Shifters and deixis:
Some reflections on Jakobson, Jespersen, and reference*

MONIKA FLUDERNIK

The term *shifter* was first introduced by Otto Jespersen (1923) and was later taken up by Roman Jakobson in his famous essay 'Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb' (originally presented as a paper in 1956). The term has gained wide currency in literary scholarship, particularly in discussions of narrative.[1] Jakobson's insights into the nature of shifters closely correspond to Benveniste's conclusions about the deictic nature of personal pronouns (Benveniste 1966: 225–266, 1971: 195–230), and — as with Jespersen (1923) — his prime category of shifters are the first and second person pronouns. This Benvenistean emphasis has resulted in a complete identification of the category of *shifters* with the first/second person pronouns. In a different book, Jespersen (1924: 292–299) additionally uses the term *shifting* to apply to the change in perspective occasioned by the move from direct to (free) indirect discourse, and for simple semantic reasons this understanding of the term *shifter* has become quite common.[2] What shifts, in this latter conception of the term, is not the *speaker/ addressee* relationship; the shift occurs between the *speaker/addressee* pair on the one hand and the perspective of the reporting instance on the other. This perspective requires a replacement of the first/second person deictic pronouns by the impersonal pronouns (he/she/it/they) or by proper names and descriptive designations, as well as, possibly, a shift in tense (the *consecutio temporum* of Latin grammar) and the conversion of deictic into non-deictic adverbs of time and place. In the first (primary) meaning, shifting is synonymous with turn-taking in conversation — shifting occurs *between* deictic positions; in the second context the shift takes place between *deictic* and *non-deictic* parts of speech. Shifters (*embrayeurs*) are then those elements of the sentence that alternate between deictic and non-deictic forms.[3]

Any discussion of *shifters* must necessarily involve notions of deixis and reference, which are among the more controversial in linguistics. Within the framework of this paper it will obviously be impossible to provide a well-argued definition of either reference or deixis. Nor am I willing to

spend half my space rehearsing classic definitions of these terms, definitions we have so far had no discernible success in ultimately delimiting.[4] I will therefore restrict myself to two or three basic observations, concentrating on a close reading of, and some theoretical observations on, Jakobson's and Jespersen's discussion of shifters, as well as providing some additional selected linguistic evidence.

One term alone, *demonstrativity*, can be disposed of briefly at this early point in the argument. For the purposes of this paper we can delimit the notion of demonstrativity to a linguistic equivalent of the physical act of pointing. Demonstratives would hence be those lexically and morphologically encoded expressions that are accompanied by a pointing finger that establishes their referent(s). In the absence of any such visual aid demonstratives linguistically substitute for the action of pointing. The emphasis in this definition is on *lexically and morphologically encoded*. Demonstrative pronouns, for instance, are means of providing deixis (in the etymological sense of 'showing', 'pointing'), and they are used quite literally to indicate both 'things out there' ('Look at that tree over there') and parts of the discourse itself (e.g., 'This paragraph ...'). The latter kind of use is usually called 'textual deixis'. Demonstrativity as a grammatical category needs to be distinguished from deixis, if only because the latter term, as we shall see, has been limited to quite specific uses by Benveniste and others.

Some of the terminological confusion in this area of reference and referentiality seems to derive from the incompatibility between the fields of inquiry from which the problem has been tackled. In semiology or semiotics, *reference* is a notion that relies on the semiotic triangle and specifies the relationship between the *sign* (consisting of signifier and signified) on the one hand and its *referent* on the other. This set-up has come under severe attack in the wake of Derrida's analyses of Saussure's representational logocentrism, and it is on account of this critique that the concepts of *reference* and *referents* have currently fallen into disgrace. In literature, the banishment of a referent from the literary text has merely perfected and radicalized the process of decontextualization and essentialization of literature (*écriture*) that has been the heritage of the New Criticism. Literature does not provide 'true' 'propositions' about the 'world' — in the sense that these terms are used in logics — even if literary texts name settings and people of whom we have 'real world' knowledge (London, Napoleon) and also rely on our everyday experience to supplement inevitable textual lacunae with our reasoning and imagination. Nevertheless, literary texts do project a fictional world, and it is unclear how the language of fiction could do anything but refer to the places, characters, and objects filling its pages. This is true not only of dialogue (and of course more incisively of theatrical dialogue — where the referents of characters'

utterances are physically present on stage[5]), but also of the narrative itself. Indeed, it is on account of language's inherent characteristic of *referring* that the fictional world can be posited to exist, in whatever realm of actuality or possibility. Only in gnomic statements, which do not refer to the fictional world, does the narrative become accessible to the logics of propositions and their truths in relation to 'the world' at large. However, such gnomic statements —frequently moral generalizations in proverbial garb —ironically and paradoxically thwart an analysis of logical references because they, more radically than the narrative itself, deal with concepts or signifieds (of morality, for instance), signifieds that have no physical existence in our world except as World 3 objects in Popper's philosophy.[6]

In literary discussions and particularly in narratology, on the other hand, deixis is commonly identified with the category of temporal and spatial adverbs that 'shift' between direct and indirect discourse: *here/there*; *yesterday/the day before*; *now/then*. In free indirect discourse such temporal and spatial adverbs, as well as demonstratives such as *this* or *that*, remain unaffected by the narrative's referential coordinates. By contrast, no first or second person pronouns of an original utterance (which of course refer to the fictional speakers) survive into (free) indirect discourse, unless the referential coordinates of the narrative and the fictional world overlap.[7] Because demonstrative *this* and *that* behave exactly like deictic adverbs of place and time, it is frequently assumed in literary circles that notions of demonstrativity and of deixis are synonymous for all practical purposes. To make matters even worse, 'deixis' and 'demonstrativity' have additionally come to be associated with *reference* or *referentiality* (the ability to establish reference). Within a conventional philosophy of science framework, these concepts of reference and referentiality, however, raise serious philosophical issues, and in the wake of the Derridean revolution only proponents of possible world theories of fiction have found a way to integrate the notions of reference and referents into a theoretical framework that does not smack of a fallacious reliance on 'the world out there' mimeticism.

Matters are quite different if one approaches the problem of reference and deixis from the *linguistic* — rather than logical or literary —point of view. Linguistics foregrounds the pragmatic notion of successful reference as it is observed to occur in everyday conversation. It therefore becomes necessary in linguistic terms to distinguish between references to items that are physically present to interlocutors, and reference to items that are present only contextually, to the understanding, mind, or pragmatic knowledge of the speakers. (See for example Langacker 1985: 124–125 *et passim*.) Two friends discussing car prices will therefore refer to specific cars they have viewed and to specific salespersons to whom they have talked, as well

as to entities such as 'sales tax' or trademarks ('Mercedes', 'Honda') which are not actually present on the scene but, between the interlocutors, are agreed to exist in the world they accept as common between them. (Compare Popper's World 3 as above.) It is significant that a linguistic approach starts out with an analysis of *conversation* (that is to say, speech) — a procedure that reflects the still pervasive logocentric bias in linguistic study.

Deixis, as a linguistic term, can then be subsumed under reference insofar as it takes the pragmatic use of language within a given conversation as the basis for its analysis: in conversation, successful reference to items of the speech situation occurs. This is the equation from which Jakobson's 'referential function' derives and on which Todorov and Ducrot's definition of shifters as 'deictic pronouns' relies (1972: s.v. *référence*).

What follows is an attempt to rethink the notion of *shifters* on the basis of a close reading of Jakobson and Jespersen, supplemented by some additional linguistic considerations. It is beyond the scope of this article to develop the question of whether there exists a language or writing which does not come within the linguistically observable frame of 'reference as deixis', and which would therefore require a different philosophical and linguistic apparatus. The existence of such a system has been posited by Benveniste in his *histoire* category, which is non-deictic by definition, and even more radically by Ann Banfield in her revolutionary account of free indirect discourse (1982; see also 1987). Both theorists maintain that narrative does not have a speaker or addressee, and is hence devoid of deixis-as-reference. Current linguistic theory inevitably relies on terminology derived from the analysis of *speech* when discussing (narrative) texts. (This is particularly evident in the area of deixis, in which one speaks of 'textual' deixis to describe cross-referencing within parts of the same text.) The question raised by Benveniste's and Banfield's accounts cannot be followed up in these pages because I will be dealing with a phenomenon that, by definition, requires an analysis of *speech* rather than *writing*, and I will therefore adhere to the logocentric orientation which underlies the existing linguistic framework and terminology. However, the cause of narrative will never be completely out of view, and the present observations can also be taken to test how far the current linguistic framework can stretch within its own limits. Can linguistic methods as they have been developed adequately account for the phenomenon of shifters? If they can, there is no *prima facie* reason to forego the advantages of an existing accumulated body of knowledge, unless a different theory should succeed in providing even better analyses of the same data.

Jakobson (1971: 132) puts the notion of *shifter* in its philosophical and functional perspective. He starts out from a definition of shifters within a

frame of the situation of communication, which is characterized by the relations between the message and its underlying code. Note, as a warning, that 'message', as will soon be discussed in detail, is a technical term that cannot be taken in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word. Both message and code function in a

duplex manner: they may at once be utilized and referred to (=pointed at). Thus a message may refer to the code or to another message, and on the other hand, the general meaning of a code unit may imply a reference (*renvoi*) to the code or to the message. (1971: 130)

In this schema M/M (message referring to message) designates *reported speech* ('a message within a message and at the same time it is also speech about speech, a message about a message') (1971: 130); C/C (code referring to code) *proper names* (a name designates anyone to whom the name is assigned); M/C (message referring to the code) *metalinguistic statements* and definitions; and C/M (code referring to message) *shifters*. C/M is defined as follows:

C/M. Any linguistic code contains a particular class of grammatical units which Jespersen labeled SHIFTERS: the general meaning of a shifter cannot be defined without a reference to the message.
Their semiotic nature was discussed by Burks in his study on Peirces' [sic] classification of signs into symbols, indices, and icons. According to Peirce, a symbol (e.g. the English word *red*) is associated with the represented object by a conventional rule, while an index (e.g. the act of pointing) is in existential relation with the object it represents. Shifters combine both functions and belong therefore to the class of INDEXICAL SYMBOLS. ... Thus on one hand, the sign *I* cannot represent its object without being associated with the latter 'by a conventional rule', and in different codes the same meaning is assigned to different sequences such as *I*, *ego*, *ich*, *ya* etc.: consequently *I* is a symbol. On the other hand, the sign *I* cannot represent its object without 'being in existential relation' with this object: the word *I* designating the utterer is existentially related to his utterance, and hence functions as an index (cf. Benveniste) [that is to say, it is an instance of deixis]. (1971: 131–132)

In a shifter, the code refers to the message in the sense that the meaning of the shifter (e.g., *I*) cannot be established without considering who utters it, who voices the message. Peirce's description of indexical symbols,[8] among which Jakobson counts shifters, coincides with Benveniste's understanding of the personal pronouns. Benveniste defines *I* as 'the individual who utters the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance *I*', and *you* as 'individual spoken to in the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance *you*' (1971: 218).

