3. WORD, DIALOGUE, AND NOVEL[1]

If the efficacy of scientific approach in "human" sciences has always been challenged, it is all the more striking that such a challenge should for the first time be issued on the very level of the structures being studied—structures supposedly answerable to a logic *other* than scientific. What would be involved is the logic of language (and all the more so, of poetic language) that "writing" has had the virtue of bringing to light. I have in mind that particular literary practice in which the elaboration of poetic meaning emerges as a tangible, *dynamic gram*.[2] Confronted with this situation, then, literary semiotics can either abstain and remain silent, or persist in its efforts to elaborate a model that would be isomorphic to this other logic; that is, isomorphic to the elaboration of poetic meaning, a concern of primary importance to contemporary semiotics.

Russian Formalism, in which contemporary structural analysis claims to have its source, was itself faced with identical alternatives when reasons beyond literature and science halted its endeavors. Research was nonetheless carried on, recently coming to light in the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. His work represents one of that movement's most remarkable accomplishments, as well as one of the most powerful attempts to transcend its limitations. Bakhtin shuns the linguist's technical rigor, wielding an impulsive and at times even prophetic pen, while he takes on the fundamental problems presently confronting a structural analysis of narrative; this alone would give currency to essays written over forty years ago. Writer as well as "scholar," Bakhtin was one of the first to replace the static hewing out of texts with a model where literary structure does not simply *exist* but is generated in relation

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to *another* structure. What allows a dynamic dimension to structuralism is his conception of the "literary word" as an *intersection of textual surfaces* rather than a *point* (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings: that of the writer, the addressee (or the character), and the contemporary or earlier cultural context.

By introducing the *status of the word* as a minimal structural unit, Bakhtin situates the text within history and society, which are then seen as texts read by the writer, and into which he inserts himself by rewriting them. Diachrony is transformed into synchrony, and in light of this transformation, *linear* history appears as abstraction. The only way a writer can participate in history is by transgressing this abstraction through a process of reading-writing; that is, through the practice of a signifying structure in relation or opposition to another structure. History and morality are written and read within the infrastructure of texts. The poetic word, polyvalent and multi-determined, adheres to a logic exceeding that of codified discourse and fully comes into being only in the margins of recognized culture. Bakhtin was the first to study this logic, and he looked for its roots in *carnival.* Carnivalesque discourse breaks through the laws of a language censored by grammar and semantics and, at the same time, is a social and political protest. There is no equivalence, but rather, identity between challenging official linguistic codes and challenging official law.

THE WORD WITHIN THE SPACE OF TEXTS

Defining the specific status of the word as signifier for different modes of (literary) intellection within different genres or texts puts poetic analysis at the sensitive center of contemporary "human" sciences—at the intersection of *language* (the true practice of thought)[3] with *space* (the volume within which signification, through a joining of differences, articulates itself). To investigate the status of the word is to study its articulations (as semic complex) with other words in the sentence, and then to look for the same functions or relationships at the articulatory level of larger sequences. Confronted with this spatial conception of language's poetic operation, we must first define the three dimensions of textual space where various semic sets and poetic sequences function.

These three dimensions or coordinates of dialogue are writing subject, addressee, and exterior texts. The word's status is thus defined *horizontally* (the word in the text belongs to both writing subject and addressee) as well as *vertically* (the word in the text is oriented toward an anterior or synchronic literary corpus.[4]

The addressee, however, is included within a book's discursive universe only as discourse itself. He thus fuses with this other discourse, this other book, in relation to which the writer has written his own text. Hence horizontal axis (subject-addressee) and vertical axis (text-context) coincide, bringing to light an important fact: each word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read. In Bakhtin's work, these two axes, which he calls *dialogue* and *ambivalence*, are not clearly distinguished. Yet, what appears as a lack of rigor is in fact an insight first introduced into literary theory by Bakhtin: any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another. The notion of *intertextuality*[5] replaces that of intersubjectivity, and poetic language is read as at least *double*.

The word as minimal textual unit thus turns out to occupy the status of *mediator*, linking structural models to cultural (historical) environment, as well as that of *regulator*, controlling mutations from diachrony to synchrony, i.e., to literary structure. The word is spatialized; through the very notion of status, it functions in three dimensions (subject-addressee-context) as a set of *dialogical*, semic elements or as a set of *ambivalent* elements. Consequently the task of literary semiotics is to discover other formalisms corresponding to different modalities of word-joining (sequences) within the dialogical space of texts.

Any description of a word's specific operation within different literary genres or texts thus requires a *translinguistic* procedure. First, we must think of literary genres as imperfect semiological systems "signifying beneath the surface of language but never without it"; and secondly, discover relations among larger narrative units such as sentences, questions-and-answers, dialogues, et cetera, not necessarily on the basis of linguistic models—justified by the principle of semantic expansion. We could thus posit and demonstrate the hypothesis that *any evolution of literary genres is an unconscious exteriorization of linguistic structures at their different levels*. The novel in particular exteriorizes linguistic dialogue.[6]

WORD AND DIALOGUE

Russian Formalists were engrossed with the idea of "linguistic dialogue." They insisted on the dialogical character of linguistic communication[7] and considered the monologue, the "embryonic form" of *common* language,[8] as subsequent to dialogue. Some of them distinguished between monological discourse (as "equivalent to a psychic state")[9] and narrative (as "artistic imitation of monological discourse").[10] Boris Eikhenbaum's famous study of Gogol's *The Overcoat* is based on such premises. Eikhenbaum notes that Gogol's text actively refers to an oral form of narration and to its linguistic characteristics (intonation, syntactic construction of oral discourse, pertinent vocabulary, and so on). He thus sets up two modes of narration, *indirect* and *direct*, studying the relationship between the two. Yet, he seems to be unaware that before referring to an *oral* discourse, the writer of the narrative usually refers to the discourse of an *other* whose oral discourse is only secondary (since the other is the carrier of oral discourse).[11]

For Bakhtin, the dialogue-monologue distinction has a much larger significance than the concrete meaning accorded it by the Russian Formalists. It does not correspond to the *direct/indirect* (monologue/dialogue) distinction in narratives or plays. For Bakhtin, dialogue can be monological, and what is called monologue can be dialogical. With him, such terms refer to a linguistic infrastructure that must be studied through a *semiotics* of literary texts. This semiotics cannot be based on either linguistic methods or logical givens, but rather, must be elaborated from the point where they leave off.

