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VIOLENCE, TERROR, AND THE CRISIS OF THE STATE

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INTRODUCTION

Among the primary goals of the modern, post-Enlightenment state are assimilation, homogenization, and conformity within a fairly narrow ethnic and political range, as well as the creation of societal agreement about the kinds of people there are and the kinds there ought to be. The ideal state is one in which the illusion of a single nation-state is created and maintained and in which resistance is managed so that profound social upheaval, separatist activity, revolution, and *coups d'etat* are unthinkable for most people most of the time. The state thus attempts to ensure conformity to encompassing unitary images through diverse cultural forms and an array of institutions and activities that, taken together, help determine the range of available social, political, ethnic, and national identities (2, 12, 66).

The crisis of the contemporary state springs from its differentially successful monopolization of power and the contradiction between it and the demands of peripheralized people(s) who through resistance have created new subject positions that challenge fundamentally the definitions of who and what ought to be repressed. To phrase it differently, the ways in which nation and state are constructed and the manner in which those constructions enter into social knowledge have to do with consensus about what is and what is not legitimate. When consensus fails, ethnic or political opposition, which is otherwise sup-

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pressed or subtle, becomes overt. The state, of course, cannot allow this to happen. As Claestres (49:110) phrases it, "The refusal of multiplicity, the dread of difference—ethnocidal violence—[is] the very essence of the state."

Since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, twenty-two new *global communities* have been created, fifteen from the remains of the Soviet Union alone, but the phenomenon is not restricted to that part of the world. There are over fifty ethnic conflicts now taking place, mostly within the confines of diverse nation-states—a veritable explosion of violence with the state lending the force of arms to one side or the other. Geographers predict that there will be twenty-five additional new states by 1996, even more in the twenty-first century (260), all forged, some violently and some by agreement, from the territory and peoples of existing states. In addition to Abkhazians in Georgia and Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Tibetans, Quebequois, Kurds, Tamils, and Basques are among others seeking their own version of a nation-state.

At the same time there is an apparently contradictory trend, namely the globalization of capitalist economy and culture. These two trends—the fragmenting of illusory nation-states and the simultaneous homogenization of culture—may only appear contradictory; the latter may be driving the former. The nation-state has long been the vehicle, the ideological justification, and the political legitimation for liberal rational forms of political and cultural unity and economic homogeneity. Although the social organization and economic achievements of a market economy are goals toward which many new entities are striving, especially those of the former Soviet Union and East Central Europe, their prospects for retracing the trajectory of nineteenth and twentieth century bourgeois capitalism are slight. The potential and reality of additional ethnic and nationalist violence are enormous as dissidents challenge the prevailing and approaching order and existing states struggle to implement new distributions of power and capital, to suppress internal movements for political change, especially autonomy and self-determination, and to stave off external threats to newly established borders.

Until relatively recently, few anthropologists examined violence and conflict between groups and the state and among groups within states, especially violence rooted in ethnicity, nationalism, bids for autonomy and self-determination, and political demands for fundamental change. Some have looked primarily at the invention and reinvention of categorical differences inflected by language, culture, and history in colonial and post-colonial societies (101, 102, 109, 117, 135, 209). An emerging project to rethink violence and social theory at the level of the imagining of the state and the role of the anthropologist in this project is suggested by the work of Coronil (64), Feldman (84a), Gordon (109), Isbell (138–140), Taussig (240, 241), Poole & Renique (198), recent collections of Carmack (37), Downing & Kushner (74, 75), Nordstrom & Martin (192), Warren (253), and others (29, 65, 230). This review places the

existing literature within a theoretical perspective that considers both the ethnography of the state and the ethnography of violence, but we must first consider some terms of the discussion.

VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND TORTURE

Violence is often reified, taken as a characteristic or category that is either present or absent within a society or group, making it difficult to examine the role it plays in social relations or to examine it as an alternative people use to deal with human predicaments. Going beyond the mere presence or absence of violence challenges us to locate it within a set of practices, discourses, and ideologies (137), to examine it as a way to deploy power within differential social and political relations (30), or as a means that states use to buttress themselves and to maintain power (132).

Scholars do not agree on exactly what constitutes violence. Noting that it permeates daily life in many parts of the modern world, Williams (256) selects violence as a keyword, denoting a concept that in his estimation significantly reflects ideas and values that often characterize general discussions of contemporary society. He identifies seven senses of violence: aggressive behavior, vehement conduct, infringement of property or dignity, the use of physical force, and threat, or dramatic portrayal of any of the above. Riches (204) argues that what is generally called violence can be practical or symbolic, visible or invisible (as in witchcraft), physical or emotional, and can stem from a perpetrator's personal capacity or from the forces of society. He gives precedence to the first in each of these dichotomies, restricting the use of the term *violence* to practical, physical, visible, and personal physical force that people use to achieve goals. In this instrumental view, interactions in which physical hurt is either absent or not readily apparent, even if it may have been intended or implicit, is not violence.

