine each other's position in one time and thereby make up a whole. If this subjective community is to rest on an objective basis, or be referred to appearances as substances, then the perception of the one appearance, as basis, must make possible the perception of the other, and thus also vice versa. Only then will the succession, which is always there in perceptions as apprehensions,[228] not be attributed to the objects, but these objects can, rather, be presented as existing simultaneously. This, however, is a reciprocal influence, i.e., a real community (*commercium*) of substances; with-
A 215 out this community the empirical relation of simultaneity could not occur in experience. Through this *commercium* appearances, insofar as they stand
B 262 outside one another and yet in connection, make up a composite[229] (*compositum reale*),[230] and such composites[231] become possible in various ways. Hence the three dynamical relations from which all other relations arise are those of inherence, consequence, and composition.[232]

These, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing but principles for the determination of the existence of appearances in time, according to all three modes of time:[233] viz., according to the relation to time itself as a magnitude (the magnitude of existence, i.e., duration); according to the relation in time as a series (i.e., as sequential); and, finally, also according to the relation in time as a sum of all existence[234] (i.e., as simultaneous). This unity of time determination is dynamical through and through. I.e., time is not regarded as that wherein experience directly determines for each existent[235] its position; for such determination is impossible, because absolute time is not an object of perception to which ap-

[228][I.e., perceptions insofar as they are considered subjectively as apprehensions always come to us successively and not simultaneously.]

[229][*Zusammengesetztes.*]

[230][Real composite.]

[231][*Composita.*]

[232][*Inhärenz, Konsequenz, Komposition*]

[233][See A 176 /B 219.]

[234][*Dasein.*]

[235][*Dasein.*]

pearances could be held up.[236] Rather, the rule of understanding through which alone the existence of appearances can acquire synthetic unity in terms of time relations is what determines for each appearance its position in time, hence doing so a priori and validly for all and every time.

By nature (in the empirical meaning of the term) we mean the coherence of appearances as regards their existence according to necessary rules, i.e., according to laws. There are, then, certain laws—which are, moreover, a priori—that make a nature possible in the first place. Empirical laws can occur and can be found only by means of experience; and this, moreover, in consequence of those original laws through which experience itself becomes possible in the first place. Hence our analogies in fact exhibit the unity of nature, in the coherence of all appearances, under certain indices;[237] these indices express nothing but the relation of time (insofar as time comprises all existence) to the unity of apperception—a unity that can occur only in synthesis according to rules. Hence together the analogies say that all appearances reside, and must reside, in one nature; for without this a priori unity no unity of experience, and hence also no determination of objects in experience, would be possible. A 216, B 263

I must, however, make a comment about the kind of proof that we have employed for these transcendental laws of nature, and about its peculiarity; this comment has to be very important also as a precept for every other attempt to prove any a priori propositions that are intellectual and also synthetic. For all our endeavor would have been entirely futile if we had tried to proceed dogmatically, i.e., from concepts,[238] in proving these analogies: i.e., in proving that everything that exists is to be found only in what is permanent; that every event presupposes something in the previous state which it succeeds according to a rule; and finally, that in a simultaneous manifold the states are simultaneous (stand in community) in reference to one another according to a rule. For through mere concepts of things, no matter how one dissects these concepts, one cannot from one of these objects and from its existence get to the existence[239] of another or to its way of existing.[240] What [method of proof], then, did that leave us? [None but B 264 A 217

[236][For reference.]

[237][*Exponenten.*]

[238][I.e., if we had tried to proceed analytically rather than synthetically]

[239][*Dasein.*]

[240][*existieren.*]

relying on something third:][241] the possibility of experience as a cognition wherein all objects, if their presentation is to have objective reality for us, must ultimately be capable of being given to us. Now in this third something, whose essential form consists in the synthetic unity of apperception of all appearances, we found the a priori conditions for the thoroughgoing and necessary time determination—without which even empirical time determination would be impossible—of all existence in [the realm of] appearance, and found rules of synthetic a priori unity that allow us to anticipate experience. In the absence of this method,[242] and in the delusion of trying to provide dogmatic proof of synthetic propositions that the experiential use of understanding recommends as understanding's principles, it then came about that people so often attempted—though always in
B 265 vain—to provide a proof of the principle of sufficient basis.[243] And no one thought of the two remaining analogies, although tacit use has always been
A 218 made of them;[244] they were overlooked because people were lacking the categories as the guide that alone can uncover and make noticeable any gap, in concepts as well as principles, on the part of understanding.

[241][In the case of analytic judgments, mere analysis (dissection) of what is already thought in the subject concept shows the connection between it and the predicate concept; and hence only two things are needed here— viz., subject and predicate. But in the case of synthetic judgments, the predicate is ascribed to the subject by means of *some third thing;* and identifying this *third thing* is, of course, the main problem of Kant's critical philosophy. See above, A 7–10/B 10–24.]

[242][The synthetic method.]

[243][Or 'ground' or 'reason.' Cf. A 201/B 246 br. n. 160.]

[244]The unity of the world whole wherein all appearances are to be connected is manifestly a mere conclusion drawn from the covertly assumed principle of the community of all substances that are simultaneous. For if those appearances were isolated then they would not, as parts, make up a whole. And if their connection (interaction of the manifold) were not already necessary on account of their simultaneity, then one could not from this simultaneity, as a merely ideal relation, infer that unity, as a real relation. But we have shown, in its appropriate place,[a] that community is in fact the basis for the possibility of an empirical cognition of coexistence, and that people[b] are in fact only making an inference from this possibility[c] back to that community as its condition.

[a][A 213–14/B 260–61.]

[b][In assuming the principle of community.]

[c][*aus dieser*, which grammatically could refer back, instead, to 'cognition' or to 'coexistence.']

4
THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT AS SUCH[1]

1. What agrees (in terms of intuition and concepts) with the formal conditions of experience is *possible.*

2. What coheres[2] with the material conditions of experience (with sensation) is *actual.* B 266

3. That whose coherence[3] with the actual is determined according to universal conditions of experience is *necessary* (exists necessarily).

Elucidation A 219

The categories of modality have the peculiarity that they do not in the least augment, as determination of the object, the concept to which they are added as predicates; they express, rather, only the object's relation to the cognitive power. For even when the concept of a thing is already quite complete, I can nonetheless still ask about this object whether it is merely possible or also actual; or, if it is actual, whether it is perhaps also necessary. Through these categories no further determinations are thought in the object itself; rather, the question is only how the object (along with all its determinations) relates to understanding and its empirical use, to the empirical power of judgment, and to reason (as applied to experience).

Precisely because of this, moreover, the principles of modality are nothing more than explications of the concepts of possibility, actuality, and necessity in their empirical use; and thereby they are also restrictions of all the categories to merely empirical use, and do not admit and allow transcendental use of the categories. For if the categories are not to have a B 267 merely logical signification and to express analytically the form of *thought,* but are to pertain to *things* and their possibility, actuality, or necessity, then they must concern possible experience and its synthetic unity, wherein alone objects of cognition are given.

[1][See H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 202–11. See also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 178–80. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 391–403. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 335–71. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 189. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 292–99.]

[2][Or 'connects': *zusammenhängen.*]

[3][Or 'connection': *Zusammenhang* ('hanging together,' literally). Cf. A 225–26/B 273–74, A 216 = B 263, A 114.]

A 220 The postulate of the *possibility* of things demands, then, that their concept agrees with the formal conditions of an experience as such. But this experience, i.e., the objective form of experience as such, contains all the synthesis that is required for cognition of objects.[4] A concept comprising[5] a synthesis is to be considered empty, and refers to no object, if this synthesis does not pertain to experience: either as a synthesis obtained from experience, the concept then being called an *empirical concept;* or as a synthesis which, as a priori condition, underlies experience as such (the form of experience), the concept then being a *pure concept*—but one that nonetheless belongs to experience, because its object can be encountered only in experience. For from where are we to obtain the character of possibility of an object that is thought through a synthetic a priori concept, if not from the synthesis in which the form of the empirical cognition of objects con-
B 268 sists? That such a concept must contain no contradiction is indeed a necessary logical condition; but it is far from sufficient for the concept's having objective reality, i.e., for the possibility[6] of such an object as is thought through the concept. Thus there is no contradiction in the concept of a figure enclosed by two straight lines, because the concepts of two straight lines
A 221 and of their meeting contain no negation of the figure. Rather, the figure's impossibility rests not on the concept in itself but on its construction in space, i.e., on the conditions of space and of its determination; and these conditions in turn have their objective reality, i.e., they apply to possible things, because they contain a priori the form of experience as such.

Let us now show the extensive benefit and influence of this postulate of possibility. If I present a thing that is permanent,[7] so that whatever varies in it belongs merely to the thing's state, then from such a concept alone I can never cognize that a thing of that sort is possible. Or suppose I present something that is to be of such a character that when it is posited then something else always and unfailingly succeeds it:[8] this something may indeed be capable of being thought thus without contradiction; but from this one cannot judge whether a property of this sort (as causality) is to be met with

[4][Kant uses *Objekt* (in the plural) here, *Gegenstand* just below, and so on for the remainder of the paragraph. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[5][*in sich fassen.*]

[6][Kant means *real* possibility. The object's *logical* possibility requires merely that the concept of the object contain no contradiction.]

[7][As in the case of substance—the first analogy of experience.]

[8][As in the case of causality—the second analogy.]

in any possible thing. Finally, I can present various things (substances) B 269
which are[9] such that the state of one thing entails a consequence in the state of another, and thus also vice versa.[10] But from these concepts, which contain a merely arbitrary[11] synthesis, I cannot glean whether a relation of this sort can belong to any things.[12] Hence only by the fact that these concepts express a priori the relations of perceptions in every experience do we cognize their objective reality, i.e., their transcendental truth; and although we A 222
cognize it indeed independently of experience, yet we do not cognize it independently of all reference to the form of an experience as such, and to the synthetic unity in which alone objects can be cognized empirically.

But suppose that we wished even to frame new concepts of substances, of forces, of interactions, and that we tried to frame them from the material offered to us by perception, without taking the example of their connection from experience itself. We would then end up with nothing but chimeras; their possibility lacks any criterion whatsoever, because for these concepts we neither have adopted experience [as such] as the teacher nor have taken these concepts from [actual] experience. Such fictional concepts cannot, as the categories can, acquire their character of possibility[13] a priori, as conditions on which all experience depends. Rather, they can acquire it only a posteriori, as concepts given by experience itself; and hence their possibility must either be cognized a posteriori and empiri- B 270
cally, or it cannot be cognized at all. Consider a substance[14] that would be present permanently in space, but without occupying it (like that intermediate something between matter and thinking beings which some have wanted to introduce); or a special basic power of our mind for *intuiting* (and by no means merely inferring) future events in advance;[15] or, finally, an ability of the mind to stand in community of thought[16] with other human beings (no matter how distant they may be). These are concepts whose A 223
possibility is entirely baseless. For we cannot base it on experience and its

[9][*beschaffen sein.*]

[10][As in the case of community—the third analogy.]

[11][Or 'chosen [by me]': *willkürlich.*]

[12][Actual or really possible things.]

[13][*den Charakter ihrer Möglichkeit.*]

[14][See A 221/B 268 br. n. 7.]

[15][See A 221/B 268 br. n. 8.]

[16][See A 221/B 269 br. n 10.]

familiar laws. But without this experience and these laws[17] that possibility is an arbitrary combination of thoughts; and although this combination of thoughts contains no contradiction, yet it cannot lay claim to objective reality, nor therefore to the possibility of such an object as one here wishes to think. As concerns reality, thinking it *in concreto* without availing oneself of experience is surely ruled out *per se*.[18] For reality can deal only with sensation, as matter of experience; it does not concern the form of relation, with which one could at least play in one's inventions.

But I leave aside everything whose possibility can be gleaned only from [the things'] actuality in experience, and here examine only the possibility
B 271 of things through a priori concepts. Of these things I go on to assert that they[19] can never occur on the basis of[20] such concepts by themselves, but only [if the concepts are taken] as formal and objective conditions of an experience as such.

It does indeed seem as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from the triangle's concept by itself (the concept is certainly independent of experience). For we can in fact provide the concept with an object—i.e., construct the concept—completely a priori. But since this[21] is only the form
A 224 of an object,[22] it would still remain forever only a product of imagination. The possibility of this product's object would still remain doubtful. This possibility requires something further still, viz., that this figure be thought under none but those conditions on which all objects of experience rest. Thus what connects with this concept of a triangle the presentation of the possibility of such a thing is solely this: that space is a formal a priori condition of outer experiences; and that the formative[23] synthesis whereby we construct a triangle in imagination is entirely the same synthesis that we perform in apprehending an appearance in order to frame an experiential concept of it. And thus, since the concepts of continuous magnitudes—indeed, of magnitudes as such—are one and all synthetic, the possibility of

[17][*sie*.]

[18][*verbietet es sich wohl von selbst*.]

[19][Kant may have meant to say 'that their possibility.']

[20][*aus*.]

[21][The geometrical object.]

[22][The form of an object of experience.]

[23][*formative*.]

such magnitudes is never clear from the concepts themselves, but solely[24] from these concepts as formal conditions for the determination of objects in experience as such. And where indeed should we wish to search for objects corresponding to concepts if not in experience, through which alone objects are given to us? Yet we can cognize and characterize the possibility of things even without having experience itself come first.[25] We can do so, viz., merely by reference to the formal conditions[26] under which anything at all is determined as an object in it; and hence we can do so completely a priori, yet only in reference to experience and within its bounds. B 272

The postulate for cognizing the *actuality* of things requires *perception,* and hence sensation of which we are conscious. Although it requires not exactly[27] that we perceive directly the object itself whose existence is to be cognized, it does require that the object cohere[28] with some actual perception, according to the analogies of experience, which set forth all real connection in an experience as such. A 225

A thing's character of existence can never[29] be found in the thing's mere concept. For no matter how complete the concept is, so that nothing whatever is lacking in order for us to think a thing with all its intrinsic determinations, yet existence has nothing whatever to do with all this. Rather, existence has to do only with the question as to whether such a thing is given to us in such a way that the thing's perception at least can precede the concept. For if the concept precedes the perception, this signifies the concept's mere possibility. The sole character of actuality is, rather, the perception that provides the material for the concept. But the existence of a thing can be cognized even prior[30] to the thing's perception, and hence comparatively a priori, provided that the thing coheres[31] with some perceptions in accordance with the principles of their empirical connection (the analogies). For then the thing's existence does, after all, cohere with our perceptions in a possible experience, and we can, with those analogies as B 273 A 226

[24][*allererst.*]

[25][*voranschicken.*]

[26][Of experience.]

[27][*eben.*]

[28][Or 'connect': *zusammenhängen.*]

[29][*gar kein Charakter seines Daseins.*]

[30][*vor.*]

[31][Or 'connects.']

our guide, get from our actual perception to the thing [contained] in the series of possible perceptions. Thus the existence of a magnetic matter permeating all bodies is cognized by us from the perception of the attracted iron filings, even though direct perception of this material is impossible for us in view of the character[32] of our organs. For in principle[33] we would, according to the laws of sensibility and the context of our perceptions in one experience, also come upon the direct empirical intuition of that magnetic matter, if our senses were more delicate; our senses' coarseness does not at all concern the form of possible experience.[34] Hence our cognition of the existence of things reaches as far as does our perception and what is attached to it[35] according to empirical laws. If we do not start from expe-
B 274 rience, or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical coherence of appearances, then our seeking to divine or explore the existence of any thing whatsoever will be a futile display. Against these rules for proving existence indirectly,[36] however, a powerful objection is made by *idealism;* this is the right place for idealism's refutation.[37]

Refutation of Idealism[38]

Idealism (I mean *material* idealism) is the theory that declares the existence of objects in space outside us either to be merely doubtful and *un-*

[32][*Beschaffenheit.*]

[33][*überhaupt.*]

[34][But concerns its *matter.*]

[35][*deren Anhang.*]

[36][Or 'mediately': *mittelbar;* cf. B xxxix br. n. 144c. Erdmann, in his notes (Ak. III, 589) explains why Kant says *mittelbar* here, rather than *unmittelbar* (as proposed by Fredericks): "The second postulate and its elucidation deal with the rules whereby we get from our actual perception to things in the series of possible perceptions. Hence the direct consciousness of the existence of other things outside myself (Ak. 192, lines 1 and 2 [B 276, end of first paragraph of the Proof]) is being presupposed. The refutation of idealism inserted in B undertakes to prove this presupposition. Accordingly, our text permits no alteration."]

[37][This sentence and the following Refutation (which ends at the horizontal line at B 279) added in B.]

[38][See H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n 22, 294–309. See also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 180–85. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 279–329. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 298–321. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol 2, 375–86. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 299–301.]

provable, or to be *false* and *impossible.* The *first* is the *problematic* idealism of *Descartes;* it declares only one empirical assertion[39] (*assertio*) to be indubitable,[40] viz.: *I am.* The *second* is the *dogmatic* idealism of Berkeley; it declares space, with all the things to which space attaches as inseparable condition, to be something that is in itself impossible,[41] and hence also declares the things in space to be mere imaginings. Dogmatic idealism is unavoidable if one regards space as a property that is to belong to things in themselves; for then space, with everything that space serves as condition, is a nonentity.[42] However, the basis for this idealism has already been removed by us in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Problematic idealism, which asserts nothing about this but only alleges that we are unable B 275
to prove by direct experience an existence apart from our own, is reasonable and is in accordance with a thorough philosophical way of thinking—viz., in permitting no decisive judgment before a sufficient proof has been found. The proof it demands must, therefore, establish that regarding external[43] things we have not merely *imagination* but also *experience.* And establishing this surely cannot be done unless one can prove that even our *inner* experience, indubitable[44] for Descartes, is possible only on the presupposition of *outer*[45] experience.

Theorem

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

[39][*Behauptung.*]

[40][*ungezweifelt* (literally, 'undoubted'). I.e., the proposition that I am (as a thinking thing, with its thoughts) is the only proposition (concerning the *existence* of something) that is *self*-evident (and as such is not even in need of being guaranteed by God against possible deception). See Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy,* Meditation II.]

[41][Cf. B 71. See Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge,* § 116. Cf. *A New Theory of Vision,* §§ 46, 126; and *Siris,* § 271. The metaphysical status of objects and their properties is discussed most extensively throughout the *Principles* and the *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.* (What sources Kant actually used is a matter of some debate.)]

[42][*Unding*: 'nonthing,' literally, with absurdity implied. See A 292/B 348 incl. br. n. 149.]

[43][*äußer.*]

[44][*unbezweifelt* (literally, 'undoubted').]

[45][*äußer.*]

Proof

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time determination presupposes something *permanent* in perception. But this permanent something cannot be something within me, precisely because my existence can be determined in time only by this permanent something.[46] Therefore perception of this permanent something is possible only through a *thing* outside me and not through mere *presentation* of a thing outside me. Hence determination of my existence[47] in time is possible only
B 276 through the existence[48] of actual things that I perceive outside me. Now consciousness of my existence[49] in time is necessarily linked with consciousness of the possibility of this time determination; therefore it is necessarily linked also with the existence of things outside me, as condition of the time determination. I.e., the consciousness of my own existence is simultaneously a direct consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Comment 1. In the preceding proof one becomes aware that the game that idealism played is being turned around and against it—and more rightly so. Idealism assumed that the only direct experience is inner experience and that from it we only *infer* external things; but[50] we infer them only unreliably, as happens whenever we infer *determinate* causes[51] from given effects, because the cause of the presentations that we ascribe—perhaps falsely—to external things may also reside in ourselves. Yet here
B 277 we have proved that outer experience is in fact direct,[52] and that

[46][According to B xxxix n. 144, this sentence is to be replaced by the following passage: "But this permanent something cannot be an intuition within me. For all bases determining my existence that can be encountered within me are presentations; and, being presentations, they themselves require something permanent distinct from them, by reference to which their variation, and hence my existence in the time in which they vary, can be determined."]

[47][*Dasein.*]

[48][*Existenz.*]

[49]['of my existence' inserted, as suggested by Vaihinger.]

[50][So idealism assumed.]

[51][Or '*definite* [or *specific*] causes,' as distinguished from inferring *some* cause or other.]

[52]In the preceding theorem, the *direct*[a] consciousness of the existence of external things is not presupposed but proved, whether or not we have insight into the possibility of this consciousness. The question concerning that possibility would be whether we have only an inner sense, and no outer sense but merely outer[b] imagination. Clearly, however, in order for us even to imagine something—i.e., exhibit

only by means of it can there be[53] inner experience—i.e., not indeed consciousness of our own existence, but yet determination of that existence in time. To be sure, the presentation *I am,* which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thinking, is what directly includes the existence of a subject; but it is not yet a *cognition* of that subject, and hence is also no empirical cognition—i.e., experience—of it. For such experience involves, besides the thought of something existent, also intuition, and here specifically inner intuition, in regard to which—viz., time—the subject must be determined; and this determination definitely requires external objects. Thus, consequently, inner experience is itself only indirect and is possible only through outer experience.

Comment 2. Now, all experiential use that we make of our cognitive power in determining time agrees completely with this view. Not only can we perceive[54] any time determination solely through the variation in external relations (i.e., through motion) by reference to the permanent in space (e.g., the sun's motion with respect to the earth's objects); but except merely B 278
for *matter* we do not even have anything permanent on which, as intuition, we could base the concept of a substance. And even this permanence is not drawn from outer experience, but is presupposed a priori as necessary condition of all time determination, and hence presupposed also as determination of inner sense, with regard to our own existence,[55] through the existence[56] of external things. The consciousness that I have of myself in the presentation *I* is not an intuition at all, but is a merely *intellectual* presentation of a thinking subject's self-activity.[57] Hence this *I*[58] also does not

it to sense in intuition—as external,[c] we must already have an outer sense, and must thereby distinguish directly the mere receptivity of an outer intuition from the spontaneity that characterizes all imagining. For if even outer sense were merely imagined, this would annul our very power of intuition which is to be determined by the imagination.

[a][*unmittelbar*; see B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[b][*äußer.*]

[c][*äußer.*]

[53][*möglich sei.*]

[54][Reading, with Grillo (and the *Akademie* edition), *wahrnehmen* for *vornehmen* ('undertake').]

[55][*Dasein.*]

[56][*Existenz.*]

[57][Or 'spontaneity': *Selbsttätigkeit.*]

[58][Emphasis added.]

have the least predicate of intuition that, *as permanent*, could serve as correlate for the time determination in inner sense—as, say, *impenetrability* is such a predicate of *empirical* intuition in matter.

Comment 3. It does not follow, from the fact that the existence of external objects is required for the possibility of a determinate consciousness of ourselves, that every intuitive presentation of external things implies also[59] these things' existence; for the presentation may very well be (as it is in dreams as well as in madness) the mere effect of the imagination. Yet it is this effect merely through the reproduction of fonner outer[60] perceptions; and these, as has been shown, are possible only through the actuality of external[61] objects. What was here to be proved is only that inner ex-
B 279 perience as such is possible only through outer experience as such. Whether this or that supposed experience is not perhaps a mere imagining must be ascertained by reference to its particular determinations and by holding it up to the criteria of all actual experience.

As concerns, finally, the third postulate,[62] it deals with material necessity in existence, and not with merely formal and logical necessity in connecting concepts. Now [we have seen that][63] no existence[64] of objects of the senses can be cognized completely a priori; but that such existence can yet be cognized comparatively a priori, viz., relatively to another exist-
A 227 ence[65] that is already given; but that even then we can get only to such existence[66] as must be contained somewhere in the coherence[67] of the experience whereof the given perception is a part. Since this is so, the necessity of existence can never be cognized from concepts, but always only from the connection with what is perceived, and according to universal laws of experience. Now there is no existence[68] that could be cognized as neces-

[59] [*zugleich einschließen.*]

[60] [*äußer.*]

[61] [*äußer.*]

[62] [Viz., that of *necessity.*]

[63] [A 225–26/B 273.]

[64] [*Existenz.*]

[65] [*Dasein.*]

[66] [*Existenz.*]

[67] [Or 'context.']

[68] [*Dasein.*]

sary under the condition of other given appearances, except the existence of effects arising from given causes according to laws of causality. The existence whose necessity we can alone cognize is, therefore, not that of things (substances), but only that of their state; viz., we can cognize this neces- B 280
sity from other states that are given in perception, and according to empirical laws of causality. From this it follows that the criterion of necessity lies solely in the law of possible experience which says that everything that occurs is determined a priori by its cause in [the realm of] appearance. Hence we cognize the necessity only of those *effects* in nature whose causes are given to us, and the characteristic of necessity in existence reaches no further than the realm of possible experience; and even in this realm it does not hold for the existence of things as substances, because substances can never be regarded as empirical effects, or [i.e.] as something that occurs and arises. The necessity concerns, therefore, only the relations of appear- A 228
ances according to the dynamical law of causality, and the possibility based thereon of inferring a priori, from some given existence (a cause), another existence (the effect). Everything that occurs is hypothetically necessary; this is a principle that subjects change in the world to a law, i.e., to a rule of necessary existence, without which even a nature would not take place at all. Hence the proposition that nothing occurs through a blind randomness[69] (*in mundo non datur casus*)[70] is an a priori law of nature. So also is the proposition that no necessity in nature is blind necessity, but all is conditioned and hence understandable necessity (*non datur fatum*).[71] Both are laws by which the play of changes is subjected to a *nature of things* (of B 281
things as appearances), or—which is the same—subjected to the unity of the understanding wherein alone these changes can belong to one experience, i.e., to the synthetic unity of appearances. These two principles belong to the dynamical ones. The first is in fact a consequence of the principle of causality (which is among the analogies of experience). The second belongs to the principles of modality. Modality adds to causal determination the concept of necessity; but this necessity is subject to a rule of understanding. The principle of continuity prohibited in the series of appearances (changes) any leap (*in mundo non datur saltus*);[72] but it also prohibited A 229
in the sum of all empirical intuitions in space any gap or breach between

[69] [*Ohngefähr* (*Ungefähr*).]

[70] [In the world there is no accident]

[71] [There is no fate.]

[72] [In the world there is no leap.]

two appearances (*non datur hiatus*).[73] For the proposition can be expressed by saying that nothing that would prove a vacuum, or would so much as admit it as a part of empirical synthesis, can enter experience. For as concerns the void that one might think as lying outside the realm of possible experience (i.e., outside the world), it does not come within the jurisdiction of mere understanding, which decides only on questions concerning the utilization of given appearances for empirical cognition. The void is a problem for ideal[74] reason, the reason which goes even beyond
B 282 the sphere of a possible experience and wants to judge of what surrounds and bounds that sphere itself; hence it must be examined in the Transcendental Dialectic.[75] We could easily present these four propositions (*in mundo non datur hiatus, non datur saltus, non datur casus, non datur fatum*),[76] like all principles of transcendental origin, in their order, according to the order of the categories, and assign[77] to each its position. However, the already practiced reader will do this on his own, or will easily discover the guide for doing so. But all four propositions unite merely in this: that they admit in empirical synthesis nothing that could impair or interfere with the understanding and the continuous coherence of all appear-
A 230 ances, i.e., the unity of understanding's concepts. For in understanding alone does the unity of experience, the unity in which all perceptions must have their position, become possible.

Whether the realm of possibility is larger than the realm containing everything actual, and this realm in turn larger than the set[78] of what is necessary—these are nice questions, whose solution is, moreover, synthetic; but they also fall solely under the jurisdiction of reason. For what they mean is roughly tantamount to the question whether things as appearances belong, one and all, within the sum and the context of a single experience whereof every given perception is a part that hence cannot be
B 283 linked with any different[79] appearances; or whether my perceptions can be-

[73][There is no break.]

[74][*idealisch*, i.e., pertaining to ideas.]

[75][Viz., in the Antinomy of Pure Reason, A 405–567/B 432–595.]

[76][In the world there is no break, there is no leap, there is no accident, there is no fate.]

[77][Reading, with Grillo, *anweisen* for *beweisen* ('prove').]

[78][*Menge.*]

[79][*anderen.*]

long to more than one possible experience (in its[80] universal coherence). The understanding gives a priori the rule to experience as such only according to the subjective and formal conditions of both sensibility and apperception, the conditions which alone make experience possible. Even if different forms of intuition (from space and time) and likewise different forms of understanding (from the discursive form of thought or of cognition through concepts) were possible, yet we cannot think them up and make them comprehensible in any way; and even if we could, they still would not belong to experience, the sole cognition in which objects are given to us. The understanding cannot decide whether perceptions differ- A 231
ent from those that belong in general to our entire possible experience can take place, and hence whether there can be a quite different realm of matter besides [the actual one]; the understanding deals only with the synthesis of what is given. Otherwise too it is very obvious how meager are our usual inferences whereby we uncover a large kingdom of possibility of which everything actual (any object of experience) is only a small part. Everything actual is possible; from this follows naturally, by the logical rules of conversion,[81] the merely particular proposition that something possible is actual—which then seems to mean the same as that much is possible B 284
that is not actual. It does indeed seem as if one could even straightforwardly posit the number of the possible beyond that of the actual because something must still be added to the possible in order to make up the actual.[82] I am, however, unacquainted with such addition to the possible; for what would still have to be added beyond the possible would be impossible. Only something can be added to my understanding, beyond agreement with the formal conditions of experience:[83] viz., connection with some perception. But what is connected with perception, according to empirical laws, is actual, even if it is not perceived directly. But that a different series of appearances is possible in the thoroughgoing coherence with what is given to me in perception, and hence that more than a single all- A 232

[80][Construing *ihrem* as referring to *Erfahrung* ('experience') rather than to *Wahrnehmungen* ('perceptions').]

[81][Specifically, conversion by limitation, i.e., the "modified" (or "changed") conversion discussed by Kant in the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 118–19.]

[82][Reading, with Vaihinger, *jenem* . . . *dieses* for *jener* . . . *diese*, which made the passage read, 'because something must still be added to the number of the possible in order to make up the number of the actual.']

[83][I.e., beyond possibility.]

encompassing experience is possible, cannot be inferred from what is given; and much less still can it be inferred unless something or other is given, since without material nothing can be thought at all. What is possible solely under conditions that themselves are merely possible is not possible *in every respect.*[84] But when one wants to know whether the possibility of things extends further than experience can reach, the question is indeed taken in reference to this possibility in every respect.

I have made mention of these questions only in order to leave no gap
B 285 in what according to common opinion belongs to the concepts of understanding. In fact, however, absolute possibility (possibility that holds in all respects) is not a mere concept of understanding, and cannot in any way have empirical use. It belongs, rather, solely to reason, which goes beyond all possible empirical use of understanding. Hence on this matter we have here had to settle for a merely critical comment, but have otherwise left the matter in obscurity until we can give it further treatment in the future.

Since I am just about to conclude this fourth subsection[85] and with it also the system of all principles of pure understanding, I must still indicate on just what ground I have called the principles of modality postulates. I do not here want to take this term in the meaning that has been given to
A 233 it—contrary to the sense that it has for the mathematicians, to whom the term in fact belongs—by some of the more recent philosophical writers, whereby to postulate is to mean the same as to pass a proposition off, without justification or proof, as directly certain. For if we were to grant this for synthetic propositions, no matter how evident they may be, viz., that without providing a deduction one may on the strength[86] of their own pronouncement commit them to unconditioned approval, then all critique of understanding is lost. And since there is no lack of audacious claims that,
B 286 moreover, common belief (while being no credential) does not reject, our understanding will then be open to every delusion; it will be unable to refuse its approval to those pronouncements that demand admission, although illegitimately, in the same tone of confidence as do actual axioms. If, therefore, an a priori determination is added synthetically to the concept of a thing, then such a proposition must without fail be supplemented by

[84][*in aller Absicht.*]

[85][*Nummer.*]

[86][*Ansehen.*]

at least a deduction, if not a proof, showing that the assertion made by such a proposition is legitimate.

The principles of modality are not, however, synthetic *objectively;*[87] for the predicates of possibility, actuality, and necessity do not in the least augment the concept of which they are affirmed,[88] merely because to the presentation of the object they still add something. But inasmuch as these principles are nonetheless always synthetic, they are so only *subjectively;* i.e., A 234
to the concept of a thing (of something real) of which they otherwise say[89] nothing they add the cognitive power wherein this concept arises and resides. Thus if the concept is connected merely in the understanding with the formal conditions of experience, then its object[90] is called possible; if the concept is in coherence[91] with perception (sensation, as matter of the senses),[92] and through perception is determined by means of the understanding, then the object[93] is actual; if the concept is determined through the perceptions' coherence according to concepts, then the object[94] is called B 287
necessary. Hence the principles of modality affirm of a concept nothing other than the action of the cognitive power by which the concept is produced. Now what is called a postulate in mathematics is a practical proposition containing nothing but the synthesis whereby we first give to ourselves an object and produce its concept—e.g., the proposition instructing us to describe, with a given line, a circle on a plane from a given point. And the reason why a proposition like this cannot be proved is that the procedure which it demands is precisely the procedure whereby we first produce the concept of such a figure. Thus we have the same right to postulate the principles of modality, because they do not at all augment our[95]

[87][Emphasis added; likewise in 'subjectively,' below.]

[88][*sagen.*]

[89][*sagen.*]

[90][*Gegenstand.*]

[91][Or 'connection': *Zusammenhang.* Likewise just below.]

[92][*Empfindung, als Materie der Sinne.*]

[93][*Objekt.*]

[94][*Gegenstand.*]

[95][Reading, with Erdmann, *unsern* for *ihren.*]

A 235 concept of things,[96] but merely indicate the way in which the concept is connected with the cognitive power as such.

B 288 General Comment on the System of Principles[97]

Something very noteworthy is the fact that we cannot have insight into the possibility of any thing according to the mere category, but must always have available an intuition by which to display the objective reality of the pure concept of understanding.[98] Take, e.g., the categories of relation. From mere concepts we can have no insight whatever into (1) how something can exist only as *subject* and not as mere determination of other things, i.e., how it can be *substance;* or (2) how because something is, something else must be, and hence how in general something can be a cause; or (3) how, when several things are there, then from the fact that one of them is there, something follows for the others, and thus also reciprocally, and hence how a community of substances can in this way occur. The same holds also for the remaining categories: e.g., how a thing can together with many things be one and the same,[99] i.e., a magnitude; etc. Hence as long as intuition is lacking, we do not know whether we are through the categories thinking an object, and whether indeed any object whatever can belong to them at all. And this is confirmation that the categories by themselves are no *cognitions* at all, but are mere *forms of thought* for making
B 289 cognitions from given intuitions. It is precisely because of this, moreover, that from mere categories no synthetic proposition can be made: e.g., that in all existence[100] there is substance, i.e., something that can exist[101] only as subject and not as mere predicate; or that each thing is a quantum; etc.

[96]*Through the actuality* of a thing I do indeed posit[a] more than the possibility of it, but not *in the thing;* for the thing can never contain more in its actuality than what was contained in its complete possibility. Rather, while the thing's possibility was merely a positing[b] of the thing in reference to the understanding (to understanding's empirical use), actuality is at the same time a connection of the thing with perception.

[a][*setzen.*]
[b][*Position.*]

[97][The General Comment (to the end of the chapter) added in B.]

[98][See H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 426–38.]

[99][*einerlei*]

[100][*Dasein.*]

[101][*existieren.*]

For [without intuition] there is nothing here that we could employ in order to go beyond a given concept and connect with it another concept. By the same token, no one has ever succeeded in proving a synthetic proposition merely from pure concepts of understanding: e.g., the proposition that whatever exists contingently has a cause. No one could ever get further than to prove that without this reference to a cause we could *not at all comprehend* the existence of the contingent, i.e., cognize a priori through understanding the existence of such a thing;[102] but from this it does not follow that this same reference to a cause is the condition also for the possibility of the things themselves. Hence if the reader will look back at our proof of the principle of causality, he will become aware that only for objects of possible experience were we able to prove that principle, viz., that everything that occurs (i.e., any event) presupposes a cause; and it presupposes this, moreover, in such a way that we were also unable to prove the principle from mere concepts, but could prove it only as principle for the possibility of experience and hence of the *cognition* of an object given in *empirical intuition.* It cannot be denied that the proposition that everything contingent must have a cause is nonetheless clearly evident to everyone B 290
from mere concepts. But the concept of the contingent is then already framed in such a way that it contains not the category of modality (viz., as something whose not-being[103] can *be thought*), but the category of relation (viz., as something that can exist only as consequence of something else); and then it is indeed an identical[104] proposition to say that what can exist[105] only as consequence has its cause. In fact, when we are asked to give examples of contingent existence,[106] we always appeal to *changes,* and not merely to the possibility of the *thought of the opposite.*[107] Change, how-

[102][Kant uses *Ding* here, *Sache* (in the plural) just below.]

[103][Or 'nonexistence': *Nichtsein.*]

[104][I.e., analytic.]

[105][*existieren.*]

[106][*Dasein.*]

[107]We can easily think the not-being of matter; yet the ancients did not infer from this the contingency of matter. But even the variation[a] of the being and not-being of a given state of a thing, in which all change consists, does not prove at all that state's contingency—from the actuality of its opposite, as it were. E.g., a body's [state of] rest succeeding its motion does not yet prove that, because the [state of] rest is the opposite of the motion, the body's motion is contingent. For this opposite is *opposed* to the other [state] only logically, not *realiter.*[b] In order to prove

B 291 ever, is an event; and an event, as such, is possible only through a cause, and hence its not-being is inherently possible. And thus we cognize contingency from the fact that something can exist only as the effect of a cause; hence if a thing is assumed as contingent, then to say that the thing has a cause is an analytic proposition.

Even more remarkable, however, is the fact that in order to understand the possibility of things as consequent upon the categories, and hence in order to establish the categories' *objective reality,* we need not merely intuitions but indeed always *outer intuitions.* If we take, e.g., the pure concepts of *relation,* we find: (1) In order to give, as corresponding to the concept of *substance,* something *permanent* in intuition (and thereby establish this concept's objective reality), we need an intuition *in space* (an intuition of matter);[108] for space alone is determined as permanent, whereas time, and hence whatever is in inner sense, constantly flows. (2) In order to exhibit *change,* as the intuition corresponding to the concept of *causality,* we must take as our example motion, as change in space;[109] indeed, only thereby can changes, whose possibility no pure understanding can comprehend, be made intuitive. For change is combination of contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing. Now,
B 292 how it is possible that from a given state[110] there should follow an opposite state of the same thing—not only can no reason make this comprehensible[111] to itself without an example, but it cannot make this understandable to itself without intuition even. And this intuition is that of the motion of a point in space; solely the point's existence in different locations (as a succession of opposite determinations) is what first makes change intuitive. For in order thereafter to make even internal changes[112] think-

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the contingency of the body's motion one would have to prove that it was possible for the body, *instead* of [undergoing] the motion at the preceding point of time, to have been at rest *then*—not for it to be at rest *afterwards,* for in that case the two opposites are quite consistent with each other.

[a][*Wechsel*; see B 224 br. n. 45.]

[b][Really.]

[108][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 469–72.]

[109][See *ibid.,* Ak. IV, 476–77.]

[110][Of a thing.]

[111][*begreiflich.*]

[112][In consciousness.]

able, we must make time, as the form of inner sense, comprehensible[113] figuratively through a line; and we must make internal change comprehensible through the drawing of this line (i.e., through motion), and hence we must make the successive existence of ourselves in different states comprehensible through outer intuition. This is so, in fact, because all change, in order even to be itself perceived as change, presupposes something permanent in intuition, but in inner sense no permanent intuition is to be met with.[114] (3) The category of *community,* finally, cannot as regards its possibility be comprehended at all by mere reason; and hence insight into the objective reality of this concept is impossible without intuition—specifically, outer intuition in space. For how are we to think the possibility that, when several substances exist, then from the existence of one substance something can reciprocally follow (as effect) for the existence of the others, and hence that because there is something in the one substance there must in
the others also be something that cannot be understood from the existence B 293
of these others alone? For this is required for community, but is not at all comprehensible among things each of which completely isolates itself through its subsistence.[115] Hence when *Leibniz* attributed to the substances in the world—but as thought by the understanding alone—a community, he needed a deity to mediate this community. For this community rightly seemed to him incomprehensible[116] as arising from their existence alone. However, we can make the possibility of community (of substances as appearances) quite readily comprehensible[117] if we present substances in space and hence in outer[118] intuition. For space already contains, a priori, formal external[119] relations as conditions for the possibility of real relations (in action and reaction,[120] and hence as conditions for the possibility of community). We can easily establish, similarly, that the possibility of things as *magnitudes,* and hence the objective reality of the category of magnitude,

[113][*faßlich.*]

[114][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 471.]

[115][*Subsistenz.* See A 186/B 230 and A 80/B 106; cf. A 36/B 52, A 39/B 56, A 414/B 441, B 419–20.]

[116][*unbegreiflich.*]

[117][*faßlich.*]

[118][*äußer.*]

[119][*äußer.*]

[120][*Wirkung und Gegenwirkung.*]

can likewise be displayed only in outer intuition, and that only by means of outer intuition can it thereafter be applied also to inner sense. However, to avoid being long-winded, I must leave it to the reader's meditation to provide examples.

This whole remark[121] is of great importance not only for confirming our preceding refutation of idealism, but much more yet for indicating to us,
B 294 when we shall be talking about *self-cognition* from mere inner consciousness and about determination of our nature without the aid of outer empirical intuitions, the limits of the possibility of such cognition.[122]

Hence the final inference from this entire section is this: all principles[123] of pure understanding are nothing more than a priori principles of the possibility of experience; and all a priori synthetic propositions also refer solely to this possibility—indeed, their possibility itself rests entirely on this reference.[124]

[121][I.e., the General Comment starting at B 288.]

[122][See the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432.]

[123][*Grundsätze* here, *Prinzipien* just below; see A vii br. n. 7.]

[124][See above, B 19–24.]

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE POWER OF JUDGMENT

([or] Analytic of Principles)

Chapter III

On the Basis of the Distinction of All Objects As Such into Phenomena and Noumena[125]

We have now not only traveled throughout the land[126] of pure understanding and carefully inspected its every part, but have also surveyed[127] it throughout, determining for each thing in this land its proper place. This land, however, is an island, and is enclosed by nature itself within unchangeable bounds. It is the land of truth (a charming name), and is surrounded by a vast and stormy ocean, where illusion properly resides and many fog banks and much fast-melting ice feign new-found lands. This sea[128] incessantly deludes the seafarer with empty hopes as he roves[129] through his discoveries, and thus entangles him in adventures that he can never relinquish, nor ever bring to an end. But before we venture upon this sea, to search its latitudes for certainty as to whether there is in them any-

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A 236

[125][See H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 237–54. Also Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 532–52. Also H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 212–37. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 185–90. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 333–44. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 404–17. Also Gottfried Martin, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 36 br. n. 26, 141–46. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 250–60; and *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 151–56. Also H. J. Paton, *op. cit.* at B 1 br. n. 152, vol. 2, 439–62. Also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 189–96. And see R. P. Wolff, *op. cit.* at B 5 br. n. 159, 311–16.]

[126][Or 'territory': *Land*.]

[127][*-messen.*]

[128][Taking *es* to refer not to the land (*das Land*) of truth but to the ocean as thought of (by anticipation of the next sentence) as the sea (*das Meer*).]

[129][*-schwärmen,* which also means 'to rave,' 'be fanatic.']

thing to be hoped, it will be useful to begin by casting another glance on the map of the land that we are about to leave, and to ask two questions. We should ask, first, whether we might not perhaps be content with what this land contains, or even must be content with it from necessity[130] if there is no other territory at all on which we could settle. And we should ask, second, by what title we possess even this land and can keep ourselves secure against all hostile claims. Although we have already answered these questions sufficiently in the course of the Analytic, a summary account of the Analytic's solutions may still reinforce one's conviction by uniting their moments in one point.

For we have seen that everything that the understanding draws from itself, rather than borrows from experience, it still has for the sake of nothing other than use in experience only. The principles of pure understanding—whether constitutive a priori (like the mathematical principles) or merely regulative (like the dynamical ones)—contain nothing but, as it were, the pure schema for possible experience. For experience has its unity solely from the synthetic unity that the understanding confers, originally and on its own, on the synthesis of imagination by reference to apperception; appearances, as data for a possible cognition, must a priori already have reference to, and be in harmony with, that synthetic unity. Now, these rules of understanding not only are true a priori; but, by containing the basis for the possibility of experience as the sum of all cognition wherein objects may be given to us, they are even the source of all truth, i.e., the source of our cognition's agreement with objects. Yet having someone set forth to us what is true does not seem to us enough; rather, we want him to set forth what we desire to know.[131] Hence if through this critical inquiry we do not learn more than what presumably we would, in the merely empirical use of our understanding, have practiced on our own even without such subtle investigation, then the advantage obtained from that inquiry does not seem worth the expense and the apparatus. Now to this one might indeed reply that no inquisitiveness[132] is more detrimental to the expansion of our

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A 237

[130][*Not.*]

[131][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 47), Kant amends this as follows After 'what is true' he inserts 'however little it may be'; and the clause after 'rather' is changed to '[we want] to expand our cognition.']

[132][*Vorwitz.*]

cognition than the inquisitiveness that always wants to know the benefit[133] in advance, i.e., before we have entered into investigations, and before we could frame the least concept of that benefit even if it were laid before us. B 297 Yet there is one advantage that even the most difficult and listless learner of such transcendental investigation can be made to comprehend and also care about. A 238 This advantage is, viz., that although the understanding, when occupied merely with its empirical use and not reflecting on the sources of its own cognition, can get along quite well, yet one task it cannot accomplish: viz., determining for itself the bounds of its use, and knowing what may lie inside or outside its entire sphere; for this task requires precisely those deep inquiries that we have performed. But if the understanding cannot distinguish whether or not certain questions lie within its horizon, then it can never be sure of its claims and its possessions; rather, it must then count on receiving a multitude of embarrassing rebukes when (as is unavoidable) it keeps overstepping the bounds of its domain and strays into delusion and deception.

We may say, therefore, that the use that the understanding can make of all its a priori principles and, indeed, of all its concepts is nothing but an empirical and never a transcendental use; and this is a proposition that, if it can be cognized with conviction, points to[134] important consequences. B 298 A concept is used transcendentally in any principle if it is referred to things *as such and in themselves;*[135] but it is used empirically if it is referred merely to *appearances*, i.e., to objects of a possible *experience*. A 239 That only the empirical use can occur at all, however, can be seen from the following. Every concept requires, first, the logical form of a concept (the logical form of thought) as such; and then, second, also the possibility of our giving to it an object to which to refer. Without an object the concept has no sense[136] and is completely empty of content, although it may still contain the logical function for making a concept from what data may come up. Now, the object cannot be given to a concept otherwise than in intuition; and if a pure intuition[137] is possible a priori even before the object, still this pure intuition itself also can acquire its object, and hence objec-

[133][Of such expansion.]

[134][*in . . . hinaussieht*—to which Kant adds (*ibid.*): 'against fanaticism [*Schwärmerei*].']

[135]['things *as such and in themselves*' amended by Kant (*ibid.*) to 'objects that are not given to us in any intuition, hence nonsensible objects.']

[136][Or 'meaning': *Sinn.*]

[137][Amended by Kant (*ibid.*) to: 'even if for us a pure sensible intuition.']

tive validity, only through empirical intuition, whose mere form the pure intuition is. Therefore all concepts, and with them all principles, however possible these [concepts and principles] may be a priori, refer nonetheless to empirical intuitions, i.e., to data for possible experience. Without this reference they have no objective validity whatever, but are mere play, whether by the imagination or by the understanding, with their respective
B 299 presentations. Just take as an example the concepts of mathematics, and take them, first, in their pure intuitions. Space has three dimensions; between two points there can be only one straight line; etc. Although all these principles, and the presentation of the object that this science deals with,
A 240 are produced in the mind completely a priori, yet they would signify nothing if we could not always display[138] their signification in appearances (empirical objects). Hence, too, we require that an abstract[139] concept be *made sensible,* i.e., that the object corresponding to it be displayed in intuition, because otherwise the concept would remain (as we say) *without sense,* i.e., without signification. Mathematics fulfills this demand by constructing the shape, which is an appearance present to the senses (although brought about a priori). In the same science,[140] the concept of magnitude seeks its hold and sense in number, and seeks number in fingers, in the beads of the abacus,[141] or in the dashes and dots put before us. The concept always remains one that is produced a priori along with the synthetic principles or formulas based on such concepts; yet their use and their reference to alleged objects can in the end be sought nowhere but in experience, whose possibility (as regards form) is contained a priori in those concepts.

B 300 But that this is also the case with all the categories, and with the principles spun from them, is evident also from the following. Not even one of the categories can we define really,[142] i.e., make understandable the possibility of its object,[143] without immediately descending to conditions of

[138][*darlegen,* used as a synonym for *darstellen* ('to exhibit'), for which cf. B xvii br. n. 73]

[139][*abgesondert.*]

[140][Of mathematics.]

[141][Literally, 'in the corals of the calculating-board.']

[142][Rather than merely nominally; 'really' added in B. For the distinction, see ns. 144 and 144b, just below, and cf. the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 143–44.]

[143][This clause added in B. In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 47), Kant had written next to the present paragraph: 'We cannot explain their [*ihre*] possibility.']

sensibility and hence to the form of appearances; to these appearances, as their sole objects, the categories must consequently be limited. For if we take away the mentioned condition, then all signification, i.e., reference to the object, is gone; and through no example can we then make comprehensible to ourselves just what sort of thing is in fact meant by such a concept.[144] A 241

[144][In A the present paragraph continues with the following passage, omitted in B (and in A the subsequent text is also still part of this same paragraph):]

Above, in presenting the table of the categories, we exempted ourselves from providing definitions of each of them,[a] because for our aim—which is concerned solely with the categories' synthetic use—such definitions are not needed, and one must not incur responsibility for needless undertakings from which one can be exempted. This was no pretext, but a not unimportant rule of prudence: viz., not to venture immediately upon defining [a concept], and not to attempt or allege to attain completeness or precision in determining a concept, if one can make do with any one or another of its characteristics—and for this we do not, of course, require a complete enumeration of all the characteristics that make up the whole concept. But we now find that the basis for this caution lies deeper still: viz., in the fact that we were unable to define them, even if we had wanted to.[b] Rather, if we remove from the categories all conditions of sensibility, which mark them as concepts for a possible empirical use, and take them as concepts of things[g] as such (and hence as concepts for transcendental use), then there is nothing more to be done with them but to regard the logical function that they have in judgments as[h] the condition for the possibility of things themselves. Yet we then do this without in the least being able to indicate just where the categories can have their application and their object, and hence how in pure understanding and without sensibility they can have any signification and objective reality. A 242

[a][For the table, see A 80/B 106; for this comment, A 82–83/B 108–9.]

[b]I here mean real definition. Such definition does not merely provide[c] for a thing's name other and more understandable words. Rather, it contains a clear characteristic whereby the *object* (*definitum*)[d] can always safely be cognized, and makes the explicated concept usable for application. Real explication,[e] therefore, would be explication that makes distinct not merely a concept but also its *objective reality*. Of this latter kind are mathematical explications that exhibit the object in intuition in conformity with the concept.[f] A 242

[c][*unterlegen*.]

[d][What is defined.]

[e][Or 'Real definition': *Realerklärung*.]

No one can explicate the concept of magnitude as such, except perhaps by saying that it is that determination of a thing whereby we can think how many times a unit[145] is posited in it. Yet this how-many-times is based on successive repetition, and hence on time and the synthesis (of the homogeneous) in time. Reality contrasted with negation can be explicated only if one thinks of a time (as the sum of all being) that is either filled with something or empty. If from the concept of substance I omit permanence (which is an existence at all time), then I have nothing left for this concept but the logical presentation of subject, a presentation that I mean to real-
A 243 ize[146] by presenting something that can occur only as subject (i.e., only
B 301 without being a predicate of anything). However, not only do I not know any conditions at all under which some thing will possess this logical superiority;[147] but we also cannot make from it anything further,[148] and cannot draw from it the least inference. For through this explication no object whatever is determined for the use of the concept of substance, and hence we do not know at all whether the concept in fact signifies anything whatsoever. Of the concept of cause (if I omit from it the time in which something succeeds something else according to a rule) I would find, in the pure category, nothing more than that it[149] is something from which the existence of something else can be inferred. And not only would we be entirely unable, through this explication, to distinguish cause and effect from each other, but since even that ability to infer the existence of something else will soon require conditions of which I know nothing, the concept would have no determination whatever as to how it fits any object. The supposed principle that everything contingent has a cause does, to be sure, make its

[f][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 47), Kant notes here: 'Instead of *to explicate* one could also use the expression *to support* [*belegen*] something by an *example*.' For Kant's position that there may be definitions in mathematics but not in philosophy, see below, A 727–32 = B 755–70.]

[g][*Dinge* here, *Sachen* just below.]

[h][Deleting the comma before *als* ('as')]

[145][*Eines.*]

[146][I.e., provide with reality: *realisieren.*]

[147][In his working copy of edition A (Ak. XXIII, 47; see br. n. 144f, just above), Kant notes: 'See the General Comment' (B 288–94).]

[148][Such as cognition.]

[149][*es* refers to *Ursache;* but, being neuter rather than feminine, it does so with (deliberate) vagueness.]

entrance with considerable gravity, as if it carried[150] its own dignity within itself. Yet if I ask what do you mean by contingent, and you reply, that whose nonexistence[151] is possible, then I would like to know by what you intend to cognize[152] this possibility of nonexistence, if you do not in the series of appearances present a succession and, in this succession, present an existence that succeeds the nonexistence (or vice versa), and hence present a variation. For to say that a thing's nonexistence does not contradict itself is a lame appeal to a merely logical condition that, although nec- {A 244 B 302} essary for the concept, is yet far from sufficient for the thing's real possibility. Thus I can indeed annul any existing substance in my thought without contradicting myself; but from this I cannot infer the substance's objective contingency in its existence, i.e., the possibility in itself of its[153] nonexistence. As regards the concept of community, one can easily gather that since the pure categories of both substance and causality permit no explication determining the object, neither is reciprocal causality in the reference of substances to one another (*commercium*)[154] capable of such explication. As for possibility, existence, and necessity, no one who has sought to draw their definition solely from pure understanding has ever been able to explicate them except through a manifest tautology. For the deception of substituting the logical possibility of the *concept* (where the concept does not contradict itself) for the transcendental possibility[155] of *things* (where to the concept there corresponds an object) can trick and satisfy only the unseasoned.[156]

[150][*habe.*]

[151][Or 'not-being': *Nichtsein.*]

[152][Or 'recognize': *erkennen.*]

[153][Reading, with Vaihinger (and the *Akademie* edition), *ihres* for *seines.* Kant seems to have thought that he had written *Gegenstand* or *Objekt.*]

[154][Cf. A 213/B 260.]

[155][Changed by Kant to 'real possibility' in his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 48).]

[156]In a word,[a] if all sensible intuition (the only intuition that we have) is removed, then none of these concepts can be *supported* by anything and their *real* possibility be established thereby. All that then remains is logical possibility, i.e., the fact that the concept (the thought) is possible. What is at issue, however, is not this, but whether the concept refers to an object and hence signifies something.

[a][This footnote added in B.]

B 303 [157]Now from this flows incontestably the consequence that the pure categories can *never* be of *transcendental* but always only of *empirical*

[157][In A, unlike in B, the following is preceded by this paragraph:]

There is something strange and even preposterous about the supposition of there being[a] a concept that [as such] must surely have a signification, but that is not capable of any explication. Yet here, with the categories, the special situation is that only by means of the universal
A 245 *sensible condition* can they have a determinate signification and reference to some object; but that this condition has been omitted from the pure category, so that the category can contain nothing but the logical function for bringing the manifold under a concept. But from this function alone, i.e., from the form of the concept alone, we can cognize and distinguish nothing as to what object belongs under the category, precisely because we have abstracted from the sensible condition on which alone objects can belong under the category at all.[b] Hence the categories require, in addition to the pure concept of understanding, determinations of their application to sensibility as such[c] (schemata).[d] Without these determinations the categories are not concepts through which an object is cognized and distinguished from others, but are only so many ways of thinking an object for possible intuitions, and of giving the object (under conditions that are still required) its signification in accordance with some function of the understanding, i.e., of *defining* it. Hence they cannot themselves be defined. The logical functions of judgments as such—unity and plurality, affirmation and negation, subject and predicate—cannot be defined without committing a circle; for the definition itself would, after all, have to be a judgment, and hence would already have to contain these functions. The pure categories, however, are nothing other than presentations of things as such insofar as the manifold of their intuition must be thought through one or another of these logical functions: magnitude is the determination that can be
A 246 thought only through a judgment having quantity (*iudicium commune*);[e] reality is the determination that can be thought only through an affirmative judgment; substance is what in reference to intuition must be the ultimate subject of all other determinations. In saying this, however, we leave quite indeterminate just what sort of things it is in regard to which this function rather than some other is to be employed. Hence without the condition of sensible intuition, for which they contain the synthesis, the categories have no reference whatever to any determinate object, and

use,[158] and that the principles of pure understanding can be referred[159] only, with respect to the universal conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, but never to things as such[160] (i.e., never without taking account of the way in which we may intuit them).

The Transcendental Analytic, accordingly, has this important result: viz., that the understanding can a priori never accomplish more than to anticipate the form of a possible experience as such; and since what is not appearance cannot be an object of experience, the understanding can never overstep the limits of sensibility within which alone objects are given to A 247
us. Its principles are merely rules for the exposition of appearances; and the proud name of an ontology that pretends to provide, in a systematic doctrine, synthetic a priori cognitions (e.g., the principle of causality) of things in themselves must give way to the modest name of a mere analytic of pure understanding.

Thinking is the act of referring given intuitions to an object. If the kind B 304
of this intuition[161] is not given[162] in any way, then the object is merely transcendental, and the concept of understanding has none but a transcendental use, viz., to provide the unity of thought of a manifold as such.[163] Hence through a pure category, in which we abstract from any condition of sensible intuition (the only intuition possible for us),[164] no object is determined;[165] rather, a pure category expresses only the thought of an ob-

hence cannot define any such object, and consequently do not in themselves have the validity of objective concepts.

[a][*daß . . . sein soll.*]

[b][*überhaupt.*]

[c][*überhaupt.*]

[d][Reading, with Vaihinger, *Schemata* for *Schema.*]

[e][Common judgment.]

[158][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13 —Ak. XXIII, 48), Kant adds, 'i.e., no principles from mere categories.']

[159][Kant (*ibid.*) adds, 'if they are to provide cognition.']

[160][Kant (*ibid.*) adds, '[referred] synthetically.']

[161][I.e., sensible intuition or some other kind; see just below.]

[162][I.e., specified.]

[163][Kant (*ibid.*) changes this to: 'manifold of a possible intuition as such.']

[164][Parentheses added.]

[165][Kant (*ibid.*) adds, 'and hence nothing is cognized.']

ject as such according to different modes. Now the use of a concept involves also a function of the power of judgment,[166] by means of which an object is subsumed under the concept, and hence involves at least the formal condition under which something can be given in intuition. If this condition of the power of judgment (the schema) is lacking, then all subsumption is lost; for nothing is then given that can be subsumed under the concept. Hence the merely transcendental use of the categories is in fact
A 248 not a use at all,[167] and has no object that is determinate, or is even determinable as regards form. From this it follows that the pure category is also insufficient for a synthetic a priori principle, and that the principles of pure understanding are only of empirical but never of transcendental use; and it
B 305 follows that beyond the realm of possible experience there can be no synthetic a priori principles at all.

Hence it may be advisable to put the point as follows. The pure categories, without formal conditions of sensibility, have merely transcendental signification, but have no transcendental use.[168] For such use of the pure categories is intrinsically impossible, because they lack all the conditions for any use of them (in judgments), viz., the formal conditions for the subsumption of some alleged object under these concepts. Hence because they (as merely pure categories) are not meant to have empirical use, and cannot have transcendental use, they have no use whatsoever when separated from all sensibility, i.e., they cannot be applied to any alleged object. They are, rather, merely the pure form of understanding's use regarding objects as such, and the pure form of thought; but through them alone we are [therefore] unable to think or determine any object.[169]

[166][Viz., a schema.]

[167][Kant (*ibid.*) changes this to: '[not a] use for cognizing anything.']

[168][See below, A 310–11/B 366–68.]

[169][Instead of the following four paragraphs (to the first part of B 309), A has the following:]

Appearances, insofar as they are thought as objects according to the
A 249 unity of the categories, are called phenomena. But if I assume things that are objects merely of the understanding and that, as such, can nonetheless be given to an intuition—even if not to sensible intuition (but hence[a] *coram intuitu intellectuali*[b])—then such things would be called noumena (*intelligibilia*).[c]

Now one would think that the concept of appearances, as limited by the Transcendental Aesthetic, provides us already by itself with the objective reality of noumena and justifies the division of objects into phe-

But there is, here, an underlying delusion that it is difficult to avoid. The categories are not, as regards their origin, based on sensibility, as are the

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nomena and noumena, and hence also the division of the world into a world of sense and a world of understanding (*mundus sensibilis et intelligibilis*). Indeed, one would think that the concept justifies this division in such a way that the distinction here[d] concerns not merely the logical form of the cognition of one and the same thing, viz., as indistinct or distinct, but concerns the difference regarding how things can be given to our cognition originally and regarding which they are in themselves distinguished from one another in type. For if the senses present something to us merely *as it appears*, then surely this something must also in itself be a thing, and an object of a nonsensible intuition, i.e., an object of understanding. That is, a cognition must then be possible in which no sensibility is to be found, and which alone has reality that is objective absolutely—i.e., a cognition whereby objects are presented to us *as they are* while being cognized in our understanding's empirical use only *as they appear*. Hence there would be, besides the A 250
empirical use of the categories (which is limited to sensible conditions), also a pure and yet objectively valid use of them; and we could not assert what we have alleged thus far, viz., that our pure cognitions of understanding are nothing more at all than principles of the exposition[e] of appearance which even a priori deal with no more than the formal possibility of experience. For a wholly different realm would here lie open before us: a world, as it were, thought (perhaps even intuited) in the intellect[f]—a world that could engage our pure understanding not less,[g] but indeed much more nobly.

Now, it is true that all our presentations are by the understanding referred to some object; and since appearances are nothing but presentations, the understanding refers them to a something as the object of sensible intuition. But this something is[h] in so far only the transcendental object.[i] This, however, signifies only a something = x of which we do not know—nor (by our understanding's current arrangement) can in principle[j] ever know—anything whatsoever. Rather, this transcendental object can serve only, as a correlate of the unity of apperception, for the unity in sensible intuition's manifold by means of which the understanding unites that manifold in[k] the concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot be separated at all from the sensible data, for then there remains nothing through which it would be thought. It is, therefore, not A 251
in itself an object of cognition, but is only the presentation of appear-

forms of intuition, space and time; they therefore seem to admit of an application expanded beyond all objects of the senses. Yet they themselves

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ances under the concept of an object as such—a concept determinable through the manifold of these appearances.[1]

Precisely because of this, too, the categories present no special object given to the understanding alone, but serve only to determine the transcendental object[m] (the concept of something as such) through what is given in sensibility, in order that we can thereby cognize appearances empirically under concepts of objects.

But as for the cause why people, being not yet satisfied by the substratum of sensibility, have added to the phenomena also noumena that only the pure understanding can think, it rests merely on the following. Sensibility—and its realm, viz., that of appearances—is itself limited by understanding so that it deals not with things in themselves but only with the way in which, by virtue of our subjective character, things appear to us. This was the result of the entire Transcendental Aesthetic; and from the concept of an appearance as such, too, it follows naturally that to appearance there must correspond something that is not in itself appearance. For appearance cannot be anything by itself and apart from
A 252 our way of presenting; hence, if we are not to go in a constant circle, then the word appearance already indicates a reference to something the direct presentation of which is indeed sensible, but which in itself—even without this character of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is based)—must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility.

Now from this consideration arises the concept of a noumenon. But this concept is[n] not at all positive and is not a determinate cognition of some thing, but signifies only the thinking of something as such—something in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition. But in order that a noumenon may signify a true object, to be distinguished from all phenomena, it is not enough that I *free* my thought from all conditions of sensible intuition. I must, in addition, also have a basis for *assuming* an intuition which is different from this sensible one and in[o] which such an object could be given; for otherwise my thought is empty after all, even though not contradictory. Above,[p] we were indeed unable to prove that sensible intuition is the only possible intuition generally, and were able to prove only that it is this *for us*; but we were likewise unable to prove that a different kind of intuition is also possible. And although our thought can abstract from any[q] sensibility, yet we are left are in turn nothing but *forms of thought* that contain merely the logical ability to unite a priori in[170] one consciousness the manifold given[171] in B 306

with the question whether this thought[r] is not then a mere form of a concept, and whether after this separation[s] there remains an object at all.[t] A 253

The object to which I refer appearance as such is the transcendental object,[u] i.e., the wholly indeterminate concept of something as such. This object cannot be called the *noumenon.* For I do not know concerning it what it is in itself, and have no concept of it except merely the concept of the object of a sensible intuition as such—an object which, therefore, is the same for all appearances. I cannot think it through any categories; for a category holds only for empirical intuition in order to bring it under a concept of an object as such. Although a pure use of a category is logically[v] possible, i.e., is without contradiction, it has no objective validity whatever, because the category does not then apply to any intuition that would thereby acquire the unity of an object. For a category is, after all, a mere function of thought; through it I am not given any object, but only think what may be given in intuition.

[a][Reading, with Vaihinger (and the *Akademie* edition), *also* for *als*.]

[b]['To an intellectual intuition.' Cf. B xl br. n. 144g, and B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[c][I.e., intelligibles.]

[d][Unlike in Leibniz and Wolff.]

[e][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 48), Kant adds, 'synthesis of the manifold.']

[f][*im Geiste*.]

[g][Than the world of sense.]

[h][Kant (*ibid.*) expands this to: 'this something as object of an intuition as such is.']

[i][*Objekt* here and at the beginning of the paragraph, *Gegenstand* just above. For the transcendental object, cf. A 104–5, 109.]

[j][*überhaupt*.]

[k]['into,' literally.]

[l][Kant (*ibid.*) notes, 'form of thought only, but no cognition.']

[m][Kant uses *Objekt* here and just above, *Gegenstand* (in the plural) just below.]

[n]['is' added by Hartenstein (and adopted by the *Akademie* edition).]

[o][*unter*.]

[p][In the Transcendental Aesthetic.]

[q][Reading, with Hartenstein (and the *Akademie* edition), *jeder* for *jener*.]

[r][Of a noumenon.]

[s][From sensibility.]

[t][In his working copy of edition A (*op. cit.* in br. n. 169e, just above, 49), Kant changes this to: '. . . there still remains *a possible intuition* at all. For no one can establish the possibility of an intellectual intuition; and hence it could easily be that no such way of cognizing, in regard to which we would consider something as object, would oc-

intuition. And thus, if one takes away from the categories the only intuition possible for us, then the signification they can have is even less than that of the pure sensible forms.[172] For through these forms an object is at least given, whereas a way—peculiar to our understanding—of combining the manifold signifies nothing whatever if the intuition wherein alone this manifold can be given is not added. On the other hand, certain objects as appearances are called by us beings of sense (phenomena), because we distinguish the way in which we intuit them from the character[173] that they have in themselves. But if this is so, then our concept of beings of sense already implies that these objects regarded in that character (even if we do not intuit them in that character)[174]—or, for that matter, other possible things that are not objects of our senses at all—are, as it were, contrasted by us with the beings of sense,[175] viz., as objects thought merely through understanding, and that we may therefore call them beings of the understanding[176] (noumena). And now the question arises whether our pure concepts of understanding might not have signification in regard to these noumena and be a way of cognizing them.

But here we find, at the very outset, an ambiguity that may occasion great misunderstanding. For when the understanding calls an object in one reference merely phenomenon, then it simultaneously frames, apart from this reference, also a presentation[177] of an *object in itself*. And hence the
B 307 understanding conceives[178] that it can frame *concepts* of such an object

cur at all. Hence the positive concept of a noumenon asserts something whose possibility cannot be proved.']

[u][Here Kant uses *Gegenstand;* just above he said *Objekt*. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[v]['logically' added by Kant himself in his working copy of edition A (*op. cit.* in br. n 169e, just above, 49).]

[170]['into,' literally.]

[171][Here 'manifold' is an adjective and 'given' functions as the noun.]

[172][Of intuition.]

[173][*Beschaffenheit*.]

[174][Parentheses added.]

[175][I.e., phenomena.]

[176][*Verstandeswesen*. Although in the interest of avoiding reification of the Kantian mental powers (cf. A xii br. n. 16) I usually omit 'the' before 'understanding,' the exception here clarifies that Kant does not mean a being *having* understanding. (Strictly speaking, the context would suffice to resolve the ambiguity—already present in the German also.)]

[177][*Vorstellung*.]

[178][*sich vorstellen*.]

also; and since the understanding supplies no concepts other than the categories, it conceives that the object in this latter signification[179] must at least be capable of being thought. Through this, however, the understanding is misled into considering the wholly *indeterminate* concept of a being of the understanding, as a something as such apart from our sensibility, to be a *determinate* concept of a being that we could in some way cognize through understanding.

If, by abstracting from our way of intuiting a thing, we mean by noumenon a thing *insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition,* then this is a noumenon in the *negative* meaning of the term. But if by noumenon we mean an *object of a nonsensible intuition* and hence assume a special kind of intuition, viz., an intellectual one[180]—which, however, is not ours and into the possibility of which we also have no insight—then that would be the noumenon in the *positive* meaning of the term.

Now the doctrine of sensibility is simultaneously the doctrine of noumena in the negative meaning of the term; i.e., it is the doctrine of things that the understanding must think without this reference to our kind of intuition, and hence must think not merely as appearances but as things in themselves. But the understanding, in thus separating [things from our intuition], simultaneously comprehends that in considering them in this way it cannot make any use of its categories. For the categories have signifi- B 308
cation only in reference to the unity of intuitions in space and time; and hence, by the same token, they can a priori determine this same unity through universal combination concepts[181] only because space and time are merely ideal. Where this unity of time cannot be found, and hence in the case of the noumenon, there the entire use of the categories—indeed, even all their signification—ceases completely, because we then have no insight even into the possibility of the things that are to correspond to the categories—a point on which I need only appeal to what I have set forth at the very beginning of the General Comment on the preceding chapter.[182] The possibility of a thing can, however, never be proved merely from the fact that a concept of this thing is not contradictory, but can be proved

[179][As object in itself.]

[180][Cf B xl br. n. 144g, and B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[181][Or: 'they can determine this same unity through universal a priori combination concepts.']

[182][See B 288.]

only by supporting[183] the concept through an intuition corresponding to it. Hence if we wanted to apply the categories to objects that are not regarded as appearances, then we would have to lay at the basis an intuition other than the sensible one; and then the object would be a noumenon in the *positive signification*. Now such an intuition—viz., intellectual intuition—lies absolutely outside our cognitive power, and hence the use of the categories can likewise in no way extend beyond the boundary containing the objects of experience. And although to the beings of sense there correspond
B 309 beings of the understanding and there may indeed be beings of the understanding to which our sensible power of intuition has no reference whatever, yet our concepts of understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, do not in the least extend to them. Hence what is called noumenon by us must be meant as such only in the *negative* signification.

If from an empirical cognition I remove all thought (through categories), then there remains no cognition at all of any object. For through mere intuition nothing at all is thought; and the fact that my sensibility's thus being affected[184] is [an occurrence] in me does not at all amount to a reference by such a presentation to any object. But if, on the other hand, I
A 254 omit all intuition, then there does still remain the form of thought, i.e., the way of determining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Hence the categories do in so far extend further than sensible intuition, because they think objects[185] as such without yet taking account of the special way (viz., sensibility)[186] in which they may be given. But they do not thereby determine a larger sphere of objects;[187] for, that such objects can be given cannot be assumed without presupposing as possible a kind of intuition other than the sensible—which, however, we are in no way entitled to do.

B 310 I call a concept problematic if, although containing no contradiction and also cohering with other cognitions as a boundary of given concepts involved in them, its objective reality cannot be cognized in any way. The concept of a *noumenon,* i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought at all as an object of the senses but is to be thought (solely through a pure understanding) as a thing in itself, is not at all contradictory; for we cannot, after all, assert of sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition. Moreover,

[183][*belegen.*]

[184][*diese Affektion der Sinnlichkeit.*]

[185][*Objekte.*]

[186][Reading, with Erdmann, *die Sinnlichkeit* for *der Sinnlichkeit* ('[kind] of sensibility')]

[187][*Gegenstände.*]

the concept of a noumenon is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition even over things in themselves, and hence in order to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition. (For the remaining things,[188] to which A 255
that validity does not reach, are called noumena precisely in order to indicate that those cognitions cannot extend their domain over everything thought by the understanding.) Yet, in the end, we can have no insight at all into the possibility of such noumena, and the range outside the sphere of appearances is (for us) empty. I.e., we have an understanding that *problematically* extends further than this sphere; but we have no intuition—indeed, not even the concept of a possible intuition—through which objects can be given to us outside the realm of sensibility, and through which the understanding can be used *assertorically* beyond sensibility. The concept of a noumenon is, therefore, only a *boundary concept*
serving to limit the pretension of sensibility, and hence is only of negative B 311
use. But it is nonetheless not arbitrarily invented; rather, it coheres[189] with the limitation of sensibility, yet without being able to posit anything positive outside sensibility's range.

Hence the division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a world of sense and a world of understanding, cannot be permitted at all in the positive signification,[190] although concepts do indeed permit the distinction[191] into sensible and intellectual ones. For we cannot determine any object for intellectual concepts, and hence also cannot pass them off as objectively valid. How, if we depart from the senses, are we to
make comprehensible that our categories (which would be the only re- A 256
maining concepts for noumena) still signify anything at all—given that in order for them to refer to some object, there must still be given something more than merely the unity of thought: viz., in addition, a possible intuition to which they can be applied? The concept of a noumenon, as taken merely problematically, remains nonetheless not only permissible, but, as a concept putting sensibility within limits, also unavoidable. But that noumenon is then not a special [viz.] *intelligible object* for our understanding. Rather, an understanding to which it would belong is itself a problem, viz.,
as to how it can cognize its object not discursively through categories, but B 312

[188][Reading, with Erdmann, *die übrigen* for *das übrige*.]

[189][Or 'connects.']

[190]['in the positive signification' added in B.]

[191][Of concepts.]

intuitively in a nonsensible intuition;[192] of such an understanding we cannot frame the slightest presentation as to its possibility. Now in this way[193] our understanding acquires a negative expansion. I.e., it is not limited by sensibility; rather, it limits sensibility by calling things in themselves (things not regarded as appearances) noumena. But it immediately sets bounds for itself also: it acknowledges not cognizing things in themselves through any categories, and hence only thinking them under the name of an unknown[194] something.[195]

In the writings of the moderns,[196] however, I find a quite different use of the expressions[197] *mundus sensibilis* and [*mundus*] *intelligibilis*[198] that
A 257 deviates completely from the sense employed by the ancients. And although this use involves no difficulty, we also find in it nothing but an idle fiddling with words. According to this use, some have opted to call the sum of appearances, insofar as it is intuited, the world of sense; but they have opted to call it the world of understanding insofar as the coher-
B 313 ence of appearances is thought according to universal laws of understanding. The first world[199] would by presented by theoretical[200] as-

[192][Concerning an intuitive understanding and its intellectual intuition, see B xl br. n. 144g, and B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[193][I.e., through the concept of a noumenon as used problematically.]

[194][*unbekannt.*]

[195][See W. Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 57, 59–60.]

[196][Kant very likely means Leibniz and Wolff. See A 249.]

[197][Which mean 'sensible world,' 'intelligible world.']

[198]We[a] must not use, instead of this expression,[b] the expression *intellectual* world, as writers commonly tend to do when they set forth their views in German. For only *cognitions* are intellectual or sensory;[c] but what can only be an *object*[d] of the one or the other kind of intuition[e]—i.e., the objects [themselves]—must be called (regardless of the harshness of the sound) intelligible or sensible.[f]

[a][This note added in B.]
[b][*mundus intelligibilis.*]
[c][*intellektuell oder sensitiv.*]
[d][Kant uses *Gegenstand* here, *Objekt* (in the plural) just below.]
[e][I.e., intellectual or sensory (sensible, in the *customary* meaning of *sinnlich*) intuition.]
[f][*intelligibel; sensibel,* in the *literal* meaning of 'capable of being sensed.' The "harsh sound" seems to be that of the ending, *-ibel,* since the pairs of terms are otherwise similar.]

[199][Viz., the sensible world.]

[200][I.e., observational; cf. the etymology of 'theoretical.']

tronomy, which sets forth our mere observations of the starry sky; the second world, on the other hand, viz., an intelligible world, would be presented by contemplative[201] astronomy (as explained, say, according to the Copernican system of the world, or even according to Newton's laws of gravitation). But such twisting of words is a merely sophistical subterfuge intended to evade a burdensome question by toning down its meaning to one's convenience. Understanding and reason can indeed be used in regard to appearances; but the question arises whether they still have any use even when the object is not appearance (but noumenon); and in this meaning the object is taken when it is thought as in itself merely intelligible, i.e., given solely to understanding and not at all to the senses. Hence the question is whether, apart from that empirical use of understanding (even in the Newtonian presentation of the world structure), there can also be a transcendental use of it that deals with the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered negatively.

Hence when we say that the senses present objects to us *as they appear,* A 258 but the understanding presents them *as they are,* then the second [description of objects] is to be taken not in transcendental but merely in empirical signification: viz., it refers to them as they must, insofar as they are objects of experience, be presented in the thoroughgoing coherence of ap- B 314 pearances, and not according to what they may be apart from the reference to possible experience and consequently to senses as such, and hence not according to what they may be as objects of pure understanding. For this will always remain unknown[202] to us—even to the point that it also remains unknown to us whether such transcendental (extraordinary) cognition is possible at all, at least as a kind of cognition that is subject to our usual categories. In us, *understanding* and *sensibility* can determine objects *only in combination.* If we separate them, then we have intuitions without concepts, or concepts without intuitions; but in either case we have presentations that we cannot refer to any determinate object.[203]

If, after this entire discussion, anyone still harbors qualms about forgoing the merely transcendental use of the categories, let that reader try them in some synthetic assertion. For an analytic assertion does not advance the understanding. And since the understanding here deals only with what is already thought in the concept, it leaves unestablished whether the concept

[201] [I.e., reflective.]

[202] [*unbekannt.*]

[203] [See A 50–52/B 74–76.]

A 259 refers in itself to objects, or whether it signifies only the unity of thought as such (which unity abstracts entirely from the way in which an object may be given). The understanding as so used is content to know what lies in its concept; it is indifferent as regards what the concept itself may apply
B 315 to. Accordingly, let that reader try the categories with some synthetic and supposedly transcendental principle, such as: Everything that is exists as substance or as some determination attaching thereto; or: Everything contingent exists as effect of another thing, namely, its cause; etc. Now I ask: whence does he intend to obtain these synthetic propositions, given that the concepts are to hold not in reference to possible experience but for things in themselves (noumena)? Where is here the third something[204] that we always require for a synthetic proposition[205] in order thereby to connect with one another concepts that have no logical (analytic) kinship[206] whatever? That reader will never be able to prove his proposition; indeed, what is still more, he will never be able to offer justification for the possibility of such a pure[207] assertion without taking into account the empirical use of understanding and thereby forgoing entirely the pure and sense-free judgment. And thus the concept[208] of pure and merely intelligible objects is entirely empty of any principles for the application of such concepts. For we cannot think of any way in which such objects might be given; and the problematic thought which yet leaves open a place for them
A 260 serves only, like an empty space, to limit the empirical principles, but without containing or displaying any other object of cognition outside the sphere of these principles.

[204][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 49), Kant changes this to: 'this third something, [consisting] of intuition.']

[205][See A 216–17/B 263–64 br. ns. 238 and 241.]

[206][Or 'affinity': *Verwandtschaft.* Cf. A 662 = B 690.]

[207][I.e., completely nonempirical.]

[208][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak XXIII, 49), Kant changes this to: 'the positive concept. the possible cognition.']

APPENDIX B 316

On the Amphiboly[1] of Concepts of Reflection[2] Which Arises through the Confusion of the Empirical with the Transcendental Use of Understanding[3]

Deliberation[4] (*reflexio*)[5] does not deal with objects themselves in order to obtain concepts from them straightforwardly, but is our state of mind when we first set about to discover the subjective conditions under which [alone] we can arrive at concepts. It is our consciousness of the relation of given presentations to our various sources of cognition—the consciousness through which alone the relation of these presentations to one another can be determined correctly. The first question that we must ask before we treat our presentations any further is this: In which cognitive power do they belong together? Is it the understanding, or is it the senses, by which they are connected or compared? Many judgments are accepted from habit or put together[6] through inclination; but because no deliberation precedes the judgment, or at least succeeds it critically, it counts[7] as a judgment having its A 261
origin in understanding. Not for all judgments do we need an *inquiry,* i.e., do we need to pay attention to their bases of truth. For if judgments are directly certain—e.g., the judgment that between two points there can be B 317
only one straight line—then we cannot indicate for them any still nearer mark of truth than they themselves express. But all judgments—indeed, all

[1][I.e., ambiguity.]

[2][*Reflexion.*]

[3][See Nonnan Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 418–24.]

[4][*Überlegung*. The decision-making implication of 'deliberation' agrees well with Kant's characterization of *Überlegung* below. I am using 'reflection' to translate *Reflexion* (and 'to reflect' occasionally, in nontechnical contexts, to render *nachsinnen* and *überdenken*).]

[5][*Reflection.*]

[6][*geknüpft.*]

[7][*gelten.*]

comparisons—require a *deliberation,* i.e., a distinction of the cognitive power to which the given concepts belong. I call *transcendental deliberation* the act whereby I hold the comparison of presentations as such up[8] to the cognitive power in which this comparison is made, and whereby I distinguish whether the presentations are being compared with one another as belonging to pure understanding or to sensible intuition. Now the relation in which concepts can in a state of mind belong to one another is that of *sameness* and *difference;* of *agreement* and *conflict;* of the *intrinsic* and the *extrinsic;* or, finally, of the *determinable* and *determination* (matter and form). Correct determination of this relation rests on distinguishing in which cognitive power these concepts belong to one another *subjectively:* whether in sensibility or in understanding. For distinguishing[9] these two makes a great difference[10] in the way in which we are to think the relation.

A 262 Before all objective judgments we compare the concepts in order to hit upon[11] the **sameness** (of many presentations under one concept) for the sake
B 318 of *universal* judgments, or their **difference** for producing *particular* judgments; and upon the **agreement** from which *affirmative* judgments and the **conflict** from which *negative* judgments can come to be; etc. Because of this we should, it seems, call the cited concepts comparison concepts (*conceptus comparationis*). However, when what matters is not the logical form of the concepts but their content—i.e., whether the things themselves are the same or different, in agreement or in conflict, etc.—then we see that the things can have a twofold relation to our cognitive power, viz., to sensibility and to understanding; yet on this place *in* which they belong depends the way in which they are to belong to one another. Therefore transcendental reflection, i.e., [consciousness of] the relation of given presentations to one or the other kind of cognition, will alone be able to determine their relation to one another; and whether the things are the same or different, agreeing or conflicting, etc., cannot be established immediately from the concepts themselves by mere comparison[12] (*comparatio*); but this can be established solely[13] by distinguishing, by means of a tran-

[8][For reference.]

[9][*Unterschied.*]

[10][*Unterschied.*]

[11][*kommen auf;* Mellin's addition, adopted by Erdmann in the *Akademie* edition.]

[12][*Vergleichung.*]

[13][*allererst.*]

scendental deliberation (*reflexio*), the kind of cognition to which they belong. Hence we could, to be sure, say that *logical reflection* is mere comparison. For in its case we abstract entirely from the cognitive power to which the given presentations belong; and hence to that extent the presentations are to be treated as homogeneous in terms of having their seat in the mind. But *transcendental reflection* (which deals with the objects them- B 319
selves) contains the basis for the possibility of objective comparison[14] of presentations with one another; it is, therefore, very different indeed from logical reflection, because the cognitive power to which the presentations A 263
belong is not the same. This transcendental deliberation is a duty that no one who wants to make any a priori judgment about things can disavow. We shall now take it in hand, and shall obtain from it more than a little light for determining understanding's proper business.

1. *Sameness*[15] and *difference*. Suppose that an object is exhibited to us repeatedly but always with the same[16] intrinsic determinations (*qualitas et quantitas*).[17] In that case, if the object counts[18] as object of pure understanding then it is always the same object,[19] and is not many[20] but only one thing (i.e., we have *numerica identitas*).[21] But if the object is appearance, then comparison of concepts does not matter at all; rather, however much everything regarding these concepts[22] may be the same,[23] yet the difference of the locations of these appearances at the same[24] time is a sufficient basis for the *numerical difference* of the object (of the senses) itself. Thus in the case of two drops of water we can abstract completely from all intrinsic difference (of quality and quantity), and their being intuited si- A 264
multaneously in different locations is enough for considering them to be numerically different. *Leibniz* took appearances to be things in themselves, B 320

[14][*Komparation.*]

[15][*Einerleiheit.*]

[16][*eben denselben.*]

[17][Quality and quantity.]

[18][*gilt.*]

[19][*eben derselbe.*]

[20][Reading, with Kehrbach, *viele* for *viel.*]

[21][Numerical identity.]

[22][*derselben.*]

[23][*einerlei.*]

[24][*gleich.*]

and hence to be *intelligibilia,* i.e., objects of pure understanding (although he assigned to them the name of phenomena, because their presentations are confused); and thus his principle[25] of the *indistinguishable*[26] (*principium identitatis indiscernibilium*)[27] could indeed not be disputed. But since appearances are objects of sensibility and since understanding's use regarding them is not pure but merely empirical, space itself—as the condition of outer appearances—already indicates plurality and numerical difference. For although one part of space may be completely similar to and like another part, it is yet outside this other part, and precisely thereby is a part different from it and added to it in order to make up a larger space; and this must, therefore, hold for all things that are simultaneous in the various positions of space, however similar and alike they may be otherwise.

2. *Agreement* and *conflict.* When reality is presented only by pure understanding (*realitas noumenon*),[28] then one cannot think a conflict between the realities, i.e., a relation such that the realities when combined in
A 265 one subject annul each other's consequences and $3 - 3 = 0$.[29] In the case of the real in appearance (*realitas phaenomenon*),[30] on the other hand, two
B 321 realities can indeed be in conflict with each other, and when they are united in the same subject each can wholly or in part annihilate *the consequence of the other*—as, e.g., two motive forces in the same straight line insofar as they either pull or push a point in opposite directions;[31] or, again, a pleasure[32] that counterbalances a pain.

3. The *intrinsic* and the *extrinsic.*[33] In an object of pure understanding, only what has (as regards its existence) no reference whatever to anything else different from itself is intrinsic. The intrinsic determinations of a *sub-*

25[*Satz.*]

26[Or 'of the indiscernible': *des Nichtzuunterscheidenden.*]

27[Principle of the identity of indiscernibles.]

28[Noumenal reality.]

29[In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 49), Kant adds, 'for only negation, = 0, is opposed to reality.']

30[Phenomenal reality.]

31[See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 544–51.]

32[*Vergnügen.*]

33[*inner, äußer,* respectively.]

stantia phaenomenon[34] in space, on the other hand, are nothing but relations,[35] and the substance itself is altogether a sum of relations[36] only. We are acquainted with substance in space only through forces that are active[37] in space: either in propelling other substances toward the substance[38] (attraction), or in preventing them from penetrating into the substance[39] (repulsion and impenetrability);[40] we are not acquainted with other properties making up the concept of the substance that appears in space and that we call matter. As object of pure understanding, on the other hand, every substance must have intrinsic determinations and forces that concern its intrinsic reality. However, what intrinsic[41] accidents can I think of but those offered to me by my inner sense—viz., what either is itself a *thinking* or is analogous to it? This is the reason why *Leibniz* turned all substances, because he conceived them as noumena, into simple subjects endowed with powers of presentation—in a word, into **monads**. And it is the reason why he turned into such monads even the components of matter, having in his thought taken from them everything that may signify extrinsic[42] relation, and hence taken from them also *composition.*[43] A 266 B 322

4. *Matter* and *form*. These are two concepts on which all other reflection is based, so very inseparably are they linked with any use of understanding. Matter signifies the determinable as such; form signifies its determination (both in the transcendental meanings of these terms, where we abstract from all difference in what is given and from the way in which it

[34][Phenomenal substance.]

[35][*Verhältnisse*. In his working copy of edition A (entry CXLVIII in Erdmann's version, omitted in Lehmann's—see A 19/B 33 br. n. 13), Kant adds, 'in space there are none but outer [*äußer*] relations, in inner sense none but inner [*inner*] ones; the absolute is lacking.']

[36][*Relationen.*]

[37][*wirksam.*]

[38][*dahin.*]

[39][Reading *in sie* for *in ihn*, on the assumption that Kant substituted (in his mind) 'object' for 'substance.' The only *proximate* referent of *ihn* is 'space,' and using this referent would construe attraction, repulsion and impenetrability as having to do with spaces rather than with the objects occupying them: 'either in propelling other substances toward the space occupied by the substance [*dahin*] (attraction), or in preventing them from penetrating into this space.']

[40][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 498–99.]

[41][*inner*, also translated as 'inner' just below.]

[42][Or 'outer.']

[43][Or 'assembly': *Zusammensetzung*; see B 201 n. 30.]

is determined). Logicians formerly called the universal the matter, but the specific difference the form.[44] In every judgment the given concepts can be called logical matter (for the judgment), and their relation (by means of the copula) the judgment's form. In every being,[45] its constituents (*essentialia*)[46] are the matter, and the way in which they are connected in a thing is the essential[47] form. As regards things as such, moreover, unbounded reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, but the limitation of
A 267 this reality (i.e., negation) was regarded as the form whereby one thing differs from another according to transcendental concepts. For the understand-
B 323 ing demands first that something be given (at least in concept), in order to be able to determine it in a certain way. Hence in pure understanding's concept matter precedes form; and because of this *Leibniz* first assumed things (monads) and within them a power of presentation on their part, in order then to base thereon their extrinsic[48] relation and the community of their states (viz., the community of the presentations). Hence space and time were possible as bases[49] and consequences—space only through the relation of substances, time through the connection of their determinations among one another. And thus it would in fact have to be, if pure understanding could be referred directly to objects, and if space and time were determinations of things as they are in themselves. But if they are only sensible intuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as appearances, then the form of intuition (as a subjective character of sensibility) precedes all matter (the sensations)—and hence space and time precede all appearances and all data of experience—and is, rather, what makes experience possible in the first place. The intellectualist philosopher could not tolerate that the form should precede the things themselves and should determine their possibility—a quite correct verdict[50] once he assumed that we intuit
A 268 things as they are (although only by means of confused presentation). But
B 324 sensible intuition is in fact a quite special subjective condition lying a priori at the basis of all perception, and its form is original. Hence the form is

[44][Cf. the view attributed to the Aristotelian school in Kant's First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. XX, 215n.]

[45][*Wesen*.]

[46][Essentials.]

[47][*wesentlich*]

[48][Or 'outer.']

[49][Or 'grounds.']

[50][*Zensur* (in the old sense based on the Latin).]

given by itself, and the matter (or the things themselves as they appear) is far from lying at the basis (as one would have to judge according to mere concepts); rather, its own possibility presupposes a formal intuition (time and space) as given.

Comment on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection

Permit me to call *transcendental location* the position that we assign to a concept either in sensibility or in pure understanding. In this way the judging[51] of this position—the position belonging to every concept according to the difference in our use of it—and the instruction, according to rules, for determining this location for all concepts would be the *transcendental topic*.[52] This would be a doctrine that, by always distinguishing to which cognitive power the concepts properly belong, would protect us thoroughly against surreptitious claims[53] made by pure understanding, and against deceptions arising from these. Every concept and every heading under which many cognitions belong may be called a *logical location.* On this is based the *logical topic* of Aristotle,[54] which schoolteachers and orators could employ in order to look up, under certain headings of thought, what was most fitting for a matter at issue, and in order then to reason or wordily chatter about it with a semblance[55] of thoroughness. {A 269 B 325}

The transcendental topic, on the other hand, contains nothing more than the cited four headings of all comparison and differentiation. These headings differ from categories inasmuch as they do not exhibit the object according to what makes up its concept (magnitude, reality), but exhibit in all its manifoldness only the comparison of presentations that precedes the concept of things. But this comparison requires first of all a deliberation, i.e., a determination of the location to which belong the presentations of the things being compared, i.e., whether they are thought by pure understanding or given in appearance by sensibility.

[51][*Beurteilung*; see A 60/B 84 br. n. 69.]

[52][Cf. A 83/B 109.]

[53][*Erschleichungen.*]

[54][See A 61/B 86 incl. br. n. 76. See also W. Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 92–5.]

[55][*Schein.*]

Concepts can be compared logically without our worrying about where their objects belong, i.e., whether as noumena they belong to understanding, or as phenomena to sensibility. But if with these concepts we want to go to the objects, then we need first of all [a] transcendental deliberation in order to decide for which cognitive power these objects are to be objects, whether for pure understanding or for sensibility. Without this deliberation, my use of these concepts is very unsafe and there arise supposed
B 326 A 270 synthetic principles that critical reason cannot acknowledge and that are based solely on a transcendental amphiboly, i.e., a confusion of a pure object of understanding with appearance.

Lacking such a transcendental topic, and being therefore tricked by the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection, the illustrious *Leibniz* erected an *intellectual system of the world;* or, rather, he believed that he cognized the intrinsic character of things inasmuch as he compared all objects only with the understanding and the abstract[56] formal concepts of his thought. Our table of concepts of reflection provides for us the unexpected advantage of laying before us what differentiates his doctrinal system[57] in all its parts, and of laying before us simultaneously the governing basis of this peculiar way of thinking that rested on nothing but a misunderstanding. He compared all things with one another merely by concepts, and naturally found among them no differences other than those by which the understanding distinguishes its pure concepts from one another. The conditions of sensible intuition, which carry with them their own distinctions, he did not regard as original. For sensibility was for him only a confused way of presenting, and not a separate source of presentations. Appearance was for him the presentation of the *thing in itself,* although a presentation different
A 271 in logical form from cognition through understanding; for, with its usual
B 327 lack of dissection, appearance draws into the concept of the thing a certain mixture of supplementary presentations[58] that the understanding knows how to separate[59] from it. In a word, **Leibniz** *intellectualized* appearances, just as **Locke** according to a system of *noogony* (if I may be permitted to employ such expressions) had *sensualized* all of the concepts of understand-

[56][*abgesondert.*]

[57][*-begriff.*]

[58][*Nebenvorstellungen.*]

[59][*absondern.*]

ing, i.e., had passed them off as nothing but empirical or abstracted[60] concepts of reflection. These great men did not seek in understanding and sensibility two quite different sources of presentations which could, however, only in *connection* make objectively valid judgments about things. Instead, each man kept to only one of the two sources, viz., the one source that in his opinion referred directly to things in themselves, while the other source did nothing but confuse or order the presentations of the first source.

Accordingly, *Leibniz* compared with one another objects of the senses, taken as things as such, merely in the understanding. *First,* he compared these objects insofar as they are to be judged by understanding as being the same or different. Hence he envisaged solely their concepts and not their position in intuition wherein alone objects can be given, and ignored completely the transcendental location of these concepts (i.e., whether the object is to be numbered among appearances or among things in themselves). Thus the outcome could not be other than it was: viz., Leibniz extended A 272 B 328 his principle of the indistinguishable,[61] which holds only for concepts of things as such, to [cover] also the objects of the senses (*mundus phaenomenon*);[62] and he believed that he had thereby provided our cognition of nature with significant expansion. Indeed, if I am acquainted with a drop of water as a thing in itself and in terms of all its intrinsic determinations, then I can accept no drop of water as being different from another if the entire concept of this drop is[63] the same as the drop. But if the drop is appearance in space, then it has its location not merely in the understanding (i.e., among concepts), but in sensible outer intuition (i.e., in space). And there the physical locations are quite inconsequential in regard to the intrinsic determinations of things, and a location *b*[64] can receive a thing completely similar to and like another found in location *a* just as well as if the things were intrinsically ever so different. The difference of locations even by itself, apart from further conditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as appearances not only possible but also necessary. Hence that

60[*abgesonderte*.]

61[Or 'indiscernible'; i.e., the principle of the identity of indiscernibles.]

62[The phenomenal world.]

63[As regards its determinations.]

64[To improve readability, I have deleted the '=' before *b* and similarly before *a* just below.]

seeming law[65] is not a law of nature. It is solely an analytic rule for[66] the comparison of things through mere concepts.

Second, the principle that realities (taken as mere affirmations) never
A 273 logically conflict with one another is an entirely true proposition concern-
B 329 ing the relation of concepts; but it has not the least signification, neither in regard to nature nor at all in regard to any thing in itself (of this thing we have no concept[67]). For this real conflict occurs wherever A – B = 0, i.e., wherever one reality combined with another in one subject annuls the other's effect. This situation is put before us unceasingly in nature by all obstructions and reactions; these, since they are based on forces, must be called *realitates phaenomena.*[68] General mechanics can even indicate the empirical condition of this conflict in an a priori rule,[69] because it takes account of the opposition in the direction[70] —a condition about which the transcendental concept of reality knows nothing whatever. Although Mr. von *Leibniz* did not exactly announce this proposition[71] with the pomp of a new principle, yet he employed it to make new assertions, and his followers entered it expressly in their *Leibnizian-Wolffian* doctrinal edifice. E.g., according to this principle all evils are nothing but consequences of creatures' limits, i.e., negations, because these alone conflict with reality. (And thus it actually is in the case of the mere concept of a thing as such, but not in things as appearances.) Similarly, the adherents of Leibniz find
B 330 it not only possible but also natural to unite, without any worrisome con-
A 274 flict, all reality in one being. For they are acquainted with no conflict other than that of contradiction (whereby the concept of a thing is itself annulled), and not with the conflict of reciprocal impairment, where one real basis[72] annuls the effect of another;[73] only in sensibility do we encounter for such conflict the conditions required to present it.

[65][The principle of the identity of indiscernibles.]

[66][Reading, with the fourth edition, *der* for *oder*.]

[67][Edition A has 'no concept whatever.']

[68][Phenomenal realities]

[69][Or 'can even indicate a priori the empirical condition of this conflict in a rule.']

[70][Of the forces. Cf. A 265/B 321 incl. br. n. 31.]

[71][The proposition that realities (taken as affirmations) never logically conflict with one another.]

[72][*Realgrund.*]

[73][And vice versa.]

Third, the Leibnizian[74] monadology has no other basis at all than the fact that this philosopher presented the distinction of the intrinsic and the extrinsic merely in relation to understanding. Substances as such must have something *intrinsic*, which therefore is free from all extrinsic[75] relations and consequently also from composition.[76] Hence the simple is the foundation of what is intrinsic in things in themselves. But what is intrinsic in the state of these substances also cannot consist in location, shape, contiguity,[77] or motion (these determinations are all extrinsic relations); and hence we can attribute to substances no other intrinsic[78] state than that whereby we ourselves inwardly[79] determine our sense, viz., the *state of presentations*. And thus the monads were completed; these are to amount to the basic material of the whole universe; but their active force[80] consists only in presentations, through which they are in fact efficacious merely within themselves.

Exactly because of this, however, Leibniz' principle of the possible *community of substances* among one another also had to be a *predetermined*[81] *harmony*, and could not be a physical influence. For since everything is engaged only inwardly, i.e., with its presentations, one substance's state of presentations could not stand in any efficacious linkage whatsoever with that of another substance. Rather, some third cause,[82] and one influencing each and every substance, had to make their states correspond to one another. But this was to be accomplished not exactly through aid provided on each occasion and specially arranged in each individual case (as in the *systema assistentiae*),[83] but through the unity of the idea [in the mind] of a cause valid for all substances, an idea in which they must one and all acquire their existence and permanence and hence also their reciprocal correspondence among one another according to universal laws. {A 275 B 331}

74[Emphasis on 'Leibnizian' deleted.]

75[Or 'outer.' Likewise just below.]

76[Or 'assembly': *Zusammensetzung;* see B 201 n. 30.]

77[*Berührung*.]

78[*inner.*]

79[*innerlich.*]

80[Or 'power.']

81[Or 'preestablished': *vorherbestimmte*]

82[Viz., God.]

83[System of assistance; the occasionalism of Nicholas de Malebranche (1638–1715).]

Fourth, Leibniz' famous *doctrinal system*[84] of *space* and *time*, in which he intellectualized these forms of sensibility, had arisen solely from this same delusion of transcendental reflection. If I want to present, by mere understanding, extrinsic[85] relations of things, then this can be done only by means of a concept of their reciprocal action; and if I am to connect a thing's state with another state of the very same thing, then this can be done only in the order of bases[86] and consequences.[87] And thus *Leibniz* thought of space as a certain order in the community of substances, and of time as
B 332 the dynamical sequence[88] of their states. But as for the peculiar [features],
A 276 independent of things, that space and time seem to have about them, these he ascribed to these concepts' *confusion*, which brought it about that what is a mere form of dynamical relations is considered to be, on its own,[89] a self-subsistent intuition that precedes the things themselves. Hence space and time were for Leibniz the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and their states) in themselves; and the things were intelligible substances (*substantiae noumena*).[90] But he nonetheless wanted to make these concepts hold[91] for appearances. For he conceded to sensibility no kind of intuition of its own; rather, he sought all—even empirical—presentation of objects in understanding, and left to the senses nothing but the despicable task of confusing and corrupting understanding's presentations.

But even if we could through pure understanding say something synthetically *about things in themselves* (which, however, is impossible), then this could still not be applied[92] to appearances, which do not present to us things in themselves. Hence in the case of appearances I shall, in transcendental deliberation, always have to compare my concepts only under the conditions of sensibility, and thus space and time will be determinations not of things in themselves but of appearances; and what things may be in

[84][*Lehrbegriff*.]

[85][Or 'outer.']

[86][Or 'grounds.']

[87][*Folgen*.]

[88][*Folge*.]

[89][*eigen*.]

[90][Noumenal substances.]

[91][*geltend machen*]

[92][*gezogen*.]

themselves I do not know—nor indeed need to know, since, after all, I can never encounter a thing otherwise than in appearance. {A 277 B 333}

The remaining concepts of reflection I also treat in this way. Matter is *substantia phaenomenon*.[93] What may belong to it intrinsically I seek in all parts of the space that it occupies and in all effects that it exerts—which, to be sure, can never be more than appearances of outer senses. Hence I do indeed have nothing that is intrinsic[94] absolutely, but have only what is intrinsic comparatively, which itself consists in turn of extrinsic[95] relations. On the other hand, the character of matter that would be intrinsic absolutely,[96] i.e., according to pure understanding, is a mere fancy.[97] For matter is not at all an object for pure understanding.[98] The transcendental object, on the other hand, which may be the basis of this appearance that we call matter, is a mere something[99] about which we would not understand what it is even if someone were able to tell us. For we cannot understand anything except what carries with it, in intuition, something[100] corresponding to our words. If the complaints that *we have no insight whatever into the intrinsic character*[101] *of things* are to mean the same as that we do not by pure understanding comprehend what the things appearing to us may be in themselves, then these complaints are quite improper and unreasonable. For they then want us to be able to cognize things, and hence intuit them, even without senses, and consequently want us to have a cognitive power wholly different from the human one not merely in degree {A 278 B 334} but even in its intuition and in kind; and hence they want us not to be human, but to be beings about whom we cannot even state whether they are so much as possible, much less what their character is. Observation and dissection of appearances penetrate to the intrinsic character[102] of nature, and one cannot know how far this penetration may in time go. But those

[93][Phenomenal substance.]

[94][*innerlich.*]

[95][Or 'outer.']

[96][*das schlechthin . . . Innerliche der Materie.*]

[97][*Grille.*]

[98][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 472–74.]

[99][*Etwas.*]

[100][*ein.*]

[101][*das Innere.*]

[102][*ins Innere.*]

transcendental questions that go beyond nature we would, despite all this, still never be able to answer, even if all of nature were uncovered for us. This is so because we have not been given [the ability] to observe even our own mind “ for in it lies the secret of our sensibility's origin—by means of an intuition other than that of our inner[103] sense. Sensibility's reference to an object, and what may be the transcendental basis of this [objective] unity, this doubtless lies too deeply hidden so that we, who are acquainted even with ourselves only through inner sense and hence as appearance, might with so unfitting an instrument of our investigation discover anything other than what are always in turn appearances—whereas it was the nonsensible cause of those appearances that we hoped to explore.

This critique of conclusions drawn from mere acts of reflection is thus extremely useful. For it establishes distinctly the nullity of any conclusions about objects compared with one another solely in the understand-
A 279 B 335 ing, and at the same time confirms what we have mainly been urging: that although appearances are not also comprised, as things in themselves, among the objects of pure understanding, yet they are the only objects by reference to which our cognition can have objective reality—viz., in cases where to the concepts there corresponds intuition.

If we reflect merely logically, then we only compare our concepts among one another in the understanding, as to whether both of two concepts have the same content, whether or not they contradict each other, whether something is contained in the concept intrinsically or added to it, and which of the two is given and which is to count[104] only as a way of thinking the given one. But if I apply these concepts to an object as such (in the transcendental meaning of the expression), without further determining this object as to whether it is an object of sensible or of intellectual intuition, then there immediately emerge limitations (whereby we are not to go outside this concept[105]) that subvert[106] all empirical use of these concepts. And precisely thereby these limitations prove that the presentation of an object as a thing as such is by no means merely *insufficient*, but is, when taken without sensible determination of it and independently of any empirical con-

[103][*inner.*]

[104][*gelten.*]

[105][Of an object as such.]

[106][*verkehren.*]

dition, internally[107] *conflicting*. They prove, therefore, that either one must (in logic) abstract from any object, or, if one does assume an object, must think it under conditions of sensible intuition; and hence they prove that the intelligible would require a quite special intuition that we do not have, B 336
and in the absence thereof the intelligible is *for us* nothing; but also prove, A 280
on the other hand, that appearances cannot be things in themselves. For if I think merely things[108] as such, then the difference of outer[109] relations can indeed not amount to a difference of the things[110] themselves, but rather presupposes it. And if the concept of the one thing does not differ at all intrinsically from the concept of the other, then I am only positing one and the same thing[111] in[112] different relations. Moreover, through addition of a mere affirmation (reality) to another the positive is, of course, augmented, and nothing is withdrawn from it or annulled; hence the real [characteristics] in things as such cannot conflict with one another—etc.

As we have shown, the concepts of reflection have, through a certain misinterpretation, such an influence on the use of understanding that they have been able to mislead even one of the most sharp-sighted[113] among all philosophers into devising a supposed system of intellectual cognition—a system that undertakes to determine its objects without involvement[114] of the senses. Precisely because of this there is great benefit, for reliably determining and securing the bounds of understanding, in extricating what cause deludes us in the amphiboly of these concepts as this amphiboly prompts us to adopt false principles.

We must indeed say that what belongs to or contradicts a concept uni- B 337
versally also belongs to or contradicts everything particular that is con- A 281

[107][*in sich selbst.*]

[108][*Dinge.*]

[109][Or 'extrinsic.']

[110][*Sachen.*]

[111][*Ding.*]

[112]['into,' literally.]

[113][*scharfsichtig;* cf. A 66 / B 91 br. n. 117.]

[114][*Dazukunft*]

tained under it (*dictum de omni et nullo*).[115] It would be absurd, however, to change this logical principle so that it reads thus: what is not contained in a universal concept is also not contained in the particular ones that fall under it; for these are particular concepts precisely because they contain more than is thought in the universal one. Now plainly the whole intellectual system of Leibniz is actually built upon this latter principle;[116] and hence his system falls simultaneously with this principle, along with all the ambiguity, arising therefrom, in the use of understanding.

The principle[117] of the indistinguishable[118] is in fact based on the presupposition that if a certain distinction is not found in the concept of a thing as such, then it is also not to be found in the things themselves; and that consequently all things that are not already distinguished from one another (in quality or quantity) in their concepts are completely the same (*numero eadem*).[119] Yet in the mere concept of some thing or other one has already abstracted from some necessary conditions of an intuition; and hence, through an odd hastiness, what one is abstracting from is taken for something that is not to be found at all, and nothing is granted to the thing except what its concept contains.

B 338

A 282 The concept of a cubic foot of space, no matter where and how often I think of it, is in itself always completely the same. But two cubic feet are nonetheless distinguished in space (*numero diversa*),[120] merely by their locations. These locations are conditions of the intuition wherein the object of this concept is given; and although these conditions do not belong to the concept, they still belong to all of sensibility. In like manner, there is no conflict at all in the concept of a thing if nothing negative is combined with an affirmative [characteristic]; and merely affirmative concepts cannot, when combined, bring about any annulment. But in the sensible intuition

[115][The dictum of all and none; i.e., the rule that what belongs to or contradicts the genus or species also belongs to or contradicts all objects that are contained under that genus or species. See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 123. This rule is there said to be easily deducible from the principle on which rests the possibility and validity of all categorical syllogisms: What belongs to the characteristic of a thing also belongs to the thing itself; and what contradicts the characteristic of a thing also contradicts the thing itself.]

[116][*Grundsatz*.]

[117][*Satz*; viz., the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Cf. A 264/B 320.]

[118][Or 'of the indiscernible': *des Nichtzuunterscheidenden*.]

[119][Numerically the same.]

[120][Numerically different.]

wherein reality (e.g., motion) is given we do find conditions (opposite directions),[121] from which we were abstracting in the concept of motion as such, that make possible a conflict, though indeed not a logical one: viz., a zero, = 0, arising from none but positive [characteristics]; and we could not say that all realities[122] are in harmony[123] with one another because no conflict is to be found among their concepts.[124] Again, according to mere concepts the intrinsic is the substratum of all relational[125] or extrinsic[126] determinations. If, therefore, I abstract from all conditions of intuition and keep solely to the concept of a thing as such, then I can abstract from all extrinsic relation, and there must yet remain a concept of what signifies no relation at all but signifies merely intrinsic determinations. Now from this it then seems to follow that in every thing (substance) there is something that is absolutely intrinsic and that precedes all extrinsic determinations inasmuch as it makes them possible in the first place, and that hence this substratum is something that no longer contains any extrinsic relations and consequently is *simple.* (For corporeal things still are never more than relations, at least relations of the parts outside one another.) And because we are not acquainted with any absolutely intrinsic[127] determinations except those [given] through our inner[128] sense, it thus seems to follow that this substratum is not only simple but is also (by analogy with our inner sense) determined through *presentations,* i.e., it seems to follow that all things are {B 339 A 283}

[121][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 491–94.]

[122][*alle Realität.*]

[123][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *in Einstimmung* for *Einstimmung.*]

[124]If we here were to make use of the usual subterfuge and to say that at least *realitates noumena*[a] cannot act in opposition to one another, then we would surely have to adduce an example of such a pure and sense-free reality, in order to understand whether such a reality indeed represents[b] something or rather nothing at all. Yet we can get no example from anywhere else but from experience, which never offers us more than phenomena; and hence this proposition[c] means nothing more than that a concept containing only affirmations contains nothing negative—a proposition that we never doubted. B 339

[a][Noumenal realities.]

[b][*vorstellen.*]

[c][That noumenal realities cannot act in opposition to one another.]

[125][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *Verhältnis-* for *Verhältnis.*]

[126][Or 'outer'; similarly for the next three occurrences of 'extrinsic']

[127][*inner.*]

[128][*inner.*]

B 340 in fact *monads*, or [i.e.] simple beings endowed with presentations. Indeed, all of this would be correct, were it not that, besides the concept of
A 284 a thing as such, something more belongs to the conditions under which alone objects of outer intuition can be given to us and from which the pure concept abstracts. For thus we find that a permanent appearance in space (impenetrable extension) can contain only relations and nothing absolutely intrinsic, and can yet be the primary substratum of all outer perception. Through mere concepts I cannot indeed think anything extrinsic without something intrinsic,[129] precisely because relational concepts do presuppose things given absolutely and are impossible without them. Intuition, however, contains something that does not lie at all in the mere concept of a thing as such; and this something provides us with the substratum that through mere concepts would not be cognized at all: viz., a space that, with all that it contains, consists of nothing but formal—or, for that matter, real—relations. Hence I cannot say that, because without something[130] absolutely intrinsic no thing can be presented *through mere concepts,* there is also in the things themselves that are contained under these concepts, and in *their intuition,* nothing extrinsic that is not based on something absolutely intrinsic. For once we have abstracted from all conditions of in-
B 341 tuition, then we are indeed left with nothing in the mere concept but the intrinsic [characteristics] as such and their relations among one another through which alone the extrinsic is possible. But this necessity, which is
A 285 based solely on abstraction, does not occur in the case of things insofar as they are given in intuition with determinations that express mere relations without being based on anything intrinsic; for such things are not things in themselves, but are merely appearances. Whatever [characteristics] we are acquainted with in matter are nothing but relations (what we call its intrinsic determinations is intrinsic only comparatively); but among these relations there are independent[131] and permanent ones, through which a determinate object is given to us. The fact that, if I abstract from these relations, I am left with nothing further to think does not annul the concept of a thing as appearance, nor the concept of an object *in abstracto;* but it does annul any possibility of an object determinable in terms of mere concepts, i.e., any possibility of a noumenon. It is startling, to be sure, to hear that a thing

[129][Or, respectively, 'outer' and 'inner.' Similarly for the remaining occurrences of these terms in this passage.]

[130][*ein.*]

[131][*selbständig*]

is supposed to consist altogether of relations. Such a thing, however, also is mere appearance and cannot be thought at all through pure categories; the thing itself consists in the mere relation of something as such to the senses. Similarly, if we begin with mere concepts, then indeed we cannot think the relations of things *in abstracto* except in such a way that one thing B 342
is the cause of determinations in another; for this is our understanding's concept of relations itself. But because we are then abstracting from all intuition, we are dropping an entire way in which the manifold [elements] can determine their location for one another, viz., the form of sensibility (space), which in fact precedes all empirical causality. A 286

If by merely intelligible objects we mean those things that are thought[132] through pure categories, without any schema of sensibility, then such objects are impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our concepts of understanding is merely the kind of intuition we have—the sensible intuition[133] whereby objects[134] are given to us; and if we abstract from this intuition, then those concepts have no reference to any object.[135] Indeed, even if we were to assume a kind of intuition other than this our sensible one, yet our functions of thought would in regard to it have no signification whatever. If, on the other hand, by merely intelligible objects we mean merely objects of a nonsensible intuition—objects for which, to be sure, our categories do not hold and of which therefore we can never have any cognition at all (neither intuition nor concept)—then noumena in this merely negative signification must indeed be admitted. For we are then saying nothing more than that our kind of intuition does not deal with all things, but deals merely with objects of our senses; that consequently its B 343
objective validity is bounded; and that hence there remains room for some other kind of intuition and therefore also for things as objects of it. But in that case the concept of a noumenon is problematic; i.e., it is then the presentation of a thing about which we can say neither that it is possible nor A 287
that it is impossible. For we are not acquainted with any kind of intuition whatever but our sensible one, nor with any kind of concepts but the categories; yet neither of the two is appropriate for an extrasensible[136] object.

[132][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 49), Kant changes this to: 'cognized by us.']

[133][Literally, Kant says 'the kind of our sensible intuition.']

[134][*Gegenstände*.]

[135][*Objekt*.]

[136][*außersinnlich*.]

Hence admitting such noumena does not yet allow us to expand positively the realm of the objects of our thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume that besides appearances there are also objects of pure thought, i.e., noumena, because these objects have no positive signification that we can indicate. For we must confess concerning the categories that, when taken alone, they are not yet sufficient for cognition of things in themselves, and that without the data of sensibility they would merely be subjective forms, without an object,[137] of the unity of understanding. Thought is not, indeed, in itself a product of the senses, and is to that extent also not limited by them; but it does not therefore have its own and pure use forthwith, without the assistance of sensibility, since it is then without an object. We also cannot call the noumenon such an *object;* for this signifies precisely the problematic concept of an object for[138] a quite different
B 344 intuition and for an understanding quite different from ours—an object that hence is itself a problem.[139] Hence the concept of the noumenon is not the concept of an object; rather, it is the problem,[140] linked inevitably with the limitation of our sensibility, as to whether there may not be
A 288 objects wholly detached from this sensibility's intuition. This question can be answered only indeterminately. We can say, viz., that because sensible intuition does not deal with all things without distinction, there remains room for more and different objects, and that therefore such objects cannot be absolutely denied; but that in the absence of a determinate concept[141] (since no category is suitable for this) they also cannot be asserted as objects for our understanding.

Accordingly the understanding limits sensibility, but without therefore expanding its own realm. And inasmuch as the understanding warns sensibility not to claim to deal with things in themselves but solely with appearances, it does think an object in itself. But the understanding thinks it only as transcendental object. This object is the cause of appearance (hence is not itself appearance) and can be thought neither as magnitude nor as

137[Here Kant says *Gegenstand*; in the next two occurrences of 'object' he says *Objekt*; then again *Gegenstand*; and so on. Cf. A vii br. n. 7.]

138[In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 49), Kant writes '[exhibited] before.']

139[*Problem.*]

140[*Aufgabe.*]

141[Of such objects.]

reality nor as substance, etc. (because these concepts always require sensible forms wherein they determine an object). Hence concerning this object we are completely ignorant[142] as to whether it is to be found in us—or, for that matter, outside us; and whether it would be annulled simultaneously with sensibility, or would still remain if we removed sensibility. If B 345
we want to call this object noumenon, because the presentation of it is not sensible, then we are free to do so. But since we cannot apply to it any of our concepts of understanding, the presentation yet remains empty for us, and does not serve for anything but to mark the bounds of our sensible cognition and to leave us with room that we can fill neither through pos- A 289
sible experience nor through pure understanding.

The critique of this pure understanding, therefore, does not permit one to create a new realm of objects apart from those that it may encounter as appearances, and to stray into intelligible worlds—not even into the concept of them. The mistake which in an utterly plausible manner misleads philosophers into doing so, and which is indeed excusable although not justifiable, lies in this move: the use of understanding, contrary to understanding's vocation, has been made transcendental; and thus objects, i.e., possible intuitions, must conform to concepts—instead of concepts' conforming to possible intuitions (as that whereon alone their objective validity rests). But the cause of this move, in turn, is that apperception, and with it thought, precedes all possible determinate arrangement of presentations. We therefore think something as such and, on the one hand, determine it sensibly; but, on the other hand, we yet distinguish from this way of intuiting it the B 346
universal object presented *in abstracto*. And thus we are left with a way of determining the object merely through thought; and although this way of determining the object is a mere logical form without content, it nonetheless seems to us to be a way in which the object exists in itself (as noumenon), i.e., without taking account of the intuition that is limited to our senses.

Before we leave the Transcendental Analytic, we must still add some- A 290
thing that, although not of special importance in itself, might yet seem required for the completeness of the system. The highest concept from which philosophers tend to begin a transcendental philosophy is usually the division into the possible and the impossible. But since any division presup-

[142][*unbekannt.*]

poses a divided concept, a still higher concept must be indicated, and this is the concept of an object as such (taken problematically, and whether it is something or nothing being left undecided). Since the categories are the only concepts referring to objects as such, the distinction of an object as to whether it is something or nothing will proceed according to the order and instruction of the categories.

B 347 1. The concepts of everything, of much, and of one are opposed by the concept that annuls everything, i.e., *none*. And thus the object of a concept to which there corresponds no intuition whatever that one can indicate is = nothing. I.e., it is a concept without an object (*ens rationis*)[143]—as noumena are, which cannot be numbered among the possibilities, even though they must not on that account be claimed to be impossible; or as, say, certain new fundamental forces that are being thought are indeed thought without contradiction, but also without an example from experience, and hence must not be numbered among the possibilities.[144] A 291

2. Reality is *something;* negation is *nothing,* viz., the concept of the lack of an object (*nihil privativum*)[145]—as, e.g., shadow or cold.

3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but is the merely formal condition of an object (as appearance) (i.e., it is an *ens imaginarium*)[146]—as pure space and pure time. These are indeed something, viz., as forms for intuiting, but are not themselves objects that are intuited.

B 348 4. The object of a concept that contradicts itself is nothing because the concept is nothing; it is the impossible (*nihil negativum*)[147]—as, say, a two-sided rectilinear figure.

[143][Being of reason. Cf. A 681 = B 709 and A 669 = B 697.]

[144][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 498–99.]

[145][Privative nothing.]