> Linguistics studies "language" and its specific logic in its *commonality* ("*obshchnost*") as that factor which makes dialogical intercourse *possible*, but it consistently refrains from studying those dialogical relationships themselves. [. . .] Dialogical relationships are not reducible to logical or concrete semantic relationships, which are in and of *themselves* devoid of any dialogical aspect. [. . .] Dialogical relationships are totally impossible without logical and concrete semantic relationships, but they are not reducible to them; they have their own specificity.[12]

While insisting on the difference between dialogical relationships and specifically linguistic ones, Bakhtin emphasizes that those structuring a narrative (for example, writer/character, to which we would add subject of enunciation/subject of utterance) are possible because dialogism is

inherent in language itself. Without explaining exactly what makes up this double aspect of language, he nonetheless insists that "dialogue is the only sphere possible for the life of language." Today we can detect dialogical realtionships on several levels of language: first, within the *combinative* dyad, langue/parole; and secondly, within the systems either of langue (as collective, monological contracts as well as systems of correlative value actualized in dialogue with the other) or of parole (as essentially "combinative," not pure creation, but individual formation based on the exchange of signs).

On still another level (which could be compared to the novel's ambivalent space), this "double character of language" has even been demonstrated as syntagmatic (made manifest through extension, presence, and metonymy) and systematic (manifested through association, absence, and metaphor). It would be important to analyze linguistically the dialogical exchanges between these two axes of language as basis of the novel's ambivalence. We should also note Jakobson's double structures and their overlappings within the code/message relationship,[13] which help to clarify Bakhtine's notion of dialogism as inherent in language.

Bakhtin foreshadows what Emile Benveniste has in mind when he speaks about *discourse*, that is, "language appropriated by the individual as a practice." As Bakhtin himself writes, "In order for dialogical relationships to arise among [logical or concrete semantic relationships], they must clothe themselves in the word, become utterances, and become the positions of various subjects, expressed in a word."[14] Bakhtin, however, born of a revolutionary Russia that was preoccupied with social problems, does not see dialogue only as language assumed by a subject; he sees it, rather, as a *writing* where one reads the *other* (with no allusion to Freud). Bakhtinian dialogism identifies writing as both subjectivity and communication, or better, as intertextuality. Confronted with this dialogism, the notion of a "person-subject of writing" becomes blurred, yielding to that of "ambivalence of writing."

AMBIVALENCE

The term "ambivalence" implies the insertion of history (society) into a text and of this text into history; for the writer, they are one and the

same. When he speaks of "two paths merging within the narrative," Bakhtin considers writing as a reading of the anterior literary corpus and the text as an absorption of and a reply to another text. He studies the polyphonic novel as an absorption of the carnival and the monological novel as a stifling of this literary structure, which he calls "Menippean" because of its dialogism. In this perspective, a text cannot be grasped through linguistics alone. Bakhtine postulates the necessity for what he calls a *translinguistic* science, which, developed on the basis of language's dialogism, would enable us to understand intertextual *relationships*; relationships that the nineteenth century labeled "social value" or literature's moral "message." Lautréamont wanted to write so that he could submit himself to a *high morality*. Within his practice, this morality is actualized as textual ambivalence: *The Songs of Maldoror* and the *Poems* are a constant dialogue with the preceding literary corpus, a perpetual challenge of past writing. Dialogue and ambivalence are borne out as the only approach that permits the writer to enter history by espousing an ambivalent ethics: negation as affirmation.

Dialogue and ambivalence lead me to conclude that, within the interior space of the text as well as within the space of *texts*, poetic language is a "double." Saussure's poetic *paragram* ("Anagrams") extends from *zero* to *two*: the unit "one" (definition, "truth") does not exist in this field. Consequently, the notions of definition, determination, the sign "=" and the very concept of sign, which presuppose a vertical (hierarchical) division between signifier and signified, cannot be applied to poetic language—by definition an infinity of pairings and combinations.

The notion of *sign* (Sr-Sd) is a product of scientific abstraction (identity-substance-cause-goal as structure of the Indo-European sentence), designating a vertically and hierarchically linear division. The notion of *double*, the result of thinking over poetic (not scientific) language, denotes "spatialization" and correlation of the literary (linguistic) sequence. This implies that the minimal unit of poetic language is at least *double*, not in the sense of the signifier/signified dyad, but rather, in terms of *one and other*. It suggests that poetic language functions as a *tabular model*, where each "unit" (this word can no longer be used without quotation marks, since every unit is double) acts as a multi-determined *peak*. The *double* would be the minimal sequence of a paragrammatic semiotics to be worked out starting from the work of Saussure (in the "Anagrams") and Bakhtin.

Instead of carrying these thoughts to their conclusion we shall concentrate here on one of their consequences: the inability of any logical system based on a zero-one sequence (true-false, nothingness-notation) to account for the operation of poetic language.

Scientific procedures are indeed based upon a logical approach, itself founded on the Greek (Indo-European) sentence. Such a sentence begins as subject-predicate and grows by identification, determination, and causality. Modern logic from Gottlob Frege and Giuseppe Peano to Jan Lukasiewicz, Robert Ackermann, and Alonzo Church evolves out of a 0-1 sequence; George Boole, who begins with set theory, produces formulae that are more isomorphic with language—all of these are ineffective within the realm of poetic language, where 1 is not a limit.

It is therefore impossible to formalize poetic language according to existing logical (scientific) procedures without distorting it. A literary semiotics must be developed on the basis of a *poetic logic* where the concept of the *power of the continuum* would embody the 0-2 interval, a continuity where 0 denotes and 1 is implicitly transgressed.

Within this "power of the continuum" from 0 to a specifically poetic double, the linguistic, psychic, and social "prohibition" is 1 (God, Law, Definition). The only linguistic practice to "escape" this prohibition is poetic discourse. It is no accident that the shortcomings of Aristotelian logic when applied to language were pointed out by, on the one hand, twentieth-century Chinese philosopher Chang Tung-Sun (the product of a different linguistic heritage—ideograms—where, in place of God, there extends the Yin-Yang "dialogue") and, on the other, Bakhtin (who attempted to go beyond the Formalists through a dynamic theorization accomplished in revolutionary society). With Bakhtin, who assimilates narrative discourse into epic discourse, narrative is a prohibition, a *monologism*, a subordination of the code to 1, to God. Hence, the epic is religious and theological; all "realist" narrative obeying 0-1 logic is dogmatic. The realist novel, which Bakhtin calls monological (Tolstoy), tends to evolve within this space. Realist description, definition of "personality," "character" creation, and "subject" development—all are descriptive narrative elements belonging to the 0-1 interval and are thus *monological*. The only discourse integrally to achieve the 0-2 poetic logic is that of the carnival. By adopting a dream logic, it transgresses rules of linguistic code and social morality as well.

In fact, this "transgression" of linguistic, logical, and social codes within the carnivalesque only exists and succeeds, of course, because it accepts *another law*. Dialogism is not "freedom to say everything," it is a *dramatic* "banter" (Lautréamont), an *other* imperative than that of 0. We should particularly emphasize this specificity of dialogue as *transgression giving itself a law* so as to radically and categorically distinguish it from the pseudo-transgression evident in a certain modern "erotic" and parodic literature. The latter, seeing itself as "libertine" and "relativizing," operates according to a principle of *law anticipating its own transgression*. It thus compensates for monologism, does not displace the 0-1 interval, nor has anything to do with the architectonics of dialogism, which implies a categorical tearing from the norm and a relationship of nonexclusive opposites.