Bourdieu, on the other hand, includes the symbolic "censored" and "euphemized" but "socially recognized violence" embedded in everyday, hegemonic practice in "disguised and transfigured" form (30:191), a totalizing vision partially challenged by Comaroff (56). Feminist scholarship in particular (177, 228, 235) and that of subordinate peoples in general (45, 63) insists that symbolic violence is important in the structuring and ordering of relations of domination and subordination, though critics caution that state regimes everywhere justify their own violence as a reaction to the (symbolic) violence implicit in opposition itself. The very presence of opposition is read by the state as violence subject to suppression (192). This review addresses both physical and symbolic violence.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDIES OF VIOLENCE

Anthropologists who have considered violence primarily in its practical, physical, and visible manifestations have juxtaposed "violent" societies [e.g. the Yanomami (42, 43), the Kiowa (178), or the Kohistani of Pakistan (147)] with those said to be peaceful [e.g. the !Kung (157, 169), the Semai (72, 204–207), the Innuit (32–34), the Buid of the Philippines (104), and the Xinguanos of the Brazilian Amazon (114)], as though they were mirror-images. No single explanation has been found for the variance in the degree to which people use violence to solve differences. Biological explanations are far from a dead letter in psychological and genetic studies, especially as they are viewed in popular culture (245), but biology is rarely cited as a single cause explanation in anthropology (41–43, 76, 97, 115). A large literature has emerged on other causes of violence [e.g. material, ecological, psychological, and historical (38, 39, 85, 87–89, 103, 104, 114)].

Historically, anthropology has been concerned mostly with so-called sub-state or pre-state societies—the tribal zone (91). Here, people condone, even encourage violence as a social and cultural resource for a variety of reasons. For the Maori and indigenous people of the Northwest Coast of North America, it is a means to material rewards and a way to maintain a trade advantage (86, 247). The Yanomami use it to protect valued resources (42, 43), the Kohistani as part of a religious code involving honor or vengeance (147), and the Ilongot to assuage grief (210). Anthropology has not been in the forefront of the study of collective violence, terrorism, and especially violence in state societies, in part because its methods and theory depend on months or years in the field, until recently defined as a relatively small, self-contained community that did not include the state. Also, prolonged research in a local community is difficult or impossible in times of violent strife and it is risky business to appear to take sides in situations in which the state resorts to torture, terrorism, and disappearances and in which armed opposition groups operate in a similar manner. Even studies of violence in the tribal zone, however, are rarely contextualized in a matrix of regional, state, or global economic and political systems, nor are they always well placed in historic perspective, though this is changing gradually (91), especially with respect to complex societies (37, 112, 192, 253).

Political, economic, and historical correctives to the more egregious representations of the colonial subject as either inherently violent or innately peaceful have appeared (109, 181). Gibson (104) discusses the historical circumstances in which the Semai, Buid, and Bataak of Southeast Asia were taken as slaves by the Sulu sultanate of eighteenth and nineteenth century Philippines. They responded by retreating deep into the forest and elaborating a cultural complex of peace and non-violence. Several restudies of the Yanomami indi-

cate that much of their violent activity coincides with contact with settlers, petrochemical industries, and institutions of the state (68, 90, 108). Gordon (109) places the "Bushmen" of southern Africa, the quintessential harmless people, in the context of the colonial project to simultaneously subdue and domesticate them on the one hand and to define them as "vermin of the veldt" on the other, a strategy of containment the United States found enormously successful in "taming" North American indigenous peoples.

Social scientists who address collective violence in complex state societies (37, 105, 121, 192, 243, 244, 253) examine the culture, economics, politics, or sociolinguistics of components of those societies from points of view that may, for example, explore local culture as it is embedded in the structure and institution of the state (224), but they do not necessarily theorize those structures and institutions (62, 63, 126, 195, 200) or the nature of the state itself. Others more successfully address historical representations of the violent Other (239–241) and take up the violence that arises within the context of decolonization, political and cultural struggles for independence from colonial rule, and the continued domination of former colonial powers (24, 45, 118, 149). Das (67b), Guidieri et al (117) and Horowitz (136) address ethnic conflict within the boundaries of a state and Glenny (106), Magas (165), and Poulton (199) are among those who examine the breakup of the Yugoslav state, though they do so with varying degrees of even-handedness, Magas being the most obviously partisan.

A number of anthropologists have studied warfare in pre-state and archaeologically known societies (87, 91, 99, 120, 258). War between states as a special kind of collective violence, its reasons and its meanings, and especially the national character of the enemies of the United States were early taken up as anthropological phenomena by North American scholars, partly in response to the needs of the United States War Department (22, 110) and in support of the United States in World War II. Since the notorious involvement of anthropologists in counter-insurgency in Thailand in the 1960s (251), anthropologists have avoided direct involvement in war related research.

Anthropological perspectives on the origins of warfare are more or less the same as for violence: they encompass the cultural (137), social and cultural (113), economic and political (248), and scarce resources arguments (92). Others take a political economy approach (18, 47, 259) or a purely historical one (171). Explanations for maintenance or continuation of war include resistance and rebellion on the part of indigenous or other oppressed people (91) and revenge, which in state societies may be couched in religious, ethnic, and ideological language (e.g. "Remember the Alamo" or "Kill a Commie for Christ"). Revenge is often deeply personalized—the images of Saddam Hussein the assassin in the Gulf War of 1990, the World War I specter of the bloodthirsty Hun, World War II and Cold War enemies as insects, pigs, and

beasts of various kinds are commonplace (146). Cohn (54) discusses the imagery of sex and death among nuclear defense technicians, and other articles in a edited volume (182) reveal the triumph of image over reality and the social, economic, and political context of media coverage of the Gulf War throughout the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. Sex and masculinity are often aspects of the representation of warfare, but Elshtain (79) casts considerable doubt on gendered myths that depict men as makers of war and women as simultaneously conciliators and socializers of warriors.

The continuation of war may also be justified in official circles as a rational, common sense strategy of deterring force with equal or greater force. Finally, a warrior class or group has an interest in maintaining war or its threat (171). These last two explanations are especially characteristic of state societies with well-developed departments of defense and standing armies, but numerous non-state societies also have permanent warrior classes and measured responses to violent incursions from the outside (91).