In the latter part of his article Jakobson arranges the verbal categories into shifters and non-shifters (1971: 134), with the shifter categories implying a reference either to the speech event (*procès de l'énonciation*) (E^s) or to its participants (P^s). The grammatical categories that are shifters include (a) *tense* (E^n/E^s);[9] (b) *mood* (P^nE^n/P^s), which 'reflects the speaker's view of the character of the connection between the action and the actor or the goal' (1971: 35; quoted from Vinogradov 1947); (c) the *evidential*, a verbal category, for instance in Bulgarian, which refers to reported actions or beliefs about events and is comparable to English formulas of the type 'it is said to/alleged to...' (E^nE^{ns}/E^s); and of course (d) the category *person* itself (P^n/P^s) in the Benvenistean sense[10] of first and second person — that is to say, referring to the speaker or addressee. Jakobson then proceeds to discuss these categories in Russian grammar, with which we need not concern ourselves here.

One first point to make about Jakobson's analysis here is that he concentrates on the verbal categories, so that temporal and spatial adverbs, whether he considers them to be shifters or not, are not actually mentioned. However, since mood and tense are considered to be deictic categories, adverbs of time and place should be as well.

The second point touches Jakobson's distinction between the speech event as a whole and its differentiation into speaker and addressee. Whereas 'person' obviously distinguishes between the speaker and the addressee, tense clearly does not, because the temporal coordinates in face-to-face conversation are the same for both interlocutors. *Mood*, according to Vinogradov's definition (which would include what is generally subsumed under 'aspect' in English[11]), can express both a subjective notion centered on the speaker (for instance, 'What the hell *are you* doing?' expresses speaker's irritation[12]), and it can also refer to results of past actions in the present that are equally deictic for both interlocutors: '*Have* you *seen* the film?' (i.e., 'Do "you" know what the film is about?'); or: 'This car *has had* a major repair' (i.e., 'Now it is working again'). The *evidential*, on the other hand, seems to be centered on the speaker's information about the rumor or about general knowledge, excluding the second person who is being informed. It is the tense of traditional narrative in Bulgarian.

Jakobson's shifter categories hence vacillate between involvement of *one* participant in the speech event and their *mutual* involvement. He deals with this by distinguishing between the *speech event* (/E^s) — which includes the speakers and the time and location of utterance — and the *participants* in it (/P^s), a category which seems to refer more to the speaker than to the addressee (compare, for instance, his definition of 'mood' as given above). Thus, one point to note about Jakobson's arguments is that he has *two* different kinds of shifters. Both expressions referring to a participant in a

speech event and expressions referring to the speech event itself (including both participants) are called shifters. This follows logically from regarding personal pronouns as a deictic category (i.e., a category referring to the situation of utterance), and from collapsing other deictic categories, such as tense, with it. Note that Jakobson does *not* include proper names, which are deictics at least for Todorov and Ducrot (1972: 322), as well as for several philosophers, among them Donnellan (1971) and Searle (1969, 1979).

Bypassing the thorny tangles of definition (deixis, reference, etc.) that his paper raises, I would like to come to what I consider the most tantalizing properties of Jakobson's concept of shifters. We have seen how Jakobson defines the category in a framework involving the entities of *message* and *code*. Within this essay, message soon emerges as a paraphrase of the actual linguistic speech event, which includes its spatio-temporal context and the interlocutors, as well as the audible encoded sound message itself. (This can be deduced from the definitions of metalinguistic statements and of the shifter categories.) The code, on the other hand, seems to designate the lexical distribution of a language, the assignment of individual *signifiants* to individual *signifiés*. The code should, for instance, include morphemes, because metalingual statements such as 'The regular past tense suffix for verbs in English is -ed' would otherwise not be comprehensible. There is no reference in Jakobson's article to syntax or pragmatic encodement of meaning.

Not only is the implicit definition of the code slim in comparison with all that the category 'message' apparently contains; the imbalance is compounded by the fact that Jakobson's terms do not correspond to, and are indeed incompatible with, the terminology he employs in his equally renowned 'Linguistics and poetics' essay (1958), a paper which does not revert to the question of shifters.

Whereas in 'Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb' the code is equated with 'general meaning' (1971: 131), or — as I have assumed — with the pairing of signifiers and signifieds, in 'Linguistics and poetics' it seems to denote the linguistic code in general — i.e., the whole system of language that enables the addressee to decode the relevant meaning. The more drastic change, however, concerns the denotation of the term *message*. As will be remembered, Jakobson expands Bühler's triad of the communicative situation (addresser, addressee, and message) — variously described by the expressive, appellative, and referential functions — to a six-point model. In this the emotive and conative functions coincide with Bühler's expressive and appellative; the referential function is relayed to the *context*; the phatic function concentrates on the channel of communication (called

                    CONTEXT (referential function)
                    MESSAGE (poetic function)
SPEAKER   ————————————————   ADDRESSEE
(emotive function)   CONTACT (phatic function)   (conative function)
                    CODE (metalingual function)
Figure 1

contact), the metalingual function on the code, and the poetic function centers on the message (see Fig. 1).

The referential (deictic) function is here separated from the message, which in 'Shifters' included the speech event and its participants. One obvious way to deal with these differences in the two models is simply to say that Jakobson re-analyzed the speech event into its constituents and included the participants of the speech event within it. However, this completely ruins his former schema of message and code and the four duplex situations derived from it. In particular, the notion of shifters as given by Jakobson can no longer be maintained, since his 'code centering on message' does not make sense if the message is regarded as a purely phonological sequence exclusive of speaker and addressee. If 'I like Ike' foregrounds the poetic function through the repetition of the same phonological sequence, as one would conclude from the example, then the message seems to be the phonological level of the utterance in its customary denotation.

Besides, Jakobson does not really define the notions of code and message in 'Linguistics and poetics' either. Ambiguities emerge, for instance, in his discussion of the similarity and difference between the metalingual and the poetic functions. We remember that the metalinguistic function in 'Shifters' was defined as M/C and the shifters as C/M — they were hence in inverse relationship to one another. The metalingual function is still centered on the code in 'Linguistics and poetics', but what is centered on the message now (although the message seems to have acquired a different definition) is the *poetic* function, and the inverse relationship between the two still obtains:

The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination. Equivalence is promoted to the constitutive device of the sequence. In poetry one syllable is equalized with any other syllable of the same sequence; word stress is assumed to equal word stress, as unstress equals unstress; prosodic long is matched with long, and short with short ... syntactic pause equals syntactic pause, no pause equals no pause. Syllables are converted into units of measure, and so are morae or stresses.

It may be objected that metalanguage also makes a sequential use of equivalent units when combining synonymic expressions into an equational sentence: $A = A$

(*'Mare is the female of the horse'*). Poetry and metalanguage, however, are in diametrical opposition to each other: in metalanguage the sequence is used to build an equation, whereas in poetry the equation is used to build a sequence. (1987: 71)

I noted before that the four duplex terms in 'Shifters' were a very unequal set, since reported speech, proper names, shifters, and metalinguistic statements do not easily fit together as natural parts of a semiotic square. The constituents of the six-part scheme from 'Linguistics and poetics' are more easily combinable as parts of a homogeneous entity, the speech act or speech event. Insofar as the poetic function concentrates on the phonological[13] level of the speech act, it does not disturb this homogeneity. However, with the introduction of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic levels of language, a different dimension as well as an entirely different point of view is added. It is unclear why Jakobson should have drawn on this additional dimension of sequence and equation for only two out of the six functions (i.e., the poetic and the metalingual functions alone). Why is it that only *code* and *message* require the consideration of sequentiality? (Any linguistic message consists of a *sequence*, whatever its dominant function.) Note also that paradigmatic equivalences are a pure *virtuality*, since an irrevocable choice is made in the actual production of a sentence and, once that sentence is uttered/written down, this choice cannot be revoked.[14] The equivalences Jakobson talks about are indeed equivalences among linguistic units (phonemes [i.e., distinctive sounds], syllables, words, pauses ...) — that is, equivalences among items of the linguistic code (whether lexical or phonological); and it is this reliance on the code which explains the diametrical opposition — necessarily situated on a common basis — between the poetic and the metalingual functions. The metalingual function builds equivalences between members of the (usually lexical) code (*mare* is a *female horse*), whereas the poetic function builds sequences utilizing units of the code. The poetic function overlays a sequence of lexical units with a sequence of identical abstract units, just as the metalingual statement disrupts a sequence by imposing on it an equivalence between different parts of the sequence.

The close relation of the poetic and the metalingual functions, or of message and code, is elucidated further by the fact that the message in the Jakobsonian scheme seems to repose on the signifier level, whereas the code, although it represents the system of assignations of signifieds to signifiers, within the metalingual function posits equivalences between *signifieds* (that of the signifier to be explained — and that of the paraphrase of that signified). The common metalinguistic formula 'The *meaning* of X is Y' or 'X *means* Y' creates an equivalence between two signifiers and two signifieds, even if on a superficial level the equivalence seems to be between a signifier (X) and a signified (Y).

Returning to the notion of *shifters*, it is evident that Jakobson's new expanded schema can no longer deal with shifters as a simple 'code referring to the message'. This is so partly because 'message' no longer refers to the context of an utterance, and also because an equivalence of deixis and referentiality is no longer possible with the separation of the *speaker/ addressee* pair from the spatio-temporal context in which they are situated. Note that in the new schema the code is a clearly abstract and mental entity, whereas all the other constituents of the speech event seem to be material (the interlocutors, the spatio-temporal situation, the contact, and the message). However, message and contact are ambiguously related, and a more precise definition of the contact would be that of the *medium*. The medium as an etic level could include both the sound quality of the voice and the shape of written letters, leaving the *message* to consist entirely of the emic level of phonemes or graphemes, and thus lifting it to a level as abstract as the one on which the code seems to be located. Such an approach parallels Hjelmslev's distinction between the planes of form (expression) and content (substance), and it would tidy up the obvious diametrical relation between the message and the code which we discussed earlier, and which then seemed to be a very untidy facet of the schema.