[146][Imaginary being.]

[147][Negative nothing.]

Hence the table of this division of the concept of *nothing* (for the parallel division, of something, follows from this on its own) would have to be set up thus:

NOTHING A 292
as

1
Empty concept without object,
ens rationis

2
Empty object
of a concept,
nihil privativum

3
Empty intuition
without object,
ens imaginarium

4
Empty object without concept,
nihil negativum

We see that the thought-entity[148] (no. 1) is distinguished from the nonentity[149] (no. 4) by the fact that the thought-entity must not be numbered among the possibilities, because it is mere invention (although not contradictory invention), whereas the nonentity is opposed to possibility inasmuch as the concept annuls even itself. Both are, however, empty con- B 349
cepts. The *nihil privativum* (no. 2) and the *ens imaginarium* (no. 3), on the other hand, are empty data for concepts. If light has not been given to the senses, then one cannot present darkness either; and if extended beings have not been perceived, then one cannot present space. Both negation and the mere form of intuition, if without something real, are no objects.

[148][Literally, 'thought-thing': *Gedankending*.]

[149][*Unding*: 'nonthing,' literally, with absurdity implied. Cf. A 39/B 56, B 71, and B 274. Cf. also A 51/B 75.]

A 293 # TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC

DIVISION II
TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC[1]

INTRODUCTION[2]

I
ON TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION

Above[3] we called dialectic as such[4] a *logic of illusion.* This does not mean that it is a doctrine of *probability.*[5] For probability is truth, but truth cog-

[1][See W. H. Walsh, *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1975), 169–76. (This work has not been cited before, but its earlier parts often provide concise help for comprehending Kant's basic meanings in the first half of the *Critique.*) See also H. W Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 238–48. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 195–200. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 425–54. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 197–201. The last half of the *Critique* (of the Doctrine of Elements, strictly speaking) has stimulated less commentary than the first half. J. N. Findlay (on page 195 of the work just cited) offers the following provocative observation: "We pass from the many badly overgrown, hazardous bunkers of the Transcendental Analytic to the comparatively smooth, green fairways of the Transcendental Dialectic, where there are fewer hermeneutic problems." *Here* the practice followed in the first half of the *Critique* is followed again in the second half: only such secondary sources are cited as are considered to be for the most part sympathetic to Kant's views and helpful for comprehending his meanings. No attempt is made to provide a complete listing of secondary sources—a task of Herculean proportions.]

[2][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *Transzendentale Dialektik: Ein Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1966–71), vol. 1, 1–15.]

[3][A 61/B 86.]

[4][*überhaupt.* My reason for translating this term in this way is given at B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[5]['Illusion' translates *Schein,* which also means 'seeming'; and 'probability' renders *Wahrscheinlichkeit,* which literally means 'seeming true ']

nized through insufficient bases;[6] and although cognition[7] of such truth is therefore deficient, yet it is not on that account deceptive, and hence must not be separated from the analytic part of logic. Still less may *appearance* and *illusion*[8] be regarded as being the same. For truth and illusion are not B 350
in the object insofar as it is intuited, but are in the judgment made about the object[9] insofar as it is thought. Hence although it is correct to say that the senses do not err, this is so not because they always judge correctly but because they do not judge at all. Thus both truth and error, and hence also illusion as the process of mistakenly leading[10] to error, are to be found only in the judgment, i.e., only in the relation of the object to our understanding. In a cognition[11] that accords throughout with the laws of understanding there is no error. There is also no error in a presentation[12] of the senses A 294
(because it contains no judgment at all). But no force of nature can deviate from its own laws by itself. Thus neither the understanding on its own (i.e., apart from the influence of another cause), nor the senses by themselves would err. The understanding would not err, because, if it acts merely in accordance with its laws, then the effect (the judgment) must necessarily agree with these laws; but the formal [element] of all truth consists in the agreement with the laws of the understanding. And in the senses there is no judgment at all, neither a true nor a false one. Now because we have no other sources of cognition besides these two, it follows that error comes about only by sensibility's unnoticed influence on understanding. Through this influence it comes about that the[13] subjective bases of the judgment meld[14] with the objective ones and make them deviate[15] from their [proper] B 351

[6][Or 'grounds' or 'reasons': *Gründe*. See B xix br. n. 79.]

[7][*Erkenntnis*. For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6.]

[8][*Erscheinung, Schein*.]

[9][*Gegenstand*, in this case. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[10][*Verleitung*.]

[11][Of the object.]

[12][*Vorstellung*. My reason for translating *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' rather than as 'representation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[13]['the' added in B.]

[14][*zusammenfließen*.]

[15][Literally, 'deviant': *abweichend*.]

determination[16]—just as a body in motion would indeed by itself always keep to a straight line in the same direction, but is deflected[17] into curvilinear motion if influenced[18] at the same time by another force acting in
A 295 another direction.[19] Hence in order to distinguish the action peculiar to understanding from the force[20] that mingles with it, we shall need to regard an erroneous judgment as the diagonal between two forces[21] determining the judgment in two different directions that—as it were—enclose an angle, and to resolve this composite action into the simple ones of understanding and of sensibility.[22] In the case of pure a priori judgments we must do this by transcendental deliberation,[23] whereby (as has already been shown)[24] every presentation is assigned its place in the cognitive power appropriate to it, and whereby the influence of sensibility on understanding[25] is therefore also distinguished.

It is not our task here to deal with empirical (e.g., optical) illusion, which
B 352 occurs in the empirical use of otherwise correct rules of understanding, and through which our power of judgment[26] is misled by the influence of imagination. Here we have to do, rather, solely with *transcendental illusion,* which influences principles whose use is not even designed for experience; if it were, then we would, after all, at least have a touchstone of their correctness. Rather, transcendental illusion carries us, even despite all the warnings issued by critique, entirely beyond the empirical use of the categories and puts us off with the deception of there being an expansion of

B 351 [16]Sensibility, when laid at the basis of understanding, as the object to which understanding applies its function, is the source of real cognitions. But the same sensibility, insofar as it influences the understanding's acts themselves and determines it to make judgments, is the basis of error.

[17][Actually Kant says that the line is so deflected.]

[18][*einfließen.*]

[19][This is Newton's first law of motion. See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 543.]

[20][Or (if *Kraft* is taken in the sense of *Vermögen*) '[mental] power.' On my use of 'power' for *Vermögen*, see A xii br. n. 16.]

[21][Or 'powers.' See the preceding note.]

[22][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 492.]

[23][See A 260/B 316 incl. br. n. 4.]

[24][A 260–92/B 316–49.]

[25][*der letzteren* [*Erkenntniskraft*] *auf jene.*]

[26][*Urteilskraft* See A 130/B 169 br. n. 3.]

pure understanding. Let us call the principles[27] whose application keeps altogether within the limits of possible experience *immanent* principles, and A 296
those that are to fly beyond these limits *transcendent principles.* But by transcendent principles I do not mean the *transcendental* use or misuse of the categories, which is a mere mistake made by the power of judgment when, not being duly curbed by critique, it does not pay enough attention to the boundaries of the territory on which alone our pure understanding is permitted to engage in its play. Rather, I mean by them actual principles requiring[28] us to tear down all those boundary posts and to claim an entirely new territory that recognizes no demarcation at all. Hence *transcendental* and *transcendent* are not the same. The principles of pure understanding that we have put forth above[29] are to be of empirical and not of transcendental use, i.e., use extending beyond the boundary of experience. B 353
But a principle that removes these limits—indeed, even commands us to step beyond them—is called *transcendent.* If our critique can manage to uncover the illusion in these claimed principles, then the principles of merely empirical use may be called, in contrast to the transcendent ones, *immanent* principles of pure understanding.

Logical illusion (the illusion of fallacious inferences), which consists in the mere imitation of the form of reason, arises solely from a lack of attentiveness in regard to the logical rule. Hence as soon as our attentiveness is sharpened in regard to the case before us, the illusion entirely vanishes. A 297
Transcendental illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even when we have already uncovered it and have, through transcendental critique, had distinct insight into its nullity. (An example is the illusion in the proposition that the world must have a beginning in terms of time.)[30] The cause of this is that in our reason (regarded subjectively as a human cognitive power) there lie basic rules and maxims of its use that have entirely the look of objective principles; and through this it comes about that the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our concepts for the benefit of understanding is regarded as an objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This is an *illusion* that we cannot at all avoid any

[27][*Grundsätze*, in this case. On my use of 'principle' to render both *Prinzip* and *Grundsatz*, see A vii br. n. 7.]

[28][Or 'expecting,' in the sense that implies not a waiting but a demand (cf. 'command,' just below): *zumuten*.]

[29][A 130–292/B 169–349.]

[30][See A 426–33/B 454–61.]

B 354 more than we can avoid the illusion that the sea seems to us higher[31] in the center than at the shore because we see the center through higher light rays than the shore; or—better yet—any more than even the astronomer can prevent the moon from seeming larger to him as it rises,[32] although he is not deceived by this illusion.

Hence the transcendental dialectic will settle for uncovering the illusion of transcendent judgments, and for simultaneously keeping it from deceiving us. But that the illusion should even vanish as well (as does logical illusion) and cease to be an illusion—this the transcendental dialectic can
A 298 never accomplish. For here we are dealing with a *natural* and unavoidable *illusion* that itself rests on subjective principles and foists[33] them on us as objective ones, whereas a logical dialectic in resolving fallacious inferences deals only with a mistake in the compliance with principles, or with an artificial illusion created in imitating such inferences. Hence there is a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason. This dialectic is not one in which a bungler might become entangled on his own through lack of knowledge,[34] or one that some sophist has devised artificially in order to confuse reasonable people. It is, rather, a dialectic that attaches to human reason unpreventably[35] and that, even after we have uncovered this decep-
B 355 tion, still will not stop hoodwinking and thrusting reason incessantly into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed.

[31][Kant actually says 'not higher,' as if instead of 'avoid' he had said 'arrange.' Similarly with 'prevent' in the example just below.]

[32][Than it does later on]

[33][*unterschieben.*]

[34][*Kenntnisse.*]

[35][*unhintertreiblich.*]

II
ON PURE REASON AS THE SEAT OF TRANSCENDENTAL ILLUSION[36]

A
On Reason As Such

All our cognition[37] starts from the senses, proceeds from there to understanding, and ends with reason, beyond which there is found in us nothing higher to work on the material of intuition and bring it under the highest A 299
unity of thought. Because I am now to provide an explication of this our supreme cognitive power, I find myself in some perplexity. There is of reason, as there is of understanding, a merely formal—i.e., logical—use, where reason abstracts from all content of cognition. But there is also a real use, where reason itself contains the origin of certain concepts and principles that it borrows neither from the senses nor from understanding. Now the first use or power[38] has indeed long since been explicated by logicians as the power of making mediate inferences (as distinguished from immediate[39] inferences, *consequentiae immediatae*).[40] But this explication does not yet give us insight into the second power, which itself produces concepts. Now since we here encounter a division of reason into a logical and a tran- B 356
scendental power, we must search for a higher concept of this source of cognition which comprises both concepts under itself. By analogy with the concepts of understanding[41] we may, however, expect that the logical concept[42] will provide us simultaneously with the key to the transcendental concept, and the table of the functions of logical reason[43] simultaneously with the root chart[44] of the concepts of reason.

36[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 15–25.]

37[*Erkenntnis*. See A vii br. n. 6.]

38[Or 'ability': *Vermögen*. See A xii br. n. 16.]

39[*unmittelbar*, which I usually (but, of course, not in the sense used in logic) render as 'direct.' See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

40[Cf. Kant's own *Logic*, Ak. IX, 114, also 115–36.].

41[See above, A 70–83/B 95–110.]

42[Of reason.]

43[*der ersteren*.]

44[*Stammleiter*.]

In the first part of our transcendental logic we explicated the understanding as our power of rules.[45] Here we shall distinguish reason from understanding by calling it our *power of principles.*

A 300 The term *principle*[46] is ambiguous, and commonly means only a cognition that can be used as a principle[47] although in itself and according to its own origin it is not a principle. Every universal proposition, even if it were obtained (by induction) from experience, can serve as major premise in a syllogism;[48] but it is not therefore itself a principle. The mathematical axioms (e.g., the axiom that between two points there can be only one straight line) are even a priori universal cognitions, and are therefore rightly called principles relatively to the instances that can be subsumed under them. But surely I cannot therefore say that I cognize this property of B 357 straight lines, as such and in itself, from principles; rather, I cognize it only in pure intuition.[49]

I would, therefore, call cognition from principles only that cognition wherein I cognize the particular in the universal through concepts. Thus any syllogism is a form of deriving a cognition from a principle. For the major premise always provides a concept whereby everything that is subsumed under the condition of this concept is cognized from it according to a principle. Now since every universal cognition can serve as major premise in a syllogism, and since the understanding offers such universal propositions a priori, these propositions may indeed be called principles in regard to their possible use.

A 301 But if we consider these principles[50] of pure understanding in themselves according to their origin, then they are anything but cognitions from concepts. For they would not even be possible a priori if we did not bring in our pure intuition (in mathematics) or conditions of a possible experience as such. The principle that everything that occurs has a cause cannot be inferred at all from the concept of what occurs as such; the principle

45[See A 126–27, A 132/B 171, A 158–61/B 197–200.]

46[Emphasis added.]

47[*Prinzip* here and just above; *Principium* just below and in the subsequent occurrence. Kant uses the two forms of the term interchangeably.]

48[*Vernunftschluß*, literally 'inference of reason.']

49[See above, B 40–41]

50[*Grundsätze* here, *Prinzipien* in the preceding sentence. Kant clearly continues to use the two terms interchangeably, as is here shown by his use of the demonstrative pronoun 'these.' See A vii br. n. 7.]

shows, rather, how we can acquire in the first place a determinate experiential concept of what occurs.

Hence the understanding cannot at all furnish synthetic cognitions from concepts; and it is properly speaking these cognitions that I call principles B 358
absolutely, whereas all universal propositions as such may be called comparative principles.

There is an ancient wish which some day, who knows how remote, will perhaps be fulfilled: viz., that we might yet, instead of the endless manifoldness of civil laws, locate their principles. For in this locating of their principles alone can the secret of—as we say—simplifying legislation consist. Yet here the laws are also only limitations of our freedom that restrict it to conditions under which it thoroughly harmonizes with itself; and hence they concern something that is entirely our own work and whereof we ourselves can, through those concepts,[51] be the cause.[52] But how objects in themselves, and how the nature of things, are to be subject to principles A 302
and to be determined according to mere concepts is something that, if not impossible, is still at least quite preposterous in its demand. But whatever may be the situation here (for the inquiry into this issue is still ahead of us), it at least shows that cognition from (what are in themselves) principles is something quite different from mere cognition of understanding. Cognition of understanding, too, can indeed in the form of a principle precede other cognitions; but in itself it does not (insofar as it is synthetic) rest on mere thought, nor does it contain a universal according to concepts.

The understanding may be considered a power of providing unity of ap- B 359
pearances by means of rules; reason is then the power of providing unity of the rules of understanding under principles. Hence reason initially[53] never deals with experience or any object, but deals with the understanding in order to provide the understanding's manifold cognitions with a priori unity through concepts. This unity may be called unity of reason, and is quite different in kind from what unity the understanding can achieve.

This is the universal concept of our power of reason, insofar as making this concept comprehensible has been possible in spite of a complete lack of examples (which are to be provided only later).

[51][Of laws.]

[52][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. III, 411–12.]

[53][*zunächst*.]

A 303
B
On the Logical Use of Reason

We make a distinction between what is cognized directly[54] and what is only
inferred. The fact that in a figure bounded by three straight lines there are
three angles is cognized directly; but the fact that these angles taken to-
gether are equal to two right angles is only inferred. Since we constantly
need to make inferences and thereby finally become quite accustomed to
doing so, we ultimately no longer take note of this distinction, and often—as
in the-so-called deception of the senses—regard as directly perceived some-
B 360 thing that we yet only inferred. In every argument[55] there is *one* proposi-
tion that lies at the basis; *one* other proposition, viz., the conclusion[56] drawn
from it; and, finally, the inference (*consequentia*)[57] whereby the truth of
the second proposition is connected inevitably with the truth of the first. If
the inferred judgment is already so contained in the first judgment that it
can be derived from it without mediation by a third presentation, then the
inference is called immediate[58] (*consequentia immediata*); I would prefer
to call it an inference of understanding.[59] But if, apart from the cognition
laid at the basis, still another judgment is needed to bring about the con-
clusion,[60] then the inference is called an inference of reason.[61] The propo-
sition *All human beings are mortal* already contains the propositions that
some human beings are mortal, that some mortals are human beings, and
A 304 that nothing that is immortal is a human being; and these propositions are
therefore immediate inferences from the first one. The proposition that all
scholars are mortal, on the other hand, is not contained in the judgment
laid at the basis[62] (for the concept of scholars does not occur there at all),
and can be inferred from it only by means of an intermediate[63] judgment.

[54][*unmittelbar*. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[55][*Schluß*. On this entire subsection, cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 114–36.].

[56][*Folgerung*.]

[57][*Schlußfolge* (*Konsequenz*).]

[58][I.e., unmediated (direct): *unmittelbar*.]

[59][See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, Ak. 115.]

[60][*Folge*.]

[61][Or 'syllogism': *Vernunftschluß*.]

[62][I.e., that all human beings are mortal.]

[63][*Zwischen-*.]

In every syllogism[64] I first think a *rule* (*maior*)[65] by the understanding. Second, I *subsume* a cognition (*minor*) under the condition of the rule by means of the *power of judgment*. Finally, I *determine* my cognition (*conclusio*) by the predicate of the rule and hence a priori by *reason*. Therefore B 361
the various kinds of syllogism consist in the relation that the major premise, as the rule, presents between a cognition and its condition. Hence syllogisms are threefold, as are all judgments as such insofar as they differ in the way in which they express the cognition's relation in the understanding; viz., they are either *categorical* or *hypothetical* or *disjunctive* syllogisms.[66]

What usually happens is that the conclusion[67] has been assigned as a judgment[68] in order to see whether it does not issue from judgments already given, viz., judgments through which a quite different object is thought. When this is the task set for me, then I locate the assertion of this conclusion[69] in the understanding, in order to see whether it does not occur in it under certain conditions according to a universal rule. If I then find such a condition, and if the object of the conclusion can be sub- A 305
sumed under the given condition, then the conclusion is inferred[70] from the rule *which holds also for other objects of cognition*. We see from this that reason in making inferences[71] seeks to reduce the great manifoldness of understanding's cognition to[72] the smallest number of principles (universal conditions) and thereby to bring about the highest unity of this cognition.

[64][Or 'inference of reason': *Vernunftschluß.*]

[65][I.e., *propositio maior*: major premise. Analogously for minor, just below.]

[66][See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 121–22.]

[67][*Konklusion.*]

[68][I.e., as asserted.]

[69][*Schlußsatz.*]

[70][*folgern.*]

[71][*schließen.*]

[72][Here 'reduce to' translates *bringen auf.*]

B 362

C
On the Pure Use of Reason

Can one isolate reason? And is it then still on its own[73] a source of concepts and judgments which arise solely from it and through which it refers to objects? Or is it then a merely subsidiary[74] power to provide given cognitions with a certain form, a form which is called logical and through which the cognitions of understanding are only subordinated to one another, and lower rules subordinated to other and higher rules (whose condition comprises in its sphere the condition of the lower rules), to whatever extent this can be accomplished by comparing them? This is the question with which we are now dealing only provisionally. Manifoldness of rules and unity of principles is indeed a demand of reason. Reason makes this demand in order to bring the understanding into thoroughgoing coherence with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition
A 306 under concepts and thereby brings the intuition into connection. But such a principle[75] prescribes no law to objects, and does not contain the basis for the possibility of cognizing and determining them as objects at all. It is, rather, merely a subjective law for the management of understanding's supplies, [instructing understanding] to reduce the universal use of its concepts—by comparing them—to their smallest possible number. This [in-
B 363 struction] does not entitle us to demand from objects themselves such accordance as would promote the convenience and the broadening of our understanding, and to provide that maxim with objective validity as well. In a word, the question is: Does reason in itself, i.e., pure reason, a priori contain synthetic principles and rules; and in what may these principles consist?

Reason's formal and logical procedure in syllogisms already gives us sufficient guidance concerning the basis on which will rest reason's transcendental principle as used in synthetic cognition through pure reason.

First, an inference of reason[76] does not deal with intuitions in order to bring them under rules (as does understanding with its categories), but deals with concepts and judgments. Hence even if pure reason deals with ob-

[73][*eigen.*]

[74][*subaltern.*]

[75][I.e., a principle that is only a demand.]

[76][Or 'syllogism'· *Vernunftschluß.*]

jects, it still has no direct[77] reference to them and their intuition, but refers directly only to understanding and its judgments; understanding and its judgments are what initially turn to the senses and their intuition in order A 307 to determine the object of these. Hence unity of reason is not unity of a possible experience—which is the unity of understanding—but the former unity is essentially different from the latter unity. The principle that everything that occurs has a cause is not at all a principle cognized and prescribed by reason. It makes possible the unity of experience and borrows nothing from reason; reason could not, without this reference to possible B 364 experience and hence from mere concepts, have commanded such synthetic unity.

Second, reason in its logical use seeks the universal condition of its judgment (i.e., of the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself nothing but a judgment made by means of subsuming its condition under a universal rule (major premise). Now this rule is in turn exposed to the same attempt by reason, and thus the condition of the condition must, as long as doing so is feasible, be sought (by means of a prosyllogism);[78] and hence we readily see that the principle[79] peculiar to reason as such (in its logical use) is: to find, for understanding's conditioned cognition, the unconditioned whereby the cognition's unity is completed.[80]

But this logical maxim can become a principle[81] of *pure reason* only by our assuming that, if the conditioned is given, then the entire series of conditions subordinated to one another—a series that is hence itself A 308 unconditioned—is also given (i.e., contained in the object and its connection).

Such a principle of pure reason, however, is plainly *synthetic;* for although the conditioned does refer analytically to some condition, it does not so refer to the unconditioned. Moreover, from this principle there must arise various synthetic propositions of which pure understanding knows B 365 nothing; for pure understanding has to do only with objects of a possible experience, and the cognition and synthesis of such objects is always con-

[77][Or 'immediate': *unmittelbar.* See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[78][On prosyllogisms (and episyllogisms), cf. A 331/B 387–88 incl. br. n. 187; also the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 134.]

[79][*Grundsatz.*]

[80][Or 'perfected': *vollendet.*]

[81][*Principium.*]

ditioned. But the unconditioned, if such there actually is,[82] may[83] be examined specially according to all those determinations[84] that distinguish it from everything conditioned, and must thereby provide material for many synthetic a priori propositions.

The principles[85] arising from this supreme principle[86] of reason will, however, be *transcendent* in regard to all appearances; i.e., no empirical use adequate to this principle can ever be made of it. It will, therefore, be entirely different from all principles of understanding (whose use is wholly *immanent*, because they have as their subject[87] only the possibility of experience). Our task in the transcendental dialectic, then, will be to answer the following questions. Does that principle—i.e., that the series of conditions (in the synthesis of appearances, or, for that matter, in that of the thinking of things as such) extends up to the unconditioned—have, or does it not have, its objective correctness; and what inferences issue from it for
A 309 the empirical use of understanding?[88] Or is there, rather, no such objectively valid proposition of reason at all, but a merely logical precept[89] to seek, in ascending to ever higher conditions, to approach their completeness[90] and thereby to bring into our cognition the highest unity of reason that is possible for us?[91] In other words: Has this need of reason been re-
B 366 garded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure reason that rashly postulates such unlimited completeness in[92] the series of conditions found in the objects themselves? But, in that case, what misunderstandings and delusions may be creeping also into syllogisms, whose

[82][*statthaben*.]

[83][The third, fourth, and fifth editions have 'will' instead.]

[84][*Bestimmungen*. See A 23/B 37 br. n. 30.]

[85][*Grundsätze*.]

[86][*Prinzip*. The synthetic principle that, if the conditioned is given, then the entire (unconditioned) series of conditions subordinated to one another is also given.]

[87][*Thema*.]

[88][These questions are treated in the Paralogisms (A 341–405/B 399–432), Antinomy (A 405–567/B 432–595), and Ideal of Pure Reason (A 567–642/B 595–670).]

[89][Or 'prescription': *Vorschrift*.]

[90][*Vollständigkeit*.]

[91][This issue is treated in the Regulative Use of the Ideas of Pure Reason, A 642–68/ B 670–96.]

[92][Kant, always aware of the original meaning of 'to postulate' as 'to demand,' actually says 'of' (or 'from'): *von*.]

major premise has been taken from pure reason (and is perhaps more a petition than a postulate), and which ascend from experience upward to its conditions? These questions, then, will be at issue in the transcendental dialectic. Let us now unfold this dialectic from its sources, which are deeply hidden in human reason. We shall divide it into two chapters,[93] the *first* of which is to deal with the *transcendental concepts* of pure reason, the *second* with its transcendent and *dialectical syllogisms.*

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC A 310

BOOK I
ON THE CONCEPTS OF PURE REASON[94]

Whatever may be the case regarding the possibility of concepts obtained from pure reason: they are, at any rate, not merely concepts that are reflected [upon], but are concepts that are inferred. Concepts of understanding are also thought a priori, viz., prior[95] to and for the sake of experience; B 367
but they contain nothing more than the unity of reflection on appearances that they have insofar as they are to belong necessarily to a possible empirical consciousness. Through them alone do cognition and determination of an object become possible. And so concepts of understanding are what first provide material for pure reason to make inferences, whereas understanding's own concepts are not preceded by a priori concepts of objects[96] from which understanding's concepts could be inferred. Rather, the objective reality of understanding's concepts is based solely on the fact that, since

[93][Books, actually.]

[94][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 27–31. See also Thomas K. Swing, *Kant's Transcendental Logic* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 229–43. (This work has not been cited before. Its earlier sections are provocative for dealing with parts of the first half of the *Critique*.)]

[95][*vor.*]

[96][Or, possibly, 'preceded a priori by concepts of objects.']

they amount to the intellectual form of all experience, their application must always be capable of being shown in experience.

But the designation, concept of reason, even if considered provisionally, already shows that such a concept refuses to be confined within experience. For a concept of reason concerns a cognition whereof any em-
A 311 pirical cognition (perhaps even the whole of possible experience or of its empirical synthesis) is only a part; although no actual experience ever fully attains to that cognition, yet any actual experience always belongs to such a cognition. Concepts of reason serve for *comprehending,*[97] whereas concepts of *understanding* serve for understanding (viz., perceptions). If concepts of reason contain the unconditioned, then they concern something to which all experience is subject but which itself is never an object of experience: viz., something to which reason leads in its inferences from experience and by which it assesses and gauges the degree of its own em-
B 368 pirical use, but which never makes up a member of the empirical synthesis. If such concepts nonetheless have objective validity,[98] then they may be called *conceptus ratiocinati*[99] (correctly inferred concepts); if they do not, then they have at least been obtained surreptitiously[100] by the illusion of an inference,[101] and may be called *conceptus ratiocinantes* (reasoning concepts).[102] But since this matter cannot be settled until we get to the chapter[103] on the dialectical inferences of pure reason, we cannot yet take it into account. Instead, just as we called the pure concepts of understanding categories, we shall provisionally assign to the concepts of pure reason a

[97][Or, i.e., grasping: *Begreifen.* It should be noted that although in different contexts this term can also mean 'to comprise' (and in that meaning it is related to *Begriff,* i.e., 'concept'), it *never* means merely 'to conceive' (as this latter term is used in philosophy). Cf. A 792 = B 820 incl. br. n. 394.]

[98][See below, A 642–68/ B 670–96.]

[99][Reasoned concepts. In Kant's working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak XXIII, 49), the words 'objective validity, then they may be called *conceptus ratiocinati,*' as well as the subsequent parenthesis, '(correctly inferred concepts),' are crossed out.]

[100][*erschlichen.* On subreption, see A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n. 14.]

[101][See below, A 338–642/B 396–670.]

[102][*vernünftelnde Begriffe.* In the *Critique of Judgment* (Ak. V, 396), the *conceptus ratiocinatus* is described as "a concept that is a basis for cognition and is confirmed by reason," and the *conceptus ratiocinans* as an "objectively empty one that we use merely for reasoning." For a similar distinction regarding judgments, cf. *ibid.,* 337n]

[103][Kant again means 'book.']

new name and call them transcendental ideas—a designation that I shall now elucidate and justify.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC A 312

BOOK I

Section I

On Ideas As Such[104]

Despite the richness of our languages, a thinking mind[105] often finds himself at a loss for the expression which precisely fits his concept, and lacking which he cannot become properly understandable either to others or even to himself. Coining new words is a presumption to legislate in lan- B 369
guages that is rarely successful; and before one proceeds to this desperate remedy, it is advisable to look around in a dead and scholarly language, in order to see whether this concept along with its appropriate expression cannot already be found there. And even if the concept's ancient use were to have become somewhat shaky through the carelessness of its originators, yet to solidify what meaning primarily belonged to it (even if whether people then had precisely this same meaning in mind were to remain doubtful) is better than to ruin one's task merely by keeping oneself from being understandable.

Hence suppose that for a certain concept we were to find perhaps only a single word that in its already established meaning precisely fits this concept—whose distinction from other, kindred concepts is of great im- A 313
portance. It is then advisable not to handle the word wastefully, or to use it synonymously in the place of others merely for the sake of variety, but to preserve for it carefully its own meaning. For otherwise it may easily

[104][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 31–43.]

[105][*Kopf.*]

come about that, after the expression no longer especially occupies people's attention but gets lost among the heap of others with meanings quite deviant from its own, the thought which it alone could have preserved is lost as well.

B 370 From the way in which *Plato* employed the expression *idea* we can readily see that he meant by it something that not only is never borrowed from the senses, but that far surpasses even the concepts of understanding—with which *Aristotle* dealt[106]—inasmuch as nothing congruent with it is ever found in experience. For Plato ideas are archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences, as are the categories. Ideas, in his opinion, flowed from highest reason, from where they have been imparted to human reason; now, however, human reason is no longer in its original state, but must laboriously recall the ancient ideas, now much obscured, through recollection (called philosophy). I do not here want to enter into any literary inquiry seeking to establish what meaning
A 314 the august philosopher linked with his expression.[107] I shall point out only that there is nothing at all unusual in finding, whether in ordinary conversation or in writings, that by comparing the thoughts uttered by an author on his topic we understand him even better than he understood himself, because he did not sufficiently determine his concept and thus sometimes spoke—or, for that matter, thought—[in a manner] contrary to his own intention.

Plato[108] well discerned that our cognitive power feels a much higher need than merely to spell out[109] appearances according to synthetic unity in order
B 371 to be able to read them as experience; and that our reason naturally soars to cognitions which go far beyond the point where any object capable of being given by experience could ever be congruent with them, but which nonetheless have their reality and are by no means mere chimeras.

Plato found his ideas primarily in whatever is practical,[110] i.e., what-
A 315 ever rests on freedom—freedom in turn being subject to cognitions that are a product peculiar to reason. Anyone seeking (as many have actually done)

[106][Cf. A 81/B 107.]

[107][I.e., *idea*.]

[108][Emphasis deleted.]

[109][Inserting, as suggested by Erdmann, *zu* before *buchstabieren*.]

[110]He did, to be sure, extend his concept[a] to speculative cognitions also, provided that they were pure and given completely a priori; he extended it even over mathematics, although mathematics has its object nowhere but in *possible* experience.

to draw the concepts of virtue from experience, i.e., to make what at most can serve only as an example for an imperfect elucidation into a source of cognition by treating it as a model, would turn virtue into an ambiguous nonentity[111] mutable according to time and circumstances and unusable for any rule. Everyone becomes aware, on the contrary, that if someone is pre- B 372
sented to him as a model of virtue, yet the true original to which he compares this alleged model, and by which alone he assesses it, he always has solely in his own mind.[112] This original, however, is the idea of virtue, in regard to which all possible objects of experience do indeed serve as examples (i.e., proofs that what the concept of reason demands is to a certain degree feasible), but not as archetypes. The fact that no human being will ever act in a manner adequate to what is contained in the pure idea of virtue in no way proves that there is in this thought anything chimerical. For it is still only by means of this idea that any judgment about moral value or lack of value is possible. Hence this idea underlies necessarily any approach to moral perfection, however far removed from such perfection we may be kept by the obstacles in human nature, which cannot be determined as regards their degree.[113]

Plato's[114] *Republic* has become proverbial as allegedly a striking ex- A 316
ample[115] of a dream-built perfection that can reside only in an idle thinker's brain; and *Brucker*[116] finds ridiculous the philosopher's assertion that a prince would never rule well if he did not partake of[117] the ideas. However, we would do better to pursue this thought further and (where the superb man leaves us without help) to shed light on it through a new

Now in this I cannot follow him any more than in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in the exaggerations whereby he hypostatized them, as it were, although the lofty language employed by him in this realm is entirely capable of a milder interpretation appropriate to the nature of things.

[a][Of *idea*.]

[111][*Unding*. See A 292/B 348.]

[112][*Kopf*.]

[113][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 406–12.]

[114][Emphasis deleted.]

[115][Kant literally says 'as an allegedly striking example.']

[116][Johann Jakob Brucker (1696–1770), German historian of philosophy and member of the Academy of Sciences at Berlin. He wrote a number of works, the main one being his (originally) five-volume *Historia Critica Philosophiae* (*Critical History of Philosophy*) of 1742–44. Kant's reference seems to be to vol. 1, 726–27 of this work.]

[117][Or 'participate in.']

B 373 endeavor, than to set it aside as useless on the pitiful and harmful pretext of unfeasibility. Surely an organization[118] consisting of the *greatest human freedom* according to laws through which *the freedom of each can coexist with that of the others*[119] (not an organization consisting of the greatest happiness, for this will no doubt follow on its own) is at least a necessary idea. It is an idea that we must lay at the basis not merely in first drafting a political constitution,[120] but also in all laws;[121] and in so doing we must initially abstract from the present obstacles, which perhaps may not so much arise inevitably from human nature, as arise, rather, from our neglecting the genuine ideas in making laws. For there is nothing more harmful to be found, and nothing more unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar appeal to experience as allegedly conflicting.[122] After all, such experience would not exist at all if those provisions had at the right time been made
A 317 according to the ideas, and if crude concepts adopted in their place had not—precisely by being drawn from experience—foiled all good intention. The more legislation and government were established in harmony with that idea, the rarer indeed would punishments become; and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain (as Plato does) that if legislation and government were arranged perfectly then no such punishments would be needed at all. Now although this perfect arrangement may never come about, yet
B 374 the idea is quite correct which puts this maximum forth as an archetype in order to bring, according to it, the legal organization of human beings ever closer to the greatest perfection possible. For what may be the highest degree at which humanity must stop, and hence how great may be the gulf that necessarily remains between the idea and its execution, is something that no one can or ought to determine, precisely because the freedom at issue here is what can surmount any stated boundary.

But Plato[123] sees an origin from ideas not merely in that sphere where human reason shows veritable causality and where ideas become efficient causes (of actions and their objects), viz., in the moral sphere; but also in regard to nature itself he rightly sees distinct proofs of its origin from

[118][*Verfassung*.]

[119][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 433–34.]

[120][*Staatsverfassung*.]

[121][See the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 231.]

[122][With ideas.]

[123][Emphasis deleted.]

ideas.[124] A plant, an animal, the regular arrangement of the world edifice
(hence presumably also the whole natural order) show distinctly that they A 318
are possible only according to ideas. They show that although no individual creature under the individual conditions of its existence is congruent with the idea of the most perfect creature of its kind (any more than a human being is congruent with the idea of humanity which, as the archetype of his actions, he yet bears in his soul), yet in the highest understanding these ideas are individual, unchangeable, thoroughly[125] determined,[126] and are the original causes of things; and that only the whole of the combination of things in the universe is, solely and exclusively, fully adequate B 375
to that idea. If we separate what is exaggerated in Plato's manner of expression, then the philosopher's intellectual soaring[127]—whereby he rises from the merely replicating[128] contemplation of what is physical in the world order to this order's architectonic connection according to purposes,[129] i.e., according to ideas—is an endeavor that deserves to be respected and followed. But this intellectual soaring is of quite particular merit in what concerns the principles of morality, legislation, and religion, where the ideas make the experience itself (of the good) possible in the first place, although they can never be expressed fully in it. This merit fails to be recognized only because it is being judged by exactly those empirical rules whose validity as principles was to be annulled precisely by the ideas.[130] For in respect of nature experience indeed provides us with the rule and is the source of truth; but in regard to moral laws experience is (alas!) the mother of illusion, and to obtain the laws about what I *ought to* A 319
do from what *is being done,* or to seek to limit them thereby, is extremely reprehensible.[131]

[124][On teleology and purposiveness in nature, see A 620–30 = B 648–59, A 690–702 = B 718–30, and cf. B 425–26, A 772–73 = B 800–801, A 799 = B 827, A 826 = B 854. For Kant's fullest treatment of the subject, see the Critique of Teleological Judgment: *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 357–485.]

[125][*durchgängig.*]

[126][Or, perhaps, 'are determined individually, unchangeably, [and] thoroughly.']

[127][*Geistesschwung.*]

[128][*copeilich* (*kopielich*).]

[129][Or 'ends,' in the nontemporal sense: *Zwecke.*]

[130][*sie.*]

[131][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 406–12.]

Instead of all these contemplations, in whose proper execution consists indeed the dignity peculiar to philosophy, we must now occupy ourselves with a less glamorous job that yet is also not without merit: viz., to level
B 376 and solidify[132] the ground for those majestic moral edifices; for in this ground can be found all kinds of mole burrows that were left by a reason digging vainly but quite confidently for treasures, and that make that building insecure. Hence what is now incumbent on us is to gain exact familiarity with pure reason's transcendental use, principles, and ideas, in order that we can properly determine and assess pure reason's influence and value. But before I put this preliminary introduction aside, I beseech those who have philosophy at heart (which is saying more than one commonly encounters)—if they should find themselves convinced by what I say here and later—to safeguard the expression *idea*[133] in its original meaning, lest it henceforth end up among the remaining expressions by which people commonly designate, in carefree disorder and to the detriment of science, sundry kinds of presentation. We are, after all, not lacking in names properly fitting each kind of presentation, and do not[134] need to encroach upon
A 320 the property of another kind of presentation. Here is a chart[135] of them. The genus is presentation[136] as such (*repraesentatio*). Under it falls presentation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A *perception*[137] that refers solely to the subject, viz., as the modification of the subject's state, is *sensation*[138] (*sensatio*); an objective perception is *cognition*[139] (*cognitio*). Cog-
B 377 nition is either *intuition* or *concept*[140] (*intuitus vel conceptus*). An intuition refers directly to the object and is singular; a concept refers to the object indirectly, by means of a characteristic that may be common to several things. A concept is either an *empirical* or a *pure concept;* and a pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in the pure

[132][*baufest machen.*]

[133][Emphasis added, as it was in the third edition.]

[134][In defining *idea.*]

[135][*Stufenleiter.*]

[136][*Vorstellung.* My reason for translating this term (despite the Latin synonym inserted here by Kant) as 'presentation' rather than as 'representation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[137][*Perzeption* (i.e., *Wahrnehmung,* as Kant says ordinarily).]

[138][*Empfindung.*]

[139][*Erkenntnis.* On cognition, cf. the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 33, 91. For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6.]

[140][*Anschauung, Begriff.*]

image of sensibility),[141] is called *notion*.[142] A concept framed from notions and surpassing the possibility of experience is an *idea*,[143] or concept of reason. Once someone has become accustomed to these distinctions, he must find it unbearable to hear the presentation of some red color to be called an idea; it must not even be called a notion (concept of understanding).

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC A 321

BOOK I

Section II
On Transcendental Ideas[144]

The Transcendental Analytic gave us an example showing how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure a priori concepts that present objects and that do so prior[145] to all experience—or, rather, that indicate the synthetic unity which alone makes possible an em- B 378
pirical cognition of objects. The form of judgments (as converted into a concept of the synthesis of intuitions) produced categories that govern all use of understanding in experience. We may similarly expect that the form of inferences of reason,[146] when applied to the synthetic unity of intuitions in accordance with the categories, will contain the origin of special a priori concepts that we may call pure concepts of reason or *transcendental ideas*, and that will determine according to principles the use of understanding in the whole of all our experience.

[141][In other words, an unschematized category of understanding. See above, A 137–47/B 176–87.]

[142][*Notio* (emphasis added). Cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 93.]

[143][*Idee.*]

[144][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 43–63.]

[145][*vor.*]

[146][Or 'syllogisms': *Vernunftschlüsse*.]

We saw that the function of reason in its inferences consists in the universality of cognition according to concepts, and that the syllogism itself
A 322 is a judgment determined a priori in the entire range of its condition.[147] I could indeed draw the proposition, Caius is mortal, from experience by using merely understanding. But I am searching for a concept (here the concept of human being) that contains the condition under which the predicate (i.e., assertion as such) of this judgment is given; and after I have subsumed [the predicate] under this condition taken in its entire range (All human beings are mortal), I determine according to this [subsumption] the cognition of my object (Caius is mortal).

Thus in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a certain
B 379 object, after having previously in the major premise thought it in its entire range under a certain condition. This complete[148] magnitude of range in reference to such a condition is called *universality*[149] (*universalitas*). To it corresponds in the synthesis of intuitions *allness* (*universitas*) or *totality* of conditions. Hence the transcendental concept of reason is none other than the concept of the *totality of conditions* for a given conditioned. Now solely the *unconditioned* makes possible the totality of conditions; and, conversely, the totality of conditions is always itself unconditioned. Therefore a pure concept as such of reason can be explicated as[150] the concept of the unconditioned insofar as this concept contains a basis for the synthesis of the conditioned.

A 323 Now there will be just as many kinds of pure concepts of reason as there are kinds of relations that the understanding presents by means of the categories. And hence we shall have to search for an *unconditioned*, **first**, of the *categorical* synthesis in a *subject;* **second**, of the *hypothetical* synthesis of the members of a *series;* **third**, of the *disjunctive* synthesis of the parts in a *system*.

For there are likewise three kinds of syllogisms, each of which proceeds by prosyllogisms[151] to the unconditioned: one proceeds to the sub-
B 380 ject that is itself no longer a predicate; another to the presupposition that presupposes nothing further; and the third to an aggregate of those mem-

147[See esp. A 306–7/B 363–64.]

148[Or 'perfect': *vollendet*.]

149[*Allgemeinheit*.]

150[Kant (here and in similar cases elsewhere) actually says *durch* ('by') He means, i.e.. explicated by 'the concept of the unconditioned ']

151[Cf. A 307/B 364 incl. br n. 78.]

bers of a division which require nothing further in order to complete[152] the division of a concept. Hence reason's pure concepts of totality in the synthesis of conditions are necessary and based on the nature of human reason at least as tasks: viz., to extend,[153] if possible, the unity of understanding up to the unconditioned. They have this necessity and basis even if these transcendental concepts were otherwise to lack a use *in concreto* adequate[154] to them, and even if they therefore have no other benefit than to put the understanding in the direction wherein its use, while being expanded to the utmost, is simultaneously brought into thoroughgoing agreement with itself.

But in speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned as the title common to all concepts of reason, we again come upon an expression that we cannot dispense with and that yet, in view of an ambiguity attaching to it through long misuse, we cannot use safely: the word **absolute**. This is one of the few words that in their very initial meaning were adapted[155] to a concept for which offhand[156] there is no other word at all in the same language that fits it precisely. Hence the word's loss—or, what is tantamount, its shaky use—must entail also the loss of the concept itself. Moreover, because this concept occupies reason very much indeed, we cannot dispense with it without great detriment to all transcendental judging.[157] The word *absolute* is now often used merely to indicate that something holds of a thing considered *in itself*, and hence holds for it *intrinsically;* in this meaning *absolutely possible* would mean what is possible in itself (*interne*)[158]—which is indeed *the least* that one can say of an object. On the other hand, the word[159] is sometimes also used to indicate that something (e.g., absolute dominion) holds in any reference[160] (i.e., without limitation); and in this meaning *absolutely possible* would mean A 324 B 381

[152][Or 'perfect': *vollenden.*]

[153][*fortsetzen.*]

[154][*angemessen.*]

[155][*angemessen.*]

[156][*nach der Hand.*]

[157][*Beurteilungen.* See A 60/B 84 br. n. 69; and cf. A 318/B 375 for a recent example of *beurteilen.*]

[158][*Intrinsically.*]

[159][*absolute.*]

[160][*in aller Beziehung.*]

what is possible in any respect, *possible in any reference*—which is in turn
A 325 *the most* that I can say about the possibility of a thing. Now, it is true that sometimes these two meanings coincide. Thus, e.g., what is intrinsically impossible is also impossible in any reference and hence absolutely. But in most cases the two meanings are infinitely far apart, and I can in no way infer that because something is possible in itself, it is therefore also possible in any reference and hence absolutely. Indeed, concerning absolute necessity I shall show later[161] that it does not by any means depend in all cases on intrinsic necessity and hence must not be regarded as synony-
B 382 mous with it. If the opposite of something is intrinsically impossible then this opposite is, of course, also impossible in every respect,[162] and hence the thing itself is absolutely necessary. But I cannot infer conversely that if something is absolutely necessary then its opposite is *intrinsically* impossible, i.e., that the *absolute* necessity of things is an *intrinsic* necessity. For this expression of intrinsic necessity is in certain cases a quite empty expression to which we cannot link the least concept. On the other hand, the expression of the necessity of a thing in any reference (reference to anything possible) carries with it quite particular determinations. Now since the philosopher[163] can never be indifferent to the loss of a concept that is of wide application in speculative philosophy,[164] I hope that he will also not be indifferent to determining and carefully preserving the expression to which the concept attaches.

A 326 In this expanded meaning, then, I shall employ the word *absolute* and oppose it to what holds only comparatively or in a particular respect;[165] for the latter is restricted to conditions, but the absolute holds without restriction.

Now, the transcendental concept of reason always concerns only the absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions, and never ends except at what is unconditioned absolutely,[166] i.e., in every reference. For pure reason

[161][Actually, outside of the present context the expression 'intrinsic necessity' seems to occur in this *Critique* only at A 185/B 229.]

[162][*Absicht.*]

[163][*Philosoph.*]

[164][*Weltweisheit.*]

[165][*Rücksicht.*]

[166][Kant here uses *schlechthin,* having used *absolut* before. I translate both terms by 'absolute' because they are synonymous (except that *schlechthin* is an adverb only), as is clearly

leaves everything else to understanding, [the power] which initially[167] refers to objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination. Pure reason reserves for itself solely the absolute totality in the use of the concepts of understanding, and seeks to take the synthetic unity thought in the category up to the absolutely[168] unconditioned. Hence this further unity may be called the *unity of reason* of appearances, just as the unity expressed by the category may be called their *unity of understanding*. Accordingly, reason refers only to the use of understanding. It does so not insofar as understanding contains the basis of possible experience (for the concept of the absolute totality of conditions is not a concept usable in an experience, because no experience is unconditioned); rather, reason refers to that use in order to prescribe to understanding the direction leading to a certain unity—a unity of which the understanding has no concept and which aims at collating[169] all acts of understanding, in regard to every object, in an *absolute whole*. Hence objective use of the pure concepts of reason is always *transcendent*, whereas objective use of the pure concepts of understanding must by its nature always be *immanent*, because it limits itself to possible experience alone. B 383 A 327

By an idea I mean a necessary concept of reason for which no congruent object can be given in the senses. Therefore the pure concepts of reason, which we are now examining, are *transcendental ideas*. They are concepts of pure reason; for they consider all experiential cognition as being determined by an absolute totality of conditions. They are not arbitrarily invented; rather, they are imposed by the nature of reason itself and hence refer necessarily to the entire use of understanding. Finally, they are transcendent and surpass the boundary of all experience; hence no object can ever occur in experience that would be adequate to a transcendental idea. When we mention an idea, then we say *very much* concerning the object (as an object[170] of pure understanding), but precisely because of this say *very little* concerning the subject[171] (i.e., regarding the [object's] actuality under empirical conditions); for the idea, as the concept of a maximum, B 384

shown by their being explicated identically here, and because no adequate synonym for 'absolute' is available in English.]

167[*zunächst*.]

168[*schlechthin* here, *absolut* just before.]

169[I.e., arranging and holding together: *zusammenfassen*. See B 114 br. n. 239.]

170[*Gegenstand* here, *Objekt* just before. See A vii br. n. 7.]

171[Specifically, concerning the object as conditioned by the (human) subject.]

can never be given congruently *in concreto*. Now since the latter[172] is in
A 328 fact the entire aim in the merely speculative use of reason, and since approaching a concept that is yet never attained in executing that aim is tantamount to missing the concept altogether, we say of such a concept that it is *only* an idea. Thus we might say that [the concept of] the absolute whole of all appearances *is only an idea;* for since we can never outline such a whole in an image, it remains a *problem* without any solution. Since in the practical use of understanding, on the other hand, we are concerned solely
B 385 to execute something according to rules, practical reason's idea can always be given actually *in concreto,* although only in part; indeed, the idea is the indispensable condition of any practical use of reason.[173] Its execution is always bounded and deficient, but under indeterminable bounds and hence always under the influence of the concept of an absolute completeness. Thus the practical idea is always extremely fruitful, and is in regard to actual actions inescapably necessary. In the practical idea pure reason even has a causality for actually producing what its concept contains.[174] Hence of wisdom we cannot say—disdainfully, as it were—that *it is only an idea.* Rather, precisely because wisdom is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible purposes,[175] it must, as an original and at least limiting condition, serve everything practical as a rule.

A 329 Now, although we must say of the transcendental concepts of reason that *they are only ideas,* yet we shall have to regard them as by no means superfluous and null. For even if no object can be determined by them, they can yet basically—and unnoticed—serve the understanding as a canon for its extensive and accordant use. By such use the understanding does not, indeed, cognize any more objects than it would cognize according to its own concepts; yet it is guided by it better and further in
B 386 this cognition—not to mention the fact that perhaps the transcendental ideas of reason make possible a transition from the concepts of nature to

172[I.e., saying something about the object's actuality under empirical conditions.]

173[See the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 28–33.]

174[See *ibid.*, 58–68.]

175[According to the *Critique of Judgment*, wisdom (as ascribed to the deity) is the combination of omnibenevolence and justice (Ak. V, 444, cf. 448n), and is what one would need in order to establish a final purpose (*ibid.*, 441, cf. 462), i.e., a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of its possibility (*ibid.*, 424).]

the practical concepts[176] and in this way provide for the moral ideas themselves support[177] and coherence with reason's speculative cognitions. For information on all of this we must await what follows.

But in accordance with our aim we here set aside the practical ideas, and hence consider reason only in its speculative use—and within this use we consider reason more narrowly still, viz., only in its transcendental use. Now here we must enter upon the same path that we took above in the deduction of the categories: viz., we must examine the logical form of rational cognition, to see whether reason might not likewise become, through this form, a source of concepts that would allow us to regard objects in themselves as determined synthetically a priori in regard to one or another function of reason.

Reason, when considered as our power of a certain logical form of cog- A 330
nition, is the power to infer, i.e., to judge mediately[178] (by the subsumption of the condition of a possible judgment under the condition of a given judgment). The given judgment is the universal rule (major premise,[179] [*propositio*] *maior*). The subsumption of the condition of another[,] possible judgment under the condition of the rule is the minor premise[180] ([*propositio*] *minor*). The actual judgment, which states the assertion of the
rule *in the subsumed case* is the conclusion[181] (*conclusio*). For the rule says B 387
something universally under a certain condition. Now the condition of the rule takes place in an occurring case. Hence what held[182] universally under that condition is regarded as valid[183] also in the occurring case (which carries that condition with it). We readily see that reason arrives at a cognition through acts of understanding that make up a series of conditions. Suppose that I arrive at the proposition, All bodies are changeable, only as follows. I start from the more remote cognition (in which the concept of body does not yet occur but which does contain the condition of that con-

[176][Kant later came to give the credit for this transition to the power of judgment. See the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, esp. 195–98.]

[177][*Haltung*.]

[178][*mittelbar*, which I usually translate as 'indirectly.' See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[179][*Obersatz*. Cf., on all of this, the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 120–21.]

[180][*Untersatz*.]

[181][*Schlußsatz*.]

[182][*gelten*.]

[183][*gültig*.]

cept): Everything composite is *changeable*. From this cognition I proceed to a closer one, viz., Bodies are composite, that falls under the condition of the previous[184] cognition. And from this cognition do I first proceed to a third one that now connects the remote cognition (changeable) with the
A 331 cognition at issue: Therefore bodies are changeable. If this has been my procedure, then I have arrived at a cognition (conclusion) through a series of conditions (premises). Now every series whose indicator[185] is given (as that of a categorical or a hypothetical judgment) can be continued. Hence this same act of reason leads to *ratiocinatio polysyllogistica;*[186] this is a
B 388 series of inferences that can be continued to indefinite lengths either on the side of the conditions (*per prosyllogismos*) or on the side of the conditioned (*per episyllogismos*).[187]

But we soon become aware that the chain or series of prosyllogisms, i.e., of inferred cognitions on the side of the bases[188] or conditions for a given cognition—in other words, the *ascending series* of syllogisms—must relate differently toward our power of reason from the *descending series,* i.e., reason's progression on the side of the conditioned through episyllogisms. For since in the former case[189] the cognition (*conclusio*) is given only as conditioned, we cannot arrive at it by means of reason except by presupposing at least that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions are given (i.e., by presupposing totality in the series of premises), because only on the presupposition of these members as given is the judgment at issue possible a priori. On the side of the conditioned or
A 332 of the conclusions, on the other hand, we think only a *becoming* series rather than one already presupposed or given *entire,* and hence think only a potential progression. Hence if a cognition is regarded as conditioned, then reason is compelled to regard the series of conditions in the ascending line as complete and as given in its totality. But if this same cognition
B 389 is regarded simultaneously as condition of other cognitions that among them make up a series of conclusions in a descending line, then reason can be quite indifferent as to how far this progression extends *a parte poste-*

184[*erster.*]

185[*Exponent.*]

186[Polysyllogistic reasoning. Cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 133–34.]

187[Respectively, by prosyllogism or by episyllogism. Cf. A 307/B 364 and the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 134.]

188[Or 'grounds': *Gründe.*]

189[On the side of the conditions.]

riori,[190] and whether indeed totality of this series is possible at all. For reason does not need such a [total] series for the conclusion lying before it, because this conclusion is already sufficiently determined and secured by its bases *a parte priori.*[191] Now it may be that the series of premises on the side of the conditions has a *first* member, as supreme condition, or that it does not and is therefore without bounds *a parte priori.* Yet in either case the series of premises must contain totality of conditions, even supposing that we can never arrive at comprehending[192] this totality;[193] and the entire series must be true unconditionally if the conditioned regarded as a conclusion arising from it is to count[194] as true. This is a demand of reason. For reason proclaims that its cognition is determined a priori and necessary, and that it is so either in itself—and then the cognition requires no bases—or, if the cognition is derived, that it is so as a member in a series of bases that is itself unconditionally true.

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC {A 333 B 390}

BOOK I

Section III
System of Transcendental Ideas[195]

We are not dealing here with a logical dialectic, which abstracts from all content of cognition and uncovers solely the deceptive[196] illusion in the

[190][On the side of what is posterior, or consequent.]

[191][On the side of what is prior, or antecedent.]

[192][I.e., (rationally) grasping: *fassen.*]

[193][*sie.*]

[194][*gelten.*]

[195][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1. 63–70.]

[196][*falsch.*]

form of syllogisms,[197] but with a transcendental dialectic. Such a dialectic is to contain, completely a priori, the origin of certain cognitions that arise from pure reason, and of inferred concepts whose object cannot be given empirically at all and which therefore lie entirely outside the range of our power of pure understanding. From the natural reference that the transcendental use of our cognition, both in inferences and in judgments, must have to its logical use, we gathered that there will be only three kinds of dialectical inferences, referring to the three different[198] kinds of inference whereby reason can from principles arrive at cognitions;[199] and we gathered that in all of these three kinds of dialectical inferences reason's task is to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, to which understanding always remains tied, to the unconditioned synthesis, which understanding can never reach.

Now what is universal about all reference[200] that our presentations can
B 391 have is (1) their reference to the subject; (2) their reference to objects,[201]
A 334 and to these objects either (a)[202] as appearances or (b) as objects of thought as such. If we combine this subdivision[203] with the above [division],[204] then all relation[205] of presentations, of which we can frame either a concept or an idea is threefold: (1) the relation of presentations to the subject; (2) their relation to (a) the manifold of the object; (3) their relation to (b) all things as such.

Now, all pure concepts as such deal with the synthetic unity of presentations; but concepts of pure reason (transcendental ideas) deal with the unconditioned synthetic unity of all conditions as such. Hence all transcendental ideas can presumably[206] be brought under *three classes,* of which the **first** contains the absolute (unconditioned) *unity of the thinking subject,* the **second** the absolute *unity of the series of conditions of appearance,* the **third** the absolute *unity of the condition of all objects of thought as such.*

[197][Or 'inferences of reason': *Vernunftschlüsse*. For fallacious syllogisms, see the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 134–35.]

[198][*dreierlei.*]

[199][See A 304/B 361 incl. br. n. 66.]

[200][*Beziehung.*]

[201][*Objekte* here, *Gegenstände* just below, and *Objekt* a little after that. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[202][The parenthesized small letters in this paragraph have been added.]

[203][(a) and (b).]

[204][Into (1) and (2).]

[205][*Verhältnis*]

[206][*werden.*]

The thinking subject is the object of *psychology;* the sum of all appearances (the world) is the object of *cosmology;* and the thing containing the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings) is the object of *theology*.[207] Hence pure reason provides us with the idea for a transcendental psychology (*psychologia rationalis*); for a transcendental cosmology (*cosmologia rationalis*); finally, also for a transcendental theology[208] (*theologia transcendentalis*).[209] Even the mere outline for each and every one of these sciences cannot at all be ascribed to understanding, not even if understanding were combined with the highest logical use of reason—i.e., all thinkable inferences—in order to progress from one object of understanding (appearance) to all others, up to the most remote members of the empirical synthesis; rather, even any such outline is a pure and genuine product or problem solely of pure reason. {B 392 A 335}

What sort of modes of reason's pure concepts fall under these three headings [or classes] of all the transcendental ideas will be set forth completely in the following chapter;[210] they run along the course[211] of the categories, for pure reason never refers straightforwardly to objects but only to understanding's concepts of them. Similarly, only in the full elaboration[212] can we make distinct a thought that at first glance seems extremely paradoxical: how reason, merely by using synthetically the same function that it employs for the categorical syllogism, must necessarily hit upon the concept of the absolute[213] unity of the *thinking subject;* how reason's logical procedure in hypothetical syllogisms must necessarily entail the idea of the[214] absolutely[215] unconditioned *in a series* of given conditions; and how, finally, the mere form of a disjunctive syllogism must necessarily entail the highest concept of reason, viz., that of a *being of all beings.* {B 393 A 336}

207[Respectively, *Psychologie, Kosmologie, Theologie.*]

208[Respectively, *Seelenlehre, Weltwissenschaft, Gotteserkenntnis* ('cognition of God,' literally).]

209[Respectively, 'rational psychology,' 'rational cosmology,' 'transcendental cosmology.']

210[Once again, Kant means 'book.']

211[Literally, 'thread': *Faden.*]

212[*Ausführung.*]

213[*absolut.*]

214[Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *in hypothetischen* [*Vernunftschlüssen*] *die Idee vom* for *in hypothetischen Ideen die vom.*]

215[*schlechthin.* See A 326/B 382 br n. 166.]

Properly speaking, an *objective deduction* of these transcendental ideas, such as we were able to supply for the categories, is impossible. For precisely because they are only ideas, they have in fact no reference to any object that could be given congruently with them. We have been able, however, to undertake a subjective derivation[216] of them from the nature of our reason, and this derivation has indeed been accomplished in the present chapter.[217]

We readily see that pure reason aims at nothing but the absolute totality of the synthesis *on the side of the conditions* (whether of inherence, or of dependence, or of concurrence), and that it is not concerned with absolute completeness *on the side of the conditioned.* For pure reason needs only the former totality in order to presuppose the entire series of conditions and in order thereby to give it to the understanding a priori. But once a condition given completely (and unconditionally) is there, then a concept of reason regarding the continuation of the series is no longer needed; for the
B 394 understanding takes each downward step, from the condition to the *conditioned,* on its own. In this way the transcendental ideas serve only for *ascending,* in the series of conditions, up to the unconditioned, i.e., to the
A 337 principles. But as regards *descending* to the conditioned, although our reason does make very extensive logical use of the laws of understanding, there is for it here no transcendental use whatsoever; and if we frame an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis (of the *progressus*[218])—e.g., of the entire series of all *future* changes of the world—then this is a thought-entity[219] (*ens rationis*)[220] that is thought only by choice[221] and is not presupposed necessarily by reason. For the possibility of the conditioned does indeed presuppose the totality of its conditions, but not the totality of its consequences. Therefore the concept of the latter totality is not a transcendental idea; yet here we are dealing solely with transcendental ideas.

We also become aware, finally, that among the transcendental ideas themselves there can be seen a certain coherence and unity, and that by means of these ideas pure reason brings all its cognitions into a system. To

216[Reading, with Mellin, *Ableitung* for *Anleitung.*]

217[I.e., again, book.]

218[Progression, i.e., the "going forward."]

219[*Gedankending.* Cf. A 292/B 348 incl. br. n. 148.]

220[Being of reason. Cf. A 290–92/B 347–48 incl. br. n. 143.]

221[Or, perhaps, 'arbitrarily': *willkürlich.*]

proceed from the cognition of oneself (the soul) to the cognition of the world and, by means of it, to [the cognition of] the original being is so natural an advance that it seems similar to reason's logical progression from B 395
premises to conclusion.[222] Now whether there actually lies at the basis here, covertly, a kinship of the same kind as there is between the logical and the transcendental procedure—this is also one of the questions for whose answer we must first await the continuation of this inquiry. Provisionally we A 338
have already accomplished our purpose. For whereas the transcendental concepts of reason are usually mixed in with others in the theory of phi- B 396
losophers, who never[223] duly distinguish them from concepts of understanding, we have been able to extricate them from this ambiguous position, to indicate their origin and thereby simultaneously their determinate number (beyond which there can be no further transcendental concepts of reason whatever),[224] and to present them in a systematic coherence, whereby a special realm is marked out and delimited for pure reason.

[222]Metaphysics[a] has only three ideas as the proper purpose of its investigation—*God, freedom,* and *immortality*[b]—and in such a way that the second concept, when combined with the first, is to lead to the third as a necessary conclusion.[c] Everything else that this science deals with serves it only as a means for arriving at these ideas and at their reality. It needs these ideas not for the sake of natural science, but in order to get beyond nature. Insight into these ideas would make *theology, morality,* and—through combination of the two—*religion* and hence the highest purposes of our existence dependent merely on our speculative power of reason and on nothing else. In a systematic presentation of those ideas the mentioned order would, as the *synthetic* order, be the most fitting. But in the treatment that must necessarily precede such systematic presentation the *analytic* order, which reverses the synthetic order,[d] will be more appropriate to the purpose of carrying out our great plan—which we do by proceeding from what experience provides us with directly, viz., *psychology,* to *cosmology,* and from there up to *theology.*[e]

[a][This note was added in B.]

[b][Cf. B 7, A 798 = B 826, and the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 473.]

[c][For this syllogistic relation, cf. the *Announcement That a Treatise on Perpetual Peace in Philosophy Is Nearly Completed,* Ak. VIII, 418. See also B 110–11 above. Also Kant's note in the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 197. Also No. 5854 in the *Reflections on Metaphysics,* Ak. XVIII, 370.]

[d][For the distinction between the analytic and synthetic orders, see the *Prolegomena,* Ak. IV, 264. See also below, B 418–19.]

[e][Respectively, *Seelenlehre, Weltlehre, Erkenntnis Gottes* ('cognition of God,' literally).]

[223][*ohne . . . einmal.*]

[224][Parentheses added.]

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II
ON THE DIALECTICAL INFERENCES OF PURE REASON[1]

We may say that the object of a mere transcendental idea is something of which we have no concept, although this idea has been produced in reason quite necessarily and according to reason's original laws. For in fact no concept of understanding—i.e., no concept that can be shown and made
A 339 intuitive in a possible experience—is possible for an object[2] that is to be
B 397 adequate to reason's demand. Yet we would express ourselves better, and with less risk of being misunderstood, if we said that we cannot become acquainted with the object corresponding to an idea, although we can have a problematic concept of it.

Now, at least the transcendental (subjective) reality of the pure concepts of reason rests on our having been led to such ideas by a necessary syllogism. Therefore there will be syllogisms which contain no empirical premises and by means of which we infer, from something that we are acquainted with, something else of which we have in fact no concept and to which, through an unavoidable illusion, we nonetheless give objective reality. Hence such inferences should, with regard to their result, rather be called *subtly reasoning*[3] inferences than inferences of reason,[4] although they may indeed bear the latter name because of how they are prompted; for they are, after all, not invented, nor have arisen contingently, but have sprung from the nature of reason. They are sophistries[5] not of human beings but of pure reason itself. Even the wisest among all human beings cannot detach himself from them; perhaps he can after much effort forestall

[1][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 71–78.]

[2][*Gegenstand* here (and just above), *Objekt* just below. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[3][*vernünftelnd.*]

[4][Or 'syllogisms': *Vernunftschlüsse.*]

[5][*Sophistikationen.*]

the error, but he can never fully rid himself of the illusion that incessantly teases and mocks him.

Hence there are only three different[6] kinds [or classes] of dialectical syllogisms—as many as there are ideas in which their conclusions result. A 340
In the syllogism of the **first** class[7] I infer from the transcendental concept B 398
of the subject—a concept that contains nothing manifold—the absolute unity of this subject itself, of which I have in this way no concept whatever. This dialectical inference I shall call the transcendental *paralogism.* The **second** class of subtly reasoning inferences is aimed at the transcendental concept of the absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given appearance as such. Here, from the fact that the concept which I have of the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series on one side is always a self-contradictory one, I infer the correctness of the opposite unity, of which I yet also have no concept. The state of reason in these dialectical inferences I shall call the *antinomy* of pure reason. By the **third** kind of subtly reasoning inferences, finally, I start from the totality of conditions for thinking of objects as such insofar as they can be given to me, and from this I infer the absolute synthetic unity of all conditions of the possibility of things as such; i.e., from things that by their mere transcendental concept I am not acquainted with I infer a being of all beings, which through a transcendent[8] concept I am even less acquainted with and of whose unconditioned necessity I can frame no concept. This dialectical inference I shall call the *ideal* of pure reason.

[6][*dreierlei.*]

[7][Double emphasis on 'class' deleted.]

[8][The fourth and fifth editions have 'transcendental.' But cf., e.g., A 469 = B 497, A 565 = B 593, A 674 = B 702.]

A 341 } B 399 }

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II

Chapter I
On the Paralogisms of Pure Reason[9]

A logical paralogism[10] consists in a syllogism's wrongness[11] as regards form, whatever its content may be. A transcendental paralogism, however, has a transcendental basis[12] for inferring wrongly as regards form. Such a fallacious inference will thus have its basis in the nature of human reason, and will carry with it an illusion that is unavoidable although not unresolvable.

We now come to a concept that was not entered in the above general list of the transcendental concepts,[13] and that must yet be classed with them, but without in the least changing the table and declaring it deficient. This is the concept—or, if one prefers, the judgment—*I think*. But we readily see that this concept is the vehicle of all concepts as such and hence also of transcendental concepts, and that it is therefore always also comprised among these and hence is likewise transcendental; but that it cannot have

B 400 a special title, because it serves only to bring forward[14] all thought as be-

[9][See Karl Ameriks, *Kant's Theory of Mind* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 1–24. See also H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 272–93. Also H W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 249–65. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 200–210. Also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 79–96. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br n. 5, 455–77. Also T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 244–45. Also W. H. Walsh, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 1, 176–95. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 201–3.]

[10][Cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 134–35.]

[11][*Falschheit*.]

[12][Or 'ground'. *Grund*. See B xix br. n 79.]

[13][The table of the categories, A 80/B 106.]

[14][*aufführen*.]

longing to consciousness. Yet however pure of the empirical (the impression of the senses) this concept may be, it still serves to distinguish two kinds of objects taken from the nature of our power of presentation. *I*, as thinking, am an object of inner sense and am called soul; what is an object of the outer senses is called body. Thus the expression, I, as a thinking being, already means the object of psychology—which may be called rational psychology[15] if I demand to know nothing more about the soul than what can be inferred from this concept *I*, insofar as it occurs in all thought, independently of all experience (which determines me more closely and *in concreto*). A 342

Now *rational* psychology actually is an enterprise of this kind. For if the slightest empirical [element] of my thought—some particular perception of my inner state—were also mixed in with this science's bases of cognition, then it would no longer be rational but *empirical* psychology. Hence we are indeed facing an alleged science which has been built on the single proposition *I think,* and whose basis or lack of basis we can, quite fittingly and in accordance with the nature of a transcendental philosophy, examine here. We must not be troubled by the fact that in this proposition, which expresses the perception of oneself, I do have an inner experience, and that B 401
therefore the rational psychology built on it is never pure but is based in A 343
part on an empirical principle. For this inner perception is nothing more than the mere apperception *I think* that makes even all transcendental concepts possible,[16] since in them we say:[17] I think substance, cause, etc. For inner experience as such and its possibility, or perception as such and its relation to other perception, without any specific[18] distinction or determination of such inner experience or perception being given empirically, cannot be regarded as empirical cognition; it must be regarded, rather, as cognition of the empirical as such, and it belongs to the inquiry into the possibility of any experience—an inquiry that is indeed transcendental. The slightest object of perception (e.g., even just pleasure or displeasure), if added[19] to the universal presentation of self-consciousness, would at once transform rational psychology into an empirical one.

[15] [*Seelenlehre* here; *Psychologie* just above.]

[16] [See C. Thomas Powell, *Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 11–64.]

[17] [*heißen.*]

[18] [Or 'particular' (as contrasted with 'universal' or 'as such'): *besonder.*]

[19] [Reading, as suggested by Erdmann, *welches* for *welche.*]

Hence *I think* is rational psychology's sole text, from which it is to unfold its entire wisdom. We readily see that if this thought is to be referred to an object (myself), then it can contain nothing but transcendental predicates of this object; for the slightest empirical predicate would ruin the science's rational purity and independence from all experience.

A 344
B 402
Here we shall merely have to follow the guidance of the categories, however, but with one exception. For here a thing—I, as thinking being—has been given first; hence although we shall not change the above order of the categories among one another as it is presented in their table, yet we shall here start from the category of substance, whereby a thing is presented in itself,[20] and thus shall pursue the series of the categories backward.[21] The topic[22] of rational psychology, from which whatever else it may contain must be derived, is thus the following:

1
The soul is
substance.[23]

2
In terms of quality
it is *simple.*

3
In terms of the different
times in which it exists,[24]
it is numerically identical,
i.e., *unity* (not plurality).

4
It stands in relation
to *possible* objects in space.[25]

[20][Grammatically, one could also read 'through which a thing in itself is presented.']

[21][See above, B 395 br. n. 222d]

[22][I.e. (here), the scheme *locating* the soul in terms of the categories. Cf. A 268/B 324 (also A 61/B 86).]

[23][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 50), Kant replaces this by 'The soul exists [*existiert*] as substance.']

[24][*da ist.*]

[25]If any reader cannot so easily divine from these expressions in their transcendental abstractness what is their psychological meaning and why the last attribute[a]

From these elements arise all concepts of pure psychology, merely by the assembly of these elements and without the least recognition of another principle. This substance, merely as object of inner sense, yields[26] the concept of *immateriality;* as simple substance, that of *incorruptibility.* Its identity as intellectual substance yields *personality;* all three of these components together, *spirituality.* The relation of the substance to objects yields *commerce*[27] with bodies; and hence as so related it presents thinking substance as the principle of life in matter, i.e., as soul (*anima*) and as the basis of *animality;* and animality as limited by spirituality presents *immortality.* A 345 B 403

Now by reference to this [topic of rational psychology] there are four paralogisms of a transcendental psychology that is wrongly considered to be a science of pure reason concerning the nature of our thinking being. Yet we can lay at the basis of this science nothing but the simple, and by B 404
itself quite empty, presentation *I,* of which we cannot even say that it is a A 346
concept, but only that it is a mere consciousness accompanying all concepts. Now through this *I* or *he* or *it*[28] (the thing) that thinks, nothing more is presented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x.[29] This subject is cognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and apart from them we can never have the least concept of it; hence we revolve around it in a constant circle, since in order to make any judgment regarding it we must always already make use of its presentation. This is an inconvenience that cannot be separated from it, because consciousness in itself is not so much a presentation distinguishing a particular object, as rather a form of presentation as such insofar as this presentation is to be called cognition; for only of such presentation can I say that I think anything through it.

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of the soul belongs to the category of *existence,* he will find them sufficiently explained and B 403
justified in what follows There is present also—both in this section and in the entire work—an influx of Latin expressions, instead of the synonymous German ones, and this may be regarded as contrary to taste in good writing style. My excuse for using them is that I preferred taking something away from the elegance of language, to impeding the book's scholarly[b] use by keeping it in the slightest degree from being understood.

[a][I.e., 4.]

[b][*Schul-*.]

[26][*geben.*]

[27][Cf. A 213/B 260.]

[28][Emphasis on the three terms added.]

[29][I.e., the unknown (as in a mathematical equation). Cf. A 104, 109.]

It must, however, seem strange at the very outset that the condition under which I think at all, and which is therefore merely a characteristic of myself as subject,[30] is to be valid also[31] for everything that thinks; and that upon a proposition that seems empirical we can presume to base an apodeictic and universal judgment, viz.: that everything that thinks is of such
B 405 a character as the pronouncement of self-consciousness asserts of me. The cause of this, however, lies in the fact that we must necessarily ascribe to
A 347 things a priori all of the properties that make up the conditions under which alone we think them. Now through no outer experience, but solely through self-consciousness, can I have the least presentation of a thinking being. Hence objects of that sort are nothing more than the transfer of this consciousness of mine to other things, which thereby alone are presented as thinking beings. But in this process the proposition *I think*[32] is taken only problematically. I.e., it is not taken insofar as it may contain a perception of an existent[33] (the Cartesian *cogito, ergo sum*[34]); the proposition is taken, rather, in terms of its mere possibility, in order to see what properties may from so simple a proposition flow to its subject (whether or not such a subject exists[35]).

If our pure rational[36] cognition of thinking beings as such were based on more than the *cogito,* viz., if we availed ourselves also of our observations concerning our thoughts' play and of what natural laws of the thinking self can be drawn from these observations, then there would arise an empirical psychology that would be a kind of *physiology* of inner sense. But although it could perhaps explain the appearances of inner sense, it still could never serve to disclose to us such properties (e.g., that of
B 406 *simple*[37]) as do not belong at all to possible experience, nor serve to teach

[30]['my subject,' Kant says literally. Similarly on several occasions below.]

[31][*zugleich.*]

[32][Emphasis added.]

[33][*Dasein,* which also means 'existence.']

[34][I think, therefore I am.]

[35][*existieren.*]

[36][*Vernunft-.*]

[37][*die des Einfachen* (emphasis added), one of the properties of the soul (A 344/B 402). The phrase could also mean 'that of the simple' or 'those of the simple.']

us *apodeictically* with regard to thinking beings as such anything whatever concerning their nature. It would, therefore, not be a *rational*[38] psychology.

[THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON]

[First Edition]

The proposition *I think* (taken problematically)[39] contains, then, the form of any of understanding's judgments as such, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle.[40] Clearly, therefore, the inferences from this proposition can contain merely a transcendental use of understanding. Such use allows no experience to be mixed in, and hence regarding its progress we can—by what we have shown above—frame even in advance none but an unfavorable conception. Let us, therefore, trace this use, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments[41] of pure psychology. A 348

First Paralogism, of Substantiality[42]

That whose presentation is the *absolute subject* of our judgments and hence cannot be used as determination of another thing is **substance**.

I, as a thinking being, am the *absolute subject* of all my possible judgments, and this presentation of myself cannot be used as predicate of any other thing.

Therefore I, as thinking being (soul), am **substance**.

[38][*rational*.]

[39][See A 347/B 405.]

[40][See A 341/B 399.]

[41][I.e., basic concepts.]

[42][See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 25–83, esp. 64–76. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 97–104. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 457–58. Also C. T. Powell, *op. cit.* at A 343/B 401 br. n. 16, 65–90. And see T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 245–49.]

CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST PARALOGISM OF PURE PSYCHOLOGY

We have shown in the analytic part of the Transcendental Logic[43] that pure categories (and among them also that of substance) have no objective sig-
A 349 nification in themselves, i.e., if they are not based on an intuition to whose manifold they can be applied as functions of synthetic unity. Without this basis they are only functions of a judgment and are without content. I can say of every thing as such that it is substance insofar as I distinguish it from mere predicates and determinations of things. Now in all our thought the *I* is the subject wherein thoughts inhere only as determinations, and this *I* cannot be used as the determination of another thing. Hence everyone must necessarily regard himself as the substance, but regard thought as being only accidents of his existence and determinations of his state.

However, what sort of use am I to make of this concept of a substance? I can by no means [legitimately] infer from it that I, as a thinking being, *continue* by myself and do not naturally *either arise or pass away*. Yet only for this inference can the concept of the substantiality of myself as thinking subject benefit me; apart from this use of the concept, I could quite readily dispense with it.

So far are these properties from being inferable from the mere pure category of a substance that we must, rather, lay at the basis the permanence of a given object taken from experience if we want to apply to this object the empirically usable concept of a *substance*. With our proposition, however, we have not laid at the basis any experience, but have merely in-
A 350 ferred permanence from the concept of the reference that all thought has to the *I*[44] as the common subject wherein it inheres. Nor could we, even if doing so were our aim, establish such permanence through any sure observation. For although the *I* is in all thoughts, there is not linked with this presentation the least intuition that would distinguish it from other objects of intuition. Hence one can indeed perceive that in all thought this presentation occurs again and again, but not that it is a constant[45] and enduring intuition wherein the thoughts (as mutable) vary.[46]

[43][A 139/B 178, A 145–47/B 185–87, and cf A 156/B 195.]

[44][Emphasis on 'I' added; similarly for the remaining originally unemphasized occurrences (of this sort) in The Paralogisms of Pure Reason, edition A.]

[45][*stehend.*]

[46][*wechseln.* See B 224 br. n 45.]

From this it follows that the first syllogism of transcendental psychology foists on us what is only a supposed new insight. For the constant[47] logical subject of thought is passed off by it as the cognition of the real subject of the inherence of thought. With this real subject we are not, and cannot be, in the least acquainted. For consciousness alone is what turns all presentations into thoughts, and hence solely in it as the transcendental subject must all perceptions be found; and apart from this logical meaning of the *I* we are not acquainted with the subject in itself that, as substratum, underlies this *I* as it underlies also all thoughts. However, we may quite readily accept[48] the proposition *The soul is substance,* provided that we are content that this concept of the soul as substance does not in the least lead us[49] further; that it cannot teach us any of the usual conclusions drawn by A 351
the subtly reasoning psychology, such as to the everlasting duration of the soul in all changes and even in death; and that this concept therefore designates a substance only in idea, but not in reality.

Second Paralogism, of Simplicity[50]

A thing whose action can never be regarded as the concurrence of many acting things is **simple**.

Now the soul, or the thinking *I*, is such a thing. Therefore, etc.

CRITIQUE OF THE SECOND PARALOGISM OF TRANSCENDENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

This is the Achilles[51] of all dialectical inferences of pure psychology. It is by no means merely a sophistical game that a dogmatist contrives in order to provide his assertions with a cursory illusion of plausibility,[52] but is an

[47][*beständig.*]

[48][*gelten lassen.*]

[49][Reading, with Hartenstein, *uns* for *unser.*]

[50][See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 25–83, esp. 47–64. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 105–20. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 458–61. Also C. T. Powell, *op. cit.* at A 343/B 401 br. n. 16, 91–129. And see T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 249–51.]

[51][The reference here is to Achilles as the great hero who slew Hector (the prince of Troy), not to Achilles' heel (his one remaining vulnerable point).]

[52][*einen flüchtigen Schein.*]

inference that seems to withstand even the keenest examination and the most scrupulous investigation. Here it is.

Any *composite* substance is an aggregate of many substances, and the action of something composite—or what inheres in this something *as*[53] thus composite—is an aggregate of many actions or accidents that are distributed among the set[54] of substances. Now an effect arising from the con-
A 352 currence of many acting substances is indeed possible when this effect is merely extrinsic (e.g., the motion of a body is the united motion of all its parts). But with thoughts, as accidents belonging intrinsically to a thinking being, the situation is different. For suppose that something composite thought: then each part of it would contain a part of the thought, but solely[55] all taken together would contain the whole thought. This, however, is contradictory. For since the presentations (e.g., the individual words of a verse) that are distributed among different beings never amount to a whole thought (a verse), the thought cannot inhere in something composite *as* composite. Hence a thought is possible only in *one* substance that is not an aggregate of many and hence is absolutely[56] simple.[57]

The so-called *nervus probandi*[58] of this argument lies in the proposition that in order for many presentations to amount to one thought, they must be contained in the absolute[59] unity of the thinking subject. No one, however, can prove this proposition *from concepts*. For just how would he set
A 353 about accomplishing this? The proposition, A thought can only be the effect[60] of the absolute unity of the thinking being, cannot be treated as analytic. For since the thought consists of many presentations, its unity is collective and can, as far as mere concepts are concerned, refer just as well to the collective unity of the substances cooperating[61] on the thought (as the

[53][Emphasis added; similarly near the end of the paragraph.]

[54][*Menge*.]

[55][*allererst*.]

[56][*schlechterdings*.]

[57]Giving this proof the usual rigorous guise that complies with school standards is quite easy. But for my purposes, putting before us, at least in a popular way, the mere basis of proof is already sufficient.

[58][Nerve of the proof.]

[59][*absolut*.]

[60][*Wirkung*.]

[61][*mitwirken*.]

motion of a body is the composite motion of all the parts of the body) as it can refer to the absolute unity of the subject. Hence we cannot by the rule of identity[62] have insight into the necessity of presupposing for a composite thought a simple substance. But that the same proposition[63] is to be cognized synthetically and completely a priori from nothing but concepts—this no one will dare to advocate who has insight into the basis, as we have set it forth above,[64] of the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions.

But it is also impossible for this necessary unity of the subject, as the condition of the possibility of any thought, to be derived from experience. For experience does not allow[65] us to cognize any necessity[66]—not to mention even the fact that the concept of absolute unity is far beyond its sphere. From where, then, do we take this proposition on which the whole psychological inference of reason[67] relies?

It is obvious that if one wants to have a presentation of a thinking being then one must put oneself in that being's place, and hence must substitute one's own self as subject for the object that one wanted to consider (which is not the case in any other kind of investigation); and it is obvious A 354 that we require, in order to have any thought, the absolute unity of the subject only because otherwise we could not say *I think*[68] (the manifold [being held together] in one presentation). For although the whole of the thought could be divided and distributed among many subjects, still the subjective *I* cannot be divided and distributed, and yet we presuppose this *I* in all thought.

Hence here, just as in the previous paralogism, the formal proposition of apperception *I think* remains the whole basis on which rational psychology ventures to expand its cognitions. But this proposition is, of course, not an experience, but is the form of apperception. Although this form at-

[62][I.e., the rule (or principle) underlying analytic propositions.]

[63][I.e., the proposition that a thought can only be the effect of the absolute unity of the thinking being.]

[64][Above all, in the Transcendental Aesthetic (A 19–49/B 33–73) and the Analytic of Principles (A 130–292/B 169–349).]

[65][*geben.*]

[66][See above, B 3–4.]

[67][Or 'syllogism.']

[68][Emphasis added (on *both* terms, in line with the whole context—cf., e.g., Kant's point at the very beginning of the next paragraph); similarly for the remaining originally unemphasized occurrences of 'I think' in The Paralogisms of Pure Reason, edition A.]

taches to and precedes every experience, it must still always be regarded only as concerning a possible cognition as such, viz., as *merely subjective condition* of such cognition. We wrongly turn this subjective condition into a condition of the possibility of a cognition of objects, viz., into a *concept* of a thinking being as such. We do this because we cannot present such a being without putting ourselves, with the formula of our consciousness, in the place of any other intelligent being.

Moreover, the simplicity of myself (as soul) is not actually *inferred* from the proposition *I think;* rather, the former proposition, *I am simple,*[69] already lies in every thought itself. The proposition *I am simple* must be re-
A 355 garded as a direct expression of apperception, just as the supposed Cartesian inference *cogito, ergo sum*[70] is in fact tautological, since the *cogito* (*sum cogitans*)[71] directly asserts my actuality. But *I am simple* means nothing more than that this presentation *I* does not comprise[72] the least manifoldness, and that it is [thus] absolute (although merely logical) unity.

Hence the so famous psychological proof[73] is based solely on the indivisible unity of a presentation [*I*] that governs only the verb *think* with regard to a person. Plainly, however, the *I* attached to this thought designates the subject of the inherence of thought only transcendentally; and through this *I* we do not indicate in this subject the least property, nor are we acquainted with or know anything about this subject at all. The subject[74] means only a something as such (transcendental subject). The presentation of this subject must indeed be simple, precisely because we determine in this subject nothing whatsoever—as, of course,[75] certainly nothing can be presented more simply than through the concept of a mere something. But the simplicity of the presentation of a subject is not therefore a cognition of the simplicity of the subject itself. For we abstract entirely from the subject's properties when we designate it solely by the expression *I,* which is entirely empty of content (and which I can apply to any thinking subject).

[69][Kant says merely *der erstere;* cf. just below. Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition change this to *die erstere,* to make it refer back to 'simplicity.']

[70][I think, therefore I am.]

[71][I think (I am [as] thinking). Cf. B 428.]

[72][*in sich fassen.*]

[73][Of the soul's simplicity.]

[74][As so designated.]

[75][*denn.*]

This much is certain: that through the *I* I always think of[76] an absolute but logical unity (simplicity) of the subject; but not that I cognize through it the actual simplicity of myself as subject. We saw that the proposition, I am substance, signifies nothing but the pure category, of which I can make no use *in concreto* (empirical use). I am similarly permitted to say, I am a simple substance, i.e., one the presentation of which never contains a synthesis of the manifold. But this concept—or, for that matter, this proposition—teaches us nothing whatever regarding myself as an object of experience. For the concept of substance is itself used only as a function of synthesis, without an underlying[77] intuition and hence without an object, and holds only of the condition of our cognition, but does not hold of any object that one can indicate. Let us perform an experiment concerning the supposed usefulness of this proposition.[78] A 356

Everyone must admit that the assertion of the simple nature of the soul has any value only insofar as I can thereby distinguish this subject from all matter, and consequently can exempt it from the decay to which matter is always subjected. Indeed, the above proposition is intended quite specifically for this use, and this is why it is usually also expressed thus: The soul is not corporeal. Now suppose that I could show that even if this cardinal proposition[79] of rational psychology, in the pure signification of a mere judgment of reason (made from pure categories), is granted all objective validity (Everything that thinks is simple substance), we nonetheless cannot make the least use of this proposition in deciding whether the soul is heterogeneous from or akin to matter. If I can show this, then this will be tantamount to my having relegated this supposed psychological insight to the realm of mere ideas, which lack the reality needed for objective use. A 357

In the Transcendental Aesthetic we have proved undeniably that bodies[80] are mere appearances of our outer sense and not things in themselves. In accordance with this, we may rightly say that our thinking subject is not corporeal;[81] that is, since it is presented by us as object of inner sense, it

[76][*sich . . . gedenken.*]

[77][Literally, 'underlaid': *unterlegt.*]

[78]['The soul is simple.']

[79][That the soul is simple.]

[80][*Körper.*]

[81][I.e., we as thinking subjects are not corporeal (*körperlich*).]

cannot insofar as it thinks be an object of outer senses, i.e., an appearance in space. Now, this means the same as that among outer[82] experiences we can never encounter thinking beings, *as such;* or that we cannot externally[83] intuit their thoughts, their consciousness, their desires, etc., for all of this belongs to[84] inner sense. In fact, this argument seems also to be the
A 358 natural and popular one that even the commonest understanding seems to have hit upon all along, and by which it began already very early to regard souls as beings that are quite distinct from bodies.

Now extension, impenetrability, cohesion, and motion—in short, whatever the outer senses can supply us with—will thus indeed neither be nor contain thoughts, feeling, inclination, or decision, which are not objects of outer intuition at all. Nonetheless, something lies at the basis of outer appearances and affects our sense in such a way that this sense acquires the presentations of space, matter, shape, etc. And this something, considered as noumenon (or better, as transcendental object), might yet simultaneously also be the subject of our thoughts—although, because of[85] the way in which our outer sense is affected by this something, we acquire no intuition of presentations, of the will, etc., but acquire merely intuitions of space and its determinations. But this something is not extended, not impenetrable, not composite, because all these predicates concern only sensibility and its intuition insofar as we are affected by such [transcendental] objects (with which we are otherwise unacquainted). These expressions,[86] however, in no way allow us to cognize what sort of object it is, but only that to this object, as one considered apart from any reference to outer
A 359 senses and thus considered in itself, we cannot ascribe these predicates of outer appearances; solely the predicates of inner sense— presentations and thought—do not contradict such an object. Accordingly, even if the simplicity of the soul's nature is granted, such simplicity does not at all sufficiently distinguish the human soul from matter, with regard to matter's substratum—if matter is regarded (as it ought to be) merely as appearance.

If matter were a thing in itself, then it would as a composite being be distinguished altogether from the soul as a simple being. However, matter is merely outer appearance, whose substratum is not cognized through any

[82][*äußer.*]

[83][*äußerlich.*]

[84][*vor.*]

[85][*durch.*]

[86][I.e., 'not extended,' 'not impenetrable,' 'not composite.']

predicates that we can indicate. Hence concerning this substratum I can[87] indeed assume that it is in itself simple, although by the manner in which it affects our senses it produces in us the intuition of what is extended and hence composite. And I can assume, therefore, that the substance which in regard to our outer sense possesses[88] extension is in itself attended by thoughts that can be presented consciously by the substance's own inner sense. In this manner, the same [thing] that in one reference is called corporeal would in another reference simultaneously be a thinking being; and although we could not intuit this being's thoughts, we could still intuit their signs in appearance. Thus the expression which says that only souls think (as special kinds of substances) would be dropped. We would say, rather, as we do usually, that human beings think; i.e., that the same [thing] which A 360 as outer appearance is extended is intrinsically (in itself) a subject that is not composite but is simple and thinks.

But we can, without permitting such hypotheses, make this general remark. If by soul I mean a thinking being in itself, then the very question as to whether or not the soul is of the same kind as matter (which is not at all a thing in itself but is only a kind of presentations in us) is already unfitting. For, of course, it is understood that a thing in itself is of a different nature from the determinations that make up merely its state.

But if we compare the thinking *I* not with matter but with the intelligible which lies at the basis of the outer appearance that we call matter, then, since of the intelligible we know nothing whatever, we also cannot say that the soul is in any respect intrinsically distinct from the intelligible.

Thus our simple consciousness is not acquaintance with the simple nature of ourselves as subject, insofar as this subject is thereby to be distinguished from matter taken as a composite being.

Hence it seems that this concept,[89] in[90] the single case where it is usable, viz., in the comparison of myself with objects of outer experience, is not suitable for determining what is peculiar to and distinctive of one's nature. But if this is so, then although we may, of course, claim to know that the thinking *I*—the soul (a name for the transcendental object of inner sense)—is simple, yet this expression does not therefore have any use what- A 361

[87][I.e., without contradicting myself.]

[88][*der . . . zukommt.*]

[89][Of the soul's simplicity.]

[90][Omitting, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *ihn* before *in.*]

ever extending to actual objects, and hence cannot in the least expand our cognition.

Thus falls, with its main support, the whole of rational psychology. And here as little as anywhere else can we hope to broaden our insights through mere concepts (but still less through the mere subjective form of all our concepts: consciousness) without reference to possible experience. This is so especially because even the fundamental concept of a *simple nature* is of such a kind that it cannot be encountered in any experience at all, so that there is no way whatever to arrive at this concept as an objectively valid one.

Third Paralogism, of Personality[91]

What is conscious of the numerical identity of itself in different times is to that extent a *person.*

Now the soul is, etc.

Therefore it is a person.

Critique of the Third Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

If I want to cognize the numerical identity of an external object through
A 362 experience, then I shall pay attention to the permanent [element in] that appearance to which, as subject, everything remaining refers as determination, and shall note the identity of that permanent [element] in the time wherein the remainder varies.[92] I, however, am an object of inner sense, and all time is merely the form of inner sense.[93] Consequently, I refer each and every one of my successive determinations to the numerically identical self found in all time, i.e., in the form of the inner intuition of myself. On this basis, the personality of the soul would have to be regarded not even as inferred, but as a fully identical proposition[94] of self-consciousness in time; and this is indeed the cause of its holding a priori. For it actually

[91][See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 128–76, esp. 130–37. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 120–26. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 461–62. Also C. T. Powell, *op. cit.* at A 343/B 401 br. n. 16, 130–73, esp. 130–35. And see T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 251–52.]

[92][*wechseln.* See B 224 br. n. 45.]

[93][See the Transcendental Aesthetic, A 32–33/B 49–50.]

[94][I.e., the proposition 'The soul is a person' would have to be regarded as analytic.]

says nothing more than that in the entire time wherein I am conscious of myself, I am conscious of this time as belonging to the unity of myself; and it amounts to the same whether I say that this entire time is in me as individual unity, or that I am with numerical identity to be found in all this time.

In my own consciousness, therefore, identity of the person is unfailingly to be met with. But if I contemplate myself from someone else's point of view (as object of his outer[95] intuition), then this external observer considers *me* first of all *in time*,[96] for in apperception *time* is in fact presented only *in me*.[97] Hence although he thus grants the *I* that in *my* consciousness accompanies at all time—and with full identity—all presentations, he will not yet infer from it the objective permanence of myself. For here the time wherein the observer posits me is not the time found in my own but the time found in his sensibility, and hence the identity that is necessarily linked with my consciousness is not therefore linked with his, i.e., with his outer intuition of myself as subject. A 363

Hence the identity of the consciousness of myself in different times is only a formal condition of my thoughts and of their coherence, but does not prove at all the numerical identity of myself as subject. In this subject—regardless of the logical identity of the *I*—there may, after all, have occurred such variation[98] as does not permit us to retain [the claim to] its identity, although we may still go on to accord to this subject the homonymous *I*. For in any different state of the subject, even the state of its conversion [to another], this *I* would still always preserve the thought of the preceding subject and thus could also pass it on to the subsequent one.[99]

[95][*äußer*, also rendered as 'external' just below.]

[96][And not yet (as I do in my self-consciousness) as (also) an individual unity having (his) entire time in him.]

[97][I.e. (cf. A 370 incl. br. n. 126), in oneself (not yet in anything external)—here in the external observer, as Kant goes on to say. I follow Vorländer in adding emphasis on 'in me' and similarly, just below, on 'my' in 'my consciousness.']

[98][*Wechsel.* See B 224 br. n. 45.]

[99]An elastic ball striking another such ball in a straight direction communicates to that ball (if we take account merely of the positions in space) its entire motion and hence its entire state.[a] Now let us—by analogy with such bodies—assume substances one of which imbues the other with presentations along with the consciousness of these. We shall then be able to think an entire series of such substances: A 364
the first would communicate its state, along with the consciousness thereof, to the second substance; the second would communicate its own state, along with the state

A 364 Although the proposition, put forth by some ancient schools,[100] that everything in the world is *in flux* and nothing is *permanent* and enduring cannot be upheld[101] once one assumes substances, this proposition is nonetheless not refuted by the unity of self-consciousness. For we ourselves cannot judge from our consciousness whether as souls we are permanent or not, because we class with our identical self only what we are conscious of, and thus must indeed necessarily judge that in the entire time of which we are conscious we are the same. But we cannot yet, on that account, declare this sameness to be valid from the standpoint of a stranger. For we do not encounter in the soul any permanent appearance except merely the presentation *I* that accompanies and connects all appearances, and hence we can never establish whether this *I* (a mere thought) is not just as much in flux as are all the remaining thoughts that it strings one to another.

A 365 It is noteworthy, however, that the personality of the soul and its presupposition, permanence, and hence the soul's substantiality must now first of all be proved. For if we could presuppose the latter,[102] then there would follow from it, not yet indeed the continuance of consciousness, but still the possibility of a continuing consciousness[,] in an enduring subject; and this is already sufficient for personality, which does not itself immediately cease because its action[103] is, perhaps, interrupted for a time. But there is nothing through which this permanence is given to us prior to the numerical identity of ourselves that we infer from the identical apperception; rather, this permanence is first inferred from that numerical identity. (And

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of the previous substance, to the third; and the third substance would similarly communicate to yet another the states of all the previous substances, along with its own state and the consciousness of all of them. Hence the last substance would be conscious of all the states of the substances that had changed before it as being its own states, because these states would have been transferred to it together with the consciousness of them. Despite this, however, that substance would not have been the same person in all these states.

[a][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 544–59.]

[100][It is attributed to Heraclitus, but was held also by such philosophers as Cratylus and (to some extent) Plato.]

[101][*stattfinden*.]

[102][I.e., substantiality, with the implicit permanence.]

[103][*Wirkung*.]

this [permanence] is what, if things were done rightly, should first be followed by the concept of substance that is usable only empirically.[104]) Since, then, this identity of the person does not by any means follow from the identity of the *I* found in the consciousness of all time wherein I cognize myself, we were also unable—above[105]—to base on it the substantiality of the soul.

However, just as the concept of substance and of the simple remained with us, so may we keep also the concept of personality (insofar as this concept is merely transcendental, i.e., insofar as it concerns[106] the unity of the subject with which we are otherwise unacquainted but in whose determinations there is a thoroughgoing connection through apperception). And to this extent the concept of personality is, indeed, needed and sufficient for practical use.[107] But on no account can we parade it as an expansion A 366
of our self-cognition through pure reason,[108] an expansion that from the mere concept of the identical self holds out[109] to us an uninterrupted continuation of the subject. For this concept revolves forever around itself, and does not take us further in regard to a single question aimed at synthetic cognition. What sort of thing matter may be in itself (as transcendental object) is indeed entirely unknown[110] to us. But inasmuch as matter is presented as something external, the permanence of it as appearance can nonetheless be observed.[111] But if I want to observe in the variation of all appearances the mere *I*, then I have no other correlate for my comparisons than again myself with the universal conditions of my consciousness. Hence I can give to all questions none but tautological answers, viz., by substituting my concept and its unity for the properties belonging to myself as object, and by thus simply presupposing what people demanded to know.

104[Cf. the end of A 349.]

105[In the first paralogism; see esp. A 349–50.]

106['concerns' inserted, as suggested by Adickes.]

107[See below, A 809–11 = B 837–39. See also the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 122–24.]

108[See *ibid.*, 134–41.]

109[*vorspiegeln.*]

110[*unbekannt.*]

111[See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 542–43.]

Fourth Paralogism, of Ideality[112] (of Outer[113] Relations)

That whose existence[114] can only be inferred as the existence of a cause for given perceptions has a merely doubtful existence.[115]

A 367 Now all outer[116] appearances are of such a kind that their existence cannot be perceived directly,[117] but that these appearances can only be inferred as the cause of given perceptions.

Therefore the existence of all objects of outer senses is doubtful. I call this uncertainty the ideality of outer appearances, and the doctrine of this ideality is called *idealism,* in comparison to which the assertion of a possible certainty concerning objects of outer senses is called *dualism.*

Critique of the Fourth Paralogism of Transcendental Psychology

Let us first subject the premises to examination. [They say the following.] We may rightly assert that only what is in ourselves can be perceived directly, and that solely my own existence can be the object of a mere perception. Therefore the existence of an actual object outside me (if this word[118] is taken in its intellectual meaning)[119] is never given straightforwardly in perception. Rather, perception is a modification of inner sense, and the existence of such an actual object can only be added to perception, as its external cause, in thought and hence can only be inferred. This is also the reason why Descartes rightly limited all perception, in the narrowest meaning of this term, to the proposition, I (as a thinking being) am.
A 368 For clearly, since the external is not in me, I cannot encounter it in my ap-

112[See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 84–127, esp. 111–14. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 126–41. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 462–63. Also C. T. Powell, *op. cit.* at A 343/ B 401 br. n. 16, 174–206, esp. 175–82. And see T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 252–69.]

113[*äußer.*]

114[*Dasein.*]

115[*Existenz* here, *Dasein* in the two occurrences just below.]

116[*äußer.*]

117[*unmittelbar.* See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

118['outside'; cf. A 369 incl. br. n. 124.]

119[I.e., the meaning that it has according to pure concepts of understanding. Cf. A 369 incl br. n. 124.]

perception, and hence also not in any perception, which is in fact only the determination of apperception.

Hence I cannot, in fact, perceive external things, but can only infer their existence from my inner perception, by regarding this perception as the effect for which something external is the proximate cause. But the inference from a given effect to a determinate[120] cause is always uncertain, because the effect may have arisen from more than one cause. Accordingly, in the reference of the perception to its cause it always remains doubtful whether this cause is internal or external; and hence it remains doubtful whether all so-called outer perceptions are not a mere play of our inner sense, or whether they do refer to external actual objects as their cause. At any rate, the existence of these objects is only inferred and runs the risk of all inferences, whereas the object of inner sense (I myself with all my presentations) is perceived directly and its existence admits of no doubt.

Hence by an *idealist* we must mean, not someone who denies the existence of external objects of the senses, but someone who merely does not grant that this existence is cognized through direct perception, and who infers from this that we can never through any possible experience become A 369
completely certain of their actuality.

Now before I exhibit our paralogism in regard to its deceptive illusion, I must first point out that we must necessarily distinguish two kinds of[121] idealism. By *transcendental idealism* of all appearances I mean the doctrinal system[122] whereby we regard them, one and all, as mere presentations and not as things in themselves, and according to which space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given on their own or conditions of objects taken as things in themselves. This idealism is opposed to a *transcendental realism,* which regards both time and space as something given in itself (independently of our sensibility). Hence the transcendental realist conceives[123] outer appearances (if their actuality is granted) as things in themselves that exist independently of us and of our sensibility, and that would therefore be *outside* us even according to pure concepts of understanding.[124] It is, in fact, this transcendental

[120][Or 'definite': *bestimmt.*]

[121]['a twofold,' literally.]

[122][*Lehrbegriff;* i.e., a (structured) body of doctrines.]

[123][*(sich)* . . *vorstellen,* which I usually translate as 'to present.' See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[124][I.e., even with 'outside' taken in the meaning that it has according to such concepts; cf. A 367 incl. br. n 119. Emphasis added.]

realist who afterwards plays the empirical idealist.[125] Having wrongly presupposed that if objets of the senses are to be external then they must have their existence in themselves, i.e., even apart from the senses, he then finds that from this point of view all our presentations of the senses are insufficient to make the actuality of these objects certain.

A 370 The transcendental idealist, on the other hand, can be an empirical realist or, as he is called, a *dualist*. I.e., he can grant the existence of matter without going outside mere self-consciousness and without assuming anything more than the certainty of presentations in me[126] and hence the *cogito, ergo sum*. For he accepts this matter and even its intrinsic possibility merely as appearance, which as separated from our sensibility is nothing. Hence matter is for him only a kind of presentations (intuition), called external; they are called external not as referring to objects *in themselves external*, but because they refer perceptions to the space wherein all things[127] are external to one another, although the space itself is in us.

Now, we have from the very beginning declared ourselves in favor of this transcendental idealism. Hence with our doctrinal system there is no longer any perplexity in assuming just as much the existence of matter on the testimony of our mere self-consciousness, and of declaring it proved thereby, as the existence of myself as a thinking being. For I am, after all, conscious of my presentations; hence these presentations exist, and so do I myself who have them. However, external objects (bodies) are mere appearances and hence are also nothing but one of the kinds of my presentations. The objects of these presentations are something only through them; apart from presentations these objects are nothing. Therefore external things
A 371 exist just as well as I myself exist—and both, moreover, on the direct testimony of my self-consciousness. The only difference is that the presentation of myself as the thinking subject is referred merely to inner sense, whereas the presentations designating extended beings are referred also to outer sense. I do not need to make an inference concerning the actuality of external objects any more than I do in regard to the actuality of the object of my inner sense (this object being my thoughts); for both objects are nothing but presentations, whose direct perception (consciousness) is simultaneously a sufficient proof of their actuality.

[125][Kant begins to describe this view at A 371.]

[126][I.e., in him (in oneself); cf. A 362 incl. br. n. 97 Transcendental idealism along with empirical realism is, of course, Kant's own view.]

[127][*alles*.]

The transcendental idealist is, therefore, an empirical realist and concedes to matter as appearance an actuality that does not need[128] to be inferred but is directly perceived. Transcendental realism, on the other hand, gets necessarily into a quandary, and finds itself compelled to make room for[129] empirical idealism. For it regards objects of the outer senses as something distinct from the senses themselves, and thus regards mere appearances as independent[130] beings that are outside us. And thus, indeed, no matter how conscious we are[131] of our presentation of these things, it is on this view still far from certain that if the presentation exists then the object corresponding to it also exists. In our system, on the other hand, these external things—viz., matter—are in all their shapes and changes nothing A 372
but mere appearances, i.e., presentations in us, of whose actuality we become conscious directly.

Now, as far as I know, all psychologists who adhere to empirical idealism are transcendental realists; and thus they have indeed proceeded quite consistently in conceding to empirical idealism great importance as one of the problems from which human reason finds it difficult to extricate[132] itself. For, indeed, if we regard outer appearances as presentations produced in us by their objects where these objets are taken as things that are in themselves outside us, then it is impossible to see how we can cognize the existence of these objects otherwise than by the inference from effect to cause; and in this inference it must always remain doubtful whether the cause is in us or outside us. Now we may, indeed, grant that something that may in the transcendental meaning of the term be outside us is the cause of our outer intuitions. But this something is not the object that we mean by the presentations of matter and of bodily things; for these are only appearances, i.e., mere kinds of presentations that are always to be found only in us and whose actuality rests just as much on direct consciousness as does the consciousness[133] of my own thoughts. In regard both to inner and to outer intuition we are equally unacquainted with the transcendental object.
Nor, however, is the transcendental object at issue; at issue is the empiri- A 373

[128][*darf;* in Kant, *dürfen* usually means the same as *bedürfen.*]

[129][Literally, 'grant room to': *Platz einzuräumen.*]

[130][*selbständig.*]

[131][*bei unserem besten Bewußtsein.*]

[132][*helfen.*]

[133][Kant probably meant to say 'as does the actuality of my own thoughts'; cf. A 370–71, esp. the end of the first paragraph at A 371.]

cal object. This object is called an *external* one if it is presented *in space,* and an *internal* object if it is presented only in a *time relation.* Both space and time, however, are to be found only *in us.*

The expression *outside us* thus carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, sometimes meaning something that *as thing in itself* exists as distinct from us, and sometimes meaning what belongs merely to outer *appearance.* Now the concept in the latter meaning is the one in which the psychological question concerning the reality of our outer intuition is properly taken. Hence in order to release this concept from the insecurity,[134] let us distinguish *empirically external* objects—from those that might be called external in the transcendental sense—by calling them, straightforwardly, things *that are to be found in space.*

Space and time are indeed a priori presentations that reside in us, as forms of our sensible intuition, even before an actual object has determined our sense through sensation in order for us to present this object under those sensible relations. Yet this material[135] or real something, this something that is to be intuited in space, necessarily presupposes perception and cannot independently of perception, which indicates the actuality of something in space, be invented or produced by any imagination.[136]
A 374 Hence perception is what designates an actuality in space or time, according as it is referred to the one or the other kind of sensible intuition. Once sensation is given (sensation, when applied to an object as such without determining it, is called perception), then through its manifoldness many an object can be invented in imagination[137] that has no empirical position in space or time outside of imagination. This is indubitably certain: whether we take the sensations called pleasure and pain, or—for that matter—those of the outer senses,[138] such as colors, heat, etc., it is through perception that the material[139] for thinking any objects of sensible intuition must first be given. This perception, then (to stay, for now, with outer intuitions only), presents something actual in space. For, first, perception is the presentation of an actuality, just as space is the presentation of a mere possibility

[134][Of ambiguity.]

[135][*materiell.*]

[136][*Einbildungskraft.*]

[137][*Einbildung* (similarly just below). This term and *Einbildungskraft* are used virtually interchangeably by Kant.]

[138]['senses' inserted, as suggested by Erdmann and incorporated in the *Akademie* edition.]

[139][*Stoff.*]

of being together. Second, this actuality is presented to[140] outer sense, i.e., in space. Third, space itself is nothing but mere presentation. Hence only what is presented in space can count[141] as actual;[142] and, conversely, what is given—i.e., presented through perception—in space is A 375
also actual in it; for if it were not actual in space, i.e., directly given in it through empirical intuition, then it also could not be invented [in imagination], because the real [component] of intuitions cannot be thought up a priori at all.

All outer perception, therefore, directly proves something actual in space—or is, rather, the actual itself. Hence to this extent empirical realism is beyond doubt; i.e., to our outer intuitions there corresponds something actual in space. To be sure, space itself and all its appearances are, as presentations, only in me. But in this space the real—or [i.e.] the material of all objects of outer intuition—is nonetheless given actually and independently of all invention. And it is indeed impossible for anything *outside us* (in the transcendental sense) to be given *in this space*, because space itself is nothing outside[143] our sensibility. Hence even the most rigorous idealist cannot demand a proof that the object outside us (in the strict [tran- A 376
scendental] meaning) corresponds to our perception. For if there were such an object, then it could still not be presented and intuited as outside us. For this presupposes space; and actuality in space, as actuality of a mere presentation, is nothing but perception itself. Hence the real [component] of outer appearances is actual only in perception and cannot be actual in any other way.

Now from perceptions there can be produced cognition of objects, either through a mere play of imagination, or—for that matter—by means

[140][*vor.*]

[141][*gelten.*]

[142]We must take careful note of this paradoxical but correct proposition: that there is nothing in space except what is presented in it. For space itself is nothing but presentation. Consequently, what is in space must be contained in the presentation, A 375
and nothing whatever is in space except insofar as it is presented in it actually. It is a proposition that must indeed sound strange: that a thing can exist only in the presentation of it. But here it loses its objectionable character, because the things[a] that we are dealing with are not things in themselves but only appearances, i.e., presentations.

[a][*Sachen*, and similarly just above; *Dinge* just below.]

[143][Or 'apart from.']

of experience. And here there may indeed arise deceptive[144] presentations to which the objects do not correspond, and where the delusion[145] is attributable sometimes (in dreams) to a deception[146] of imagination, sometimes (with the so-called deception[147] of the senses) to a slip of the power of judgment.[148] Now in order here to escape the deceptive illusion,[149] one proceeds by this rule: *What is linked with a perception according to empirical laws is actual.* Such delusion, however, as well as the safeguard against it, affects idealism just as much as dualism, because we are dealing, as regards such illusion,[150] only with the form of experience. To refute empirical idealism as a false perplexity concerning the objective reality of our outer perceptions, the following is already sufficient: Outer
A 377 perception directly proves an actuality in space. This space, although being in itself only a mere form of presentations, still has objective reality in regard to all outer appearances (which are also nothing but mere presentations). And likewise, without perception even [imaginative] inventing and dreaming are not possible, and hence our outer senses have, according to the data from which experience can arise, their actual corresponding objects in space.

The *dogmatic idealist* would be the one who *denies* the existence of matter; the *skeptical idealist* the one who *doubts* matter's existence because he considers such existence[151] to be unprovable. The dogmatic idealist can be such only because he believes that he finds contradictions in the possibility of a matter as such; and we are not yet dealing with him now. The following section[152] on dialectical inferences, which presents reason in its internal dispute regarding what concepts it frames concerning the possibility

144[*trüglich.*]

145[*Täuschung.*]

146[*Blendwerk.*]

147[*Betrug.*]

148[*Urteilskraft.*]

149[*falscher Schein.*]

150[*dabei.*]

151[Reading, with Erdmann, *es* . . . *es* for *sie* . . . *sie.* Kant seems to have thought that he had written *Existenz* rather than *Dasein.*]

152[Chapter, actually.]

of what[153] belongs to the coherence of experience, will also remedy this difficulty. The skeptical idealist, however, challenges merely the basis of our assertion and declares that our persuasion as to the existence of matter—a persuasion that we believe ourselves to be basing on direct perception—is insufficient. He is a benefactor[154] of human reason insofar as he compels us to open our eyes widely in taking even the smallest step of common experience, and not immediately to admit as well-earned into our possession what perhaps we obtain only surreptitiously.[155] The benefit[156] provided here by these objections of idealism is now obvious and clear. They forcibly impel us—if we do not want to become entangled in our commonest assertions—to regard all perceptions, whether called inner or outer, as a consciousness merely of what attaches to our sensibility. And they impel us to regard the external objects of these perceptions not as things in themselves but only as presentations of which we can become conscious directly, as we can of any other presentation. We thus see that these objects are called outer[157] because they attach to the sense that we call the outer sense. The intuition of this sense is space—this space itself, however, being yet nothing but an inner kind of presentation wherein certain perceptions connect with one another. A 378

If we accept external objects as things in themselves, then it is absolutely impossible to comprehend how we could arrive at the cognition of their actuality outside us, since we rely merely on the presentation that is in us. For, after all, one cannot sense outside oneself but only within oneself, and hence our entire self-consciousness supplies us with nothing but merely our own determinations. Thus skeptical idealism compels us to take the one refuge left us, viz., that of the ideality of all appearances. We have—in the Transcendental Aesthetic—established this ideality independently of these consequences, which we could not then foresee. Now if we ask whether, accordingly, only dualism has a place in psychology, then the answer is: Indeed—but only in the empirical meaning of the term. I.e., in A 379

153[Adopting Hartenstein's reading of *die sie sich* for *die sich*, but as combined with Kehrbach's reading of *dessen macht* for *dessen*. Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition simply drop *die sich*, thus leaving 'the concepts of the possibility.']

154[*Wohltäter*.]

155[*erschleichen*.]

156[*Nutzen*.]

157[Or 'external.']

the coherence[158] of experience matter, as substance in [the realm of] appearance, is actually given to outer sense,[159] just as the thinking *I*, likewise as substance in [the realm of] appearance, is given to[160] inner sense. And in both cases appearances must, moreover, be connected with one another according to the rules that this category[161] brings into the coherence—of both our outer and inner perceptions—that yields[162] an experience. If, however, as is commonly done, we were to expand the concept of dualism and take it in the transcendental meaning, then neither it nor the views opposed to it—*pneumatism* on the one hand, or *materialism* on the other hand[163] —would have the slightest basis. For we would then fail in the determination of our concepts, taking the difference in the way of presenting objects—objects with which we remain unacquainted as regards what they are in themselves—to be a difference in these things themselves. I, as presented through inner sense in time, and objects in space outside me are indeed appearances quite distinct in kind,[164] but they are not thereby thought as different things. The *transcendental object* which underlies outer appearances,
A 380 and likewise that transcendental object which underlies inner intuition is in itself neither matter nor a thinking being, but is, rather, a basis—with which we are unacquainted—of appearances that provide us with the empirical concept of both the first and the second kind.[165]

If, therefore, as the present critique obviously compels us to do, we remain faithful to the rule—laid down above—to carry our questions just as far as [our] possible experience can provide us with its object and no further, then it will not even occur to us to explore the objects of our senses as to what they may be in themselves, i.e., apart from any reference to the senses. But if the psychologist takes appearances to be things in themselves, then whether as a materialist he accepts into his doctrinal system solely and exclusively matter as things existing by themselves, or as a spiritualist accepts merely thinking beings (viz., according to the form of inner

[158][Or 'context.']

[159][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 503, 542–43.]

[160][*vor.*]

[161][Of substance.]

[162][*zu.*]

[163][I.e., concerning (respectively) spirit and matter.]

[164][Correcting *skeptisch* to *spezifisch*, on Kant's own instruction at A xxii.]

[165][I.e., of matter and of a thinking being. Cf. A 379.]

sense), or as a dualist accepts both: he is yet, through misunderstanding, always kept doing subtle reasoning about the way in which what is, after all, not a thing in itself—but is only the appearance of a thing as such—may exist in itself.

Observation on the Sum of Pure Psychology in Consequence of These Paralogisms[166] A 381

If we compare *psychology* as the physiology of inner sense with *somatology*[167] as a physiology of objects of outer senses, then we find—besides the fact that much can be cognized empirically in both—the noteworthy difference that in the second science much can yet be cognized synthetically a priori from the mere concept of an extended impenetrable being, but in the first science nothing at all can be so cognized from the concept of a thinking being.[168] The cause is this. Although both kinds are appearances, yet the appearance to outer sense has something constant[169] and enduring that provides us with a substratum lying at the basis of the mutable determinations, and hence provides us with a synthetic concept, viz., the concept of space and of an appearance in space;[170] time, on the other hand, which is the sole form of our inner intuition, has nothing enduring, and hence allows[171] us to cognize only the variation[172] by determinations, but not the determinable object. For in what we call soul, everything is in continual flux and there is nothing enduring, except perhaps (if one insists)[173] the *I;* the *I* is so simple because this presentation, by having no content and hence no manifold, seems also to present, or—to put it better—to des- A 382
ignate, a simple object. If bringing about a pure rational cognition of the nature of a thinking being as such is to be possible, then this *I* would have

[166][See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 84–127. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 141–64. And see Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 463–66.]

[167][*Körperlehre,* literally 'doctrine of bodies.']

[168][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 471.]

[169][*stehend.*]

[170][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 471–72.]

[171][*geben.*]

[172][*Wechsel.* See B 224 br. n. 45.]

[173][In his working copy of edition A (see *Preliminary Studies and Supplementary Entries*—cited at A 19/B 33 br. n. 13—Ak. XXIII, 50), Kant deletes 'perhaps (if one insists).']

to be an intuition that, by being presupposed in thought as such (prior to all experience), would—as thus an a priori intuition—supply synthetic propositions.[174] However, this *I* is no more an intuition than a concept of any object. It is, rather, the mere form of consciousness[175]—the consciousness that can accompany both kinds[176] of presentations and can thereby raise them to cognitions, viz., insofar as there is also given in intuition something[177] else that offers material for a presentation of an object. Hence the whole of rational psychology falls, as a science surpassing all powers of human reason; and nothing is left for us but to study our soul by the guidance of experience, and to keep within the limits of those questions that go no further than [the realm where] their content can be displayed by possible inner experience.

But although rational psychology if taken as expansive cognition has no benefit but is then composed of nothing but paralogisms, one cannot deny that it has an important negative benefit if it is supposed to count as nothing more than a critical treatment of our dialectical inferences, viz., those of common and natural reason.

A 383 For what, indeed, do we need a psychology based merely on pure principles of reason? Doubtless primarily for the aim of securing our thinking self against the danger of materialism. This, however, is accomplished by the pure rational concept of our thinking self that we have already given. For so far is this concept from leaving us with any fear that if we removed matter then all thinking and even the existence of thinking beings would thereby be annulled, that it shows—rather—that if I removed the thinking subject then the whole corporeal world would have to go away, since this world is nothing but the appearance in the sensibility of, and a kind of presentations of, ourselves as subject.

Through this concept, to be sure, I do not cognize this thinking self better as regards its properties, nor can I thus gain insight into its permanence—indeed, not even into the independence[178] of this self's existence from what may be[179] the transcendental substratum of outer ap-

[174][Or, perhaps, 'would as intuition supply synthetic propositions a priori.']

[175][In his working copy of edition A (see br. n. 173, just above), Kant changes 'the mere form of consciousness' to 'the object of consciousness with which we are unacquainted.']

[176][I.e., inner and outer.]

[177][*irgend etwas.*]

[178][*Unabhängigkeit.*]

[179][*etwaig.*]

pearances; for I am just as unacquainted with this substratum as I am with the thinking self.[180] But it is nonetheless possible that I may find cause, somewhere other than in merely speculative bases, to hope for an existence of my thinking nature that is independent[181] and permanent during[182] all possible variation of my state. And hence much has been gained already, as I freely confess my own ignorance, by my yet being able to repel the dogmatic attacks of a speculative opponent, and to show him that he A 384
can never know more about the nature of myself as subject in denying that my expectations are possible, than do I in holding on to them.