The novel incorporating carnivalesque structure is called *polyphonic*. Bakhtin's examples include Rabelais, Swift, and Dostoievski. We might also add the "modern" novel of the twentieth century—Joyce, Proust, Kafka—while specifying that the modern polyphonic novel, although analogous in its status, where monologism is concerned, to dialogical novels of the past, is clearly marked off from them. A break occurred at the end of the nineteenth century: while dialogue in Rabelais, Swift, and Dostoievski remains at a representative, fictitious level, our century's polyphonic novel becomes "unreadable" (Joyce) and interior to language (Proust, Kafka). Beginning with this break—not only literary but also social, political, and philosophical in nature—the problem of intertextuality (intertextual dialogue) appears as such. Bakhtin's theory itself (as well as that of Saussure's "Anagrams") can be traced historically to this break: he was able to discover textual dialogism in the writings of Mayakovsky, Khlebnikov, and Andrei Bely, to mention only a few of the Revolution's writers who made the outstanding imprints of this scriptural break. Bakhtin then extended his theory into literary history as a principle of all upheavals and defiant productivity.

Bakhtin's term *dialogism* as a semic complex thus implies the double, language, and another logic. Using that as point of departure, we can outline a new approach to poetic texts. Literary semiotics can accept the word "dialogism"; the logic of *distance* and *relationship* between the different units of a sentence or narrative structure, indicating a *becoming*—in opposition to the level of continuity and substance, both of which

obey the logic of being and are thus monological. Secondly, it is a logic of *analogy* and *nonexclusive opposition*, opposed to monological levels of causality and identifying determination. Finally, it is a logic of the "transfinite," a concept borrowed from Georg Cantor, which, on the basis of poetic language's "power of the continuum" (0-2), introduces a second principle of formation: a poetic sequence is a "next-larger" (not causally deduced) to all preceeding sequences of the Aristotelian chain (scientific, monological, or narrative). The novel's ambivalent space thus can be seen as regulated by two formative principles: monological (each following sequence is determined by the preceding one), and dialogical (transfinite sequences that are next-larger to the preceding causal series).[15]

Dialogue appears most clearly in the structure of carnivalesque language, where symbolic relationships and analogy take precedence over substance-causality connections. The notion of *ambivalence* pertains to the permutation of the two spaces observed in novelistic structure: dialogical space and monological space.

From a conception of poetic language as dialogue and ambivalence, Bakhtin moves to a reevaluation of the novel's structure. This investigation takes the form of a classification of words within the narrative—the classification being then linked to a typology of discourse.

CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS WITHIN THE NARRATIVE

According to Bakhtin, there are three categories of words within the narrative.

First, the *direct* word, referring back to its object, expresses the last possible degree of signification by the subject of discourse within the limits of a given context. It is the annunciating, expressive word of the writer, the *denotative* word, which is supposed to provide him with direct, objective comprehension. It knows nothing but itself and its object, to which it attempts to be adequate (it is not "conscious" of the influences of words foreign to it).

Second, the *object-oriented* word is the direct discourse of "characters." It has direct, objective meaning, but is not situated on the same level as the writer's discourse; thus, it is at some distance from the latter. It is both oriented towards its object and is itself the object of the writer's orientation. It is a foreign word, subordinate to the narrative word as object of the writer's comprehension. But the writer's orientation towards the word as object does not penetrate it but accepts it as a whole, changing neither meaning nor tonality; it subordinates that word to its own task, introducing no other signification. Consequently, the object-oriented word, having become the object of an other (denotative) word, is not "conscious" of it. The object-oriented word, like the denotative word, is therefore univocal.

In the third instance, however, the writer can use another's word, giving it a new meaning while retaining the meaning it already had. The result is a word with two significations: it becomes *ambivalent*. This ambivalent word is therefore the result of a joining of two sign systems. Within the evolution of genres, ambivalent words appear in Menippean and carnivalesque texts (I shall return to this point). The forming of two sign systems relativizes the text. Stylizing effects establish a distance with regard to the word of another—contrary to *imitation* (Bakhtin, rather, has in mind *repetition*), which takes what is imitated (repeated) seriously, claiming and appropriating it without relativizing it. This category of ambivalent words is characterized by the writer's exploitation of another's speech—without running counter to its thought—for his own purposes; he follows its direction while relativizing it. A second category of ambivalent words, *parody* for instance, proves to be quite different. Here the writer introduces a signification opposed to that of the other's word. A third type of ambivalent word, of which the *hidden interior polemic* is an example, is characterized by the active (modifying) influence of another's word on the writer's word. It is the writer who "speaks," but a foreign discourse is constantly present in the speech that it distorts. With this *active* kind of ambivalent word, the other's word is represented by the word of the narrator. Examples include autobiography, polemical confessions, questions-and-answers, and hidden dialogue. The novel is the only genre in which ambivalent words appear; that is the specific characteristic of its structure.

THE INHERENT DIALOGISM OF DENOTATIVE OR HISTORICAL WORDS

The notion of univocity or objectivity of monologue and of the epic to which it is assimilated, or of the denotative object-oriented word, cannot withstand psychoanalytic or semantic analysis of language. Dialogism is coextensive with the deep structures of discourse. Notwithstanding Bakhtin and Benveniste, dialogism appears on the level of the Bakhtinian denotative word as a principle of every enunciation, as well as on the level of the "story" in Benveniste. The story, like Benveniste's concept of "discourse" itself, presupposes an intervention by the speaker within the narrative as well as an orientation toward the other. In order to describe the dialogism inherent in the denotative or historical word, we would have to turn to the psychic aspect of writing as trace of a dialogue with oneself (with another), as a writer's distance from himself, as a splitting of the writer into subject of enunciation and subject of utterance.

