# Party Policy in Modern Democracies

## Kenneth Benoit and Michael Laver

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*Policy and Party Competition* (1992) established itself as one of the main-stream data sources used by political scientists when exploring the policy positions of political parties, and has become a standard data resource for comparative political science.

This new book updates and radically extends this work, providing a wide-ranging empirical overview of party policy in 47 modern democracies, including all of the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The book is divided into three main sections:

- Part I introduces the study, themes and methodology.
- Part II contains a set of substantive chapters dealing in depth with the wide range of issues involved in estimating and analyzing the policy positions of key political actors.
- Part III offers an extensive data appendix, identifying the key policy dimensions in each of the 47 countries, party positions on each of these, and a two-dimensional representation of each party system.

This book will prove to be an invaluable reference for all political scientists, particularly those interested in party policy and comparative politics.

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# Routledge research in comparative politics

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# Introduction

Party competition is a process that in practice lies at the heart of almost every functioning democracy. Understanding this process involves understanding both why particular voters choose to support particular political parties, and why these parties do what they do once the votes have been counted and the election is over. The link between public needs and wants and policy outputs to satisfy these needs and wants, in other words, lies in the realm of policy positions adopted and acted upon by political parties. This book, therefore, is about the policy positions of political parties, measured in 47 countries. There are many reasons why we might want to have systematic information about these positions, and many different ways to gather this information.

In practical terms, it is very hard to engage in the systematic analysis of party competition without reliable information on the policy positions of political parties. In normative terms, the justification for representative democracy is that the policy positions promoted by political parties in some sense "represent" the policy positions of the wider electorate.

Information about party policy positions can be collected by analyzing what parties claim their policy positions to be, for example in their election manifestos. It can be collected by observing how parties behave, for example in roll call votes; or by surveying party politicians or party supporters in mass electorates. All of these methods have their own particular advantages and drawbacks, reviewed at some length in Chapter 3 of this book. There remain unresolved methodological controversies surrounding the systematic analysis of the content of party manifestos. Mass surveys are extraordinarily expensive to conduct, especially to conduct in a coordinated way across a wide range of countries; moreover, both electors' and politicians' perceptions of party policy positions can be intensely colored by their private political perspectives. Roll call voting by party legislators, especially in parliamentary government systems with high levels of party discipline, is likely to reflect strategic choices by sophisticated political agents, rather than their "sincere" views about the policy outcomes they most prefer.

For all of these reasons we opt, in the research reported in this book, to

measure party policy positions using systematic surveys of country special-
ists. We describe the detailed methodology of these "expert" surveys in
Chapter 4. Briefly, the most comprehensive population of country special-
ists we could identify were each asked to use their best judgment to locate
party policy positions, in the party systems of which they had expert
knowledge, on a set of predefined policy dimensions. The *a priori* choice of
these policy dimensions was guided by a combination of our general
knowledge about policy and party competition, as well as by specific
knowledge about policy debates in particular countries or regions. The
general dimensions – policy issues found to a lesser or greater degree in
every country – included a core set relating to policy on the economy,
"social" issues such as abortion and gay rights, environmental matters,
and the decentralization of decision making. In addition, we also measured
policy positions on more country-specific dimensions, judged applicable on
a country-by-country basis following careful consultation with local
experts. These included, in the general case, immigration, deregulation,
several questions regarding EU policy, foreign and security policy, and
health care. One major category of these was a standard set of "post-
communist" dimensions, consisting of policy dimensions particular to the
party systems of states that made the transition to democracy from state
socialism in the early 1990s. From a total of 19 countries – including many
whose parties had never before been assessed on policy dimensions – post-
communist parties were located on policy dimensions that included priva-
tization, religion, treatment of former communists, media freedom, EU
accession, nationalism, and foreign ownership of land. In a departure from
earlier expert surveys to measure party policy, we also asked experts to
locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of
party policy into account. Finally, for each policy dimension investigated
in a particular setting, country specialists were also asked to assess, for
each party, the *importance* of the dimension to the party in question, as
well as the party's *position* on this.

Systematic surveys of country specialists are useful for a number of
reasons, again reviewed more extensively in Chapter 3. Among the more
significant is that such surveys provide information on party policy posi-
tions, in a common format, across a wide range of countries. While we
must remain ever alert to the possibility that the "same" policy dimensions
mean different things in different countries, it nonetheless remains the case
that many scholars, for many different reasons, want to engage in system-
atic cross-national research, for which an important empirical input is
information about the policy positions of key political actors on a range of
"dimensions" that are at least broadly equivalent in their substance. Thus,
while the precise substantive content of "economic" policy can vary from
country to country, economic policy remains, in very many countries, a
crucial source of structure in political competition. Furthermore, age-old
trade-offs between lower taxation and higher government spending, or

between the regulation and deregulation of the private sector, remain a self-evident part of the substance of economic policy in many countries, even when the precise details change from country to country. Surveys of country specialists such as the ones carried out in our study thus have the great advantage of generating comprehensive information about party policy positions that has a systematic underlying structure.

A somewhat "deeper" reason to be interested in expert surveys comes to light when we think about how to assess the content validity of any new measure of party policy positions. If someone devises a way to measure party policy positions – whether this is based on content analysis, roll call voting patterns, opinion surveys or anything else – the first question that arises has to do with the substantive validity of the measurements being generated. We can assess this informally by looking at the numbers to see if they seem reasonable, and more systematically by comparing these with the output of alternative methods that have set out to measure the same thing for at least some of the cases in which we are interested. When alternative measures of the "same" thing conflict, we tend to resort to experts – specialists on the politics of the country under investigation – who can use their expert knowledge to adjudicate on the substantive plausibility of what is on offer. There is an obvious danger that proponents of some particular measure will deploy expert opinion selectively and rhetorically, citing experts whose views are sympathetic and ignoring others. The great virtue of an expert survey is that it sets out to summarize the judgments of the *consensus* of experts on the matters at issue, and moreover to do so in a *systematic* way. In this sense, even when researchers feel they have excellent reasons to use alternative measures of party policy positions for their own particular research project, expert survey results provide a benchmark that gives some systematic sense of the content validity of alternative measures. For this reason we feel that surveys of country specialists, of the type we report in this book, are an invaluable empirical resource for all who are interested in the systematic exploration of the process of party competition.

The enterprise of estimating party policy positions is not a new one, either for political scientists generally or for the authors themselves, although in this book we present many significant and previously unrealized improvements on the application of expert surveys. The present book is, in a very real sense, the successor to *Policy and Party Competition* by Michael Laver and W. Ben Hunt (also published by Routledge), widely used by political scientists researching many different aspects of party competition (Laver and Hunt 1992),[1] which reported results from a cross-national survey of party policy positions taken in 1988–89. Our surveys of country specialists were conducted 15 years later, mostly in 2003, covered each of the 24 countries for which information was collected by Laver and Hunt, and used a core set of policy dimensions defined in precisely the same way as those used by Laver and Hunt. This provides real continuity

with Laver and Hunt's measurements of party positions in 1988–89, to allow for the investigation of continuity and change in the party systems investigated by both surveys. However, the survey we report here is far more comprehensive than that of Laver and Hunt, in a number of ways. First, country coverage was broadened from 24 to 47 countries, including all of the European countries from the former Soviet bloc that in 1988 were one-party socialist states. Second, the samples of experts targeted in each country were significantly expanded. We first gathered separate lists of country specialists, provided by the national political science associations for each of the countries concerned, or compiled meticulously from academic and organizational listings. Candidate policy dimensions for each country's survey were then selected and confirmed by at least two local experts in each country. In total, the surveys presented here covered a total of 38 distinct policy dimensions, averaging more than ten policy dimensions per country (including the general left–right dimension). Our survey questionnaires also made every effort to survey the country experts in their native languages, based on a carefully translated and expert-checked document – as opposed to being sent an English language questionnaire, as in the Laver–Hunt survey. This necessitated translating the survey questionnaire into 22 different languages including, for example, Moldovan, Albanian, Slovenian, and Japanese.[2] The result was not only a far larger pool of country specialists than was used by Laver and Hunt – and not confined to English speakers – but also higher response rates. Most surveys, furthermore, were (subject to the advice of local experts) conducted via the Internet, using individually targeted e-mail solicitations to participate in an interactive Web version of the survey instrument which directly recorded the expert judgments. In each of these ways, we considerably broadened and deepened the reach of the original Laver–Hunt surveys to provide a more comprehensive and reliable resource for the political science profession as a whole.

The benefits of encompassing a broad country sample, we feel it necessary to note, means that we have included some countries that clearly do not deserve to be called modern *democracies* as implied in our title. Belarus and Russia in particular were not democratic at the time of our survey, and three others – Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine – were only partly democratic.[3] We have nonetheless retained these countries in our study for several reasons. First, although these states possess authoritarian characteristics, they also allow opposition political parties, and this suggests that empirical measurement of their party positions is something worth attempting. Second, very few studies are available that document the policy positions of parties in these countries, and hence even imperfect information on these systems may be of great interest to scholars working in such areas. Finally, some countries, such as the Ukraine following its "Orange revolution" in November 2004, have moved towards greater political democracy, which suggests that we will be measuring and analyz-

ing these countries in the future. Our study has therefore included them now. Yet we warn researchers interested in our results for the non-democratic or partly democratic countries – especially Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine – to be circumspect in interpreting the party data from these countries.

In what follows, we first (in Chapter 1) explore what we mean by the "policy position" of any individual – looking at this idea not only from the perspective of the professional political scientist, but also from that of an ordinary decent human being. As we shall see, and notwithstanding the widespread use of the notion of a policy position, the issues we must think about force us to engage some surprisingly deep notions – issues often glossed over by end-users of information on party policy positions. In Chapter 2, we briefly survey some of the different ways of analyzing political competition that make use of information on the policy positions of political agents, and thereby generate a demand for the empirical estimation of these. We move on in the same chapter to review the main ways that have been used by political scientists to measure the policy positions of politicians or political parties. In Chapters 3 and 4, we elaborate our method for the systematic surveying of country specialists and review the main methodological issues involved in doing this. Chapters 5 and 6 summarize some of the main empirical patterns we found. In Chapter 5, we look at ways in which our expert survey can tell us about the number and identity of the key policy dimensions in any particular country. This is an important matter since the "dimensionality" of any given policy space can have significant theoretical and substantive implications, yet is something that typically requires at least some subjective input by the analyst. In Chapter 6, the final chapter before we report detailed data from our surveys in the Appendices, we look in a systematic way at the substantive content of the left–right political dimension, so ubiquitous in shorthand characterizations of political competition, and at how the substantive meaning of left and right varies from country to country. Our method gives us particular insight into this, since it allows us systematically to infer what the country specialists appear to have had in mind when they placed parties on the general left–right dimension.

Before rolling up our sleeves and getting down to business, we view it as crucial to thank the many people without whose assistance and goodwill this book could never have been realized. The list is truly a long one but at the very top with a double underline would be Marina McGale, our research fellow for 18 months, responsible for all logistics, paper and electronic, of deploying, collecting, and recording the survey data. Her expert skills in programming the on-line surveys and designing and maintaining the database and Web servers used to collect our data were absolutely central to this project. We also had excellent help from Marina's husband Matt Kerby, who implemented and helped to design the on-line survey forms. Also indispensable to this project was Alex Baturo who managed

the thousands of paper surveys, oversaw data entry, and provided extensive and insightful comments on the manuscript. Slava Mikhailov also helped enormously with data processing and coding for the final database, as well as commenting on the manuscript.

Aside from the hard-working and talented personnel contributing to this project, we also are indebted to several institutions and funding agencies who provided institutional and financial support for our research. Kenneth Benoit received sabbatical support in the form of a Government of Ireland Research Fellowship in 2002–03, when the bulk of the surveys we conducted were designed and deployed. The Institute for International Integration Studies at Trinity College, Dublin contributed not only critical funding, but also office space for our key personnel and hosting for our project files and Web server. Major financing was also provided by Domestic Structures of European Integration project funded under the European Commission Fifth Framework (project number SERD-2002–00061). The Department of Political Science at Trinity College was also, as always, extremely supportive of the project and of both authors (who were both at Trinity College while research for this book was conducted).

Our list of additional acknowledgements is quite long, yet the degree of our indebtedness to the people on it merits the attempt at a full accounting. In refining the wording of many of the key dimensions, we had assistance from Simon Hix and Bing Powell, and thank the latter for the suggestion to include the general left–right dimension. In designing the general format of the survey, we benefited from feedback from Fiachra Kennedy, Eoin O'Malley, Lucy Mansergh, Michael Marsh, and Gail McElroy (all of whom also helped with the Irish survey). Eoin also provided general help by sharing his cross-national expert lists. For reading drafts of the manuscripts and providing helpful comments, suggestions, and corrections, we thank Jos Elkink. Timea Kacskovics also provided much-appreciated assistance formatting the final manuscript.

In each country, numerous experts provided help in translating the surveys, editing the surveys, selecting the dimensions, advising on the best questionnaire format, and in some cases even carrying out the surveys themselves. Country-by-country, our acknowledgements include: Albania: Altin Ilirjani (who personally conducted the surveys); Australia: Joe Atkinson, Rodney Smith; Austria: Gertrud Hafner, secretary of the Austrian Political Science Association; Belarus: Alexander Baturo, Slava Mikhailov; Belgium: Christophe Crombez; Bosnia: Adnan Habul, Jasmina Juzbasic, Vesna Paleksic, Svjetlana Nedimovic; Britain: Sandra McDonagh of the Political Studies Association; Bulgaria: Dimitar Dimitrov, Kalina Popova, Alexander Stoyanov; Canada: Raj Chari, Matt Kerby; Croatia: Goran Cular, Damir Grubisa, Jelena Stojanovic; Cyprus: Joseph S. Joseph, Caesar Mavratsas; Czech Republic: Michal Klima, Renata Kralikova, Zdenka Mansfeldova; Denmark: Robert Klemmensen, Martin Ejnar Hansen;

Estonia: Sara Binzer Hobolt, Mikko Lagerspetz; Finland: Timo Moilanen, Hannu Nurmi; France: Nicholas Sauger; Germany: Patrick Bernhagen, Thomas Bräuninger, Thomas König; Greece: George Pagoulatos, Dimitri Sotiropoulos; Hungary: Zsolt Enyedi, Tibor Gazsó, Tamás Kern, Agnes Kozma, Gábor Toka; Iceland: Indridi Indridason; Ireland: Michael Gallagher, Gary Murphy, and the others mentioned above; Israel: Orit Kedar, David Levi-Faur, Assaf Meydani, Itai Sened; Italy: Daniela Giannetti, Luca Verzichelli; Japan: Junko Kato (who translated and personally conducted the survey); Latvia: Oskars Ceris, Janis Ikstens, Zaneta Ozolina; Lithuania: Algis Krapavicius, Inga Vinogradnaite; Luxembourg: Patrick Dumont; Macedonia: Dragan Ristovski; Malta: Dominic Fenech; Moldova: Katia McDonagh, Florin Fesnic, Razvan Grecu, Irene Malai (who carried out the survey), Steve Roper; the Netherlands: Sarah Delange, Bob Reinalda; New Zealand: Matthew Atkinson, Jack Vowles; Northern Ireland: Michael Gallagher; Norway: Hanne Marthe Narud, Lars Svåsand; Poland: Arkadiusz Bernasz, Anna Gwiazda, Grzegorz Ekiert, Krzysztof Jasiewicz, Marek Kaminski, Jerzy Przystawa, Jacek Wasilewski; Portugal: Marina Costa Lobo, Paula Espírito Santo; Romania: Oana Armeanu, Florin Fesnic, Razvan Grecu, Laurentiu Stefan; Russia: Alexander Baturo, Slava Mikhailov, Tim Colton; Serbia: Srecko Mihailovic, Jelena Stojanovic, Bojan Todosijevic; Slovakia: Renata Kralikova, Marek Rybar; Slovenia: Miro Ha_ek, Tanja Hafner, Urban Vehovar, Drago Zajc; Spain: Arantza Gomez Arana, Raj Chari, Josep Colomer, José Ramón Montero; Sweden: Leif Lewin; Switzerland: Michelle Beyeler, Simon Hug; Turkey: Ilter Turan, Omer Turan; United States: Tim Barnett; Ukraine: Mykhailo Mishchenko, Sergiy Shtukarin, Volodymyr Skoblyk, Anatoliy Tkachukm, Ira Zbrozhek.

Last but certainly not least, of course, we also express our heartfelt thanks to all of the more than 1,500 experts who took time out from their busy schedules to complete our questionnaires, and in some cases also to send additional comments. Their expertise and effort made the data presented in this book possible.

# Part I

# Policy and political competition

# 1  Dimensions of political difference

## Talking about the "positions" of political actors

Most people who talk about politics are likely to talk sooner or later about the "positions" of political actors. It is difficult if not impossible to have a serious discussion about the substance of real politics without referring to "where" key actors stand on substantive matters at issue.

The very notion of position implies distance. It is effectively impossible for any observer of real politics to describe the positions of two key actors without making at least an implicit statement that these positions are either "the same" or "different." If they are different, it is difficult not to have some intuitive sense of whether they are somewhat different or very different. This intuition can become more systematic when describing the positions of three or more actors. Now, it is possible to make substantively meaningful statements such as "Churchill and Roosevelt are closer together on this matter than are Churchill and Stalin." This is not a technical statement emerging from some formal model of politics. It is a statement easily understood by ordinary decent human beings who wouldn't recognize a political scientist if they were mugged by one in broad daylight.

The very notion of distance implies movement. If my position differs from yours then it is conceivable these positions could move closer together: or further apart. It is also very common when talking about the ebb and flow of real politics to talk about people "changing" their positions on some important matter, with the result that they are now "closer to" or "farther away from" some other person than they were before. Once again, this is part of a common language people use when they talk about politics. Indeed, most political debate has to do with some people trying to change the positions of others on important matters at issue.

The very notion of movement implies direction. If my position moves closer to yours on some matter at issue, I have moved "towards" you on that matter.

All movement is relative. I can only observe and describe your movement relative to some benchmark. For example, it seems to be an

uncontroversial part of the received wisdom of recent British politics that the Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair moved "towards the center," and "away" from the more "left-wing" position it had occupied under the leadership of Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock. This statement is *understood* by everyone who is interested in British politics, political scientist or civilian, whether or not they actually *agree* with it. It is a statement that benchmarks changes in the positions of well-known British politicians against a commonly understood "left–right" scale, to which we shortly return, that has been found useful over the years for describing people's positions on a range of important matters.

All of this goes to show that it is very common to think and to speak about politics in positional terms. Indeed it is very difficult to analyze real political debates *without* using positional language and reasoning. A skeptical reader should try doing this systematically for a sustained period of several months. It is not that we are making a helpful *analogy* between politics and the physical space within which we all live out our daily lives. It is much more than that. Most people – including those who are blissfully unaware of the mysteries of political science, as well as those who are utterly dismissive of them – find it difficult to talk about real politics in tooth and claw without using the notions of position, distance, and movement on the important matters at issue. These notions thus seem to have deep roots in the ways that people, from many different walks of life, think about and describe politics.

Positional political imagery has a long history, conventionally traced back at least to the Constituent Assembly that came into being after the French Revolution. The potential for chaos arising from the different "beliefs and wishes" of members of the Assembly in July 1789 is famously described by Thomas Carlyle (1871):

> there are Twelve Hundred miscellaneous individuals; not a unit of whom but has his own thinking apparatus, his own speaking apparatus! In every unit of them there is some belief and wish, different for each . . . Twelve Hundred separate Forces, yoked miscellaneously to any object, miscellaneously to all sides of it; and bidden to pull for life!
>
> (pp. 188–189)

But Carlyle goes on quickly (for him) to describe the emergence of order in the Assembly in explicitly spatial terms:

> Nevertheless, as in all human Assemblages, like does begin to arrange itself to like; . . . There is a Right Side (*Coté Droit*), a Left Side (*Coté Gauche*); sitting on M. le President's right hand, or on his left: the *Coté Droit* conservative; the *Coté Gauche* destructive. Intermediate is Anglo-maniac Constitutionalism, or Two-Chamber Royalism.
>
> (p. 192)

We return later in this book to the potential substantive meanings of a general "left–right" dimension, like the one used by Carlyle, as a benchmark for describing the positions of political actors. What is interesting in the present context is that similarities and differences in the positions of key actors are not only easily characterized in positional terms, but actually manifested themselves physically in the seating arrangements of the Assembly. Without going into the fine detail of "Anglo-maniac Constitutionalism," furthermore, we find Carlyle defining an "intermediate" position between what he sees as two poles on the *Coté Gauche* and *Coté Droit*. Carlyle thus gives us a clear sense of a scale or dimension that runs from left to right. Certainly since 1789, the fundamentally positional notions of "left" and of "right," with some underlying dimension defining intermediate positions, have been an important part of the common lexicon of politics. These notions have clearly been found useful as ways of conveying significant information about the motives and behavior of political actors.

A single "left–right" dimension, however, is not always enough to convey even the big picture. A clear example can be found when we set out to distinguish the positions of those who promote a "conservative" position on some matter from those who promote a "liberal" position – using liberal here in the "classical" sense associated with John Locke, Adam Smith, and, more recently, Friedrich von Hayek. If we are allowed only one descriptive dimension we can feel confident in saying that the conservative and classical liberal positions are both on the right; but we also are acutely aware that they are distinctly different; and we are not comfortable with describing the conservative position as being clearly to the left of classical liberalism, or vice versa. These two positions differ on some other dimension. At one end of this other dimension we find a quintessentially conservative belief in the value of loyalty to the nation and/or state, an organic view of the interrelationships between citizens and society, and possibly also a belief in the central role played by the church in binding citizens and society together.[1] At the other end of this dimension we find a quintessentially individualistic liberal belief in the primacy of the citizen vis-à-vis the nation and/or state, a consequent suspicion of state intervention in the lives of individuals, and often also a very firm belief in the need to separate the roles of church and state.[2] The resulting "liberal–conservative" dimension is another indispensable tool for describing the positions of different political actors. Without it, classical liberals and conservatives, who self-evidently promote different ideas, cannot be distinguished.

The richer the description of politics we seek, the more dimensions we need to describe the positions of political actors. The more dimensions we use, the more fine-grained our descriptions of politics can be. More dimensions are not always better however, since adding ever finer-grained detail does necessarily not make for ever-more useful descriptions of the world.

When we set sail across the Atlantic, for example, we would get lost if our only charts were so detailed that they show the position of every single grain of sand on every single beach we might pass. We need a description of the (political) world rich enough for the purpose at hand, but not so rich we cannot see the beach for the grains of sand.

The bottom line in all of this is that most people, whether they realize it or not:

- almost certainly think about politics in positional terms;
- almost certainly need more than one dimension to describe important political interactions;
- typically use no more dimensions than they really need to describe the interactions in which they are interested;
- feel they share with others a common understanding of the meaning of these dimensions and associated terms such as left, right, liberal, conservative, and so on – so that conversations with others using these terms are meaningful.

All of this motivates a systematic attempt to describe politics in positional terms using a limited number of underlying dimensions. This has been reflected in the steady growth of interest by political scientists in "spatial" model of politics. Indeed, one of the profession's most distinguished practitioners, Gary Cox (2001), recently described the spatial model as "the workhorse theory of modern legislative studies."

If these spatial models are to be expressed in terms of real-world politics, rather than remaining as mathematical abstractions, it is necessary to measure the positions of key political actors, which is the core purpose of this book. Before rolling up our sleeves and getting down to the business of measuring policy positions, however, we must first consider some matters we have so far avoided. These have to do with what, more precisely, we mean by the "positions" of particular political actors if we abandon our current implicit perspective as God-like observers looking down on the political world from on high and get down to street level, looking at the world through the eyes of individual citizens.

## Ideal points, policy "positions," and policy "distances"

Things do look different at street level. We can be reasonably confident that each individual knows what he or she wants, more or less. (We won't get into what the world would look like if nobody had the slightest clue about *his or her own* personal tastes.) But we also can be confident nobody knows for sure what *anyone else* wants. All any individual can do is draw inferences about the tastes of others from the systematic observation and analysis of their behavior. In the present context, we are interested in two particular aspects of these inferences. The first is that

individuals are aware that the behavior of others is potentially "strategic." Thus when other people tell you things, you must always consider whether or not they are telling the truth since you know they often have strong incentives to lie. The second problem is that the meaning of the dimensions used by a particular individual to describe the positions of others is subjective to that individual. This forces us to confront the possibility that the other people with whom we interact are navigating the political world using a map of this that differs radically, and in ways incomprehensible, from our own.

We could take a puritan line on this and conclude that the endless possibilities for strategic dissimulation, and the subjective nature of any individual's map of the political world, mean that there is no possibility of finding a commonly understood set of dimensions we can use to describe and analyze real politics. This would imply that the use of positional language to describe politics might be very pervasive, but is ultimately misleading.

We are not puritans. We feel that very many, very enlightening, descriptions and analyses of politics have, over the generations, used spatial language and reasoning. We find it particularly compelling that intelligent and well-informed commentators – most of whom know nothing whatsoever, and care less, about political science and its "spatial models" – have coordinated over many years on positional language and reasoning as an effective way to communicate with each other. Thus the question for us becomes one of *how* positional language and reasoning have become so useful and pervasive, in the face of the serious epistemological and methodological problems that appear to confront us when we try to view the political world from street level.

### "Sincere" or "strategic" positions?

If we can assume anything at all when we talk about politics, we can assume each individual to be motivated by a set of beliefs, needs, and desires that condition how s/he behaves in a given situation. Describe as "preferences" the set of desires that motivate a given individual in a particular context. Such preferences may be highly contingent on context and/or highly conditioned by the political process under observation. But, for a given point in space and time, there is a particular set of preferences that motivate each individual. We have to start somewhere and we start with this.

We also know these preferences are intensely private to the individual[3] and effectively impossible even for fully socialized and articulate individuals to communicate perfectly to each other. There is always a potential for misunderstanding. Furthermore we know that, in most societies, part of being a fully socialized individual is *not* saying exactly what you think in a given situation. Indeed saying exactly what you think in every

situation you find yourself in is considered a form of "disinhibition" and seen as a mild social and/or mental disorder. Add to this the widely recognized and pervasive incentives facing every individual to dissimulate for all sorts of reasons, which means that we can never be certain that any individual claiming to be sincerely communicating his/her preferences really is being sincere. We are left, whether looking at any other individual from a position as fellow players in the game or as disinterested external observers, with at least two different "positions" for that individual in relation to any matter at issue. There is a sincere or "ideal" position, which reflects the individual's own beliefs, needs and desires. This motivates his or her actions but is fundamentally unobservable by others. And there is a "public" position, which can be inferred from a person's words and deeds.

Our social and political interactions with others involve, among other things, anticipating their behavior in different circumstances on the basis of inferences we draw about their ideal positions from their public positions, viewed in strategic context. A person's public position is all we can observe; everything else is a logical inference from our observations of others, using some explicit or implicit model of the situation under observation. Ordinary decent humans draw these inferences intuitively and informally. Experimental social scientists draw them on the basis of carefully controlled experiments. But what everyone is doing is using some particular model to draw inferences, from the observed actions and statements of other people, about how their fundamentally unobservable private preferences are likely to motivate their future behavior.

These inferences are not easy to draw in a systematic and rigorous way but they are thankfully not our concern in this book. Here, we are very explicitly dealing with the *observed* positions of important political actors, as these appear to groups of people who are skilled at observing these things, and who in effect we treat as God-like external observers looking at the political world from on high. It may well be, for example, that we feel strongly some political party is "really" more extreme than its stated position on some policy dimension under investigation – that its stated position does not reflect its true position. But that is a case to be made and investigated on the basis of some precise model of party competition, for which the position actually observed will be an important empirical referent. The estimated party positions we present later in this book are thus publicly observed positions – we make no claim whatsoever about what is "really" going on inside the heads of particular party politicians.

### The subjectivity of spatial maps

There is a ring of solipsism to the superficially attractive argument that every one of us views the political world from his or her own unique perspective, so that no common view of the political world can be shared

by a group of people who interact with each other. It is thus useful to consider whether we can extend to our present concerns the robust argument, following Wittgenstein, that solipsism is incoherent because constructing the solipsist argument requires using a language that intrinsically implies some shared understanding of certain words, thereby admitting the very premise the solipsist argument denies. In the present context this might take the form of arguing that, by accepting that the study of *political* interactions between two or more human beings is both possible and potentially fruitful, we accept the notion of *inter*action. This intrinsically involves political actors being able to anticipate the actions of others to some degree; this in turn implies they can see the world to some degree through the eyes of those others. Indeed humans who are deemed quite unable to see the world though the eyes of others are typically considered to be in some sense mentally disturbed and/or sociopathic. Political discussions are expressed in a conceptual language for describing positions that allows individual humans to describe differences between themselves and other humans. The use of this shared language and meaning of these shared concepts is reinforced whenever politics unfolds in ways that do not endlessly take the protagonists by complete surprise. People thus learn from experience that the use of these shared concepts for describing their own positions relative to the positions of others is not completely idiosyncratic. The intellectual issue then becomes one of characterizing these shared concepts in a systematic way, which is what we try to do in this book when we describe them in terms of benchmark scales or dimensions.

In doing this it is important to note that we certainly do not assume that all individuals attach the same weight to the different dimensions used to describe politics – far from it. We will return to this important matter at some length, but for now simply make the point that it is perfectly possible to assume that I feel very strongly about some matters, and you feel very strongly about quite different matters, while also assuming we both more or less agree on the meaning of the concepts and dimensions with which these differences are described.

## From dimensions to spaces

We need to be very careful indeed when we move beyond talking about politics using individual dimensions to the construction of multidimensional spatial "maps" of politics. Imagine that we need two substantively distinct dimensions to benchmark important differences between the positions of several actors. We used a "left–right" dimension and a "liberal–conservative" dimension to distinguish between common perceptions of the positions of a classical liberal and a conservative. If we add a social democrat to the cast of characters, taking this person to have a "leftish" position on the left–right dimension and a "liberalish" position on the liberal–conservative dimension, we might end up with the two

underlying descriptive dimensions shown in the top panel of Figure 1.1. We might be tempted, as many political scientists have been before us, to combine these two dimensions into a single "two-dimensional" "spatial" picture of the positions of three actors. Such two-dimensional pictures are easy to draw and pleasing to look at. An example is shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1.1. But what, precisely, does this two-dimensional picture tell us?

First, note that we certainly do not draw this picture to save a rainforest. It uses a lot more paper than the two stacked one-dimensional descriptions of the same positions of the same three actors and is in no sense a



*Figure 1.1* Actor positions on two dimensions and in a two-dimensional "space."

more economical way of presenting the same information. Second, note that the two-dimensional object in the bottom panel of Figure 1.1 is definitely *not* the sort of thing that forms part of everyday descriptions of politics, by civilians or expert commentators, or even by political scientists other than those who have been inducted into the rituals of a particular modeling tradition. This is in striking contrast to the two stacked one-dimensional objects in the top panel of Figure 1.1 which, as we have seen, have proved useful to generations of people who want to talk about politics for a wide variety of different reasons. Drawing the two-dimensional picture in the bottom panel of Figure 1.1 has created something completely new – the triangle CLS. This triangle gives us a visual image of the relationship between the positions of conservatives, liberals and social democrats that is quite different from the image in the top panel of Figure 1.1. What has been added?

Figure 1.2 shows the triangle CLS in more detail. From this we can see that what has been added, whether or not we realize this given the seductive simplicity of combining the two stacked dimensions into a single two-dimensional picture, is a whole new set of assumptions about how people think about politics. Thus the triangle CLS gives us a visualization of the



*Figure 1.2* "Distances" between actors in a two-dimensional (flat) space.

political world that tells us that the two actors who are "closest" to each other are the conservative and the social democrat – since the distance between C and S (9.22) appears on the page as shorter than the distance between C and L (10.20) and the distance between S and L (9.85). But what, precisely, allows us to take the two stacked scales at the top of Figure 1.1, which we can feel reasonably confident are grounded in received wisdoms about politics that have stood the test of time, and come to this particular "two-dimensional" conclusion?

To see this in more concrete terms, we must climb down to street level and look at the world through the eyes of the social democrat, S. When S looks at the liberal, L, she sees that L is 9 units apart from her on the left–right dimension and 4 units apart from her on the liberal–conservative dimension, a total of 13 units. If S considers the conservative, C, she sees that C is 7 units apart from her on the left–right dimension and 6 units apart from her on the liberal–conservative dimension, a total of 13 units. Why on earth would S consider C to be closer to her than L?

The reason the visual image in Figure 1.2 tells us C is closer to S than is L has to do with Pythagoras' theorem, used to calculate the lengths of the sides of the triangle CLS. More generally, it is because the page on which Figure 1.2 is printed is a two-dimensional Euclidean plane and every visual intuition we derive from looking at the picture is fundamentally Euclidean. This is in a sense the only purpose of the picture.

If we combine the two dimensions in the top panel of Figure 1.1 on the surface of a sphere, for example, we derive quite different visual intuitions. Some of the "parallel" dashed lines in the figure, rather than never inter-secting as on a Euclidean plane, intersect at some point we could think of as the "pole" of the sphere. The sum of the interior angles of the triangle is not 180 degrees, as on a Euclidean plane, but greater than this. And so on. A sense of these intuitions, albeit projected onto the two-dimensional Euclidean plane that is the page, in the manner of a flat map of a spherical earth, can be gained from Figure 1.3. We may gain some intuitions from this, since we have a sense of what is involved living on a more or less spherical planet and thus of the physical geometry involved in traveling long distances over the surface of a sphere, from which we know that great circle routes are the shortest distances between two points.

More generally, mathematicians have known for over a century that there is an infinite number of possible geometries, over and above that of the three-dimensional Euclidean space in which most of us consider our-selves to live for most practical purposes and thus can easily visualize. Figure 1.4, for example, projects onto a two-dimensional Euclidean plane the "distances" between C, S, and L generated by a haphazardly chosen arbitrary geometry. It is probably fair to say that Figure 1.4 does not convey any useful intuition whatsoever about politics. This is because, in using different non-Euclidean geometries to visualize the "same" informa-tion in the top panel of Figure 1.1, we are made acutely aware of the arbi-

*Figure 1.3* Shortest "distances" between actors on a sphere (projected onto a Euclidean plane).

trariness of the spatial maps in Figures 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. This focuses attention on the additional assumptions we make, whether we are aware of this or not, when combining positions on $n$ (in this case two) individual dimensions into a single $n$-dimensional picture of how the world looks. It also draws attention to the plain fact that the Euclidean representation of this information is arbitrary – one among an infinite number of mathematical possibilities – unless we have good substantive reasons for choosing it.

For example, it might be quite plausible to assume, looking at the top panel in Figure 1.1, that people feel the aggregate difference between two actors is the sum of the distance between them on each dimension. Thus we might think that to be $x$ away from you on the left–right dimension and $y$ away from you on the liberal–conservative dimension, means that we are $x+y$ away from you overall. If our thinking did run along such lines, then we would be using what is known as the "city block" or

*Figure 1.4* Shortest "distances" between actors in a haphazardly selected arbitrary
       geometry (projected onto a Euclidean plane).

"Manhattan" metric, which is distinctly non-Euclidean yet quite plausible intuitively. Indeed it is actually implicit in the methods people often use to measure political attitudes, for example, using simply additive "Likert" scales that combine attitudes on a series of sub-dimensions by adding these together using simple integer arithmetic to produce a position on a single composite scale or dimension. If we view the world of Figure 1.2 though the eyes of an actor who sees it using a city block geometry, what is remarkable is that A and C – the two people who seem the farthest apart in Euclidean terms (10.20 as opposed to 9.85 and 9.22) – now seem the closest together (12 as opposed to 13 and 13). Viewed through city block eyes, A and C now appear the most, not the least, likely pair to agree with each other.

   Without beating this example to death it is clear, first, that there is an

infinite number of different but nonetheless internally consistent ways in which we can use the information in the top panel of Figure 1.1 to generate a two-dimensional map of the positions of the three actors under observation. Second, it is clear the visual intuitions that we derive from looking at such maps are almost inevitably Euclidean. Those who remain in any doubt on this matter should read Roger Penrose's (2005) discussion of a woodcut by M.C. Escher, in terms of different possible projections of one picture drawn in hyperbolic geometry onto a Euclidean plane. Figure 1.5 shows an Escher picture, "Circle Limit IV, 1960," that is a projection onto a Euclidean plane of a world with the hyperbolic geometry that Penrose argues gives us the best view of the Universe, viewed on a cosmological scale.

The circle bounding the picture shows the hyperbolic equivalent of the



*Figure 1.5* Escher's "Circle Limit IV, 1960" © 2005, The M. C. Escher Company, Holland. All rights reserved. Available at: www.mcescher.com.

infinite horizon of the two-dimensional Euclidean plane. What is import-
ant here is that the objects in the picture appear in the Euclidean projec-
tion to get smaller and closer together as they approach this horizon,
whereas in terms of hyperbolic geometry they are all the same size and
equidistant from each other. The projection of this world onto a Euclidean
plane is thus deeply misleading. For an extended discussion of the relation-
ship between geometries and visualization, and the difficulty of visualizing
non-Euclidean geometries, see Reichenbach's (1956) classic work on the
philosophy of space and time.

   All of this should make clear that, notwithstanding the fact that most
spatial models constructed by political scientists are based on Euclidean
notions of distance, we need a very good reason to use the information in
the top panel of Figure 1.1 to generate a Euclidean two-dimensional
representation of the positions of the actors, as opposed to using some
other geometry. In concrete terms this brings us back to the question posed
above. Why, given the information in the top panel of Figure 1.1, would
we consider S and C to be "closer" to each other than S and L?

   In order to answer this question we need to distinguish between what
Reichenbach (1956: 6) calls "mathematical" and "physical" geometries,
where "[m]athematics reveals the possible spaces; physics decides which of
them corresponds to physical space." The latter is an essentially empirical
task involving measurement. This makes it clear that the question of
whether or not the picture in Figure 1.2 conveys useful information about
the real world is an essentially *empirical* question. In the present context it
can only be addressed by tackling the question "do real humans actually
think like this about politics?" In answering this question we take it as
given that we are reasonably satisfied, on the basis of the argument at the
beginning of this chapter, that real people do think about politics in some
sense positionally, in the manner set out in the top panel of Figure 1.1.
Thus the question becomes one of "does the combination of the two scales
at the top of Figure 1.1, into the two-dimensional Euclidean plane in
Figure 1.2, reflect the way that real people think about politics when more
than one dimension is needed to describe this?" We can boil this down, in
the context of this specific example, to the question of what evidence and
substantive argument we need to settle the matter of whether, given the
situation described in the top panel of Figure 1.1, S will consider herself
to be:

- closer to C than to L, as indicated by the Euclidean geometry of this
  two-dimensional world;
- equidistant from C and L, as indicated by a "city block" geometry
  that measures the distance between two points in a multidimensional
  space by simply adding their distances apart on each dimension;
- farther from C than from L, as indicated by some other potentially
  plausible geometry, for example in this case, one that measured the

distance between two points as the shortest distance between them on any one dimension (which we might interpret psychologically as people feeling close to others with which they have at least one dimension of similarity).

The answer to this empirical question is certainly not self-evident. This not least because, while we do routinely find discussions of politics by ordinary decent humans and/or informed external observers that deploy the concepts of position and movement in relation to *individual dimensions* of the type in the top panel of Figure 1.1, we do not find such discussions that use *multidimensional objects* such as that in Figure 1.2. The answer to this crucial empirical question thus does not leap out of our everyday experience. So where can we look for evidence to settle the matter?

### Stalking Euclid

Notwithstanding the widespread use of Euclidean distances and "spatial" models within political science, there is surprisingly little evidence or argument to be found in the professional political science literature on the question of whether, and in what circumstances, real people think about political similarity and difference in Euclidean terms. Wishing to leave as few stones as possible unturned on this particular matter, in February 2005 Michael Laver conducted an informal "expert survey" of prominent political scientists engaged in spatial modeling to ask about the basis of the widespread use of Euclidean distances when constructing these models. These modeling practitioners were asked whether these models are (a) grounded in an explicit model of the psychology of political preference and choice, (b) used for "normal science" reasons, to build on the work of others who have also used Euclidean distances, and (c) used because they are tractable using current analytical techniques. The consensus of responses to this survey was overwhelming. The vast majority of modeling practitioners answered (c) – that Euclidean distances are used because they are tractable given current analytical techniques (essentially differential calculus). Only two of the 23 spatial modelers who replied claimed that Euclidean models are used because they are grounded in some body of evidence about how real people think about politics. The overwhelming majority felt that the use of Euclidean models is *not* grounded in any such evidence, and are useful simply because they are easy to analyze. Several practitioners, indeed, argued vigorously and in some detail that there is actually strong evidence that real people do *not* think about politics in Euclidean terms.[4]

The two practitioners who felt there was some empirical evidence supporting the use of Euclidean models cited evidence that people are risk averse when making choices, and that they experience diminishing marginal utility in situations where their spending choices are subject to a

budget constraint. In each case it was argued that the Euclidean metric was the most tractable among the set of metrics that can be used to capture these aspects of decision making by real humans.

In contrast it was argued vigorously by several sharp-end practitioners that the Euclidean metric should *not* be used in models of real political decision making. These arguments were both analytically and empirically grounded. For example it was argued by one modeling practitioner that "Euclidean distance is almost surely wrong if you begin with the classical public finance assumptions of goods and budget constraints" and by another that "it is well known among a few spatial modelers that if you do go through the micro-foundations of a model of choice, that you will not get anything that looks like this [Euclidean distance]."

This argument is elaborated in a paper by Jeffrey Milyo (2000), which concludes that the representation of preferences that underpins most spatial models developed by political scientists is not consistent with the broad spectrum of microeconomic models of choice. This is essentially because political scientists assume individual preferences on individual dimensions to be independent primitives, rather than seeing preferences on a set of dimensions as being induced by some common constraint, most obviously a budget constraint. Milyo shows analytically that these induced preferences cannot coherently be represented as Euclidean distances. Agreeing with this analysis means accepting that most spatial representations of politics are not well grounded in economic micro-foundations, despite typical claims that they are. To the extent that the economic micro-foundations are compelling, this implies that the spatial representations of most political scientists are misleading. At the very least, we need a rationale for the different micro-foundations of the political science approach, and none appears to be forthcoming.

It was also argued vigorously by some of the modeling practitioners who responded to the survey that Euclidean spatial representations have no *psychological* micro-foundations. Thus, "the notion that actual preferences are like spatial preferences requires a heroic set of assumptions about conceptual relations – assumptions whose relations to hard empirical evidence will not be found." This is in a context where there has been, according to another modeling practitioner "very little micro-foundational work on the psychology of policy evaluations, and very little tendency for modelers to question the received assumptions in the field."

Indeed if we turn to the psychological literature on perceptions of similarity and distance, on which there has been an enormous amount of research and writing in the past 50 years or so, we find something quite striking – a body of directly cognate work based on extensive empirical research on how real humans perceive differences between psychological stimuli that appear to have had little impact on the spatial models constructed over the same period by political scientists. The dominant paradigm in psychological work on perceptions of similarity over the past 50

years has been spatial – based on the notion of "dimensions" of similarity between the objects being perceived. It has become widely accepted on the basis of considerable experimental research that pairs of such dimensions may be either "separable" or "obvious" on the one hand – in the sense that similarity on one dimension can be assessed quite independently of similarity on the other. On the other hand they may be "integral" – in the sense that similarity on one dimension cannot be assessed without regard to similarity on the other. There is an effectively identical distinction between separable and non-separable dimensions made by spatial modelers in the tradition of microeconomics, but the experimental results from psychology repeatedly suggest that, when dimensions of similarity are separable, the city block metric better fits real human perceptions of similarity and difference; the Euclidean metric fits these better when sets of dimensions are integral.[5] The same distinction between separable and integral criteria, and between the use of city block and Euclidean distances to measure these, has also been made in work on human–machine interaction. Closely related to the city block metric is the Hamming (or signal) distance, widely used by computer scientists in efficient algorithms designed to search large spaces for similar objects.[6] This is no place to summarize the vast related literature in both cognitive and computer science. We simply note that considerable empirical research programs in both fields, in each case dealing with human perceptions of similarity and difference, make very extensive use of city block, or city block-like metrics, reserving the Euclidean metric for measuring distances on dimensions that cannot be separated analytically.

It is in this context that we must consider the overwhelming justification from the political science spatial modelers themselves for the widespread use of Euclidean representations of political decision making. These were purely pragmatic and not grounded in any argument or evidence about how real humans make real choices. To sample a few of the justifications offered: "because it's got a nice linear differential these models all use derivatives, and the city block metrics aren't differentiable"; ". . . because the first derivative tends to exist everywhere in the standard setup. There is no evidence of which I am aware that the assumption increases the models' psychological realism"; "it is simple, tractable, and is rotation-invariant. No doubt its common use has led researchers to continue its use"; "the weighted Euclidean distance model is a simple and tractable distance model that allows for complementarity between the dimensions"; "it is mostly a matter of convenience (tractability) and people have pretty well developed intuitions. I cannot see any specific psychological grounding for it." The consensus of respondents to this informal survey is so overwhelming that it seems unlikely it would change if more people were asked. This is that the widespread use of Euclidean spatial representations by the current generation of political scientists is a matter of convenience, convention, and mathematical tractability, and has very little to do with either

empirical evidence or even abstract economic or psychological micro-models dealing with how real people actually view the world.