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political violence encompasses overt state-sponsored or tolerated violence in all of Williams' senses, (coercion or the threat of it, bodily harm, etc) but may also include actions taken or not by the state or its agents with the express intent of realizing certain social, ethnic, economic, and political goals in the realm of public affairs, especially affairs of the state or even of social life in general. These may or may not be direct violence. For example, ferocity between Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi (158, 166, 167, 173); between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka (142, 215, 228a, 236–238); between Ladinos and indigenous peoples in Guatemala (37, 168, 246, 253); between Israelis and Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip (227); or among Croats, Serbs, and Muslims in the Balkans (106, 125, 165, 199), insofar as it is tolerated or encouraged by states in order to create, justify, excuse, explain, or enforce hierarchies of difference and relations of inequality, are acts of state violence, even though states themselves may not appear on the surface to be primary agents (cf 133). Moreover, the deliberate acts of agents of the state in, for example, the Soviet Union in the 1930s, which caused mass starvation in the countryside (13, 14, 164), and similar economic or political deeds elsewhere in the world that result in widespread deaths (226) and often huge numbers of political refugees (67a, 84, 124, 262) also qualify as political violence, terror, even genocide (151, 160).

Terrorism is, according to the dictionary, "the policy of using acts inspiring great fear as a method of ruling or of conducting political opposition," and may include violence in all of its senses including torture or its threat. It "is not so much the exploitation of the other as much as the mere consciousness of the

possibility," said Simmel (quoted in 192:8) of domination. Clearly the same must be even more true of torture. Torture—the very term evokes images of a distant, less civilized past, of dark cellars, of both the tortured and torturers radically different from ourselves. Nonetheless torture perpetrated by states and their agents is commonplace, documented in scores of countries around the world (9). As for terror, academics, politicians, and popular pundits usually reserve the label for political opposition movements or figures (155), only rarely applying it to states (29, 46, 132, 156). Violence and terror are highly politicized terms embraced and elaborated by victims and avoided by perpetrators, especially if the perpetrator is a state. In fact, state leaders everywhere claim respect for universal human rights and deny that their acts constitute torture, violence, or terror, preferring to characterize them as necessary measures to insure order and respect for the law. Nonetheless, the state is often the instigator of cycles of violent human rights abuses as it seeks to suppress change and prevent opposition movements from undermining its legitimacy (9, 69).

Discussions and explanations of torture, other violence, and terrorism within state society center on the purported need of societies to modernize quickly at all costs (197, 202), to coordinate knowledge with systems of social control (93), and to legitimate the rule of the state (202). Legitimacy is always a central concern in the sense that violence is only violence by definition if the perpetrators fail to establish the legitimacy of their acts against claims of others that it is illegitimate (203). Consider the case of a California woman who shot dead, in the very courtroom in which he was being tried, the man accused of sodomizing her son. In the eyes of her supporters, she was justified in killing the man who, just before the shooting, allegedly smirked at her terrified son, whom he had earlier threatened with death if he, the child, ever told anyone about his sexual abuse. The woman's supporters do not define her act as violence. Similarly, the person who bombs an office building or hijacks an airplane is not considered a terrorist by those who believe that the workers in the building are part of a military and industrial complex that threatens world peace or that their political cause will somehow be advanced by the hijacking.

States as well as political opposition movements also take this instrumental view as justification for tactical preemption in which they gain advantage over opponents by forestalling with violent measures possible action by opponents or by taking revenge for acts completed. They present their actions as both unavoidable and necessary to prevent what would otherwise be inevitable and unavoidable deeds of their targets (203). For the most part, the public has learned to find such official measures justified, that is to say, legitimate by definition. But the public does not accept as readily the structurally similar acts

of foreign nationals targeting civilian centers or vigilante justice of the sort meted out to the alleged sodomizer.

THE STATE

Conventional social science theories of the state, drawn largely from utilitarian and Weberian analyses of legitimacy and political power, objectify and endow the state with institutions with law-making and enforcing capabilities that may be more or less democratic, more or less brutal, more or less violent. Insofar as anthropology has dealt with the state, it has taken it as an unanalyzed given or posited a stage, implicitly the final one, in the evolution of political and cultural organization. In this view, the state is manifest as the political management of a specified geographic territory and its inhabitants through the mechanism of centralized government institutions staffed and controlled by a small number of specialists (51, 221). State structures and practices are the cumulative effect of a social contract in which the public has ostensibly agreed that the state has a monopoly on force, and therefore it and only it can legitimately constrain and coerce people. According to conflict theory, the state emerged in order to allow an elite class to obtain and maintain power over subordinates, thereby managing class conflict through force and by means of the control of ideology (99; cf 48, 152). In a benign view of origins, the state provides the stability needed for increasing complexity and presumably desirable and beneficial overall growth and development (39, 51), a utopian bias that has been implicated in the ongoing critique of colonialism and its projects (188, 216; cf 222). Recent debate in other social sciences about the nature of the state (21, 35, 40, 83, 100, 141, 179, 211, 223) and analyses that interrogate the state as ethnographic subject are not as commonplace in anthropology, although that is changing slowly (1, 10, 52, 71, 250).

To be sure, there is an autonomous and extraordinarily powerful entity called the state. According to Abrams, one measure of its powerfulness is its ability to thwart attempts to unmask that power (2:63). But the state is not just a set of institutions staffed by bureaucrats who serve public interest. It also incorporates cultural and political forms, representations, discourse, practices and activities, and specific technologies and organizations of power that, taken together, help to define public interest, establish meaning, and define and naturalize available social identities (2, 12, 53, 66, 79, 94–96, 185, 186, 190, 193). These identities are located within both the domain of state apparatuses and so-called civil society, often glossed as public versus private, a distinction that renders opaque the state's daily intrusions into peoples' lives, their employment, their bodies, "through a plurality of qualities and statuses which are the predicate of the subject 'I'" (3:42). Abrams, for example, characterizes the state as an ideological project, "an exercise in legitimation

be illegitimate if seen directly and as itself, an unacceptable domination" (2:76). He advocates a shift to analysis of social subordination, the legitimating of the illegitimate, and to the hegemonic fields in which power relations play themselves out. Integral to this view is Gramsci's (111) theory of hegemony, especially transformative hegemony (58, 255, 256).