By the very act of narrating, the subject of narration addresses an other; narration is structured in relation to this other. (On the strength of such a communication, Francis Ponge offers his own variation of "I think therefore I am": "I speak and you hear me, therefore we are." He thus postulates a shift from subjectivism to ambivalence.) Consequently, we may consider narration (beyond the signifier/signified relationship) as a dialogue between the *subject* of narration (S) and the *addressee* (A)—the other. This addressee, quite simply the reading subject, represents a doubly oriented entity: signifier in his relation to the text and signified in the relation between the subject of narration and himself. This entity is thus a dyad (A_1 and A_2) whose two terms, communicating with each other, constitute a code system. The subject of narration (S) is drawn in, and therefore reduced to a code, to a nonperson, to an *anonymity* (as writer, subject of enunciation) mediated by a third person, the *he/she* character, the subject of utterance. The writer is thus the subject of narration transformed by his having included himself within the narrative system; he is neither nothingness nor anybody, but the possibility of permutation from S to A, from story to discourse and from discourse to story. He becomes an anonymity, an absence, a blank space, thus permitting the structure to exist as such. At the very origin of narration, at the very moment when the writer appears, we experience emptiness. We see

the problems of death, birth, and sex appear when literature touches upon this strategic point that writing becomes when it exteriorizes linguistic systems through narrative structure (genres). On the basis of this anonymity, this zero where the author is situated, the *he/she* of the character is born. At a later stage, it will become a *proper name* (N). Therefore, in a literary text, 0 does not exist; emptiness is quickly replaced by a "one" (a *he/she*, or a *proper name*) that is really twofold, since it is subject and addressee. It is the addressee, the other, exteriority (whose object is the subject of narration and who is at the same time represented and representing) who transforms the subject into an *author*. That is, who has the S pass through this zero-stage of negation, of exclusion, constituted by the author. In this coming-and-going movement between subject and other, between writer (W) and reader, the author is structured as a signifier and the text as a dialogue of two discourses.

The constitution of characters (of "personality") also permits a disjunction of S into S_r (subject of enunciation) and S_d (subject of utterance). A diagram of this mutation would appear as diagram 1. This



Diagram 1

diagram incorporates the structure of the pronominal system[16] that psychoanalysts repeatedly find in the discourse of the object of psychoanalysis (see diagram 2).

At the level of the text (of the signifier)—in the S_r-S_d relationship—we find this dialogue of the subject with the addressee around which every narration is structured. The subject of utterance, in relation to the subject



Diagram 2

of enunciation, plays the role of addressee with respect to the subject; it inserts the subject of enunciation within the writing system by making the latter pass through emptiness. Mallarmé called this operation "elocutionary disappearance."

The *subject of utterance* is both representative of the subject of enunciation and represented as object of the subject of enunciation. It is therefore commutable with the writer's anonymity. A *character* (a personality) is constituted by this generation of a double entity starting from zero. The subject of utterance is "dialogical," both S and A are disguised within it.

The procedure I have just described in confronting narration and the novel now abolishes distinctions between signifier and signified. It renders these concepts ineffective for that literary practice operating uniquely within dialogical signifier(s). "The signifier represents the subject for another signifier" (Lacan).

Narration, therefore, is always constituted as a dialogical matrix by the receiver to whom this narration refers. Any narration, including history and science, contains this dialogical dyad formed by the narrator in conjunction with the other. It is translated through the dialogical S_r/S_d relationship, with S_r and S_d filling the roles of signifier and signified in turns, but constituting merely a permutation of two signifiers.

It is, however, only through certain narrative structures that this dialogue—this hold on the sign as double, this ambivalence of writing—is exteriorized in the actual organization of poetic discourse on the level of textual, literary occurrence.

TOWARD A TYPOLOGY OF DISCOURSES

Bakhtin's radical undertaking—the dynamic analysis of texts resulting in a redistribution of genres—calls upon us to be just as radical in developing a typology of discourses.

As it is used by the Formalists, the term "*narrative*" is too ambiguous to cover all of the genres it supposedly designates. At least two different types of narrative can be isolated.

We have on the one hand *monological discourse*, including, first, the representative mode of description and narration (the epic); secondly, his-

torical discourse; and thirdly, scientific discourse. In all three, the subject both assumes and submits to the rule of 1 (God). The dialogue inherent in all discourse is smothered by a *prohibition*, a censorship, such that this discourse refuses to turn back upon itself, to enter into dialogue with itself. To present the models of this censorship is to describe the nature of the differences between two types of discourse: the epic type (history and science) and the Menippean type (carnivalesque writings and novel), which transgresses prohibition. Monological discourse corresponds to Jakobson's systematic axis of language, and its analogous relationship to grammatical affirmation and negation has also been noted.

On the other hand, *dialogical discourse* includes carnivalesque and Menippean discourses as well as the polyphonic novel. In its structures, writing reads another writing, reads itself and constructs itself through a process of destructive genesis.

EPIC MONOLOGISM

The *epic*, structured at the limits of syncretism, illustrates the double value of words in their postsyncretic phase: the utterance of a subject ("I") inevitably penetrated by language as carrier of the concrete, universal, individual, and collective. But in an epic, the speaker (subject of the epic) does not make use of another's speech. The dialogical play of language as correlation of signs—the dialogical permutation of two signifiers for one signified—takes place on the level of *narration* (through the denotative word, or through the inherency of the text). It does not exteriorize itself at the level of textual *manifestation* as in the structure of novels. This is the scheme at work within an epic, with no hint as yet of Bakhtin's problematic—the ambivalent word. The organizational principle of epic structure thus remains monological. The dialogue of language does not manifest itself except within a narrative infrastructure. There is no dialogue at the level of the apparent textual organization (historical enunciation/discursive enunciation); the two aspects of enunciation remain limited by the narrator's absolute point of view, which coincides with the wholeness of a god or community. Within epic monologism, we detect the presence of the "transcendental signified" and "self presence" as highlighted by Jacques Derrida.

It is the systematic mode of language (similarity, according to Jakobson) that prevails within the epic space. Metonymic contiguity, specific to the syntagmatic axis of language, is rare. Of course, association and metonymy are there as rhetorical figures, but they are never a principle of structural organization. Epic logic pursues the general through the specific; it thus assumes a hierarchy within the structure of substance. Epic logic is therefore causal, that is, theological; it is *a belief* in the literal sense of the word.

THE CARNIVAL: A HOMOLOGY BETWEEN THE BODY, DREAM, LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE, AND STRUCTURES OF DESIRE

Carnivalesque structure is like the residue of a cosmogony that ignored substance, causality, or identity outside of its link to the whole, *which exists only in or through relationship*. This carnivalesque cosmogony has persisted in the form of an antitheological (but not antimystical) and deeply popular movement. It remains present as an often misunderstood and persecuted substratum of official Western culture throughout its entire history; it is most noticeable in folk games as well as in Medieval theater and prose (anecdotes, fables, and the *Roman de Renart*). As composed of distances, relationships, analogies, and nonexclusive oppositions, it is essentially dialogical. It is a spectacle, but without a stage; a game, but also a daily undertaking; a signifier, but also a signified. That is, two texts meet, contradict, and relativize each other. A carnival participant is both actor and spectator; he loses his sense of individuality, passes through a zero point of carnivalesque activity and splits into a subject of the spectacle and an object of the game. Within the carnival, the subject is reduced to nothingness, while the structure of *the author* emerges as anonymity that creates and sees itself created as self and other, as man and mask. The cynicism of this carnivalesque scene, which destroys a god in order to impose its own dialogical laws, calls to mind Nietzsche's Dionysianism. The carnival first exteriorizes the structure of reflective literary productivity, then inevitably brings to light this structure's underlying unconscious: sexuality and death. Out of the dialogue that is established between them, the structural dyads of carnival appear:

high and low, birth and agony, food and excrement, praise and curses, laughter and tears.