In short, the tradition within political science of describing politics using Euclidean spatial representations is essentially *sui generis*. In Reichenbach's terms, it offers for the political world one possible and tractable *mathematical* geometry, but in no sense represents this world in terms of *physical* geometry. What remains to be undertaken, then, is an essentially empirical task of finding the best spatial representation of how real humans think about politics. Political science, it turns out, is peculiar in that it has reversed the epistemological sequence of Euclidean geometry, which in relation to physical space, established itself first as an empirical physical geometry. A more abstract mathematical geometry emerged out of this, but only once physical Euclidean geometry had demonstrated its empirical validity and usefulness – essentially using real measuring rods. The Euclidean geometry implicit in many spatial representations of politics, in contrast, appears to have arisen as an agreement between academic theorists on a set of shared assumptions that have not evolved from a well-tested, or indeed any, empirical model of the real world. This is not at all to argue that these spatial representations are useless, but rather that such models are more usefully treated as political "cosmologies" – as abstract models that are valuable for the (perhaps very deep) intuitions they give us about conceivable counterfactual states of the world.[7] But it does mean that such models in themselves do not tell us anything about the world as it actually is, since they are not grounded in assumptions about the world for which we have systematic empirical evidence, or indeed much empirical evidence at all.

## The need for empirical research on how real people perceive political similiarity and difference

We are left with something of a puzzle. On the one hand it seems downright foolish to turn our backs on the fundamentally spatial notions of position and movement that self-evidently play such a significant role in how both ordinary people and informed observers talk about politics. On the other hand it is clear that the "spatial models" that have become industry-standard within the profession of political science appear, even to the vast bulk of practitioners who are deeply involved with them, not to be based on any empirically well-grounded premise about how real humans think about politics.

The key distinctions between different ways of measuring political similarity and difference collapse when only one dimension of difference is important. For example, it makes no difference if there is only one dimension whether a city block or Euclidean metric is used. The complications set in when we move from looking at sets of dimensions one at a time to looking at them in combinations. So we must begin by asking why we would want to look at combinations of dimensions.

One good reason to look at combinations of dimensions, at the heart of microeconomics, has to do with trade-offs – and in particular how people adapt their preferences to perceived budget constraints. Thinking of the familiar "guns versus butter" trade-off in a world of finite resources it seems self-evident that, while a person might have in some sense "primitive" preferences for infinite guns *and* infinite butter, the same person will have "induced" preferences for a particular blend of guns and butter given any particular budget constraint. In this context, we have excellent reasons to take a two-dimensional view of positions on the guns and butter dimensions if we want to present a realistic picture of the political world. One of the main arguments put forward by Milyo (2000) is that citizens' induced preferences will not be separable across a number of public policy dimensions bound together by a budget constraint. Thus it is argued that the preferred policy on guns cannot be independent of the preferred policy on butter. Milyo goes on to argue that this means that preferences cannot be Euclidean, and thus that most of the spatial models in political science make inappropriate assumptions about how to combine dimensions in many realistic settings. Of course, this does not tell us precisely *how* to construct the most appropriate two-dimensional view in such circumstances. What it does tell us is that this is a very important matter to which far too little attention has been paid. In short, when we are interested in a set of policy dimensions that are characterized by the empirical fact that an individual's positions on all dimensions are subject to some over-arching budget constraint, we have no alternative to specifying some function that describes how positions on individual dimensions are traded-off in the minds of real people making the choices we want to analyze. We have no *a priori* reason to suppose this function is realistically expressed in terms of Euclidean distances and, according to Milyo, compelling analytical reasons to suppose it is not.

Politics, of course, is much more than microeconomics; political decisions concern many matters not bound together by an over-arching budget constraint. If we were obsessive about budget constraints, then we might argue that every matter to be decided is ultimately subject to some form of rationing, of course. But, and ultimately this is again an empirical matter, it does seem reasonable to assume that, when ordinary people think about the death penalty, for example, they do not offset the money saved on power for the electric chair against the extra cost of keeping more lifers in prison, and then trade-off the balance against a myriad other ways of spending public money.[8] Similarly, one could no doubt construct complicated economic arguments about the costs and benefits of legalizing gay marriage; but it seems likely that gay marriage is an issue most people think about without reference to a budget constraint, not trading off a certain amount of gay marriage against certain amount of something else. There is no need to go on about this – what is distinctive about politics, viewed in these terms, is that there are many important matters to be

decided that are not subject to a budget constraint. Considering only such matters, what might impel us towards a multidimensional representation of them?

We may perhaps feel there is significant linkage in the way real people think about the set of such matters taken as a whole. For example, it may be that, empirically, what you feel about gay marriage depends upon whether or not a death penalty is in place. In this case we need to describe the functional relationship in your mind between these two issues. More plausibly, it seems very likely that, taking the population as a whole, there is a strong correlation between people's positions on apparently quite different matters. For example, we may be able to make a confident empirical statement that people who favor the death penalty also tend to oppose gay marriage. This, however, is not a statement about the cognitive geometry of how these two dimensions are related to each other, but an empirical observation about the distribution of preferences in the population as a whole on the two matters at issue. It might even be that linkages between someone's preferences on different matters are related to empirical patterns of preference in the population as a whole. For example a new issue such as stem cell research might pop up on the political radar, an issue about which most people know next to nothing. In this case, a completely uninformed Person X's position on stem cell research may be taken from the position of Person Y on this matter, where Person Y has expressed a position on stem cell research and is someone with the same views as Person X on the death penalty and gay marriage. Our aim here is not to resolve these complicated problems, but rather to argue that each possibility raised above is an essentially empirical statement about how people think, so that the only way to resolve these matters is by well-designed empirical research.

In the end, what all of this means is that we should be alert to the need to answer the right questions – some of them quite deeply implicit – when we generate spatial maps of politics. In relation to issues bound together by a budget constraint, we can be fairly certain that we should not view political preferences as raw primitives, but rather as being induced by the need to make trade-offs subject to the budget constraint. If we accept this, it seems likely that we should *not* construct a Euclidean map of politics. In relation to bundles of issues *not* intrinsically bound together by a budget constraint, we may feel happier, at least logically, seeing preferences on one dimension as being independent of preferences on another dimension – as being "separable" in the technical sense. Even here, it is not at all self-evident that we should use Pythagoras' Theorem and Euclidean geometry to measure the distance between two actors over a set of different issues, and no strong empirical reason has been advanced for doing this from within the profession. Furthermore, if we use Euclidean geometry, we ignore a long tradition of psychological research supporting the idea that the city block metric is a more realistic way to combine the ways in which

people think about different "separable" dimensions of politics. The way forward is obviously to conduct careful empirical research on how real people feel about bundles of different political issues.

## The relative importance of dimensions of political difference

In the above discussion about the empirical *trade-offs* by real humans that underlie any spatial representation of politics, we have left unmentioned a very important matter: the possibility that different people interpret the "same" map of politics in different ways, because they attach different degrees of *importance* to the same underlying dimensions of similarity and difference. Figure 1.6 shows how three different people might think about the positions of the three actors described in Figure 1.1. The top left panel repeats Figure 1.2, and shows how the political world looks to people who attach equal importance to both dimensions. The right hand panel shows how the political world looks to people who feel that the liberal–conservative dimension is twice as important as the left–right dimension. Distances on the liberal–conservative dimension now have twice as much weight in calculations of the distance between two points as do distances on the left–right dimension. Conversely, the bottom left panel shows how the political world looks to people who feel the left–right dimension is twice as important as the liberal–conservative dimension.

   A number of things are striking about these three different views of the "same" underlying political map. The most obvious is that they generate different conclusions about which points are closer, and which farther, from each other. If both dimensions are equally important the two actors seen as being *farthest apart*, if we use a Euclidean metric, are liberals (L) and conservatives (C). (Though remember that they actually seem closest together if we use the city block metric.) The bottom left panel shows us, not surprisingly, that the same two actors seem *closest together* when viewed through the eyes of somebody attaching twice as much importance to the left–right dimension as to the liberal–conservative dimension. The largest distance now seems to be between the social democrats (S) and the liberals (L). In contrast, somebody who saw the liberal–conservative dimension as being twice as important as the left–right dimension would see social democrats and liberals as being the closest pair. Indeed, if we wanted to identify the closest pair of actors in this political space – perhaps because we wanted to predict which pair would be most likely to do a deal with each other – then the three different sets of dimension weights in Figure 1.6 generate three different closest pairs if we view the political world in Euclidean terms. Two people at the same "position" in some political space can still disagree fundamentally about political choices if they attach different weights to the different dimensions. For any individual therefore, we need to know both their position on some particular dimension of interest

and the importance they attach to this dimension relative to other dimensions of interest. This will allow us to capture the different views that different people have of the same underlying spatial map.

The possibility that different people attach different weights to the same set of dimensions of politics is easy to state and seems very plausible, but has profound consequences for how we, as external observers, can describe the political world. The "distance" between two people A and B is now different, depending on whether this distance is perceived by A or perceived by B. This means that we cannot represent the positions of A and B graphically in a single "common" political space, since to do so requires a single distance AB. There is no problem with representing these positions algebraically, recording both dimension coordinates and dimension weights for both A and B. But this does call into question the intuitions we might derive from such a spatial representation, to the extent these intuitions are grounded in a physical space in which we are accustomed to believe that the distance between A and B is the same as the distance between B and A. Furthermore, many of the "spatial" models of politics to which we shortly turn do in practice represent collections of political agents in a single common space in which the distance AB is the



*Figure 1.6* The "same" space with different dimension weights.

same as the distance BA, and in practice many of the analytical scaling techniques for measuring the positions of sets of political agents in effect make the same assumption.

Our expert survey approach, described in greater detail below, quite explicitly separates measurement of the positions of each agent on each dimension investigated from measurement of the relative weights attached by each agent to each of a set of dimensions. This is a particular virtue of the expert survey approach, but users applying these data to particular models of political choice should be alert to the fact that such models may themselves make the assumption that the set of political actors all share a common view of the political space, in the sense of using a common set of weights for the set of dimensions deemed to be important. This is almost certainly the case if the model deploys some graphical representation of the set of decision makers in a common political space.

## The way forward

Putting all of this together, we are left with two main conclusions. The first is that the use of spatial language to talk about politics is very pervasive indeed. This language has been used for centuries by wise observers of politics from many different perspectives, and seems integral to contemporary political debate, discourse, and analysis. Spatial language has also formed the basis for major sub-disciplines within political science, microeconomics, and cognitive science. In all of these contexts, the spatial notions of position, movement, direction, and dimensions all seem to be used in broadly similar ways. We are not observing different types of analyst using the same language in confusingly different ways. This common understanding seems clearest when we look at one dimension of choice at a time.

The second conclusion concerns the clear and understandable temptation to combine sets of dimensions into multidimensional "spaces," and indeed to view the context of choice – whether political, economic, or psychological – as multidimensional. The problem that now arises is that, despite the seductive charms of combining these different dimensions into a single Euclidean picture – deeply underwritten by the facility with which humans experience Euclidean visualizations of multidimensional worlds – we have no reason to presume that the multidimensional worlds of political, economic, or psychological choice are, as an empirical fact, Euclidean. This is not a reason for despair. But it is a reason to be careful, when we step off the solid ground of looking at dimensions of political similarity and difference one at a time. We then need to think hard about how we combine different dimensions into a single "summary" map of the political world under investigation.

The empirical sections of this book present estimates of the positions of political parties, in many different countries, on a range of different policy

dimensions, as well as estimates of the relative importance attached by each party to each dimension. What we have seen in this chapter is that such estimates are the *raw material* for a range of different empirical models of politics, but that there is no "one true way" to combine them to generate multidimensional representations of the politics of any given country.

# 2 Policy positions and theoretical models of political competition

We concluded the previous chapter with the observation that estimates of the policy positions of political actors are raw material for many different approaches to analyzing political competition, but that there is no "one true way" to combine these positions into a single "best" multidimensional representation of the politics of any given political system. In this chapter we sketch the different ways in which spatial models have been used to illuminate various aspects of political competition, noting the different types of spatial representation of policy positions that each implies. We do not attempt a comprehensive review of the huge research program concerned with the spatial modeling of political competition, which has generated an enormous literature. Rather, we map out the general territory of the different types of spatial model that have been influential, considering the different types of need that each approach generates for reliable and systematic empirical estimates of the policy positions of political actors.

Spatial models of political competition have been deployed in a wide range of different contexts, which refer to different parts of what we might think of as the "big" model of political competition. The broad shape of this big model is in turn affected fundamentally by the constitutional regime within which political competition is played out. The incentives for both politicians and ordinary citizens differ in significant ways, for example, within the constitutional regime of European-style "parliamentary government" as opposed to that of "presidential government," US-style. The impacts of these different constitutional regimes on party competition are reviewed by Gallagher *et al.* (2006), but boil down to the fact that the legislature makes and breaks the executive under parliamentary government, while it does not in US-style separation-of-powers regimes. This means that the choices made by politicians, and the responses of citizens to these choices, are likely to differ fundamentally in the two constitutional settings.

To give a sense of some of the different features of political competition that may motivate different spatial models, Figure 2.1 sketches aspects of what we might think of as the "big" model of political competition within

*Figure 2.1* The "big" model of party competition under parliamentary government.

parliamentary government systems. The fact that this sketch would be quite different for a US-style separation-of-powers regime underlines the crucial impact of regime type on the process of political competition. Figure 2.1 is a highly stylized and simplified description of the process of political competition under parliamentary government, but even this simplified picture shows us that the process creates a very complex system of interactions. With its multilayered interactions, two-way causality and feedback loops, it is abundantly clear why no one scholar has yet come close to modeling the entire system of political competition taken as a whole. Working models of politics deal only with parts of the system, effectively ignoring what is going on elsewhere in it, in the interests of being able to say at least something about political competition.

Looking at the big model Figure 2.1, we can think of political competition as a continuous process that is structured into two distinct phases by two institutional automata – an electoral system and a legally mandated maximum inter-election period. Viewed on a long timescale, of course, even these exogenous "automata" are endogenous products of the process of political competition. Politicians can and do choose electoral systems as part of the process of party politics (Benoit 2004), while the legal maximum inter-electoral period can also, in the long run, be changed endogenously (as it has recently for French presidential elections, for example, with profound political consequences). Nonetheless, we do gain analytical purchase by treating these institutional features of the political landscape as fixed automata in the short run. They distinguish what we might think of as the "electoral" phase of political competition from the "inter-electoral" phase.

## Spatial models of *electoral* competition

We have to start describing the endlessly churning process of political competition somewhere and we start with the triggering of an election, either by electoral law or as the result of a strategic decision by actors inside the system – a strategic decision to which we return. This initiates the electoral phase of the competitive process, crucially distinguished by the fact that it involves decisions made by ordinary citizens. We pause to note that even the set of "ordinary citizens" is not exogenous to the process of political competition since, at the limit, citizens chose where to live and can be seen as sorting themselves into jurisdictions according to what they perceive as the likely policy outputs of political competition in different jurisdictions (Tiebout 1956; Kollman *et al.* 2003). The big spatial model in Figure 2.1 is thus but one element in an even bigger spatial model. While such endogenous inter-jurisdictional sorting of citizens is a non-negligible phenomenon at the level of local political competition, we take it to be rare at the level of national politics.[1]

The electoral phase of political competition – including the electoral

system and the processes sketched "above" this line in Figure 2.1 – is what has been of primary concern to those many scholars who have modeled party politics in the Downsian tradition. The arguments of Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* spawned an entire school of spatial models of electoral competition (Downs 1957). Accessible overviews of this literature can be found in two books by Hinich and Munger, while an authoritative and rigorous recent synthesis is provided by Austen-Smith and Banks (Hinich and Munger 1994; Hinich and Munger 1997; Austen-Smith and Banks 2005). The essential logic of most of such models, though as we shall see not all of them, assumes that the political world has two types of agent – citizens and political parties.

Political parties are typically modeled in anthropomorphic terms as unitary actors, each with a single human brain. Citizens are typically assumed to be concerned above all else with policy and to have in mind an "ideal" policy outcome, to be found somewhere in the set of all feasible policy outcomes. Political parties are assumed in most models to be concerned above all else with maximizing the number of citizens who support them in elections. Elections are assumed to be self-contained political episodes during which parties compete with each other by offering policy positions to citizens, each party trying to put forward the position it expects to be closer than any other party policy position on offer to the ideal positions of the largest possible number of citizens. Citizens are typically assumed to favor the political party offering the closest policy position to their own ideal policy position and to vote for this party in elections. Citizens are assumed to do this even if the policy positions on offer from political parties are sufficiently close to each other that the potential benefits of voting are not worth the costs of doing so, which are assumed to be non-zero. Thus the sets of citizens and voters are typically taken to be identical.

This latter point has been the cause of much soul searching within the profession, since the probability that a single citizen in a large electorate makes a difference to an election outcome is effectively zero, implying that instrumentally rational citizens should not turn out to vote if doing this has any cost at all. Since many real and apparently rational citizens do indeed vote, the resulting contradiction between theory and reality was branded "the paradox that ate rational choice theory" (Fiorina 1990), and became the focus of a sustained critique of the entire spatial approach to modeling party competition (Green and Shapiro 1994). This debate continues, with theorists essentially seeking a logically consistent account of rational voting turnout that does not merely assume that people vote because they like voting per se. One promising avenue has been to look at ways in which people can be *mobilized* to vote, if they are offered selective (though possibly intangible) incentives by leaders of social groups to which they belong (Morton 1991; Morton 2006). In a more behavioral tradition, it has been argued that citizens may "learn" to vote if they are systematic-

ally rewarded for being on the winning side (Bendor *et al.* 2003). Another avenue has been to work with the notion that most people are conventional, in the sense of not wanting to do something different from others who are like them, so that voting turnout can "cascade" through the population as people in effect imitate each other's behavior (Fowler 2005). The jury, however, remains out on the important matter of whether, within the general framework of spatial party competition, it is rational for citizens to vote at all.

Implicit in the largely US-oriented focus of many spatial models on two-party competition, political parties have typically been assumed to set policy positions so as to maximize *votes* – which does amount in a two-party setting to "winning" the election. A related assumption is that there is a first-past-the-post "winner takes all" electoral system. Even in multiparty competition under proportional representation electoral systems, of course, receiving more rather than fewer votes is almost never bad for a party. However, winning more votes than any other party may not in this case amount to winning the election in any meaningful sense, given that it is empirically very rare in such systems for any party to win over 50 percent of the popular vote. If we assume that parties do not covet votes for their own sake but value votes because of what these can do for them, then party motivations during elections must derive from the *inter-electoral* phase of party competition, sketched in the bottom half of Figure 2.1, below the line of the electoral system.

Party leaders may covet votes because they want to get into government and then consume the fruits of office, or because they genuinely do want to have an impact on inter-electoral public policy decisions (Müller and Strøm 1999), but either way the political game does not stop once the election result has been declared. We return shortly to the inter-electoral phase of party competition, noting here that to assume voters and parties take account during election campaigns of inter-electoral politics – an assumption that is hard to ignore once we set out to model multiparty competition, which may well not result in a majority election winner – adds very considerable complexity to the analysis of electoral party competition.

For the most part, however, spatial models of multiparty electoral competition have tended to assume that parties are motivated by vote maximization, implicitly using this as a proxy for likely success in the inter-electoral game. Extensions from two- to multiparty competition have also tended to be accompanied by extensions from one to several important policy dimensions. Hinich and Munger synthesize a wide range of work on multiparty competition when more than one dimension of policy is important (Hinich and Munger 1997). Recent work, however, has begun the difficult task of building an integrated spatial model of electoral competition and post-electoral politics (Austen-Smith and Banks 1988; Schofield 2003; Schofield 2004; Austen-Smith and Banks 2005).

All of these models, as we have seen, typically treat parties as *unitary*

*actors*, each with a single human brain. They thus ignore the "candidates" box at the top left of Figure 2.1. Once we allow that political parties are actually *endogenous clubs of politicians* and not exogenous facts of political life, however, the question arises as to what a spatial model of electoral competition looks like when political parties are endogenous. This has been the focus of a relatively recent modeling tradition, building from early work on "party free" electoral competition between "citizen candidates" (Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997). Such work focuses on the incentives of individual policy-motivated citizens to run as candidates in elections and work in this tradition has gone on to consider the various benefits for citizen candidates who coalesce into political parties. Benefits that have been considered include: the value of a unified party "brand" in communicating policy positions to voters (Snyder and Ting 2002); the value of a mechanism for politicians to commit to positions other than their ideal points when offering policy positions to voters (Levy 2004; Morelli 2004); and the ability to take advantages of economies of scale in campaign costs (Osborne and Tourky 2004). Almost all of this work has retained a US-oriented focus on two-party competition with a single policy dimension, although Morelli has extended the analysis to proportional representation electoral systems, albeit still with only a single important policy dimension (Morelli 2004).

The citizen–candidate approach and its extensions are interesting in the present context because they do away with what is otherwise a very arbitrary distinction between citizens and politicians, often treated by theorists as if they were two quite different "breeds" of political animal. One breed (citizens) is assumed to care above all about policy while the other breed (politicians) cares above all about getting into positions of power, deploying policy positions in order to do this, to be sure, but having no intrinsic interest in the substance of those positions.[2] The citizen–candidate approach has the great theoretical and aesthetic virtue of making the same assumption about the motivations of *all* agents in the system, each of which is assumed to be motivated by potential policy outputs, although the intrinsic pleasure of holding office may be traded off against this (both by serving politicians and by citizens who might once in a while consider what it would be like to run for office). The cost of this more unified approach, reviewed by Austen-Smith and Banks (2005), is considerable analytical complexity.   Furthermore, none of this work to date models what goes on *inside* endogenous political parties although it is clear that, since political parties on this account are political systems in their own right, there is obvious potential for policy-driven political competition inside them. There is thus a clear theoretical and substantive potential, as yet unrealized, for spatial models of intra-party politics.

## Spatial models of *inter-electoral* politics

When we consider the inter-electoral politics that swing into action once citizens have had their say at election time, the distinction between presidential and parliamentary government becomes particularly crucial to any analysis of political competition. What happens between elections is completely different under the two types of constitutional regime. And, of course, to the extent what is expected to happen *between* elections feeds back to affect what people do *during* election campaigns – as it does in the "big" model of political competition sketched in Figure 2.1 – then models of *electoral* party competition are also conditioned by this distinction between constitutional regimes.

### Inter-electoral politics under parliamentary government

For the most part, spatial models of inter-electoral political competition in parliamentary government regimes have concentrated on the making and breaking of governments. The "life and times" of governments in between these two fundamental events – which of course comprises the vast bulk of "normal" politics in parliamentary government systems – has been the subject of much less explicit spatial modeling, although it is implicit in many models of both government formation and government duration.

Spatial models of government formation can be traced to the early work of de Swaan and Axelrod; Laver reviews work in this field up to the mid-1990s (Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 1973; Laver 1998). Political parties are once more seen as unitary actors by the vast bulk of these models – Laver and Schofield review this assumption substantively in the context of government formation (Laver and Schofield 1998). These models deal exclusively with the inter-electoral phase of political competition and only in the most implicit sense do they consider any feedback from government formation to electoral party competition. This is important because the essential logic of spatial models of government formation is that *political parties are policy-motivated* and seek to form government coalitions by joining with other parties that share similar policy objectives. Such an assumption appears on the face of things to be a stark contrast with spatial models of *electoral* party competition, which as we have seen tend to assume that political parties are essentially office seeking. The two spatial modeling traditions thus seem to make different assumptions, when dealing with different phases of party competition, about the role of policy in the motivations of political parties. In electoral competition, policy positions are assumed to be *instrumental* for political parties; in government formation, they are assumed to be sources of *intrinsic* value.

This apparent inconsistency can be reconciled, however, if we return to the distinction between "ideal" and "stated" policy positions that we made in Chapter 1, and combine this with a consideration of the feedback

effects between electoral and inter-electoral political competition. This allows us to see the policy positions of political parties as instrumental "stated" positions in both phases of the political game. We can thereby retain a Downsian view of an *electoral* politics in which parties are political entrepreneurs that promote policy positions from which they derive no intrinsic value in order to win votes, with a view of an *inter-electoral* politics driven by the need to reconcile the policy positions of different political parties. To do this, however, we have to assume that parties have an *eye to the next election* when they bargain over the making and breaking of governments – seeking to be part of governments expected to enact public policies close to their stated positions because they fear citizens will punish them if they promise one policy position at election time and associate themselves with quite a different position between elections. Furthermore, we need to assume voters cast a *retrospective* eye back at the *performance of the outgoing government*, as well as looking forward at the impact on *future* policy outputs of the current menu of party policy platforms on offer. It has to be said that this reconciliation of the potentially conflicting motives of political parties is no more than deeply implicit in existing models of government formation. None of these models, to our knowledge, impounds an account of retrospective voting by citizens that is in any way explicit, dealing with how citizens might punish parties who promise one thing at elections and do something else afterwards. The net point, however, is that the apparent inconsistency in assumptions about what motivates political parties, with spatial models of different phases of the big political game assuming different things, can only be handled by explaining the instrumental behavior of parties in terms of feedback between electoral and inter-electoral party competition. This is an intrinsically dynamic process.

Having said all of this, there is as we have seen a large body of work setting out spatial models of inter-electoral government formation. All of this essentially argues that, other things being equal, government coalitions are more likely between sets of parties stating policy positions that are more, rather than less, similar to each other. One very important substantive conclusion from this work has to do with "minority" governments. These are governments whose member parties do not themselves control a legislative majority. Under the constitutional rules of parliamentary government, governments remain in office as long as they can command a majority in a legislative vote of no confidence. All governments thus enjoy the support of a legislative majority in the sense that there is a legislative majority that prefers the incumbent government to any credible alternative. But minority governments, which must depend upon the support of non-government parties to win legislative votes of no confidence, are common in parliamentary democracies. Gallagher, Laver and Mair find that these comprise nearly 30 percent of all post-war European governments (Gallagher *et al*. 2006).

One influential theoretical interpretation of this very strong empirical pattern is that policy must be important to politicians when they interact over government formation. If politicians were motivated only by the desire to get into office, and not at all by policy, then a minority government would face a majority opposition that both wanted to get into office and controlled enough legislative votes to do so. The theoretical explanation within the spatial modeling literature of why this does not happen is that politicians do care about policy positions, and that a minority government can be a stable equilibrium in the political game if no opposing majority coalition can agree on a credible alternative to it. For this to be the case there must be something that divides the majority opposition, and this something is assumed to be policy. To take a simple intuition from a spatial model of government formation in which only one dimension of policy is important, a government coalition that promoted the policy position of the median legislator would not need to comprise a set of parties controlling a legislative majority. Even a government controlling rather few legislators would divide the opposition in this case, since there is no legislative majority either to the left, or to the right, of the government. Laver and Shepsle have proposed a model of government formation that, on certain institutional assumptions, generalizes this result to account for minority governments when many different dimensions of policy are important (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Thus the frequency of minority governments can be taken as strong empirical evidence that party policy positions are indeed an important part of inter-electoral political competition. We need to keep in mind, however, that assuming politicians care about policy in the inter-electoral game means we must also assume feedback from inter-electoral to electoral politics if we want to maintain consistent assumptions about the motivations of politicians.

There has been much less *analytical* spatial modeling of the *death* of governments in parliamentary democracies, and the main body of work on this theme can be found in a substantial literature that fits statistical models to observed government durations, models that include sets of variables reflecting in some form or another the policy positions of political actors. This tradition is reviewed overall by Laver (2003); recent important work in it has been published by Daniel Diermeier and co-authors (Diermeier and Stevenson 1999; Diermeier and Merlo 2000; Diermeier and Stevenson 2000; Laver 2003). All of the work in this tradition impounds the theoretical intuition that the policy diversity of both government and opposition parties have a significant impact on government *durability*, a fundamentally unobservable concept, with empirically observed government *durations* being used as an operational indicator of this.[3] In the present context, the bottom line substantive conclusion from this body of work is that policy positions matter because they have a significant effect on government durability.

### Inter-electoral political competition in separation-of-powers regimes

One of the paradoxes of modern political science is that the most substantial body of theoretical work on political competition in general, and on the spatial modeling of this in particular, has been set in what in global terms is a highly unusual constitutional context – US-style separation-of-powers. Not only is the US executive elected independently from the legislature but, in comparison to many other "presidential" regimes for which this is also true, the US president has atypically weak powers vis-à-vis the legislature (Samuels and Shugart 2003). Since such an unusual constitutional regime is the "model generator" for so many theories of political competition, we must take great care when exporting the models generated to different constitutional contexts.

By definition, inter-electoral politics in separation of power regimes has nothing at all to do with the making and breaking of governments – the main business of inter-electoral politics in parliamentary government regimes. Inter-electoral interaction between legislature and executive takes place in a completely different constitutional context under presidential government. Going back to our sketch of the big model of political competition, this simple constitutional fact is crucial. This is because the distinction between the two regime types is not just a matter of inter-electoral politics. To the extent that inter-electoral politics feeds back into electoral politics, as we have seen it surely must, then electoral politics is also likely to be substantively very different in the two regime types.

A very clear example of this can be seen in one of the most widely cited recent papers on legislative bargaining – Baron and Ferejohn's "Bargaining in legislatures" (Baron and Ferejohn 1989). This sets out a "model of a legislature" (p. 1183) that is in effect a model of a legislature operating under the US separation-of-powers regime. Leaving aside the particular legislative procedures used to structure this seminal non-cooperative model of legislative bargaining, and acknowledging its undoubted theoretical fruitfulness in provoking creative work by other scholars, this model says nothing whatsoever about interactions between legislature and executive – interactions that are the very essence of parliamentary government. The same paper does offer an application to "government formation in parliamentary systems" (p. 1194) but this presents a government as no more than a proposed allocation of cabinet ministries that is voted upon by the legislature – in effect as just another piece of pork barrel legislation. The impact of the implicit US constitutional setting can be seen in an extension of this argument to policy-driven government formation in parliamentary democracies (Baron 1991) in which a government is seen as a policy proposal by a *formateur* party that is approved by a majority vote in the legislature and then implemented instantaneously. The executive is again reduced, in effect, to a legislative vote – this time on policy. In

parliamentary government systems, however, the executive typically has firm control over the legislative agenda. Furthermore, the executive under parliamentary government can typically choose to make a single legislative proposal a matter of confidence and thus force the legislature to choose between accepting a specific government proposal and bringing down the entire government (Huber 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998). Legislative bargaining under such a constitutional regime is going to be very different from that which takes place in somewhere like the United States.

Under the US separation-of-powers regime, however, it has indeed made theoretical sense to model inter-electoral legislative politics as being in some sense autonomous from the executive, although authors such as Cameron and Krehbeil have begun to explore the interaction between the two institutions (Krehbiel 1998; Krehbiel 1999; Cameron 2000). One immediate consequence of this is that a quite different rationale is needed for the existence of legislative parties – which in the US Congress are self-evidently not unitary actors. Under parliamentary government, legislative party discipline can be accounted for as a product of the intimate interaction between legislative and executive – party leaders have a strong incentive to impose tight discipline because this is what keeps them in government. Under a separation-of-powers regime, especially one like that in the USA where individual legislators also enjoy a strong personal incumbency advantage when fighting elections, party discipline is more of a theoretical puzzle.

We have already noted the incentives arising from the electoral game for politicians to coalesce into parties – essentially the benefits of associating with a party "brand" and of making a credible commitment to a policy position in a world of imperfect information. Inter-electoral politics provide further incentives for the maintenance of political parties in a separation-of-powers regime. Cox and McCubbins provide a recent and very comprehensive overview of work on these incentives (Cox and McCubbins 2005). For them, the main post-electoral incentive for legislators to coalesce into parties has to do with control over the legislative agenda. Belonging to a political party, and accepting the consequent responsibilities, provides access to a range of practical ways to do effective business in a legislature, most of these under the control of party hierarchs. What is important for our purposes is that party discipline is seen as a phenomenon whereby legislators with diverse policy preferences vote in a coordinated way on particular bills, quite possibly voting the party line on a particular issue when this does not reflect their true underlying preference. The Cox–McCubbins argument that US parties provide exclusive incentives for their members by manipulating scarce agenda-control resources contrasts with an alternative influential argument, associated with Keith Krehbiel. On Krehbiel's account, what looks like coordinated party behavior arises because US legislators choose which party to affiliate to on the basis of their intrinsic policy preferences – in effect joining a

party of like-minded individuals and then quite voluntarily behaving in the same way as these on the floor of the House without the need for any "external" party incentives (Krehbiel 1993; Krehbiel 1998).

Another important research tradition has been concerned with institutional sources of structure in legislative decision making. A "new institutionalist" literature on this theme has emerged, essentially in response to the long-standing theoretical argument that majority decision making in a wide range of contexts is generically unstable in situations where several dimensions of policy are important (McKelvey and Schofield 1986; McKelvey and Schofield 1987). This approach to the analysis of legislative politics unpacks the logic of a set of axioms derived from stylized descriptions of key aspects of the way in which the US Congress does its business. Topics analyzed within this research tradition include, among others: interactions between the legislative committee system and the plenary legislature; logrolling between groups of legislators trading votes across a portfolio of issues; agenda setting and the impact of different types of amendment rule; and the politics of constitutionally enshrined vetoes over legislation. Shepsle and Weingast offer an overview of this substantial literature (Shepsle and Weingast 1995).

Perhaps the most influential and internationally "portable" intuition that can be derived from this research tradition was generated by Shepsle's early work on ways in which the congressional committee system can bring about "structure induced equilibrium" (Shepsle 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1987). The logic of this argument is straightforward but powerful. This is that legislation is processed, not in an unconstrained free-for-all on the floor of either House, but by way of a specialized committee system that in effect breaks down a legislative program with multiple policy dimensions into a set of legislative proposals that each deal with a single policy dimension. This strong structure in the congressional decision-making process is argued to induce equilibrium outcomes that would otherwise be unattainable, while intra-committee politics is further structured by the agenda-setting powers of the committee chairs. The portability of this intuition became evident with its application to the role of cabinet ministers in parliamentary government systems, where each minister has jurisdiction over a particular policy portfolio (Laver and Shepsle 1996). Just as in separation-of-powers regimes, public policy is not set on the floor of the legislature. The role of cabinet ministers as agenda setters within their own policy jurisdiction thus generates equilibrium outcomes that could not otherwise be achieved. Indeed, re-importing the same argument back into Congress, we find a case for seeing congressional committee chairs as filling some of the roles in the US system that are filled by cabinet ministers under parliamentary government.

### Integrating models of electoral and inter-electoral politics

Providing a rigorous and integrated theoretical analysis of the full process of political competition set out in the "big" model sketched in Figure 2.1 is an effectively impossible task. This is also not an appropriate objective for even the most able and ambitious political scientist. The main reason for this has to do with the sheer complexity of the overall system and its many component parts.

Imagine that Figure 2.1 captures every single thing that is important about political competition. And imagine that we have the mental resources to model every aspect of this entire integrated system in a plausible and rigorous way. The problem would now be that the resulting model would inevitably have "too many" parameters to be either elegant or useful. Models with too many parameters are aesthetically ugly. Even more important than this, they do not generate the clear insights and intuitions that are the very incentive for building models in the first place. But how can we possibly say without seeing the precise model that it has too many parameters?

We can answer this question simply by looking at a sketch of the model and imagining what will be involved in modeling any of its subsystems, and then modeling interactions between these. Most of the boxes in Figure 2.1 will involve at least one free parameter – indeed identifying such a parameter is to a large extent what we are doing when we draw a line around some aspect of the political process so as to put it in a box and describe it. So "citizens have diverse policy preferences"; the spatial distribution of these preferences will take at the very least one parameter to describe it. "Candidates state policy positions" and these stated positions are at last conceptually distinct from candidates' ideal points; any model that relates candidate ideal points to stated policy positions will have at the very least one trade-off (stress) parameter. "Electoral parties state policy positions"; models of how parties' stated positions emerge involve a series of trade-offs, each with at least one parameter – trade-offs between office and policy, between the diverse ideal points of party members and the stated position of the party, between long-term and short-term payoffs. "Citizens vote for candidates and/or parties"; this immediately identifies a trade-off in each citizen's mind between candidate and party characteristics, to which we add trade-offs for a citizen when deciding whether to vote at all. And so on . . . we need not belabor the point. The big model in Figure 2.1 must have a large number of free parameters.

This in itself would make the big model a very frugal source of intuition, even from the perspective of the "pure" theorist and before getting into the mind-boggling issues associated with estimating it empirically. We are not, after all, trying to build a political robot that resembles the real political system – like a robot dog that barks, runs around, wags its tail, jumps up on our laps, slurps its bowl of water, and even responds to

affection just like a "real" dog. The modeler's dream of a dog robot is an automaton that nobody can distinguish from a "real" dog. Given this, the modeler does indeed want the best possible model of a dog system and the parameter set, however huge, that best captures the doggieness of a real dog. As political scientists, however, we are always seeking the best possible intuition and understanding about political competition, and we gain this most effectively from simple models with small numbers of parameters that we can manipulate to explore counterfactuals in systematic ways. And to this we add the obvious point that actually specifying and solving the big model of political competition poses intellectual challenges that are likely intractable.

So why do we torment ourselves by looking at a sketch of the big model, when we know it is a sketch of something that can probably never be realized and would probably not be useful if it was indeed realized? We do this because, as we have already seen when discussing constituent parts of the big system in Figure 2.1, it is important for us to be consistent about the assumptions we make when analyzing political competition, and it may be substantively very implausible to ignore at least *some* of the key interactions between different subsystems in this process.

Thus, considering the motivations of politicians, it would surely be unsatisfactory to work with a spatial model that saw politicians as office seekers at elections and policy seekers after elections, without considering how this inconsistency is resolved in the minds of both politicians and the citizens who vote for them. The answer comes in reconciling models of elections and government formation, at least in this respect, and presumably making both models the better for this. This might involve making some explicit assumption about how politicians take the next election into account when forming a government, and some explicit assumption about how citizens evaluate, when deciding how to vote, any divergence between what each party promised at the previous election and what it did subsequently. These two features are not part of any current model of elections or government formation of which we are aware, but illustrate the point that taking account of obvious interactions between parts of the big political model – for the most part treated as self-contained entities, can be potent sources of better intuitions and enhanced models.

In a similar vein, considering the motivations of citizens when deciding whether and how to vote, we have to decide how realistic it is to assume that, when doing this, citizens forecast the likely election result and take account of the different coalition possibilities that this generates, conditional on the impact of the electoral system. A hyper-rational citizen might forecast the outcome of entire political process, and vote in such a way as to influence the policies implemented by the eventual government coalition. But would a citizen who is hyper-rational in this sense not also figure out that it is instrumentally rational not to vote at all, given the tiny probability that her vote will make a difference? We offer no solutions to

these questions here, simply noting that they are important questions that only come to light when we consider the interactions between different parts of the system.

## The dimensionality of policy spaces

A general problem that confronts any analyst who uses a spatial model of political competition has to do with determining the number and identity of the policy dimensions needed to generate a useful and valid representation of politics in any given setting. This is critical, because different models of political competition have different implications depending on whether decision making is seen as taking place within a policy space of one, two, three, four, or many dimensions. Most strikingly, many models make completely different predictions for policy spaces with one, as opposed to more than one, dimension. More generally, however, the precise dimensional configuration of the policy space under investigation has significant analytical implications.

This problem can in part, but only in part, be restated in terms the relative salience of different policy dimensions, a matter we discussed in Chapter 1. If only the same one (or two) dimension(s) are salient for all agents, then only one (or two) dimensions are needed for a valid representation of the policy space within which decision making takes



*Figure 2.2* Estimated ideal points of agents in a two-dimensional policy space.

place. Clearly, we do not need to consider dimensions that are completely unimportant for any agent. Thus, one fix on the dimensionality of the relevant policy space is the number of policy dimensions that have some importance for some agent.

Things are by no means so simple however, and this is not just for the practical reason that there may be many dimensions that are important to at least some agents. Once we begin to think about the need to specify the dimensional configuration of some policy space, we are forced to think more precisely about what a policy dimension might actually be, and to confront a distinction between what we might think of as *a priori*, and inductive, policy dimensions. To get a sense of this problem, consider the two-dimensional Euclidean policy space shown in Figure 2.2, showing the estimated positions of nine political agents in this. Is the "dimensionality" of this policy space one, or two? Each ideal point has estimated coordinates in a two-dimensional space, but the empirical configuration of these ideal points appears to lie more or less along a line. It certainly seems possible that the two estimates of ideal point locations, represented by the horizontal and vertical axes of Figure 2.2, are "really" measuring the same thing, perhaps with a little error – positions on the "latent" or underlying policy dimension shown as the broken diagonal line. We might thus come to the *inductive* conclusion that this policy space in Figure 2.2 is unidimensional, that the ideal points of agents could be validly represented as lying on the single diagonal line.

But now consider Figure 2.3. This shows a precisely identical set of ideal point estimates in a two-dimensional space. The only difference is that we have given substantive *a priori* meaning to the dimensions of the space. The horizontal (left–right) dimension represents an aspect of economic policy; the vertical (north–south) dimension represents of aspects a liberal–conservative dimension dealing with matters of personal morality. This grounds the space in some external reality using the *a priori* dimensions as what we might think of as "basis vectors." We can also reveal that the points are the estimated positions, on the basis of our expert survey, of Spanish political parties on these policy dimensions. Is the "dimensionality" of *this* policy space one, or two? The empirical configuration of ideal points is exactly the same and still appears to put these more or less along a diagonal line but, with the substantive information we now have, it is by no means so straightforward to decide this policy space is "really" one-dimensional. We certainly observe that the positions of party positions on the two *a priori* policy dimensions are very highly correlated – but in a sense we are simply describing an empirical finding that these positions are correlated when, on *a priori* grounds, they might well not have been. In this sense, what we observe is that, in this two-dimensional policy space, the parties have chosen positions on one dimension that can be predicted from their position on the other dimension. This is certainly a striking empirical finding. But it does not necessarily amount to a finding that this

*Figure 2.3* Estimated ideal points of Spanish political parties in a two-dimensional policy space with substantive basis vectors.

Spanish policy space is "really" one-dimensional. After all, the parties remain free to compete by changing their positions in this two-dimensional space, while new parties may enter the fray and articulate a position anywhere in the space.

There are thus two potential interpretations of Figure 2.3. One is that the Spanish parties have aligned themselves in a particular way in a policy space that is "really" two-dimensional. The other is that the two empirical measures that have been used – of economic and of "social" policy – are "really" two different ways of measuring a single underlying piece of structure in the system. (This would be almost as if we had asked the party leaders to tell us their height in inches, and also in centimeters, without being allowed to consult a conversion chart.)

The data themselves cannot tell us the "correct" interpretation and this leaves us with something of a conundrum. Since the data do not speak for themselves, choosing between dimensional representations of a given space is to a large extent a substantive modeling decision taken by the analyst. Leaving the choice of dimensionality to the analyst, however, is not entirely satisfactory in a context where different dimensional representations have different analytical implications. In its purest form, this problem

is insoluble. Later in this book, we do conduct a series of analyses that attempt to estimate the *inductive* dimensionality of different policy spaces. This provides what seem to us to be useful summaries of the types of structure in the empirical data that we observe in Figures 2.2 and 2.3. In a context in which we feel that there are theoretically important differences in the *a priori* meaning of two dimensions such as those in Figure 2.3, however, our estimates of inductive dimensionality should not be taken as advice that particular policy dimensions should be combined as if they were "really" different measures of the same underlying construct.

## Theoretical models and empirical policy positions

The entire portfolio of spatial models of political competition, some key features of which we sketched above, is huge. It has generated a literature that is probably too vast for any single scholar to come to terms with, a literature augmented relentlessly with the publication of almost any major political science journal. In this sense, the need for systematic and reliable empirical measures of the policy positions of political actors is overwhelmingly self-evident. We review the main methods for deriving such empirical measures in the following chapter. Here, we conclude by considering the different types of policy "position" that the different types of theoretical model require to be measured.

When we think of electoral politics, politics "above the line" in Figure 2.1, we think primarily of the policy positions of individual *citizens*, and of *candidates* for election. Typically, we think of the policy positions of citizens in terms of "sincere" policy preferences, and our core empirical task is to measure these preferences in a valid way, without disturbing them – putting the idea in someone's head that an issue is important, by asking a survey question about this for example. Essentially, however, public opinion surveys, when available, are the most obvious empirical data resource at our disposal.

Moving on to politicians, as we have seen, a substantial part of the spatial modeling literature operates on the assumption that the policy positions offered to voters by candidates are strategic rather than sincere. Given this, the task of measurement is more complex. This complexity is increased in light of the simple empirical fact that most candidates who contest elections are affiliated to some political party or other, with political parties each having stated electoral policy positions. It may be that there is no way of measuring directly the "sincere" policy preferences of practicing politicians, in a context where every observable action of a politician is potentially strategic. In such a context, measurements of the sincere policy preferences of any politician, when not metaphysical, rely on using some model of politics indirectly to infer sincere preferences from observable actions.