It has become an anthropological commonplace to note that arbitrary symbolic systems are created in a dialectic of official hegemony and popular resistance that both divide and unite and that are naturalized so that they are both part of taken-for-granted daily life and flexible enough to respond to changing political and economic circumstances (35, 66). The agreed upon identities imply closure on other modes of being by disrupting, diluting, sometimes even denying the possibility of alternatives. The state promotes and enforces that consensus in a dialectical relationship with the intelligentsia (31) even as external relations change. This is not a totally transparent process of course, as Stuart Hall (122:44) reminds us:

> Ruling or dominant conceptions of the world [may] not directly prescribe the mental content of...the heads of the dominated classes. But the circle of dominant ideas does accumulate the symbolic power to map or classify the world for others; its classifications do acquire not only the constraining power of dominance over other modes of thought but also the inertial authority of habit and instinct. It becomes the horizon of the taken for granted: what the world is and how it works, for all practical purposes. Ruling ideas may dominate other conceptions of the social world by setting the limit to what will appear as rational, reasonable, credible, indeed sayable or thinkable, within the given vocabularies of motive and action available to us.

In most states, the struggle for consensus is not ordinarily contested in the realm of politics but rather in that of social life where consensus is built. It is the deviants and resisters of all kinds who are subject to the state's violence. Although there is a danger that the state as ideological project becomes a mechanical device to explain all limitations to human freedom, proponents maintain that that project is a dialogue between destruction and preservation, prohibition and enabling, and it illuminates how people contest, negotiate, learn, and ultimately internalize identities.

THE NATION

We cannot speak of the state without also discussing nation and nationalism as hegemonic ideas that inflect the behavior of those who engage in violent action against a perceived Other. There are two views of nation, the first of which is that nations existed naturally before the emergence of states; that they are unique, distinctive units distinguishable from all others; that language, culture, or religious differences may even be manifest in physical singularity;

and that they are unambiguously based on shared history, values, and/or territory (23, 27). In this Herderian view, nationalism is the spiritual, ideological, and political expression of objective reality and must coincide with a political state and a specific territory. The second, more generally held view, among scholars at least, is that a nation is constructed initially by subjective self-awareness by virtue of its presumed members bringing to consciousness a sense of commonality and collective will (12, 58, 60, 61, 100, 134, 145, 225, 237, 237a). Moreover, nations do not produce states, but rather states produce nations through "the artefact, invention, and social engineering of nations" (134:10). In short, the integrative needs of the modern state produced nationalist ideology, which created the nation, "sometimes tak[ing] pre-existing cultures and turn[ing] them into nations, sometimes invent[ing] them, and often obliterat[ing] pre-existing cultures" (100:48, 49), a dynamic relationship recognized and elaborated by nationalist leaders of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, among them Pilsudski of Poland (185, 208) and Mazzini of Italy (111). Those who discuss nationalism solely as an instrument of intellectuals and activists (261), however, must explain how it becomes the lived reality of everyone else who then act upon it, and acknowledge that intellectual ideology is not transformed into folk culture unproblematically unless the ideas of intellectuals are a reflection of an already hegemonic popular culture.

The liberal intelligentsias of the nineteenth century, leaders of nationalist movements in Poland, Italy, Germany, Serbia, Romania, Belgium, and elsewhere had to codify one of a number of dialects, almost always that of the elite, into national languages and privilege or invent common histories in order to bind people together around loyalty to a new political form that in Europe, North America, and their colonies had a decidedly economic rationale (148). Elites, national leaders, and educators did not apologize for this cultural repackaging but rather celebrated what they saw as rational, democratic movements toward modernity and capitalism. It was progress (145; cf 45) and subordinate atavistic identities and people had to be submerged and homogenized, sometimes disappearing altogether, sometimes retaining an identity as a minority or an indigenous people. At best subordinate languages, cultures, and ways of life are elaborated as national symbols of the past, often converted into tourist attractions for domestic and foreign consumption (186). At worst they are suppressed violently as threats to national unity and territorial integrity. Sometimes, as in Guatemala, both strategies are mobilized (37, 168, 188).

Nation and nationalism are in Europe and North America terms of modernity, offspring of the Enlightenment, colonial expansion, religious wars, rationalism, and liberal capitalism that serve as ideological justification and political legitimation for certain notions of territorial, political, and cultural unity enforced by the hegemony of liberal thought and organization. The

vision of shared nationality as routine lived reality usually masks the hidden presence of class and other power relations of modern states, including those of parts of socialist East Central Europe and the Soviet Union, which were constructed of similar raw materials (185, 249). Other literature that defines nation and state broadly include Malkki's (167) account of the manner in which maps and scholarly studies of refugees contribute to the definition of that which roots people in specific bits of soil. Malkki invokes the "territorializing concepts of identity" (167:25) in describing desecrated graves in a Jewish cemetery in France and the recently buried corpse that was disinterred and impaled on an umbrella. The corpse could not, in the estimation of the desecrators, be simultaneously Jewish and of the French nation and therefore had to be taken out of its soil, lest it *root* there. Borneman (28) takes up the constructions of national and nationalist narratives and conversations among states and citizens as a means of legitimating both the division and ultimately the reunification of Berlin, and Dominquez (73) discusses the politics of heritage as Ashkenazim and Sepharadim contest the cultural contents of the Israeli state.