Figures germane to carnivalesque language, including repetition, "inconsequent" statements (which are nonetheless "connected" within an infinite context), and nonexclusive opposition, which function as empty sets or disjunctive additions, produce a more flagrant dialogism than any other discourse. Disputing the laws of language based on the 0-1 interval, the carnival challenges God, authority, and social law; insofar as it is dialogical, it is rebellious. Because of its subversive discourse, the word "carnival" has understandably acquired a strongly derogatory or narrowly burlesque meaning in our society.

The scene of the carnival, where there is no stage, no "theater," is thus both stage and life, game and dream, discourse and spectacle. By the same token, it is proffered as the only space in which language escapes linearity (law) to live as drama in three dimensions. At a deeper level, this also signifies the contrary: drama becomes located in language. A major principle thus emerges: all poetic discourse is dramatization, dramatic permutation (in a mathematical sense) of words. Within carnivalesque discourse, we can already adumbrate that "as to mental condition, it is like the meanderings of drama" (Mallarmé). This scene, whose symptom is carnivalesque discourse, is the only dimension where "theater might be the reading of a book, its writing in operation." In other words, such a scene is the only place where discourse attains its "potential infinity" (to use David Hilbert's term), where prohibitions (representation, "monologism") and their transgression (dream, body, "dialogism") coexist. Carnivalesque tradition was absorbed into Menippean discourse and put into practice by the polyphonic novel.

On the omnified stage of carnival, language parodies and relativizes itself, repudiating its role in representation; in so doing, it provokes laughter but remains incapable of detaching itself from representation. The syntagmatic axis of language becomes exteriorized in this space and, through dialogue with the systematic axis, constitutes the ambivalent structure bequeathed by carnival to the novel. Faulty (by which I mean ambivalent), both representative and antirepresentative, the carnivalesque structure is anti-Christian and antirationalist. All of the most important polyphonic novels are inheritors of the Menippean, carnivalesque structure: those of Rabelais, Cervantes, Swift, Sade, Balzac,

Lautréamont, Dostoievski, Joyce, and Kafka. Its history is the history of the struggle against Christianity and its representation; this means an exploration of language (of sexuality and death), a consecration of ambivalence and of "vice."

The word "carnivalesque" lends itself to an ambiguity one must avoid. In contemporary society, it generally connotes parody, hence a strengthening of the law. There is a tendency to blot out the carnival's *dramatic* (murderous, cynical, and revolutionary in the sense of *dialectical transformation*) aspects, which Bakhtin emphasized, and which he recognized in Menippean writings or in Dostoievski. The laughter of the carnival is not simply parodic; it is no more comic than tragic; it is both at once, one might say that it is *serious*. This is the only way that it can avoid becoming either the scene of law or the scene of its parody, in order to become the scene of its *other*. Modern writing offers several striking examples of this omnified scene that is both *law* and *other*—where *laughter* is silenced because it is not parody but *murder* and *revolution* (Antonin Artaud).

The epic and the carnivalesque are the two currents that formed European narrative, one taking precedence over the other according to the times and the writer. The carnivalesque tradition of the people is still apparent in personal literature of late antiquity and has remained, to this day, the life source reanimating literary thought, orienting it towards new perspectives.

Classical humanism helped dissolve the epic monologism that speech welded together so well, and that orators, rhetoricians, and politicians, on the one hand, tragedy and epic, on the other, implemented so effectively. Before another monologism could take root (with the triumph of formal logic, Christianity, and Renaissance humanism),[17] late antiquity gave birth to two genres that reveal language's dialogism. Situated within the carnivalesque tradition, and constituting the yeast of the European novel, these two genres are *Socratic dialogue* and *Menippean discourse*.

SOCRATIC DIALOGUE: DIALOGISM AS A DESTRUCTION OF THE PERSON

Socratic dialogue was widespread in antiquity: Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, Euclid, and others excelled in it,

although only the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon have come down to us. Not as much rhetorical in genre as popular and carnivalesque, it was originally a kind of memoir (the recollections of Socrates's discussions with his students) that broke away from the constraints of history, retaining only the Socratic process of dialogically revealing truth, as well as the structure of a recorded dialogue framed by narrative. Nietzsche accused Plato of having ignored Dionysian tragedy, but Socratic dialogue had adopted the dialogical and defiant structure of the carnivalesque scene. According to Bakhtin, Socratic dialogues are characterized by opposition to any official monologism claiming to possess a ready-made truth. Socratic truth ("meaning") is the product of a dialogical relationship among speakers; it is correlational and its relativism appears by virtue of the observers' autonomous points of view. Its art is one of *articulation* of fantasy, *correlation* of signs. Two typical devices for triggering this linguistic network are syncrisis (confronting different discourses on the same topic) and anacrusis (one word prompting another). The subjects of discourse are nonpersons, anonyms, hidden by the discourse constituting them. Bakhtin reminds us that the "event" of Socratic dialogue is of the nature of discourse: a questioning and testing, through speech, of a definition. This speech practice is therefore organically linked to the man who created it (Socrates and his students), or better, speech *is* man and his activity. Here, one can speak of a practice possessing a synthetic character; the process separating the *word* as act, as apodeictic practice, as articulation of difference from the *image* as representation, as knowledge, and as idea was not yet complete when Socratic dialogue took form. But there is an important "detail" to Socratic dialogism; it is the exclusive position of a subject of discourse that provokes the dialogue. In the *Apology* of Plato, Socrates's trial and the period of awaiting judgment determine his discourse as the confessions of a man "on the threshold." The exclusive situation liberates the word from any univocal objectivity, from any representative function, opening it up to the symbolic sphere. Speech affronts death, measuring itself against another discourse; this dialogue counts the *person* out.

The resemblance between Socratic dialogue and the ambivalent word of the novel is obvious.

Socratic dialogue did not last long, but it gave birth to several dialogical genres, including *Menippean discourse*, whose origins also lie in carnivalesque folklore.

MENIPPEAN DISCOURSE: THE TEXT AS SOCIAL ACTIVITY

1. Menippean discourse takes its name from Menippus of Gadara, a philosopher of the third century B.C. His satires were lost, but we know of their existence through the writings of Diogenes Laertius. The term was used by the Romans to designate a genre of the first century B.C. (Marcus Terentius Varro's *Satirae Menippeae*).