Setting aside political parties for a moment, this might imply inferring

politicians' policy preferences from their voting behavior in legislators (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), from their legislative speeches (Giannetti and Laver 2005b), or from their behavior in party congresses (Giannetti and Laver 2005a), or indeed from local election addresses and reports on local newspapers. For politicians who are affiliated to political parties, a further complication arises if we expect citizens to distinguish between the policy position of an individual politician and the position of the party to which s/he is affiliated, assumptions about which lie at the heart of several models of party competition (Levy 2004; Morelli 2004). Measuring the difference between a politician's policy position and that of his/her party implies that we have a clear sense of what the "party" position actually is.

As we have seen, many prominent spatial models of party competition sidestep the complex issues involved in distinguishing between politicians and their parties by assuming parties to be unitary actors. By implication all politicians are then taken to have the same policy position as that of the party to which they belong. Moving beyond this requires us to "get inside" political parties with some model of how the (presumably somewhat diverse) policy preferences of party members are mapped into a single party policy position, before we can have a clear sense of what "the" party policy position actually means. For example, we might assume that party policy is set by members voting, issue by issue, at a party congress – which might result in a party policy position at the center of the cloud of party members' ideal points. Alternatively, we might see party policy being set in a "take it or leave it" manner by an autocratic leader (or leadership faction), with party members being forced either to accept the policy package on offer, or to leave the party. Laver explores the impact of these two possibilities in a dynamic spatial model of party competition (Laver 2005). Whatever we choose as a model of the intra-party politics that maps many members' preferred policy positions into a single party policy, it nonetheless remains the case that many scholars have found it useful to describe electoral competition in terms of the interaction between the preferences of citizens and the policy positions of *political partie*s, however these party positions might have evolved. In short, to measure "party" policy positions is not in any sense to assume that parties are unitary actors, although it does assume that the composite party position has some political meaning.

This meaning might well, however, be different in different constitutional regimes. In a parliamentary government system in which legislative elections are in effect about making and breaking governments, and where governments are to a large extent put together by party leaders, it may be reasonable to assume that voters see voting for some candidate as a way of increasing the chance that this candidate's party will go into government. In this event the policy position of the party, rather than that of the individual candidate, will presumably be more important to the voter. In a

presidential government system such as the USA, where legislators do not make and break governments and where party discipline is as a consequence much weaker, the particular policy positions of the candidate, to the extent this is a guide to future relevant behavior, might be more salient for voters than some more general view of the position of the candidate's party. In this important sense, having reliable and valid information of the policy positions of political *parties* may be more relevant for parliamentary government systems.

Finally, when we turn to the inter-electoral phase of party competition, politics "below the line" in Figure 2.1, we must confront the problem that the positions of a "party in government" might be rather different from that of a "party in the electorate." For one thing, once we look inside political parties, the cast of characters is different. It is almost inevitable that a party in government will be a more exclusive club than a party in the electorate. To the extent that "party" policy is some mapping from the policy positions of relevant party actors, changing the cast of relevant actors may well change party policy positions. Thus the incentives and policy preferences of senior party politicians may well differ from those of the rank and file and many observers have a sense (often only vaguely articulated) that parties, especially more radical parties, become more conservative in office. Changes in inter-electoral policy positions may also arise from the need to do deals with coalition partners – whereby party leaders may give up certain policy objectives and then be required to defend the new policy position in government, bound by a constitutional rule of collective cabinet responsibility. Parties moving into the corridors of power may also change their views on what is, and is not feasible – whether influenced by the advice of a permanent civil service, or by the practical need to balance a budget. For many different reasons, inter-electoral politics is different and may generate different party policy positions. Almost no work has been done within political science to attempt to measure these differences.[4]

Thus, while we turn in the next chapter to discuss *how* to measure party policy, we conclude this chapter by noting that the matter of *what* we are measuring when we set out to measure party policy is by no means trivial. As with most scientific, and especially social scientific, enterprises, we could split hairs and refine our definitions until we concluded that it is impossible to define and measure anything in a rigorous and reliable way. We do not consider this a useful way forward. As we have argued in the conclusion to this chapter, it is of course important to be sensitive to what it is, precisely, we are measuring when we measure party policy positions. And we need to be sensitive to the possibility that different techniques that we could deploy might measure different things. Nonetheless, there is a wide variety of both formal models and more informal theoretical explanations of political competition that make use of a rather general notion of party policy. The sources of such policy positions, whether in intra-party

politics, inter-party competition, or indeed anything else, might be many and varied. For whatever reason, it remains the case that the generic notion of a "party" policy position remains something that we have good reason to measure. And it remains the case that there are many more sophisticated theories, constructed by highly intelligent people, than there are reliable and valid measures of the concepts that these theories deploy.

# 3   Empirical policy spaces

The spatial models of political competition we discuss in the previous chapter can be constructed either at the level of pure theory, or in a form that allows them to address politics in the real world. Many formal models are in effect self-contained and stylized "Platonic" systems of assumed motivations, institutions, and rules of interaction. Yet, at the same time, the authors of these models typically name the concepts they use in ways that refer suggestively to the real world. Thus modeled agents such as "voters" and "politicians" are given these sobriquets precisely because the claim is being made, at least implicitly and often explicitly, that these theoretical abstractions from reality do bear some meaningful resemblance to wet-life human "voters" and "politicians" who can actually be observed and touched. This in turn is often taken to imply, even if only rhetorically, that analytical implications of the theoretical model have something to do with reality. Indeed the authors of such models are only very rarely satisfied to present us with a purely Platonic system adorned with "political" labels – however beautiful this system might be. They are typically concerned to argue, often surprisingly informally, that their model addresses some aspect of real political competition. This brings us back to Reichenbach's distinction, discussed in Chapter 1, between mathematical and physical geometries – with the latter an essentially empirical enterprise that involves measuring the real-world. In the present context this means that the development of physical, as opposed to mathematical, spatial models of political competition depends upon the creation of a set of measuring rods that can be used to describe real-world spatial locations. In this chapter, we consider alternative types of such metaphorical measuring rods, and the extent to which different types of measurement instrument may be suitable for different types of spatial models.

## Measurement choices and trade-offs

In the empirical measurement of policy spaces, as in any practical activity requiring the use of tools, we select our instruments based on their fit to our objectives. Selecting tools typically implies making trade-offs. In this

section we explore some of these trade-offs, before discussing specific tools for measuring empirical policy spaces.

In order to operationalize the models of political competition described in the previous chapter, we need to estimate both the positions of political parties on various policy dimensions, and the relative importance of each dimension for each party. While party policy positions, as well as the weights attached by particular parties to particular policy dimensions, are fixed at any given point in time, they may change over time. Because these policy positions and weights are fundamentally abstract concepts, they *cannot be observed directly*. However there are many directly observable *manifestations* of these in the activities of parties, including political statements and speeches, election manifestos, legislative speeches, and legislators' voting patterns. Furthermore, citizens and elites, as well as experts, also gather "*secondhand*" information about party policy positions using numerous sources, notably the various communications media, though also via direct personal communication with others. Hence, while a party's position on some policy dimension may be fundamentally unobservable, a strong consensus may arise about its location – which in this sense may be treated as "common knowledge."

Nearly all observers of British politics, for example, would probably agree that the Labour Party moved towards the center of the political space under Tony Blair's leadership. Yet no purely physical evidence of this shift, beyond the types of manifestation we have just mentioned, will ever measure this shift directly. Thus, while we take the location of the British Labour Party's policy position as something fixed and real – manifested as common knowledge – no amount of archeological excavation, brain scanning, satellite imaging, or anything else will allow us to measure the party's "real" location directly. Instead, we must rely on either forming our own judgments based on first-hand manifestations of party policy positions, or on somehow accessing judgments of this formed by others. To do this scientifically, of course, we need a systematic method, a well-specified and properly tested procedure.

Given the theoretical and substantive importance of measuring real-world policy spaces, it should come as no surprise to find a considerable body of research devoted to precisely this problem – and coming at it from a range of quite different perspectives. These perspectives can be distinguished according to their answers to several key questions.

1  *Is the relevant evidence about policy positions "second-hand" or "behavioral?"* Behavioral evidence includes phenomena directly observable by the analyst – such as party statements, election manifestos, political speeches, and voting records. Second-hand evidence, on the other hand, typically consists of *evaluations* of evidence about policy positions by third-party analysts of these observables. These analysts may be real voters or politicians, whose views are collected in public opinion or elite

Table 3.1 Comparison of measurement approaches of party policy positions

| Characteristic | Expert surveys | Mass surveys | Politician surveys | Roll call votes | Manifesto analysis – CMP | Manifesto – analysis Wordscores |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evidential basis | Second-hand | Second-hand | Second-hand | Behavioral | Behavioral | Behavioral |
| Dimensionality level | Flexible | Flexible | Flexible | Low | Typically low | High |
| Scale epistemology | A priori | A priori | A priori | A posteriori | A posteriori | A priori |
| Estimand-observation link | Direct | Indirect | Indirect | Indirect | Direct | Direct |
| Observability of data | Complete | Partial – depends on response frequency per party | Selective – depends on response rate | Selective or incomplete – depends on application and existence of RCVs | Complete | Complete |
| Researcher resource commitment | Low | High | Low | Low | High | Low |
| "Sincerity" of observed behavior | High | High | Low | Medium | High | High |
| Reliability | High | Low | Low | High | Medium | High |
| Estimation uncertainty | Known | Known | Known | Knowable | Unknown | Known |
| Examples | This book; Laver and Hunt (1992); Castles and Mair (1984); Inglehart and Huber(1995); Marks and Steenbergen (2004) | Thomassen and Schmidt (1997); Van der Eijk and Franklin (2004) | Scully and Farrell (2003) | Poole and Rosenthal (1997); Clinton et al. (2004); Hix (2001) Hix et al. (2005, forthcoming) | Budge et al. (2001); McDonald and Mendes (2001) | Laver et al. (2003) Benoit and Laver (2003, 2005) |

surveys. Or they may be "professional" observers of politics of some sort, whose views may be collected using systematic methods such as expert surveys, or indeed in a more haphazard manner.

2   *What* a priori *assumptions are made, prior to measurement, about the nature of policy space being measured?* Two key questions arise here:

   a   *Do we assume the policy space to be high- or low-dimensional?* We have already noted that there is no such thing as the "true" underlying dimensionality of any policy space. We can define issues for consideration at a very fine-grained level and think in terms of an issue space of very high dimensionality. Or we can see most of the important features of the political system under investigation as being captured by agents' positions on a single underlying dimension. The type of space we want to measure depends upon the type of model we want to operationalize. The decisions we make on this important matter drive all subsequent measurement decisions, and thus the type of empirical data we generate.

   b   *Do we have* a priori *knowledge of the substance of key policy dimensions before we set out to measure agents' positions on these?* It may be that we know, in advance of measurement, the key substantive policy dimensions of the political decision-making space in which we are interested. Alternatively, we may be engaging in empirical research precisely to find out what these dimensions are. In the first situation we can adopt an *a priori* approach. Our task is to estimate agents' unknown positions on "known" dimensions that we explicitly specify when designing the research. Essentially, this approach assumes we know more about key substantive policy dimensions than we do about the positions of key agents on these dimensions. In the second situation we do not want to assume in advance that we know the number and substantive meanings of key policy dimensions, but instead want to treat these as open empirical questions. This *a posteriori* and quintessentially inductive approach sets its essential empirical task as finding the best-fitting empirical representation of the policy space under investigation, using techniques of dimensional analysis to infer latent policy dimensions and then interpreting the substantive meaning of these dimensions in terms of relative locations of key political agents on these. The approach thus assumes that we know more about the positions of key political actors, relative to each other, than we know about the substantive meaning of key policy dimensions. In a nutshell, the *a priori* approach assumes the substantive meaning of the dimensions and investigates the relative locations of agents, while the *a posteriori* approach assumes substantive meaning in the relative locations of key agents and uses this information to investigate the dimensional structure of the political space.

3   *What are the statistical properties of the estimated policy positions generated?* Estimation is a problem treated most formally in the field of statistics, where estimators have well-defined, different properties that are used to evaluate alternatives. However, estimators of party policy positions also have properties that may be compared when evaluating alternatives. *Precision* is one such property, which includes whether discrete or continuous scales, and/or whether five-, seven-, 20-, or 200-point scales are used. *Accuracy*, of course, is another key criterion, concerned with whether the measured position reflects a presumed "true" party position. *Reliability* is another important property of any measure, and concerns whether repeated measurements of the same party position would be likely to yield similar results. Finally, estimators may be distinguished by whether they come with accurate assessments of their associated *uncertainty*, providing some measure of confidence in a particular point estimate of the quantity being measured, in this case a party policy position.

This list articulates some of the fundamental scientific issues we confront when evaluating tools we might use to measure empirical policy spaces and the location of political actors within these spaces. These choices and trade-offs are themes to which we return many times during the rest of this chapter, in which we discuss various means of measuring policy spaces and locations.

## Surveys of citizens and politicians

On the face of things, perhaps the most obvious way to estimate the policy positions of either citizens or politicians is to ask them directly. As far as citizens are concerned, there is certainly a huge and rapidly expanding database of surveys dealing with the attitudes of citizens to many different matters in different countries at different times. These data sources take several forms.

First respondents may be presented with particular "synthetic" policy scales and asked to locate themselves on these, possibly also being asked to locate named politicians or organizations on the same scale. Such synthetic scales include, for example, a left–right scale or a scale that contrasts protecting the environment with encouraging economic growth. The danger inherent in this approach is that analytical scales that are meaningful to the researcher as ways of describing a policy space may not be meaningful to survey respondents – who out of politeness nonetheless answer the question rather than responding that the questions they have been asked are meaningless.

Although these are not directly related to politics, the findings of cognitive scientists on human perceptions of color are instructive in this context. Most models of the human color space (with which any reader who has

used a computer graphics package will be familiar whether they realize this or not) are three-dimensional – describing the set of all humanly perceived colors in terms of hue (typically using a color circle), saturation, and brightness. While there are different models of the human color space, all are three-dimensional and broadly analogous. Extensive empirical research on color matching by humans has confirmed that such models fit human perceptions of color very well indeed. Yet even a highly intelligent human would be incapable of describing a color he or she is looking at using the three analytical dimensions of hue, saturation, and brightness. These dimensions are constructed by analysts of human color perception. They do very systematically describe how ordinary humans *behave* but they themselves are not *perceived* by ordinary humans. We might for the same reason treat with circumspection survey data that are derived from asking respondents to place themselves on synthetic analytical policy scales – such scales may not actually mean anything to the respondents, or may mean quite different things to different respondents. Indeed there is strong evidence that this latter point is a significant problem. When Irish citizens were asked in an Irish election study to locate parties on synthetic policy scales, for example, respondents located parties in positions that were strongly influenced by their own views on the issues at stake. In addition, survey respondents' use of the scales bunched all parties toward the midpoint and typically avoided placing parties in either extreme quartile (Benoit and Laver 2005).

The way that psychological researchers draw maps of the "cognitive spaces" of real humans is to collect data on human perceptions of similarity and difference. Such perceptions are taken in some sense to be "natural" or "primitive," in contrast to the synthetic dimensional structure used by analysts to describe cognitive spaces. This synthetic dimensional structure is then inferred by analysts from data on human perceptions of similarity and difference, using techniques of multidimensional scaling. Very striking in this context is the fact that the analytical technique used to infer the dimensional structure of human perceptions of similarity and distance must inevitably make assumptions about the metric that best describes "distances" in this conceptual space. Thus the choice of metric is not just the abstract theoretical matter we discussed in Chapter 1, but a practical empirical concern – albeit one that is either ignored or not recognized at all by many empirical analysts of politics.

Cognitive scientists, when engaging in the multidimensional scaling of such data, typically see the choice as between a Euclidean and a city block metric. As we saw in Chapter 1, a considerable body of empirical psychological research suggests that the city block metric fits human behavior best when the dimensions of difference are "separable," and the Euclidean metric fits best used when they are "integral." For example, there is an empirical finding about human color perception that the hue of an object cannot be assigned without also assigning its brightness, so these two dimensions of perception are integral. In contrast the weight of an object can be assigned

quite independently of its temperature, so these two dimensions of perception are separable. It also seems likely that the ability to perceive an increasing number of *separable* dimensions of similarity and difference is an important part of human cognitive development during childhood.

These distinctions should also be important when we think about measuring the positions of real humans in political spaces. To do this involves scaling, which involves making assumptions about metrics. When we estimate real political spaces by analyzing survey data, for example, we can follow the cognitive scientists and take perceptions of similarity and distance as psychological primitives, inferring from data on such perceptions the dimensional structure of the underlying political space. Or we can attempt in some more direct way to estimate respondents' positions on substantive analytical policy dimensions – taking these positions as primitive and using an assumption about metrics to draw inferences about distances between points in the underlying space. Data are available in election surveys that facilitate both approaches.

Thus some survey questions ask respondents how "close" they feel to named and well-known politicians. These can be taken as revealing primitive perceptions of political similarity and can be subjected to multidimensional scaling using some assumption about the most appropriate distance metric. Opinion surveys typically also contain batteries of attitude questions. These in effect locate the positions of respondents in a high-dimensional attitude space, taken to be primitive, with one dimension for each question to which a response is given. This high-dimensional attitude space can then be subjected to some form of dimensional analysis to discover whether patterns in respondents' positions on coherent sets of attitudinal dimensions can be explained by a limited number of underlying "policy" dimensions. What is perhaps not fully appreciated by some scholars using this approach is that assumptions about cognitive metrics are inevitably embedded in such dimensional analyses.

For example, one scaling approach is to take a battery of attitude questions on matters considered on *a priori* grounds to be substantively related – attitudes on a series of "moral" issues, for example, or on the economy – and to analyze the extent to which respondents' answers to each of these questions can be combined into a single reliable additive (Likert) scale. Such a scale might be used to measure the "conservatism" of respondents on moral issues, for example, or of left–right positions on economic policy, and thereby to reduce positions in a high-dimensional attitude space to points on one synthetic analytical dimension. Note that the additive combination of survey items into a single Likert scale, common when survey data are used to estimate the scale positions of citizens, makes the implicit cognitive assumption about respondents that they use the city block metric when judging similarity and distance between agents in the attitude space. Cognitive scientists would tell us that this is the right thing to do if we think the component parts of the scale are separable – if we feel a person

can state a position on stem cell research, for example, without intrinsically needing to condition this position on their simultaneous positions on capital punishment and/or gay marriage. An alternative approach would be to use a data reduction technique such as factor analysis to search for latent dimensions, with which answers to batteries of attitude questions are correlated. Note that most factor analysis is based on least squares algorithms that minimize Euclidean rather than city block distances between latent dimensions and the observed measures from which they are constructed. Using factor analysis to derive respondents' positions from a high-dimensional attitude space thus makes different cognitive assumptions about how agents perceive political distance. Cognitive scientists would tell us that this is behaviorally more suitable for "integral" sets of issue dimensions, for which positions on one dimension intrinsically depend on positions on other dimensions – for example preferences on the relative proportion of public spending to be devoted, respectively, to education, defense, health, and welfare. Microeconomic theorists like Milyo, however, would, as we saw in the previous chapter, disagree with this on pure theoretical grounds. Indeed, estimating distinct policy positions on a set of policy dimensions that we have good *a priori* reasons to believe are non-separable raises complex methodological issues that have not to our knowledge been addressed in the analysis of real public opinion survey data. By default, such data are typically analyzed as if dimensions of the attitude space are cognitively separable – suggesting the use of a city block distance metric and the resulting additive scaling when sets of survey items are combined to give estimated positions on a single underlying dimension.

Overall, carefully designed and analyzed mass survey research remains the only practicable way to derive estimates of the policy positions of members of mass electorates. Hence "election studies" – mass surveys, carefully designed for explicit social and political research purposes – form the main source of data on policy positions for spatial models that use the ideal points of *citizens* as input: typically models found "above" the electoral system line in the "big" model of party competition set out in Figure 2.1. For accurate and reliable measurements of political actors such as politicians and parties, however, citizen surveys are beset by a number of problems. Mass survey research is useful for telling us how citizens *perceive* parties, but inherently problematic when used in estimating where these parties are *actually positioned* in relation to different dimensions of policy.

Turning now to the need to make inferences about the positions of politicians and political parties, the most obvious thing to do might seem to be to extend the logic of citizen surveys to estimate citizen positions, and use "elite" surveys that ask politicians directly about their own policy positions. This approach, however, is beset by problems when the goal is to obtain accurate and reliable estimates of party positions on policy. One key problem is the strong incentives for politicians to characterize party

policy positions – both their own and those of others – in a non-sincere fashion.[1] Politicians from more centrist parties, for instance, are more likely to rate extreme parties as extreme, while politicians from extreme parties are more likely to place such parties as being less extreme. In other contexts, centrist parties may have electoral incentives to attempt to differentiate themselves from close policy neighbors even when their actual differences are negligible. Indeed, many political parties tend to view representations of their policy positions as something to be carefully controlled. For political reasons, some political organizations explicitly forbid their members from participating in academic surveys. The British Labour Party, for instance, has allegedly issued instructions to its MPs not to respond to political questionnaires without explicit permission from the party leadership.

The other main problem with politician or elite surveys is purely practical, although just as limiting. It is nearly impossible to get high levels of cooperation from the members of any significant legislature in the time-consuming completion of an academic survey. In a 2000 survey of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), for instance, less than one-third of MEPs responded. Moreover, this low participation rate occurred despite the high expertise and reputation of the survey's principal investigators, and despite the fact that, more than most legislatures by its nature and the backgrounds of its members, the European Parliament is favorably predisposed towards academic research.[2]

To estimate the policy positions of politicians and parties, therefore, we need to turn to alternative sources of data, of which there are essentially two in addition to expert surveys. These involve the systematic analysis either of political text generated by politicians or of their legislative voting behavior.

## Analyzing political text

If we want to estimate the policy positions of politicians, one of the main sources of information at our disposal is political text. There are of course many different types of political text, but one authoritative source of information about the stated electoral policy positions of political parties is the official party manifesto. It might be argued that very few real voters read any party manifesto at all, while almost no sane voter peruses all party manifestos on offer and conducts an in-depth comparative analysis of these, basing her voting decision on the results of this analysis. Nonetheless the party manifesto is the official statement of party policy, to which the party can be held accountable – by critics, journalists, and expert observers of the political scene. In this sense, positions outlined in the party manifesto can be taken as "official" party policy.

The long-standing Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP) has conducted a systematic analysis of party manifestos over a long period of time, using

trained human readers to code, into a predefined 56-category coding scheme, every sentence of every manifesto investigated. Coverage extends to almost every party manifesto issued at every democratic election since World War II. This has generated a time series of the *electoral* party policy positions that spans the post-war era for most parties in most democratic states. The comprehensive coverage of this dataset has made it a popular choice with researchers, despite the fact that, theoretically, the CMP actual coding scheme very explicitly impounds a particular "saliency" theory of politics that is relatively far from the mainstream of recent spatial modeling and despite the fact that, methodologically, each CMP text is coded once and once only by a human coder, so that no policy position that is generated comes with any estimate whatsoever of associated error.

The theoretical basis of the CMP dataset is set out very clearly in the book *Mapping Policy Preferences* (Budge *et al.* 2001), hereafter *MPP*. The authors of *MPP* are unequivocal in arguing that the CMP data are fundamentally grounded in a "saliency theory" of party competition: "Not only coding categories but also rules for assigning textual units to them are shaped by theory" (p. 12). "[The] saliency theory of party competition is the one the manifesto codes and estimates are based on" (p. 76). For researchers who want to know about the theory that so firmly structures the data they are using, the authors of *MPP* could not be clearer about their assumptions. The first of these is "1. Party strategists see electors as overwhelmingly favouring one course of action on most issues. Hence *all party programmes endorse the same position*, with only minor exceptions" (p. 82, emphasis added). This clear statement lies at the heart of the saliency theory of party competition and therefore, according to the authors of *MPP*, at the heart of the CMP data that derive from this. The CMP data are not at all, according to the CMP, about party *positions* on particular policy dimensions; these party positions are all very explicitly assumed to be the same. Rather, the CMP data are ostensibly about the party-specific *saliency weights* of different policy dimensions.

The good news for those who have used CMP data to operationalize theoretical models, assuming that these were about party *policy positions* as opposed to *dimension weights*, is that the CMP did not actually use saliency theory when designing its own coding scheme for party manifestos. As a result of debates within the research team when the coding scheme was originally devised (Budge *et al.* 2001: 82–83), about half of the CMP coding categories are explicitly positional and do not derive directly from saliency theory. *MPP* openly admits that the inclusion of these categories "undermined the pure saliency nature of our framework" (p. 83) Reading the actual definitions of the remaining CMP coding categories, it quickly becomes clear that most of the remaining "saliency" coding categories are also explicitly positional rather than saliency driven. Most people, for example, would regard "centralization" and "decentralization" as opposite ends of the same policy continuum despite the fact

that they do not have "pro" and "con" attached to their labels. For numerous clear examples of this pattern, we refer the reader to Appendix III of *MPP*. Take the first coding category, "anti-imperialism," defined as "negative references to exerting strong influence (political, military or commercial) over other states; negative references to controlling other states as if they were part of an Empire; favourable mentions of decolonialization" and so on (Budge *et al.* 2001: 222). This is self-evidently not a saliency category dealing with, for example, attitudes to imperialism (pro and con). The issue *position* content in this definition could hardly be more explicit. This coding category is in fact one end of a bipolar variable for which the designers of the coding scheme have simply predicted that the other end is unlikely to be populated because imperialism is not very popular these days. The result is that any hostile mention of, or regret about, decolonialization that might be observed in a text does not contribute at all to the salience of the "imperialism" issue area, but must either be left uncoded or coded into some other category. The prediction that the other side of the issue will not be populated by party manifesto references can never be tested, furthermore, because the coding scheme actively prevents information from being collected on it.

This pattern has been systematically demonstrated by two of *MPP*'s authors, albeit writing in another context. McDonald and Mendes analyze the positional content of each of the *MPP* coding categories and conclude that "[i]t is not as if the MRG [CMP] coding is non-positional in policy terms ... Fifty-four of the fifty-six categories involve clear value statements." (McDonald and Mendes 2001: 91). One of the remaining two, "nationalisation, is actually directional" (McDonald and Mendes 2001: 92). There is thus actually just one of the 56 coding categories in the CMP coding scheme, "economic goals," that does *not*, according to the logic of *MPP*, undermine the assumptions of "saliency theory." In short, and probably much to the relief of the many third-party analysts who have used the CMP data to measure party *positions*, the CMP coding scheme is not in practice a "pure salience" scheme, as claimed so explicitly in *MPP*'s theoretical discussions. It is a *positional* coding scheme in which many of the potential positional categories have been censored in advance on the basis of the empirical expectations of the scheme's designers.

Human-coded content analysis is a painfully resource-intensive activity. Nowhere is this more true than for the CMP project, which is reported by *MPP* to have covered 2,347 manifestos, issued by 632 parties, in 52 countries (Budge *et al.* 2001: 95). And the CMP has coded many more manifestos since the publication of that report. Given the huge expense involved, the vast majority of the manifestos that form the basis of the CMP dataset were coded once only by a single human coder. A crucial consequence of this is that every single number in the CMP dataset, as in almost all other datasets generated by human-coded content analysis, is presented as a single point estimate with no estimate of associated error.

But there is surely error in these, as in all other, data. We get inklings of this in *MPP*'s discussion of Italian party positions. When the Italian manifestos were recoded by a different coder, the net result was a different set of left–right policy positions for the Italian Communist Party (Budge *et al.* 2001: 50 fn 2). The crucial implication of having no estimate of associated error is that, when evaluating the difference between the estimated positions of two parties (or the same party at two points in time), we have no way of knowing, systematically, whether these positions are "the same" or "different." The same two positions might be judged to be the same if they had large standard errors, or different if their standard errors were small. Absent such error estimates, however, it is impossible in the CMP data to distinguish measurement error from "real" underlying change in the policy positions under investigation.

Such problems, while almost inevitable given the huge cost of human coded content analysis, may soon be overcome by computerized text analysis. For example, Laver *et al.* (2003) recently proposed a language-blind computerized technique for political text analysis that retrieves valid party positions on *a priori* policy dimensions and reports associated standard errors. Essentially this technique estimates for one or more policy dimensions the (unknown) positions of a set of "virgin" texts under investigation, stating these positions in relation to the (known or assumed) positions of a particular set of "reference" texts. The reference texts are chosen at least in part because their positions on the policy dimensions under investigation are either known, or can uncontroversially be assumed. Patterns of relative word frequencies are first analyzed for the reference texts, allowing the computation, for every word in these texts, of a key conditional probability – the probability you are reading reference text $R_i$, given you are reading word $w$. Knowing or assuming the position of each reference text on each dimension under investigation, this conditional probability allows the computation of a dimension score for each unique word in the set of reference texts. This score reflects the expected position of a text on the dimension in question, given only that one is reading word $w$. Having computed these word scores, relative word frequencies for all of the virgin texts, whose policy positions are to be estimated, are then computed. This allows the computation of an expected position of each virgin text on each dimension under investigation, with associated standard errors, given the words it contains. The application of this technique was recently extended from manifestos to speeches in the Italian legislature, retrieving estimated policy positions for individual Italian legislators. Sooner rather than later, therefore, systematic research programs using computerized text analysis will provide alternative sources of information about the policy positions of individual legislators and, crucially, because they are statistically based, will provide estimates of the error associated with each policy position estimated.

The word scoring technique for computational text analysis, despite its alluring potential to analyze immense volumes of text written in languages

not understood by the researcher, is not however a magic bullet for those who are in the business of estimating policy positions. In the first place it requires good reference texts and valid estimates of the policy positions of these texts on the dimensions under investigation. These are not always available. In the second place computer word scoring runs into significant problems when it comes to generating long time series of the policy positions of particular texts' authors. Essentially this is because words change their political associations over time, which makes it difficult for us to know, if we estimate the positions of the same author of different texts, issued at different time points, whether any movement we observe can be attributed to a changing meaning of the words, or to a changing underlying policy position of the author.

This is not a problem unique to computer word scoring, however, just a particularly explicit manifestation of a fundamental problem in estimating any time series of policy positions. This has to do with whether any change we observe results from a change in the underlying policy positions under investigation or a change in the calibration of our measuring instrument. Thus, when we measure the height or the weight of human beings, we have no reason to suppose that our measuring instruments are themselves changing over time. We can therefore infer, when our measurements of height and weight change over time, that the height or weight of the subject has in fact changed.

We can for obvious reasons be much less confident in assuming that the calibration of any scale for measuring important features of the political system remains fixed over time. Thus the CMP has devised a very widely-used left–right scale for measuring party policy positions. This scale was devised in the early 1980s, from an inductive analysis of party manifesto content between about 1945 and 1985; the average manifesto used in this inductive analysis was thus written about 1965. The CMP's left–right scale's substantive content has remained fixed since it was devised. This scale, for example, did not include party manifesto positions on the environment as part of the left–right scale. As we shall see in Chapter 6, there is very strong evidence that party positions on the environment are indeed now part of our contemporary understanding of left and right in politics. The meaning of left and right has almost certainly changed over time to encompass attitudes on the environment. If a party in the CMP dataset starts talking more about the environment and less about other content categories in the CMP left–right scale, then it will appear to be becoming more centrist – measuring this using the CMP left–right scale. But we might well feel that this party is not "really" becoming more centrist at all – but rather that the scale we are using is getting progressively more "out of date."

We appear to be stuck between a rock and a hard place. If we do not change the definition of some policy scale in which we are interested, then it remains frozen at a particular time point and becomes progressively less

valid. If we do update the content to reflect the changing political reality the scale is intended to measure, then how do we compare scale positions before and after the scale's definition has been changed? In short, how *do* we measure a valid time series using some scale whose meaning we have good reason to suspect is changing over time? We are aware of no definitive solution to this problem on offer in the professional political science literature, although a directly analogous problem confronts economists when defining the bundle of good they use to measure "inflation," for example. But this problem is nonetheless something to be kept firmly in mind by analysts who intend to lay theoretical or empirical emphasis on observed movements over time, measured on some synthetic political scale.

### The analysis of legislative voting behavior

As far as the US Congress is concerned, the primary source of information on the policy positions of legislators has, as a matter of research practice, become the systematic analysis of roll-call voting data, with a remarkable recent coordination among scholars on using the NOMINATE technique. This very explicitly *assumes* a spatial model of party competition in which differences between the policy positions of legislators can be represented as Euclidean distances. Conditional on these assumptions, the spatial policy positions of legislators are retrieved by analyzing roll-call voting records, assuming that two legislators with more similar voting records can be seen as being closer to each other than are two legislators with more different voting records. The NOMINATE technique is a form of multidimensional scaling, and using this with a Euclidean metric comes close to the approach of cognitive scientists who feel that the underlying dimensions being analyzed are not separable. Given this setup, Poole and Rosenthal (1997: 22) give themselves the job of retrieving "the locations of 11,000 legislators and 70,000 roll calls from the 11,000,000 recorded individual decisions of Congresses stretching from 1789 to 1985." This is no mean feat, and the promise of generating extended time series of the estimated policy positions of every individual US legislator, given the partially overlapping memberships of consecutive legislatures, has made the Poole and Rosenthal approach extremely attractive to many other legislative scholars. What is particularly striking in an environment in which levels of party discipline, as we have seen, are relatively low, is that this approach allows us to plot what is happening inside legislative parties, and thereby to investigate the structure of intra-party coalitions and factions. Indeed this is actually the main thing that the NOMINATE technique does allow us to plot – so it is an appropriate data source of the positions of members of the US Congress in models that assume endogenous party discipline. If there are two opposing parties with rigid discipline in the sense that all Party X legislators always vote in the same way as each other and in the opposite way to all legislators from Party Y, then NOMINATE will simply

tell us that the two parties and their legislators are different – something we already know – and will add no metric information to this.

This highlights the fundamental problem that arises if we want to export techniques of Congressional roll-call analysis to political systems in which there are very high levels of legislative party discipline. In a multiparty system where party discipline is close to 100 percent, roll-call analysis might conceivably allow us to retrieve the positions of *parties*, rather than individual *legislators* – since legislators would be revealing their party membership in their voting record, rather than their ideal policy positions. However, since multiparty systems also beget coalition cabinets, and since members of such cabinets are bound together by constitutional rules of collective cabinet responsibility, it is likely that all parties in the executive coalitions will vote in the same way, despite having different policy positions. It is also possible that all members of a diverse opposition to the government will vote in the same way, and against the government. High levels of party discipline combine with the parliamentary government system, therefore, to undermine quite fundamentally the potential of roll-call analysis to give us useful information about the policy positions of either individual legislators or, indeed, of legislative parties.

The converse situation also presents a problem associated with measuring party positions on policy from roll-call voting analysis. When party discipline is low and voting sincere, estimates of legislator positions *from the same party* will vary significantly, often in both of the dimensions typically produced by NOMINATE. For investigating many questions about the behavior of individual legislators, such results may yield valuable insights into intra-party politics. One setting to which NOMINATE has been successfully exported, for example, is the European Parliament, where the absence of an executive sustained in office by the legislature, and consequently looser discipline among European party groups, combine to allow roll-call analysis to yield fruitful insights into party group cohesion and discipline. For producing point estimates of the policy positions of political *parties*, however, variance in NOMINATE scores raises the question of where the party's official position lies, within the cloud of points described by the positions of its individual legislative members. Substantively, it may not be warranted in all cases to assume that a party's position is simply the mean of its legislator's estimated ideal points. Methodologically, the assumption of party-as-mean also makes strong assumptions about underlying Euclidean distances, and also ignores the inherently spherical nature of NOMINATE estimates.

As with any empirical method of measuring positions in policy spaces, of course, the analysis of roll-call votes also confronts practical limitations regarding data availability. The great advantage of roll-call votes is that the study of this data requires no action or consent of the actors who generated it. Their great disadvantage, however, is that roll-call votes are unavailable or available only selectively in many contexts. In some

countries – for instance Ireland and Hungary – no roll-call votes are taken or recorded, making it simply impossible in these contexts to obtain estimates of the positions of either legislators or parties using roll-call analysis. In other contexts where roll-call votes are available, they are frequently highly selective, called strategically, perhaps in order to verify discipline among a party's own members or to expose a lack of discipline among a rival party's members. In the much-analyzed European Parliament, for instance, any vote can be made into a roll-call vote by request of a party group or 32 MEPs (from a current total of 732), and there is evidence that roll-call votes tend to be called on some issues more than others (Carruba *et al.* 2004). Consequently, roll-call votes tend to be called selectively and strategically, as well as only for certain issues, especially in the European Parliament. In addition to the selection bias this produces, the policy scales which roll-call vote analysis yields must be interpreted *a posteriori*, and these interpretations are by no means self-evident (see McElroy and Benoit forthcoming; Hix *et al.* 2005).

### Expert surveys

What we have just described might appear to be a considerable armory of techniques for estimating the policy positions, of both large numbers of voters and smaller numbers of "elite" politicians or political parties. So why do we need expert surveys? In this last section we address this question, discussing epistemological and practical advantages of the expert survey method.

Expert survey methodology has been used in such diverse fields as cognitive psychology, decision analysis, statistics, sociology, cultural anthropology, and knowledge acquisition. It entails the use of specific procedures to identify experts, define the problem, and elicit and characterize the experts' collective judgment. Expert judgment data are typically used as a means of providing information when other sources, such as direct measurements, observations, or experiments are unavailable. In these situations, expert judgment may be useful (a) to provide estimates of complex or difficult to observe phenomena, (b) to forecast future events, and (c) to integrate or interpret existing data. Substantive problems to which expert judgment has been applied include:

- assessing the social and economic impact of the spread of HIV/AIDS (CINSSA Ltda 1997);
- studies of climate change;
- economic forecasts;
- risk assessment; and
- estimating empirical policy spaces in political science (Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992; Inglehart and Huber 1995; McElroy and Benoit forthcoming; Marks and Steenbergen 2004).

A common factor in these applications of expert judgment is its use to estimate quantities that are difficult or even impossible to observe directly. Frequently, such measurements will involve qualitative judgments, almost always converted into quantitative information in the form of ordinal or interval scales. Nearly everyone will be familiar with the scoring of gymnastic, skating, and diving events in the Olympic Games, for example, where performance quality is estimated by panels of expert judges applying predefined criteria. In academia, expert surveys (peer review) form the basis for evaluating many important decisions, ultimately determining whether grant proposals are funded and whether individuals are granted tenure or promotion. Indeed, the anonymous peer review process by which journal editors solicit opinions on the publishability, or otherwise, of almost any academic paper is in itself a form of expert survey.

Turning to the more specific task at hand, using expert surveys to measure empirical policy spaces involves the *a priori* identification of salient dimensions of policy competition and the location of political parties on these dimensions, based on systematically collected judgments of political experts. To locate a party's economic policy position, for instance, an expert survey might present a ten- or 20-point scale anchored by two short characterizations of an extreme left position on one end, and an extreme right position on another, and ask respondents to locate each party at a position on the scale. The expert scorings of each party on the economic left–right policy dimension are then summarized statistically in order to measure the party positions, as well as the degree of certainty and consensus over these positions. In this particular context, "experts" are defined as people with expertise in party politics in their own national contexts, having considerable knowledge about the policy positions of those parties. Deciding which experts to select for such surveys is extremely important, of course, and we return to this matter in the next chapter. When chosen properly, however, experts who are knowledgeable in a field are much more capable of rendering accurate information than those who are less knowledgeable, and have also been shown to be less prone to overestimate the confidence of their answers. In addition, research results show that experts are less subject to biases than non-experts; not only do they possess superior knowledge, but they also are far less affected by ordering effects and other irrelevant factors. For these reasons, when using "secondhand" sources of data as opposed to direct behavioral manifestations of the underlying constructs to be measured, expert surveys are viewed as superior to the alternative of asking mass publics to identify parties' locations in policy spaces.

Expert surveys are fundamentally grounded in the *a priori* approach to measuring empirical policy spaces, since they almost invariably proceed by presenting predefined scales and asking respondents to use their best judgments to locate specified political actors on these scales. The underlying assumption is that the key substantive policy dimensions in a particular

context can be identified in advance of the location of party groups, based on substantive expert understanding of potentially salient policy issues. The unknowns which experts are then asked to estimate are the locations of each party group on these *a priori* dimensions. The estimates of party group positions are then taken to be the statistically aggregated judgment of the experts, on each predefined dimension. Unlike factor analytic scorings, constructed scales, or locations in a purely inductive space from multidimensional scaling analyses, expert survey summaries eliminate the need for subjective and often *ad hoc a posteriori* interpretation of results in terms of substantive policy scales.

Expert surveys provide measures that are explicitly second-hand in their approach to observation, rather than attempting to measure policy positions based on observable first-hand evidence. Especially in fluid political situations, this may indeed be one of the most attractive properties of expert surveys. Any inductive technique ultimately relies on expert judgment to judge the validity of *a posteriori* interpretations of results but, in fluid or new political contexts, this judgment may be hard to form, or may overwhelm the evidence, especially if first-hand evidence is scant. In a very real sense with all *a posteriori* interpretation, the analyst sets up him- or herself as an expert panel of one. Expert surveys, on the other hand, collect the best knowledge and wisdom of a population of experts, based on their evaluation of all the evidence at their disposal, and summarize their consensus in a set of tractable estimates. Indeed, when trying to resolve which method of estimating party positions is "best" in a given context, we typically fall back on the expertise and wisdom of political experts. By extension, then, we see systematic collection of judgments of political experts on party locations as the best way to harvest this collective knowledge, which by its nature takes into account all available and relevant information about a party group's position, including voting behavior, political speeches, debates, expressed opinions of party leaders, and so on. Studies of different forecasting techniques, for instance, have demonstrated that surveys of expert opinion, in addition to being efficient and economic, do very well in terms of accuracy because they reflect the most up-to-date core assumptions. Even though experts will vary in their judgments, we can combine and summarize these judgments as a substantive indication of a party's likely set of policy locations. In short, our best estimate of party positions on policy resides in the consensus of experts, available through systematically collected and summarized expert judgments.

Some measure of the ultimate authority of expert judgments may be seen in their use to cross-validate the other means of measuring empirical policy spaces reviewed in this chapter. Once we have used some measurement instrument, such as the coding of text or the scaling of roll-call voting behavior, to estimate the policy positions of political actors, it is of course vital to assess the validity of our estimates. At its simplest, validity

in this context has to do with the correspondence between our measurements, for example, of some party policy position and the actual "real" policy position held by the party. Because parties' "real" policy positions are intangible and ultimately unknowable, however, we must proceed more indirectly. The two most commonly used approaches we find in published work in this field are to assess the "face validity" of the resulting estimates, and to compare new estimates with authoritatively published and cited alternatives.

A conclusion that a set of estimated policy positions does indeed have face validity essentially relies upon an informal judgment that these estimates have certain familiar and expected properties – for example that the positions of prominent actors are more or less in their "correct" places. But who is to say what is, and what is not, "correct?" Such judgments of face validity must inevitably be grounded, explicitly or implicitly, in the accumulated knowledge of country specialists. If we were to challenge a judgment that a particular set of estimates has face validity, in other words, we would almost certainly be referred to published work by a relevant country specialist. A clear example of this approach can be found in more recent publications by the Comparative Manifestos Project, in particular their book *Mapping Policy Preferences*. In this, the face validity of the CMP's left–right ideological scale is investigated by assessing the substantive plausibility of its measured movements of party left–right positions in a series of country-by-country discussions. The ultimate arbiters of this "plausibility" are in practice selected specialists in the politics of each country, whose published work is cited in *MPP*'s footnotes as validating the CMP estimates.

A conclusion that an estimated set of policy positions has been cross-validated against an independent published alternative is, of course, only convincing if this independent source is itself widely accepted as valid – as some sort of benchmark against which to measure alternatives. And who are the arbiters of a valid benchmark in this case? Once more, either explicitly or implicitly, we are likely to be referred to the judgments of selected country specialists. When two sets of published estimates differ in substantively significant ways, then how do we resolve the situation? We can either engage in a methodological investigation of the potential sources of this difference, or we can appeal to some independent third-party arbiter of substantive validity. Once more, we will be led to rely on the substantive knowledge of country specialists.

All of this is rather obvious, but the implications are rather deeper than many have appreciated. We have no access to "real" policy positions against which to validate any particular estimate of these. We therefore rely, in assessing the validity of such estimates, on some professionally established benchmark. The validity of the benchmark ultimately derives from substantive judgments by specialists in the politics of the political system under investigation. The obvious problem when doing this is that,

since country specialists are never in complete agreement on any matter, and since their discursive writing is always subject to *a posteriori* interpretation by the reader, there is a danger that the work of country specialists will be used at best haphazardly and at worst rhetorically when resolving any issue about the content validity of particular empirical estimates. What expert surveys of a population of country specialists do, on the other hand, is to summarize their accumulated knowledge in a systematic way, seeking an unbiased estimate of their judgments on particular matters that are specified *a priori*. As such, expert surveys may well be the most systematic source of reference on questions that might arise about the validity of estimates derived using other methods.