Then there are still three dialectical questions that are based on this transcendental illusion of our psychological concepts—questions that amount to the goal proper of rational psychology and cannot be decided otherwise than through the above inquiries: viz., the questions (1) about the possibility of the soul's communion[183] with an organic body, i.e., about animality[184] and the state of the soul in a human being's life; (2) about the beginning of this communion, i.e., about the soul in and before a human being's birth; (3) about the end of this communion, i.e., about the soul in and after a human being's death (the question concerning immortality).

Now, people believe that they find difficulties in these questions, and by using[185] them as dogmatic objections they seek to give themselves the reputation of having a deeper insight into the nature of things than common understanding can presumably have. All these difficulties, I maintain, rest on a mere deception whereby what exists merely in thoughts is hypostatized and is assumed, in the same quality, as an actual object outside the thinking subject. I.e., I mean the deception of regarding extension, which is nothing but appearance, as a property of external things that subsists[186] even apart from our sensibility, and of regarding motion as these things' A 385
effect that occurs actually and in itself, even apart from our senses. For matter, whose communion with the soul arouses such great concern, is nothing but a mere form, or a certain way of presenting an object, with which

[180][See above, A 357–60.]

[181][*selbständig*.]

[182][*bei*.]

[183][*Gemeinschaft*, which also means 'community.']

[184][*Animalität*.]

[185][*mit*.]

[186][*subsistierend*.]

we are unacquainted, by means of that intuition which is called outer sense. Thus there may well be something outside us to which this appearance that we call matter corresponds; but in the same quality that it has as appearance it is not outside us, but is merely within us as a thought—although this thought, through the mentioned [outer] sense, presents it as being outside us. Hence matter does not signify a kind of substances that is so very distinct and heterogeneous[187] from the object of inner sense (the soul). It signifies, rather, the heterogeneity[188] of the appearances of objects (with which we are unacquainted as they are in themselves) whose presentations we call outer, by comparison with those that we class with inner sense. We call those presentations outer although they belong just as much merely to the thinking subject as do all other thoughts, except for having the delusive feature that, because they present objects in space, they detach themselves—as it were—from the soul and seem to hover outside it; and yet the space itself wherein they are intuited is nothing but a presentation, whose counterpart cannot in the same quality be encountered outside the
A 386 soul at all. Hence now the question is no longer about the soul's communion with other known[189] substances outside us that are different in kind,[190] but merely about the connection of the presentations of inner sense with the modifications of our outer sensibility, and how these presentations and modifications may be connected among one another according to constant laws so as to cohere in an experience.

As long as we hold inner and outer appearances up to one another as mere presentations in experience, we find nothing that is preposterous and that makes the communion of the two kinds of senses strange. But suppose that we hypostatize outer appearances, and that we refer them to our selves as thinking subject no longer as presentations but so refer them also, *in the same quality which they have as they are in us, as subsisting*[191] *by themselves outside us;* and suppose that we so refer also their actions which they show in relation to one another as appearances. As soon as we do this, we have outside us a character of efficient causes that refuses to be reconciled with their effects in us; for this character refers only to outer senses, but the effects refer to inner sense—and these outer and inner senses, although

[187][*heterogen.*]

[188][*Ungleichartigkeit.*]

[189][*bekannt.*]

[190][*fremdartig*, i.e., here, different from the phenomenal.]

[191][*bestehend.*]

united in one subject, are yet extremely heterogeneous. Thus we then have no other outer effects than changes of place, and no forces except merely endeavors resulting in, as their effects, relations in space. In us, however, the effects are thoughts, among which there does not occur any relation of A 387
place, or any motion, shape—or any determination of space at all; and thus for us the guide to the causes is entirely lost from their effects that were to show up in inner sense. We should bear in mind, however, that bodies are not objects in themselves that are present to us, but are a mere appearance of who knows what unknown[192] object; that motion is not the effect of this unknown cause, but is merely the appearance of its influence on our senses; and that, consequently, both the bodies and the motion are not something outside us, but are merely presentations in us; and that hence the motion of matter does not produce presentations in us, but the motion itself (and hence also the matter that we can thereby come to know[193]) is mere presentation. And we should bear in mind, finally, that the entire self-created difficulty thus comes down to this question: how and by what cause the presentations of our sensibility are so linked with one another that the presentations called outer intuitions can according to empirical laws be presented as objects outside us. Now, this question in no way involves the supposed difficulty of explaining the origin of presentations of efficient causes outside us that are quite different in kind. This difficulty arises by our taking the appearances of an unknown cause to be the cause itself outside us[194] —a move that can occasion nothing but confusion. When judgments involve a misinterpretation that has through long habit taken root in them, then it is impossible to make the correction immediately as comprehen- A 388
sible as may be demanded[195] in other cases, where no such unavoidable illusion confuses the concept. Hence this liberation of our reason from sophistical theories can hardly already have the distinctness that it needs in order to be fully satisfactory.

I believe that I can further this distinctness in the following manner.

All *objections* can be divided into *dogmatic, critical,* and *skeptical* ones. A dogmatic objection is one directed against a *proposition;* a critical objection is one directed against the *proof* of a proposition. A dogmatic ob-

[192][*unbekannt;* likewise just below and near the end of A 387.]

[193][*sich . . . kennbar macht.*]

[194][I.e., the appearances are taken to be things in themselves. See below, A 391 *ad fin.* and A 392 *ad fin.*]

[195][Reading, with Rosenkranz, *gefordert* for *gefördert.*]

jection requires that we have an insight into the character of the object's nature, in order that we can assert the opposite of what the proposition claims concerning this object. Hence the objection is itself dogmatic, and claims to be better acquainted with the character at issue than is the adversary. A critical objection, because it leaves the proposition untouched in regard to its merit[196] or lack of merit and challenges only the proof, does not at all need to be better acquainted with the object or to pretend to a better acquaintance with it. Such an objection shows only that the assertion is baseless, not that it is incorrect. A skeptical objection puts proposition and counterproposition in reciprocal opposition to each other as objections of equal importance: each reciprocally as dogma and the other as
A 389 the objection thereto. It is, therefore, seemingly dogmatic on two opposite sides, in order to annul entirely all judgment about the object. Hence a dogmatic and a skeptical objection must both alike pretend to as much insight into their object as is needed in order to assert something about it affirmatively or negatively. Only a critical objection is such that, just by showing that something null and merely imagined is being assumed for the sake of someone's assertion, it topples the theory; it does so by withdrawing the theory's alleged foundation, without seeking to establish anything else—i.e., anything about the character of the object.

Now when we follow[197] our reason's ordinary concepts regarding the communion[198] in which our thinking subject stands with the things outside us, we are dogmatic and regard them as veritable objects[199] subsisting independently of us. I.e., we then follow a certain transcendental dualism that does not class those outer appearances with the subject as presentations, but transfers them, just as sensible intuition supplies them to us, outside us as objects and thus separates them entirely from the thinking subject. Now this subreption[200] is the foundation of all theories concerning the community between soul and body. And people never ask whether this objective reality of appearances is indeed [assumed] quite correct[ly], but presuppose this reality as having been conceded and reason only about the way
A 390 in which it must be explained and comprehended. Three systems are usually devised concerning this, and are actually the only possible ones: viz.,

[196][*Wert.*]

[197][*nach.*]

[198][Or 'community'. *Gemeinschaft.*]

[199][*Gegenstände* here, *Objekte* just below. See A vii br. n. 7]

[200][See A 643/B 671 incl. br n. 14]

those of *physical influence, predetermined harmony,* and *supranatural assistance.*[201]

The last two of these ways of explaining the soul's communion with matter are based on objections against the first way, which is the conception[202] of common sense. The objection is that what appears as matter cannot by its direct influence be the cause of presentations, since these are a kind of effects entirely heterogeneous from matter. But those who raise this objection cannot be linking with what they mean by an object of outer senses the concept of a matter that is nothing but appearance and hence is in itself already mere presentation produced by some external objects. For otherwise they would be saying that the presentations of external objects (appearances) cannot be external causes of the presentations in our mind; and this would be an entirely senseless objection, since no one would think of[203] regarding as an external cause what he has once acknowledged to be mere presentation. Hence they must, by our principles, aim their theory at the assertion that whatever is the true (transcendental) object of our outer senses cannot be the cause of those presentations (appearances) that we mean by the name matter. But then their assertion is entirely baseless, since A 391
no one can have a basis for claiming to know[204] anything about the transcendental cause of our presentations of outer senses. Suppose, on the other hand, that the alleged reformers of the doctrine of physical influence—in accordance with the common way of conceiving a transcendental dualism—regard matter, as such, as a thing in itself (and not as mere appearance of an unknown[205] thing); and suppose that they aim their objection at showing that such an external object, which shows in itself no other causality than that of motions, can never be the efficient cause of presentations, but that a third being must hence intercede in order to bring about between the two, if not interaction, then at least correspondence and harmony. If they argued in this way, then they would begin their refutation by assuming in their dualism the πρῶτον ψεῦδος[206] of physical influence;

[201] [These seem to correspond to the interactionism of (above all) René Descartes (1596–1650), the theory of preestablished harmony of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646–1716), and the occasionalism of Nicholas de Malebranche (1638–1715).]

[202] [*Vorstellung.*]

[203] [*einfallen.*]

[204] [*kennen.*]

[205] [*unbekannt*; likewise at the end of the paragraph and (twice) in the subsequent one.]

[206] [*prōton pseudos:* foremost falsehood.]

and hence they would refute by their objection not so much this natural influence as their own dualistic presupposition. For all the difficulties concerning the linking of our thinking nature with matter arise, without exception, from this surreptitiously obtained[207] conception[208] that matter, as such, is not appearance—i.e., mere presentation[209] of the mind to which an unknown object corresponds—but is the object in itself as it exists outside us and independently of all sensibility.

A 392 Hence no dogmatic objection can be made against the commonly assumed physical influence. For if the opponent assumes that matter and its motion are mere appearances and hence are themselves mere presentations, then he can posit the difficulty only in the claim that the unknown object of our sensibility cannot be the cause of the presentations in us; but for this claim he does not have the least justification, because no one can tell concerning an unknown object what it can or cannot do. Yet, by the proofs given by us above, he must necessarily concede this transcendental idealism—provided that he does not want manifestly to hypostatize presentations and to transfer them, as true things, outside himself.

Nonetheless, a well-based *critical* objection can be made against the common dogma[210] of physical influence. Such an alleged communion between two kinds of substances, viz., thinking and extended, uses as its basis a crude dualism; and it turns extended substances—which, after all, are nothing but mere presentations of the thinking subject—into things subsisting by themselves. Hence the misunderstood physical influence can be defeated fully by uncovering the fact that its basis of proof is null and surreptitiously obtained.

Hence the notorious question concerning the communion of the thinking and the extended, if everything merely imaginary is separated from it, A 393 would come down solely to this: *how in a thinking being as such there is possible an outer intuition*—viz., that of space (specifically, a filling of space with shape and motion). Finding an answer to this question is, however, impossible for any human being;[211] and we can never fill this gap in

[207][*erschlichen.*]

[208][*Vorstellung.*]

[209][*Vorstellung.*]

[210][*Lehrmeinung,* literally 'doctrinal opinion.']

[211][For some other instances where Kant claims that the utter limits of human comprehension have been reached, see above, B 145–46; the *Prolegomena*, Ak. IV, 318 *ad fin.*, and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 405–6.]

our knowledge, but can only mark it by ascribing outer appearances to a transcendental object: an object which is the cause of this kind of presentations, but with which we are not acquainted at all and of which we shall also never acquire any concept. In any problems that we may encounter in the realm of experience we treat those outer appearances as objects in themselves, without worrying about the primary basis of their possibility (as appearances). But if we go beyond their boundary, then for this the concept of a transcendental object becomes necessary.

A direct consequence of these remarks about the communion between a thinking and an extended being is the settlement of all controversies and objections concerning the state of the thinking nature before this communion (i.e., before life), or after such communion once abolished (in death). The opinion that before any communion with bodies the thinking subject was able to think would be expressed thus: that before the beginning of this kind of sensibility, whereby something appears to us in space, the same A 394
transcendental objects that in our present state appear as bodies were intuitable in an entirely different way. And the opinion that after abolition of all communion with the corporeal world the soul can still continue to think would be proclaimed in this form: that if the kind of sensibility should cease whereby transcendental and, for now, entirely unknown[212] objects appear to us as a material world, then this would not yet abolish all intuition of these objects, and these same unknown objects might quite possibly continue to be cognized by the thinking subject—although, of course, no longer in the quality of bodies.

Now although no one can from speculative principles adduce the slightest basis for such an assertion—indeed, even its possibility cannot thus be established but can only be presupposed—yet just as little can anyone make any valid dogmatic objection against it. For whoever he may be, he knows just as little as I or anyone else regarding the absolute and intrinsic[213] cause of outer and corporeal appearances. Hence he also cannot have a basis for claiming to know on what the actuality of outer appearances in our current state (i.e., in life) rests—nor, therefore, can he know that the condition of all outer intuition, or even the thinking subject himself, will cease after this A 395
state (i.e., in death).

And thus all dispute about the nature of our thinking being and of its connection with the corporeal world is merely a consequence of this error:

[212][*unbekannt;* likewise just below.]

[213][*inner,* which also means 'internal' or 'inner.']

that in regard to something of which one knows nothing one fills the gap by using paralogisms of reason, whereby one turns thoughts into things and so hypostatizes them. From this there arises, in the case both of him who asserts affirmatively and of him who asserts negatively, imaginary science. For each of them either supposes that he knows something about objects of which no human being has any concept, or turns his own presentations into objects and thus revolves in a perpetual circle of ambiguities and contradictions. Nothing but the sobriety of a strict but just critique can free us from this dogmatic deception—which keeps so many people caught up in theories and systems through an imagined happiness to be found there—and can limit all our speculative claims to the realm of possible experience only. The critique does not do this, say, by insipidly scoffing at all the attempts that have so frequently failed, or by piously sighing over the limits of our reason. It does so, rather, by means of a determination of reason's bounds that is carried out according to secure principles, and that affixes with utmost reliability its *nihil ulterius*[214] to the Pillars of Hercules. These pillars were erected by nature itself in order that we pursue reason's voy-
A 396 age only as far as the steadily continuing coasts of experience extend; for we cannot leave these coasts of experience without venturing upon a shoreless ocean that, after offering to[215] us outlooks forever deceptive, compels us in the end to give up, as hopeless, all our burdensome and tedious endeavor.[216]

So far we still owe the reader a distinct and general exposition of the transcendental and yet natural illusion in the paralogisms of pure reason, as well as the justification for their arrangement, which is systematic and runs parallel to the table of categories. We could not have taken on this exposition and justification at the beginning of this section[217] without running the risk of becoming obscure or of inappropriately anticipating ourselves. Let us now try to fulfill this obligation.

[214][Nothing beyond—viz., beyond the line connecting the Pillars of Hercules, i.e., the two points of land, Gibraltar and Jebel Musa, on either side of the Strait of Gibraltar. The Pillars were for centuries regarded by the peoples of the Mediterranean as the limits of seafaring enterprise.]

[215][*unter*.]

[216][This is one of the rare occasions when Kant waxes poetic. For some others, see A 235–36/B 294–95; A 613 = B 641; A 629–30 = B 657–58.]

[217][Chapter, actually.]

We may posit all *illusion* as consisting in taking the *subjective* condition of thinking to be the cognition of the object. Moreover, in the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic we have shown that reason deals solely with the totality of the synthesis of the conditions for a given conditioned.[218] Now since the dialectical illusion of pure reason cannot be an empirical illusion, which occurs in determinate empirical cognition, it will concern what is universal in the conditions of thinking, and there will be A 397
only three cases of pure reason's dialectical use:

1. The synthesis of the conditions of a thought as such.
2. The synthesis of the conditions of empirical thinking.
3. The synthesis of the conditions of pure thinking.

In all three of these cases pure reason deals merely with the absolute totality of this synthesis, i.e., with the condition that is itself unconditioned. This division is also the basis for the threefold transcendental illusion, which gives rise to the three sections[219] of the Dialectic and accordingly provides us with the idea for three illusory sciences drawn from pure reason: transcendental psychology, transcendental cosmology, and transcendental theology.[220] Here we have to do only with transcendental psychology.

Because in thinking as such we abstract from all reference of the thought to any object (whether of the senses or of pure understanding), the synthesis of the conditions of a thought as such (No. 1) is not objective at all, but is merely a synthesis[221] of the thought with the subject—a synthesis that is, however, wrongly regarded as a synthetic presentation of an object.

From this, however, it also follows that the dialectical inference to the condition of all thinking as such, a condition which is itself unconditioned, does not commit an error in content (for it abstracts from any content or object), but that it errs in form alone and must therefore be called a paralogism. A 398

Moreover, because the one condition that accompanies all thinking is the *I* in the universal proposition *I think*, reason deals with this condition insofar as the condition is itself unconditioned. It is, however, only the formal condition—viz., the logical unity of any thought, a thought wherein I

[218] [See A 307–9/B 364–66.]

[219] [Kant means chapters again.]

[220] [Cf A 334–35/B 391–92.]

[221] [Viz., the *I think*.]

thus abstract from any object—and is yet presented as an object that I think: viz., I myself and the unconditioned unity of this *I*.

If someone were to pose to me the question, in general, What is the character of a thing that thinks?, then I do not a priori know the slightest answer to this. For the answer is to be synthetic (because an analytic answer may indeed explicate what thinking is, but provides no expanded[222] cognition of what this thinking rests on as regards its possibility).[223] Any synthetic solution, however, requires intuition; but in this problem, universal as it is, intuition has been omitted entirely. Likewise, no one can answer the question, Just what sort of thing must a movable thing be?, in its universality. For impenetrable extension (matter) is then not given [in intuition].[224] Now although I know no universal answer to this question, it does seem to me that I can give such an answer in a single case, viz., in the
A 399 proposition that expresses self-consciousness: *I think*. For this *I* is the primary subject; i.e., it is substance; it is simple; etc. But then these propositions would all have to be experiential ones; yet in fact they could not contain such predicates[225] (which are not empirical) without a universal rule stating a priori the conditions[226] of the possibility of thinking as such. In this way my initially so plausible insight, that we can make judgments about the nature of a thinking being and can do so from concepts alone, becomes suspect, although I have not yet uncovered the error in it.

This error can be uncovered, however, by further investigation into[227] the origin of these attributes that I ascribe to myself as a thinking being as such. They are nothing more than pure categories, through which I never think a determinate object, but think only the unity of presentations in order to determine an object of them. A category alone, without an underlying intuition, cannot provide me with a concept of an object; for only through intuition is the object given, which is thereupon thought in accordance with the category.[228] If I declare a thing to be a substance in [the realm of] appearance then there must be given to me beforehand predi-

[222][*erweitert*.]

[223][See above, A 6–10/B 10–14.]

[224][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 472.]

[225][As 'substance,' 'simple,' etc.]

[226][As including these predicates.]

[227][Literally, 'behind'. *hinter*]

[228][See above, B 146–49.]

cates of its intuition, by which I distinguish the permanent from the mutable and the substratum (the thing itself) from what merely attaches to it. A 400
If I call a thing *simple in [the realm of] appearance*, then I mean by this that the intuition of it is indeed a part of appearance but cannot itself be divided, etc. But if I cognize something as simple only in concept and not in [the realm of] appearance, then this actually provides me with no cognition at all of the object, but only of my concept which I frame of a something as such that does not admit of an intuition proper. I am then saying only that I think something as entirely simple, because I actually know nothing more to say about it than merely that it is something.

Now, mere apperception (the *I*) is substance in concept, simple in concept, etc.; and thus all those psychological doctrines do to that extent have their indisputable correctness. Yet through this we do not by any means cognize concerning the soul what in fact we want to know. For none of these predicates hold of any intuition at all, and hence they also cannot have any consequences that would be applied to objects of experience. They are, therefore, completely empty. For this concept of substance does not teach me that the soul continues on its own, nor that it is a part of outer intuitions which itself cannot be divided further and hence cannot arise or pass away through any changes of nature—all of these being properties that could make the soul knowable[229] to me in the coherence[230] of experience and could disclose to me something concerning its origin and future state. But if I say A 401
through the mere category that the soul is a simple substance, then I am using understanding's bare concept of substance, which contains nothing more than that a thing is to be presented as a subject in itself and not in turn as a predicate of another subject. Clearly, therefore, nothing follows from this concept as regards the soul's permanence; and the attribute *simple*[231] certainly cannot add this permanence. Hence we are not in the least being informed about what may in the world's changes affect the soul. If we could be told that the soul is a *simple part of matter*, then from this matter we could, by what experience teaches us about it, derive the permanence and, together with the soul's simple nature, its indestructibility. But of this[232] the concept of the *I* in the psychological principle (*I think*) tells us not one word.

229[*kennbar*.]

230[Or 'context.']

231[Emphasis added]

232[I.e., the soul's being a simple part of matter.]

But the fact that the being which thinks in us supposes that it cognizes itself through pure categories—specifically those expressing absolute unity under each heading of categories—is due to this. Apperception is itself the basis of the possibility of the categories, which in turn present nothing but the synthesis of the manifold of intuition insofar as this manifold has unity in apperception. Hence self-consciousness as such is the presentation of what is the condition of all unity and is yet itself unconditioned. Hence we can
A 402 say about the thinking *I* (the soul)—which thinks[233] itself as substance, as simple, as numerically identical in all time, and as the correlate of all existence from which all other existence must be inferred—that it cognizes *not so much itself through the categories,* but cognizes the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception and hence *through itself.* Now it is, indeed, very evident that what I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all cannot itself be cognized as an object by me, and that the determining self (the thinking) is distinct from the determinable self (the thinking subject) as cognition is distinct from the object [cognized]. Nonetheless, nothing is more natural and tempting than the illusion of regarding the unity in the synthesis of thoughts as a perceived unity in the subject of these thoughts. One might call this illusion the subreption[234] of the hypostatized self-consciousness (*apperceptionis substantiatae*).[235]

If the paralogism in the dialectical syllogisms of rational psychology is to be given a logical title insofar as these syllogisms nonetheless have correct premises, then it may be considered[236] a *sophisma figurae dictionis.*[237] In this sophism the major premise uses the category merely transcendentally, in regard to its condition; but the minor premise and the conclusion use the same category empirically, in regard to the soul that has
A 403 been subsumed under this condition. Thus in the paralogism of substantiality,[238] e.g., the concept of substance is[239] a purely intellectual concept that, without conditions of sensible intuition, has a merely transcendental

[233]['thinks' inserted originally by Mellin.]

[234][See A 643/B 671 incl. br. n. 14.]

[235][(Subreption) of the substantiated apperception; reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *apperceptionis* for *apperceptiones.*]

[236][*gelten.*]

[237][Sophism (a type of fallacy) of figure of speech, in which the middle term is taken in different meanings. See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 134–35.]

[238][Reading, with Adickes, *Substanzialität* for *Simplizität.*]

[239][In the major premise.]

use, i.e., has no use whatsoever. But in the minor premise one applies the same concept to the object of all inner experience, yet without first ascertaining and laying at the basis the condition of its application *in concreto,* viz., this object's permanence; hence the use that has been made of the concept is empirical, although here inadmissible.

Finally, let me show the systematic coherence of all these dialectical assertions of a subtly reasoning psychology in a coherence of pure reason, and hence show them in their completeness. It should be noted that apperception is being carried through all the classes of the categories, but only for those concepts of understanding that in each class lie at the basis of the others' unity in a possible perception, and hence for subsistence, reality, unity (not plurality), and existence. The only difference is that reason here presents all of these concepts as conditions of the possibility of a thinking being that are themselves unconditioned. Thus the soul cognizes in itself:

1 A 404
the unconditioned unity of **relation,**
i.e., it cognizes itself not as
inhering but as **subsisting**

2
the unconditioned unity
of **quality,**
i.e., it cognizes itself
not as a real whole
but as **simple**[240]

3
the unconditioned unity
in the **plurality** in time,
i.e., it cognizes itself
as being, in different times,
not numerically different but
one and the **same subject**

4
the unconditioned unity
of **existence** in space,
i.e., it cognizes itself
not as the consciousness of several things outside it,
but as that of **the existence of itself only**
and of other things merely as its presentations

[240]How the simple here corresponds in turn to the category of reality I am not yet able to show, but this will be pointed out in the next chapter on the occasion of another use that reason makes of the same concept.[a]

[a][See A 435–43 = B 463–71.]

A 405 Reason is our power of principles. The assertions of pure psychology do not contain empirical predicates of the soul, but contain such predicates of the soul as, if such there be, are to determine the object in itself independently of experience and hence through mere reason. Therefore they would, properly, have to be based on principles and universal concepts of thinking natures as such. Instead we find that the singular presentation, I am, governs them all. This presentation, precisely because it expresses (indeterminately) the pure formula of my entire experience, announces itself like a universal proposition holding for all thinking beings; and since it is nonetheless in every respect singular, it carries with it the illusion of an absolute unity of the conditions of thought as such, and thus extends farther than possible experience could reach.

[THE PARALOGISMS OF PURE REASON]

[Second Edition][241]

The proposition *I think* (taken problematically)[242] contains, then, the form of any of understanding's judgments as such, and accompanies all categories as their vehicle.[243] Clearly, therefore, the inferences from this proposition can contain merely a transcendental use of understanding. Such use allows no experience to be mixed in, and hence regarding its progress we can—by what we have shown above—frame even in advance none but an unfavorable conception. Let us, therefore, trace this use, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments[244] of pure psychology. For the sake of brevity, however, let us allow their examination to proceed in an uninterrupted continuity.[245]

[241][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 164–71. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n 5, 466–70 and cf. 473–77.]

[242][See A 347/B 405]

[243][See A 341/B 399.]

[244][I.e., basic concepts.]

[245][*Zusammenhang.*]

First of all, the following general remark may make us more keenly attentive to this kind of inference. I do not cognize any object[246] by merely thinking, but I can cognize any object only by determining a given intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists. Hence I do not cognize myself by being conscious of myself as thinking, but I cognize myself when I am conscious of the[247] intuition of myself as determined with regard to the function of thought. All the *modes* of self-consciousness in thought as such are, therefore, not yet understanding's concepts of objects (categories), but are mere functions that do not allow[248] thought to cognize any object at all, and hence also do not allow it to cognize myself as an object. The *object* is not the consciousness of the *determining* self, but only that[249] of the *determinable* self, i.e., of my inner intuition (insofar as its manifold can be combined in accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thought). B 407

1. Now in all judgments I am always the *determining* subject of the relation that makes up the judgment. But that I, who think, must be considered[250] in such thought always as a *subject* and as something that cannot be regarded as merely attaching[251] to thought like a predicate—this is an apodeictic and even identical[252] proposition. But this proposition does not mean that I am, as an *object*, a *being subsisting* by myself or [i.e.] *substance*. This latter claim goes very far, and hence it also requires data that are in no way found in thought, and perhaps (insofar as I consider the thinking [self] merely as thinking) requires more than I shall ever find (in thought) at all.

2. That the *I*[253] of apperception, and hence in all thought, is a *singular* that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects and therefore designates a logically simple subject—this lies already in the concept of thought and

[246][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* just below; and so on for the rest of the paragraph. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[247][Reading, with Grillo, *der* for *die*.]

[248][*geben*.]

[249][Reading, with Hartenstein, *das* for *die*.]

[250][*gelten*.]

[251][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *anhängend* for *anhänge*.]

[252][I.e., analytic.]

[253][Emphasis added; similarly for the remaining originally unemphasized occurrences (of this sort) of 'I' in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, edition B.]

B 408 hence is an analytic proposition. But this does not mean that the thinking *I* is a simple *substance;* that would be a synthetic proposition. The concept of substance always refers to intuitions that, in me, cannot be other than sensible and hence lie entirely outside the realm of understanding and its thought; yet here we are in fact talking only about this thought when we say that the *I* in thought is simple. Indeed, it would be miraculous if what otherwise requires so much effort for distinguishing what is substance in what intuition displays—but even more for distinguishing (as with the parts of matter) whether this substance can also be simple—were here in the poorest of all presentations given to me thus straightforwardly, as if through a revelation, as it were.

3. The proposition of the identity of myself in all the manifold whereof I am conscious is likewise a proposition that lies in the concepts themselves and hence is analytic. But this identity of the subject, of which I can become conscious in all presentations of this subject, does not concern the subject's intuition whereby it is given as object. Hence this identity also cannot mean identity of the person, by which we understand the consciousness of the subject's own substance as a thinking being in all variation of its states. Proving this identity could not be accomplished by merely ana-
B 409 lyzing the proposition *I think,*[254] but would require various synthetic judgments based on the given intuition.

4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (which include my body)—this is likewise an analytic proposition. For *other* things are things that I think as *distinct* from me. But from this I do not in any way know whether this consciousness of myself is at all possible without things outside me whereby presentations are given to me, and hence whether I can exist as merely a thinking being (i.e., without being human).[255]

Hence analyzing the consciousness of myself in thought as such does not yield the slightest gain as regards the cognition of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought as such is wrongly considered to be a metaphysical determination of the object.

It would be for our entire critique a great stumbling-block—indeed, even the only one—if there were a possibility of proving a priori that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances; and that, being such, they therefore (as a consequence from the same basis of proof) insepa-

[254][Emphasis added; similarly for the remaining originally unemphasized occurrences of 'I think' in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, edition B.]

[255][See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 115–20.]

rably carry with them personality and are conscious of their existence as one that is set apart from all matter. For in this way we would, after all, have taken a step beyond the world of sense; we would have entered the realm of *noumena*—and now let no one deny us the right to expand further into this realm, to settle in it, and to take possession in it according as each of us is favored by his lucky star. For the proposition, Any thinking being is, as such, a simple substance, is a synthetic a priori proposition. For, first, it goes beyond the concept on which it is based[256] and adds to thinking being as such its *way of existing;* and, second, it adds to that concept a predicate (that of simplicity) that cannot be given in any experience whatever. Hence it would then seem that synthetic a priori propositions are feasible and admissible not merely, as we have asserted, in reference to objects of possible experience—viz., as principles of the possibility of this experience itself—but that they can apply also to things as such and in themselves. And this is a conclusion that would put an end to this entire critique and would dictate that we leave everything as it was. Once we step closer to the matter, however, we see that the danger here is not so great. B 410

In the procedure of rational psychology a paralogism prevails, which is exhibited by the following syllogism:

What cannot be thought otherwise than as subject also does not exist otherwise than as subject, and therefore is substance.

Now a thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject. B 411

Therefore it also exists only as a subject, i.e., as substance.

In the major premise one talks about a being that can be thought in general, in every respect, and hence also as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor premise one talks about it insofar as it considers itself, as subject, only relatively to thought and the unity of consciousness, but not simultaneously in reference to the intuition whereby it[257] is given as object for such thought. Therefore, one is inferring the conclusion *per sophisma figurae dictionis,*[258] and hence by a fallacious inference.[259]

[256][The concept of a thinking being.]

[257][Reading, with Vorländer, *es* for *sie.*]

[258][By a sophism of figure of speech. See A 402 br. n. 237.]

[259]Thought is taken in two entirely different meanings in the two premises. In the

B 412 That resolving a famous argument into a paralogism in this way is entirely correct is distinctly evident when one consults the general comment on the systematic presentation of the principles and the section on the noumena.[260] There we proved that the concept of a thing that can exist by itself as subject but not as mere predicate does not yet carry with it, on that account, any objective reality; i.e., we proved that—since we have no insight into the possibility of such a way of existing—we cannot know whether an object belongs to this concept at all, and consequently proved that this concept[261] yields absolutely no cognition. Hence if this concept is to indicate, under the name of substance, an object that can be given, and the concept is to become a cognition, then we must lay at its basis a permanent intuition; for intuition—i.e., that whereby alone the object is given—is the indispensable condition of a concept's having objective re-
B 413 ality. In inner intuition, however, we have nothing permanent at all, for the *I* is only the consciousness of my thinking. Hence if one remains with mere thinking, then one also lacks the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance—i.e., the concept of a self-subsistent subject—to oneself as a thinking being. And the simplicity of the substance, which is linked with this concept, then drops out entirely along with that concept's reality, and is transformed into nothing more than a logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought as such—no matter whether the subject is composite or not.

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major premise it is taken as it applies to an object as such[a] (and hence also to an object as it may be given in intuition). But in the minor premise it is taken only as it consists in the reference to self-consciousness; hence here one thinks of no object whatever, but presents only the reference to oneself as subject (as the form of thought). In the first premise one talks about things that cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects. In the second premise, however, one talks (by abstracting
B 412 from any object) not about *things* but about *thought*, in which the *I* always serves as the subject of consciousness. Hence in the conclusion it cannot follow that I cannot exist otherwise than as subject, but merely that in thinking my existence[b] I can use myself only as the judgment's subject. And this is an identical proposition that reveals absolutely nothing concerning the way in which I exist.[c]

[a][Or 'object in general.']
[b][*Existenz*]
[c][*Dasein*.]

[260][Respectively, B 288–94 and A 235–60/B 294–315.]

[261][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *er* for *es*.]

Refutation of Mendelssohn's Proof[262] of the Soul's Permanence[263]

The usual argument for the soul's permanence is meant to prove that the soul (if it is granted to be a simple being) cannot cease to be by *division*. But Mendelssohn, this acute philosopher, soon noticed that the argument falls short of being adequate for the aim of securing necessary continuance for the soul; for one could assume as well that the soul ceases to exist by *vanishing*. Now in his *Phaedo* Mendelssohn tried to shield[264] the soul from this capacity to pass away,[265] which would be a true annihilation, by venturing to prove that a simple being cannot cease to be at all. For, he argued, a simple being (because it contains no parts and thus also no plurality) cannot at all be diminished and thus lose little by little[266] something of its existence, and thus be transformed gradually into nothing; and hence [if the being vanished then] there would be no time whatever to be encountered between an instant wherein this being is and another instant B 414
wherein it no longer is—which is impossible. However, Mendelssohn failed to bear in mind the following: We may indeed grant to the soul this simple nature—i.e., a nature such that the soul contains no manifold [elements] external to one another and hence no extensive magnitude.[267] Yet even then one cannot deny to the soul, any more than to any existent whatever, intensive magnitude,[268] i.e., a degree of reality in regard to all its powers[269] —indeed, in regard to everything as such that makes up existence.[270] This

[262][Moses Mendelssohn (1729–86), *Phädon, oder über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele* (*Phaedo, or on the Immortality of the Soul*), 1767, in the *Gesammelte Schriften Jubiläumsausgabe* (*Collected Writings Anniversary Edition*), 1929–38, as photomechanically reproduced by Felix Meiner Verlag (Hamburg: 1979), iii/1, 61–71, 89–99. Cf. the appendix to the second edition (1768), *ibid.*, 133–35, and the appendix to the third edition (1769), *ibid.*, 146–48.]

[263][See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 175–88. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 1, 171–91. And see Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 470–73.]

[264][*abhalten.*]

[265][*Vergänglichkeit.*]

[266][*nach und nach.*]

[267][See above, A 162–66/B 202–7.]

[268][See above, A 166–76/B 207–18.]

[269][*Vermögen.*]

[270][In the appendix to the third edition of his work (see br. n. 262, just above), p. 155, Mendelssohn actually discusses intensive quantity (magnitude), i.e., degree, but in a different context.]

degree can decrease through all the infinitely many smaller degrees; and thus the alleged substance (the thing whose permanence has not otherwise already been established) can be transformed into nothing—not indeed by division, but yet by gradual abatement (*remissio*) of its powers[271] (and hence, if I may be permitted to employ this expression, by fading out[272]). For even consciousness has always a degree, which can be diminished ever
B 415 further;[273] and so does, consequently, the power of being conscious of oneself, and thus also all the other powers. Hence the permanence of the soul considered as mere object of inner sense remains unproved, and even unprovable, although in life its permanence is clear by itself.[274] For there the thinking being (as human) is to himself simultaneously an object of outer senses; this, however, is not at all adequate for the rational psychologist, who undertakes to prove from mere concepts the soul's absolute permanence even beyond life.[275]

[271] [*Kräfte.*]

[272] [*Elangueszenz.*]

[273] Clarity is not—as logicians say—the consciousness of a presentation, since a certain degree of consciousness, although not sufficient for recollection, must be found[a] even in many obscure presentations. For without any consciousness we
B 415 would make no distinction in the combination of obscure presentations; yet we are in fact able to do this with the characteristics of many concepts (such as the concepts of rightness[b] and fairness, or those of the musician when he strikes many notes simultaneously in improvising). A clear presentation is, rather, one in which the consciousness suffices for *being conscious of the distinction* between this presentation and others. If the consciousness suffices for distinguishing them but not for being conscious of the distinction, then the presentation would still have to be called obscure. Hence there are infinitely many degrees of consciousness, down to its vanishing.

[a] [*anzutreffen.*]

[b] [On this example and the entire note, cf. the First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. XX, the n. on 226–27.]

[274] [See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 542–43.]

[275] There are those who, in bringing up[a] a new possibility, believe that they have done enough already if they insist[b] that no contradiction can be shown in their presuppositions. (They include all those people who believe that they have insight into the possibility of thought—of which they have an example only with the empirical
B 416 intuitions in human life—even after life ceases.) These people can be put in a great quandary by other possibilities that are not in the least bolder. An example of this sort is the possibility of the division of a *simple substance* into several substances, and—vice versa—the melding (coalition) of several substances into one simple sub-

Now suppose that we take our above propositions[276] in *synthetic* context, which is indeed how they must, as valid for all thinking beings, be B 416

stance. For although divisibility presupposes a composite, yet it does not necessarily require a composite of substances, but may involve a composite merely of degrees (of the various powers) of one and the same substance. Now, we can think all powers and abilities[c] of the soul, even that of consciousness, as being shrunk to half, but in such a way that substance always still remains. In the same way we can also without contradiction conceive[d] the extinguished half as preserved, not in the soul but outside it; and thus, since whatever in the soul is real and therefore has a degree—and hence the soul's entire existence, with nothing lacking—has here been halved, we can conceive that a separate substance would then arise outside it. For the multiplicity[e] that has been divided was already in the soul[f] beforehand—not, however, as multiplicity of substances, but as multiplicity of each reality considered as quantum of existence; and the unity of substance was only a way of existing that, through this division alone, has been transformed into a plurality[g] of B 417
subsistence.[h] In the same way, however, several simple substances could in turn meld into one, with nothing getting lost except merely the plurality of subsistence; for the one substance would contain the degree of reality of all the previous substances taken together. And perhaps the simple substances that give us the appearance of matter[i] might produce souls of children through such *dynamical* division of parent souls considered as *intensive magnitudes* (although not, of course, by a mechanical or chemical influence on one another, but still by an influence unknown[j] to us whereof this mechanical or chemical influence would be only the appearance)—the parent souls in turn compensating for their children's souls' departure through coalition with new material of the same kind. I am far from granting to such chimeras the slightest value or validity, and the above principles of the Analytic have urged us sufficiently to make no other use of the categories (such as that of substance) than an experiential one. Yet here the rationalist makes, out of our mere power of thought and without any permanent intuition whereby an object would be given, a self-subsistent being; and he does so merely because the unity of apperception in thought permits him no explanation of the soul from what is composite—whereas he would do better to admit that he does not know how to B 418
explain the possibility of a thinking nature. But if the rationalist is bold enough to make a self-subsistent being in this way, why should not the *materialist*, although no more able to adduce experience for the sake of supporting his possibilities, be entitled to equal boldness in availing himself of his own principle for the opposite use, while retaining the formal unity of the first principle.[k]

[a][*auf die Bahn bringen.*]
[b][*trotzen.*]
[c][*Kräfte und Vermögen.*]
[d][*sich . . . vorstellen*; cf. B xvii br. n. 73.]
[e][Or 'plurality': *Vielheit.*]
[f][Reading *in ihr* as referring to the soul, instead of connecting it with 'each reality,' as Erdmann suggests.]

taken in rational psychology as a system; and suppose that we proceed from
B 417 the category of relation—with the proposition, All thinking beings are, as such, substances—backward through the series of categories, until the circle closes. If we do this, then we come ultimately upon these beings' existence.[277] But in this system of rational psychology the thinking beings not only are conscious of this existence independently of external things, but
B 418 they can also independently of external things determine this existence by themselves (as regards the permanence that belongs necessarily to the character of substance). From this, however, it follows that in this system *idealism*—at least problematic idealism—is unavoidable; and that, if the existence[278] of external things is thus not required at all for determining one's own, then, by the same token, one is only assuming their existence quite gratuitously, without ever being able to give a proof of it.

Suppose, on the other hand, that we pursue the *analytic* procedure. Here the *I think*, as a proposition that already includes an existence, lies at the basis as given, and hence[279] so does modality. And suppose that we now dissect this proposition, in order to cognize its content, viz., as to whether and how this *I* existing in space or in time determines its existence only thereby.[280] If we proceeded in this way, then the propositions of rational psychology would start not with the concept of a thinking being as such, but with an actuality; and from the way in which this actuality is thought,

[g][*Mehrheit.*]

[h][I.e., existence as a substance; see A 186/B 230.]

[i][*einer Materie.*]

[j][*unbekannt.*]

[k][I.e., the unity of apperception.]

[276][Propositions 1–4, A 344/B 402.]

[277][*Existenz.* Existence (*da ist*, from *Dasein*) is mentioned only in proposition 3. (See the preceding note, as well as the reference to *time* both in proposition 3 and at B 418, just below.) We arrive there by moving counterclockwise ("backward") from proposition 1; and the circle is then closed, provided that we consider the four propositions (along with the four category types) as occupying equal *segments* of the circle, all of which we have then visited. If, alternatively, we considered the propositions as located at discrete *points* on the circle, then the circle would close only when we return to proposition 1, which says that the soul is substance. But Kant in no way suggests that we have returned to the starting point. And although he did indeed in his working copy of edition A change proposition 1 to read '[The soul] *exists* as substance' (see A 344/B 402 br. n. 23; emphasis added), he did not incorporate this change in edition B.]

[278][*Dasein.*]

[279][By the table of categories, A 80/B 106.]

[280][I.e., by space and time; cf. the end of B 419, and B 420.]

after everything empirical in it has been separated, one would infer what belongs to a thinking being as such—as is shown in the following table. B 419

1
I think,

2
as subject,

3
as simple subject,

4
as identical subject [281]
in every state of my thought.

Now the second proposition here leaves undetermined whether I can exist and be thought only as subject, and not also as predicate of another subject. Hence the concept of a subject is here taken merely logically, and whether or not we are to understand substance by it remains undetermined. But in the third proposition, although I have not yet established anything concerning the subject's character or subsistence, the absolute unity of apperception—the simple *I* in the presentation, the *I* to which all combination or separation that makes up thought refers—is important even by itself. Apperception is something real, and its simplicity lies in its very possibility. Now there is in space nothing real that is simple; for points (which are[282] all that is simple in space) are merely boundaries, and are not themselves anything that—as a part—serves to make up space. From this follows, therefore, the impossibility of explicating my character as merely a B 420
thinking subject[283] on bases supplied by ***materialism***. On the other hand, in the first proposition my existence is regarded as *given*. For the proposition does not say that every thinking being exists (which would simultaneously affirm of these beings absolute necessity, and hence too much), but says only that I exist as thinking. Hence the proposition is empirical, and comprises determinability of my existence merely in respect to my presentations in time. But for this [determination], on the other hand, I first need something permanent; yet such, insofar as I think myself, is not given

[281][Deleting the comma after 'subject.']

[282][*ausmachen.*]

[283][I.e., as (thinking) substance, and not as predicate of another substance (and hence as accident).]

to me at all in inner intuition. Therefore, there is no possibility of determining the way in which I exist, i.e., whether as substance or as accident, through this simple self-consciousness. Hence if *materialism* is unsuitable as a way of explicating my existence, then *spiritualism* is likewise insufficient for this; and the conclusion is that in no way—whichever it might be—can we cognize anything whatsoever about that character of our soul which concerns the possibility of the separate existence [of the soul] as such.

Indeed, we are acquainted with the unity of consciousness itself only by its being for us an indispensable requirement for the possibility of experience. How then could we, through this unity, get beyond experience (our existence in life), and even extend our cognition—by the proposition *I think,*
B 421 which is empirical but indeterminate in regard to any kind of intuition—to the nature of all thinking beings as such?

There is, therefore, no rational psychology as a *doctrine,* which would furnish us an addition to our self-cognition, but only as a *discipline,* which in this field sets bounds for speculative reason that cannot be overstepped. This discipline sets these bounds in order to keep us, on the one hand, from throwing ourselves into the lap of soulless materialism, and, on the other hand, from getting lost while roving about in spiritualism, which for us, in life, is baseless. It reminds us, rather, that this refusal of reason to give a satisfying answer to our inquisitive questions reaching beyond this life should be regarded as a hint of reason to turn our self-cognition away[284] from fruitless transcendent[285] speculation and to fruitful practical use. Although this use[286] is directed always only to objects of experience, it yet obtains its principles from higher up, and determines our conduct in such a way as it would if our vocation reached infinitely far beyond experience and hence beyond this life.[287]

We see from all this that rational psychology owes its origin to a mere misunderstanding, where one takes the unity of consciousness underlying the categories to be an intuition of the subject as object, and applies to it

[284][Reading *abwenden* for *anwenden.* Erdmann, Valentiner, and Mellin suggest similar changes. Without them, the text says '. . . apply our self-cognition of fruitless transcendent speculation to fruitful practical use.']

[285][*überschwenglich.*]

[286][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *welcher, wenn er* for *welches, wenn es* (which would refer back to the self-cognition).]

[287][Cf. B 424–26 and A 828–29 = B 856–57 incl. br. n. 148.]

the category of substance. But this unity is only the unity in *thought;* through it alone no object is given, and hence the category of substance, which always presupposes given *intuition,* cannot be applied to it. This subject, therefore, cannot be cognized at all. Hence the subject of the categories cannot by thinking the categories acquire a concept of itself as an object of the categories. For in order to think the categories, this subject must use as basis its pure self-consciousness, which—after all—was to be explicated. Similarly, the subject wherein the presentation of time originally has its basis cannot thereby determine its own existence in time; and if this determination cannot be made, then the first one, as determination of oneself (as thinking being as such) through categories, cannot take place.[288] B 422

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[288]The *I think* is, as has been said already,[a] an empirical proposition, and contains the proposition *I exist.*[b] But I cannot say, Everything that thinks exists; for then the property of thinking would turn all beings possessing it into necessary beings. Hence my existence also cannot, as Descartes supposed, be regarded as inferred from the proposition *I think* (because otherwise it would have to be preceded by the major premise, Everything that thinks exists), but is identical with it. The proposition *I think* expresses an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., perception (and hence it does prove that sensation,[c] which as such[d] belongs to sensibility,[e] underlies this existential proposition). But the proposition *I think* precedes the experience that is to determine the object of perception through the category in regard to time; and the existence is here[f] not yet a category. The category of existence has reference not to an indeterminate given object, but only to an object of which one has a concept and concerning which one wants to know whether or not it is posited also outside of this concept. An indeterminate perception here signifies only something real that has been given—and given only for thought as such, and hence not as appearance nor as thing in itself (noumenon), but as something that in fact exists and is marked as such in the proposition *I think.* For we must note that, when I called the proposition *I think* an empirical proposition, I did not mean that the *I* in this proposition is an empirical presentation. Rather, this presentation is purely intellectual, because it belongs to thought as such. Yet without some empirical presentation that provides the material for thought, the act *I think* would not take place; and the empirical [element] is only the condition of the application or use of the pure intellectual power. B 423

[a][B 420.]

[b][Emphasis added]

[c][*Empfindung.*]

[d][*folglich.*]

[e][*Sinnlichkeit.*]

[f][I.e., as contained in this proposition.]

B 423 Thus a cognition attempted beyond the bounds of possible experience, although pertaining to the highest interest of humanity, vanishes—insofar
B 424 as it is to be credited to speculative philosophy—as based on deluded expectation. Yet the critique, in its strictness, simultaneously proves that there is no possibility of dogmatically establishing, concerning an object of experience, anything beyond the boundary of experience. And thereby the critique renders to reason—with its interest[289]—a not unimportant service: viz., the critique also secures reason against all possible assertions of the opposite. For this can be done only in two ways: either by proving one's proposition apodeictically, or—if this is unsuccessful—by locating the sources of this inability; and if these sources lie in the necessary limits of our reason, then they must subject any opponent to exactly the same law of renouncing all claims to any dogmatic assertion.

Yet not the slightest loss arises from this for the right—indeed, even the necessity—of assuming a future life by following principles of the practical use of reason, which is linked with the speculative use.[290] For the merely speculative proof of a future life has never been able to have any influence on common human reason anyway. The proof is so poised[291] on the tip of a hair that even the school can maintain it on this tip only as long as it makes the proof spin unceasingly around it, like a top; hence even in the school's eyes the proof provides no permanent foundation on which anything could be built. The proofs that are usable for the world
B 425 are all left with their value undiminished by this. On the contrary, by doing away with those dogmatic pretensions they gain in clarity and in a conviction that is not artificial. For they transfer reason to the domain peculiar to it, viz., the order of purposes,[292] which is yet simultaneously an order of nature. But then reason, when regarded as in itself a practical power that is not limited to the conditions of the order of nature, is justified in going beyond this order by simultaneously expanding the order of purposes, and with it our own existence, beyond the bounds of experience and life.[293] For consider the *analogy with the nature* of living beings in this world. Here reason must necessarily assume as a principle

289[In obtaining such cognition.]

290[Cf. A 828–29 = B 856–57 incl. br n. 148 See also the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak V, 122–24 and 134–41.]

291[*gestellt.*]

292[Or 'ends': *Zwecke.*]

293[See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 189–233.]

that there is to be found in these beings no organ, no power, no impulse—and, therefore, nothing—that would be dispensable or disproportionate to its use and hence unpurposive, but that everything in them is exactly commensurate with its destination in life.[294] Judging by this analogy, the human being—who, after all, can alone contain the ultimate final purpose[295] of all this purposive natural order—would have to be the only creature excluded from this order. For his natural predispositions—not merely concerning his talents and the impulses to make use of these, but concerning, above all, the moral law in him—go far beyond all the benefit and advantage that he could draw from them in this life.[296] They go so far beyond these that this moral law teaches him to esteem above everything even the mere consciousness of a righteous attitude—and this in B 426
the absence of all advantages, including even the shadowy construct[297] of posthumous fame; and that he feels inwardly called upon to make himself fit, by his conduct in this world and while forgoing many advantages, to be a citizen of a better world, which he has in his idea. Thus there always still remains this powerful and forever irrefutable basis of proof, accompanied by an incessantly increasing cognition of purposiveness in everything that we see before us and by an outlook into the immensity of creation, and hence also by the consciousness of a certain unboundedness in the possible expansion of our knowledge[298] along with an urge commensurate therewith. This basis of proof remains despite our having to give up any claim to insight into the necessary continuance of our existence from the merely theoretical cognition of ourselves.

Concluding the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism[299]

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology is due to the confusion of an idea of reason (the idea of a pure intelligence) with the concept—in all

[294][See the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 369–77.]

[295][*letzter Endzweck*. In the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant makes a distinction between ultimate and final purpose: Ak. V, 426, cf. 443.]

[296][See the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 161–63.]

[297][*Schattenwerk*.]

[298][*Kenntnisse*.]

[299][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit* at A 293/B 349 br n. 2, vol. 1, 191–98.]

respects indeterminate—of a thinking being as such. I think myself for the sake of a possible experience while still abstracting from all actual experience, and infer from this thought that I can become conscious of my existence even as it is apart from experience and its empirical conditions. I
B 427 consequently confuse the possible *abstraction* from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of an existence of my thinking self that is possible *separately,* and I believe that I *cognize* the substantial in me as the transcendental *subject.* For I have in my thoughts merely the unity of consciousness that, as the mere form of cognition,[300] lies at the basis of all determination.

The problem of explicating[301] the soul's communion with the body does not properly belong to the psychology at issue here. For [anyone addressing] this problem intends to prove the soul's personality even as apart from this communion (i.e., after death), and hence this problem is in the proper meaning of the term *transcendent.* [For] although it deals with an object of experience, yet it does so only insofar as this object ceases to be an object of experience. In terms of our doctrinal system, however, a sufficient answer can be given to this problem also. The difficulty giving rise to this problem consists, as is familiar, in the presupposed heterogeneity of the object of inner sense (the soul) and the objects of outer senses; to the former only time, to the latter also space, attaches as formal condition of their intuition. However, the two kinds of objects differ hereby from each other not intrinsically but only insofar as
B 428 one extrinsically *appears* to the other. Consequently, what it is, as thing in itself, that underlies the appearance of matter might perhaps not be so heterogeneous. If we bear this in mind, then that difficulty vanishes, and only one remains: how a communion[302] of substances is possible at all. Solving this difficulty lies wholly outside the realm of psychology, and—as the reader will readily judge after what has been said in the Analytic about basic powers and abilities[303]—without any doubt also outside the realm of all human cognition.

[300][Reading, with Wille, *die bloße* for *der bloßen.*]

[301][Or 'explaining': *erklären.*]

[302][Or 'community': *Gemeinschaft.*]

[303][*Grundkräfte und Vermögen.*]

General Comment Concerning the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology[304]

The proposition *I think* or *I exist as thinking*[305] is an empirical proposition. Such a proposition, however, is based on empirical intuition, and hence is based also on the object[306] being thought, taken as appearance. And thus it seems as if on our theory the soul would be transformed altogether, even in its thinking, into appearance, and as if in this way our consciousness itself, as mere illusion,[307] would in fact have to deal with nothing.

Thought, taken by itself, is merely the logical function, and hence is wholly[308] spontaneity in the combination of the manifold of a merely possible intuition, and by no means exhibits the subject of consciousness as B 429 appearance. This is so merely because thought [as such] takes no account whatever of the kind of intuition involved, as to whether it is sensible or intellectual.[309] By such thought I present myself to myself neither as I am nor as I appear to myself, but think myself only as I think any object as such, i.e., any object from whose kind of intuition I abstract. If I here present myself as *subject* of thoughts, or—for that matter—as *basis* of thought, then these ways of presenting do not signify the categories of substance or cause. For the categories are those same functions of thinking (judging) but as already applied to our sensible intuition—the intuition that would indeed be required if I wanted to *cognize* myself. Here, however, I want to become conscious of myself only as thinking; I set aside how my own self is given in intuition. And thus the self could indeed be merely appearance to me who think, but not insofar as I think. In the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the *being itself*—of which, however, through this consciousness nothing is yet given for thought.

But insofar as the proposition *I think* says the same as *I exist as thinking,* it is not a mere logical function. Rather, it determines the subject (which is then simultaneously an object) in regard to existence; and it cannot take place without inner sense, whose intuition always provides us with the object not as thing in itself but merely as appearance. In this proposi-

304[See Karl Ameriks, *op. cit.* at A 341/B 399 br. n. 9, 234–301.]

305[Cf. A 355 incl. br. n. 71. Emphasis added.]

306[Which in this case is the subject.]

307[Or 'semblance': *Schein*]

308[*lauter.*]

309[On intellectual intuition, see B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

B 430 tion, therefore, there already is no longer mere spontaneity of thought but also receptivity of intuition, i.e., the thinking of myself as subject is applied to the empirical intuition of the same subject. In this intuition, then, would the thinking self have to seek the conditions for using its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, etc., in order not merely to designate itself—through the *I*—as object in itself, but also to determine the kind of its existence, i.e., to cognize itself as noumenon. This determination and cognition, however, is impossible; for inner empirical intuition is sensible and provides us with nothing but data of appearance. Such data supply to the object of *pure consciousness* nothing for any knowledge[310] of its separate existence, but can serve us merely for the sake of experience.

But suppose that we later found occasion, not in experience but in certain laws of the pure use of reason[311] that hold[312] a priori but yet concern our existence (i.e., not in merely logical rules), to presuppose ourselves completely a priori as *legislating* in regard to our own *existence,*[313] and as also ourselves determining this existence. This would then uncover in us a spontaneity whereby our actuality would be determinable without our needing for this determination the conditions of empirical intuition. And here we would become aware that the consciousness of our existence contains a priori something that, although our existence can be determined thor-
B 431 oughly[314] only through sensibility,[315] can yet in view of a certain inner power serve to determine it in reference to an intelligible (although only thought) world.[316]

But this would, nonetheless, not advance in the least all the attempts made in rational psychology. For although I would have, through this marvelous power that the consciousness of the moral law first reveals to me, a purely intellectual principle for determining my existence, yet through what predicates would I do this? Through none but those predicates that must be given to me in sensible intuition; and thus I would in rational psychol-

[310][*Kenntnis.*]

[311][Viz., its pure practical use.]

[312][*feststehen.*]

[313][*Dasein* here; *Existenz* just above and just below. The two terms continue to alternate in the remainder of the paragraph.]

[314][*durchgängig.*]

[315][*sinnlich.*]

[316][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 452–53.]

ogy end up again where I was: viz., in need of sensible intuition in order to provide signification for my concepts of understanding (substance, cause, etc.),[317] through which alone I can have cognition of myself. These intuitions, however, can never help me advance beyond the realm of experience. Yet in regard to reason's practical use, which is still always directed to objects of experience, I would be entitled to apply these concepts, in accordance with the signification analogous to the one found in reason's theoretical use, to freedom and its subject. For I then understand by them merely the logical functions of subject and predicate, of basis[318] and consequence; and in accordance with these functions all acts or effects are, in B 432
accordance with those laws, determined in such a way that they can always be explained in accordance with the categories of substance and of cause simultaneously with the natural laws, although they arise from an entirely different principle. The intention in saying this was only to forestall the misunderstanding to which the doctrine of our self-intuition, the intuition of ourselves as appearance, is easily exposed. We shall have occasion to make use of this in what follows.[319]

[317][Parentheses added.]

[318][Or 'ground.' See B xix br. n. 79.]

[319][See below, A 444–51 = B 472–79 and A 532–658 = B 560–86.]

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II

Chapter II
The Antinomy of Pure Reason[1]

We have shown in the introduction to this part of our work[2] that all transcendental illusion of pure reason rests on dialectical inferences whose
A 406 schema is provided by logic, viz., in the three formal kinds of syllogisms[3] as such[4] —roughly as the categories find their logical schema in the four functions of all judgments. The *first kind* of these subtly reasoning[5] inferences[6] dealt with the unconditioned unity of the *subjective* conditions of all presentations[7] as such (of the subject or soul); it corresponds to **categorical** syllogisms, whose major premise, as principle,
B 433 states the reference of a predicate to a *subject*. Thus the *second* kind of dialectical argument will, by analogy with **hypothetical** syllogisms, take as[8] its content the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions in [the realm of] appearance—just as the *third kind* of dialectical inferences, which will come up in the following [third] chapter, has[9] as its

[1][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 199–203.]

[2][I.e., in the introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic. See A 299/B 355–56, A 304/B 360–61, A 306–9/B 363–66.]

[3][Literally, 'inferences of reason': *Vernunftschlüsse*.]

[4][*überhaupt*. See B xxvii br. n. 106]

[5][*vernünftelnd*.]

[6][I.e., the paralogisms, A 341–405/B 399–432.]

[7][*Vorstellungen*. My reason for translating *Vorstellung* as 'presentation' rather than as 'representation' is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[8][*machen zu*.]

[9][By analogy with *disjunctive* syllogisms.]

topic[10] the unconditioned unity of the objective conditions for the possibility of objects as such.

It is noteworthy, however, that the transcendental paralogisms brought about a merely one-sided illusion[11] regarding the idea of the subject of our thought, and that not the slightest illusion of plausibility[12] arising from concepts of reason can be found for the assertion of the opposite. The advantage is entirely on the side of pneumatism, although this view cannot deny having the built-in[13] defect that, despite all the illusion of plausibility in its favor, in the critique's ordeal by fire it dissolves entirely into smoke.

The outcome is quite different when we apply reason to the *objective synthesis* of appearances. Here, although reason means to validate[14] its principle of unconditioned unity with much illusion of plausibility, it soon becomes entangled in such contradictions that it is compelled, in regard to cosmology, to renounce its demand for such unity. A 407

For here a new phenomenon of human reason manifests itself, viz., an entirely natural antithetic: i.e., an antithetic for [the discovery of] which no one needs to ponder or artfully lay snares, but into which reason falls on B 434
its own and, moreover, inevitably. And although this antithetic protects reason from the slumber—produced by a merely one-sided illusion—of an imaginary conviction, yet it also tempts reason either to submit to a skeptical hopelessness, or to adopt a dogmatic defiance and rigidly stand up for[15] certain assertions without granting a hearing or doing justice to the bases[16] supporting the opposite. Both [the slumber of imaginary conviction and this skepticism or dogmatism] are the death of a sound philosophy, although the slumber[17] might at least still be called pure reason's *euthanasia*.

Before we unveil the instances[18] of discord and disarray to which this conflict of laws (antinomy) of pure reason gives rise, let us offer certain

[10][In the sense of 'subject' or 'subject matter' (not in the sense of *topic* discussed at A 268/B 324): *Thema.*]

[11][*einseitigen Schein.*]

[12][*der mindeste Schein;* similarly just below and in the next paragraph.]

[13][Literally, 'hereditary': *Erb-*.]

[14][*geltend machen.*]

[15][*den Kopf . . . auf . . . setzen.*]

[16][Or 'grounds.' See B xix br. n. 79.]

[17][*jener,* which can refer only to the slumber; hence the other (nonbenign) death must be the disjunction of skepticism and dogmatism.]

[18][*Auftritte.*]

points[19] that may elucidate and justify the method employed by us in treating our topic. All transcendental ideas insofar as they concern absolute to-
A 408 tality in the synthesis of appearances I call *world concepts,* partly because of precisely this unconditioned totality—on which rests also the concept, which itself is only an idea, of the world whole—and partly because they deal with the synthesis of appearances only, and hence with empirical synthesis. By contrast, absolute totality in the synthesis of the conditions of
B 435 all possible things as such will give rise to an ideal of pure reason; this ideal, although it has reference to a world concept, is yet entirely distinct from it. Hence just as the paralogisms of pure reason laid the basis for a dialectical psychology, so will the antinomy of pure reason put before us the transcendental principles of a supposed pure (rational) cosmology. The antinomy will do so not in order to find this cosmology[20] valid and adopt it, but—as is, indeed, already indicated by the very name, conflict of reason—in order to exhibit it in its beguiling but deceptive[21] illusion, as an idea that cannot be reconciled with appearances.

19[*Erörterungen geben.*]

20[*sie.*]

21[*blendenden aber falschen.*]

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section I
System of Cosmological Ideas[22]

Now in order for us to be able to enumerate these ideas with systematic precision according to a principle, we must note two points. *First,*[23] pure and transcendental concepts can arise only from the understanding. Rea- A 409
son does not in fact produce any concept, but at most *frees* the *concept of understanding* of the inevitable limitations of a possible experience; and thus reason tries to expand the concept beyond the bounds of the empirical, but yet in connection with the empirical. Reason does this by demand- B 436
ing, for a given conditioned, absolute totality on the side of the conditions (under which the understanding subjects all appearances to synthetic unity). It thereby turns the category into a transcendental idea, in order that, by continuing empirical synthesis up to the unconditioned (which is never found in experience but only in the idea), reason may provide this synthesis with absolute[24] completeness. Reason demands this totality according to the principle that *if the conditioned is given, then the entire sum of conditions and hence the absolutely*[25] *unconditioned* (through which alone the conditioned was possible) *is also given.* Hence, *first,* transcendental ideas will in fact be nothing but categories expanded up to the unconditioned, and they can be put in a table arranged according to the [four] headings of the categories. However, *second,* not all categories will be suitable for this,

[22][See Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 530–32. See also H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 266–311. Also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 21–25. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 385–407. Also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 203–14. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 478–80. Also Gottfried Martin, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 36 br. n. 26, 42–64. Also W. H. Walsh, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 1, 195–214. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21 / B 35 br. n. 22, 203–10.]

[23][Edition A emphasizes 'first' *doubly* (by bold print), its repetition at A 409 singly, and 'second' at A 409 again doubly.]

[24][*absolut.*]

[25][*schlechthin.*]

but only those categories in which the synthesis makes up a *series*— a series, moreover, of conditions for a conditioned that are subordinated to (not coordinated[26] with) one another. Absolute totality is demanded by reason
A 410 only insofar as this totality concerns the ascending series of conditions for a given conditioned, and hence not when we are talking about the descending line of consequences, nor yet when we are talking about the aggregate of coordinated[27] conditions for these consequences. For as regards the given
B 437 conditioned, conditions are already presupposed and must be regarded as given with it. Consequences, on the other hand, do not make their conditions possible, but rather presuppose them; hence in proceeding to the consequences (or [i.e.] in descending from the given condition to the conditioned) we do not have to worry whether or not the series ceases, and the question concerning the totality of this series is, indeed, no presupposition of reason at all.

Thus a completely elapsed time up to the given instant is thought by us necessarily and as also being given (although not as being determinable by us). Future time, on the other hand, is not the condition for arriving at the present; and hence for comprehending future time it makes no difference at all how we want to deal with that time, i.e., whether we want to let it cease somewhere or let it run *ad infinitum*. Let the series be *m, n, o,* in which *n* is given as conditioned with respect to *m* but simultaneously as condition of *o;* let the series proceed upward from the conditioned *n* to *m* (*l, k, i,*[28] etc.), and similarly downward from the condition *n* to the conditioned *o* (*p, q, r,* etc.). In that case I must presuppose the first series in order to regard *n* as given, and according to reason (with its demand for to-
A 411 tality of conditions) *n* is possible only by means of this [ascending] series. But the possibility of *n* does not rest on the subsequent [descending] se-
B 438 ries *o, p, q, r,* which, therefore, also cannot be regarded as given, but only as *dabilis.*[29]

Let me call *regressive* the synthesis of a series on the side of the conditions, i.e., the synthesis proceeding from the condition nearest to the given appearance and thus onward to the more remote conditions. And let me

26[*beigeordnet.*]

27[*koordiniert.*]

28[Kant skips *j*, as merely the (consonant) variant of *i*.]

29[Givable.]

call *progressive* the synthesis that proceeds,[30] on the side of the conditioned, from the nearest consequence[31] to the more remote ones. The regressive synthesis proceeds[32] *in antecedentia*, the progressive one *in consequentia*.[33] Hence the cosmological ideas deal with the totality of the regressive synthesis and proceed *in antecedentia*, not *in consequentia*. When this latter process occurs,[34] then it is a chosen[35] rather than a necessary problem of pure reason; for in order to be able to comprehend completely what is given in appearance we do indeed need the bases[36] thereof, but not the consequences.

Now in order to set up the table of ideas in accordance with the table of categories, we first take the two original quanta[37] of all our intuition, time and space. Time is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series), and hence in time—with regard to a given present—the *antecedentia* as conditions (what is past) are to be distinguished a priori from the *consequentia* (what is future). Consequently, the transcendental idea of the A 412
absolute totality of the series of conditions for a given conditioned deals B 439
with all past time only. According to the idea of reason the entire elapsed time, as condition of the given instant, is thought necessarily as given. As regards space, however, in it taken in itself there is no distinction of progression from regression; for space amounts to an *aggregate*, but *not to a series*, since its parts are one and all simultaneous. In the case of time, I was able to regard the present point of time—with regard to past time—only as conditioned [by this past time], but never as its condition; for only through bygone time (or, rather, through the going-by of the preceding time) does this instant arise in the first place. But the parts of space are not subordinated to, but are coordinated with, one another; hence here one part is not the condition for the possibility of another part, and thus space does not in itself amount to a series, as does time. The synthesis of the mani-

30[*fortgehen.*]

31[*Folge.*]

32[*gehen.*]

33[Respectively: to the antecedents, to the consequents.]

34[I.e., when the cosmological ideas proceed to the consequents.]

35[*willkürlich.*]

36[Or 'grounds.' See B xix br. n. 79. For my use of 'comprehend' instead of 'grasp,' see B 114 br. n. 239.]

37[I.e., the categories of *quantity* are considered first.]

fold parts of space, however, through which we apprehend space, is nonetheless successive; hence it occurs in time and contains a series. And in this series of aggregated spaces (e.g., the feet in a rod),[38] from a given space onward, the further spaces that are added in thought are always the *condition of the boundary* of the previous spaces. Hence the *measuring* of a space is likewise to be regarded as a synthesis of a series of the conditions for a given conditioned, with this exception: here the side of the conditions
A 413 is not in itself distinct from the side on[39] which the conditioned lies, and
B 440 hence in space regression and progression[40] seem to be the same. Yet because one part of space is not given by another part but is only bounded by it, we must regard each bounded space as being also conditioned insofar as it presupposes another space as the condition of its boundary, and so on for the other spaces. As regards bounding,[41] therefore, the progression[42] in space is also a regression, and the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in the series of conditions concerns also space. And thus I can inquire just as well about the absolute totality of appearance in space as about that of appearance in bygone time. But whether an answer to such questions is possible at all we shall be able to determine hereafter.

Second,[43] then, reality[44] in space— i.e., matter—is a conditioned. The internal[45] conditions of this conditioned are its parts, and the parts of the parts are its remote conditions. Thus there takes place here a regressive synthesis, whose absolute totality is demanded by reason. This absolute totality cannot take place otherwise than by a completed division whereby the reality of matter vanishes either into nothingness[46] or, at any rate, into what

[38][The German rod (*Rute*) varied in length from 2.8 to 5.3 meters (the most commonly used variant being 3.766 meters long) and contained 10, 12, 14, or 16 feet (*Fuß*).]

[39][Literally, 'toward': *nach . . . hin*.]

[40][*regressus und progressus*.]

[41][*Begrenzung*.]

[42][*Fortgang*.]

[43][The corresponding 'first' occurred at the beginning of the last paragraph in A 411/B 438 and concerned time and space. Here, second, Kant turns to the content of space.]

[44][I.e., Kant now considers the categories of *quality*.]

[45][Or 'intrinsic'. *inner*.]

[46][*in Nichts*.]

is no longer matter: viz., the simple. Hence here also there is a series of conditions and an advance[47] to the unconditioned.

Third, as concerns the categories of real relation[48] among appearances, the category of substance with its accidents is not fitting for a transcendental idea; i.e., with regard to this category reason has no basis for proceeding regressively to conditions. For accidents (insofar as they inhere in a single substance) are coordinated with one another and do not make up a series. In regard to the substance, on the other hand,[49] accidents are not, in fact, subordinated to it, but are the way of existing of the substance itself. What might here still seem to be an idea of transcendental reason would be the concept of the *substantial*. But this means nothing but the concept of an object as such that subsists insofar as one thinks in it merely the transcendental subject without any predicates; here, however, we are talking only about the unconditioned in the series of appearances. Clearly, therefore, the substantial cannot amount to a member in this series. The same holds also for substances in community, which are mere aggregates and have no indicator[50] of a series. For they are not subordinated to one another as conditions of their possibility—as we were indeed able to say of spaces, whose boundary was never determined in itself but always by another space. There remains, therefore, only the category of *causality*, which offers us a series of causes for a given effect. In this series we can ascend from the effect as the conditioned to the causes as conditions, and thus can answer the question of reason. B 441 A 414 B 442

Fourth, the concepts of the possible, the actual, and the necessary[51] do not lead to any series—except only insofar as what is *contingent* in existence must always be regarded as conditioned; and insofar as it points, according to the rule of understanding, to a condition under which this condition itself must necessarily be pointed to a higher condition,[52] until reason encounters—only in the totality of this series—unconditioned *necessity*. A 415

Accordingly, if we pick out those categories that necessarily carry with them a series in the synthesis of the manifold, then there are no more than

[47][*Fortschritt*.]

[48][I.e., Kant now turns to the categories of *relation*.]

[49][I.e., rather than in regard to other accidents.]

[50][*Exponent*.]

[51][I.e., lastly, Kant considers the categories of *modality*.]

[52][And so on.]

four cosmological ideas, in accordance with the four headings of the categories.

B 443

1
Absolute completeness
of the
composition
of the given whole of all appearances

2
Absolute completeness
of the
division
of a given whole
in [the realm of] appearance

3
Absolute completeness
of the
arising[53]
of an appearance
as such[54]

4
Absolute completeness
of the
dependence of the existence
of the changeable in [the realm of] appearance

A 416 Here we must note, first, that the idea of absolute totality concerns nothing but the exposition of *appearances*, and hence not understanding's pure concept of a whole of things as such. Therefore appearances are here considered as given, and reason demands absolute[55] completeness of the conditions of their possibility insofar as these conditions make up a series. Hence reason demands an absolutely[56] (in every respect) complete synthesis whereby the appearance can be expounded in accordance with laws of understanding.

B 444 Second, what reason seeks in this synthesis of conditions—which is pursued serially and, moreover, regressively—is, in fact, only the unconditioned; i.e., what reason seeks is, as it were, completeness in the series of the premises that together presuppose no further premises. Now this *un-*

[53][*Entstehung*.]

[54][*überhaupt*. See B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[55][*absolut*.]

[56][*schlechthin*]

conditioned is always contained *in the absolute totality of the series* if we present this totality in imagination.[57] But this absolutely completed synthesis is again only an idea; for we cannot know, at least not in advance, whether such a synthesis is indeed possible with appearances. If we present everything merely through pure concepts of understanding, without conditions of sensible intuition, then we can say straightforwardly that for a given conditioned the entire series of conditions subordinated to one another is also given; for the conditioned is given solely through that series.[58] With appearances, however, we find[59] a special limitation of the way in which they are given: viz., they are given through the successive synthesis of the A 417
manifold of intuition, a synthesis that in regression is to be complete. Now whether this completeness is possible in sensibility[60] is still a problem. The idea of this completeness, however, does lie in reason, regardless of the possibility or impossibility of connecting empirical concepts in a way adequate to this idea. The absolute totality, then, of the regressive synthesis of the manifold of appearance (a synthesis governed by the categories that present appearance as a series of conditions for a given conditioned) necessarily contains the unconditioned—even if we leave undecided whether B 445
and how this totality is to be brought about; and hence reason here takes the path of starting from the idea of totality although its final aim is in fact the *unconditioned,* whether that of the entire series or of a part thereof.

Now, one can think of[61] this unconditioned in two ways. Either one thinks of it as consisting merely in the whole series, in which therefore all members would without exception be conditioned and only their whole would be absolutely[62] unconditioned; and then the regression is called infinite. Or the absolutely[63] unconditioned is only a part of the series, a part to which the remaining members of the series are subordinated but which itself is not subject to any other condition.[64] In the first case the series is *a* A 418

[57][*Einbildung.*]

[58][Construing *diese* as singular; cf. 'sum' at A 409/B 436.]

[59][*anzutreffen.*]

[60][*sinnlich.*]

[61][*sich . . . gedenken.*]

[62][*schlechthin.*]

[63][*absolut.*]

[64]The absolute whole of a series of conditions for a given conditioned is always unconditioned; for outside the series there are no further conditions in regard to

parte priori[65] given without bounds (without beginning), i.e., infinitely, and yet wholly; but the regression in it is never completed and can be called
B 446 infinite only potentially. In the second case there is a first member of the series, which is called: with regard to bygone time, the *beginning of the world;* with regard to space, the *boundary of the world;*[66] with regard to the parts of a whole given within its bounds,[67] the *simple;* with regard to causes, absolute *self-activity* (freedom); with regard to the existence of changeable things, absolute *natural necessity.*

We have two terms, **world** and **nature**, which sometimes blend.[68] The first term means the mathematical whole of all appearances and the totality of their synthesis on both the large and the small scale, i.e., the totality of the synthesis as it advances both by composition[69] and by division. But
A 419 this same world is called nature[70] insofar as we consider it as a dynamical
B 447 whole and take account, not of the aggregation in space or time in order to bring this aggregation about as a magnitude, but of the unity in the *existence* of appearances. Now here the condition of what occurs is called the cause;[71] and the cause's unconditioned causality[72] in [the realm of] appearance[73] is called freedom, whereas the conditioned causality is called

which this whole could be conditioned. However, this absolute whole of such a series is only an idea—or, rather, a problematic concept whose possibility must be examined, viz., in reference to the way in which it may contain the unconditioned, which is the transcendental idea that is in fact at issue.

65[On the side of what is prior, or antecedent.]

66[*Weltgrenze.*]

67[*Grenzen.*]

68[*ineinanderlaufen.*]

69[Or 'assembly': *Zusammensetzung.*]

B 446 70Nature, taken adjectivally (formally), signifies the coherence of a thing's determinations according to an internal principle of causality. By nature taken substantively (materially), on the other hand, we mean the sum of appearances insofar as, by virtue of an internal principle of causality, they are in thoroughgoing coherence. In the first meaning we speak of the nature of fluid matter, fire, etc., and we then use the word adjectivally. On the other hand, when we talk about the things of nature, then we have in mind a subsisting whole.

71[*Ursache*]

72[*Kausalität.*]

73[*unbedingte Kausalität der Ursache in der Erscheinung*, which could also mean 'unconditioned causality of the cause in [the realm of] appearance.']

natural cause—in the narrower meaning.[74] The conditioned found in existence as such is called contingent, and the unconditioned necessary. The unconditioned necessity of *appearances* may be called natural necessity.

I earlier[75] called the ideas with which we are now dealing cosmological ideas.[76] I did so partly because by the term world we mean the sum of all appearances, and our ideas are indeed directed to the unconditioned only among appearances; and partly because the term world, in the transcendental meaning, signifies the absolute totality of the sum of existing things, and we are indeed directing our attention solely to the completeness of the A 420
synthesis (although, in fact, only in the regression to the conditions). Moreover, these ideas are one and all transcendent, and although they do not exceed the object—viz., appearances—*in kind* but deal merely with the world of sense (not with noumena), they still carry the synthesis up to a *degree* that surpasses all possible experience; hence, in my opinion, they may one and all quite fittingly be called world concepts. Yet with regard to the distinction between the mathematically and the dynamically uncon- B 448
ditioned at which the regression aims, I would call the first two of these concepts[77] world concepts (concepts of the world on the large and the small scale) in a narrower meaning, but would call the remaining two concepts *transcendent natural concepts*. For now this distinction is not of special significance, but it may become more important hereafter.

[74][Of *natural;* i.e., the meaning that excludes freedom as manifested in appearance.]

[75][A 408/B 435, A 411/B 438, A 415/B 442.]

[76][I.e., world ideas]

[77][I.e., the world concepts (cosmological ideas), as listed in the table at A 415/ B 443.]

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section II
Antithetic of Pure Reason[78]

If thetic is the term for any sum of dogmatic doctrines,[79] then by antithetic I mean not dogmatic assertions of the opposite, but the conflict of seemingly dogmatic cognitions (*thesis cum antithesi*)[80] without attribution to one
A 421 of them of a superior claim to approval over the other. Thus the antithetic does not deal at all with one-sided assertions, but considers universal cognitions of reason only in regard to[81] their conflict with one another and to the causes of this conflict. The transcendental antithetic is an inquiry concerning the antinomy of pure reason, its causes, and its result. When we
B 449 apply our reason not merely—for the sake of using the principles of understanding[82] —to objects of experience, but venture to extend our reason beyond the bounds of experience, then there arise *subtly reasoning* doctrines.[83] These doctrines neither may hope to be confirmed in experience, nor need they fear being refuted in it; and each of them not only is in itself without contradiction, but even encounters conditions of its necessity in the nature of reason—except that, unfortunately, the counterproposition[84] has on its side equally valid and necessary bases[85] for its assertion.

The questions, then, that naturally arise in such a dialectic of pure reason are the following. (1) What are, in fact, the propositions in which pure reason is unfailingly subject to an antinomy? (2) To what causes is this an-

[78][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 215–19.]

[79][*Lehren.*]

[80][Of thesis with antithesis. (Replacing *thesin,* the accusative of *thesis,* with the (Latin) genitive.)]

[81][*nach.*]

[82][The principles of understanding (*Grundsätze des Verstandes*) were treated above, A 158–235/B 197–294.]

[83][*vernünftelnde Lehrsätze.*]

[84][Or 'antithesis': *Gegensatz.*]

[85][Or 'grounds.' See B xix br. n. 79.]

tinomy due? (3) Despite this contradiction, does a path to certainty yet remain open to reason, and in what way?

Accordingly, a dialectical doctrine[86] of pure reason must have this twofold feature distinguishing it from all sophistical propositions: First, it must concern not a chosen[87] question that one is raising only for this or that arbitrary[88] aim, but a question that any human reason must in its progress necessarily come upon. And second, such a doctrine, with its counterproposition, must carry with it not a merely artificial illusion that immediately vanishes once we have insight into it, but a natural and unavoidable illusion that still continues to delude us—although not to deceive us—even when we are no longer tricked by it, and that hence can be rendered innocuous, but never obliterated. A 422 B 450

Such a dialectical doctrine[89] will refer not to the unity of understanding in experiential concepts, but to the unity of reason in mere ideas.[90] But as synthesis according to rules this unity is still to be congruent, first, with the understanding, and yet as absolute unity of this synthesis it is to be congruent simultaneously with reason. Hence if this unity is adequate to reason then its conditions will[91] be too great for the understanding, and if the unity is commensurate with the understanding then its conditions will be too small for reason. And from this there must arise a conflict that cannot be avoided, no matter how one goes about doing so.

These subtly reasoning assertions thus reveal a dialectical combat arena.[92] There any party permitted to make the attack keeps the upper hand, and the party compelled to proceed[93] merely defensively is certain to be defeated. Vigorous knights, by the same token, whether they pledge themselves to the good or to the evil[94] cause, are sure to carry off the wreath of victory—provided they take care to have the prerogative of making the last attack and are not obliged to withstand a new onslaught A 423

86[*Lehrsatz.*]

87[*willkürlich.*]

88[*gewisser beliebiger.*]

89[*Lehre.*]

90[See above, A 310–11/B 366–68.]

91[Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *werden* for *wird.*]

92[*Kampfplatz.*]

93[*verfahren;* A has 'carry on' (*sich führen*).]

94[Or 'bad': *schlimm.*]

by the opponent. We can indeed readily conceive that this contest arena[95] has all along been entered often enough and that many victories have been
B 451 won by both sides, but that for the last and decisive victory care has always been taken—by forbidding the opponent to take up arms thenceforth—that solely the champion of the good cause would prevail in the arena. We, however, as impartial arbiters of combat, must set aside entirely whether the cause for which the contestants[96] are fighting is the good or the evil one, and must let them decide their cause between themselves. Perhaps, after having more exhausted than harmed each other, they will become aware on their own of the nullity of their contest,[97] and will part as good friends.

This method of watching—or, rather, of occasioning on one's own—a contest[98] of assertions, not in order finally to decide in favor of one or the other party, but in order to inquire whether the contest's object is not perhaps a mere deception for which each party grasps in vain and from which
A 424 it cannot gain anything even if not resisted at all—this procedure, I say, may be called the *skeptical method.*[99] It is entirely distinct from *skepticism,* a principle of technical[100] and scientific ignorance—a principle that undermines the foundations of all cognition in order, if possible, to leave cognition without any reliability and security whatsoever. For the skeptical method aims at certainty. It does so by seeking to discover the point of
B 452 misunderstanding in such a dispute[101]—a dispute that on both sides is meant sincerely and is conducted with understanding—in order that, as wise legislators do, it may from the perplexity of judges in lawsuits obtain information for itself about what is deficient and not precisely determined in its laws. The antinomy that manifests itself in the application of laws is for our limited wisdom the best experiment for testing [reason's] nomothetic,[102] in order that by this antinomy we may alert reason—which in ab-

[95][*Tummelplatz.*]

[96][*die Streitenden.*]

[97][*Streithandel.*]

[98][*Streit.*]

[99][See Walter Watson, *op. cit.* at B xvi br. n. 71, 95.]

[100][*kunstmäßig.*]

[101][*Streit.*]

[102][I.e., the legislation giving rise to those laws.]

stract speculation does not easily become aware of its slips—to the moments[103] involved in determining its principles.

Only to transcendental philosophy, however, does this skeptical method belong essentially. In any other field of inquiry it may perhaps be dispensable; but not in this one. Using this method in mathematics would be absurd; for there no false assertions can hide and make themselves invisible, inasmuch as the proofs must always proceed along the course[104] of pure A 425
intuition and, moreover, by a synthesis that is always evident. In experimental philosophy[105] a doubt that prompts delay may indeed be useful, but at least no misunderstanding is possible that cannot easily be removed; and experience must in the end contain the ultimate means—whether discovered early or late—for deciding the quarrel.[106] Morality can also—at least B 453
in possible experiences—give all of its principles *in concreto,* along with their practical consequences, and can thereby avoid the misunderstanding arising from abstraction. Transcendental assertions claiming an expansive[107] kind of insight even beyond the realm of all possible experiences, on the other hand, neither fit the case where their abstract synthesis could be given in any a priori intuition, nor are such[108] that the misunderstanding could be uncovered by means of any experience. Therefore transcendental reason permits no other touchstone[109] than the attempt to reconcile[110] its assertions among themselves, and hence to conduct beforehand a free and unhindered contest[111] of these assertions among one another. Let us now engage in this contest.[112]

[103][I.e., key elements.]

[104][*Faden.*]

[105][*Experimentalphilosophie.* Wille suggests that we read *Experimentalphysik* ('experimental physics').]

[106][*Zwist.*]

[107][*erweiternd.* See A 7/B 11 br. n. 194.]

[108][*sind . . . so beschaffen.*]

[109][Of truth.]

[110][*Vereinigung.*]

[111][*Wettstreit.*]

[112]The antinomies succeed one another according to the order of the transcendental ideas cited above.[a]

[a][A 415/B 443]

A 426
B 454

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

A 427
B 455

FIRST CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS[113]

THESIS

The world has a beginning in time and is also enclosed within bounds as regards space.

PROOF

For assume that the world has no beginning as regards time. In that case, up to every given point in time an eternity has elapsed and hence an infinite series of successive[114] states of things in the world has gone by. However, the infinity of a series consists precisely in the fact that it can never be[115] completed by successive[116] synthesis. Therefore an infinite bygone world series is impossible, and hence a beginning of the

ANTITHESIS

The world has no beginning and no bounds in space, but is infinite as regards both time and space.

PROOF

For suppose that it has a beginning. In that case, since the beginning is an existence preceded by a time wherein the thing is not, a time must have preceded wherein the world was not, i.e., an empty time. In an empty time, however, no arising of any thing is possible; for no part of such a time has,[117] in preference to another part, any distinguishing condition of existence rather than nonexistence[118] (whether one assumes

113[See Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 407–09. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 220–27. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 483–88. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 318–53. And see T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 270–76.]

114[*aufeinander folgend.*]

115[*sein* (rather than *werden*).]

116[*sukzessiv.*]

117[*an sich hat.*]

118[Kant actually says, 'rather than [condition] of nonexistence' (where I read, with Valentiner, *vor der* instead of *vor die.*]

world is a necessary condition of the world's existence—which was the first point to be proved.

As regards the *second* point in the thesis, assume again the opposite. In that case the world will be an infinite given whole of things existing simultaneously. Now in the case of a *quantum* that is not given within certain bounds of any intuition,[119] we can think of[120] this
A 428 B 456 quantum's magnitude in no other way than through the synthesis of its parts, and can think of the totality of such a quantum only through the completed synthesis, or [i.e.] through repeated addition of unit to unit.[121] Accordingly, in order for the world—which occupies all spaces—to be thought as a whole, the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world would have to be regarded as completed, i.e., in the enu-

that the world[122] arises of itself or through another cause). Hence although many a series of things can begin in the world, the world itself cannot have a beginning and hence is infinite with regard to past time.

As concerns the second point in the antithesis, assume, first of all, the opposite: viz., that the world is, as regards space, finite and bounded. In that case the world is located[123] in an empty space that is not bounded. Hence we would find here not only a relation of things *in space* but also a relation of things *to space*. Now the world is an absolute whole,
outside of which there is to be found A 429 B 457
no object of intuition, and hence no correlate of the world to which the world stands in relation; therefore the relation of the world to empty space would be a relation of it to *no object*. But such a relation—and

[119]If an indeterminate quantum is enclosed within bounds, then we can intuit it as
a whole without needing to construct its totality through measuring, i.e., through B 456
the successive synthesis of its parts. For the bounds already determine the [quantum's] completeness by cutting off anything further.

[120][*gedenken*.]

[121]The concept of totality is in this case nothing but the presentation of the completed synthesis of the quantum's parts. For since we cannot abstract the concept from the intuition of the whole (such intuition being impossible in this case), we can frame the concept only through the parts' synthesis carried up to the completion of the infinite—at least in our idea.

[122][*sie*, the closest referent of which is actually *Bedingung* ('condition') rather than *Welt* ('world').]

[123][*befindet . . . sich*.]

meration[124] of all coexisting things an infinite time would have to be regarded as having elapsed—which is impossible. Accordingly, an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be regarded as a given whole, and hence also not as given *simultaneously*. Consequently, a world is, as regards extension in space, not *infinite* but is enclosed in its bounds—which was the second point to be proved.

hence also the bounding[125] of the world by empty space—is nothing. Therefore the world is, as regards space, not bounded at all; i.e., it is infinite with regard to extension.[126]

[124][*Durchzählung*.]

[125][*Begrenzung*.]

[126]Space is merely the form of outer[a] intuition (i.e., it is merely formal intuition), B 457
but not an actual object that can be intuited externally. Space, as prior to all things that determine (occupy or bound) it—or that, rather, give us an *empirical intuition* conforming[b] to its form—is called absolute space;[c] absolute space is nothing but the mere possibility of outer appearances insofar as they either exist in themselves or can still be added to given appearances. Hence empirical intuition is not composed of[d] appearances and space (i.e., perception and empty intuition). The one is not the other's correlate in synthesis, but is only linked with the other in one and the same empirical intuition, viz., as its matter and form. If we try to posit one of these two items outside the other (viz., space outside all appearances), then there arise from this all sorts of empty determinations of outer intuition that yet are not possible perceptions: e.g., the distinction between the world's motion or rest in infinite empty space—a determination of the relation of the two to each other that can never be perceived and that, by the same token, is therefore the predicate of a mere thought-entity.

[a][Or 'external.']

[b][*gemäß*.]

[c][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak IV, 481–82, 560 See also J. W. Ellington, *op. cit.* at B xliii br n. 149, Translator's Introduction to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, xiv–xv.]

[d][Or 'assembled from': *zusammengesetzt aus*.]

430 }
458 }

Comment on
The First Antinomy

{ A 431
{ B 459

I. On the Thesis

In these mutually conflicting arguments I have not sought to use deceptions in order perhaps to conduct (as we say) a lawyer's proof—which employs the opponent's carelessness to its own advantage and gladly accepts his appeal to a misunderstood law in order to build its own illegitimate claims on that law's refutation. Each of these proofs is drawn from the nature of the case, and the advantage obtainable from the fallacious inferences of the dogmatists from both parties has been put aside.

I could also seemingly have proved the thesis by starting, in accordance with the custom of the dogmatists, from[127] a defective concept of the infinity of a given magnitude. A magnitude[128] [so I could have argued] is *infinite* if beyond it (i.e., beyond what multitude of a

II. On the Antithesis

The proof for the infinity of the given world series and the infinity of the world sum-total[129] rests on this: that in the opposite case an empty time and similarly an empty space would have to make up the boundary of the world. Now, I am not unaware that philosophers seek subterfuges against this implication,[130] by claiming that a boundary of the world as regards both time and space is indeed entirely possible without one's needing to assume an absolute time prior to the beginning of the world, or an absolute space spread out outside of the actual world—both of which are impossible. With the latter part of this opinion[131] of the philosophers from the Leibnizian school I am entirely satisfied. Space is merely the form of outer[132] intuition, but not an actual object that can be intuited ex-

127['starting . . . from' here renders *vorangeschickt.*]

128[*Größe.*]

129[*Weltinbegriff.*]

130[*Konsequenz.*]

131[I.e., the part denying an absolute time prior to the beginning of the world and an absolute space spread out outside of the actual world. Kant goes on to show how *his own* view (though different from that of Leibniz) also has this consequence.]

132[Or 'external']

given unit it contains) no greater[133] one is possible. Now no magnitude is the greatest, because one or more units can always still be added. Therefore an infinite given magnitude, and hence also an infinite world (infinite as regards both the bygone series and extension), is impossible; therefore the world is bounded in both respects. Thus could I have conducted my proof. However, this concept of the infinity of a given magnitude does not agree with what is meant by an infinite whole. For we do not present[134] through this concept *how great* this whole is, and hence the concept of this whole is also not the concept of a *maximum*. Rather,
A 432 B 460 through this concept we think only the whole's relation to an arbitrarily assumed unit, in regard to which this whole is greater than any number. Now according as the unit is assumed greater or smaller, the infinite whole would be greater or smaller. Only infinity, since it con-

ternally, and not a correlate of appearances but the form of appearances themselves. Hence space cannot occur absolutely (by itself) as something determinative in the existence of things, since it is no object at all but only the form of possible objects. Hence things considered as appearances do indeed determine space; i.e., they bring about the fact that among all its possible predicates (of magnitude and relation) these or those [particular] predicates belong to actuality. But space considered as something self-subsistent cannot conversely determine the actuality of things as regards magnitude or shape, because it is nothing actual in itself. Hence a space (whether full or empty)[135] can indeed be bounded by appearances, but appearances A 433 B 461
cannot be bounded by an empty space outside them. The same holds also for time. But all of this being granted, the fact is nonetheless indisputable that these two non-

[133][*größer*.]

[134][Or 'conceive': *vorstellen*. See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[135]It will readily be discerned that I mean by this the following: *empty space insofar as it is bounded by appearances*—hence empty space *within the world*[a]—at B 461
least does not contradict transcendental principles, and thus may, as far as they are concerned, be granted (although its possibility[b] may not therefore immediately be asserted).

[a][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 563–64]

[b][Real, rather than merely logical, possibility.]

sists merely in the relation to these given units, would always remain the same; but through this concept, of course, the absolute magnitude of the whole would not be cognized—nor, indeed, is cognizing this magnitude at issue here.[136]

The true (transcendental) concept of infinity is this: that the successive[137] synthesis of unit[s][138] in measuring by means of a quantum can never be[139] completed.[140] From this it follows quite surely that an eternity of actual successive[141] states up to a given point in time (the present one) cannot have gone by, and that the world must therefore have a beginning.

In regard to the second part of the thesis the difficulty concerning an infinite and yet elapsed series does, indeed, go away; for the manifold of a world that is infinite as regards extension is given *simultaneously*. But if we are to think the totality of such a multitude, and cannot appeal to bounds that by themselves make up this totality in intuition, then we must give an account of our concept, which in such a case cannot proceed from the whole to the determinate multitude of the parts, but must establish the possibility of a whole through the successive synthesis of the parts. Now since this synthesis would have to amount to a never-to-be-completed series, one cannot think a totality prior to it and hence also through it. For the concept of totality itself is in this case the presentation of a completed synthesis of the parts; and this completion, and hence also its concept, is impossible.

entities[142]—empty[143] space outside, and empty time prior to, the world—must assuredly be assumed if one assumes a boundary of the world, whether in regard to space or time.

For as concerns the above implication—whereby we say that if the world has bounds (as regards time and space) then the infinite void[144] must determine the existence of actual things as regards their magnitude—the escape by which philosophers seek to evade this implication consists, although covertly, only in this: that instead of thinking of a *world of sense* one thinks of[145] who knows what kind of intelligible world; instead of the first beginning (an existence preceded by a time of nonexistence) one thinks an existence as such[146] that *presupposes no other condition* in the world; and in-

[136][In this concept.]

[137][*sukzessiv*.]

[138][Or 'unity' ('oneness'): *Einheit*.]

[139][*sein* (rather than *werden*).]

[140]The quantum thereby contains a multitude (of [a] given unit) that is greater than any number—which is the mathematical concept of the infinite.

[141][*aufeinander folgend*.]

[142][*Undinge*. See A 292/B 348.]

[143][*leer*.]

[144][*Leere*.]

[145][*sich . . . gedenken*.]

[146][*überhaupt*. See B xxvii br. n. 106.]

gards extension is given *simultaneously*. Consider, however, the totality of such a multitude: since we cannot appeal to bounds that by themselves make up this totality in intuition, we must, in order to think this totality, account for our concept. However, this concept cannot in such a case proceed from the whole to the determinate multitude of parts, but must establish the possibility of a whole through the successive synthesis of the parts. Now because this synthesis would have to make up a series that can never be completed, one cannot think a totality of[147] such a synthesis, and hence also not by means of it. For the concept of totality itself is in this case the presentation of a completed synthesis of the parts; but this completion, and hence also the concept of it, is impossible.

stead of the boundary[148] of extension one thinks *limits*[149] of the world whole; and thus one gets away from[150] time and space. But we are here talking only about the *mundus phaenomenon*[151] and its magnitude, and in the case of this world we can by no means abstract from the mentioned conditions[152] of sensibility without annulling the essence[153] of that world. The world of sense, if it is bounded, lies necessarily in the infinite void. If one wants to leave out the void, and hence space as such, as a priori condition for the possibility of appearances, then the entire world of sense drops out. In our problem,[154] this world alone is given to us. The *mundus intelligibilis*[155] is nothing but the universal concept of a world as such. In this concept one abstracts from all conditions of the intuition of the world, and therefore in regard to this concept no synthetic proposition whatever is possible either affirmatively or negatively.

147[Reading *von* instead of *vor,* which would yield 'a totality cannot be thought prior to it.']

148[*Grenze.*]

149[*Schranken.*]

150[*aus dem Wege gehen.*]

151[Phenomenal world.]

152[I.e., time and space.]

153[*Wesen.*]

154[As to whether the world is bounded or infinite.]

155[Intelligible world.]

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

SECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS[156]

THESIS

Every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and nothing at all[157] exists but the simple or what is composed of it.

PROOF

For suppose that composite substances did not consist of simple parts. In that case, if all composition[158] were annulled in thought, then there would remain no composite part and (since on this supposition there are no simple parts) also no simple part; hence there would remain nothing at all, and consequently no substance would

ANTITHESIS

No composite thing in the world consists of simple parts, and there exists in the world nothing simple at all.

PROOF

Suppose that a composite thing (as substance) consists of simple parts. Now all external[159] relation and hence also all composition from substances[160] is possible only in space; hence however many parts the composite consists of, the space that it occupies must also consist of as many parts. Now space consists not of simple parts but of spaces. Hence

[156][See Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 409–11 See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 227–37. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 488–92. Also Arthur Melnick, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 283–317, 353–66. And see T K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 276–77.]

[157][*überall.* In Kant this term does not, as it does today, mean 'everywhere' (for which Kant uses *allerwärts* or *allenthalben*).]

[158][*Zusammensetzung.*]

[159][Or 'extrinsic.']

[160][*aus Substanzen* (cf. the end of this paragraph), i.e., all composition of a substance from other substances]

have been given. Therefore, either one cannot possibly annul in thought all composition, or after its annulment there must remain something that subsists without any composition, i.e., the simple. In the first case,[161] however, the composite would again not consist of substances; (for with substances composition is only a contingent relation of substances—a relation without which substances, as by themselves permanent beings,[162] A 436 B 464 must still subsist). Now since this case contradicts the presupposition,[163] there remains only the second case: viz., that the substantive[164] composite in the world consists of simple parts.

From this it follows directly that the things in the world are, one and all, simple beings; that composition is merely an external[165] state of them; and that although we can never put elementary substances completely out of this state of combination and isolate them, yet reason must think them as the first[166] every part of the composite must occupy a space. However, the absolutely first[167] parts of anything composite are simple. Therefore the simple occupies a space. Now anything real that occupies a space comprises[168] a manifold [of elements] outside one another and hence is composite; as a real composite, moreover, it is composed not from accidents (for these cannot without substance be outside one another) but, hence, from substances; therefore the simple would be a substantive composite—which is self-contradictory.

The second proposition of the antithesis—that nothing simple whatever exists in the world—is to mean no more here than this: the ex- A 437 B 465 istence of the absolutely simple cannot be established from any experience or perception, whether outer or inner; and the absolutely simple[169] is, therefore, a mere idea the objective reality of which can never be established in any possible experience, and which is hence without

[161][Where not all composition has been annulled in thought.]

[162][*Wesen.*]

[163][That composite substances do not consist of simple parts.]

[164][*substantielle.*]

[165][Or 'extnnsic.']

[166][Or 'primary.']

[167][Or 'primary.']

[168][*in sich fassen.*]

[169][*Einfache.*]

subjects of all composition,[170] and hence must think them, prior to any composition, as simple beings.

any application and object in the exposition of appearances. For let us assume that an object of experience could be found for this transcendental idea; then the empirical intuition of some object would have to be cognized as one containing absolutely[171] no manifold [of elements] outside one another and combined into unity. Now from our not being conscious of such a manifold we cannot validly infer that such a manifold is entirely impossible in any intuition of an object; yet this impossibility is assuredly needed for absolute simplicity.[172] Thus it follows that this simplicity cannot be inferred from any perception whatsoever. Since, therefore, nothing can ever be given as an absolutely[173] simple object[174] in any possible experience, but since the world of sense must be regarded as the sum of all possible experiences, nothing simple is given in it at all.

This second proposition of the antithesis goes much further than the first. The first proposition banishes the simple only from the intuition of the composite; the second, by contrast, removes the simple from all of nature—which is also

170[*Komposition.*]

171[*schlechthin.*]

172[*absolute Simplizität.*]

173[*schlechthin.*]

174[*Objekt* here and just above; *Gegenstand* before that and just below. See A vii br. n. 7.]

the reason why we were able to prove this proposition not from the concept of a given object of outer intuition (of the composite), but only from the concept's relation to a possible experience as such.

A 438 B 466 A 439 B 467

Comment on The Second Antinomy

I. On the Thesis

In talking about a whole that necessarily consists of simple parts I mean only a substantive whole—this being the composite proper, i.e., the contingent unity of the manifold that, *given separately* (at least in thought), is put into a reciprocal linkage and thereby makes up a unit.[175] Space should, properly, be called not a *compositum* but a *totum,*[176] because its parts are possible only in the whole, not the whole through the parts. At most space could be called a *compositum ideale,* rather than *reale.*[177] But this is mere subtlety. Space is not a composite made up from substances (not even from real accidents). Hence if I annul all composition in it, then nothing must remain, not even a

II. On the Antithesis

Against this proposition—whose basis of proof is merely mathematical—concerning an infinite division of matter, objections have been advanced by the *monadists*. These objections already arouse suspicion by the fact that the monadists refuse to accept the clearest mathematical proofs as being insights into the character of space—insofar as space is in fact the formal condition for the possibility of all matter—but they regard such proofs only as inferences from abstract but chosen[178] concepts that could not be referred to actual things. The monadists downgrade these proofs as if, indeed, it were so much as possible to think up a different kind of intuition from the one that is given in the

[175][*Eines.*]

[176][Not a composite but a whole.]

[177][An ideal, rather than a real, composite.]

[178][*willkürlich*]

A 440 B 468 point; for a point is possible only as the boundary of a space (hence of a composite). Therefore, space and time do not consist of simple parts. If something belongs only to the state of a substance, then—even if it has a magnitude (e.g., change)—it also does not consist of the simple; i.e., a certain degree of change does not come about by an accretion of many simple changes. Our inference from the composite to the simple holds[179] only for self-subsistent things. But accidents of the state[180] are not self-subsistent. Hence one can easily ruin the proof for the necessity of the simple, as the components[181] of any substantive composite,[182] and thereby ruin one's case as such: viz., if one extends the proof too far and tries to make it hold, without making a distinction, for anything composite—as has actually already happened repeatedly.

I am, besides, talking here only about the simple insofar as it is necessarily given in the composite—inasmuch as the composite can be resolved into the simple as its com-

original intuition of space, and as if the a priori determinations of this space did not pertain[183] simultaneously to whatever is possible only through the fact that it occupies this space. If we listened to them, then besides the mathematical point—which, although simple, is not a part but merely the boundary of a space—we would have to think also physical points; these, although likewise simple, have the advantage that, as parts of space, they occupy it by their mere aggregation. Now, I shall not here repeat the common and clear refutations of this absurdity—since,[184] indeed, the attempt by means of merely discursive concepts to subtly reason away the self-evidence of mathematics is entirely futile. I shall note only that if philosophy here plays tricks with mathematics, then this happens only A 441 B 469
because philosophy forgets that in this question the concern is only with *appearances* and their conditions. Here, however, it is not enough that for *understanding's concept* of the composite we find the concept of the simple. Rather, for

179[Or 'is valid': *gilt.*]

180[Of a thing.]

181[*Bestandteile.*]

182[*Zusammengesetzten.*]

183[Or, possibly, 'as if the determinations of this space did not a priori pertain.']

184[*wie.*]

A 442
B 470
ponents.[185] The proper meaning of the term *monad*[186] (according to Leibniz's use) should, presumably, apply only to the simple that is given *directly*[187] as simple substance (e.g., in self-consciousness), rather than given as element of the composite, which might better be called an *atomus.*[188] And since it is only with regard to the composite that I wish to prove simple substances, as elements of the composite, I could call the thesis[189] of the second antinomy transcendental *atomism.*[190] However, inasmuch as this term has long since already been used to designate a particular way of explaining bodily appearances (*moleculae*)[191] and hence presupposes empirical concepts, the thesis may be called the dialectical principle of *monadology.*

the *intuition* of the composite (the intuition of matter) we must find the intuition of the simple; and this, according to laws of sensibility and hence also for objects of the senses, is entirely impossible. Hence for a whole composed from substances that is thought merely through pure understanding it may indeed hold that we must, prior to any composition of this whole, have the simple; yet this does not hold for the *totum substantiale phaenomenon,*[192] which, as empirical intuition in space, carries with it the necessary property that no part of it is simple—because no part of space is simple. The monadists, however, have been acute enough to try to evade this difficulty: viz., by presupposing not space as a condition for the possibility of objects of outer intuition (bodies), but instead these objects and the dynamical relation of substances as such as the condition for the possibility of space. Now, we have a concept of bodies

185[See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 503.08. See also J. W. Ellington, *op. cit.* at B xliii br. n. 149, Translator's Introduction to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* xxi–xxiii.]

186[*Monas.*]

187[*unmittelbar*. See B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

188[Atom, i.e., indivisible element.]

189[Reading—with Mellin, Valentiner, and the *Akademie* edition—*These* (or 'Thesis') for *Antithese.*]

190[*Atomistik.*]

191[Molecules.]

192[Phenomenal substantive whole]

only as appearances; as appearances, however, they necessarily presuppose space as the condition for the possibility of all outer appearances. Hence this subterfuge of the monadists is futile—and it has, indeed, been sufficiently cut down above, in the Transcendental Aesthetic.[193] If bodies were things in themselves, [on the other hand,] then the proof of the monadists would indeed hold.[194]

The second dialectical assertion[195] has the peculiarity of having against it a [special] dogmatic assertion. This latter assertion is, among all subtly reasoning assertions, the only one that undertakes to prove manifestly, in an object of experience, the actuality of what above we ascribed merely to transcendental ideas: viz., the absolute simplicity[196] of substance. I mean the assertion that the object of inner sense, the *I* that thinks,[197] is an absolutely simple[198] substance. Now without here entering into this issue (since it has been examined more elaborately above),[199] I shall note only this: that when we think some- {A 443 B 471}

193[A 22–30/B 37–45.]

194[Or 'be valid': *gelten.*]

195[Of the antithesis.]

196[*Simplizität.*]

197[*das Ich, was da denkt.* Emphasis added; similarly below.]

198[*einfach.*]

199[See the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405 (especially 348–61)/B 399–432.]

thing merely as object without adding any synthetic determinations of its intuition (and this is, in fact, what we do through the entirely bare presentation *I*), then of course we cannot perceive in such a presentation anything manifold and any composition. Moreover, since the predicates through which I think this object are merely intuitions of inner sense, there also cannot occur in it anything that would prove a manifold [of elements] outside one another and hence prove real composition. Thus what prompts the mentioned assertion is only that our self-consciousness is such that, because the subject that thinks is simultaneously its own object, this subject cannot divide itself (although it can divide the determinations inhering in it); for in regard to itself any object is absolute unity. Nonetheless, if this subject were to be contemplated *externally*[200] as an object of intuition, then presumably it would in appearance manifest in itself composition. That, however, is how it must always be contemplated if we want to know whether or not there is in it a manifold [of elements] *outside*[201] one another.

[200][*äußerlich.*]

[201][*außerhalb.*]

A 444 B 472

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

A 445 B 473

THIRD CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS[202]

THESIS

The causality according to laws of nature is not the only causality, from which the appearances of the world can thus one and all be derived. In order to explain these appearances, it is necessary to assume also a causality through freedom.

ANTITHESIS

There is no freedom, but everything in the world occurs solely according to laws of nature.

PROOF

Assume that there is no other causality than the one according to laws of nature. In that case, everything that *occurs* presupposes a previous state upon which it unfailingly follows according to a rule. The previous state, however, must itself be something that has occurred (has come to be in the time wherein previously it was not); for if it had always[203] been, then its consequence also would always have been and

PROOF

Suppose there is, in the transcendental meaning of the term, a *freedom* as a special kind of causality according to which the events of the world could happen:[204] viz., a power[205] of absolutely beginning a state, and hence also of absolutely beginning a series of consequences thereof. In that case, not only will a series begin absolutely through this spontaneity, but the determination of this spontaneity itself to produce the

[202][See H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 310–29. See also Graham Bird, *op. cit.* at A 67/B 92 br. n. 121, 198–204. Also Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 411–12. Also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 237–47. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 492–95. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br n. 22, 210–17.]

[203][*jederzeit* here, *immer* just below; the two terms are synonymous.]

[204][*erfolgen.*]

[205][*Vermögen*. See A xii br. n. 16]

would not now first of all have arisen. Hence the cause's causality,[206] through which something occurs, is itself something which has *occurred* and which, according to the laws of nature, again presupposes a previous state and its causality, but this state similarly presupposes a still earlier[207] one, etc. Hence if everything occurs according to mere laws of nature, then there is always only a subsidiary[208]
A 446 B 474 but never a first beginning, and hence there then is on the side of the causes originating from one another no completeness of the series at all. The law of nature, however, consists precisely in this: that nothing occurs without a cause sufficiently determined a priori. Hence the proposition, in its unlimited universality, whereby[209] any causality is possible only according to natural laws contradicts itself; and hence this causality cannot be assumed as being the only one.

Accordingly, we must assume a causality through which something series—i.e., the causality—will begin absolutely, so that nothing precedes by which this occurring action is determined according to constant laws. However, any beginning to act presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause; and a dynamically first beginning of action presupposes a state that has no connection[210] of causality at all with the preceding state of the same cause, i.e., in no way results[211] from that preceding state. Therefore, transcendental freedom runs counter to the causal law;[212] and hence a linkage[213] of successive states of efficient causes according to which no A 447 B 475
unity of experience is possible—and which, therefore, is also not encountered in any experience—is an empty thought-entity.

We have, therefore, nothing but *nature* as the place wherein we must seek the coherence[214] and order of events in the world. Freedom (independence) from the laws of nature is indeed a *liberation* from *constraint,* but also from the *guidance* of all

[206][*Kausalität der Ursache.*]

[207][*älter.*]

[208][*subaltern.*]

[209][*als wenn.*]

[210][*Zusammenhang,* which also means 'coherence.']

[211][*erfolgen.*]

[212][*Kausalgesetz;* i.e., the law of causality (*Gesetz der Kausalität*—cf. B 232).]

[213][*Verbindung;* cf. B 201 n 30]

[214][*Zusammenhang.*]

occurs without its cause's being determined still further, according to necessary laws, by another, preceding cause. I.e., we must assume an *absolute spontaneity* of causes whereby they can begin *on their own* a series[215] of appearances that runs[216] according to natural laws—hence transcendental freedom—without which even in the course[217] of nature the sequence[218] of appearances on the side of the causes is never complete.

rules. For one cannot say that instead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom enter into the causality of the course of nature, because if freedom were determined according to laws then it would not be freedom but would itself be nothing but nature. Hence nature and freedom differ as do law-governedness[219] and lawlessness. Nature[220] does indeed burden the understanding with the difficulty of seeking the origin of events ever higher up in the series of causes, because the causality in them is always conditioned; but for compensation it promises[221] us thoroughgoing and law-governed unity of experience. The deception of freedom, on the other hand, does indeed promise to the investigating understanding a point of rest in the chain of causes, by leading it to an unconditioned causality that on its own starts to act; but, being blind itself, it disrupts the guidance of rules that alone makes possible an experience having thoroughgoing coherence.

215[*Reihe.*]

216[*laufen.*]

217[*Lauf.*]

218[*Reihenfolge.*]

219[*Gesetzmäßigkeit.*]

220[*davon jene.*]

221[*versprechen* here, *verheißen* just below.]

A 448 B 476

Comment on The Third Antinomy

A 449 B 477

I. On the Thesis

The transcendental idea of freedom does not, indeed, amount to the entire content—which is in large part empirical—of the psychological concept of that name;[222] rather, the transcendental idea's content is only the absolute spontaneity of action, as the proper basis for the action's imputability. But this idea is nonetheless the stumbling-block proper for philosophy, which finds insurmountable difficulties in granting such a kind of unconditioned causality. Hence what in the question about the freedom of the will has all along put speculative reason in a great quandary[223] is—properly speaking—only *transcendental,* and concerns merely this: whether we must assume a power of beginning *spontaneously*[224] a series of successive things or states. Being able to answer the question as to how such

II. On the Antithesis

The defender of the omnipotence[225] of nature (transcendental *physiocracy*) would, in opposing the doctrine of freedom, maintain his proposition against this doctrine's subtly reasoning inferences in the following manner. *If you do not assume in the world something mathematically first as regards time,*[226] *then you also do not need to seek something dynamically first as regards causality.* Who told you to think up an absolutely[227] first state of the world and hence an absolute[228] beginning of the gradually passing[229] series of appearances, and to set bounds to limitless nature in order to provide your imagination with a resting-point? Since the substances in the world have always been—or since at least the unity of experience makes such a presupposition necessary—there is no difficulty in

222['Freedom.']

223[The transcendental idea of freedom is a stumbling-block for speculative philosophy but not for practical philosophy. See below, A 532–58 = B 560–86.]

224[*von selbst,* literally 'on [one's] own.']

225[*Allvermögenheit.*]

226[As was the case with the antithesis of the first antinomy.]

227[*schlechthin.*]

228[*absolut*]

229[*ablaufen.*]

a power is possible is not equally necessary. For in the causality according to natural laws we must likewise settle for cognizing a priori that such a causality must be presupposed, even though we do not comprehend in any way the possibility whereby through a certain [thing's] existence the existence of another is posited, and must thus keep solely to experience. Now, to be sure, we have in fact established this necessity of a first beginning, issuing from freedom, only insofar as this is required for making comprehensible an origin of the world, whereas all subsequent states can be taken to be a succession[230] accord-
A 450 B 478 ing to mere natural laws. Yet, having once proved thereby (although not gained insight into) the power of beginning entirely spontaneously a series in time, we are now also permitted to let different series begin spontaneously, even in the midst of the course of the world, as regards [not time but] causality,[231] and to attribute to their substances a power of acting from freedom. Here we must not let ourselves be detained, however, by a misunderstanding: viz., that because a successive se-

also assuming that the variation[232] by the states of these substances, i.e., a series of their changes, has likewise always been, and that we therefore need not seek a first beginning, whether mathematical or dynamical. The possibility of such an infinite origination,[233] without a first member in regard to which everything else is merely subsequent, cannot be made comprehensible.[234] But if you want therefore to dismiss this puzzle of nature, then you will find yourselves compelled to reject many basic synthetic characteristics (basic forces) that you are just as little able to comprehend, and even A 451 B 479
the possibility of a change as such must then become objectionable to you. For if you did not find through experience that change is actual, then you would never be able to excogitate a priori how such an unceasing sequence of being and notbeing is possible.

However, even if a transcendental power of freedom is perhaps conceded in order to begin the changes of the world, yet this power would at any rate have to be solely outside the world (although to assume, outside of the sum of all possible in-

[230][*Abfolge*.]

[231][Cf. just below.]

[232][*Wechsel*. See B 224 br. n. 45.]

[233][*Abstammung*.]

[234][Kant actually says, 'cannot be made comprehensible as to its [*seiner*, which also has no grammatical antecedent] possibility.']

ries in the world can have only a comparatively first beginning, since a state of things in the world does always precede it, perhaps no absolutely first beginning of any series is possible during the course of the world. For we are here talking about an absolutely[235] first beginning not as regards time but as regards causality. If (for example) I now get up from my chair completely freely and without the influence of natural causes, which is determinative necessarily, then in this event—along with its natural consequences *ad infinitum*—a new series begins absolutely,[236] although as regards time this event is only the continuation of a preceding series. For this decision and act of mine do not lie at all in the succession of mere natural effects, and are not a mere continuation of them. Rather, as regards this happening of my decision and act, the determinative natural causes entirely cease above them;[237] and although this happening follows[238] upon the determinative natural causes, it does not result[239] from them, and hence must be called—not, indeed, as regards time, but yet with regard to tuitions, a further object that cannot be given in any possible perception always remains a bold presumption). But to attribute such a power to substances in the world itself cannot be permitted on any account. For then the coherence—which is called nature—of appearances determining one another necessarily, according to universal laws, would for the most part vanish, and along with it so would the mark of empirical truth which distinguishes experience from a dream. For alongside such a lawless power of freedom, nature can scarcely be thought any more, because the laws of nature are altered incessantly by the influences of freedom, and the play of appearances—which according to mere nature would be regular and uniform—is thereby rendered confused and incoherent.

235[*absolut.*]

236[*schlechthin.*]

237[Kant pictures the causes as lying "above" their effects—by analogy with premises in relation to their conclusion.]

238[*folgt.*]

239[*erfolgt.*]

causality—an absolutely first beginning of a series of appearances.

Reason's requirement to appeal, in the series of natural causes, to a first beginning issuing from freedom is confirmed with great clarity by the fact that (except for the Epicurean School) all the philosophers of antiquity found themselves constrained, in order to explain the world's motions, to assume a *prime mover*,[240] i.e., a freely acting cause that first and on its own[241] began this series of states. For they did not undertake to make a first beginning comprehensible from mere nature.

A 452 B 480

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

A 453 B 481

FOURTH CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS[242]

THESIS

There belongs to the world something that, either as its part or as its cause, is an absolutely necessary being.

ANTITHESIS

There exists no absolutely necessary being at all,[243] neither in the world nor outside the world, as its cause.

[240]['first mover,' literally.]

[241][Or 'spontaneously': *von selbst.*]

[242][See Paul Guyer, *op. cit.* at A 84/B 116 br. n. 1, 411–12. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 247–59. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 495–98. And see T K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 278–80.]

[243][*überall.* See A 434 = B 462 br. n. 157.]

PROOF

The world of sense, as the whole of all appearances, contains also[244] a series of changes. For without changes even the presentation of the time series, as a condition for the possibility of the world of sense, would not be given to us.[245] Any change, however, is subject to its condition—a condition which precedes it as regards time and under which it is necessary. Now any conditioned that is given presupposes, with regard to its existence, a complete series of conditions up to the absolutely[246] unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. Hence something absolutely necessary must exist, if a change exists as its consequence. This necessary something, however, belongs itself to the world of sense. For suppose that it were outside that world; then the series of changes of the world would derive its beginning from this something
A 454 B 482 even though this necessary cause itself would not belong to the world of sense. This, however, is impossible. For inasmuch as the be-

PROOF

Suppose that the world itself were, or that in it there were, a necessary being. In that case, either there would be in the series of the world's changes a beginning that would be unconditionally necessary and hence without cause—which conflicts with the dynamical law of the determination in time of all appearances; or the series itself would be without any beginning and, although contingent and conditioned in all its parts, would nonetheless be absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a whole—which is self-contradictory, because the existence of a multitude cannot be necessary if no single part thereof possesses an existence that is necessary in itself.

Suppose, on the other hand, that there were an absolutely necessary cause of the world [that existed] outside the world. In that case, this
cause, as the supreme[247] member in A 455 B 483
the *series of causes* of changes of the world, would first begin the existence of and the series of these

[244][*zugleich.*]

[245]As formal condition of the possibility of changes, time does indeed precede them[a] objectively; but subjectively, and in the actuality of consciousness, this presentation is still, like any other, given only through the prompting of perceptions.

[a][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *diesen* for *dieser.*]

[246][*schlechthin* here, *absolut* twice just below.]