Yet, the genre actually appeared much earlier; its first representative was perhaps Antisthenes, a student of Socrates and one of the writers of Socratic dialogue. Heraclitus also wrote Menippean texts (according to Cicero, he created an analogous genre called *logistoricus*); Varro gave it definite stability. Other examples include Seneca the Younger's *Apocolocynthosis*, Petronius's *Satyricon*, Lucan's satires, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Hippocrates' *Novel*, various samples of Greek "novels," classical utopian novels, and Roman (Horatian) satire. Within the Menippean sphere there evolve diatribe, soliloquy, and other minor genres of controversy. It greatly influenced Christian and Byzantine literature; in various forms, it survived through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Reformation through to the present (the novels of Joyce, Kafka, and Bataille). This carnivalesque genre—as pliant and variable as Proteus, capable of insinuating itself into other genres—had an enormous influence on the development of European literature and especially the formation of the novel.

Menippean discourse is both comic and tragic, or rather, it is *serious* in the same sense as is the carnivalesque; through the status of its words, it is politically and socially disturbing. It frees speech from historical constraints, and this entails a thorough boldness in philosophical and imaginative inventiveness. Bakhtin emphasizes that "exclusive" situations increase freedom of language in Menippean discourse. Phantasmagoria and an often mystical symbolism fuse with macabre naturalism. Adventures unfold in brothels, robbers' dens, taverns, fairgrounds, and prisons, among erotic orgies and during sacred worship, and so forth. The word has no fear of incriminating itself. It becomes free from presupposed "values"; without distinguishing between virtue and vice, and without distinguishing itself from them, the word considers them its private domain, as one of its creations. Academic problems are

pushed aside in favor of the "ultimate" problems of existence: this discourse orients liberated language towards philosophical universalism. Without distinguishing ontology from cosmogony, it unites them into a practical philosophy of life. Elements of the fantastic, which never appear in epic or tragic works, crop forth here. For example, an unusual perspective from above changes the scale of observation in Lucan's *Icaro-menippea*, Varro's *Endymion*, and later in the works of Rabelais, Swift, and Voltaire. Pathological states of the soul, such as madness, split personalities, daydreams, dreams, and death, become part of the narrative (they affect the writing of Shakespeare and Calderon). According to Bakhtin, these elements have more structural than thematic significance; they destroy man's epic and tragic unity as well as his belief in identity and causality; they indicate that he has lost his totality and no longer coincides with himself. At the same time, they often appear as an exploration of language and writing: in Varro's *Bimarcus*, the two Marcuses discuss whether or not one should write in tropes. Menippean discourse tends towards the scandalous and eccentric in language. The "inopportune" expression, with its cynical frankness, its desecration of the sacred, and its attack on etiquette, is quite characteristic. This discourse is made up of contrasts: virtuous courtesans, generous bandits, wise men that are both free and enslaved, and so on. It uses abrupt transitions and changes; high and low, rise and fall, and misalliances of all kinds. Its language seems fascinated with the "double" (with its own activity as graphic *trace*, doubling an "outside") and with the logic of opposition replacing that of identity in defining terms. It is an all-inclusive genre, put together as a pavement of citations. It includes all genres (short stories, letters, speeches, mixtures of verse and prose) whose structural signification is to denote the writer's distance from his own and other texts. The multi-stylism and multi-tonality of this discourse and the dialogical status of its word explain why it has been impossible for classicism, or for any other authoritarian society, to express itself in a novel descended from Menippean discourse.

Put together as an exploration of the body, dreams, and language, this writing grafts onto the topical: it is a kind of political journalism of its time. Its discourse exteriorizes political and ideological conflicts of the moment. The dialogism of its words *is* practical philosophy doing battle against idealism and religious metaphysics, against the epic. It con-

stitutes the social and political thought of an era fighting against theology, against law.

2. Menippean discourse is thus structured as ambivalence, as the focus for two tendencies of Western literature: representation through language as staging, and exploration of language as a correlative system of signs. Language in the Menippean tradition is both representation of exterior space and "an experience that produces its own space." In this ambiguous genre appear, first, the *premises of realism* (a secondary activity in relation to what is lived, where man describes himself by making of himself an exhibition, finally creating "characters" and "personalities"); and secondly, the *refusal to define* a psychic universe (an immediately present activity, characterized by images, gestures, and word-gestures through which man lives his limits in the impersonal). This second aspect relates Menippean structure to the structure of dreams and hieroglyphic writing or, possibly, to the theater of cruelty as conceived by Artaud. His words apply equally; Menippean discourse "is not equal to individual life, to that individual aspect of life where characters triumph, but rather to a kind of liberated life that sweeps away human individuality and where man is no more than a reflected image." Likewise, the Menippean experience is not cathartic; it is a festival of cruelty, but also a political act. It transmits no fixed message except that itself should be "the eternal joy of becoming," and it exhausts itself in the act and in the present. Born after Socrates, Plato, and the Sophists, it belongs to an age when thought ceases to be practice; the fact that it is considered as a *techne* shows that the *praxis-poiesis* separation has already taken place. Similarly, literature becoming "thought" becomes conscious of itself as *sign*. Man, alienated from nature and society, becomes alienated from himself, discovering his "interior" and "reifying" this discovery in the ambivalence of Menippean writing. Such tokens are the harbingers of realist representation. Menippean discourse, however, knows nothing of a theological principle's monologism (or of the Renaissance man-God) that could have consolidated its representative aspect. The "tyranny" it is subjected to is that of text (not speech as reflection of a preexisting universe), or rather its own structure, constructing and understanding itself through itself. It constructs itself as a *hieroglyph*, all the while remaining a spectacle. It bequeaths this ambivalence to the novel, above all to the polyphonic novel, which knows neither law nor hierarchy, since

it is a plurality of linguistic elements in dialogical relationships. The conjunctive principle of the different parts of Menippean discourse is certainly *similitude* (resemblance, dependence, and therefore "realism"), but also contiguity (analogy, juxtaposition, and therefore "rhetoric"—not in Benedetto Croce's sense of ornament, but rather, as justification through and in language). Menippean ambivalence consists of communication between two spaces:[18] that of the scene and that of the hieroglyph, that of representation *by* language, and that of experience *in* language, system and phrase, metaphor and metonymy. This ambivalence is the novel's inheritance.

In other words, the dialogism of Menippean and carnivalesque discourses, translating a logic of relations and analogy rather than of substance and inference, stands against Aristotelian logic. From within the very interior of formal logic, even while skirting it, Menippean dialogism contradicts it and points it towards other forms of thought. Indeed, Menippean discourse develops in times of opposition against Aristotelianism, and writers of polyphonic novels seem to disapprove of the very structures of official thought founded on formal logic.

THE SUBVERSIVE NOVEL

1. In the Middle Ages, Menippean tendencies were held in check by the authority of the religious text; in the bourgeois era, they were contained by the absolutism of individuals and things. Only modernity—when freed of "God"—releases the Menippean force of the novel.