Beyond the methodological advantages of expert surveys, there is also an enormously compelling practical reason for their use: practicality. Expert surveys may be deployed quickly and inexpensively, to derive systematic estimates of policy positions, on a similar basis, across a wide range of countries. Given their relative ease of setup, it is a fairly simple matter to survey experts at any given time point, without the fixed costs of a huge data-gathering project, detailed document coding, time-consuming interviews, or costly opinion surveys. This is a far less "noble" justification than the scientific need for systematic benchmark estimates, but it is no less persuasive. Using the expert survey method, we were able in a relatively short period of time to estimate the positions of all significant political parties in 47 countries, on a common set of policy dimensions, as well as on a series of country specific dimensions. This is a task that would have been extraordinarily resource intensive and time consuming for any of the other techniques we have been discussing. There is also a considerable demand from cross-national researchers for multidimensional estimates of party positions on a standard set of policy dimensions, a demand attested to by the wide range of usage and citation of this current book's precursor, *Policy and Party Competition* (Laver and Hunt 1992). In many settings, therefore, expert surveys may simply be the most efficient way to generate a reliable dataset and, for the reasons we have discussed in the previous paragraphs, it is certainly arguable that they also provide the most scientific benchmark against which to assess the content validity of other estimates of the policy positions of key political actors.

## Conclusion: advantages of the expert survey method

To summarize the preceding discussions, several cogent justifications follow for the use of expert surveys when compared to other methods. To begin at a practical level, one huge advantage of expert surveys is an attractive combination of economy and access. Not only do expert surveys typically require little time and expense to conduct, but they also enable researchers to explore policy spaces in almost any context, regardless of the availability of more problematic first-hand data. Expert surveys may

thus be used as a research tool to explore empirical policy spaces independently of the systematic practical availability of behavioral data such as speeches, elections, party manifestos, or roll-call votes. Put very crudely but nonetheless realistically, data for many of the countries covered in the expert surveys reported in this book would probably have been unavailable using any other means. This is no small advantage.

Another compelling advantage of expert surveys arises from their very explicit use of the *a priori* approach to estimating key political parameters. First, informal surveys of expert judgment may be used to identify key policy dimensions in each country, ensuring that substantive expertise guides the selection of the precise scales to be applied in each context. Following on this, the use of predefined scales provides complete flexibility for designers of expert surveys to treat policy spaces as high-dimensional or low-dimensional, depending on expert knowledge in context. Other more explicitly behavioral methods, such as the analysis of legislative roll-call votes, do not offer such choices. Finally, the use of predefined scales eliminates any ambiguity or guesswork from interpreting final results, minimizing *ad hoc* interpretation of results by the researcher and the consequent (quite possibly unconscious) temptation to read substantive meaning into the tea leaves that appear to form patterns when in fact there are none.

Another advantage relates to the statistical character of expert sampling, namely the property that gathering more information increases our certainty in the accuracy of our estimates (something we explore in detail in the next chapter). Researchers using expert surveys have control over their sample sizes, furthermore, and it is fairly economical to add more experts to a survey as informational requirements dictate. Moreover, it is possible, using well-understood statistical rules, to quantify the uncertainty associated with any estimates of policy location that expert survey scores produce.

A final, deeper justification for using expert surveys lies in the ability of expert consensus, summarizing the state of the art of knowledge and expertise, to provide the ultimate means of estimating intangible and ultimately unobservable empirical policy spaces. Political scientists may with some justification consider what they do to be science, but we nonetheless lack the physical measurement benchmarks of many of the empirical natural sciences. In politics, there is no equivalent of the atomic clock against which to calibrate alternative measurements of time, and no universally accepted measuring stick against which to calibrate alternative measurements of distance. When discussing alternative approaches to measuring the key parameters of political spaces, we often make reference to the need to appeal to the "accumulated wisdom of country specialists," whether used implicitly or explicitly, when assessing the substantive content validity of particular empirical measurements. The obvious problem when doing this is that, since country specialists are never in com-

plete agreement on any matter, and since their discursive writing is always subject to *a posteriori* interpretation by the reader, there is a danger that the work of country specialists will be used at best haphazardly and at worst selectively when resolving any issue about the content validity of particular empirical estimates. What expert surveys of a population of country specialists do, on the other hand, is to summarize their accumulated wisdom in a systematic way, seeking an unbiased estimate of their judgments on particular matters that are specified *a priori*. As such, they may well be the most systematic source of reference on questions that might arise about the validity of estimates derived using other methods. Instead of referring to a haphazard selection of country specialists when assessing the "face validity" of some estimate, our best estimate of the collective wisdom of the population of country specialists is available in more systematically collected and summarized expert survey results.

# Part II

# Measuring policy positions

# 4   Measuring policy positions

In Part I of this book, we explored theoretical issues generated by describing political competition in terms of "policy spaces" and surveyed different means of mapping these spaces into the world of real political actors. Set in this context, the primary purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive, accurate, and reliable database of the policy positions of political parties. The previous chapter outlined a range of general issues relating to the measurement of empirical policy spaces and described the advantages of the expert survey method. In this chapter, we describe our own use of expert surveys to estimate both the locations of political parties on key dimensions of policy, and the relative importance of each dimension for each party.

## Designing the expert survey

Our approach to measuring empirical policy spaces was to conduct a set of systematic surveys, one survey for each political system under investigation, of specialists on the politics of the country concerned. The objective was to collect the information required to locate all politically relevant political parties on a wide range of policy dimensions associated with party competition, in as many countries as possible with a tradition of free elections and competitive party systems. The surveys were conducted from 2002–03, covered 47 countries, resulted in 1,491 valid expert responses, locating 387 different political parties on scales relating to a total of 37 unique policy dimensions. This section describes key operational decisions determining the design of our surveys. In Appendix A, we discuss more detailed aspects of our survey methodology and describe diagnostic tests we performed on the dataset we generated.

### Choosing countries

As with its predecessor (Laver and Hunt 1992), our study was designed to cover as many countries as possible in which competitive elections are held. We were able to include 47 countries from four continents, far more comprehensive coverage than any other survey of its type. Our survey did

not include countries from Latin America, Africa, or Asia (outside of Japan). The decision to exclude these regions was mainly a practical consequence of limited resources. Given the reality that it would not be feasible to include all of the world's democracies in our survey – some 121 of the world's 192 governments in 2003, according to the Freedom House survey (Freedom House (US) 2003) – we made the decision to cover one region, Europe, as thoroughly as possible. Our primary focus was thus on European democracies, covering every country from Iceland to Russia, plus Turkey and Israel. Five countries outside of Europe, broadly defined, were also surveyed: the long-standing English-speaking democracies of the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as Japan. While almost all of the political systems we surveyed were independent states, there were some exceptions. In the United Kingdom, for instance, we surveyed Northern Ireland and Britain separately. The Serbian region of Serbia and Montenegro was also surveyed separately from its federation.

Because of the decision to cover all, and not just the major, countries of Europe, our survey mapped policy spaces that have never previously been explored. Our placements of parties in countries such as Albania, Moldova, and the former republics of Yugoslavia – especially Macedonia – provide data on countries usually excluded from cross-national data-gathering exercises. Table A.1 in Appendix A provides the full listing of the countries we surveyed.

### Identifying experts

The first step in each survey was to identify the population of experts whose judgments we wished to aggregate. Since the quality of expert survey data is directly influenced by the quality of the expert panel, this selection must be performed very carefully. The typical expert in our survey was an academic specializing in political parties and electoral politics of his or her country. These people were generally familiar with surveys and most would previously have participated, conducted, or employed the results from surveys of some form or other dealing with politics in their areas of expertise. Our method for identifying experts was the following. First, we contacted the national political science association of the country, if such an organization existed, with a request for its membership lists.[1] When no political science association existed, as was the case in many countries, especially post-communist states, we used a "snowball" strategy where we started with a very short list of well-known experts from the country, and asked each to name as many additional experts as possible. We then contacted each of those experts, asking them in turn to name as many additional experts as possible. In addition, we scoured the lists from universities and non-profit organizations in search of additional experts. The vast majority of our experts were drawn from academia or

research institutes and, with extremely few exceptions, excluded both journalists and political actors.

## Identifying political parties

The parties we asked experts to locate included all that were politically relevant, a definition that included parties meeting any one of three criteria. First, we automatically included every existing[2] national political party that won seats in the national legislature at the country's most recent election. Second, we included every existing national party that had won at least 1 percent of the vote nationally at the country's most recent election. Finally, we included any other parties that local experts informed us were politically relevant despite not meeting the other two criteria.[3] Most of the parties included using the third criterion were found in post-communist contests where party systems were not fully consolidated or were undergoing rapid change. In such cases we relied on the advice of local experts to guide in the definition of political relevance.

The decision to represent all politically relevant parties generated a long list of parties in some countries, requiring experts to locate up to a dozen parties or more. For instance, experts were asked to locate the policy positions of 13 parties in Slovakia, Italy, and Bosnia, 12 in Israel and Poland, and 11 parties in six other countries. The list of parties in a few countries was quite small – two in the United States and three in Cyprus – but the typical number was much higher. The median number of parties, over the 47 party systems we covered, was eight. We included as many parties as we feasibly could because even small parties can be crucial for the analysis of political competition. It is quite common for parties winning tiny seat shares to play important roles in forming governments, and/or other key roles in important aspects of party competition. Parties' electoral fortunes also fluctuate, sometimes quite wildly, between elections; excluding smaller parties based on vote or seat share at one point in time could lead us to exclude parties playing significant roles in party competition over a longer period. Our answer, therefore, was to err on the side of caution and include as many parties as might conceivably be relevant.[4]

## Identifying policy dimensions

Survey instruments of any sort require careful design, and expert surveys are no exception. The questions of interest must be clearly identified and item wordings must be carefully chosen to elicit valid responses on these questions. The *a priori* nature of our expert survey method for measuring policy positions means that the questions of interest concern the policy dimensions on which parties are to be located. Selecting these dimensions and defining them carefully are thus key aspects of our research design, which reflects several important choices.

First, we made the decision to measure party policy positions in *high-dimensional spaces*. The main aim in our study was to measure party positions on policy on as many separate dimensions as our local experts deemed politically relevant for any given country. The downside of this decision was to increase the length and complexity of our survey instrument, potentially affecting reliability. (We report checks for this potential effect in Appendix A and the results imply that the effect was present but very small.) The upside was to obtain separate locations for political parties on a wide range of policy dimensions whose substantive meanings were deemed separable. This approach sharply distinguishes our study from other expert surveys of party policy, since these typically bundle policy positions into lower dimensional spaces. Castles and Mair (1984) for instance, asked experts to locate parties on a single left–right scale. This approach was also followed by Inglehart and Huber (1995), although they also allowed respondents to include one other dimension of the respondent's own choice. Marks and Steenbergen on the other hand, asked experts to locate parties on two dimensions, one dealing with socio-economic left–right positions and the other with a contrast between "traditional/authoritarian/nationalist" and "green/alternative/ liberal" values (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). All of these studies measure policy positions in spaces determined *ex ante* to be low-dimensional. Our approach, in stark contrast, was to estimate party policy positions on the most elemental dimensions that local experts deemed validly measurable; no valid configuration of policy positions is excluded because the underlying dimensions were bundled together *by design*. This is of course a quite distinct matter from the *empirical observation* in some particular setting that some policy dimensions may tend to be bundled together in practice, in the sense that party positions on these dimensions are highly correlated.

A second important feature of our expert survey is that it *deployed a core set of policy dimensions in every country surveyed*. The great advantage of this is to collect observations using directly comparable policy scales for all the countries studied. This enables the possibility of cross-national comparisons, something that within-country inductive methods such as roll-call vote analysis or factor analysis do not allow. The potential disadvantage of this approach is that, in the attempt to devise policy dimensions that can be applied to all party contexts, we risk ending up with a set of scales so generic that they do not apply meaningfully to any particular national context. The policy dimension contrasting moral liberalism and conservatism, for example, referred to party positions "on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia." In pretesting of the set of dimensions to be deployed in each country, many experts told us this question only partially applies to "their" country. The issue of abortion, for instance, was virtually absent from the political discourse of parties in Hungary and some other countries, although homosexuality (issues such as gay marriage) was occasionally discussed. Similarly, gay rights might no

longer be a live political issue in some Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands.[5] In some countries, such as the United States, all three issues defining the "liberalism vs conservatism" scale were salient and divisive. The temptation in tailoring policy dimensions to each country is to include in the question wording only issues known to be salient in that context. The strong reason not to do this, however, is that it compromises scale comparability when data are used across countries or even across time in the same country. Our solution to this problem was to err on the side of comparability, maintaining a common dimension text wording to apply to all political parties in all countries for the *core* set of policy dimensions investigated. We made only very rare exceptions to this, at the strong insistence of local experts.[6]

A hard core of four substantive policy dimensions was thus deployed in every country covered in our survey; a fifth was deployed almost as widely. The core four were:

- economic policy (interpreted as the trade-off between lower taxes and higher public spending);
- social policy (interpreted as policies on matters such as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia);
- the decentralization of decision making;
- environmental policy (interpreted as the trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth).

The fifth dimension, deployed in almost all countries, concerned state involvement in economic regulation, interpreted in non-post-communist states as "favoring high levels of market regulation versus deregulation," and in post-communist cases as "favoring state ownership of business and industry versus private ownership."[7] Our implementation of this dimension thus highlights another important feature of our approach: the decision to apply a different set of policy scales to the 19 post-communist countries in our study. Although the four core dimensions were also deployed in all post-communist countries, a secondary set of dimensions was used in post-communist contexts that were not deployed in other countries. This is because countries engaged in transitions to democracy and free market systems from state socialism experience policy competition of a different nature (Kitschelt 1999) and can involve higher electoral volatility, party system instability, and less stability with regard to issue positioning (see Zielinski 2002). The additional dimensions applied to the post-communist cases were:

- treatment of former communists (permitting the full participation of former communist rulers in democratic politics, versus prohibiting their involvement);
- access to foreigners to purchase and own land;

- freedom of the mass media to publish any material it sees fit, versus regulation of media in the public interest;
- nationalism versus cosmopolitanism (in the approach to history, culture, and national consciousness);
- promotion of religious versus secular principles in politics;
- promotion of urban versus rural interests.

A dimension relating to immigration policy was also applied in many countries. This contrasted support for the full integration of immigrants and asylum-seekers with support for returning immigrants to their countries of origin.

In the European cases we covered – the vast bulk of countries in the survey – we also measured party policy in relation to the European Union. Numerous expert surveys have measured party policy towards European integration, including surveys by Marks *et al.* (2006), Marks *et al.* (2002), Ray (1999), Meyer *et al.* (2002), and Whitefield *et al.* (in press). None, however, covered all of the 39 European countries included in our survey, nor measured at the same time the non-EU dimensions of policy that we include. Following extensive discussions with specialists on the impact of the EU on European national politics, and in the context of our participation in a quite separate research project on precisely this matter,[8] our questions on European integration were designed to measure party policy towards Europe on two critical dimensions:

- scope of EU policy authority: whether the domain within which the EU can authoritatively make policy decisions should be expanded or restricted; and
- approach to EU governance: whether EU institutions should provide direct links to citizens through representative institutions such as the European Parliament, or should be controlled instead by national governments.

We also included a measure of a party policy on the issue of expanding the role of the EU in collective security, peacekeeping, and other military affairs (or the role of NATO for countries in that organization but not in the EU, such as Turkey). For countries not yet in the European Union, including the ten states that joined in May 2004,[9] we asked only a single question relating to support or opposition for joining the EU.

In all cases, dimensions chosen for a specific country were pre-screened by at least two country experts who provided feedback on fit of dimensions to the particular country context. In rare cases this resulted in the deletion of dimensions, but more often it resulted in the addition of "local" dimensions important only in that country. In Northern Ireland, Britain, and Ireland for example, parties were also located on a dimension regarding policy towards Northern Ireland. Similar country-specific ques-

tions were added in Canada (regarding Quebec sovereignty), Palestinian statehood (Israel), and national identity (Japan). Other dimensions applied in only a few cases included civil liberties, relations with Russia, defense policy, and health care.

Two scales on which we asked experts to locate parties were quite distinct from the others. The first was defined as an explicit left–right dimension. Following the questions asking experts to place the parties on specific policy scales, we asked experts to locate each party's position on a general left–right scale. Explicitly leaving the precise interpretation of left and right to the country specialists being surveyed, we asked them to "locate each party on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account." Including this scale allowed us to draw important conclusions about the meaning of "left" and "right" in specific national contexts, discussed at some length later in Chapter 6.

The second distinctive scale on which we asked experts to locate each party characterized how close it was to the expert's own personal policy preferences, taking all aspects of party policy into account. The purpose of this question was, following Laver and Hunt, to test for respondent bias by checking whether expert placements of parties on substantive dimensions were correlated with their personal sympathy for a party's policies (Laver and Hunt 1992). Appendix A provides the results of a huge battery of tests we ran to test for such respondent bias, something also discussed later in this chapter. The conclusion of these tests, however, is that there was no systematic bias in expert placements introduced by their personal political views – a conclusion replicating similar tests conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992).

Each scale deployed in each survey was given a precise title, and was anchored at each end with two precise substantive definitions of the scale end points. To take one example, the main economic policy dimension we deployed was defined as (1) "Promotes raising taxes to increase public services" and (20) "Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes." Precise English language wordings for all scale definitions and end points are given in Appendix A.

### Questionnaire format

Following a cover letter explaining the survey and its purpose, a sample sheet listed the parties to be located on each policy dimension, and provided an example of how the parties should be located on the scale dimensions provided in the questionnaire. For the same reasons as Laver and Hunt, and in order to maintain comparability with subsequent surveys using the same format, we used a scale running from one to 20, with the lower position indicating the typically "left" position and the higher value the traditionally "right" position (Laver and Hunt 1992). The use of the 20-point scale permits experts to distinguish the positions of many more

parties than would a scale with fewer positions, something that becomes essential when the number of parties approaches two digits – as it did in many of the countries we covered.

Respondents were presented with one policy dimension at a time, and asked to indicate where on the scale each party was located. In addition to the party's policy *position*, respondents were also asked to assess the *importance* of that policy dimension to each party, also on a 20-point scale. Finally, as we have already indicated, respondents were asked to place each party on an overall left–right scale as well as to indicate how close they felt was each party's policy position to their own views.

In a departure from the Laver and Hunt (1992) survey design, we did not ask respondents to consider separately the positions of party leaders and party voters. Not only were there few discernable differences between the two in the Laver–Hunt data, but only leader positions have tended to be used by researchers employing the Laver–Hunt data.[10] Nor did our survey ask respondents to provide information about internal party politics or activists, data which were also never used in subsequent research using the Laver–Hunt data. Given the onerous task of completing surveys asking the locations of typically eight parties on typically ten policy dimensions, with two scales (position and importance) for each dimension – plus the general left–right and sympathy dimensions – we felt that sacrificing other little-used information was justified by the need for quality measures on the key data, which have to do with policy locations and importance.

In an effort to increase both the quality and quantity of expert respondents, we translated the survey questionnaires into native languages in every case where local experts advised doing so. This led us to translate the questionnaires and cover letters into a total of 22 different non-English languages (see Table A.1 of Appendix A and Table 4.1). Each translation was performed by a native speaker of the target language, and checked by at least one other native speaker who had the original English-language document at his or her disposal for comparison. Non-native English experts were thus typically not forced to respond to an English-only questionnaire; indeed, in cases where the questionnaire was translated into a native language, many of the experts we surveyed did not speak English. Non-English native languages were used to reach 34 different expert target groups in all. English was used as a substitute for native languages mainly in the Scandinavian countries, Flanders, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Estonia, because the general English-language aptitude was deemed quite high, and in Malta and Cyprus, and Turkey for practical reasons relating the difficulty of locating suitable translators. In Romania, local experts advised us to deploy the survey in English, although we later translated the questionnaire into Moldovan-Romanian for deployment in Moldova.

The survey questionnaires were deployed in two different formats, with the format selected for a particular national context depending on advice received from local experts. One method involved sending printed paper

*Table 4.1* Questionnaire formats, country frequency

| Questionnaire format | Language | | Total |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | *Non-native English* | *Native (incl. English)* | |
| Paper | 1 | 18 | 19 |
| Web | 14 | 16 | 30 |
| Total | 15 | 34 | *49 |

Note
*Belgium and Switzerland are counted twice since two different languages were used for surveys in each country.

surveys through the regular post, along with pre-addressed (but not pre-stamped) envelopes for returning the surveys. Paper surveys received were then checked and keyed by hand into our database of responses. Of the 49 national contexts where the surveys were deployed,[11] 19 were deployed using the traditional paper-and-post method. The other method of deployment was on-line, using individually addressed e-mails containing the cover letter as well as a customized World Wide Web link leading to our survey page. The web page was designed to look and function as closely to the paper survey as possible. The widespread use of the on-line surveys had the tremendous advantage of combining speed and economy of deployment, with elimination of labor costs and error from data entry since each completed survey was recorded directly in our database. Feedback from respondents regarding the web-based system, furthermore, was in general very positive.[12] The pay-off of the translations and custom-fitted deployment methods can be seen in Table A.1: these are relatively high response rates compared with previous political expert surveys. In the typical country context, 28 percent of the experts surveyed returned validly completed forms, an excellent response rate given its relatively lengthy and demanding nature of the survey questionnaire.

## Dealing with bias and random error

### Describing *a population as opposed to* inferring *population characteristics from a sample*

Analyzing the results of expert surveys involves complex methodological issues of sampling and statistical inference. Expert surveys differ in an important way from opinion surveys. Their objective is to uncover an assumed underlying "truth," the spatial location of a party's policy position, rather than to infer attitudes of a population from information about a sample of this, as is the case with traditional survey methodology. If we

were certain every expert would provide a perfectly accurate location of each party policy position, then we would need to ask only one expert in each country. In practice of course, expert judgments about the location of the same party on the same policy dimension will vary for all sorts of reasons; this is why it is important to survey not only a number of experts, but also experts holding a range of different perspectives. Our confidence in our estimates as an accurate description of a true party position increases according to the classical rules of sampling, with confidence intervals shrinking as we increase the number of expert respondents.

Nonetheless we must also remember that the set of respondents in an expert survey is typically assumed to be the *population* of qualified experts in the field under investigation – for instance, all experts from some valid register of country specialists. Of course, the notion of the "population of experts" in any context is almost metaphysical. At the very least, however, the results of the expert survey represent a summary of the judgments of the members of the population surveyed. Because of this key difference between expert surveys and traditional opinion surveys, a statistical summary of expert survey scores is not an *estimate* but a *description* of population characteristics. This has implications for how we use expert surveys to construct valid measures of party positions and deal with issues of both bias and random error.

## Evaluating bias among experts

It is self-evident that our expert respondents are not random samples from a population, at least not a population whose characteristics we are attempting to estimate. Experts, by their very definition as experts, are highly *unrepresentative* of the population of citizens, voters, or politicians in any given political setting. As we have just noted, however, we do not want to use our sample of experts to characterize a population, but rather to characterize unobservable yet meaningful quantities by systematically consulting the knowledge of experts. The classic problem of sample bias is not a concern, even if the experts we consult hold strong political preferences, as long as these preferences do not interfere with their expert knowledge or the ways in which they deploy that knowledge to complete our survey. Our concern with bias thus has to do with whether the information supplied by respondents is linked systematically to some respondent characteristic – for example political preferences – with the consequence that inferences from the set of respondents are biased with respect to this characteristic. Our chief concern is not so much to obtain an *ideologically representative sample* of experts, but to ensure there is no systematic relationship between the experts' own ideologies and their judgments about party policy positions. For example, if we survey party positions in a country whose experts are predominantly left-wing socialists, and if left-wing socialists tend to rank left-wing parties as more centrist than they "really" are and/or right-of-

center parties as more right-wing than they "really" are, then our inferences from the expert survey will be biased. Fortunately, however, it is possible to test for this sort of bias by eliciting information on respondents' personal affectations towards the parties whose positions they are locating. In order to be able to test for this type of respondent bias in our study, we included a "sympathy scale" that asked to experts to place all parties on a scale indicating their own closeness to each party's policies.[13] All other things being equal – in other words, for the same country, party, dimension, and scale – an expert's placement of a party should be unrelated to his or her closeness to that party. If experts' political sympathies influence their placements of parties, on the other hand, then for any given placement we will observe systematic differences between experts' placements, according to their political closeness to the party concerned.

In the United States, to take a striking example, despite a broadly even split of partisan affiliation in the voting population, the experts we consulted for the most part responded that they felt much closer to the Democratic than to the Republican Party. This can be seen in the starkly bimodal distribution of party sympathy scores shown in Figure 4.1. While this yielded interesting (but not surprising!) political information about the political leanings of US political scientists, such information need not be of concern in this study. As long as our US experts' feelings about the two parties are unrelated to their placements of these parties on our policy scales, then our resulting measures will be unbiased. If, however, experts sympathetic to the Democrats tend to place the Democrats towards the center and the



*Figure 4.1* Distribution of respondent sympathy scores in the United States, $N = 164$.

Republicans towards the extreme right, while Republican-leaning experts do the exact opposite, then this would be evidence of respondent bias, since political sympathy would be correlated with party placement. The ideologically skewed nature of our population of experts would then be a problem.

Our method for assessing the level of bias among sets of experts is described in detail in Appendix A, but in a nutshell involves searching for systematic relationships between the political sympathies of experts and their placements of parties on the general left–right dimension. From the expert placements of hundreds of parties that we analyzed in this way, only seven appeared to involve systematic bias that could be statistically distinguished from zero. These are listed in Table A.3 of Appendix A and all are extreme right parties. In each case, the observed bias is that less sympathetic experts tend to place these parties as more extreme than do more sympathetic experts. These parties, however, were only a tiny minority of the universe of parties in our study. Figure A.6, in Appendix A, graphs estimated expert bias on the general left–right scale for all parties by country type, and clearly shows that very few biases emerge that were statistically different from zero. Thus, returning to the US experts whose political views are shown in Figure 4.1, there was absolutely no evidence that their highly partisan party sympathy scores affected their left–right placements of the US parties in any systematic way.

The results of our systematic attempts to check for the effects of bias in our populations of expert respondents were therefore very reassuring. We did not find systematic evidence of bias in expert placements for the overwhelming majority of parties, and are left with a small number of far-right parties that do seem to have been rated as more extreme by unsympathetic experts. We are fortunate that this is a rare occurrence in our surveys, since such cases create a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On one hand, academic experts, who are predominantly unsympathetic to extreme-right parties, seem to be rating these parties as more right-wing than would a hypothetical "unbiased" expert. On the other hand, such parties seem to invite biased perceptions by expert observers, so that the very notion of an unbiased expert observer is indeed largely hypothetical. If we are honest, we must admit that our expert survey technique fails in such cases. This is not because of an inherent flaw in the technique. It is because, in these rare cases (which our technique is however able to identify), we are using an expert survey to measure something that may well not exist, which is an unbiased perception of a particular type of party. In this sense our diagnostics suggest that any precise assessment of the positions of these extreme right parties should be treated cautiously, which is an important finding in its own right.

### Characterizing measurement error

A particular feature of our approach to estimating party policy positions is that it measures the policy positions of all politically significant parties on

all potentially relevant policy dimensions. The advantage of this approach is that is leaves open the empirical question of which parties find which dimensions important. The potential disadvantage is that it may increase the *error* in our measurement if we are asking experts to locate smaller political parties, about which they know relatively little, on policy dimensions of lesser importance. This will be reflected in the relative *variation* in the placements, by particular sets of country experts, of the same party on the same policy dimension.

There are two ways to interpret this variation, only one of which relates to measurement error. One interpretation is that the policy positions of a particular party may be *fundamentally vague and ill-defined*. In this case we expect experts to disagree on the position of a party, and the resulting variation in expert judgments of the party policy position has substantive meaning. The other is that variation in expert judgments of the same party policy position is a manifestation of *imprecision in our measurement instrument*. It is difficult to separate these two potential effects but, if we can be certain of anything, we can be certain that our measurement technique generates measurement error, as does any other measurement technique, and that this error may be both random and systematic. We dealt with the main potential source of systematic error when checking for respondent bias in the previous section. Random measurement error, on the other hand, might arise for many reasons; here we list some of the main potential sources in relation to our expert survey.

- Different experts may have *different conceptualizations of the "target,"* having in mind different time periods or different characterizations of the target party when evaluating the same party policy position.
- Different experts may have in mind *different substantive interpretations of the "same" scale*, notwithstanding the explicit end points we supplied.
- Different experts may *use the same scales in different ways*. Some experts may be psychologically disinclined to use the full range of the scales, and tend to bunch all parties towards the center; other experts may do the opposite.
- Experts may disagree when placing a *commonly understood party on a commonly understood scale*. This may happen when experts simply differ over the position of a party, having processed all available information and come up with a different answer, perhaps because they have different access to information or different internal ways of processing that information. This source of disagreement comes closest to the notion of fundamental uncertainty in any given party's policy positions.

The important thing about *random* error is that it does not have any *consistent* effects across the policy placements we are attempting to estimate.

Instead, it pushes observed scores up or down in ways that are not predictable or correlated with other characteristics of the quantities being measured. In this sense, the presence of random error will not bias our estimates of the main quantities we are interested in, though it will make our resulting estimates more uncertain. This uncertainty can be directly characterized by observing the variation of different experts' placements of the same policy positions. When expert positions are aggregated and summarized, furthermore, the uncertainty resulting from random error can be reduced by increasing the number of expert respondents in a particular country survey. This increases our confidence that a statistical summary of the expert positions (for instance, the sample mean) represents a party's true policy position.

We systematically investigated the impact of some potential sources of measurement error in our expert survey and report the results of these diagnostic tests in Appendix A. For example, we investigated the extent to which the level of variation in expert judgments of a given party was affected by the following:

- the number of judgments required of each expert in a given country (the number of parties times the number of policy dimensions), in the expectation that more onerous surveys might generate more variation in expert responses, which could be interpreted as more error;
- the size of the party, in the expectation that smaller parties might generate more variation in expert responses – perhaps because their positions are more fundamentally uncertain, or because lower levels of information about them generate more random error in expert responses
- the type of party system, in particular making the distinction between post-communist party systems and others – in the expectation that there would be more fundamental uncertainty about party positions in relatively new party systems, and thus greater variation in the expert judgments.

Detailed results are reported in Appendix A. Party size made almost no difference; smaller parties did not appear to have more uncertainty associated with their estimated positions than larger parties. The complexity of the survey (and thus of the party system under investigation) did have a very small, but nonetheless statistically significant, effect on the variation in expert judgments. This may be because the expert survey instrument becomes less reliable as the "payload" of the survey increases, or because there is more fundamental uncertainty about party policy positions in more complex party systems. By far the most remarkable finding, however, was that there was a significantly higher level of variation of expert judgments in the post-communist party systems. It seems plausible to attribute this to a higher level of fundamental uncertainty among experts about party policy positions in post-communist countries than to an artifact of

our measurement instrument. For whatever reason, however, it shows that we are somewhat less certain about our estimates of party policy positions in the post-communist party systems.

Above all, of course, and here we apologize if many of those we are preaching to have already been converted, the most important thing to bear in mind is that there is indeed error in our data as in any other data, and that users must take this into account when drawing inferences about party policy positions. When we report an estimate of the position of a given party on a given dimension, therefore, the standard error of this estimate is every bit as important as the estimate itself – and indeed is what gives the estimated position substantive meaning. In the end, what we are able to do is to establish statistically a *range* for each party's position on each dimension investigated – allowing users to determine, for example, whether two party positions are, in a statistical sense, "the same" or significantly "different."

## Assessing the validity of our results

It is very difficult, and perhaps in a strict epistemological sense it may be impossible, to demonstrate definitively that a given measure of some fundamentally unobservable concept is more valid than some alternative measure. When different measures of the same unobservable property differ, it can be very difficult to know which to choose as the "best." Nonetheless, it is also important to assess the validity of any new measure by comparing them with existing measures of the same thing, if these existing measures are accepted as in some sense valid.

As a check on the content validity of our estimates, therefore, it is helpful to compare at least some aspects of our measures with measures generated by a well-known, widely-used, published measurement instrument relying on a completely different method. It is impossible to compare our estimates on all policy dimensions, since no other study of which we are aware has estimated party positions on all of these policy dimensions. However, there is a range of different quite independent estimates of the positions of parties on the general left–right dimension. A widely used collection of estimates can be found in the published left–right policy scores derived from the content analysis of party manifestos by Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP), published in the CD-ROM issued with their most recent book, *Mapping Policy Preferences* (Budge *et al.* 2001). Because both our expert surveys and the CMP scales measure the positions of parties on a general left–right scale, comparing these estimates offers a unique opportunity to make direct comparisons between the results generated by two quite different methods. To the extent that two quite independent methods agree, we are reassured about their validity. To the extent to which they do not agree, we may examine substantive disagreements and attempt to draw inferences from these. Our approach to this comparison is

straightforward: we directly compare the left–right scores and rankings produced by the two methods.

### Cross-national comparisons between manifesto and expert survey estimates

We are in a position to compare our expert survey estimates, with the CMP manifesto-based estimates, of parties' left–right positions for the set countries for which both studies estimate left–right positions. For each country, we use CMP left–right estimates for the most recent election year covered in the CMP dataset. To compare estimated left–right positions of parties in the pooled cross-national dataset thereby created, we plot left–right scores from both measures, for every national party for which both CMP and expert survey estimates are available. Figure 4.2 shows this plot, using country-party abbreviations to identify each point. It also plots a fitted linear regression line along with a 95 percent confidence interval.[14] (The "cross-validation hypothesis" is in effect that there is a perfect linear relationship between the two measures.) The large cross-hairs split the plot into four quadrants, intersecting at the mid-point of each scale – zero for CMP and 10.5 for the expert survey estimates.

The first impression from inspecting Figure 4.2 is reassuring: there is a relatively good linear fit[15] between the two measures and there is a nearly perfect intersection of the regression line through the (10.5, 0) midpoint of



*Figure 4.2* Across-country scatterplot of CMP left–right scores versus expert survey left–right estimates.

the two scales. In this sense, the two scales seem to be measuring the same thing, albeit noisily. If one set of measures were systematically different from the other, we would not see this empirical origin correspond so neatly with the theoretical midpoint of the scales. As a check on face validity, we find this pattern to provide a good indication that, compared to an established measure, our expert survey data are not measuring something fundamentally different from pre-existing, independent measurement instruments.

The second clear impression from inspecting Figure 4.2 is that, despite the good linear fit, there is a lot of apparently random noise. The expert survey estimates of parties' left–right positions explain only 40 percent of the variance in the CMP estimates of ostensibly the same thing. Furthermore, there is no obvious pattern to this noise that emerges from the overall scatterplot. To examine further the divergent estimates, we select individual cases of high disagreement and try to ascertain why our expert survey estimates and the CMP scores differ. To identify these cases, we focus on the outliers in the off-diagonal quadrants: the parties classified as "left" by our expert survey and "right" by the CMP manifesto analysis, as well as the inverse of this. Table 4.2 identifies all of these parties, listing our expert survey estimates and the CMP's manifesto-based scores (along with the standardized residual).

Drawing on our general knowledge about the parties listed in this table, there are clearly some that have been located incorrectly on at least one of the left–right scales. We have not identified any particular pattern that explains these differences, although several of the outliers in Table 4.2 seem to be parties for which immigration, nationalism, or the environment are important issues. Because none of these issues are components of the CMP left–right scale used in *Mapping Policy Preferences*, it is possible that CMP scores for parties emphasizing these issues could differ from the corresponding expert survey estimates of their left–right positions. For instance, it might explain why the CMP ranked as centrist the Austrian Greens and Belgian *Ecolo* parties, whereas our expert survey scores placed these parties on the left. Likewise, the CMP ranked as left-of-center several nationalist parties such as the Belgian VB and the New Zealand First Party, which are scored as right-wing by our experts. In nearly all cases such as this where the two independent measures disagree, and while readers are entitled to draw their own conclusions, we feel quite confident that our expert estimates come closer to what most observers would regard as the "correct" policy positions than the CMP's manifesto-based estimates. To put it crudely, when measures disagree, we are happier with a measure that puts the Italian Communist Party and the Austrian Greens on the left (as does our measure) rather than on the right (as does the CMP). Similarly, we are happier with a measure that puts Spain's *Partido Popular* or Greece's New Democracy on the right (as does our measure) rather than on the left (as does the CMP). We can find no off-diagonal case in which our expert survey measure appears to give the "wrong" answer, in this sense.

*Table 4.2* Largest divergences between expert survey and CMP estimated left–right positions

| Country | Party | Party name | Left–right score | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Expert survey | CMP | Standardized residual |
| *Expert survey says left, CMP says right* | | | | | |
| AU | AD | Australian Democrats | 7.8 | 56.6 | 3.47 |
| IT | PDCI | Partito dei Comunisti Italiani | 3.3 | 16.8 | 2.13 |
| AT | Gru | The Greens | 5.4 | 19.7 | 1.90 |
| AU | ALP | Australian Labor Party | 9.9 | 29.3 | 1.65 |
| GR | SYN | Synaspismos | 6.5 | 14.8 | 1.46 |
| AT | SPO | Austrian Social Democratic Party | 8.8 | 20.8 | 1.39 |
| IL | Lab | Labor | 7.5 | 15.2 | 1.31 |
| US | Dem | Democratic Party | 7.1 | 8.8 | 1.03 |
| CA | BQ | Bloc Québécois | 7.2 | 6.1 | 0.87 |
| TR | DSP | Demokratik Sol Partisi | 9.2 | 6.7 | 0.55 |
| *Expert survey says right, CMP says left* | | | | | |
| NL | CDA | Christen Democratisch Appe`l | 13.6 | −1.6 | −0.64 |
| NO | V | Venstre | 12.5 | −7.3 | −0.75 |
| NZ | NP | New Zealand National Party | 14.6 | −7.2 | −1.11 |
| PT | CDS/PP | People's Party | 16.9 | −0.7 | −1.16 |
| ES | CiU | Convergència i Unió de Catalunya | 13.7 | −11.5 | −1.18 |
| LU | CSV | Christian Social People's Party | 13.2 | −17.6 | −1.44 |
| GR | ND | Nea Dimokratia | 15.6 | −11.2 | −1.49 |
| IS | X-B | Framsóknarflokkurinn | 12.8 | −21.1 | −1.54 |
| IL | Shas | Shas | 14.4 | −16.7 | −1.58 |
| ES | PP | Partido Popular | 17.0 | −8.4 | −1.60 |
| BE | VB | Flemish Block | 18.9 | −3.0 | −1.63 |
| LU | ADR | Action Comity for Democracy and Pensions Justice | 17.8 | −7.9 | −1.70 |
| NZ | NZFP | New Zealand First Party | 12.5 | −25.2 | −1.71 |

## Within-country comparisons between manifesto and expert survey estimates

As well as comparing raw left–right scores for each party, we can also compare left–right scores for parties within each country. Our method for this is also deliberately simple: within each country, we compare the orderings from left to right of every party for which there are both CMP and expert survey scores. This method avoids the potential problem that left–right scores in one country are not directly comparable to left–right scores in another. By using only ordinal information, this method avoids problems of scale comparability. Table 4.3 shows the left–right orderings produced by the CMP and our expert survey scores and highlights the dif-

Table 4.3  Within-country comparisons of CMP and expert survey left–right party orderings

| Country | CMP election year | Kendall's tau-a | Spearman's rho | Party ordering from left to right — Expert survey | CMP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GR | 1995 | -0.33 | -0.60 | KKE SYN PASOK ND | PASOK ND KKE SYN |
| AU | 1995 | -0.17 | -0.32 | AD ALP NP LPA | ALP LPA NP AD |
| BE | 1998 | 0.00 | -0.20 | Eco PS SPSp VB | PS SPSp VB Eco |
| IT | 1995 | 0.33 | 0.49 | RC PDCI Green FI LN AN | RC Green AN PDCI LN FI |
| TR | 1998 | 0.33 | 0.40 | CHP DSP ANAP DYP | CHP DYP DSP ANAP |
| CH | 1997 | 0.52 | 0.75 | GPS SPS EVP CVP FDP SVP SD | SPS EVP GPS CVP SD SVP FDP |
| FI | 1996 | 0.52 | 0.71 | VAS VIHR SDP KESK SFP KD KOK | VAS SDP VIHR SFP KOK KD KESK |
| IL | 1997 | 0.64 | 0.76 | Hada Raam Merz Lab Lik YhT Shas NRP | Hada Raam Merz Shas Lab YhT NRP Lik |
| NO | 1998 | 0.71 | 0.89 | SV Sp DNA KrF V FrP H | SV DNA Sp V KrF H FrP |
| SE | 1995 | 0.71 | 0.86 | V MP SAP C FP KD M | MP V SAP KD C FP M |
| DK | 1998 | 0.72 | 0.90 | Enh SF SD RV KrF CD V KF FrP | SF Enh RV SD CD KrF KF FrP V |
| ES | 1998 | 0.80 | 0.90 | IU PSOE GiU PNV PP | IU PSOE GiU PP PNV |
| IE | 1996 | 0.80 | 0.90 | GR LB FG FF PD | GR LB FF FG PD |
| LU | 1996 | 0.80 | 0.90 | G LSAP CSV DP ADR | G LSAP CSV ADR DP |
| AT | 1998 | 1 | 1 | Gru SPO OVP FPO | Gru SPO OVP FPO |
| CA | 1995 | 1 | 1 | NDP BQ LPC PC | NDP BQ LPC PC |
| DE | 1995 | 1 | 1 | PDS GRÜ SPD FDP CDU/C | PDS GRÜ SPD FDP CDU/C |
| IS | 1996 | – | 1 | X-B X-D | X-B X-D |
| NL | 1994 | 1 | 1 | GL PvdA D66 CDA VVD | GL PvdA D66 CDA VVD |
| NZ | 1997 | 1 | 1 | Allc NZLP NZFP NP | Allc NZLP NZFP NP |
| PT | 1996 | 1 | 1 | PS PSD CDS/PP | PS PSD CDS/PP |
| UK | 1995 | 1 | 1 | LD Lab Con | LD Lab Con |
| US | 1997 | – | 1 | Dem Rep | Dem Rep |

ferences between these, and reports two measures of ordinal association summarizing the agreement between measures. Kendall's tau-a measures the relative likelihood of the ranks agreeing, rather than disagreeing, and ranges from –1.0 to 1.0. In Ireland, for example, where the only difference between measures is the relative placement of Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, the two party orderings are 80 percent more likely to agree than to disagree. Spearman's *rho* is an ordinal measure of correlation analogous to Pearson's *r* but applied to ordinal data. The countries for which the two measures were in greatest disagreement were Greece and Australia, where disagreement was 33 percent and 17 percent more likely than agreement respectively. In nine of the 23 countries compared, the expert survey and CMP rankings agreed perfectly.

### Differences between CMP and expert survey placements

There are two main ways to explain differences between our expert survey estimates of left–right positions and the CMP's manifesto-based estimates of ostensibly the same thing. The first is that, between the time of the election for which the CMP scored the party's manifesto and the time of our expert survey, some parties changed their positions on the left–right scale in radical ways. We might make this case for the US Democratic Party, for instance: perhaps it was right-of-center in 1997 but moved to the left-of-center by 2003. We might find such an argument much more difficult to sustain for parties such as the Italian Communists (PDCI) or the Belgian Flemish Bloc (VB). This would amount to arguing that the Italian Communists were indeed on the right when assessed by the CMP, but moved dramatically to the left by the time of our survey; and that the Belgian Flemish Block, widely perceived as among the group of far-right parties in Europe, was in fact on the left when measured by the CMP, switching dramatically to the right at the time of our expert survey.

The second possibility is that one of the two measures is wrong for these particular cases. For any variable with a degree of measurement error, it would be entirely consistent to observe overall patterns that appear unbiased – that is, right on average as indicated by Figure 4.2 – but mistaken in particular cases such as those listed in Table 4.1. We contend that whichever measure appears to be more "correct" substantively in the off-diagonal cases (Table 4.1) is the measure containing less error. Our firm view is that, when our expert survey and the CMP estimates diverge, the expert survey estimates are the more plausible substantively. Given the special character of many of the parties which are shown to be divergent, furthermore, we have good reason to believe that differences in our left–right measures and those from the CMP stem not only from random measurement error, but also from different approaches to measuring left–right positioning. In particular, if there is no consistent cross-national definition of left–right that applies equally to all country contexts, then

measures such as the CMP which employ a fixed scale will get it wrong in many countries, even if they get it right when averaged across countries. The consistency of policy dimensionality across countries, particularly the substantive meaning of the left–right dimension, form important outstanding questions which we address in the remaining chapters.

# 5 The dimensional structure of policy spaces

Throughout this book we describe the policy positions of political actors in terms of a set of distinct "dimensions," each taken to capture a substantively important feature of the potential for political disagreement. Taken together, these dimensions combine to span a multidimensional common policy "space" in which both the policy positions of politicians and the ideal points of citizens can be located, according to their substantive positions on each dimension. In previous chapters we discussed how to measure positions on a given dimension. We now turn to the problem of characterizing the common policy space in each country, taking all important dimensions together. In order to do this, we must answer three questions.

First, we must identify policy dimensions of *potential* political significance in each country. As we noted in Chapter 4, we use an *a priori* approach to this problem, identifying potentially salient dimensions on the basis of prior knowledge of politics in the countries under investigation, in consultation with country specialists. This first question is thus answered as part of the design of the expert questionnaires.

Second, we need to identify which policy dimensions are *actually* salient politically in a given setting. When measuring relative dimension salience in each country, furthermore, we must be open to the strong possibility that different political actors attach different levels of importance to each dimension. Using the party-specific measures of issue importance from our expert surveys, however, we can combine the various parties' dimension importance scores into an aggregate measure of dimension importance for the country as a whole. We return to this type of analysis later in this chapter.