[247][*oberst.*]

ginning of a time series can be determined only by what precedes it as regards time, the supreme condition of the beginning of a series of changes must exist in the time wherein this series was not yet (for a beginning is an existence preceded by a time wherein the thing that begins was not yet). Therefore the causality[248] of the necessary cause[249] of changes, and hence also the cause itself, belong to time and hence to appearance (in which alone time, as its form, is possible); consequently they cannot be thought as separate from the world of sense, which is the sum of all appearances. Therefore there is contained in the world itself something absolutely necessary (whether it be the entire world series itself or a part thereof).

changes.[250] But in that case this cause would also have to begin to act, and its causality would belong to time, but precisely because of this would belong to the sum of appearances; consequently it itself, the cause, would not be outside the world—which contradicts the presupposition. Therefore neither in the world nor outside the world (although in causal linkage with it) is there any absolutely necessary being.

A 456 B 484

Comment on The Fourth Antinomy

A 457 B 485

I. On the Thesis

Here it is incumbent on me, in proving the existence of a necessary being, to use none but a *cosmological*

II. On the Antithesis

When in ascending in the series of appearances we suppose ourselves to encounter difficulties that go

248[*Kausalität.*]

249[*Ursache.*]

250The word *begin*[a] is taken in two meanings. The first is *active,* where the cause begins (*infit*) a series of states as its effect. The second is *passive,* where the causality starts (*fit*) in the cause itself. My inference here is from the former to the latter kind of beginning.

a[Emphasis added.]

argument, i.e., one that ascends from the conditioned in [the realm of] appearance to the unconditioned in concept, this unconditioned being regarded as the necessary condition for the absolute totality of the series. Attempting the proof[251] from the mere idea of a highest[252] of all beings as such belongs to a different principle of reason, and such a proof[253] will therefore have to come up separately.[254]

Now the pure cosmological proof can establish the existence of a necessary being only if it simultaneously leaves undecided whether this being is the world itself or a thing distinct from it. For in order to ascertain the latter alternative, we require principles that are no longer cosmological and do not proceed in the series of appearances; we then require, rather, concepts of contingent beings as such (insofar as they are considered merely as objects of the understanding) and a principle for connecting these, through mere concepts, with a necessary being. All of this, however, belongs to a *transcendent* philosophy. But since the time for that has not yet come, the point here must be this: if we start from the cosmological argument and base it on the series of appearances, then, [while we may] have difficulties in raising objections

against the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme cause, then—by the same token—these difficulties must not be based on mere concepts of the necessary existence of a thing as such; hence they must not be ontological. Rather, these difficulties must emerge[255] from the [supreme cause's] causal linkage with a series of appearances, [the linkage that is required] in order to assume for this series a condition that is itself unconditioned; consequently, these difficulties must be cosmological, and must be inferred according to empirical laws. For we must find that the ascent in the series of causes (in the world of sense) can never end with an empirically unconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from the contingency of the states of the world—as evinced by[256] their changes—turns out to go against the assumption of a cause that is first and that absolutely first starts the series.

In this antinomy, however, we find an odd contrast. We find, viz., that the basis of proof from which { A 459 B 487 }

[251][Of a necessary being's existence.]

[252][Or 'supreme' (*oberst*), which here does not work grammatically.]

[253][See A 592–602 = B 620–30 for the ontological proof, which belongs to the ideal of pure reason, A 567–704 = B 595–732.]

[254][*besonders*.]

[255][*sich . . hervorfinden*.]

[256][*laut*]

phy, for which this is not yet the place.[257]

But once we begin the proof cosmologically, by laying at the basis the series of appearances and the regression in these according to empirical laws of causality, we cannot afterwards leap away from it and cross over to something that does not, as a member, belong in the se-
A 458 B 486 ries at all. For if we regard something as condition, then we must do so in the same meaning[258] in which we took the relation[259] of the conditioned to its condition in the series that was to lead, by a continuous advance, to this highest[260] condition. Now if this relation[261] is sensible and belongs to the possible empirical use of understanding, then the supreme condition or cause can close the regression only according to laws of sensibility, hence only as belonging to the time series, and the necessary being must then be regarded as the supreme member of the world series.

People have nonetheless taken the liberty of making such a leap an original being's existence was inferred in the thesis is the same from which this being's nonexistence is inferred—and inferred, moreover, with the same rigor—in the antithesis. First we were told[262] that *there is a necessary being,* because the entire past time comprises the series of all conditions and with it, therefore, also the unconditioned (the necessary). Now we are told that *there is no necessary being,* precisely because the entire bygone time comprises the series of all conditions (which therefore are, one and all, in turn conditioned). The cause of this [odd contrast] is this. The first argument takes account only of the *absolute totality* of the series of conditions determining one another in time, and thereby obtains something[263] unconditioned and necessary. The second argument, on the other hand, takes into consideration the *contingency* of everything that is determined in the *time series* (because anything so determined is preceded by a time wherein the condition itself must, as conditioned, be

[257][For the cosmological proof of the existence of God, see A 603–20 = B 631–48.]

[258][Of *condition.*]

[259][*Relation.*]

[260][*höchst.*]

[261][*Verhältnis.*]

[262][*hieß es.*]

[263][*ein.*]

(μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος).[264] For from the changes in the world they inferred the empirical contingency of these changes, i.e., their dependence on empirically determinative causes, and obtained an ascending series of empirical conditions—and this was, indeed, quite proper. But since in this series they could find no first beginning and no supreme member, they suddenly departed from the empirical concept of contingency and took the pure category. This category then gave rise to a merely intelligible series whose completeness rested on the existence of an absolutely necessary cause; and this cause, not being tied to any sensible conditions, was now also freed from the time condition for beginning its causality itself. This procedure, however, is entirely illegitimate, as can be inferred from the following.

Contingent, in the pure sense of the category, is that whose contradictory opposite is possible. Now this intelligible contingency cannot at all be inferred from empirical con-
A 460 B 488 tingency. If something is changed, then its opposite (the opposite of its state) is actual, and hence also possible, at another time. Hence this is determined in turn)—whereby, then, A 461 B 489
everything unconditioned and any absolute necessity drop out entirely. The kind of inference in both arguments, however, is quite commensurate even with common human reason, which repeatedly lands in the situation[265] of being at variance with itself after having considered its object from two different standpoints. Mr. *de Mairan*[266] regarded the dispute between two famous astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty concerning the choice[267] of standpoint, as a sufficiently remarkable phenomenon in order to compose a special treatise on it. For the one astronomer inferred that the *moon revolves on its axis*, because it always turns the same side toward the earth; and the other astronomer inferred that the *moon does not revolve on its axis*, precisely because it always turns the same side toward the earth. Both inferences were correct, according as one took the one or other standpoint from which to observe the moon's motion.

[264][*metábasis eis állo génos*, i.e., a shifting to another kind.]

[265][*Fall*.]

[266][Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan (1678–1771), French physicist and mathematician. He is the author of numerous memoirs and of works on the pendulum, atmospheric refraction, and the motions of the earth and the moon.]

[267][*Wahl*]

not the contradictory opposite of the previous state; for this would require that in the same time wherein the previous state was, its opposite could have been in its place—and this cannot at all be inferred from the change. A body that was in motion, = A, comes to rest, = non-A. Now from the fact that a state opposite to state A succeeded state A, we cannot at all infer that the contradictory opposite of A is possible and that hence A is contingent; for this would require that in the same time wherein the motion was, rest could have been there instead of it. Now, we know nothing more than that rest was actual, and hence also possible, in the subsequent time. But motion at one time and rest at another time are not contradictorily opposed to one another. Therefore the succession of opposite determinations, i.e., change, in no way proves the contingency according to concepts of pure understanding, and hence also cannot lead to the existence of a necessary being conceived according to pure concepts of understanding. Change proves only empirical contingency, i.e., it proves only that the new state by itself, without a cause that belongs to the previous time, could not—in consequence of the law of causality—have taken place at all. This cause, even if it is assumed as absolutely necessary, must still in this way be encountered in time and belong to the series of appearances.

A 462 B 490

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section III
On the Interest of Reason in This Its Conflict[1]

There we have, then, the entire dialectical play of the cosmological ideas. These ideas in no way permit an object congruent with them to be given in any possible experience; indeed, they do not even permit reason to think them in agreement with universal laws of experience. Yet they are nonetheless not thought up by choice,[2] but reason is led to them necessarily in the continuous progress of empirical synthesis—viz., when it wants to free from any condition and comprehend, in its unconditioned totality, what according to rules of experience can always be determined only conditionally. These subtly reasoning[3] assertions are so many attempts to solve four natural and unavoidable problems of reason. Hence there can only be exactly four[4] of these assertions, neither more nor fewer, because there are no further series of synthetic presuppositions that bound the empirical synthesis a priori.

The glamorous pretensions that reason has in expanding its domain beyond all bounds of experience have been presented by us only in dry formulas that contain merely the basis of reason's claims of its right.[5] And, A 463 B 491 as befits a transcendental philosophy, we have divested these formulas of everything empirical, although only in combination with the empirical can the whole splendor of reason's assertions shine forth. In this application, however, and in the progressive expansion of reason's use by starting from the realm of experiences and gradually soaring up to these sublime ideas, philosophy shows a dignity that, if philosophy could only maintain its pre-

[1][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 259–76. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 498–99.]

[2][Or, perhaps, 'arbitrarily': *willkürlich*.]

[3][*vernünftelnd*.]

[4][*gerade so viele*.]

[5][*rechtlichen Ansprüche*. Cf. A 465 = B 493.]

tensions, would far surpass the value of all other human science. For philosophy promises to us the foundation for our greatest expectations and outlooks concerning the ultimate purposes wherein all endeavors of reason must in the end be united.[6] Consider again these questions: whether the world has a beginning and some boundary to its extension in space; whether somewhere, and perhaps in my thinking self, there is an indivisible and indestructible unity—or nothing but what is divisible and passes away; whether in my actions I am free or, like other beings, led along the course[7] of nature and fate; whether, finally, there is a supreme cause of the world, or whether the things of nature and their order amount to the ultimate object, at which we must stop in all our contemplations. These are questions for whose solution[8] the mathematician would gladly give away his entire science, since it still cannot provide him with satisfaction regarding humanity's highest and most treasured purposes. The proper dignity even of mathematics (this pride of human reason) rests on this: Mathematics gives reason the guidance for gaining insight into nature, on both the large and the small scale, far beyond all expectation of a philosophy building on common experience—viz., insight into nature in its order and regularity as well as in the admirable unity of the forces that move it.[9] By doing this, mathematics itself provides prompting and encouragement to a use of reason that is expanded beyond all experience, as well as furnishes the philosophy[10] engaged in this use of reason with the most superb materials for supporting its investigation, as much as the character thereof permits, by means of adequate intuitions.[11] { A 464 B 492

Unfortunately for speculation (but fortunately perhaps for the practical vocation[12] of human beings), reason finds itself—in the midst of its great-

[6][See B 395 n. 222; also the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 477.]

[7][*Faden.*]

[8][In this entire context I am translating *Auflösung* consistently as 'solution' rather than as 'resolution,' because Kant is obviously talking about *problems* (even when calling them *questions*).]

[9][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 470–73, 477–79.]

[10][*Weltweisheit* here, *Philosophie* just above.]

[11][I.e., mathematics goes beyond actual experience and provides the formal (and a priori) basis of the natural sciences; but it does not transcend all experience, as do speculative reason's attempts (discussed in the Transcendental Dialectic) to enter the realm of noumena.]

[12][*Bestimmung*. The reference is to the ultimate purposes of humanity just mentioned at A 463 = B 491. Cf. the reference to morality and religion at the end of A 466 = B 494.]

est expectations—quite disconcerted in a throng of arguments and counterarguments.[13] Yet because of reason's honor and even security, neither withdrawing from the quarrel nor watching it indifferently as a mere mock combat is feasible, and even less feasible is simply[14] commanding peace; for the object of the dispute is of great interest. Thus nothing is left for reason but to reflect on the origin of this disunity with itself, in order to see whether the disunity is not perhaps to be blamed on a mere misunderstanding. For although upon exposition of such a misunderstanding the
A 465 B 493 proud claims on both sides might indeed be dropped, yet instead a lasting tranquil reign of reason over the understanding and the senses would have its beginning.

Let us for now defer this thorough exposition yet a little, and consider first which party[15] we might best like to join,[16] should[17] we be compelled to take sides.[18] We are consulting, in that case, not the logical touchstone of truth but merely our interest. Hence although such an inquiry establishes nothing in regard to the disputed right of the two parties,[19] it will still have this benefit: it will make comprehensible why the participants in this dispute have preferred to join one side rather than the other—precisely without being caused to do so by a superior insight into the object of the dispute; and it will likewise explain still other, secondary things,[20] e.g., the zealous heat of the one party and the cold assertion of the other; why people like to cheer the one side with joyous approval and are implacably prejudiced in advance against the other.

There is something, however, that in this preliminary judgment[21] determines the point of view from which alone it can be carried out with due thoroughness, and this is the comparison of the principles from which the two parties start. Among the assertions of the antithesis one discerns a per-

[13][Literally, 'grounds and countergrounds' or 'bases and counterbases': *Gründen und Gegengründen*.]

[14][*schlechthin*.]

[15][*Seite*.]

[16][*sich schlagen auf*.]

[17][*etwa*.]

[18][*Partei*.]

[19][*Teile*.]

[20][*Nebendinge*.]

[21][*Beurteilung* See A 60/B 84 br. n. 69.]

fect uniformity in the way of thinking and a complete unity of the maxim—namely, a principle of pure *empiricism*—not only in explaining the appearances in the world[22] but also in solving the transcendental ideas[23] of the universe[24] itself. By contrast, the assertions of the thesis lay at their basis, besides the empirical kind of explanation within the series of appearances, also intellectual beginnings, and to that extent the maxim is not simple. Now, I shall call this maxim, after its essential distinguishing characteristic,[25] the *dogmatism* of pure reason. {A 466 B 494}

Thus on the side of *dogmatism* in determining the cosmological ideas of reason, viz., on the side of the *thesis,* we find the following.

First, we find a certain *practical interest,* which is heartily shared by any well-meaning person if he understands what is truly to his advantage. For that the world has a beginning; that my thinking self is of a simple and hence incorruptible[26] nature; that this self is also, in its voluntary[27] actions, free and raised above the constraint of nature; and that, finally, the entire order of the things that make up the world stems from an original being from which everything takes its unity and purposive connection—these are so many foundation stones of morality and religion. The antithesis robs us of all these supports, or at least seems to do so.

Second, there manifests itself on this side[28] also a *speculative*[29] *interest* of reason. For if we assume and use the transcendental ideas in such a way, then we can completely a priori comprehend[30] the entire chain of condi- {A 467 B 495}

[22][*Welt.*]

[23][On *solving* ideas (considered as *problems*), see below, A 482/B 510.]

[24][*Weltall.*]

[25][Viz., the pretension that we can make progress in metaphysics by means of no more than a cognition from concepts—i.e., intellectual cognition. See B xxxv.]

[26][I.e., not subject to decay.]

[27][*willkürlich.*]

[28][I.e., the side of the thesis.]

[29]['Speculative' in Kant means the same as 'theoretical' except for being confined to objects beyond any possible experience. See A 634–35 = B 662–63.]

[30][I.e., (rationally) grasp: *fassen* here, *begreifen* just below. The two terms are almost always used interchangeably by Kant (only rarely does Kant use *fassen* as a synonym for *auffassen,* 'to apprehend'), and 'to comprehend' captures their meaning best. See B 114 br. n. 239. Note also that *begreifen,* in the sense at issue here, does *not* mean merely 'to conceive' (as this latter term is used in philosophy)—cf., e.g., A 792 = B 820 incl. br. n. 394—despite its etymological link to *Begriff* ('concept'); and in the sense in which the verb *is* so linked, it means 'to comprise.']

tions and comprehend the derivation of the conditioned, because we start from the unconditioned. The antithesis does not accomplish this; it commends itself very poorly by being unable to give, to the question concerning the conditions of its synthesis, any answer that does not endlessly leave us with ever further questions to ask. According to the antithesis, we must from a given beginning ascend to a still higher one; any part[31] leads to a still smaller part; any event always has above it still another event as its cause; and the conditions of existence as such are always supported in turn by[32] others, without ever obtaining unconditioned bearing and support in an independent[33] thing as original being.

Third, this side has also the advantage of *popularity,* an advantage that certainly plays more than the smallest part in commending it. The common understanding finds not the least difficulty in the ideas concerning the unconditioned beginning of all synthesis. For it is more accustomed anyway to proceed downward [to consequences] than to ascend to the [antecedent] bases; and in the concepts of the absolutely first (over whose possibility it does not ponder) it has something convenient as well as a fixed point to which to tie the line that guides its steps, whereas in the restless ascent from the conditioned to the condition—always with one foot in the air—it can find nothing at all to like.

A 468 B 496 On the side of *empiricism* in determining the cosmological ideas of reason, or on the side of the *antithesis,* we find the following.

First, we find no such practical interest issuing from pure principles of reason as morality and religion carry with them. Mere empiricism seems, rather, to deprive both of these of all force and influence. For if there is no original being distinct from the world; if the world is without a beginning and hence also without an author; if our will is not free and the soul has the same divisibility and corruptibility as does matter; then the *moral* ideas and principles also lose all validity, and fall along with the *transcendental* ideas that amounted to their theoretical support.

Second: On the other hand, however, empiricism offers to the speculative[34] interest of reason advantages that are very enticing and that far surpass what advantages the dogmatic teacher of ideas of reason may promise. According to empiricism the understanding is always on its own

[31][Of a substance.]

[32][*stützen sich . . . auf.*]

[33][*selbständig.*]

[34][See br. n. 29, just above.]

territory, viz., the realm consisting entirely of possible experiences; the understanding can explore the laws of these experiences, and by means of these laws can expand endlessly its secure and comprehensible cognition. Here the understanding can and should exhibit the object—both in itself and in its relations—in intuition,[35] or at least in concepts whose image can be submitted clearly and distinctly in given similar intuitions. The understanding not only does not need to leave this chain of the natural order so as to attach itself to ideas, with whose objects it is not acquainted because as thought-entities[36] they can never be given, but it is not even permitted to leave its business. I.e., the understanding is not permitted to cross over—under the pretext that its business is now finished—into the domain of idealizing reason and to transcendent concepts, where it no longer needs to observe, and to investigate according to the laws of nature, but needs only to *think* and to *invent*[37]—being sure that it cannot be refuted by facts of nature, precisely because it is not tied to their[38] testimony but may pass them by or even subordinate these facts themselves to a higher authority, viz., that of pure reason. {A 469 B 497}

Hence the empiricist will never permit one to assume any epoch of nature to be the absolutely first; or to regard any boundary of his outlook into the range of nature as being the outermost; or to cross over, from the objects of nature that he can analyze by observation and by mathematics and that he can determine synthetically in intuition (i.e., from the extended), to such [objects] as neither sense nor imagination can ever exhibit *in concreto* (i.e., to the simple). Nor will the empiricist grant us permission to lay down as basis even *in nature* a power of producing effects[39] independently of laws of nature (i.e., freedom), and thus to encroach on the understanding's business of exploring, by the guidance of necessary rules, how appearances arise. Nor, finally, will the empiricist allow us to seek the cause for anything outside of nature (i.e., to seek an original being); for we are acquainted with nothing more than nature, since nature alone offers us objects and can inform us regarding its laws.[40] {A 470 B 498}

[35][Literally, 'to intuition': *der Anschauung*.]

[36][*Gedankendinge*. See A 292/B 348.]

[37][*dichten*.]

[38][Or, possibly, 'nature's': *ihr;* similarly for the remainder of the sentence.]

[39][*wirken*.]

[40][*ihren*, which could also refer to 'objects.']

The empirical philosopher might, to be sure, have no other aim with his antithesis than to subdue the inquisitiveness[41] and presumption of reason. For reason may, mistaking its true vocation, boast of *insight* and *knowledge* where in fact insight and knowledge cease. And what we allow as holding in regard to our practical interest reason may want to pass off as furthering our speculative interest; reason may want to do this in order to break, where doing so is conducive to its convenience, the thread of physical inquiries and fasten it—with a pretense of expanding our cognition—to transcendental ideas, through which in fact we cognize only *that we know nothing*. If, I say, the empiricist settled for this aim, then his principle would be a maxim for moderation in claims, for modesty in assertions, and simultaneously for the greatest possible expansion of our understanding through the teacher who is in fact assigned[42] to us, viz., experience. For in that case the intellectual *presuppositions* and *faith*[43] that we need for the sake of our practical concerns would not be taken from us. We merely could
A 471 B 499 not let them come forward under the title and with the pomp of science and rational insight. For speculative *knowledge* proper cannot concern any object at all other than an object of experience; and if we step beyond the boundary of experience, then the synthesis seeking cognitions that are new and independent of experience has no substratum of intuition on which it could be performed.

As it is, however, i.e., if empiricism itself (as usually happens) becomes dogmatic with regard to ideas and audaciously denies whatever is beyond the sphere of its intuitive cognitions, then empiricism itself commits the mistake of immodesty, which is all the more censurable here because it causes irreparable detriment to reason's practical interest.

This is the form that the conflict takes in the opposition of *Epicureanism*[44] against Platonism.

[41][*Vorwitz*.]

[42][*vorgesetzt*.]

[43][*Glaube*. See B xxx br. n. 122.]

[44]There is, however, still the question as to whether Epicurus ever put these principles forth as objective assertions. If, say, they were nothing more than maxims for the speculative use of reason, then he showed in them a more genuine philosophical[a] spirit than any other of the philosophers[b] of antiquity. For consider the principles which hold that, in explaining appearances, we must proceed as if the realm of inquiry is not cut off by any boundary or beginning of the world; that we must assume the material of the world to be such as it must be if we are to be in-

Each of the two philosophers says more than he knows, but in this way: *Epicurus* encourages and furthers knowledge, although to the detriment of the practical; and *Plato,* while providing us with superb principles for the practical, yet precisely thereby permits reason, in regard to all matters wherein alone a speculative knowledge is accorded to us, to cling to[45] ideal explanations of natural appearances to the neglect of physical investigation. {A 472 B 500}

As concerns, finally, the *third* moment of which one may take account in a preliminary choice between the two disputing parties, one fact is extremely strange: viz., empiricism goes entirely against popularity, although one would think[46] that the common understanding would eagerly adopt a plan which promises to satisfy it through nothing but experiential cognitions and their rational coherence, whereas transcendental dogmatics[47] compels it to ascend to concepts that far surpass the insight and rational power of the minds most practiced in thinking. Yet this is precisely the common understanding's motive.[48] For it then finds itself in a situation in which even the most scholarly person can presume nothing that is beyond the common understanding. If it understands little or nothing of these surpassing concepts,[49] yet there also is no one who can pride himself on understanding much more about them. And although the common understanding cannot speak about such concepts in a manner complying with school standards as well as others can, yet it can do infinitely more than this by way of subtle {A 473 B 501}

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structed about it through experience; that we must use no other production of events than one where they are determined by unchangeable natural laws; and, finally, that we must use no cause distinct from the world. Even now these are still quite correct but little observed principles[c] for expanding speculative philosophy, as well as for discovering the principles of morality independently of extraneous resources; and those who demand that as long as we are engaged in mere speculation we must *ignore* the dogmatic [versions of these] propositions must not therefore be accused of wanting to *deny* them. {A 472 B 500}

[a][*philosophisch.*]

[b][*Weltweisen.*]

[c][*Grundsätze* here, *Prinzipien* just below. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[45][*nachhängen.*]

[46][*glauben.*]

[47][*Dogmatik.*]

[48][In preferring dogmatism.]

[49][*davon.*]

reasoning[50] about them; for it is wandering around among nothing but ideas, about which one is most eloquent precisely because one *knows nothing about them.* Concerning the investigation of nature, on the other hand, the common understanding would have to grow entirely silent and to admit its ignorance. Hence, no doubt, convenience and vanity strongly commend these principles. Moreover, although a philosopher will find it very difficult to accept something as a principle if he cannot account to himself for doing so, or perhaps to introduce concepts into whose objective reality one can have no insight, yet to the common understanding nothing is more usual. It wants to have something with which it can confidently begin. It is not troubled by the difficulty of comprehending the presupposition itself. For to the common understanding (which does not know[51] what comprehending means) this difficulty never occurs,[52] and the common understanding regards as known[53] what is familiar[54] to it through repeated use. But for the common understanding all speculative interest ultimately vanishes in the face of[55] practical interest, and it imagines that it has insight
B 502 into and knowledge of[56] what its worries or hopes impel it to assume or
A 474 have faith in.[57] Thus empiricism is entirely bereft of all the popularity of transcendentally idealizing reason;[58] and no matter how much empiricism[59] may contain that is detrimental to the supreme practical principles, there is yet no need to worry that it will ever step beyond the bounds of the school, and that it will acquire in the community even a somewhat considerable reputation and some favor with the great multitude.

[50][*vernünfteln.*]

[51][*wissen.*]

[52][*in den Sinn kommen.*]

[53][*bekannt.*]

[54][*geläufig.*]

[55][*vor.*]

[56][*zu wissen.*]

[57][*glauben*]

[58][Reading, with Erdmann (who does not make the change in the text of the *Akademie* edition), *aller Popularität der transzendental-idealisierenden Vernunft* for *der transzendental-idealisierenden Vernunft aller Popularität.*]

[59][Reading, with Mellin, *er . . er* for *sie . . . sie.*]

Human reason is by its nature architectonic.[60] I.e., it regards all cognitions as belonging to a possible system, and hence it also permits only such principles as at least do not make a projected cognition incapable of standing together with others in some system. The propositions of the antithesis, however, are of such a kind that they make the completion of an edifice of cognitions entirely impossible. According to them, beyond any state of the world there is always a still earlier[61] state; in any part there are always still other parts that are in turn divisible; prior to any event there is always another event that likewise was in turn produced at another point;[62] and in existence as such everything is always only conditioned, no unconditioned and first existence whatever being acknowledged. Since, then, the antithesis nowhere grants anything first, and grants no beginning that could serve absolutely as the structure's basis, a complete edifice of cognition is—on such presuppositions—entirely impossible. Hence reason's architectonic interest A 475 B 503
(which demands not empirical but pure a priori rational unity) carries with it a natural commendation for the assertions of the thesis.

But suppose that a human being could disavow all interest and could, indifferent toward all consequences, consider the assertions of reason merely according to the merit[63] of their bases. Such a human being, if he knew of no way to get out of the throng of assertions except by subscribing to one or the other of the doctrines in dispute, would be in a state of unceasing vacillation. Today it would strike him as convincing that the human will is *free;* tomorrow, taking into consideration the indissoluble chain of nature, he would suppose that freedom is nothing but self-delusion and that everything is merely *nature*. If, however, doing and acting now came up, then this play of merely speculative reason would vanish like the shadowy images of a dream, and he would choose his principles merely according to practical interest. But it is nonetheless fitting for a meditating and investigating being to devote certain times solely to the examination of his own reason, but—in doing so—to divest himself entirely of all partiality and thus to communicate his observations publicly to others for their judgment. Therefore no one can be blamed for, still less barred from, let- A 476
ting the propositions and counterpropositions come forward to defend them- B 504

60[Cf. A 832–51 = B 860–79.]

61[*älter.*]

62[*anderweitig.*]

63[*Gehalt*]

selves, as best they can when not frightened by any threat, before a jury of his own rank (viz., the rank of feeble human beings).

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section IV

On the Transcendental Problems of Pure Reason Insofar as They Must Absolutely Be Capable of Being Solved[64]

To want to solve all problems and answer all questions would be such impudent bluster and extravagant self-conceit that one would thereby have to forfeit all trust immediately. Nonetheless there are sciences by whose nature any question occurring in them must, on the basis of what one knows, absolutely be answerable, because the answer must arise from the same sources from which the question arises; and in such sciences[65] it is by no means permitted to plead unavoidable ignorance, but the solution can be demanded. What in all possible cases [of action] is *right* or *wrong* we must be able to know according to [a] rule, because it concerns our obligation, and *what we cannot know* we also have no obligation to do. In the expla-
A 477 B 505 nation of nature's appearances, on the other hand, much must remain uncertain and many questions must remain insoluble for us, because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient, in all cases, for what we are to explain. Now, the question arises whether in transcendental philosophy there is any question, concerning an object[66] put before reason, that is unanswerable by this same pure reason; and whether we may rightly avoid

[64][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, 276–83. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br n. 5, 499–501.]

[65][*wo.*]

[66][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* in several subsequent paragraphs. See A vii br. n. 7]

answering it decisively by classing the object[67] —as being (on the basis of[68] anything that we can cognize) absolutely uncertain—with what is such that, although we have a concept of it sufficient for raising a question, we are entirely lacking in means or ability[69] ever to answer this question.

Now, I maintain that transcendental philosophy has, among all speculative cognition, this peculiarity: that no question whatever concerning an object given to pure reason is insoluble for this same human reason, and that no pleading of unavoidable ignorance and of the problem's unfathomable depth can absolve us from the obligation to answer it thoroughly and completely. For, the same concept that enables us to ask the question must assuredly also make us competent to answer it, since (as in the case of[70] right and wrong) the object is not to be met with outside the concept at all.

However, the only questions in transcendental philosophy to which one may rightly demand a satisfactory answer concerning the character of the object—and which the philosopher is not permitted to avoid by pleading their impenetrable obscurity—are cosmological ones. And these questions can pertain only to cosmological ideas. For the object must be given empirically, and the question concerns only the object's adequacy to an idea. By contrast, if the object is transcendental and hence itself unknown[71] —e.g., in the questions as to whether the something whose appearance (in ourselves) is our thinking (i.e., the soul) is in itself a simple being,[72] and whether there is a cause of all things taken together that is absolutely necessary;[73] etc.—then we are to seek for our idea an object concerning which we can admit that it is unknown to us, although not therefore impossible.[74] { A 478 B 506

[67][*es.*]

[68][*aus.*]

[69][*Vermögen*. See A xii br. n. 16.]

[70][*bei.*]

[71][*unbekannt.*]

[72][This question was treated in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432.]

[73][This question will be treated in the Ideal of Pure Reason, A 567–642/B 595–670.]

[74]Although one can give no answer to the question as to what character a transcendental object has, i.e., *what the object is*, one can indeed answer that the *question* itself is *nothing*—viz., because no object of it has been given. Hence all questions of transcendental psychology are [in this way] indeed answerable and actually answered. For they concern the transcendental subject of all inner appearances; this subject is not itself appearance and therefore is not *given* as object, and thus none of the categories (at which, after all, the question is actually aimed[a]) encounter con- { A 479 B 507

A 479 B 507 The cosmological ideas alone possess the peculiarity that they can presuppose their object and the empirical synthesis required for its concept as given; and the question that arises from these ideas concerns only the progression of this synthesis insofar as this progression is to contain absolute totality—a totality that is no longer anything empirical, since it cannot be given in any experience. Now what is at issue here is merely a thing[75] as object of a possible experience and not as a thing[76] in itself. Hence the answer to the transcendent cosmological question, since it concerns no object in itself, cannot lie anywhere else except in the idea. And in regard to possible experience the question is not about what can be given *in concreto* in some experience, but about what lies in the idea that the empirical synthesis is merely to approach. Therefore the question must be capable of being solved from the idea alone. For the idea is a mere creature of reason, which therefore cannot turn the responsibility[77] away from itself and shift it to the unknown object.

A 480 B 508 The fact that a science can, in regard to all questions belonging to its own sum total[78] (*quaestiones domesticae*),[79] demand and expect solutions that are all certain—even if perhaps at this time they have not yet been found—is not so extraordinary as initially it seems. Apart from transcendental philosophy, there are two further pure rational sciences, the one having a merely speculative and the other a practical content: *pure mathematics* and *pure morality*.[80] But has anyone ever heard [it claimed] that—because, as it were, of a necessary ignorance on our part regarding the conditions—it is uncertain what relation the diameter has quite exactly, in rational or irrational numbers, to the circle? Since in[81] rational numbers

ditions for their application to this subject. Hence here is the case where the common expression holds, that no answer is also an answer—i.e., a question as to the character of the something that, being posited entirely outside the sphere of those objects that can be given to us, cannot be thought through any determinate predicate is entirely null and empty.

[a][*auf . . . gestellt*.]

[75][*Ding*.]

[76][*Sache*.]

[77][*Verantwortung*. Grillo reads *Beantwortung* ('[the task of] answering [the question]')]

[78][*Inbegriff*.]

[79][*Indigenous questions*.]

[80][*Moral*.]

[81][*durch*.]

this relation cannot be given congruently at all, but in irrational numbers it has not yet been found, people[82] judged that at least the impossibility of such a solution can be cognized with certainty, and Lambert gave a proof of this impossibility.[83] In the universal principles of morals[84] there can be nothing uncertain, because the propositions either are altogether null and meaningless, or must flow merely from our concepts of reason. In natural science,[85] on the other hand, there is an infinity of conjectures in regard to which certainty can never be expected. For natural appearances are objects that are given to us independently of our concepts. Therefore the key to them lies not in us and our pure thinking but outside us;[86] and, precisely because of this, in many cases this key cannot be found and hence no secure information can be expected. I am not counting here the questions of the Transcendental Analytic, which concern the deduction of our pure cognition; for we are now dealing with the certainty of judgments only in regard to the objects and not in regard to the origin of our concepts themselves. {A 481 B 509}

Hence as regards the obligation to provide at least a critical solution of the questions of reason that have been posed, we shall not be able to evade it by raising complaints about the narrow limits of our reason, and by confessing, with the semblance of a humble self-cognition, that deciding these questions is beyond our reason: whether the world has been there from eternity or has a beginning; whether cosmic space is filled with beings *ad infinitum* or enclosed within certain bounds; whether anything at all in the world is simple, or whether everything must be divided *ad infinitum;* whether there is a generation or production from freedom, or whether everything is attached to the chain of the natural order; and finally, whether there is some entirely unconditioned[87] and in itself necessary being, or whether everything is, as regards its existence, conditioned and hence externally dependent and in itself contingent. For all these questions concern

[82][*man.*]

[83][Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–77), German physicist, astronomer, and mathematician. The paper containing his proof of the incommensurability of π was presented by him to the Royal Academy of Sciences of Berlin in 1761. He was made a member of the Academy in 1764.]

[84][*Sitten.*]

[85][*Naturkunde.*]

[86][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak IV, 473.]

[87][Reading, at Erdmann's suggestion, *unbedingtes* for *unbedingt.*]

an object that cannot be given anywhere else but in our thoughts, viz., the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of appearances. If we are
A 482 B 510 unable to say and establish anything certain about this object from our own concepts, then we must not shift the blame upon the thing[88] that is hiding from us; for a thing of that sort cannot be given to us at all (because it is nowhere to be met with outside our idea). Rather, we must seek the cause of that inability in our idea itself; the idea is a problem[89] which admits of no solution and of which we nonetheless obstinately assume that an actual object corresponds to it. If we set forth distinctly the dialectic that lies in our concept itself, this would soon lead us to complete certainty as to what our judgment regarding such a question has to be.

Your pretext of uncertainty regarding these problems can be countered, first of all, with this question—and it, at least, you must answer distinctly: From where do you get the ideas whose solution here entangles you in such difficulty? Is it perhaps from appearances whose explanation you require and whereof, in consequence of these ideas, you have to seek only the principles, or the rules[90] of their exposition? Suppose that nature were lying before you entirely uncovered, and that nothing were hidden from your senses and from the consciousness of whatever is put before your intuition. Yet, through not a single experience will you be able to cognize the object of your ideas *in concreto*. (For doing so requires, besides this com-
B 511 plete[91] intuition, also a completed[92] synthesis and the consciousness of its
A 483 absolute totality—and this is not possible through any empirical cognition.) Hence your [cosmological] question can by no means be necessary for explaining any appearance that occurs,[93] and thus can by no means be assigned, as it were, by the object itself. For you can never encounter[94] the object, because it cannot be given through any possible experience. In all possible perceptions you always remain encumbered by[95] *conditions,*

88[*Sache.*]

89[Ideas, as problematic concepts (A 647 = B 675), are problems assigned to us (cf A 669 = B 697)]

90[Reading, as suggested by Erdmann, *Regeln* for *Regel*]

91[*vollständig.*]

92[*vollendet.*]

93[*vorkommen.*]

94[*vorkommen.*]

95[*befangen . . unter.*]

whether conditions in space or in time; you never get to anything unconditioned, in order to establish whether this unconditioned is to be posited in an absolute beginning of the synthesis or in an absolute totality[96] of the series without any beginning. But the total[97] when thus taken in the empirical meaning is always only comparative. The absolute total of magnitude (the world total[98]), of division, of origin, of the condition of existence as such—with all the questions as to whether this total is to be brought about through finite synthesis or through a synthesis to be continued *ad infinitum*—concerns no possible experience. E.g., you could not in the least explain the appearances of a body better, or even just differently, by assuming either that the body consists of simple parts or that it consists throughout of parts that are always again composite; for you can never encounter either a simple appearance or an infinite composition. Appearances demand to be explained only insofar as their conditions of explanation are given in perception; but everything in them that may ever be given, B 512
when taken together in an *absolute whole,* is not[99] itself a perception. Yet A 484
in fact this total is what in the transcendental problems of reason we are required to explain.

Since, therefore, the solution of these problems can itself never occur in experience, you cannot say that what is to be attributed herein to the object is uncertain. For your object is merely in your brain and cannot be given outside it at all. Consequently, you need only take care to be at one with yourselves, and to prevent the amphiboly[100] that turns your idea into a supposed presentation of an object that is empirically given and that hence can also be cognized according to laws of experience. The dogmatic solution, therefore, is by no means uncertain, but impossible. The critical solution, however, which can be completely certain, considers the question not objectively at all, but in terms of the foundation of cognition on which the question is based.

[96][*Totalität.*]

[97][*das All.*]

[98][*das Weltall,* i.e., the universe.]

[99][Reading, with Mellin and the *Akademie* edition, *keine* for *eine.*]

[100][I.e., ambiguity. Cf. A 260–92/B 316–49.]

A 485 B 513

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section V

Skeptical Presentation of the Cosmological Questions Through All Four Transcendental Ideas[101]

We would gladly renounce our demand to see our questions answered dogmatically, if we comprehended already in advance that the answer, no matter how it turns out, would only further increase our ignorance and plunge us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into a still greater one, and perhaps even into contradictions. If our question aims merely at affirmation or negation, then we act prudently if at the outset we leave aside the supposed bases for answering them, and consider first of all what we would gain if the answer fell to the one side, and what if it fell to the opposite side. Now if the result in both cases turns out to be something entirely meaningless (nonsense),[102] then we have [in this] a well-based challenge to examine critically our question itself, and to see whether the question itself does not rest on a baseless presupposition and does not play with an idea that betrays its falsity better in application and through its consequences than in its abstract presentation. This is the great benefit
A 486 B 514 which we have in the skeptical manner of treating the questions that pure reason puts to pure reason, and by which we can at little expense be spared a great dogmatic jumble, so as to put in its place a sober critique that, as a true cathartic, will luckily purge us of delusion along with its attendant, viz., the attitude of knowing a lot.

Hence if concerning a cosmological idea I could in advance have insight into the fact that, whichever side of the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of appearances the idea were to join, the idea would yet be either *too large* or *too small* for any *concept of understanding,* then I would comprehend that the idea must be entirely empty and without significa-

[101][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 284–86. See also Norman Kemp Smith. *op cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 501–3]

[102][*lauter Sinnleeres (Nonsens).*]

tion. For since, after all, the idea has to do only with an object of experience that[103] [as such] is to be commensurate with a possible concept of understanding, the object, no matter how I may accommodate it to the idea, does not fit the idea. And this is actually the case with all world concepts;[104] and precisely because of this do they entangle reason, as long as it adheres to them, in an unavoidable antinomy. For [consider the various pairs of alternative assumptions.]

First, assume *that the world has no beginning*. In that case the world is *too large* for your concept. For this concept, which consists in a successive regression, can never attain the entire bygone eternity. Suppose *that the world has a beginning*. In that case the world is in turn *too small* for your concept of understanding in its necessary empirical regression. For { A 487 B 515
since the beginning always still presupposes a time that precedes it, it is not yet unconditioned; and hence the law of the understanding's empirical use enjoins us to inquire about a still higher time condition, and thus the world is plainly too small for this law.

The situation is the same regarding the twofold answer to the question concerning the world's magnitude as regards space. For *if the world is infinite* and unbounded, then it is *too large* for any possible empirical concept. *If the world is finite* and bounded, then you rightly go on to ask, What determines this boundary? Empty space is not a self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a condition at which you could stop; still less can it be an empirical condition amounting to a part of a possible experience. (For who could have an experience of the absolutely[105] empty[106]?) But absolute totality of the empirical synthesis always requires that the unconditioned be an experiential concept. Therefore a *bounded world* is *too small* for your concept.

Second, if every appearance in space (any matter) consists *of infinitely many parts,* then the regression of the division is always *too large* for your concept. And if alternatively the *division* of space is to *cease* with some member of the division (viz., with the simple), then the regression is *too small* for the idea of the unconditioned. For this member still[107] leaves us A 488
with a regression to further parts contained in it. B 516

[103][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *welcher* for *welche.*]

[104][I.e., cosmological concepts.]

[105][*Schlechthin-* here, *absolut* just below.]

[106][Or 'void.']

[107][*noch immer.*]

Third, if you assume that in all that occurs in the world there is nothing but the result according to laws of *nature,* then the causality of the cause[108] is always in turn something that occurs; and this causality thus necessitates your regression to a still higher cause and hence necessitates the ceaseless prolongation of the series of conditions *a parte priori.*[109] Thus the nature that merely produces effects[110] is *too large* for any concept of yours in the synthesis of events in the world.

If you choose to admit now and then events caused *spontaneously,*[111] and hence to admit generation from *freedom,* then according to an unavoidable natural law the *why*[112] pursues you, and compels you according to the causal law of experience to go beyond this point;[113] and thus you find that a totality of connection of this sort is *too small* for your necessary empirical concept.

Fourth, if you assume an *absolutely necessary* being (whether it be the world itself, or something in the world, or the cause of the world), then you posit it in a time that is infinitely remote from any given point of time; for otherwise it would be dependent on another, earlier existence.[114] But in that case this [necessary] existence is inaccessible to your empirical concept, and *too large* ever to be reached by you through any regression that you may pursue.

A 489 B 517 On the other hand, if—in your opinion—everything belonging to the world (whether as conditioned or as condition) is *contingent,* then any existence given to you is *too small* for your concept. For any such existence compels you to continue to look around for another existence on which it is dependent.

We have said in all these cases that the *world idea*[115] is either too large, or again too small, for the empirical regression and hence for any possible concept of understanding. Why did we not put the point in reverse and say that in the first case the empirical concept is always too small for the idea,

108[*Kausalität der Ursache.*]

109[On the side of what is prior.]

110[*wirkend.*]

111[*von selbst gewirkte.*]

112[Emphasis added.]

113[Of spontaneous generation.]

114[*Dasein* here, *Existenz* just below and in the next paragraph.]

115[I.e., cosmological idea.]

and in the second too large, and that hence the blame attaches, as it were, to the empirical regression? Instead we accused the cosmological idea by saying that in being too much or too little it diverges from its purpose, viz., possible experience. The reason was this. Possible experience is what alone can give reality to our concepts; without it any concept is only an idea devoid of truth and of reference to an object. Hence the possible empirical concept was the standard by which the idea had to be judged, as to whether it is a mere idea and a thought-entity[116] or finds its object in the world. For we say of something that it is too large or too small relatively to something else only if it is assumed for the sake of, and must be equipped according to,[117] the latter. The playthings of the ancient dialectical schools included A 490 B 518
also this question: If a ball will not go through a hole, which are we to say: Is the ball too large, or the hole too small? In this case how you want to express yourselves makes no difference; for you do not know which of the two is there for the sake of the other. On the other hand, you will not say, The man is too tall for his garment; but, The garment is too short for the man.

Hence we have been brought at least to the well-based suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and with them all the subtly reasoning assertions that have been put in contest with one another, are perhaps based on an empty and merely imaginary concept of the way in which the object of these ideas is given to us; and this suspicion may already be able to lead us onto the right track for uncovering the deception that has so long misled us.

[116][See A 292/B 348.]

[117][*darnach eingerichtet.*]

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section VI

Transcendental Idealism as the Key to Solving the Cosmological Dialectic[118]

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or time, and hence all objects of an experience pos-
A 491 B 519 sible for us, are nothing but appearances. I.e., they are mere presentations that—in the way in which they are presented, viz., as extended beings, or as series of changes—have no existence with an intrinsic basis,[119] i.e., outside our thoughts. This doctrinal system I call *transcendental idealism.*[120] The realist in the transcendental meaning of this term turns these modifications of our sensibility into things[121] subsisting in themselves, and hence turns *mere presentations* into things in themselves.[122]

One would do us wrong if one sought to impute to us empirical idealism,[123] long since much-decried. This view, while assuming that space has its own actuality, denies the existence in it of extended beings, or at least

[118][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 287–96. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 503–4.]

[119][*an sich gegründete.*]

[120]Elsewhere[a] I have sometimes also called it *formal* idealism, in order to distinguish it from *material* idealism—i.e., the usual idealism, which doubts or denies the existence of external things themselves. In some cases it seems advisable, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, to employ these expressions instead of the ones mentioned above.[b]

[a][The note was added in B.]

[b][Transcendental idealism has just been mentioned; empirical idealism is about to be mentioned.]

[121][*Dinge* here, *Sachen* just below.]

[122][This may be a reference to John Locke.]

[123][Kant may have in mind the philosophy of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne; but his characterization of Berkeley's position is not without a certain amount of polemical violation.]

finds that existence doubtful, and does not concede on this point any sufficiently provable distinction between dream and truth. As regards the appearances of inner sense in time, empirical idealism finds no difficulty in considering these as actual things; indeed, it even asserts that this inner experience, solely and exclusively, adequately proves the actual existence of this experience's object (as object in itself, with all this time determination).

Our transcendental idealism, by contrast, allows that the objects of outer B 520
intuition, just as they are intuited in space, are also actual; and that all changes are actual in time just as inner sense presents them. For since space is already a form of the intuition that we call outer, and since without ob- A 492
jects in this space there would be no empirical presentation at all, we can and must assume in it extended beings as actual—and the same is the case also with time. But this space itself, together with this time, and along with both of them all appearances are yet in themselves no *things;* rather, they are nothing but presentations, and cannot exist at all outside our mind. And even the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as object of consciousness)—the mind whose determination is presented through the succession of different states in time—is also not the proper self as it exists in itself, or [i.e.] the transcendental subject, but is only an appearance that has been given to the sensibility of this being which is unknown[124] to us. We cannot concede the existence of this inner appearance as a thing existing in itself in this same way.[125] For the condition of this appearance is time, and time cannot be a determination of any thing in itself. In space and time, however, the empirical truth of appearances is sufficiently secured and adequately distinguished from the affinity with the dream if B 521
both[126] cohere, correctly and thoroughly, in one experience according to empirical laws.

Accordingly, objects of experience are *never* given *in themselves,* but are given only in experience and do not exist outside it at all. That there may be inhabitants on the moon,[127] although no human being has ever per- A 493
ceived them, must indeed be conceded; but it signifies no more than that

[124][*unbekannt*]

[125][As was shown in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432.]

[126][Truth and dream.]

[127][Cf. the *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), Ak. I, 349–68, and the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Ak. V, 467.]

in the possible advance[128] of experience we could come upon them. For anything is actual that stands in a context with a perception according to laws of empirical progression.[129] Hence those inhabitants are actual if they stand in an empirical coherence with my actual consciousness, although they are not therefore actual in themselves, i.e., outside this advance of experience.

Nothing is actually given to us but perception and the empirical advance from it to other possible perceptions. For appearances, as mere presentations, are in themselves actual only in perception; perception, in fact, is nothing but the actuality of an empirical presentation, i.e., appearance. If an appearance is called an actual thing prior to perception, then this signifies either that in the progression of experience we must come upon such a perception, or it has no signification[130] at all. For that the appearance[131] exists in itself, without reference to our senses and to possible experience,
B 522 could indeed be said if we were talking about a thing in itself. But we are talking merely about an appearance in space and time, and both space and time are determinations not of things in themselves but only of our sensi-
A 494 bility. Hence what is in space and time (viz., appearances) is not something in itself; rather, appearances are mere presentations, which, if they are not given in us (in perception), are not encountered anywhere at all.

Our power of sensible intuition is, in fact, only a receptivity, i.e., a capacity to be affected in a certain way with presentations. The relation of these presentations to one another is a pure intuition of space and time (which are nothing but forms of our sensibility); and insofar as these presentations are connected and determinable in this relation (i.e., in space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience, they are called *objects*. With the nonsensible cause of these presentations we are entirely unacquainted, and hence we cannot intuit it as object.[132] For such an object would have to be presented neither in space nor in time (which are merely conditions of sensible presentation), and without these conditions we cannot think of any intuition at all. We may, however, call the merely intelligible cause of appearances as such the transcendental object, just so that

[128][*Fortschritt.*]

[129][*Fortgang.*]

[130][*Bedeutung.* See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66, and cf. below, A 495/B 523.]

[131][I.e., the thing that appears.]

[132][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* just above and just below In this entire paragraph, as elsewhere, Kant uses the two terms interchangeably. See A vii br. n. 7.]

we have something that corresponds to sensibility, which is a receptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole range and coherence of our possible perceptions, and about it we may say that it is given B 523
in itself prior to all experience. But appearances are given, in conformity with the transcendental object, not in themselves but only in this experience. For they are mere presentations, which signify an actual object only A 495
as perceptions; they do so, viz., if such a perception coheres with all others according to the rules of the unity of experience. Thus we may say that actual things of past time are given in the transcendental object of experience. But they are objects for me, and actual for me in past time, only insofar as I present[133] that a regressive series of possible perceptions (either by the guide of history or by the footprints of causes and effects) leads according to empirical laws—in a word, that the course of the world leads—to a bygone time series as condition of the present time. Yet this series is then presented as actual only in the coherence[134] of a possible experience, and not in itself; and hence all events that have from time immemorial[135] gone by prior to my existence yet signify nothing but the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, starting from the present perception, upward to the conditions that determine this perception as regards time.

Accordingly, if I present, taken together, all existing objects of the senses in all time and in all spaces, then I do not prior to experience posit [or put] those objects into that time and these spaces; rather, this presentation is B 524
nothing but the thought of a possible experience in its absolute completeness. In this possible experience alone are those objects given (since they are nothing but mere presentations). Thus when we say that those objects A 496
exist prior to all my experience, this signifies only that they are to be met with in the part of experience *to which,* starting from the perception, I must first of all *advance.* The cause of the empirical conditions of this advance—and hence what members I may come upon, or, again, how far I can in my regression come upon such members—is transcendental and thus necessarily unknown[136] to me. Nor, however, are we concerned with this cause; rather, we are concerned only with the rule of the advance of the experience wherein objects—i.e., appearances—are given to me. The

[133][Or 'conceive': *vorstelle.*]

[134][Or 'context': *Zusammenhang.*]

[135][*undenklich.*]

[136][*unbekannt.*]

upshot is entirely the same, moreover, whether I say that in my empirical progression in space I can come upon stars that are a hundred times more remote than the outermost stars that I see, or whether I say that perhaps such stars are to be met with in cosmic space even though no human being has ever perceived or will ever perceive them. For even if these stars were given as things in themselves, without reference to possible experience as such, yet for me they are nothing and hence are no objects except insofar as they are contained in the series of the empirical regression. Only
B 525 in another reference is the distinction of the way in which one takes the actuality of the mentioned objects[137] of the senses important: viz., when these same appearances are to be used for the cosmological idea of an absolute whole, and hence when one is concerned with a question that goes
A 497 beyond the bounds of possible experience. This distinction is then important, viz., for preventing a deceptive delusion that must inevitably arise from the misinterpretation of our own experiential concepts.

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

Section VII
Critical Decision of the Cosmological Dispute That Reason Has with Itself[138]

The entire antinomy of pure reason rests on this dialectical argument: If the conditioned is given, then the entire series of all its conditions is also given; now objects of the senses are given to us as conditioned; consequently, etc. Now through this syllogism,[139] whose major premise seems

[137][Or, possibly, 'of conceived objects': *gedachter Gegenstände*]

[138][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n 2, vol. 2, 296–309 See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 504–6. And see Arthur Melnick, *op cit* at A 22/B 37 br. n. 27, 379–95.]

[139][Literally, 'inference of reason'· *Vernunftschluß*.]

so natural and evident, as many cosmological ideas are introduced as there are different[140] conditions (in the synthesis of appearances), insofar as these conditions make up a series. The cosmological ideas postulate the absolute totality of these series, and precisely thereby put reason inevitably in conflict with itself. But before we uncover what is deceptive in this subtly reasoning argument, we must enable ourselves to do so, by correcting and making determinate certain concepts occurring in it. B 526

First, the following proposition is clear and indubitably certain: that if the conditioned is given, then precisely thereby a regression in the series of all conditions for this conditioned is **assigned**[141] to us. For the very concept of the conditioned implies that through this concept something is referred to a condition; and if this condition is in turn conditioned, then that something is referred to a more remote condition, and thus is referred through all the members of the series. The above proposition, therefore, is analytic and rises above any fear from a transcendental critique. It is a logical postulate[142] of reason, viz., to pursue and as far as possible extend,[143] by means of understanding, that connection of a concept with its conditions which attaches to the very concept itself. A 498

Furthermore, if both the conditioned and its condition are things in themselves, and if the conditioned has been given, then not merely is the regression to the condition *assigned*, but this condition is thereby actually already given[144] with the conditioned. And since this holds for all members of the series, the complete series of conditions—and hence also the unconditioned—is given, or, rather, presupposed, simultaneously[145] through the fact that the conditioned, which was possible only through that series, is given. Here the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition is a synthesis of the mere understanding, which presents things *as they are* without considering whether and how we can reach a cognition[146] of them. Appearances, on the other hand, are mere presentations, and as such are not B 527

[140][Kant literally says 'according to the difference of.']

[141][*aufgegeben*.]

[142][I.e., in the original sense of the term, a demand. See the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 468; and cf. above, A 220/B 267 and A 225/B 272.]

[143][*fortsetzen*.]

[144][*gegeben*.]

[145][With the conditioned.]

[146][*Kenntnis* (rather than *Erkenntnis*) here and in the next two occurrences. The term's more literal meaning, 'acquaintance,' is grammatically unmanageable here.]

A 499 given at all unless I reach cognition of them (i.e., unless I reach the appearances themselves, for they are nothing but empirical cognitions). Hence if I deal with appearances then I cannot say, in the same meaning of the term, that if the conditioned is given then all conditions for it (as appearances) are also given, and hence I can in no way infer the absolute totality of the series of these conditions. For *appearances* themselves are, in apprehension, nothing but an empirical synthesis (in space and time) and hence are given only *in this synthesis*. Now it does not follow at all that if the conditioned is given (in appearance), then the synthesis amounting to its empirical condition is thereby also given with it and presupposed; rather, this synthesis first occurs in the regression, and never without it. What we can indeed say in such a case, however, is that a *regression* to the conditions, i.e., that a continued empirical synthesis on this side[147] is dictated or *assigned* to us, and that there can be no lack of conditions given through this regression.

This shows that the major premise of the cosmological syllogism takes the conditioned in the transcendental meaning of a pure category, but the minor premise takes it in the empirical meaning of a concept of understanding applied to mere appearances. Therefore, we find in this syllogism B 528 the dialectical deception called *sophisma figurae dictionis*.[148] This deception, however, is not contrived, but is a quite natural delusion of common A 500 reason. For by this delusion, if something is given as conditioned, then (in the major premise) we presuppose the conditions and their series—*uninspected,* as it were. For to do this is nothing other than [to satisfy] the logical demand to assume complete premises for a given conclusion; and here no time order is to be found in the connection of the conditioned with its condition, but they are presupposed in themselves, as given *simultaneously*. Furthermore, it is equally natural (in the minor premise) to regard appearances as things in themselves and likewise as objects given to mere understanding—as was done in the major premise, where I abstracted from all conditions of intuition under which alone objects can be given. In this [natural treatment of the premises] we have, however, overlooked a noteworthy distinction between the concepts. The synthesis of the conditioned with its condition—and the entire series of conditions—carried with it (in the major premise) nothing about limitation by time, and no concept of succession. On the other hand, the empirical synthesis—and the se-

[147][The side of the conditioned]

[148][Sophism (a type of fallacy) of figure of speech. See A 402 incl. br. n. 237]

ries of conditions in appearance—(which in the minor premise is subsumed [under the major]) is necessarily given successively and only in time, i.e., sequentially. Hence here[149] I was not able to presuppose, as I was there,[150] the absolute *totality* of the synthesis and of the series presented through this synthesis. For there all the members of the series are B 529
given in themselves (without time condition), but here they are possible only through the successive regression, which is given only by actually A 501
being carried out.

After having been convicted[151] of such a slip in the argument that they jointly laid at the basis (of their cosmological assertions), both disputing parties may rightly be dismissed, as parties whose demand is based on no well-founded title. But although they did not know how to build their conclusions on sturdy bases of proof, their quarrel is not yet ended thereby in the respect that both or either of them has been shown[152] to be wrong in the asserted matter itself (the conclusion). After all, nothing seems clearer than that if one of two persons asserts that the world has a beginning and the other asserts that the world has no beginning but has been there from eternity, then surely one must be right. Yet if that is so, then, because the clarity is the same on both sides, there is no possibility of ever ascertaining which side is in the right, and the dispute continues as before even though at the tribunal of reason the parties[153] have been ordered to silence. Thus no remedy remains for ending the dispute thoroughly and to the satisfaction of both parties, except finally to show that—since, after all, they can so nicely refute each other—they are disputing about nothing, and that a certain transcendental illusion has painted for them an actuality where B 530
none is to be found. Let us now enter upon this path on which a dispute A 502
that defies a verdict can be settled.

The *Eleatic philosopher Zeno,*[154] a subtle dialectician, was severely rebuked as a mischievous sophist already by *Plato* because—to show his

[149][In the minor premise.]

[150][In the major premise.]

[151][*Überweisung*.]

[152][*überführen*.]

[153][*Parteien* here, *Teile* earlier in the paragraph and just below]

[154][Zeno of Elea, born probably around 490 B.C., is best known for his paradoxes concerning, above all, plurality and motion.]

artistry—he sought to prove a proposition by plausible[155] arguments and soon after to overturn the same proposition again by other arguments equally strong. Zeno asserted that God (this God presumably was for him nothing but the world) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. To those who judged Zeno on this procedure he seemed to want entirely to deny two propositions contradicting each other—which is absurd. I believe,[156] however, that he cannot rightly be charged with this. The first of these propositions I shall soon examine more closely.[157] As for the others, if by the word *God* Zeno meant the universe, then he did indeed have to say that this universe neither is permanently present in its location (at rest) nor changes its location (moves), because all locations are only in the universe and hence *the universe* itself is in no location.[158] Likewise, if the universe comprises all that exists, then it is to that extent also neither similar nor dissimilar to any *other*
B 531 *thing,* because there is apart from it *no other thing* to which it could be
A 503 compared. If two judgments that are opposed to each other presuppose an inadmissible condition, then despite the conflict between them (which, however, is not a contradiction proper) both of them drop out, because the condition drops out under which alone each of these propositions was to hold.

If someone were to say that any body either smells good or smells not good, then there is a third alternative, viz., that the body does not smell (emit an odor) at all; and thus both of the conflicting propositions can be false. If I say that any body either is good-smelling or is not good-smelling (*vel suaveolens vel non suaveolens*), then the two judgments are opposed to each other contradictorily and only the first one is false, while its contradictory opposite—viz., that some bodies are not good-smelling—comprises also those bodies *that do not smell at all.* In the previous opposition (*per disparata*),[159] the contingent condition of the concept of bodies (smell) still *remained* in the conflicting judgment and therefore was not also annulled by it; hence this latter judgment was not the contradictory opposite of the former judgment.

Accordingly, if I say that, as regards space, either the world is infinite or it is not infinite (*non est infinitus*), then if the first proposition is false,

155[*scheinbar.*]

156[*finde.*]

157[See the pair of propositions discussed at A 504 = B 532.]

158[*Univers(um)* here and just above, *Weltall* just below.]

159[By disparates.]

its contradictory opposite, that the world is not infinite, must be true. By this [negative proposition] I would only annul an infinite world, without positing another world, viz., the finite one. But if I said that the world is {A 504 B 532} either infinite or finite (noninfinite), then both of these propositions can be false. For I then regard the world as in itself determined in terms of magnitude, because in the counterproposition I do not merely annul the infinity, and with it perhaps the entire separate existence of the world; rather, I add a determination to the world taken as a thing that is actual in itself, and this may likewise be false, viz., if the world were *not* given *as a thing in itself at all* and hence also not in terms of its magnitude—neither as infinite nor as finite. Permit me to call this sort of opposition *dialectical* but that of contradiction *analytical*[160] *opposition.*[161] Thus of two dialectically opposed judgments both can be false, because one judgment not merely contradicts the other but says something more than is required for contradiction.

If one regards the two propositions, that the world is infinite in magnitude and that the world is finite in magnitude, as opposed to each other contradictorily, then one assumes that the world (the entire series of appearances[162]) is a thing in itself. For [in either proposition] the world remains, whether I annul in the series of its appearances the infinite or the finite regression. But if I remove this presupposition—or [i.e.] this transcendental illusion—and deny that the world is a thing in itself, then the contradictory conflict of the two assertions is transformed into a merely dia- {A 505 B 533} lectical one; and because the world does not exist in itself at all (i.e., independently of the regressive series of my presentations), it exists neither as *a whole that is infinite in itself* nor as *a whole that is finite in itself.* The world is to be met with only in the empirical regression of the series of appearances, and not at all by itself. If, therefore, this series is always conditioned, then it is never given wholly; and hence the world is not an unconditioned whole, and thus also does not exist as such a whole—neither with infinite nor with finite magnitude.

What has been said here about the first cosmological idea, viz., that of the absolute totality of magnitude in [the realm of] appearance, holds also for all the other cosmological ideas. The series of conditions is to be met with only in the regressive series itself, but not [as existing] in itself in ap-

[160][Or 'analytic'.]

[161][*Opposition* here, *Entgegensetzung* before.]

[162][I.e., things that appear.]

pearance[163] considered as a thing of its own given prior to all regression. Hence I shall also have to say that the multitude of parts in a given appearance is in itself neither finite nor infinite. For appearance is nothing that exists in itself, and the parts are first given by, and in, the regression of the decomposing[164] synthesis, a regression that is never given in absolute *entirety*—neither as finite nor as infinite. The same holds for the series of causes superordinated to one another,[165] or the series of the conditioned existence up to the unconditionally necessary existence. Here again
A 506 B 534 this series can never be regarded as being in itself, as to its totality, either finite or infinite. For as a series of subordinated presentations it consists[166] only in the dynamical regression; prior to this regression, however, and as a series of things in themselves that subsists[167] by itself, it cannot exist at all.[168]

Thus the antinomy of pure reason [that takes place] with pure reason's cosmological ideas is removed: viz., by showing that it is merely dialectical, and is a conflict due to an illusion that arises because the idea of absolute totality, which holds only as a condition of things in themselves, has been applied to appearances, which exist only in our presentation and—if they make up a series—in the successive regression, but otherwise do not exist at all. However, conversely, we can also draw from this antinomy a true benefit that, although not a dogmatic one, is yet a critical and doctrinal benefit: viz., we can by this antinomy prove indirectly the transcendental ideality of appearances—in case, perhaps, someone were not satisfied with the direct proof provided in the Transcendental Aesthetic. This indirect proof would consist in the following dilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, then it is either finite or infinite. Now, both of these alternatives are false (according to the proofs, adduced above, of the thesis and antithesis, respectively). Hence it is also
B 535 false that the world (the sum of all appearances) is a whole existing in
A 507 itself. From this it follows, then, that appearances as such are nothing

[163][I.e., in what appears.]

[164][I.e., disassembling.]

[165][*übereinander geordnet.*]

[166][*bestehen.*]

[167][*bestehen*]

[168][Or, possibly: 'and as a series of things that subsists by itself, it cannot exist in itself at all.']

apart from our presentations[169]—which is precisely what we meant by their transcendental ideality.

This comment is important. It shows that the above proofs of the fourfold antinomy were not deceptions but were well-founded.[170] They were well- founded, viz., on the presupposition that appearances, or a world of sense comprising them all, are things in themselves. The conflict of the propositions drawn from these proofs reveals, however, that there is a falsehood in the presupposition, and thereby leads us to discover the true character of things as objects of the senses. Hence the dialectic by no means promotes skepticism. But it does promote the skeptical method,[171] which can display the dialectic as an example of the method's great benefit: viz., when we let the arguments of reason come forward against each other in their greatest freedom; for although these arguments ultimately do not supply what we were searching for, yet they will always supply something beneficial and useful for correcting our judgments.

The Antinomy of Pure Reason

{A 508 B 536}

Section VIII

Pure Reason's Regulative Principle Regarding the Cosmological Ideas[172]

Since through the cosmological principle of totality no maximum of the series of conditions in a world of sense considered as a thing in itself is

[169][Or, possibly, 'that appearances are nothing whatsoever [*überhaupt*] apart from our presentations.']

[170][Or, perhaps, 'thorough': *gründlich.*]

[171][See A 424/B 451 incl. br. n. 99.]

[172][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 310–18. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 506–8.]

given, but such a maximum can merely be *assigned*[173] to us in the regression of the series, this principle of pure reason, with its meaning corrected in this manner, still retains all its validity—although not as an *axiom* for thinking the totality as actual in the object.[174] The principle retains its validity, rather, as a *problem* for the understanding, and hence for the subject: viz., to perform and continue, in accordance with the completeness in the idea, the regression in the series of conditions for a given conditioned. For in sensibility, i.e., in space and time, any condition that we can reach in the exposition of given appearances is in turn conditioned, because these appearances are not objects in themselves—in which the absolutely unconditioned might, perhaps, occur. These appearances are, rather, merely empirical presentations; and these must always find their condition, which determines them as regards space or time, in intuition. Hence the cosmological principle of reason is, in fact, only a *rule* that commands us to perform, in the series of conditions of given appearances, a regression that is
A 509 B 537 never permitted to stop at anything absolutely unconditioned. It is, therefore, not a principle[175] for the possibility of experience and of the empirical cognition of objects of the senses, and hence it is not a principle of understanding; for every experience is enclosed (in accordance with the given intuition) within its bounds. Nor is this cosmological principle a *constitutive* principle[176] of reason for expanding the concept of the world of sense beyond all possible experience. Rather, it is a principle of the greatest possible continuation and expansion of experience, whereby no empirical boundary must count[177] as absolute. Thus it is a principle of reason that, *as rule,* postulates[178] what is to be done by us in the regression, and *does not anticipate* what is given in itself in the *object* prior to all regression. I therefore call this cosmological principle a *regulative* principle of reason.[179] By contrast, the principle of the absolute totality of the series of

[173][The two emphasized terms are *gegeben* and *aufgegeben.*]

[174][*Objekt.* Throughout this section, as in general, Kant uses this term interchangeably with *Gegenstand.* See A vii br. n. 7.]

[175][*Prinzipium.* In this section, as elsewhere, Kant uses Prinzip(ium) interchangeably with *Grundsatz.* See A vii br. n. 7.]

[176][Emphasis on 'principle' deleted.]

[177][*gelten.*]

[178][I.e., demands. Cf. A 498/B 526 br n. 142.]

[179][The regulative use of the ideas of reason will be discussed not only in what immediately follows but, above all, at A 642–68/B 670–96.]

conditions considered as given in the objects (the appearances) in themselves[180] would be a constitutive cosmological principle. The nullity of this latter principle I wanted to indicate precisely by this distinction, and wanted thereby to prevent what otherwise inevitably occurs: our attributing (by transcendental subreption)[181] objective reality to an idea that serves merely as a rule.

Now in order properly to define[182] the meaning of this rule of pure reason, we must note, first of all, that this rule cannot tell us *what the object is*, but only *how the empirical regression is to be performed* in order for us to arrive at the complete concept of the object. For if the rule told us what the object is, then it would be a constitutive principle, and obtaining such a principle from pure reason is impossible. By this rule, therefore, we can in no way intend to mean that the series of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself finite or infinite. For then we would by a mere idea of absolute totality—a totality that is provided only in the idea itself—think an object that cannot be given in any experience; for we would confer on a series of appearances an objective reality independent of the empirical synthesis. Hence the rational idea[183] will prescribe a rule only to the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions; according to that rule this synthesis proceeds from the conditioned, by means of all the conditions subordinated to one another, to the unconditioned—although this unconditioned is never reached, for the absolutely unconditioned is not found in experience at all. {A 510 B 538}

Now to this end[184] we must first accurately define the synthesis of a series insofar as this synthesis is never complete. For this aim, people usually employ two expressions that are intended to distinguish something in this synthesis, yet they do so without quite being able[185] to indicate the basis of this distinction. The mathematicians speak solely of a *progressus in infinitum*.[186] In its place, the investigators of concepts (philosophers) {A 511 B 539}

[180][I.e., in the objects that appear, considered as they are in themselves. Cf. the next paragraph.]

[181][See A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n. 14.]

[182][Or 'determine': *bestimmen*. Similarly in the next paragraph.]

[183][Or 'idea of reason': *Vernunftidee*.]

[184][Of defining this prescription of a rule by the rational idea to the regressive synthesis.]

[185][*recht wissen*.]

[186][Progression to infinity (literally, 'to the infinite'), i.e., infinite progression.]

want to accept only the expression of a *progressus in indefinitum.*[187] Without lingering upon an examination of the perplexity that has commended to them this distinction of two progressions, and upon the distinction's good or fruitless use, I want to try to define these two concepts accurately in reference to my aim.

Of a straight line we may rightly say that it can be extended to infinity,[188] and here the distinction of an infinite and an indeterminably long progression[189] (*progressus indefinitum*) would be an empty subtlety. To be sure, if one says, Continue[190] drawing a line, then it is[191] indeed more correct to add *in indefinitum* than to say *in infinitum.* For the first means no more than, Extend the line as far as *you want;* but the second means, *You shall* never stop extending it (which, of course,[192] is not the aim here). Nevertheless, if only what *can* be done is at issue, then the first expression is quite correct; for you can go on augmenting[193] the line to infinity. And so is it also in all cases where one speaks not of the *regressus* but only of the *progressus,* i.e., of the progression[194] from the condition to the conditioned; in the series of appearances this possible progression proceeds to infinity. From a pair of parents you can progress[195] without end in the descending line of procreation, and you can quite readily think that the line
A 512 B 540 actually progresses thus in the world. For here[196] reason never requires absolute totality of the series, because it does not presuppose such totality of the series as a condition and as[197] *given* (*datum*), but presupposes it only

187[Indefinite progression (literally, 'progression to the indefinite.']

188[Literally, 'to the infinite': *ins Unendliche,* which I usually translate as *ad infinitum.* In the present context, I am trying to avoid mixing Kant's own Latin expressions with my own, especially where the two are similar but not identical, as in the case of *in infinitum* and *ad infinitum.*]

189[*unbestimmbar weiten Fortgangs.*]

190[*fort.*]

191[*lautet.*]

192[*eben.*]

193[*immer größer machen.*]

194[The two terms in the original are *Progressus* (which I usually render as 'progression') and *Fortgang.*]

195[Or 'proceed' or 'continue': *fortgehen*—the verb corresponding to *Fortgang* ('progression').]

196[I.e., in progression rather than regression.]

197[*wie* here, *als* just below and elsewhere.]

as something conditioned that is only alleged and givable[198] (*dabile*) and is added to without end.

But the situation is quite different with the problem concerning regression: How far does the regression[199] extend that ascends in a series from the given conditioned to the conditions? Can I say that it is a **regression to infinity**,[200] or only that it is a regression extending *indeterminably far*[201] (*in indefinitum*)? Hence can I from the now living human beings ascend, in the series of their progenitors, to infinity? Or can I say only that, no matter how far I have gone back,[202] I have never encountered an empirical basis for regarding the series as limited somewhere, and thus for each of the forefathers[203] I am entitled and also obligated to go on locating—although indeed not presupposing—his ancestor also?

In answer to these questions I say this:[204] (a) If the whole has been given in empirical intuition, then the regression in the series of the whole's internal conditions proceeds to infinity. (b) If [the regression is not one of decomposition,] however, i.e., if only a member of the series is given and the regression is first of all to proceed[205] from this member to absolute totality, then there takes place only a regression to an undetermined dis- B 541
tance[206] (*in indefinitum*). Hence[207] the division of some[208] matter given be- A 513
tween its bounds (i.e., a body)[209] must be said to proceed to infinity. For this matter is given as a whole, and consequently with all its possible parts, in empirical intuition. But the condition of this whole is its part, and the

[198][*nur angeblich; angeblich* means 'alleged,' but Kant is here relying also on the root meaning that *geblich* would have, viz , 'givable.']

[199][*Regressus* here and usually; in the rest of this and in the next paragraph Kant uses also *Rückgang*.]

[200][I.e., *in* (or *ad*) *infinitum*. See A 511 = B 539 br. n. 188.]

[201][*unbestimmbar weit*.]

[202][*zurückgegangen*, the verb corresponding to *Rückgang* ('regression').]

[203][*Urväter*.]

[204][The small parenthesized letters in the entire discussion below have been added.]

[205][*fortgehen* here, *gehen* just above]

[206][*in unbestimmte Weite*.]

[207][In case (a).]

[208][*einer*.]

[209][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 525, where Kant says that a body is a matter between determinate bounds and thus has a figure (or shape).]

condition of this part is the part of the part, etc.; and in this regression of decomposition an unconditioned (indivisible) member of this series of conditions is never encountered. Therefore, not only is there nowhere an empirical basis for stopping in the division, but the further members of the division that is to be continued are themselves empirically given prior to this continuing[210] division; i.e., the division proceeds to infinity.[211] By contrast,[212] the series of progenitors for a given human being is not given in its absolute[213] totality in any possible experience. But the regression still proceeds from each member of this [series of] procreation to a higher member, so that no empirical boundary is to be encountered that would exhibit a member as absolutely[214] unconditioned. Nevertheless, since even the members that might provide the condition for such [exhibition of a member as absolutely unconditioned] do not already lie, prior to the regression, in the empirical intuition of the whole, the regression proceeds not to infinity (in dividing the given) but to an indeterminable distance in locating further members for the given ones, and these further members are always given in turn only as conditioned.[215]

A 514 B 542 In neither of the two cases, the *regressus in infinitum* and the *regressus in indefinitum,* is the series of conditions regarded as being given as infinite in the object. These conditions are not things that are given in themselves, but only appearances, which are given as conditions of one another only in the regression itself. Hence the question no longer is how large this series of conditions is in itself, i.e., whether it is finite or infinite; for the series is nothing in itself. The question is, rather, how we are to perform the empirical regression, and how far we are to continue it. And here there is indeed[216] a notable difference regarding the rule for this advance. If the whole (a) has been given empirically, then it is *possible* to go back *to infinity*[217] in the series of the whole's internal conditions. However, if the

[210][*weitergehen* here, *fortsetzen* just above.]

[211][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 503–8, where Kant deals with the infinite divisibility of matter.]

[212][In case (b).]

[213][*absolut.*]

[214][*schlechthin.*]

[215][And hence only *in indefinitum.*]

[216][*denn.*]

[217][I.e., *ad infinitum: ins Unendliche . . . zurück zu gehen.*]

whole (b) is not given but is first to be given through empirical regression, then I can say only that it is *to infinity possible* to proceed to still higher conditions of the series. In the first case I was able to say that always more members are there, and are empirically given, than I reach through the regression (of decomposition). But in the second case I am able to say only that I can always proceed still further in the regression, because no member is empirically given as absolutely unconditioned, and thus any member always still admits a higher member as possible, and hence admits as necessary the inquiry about it. In the first case it was necessary to *encounter* further members; in the second, however, it is necessary always to *inquire* about further members, because no experience bounds anything absolutely. { A 515 B 543 } For either you have no perception that bounds your empirical regression absolutely;[218] and then you must not regard your regression as completed. Or you do have such a perception that bounds your series; and then this perception cannot be a part of the series that you have traversed (because what *bounds* must be distinguished from *what is bounded* by it); and thus you must continue your regression still further to this condition also, and so on.

The following section will put these remarks in their proper light by applying them.

[218] [*schechthin* here, *absolut* just above.]

Section IX
On the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle of Reason in Regard to All Cosmological Ideas[219]

There is, as we have shown repeatedly, no transcendental use of pure concepts either of understanding or of reason. The absolute totality of the series of conditions in the world of sense is based solely on a transcendental use of reason that demands this unconditioned completeness from what it
A 516 B 544 presupposes as being a thing in itself. The world of sense, however, does not contain such completeness. Therefore, the issue can never again be the absolute magnitude of the series that occur in the world of sense, i.e., whether they may be bounded or *in themselves* unbounded. Rather, the issue can only be how far, in tracing experience back to its conditions, we are to go back in the empirical regression in order that—in accordance with the rule of reason—we may stop at no other answer to reason's questions than one that is commensurate with the object.

Hence what alone remains to us is the *validity of the principle of reason* taken only as a rule of the *continuation* and magnitude of a possible experience—the principle's invalidity as a constitutive principle of appearances [taken as things] in themselves having been established sufficiently. Moreover, if we can beyond doubt display that validity of the principle taken as such a rule, reason's dispute with itself is wholly ended. For not only have we, through this critical solution, annulled the illusion that put reason at variance with itself; but, in its place, we are disclosing the sense in which reason agrees with itself and the misinterpretation of which alone prompted the dispute, and are thus transforming what would otherwise be only a *dialectical* principle into a *doctrinal* one. Indeed, if this principle

[219][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 318–19. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit* at A vii br. n. 5, 508–21.]

can be verified in[220] its subjective signification, whereby it is to determine understanding's greatest possible use in experience commensurately with the objects of experience, then this is to achieve just as much as if, like an {A 517 B 545} axiom, the principle determined objects in themselves a priori (which is impossible from pure reason). For even such a priori determination could have, in regard to objects[221] of experience, no greater influence on the expansion and correction of our cognition than would actively manifest itself in the most extensive experiential use of our understanding.

I
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF THE TOTALITY OF COMPOSITION OF APPEARANCES OF A WORLD WHOLE[222]

Here, as with the remaining cosmological questions, the basis of the regulative principle of reason is this proposition: that in empirical regression we can encounter *no experience of an absolute boundary,* and hence no experience of any condition as one that is *absolutely unconditioned empirically*. The basis[223] of this, however, is that such an experience would have to contain a bounding of appearances by nothing, or [i.e.] the void, [as something] that the continued regression could come upon by means of a perception—which is impossible.

Now this proposition,[224] which says as much as that in empirical regression I always arrive only at a condition that must itself be regarded in {A 518 B 546} turn as empirically conditioned, contains this rule *in terminis:*[225] that however far I may have got with this inquiry in the ascending series, I must always inquire about a still higher member of the series, whether or not I become acquainted with this member through experience.

[220][*nach.*]

[221][*Objekte* here, *Gegenstände* just above. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[222][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 319–23. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 508–9.]

[223][Or 'ground' or 'reason': *Grund.*]

[224][The proposition mentioned in the first sentence of the preceding paragraph.]

[225][In its (very) terms.]

Now nothing further is needed for the solution of the first cosmological problem than to establish also whether, in the regression to the unconditioned magnitude of the world whole (as regards time and space), this never bounded ascending can be called (a)[226] a *regression to infinity*[227] or (b) only an *indeterminably continued regression*[228] (*in indefinitum*).

The mere general presentation of the series of all past states of the world, as well as that of the series of all things that are simultaneous in cosmic space, is itself nothing but a possible empirical regression that I think, although still indeterminately; and only through this possible regression can there arise the concept of such a series of conditions for the given percep-
A 519 B 547 tion.[229] Now, I have the world whole always only in concept, and by no means (as a whole) in intuition. Hence I cannot from that whole's magnitude infer the magnitude of the regression and determine the regression's magnitude in accordance with that of the world; rather, I must frame a concept of the world's magnitude in the first place through the magnitude of the empirical regression. But of this regression I never know anything more than that from any given member of the series of conditions I must always proceed empirically to a still higher (more remote) member. Therefore, the magnitude of the whole of appearances is not thereby determined absolutely at all. Hence we also cannot say that this regression proceeds to infinity. For saying this would anticipate the members not yet reached by the regression, and would present their multitude as so great that it could not be reached by any empirical synthesis, and consequently would *determine* (although only negatively) the world's magnitude prior to the regression—which is impossible. For prior to the regression this [world] is not (as regards its totality) given to me at all; nor, therefore, is its magnitude. Accordingly, we cannot say anything at all about the world's magnitude in itself, not even that there occurs in the world a regression *in infinitum,* but we must merely search for the concept of the world's magnitude

[226][Small parenthesized letters added.]

[227][I.e., *in* (or *ad*) *infinitum.* See A 511 = B 539 br. n. 188.]

[228][*Regressus* here and in the remainder of subsection I, *Rückgang* just above.]

[229]Hence, by the same token, this world series cannot be either larger or smaller than the possible empirical regression on which alone its concept rests. And since this regression cannot give to us any determinate infinite, but just as little anything determinately finite (absolutely bounded), we clearly cannot assume the world's magnitude either as finite or as infinite, because the regression (through which this magnitude is presented) permits neither of the two.

according to the rule that determines the empirical regression in the world. This rule, however, says no more than that however far we may have got in the series of empirical conditions, we are not to assume an absolute boundary anywhere, but are to subordinate every appearance, as conditioned, to another as its condition, and hence are to proceed onward to this condition; and this is the regression *in indefinitum,* which, because it determines no magnitude in the object, can be distinguished distinctly enough from the regression *in infinitum.* {A 520 B 548}

Therefore, I cannot say that the world is *infinite* as regards past time or as regards space; for such a concept of magnitude as a given infinity is empirical, and hence is also absolutely impossible in regard to the world taken as an object of the senses. Nor shall I say that the regression from a given perception onward to all that bounds it in a series, both in space and in past time, proceeds *to infinity;* for saying this presupposes the world's magnitude to be infinite. Nor shall I say that this regression is *finite;* for an absolute boundary is likewise empirically impossible. I shall, therefore, be unable to say anything about the whole object of experience (the world of sense), but shall be able to say something only about the rule according to which experience is to be engaged in, and continued, commensurately with its object.

Hence the first and negative answer to the cosmological question concerning the world's magnitude is this: the world has no first beginning as regards time and no outermost boundary as regards space.

For in the opposite case the world would be bounded by empty time, on the one hand, and by empty space, on the other. Now since the world as appearance cannot in itself be bounded in either of the two ways, because appearance is not a thing in itself, there would have to be possible a perception of bounding by absolutely empty time or space through which these world ends would be given in a possible experience. Such an experience, however, being completely empty of content, is impossible. Therefore, an absolute[230] boundary of the world is impossible empirically, and hence also absolutely.[231] {A 521 B 549}

[230][*absolut* here, *schlechterdings* just below.]

[231]It will be noted that the proof has been conducted in a quite different way from the dogmatic proof provided above in the antithesis of the first antinomy.[a] We had there accepted[b] the world of sense, in accordance with the common and dogmatic way of presenting it, as a thing that is, as regards its totality, given in itself prior to all regression; and we had asserted that if the world does not occupy all time and

From this, then, there follows simultaneously the *affirmative* answer: the regression in the series of the world's appearances, as a determination of the world's magnitude, proceeds *in indefinitum*. This is equivalent to saying: the world of sense has no absolute magnitude; rather, the empirical regression (through which alone the world can be given on the side of its conditions) has its rule, viz., that from any member in the series, as a con-
A 522 B 550 ditioned member, we are always to advance (whether by our own experience, or the guide of history, or the chain of effects and their causes) to a still more remote member, and are not to refrain anywhere from expanding the possible use of our understanding—this expansion being, indeed, reason's proper and sole task with its principles.

This rule does not prescribe a determinate empirical regression that continues ceaselessly in a certain kind of appearances. E.g., it does not prescribe that from a living human being we must always ascend in a series of progenitors without expecting a first pair; or that in the series of cosmic[232] bodies we must always ascend without admitting an outermost sun. Rather, the rule commands only the advance from appearances to appearances, even if these were not to yield any actual perception (if, viz., the perception is for our consciousness too weak in degree to become experience); for these appearances do nonetheless belong to possible experience.

Any beginning is in time, and any boundary of what is extended is in space. Space and time, however, are only in the world of sense. Hence only appearances *in the world* are conditionally bounded, but *the world* itself is bounded neither in a conditioned nor in an unconditioned way.

Precisely on this account, and because the world can never *be given wholly* and even the series of conditions for a given conditioned cannot, as world series, *be given wholly*, the concept of the world's magnitude is given
A 523 B 551 only through the regression, and not prior to it in a collective intuition. This regression, however, always consists only in the [continued] *determining* of the magnitude. Therefore, it yields no *determinate* concept, and hence also no concept of a magnitude that would with respect to a certain [unit of] measure be infinite. The regression, therefore, does not proceed to infinity (as given, as it were), but proceeds to an undetermined distance, in

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all spaces, then it has no determinate position whatever in either. Hence the inference was likewise different from the one made here; viz., we there inferred the world's actual infinity.

[a][A 427–29/B 455–57.]

[b][*gelten lassen*.]

[232][I.e., celestial.]

order to yield a magnitude (of experience) which first becomes actual through this regression.

II
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA OF THE TOTALITY OF DIVISION OF A WHOLE GIVEN IN INTUITION[233]

If I divide a whole that is given in intuition, then I proceed from something[234] conditioned to the conditions of its possibility. The division of the parts (*subdivisio* or *decompositio*)[235] is a regression in the series of these conditions. The absolute totality of this *series* would be given only if the regression could reach *simple* parts. But if all the parts of a continuously progressing decomposition are always in turn divisible, then the division—i.e., the regression from the conditioned to its conditions—proceeds *in infinitum*. For the conditions (the parts) are contained in the conditioned itself; and since the conditioned is wholly given in an intuition that is enclosed between its bounds, the conditions[236] are one and all given with it also. Hence the regression must not be called merely a regression[237] *in indefinitum*, as we were permitted to call the previous cosmological idea only. In the previous case [also] I was to proceed from the conditioned to its conditions; but there the conditions were given outside the conditioned, and hence they were not given through the conditioned and simultaneously with it, but were first added in the empirical regression. Despite this, however, we are by no means permitted to say of such a whole which is divisible to infinity that *it consists of infinitely many parts*. For although the intuition of the whole contains all the parts, it yet does *not* contain the *whole division;* this division consists only in the progressing decomposition, or [i.e.] in the regression itself that first makes the series actual. Now since this regression is infinite, all the members (parts) that it reaches are indeed contained in the given whole taken as an *aggre-* { A 524 B 552 }

[233][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 323–29. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 509.]

[234][*einem.*]

[235][Subdivision or decomposition].

[236][I.e., the parts.]

[237][*Rückgang* here, *Regressus* just above and in the remainder of subsection II.]

gate;[238] but not contained therein is the whole *series of the division,* which is infinite successively and never *whole* and hence can exhibit no infinite multitude of parts and no gathering together of such a multitude in a whole.

This general notice can quite readily be applied, first, to space. Any space intuited within its bounds is a *whole* such that its parts are, in any decomposition, always in turn spaces; and hence any such space is divisible to infinity.

A 525 B 553 From this the second application of the notice follows quite naturally: viz., to an outer appearance enclosed within bounds (a body). The divisibility of such an appearance is based on the divisibility of space, for space amounts to the possibility of a body as an extended whole. Hence a body is divisible to infinity, yet without therefore consisting of infinitely many parts.[239]

It seems, to be sure, that because a body must be presented in space as being a substance, it will be different from space as regards the law of the divisibility of space. For we may surely admit at least this difference: Decomposition[240] can never remove all composition[241] in space; for all space, which otherwise has nothing independent[242] about it, would then cease to be (which is impossible). On the other hand, the claim that if all composition in matter were annulled in thought then nothing at all would remain seems not to be reconcilable with the concept of a substance; for a substance properly ought to be the subject of all composition, and would have to remain in its elements even if the connection of these elements in space, whereby they amount to a body, were annulled. However, what would indeed be thought [thus] concerning a thing in itself, through a pure concept of understanding, is not the case with what is called substance in [the realm of] appearance. This substance is not an absolute subject; it is, rather, a
A 526 B 554 permanent image belonging to sensibility and is nothing but intuition, in which nothing unconditioned whatsoever is to be met with.

But although this rule of advance to infinity does without any doubt have its place in the subdivision of an appearance as a mere occupying of space, yet the rule cannot hold if we want to extend it also to the multitude of parts that—in the given whole—are already separated in a certain way so

[238][Taking *Aggregate* to be dative singular rather than nominative plural.]

[239][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 503–8.]

[240][*Dekomposition.*]

[241][*Zusammensetzung.*]

[242][*Selbständiges.*]

as to[243] make up [an appearance as] a *quantum discretum.* To assume that in every structured (organized) whole each part is structured in turn, and that thus in dissecting the parts to infinity one always encounters new artful[ly structured] parts[244] —in a word, that the whole is structured to infinity: this assumption is quite unthinkable,[245] even though the alternative assumption that the parts of matter could to infinity become structured in their decomposition is indeed thinkable. For the infinity of the division of a given appearance in space is based solely on the fact that what is given through this appearance is merely [its] divisibility, i.e., merely a multitude of parts that in itself is absolutely indeterminate, whereas the parts themselves are given and determined only through the subdivision—in short, the fact that the whole is not in itself already divided. Hence in this whole the division can determine a multitude of parts that will go as far as one wants to advance in the regression of division. In the case of an organic body structured to infinity,[246] on the other hand, the whole is—precisely through this concept of an organic body—already presented as divided, and one [conceives that one] encounters in it, prior to any regression of division, a multitude of parts that is in itself determinate but also infinite—and thereby one contradicts oneself. For this infinite involution[247] is regarded as a series never to be completed (i.e., as infinite), and yet also—when gathered together[248]—as nonetheless completed. Infinite division characterizes only appearance as *quantum continuum,*[249] and is inseparable from the occupation of space; for precisely in this occupation lies the basis of infinite divisibility. But as soon as something is assumed as *quantum discretum,* then the multitude of units in it is determinate and hence, by the same token, is always equal to some number. Therefore, only experience can establish how far the organization in a structured body may go; and even if

{A 527 B 555}

243[*dadurch.*]

244[*Kunstteile.*]

245[*will sich gar nicht denken lassen*]

246[In the Critique of Teleological Judgment (the second half of the *Critique of Judgment*) an organic (or "organized") body (or "being") is characterized as one in which everything is a purpose (*Zweck*) and reciprocally also a means (Ak. V, 376); hence in the case of such a body the *idea* of the whole (as a purpose) is what allows us to judge and cognize all the parts in their systematic combination (Ak. V, 193, 426).]

247[Or 'enfolding': *Einwicklung.* Cf. the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 423, cf. 418.]

248[*in einer Zusammennehmung.*]

249[I.e., as continuous (rather than discrete) quantum] [actual] experience were certain to reach no inorganic part, yet such parts must lie at least in possible experience. But how far the transcendental division of an appearance as such extends is not a matter of experience at all, but is governed by a principle of reason whereby the empirical regression in the decomposition of what is extended is, in accordance with the nature of this appearance, never to be regarded as absolutely completed.

A 528 B 556

Concluding Comment on the Solution of the Mathematical-Transcendental Ideas, and Advance Notice on the Solution of the Dynamical-Transcendental Ideas[250]

We presented the antinomy of pure reason, through all the transcendental ideas, in a table.[251] We also indicated the basis of this conflict and the only remedy for removing it, which consisted in declaring both the opposed assertions to be false.[252] In doing all this, we everywhere presented the conditions as belonging to their conditioned according to relations of space and time, which is the usual presupposition of the common human understanding; and so this conflict was indeed based entirely on that presupposition. In this respect all the dialectical presentations of totality in the series of conditions for a given conditioned were indeed throughout of the same *kind*.[253] There was always a series, and in it the condition and the conditioned were connected as members of this series and were thereby *homogeneous*.[254] And thus the regression always had to be thought as uncompleted; or, if it was to be thought as completed, then a member that was in itself conditioned must falsely be assumed to be a first member and hence to be unconditioned. Therefore, although in all cases the object, i.e., the
A 529 B 557 conditioned, was not considered merely according to its magnitude, yet the series of conditions for this object was considered merely in this way. And thus the difficulty, which could be removed by no settlement but only by entirely severing the knot, consisted in reason's making the series[255] either

250[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 329–34. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 510–12.]

251[A 415/B 443.]

252[A 502–7/B 530–35.]

253[*von gleicher Art.*]

254[I.e., (again,) of the same kind: *gleichartig*]

255[*es.*]

too long or *too short* for the understanding, so that the understanding could never match reason's idea.

In all this we did, however, overlook an essential difference obtaining among the objects—i.e., the concepts of understanding—that reason endeavors to raise to ideas; for according to our table of categories provided above,[256] two of the categories signify a *mathematical* but the other two a *dynamical* synthesis of appearances. Up to this point we could, indeed, quite readily afford to overlook this difference. For just as in the general presentation of all the transcendental ideas we always remained subject to conditions *in [the realm of] appearance,* so in the two mathematical-transcendental ideas we also had no other *object* than the one in [the realm of] appearance. Now, however, we proceed to *dynamical* concepts of understanding insofar as these are to fit the idea of reason; and here this distinction[257] becomes important,[258] and opens up for us an entirely new outlook concerning the contest in which reason is embroiled. For previously this contest was *dismissed* as built, on both sides, on false presuppositions. But now, in the dynamical antinomy, perhaps there occurs a presupposition that can coexist with reason's pretension; and from this point of view, and with the judge compensating for the lack of legal bases that were mistaken [as being such] on both sides, the contest can be *settled* to the satisfaction of both parties—which could not be done with the dispute in the mathematical antinomy. {A 530 B 558}

The series of conditions are indeed homogeneous insofar as we take account only of their *extent:*[259] i.e., of whether they are commensurate with the idea, or whether the ideas are too large or too small for those series. However, the concept of understanding that underlies these ideas may contain either only a *synthesis of the homogeneous*[260] (this homogeneous is presupposed with any magnitude, in both the composition and division thereof), or a *synthesis of the heterogeneous;* this heterogeneous can at least be admitted in the dynamical synthesis, i.e., the synthesis of both the causal linkage[261] and the linkage of the necessary with the contingent.[262]

256[A 80/B 106.]

257[Between the dynamical and the mathematical categories.]

258[See above, A 160–61/B 199–200; also A 178–80/B 221–23]

259[*Erstreckung*.]

260[As in the case of the two mathematical-transcendental ideas.]

261[In the case of the third antinomy.]

262[In the case of the fourth antinomy.]

Hence in the case of the mathematical connection of series of appearances none but a *sensible* condition can come in, i.e., a condition that is itself a part of the series.[263] The dynamical series of sensible conditions, on the other hand, does also admit of a heterogeneous condition that is not
A 531 B 559 part of the series but, *as merely intelligible,* lies outside the series. Thus reason is satisfied; for the unconditioned is put prior to appearances, and yet the series of appearances, as always conditioned, is not thereby confused and—contrary to the principles of understanding—cut off.

Now because the dynamical ideas admit of a condition of appearances that lies outside the series of these, i.e., a condition that is not itself appearance, something occurs here that is entirely different from the result of the mathematical antinomy.[264] For the mathematical antinomy caused the result that both dialectical counterassertions[265] had to be declared false. By contrast, in the dynamical series the thoroughly conditioned—which is inseparable from these series as appearances—can be connected with the condition which, although empirically unconditioned, is also *nonsensible.* As so connected, this thoroughly conditioned can satisfy the *understanding,* on the one hand, and *reason,* on the other.[266] Thus the dialectical arguments that in one way or another sought unconditioned totality in mere ap-
A 532 B 560 pearances drop out; and hence the propositions of reason—in their signification as corrected in this way—can, by contrast,[267] *both* be *true.* This can never take place with the cosmological ideas that concern merely a mathematically unconditioned unity; for in their case we encounter no con-

[263][And thus homogeneous with it.]

[264]['mathematical' inserted (likewise just below), as suggested by Hartenstein and incorporated in the *Akademie* edition. Kant is here treating the two mathematical antinomies as *one* such antinomy involving two cases: (a) composition (first antinomy) and (b) division (second antinomy).]

[265][Kant here means assertions that counter *each other,* viz., thesis and antithesis.]

[266]For, the understanding does not permit among *appearances* any condition that would itself be empirically unconditioned. But if for some[a] conditioned one could conceive an *intelligible* condition—which thus would not likewise belong, as a member, in the series of appearances—but without thereby in the least interrupting the series of empirical conditions, then such a condition could be admitted as *empirically unconditioned,* and yet the empirical continuous regression would not thereby be impaired anywhere.

[a][*einem.*]

[267][With those in the mathematical antinomies. See br. n. 264, just above.]

dition of the series of appearances that is not itself appearance and as such likewise[268] a member of the series.

III
SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL IDEA[269] OF TOTALITY IN THE DERIVATION OF WORLD EVENTS FROM THEIR CAUSES[270]

Only two kinds of causality can be conceived in regard to what occurs, viz., either a causality according to *nature* or one from *freedom.* The causality according to nature is the connection, in the world of sense, of one state with a previous state upon which the state follows according to a rule. Now the *causality* of appearances rests on conditions of time; and the previous state, if it had always been there, would not have produced an effect that first arises in time. Therefore, the causality of the cause[271] of what occurs or comes about has likewise *come about,* and—according to the principle of understanding—itself requires a cause in turn.

By freedom, on the other hand, in the cosmological sense of the term, I mean the power[272] to begin a state *on one's own.*[273] Thus the causality of freedom is not in turn subject, according to the law of nature, to another cause that determines it as regards time. Freedom, in this meaning of the term, is a pure transcendental idea. This idea, first, contains nothing borrowed from experience. Moreover, second, the object of this idea cannot be given determinately in any experience, because there is a universal law of the very possibility of all experience whereby whatever occurs must have a cause, and whereby, therefore, also the cause's causality which *itself has occurred* or come about must in turn have a cause. And thus the entire realm of experience, however far it may extend, is transformed into a sum of what is mere nature. But since in this way no absolute totality of conditions in

{ A 533 B 561 }

[268][*mit . . . ausmacht.*]

[269][Reading, with Erdmann, *Idee* for *Ideen.*]

[270][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 334–45. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 512–13.]

[271][*Kausalität der Ursache.*]

[272][Or 'ability': *Vermögen.* See A xii br. n. 16.]

[273][I.e., spontaneously: *von selbst.*]

junction, or whether—rather—*both* can, with one and the same event but in different reference, take place simultaneously. As for the principle concerning the thoroughgoing connection[288] of all events in the world of sense according to immutable natural laws, its correctness is already established as a principle of the Transcendental Analytic and tolerates no impairment. Hence the question is only whether, in regard to the same effect that is determined according to nature, freedom can nonetheless also take place, or whether freedom is completely excluded by that inviolable rule. And here the deceptive, although common, presupposition of the *absolute reality* of appearances at once shows its detrimental influence of confusing our reason. For if appearances[289] are things in themselves, then freedom cannot be saved. Nature is then the complete and in itself sufficiently determining cause of every event, and the condition of this cause is always contained only in the series of appearances—which, along with their effect, are nec-
A 537 B 565 essary under natural law. If, on the other hand, appearances count as nothing more than they in fact are, viz., if they count not as things in themselves but as mere presentations connected[290] according to empirical laws, then they must themselves still have bases[291] that are not appearances. But such an intelligible cause[292] is not, as regards its causality, determined by appearances, although its effects appear and thus can be determined by other appearances. Hence this cause, along with its causality, is outside the series of empirical conditions, whereas its effects are encountered within the series. Hence the effect can be considered as free with regard to its intelligible cause, and yet with regard to appearances be considered simultaneously as resulting from these according to the necessity of nature. This distinction, when set forth in a universal way[293] and quite abstractly, must appear extremely subtle and obscure, but it will become clear in its application. Here I wanted only to make the comment that since the thoroughgoing connection of all appearances in one context of nature is an inexorable law, this law would necessarily have to overturn all freedom if one were to adhere obstinately to the reality of appearances. This is also the

288[Or 'coherence': *Zusammenhang*.]

289[I.e., things that appear.]

290[Or 'cohering': *die . . zusammenhängen*.]

291[Or 'grounds': *Gründe*. See B xix br. n. 79.]

292[Or, i e., basis.]

293[*im allgemeinen*.]

reason why those who follow the common opinion in this matter have never succeeded in reconciling nature and freedom with each other.

Possibility of the Causality through Freedom, as Reconciled[294] with the Universal Law of Natural Necessity[295]

{A 538 B 566}

What in an object of the senses is not itself appearance I call *intelligible*. Accordingly, if what in the world of sense must be regarded as appearance has, when taken in itself, also a power which is not an object of sensible intuition but through which it can still be the cause of appearances, then the *causality* of this being can be considered from two sides: as *intelligible*, according to its action as that of a thing in itself; and as *sensible*, according to the effects of this causality as those of an appearance in the world of sense. Thus regarding such a subject's power we would frame an empirical as well as an intellectual concept of its causality, these concepts occurring together in one and the same effect. Such a twofold side from which to think the power of an object of the senses contradicts none of the concepts that we have to frame of appearances and of a possible experience. For since these appearances are not in themselves things, they must be based on a transcendental object determining them as mere presentations; and hence nothing prevents us from attributing to this transcendental object, besides the property through which it appears, also a *causality* {A 539 B 567} that is not appearance although its *effect* is nonetheless encountered in appearance.[296] Any efficient cause, however, must have a **character**,[297] i.e., a law of its causality[298] without which it would not be a cause at all. And thus in a subject of the world of sense we would have, first, an *empirical character*. Through this character the subject's actions, as appearances, would according to constant natural laws stand throughout in connection with other appearances and could be derived from these appearances as the actions' conditions; and thus these actions would, in combination with those other appearances, amount to members of a single series of the natural or-

[294][Or 'as United': *in Vereinigung*.]

[295][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 345–52, 397–406. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 513–14.]

[296][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 453–59.]

[297][*Charakter.*]

[298][*Kausalität;* 'cause' just below translates *Ursache*.]

the causal relation can be obtained, reason creates for itself the idea of a spontaneity that can, on its own, start to act—without, i.e., needing to be preceded[274] by another cause by means of which it is determined to action in turn, according to the law of causal connection.

Extremely noteworthy is the fact that this *transcendental idea of freedom* is the basis of the practical concept of freedom, and that transcendental freedom is what in practical freedom[275] amounts to the proper moment[276] of the difficulties that have all along surrounded the question of
A 534 B 562 practical freedom's possibility. *Freedom in the practical meaning* of the term is the independence of our power of choice[277] from coercion[278] by impulses of sensibility. For a power of choice is *sensible*[279] insofar as it is *pathologically affected* (i.e., affected[280] by motivating causes[281] of sensibility); it is called animal power of choice (*arbitrium brutum*) if it can be *pathologically necessitated.*[282] The human power of choice, although an *arbitrium sensitivum,*[283] is an *arbitrium* not *brutum* but *liberum;*[284] for its action is not made necessary[285] by sensibility, but the human being has a power to determine himself on his own, independently of coercion by sensible impulses.

We readily see that if all causality in the world of sense were merely nature, then every event would be determined by another event in time and according to necessary laws; and hence, since appearances insofar as they determine the power of choice would have to make every action necessary as their natural result, the annulment of transcendental freedom would simultaneously eliminate all practical freedom. For practical freedom pre-

[274][*vorangeschickt werden.*]

[275][*jene in dieser.*]

[276][I.e., key element.]

[277][*Willkür.*]

[278][*Nötigung.* I usually translate *nötigen* as 'to compel,' but 'compulsion' would sound too psychological here.]

[279][I.e., belongs to sensibility]

[280][On this and the entire paragraph, cf. A 802 = B 830.]

[281][*Bewegursachen.*]

[282][*necessitiert.*]

[283][Sensory (sensible) power of choice.]

[284][Not animal but free.]

[285][*notwendig.*]

supposes that although something did not occur, it yet *ought* to have occurred, and that hence the cause of this something in [the realm of] appearance was not completely determinative: not so determinative, viz., that there did not lie in our power of choice a causality for producing, independently of those natural causes and even against their force and influence, something that in the time order is determined according to empirical laws—and hence a causality whereby we can begin a series of events *entirely on our own.*

Hence what happens here—as we find in general in the conflict of a reason that ventures beyond the bounds of possible experience—is that the problem is in fact not *physiological* but *transcendental.* Hence the question of the possibility of freedom does indeed challenge psychology; but since it rests on dialectical arguments of the merely pure reason, it must, along with its solution, engage only transcendental philosophy. Now in order to enable transcendental philosophy to give a satisfactory answer to this problem, which it cannot decline to do, I must first try—by the following remark—to determine more closely the procedure of transcendental philosophy in dealing with this problem. {A 535 B 563}

If appearances were things in themselves, and hence if space and time were forms of the existence of things themselves, then the conditions and the conditioned would always belong, as members, to one and the same series. And from this there would arise, in the present case also, the antinomy that is common to all transcendental ideas: viz., that this series would have to turn out inevitably too large or too small for the understanding. However, the dynamical concepts of reason,[286] with which we are dealing in this and the following subsection,[287] have the following peculiarity. Because these concepts have to do not with an object considered as a magnitude but only with the object's *existence,* we can abstract also from the magnitude of the series of conditions, and what matters in their case is merely the dynamical relation of the condition to the conditioned. Thus in the question concerning nature and freedom we already encounter the difficulty as to whether freedom is even possible at all, and, if it is possible, whether it can coexist with the universality of the natural law of causality. And hence the question arises whether the proposition that every effect in the world must arise *either* from nature *or* from freedom is a correct dis- {A 536 B 564}

[286][In contrast to the mathematical concepts of reason, which were dealt with in subsections I and II.]

[287][*Nummer;* viz., III and IV]

der. Second, one would have to grant to the subject also an *intelligible character*. Through this character the subject is indeed the cause of those actions as appearances, but the character itself is not subject to any conditions of sensibility and is not itself appearance. The first character could also be called the character of such a thing in [the realm of] appearance, the second the character of the thing in itself.

Now according to its intelligible character this acting subject would not stand under[299] any conditions of time; for time is the condition only of appearances and not of things in themselves. In this subject no *action* would
A 540 B 568 *arise* or *pass away*. Hence it would also not be subjected to the law of all time determination and of everything changeable, viz., that everything *that occurs* has[300] its cause *in appearances* (those of the previous state). In a word, the subject's causality, insofar as it is intellectual, would not stand at all in the series of empirical conditions that make the event necessary in the world of sense. We could not, indeed, ever become acquainted with this intelligible character directly, because we cannot perceive anything except insofar as it appears; but we would still have to *think* it in accordance with the empirical character, just as in general we must—in thought—lay a transcendental object at the basis of appearances although we know nothing about this object as to what it is in itself.[301]

Hence according to its empirical character this subject, as appearance, would be subjected to all laws of determination in terms of causal linkage. To this extent the subject would be nothing but a part of the world of sense; and its effects would, like any other appearance, flow from nature unfailingly. Just as[302] outer appearances would influence[303] this subject, and as the subject's empirical character, i.e., the law of its causality, would be cognized through experience, so all its actions would have to be explicable according to natural laws, and all requirements for a complete and necessary determination of these actions would have to be found in a possible experience.

A 541 B 569 But according to its intelligible character (although we can have nothing more of this character than just the general concept of it) the same subject would nonetheless have to be pronounced free from any influence of

299[I.e., be subject to.]

300[Literally, 'encounters' or 'finds': *antreffe*.]

301[See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak IV, 461–63.]

302[Or, perhaps, 'In the way in which'. *So wie*.]

303[*einfließen*]

sensibility and determination by appearances. For insofar as this subject is *noumenon,* nothing *occurs* in it and there is found in it no change requiring dynamical time determination and hence no connection with appearances as causes. Therefore, this active being would to this extent be independent and free in its actions from all natural necessity, which is found only in the world of sense. Of this subject we would say quite correctly that it begins its effects in the world of sense *on its own,*[304] without the action's beginning *in the subject* itself.[305] And this would be valid without any consequent[306] need for the effects in the world of sense to begin on their own.[307] For in that world they are always predetermined—although only by means of the empirical character (which is merely the appearance of the intelligible character)—by empirical conditions in the previous time, and are possible only as a continuation of the series of natural causes. And thus freedom and nature, each in the complete meaning of its term, would be found in the same actions—according as these are compared with their intelligible or with their sensible cause—simultaneously and without any conflict.

Elucidation of the Cosmological Idea of a Freedom in Combination with the Universal Natural Necessity[308] {A 542 B 570

I thought it good to start by[309] sketching the outline of the solution to our transcendental problem, in order that we might better survey the course that reason takes in solving the problem. Let us now spell out the moments that are in fact at issue in deciding this solution, and examine each separately.

Consider the natural law that everything that occurs has a cause; that since the causality of this cause,[310] i.e., the *action,* precedes [the effect] in time and—in regard to an effect that has *arisen*—cannot itself always have been there but must have *occurred,* this causality likewise has among appearances its cause whereby it is determined; and that, consequently, all

304[*von selbst.*]

305[*in ihm selbst.*]

306[*darum.*]

307[*von selbst.*]

308[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 352–87, 397–406. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit* at A vii br. n 5, 514–18.]

309[*zuerst.*]

310[*die Kausalität dieser Ursache.*]

events are determined empirically within a natural order. This law, through which appearances can first amount to a *nature* and yield objects of an experience, is a law of understanding from which we are not permitted on any pretext to deviate, nor exempt any appearance. For otherwise we would posit the appearance outside of all possible experience, but thereby would
A 543 B 571 distinguish it from all objects of possible experience and thus would turn it into a mere thought-entity and chimera.

Thus it looks, here, as if there is only a chain of causes that in the regression to the causes' conditions permits no *absolute totality* at all. Yet this perplexity in no way detains us; for it has already been removed in our general judgment on the antinomy of reason, into which reason falls when in the series of appearances it aims at the unconditioned. If we wish to yield to the delusion of transcendental realism, then we are left with neither nature nor freedom. Here the question is only whether, if in the entire series of all events we acknowledge nothing but natural necessity, it is still possible to regard the same event, which on the one hand is a mere natural effect, as yet being on the other hand an effect arising from freedom, or whether we find between these two kinds of causality a direct contradiction.

Among the causes in [the realm of] appearance there assuredly cannot be anything that could absolutely and on its own begin a series. For here every action, as appearance, insofar as it produces an event, is itself an event or happening that presupposes another state wherein its cause is to be found; and thus everything that occurs is only a continuation of the series, and in
A 544 B 572 this series no beginning that takes place on its own is possible. Hence all the actions of natural causes in the time sequence are themselves in turn effects that likewise presuppose their causes in the time series. An *original* action, through which something occurs that was not there before, is not to be expected from the causal connection of appearances.

But if effects are appearances, is it indeed also necessary that the causality of their cause, which (cause) itself is also appearance, must be solely empirical? And is it not possible, rather, that although every effect in [the realm of] appearance does indeed require a connection[311] with its cause according to laws of empirical causality, yet this empirical causality itself could nonetheless, without in the least interrupting its connection with natural causes, be an effect of a causality that is not empirical but intelligible? I.e., could not the empirical causality itself be an effect of an action, origi-

[311] [*Verknüpfung* here, *Zusammenhang* just below.]

nal in regard to appearances, of a cause that in so far[312] is therefore not appearance but—according to this power—intelligible, although otherwise it also must, as a link in the chain of nature, be classed entirely with the world of sense?

The principle of the causality of appearances among one another is required by us in order that for natural events we can seek and indicate natural conditions, i.e., causes in [the realm of] appearance. If this requirement is granted to us and not weakened by any exception, then the understanding—which in its empirical use sees in all happenings nothing but nature and is, moreover, entitled to do so—has all that it can demand, and physical explanations proceed along their course unhindered. Now in this [task] the understanding is not impaired in the least if one assumes—even supposing that the assumption were, besides, to be merely invented—that among the natural causes there are also some which have a power that is only intelligible, inasmuch as this power's determination to action never rests on empirical conditions but rests on mere bases of understanding—yet rests on these in such a way that this cause's *action in [the realm of] appearance* conforms to all laws of empirical causality. For in this way the acting subject would, as *causa phaenomenon,*[313] be linked up with nature in the unsevered dependence of all this cause's actions; and this subject's phenomenon[314] (with all its causality in [the realm of] appearance) would only contain certain conditions that, if one wants to ascend from the empirical object to the transcendental, would have to be re- {A 545 B 573}

[312][Or, possibly, 'an effect of a cause's action that in regard to appearances is original and in so far.' Although this latter reading connects well with the preceding discussion of original *action*, the reference to *power* suggests that Kant is now referring to the *cause*. Cf. below, A 545 = B 573 and A 546 = B 574.]

[313][Phenomenal cause.]

[314][I.e., the subject's appearance, by which Kant means simply the appearing subject. This appearing subject can still, when considered in itself, have intelligible properties. See, e.g., A 538 = B 566, A 539 = B 567; and just above, where Kant speaks of *natural* causes as having an intelligible power. Hartenstein's substitution of 'noumenon' for 'phenomenon' raises, moreover, several other difficulties. First, whereas it makes sense to speak of the subject as not only (as phenomenal) *being* an appearance but also (as noumenal) *having* an appearance (as the phrase 'the subject's phenomenon' implies), the subject (whether as phenomenal or noumenal) cannot *have a noumenon*, but can only *be* one (cf. A 541/B 569). Second, the causality of the subject as *noumenal* would *not* be in the realm of appearance—only its effects would be. (Cf. the continuation of this paragraph, and Erdmann's note in the *Akademie* edition, Ak. III, 590.) Third (cf. again Erdmann, *ibid.*), it is from the *empirical* object—here the subject; cf. the end of A 546 = B 574—that we may want to ascend to the transcendental one.]

garded as merely intelligible. For if we only follow the rule of nature in regard to what may be the cause among appearances, then we need not be concerned as to what sort of basis of these appearances and their connection is being thought in the transcendental subject, which is empirically unknown[315] to us. This intelligible basis in no way challenges the empirical questions, but concerns perhaps merely the thinking in pure understand-
A 546 B 574 ing; and although the effects of this thinking and acting of pure understanding are found in the appearances, yet these appearances must nonetheless be capable of being explained completely, according to natural laws, from their cause in [the realm of] appearance. The appearances must be capable of being explained by pursuing, as the supreme basis of explanation, their merely empirical character, and by entirely bypassing as unknown the intelligible character that is the empirical character's transcendental cause—except insofar as this intelligible character is indicated by the empirical character as the intelligible character's sensible sign.[316] Let us apply this to experience. The human being is one of the appearances in the world of sense, and in so far is also one of the natural causes, the causality of which must be subject to empirical laws. As such a cause he must, accordingly, also have an empirical character, as do all other things of nature. We discern this character through abilities and powers[317] that he manifests in his effects. In inanimate nature, or in animate but merely animal[318] nature, we find no basis for thinking any power as being other than merely sensibly conditioned. Only the human being, who otherwise is acquainted with all of nature solely through his senses, cognizes himself also through mere apperception—viz., in actions and inner determinations that he cannot class at all with any impression of the senses. And thus he is to himself, indeed, on the one hand phenomenon, but on the other hand—viz., in regard to certain powers—a merely intelligible object, because his action
A 547 B 575 cannot be classed at all with the receptivity of sensibility. We call these [specifically human] powers understanding and reason. Reason, above all, is quite particularly and primarily distinguished from all empirically conditioned abilities, because it examines its objects merely according to ideas

[315][*unbekannt*; likewise just below, A 546 = B 574.]

[316][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 453–63.]

[317][*Kräfte und Vermögen.* When used in reference to mental powers, *Kräfte* is actually synonymous with *Vermögen* (see also A xii br. n. 16). On the term 'ability,' see A 19/B 33 br n 10 and A 51/B 75 br n 22.]

[318][*bloß tierisch belebt.*]

and according to these ideas determines the understanding, which then makes an empirical use of its own (although likewise pure) concepts.

Now, that this reason has causality, or that we at least conceive such a causality in it, is evident from the *imperatives* which, in all that is practical,[319] we impose as rules on the performative powers.[320] The *ought* expresses a kind of necessity and connection with bases[321] that does not otherwise occur in all of nature. The understanding can cognize regarding nature only *what is,* or has been, or will be. That something in nature *ought to be* other than what in fact it is in all these time relations—this is impossible; indeed, the [term] ought, if we have in mind merely the course of nature, has no meaning whatsoever. We cannot ask at all what ought to happen in nature, any more than what properties a circle ought to have, but can ask only what happens in nature, or what properties the circle has.

Now this *ought*[322] expresses a possible action whose basis is nothing but a mere concept, whereas the basis of a mere action of nature must always be an appearance. Now the [concept-based] action must indeed be possible under natural conditions, if the *ought* is directed to nature;[323] however, these natural conditions concern not the determination itself of the power of choice but only this determination's[324] effect and result in [the realm of] appearance. No matter how many natural bases—how many sensible stimuli—impel me to *will,*[325] they yet cannot produce the *ought;* they can produce only a willing that is far from necessary but is always conditioned, whereas the *ought*[326] pronounced by reason opposes this conditioned willing with standard and goal[327] —indeed, with prohibition and authority. Whether the object[328] is one of mere sensibility (the agreeable) or even of pure reason (the good), reason does not yield to the empirically { A 548 B 576

319[I.e., all that has to do with action.]

320[*ausübende Kräfte* (cf. br. n. 317, just above).]

321[Or 'grounds': *Gründe* See B xix br. n. 79).]

322[*Sollen;* emphasis added here and in the next occurrence of the term, at the beginning of A 548 = B 576.]

323[*sie.*]

324[*derselben.*]

325[*Wollen.*]

326[Emphasis added.]

327[*Maß und Ziel.*]

328[The object of my power of choice]

given basis and does not follow the order of things as they exhibit themselves in appearance, but with complete spontaneity makes for itself an order of its own according to ideas. Reason adapts the empirical conditions to accord with these ideas, and in conformity with these ideas declares to be necessary even such actions as in fact[329] *have not occurred* and perhaps will not occur, but concerning which reason nonetheless presupposes that it can have causality in reference to them, since otherwise reason would not expect from its ideas effects in experience.

Let us now remain with this point and assume as at least possible that A 549 B 577 reason actually has causality with regard to appearances. In that case, despite being all reason,[330] it must yet show itself as having an empirical character. For any cause presupposes a rule according to which certain appearances follow as effects; and any rule requires a uniformity of effects that is the basis for the concept of cause (as a power). And this concept, insofar as it must become evident from mere appearances, we may call the power's empirical character. This character is constant, whereas the effects appear in changeable shapes according to the difference in the accompanying and in part limiting conditions.

Thus every human being's power of choice[331] has an empirical character. This character is nothing but a certain causality of his reason insofar as this causality shows in its effects in [the realm of] appearance a rule whereby one can gather, in terms of their kind and degrees, the bases[332] and actions of his reason and thereby judge the subjective principles of his power of choice. Since this empirical character itself must be drawn from appearances, as its effect, and from the rule of these as provided to us by experience, all actions of a human being are determined in appearance on the basis of[333] his empirical character and the other contributing[334] causes according to the order of nature; and if we could explore all appearances A 550 B 578 of his power of choice down to the bottom, there would not be a single human action that we could not with certainty predict and cognize as nec-

[329][*doch.*]

[330][Literally, 'no matter how much it is reason.']

[331][*Willkür.*]

[332][Or 'grounds']

[333][*aus.*]

[334][*mitwirkend.*]

essary from[335] its preceding conditions. In regard to this empirical character, therefore, there is no freedom; and yet only in terms of this character can we consider a human being if we seek merely to **observe** him and, as is done in anthropology, explore physiologically the motivating causes of his actions.

But if we examine the same actions in reference to reason—not, however, speculative reason in order to *explain* them in terms of their origin, but reason solely insofar as it is itself the cause *for producing* them—in a word: if we compare these actions with reason in a *practical* regard, then we find a rule and order quite different from the order of nature. For in that regard perhaps there *ought not to have occurred* all that according to nature's course yet *has occurred* and according to its own empirical bases inevitably had to occur. But sometimes we find, or at least believe that we find, that the ideas of reason have actually proved their causality in regard to human beings' actions considered as appearances, and that these actions have occurred not because they were determined by empirical causes—no: but because they were determined by bases of reason.