Now that modern, bourgeois society has not only accepted, but claims to recognize itself in the novel,[19] such claim can only refer to the category of monological narratives, known as realistic, that censor all carnivalesque and Menippean elements, whose structures were assembled at the time of the Renaissance. To the contrary, the Menippean, dialogical novel, tending to refuse representation and the epic, has only been tolerated; that is, it has been declared unreadable, ignored, or ridiculed. Today, it shares the same fate as the carnivalesque discourse practiced by students during the Middle Ages outside of the Church.

The novel, and especially the modern, polyphonic novel, incorporating Menippean elements, embodies the effort of European thought to break

out of the framework of causally determined identical substances and head toward another modality of thought that proceeds through dialogue (a logic of distance, relativity, analogy, nonexclusive and transfinite opposition). It is therefore not surprising that the novel has been considered as an inferior genre (by neoclassicism and other similar regimes) or as subversive (I have in mind the major writers of polyphonic novels over many centuries—Rabelais, Swift, Sade, Lautréamont, Kafka, and Bataille—to mention only those who have always been and still remain on the fringe of official culture). The way in which European thought transgresses its constituent characteristics appears clearly in the words and narrative structures of the twentieth-century novel. Identity, substance, causality, and definition are transgressed so that others may be adopted: analogy, relation, opposition, and therefore dialogism and Menippean ambivalence.[20]

Although this entire historical inventory that Bakhtin has undertaken evokes the image of a museum or the task of an archivist, it is nonetheless rooted in our present concerns. Everything written today unveils either the possibility or impossibility of reading and rewriting history. This possibility is evident in the literature heralded by the writings of a new generation, where the text is elaborated as *theater* and as *reading*. Mallarmé, one of the first to understand the Menippean qualities of the novel (let it be emphasized that Bakhtin's term has the advantage of situating a certain kind of writing within history), said that literature "is nothing but the flash of what should have been produced previously or closer to the origin."

2. I would now suggest two models for organizing narrative signification, based on two dialogical categories: (1) Subject (S) $\rightleftarrows$ Addressee (A); and (2) Subject of enunciation $\rightleftarrows$ Subject of utterance.

The first model implies a dialogical relationship, while the second presupposes modal relationships within this dialogical formation. The first model determines genre (epic poem, novel) while the second determines generic variants.

Within the polyphonic structure of a novel, the first dialogical model (S $\rightleftarrows$ A) plays itself out entirely within the writing discourse; and it presents itself as perpetually challenging this discourse. The writer's interlocutor, then, is the writer himself, but as reader of another text. The

one who writes is the same as the one who reads. Since his interlocutor is a text, he himself is no more than a text rereading itself as it rewrites itself. The dialogical structure, therefore, appears only in the light of the text elaborating itself as ambivalent in relation to another text.

In the epic, on the other hand, A is an extratextual, absolute entity (God or community) that relativizes dialogue to the point where it is canceled out and reduced to monologue. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why not only the so-called "traditional" novel of the nineteenth century, but also any novel with any ideological thesis whatsoever, tends towards an epic, thus constituting a deviation in the very structure of the novel; this is why Tolstoy's monologism is epic and Dostoievski's dialogism novelistic.

Within the framework of the second model, several possibilities may be detected:

a. The subject of utterance (S_d) coincides with the zero degree of the subject of enunciation (S_r), which can be designated either by the "he/she" nonperson pronoun or a proper name. This is the simplest technique found at the inception of the narrative.

b. The subject of utterance (S_d) coincides with the subject of enunciation (S_r). This produces a first person narrative: "I."

c. The subject of utterance (S_d) coincides with the addressee (A). This produces a second person narrative: "you": as for example with Raskolnikov's object-oriented word in *Crime and Punishment*. Michel Butor insistently explored this technique in *A Change of Heart*.

d. The subject of utterance (S_d) coincides both with the subject of enunciation (S_r) and the addressee (A). In such a case the novel becomes a questioning of writing and displays the staging of its dialogical structure. At the same time, the text becomes a reading (quotation and commentary) of an exterior literary corpus and is thus constructed as ambivalence. Through its use of personal pronouns and anonymous quotations, Philippe Sollers's *Drame* is an example of this fourth possibility.

A reading of Bakhtin therefore leads to the paradigm shown in figure 1.

I should finally like to insist on the importance of Bakhtin's concepts



Figure 1

(on the status of the word, dialogue, and ambivalence), as well as on the importance of certain new perspectives opened up through them.

By establishing the status of the word as *minimal unit* of the text, Bakhtin deals with structure at its deepest level, beyond the sentence and rhetorical figures. The notion of *status* has added to the image of the text as a corpus of atoms that of a text made up of relationships, within which words function as quantum units. If there is a model for poetic language, it no longer involves lines or surfaces, but rather, *space* and *infinity*—concepts amenable to formalization through set theory and the new mathematics. Contemporary analysis of narrative structure has been refined to the point where it can delineate functions (cardinal or catalytic), and indices (as such or as information); it can describe the elaboration of a narrative according to particular logical or rhetorical patterns. Without gainsaying the undisputed value of this kind of research,[21] one might wonder whether the presuppositions of a metalanguage that sets up hierarchies or is heterogeneous to narrative do not weigh too heavily upon such studies. Perhaps Bakhtin's naive procedure, centered on the word and its unlimited ability to generate dialogue (commentary of a quotation) is both simpler and more productive.

The notion of dialogism, which owes much to Hegel, must not be confused with Hegelian dialectics, based on a triad and thus on struggle and projection (a movement of transcendence), which does not transgress the Aristotelian tradition founded on substance and causality. Dialogism replaces these concepts by absorbing them within the concept of relation.

It does not strive towards transcendence but rather toward harmony, all the while implying an idea of rupture (of opposition and analogy) as a modality of transformation.

Dialogism situates philosophical problems *within* language; more precisely, within language as a correlation of texts, as a reading-writing that falls in with non-Aristotelian, syntagmatic, correlational, "carnivalesque" logic. Consequently, one of the fundamental problems facing contemporary semiotics is precisely to describe this "other logic" without denaturing it.

The term "ambivalence" lends itself perfectly to the current transitory stage of European literature—a coexistence (an ambivalence) of "the double of lived experience" (realism and the epic) and "lived experience" itself (linguistic exploration and Menippean discourse)—a literature that will perhaps arrive at a form of thought similar to that of painting: the transmission of essence through form, and the configuration of (literary) space as revealing (literary) thought without "realist" pretensions. This entails the study, through language, of the novel's space and of its transmutations, thereby establishing a close relationship between language and space, compelling us to analyze them as modes of thought. By examining the ambivalence of the spectacle (realist representation) and of lived experience (rhetoric), one might perceive the line where the rupture (or junction) between them takes place. That line could be seen as the graph of a motion through which our culture forsakes itself in order to go beyond itself.