The third question concerns *correlations* between party positions on different policy dimensions. If party positions on some set of dimensions are highly correlated, in other words if we can confidently predict each party's position on one dimension from its position on each other dimension in some set, then we might think of each dimension in the set as measuring what is in some sense the "same" thing. We could think of this as some "deeper" underlying dimension, or "axis," of political competition. The

most commonly recognized axis of political competition in most political systems is the classic "left–right" dimension used to characterize parties along a single continuum, and we provide a fuller treatment of the left–right dimension in Chapter 6. Our concern here is to identify and measure the main axes of political competition in each country we investigate, based on patterns of correlation between party positions on different policy dimensions. In a country where all party positions on all policy dimensions are very highly correlated, for example, we might describe party competition as taking place along a single underlying axis of policy. In other contexts, however, this may not at all be the case; party positions on different key dimensions might not be highly inter-correlated and we might see policy competition as effectively taking place along more than one underlying axis. We already noted in Chapter 1, for example, that a classical European "Liberal" party might have a right-wing position on economic policy and a liberal position on moral issues, while a classical Conservative party might be right-wing on the economy and conservative on moral issues. The Liberal and Conservative positions are not correlated on these two dimensions, and we need both dimensions for an accurate rendering of the policy space.

Our goal in this chapter is to analyze the patterns in party positioning revealed by our expert surveys, with the intention of characterizing each country's common policy space in terms of the number and substantive nature of the key axes of political competition. We do this in two ways. One way is to answer the second question set out above, reporting on expert judgments of the relative importance of the various substantive policy dimensions deployed in each country. The other way is to answer the third question set out above, using a dimensional analysis of party positions on the full set of dimensions deployed in each country to investigate the extent to which these dimensions are related to a smaller number of underlying axes of political competition. Before doing any of this we briefly review some of the operational decisions that have shaped our analysis.

## Measuring the dimensionality of policy spaces

### A priori *approach to identifying substantive policy dimensions*

As we have just indicated, our approach towards measuring the dimensionality of political competition in any country is a combination of *ex ante* decisions that identify the dimensions of potential importance, and *ex post* dimensional analysis of measured policy positions on these dimensions. A key decision concerning dimensionality is thus made at the research design stage when identifying, in consultation with country specialists, the particular substantive policy dimensions in each country on which parties are to be located. Our approach provides for a very specific

set of multiple dimensions, intended to capture all politically salient issues. Other survey-based approaches, when they have admitted the possibility of multiple dimensions, tend to leave the dimension set open-ended. Inglehart and Huber (1995), for example, asked respondents to write in a single secondary dimension of political competition, which they later coded into a set of discrete categories. A second key choice was to specify a relatively large number of dimensions on which to measure party positions in each country. Other survey-based approaches either restrict dimensions to a smaller set of predefined categories (e.g. Marks and Steenbergen 2004) or ask experts to place parties on left–right scales only (Castles and Mair 1984). Our approach, however, as we discussed in Chapter 3, is to specify a large number of substantive dimensions *a priori* and leave the number and substance of any underlying axes of political competition as empirical questions to be investigated by *ex post* data analysis.

### Constraints on the measured dimensionality of policy spaces

The number of distinct dimensions on which party positions are measured obviously acts as an upper bound on the potential dimensionality in party positioning that we might observe empirically. Ten policy dimensions were deployed in the typical country in our survey. If all party positions on each dimension were perfectly correlated with positions of the same parties on each other dimension, then we might well conclude that the policy space was one-dimensional in the sense that the full set of policy dimensions could be characterized in terms of a single underlying axis of political competition. If, by contrast, all party positions on each dimension were completely uncorrelated, then we might conclude that ten independent (orthogonal) dimensions of policy are needed to characterize the policy space. In practice, of course, we are very unlikely to observe either of these extreme cases, since party positions on many policy dimensions tend to be correlated with one another, although less than perfectly. As we will see later on in this chapter, however, it is quite common for party positions on different policy dimensions, or sets of policy dimensions, to be uncorrelated (orthogonal), suggesting multiple underlying axes of policy competition.

Another important constraint when measuring the dimensionality of real policy spaces concerns the number of "stimulus points" used – in this case the number of political parties whose policy positions were measured. This also places an upper bound on the dimensionality of the policy space we are capable of measuring. When there are only two parties, for example, party positions on dimensions will always, trivially, be perfectly correlated; dimensional analysis will always reveal a single underlying dimension. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that our analysis of the two-party system in the United States reveals an underlying one-dimensional structure.

## The relative importance of substantive policy dimensions

### Between-party variations in dimension importance

In consultation with specialists on the politics of each country surveyed, we specified all *potentially important* policy dimensions to be used in each country in advance of deploying each expert survey. It is therefore important to measure the relative salience or importance, for each party, of each of the policy dimensions deployed. This is why we attached a separate scale to each policy dimension asking respondents to judge the *relative importance* of the dimension for each party, on a scale from one (not important at all) to 20 (very important). Analysis of the party-specific importance scores in each country reveals substantial differences between parties over the importance attached to different dimensions. For example, Table 5.1 shows party-specific importance scores for the Netherlands, revealing strong differences between parties. Consider two parties generally seen to be on the right in the Netherlands, though for very different reasons – the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) and the *Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij* (SGP). The LPF was judged to attach twice as much importance to the "immigration" dimension (a mean importance score of 18.8) as did the SGP (a mean score of 9.9). These importance rankings were reversed for the social policy dimension, the definition of which included gay marriage. The LPF, with its publicly gay leader Pim Fortuyn, was judged to rate this dimension as unimportant (7.0). The SGP, in contrast, a fundamentalist protestant party, was judged to rate this the single most important policy dimension (19.3). Similar differences between parties may also be observed for other dimensions. The interesting exception concerns "EU Authority": the Dutch parties diverged relatively little in terms of the importance they appear to attach to this dimension.

### Between-dimension variations in importance

To measure the overall relative importance of issue dimensions in each country, we calculated the mean party-specific importance score for each dimension, weighting scores by the vote share received by each party. Weighting was necessary in order to avoid skewing the overall importance measures on the basis of scores for extreme or single-issue parties who might represent only a small proportion of a country's electorate. The far-right SGP in the Netherlands, for example, won only 1.6 percent of the vote in the 2003 elections; its very high importance scores for some dimensions thus contribute relatively little to each dimension's overall importance score.

Overall importance scores are reported for each policy dimension, by country, in Appendix B. (Because of space constraints, we do not report importance scores by party; this information is available in the dataset

*Table* 5.1 Means (standard errors) of party-specific dimension importance scores in the Netherlands (1 = lowest, 20 = highest)

| Party | Immigration | Deregulation | Taxes vs spending | Social | Environment | EU authority |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | *Policy dimension* | | | |
| LPF | 18.8 | 14.4 | 13.9 | 7.0 | 8.4 | 11.7 |
| | (0.31) | (0.99) | (0.89) | (0.94) | (1.04) | (1.33) |
| GL | 17.0 | 14.0 | 13.4 | 13.8 | 16.8 | 10.2 |
| | (0.41) | (0.61) | (0.83) | (0.83) | (0.71) | (0.99) |
| VVD | 16.2 | 17.5 | 16.1 | 11.2 | 12.2 | 10.7 |
| | (0.51) | (0.33) | (0.68) | (1.01) | (0.97) | (0.91) |
| SP | 13.4 | 16.7 | 15.7 | 8.6 | 9.2 | 11.7 |
| | (0.81) | (0.44) | (0.77) | (1.06) | (0.81) | (1.21) |
| D66 | 13.2 | 10.9 | 11.5 | 15.3 | 12.7 | 11.4 |
| | (0.51) | (0.48) | (0.57) | (0.91) | (0.68) | (0.80) |
| CDA | 13.0 | 12.7 | 12.7 | 13.7 | 9.1 | 10.3 |
| | (0.66) | (0.58) | (0.65) | (0.66) | (0.64) | (0.91) |
| PvdA | 12.9 | 13.1 | 13 | 10.2 | 10.0 | 9.9 |
| | (0.65) | (0.50) | (0.69) | (0.85) | (0.54) | (0.95) |
| CU | 11.2 | 9.2 | 10.6 | 17.8 | 12.3 | 9.7 |
| | (0.81) | (0.77) | (0.65) | (0.58) | (0.73) | (1.25) |
| SGP | 9.9 | 9.0 | 8.2 | 19.3 | 7.6 | 10.8 |
| | (0.92) | (0.68) | (0.83) | (0.24) | (0.79) | (1.26) |
| Overall | 14.0 | 13.9 | 13.5 | 11.8 | 10.5 | 10.4 |
| | (0.72) | (0.82) | (0.60) | (0.93) | (0.75) | (0.22) |

Note
The "overall" score is the mean importance score for each dimension, weighted by party vote share.

associated with this book.) Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 summarize this information for western Europe, eastern Europe, and other countries, respectively. First, the weighted mean saliency score was computed for each dimension in each country, as described in the previous paragraph. The overall mean of these weighted mean scores across all dimensions was then calculated. The numbers reported in Tables 5.2–5.4 give the weighted mean score of each dimension in each country, as a proportion of this overall mean. A score over 1.0 implies that the dimension was scored as more important than the mean score for all dimensions in the country; a score of less than 1.0 implies the dimension was rated as relatively less important. Numbers in bold show the dimension judged to be most important in each country.

For the western European countries surveyed, economic policy was judged most important; the taxes/spending and deregulation dimensions received on average the highest importance scores. With only rare exceptions, one or the other of these two dimensions was most important in each of the western European countries surveyed. The exceptions were the

*Table 5.2* Weighted mean importance scores, by dimension, as a proportion of weighted mean saliency, by country, western Europe

| Country | Taxes vs spending | Social | Environment | Decentralization | Immigration | Deregulation | EU accountability | EU authority | EU collective security* | Northern Ireland |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | **1.13** | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.10 | | 0.89 | 0.95 | 0.95 | |
| Belgium | 1.09 | 1.11 | 0.94 | 1.03 | **1.12** | **1.12** | 0.81 | 0.92 | 0.85 | |
| Britain | 1.15 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 0.92 | 1.02 | 1.08 | 1.05 | **1.16** | 0.97 | 0.89 |
| Cyprus | 1.09 | 0.76 | 0.77 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 1.19 | | **1.25** | 1.08 | |
| Denmark | 1.13 | 0.82 | 0.92 | 0.87 | **1.20** | 0.94 | 1.07 | 1.05 | | |
| Finland | 1.10 | 0.92 | 0.98 | 0.96 | 0.86 | **1.11** | 0.98 | 1.05 | 1.04 | |
| France | 1.04 | 0.97 | 0.84 | 0.95 | 1.06 | | | **1.11** | | |
| Germany | **1.25** | 1.06 | 1.01 | 0.81 | 1.10 | | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.99 | |
| Greece | 1.13 | 0.73 | 0.88 | 0.95 | 1.08 | **1.23** | 0.88 | 1.09 | 1.04 | |
| Iceland | 1.13 | 0.71 | 1.25 | 0.9 | 0.72 | **1.28** | | | | |
| Ireland | **1.16** | 0.92 | 0.90 | 0.85 | 0.97 | 1.08 | 1.02 | 1.03 | 1.15 | |
| Italy | **1.11** | 0.97 | 0.81 | 0.93 | 1.08 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 1.05 | 1.00 | |
| Luxembourg | 1.07 | 1.01 | 0.94 | 0.85 | **1.12** | 1.06 | 1.01 | 1.08 | 0.97 | |
| Malta | 1.08 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.71 | 1.06 | | **1.26** | 0.95 | |
| Netherlands | 1.16 | 1.01 | 0.89 | 0.78 | **1.20** | 1.19 | 0.89 | 0.89 | 1.00 | |
| N. Ireland | 0.87 | 1.08 | 0.61 | 0.92 | 0.79 | 0.89 | 1.07 | 1.19 | | **1.58** |
| Norway | 1.09 | 0.90 | 1.00 | 0.88 | 0.98 | **1.10** | | 1.06 | 1.00 | |
| Portugal | 1.02 | 0.93 | 0.88 | 0.99 | 0.99 | | **1.07** | 1.06 | 1.04 | |
| Spain | 1.11 | 0.97 | 0.79 | 1.09 | 1.07 | **1.16** | 0.86 | 0.95 | 0.99 | |
| Sweden | **1.10** | 0.93 | 0.95 | 0.89 | 0.96 | **1.10** | 1.00 | 1.08 | 0.98 | |
| Switzerland | **1.12** | 0.94 | 0.86 | 0.84 | 1.07 | 1.09 | | 1.08 | | |
| Average | **1.10** | 0.94 | 0.91 | 0.92 | 1.00 | 1.11 | 0.95 | 1.06 | 1.00 | |

Notes
1 *EU collective security combines NATO/peacekeeping for CY, MT, NO.
2 Bold figures represent the dimensions with the highest overall importance in each country.

Table 5.3 Weighted mean importance scores, by dimension, as a proportion of weighted mean saliency, by country, post-communist countries

| Country | Taxes vs spending | Social | EU joining | Environment | Deregulation | Former communists | Foreign land ownership | Media freedom | Nationalism | Religion | Urban–rural | Decentralization |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | 1.04 | 0.66 | 1.52 | 0.59 | 1.19 | 1.10 | 0.93 | 1.14 | 0.97 | 0.72 | 1.05 | 1.10 |
| Belarus | 1.11 | 1.09 | 0.99 | 1.03 | 1.10 | 1.02 | 1.16 | 1.06 | 0.88 | 0.79 | 0.94 | |
| Bosnia | 1.06 | 0.76 | 1.18 | 0.60 | 1.28 | 0.85 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 1.50 | 1.11 | 1.17 | 1.05 |
| Bulgaria | 1.02 | 0.64 | 1.37 | 0.81 | 1.15 | 0.99 | 1.10 | 1.06 | 0.94 | 0.76 | 1.10 | 1.06 |
| Croatia | 0.93 | 1.00 | 1.39 | 0.74 | 1.02 | 0.73 | 1.08 | 0.95 | 1.18 | 1.13 | 0.92 | 0.92 |
| Czech Republic | 1.10 | 0.87 | 1.23 | 0.86 | 1.14 | 1.04 | 1.05 | 0.99 | 1.04 | 0.85 | 0.82 | 1.02 |
| Estonia | 1.15 | 0.71 | 1.36 | 0.89 | 1.17 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 0.85 | 0.96 | 0.78 | 1.05 | 1.11 |
| Hungary | 0.96 | 0.96 | 1.26 | 0.86 | 1.03 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 1.03 | 1.06 | 0.93 | 0.95 | 0.93 |
| Latvia | 1.01 | 0.87 | 1.23 | 0.80 | 1.18 | 1.11 | 1.01 | 0.89 | 1.15 | 0.92 | 0.81 | 1.03 |
| Lithuania | 1.13 | 0.85 | 1.32 | 0.78 | 1.08 | 1.01 | 0.97 | 0.89 | 0.81 | 0.98 | 0.98 | |
| Macedonia | 1.00 | 0.64 | 1.53 | 0.72 | 1.35 | 0.74 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 1.07 | 0.91 | 0.82 | 1.22 |
| Moldova | 1.04 | 0.43 | 1.10 | 0.75 | 1.08 | 1.01 | 1.09 | 1.14 | 1.18 | 0.72 | 1.18 | 1.28 |
| Poland | 1.08 | 0.99 | 1.34 | 0.66 | 1.02 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 1.02 | 0.96 | 0.99 | 0.95 | 1.05 |
| Romania | 0.91 | 0.89 | 1.22 | 0.54 | 1.10 | 0.98 | 1.09 | 1.11 | 1.15 | 0.94 | 0.83 | 1.24 |
| Russia | 1.14 | 0.79 | 0.72 | 1.16 | 0.81 | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.23 | 1.00 | 0.98 | 1.00 | |
| Serbia | 1.03 | 0.98 | 1.04 | 0.51 | 1.34 | 0.93 | 0.82 | 0.92 | 1.25 | 1.19 | 0.60 | 1.39 |
| Slovakia | 1.03 | 1.02 | 1.20 | 0.71 | 1.12 | 0.96 | 1.02 | 0.95 | 1.03 | 1.01 | 0.88 | 1.08 |
| Slovenia | 0.95 | 0.97 | 1.33 | 0.87 | 1.08 | 0.98 | 1.00 | 1.03 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 0.99 |
| Ukraine | 1.11 | 0.58 | 1.22 | 0.84 | 1.16 | 1.06 | 1.04 | 1.09 | 1.16 | 0.80 | 0.89 | 1.05 |
| Average | 1.04 | 0.81 | 1.27 | 0.75 | 1.14 | 0.96 | 1.01 | 1.00 | 1.09 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 1.08 |

Table 5.4 Weighted mean importance scores, by dimension, as a proportion of weighted mean saliency, by country, non-European countries

| Country | Taxes vs spending | Social | Environment | Decentralization | Immigration | Deregulation | Health care | US affairs | Nationalism | Religion | EU: joining | Quebec Palestinian state | Security |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 1.06 | 0.89 | 0.97 | 0.79 | 1.05 | 1.07 | **1.10** | 1.07 | | | | | |
| Canada | 1.04 | 0.97 | 0.83 | 0.98 | 0.98 | 1.02 | **1.10** | 0.98 | 1.1 | | | | |
| Turkey | 0.98 | 0.78 | 0.72 | 1.12 | 0.75 | 1.08 | | | 1.15 | **1.24** | **1.24** | | |
| United States | **1.15** | 1.13 | 1.05 | 0.74 | 0.77 | 1.04 | 1.08 | 1.05 | | | | | |
| Japan | 1.08 | **0.79** | 0.89 | 0.98 | 0.84 | 1.02 | | 1.15 | | | | | |
| New Zealand | 1.03 | 1.03 | 0.96 | 0.81 | 0.98 | 1.03 | 1.09 | **1.11** | | | | | |
| Israel | 1.01 | 0.86 | 0.53 | 1.01 | | 1.00 | | | | 1.14 | | 1.21 | **1.25** |
| Average | 1.03 | 0.96 | 0.94 | 0.92 | 0.93 | 1.06 | **1.09** | 0.99 | | | | | |

Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and Denmark, where immigration was the top-rated policy dimension, and Britain, France, Malta, and Cyprus, where EU Authority was the top-rated dimension. Overall in western Europe, after the two main economic policy dimensions, the next most important was "EU authority" (somewhat unexpectedly) and immigration. Of the two dimensions tapping social liberalism vs conservatism – "social policy" on abortion, divorce and gay rights, and immigration policy – immigration was almost invariably the more important. These rankings are summarized in Table 5.5, separated according to our three regions of countries. These rankings were very similar among non-European cases, except that the taxes versus spending economic dimension came out slightly ahead of the deregulation dimension, and decentralization and social policy exchanged places. In both the western European and the non-European countries, the environmental policy issue was ranked last in overall importance.

The situation was quite different for the eastern European countries surveyed, for which the issue of joining the European Union was typically rated as the most salient and economic policy was never the most salient. The main exceptions were Bosnia and Russia, where "nationalism" was judged most salient, and Moldova and Serbia, where decentralization was judged most important, probably because of the association of the dimension with the issues of Transdnistria and Kosovo, respectively. It is also worth noting that overall, as portrayed in Table 5.5, the specifically "post-communist" dimensions (such as urban–rural, foreign land ownership, and former communists) were ranked of less importance than the "core" dimensions also asked in the other set of countries. The only exception is social policy, which ranked at the bottom of the relative importance ranking (in eleventh place), just ahead of the environment. Unsurprisingly, although disappointing from an ecological standpoint, the environmental issue was at the very bottom of the importance rankings among post-communist countries.

## Analyzing the dimensional structure of policy spaces

### There is no "one true" dimensionality for any given policy space

When we discussed theoretical issues associated with estimating the "dimensionality" of policy spaces in Chapter 2, we were very careful to stress that this is a question to which there is no unambiguously "correct" answer. There is no true but unobserved "dimensionality" of any policy place waiting to be revealed by careful empirical analysis. The appropriate dimensional structure for any empirical policy space that we use, therefore, depends a great deal on why it is we want to estimate an empirical policy space in the first place. At one level of granularity, the number of actual potential issues that might come up for discussion is more or less infinite. A

very fine-grained analysis of policy competition might need to work with a very high-dimensional policy space, therefore. At another level of analysis, we might feel that the really big difference between political actors can adequately be described using a single "left–right" dimension of broad ideology. Thus we might be well aware of differences between two actors who are both judged to be equivalently right wing, but may decide that the importance of these more subtle differences is dwarfed, in a particular setting, by the importance of the gulf between actors on the left and actors on the right. To paint a one-dimensional picture of politics in this case is not at all to say that we assume positions on every substantive policy dimension to be perfectly correlated with the same underlying axis of competition. Rather it is to say that, in some particular setting (analyzing government formation, for example) broad similarities between parties located at what look like the same positions on the main axis of political competition are far more important than more detailed differences between them.

### Characterizing "dimensionality" in terms of correlations between dimensions

#### The dimensional structure of the Dutch party system

We may gain further insight into the problem that there is no "one true" dimensionality for any given policy space by looking in greater detail at ways to analyze the dimensional structure of party policy positions on a set of substantive policy dimensions. The easiest way to do this is by extending the Dutch example we reported in Table 5.1. The Dutch party system contains three major parties: Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) and Liberals (VVD) – together in a coalition government when our survey was conducted – and the Labor Party (PvdA). By observing the relative positions of these and the other politically relevant parties in the system on a range of salient policy dimensions, we can gain some sense of the dimensional structure of the policy space in the Netherlands.

Figure 5.1 shows the positions of the main Dutch parties on two dimensions, "taxes versus spending" and "environmental policy." The dashed line shows the least squares (OLS) regression line for a regression, weighted by party vote share, predicting the environmental policy position of each party from its position on the tax/spend dimension. Each label shows a party position in the two dimensions of policy, with the size of the label being proportional to the party's vote share. The plot displays a very high linear correlation between the two policy dimensions, although Green Left (GL) is slightly greener on the environment than it is left-wing on economic policy, while the Socialist Party (SP) is slightly more left-wing on economic policy than it is green on the environment. The three largest parties, however, are aligned almost perfectly along the linear axis. What Figure 5.1 shows us about the Netherlands is that, once we know a party's economic

policy position, we also know its environmental policy position with a high degree of accuracy. This may lead us to conclude that the economic policy and environmental policy in the Netherlands are closely related to the same underlying "latent dimension," or "axis" of political competition.

In contrast to the clear pattern we see in Figure 5.1, Figure 5.2 plots Dutch party positions on the economic policy and social liberalism dimensions. Here, we see no neat linear correlation between party policy positions; indeed positions of the main three parties form a triangle in this scatterplot. It is clear that a single dimension cannot accurately describe the policy positions of the parties portrayed in Figure 5.2 – we cannot predict a party's position on the social liberalism dimension from its position on the economic policy dimension. Indeed this is precisely the type of example we have used to illustrate a multidimensional policy space. The VVD in the Netherlands is in our terms a classical liberal party – right wing on the economy but liberal on moral issues. This is in contrast to the Christian democratic CDA – rightist on the economy but much more conservative on moral issues. Provided that both dimensions are judged to be of substantive significance, the lack of association between party positions on them can be taken as evidence of multidimensionality in the Dutch policy space – that one dimension is just not enough for a full and accurate characterization of party policy positions in the Netherlands.



*Figure 5.1* Scatterplot of party positions in the Netherlands on taxes/spending and environmental policy dimensions (label sizes proportional to party vote shares at time of survey).

*Figure 5.2* Scatterplot of Dutch parties on taxes/spending vs social liberalism

So far we have proceeded by analyzing associations between the position of the Dutch parties on pairs of dimensions – using two-dimensional scatterplots or the bivariate OLS regressions that summarize these. We are, however, interested in the underlying dimensional structure of the full set of policy dimensions estimated for the Netherlands – and indeed in every other country we surveyed. We conduct this investigation using the "data reduction" technique of factor analysis, a technique commonly applied to high-dimensional, and more complex, data matrices when the desire is to reduce these to much smaller lower-dimensional, and more simple, representations of essentially the same information. The technique examines and classifies sets of correlated variables and estimates underlying "factors" based on "principal components" that explain most of the variance in the data. Each variable can then be examined in terms of its relationship to the underlying factors, and the factors can be interpreted on the basis of the variables that correlate (or load) with the factor. If a set of variables all load very highly on a single underlying factor, then that factor summarizes most of the information in those variables. We can in this sense replace the set of variables with the single factor; this factor can be interpreted as an underlying dimension to which all variables are related; and the factor can be interpreted substantively in terms of the measured variables that load highly on it. This technique has been applied to data

*Table 5.5* Overall rank of policy dimensions by country type: scores represent ranks of weighted mean importance

| Policy dimension | Western Europe | Post-communist Europe | Non-European |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deregulation | 1 | 2 | 1 |
| EU joining | | 1 | |
| Taxes vs spending | 2 | 5 | 2 |
| EU: authority | 3 | | |
| Nationalism | | 3 | |
| Immigration | 4 | | 4 |
| EU: accountability | 5 | | |
| Social | 6 | 11 | 3 |
| Decentralization | 7 | 4 | 5 |
| Foreign land ownership | | 6 | |
| Media Freedom | | 7 | |
| Former communists | | 8 | |
| Urban–rural | | 9 | |
| Religion | | 10 | |
| Environment | 8 | 12 | 6 |

from the content analysis of party manifestos, to move from more specific coding categories to more general policy dimensions (Budge *et al.* 1987; Gabel and Huber 2000) and to expert survey placements to estimate principal axes of party competition (Laver and Hunt 1992; McElroy and Benoit 2006).

As an example, Table 5.6 shows the results of a principal components analysis applied to party positions on the full set of substantive dimensions measured for the Dutch party system. Nine substantive policy dimensions were estimated for the Dutch parties and 77 expert responses were received on these. The left hand column of the lower panel of Table 5.6 shows the names of these dimensions. The top panel of the table reports the eigenvalues of each underlying factor extracted from the dimensional analysis. If a factor has an eigenvalue of greater than unity then it contains more information than a single one of the input variables. It is thus conventional to consider only latent factors with eigenvalues of greater than 1.0 as part of a data reduction analysis. On this measure, therefore, since three factors have eigenvalues of greater than unity, we might consider the Dutch policy space to be three dimensional. The right hand column of the top panel in Table 5.6 shows us that these three factors explain more than 78 percent of the variance in Dutch party policy positions on the nine input dimensions.

The middle column of the top panel in Table 5.6 shows us that the first and most important factor is responsible for about 48 percent, almost half, of the variance in all nine input variables. We can interpret this factor substantively by looking at which of the input variables load highly on it;

*Table 5.6* Dimensional analysis of the Dutch policy space: principal components factor analysis, $n = 77$, parameters $= 24$

| Factor | Eigenvalue | Proportion | Cumulative |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 4.28 | 0.48 | 0.48 |
| 2 | 1.50 | 0.17 | 0.64 |
| 3 | 1.26 | 0.14 | 0.78 |
| 4 | 0.63 | 0.07 | 0.85 |
| 5 | 0.52 | 0.06 | 0.91 |
| 6 | 0.28 | 0.03 | 0.94 |
| 7 | 0.26 | 0.03 | 0.97 |
| 8 | 0.18 | 0.02 | 0.99 |
| 9 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 1.00 |

*Varimax rotated factor loadings*

| Variable | Factor | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | 1<br>Economic<br>Left–right | 2<br>EU | 3<br>Social<br>Liberalism |
| Taxes vs spending | **0.88** | −0.17 | 0.18 |
| Environment | **0.89** | 0.15 | 0.01 |
| Immigration | **0.87** | 0.23 | 0.15 |
| Deregulation | **0.95** | −0.09 | 0.07 |
| EU accountability | **0.67** | **0.54** | 0.23 |
| EU security | −0.23 | **0.84** | −0.01 |
| EU authority | 0.43 | **0.71** | −0.01 |
| Social liberalism | 0.08 | 0.11 | **0.84** |
| Decentralization | −0.18 | 0.08 | **−0.80** |

these loadings are shown in the bottom panel of Table 5.6. From this we see that the highest loadings on Factor 1 are for input variables mainly involving left–right issues, and note the very high loadings of the taxation and deregulation dimensions. Environmental policy also loads strongly on this dimension, perhaps because the dimension wording contrasts priorities for environmental protection versus economic growth. Immigration is another issue with economic ramifications, although this is not exclusively an economic issue. What we can infer from all of this is that Factor 1 is essentially a left–right dimension – dominated by economic policy but also, in the Dutch case, highly correlated with policies on immigration and the environment.

The second factor emerging from this analysis explains about 17 percent of the variation in the input variables. We see from the bottom panel of Table 5.6 that this factor appears to relate to Dutch party positions on the European Union (EU), since the three, and the only three, input variables to load on the second factor relate to some aspect of policy

towards the EU. In this context we might pause to note the unprecedented rejection by Dutch citizens in May 2005 of the referendum proposing adoption of the draft EU constitution as corroborating evidence of the salience of EU affairs in the Dutch policy space.

The third factor implied by the analysis explains about 14 percent of the overall variation in the nine input variables. We see from the bottom panel in Table 5.6 that the two variables loading most strongly on Factor 3 are social liberalism and decentralization. However we also note that these variables load with opposite signs – suggesting that favoring environmental protection tends to go along with opposing the decentralization of decision making, all other things being held constant. We also note from Table 5.2 that the "decentralization" dimension was the policy issue rated the least salient across parties in the Netherlands – a geographically compact unitary state – and therefore we might feel that this third factor is most appropriately interpreted in terms of social liberalism.

### A comparative analysis of the dimensional structure of policy spaces investigated

Tables 5.7a–5.7d report the results of analyses equivalent to that reported for the Netherlands in Table 5.6, for each of the 47 party systems we surveyed. These tables obviously convey a huge amount of information and we confine ourselves here to discussing some illustrative examples. One way to begin doing this is to consider party systems that appear to need only a single underlying dimension to describe the policy positions of all parties in the system. This only happens in three of the countries we studied – Switzerland, Britain, and the United States. We have already noted that, for the US, this is to a large extent an artefact of the two-party system.[1] In the one-dimensional cases of Switzerland and Britain, however, considerably more than two parties were included in the survey so that the results have stronger substantive implications. In each case party positions on all of the dimensions investigated loaded on the underlying left–right dimension. In the Swiss and US cases, however, the "decentralization" dimension loaded negatively – implying that promoting decentralisation is associated more with the right, than with the left, in Switzerland and the United States (where states' rights tends to be a Republican issue).

We can move on to consider those multidimensional policy spaces that appear to be "nearly" one dimensional, in the sense that the first underlying dimension explains far more of the variance in policy positions than the second. For now, consider Table 5.7a, which examines the countries from western Europe. The example we have explored in this chapter, the Netherlands, follows the "dominant single dimension" pattern, with the first dimension explaining more than three times the variance of party positions than the second factor. Four other clear cases of first dimension dominance are Italy, Norway, Iceland, and Northern Ireland, where like

the Dutch case the first factor explains approximately three times as much variance as the second. In all of these cases, the first factor can straightforwardly be interpreted in terms of a left–right dimension of economic policy. After the first dimension, policy content varies by country. In the Dutch case, as we have seen, the second dimension consists primarily of positioning on EU integration, and the third of positions on social issues and decentralization policy. In the case of Italy, by contrast, social liberalism and immigration policy load with economic policy on this first factor, as do most aspects of EU policy. The same is nearly true for Iceland, although immigration loads more strongly with the second than the first factor. While the first factor in these countries clearly represents the dominant left–right axis of political competition, therefore, it should be clear by now that the precise policy content of the principal left–right axis of competition is not the same in different countries. (The comparative meaning of the left–right political dimension is the central theme of Chapter 6.)

Examining the dimensions which load on the second factor is also quite informative. The second factor in Italy is distinguished by a high loading for policy on decentralization, reflecting the distinctive position of the Northern League, a right-wing party whose *raison d'etre* is to a large extent the decentralization of power to the Italian provinces. In the Norwegian case, by contrast, the main economic policy dimension does not incorporate immigration policy or social liberalism, which instead characterize the second factor. An almost identical pattern can be seen in Sweden, where the first factor also explains far more variance in party positions than the second. Last we note the Northern Ireland case, where the first dimension consists of economic left–right, Northern Ireland policy, the environment, and decentralization. The second dimension, by contrast, consists mainly of immigration policy and EU issues. Once again, in analyzing the content of the primary and secondary dimensions, it should be clear that in multidimensional party systems, the principal as well as the secondary axis clearly varies in content from setting to setting.

Considering the most unambiguously "multidimensional" party systems, indicated when the first and second factors explain a more or less equal amount of the variance in party policy positions, the two most striking western European examples are Denmark and Finland. In each case the first and second factors are almost equally important and the party system looks distinctly two-dimensional in this sense. The two party systems, however, are quite different. In Finland, the main economic policy factor (Factor 2) is strictly concerned with economic policy and the other factor is concerned with social policy, immigration, and the environment. In other words, the "social" and "economic" dimensions of socio-economic policy are quite distinct in Finland. In Denmark, in contrast, the main economic policy factor (Factor 1) also incorporates immigration and environmental policy as well as social liberalism – generating a single axis of

Table 5.7a Dimensional analysis of policy spaces, western Europe: principal components factor analysis, with varimax-rotated loadings

| Country | Factor | Eigenvalue | Variance explained | Tax/spend | Social | Environment | Decentralization | EU peace-keeping[2] | Immigration | EU accountability[3] | EU authority[4] | Deregulation | North Ireland/ Globalization[5] |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | 1 | 3.49 | 43.6% | 0.43 | 0.59 | 0.93 | 0.10 | -0.34 | 0.77 | 0.50 | 0.31 | | |
| Austria | 2 | 1.61 | 20.1% | 0.73 | 0.70 | -0.04 | -0.93 | -0.32 | 0.41 | 0.12 | 0.18 | | |
| Austria | 3 | 1.06 | 13.3% | -0.08 | 0.06 | -0.10 | 0.07 | 0.79 | 0.19 | 0.55 | 0.72 | | |
| Belgium | 1 | 4.19 | 46.5% | 0.92 | 0.51 | 0.84 | -0.42 | -0.14 | 0.82 | 0.36 | 0.15 | 0.92 | |
| Belgium | 2 | 1.78 | 19.7% | 0.06 | 0.44 | -0.01 | -0.31 | 0.84 | 0.37 | 0.73 | 0.80 | 0.03 | |
| Britain | 1 | 6.54 | 65.4% | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.81 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.73 | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.82 | 0.62 |
| Switzerland | 1 | 5.34 | 76.2% | 0.95 | 0.83 | 0.90 | -0.77 | | 0.94 | | 0.87 | 0.83 | |
| Germany | 1 | 3.16 | 39.5% | 0.44 | 0.86 | 0.78 | 0.11 | -0.03 | 0.88 | 0.67 | 0.40 | | |
| Germany | 2 | 1.39 | 17.4% | -0.72 | -0.06 | 0.02 | 0.92 | 0.09 | -0.09 | 0.03 | -0.15 | | |
| Germany | 3 | 1.06 | 13.3% | -0.04 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.89 | 0.03 | 0.26 | 0.64 | | |
| Denmark | 1 | 2.66 | 33.2% | 0.80 | 0.63 | 0.90 | -0.02 | -0.15 | 0.85 | 0.10 | -0.04 | | |
| Denmark | 2 | 2.46 | 30.7% | -0.28 | 0.26 | -0.10 | 0.05 | 0.82 | 0.12 | 0.79 | 0.93 | | |
| Denmark | 3 | 1.08 | 13.5% | -0.33 | 0.46 | 0.02 | 0.95 | -0.01 | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.08 | | |
| Finland | 1 | 2.98 | 33.1% | 0.19 | 0.86 | 0.55 | -0.03 | 0.18 | 0.85 | 0.60 | 0.53 | 0.14 | |
| Finland | 2 | 2.83 | 31.5% | 0.91 | 0.16 | 0.31 | -0.11 | -0.49 | 0.25 | 0.03 | -0.26 | 0.93 | |
| Finland | 3 | 1.02 | 11.4% | -0.08 | 0.17 | -0.58 | -0.86 | 0.68 | 0.01 | 0.30 | 0.70 | -0.09 | |
| France | 1 | 3.92 | 56.1% | 0.89 | 0.91 | 0.80 | 0.43 | | 0.86 | | -0.46 | | -0.20 |
| France | 2 | 1.58 | 22.6% | -0.10 | 0.20 | 0.11 | 0.68 | | 0.32 | | -0.82 | | 0.88 |
| Greece | 1 | 4.23 | 47.0% | 0.90 | 0.59 | 0.71 | 0.69 | -0.51 | 0.83 | 0.34 | -0.21 | 0.91 | |
| Greece | 2 | 2.07 | 23.0% | -0.16 | 0.43 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.27 | 0.72 | 0.87 | -0.22 | |
| Iceland | 1 | 3.25 | 54.1% | 0.91 | 0.64 | 0.89 | -0.34 | | 0.56 | | | 0.89 | |
| Iceland | 2 | 1.15 | 19.2% | -0.07 | 0.10 | -0.01 | 0.83 | | 0.65 | | | -0.18 | |
| Ireland | 1 | 3.51 | 39.0% | 0.84 | 0.73 | 0.84 | 0.70 | -0.53 | 0.86 | 0.02 | 0.03 | | -0.07 |

| Country | | Eigenvalue | % | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ireland | 2 | 1.82 | 20.2% | -0.13 | 0.18 | -0.08 | -0.08 | **0.62** | 0.04 | **0.74** | **0.71** | | **-0.61** |
| Italy | 1 | 4.76 | 52.8% | **0.78** | **0.70** | **0.85** | 0.19 | 0.05 | **0.93** | **0.89** | **0.89** | **0.58** | |
| Italy | 2 | 1.55 | 17.3% | 0.48 | -0.26 | 0.27 | **-0.83** | -0.10 | -0.03 | -0.08 | 0.01 | **0.69** | |
| Italy | 3 | 1.08 | 12.0% | -0.14 | -0.39 | -0.13 | 0.04 | **0.95** | -0.05 | 0.16 | 0.26 | -0.14 | |
| Luxembourg | 1 | 3.93 | 43.7% | **0.91** | **0.73** | **0.69** | 0.05 | -0.43 | **0.93** | 0.45 | -0.11 | **0.82** | |
| Luxembourg | 2 | 2.06 | 22.9% | -0.09 | -0.07 | -0.13 | 0.11 | **0.76** | 0.12 | **0.83** | **0.74** | 0.01 | |
| Luxembourg | 3 | 1.19 | 13.2% | -0.04 | 0.03 | **0.60** | **0.94** | 0.00 | 0.09 | -0.07 | 0.49 | 0.14 | |
| Netherlands | 1 | 4.28 | 47.6% | **0.88** | 0.08 | **0.89** | -0.18 | -0.23 | **0.87** | **0.67** | 0.43 | **0.95** | |
| Netherlands | 2 | 1.50 | 16.7% | -0.17 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 0.08 | **0.84** | 0.23 | **0.54** | **0.71** | -0.09 | |
| Netherlands | 3 | 1.26 | 14.0% | 0.18 | **0.84** | 0.01 | **-0.80** | -0.01 | 0.15 | 0.23 | -0.01 | 0.07 | |
| Norway | 1 | 4.34 | 54.3% | **0.60** | -0.26 | **0.79** | **0.75** | **-0.79** | 0.50 | | **-0.91** | **0.65** | |
| Norway | 2 | 1.41 | 17.6% | **0.60** | **0.83** | 0.38 | -0.03 | -0.20 | **0.62** | | 0.12 | **0.60** | |
| Portugal | 1 | 3.65 | 45.6% | **0.74** | **0.91** | **0.90** | **0.60** | -0.14 | **0.86** | 0.23 | 0.16 | | |
| Portugal | 2 | 1.98 | 24.8% | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.27 | **0.85** | 0.15 | **0.81** | **0.88** | | |
| Sweden | 1 | 4.09 | 45.4% | **-0.73** | -0.17 | **-0.65** | 0.06 | **0.84** | -0.06 | **0.75** | **0.79** | **-0.80** | |
| Sweden | 2 | 1.47 | 16.4% | **0.52** | **0.86** | 0.32 | -0.07 | -0.08 | **0.82** | 0.21 | -0.05 | 0.40 | |
| Sweden | 3 | 1.31 | 14.5% | -0.19 | -0.02 | **0.53** | **0.90** | -0.10 | 0.05 | 0.23 | -0.34 | -0.19 | |
| Cyprus | 1 | 4.87 | 60.9% | **-0.89** | **0.73** | -0.31 | **0.90** | **0.75** | -0.10 | | **0.91** | **-0.85** | |
| Cyprus | 2 | 1.47 | 18.4% | 0.32 | 0.29 | **0.81** | -0.22 | -0.36 | **0.91** | | -0.03 | 0.36 | |
| Malta | 1 | 3.37 | 42.2% | 0.03 | **0.91** | **0.94** | -0.22 | 0.08 | **0.81** | | -0.07 | **0.77** | |
| Malta | 2 | 2.26 | 28.2% | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.15 | **0.72** | **0.96** | -0.22 | | **0.78** | **-0.53** | |
| Malta | 3 | 1.13 | 14.1% | **0.96** | -0.21 | 0.03 | **0.52** | | 0.27 | | 0.15 | -0.04 | |
| Northern Ireland | 1 | 5.04 | 56.0% | **0.88** | 0.47 | **0.71** | **0.66** | | **0.57** | 0.02 | 0.03 | **0.91** | **-0.71** |
| Northern Ireland | 2 | 1.55 | 17.2% | 0.03 | **0.54** | **0.56** | 0.44 | | **0.64** | **0.86** | **0.86** | -0.05 | **-0.54** |

Notes

1 Variable loadings higher than 0.5 are highlighted in bold, except when the variable had a higher loading on another dimension.

2 NATO Peacekeeping replaces EU peacekeeping for Norway, Cyprus, and Malta.

3 EU strengthening replaces EU accountability for Ireland.

4 EU joining replaces "EU authority" for Switzerland, Norway, Cyprus, and Malta; EU enlargment for Ireland; EU larger/stronger in France.

5 Globalization applies to France only; other countries' figures in this column refer to the Northern Ireland dimension.

*Table 5.7b* Dimensional analysis of policy spaces, EU post-communist cases

| Country | Factor | Eigenvalue | Variance explained | Tax/spend | Social | Environment | Decentralization | Privatization | Former communists* | Nationalism | Religion | Media freedom | Foreign ownership of land | Urban–rural | EU joining | Neighbor relations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Czech Rep. | 1 | 3.97 | 33.0% | 0.90 | 0.15 | 0.55 | -0.01 | 0.90 | 0.83 | 0.01 | 0.28 | -0.44 | -0.56 | -0.56 | -0.15 | -0.16 |
| Czech Rep. | 2 | 2.34 | 19.5% | 0.10 | 0.17 | 0.44 | 0.71 | -0.12 | -0.24 | 0.83 | -0.31 | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.03 | 0.74 | 0.65 |
| Czech Rep. | 3 | 1.74 | 14.5% | 0.02 | 0.85 | -0.19 | 0.07 | 0.09 | 0.28 | 0.02 | 0.74 | 0.09 | -0.07 | 0.61 | -0.09 | 0.21 |
| Estonia | 1 | 4.88 | 40.6% | 0.83 | -0.13 | 0.73 | 0.56 | 0.92 | 0.24 | -0.12 | 0.09 | -0.49 | -0.97 | -0.83 | -0.62 | 0.15 |
| Estonia | 2 | 2.72 | 22.6% | 0.29 | 0.95 | 0.14 | 0.23 | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.93 | 0.81 | 0.26 | 0.09 | 0.28 | -0.12 | |
| Estonia | 3 | 2.22 | 18.4% | -0.01 | 0.09 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.07 | -0.79 | 0.01 | -0.38 | 0.50 | -0.02 | 0.32 | 0.64 | |
| Hungary | 1 | 6.62 | 55.1% | 0.74 | 0.91 | -0.29 | 0.65 | -0.61 | 0.85 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.71 | 0.88 | 0.76 | 0.76 | |
| Hungary | 2 | 1.33 | 11.1% | 0.24 | -0.18 | -0.73 | -0.29 | 0.36 | 0.15 | -0.03 | 0.01 | -0.14 | 0.01 | -0.08 | -0.19 | |
| Lithuania | 1 | 3.84 | 29.5% | -0.77 | 0.67 | -0.23 | 0.32 | 0.07 | 0.79 | 0.87 | 0.68 | 0.75 | 0.60 | 0.11 | 0.38 | |
| Lithuania | 2 | 2.71 | 20.8% | 0.23 | -0.12 | 0.11 | 0.40 | -0.80 | 0.15 | -0.16 | -0.44 | -0.01 | 0.50 | -0.01 | 0.54 | |
| Lithuania | 3 | 1.15 | 8.8% | 0.29 | 0.03 | 0.77 | -0.24 | 0.25 | 0.19 | -0.07 | -0.11 | 0.17 | 0.02 | 0.70 | 0.42 | |
| Lithuania | 4 | 1.06 | 8.1% | 0.71 | -0.34 | -0.21 | -0.48 | 0.16 | 0.28 | 0.03 | -0.06 | -0.31 | 0.23 | -0.45 | 0.23 | |
| Latvia | 1 | 4.68 | 39.0% | -0.05 | 0.03 | 0.44 | 0.73 | 0.94 | 0.88 | 0.79 | 0.52 | 0.33 | 0.74 | 0.26 | -0.88 | |
| Latvia | 2 | 2.21 | 18.4% | -0.16 | 0.60 | -0.57 | -0.26 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 0.39 | -0.22 | 0.08 | 0.46 | -0.78 | -0.13 | |
| Latvia | 3 | 1.37 | 11.4% | -0.35 | 0.37 | 0.38 | 0.31 | -0.11 | -0.03 | -0.19 | -0.32 | 0.68 | -0.14 | 0.32 | 0.01 | |
| Latvia | 4 | 1.06 | 8.8% | 0.01 | 0.04 | -0.37 | -0.11 | -0.09 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.66 | 0.52 | 0.82 | -0.19 | 0.13 | |
| Poland | 1 | 5.24 | 43.6% | 0.89 | 0.93 | -0.09 | 0.16 | -0.06 | 0.73 | 0.87 | 0.89 | 0.25 | -0.39 | 0.67 | 0.86 | |
| Poland | 2 | 3.03 | 25.2% | 0.47 | 0.06 | -0.29 | -0.71 | 0.86 | 0.49 | -0.20 | 0.19 | -0.66 | 0.45 | 0.50 | -0.28 | |
| Slovenia | 1 | 4.35 | 36.2% | 0.28 | 0.87 | -0.30 | -0.11 | 0.28 | 0.85 | 0.79 | 0.83 | 0.23 | -0.66 | 0.85 | 0.30 | |
| Slovenia | 2 | 1.68 | 14.0% | -0.13 | 0.03 | 0.45 | 0.07 | 0.57 | 0.23 | -0.11 | 0.31 | -0.09 | -0.05 | 0.24 | -0.69 | |
| Slovenia | 3 | 1.32 | 11.0% | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.46 | 0.66 | -0.29 | -0.12 | 0.08 | 0.07 | 0.72 | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.03 | |
| Slovakia | 1 | 4.27 | 35.5% | 0.63 | -0.13 | -0.18 | -0.75 | 0.39 | 0.36 | -0.35 | -0.10 | -0.77 | -0.30 | 0.27 | -0.70 | |
| Slovakia | 2 | 2.68 | 22.3% | 0.38 | 0.90 | 0.19 | 0.06 | 0.57 | 0.68 | 0.18 | 0.91 | 0.28 | -0.30 | 0.47 | -0.15 | |
| Slovakia | 3 | 1.04 | 8.6% | -0.34 | -0.03 | -0.72 | 0.19 | -0.53 | -0.28 | 0.60 | -0.05 | -0.07 | 0.73 | 0.52 | 0.24 | |

Note
*Civil liberties replaces former communists for Lithuania.

socio-economic competition. The second factor in Denmark – which like the Netherlands has seen popular referendums voting against the EU – brings together various aspects of policy towards the EU.