An explanation along these lines would agree very nicely with what Jakobson says about the poetic function, but might cause problems with onomatopoeia, or the *phonetic* level, so to speak. Iconic signs are not part of the code; or rather, their iconicity is a superadded quality projected on that of the ordinary symbolic signification. Thus *to babble* has a constant signified within the code, yet there is felt to exist a structural homology between the rhythm of the syllables and the natural qualities of speech (or those of a river) as denoted by the signified. In the case of the frequently noted appropriateness of F. *guerre* and G. *Krieg* for what in English is merely pale and unsuggestive *war*, aesthetic judgments and pejorative connotation or associations are sometimes felt to coincide. In this case the vocal realization of the relevant phonemes, their materiality is at stake. One could thus say that the iconic function establishes a homology between the material of signification on the one hand (the signifier's sound quality or visual quality), and the (material, perceptual) structure of the signified's referent on the other. Linguistic iconicity hence reaches both ways beyond the message–code binarity, using the structure of language to signify structural similarity in its existential referents. Contrary to widespread belief (e.g., Waugh 1980: 70–71), iconicity (onomatopoeia) does *not* disrupt the arbitrary nature of the linguistic sign, because the relation of iconicity holds not between signifier and signified, but between the material equivalents of sound and object in their actuality (Saussure 1966: 69).

Jakobson's present schema does not consider the iconic function, and

this initiates a *renvoi* to the starting point of the discussion in 'Shifters', where *shifters* were defined as indexical symbols. Jakobson's six-part schema restricts the notion of code to the representation of the *symbolic* nature of signs, the signifier/signified relationship. Linguistic signifiers, however, also include indexical and iconic signs, which — if one adheres to Peirce's definition — have no signifieds, but only referents. *This* has no 'general meaning' and requires a pointing finger and a context of utterance to establish a referent; and an icon, by representing the referent on the level of the signifier, eludes the code. One could therefore say that in the case of indexical signs — as which Jakobson, in the wake of Peirce, defined shifters — the signified in the code points beyond 'general meaning' to the context, and this would hold true for both demonstratives and proper names (cf. Harweg 1978: 137–138). For such an explanation to be viable, the notion of context would have to be expanded to include not only the spatio-temporal materiality of the communicative situation but also the context of pragmatic signification that would enable the interlocutors to communicate by applying the rigid code to their situation.

Bühler's and Jakobson's models are signally unsuited to cope with illocutionary (much less with perlocutionary) speech acts, since they do not take the context of the speech act into consideration. If one wanted to incorporate this 'general context' in Jakobson's model, one would have to enclose it by an area of general reference including, for instance, the past and the future (both generally and the characters' past and future), as well as 'pragmatic knowledge of the material world' or what Popper calls World 3. One would then arrive at a division of referential contexts. Demonstrative deixis (*this*, *that*) would point exclusively to the immediate situation of communication, whereas proper names would refer to known entities beyond this immediate context (cf. Bar-Hillel 1954: 371–372). People and items referred to by proper names take the third person non-deictic pronoun, whereas *I* and *you*, in this scheme, as part of the immediate context, but distinct from it as respectively designating the producer and receiver of the discourse. What I wish to propose as a preliminary suggestion to incorporating deixis and shifters into Jakobson's revised 'Linguistics and poetics' schema is the introduction of two new functions: the *deictic function*, which designates the constituents of the speech event *qua* spatio-temporal and existential entities; and the *referential function*, which would be restricted to the wider realm of context and co-text (the discourse level).

We return to the deictic, symbolic (referential), and iconic functions of language and their relation to the other linguistic functions in the Jakobsonian model. The emotive, conative, and phatic functions cannot be discussed on the same level because they are incidental to the message–code system. They go beyond mere signification, beyond the allocation of signifiers and

signifieds. This is particularly true of the conative function, which for Jakobson seems to consist entirely of the vocative and imperative (1987: 67–68). Questions, too, and forms of address necessarily center on the addressee. The emotive function, on the other hand, is observable in phonological as well as intonational peculiarities, and emotive expressions are frequently lexicalized. Moreover, recent studies have provided impressive evidence for a syntax of subjectivity (Emonds, Milner, Banfield). The affective and emotional load of a sentence, although it is formally shaped on the signifier level, has as signified the implication of emotionality or affectivity (address), or of various illocutionary functions, as we would now say: address, question, order; irritation, delight, disbelief, etc. The *phatic* mode ('Hello. Are you still on the line?') closely resembles this illocutionary pattern too: 'staying in contact'. It cannot so easily be circumscribed by reference to the code as a signifier/signified function, either. In parallel with the deictic function, I will subsume the emotive, conative, and phatic functions under what I will call the *structural relation*.

In Figure 2 I try to address the problems with Jakobson's six-part functional model which we have just analyzed. The *symbolic* function (Fig. 2a) of language in this is represented by the assignment of signifiers and signifieds within the code. Within the code, the function that centers on the signifier level is the *poetic* function, the function that centers on the signified level is the *metalingual* function. The code also supports functions that establish relations with areas beyond the signifier/signified dyad. Thus the *deictic* function could be defined as pointing beyond the code to the immediate (physical) situation of utterance (Jakobson's earlier 'speech event', so to speak), and the *referential* function would point to the context and co-text which lies beyond the immediate physical situation of utterance. Both of these would come under Peirce's 'indexical signs' (or the *indexical* relation of language, as shown in Fig. 2b). The same also holds true for the emotive, conative, and phatic functions, in the sense that they too depend on the situation of utterance. They do so, however, structurally rather than materially. Whereas the context (deictic or referential) is something that *exists* as a referent — as do the speaker and the addressee as persons, and the voice or visual channel as material *medium* of the code — the emotive and conative functions and the phatic function highlight the *workings* of the *structure* of communication. This functional triad (Fig. 2c) explicates the codified expressivity and directedness of linguistic utterance and the self-reflexive routine of maintaining the channel in operation (*structural* relation of language). As Figure 2d illustrates, the signifier level of the code lends itself to further functional subdivision. It can be demonstrated to have — as in Hjelmslev's formulations — both a form (on which the poetic function centers) and a content or substance, which is the phonic

A.   SYMBOLIC FUNCTION   signifiers

C O D E

signifieds

B.

referential function

CODE < = = = = = = = >   CONTEXT

signifiers vs. signifieds   deictic function

C.   STRUCTURAL RELATIONS:

          SPEAKER ——— discourse ——— ADDRESSEE
CODE

      expressive function = = = = = > appellative function

                phatic function

D.   SELF-REFLEXIVE RELATIONS:

           —— formal level: < ———— > poetic function
   signifier {
           —— content level: < ———— > iconic function
  CODE

   signified — — — — —   < ———— > metalingual function

E.   STRUCTURAL RELATIONS

= = = = = = = = = = >   C O D E   = = = = = = = >
SELF-REFLEXIVE   symbolic   INDEXICAL
RELATIONS   function   RELATIONS

Figure 2

medium: the *point de repère* of the iconic function.[15] The signified level of the code, on the other hand, would constitute pure meaning divorced from application or utterance. All these levels allow *self-reflexive* abstractions, and so initiate the poetic, iconic, and metalingual functions respectively. The self-reflexive relation in its application to the phonological level here gives rise to the poetic function; the medium, if considered self-reflexively, produces the iconic function; and the metalingual function originates in the self-reflexivity of the plane of content, of signifieds. In this, the medium or the phonetic level may be held responsible for the *iconic* function, since the iconic function establishes a relation between the materiality of the sound (the phonetic level) and the materiality of the (deictic or referential) context. This is only appropriate because the phonetic level is the one aspect of the sign that is physically part of the immediate context.

In Figure 2e I try to diagram the main functions as I see them. In this figure the symbolic function is limited to the code itself; the self-reflexive functions center on the elements of the code; the indexical functions point beyond the code; and the structural functions are located outside the code area, so to speak.

So far my discussion of shifters has concentrated on Roman Jakobson's presentation of this category in the frame of his two models of the speech situation and its attendant linguistic functions. In the course of my analysis I have illustrated the differences between Jakobson's two schemata and have attempted to elucidate some of the implicit aspects of the two models. By redrawing Jakobson's categories, I have ended up positing an indexical relation. This includes both the deictic function, centering on the speech situation (exclusive of SPEAKER/ADDRESSEE), and the referential function, which is determined by everything outside the immediate situation of discourse. Whereas shifters are clearly established as a category in Jakobson's first model (which we have, however, demonstrated to be self-contradictory), they have no real place in his second schema, since there is no longer a speech situation including SPEAKER and ADDRESSEE which would allow *I* and *you* to be deictic pronouns (i.e., to be deictic in reference to an immediate context), because this context is now covered by the referential function. Tense, mood, and the evidential — Jakobson's other earlier shifter categories — all center on the immediate context, whereas person alone would have to be allocated to the emotive function, if the individual points in Jakobson's diagram are to be taken as separate from each other.

This revision of the Jakobsonian schema does not yet say anything about the possible location of shifters. Jakobson's examples of shifters are insufficient to resolve the problem at this early stage. I will therefore now turn to Jespersen's classic chapter on shifters in order to present his view

on the nature of 'shifterhood'. Since Jespersen's examples are as self-contradictory as Jakobson's, I will have to append a third section, discussing linguistic evidence for shifters in general before returning to my revised Jakobsonian schema and the place of shifters within it.

When Frans played a war-game with Eggert, he could not get it into his head that he was Eggert's enemy: no, it was only Eggert who was the enemy. A stronger case still is 'home'. When a child was asked if his grandmother had been at home, and answered: 'No, grandmother was at grandfather's', it is clear that for him 'at home' meant merely 'at my home'. Such words may be called shifters. (Jespersen 1959: 123)

Jespersen launches his discussion of shifters by examining words such as *enemy, home, father*, or *mother*, and only then goes on to treat of the personal pronouns as the clearest case of shifters. He does *not* mention spatial or temporal adverbs.

Jespersen's presentation of the concept *shifter* as in the above quotation establishes that the referent of the shifter changes according to the participants in a speech situation. However, the illustrative examples he adduces are actually cases of unsuccessful reference, which are due to linguistic incompetence. When Frans and Eggert use the word *enemy* to designate each other's personal opponent, Frans is unable to comprehend the shifter nature of *the enemy*: he cannot understand that *the enemy* when pronounced by Eggert might refer to himself. The term *enemy*, with its implicit first person possessive, seems to be securely linked to Frans's individuality and not transferable to another's (Eggert's) subjectivity. Besides, Frans is understandably bothered by the symmetrical nature of the word's application. 'My enemy' is *the* enemy, the typification of the Other; hence it is particularly daunting to find that what one had distanced from oneself as one's not-I suddenly rebounds on oneself to claim to be the I. By identifying *the enemy* with Eggert, the referent, he makes it impossible for himself to face the idea that *enemy* now has a different referent — i.e., himself. In fact, Frans not only misses the shifter nature of the word — the fact that *the enemy* would change its reference whenever the speaker changes; he additionally misses the relationality of the term. *The enemy* in this example makes a claim about a referent's relationship to *self*, neither describing the referent in objective class terms (*the cobbler*) nor designating the referent's unique specificity, as when using a proper name (*Eggert*). These two aspects are interrelated. It is precisely because shifters establish a relation between the current speaker and a referent that they imply a change of referents. Shifters, if you so wish, refer to the *relationship* that obtains between the speaker and whoever or whatever he may designate by invoking this

relationship. Since the relation between a speaker and a certain referent is not likely to apply to another speaker and the same referent, it is at turn-taking points that a change in reference usually occurs. The given relation specifies a different person or object for the second speaker. If the two speakers have the same relation to the same objects or persons, no shift in reference is produced. For instance, Henrik could be *the enemy* for both Frans and Eggert.