Now supposing one could say that reason has causality in regard to appearance: could reason's action then indeed be called free, when in reason's empirical character (the way of sensing)[336] the action is quite exactly determined and necessary? This empirical character in turn is determined in the intelligible character (the way of thinking).[337] We are not, however, acquainted with the intelligible character but designate it only by appearances, which, properly speaking, allow[338] us to cognize directly only the way of sensing (empirical character).[339] Now insofar as the action is at- { A 551 B 579 }

[335][*aus.*]

[336][*Sinnesart.*]

[337][*Denkungsart.*]

[338][*geben.*]

[339]Hence the morality proper of actions (merit and guilt),[a] even the morality of our own conduct, remains entirely hidden to us. Our imputations can be referred only to the empirical character. But no one can fathom how much of this character is a pure effect of freedom, and how much is to be ascribed to mere nature: viz., either to a defect of temperament that one has through no fault of one's own,[b] or to one's temperament's fortunate[c] constitution (*meritum fortunae*).[d] And hence no one can pass judgment[e] in accordance with complete justice.

[a][*Verdienst und Schuld.* Note that Kant says 'and' here, not 'or.' In other words, what is said to be hidden from us is not whether an action is morally *good or bad* (i.e., moral or *immoral*), but whether it falls within the moral sphere *at all* (i.e., whether it is moral or

tributable to the way of thinking as its cause, it yet in no way results from this way of thinking according to empirical laws, i.e., in such a way that the conditions of pure reason *precede* the action, but only in such a way that the effects of these in [the realm of] appearance of inner sense precede it. Pure reason, as a merely intelligible power, is not subjected to the form of time, nor consequently to the conditions of temporal succession. The causality of reason in its intelligible character by no means *arises,* or starts at
A 552 B 580 a certain time, in order to produce an effect. For otherwise it would itself be subjected to the natural law of appearances insofar as this law determines causal series with regard to time, and the causality of reason would then be nature, not freedom. Hence we must be entitled to say that if reason can have causality in regard to appearances, then it is a power *through* which the sensible condition of an empirical series of effects first begins. For the condition that lies in reason is not sensible and hence does not itself begin. Accordingly, there takes place here what in all empirical series we were unable to find:[340] viz., that the *condition* of a successive series of events can[341] itself be empirically unconditioned. For here the condition is *outside* the series of appearances (viz., in the intelligible) and hence is subjected to no sensible condition and no time determination by a preceding cause.

Yet in another reference the same cause belongs nonetheless also to the series of appearances. The human being is himself an appearance. His power of choice has an empirical character that is the (empirical) cause of all his actions. There is no condition determining a human being in accordance with this character which is not contained in the series of natural effects and which does not obey nature's law—the law according to which

nonmoral). Now in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (Ak. VI, 227) Kant draws a *different* (and tripartite) distinction between *verdienstlich (meritum), Schuldigkeit (debitum),* and *moralische Verschuldung (demeritum)*—respectively, 'meritorious,' 'debt due,' and 'moral guiltiness (or liability)'. Of these, *verdienstlich* ('meritorious') agrees with 'merit' as used above. As regards the remaining two terms in the tripartite distinction, *both* terms, *Schuldigkeit* and *(moralische) Verschuldung,* contain the term *Schuld* (likewise used above) This is possible because *Schuld* can mean *either* 'debt' *or* 'guilt.' Of these two, only 'guilt' fits the distinction that Kant is making *here* (cf. also A 555 = B 583).]

[b][*unverschuldet.*]

[c][*glücklich.*]

[d][Reward of fortune.]

[e][*richten.*]

[340][*vermissen.*]

[341][*konnte.*]

an unconditioned empirical causality of what occurs in time is not to be found at all. Therefore, no given action (since it can be perceived only as appearance) can begin absolutely on its own. Of reason, however, one cannot say that the state wherein it determines the power of choice[342] is preceded by another state wherein that state itself is determined. For since reason itself is not an appearance and is not subjected to any conditions of sensibility, there takes place in reason, even as concerns its causality, no temporal succession; and hence the dynamical law of nature that determines temporal succession according to rules cannot be applied to reason. {A 553 B 581}

Hence reason is the permanent condition of all the voluntary[343] actions under which the human being appears. Each of these actions, even before it occurs, is predetermined in the human being's empirical character. But in regard to the intelligible character, of which the empirical character is only the sensible schema, no *before* or *after* holds, and every action—regardless of its time relation to other appearances—is the direct[344] effect of the intelligible character of pure reason. Hence pure reason acts freely, i.e., without being dynamically determined in the chain of natural causes by external or internal bases that precede the action as regards time. And this freedom of pure reason can be regarded not only negatively, as independence from empirical conditions (for the power of reason would thus cease to be a cause of appearances). Rather, this freedom can be designated also positively, as a power of reason to begin on its own a series of events.[345] Reason begins the series in such a way that nothing begins in reason itself, but that reason, as unconditioned condition of any voluntary action, permits no conditions above itself that precede the action as regards time—although reason's effect does begin in the series of appearances, but in the series can never amount to an absolutely first beginning. {A 554 B 582}

To illustrate the regulative principle of reason involved here by an example drawn from the principle's empirical use—not to confirm it (for such proofs by example are unsuitable for transcendental assertions)—let us take

342[*Willkür.*]

343[Or 'chosen'· *willkürlich*]

344[*unmittelbar;* see B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

345[For other places where Kant distinguishes freedom in the negative sense from freedom in the positive sense, see the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 446–47, 452–53, 454–55, 457–58; also the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 213–14, 221, 226.]

a voluntary action, e.g., a malicious lie, by means of which a person[346] has brought a certain amount of confusion into society.[347] And suppose that we first investigate his action as to its motivating causes[348] from which it arose, and that thereupon we judge how the action can, along with its consequences, be imputed to him. In pursuing the first aim we search[349] through the agent's empirical character until we come to its sources. We locate these in bad upbringing, evil company,[350] partly also in the wickedness of a natural makeup[351] that is insensitive to shame; and partly we put them to frivolity and rashness. Here, then, we do not ignore the occasioning causes that prompted the action. In all this we proceed as we do in general when we investigate the series of determining causes for a given
A 555 B 583 natural effect. But although we believe the action to be determined by these causes, we nevertheless blame the perpetrator. We blame him not because of his unfortunate natural makeup, nor because of the circumstances influencing him—indeed, not even because of his previous way of life. For we presuppose that we can set aside entirely how this way of life was,[352] and that we can regard the bygone series of conditions as not having occurred, and can regard this deed as entirely unconditioned with respect to the previous state, as if the perpetrator starts with it a series of consequences completely on his own. This blame is based on a law of reason; and reason is regarded in this blaming as a cause that, regardless of all the mentioned empirical conditions, could and ought to have determined the person's conduct differently. And the causality of reason is by no means regarded merely as concurrence; rather, it is regarded as in itself complete, even if the sensible incentives were not at all for this causality but were even against it. The action is imputed to the agent's intelligible character: now—at the instant when he is lying—the guilt is entirely his. Hence his reason, regardless of all empirical conditions of the deed, was wholly free, and to its failure[353] is the deed to be imputed entirely.

[346][*Mensch.*]

[347][*Gesellschaft.*]

[348][*Bewegursachen.*]

[349][*gehen.*]

[350][*Gesellschaft*]

[351][*Naturell.*]

[352][*beschaffen.*]

[353][I.e , his reason's failure to adhere to the truth: *ihrer Unterlassung*]

We can readily see from this imputing judgment that in making it we are thinking that reason is in no way affected by all that sensibility;[354] that reason does not change (although reason's appearances—viz., the way in which reason manifests itself in its effects—do change); that in reason there is no antecedent state determining the subsequent state, and that reason therefore does not belong at all in the series of sensible conditions that make appearances necessary according to natural laws. Reason is present to, and is the same in, all actions of the human being in all circumstances of time. But reason itself is not in time, and by no means gets into a new state in which it previously was not; with regard to this state reason is *determinative,*[355] but not *determinable.* Hence we cannot ask, Why did reason not determine *itself* differently?—but only, Why did reason not determine *appearances* differently through its causality? To this, however, no answer is possible. For a different intelligible character of reason would have given a different empirical character. And when we say that regardless of his entire previous way of life the perpetrator could still have abstained from the lie, this means only that the lie is directly subject to[356] the force of reason, and reason is not subjected[357] in its causality to any conditions of appearance and of the course of time. And it means, moreover, that although the difference of time can make a principal difference for appearances in regard to one another, it can make no difference for the action in reference to reason, because appearances are not things[358] in themselves and hence are also not causes[359] in themselves. {A 556 B 584}

Hence in judging free actions with regard to their causality we can get only as far as the intelligible cause, but not *beyond it.* We can cognize that this cause determines[360] [actions] freely, i.e., independently of sensibility, and that in this way it can be the sensibly unconditioned condition of ap- {A 557 B 585}

[354][I.e., by all those sensible incentives.]

[355][Or 'determining' or 'determinant': *bestimmend.*]

[356][*stehen unter.*]

[357][*unterworfen.*]

[358][*Sachen.*]

[359][*Ursachen.*]

[360][*bestimmt.* The grammar of this sentence allows this alternative reading: 'We can cognize that this cause can be free, i.e., determined [*bestimmt*] independently of sensibility, and that in this way it can be the sensibly unconditioned condition of appearances.' However, the intelligible cause (reason) has all along been said to *determine* (actions), not to *be determined.* Kant said this most recently and quite explicitly at A 556 = B 584, and he implies it again

pearances. But why the intelligible character gives precisely these appearances and this empirical character under the conditions at hand—this question far exceeds all our reason's power to answer it, indeed, all its right even to ask it; it exceeds these as far as if we asked whence it is that the transcendental object of our outer sensible intuition gives us precisely intuition in *space* only, and not some other intuition.[361] However, the problem that we had to solve does not obligate us to answer that question. For that problem was only this: whether freedom conflicts with natural necessity in one and the same action; and this we have answered sufficiently. For we have shown that, because in the case of freedom a reference to a quite different kind of conditions is possible from the kind found in the case of natural necessity, the latter's law does not affect freedom, and hence both can take place independently of, and without interfering with, each other.

A 558 B 586 It must be noted carefully that by this contemplation we have not sought to establish the *actuality* of freedom as one of the powers containing the cause of the appearances of our world of sense. For not only would this contemplation then not have been a transcendental one at all, which deals merely with concepts, but this [attempt to establish the actuality of such freedom] also could not succeed; for from experience we can never infer something that must not be thought according to laws of experience at all. Furthermore, we have not even sought to prove the *possibility* of freedom;[362] for this [attempt] also would not have succeeded, because in general we cannot from mere a priori concepts cognize the possibility of any real basis[363] and any causality. Freedom is being treated here only as a transcendental idea whereby reason means[364] to start absolutely the series of conditions in [the realm of] appearance by the sensibly unconditioned.[365] In this [attempt], however, reason becomes entangled in an antinomy with its own laws, the laws that it prescribes to the empirical use of understanding. Now, to show that this antinomy rests on a mere illusion and that na-

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just below—although doubtless bearing in mind the restrictions in the (upcoming) last part of this subsection, A 557–58 = B 585–86.]

[361][See above, A 393 br. n. 211.]

[362][Kant means real, not logical, possibility. For the distinction, see A 139/B 178 br. n. 66]

[363][*Realgrund*.]

[364][*denkt.*]

[365][See the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 3–5, 47.]

ture at least does *not conflict* with the causality from freedom—this was the only goal that we were able to accomplish, and it was, moreover, our one and only concern.

IV
Solution of the Cosmological Idea of Totality in the Dependence of Appearances as Regards Their Existence as Such[366] {A 559 B 587}

In the preceding subsection[367] we considered the changes of the world of sense in their dynamical series, where each change is subject to another as its cause. Now, however, we employ this series of states only for our guidance in order to arrive at an existence[368] that can be the highest condition of all that is changeable, viz., the *necessary being*. Our concern here is not unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned existence[369] of substance itself. Hence the series that we have before us is in fact only the series of concepts, and not that of intuitions insofar as one intuition is the condition of the other.

But we readily see that since everything in the sum of appearances is changeable and hence is conditioned in its existence, there cannot be in the series of dependent existence[370] any unconditioned member at all whose existence would be absolutely necessary. And hence we see that if appearances were things in themselves, and if precisely because of this their condition would always belong to one and the same series of intuitions as does the conditioned, then a necessary being as condition of the existence of the {A 560 B 588} appearances of the world of sense could never have its place.

However, the dynamical regression has the following peculiarity that distinguishes it from the mathematical regression. The mathematical regression deals, in fact, only with the assembling[371] of parts to form a whole,[372]

[366][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 387–94. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 518–19.]

[367][*Nummer.*]

[368][Or 'existent'. *Dasein.*]

[369][*Existenz.*]

[370][*Existenz* here, *Dasein* just above and just below.]

[371][Or 'composing': *Zusammensetzung.*]

or with the splitting up[373] of a whole into its parts.[374] Therefore, the conditions of this series must always be regarded as parts of the series, hence as homogeneous with it, and consequently as likewise appearances. In the dynamical regression,[375] on the other hand, we are not concerned with the possibility of an unconditioned whole composed from given parts, or the possibility of an unconditioned part for a given whole; here we are concerned, rather, with the derivation[376] of a state from its cause, or the derivation[377] of the contingent existence of substance itself from necessary existence.[378] Hence in the dynamical regression the condition need not, of course,[379] necessarily make up one empirical series together with the conditioned.

Hence there still remains open to us an escape from the seeming[380] antinomy now before us. For both of the mutually conflicting propositions may be true simultaneously in a different reference, so that all things in the world of sense are contingent throughout and hence, by the same token, have only empirically conditioned existence, while yet a nonempirical condition of the whole series, i.e., an unconditionally necessary being, also has its place. For this being, as intelligible condition, would not at all belong
A 561 B 589 to the series as a member thereof (not even as the supreme member), nor would it make any member of the series empirically unconditioned; rather, it would leave[381] the entire world of sense in its empirically conditioned existence that runs[382] through all the members. This way of laying an unconditioned existence at the basis of appearances would thus differ from the empirically unconditioned causality (freedom) treated in the previous

372[As examined in the first antinomy.]

373[*Zerfällung*.]

374[As examined in the second antinomy.]

375[Examined in the third and fourth antinomies.]

376[Examined in the third antinomy.]

377[Examined in the fourth antinomy.]

378[Reading *von dem notwendigen* for *von der notwendigen*. Kant seems to have thought that he had just used *Existenz* rather than *Dasein*.]

379[*eben*]

380[Or 'illusory': *scheinbar*.]

381[Or 'keep': *lassen*]

382[*gehen*.]

item.[383] For in the case of freedom the thing itself, as cause (*substantia phaenomenon*),[384] belonged nonetheless in the series of conditions, and only its *causality* was thought as intelligible. Here, on the other hand, the necessary being would have to be thought as entirely outside the series of the world of sense (as *ens extramundanum*[385]) and as merely[386] intelligible; for only thereby can one prevent that this being itself is subjected to the law of the contingency and dependence of all appearances.

Hence the *regulative principle* of reason regarding this problem of ours is the following: that everything in the world of sense has empirically conditioned existence, and that there is in that world no unconditioned necessity whatsoever with regard to any quality; that there is in the series of conditions no member of which one must not always expect—and, as far as one can, seek—the empirical condition in a possible experience, and that nothing entitles us to derive any existence from a condition outside the empirical series, or, for that matter, to regard such an existence as absolutely independent and self-sufficient[387] in the series itself; yet that we hold all this without thereby disallowing that the whole series could be based on some intelligible being (which, therefore, is free from any empirical condition and contains, rather, the basis of the possibility of all these appearances). {A 562 B 590}

But our intent with this contemplation is by no means to prove the unconditionally necessary existence of a being, or even just to base on this contemplation the possibility of a merely intelligible condition of the existence of the appearances in the world of sense. Rather, our intent is only that, just as we limit reason in such a way that it does not leave the thread of empirical conditions and stray into bases of explanation that are *transcendent* and incapable of any exhibition *in concreto*, so, on the other hand, should[388] we limit also the law of the merely empirical use of understanding, so that it does not decide on the possibility of things as such and declare what is intelligible—although we can indeed not use it to explain appearances—to be therefore *impossible*. Hence this contemplation shows

[383][*im vorigen Artikel;* i.e., Subsection III.]

[384][Phenomenal substance.]

[385][Extramundane being, i.e., being beyond the world.]

[386][*bloß;* Kant says 'merely' because theoretical cognition is being ruled out.]

[387][*unabhängig und selbständig*. In other types of context I translate *selbständig* as 'independent.']

[388][*zu.*]

only that the thoroughgoing contingency of all natural things can quite well coexist with the voluntary[389] presupposition of a necessary, although merely intelligible, condition; and that, therefore, no true[390] contradiction is to be found between these assertions, and hence they can *both be true*. Such an absolutely necessary being of the understanding may, indeed, be in itself
A 563 B 591 impossible; yet this impossibility can by no means be inferred from the universal contingency and dependence of everything belonging to the world of sense, nor inferred from the principle that tells us not to stop at a single member thereof, insofar as it is contingent, and appeal to a cause outside the world. Reason takes its course in its empirical use, and its special course in its transcendental use.

The world of sense contains nothing but appearances; these, however, are mere presentations that are always in turn sensibly conditioned. Here, then, we never have as our objects things in themselves. It is not surprising, therefore, that we are never entitled to make a leap from a member of the empirical series,[391] whatever member it may be, outside the coherence[392] of sensibility. To make this leap would be to act as if these members were things in themselves that existed outside[393] their transcendental basis and that we could leave in order to seek outside them the cause of their existence. In the case of contingent *things* this seeking of the outside cause would indeed have to be done in the end, but not in the case of mere *presentations* of things; for their contingency is itself merely phenomenon, and can lead to no other regression than to the one that determines phenomena, i.e., the regression that is empirical. But thinking an intelligible basis of appearances, i.e., of the world of sense, and thinking it as freed from the contingency of that sensible world[394] runs counter neither to the
A 564 B 592 unlimited empirical regression of appearances nor to their thoroughgoing contingency. Establishing this, however, is indeed all that we had to accomplish in order to remove the seeming antinomy; and only in this way could it be done. For if the condition for everything that is conditioned (as regards its existence) is in each case sensible, and precisely therefore be-

[389][Or 'chosen': *willkürlich*.]

[390][I.e., genuine.]

[391][*Reihen* (i.e., plural).]

[392][Or 'context': *Zusammenhang*.]

[393][Or 'apart from': *außer*.]

[394][Or, possibly, 'of appearances': *der letzteren*.]

longs to the series, then the condition itself is in turn conditioned (as is brought out by the antithesis of the fourth antinomy). Hence there either had to remain a conflict within reason, which demands the unconditioned, or the unconditioned had to be posited outside the series and in what is intelligible; the necessity of what is intelligible neither requires nor permits any empirical condition, and hence the intelligible is absolutely necessary with respect to appearances.

Reason's empirical use (regarding the conditions of existence in the world of sense) is not affected by our granting a merely intelligible being, but proceeds, in accordance with the principle of thoroughgoing contingency, from empirical conditions to higher conditions that are always likewise empirical. But just as little does this regulative principle, when our concern is reason's pure use (regarding purposes[395]), exclude our assuming an intelligible cause that is not in the series. For then [the expression] intelligible cause means only the basis, to us merely transcendental and unknown,[396] of the possibility of the sensible series as such. The existence of this basis, as independent of all conditions of the sensible series and unconditionally necessary in regard to these conditions,[397] does not at all run counter to the unbounded contingency of the sensible series,[398] and hence also does not run counter to the never-ending[399] regression in the series of empirical conditions. {A 565 B 593}

Concluding Comment on the Entire Antinomy of Pure Reason[400]

As long as, in dealing with our concepts of reason, we have as our object merely the totality of conditions in the world of sense and what can be done concerning these conditions in the service of reason, our ideas, although transcendental, are yet *cosmological*. But as soon as we posit the unconditioned (which is, after all, what we are in fact concerned with) in what is entirely outside the world of sense and hence outside all possible experi-

395[Or 'ends': *Zwecke*.]

396[*unbekannt*.]

397[*dieser*.]

398[*der ersteren* (i.e., in relation to the just mentioned conditions).]

399[Literally, 'nowhere-ended': *nirgend geendigt*.]

400[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 2, 394–97. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 519–21.]

ence, the ideas become *transcendent*. They then do not serve merely for the completion of reason's empirical use (which completion[401] remains always an idea that can never be achieved but must nonetheless be followed[402]). Rather, they then part entirely with reason's empirical use, and make for themselves objects whose material is not taken from experience and whose objective reality also does not rest on the completion of the empirical series but rests on pure a priori concepts. Such transcendent ideas have a merely intelligible object. Admitting this object as a transcendental object[403] of which we otherwise know nothing is indeed allowed. But we do not have on our side, for this transcendental object,[404] what we would need in order to think it as a thing determinable through its distinguishing
A 566 B 594 and intrinsic predicates: we have neither any bases of its possibility (as something independent of all experiential concepts), nor the slightest justification for assuming such an object—which, therefore, is a mere thought-entity.[405] Nonetheless, among all the cosmological ideas, the one that prompted the fourth antinomy urges us to venture this step. For the existence of appearances, which within itself has no basis whatsoever but is always conditioned, calls upon us to look around for something different from all appearances, and hence to look for an intelligible object with which this contingency will cease. However, once we have given[406] ourselves permission to assume a self-subsistent actuality outside the realm of sensibility as a whole, appearances can be regarded[407] only as contingent ways in which beings that are themselves intelligences[408] present intelligible objects. And hence we are left with nothing but analogy: according to it we use experiential concepts in order that regarding intelligible things, of which

[401][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *die* for *der*.]

[402][*befolgt*.]

[403][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* everywhere else in this Concluding Comment. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[404][*wozu*.]

[405][*Gedankending*. See A 292/B 348.]

[406][Literally, 'taken': *genommen*]

[407][Following Hartenstein's reading, as adopted by Erdmann in the *Akademie* edition, of *anzusehen sind* for *anzusehen*.]

[408][Cf. A 641 = B 669, A 698 = B 726, A 815 = B 843; and B 155, 157 n. 296, 426, A 742 = B 770. Cf also the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 114; the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 418; and the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 233.]

as they are in themselves we have not the least cognition,[409] we can yet frame some sort of concept. Since we do not come to cognize[410] the contingent except through experience, but are here concerned with things that are not to be objects of experience at all, we shall have to derive our cognition of them from what is necessary in itself, viz., from pure concepts of things as such. Hence in taking the first step outside the world of sense, we are compelled to begin our new cognitions with our inquiry into the absolutely necessary being, and to derive from the concept thereof the concepts of all things insofar as they are merely intelligible. And this attempt we shall[411] undertake in the following chapter. {A 567 B 595}

[409][*Kenntnis;* similarly in the remainder of this paragraph. The more literal 'acquaintance' is grammatically unmanageable here.]

[410][More literally, 'become acquainted with': *kennenlernen.*]

[411][*wollen.*]

TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

BOOK II

Chapter III
The Ideal of Pure Reason[1]

Section I
On an Ideal as Such[2]

We have seen above that through pure *concepts of understanding,*[3] apart from all conditions of sensibility, no objects whatever can be presented,[4] inasmuch as these concepts then lack the conditions of their objective reality, and nothing is to be found in them but the mere form of thought. But these concepts can nonetheless be exhibited[5] *in concreto* if they are applied to appearances; for in appearances they properly have the material for an experiential concept, which is nothing but a concept of understanding *in concreto. Ideas,* however, are still further removed from objective reality than are *categories;* for no appearance can be found in which they

[1][See H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 312–29. See also J. N. Findlay, *op. cit* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 226–41. Also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 409–19. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 522–25. Also Gottfried Martin, *op. cit.* at A 22/B 36 br. n. 26, 158–70. Also T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br n 94, 298–301. Also W. H. Walsh, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 1, 214–29. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 228–29.]

[2][*überhaupt.* My reason for translating this term in this way is given at B xxvii br n 106]

[3][I.e., categories.]

[4][*vorstellen,* traditionally translated as 'to represent.' My reason for breaking with this tradition is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[5][*darstellen,* traditionally often rendered as 'to present.' My reason for translating the term differently is given at B xvii br. n. 73.]

could be presented *in concreto.* Ideas contain a certain completeness to which no possible empirical cognition[6] is adequate; and reason has in mind[7] with them only a systematic unity to which, without ever fully reaching this systematic unity, reason seeks to approximate the unity that is possible empirically. A 568 B 596

But what I call an *ideal* seems to be still further removed from objective reality than is even the idea. By *ideal* I mean an idea not merely *in concreto* but *in individuo,* i.e., as an individual[8] thing determinable or even determined by the idea alone.[9]

Humanity [as conceived] in its entire perfection contains not only the expansion of all the essential properties belonging to human nature, which make up our concept thereof, to the point of their complete congruence with humanity's purposes; for this would be only our *idea*[10] of perfect humanity. Rather, humanity [as so conceived] contains also everything that, besides this concept, belongs to the thoroughgoing determination of the idea. For plainly only one [member] of all [pairs of] opposite predicates can be fit for the idea of the most perfect human being. What to us is an ideal was for *Plato* an *idea of the divine understanding,* an individual object in this understanding's pure intuition,[11] the most perfect of each kind of possible being, and the original basis of all copies thereof in [the realm of] appearance.[12]

But even without going as far as Plato did, we must admit that human reason contains not only ideas but also ideals. Although these ideals, unlike the *Platonic* ones, do not have creative power, they do have *practical power* (as regulative principles) and underlie the possibility of the perfection of certain *actions.* Moral concepts are not entirely pure concepts of reason, because something empirical (pleasure or displeasure) underlies them. Nonetheless, with regard to the principle by which reason sets limits to a freedom that in itself is lawless (in other words, if one attends merely to the form of moral concepts), these concepts can quite readily serve as A 569 B 597

[6][*Erkenntnis.* For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6.]

[7][*Sinn.*]

[8][*einzeln.*]

[9][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 232–33.]

[10][And not yet an ideal. Emphasis added.]

[11][On the intellectual intuition of an intuitive understanding, see B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[12][See A 313–15/B 370–72.]

examples of pure concepts of reason. Virtue and, with it, human wisdom
in their entire purity are ideas. But the wise person[13] (of the Stoics) is an
ideal, i.e., a human being who exists only in one's thoughts but is com-
pletely congruent with the idea of wisdom. Just as the idea gives the *rule*,
so the ideal serves in such a case as the *archetype*[14] for the thoroughgoing
determination of the copy;[15] and we have within us no other standard for
our actions than the conduct of this divine human being—a standard with
which we can compare, judge, and thereby improve ourselves even though
we can never attain it. Even if one were not to grant objective reality (ex-
istence) to these ideals, yet they are not therefore to be regarded as chime-
ras. They provide us, rather, with an indispensable standard of reason. Rea-
A 570 / B 598 son requires the concept of what is entirely complete in its kind, in order
to assess and gauge by this concept the degree and the deficiencies of what
is incomplete. But trying to realize the ideal in an example, i.e., in
appearance,—as, e.g., to realize the wise person in a novel—is unfeasible
and has, moreover, something preposterous and not very edifying about it.
For in such an attempt the natural limits that continually impair the com-
pleteness in the idea make any illusion impossible, and the good itself that
lies in the idea is thereby made suspect and similar to a mere invention.

Such is the case with the ideal of reason, which must always rest on determinate concepts and serve as rule or archetype, whether to be complied with or to judge[16] by. The situation is quite different with the creatures of the imagination concerning which no one can offer an explication and give an understandable concept: the *monograms*, as it were. These are only characteristics that, although [likewise] individual, are not determined according to any rule that one can indicate. Such characteristics amount less to a determinate image than to a design that hovers, as it were, at the mean of various experiences;[17] they are characteristics such as painters and physiognomists claim to have in their minds[18] and as are supposed to be an incommunicable shadowy image of these people's products or, for that matter, for their judgments. Such characteristics may, although only

[13][Or, of course, 'the sage.']

[14][Or 'original image': *Urbild*.]

[15][Or 'ectype' or 'derivative image': *Nachbild*.]

[16][*Beurteilung;* similarly for 'judgments' a few lines down. See A 60/B 84 br n. 69]

[17][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 234.]

[18][*in ihrem Kopfe*.]

improperly, be called ideals of sensibility; for they are meant to be the unattainable models of possible empirical intuitions, yet provide no rule capable of explication and examination. {A 571 B 599}

By contrast, the aim that reason has with its ideal is thorough[19] determination according to a priori rules. Hence reason thinks an object that is to be thoroughly determinable according to principles, although the conditions adequate for this determination are lacking in experience and the concept itself is thus transcendent.

Chapter III

Section II
On the Transcendental Ideal[20]

(*prototypon transcendentale*)[21]

Every *concept* is, as regards what is not contained in this concept itself, indeterminate and subject to the principle of *determinability:* viz., that of *every two* predicates contradictorily opposed to each other only one can belong to the concept. This principle rests on the principle[22] of contradiction, and hence is a merely logical principle that abstracts from all content of cognition and has in view nothing but the cognition's logical form.

But every *thing* is, with regard to its possibility, subject also to the principle of *thoroughgoing determination,*[23] whereby of *all possible* predicates of *things,* insofar as these predicates are compared with their opposites, one {A 572 B 600}

[19][Or 'thoroughgoing': *durchgängig.*]

[20][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br n. 2, vol. 3, 419–59.]

[21][Transcendental prototype.]

[22][*Satz* (literally 'proposition') in this particular expression, but *Grundsatz* above and *Prinzip* just below: see A vii br. n. 7. (Similarly in the next paragraph.)]

[23][Emphasis on *determination* added by the *Akademie* edition]

must belong to the thing. This principle[24] rests not merely on the principle of contradiction. For besides considering the relation of two predicates that conflict with each other, the principle considers every thing also in relation to *possibility in its entirety*,[25] i.e., to the sum of all predicates of things as such. And by presupposing a priori this entire possibility as condition,[26] the principle presents every thing as deriving its own possibility from the share that it has in that entire possibility.[27] Hence the principle of thoroughgoing determination concerns content, and not merely logical form. It is the principle of the synthesis of all predicates that are to make up the complete concept of a thing, and is not merely the principle of the analytic presentation through one of two opposite predicates. And it contains a tran-
A 573 B 601 scendental presupposition, viz., of the matter for *all possibility*, the matter[28] that is to contain a priori the data for the *particular* possibility of every thing.

The proposition that *every existing thing*[29] *is thoroughly*[30] *determined* means not only that of each pair of *given* predicates opposed to each other, but also that of all *possible* [pairs of] predicates one always belongs to the thing. This proposition does not just logically compare predicates with one another, but compares transcendentally the thing itself with the sum of all possible predicates. What it means is that in order to cognize a thing com-

[24][*Dieses;* Kant writes this whole sentence as if he had just said *Prinzip* rather than *Grundsatz*. Cf. A vii br n. 7.]

[25][*gesamte Möglichkeit.*]

[26][Or, perhaps, 'presupposing this possibility as a priori condition.']

[27]Hence through this principle every thing is referred to a common correlate, viz., possibility in its entirety. This entire possibility (i.e., the material for all possible predicates), if it were found in the idea of some single thing, would prove an affinity of all possible things[a] through the identity of the basis[b] of their thoroughgoing determination. The *determinability* of every *concept* is subordinated to the **universality**[c] (*universalitas*) of the principle of the excluded middle between two opposite predicates; but the *determination* of every *thing* is subordinated to the **allness**[d] (*universitas*) or [i.e.] the sum of all possible predicates.

[a][*alles Möglichen.*]
[b][Or 'ground'; see B xix br. n. 79.]
[c][*Allgemeinheit.*]
[d][*Allheit.* Cf. A 80/B 106]

[28][Or, perhaps, 'the possibility.']

[29][*alles Existierende.*]

[30][*durchgängig;* similarly (twice) in the next paragraph.]

pletely, one must cognize everything possible and thereby determine the thing, whether affirmatively or negatively. Thoroughgoing determination, consequently, is a concept that we can never exhibit *in concreto* as regards its totality; and hence this concept is based on an idea that resides only in reason, the power which prescribes to the understanding the rule of the understanding's complete use.

Now, to be sure, this idea of the *sum of all possibility*—insofar as this sum underlies, as condition, the thoroughgoing determination of every thing—is itself still indeterminate with regard to the predicates that may make up that sum, and we think through it nothing more than a sum of all possible predicates as such. Yet upon closer investigation we find that this idea, as original concept,[31] expels a multitude of predicates which, as derivative, are already given through other predicates, or which are not consistent with one another,[32] and that the idea thus refines[33] itself until it becomes a concept thoroughly determined a priori. The idea thereby becomes the concept of a single[34] object that is determined thoroughly through the mere idea, and that must therefore be called an *ideal* of pure reason. {A 574 B 602}

If we consider all possible predicates not just logically but transcendentally, i.e., with regard to their content insofar as it can be thought in them a priori, then we find that through some of them we present a being [of something], through others a mere not-being. Logical negation, which is indicated merely by the little word *not,*[35] never attaches—properly speaking—to a concept [intrinsically] but only to its relation to another concept in the judgment; and hence it cannot even remotely be sufficient to designate a concept as regards the concept's content. The term *not-mortal*[36] can in no way allow[37] us to cognize that a mere not-being is presented through it in the object; rather, it leaves all content untouched. A transcendental negation, on the other hand, signifies not-being in itself. It is opposed by transcendental affirmation, which is a something whose concept

[31][*Urbegriff.*]

[32][*nebeneinander nicht stehen können.*]

[33][*läutern.*]

[34][Or 'individual': *einzeln*]

[35][Emphasis added]

[36][Or 'nonmortal': *nichtsterblich*. Emphasis added.]

[37][*geben.*]

expresses already in itself a being and hence is called reality[38] (thinghood[39]). For through this affirmation alone, and as far as it reaches, are objects something (things[40])—whereas the opposing [transcendental] nega-
A 575 B 603
tion signifies a mere lack; and where this negation alone is thought, there the annulment of any thing is presented.

Now, no one can think a negation determinately without using as a basis the opposed affirmation. The person born blind cannot frame the least conception of darkness, because he has none of light; or the savage frame one of poverty, because he is not acquainted with wealth. The ignorant person has no concept of his ignorance,[41] because he has none of science;[42] etc.[43] Hence all concepts of negations are also derivative, and the realities are what contain the data and, so to speak, the matter[44] or the transcendental content for the possibility and thoroughgoing determination of all things.

If, therefore, thoroughgoing determination is based by us on a transcendental substratum in our reason—a substratum that contains, as it were, the entire supply of the material[45] from which all possible predicates of things can be obtained—then this substratum is nothing other than the idea of a
A 576 B 604
total[46] of reality (*omnitudo realitatis*). All true negations are then nothing but *limits*—which they could not be called if the unlimited (the total) did not lie at the basis.

[38][Which is derived from Latin *res*, thing.]

[39][*Sachheit.*]

[40][*Dinge.*]

[41][*Unwissenheit.*]

[42][*Wissenschaft.*]

[43]The observations and calculations of the astronomers have taught us many marvelous things; but most important, I suppose, is the fact that they have uncovered for us the abyss of our *ignorance*. For without these [astronomical] cognitions,[a] human reason could never have conceived this abyss to be so great. Meditating on this [ignorance] must produce a great change in the determination of the final aims of the use of our reason.[b]

[a][*Kenntnisse.*]

[b][I follow Wille in attaching this note to the 'etc.' instead of to the preceding sentence.]

[44][*Materie.*]

[45][*Stoff.*]

[46][*All.*]

But through this [idea of] total possession[47] of reality one presents also the concept of a *thing in itself* as thoroughly determined. And the concept of an *ens realissimum*[48] is the concept of a single[49] being [*Wesen*], because of all possible opposite predicates one predicate, viz., what belongs to being [*Sein*][50] absolutely, is found in this concept's determination. Hence a transcendental *ideal* is what underlies the thoroughgoing determination found necessarily with everything that exists, and this ideal is what amounts to the supreme and complete material condition[51] of the possibility of everything that exists—the condition to which all thinking of objects as such as regards their content must be traced back. But it is also the only ideal proper of which human reason is capable; for this case is the only one where a thing's concept that in itself is universal is determined thoroughly through itself and cognized as the presentation of an individual.[52]

Logical determination of a concept by reason rests on a disjunctive syllogism,[53] in which the major premise contains a logical division[54] (the division of the sphere of a universal concept), the minor premise limits this sphere to a part, and the conclusion determines the concept through this part.[55] The universal concept of a reality as such, however, cannot be divided a priori; for without experience one is not acquainted with any determinate kinds[56] of reality that would be contained under that genus. Hence the transcendental major premise of the thoroughgoing determination of all things is nothing other than the presentation of the sum of all reality. It is a concept that not merely comprises all predicates with regard to their transcendental content *under itself*, but that comprises them *within itself*. And the thoroughgoing determination of any thing rests on the limitation of this { A 577 B 605

47[*Allbesitz*.]

48[Most real being.]

49[Or 'individual': *einzeln*.]

50[Because 'being' in the sense of *Sein* is clearly broader in meaning than is 'existence' (*Existenz, Dasein*), inasmuch as it includes (especially in the present context) the ascription of predicates by means of the copula, there is no adequate way in English to avoid the use of 'being' in these two different senses here.]

51[*oberste und vollständige materiale Bedingung*.]

52[*Individuum*.]

53[Literally, 'inference of reason': *Vernunftschluß*.]

54[*Einteilung* here, *Teilung* immediately hereafter; similarly later in this paragraph.]

55[See the *Logic*, §§ 77, 78, Ak IX, 129–30.]

56[Or 'species': *Arten*.]

total[57] of reality, inasmuch as some of this reality is attributed to the thing but the rest is excluded. This procedure agrees with the *either* and *or*[58] of the disjunctive major premise and the determination of the object through one of the members of this division in the minor premise. Thus the use of reason whereby it lays the transcendental ideal at the basis of its determination of all possible things is analogous to the use according to which it proceeds in disjunctive syllogisms. This, however, was the proposition on which I earlier based the systematic division of all transcendental ideas,[59] viz., the proposition according to which these ideas are produced in a way parallel and corresponding to the three kinds of syllogisms.

A 578 B 606 It goes without saying that reason, for this its aim of merely presenting the necessary thoroughgoing determination of things, does not presuppose the existence of such a being as conforms to this ideal;[60] rather, reason presupposes only the idea of this being, in order that from an unconditioned totality of thoroughgoing determination it can derive the conditioned one, i.e., the totality of what is limited. Hence the ideal is for reason the archetype (*prototypon*)[61] of all things, the things which one and all—as deficient copies (*ectypa*)[62]—take the material for their possibility from that archetype, and which while approximating it either more or less are nonetheless always infinitely far from attaining it.

Thus all possibility of things (i.e., possibility of the manifold's synthesis as regards its content) is viewed as derivative, and solely the possibility of what includes all reality is viewed as original. For all negations (which, after all, are the only predicates through which everything else can be distinguished from the most real being) are mere limitations of a greater and, finally, of the supreme[63] reality; hence they presuppose this reality and are merely derived from it as regards their content. All manifoldness of

57[*All.*]

58[Emphasis on both terms added.]

59[See A 321–40/B 377–99, esp. A 321/B 378.]

60[Kant himself had earlier tried to infer the existence of God from the real possibility of things. See *The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God* (1763). Ak. II, 70–92, 162–63. See also the *Principorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae nova dilucidatio* (*New Elucidation of the First Principles of Cognition in Metaphysics*, 1755), Ak I, 385–416.]

61[Prototype.]

62[Ectypes.]

63[*höchst.*]

things is only a way, as multifarious as this manifoldness, of limiting the concept of the supreme reality—the concept which is their common substratum—just as all [geometric] figures are possible only as various ways of limiting infinite space. Hence the object of reason's ideal, an object which is to be found only in reason, is called also the *original being*[64] (*ens originarium*); insofar as it has no being above it, it is called the *supreme being* (*ens summum*); and insofar as everything, as conditioned, is subject to it, it is called the *being of all beings* (*ens entium*). All this does A 579 B 607
not, however, signify the objective relation of an actual object to other things. Rather, it signifies the relation of the *idea to concepts,* and leaves us in complete ignorance concerning the existence of a being of such exceptional superiority.

Moreover, because an original being cannot be said to consist of many derivative beings, inasmuch as each of these presupposes that being and hence cannot make it up, the ideal of the original being will have to be thought also as simple.

Hence, moreover, the derivation of all other possibility from this original being cannot, strictly[65] speaking, be regarded as a *limitation* of this being's supreme reality and, as it were, as a *division* of this reality. For then the original being would be regarded as a mere aggregate of derivative beings, which by the foregoing [paragraph] is impossible—although initially we did, in the first rough outline, present the being in this way.[66] Rather, the supreme reality would underlie the possibility of all things as a *basis,*[67] and not as a *sum.* And the manifoldness of those things would rest not on the limitation of the original being itself, but on that of its complete consequence. And to this consequence there would belong also our entire sensibility, along with all reality in [the realm of] appearance; yet this sensibility cannot belong as an ingredient to the idea of the supreme being.

Now if we thus pursue this idea of ours further by hypostatizing it, then A 580 B 608
we shall be able to determine the original being, through the mere concept of the supreme reality, as a being that is single, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, etc.—in a word, we shall be able to determine it in its unconditioned

[64][*Urwesen.*]

[65][*genau.*]

[66][See A 572–73 = B 600–601, and cf. A 577 = B 605.]

[67][Or 'ground': *Grund*; see B xix br. n. 79.]

completeness through all the predicaments.[68] The concept of such a being is that of *God,* as thought in the transcendental meaning; and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object of a transcendental *theology*—as, indeed, I have mentioned above.[69]

In fact,[70] however, such use of the transcendental idea would already overstep the bounds of the idea's [proper] determination and admissibility. For in laying this idea at the basis of the thoroughgoing determination of things as such, reason treated the idea only as the *concept* of all reality, without demanding that all this reality should be given objectively and should itself amount to a thing. This latter thing is a mere invention through which we integrate[71] and realize the manifold of our idea in an ideal regarded as a separate being. We have, however, no right to do this, or even to assume straightforwardly the possibility of such a hypothesis. Nor, indeed, do all the inferences that flow from such an ideal have any bearing, or the slightest influence, on the thoroughgoing determination of things as such—the determination for whose sake alone the idea was needed.

A 581 B 609 Describing our reason's procedure and dialectic is not enough, however. We must also try to discover the sources of this dialectic, in order to be able to explain this illusion[72] itself, like a phenomenon of understanding; for the ideal of which we are speaking is based on an idea that is natural and not merely chosen.[73] I ask, therefore: How does reason come to regard all possibility of things as derived from a single underlying possibility, viz., that of the supreme reality, and then to presuppose this supreme reality as contained in a separate original being?

The answer arises[74] on its own from the discussions of the Transcendental Analytic. The possibility of objects of the senses is a relation of these objects to our thinking. In this relation something (viz., the empirical form) can be thought a priori. But what amounts to the matter—viz., the reality in [the realm of] appearance (i.e., what corresponds to sensation)—must be given, for without being given it could in no way even be thought, and

68[I.e., basic concepts.]

69[A 334–35/B 391–92.]

70[*doch.*]

71[*zusammenfassen.*]

72[*Schein*]

73[Or, perhaps, 'arbitrary': *willkürlich.*]

74[*bietet sich . . dar.*]

hence its possibility could not be presented. Now, an object of the senses can be determined thoroughly[75] only if it is compared with all predicates of [the realm of] appearance and presented through them affirmatively or negatively. In this process, however, what amounts to the thing itself (in [the realm of] appearance)—viz., the real—must be given, for without being given it could in no way even be thought. But that wherein the real of all appearances is given is the single, all-encompassing experience. Therefore, the matter for the possibility of all objects of the senses must be presupposed as given in one sum[76]—as that on whose limitation alone all possibility of empirical objects, their difference[77] from one another, and their thoroughgoing determination can rest. Now in fact no objects but those of the senses can be given to us, and they can be given to us nowhere but in the context of a possible experience. Consequently, nothing is an object *for us* unless it presupposes the sum of all empirical reality as condition of its possibility. Now in accordance with a natural illusion[78] we regard this presupposition as a principle[79] that must hold for all things as such—although it is a principle that properly holds only for those things that are given as objects of our senses. Consequently, the empirical principle[80] of our concepts of the possibility of things as appearances will be regarded by us, through omission of this limitation, as a transcendental principle of the possibility of things as such. {A 582 B 610}

But the fact that we thereafter hypostatize this idea of the sum of all reality is due to the following. We dialectically transform the *distributive* unity of the understanding's experiential use into the *collective* unity of a whole of experience;[81] and by this whole of appearance we think an individual thing containing all empirical reality within itself. And this thing is then confused, by means of the already thought transcendental subreption,[82] with {A 583 B 611}

75[*durchgängig*.]

76[Or 'sum total': *Inbegriff*.]

77[*Unterschied*.]

78[*Illusion*.]

79[*Grundsatz* (likewise twice just below).]

80[*Prinzip*. This term is synonymous with *Grundsatz*. See A vii br. n. 7.]

81[Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 406–8.]

82[I.e., the subreption whereby the presupposition of the sum of all empirical reality is regarded as a principle that holds for all things as such. On subreption, see A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n. 14.]

the concept of a thing that stands at the top of the possibility of all things, for whose thoroughgoing determination it provides the real conditions.[83]

Chapter III

Section III
On Speculative Reason's Bases of Proof for Inferring the Existence of a Supreme Being[84]

Although reason has this urgent need to presuppose something that can serve the understanding as a complete basis for the latter's thoroughgoing determination of its concepts, it yet discerns that such a presupposition is ideal and merely fictitious. Reason discerns this far too easily to be per-
A 584 B 612 suaded, by this presupposition alone, to assume that a mere creature of its own thought[85] is an actual being. Reason would not assume such a being if it were not pressed by something else to seek its state of rest somewhere in the regression from the conditioned, which is given, to the unconditioned; although this unconditioned is not in itself and according to its mere concept given as actual, yet it alone can complete the series of conditions

[83]Hence this ideal of the maximally real being,[a] although it is a mere presentation, is first *realized,* i.e., turned into an object; thereupon it is *hypostatized;* finally, by a natural advance of reason to the completion[b] of unity, the ideal is even *personified*—as we shall soon set forth. For the regulative unity of experience rests not on the appearances themselves (i.e., on sensibility alone), but on the connection of their manifold through the *understanding* (in an apperception); hence the unity of the supreme reality and the thoroughgoing determinability (possibility) of all things seem to lie in a supreme understanding, and hence in an *intelligence.*

[a][Or 'supremely real being': *des allerrealsten Wesens,* i.e., the *ens realissimum.*]

[b][Or 'perfection': *Vollendung.*]

[84][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 459–74. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 525–27.]

[85][*Selbstgeschöpf ihres Denkens.*]

when these are traced to their bases. Now, this is the natural course taken by every—even the commonest—human reason, although not every human reason perseveres in it. Human reason starts not from concepts, but from common experience, and hence lays at the basis something existent. This ground,[86] however, sinks unless it rests on the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. But this rock itself hovers unsupported if there is still empty space outside and under it, and if the rock does not itself fill all, and thus leave no more room for any *why*—viz., by being infinite in terms of reality.

If something—whatever it may be—exists, then we must grant also that something or other exists *necessarily*. For the contingent exists only under the condition of another [existent] as its cause; and for this cause the same inference holds again; and so on, until we get to a cause that is not contingent and that precisely therefore is there without any condition and necessarily. This is the argument on which reason bases its advance to the original being.

Now, reason looks around for the concept of a being that fits such a superiority of existence[87] as unconditioned necessity is. Reason does this not so much in order then to infer a priori from the concept of this being the being's existence (for if it dared to do that, then it would have no need whatever to investigate more than mere concepts, and would not have to lay at the basis[88] a given existence). Rather, reason looks around for the concept of such a being in order to find, among all concepts of possible things, the concept that has within it nothing that conflicts with absolute necessity. For it regards as already established, according to the earlier inference, that surely something or other must exist with absolute[89] necessity. If reason can now remove everything that, except for one [thing], is incompatible with this necessity, then this [one thing] is the absolutely necessary being—whether or not we can comprehend this being's necessity, i.e., derive it from the being's concept alone. { A 585 B 613

Now, that [being] whose concept contains within itself the *therefore* for every *wherefore*[90] and is in no point and in no respect defective but is everywhere sufficient as condition—[that being] seems to be, precisely there-

[86][*Boden*.]

[87][*Existenz* here, *Dasein* twice just below Similarly in the remainder of this section]

[88][Of its inference.]

[89][*schlechthin* here and just below, *absolut* earlier in this section.]

[90][I.e., for every *why*, emphasis in both terms added.]

fore, the being that is fitting for absolute necessity. For since it itself possesses all conditions for all that is possible, it does not itself require—nor is even capable of [depending on]—any condition, and consequently satisfies at least in one point the concept of unconditioned necessity. In this
A 586 B 614 regard it cannot be equaled by any other concept that, being deficient and in need of supplementation, manifests no such characteristic[91] as independence from all further conditions. From this inequality, it is true, one cannot yet safely infer that what does *not*[92] contain within itself the supreme and in every respect complete condition must therefore itself be conditioned as regards its existence; but still, it then does not have in it the one mark[93] of unconditioned existence that reason can cope with in order to cognize—through an a priori concept—some being as unconditioned.

Hence the concept of a being of supreme reality would, among all concepts of possible things, be most fitting for the concept of an unconditionally necessary being. And although it does not satisfy this latter concept completely, we still have no choice here, but find ourselves compelled to keep to this concept.[94] For we must not cast the existence of a necessary being to the winds; but if we admit the existence of such a being, we still cannot find in the entire realm of possibility anything that could lay a better-based[95] claim [than can this being of supreme reality] to such a superiority [as necessity] of existence.

Such, then, is human reason's natural course. Human reason first convinces itself of the existence of *some* necessary being. In this being it cognizes an unconditioned existence. Now it seeks the concept of what is in-
A 587 B 615 dependent of any condition, and finds this concept in what is itself the sufficient condition for everything else, i.e., in what contains all reality. But the total[96] without limits is absolute unity and carries with it the concept of a being that is single, viz., the supreme being. And thus human reason infers that the supreme being, as original basis of all things, exists[97] with absolute necessity.

[91][*Merkmal*]

[92][Emphasis added.]

[93][*Merkzeichen* The mark is independence of further conditions, viz., by being the sufficient condition for everything else, i.e., by containing all reality. Cf the next two paragraphs.]

[94][Of a being of supreme reality]

[95][*einen gegründeteren*]

[96][*All.*]

[97][*da sei.*]

This concept [of the supreme being] cannot be denied to have a certain soundness[98] if one is talking about making *decisions,* i.e., if the existence of some necessary being has been granted and one agrees that one must take sides and decide wherein to posit this being. For then one cannot choose more fittingly—or, rather, one has no choice at all but is compelled to give one's vote to the absolute unity of complete reality as the original source of possibility. However, if nothing impels us to decide and we would prefer to leave this whole matter aside until the full weight of the bases of proof would force us to give our assent—i.e., if we are concerned merely with *judging* how much we do know and what we merely flatter ourselves to know about this problem—then the above inference appears in a far less advantageous guise, and requires our favor to compensate for its lack of legitimate claims.

For, that inference is defective even if we consent to[99] everything as it here lies before us: viz., first, that there is a correct inference from some given existence (perhaps even merely my own) to the existence of an unconditionally necessary being; and second, that a being containing all reality and therefore also every condition must be regarded as absolutely[100] unconditioned, and that, consequently, the concept of a thing that is fitting for absolute necessity has thereby been found. Even from all this one can in no way infer that the concept of a limited being, which does not have supreme reality, therefore contradicts absolute necessity. For although in this limited being's concept we do not find the unconditioned that already carries with it the total of conditions, we still can in no way infer from this that this being's existence must, on that very account, be conditioned—just as in a hypothetical syllogism I cannot say that when a certain condition (viz., here, that of completeness according to concepts) is not there, then the conditioned also is not there. Rather, we remain at liberty to accept all the remaining—limited—beings as likewise unconditionally necessary, although we cannot infer their necessity from the universal concept that we have of them. In this way, however, the present argument would not have provided us with the least concept of the properties of a necessary being, and would have accomplished nothing whatsoever.

{A 588 B 616}

Nonetheless, this argument for a supreme being retains a certain importance, and retains an authority that cannot immediately be taken from it

[98][*Gründlichkeit*]

[99][*gut sein lassen.*]

[100][*schlechthin* here, *absolut* twice just below.]

A 589 B 617 because of this objective insufficiency. For suppose there are obligations that, while being entirely right in the idea of reason, would be without any reality when applied to ourselves—i.e., would be without any incentives[101]—unless a supreme being were presupposed that could provide such practical laws with efficacy and forcefulness.[102] In that case we would also have an obligation to follow practical concepts which, although perhaps not sufficient objectively, are still preponderant by the standard of reason, and by comparison with which we still cognize nothing that is better and more convincing. Thus the duty to choose would here, through a practical addition,[103] upset the balance left by the inconclusiveness of speculation.[104] Indeed, reason would get no justification from itself, its most lenient judge, if—when subject to urgent motivating causes[105] but endowed with only deficient insight[106]—it had not followed these bases of its judgment, since, after all, we are at least not acquainted with any that are superior and better.

Because this argument [for a supreme being] rests on the intrinsic insufficiency of what is contingent, it is in fact transcendental. Nonetheless, the argument is so simple[107] and natural that even the commonest human mind,[108] once led to the argument, is adequate to it. One sees things change, arise, and pass away. Hence they, or at least their state, must have a cause.
A 590 B 618 But the same question[109] can be asked about any cause that may ever be given in experience. Now where could[110] we put the *highest* causality more appropriately than where there is also the *supreme*[111] causality? I.e., the

[101][Or 'springs': *Triebfedern.*]

[102][*Wirkung und Nachdruck*; cf. A 811 = B 840. On the necessity of presupposing a supreme being on moral grounds, see A 804–19 = B 832–47, esp. A 813–15 = B 841–42]

[103][Whereby we are to presuppose a supreme being.]

[104][Regarding such a being.]

[105][I.e., practical concepts (bases of reason's practical judgment) that—as Kant has just said—are preponderant by the standard of reason although perhaps not sufficient objectively.]

[106][Insight insufficient to decide theoretically whether there is a supreme being.]

[107][*einfältig.*]

[108][*Menschensinn.*]

[109][As to what is the cause]

[110][*sollen*]

[111][Respectively, *oberst* and *höchst.* I have been translating *höchst* as 'supreme' because 'supreme being' renders *höchstes Wesen* more idiomatically than does 'highest being.']

highest causality must surely be put into that being which contains within itself originally the sufficiency for every[112] possible effect, and the concept of which also arises very easily from the single characteristic of an all-encompassing perfection. This supreme cause we then regard as absolutely necessary, because we find our ascending to it absolutely necessary and also find no basis[113] for going still further and beyond this cause. With all peoples, therefore, we see shining through their blindest polytheism[114] some sparks of monotheism,[115] to which they have been led not by meditation and deep speculation, but only by the common understanding's natural course that has gradually become understandable to them.

Only Three Ways of Proving the Existence of God from Speculative Reason Are Possible

All the paths that one may enter upon with this aim [of proving theoretically the existence of God] follow one of three courses. They either start from determinate experience and the particular character—cognized thereby—of our world of sense, and from this character ascend according to laws of causality to the supreme cause [existing] apart from the world; or they empirically lay at the basis indeterminate experience only, i.e., some existence; or, finally, they abstract from all experience and infer completely a priori, from mere concepts, the existence of a supreme cause. The { A 591 B 619 }
first proof is the *physicotheological,* the second the *cosmological,* the third the *ontological* proof. There neither are, nor can be, any more such proofs.

I shall establish that reason accomplishes no more on the one path (the empirical) than it does on the other (the transcendental), and that reason spreads its wings in vain in trying to get beyond the world of sense by the mere force[116] of speculation. But as for the order in which these ways of proving [the existence of God] must be put forth, it will be exactly the reverse of the order which the gradually expanding reason takes and in which we [here] also placed them at first. For we shall find that although expe-

112[Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *jeder* for *der*.]

113[Or 'ground': *Grund*; see B xix br n. 79.]

114[*Vielgötterei*]

115[*Monotheismus*.]

116[*Macht*.]

rience provides the first prompting for such proofs, yet the mere *transcendental concept* is what guides reason in this its endeavor and what in all such attempts marks out the goal that reason has set for itself. Hence I shall begin by examining the transcendental proof, and shall see thereafter what adding the empirical considerations can do to increase its cogency.[117]

A 592 } B 620

Chapter III

Section IV

On the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of the Existence of God[118]

From what has been said thus far, we see that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is a pure concept of reason, i.e., a mere idea, whose objective reality is far from proved by the mere fact that reason requires this idea. Indeed, the idea only instructs us to seek a certain—although unattainable—completeness, and serves in fact more to confine[119] the understanding than to expand it to new objects. Now here we find the strange and preposterous fact that although the inference from a given existence as such to some absolutely necessary existence seems to be compelling and correct, we nonetheless have all the conditions of the understanding entirely against us when we attempt to frame a concept of such a necessity.

People have at all times spoken of the *absolutely*[120] *necessary* being, and have taken pains not so much to understand whether and how a thing

[117][More literally, 'proving force': *Beweiskraft*.]

[118][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 474–86. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n 5, 527–31. Also T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br n. 94, 301–15. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n 22, 229–30. See also the *Critique of Judgment*, 475–76, and cf. 473.]

[119][Or 'to bound': *begrenzen*.]

[120][*absolut*.]

of this kind can even be thought, but rather to prove its existence. Now a nominal explication of this concept is, indeed, quite easy: we can say, viz., that this being is something whose nonexistence is impossible. But this explication leaves us not a whit more informed concerning the conditions that make it necessary[121] to regard a thing's nonexistence as absolutely[122] unthinkable. And yet these conditions are what we want to know; i.e., we want to know whether or not we think anything at all through this concept.[123] For if by means of the word *unconditionally*[124] I dismiss all the conditions that the understanding always requires in order to regard something as necessary, this does not come close to enabling me to understand whether I then still think something through a concept of an unconditionally necessary being, or perhaps think through it nothing at all. {A 593 B 621}

What is still more: once people had ventured to accept this concept merely haphazardly and had finally become quite familiar with it, they even believed themselves to be explicating it by a multitude of examples. And thus there seemed to be no need whatever for any further inquiry as to whether the concept is understandable. People knew that every proposition of geometry—e.g., the proposition that a triangle has three angles—is absolutely necessary; and thus they spoke even of an object that lies entirely outside the sphere of our understanding[125] as if they understood quite well what they meant by the concept of this object.

In fact all the alleged examples are, without exception, taken from *judgments* rather than from *things* and their existence. But the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not an absolute necessity of things.[126] For the unconditioned necessity of a judgment is only a conditioned necessity of the thing [as subject] or of the predicate in the judgment. The above [geometric] proposition does not say that three angles are necessary absolutely;[127] it says, rather, that under the condition that a triangle is there (i.e., is given), three angles are necessarily also there (in it). Nonetheless, this {A 594 B 622}

[121] [Reading, with Noiré, *notwendig* for *unmöglich* ('impossible').]

[122] [*schlechterdings*]

[123] [Of an absolutely or unconditionally *necessary* being.]

[124] [*unbedingt*, which also means 'unconditioned ']

[125] [Viz., God.]

[126] [*Sachen* here (and similarly just below); *Dinge* just above.]

[127] [*schlechterdings* here; *absolut* (twice) just above]

merely logical necessity has proved to have great power[128] of illusion. For people framed[129] an a priori concept of a thing[130] and arranged this concept in such a way that—in their opinion—it comprised in its range also[131] existence.[132] Having framed the concept in this way, they believed that they could safely infer the being's existence. For since existence necessarily belongs to the object of this concept—i.e., under the condition that this thing is posited as given (existing)[133]—the object's existence is (according to the rule of identity)[134] necessarily also posited. And hence this being is itself absolutely necessary, because—in a concept that has been assumed at will—this being's existence also[135] is thought, viz., under the condition that the concept's object is posited.

If in an identical[136] judgment I annul the predicate and retain the subject, then a contradiction arises, and hence I say that the predicate belongs to the subject necessarily. But if I annul the subject along with the predicate, then no contradiction arises, for *nothing is left* that could be contradicted. To posit a triangle and yet to annul its three angles is contradictory; but to annul the triangle along with its three angles is not a contradiction.
A 595 B 623 And with the concept of an absolutely necessary being the situation is exactly the same. If you annul the being's existence, then you annul the thing itself with all its predicates. Whence, then, is the contradiction to come? Extrinsically[137] there is nothing that would be contradicted, for the thing is not to be necessary extrinsically.[138] Intrinsically to the thing there is also nothing that would be contradicted; for by annulling the thing itself you have simultaneously annulled everything intrinsic to it. God[139] is omnipotent—this is a necessary judgment. The omnipotence cannot be an-

[128][*Macht.*]

[129][Viz., in the ontological proof.]

[130][I.e., of a being.]

[131][*mit.*]

[132][*Dasein*, here and in the remainder of the paragraph.]

[133][*existierend*]

[134][I.e., in this case, whatever is existent is existent.]

[135][*mit.*]

[136][I.e., analytic (true by virtue of the meaning of its terms).]

[137][To the thing Similarly just below]

[138][I.e., necessitated by something other than itself.]

[139][*Gott*]

nulled if you posit a deity,[140] i.e., an infinite being, with [part of] whose concept the concept of omnipotence is identical. But if you say *God does not exist,*[141] then neither omnipotence nor any other of his predicates is given; for they are all annulled along with[142] the subject, and hence this thought does not manifest the least contradiction.

Thus you have seen that if I annul the predicate of a judgment together with[143] the subject, then an intrinsic[144] contradiction can never arise—no matter what the predicate may be. You are now left with no escape except to say that there are subjects that cannot be annulled at all and that hence must remain. This, however, would be equivalent to saying that there are absolutely necessary subjects—the very presupposition whose correctness I doubted and whose possibility you wanted to show me. For I cannot frame the slightest concept of a thing that, if it were annulled with all its predicates, would leave a contradiction; and without a contradiction I have, through pure a priori concepts alone, no mark of impossibility. {A 596 B 624}

Wishing now to argue against all these general conclusions (which no one can refuse to accept), you challenge me with a case that you put forth as a factual[145] proof. You argue that there is indeed one concept—and, moreover, only this *one*[146]—where the nonexistence or annulment of the concept's object is self-contradictory: viz., the concept of the maximally real[147] being. This being, you say, has all reality, and you are entitled to assume such a being as possible. (This possibility I concede for now, although the fact that a concept does not contradict itself is far from proving the object's possibility.)[148] Now [so you argue] *all reality* includes

[140][*Gottheit.*]

[141][Literally, 'God is not': *Gott ist nicht.*]

[142][*zusamt.*]

[143][*zusamt.*]

[144][Or 'internal': *inner.*]

[145][*durch die Tat.*]

[146][Emphasis added.]

[147][*allerrealst.*]

[148]A concept is always possible if it does not contradict itself. This is the logical mark of possibility, and by this mark the concept's object is distinguished from the *nihil negativum.*[a] But the concept may nonetheless be an empty one if the objective reality of the synthesis whereby the concept is produced is not separately established. However, as has been shown above,[b] establishing this reality rests always on principles of possible experience and not on the principle[c] of analysis (the

also[149] existence; hence existence lies within the concept of a possible A 597 B 625 thing.[150] If now this thing is annulled, then the thing's intrinsic possibility is annulled—which is contradictory.

I reply: You have already committed a contradiction if, in offering the concept of a thing that you wanted to think merely as regards its possibility, you have already brought into this concept—no matter under what covert name[151]—the concept of the thing's existence.[152] If this [move] is granted to you, then you have seemingly won your point;[153] but in fact you have said nothing, because you have committed a mere tautology. I ask you: is the proposition that *this or that thing exists* (a thing that, whatever it may be, I grant you as possible)—is this proposition, I ask, an analytic or a synthetic one? If the proposition is analytic, then by asserting the thing's existence you add nothing to your thought of the thing. But in that case either the thought, which is in you, would have to be the thing itself; or you have presupposed an existence as belonging to possibility, and have then allegedly inferred the thing's existence from the thing's intrinsic possibility—which is nothing but a pitiful tautology. The word *reality,* which merely sounds different in the concept of the thing [as subject] from [the word] *existence*[154] in the concept of the predicate, is of no help.[155] For even if you call all positing [of a subject] *reality* (whatever it is that you are positing), you have in the concept of the subject already posited, and assumed as actual, the thing with all its predicates and are merely re- A 598 B 626 peating it in the predicate. On the other hand, if you admit—as any rea-

principle of contradiction). This point is a warning that we must not from the (logical) possibility of concepts immediately infer the (real) possibility of things.

[a][Negative nothing.]

[b][See esp. A 155–57/B 194–96, and cf. the beginning of this chapter, A 567–69 = B 595–97.]

[c][*Grundsatz* here, *Prinzipien* just above, *Satz* just below. See A vii br. n. 7. and A 571 = B 599 br. n. 22.]

[149][*mitbegreifen . . . unter;* emphasis on 'all reality' added.]

[150][*von einem Möglichen*]

[151][Such as 'reality' or (cf., just below, the analytic version of 'This or that thing exists') 'real possibility.']

[152][*Existenz* here. *Dasein* in the preceding paragraph. Similarly in the remainder of this section.]

[153][*Spiel.*]

[154][Emphasis added; likewise for 'reality' just above and just below.]

[155][*macht es nicht aus.*]

sonable person must—that any existential proposition is synthetic, then how can[156] you assert that the predicate of existence cannot be annulled without contradiction? For this superiority[157] belongs only to analytic propositions as their peculiarity, since their character rests precisely on this [necessity].

I would, indeed, hope to eliminate without much ado all this meditative subtlety[158] through an exact determination of the concept of existence—had I not found that the illusion arising from the confusion of a logical with a real predicate (i.e., with the determination of a thing) permits almost no instruction [to dispel the illusion]. Anything whatsoever can serve as a *logical predicate;* even the subject [of a proposition] can be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a *determination* is a predicate that is added[159] to the subject's concept and increases it; hence it must not already be contained in that concept.

Being[160] is obviously not a real predicate,[161] i.e., it is not a concept of anything that can be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing [in itself] or of certain determinations in themselves.[162] In its logical use it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition *God is omnipotent* contains two concepts that have their objects: God and omnipotence. The little word *is* is not a further predicate over and above these two, but is only what posits the predicate *in reference* to the subject. If I now take the subject (God) together with all its predicates (to which belongs also omnipotence) and say *God is*[163]—or, There is a God—then I posit no new predicate as added to the concept of God, but posit only the subject in itself with all its predicates; viz., I posit *the object* in reference to my *concept*. Both[164] must contain exactly the same; and hence nothing further can be added to the concept—which expresses only the [object's] { A 599 B 627

[156][*wollt.*]

[157][Of having such necessity]

[158][*grüblerische Argutation.*]

[159][Viz., in a synthetic proposition.]

[160][Or *to be: Sein.*]

[161][*reales* (as derived from Latin *res*, thing) *Prädikat.* On Kant's famous argument that existence is not a (real) predicate, cf. *The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God*, Ak. II, 72–77, 156–57.]

[162][*an sich*, used loosely here (with regard to the thing and the determinations).]

[163][I.e., God exists.]

[164][The object and the concept.]

possibility—merely because (through the expression *it is*[165]) I think this object as given absolutely. And thus the actual contains no more than the merely possible.[166] A hundred actual thalers[167] do not contain the least more than a hundred possible thalers. For, the possible thalers signify the concept and the actual thalers signify the object and the positing thereof in itself; hence if the object contained more than the concept, then my concept would not express the entire object and thus would also not be the concept commensurate with this object. In the state of my assets, however, there is more in the case of a hundred actual thalers than in the case of the mere concept of them (i.e., their mere possibility). For in the case of the hundred thalers' actuality the object is not merely contained analytically in my concept (which is a determination[168] of my state[169]), but is added synthetically to my concept; yet these thought hundred thalers themselves are not in the least augmented by their being outside my concept.

A 600 B 628 Hence no matter through which and through how many predicates I think a thing (even if I think it in its thoroughgoing determination), not the least is added to this thing by my going on to say that this thing *is*.[170] For otherwise what exists would not be the same as I had thought in the concept, but would be more; and I could then not say that exactly the object of my concept exists. Even if I think in a thing all reality except one, the missing reality is not added by my saying that such a deficient thing exists. Rather, the thing then exists as encumbered with exactly the same deficiency with which[171] I thought it, since otherwise there would exist something other than what I thought. Now if I think a being as the supreme reality (i.e., as a being without deficiency), then there still remains the question as to whether or not this being exists. For although nothing of the possible real content of a thing as such is missing in my concept of this being, yet something is still missing in the concept's relation to my entire state of thought, viz., that the cognition of this object is possible also a posteriori.[172] And

[165][Emphasis added.]

[166][See A 230–32/B 282–85.]

[167][See A 170/B 212 br. n. 97.]

[168][I.e., attribute.]

[169][The state of my assets.]

[170][I.e., exists.]

[171][*als*.]

[172][Not just conceptually and thus a priori]

now we find also the cause of the difficulty that prevails here. If an object[173] of the senses were at issue, then I could not confuse the thing's existence with the mere concept of the thing. For when the object is thought through the concept, then it is thought only as agreeing with the universal conditions of a possible empirical cognition as such. But when it is thought through existence, then the object is thought as contained in the context of experience as a whole; and here the concept of the object is not in the least augmented by the connection with the content of experience as a whole, although our thinking acquires through this content another possible perception. But if we wish to think existence through the pure category alone, then we must not be surprised that we cannot indicate any mark whereby to distinguish existence from mere possibility. {A 601 B 629}

Hence no matter what and how much our concept of an object may contain, we must yet go outside the concept in order to assign existence to the object. In the case of objects of the senses this is done through the coherence of these objects, according to empirical laws, with some one of my perceptions. But for objects of pure thought there is no means whatsoever of cognizing their existence. For their existence would have to be cognized entirely a priori. But our consciousness of any existence (whether such consciousness arises directly through perception or indirectly through inferences connecting something with perception) belongs altogether to the unity of experience. And although an existence outside this realm [of experience] cannot absolutely be declared to be impossible, it is a presupposition that we cannot justify by anything.

The concept of a supreme being is in many respects a very useful idea. But this idea, precisely because it is merely that, is quite incapable of allowing us to expand, by means of it alone, our cognition regarding what exists. Even as regards possibility the idea is unable to teach us anything further. To be sure, the analytic mark of possibility, which consists in the fact that mere positings[174] (realities) cannot generate a contradiction, cannot be denied to this concept.[175] However, the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis whose possibility we cannot judge a priori. For the realities are not given to us specifically. And even if they were, no {A 602 B 630}

[173] [*Gegenstand* here and throughout the remainder of this section; *Objekt* just above. In this entire section and everywhere else Kant treats the two terms as interchangeable. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[174] [*Positionen*.]

[175] [Of a supreme being.]

judgment whatever in regard to them [can] take place at all. For, the mark of the possibility of synthetic cognitions must always be sought only in experience; the object of an idea, however, cannot belong to experience. Hence the illustrious[176] *Leibniz* is far from having accomplished what he flattered himself to have achieved: viz., an a priori insight into the possibility of such an august[177] ideal being.

Hence all effort and labor is lost if expended on the famous[178] ontological (Cartesian) proof of the existence of a supreme being from mere concepts; and, I suppose, a human being could not from mere ideas become richer in insights[179] any more than a merchant could become richer in assets if he tried to improve his situation by adding a few zeros to his cash balance.

A 603 B 631

Chapter III

Section V
On the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the Existence of God[180]

Trying[181] to wrest from an idea drawn up entirely by choice[182] the existence of the object corresponding to it is something quite unnatural and a

[176][*berühmt.*]

[177][Or 'sublime': *erhaben.*]

[178][*berühmt.*]

[179][I.e., theoretical cognitions; cf. the etymology of 'theoretical ']

[180][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 486–511. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br n. 5, 531–37. Also T K. Swing, *op cit.* at A 310/B 366 br n. 94, 316–18 And see T D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 230–31. See also the *Critique of Judgment*, 475–76, and cf. 473]

[181][As does the ontological proof]

[182][*ganz willkürlich entworfen*]

mere innovation of school wit.[183] Indeed, the attempt to prove the existence of God in this way would never have been made, had it not been preceded by two facts: First, our reason had a need to assume, [as the condition] for existence as such, something or other that is necessary (at which one can stop in ascending [to ever further conditions]). Second, since this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori certain, reason was forced to seek a concept that would, if possible, satisfy such a demand and allow[184] us to cognize an existence completely a priori. Now this concept was believed to have been found in the idea of a maximally real being.[185] And thus this idea was there used only for gaining a more determinate acquaintance with something concerning which one was already otherwise convinced or persuaded that it must exist—viz., the necessary being. But people concealed this natural course of reason, and instead of ending with this concept, they tried to start from it in order to derive from it the necessity of existence which the concept was, after all, determined only to supplement. {A 604 B 632}
Thus there arose the miscarried ontological proof, which brings with it nothing satisfactory either for the natural and sound understanding or for any examination that complies with school standards.[186]

The *cosmological* proof, which we shall now investigate, retains the connection of absolute necessity with supreme reality. But rather than make an inference—as did the foregoing [ontological] proof—from supreme reality to necessity of existence, the cosmological proof instead makes an inference from the previously given unconditioned necessity of some being to this being's unbounded reality. And to this extent the proof at least puts everything onto the track of a kind of inference that is—I do not know whether rational or subtly reasoning[187]—at least natural. This kind of inference carries with it the strongest[188] persuasion not only for the common but also for the speculative understanding—as, indeed, it manifestly also

[183][*Schulwitz.* (*Witz* alone is rendered in this translation as 'ingenuity.')]

[184][*geben.*]

[185][Or 'supremely real being': *allerrealstes* Wesen, i.e., *ens realissimum.*]

[186][On the ontological and the cosmological proofs and the relation between them, cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 475–76. (Kant there considers *both* these proofs to be *ontological*, but the former ontological *proper*.) See also *The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God*, Ak. II, 157–58.]

[187][*vernünftigen oder vernünftelnden.*]

[188][*meiste.*]

draws the first contours[189] for all proofs of natural theology. These contours have always been followed and will continue to be followed, no matter how much they may be decorated and concealed with an abundance of[190] ornamental foliage and curlicues. This proof, which Leibniz[191] also called the proof *a contingentia mundi,*[192] we shall now lay before us and subject to examination.

The proof, then, runs as follows:[193] If anything exists, then an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now at least I myself exist. Therefore, an absolutely[194] necessary being exists. The minor premise contains
A 605 B 633 an experience; the major premise contains the inference from an experience as such to the existence of the necessary.[195] Thus the proof starts, in fact, from experience, and hence is not conducted entirely a priori, or [i.e.] ontologically. And because the object of all possible experience is called the world,[196] the proof is called the *cosmological* proof. Since this proof also abstracts from any particular property of objects of experience whereby this [particular] world may be distinguished from every possible world, the proof's name already distinguishes it also from the physicotheological proof,[197] which uses as bases of proof observations of the particular character of this our world of sense.

189[*Grundlinien.*]

190[*noch so viel.*]

191[Emphasis deleted.]

192[From the contingent things of the world.]

193[Cf. the *Critique of Judgment* (Ak. V, 476): "The other ontological proof (which is also called the metaphysical-*cosmological* proof) starts from the necessity of the existence of some thing or other (which must certainly be granted, since an existence is given me in self-consciousness), and infers from this the complete determination of it as the supremely real being."]

194[*absolut* here, *schlechterdings* just above; similarly in the remainder of this section.]

195This inference is too familiar to require being set forth at length here. It rests on the supposedly transcendental natural law of causality whereby everything *contingent* has its cause; and this cause, if contingent in turn, must likewise have a cause; and so on, until the series of causes subordinated to one another must end at an absolutely necessary cause, without which the series would not have completeness.

196[I.e., the cosmos.]

197[To be discussed in Section VI below, A 620–30 = B 648–58.]

The proof now continues to infer as follows: The necessary being can be[198] determined in only one way, i.e., by only one predicate from all possible [pairs of] opposite predicates. Consequently, it must be[199] determined thoroughly[200] by its very concept.[201] Now only one concept of a thing is possible that determines the thing thoroughly and a priori, viz., the concept of the *ens realissimum*.[202] Therefore, the concept of the maximally real being is the only concept through which a necessary being can be thought. I.e., a supreme being necessarily exists. {A 606 B 634}

So many subtly reasoning[203] principles come together in this cosmological argument, that speculative reason here seems to have mustered all its dialectical art in order to bring about the greatest possible transcendental illusion. However, let us set examination of these principles[204] aside for a while, in order merely to reveal a trick whereby speculative reason puts forth as a new argument what is in fact an old one in disguised shape, and thereby appeals to the agreement between [allegedly] two witnesses: one a witness from pure reason,[205] and another with empirical credentials. But in fact there is solely the first witness, who is merely changing his apparel and voice in order to be taken for a second witness. In order to lay its foundation quite securely, the cosmological proof bases itself on experience, and thereby gives itself the look of being distinct from the ontological proof, which puts its entire confidence in pure a priori concepts alone. But the cosmological proof employs this experience only for taking a single step, viz., the step to the existence of a necessary being as such. What properties this being has—this the empirical basis of proof cannot teach us, but reason here entirely abandons this basis of proof and conducts its investigation among[206] concepts only. Viz., reason investigates what properties an absolutely necessary being as such must have, i.e., which among all pos- {A 607 B 635}

[198][*werden.*]

[199][*sein.*]

[200][*durchgängig*, emphasis added]

[201][And hence a priori.]

[202][Maximally real being.]

[203][*vernünftelnde.*]

[204][*ihre*; the term could refer, alternatively, to the dialectical art or even to speculative reason.]

[205][*reiner Vernunftzeuge.*]

[206][*hinter.*]

sible things contains within itself the required[207] conditions (*requisita*)[208] for an absolute necessity. Now, reason believes that it finds these requisites solely and exclusively in the concept of a maximally real being, and it then infers that this maximally real being is the absolutely necessary being. Clearly, however, one is here presupposing that the concept of a being of supreme reality is completely adequate to the concept of absolute necessity of existence, i.e., that the absolute necessity of existence can be inferred from the supreme reality—a proposition that was asserted by the ontological argument. Hence the ontological argument, although it was to have been avoided, is in fact being assumed and laid at the basis in the cosmological proof. For absolute necessity is an existence based on[209] mere concepts. If I now say that the concept of the *ens realissimum* is such a concept—and is, moreover, the only one that is suitable and adequate to necessary existence—then I must also concede that necessary existence can be inferred from this concept. Hence the ontological proof alone, conducted from mere concepts, is what in fact contains all the cogency[210] in the so-called cosmological proof. And the alleged experience [appealed to in the proof] is entirely futile—sufficient, perhaps, for merely leading us to the concept of absolute necessity, but not for establishing this necessity in any determinate thing. For as soon as we aim at establishing this necessity in a determinate thing, we must immediately leave all experience and search among pure concepts, in order to discover which of them might contain the conditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. But
A 608 B 636 once[211] we gain insight in this way into the possibility of such a being, then the being's existence is also established. For this possibility means the same as that among all possible things[212] there is one that carries with it absolute necessity, i.e., this being exists with absolute necessity.

All deceptions committed in making inferences are discovered most easily if they are displayed in a manner complying with school standards. Here is such an exposition.

[207][*erforderlich.*]

[208][Requisites.]

[209][*aus.*]

[210][More literally, 'proving force'. *Beweiskraft*]

[211][*nur.*]

[212][*unter allem Möglichen.*]

Consider the proposition (which is the *nervus probandi*[213] of the cosmological proof) that any absolutely necessary being is also[214] the maximally real being. If this proposition is correct, then it must, like all affirmative judgments, be convertible at least *per accidens*[215]—i.e., at least to this proposition: some maximally real beings are also absolutely necessary beings. However, one *ens realissimum* is in no respect different from another; and hence what holds for *some* beings contained under this concept holds also for *all*. Hence I shall (in this case) be able to convert the proposition also *simply*[216]—i.e., to this one: any maximally real being is a necessary being. Now because this proposition is determined a priori and merely from its concepts,[217] the mere concept of the maximally real[218] being must carry with it also this being's absolute necessity. But this is precisely what the ontological proof asserted, and what the cosmological proof did not want to acknowledge but nonetheless laid at the basis of its inferences, although in a covert manner. A 609 B 637

Thus the second path taken by speculative reason in order to prove the existence of the supreme being not only is just as deceptive as the first, but has the further defect of committing an *ignoratio elenchi*.[219] For it promises to lead us along a new course, but after a little detour takes us back again onto the old course that we had left for its sake.

I said just previously[220] that in this cosmological argument there lies hidden an entire nest of dialectical claims—a nest that transcendental critique can easily discover and destroy. I shall now only cite these claims, and shall leave it to the already practiced reader to investigate these deceptive principles further and to annul them.

[213][Nerve of the proof.]

[214][*zugleich;* likewise in the converse by limitation, just below.]

[215][On conversion, including conversion *per accidens* (by contingent [fact], i.e., conversion by limitation), cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 118–19.]

[216][Rather than *per accidens* (by limitation): *schlechthin.*]

[217][Erdmann wonders whether instead of *aus seinen* we should read *aus reinen:* 'from pure concepts.']

[218][Kant actually says just *realst* here ('most real'), rather than *allerrealst.*]

[219][The fallacy of misconstruing one's argument, normally by alleging to prove one proposition while actually proving another, but here by alleging to use certain premises while actually using others.]

[220][At the beginning of the first full paragraph at A 606 = B 634.]

Thus we find, e.g.: (1) The transcendental principle for making an inference from the contingent to a cause. This principle has signification[221] only in the world of sense, but outside this world it has no meaning[222] at all. For the merely intellectual concept of the contingent can in no way produce a synthetic proposition, such as the principle of causality; and the principle of causality has no signification whatever and no mark for its use except only in the world of sense. Yet here [in the cosmological proof] the principle was to serve precisely for getting beyond the world of sense.
A 610 B 638 (2) The principle[223] for inferring a first cause from the impossibility, in the world of sense, of an infinite series of causes given above[224] one another. The principles of reason's use do not entitle us to make this inference[225] even in experience, and still less to extend this principle beyond experience (to [a realm] to which this chain [of causes] cannot be expanded at all). (3) Reason's false self-satisfaction as regards the completion of this series. It arises through the fact that one finally removes any [further] condition, while yet without [such further] condition no concept of a necessity can take place; and since nothing further can then be comprehended, this[226] is assumed to be a completion of one's concept [of the series]. (4) The confusion of the logical possibility of a concept of all united reality (without internal contradiction) with the transcendental possibility [of that reality]. The latter possibility requires a principle of the feasibility of such a synthesis; such a principle, however, can again apply only to the realm of possible experiences—etc.

The cosmological proof is an artistic feat that aims merely at evading the attempt to prove the existence of a necessary being a priori and through mere concepts. For, such a proof would have to be conducted ontologically; but we feel entirely incapable of doing this. With this aim[227] we lay at the basis an actual existence (an experience as such) and infer from it. as best we can, some absolutely necessary condition of this existence. We
A 611 B 639 then do not need to explicate the possibility of this condition; for if the

[221][*Bedeutung*.]

[222][*Sinn*]

[223][This term substituted in B; A had 'inference.']

[224][I.e., as superordinated to.]

[225][Or, possibly, 'do not entitle us to this principle': *wozu .. nicht berechtigen*.]

[226][I.e., the removal of any further conditions—or, possibly, the fact that nothing further can be comprehended.]

[227][Of evading an ontological proof.]

condition has been proved to exist, then there is no need whatever to raise the question concerning its possibility. If now we want to determine this necessary being more closely as regards its character,[228] then we do not[229] seek what [condition] is sufficient for comprehending from [the being's] concept the necessity of [the being's] existence; for if we could find this [condition], then we would not need an empirical presupposition. No, we seek[230] only the negative condition (*conditio sine qua non*)[231] without which a being would not be absolutely necessary. Now this procedure would, indeed, be acceptable in any other kind of inferences from a given consequence to its basis. But here, unfortunately, it so happens that the condition being demanded for absolute necessity can be found in only one being. Hence this being would have to contain within its concept everything that is required for absolute necessity [viz., supreme reality]. And thus this [condition, viz., supreme reality,] makes an inference to this absolute necessity possible a priori.[232] I.e., I would thus have to be able to infer [not only that any absolutely necessary being is also the maximally real being,[233] but] also, conversely, that anything to which this concept (of supreme reality) applies is absolutely necessary. And if I cannot make this inference (as, indeed, I must confess that I cannot if I want to avoid the ontological proof), then I have come to grief on my new path and find myself back again where I started. The concept of a supreme being does, indeed, satisfy all a priori questions that can be raised concerning the intrinsic determinations of a thing; and hence this concept is also an ideal without equal, because the universal concept[234] distinguishes this being among all { A 612 B 640
possible things also as an individual. But the concept of a supreme being does not at all satisfy the question concerning this being's own existence. Yet only that was, in fact, the concern.[235] And to the inquiry of someone who already assumed the existence of a necessary being and who only

[228][Or nature]

[229][As does the ontological proof.]

[230][In the cosmological proof.]

[231]["Condition without which not," i.e., necessary condition.]

[232][Or, perhaps, 'makes possible an a priori inference to this absolute necessity.']

[233][This being the "nerve" of the cosmological proof; see A 608 = B 636, the beginning of the last paragraph.]

[234][*As* universal.]

[235][In the cosmological proof.]

wanted to know which among all things would have to be regarded as that being, one was still unable to respond: This [being] here is the necessary being.

We may, indeed, be permitted to *assume* the existence of a being of supreme sufficiency as cause for all possible effects, in order to facilitate reason's search for unity among its bases of explanation. But to presume so much as to say that *such a being necessarily exists* is no longer the modest utterance of a permitted hypothesis, but the audacious claim to an apodeictic certainty. For the cognition of what one alleges to cognize as absolutely necessary must likewise carry with it absolute necessity.

The entire problem of the transcendental ideal depends on this: either to find for absolute necessity a concept [of a being having such necessity], or to find for the concept of some thing the thing's absolute necessity. If one can perform one of these tasks, then one must also be able to perform the other; for reason cognizes as absolutely necessary only what is neces-
A 613 B 641 sary by its very concept. However, both tasks entirely surpass all our utmost endeavors to *satisfy* our understanding on this point, but surpass also all attempts to calm the understanding on account of this incapacity.

Unconditioned necessity, which we so indispensably require as the ultimate support[236] of all things, is for human reason the true abyss. Even eternity, no matter how awesomely sublime it may be depicted to be by someone like *Haller*,[237] does not make nearly the same dizzying impression on the mind; for it only *measures* the duration of things, but does not *support* them. One cannot fend off the thought, nor can one bear it, that a being conceived by us as supreme among all possible beings might, as it were, say to itself: I am from eternity to eternity, and apart from me there is nothing except what is something merely through my will; *but whence, then, am I?* Here everything gives way beneath us; and the greatest no less than the littlest perfection merely hovers unsupported[238] before speculative reason, which loses nothing in letting the one no less than the other vanish without the slightest hindrance.

Many forces of nature that manifest their existence through certain effects remain for us inscrutable;[239] for we cannot trace them far enough by

[236][*Träger.*]

[237][Albrecht von Haller (1708–77), Swiss anatomist and physiologist. He is the author of many scientific works, and even of theological writings and poems, including *Die Alpen* (*The Alps*).]

[238][*ohne Haltung.*]

[239][*unerforschlich.*]

observation. Likewise, the transcendental object that lies at the basis of appearances—and with it the basis as to why our sensibility has these [particular] highest conditions rather than others—is and remains for us inscrutable;[240] for although the thing[241] itself is indeed given,[242] we just do not have insight into it. An ideal of pure reason, however, cannot be called *inscrutable.* For it can show no further credentials of its reality than reason's need to complete[243] all synthetic unity by means of it. Hence the ideal is not given even as a thinkable object, and thus is also not inscrutable as an object. Rather, the ideal[244] must, as a mere idea, find its seat and its solution in the nature of reason, and hence must be scrutable. For reason consists precisely in our being able to account for all our concepts, opinions, and assertions, whether from objective bases or—if these concepts, opinions, and assertions are a mere illusion—from subjective bases. { A 614 B 642

EXPOSURE[245] AND EXPLANATION OF THE DIALECTICAL ILLUSION IN ALL TRANSCENDENTAL PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF A NECESSARY BEING

Both of the proofs conducted[246] thus far were transcendental, i.e., they were attempted independently of empirical principles. For although the cosmological proof lays at the basis an experience as such, it is still not conducted from some particular character of experience.[247] Rather, it is conducted from pure principles of reason, as referred to an existence given through empirical consciousness as such, and it abandons even this guidance so as to rely on pure concepts alone. What, then, in these transcen- { A 615 B 643

240[See the chapter on the distinction between phenomena and noumena, A 235–60/B 294–315.]

241[*Sache;* i.e., here, the transcendental object.]

242[*übrigens gegeben,* viz , as a thinkable object; cf. just below.]

243[Or 'perfect': *vollenden.*]

244[Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *es* for *er.*]

245[Or 'Uncovering': *Entdeckung.*]

246[By Kant's imagined interlocutors, whom he previously addressed directly by (the plural) 'you': A 595–98 = B 623–26.]

247[As is the physicotheological proof, discussed in the next section.]

dental proofs, is the cause of the natural illusion that connects the concepts of necessity and supreme reality, and that realizes and hypostatizes[248] what can, after all, be only an idea? What is the cause that makes it inevitable for us to assume something, among existing things, as in itself necessary, and yet at the same time to shrink back from the existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how do we set about bringing reason to an understanding with itself on this issue, so that it may get away from the wavering state of a timid approval, which it always takes back again, and arrive at calm insight?

It is an extremely remarkable fact that if one presupposes that something exists, then one cannot circumvent the inference that something or other also exists necessarily. On this entirely natural (although not yet therefore secure) inference[249] rests the cosmological argument. On the other hand, no matter what concept of a thing I may assume,[250] I find that I can never conceive[251] the thing's existence as absolutely necessary; and that whatever it may be that exists, nothing prevents me from thinking its nonexistence.[252] Hence although I must for the existent[253] as such assume something necessary, I cannot think any thing as necessary[254] in itself. In
A 616 B 644 other words, I can indeed never *complete* the regression[255] to the conditions of existence[256] without assuming a necessary being, but I can never *start* from this being.

If for existing things as such I must think something necessary, but am not entitled to think any thing as necessary in itself,[257] then it follows inevitably that necessity and contingency must not concern and apply to things themselves, because otherwise a contradiction would take place; and hence it follows that neither of these two principles is objective, but that

[248][I.e., respectively: turns (an idea) into a thing and, moreover, into one that is self-subsistent.]

[249][*Schluß* here, *Folgerung* just above.]

[250][I.e., a concept adequate for something or other that exists necessarily.]

[251][Or 'present': *vorstellen.* See B xvii br. n. 73.]

[252][Literally, 'not-being': *Nichtsein.* Cf. A 80/B 106.]

[253][*zu dem Existierenden.*]

[254][*selbst als an sich notwendig.*]

[255][*Zurückgehen,* previously referred to as *Regressus.*]

[256][*des Existierens.*]

[257][*an sich selbst als notwendig.*]

they can at most be subjective principles[258] of reason. As such subjective principles they enjoin us, on the one hand, to seek for everything given as existent [a] something that is necessary—i.e., never to stop anywhere but at an explanation that is complete a priori. But, on the other hand, they enjoin us never to hope to attain this completion—i.e., to assume nothing empirical as being unconditioned in order to exempt ourselves from further derivation. In such subjective signification the two principles, as merely heuristic and *regulative* principles concerned with nothing but reason's formal interest,[259] can quite well coexist.[260] For the one principle says, You ought to philosophize in such a way about nature as if for everything belonging to existence there is[261] a necessary first basis; you ought to do this solely in order that by pursuing such an idea, viz., an imagined highest[262] basis, you may bring systematic unity into your cognition. But the other principle warns you not to assume any determination pertaining to the existence of things as being such a highest basis—i.e., as being absolutely necessary—but to continue keeping your path open to further derivation, and hence always to treat any such determination as still conditioned. But if everything that is perceived in things must necessarily be regarded by us as conditioned, then—by the same token—no thing (that may be given empirically) can be regarded as absolutely necessary. {A 617 B 645}

From this, however, it follows that you must assume the absolutely necessary as being *outside* the world. For the absolutely necessary is to serve only as a principle of the greatest possible unity of appearances, viz., as their highest basis; and within the world you can never reach this highest basis, because the second rule commands you to regard all empirical causes of unity always as derivative.

The philosophers of antiquity regarded every[263] form of nature as contingent, but regarded matter—in accordance with the judgment of common reason—as original and necessary. But if they had regarded matter, as to its existence, *in itself* rather than in respect of appearances—as substratum thereof—then the idea of [matter's] absolute necessity would have van-

[258] [*Prinzipien* here, *Grundsätze* just above. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[259] [Such heuristic principles will be examined fully in the Appendix, A 631–68/B 659–96.]

[260] [*beieinander bestehen.*]

[261] [Or 'were,' if *gebe* is here taken as the older spelling of *gäbe*.]

[262] [*oberst;* see A 590 = B 618 br. n. 111.]

[263] [*alle.*]

ished at once. For there is nothing that ties reason to this existence absolutely, but reason can always, and without conflict, annul such existence in thought; but hence the absolute necessity [of matter] resided likewise only
A 618 B 646 in thought. Therefore, this persuasion[264] must have been based on a certain regulative principle. And indeed, extension and impenetrability (which together amount to the concept of matter)[265] constitute the highest empirical principle of the unity of appearances; and insofar as this principle is empirically unconditioned, it possesses a property of a regulative principle. But since every determination of matter (the matter which amounts to the real [component] of appearances)[266]—and thus also impenetrability—is an effect (action) that [as such] must have its cause and hence is always still derivative, matter is nonetheless not fitting for the idea of a necessary being as principle of all derivative unity.[267] For, each of matter's real properties, as derivative, is only conditionally necessary and hence can intrinsically be annulled—but therewith the entire existence of matter would be annulled; on the other hand, if this [intrinsic annullability of matter] did not result,[268] then we would have reached the supreme basis of unity empirically, which is prohibited by the second regulative principle. Thus it follows that matter—and in general whatever belongs to the world—is unfitting for the idea of a necessary original being [considered even] as a mere principle of the greatest empirical unity, but that this being must be posited outside the world. For then we can always confidently derive the appearances of the world and their existence from other appearances as if there were no necessary being, and yet can strive unceasingly toward the
A 619 B 647 completeness of this derivation as if such a being were presupposed as a highest basis.

According to these considerations, the ideal of the supreme being is nothing but a *regulative principle* of reason. This principle enjoins us to regard all linkage in the world *as if* it arose from an all-sufficient necessary cause, in order that in explaining this linkage we may base on this cause[269] the rule of a unity that is systematic and necessary according to

[264][Of the necessity of matter.]

[265][Cf. the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*. Ak. IV, 498–99, 508–11.]

[266][Parentheses added.]

[267][I.e., not even if this being is considered as a merely regulative such principle]

[268][*geschehen*.]

[269][*darauf*, which could also refer to the (described) way of regarding all linkage in the world, or to the regulative principle, or to the ideal.]

universal laws; the ideal is not an assertion of an existence necessary in itself. At the same time, however, we cannot avoid conceiving[270] this formal principle—by means of a transcendental subreption[271]—as constitutive, and to think this unity hypostatically. For [the case here is similar to that of space.] All shapes, which are merely different limitations of space, are made originally possible by space, although space is only a principle of sensibility; yet space is precisely therefore regarded as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent something, and as an object given a priori in itself. Such [a subreption] also happens quite naturally in the case at hand. The systematic unity of nature cannot in any way be put forth as a principle of our reason's empirical use, except insofar as we lay at the basis [of this unity] the idea of a maximally real being as the highest cause. Since that is so, this idea of such a being is thereby conceived as an actual object; and this object in turn is conceived as necessary, because it is the highest condition. And hence a *regulative* principle is transformed into a *constitutive* one. This substitution manifests itself through the following fact. { A 620 B 648 This highest being was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary with respect to the world. But if I now consider it as a thing by itself, this necessity is not capable of any concept. Hence this necessity must be one that was to be found in my reason only as formal condition of thinking, but not as material and hypostatic condition of existence.

[270][Or 'presenting'; similarly near the end of A 619 = B 647]

[271][See A 643 = B 671 incl. br n. 14]

Chapter III

Section VI
On the Impossibility of the Physicotheological Proof[272]

If, then, neither the concept of things as such nor the experience of some *existence as such*[273] can accomplish what is being demanded,[274] there remains one further remedy to be tried. We must inquire whether a *determinate experience*—hence the experience of the things of the present world, their character and arrangement—does not perhaps provide a basis of proof that can safely bring[275] us to the conviction of the existence of a supreme being. We would call such a proof the *physicotheological* proof.[276] Should this proof likewise be impossible, then no satisfactory proof for the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea[277] is possible at all from mere speculative reason.[278]

[272][See Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 523–30. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 511–30. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit* at A vii br. n. 5, 538–540. Also T. K. Swing, *op. cit.* at A 310/B 366 br. n. 94, 318–33. And see T. D Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 231–32. Unlike in the preceding two sections, Kant omits from the title the words 'of the existence of God,' presumably as already implied by 'physicotheological.' This proof is better known as the *teleological argument* or *argument from design*. Kant presents and criticizes it most fully in the *Critique of Judgment*: see Ak V. 385–485, esp. 436–42, 461–66, and 476–85. See also *The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God*, Ak. II, 116–37, and cf. 160–62.]

[273][As, respectively, in the ontological and cosmological proofs discussed in the preceding two sections. On my rendering of *überhaupt* by 'as such' (only rarely by 'in general'), see B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[274][Viz., to prove the existence of God.]

[275][*verhelfen*.]

[276][I.e., by the etymology of the adjective, a proof proceeding from nature to God.]

[277][Of a supreme being]

[278][Our only recourse will then be a *moral* theology based on *practical* reason. See A 632 = B 660, A 636 = B 664, A 641 = B 669, and A 804–19 = B 832–47 (esp. A 808–16 = B 836–44).]

After all the above considerations, we soon become aware that we can expect the answer to this inquiry to be quite easy and conclusive. For how can [an] experience ever be given that would be adequate to an idea? The peculiarity of an idea consists precisely in the fact that no experience at all can ever be congruent with it. The transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient original being is so exceedingly large[279] and so highly exalted above everything empirical, which is always conditioned, that partly one can never turn up enough material in experience to fill such a concept,[280] and partly one is always groping about in what is conditioned and [thus] will forever search in vain for the unconditioned; for no law of any empirical synthesis gives us an example of the unconditioned or the slightest guidance for finding it. A 621 B 649

If the supreme being stood in this chain of conditions, then it would itself be a member of the series of these conditions; and thus it would—like the lower members to which it is superior[281]—still require further investigation concerning its own, still higher basis.[282] On the other hand, if one wants to separate the supreme being from this chain and keep it[283]—as a merely intelligible being—from also being included[284] in the series of natural causes, then just what bridge can reason build so as to reach this being? For all laws of the transition from effects to causes—indeed, all synthesis and expansion of our cognition as such—pertain to nothing but

[279][Or 'exceedingly great': *überschwenglich groß*. Although 'great' might seem to be the more fitting adjective, note the spatial metaphor just below.]

[280][Cf. the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–76), who in his *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (Pt. V, next to last paragraph) has Philo say: "In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your hypothesis [that a God is needed to account for the order in the world] is able, perhaps, to assert or conjecture that the universe sometime arose from something like design; but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis."]

[281][More literally, 'placed ahead of': *vorgesetzt.*]

[282][Hume (*Dialogues*, Pt. IV, pars. 6–9) extends the same reasoning even to a supreme being conceived as intelligible ("mental"): "We are still obliged to mount higher in order to find the cause of this cause. . . . [A] mental world or universe of ideas requires a cause as much as does a material world. . . Have we not the same reason to trace that ideal world into another ideal world or new intelligent principle? . . . If the material world rests upon a similar ideal world, this ideal world must rest upon some other, and so on without end."]

[283][*nicht*]

[284][*mitbegreifen.*]

A 622
B 650
possible experience; hence they pertain merely to objects of the world of sense and can have signification only in regard to them.

The present world discloses to us a vast arena of manifoldness, order, purposiveness,[285] and beauty—whether we pursue these in the infinity of space or in space's unlimited division. Such is this arena—even by what little acquaintance with it our feeble understanding has been able to gain—that vis-à-vis so many and such immensely great marvels all speech[286] loses[287] its force, all numbers lose their power to measure, and even our thoughts lose any boundary; and thus our judgment of the whole must dissolve into a speechless, but all the more eloquent amazement. Everywhere we see a chain of effects and causes, of purposes[288] and their means, and we see regularity in all arising and passing away. And since nothing has on its own entered the state wherein it is to be found, anything[289] always points further toward another thing as its cause; and this cause in turn necessitates precisely the same further inquiry. And thus the entire universe would in this way have to sink into the abyss of nothingness,[290] unless one assumed something that—outside of this infinite [world of the] contingent—subsists on its own originally and independently: something that supports this [universe] and, as the cause of its origin, secures for it also[291] its continuance. This supreme cause (regarding all things of the world)—how large[292] are we to think it? We are not acquainted with

[285][*Zweckmäßigkeit*. For a defense of my rendering of this term as 'purposiveness' rather than as 'finality,' see my essay cited at A vii br. n. 7 The concept of purposiveness is the most important concept in both halves of the *Critique of Judgment: subjective* purposiveness is central to the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, *objective* purposiveness to the Critique of Teleological Judgment and, in particular, to Kant's discussion therein of the physicotheological proof. The *relation* between subjective and objective purposiveness bears not only on that between the two halves of the *Critique of Judgment*, but also on the relation—which was of great concern to Kant—of that entire work to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. See, on these matters, the Translator's Introduction to my translation of the *Critique of Judgment*, *op. cit.* at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[286][Or 'language': *Sprache*.]

[287][More literally, 'is unable to find': *vermissen*]

[288][Or 'ends': *Zwecke*.]

[289][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *es* for *er*]

[290][*des Nichts*.]

[291][*zugleich*.]

[292][Or 'great': *groß*. Here again 'great' might seem to be more fitting; but note again the spatial references below, especially A 624 = B 652, at the end of the first full paragraph]

the world in its entire content, much less do we know how to assess its {A 623 B 651} magnitude[293] by comparison with all that is possible. But since with regard to causality we do[294] require an utmost[295] and highest being, what prevents us from also positing this being, in its degree of perfection, *above everything else that is possible?* This we can easily accomplish—although indeed only through the delicate outline of an abstract concept—if we conceive all possible perfection as united in this being as in a single substance. The concept of this being is beneficial to reason's demand for parsimony of principles; it is not subjected to any contradictions within itself; and—through the guidance that such an idea provides toward order and purposiveness—the concept is even conducive to the expansion of our use of reason in the midst of experience, but is also not contrary in a decisive way to any experience.

This proof deserves always to be mentioned with respect. It is the proof that is oldest, clearest, and most commensurate with common human reason. It enlivens the study of nature, just as the proof itself has its existence from and acquires ever new force through this study. It brings purposes and aims[296] to things where our observation would not have discovered them on its own, and it expands our acquaintance[297] with nature through the guidance provided by a special unity whose principle is outside nature. But this acquaintance with nature reacts again on its cause—viz., on the idea that prompted it—and increases the faith[298] in a supreme origina- {A 624 B 652} tor[299] to an irresistible conviction.

Hence any attempt to detract from the authority of this proof would not only be hopeless, but also entirely futile. For reason is lifted up unceasingly by bases of proof that, although only empirical, are very powerful and are forever increasing under reason's very eyes.[300] And thus no doubts arising from subtle abstract speculation can weigh reason down so much that it would not quickly recover. For casting one glance upon the marvels

[293][*Größe.*]

[294][*einmal.*]

[295][*äußerst.*]

[296][Or 'intentions.']

[297][*-kenntnisse.*]

[298][*Glaube.* See B xxx br n. 122]

[299][Of the world.]

[300]['hands,' literally.]

of nature and upon the majesty of the world edifice would tear reason out of any brooding indecision, as out of a dream; and reason would lift itself up from one magnitude to the next until reaching the most supreme, and would lift itself up from the conditioned to the condition until reaching the highest and unconditioned originator.[301]

Thus we have indeed no objection to make against the rationality and usefulness of this procedure, but must, rather, recommend and encourage it. Yet we cannot therefore endorse the claims which this kind of proof would like to make to apodeictic certainty and to an approval requiring no favor or extraneous support whatsoever. And the proof's good cause cannot be harmed in any way if the dogmatic language of a disdainful subtle reasoner[302] is tuned down to the tone of moderation and modesty
A 625 B 653 of a faith that suffices to calm us—but precisely without commanding unconditional submission. Accordingly, I maintain that the physicotheological proof can never by itself establish the existence of a supreme being, but must always leave the task of compensating for this deficiency to the ontological proof (which it serves only as an introduction). Hence the ontological proof still contains (insofar as a speculative proof has, indeed, any place at all) the *only possible basis of proof* that no human reason can pass over.[303]

The chief moments of the physicotheological proof in question are the following: (1) Everywhere in the world we find distinct signs of an arrangement[304] carried out with great wisdom according to a determinate aim;[305] and we find these signs within a whole of indescribable manifoldness in content, as well as unbounded magnitude in range. (2) This purposive arrangement is quite extraneous to the things of the world and attaches to them only contingently; i.e., the nature of different things could not—through so many kinds of means acting in unison—have harmonized on its own with determinate final aims, had not an arranging rational principle expressly[306] selected and designed these things according to under-

301[Of the world.]

302[*hohnsprechender Vernünftler.*]

303[*vorbeigehen,* which could also be rendered as 'ignore.']

304[*Anordnung.*]

305[Or 'determinate [*or* definite] intention': *bestimmte Absicht.*]

306[*eigentlich*]

lying ideas. (3) Therefore, there exists an august[307] and wise cause (or several such causes) that must be the cause of the world not merely as an all-powerful nature acting[308] through *fecundity,* but as an intelligence acting through *freedom.* (4) The unity of this cause can be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal reference that the parts of the world have as members of an artistic structure; from what our observation can reach we can make this inference with certainty, but beyond that point we can make the inference with probability, according to all the principles of analogy. {A 626 B 654}

Let us not here cavil[309] with natural reason concerning its inference from the analogy of some natural products to what human art produces—viz., when this art does violence to nature and compels it not to proceed according to its own purposes but to yield to ours. From this analogy (i.e., from the similarity of those natural products with houses, ships, or clocks) natural reason infers that presumably[310] just such a causality—viz, understanding and will—lies at the basis also in nature's case. In this way natural reason derives the intrinsic possibility of freely acting nature (the nature which first makes possible all art and perhaps even reason itself) from still another art, although a suprahuman one. Indeed, this kind of inference might perhaps not withstand the most rigorous transcendental critique. Yet we must admit that once we are asked to name a cause, then we cannot here proceed more safely than on the analogy with such purposive products; for these are the only products in whose case we are fully acquainted with the causes and the manner of their action. Indeed, reason could not be justified[311] even to itself if from the causality with which it is acquainted it sought to pass to obscure and unprovable bases of explanation with which it is not acquainted.

According to this inference, the purposiveness and consonance of nature's many arrangements would have to prove merely the contingency of the form but not that of the matter—i.e., the substance—in the world. For proving the contingency of the matter would require, in addition, that we be able to prove that unless the things of the world were the product of a supreme wisdom even *as regards their substance,* they would in themselves be unsuitable for acquiring such order and harmony according to uni- {A 627 B 655}

[307][Or 'sublime': *erhaben.*]

[308][*wirken.*]

[309][*Ohne . . . zu schikanieren*]

[310][*wird.*]

[311][*sich verantworten.*]

versal[312] laws. But proving this would require bases of proof quite different from those of the analogy with human art. Hence the proof could not establish [the existence of] a *creator of the world,* to whose idea everything is subjected; but it could establish at best [the existence of] an *architect of the world,* who would always be greatly limited by the suitability of the material on which he works.[313] This, however, is far from sufficient for the great aim that is being envisaged, viz., to prove an all-sufficient original being. If we wished to prove the contingency of matter itself, we would have to resort to a transcendental argument; but precisely this was to be avoided here.

The inference, then, proceeds from the order and purposiveness observable throughout the world, regarded as a thoroughly[314] contingent arrangement,[315] to the existence of a cause *proportionate thereto.* However, the concept of this cause must allow[316] us to cognize something quite *determinate* concerning this cause, and hence it can be no other concept than that of a being possessing all power, wisdom, etc.—in a word, all perfec-
A 628 B 656 tion as an all-sufficient being. For such predicates as *very great*[317] or amazing or immense power and excellence provide no determinate concept at all, and in fact do not say what the thing is in itself.[318] Rather, they are only relational presentations of the magnitude[319] of an object that the ob-

312[Or 'general': *allgemein.*]

313[As in the case of Plato's cosmology presented in his *Timaeus.*]

314[*durchaus.*]

315[*Einrichtung.*]

316[*geben.*]

317[*groß.*]

318[Cf. the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 438. And cf. David Hume again: "The Deity is known to us only by his productions. . . . As the universe shews wisdom and goodness, we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections, we infer a particular degree of them, precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But further attributes or further degrees of the same attributes, we can never infer or suppose, by any rules of just reasoning." (*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,* XI, 5th par. from the end) And in the *Dialogues,* Philo says to Cleanthes: "*First,* by this method of reasoning, you renounce all claim to infinity in any of the attributes of the Deity. For, as the cause ought only to be proportioned to the effect, and the effect, so far as it falls under our cognizance, is not infinite, what pretensions have we, upon your suppositions, to ascribe that attribute to the Divine Being? . . . *Secondly,* you have no reason, on your theory, for ascribing perfection to the Deity, even in his finite capacity, or for supposing him free of error, mistake, or incoherence. in his undertakings." (Pt. V, pars 5–6).]

319[*Größe.*]

server (of the world) is comparing with himself and his power of comprehension; and they turn out equally eulogistic whether the object is made greater,[320] or whether the observing subject is made smaller in relation to it. When magnitude (of perfection) of a thing as such is at issue, then there is no determinate concept except the one that comprises the entire possible perfection, and only the total[321] (*omnitudo*) of reality is thoroughly[322] determined in the concept.

Now, I trust that no one will presume to have insight into the relation of the world's magnitude observed by him (in both range and content) to omnipotence, the relation of the world's order to supreme wisdom, the relation of the world's unity to the absolute unity of the originator,[323] etc. Therefore, physicotheology cannot provide a determinate concept of the highest cause of the world, and hence it cannot be sufficient for a principle of theology that is in turn to amount to the foundation of religion.

The step to absolute totality is altogether impossible by the empirical path. Now in the physicotheological proof this step is nonetheless taken. What, then, may be the means employed in order to cross such a wide gap? A 629 B 657

Having reached a state of admiration for the greatness,[324] wisdom, power, etc., of the originator of the world, and being unable to get further, one abandons all at once this physicotheological argument conducted from empirical bases of proof, and proceeds back to the world's contingency that one has inferred at the very outset from the world's order and purposiveness. From this contingency alone one now proceeds, solely by transcendental concepts, to the existence of an absolutely[325] necessary [being as first cause]; and from the concept of the absolute necessity of the first cause one then proceeds to the thoroughly determined or determining concept of this originator of the world,[326] viz., the concept of an all-encompassing reality. Hence the physicotheological proof reached an impasse in its enterprise, and in this quandary shifted suddenly to the cosmological proof. And since the latter is only a covert ontological proof, the physicotheological

[320][*vergrößern.*]

[321][*All.*]

[322][*durchgängig.*]

[323][Of the world]

[324][*Größe.*]

[325][*schlechthin* here, *absolut* just below.]

[326][*desselben*, Kant may have thought that he had just repeated *Welturheber* rather than said *erste Ursache* ('first cause').]

proof actually carried out its aim merely through pure reason, although at the very outset it had denied all affinity with pure reason and had staked everything on evident proofs from experience.

Hence the physicotheologians do not have cause at all to act so demurely toward the transcendental kind of proof, and to look down on it—with the self-conceit of clairvoyant naturalists[327]—as the cobweb of gloomy ponderers. For if they would only examine themselves, they would
A 630 B 658 find that after having proceeded a good distance on the ground[328] of nature and experience, and yet still finding themselves just as far as before from the object that shines toward their reason,[329] they suddenly abandon this ground and pass over into the kingdom of mere possibilities, where on the wings of ideas they hope to get close to what had eluded all their empirical investigation.[330] Having finally gained—by such a mighty leap—what they suppose to be a firm foothold, they extend the now determinate concept (which they have come to possess without knowing how) over the entire realm of creation. And the ideal, which was a product solely of pure reason, they now elucidate—although poorly enough and far below the dignity of its object—by experience; and they refuse to admit that they have reached this acquaintance with or presupposition of this object by a course other than that of experience.

Accordingly, the physicotheological proof of a single original being as supreme being is based on the cosmological proof thereof, but this proof in turn on the ontological proof.[331] And since no further path besides these three is open to speculative reason, the ontological proof—from pure concepts of reason alone—is the only possible proof,[332] if indeed a proof of a proposition so far exalted above all empirical use of the understanding is possible at all.

[327][*Naturkenner*.]

[328][*Boden*.]

[329][I.e., like a sun: *entgegenscheint* (still written in two words, as was typical in Kant's time).]

[330][For such eloquence as Kant displays here, cf. A 235–36/B 294–95.]

[331][Of such a being.]

[332][That there is a God.]

Chapter III

{A 631 B 659}

Section VII
Critique of Any Theology Based on Speculative Principles of Reason[333]

If by theology I mean the cognition of the original being, then this theology is of two kinds. One kind is based on mere reason (*theologia rationalis*); the other kind is based on revelation[334] (*theologia revelata*).[335] Now the first kind[336] either thinks its object (as *ens originarium, ens realissimum, ens entium*)[337] merely through pure reason, by means of transcendental concepts alone; and then it is called **transcendental** theology. Or this theology[338] thinks its object—as the supreme intelligence—through a concept which it borrows from nature (the nature of our soul); and then it would have to be called **natural** theology. Someone who grants only a transcendental theology is called a *deist;* someone who assumes also a natural theology is called a *theist*. The deist admits that through pure reason we can cognize at most the existence of an original being, but that our concept of this being is merely transcendental, i.e., only the concept of a being having all reality—a reality[339] which cannot, however, be determined more closely. The theist asserts that reason is able to determine the object[340] more closely on the analogy with nature,[341] viz., as a being that

[333][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n 2, vol. 3, 531–45. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 541–42]

[334][*Offenbarung*.]

[335][Respectively, 'rational theology' and 'revealed theology.']

[336][Rational theology.]

[337][Original being, most real being, being of (all) beings]

[338][I.e., rational theology]

[339][And with it, of course, the being itself]

[340][I.e., object of theology.]

[341][Specifically, the nature of our soul; see just above.]

through understanding and freedom[342] contains within itself the original basis of all other things. Thus the deist conceives of the object as merely
A 632 B 660 a *cause of the world* (whether a cause through the necessity of its nature or through freedom remains undecided); whereas the theist conceives of the object as an *originator of the world.*

Transcendental theology is again of two kinds. The one kind seeks to derive the existence of the original being from an experience as such (without determining more closely anything concerning the world to which this experience belongs); it is called *cosmotheology*. The other kind of transcendental theology believes that it cognizes the existence of the original being through mere concepts, without the aid of the least experience; it is called *ontotheology*.

Natural theology infers the properties and the existence of an originator of the world from the character, the order, and the unity found in this world—a world in which we must assume two kinds of causality and their rule, viz., nature and freedom. Hence natural theology ascends from this world to the supreme intelligence, considered either as the principle of all natural or as the principle of all moral[343] order and perfection. In the first case natural theology is called *physicotheology,* in the second *moral theology.*[344]

What one usually understands by the concept of God is by no means merely a blindly acting and eternal nature as the root of things, but a su-
A 633 B 661 preme being that is to be the originator of things through understanding and freedom;[345] and this concept is also the only one that interests us. Hence one could, strictly speaking, deny[346] that the *deist* has any faith in God, and leave him merely the assertion of an original being or highest cause. However, no one must be accused of wishing to deny something merely because he does not dare to assert it; and thus it is more lenient and appropriate to say that the *deist* has faith in a *God,* but the *theist* in a *liv-*

[342][I e., free will.]

[343][*sittlich* here, *Moral-* just below.]

[344]Not theological morality; for the latter contains moral laws that *presuppose* the existence of a supreme ruler of the world, whereas moral[a] theology is a conviction—of the existence of a supreme being—that is based on moral laws

[a][*Moral-* here (likewise, without the hyphen, for 'morality' above), *sittlich* just above and just below]

[345][I.e., through intellect and free will.]

[346][*absprechen* here, *leugnen* just below.]

ing God (*summa intelligentia*).[347] Let us now locate the possible sources of all these attempts of reason in theology.

I shall here settle for explicating theoretical cognition as one whereby I cognize *what is,* and practical cognition as one whereby I conceive *what ought to be.* Accordingly, the theoretical use of reason is the use whereby I cognize a priori (as necessary) that something is; and the practical use is the use whereby one cognizes a priori what ought to occur.[348] Now if the fact that something is or that something ought to occur is indubitably certain but yet only conditioned, then a certain determinate condition for this fact may yet either be absolutely necessary, or it may be presupposed only as optional[349] and contingent. In the first case the condition is postulated (*per thesin*); in the second case it is supposed[350] (*per hypothesin*).[351] Now, there are practical laws that are absolutely necessary (viz., the moral laws). Hence if these laws presuppose necessarily some existence[352] as the condition for the possibility of their *obligating* force, then this existence must be *postulated;* for the conditioned from which the inference proceeds to this determinate condition is itself cognized a priori as absolutely necessary. We shall show hereafter[353] that moral laws not only presuppose the existence of a supreme being, but—because, as they are considered otherwise,[354] they are absolutely necessary—they rightly postulate this existence, although indeed only practically. But for now we still set this kind of inference aside. A 634 B 662

When we are concerned merely with what is (not with what ought to be), then the conditioned that is given to us in experience is always thought as being also contingent. Hence the condition pertaining to this conditioned cannot be cognized from it as absolutely necessary, but serves only as a presupposition for rational cognition of the conditioned: a presupposition that is necessary—or, rather, *needed*—in respect to something else,

347 [Highest intelligence.]

348 [Or 'to happen' or 'to be done': *geschehen.*]

349 [*beliebig.*]

350 [*supponiert.*]

351 [Respectively, 'by thesis' and 'by hypothesis.']

352 [Or 'existent': *Dasein.*]

353 [See A 804–19 = B 832–47, esp. A 808–19 = B 836–47.]

354 [I.e., *not* as the commands of a supreme being but as having *their own* (rational) obligating force. Cf. A 819 = B 847]

but that in itself and a priori is only chosen.[355] But if in theoretical cognition the absolute necessity of a thing is to be cognized, then this could be done only from a priori concepts—but never[356] from [such concepts considered] as a cause in reference to an existence given through experience.

A 635 B 663 A theoretical cognition is *speculative* if it concerns such an object, or such concepts of an object, as one cannot reach in any experience. It is contrasted with *cognition of nature,* which concerns no objects or predicates of objects other than those that can be given in a possible experience.

The principle whereby from what occurs (i.e., from the empirically contingent), taken as effect, we infer a cause is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not a principle of speculative cognition. For if we abstract from this principle taken as one that contains the condition of possible experience as such, and then—by omitting everything empirical—wish to assert it of the contingent as such,[357] then there remains not the least justification for such a synthetic proposition. I.e., I cannot then use this principle in order to gain insight from it as to how, from something that is, I can pass over to something quite different (called cause). Indeed, in such merely speculative use the concept of a cause as well as the concept of the contingent loses any signification whose objective reality could be made comprehensible *in concreto*.

Now if from the existence of *things* in the world one infers their cause, then this inference belongs not to the *natural* but to the *speculative* use of reason. For what the natural use of reason refers, as empirically contingent, to some cause are not things themselves (substances) but only what *occurs,* i.e., the *states* of things; [a cognition] that substance itself (matter) is contingent as regards its existence would have to be a merely specula-
A 636 B 664 tive rational cognition. But even if I were concerned only with the form of the world—the manner of the world's combination[358] and the variation thereof—but wished to infer from this form a cause entirely distinct from the world, then this would again be a judgment of merely speculative reason; for the object[359] here is not at all an object of a possible experience. But in that case the principle of causality—which holds only within the

[355][Or, possibly, 'arbitrary': *willkürlich*]

[356][As in practical cognition.]