In about half of the western European cases studied, a third principal axis of political competition emerges from the factor analyses, explaining between 11–14 percent of the variance in party positions depending on the country. In many of the countries, this third dimension consisted of positioning on EU integration: Austria, Germany, and Finland were such examples, with EU peacekeeping forming a third dimension in Italy. In most of the other three-dimension countries, the third principal component consisted primarily of decentralization: Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and to a lesser extent Finland were such cases. Finally, the third dimension in Malta consisted of taxes/spending policy, interestingly separate from the first-factor policy dimension of deregulation.

Turning to Tables 5.7b and 5.7c, we can examine the post-communist cases, grouped by whether they are EU members. One immediately visible difference between these cases and the western European countries is the emergence of a greater number of factors, or principal underlying dimensions. Of the 18 countries in Tables 5.7b and 5.7c, none are one-dimensional, and only two – Hungary and Poland – are two-dimensional. Of these two cases, only Hungary truly fits the "dominant single-dimension" pattern, with the first factor explaining more than five times the variance of the second, which consists of policy on the environment and taxes versus spending. Furthermore, four principal factors emerged in eight of the countries, with the fourth factor explaining between 8 and 9 percent of the variance in party positions. Substantively, the content of the fourth factors in countries where these were identified varied considerably, including nationalism (Bulgaria, Moldova), foreign land ownership (Serbia, Macedonia), decentralization (Macedonia), the urban–rural divide (Lithuania, Albania), and religion (Latvia).

In the post-communist cases, we also observed interesting patterns for the contribution of social liberalism to the underlying axes of political contestation. In western Europe, positions on social liberalism were typically associated with the same underlying left–right axis of political competition as economic policy positioning (as represented by taxes versus spending), although some notable exceptions were Finland, Germany, and Malta. In the post-communist countries, by contrast, positioning on social liberalism is typically orthogonal to positioning on economic policy positioning (as represented mainly by privatization). An exception is Croatia, although social policy is still uncorrelated with economic policy as represented by the taxes versus spending dimension. Interestingly, social policy also formed the sole content of the fourth factor in Ukraine. Despite predictions that socially liberal parties also tend to support economically right-libertarian policies in terms of redistribution and deregulation (e.g.

Table 5.7c  Dimensional analysis of policy spaces, non-EU post-communist cases

| Country | Factor | Eigenvalue | Variance explained | Tax/spend | Social* | Environment | Decentralization | Privatization | Former communists* | Nationalism | Religion | Media freedom | Foreign ownership of land | Urban–rural | EU joining† |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | 1 | 3.83 | 32.0% | 0.67 | 0.18 | 0.35 | -0.17 | 0.64 | 0.87 | 0.86 | 0.26 | -0.03 | 0.09 | -0.05 | 0.12 |
| Albania | 2 | 2.61 | 22.1% | 0.31 | 0.80 | 0.43 | -0.60 | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.13 | -0.88 | 0.56 | -0.09 | -0.26 |
| Albania | 3 | 1.27 | 10.6% | 0.23 | 0.02 | -0.59 | 0.49 | -0.35 | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.78 | 0.11 | -0.32 | -0.23 | 0.83 |
| Albania | 4 | 1.01 | 8.4% | -0.28 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.40 | -0.54 | -0.01 | -0.01 | -0.09 | 0.18 | -0.08 | 0.86 | -0.08 |
| Belarus | 1 | 5.89 | 49.1% | 0.86 | -0.36 | 0.02 | -0.58 | 0.88 | 0.27 | 0.40 | 0.40 | -0.52 | -0.74 | 0.01 | -0.56 |
| Belarus | 2 | 2.43 | 20.0% | 0.38 | 0.37 | -0.81 | -0.17 | 0.36 | 0.88 | 0.82 | 0.82 | -0.02 | -0.16 | -0.24 | -0.13 |
| Belarus | 3 | 1.07 | 8.9% | -0.08 | 0.66 | 0.37 | 0.46 | -0.12 | 0.03 | -0.17 | 0.17 | 0.69 | 0.44 | 0.83 | 0.57 |
| Bulgaria | 1 | 4.33 | 36.0% | 0.73 | 0.08 | 0.18 | -0.43 | 0.87 | 0.62 | -0.20 | 0.71 | -0.39 | -0.70 | -0.50 | -0.71 |
| Bulgaria | 2 | 1.77 | 14.7% | -0.27 | -0.01 | 0.84 | 0.60 | -0.11 | 0.17 | 0.02 | -0.20 | 0.78 | -0.11 | 0.14 | 0.13 |
| Bulgaria | 3 | 1.31 | 10.9% | -0.09 | 0.89 | -0.03 | -0.08 | 0.03 | -0.39 | 0.10 | -0.06 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.65 | 0.07 |
| Bulgaria | 4 | 1.15 | 9.6% | -0.29 | 0.21 | 0.07 | -0.45 | -0.21 | 0.03 | 0.89 | 0.38 | 0.01 | -0.06 | -0.24 | 0.21 |
| Croatia | 1 | 5.86 | 48.9% | -0.12 | 0.82 | 0.79 | 0.89 | -0.71 | 0.83 | 0.90 | 0.96 | 0.21 | 0.60 | 0.61 | 0.49 |
| Croatia | 2 | 1.74 | 14.5% | 0.82 | -0.06 | 0.01 | -0.05 | 0.31 | -0.08 | -0.03 | -0.05 | -0.14 | 0.13 | -0.36 | -0.61 |
| Croatia | 3 | 1.09 | 9.2% | -0.08 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.44 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.08 | 0.87 | 0.36 | 0.26 | 0.21 |
| Macedonia | 1 | 4.00 | 33.6% | 0.57 | 0.87 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 0.51 | 0.86 | 0.93 | 0.20 | -0.04 | 0.90 | 0.14 |
| Macedonia | 2 | 2.61 | 21.8% | -0.19 | -0.07 | -0.59 | 0.66 | -0.81 | 0.35 | 0.10 | -0.10 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.89 |
| Macedonia | 3 | 1.84 | 15.3% | -0.35 | 0.09 | 0.59 | -0.18 | -0.30 | -0.57 | 0.10 | -0.14 | 0.83 | 0.31 | 0.11 | -0.15 |
| Macedonia | 4 | 1.02 | 8.5% | 0.43 | 0.16 | 0.01 | 0.57 | 0.05 | 0.15 | 0.03 | -0.12 | 0.33 | 0.85 | 0.02 | 0.04 |
| Moldova | 1 | 5.09 | 42.4% | 0.19 | -0.09 | 0.52 | -0.22 | 0.60 | 0.89 | 0.42 | 0.71 | -0.73 | -0.85 | -0.31 | -0.13 |
| Moldova | 2 | 2.44 | 20.3% | -0.02 | 0.06 | 0.76 | 0.86 | 0.11 | -0.14 | 0.09 | -0.44 | 0.25 | -0.09 | 0.80 | -0.13 |
| Moldova | 3 | 1.24 | 10.0% | 0.93 | -0.22 | 0.07 | -0.11 | 0.55 | 0.14 | 0.06 | -0.05 | -0.26 | -0.30 | 0.23 | -0.78 |

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moldova | 4 | 1.07 | 8.9% | −0.03 | **−0.78** | 0.22 | −0.28 | 0.34 | 0.22 | **0.80** | 0.33 | −0.33 | 0.03 | 0.22 | −0.34 |
| Romania | 1 | 6.09 | 50.7% | −0.82 | 0.55 | 0.12 | **0.84** | **−0.86** | **−0.89** | 0.70 | −0.19 | **0.87** | **0.69** | 0.37 | 0.30 |
| Romania | 2 | 1.67 | 13.9% | −0.14 | **0.68** | −0.04 | 0.37 | −0.28 | 0.01 | 0.56 | **0.78** | −0.09 | 0.55 | 0.11 | **0.72** |
| Romania | 3 | 1.28 | 10.7% | 0.14 | 0.06 | **−0.82** | 0.02 | 0.07 | −0.06 | 0.02 | 0.34 | 0.08 | 0.13 | **0.69** | −0.30 |
| Russia | 1 | 5.89 | 49.1% | **−0.88** | 0.28 | 0.04 | 0.26 | **−0.83** | −0.06 | **0.79** | 0.50 | 0.52 | **0.87** | **0.70** | **0.88** |
| Russia | 2 | 1.40 | 11.7% | 0.04 | **0.54** | **0.75** | **0.75** | −0.07 | −0.12 | 0.36 | −0.05 | **0.65** | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.27 |
| Russia | 3 | 1.07 | 9.0% | −0.09 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.13 | −0.26 | **−0.92** | −0.02 | **0.52** | 0.21 | 0.04 | 0.34 | 0.04 |
| Serbia | 1 | 4.82 | 40.2% | 0.00 | **0.54** | 0.01 | **0.74** | −0.27 | 0.02 | **−0.82** | −0.02 | **0.71** | 0.40 | **0.75** | **0.89** |
| Serbia | 2 | 2.29 | 19.1% | 0.41 | −0.10 | 0.50 | −0.43 | **0.87** | **0.91** | 0.16 | 0.07 | 0.10 | −0.18 | 0.16 | −0.13 |
| Serbia | 3 | 2.03 | 16.9% | −0.06 | **0.75** | **−0.73** | −0.07 | −0.07 | −0.05 | −0.29 | **0.94** | 0.03 | −0.22 | 0.35 | −0.08 |
| Serbia | 4 | 1.03 | 8.6% | **−0.87** | 0.11 | 0.06 | −0.14 | −0.19 | −0.32 | −0.03 | −0.13 | 0.51 | **0.82** | 0.25 | 0.24 |
| Ukraine | 1 | 4.79 | 39.9% | **0.70** | −0.10 | −0.05 | −0.05 | 0.60 | **0.83** | **0.82** | 0.29 | **−0.54** | **−0.66** | 0.05 | **−0.93** |
| Ukraine | 2 | 2.01 | 16.7% | −0.21 | −0.02 | **−0.81** | 0.04 | −0.15 | 0.26 | 0.32 | −0.04 | −0.51 | 0.38 | **0.83** | 0.01 |
| Ukraine | 3 | 1.26 | 10.5% | −0.06 | −0.11 | 0.04 | **−0.80** | 0.62 | 0.24 | 0.26 | **0.79** | −0.15 | 0.07 | −0.13 | −0.17 |
| Ukraine | 4 | 1.05 | 8.8% | −0.43 | **0.94** | 0.01 | 0.21 | −0.19 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 0.41 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.07 |

Notes

* "Privacy" replaces Social dimension for Belarus.
† "Relations with West" replaces EU joining for Russia.

Table 5.7d Dimensional analysis of policy spaces, non-European cases

| Country | Factor | Eigenvalue | Variance explained | Tax/spend | Social | Environment | Decentralization | Deregulation | Immigration | Health care | NATO/US affairs | Nationalism/sovereignty[1] | EU joining | Religion | Security[2] | Deficit bonds |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Australia | 1 | 5.31 | 66.4% | 0.94 | 0.89 | 0.88 | -0.08 | 0.87 | 0.70 | 0.89 | -0.83 | | | | | |
| Australia | 2 | 1.02 | 12.8% | -0.10 | -0.26 | -0.03 | 0.98 | 0.11 | -0.23 | -0.20 | 0.06 | 0.26 | | | | |
| Canada | 1 | 5.81 | 64.5% | 0.91 | 0.95 | 0.88 | -0.57 | 0.92 | 0.74 | 0.86 | -0.87 | | | | | |
| Canada | 2 | 1.42 | 15.8% | 0.14 | -0.07 | 0.02 | 0.65 | 0.13 | -0.39 | -0.18 | -0.06 | 0.89 | | | | |
| Israel | 1 | 3.58 | 51.2% | 0.01 | 0.91 | 0.62 | 0.10 | 0.03 | | | | 0.86 | | 0.89 | 0.87 | |
| Israel | 2 | 2.09 | 29.9% | 0.96 | -0.21 | 0.24 | 0.81 | 0.96 | | | | 0.29 | | 0.22 | 0.30 | |
| Japan | 1 | 4.45 | 44.5% | 0.01 | 0.57 | 0.77 | 0.10 | 0.72 | 0.60 | | 0.90 | 0.80 | | | 0.91 | 0.29 |
| Japan | 2 | 1.82 | 18.2% | 0.04 | 0.62 | 0.36 | 0.81 | -0.45 | 0.60 | | 0.17 | -0.08 | | | 0.13 | -0.55 |
| Japan | 3 | 1.01 | 10.1% | 0.99 | -0.02 | -0.03 | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.09 | | -0.01 | 0.10 | | | 0.00 | 0.09 |
| New Zealand | 1 | 4.17 | 59.6% | 0.93 | | 0.91 | -0.07 | 0.90 | 0.64 | 0.86 | -0.64 | | | | | |
| New Zealand | 2 | 1.14 | 16.3% | -0.16 | 0.31 | 0.02 | 0.91 | -0.23 | 0.32 | -0.05 | 0.50 | | | | | |
| Turkey | 1 | 2.79 | 27.9% | 0.12 | 0.75 | 0.06 | 0.70 | -0.34 | 0.63 | | 0.45 | 0.75 | 0.85 | -0.13 | | |
| Turkey | 2 | 2.50 | 25.0% | 0.02 | 0.09 | 0.78 | -0.29 | 0.31 | 0.46 | | -0.36 | 0.23 | 0.02 | 0.85 | | |
| Turkey | 3 | 1.24 | 12.3% | 0.90 | | 0.12 | 0.00 | 0.71 | 0.02 | | 0.16 | 0.13 | -0.14 | 0.10 | | |
| United States | 1 | 5.58 | 69.8% | 0.93 | 0.95 | 0.95 | -0.65 | 0.91 | 0.73 | 0.93 | -0.52 | | | | | |

Notes
1 Nationalism for Turkey, Quebec sovereignty for Canada, Palestinian statehood for Israel, national identity for Japan.
2 Security for Israel, defense policy for Japan.

Kitschelt 1992; Kitschelt 1999), our results indicate that economic policy and social liberalism are typically uncorrelated in post-communist systems.[2]

Two other policy dimensions salient in the post-communist cases that do not feature in other regions relate to nationalism versus cosmopolitanism, as well as attitudes towards the role of former communists in political affairs. The dimension of nationalism is important in the post-communist context because of the historical circumstances of central and eastern Europe, and because anti-communist forces may be especially predisposed to embracing nationalist positions in order to attract supporters (Kitschelt 1999). Generally omitted from cross-national measures of political contestation, nationalism in post-communist contexts forms an important, separate dimension of politics from economic left–right. These two policy dimensions frequently constituted a second or third dimension of political competition separate from economic left–right positioning. In all but four of the post-communist cases – Hungary, Latvia, Romania, and Russia – nationalism was uncorrelated with economic left–right (as represented by privatization). With regard to attitudes towards former communists, this policy dimension also more often than not was associated with a principal axis of competition different from economic left–right positioning: in ten of the 18 cases, the former communist dimension loaded on a different factor from privatization. Viewed together, these two "post-communist" policy dimensions also showed interesting associations to each other. In more cases than not – e.g. Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Belarus, Ukraine – the former communists and nationalism dimension loaded on the same factor and were positively correlated with that factor. In substantive terms, because higher values on these two dimensions are associated with excluding former communists from politics and with promoting nationalism, it means that there existed an underlying dimension of political competition that contrasted liberal, often communist successor parties with competitor parties bundling a mixture of anti-communist opposition and nationalism. In Hungary, for instance, the Hungarian Socialist Party, which promotes cosmopolitan values and strongly embraces European integration (along with its liberal coalition partner, the Alliance of Free Democrats) consists of many former communist officials. Its main opposition, the right-of-center Fidesz-Hungarian Civic Party, is not only strongly opposed to the participation of former communist officials, but also has shown its considerably nationalist character in recent election campaigns and legislative initiatives. An interesting exception to this pattern is Romania, where nationalist policy positions and attitudes towards former communists formed part of the same underlying axis of competition, yet were negatively correlated. The main ruling party, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), was relatively pro-nationalist (12.9) but was also very open to former communist officials participating in public affairs (3.7). Having grown out of the National Salvation Front which initially governed following the takeover of power from Ceaucescu, the

PSD has often been criticized for serving as a front for former communist officials. The PSD's coalition partner, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), was by contrast opposed to former communists participating in public affairs (13.5), but was the least nationalist of all parties (2.5), since its main objective was to preserve Hungarian minority rights in the face of pro-Romanian nationalism. Moving back to the other extreme, the opposition Great Romania Party (PRM) was not only the most extreme nationalist party (19.6) but also held the most favorable views towards former communists (2.8).

A final feature of the post-communist cases worth noting is the association of party positions on EU integration with many other issues, rather than forming a frequently orthogonal, independent axis of contestation as we saw in many of the western European countries. EU joining, the most salient issue in the post-communist set of countries, frequently loads on the first factor with main left–right issues (e.g. Hungary, Latvia, and Poland), but also loaded on underlying dimensions that included social liberalism, nationalism, or foreign ownership of land. The EU issue in the post-communist cases, in other words, is more linked to policy positions on other issues than in western Europe, and these linkages form no strongly consistent patterns.

The final, non-European set of country cases is examined in Table 5.7d. With the exception of Japan and Turkey, policy contestation in these countries can be reduced to two primary axes of competition (excepting the single-dimension case of the United States as noted earlier). In most cases, the first principal component clearly represents the primary left–right axis of political competition. An exception is Israel, where "local" policy dimensions such as Palestinian statehood, security, and religion formed the underlying axis that explained more than 51 percent of the variation in policy positions. Turkey formed another partial exception, where the first dimension consisted mainly of foreign policy issues such as EU accession, nationalism, NATO policy, and immigration – although this first principal component explained just 27.9 percent of the variance. The most common second dimension was decentralization, as evidenced in Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. Interestingly, economic left–right policy – usually components of the first principal axis – loaded on the second or third factors in Japan, Israel, and Turkey.

## Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the organization of party positioning on different dimensions of policy to see how they may be reduced to fewer principal axes of political competition. We have also examined the relative importance that different parties attach to different dimensions of policy. Employing the data reduction technique of factor analysis, we have examined patterns in party positions in order to determine, empirically, how

many distinct underlying axes of political competition appear to exist in each country. Our main conclusions are as follows.

First, it should be clear that the *importance* parties attach to policy dimensions is quite distinct from the *positions* they take on these same dimensions. Comparing the relative importance of dimensions across countries, we see that the importance assigned to different issues varies considerably across parties and across countries. Even across groups of countries, as we have shown in this chapter, issue importance differs considerably – EU accession, for instance, is foremost in importance among post-communist countries, and environment the least. It also emerged, for example, that the taxes/spending dimension is the most salient economic dimension in western Europe, while privatization takes this distinction in the post-communist sample.

Second, the number of principal axes of competition varies substantially across the different countries that we have examined. In some – such as Britain, Switzerland, and the United States – there is in effect a single underlying principal axis of political competition. In other countries, political competition is nearly one-dimensional, dominated by one main dimension which explains most of the variance in party positioning. In other systems, by contrast, political competition may be characterized by two underlying dimensions or even three or four. We consider this one of the significant empirical findings from our comparative study: that the real number of underlying axes of political competition differs across country contexts. Real political spaces, furthermore, with only a few exceptions, are multidimensional, an empirical result which our research design made it possible to measure. Applications or characterizations of political competition as one-dimensional are therefore unlikely in nearly all cases to tell the full story, and to omit important elements of political competition.

Third, we can gain insight into the substantive meaning of a number of important "secondary" axes of political competition – notably in relation to policy towards the EU and the environment. The environment, for example, emerged as a "new" issue of political concern in the 1970s and 1980s, and a key matter of interest concerns whether party positions on this issue were subsumed into general policy spaces or have changed these fundamentally by creating new axes of political competition. Our results suggest strongly that, in most countries, environmental policy has evolved into a new component of the traditional left–right dimension – with pro-environmental positions on the left – rather than constituting a "new" orthogonal axis of party competition. More recently, a debate has emerged in the literature on European integration about whether party positions on EU integration are orthogonal to the traditional left–right axis of political competition or have been subsumed as a new substantive feature of the left–right dimension. Tsebelis and Garrett (2000), for example, argue that political parties disagree fundamentally over Europe and that, furthermore, the European dimension can be subsumed into the traditional

left–right dimension. Hix and Lord (1997), by contrast, argue that the left–right dimension is orthogonal to policy on EU integration. Our results support the latter view. The various aspect of EU policy we measured were both rated as being important for many parties, and also tended strongly to load together in the dimensional analysis, creating an axis of party competition mostly orthogonal to the traditional left–right dimension. To a large extent this arises because opposition to further EU integration is a policy position taken by parties from both the far right as well as on the far left.

Finally, we find that the substantive policy content of principal axes of competition also differs substantially across country contexts. In most countries, the first principal dimension is typically represented by a classic pattern of left–right political competition. In some, however – Turkey and Israel, for instance – the first underlying dimension may have comprised other political issues not traditionally associated with the classical left–right political spectrum, such as foreign policy, immigration, nationalism, or religion. Furthermore, the precise policy content of the principal left–right axis of political competition varies considerably from country to country. Just as there is no single "best" representation of the policy space in any given country, there is no single "best" definition of the main left–right axis of political competition that is substantively portable from country to country. Indeed we regard this particular point as being of sufficient importance to devote the entire main final chapter of this book to it.

# 6 Left and right in comparative context

## Overview

As we saw in Chapter 1, probably the most time honored and universal way of using spatial language to describe the policy positions of political actors has been to describe these as being to the "left" or to the "right" of the political spectrum. This political spectrum is an explicit or implicit "left–right" scale that defines a spatial language understood by almost every political commentator, from the interested lay observer, to the hyper-connected political insider, to the political scientist who stands aloof from politics and attempts to describe this from a distance. As we saw in Chapter 2, many spatial models of politics are "one-dimensional." This may be for reasons of tractability, as complex models of political competition can be hard enough to specify and solve in one dimension, let alone many. It may result from a substantive judgment that, for a given political system, one key policy dimension is sufficient to capture most of what is going on. Putting all of this together, there is no doubt that the notion of a single "left–right" political spectrum is both widely understood by informal political commentators and widely used by many who theorize about politics – at least as a first step in specifying and solving complex models. It is therefore both theoretically important and practically useful for us to be able to produce reliable and valid estimates of the positions of political actors on a well-defined left–right scale.

## Sui generis *or constructed meanings of left and right?*

There are two fundamentally different approaches to estimating positions on a left–right scale. The first is to assume that the substantive meaning of left and right in any given political system is self-evident to all. This approach builds on the observation that, when political observers in a given country use the notions of left and right, they do so without feeling the endless need to keep defining what they mean by these terms. They thereby assume these meanings to be commonly understood by others with whom they are communicating. In this sense, the left–right spectrum is *sui*

*generis* for a given political system, forming one of the primitives of the system. The second approach is to build up a left–right scale from component parts, each part having a more precise substantive meaning than the more general underlying notions of left and right. Thus the left–right scale in a given political system can be seen as having to do with economic policy – where economic policy might include policies on the trade-offs between lower taxation and higher public spending, for example, or between the regulation and deregulation of business and industry. It may also be seen as having to do with "social" policy on matters such as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia. The left–right scale might be seen as having a bearing on foreign and defense policy on matters such as military spending, overseas aid, and dealings with international organizations such as the United Nations. In other words, there is a lot of substantive policy content that people typically regard as being natural to associate with the left–right spectrum in politics, and one approach to defining and estimating a left–right scale is to construct this scale from its substantive content.

## A priori *or inductive definitions of left and right?*

If we set out to construct a left–right scale from its substantive policy content, then there are again two fundamentally different ways to do this. The first defines the policy content of the left–right scale *a priori*, on the basis of prior knowledge of the political system under investigation. This involves deciding, on the basis of the available evidence, that left and right in the system under investigation are primarily about economic policy, for example, or about some combination of economic and social policy. The empirical analysis proceeds by estimating the constituent substantive parts and then combining these into a synthetic left–right scale. The benefit of doing things this way is that the substantive meaning of the resulting left–right scale is unambiguously defined. The disadvantage is that the content validity of the scale depends, not on the empirical research conducted, but on the *a priori* information and decisions of the researcher at the scale design stage. This *a priori* approach is used, for example, by computerized word scoring or dictionary-based methods for estimating policy positions from political texts – discussed in Chapter 2.

   The second approach is fundamentally inductive. The substantive policy content of the left–right scale is derived by analyzing data on policy positions using techniques, such as factor analysis or multidimensional scaling, that identify "latent" variables in high-dimensional spaces comprising a set of variables dealing with substantive policy positions. The previous chapter, for example, used factor analysis to realize just such an approach. The substantive policy *interpretation* of the latent variables derived from such dimensional analysis is conducted by the analyst *a posteriori*, for example using correlations between the constituent substantive policy variables and the synthetic underlying scale. A latent variable is given the

name "left–right scale" if the substantive policy variables correlate with it in ways that are expected by the researcher. Scientifically, such expectations should be specified by researchers before the statistical analysis is conducted and the statistical analysis should *confirm* these. Much more commonly, dimensional analyses in political science are designated as *exploratory*. This means that the *a posteriori* interpretation and labeling of latent variables can become something of a rhetorical or aesthetic exercise in constructing reasons why such and such a scale should be given such and such a label. The benefit of the inductive approach is that the substantive meaning of left and right is not defined in advance by the researcher. Thus the approach is more suitable in contexts where the substantive meaning of left and right are not clear in advance, and one of the main purposes of the research is to uncover this. This was the approach taken, for example, by the Comparative Manifesto Project in their early use of human-coded content analyses of party manifestos, discussed in Chapter 3.

This approach to estimating left and right has its purest manifestation in the work of Gabel and Huber (2000), who unambiguously define their left–right scale in a purely inductive way, as the latent variable explaining the largest proportion of the variance in a dimensional analysis of a set of substantive policy variables. The main disadvantage of the inductive approach is the inevitable consequence of not specifying scale content in advance and allowing this to emerge inductively. Different analysts can come up with different *a posteriori* interpretations of the same empirical results when inductive scales are based on exploratory dimensional analysis. For Gabel and Huber, however, the left–right scale is simply defined in advance as the principal dimension of policy variation between parties, and no *a posteriori* attempt is made to interpret its substantive meaning in any given context. While there is no *a posteriori* interpretation of results using the Gabel–Huber approach, the price paid is that the notions of left and right that emerge have no substantive meaning in terms of public policy.

## Left–right scales in different political systems

By its very nature the left–right scale, having no fixed definition in terms of its substantive policy content, is likely to vary in meaning as we move from country to country. While most people using the terms left and right probably feel that these terms do indeed have substantive policy content in any given setting, it seems very unlikely indeed that all of the policy areas in which we are interested have the same importance in all political systems we want to investigate. Thus the relative contributions of different policy areas to the meaning of left and right seem likely to vary from setting to setting. For this reason at the very least, the substantive meaning of left and right is almost certain to vary between political systems.

The central purpose of this chapter is to use results from our expert

survey to investigate these shifts of meaning in a systematic way. We can do this because we asked each of our country specialists to do two quite different things. The first was to locate each of the parties in the system under investigation on a set of substantive policy scales; the second was to locate the same parties on a general left–right scale. By analyzing the relationship between experts' judgments of parties' positions on a left–right scale and judgments of the same experts of the substantive policy positions of the same parties, we can get a systematic sense of the substantive policy content of left and right in a given country at the time of our survey, at least in the minds of our country specialists.

## The substantive content of left and right in different contexts

### The left–right scale as a description of "socio-economic" policy positions

Perhaps the most common way of imputing substantive policy content to the left–right scale is to describe it as a left–right scale of "socio-economic policy." This implies that the meaning of left and right is some blend of a dimension contrasting "interventionist" with "laissez-faire" economic policies, with a dimension contrasting "liberal" with "conservative" positions on matters of social and moral policy. At one end of the combined left–right scale we have people who favor liberal views on social policy as well as economic policies involving higher levels of state intervention in the economy. At the other end we have those who favor conservative views on social policy and lower levels of state intervention in the economy. Combining substantive policy dimensions in this way is an empirical generalization about the way many people think about the world – implying that social liberals have tended to favor state intervention in the economy and social conservatives have tended to favor laissez-faire economic policies. On this account classical liberalism as we defined it in Chapter 1 – which combines support for socially liberal policies with laissez-faire economics – has no unambiguous place on a left–right socio-economic scale. This position may be both a logical possibility and a set of views that real people actually hold, but using a single left–right dimension of socio-economic policy amounts to an empirical judgment that classical liberalism is not observed with sufficient frequency to make us want to give up a parsimonious one-dimensional map of the political world that captures most of the observed variation in real political preferences.

While the meaning of left and right might contain elements of both economic and social policy, however, the precise substantive blend of these may well vary from setting to setting. We can use results from our expert survey to investigate this by analyzing, for any given country, the relationship between the judgments of country specialists of the left–right

positions of political parties and their judgments of the positions of the same parties on substantive dimensions of economic and social policy. As we have seen, country specialists were asked to locate each political party "on a general left–right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account." On more specific policy grounds, experts were also asked to locate each party on an economic policy dimension, anchored by the substantive extremes of "promotes raising taxes to increase public services" and "promotes cutting public services to cut taxes." Experts were also asked to locate parties on a social policy dimension, contrasting those who favor with those who oppose "liberal policies on matters such as homosexual law, abortion, and euthanasia."

Comparing experts' judgments of party positions on the general left–right dimension with their placements of the same parties on the more specific economic and social policy scales, we can examine the association between these in each country context. Table 6.a.1 in an appendix to this chapter gives the results of OLS regressions, for each country investigated, predicting party positions on the left–right scale from party positions on economic and social policy dimensions, measured in this way.[1] The countries in Table 6.a.1 are ranked in descending order of the adjusted R-squared statistics for these regressions. While recognizing that this statistic also reflects sample variance in the left–right scores,[2] we nonetheless observe discernable and striking patterns through comparing the model fits in terms of overall left–right positioning explained by economic and social policy. For many of the countries in our study, party positions on these two substantive dimensions of economic and social policy predict their left–right policy positions very well. At least in the minds of our country specialists, parties' positions on the left–right spectrum can easily be constructed from their positions on economic and social policy. It is also striking that the set of countries at the top of this list are almost entirely from the "old" developed west, rather than from the post-communist party systems we examined. Estonia and the Czech Republic are exceptions but, apart from these, the top half of the list consists of countries exclusively from western Europe plus the US, Canada, and Australia. In contrast, the list of countries with an R-squared for this regression of below 0.5 consists almost entirely of post-communist countries, plus Japan, Turkey, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Israel, and Malta. In this sense, the "classic" socioeconomic definition of left and right seems to be a particularly western way of looking at things. Going beyond the information in Table 6.a.1, it is also the case that the existence of important "local" policy dimensions – such as national identity in Japan, religion in Turkey, security and Palestinian statehood in Israel, or the Northern Ireland question in both parts of Ireland – lessen the degree to which purely socio-economic policy can fully explain left and right placements in a particular context.

The detailed regression results in Table 6.a.1 confirm our expectation that there is huge variation in the substantive correlates of left and right

when we move from country to country. These findings are summarized in Figure 6.1, which shows, by broad region, the differences between the regression coefficients for economic and social policy. A regression coefficient of 1.0 means that there is essentially a one-to-one correspondence between party positions on the policy dimension under consideration and



*Figure 6.1* Comparison by country of coefficients on taxes/spending policy versus social liberalism, based on (weighted) OLS regressions of left–right placements (see Table 6.a.1).

positions of the same parties on the left–right scale; a smaller coefficient means there is an association but that the correspondence is less direct. Figure 6.1 shows the coefficients for the taxes/spending dimension on the right, and those for social liberalism on the left. Nearly all coefficients were positive in sign, indicating that social conservatism and a preference for lowering taxes were indeed consistent with the local definitions of political "right." The only exceptions are in cases where the bars cross over to the other side. This happened in Slovakia for social liberalism, and for taxes/spending policy in Croatia and Malta – although only in the case of Malta was the coefficient estimate statistically significant.

Comparing the coefficient for economic policy with the coefficient for social policy – the only two independent variables in each analysis – gives us a measure of the relative impact of economic and social policy positions on predictions of left–right policy positions. Even the briefest of glances at Figure 6.1 shows us that the substantive meaning of left and right, at least in the minds of country specialists who are probably sources as authoritative as any on such matters, is indeed very different in different countries. At the top section of each region, where the taxes/spending bars are longest, we find countries such as Cyprus, Iceland, Norway, the Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, and Estonia, for which left–right positions are almost entirely explained by economic policy. At the bottom of the table we find countries such as Portugal, Austria, Hungary, Japan, and Turkey, for which left–right positions are by contrast dominated by positioning on social policy. Between these extremes, we find countries such as Germany, Britain, Poland, Israel, the United States, and Australia, for which economic and social policy contribute to left–right positions in relatively equal measure.

As we will see later in this chapter, economic and social policy positions are not the only substantive correlates of left and right in each country. Yet viewed by themselves, what emerges beyond any shadow of a doubt from Figure 6.1 is that their relative contribution to the left and right placements – and hence to the substantive meaning of the left–right political dimension itself – varies widely across countries. One implication of this finding is that comparisons of left–right positions across political settings have very ambiguous substantive meaning.[3] This in turn means that synthetic left–right scales built on *a priori* grounds from substantive policy components must be adapted to their specific setting. If a single synthetic scale is used to make comparisons across countries, by implication, it will contain significant measurement error in individual counties. This leads to a second implication concerning time series of policy positions. We cannot show with our expert data that the substantive meaning of left and right varies over time within a single country, but this certainly seems likely given the highly context-specific meaning of left and right. This raises the possibility alluded to in Chapter 2, that "movements" in left–right positions may either be real underlying movement in party positions, or

changes over time in the substantive meaning of the scale. It will be diffi-cult without very carefully designed research to discover which of these two possibilities is in fact taking place.

## Environmental policy and left–right party positions

If the left–right spectrum is indeed changing its meaning over time, the most likely source of such movement is the changing salience of particular substantive policy dimensions that contribute to the meaning of left and right in any given setting. One obvious candidate for a "new" dimension of substantive policy that has become more important over the years is environmental policy (Carter 2001; Inglehart 1997; ch. 8). We have also seen the rise to prominence of Green parties, with strong emphasis on environmental policy, and in the previous chapter we confirmed systematically that environmental policy often has a high loading, with pro-environmentalist positions on the left, on the axis of political competi-tion defined in terms of left- vs right-wing economic policies. All of this suggests that environmental policy may in many contexts form an import-ant component of the substantive meaning of the more general left–right dimension.

 Environmental policy was one of the four "core" policy dimensions deployed in every country we investigated. Country specialists were asked to place each party on a dimension that contrasted support for "protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth" with support for "economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment." Adding parties' environmental policy positions to the weighted OLS regressions used to predict left–right positions from the economic and social policy dimensions, we get the series of results reported in Table 6.a.2 reported at the end of this chapter. In Table 6.1, we organize the results of these regressions to show the difference in model fit caused by the addition of the environmental policy variable. Our focus is on the reduction in the root mean squared error that results from including environmental policy, a quantity measured in units of the left–right scale (running from 1 to 20). A decrease in the average root mean squared error indicates that the inclusion of environmental policy better predicts left–right placement,[4] and hence our first three numerical columns compare the estimates of this parameter for the two models. The countries in Table 6.1 are ranked in descending order of the improvement or reduc-tion in RMSE (root mean squared error) that resulted from adding environmental policy. We also focus attention on the coefficient estimates for environmental policy, shown along with its standard error and *p*-values in the final column.

 The table shows that, for a number of countries, environmental policy added very considerably to our ability to predict parties' left–right posi-tions. At the top of this table we find Japan, Estonia, Albania, Denmark,

*Table 6.1* Contribution of environmental policy to predictions of left–right positions

| Country | Root MSE | | | Environment variable | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Economic + social | Environment + economic + social | Reduction | Coefficient | SE | p |
| Japan | 3.64 | 2.84 | 0.81 | **0.64** | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Estonia | 2.07 | 1.71 | 0.36 | **0.34** | 0.10 | 0.00 |
| Albania | 3.19 | 2.93 | 0.26 | **0.44** | 0.12 | 0.00 |
| Denmark | 2.53 | 2.28 | 0.26 | **0.38** | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Italy | 2.82 | 2.62 | 0.20 | **0.33** | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Belarus | 3.82 | 3.62 | 0.20 | **−0.30** | 0.12 | 0.01 |
| Turkey | 3.61 | 3.44 | 0.18 | **0.27** | 0.06 | 0.00 |
| Portugal | 1.58 | 1.41 | 0.17 | **0.26** | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Netherlands | 1.99 | 1.83 | 0.16 | **0.25** | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Ireland | 2.19 | 2.05 | 0.15 | **0.25** | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Cyprus | 3.61 | 3.49 | 0.13 | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.09 |
| Spain | 1.83 | 1.70 | 0.13 | **0.27** | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| United States | 1.77 | 1.65 | 0.12 | **0.29** | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Luxembourg | 2.42 | 2.31 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 0.14 | 0.12 |
| Britain | 2.09 | 1.98 | 0.11 | **0.22** | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Latvia | 3.62 | 3.52 | 0.10 | **0.28** | 0.14 | 0.05 |
| Iceland | 2.01 | 1.92 | 0.09 | **0.20** | 0.08 | 0.01 |
| Northern Ireland | 3.30 | 3.22 | 0.08 | 0.34 | 0.17 | 0.06 |
| Serbia | 3.52 | 3.45 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.21 |
| Belgium | 2.56 | 2.48 | 0.08 | **0.19** | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Canada | 1.64 | 1.59 | 0.05 | **0.17** | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Germany | 1.94 | 1.89 | 0.05 | **0.12** | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Sweden | 2.11 | 2.06 | 0.05 | **0.12** | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Lithuania | 3.14 | 3.10 | 0.04 | **0.17** | 0.08 | 0.05 |
| Austria | 1.98 | 1.95 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.08 |
| Norway | 1.92 | 1.88 | 0.04 | **0.10** | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Greece | 2.14 | 2.12 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.15 |
| Russia | 3.52 | 3.51 | 0.02 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.16 |
| Slovakia | 3.91 | 3.89 | 0.02 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.11 |
| Israel | 3.03 | 3.01 | 0.02 | **0.11** | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Switzerland | 1.79 | 1.79 | 0.01 | **0.06** | 0.03 | 0.05 |
| Hungary | 2.86 | 2.86 | 0.01 | −0.08 | 0.05 | 0.13 |
| Ukraine | 4.65 | 4.63 | 0.01 | −0.15 | 0.13 | 0.26 |
| Finland | 2.40 | 2.40 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.90 |
| Slovenia | 3.48 | 3.48 | 0.00 | −0.04 | 0.04 | 0.29 |
| Czech Republic | 2.98 | 2.98 | −0.01 | 0.01 | 0.05 | 0.82 |
| Poland | 3.60 | 3.61 | −0.01 | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.97 |
| Australia | 2.37 | 2.39 | −0.01 | −0.04 | 0.09 | 0.68 |
| Croatia | 3.74 | 3.75 | −0.01 | −0.10 | 0.12 | 0.40 |
| Bulgaria | 3.76 | 3.78 | −0.02 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.59 |
| Romania | 4.09 | 4.11 | −0.02 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 0.93 |
| Macedonia | 3.06 | 3.09 | −0.03 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.80 |
| Malta | 2.12 | 2.16 | −0.04 | −0.12 | 0.19 | 0.54 |
| Moldova | 4.79 | 4.84 | −0.05 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.85 |

Note
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p <= 0.05$ level.

and Italy – all cases where the regression coefficient for environmental policy was also substantial. In these countries at least, environmental policy seems to be an integral part of the substantive meaning of left and right. At the bottom of the table we find a set of countries for which environmental policy seems to play no part in the meaning of political left and right. These include Finland and Australia, as well as the vast majority of the post-communist countries. Among the post-communist countries, in fact, only in the three Baltic states and Belarus – where opposition in the twilight of the USSR had emerged from environmental groups and continues to be associated with party positioning – did environmental policy positions contribute anything noticeable to the prediction of left–right placement.[5]

There is also a strong pattern in the middle of the table of countries for which adding environmental policy does not greatly improve prediction, but for which the estimated coefficients for environmental policy are nonetheless substantial, indicating that environmental positioning contributes to the definition of left and right, even if not as directly or as consistently as socio-economic policy positions. Canada, Germany, Sweden, and the United States are clear examples. In these cases we expect that environmental policy is taking over at least part of the role of economic and/or social policy in predicting left–right party positions, and comparison of the regression models reported in Tables 6.a.1 and 6.a.2 confirms that this is the case. Thus Table 6.a.1 shows for Canada that the regression coefficients for economic and social policy, respectively, are 0.35 and 0.47. When environmental policy is added to the model predicting left–right party positions, coefficients for economic, social, and environmental policy, respectively are 0.25, 0.31, and 0.29; the three substantive policy dimensions now make an almost equal contribution to predicting left–right positions in Canada. Furthermore, when environmental policy is omitted from the predictions of left–right policy content in these countries, then the estimates of the impact of social and economic policy positions are distorted by the correlation of these with the omitted environmental policy dimension. Once again, whether or not omitting environmental policy from the interpretation of left and right produces a problem, depends heavily on the country context. Overall, however, it can be seen that, in a substantial number of settings, environmental policy does make an important and independent contribution to the substantive meaning of left and right.

### Alternative manifestations of economic and social policy

Another way in which the substantive policy content of left and right might change over time and across countries has to do with the manner in which we measure economic and social policy positions. In quite a few countries, the country specialists we consulted before launching the survey

advised us that we needed to capture economic and social policy using more than the core policy dimensions defined by the trade-off between lower taxes and higher public spending, and positions on matters such as abortion, homosexual law, and euthanasia. A common theme was that policy on the *deregulation* of business and industry is now at least as important an indicator of economic policy as policy on taxes and spending, and captures a quite different aspect of economic policy. In post-communist contexts, furthermore, an additional economic dimension related to the *privatization* of formerly state-owned industries was also deemed a highly salient, and often separate, aspect of economic policy. Similarly, policy on *immigration* is growing in importance in a number of European countries, and refers to something that is substantively different from the classic set of "liberal versus conservative" issues, which have more to do with the role of the state in matters of personal morality.

In order to assess the potential importance of these distinct dimensions of policy, therefore, we asked experts to place parties on additional scales reflecting the content of these alternative manifestations of left–right policy. Country specialists were asked to place parties on a "deregulation" policy dimension that contrasted those who favor "high levels of state regulation and control of the market" with those who favor "deregulation of markets at every opportunity" (or for post-communist countries, a similarly worded question related to the privatization of state assets). Experts were also asked to place parties on an "immigration" policy dimension that contrasted policies "designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into [*e.g. British*] society" with policies "designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin." In post-communist countries we also measured party positions on the issue of former communists participating in politics, a dimension which we explored in Chapter 5 as being related to left–right positioning.