It is disappointing that Jespersen did not give us the dialogue between Eggert and Frans *verbatim*: his free indirect discourse transcription camouflages the important detail of whom Frans is addressing (Jespersen? or Eggert?) and of whether, if he addressed Eggert, he said '*you* are the enemy, not *I*', indicating that he had mastered the main category of shifters (the personal pronouns), or whether he used the proper name, *Eggert*. Or did Eggert say 'I am attacking the enemy' when attacking Frans, thus leaving Frans baffled by this?

Jespersen's second example is *home*. The child's reaction again is the same. *At home*, like *the enemy*, is taken to be *at my home*, with an underlying[16] first person possessive. However, in this case a relationship is established between a third person and an object; the grandmother is not even addressed by the child (as Eggert presumably is addressed by Frans). She is not a partner in a dialogue between two people — the Jakobsonian prerequisite for applying the term *shifter*, since its referent has to be determined in relation to the speech event and the participants in it. Indeed, what the child does not realize is not necessarily that *at home* is a shifter (I am going to argue that *home* is *not* a shifter), but that in a sentence like 'was grandmother at home', *at home* does *not* function as a shifter and does *not* have an underlying first/second person possessive, but a *third* person possessive. Again, Jespersen does not specify *who* asks the question, a factor of the utmost importance because, if this had been asked by the child's mother or father, the child would have decoded 'at home' *as a shifter* (namely, as 'at my [i.e., the father's/mother's] home', which happens to be the child's own home as well).

Let us now turn to *mother, father, Dad, Mum*, etc. These terms have an underlying first person possessive when they are employed with zero article, and then function as shifters.

Bill: Dad is quite old now.
Jeremy: Gosh, that reminds me. I've promised to meet Dad at the
          doctor's at 12, and it's ten to already. See you, Bill.

For Bill and Jeremy *Dad* is *my dad*, hence Bill's dad and then Jeremy's dad. Note the awkwardness of having Bill and Jeremy refer to their fathers within one turn-taking unit. The most natural thing to say for Jeremy

would be 'My (own) dad has also been poorly recently' or something of the sort. The simple explanation for this necessity of disambiguation lies in the fact that *I* and *you* clearly refer to the speaker/addressee, whereas *Dad* as a third person (in this dialogue) refers to a referent outside the communicative situation. The repetition of the word *Dad* would therefore immediately imply sameness of reference — hence the disambiguating 'my dad' to clarify the shifter nature of the term.

In reference to the second or the third person, *dad* (instead of *father*) can be used empathetically, but it needs to take an *explicit* second/third person possessive pronoun. The context will tend to be contrastive.

a. His dad is a big man.
b. [My, our] Dad is a big man. Or: My dad is a big man.
c. [*Your] Dad is a big man.   Your dad is a big man.
d. [*His] Dad is a big man.   His dad is a big man.

We will return later to the fact that the second and the third person possessive pronouns behave in exactly the same way, that they are complementary to the first person.

Complications arise if these terms are used among siblings or in the family at large. *Mum* and *Dad*, *father* and *mother* are of course appellations as much as referential designations and can hence come to share all the properties of proper names. Since the underlying possessive is determined by person (and not number), Tommy can use *Dad* when talking to his sister Marlena, implying [*our*] *dad*. However, one need not necessarily postulate the underlying plural possessive, because '[my] dad [who happens to be yours as well]' will explain the situation as efficiently (cf. Brown and Yule 1983: 218). Note also that this is a case where Jeremy's use of *Dad* as '[my] dad' following close upon Bill's is perfectly acceptable:

Thomas: Dad's quite old now.
Marlena: Yes. I think Dad should have stopped smoking long ago.

The preferable version, however, is still a pronominal *he* in Marlena's answer, which does *not* require underlying [*our*] for Tommy's *Dad* because the *he* can very well be considered to be co-indexed with the *referent* rather than with the *signifier* exclusively (on coindexing, cf. Brown and Yule 1983: 218). Indeed, Bill's and Jeremy's conversation could well have been:

Bill: Dad's quite old now.
Jeremy: Yes, I met *him* in town last week and was shocked to see how bony he had grown.

Cross-referencing therefore appears to identify objects that have been *referred* to, rather than to replace identical noun phrases with pronominals: Jeremy could not reply, 'Yes, I met Dad in town last week'. The anaphor has to relate to the referent of *Dad* rather than to the signifier. As with shifters in general, the signified of *Dad* ('SPEAKER's father') can be determined by ADDRESSEE only within a deictic context of the situation of speech, depending on who is the SPEAKER and what he (ADDRESSEE) knows about him.

A further much more serious aspect comes in when one realizes that *Dad* (notice the consistent capitalization) is actually used as a proper name in all these examples. Note that *Dad* can be employed both in the vocative and in addressing letters or cards: 'To Dad with love'.[17] If it is a proper name, is *Dad* then still a shifter? Todorov and Ducrot (1972: 323)[18] answer this question in the affirmative. However, their concept of a shifter or deictic pronoun seems to rely on an understanding of deixis as reference to the *common* situation of speech — that is to say, common between both interlocutors. This is why they define *hier* as 'la veille du jour où *nous* parlons' and *en ce moment* as 'au moment où *nous* parlons' (1972: 323). It can certainly be observed in other cases, too, that proper names are used in situations in which the speaker does *not* have the status that would justify the choice of this relational term. For instance, it is very common for adults to use *dad* (or *pappy*, etc.) when talking to their own or somebody else's child to designate themselves, their husbands, or the child's father respectively. Thus the man at the gasoline station may well calm down little Florence by saying to her:

Look, daddy's over there paying the check.[19]

and mother will explain that

Dad's in the office. He will be back at six.

I would hold that this use of *Dad* (*Mum*, etc.) is a feature of *family language* (as used by adults), and that it uses *Dad* as a proper name for the child's father from the perspective of the child with whom the speaker empathizes (as one does resorting to child language —cf. Langacker 1985: 127–128). In the same way, *Aunt Jane* may generally be called *Auntie* by the family at large, even by those who are not her nephews or nieces. *Aunt Jane* will therefore be used as a proper name within the family, almost even as a clerical title such as *Brother John*. It is doubtful whether one would claim an underlying possessive here. Such uses of family names by people who do not qualify for the relevant relation to the designated person cannot be considered shifters.

This leads us back to the question of whether proper names are or are not shifters. As the capitalization in our examples shows, uses of family appellations with underlying first person possessives are all proper names. While *dad* (*Dad*) seems to retain or at least evoke an underlying possessive, some other family appellations (for instance *Aunt Jane*) do not. The test for this is a stranger's use of these terms, which would be '*your* dad', but '*Aunt Jane*' (*your Aunt Jane; *your Dad[20]) or '*your aunt Jane*'. Note that in the latter case the prosodic pattern identifies *aunt* as a common noun:

> Your aunt Jane's quite nice. I didn't like your aunt Ruth that much, though.

The same could be argued for *dad*. In 'Your dad is the nicest person of your family', *dad* functions as a common noun. The shifter use of *Dad* would thus be taken to boil down to the existential qualification of SPEAKER to name and address somebody as his/her father, a qualification that becomes diluted into non-shifter uses for the family at large. Thus a mother will perhaps regularly talk *about* 'Dad' to her children, but call her husband Robert, although *Dad* in some families is just as acceptable. For the moment, I will restrict the shifter use of *Dad* to those situations in which it signifies 'SPEAKER's father', presupposing an existential relation of the sort that was required by *the enemy* for '[my] enemy'. The question is certainly very tangled, and Jespersen clearly does not do justice to the complexity of the issues he raises by his explanatory examples.

Let us now turn to *(at) home*. Although this phrase is frequently used by SPEAKER to designate his/her own home and thus employed with an underlying first person possessive, it can equally well be used by SPEAKER to designate ADDRESSEE's or a third person's home:

> Did you go home [i.e., to your home] after the movie?
> Sorry, John's left already. He should be home [i.e., at John's home] by now.

Indeed, *home* can even change reference within the same speech event (turn-taking unit): i.e., SPEAKER can use *home* to designate two different homes in succession, as in Lucy's explanation of the following situation:

> Tom: My professor was not at [her] home when I arrived.
> Lucy: I was not at [my] home when Tom arrived, so he went [to his] home and rang my office.

One conclusion from this is that *home* is a shifter only when used as [*my*] *home*, and that it also has non-shifter uses. Even in non-shifter uses,

however, *home* seems to function as an empathy signal with an underlying co-indexed possessive:

Did you$_i$ go home$_i$?
He$_i$ should be home$_i$ by now.

I suspect that these phenomena may be analyzed as empathy structures, and that the model which Kuno (1987) provides with his empathy scales, if not applicable in all its details, may at least serve as a close enough analogy to the processes I have analyzed here. Kuno's study is mainly concerned with empathy phenomena, which cannot be explained by purely TG-grammatical rules. He starts out with a discussion of anaphors and reflexives and eventually demonstrates that empathy processes observable with these are applicable also to other grammatical structures, which are more generally acknowledged to be empathy phenomena. In the course of his investigation Kuno establishes, for instance, a Speech Act Empathy Hierarchy for explicit and implicit renderings of (also internal) speech (1987: 212; section 3.16). He also discusses empathy scales for picture noun sentences under the heading of 'Awareness condition for picture noun reflexives' (1987: 179; section 4.1), and treats empathy adjectives such as *beloved, dear old*, and *embarrassing* (1987: section 5.9), empathy reflexives (1987: sections 3.10 and 5.10), and 'as for X-self' constructions (1987: section 3.12), all of which link up with his direct discourse perspective (1987: Chapter 3). Awareness conditions, particularly in situations of direct discourse, logically imply empathy along a scale of SPEAKER–ADDRESSEE–THIRD PERSON. In analogy to Kuno's approach I will therefore suggest that in the co-indexing of *home*, the presence of *I* overrules that of *you* or *s/he*, and empathy with a third person is possible only in the absence of a speaker or addressee–NP in the vicinity of *home*. The binding category for *home* seems to be S, since subsidiary or coordinate clauses can establish different referents, as in both Tom's and Lucy's sentences above. Note also:

Have you already seen my home?
John has been at my home twice before.

Here the possessive needs to surface in order to counter the automatic co-indexing that would otherwise be performed by the hearer/reader.