[357][Rather than of the *empirically* contingent.]

[358][As found, e.g., in the systems of heavenly bodies, but especially also in organisms.]

[359][*Gegenstand* here, *Objekt* just below; similarly in the remainder of the section (and elsewhere). See A vii br. n. 7.]

realm of experience, and which outside that realm is without use and, indeed, even without signification—would be diverted entirely from its [proper] determination.

Now, I maintain that all attempts to make a merely speculative use of reason in regard to theology are entirely fruitless and are—by their intrinsic character—null and void, but that the principles of reason's natural use lead to no theology whatsoever; and I maintain, consequently, that unless moral laws are laid at the basis or used as a guide, there can be no theology of reason at all. For, all synthetic principles of understanding are of immanent use only; but cognition of a supreme being requires a transcendental use of these principles, a use for which our understanding is not at all equipped. If the empirically valid law of causality is to lead to the original being, then this being would likewise[360] have to belong to the chain of objects of experience; but in that case this being would itself, like all appearances, be conditioned in turn. However, even if we were permitted to { A 637 B 665 }
make the leap beyond the bounds of experience by means of the dynamical law of the reference of effects to their causes, with what concept can this procedure provide us? By no means can it provide us with a concept of a supreme being, because experience never offers us the greatest of all possible effects (the effect which is to provide testimony of its cause[361]). If we are to be permitted—merely in order not to leave anything empty in our reason—to fill in this lack of complete determination[362] through a mere idea of supreme perfection and original necessity, then this may indeed be granted as a favor; but it cannot be demanded as a right based on an irresistible proof. Thus perhaps the physicotheological proof could indeed, by connecting speculation with intuition, give force to other proofs (if such are to be had); but when taken by itself it merely prepares the understanding for theological cognition and points it in a straight and natural direction,[363] instead of being able to complete the business *alone*.[364]

[360][*mit-*.]

[361][I.e., the supreme cause.]

[362][Of the concept of a supreme being.]

[363][For such cognition.]

[364][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 381–84, 417, 436–48, 455–56, 470, 480, 485. Indeed, this "preparation" that teleology provides for (moral) theology is at the heart of the role played by the *Critique of Judgment* in uniting the three *Critiques* into a system. (Cf. above, A 622 = B 650 br. n 285.) See the Translator's Introduction to my translation of the *Critique of Judgment* (*op. cit.* at B xvii br n 73), Section 15, lxxxvi–cix.]

We readily see from this that transcendental questions permit only transcendental answers, i.e., answers based on a priori concepts alone, without the least empirical admixture. Here, however, the question is obviously synthetic and demands an expansion of our cognition beyond all bounds of experience, viz., to the existence of a being that is to correspond to our
A 638 B 666 mere idea—an idea that[365] can never be matched by any experience. Now by the proofs that we have given above,[366] all synthetic a priori cognition is possible only through the fact that it expresses the formal conditions of a possible experience; and hence all principles have only immanent validity, i.e., they refer solely to objects of empirical cognition, or [i.e.] to appearances. Hence, by the same token, a transcendental procedure used with a view to the theology of a merely speculative reason accomplishes nothing.

But suppose even that someone would rather cast doubt on all the proofs given above, in the Analytic, than let me rob him of his persuasion that the bases of proof that he has used so long have weight. Even then he cannot refuse to yield to my challenge if I demand that he should at least justify himself as to how it is—and by means of what illumination—that he dares to soar above all possible experience by the might of mere ideas. I would beg to be spared new proofs, or amended work on old proofs. For [such will continue to be offered]. It is true that there is not much choice in this regard, because all merely speculative proofs do in the end come down to a single one, viz., the ontological proof; and thus I do not, indeed, need to fear being particularly burdened by the fertile ingenuity[367] of the dogmatic champions of such a sense-free reason. It is true, moreover, that I do not want to decline the challenge—and I say this without therefore consider-
A 639 B 667 ing myself to be very contentious—to uncover in every attempt of this kind the fallacious inference, and thus to foil the attempt's claim. Still, none of this ever completely destroys the hope for better luck in those who have once become accustomed to dogmatic persuasions. And hence I keep to my single and appropriate demand that they justify themselves, in a universal way and from the nature of the human understanding along with all other sources of cognition, in regard to this question: how do they want to set about expanding their cognition entirely a priori, and extending it to

[365][As such.]

[366][In the Transcendental Analytic, A 64–292/B 89–349 (to some extent also in the Transcendental Aesthetic, A 19–49/B 33–73).]

[367][*die Fruchtbarkeit.*]

[the realm] where no possible experience and hence no means whatever is sufficient to ensure the objective reality of any concept thought up by ourselves? In whatever way the understanding may have arrived at this concept, the existence of the concept's object still cannot be found analytically in the concept; for the cognition of the object's *existence* consists precisely in the object's being posited in itself *outside the thought.* But going outside a concept on one's own and managing to discover new objects and transcendent[368] beings without pursuing the empirical connection (which, however, never gives us more than appearances)—this is entirely impossible.

But although reason in its merely speculative use is far from sufficient for achieving this great aim—viz., arriving at the existence of a highest being—it still has one great benefit. For in case the cognition of this being can be obtained from somewhere else,[369] reason in its speculative use is able to *correct* this cognition; to make it harmonize with itself and with any intelligible aim; and to purify it of anything that might go against the concept of an original being, and purify it of any admixture of empirical limitations. {A 640 B 668}

Hence transcendental theology, in spite of all its insufficiency, still has an important negative use. For it is a constant appraisal[370] of our reason when this reason deals merely with pure ideas—which permit none but a transcendental standard precisely because they are ideas. For the *presupposition* of a supreme and all-sufficient being as highest intelligence may once incontestably[371] assert its validity, even if in a different—perhaps practical—reference. And in that case it would be of the greatest importance to determine this concept accurately on its transcendental side, as the concept of a necessary and maximally real being; and to remove from this concept whatever goes against supreme reality and belongs to mere appearance (viz., anthropomorphism in the broader meaning of this term); and to get rid at the same time of all opposing assertions—whether *atheistic,* or *deistic,* or *anthropomorphistic.* Doing all this is very easy in such critical treatment; for the same bases by which we display human reason's inability as regards the assertion of such a being's existence are necessarily also sufficient to prove the uselessness of any counter-assertion. For whence {A 641 B 669}

[368][*überschwenglich.*]

[369][Viz., from reason in its pure practical (i.e., moral) use.]

[370][*Zensur.*]

[371][*ohne Widerrede.*]

is anyone to obtain, by pure speculation of reason, the insight that[372] there is no supreme being as original basis of everything; or that[373] this being has none of the properties that we conceive, by their consequences, as analogical with the dynamical realities of a thinking being; or that[374] these properties would in the latter case[375] also have to be subjected to all the limitations that sensibility imposes inevitably on the intelligences that are familiar to us through experience?

Hence the supreme being remains for the merely speculative use of reason a mere *ideal*—but yet a *faultless* ideal, a concept that concludes and crowns the whole of human cognition. Although the concept's objective reality cannot be proved by this speculative path, it also cannot be refuted by it. And if there were to be a moral theology that can compensate for this deficiency,[376] then transcendental theology—previously only problematic—proves itself indispensable: by the determination of its concept,[377] and by the unceasing appraisal of a reason that is deluded often enough by sensibility and is not always in harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the world (rather than as world soul),[378] eternity without conditions of time, omnipresence without conditions of space, omnipotence, etc.: all of these are transcendental predi-
A 642 B 670
cates; and hence the purified concept of them, which any theology needs so very much, can be obtained only from transcendental theology.

[372][As the atheist claims.]

[373][As the deist claims.]

[374][As the anthropomorphist claims.]

[375][Of their being thus analogical.]

[376][See A 804–19 = B 832–47, esp. A 808–16 = B 836–44).]

[377][Of a supreme being.]

[378][See the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 392, and cf. 374–75.]

APPENDIX TO THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC

ON THE REGULATIVE USE OF THE IDEAS OF PURE REASON[1]

The outcome of all dialectical attempts of pure reason does not only confirm what we have already proved in the Transcendental Analytic, viz., that all our inferences seeking to take us beyond the realm of possible experience are deceptive and baseless.[2] Rather, the outcome of those attempts teaches us also this special fact: that human reason has in these attempts[3] a natural propensity to overstep this realm's boundary; and that transcendental ideas are just as natural to human reason as the categories are to the understanding. But there is this difference: whereas the categories lead to truth, i.e., to the agreement of our concepts with the object,[4] the transcendental ideas bring about a mere illusion[5]—although an irresistible one—which we can barely prevent from deluding[6] us, even by means of the most rigorous critique.

Whatever has its basis in the nature of our powers[7] must be purposive[8] and be accordant with their correct use—if only we can prevent a certain misunderstanding and thus can discover these powers' proper direction. { A 643 B 671
Hence presumably the transcendental ideas will have their good and con-

[1][See Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 497–516. See also H. W. Cassirer, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 330–50. J. N. Findlay, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 241–45. Also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 546–601. Also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 543–52. Also W. H. Walsh, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 1, 241–49. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 232–45.]

[2][*grundlos.* On *Grund*, see B xix br. n. 79.]

[3][*dabei.*]

[4][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* in the next paragraph; and so on. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[5][*Schein.*]

[6][*Täuschung.*]

[7][I.e., mental powers: *Kräfte.* Here *Kraft* is a synonym for *Vermögen*—for which see A xii br. n. 16.]

[8][*zweckmäßig.* See A 622 = B 650 br. n. 285.]

sequently *immanent* use, although when their signification[9] is misunderstood[10] and they are taken to be concepts of actual things, they can be transcendent in their application and can on that very account be deceptive. For it is not the idea in itself but merely its use[11] that can in regard to our entire possible experience be either *overreaching* (transcendent) or *indigenous* (immanent),[12] according as the idea either is directed straightforwardly to an object that supposedly corresponds to it, or is directed only to the understanding's use as such[13] in regard to the objects dealt with by the understanding. And hence all errors of subreption[14] are to be attributed always to a deficiency in the power of judgment,[15] but never to the understanding or to reason.

Reason never refers straightforwardly[16] to an object, but refers solely to the understanding, and by means of it to reason's own empirical use. Hence reason does not *create* any concepts (of objects), but only *orders* them and gives to them that unity which they can have in their greatest possible extension,[17] i.e., the unity which they can have in reference to totality on the part of series. The understanding takes no account at all of this totality, but takes account only of the connection *whereby series* of conditions *come*
A 644 B 672 *about* everywhere according to concepts. Hence reason properly has as its object only the understanding and the purposive engagement thereof. And just as the understanding unites the manifold in the object by means of con-

[9][*Bedeutung*. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[10][*verkennen*.]

[11][By the power of judgment; see just below.]

[12][*überfliegend (transzendent) oder einheimisch (immanent)*.]

[13][*überhaupt* (see B xxvii br. n. 106); i.e., even apart from any intuition, and hence even beyond possible experience.]

[14][*Subreption*, also called by Kant *Erschleichung*. See A 791–92 = B 819–20, and cf. A 36/B 53, A 149/B 188, A 311/B 368, A 389, A 402, A 509 = B 537, A 583 = B 611, A 619 = B 647. See also Kant's Inaugural Dissertation (1770), *De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis* (*On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*), § 24, Ak. II, 412: "*. . . praestigia intellectus, per subornationem conceptus sensitivi, tamquam notae intellectualis, dici posset (secundum analogiam significatus recepti) vitium subreptionis,*" i.e., "We may call *fallacy of subreption* (by analogy with the accepted meaning) the intellect's trick of slipping in a concept of sense as if it were the concept of an intellectual characteristic." Cf. also the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 257.]

[15][*Urteilskraft*. See A 130/B 169 br. n. 3.]

[16][I.e., directly: *geradezu*.]

[17][*Ausbreitung*.]

cepts, so reason in its turn unites the manifold of concepts by means of ideas—viz., by setting a certain collective unity as the goal of the understanding's acts, which otherwise deal only with distributive unity.

Accordingly, I maintain that the transcendental ideas are never of *constitutive*[18] use, i.e., a use[19] whereby concepts of certain objects would be given; and in case they are nonetheless understood in that way, they are merely subtly reasoning[20] (i.e., dialectical) concepts. On the other hand, the transcendental ideas have a superb and indispensably necessary *regulative* use: viz., to direct[21] the understanding to a certain goal by reference[22] to which the directional lines of all the understanding's concepts converge in one point. And although this point of convergence is only an idea (*focus imaginarius*),[23] i.e., a point from which—since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience—the concepts of understanding do not actually emanate, it yet serves to provide for these concepts the greatest unity, in addition[24] to the greatest extension. Now from this there does indeed arise for us the delusion[25] whereby it seems as if these directional lines had sprung forth[26] from an object itself, lying outside the realm of empirically possible cognition (just as objects[27] are seen behind the mirror's plane). Yet this illusion[28] (which we can, after all, prevent from deceiving us), is nonetheless indispensably necessary if, besides the objects { A 645 B 673 that are before our eyes, we want at the same time to see—far from these objects[29]—also the objects that lie behind our back. I.e., the illusion is necessary if, in our own case, we want to direct[30] the understanding beyond

18[Emphasis added; likewise in 'regulative' just below.]

19[*so daß.*]

20[*vernünftelnde.*]

21[*richten.*]

22[*in Aussicht.*]

23[Imaginary focus.]

24[*neben.*]

25[*Täuschung.*]

26[Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *ausgeschossen* for *ausgeschlossen.*]

27[Viewed in a mirror.]

28[*Illusion.*]

29[Viz., objects of experience.]

30[*abrichten.*]

every given experience (as part of the entirety of possible experience), and hence also to direct it to its greatest possible and utmost expansion.

If we survey our cognitions of understanding in their whole range, we find that what reason decrees and tries to bring about concerning them—as a goal quite peculiar to reason—is the *systematic* character of cognition, i.e., its coherence based on a[31] principle. This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, viz., the idea of the form of a whole of cognition—a whole that precedes the determinate cognition of the parts and that contains the conditions for determining a priori for each part its position and its relation to the remaining parts. Accordingly, this idea postulates[32] complete unity of the cognition of understanding, whereby this cognition is not merely a contingent aggregate but becomes a system that coheres according to necessary laws. This idea cannot properly be said to be a concept of the object, but can be said only to be a concept of the thoroughgoing unity of such[33] concepts, insofar as this unity serves the understanding as a rule. Such concepts of reason are not drawn from nature; rather, we interrogate nature in accordance with these ideas, and we consider our cognition to be
A 646 B 674 deficient as long as it is not adequate to them. We admit that *pure earth, pure water, pure air,* etc., are scarcely to be found. Yet the concepts of them (which, therefore, as far as the complete purity is concerned, have their origin only in reason) are needed by us in order properly to determine what share each of these natural causes has in [the whole of] appearance. And thus, in order to explain in accordance with the idea of a mechanism the chemical effects that [different] kinds of matter[34] have on one another, we reduce[35] all kinds of matter to earths (mere weight, as it were), to salts and flammable entities (considered as force), and finally to water and air as vehicles (the machines, as it were, by means of which the first two[36] produce their effects[37]). For although we do not actually express ourselves in that way, we can yet readily detect such an influence of reason on the divisions made by investigators of nature.

[31][Or 'one': *einem.*]

[32][And thus (in the original sense of 'to postulate') *demands.*]

[33][*dieser.*]

[34][*Materien.*]

[35][*bringen.*]

[36][Weight and force.]

[37][*wirken.*]

If reason is a power to derive the particular from the universal, then there are two alternatives.[38] Either, first,[39] the universal is already *certain in itself* and given. On this alternative, only the *power of judgment* is required, for subsumption, and by this subsumption the particular is determined necessarily. I shall call this the apodeictic use of reason. Or, second, the universal is assumed only *problematically* and is a mere idea; i.e., the particular is certain but the universality of the rule for this consequence[40] is still a problem. Thus here several particular cases, all of which are certain, are tried out on the rule as to whether they issue from it. And if, on this second alternative,[41] it seems that all particular cases that we can indicate do follow from the rule, then we infer the rule's universality; and from this universality we afterwards infer also all cases that are not in themselves[42] given. This I shall call the hypothetical use of reason. {A 647 B 675}

The hypothetical use of reason based on[43] ideas, as problematic concepts,[44] is properly speaking not *constitutive.* I.e., this use of reason is not such[45] that—if we are to judge with all strictness—there follows from it the truth of the universal rule that has been assumed as hypothesis. For how is one to know all the possible consequences that, inasmuch as they follow from the same assumed principle, prove the principle's universality? Rather, this use of reason is only *regulative.*[46] Through it we seek, as far as possible, to bring unity into the particular cognitions, and thereby to *bring* the rule *close* to universality.

Hence the hypothetical use of reason aims at the systematic unity of the cognitions of understanding; this unity, however, is the *touchstone of the truth* of the understanding's rules. On the other hand,[47] the systematic unity

[38][On the upcoming distinction between the apodeictic and the hypothetical (or the *constitutive* and the *regulative*) uses of reason, compare and contrast Kant's distinction between determinative and reflective judgment in the *Critique of Judgment:* Ak. V, 179–81.]

[39]['first' inserted; likewise 'second' just below.]

[40][Of the universal.]

[41][To clarify this paragraph, I have used both 'alternative' and 'case' to translate *Fall.*]

[42][*an sich,* used loosely here; likewise repeatedly below.]

[43][*aus zum Grunde gelegten.*]

[44][Cf. A 482/B 510.]

[45][*so beschaffen.*]

[46][Emphasis added]

[47][*umgekehrt.*]

(as a mere idea) is nothing more than a *projected* unity, which in itself must be regarded not as given but only as a problem. This unity, however, serves us in finding a principle for the manifold and particular use of understanding, and thereby serves us in guiding this use[48] and making it coherent also concerning the cases that are not given.

A 648 B 676 This, however, shows only that the systematic unity—or unity of reason—of the manifold cognition of understanding is a *logical* principle: viz., a principle which serves to assist the understanding by means of ideas in cases where the understanding is not sufficient for setting up rules, and which serves at the same time to provide the diversity[49] of the understanding's rules—as far as this can be done—with accordance under a[50] principle (systematic accordance) and thereby with coherence. But this merely *logical* principle does not decide whether the character of the objects—or of the nature of the understanding that cognizes them as such objects—is in itself determined for systematic unity, and whether we may therefore, even without taking account of such an interest of reason, postulate this unity a priori in a manner [implying] certainty.[51] And hence the logical principle does not decide whether we may say that all possible cognitions of understanding (including the empirical ones) have unity of reason and fall under common principles from which they can be derived in spite of their diversity. A principle deciding all of this would be a *transcendental* principle of reason, i.e., a principle that would make the systematic unity necessary not merely subjectively and logically, as a method, but objectively.

Let me illustrate this point by an instance of the use of reason. To the various kinds of unity according to concepts of understanding there belongs also the unity of the causality of a substance—the causality which is called [power or] force.[52] The various appearances of the same substance show, at first glance, so much heterogeneity that one must at the outset assume almost as many kinds of[53] [powers or] forces of this substance[54] as
A 649 B 677 there are effects coming to the fore. Thus in the human mind we assume at

[48][*diesen,* which by (Kantian) grammar could refer back also to 'understanding.']

[49][Or 'variety': *Verschiedenheit*]

[50][Or 'under one.']

[51][*in gewisser Maße.* This (feminine) noun, *Maße* ('manner'), is no longer in use).]

[52][*Kraft.*]

[53][*vielerlei.*]

[54][*derselben*]

the outset [such powers as] sensation, consciousness, imagination, memory, ingenuity,[55] discrimination,[56] pleasure, desire, etc. But a logical maxim commands us at the outset to diminish as much as possible this seeming diversity[57] by comparing [these powers] and thereby discovering their hidden identity, and by examining whether imagination combined with consciousness is not [the same as] memory, ingenuity, discrimination, or perhaps even [the same as] understanding and reason. We have thus the idea of a *basic power;* and although logic does not at all ascertain whether there is such a power, the idea of such a power is at least the problem posed for a systematic presentation of the manifoldness of powers. The logical principle of reason demands that we bring about this systematic unity as far as possible; and the more the appearances of one power and another are found to be identical to each other, the more probable does it become that these appearances are nothing but different[58] manifestations of one and the same power—which may be called (comparatively) their *basic power.* And we proceed in the same way with the remaining powers.

The comparative basic powers must in turn be compared with one another, so that by discovering their accordance we can bring them close to a single radical—i.e., absolute—basic power. But this unity of reason among the powers is merely hypothetical. For we are not asserting that such a power must in fact be there.[59] Rather, we are asserting that we must—for reason's benefit, viz., in order to set up certain principles—seek this absolute basic power for the various rules that may be provided to us by experience, and that we must in this way bring systematic unity into cognition wherever this can be done. A 650 B 678

But if we direct our attention to the understanding's transcendental use, we find that this idea of a basic power as such is not determined merely as a problem for hypothetical use. Rather, the idea claims to have objective reality, and through this claim the systematic unity of the various powers of a substance is postulated and an apodeictic[60] principle of reason is set

[55][*Witz.*]

[56][More literally, 'power to differentiate' *Unterscheidungskraft.*]

[57][This maxim—that principles (or entities) must not be multiplied beyond necessity—is traditionally called *Ockham's Razor,* after William of Ockham (1300–49), the English scholastic philosopher.]

[58][*verschieden.*]

[59][Kant says literally, 'be encountered': *angetroffen werden.*]

[60][Rather than merely problematic. Cf A 646–47/B 674–75.]

up. For without ever having attempted to discover the accordance of the various powers—indeed, even if all our attempts to discover it fail—we still presuppose that such accordance will be there.[61] And we presuppose this not only, as in the case just mentioned,[62] because of the unity of the substance. Rather, even where many, although to a certain degree homogeneous substances are found, as in matter in general, reason presupposes systematic unity of manifold [powers or] forces—where the particular natural laws fall under more general ones, and parsimony of principles[63] is not merely an economical principle of reason but becomes an intrinsic law of nature.

It is, indeed, impossible to see how there could be a *logical*[64] principle concerning the unity of reason of nature's rules, if we did not presuppose a *transcendental* principle whereby such systematic unity, construed as at-
A 651 B 679 taching to the objects themselves, is assumed a priori as necessary. For by what right can reason in its logical use demand that the manifoldness of forces which nature allows[65] us to cognize should be treated as a merely hidden [actual] unity and should be derived as much as possible[66] from some basic [power or] force, if reason were free to admit as likewise possible that all forces are [actually] heterogeneous and that the systematic unity of their derivation does not conform to nature? For reason would then proceed in a manner contrary to its vocation,[67] by setting itself as a goal an idea that would entirely contradict nature's [actual] arrangement. Nor can we say that this unity according to principles of reason was gleaned by reason previously from the contingent character of nature. For reason's law whereby we are to seek this unity is necessary, because without this law we would have no reason at all, but without reason would have no coherent use of the understanding, and in the absence of such use would have no sufficient mark of empirical truth. And hence, in view of this mark, we must throughout presuppose the systematic unity of nature as objectively valid and necessary.

[61][Literally, 'to be encountered': *anzutreffen.*]

[62][I.e., the case of the human mind.]

[63][Here the term is *Prinzipien*, just below it is *Grundsatz*. See A vii, br. n. 7.]

[64][Emphasis added; likewise for 'transcendental' just below.]

[65][*gibt.*]

[66][*soviel an ihr ist.*]

[67][*Bestimmung*, which also means 'determination.']

We also find this transcendental presupposition hidden, in a marvelous way, in the principles of philosophers, although these philosophers have not always recognized[68] it in them, or admitted the presupposition to themselves. Consider the principle that all the manifoldnesses among individual things does not exclude the identity of a *species;* that the various species must be treated only as the different determinations of a few *genera*, but these genera as the different determinations of still higher *families*,[69] etc.; and that we must therefore seek a certain systematic unity of all possible empirical concepts insofar as they can be derived from higher and more general ones. This principle is a rule of the school[70]—or a logical principle—without which no use of reason would take place; for we can make inferences from the general to the particular only insofar as we base such inferences on general properties of things under which the particular properties fall.[71] {A 652 B 680}

But that such accordance is found also in nature is presupposed by philosophers in this familiar rule of the school: that rudiments[72] (principles) must not needlessly be multiplied (*entia praeter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda*).[73] This rule says that the nature of things itself offers material for the unity of reason, and that the apparently infinite variety must not keep us from presuming behind it a unity of basic properties—properties from which the manifoldness can be derived only by further determination.[74] This unity, despite being a mere idea, has at all times been pursued so eagerly that people have found cause to moderate rather than to encourage the desire for it. Great[75] though it was already that chemists[76] were able to reduce all salts to two main genera, acid and alkaline, they are even

[68][*erkannt.*]

[69][*Geschlecht.*]

[70][See A 649 = B 677 br. n. 57.]

[71][On this rule, as well as those discussed below (up to A 668/B 696), see the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 182, and cf. 185–88. See also the First Introduction to that same work, Ak. XX, 210–16.]

[72][*Anfänge* (literally 'beginnings').]

[73][That entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity; cf. A 649 = B 677 br. n. 57.]

[74][Of these properties.]

[75][*viel.*]

[76][*Scheidekünstler* (literally, 'separation artists').]

A 653 B 681 trying to regard this difference also as merely a variation[77] or different manifestation of one and the same basic material. They have sought to reduce little by little the various kinds of earths (the material of stones and even of metals) to three, and finally to two; but, not yet content with this, they cannot rid themselves of the thought of presuming nonetheless a single genus behind these varieties[78]—indeed, of presuming a common principle even for these earths and the salts. One might think,[79] perhaps, that this [attempt to find such unity] is merely an economical stratagem[80] that reason uses in order to save itself as much trouble as possible, and merely a hypothetical attempt that—if successful—provides probability to the presupposed basis of explanation precisely through this unity. Yet such a selfish aim can easily be distinguished from the idea whereby everyone presupposes that this unity of reason is commensurate with nature itself, and that reason is here not begging but commanding, although without being able to determine the bounds of this unity.

Suppose (a case that is readily thinkable) that among the appearances offering themselves to us there were so great a diversity—I will not say in form (for in that regard appearances may be similar to one another), but in content, i.e., in the manifoldness of existing beings—that even the very keenest human understanding could not by comparing appearances with one another discover the slightest similarity. If that were so, then the logical
A 654 B 682 law of genera would have no place at all; and even a concept of genus, or any general concept whatsoever, would have no place—nor, indeed, would even an understanding, which deals solely with such concepts. Hence the logical principle of genera, if it is to be applied to nature[81] (by which I here mean only those objects that are given to us), then it presupposes a transcendental one. According to this transcendental principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in the manifold of a possible experience (although we cannot a priori determine the degree of this homogeneity); for without homogeneity no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible.

[77][*Varietät.*]

[78][*Varietäten.*]

[79][*glauben.*]

[80][*Handgriff.*]

[81][Or 'to what is nature': *auf Natur.*]

The logical principle of genera, which postulates[82] identity, is opposed by another one, viz., the principle of *species*. This principle requires of things—regardless of their agreement under the same genus—manifoldness and diversity, and makes it a precept for the understanding to be no less attentive to these than to identity. This principle[83] of species (or of mental acuteness, or discrimination[84]) greatly limits the frivolity[85] of the principle of genera (or of ingenuity).[86] Thus reason shows here a twofold interest—two interests that conflict with each other: on the one hand the interest of *range* (generality) as concerns genera, on the other hand the interest of *content* (determinateness) in regard to the manifoldness of species; for although in the first case the understanding thinks much *under* its concepts, yet in the second case it thinks all the more in the concepts *themselves*. This twofold interest manifests itself also in the very different ways of thinking found among investigators of nature. Some of them (who are primarily speculative) always look—being, as it were, hostile to heterogeneity—to the unity of the genus; the others (primarily empirical minds) unceasingly seek to split nature into so much manifoldness that on their view one would almost have to give up any hope of judging[87] nature's appearances according to general principles. {A 655 B 683}

Obviously this latter[88] way of thinking is likewise based on a logical principle. This principle[89] aims at the systematic completeness of all cognition. It applies when I descend, starting from the genus, to the manifold that may be contained thereunder, seeking in this way to provide the system with extension—just as in the first case,[90] where I ascend to the ge-

82[Which here again implies 'demands.']

83[*Grundsatz* here, *Prinzip* at the beginning of the paragraph. See A vii br. n. 7.]

84[Respectively, *Scharfsinnigkeit* and *Unterscheidungsvermögen*.]

85[*Leichtsinn*.]

86[*Witz*. In the *Anthropology*, ingenuity—*Witz* (*ingenium*)—is described as the power to think up the (general or) universal for the particular; and the power to find the particular for the (general or) universal (the rule) is called simply *power of judgment*. See Ak. VII, 221, 201, cf. 204.]

87[*beurteilen;* see A 60/B 84 br. n. 69.]

88[I.e., empirical.]

89[The principle of species.]

90[The case of the principle of genera.]

nus, I seek to provide the system with oneness.[91] For from the sphere of a concept designating a genus one cannot see how far this sphere's division can proceed, just as from the space that can be occupied by matter one cannot see how far the division of matter can proceed.[92] Hence every *genus* requires different[93] *species,* but these in turn require *subspecies.* And since there is[94] no subspecies that does not always in turn have a sphere (a range, as *conceptus communis*[95]), reason in its full[96] expansion demands that no species be regarded as being in itself[97] the lowest. For since, after all, the species is always a concept that contains within itself only what is common to different things, this concept cannot be thoroughly[98] determined.
A 656 B 684 Hence the concept also cannot be referred proximately[99] to an individual, but must consequently always contain under itself other concepts, i.e., subspecies. This law of specification[100] could be expressed thus: *entium varietates non temere esse minuendas.*[101]

One can readily see, however, that this *logical*[102] law would likewise be without meaning and application, if there did not lie at its basis a *transcendental law of specification.* This law does not, indeed, demand of the things that can become our objects an actual *infinity* of differences; for the logical principle, which asserts merely the *indeterminateness* of the logical sphere in regard to possible division, gives no occasion for such a demand. But the transcendental law nonetheless imposes on the understanding the demand that under every species that we encounter it must seek subspecies, and for every difference must seek smaller differences. For if

91[I.e., unity: *Einfalt,* literally 'onefold(ness),' as contrasted with the just mentioned manifold(ness).]

92[See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 503–8.]

93[Or 'diverse': *verschieden.*]

94[*stattfinden.*]

95[Common concept (for more specific concepts); cf. the next sentence.]

96[*ganz.*]

97[Or 'in principle': *an sich selbst.*]

98[*durchgängig.*]

99[*zunächst.*]

100[Cf the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 186, and the First Introduction thereto, Ak. XX, 214–16, 242–43]

101[The varieties of entities must not lightly be diminished.]

102[Emphasis added; likewise for 'transcendental' just below] there were no *lower* concepts, then there would also be no *higher* ones. Now the understanding cognizes everything only through concepts; consequently, however far the understanding reaches in its process of division, it cognizes never through mere intuition, but always in turn through *lower* concepts. Cognition of appearances in their thoroughgoing[103] determination (such cognition is possible only through understanding) requires a specification[104] of the understanding's concepts that must unceasingly be continued; and hence such cognition requires an advance to the always still remaining differences from which we had abstracted in the concept of the species and had abstracted even more in that of the genus.

Moreover, this law of specification also cannot be borrowed from experience; for experience cannot provide us with such far-reaching disclosures. Empirical specification soon comes to a halt in the differentiation of the manifold, if it has not already been preceded by the transcendental law of specification as a principle of reason, and has not been guided by this principle to seek such differentiation, and to continue to presume such differentiation even when it is not manifested to the senses. To discover that absorbent earths are in turn[105] of different kinds (viz., calcareous and muriatic earths) we required an antecedent rule of reason that assigned to the understanding the task of seeking difference. The rule did this by presupposing nature to be so opulent[106] that we may presume it to have such difference. For only under the presupposition of differences in nature do we have understanding, just as we have understanding only under the condition that nature's objects possess homogeneity. For the manifoldness of what can be collated[107] under a concept is precisely what amounts to this concept's use and to the activity of the understanding. {A 657 B 685}

Hence reason prepares the understanding's realm by these means: (1) by a principle[108] of the *homogeneity*[109] of the manifold under higher genera; (2) by a principle of the *variety* of the homogeneous under lower

103[*durchgängig*.]

104[I.e., a making specific.]

105[Reading, with Mellin, *noch* for *nach*.]

106[*reichhaltig*]

107[I.e., arranged and held together (by us, and thus comprised by the concept): *zusammengefaßt*. See B 114 br. n. 239.]

108[*Prinzip* here, *Grundsatz* just below. See A vii br. n. 7.]

109[*Gleichartigkeit* here, *Homogenität* just below]

species;—and, in order to complete[110] the systematic unity, reason adds (3) also a law of the *affinity* of all concepts, a law that commands a con-
A 658 B 686 tinuous transition from every species[111] to every other species through a step-wise increase of difference.[112] We may call these three rules the principles of the *homogeneity,* of the *specification,*[113] and of the *continuity* of forms. The third principle arises by our uniting the first two, after we have—in our idea—completed the systematic coherence both in ascending to higher genera and in descending to lower species. For all manifoldnesses[114] are then akin to one another, because they stem one and all, through all degrees of the expanded determination, from a single highest genus.

We can make the systematic unity among the three logical principles sensible[115] in the following manner. We can regard every concept as a point that serves as the standpoint of an observer and thus has its horizon, i.e., there is a multitude of things that can be presented and—as it were—surveyed from this standpoint. Within this horizon there must be a multitude of points that can be indicated *ad infinitum,* each having in turn its own narrower purview.[116] I.e., every species contains subspecies,[117] according to the principle of specification,[118] and the logical horizon[119] consists only of smaller horizons (subspecies), but not of points having no range (individuals). But for [several] different horizons (i.e., genera)[120] de-
A 659 B 687 termined by equally many concepts, a common horizon can be thought as drawn, from which those different horizons can one and all be surveyed as from a central point. This common horizon is the higher genus. And so on, until finally we reach the highest genus; this is the universal and true horizon, which is determined from the standpoint of the highest concept, and

110[Or 'to perfect': *vollenden.*]

111[*Art.*]

112[Or 'diversity': *Verschiedenheit.*]

113[*Spezifikation.*]

114[I.e., varieties.]

115[I.e., capable of being sensed.]

116[*Gesichtskreis.*]

117[Respectively, *Arten* and *Unterarten.*]

118[*Spezifikation.*]

119[Of a genus or species.]

120[Parentheses added]

which comprises under itself all manifoldness as [its] genera, species, and subspecies.

To this highest standpoint I am led by the law of homogeneity; to all lower standpoints and to their greatest variety I am led by the law of specification. But since there is thus nothing empty in the entire range of all possible concepts, and since nothing can be encountered outside this range, the presupposition of that universal purview and of its thoroughgoing division[121] gives rise to this principle: *Non datur vacuum formarum.*[122] I.e., this principle says that there are not different original and first genera that are, as it were, isolated and separated from one another (by an empty intermediate space); rather, all the manifold genera are only divisions of a single highest and universal genus. And from that principle there arises this direct consequence: *Datur continuum formarum.*[123] I.e., according to this principle all differences of species border on one another and permit no transition to one another by a leap, but permit a transition only through all the smaller degrees of difference[124] through which one can get from one species to another. In a word, this principle says that there are (in reason's concept) no species or subspecies that are nearest to each other; rather, intermediate [third] species are always still possible whose difference from the first and the second species is smaller than the difference between these two. {A 660 B 688}

Thus the first law keeps us from straying into accepting a manifoldness of different original genera, and recommends homogeneity. The second law, on the other hand, limits in turn this inclination toward accordance, and commands us to distinguish subspecies before we take our general concept and turn with it to individuals. The third law unites these two, inasmuch as amidst the utmost manifoldness it[125] yet prescribes that we seek homogeneity through the stepwise transition from one species[126] to another—a transition which indicates a kind of kinship of the different branches insofar as all of them are offshoots from one stem.

121[*Einteilung* here, *Abteilung* just below.]

122[There is no vacuum of forms.]

123[There is a continuum of forms.]

124[*Unterschied* here and (twice) just below; *Verschiedenheit* just above.]

125[Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *es* for *sie*.]

126[*Spezies*.]

However, this logical law of the *continuum specierum* (*formarum logicarum*)[127] presupposes a transcendental one (*lex continui in natura*).[128] For without such a transcendental law, the understanding's use would only be misled by that logical law's prescription, inasmuch as this use[129] would then perhaps take a path directly opposite to nature. Hence this logical law must rest on pure transcendental and not on empirical bases. For in the latter case this law would come later than the systems; but in fact this law first gave rise to what is systematic in our cognition of nature. Nor indeed are there hidden behind these laws,[130] construed as mere attempts, any intentions for a test to be performed with them—although where this coherence
A 661 B 689 does occur[131] it provides, of course, a powerful basis for considering the hypothetically excogitated unity to be well-based, and although the laws thus have their benefit in this regard also. Rather, we can see distinctly from these laws that they judge the parsimony of basic causes, the manifoldness of effects, and a consequent kinship of the members of nature to be in themselves rational and commensurate with nature, and that these principles therefore carry their commendation with themselves directly and not merely as stratagems[132] of method.

We can readily see, however, that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, for which no congruent object whatever can be shown in experience. This is so *not only* because the species in nature are actually separated and each species must therefore in itself amount to a *quantum discretum,*[133] and because if the stepwise progression in their kinship were continuous then this kinship would have to contain also a true infinity of intermediate members lying between[134] any two given species—which is impossible. *Rather,* the continuity of forms must be a mere idea *also* because we cannot make any determinate empirical use whatever of this law; for this law does not indicate the least mark of affinity as to how—and how far—we are to seek

[127][Continuum of species ([i.e.,] of logical forms).]

[128][Law of (the) continuum (or of continuity) in nature.]

[129][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *er* for *sie*.]

[130][The law just mentioned, along with the previous two laws that it unites and thus incorporates.]

[131][*zutreffen.*]

[132][*Handgriffe.*]

[133][Discrete quantum.]

[134][Kant literally says 'within': *innerhalb*]

the sequence of degrees of difference in this affinity, but contains nothing further than a general indication that we are to seek this affinity.

If we now transpose the just mentioned principles in terms of their order, so as to arrange them according to their *use in experience,* then the principles might stand in this order: *manifoldness, kinship,* and *unity*—but each taken as an idea[135] in its highest degree of completeness. Reason presupposes the cognitions of understanding that are applied proximately[136] to experience, and seeks their unity in terms of ideas—a unity that goes much further than experience can extend. The kinship that the manifold—irrespective of its diversity—has under a principle of unity concerns not merely things, but concerns much more yet the mere properties and forces of things. Thus, e.g., if through an experience (that is not yet fully corrected) the [orbital] course of the planets is given to us as circular[137] and we then find differences, we presume them to lie in what can change[138] a circle[139] according to a constant law, through all the infinite intermediate degrees, to one[140] of these divergent orbits; i.e., we presume that the planetary motions that are not circles will more or less approximate the properties of a circle; and thus we hit upon the ellipse. Comets show in their paths an even greater difference from the circle, since (as far as our observation extends) they do not even return in a circle.[141] But we guess that they follow a parabolic course, which is still akin to the ellipse, and which in all our observations is indistinguishable from an ellipse if the latter's major axis is extended very far. Thus, under the guidance of those principles, we arrive at unity of the genera of these paths' shape. But thereby we arrive in addition at unity of the cause of all the laws of these bodies' motion (viz., gravitation). From this cause we thereafter extend our conquests, and try to explain on the same principle also all variations and seeming departures from those rules. Finally we even add more than can ever be confirmed by experience: viz., we conceive, according to the rules of kinship, even hyperbolic comet paths; on such paths these bodies leave

{A 662 B 690}

{A 663 B 691}

[135][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *Idee* for *Ideen.*]

[136][*zunächst.*]

[137][*kreisförmig.*]

[138][*abändern,* elsewhere translated as 'alter' (which here would not work well grammatically).]

[139][*Zirkel.*]

[140][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *einem* for *einer.*]

[141][I.e., they do not complete a revolution wherein they return to the same point.]

our solar world[142] altogether and, by going from sun to sun, they unite in their course the more distant parts of a—for us unbounded—world system that coheres through one and the same motive force.

What is remarkable about these principles and is also our sole concern here is this: they seem to be transcendental. And although these principles contain mere ideas—which are to be observed[143] by reason's empirical use although they can be followed[144] by it only asymptotically, as it were, i.e., merely approximately, without ever being reached by it—they nonetheless have, as synthetic a priori propositions, objective but indeterminate validity and serve as rules of possible experience. Moreover, as we work on experience we actually use these principles with good success[145] as heuristic
A 664 B 692 principles, despite our inability to bring about a transcendental deduction[146] of them. Such a deduction is always impossible in regard to ideas, as has been proved above.[147]

In the Transcendental Analytic we made a distinction among the principles of understanding:[148] we distinguished the *dynamical* principles, as merely regulative principles of *intuition*, from the *mathematical*, which are constitutive as regards intuition. Nonetheless, those dynamical laws are indeed[149] constitutive as regards *experience*, inasmuch as they make possible a priori the *concepts* without which no experience takes place. Principles of pure reason, on the other hand, cannot be constitutive even as regards empirical *concepts;* for since no corresponding schema of sensibility can be given for them, they cannot have an object *in concreto.* If I thus abandon such an empirical use of these principles taken as constitutive, how am I nonetheless to secure for them a regulative use, and with it some objective validity, and what sort of signification can this regulative use have?

The understanding amounts to an object for reason, just as sensibility is an object for the understanding. Making the unity of all possible empirical

[142][I.e., the solar system.]

[143][Or 'complied with': *Befolgung.*]

[144][*folgen.*]

[145][*Glück.*]

[146][I.e., legitimation.]

[147][See A 336/B 393; cf. A 669 = B 697, A 787 = B 815.]

[148][A 160–62/B 199–202.]

[149][I e , despite being merely regulative as regards intuition.]

acts of understanding systematic is a business of reason, just as the under-
standing has the business of connecting the manifold of appearances
through concepts and of bringing this manifold under empirical laws. How-
ever, acts of understanding without schemata of sensibility are *indetermi-
nate.*[150] In the same way, the *unity of reason* is in itself also *indeterminate* A 665 B 693
as regards the conditions under which the understanding is to link its con-
cepts systematically, and as regards the degree to which—i.e., how far—the
understanding is to do this. But although *in intuition* no schema can be
found for the thoroughgoing systematic unity of all concepts of under-
standing, yet there can and must be given an *analogue* of such a schema—an
analogue that is the idea of the *maximum* of the division and union of the
understanding's cognitions in a principle. For what is greatest and abso-
lutely complete can be thought of determinately, because all restricting
conditions—which yield indeterminate manifoldness—are being left out.
Hence the idea of reason is an analogue of a schema of sensibility, but with
this difference: application of the concepts of understanding to the schema
of reason is not likewise (as is application of the categories to their sen-
sible schemata) a cognition of the object itself, but is only a rule or prin-
ciple for the systematic unity of all use of the understanding. Now, every
principle that lays down a priori for the understanding the thoroughgo-
ing[151] unity of the latter's use holds also, although only indirectly, of the
object[152] of experience. Hence the principles of pure reason will have ob-
jective[153] reality as regards this object also—not, however, so as *to deter-
mine* anything in this object,[154] but only so as to indicate the procedure
whereby the understanding's empirical and determinate experiential use can B 694
become thoroughly[155] accordant with itself. This use can become so by be- A 666
ing *as much as possible* brought into coherence with, and derived from,
the principle of thoroughgoing unity.

I call *maxims* of reason all subjective principles that are obtained not from the character of the object, but from reason's interest concerning a certain possible perfection of the cognition of this object. Thus there are

[150][See A 137–42/B 176–81.]

[151][*durchgängig.*]

[152][*Gegenstand.*]

[153][*objektive.*]

[154][Reading, with Wille, *ihm* for *ihnen.*]

[155][*durchgängig.*]

maxims of speculative reason, which rest solely on reason's speculative interest, although it may seem as if they were objective principles.

When merely regulative principles[156] are regarded as constitutive, then they can, as objective principles, be in conflict with each other. But if they are regarded merely as *maxims*, then there is no true conflict but merely a diverse interest of reason that causes the splitting of the way of thinking. In fact, reason has only one single[157] interest, and the dispute between reason's maxims is only a diversity and reciprocal limitation of the methods used to satisfy this interest.

Thus in *one* reasoning person[158] the interest of *manifoldness* (according to the principle of specification), but in *another* the interest of *unity*
A 667 B 695 (according to the principle of aggregation[159]) may be stronger.[160] Each of them believes that he has acquired his judgment from insight into the object, and is yet basing it solely on his greater or lesser attachment to one of the two principles. Neither[161] of these principles rests on objective bases, but they rest only on the interest of reason; hence they might better be called maxims rather than principles. Sometimes men of insight dispute with one another concerning the characteristics of human beings, animals, or plants—indeed, even the characteristics of bodies in the mineral kingdom—some of them assuming, e.g., that there are special national characteristics[162] based on lineage, or definite and hereditary differences of families, races, etc., while others have their mind set on maintaining that nature has made entirely uniform[163] predispositions in this regard and that all such difference rests only on external contingencies. When I see men of insight disputing in this way, then I need only consider the character[164] of the object at issue in order to comprehend that this character lies far too deeply hidden for either side to be able speak from insight into the nature

[156][Here (and at the beginning of the preceding paragraph) the term used is *Grundsatz;* just above and just below it is *Prinzip.* See A vii br. n. 7.]

[157][Or 'unitary': *einig.*]

[158][*Vernünftler.*]

[159][I.e., presumably, the principle of homogeneity.]

[160][*vermögen.*]

[161][Reading, with Rosenkranz, *keiner* for *keine,* Kant seems to have thought that he had just said *Prinzipien* (as he does again just below) rather than *Grundsätzen*]

[162][*Volkscharaktere.*]

[163][*einerlei.*]

[164][*Beschaffenheit.*]

of the object.[165] What manifests itself here is nothing but the twofold interest of reason, of which the one party takes to heart—or, for that matter, affects—the one interest and the other party the other. Hence the maxims of nature's manifoldness and of nature's unity can indeed quite readily be reconciled; but as long as these maxims are regarded as objective insights, their difference occasions not only dispute but also obstacles. These obstacles greatly[166] delay the truth, until a means is found to reconcile[167] the disputing interest and to satisfy reason in this regard. {A 668 B 696}

The situation is the same with the assertion or challenge of a very famous law initiated by Leibniz and excellently dressed up by Bonnet: the law of the *continuous scale*[168] of creatures. This law[169] is nothing but the fact of our compliance with the principle of affinity, which rests on the interest of reason. For observation and insight into the arrangement of nature could in no way have provided us with this law as an objective assertion. The steps of such a scale, as they can be indicated to us by experience, stand much too far apart; and in nature itself our supposedly small differences on that scale commonly are such wide gaps that observations of this sort do not count for anything when taken as intentions of nature (above all in dealing with a great manifoldness of things, where finding certain similarities and approximations must always be easy). On the other hand, the method of looking for order in nature in accordance with such a principle, and the maxim of regarding such order as having its basis in a nature as such—although we leave undetermined as to where and how far this order may have such a basis—is indeed a legitimate and excellent regu-

165[*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* just above. See A vii br. n. 7.]

166[*lang*.]

167[Or 'unite': *vereinigen*.]

168[*Stufenleiter* (literally 'stepladder'). As for Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), the reference seems to be to his principle of continuity. But more specifically (for the present context), see his *Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain* (*New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, written in 1704 as a reply to Locke's *Essay* [1690] of the same title, but not published until 1765), bk. III, ch. vi, § 12. Charles Bonnet (1720–93) was a Swiss naturalist and philosopher. In his *Contemplation de la nature* (*Contemplation of Nature*, 1764–65), he further developed the idea of the scale of creatures (or chain of beings), construing this scale temporally rather than—as Leibniz had done—statically as resulting from divinely preestablished harmony. See also Lorin Anderson, *Charles Bonnet and the Order of the Known* (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982). And see Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being· A Study of the History of an Idea; The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University, 1933* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936).]

169[Reading, with Erdmann, *welches* for *welche*.]

lative principle of reason. But although this principle, as regulative, goes much further than the point where it[170] can be matched by experience or observation, yet it does so without determining anything. Rather, it only traces out for such experience or observation[171] the path to systematic unity.

A 669
B 697

On the Final Aim of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason[172]

The ideas of pure reason can never in themselves be dialectical; rather, their mere misuse alone must bring it about that there arises from them a deceptive illusion[173] for us. For they are assigned[174] to us by the nature of our reason, and this highest tribunal of all rights and claims of our speculation cannot possibly itself contain original delusions and deceptions.[175] Hence presumably the ideas will have their good and purposive vocation in the natural predisposition of our reason. But the rabble of subtle reasoners[176] screams, as usual, about [alleged] absurdity and contradictions, and rails at reason's government. Yet these people are unable to penetrate into the innermost plans of this government, to whose beneficial influences they should feel indebted even for their own preservation and, indeed, for the very culture that enables them to rebuke and condemn that government.

One cannot with any reliability employ an a priori concept without first having brought about a transcendental deduction of it. The ideas of pure reason do not, indeed, permit a deduction of the same kind as do the categories.[177] But if they are to have at least some objective validity—even if only an indeterminate one—and are not merely to present empty thought-

[170][Reading, with Erdmann, *ihm* for *ihr.*]

[171][*ihr.*]

[172][See Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 520–30. See also Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 3, 602–43. And see Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 552–61.]

[173][*trüglicher Schein.*]

[174][*aufgegeben,* viz., as a problem. See A 482/B 510, cf. A 647 = B 675.]

[175][*Täuschungen und Blendwerke.*]

[176][*Vernünftler.*]

[177][Cf. A 663–64 = B 691–92 incl. br. n. 147.]

entities[178] (*entia rationis ratiocinantis*),[179] then a deduction[180] of them must definitely be possible, even supposing that it might deviate greatly from the deduction that one can carry out with the categories. This deduction will be the completion[181] of pure reason's critical business, and this deduction we shall now take on. {A 670 B 698}

It makes a great difference whether something is given to my reason as an *object absolutely* or only as an *object in my idea*. In the first case my concepts serve to[182] determine the object. In the second case there is actually only a schema. No object is directly added to this schema, not even hypothetically; rather, the schema serves[183] only for presenting, by means of the reference to this idea, other objects according to their systematic unity, and hence for presenting them indirectly. Thus I say that the concept of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea. I.e., its objective reality is not held to consist in the concept's referring straightforwardly[184] to an object (for we could not justify the concept's objective validity if we took it in that signification). Rather, the concept is only a schema—arranged according to conditions of the greatest unity of reason—of the concept of a thing as such. This schema serves only to preserve the greatest systematic unity in our reason's empirical use; and it preserves this unity inasmuch as we derive, as it were, the object of experience from this idea's imagined object considered as the basis or cause of the object of experience. One then says, e.g., that the things of the world must be regarded *as if* they had received their existence from a supreme intelligence. In this way the idea is in fact only a heuristic and not an ostensive concept; and it indicates not what the character of an object is, but how we ought, under this concept's guidance, to *search* for the character and connection of experiential objects as such. Thus the three different[185] transcendental ideas (*psychologi-* {A 671 B 699}

[178][*Gedankendinge;* cf. A 290–92/B 347–48.]

[179][Beings of (our) reasoning, as distinguished from *entia rationis ratiocinatae*, i.e., beings of reason, which will be mentioned at A 681/B 709. See also the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 468, and cf. 337n, 396.]

[180][I.e., legitimation.]

[181][Or 'the perfecting': *die Vollendung*.]

[182][*gehen . . . dahin.*]

[183][*dienen.*]

[184][I.e., directly: *geradezu*.]

[185][*dreierlei.*]

cal, cosmological, and *theological*)[186] are indeed not referred directly to any object corresponding to them and to the *determination* thereof. But if one can show that, nonetheless, under the presupposition of such an *object in one's idea* all[187] rules of reason's empirical use lead to systematic unity and always expand experiential cognition and can never go against it, then proceeding according to such ideas is a necessary *maxim* of reason. And this is the transcendental deduction[188] of all ideas of speculative reason, not as *constitutive* principles of our cognition's expansion over more objects than experience can give, but as *regulative* principles of the systematic unity of the manifold of empirical cognition as such. By means of these regulative principles[189] this cognition is, within its own bounds, cultivated and corrected more than could be done without such ideas and by using merely the principles of understanding.

A 672 B 700 Let me make this point more distinct. In conformity with the mentioned ideas construed as principles, we shall [have a threefold regulative use thereof]. *First* (in psychology), we shall, by the guidance of inner experience, connect all appearances, actions, and receptivity of our mind *as if* this mind were a simple substance that (at least in life) exists permanently and with personal identity, while its states—to which the body's states belong only as external conditions—vary[190] continually. *Second* (in cosmology), we must trace the conditions of both internal and external natural appearance, in an inquiry not to be completed at any point,[191] *as if* nature[192] were in itself infinite and without a first or highest member. And although we must not[193] therefore deny—outside of all appearances—the merely intelligible first bases of nature, we must never bring these bases into the context of natural explanations, because we are not acquainted with them at all. Finally, and *third* (as concerns theology), we must regard whatever may

[186][The ideas, respectively, of the thinking subject, of the sum of all appearances (the world), and of the thing containing the supreme condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all beings [i.e., God]): see—besides the remainder of the current section—A 334/B 391.]

[187][Grillo reads *als* for *alle*, thus construing the ideas as *being* these rules.]

[188][I.e., legitimation.]

[189][*dadurch.*]

[190][*wechseln;* see B 224 br. n. 45.]

[191][*nirgend.*]

[192][*dieselbe;* similarly just below.]

[193][*nicht dürfen,* which in Kant *almost* always means 'need not.']

belong in the context of possible experience *as if* this experience amounted to an absolute unity that were nonetheless dependent[194] throughout and were always still conditioned within the world of sense. Yet whatever belongs in that context must be regarded by us at the same time *as if* the sum of all appearances (the sensible world itself) had outside its own range a single highest and all-sufficient basis, viz.—as it were—an independent,[195] original, and creative reason. I mean a reason by reference to which we direct all *our* reason's empirical use, in its greatest expansion, *as if* the ob- A 673 B 701
jects themselves had arisen from that archetype of all reason. This [threefold regulative use of our ideas thus] means the following: First,[196] we must not derive the internal appearances of the soul from a simple thinking substance, but must derive them from one another according to the idea of a simple being. Second, we must not derive the world order and its systematic unity from a supreme intelligence, but must, third, obtain from the idea of a supremely wise cause the rule whereby reason, when we connect causes and effects in the world, can best be used to its own satisfaction.

Now, there is not the slightest obstacle to prevent us from *assuming* these ideas as also objective and hypostatic[197]—except only in the case of the cosmological idea, where reason comes upon an antinomy when it tries to bring about such an idea. (The psychological and theological ideas contain no such antinomy at all.) For there is no contradiction in [any of] these ideas;[198] hence how could someone dispute with us regarding the objective reality of these ideas, when he knows no more concerning their [objects' real] possibility in order to deny it, than we do in order to affirm it? Nevertheless, the fact that there is no positive obstacle against assuming something is not yet sufficient [justification] for doing so; and we cannot be permitted—on the mere trust[199] of a speculative reason that likes to complete its business—to introduce as actual and determinate objects what are only thought-beings[200] that surpass all our concepts, although such beings do so without contradicting any of these concepts. Hence these [things] are A 674 B 702

194[*abhängig.*]

195[*selbständig.*]

196['First' added; likewise 'Second' and 'third' just below.]

197[Substantive (i.e., pertaining to substance).]

198[Not even in the cosmological idea; for the antinomy (A 405–61/B 432–89), although an obstacle, has been solved (A 515–65/B 543–93).]

199[*Kredit.*]

200[*Gedankenwesen.* Cf. *Gedankendinge:* A 290–92/B 347–48.]

not to be assumed in themselves, but the reality of these [ideas] is to be assumed to hold only as the reality of a schema for the regulative principle of systematic unity of all cognition of nature; and hence these [things] are to be laid at the basis[201] only as analogues of actual things, but not as in themselves actual things. First we annul in[202] the idea's object the conditions that limit our concept of understanding, but that also alone make possible our having a determinate concept of any *thing*.[203] And now we think a something of which, as to what it is in itself, we have no concept whatever, but for which we can nonetheless think a relation—analogous to the relation that appearances have among one another—that this something has to the sum of appearances.

Accordingly, if we assume such ideal beings, then we do not in fact expand our cognition beyond the objects of possible experience; rather, we then expand only the empirical unity of this experience, viz., through the systematic unity for which the idea provides the schema. Hence this idea holds not as a constitutive but only as a regulative principle. For by positing a thing—a something, or actual being—corresponding to the idea, we do not say that we seek to expand our cognition of things by means of transcendent[204] concepts. For we lay this being at the basis[205] not in itself but
A 675 / B 703 only in our idea, and hence only so as to express the systematic unity that is to serve us as a guideline for reason's empirical use. But we do this without establishing anything concerning the basis of that unity, or concerning the intrinsic property of such a being on which as cause this unity rests.

Thus the transcendental and sole determinate concept that merely speculative reason provides of God is—in the strictest meaning of the term—*deistic*. I.e., reason provides us not even with the objective validity of such a concept, but provides us only with the idea of something on which the supreme and necessary unity of all reality is based, and which we cannot think except on the analogy of an actual substance as cause of all things according to laws of reason. Only thus can we think this something—if.

[201] [Of that cognition.]

[202] [*von*.]

[203] [Emphasis added.]

[204] [*transzendent*. The fourth and fifth editions have 'transcendental' (cf A 340/B 398) But see A 565 = B 593 (cf. A 469 = B 497), and contrast the *transcendental* (because legitimately used) *deistic* concept mentioned at the beginning of the next paragraph.]

[205] [I.e., at the basis of empirical cognition (our reason's empirical use).]

indeed, we undertake to think it as a separate[206] object at all, and do not prefer to be content with the mere idea of reason's regulative principle, and to set aside the completion of all conditions of thought as a goal transcendent[207] for human understanding. This latter alternative, however, cannot coexist with the aim of achieving in our cognition a perfect systematic unity to which reason at least sets no limits.

Hence comes about this [twofold fact]: On the one hand, if I assume a divine being, then I have indeed not the slightest concept either of the intrinsic possibility of this being's supreme perfection or of the necessity of this being's existence. But, on the other hand, I can then nonetheless deal {A 676 B 704} adequately with all those other questions that concern what is contingent, and can provide for reason the most perfect satisfaction as regards the greatest unity that reason in its empirical use is to search for—although not as regards that being's presupposition itself. This [twofold fact] proves that reason's speculative interest and not its insight is what entitles[208] reason to start from a point lying so far beyond its sphere, in order to contemplate its objects from that point as a complete whole.

Thus we can see here a distinction in the way of thinking—given[209] one and the same presupposition—that is fairly subtle but yet of great importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have sufficient ground to assume something relatively (*suppositio relativa*), and yet not be entitled[210] to assume it absolutely[211] (*suppositio absoluta*).[212] This distinction applies when we are concerned merely with a regulative principle of which we do indeed cognize the necessity in itself but not the source thereof, and when we assume for this necessity a supreme basis merely in order to think the principle's universality so much more determinately—e.g., when I think as existing a being corresponding to a mere idea that is, moreover, transcendental. For then I can never assume this thing's existence in itself; for this existence cannot be reached by any of the concepts through which I can {A 677 B 705} think any object determinately, and the conditions of my concepts' objec-

[206][*besonder.*]

[207][*überschwenglich.*]

[208][*berechtigen.*]

[209][*bei.*]

[210][*befugt.*]

[211][*schlechthin.*]

[212][(Make a) relative and absolute supposition, respectively.]

tive validity are excluded by the idea itself. The concepts of reality, substance, causality, and even of necessity in existence have—apart from the use whereby they make empirical cognition of an object possible[213]—no signification whatever that would determine any object. Hence they can indeed be used to explain the possibility of things in the world of sense, but not the possibility of a *world whole itself*, because the basis for explaining this world whole would have to be outside the world and hence could not be an object of possible experience. Now, I can nonetheless assume such an incomprehensible being—the object of a mere idea—relatively to the world of sense, although not in itself. For if the greatest possible empirical use of my reason is based on an idea (the idea of systematically complete unity, of which I shall soon speak more determinately[214]), and if this idea can never in itself be exhibited adequately in experience but is yet inescapably necessary in order for me to bring empirical unity close to its highest possible degree, then I shall be not only entitled but also compelled to realize this idea. I.e., I must then posit for this idea an actual object. But I must posit this object only as a something as such with which I am not at all acquainted in itself, and to which, as a basis of that systematic unity
A 678 B 706 and in reference thereto, I merely give such properties as are analogous to the concepts of understanding employed in the understanding's empirical use. Hence by analogy with the realities in the world—i.e., the substances, the causality, and the necessity—I shall think a being that possesses all of this in supreme perfection. And inasmuch as this idea rests merely on my reason, I shall be able to think this being as an *independent*[215] *reason* that is the cause of the world whole through its ideas of the greatest harmony and unity. Thus I omit all conditions limiting the idea, solely in order to make possible—under the safeguard of such an original being—the systematic unity of the manifold in the world whole, and, by means of this unity, the greatest possible empirical use of reason. This I do by regarding all linkages *as if* they were arrangements made by a supreme reason of which our reason is a faint copy. I then think this supreme being entirely[216] through concepts that in fact have their application only in the world of sense. But since, on the other hand, I have that transcendental presupposition available for none but a relative use—viz., that use whereby it

213[I.e., sensible intuition, as matter, is determined by the concepts, as form]

214[See below, A 680–88 = B 708–16.]

215[*selbständig*.]

216[*lauter*.]

is to provide merely the substratum of the greatest possible unity of experience—I may quite readily think a being that I distinguish from the world [of sense and yet think it] through properties that belong solely to the world of sense. For I do not by any means demand—nor am I entitled to demand—to cognize this object of my idea according to what it may be in itself. For I have no concepts for doing this; and even the concepts of reality, substance, causality—indeed, even the concept of necessity in existence—lose all significance and are empty titles for concepts devoid of any content, if I venture with them outside the realm of the senses. Rather, I merely think the relation that a being, in itself quite unknown[217] to me, has to the greatest systematic unity of the world whole; and I do this solely in order to make this relation the schema of the regulative principle of my reason's greatest possible empirical use. {A 679 B 707}

If we now cast our glance upon the transcendental object of our idea, we see that we cannot presuppose this object's actuality *in itself* according to the concepts of reality, substance, causality, etc., because these concepts have not the slightest application to something that is entirely distinct from the world of sense. Hence reason's supposition of a supreme being as highest cause is thought only relatively, for the sake of the systematic unity of the world of sense, and this being is a mere something in our reason's idea whereof we have no concept as to what it is *in itself*. This also explains why we do indeed require—in reference to what is given to the senses as existing—the idea of an original being *necessary* in itself, yet can never have the slightest concept of this being and its absolute *necessity*.

We can now put before us distinctly the result of the entire Transcendental Dialectic, and determine accurately the final aim of pure reason's ideas, which become dialectical only through misunderstanding and carelessness. Pure reason is in fact occupied with nothing but itself. Nor can it have any other business. For what are given to it are not objects for the unity of the experiential concept, but cognitions of understanding for the unity of the concept of reason, i.e., for the unity of coherence in a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of a system; and this systematic unity serves reason not objectively, as a principle for extending[218] reason over objects, but subjectively, as a maxim for extending reason over all possible empirical cognition of objects. Nevertheless, the systematic coherence that reason can give to the understanding's empirical use not only furthers the {A 680 B 708}

[217] [*unbekannt.*]

[218] [*verbreiten.*]

extension[219] of this use, but at the same time verifies[220] the correctness thereof. And thus the principle of such a systematic unity is also objective,[221] but in an indeterminate way (as *principium vagum*[222]). I.e., it is objective not as a constitutive principle for determining something in regard to its direct object,[223] but as a merely regulative principle and maxim for furthering and solidifying *ad infinitum* (*indefinitum*)[224] reason's empirical use—viz., by opening up new paths unknown[225] to the understanding, while yet never going in the least against the laws of this empirical use.

A 681 B 709 However, reason cannot think this systematic unity otherwise than by giving to its idea thereof at the same time an object. But since experience never gives an example of perfect systematic unity, this object cannot be given by any experience.[226] Now this being of reason[227] (*ens rationis ratiocinatae*) is indeed a mere idea, and hence is not assumed absolutely and *in itself* as something actual. Rather, we lay it at the basis[228] only problematically (because we cannot reach it through any concepts of understanding), in order to regard all connection of things in the world of sense *as if* they had their basis in this being of reason. But we do this solely with the aim of basing on this idea the systematic unity that is indispensable to reason but that furthers the cognition of understanding in every way and yet can also never hinder it.

We mistake this idea's signification as soon as we regard this idea as the assertion—or even just the presupposition—of an actual thing[229] to which we mean to ascribe the basis of the world's systematic organiza-

[219][*dessen Ausbreitung*.]

[220][*bewähren*.]

[221][*objektiv*.]

[222][Indefinite principle.]

[223][*Gegenstand*.]

[224][My Latin here translates Kant's German expressions: *ins Unendliche* (*Unbestimmte*); i.e., literally, 'to the infinite (indefinite).']

[225][*nicht kennt*.]

[226][And is thus a being of reason.]

[227][*Vernunftwesen*, as contrasted with the being of (our) reasoning (*ens rationis ratiocinantis*). See A 670 = B 698 incl. br. n. 179.]

[228][Of our cognition of nature.]

[229][*Sache* here, *Ding* near the end of the paragraph.]

tion.[230] Instead, we here leave entirely undecided what sort of character this organization's basis that eludes our concepts has in itself; we only set up for ourselves an idea serving us as a point of view from which alone we can extend that unity so essential to reason and so salutary to the understanding. In a word, this transcendental thing is merely the schema of that regulative principle by which reason extends systematic unity over all experience as far as it can.[231] {A 682 B 710}

The first object of such an idea am I myself, regarded merely as thinking nature (soul). If I want to search for the properties with which a thinking being exists in itself, then I must consult experience; and I cannot even apply to this object any one of the categories except insofar as the schema thereof is given in sensible intuition. But with this experience I never arrive at a systematic unity of all appearances of inner sense. Hence instead of this experiential concept (of what the soul actually is)—which cannot carry us far—reason takes the concept of the empirical unity of all thought; and by thinking this unity as unconditioned and original, reason turns this concept into a rational concept (idea) of a simple substance that, in itself immutable (personally identical), stands in community with other actual things outside it—in a word, the idea of a simple independent intelligence. In so doing, however, reason has before it nothing but principles of systematic unity that are useful to it in explaining the appearances of the soul. These principles tell us, viz., to regard all determinations as [united] in a single subject; to regard all powers[232] as much as possible as derived from a single basic power; to regard all variation[233] as belonging to the states {A 683 B 711} of one and the same permanent being; and to present all *appearances* in space as entirely different from actions of *thought.* This simplicity of the substance, etc., was meant to be only the schema for this regulative principle, and is not presupposed as if it were the actual basis of the soul's properties. For these properties may also rest on quite different bases with which we are not at all acquainted. Indeed, we could not—properly speaking—cognize the soul in itself through these assumed predicates even if we wanted to allow them to hold of the soul absolutely; for they amount to a mere idea, which cannot at all be presented *in concreto.* Now, such a

[230][-*verfassung.*]

[231][*soviel an ihr ist.*]

[232][Or 'forces': *Kräfte.*]

[233][*Wechsel.* See B 224 br. n. 45.]

psychological idea can give rise to nothing but advantage, provided that we take care to allow this idea to hold not as something more than a mere idea, but to hold merely relatively to reason's systematic use regarding our soul's appearances. For then no empirical laws of corporeal appearances, which are of a quite different kind, mingle with the explanations of what belongs merely to *inner sense.* No windy hypotheses concerning the generation, destruction, and palingenesis[234] of souls, etc. are then admitted. Thus our contemplation of this object of inner sense is then quite pure and unmingled with heterogeneous properties. Moreover, reason's inquiry is then directed at tracing the bases of explanation within this subject as far
A 684 B 712 as possible to a single principle. All of this is brought about by—indeed, is best brought about solely and exclusively by—such a schema considered *as if* it were an actual being. Indeed, the psychological idea cannot signify anything but the schema of a regulative concept. For even if I wished only to ask whether the soul is not in itself of a spiritual nature, this question would have no meaning at all. For by using such a concept I remove[235] not merely corporeal nature but all nature as such,[236] i.e., all predicates of any possible experience; and hence I then remove all conditions for thinking an object for such a concept, even though solely this thinking of an object is what makes us say that the concept has a meaning.

The second regulative idea of merely speculative reason is the world concept as such. For nature[237] is in fact the one and only given object in regard to which reason needs regulative principles. Now this nature is indeed twofold—either thinking or corporeal nature. However, in order to think corporeal nature as regards its intrinsic possibility—i.e., in order to determine the application of the categories to it—we need no idea, i.e., no presentation that surpasses experience. Indeed, no idea is possible in regard to corporeal nature. For in it we are guided merely by sensible intuition—unlike in the psychological basic concept (*I*),[238] which contains a priori a certain form of thought, viz., the unity of thought.[239] Hence there

[234][I.e., regeneration.]

[235][From the concept of the soul.]

[236][Or 'in general': *überhaupt*. See B xxvii br. n. 106.]

[237][Or, i.e., the world.]

[238][Emphasis added.]

[239][And there reason does turn the concept of this unity into an idea, viz., the idea of a simple substance. See A 682 = B 710.]

remains for pure reason nothing[240] but nature as such[241] and the completeness of the conditions therein according to some principle. Absolute totality of the [various] series of these conditions—in the derivation of the members of these series—is an idea. Although in reason's empirical use this idea can never come about [as realized] completely, the idea yet serves as a rule as to how we are to proceed in regard to these series of conditions—viz., in explaining given appearances (i.e., in regressing or, in other words, ascending[242]), we are to proceed *as if* the series were in itself infinite, i.e., we are to proceed *in indefinitum.*[243] But where (viz., in [the realm of] freedom) reason itself is regarded as determining cause, i.e., where we deal with practical principles, we are to proceed *as if* we had before us an object not of the senses but of the pure understanding. There the conditions can no longer be posited in the series of appearances, but can be posited outside this series; and the series of states can be regarded *as if* it began absolutely (through an intelligible cause). All of this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but regulative principles, and are far from positing—constitutively, as it were—an actual totality of such series. The remainder of these considerations can be found in its place under the Antinomy of Pure Reason.[244] {A 685 B 713}

The third idea of pure reason, which contains a merely relative supposition of a being considered as the single and all-sufficient cause of all cosmological series, is the rational concept of *God.* We do not have the slightest basis for assuming the object of this idea absolutely (i.e., for *supposing it in itself*). For what indeed, if not the world, can enable[245] or even just entitle us to believe in or to assert, in itself and as absolutely necessary by its very nature, a being of the highest perfection, and to do so from the mere concept of such a being? Solely in reference to the world can this supposition be necessary. And thus we can see clearly that the idea of this being, like all speculative ideas, says no more than that reason commands us to regard all connection in the world according to principles of a systematic unity, and hence to regard all these connections *as if* they had arisen, {A 686 B 714}

240[Nothing for which to provide regulation.]

241[I.e., whether corporeal *or* thinking nature.]

242[In a series.]

243[Indefinitely.]

244[A 405–567/B 432–595.]

245[*vermögen.*]

one and all, from a single all-encompassing being as supreme and all-sufficient cause. Clearly, therefore, reason can here be aiming at nothing but its own formal rule—the rule that it employs in the expansion of its empirical use—but can never be aiming at an expansion *beyond all bounds of its empirical use;* and consequently there does not lie hidden under this idea any constitutive principle of that use of reason which is directed to possible experience.

This supreme[246] formal unity, which rests solely on concepts of reason, is the *purposive*[247] unity of things, and reason's *speculative* interest necessitates our regarding all arrangement in the world *as if*[248] it had sprung from the intention of a most supreme reason. For such a principle opens
A 687 B 715 up to our reason, as applied to the realm of experiences, entirely new prospects for connecting the things of the world according to teleological laws, and for arriving thereby at their greatest systematic unity. Hence the presupposition of a supreme intelligence—although, of course, merely in one's idea—as the world whole's only cause can always benefit reason, and yet can also never do harm. For if in regard to the shape[249] of the earth (as round, but somewhat flattened),[250] or of mountains and oceans, etc., we previously assume[251] nothing but the wise intentions[252] of an originator, then we can in this way make a multitude of discoveries. Provided that we stay with this presupposition taken as a merely *regulative* principle, then even error cannot harm us. For, at worst, all that can follow from this er-

[246][Or 'highest': *höchst.*]

[247][*zweckmäßig.* On *Zweckmäßigkeit,* see A 622 = B 650 br. n. 285.]

[248][Emphasis added.]

[249][*Figur.*]

[250]The advantage provided by a spherical shape[a] of the earth is familiar enough. But few people know that the flattening of the earth as a spheroid is what alone prevents the prominences consisting of the mainland—or even those consisting of smaller mountains, thrown up perhaps by earthquakes—from shifting [the tilt of] the earth's axis continuously and considerably in a fairly short time. Such shifts would indeed occur if the bulge of the earth at[b] the equator were not a mountain so enormous that it can never noticeably be displaced with regard to that axis by the momentum of any other mountain. And yet we unhesitatingly explain this wise provision from nothing more than the equilibrium of the earth's formerly fluid mass.

[a][*-gestalt.*]

[b][*unter.*]

[251][As explanation.]

[252][*Absichten.*]

ror is that where we expected a teleological coherence[253] (*nexus finalis*) we find a merely mechanical or physical one (*nexus effectivus*).[254] Through this error we merely fail to find[255] in such a case one further unity, but do not ruin the unity of reason required in reason's empirical use. But even this contrariety[256] of such an error cannot at all affect the [regulative] law itself in its general and teleological intent.[257] For although a dissector may be found guilty of an error if he refers some member of an animal body to a purpose from which it can distinctly be shown not to result, yet there is no possibility whatever of *proving* in any case that a natural arrangement—whatever it may be—has no purpose whatsoever. This is also the reason why (the physicians') physiology has expanded its very limited empirical knowledge[258] of the purposes of an organic body's structure by a principle that was brought in[259] merely by pure reason; this principle has been taken so far in this physiology that one assumes quite audaciously, and at the same time with the agreement of all people with understanding, that everything in the animal has its benefit and good intent.[260] This presupposition, if it were meant to be constitutive, would go much further than all observation performed thus far can entitle us to go. And this shows that the presupposition is nothing but a regulative principle of reason for reaching supreme systematic unity. Through this principle reason seeks to reach such unity by means of the idea of a purposive causality on the part of the highest cause of the world, and by acting *as if* this cause, as supreme intelligence, were the cause of everything according to the wisest intention.[261] {A 688 B 716}

But if we deviate from this restriction of the idea to the merely regulative use of reason, then reason is misled in a variety of ways. For it then leaves the ground[262] of experience—the ground which must, after all, con- {A 689 B 717}

[253][Or 'connection': *Zusammenhang*.]

[254][Respectively, connection in terms of final and in terms of efficient causes.]

[255][*vermissen*.]

[256][*Querstrich*.]

[257][*Absicht*.]

[258][*Kenntnis*.]

[259][*eingeben*, which also means 'to inspire.']

[260][Or 'aim': *Absicht*.]

[261][On physicotheology, cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 436–42.]

[262][*Boden*.]

tain the signs marking reason's course—and ventures beyond this ground to [the realm of] the incomprehensible and inscrutable.[263] At the altitude of this [realm] reason necessarily gets dizzy; for from the standpoint of this [realm] reason sees itself cut off entirely from any use that harmonizes with experience.

The first mistake that arises from using the idea of a supreme being not merely regulatively but constitutively (which goes against the nature of an idea) is lazy reason[264] (*ignava ratio*).[265] We may call by this name any prin-
A 690 B 718 ciple that makes one regard one's investigation of nature as absolutely completed, and thus makes reason retire to rest as if it had fully carried out its task. And this applies wherever such investigation may be pursued, and hence it applies even to the psychological idea. If the psychological idea is used as a constitutive principle for explaining the appearances of our soul, and thereafter perhaps for expanding our cognition of this subject even beyond all experience (viz., to the subject's state after death), then this does indeed make things[266] very easy for reason, but it also entirely ruins and destroys all natural use of reason according to the guidance of experiences. Thus the dogmatic spiritualist, in explaining the person's unity that subsists unchanged through all variation of the person's states, does so by [ap-

[263][*unerforschlich.*]

[264][*faule Vernunft.*]

[265]This is what the ancient dialecticians called a fallacious inference that ran thus: If it is your fate that you shall recover from this illness, then it will happen, whether or not you use a physician. Cicero says that this [lazy] kind of inference acquired its name because if we follow it, then reason is left without any use whatever in life.[a] This is the cause for which I assign the same name to the sophistical argument of pure reason.

[a][On *lazy reason,* cf. A 773 = B 801. I have not been able to find this expression in Cicero. But in Leibniz's *Discourse on Metaphysics* (IV, second paragraph), we find this passage: 'Car, quant à l'avenir, il ne faut pas estre quietiste ny attendre ridiculement à bras croisés, ce que Dieu fera, selon ce sophisme que les Anciens appeloient λόγον ἄεργον, la raison paresseuse, mais il faut agir selon la volonté présomtive de Dieu, autant que nous en pouvons juger, tachant de tout nostre pouvoir de contribuer au bien general, et particulierement à l'ornement et à la perfection de ce qui nous touche, ou de ce qui nous est prochain, et pour ainsi dire à portée.' I.e.: 'For as regards the future we must not be quietists, nor await ridiculously with folded arms what God will do, according to the sophism that the ancients called λόγον ἄεργον [*lógon áergon*], lazy reason; rather, we must act according to the presumptive will of God insofar as we can judge of it, trying, with all our power, to contribute to the general good, and particularly to the adornment and perfection of what touches us, or of what is close to us and, so to speak, within range.']

[266][*es.*]

pealing to] the unity—which he believes he perceives directly in the *I*—of the thinking substance;[267] the interest that we take in things that are held not to take place until after our death he explains by our consciousness of the immaterial nature of ourselves as thinking subject; etc. And thus the dogmatic spiritualist exempts himself from all natural investigation—[which starts] from physical bases of explanation—of the cause of these our inner experiences. For by the fiat, as it were, of a transcendent reason he bypasses—for the sake of his convenience but with the forfeiture of all insight—the sources of cognition that are immanent in experience. This detrimental consequence is even more obvious in the dogmatism concerning our idea of a supreme intelligence and in the theological system of nature (physicotheology) wrongly based thereon. For there all the purposes mani- {A 691 B 719}
festing themselves in nature—which are often only turned into such purposes by ourselves—serve to make the exploration[268] of causes quite easy for us, because instead of seeking these causes in the universal laws of the mechanism of matter, we then appeal straightforwardly to the inscrutable[269] decree of the supreme wisdom. And thus we regard reason's endeavor as completed when in fact we are merely exempting ourselves from reason's use—a use that, after all, finds no guidance anywhere except where such is provided to us by the order of nature and the series of changes taking place according to nature's intrinsic and universal[270] laws. This mistake can be avoided if we consider from this viewpoint of purposes not merely some components of nature—as, e.g., the distribution and structure of the mainland, and the character and location of mountains, or perhaps even just the organization in the plant and animal kingdoms—but instead make this systematic unity of nature in reference to the idea of a supreme intelligence *entirely universal*. For we then lay at the basis [of nature] a purposiveness according to universal laws of nature—laws from which no particular arrangement has been excepted, but which have only marked any such arrangement [as purposive] more or less discernibly[271] for us. And we then have a regulative principle of the systematic unity of a teleological connection—a unity, however, which we must not determine in ad-

[267][Cf. the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432. (The term *spiritualism* occurs at A 380.)]

[268][*Erforschung*.]

[269][*unerforschlich*.]

[270][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *allgemeinen* for *allgemeineren*.]

[271][*kenntlich*.]

A 692 B 720 vance, but in expectation of which we may only trace the physical-mechanical connection according to universal laws. For only in this way can the principle of purposive unity always expand reason's use regarding experience, and not impair it in any instance.

The second mistake that arises from the misinterpretation of this principle of systematic unity is that of inverted[272] reason (*perversa ratio*, ὕστερον πρότερον *rationis*[273]). The idea of systematic unity was to serve only as a regulative principle for seeking such unity in the coherence of things in terms of universal natural laws, and for believing that insofar as some measure of this unity can be found along the empirical path, one has to that extent also come closer to completeness in the use of the idea[274] —although this completeness will, of course, never be reached. But instead of treating the idea in this regulative way, one reverses[275] the matter:[276] one begins by presupposing[277] as hypostatic[278] the actuality of a principle of purposive unity; and because the concept of such a supreme intelligence is in itself quite inscrutable, one determines it anthropomorphically; and then one thrusts purposes upon nature forcibly and dictatorially, instead of seeking them—as is proper—along the path of physical investigation. Thus the result is not only that teleology, which was to serve merely to supplement the natural unity in terms of universal laws, now
A 693 B 721 works rather toward annulling this unity;[279] but, in addition, reason even deprives itself of its purpose, viz., to prove from nature, in accordance with these laws,[280] the existence of such an intelligent highest cause. For if the supreme purposiveness in nature cannot be presupposed a priori, i.e., as belonging to nature's essence, how then can we be enjoined to search for

[272][*verkehrt.*]

[273][*hýsteron próteron* of reason, i.e., reason's (fallacy of putting) prior what is posterior; an example would be begging the question]

[274][*ihres.*]

[275][*umkehren.*]

[276][*Sache.*]

[277][*zum Grunde legen.* See A 693 = B 721 br. n. 283.]

[278][I.e., substantive (pertaining to substance—here a supreme intelligence as principle of purposive unity).]

[279][I.e., any purposes "forcibly and dictatorially thrust" upon nature are extraneous to it and hence can interfere with natural unity. Cf. just below.]

[280][Cf. the beginning of this paragraph I am reading, with Wille, *nach diesen* for *nach diesem*]

this purposiveness and to come closer, on the scale[281] thereof, to an originator's supreme perfection construed as a perfection that is absolutely necessary and hence cognizable a priori?[282] The regulative principle of systematic unity demands that we presuppose this unity—absolutely, and hence as following from the essence of things—as a *unity of nature* that is not merely cognized empirically but is presupposed a priori, although still indeterminately. But if I first lay at the basis[283] a supreme arranging being,[284] then the unity of nature is indeed annulled. For then this unity is quite extraneous and contingent to the nature of things, and also cannot be cognized from universal laws of nature. Hence there arises a vicious circle in proving, since one is presupposing what in fact was to be proved.

We merely confuse reason if we take the regulative principle of nature's systematic unity as constitutive, and if we presuppose hypostatically[285] as cause what is—in our idea only—laid at the basis of an accordant use of reason. { A 694 B 722 } The investigation of nature takes its course, all by itself and in accordance with nature's[286] universal laws, along the chain of natural causes. This investigation does indeed proceed in accordance with the idea of an originator.[287] But it does so not in order to derive from this originator the purposiveness that it pursues everywhere. Rather, it does so in order to cognize from this purposiveness the existence of this originator, and to cognize this existence as absolutely necessary inasmuch as the purposiveness is sought in the essences of natural things and also—if possible—in the essence[288] of all things as such. Now whether or not this latter aim[289] suc-

[281][*Stufenleiter*.]

[282][I.e., such *necessary* perfection on the part of a creator could not be inferred (in a physicoteleological argument or "argument from design") from *empirically* cognized and hence *contingent* purposiveness in nature.]

[283][Of my consideration: *zum Grunde legen*. Although in Kant this expression is sometimes synonymous with *voraussetzen* (cf., e.g., A 692 = B 720, or A 736 = B 764), i.e., 'to presuppose,' more frequently it is somewhat broader (less determinate) in meaning and weaker in force. Consider, e.g., the beginning of the next paragraph, where both expressions occur.]

[284][I.e., a God: *höchstes ordnendes Wesen*.]

[285][I.e., as a substance.]

[286][*derselben*.]

[287][*Urheber*.]

[288][Here (unlike just above) I follow Hartenstein in reading *dem Wesen* for *den Wesen*.]

[289][Of proving the absolutely necessary existence of an originator.]

ceeds, the idea itself always remains correct; and so does likewise the idea's use, if it is restricted to the conditions of a merely regulative principle.

Complete purposive unity is perfection[290] (considered absolutely). If we do not find this absolute perfection in the essence of the things that make up the entire object[291] of experience, i.e., in the essence of the entire object of all our objectively[292] valid cognition, and hence if we do not find this perfection in natural laws that are universal and necessary, how are we from this [fact] to infer—of all things[293]—the idea of the supreme and absolutely necessary existence of an original being[294] as origin[295] of all causality? The greatest systematic unity—and consequently also all purposive unity—is the school for the greatest use of human reason, and is even the foundation of the possibility of this greatest use. Hence the idea of this unity
A 695 B 723 is linked inseparably with the essence of our reason. Therefore, this same idea is legislative for us; and thus assuming, as corresponding to this idea, a legislative reason (*intellectus archetypus*)[296]—from which, as object of our reason, all systematic unity is to be derived—is very natural for us.

On the occasion of [our discussion of] the antinomy of pure reason, we said[297] that all questions raised by pure reason must absolutely be answerable, and that here we cannot be permitted to excuse ourselves from such answers by pleading the limits of our cognition—as is indeed both inevitable and proper in many questions on the nature of things. For here[298] the questions are put before us not by the nature of things but solely by the nature of reason, and they concern only reason's intrinsic arrangement.[299] We can now confirm this assertion—which at first seemed bold—with re-

[290][*Vollkommenheit.*]

[291][*Gegenstand.*]

[292][*objektiv.*]

[293][*gerade.*]

[294][*Urwesen.*]

[295][*Ursprung.*]

[296][Archetypal intellect (understanding). Cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak V, 408. An archetypal understanding would present *originals* (things in themselves). Our own understanding is "ectypal"; it requires images (perceptions) gained from our (sensible rather than intellectual) intuition, and with their help presents *derivatives* (things as appearances) of those originals.]

[297][A 476–84/B 504–12.]

[298][I.e., in the case of pure reason.]

[299][Or 'intrinsic (*or* inner) disposition'. *innere Einrichtung*.])

gard to the two questions in which pure reason has its greatest interest;[300] and we can thereby bring to full completion our consideration of the dialectic of pure reason.

Thus if (with regard to a transcendental theology)[301] one asks, *first*, whether there is something that is distinct from the world and contains the basis of the world order and of the coherence thereof according to universal laws, then the answer is: *without doubt*. For the world is a sum[302] of appearances; hence there must be some basis of these appearances that is transcendental, i.e., thinkable only for the pure understanding. If the question is, *second*, whether this being is substance, and of the greatest reality, and necessary, etc., then I answer that *this question has no signification*[303] *whatever*. For all the categories through which I try to frame a concept of such an object have only an empirical use, and have no meaning[304] whatever unless they are applied to objects[305] of possible experience, i.e., to the world of sense. Outside this realm they are mere titles for concepts { A 696 B 724

[300][Kant might be referring to the first two questions in the upcoming paragraph, the subsequent questions being construed as supplemental and elucidatory. But more likely he is referring, first, to whether the soul is immortal and, second, to whether God exists—the upcoming questions all dealing with details concerning only the latter of these two. The immortality of the soul and the existence of God become postulates of practical reason later on, in the Canon of Pure Reason (A 795–831 = B 823–59). As for freedom of the will, this is not actually a *postulate* of practical reason, despite what Kant says in one place (*Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 475). Kant holds (*Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 31 and 47) that the moral law is a fact of reason (*Faktum der Vernunft*), and that the moral law leads directly to the concept of freedom and to practical knowledge (not merely practical cognition) of freedom. See the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Ak. V, 29–30, 47; the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 468, 474–75, cf. 280, 403, 484; and Kant's First Introduction to the latter work, Ak. XX, 206.]

[301]Through what I have already previously said[a] concerning the psychological idea and its proper vocation as a principle for the merely regulative use of reason, I am here exempted from any specific and long-winded further discussion of the transcendental illusion whereby the systematic unity of all manifoldness of inner sense is presented hypostatically.[b] The procedure in that case is very similar to the one that the critique [offered here] observes in regard to the theological ideal.

[a][See A 680–84 = B 708–12.]

[b][I.e., substantively.]

[302][*Summe*.]

[303][*Bedeutung*. See A 139/B 178 br. n. 66.]

[304][*Sinn*.]

[305][Kant here uses the term *Objekt;* just above and later in the paragraph he uses *Gegenstand*. See A vii br. n. 7.]

—titles which may indeed be admitted but through which, on the other hand, nothing can be understood. If the question is, *third* and finally, whether we may not at least think this being, which is distinct from the world, on an *analogy* with objects of experience, then the answer is: *in-*
A 697 B 725 *deed,* but only as object in our idea and not in reality. I.e., we may do so only insofar as this being is a substratum, unknown[306] to us, of systematic unity, order, and purposiveness of the world's arrangement—[an idea] which reason must turn into the regulative principle of its investigation of nature. What is more, we may without fear or rebuke permit in this idea certain anthropomorphisms that further the regulative principle at issue. For it is always only an idea. This idea is not at all referred directly to a being distinct from the world. Rather, the idea is directly referred to the regulative principle of the world's systematic unity, but is referred to this principle only by means of a schema of this unity, viz., a supreme intelligence[307] as originator of this unity according to wise intentions. Through this idea we were to think not what this original basis of the unity of the world is in itself, but how we are to use this basis—or, rather, the idea of it—relatively to reason's systematic use regarding the things of the world.

But (one will continue to ask) in this way we *can,* after all, assume a single wise and omnipotent originator of the world? *Without any doubt;* and not only that, but we *must* presuppose such an originator. But then we do, after all, expand our cognition beyond the realm of possible experi-
A 698 B 726 ence? *By no means.* For we have presupposed only a something (a merely transcendental object) of which we have no concept at all as to what it is in itself. But we have—in reference to the systematic and purposive order of the world edifice, an order that we must presuppose when we study nature—thought this unknown[308] being only *on the analogy* with an intelligence (an empirical concept). I.e., we have endowed this being, in view of the purposes and perfection based on it,[309] with just those properties that can—according to the conditions of our reason—contain the basis of such a systematic unity. Hence *respectively to the world use* of our reason this idea has its full basis. But if we sought to confer objective validity on this

306[*unbekannt.*]

307[I take the genitive case in *einer* to go with *vermittelst* ('by means of') rather than with *Schema.* On this kind of schema, cf. A 665/B 693, A 670 = B 698, A 674 = B 702, A 681-82 = B 709-10, A 699 = B 727; also A 679 = B 707, A 683-84 = B 711-12.]

308[More literally, 'to us unknown': *uns unbekannte.*]

309[By our reason.]

idea absolutely, then we would be forgetting that what we are thinking is solely a being in our idea. And since we would then be starting from a basis not determinable at all through observation of the world, we would thus be rendered unable to apply this principle commensurately with reason's empirical use.

But (one will go on to ask) in this way I can, after all, make use of the concept and presupposition of a supreme being in the course of my rational observation of the world? Yes, this was in fact the aim for which this idea was laid at the basis by reason. But may I now regard purposelike arrangements as intentions, inasmuch as I derive them from the divine will, {A 699 B 727} although [as brought about] by means of special predispositions in the world that are aimed[310] at such arrangements? Yes, you[311] can do that also, but when you do so it must be indifferent to you whether someone says that divine wisdom has so arranged everything for its[312] highest purposes, or whether he says that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative [element] in the investigation of nature and a principle of nature's systematic and purposive unity according to universal laws, even where we do not become aware of that unity. I.e., it must be entirely the same to you, wherever you perceive this unity, whether you say that God has wisely willed it so, or whether you say that nature has wisely arranged it thus. For the greatest systematic and purposive unity, which your reason required you to lay at the basis of all natural investigation as a regulative principle, was precisely what entitled you to lay at the basis[313] the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema of the regulative principle. And to whatever extent, [when investigating] according to this [schema], you now find purposiveness in the world, to that extent you have confirmation of the idea's legitimacy. However, the principle in question had as its aim nothing other than the search for the necessary and greatest possible unity of nature. Hence insofar as we attain this unity, we shall indeed owe it to the idea of a supreme being; yet we cannot, without falling into contradiction with ourselves, bypass nature's universal laws—for [the investigation of] which alone the idea was laid at the basis—in order to regard this purposiveness of nature as con- {A 700 B 728}

[310][*gestellt*.]

[311][*ihr;* i.e., Kant replies in the plural.]

[312][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *ihren* for *seinen*.]

[313][Of that natural investigation: *zum Grunde legen*. See A 693 = B 721 br. n. 283.]

tingent and hyperphysical[314] in its origin. For we were not entitled to assume above nature[315] a being with the mentioned [divine] properties, but were entitled only to lay the idea of this being at the basis[316] in order to regard appearances[317]—on the analogy of a causal determination—as connected with one another systematically.

Precisely therefore, moreover, are we entitled to think the world cause—in our idea—not only according to a subtler anthropomorphism (without which nothing whatever concerning this being would be thinkable), viz., as a being that has understanding, liking and disliking, as well as a desire and a will that accord therewith,[318] etc.. Rather, we are entitled to attribute to this being infinite perfection—which, therefore, far surpasses the perfection that any empirical knowledge[319] of the world order can entitle us to attribute to this being. For the regulative law of systematic unity wants us to study nature *as if* systematic and purposive unity—amidst the greatest possible manifoldness—were everywhere[320] to be found *ad infinitum*. For although we shall in fact spy out or reach only little of this perfection of the world, yet seeking and presuming it everywhere belongs to our reason's legislation; and to engage in the observation of nature according to this principle must always be advantageous for us
A 701 B 729 and can never become disadvantageous. But likewise clear—under this conception[321] of the idea of a supreme originator as laid at the basis[322]—is the fact that I lay at the basis not the existence and the knowledge but only the idea of such a being. I.e., I do not in fact derive anything from this being, but derive something merely from the idea thereof; i.e., I derive something, according to such an idea, from the nature of the things of the world. Moreover, a certain consciousness—although undeveloped—of the genu-

[314][I.e., supranatural.]

[315][Reading, with Rosenkranz, *der Natur* for *die Natur,* which would go with *Kant's* use of *setzen* ('to posit').]

[316][Of our investigation.]

[317][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *die Erscheinungen* for *der Erscheinungen.*]

[318][*demselben gemäße.*]

[319][*Kenntnis;* likewise later in this paragraph.]

[320][*allenthalben* here, *allerwärts* just below.]

[321][*Vorstellung.*]

[322][Of my investigation of nature (likewise just below): *zum Grunde legen.* See A 693 = B 721 br. n. 283.]

ine use of this our concept of reason seems to have prompted the modest and appropriate language of the philosophers of all times. For in talking about the wisdom and foresight[323] of nature and also about divine wisdom they treat these as synonymous expressions. Indeed, as long as philosophers are concerned merely with speculative reason they prefer the first expression, because it restrains the claim to an assertion that is bigger than the one to which we are entitled, and at the same time points reason back to its proper realm—nature.

Thus pure reason, which seemed at the outset to promise us nothing less than an expansion of our knowledge[324] beyond all bounds of experience, contains—if we understand it properly—nothing but regulative principles. These principles do indeed command us to aim at a greater unity than the understanding's empirical use can attain; yet precisely by moving the goal to be approached by this use[325] so far away, they bring this use's agreement with itself—through systematic unity—to the highest degree. But if one misunderstands these principles and considers them to be constitutive principles of transcendent cognitions, then they give rise, by a splendid but deceptive illusion, to persuasion and imaginary knowledge,[326] and thereby to perpetual contradictions and controversies. {A 702 B 730}

Thus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from there to concepts, and ends with ideas. This cognition does indeed have—with regard to all three of these elements—a priori sources of cognition that seem at first glance to defy the bounds of all experience. Yet a completed critique convinces us that all our reason in its speculative use can never—with these elements—get beyond the realm of possible experience. And the critique convinces us that the proper vocation of this highest cognitive power is to employ all the methods and principles of reason[327] solely for tracing nature to its innermost core according to all possible principles of unity—the foremost of which is the unity of purposes—but never to soar beyond nature's boundary, since *for us* there is nothing but empty space outside it. The critical investigation—as carried out in the Transcendental Analytic—of

[323][*Vorsorge.*]

[324][*Kenntnisse.*]

[325][*desselben* (similarly just below), grammatically, this could refer instead to *understanding.*]

[326][*Wissen.*]

[327][*derselben.*]

A 703 B 731 all propositions that can expand our cognition beyond actual experience has, to be sure, sufficiently convinced us that these propositions can never lead to anything more than a possible experience. And if we were not distrustful of even the clearest abstract and general doctrines, and if charming and plausible[328] prospects did not entice us to cast off those doctrines' constraint, then we could indeed have been spared the laborious interrogation[329] of all the dialectical witnesses that a transcendent reason brings forward on behalf of its claims. For even beforehand we knew with complete certainty that all allegation of reason, although perhaps honestly meant, must be absolutely null, because it concerns information[330] that no human being can ever acquire. Yet there is no end of the talking unless one uncovers the true cause of the illusion[331] that can trick even the most reasonable person. Moreover, resolving all our transcendent cognition into its elements (as a study of our inner nature) is in itself of no slight value; but for the philosopher it is even a duty. Hence not only was there a need to investigate comprehensively this entire working of speculative reason—idle though it is—down to its primary sources. But since the dialectical illusion
B 732 is here not only deceptive in the judgment[332] but is also enticing in the in-
A 704 terest that is here taken in the judgment, and since the illusion is always natural and will remain so for the future, it was advisable for us to draw up comprehensively the proceedings of this trial, as it were, so as to deposit them in the archives of human reason in order to prevent future errors of a similar kind.

328[*scheinbar.*]

329[*Abhörung.*]

330[*eine Kundschaft.*]

331[*Schein.*]

332[I.e., the judgment (*Urteil*) handed down in the court of reason]

[Critique of Pure Reason]

II

Transcendental Doctrine of Method[1] { A 705 B 733

If I regard the sum of all cognition[2] of pure speculative reason as an edifice for which we have at least the idea within ourselves, then I can say that in the transcendental doctrine of elements we assessed the building equipment available to us, and determined for what edifice—and for what height and firmness thereof—the equipment suffices. We found, to be sure, that although we had in mind to build a tower that was to reach to heaven, yet our supply of materials sufficed only for a dwelling just spacious enough for the tasks that we perform on the level of experience, and just high enough for us to survey these tasks. But we found that through lack of material[3] the bold enterprise[4] had to fail—even if one leaves out of account the language confusion[5] that inevitably had to disunite the workers concerning the plan, and to scatter them all over the world to build [dwellings] separately—each according to his own design. Here[6] we are concerned not so much with the materials, as rather with the plan. And since we have been { A 707 B 735

[1][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 645–49.]

[2][*Erkenntnis*. For the distinction between cognition and knowledge (*Wissen*), see A vii br. n. 6.]

[3][The term used here is *Stoff;* above and below in this paragraph Kant uses *Materialien*.]

[4][Of building the tower.]

[5][As in the Biblical story of the tower of Babel, *Genesis* 11:1–9.]

[6][In the transcendental doctrine of method.]

warned not to venture upon this task in accordance with an arbitrary and blindly chosen design[7] that might perhaps surpass our entire power,[8] and yet cannot well abstain from erecting a firm residence, we must make our projection for such a building in relation to that supply which is both given to us and is adequate for our need.

A 708 B 736 Hence by transcendental doctrine of method I mean the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. With this aim, we shall be dealing with a *discipline,* a *canon,* an *architectonic,* and finally a *history* of pure reason. And we shall here accomplish with a merely transcendental aim what—under the name of a [general] *practical logic*—the schools have tried to do but have accomplished poorly in regard to the use of the understanding as such.[9] For general logic[10] is not limited to a particular kind of cognition of understanding (e.g., not to the pure kind), nor to certain objects.[11] Hence it can do nothing more—without borrowing knowledge[12] from other sciences—than put forth the titles for *possible methods* and the technical terms that are employed in all sorts of sciences for what is systematic therein; and these titles and terms acquaint the learner in advance merely with names whose meaning and use he is not meant to get to know until later.

[7] [*blinden Entwurf.*]

[8] [Or 'ability': *Vermögen.* See A xii br. n. 16.]

[9] [*überhaupt.* See B xxvii br n. 106.]

[10] [I.e., the logic of the understanding as such, as distinguished from transcendental logic, the logic of the understanding as aided by a priori intuition. See above, A 52–57/B 76–82.]

[11] [Here the term used is *Gegenstand.* See A vii br. n. 7.]

[12] [*Kenntnisse;* 'know' similarly renders *kennen* just below.]

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

Chapter I
The Discipline of Pure Reason[13]

Because human beings desire knowledge, negative judgments that are such not only in form but also in content are held in no special regard. Perhaps they are viewed even as jealous enemies of our cognitive urge in its unceasing endeavor to expand [our cognition]; and one almost needs to defend oneself[14] for trying to gain mere toleration for these judgments—and even more so for trying to gain for them favor and esteem. {A 709 B 737}

Although any proposition whatsoever can be expressed negatively [in form, i.e., as negative] *logically,* yet in regard to the content of cognition as such,—i.e., whether this cognition is either expanded or limited by a judgment—the task peculiar to negative[15] judgments is merely to *prevent error.* This is also the reason why, when negative propositions are intended to prevent a false cognition in cases where error is in fact[16] never possible, they are indeed very true, but empty. I.e., they are not at all appropriate to

[13][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 650–55. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 563. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 246–47.]

[14][*Apologie.*]

[15][*verneinend* here, *negativ* in 'negatively' above and in 'negative' below.]

[16][*doch.*]

their purpose, and precisely therefore are often ridiculous—like the proposition of that school orator who said that without an army Alexander could not have conquered any countries.

But where the limits of the cognition possible for us are very narrow and the inducement to judge is great, where the illusion offering itself to us is very deceptive and the detriment arising from error is considerable, there an instruction's *negative* character, which serves merely to safeguard us from errors, is even more important than is much positive information by which our cognition could be increased. The *constraint* whereby the constant propensity to deviate from certain rules is limited and finally eradicated is called *discipline*. It is distinguished from *culture,*[17] which is intended merely to provide a *proficiency*[18] without annulling, on the other hand, another proficiency already present. Hence discipline will make a
A 710 B 738 negative[19] contribution, but culture and doctrine a positive contribution, toward molding a talent that has already on its own[20] an impulse to manifest itself.

Everyone will readily admit that a discipline is in many respects required for our temperament, as well as for those talents (such as imagination and ingenuity) that like to allow themselves free and unlimited movement. But that reason, which properly is obligated to prescribe its discipline to all other endeavors, itself needs a discipline—this may indeed seem strange. And reason has, in fact, thus far escaped such humiliation precisely because, given[21] the solemnity and thorough propriety with which it deports itself, no one could easily have come to suspect it of playing

[17][Or 'cultivation': *Kultur.* On culture and discipline, cf. the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 431–34.]

[18][*Fertigkeit.*]

[19]I am well aware that in the language of the school the name of *discipline* tends to be used as equivalent to that of instruction. Yet there are—on the other hand—so many other cases where the first expression, as meaning *training,*[a] is carefully distinguished from the second, as meaning *informing.* And the very nature of things also requires that we preserve for this distinction the only fitting expressions. Thus I wish that this word[b] might never be permitted to be used in any but a negative meaning.

[a][*Zucht,* which in German is actually more clearly synonymous with *Disziplin* than are the English terms *training* and *discipline.*]

[b][*discipline.*]

[20][Reading, with *Valentiner* and the *Akademie* edition, *für sich selbst* instead of *vor sich selbst.*]

[21][*bei.*]

frivolously with imaginings in place of concepts, and with words in place of things.

Reason in its empirical use needs no critique; for its principles are subjected to continuous examination against the touchstone of experience. Nor does reason need a critique in mathematics, where its concepts must immediately be exhibited[22] *in concreto* in pure intuition, and where anything unfounded and arbitrary thus becomes obvious at once. But where neither empirical nor pure intuition keeps reason on a visible track—viz., in its transcendental use according to mere concepts—there reason needs a discipline that will subdue its propensity toward expansion beyond the narrow bounds of possible experience, and that will keep it away from extravagance and error. So much does reason there need this discipline that even the entire philosophy of pure reason deals with nothing but this negative benefit. Single aberrations can be remedied by an *appraisal,*[23] and their causes by critique. But where we find—as we do in pure reason—an entire system of delusions and deceptions,[24] well linked with one another and united under common principles, there a quite particular and moreover negative legislation seems to be required, under the name of a *discipline.* This legislation, working from the nature of reason and of the objects of reason's pure use, must set up a system, as it were, of caution and self-examination—a system before which any false and subtly reasoning[25] illusion cannot endure but must immediately betray itself, regardless of all the grounds that may be offered for its palliation. {A 711 B 739}

But we must note carefully that, in this second main part of the transcendental critique,[26] I direct the discipline of pure reason not at the content of the cognition from pure reason but merely at the method of this cognition; the former has already been done in the Doctrine of Elements. But reason's use is so similar no matter what may be the object to which it is applied, and yet is also—insofar as it is to be transcendental—so essentially different from any other use, that we cannot, without the admonitory negative doctrine of a discipline especially aimed at this goal, prevent what errors must necessarily arise from our complying inappropriately with methods that are indeed fitting for reason elsewhere—only not here. {A 712 B 740}

[22][*darstellen;* see B xvii br. n. 73.]

[23][*Zensur.*]

[24][*Täuschungen und Blendwerke.*]

[25][*vernünftelnd.*]

[26][I.e., the Doctrine of Method.]

Chapter I

Section I
The Discipline of Pure Reason in its Dogmatic Use[27]

Mathematics provides the most splendid example of a pure reason successfully[28] expanding itself on its own, without the aid of experience. But examples are contagious, primarily for the very power that naturally flatters itself with having the same success in other cases that was imparted
A 713 B 741 to it in one case. Thus pure reason hopes to be able to expand just as successfully and soundly[29] in its transcendental use as it managed to do in its mathematical use, if it applies primarily the same method in the transcendental use that was so obviously beneficial in the mathematical. Hence we are greatly concerned to know whether the method for attaining apodeictic certainty which in the latter science is called *mathematical* is the same method which is used to seek the same certainty in philosophy—and which would there have to be called *dogmatic*.

Philosophical cognition is *rational cognition from concepts. Mathematical* cognition is rational cognition from the *construction* of concepts. But *to construct* a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it.[30] Hence construction of a concept requires a *nonempirical* intuition. Consequently this intuition, as intuition, is an *individual*[31] object; but as the construction of a concept (a universal[32] presentation[33]), it must nonetheless express in the presentation its universal validity for all possible in-

[27][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 655–88. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 563–67.]

[28][*glücklich;* analogously for 'success' just below.]

[29][*gründlich.*]

[30][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 343.]

[31][Or 'singular': *einzeln*]

[32][Or 'general': *allgemein.* Similarly in the remainder of this paragraph and in the next one]

[33][*Vorstellung,* traditionally translated as 'representation.' See B xvii br. n. 73.]

tuitions falling under the same concept. Thus I construct a triangle by exhibiting the object corresponding to this concept either through imagination alone in pure intuition, or—in accordance with this pure intuition—also on paper, and hence also in empirical intuition. But in both cases I do exhibit the object completely a priori, without having taken the model for it from any experience. The individual figure drawn there[34] is empirical, and yet serves to express the concept without impairing the concept's universality. For in dealing with this empirical intuition one takes account only of the action of constructing the concept—to which[35] many determinations are entirely inconsequential: e.g., the magnitude[36] of the sides and of the angles—and one thus abstracts from all these differences that do not change the concept of triangle.[37] {A 714 B 742}

Hence philosophical cognition contemplates the particular only in the universal. Mathematical cognition, on the other hand, contemplates the universal in the particular, and indeed even in the individual;[38] yet it does so nonetheless a priori and by means of reason. And thus, just as this individual is determined under certain universal conditions of construction, so the object of the concept—to which this individual corresponds only as its schema—must be thought as determined universally.

Hence the essential difference between these two kinds of rational cognition consists in this difference of form, and does not rest on the difference of their matter or [i.e.] objects. Those who have meant to distinguish philosophy from mathematics by saying that philosophy has as its object[39] merely *quality* but mathematics only *quantity* have mistaken the effect for the cause. The form of mathematical cognition is the cause of the fact that mathematics can deal solely with quanta.[40] For only the concept of magnitudes can be constructed, i.e., displayed[41] a priori in intuition. Qualities, on the other hand, can be exhibited only in empirical intuition; hence a ra- {A 715 B 743}

[34][On the paper.]

[35][As concept.]

[36][I follow Hartenstein in deleting the comma after *Größe* ('magnitude').]

[37][See above, A 140–42/B 179–81.]

[38][Viz., the individual (i.e., singular) intuition.]

[39][The term used is *Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* just above. (Similarly later in this paragraph.) See A vii br. n. 7.]

[40][Or, i.e., magnitudes.]

[41][*darlegen*, which is here used synonymously with *darstellen* ('to exhibit')—see just below.]

tional cognition of qualities can be possible only through concepts. Thus no one can take an intuition corresponding to the concept of reality from anywhere but experience, and one cannot acquire this intuition[42] a priori from oneself and prior[43] to empirical consciousness. Conical[44] shape can indeed[45] be made intuitive without any empirical aid, merely according to the concept of a cone; but the color of this cone[46] will have to be given previously in some experience or other. I cannot in any way exhibit in intuition the concept of a cause as such except by an example provided to me by experience; etc. Besides, philosophy deals with magnitudes just as much as mathematics does—e.g., with totality, infinity, etc. Mathematics similarly is concerned not only with quantity but also with the difference between lines and planes considered as spaces of different quality, and with continuity as a quality of extension. But although in such cases philosophy and mathematics have a common object, the way in which this object is treated by reason is yet entirely different in philosophical and in mathematical contemplation. Philosophy keeps to universal concepts only. Mathematics[47] can accomplish nothing with the mere concept but hastens at once to intuition, in which it contemplates the concept *in concreto,* but yet not A 716 B 744 empirically; rather, mathematics contemplates the concept only in an intuition that it exhibits a priori—i.e., an intuition that it has constructed—and wherein what follows from the construction's universal conditions must also hold universally for the object of the constructed concept.[48]

Give to a philosopher the concept of a triangle, and let him discover in his own way what the relation[49] of the sum of its angles to a right angle might be. He now has nothing but the concept of a figure enclosed within three straight lines and—with this figure—the concept of likewise three angles. Now, no matter how long he meditates on this concept, he will uncover nothing new. He can dissect and make distinct the concept of a

[42][*derselben teilhaftig werden.*]

[43][*vor.*]

[44][*konisch.*]

[45][*wird.*]

[46][*Kegel.*]

[47][*diese;* grammatically the term would refer to the mathematical *contemplation* (similarly for *Jene* just above and the philosophical contemplation), but clearly 'contemplates' just below requires *mathematics* as its subject.]

[48][See above, A 714 = B 742 br. n. 37.]

[49][Or 'ratio': *sich . . . verhalten.*]

straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he cannot arrive at any other properties that are in no way contained in these concepts. But now let the geometrician take up this question. He begins immediately by constructing a triangle. He knows that two right angles together yield[50] exactly the same [sum] as do all the adjacent angles together that can be drawn from one point on a straight line. He therefore extends one side of his triangle and thus obtains[51] two adjacent angles[52] that together are equal to two right angles. Of the two angles he now divides the external one by drawing a line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle; and he sees that there arises here an external adjacent angle that is equal to an internal one; etc. In this manner he arrives, by a chain of inferences but always guided by intuition, at a completely evident and at the same time universal solution of the question.[53] {A 717 B 745}

However, mathematics constructs not merely magnitudes (*quanta*), as in geometry, but also mere magnitude [as such] (*quantitas*),[54] as in algebra. In this algebraic construction, mathematics abstracts entirely from the constitution[55] of the object that is to be thought according to such a con-

[50][*austragen.*]

[51][Along this straight line.]

[52][One internal and one external to the triangle.]

[53][The following diagram may serve to guide *our* intuition:



Extending the triangle's one side (here at the bottom) yields at first two angles (equal to two right angles): 3, and the sum of 2e and 1e ('e' stands for 'external'). This latter sum is then divided further into 2e and 1e by the line parallel to the triangle's opposite side. *Because* this line is thus parallel, 1e can be seen to equal 1, and 2e can similarly (as Kant indicates merely by saying 'etc.') be seen to equal 2 The remainder (3) of the angle (equal to two right angles) along the straight line is simply the triangle's third angle. Thus the sum of the triangle's three angles—two of them transposed, as it were—can be seen to equal the angle along the straight line and thus to equal two right angles.]

[54][Quantity.]

[55][*Beschaffenheit*, which I usually translate by 'character.']

cept of magnitude. It then chooses a certain notation[56] (viz., numbers)[57] usable for all constructions of magnitudes as such, i.e., for addition, subtraction, etc., extraction of the root, and so on. And after mathematics has designated[58] the universal concept of magnitudes also according to the different relations of these magnitudes,[59] it exhibits in intuition, according to certain universal rules, all manipulation by which the[60] magnitude is produced or changed. E.g., in cases where one magnitude is to be divided by another, mathematics puts the characters[61] of the two magnitudes together according to the form distinctive[62] of division; etc. And thus [in algebra] mathematics reaches by means of a symbolic construction—just as [in] geometry [it] reaches according to an ostensive or geometric construction (of the objects themselves)—results that could never be reached through any discursive cognition by means of mere concepts.

What may be the cause of the fact that two artists of reason[63] find themselves in so different a position, the one proceeding on his path by concepts, the other by intuitions that he exhibits a priori in accordance with
A 718 B 746 concepts? By the basic transcendental doctrines set forth above, this cause is clear. At issue here are not analytic propositions, which can be produced by merely dissecting concepts (in this the philosopher would doubtless have the advantage over his rival); rather, at issue are synthetic propositions—and such, moreover, as are to be cognized a priori. For I am to take account not merely of what I actually think in my concept of a triangle (since this is nothing more than the mere definition); rather, I am to go beyond the concept and to properties that do not lie in this concept but yet belong to it. Now, doing this is impossible except by my determining my object according to the conditions either of empirical intuition or of pure intuition. The first procedure would yield (by measuring the triangle's angles) only

[56][*Bezeichnung.*]

[57][Right parenthesis moved here, following Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, from its position after 'etc.' just below.]

[58][*bezeichnet.*]

[59][In the various constructions or operations.]

[60][Reading, with Wille, *durch die die* for *die durch die.*]

[61][Or 'symbols': *Charaktere.*]

[62][*bezeichnend.*]

[63][The philosopher and the mathematician: *Vernunftkünstler.*]

an empirical proposition, which[64] would contain no universality, still less any necessity; and with such propositions we are not concerned at all here. But the second procedure is mathematical construction, and here specifically geometric construction. By means of this construction I add in pure intuition, just as I do in empirical intuition, the manifold that belongs to the schema of a triangle as such and hence belongs to the triangle's concept. Universal synthetic propositions must indeed be constructed by this[65] [second procedure].[66]

Hence it would be futile for me to philosophize about the triangle—i.e., to meditate about it discursively.[67] By doing so I would not advance in the least, except to the mere definition; yet from the definition I should, properly, start. There is indeed a transcendental synthesis from concepts alone, one that again[68] only the philosopher succeeds in performing. But this synthesis never concerns more than a thing as such,[69] viz., as regards the question under what conditions the thing's perception can belong to possible experience. But in mathematical problems the question is not about this, nor in general[70] about existence, but is about the properties of the objects in themselves,[71] solely insofar as these properties are linked with the concept of the objects. {A 719 B 747}

In the [geometric] example cited above we tried only to make distinct how great a difference there[72] is between reason's discursive use according to concepts and its intuitive use through construction of concepts. Now the question naturally arises as to what is the cause that necessitates such a twofold use of reason, and by what conditions we can cognize[73] whether [in a specific case] only the first use has a place or the second use also.

All our cognition still refers ultimately to possible intuitions; for through these alone is an object given. Now an a priori concept (a nonempirical

[64][As empirical.]

[65][*wodurch.*]

[66][Cf. above, A 714 = B 742 incl. br. n. 37.]

[67][I.e., conceptually.]

[68][I.e., as in the case of producing analytic propositions.]

[69][Or 'thing in general': *Ding überhaupt.*]

[70][*überhaupt.*]

[71][*an sich,* used loosely here.]

[72][*anzutreffen.*]

[73][Or 'recognize': *erkennen.*]

concept) either already contains within itself a pure intuition; and in that case it can be constructed. Or it contains nothing but the synthesis of pos-
A 720 B 748 sible intuitions that are not given a priori; and in that case we can indeed judge through it synthetically and a priori, but only discursively according to concepts, never intuitively by constructing the concept.

Now of all intuition[74] none is given a priori except the mere form of appearances, i.e., space and time; and a concept of these as quanta can be exhibited a priori in intuition—i.e., constructed—either simultaneously with the quality of these [quanta] (their shape), or their mere quantity alone (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous manifold) can be so exhibited through number. But the matter of appearances, through which *things* are given to us in space and time, can be presented[75] only in perception and hence a posteriori. The only concept that presents this empirical content of appearances a priori is the concept of *thing as such;*[76] and the synthetic a priori cognition of this thing as such can supply nothing more than the mere rule of the synthesis of what our perception may give us a posteriori, but can never supply a priori the intuition of the real object, because this intuition must necessarily be empirical.

Synthetic propositions dealing with *things* as such—whose intuition cannot be given a priori at all—are transcendental. Accordingly, transcendental propositions can never be given through construction of concepts, but can be given only according to a priori concepts. Such propositions contain merely the rule according to which we are to seek empirically a cer-
A 721 B 749 tain synthetic unity of what cannot be presented intuitively and also a priori (viz., perceptions). But transcendental propositions cannot a priori exhibit a single one of their concepts in any instance; they do this exhibiting only a posteriori, by means of experience, which itself first becomes possible in accordance with those synthetic principles.

If we are to judge synthetically concerning a concept, then we must go beyond this concept, viz., to the intuition wherein it is given. For if we stayed with what is contained in the concept, then the judgment would be merely analytic and merely an explication of the thought as to what is actually contained therein. But from the concept I can go to the pure or empirical intuition that corresponds to it, in order to consider the concept in

[74][Of whatever kind.]

[75][*vorstellen.* See B xvii br. n. 73]

[76][*des Dinges überhaupt.* I follow the *Akademie* edition in extending the emphasis to include *überhaupt.*]

that intuition *in concreto* and thus to cognize a priori or a posteriori what property belongs to this concept's object. The first alternative is rational and mathematical cognition through construction of the concept; the second is mere empirical (mechanical) cognition, which can never yield necessary and apodeictic propositions. Thus I could indeed dissect my empirical concept of gold, and would gain from this nothing more than the ability to enumerate everything that I actually think in connection with this word; but although a logical improvement would thus occur in my cognition, no increase or addition would be gained in it. However, [instead of dissecting the concept of gold, I here go to empirical intuition:] I take the matter that we encounter under this name,[77] and with it I engage in perceptions that will provide me with various synthetic but empirical propositions.[78] The mathematical concept of a triangle, on the other hand, I would construct, i.e., give a priori in intuition, and in this way I would acquire a synthetic but rational cognition. But if, finally, the transcendental concept of reality, substance, force, etc. is given to me, then this concept designates neither an empirical nor a pure intuition, but only the synthesis of empirical intuitions (intuitions that therefore cannot be given a priori). And because here the synthesis cannot a priori go outside the concept to the intuition corresponding thereto, there also can arise from this concept no determinative[79] synthetic proposition, but only a principle of the synthesis[80] of possible empirical intuitions. Therefore, a transcendental proposition is a synthetic rational cognition according to mere concepts, and hence is discursive; for although all synthetic unity of empirical cognition first becomes possible through such propositions, no intuition is given a priori through them. {A 722 B 750}

There is, then, a twofold use of reason;[81] and the two uses, despite the universality and a priori production of cognition that they have in com- {A 723 B 751}

[77][Of *gold*.]

[78][Cf. below, A 727–28/B 755–56.]

[79][Or 'determinant': *bestimmend*.]

[80]By means of the concept of cause I do actually go outside the empirical concept of an event (where something occurs)—not, however, to the intuition that exhibits the concept of cause *in concreto*, but to the time conditions as such that might, in conformity with the concept of cause, be found in experience. Hence I here proceed merely according to concepts, and cannot proceed by constructing concepts. For the concept is a rule of the synthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intuitions and hence cannot be *given* a priori.