The path charted between the two poles of dialogue radically abolishes problems of causality, finality, et cetera, from our philosophical arena. It suggests the importance of the dialogical principle for a space of thought much larger than that of the novel. More than binarism, dialogism may well become the basis of our time's intellectual structure. The predominance of the novel and other ambivalent literary structures; the communal, carnivalesque phenomena attracting young people; quantum exchanges; and current interest in the correlational symbolism of Chinese philosophy—to cite only a few striking elements of modern thought—all confirm this hypothesis.

1966

Notes

1. The point of departure for this essay lies in two books by Mikhail Bakhtin: *Rabelais and His World*, Helene Iswolsky, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), and *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, R. W. Rotsel, trans. (Ann Arbor: Ardis, 1973). Bakhtin died in 1975, the year of the publication of his collection of essays, *Voprosy literatury i estetiki* (Moscow), published in French as *Esthétique et théorie du roman* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978).

2. Derrida uses the word *gram* (from the Greek *gramma*, "that which is written") to designate the irreducible material element of writing, as opposed to the vast amount of extraneous connotations currently surrounding that word. See his *Of Grammatology*, Gayatri Spivak, trans. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976). [Ed.]

3. "Language is as old as consciousness, language *is* practical consciousness that exists also for other men, and for that reason alone it really exists for me personally as well." Karl Marx, *The German Ideology*, S. Ryazanskaya, trans., in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, Robert C. Tucker, ed. (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 122. [The French translation quoted by Kristeva is less faithful to the German text, although, in the latter part of the sentence, the German word for "genuine" does modify "consciousness": ". . . auch für mich selbst echt existierende Bewußtsein." The French version begins. "Le langage *est* la conscience réelle . . . "—Ed.]

4. I shall refer to only a few of Bakhtin's notions insofar as they are congruent with the conceptions of Ferdinand de Saussure as related to his "anagrams" (see Jean Starobinski, *Les Mots sous les mots* [Paris: Gallimard, 1971]) and suggest a new approach to literary texts.

5. See Julia Kristeva, *La Révolution du langage poétique* (Paris: Seuil, 1974), pp. 59–60, and the "Notes on the Translation and on Terminology" in this volume. [Ed.]

6. Indeed, when structural semantics refers to the linguistic foundations of discourse, it points out that "an expanding sequence is recognized as the equivalent of a syntactically simpler communication" and defines "expansion" as "one of the most important aspects of the operation of natural languages." A. J. Greimas, *Sémantique structurale* (Paris: Larousse, 1966), p. 72. I conceive of the notion of expansion as the theoretical principle authorizing me to study in the structure of genres an exteriorization (an expansion) of structures inherent to language.

7. E. F. Boudé, *K istorii velikoruskix govorov* (Toward a History of Russian Dialects) (Kazan: 1869).

8. L. V. Czerba, *Vostotchno-luzhickoe narechie* (The Eastern Loujiks' Dialect) (Petrograd: 1915).

9. V. V. Vinogradov, "O dialogicheskoj rechi" (On Dialogical Discourse), in *Russkaja rech*, 1:144.

10. V. V. Vinogradov, *Poetika* (Moscow: Nauka, 1926), p. 33.

11. It seems that what is persistently being called "interior monologue" is the most indomitable way in which an entire civilization conceives itself as identity, as organized chaos, and finally, as transcendence. Yet, this "monologue" probably exists only in texts that pretend to reconstitute the so-called physical reality of "verbal flux." Western man's state of "interiority" is thus a limited literary effect (confessional form, continuous psychological speech, automatic writing). In a way, then, Freud's "Copernican" revolution (the discovery of the split within the subject) put an end to the fiction of an internal *voice* by positing the fundamental principles governing the subject's radical exteriority in relation to, and within, language.

12. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, pp. 151–52.

13. "Shifters, Verbal Categories and the Russian Verb," in *Selected Writings II* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), pp. 130–47.

14. Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, p. 151.

15. I should emphasize that introducing notions of set theory into considerations on poetic language has only metaphorical value. It is legitimate to do so because one can draw an analogy between the Aristotelian logic/poetic logic relationship on the one hand, and the quantifiable/infinite relationship on the other.

16. See Luce Irigaray, "Communication linguistique et communication speculaire," in *Cahiers pour l'Analyse*, no. 3, (May 1966), pp. 39–55.

17. I should like to stress the ambiguous role of Western individualism. Involving the concept of identity, it is linked to the substantialist, causal, and atomist thought of Aristotelian Greece and has strengthened throughout centuries this activist, scientistic, or theological aspect of Western culture. On the other hand, since it is founded on the principle of a difference between the "self" and the "world," it prompts a search for mediation between the two terms, or for stratifications within each of them, in order to allow the possibility of a correlative logic based on the very components of formal logic.

18. It was perhaps this phenomenon that Bakhtin had in mind when he wrote, "The language of the novel can be located neither on a surface nor on a line. It is a system of surfaces that intersect. The author as creator of everything having to do with the novel cannot be located on any of these linguistic surfaces. Rather, he resides within the controlling center constituted by the intersection of the surfaces. All these surfaces are located at varying distances from that authorial center" ("Slovo o romane," in *Voprosy literatury*, [1965], vol. 8, pp. 84–90). Actually, the writer is nothing more than the *linking* of these centers. Attributing a single center to him would be to constrain him within a monological, theological position.

19. This point of view is shared by all theorists of the novel: A. Thibaudet, *Réflexions sur le roman* (Thoughts on the Novel; Paris: Gallimard, 1938); Koskimies, "Theorie des Romans" (Theory of the Novel), in *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Finnicae*, I, series B, (1935) 35:5–275. Georg Lukács, *Theory of the Novel* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), and others.

An interesting perspective on the concept of the novel as dialogue is provided by Wayne Booth's *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961). His ideas concerning the *reliable* and *unreliable writer* parallel some of Bakhtin's investigations into dialogism in the novel, although they do not posit any specific relationship between novelistic "illusionism" and linguistic symbolism.

20. Such a mode shows up in modern physics as well as in ancient Chinese thought, as the two are equally anti-Aristotelian, antimonological, and dialogical. See S. I. Hayakawa, "What Is Meant by Aristotelian Structure in Language," in *Language, Meaning, and Maturity* (New York: Harper, 1959); Chang Tung-sun, "A Chinese Philosopher's Theory of Knowledge," in S. I. Hayakawa, ed., *Our Language and Our World* (New York: Harper, 1959); Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1965).

21. See the important collection of studies on narrative structure in *Communications*, no. 8 (1966), which includes contributions by Roland Barthes, A. J. Greimas, Claude Bremond, Umberto Eco, Jules Gritti, Violette Morin, Christian Metz, Tzvetan Todorov, and Gérard Genette.