So far we have established *Dad* with an underlying first person possessive to be a shifter — but, arguably, not as the family proper name *Dad* — and we have tentatively added [*my*] *home. The enemy*, with its definite article, points toward another set of shifters and also recalls that in lan-

guages other than English the shifter function for family members is frequently signalled by a definite article, whereas the general use of these expressions as common nouns requires an explicit possessive. In German, for instance, *Der Vater* corresponds to *Dad*, with zero-article *Vater* as an equally acceptable alternative.[21] A comparable use is made in English of terms such as *the boss* ([my/our] boss), and German dialects have the quaint *der Alte, die Alte* to designate one's (longtime) partner in marriage.[22] This usage is, however, similar to what Halliday and Hasan (1976: 71) have called the 'one member of a class assumed' phenomenon: for instance, *the* sun (there being only one sun), *the* baby (i.e., our baby, the one which looms large in the family's consciousness). In fact, whether these terms surface as shifters or not depends on the context. 'The baby's been crying all night', if uttered by the mother to the father, mirrors the situation of the two siblings talking about *Dad*, because for both interlocutors the baby is (*my, our*) *baby*. On the other hand, Gertrude talking to her friend Lucy will use *the baby* to refer to her own baby, and Lucy might well employ *the baby* to designate her own Tommy. If Elizabeth says, 'The boss is in the office', *the boss* as used by her co-worker Janet will also reflect the fact that they have a boss in common between them. Indeed, with *boss* this seems to be the general case. All of these terms can additionally be used empathetically in third person contexts. Thus an angry customer can demand 'Where's the boss?' (i.e., [your, the employee's] boss). Note the aptness of Halliday and Hasan's 'one of a class assumed' description. A passage could also run:

> Lynn was sitting on a bench. The baby [i.e., her baby] was beside her in the carriage.

Note that such uses imply the existence of a consciousness of an observer or perceiver, for whom the baby is 'one of a class assumed' — either Lynn, whose perspective is here implied (she keeps an eye on the baby), or the point of view of an observer who concentrates on the scene. The same kind of usage can be observed for *enemy*:

(a) We heard on the radio today that Iran and Iraq are ending their seven year's conflict. Each of these countries has fought the enemy with an extremely high casualty rate.

(b) According to the *Washington Post*, General Nadiva has defeated the invading enemy.

As with *home*, one could here posit empathy scales, which in the absence of a first or second person referent allow empathy for a third person referent.

Jespersen's examples of shifters — that is, those he offers besides the first person/second person pronouns *I* and *you* — therefore establish a good case for words which have an underlying first person possessive (*Dad*, etc.). They additionally suggest that some other terms, which are generally used empathetically, allowing underlying first, second, and third person possessives — as we have seen — might also qualify as shifters when employed with the first person. Note, however, that these examples include no expressions which have an underlying second person possessive (your) while at the same time disallowing the first person possessive (my). By contrast, there do exist terms with exclusive underlying first person possessives — for instance, *Dad*. This asymmetry suggests that the shifters *I* and *you* are peculiar in having a separate grammatical form, or, alternatively, that the quality of shifterhood really depends on the first person, and that *you* is not a shifter to the same extent that *I* is. I will pursue this more fully later.[23]

It is now time to supply some additional linguistic evidence beyond the very sketchy portraits that both Jakobson and Jespersen have vouchsafed us. In particular, we will now have to turn to adverbs of time and place. These are Todorov and Ducrot's prime examples of deictic pronouns, and they figure prominently in narratological discussions of shifters. In linguistics, adverbs of time and place are usually treated as temporal and spatial deixis, and in what follows deixis will be used in this general sense, whereas the use of *shifter* will be restricted to those items that change their referent whenever the speaker changes. *Deixis*, as it will now be employed, is to be distinct from the *deictic function* as I have proposed it for Jakobson's model. I will return to my distinction of the deictic and the referential functions later, but for the moment the necessity of summarizing standard views on deixis requires the use of the term *deixis* in its grammatical designation.

Adverbials can be regarded as shifters when their referent changes in relation to the situation of communication. If A describes something as being at his left, it might well be at B's right (or back to front) in the canonical situation of face-to-face conversation, and so the same symmetrical situation as with *I/you* would obtain. Similarly, *here* (by me) might designate a place which for the interlocutor might have to be referred to as (over) *there* (by you), and vice versa. Such uses of *here* and *there*, *left* and *right* can therefore be included in the category of shifters.

Todorov and Ducrot also mention deictic *now* (vs. *at this time*), *yesterday* (vs. *the day before*), *tomorrow* (vs. *the next day*), etc., without exactly specifying whether or not they regard these as shifters. These pairs are usually treated under the category of temporal deixis and are familiar to

all students of speech representation as one of the features of direct discourse that survives into free indirect discourse or does not require adaptation to the narrative viewpoint. In the canonical situation of communication *now, yesterday,* and *tomorrow* have a common temporal referent for *both* interlocutors, so they would not change when speaker B takes over from A. Indeed, as we have seen, Todorov and Ducrot define their 'deictic' expressions by resorting to a *we*: 'la veille du jour où *nous* parlons' for *hier* (1972: 323). However, *now,* like *here,* can function as a shifter if it designates the precise moment of utterance, as in:

A: Now the train is moving.
B: And now it's already passed the bridge.

Compare:

Here is your desk. (Moving) And here is your typewriter.

Taking *here* as a point of departure for the moment, we can distinguish a variety of different uses of such words, only a fraction of which conform to the shifter use just indicated. Thus *here* and *now* can refer to the context *common* between the interlocutors (here where we are sitting, now at the time of this conversation). This expanded concept of *here* and *now* can be further diluted to include the more general spatial and temporal context, as in

People are very friendly here.

in which *here* can be anything from 'this restaurant', 'this company', 'this town', 'this country' to the globe ('here on earth'). Likewise, *now* can refer to the vaguest entities such as 'at this stage of our discussion', or 'in this century', as in *nowadays* for 'these days'. From these general uses of *here* and *now* one can distinguish additionally what might be called *displaced reference* as in 'here on this map' (Brown and Yule 1983: 53; 'analogische Deixis' in Klein 1978).

As with *here* and *now,* properly deictic (or shifter) uses can be established also for demonstrative *this* (vs. *that*), namely on those occasions where *this* refers to the sphere of the speaker exclusively: 'this table over here' vs. 'that table over there where you are'. And like *here* and *now,* demonstratives are used in a variety of contexts which are *not* 'deictic' (i.e., centered on the speech event), and can be very general. For instance, in *'This* is gorgeous', *this* can refer to a landscape, a sunset, the job opportunities your interlocutor has just described to you, etc. Displaced reference (*this*

mountain [on the map]) also exists with demonstratives. And there is of course textual deixis, as in 'at this stage of the discussion', 'in this paragraph', 'this is as much as to say', etc. (see also Ehlich 1983: 89).

As I pointed out earlier, the term *deixis* is usually employed in a sense that goes *beyond* the shifter category, since it usually includes all grammatical means of pointing to all kinds of objects and persons. It is only in the restricted (Benvenistean) sense of 'deictic' that deixis has come to signify a reference to the immediate situation of discourse, and in particular to terms that center on the addressor or addressee and hence shift reference at turn-taking. Therefore, the definition of shifters as 'deictic pronouns' — on the lines of Benveniste, and Todorov and Ducrot — has involved a redefinition of deixis to exclude third person referents, whether persons or objects.

Such a model departs from the classic understanding of deixis as including what are generally termed proximal, medial, and distal deixis.[24] In this the speech situation (including SPEAKER and ADDRESSEE) is covered by medial deixis, whereas proximal deixis is aligned with the SPEAKER's sphere, and distal deixis with the sphere beyond the SPEAKER/ADDRESSEE field. Some languages, such as Japanese, carefully distinguish among these three areas on a morphological level. In most European languages only a binary system can be encountered, with the consequence that proximal deixis can cover both the SPEAKER's sphere and the SPEAKER/ADDRESSEE field, and distal deixis designates the medial (ADDRESSEE) as well as the distal (third person) positions.

Since interlocutors canonically share their temporal coordinates, temporal *now* almost exclusively collapses proximal and medial deictic categories. However, contexts can occur in which speakers are situated at different points in time as well as space, such as at the respective ends of a transatlantic telephone line. In this case what is 'today' for A may well be 'yesterday' for B. Letter-writing is another case in point. Whereas in telephone conversations *now* is at least constant for the situation of communication itself — i.e., SPEAKER and ADDRESSEE hear each other simultaneously even if they do not perceive one another — letters are even more tricky, because the acts of encoding and decoding, of production and reception can be separated by a long timespan, and the self-conscious attempt by the writer to deal with this situation gives rise to major linguistic problems. In particular the code of politeness, which constrains one to project the reader's temporal coordinates, comes into conflict with SPEAKER's responsibilities toward veracity from his own point of view.[25] Note the parallel ambiguities that arise in giving one's face-to-face interlocutor directions on how to move objects in space: speakers frequently use *left* and *right* from ADDRESSEE's perspective to save ADDRESSEE the

trouble of converting directions into his own spatial coordinates, and point of view in such cases is frequently made explicit: *on your right*, etc.

Proximal, medial, and distal deictic positions are taken to coincide with the morphologically explicit distinction between first, second, and third person. This correlation has by now become the standard account (Frei 1944; Benveniste 1971). Such a schema, however, causes major methodological problems. Since Benveniste, the first and second person pronouns (and verbal categories) have been put into a class of their own that is separated by a gulf from third person reference, which is considered to be *impersonal* and, by implication, non-'deictic'.[26] Such a break between the first–second and third persons clearly conflicts with the easy collapsing between medial and distal deictic positions in most central European languages, all of which, basically, have a binary rather than tripartite deictic system.

A tentative solution to this incompatibility may be sought by reducing the medial (second person, ADDRESSEE) category to a position commensurate with its actual functional importance in the linguistic system. Benveniste, and after him Banfield, in her revision of his tenets, have over-emphasized the significance of the second person. Benveniste considered the first and second persons to be roughly of equal — and symmetrical — status, but with the first person marked by subjectivity: 'Language is so organized that it permits each speaker to *appropriate to himself* an entire language by designating himself as *I*' ('Subjectivity in language', in 1971: 226). In her deconstruction of the standard narratological account of free indirect discourse, Banfield reverses this position of markedness and places it on the second person, without the presence of which, she claims, no piece of communication can properly be called communication (Benveniste's *discours*). This is not the place to argue with Banfield's position, which needs to be considered within her own theoretical framework.[27] However, what I wish to do in the following is to argue for a different approach, in which the binary oppositions are replaced by scales. Deictic categories in this model could be described in terms of an *extension* of the fundamental category of subjectivity, as located in the ego and its *hic* and *nunc*. In the following I will attempt to demonstrate how deictic categories allow themselves to be extended and conflated on a scale arrangement from subjectivity to absolute non-subjectivity (the Other). Beyond this, the specificity of the second person category will be at issue, in particular its quality of non-I subjectivity and the way it functions as a shifter (i.e., its symmetrical or inverse relation to the first person), and how these can be assimilated to a concept of gradational differences.