Some scholars of the post-colonial world insist that the content of nationalism in the southern hemisphere has logical and theoretical implications not derived from western, rational thought but rather is a discourse that emerged in dialogue with colonialism. Insofar as it is able to reject colonial rule as an "almost palpable historical truth," so is this nationalist discourse able to construct and assert new political possibilities (45:40, 41). Chatterjee presumes that these possibilities, though still encompassing discourses of power, are capable of perceiving, revising, and rejecting the imperatives of capitalism, the hegemony of the liberal rationalist state, and the moral leadership of an intelligentsia derived from elite classes.

Not only has nation been conceptually delinked from state, but there is a growing literature on deterritorialized spatial possibilities in which nations are deployed in transnational communities of various kinds (15, 107, 143, 144, 212, 213). Gupta (119) offers the non-aligned movement and the European Community as communities that transgress expectable spatial arrangements. Violence in the name of keeping some people out, however, is still a means of enforcing definitions of the nation-state and class and power relations appropriate to capitalist production, as many Mexican and Central American farm worker migrants to California and the Southwest well-know (187, 254).

THE STATE, THE NATION, AND HEGEMONY

The numbers of people worldwide subjected to the violence of their own states are staggering. More than a quarter of a million Kurds and Turks in Turkey have been beaten or tortured by the military, police, and prison guards since 1980; tens of thousands of indigenous people in Peru and Guatemala (8), street

children in Brazil and Guatemala, Palestinians in Kuwait, Kurds in Iraq, and Muslim women and girls in Bosnia have been similarly treated (9). Mutilated bodies turn up somewhere every day. Some 6000 people in dozens of counties were legally shot, hung, electrocuted, gassed, or stoned to death by their respective states between 1985 and 1992 for political misdeeds: criticism of the state, membership in banned political parties or groups, or for adherence to the "wrong" religion; for moral deeds: adultery, prostitution, homosexuality, sodomy, or alcohol and drug use; for economic offenses: burglary, embezzling, and corruption; and for violent crimes: rape, assault, and murder (5, 7, 9).

Lyotard (163:46) describes the postmodern as "the presentation of the unpresentable," its translation into recognizable and acceptable myths and discourses. For a state, the unpresentable is that which is improper, unthinkable under the requirements of its formal presentation of itself. It is formally unthinkable that a state would typically and openly exercise its power through violence, even torture and terrorism (248). If torture is unimaginable in unmediated form, unpresentable for what it is, its representation must be fit into existing, acceptable discourses: patriotism, retaliation for real and imagined past injustices, separatism, terrorism, communism, subversion, anarchy, the need to preserve the state's territorial integrity, the need to protect the nation from subversion through ethnic cleansing, the fight against crime, the war on drugs (172).

All peoples, to a certain extent, take myth as reality (142, 239, 240). Essential to myth is a process in which "one immunizes the contents of the collective imagination by means of a small inoculation of acknowledged evil; thus protecting it against the risk of a generalized subversion" (20:150). A single or a few separatists, communists, or dissidents of other sorts is sufficient to inoculate a shaky social order with evil, first justifying the torture or killing of all separatists, then anyone who knows a separatist, those who are friends or family to those who know separatists, and so forth. The social order, of course, need not be objectively precarious for the heavy hand of the state to be felt. Andersen (11) argues that Argentina's generals fabricated a threat from armed leftists in the 1970s as pretext for their own seizure of power and for the "dirty war" that cost eight to ten thousand people their lives because they "might have had" leftist sympathies. Inoculations of evil become part of social knowledge that enter public discourse and inflect the building of consensus around categories of dissidence and the state's control of them. The repression of the real or imagined violence of dissidents is also justified and enters into the hegemonic field through the violence of representation in popular culture, the media, television, films, the theater, and music (e.g., 17, 116, 123, 127, 128, 214; cf 180).

"We only beat bad people," said a prison official in Turkey in 1984.[1] "They are no good, they are worthless bums, they are subversives who think that communism will relieve them of the necessity of working." The warden revealed with apparent pride that he had "given orders that all prisoners should be struck with a truncheon below the waist on the rude parts and warned not to come to prison again." "My aim," he said, "is to ensure discipline. That's not torture, for it is only the lazy, the idle, the vagabonds, the communists, the murderers who come to prison." "Communism is against the law here, so is separatism," said another, referring to the Kurdish movement for independence. During the "dirty war" in Argentina, a general is reported to have said that "Democracy must be protected for wrong ideas spread like a cancer through the society if they are not excised." One is reminded of the announcement that Joao Baptista Figueriredo, President of Brazil, made after his election in 1979: "I intend," he said, "to open this country up to democracy and anyone who is against that, I will jail, I will crush" (quoted in 201:304).