Tables 6.a.3a and 6.a.3b in the appendix to this chapter show the results of weighted OLS regressions predicting expert placements of parties on the left–right dimension, adding the deregulation and immigration policy dimensions to taxes/spending, social, and environmental policy. These results are only available for the subset of countries for which experts were asked to locate parties on all five substantive policy dimensions. From the results we can see that for most of the countries investigated in this way, the five substantive policy dimensions combine to give us strong predictions of parties' left–right placements. The salient features of these regressions are summarized in Tables 6.2a and 6.2b which show, for each country, the regression coefficients for the substantive policy variables dealing with deregulation and immigration policy, in addition to estimates of the residual standard deviation and the total variance explained. Countries in each table are grouped according to whether one or both alternative policy dimensions contributed to the meaning of left–right. Within each group, countries are ranked in this table according to the

relative impact of the alternative policy dimensions on left–right place-ments. Coefficients highlighted in bold show the cases in which the relative impact of deregulation policy was greater than that of policy on taxes and spending, and cases in which the relative impact of immigration policy was greater than that of policy on abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia.

Of the 20 countries in this subset, there were nine countries in which parties' policies on deregulation contributed more to their left–right place-ment by the experts than their policies on taxes and public spending. Far at the top were the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta, with Norway, Australia, and Finland also having party systems in which eco-nomic policy was much more about deregulation than the "raise taxes versus cut spending" dilemma. In countries such as Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Luxembourg, in contrast, taxation and public spending was much more closely associated with left–right party placements than was policy on deregulation. Equally strong patterns were seen in relation to immigra-tion policy, which in eight of the 20 countries were more closely associated with left–right party placements than was policy on traditional liberal–conservative issues. Countries for which immigration outweighed traditional social policy issues included Italy and Greece – on southern Europe's immigration frontier – as well as the Benelux states and Switzer-land, at the heart of old Europe.

For a final group of countries, more traditional substantive correlates of left and right continued to dominate matters such as deregulation and immigration. Notably in the United States and Canada, but also in coun-tries such as Sweden and Spain, it was taxation versus spending and the "traditional" liberal–conservative debates over matters such as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia that seem to have been driving the country spe-cialists when they located parties on the general left–right spectrum.

Of the post-communist countries in Table 6.2b, we see clearly that for all countries measured, the "former communists" dimension is very important when it comes to predicting the left–right dimension in context. All countries showed a substantial coefficient on this variable. Of the five countries where the post-communist policy was not statistically significant, all except Romania had relatively small samples of respondents. Not only does orientation towards former communist officials form an important aspect of political contestation in post-communist countries, as we saw clearly in Chapter 5, but also the divide over former communists con-tributes substantially to the definition of political left and right in virtually all post-communist party systems.

The privatization dimension was important in most, but by no means all, post-communist party systems, contributing almost nothing to our ability to predict left–right placement in Croatia, Hungary, Russia, Bosnia, Romania, or Serbia, but having a fairly substantial impact on this in all of the other post-communist countries. The issue was especially important to the definition of left–right in Latvia (coefficient 0.77) and Slovakia (0.59).

*Table 6.2a* Relationship of immigration and deregulation to left–right positioning (results from Table 6.a.3a)

| Country | Coefficient | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Immigration | Deregulation | Adjusted R2 | Root MSE | N |
| *Immigration policy only* | | | | | |
| Italy | **0.39** | –0.01 | 0.82 | 2.26 | 496 |
| Turkey | **0.32** | 0.00 | 0.50 | 3.27 | 120 |
| Luxembourg | 0.39 | –0.01 | 0.77 | 2.03 | 20 |
| *Deregulation policy only* | | | | | |
| Cyprus | 0.04 | **0.78** | 0.85 | 2.55 | 32 |
| Malta | –0.34 | **0.67** | 0.49 | 2.06 | 16 |
| Norway | 0.02 | **0.59** | 0.90 | 1.51 | 163 |
| Finland | –0.02 | **0.46** | 0.76 | 2.03 | 252 |
| Sweden | 0.00 | **0.35** | 0.84 | 1.88 | 444 |
| Australia | 0.06 | **0.31** | 0.75 | 2.26 | 80 |
| Britain | 0.04 | **0.31** | 0.79 | 1.79 | 202 |
| United States | 0.03 | **0.16** | 0.91 | 1.58 | 320 |
| *Both immigration and deregulation* | | | | | |
| Northern Ireland | **0.52** | 0.29 | 0.61 | 2.73 | 51 |
| Belgium | **0.32** | **0.16** | 0.85 | 2.04 | 191 |
| Switzerland | **0.31** | **0.16** | 0.93 | 1.53 | 408 |
| Iceland | **0.26** | **0.22** | 0.87 | 1.64 | 62 |
| Netherlands | **0.21** | **0.37** | 0.87 | 1.58 | 137 |
| Greece | 0.17 | 0.18 | 0.75 | 2.00 | 58 |
| Japan | **0.10** | **0.37** | 0.76 | 2.25 | 266 |
| Spain | **0.10** | **0.18** | 0.90 | 1.62 | 346 |
| Canada | **0.07** | **0.24** | 0.88 | 1.52 | 488 |

Note:
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

## Conclusions: the substantive content of left and right

There are two straightforward pieces of headline news emerging from the analyses we have discussed in this chapter. The first is that it is indeed possible to predict expert placements of parties on a very general left–right scale from placements of the same parties on a set of substantive policy dimensions. This is true even when we confine the set of substantive dimensions to two – economic policy, measured in terms of the trade-off between lower taxes and higher public spending, and policy on moral issues such as abortion, gay rights, and euthanasia. Using only these two substantive scales, OLS regressions predicting left–right placements had adjusted $R^2$ values of over 0.67 for half of the countries we investigated. Furthermore, adding just three more substantive policy dimensions –

*Table 6.2b* Relationship of immigration and deregulation to left–right positioning
                (results from Table 6.a.3b)

| Country | Coefficient | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Former Communists | Privatization | Adjusted R2 | Root MSE | N |
| *Former communists only* | | | | | |
| Croatia | **0.47** | 0.05 | 0.57 | 3.02 | 63 |
| Hungary | **0.42** | 0.06 | 0.79 | 2.14 | 231 |
| Russia | **0.25** | −0.05 | 0.50 | 3.29 | 106 |
| Bosnia | 0.22 | 0.08 | 0.91 | 1.50 | 15 |
| Romania | 0.20 | −0.07 | 0.17 | 4.10 | 92 |
| Serbia | 0.15 | −0.04 | 0.33 | 3.62 | 20 |
| *Privatization only* | | | | | |
| Estonia | 0.03 | 0.25 | 0.89 | 1.64 | 26 |
| *Both former communists and privatization* | | | | | |
| Ukraine | **0.45** | **0.31** | 0.74 | 3.21 | 55 |
| Bulgaria | **0.44** | **0.39** | 0.78 | 2.13 | 72 |
| Belarus | **0.42** | 0.37 | 0.73 | 3.06 | 55 |
| Poland | **0.37** | **0.33** | 0.62 | 3.09 | 233 |
| Slovenia | **0.33** | **0.16** | 0.64 | 2.99 | 453 |
| Czech Republic | **0.32** | **0.28** | 0.82 | 2.23 | 246 |
| Macedonia | **0.27** | 0.19 | 0.58 | 2.96 | 49 |
| Latvia | **0.24** | **0.77** | 0.90 | 1.64 | 54 |
| Albania | **0.22** | **0.23** | 0.65 | 2.47 | 60 |
| Slovakia | **0.18** | **0.59** | 0.71 | 2.79 | 138 |
| Moldova | 0.17 | **0.46** | 0.65 | 3.43 | 49 |
| Lithuania | **−0.21** | **0.40** | 0.54 | 2.74 | 128 |

Note
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p <= 0.05$ level.

relating to deregulation/privatization, immigration, and the environment –
produces a very tight fit in most countries between expert placements of
parties on substantive policy dimension and the left–right scale. From
additional work not reported here, we know that adding additional sub-
stantive policy dimensions further improves this fit. Using this type of
analysis, therefore, we can get a fairly systematic sense of the substantive
policy dimensions that our experts associated with left and right in any
given country.

The second piece of headline news is that the relative contribution of
different substantive policy dimensions to our ability to predict parties'
left–right positions varies quite considerably from country to country. In
some countries, left and right are overwhelmingly about economic policy.
In others, left and right are primarily associated with social liberalism and
conservatism. In some countries, environmental policy makes a big contri-

bution to our ability to predict left–right positions; in others it makes hardly any contribution at all. Furthermore, once we look inside the general realm of economic policy, there are countries where it is the taxes/spending dimension that is associated with left and right, and others where left and right are more closely associated with deregulation. Similarly, in some countries it is social liberalism and conservatism that allows us to classify parties as being on the left or the right; in others it is immigration policy.

The most glaring differences, our analysis has shown, exist between countries that emerged from communism during the period 1989–92, and countries with longer democratic histories. For instance, we might be forgiven for thinking, based on comparing their socio-economic positions, that the Hungarian Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) occupied a similar place in the left–right scale as the Italian *Lista Panella Bonino*. Both are considered "liberal" parties, with the SZDSZ being the main supporter in Hungarian politics of both economic and social liberalism, and the *Lista Bonino* – also known as the Radical Party – describing itself as "a liberal, *liberista* and libertarian" political movement. Both parties score 15.2 on the taxes versus spending dimension and between 2.0–2.3 on the social scale (and, we might point out, differ only 1.3 points on the environmental policy dimension). And yet in the Hungarian context, the SZDSZ is considered the primary mainstream party of the *left* (with a left–right placement of 8.2), while in Italy, the *Lista Bonino* is considered squarely *right* of center (left–right mean of 12.0). The difference stems from the different contributions of the economic right and socially left positions that define classic liberal parties: in Hungary, social policy is more important than economics in the definition of left–right, while in Italy precisely the reverse is true (see Table 6.a.1). In addition, the SZDSZ's permissive policies towards former communist officials – in Hungary a critical component of the left–right dimension – is not at all a factor in Italy. Our study is replete with similar examples, but the conclusion is the same: the meaning of the left–right dimension is not the same across different national contexts.

The pessimistic conclusion, then, is that we may well be treading on thin ice methodologically when comparing left–right policy positions across space or time. Because the substantive meaning of the left–right dimension is so context-dependent, it may be impossible for any single scale to measure this dimension in a manner than can be used for reliable or meaningful cross-national comparison. This conclusion has deep implications for those who might want to apply some standard left–right index to perform cross-national comparisons – perhaps by using party positions on a common scale as a variable in cross-national data analysis. Although our data cannot be squeezed further on this, we might extend this conclusion to speculate that the substantive meaning of left and right might also change over time, with equally deep implications for the

interpretation of times series of party positions, even in one country, on some common left–right scale.

This warning has been sounded before (for example by Gabel and Huber 2000) yet never before has it been demonstrated so starkly. What then is the prescription for political scientists who are interested, for obvious reasons, in comparing countries based on a single left–right scale? If the past is any guide, most warnings about the lack of cross-national comparability in the substantive meanings of left and right will be briefly acknowledged and then steadfastly ignored, so that our expert data will be used in precisely the ways that we warn against here.

Of course, when a general left–right scale is deployed in independent national contexts – perhaps because a one-dimensional model of some aspect of party competition is deemed most appropriate – there is nothing wrong with using this scale on a country-by-country basis in *simultaneous parallel applications of the same model*. In this case the key comparisons are made within one country and nothing at all rides on having left–right scales that have the same substantive meaning in different countries. When cross-national comparisons are indeed central to the research task at hand, however (perhaps because arguments are being made that take the form "countries with more left-wing governments are more likely to have the features X, Y, or Z than countries with more right-wing governments"), then we have shown that comparing the scores from the same left–right scale across countries is a highly dubious exercise. The alternative in this case is to use substantively defined policy scales of the type we have deployed in this survey. Each of these scales is substantively anchored, and these anchors were translated by country specialists into the native language, as appropriate. Even then we can of course never be certain that the political meaning of these scale anchors does not change as we move from country to country. But at least we can be sure that we have done our utmost to give the same scale the same substantive anchors in each country, rather than doing something we know very well to be invalid. In this precise sense, therefore, our substantive policy scales are more likely to yield valid cross-country comparisons than the general left–right scales, though it will always remain true that any inter-country comparison of substantive policy spaces remains an endeavor fraught with intellectual danger.

# Appendix

*Table 6.a.1* OLS regressions predicting experts' left-placements of parties from placements of the same parties on the taxes/spending and social policy dimensions

| Country | Coefficients | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Taxes-spending | SE | Social | SE | Constant | SE | Adj R2 | Root MSE | N |
| Switzerland | **0.72** | 0.02 | **0.23** | 0.02 | **0.67** | 0.19 | 0.90 | 1.79 | 433 |
| United States | **0.35** | 0.04 | **0.47** | 0.03 | **2.65** | 0.22 | 0.89 | 1.77 | 332 |
| Spain | **0.48** | 0.04 | **0.35** | 0.03 | **2.76** | 0.22 | 0.87 | 1.82 | 365 |
| Canada | **0.53** | 0.03 | **0.31** | 0.02 | **2.42** | 0.20 | 0.86 | 1.64 | 539 |
| Norway | **0.83** | 0.03 | **0.06** | 0.03 | **2.01** | 0.39 | 0.85 | 1.92 | 165 |
| Estonia | **0.89** | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 1.13 | 1.28 | 0.84 | 1.93 | 32 |
| Portugal | **0.21** | 0.04 | **0.59** | 0.04 | **1.92** | 0.41 | 0.84 | 1.58 | 115 |
| Iceland | **0.94** | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.66 | 0.76 | 0.80 | 2.01 | 62 |
| Sweden | **0.76** | 0.02 | **0.14** | 0.02 | **2.09** | 0.24 | 0.79 | 2.11 | 465 |
| Netherlands | **0.81** | 0.03 | **0.09** | 0.03 | **1.52** | 0.45 | 0.79 | 2.00 | 163 |
| Belgium | **0.64** | 0.04 | **0.37** | 0.03 | 0.53 | 0.46 | 0.74 | 2.67 | 210 |
| Austria | 0.11 | 0.07 | **0.53** | 0.06 | **4.37** | 0.64 | 0.74 | 2.01 | 64 |
| Britain | **0.40** | 0.05 | **0.35** | 0.04 | **4.91** | 0.32 | 0.73 | 2.15 | 240 |
| Australia | **0.34** | 0.08 | **0.44** | 0.08 | **3.66** | 0.66 | 0.72 | 2.38 | 88 |
| Greece | **0.61** | 0.07 | **0.36** | 0.07 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 0.72 | 2.14 | 59 |
| Italy | **0.56** | 0.02 | **0.38** | 0.02 | **0.93** | 0.31 | 0.71 | 2.83 | 535 |
| Cyprus | **1.29** | 0.15 | **0.37** | 0.18 | **−7.13** | 3.23 | 0.70 | 3.61 | 32 |
| Germany | **0.42** | 0.02 | **0.31** | 0.02 | **2.38** | 0.25 | 0.70 | 1.97 | 559 |
| Denmark | **0.69** | 0.04 | **0.29** | 0.04 | **1.20** | 0.49 | 0.68 | 2.53 | 239 |
| Czech Republic | **0.77** | 0.03 | **0.09** | 0.04 | **1.50** | 0.47 | 0.68 | 3.00 | 253 |
| Luxembourg | **0.40** | 0.12 | **0.30** | 0.10 | **3.85** | 1.25 | 0.68 | 2.37 | 22 |
| Finland | **0.57** | 0.03 | **0.32** | 0.03 | **1.97** | 0.42 | 0.67 | 2.40 | 260 |
| Ireland | **0.62** | 0.03 | **0.11** | 0.03 | **3.13** | 0.43 | 0.62 | 2.26 | 304 |
| Hungary | 0.11 | 0.05 | **0.73** | 0.04 | 1.79 | 0.81 | 0.59 | 3.01 | 262 |
| Belarus | **1.04** | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.11 | −1.08 | 2.01 | 0.58 | 3.82 | 55 |
| Israel | **0.40** | 0.04 | **0.55** | 0.03 | 0.93 | 0.63 | 0.56 | 3.11 | 271 |
| Latvia | **0.89** | 0.11 | 0.19 | 0.11 | −0.21 | 2.10 | 0.53 | 3.67 | 56 |
| Slovenia | **0.30** | 0.04 | **0.47** | 0.03 | **2.91** | 0.43 | 0.51 | 3.48 | 462 |
| Macedonia | **0.56** | 0.11 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 1.90 | 1.18 | 0.50 | 3.06 | 58 |
| Albania | **0.65** | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.08 | **4.00** | 1.04 | 0.50 | 3.18 | 69 |
| Poland | **0.47** | 0.05 | **0.40** | 0.04 | **1.40** | 0.57 | 0.48 | 3.59 | 248 |
| Ukraine | **1.12** | 0.17 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.72 | 3.01 | 0.45 | 4.65 | 56 |
| Slovakia | **0.49** | 0.07 | **0.33** | 0.05 | **2.86** | 0.87 | 0.45 | 3.81 | 154 |
| Russia | **0.64** | 0.08 | −0.08 | 0.08 | **5.72** | 1.37 | 0.43 | 3.57 | 114 |
| Moldova | **0.55** | 0.15 | **−0.64** | 0.20 | **12.52** | 3.03 | 0.41 | 4.76 | 54 |
| Northern Ireland | **0.46** | 0.12 | **0.38** | 0.08 | 1.76 | 1.31 | 0.41 | 3.21 | 68 |
| Lithuania | **0.61** | 0.07 | **0.27** | 0.07 | 0.99 | 1.06 | 0.40 | 3.13 | 129 |
| Turkey | −0.01 | 0.05 | **0.63** | 0.06 | **3.86** | 0.96 | 0.40 | 3.66 | 181 |
| Malta | **−0.39** | 0.22 | **0.34** | 0.11 | **9.96** | 2.72 | 0.38 | 2.12 | 19 |
| Serbia | 0.15 | 0.16 | **0.54** | 0.15 | **6.91** | 2.78 | 0.37 | 3.52 | 20 |
| Japan | 0.00 | 0.05 | **0.55** | 0.04 | **5.65** | 0.72 | 0.36 | 3.64 | 278 |
| Croatia | −0.18 | 0.13 | **0.39** | 0.07 | **9.46** | 1.87 | 0.34 | 3.74 | 64 |
| Bulgaria | **0.61** | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.10 | **3.44** | 1.54 | 0.29 | 3.76 | 75 |
| Romania | **0.48** | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.09 | **5.83** | 1.80 | 0.16 | 4.10 | 99 |

Note
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table 6.a.2 OLS Regressions predicting experts' left-placements of parties from placements of the same parties on the taxes/spending, social, and environmental policy dimensions

| Country | Taxes/ spending | SE | Social | SE | Environment | SE | Constant | SE | Adj R2 | Root MSE | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | **0.67** | 0.07 | −0.09 | 0.08 | **0.44** | 0.12 | 0.58 | 2.93 | 0.58 | 2.93 | 68 |
| Austria | 0.09 | 0.07 | **0.49** | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.08 | **0.76** | 1.95 | 0.76 | 1.95 | 63 |
| Australia | **0.37** | 0.09 | **0.45** | 0.09 | −0.04 | 0.09 | **0.72** | 2.39 | 0.72 | 2.39 | 87 |
| Belgium | **0.55** | 0.05 | **0.34** | 0.03 | **0.19** | 0.05 | **0.78** | 2.48 | 0.78 | 2.48 | 197 |
| Bulgaria | **0.62** | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 0.28 | 3.78 | 0.28 | 3.78 | 75 |
| Belarus | **0.91** | 0.12 | 0.14 | 0.11 | −0.30 | 0.12 | 0.62 | 3.62 | 0.62 | 3.62 | 55 |
| Canada | **0.48** | 0.03 | **0.24** | 0.02 | **0.17** | 0.03 | **0.87** | 1.59 | 0.87 | 1.59 | 529 |
| Switzerland | **0.67** | 0.03 | **0.23** | 0.02 | **0.06** | 0.03 | **0.90** | 1.79 | 0.90 | 1.79 | 427 |
| Cyprus | **1.17** | 0.16 | **0.38** | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.18 | **0.72** | 3.49 | 0.72 | 3.49 | 32 |
| Czech Republic | **0.76** | 0.04 | **0.09** | 0.04 | 0.01 | 0.05 | **0.68** | 2.98 | 0.68 | 2.98 | 249 |
| Germany | **0.39** | 0.02 | **0.27** | 0.02 | **0.12** | 0.02 | **0.72** | 1.89 | 0.72 | 1.89 | 537 |
| Denmark | **0.47** | 0.04 | **0.15** | 0.04 | **0.38** | 0.05 | **0.74** | 2.28 | 0.74 | 2.28 | 239 |
| Estonia | **0.69** | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.07 | **0.34** | 0.10 | **0.88** | 1.71 | 0.88 | 1.71 | 26 |
| Spain | **0.36** | 0.04 | **0.27** | 0.03 | **0.27** | 0.04 | **0.89** | 1.70 | 0.89 | 1.70 | 351 |
| Finland | **0.57** | 0.04 | **0.32** | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.04 | **0.66** | 2.40 | 0.66 | 2.40 | 256 |
| Greece | **0.55** | 0.08 | **0.33** | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.09 | **0.73** | 2.12 | 0.73 | 2.12 | 59 |
| Croatia | −0.12 | 0.15 | **0.40** | 0.08 | −0.10 | 0.12 | **0.34** | 3.75 | 0.34 | 3.75 | 63 |
| Hungary | 0.06 | 0.06 | **0.73** | 0.04 | −0.08 | 0.05 | **0.63** | 2.86 | 0.63 | 2.86 | 232 |
| Ireland | **0.50** | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 | **0.25** | 0.04 | **0.68** | 2.05 | 0.68 | 2.05 | 291 |
| Israel | **0.35** | 0.04 | **0.51** | 0.04 | **0.11** | 0.06 | **0.58** | 3.01 | 0.58 | 3.01 | 224 |
| Iceland | **0.76** | 0.10 | 0.00 | 0.07 | **0.20** | 0.08 | **0.82** | 1.92 | 0.82 | 1.92 | 62 |
| Italy | **0.34** | 0.03 | **0.31** | 0.02 | **0.33** | 0.04 | **0.75** | 2.62 | 0.75 | 2.62 | 507 |
| Japan | −0.01 | 0.04 | **0.19** | 0.04 | **0.64** | 0.05 | **0.61** | 2.84 | 0.61 | 2.84 | 278 |
| Lithuania | **0.62** | 0.07 | **0.29** | 0.07 | **0.17** | 0.08 | **0.41** | 3.10 | 0.41 | 3.10 | 128 |
| Luxembourg | 0.29 | 0.15 | **0.27** | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.14 | **0.70** | 2.31 | 0.70 | 2.31 | 20 |
| Latvia | **0.79** | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.11 | **0.28** | 0.14 | **0.55** | 3.52 | 0.55 | 3.52 | 55 |
| Moldova | **0.55** | 0.15 | **−0.64** | 0.20 | 0.04 | 0.19 | **0.40** | 4.84 | 0.40 | 4.84 | 53 |
| Macedonia | **0.57** | 0.12 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.10 | **0.50** | 3.09 | 0.50 | 3.09 | 57 |
| Malta | −0.35 | 0.23 | **0.45** | 0.21 | −0.12 | 0.19 | **0.36** | 2.16 | 0.36 | 2.16 | 19 |
| Northern Ireland | **0.40** | 0.13 | **0.27** | 0.11 | **0.34** | 0.17 | **0.45** | 3.22 | 0.45 | 3.22 | 62 |
| Netherlands | **0.65** | 0.04 | **0.07** | 0.03 | **0.25** | 0.05 | **0.82** | 1.83 | 0.82 | 1.83 | 161 |
| Norway | **0.77** | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.03 | **0.10** | 0.03 | **0.85** | 1.88 | 0.85 | 1.88 | 163 |
| Poland | **0.50** | 0.05 | **0.42** | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.06 | **0.48** | 3.61 | 0.48 | 3.61 | 237 |
| Portugal | **0.18** | 0.04 | **0.44** | 0.05 | **0.26** | 0.05 | **0.87** | 1.41 | 0.87 | 1.41 | 113 |
| Romania | **0.54** | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.10 | **0.16** | 4.11 | 0.16 | 4.11 | 93 |
| Russia | **0.62** | 0.08 | −0.12 | 0.08 | 0.14 | 0.10 | **0.44** | 3.51 | 0.44 | 3.51 | 106 |
| Sweden | **0.71** | 0.03 | **0.13** | 0.02 | **0.12** | 0.02 | **0.80** | 2.06 | 0.80 | 2.06 | 463 |
| Slovenia | **0.30** | 0.04 | **0.47** | 0.03 | −0.04 | 0.04 | **0.51** | 3.48 | 0.51 | 3.48 | 456 |
| Slovakia | **0.46** | 0.07 | **0.34** | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.08 | **0.45** | 3.89 | 0.45 | 3.89 | 140 |
| Serbia | 0.12 | 0.16 | **0.58** | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.18 | **0.40** | 3.45 | 0.40 | 3.45 | 20 |
| Turkey | −0.04 | 0.05 | **0.47** | 0.07 | **0.27** | 0.06 | **0.46** | 3.44 | 0.46 | 3.44 | 177 |
| Ukraine | **1.13** | 0.17 | 0.06 | 0.17 | −0.15 | 0.13 | **0.46** | 4.63 | 0.46 | 4.63 | 56 |
| Britain | **0.31** | 0.05 | **0.27** | 0.04 | **0.22** | 0.04 | **0.75** | 1.98 | 0.75 | 1.98 | 225 |
| United States | **0.25** | 0.04 | **0.31** | 0.04 | **0.29** | 0.04 | **0.90** | 1.65 | 0.90 | 1.65 | 332 |

Note
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table 6.a.3a OLS regressions predicting experts' left-placements of parties from placements of the same parties on the taxes/spending, social, and environmental, immigration, and deregulation policy dimensions, non-post-communist countries

| Country | Immigration | SE | Deregulation | SE | Taxes/spending | SE | Social | SE | Environment | SE | Constant | SE | Adj R2 | Root MSE | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Northern Ireland | **0.52** | 0.16 | 0.29 | 0.18 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.12 | **-0.12** | 0.16 | 0.89 | 1.46 | 0.61 | 2.73 | 51 |
| Luxembourg | 0.39 | 0.19 | -0.01 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.06 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | **3.89** | 1.28 | 0.77 | 2.03 | 20 |
| Italy | **0.39** | 0.03 | -0.01 | 0.03 | **0.26** | 0.04 | **0.16** | 0.02 | **0.16** | 0.03 | **0.96** | 0.28 | 0.82 | 2.26 | 496 |
| Turkey | **0.32** | 0.08 | 0.00 | 0.07 | -0.05 | 0.07 | **0.36** | 0.07 | **0.22** | 0.08 | 1.96 | 1.17 | 0.50 | 3.27 | 120 |
| Belgium | **0.32** | 0.04 | **0.16** | 0.06 | **0.30** | 0.07 | **0.23** | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.24 | 0.44 | 0.85 | 2.04 | 191 |
| Switzerland | **0.31** | 0.03 | **0.16** | 0.03 | **0.37** | 0.04 | **0.14** | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.03 | **0.68** | 0.18 | 0.93 | 1.53 | 408 |
| Iceland | **0.26** | 0.06 | **0.22** | 0.08 | **0.55** | 0.11 | -0.05 | 0.06 | **0.13** | 0.06 | -0.53 | 0.66 | 0.87 | 1.64 | 62 |
| Netherlands | **0.21** | 0.05 | **0.37** | 0.06 | **0.26** | 0.06 | **0.09** | 0.03 | **0.09** | 0.05 | 0.47 | 0.43 | 0.87 | 1.58 | 137 |
| Greece | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.30 | 0.14 | **0.23** | 0.08 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.61 | 1.01 | 0.75 | 2.00 | 58 |
| Japan | **0.10** | 0.04 | **0.37** | 0.03 | -0.03 | 0.03 | **0.19** | 0.04 | **0.46** | 0.04 | -0.33 | 0.55 | 0.76 | 2.25 | 266 |
| Spain | **0.10** | 0.03 | **0.18** | 0.04 | **0.26** | 0.04 | **0.19** | 0.03 | **0.20** | 0.03 | **1.09** | 0.27 | 0.90 | 1.62 | 346 |
| Canada | **0.07** | 0.02 | **0.24** | 0.03 | **0.38** | 0.03 | **0.12** | 0.03 | **0.11** | 0.02 | **1.41** | 0.24 | 0.88 | 1.52 | 488 |
| Australia | 0.06 | 0.07 | **0.31** | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.12 | **0.48** | 0.10 | -0.09 | 0.07 | **3.25** | 0.72 | 0.75 | 2.26 | 80 |
| Britain | 0.04 | 0.04 | **0.31** | 0.05 | **0.21** | 0.05 | **0.16** | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.04 | **1.95** | 0.51 | 0.79 | 1.79 | 202 |
| Cyprus | 0.04 | 0.19 | **0.78** | 0.16 | 0.30 | 0.21 | **0.46** | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.19 | **-7.70** | 2.46 | 0.85 | 2.55 | 32 |
| United States | 0.03 | 0.03 | **0.16** | 0.04 | **0.20** | 0.04 | **0.28** | 0.04 | **0.23** | 0.03 | **1.53** | 0.26 | 0.91 | 1.58 | 320 |
| Norway | 0.02 | 0.04 | **0.59** | 0.06 | **0.28** | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.04 | **1.04** | 0.34 | 0.90 | 1.51 | 163 |
| Sweden | 0.00 | 0.02 | **0.35** | 0.04 | **0.38** | 0.04 | **0.14** | 0.02 | **0.09** | 0.02 | **1.01** | 0.27 | 0.84 | 1.88 | 444 |
| Finland | -0.02 | 0.05 | **0.46** | 0.05 | **0.20** | 0.05 | **0.33** | 0.04 | -0.03 | 0.05 | **1.26** | 0.41 | 0.76 | 2.03 | 252 |
| Malta | -0.34 | 0.21 | **0.67** | 0.28 | -0.23 | 0.24 | 0.17 | 0.30 | 0.06 | 0.21 | 6.06 | 3.34 | 0.49 | 2.06 | 16 |

Note
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level

*Table 6.a3.b* OLS regressions predicting experts' left-placements of parties from placements of the same parties on the taxes/spending, social, and environmental, former communists, and privatization policy dimensions, post-communist countries

| Country | Former communists | SE | Privatization | SE | Taxes/spending | SE | Social | SE | Environment | SE | Constant | SE | Adjusted R2 | Root MSE | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Croatia | **0.47** | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.12 | -0.19 | 0.12 | 0.11 | 0.09 | **-0.04** | 0.08 | **8.20** | 2.14 | 0.57 | 3.02 | 63 |
| Ukraine | **0.45** | 0.09 | **0.31** | 0.10 | **0.49** | 0.15 | 0.08 | 0.12 | **0.01** | 0.09 | -1.73 | 2.30 | 0.74 | 3.21 | 55 |
| Bulgaria | **0.44** | 0.05 | **0.39** | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.06 | **-0.11** | 0.05 | 1.64 | 1.31 | 0.78 | 2.13 | 72 |
| Belarus | **0.42** | 0.09 | 0.37 | 0.30 | 0.24 | 0.32 | -0.01 | 0.10 | **0.01** | 0.09 | 1.21 | 2.26 | 0.73 | 3.06 | 55 |
| Hungary | **0.42** | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.04 | **0.41** | 0.04 | **0.10** | 0.03 | 0.04 | 1.05 | 0.79 | 2.14 | 231 |
| Poland | **0.37** | 0.05 | **0.33** | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.07 | **0.13** | 0.06 | **0.02** | 0.05 | 1.45 | 0.97 | 0.62 | 3.09 | 233 |
| Slovenia | **0.33** | 0.03 | **0.16** | 0.04 | **0.18** | 0.04 | **0.23** | 0.03 | **0.01** | 0.03 | 1.25 | 0.67 | 0.64 | 2.99 | 453 |
| Czech Republic | **0.32** | 0.04 | **0.28** | 0.05 | **0.25** | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.03 | **0.10** | 0.04 | -0.54 | 0.50 | 0.82 | 2.23 | 246 |
| Macedonia | **0.27** | 0.08 | 0.19 | 0.13 | **0.48** | 0.12 | 0.04 | 0.10 | **0.13** | 0.08 | -2.24 | 2.15 | 0.58 | 2.96 | 49 |
| Russia | **0.25** | 0.06 | -0.05 | 0.13 | **0.63** | 0.12 | -0.04 | 0.09 | **0.13** | 0.06 | 2.58 | 1.67 | 0.50 | 3.29 | 106 |
| Latvia | **0.24** | 0.07 | **0.77** | 0.10 | -0.01 | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.05 | **0.18** | 0.07 | -1.97 | 1.12 | 0.90 | 1.64 | 54 |
| Bosnia | **0.22** | 0.15 | 0.08 | 0.32 | -0.05 | 0.12 | **0.94** | 0.22 | -0.03 | 0.15 | -3.60 | 2.58 | 0.91 | 1.50 | 15 |
| Albania | **0.22** | 0.09 | **0.23** | 0.08 | **0.34** | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.08 | **0.12** | 0.09 | 0.01 | 1.53 | 0.65 | 2.47 | 60 |
| Romania | 0.20 | 0.12 | -0.07 | 0.16 | **0.41** | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.11 | -0.01 | 0.12 | 5.07 | 2.74 | 0.17 | 4.10 | 92 |
| Slovakia | **0.18** | 0.06 | **0.59** | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.06 | **0.15** | 0.05 | **0.04** | 0.06 | -0.10 | 0.86 | 0.71 | 2.79 | 138 |
| Moldova | 0.17 | 0.12 | **0.46** | 0.15 | 0.23 | 0.12 | **-0.42** | 0.14 | -0.02 | 0.12 | **6.07** | 2.72 | 0.65 | 3.43 | 49 |
| Serbia | 0.15 | 0.24 | -0.04 | 0.29 | 0.03 | 0.21 | **0.55** | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.24 | 4.19 | 5.07 | 0.33 | 3.62 | 20 |
| Estonia | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.25 | 0.15 | **0.54** | 0.11 | **0.17** | 0.08 | 0.24 | 0.06 | -1.70 | 1.44 | 0.89 | 1.64 | 26 |
| Lithuania | **-0.21** | 0.07 | **0.40** | 0.09 | **0.25** | 0.09 | **0.24** | 0.07 | **0.17** | 0.07 | -0.05 | 1.69 | 0.54 | 2.74 | 128 |

Note
Bold coefficients are statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

# 7    In conclusion

We began this book by remarking how very hard it is to talk systematic-
ally about politics without talking about the policy "positions" of key
political actors. This is why "spatial" models of party competition have
been so influential over recent decades. As we noted in Chapter 1,
however, the notion of a policy space raises some unexpectedly deep intel-
lectual issues when we start to think carefully about it. The most import-
ant conclusion to be drawn is that, just as there is no such thing as a
perfect map of the physical space in which we all live, there is no such
thing as the perfect map of any real world policy space. In each case, dif-
ferent maps are suitable for different purposes. We have not therefore, in
this book, been in search of some elusive Holy Grail of a unified empirical
policy space for use by political scientists. Our result, if anything, indicates
that such a goal is unattainable.

Nonetheless, particular substantive dimensions of public policy do seem
to have commonly understood meanings, witnessed by the fact that these
are used in political discourse and commentary by people who do seem to
understand each other well enough. Furthermore, spatial models of polit-
ical competition, varieties of which are reviewed in Chapter 2, do very
often assume a "common space" within which the positions of all key
decision makers can be located. What we have done in this book, there-
fore, is to map such common spaces in 47 different political systems. Our
mapping has operated  at two different levels of detail.

One level of detail is that of substantive broad-brush policy dimensions,
dealing with things like the trade-off between higher taxes and lower levels
of public services, or between environmental protection and economic
growth. We certainly didn't discover these dimensions, but rather distilled
them from previous work in the field and applied them on an *a priori* basis
in our own study. There will no doubt be many readers who will think
that we have omitted important policy dimensions in particular contexts.
Some may gnash their teeth and lament that "if *only* they'd also investi-
gated party positions on dimension X in country Y." Yet other readers
may object, conversely, that some of the more general dimensions were
inappropriate or least inappropriately worded for a particular country

("No party talks about *abortion* in country Y"). Striking a balance between perfectly adapting our policy dimensions to a particular country, yet also maintaining an element of comparability through the use of general dimensions of policy, obviously involves living with trade-offs in the design of our *a priori* approach. All we can do for potentially plaintive victims of our decisions is to offer our humble apologies, and tender the excuse that we consulted as widely as we could with country specialists before we launched the survey for each country in our study, and took the best advice we could find on the set of policy dimensions to be deployed. We also carefully consulted previous research of this type, and attempted also to satisfy a degree of comparability between countries. Unavoidably, balancing this goal with that of a country fit involved hard decisions from the standpoint of our basic research design. Given our fundamentally *a priori* approach, there was simply no getting away from this.

The other level of detail at which we have tried to plot policy spaces uses an even broader brush, locating all key political actors on the single underlying left-right dimension that has been both an integral part of the political lexicon for many years and the raw material for many influential models of politics. In the study of political competition as in all branches of science, simpler models are better models if they get the job done. One-dimensional models of political competition have been both popular and influential primarily because they are simple, but also in some cases, effective. Inevitably, a lot of information is destroyed when a complex political universe is reduced to a simple one-dimensional representation but we should never forget that, in any science, information is not good *in itself*. What is important is valid information that is *organized* in an intellectually valuable way and many before us have found that organizing information about the policy positions of political actors using a single underlying dimension has yielded important intellectual insights. In this important sense, our one-dimensional maps of political spaces certainly differ from our multidimensional maps, but they are not intrinsically less informative.

There are many different methods that we can use to measure and map empirical policy spaces. We have reviewed some important examples of these in Chapter 3. Each method has its advocates, and different methods suit different purposes. We deploy expert surveys in this book but we do not do this because we believe it is the "one true way" to measure policy positions. Indeed, in other joint work, we have deployed both computerized content analysis and mass survey data and we remain absolutely open to the use of human-coded content analysis and analyses of roll-call votes if both method and research setting are appropriate. Yet for the many reasons we outline in Chapter 3, we think that systematically collected and summarized expert judgments offer a unique combination of convenience and validity for measuring the policy positions of political parties. Convenience comes from the obvious point that experts need simply be asked, and this information carefully recorded and summarized, avoiding difficult

and costly human coding of manifestos, or the analysis of voting records to generate inductive results whose precise interpretation is ultimately ambiguous.

The validity of policy positions measured through expert surveys, furthermore, comes from the simple fact that expert surveys tap into the professional knowledge of country experts and summarize this information to form a consensus about party policy positions. There are many and varied ways to establish the validity of estimates of policy spaces, but when doubt or ambiguity arises, the most common solution is to refer to substantive knowledge by country specialists – to confirm that substantive measurements correspond to the received wisdom of experts in the field. This can be done in one of two ways. It can be done haphazardly and, alas, sometimes rhetorically by plucking selected published works by country specialists from the library shelf and citing these in support of the "face validity" of some new measure. Or it can be done systematically, by surveying what, to the best of our knowledge, is the population of experts on the matter at hand and summarizing their judgments. This, in essence, is what expert surveys are about. In this sense our expert survey estimates *are* different because, if they are wrong, then either the aggregated knowledge of country specialists, or our precise method of ascertaining this, is also wrong.

This is why we set out our expert survey method in some detail, and at considerable risk of boring the casual reader, in Chapter 4 and Appendix A. We did this because we feel very strongly indeed that, if we are going to be scientific about the study of politics, then our methods of data collection should yield the same results in quite different hands – which can only be achieved if we are very explicit about what those methods are. The easy thing for anyone to do, although still not wildly common in political science, is to publish a new dataset as soon as it is gathered, as we have done with our expert data some time in advance of publishing this book, so that the research community can confirm that other researchers get the same results when they analyze the same data in the same way. That, in a way, is a relatively trivial matter – guarding as it does against simple errors of data analysis. A much more fundamental issue, far more rarely confronted by political scientists, is whether a particular key dataset is itself replicable. It is much more rarely confirmed in political science, and this is largely the fault of tight research budgets, that the same dataset would have been collected by different researchers using the same method. This is a much more fundamental and important issue relating to the ability to replicate (or at least reproduce) our research results and is why we taxed our readers' patience by describing  our method in considerable detail.

Deploying our expert survey in 47 different political systems, having translated it into 22 different non-English languages, having collected judgments from 1,491 different experts on the positions of 387 different political parties, we have clearly generated a lot of information. To a large

extent, our purpose has been to put this information at the disposal of the profession as soon as possible and, as noted, the data were made available some time in advance of the publication of this book. We ourselves will be putting this information to a number of different uses in future publications; in this present volume we have confined ourselves, in Chapter 5 and 6, to exploring two very general issues that arise when constructing spatial models of party competition.

The first of these, discussed in Chapter 5, concerns the dimensional structure of policy spaces. This has to do with which set of policy dimensions are important in any given political system. And it has to do with the extent to which a set of highly correlated policy dimensions can be seen as "really" describing the "same" differences between political actors and can thus be characterized in terms of some deeper underlying dimension of policy difference. Again there is no right or wrong answer to these questions. We can start with a policy space that describes the positions of all key political decision makers on every single matter that will, or might conceivably, come up for consideration. This would be a policy space of immensely high, indeed near-infinite, dimensionality. We would then note that, once we know actors' positions on some matters, it is very easy to forecast their positions on some other matters – that clusters of issues are in effect aligned along the same underlying policy dimension. Chapter 5, in essence, is about how we might make such decisions in an attempt to produce the most parsimonious representation of the policy spaces we wish to analyze. We found that, for some countries, almost everything that was important about policy could indeed be represented as a position on a single underlying dimension. In other countries, two, and sometimes even three, dimensions are needed to capture the underlying structure of policy positions taken by the political parties. This is by no means idle number crunching. As we saw in Chapter 2, the substantive conclusions we come to about political competition are deeply affected by the dimensional structure we feel best characterizes the policy space in any given system.

We devoted Chapter 6 to a single analytical construct – the left-right dimension – that has been grist to the mills of political discourse since the days of the French Revolution. We emerged from the chapter with an important result that may surprise some readers. People are accustomed to talking easily about left and right within any one country, and talking as if the meaning of these terms was clearly understood by all. *Within any one country*, our results do not suggest there is anything wrong with doing this. However, our results also suggest quite strongly that the substantive meaning of left and right is a poor international traveler. Tempting as it might be to compare the right in the United States, for example, with the right in Britain (or Russia or Japan) this comparison likely rests on very shaky foundations. The substantive meanings of left and right are without doubt very different in these different political settings. "Yes, yes," we hear everyone cry, "we knew that already!" But careful reading of a

surprising amount of cross-national research in political science suggests, notwithstanding this knowledge, that such comparisons can sneak into an analysis in a host of unexpected ways. Furthermore the fact that cross-country comparisons of left and right are of dubious validity raises the possibility, rarely considered by political scientists, that cross-temporal comparisons (i.e. time series) of left-right positions in the same country may also be invalid – as the substantive meaning of left and right changes over time. We simply don't know, if we observe movement, whether it is the positions of the parties, the meaning of the scale, or both, that is changing over time. We offer no solution to this conundrum other than advising the use of great modesty when making claims that derive from observing time series movements in the left-right policy positions of key political actors.

Lest we end this book on too somber a note, we finish by describing the dataset we have collected and made freely available. Some snapshots of these data, for each of the countries we investigated, are presented in Appendix B. The full dataset is downloadable as a computer file that we hope very much will be both useful and widely used – the two ultimate benchmarks of the value of our study.

# Part III

# Data

# Appendix A
## Methodology and diagnostics

### Deployment details

The selection of experts, parties, and policy dimensions for the expert survey is described in Chapter 4. All surveys were deployed between late 2002 and early 2004, with most occurring in 2003. Before deployment, all surveys were pretested on local experts, paying particular attention to the questionnaires translated from English.[1] Following this, we sent out customized letters or e-mails to individual respondents, explaining the purpose of the survey and providing instructions on how to complete it.[2] Table A.1 details the different methods chosen for deploying the survey. Two to three weeks after initial deployment, all who had not responded were sent a second solicitation. A third solicitation was sent if this was necessary to increase the response rate. In order to track responses, each respondent was assigned a unique identification number.[3] All respondents were assured absolute anonymity, notwithstanding the need for this tracking number.