[81][See the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 22–23; also the *Prolegomena*, Ak. III, 268–69, 272–73, 280–86.]

mon, are yet very different thereafter.[82] And this is so because in appearance, through which all objects are given to us, there are two components: the form of intuition (space and time), which can be cognized and determined completely a priori; and the matter (the physical [component]) or content [of intuition], which signifies a something encountered in space and time and hence a something containing an existence and corresponding to sensation. As regards the material component, which can never be given in a determinate way except empirically, we cannot have anything a priori except indeterminate concepts of the synthesis of possible sensations insofar as these [concepts] belong to the unity of apperception (in a possible experience). As regards the form of intuition, we can determine our concepts a priori in intuition, by creating for ourselves in space and time the objects themselves through uniform synthesis, which we accomplish by contemplating them merely as quanta. Of the two uses of reason, the first is called the use of reason according to concepts; in it[83] we can do nothing more than bring appearances—according to their real content—under concepts, which cannot thereby[84] be determined otherwise than empirically, i.e., a posteriori (but still in conformity with these same concepts as rules of an empirical synthesis). The second is the use of reason through construction of concepts; in it, since the concepts already concern an a priori
A 724 B 752 intuition, they also can—precisely therefore—be given determinately and a priori, without any empirical data, in pure intuition. [The first use of reason is philosophical, the second mathematical.] To consider everything that exists[85] (as a thing in space or time)[86] (1) as to whether and how far it is a quantum or not; to consider (2) that an existence or lack thereof must be presented in it; to consider (3) how far this something (which occupies space or time) is a primary substratum or a mere determination, how far it has, as regards its existence, a reference to[87] something else as its cause or effect, and finally how far, as regards its existence, it stands isolated or in

[82][*im Fortgange*]

[83][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *in dem* for *indem*. Similarly just below, where Kant turns again to the second use of reason.]

[84][I am following Erdmann's suggestion to read *dadurch* for *darauf* ('thereupon').]

[85][*da ist*.]

[86][The four parenthesized numerals just below have been added. Kant's list roughly follows (as indicated by these numerals) the table of categories at A 80/B 106, and (thus) follows also the order of the principles of understanding at A 154–235/B 193–287.]

[87][Literally, 'how far it has a reference of its existence to.']

[a relation of] reciprocal dependence with others; and to consider (4) the possibility of this existence, its actuality and necessity, or the opposites of these three—all this belongs to *rational cognition* from concepts, which is called *philosophical.* But to determine [and cognize] a priori an intuition in space (i.e., shape); to divide time (i.e., [to cognize] duration); or merely to cognize the universal [element] of the synthesis of one and the same [item] in time and space and thus cognize the magnitude, arising from this synthesis, of an intuition as such (i.e., number)—that is a *rational task*[88] through construction of concepts, and is called *mathematical.*

The great success that reason is having in mathematics[89] gives rise quite naturally to the presumption that reason—if not itself then still its method—will manage to have such success also outside the realm of magnitudes,[90] viz., by bringing all its concepts[91] to intuitions that it can give a priori. By doing this[92] reason would become, so to speak, master of[93] nature—whereas pure philosophy fumbles around in nature with discursive concepts, without being able to make the reality of these concepts intuitive and precisely thereby authenticated.[94] Nor do the masters in this mathematical art, should they some day take up this extended task, seem at all lacking in this kind of confidence in themselves, or the community lacking in great expectations from their skill. For since these mathematicians have hardly ever philosophized about their mathematics (a difficult task!), the specific difference between the two uses of reason does not enter their mind and thoughts at all. They then count as axioms what are merely prevalent and empirically used rules that they borrow from common reason. As for their concepts of space of time, with which (as the only original quanta) they occupy themselves, the question as to whence these concepts may come is of no concern to them at all. And it similarly seems useless to them to investigate the origin of pure concepts of understanding and therewith also the range of these concepts' validity, but it seems useful to them only to employ these concepts. In all of this they act quite

{A 725 B 753}

88[Or *task of reason: Vernunftgeschäft.*]

89[*Das große Glück, welches die Vernunft vermittelst der Mathematik macht.*]

90[I.e., outside of mathematics.]

91[Rather than only mathematical concepts.]

92[I.e., by thus extending this mathematical method.]

93[*über.*]

94[*beglaubigt.*]

properly—provided that they do not overstep the boundary assigned to them, viz., that of *nature*. As it is, however, they pass inadvertently from the realm of sensibility to the unsafe terrain of concepts that are pure and even transcendental, where the ground permits them neither to stand nor
A 726 B 754 to swim (*instabilis tellus, innabilis unda*),[95] and where they can take only hasty steps of which not the slightest trace is preserved by time. In mathematics, on the other hand, their path forms[96] a highway that even the remotest posterity can tread with confidence.

We, however, have made it our duty to determine with accuracy and certainty the bounds of pure reason in its transcendental use. But this kind of endeavor has the peculiarity that, despite the most emphatic and clear warnings, people engaging in it continue to allow themselves to be put off with hopes—before they completely give up the project of getting beyond the bounds of experiences and into the exciting[97] regions of the intellectual [realm]. Hence it is necessary for us to remove even the last anchor, as it were, of such a fanciful hope, and to show that pursuing the mathematical method in this kind of cognition cannot provide the slightest advantage—unless it were the advantage of exposing all the more distinctly the weak sides of the method itself. And we must show that geometry[98] and philosophy are two quite different things—although in natural science they offer their hands to each other[99]—and that therefore the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.

The solidity[100] of mathematics rests on definitions, axioms, and demonstrations. I shall here settle for showing that none of these items can, in
A 727 B 755 the sense in which the mathematician takes them, be accomplished or imitated by philosophy. I shall show that in philosophy the geometrician brings about by his method nothing but houses of cards, and that the philosopher can by his method only arouse chatter in the share of [cognition belonging

[95][Unstable (literally, 'incapable of being stood on') earth, unswimmable sea (literally 'wave').]

[96][*macht.*]

[97][*reizend.*]

[98][*Meßkunst* (literally, 'art of measuring'). Perhaps Kant here intends the term to stand for all of mathematics. Similarly for *Meßkünstler* ('geometrician') in the next paragraph.]

[99][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 470–73 See also J. W. Ellington, *op. cit.* at B xliii br. n. 149, 198–204. And see Gerd Buchdahl, *op. cit.* at A 176/B 218 br. n. 3, 552–73 (esp 560–61).]

[100][*Gründlichkeit.*]

to] mathematics.[101] Yet philosophy consists precisely in knowing[102] its own bounds; and even the mathematician, if his talent is not perhaps by nature already bounded and limited to his field, cannot reject the warnings of philosophy, nor brush them aside.

1. On **definitions.** To *define,* as the term itself yields,[103] is in fact intended to mean no more than to exhibit a thing's comprehensive[104] concept originally within its bounds.[105] According to such a requirement, an *empirical* concept cannot be defined[106] at all but can only be *spelled out.*[107] For since in such a concept we have only some of the characteristics belonging to a certain kind of objects of the senses, we can never be sure whether by the word designating the same object we do not sometimes think more and sometimes fewer of the object's characteristics. Thus in the concept of *gold* one person may think, besides the weight, color, and ductility, also the property of not rusting, while another person perhaps knows nothing of this property. We employ certain characteristics only as long as they are sufficient for distinguishing;[108] new observations, on the other hand, remove some characteristics and add others, and thus the concept is never securely bounded. What, indeed, could be the point of defining an empiri- {A 728 B 756}

[101][Or, conceivably, 'in that share of mathematics [viz., in geometry]': *in dem Anteil der Mathematik.*]

[102][*kennen.*]

[103][I.e., as its etymology implies. Cf. A 134/B 173 incl. br. n. 31. See also the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 144, and cf. 62–63, 140.]

[104][*ausführlich,* which also means 'elaborate.']

[105]*Comprehensiveness*[a] means clarity and sufficiency of the characteristics; *bounds* means the precision whereby there are no more characteristics than belong to the comprehensive concept; and *originally* means that this determination of the bounds is not derived from somewhere else and thus still in need of a proof—which would render the supposed explication of the concept incapable of standing at the top of all judgments concerning an object.

[a][*Ausführlichkeit.* In the *Logic* (Ak. IX, 63) Kant once gives *completudo* ('completeness') as the Latin equivalent of this term. Since 'completeness' is needed to render *Vollständigkeit,* it seems appropriate to translate *Ausführlichkeit* differently, especially where the two German terms occur together: e.g., at A xiv and A 732/B 760.]

[106][Cf. the *Logic,* § 103, Ak. IX, 141–42.]

[107][*expliziert* (literally 'unfolded'), the corresponding noun being *Explikation.* The English term 'explication' (similarly for the verb) is needed to render *Erklärung* (except in the infrequent cases where this term means 'explanation'), of which *Explikation* is merely one type: see below, A 730/B 758.]

[108][I.e., for distinguishing one kind of thing from others.]

cal concept? For when we talk, e.g., about water and its properties, we shall not linger upon what we think by the word *water,*[109] but shall proceed to experiments; and the word, with the few characteristics attaching to it, is to amount merely to a *designation* of the thing, not to a concept of it. Hence the alleged definition of water is nothing but a determining of the word. [Thus empirical concepts cannot be defined but can only be spelled out.] Second, strictly speaking one also cannot define any concept that is given a priori, e.g., substance, cause, right, propriety, etc. For I can never be sure that the distinct presentation of a concept given to me (as still confused) has been developed comprehensively, unless I know that it is adequate to the object. However, the object's concept, as it is given, may contain many obscure presentations that we pass over in dissecting the concept, although we always use them in applying it; and hence the comprehensiveness of my concept's dissection is always doubtful, and can—through multifarious
A 729 B 757 fitting examples—be made only *presumptively* but never *apodeictically* certain. Instead of the term *definition*[110] I would[111] rather use *exposition.* This term always still remains cautious; and thus in its case the critic can allow this exposition to hold to a certain degree and can yet still harbor qualms concerning its comprehensiveness. Since, then, neither concepts given empirically nor concepts given a priori can be defined, there remain no concepts on which to try this artistic feat of definition except concepts thought by choice.[112] In such a case I can indeed always define my concept; for I must surely know what I wanted to think—since I myself deliberately made the concept and it was not given to me through the nature of my understanding, nor through experience. But I cannot say that I have thereby defined a true object. For if the concept rests on empirical conditions—e.g., the concept of a ship's clock—then the object and its possibility is not yet given through this chosen[113] concept. From this concept itself I do not even know whether it has an object at all, and my explication of the concept may better be called a declaration[114] (of my project) than a definition of an object. Thus no concepts suitable for definition have remained except those that contain a chosen synthesis capable of being constructed a priori.

[109][Emphasis added.]

[110][Emphasis added.]

[111][In the case of a priori concepts.]

[112][I.e., invented: *willkürlich.*]

[113][I.e., invented: *willkürlich.*]

[114][Cf. the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 143.]

Hence only mathematics has definitions. For the object that it thinks is also exhibited by it a priori in intuition, and this object assuredly can contain neither more nor less than the concept, because the concept of the object was given through the explication[115] originally, i.e., without the explication's being derived from anything. The German language has for the terms[116] *exposition, spelling-out,*[117] *declaration,* and *definition* no more than one word: *Erklärung.*[118] Hence we must surely relinquish some of the strictness of the requirement under which we refused the honorary name of definition to philosophical explications. Let us confine this whole comment to the observation that philosophical definitions are brought about only as expositions of given concepts, but mathematical definitions as constructions of concepts made originally; philosophical definitions are brought about only analytically through the concepts' dissection (whose completeness is not apodeictically certain), whereas mathematical definitions are brought about synthetically; and thus mathematical definitions themselves *make* the concept, whereas philosophical definitions only *explicate* it. From this there follow two consequences: {A 730 B 758}

(a) In philosophy one must not imitate mathematics by starting from a definition—except perhaps as a mere attempt. For since the definitions are dissections[119] of given concepts, the concepts, though still confused, precede the definitions; and the incomplete exposition precedes the complete one. Thus once we have drawn some characteristics from a still uncompleted dissection, we can infer from them various details in advance, before we have reached the complete exposition, i.e., the definition. In a word, in philosophy the definition, as involving rigorous[120] distinctness, must conclude rather than begin the work.[121] In mathematics, on the other hand, we {A 731 B 759}

[115][Which is, in this case, a definition.]

[116][All of Latin origin.]

[117][*Explikation.* See br. n. 107 just above.]

[118][I.e., 'explication.']

[119][I.e., analyses.]

[120][*abgemessen.*]

[121]Philosophy is teeming with defective definitions—above all those that, although actually containing elements for the definition, do not yet contain them completely. Now if one could do nothing whatever with a concept until one had defined it, then all philosophizing would be in a bad state indeed. Yet as far as the elements (resulting from the dissection) reach, a good and safe use can always be made of them; and hence even deficient definitions—i.e., propositions that are properly not yet defi-

have no concept whatever prior to the definition, since the concept is given through the definition in the first place; hence mathematics must—and also always can—start from the definition.

(b) Mathematical definitions can never err. For since the concept is first given through the definition, it contains exactly just what the definition wants us to think through the concept. But although there cannot occur in the concept anything incorrect in content, sometimes—although only rarely—there may still be a defect in the form (the guise) of the concept, viz., as regards its precision. Thus the common explication of a circular line[122]

A 732 B 760 —viz., that it is a *curved* line every point of which is equidistant from a single point (the center)—has the defect that the determination[123] *curved* has unnecessarily come in. For clearly there must be a particular theorem, deduced from the definition and easily provable, that any line every point of which is equidistant from a single point is curved (i.e., no part of it is straight). Analytic definitions, on the other hand, can err in a multitude of ways: viz., either by bringing in characteristics that actually did not lie in the concept; or by lacking the comprehensiveness that amounts to the essential feature of a definition—for one can never be entirely certain of the completeness of one's dissection of the concept. Hence the method that mathematics uses in defining cannot be imitated in philosophy.

2. On **axioms.** These are synthetic a priori principles insofar as such principles are directly certain. Now, one cannot link a concept with another concept synthetically and yet directly;[124] for in order for us to go beyond a concept, a third, mediating[125] cognition is needed.[126] Now, since philosophy is merely the rational cognition according to concepts, there will be no principle to be found in it that deserves the name of an axiom. Mathematics, on the other hand, is capable of having axioms, because by means

nitions but that are otherwise true and thus are approximations to definitions—can be used to great benefit. In mathematics definition belongs *ad esse,* in philosophy *ad melius esse.*[a] It is nice, but often very difficult, to reach a definition. The jurists are still searching for a definition for their concept of right.

[a][Respectively, 'to being (essence)' and 'to better being (improved essence)'.]

[122][I.e., in effect, the circumference of a circle.]

[123][I.e., attribute: *Bestimmung.*]

[124][*unmittelbar* (similarly just above); see B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[125][*vermittelnd.*]

[126][See above, A 6–10/B 10–14.]

of constructing concepts in the intuition of the object it can connect the object's predicates a priori and directly—e.g., the axiom that three points B 761
always lie in one plane. On the other hand, a synthetic principle can never A 733
be directly certain merely from concepts—e.g., the proposition that everything that occurs has its cause. There I must look around for a third something, viz., the condition of time determination in an experience,[127] and am unable to cognize such a principle from the concepts alone, directly and without mediation.[128] Hence discursive principles are something quite different from intuitive principles, i.e., axioms. Discursive principles always still require a deduction.[129] Intuitive principles [or axioms], on the other hand, can altogether dispense with a deduction. For the same reason they are evident, which is something that the philosophical[130] principles, despite all their certainty, can never claim. Thus we are infinitely far from having any synthetic proposition of pure and transcendental reason that is as obvious (as people defiantly tend to express it) as the proposition *that two times two make four.* It is true that in the Analytic, in the table of the principles of pure understanding,[131] I also mentioned some axioms. But the principle adduced there[132] was not itself an axiom; rather, it served only to state the principle[133] of the possibility of axioms as such, and itself is only a principle based on concepts. For the possibility even of mathematics must be shown in transcendental philosophy.[134] Hence philosophy has no axioms and must never enjoin its a priori principles in such an absolute manner, but must take the trouble to justify its right regarding them by a A 734 B 762
thorough deduction.[135]

3. On **demonstrations.** Only an apodeictic proof insofar as it is also intuitive can be called a demonstration. Now experience indeed teaches us

[127][Cf. A 217/B 264.]

[128][*direkt unmittelbar.*]

[129][I.e., legitimation. Likewise just below.]

[130][And thus discursive.]

[131][A 161/B 200.]

[132][See above, A 162–66/B 202–7.]

[133][*Principium* here, *Grundsatz* just above and just below. See A vii br n. 7.]

[134][See above, B 40–41 and A 165–66/B206–7.]

[135][I.e., legitimation.]

what is,[136] but not that it[137] cannot possibly[138] be different. Hence empirical bases of proof can provide no apodeictic proof at all. But even from a priori concepts (used in discursive cognition) no intuitive certainty—i.e., no self-evidence[139]—can ever arise, no matter how apodeictically certain the judgment may otherwise be. Hence only mathematics contains demonstrations, because it derives its cognition not from concepts but from the construction thereof, i.e., from the intuition that can be given a priori as corresponding to the concepts. Even the procedure that algebra follows with its equations (producing from them by reduction the truth together with the proof),[140] while not a geometric construction, is still a construction in terms of characters.[141] Here the concepts, above all those of the relation of magnitudes, are displayed in intuition through signs, and all inferences are secured against mistakes—leaving aside now the heuristic [value of this kind of construction]—by putting each inference before our eyes. Philosophical cognition, on the other hand, must forego this advantage, inasmuch as it must consider the universal always *in abstracto* (through concepts), whereas mathematics can examine the universal *in concreto* (in the
A 735 B 763 individual intuition) and yet through pure a priori presentation, so that any slip becomes visible. Hence I would prefer to call the former[142] proofs *acroamatic* (discursive) *proofs*, because they cannot be conducted except through words alone (i.e., through the object in thought), instead of calling them *demonstrations*, which—as the term already indicates—proceed in the intuition of the object.

From all this it follows that it is in no way fitting for the nature of philosophy, above all in the realm of pure reason, to strut about with a dogmatic gait[143] and adorn itself with the titles and ribbons of mathematics, for philosophy still does not belong in the order of mathematics, despite

136[*was da sei*, which I here read with *da* unemphasized (and *sei* emphasized); emphasizing *da* (let alone contracting the two words to *dasei*, as the *Akademie* edition does) changes the meaning to 'what there is' or 'what exists,' and thus narrows Kant's point.]

137[I.e., what is.]

138[*gar*.]

139[*Evidenz*. The visual connotation of this term's etymology is here being linked by Kant to the same connotation in *Anschauung* ('intuition'). Cf. the remainder of this paragraph.]

140[Parentheses added.]

141[*charakteristische Konstruktion*.]

142[I.e., the philosophical.]

143[*Gang*]

having every cause to hope for a sisterly union with mathematics. Such dogmatic claims are idle pretensions that can never succeed, but that must rather undo philosophy's aim to uncover the deceptions of a reason mistaking its own bounds, and philosophy's aim to guide, by sufficiently clarifying our concepts, the self-conceit[144] of speculation back to a modest but thorough self-cognition.[145] Hence reason will not in its transcendental attempts be able to look ahead so confidently, as though the path that it has traversed led to the goal so very directly. And reason will not be able to count on its presupposed[146] premises so daringly as to eliminate[147] any need to look back repeatedly and be mindful whether it may not perhaps uncover mistakes in the progression of its inferences—mistakes that were overlooked in the principles and that require reason either to determine these principles more fully or to alter them entirely. {A 736 B 764}

I divide all apodeictic propositions (whether they be provable or, for that matter, certain immediately[148]) into *dogmata* and *mathemata.* A directly synthetic proposition[149] based on concepts is a *dogma,* whereas a directly synthetic proposition obtained through construction of concepts is a *mathema.* Analytic judgments teach[150] us in fact nothing more about the object than is already contained in the concept that we have of it; for they do not expand the cognition beyond the concept of the proposition's subject, but only elucidate this concept. Hence analytic propositions cannot properly be called dogmas[151] (a word that could perhaps be rendered as *instructional pronouncements*[152]). Of the mentioned two kinds of [directly] synthetic a priori propositions, however, only those belonging to philosophical cognition can, according to the customary usage of language, carry this name,[153]

144[*Eigendünkel.*]

145[*Selbsterkenntnis.*]

146[*zum Grunde gelegt.*]

147[*nicht.*]

148[*unmittelbar;* my usual translation of this tenn as 'directly' might in this context be misleading.]

149[I.e., a proposition that is synthetic in itself, not merely under the presupposition of possible experience. Cf. the next paragraph.]

150[*lehren.*]

151[*Dogmen.*]

152[*Lehrsprüche,* which approximates the root-meaning of *Dogmen.*]

153[Of *dogmata.*]

and one would scarcely call by the name of dogmata the propositions of arithmetic or geometry. Hence this customary usage confirms the explication[154] that we have given, whereby only judgments based on concepts—and not those based on the construction of concepts—can be called dogmatic.

Now all of pure reason in its merely speculative use contains not a single directly synthetic judgment based on concepts. For, as we have shown, by means of ideas reason is not capable of any synthetic judgments that would
A 737 B 765 have objective validity.[155] But although reason does set up secure principles by means of concepts of understanding, it does this not at all directly from concepts, but always only indirectly by referring these concepts to something entirely contingent, viz., to *possible experience.*[156] And thus these principles are indeed apodeictically certain when this possible experience (i.e., something considered as object of possible experiences) is presupposed; but in themselves (directly) they cannot even be *cognized* a priori.[157] Thus as regards the proposition that everything that occurs has its cause, no one can have thorough insight into it from these given concepts alone. Hence this proposition is not a dogma, although from another point of view—viz., that of the only realm of the proposition's possible use, i.e., experience—it can quite well be proved, and proved apodeictically. But despite having to be proved, the proposition is called a *principle* rather than a *theorem,*[158] because it has the special property of itself first making possible its own basis of proof, viz., experience, and of always having to be presupposed in experience.

Now if in pure reason's speculative use there are indeed no dogmata whatever in terms of content, then all *dogmatic* method, whether it is borrowed from the mathematician or is meant to become a peculiar manner of its own, is inherently inappropriate. For it merely hides defects and errors and thus deludes philosophy, whose proper aim is to let all steps of reason be seen in their clearest light. The method can nonetheless always
A 738 B 766 be *systematic.* For our reason is itself (subjectively) a system. But reason in its pure use by means of mere concepts is only a system of investigation according to principles of unity—an investigation for which only *ex-*

[154][Of *dogma.*]

[155][See A 669–71/B 697–99.]

[156][See above, A 156–58/B 195–97.]

[157][I.e., let alone cognized (a priori and) with apodeictic certainty. Emphasis on 'cognized' added.]

[158][Respectively, *Grundsatz* and *Lehrsatz.*]

perience can supply the material. Concerning the method peculiar to a transcendental philosophy, however, nothing can be said here. For we are dealing only with a critique of the circumstances of our assets:[159] whether we can build anything at all, and how high up we might, from the material that we have (the pure a priori concepts), be able to take our edifice.

Chapter I

Section II

The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Polemic Use[160]

Reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to critique, and cannot impair the critique's freedom by any prohibition without doing harm to itself and drawing upon itself a suspicion detrimental to it. Thus nothing is so important as regards any benefit, and nothing so sacred, that it might exempt itself from this testing and probing scrutiny, which knows[161] no authority[162] of the person. The very existence of reason rests on this freedom [of critique]. For reason has no dictatorial authority; and its pronouncement [in people] is never more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able, without holding back, to utter his qualms— {A 739 B 767} indeed, even his veto.

But although reason can never *refuse* to submit to critique, it yet does not always have cause to *fear*[163] critique. Pure reason in its dogmatic (rather than mathematical) use, however, is not conscious of observing its own supreme laws so very strictly that it would not, before the critical eye of a

159[Or 'powers': *Vermögensumstände*.]

160[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 688–718. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 567.]

161[*kennen.*]

162[*Ansehen.*]

163[*scheuen.*]

higher and judicial reason, have to appear with timidity—indeed, with complete relinquishment of all pretension to dogmatic authority.

The situation is quite different when reason is dealing not with the verdict[164] of a judge but with the claims of a fellow-citizen, and is expected merely to defend itself against them. For these claims likewise seek to be dogmatic, although in denying,[165] as the former claims[166] are so in affirming; and hence there takes place a justification κατ' ἄνθρωπον.[167] Such justification secures one's claims against any encroachment and provides one with a titled possession that need not fear any pretensions from others[168] even if it cannot itself adequately be proved κατ' ἀλήθειαν.[169]

Now by pure reason's polemic use I mean the defense of its propositions against their dogmatic denials. What matters here is not whether perhaps pure reason's assertions might not just as well be false, but only the fact that no one can ever with apodeictic certainty (indeed, even just with greater plausibility[170]) assert their opposite. For surely we do not then hold our possession by way of petition, if we have before us a title of it—although an insufficient one—and if there is complete certainty that no one can ever prove this possession to be illegitimate.

A 740 } B 768

It is a worrisome and distressing fact that there should be an antithetic of pure reason at all, and that pure reason—which represents, after all, the highest tribunal ruling over all controversies,[171] should fall into dispute[172] with itself. Above we did indeed have before us such a seeming antithetic of pure reason.[173] But it turned out to rest on a misunderstanding. For appearances were taken, in accordance with the common prejudice, to be

164[*Zensur.*]

165[Or 'negating': *verneinen.*]

166[I.e., reason's own.]

167[*kat' ánthrōpon,* i.e., according to man.]

168[*fremd.*]

169[*kat' alḗtheian,* i.e., according to the truth. Cf., for this contrast, the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 463.]

170[*Schein.*]

171[*Streitigkeiten.*]

172[*Streit.*]

173[Cf. A 420–61/B 448–89.]

things in themselves, and then absolute completeness of their synthesis was demanded in the one way or the other[174] (but was found to be equally impossible in both ways). However, such completeness cannot be expected of appearances at all. Hence there was then no actual *contradiction* of *reason* with itself in the propositions that the series of appearances *given in themselves* has an absolutely[175] first beginning, and that this series absolutely and *in itself* is without any beginning.[176] For the two propositions are quite consistent with each other, since *appearances,* according to their existence (as appearances), are nothing at all *in themselves*—i.e., are something contradictory,[177] and hence presupposing them in this way must naturally entail contradictory conclusions.

But one could not allege such a misunderstanding and thereby settle the dispute of reason if, say, someone asserted theistically that *there is a supreme being,* and—on the contrary—someone else asserted atheistically that *there is no supreme being;*[178] or, in psychology,[179] if someone asserted that everything that thinks has absolute permanent unity and is thus distinct from any material unity that passes away, and someone else countered this by asserting that the soul is not an immaterial unity and cannot be exempted from the fact of passing away.[180] For here the question's object is free from anything extraneous that contradicts its nature, and the understanding is dealing only with *things in themselves* and not with appearances. Hence a true conflict would indeed be found here, provided that pure reason had something to say on the denying side that came close to being the basis for an assertion; for as regards critique of the bases of proof used by the dogmatically affirming side, one may quite well concede this critique to the opponent without therefore giving up these affirmative propositions—which, after all, at least have on their side the interest of reason, to which the opponent cannot appeal at all. {A 741 B 769}

174[In the thesis and antithesis, respectively, of each of the four antinomies.]

175[*absolut* here, *schlechthin* just below.]

176[See the first antinomy, A 426–33/B 454–61.]

177[When nonetheless so regarded.]

178[See the Ideal of Pure Reason, A 567–642/B 595–670.]

179[See the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432.]

180[*von der Vergänglichkeit.*]

I am not, indeed, of the opinion so often expressed by superb and meditative men (e.g., Sulzer)[181] when they felt the weakness of the proofs provided thus far, viz., that we may still hope to discover some day evident demonstrations of the two cardinal propositions of our pure reason: There A 742 B 770 is a God, There is a future life. On the contrary, I am certain that this will never occur. For whence is reason to obtain the basis for such synthetic assertions that do not refer to objects of experience and to their intrinsic possibility? But it is likewise apodeictically certain that no human being will ever come forward who can assert the *opposite* with the slightest plausibility, let alone do so dogmatically. For since, after all, he could establish this opposite only through pure reason, he would have to undertake to prove that a supreme being is *impossible,* and that so is the subject who is thinking in us, when considered as pure intelligence.[182] But whence is he to obtain the knowledge[183] entitling him to make such synthetic judgments concerning things that lie beyond all possible experience? Hence we do not have to worry at all that someone will some day prove the opposite.[184] And precisely because of this we do not need to devise proofs for them that conform to school standards, but may assume at least those propositions that are linked[185] quite well with the speculative interest of our reason in its empirical use, and that are, moreover, the only means of reconciling[186] our reason's speculative with its practical interest. And for the opponent (who must here be regarded not merely as a critic),[187] we have in readiness our *non liquet,*[188] which cannot fail to disconcert him. But if the same *non liquet* is turned back upon us, we do not refuse it; for we have constantly in A 743 B 771 reserve the subjective maxim of reason[189]—which our opponent necessar-

[181][Johann Georg Sulzer (1720–79), Swiss writer and theorist. His main work (1771–74) is *Allgemeine Theorie der Künste (General Theory of the Arts).*]

[182][See A 566 = B 594 incl. br. n. 408.]

[183][*Kenntnisse.*]

[184][Of the two cardinal propositions.]

[185][*zusammenhängen.*]

[186][Or 'uniting': *vereinigen.*]

[187][But as making dogmatic assertions opposite to our own. Kant now goes on, in line with the root meaning of *polemic,* to describe this clash of opposing assertions by analogy with a medieval fencing bout.]

[188][It (your assertion) is not clear (i.e., not proved).]

[189][Whereby we may assume propositions that are linked quite well with the speculative interest of our reason in its empirical use, etc.]

ily lacks—and under its protection we can watch all his strokes in the air with tranquillity and indifference.

Thus there is, properly speaking, no antithetic of pure reason at all. For the only combat arena for such an antithetic would have to be sought on the field of pure theology and psychology; but that terrain can bear no combatant in his full armor and equipped with weapons that we need fear. He can come forward only with taunts and bluster—which we may laugh off as child's play. This is a comforting remark that gives reason courage again; for on what else could reason rely if it—alone called upon to do away with all errors—were itself in internal disarray,[190] unable to hope for peace and tranquil possession?

Whatever nature itself arranges is good for some aim. Even poisons serve to overpower other poisons that are produced in our own bodily humors, and hence they must not be missing in a complete collection of medical remedies (a pharmacy). Thus the objections against the persuasions and the self-conceit of our merely speculative reason are themselves assigned to us by the nature of this same reason, and they must therefore have their own good determination and aim that must not be cast to the winds. For what aim have many objects, although linked with our highest interest, been placed so high by Providence that we are allowed to encounter them almost only in an indistinct perception doubted even by ourselves—a perception whereby our searching gazes are more excited than satisfied? { A 744 B 772 } Whether venturing to make audacious determinations of such [Providential] outlooks is beneficial must at least be doubted, and perhaps doing so is even harmful. But putting the investigating as well as the examining reason in a state of complete freedom—so that it can attend unhindered to its own interest—is always and without any doubt beneficial. Reason furthers this interest just as much by setting limits to its own insights as it does by expanding them; and this interest always suffers when outside[191] hands intervene to lead reason—against its natural course—in accordance with forced aims.

Therefore, just let your opponent speak[192] reason, and combat him only with weapons of reason. Be otherwise without worries concerning the good

[190][*in sich selbst zerrüttet.*]

[191][*fremd*]

[192][*sagen*—replaced by Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition with *zeigen* ('show'), in view of Kant's use of *zeigen* in the second paragraph of A 746/B 774.]

cause[193] (of reason's practical interest), for in a merely speculative dispute this cause never comes into play. The dispute then reveals nothing but a certain antinomy of reason that, because it rests on the very nature of reason, must necessarily be listened to and examined. The dispute[194] cultivates reason by making it contemplate its object from two sides, and the dispute corrects reason's judgment[195] by limiting it. What becomes disputable here is not the *cause*[196] but the *tone*. For you are still left with a sufficient basis to speak the language—justified before the keenest
A 745
B 773
reason—of a firm *faith*, even though you have had to give up the language of *knowledge*.[197]

Suppose that[198] we asked *David Hume*, a man dispassionate[199] and particularly destined[200] to maintain balance of judgment: What led you to undermine, by perplexities reached through laborious pondering, the persuasion—so comforting and beneficial to human beings—that their rational insight suffices for asserting [the existence of] a supreme being and for obtaining a determinate concept of this being?[201] Hume would answer: Nothing but the aim of advancing reason in its self-cognition, and also a certain indignation at the constraint that people want to inflict on reason, inasmuch as they boast of reason and simultaneously prevent it from frankly confessing its own weaknesses that are revealed to it in its self-examination. Suppose, on the other hand, that you ask *Priestley*, a man devoted solely to the principles of reason's *empirical* use and averse to all transcendent speculation, what motives he had for tearing down two such basic pillars of all religion as our soul's freedom and immortality (the hope for a future life is for him only the expectation of a miracle of resurrection)—he, who

193[*Sache.*]

194[*Streit.*]

195[*Urteil;* see A 130/B 169 br. n. 3.]

196[Or '(subject-)matter': *Sache.*]

197[Cf. B xxx incl. br. n. 122. See also A 820–31/B 848–59.]

198[*Wenn;* similarly just below.]

199[*kaltblütig* (literally, 'cold-blooded').]

200[*eigentlich geschaffen.*]

201[See the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1779)—cf. above, A 621/B 649 br. n. 280)—and the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1748).]

is himself a pious and zealous teacher of religion?[202] Priestley could give no other answer than this: I was motivated by the interest of reason; reason loses something if we seek to withdraw certain objects from the laws of material nature—the only laws that we can cognize[203] and determine exactly. {A 746 B 774} Now it would seem inappropriate to decry the latter philosopher, who knows how to reconcile his paradoxical assertion with the aim of religion, and thus to hurt a well-meaning man because he cannot find his way once he has strayed from the realm of natural science.[204] But this favor must then be accorded just as much to the no less well-intentioned and in his moral character irreproachable *Hume,* who cannot abandon his abstract speculation merely because he rightly supposes that their object lies entirely outside the bounds of natural science and in the realm of pure ideas.

What, then, is to be done about this contest, above all as regards the danger arising from it that seems to threaten the common best interest[205]? Nothing is more natural and nothing more appropriate than the decision that you have to make concerning this contest. Just let these people do as they wish; if they show talent, if they show themselves engaged in deep and new investigation—in a word, if they just show reason—then reason always gains. If you adopt other means than those of an unconstrained reason, if you scream about treason or call together the community as if to put out a fire, as it were, then you make yourselves ridiculous. For the issue is not at all what side among these is advantageous or disadvantageous to the common best interest, but only how much reason may achieve in its speculation that abstracts from all interest, and whether this speculation can count for anything at all or must perhaps rather be given up for what is practical.[206] {A 747 B 775} Hence instead of flailing about with your swords, you should rather watch this contest quietly from the secure seat of critique. This contest is troublesome for the combatants, but entertaining for you; and—given an outcome that is certain to be bloodless—it must turn out to be profitable for your insights. For to expect enlightenment from reason and yet to prescribe to it beforehand on which side it must necessarily sally forth is

[202][See Joseph Priestley (1733–1804; Priestley died six days before Kant, on February 6), *Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit* (1777) and *The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated* (1777). Priestley is best known for his discovery of oxygen.]

[203][*kennen.*]

[204][*Naturlehre* here, *Naturwissenschaft* just below.]

[205][*dem gemeinen Besten.*]

[206][Cf. B xxxviii incl. br. n. 142.]

quite absurd. Besides, reason is already on its own so well subdued and kept within limits by reason, that there is no need whatever for you to summon the guard to oppose with civic resistance the party whose worrisome superiority seems dangerous to you. In this dialectic there is no victory that you have cause to worry about.

Moreover, reason very much needs such a dispute,[207] and one would wish that the dispute had been conducted sooner and with unlimited public permission. For a mature critique would have come about so much the earlier. At that critique's appearance all these contests[208] must vanish, because the contestants learn to become aware of their delusion and their prejudices that have disunited them.

A 748 B 776 There is in human nature a certain insincerity that must still in the end involve, like everything that comes from nature, a predisposition to good purposes: viz., an inclination to conceal one's true attitudes, and to parade certain adopted attitudes that one considers good and laudable. Through this propensity both to conceal themselves and to adopt a semblance advantageous to them, human beings have quite certainly not only *civilized* themselves but also little by little *moralized* themselves in a certain measure. For no one was able to penetrate the cosmetic of propriety, respectability, and decency; and thus everyone found for himself, in what supposedly genuine examples of the good he saw around him, a school for improvement. Yet this predisposition to simulate being better than one is and to express attitudes that one does not have serves only *provisionally,* as it were, to bring a human being out of the state of crudeness, and to allow him at first to adopt at least the *manner* of the good familiar to him. For afterwards, once the genuine principles have been developed and have passed over into the person's way of thinking, that falseness must little by little be combated vigorously; for otherwise it corrupts the heart and keeps good attitudes from springing up under the rank weed of the beautiful semblance.

It saddens me to perceive the same insincerity, dissimulation, and hypocrisy even in the utterances made in the speculative way of thinking—where, after all, human beings meet far fewer obstacles in revealing their confessed thoughts[209] openly and candidly,[210] as is proper, and where they

[207][*Streit.*]

[208][*Streithändel.*]

[209][Literally, 'the confession of their thoughts.']

[210][*unverhohlen.*]

have no advantage whatever [if they do otherwise]. For what can be more detrimental to our insights than to communicate even mere thoughts in a falsified manner, or to conceal[211] doubts that we feel concerning our own assertions, or to give a veneer of self-evidence to bases of proof that do not satisfy even ourselves? However, as long as these secret wiles are provoked merely by private vanity (as is usually the case in speculative judgments that have no special interest for us and do not easily admit of apodeictic certainty), they are at least countered by the vanity of others—*and this with public sanction;* and thus things ultimately arrive where they would have been brought, although much earlier, by the sincerest attitude and uprightness. But in cases where the community supposes that some quibbling subtle reasoners[212] are handling nothing less than [a plan] to rock the foundation of the public welfare, there it seems not only prudent but also permitted and perhaps even laudable for us to come to the aid of the good cause by using illusory bases.[213] For in such cases this is preferable to leaving the supposed opponents of the good cause even just the advantage of making us tune down our [argument's] tone to the moderation befitting a merely practical conviction, and of compelling us to admit our lack of speculative and apodeictic certainty. I would think, however, that surely nothing in the world is reconcilable more poorly with the aim of maintaining a good cause than are insidiousness, dissimulation, and fraud. In weighing the rational bases of a mere speculation, surely the least that may be demanded is that everything must proceed honestly. And if even this little could safely be counted on, then the dispute of speculative reason concerning the important questions of God, immortality (of the soul), and freedom would either have been decided long ago, or would be brought to an end very soon. Thus the sincerity of the attitude often stands in inverse relation to the goodness[214] of the cause itself, and this cause has perhaps more upright and righteous[215] opponents than defenders.

{A 749 B 777}

{A 750 B 778}

Hence I here presuppose that I have readers who do not want any just cause to be defended with injustice. Now, it is already decided regarding

[211][*verhehlen;* similarly in the preceding paragraph.]

[212][*spitzfindige Vernünftler.*]

[213][Or 'grounds': *Gründe.* See B xix br n. 79.]

[214][*Gutartigkeit.*]

[215][*redlich.*]

this cause[216] that according to our principles of critique—if one takes account not of what occurs but of what properly ought to occur—there should in fact be no polemic of pure reason at all. For how can two persons carry on a dispute about a thing[217] whose reality neither of the two can exhibit in an actual or even merely in a possible experience, each brooding over the thing's idea solely in order to extract from it a little *more* than an idea, viz., the actuality of the object itself? By what means are they to get out of the dispute, when neither of the two can make his cause[218] comprehensible and certain straightforwardly, but can only attack and refute that of
A 751 B 779 his opponent? For this is the fate of all assertions of pure reason: They [are synthetic propositions that] go beyond the conditions of all possible experience—the conditions outside of which no documentation of truth is anywhere to be found. But such assertions must nonetheless employ the laws of understanding; and these laws are determined merely for empirical use, yet without them no step can be taken in any synthetic thought. Thus assertions of pure reason always offer weak sides to the opponent and can reciprocally take advantage of their opponent's weak side.

The critique of pure reason may be regarded as the true tribunal for all controversies of reason. For the critique is not itself involved in these controversies, which deal directly with objects, but is aimed at determining and judging the right[219] of reason as such according to the principles of its first institutes.[220]

Without such critique reason is, as it were, in the state of nature,[221] and cannot validate[222] or secure its assertions and claims except through *war*: Critique, on the other hand, which obtains all its decisions from the basic rules governing its own appointment[223]—rules whose authority no one can doubt—provides us with the tranquillity of a situation of law, a situation in which we are to carry on our controversy solely through *litigation*. What

[216][*Sache.*]

[217][*Sache.*]

[218][*Sache.*]

[219][*Rechtsame*]

[220][*Institution;* i.e., here, the summary of such (legal) principles.]

[221][As described by Thomas Hobbes (cf. below), *Leviathan*, ch. 13.]

[222][*geltend machen*]

[223][*Einsetzung*]

in the first situation ends the transactions[224] is a *victory* boasted of by both parties, usually followed by what is merely an insecure peace brought about by some mediating authority; but in the second situation it is the critique's *verdict*,[225] which, because it here concerns the very source of the controversies, must warrant a perpetual peace. Moreover, the endless controversies of a merely dogmatic reason compel us finally to seek tranquillity in some critique of this reason itself and in a legislation based on this critique. It is as *Hobbes* maintains: the state of nature is a state of injustice and violence, and one must necessarily abandon it and subject oneself to the constraint of law; for such constraint alone limits our freedom so that it can coexist with the freedom of everyone else and precisely thereby with the common best interest.[226] {A 752 B 780}

This freedom then also includes that of putting forth publicly, for judgment[227] by others, one's thoughts and one's doubts that one cannot resolve for oneself, without therefore being decried as a restless and dangerous citizen. This much already lies in the original right of human reason. For human reason recognizes no other judge than universal human reason itself again, wherein everyone has his voice. And since all improvement of which our situation[228] is capable must come from this universal human reason, such a right is sacred and must not be encroached upon. Moreover, it is unwise to cry down certain daring assertions as dangerous, or thus to cry down presumptuous attacks on assertions that already have on their side the assent of the largest and best part of the community; for to do this is to give to such assertions an importance that they should not have at all. When I hear that an uncommon mind is supposed to have demonstrated away the freedom of the human will, the hope for a future life, and the existence of God, then I am eager to read his book; for in view of his talent I expect him to further my insights. That in fact he will have accomplished nothing of all this—this I already know beforehand with complete certainty. I do so not because, say, I believe that I am already in possession of invincible proofs of these important propositions, but because the transcendental {A 753 B 781}

[224][I.e., what in the state of nature puts an end to the acts of war.]

[225][*Sentenz.*]

[226][See *Leviathan*, ch. 14, and cf. the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. VI, 230, and the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, Ak. IV, 433–36.]

[227][*Beurteilung.*]

[228][Or 'condition' or 'state'. *Zustand.*]

critique—which has uncovered for me our pure reason's entire supply[229] —has completely convinced me that, just as pure reason is entirely insufficient for making affirmative assertions in this realm, so will its knowledge be insufficient—indeed, even more insufficient—for making any negative assertions concerning these questions. For whence is the alleged freethinker to obtain his knowledge[230]—e.g., that there is no supreme being? This proposition lies outside the realm of possible experience, and hence also outside the bounds of all human insight. On the other hand, the dogmatic defender of the good cause against this enemy of the good cause I would not read at all. For I know beforehand that he will attack the other's illusory bases[231] solely in order to gain admittance for his own—and that, besides, a routine illusion still does not provide one with so much material for new observations as does an illusion that is strange and ingeniously excogitated. By contrast, the opponent of religion, likewise dogmatic in his own way, would give to my critique a much-desired occupation
A 754 B 782 and an occasion for further correction of its principles, without there being anything whatsoever to fear on account of him.

But[232] surely at least the youths entrusted to academic instruction should be warned against such writings, and should be kept away from early acquaintance with such dangerous propositions until their power of judgment[233] has matured—or rather until the doctrine that one seeks to establish in them is rooted so firmly as to resist vigorously all persuasion to the contrary views, wherever such views may come from?

If in matters[234] of pure reason one had to keep to the dogmatic procedure and expressly had to dispose of one's opponents polemically—i.e., in such a way that one would enter into the fight and would arm oneself with bases of proof for opposite assertions—then indeed nothing would *for the time being* be more expedient than to place the youths' reason under guardianship for some time, and thus to protect their reason at least that long against corruption. *In the long run,* however, nothing would be more idle and fruitless. For if after the initial period either curiosity or the fashion of

229[I.e., supply of synthetic a priori propositions.]

230[*Kenntnis.* Wille chooses to make 'alleged' modify 'knowledge.']

231[I.e., bases of proof.]

232[So it will be objected.]

233[*Urteilskraft;* see A 130/B 169 br n. 3.]

234[*Sachen.*]

the times play such writings into the youth's hands, will that inculcated youthful persuasion then still stand the test? Consider someone who in order to resist the attacks of his opponent brings with him nothing but dogmatic weapons, and does not know how to develop the hidden dialectic that lies no less in his own bosom than in his adversary's. He sees illusory bases[235] which have the advantage of novelty, making their entrance against illusory bases which no longer have such an advantage but which arouse, rather, the suspicion that the credulity of youth has been misused. He then believes that there is no better way for him to show that he has outgrown the child-rearing stage than by brushing aside those well-meant warnings; and, being dogmatically habituated, he imbibes in long drafts the poison that dogmatically ruins his principles. {A 755 B 783}

Exactly the opposite of what was here recommended must be done in academic training, but of course only on the presupposition that a thorough instruction in the critique of pure reason has already occurred. For in order to bring that critique's principles into operation[236] as early as possible and show their sufficiency in dealing even with the greatest dialectical illusion, it is definitely necessary that the student be trained to use these principles. The attacks that are so dreadful for the dogmatist must be directed against the student's reason—which, although still weak, is by then enlightened through critique—and the student must be allowed to make the attempt to test the baseless assertions of the opponent bit by bit against those principles. He cannot possibly find it difficult[237] to dissolve those assertions into nothing but smoke; and thus he begins early to feel his own power[238] to secure himself completely against such harmful deceptions, which must ultimately lose all illusion for him. To be sure, the same strokes[239] that knock down the enemy's edifice must be equally ruinous to his own speculative building also—should he mean to erect such. Yet he is entirely unconcerned about this; for he has no need whatever to live in that building, but still has before him an outlook into the practical realm, where he can with good ground hope to find a firmer terrain on which to erect his rational and salutary system. {A 756 B 784}

235[Bases of proof. (Likewise just below.)]

236[*Ausübung*.]

237[By this method.]

238[*Kraft*.]

239[Of his sword.]

There is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the realm of pure reason. Both parties fight only in the air,[240] scuffling with their shadows. For they go beyond nature, where nothing is available for their dogmatic grip to seize and hold. Well may they fight: the shadows that they cut up grow together again in one moment—like the heroes in Valhalla[241]—so as to amuse themselves anew in bloodless combats.

But there also is no permissible skeptical use of pure reason—no principle that could be called the principle of *neutrality* in all controversies of pure reason. To incite reason against itself, to hand weapons to it on both sides, and then to watch its fiercest fight calmly and scoffingly—this does not look sound[242] from a dogmatic point of view, but has about it the air[243] of a mischievous and spiteful cast of mind. However, if one looks at the
A 757 B 785 invincible delusion and the boastfulness[244] of the subtle reasoners[245]— an attitude that refuses to be moderated by any critique—then indeed there is actually no other course[246] than to oppose the bluster[247] on the one side with another bluster that bases itself on the same rights as the first. For through the resistance of an enemy, reason may at least just be startled enough to put some doubt into its pretensions and to give a hearing to critique. On the other hand, to settle entirely for these doubts alone and to set out to commend the conviction and confession of one's ignorance—not merely as a remedy against dogmatic self-conceit but also as the way to end reason's dispute with itself—is an entirely futile project, and can in no way be suitable for providing reason with a state of tranquillity; at best it is a means for awakening reason from its sweet dogmatic dream and for inducing it to subject its situation to a more careful examination. Yet because this skeptical manner of withdrawing from an irksome transaction[248] of reason seems to be, as it were, the short path to a permanent philosophi-

[240][*sind Luftfechter.*]

[241][In Norse mythology (and in Richard Wagner's operatic version thereof in *Der Ring des Nibelungen*), the hall of the chief god Odin (German *Wotan*) into which he receives the souls of heroes slain in battle.]

[242][*wohl.*]

[243][*Ansehen.*]

[244][*Großtun.*]

[245][*Vernünftler.*]

[246][*Rat.*]

[247][*Großsprecherei.*]

[248][Cf. above, A 751–52 = B 779–80.]

cal tranquillity—or at least the highway favored by those who think that by scoffingly despising all investigations of this kind they can give themselves philosophical airs—I find it necessary to exhibit this way of thinking in its proper light.

On the Impossibility of a Skeptical Satisfaction of Pure Reason as Disunited with Itself

{A 758 B 786}

Consciousness of my ignorance (unless this ignorance is simultaneously cognized as necessary), instead of[249] ending my inquiries, is rather the proper cause to arouse them. All ignorance is either ignorance of things or ignorance of the [proper] determination and bounds of my cognition. If the ignorance is only[250] contingent, then it must impel me to investigate things (objects) *dogmatically* in the first case, and to investigate the bounds of my possible cognition *critically* in the second case. But that my ignorance is absolutely necessary and hence absolves me from all further investigation—this cannot be established empirically, by *observing,* but can be established only critically, by *fathoming* the primary[251] sources of our cognition. Therefore, determination of our reason's bounds can be made only according to a priori bases. However, the limitation of reason that is merely a cognition, although only indeterminate, of an ignorance that can never be removed completely can be cognized also a posteriori, viz., by what—despite all our knowledge[252]—always still remains for us to know. The first kind of cognition of one's ignorance,[253] which is possible only through critique of reason itself, is thus *science;*[254] the second kind is nothing but *perception;* and regarding perception one cannot say how far the {A 759 B 787} inference from it may reach. If I conceive of the earth's surface[255] (according to its sensible semblance) as a plate, then I cannot know how far

[249][Reading, with Kirchmann and the *Akademie* edition, *es* for *sie.*]

[250][Reading *nur* for *nun,* as suggested by Erdmann.]

[251][I.e., a priori.]

[252][*Wissen.*]

[253][*Unwissenheit.*]

[254][*Wissenschaft.*]

[255][*Erdfläche.*]

it extends. But experience does teach me that wherever I may go, I always see a space around me in which[256] I could proceed farther. Hence I cognize the limits of what is in each case my actual geography,[257] but I do not cognize the bounds of all possible geography. But if I have indeed got as far as to know that the earth is a sphere and its surface spherical, then I can also from a small part of it—e.g., the magnitude of a degree—cognize determinately and according to a priori principles the diameter, and through it the complete boundary of the earth, i.e., its surface area. And although I am still ignorant as regards the objects that this surface may contain, yet I am not ignorant as regards the range that it contains,[258] i.e., the surface's magnitude and limits.

The sum of all possible objects for our cognition seems to us [similarly] to be a level surface; and this surface has its seeming horizon—viz., what comprises the entire range of such possible objects for our cognition and has been called by us the rational concept of unconditioned totality.[259] To reach this horizon empirically is impossible, and all attempts to determine it a priori according to a certain principle have been futile. However, all
A 760 B 788 questions of our pure reason still aim at what may lie outside this horizon, or—for that matter—at least on its boundary line.

The illustrious *David Hume* was one of these geographers of human reason. He supposed that he had adequately disposed of all those questions by relegating them outside human reason's horizon—a horizon which he was yet unable to determine. He dwelt above all on the principle of causality, and noted quite correctly concerning it that people are not basing its truth (indeed, not even the objective validity of the concept of an efficient cause as such) on any insight whatever, i.e., on any a priori cognition; and that, therefore, what makes up the principle's entire reputation is not in the least this law's necessity, but merely its general usefulness in the course of experience, and a subjective necessity—arising from this usefulness—that he calls custom.[260] Now, from our reason's inability to use this principle in a way that goes beyond all experience he inferred that all pretensions of reason as such to go beyond the empirical [realm] are null.

[256][Reading, with Erdmann (but not the *Akademie* edition), *darin* for *dahin* ('to which').]

[257][*Erdkunde* here, *Erdbeschreibung* just below.]

[258][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *des Umfanges, den sie enthält* for *des Umfanges, der sie enthält* ('the circumference that contains them').]

[259][See, e.g., A 322/B 379.]

[260][Or 'habit.' See B 5 incl. br. n 160.]

A procedure of this kind—of subjecting the facts[261] of reason to examination and, [as warranted] according to the findings, to rebuke—may be called the *census*[262] of reason. There can be no question[263] that this procedure leads inevitably to *doubt* concerning all transcendent use of principles. However, this is only the second step, which does not nearly complete the work to be done. The first step in matters of pure reason, which marks pure reason's infancy, is *dogmatic*. The just mentioned second step is *skeptical*, and attests to cautiousness on the part of the power of judgment made shrewd through experience. However, a third step is still needed—one that pertains to the power of judgment only in its maturity and manhood, when it has at its basis firm maxims that are verified as regards their universality—viz., to subject to assessment not the facts of reason, but reason itself as regards its entire ability[264] and suitability for pure a priori cognitions. This step is not the census but the *critique* of reason. What through this critique we prove from principles—and do not by any means merely conjecture—are not merely *limits* of reason but the determinate *bounds*[265] of reason; i.e., what we thus prove is reason's ignorance not merely in some part or other but in regard to all possible questions of a certain kind. Thus skepticism is a resting-place for human reason, where it can reflect on its dogmatic wandering and make a sketch of the region where it finds itself, so that it can thereafter choose its path more safely. But skepticism is not a dwelling-place for constant residence; for such can be found only in a complete certainty, whether certainty in the cognition of the objects themselves or certainty in the cognition of the bounds within which all our cognition of objects is enclosed. {A 761 B 789}

Our reason is by no means a plane spread out indeterminably far, whose limits one cognizes only in a general way. It must, rather, be compared to a sphere whose radius one can find from the curvature of the arc on its surface (i.e., from the nature of synthetic a priori propositions), from which in turn one can reliably indicate also the sphere's content[266] and boundary. Outside this sphere (the realm of experience) nothing is an object for rea- {A 762 B 790}

[261][*Fakta.*]

[262][I.e., inventory-taking: *Zensur*.]

[263]['doubt,' Kant says literally.]

[264][Or 'power': *Vermögen*. See A xii br. n. 16.]

[265][Respectively, *Schranken* and *Grenzen*.]

[266][Or 'volume': *Inhalt*.]

son; indeed, there even questions about such supposed objects concern only subjective principles of a thoroughgoing determination of what relations can occur, within this sphere, among the concepts of understanding.

We are actually in possession of synthetic a priori cognitions,[267] as is established by the principles of understanding that anticipate experience. Now if someone cannot make the possibility of such cognitions comprehensible to himself at all, then he may indeed initially doubt whether such cognitions actually reside in us a priori. But he cannot yet claim that this inability of his is also an impossibility for such cognitions actually to arise through mere powers of the understanding, and cannot yet claim that all steps that reason takes by their guidance are null. He can only say that if we had insight into the origin and genuineness of such cognitions, then we could determine the range and the bounds of our reason; but that be-
A 763 B 791 fore this determination has occurred, all assertions of reason are ventured blindly. And in this way a thoroughgoing doubt concerning all dogmatic philosophy, which[268] takes its course without critique of reason itself, has a very good basis. Yet one could not therefore entirely deny that reason might make such an advance, if the advance were prepared and secured by laying a better foundation. For, in the first place, all concepts and indeed all questions put before us by pure reason lie by no means in experience, but lie themselves only in reason again, and hence they must be capable of being solved and comprehended as regards their validity or nullity. Moreover, we are not entitled to dismiss these problems and to refuse to investigate them further, on the pretext—as if their solution actually lay in the nature of things—that we are unable [to discover that nature]; for reason itself has produced these ideas solely in its womb, and is therefore obliged to account for their validity or their dialectical illusion.

Thus all skeptical polemicizing is in fact turned only against the dogmatist—who without placing any distrust in his original objective principles, i.e., without critique, continues solemnly on his course—in order to put him out of countenance and thus bring him to self-cognition. In itself this skeptical polemic[269] establishes nothing whatsoever as regards what we can know and what, on the contrary, we cannot know. All failed dog-

[267][Reading *Erkenntnisse* for *Erkenntnis*, as suggested by Erdmann.]

[268][As such.]

[269][*sie*, as if Kant had said *skeptische Polemik* just above.]

matic attempts of reason are facts,[270] and subjecting these to a census is always beneficial. But this [method] cannot decide anything concerning the expectations of reason that lead it to hope for, and lay claim to, a better result in its future endeavors. Hence the mere census can never bring to an end the controversy concerning the right[271] of human reason. {A 764 B 792}

Hume is perhaps the most brilliant among all the skeptics, and is incontestably the most superb skeptic as regards what influence the skeptical procedure can have on arousing in us a thorough examination of reason. Hence it will surely be worth our trouble to present to ourselves,[272] as far as is fitting for my aim, the course of his inferences and the aberrations of such an insightful and estimable man—which did, after all, begin on the track of truth.

Hume was perhaps thinking, although he never developed this [thought] completely, that in judgments of a certain kind we go beyond our concept of the object. I have called this kind of judgments *synthetic.*[273] How I can, by means of experience, go outside what concept I had until then is not subject to any perplexity. Experience is itself a synthesis of perceptions—a synthesis whereby what concept I have acquired by means of a perception is augmented through other, additional perceptions. However, we believe that a priori, too, we can go outside[274] our concept and expand our cognition. We try to do this either through pure understanding, in regard to what can at least be an *object of experience;*[275] or we try to do it even through pure reason, in regard to such properties of things—or, indeed, even the existence of such objects—as can never occur in experience.[276] Our skeptic did not distinguish these two kinds of judgments, as surely he should have done. Instead he straightforwardly regarded this augmentation of concepts from themselves—and, so to speak, the self-delivery of our understanding (along with reason) without impregnation by experience—as impossible. And hence he regarded all supposed a priori principles of these {A 765 B 793}

[270][*Fakta.*]

[271][*Rechtsame.*]

[272][*vorstellig machen.*]

[273][For Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, see A 6–10/B 10–14.]

[274][I.e., beyond.]

[275][As in the Transcendental Analytic, A 64–292/B 89–349.]

[276][As in the Transcendental Dialectic, A 293–704/B 349–732.]

powers as imaginary, and thought that they are nothing but a habit arising from experience and its laws, and that hence they are merely empirical rules—i.e., rules contingent in themselves—to which we attribute a supposed necessity and universality. But in order to maintain this strange proposition, Hume referred to the universally recognized principle of the relation of cause to effect. For since no power of understanding can by itself take us from the concept of a thing to the existence of something else that is thereby universally and necessarily given, he thought he could infer from this that without experience we have nothing that could augment our concept and entitle us to such a judgment as expands [our cognition] a
A 766 B 794 priori. That the sunlight which illuminates wax also melts the wax, whereas it hardens clay, is a fact that no understanding can divine—much less lawfully infer—from concepts that we previously had of these things, and only experience can teach us such a law. However, in the Transcendental Logic we saw that although we can never go *directly* beyond the content of a concept that is given to us, we can still cognize the law of the connection of a thing with other things[277] completely a priori—but in reference to a third something, viz., *possible*[278] experience, and hence a priori after all. Hence if previously firm wax melts, then I can cognize a priori that there must have preceded something or other (e.g., the sun's heat) upon which this melting followed according to a constant law—although without experience I could not a priori and without the instruction of such experience cognize *determinately* either the cause from the effect or the effect from the cause.[279] Hence from the contingency of our determination[280] *according to the law,* Hume wrongly inferred the contingency of the *law* itself. And the act of going outside[281] the concept of a thing to possible experience, which is done a priori and amounts to the concept's objective reality, was confused by him with the synthesis of the objects of actual experience—a synthesis that is indeed always empirical. But through this confusion he turned a principle of affinity, which has its seat in the understanding and asserts necessary connection, into a rule of association, which is found

[277][See A 155–58/B 194–97 (also A 137–47/B 176–87) and A 189–211/B 232–56.]

[278][Rather than actual.]

[279][I.e., I could not a priori cognize the *specific* causes or effects.]

[280][Our experiential determination of cause or effect.]

[281][I.e., beyond.]

merely in the ectypal imagination[282] and can exhibit only contingent but not at all objective linkages.[283] A 767 B 795

However, the skeptical aberrations of this otherwise extremely acute man arose primarily from a defect that he did, after all, have in common with all dogmatists: viz., the fact that he did not systematically survey all the kinds of a priori synthesis of understanding. For then he would have found, e.g., the *principle of permanence*[284]—and I shall not here mention the other principles—to be one that, just as much as the principle of causality, anticipates experience. This survey would also have enabled him to trace out determinate bounds for the understanding that expands a priori, and for pure reason. But instead he only *limits* our understanding without *bounding*[285] it. And thus he does indeed bring about a general distrust, but no determinate cognition[286] of the ignorance that is unavoidable for us. For he subjects some principles of understanding to a census without putting this understanding on the test scale[287] of critique as regards its entire ability. And while he [rightly] denies to the understanding what it actually cannot accomplish, he goes further and disputes all its ability to expand a priori, even though he has not subjected this entire ability to assessment. And thus the fate befalls Hume that always strikes down skepticism, viz., that skepticism is doubted itself; for its objections rest only on facts that are contingent, but not on principles that could effect a necessary renunciation of A 768 B 796
the right to dogmatic assertions.

Hume also knows[288] no distinction between the well-founded claims of the understanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason—his attacks being in fact directed mainly against these dialectical pretensions. And hence reason, whose very own momentum has not in the least been disrupted[289] in this [skeptical attack] but only impeded, feels that the space for its extension is not closed off; and thus—despite being pinched here or there—it

282[*nachbildende Einbildungskraft*, i.e., the reproductive (rather than productive) imagination—see A 100–102.]

283[*Verbindungen;* see B 201 n. 30.]

284[For the principle of the permanence of substance, see A 182–89/B 224–32.]

285[Respectively, *einschränken* and *begrenzen.*]

286[*Kenntnis.*]

287[Or 'assay balance': *Probierwaage.*]

288[*kennt.*]

289[*gestört.*]

can never be deterred entirely from its attempts. For [as a reaction] against attacks one arms oneself for defense, and sets one's mind all the more rigidly on enforcing one's demands. But a complete appraisal of one's entire assets,[290] with the resulting conviction that a small possession is certain whereas higher claims are futile, annuls all dispute and moves one to settle peaceably for a limited but undisputed property.

When these skeptical attacks are used against the uncritical dogmatist, they are not only dangerous but are even ruinous for him. I.e., they are so for the dogmatist who has not measured his understanding's sphere and hence has not determined according to principles the bounds of his possible cognition, and who thus does not already know beforehand how much he can do but means to discover this through mere attempts. For if he is
A 769 B 797 caught with a single assertion which he cannot justify, but the illusion of which he also cannot develop from principles, then the suspicion falls on all his assertions, no matter how persuasive they may be otherwise.

Thus the skeptic is the disciplinarian[291] of the dogmatic subtle reasoner,[292] inasmuch as he moves him toward a sound critique of the understanding and of reason itself. When the dogmatist has arrived there, he need fear no further challenge. For he then distinguishes his possession from the realm which lies entirely outside it, and regarding which he makes no claims and thus also cannot become involved in controversies. Thus although the skeptical procedure is not in itself *satisfactory* for questions of reason, it is still *preparative* for arousing reason's cautiousness and for pointing reason to well-based means capable of securing it in its legitimate possessions.

[290][Or 'power': *Vermögen*.]

[291][*Zuchtmeister*.]

[292][*Vernünftler*.]

Chapter I

Section III
The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to Hypotheses[293]

Since, then, through critique of our reason we finally know this much: that in reason's pure and speculative use we can in fact know nothing whatsoever, should not reason open up an all-the wider realm for *hypotheses*, where at least it is allowed to engage in invention[294] and opinion, even if not in assertion?

Where imagination is not, say, merely to *rave* but—under the strict supervision of reason—to *invent*, there must always be something beforehand that is completely certain and not invented or mere opinion; and this is the *possibility* of the object itself.[295] If this possibility is there, then we are indeed permitted to resort to opinion concerning the object's actuality. But if this opinion is not to be baseless, then it must be brought into connection with what is actual and hence certain—viz., as basis of explanation thereof—and is then called *hypothesis*. {A 770 B 798}

Now, we cannot a priori frame the slightest concept of the possibility of dynamical connection, and a category of the pure understanding serves not for thinking up such a connection but only for understanding it if encountered in experience. Hence we cannot, in accordance with these categories, originally excogitate a single object in terms of a characteristic that is new and that cannot be indicated empirically, and lay it[296] at the basis of a permitted hypothesis; for that would mean to lay at reason's basis empty chimeras instead of concepts of things. Thus we are not permitted

[293][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 718–30. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 543–46.]

[294][*zu dichten.*]

[295][The object's *real* rather than merely *logical* possibility. For the distinction (cf. also the upcoming paragraph), see the references in A 139/B 178 br n. 66.]

[296][Reading, with Erdmann (but not the *Akademie* edition) *ihn* for *sie*—which would refer to the property, or perhaps to the object's possibility.]

to think up some new original powers,[297] e.g., an understanding capable of intuiting its object without senses;[298] or a force of expansion[299] without any contact; or a new kind of substances, e.g., a kind that would be present in space without having impenetrability. Nor, consequently, may we think
A 771 B 799 up any community of substances that is different from all such community provided to us by experience, nor think up any presence otherwise than as presence in space, or any duration except only as duration in time. In a word: our reason can use as condition of the possibility of things only the conditions of possible experience; by no means can it, entirely independently of these, create for itself—as it were—such conditions of the possibility of things. For such concepts, although being without contradiction, would nonetheless also be without an object.

Concepts of reason, as I have said, are mere ideas and have indeed no object to be encountered in any experience; yet they do not therefore designate objects that are invented and simultaneously also assumed as possible.[300] [The objects of] such concepts are thought only problematically, in order that by reference to them (as heuristic fictions), we can provide a basis for[301] regulative principles governing the systematic use of the understanding in the realm of experience.[302] If we deviate from this [construal of such objects], then they are mere thought-entities.[303] The possibility of such entities cannot be proved, and hence such entities also cannot be used as a basis for explaining actual appearances through a hypothesis. To *think* the soul as simple is entirely permitted, in order that in accordance with this *idea* a complete and necessary unity of all mental powers can be laid down—even though we can have no insight into such a unity *in concreto*—as principle for our judging of the soul's inner appearances. But to *assume* the soul as simple substance (a transcendent concept) would
A 772 B 800 be to affirm a proposition that not only would be unprovable (as several

[297][*Kräfte.*]

[298][On an intuitive understanding with its intellectual intuition, see B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[299][Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *Ausdehnungskraft* for *Anziehungskraft* ('force of attraction')—Mellin instead substitutes *Zurückstoßungskraft* ('force of repulsion') Kant certainly did not deny action at a distance. See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 511–15, cf. also 521–22.]

[300][See above, A 327–29/B 383–86; also A 338–40/B 396–98.]

[301][*gründen.*]

[302][See above, A 642–68/B 670–96.]

[303][*Gedankendinge.* See A 292/B 348.]

physical hypotheses are), but would also be ventured quite arbitrarily and blindly. For the simple cannot occur in any experience whatsoever, and if by substance one means here the permanent object[304] of sensible intuition, then the possibility of a *simple appearance* is something that one can have no insight into at all. No merely intelligible beings—or merely intelligible properties of things in the world of sense—can with any well-based authority[305] of reason be assumed as an opinion, although they also cannot be denied dogmatically through any appeal to supposedly better insight (since one has no concepts of their possibility or impossibility).

To explain given appearances, no other things and bases of explanation can be adduced but those that have, according to already familiar laws of appearances, been put in connection with the given appearances. Hence a *transcendental hypothesis,* in which a mere idea of reason would be used to explain natural things, would be no explanation at all. For in such a hypothesis, what one does not sufficiently understand from familiar empirical principles would be explained through something whereof one understands nothing at all. Moreover, the principle of such a hypothesis would in fact serve only to satisfy reason, and not to further the use of understanding in regard to objects. Order and purposiveness in nature must be explained in turn from natural bases and according to natural laws; and there even the wildest hypotheses, if only they are physical, are more bearable than a hyperphysical[306] hypothesis, i.e., the appeal to a divine originator presupposed for the sake of this explanation. For this appeal would be a principle of lazy reason (*ignava ratio*):[307] viz., to bypass at a stroke all causes with whose objective reality—at least as regards their possibility—we can still become acquainted through continued experience, in order to [seek a place of] rest in a mere idea that is very convenient to reason. But as regards absolute totality of the basis of explanation in the series of these causes, this concern cannot give rise to any difficulty regarding the objects of the world; for since these objects are nothing but appearances, nothing complete in them can ever be hoped for in the synthesis of the series of conditions.[308] { A 773 B 801

[304][*Objekt* here, *Gegenstand* earlier in this (and also in the next) paragraph. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[305][*Befugnis.*]

[306][I.e., supranatural.]

[307][Cf. A 689 = B 717 incl. n. 265 and br. n. 265a.]

[308][See A 330–38/B 386–96.]

Transcendental hypotheses of reason's speculative use—and a freedom to compensate for the lack of physical bases of explanation by availing oneself at least of hyperphysical ones—cannot be permitted at all. This is so partly because using such hypotheses does not at all advance reason but rather cuts off all progress in reason's use, and partly because this license would ultimately have to deprive reason of all fruits gained from working its proper soil, viz., experience. For if natural explanation becomes difficult for us here or there, we then constantly have at hand a transcendent
A 774 B 802 basis of explanation that exempts us from that [natural] inquiry; and our investigation is concluded not by insight, but by the utter incomprehensibility[309] of a principle that has already beforehand been excogitated so as to contain necessarily the concept of the absolutely primary.

The second component required in order for a hypothesis to be worthy of assumption[310] is that it be sufficient for our determining from it a priori the consequences that are [actually] given. If for this purpose we are compelled to call in auxiliary hypotheses, then these give rise to the suspicion that the [basic] hypothesis is mere invention. For each of the auxiliary hypotheses itself needs the same justification that was required by the thought laid at the basis, and hence can provide no competent witness. Thus on the presupposition of a cause of unlimited perfection there is indeed no lack of bases for explaining all the purposiveness, order, and magnitude found in the world. Yet in view of—what are at least by our concepts—deviations and evils manifesting themselves, this perfect cause still requires new hypotheses in order to be saved from these deviations and evils taken as objections. Similarly, the simple independence[311] of the human soul[312] has been laid at the basis[313] of the soul's appearances.[314] But when this independence is controverted by difficulties such as the phenomena of the soul that are similar to the alterations of matter (viz., increase and decrease[315]), then new hypotheses have to be called upon for assistance. And although these new hypotheses are not without plausibility, they still have no cre-

309[*Unbegreiflichkeit.* See A 467 = B 495 br. n. 30 and B 114 br. n. 239.]

310[Or 'of acceptance': *Annehmungs-*.]

311[*Selbständigkeit.*]

312[From the material realm.]

313[As a hypothesis.]

314[In order to explain these.]

315[Of the soul's powers; cf. below, A 778 = B 806.]

dentials other than those given to them by the very opinion[316] that was assumed as the main basis [of explanation], which yet they are to corroborate. A 775 B 803

If the assertions of reason that I have here cited as examples (viz., incorporeal unity of the soul,[317] and existence of a supreme being[318]) are meant to hold not as hypotheses but as dogmas proved a priori, then they are not at issue here at all. But in that case one should take care indeed that the proof has the apodeictic certainty of a demonstration. For to seek to make the actuality of such ideas merely *probable*[319] is an absurd project—just as if one planned to prove a proposition of geometry merely with probability. Reason as separated from all experience can only cognize everything a priori and as necessary, or not cognize it at all. Hence reason's judgment is never opinion, but is either abstention from all judgment, or else apodeictic certainty.[320] Opinions and probable judgments concerning what pertains to things can occur only as bases for explaining what is actually given, or as consequences—according to empirical laws—of what lies at the basis as actual [antecedent], and hence they can occur only within the series of objects of experience. Outside of this realm, having an *opinion* is equivalent to playing with thoughts—unless perhaps one had, concerning such an insecure path of judgment, merely the opinion that one might find the truth on such a path.

But although in merely speculative questions of pure reason hypotheses A 776 B 804 have no place as bases for propositions, they are nonetheless quite permissible at least for just defending such propositions; i.e., they do have a place in reason's polemic use, although not in its dogmatic use. Now by defending I do not mean augmenting the bases of proof for one's assertion; I mean, rather, merely foiling the opponent's illusory insights that are intended to damage the proposition asserted by us. However, all synthetic propositions based on pure reason have this peculiarity: that although the person asserting the reality of certain ideas never knows as much as is needed to make his proposition certain, the opponent on the other side can just as little know

316[Or, i.e., hypothesis.]

317[Considered above, in the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, A 341–405/B 399–432.]

318[Considered above, in the Ideal of Pure Reason, A 567–642/B 595–670.]

319[*wahrscheinlich*, which literally means 'seeming true.']

320[Opinion (as related to knowledge and to faith) is discussed more fully below, A 820–31/B 848–59.]

enough to assert the reverse.[321] Now this equality of the lot[322] of human reason favors indeed neither of the two opponents in [the realm of] speculative cognition, and that [realm] is also the proper combat arena for feuds that can never be settled. But we shall see later[323] that in regard to its *practical use* reason does have a right to assume something that in the realm of mere speculation it would in no way be entitled to presuppose without sufficient bases of proof. For all such [theoretically illegitimate] presuppositions impair the completeness of speculation; but this completeness is of no concern whatever to our reason's practical interest. There[324] our reason is thus in possession [of legitimate practical presuppositions]; it does not need to prove [theoretically] the possession's legitimacy, nor would it in
A 777 B 805 fact be able to conduct that proof. Hence the opponent should prove [his own, negative proposition]. He, however, does not know anything concerning the doubted object so as to establish its nonexistence—any more than does the first person, who asserts its actuality; and hence we can see here an advantage on the side of the one who asserts something as a practically necessary presupposition (*melior est conditio possidentis*).[325] For he is free to employ—in self-defense, as it were—the same means for his good cause [or thing][326] as the opponent employs against it: i.e., hypotheses. These hypotheses are in no way meant to serve to strengthen the proof of this [thing], but are meant only to show that the opponent understands far too little concerning the dispute's object in order to flatter himself with having an advantage of speculative insight in comparison to ours.

Hence hypotheses are permitted in the realm of pure reason only as weapons of war—not in order to base a right on them, but only in order to defend this right. The opponent, however, must here always be sought within ourselves. For speculative reason in its transcendental use is *in itself* dialectical. The objections that might have to be feared lie within ourselves. We must seek them out—like claims that are old but that never become superannuated—in order to base a perpetual[327] peace on their

321[*Widerspiel.*]

322[*Los.*]

323[A 795–831/B 823–59.]

324[In the practical realm.]

325[The condition of the possessor is better.]

326[*Sache.* Cf., e.g., the end of A 780 = B 808.]

327[*ewig*]

annihilation. Outward tranquillity is only a seeming tranquillity. The seed of the challenges, which lies in the nature of human reason, must be eradicated. But how can we eradicate this seed unless we give it freedom —indeed, even nourishment—to sprout leaves and thereby reveal itself, so that we can thereafter obliterate it with the root? Do you, then, yourselves think up objections that have not yet occurred to any opponent; and even lend him weapons, or concede to him the most favorable position that he could possibly wish for. In this proposal there is nothing at all to be feared, yet much to be hoped: viz., that you will gain a possession that can never again be challenged throughout the future. {A 778 B 806}

Thus to your complete armor there now belong also the hypotheses of pure reason; and although they are only leaden weapons (because they have not been steeled by any law of experience), they are nonetheless always as potent as the weapons that any opponent may employ against you. Hence if you have assumed (in some respect other than a speculative one) that the soul's nature is immaterial and not subject to any corporeal transformation, you may come upon the difficulty—raised against this assumption —that nonetheless experience seems to prove that both the elevation and the derangement of our mental powers are merely diverse modifications of our organs. To defend your assumption, you can then weaken the force of this proof against it by assuming that our body is nothing but the fundamental appearance to which—in our current state (in life)—our entire power of sensibility and therewith all our thought refer as [corporeal] condition; and that the soul's separation from the body is the end of this sensible use of your cognitive power, and the beginning of its intellectual use. Thus the body would not be the cause of thought, but merely a restricting condition of it. Hence the body would then have to be regarded as a furtherance for the sensible and animal life, but be regarded all the more as also a hindrance for the pure and spiritual life; and the dependence of our sensible and animal life on our corporeal constitution would be no proof for the dependence of our entire life on the state of our organs. But you can go still further, and can perhaps even discover new doubts that have either not been raised or not carried far enough. {A 779 B 807}

Procreation is contingent: both in human beings and in nonrational creatures it depends on opportunity, but in addition also often on sustenance, on the [people in] government, their moods and whims, and often even on vice. This contingency[328] gives rise to great difficulty for the opinion that

[328][*Zufälligkeit.*]

a creature whose life first began under such insignificant circumstances —which are, moreover, left altogether to our freedom[329]—should continue [in a life] extending to all eternity.[330] Now as regards the continuance (here on earth) of the entire human species, this difficulty[331] is inconsiderable, because chance[332] in the individual [case][333] is nonetheless subjected to a rule in the whole [species]. But to expect so mighty an effect from so unimportant a cause in regard to every individual[334] does indeed seem precarious. Against this objection, however, you can muster a transcendental
A 780 B 808 hypothesis. You can say that properly speaking all life is intelligible only and not subjected to changes of time, and that it neither began through birth nor is ended through death; but that this life, on the other hand, is nothing but a mere appearance, i.e., a sensible presentation of the pure spiritual life, and the whole world of sense is a mere image hovering before our current way of cognizing, and like a dream has in itself no objective reality; but that if we were to intuit things and ourselves *as they [and we] are,* we would then see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures—a world with which we have our one true community that neither has started through birth nor will cease through bodily death (both of which are mere appearances), etc.

Now although we have not the least knowledge of any [part] of this [assumption] that we here put up hypothetically against the attack, nor are asserting it seriously—everything being, rather, not even an idea of reason but merely a concept *thought up* for our defense—we are still proceeding quite rationally in this. For the opponent thinks that he has exhausted every possibility, inasmuch as the lack of empirical conditions on the part of what things[335] we have faith in[336] is falsely passed off by him as a proof that such things are entirely impossible; and we only show him that he can no more through mere laws of experience encompass the whole realm of possible things in themselves, than we can outside of[337] experience ac-

[329][Our freedom of choice.]

[330][*auf Ewigkeiten.*]

[331][Regarding individual creatures.]

[332][*Zufall.*]

[333][*im Einzelnen.*]

[334][*Individuum.*]

[335][*ihrer.*]

[336][Or 'believe', cf. below, A 820–31/B 848–59.]

[337][I.e., beyond]

quire for our reason anything whatsoever in a well-based way. If someone turns such hypothetical remedies against the pretensions of the opponent {A 781 B 809} and his audacious negations, then he must not be regarded as seeking to appropriate these [hypotheses] as his own true opinions. He abandons them as soon as he has disposed of the opponent's dogmatic self-conceit. For no matter how modest and moderate someone may look who behaves toward the assertions of others[338] in a merely declining and negating manner, yet as soon as he wants to make his objections hold as proofs of the opposite assertion, his claim is always just as haughty and imaginary as if he had adopted the affirming party and its assertion.

We see from this, therefore, that in the speculative use of reason hypotheses have no validity in themselves, but have such validity only relatively to opposite transcendent pretensions. For extending the principles of possible experience to the possibility of things as such is just as transcendent as is asserting the objective reality of concepts that cannot find their objects anywhere but outside the boundary of all possible experience. Whatever pure reason judges assertorically must (like everything that reason cognizes) be necessary, or it is nothing at all. Accordingly, pure reason in fact contains no opinions whatsoever. But the mentioned hypotheses are only problematic judgments—which at least cannot be refuted, although they cannot indeed be proved by anything. Hence they are purely[339] private opin- {A 782 B 810} ions; yet they cannot properly be dispensed with (even for gaining inner tranquillity) as remedies against stirring scruples. They must, however, be preserved in this quality, and must be prevented carefully indeed from coming forward as in themselves having credentials[340] and some absolute validity, and thus prevented from drowning reason in inventions and deceptions.

[338][*fremd.*]

[339][Reading, with Hartenstein and the *Akademie* edition, *reine* for *keine*.]

[340][*beglaubigt.*]

Chapter I

Section IV
The Discipline of Pure Reason in Regard to its Proofs[341]

Among all proofs of a synthetic a priori cognition, the proofs of transcendental synthetic propositions have the peculiarity that reason in their case must not turn straightforwardly to the object, but must first establish a priori the objective validity of their concepts and the possibility of these concepts' synthesis. This is by no means merely a needed rule of caution, but concerns the nature[342] and possibility of the proofs themselves. If I am to go a priori beyond the concept of an object, then doing this is impossible without a special guide[343] located outside of[344] this concept. Thus in mathematics my synthesis is guided by a priori intuition, and hence all infer-
A 783 B 811 ences can there be conducted directly[345] by reference to pure intuition.[346] In transcendental cognition, as long as such cognition deals merely with concepts of understanding, this outside guideline[347] is possible experience.[348] For the proof here does not show that the given concept (e.g., the concept of what occurs) leads straightforwardly to another concept (that of a cause), because such a transition would be a leap that could not at all be justified;[349] the proof shows, rather, that experience itself and hence the

[341][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 730–42. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 568.]

[342][*Wesen.*]

[343][*Leitfaden.*]

[344][I.e., beyond.]

[345][*unmittelbar;* see B xxxix br. n. 144c.]

[346][See above, A 713–20 = B 741–48.]

[347][*Richtschnur.*]

[348][See above, A 720–24 = B 748–52, A 736–37 = B 764–65.]

[349][*verantworten.*]

object of experience would be impossible without such a connection.[350] Hence the proof had to indicate also the possibility of arriving synthetically and a priori at a certain cognition of things that was not contained in their concept. Without this attention to possibility, proofs run like waters breaking through their banks, wildly and haphazardly, wherever the propensity of hidden association chances to lead them. The semblance[351] of conviction that rests on subjective causes of association and is regarded as insight into a natural affinity cannot at all counterbalance the perplexity to which such daring steps must appropriately give rise. This is also why, as is universally confessed by the experts, all attempts to prove the principle of sufficient basis[352] have been futile; and before transcendental critique made its entrance, people—being nonetheless unable to abandon that principle[353]—would always rather appeal defiantly to sound human understanding (resorting to this always proves that the cause[354] of reason is desperate) than attempt new dogmatic proofs. {A 784 B 812}

But if the proposition to be proved is an assertion of pure reason, and if I seek to go beyond my concepts of experience even by means of mere ideas, then there would be an even greater need for this proof to contain, as a necessary condition of its cogency, the justification of such a step of synthesis (if indeed this step were possible in a different way[355]). Hence no matter how plausible[356] the supposed proof of our thinking substance's simple nature from the unity of apperception may be,[357] it yet faces inevitably this perplexity: Absolute simplicity is not a concept that can be referred directly to a perception; rather, being an idea, it must be merely inferred. And hence one cannot see at all how the mere consciousness that is or at least can be contained *in all thinking*—despite being to that extent a simple presentation—is to bring[358] me to the consciousness and the knowl-

[350][See above, A 766 = B 794.]

[351][*Schein.*]

[352][Or 'ground' or 'reason': *Satz des zureichenden Grundes;* see A 201/B 246 br. n. 160.]

[353][*Grundsatz.*]

[354][*Sache.*]

[355][I.e., different from the reference to possible experience; see above, A 736–37 = B 764–65, A 769–72 = B 797–800, and below, A 785–86 = B 813–14.]

[356][*scheinbar.*]

[357][See the second paralogism, A 351–61; cf. B 407–8, 410–13.]

[358][*überführen*]

edge[359] of a thing *in which* alone this thinking can be contained. For if I present to myself the force of a[360] body in motion, then to that extent the body is for me absolute unity, and my presentation of it is simple. This is also the reason why I can express this presentation by the motion of a point; for here the body's volume[361] does nothing and can without diminution of A 785 B 813 the force be thought as small as we wish, and hence also can be thought as located in a point.[362] Yet I shall not infer from this that if nothing but the motive force of a body is given to me, then the body can be thought as simple substance—merely because its presentation abstracts from all magnitude of the volume[363] and hence is simple. Now the simple in the abstraction is thus entirely distinct from the simple in the object; and the *I*[364] that in the first sense comprises *within itself* no manifoldness whatsoever can in the second sense, where it signifies the soul itself, be a very complex concept, viz., one serving to contain and designate very much *under itself*—and by seeing this I discover a paralogism.[365] Yet in order to impugn[366] this paralogism in advance (for without such a provisional presumption we would not become suspicious toward the proof at all), we need throughout to have at hand an everlasting criterion of the possibility of those synthetic propositions that are meant to prove more than experience can give. This criterion consists in the requirement that the proof should be conducted not straightforwardly to the desired predicate, but only by means of a principle of the possibility of expanding our given concept a priori up to ideas in order to realize these ideas. This caution should always be exercised; i.e., before even attempting the proof, we should first wisely take counsel as to how and with what basis for hope we might expect such an expansion[367] through pure reason, and from where indeed we are to take, A 786 B 814 in such a case, these insights that are not developed from concepts nor can

[359][*Kenntnis.*]

[360][Reading, with Hartenstein, *eines* for *meines*.]

[361][*Volumen.*]

[362][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 482–83.]

[363][*Raumesinhalt.*]

[364][Emphasis added.]

[365][See above, A 351–61, B 407–8.]

[366][Or, possibly, 'to suspect,' if *ahnden* is taken as the old variant spelling of *ahnen.* Cf. *Etymologisches Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache,* eds. Friedrich Kluge and Elmar Seebold (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), 14.]

[367][Of cognition.]

be anticipated by reference to possible experience. For by so doing we can save ourselves many difficult and yet fruitless efforts, by not requiring from reason what obviously exceeds its power—or, rather, by subjecting reason, which in bursts of its passion for speculative expansion[368] does not like to be confined, to the discipline of restraint.

Hence the *first*[369] rule is this: not to attempt any transcendental proofs without first having deliberated on the questions, and justified ourselves on their account, whence we shall take the principles upon which we mean to build these proofs, and with what right we may expect from these principles the success of our inferences. If the principles are principles of understanding (e.g., that of causality), then attempting to arrive, by means of them, at ideas of pure reason is futile; for these principles hold only for objects of possible experience. If they are to be principles based on pure reason, then again all endeavor is futile. For although reason does have such principles, they are one and all dialectical when taken as objective principles, and can be valid at most in the manner of regulative principles of the systematically coherent use of reason in experience.[370] But if such alleged proofs are already present, then you should oppose the deceptive[371] conviction with the *non liquet*[372] of your matured power B 815
of judgment; and although you cannot yet penetrate the deception[373] in A 787
these proofs, you still have every right to demand the deduction[374] of the principles used in them—a deduction which, if these principles are to have arisen from reason alone, can never be provided to you. And thus you need not even occupy yourselves with the development and the refutation of every baseless illusion, but can dismiss all at once and in bulk all dialectic, however inexhaustible in artifices, at the tribunal of a critical reason that demands laws.

The *second* peculiarity of transcendental proofs is this: that for every transcendental proposition only *a single* proof can be found. When I am to make an inference not from concepts but from the intuition corresponding

[368][Of its cognition.]

[369][Emphasis added; likewise on 'third' at A 789 = B 817.]

[370][See above, A 770–77 = B 798–803.]

[371][*trüglich.*]

[372][It is not clear (i.e., not proved).]

[373][*Blendwerk.*]

[374][I.e., legitimation or justification. Cf. A 663–64 = B 691–92 incl. br. n. 147.]

to a concept—whether a pure intuition as in mathematics, or an empirical one as in natural science—then the intuition laid at the basis[375] provides me with manifold material for synthetic propositions. I can connect this material in more than one way; and since I am allowed to start from more than one point, I can arrive at the same proposition by different paths.

But any transcendental proposition starts merely from one concept, and states[376] the synthetic condition of the object's possibility in accordance with this concept. Hence the basis of proof can be only a single one. For
A 788 B 816 apart from this concept there is nothing further whereby the object could be determined; and hence the proof can contain nothing more than the determination of an object as such in accordance with this concept, which is also only a single[377] concept. In the Transcendental Analytic the principle that everything that occurs has a cause,[378] e.g., had been obtained by us from the single condition for the objective possibility of a concept of what occurs as such: viz., that the determination of an event in time—and hence this (event) as belonging to experience—would be impossible without being subject to such a dynamical rule. Now this is indeed the only[379] possible basis of proof. For the presented event has objective validity—i.e., truth—only because an object is determined for the concept by means of the law of causality. To be sure, other proofs of this principle have also been attempted, e.g., the proof from the contingency [of what occurs]. Yet when this proof is examined closely, we can find no criterion of contingency except the *occurrence*—i.e., the object's existence that is preceded by the object's nonexistence—and thus we always come back again to the same basis of proof. Similarly, if we are to prove the proposition that everything that thinks is simple, then we do not dwell upon the manifold of thought but stay merely with the concept of the *I*,[380] which is simple and to which all thought is referred.[381] The same applies to the transcendental proof of the existence of God; this proof rests solely on the interchange-

[375][Of my inference.]

[376][*sagt.*]

[377][*einzig.*]

[378][See above, A 189–211/B 232–56.]

[379][*einzig.*]

[380][Emphasis added.]

[381][See above, A 785 = B 813 br. n. 365.]

ability[382] of the concepts of the most real and of the necessary being and cannot be sought anywhere else.[383] A 789 B 817

This note of caution makes the critique of the assertions of reason a very much smaller task. Where reason carries on its business through mere concepts, there only a single proof is possible, provided that any proof is possible at all. Hence as soon as we see the dogmatist come forward with ten proofs, we may safely believe that he has none at all. For if he had one that proved its conclusion apodeictically (as is required in matters of pure reason), for what would he need the others? His intention is only like that of the parliamentary advocate, whose one argument is for this and the other for that member—so that he may take advantage of the weakness of his judges, who, without entering deeply into the business and wishing to get away from it soon, seize upon whatever first happens to attract their attention, and decide by it.

The *third* rule peculiar to pure reason if this reason is subjected to a discipline regarding transcendental proofs is this: that its proofs must never be *apagogic* but always *ostensive.*[384] A direct or ostensive proof is, in every kind of cognition, a proof that combines with the conviction of the truth also insight into the sources of this truth. An apagogic proof, on the other hand, can indeed produce certainty, but not comprehensibility[385] of the truth as regards its connection[386] with the bases of its possibility. Hence apagogic proofs are more an expedient than a procedure that satisfies all the aims of reason. Yet they are superior to direct proofs in regard to evidence, inasmuch as contradiction always carries with it more clarity in the presentation than does the best connection,[387] and thus comes closer to the intuitive character of a demonstration. A 790 B 818

The proper cause, however, of the use of apagogic proofs in various sciences is presumably the following. If the bases from which a certain cog-

[382][*Reziprokabilität.*]

[383][See above, A 567–642 = B 595–670.]

[384][Apagogic proofs are *indirect* proofs (which prove a proposition by establishing the falsehood of its contradictory) and are to that extent of the form *modus tollens* (i.e., the annulling mode: If *p*, then *q*; not *q*; therefore, not *p*.); cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 52 (also 71). Ostensive proofs are *direct* proofs and are to that extent of the form *modus ponens* (i.e , the positing mode: If *p*, then *q*; *p*; therefore, *q*.).]

[385][*Begreiflichkeit.* See A 467 = B 495 br. n. 30 and B 114 br. n. 239.]

[386][*Zusammenhang.*]

[387][*Verknüpfung.*]

nition is to be derived are too manifold or lie too deeply hidden, then we try to find out whether the cognition might not be reachable through its consequences. Now a *modus ponens* inferring the truth of a cognition from the truth of its consequences[388] would be permitted only if all possible consequences of the cognition are true; for then only a single basis for these[389] consequences is possible, which is therefore also the true basis. This procedure is unfeasible, however, because gaining insight into all possible consequences of any assumed sentence exceeds our powers. We nonetheless employ this kind of inference, although indeed with a certain amount of forbearance, when we are concerned to prove something merely as a hypothesis—viz., inasmuch as we grant this inference by analogy: that if all the consequences that we may have tried agree with an assumed basis, then all the remaining possible consequences will also agree with this basis.
A 791 B 819 Because of this,[390] a hypothesis can never by this path be transformed into demonstrated truth. The *modus tollens* in syllogisms[391] making an inference from the consequences to the bases is not only a quite strict but also an extremely easy proof. For if even a single false consequence can be drawn from a proposition, then this proposition is false. Thus we need not provide an ostensive proof and go through the entire series of bases that can lead us to the truth of a proposition by means of complete insight into this truth's possibility. Instead we need only look at the consequences issuing from the cognition's opposite and find a single one of them to be false; for then this opposite is also false, and hence the cognition that we had to prove is true.

However, the apagogic kind of proof can be permitted only in those sciences where there is no possibility of [erroneously] *substituting* the subjective [element] of our presentation for the objective, viz., for the cognition of what is in the object.[392] But where such substitution is prevalent, there it must frequently happen that the opposite of some proposition either contradicts not the object but merely the subjective conditions of thought, or that the two propositions contradict each other only under a subjective condition that is falsely regarded as objective—in which case, since

388[Rather than vice versa.]

389[Reading, with Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition, *diesen* for *diesem*.]

390[This reliance on analogy in such a *modus ponens*.]

391[Literally, 'inferences of reason': *Vernunftschlüsse*.]

392[Such erroneous substitution is what Kant calls *subreption*. See A 643 = B 671 incl. br. n 14.]

the condition is false, both propositions can be false and thus no inference can be made from the falsity of the one proposition to the truth of the other.

In mathematics this subreption[393] is impossible; hence that is where these apagogic proofs have their proper place. In natural science everything is based on empirical intuitions, and hence such subreption can indeed usually be prevented there by comparing many observations; yet there this kind of proof is usually unimportant. But each and every transcendental attempt of pure reason is carried out within the medium proper of dialectical illusion, i.e., the subjective [element] that in reason's premises offers itself to reason—or even thrusts itself upon reason—as objective. Thus here, as far as synthetic propositions are concerned, one cannot be permitted at all to justify one's assertions by refuting their opposite. For either this refutation is nothing but the mere presentation of the opposed opinion's conflict with the subjective conditions of comprehensibility[394] by our reason; and this does nothing to repudiate the matter[395] itself. (E.g., the unconditioned necessity in a being's existence absolutely cannot be comprehended by us; hence *subjectively* it rightly resists every speculative proof of a necessary supreme being, but resists wrongly the possibility of such an original being *in itself*.) Or both parties, the asserting as well as the negating party, being deceived[396] by transcendental illusion, are basing their propositions on an impossible concept of the object; and then this rule holds: *non entis nulla sunt praedicata*[397]—i.e., what is asserted affirmatively as well as what is asserted negatively of the object are both incorrect—and one cannot apagogically, by refuting the opposite, arrive at cognition of the truth. Thus, e.g., if one presupposes that the world of sense is given *in itself* in its totality, then it is false to say that this world must *either* be infinite as regards space *or* be finite and bounded,[398] because both alternatives are false. For appearances[399] (as mere presentations) that are

{A 792 B 820}

{A 793 B 821}

[393][*Subreption* here, *Erschleichung* just below.]

[394][*Begreiflichkeit.* Note how translating *begreiflich* as 'conceivable' rather than as 'comprehensible' here has the effect of making the upcoming parenthetical sentence itself incomprehensible, since anything that is inconceivable (as this term is used in philosophy) is therefore also *logically impossible*. See A 467 = B 495 br. n. 30 and A 310/B 367 br. n. 97.]

[395][*Sache.*]

[396][*betrogen.*]

[397][A nonentity has no predicates.]

[398][Cf the first antinomy, A 426–33 = B 454–61.]

[399][Of which the world of sense consists.]

nonetheless given *in themselves* (as objects) are something impossible; and although the infinity of this imagined whole would indeed be unconditioned, it would still contradict the determination[400] of unconditioned magnitude[401] which is presupposed in the concept (because in[402] appearances everything is conditioned).

Indeed, the apagogic kind of proof is the particular deception[403] by which those who admire the thoroughness of our subtle dogmatic reasoners have always been put off. It is, as it were, the champion who wants to prove the honor and the indisputable right of his adopted party by promising to scuffle with anyone who might doubt these. Yet such bluster decides nothing concerning the matter but only concerning the respective strength of the adversaries,[404] and even this only on the side of the one
A 794 B 822 who behaves aggressively. The spectators, seeing that each adversary takes his turn being now victorious and then defeated, are often prompted by this to become skeptical themselves and to doubt the object of the dispute. But they do not have cause for this, and it suffices to shout to them:[405] *non defensoribus istis tempus eget.*[406] Everyone must conduct his case[407] by means of a legal proof through transcendental deduction of the bases of proof—in other words, directly—so that one can see what bases his claims of reason can adduce on their own behalf. For if his opponent[408] relies on subjective bases, then this opponent can indeed easily be refuted, but without advantage to the dogmatist himself, who usually adheres just as much to the judgment's subjective causes and can likewise be driven into a corner by his opponent. But if both parties proceed only directly, then they will either notice on their own the difficulty—indeed, the impossibility—of

400[I.e., attribute.]

401[I.e., totality.]

402[*an.*]

403[*das eigentliche Blendwerk.*]

404[*Gegner.*]

405[Kant may have meant the shout to be addressed to the adversaries rather than to the spectators, but it obviously works either way.]

406[In Vergil's *Aeneid* (ii, 521–22), Hecuba says to Priam, who is taking up arms: *Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis tempus eget;* i.e., *the situation* (the *time,* literally) *does not call for* such aid and *such defenders.* (The emphasized portion of the translation renders Kant's own quotation here.)]

407[*Sache.*]

408[*Gegner.*]

discovering any title for their assertions, and can ultimately plead only that the statute of limitations has run out;[409] or the critique will easily uncover the dogmatic illusion and will compel pure reason to abandon the over-blown pretensions that it makes in its speculative use, and will compel pure reason to retreat within the bounds of its proper territory, viz., that of practical principles.[410]

409[*Verjährung*.]

410[To be treated in the Canon of Pure Reason (the next chapter).]

A 795 B 823

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD[1]

Chapter II
The Canon of Pure Reason

Human reason is humiliated by the fact that, in its pure use, it accomplishes nothing and indeed even needs a discipline to restrain its own extravagances and prevent the deceptions that these engender for it. But, on the other hand, human reason is elevated and acquires self-confidence through the fact that it can and must exercise this discipline on its own, without permitting any other verdict[2] concerning itself; and likewise through the fact that the bounds that it is compelled to set to its own speculative use simultaneously limit the subtly reasoning[3] claims of every opponent, so that whatever may still be left to human reason from its previously exaggerated demands can be secured by it against all attacks. Hence the greatest and perhaps only benefit of all philosophy of pure reason may be only negative. For such philosophy does not—as an organon—serve to expand [cognition], but—as a discipline—serves to determine the boundary [of cognition]; and instead of discovering truth, it has only the silent merit of preventing errors.

Yet somewhere there must nonetheless be a source of positive cognitions that belong in the domain of pure reason, and that perhaps give rise
A 796 B 824 to errors only through misunderstanding but in fact amount to the aim of reason's zeal. For to what cause could one otherwise attribute reason's indomitable desire to gain by all means a firm foothold somewhere beyond the boundary of experience? Reason there suspects[4] objects that carry with

[1][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 743–46.]

[2][*Zensur.*]

[3][*die vernünftelnden.*]

[4][Reading *ahnden* as the old variant spelling of *ahnen.* Cf. A 785 = B 813 incl. br. n. 366.]

them a great interest for it. It enters upon the path of mere speculation in order to come closer to these objects; but there they flee from it. Presumably we may hope that reason will have better fortune[5] on the only path that still remains to it, viz., that of its *practical* use.

By a canon I mean the sum of a priori principles governing the correct use of certain cognitive powers as such. Thus general logic in its analytical part is a canon for understanding and reason as such[6]—but only as regards form, for general logic abstracts from all content. And thus the transcendental analytic was the canon of pure *understanding;*[7] for pure understanding alone is capable of having true synthetic a priori cognitions. But where no correct use of a cognitive power is possible, there is no canon. Now all synthetic cognition of pure *reason* in its speculative use is, according to all the proofs conducted thus far, entirely impossible. Hence there is no canon whatever of pure reason's speculative use (for this use is dialectical throughout), and all transcendental logic is in regard to this speculative aim nothing but discipline. Consequently, if there is a correct use of pure reason at all, in which case there must also be a *canon* of pure reason, then this canon will concern not the speculative but the *practical use of reason.* Hence we shall now investigate this use. A 797 B 825

[5][*Glück.*]

[6][See the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 13–16.]

[7][See above, A 12/B 26, A 60–61/B 85, A 63/B 88.]

The Canon of Pure Reason

Section I[8]

On the Ultimate Purpose[9] of the Pure Use of Our Reason

Reason is impelled by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experience, to venture outward—in a pure use and by means of mere ideas—to the utmost bounds of all cognition, and to find rest for the first time[10] in the completion of its sphere,[11] i.e., in a self-subsistent systematic whole. Now, is this endeavor based merely on reason's speculative interest, or is it, rather, based solely and exclusively on its practical interest?

Let me now set aside whatever success[12] pure reason has in regard to its speculative aim, and inquire only into the problems whose solution amounts to pure reason's ultimate purpose—the purpose which pure reason may or may not accomplish, and in regard to which all other purposes have only the value of means. These highest purposes must, according to
A 798 B 826 the nature of reason, have unity in turn, in order that—as thus united—they may further that interest of humanity which is not subordinate to any higher interest.

The final aim[13] to which the speculation of reason as used transcendentally is ultimately directed concerns three objects: the freedom of the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God.[14] With regard to all three the merely speculative interest of reason is only very slight; and with

[8][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 746–55. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 569–70.]

[9][*Zweck.* Translating this term as 'end' (which also has a temporal meaning) would frequently result in serious ambiguities; indeed, it would do so in this very instance. See my article on *Zweckmäßigkeit* ('purposiveness'), cited at A vii br. n. 7.]

[10][*nur allererst.*]

[11][*Kreis.*]

[12][*Glück.*]

[13][*Endabsicht.*]

[14][Cf. B 395 n. 222, including the references in br. n. 222b.]

this interest in view[15] one presumably would scarcely undertake an exhausting job—which wrestles with unceasing obstacles—of transcendental investigation. For whatever discoveries one might be able to make concerning these three objects, one could still not make of these discoveries a use that would prove its benefit *in concreto,* i.e., in the investigation of nature. E.g., first, even if the will[16] is free, this fact still can concern only the intelligible cause of our willing. For as regards the phenomena consisting of that will's manifestations,[17] i.e., the actions, we must always—according to an inviolable basic maxim without which we could not exercise any empirically used reason at all—explain them only as we explain all the remaining appearances of nature, viz., according to immutable laws of nature.[18] Moreover, second, even if one can have insight into the spiritual nature of the soul (and, with this nature, into the soul's immortality), one still can count on this spiritual nature neither as a basis of explanation regarding the appearances of this life, nor as shedding light on the particular character of our future state.[19] For our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative; it does not in the least expand our cognition or offer suitable material for inferences—except perhaps for inferences that can be regarded[20] only as inventions but that philosophy does not allow. Third, even if the existence of a supreme intelligence were proved, although we would indeed from this existence make comprehensible for ourselves in a general way what is purposive in the world's arrangement and order, we would by no means be entitled to derive from this existence any particular provision and order, or boldly to infer such provision or order where it is not perceived.[21] For there is a necessary rule of the speculative use of reason, not to pass over natural causes and abandon something of which we can inform ourselves through experience, in order to take something that we know[22] and derive it from what entirely surpasses our knowledge. In a

{A 799 B 827}

[15][*Absicht.*]

[16][*Wille;* 'willing' just below renders *Wollen.*]

[17][*Äußerungen.*]

[18][See above, A 538–41 = B 566–69.]

[19][As considered above, in the Paralogisms, A 341–405/B 399–432. See also A 778–80 = B 806–8.]

[20][*gelten.*]

[21][See above, A 559–65 = B 587–93. See also the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 436–42, 461–66.]

[22][*kennen;* similarly *Kenntnis* for 'knowledge' just below.]

word, for speculative reason these three propositions[23] always remain transcendent and have no immanent use whatever, i.e., no use admissible for objects of experience and hence beneficial to us in some way; rather, when regarded in themselves, they are endeavors of our reason that are entirely futile and are even extremely difficult into the bargain.

Accordingly, if these three cardinal propositions are not at all necessary to us for *knowledge*[24] and are nonetheless urgently commended to us by
A 800 B 828 our reason, then—I suppose—their importance will properly have to concern only the *practical.*

Practical[25] is everything that is possible through freedom. But if the conditions for the exercise of our free power of choice[26] are empirical, then reason can have in this exercise none but a regulative use and can serve only to bring about the unity of empirical laws. Thus, e.g., in the doctrine of prudence, the entire business of reason consists in taking all the purposes assigned to us by our inclinations and uniting them in the one purpose, *happiness,* and in harmonizing the means for attaining this happiness.[27] Consequently, reason can here supply none but *pragmatic* laws of free conduct that is aimed at attaining the purposes commended to us by the senses, and hence can supply no laws that are pure, i.e., determined completely a priori. By contrast, pure practical laws, the purpose of which is given completely a priori by reason and which command not in an empirically conditioned but in an absolute way, would be products of pure reason. *Moral* laws, however, are indeed such pure practical laws, and hence they alone belong to the practical use of pure reason and permit a canon.

The entire apparatus of pure reason, as considered in the treatment that may be called pure philosophy, is in fact directed only to the three mentioned problems. These problems themselves, however, have in turn their more remote aim, viz., *what is to be done* if the will is free, if there is a God, and if there is a future world. Now since this more remote aim con-
A 801 B 829 cerns our conduct in reference to the highest purpose, the ultimate aim of nature—the nature that in the arrangement of our reason provides for us wisely—pertains properly only to what is moral.

[23][I.e., that the will is free, that the soul is immortal, and that there is a God.]

[24][*Wissen.*]

[25][Emphasis added.]

[26][*Willkür.*]

[27][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak IV, 394–96.]

But as we turn our attention to an object extraneous to transcendental philosophy,[28] we must be cautious not to stray into digressions and violate the unity of the system, and cautious also—on the other hand—not to incur a lack of distinctness or of [power of] conviction by saying too little about our new material. I hope to accomplish both of these goals by keeping as close as possible to what is transcendental and setting aside entirely what might in this material be psychological, i.e., empirical.

And thus I must first point out that I shall for now employ the concept of freedom in its practical meaning only, and shall here set aside—as having been dealt with above[29]—the same concept in the transcendental signification. The latter concept cannot be presupposed empirically as a basis for explaining appearances, but is itself a problem for reason. For a power of choice is merely *animal* (*arbitrium brutum*)[30] if it cannot be determined otherwise than through sensible impulses,[31] i.e., *pathologically.* But the power of choice that can be determined independently of sensible impulses and hence through motivating causes that are presented only by reason is called the *free power of choice* (*arbitrium liberum*); and everything connected with this free power of choice, whether as basis or as consequence, is called *practical.* Practical freedom can be proved through experience. For the human power of choice[32] is determined not merely by what stimulates, i.e., by what directly affects the senses. Rather, we have a power[33] of overcoming, through presentations of what is beneficial or harmful even in a more remote[34] way, the impressions made upon our sensible

{A 802 B 830}

[28]All practical concepts deal with concepts of liking or disliking,[a] i.e., pleasure or displeasure, and hence deal at least indirectly with objects of our feeling. Feeling, however, is not a power to present things, but lies outside the cognitive power as a whole. Therefore, the elements of our judgments insofar as these judgments refer to pleasure and displeasure—and hence the elements of practical judgments—do not belong to the sum of transcendental philosophy, which has to do solely with pure a priori cognitions.

[a][*des Wohlgefallens oder Mißfallens.*]

[29][See the third antinomy (A 444–51 = B 472–79) and its solution (A 538–59 = B 566–87).]

[30][On the contrast that Kant is about to make, cf. A 534 = B 562. See also the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 213–14, 226–27.]

[31][I.e., impulses of sense.]

[32][*Willkür.*]

[33][*Vermögen.*]

[34][*auf entferntere Art:* A has *auf entfernete* (*entfernte*) *Art,* i.e., 'in a remote way.']

power of desire. These deliberations, however, concerning what is with regard to our whole state desirable,[35] i.e., good and beneficial, rest on reason. This is also why reason gives laws[36] that are imperatives, i.e., objective *laws of freedom.* Such laws tell us *what ought to occur* even though perhaps it never does occur[37]—and therein they differ from *laws of nature,* which deal only with *what occurs*—and this is why the laws of freedom are also called practical laws.

A 803 B 831 But whether reason is not, even in these actions through which it prescribes laws, determined in turn by other influences, and whether what in regard to sensible impulses is called freedom may not in regard to higher and more remote efficient causes in turn be nature—this further question does not concern us in the practical [realm]. For there we initially consult reason only concerning the *prescription* of conduct; but that further question is a merely speculative one, which we can set aside as long as our intention is directed to *doing* or *refraining.*[38] Hence we cognize practical freedom through experience; we cognize it as one of the natural causes, viz., as a causality of reason [that is operative] in the determination of the will. Transcendental freedom, on the other hand, demands an independence of this reason itself (as regards reason's causality whereby it is able to begin a series of appearances) from all determining causes of the world of sense; and to this extent transcendental freedom seems to be contrary to the law of nature and hence to all possible experience, and therefore remains a problem.[39] But this problem does not pertain to reason in its practical use; and hence in a canon of pure reason we deal with only two questions, which concern the practical interest of pure reason and with regard to which a canon of this reason's use must be possible, viz.: Is there a God? Is there a future life? The question regarding transcendental freedom concerns merely our speculative knowledge. This question we can set
A 804 B 832 aside as making no difference whatever when our concern is what is practical; and sufficient discussion regarding it can already be found in the antinomy of pure reason.[40]

[35][*begehrungswert.*]

[36][I.e., reason legislates.]

[37][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 406–12.]

[38][Emphasis on both these terms added.]

[39][See H. E. Allison, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n 22, 315–29.]

[40][See br. n. 29, just above.]

Section II

On the Ideal of the Highest Good, As a Determining Basis of the Ultimate Purpose of Pure Reason[41]

Reason in its speculative use led us through the realm of experiences and, since complete satisfaction can never be found for it in that realm, from there to speculative ideas. But in the end these ideas led us back again to experience, and thus they fulfilled their intent in a way that, although beneficial, did not at all conform to our expectation. This leaves us with one more attempt. Viz., we must inquire whether pure reason can be found also in reason's practical use; whether in this use it leads us to the ideas which reach the highest purposes of pure reason that we have just mentioned; and whether, therefore, pure reason cannot perhaps grant us from the viewpoint of its practical interest what it altogether denies us with regard to its speculative interest.

All my reason's interest (speculative as well as practical) is united in the following three questions:[42]

1. *What can I know?* {A 805 B 833}
2. *What ought I to do?*
3. *What may I hope?*

The first question is merely speculative. We have (as I flatter myself) exhausted all possible answers to this question and have finally found the one answer with which reason must indeed content itself and, if reason does

[41][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 756–75. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 570–76.]

[42][In the *Logic* (Ak. IX, 25) Kant adds a fourth question: *What is the human being?*]

not take account of the practical, also has cause to be content. From the two great purposes,[43] however, to which this entire endeavor of pure reason was properly directed we have remained just as distant as if we had—from love of leisure—refused this job at the very beginning. Hence if our concern is knowledge, then at least this much is certain and established: that we shall never be able to partake of knowledge regarding those two problems.[44]

The second question is merely practical. As such it can indeed belong to pure reason; but it is then a moral[45] rather than a transcendental question and hence cannot in itself occupy our [present] critique.[46]

The third question—viz., If, now, I do what I ought to do, what may I then hope?—is simultaneously practical and theoretical, so that the practical [component] is only a guide that leads to the answering of the theoretical question and—if the theoretical question rises high[47]—of the speculative question. For all *hoping* aims at happiness, and is in regard to the practical [realm] and to the moral[48] law the same [thing] that knowing and
A 806 B 834 the natural law are in regard to the theoretical cognition of things. Hoping ultimately amounts to the conclusion that there *is* something (that determines the ultimate possible purpose) *because something ought to occur;* knowing ultimately amounts to the conclusion that there *is* something (that acts as supreme cause) *because something does occur.*

Happiness is the satisfaction of all our inclinations[49] (*extensively,* in terms of their manifoldness; *intensively,* in terms of their degree; and also *protensively,* in terms of their duration). The practical law issuing from the motive of *happiness* I call pragmatic (i.e., rule of prudence).[50] But the prac-

[43][Existence of God, and immortality of the soul.]

[44][I.e., the two purposes just mentioned. See, however, A 818 = B 846 incl. br. n. 102.]

[45][*moralisch.*]

[46][This question is considered in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* the *Critique of Practical Reason,* and the *Metaphysics of Morals.*]

[47][To the point where experience is no longer possible and thus theorizing gives way to speculation; see A 634–35 = B 662–63.]

[48][*Sitten-.*]

[49][*Neigungen,* which are *lower* desires (*Begehrungen*), i.e., those of sensibility, as distinguished from *higher* desires, which are those of morality. See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 24–25, and the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 178–79, 209, cf. 168–69, 190, 196–97, 210, 353. Cf. also the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 411–12.]

[50][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 22–26.]

tical law that has as its motive nothing but the *worthiness to be happy*—if there is such a law—I call moral (moral law).[51] The pragmatic law advises [us] what we must do if we want to partake of happiness; the moral law commands[52] how we ought to behave in order just to become worthy of happiness. The pragmatic law is based on empirical principles; for in no other way than by means of experience can I know either what inclinations there are that want to be satisfied, or what the natural causes are that can bring about the satisfaction of those inclinations. The moral law abstracts from inclinations and from the natural means for satisfying them.[53] It considers only the freedom of a rational being as such, and the necessary conditions under which alone this freedom harmonizes with a distribution of happiness that is made in accordance with principles. Hence the moral law at least *can* rest on mere ideas of pure reason and thus be cognized a priori.

I assume that there actually are pure moral laws that determine completely a priori (without regard to empirical motives, i.e., to happiness) the doing and the refraining, i.e., the use of the freedom of a rational being as such, and that these laws command *absolutely* (not merely hypothetically, on the presupposition of other empirical purposes) and are therefore necessary in every regard.[54] This proposition [that there are such laws] I may rightly presuppose, by appealing not only to the proofs of the most enlightened moralists, but also to the moral judgment that every human being makes if he wishes to think such a law distinctly. {A 807 B 835}

Hence pure reason contains—although not in its speculative use but still in a certain practical. viz., the moral, use—principles of the *possibility of experience*, viz., of the experience of such actions as *could* be encountered in accordance with moral precepts[55] in the *history* of the human being. For since pure reason commands that such actions ought to occur, they must also be able to occur. And hence a particular kind of systematic unity must be possible, viz., moral unity. By contrast, the systematic unity of nature *according to speculative principles of reason* was incapable of being proved; for although reason has causality with regard to freedom as such,

[51][*moralisch* (*Sittengesetz*). See *ibid.*, 110–13.]

[52][*gebieten.* Although one alternative translation of this verb, as 'to dictate' (which I do use in two places in order to avoid contorted grammar), might sound more idiomatic in the present context, the verb's connotation of haughtiness is inappropriate here.]

[53][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 411–12.]

[54][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 31–34, 46–50.]

[55][Or 'prescriptions': *Vorschriften.*]

it does not have causality with regard to all of nature; and although moral principles of reason can give rise to free actions, they cannot give rise to
A 808 B 836 natural laws.[56] Accordingly, the principles of pure reason in its practical use—but specifically in its moral use—have objective reality.

The world insofar as it would be in accordance with all moral laws (as, indeed, according to the *freedom* of rational beings it *can* be, and as according to the necessary laws of *morality* it *ought* to be) I call a **moral world**. The moral world is thought merely as an intelligible world, inasmuch as we abstract in it from all conditions (purposes) and even from all obstacles for morality (weakness or impurity of human nature). Therefore, to this extent the moral world is a mere idea; yet it is a practical idea that actually can and ought to have its influence on the world of sense, in order to bring this world as much as possible into accordance with the moral world. Hence the idea of a moral world has objective reality. But it has such reality not as dealing with an object of an intelligible intuition[57] (such [a way for this idea to have objective reality] we cannot even think), but as dealing with the world of sense. However, the world of sense must here be taken as an object of pure reason in its practical use and as a *corpus mysticum*[58] of the rational beings in it insofar as their free power of choice is, under moral laws, in thoroughgoing systematic unity both with itself and with the freedom of every other such being.[59]

This has been the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason that concerned its practical interest,[60] and this answer is: *Do that*
A 809 B 837 *whereby you become worthy to be happy.* Now the second question asks this: What if now I behave in such a way as not to be unworthy of happiness, may I also hope that I can thereby partake of happiness? In answering this question, what matters is whether the principles of pure reason that prescribe the law a priori do also connect this hope necessarily with that law.

I maintain, then, that just as moral principles are necessary according to reason in its *practical* use, so it is equally necessary also according to reason in its *theoretical* use to assume that everyone has cause to hope for happiness insofar as he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct, and

[56][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 50–57, 119–21.]

[57][I.e., an intellectual intuition; see B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[58][Mystical object.]

[59][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 433–34.]

[60][I.e.: *What ought I to do?*]

hence to assume that the system of morality is linked inseparably—but only in the idea of pure reason—with the system of happiness.

Now in an intelligible world, i.e., in the moral world, in whose concept we abstract from all obstacles to morality[61] (i.e., from inclinations),[62] such a system of a proportionate happiness linked[63] with morality can indeed be thought as necessary. For freedom, partly impelled[64] and partly restricted by moral laws, would itself be the cause of general happiness; and hence rational beings, under the guidance of such principles, would themselves be originators of their own and also of other beings' lasting welfare. But this system of the morality that rewards itself is only an idea. Carrying out {A 810 B 838} the idea rests on the condition that *everyone* does what he ought to do, i.e., the condition that all actions of rational beings occur as they would if they sprang from a supreme will[65] comprising all private power of choice[66] within itself or under itself. However, the obligation issuing from the moral law remains valid for everyone's particular use of freedom even if others were not to behave in accordance with this law. Therefore, how the consequences of these actions will relate to happiness is determined neither by[67] the nature of the things of the world, nor by the causality of the actions themselves and their relation to morality.[68] And thus the mentioned necessary connection of one's hope for happiness with the unceasing endeavor to make oneself worthy of happiness cannot be cognized through reason if mere nature is laid at the basis. Rather, this connection may be hoped for only if a *supreme*[69] *reason* that commands according to moral laws is also laid at the basis of nature, as nature's cause.

The idea of such an intelligence wherein the morally most perfect will, combined[70] with the highest[71] bliss, is the cause of all happiness in the

[61][*Sittlichkeit* here, *Moralität* just below.]

[62][Reading, with Kirchmann, *den Neigungen* for *der Neigungen*.]

[63][*verbunden.*]

[64][*bewegt.*]

[65][*oberster Wille.*]

[66][*Privatwillkür.*]

[67][Literally, 'from': *aus.*]

[68][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 113–19.]

[69][I.e., divine: *höchst.*]

[70][*verbunden*]

[71][*höchst;* likewise in 'highest good,' just below.]

world, insofar as this happiness is exactly proportionate to one's morality (as the worthiness to be happy), I call *the ideal of the highest good.*[72] Hence only in the ideal of the highest *original* good[73] can pure reason find the A 811 B 839 basis of the practically necessary connection between the two elements[74] of the highest derivative good, viz., the basis of an intelligible, i.e., *moral* world. Now, we must through reason necessarily conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world,[75] although the senses exhibit to us nothing but a world of appearances. Hence we shall have to assume the moral world as being a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense, and—since the world of sense does not now offer us such a connection between happiness and morality—as being for us a future world. Hence God[76] and a future life[77] are two presuppositions that, according to principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation imposed on us by that same reason.