As the above discussion of deixis has shown, the prime bedrock category of deixis is that of the *common ground of communication*, which is the situation Bühler takes as his basic deictic category, the *demonstratio ad*

218   *M. Fludernik*

oculos. Within this 'original scene' Bühler locates or distinguishes the addressor, the addressee, and the object or referent being talked about. The area of what establishes the interlocutors' field of vision necessarily includes virtual interlocutors (i.e., persons that may join in the dialogue) as well as exclusively third person entities. This primal scene, then, could be regarded as an extended area of subjectivity which can temporarily come to include the *you*. The principal possibility of an extension of the first person is demonstrated by the existence of inclusive and exclusive first person plural pronouns (*we*)[28] which variously include a second or third person referent into their subjective reference. In exclusive forms, a person/ persons that is/are outside the present situation of speech is/are felt by the speaker to be closer to him than ADDRESSEE. Likewise, the extension of proximal deixis into medial positions, by which the common spatio-temporal coordinates of the interlocutors are explicitly foregrounded, in this framework emerges as a precise parallel to the pronominal behavior of including *addressee* in one's area of subjectivity. Inversely, the conflation of medial and distal deixis might appear to be a maneuver to relegate the addressee to the area of non-subjectivity, the Other, the third person realm.

The *you* (as well as a *he/she*, if they are present on the scene), however, can never be repressed into exclusively apersonal object positions. They remain potential speakers, and hence potential *loci* of subjectivity. This is paralleled by the fact that empathy constraints move from speaker empathy to addressee empathy to third person empathy, as we suggested earlier in relation to *the enemy* or *home*. One can empathize most easily with the speaker (oneself), next with the addressee's point of view, and only third with a third person viewpoint in the absence of a first or second person position; one can empathize least with a non-human third person object, unless one confers anthropomorphic properties on it, as one tends to do with pets, other animals, cars, or even favorite plants.[29]

Since the second and third persons are potential expressers of subjectivity, they share a class between themselves, as do the medial and distal deictic positions. This is supported by the fact that the referent of *you* can change within one speaker's discourse, whereas the referent of *I* by necessity remains constant (i.e., the speaker). Additionally, in expressions such as *Dad*, as we have seen, only the first person possessive can be left implicit, and no underlying second person possessives occur anywhere. This, too, argues for a structural asymmetry between *I* and *you*. Additionally, one can note that the presentation of ADDRESSEE's and a third person's consciousness is barred for SPEAKER in all but purely fictional contexts; in fiction the so-called 'figural' (Stanzel 1984) narration that centers on characters' consciousness can transmit both third and second persons' consciousness. In Japanese, a greater number of grammatical structures

also group the second and third person in opposition to the first, as in the use of *tsumori desu* '[I] mean to/intend' (only usable for SPEAKER) versus *hazu desu* '[you/X] mean(s) to (apparently)' (second and third persons), or in the family names, whose out-group variants are employed for ADDRESSEE and third person referents. Examples for the latter would be *okaasan* '[your/X's] mother' or *gosujin* '[your/X's] husband', with *haha* '[my] mother' and *sujin* '[my] husband' obligatory for first person contexts.

A further argument that invalidates the supposition of a symmetrical relation between the first and second persons can be brought forward by considering the *directionality* of speech. All the linguistic functions, as well as speech acts (as they were proposed by Searle), center on the speaker. The addressee is a passive receiver whose reaction and consciousness (i.e., his subjectivity) can be imagined and anticipated, but only as a projection or empathy phenomenon. Thus the conative function (Bühler's appellative) is designed to describe the effect one wishes to produce on one's interlocutor, whether illocutionary or perlocutionary in nature. The shift that occurs at turn-taking is a shift in roles and communicative function. The speaker has the privilege of experiencing his/her subjectivity and of naming the objects of discourse, as well as performing illocutionary and perlocutionary acts designed to affect his/her interlocutor. Since this effect on the listener can be mental rather than physical, the position of the addressee, as of a third person — a potential addressee and speaker — is a linguistic construct projected by language and not necessarily filled by the actual presence of 'alien' (*alius/alienus*) subjects. The addressee by definition and function is passive and non-present, a systematic condition that highlights the basic *written* nature of language: it is in writing that the addressee is most typically absent. Language — speech — always already contains within itself the absent passive addressee, an addressee frequently perceived to be the weaker vessel.

The speaker function, as we said, is the only one that allows for the expression of subjectivity. This becomes particularly apparent in the joint inability of the second and third person pronouns to co-occur with expressive features (except of course in free indirect discourse). 'John is tired' or 'You are tired' cannot be uttered by anybody except as surmises or assertions on the basis of John's or the addressee's communication about their tiredness. The description of feelings, or generally states of consciousness, of anybody except the speaker himself, require the existence of an authorial ('omniscient') framework. In discourse people only use these forms if they have reason to infer the relevant information, or if they have been told by the subjects themselves.[30]

What holds true for feelings also applies to perceptions and awareness. With perception, however, there are examples of an inverse nature, namely

those that describe perceptions excluding the expression of subjectivity on the part of the person perceived.[31] Such linguistic constructions could be termed 'outward point of view schemata'. Nomi Tamir has provided some examples of this type:

> *I am lurking in a culvert.
> He is lurking in a culvert.
> *I misunderstand you.
> You misunderstand me.
> He misunderstands you.
> *According to me, prices would skyrocket.
> According to him, prices would skyrocket. (Based on Tamir 1976: 414)

All these constructions are incompatible with a first person (speaker's) point of view, although they become acceptable within a third person viewpoint (where they are free indirect discourse or reported speech of some sort). Tamir quotes the acceptable 'Max believes that I am lurking in a culvert' (1976: 414, fn 12). Note also that the introduction of the past tense makes these sentences perfectly acceptable:

> I misunderstood you/Jane entirely.

This is possible because present-day *I* (or, as narratologists would say, the 'narrating I'[32]) is able to look back on its past experience as an observer of its past self (the 'experiencing I'). There is then a definite distance between the two *I*'s, and the implication is 'I (then) misunderstood you, i.e., what I then believed was wrong (I now know)'; 'According to what I said then, prices would skyrocket'; 'I now describe to you that I was then lurking in a culvert'. Note additionally that some adverbs also help to make sentences of this type acceptable. Thus,

> I evidently misunderstood you.

implies reflection on the part of the speaker and seems to vouchsafe him an external view of himself.[33]

Awareness and knowledge or perception tie in with what has been dealt with under the heading of empathy phenomena in a number of recent linguistic studies. The results in this area have pointed in two directions. Some phenomena, such as the distribution of *come* and *go*, point to an emphasis on the SPEAKER/ADDRESSEE pair over third persons; others, particularly the use of reflexives, indicate that there is a gradual scale along

which empathy can develop. The two interact, however. Thus speech representation is a canonical case, where — in the absence of a speaker or an addressee (i.e., in the absence of a first or second person) — a third person referent can acquire subjectivity structures, as for instance in free indirect discourse or perspectival narration. In the example of *come* and *go*, empathy structures are also at work, beyond the merely spatial perspectives that Fillmore (1966, 1972) has analyzed:

> John told me that he *went* up to Jane.
> Jane told me that John had *come* up to her.
> Bill told Martin that Jane had *come* up to him after class.

Here the use of *come* and *go* reflects that of direct discourse, even when the reporting speech act entirely lacks a first or second person (cf. Langacker 1985: 115–116). Kuno (1987: 224–227) explains this by reference to the interaction of empathy structures between regular *come* and *go*, and those for *come up to* and *go up to*.

In actual fact the use of *come* is determined by the perspective of seeing somebody arrive, and when it occurs with the second person, this perception is transferred to the addressee's point of view — for reasons of politeness, I suspect. Thus in

> Can I come [i.e., to you] tomorrow?

the request is phrased from the perspective of ADDRESSEE, who will see the speaker arrive. Likewise, in

> Will John come to the party?

the implication is that the addressee will be there and will see John arrive, or of course the party will be at the speaker's place, in which case the speaker himself will or will not see John arrive. This is why

> I will come to John's party

is possible only if the addressee will be there as well. The process is very similar to preferences for 'enclosed please find' rather than 'I enclose' locutions: one transfers the center of empathy to one's addressee. In the absence of first and second person pronouns (in the absence of address or involvement of SPEAKER, that is), this perceptual quality becomes clear, as the choice of *come* and *go* under these circumstances is determined by SPEAKER's taking a spatial perspective either with the departure point

or the arrival point. In neutral cases *go* is the only choice (Kuno 1987: 225). This demonstrates that *come* ultimately belongs with those verbs (discussed earlier) which cannot co-occur with the first person's point of view in conjunction with first person agency: the speaker either has to be the perceiver of somebody else's arrival, or do the arriving as observed by somebody else from their point of view.[34]

I think I have now accumulated a sufficient (necessarily preliminary) number of arguments to document the asymmetry between the first and the second person, and I have also adduced some evidence to suggest that deictic categories as well as empathy processes operate on a scale model of expansion from the realm of speaker's locus of subjectivity to that of the addressee and of a third person. This takes me back to my starting point, the *shifters*, and how they fit into this new view of things.

As a preliminary conclusion of our deliberations on shifters and deixis I wish to emphasize three main points. One concerns the definition of *shifter*, which was not made entirely clear by Jespersen (nor, indeed, by Jakobson). In the course of this paper we have come to adhere to an understanding of *shifter* as a term applicable solely to those expressions which shift their referent at turn-taking points in conversation. The examination of various shifters proposed by Jespersen and Todorov and Ducrot has established, secondly, that only expressions that center on the *speaker*, on his/her *subjectivity*, can be shifted in this sense. As a consequence, many of the shifters Jespersen cited as examples for the category have turned out either not to be shifters at all (*you*), or to be shifters only in certain contexts (*home, the enemy, dad/Dad*, adverbs of time and place). On the other hand, discovering that subjectivity is the essential feature of a shifter will perhaps allow us to locate shifters other than *I*.[35] Moreover, expressions that behave in an inverse relationship to shifters, since they disallow *speaker*'s perspective, can now be integrated into the discussion. This is where our third conclusion comes in. If one recognizes the special position of subjectivity in relation to second and third person subjects in language, not only can one discover that language projects an addressee (the non-I); one is also able to observe extensions of the originary subjectivity toward medial and distal areas. This is the special task of deictic processes, in the frame of which shifters now reveal themselves to be a special case. We are thus able to describe referring or phoric processes as capable of being illustrated on a scale, which ranges from the speaker's *ego–hic–nunc* deixis of subjectivity (*shifter* category), through the medial position of the common ground between speakers ('deixis' in the Benvenistean sense), to the distal position of the third person/object category of general reference or phoricity. Phoric or referential processes typically include references to objects or persons outside the situation of discourse as well as anaphoric

or cataphoric deixis. Deixis — and here I come back to the point of my conclusions in the Jakobson section above — would refer exclusively to those entities that are physically present (perceivable), whereas *reference* would more generally designate the mention or indication of known entities both past and present, actual or imaginary.