Torture is in part an expedient, a means of squeezing information or confessions from suspected criminals, subversives, traitors, terrorists. Women in several countries have been raped and otherwise sexually abused by guards, sometimes in the presence of their husbands or parents as a means of extracting information from witnesses. This form of violence, a commonplace in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war of the 1990s, is particularly diabolical in societies where women are more often assigned responsibility for sexual transgressions than are men and in which rape is a means by which the men of one faction humiliate those of another. Rape both creates and punishes Otherness. Turkish guards have reportedly raped men with truncheons (6, 129), a significant symbolic act linked to the stigma assigned in Islamic societies to acts attributed stereotypically to the passive partner in a homosexual encounter. General Turgut Sunalp, a candidate for Prime Minister in 1983, scoffed at allegations of sexual torture of prisoners, but added his claim for the normality of soldiers, saying in effect that if the point was to rape, soldiers are healthy young men with more pleasurable "tools" at their disposal, so why would they use truncheons. As for the men who claimed they had been raped, he said that "if such prisoners had any character at all, they would have committed suicide" (translation of remarks reported in Turkish newsmagazine *Notka,* personal communication). The conflation of the penis as an object of the victim's

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Between 1982 and 1987, I headed a group in Amnesty International, USA that coordinated all Amnesty International's work on human rights abuses in Turkey. During that time, I came into contact, both through correspondence and in person, with a number of people who had been imprisoned, sometimes tortured, for their political beliefs or activities, often only because they were suspected of subversive activities. Consequently, I have a large store of quotes and comments from former prisoners and from Turkish officials. It serves no interests to name names, especially since torture is still daily fare in Turkey (see 6, 129, 130, 174–176).

pain and the torturer's pleasure suggests the often sadomasochistic nature of the relationship. But a number of researchers (93, 170, 217) remind us that the goal of state violence is not to inflict pain; it is the social project of creating punishable categories of people, forging and maintaining boundaries among them, and building the consensus around those categories that specifies and enforces behavioral norms and legitimates and de-legitimates specific groups. Torture has another, only partially successful function—to terrorize people into conformity.

In 1984, the then Turkish Ambassador to the United States insisted to me that Turks who claim they were tortured were really "just" members of unlawful political organizations. He meant Kurdish separatist groups and several opposition political parties. He explained that they were agitators, ignorant peasants and workers manipulated by communist infiltrators. And because they were common workers and peasants, they had probably been beaten before and could not have been surprised when they were struck by prison guards. "They are calling it torture in order to influence world opinion and discredit the Turkish state," the Ambassador said. He did not mention the students, professors, doctors, publishers, lawyers, and politicians who were among the tortured but invited my complicity in his claim for the radical Otherness of the tortured with his confidential tone of voice, adding that Turkish police, prison guards, and soldiers were mostly poor peasants with little education. He claimed that brutality was part of their culture, and sometimes the guards were overzealous, but they were true patriots, true enemies of communism and other threats to the Turkish state. Not only must the torturer and his apologist assign the status of Other to the condemned, the specification of the kind of differentness the tortured symbolizes must conform to dominant representations of the vile and worthless, a vileness that has mythical status as something to be found lurking everywhere, a constant threat to the accepted order (109, 183, 240). It is largely underclass status that makes certain people(s) susceptible to violent abuses and it is their ambiguity—as both less-than-human brutes and super-humans capable of undermining the accepted order of society—that allows elites to crystallize the myths about the evil they represent, hence, justifying the violence perpetrated against them.

Depending on the success or failure of their cause, survivors of state violence often need to conquer the impulse to reciprocate, even the hidden transcripts of power that Scott describes as used by slaves, serfs, and minorities held in contempt (55, 219), for the terror of the survivor may be complete and social disapprobation may be more or less total. Some survivors speak of the guilt and shame they feel as well as of the refusal of people to believe their stories of abuse and of the persistent questioning about what they had done to get themselves arrested in the first place (159, 234). Just as Jews have been held responsible for anti-Semitism (183), women for misogyny (70), Latinos

and African-Americans in the United States for racism, so too have those who have suffered torture been blamed for their own oppression. Survivors often suffer total social, political, and psychological isolation, and suicide is common. Having been tortured by the state may be the ultimate form of distinction (31).

Research suggests that torturers are ordinary people. The techniques of training them, best known to human rights monitors from the experiences of the military police in Greece during the dictatorship of the early 1970s, do brutalize young men. More importantly, they are taught, through the manipulation of symbols, that they are "just doing their jobs," as one former torturer put it in a rare depiction of the voice of the violent in the documentary film "Your Neighbor's Son: The Making of a Torturer" (196). This is a process common to military recruits the world over (36, 146, 162). The very phraseology of police or soldiers "doing their jobs," the above quoted Turkish general's use of the metaphor of the penis as a tool of the trade of torture, so to speak, an emblem of his work in mastering the world, the once High Executioner of Great Britain's remark that he didn't think executions prevented crime, but that he did what he was hired to do, that it was a matter of sacred duty to him (229:24–28), all suggest that the discourse of work has historically been an effective instrument of state control, an instrument whereby certain sectors of society have been deprived of essential aspects of their humanity through the work of others.

At the core of the social contract theory of the state—its surface appearance—is Locke's (161) contention that "through work, man embarked on a voyage of exploration whose ultimate goal is the discovery of man; through work man becomes master of the world; through a community of work, society comes into being" (see also 50). The unproblematized equation in the capitalist world of work with society and culture entails a compulsion to represent political, cultural, or ethnically subordinate dissidents as the negation of the proper working self. So represented, we cannot help but take their Otherness personally. Thus, the natives discovered and described by early colonists, missionaries, and ethnographers were depicted as savages, prone to mindless violence, dirty, and without material or symbolic goods (25, 109). Most of all, they were categorized as lazy and shiftless and as such were said to be without rationality, without culture. Their life styles violated colonial mores and European notions of progress and civilization, which by the beginning of the seventeenth century centered increasingly upon the discipline of work (58, 59). Work discipline is an integral principle upon which the institutions of private property and law-and-order were founded and are central to the project of the state in the liberal bourgeois world order. Certainly the most chilling and supremely ironic expression of the relationship between work and

national purity was the slogan *Arbeit mach frei* (Work Makes One Free) over the entrance to Auschwitz.