Morality[78] in itself amounts to a system; but happiness does not, except insofar as its distribution is exactly commensurate with morality. This, however, is possible only in the intelligible world, under a wise originator and ruler. Reason finds itself compelled either to assume such a being, along with life in such a world, which we must regard as a future world; or to regard the moral laws as idle chimeras, because without this presupposition the necessary result that reason connects with these laws would have to vanish. This is, moreover, why everyone regards the moral laws as *commands;*[79] this the moral laws could not be if they did not a priori connect with their rule commensurate consequences and thus carry with them *promises* A 812 B 840 *ises* and *threats.* But this again the moral laws cannot do unless they re-

[72][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 110–19.]

[73][Or 'supreme *original* good'; i.e., the existence of God. Cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 125.]

[74][I.e., happiness as proportioned to one's morality (worthiness to be happy).]

[75][Viz., a moral world.]

[76][On the moral proof of the existence of God, cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 124–32; also the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 447–85 (esp. 447–53). See also W. H. Walsh, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 1, 229–41. And see T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 247–48.]

[77][On the presupposition of a future life (immortality of the soul), cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 122–24; also the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 460–61, 471–75. See also T. D. Weldon, *op. cit.* at A 21/B 35 br. n. 22, 247–48.]

[78][*Sittlichkeit* here, *Moralität* just below.]

[79][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 412–13; also the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 36–37.]

side in a necessary being that, as the highest good, can alone make such a purposive unity possible.

Leibniz called the world, insofar as we consider in it only the rational beings and their coherence according to moral laws under the government of the highest good, the *kingdom of grace.*[80] And this he distinguished from the *kingdom of nature,* where these beings are indeed subject to moral laws but expect from their conduct no other results than those that occur in accordance with the course of nature in our world of sense. Therefore, seeing ourselves in the kingdom of grace, where all happiness awaits us except insofar as we ourselves limit our share therein by being unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of reason.

Practical laws insofar as they also become subjective bases of actions, i.e., subjective principles, are called *maxims.*[81] The *judging* of morality in terms of its purity and consequences occurs according to *ideas,* the *compliance* with its laws occurs according to *maxims.*

It is necessary that our entire way of life[82] be subjected to moral maxims. But it is at the same time impossible for this to occur unless reason connects with the moral law, which is a mere idea, an efficient cause that determines for all conduct conforming to[83] this law an outcome, whether in this or in another life, that corresponds exactly to our highest purposes. {A 813 B 841}
Hence without a God and without a world that is invisible to us now but is hoped for, the splendid ideas of morality are indeed objects of approbation and admiration, but are not incentives[84] for our resolve and for our carrying out these ideas. For they do not then fulfill the entire purpose which is natural for every rational[85] being and which is determined a priori and made necessary by that same pure reason.

Happiness by itself is, for our reason, far from being the complete good. For happiness is not approved by our reason (however much it may be wished for by our inclination) unless this happiness is united with worthiness to be happy, i.e., with morally good conduct. But morality by

[80][Cf. below, A 815 = B 843.]

[81][Cf. the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 19–20, 79. See also the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 400n, 421n, 438–39, 449.]

[82][*Lebenswandel.*]

[83][*Verhalten nach.*]

[84][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 427; also the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 71–72.]

[85][*vernünftig.*]

itself—and with it the mere *worthiness* to be happy—is also far from being the complete good. In order for this good to be completed, the person who in his conduct has not been unworthy of happiness must be able to hope that he will partake of it. Even a reason free from any private aim and thus not taking into account an interest of its own, if it puts itself in the position of a being that had to distribute all happiness to others, cannot judge differently. For in the practical idea[86] the two components are linked essentially—although in such a way that it is the moral attitude, as condition, that first makes possible the sharing in happiness, and not, conversely, the prospect of happiness that first makes possible the moral attitude.[87] For in the latter case the attitude would not be moral, and hence
A 814 B 842 would also not be worthy of full[88] happiness—the happiness which in reason's view[89] recognizes no other limitation than a limitation due to our own immoral conduct.

Hence happiness, in exact balance with the morality of rational beings whereby these beings are worthy of happiness, alone amounts to the highest good of a world into which, according to the precepts of pure but practical reason, we must definitely transfer ourselves. That world, to be sure, is only an intelligible one; for the world of sense does not promise to us, as arising from the nature of things, such systematic unity of purposes. Moreover, the reality of that intelligible world cannot be based on anything other than the presupposition of a highest original good: a good where independent[90] reason, equipped with all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, establishes, preserves, and completes—according to the most perfect purposiveness—the order of things that is universal although very much concealed from us in the world of sense.

Now this moral theology has over speculative theology the particular advantage of leading inevitably to the concept of a *single, maximally perfect,* and *rational* original being; speculative theology does not, from objective bases, even *point* to such a being, much less is able to *convince* us [of the existence] thereof. For no matter how far reason may lead us in transcendental and in natural theology, in neither of them do we find any

[86][Of the complete good.]

[87][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 113–19; also the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 337–78.]

[88][*ganz.*]

[89][*vor der Vernunft.*]

[90][*selbständig.*]

significant basis for assuming just a single being such that we would have sufficient cause to put this being prior to[91] all natural causes and also to make these causes in all respects dependent on it. By contrast, if we consider from the viewpoint of moral unity, as a necessary law of the world, the cause that alone can give to this law the commensurate effect and hence also its obligating force for us, then what comprises all these laws within itself must be a single supreme will. For how could we find perfect unity of purposes among different wills? This will must be omnipotent, in order that all of nature and its reference to morality in the world may be[92] subject to it; omniscient, in order that it may cognize the innermost core of our attitudes and their moral value; omnipresent, in order that it may be directly close to all need that the highest greatest good of the world requires [to be satisfied];[93] eternal, in order that this harmony of nature and freedom may at no time be lacking; etc. {A 815 B 843}

Thus we arrive at systematic unity of purposes in this world of intelligences[94]—a world that as mere nature can indeed be called only the world of sense, but that as a system of freedom can be called the intelligible, i.e., the moral world (*regnum gratiae*).[95] But this systematic unity of purposes leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things making up this large whole [as a unity] according to universal natural laws, just as the unity in the world of intelligences is one according to universal and necessary moral laws; and it thus unites practical with speculative reason. The world must be presented by us as having arisen from an idea, if {A 816 B 844} it is to harmonize with that use of reason without which we would consider ourselves unworthy of reason, viz., the moral use, which rests entirely on the idea of the highest good. Through this way of presenting the world, all investigation of nature acquires a direction according to the form of a system of purposes, and in its highest extension becomes physicotheology.[96] But because physicotheology started from moral order, as a unity

[91][Reading, with Wille, *vorzusetzen* for *vorsetzen*.]

[92][‘may be’ here translates *sei;* similarly below.]

[93][*welches das höchste Weltbeste erfordert,* which (by its grammar) could also mean ‘that requires the highest greatest good of the world.’]

[94][Cf. A 566 = B 594 incl. br. n. 408.]

[95][Kingdom of grace; cf. above, A 812 = B 840.]

[96][Cf. the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 436–42 On this entire topic of the relation between nature’s unity and morality (as well as the relation among our theoretical and our practical

that has its basis in the essence[97] of freedom and is not brought about contingently through external commands, it leads the purposiveness of nature to bases that must be inseparably connected a priori with the intrinsic possibility of things. It thereby leads nature's purposiveness to a *transcendental theology,* which adopts the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as a principle of systematic unity—a principle that connects all things according to universal and necessary natural laws because all these things have their origin[98] in the absolute necessity of a single original being.[99]

What sort of *use* can we make of our understanding, even as regards experience, if we do not set purposes for ourselves? But the highest purposes are those of morality, and these are purposes that only pure reason can allow us to cognize. Now even as furnished with these moral purposes and guided by them, we still cannot make any purposive use of our acquaintance with nature itself as regards cognition, if nature itself has not
A 817 B 845 also laid down purposive unity. For without this unity we ourselves would not even have any reason, since we would have no school for it and no culture[100] [of reason] through objects that would offer to it the material for such concepts of purposes. However, the moral purposive unity is necessary and has its basis in the essence of the power of choice itself. Hence the natural purposive unity, which contains the condition of the moral unity's application *in concreto,* must likewise be necessary. And thus the transcendental enhancement of our rational cognition would be not the cause but merely the effect of the practical[101] purposiveness imposed on us by pure reason.

Thus we do indeed find, in the history of human reason, that before the moral concepts were sufficiently purified and determined, and insight gained—and this from necessary principles—into the systematic unity of purposes according to these concepts, our acquaintance with nature and even a considerable degree of the culture of reason in various other sciences [had very little theological significance; for in part they] could produce only crude and erratic concepts of the deity, and in part they left people

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powers and among Kant's three *Critiques*), see Section 15 of the Translator's Introduction to my translation of that work, cited at B xvii br. n. 73.]

[97] [Or 'nature': *Wesen*.]

[98] [*Ursprung*.]

[99] [*Urwesen*.]

[100] [Or 'cultivation': *Kultur*.]

[101] [Or, i.e., moral.]

with an amazing general indifference regarding this question. A greater treatment of moral ideas—which was made necessary by the extremely pure moral law of our religion—sharpened reason for dealing with this [divine] object, through the interest that this treatment compelled people to take in this object. And these moral ideas, without any contribution either from an expanded acquaintance with nature or from correct and reliable transcendental insights (of which there has at all times been a lack), brought about {A 818 B 846} a concept of the divine being that we now regard as the correct concept; and we regard it as correct not because speculative reason convinces us of this correctness, but because the concept harmonizes perfectly with reason's moral principles. And thus in the end it is always still pure reason alone, but only in its practical use, that has the merit of connecting a cognition[102] to our highest interest: a cognition that mere speculation can only surmise but cannot validate.[103] And pure practical reason has the merit of thereby turning this cognition, not indeed into a demonstrated dogma, but still into an absolutely necessary presupposition linked with reason's most essential purposes.

However, when practical reason has reached this high point, viz., the concept of a single original being as the highest good, it must by no means—just as if it had elevated itself beyond all empirical conditions of this concept's application and had soared to a direct acquaintance with new objects—presume to start now[104] from this concept and to derive from it the moral laws themselves.[105] For it was precisely these laws whose intrinsic practical necessity led us to the presupposition of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler of the world, in order to provide these laws with effect. And hence we cannot thereafter regard them in turn as contingent and as derived from a mere will, especially not from a will of which we {A 819 B 847} would have no concept at all if we had not formed this concept in accordance with those laws. As far as practical reason has the right to guide us, we shall not regard actions as obligatory because they are commands of God, but shall regard them as divine commands because we are intrinsi-

[102][Viz., of God. What pure practical reason connects to our highest (moral) interest is *Erkenntnis* (cognition), not *Wissen* (knowledge), which in the case of God we *do not* have: see A 828–29 = B 856–57, and A vii br. n. 6. Cf. also A 805 = B 833 incl. br. n. 44]

[103][*wähnen, aber nicht geltend machen.*]

[104][Reading, with Hartenstein, *nun* for *um.*]

[105][See the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 132–34.]

cally[106] obligated to them.[107] We shall study freedom in terms of[108] the purposive unity according to principles of reason, and shall believe that we conform to the divine will only insofar as we hold sacred the moral law which reason teaches us from the nature of the actions themselves; and we shall believe that we can serve this will solely by furthering in[109] us and in others the highest good in the world.[110] Hence moral theology is only of immanent use. It serves us, viz., to fulfill our vocation here in the world by fitting ourselves into the system of all purposes, and to keep from abandoning in a good way of life, through fanaticism or perhaps even wickedness, the guiding thread of a morally legislating reason in order to tie this thread directly to the idea of a supreme being. For doing the latter would yield a transcendent use of reason and must—just like the use of reason in mere speculation—pervert and defeat the ultimate purposes of reason.[111]

106[Or, possibly, inwardly: *innerlich.*]

107[See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 408–09; the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 127–29; and the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 486–88.]

108[*unter.*]

109[*an.*]

110[*das Weltbeste.*]

111[See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 443; the *Critique of Practical Reason,* Ak. V, 127–30; and the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 486–91.]

Section III[112]
On Opinion, Knowledge, and Faith[113]

Assent[114] is an event in our understanding that may rest on objective bases[115] but that also requires subjective causes in the mind of the person who is judging. If the assent is valid for everyone, provided that he has reason, then its basis is sufficient *objectively*, and the assent is then called *conviction*. If the assent has its basis only in the particular character[116] of the subject, then it is called *persuasion*.[117]

112[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 776–88. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 576–78.]

113[*Glauben*, which can also refer to *belief*. In this section and elsewhere, Kant is concerned above all with *faith*, a *Glaube* that is *incompatible* with knowledge—which is commonly defined as belief that is true, (theoretically) justified, etc.—i.e., incompatible with *Wissen*, though not with *Erkenntnis* (cognition). See Kant's definition of *Glauben* at A 822 = B 850. See also B xxx incl. br. n. 122, and cf. A vii br. n. 6. (On this whole section, cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 65–74.) However, because Kant here also discusses the kind of *Glaube* that is *compatible* with knowledge, I do use the noun 'belief' in places where incompatibility with knowledge is *not* implied. And I use the verb 'to believe' where that incompatibility is not implied *or* where the verbal phrase 'to have faith in' would be excessively awkward or even misleading. Given these terminological choices, one could translate the section's heading more literally, as 'On Opining, Knowing, and Believing.' However, the verb 'to opine' is at best quaint (where necessary, I use instead the phrase 'to hold an opinion'), and for the noun 'faith' there is no good verb. Besides, Kant's decision to use the verbs (as verbal nouns) does not seem to have philosophical—in particular, phenomenological—significance. He may well have used the verbs simply because in the case of knowledge *there is* no noun other than the verbal noun *Wissen*, and in the case of faith the nonverbal *Glaube* is, in the dative case (with *Vom*, 'On') indistinguishable from the verbal noun *Glauben;* and thus a similar use of *Meinen* instead of *Meinung* ('opining' instead of 'opinion') would have suggested itself.]

114[Literally, 'considering-true': *Fürwahrhalten*.]

115[Or 'grounds': *Gründen*. See B xix br. n. 79.]

116[*Beschaffenheit*.]

117[For this contrast, cf. the *Critique of Judgment*, Ak. V, 461–63, also 467–73. See also the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 72–73.]

Persuasion is a mere illusion; for the judgment's basis, which lies in the subject, is regarded as objective. Hence such a judgment also has only private validity, and the assent cannot be communicated. Truth, however, rests on agreement with the object; consequently, in regard to the object the judgments of every understanding must be in agreement (*consentientia uni tertio, consentiunt inter se*).[118] Thus, whether assent is conviction or mere persuasion, its touchstone externally is the possibility of communicating the assent and of finding it to be valid for every human being's reason.
A 821 B 849 For then there is at least a presumption that the agreement[119] of all the judgments, despite the difference among the subjects, will rest on the common basis, viz., the object, and that hence the judgments will all agree with the object and will thereby prove the truth of the [joint] judgment.

Accordingly, persuasion can indeed not be distinguished subjectively from conviction if the subject views the assent merely as an appearance of his own mind. But the assent's bases that are valid for us can be tested[120] on the understanding of others, to see whether these bases have the same effect on the reason of others that they have on ours; and this test is still a means, although only a subjective one, not indeed to bring about conviction, but still to detect any merely private validity of the judgment, i.e., whatever in the judgment is mere persuasion.

If, in addition, we can unfold the judgment's subjective *causes* that we take to be objective *bases* of it, and if we can therefore explain the deceptive assent as an event in our mind without needing the object's character[121] for this explanation, then we expose the illusion and are no longer tricked by it. But we are still to a certain degree tempted[122] by the illusion if its subjective cause attaches to our nature.

I cannot *assert* anything—i.e., pronounce it as a judgment that is nec-
A 822 B 850 essarily valid for everyone—unless it is something that produces conviction. Persuasion I can keep for myself if I am at ease with it, but I cannot and should not try to make it hold apart from me.

[118][If there is agreement of one (of several judgments) with (something) third (the object), then they (all the judgments) agree with one another.]

[119][Kant actually says 'the basis of the agreement,' apparently intending to go on to say 'will be the common basis' rather than 'will rest on the common basis.']

[120][*Versuch machen.*]

[121][*Beschaffenheit.*]

[122][*versucht*]

Assent—or the judgment's subjective validity—in reference to conviction (which holds [subjectively and] at the same time objectively) has the following three levels: *opinion, faith,*[123] and *knowledge. Opinion* is an assent that is consciously insufficient *both* subjectively and objectively. If the assent is sufficient only subjectively and is at the same time regarded as objectively insufficient, then it is called *faith.* Finally, assent that is sufficient[124] both subjectively and objectively is called *knowledge.* Subjective sufficiency[125] is called *conviction* (for myself); objective sufficiency is called *certainty* (for everyone). I shall not linger upon the elucidation of such readily comprehensible concepts.

I must never presume to hold an *opinion*[126] without *knowing* at least something by means of which the judgment, which in itself is merely problematic, acquires a connection with truth; for truth, even when not complete, is still more than an arbitrary invention. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be certain. For if in regard to this law I again have nothing but opinion, then everything is only a play of imagination without the least reference to truth. In judgments issuing from pure reason, holding an *opinion* is not permitted at all. For such judgments are not supported by experiential bases. Rather, where everything is necessary, there everything {A 823 B 851} is to be cognized a priori. Hence there the principle of connection requires universality and necessity,[127] and hence complete certainty; otherwise one finds in it no guidance to truth. Thus holding an opinion in pure mathematics is absurd; here one must know, or refrain from all judgment. The same applies to the principles of morality, where one must not venture upon an action on the mere opinion that something is *permitted,* but must know this to be permitted.

In the transcendental use of reason, on the other hand, holding an opinion is indeed too little, but knowing is again too much. Hence here we cannot judge at all with a merely speculative aim. For subjective bases of assent, such as those that can bring about faith, deserve no approval in the case of speculative questions, because as used independently of all

[123][*Glauben.* Although this term can also refer to *belief,* Kants definition, just below, of *Glaube* as assent that is sufficient subjectively *but not objectively* fits *only* the term 'faith,' inasmuch as a *belief* at least *can* still also be knowledge. See br. n. 113, just above.]

[124][*zureichend.*]

[125][*Zulänglichkeit.*]

[126][*zu meinen.*]

[127][Cf. above, B 3–6]

empirical assistance they do not hold up, nor can be communicated in equal measure to others. [That leaves faith or belief.]

However, only in a *practical reference* can the theoretically insufficient assent be called belief[128] at all. Now this practical [reference or] aim is either one of *skill* or of *morality*—of skill for optional and contingent purposes, of morality for absolutely necessary purposes.

Once a purpose has been set, the conditions for attaining it are hypothetically necessary. This necessity is subjectively sufficient—yet it is so
A 824 B 852 only comparatively if I do not know any other conditions whatever under which the purpose could be attained. But the necessity is sufficient absolutely and for everyone if I know with certainty that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions leading to the set purpose. In the first case my presupposition and the assent to certain conditions is a merely contingent belief, but in the second case it is a necessary belief.[129] A physician must do something for a patient who is in danger, but is not acquainted with the nature of the patient's illness. He observes the phenomena and then judges, not knowing anything better to conclude, that the disease is consumption. His belief, even in his own judgment, is merely contingent; another belief might perhaps hit it better. Such belief, which is contingent but underlies our actual use of the means for certain actions, I call *pragmatic belief.*

The usual touchstone as to whether something asserted by someone is mere persuasion, or at least subjective conviction—i.e., firm belief—is *betting.* Often someone pronounces his propositions with such confident and intractable defiance that he seems to have entirely shed all worry about error. A bet startles him. Sometimes the persuasion which he owns turns out to be sufficient to be assessed at one ducat, but not at ten. For although he
A 825 B 853 may indeed risk the first ducat, at ten ducats he first becomes aware of what he previously failed to notice, viz., that he might possibly have erred after all. If we conceive in our thoughts the possibility of betting our whole life's happiness on something,[130] then our triumphant judgment[131] dwindles very much indeed; we then become extremely timid and thus discover for the first time that our belief does not reach this far. Thus pragmatic belief has

[128] [Or 'faith.']

[129] [Or 'faith.']

[130] [Something that we believe.]

[131] [Or, i.e., belief.]

merely a degree, which according to the difference of the interest involved may be large but may also be small.

Even if we cannot undertake anything at all concerning an object, and the assent regarding it is therefore merely theoretical, we can still in many cases conceive and imagine an undertaking[132] for which we suppose ourselves to have sufficient bases[133] if there were a means of establishing the certainty of the matter.[134] And thus there is in merely theoretical judgments an *analogue* of *practical* judgments, and for an assent to such judgments the word *faith*[135] is appropriate. We may call this a *doctrinal faith.* I would indeed bet all that I own—if this matter could be established through some experience—that there are inhabitants on[136] at least one of the planets that we see. Hence I say that this view—that there are inhabitants also on other worlds—is not a mere opinion but a strong faith (on whose correctness I would surely risk many of life's advantages).

Now, we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to doctrinal faith. To be sure, as regards theoretical cognition of the world[137] I have nothing *available* that necessarily presupposes this thought as a condition for my explanations of the world's appearances; rather, I am obligated to employ my reason as if everything were mere nature. Yet purposive unity is such a major condition for applying reason to nature that I cannot pass it by—[especially] since experience also provides me richly with examples of this unity.[138] But I know[139] no other condition for this unity that would make it my guide for the investigation of nature except the presupposition that a supreme intelligence has arranged everything in this way in accordance with the wisest purposes. Hence presupposing a wise originator of the world is a condition for an aim that is indeed contingent but still not unimportant, viz., to have guidance in the investigation of nature. Moreover, so often is this presupposition's usefulness confirmed by { A 826 B 854

[132][Such as a bet.]

[133][Or 'grounds.']

[134][I.e., the certainty concerning the object.]

[135][Or *belief;* likewise for the remainder of the discussion of doctrinal faith (which ends just after the end of A 827 = B 855.]

[136][Kant actually says 'in.']

[137][*Weltkenntnis.*]

[138][See above, A 620–30 = B 648–58. See also the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak. V, 425–42, 461–66.]

[139][*kenne.*]

the outcome of my attempts,[140] while nothing can be adduced against the presupposition in a decisive way, that I would say far too little if I wanted to call my assent merely an opinion. Rather, even in this theoretical relation we may say that I have firm faith in a God. But this faith is then still not practical in a strict meaning of this term; rather, it must be called a
A 827 B 855 doctrinal faith, to which the *theology* of nature (physicotheology) must necessarily give rise everywhere. With regard to the same wisdom, and in view of the superb endowment of human nature and the shortness of life that is so incommensurate with this endowment, we can likewise find a sufficient basis for a doctrinal faith in the future life of the human soul.[141]

The expression *faith*[142] is in such cases an expression of modesty from an *objective* point of view, but simultaneously of firmness of confidence from a *subjective* point of view. If I here wanted to call the merely theoretical assent even just a hypothesis that I am entitled to assume, I would already be promising to have a fuller concept of the character[143] of a world cause and of the character of another world than I can actually show. For if I assume something even just as a hypothesis, then I must know[144] at least so much about its properties that I need to invent *not its concept* but *only its existence.* The word *faith,* however, applies here only to the guidance that an idea gives to me, and to the idea's subjective influence on the furtherance of my acts of reason—the furtherance that keeps me attached to the idea even though I am unable to account for it from a speculative point of view.

The merely doctrinal faith, however, has something shaky about it; for the difficulties encountered in speculation often drive one away from this
A 828 B 856 faith, although inevitably one always returns to it again.

The situation is quite different with *moral faith.* For here there is an absolute necessity that something must occur, viz., that I comply in all points with the moral law. Here the purpose is inescapably established, and—according to all the insight I have—only a single condition is possible under which this purpose coheres with the entirety of all purposes and thereby has practical validity, viz., the condition that there is a God and a

140[To explain nature.]

141[See above, A 805–11 = B 833–39.]

142[Emphasis added; likewise later in this paragraph.]

143[*Beschaffenheit;* i.e., roughly, *nature.*]

144[*kennen.*]

future world.[145] I also know with complete certainty that no one else is acquainted with other conditions that lead[146] to the same unity of purposes under the moral[147] law. But since the moral precept is thus simultaneously my maxim (as, indeed, reason commands), I shall inevitably have faith in the existence of God and in a future life. And I am sure that nothing can shake this faith; for that would overturn my moral principles themselves, which I cannot renounce without being detestable in my own eyes.

In this way, even after all the ambitious aims of a reason roaming beyond the bounds of experience have been defeated, we are still left with enough in order to have cause to be satisfied from a practical point of view. No one, indeed, will be able to boast that he *knows*[148] that there is a God and that there is a future life; for if he knows this, then he is just the man { A 829 B 857 that I have been looking for all along. All knowledge (if it concerns an object of mere reason) can be communicated, and hence I could then hope that I might through his instruction see my own knowledge extended in such a marvelous degree. No, the conviction is not a logical but a *moral* certainty; and because it rests on subjective bases (of the moral attitude), I must not even say, *It is* morally certain that there is a God, etc., but must say, *I am* morally certain, etc. In other words, the faith in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral attitude that, as little as I am in danger of losing my moral attitude, so little am I worried that my faith[149] could ever be torn from me.

The only precariousness to be found in this[150] is the fact that this rational faith is based on the presupposition of moral attitudes. If we abandon this presupposition and assume someone who is entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws, then the question posed by reason becomes merely a problem for speculation; and it can indeed still be supported then by strong bases taken from analogy, but not by bases to which the most

[145][See above, A 805–19 = B 833–47.]

[146][Reading, with Grillo and the *Akademie* edition, *führen* for *führe*.]

[147][*moralisch* here, *sittlich* just below.]

[148][*wissen.* Kant is denying knowledge of God, but is denying neither faith *nor cognition* (*Erkenntnis*). Cf. A 818 = B 846, and B xxx incl. br. n. 122.]

[149][Reading, with Mellin and the *Akademie* edition, *letztere . . . erste* for *erstere . . zweite.*]

[150][I.e., in this account of moral faith.]

A 830 B 858 obstinate skepticism would have to yield.[151] But in these questions no human being is free of all interest. For although he may be separated from moral interest through a lack of good attitudes, yet enough remains even in this case to make him *fear* a divine existence and a future life. For this requires nothing more than the fact that at least he cannot plead any *certainty* that *no* such being and *no* future life are to be found. This [negative proposition]—since it would have to be proved through mere reason and hence apodeictically—he could prove only by establishing that both such a being and such a future life are impossible; and certainly no reasonable human being can undertake to do that. This [faith based on fear] would be a *negative* faith; and although it could not bring about morality and good attitudes, it could still bring about their analogue, viz., a powerful restraint on the eruption of evil attitudes.

But, it will be said, is this all that pure reason accomplishes in opening up prospects beyond the bounds of experience? Nothing more than two articles of faith? Even the common understanding could presumably have accomplished as much without consulting philosophers about it! A 831 B 859

In reply, I do not here want to extol what merit philosophy has on behalf of human reason through the laborious endeavor of its critique, even supposing that this merit were in the upshot deemed to be merely negative; for I shall say something more about this in the following section.[152] But do you indeed demand that a cognition which concerns all human beings should surpass the common understanding and be revealed to you only by philosophers? Precisely the point[153] which you rebuke is the best confirmation that the assertions made thus far are correct. For it reveals what one could not have foreseen at the outset: viz., that in matters of concern to all human beings, without distinction, nature cannot be accused of partiality in the distribution of its gifts; and that with regard to the essential purposes of human nature the highest philosophy cannot get further than

A 830 B 858 [151]The human mind takes (as, I believe, happens necessarily with any rational being) a natural interest in morality, although this interest is not undivided and not preponderant practically. Solidify and increase this interest, and you will find reason very teachable and even further enlightened for the task of uniting with the practical interest also the speculative interest. But if you do not take care beforehand to make at least halfway good human beings, then you will also never make them human beings of sincere faith.

[152][The next chapter, actually: The Architectonic of Pure Reason.]

[153][Viz., that even the common understanding could have discovered the two articles of faith.]

can the guidance that nature has bestowed even upon the commonest understanding.

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

A 832
B 860

Chapter III
The Architectonic of Pure Reason[154]

By an *architectonic* I mean the art of systems. Since systematic unity is what first turns common cognition into science,[155] i.e., turns a mere aggregate of cognition into a system, architectonic is the doctrine of what is scientific[156] in our cognition as such; and hence it necessarily belongs to the doctrine of method.

Under reason's government our cognitions as such must not amount to a rhapsody; rather, they must amount to a system, in which alone they can support and further reason's essential purposes. By a system, however, I mean the unity of the manifold cognitions under an idea. This idea is reason's concept of the form of a whole insofar as this concept determines a priori both the range of the manifold and the relative position that the parts have among one another. Hence reason's scientific concept contains the whole's purpose and the form of the whole congruent with this purpose.[157]

[154][See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n 2, vol. 4, 789–820 See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit.* at A vii br. n. 5, 579–81.]

[155][*Wissenschaft.*]

[156][*szientifisch;* likewise in the next paragraph.]

[157][Or, possibly, 'with this concept: *mit demselben*.]

The unity characteristic of a purpose,[158] to which all the parts refer and to which in the idea of the purpose they also refer among one another, makes A 833 B 861 possible the fact that every part can be missed if the remaining parts are familiar, and the fact that there is no place for any contingent addition or indeterminate magnitude of the whole's perfection—i.e., a magnitude that does not have its a priori determined bounds. Hence the whole is structured (*articulatio*) and not accumulated (*coacervatio*).[159] It can indeed grow internally (*per intus susceptionem*) but not externally (*per appositionem*);[160] i.e., it can grow only like an animal body, whose growth adds no member but makes each member stronger and more efficient for its purposes without any change of proportion.

For its execution the idea requires a *schema,* i.e., an essential manifoldness as well as order of the parts that is determined a priori from the principle of the purpose. A schema that is drawn up not in accordance with an idea—i.e., on the basis of reason's main purpose—but empirically, in accordance with aims that offer themselves contingently (whose number one cannot know in advance), yields *technical* unity.[161] But a schema that arises only in conformity with an idea (where reason imposes the purposes a priori and does not await them empirically) is the basis for *architectonic* unity. What we call science cannot arise technically, i.e., not because of the similarity of the manifold [parts in it] or because of the contingent use of cognition *in concreto* for all sorts of optional external purposes; but it can arise only architectonically, on account of the affinity [of its parts] and the derivation [of these parts] from a single supreme and internal purpose that makes the whole possible in the first place. For the schema of what we call A 834 B 862 science must contain the whole's outline (*monogramma*) and the whole's division into members in conformity with the idea—i.e., it must contain these a priori—and must distinguish this whole from all others securely and according to principles.

No one tries to bring about a science without having an underlying idea. But as one elaborates the idea, the schema—indeed, even the definition—that at the very outset he gives of his science corresponds very seldom to his idea. For this idea lies hidden in reason like a germ in which

158[*Einheit des Zwecks.*]

159[In the Latin, (by) articulation (but not by) accumulation.]

160[In the Latin, by internal (taking-up or) inclusion (but not) by apposition (external addition).]

161[I.e., the unity characteristic of art (in the broad sense of this term, which includes craft).]

all the parts are still enfolded and barely recognizable even to microscopic observation. Hence all sciences—because they are, after all, devised from the viewpoint of a certain universal interest—must be explicated and determined[162] not according to the description that their originator gives of them, but according to the idea that, judging from the natural unity of the parts that the originator has brought together, we find to have its basis in reason itself. For we shall then find that the originator of the science and often even his latest successors are wandering around an idea that they were unable to make distinct to themselves, thus being unable also to determine the science's proper content, articulation (systematic unity), and bounds.

It is terrible[163] that only after we have, in accordance with the instruction of an idea lying hidden in us, for a long time collected rhapsodically as building material many cognitions referring to this idea,[164] and indeed only after we have over long periods of time assembled these cognitions technically, we are first able to discern the idea in a clearer light and to sketch a whole architectonically in accordance with the purposes of reason. Systems seem to have been formed, truncated at first but with time complete, by a *generatio aequivoca*[165]—like vermin—from the mere melding[166] of gathered concepts, although every one of these systems had its schema, as the original germ, in the reason that was merely unfolding. Hence not only is each system by itself structured in accordance with an idea, but, in addition, all systems are in turn united purposively among one another—as members of a whole—in a system of human cognition, and thus permit an architectonic of all human knowledge. Such an architectonic—at the present time, when so much material has already been collected or can be obtained from the ruins of collapsed old edifices—would not only be possible, but indeed not even difficult. Here we settle for the completion of our task, viz., merely to sketch the *architectonic* of all cognition issuing from *pure reason;* and we start only from the point where the general root of our cognitive power divides and thrusts forth two stems, one of which is *reason.*[167] By reason, however, I mean here the whole

A 835
B 863

[162][Or 'defined': *bestimmt;* likewise in the next sentence.]

[163][*schlimm.*]

[164][*dahin.*]

[165][See B 167 incl. br. n. 326.]

[166][*Zusammenfluß*]

[167][The other stem is sensibility.]

higher cognitive power, and I therefore still contrast[168] what is rational with what is empirical.

If I abstract from all content of cognition as considered objectively, then A 836 B 864 subjectively all cognition is either historical or rational. Historical cognition is *cognitio ex datis,* but rational cognition is *cognitio ex principiis.*[169] No matter how a cognition is given originally, with the person[170] who possesses the cognition it is still historical if he cognizes [material] only to the degree and in the amount[171] given to him from elsewhere, whether this [material] was given to him through direct experience, through someone's report, or through instruction (of universal cognitions[172]). Hence someone who has (properly speaking) *learned* a system of philosophy (e.g., the *Wolffian* system)[173]—even if he has in his mind all the principles, explications, and proofs, together with the division of the entire doctrinal edifice, and could count it all on his fingers—would still have none but a complete *historical* cognition of the Wolffian philosophy. He knows and judges only as much as was given to him. Dispute one of his definitions, and he will not know whence to take another. He molded[174] himself according to the reason of another person.[175] But the reproductive[176] power is not the productive.[177] I.e., with him the cognition did not arise *from* reason; and although it was objectively indeed a rational cognition, yet subjectively it is merely historical. He has well comprehended and retained, i.e., learned, and is the plaster cast of a living human being. Rational cognitions that are such objectively (i.e., that can arise initially only from a human being's own reason), may be so named subjectively as well solely if they are drawn A 837 B 865 from universal sources of reason—from which there can arise also the cri-

[168][Within this power.]

[169][Respectively, cognition from data and cognition from principles Cf. the *Logic*, Ak. IX, 22.]

[170][*bei dem.*]

[171][*so viel.*]

[172][Cf. below, near the end of the paragraph.]

[173][See B xxxvi incl. br. n. 134. (Parentheses added; likewise just above.)]

[174][*bilden.*]

[175][*fremd.*]

[176][*nachbildend.*]

[177][*erzeugend.*]

tique, and indeed even the rejection, of what has been learned—i.e., solely if these cognitions are drawn from principles.

Now all rational cognition is obtained either from concepts or from the construction of concepts. The first is called philosophical, the second mathematical. The intrinsic difference between these two kinds of rational cognition has already been dealt with in the first chapter.[178] Thus a cognition can be objectively philosophical and yet be subjectively historical. This is the case with most learners, and with all learners who never look beyond the school and remain learners all their lives. What is odd, however, is that mathematical cognition, just as one has learned it, can yet count as rational[179] cognition also subjectively, and that there is with this cognition no such distinction as there is with philosophical cognition. The cause of this is the fact that the sources of cognition from which alone the teacher can draw his cognition do not lie anywhere but in the essential and genuine principles of reason; and hence the learner cannot obtain these cognitions from anywhere else, nor indeed dispute them. And this is so because here the use of reason, although performed only *in concreto,* occurs nonetheless a priori, viz., by reference to pure and precisely therefore faultless intuition, and thus excludes all delusion and error. Hence among all the (a priori) rational sciences, solely mathematics can be learned. But philosophy can never be learned (except historically); rather, as far as reason is concerned, one can at most learn only *to philosophize.*[180]

Now the system of all philosophical cognition is *philosophy.* Philoso- {A 838 B 866}
phy must here be taken objectively, if we mean by it the archetype[181] for judging all attempts at philosophizing—the archetype[182] that is to serve for judging any subjective philosophy, whose edifice is often quite[183] diverse and changeable. Considered in this way, philosophy is a mere idea of a possible science that is given nowhere *in concreto* but that by various roads we try to approach. We try this until we discover the single path, which is heavily overgrown by sensibility, and until we succeed in making the

[178][Of the Transcendental Doctrine of Method; mainly in Section I (A 712–38 = B 740–66), but also in Section IV (A 782–94 = B 810–22). See also the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 22–23.]

[179][Rather than merely historical.]

[180][Cf. the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 23–26.]

[181][*Urbild,* i.e., literally, 'original image.']

[182][Reading, with Rosenkranz, *welches* for *welche.*]

[183][*so.*]

ectype[184]—failed thus far—equal to the archetype insofar as doing this is granted to human beings. Until then philosophy cannot be learned; for where is philosophy, who possesses it, and by what can it be recognized? We can learn only to philosophize, i.e., to practice reason's talent of complying with its own universal principles upon certain already available attempts at philosophy—but always while reserving reason's right to investigate these principles themselves in their sources and to confirm or reject them.

Thus far, however, the concept of philosophy is only a *school concept,* viz., the concept of a system of cognition that is being sought only as science,[185] and that has as its purpose nothing more than the systematic unity of this knowledge[186] and hence the *logical* perfection of cognition. But there is also a *world concept* (*conceptus cosmicus*) on which this name[187]
A 839 B 867 has always been based, primarily when the concept was, as it were, personified and conceived as an archetype in the ideal of the *philosopher.* From this point of view, philosophy is the science of the reference of all cognition to the essential purposes of human reason (*teleologia rationis humanae*),[188] and the philosopher is not an artist of reason but the legislator of human reason. In such a meaning of the term it would be quite vainglorious to call oneself a philosopher and to claim that one has come to equal the archetype, which lies only in the idea.

The mathematician, the natural scientist,[189] and the logician,[190] however superbly the former two may be progressing in rational cognition as such and the latter two in philosophical cognition in particular, are still only artists of reason. There is—as an ideal—another teacher, who assigns to all of these their tasks, and who uses them as instruments in order to further the essential purposes of human reason. This teacher alone would have to be called the philosopher. However, since he himself is not to be found

184[Or 'derivative image': *Nachbild.*]

185[*Wissenschaft.*]

186[*Wissen.*]

187['Philosophy.']

188[Teleology of human reason.]

189[*der Naturkündiger* (i.e , *der Naturkundige*).]

190[Who deals, of course, not only with general but, above all, with *transcendental* logic: the science that determines the origin, the range, and the objective validity of rational cognitions. See A 57/B 81.]

anywhere but the idea of his legislation is found throughout[191] in every human reason, we shall keep solely to this idea, and shall determine more closely what sort of systematic unity is prescribed by philosophy, according to this world concept,[192] from the standpoint of purposes. {A 840 B 868}

Essential purposes are not yet, on that account, the highest purposes, of which (in the case of perfect systematic unity of reason) there can be only one. Hence essential purposes are either the final purpose itself or subsidiary[193] purposes that necessarily belong to the final purpose as means. The final purpose is none other than the whole vocation of the human being, and the philosophy concerning it is called morality.[194] By the same token, among the ancients the name *philosopher*[195] was always used, because of this superiority of moral philosophy over all other pursuits of reason, to mean also and especially the moralist. And, indeed, even now someone's outer semblance of self-control through reason makes us—by a certain analogy—call him a philosopher, despite his limited knowledge.

Now the legislation of human reason (philosophy) has two objects, nature and freedom.[196] It thus contains natural law as well as moral law, initially in two separate philosophical systems but ultimately in a single such system. The philosophy of nature concerns everything that *is*, the philosophy of morals concerns only what *ought to be.*

All philosophy, however, is either cognition from pure reason or rational cognition[197] from empirical principles. The first is called pure and the second empirical philosophy.[198]

Now, the philosophy of pure reason either is the *propaedeutic* (preparation), which investigates our power of reason with regard to all pure a {A 841 B 869}

[191][*allenthalben.*]

[192]*World concept* here means a concept that concerns what interests everyone necessarily. Hence I determine the aim of a science merely according to *school concepts* if the science is regarded only as a science of the skills for certain optional purposes.

[193][*subaltern*]

[194][*Moral.*]

[195][Emphasis added.]

[196][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 387–88; also the *Critique of Judgment,* Ak V, 171–72, 174–75; and also the First Introduction to that same work, Ak. XX, 195–96.]

[197][Or 'cognition of reason': *Vernunfterkenntnis.*]

[198][See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 387–89.]

priori cognition, and is called *critique;* or, second, it is the system of pure reason (science), i.e., the whole (true as well as seeming) philosophical cognition from pure reason in its systematic coherence, and is called *metaphysics.*[199] This latter name, however, may also be given to the whole of pure philosophy, including critique, in order to encompass therein the investigation of all that can ever be cognized a priori, as well as the exposition of what makes up a system of pure philosophical cognitions of this a priori kind while differing from all empirical and likewise from the mathematical use of reason.

Metaphysics is divided into that of the *speculative* and that of the *practical* use of pure reason, and thus is either *metaphysics of nature* or *metaphysics of morals.*[200] The metaphysics of nature contains all pure principles of reason, based on mere concepts (hence excluding mathematics),[201] of the *theoretical* cognition of all things.[202] The metaphysics of morals contains the principles that a priori determine and make necessary our *doing and refraining.*[203] Now morality[204] is the only law-governedness of actions that can be derived completely a priori from principles. Hence the metaphysics of morals[205] is, in fact, a pure morality,[206] i.e., one in which
A 842 B 870 no anthropology (no empirical condition) is used as a basis.[207] Now, the metaphysics of speculative reason is what is usually called metaphysics in the *narrower*[208] *meaning* of the term. But insofar as the pure doctrine of morals[209] belongs nonetheless to the same special stem of human and, in

199[See above, A xix–xxi, A 10–16/B 24–30.]

200[See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 388–89; also the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 205.]

201[Both commas added.]

202[See above, A xxi; also the *Prolegomena,* Ak. III, 295; the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 214–15; and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 469–70.]

203[See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 388–92; also the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 205–06, 214–18.]

204[*Moralität.*]

205[*Sitten.*]

206[*Moral.*]

207[See the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. IV, 388–91; also the *Metaphysics of Morals,* Ak. VI, 217–18.]

208[*engeren;* the fourth edition has *eigenen,* i.e., 'proper.']

209[*Sittenlehre.*]

particular, philosophical cognition from pure reason, we shall keep for it also that name.[210] Here, however, we set it aside as not pertaining to our purpose *now.*

It is of the utmost importance to *isolate* cognitions that differ from one another in type and origin, and to keep them carefully from melding into a mixture with other cognitions to which they are customarily linked in use. What chemists do in separating kinds of matter[211] and what mathematicians do in their pure doctrine of magnitudes[212] is far more incumbent still on the philosopher, in order that he can reliably determine the share that a particular kind of cognition has in the roaming use of the understanding, i.e., determine its own value and influence.[213] Hence human reason, ever since it has been thinking[214] or—rather—meditating,[215] has never been able to dispense with a metaphysics, yet has nonetheless been unable to expound one that was sufficiently purified of everything extraneous. The idea of such a science is just as old as speculative human reason; and what reason is there that does not speculate, whether such speculation be done in a scholastic or in a popular manner? One must admit, however, that the differentiation between the two elements of our cognition, of which one is { A 843 B 871 }
in our control completely a priori and the other can be obtained only a posteriori from experience, remained only very indistinct even among thinkers by trade. Hence this differentiation was never able to bring about the determination of the bounds for a special kind of cognition, nor, therefore, the genuine idea of a science that has so long and so greatly occupied human reason. When people[216] said that metaphysics is the science of the first principles of human cognition, they were indicating not a quite special kind of cognition but only a status of cognition in regard to generality. Hence metaphysics could not thereby be differentiated discernibly[217] from the empirical. For even among empirical principles some are more general and

[210]['Metaphysics.']

[211][*Materien.*]

[212][*Größenlehre*, i.e., mathematics.]

[213][Cf. the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 472–73, 477–78.]

[214][*denken.*]

[215][*nachdenken.*]

[216][*man.*]

[217][*kenntlich.*]

therefore higher than others; and where, in the series of such a subordination of principles (when what is cognized completely a priori is not differentiated from what is cognized only a posteriori) is one to draw the line that differentiates the *first* part and thus the highest members from the *last* part and the subordinate members? What would one say if our chronology could designate the world's epochs only by dividing them into the first centuries, on the one hand, and the subsequent centuries, on the other? Does the fifth or the tenth century, etc., also still belong to the first centuries?—one would ask. In the same way I ask: Does the concept of the extended belong to metaphysics? You answer: Yes! Ah, but also the
A 844 B 872 concept of a body? Yes! And the concept of a fluid body? You become perplexed; for if this continues, then everything will belong to metaphysics. We see from this that the mere degree of subordination (of the particular under the general) cannot determine any bounds of a science, but such bounds can be determined—in our case—only by complete heterogeneity and complete difference of origin. However, what obscured the basic idea of metaphysics on yet another side[218] was the fact that, as a priori cognition, it manifests a certain homogeneity with mathematics. This homogeneity does indeed make them akin[219] to each other as regards their a priori origin. But consider now the kind of cognition involved: viz., cognition from concepts, in the case of metaphysics, as compared to the kind of cognition where a priori judgments are made only by constructing concepts, in the case of mathematics; and hence consider the difference between a philosophical and a mathematical cognition.[220] We can then see a very definite heterogeneity; and although this heterogeneity has always been felt, as it were, no one has ever been able to bring it to distinct criteria. And hence it came about that, because philosophers themselves failed in their attempt to develop the idea of their science, the treatment of this science could have no determinate purpose and no secure guideline. Thus philosophers—by dealing with a project brought about so arbitrarily, and being ignorant concerning the path that they would have to take, and also being always at odds with each other concerning the discoveries that each claimed to have made on his own

[218][I.e., other than the side where it contrasts with what is empirical.]

[219][Reading, with Hartenstein, *verwandt macht* for *verwandt*]

[220][See above, A 712–38/B 740–66]

path—brought their science into contempt, at first among others and finally even among themselves.

Thus all pure a priori cognition, by virtue of the special cognitive power in which alone this cognition can reside, makes up a special unity; and metaphysics is the philosophy that is to exhibit that cognition in this systematic unity. Now, the speculative part of metaphysics, which has especially appropriated this name, is the metaphysics that we call *metaphysics of nature* and that considers everything on the basis of concepts insofar as it *is* (rather than what ought to be).[221] And this part of metaphysics is divided in the following manner. {A 845 B 873}

Metaphysics in this narrower meaning of the term consists of *transcendental philosophy* and the *physiology* of pure reason. Transcendental philosophy (*ontologia*)[222] contemplates only our *understanding* and reason themselves in a system of all concepts and principles referring to objects as such, without assuming objects[223] that *are given.*[224] The physiology of pure reason contemplates *nature,*[225] i.e., the sum of *given* objects (whether given to the senses or, for that matter, to some other kind of intuition),[226] and hence is *physiology* (although only *physiologia rationalis*).[227] However, the use of reason in this rational contemplation of nature is either physical or hyperphysical,[228] or—better yet—either *immanent* or *transcendent.* Reason's immanent use deals with nature insofar as the cognition thereof can be applied in appearance (*in concreto*).[229] Reason's transcendent use deals with that connection of objects of experience which surpasses all [possible] experience.[230] This latter, *transcendent* physiology, {A 846 B 874}

[221][See above, A 10–16/B 24–30.]

[222][Ontology.]

[223][*Objekt* here; *Gegenstand* just above and just below. See A vii br. n. 7.]

[224][I.e., referring to (really) *possible* objects (a priori) rather than to *actual* objects (a posteriori).]

[225][In accordance with the root meaning of 'physiology.']

[226][See B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

[227][Rational physiology.]

[228][I.e., natural or supranatural.]

[229][This was treated above, in the Transcendental Aesthetic and in the Transcendental Analytic.]

[230][This was treated above, in the Transcendental Dialectic.]

then, has as its object either an *internal* or an *external* connection; both of these, however, go beyond possible experience. The first kind of transcendent physiology is the physiology of the entirety of nature; i.e., it is *transcendental cosmology.*[231] The second kind is the physiology of the link[232] of the entirety of nature with a being above nature; i.e., it is *transcendental theology.*[233]

Immanent physiology, on the other hand, contemplates nature as the sum of all objects of the senses, and hence as nature is given to *us,* but does so only according to a priori conditions under which nature can be given to us at all. There are, however, only two kinds of objects of this physiology:[234] (1) The objects of the outer senses, and hence the sum of these objects, *corporeal nature.* (2) The object of the inner sense, i.e., the soul, and—according to the basic concepts of the soul as such—*thinking nature.* The metaphysics of corporeal nature is called *physics,* but more specifically—because physics is to contain only the principles of its a priori cognition—*rational physics.* The metaphysics of thinking nature is called *psychology,* and is to be understood—because of the just mentioned restriction to a priori cognition[235]—as including only psychology's *rational cognition.*[236]

Accordingly, the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts: (1) *Ontology.* (2) *Rational physiology.* (3) *Rational cosmology.*[237] (4) *Rational theology.*[238] The second part, viz., the natural science[239] of

[231][Literally, 'cognition of the world': *Welterkenntnis,* treated above, in the Antinomies. Kant presumably meant to say 'transcendent' rather than 'transcendental.' (Likewise for theology, just below.)]

[232][*Zusammenhang.*]

[233][Literally, 'cognition of God': *Gotteserkenntnis,* treated above, especially in the fourth antinomy and in the Ideal of Pure Reason. (Emphasis on 'transcendental' added, following Erdmann and the *Akademie* edition.)]

[234][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 467–73.]

[235][Kant says only 'for the just mentioned reason ('cause,' literally): *aus der eben angeführten Ursache.*]

[236][In other words, *rational psychology.*]

[237][*Rationale Kosmologie.*]

[238][*Rationale Theologie.*]

[239][*Naturlehre*]

pure reason, contains two divisions in turn: *physica rationalis*[240] and *psychologia rationalis*.[241] A 847 B 875

The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason prescribes by itself this entire division. Hence the division is carried out *architectonically*, i.e., in conformity with pure reason's essential purposes, and not merely *technically*, i.e., according to contingently perceived kinships and, as it were, haphazardly. But precisely therefore it also is immutable and has legislative authority.[242] Here we find some points, however, that may arouse qualms and may weaken one's conviction concerning the division's being law-governed.

First, how can I expect there to be an a priori cognition—and hence a metaphysics—of objects insofar as they are given to our senses and thus a posteriori? And how is cognizing the nature of things and arriving at a *rational* physiology possible according to a priori principles? A 848 B 876 The answer is this: we take from experience nothing more than what is needed to *give* us an object either of outer or of inner sense. The object of outer sense is given through the mere concept of matter (impenetrable, inanimate extension); the object of inner sense is given through the concept of a thinking being[243] (in the empirical inner presentation *I think*[244]). [For this, then, we need these two concepts.] Otherwise we would have to abstain entirely, in the whole metaphysics of these objects, from using any empirical prin-

[240]Let no one think that I mean by this what is commonly called *physica generalis*,[a] and what is closer to[b] mathematics than to philosophy of nature. For the metaphysics of nature is entirely set apart from mathematics, and also cannot offer nearly so many expansive cognitions as mathematics can. But the metaphysics of nature is very important nonetheless in view of the critique which it provides of the understanding's pure cognition as such that is to be applied to nature. Lacking such critique, even mathematicians—inasmuch as they adhere to certain concepts that are common but are in fact still metaphysical—have inadvertently burdened natural science with hypotheses that vanish upon a critique of these [metaphysical] principles, yet do so without in the least impairing the (quite indispensable) use of mathematics in this field.

[a][General physics.]

[b][*mehr.*]

[241][Rational physics, rational psychology.]

[242][*legislatorisch.*]

[243][See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Ak. IV, 467–72; also above, A 265–66/B 321–22, A 277–78/B 333–34.]

[244][Emphasis added.]

ciples that seek to supplement the concept with some experience in order to judge from this experience something concerning these objects.

Second, what becomes of *empirical psychology,* which has all along maintained its place in metaphysics, and from which people[245] have expected great things in our times for the enlightenment of metaphysics, once they had abandoned their hope for anything suitable to be accomplished there a priori? I answer: empirical psychology goes where the proper (empirical) natural science must be put, viz., on the side of *applied* philosophy, whose a priori principles are contained in pure philosophy. But although pure philosophy must thus be linked with applied philosophy, it must not be mixed up with applied philosophy. Hence empirical psychology must be banished entirely from metaphysics, and is wholly excluded from it by the very idea of metaphysics. Nonetheless, in accordance with scholarly usage,[246] one will still have to allow it a little place
A 849 B 877 in metaphysics (although only as a digression)—viz., from economic motives. For empirical psychology is not yet rich enough to make up a field of study by itself,[247] and yet is too important to be expelled entirely or attached somewhere else, where it might encounter even less kinship than in metaphysics. It is, therefore, merely a stranger whom one puts up for a while and grants residence for some time, until he can move into his own lodging in a comprehensive anthropology (the pendant to empirical natural science).[248]

This, then, is the general idea of metaphysics. Because people[249] initially required more from metaphysics than can legitimately be demanded, and for some time took delight in agreeable expectations, they ultimately found their hopes betrayed; and thus metaphysics fell into general contempt. From the entire course of our critique, the reader[250] will have become sufficiently convinced that although metaphysics cannot be the foundation of religion, it must yet always remain in place as the bulwark of religion. And he will have become convinced that human reason, which is dialectical already by the very direction of its nature, can never dispense

245[*man.*]

246[*Schulgebrauch.*]

247[See the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science,* Ak. IV, 471]

248[Kant's own empirical psychology is contained mainly in his *Anthropology,* Ak VII]

249[*man.*]

250[*man.*]

with a science curbing it and keeping away from it, through a scientific and completely evident self-cognition, the devastations that a lawless speculative reason would otherwise quite unfailingly wreak in both morality and religion. Hence even if those who are able to judge a science solely by its B 878
contingent effects—rather than by its nature—may act very demurely or A 850
disdainfully, we[251] may be sure that we shall always return to metaphysics as we would to a beloved woman[252] with whom we have had a quarrel. For here[253] the concern is with essential purposes, and hence reason must work tirelessly either toward thorough insight or toward the destruction of [allegedly] already present good insights.

Properly speaking, therefore, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals—but, above all, as preceding metaphysics *as its preparation* (propaedeutic), also the critique of the reason venturing forward on its own wings—alone make up what can be called philosophy in the genuine meaning of the term. Philosophy refers everything to [the goal of] wisdom. But it does so by the path of science—the only path that, once opened, is never overgrown and permits no straying. Mathematics, natural science, and even our empirical cognition[254] of the human being have a high value as means to purposes of humanity—for the most part to contingent purposes but in the end still to essential purposes of humanity. But in the latter case they have this value only through the mediation of a rational cognition from mere concepts that—no matter what we call it—is in fact nothing but metaphysics.

Precisely therefore metaphysics is also the completion of all *culture*[255] of human reason, which is indispensable even if the influence that meta- A 851 B 879
physics has as a science on certain determinate purposes is set aside. For metaphysics contemplates reason in terms of reason's elements and highest maxims that must underlie the very *possibility* of some sciences and the use of all sciences. The fact that metaphysics, as mere speculation, serves more to prevent errors than to expand cognition does not impair its value, but rather gives to metaphysics dignity and authority through the cen-

[251][*man.*]

[252][*eine Geliebte.* In German, the word 'metaphysics' is likewise feminine in gender; cf. A viii–ix.]

[253][In metaphysics.]

[254][*Kenntnis.*]

[255][Or 'cultivation': *Kultur.*]

sor's office that it operates.[256] This office secures the general order and the concord, and indeed the prosperity of the scientific community, and keeps that community's daring and fertile works from deviating from the main purpose, viz., the general happiness.

[256] [*durch das Zensoramt.*]

TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD

{A 852 B 880}

Chapter IV

The History of Pure Reason[257]

This heading is[258] here only in order to mark a place in the system that still remains and that must be filled in the future. I shall here settle for casting a cursory glance—from a merely transcendental point of view, viz., that of the nature of pure reason—upon the whole of the works produced by pure reason thus far. This whole does indeed present edifices to my eye, but only in ruins.

It is a quite[259] remarkable fact—even though by nature it could not have happened differently—that in philosophy's infancy human beings started from the point where we would now prefer to end: they started, viz., by studying their cognition of God[260] and their hope for another world,[261] or perhaps even the character of such a world. However coarse may have been the concepts of religion introduced by the ancient usages that still remained from the crude state of peoples, this still did not prevent the more enlightened part [of humanity] from devoting itself to free investigations on this topic.[262] And these people[263] easily saw that there can be no more thorough[264] and reliable way of pleasing the invisible power ruling the world, in order to be happy at least in another world, than through good {A 853 B 881}

257[See Heinz Heimsoeth, *op. cit.* at A 293/B 349 br. n. 2, vol. 4, 821–88. See also Norman Kemp Smith, *op. cit* at A vii br. n. 5, 582. And cf. the *Logic,* Ak. IX, 27–33.]

258[*steht.*]

259[*genug.*]

260[I e., what came to be called *theology.*]

261[I.e , heaven.]

262[Or, perhaps, 'concerning this [religious] object' (viz., God): *über diesen Gegenstand.*]

263[*man;* likewise in the next sentence.]

264[Reading, with Rosenkranz, *gründlichere* for *gründliche.*]

conduct. Thus theology and morality were the two incentives—or, better yet, points of reference—for all abstract rational investigations to which people have afterwards at all times devoted themselves. But it was in fact theology that little by little drew the merely speculative reason into the business that later became so famous under the name of metaphysics.

I shall not now distinguish the time periods in which this or that change in metaphysics came about, but shall only depict[265] in a cursory sketch the difference in the idea of metaphysics that occasioned the main revolutions. And there I find the following three respects in which the most notable changes in this contest arena were brought about.

1. *As regards the object* of all our rational cognitions, some metaphysicians were merely *sensualist philosophers*[266] and others merely *intellectualist philosophers. Epicurus* may be called the foremost philosopher of sensibility, *Plato* of the intellectual [realm]. But this distinction of schools, however subtle it is, had already begun in earliest times; and it maintained itself uninterrupted for a long time. The philosophers of the sensualist school asserted that actuality is to be found only in the objects of the senses, and that everything else is imagination. Those of the intellectualist school,
A 854 B 882 by contrast, said that in the senses there is nothing but illusion, and that only the understanding[267] cognizes what is true. Yet the sensualists did not by any means therefore deny reality to the concepts of understanding; but this reality was for them only *logical,* whereas for the intellectualists[268] it was *mystical.* The sensualists granted *intellectual concepts,* but assumed only sensible *objects.* The intellectualists required the true objects to be *merely intelligible,* and asserted that there is an *intuition* through a pure understanding unaccompanied by any senses, which in their opinion merely confuse this understanding.[269]

2. *As regards the origin* of pure rational cognitions, as to whether they are derived from experience or have their origin independently of experience, viz., in reason. Here *Aristotle* may be regarded as head of the empiricists, Plato of the *noologists*. In modern times, *Locke* has followed

[265] [*darstellen.*]

[266] [I.e., philosophers of sensibility; cf. just below.]

[267] [I.e., the intellect.]

[268] [Instead of 'sensualists' and 'intellectualists' Kant actually says merely *die ersteren* and *die anderen* (i.e., 'the first' and 'the others'). Similarly in the remainder of the paragraph, where Kant actually says merely *jene* and *diese* (i.e., 'the former' and 'the latter').]

[269] [Cf. B 72 incl. br. n. 183.]

Aristotle, and *Leibniz* has followed Plato (although keeping sufficient distance from Plato's mystical system); however, Locke and Leibniz have not yet been able to bring about a decision in this contest. As regards *Epicurus*[270] (inasmuch as in his inferences he never went beyond the boundary of experience), he at least proceeded far more consistently in accordance with his sensualist system than did Aristotle and Locke (but above all Locke). For although Locke derives all concepts and principles from experience, in their use he goes as far as to assert that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul can be proved with the same [degree of] evidence as can any mathematical theorem (even though both objects[271] A 855 B 883
lie entirely outside the bounds of possible experience).[272]

3. *As regards method.* If something is to be called a method, then it must be a procedure in accordance with *principles.* Now, the method that currently[273] prevails in this field—i.e., in the investigation of nature—can be divided into the *naturalistic* and the *scientific*[274] method. The naturalist of pure reason adopts as his principle the view that, as regards the most august[275] questions making up the problem of metaphysics, more can be accomplished through common reason without science[276] (he calls this sound reason) than through speculation. He maintains, therefore, that the size and distance of the moon can be determined more reliably by eye than through mathematical detours. But this is mere misology brought to principles; and—what is most absurd—the neglect of all artificial means is here being extolled as a *special method* for expanding one's cognition. For as regards those who are naturalists for *lack* of more insight, they cannot with any basis be blamed. They follow common reason without boasting of their ignorance as a method that is held to contain the secret for drawing[277] the

270[The Athenian philosopher (mentioned repeatedly by Kant throughout this *Critique*), c. 342–270 B.C., who was much admired by David Hume.]

271[I.e., God and the soul.]

272[Cf. B 127–28. For Locke's assertion regarding the existence of God, see *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. IV, ch. x, 1 (cf. 5 and 6); for his assertion regarding the immortality of the soul—though *without* the comparison to mathematics asserted by Kant—see *ibid.*, Bk. IV, ch. iv, 15 (cf. ch. iii, 6).]

273[*jetzt.*]

274[*szientifisch.*]

275[Or 'sublime': *erhaben.*]

276[*Wissenschaft.*]

277[*-holen.*]

truth from the deep well of Democritus.[278] *Quod sapio, satis est mihi; non ego curo esse quod Arcesilas aerumnosique Solones—Pers.*[279]—is their
A 856 B 884 motto, with which they can live cheerfully and laudably without worrying about science or confounding its business.

Now as regards those who observe a *scientific* method, they have the choice here of proceeding either *dogmatically* or *skeptically;* but in any case they have the obligation to proceed *systematically.* If for[280] the dogmatic method I here mention the illustrious *Wolff*[281] and for the skeptical method *David Hume,* then I can—as far as my current aim is concerned—leave the others unmentioned. The *critical* path[282] alone is still open. If the reader has had the kindness and the patience to travel along[283] this path in my company, and if it pleases him to contribute his share toward turning this path[284] into a highway, then he may now judge whether what many centuries have been unable to accomplish might not still be achieved before the end of the present one: namely, to bring human reason to complete satisfaction in what has always—although thus far in vain—engaged its desire to know.

[278][The Greek atomist philosopher, c. 460–c. 370 B.C., from Abdera in Thrace. The reference may be to Fragment 117. Cf. G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 424.]

[279][Persius, *Satires,* iii, 78–79: "What I know is enough for me; I do not care to be an Arcesilas or one of those poor wretches of Solon." Arcesila(u)s, 316–241 B.C., Greek philosopher, is considered to be the founder of the Middle Academy. Solon, c. 630–c. 560 B.C., Athenian statesman, reformer, and poet, is the most famous of the Seven Wise Men of Greece.]

[280][*in Ansehung;* likewise just below.]

[281][See above, B xxxvi br. n. 134.]

[282][*Weg.*]

[283][*durch-.*]

[284][*Fußsteig.*]

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GLOSSARY

The German terms are usually given *not* as they appear in the original text, but in their modern spelling, in order that they can more easily be found in a modern German dictionary. For translations from English to German, please see the Index.

A

abändern	to alter, to change
Abbruch (tun)	impairment (to impair, to damage)
Aberglaube	superstition
abbrechen	sever, cut off
abfassen	to draw up, to formulate, to compose
abfließen aus	to flow from
Abfolge	succession, sequence
abgeleitet	derivative, derived
abgesondert	separate, apart, abstract
abgezogen	abstract
Abhandlung	treatise
abhängend	dependent
abhängig	dependent
abhelfen	to remedy
Abkunft	descent
ablaufen	to elapse, to pass
ableiten	to derive
Abmessung	dimension
abnehmen	to decrease, to gather, to glean
abreißen	to disrupt, to break
Abriß	sketch
Absicht	aim, intention, intent, (point of) view, regard, respect
absolut	absolute
absondern	to separate, to isolate, to set apart
abstammen	to originate, to stem
Abstammung	origin, lineage
absteigen	to descend
abstrahieren	to abstract
abstrahiert	abstract(ed)
abstrakt	abstract
abteilen	to separate
abwärts	downward
Abwechslung	variety

abweichen	to depart, to deviate, to diverge
abziehen	to abstract, to subtract
Achtsamkeit	attentiveness
Achtung	respect
adäquat	adequate
affektieren	to affect
Affektion	being affected
Affinität	affinity
affizieren	to affect
Aggregat	aggregate
Aggregation	aggregation
ahnen	to suspect
akademisch	academic
akroamatisch	acroamatic
Akzidenz	accident
Algebra	algebra
All	universe, total
allbefassend	all-encompassing
alleinig	unique, sole
allenthalben	in each case, everywhere, throughout
allererst	first (of all), for the first time
allerhöchst	most supreme
allerrealst	maximally real
allerwärts	everywhere, in all cases
alles	everything
allgegenwärtig	omnipresent
allgemein	universal, general
allgenugsam	all-sufficient
allgewaltig	omnipresent
Allheit	allness
allmächtig	omnipotent
allmählich	gradually
allvermögend	all-powerful
Allvermögenheit	omnipotence
allwissend	omniscient
Alten, die	the ancients
Amphibolie	amphiboly
Analogie	analogy
Analogon	analogue
analysieren	to analyze
Analysis	analysis
Analytik	analytic
analytisch	analytic
ändern	to change
andichten	to attribute fictitiously
anfangen	to begin, to start, to set (go) about
anfänglich	at first, initially, at the outset
anfangs	at first, initially, at the outset
anfechten	to challenge, to controvert
anführen	to adduce, to cite, to mention, to set forth
angeben	to indicate, to state, to give
angeblich	alleged
Angelegenheit	concern(s)
angemessen	appropriate, adequate, fitting, commensurate
angenehm	agreeable
Angriff	attack, charge
anhaften	to adhere
anhängen	to attach, to adhere
anheften	to attach
anheischig machen, sich	to promise
animalisch	animal
ankündigen	to announce, to proclaim
Anlage	predisposition
Anlaß	prompting
Anleitung	guidance
anlocken	to entice
anmaßen, sich	to presume, to pretend, to claim
anmerken	to note, to point out, to comment
annehmen	to assume, to suppose, to take (on), to accept, to adopt
anordnen	to arrange
Anreiz	stimulus, inducement
anschauen	to intuit

anschauend	intuitive
anschaulich	intuitive
Anschauung	intuition
Anschauungsart	kind of intuition, way of intuiting
Anschlag	project
Ansehen	reputation, authority, look, air(s)
ansehen	to regard, to watch, to view
an sich	in itself (themselves), intrinsically, in principle
Anspruch	claim, entitlement
Anstalt	arrangement
Anständigkeit	propriety
anstellen	to perform, to engage in, to carry out (*or* on), to undertake, to arrange
Anstrengung	effort, endeavor
Anteil	contribution, share, sharing
Anthropologie	anthropology
Anthropomorphismus	anthropomorphism
Antinomie	antinomy
Antithesis	antithesis
Antithetik	antithetic
Antizipation	anticipation
antreffen	to encounter, to find, to meet
antreiben	to impel
Antrieb	impulse
antworten	to answer, to reply, to respond
Anwachs	accretion
anweisen	to impose, to assign, to enjoin
Anweisung	instruction
anzeigen	to indicate, to point out
Anziehung	attraction
apagogisch	apagogic
apodiktisch	apodeictic
Apperzeption	apperception
Apprehension	apprehension
Arbeit	work, job
Architektonik	architectonic
Argument	argument
Argutation	subtlety
Arithmetik	arithmetic
Art	kind, way, manner, species, style
Artikulation	articulation, structure
assertorisch	assertoric
Assoziation	association
Ästhetik	aesthetic
Astronomie	astronomy
asymptotisch	asymptotically
Atheismus	atheism
Atomistik	atomism
Attribute	attribute
aufbehalten	to preserve
aufbewahren	to preserve
aufbieten	to enlist, to muster, to summon
aufdecken	to uncover, to expose
aufeinander folgend	successive
Aufenthalt	residence
auferlegen	to impose
auffinden	to discover
auffordern	to call for (upon), to challenge
Aufgabe	problem, task, business
aufgeben	to assign, to impose, to abandon
aufheben	to annul, to abolish, to destroy
aufhellen	to clear up
aufhören	to cease, to stop
Aufklärung	clarification, enlightenment
auflegen	to enjoin

auflösen	to solve, to resolve, to analyze
aufmerksam	attentive
aufnehmen	to take up, to adopt, to receive, to record
Aufrichtigkeit	uprightness
aufsammeln	to gather
Aufschluß	information
aufsteigen	to ascend
aufstellen	to put forth
aufsuchen	to locate, to look for, to search for
aufwärts	upward
aufweisen	to display, to bring out, to show forth
aufzählen	to enumerate
aufzeigen	to show
Augenblick	instant
augenscheinlich	obvious, manifest
Ausarbeitung	elaboration
ausbreiten	to expand, to broaden
ausbreiten, sich	to extend, to expand
Ausdehnung	extension
Ausdruck	expression, term
ausfinden	to discover
ausfindig machen	to discover
Ausflucht	escape, subterfuge
Ausforderung	challenge
ausführen	to carry out, to achieve, to execute
ausführlich	comprehensive, elaborate
ausfüllen	to occupy, to fill in
ausgeben als	to pass of as, to claim to be
ausgebreitet	extensive, spread out
ausgehen auf	to seek, to aim at
ausgehen von	to emanate from, to start from
auslaufen	to amount, to result, to issue
Auslegung	interpretation
ausmessen	to survey
ausnehmen	to exclude, to except
ausrotten	to eradicate
aussagen	to state, to assert
ausschließen	to exclude
außer(halb)	outside
äußer(lich)	outer, external, extrinsic, outward
äußern	to utter, to manifest, to express
außerordentlich	extraordinary
außersinnlich	extrasensible
äußerst	extreme, outermost, utmost
Äußerung	utterance, manifestation
Aussicht	outlook, prospect
aussinnen	to excogitate
aussondern	to differentiate
aussprechen	to pronounce
Ausstattung	endowment
ausstellen	to put forth
ausstoßen	to expel
ausüben	to exercise, to perform, to practice, to exert
Ausweg	escape, way (out)
ausweichen	to evade, to escape
auswickeln	to unfold
auszeichnen	to distinguish, to mark
Axiom	axiom

B

Bahn	route, path
bändigen	to subdue, to restrain
Bau	edifice, structure, construction
Baumeister	architect
Bauwerk	building, structure
Bearbeitung	treatment, work on

Bedenken	concern, qualms
bedenklich	precarious, scrupulous
Bedenklichkeit	perplexity, qualms
bedeutend	significant
Bedeutung	signification, meaning, significance
bedingt	conditioned, conditional
Bedingung	condition
bedürfen	to require, to need
befassen	to comprise, to encompass, to take in(to)
befassen, sich mit	to take up, to occupy oneself with
befinden, sich	to be (located, found)
befolgen	to comply with, to follow, to observe, to pursue
Beförderung	furtherance
befragen	to consult, to interrogate
befreien	to free, to liberate
befremdlich	disturbing, strange
befugen	to entitle
Befugnis	right, authority
begabt	endowed
Begebenheit	event
begehen	to commit
Begehrung	desire
Begierde	desire
beglaubigen	to authenticate
Begleitung	concomitance, accompanying
begreifen	to comprehend, to comprise
begreiflich	comprehensible
begrenzen	to bound, to confine
Begriff	concept
behafted	encumbered
Behandlung	treatment, action on, manipulation

beharrend	permanent
beharrlich	permanent
behaupten	to assert, to maintain
Behuf	sake, behalf
behutsam	cautious
beieinander bestehen	to coexist
Beifall	approval, approbation, assent
Beigesellung	association
Beihilfe	aid, assistance
beilegen	to ascribe, to attribute
beimessen	to assign, to impute, to attribute
beiordnen	to coordinate
Beispiel	example
Beistand	support, aid
Beistimmung	assent
Beitrag	contribution
Beitritt	assistance
beiwohnen	to attend, to reside (in)
beizählen	to include among (with)
bejahend	affirmative
bekämpfen	to combat
bekommen	to acquire, to obtain, to gain
bekümmernd	worrisome
belachenswert	ridiculous
beleben	to enliven, to animate
belegen	to support
belehren	to instruct, to inform, to teach
belehrend	didactic
beleuchten	to examine
beliebig	this or that, arbitrary, optional
Bemerkung	observation, remark
bemerkungs-würdig	noteworthy

Bemühung	endeavor
Benennung	name, designation
Benutzung	employment
beobachten	to observe
berechtigen	to entitle, to justify
berichtigen	to correct
berüchtigt	notorious
berufen, sich	to appeal, to plead
beruhen	to rest, to be due, to be based
beruhigen	to calm
berühmt	illustrious, famous, celebrated
Beschaffenheit	character(istic), property, constitution
Beschäftigung	activity, enterprise, occupation
bescheiden	modest
Beschönigung	rationalization, painting over, palliation
beschränken	to limit, to confine, to restrict, to delimit
Beschränktheit	limitedness
beschreiben	to describe
beschuldigen	to accuse
beschwerlich	difficult, burdensome
Besitz	possession
besonder	particular, special, separate, specific
besorglich	worrisome
Bestand	stability
beständig	steady, constant, subsistent
Bestandteil	component
bestätigen	to confirm
bestehen	to consist, to subsist, to hold
bestehend, (für sich [selbst])	(self-)subsistent
bestimmbar	determinable
bestimmen	to determine, to make determinate, to define, to destine
bestimmend	determinative, determining
bestimmt	determinate, determined, definite
Bestimmung	determination, vocation, destination, attribute
Bestimmungsgrund	determining basis
bestrafen	to punish
Bestrebung	endeavor
bestreiten	to dispute, to deny
betrachten	to examine, to consider, to contemplate, to regard, to study
Betrug	deception, fraud
beurteilen	to judge, to pass judgment on
bewähren	to verify
Beweger, erster	prime mover
Bewegung	motion, movement
Beweggrund	motive
Bewegungsgrund	motive
Bewegursache	motivating cause
Beweis	proof
Beweisgrund	basis of proof (for proving)
Beweiskraft	cogency
bewirken	to bring about
Bewunderung	admiration
Bewußtsein	consciousness, awareness
bezeichnen	to characterize, to mark, to designate, to indicate
Beziehung	reference, relation
Bild	image
bilden	to mold, to form
billig	proper, appropriate, legitimate
bleiben	to endure, to remain, to abide
bleibend	enduring

Blendwerk	deception
blind	blind
Boden	soil, ground, terrain, territory, bottom
borgen	to take
brauchbar	usable, useful
bündig	cogent
C	
Chaos	chaos
Charakter	character, characteristic
Charakteristik	characteristic
Chemie	chemistry
D	
darbieten	to offer, to provide
darlegen	to set forth, to display
darreichen	to offer
Darstellung	exhibition, exposition
dartun	to establish
da sein	to exist
Dasein	existence, existent
Data	data
Dauer	duration
dauerhaft	lasting
Deduktion	deduction
Definition	definition
deistisch	deistic
Dekadik	decimal system
Deklaration	declaration
Dekomposition	decomposition
Demonstration	demonstration
demütig	humble
demutsvoll	humble
denken	to think, to conceive, to mean, to seek
Denken, das	thought, thinking
Denkungsart	way of thinking
Denkungsvermögen	power of thought
Dependenz	dependence
deutlich	distinct
Dialektik	dialectic
Diallele	circle
Dichotomie	dichotomy
dichten	to invent, to engage in invention
didaktisch	didactic
dienlich	suitable, useful
Dignität	dignity
Ding	thing, entity
Ding an sich (selbst)	thing in itself
direkt	direct
dirigieren	to govern
disjunktiv	disjunctive
diskursiv	discursive
Disziplin	discipline
dogmatisch	dogmatic
Doktrin	doctrine
drängen	to urge, to press
dringen	to penetrate
dringend	urgent, compelling
Drittes, ein	something third
Dualismus	dualism
dunkel	obscure
durchaus	throughout, thoroughly, definitely, assuredly, without exception
durchdringen	to penetrate, to permeate
durchführen	to carry through
durchgängig	thoroughgoing, throughout
durchgehends	thoroughgoing, throughout
Durchzählung	enumeration
dürfen	may, need
dynamisch	dynamical
E	
Ebenmaß	balance
Ehrbarkeit	respectability
ehrsüchtig	ambitious
eigen	own, particular, in (its) own right
Eigenschaft	property
Einbildung	imagination

Einbildungskraft	(power of) imagination
eindringen	to penetrate
Eindruck	impression
einerlei	(entirely, one and) the same, uniform
Einerleiheit	sameness, identity
einfach	simple
einfließen	to influence, to impinge
einflößen	to imbue
Einfluß	influence
eingebildet	imagined, imaginary
eingeschränkt	limited
einheimisch	indigenous
Einheit	unity, unit
Einhelligkeit	agreement, accordance
einig	one, single, unitary
einleuchtend	evident, plausible, convincing
einnehmen	to occupy
einräumen	to grant, to concede, to admit
Einrichtung	arrangement
einschränken	to limit, to restrict, to confine, to delimit
einsehen	to have (gain) insight into, to see, to discern
Einsicht	insight
einstimmig	unanimous, agreeing, accordant
Einstimmigkeit	agreement, harmony
Einstimmung	agreement, harmony
Einteilung	division
Eintracht	concord
einwenden	to object
Einwohner	inhabitant
Einwurf	objection
einzeln	individual, singular, single
Einzelnheit	singularity
einzig	single, sole, one, only
Ektypon	ectype
Elangueszenz	fading out
Eleganz	elegance
Element	element
Elementarlehre	doctrine of elements
Empfänglichkeit	receptivity
empfehlen	to commend
empfinden	to sense
Empfindung	sensation
empirisch	empirical
Empirismus	empiricism
Endabsicht	final aim
Ende	end
endlich	finite, finally, in the end
endlos	endless
Endursache	final cause
Endzweck	final purpose
entbehren	to dispense with, to forgo
entdecken	to discover, to uncover, to reveal, to detect
entfernt	remote, removed, distant
Entgegensetzung	opposition, contrast
entgehen	to escape
enthalten	to contain, to include, to involve, to comprise
entsagen	forgo, renounce
entscheiden	to decide, to settle
entschieden	definite
entschließen, sich	to decide
entspringen	to arise, to spring, to issue, to originate

entstehen	to arise, to originate, to be brought about, to come about
entwerfen	to outline, to draw up, to sketch
entwickeln	to extricate, to unfold, to develop
Entwurf	plan, design, sketch, project
Epigenesis	epigenesis
Episyllogismus	episyllogism
erbauen	to build
Erdbeschreibung	geography
erdenken	to think up, to devise
erdichten	invent
Erdkunde	geography
Ereignis	happening
Erfahrung	experience
Erfahrungs-, der Erfahrung	experiential, of experience
Erfindung	invention, discovery
Erfolg	result, success
erfordern	to require
erforschen	to explore
erfüllen	to occupy, to fill, to fulfill
ergänzen	to compensate for, to complement, to supplement
ergeben, sich	to surrender, to yield, to result
ergründen	to explore, to fathom
erhaben	sublime, august, exalted
erheben	to elevate, to raise, to lift (up), to exalt
erheben, sich	to rise (above)
erheblich	significant, important, considerable
erheischen	to require
Erinnerung	notice, reminder, remark, recollection
erkennen	to cognize, to recognize
Erkenntnis	cognition
Erkenntnis-	cognitive, of cognition
Erkenntnisart	way of cognizing, kind of cognition
erklären	to explicate, to explain, to declare
Erklärungsgrund	basis of explanation, basis for explaining
Erkundigung	inquiry, information, exploration
erläutern	to elucidate, to illustrate
eröffnen	to open up, to disclose, to reveal
Erörterung	exposition, discussion
erregen	to arouse, to give rise to
erreichen	to attain, to reach, to accomplish, to be adequate to
errichten	to erect, to build, to set up
Erscheinung	appearance
Erschleichung	subreption
Erschleichung, durch	surreptitious(ly)
erschlichen	surreptitious(ly)
erschweren	to impede
ersinnen	to devise, to excogitate, to think of
Ersparung	parsimony
erst	first, primary, prime, earliest

Erstaunen	amazement
erstrecken, sich	to extend
erteilen	to confer, to assign
erwägen	to examine, to consider
erweisen	to prove
erweitern, (sich)	to expand
erweiternd	expansive
Erweiterungs-	expansive
erwerben	to acquire
erzeugen	to produce, to generate
etwas	something
Euthanasie	euthanasia
Evidenz	(self-)evidence
ewig	eternal, perpetual
Existenz	existence
Existenzial-	existential
existierend	existent, existing
Experiment	experiment
Explikation	explication
Exponent	index, indicator
exponieren	to expound
Exposition	exposition
extensiv	extensive

F

Fach	field
Faden	thread, course
Fähigkeit	capacity
Fall	case, instance, situation
falsch	wrong, false, deceptive
fassen	to comprehend, to encompass, to apprehend, to seize, to frame, to take
fassen, in sich	to comprise
faßlich	comprehensible
Fassungskraft	power of comprehension
Fatalismus	fatalism
faul	lazy
fechten	to fight
Fehler	mistake, error, defect
fehlerfrei	faultless
fehlschlagen	to fail
Fehlschluß	fallacious inference
fein	acute, delicate
Feld	realm, field
Fertigkeit	proficiency
fest	solid, firm
festsetzen	to ascertain, to fix, to lay down
feststehen	to hold
feststellen	to establish
Figur	figure, shape
finden	to find, to discover, to think, to believe
Fläche	plane, surface
fließen	to flow, to be in flux, to emanate, to issue
flüssig	fluid
Folge	succession, consequence, sequence, result
Folge nacheinander	sequentiality
folgen	follow (upon), succeed
folgend	following, subsequent
folgern	to infer, to conclude, to deduce
Folgesatz	consequence
fordern	to demand, to require
fördern	to further, to promote
Form	form
formativ	formative
Formel	formula
forschen	to investigate
fortdauern	to continue
Fortgang	progression, advance, progress
fortgehen	to proceed, to progress
fortschreiten	to progress, to advance

fortsetzen	to continue, to pursue
Frage	question
Freiheit	freedom
fremd	foreign, extraneous, outside, of another (of others)
fruchtbar	fertile, fruitful
fruchtlos	fruitless
Fundament	foundation
Funktion	function
Fürwahrhalten	assent
Fuß	basis, footing, foothold
Fußsteig	course, path

G

Gabe	gift
Gang	course
Ganzes	whole
Gattung	genus, type
Gebäude	edifice, building
geben	to give, to put forth, to provide, to yield, to offer
Gebiet	domain
gebieten	to command, to enjoin, to dictate
Gebot	command
Gebrauch	use, usage
Gedanke	thought
Gedankending	thought-entity
Gedankenwesen	thought-being
gedenken	to mean, to plan, to bear in mind
gedichtet	fictional, fictitious
Gefahr	danger, risk
Gefecht	fight
Gefühl	feeling, touch
gegeben	given
Gegenbehauptung	counterassertion
Gegenmittel	remedy
Gegensatz	opposition, conflict, contrast, antithesis, counterproposition
Gegenstand	object, subject matter, topic
gegenwärtig	present
Gegenwehr	defense
Gegenwirkung	reaction, interference
gegliedert	structured
Gegner	opponent, adversary
gehalten	obliged
Geist	spirit
Geistes, des	intellectual
geistig	spiritual
geistreich	brilliant
gekünstelt	artificial
Gelegenheit	occasion
Gelegenheitsursache	occasioning cause
gelehrig	teachable
Gelehrsamkeit	erudition
Gelehrter	scholar
gelten	to hold, to count, to be valid, to apply, to be considered
gemäßigt	moderate
gemein	common, usual, general, ordinary
gemeines Wesen	community
gemeinsam	common
Gemeinschaft	community, communion
gemeinschaftlich	common, concerted, joint
Gemüt	mind
Gemüts-	mental, of the mind
genau	exact, accurate, strict
Genealogie	genealogy
Genehmigung	sanction
geneigt	inclined
genug	enough, sufficient, quite
genugsam	sufficient
genugtuend	adequate, satisfactory
Geometrie	geometry

gerade	direct(ly), precisely, exactly, just
geradezu	straightforwardly
Gerichtshof	tribunal, court of law
Geschäft	business, task
Geschehen	occurence, happening
Geschichte	history
Geschicklichkeit	skill
Geschöpf	creature
Gesellschaft	society, company
Gesetz	law
Gesetzgebung	legislation
gesetzlich	legal, of law
gesetzlos	lawless
gesetzmäßig	law-governed, lawful, legitimate
Gesichtspunkt	point of view, viewpoint
Gesinnung	attitude
Gestalt	shape, guise
gesund	sound
gewachsen	adequate
gewagt	daring
Gewalt	force, authority, control
Gewinn	gain
gewiß	certain
Gewohnheit	habit, custom
Glaube	faith, belief
gleichartig	homogeneous
gleichbedeutend	synonymous
gleichförmig	uniform
gleichgeltend	equivalent
gleichgültig	indifferent, inconsequential
gleichlautend	homonymous
Glied	member, link
Gliederbau	structure
Glück	fortune, success
glücklich	happy, fortunate, lucky
Glückseligkeit	happiness
Gott	God
Gotteserkenntnis	theology
Gottheit	deity
göttlich	divine
Grad	degree
Gravitation	gravitation
Grenze(n)	boundary (bounds)
grenzenlos	boundless
Grenzlinie	boundary line
grob	coarse, crude
groß	large, great, big, major, wide
Größe	magnitude, size
grübeln	to ponder
Grund	basis, ground, foundation
Grund-	basic, fundamental
gründen	to be the basis for, to establish
gründen, sich	to be based, to rest
Grundfeste	foundation
gründlich	well-founded, thorough, solid, sound
Grundsatz	principle
gültig	valid
Gute, das	the good
gutgesinnt	well-intentioned

H

haften	to adhere
Handelnder	agent
Handlung	act, action
Hang	propensity
Harmonie	harmony
Haufen	heap, accumulation
heben	to remove
heften	to affix, to attach
heilig	sacred
Heilmittel	remedy
heischen	to demand
herausbringen	to discover, to uncover, to extract
herbeirufen	to summon, to call in
herleiten	to derive
herrschen	to prevail, to be prevalent, to obtain

hervorbringen	to produce, to generate, to give rise to
Heterogeneität	heterogeneity
Heuchelei	hypocrisy
heuristisch	heuristic
Hilfsmittel	remedy
Hilfsquelle	resource
Himmel	sky
Himmels-	celestial
hinabgehen	to descend
hinaufsteigen	to ascend, to rise
Hindernis	impediment, obstacle, hindrance
hinlänglich	sufficient, adequate
hinreichend	sufficient, adequate
hinweisen	to point
Hinzutun	addition
Hirngespinst	chimera
höchst	highest, supreme, exceedingly, utmost, extremely
Hoffnung	hope
Homogeneität	homogeneity
Horizont	horizon
hyperbolisch	hyperbolic
hyperphysisch	hyperphysical
hypostasieren	to hypostatize
Hypothese	hypothesis
I	
Ich, das	the I
Ideal	ideal
idealisch	ideal
idealisierend	idealizing
Idealismus	idealism
Idealität	ideality
Idee	idea
Identität	identity
Illusion	illusion
Illustration	illustration
Imagination	imagination
immanent	immanent
Immaterialität	immateriality
immerwährend	everlasting
Imperativ	imperative
Imputabilität	imputability

imstande	able
Inbegriff	sum (total)
Indifferentismus	indifferentism
indirekt	indirect
Individuum	individual
Induktion	induction
Inhalt	content(s), volume
Inhärenz	inherence
inkonsequent	inconsistent
inner(lich)	inner, internal, intrinsic, inward
innerst	innermost
in sich (selbst)	internally, intrinsically
Intellekt	intellect
intellektual	intellectualist
intellektuell	intellectual
intellektuieren	to intellectualize
Intelligenz	intelligence
intelligibel	intelligible
intensiv	intensive
Interesse	interest
intuitiv	intuitive
Inventar	inventory
Irrational-	irrational
irren, (sich)	to err, to be mistaken
Irrtum, Irrung	error
isolieren	to isolate
ist, was da	what is
J	
jedermann	everyone
Jugend	youth
juristisch	juridical
K	
Kämpfer	combatant
Kanon	canon
Kardinalsatz	cardinal proposition
Kasualität	casualism
Kategorie	category
kategorisch	categorical
Kathartikon	cathartic
Kausal-	causal
Kausalität	causality
keines	none

kennen	to be acquainted with, to know, to (re)cognize, to be familiar with
kennenlernen	to become acquainted with, to get to know
Kenner	expert
Kenntnis(se)	acquaintance, knowledge, cognition
Kennzeichen	indicator, criterion, characteristic
klar	clear, evident
klein	small, little
Kluft	breach, gulf, gap
Klugheit	prudence, sagacity
knüpfen	to tie, to weave, to fasten
Koalition	coalition
Koexistenz	coexistence
Kommerzium	commerce
Komposition	composition
kongruieren	to be congruent
Konklusion	conclusion
Konkurrenz	concurrence
konsequent	consistent
Konsequenz	consequence, implication
konstitutiv	constitutive
konstruieren	to construct
Kontext	context
kontinuierlich	continuous, continual
Kontinuität	continuity
Kontinuum	continuum
kontradiktorisch	contradictorily
koordinieren	to coordinate
Kopf	mind
Kopie	copy
Körper	body
Körper-	corporeal
Körperlehre	somatology
körperlich	corporeal, bodily
Korrelatum	correlate
Kosmologie	cosmology
Kosmotheologie	cosmotheology
Kraft	power, force, ability
Kriterium	criterion
Kritik	critique
kritisch	critical
krumm	curved
Kugel	sphere
kühn	bold
Kultur	culture, cultivation
künftig	(in the) future, hereafter, thereafter, later
Kunst	art, artistry
künstlich	artful, artificial
kunstmäßig	technical

L

Lage	position, location
Land	land, territory
langweilig	tedious
langwierig	tedious
lästig	irksome
Lauf	course
Laune	mood
läutern	to purify, to refine
Leben	life
Lebenswandel	conduct, way of life
leer	empty, void, idle
Lehre	doctrine, science, teaching, theory
Lehrling	learner
Lehrmeinung	dogma
Lehrsatz	doctrine, theorem
Leibes-	bodily
leiden	to undergo, to tolerate, to admit of
leidend	passive
Leidender	patient
Leidenschaft	passion
leisten	to accomplish, to achieve
leiten	to govern, to guide
Leitfaden	guide, guidance, guiding thread
Leitung	guidance
letzt	ultimate
leugnen	to deny

Limitation	limitation
locken	to entice
Logik	logic
Lust	pleasure
M	
Macht	force, power, might
Machtspruch	fiat
Maler	painter
Mangel	deficiency, lack, failure, omission
Manier	manner
mannigfaltig	manifold, diverse
Mannigfaltige, das	the manifold
Mann	man
Mark	mark
Maschine	machine
Maß	measure, extent, degree, standard
mäßigen	to moderate
Material	material
material	material
Materialismus	materialism
Materie(n)	matter, material, (kinds of matter)
materiell	material
Mathema	mathema
Mathematik	mathematics
Maxime	maxim
Maximum	maximum
Mechanik	mechanism, mechanics
Mechanismus	mechanism
mehrenteils	usually
mehrentlich	usually
Mehrheit	plurality
mehrmals	repeatedly
meinen	to have (hold) an opinion, to mean, to think
Meinung	opinion, intent
Meinungssache	matter of opinion
Menge	multitude, amount, number
Mensch	human being, person, man
Menschheit	humanity
Merkmal	mark, characteristic

Merkzeichen	mark
Meßkunst	geometry
Metaphysik	metaphysics
Methode	method
Methodenlehre	doctrine of method
mischen	to mix, to mingle
Misologie	misology
Mißdeutung	misinterpretation
Mißfallen	dislike, disliking
Mißtrauen	distrust
Mißverstand	misunderstanding
mißverstehen	to misunderstand
mitteilen	to communicate
Mittel	means, remedy
Mittel-	intermediate
mittelbar	indirect, mediate
mitwirken	to cooperate, to contribute
Modalität	modality
Modifikation	modification
Modus	mode
möglich	possible
Molekül	molecule
Moment	moment
Monadologie	monadology
Mond	moon
Monogramm	monogram
Monotheismus	monotheism
Moral	morality
moralisiert	moralized
Moralität	morality
müßig	idle, futile
Muster	model
mutig	daring
mystisch	mystical
N	
nachahmen	to imitate
Nachbild	copy, ectype
nachbildend	reproductive, ectypal
nachdenken	to meditate
nachdrücklich	emphatic
nacheinander (folgend)	successive, sequential
Nacheinandersein	sequentiality
nachfolgend	subsequent
Nachfolger	follower, successor

nachforschen	to investigate, to search for
Nachforschung	investigation, inquiry
Nachfrage	inquiry
Nachsicht	forbearance
nachsinnen	to reflect
nachspüren	to explore, to trace, to discover
nächst	proximate, nearest
Nachsuchung	investigation
nachteilig	detrimental, disadvantageous, unfavorable
nähern, sich	to approach, to come closer to
Name	name
Namenerklärung	nominal explication
Natur	nature
Naturalist	naturalist
Naturkenner	naturalist
nebeneinander	concurrent
Negation	negation
neigen	to tend
neugierig	inquisitive
Neigung	inclination
Neuerung	innovation
Neuigkeit	novelty
nichtig	null, void
nichts	nothing
Nichts, das	nothing(ness)
Nichtsein	nonexistence, not-being
Nomothetik	nomothetic
Nonsens	nonsense
Noogonie	noogony
Noologist	noologist
Norm	standard
Nothilfe	expedient
nötig	needed, necessary
nötigen	to compel
Notion	notion
notwendig	necessary
Noumenon	noumenon
null	zero, null
numerisch	numerical
Nutzen	benefit
nützlich	beneficial, useful

O

Obersatz	major premise
oberst	supreme, highest
Objekt	object
objektiv	objective
Obliegenheit	obligation
offenbar	manifest, plain, obvious
Okkasionalismus	occasionalism
Ontologie	ontology
Ontotheologie	ontotheology
Opposition	opposition
Orden	order
ordnen	to order, to arrange
Ordnung	order
Organ	organ
Organisation	organization
organisch	organic
organisieren	to organize
Organon	organon
Original	original
Ort	place, location
ostensiv	ostensive

P

Palingenesie	palingenesis
Pantheismus	pantheism
paradox	paradoxical
Paralogismus	paralogism
Partei	side, party
parteiisch	partial
Parteilichkeit	partiality
partikular	particular
passiv	passive
pathologisch	pathological
Person	person
Personalität	personality
personifizieren	personify
Persönlichkeit	personality
Perzeption	perception
Petition	petition
Pflicht	duty
Phaenomenon	phenomenon
Philodoxie	philodoxy
Philosophie	philosophy
Physik	physics
Physikotheologie	physicotheology

Physiognom	physiognomist
Physiokratie	physiocracy
Physiologie	physiology
physisch	physical
physisch-mechanisch	physical-mechanical
physisch-theologisch	physicotheological
Planet	planet
Platz	room, place, position, territory
Pneumatismus	pneumatism
polemisch	polemic
polysyllogistisch	polysyllogistic
populär	popular
Position	positing
positiv	positive
Posten	position
Postprädikament	postpredicament
Postulat	postulate
postulieren	to postulate
potential	potential
Prädikabilie	predicable
Prädikament	predicament
Prädikat	predicate
Präformation	preformation
pragmatisch	pragmatic
praktisch	practical
Prämisse	premise
Präzision	precision
Principium	principle
Prinzip	principle
Probe	sample, test
Probierstein	touchstone
Problem	problem
Produkt	product
produktiv	productive
Programm	program
Progressus	progression
Projekt	project
Propädeutik	propaedeutic
Proportion	proportion
Prosyllogismus	prosyllogism
Prozess	trial, litigation
prüfen	to examine, to test
Psychologie	psychology
Punkt	point, dot, locus

Q

Qualität	quality, capacity
Quantität	quantity
Quantum	quantum
Quelle	source

R

Radikal-	root
Rationalismus	rationalism
ratsam	advisable
Ratschluß	decree
Raum	space
Realgrund	real basis
realisieren	to realize
Realismus	realism
Realität	reality
realst	most real
Rechenkunst	arithmetic
Rechenschaft geben	to account for
Recht	law, right, rightness
recht	proper, right, quite
rechtens	legal
rechtfertigen	to justify
rechtlich	legal
rechtmäßig	legitimate
Rechts-	legal, legitimate
Rechtsame	rightness
Rechtsanspruch	legitimate claim
rechtschaffen	righteous
Rechtshandel	lawsuit
Rede	speech, language, issue
reden	to talk, to speak
Reflexion	reflection
Regel	rule
regelmäßig	regular
Regierer	ruler
Regierung	government
Regiment	reign
Register	register
regressiv	regressive
Regressus	regression
regulativ	regulative
Reich	kingdom

reichen	to extend, to reach, to hand
Reihe	series
Reihenfolge	sequence
reihenweise	serially
rein	pure
reizen	to stimulate
reizend	charming, exciting
Rekognition	recognition
Relation	relation
Religion	religion
Reproduktion	reproduction
reproduktiv	reproductive
Requisit	requirement
restringieren	to restrict
Restriktion	restriction
Resultat	result
retten	to save
Revolution	revolution
Rezeptivität	receptivity
Reziprokabilität	interchangeability
Rhapsodie	rhapsody
richten, (sich)	to direct, to aim, (to conform)
Richter	judge
richtig	correct
Richtmaß	standard
Richtschnur	guideline, guidance
roh	crude
Rückgang	regression
Ruhe	calm, silence, tranquillity, rest
Rührung	emotion

S

Sache	thing, matter, cause, case
Sache an sich (selbst)	thing in itself
Sachheit	thinghood
sagen	to say, to utter, to tell, to speak, to affirm
sagen wollen	to mean
sammeln	to gather, to collect
Satz	proposition, thesis, principle, premise
schaden	to (do) harm
schaffen	to create, to provide
scharf	keen, rigorous
schärfen	to sharpen
Schattenriß	outline
schätzen	to assess, to rate
schauderhaft	horrible, awesome
Scheidekünstler	chemist
scheiden	to separate
Schein	illusion (of plausibility), semblance (of plausibility)
scheinbar	seeming, illusory, plausible
scheinen	to seem
Schema	schema
Schematismus	schematism
schicklich	fitting, appropriate
Schicksal	fate
schlechterdings	absolutely
schlechthin	absolutely
schließen	to conclude, to infer, to make an inference
Schluß	inference, conclusion, argument
Schlußfolge	conclusion, inference, argument
Schlußfolgerung	inference
schmeicheln	to flatter
scholastisch	scholastic
Schöpfung	creation
Schoß	womb
Schranke	limit
schreiten	to proceed
Schritt	course
schüchtern	timid
Schuld	blame, guilt
Schule, Schul-	school
schulgerecht	complying with school standards
schwach	feeble, weak, faint
schwankend	shaky, wavering
schwärmen	to rave, to rove
Schwärmerei	fanaticism

schwatzen	to chatter
schwer	difficult, having weight, heavy
schwerlich	scarcely
schwierig	difficult
schwindlig	dizzy
Schwung	momentum, soaring
Seele	soul
Seelenlehre	psychology
sei, was da	what is
Sein	being
Selbst, das	self
Selbst-	self-
selbständig	independent
selbstsüchtig	selfish
Seligkeit	bliss
seltsam	odd
sensibel	sensible
sensifizieren	to sensualize
sensitiv(us)	sensory
Sensual-	sensualist
Sentenz	verdict
setzen	to place, to set, to suppose, to posit
sicher	secure, safe, sure, assured, reliable
Simplizität	simplicity
Simultaneität	simultaneity
Singular	singular
sinken	to sink, to give way
Sinn	sense, mind, meaning
Sinnen-	of sense, sensible
sinnen auf	to devise, to think up
sinnenfrei	sense-free
sinnleer	meaningless
sinnlich	sensible
Sinnlichkeit	sensibility
sinnreich	ingenious
Sitten	morals
sittlich, Sitten-	moral, of morals
Sittlichkeit	morality
Sittsamkeit	decency
skeptisch	skeptical
Skeptizismus	skepticism

sofort	immediately, forthwith
sogleich	at once, immediately, forthwith
sollen	ought, to be (intended, meant, expected) to, shall, should
sonderbar	odd
Sophist	sophist
Sophistikationen	sophistries
sorgfältig	careful
sorglos	carefree
Sparsamkeit	parsimony
Spekulation	speculation
spekulativ	speculative
Spezies	species
Spezifikation	specification
Sphäre	sphere
Spiritualismus	spiritualism
Spiritualität	spirituality
Spontaneität	spontaneity
Sprache	language, speech
Sprung	leap
Stamm-	root, genealogical
Stammbaum	genealogical tree
Stand	state
Standpunkt	standpoint
Statt	place
stattfinden	to occur, to happen, to take place, to have a(ny) place, to be there
-steig	course, path
steigen	ascend
Stelle	position, place, passage
Stellung	position
sterblich	mortal
stimmen	to harmonize, to agree
Stern	star
Stoff	material
streben	to endeavor
Streit	dispute, contest
Streithandel	contest

Streithandlung	contest
streitig	disputed, disputable, at odds
Streitigkeit	conflict, controversy
streng	strict, rigorous
strittig	disputing, in dispute
Stück	component, item, matter, work, point, regard, respect
Studium	study
stufenartig	stepwise
Stufenordnung	hierarchy
Stütze	support
subaltern	subsidiary
Subjekt	subject
subjektiv	subjective
subordinieren	to subordinate
Subreption	subreption
Subsistenz	subsistence
substantial	substantial
Substantialität	substantiality
substantiell	substantive
Substanz	substance
Substrat(um)	substrate (substratum)
subsumieren	to subsume
subtil	subtle
Sucht	passion
Sukzession	succession
sukzessiv	successive
Summe	sum
syllogistisch	syllogistic
synonymisch	synonymous
Synopsis	synopsis
Synthesis	synthesis
synthetisch	synthetic
System	system
systematisch	systematic
szientifisch	scientific

T

Tadel	rebuke
Tat	act, deed
Täter	perpetrator
Tätigkeit	activity
tauglich	fit, suitable
Täuschung	delusion
Tautologie	tautology
technisch	technical
Teil	part
Teil-	component, partial
teilbar	divisible
teilen	to divide, to share
Teleologie	teleology
theistisch	theistic
Thema	topic
Theologie	theology
theoretisch	theoretical
Theorie	theory
Thesis	thesis
Thetik	thetic
Tier	animal
Ton	sound, tone
Tonkünstler	musician
Topik	topic
Totalität	totality
Traktat	treatise
transzendent	transcendent
transzendental	transcendental
treu	faithful
Triangel	triangle
Triebfeder	incentive
trocken	dry
tröstend	comforting
trostlos	hopeless
trüglich	deceptive
Trugschluß	fallacious inference
tüchtig	sturdy, competent, efficient
Tüchtigkeit	sturdiness
Tugend	virtue
Tun	doing

U

übel	evil
üben	to practice, to exercise
überall	at all, throughout, whatsoever
überdenken	to reflect on
übereinkommen	to agree
Übereinstimmung	agreement, harmony

überfliegen	to fly (soar) beyond (above), to overreach
Übergang	transition
überhaupt	as such, in general, in principle
überheben, sich	to refrain, to exempt oneself
über . . . hinaus	beyond
überlegen	to deliberate
übermenschlich	suprahuman
übernatürlich	supranatural
überreden	to persuade
überschlagen	to gauge, to assess
überschreiten	to overstep, to step beyond, to exceed
überschwenglich	transcendent, exceedingly
übersinnlich	suprasensible
übersteigen	to surpass, to surmount
übertragen	to transfer
übertreffen	to surpass
überwinden	to overcome
überzeugen	to convince
Umänderung	transformation
Umfang	range
umgekehrt	vice versa, conversely, (in) reverse, on the other hand
Umkehrung	conversion
Umriß	outline
umspannen	to encompass
Umwandlung	transformation, conversion
unabhängig	independent
unablässig	unceasingly, incessantly
unaufhörlich	incessantly, unceasingly, constantly
unauflöslich	indissoluble, insoluble
unausbleiblich	unfailingly, inevitably
unausgemacht	undecided, unestablished
unbedingt	unconditioned, unconditionally
unbegreiflich	incomprehensible
unbegrenzt	unbounded
unbekannt	unknown
unbescheiden	immodest
unbeschränkt	unlimited
unbestimmbar	indeterminable
unbestimmt	indeterminate, undetermined, indefinite
Unbestimmtheit	indeterminateness
unbeweglich	immovable
unbezweifelt	indubitable
Unding	nonentity
undurchdringlich	impenetrable
uneingeschränkt	unlimited, without limitation
unempfindlich	insensitive
unendlich	infinite
Unendliche, ins	*ad infinitum*
Unendlichkeit	infinity
unentbehrlich	indispensable
unerforschlich	inscrutable
unergründlich	unfathomable
unermeßlich	immense, vast
unerweislich	unprovable
unfähig	incapable
unfehlbar	unfailingly
ungegründet	unfounded
ungereimt	absurd
ungezweifelt	indubitable, beyond doubt
Unglaube	lack of faith
ungleichartig	heterogeneous
Ungrund	lack of basis
ungültig	invalid
Universum	universe
unkritisch	uncritical
Unkunde	ignorance
Unlauterkeit	insincerity, impurity
Unlust	displeasure
unmittelbar	direct, immediate
unmöglich	impossible
unnatürlich	unnatural

unnötig	needless, unnecessary
unnütz	useless
Unordnung	disorder
unorganisch	inorganic
unparteiisch	impartial
Unparteilichkeit	impartiality
unrecht	wrong
unrechtmäßig	illegitimate
unrichtig	incorrect
Unschlüssigkeit	inconclusiveness
unsicher	unsafe, insecure
unsittlich	immoral
unstatthaft	inadmissible
unsterblich	immortal
unstreitig	indisputable
unstrittig	undisputed
untauglich	useless, unsuitable, unfit
unteilbar	indivisible
unterbrechen	to interrupt
untergeordnet	subordinate
Unternehmung	undertaking, enterprise
Unterordnung	subordination
Unterricht	instruction, information
Untersatz	minor premise
unterscheiden, (sich)	to distinguish, to differentiate, (to differ)
Unterscheidungsmerkmal	distinguishing characteristic
unterschieben	to allege, to substitute, to foist
Unterschied	distinction, difference
unterschieden	distinct, different
untersuchen	to investigate, to inquire into, to examine
Unterweisung	instruction
untunlich	unfeasible
unüberwindlich	insurmountable
unumschränkt	limitless
ununterbrochen	uninterrupted
unveränderlich	unchangeable
unverletzlich	inviolable
unvermeidlich	unavoidable, inevitable
Unvermögen	incapacity
unvermögend	incapable
unverschämt	impudent
unvollkommen	imperfect
unwandelbar	immutable
unwidersprechlich	incontestable
Unwille	indignation
Unwissenheit	ignorance
unzerstörlich	indestructible
unzertrennlich	inseparable
unzulänglich	insufficient, inadequate
unzulässig	inadmissible
unzureichend	insufficient
Urbild	archetype
Urgrund	original basis
Urheber	originator, author
Urquelle	original source
Ursache	cause
Ursprung	origin, origination
Urteil	judgment, verdict
Urteilskraft	power of judgment
Urväter	forefathers
Urwesen	original being

V

Vakuum	vacuum
Varietät	variety, variation
verächtlich	despicable
Verachtung	contempt
veränderlich	changeable
Veränderung	change
veranlassen	to prompt, to occasion, to give rise to
verbieten	to prohibit
verbinden	to combine, to link (together), to obligate
Verbindlichkeit	obligation
Verbindungsbegriff	combination concept

Verbindungs-vermögen	power of combination
Verblendung	delusion
Verbot	prohibition
Verbrennung	combustion
verbunden	obligated
Verdacht	suspicion
verdächtig	suspect
verderben	to corrupt, to ruin
verdienen	to deserve
verdient	worthy
vereinbaren	to reconcile
vereinen	to unite
vereinigen	to unite, to reconcile
vereiteln	to foil, to defeat
Verfahren	procedure, process, treatment
verfälschen	to corrupt
Verfasser	author
Verfechter	champion
verfehlen	to miss, to fail in
verfehlt	false, failed
verflossen	gone by, bygone
Verfolg	continuation
verfolgen	to trace, to pursue
Verführung	corruption
vergangen	past
vergeblich	futile, (in) vain
vergehen	to pass away
vergleichen	to compare
Vergleichungs-begriff	comparison concept
vergrößern	to increase
Verhalten	conduct, behaving
Verhältnis	relation, proportion, ratio
verhältnisweise	relatively
verhindern	to prevent
verhüten	to forestall, to prevent, to keep from
Verirrung	aberration, straying
verkehrt	inverted
verkennen	to mistake, to misunderstand

verknüpfen	to connect
verlangen	to demand, to require
verlängern	to expand
verlassen	to leave, to abandon
Verlauf	course
Verlegenheit	perplexity, quandary
verleiten	to mislead
verletzen	to violate
vermehren	to augment, to increase
vermeiden	to avoid, to prevent
vermessen	presumptuous
vermitteln	to mediate
Vermögen	power, ability
vermuten	to presume
Vermutung	conjecture, presumption
verneinend	negative
Verneinung	negation
vernichten	to annihilate, to annul
Vernunft	reason
Vernunft-	rational, of reason, reason's
vernünfteln(d)	subtle (subtly) reasoning
vernünftig	reasonable, ratonal
vernunftlos	nonrational
vernunftmäßig	rational
Vernunftschluß	syllogism, inference of reason
verrichten	to perform
Verringerung	diminution
verschaffen	to furnish, to provide, to impart, to gain
verschieden	different, various, varied, diverse
verschwinden	to vanish
versetzen	to transfer, to put, to transpose
Verstand	understanding, meaning, sense

Verstandes-	of (the) understanding, understanding's
verständlich	understandable
verstärken	to reinforce, to strengthen, to increase
verstatten	to permit, to allow
versteckt	hidden, covert
verstehen	to understand, to mean
Versuch	attempt, experiment, test, essay
vertauschen	to exchange
Verteidiger	defender
vertilgen	to obliterate, to eliminate, to eradicate
vertragen, sich (nicht)	to be (in)compatible with
Vertrauen	confidence
Veruneinigung	disunity
verunstalten	to corrupt
verursachen	to cause
verurteilen	to condemn
Verwahrung	safeguard
verwandeln	to transform, to convert
verwandt	kindred, akin
Verwandtschaft	kinship, affinity
verwechseln	to confuse
verweigern	to refuse
verweisen	to relegate, to order
verwenden	to employ
verwerfen	to reject, to repudiate
verwerflich	reprehensible
Verweslichkeit	corruptibility
verwirren	to confuse, to confound, to disconcert
verwirrt	confused
verworren	confused
vieles	much
vielfältig	manifold, a multitude of, multifarious
Vielgötterei	polytheism
Vielheit	multiplicity, plurality
Vielwissen	gaining a lot of knowledge
Vielwisserei	attitude of knowing a lot
Volk	people, population
vollenden	to complete, to perfect
vollführen	to carry out, to complete
vollkommen	perfect, complete
vollständig	complete
vollzählig	complete
vollziehen	to carry out
Volumen	volume
vorangehen	to precede
vorausgehen	to precede
voraussetzen	to presuppose
Voraussetzung	presupposition
vorbeigehen	to pass by, to bypass, to pass over
vorbestimmt	predetermined
vorbeugen	to forestall
Voreltern	progenitors
Vorerinnerung	advance notice, preliminary reminder
vorfinden, sich	to occur
vorgaukeln	to hoodwink
vorgeben	to allege, to purport, to claim
vorgehen	to precede, to occur, to take place
Vorhaben	project
vorhanden	present, at hand, available
vorher	previously, before(hand), in advance
vorherbestimmt	predetermined, preestablished

vorhergehen	to precede
vorig	previous, foregoing, above
vorkommen	to occur, to come up, to be found
vorkommen, uns	we encounter
vorläufig	provisional, preliminary
vorlegen	to pose, to submit, to put before, to put forth
vornehmen	to carry out, to take up
vornehmlich	above all, primarily, even
vornehmst	foremost, principal
Vorrat	supply
Vorrecht	prerogative
vorrücken	to advance
Vorsatz	precept, resolve
vorsätzlich	deliberate
vorschreiben	to prescribe, to enjoin
Vorschrift	precept, prescription
Vorsehung	Providence, foresight
Vorsicht	care, caution, provision
vorstehend	preceding
vorstellen, (sich)	to present, to have a presentation (of), to conceive (of)
Vorstellung	presentation, conception
Vorstellungsart	way of presenting, kind of presentation
Vorstellungs-fähigkeit	capacity to present
Vorstellungsform	form of presentation
Vorstellungskraft	power to present, power of presentation
Vorstellungs-vermögen	power to present, power of presentation
Vorteil	advantage, favor
Vortrag	treatise
vortragen	to set (put) forth, to propound, to treat
vortrefflich	superb
Vorübung	preparation
Vorurteil	prejudice
vorwenden	to allege
vorzeigen	to display
Vorzug	superiority, advantage

W

wachsen	to increase
wagen	to venture, to risk, to dare
wählen	to select, to choose
Wahn	delusion
wähnen	to surmise
Wahnsinn	madness
wahr	true
wahrhaftig	veritable
Wahrheit	truth
wahrnehmen	to perceive, to observe
Wahrnehmung	perception
wahrscheinlich	probable
wandelbar	mutable
wankend	shaky
Wärme	heat
Wechsel	variation
wechseln	to vary
wechselseitig	reciprocal
wechselweise	vice versa
Wechselwirkung	interaction
Weg	path, road, course, way, passage
weglassen	to omit, to leave out
wegnehmen	to remove
wegschaffen	to remove
wegwerfen	to dismiss
Weise	manner, way
weise	wise

weisen	to show, to point out
Weisheit	wisdom
weiterbringen	to advance, to take further
weitergehen	to continue
weitgehend	far-reaching
Welt	world
Welt-	world, of the world, the world's
Weltall	universe
Weltbestes	highest (greatest) good of the world
Weltkörper	celestial body, cosmic body
Welterkenntnis	cosmology
Weltlehre	cosmology
Weltraum	cosmic space
Weltweisheit	philosophy
Weltwissenschaft	cosmology
Werk	work
Werkzeug	instrument
Wert	value, merit
Wesen	being, entity, essence, nature
wesentlich	essential
Wettstreit	contest
Wichtigkeit	importance
widerfahren	to befall
widerlegen	to refute, to disprove
widerrechtlich	illegitimate
widersinnig	preposterous
widersinnisch	preposterous
widersprechend, (in sich selbst)	(self-)contradictory
widerstehen	to resist, to counter
Widerstreit	conflict
Wiederholung	repetition
Wille	will
Willkür	power of choice
willkürlich	chosen, elected, voluntary, arbitrary
wirken	to produce (an effect), to effect, to act, to work
wirkende Ursache	efficient cause
wirklich	actual
wirksam	active
Wirkung	effect, efficacy, action
Wißbegierde	desire (thirst) for knowledge
Wissen	knowledge
Wissenschaft	science
Witz	ingenuity, wit
wohldenkend	well-meaning
Wohlgefallen	liking
wohlgemeint	well-meant
Wohlgereimtheit	consonance
Wohlstand	wealth, prosperity
Wohltäter	benefactor
Wollen, das	willing
Wort	word, term
Wunder	marvel
wunderbar	miraculous
würdig	worthy
Wurzel	root

Z

Zahl	number
Zahl-	numerical
zählen	to number, to class, to include
zanken	to quarrel
Zauber-	magical
Zeichen	sign
Zeichnung	design
zeigen	to show, to manifest
Zeit	time, age, period of time, time period
Zeit-	temporal, of time
Zeitalter	age
zeitlich	temporal
zelotisch	zealous
Zensur	census, verdict
zerfällen	to break up, to cut up, to split up
zergliedern	to dissect, to analyze

zerhauen	to cut up	zureichend	sufficient
zero	zero	zurückführen	to trace back, to guide back
zerrüttet	in disarray	zurückgehen	to go backward, to regress
zerstreut	sporadic	Zurückstoßung	repulsion
Zerteilung	partition	zurückweisen	to point back
Zeug	material, equipment	Zurüstung	apparatus
zeugen	to attest	zusammen bestehen	to coexist, to be consistent
Zeugungen	generations	zusammenfassen	to collate, to encompass, to integrate
Ziel	aim, goal	Zusammenfassung	collating
Zierlichkeit	elegance	zusammenfließen	to meld
Zirkel, fehlerhafter	vicious circle, fallacy of circular reasoning	zusammengesetzt	composite, composed
Zucht	training	zusammenhalten mit	to hold up to
zufällig	contingent, accidental, incidental	Zusammenhang	coherence, cohesion, context, connection, link, continuity
Zufälligkeit	contingency	zusammenhängen	to cohere, to be linked, to connect
Zuflucht nehmen	to resort	Zusammenhäufung	accumulation
Zug	characteristic, draft	zusammenkommen	to come together
zugeben	to allow, to admit, to add	zusammennehmen	to gather together
zugehen	to happen, to be done	zusammensetzen	to assemble, to compose, to put together
zugestehen	to concede	Zusammenstellung	compilation
zugleich	at the same time, simultaneous, also, as well, both, along	zusammenstimmen	to agree, to accord, to harmonize
Zugleichsein	simultaneity	zusammentreffen	to concur, to coincide
Zukunft	future	Zusatz	addition
zulänglich	sufficient, adequate	Zuschauer	observer
zulassen	to admit (of), to permit	zuschreiben	to attribute, to ascribe
zuletzt	ultimately, finally	Zustand	state, situation
zumuten	to require, to impute	zustande bringen	to bring about
zunächst	initially, proximately		
zunehmen	to increase		
zunichte machen	to eliminate		
zurechnen	to ascribe, to impute		
Zurechtweisung	rebuke		
Zurechnung	imputation		

zustande kommen	to come about, to arise
zutragen, sich	to take place, to happen
zuträglich	conducive
Zutrauen	confidence, trust
zuverlässig	reliable
Zuversicht	confidence
zuvor	first, before(hand)
zuvörderst	first of all
zuvorkommend	antecedent
Zuwachs	increase
zuwider sein	to go against, to be contrary to
Zwang	constraint
zwanglos	unrestrained
Zweck	purpose
zweckähnlich	purposelike
zweckmäßig	purposive, appropriate
zweideutig	ambiguous
Zweifel	doubt
zweifelhaft	doubtful
zweifeln	to doubt
Zweifelsucht	skepticism
Zwiespalt	discord
Zwischen-	intermediate
Zwist	quarrel

INDEX

Headings are arranged alphabetically, but their subheadings are ordered by affinity of topics. The sequence of the individual references follows the arrangement of the text in this volume—except that indirect references (introduced by 'cf.') follow direct references as a group, and occasionally the group of direct references starts with a subgroup of especially important (rather than early) references. Where headings have subheadings, the references immediately following the main headings and preceding the subheadings are usually less specific (and often less important) than those given under the subheadings. Referrals (marked by '*see*' or '*see also*') to other headings are typically given only once under each heading, even where they are relevant to several of the subheadings.

Both the roman and the arabic numerals refer to the pagination of the *Critique's* original editions A and B (of 1781, 1787), as this pagination appears (in *approximate* correspondence to that of the German editions) on the margins of the translation. The *primed* numerals refer to A, the unprimed to B. Where A runs concurrently with B or appears in a footnote to B, only the B references are given.

References to footnotes are keyed to this A and B pagination. Notes containing extended Kantian text (Kant's own notes as well as notes giving passages from A) are marked by 'n.' or the plural 'ns.' The translator's bracketed notes are marked by 'br. n.' or 'br. ns.' (Notes identified by lowercase *letters* are notes *to other* notes; see the Translator's Preface for further details.)

Works by Kant are listed by their English titles, with the original titles given in parentheses. Other authors are listed here only by their names; their works, insofar as these are cited in this translation, are listed in the bibliography.