How do these conclusions link up with the model we have developed in an attempt to explicate the Jakobsonian schema and to reduce its inconsistencies? The distinction between the deictic and the referential functions now appears to be one of degree rather than an absolutely determinable *either/or* alternative. If *shifters*, as I have concluded, are empathy phenomena rather than functions of deixis (i.e., demonstrativity), they should be discussed as a sign of subjectivity, and so should be treated under the aegis of the emotive function — a *structural* relation of language. Moreover, since the area of subjectivity is consistently liable either to become extended into an identification with the common ground between interlocutors or capable of empathizing with third person referents (exclusive *we*, empathy processes), there seems to be a similarly sliding scale between the structural relation of the emotive function, on the one hand, and the two indexical functions on the other. Jakobson's schema, even in its revised shape — a shape suggested simply by the loose ends Jakobson left dangling in his two essays — is a static affair, whereas processes of empathy and of the extension of subjectivity can by definition be grasped only within a dynamic framework of vector-fields or the transferral of energy. Such kinds of gravitational pull I will not be able to formalize, and they certainly lie beyond what can reasonably be expected from a structuralist model of speech processes.

This final point brings me back to my original question of whether the current framework of linguistics has been suitable for dealing with the problem of shifters and deixis. We can now tentatively conclude that it has, up to a point, and I want to note additionally that, where the lack of dynamic models of description has made itself felt, a model based on writing rather than speech aspects of language is likely to remain unsatisfactory. Only an emphasis on the processual decoding and interpretation strategies elicited through language, combined with a further analysis of empathy phenomena, can be expected to advance our knowledge of the place of reference and subjectivity in language.

The present article has attempted to raise questions, rather than answer them, in an area that concerns more than one discipline in the humanities. The loose ends I have inevitably been forced to leave on display are also meant to visibly provide open spaces for further connections with yet other areas in linguistics and literary scholarship. What had seemed to be a relatively unimportant minor problem of definition in the Jakobsonian and

224   M. Fludernik

Benvenistean tradition can now at least be recognized as a place at which points are being shifted between the levels of deixis, reference, empathy, and subjectivity in language. Shifters have so far served as a dangerous supplement to theories trying to explain these central problems of both literature and linguistics. I do not doubt that this text, too, will prove equally subversive to my own project of elucidation.

Notes

1. In French the technical term is *embrayeurs* (cf. Jakobson's French version of the article — Jakobson [1963]: 176–196).
2. This can easily be seen in Gérard Strauch's description of the transformation of direct discourse into free indirect discourse by means of a shift from first/second personal pronouns to pronouns determined by the narrative stance ('régime des embrayeurs' — Strauch 1974: 42). The term is obviously important for narratologists, since shifters (including or excluding adverbs of place and time) play a decisive role in the representation of speech. Shifters have therefore received close attention from theorists of free indirect discourse and from scholars interested in the differences between first and third person narration. For a standard account of free indirect discourse see McHale (1978, 1983) as well as the excellent account provided by Leech and Short (1981). Banfield (1982) presents a highly original alternative. The importance of the term for narratology is also signalled by its inclusion in Prince's *Dictionary of Narratology* (Prince 1987).
3. I would like to note in passing that this grammatical and functional understanding of shifters relies on a conventional model of language as a sequence of distinct sentences, a model that can no longer be regarded as universally acceptable since the advent of speech act theory and discourse analysis. Note also that talking about 'replacements' and 'transformations' implies that direct and (free) indirect discourse can be transformed into one another by a mechanical sequence of transformational rules — a fallacy Banfield (1982) conclusively disposes of.
4. For a good overview, see Whiteside and Issacharoff (1987). Philosophical treatments of reference are, for instance, Putnam (1973) and Burge (1973). See also the literature quoted in Lyons (1977), as well as the articles in Steinberg and Jakobovits (1971) — especially those by Linsky, Grice, and Donnellan — as well as Searle (1969, 1979).
5. Note, however, that stage props and actors only simulate the existents projected by the dialogue. Cf. Jean Alter in Whiteside and Issacharoff (1987: 50).
6. 'World 3, then, is the world of ideas, art, science, language, ethics, institutions — the whole cultural heritage, in short — in so far as this is encoded and preserved in such World 1 objects as brains, books, machines, films, computers, pictures, and records of every kind. Although all World 3 entities are products of human minds, they may exist independently of any knowing subject — the Linear B scripts of Minoan civilization have only recently been deciphered — provided they are encoded and preserved in some potentially accessible World 1 form' (Magee 1975: 61).

7. E.g., in 'I told you that you were a fool' the current speaker is the same as the speaker of the reported statement, and so no change in pronoun is required.

8. Compare Rauh (1983b: 11, fn. 3) on the Burkian origins of the term 'indexical symbol'.

9. Superscripted n refers to 'narrated matter'; E^n to 'narrated event'; E^s to 'speech event'; P^s to 'participant in speech event'; P^nE^n to the conjunction of a character of a narrative and an event of narration; and E^nE^{ns} to a conjunction of a narrated event with a narrated speech event. On the deictic character of tense see Lyons (1977: 677–690) as well as Rauh (1982, 1983c).

10. According to Benveniste, the category 'person' contains only first and second person pronouns distinguished by deictic reference to the situation of utterance, to the speaker and the addressee. What grammar calls the third person pronoun is etymologically a demonstrative and *impersonal* expression, which should therefore be excluded from the category of *person* (Benveniste 1971: 200).

11. For a standard treatment of the issue, which is nevertheless debatable, see Quirk et al. (1972: section 3.36 ff.).

12. One can disagree with this identification, since some linguists claim that the progressive form is only one possible formal means of expressing irritation. Intonation and lexical choices are equally important in determining a listener's interpretation of an utterance as expressive of SPEAKER's irritation.

13. Equivalences seem to obtain between emic rather than etic entities, and would thus be an expression of the code.

14. Note that Jakobson uses the paradigm/syntagma dichotomy in a post-Saussurean sense. Saussure comes closest to this distinction in his discussion of the relation between signifiers and signifieds, a relation that he illustrates on the example of monetary value (Saussure 1966: 114–115). Saussure's syntagm, the linear arrangement of speech — he does not oppose it to a paradigmatic axis, using the term paradigm exclusively in the grammatical sense of 'inflectional paradigm' — is opposed to 'associative relations', and his examples are compound verbs and adjectives: *dé-faire* and *quadru-plex*. Saussure's axes explain associations of virtual relationships on *both* the syntagmatic *and* the paradigmatic levels. Thus *défaire* evokes both the paradigmatic *re-faire*, and the syntagmatic *dé-laisser*, *dé-truire*, etc. (1966: 128–130). The paradigm/syntagma distinction for equally virtual slots makes sense only within phrase structure grammar, where NPs, VPs, etc. can be filled by concrete lexemes and phrase structure rules such as S — NP + VP and their specifications project possible sentence structures to be filled in. The notion of valency in more recent syntactic and lexical debates also illustrates such a syntagmatic schema.

15. This schema, as one can observe, repeats within itself the Saussurean weighted triad of (signifier/signified)$_{SIGN}$/referent as (form of signifier/content of signifier)/signified. The slash can be described as 'relation between' and stands in for the Lacanian bar — or the sheet of paper Saussure put between signifier and signified.

16. I leave it open to discussion whether such underlying first person pronouns need to be situated in a semantic or syntactic deep structure.

17. I owe this suggestion to Dr. Frances White, Corpus Christi, Oxford.

18. 'On peut se demander si un acte de référence est possible sans l'emploi, explicite ou non, de deictiques. Les démonstratifs, tels que nous les avons définis, comportent des deictiques. C'est le cas aussi des noms propres (<Dupont> = <le Dupont que tu connais>). Enfin les descriptions définies ne peuvent peut-être pas satisfaire à la condition d'unicité si elles ne contiennent pas, ou des deictiques, ou des noms propres et des démonstratifs' (Todorov and Ducrot 1972: 323). See also Bar-Hillel (1954: 371–373) and Burge (1973).

19. To my knowledge, capitalization is not usual under these circumstances. Compare also the child language designation *doggie* for any dog.

20. Compare also **your Bill*. All such uses are possible only under very specific circumstances, for instance when one is quoting *addressee*'s usual appellation for the referent, and, generally, in emotional parlance.

21. Register and diachronic aspects determine the distribution of these variants, and I suspect that local preferences exist as well.

22. Compare the English 'my old man'/'my old woman' for one's parents, for which shifter uses of 'the old man' exist.

23. Lyons (1982) also equates deixis with subjectivity, but demonstrates this on the example of tense and mood. Langacker (1985), on the other hand, is more relevant, and has a number of interesting insights to offer. However, I find his linguistic arguments rather strained at times. In this paper there is no space for a detailed discussion of Langacker's paper, particularly because he has invented a new terminology which would need ample quotation to be made intelligible to the reader.

24. See Fillmore (1971). Rauh (1983b: 16) has a different tripartite division, and Langacker (1985) divides the field into ground and various kinds of profile determination.

25. For instance: 'By now you will have received the postcard I sent you on Monday'. Here *now* is ambiguous between encoding and decoding time. Compare also Fillmore (1971: 235–236).

26. Cf. Benveniste (1971: 199–200) ('Relationships of person in the verb'). Benveniste's distinctions are discussed in interesting ways by Schmid (1983: 68) and Sternberg (1983: 284–285).

27. On this question a book-length account is in preparation.

28. Inclusive *we* includes the addressee (I + YOU); exclusive *we* (I + THIRD PERSON) excludes a reference to the addressee. A number of languages have morphological distinctions for these two categories.

29. Note that such privileged objects also tend to acquire names and may be addressed by their owners, which effectively transfers them into the status of a potential (second or third person) partner in conversation.

30. Interestingly, in Bulgarian, the evidential ('I am told that'), which Jakobson mentions in 'Shifters', is the normal tense of narration, since folk tales have typically been passed on through generations, and therefore belong to those things one has typically heard of and been told about.

31. Langacker has some highly interesting observations on the nonsymmetrical relation between the perceiver and the object s/he perceives (1985: 120 f.). However, his formula for subjectivity versus objectivity cannot be used to explain these data because he uses the terms subjective and objective in a specific sense, in which what he calls the 'egocentric viewing arrangement' is determined by the subject's self-reflexive awareness of himself as part of the ground with the object observed (1985: 121–122).