Non-work in the sense of labor will not do, of course, but neither will work that undermines the disciplining of the labor force and the proper order of things. The state must be a state of mind that divides people into the purified and honest who do legitimate work and a politically suspect or criminal, deviant underworld of aliens, communists, loafers, delinquents, even thieves, killers, and drug lords who do not. The violent dissident must be positioned and repositioned as necessary, "in a negative relationship with middle-class rational masculinity, a model that ensures a relationship of dominance and subordination...by locking the two into a mutually defining relationship" (16:15, 21). In the United States, the presumed idleness of the unemployed, the poverty-stricken, the drug user or gang member, the single parent, gay man or lesbian woman (all the latter with overtones of promiscuity and contagious disease) is also seen as violence against the social body. It cannot be just any old work; it must be work that contributes to what dominant groups have defined as the common good (153).

The hegemony of respectable culture and good taste and the denigration of what is represented as the disgusting, degenerate, worthless, criminal lower parts of the social body is so strong that, according to a poll conducted by the *Washington Post* and ABC News in September 1989, 66% of those surveyed favored random searches of peoples' houses, cars, and personal belongings, even if the police had no suspicion of any wrongdoing. Seventy-two percent said they approved of censorship of any film depicting illegal drug use. People have been so inoculated with the fear of evil and with the myth of an essential relationship of repression to the cure of society, that they are willing to give up some of their own rights for what has been defined as the good of the social body. When William Bennett, the so-called drug czar until 1990, said he saw nothing wrong with beheading drug offenders, his audience applauded wildly.

An anthropological task for the 1990s and beyond is to continue to uncover the ways in which identities that entail inequalities are historically constructed, ascertain how those identities become deployed in time and space, determine under what circumstances people do or do not internalize and subjectify them, and how they are dismantled, disorganized, and redefined through the redistribution of people in different spaces at other times. In other words, what are the circumstances and the means through which people create identities and have them created for them? How are these identities then normalized so that resistance is domesticated or failing that, crushed by violent means that meet with general social approval? Finally, how do people generate oppositional identities, a sense of self that rejects subordination and repression, how do they achieve autonomy?

Resistance to the project of the state is understood by some scholars as a manifestation of class struggle, especially against capitalist relations of production (189, 194, 240). Others examine resistance in the context of colonialism (58, 233, 241), or view it as a result of competition for scarce resources among ethnic groups (136, 190, 238). Finally, theorists of "new social movements" (4, 77, 81, 82, 232) describe the deliberate appropriation and incorporation of montages of diverse cultural forms into local resistance movements (55, 154, 220, 252). Sometimes these movements mobilize people in the name of loyalty to an existing nation-state (98, 100, 142, 236), but increasingly they are couched in terms of self-determination and the dismantling of those same nation-states.

SELF DETERMINATION, NATION-STATES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Some scholars conclude that while nationalism and human rights are compatible, self-determination is not a human right (148). Others (23) are convinced that self-determination is the highest right of all. Yelena Bonner, the respected Russian human rights activist, is but one proponent of the view that "self-determination is the essence of human rights...self-determination for every people, for every nationality, a state" (27). These statements raise two sets of questions as peoples who live or once lived within the confines of another state or empire struggle to assert their autonomy. What if self-determination claims on the part of one nation mean that the individual and collective human rights of another are violated? What happens if one side is coincidentally more powerful militarily than the other, or if there is cheap high-powered and sophisticated weaponry readily available to the highest bidder? Battles raging in the Caucasus, Tadzhikistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Croatia center on definitions of nation, state, minority group, and peoples, and on the assumption of state power by a new set of elites or in some cases old elites in new guises. The other set of questions focuses on the kind of future newly emerging elites imagine in a world order in which the possibilities for recapitulating the trajectory of the west is unlikely, where socialism has been discredited, and where there are no other alternatives on the horizon. How, under these circumstances, will new constellations of power and social knowledge emerge and be channeled?

In the contemporary post-colonial world left by the demise of communism, the predominate discourse invokes the paradigmatic liberal ideas of democracy, reason, and progress toward capitalism. At the same time, local populations seek to recover their histories and traditions. In contradictory national situations in which an emergent bourgeoisie cannot, in the absence of appropriate social conditions, establish adequate hegemonic domination over a

newly constituted nation (which is clearly the case for many nascent or hopeful new states), it may resort to what Gramsci (111:181, 182) called passive revolution, the transformation of once dominant classes into partners in a configuration that replaces the structure of colonial power with a different order, that of national power. This translates into the creation of states capable of transforming the economy while at the same time suppressing or submerging the interests of subordinate groups.

Those subordinate groups often constitute power groups challenging similarly constituted rivals or the state itself. Many are the historical victims of colonization, internal or external, or a result of the way colonial empires were carved up. Their claims may be couched in the language of human, minority, or indigenous rights. For their part, states often attempt to absorb subalterns in a process benignly described as assimilation or acculturation, and less benignly as ethnocide (231:91), a dialectic between state and nation, peoples and minorities, which often results in violent suppression, even genocide (26, 44, 150). Since 1945, state-sponsored violence toward ethnic and political groups has caused more deaths, injuries, and general human suffering than "all other forms of deadly conflict, including international wars and colonial and civil wars" (231:76). Other costs are incalculable: extinction of languages, cultures, and ways of life; destruction of ethnographic and historical treasures; and loss or damage to residences, industry, and commerce.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the covenants and treaties that give them the force of law in the United Nations (UN) are designed to protect people from the excesses of the state, including torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and are intended to be universal (131, 257). Self-determination is another basic right regarded as so essential it appears as Article One in both covenants to the UDHR:

> All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Although this seems on the face of it an unambiguous statement, its interpretation in the UN has been problematic. The definition of peoples itself is both contested and confused with other categories, such as minorities. Member states define a minority as "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-dominant position, whose members...possess ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population, and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religions, or language" (Capotorti quoted in 231:59). For some purposes, states consider refugees and indigenous peoples minorities as well as those in the numerical majority who are legislatively or practically prevented from full participation in the rights of citizen-

ship (e.g. the indigenous peoples of Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala; Blacks in South Africa; and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories). Finally, most of the world's five to eight thousand ethnic groups are considered minorities by their own states. The United Nations has carefully and deliberately avoided defining *peoples* even though it allows them certain rights (80). Peoples are generally to be understood not in an ethnic sense but as the inhabitants of a specific territory, and international law is to be understood as applicable to peoples but not to minorities. Peoples can claim self-determination; minorities cannot (231:60-70).

Except for cases of colonialism and recent occupations, even peoples must meet minimum requirements in order to claim self-determination leading to independence (78). First, they must be clearly differentiated in key aspects from the dominant population in the country concerned. Ethnic, cultural, or linguistic differences are not sufficient if there is no clear territorial division. When group members are geographically spread out among other populations, the UN will not usually recognize a self-determination claim. The principle of territorial integrity, an important aspect of the principle of sovereignty, normally overrides a claim of self-determination, which is another aspect of sovereignty. Thus, a people can claim independence only if they are under military occupation, have historically formed a nation-state of its own, or were once part of a different state, *and* occupy a clearly defined territory. The drafters of Article 1 of the UDHR had in mind independence for various African, Asian, and Caribbean colonies, a goal that has been long since realized. Aside from the successor states of East Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, which by and large met the criteria above, the Security Council and the General Assembly are not likely to recognize self-determination demands of regional or local ethnic groups, indigenous peoples, or minorities of any kind.

Minorities with aspirations to independence were not satisfied to be told that those aspirations could never be considered collective human rights and that "whatever depredations are inflicted upon [minorities], they must attempt to find justice within the boundaries of existing states and be reconciled with them. Since self determination in the sense of independence is not a right of minorities, they must look instead to individual human rights [standards]" (242:5). As a result of subsequent activism by minorities and indigenous peoples, the international community has been forced to recognize some rights of minorities to internal self-determination, that is within the boundaries of existing states (231). This means the right to control some aspects of education, social affairs, welfare, and culture while defense, international trade relations, and diplomatic affairs are left to the central state. Indigenous peoples, for example, often demand internal autonomy or access to land that was once theirs as well as other social rights (67, 184).

The message of the UN is that states should avoid interfering with the sovereign decisions of other states about who does or does not constitute a people. This is hardly surprising since the UN comprises states that presumably would be disinclined to entertain independence movements within their own borders. As far as the UN is concerned, maintaining the existing territorial integrity of member states trumps any nascent disposition toward self-determination on the part of self-described nations, ethnic groups, or indigenous peoples (136, 231, 261). Moreover, the commitment to the sovereignty of existing states in their bureaucratic and administrative roles also takes precedence over, in almost all cases, the sovereignty of the individual. Individuals can bring legal suit against their own government or that of another state for human rights violations through the UN Human Rights Commission but the process is cumbersome, lengthy, and generally unsatisfactory (190).

Historically, the states of the UN have shown themselves willing to commit troops to the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is the version of the state, however, that is in crisis in this the last dance of the twentieth century. Consensus about the virtual inviolability of the state is unraveling as conflicts over nationalism, ethnicity, and paradoxically a dialectic between individual and collective human rights threaten the given order of the world, as formerly powerless individuals are able to call on allies around the world (e.g. Amnesty International and the Watch Commmittees) to defend them from their own states, and as historically peripheralized peoples assert autonomy and demand self-determination. The sanctity of the individual person who has a set of specific rights recognized by virtue of common humanity, rather than entitlements to be petitioned for from one's state, has entered the lexicon, if not the practice of the community of nations (191). Although the process is less than satisfactory, states no longer enjoy absolute impunity.

It is perhaps indicative of the crisis of the state that the universality of human rights came under attack at the 1993 UN World Conference on Human Rights, an attack led for the most part by China and other states that have most openly failed to make consensus prevail over coercion and that have records of especially egregious human rights abuses against both individuals and peoples. China's record in suppressing students and Tibetans, for example, needs no rehearsal here. Nonetheless, China, Singapore, and other less well-developed states invoked cultural relativity to justify torture and mistreatment. Cultural relativity is now code in some circles for permission to oppress people and peoples and to maintain women as second and third class citizens in the name of ostensible tradition (186) and lack of cultural equivalence (218). The world community staved off threats to the universality concept, but the attack suggests the complexity of the terrain faced by anthropologists concerned with many voices and many modalities (19, 75).

Some politicians are sanguine about the continued development of a new hierarchy of governance, not only established state governments, but also regional associations like the European Community, the North American Free Trade Association, and global federation under the UN. Others are less optimistic as the UN founders in Somalia, as the war in the Balkans continues, and as violence flares in Chiapas and elsewhere. As one scholar said as recently as December 1992, "The world is...in transition from strict acceptance of sovereign jurisdiction and non-intervention to more and more readiness to undertake...action, up to and including military action, that would in the past have been considered intervention in domestic affairs" (Sonnenfeldt quoted in 260:21). Is the world moving away from the nation-state as the key unit and toward some kind of world government? Probably not. It is more likely that a multitude of new linguistically and ethnically based nation-states will emerge, even though the salient differences of languages and ethnicities must be ever created and recreated, and that their legitimacy might have to be maintained at least in the short run through violence and terrorism.

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