32. 'Erzählendes Ich' (Lämmert 1955). Cf. also Stanzel (1984) and Prince (1987).

33. The adverbial example was suggested to me by Professor Herbert Schendl, whom I wish to thank for his encouragement and constructive suggestions in discussing an earlier version of this paper.

34. Fillmore's analysis of *come* and *go* centers on the spatial position of the speakers with regard to the departure and arrival points of the motion. Rauh (1981), on the other hand, concentrates on goal-orientedness and achievement in English and German uses of the two verbs, including idioms and metaphoric expressions.

35. I have made one such attempt, arguing that emotive *this* and *that* function as shifters (see Fludernik 1990). Emotive *this* and *that* have been discussed by Lakoff (1973), but

he does not link their use to topic/focus considerations, although he recognizes their substitution for definite/indefinite pronouns. Topicalization, on the other hand, is amply treated in Rauh (1983b: 34–37). Ehlich (1983: 85) regards the use of deictic expressions as such as a focusing of addressee's attention on elements of the speech situation.

References

Alter, Jean (1987). Waiting for the referent: Waiting for Godot? In *On Referring in Literature*, Anna Whiteside and Michael Issacharoff (eds.), 42–56. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Banfield, Ann (1982). *Unspeakable Sentences: Narration and Representation in the Language of Fiction*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

—(1987). Describing the unobserved: Events groups around an empty centre. In *The Linguistics of Writing: Arguments between Language and Literature*, Nigel Fabb, Derek Attridge, Alan Durant, and Colin MacCabe (eds.), 265–285. New York: Methuen.

Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua (1954). Indexical expressions. *Mind* 54, 359–379.

Benveniste, Émile (1966). *Problèmes de linguistique générale I*. Paris: Gallimard.

—(1971). *Problems in General Linguistics* (= Miami Linguistics Series 8). Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press.

Brown, Gillian and Yule, George (1983). *Discourse Analysis* (= Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burge, Tyler (1973). Reference and proper names. *The Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1), 425–439.

Donnellan, Keith (1971). Reference and definite descriptions. In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), 100–114. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emonds, Joseph E. (1985). *A Unified Theory of Syntactic Categories* (= Studies in Generative Grammar 19). Dordrecht: Foris.

Ehlich, Konrad (1982). Anaphora and deixis: Same, similar, or different? In *Speech, Place, and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics*, Robert J. Jarvella and Wolfgang Klein (eds.), 315–338. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.

—(1983). Deixis and anaphor. In *Essays on Deixis*, Gisa Rauh (ed.), 79–98. Tübingen: Narr.

Fillmore, Charles (1966). Deictic categories in the semantics of 'come'. *Foundations of Language* 2, 219–227.

—(1971). Toward a theory of deixis. *University of Hawaii, Department of Linguistics. Working Papers in Linguistics* 3 (4), 219–241.

—(1972). How to know whether you're coming or going. In *Linguistik 1971. Referate des 6. Linguistischen Kolloquiums zur generativen Grammatik 11–14 August in Kopenhagen*, Karl Hyldgaard-Jensen (ed.), 369–379. (= Kopenhager Beiträge zur germanistischen Linguistik 2). Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag.

Fludernik, Monika (1990). Jesperen's shifters: Reflections on deixis and subjectivity in language. In *Klagenfurter Beiträge zur Sprachwissenschaft. Vorträge der 16. österreichische Linguistentagung (Salzburg, 8–11.12.1988)* 15 (1989)–16 (1990), 97–116.

Freadman, Anne (1988). Reason and persuasion: Two essays to re-read Jakobson. *Poetics* 17, 113–134.

Frei, Henri (1944). Système de déictiques. *Acta Linguistica* 4, 111–129.

Galbraith, Mary (1990). Subjectivity in the novel: A phenomenological and linguistic approach to the narration of childhood self. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY at Buffalo.

Grice, H. P. (1971). Meaning. In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), 53–59. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halliday, M. A. K. and Hasan, Ruquaiya (1976). *Cohesion in English* (= English Language Series 9). London: Longman.

Harweg, Roland (1976). Formen des Zeigens und ihr Verhältnis zur Deixis. *Zeitschrift für Dialektologie und Linguistik* 43, 317–337.

—(1978). Deixis und variable Referenz. *Zeitschrift für Phonetik, Sprachwissenschaft und Kommunikationsforschung* 31, 132–142.

Jakobson, Roman (1971). Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb. In *Selected Writings II*, 130–147. The Hague: Mouton.

—(1987). Linguistics and poetics. In *Roman Jakobson. Language in Literature*, Krystyna Pomorska and Stephen Rudy (eds.), 62–94. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

—(1963). *Essais de linguistique générale* (= Arguments 14), trans. by Nicolas Ruwet. Paris: Minuit.

Jarvella, Robert J. and Klein, Wolfgang (eds.) (1982). *Speech, Place, and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics*. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.

Jespersen, Otto (1959). *Language: Its Nature, Development and Origin*. London: Allen and Unwin.

—(1924). *The Philosophy of Grammar*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Kaplan, David (1977). Demonstratives. An essay on the semantics, logics and metaphysics of demonstratives and other indexicals. Mimeo. [Quoted and discussed in Jarvella 1982, among others.]

Klein, Wolfgang (1978). Wo ist hier? Präliminarien zu einer Untersuchung der lokalen Deixis. *Linguistische Berichte* 58, 18–40.

Kuno, Susumu (1987). *Functional Syntax: Anaphora, Discourse and Empathy*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Lakoff, George (1973). Remarks on *this* and *that*. *Papers from the Tenth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, April 19–21, 1973*, 345–356.

Lämmert, Eberhard (1955). *Bauformen des Erzählens*. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlerscher Verlag.

Langacker, Ronald W. (1985). Observations and speculations on subjectivity. In *Iconicity in Syntax: Proceedings of a Symposium on Iconicity in Syntax, Stanford, June 24–26, 1983* (= Typological Studies in Language 6), John Haiman (ed.), 109–150. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Leech, Geoffrey N. and Short, Michael H. (1981). *Style in Fiction: A Linguistic Introduction to English Fictional Prose*. London: Longman.

Linsky, Leonard (1971). Reference and referents. In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits. (eds.), 76–85. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, John (1977). *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—(1982). Deixis and subjectivity: *Loquor, ergo sum?* In *Speech, Place, and Action: Studies in Deixis and Related Topics*, Robert J. Jarvella and Wolfgang Klein (eds.), 101–124. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.

McHale, Brian (1978). Free indirect discourse: A survey of recent accounts. *PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature* 3, 249–287.

—(1983). Unspeakable sentences, unnatural acts: Linguistics and poetics revisited. *Poetics Today* 4 (1), 17–45.

Magee, Bryan (1975). *Popper* (= Fontana Modern Masters). Glasgow: Fontana/Collins.

Milner, Jean-Claude (1978). *De la syntaxe à l'interprétation: Quantités, insultes, exclamations* (=Travaux linguistiques). Paris: Seuil.

Powell, Mava Jo (1987). Benveniste's notion of subjectivity in the active metaphors of ordinary language. *Semiotica* 67 (1/2), 39–59.

Prince, Gerald (1987). *A Dictionary of Narratology*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Putnam, Hilary (1973). Meaning and reference. *The Journal of Philosophy* 70 (1), 699–711.

Quine, W. V. (1971). The inscrutability of reference. In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), 142–154. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quirk, Randolph, Greenbaum, Sidney, Leech, Geoffrey, and Svartvik, Jan (1972). *A Grammar of Contemporary English*. London: Longman.

Rauh, Gisa (1978). *Linguistische Beschreibung deiktischer Komplexität in narrativen Texten*. Tübingen: Narr.

—(1981). On *coming* and *going* in English and German. *Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics* 13, 55–68.

—(1982). Über die deiktische Funktion des epischen Präteritums: Die Reintegration einer scheinbaren Sonderform in ihren theoretischen Kontext. *Indogermanische Forschungen* 87, 22–55.

—(ed.) (1983a). *Essays on Deixis*. Tübingen: Narr.

—(1983b). Aspects of deixis. In *Essays on Deixis*, Gisa Rauh (ed.), 9–60. Tübingen: Narr.

—(1983c). Tenses as deictic categories: An analysis of English and German tenses. In *Essays on Deixis*, Gisa Rauh (ed.), 119–276. Tübingen: Narr.

Ryan, Marie-Laure (1981). The pragmatics of personal and impersonal fiction. *Poetics* 10, 517–539.

Saussure, Ferdinand de (1966). *Course in General Linguistics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schmid, Wolfgang P. (1983). Die pragmatische Komponente in der Grammatik. In *Essays on Deixis*, Gisa Rauh (ed.), 61–78. Tübingen: Narr.

Searle, John R. (1969). *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—(1979). *Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stanzel, Franz Karl (1984). *A Theory of Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steinberg, Danny D. and Jakobovits, Leon A. (eds.) (1971). *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, Meir (1983). Deictic sequence: World, language and convention. In *Essays on Deixis*, Gisa Rauh (ed.), 277–215. Tübingen: Narr.

Strauch, Gérard (1974). De quelques interprétations récentes du style indirect libre. *RANAM* 7, 40–73.

Strawson, P. F. (1971). Identifying reference, and truth-values. In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits. (eds.), 86–99. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tamir, Nomi (1976). Personal narrative and its linguistic foundation. *PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature* 1, 403–429.

Todorov, Tzvetan and Ducrot, Oswald (eds.) (1972). *Dictionnaire encyclopédique des sciences du langage*. Paris: Seuil.

Vendler, Zeno (1971). Singular terms. In *Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and Psychology*, Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (eds.), 115–133. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Vinogradov, Viktor (1947). *Russkij jazyk*. Leningrad. [Quoted in Jakobson 1971.]

Waugh, Linda R. (1980). The poetic function in the theory of Roman Jakobson. *Poetics Today* 2 (1a), 57–82.
Whiteside, Anna and Issacharoff, Michael (eds.) (1987). *On Referring in Literature*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Monika Fludernik (b. 1957) is an Assistant Professor at the Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik at the University of Vienna, Austria. Her principal research interests include narratology, discourse analysis and text linguistics, and modern drama. Among her publications are 'Narrative and its development in *Ulysses*' (1986), 'The dialogic imagination of Joyce: Form and function of dialogue in *Ulysses*' (1986), ' "The divine accident of life": Metaphoric structure and meaning in *Winesburg Ohio*' (1988), 'Hänsel and Gretel, and Dante: The coordinates of hope in *Gravity's Rainbow*' (1989), 'Byron, Napoleon, and thorough-bred mares: Symbolism and semiosis in Eugene O'Neill's *A Touch of the Poet*' (1990), 'The historical present tense yet again: Tense switching and narrative dynamics in oral and quasi-oral storytelling' (1991), and 'Narrative schemata and temporal anchoring' (forthcoming).