### Response rates

Compared to previous expert surveys of this type, response rates for our study were good, with a mean of 28 percent and an inter-quartile range of 19 to 3 percent. Figure A.1 plots the distribution of response rates across the 47 national contexts we surveyed. The highest response rate was in Ireland, exceeding 75 percent, no doubt because the authors were well-known in Ireland. Response rates in Norway, Iceland, and Denmark were also above or around 50 percent (57, 52, and 48 percent respectively). The lowest response rates were in countries where political science was poorly organized as a discipline, making it difficult to identify suitable respondents. Of 38 respondents targeted in Bosnia, for instance, just two replied. In Luxembourg, where no academic politics department existed at the time of our survey, only 5 percent of our list of 69 target experts responded. The only other countries where response rate was below 10 percent were Ukraine, Turkey, and Russia (9, 9, and 8 percent respectively). In countries

Table A1  Survey details from 47 countries

| Country | Questionnaire | | Total parties | Total dimensions | Respondents | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Language | Format | | | Total respondents | Total surveyed | Response rate (%) |
| *Eastern Europe* | | | | | | | |
| Albania | Albanian | Paper | 11 | 13 | 16 | n/a | n/a |
| Belarus | Belarusian | Paper | 11 | 13 | 10 | 32 | 31 |
| Bosnia | Bosnian | Paper | 8 | 13 | 2 | 38 | 5 |
| Bulgaria | Bulgarian | Paper | 13 | 13 | 11 | 65 | 17 |
| Croatia | Croatian | Paper | 11 | 13 | 6 | 31 | 19 |
| Czech Republic | Czech | Paper | 11 | 13 | 36 | 107 | 34 |
| Estonia | English | Web | 9 | 13 | 7 | 20 | 35 |
| Hungary | Hungarian | Web | 8 | 13 | 42 | 124 | 34 |
| Latvia | Latvian | Paper | 7 | 13 | 8 | 31 | 26 |
| Lithuania | English | Paper | 8 | 14 | 20 | 95 | 21 |
| Macedonia | English | Paper | 10 | 13 | 11 | 42 | 26 |
| Moldova | Moldovan | Paper | 8 | 13 | 12 | n/a | n/a |
| Poland | Polish | Paper | 12 | 13 | 32 | 103 | 31 |
| Romania | English | Web | 7 | 13 | 18 | 101 | 18 |
| Russia | Russian | Paper | 6 | 13 | 20 | 247 | 8 |
| Serbia | Serbian | Paper | 11 | 13 | 4 | 20 | 20 |
| Slovakia | Slovakian | Paper | 13 | 13 | 17 | 51 | 33 |
| Slovenia | Slovenian | Paper | 8 | 13 | 60 | 228 | 26 |
| Ukraine | Ukrainian | Paper | 12 | 13 | 11 | 122 | 9 |
| *Subtotals* | | | 184 | | 343 | 1457 | 23 |
| *Western Europe* | | | | | | | |
| Austria | German | Web | 4 | 9 | 16 | 48 | 33 |
| Belgium | French/English | Web | 11 | 10 | 23 | 137 | 17 |
| Britain | English | Web | 5 | 11 | 57 | 145 | 39 |
| Cyprus | English | Web | 8 | 9 | 4 | 18 | 22 |

| | Language | | Different parties | | Total valid responses | Experts surveyed | Mean response rate 28% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | English | Web | 10 | 9 | 26 | 54 | 48 |
| Germany | German | Web | 10 | 9 | 98 | 525 | 19 |
| Finland | English | Web | 8 | 10 | 33 | 99 | 33 |
| France | French | Paper | 9 | 7 | 51 | 173 | 29 |
| Greece | English | Web | 4 | 10 | 16 | 44 | 36 |
| Iceland | English | Web | 6 | 7 | 12 | 23 | 52 |
| Ireland | English | Web | 6 | 10 | 53 | 70 | 76 |
| Italy | Italian | Web | 13 | 10 | 54 | 182 | 30 |
| Luxembourg | French | Web | 6 | 10 | 4 | 69 | 6 |
| Malta | English | Web | 3 | 9 | 7 | 21 | 33 |
| Netherlands | English | Web | 9 | 10 | 23 | 78 | 29 |
| Northern Ireland | English | Web | 7 | 10 | 11 | 32 | 34 |
| Norway | English | Web | 8 | 9 | 21 | 37 | 57 |
| Portugal | Portuguese | Web | 6 | 9 | 21 | 73 | 29 |
| Spain | Spanish | Web | 5 | 10 | 76 | 381 | 20 |
| Sweden | English | Web | 7 | 10 | 67 | 244 | 27 |
| Switzerland | French/German | Paper | 10 | 8 | 51 | 197 | 26 |
| *Subtotals* | | | 155 | | 724 | 2,650 | 32 |
| | | | | | | | |
| *Non-Europe* | | | | | | | |
| Australia | English | E-mail | 6 | 9 | 15 | n/a | n/a |
| Canada | English | Web | 6 | 10 | 104 | 611 | 17 |
| Israel | English | Web | 12 | 8 | 30 | 185 | 16 |
| Japan | Japanese | Paper | 6 | 12 | 58 | n/a | n/a |
| New Zealand | English | Web | 8 | 8 | 21 | 73 | 29 |
| Turkey | English | Web | 8 | 11 | 29 | 323 | 9 |
| United States | English | Web | 2 | 9 | 167 | 648 | 26 |
| *Subtotals* | | | 48 | | 424 | 1,840 | 25 |
| | | | | | | | |
| *Totals* | 23 different languages | | 387 different parties | | 1,491 total valid responses | 5,947 experts surveyed | Mean response rate 28% |

*Figure A.1*  Distribution of response rates by country.

where the primary medium was electronic, respondents were given the option to request a paper questionnaire. Of all questionnaires received from electronic solicitations, 18 percent were paper questionnaires requested by respondents and 82 percent were completed on-line.

For the methodological reasons discussed in Chapter 4, the total *number* of surveys completed in each country is more important for the reliability and accuracy of our estimates than simple response *rates*. The median country yielded 21 expert responses, an excellent figure compared to other political expert surveys.[4] The greatest numbers of respondents came from western European countries where suitable experts were easy to identify. The United States topped the list at 167, followed by Canada at 104 and Germany with 98 respondents. Nine other countries yielded more than 50 expert responses, including Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Britain, Italy, and France. Switzerland yielded 51 expert responses, despite having been the lowest-response country in the Laver and Hunt (1992) survey, with only four responses. Among the post-communist countries surveyed, Slovenia yielded the most expert responses (60), followed by Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland with 42, 36, and 33 respectively.

Since our study is the largest cross-national implementation of political expert surveys to date, we can analyze response patterns to test whether country-specific survey characteristics influenced the likelihood of expert

*Figure A.2*  Relationship of response rate to survey complexity, by country.

responses. For example it is plausible that potential respondents were deterred by the complexity of the questionnaires, as well whether the questionnaire was translated into the native language or in English. In Turkey, for instance, where we obtained a full listing from the national association of 323 political scientists, we suspect the low response rate of 9 percent to be influenced by our use of English rather than Turkish as the survey language. It is also possible that response rates were lower in settings where the surveys' lengths were more onerous, involving more parties and/or more policy dimensions, and for this reason we measured questionnaire length as the *product* of the number of parties and the number of dimensions. Figure A.2 plots the relationship between questionnaire length and response rate and does indeed show a mild negative association. To test this association more systematically, we fit a linear model predicting the response rate in each country from the length of the relevant questionnaire, controlling for whether or not the questionnaire was in the native language. The first numerical column of Table A.2 shows that, while the coefficients are signed as we might expect, none of the results are statistically significant. In addition, the *F*-test for the joint effect of all variables cannot be rejected ($p = 0.09$). While a modest tendency exists for questionnaire length and non-use of the native language to lower response rates, these effects are not statistically significant.

*Table A.2* The effects of questionnaire characteristics

| Independent variable | Dependent variable: placement std. deviation | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | *Response rate (%)* | *Position* | *Importance* |
| No. of parties × no. dimensions | −0.7 | **0.003 | **0.003 |
| | (0.04) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Native language | −4.7 | | |
| | (4.57) | | |
| Party vote share | | 0.001 | **−0.007 |
| | | (0.002) | (0.002) |
| Post-communist country | | **0.424 | **0.317 |
| | | (0.052) | (0.061) |
| Constant | **37.8 | **2.698 | **3.690 |
| | (5.50) | (0.084) | (0.094) |
| N | 43 | 4,027 | 3,674 |
| *F*-statistic | 2.53 | 70.77 | 50.00 |
| $R^2$ | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.04 |

Notes
Estimates are OLS regression with robust standard errors.
**Statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

## Characterizing and assessing measurement error

We noted in Chapter 4 that one way in which our survey may generate measurement error is by asking experts to locate large numbers of parties on large numbers of policy dimensions. We can investigate this possibility by testing whether the complexity of the survey, measured in terms of the number of party-dimension placements it asked respondents to provide, increases the variance in expert placements in any particular country-party-dimension-scale (referred to henceforth as an *item*) estimate. Figure A.3 plots this relationship, showing the standard deviation of item placements on the vertical axis and survey complexity on the horizontal axis. The results do suggest a positive association between survey length and the variance of expert judgments. To investigate this effect more systematically, we regressed item standard deviation as the dependent variable, on survey length (number of parties times number of dimensions) with two control variables that we felt capture potential fundamental uncertainty about party policy positions. These were: whether the country was post-communist (since many parties in such systems are likely to be relatively new and unknown) and the vote share of the party (since the positions of smaller parties may be less well known than those of larger ones). The second and third numerical columns in Table A.2 show the results of the regression model.

*Figure A.3* Relationship of placement error rate to survey complexity, by country. Dependent variable is the standard deviation of the placement of a given party in a given country on a given dimension.

The regression results indicate that survey complexity does indeed have a very small but statistically significant effect (0.0003, $p < 0.0001$) on the level of variance in party placements, both on the position and importance scales. Yet because the empirical range of survey complexity ranges from 16 (in the US two-party system with eight policy dimensions) to 130 or more (for countries such as Slovakia or Poland with ten named parties and 13 dimensions), this means that the maximum contribution that survey complexity can make to the level of random error is 0.042 of a standard error – insignificant in substantive terms, even if significant statistically. A much stronger and very highly significant effect was whether or not a country was post-communist – not surprisingly a substantive difference far more important in distinguishing the United States from Ukraine. It seems plausible to attribute this to a higher level of fundamental uncertainty among experts about party policy positions in post-communist countries than to an artifact of our measurement instrument. Party size made almost no difference: smaller parties did not appear to have more uncertainty associated with their estimated *positions* than larger parties, although there was a substantively small but statistically significant tendency (0.0003, $p < 0.0001$) for experts to vary more in their judgments about the *importance* attached by smaller parties to particular policy dimensions.

Overall, we see these results as reassuring; variance in expert judgments of the positions of particular parties for the most part arose from what looks more like political substance than some feature of our research design or survey instrument.

## Characterizing and assessing bias

As we note in Chapter 4, the method we used to check for respondent bias was to look for associations between expert placements of parties and expert sympathy scores for the same parties. Laver and Hunt (1992) ran similar checks for bias, reporting coefficients from regressions predicting experts' judgments of particular party positions on particular scales from the same experts' sympathy scores for the party concerned. Our tests here differ slightly but are based on the same basic framework. Because our respondent samples differed widely across countries, and because sample size affects the statistical significance and variance of the resulting bias estimates, we use the following regression-based technique to assess bias. We focus here on the general left–right dimension only, seen as the main dimension of political competition, thereby avoiding the problem of summarizing thousands of separate regressions, one for each 387 parties for an average of ten dimensions.

1  We divided the expert response data into country-party sections, each section comprising expert placements of left-right for the same party in the same country, with sample size equal to the number of expert responses for that section.
2  For each section, we regressed experts' placements on their sympathy scores for the party in question.
3  Saving the parameter estimates from this regression, we computed the mean and variance of the predicted left-right score for an expert with the "indifferent" sympathy score set to 10.5 (the midpoint of the one to 20 scale). We think of this as the "corrected" placement.
4  We then compared the "corrected" expert placements with the actual placements to see whether these differences are statistically distinguishable.

Figure A.4 plots the distribution of the differences in actual and corrected placements. As the box plots indicate – separated here by country type – the vast bulk of corrections are very small. The inter-quartile ranges, indicated by the edges of the box, span a range of less than one point on the 20-point scale. Some parties have higher values than this, but these are rare cases. Post-communist countries appear to have a greater spread of differences than the other country types, and most of the differences in western Europe appear to come from right-wing parties that are rated as more right-wing by experts than the corrected score would suggest.

*Figure A.4* Distribution of differences in actual and corrected left–right mean placements.

To indicate how this effect works in a particular country, we show results from Germany, since the placement of several of its more right-wing parties was affected by respondent sympathy and since the large sample size from the German survey makes it easier to distinguish systematic from random error. Figure A.5 plots the difference between recorded and corrected left-right placements for the German parties, as well as their 95 percent confidence intervals. For nearly all parties, the differences between actual and corrected scores are negligible and not statistically distinguishable from zero. Turning to the four right-wing parties, however – the Republicans, the *Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive* (*Schil*), DVU, and the NPD – we see that experts systematically placed these further to the right than their corrected scores (based on a hypothetical expert giving a midpoint sympathy score) suggest was warranted. Respondents who were unsympathetic to these far-right parties did tend systematically to place these farther to the right than respondents who were more sympathetic. If mean sympathy is assumed to be neutral, the placements of these parties become more centrist. Perhaps because these are smaller parties in Germany and experts know less about their policy positions, they also have very wide confidence intervals, covering the zero-difference line for DVU and NPD for instance. But for the Republicans and *Schil*, the difference in corrected and actual scores is statistically significant.

*Figure A.5* Differences in actual and corrected left–right scores in Germany.

From the expert left-right placements of hundreds of parties that we analyzed in this way, only seven had corrected placements whose differences could be statistically distinguished from zero. These parties are listed in Table A.3. All are extreme right and right-wing parties, and their correction towards the middle of the policy spectrum indicates that unsympathetic respondents tended to place them as more extreme than did more sympathetic respondents. These parties were a tiny minority, however.

*Table A.3* Parties for which respondent sympathy affects left–right placement

| Country | | Party | Left–right | Corrected Left–right | Difference | S.E. | N |
|---------|---|-------|-----------|----------------------|-----------|------|---|
| Austria | FPO | Freedom Party of Austria | 17.4 | 11.9 | 5.5 | 1.78 | 16 |
| Belgium | FN | National Front | 18.9 | 14.1 | 4.8 | 0.46 | 19 |
| Germany | Rep | Republicans | 18.8 | 14.3 | 4.5 | 1.93 | 82 |
| Germany | Schil | *Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive* | 17.5 | 15.1 | 2.4 | 1.20 | 84 |
| Italy | FI | *Forza Italia* | 15.6 | 13.6 | 2.0 | 1.03 | 51 |
| Spain | PP | *Partido Popular* | 17.0 | 15.2 | 1.8 | 0.82 | 76 |
| Croatia | HB | Croatian Block | 18.8 | 15.2 | 3.6 | 1.30 | 6 |

*Figure A.6* Differences in actual and corrected left–right scores, by left–right placement.

Figure A.6 graphs all differences for all parties by country type, and clearly shows that very few differences emerge that could be statistically determined to be different from zero.

From one point of view, the findings highlighted in Table A.3 indicate that experts who dislike these extreme right and right-wing parties tend to rank them as being "too" extreme. From a converse perspective, however, the findings also indicate that experts more sympathetic to these parties ranked them as "too" centrist. The question ultimately comes down to which set of experts – those favoring the right-wing parties or those disliking them – can be better trusted as a valid source of information on extreme-right parties' policy positions. Viewed this way, our checks for bias have merely revealed a statistically discernable difference of expert opinion, split along party sympathy, rather than necessarily indicating bias among the expert sample. Ultimately, we cannot pass final judgment, at least not using only the data we have gathered in this study, as to whether the experts that were sympathetic or unsympathetic to a particular party can be better trusted to have accurately represented its policy position. At the end of the day, we still view our best strategy to use the uncorrected mean expert placements from the expert responses, although we view this investigation of the dataset for patterns of response bias to have been useful in assuring us that potential problems based on expert sympathy towards particular parties are minor at most.

## Policy dimension wording

As we have noted, our expert survey technique depends upon giving very precise substantive definitions to the end points of each policy dimension we investigate. These definitions are listed in full below.[5] Table A.4 shows which dimensions were used, following detailed discussions with local collaborators, in each of the countries investigated.

### Economic policy

TAXES VS SPENDING [1]
Promotes raising taxes to increase public services. (1)
Promotes cutting public services to cut taxes. (20)

DEREGULATION [22]
Favors high levels of state regulation and control of the market. (1)
Favors deregulation of markets at every opportunity. (20)

### Social policy

SOCIAL LIBERALISM [2]
Favors liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (1)

Opposes liberal policies on matters such as abortion, homosexuality, and euthanasia. (20)


*European integration*

EU JOINING (Accession states and potential EU entrants) [4]
Opposes joining the European Union. (1)
Favors joining the European Union. (20)


EU: ENLARGEMENT (Ireland only) [16]
Favors the extension of the EU to include new member states. (1)
Opposes the extension of the EU to include new member states. (20)


EU: PEACEKEEPING (EU-15 except France and Ireland) [17]
Favors [country name] involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions. (1)
Opposes any [country name]  involvement in European military affairs. (20)


EU: STRENGTHENING (Ireland only) [18]
Favors a more powerful and centralized EU. (1)
Opposes a more powerful and centralized EU. (20)


NATO/PEACEKEEPING (Cyprus, Malta, Norway, Turkey) [21]
Favors [country name] involvement in European security and peacekeeping missions. (1)
Opposes any [country name] involvement in European military affairs. (20)


EU: ACCOUNTABILITY (EU-15 except France and Ireland) [23]
Promotes the direct accountability of the EU to citizens via institutions such as the European Parliament. (1)
Promotes the indirect accountability of the EU to citizens via their own national governments. (20)


EU: AUTHORITY (EU-15 except France and Ireland) [24]
Favors increasing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (1)
Favors reducing the range of areas in which the EU can set policy. (20)


EU: LARGER/STRONGER (France) [25]
Opposes an expanded and stronger EU. (1)
Favors an expanded and stronger EU. (20)

*Table A.4* Policy dimensions from the expert surveys

| | Taxes vs spending | Social | Environment | Deregulation | Decentralization | Immigration | EU joining/enlargement | EU: authority | EU: accountability | EU: peacekeeping | Northern Ireland | NATO/peacekeeping | Globalization | Left–right | Sympathy | Total respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Western Europe** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Austria | 16 | 16 | 16 | | 16 | 16 | | 16 | 16 | 16 | | | | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Belgium | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | 23 | | 22 | 21 | 19 | | | | 22 | 21 | 23 |
| Britain | 57 | 57 | 55 | 54 | 56 | 56 | | 57 | 57 | 58 | 55 | | | 57 | 58 | 58 |
| Cyprus | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | | | | | 4 | | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Denmark | 26 | 25 | 26 | | 25 | 25 | | 24 | 23 | 24 | | | | 26 | 23 | 26 |
| Finland | 33 | 33 | 33 | 33 | 32 | 33 | | 33 | 31 | 33 | | | | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| France | 50 | 50 | 51 | | 49 | 51 | | 50 | | | | | 50 | | | 51 |
| Germany | 97 | 95 | 95 | | 92 | 95 | | 91 | 90 | 90 | | | | 96 | 92 | 97 |
| Greece | 17 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | | 16 | 15 | 16 | | | | 16 | 15 | 17 |
| Iceland | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 | | | | | | | | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Ireland | 53 | 53 | 53 | 52 | 53 | 52 | 52 | 53 | 48 | 53 | 52 | | | 53 | 52 | 53 |
| Italy | 48 | 48 | 52 | 52 | 52 | 53 | | 52 | | 52 | | | | 54 | 51 | 54 |
| Luxembourg | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | | 4 | 4 | 4 | | | | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| Malta | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 7 | | | | | | | 7 | 6 | 7 |
| Netherlands | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 20 | 21 | | 21 | 18 | 18 | | 7 | | 21 | 20 | 22 |
| Northern Ireland | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 10 | 10 | | 11 | 10 | | 11 | | | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Norway | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 19 | 21 | | 18 | | 21 | 19 | 21 |
| Portugal | 21 | 21 | 21 | | 21 | 21 | | 21 | 19 | 21 | | | | 21 | 20 | 21 |
| Spain | 76 | 76 | 775 | 76 | 76 | 76 | | 70 | 70 | 74 | | | | 76 | 76 | 76 |
| Sweden | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 67 | 66 | | 67 | 65 | 67 | | | | 67 | 62 | 67 |
| Switzerland | 50 | 51 | 51 | 51 | 50 | 51 | 50 | | | | | | | 48 | 47 | 51 |

Table A.4 continued

| Eastern Europe | Taxes vs spending | Social | Environment | Privatization | Decentralization | Nationalism | EU joining | Former communists | Foreign land ownership | Media freedom | Nationalism | Religion | Urban–rural | Civil Liberties | Neighbor relations | Privacy | Relations with west | Left–right | Sympathy | Total respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Albania | 16 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 14 | 14 | 16 | 14 | 14 | | | | | 15 | 11 | 16 |
| Belarus | 10 | | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 8 | | | 10 | | 10 | 9 | 10 |
| Bosnia | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Bulgaria | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | | | | | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Croatia | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | | | | 6 | 6 | 6 |
| Czech Republic | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | | | | | 36 | 35 | 36 |
| Estonia | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 65 | 7 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 5 | 7 | | | | | 7 | 7 | 7 |
| Hungary | 41 | 41 | 38 | 41 | 38 | 42 | 40 | 42 | 42 | 41 | 42 | 40 | 40 | | | | | 42 | 37 | 42 |
| Latvia | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | 8 | | | | | 8 | 7 | 8 |
| Lithuania | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | | | 19 | 18 | 20 |
| Macedonia | 11 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 9 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | | 20 | | | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Moldova | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 11 | 12 | 12 | | | | | 11 | 11 | 12 |
| Poland | 32 | 32 | 31 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 32 | 31 | | | | | 31 | 29 | 32 |
| Romania | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 18 | 17 | 17 | | | | | 18 | 17 | 18 |
| Russia | 20 | 20 | 19 | 20 | 19 | 19 | | 20 | 20 | 20 | 19 | 20 | 18 | | | | 20 | 19 | 19 | 20 |
| Serbia | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | | | | | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Slovakia | 17 | 17 | 15 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 16 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 16 | | | | | 17 | 14 | 17 |
| Slovenia | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | 60 | | | | | 60 | 58 | 60 |
| Ukraine | 11 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | 11 | | | | | 11 | 11 | 11 |

Table A.4 continued

| | Taxes vs spending | Social | Environment | Deregulation | Decentralization | Nationalism | EU joining | Immigration | NATO/peacekeeping | Health care | US affairs | Religion | Palestinian state | Security | Quebec | Deficit bonds | Defense policy | National identity | Left–right | Sympathy | Total respondents |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Non-Europe* | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Australia | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 | 14 | | | 14 | | 15 | 15 | | | | | | | | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| Canada | 102 | 104 | 104 | 104 | 103 | | | 102 | | 104 | 104 | | | | 104 | | | | 101 | 99 | 104 |
| Israel | 30 | 30 | 30 | 30 | | | | | | | | 29 | 30 | 30 | | | | | 30 | 28 | 30 |
| New Zealand | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | 19 | | | 21 | | 21 | 21 | | | | | | | | 20 | 19 | 21 |
| Turkey | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 28 | 29 | 28 | 25 | 28 | | | 28 | | | | | | | 29 | 27 | 29 |
| United States | 166 | 166 | 166 | 166 | 161 | | | 162 | | 165 | 165 | | | | | | | | 167 | 164 | 167 |
| Japan | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | | | 58 | | | 58 | | | | | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 | 58 |

Note
Numbers provide the total expert responses on each dimension.

## Other general policy dimensions

ENVIRONMENT [5]
Supports protection of the environment, even at the cost of economic growth. (1)
Supports economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment. (20)

DECENTRALIZATION [12]
Promotes decentralization of all administration and decision making. (1)
Opposes any decentralization of administration and decision making. (20)

IMMIGRATION [19]
Favors policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants integrate into [country name] society. (1)
Favors policies designed to help asylum seekers and immigrants return to their country of origin. (20)

HEALTH CARE (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and United States) [27]
Advocates that the government should provide universal free health care. (1)
Advocates that medical expenses should be paid by individuals and private insurance plans. (20)

US AFFAIRS (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, and United States) [28]
Supports an expanded US military and political role in world affairs. (1)
Opposes an expanded US military and political role in world affairs. (20)

## Dimensions specific to post-communist countries

PRIVATIZATION [3]
Promotes maximum state ownership of business and industry. (1)
Opposes all state ownership of business and industry. (20)

FORMER COMMUNISTS [6]
Former communist party officials should have the same rights and opportunities as other citizens to participate in public life. (1)
Former communist party officials should be kept out of public life as far as possible. (20)

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF LAND [7]
Supports unrestricted rights of foreigners to purchase and own [country name] land. (1)
Opposes any rights of foreigners to purchase and own [country name] land. (20)

MEDIA FREEDOM [8]
The mass media should be completely free to publish any material they see fit. (1)

The content of mass media should be regulated by the state in the public interest. (20)

NATIONALISM [9]
Strongly promotes a cosmopolitan rather than a [country name] national consciousness, history, and culture. (1)
Strongly promotes a [country name] national rather than a cosmopolitan consciousness, history, and culture. (20)

RELIGION [10]
Supports religious principles in politics. (1)
Supports secular principles in politics. (20)

URBAN VERSUS RURAL INTERESTS [11]
Promotes interests of urban voters above others. (1)
Promotes interests of rural voters above others. (20)

### *The general left–right dimension [13]*

Please locate each party on a general left-right dimension, taking all aspects of party policy into account.
Left (1) Right (20)

### *Country-specific dimensions*

CIVIL LIBERTIES (Lithuania only) [14]
Promotes protection of civil liberties, even when this hampers efforts to fight crime and promote law and order. (1)
Supports tough measures to fight crime and promote law and order, even when this means curtailing civil liberties. (20)

NEIGHBOR RELATIONS (Lithuania only) [15]
Supports closer relations with Eastern neighbors rather with NATO and western Europe. (1)
Supports closer relations with NATO and western Europe rather than with Eastern neighbors. (20)

GLOBALIZATION (France only) [26]
Opposed to all consequences of globalization. (1)
Favorable toward the consequences of globalization. (20)

PALESTINIAN STATE (Israel) [29]
Favors the establishment of an independent 100 percent sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. (1)
Opposes any form of an independent sovereign Palestinian state. (20)

SECURITY (Israel) [30]
Favors pursuit of peace initiatives with the intention to return to the 1967 "green line" border in return for durable peace. (1)

Favors expansion of the territory controlled by Israel in any future agreement to include most of the territory currently occupied by Jewish settlements. (20)

QUEBEC (Canada) [31]
Supports Quebec sovereignty. (1)
Opposes Quebec sovereignty. (20)

PRIVACY (Belarus) [32]
Favors policies protecting the interests of a private person, such as homosexual law, abortion, and euthanasia. (1)
Opposes policies protecting the interests of a private person, such as homosexual law, abortion, and euthanasia. (20)

RELATIONS WITH WEST (Russia) [33]
Supports closer relations with NATO and the West. (1)
Opposes closer relations with NATO and the West. (20)

DEFICIT BONDS (Japan) [37]
Support the issuing of deficit bonds rather than the increasing of taxes. (1)
Support the increasing of taxes rather than the issuing of deficit bonds. (20)

DEFENSE POLICY (Japan) [38]
Promotes reduced spending on defense. (1)
Promotes increased spending on defense. (20).

NATIONAL IDENTITY (Japan) [39]
Does not encourage increased respect for Emperor. (1)
Encourage increased respect for Emperor. (20).

NORTHERN IRELAND (Britain, Ireland) [20]
Opposes permanent British presence in Northern Ireland. (1)
Defends permanent British presence in Northern Ireland. (20)

NORTHERN IRELAND (Northern Ireland) [40]
Supports long-term maintenance of Northern Ireland as part of United Kingdom. (1)
Supports goal of a united Ireland. (20)

*Respondent sympathy/closeness to party [99]*

Taking all aspects of party policy into account, please score each party in terms of how close it is to your own personal views.
Same as respondent. (1) Farthest from respondent. (20)

# Appendix B
## Country data

In this appendix we present summary data from the expert surveys in each of the 47 countries. Because space is limited, we have attempted to distil the most crucial information from each expert survey into two pages. First, we report the means and standard errors of the expert placements of each party on each dimension. The standard errors are specific to each party on each dimension, and are computed as the standard deviation of the expert placements divided by the square root of the number of placements minus one. Lower error, hence greater confidence in each estimate, results from having more expert placements for a party-dimension placement, as well as from greater agreement among experts. In countries where the expert sample was small or where the experts tended to disagree on a party's placement, standard errors will be larger, reflecting greater uncertainty about their precise values.

Policy dimensions are listed in order of descending importance in each country, where the importance of each policy dimension is measured as the mean importance of the issue to each party, reported in the first numerical column. Because our measure of issue importance is intended to characterize overall policy at the country level, we weight mean importance by the party vote shares to prevent our measure from being unduly influenced by very small and possibly atypically extreme parties. Party vote shares are displayed on the first numerical row at the top of the table.

Each country section includes a plot of party positions on two key dimensions of policy: a left-right dimension of economic policy and a liberal-conservative dimension of social policy. The economic dimension comes from one of two sources, depending on the type of country we surveyed. For most countries, economic policy is represented by the "tax cuts versus spending increases" dimension, denoting a relative preference for redistribution and services versus maximizing economic libertarianism. For post-communist countries, however, we observed that the dimension of "state ownership of business and industry versus privatization" dimension was both more important overall and captured more variation in economic policy among different parties. Consequently, we employed the privatization dimension in our plots for the post-communist countries instead of

the taxes/spending dimension. To represent liberal versus conservative social policy, we used the "social" dimension that contrasted policies on moral matters such as abortion, homosexual marriage, and euthanasia. The only exceptions were in countries where social policy was not measured (e.g. New Zealand) or three fairly authoritarian states where social liberalism was a very low salience dimension that did not provide meaningful distinctions between parties (Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine). In all other countries, we plot economic policy on the horizontal axis and social policy on the vertical axis. Each party is marked by its party abbreviation, with the size of its text label proportional to its vote share. The positions of the parties represented by the center of their text labels illustrate the absolute placement of the parties in the full two-dimensional economic versus social policy space which we have chosen to facilitate the cross-country comparison. The graphs also show a division of the space into regions occupied by each party. Known as Voronoi tessellations (or Thiessen diagrams), these regions define areas of the policy space closer (in Euclidean terms) to a given party than to any other party, and are denoted by dashed lines forming boundaries between one party and another.[1]

All data used in this section are drawn from the detailed dataset available from the book's main website, www.politics.tcd.ie/ppmd/. This site contains electronic versions of both the summary dataset of party means on position and importance, as well as the complete detailed dataset of all survey responses. The website also provides a detailed codebook.

**Albania**

| Policy dimension | Importance | PSD | PS | PBDNJ | PDr | PAD | PD | PR | PLL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | | 3.6 | 42.0 | 2.6 | 5.1 | 2.4 | 19.4 | 4.8 | 4.0 |
| Left–right | . | 5.9 | 7.5 | 7.9 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 13.3 | 15.0 | 17.7 |
| | | 0.67 | 1.00 | 0.87 | 0.67 | 1.87 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 1.20 |
| EU joining | 16.7 | 18.6 | 18.1 | 17.7 | 18.5 | 17.8 | 18.3 | 17.5 | 18.0 |
| | 0.32 | 0.46 | 0.67 | 0.69 | 0.46 | 0.25 | 0.62 | 0.82 | 1.00 |
| Privatization | 13.1 | 10.1 | 11.3 | 10.3 | 13.8 | 12.0 | 15.1 | 15.8 | 17.5 |
| | 0.66 | 1.56 | 1.21 | 1.41 | 1.11 | 4.58 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 2.50 |
| Media freedom | 12.4 | 8.5 | 10.6 | 7.0 | 7.6 | 7.5 | 8.3 | 9.9 | 13.5 |
| | 0.45 | 1.38 | 1.42 | 0.89 | 1.15 | 1.94 | 1.35 | 1.45 | 1.50 |
| Former communists | 12.3 | 4.2 | 3.9 | 7.6 | 11.8 | 5.5 | 15.0 | 17.0 | 19.0 |
| | 0.68 | 0.59 | 0.76 | 1.08 | 1.41 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.48 | 0.58 |
| Decentralization | 11.9 | 7.9 | 9.1 | 5.7 | 8.0 | 5.0 | 7.9 | 9.5 | 9.0 |
| | 0.42 | 1.08 | 1.16 | 0.88 | 1.25 | 1.15 | 0.97 | 1.26 | 1.00 |
| Urban–rural | 11.3 | 9.8 | 12.5 | 10.5 | 7.4 | 4.7 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 7.0 |
| | 0.42 | 0.97 | 1.38 | 1.30 | 0.87 | 1.20 | 0.93 | 1.31 | 3.00 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.2 | 6.8 | 5.9 | 8.5 | 12.6 | 12.8 | 12.0 | 12.9 | 16.0 |
| | 0.81 | 1.22 | 0.88 | 1.22 | 1.16 | 3.04 | 1.08 | 1.37 | 2.00 |
| Nationalism | 10.9 | 6.5 | 5.3 | 4.7 | 9.1 | 7.3 | 11.6 | 14.9 | 19.0 |
| | 1.13 | 0.76 | 0.69 | 0.66 | 1.26 | 1.65 | 1.01 | 1.17 | 0.58 |
| Foreign land ownership | 10.1 | 8.4 | 9.0 | 6.0 | 8.7 | 7.8 | 9.1 | 13.1 | 12.0 |
| | 0.30 | 1.55 | 1.12 | 1.11 | 1.36 | 2.32 | 1.31 | 1.64 | 5.00 |
| Religion | 7.9 | 18.3 | 19.0 | 12.8 | 18.1 | 15.5 | 16.8 | 15.5 | 12.7 |
| | 0.55 | 0.70 | 0.36 | 1.77 | 0.50 | 2.50 | 1.02 | 1.61 | 4.91 |
| Social | 7.0 | 9.3 | 10.3 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 4.7 | 11.5 | 14.3 | 14.0 |
| | 0.63 | 1.35 | 1.42 | 1.35 | 1.49 | 1.20 | 1.29 | 1.27 | 1.53 |
| Environment | 6.8 | 13.2 | 13.2 | 11.6 | 13.1 | 12.8 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 11.0 |
| | 0.88 | 0.81 | 0.82 | 0.89 | 0.80 | 1.31 | 0.74 | 0.86 | 2.00 |
| Sympathy | . | 15.2 | 14.4 | 15.6 | 10.0 | 12.0 | 8.9 | 10.1 | 12.0 |
| | . | 1.75 | 1.82 | 1.28 | 1.69 | 6.00 | 1.45 | 1.77 | 7.00 |

Social liberalism

Privatization

Notes
**Socialist Party of Albania**                      PS
**Party of the Democratic Alliance**                PAD
**Human Rights' Union Party**                       PBDNJ
**Social Democratic Party**                         PSD
Democratic Party                                    PD
Reformed Democrat Party                             PDr
Movement of Legality Party                          PLL
Republican Party                                    PR

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Australia**

| Policy dimension | Importance | GRN | AD | ALP | NP | LPA | ON |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | . | 5.0 | 5.4 | 37.8 | 5.6 | 36.8 | 4.3 |
| Left–right | . | 3.9 | 7.8 | 9.9 | 14.9 | 15.9 | 16.5 |
|  | . | 0.44 | 0.78 | 0.78 | 0.65 | 0.62 | 0.73 |
| Health care | 16.1 | 2.8 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 12.3 | 16.5 | 6.5 |
|  | 1.04 | 0.43 | 0.79 | 0.46 | 1.11 | 0.74 | 1.12 |
| Deregulation | 15.6 | 3.0 | 7.9 | 10.0 | 8.9 | 16.9 | 5.0 |
|  | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.91 | 0.76 | 1.01 | 0.68 | 0.74 |
| US affairs | 15.6 | 16.3 | 14.8 | 9.4 | 4.5 | 3.7 | 11.9 |
|  | 1.06 | 1.50 | 0.78 | 0.94 | 0.97 | 1.14 | 1.76 |
| Taxes vs spending | 15.5 | 3.5 | 7.4 | 8.7 | 12.9 | 17.0 | 11.1 |
|  | 0.94 | 0.48 | 0.84 | 0.47 | 0.90 | 0.64 | 0.95 |
| Immigration | 15.3 | 4.2 | 4.5 | 6.9 | 12.7 | 12.0 | 17.0 |
|  | 0.47 | 0.92 | 0.72 | 0.89 | 1.29 | 1.51 | 1.26 |
| Environment | 14.2 | 1.5 | 5.2 | 9.9 | 16.0 | 15.9 | 14.5 |
|  | 0.77 | 0.29 | 0.73 | 0.78 | 0.47 | 0.73 | 1.00 |
| Social | 12.9 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 7.2 | 17.1 | 14.3 | 16.1 |
|  | 0.65 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.60 | 0.61 | 0.88 | 1.09 |
| Decentralization | 11.5 | 7.6 | 10.2 | 14.5 | 8.4 | 11.1 | 7.9 |
|  | 0.51 | 1.47 | 1.02 | 0.68 | 0.94 | 1.09 | 1.55 |
| Sympathy | . | 7.2 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 15.2 | 15.8 | 16.4 |
|  | . | 1.39 | 0.81 | 0.85 | 0.70 | 0.90 | 1.34 |

**Notes**
**Liberal Party of Australia**    LPA
**National Party of Australia**    NP
Australian Democrats    AD
Australian Labor Party    ALP
Australian Greens    GRN
Pauline Hanson's One Nation    ON

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Austria

| Policy dimension | Importance | Grü | SPÖ | ÖVP | FPÖ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 | . | 9.5 | 36.5 | 42.3 | 10.0 |
| Left–right | . | 5.4 | 8.8 | 14.3 | 17.4 |
|  |  | 0.56 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 0.53 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.3 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 14.7 | 13.9 |
|  | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.75 | 0.86 | 1.08 |
| Immigration | 14.0 | 3.7 | 8.9 | 13.6 | 18.5 |
|  | 1.17 | 0.55 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.39 |
| Social | 12.7 | 3.9 | 6.8 | 16.3 | 16.8 |
|  | 0.91 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.60 | 0.82 |
| Environment | 12.5 | 4.4 | 10.9 | 12.6 | 13.9 |
|  | 1.31 | 0.50 | 0.88 | 0.47 | 0.73 |
| Decentralization | 12.5 | 9.0 | 13.3 | 6.1 | 8.5 |
|  | 1.07 | 0.93 | 0.82 | 0.75 | 1.07 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 12.0 | 11.8 | 10.3 | 6.0 | 9.4 |
|  | 0.53 | 1.15 | 0.86 | 0.94 | 1.17 |
| EU: authority | 12.0 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 9.4 | 16.3 |
|  | 0.33 | 0.85 | 0.95 | 0.67 | 0.58 |
| EU: accountability | 11.3 | 5.9 | 8.6 | 10.4 | 13.1 |
|  | 0.65 | 1.11 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 1.37 |
| Sympathy | . | 8.5 | 9.8 | 11.3 | 18.0 |
|  | . | 1.01 | 0.68 | 0.97 | 0.63 |

Notes
**Austrian People's Party**                    ÖVP
**Freedom Party of Austria**                   FPÖ
The Greens                                      Grü
Austrian Social Democratic Party               SPÖ

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Belarus**

| Policy dimension | Importance | KPB | PKB | WP | BSDP-NH | APB | BSDH | LDPB | CCP-BPF | BPF | UCP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Left–right | . | 1.9 | 5.4 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 11.0 | 11.8 | 13.35 | 14.7 | 15.6 | 17.1 |
|  |  | 0.26 | 0.73 | 2.5 | 1.09 | 3.03 | 1.60 | 1.000 | 1.73 | 0.56 | 0.73 |
| Media freedom | 13.3 | 18.0 | 12.0 | 6.0 | 6.6 | 10.8 | 4.8 | 5.50 | 10.7 | 4.4 | 1.8 |
|  | 1.11 | 0.65 | 1.31 | 0.0 | 1.50 | 4.11 | 2.17 | 1.490 | 1.99 | 0.91 | 0.36 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.7 | 2.6 | 4.9 | 8.0 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 13.3 | 13.35 | 11.4 | 13.4 | 17.7 |
|  | 0.75 | 0.58 | 0.62 | 1.5 | 1.32 | 3.33 | 2.14 | 1.280 | 1.25 | 1.26 | 0.71 |
| Former communists | 12.7 | 1.2 | 1.3 | 4.0 | 6.1 | 2.8 | 11.8 | 6.15 | 17.6 | 14.2 | 7.4 |
|  | 1.23 | 0.22 | 0.21 | 1.5 | 1.36 | 1.44 | 2.93 | 1.460 | 0.92 | 1.79 | 1.31 |
| EU joining | 12.5 | 2.7 | 7.3 | 19.0 | 16.6 | 12.3 | 18.0 | 9.30 | 12.9 | 18.9 | 17.1 |
|  | 1.29 | 1.31 | 1.85 | 1.0 | 1.36 | 4.09 | 0.41 | 1.920 | 1.81 | 0.53 | 1.06 |
| Nationalism | 12.2 | 2.2 | 5.1 | 9.0 | 12.1 | 8.0 | 17.8 | 4.95 | 19.6 | 18.9 | 7.8 |
|  | 1.77 | 0.46 | 1.22 | 1.5 | 1.12 | 2.58 | 1.03 | 1.270 | 0.22 | 0.46 | 1.53 |
| Privatization | 11.8 | 1.8 | 5.3 | 9.0 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 12.8 | 12.65 | 11.8 | 14.3 | 18.1 |
|  | 0.88 | 0.32 | 0.42 | 2.5 | 0.85 | 2.53 | 1.38 | 1.130 | 1.28 | 1.16 | 0.51 |
| Foreign land ownership | 11.7 | 19.4 | 17.1 | 9.0 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 9.5 | 7.60 | 11.2 | 7.7 | 3.1 |
|  | 1.08 | 0.29 | 0.91 | 0.0 | 1.23 | 3.59 | 2.40 | 1.320 | 1.84 | 1.14 | 0.77 |
| Environment | 11.3 | 16.9 | 12.3 | 7.0 | 7.9 | 14.0 | 7.0 | 14.50 | 5.4 | 8.3 | 12.4 |
|  | 0.82 | 0.75 | 1.16 | 2.0 | 1.32 | 2.04 | 1.58 | 1.130 | 1.09 | 1.27 | 1.99 |
| Decentralization | 10.7 | 16.0 | 11.7 | 10.0 | 10.1 | 7.3 | 9.0 | 10.55 | 9.6 | 6.6 | 3.0 |
|  | 1.15 | 1.68 | 1.26 | 4.5 | 0.65 | 1.93 | 0.58 | 1.880 | 1.54 | 1.46 | 0.60 |
| Religion | 10.1 | 19.0 | 18.6 | 11.0 | 14.6 | 11.8 | 11.4 | 13.90 | 3.1 | 9.4 | 15.4 |
|  | 1.42 | 0.44 | 0.43 | 3.0 | 1.23 | 1.75 | 2.46 | 1.090 | 0.80 | 2.11 | 1.86 |
| Privacy | 9.3 | 16.4 | 12.8 | 13.0 | 8.6 | 9.7 | 11.0 | 10.00 | 14.6 | 10.4 | 5.9 |
|  | 0.80 | 1.39 | 1.65 | 1.0 | 1.52 | 3.28 | 0.00 | 1.800 | 1.68 | 1.75 | 1.08 |
| Urban–rural | 9.1 | 13.6 | 12.3 | 6.0 | 8.8 | 14.7 | 7.5 | 7.55 | 9.4 | 7.6 | 3.3 |
|  | 0.83 | 2.02 | 1.58 | 2.5 | 1.49 | 2.33 | 2.50 | 1.690 | 1.48 | 1.81 | 0.78 |
| Sympathy | . | 15.4 | 12.4 | 13.0 | 10.5 | 12.8 | 8.7 | 17.60 | 11.0 | 8.2 | 8.6 |
|  | . | 2.27 | 2.27 | 3.0 | 1.66 | 3.30 | 2.40 | 0.870 | 1.14 | 1.88 | 2.14 |

# Belgium

| Policy dimension | Importance | Eco | Gro! | PS | SPSp | CD&V | CDH | MR | N-VA | VLD | FN | VB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2003 | . | 3.1 | 2.5 | 13.0 | 14.9 | 5.5 | 13.2 | 11.4 | 3.1 | 15.4 | 2.0 | 11.6 |
| Left–right | . | 3.5 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 6.6 | 10.6 | 12.3 | 12.7 | 14.4 | 14.5 | 18.9 | 18.9 |
|  |  | 0.41 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 0.58 | 0.35 | 0.76 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.42 |
| Deregulation | 14.1 | 4.9 | 4.5 | 3.4 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 11.1 | 14.9 | 11.7 | 16.7 | 13.6 | 13.0 |
|  | 0.81 | 0.75 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.66 | 0.52 | 0.58 | 0.60 | 1.54 | 1.02 |
| Immigration | 14.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 7.7 | 10.6 | 9.7 | 12.7 | 12.9 | 19.2 | 19.8 |
|  | 0.84 | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.75 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.77 | 0.94 | 0.98 | 0.82 | 0.53 | 0.08 |
| Social | 14.0 | 2.9 | 2.3 | 4.8 | 4.7 | 13.5 | 14.7 | 7.7 | 12.4 | 7.0 | 17.2 | 19.0 |
|  | 0.55 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.67 | 0.55 | 0.76 | 1.21 | 0.42 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.8 | 4.6 | 4.5 | 5.0 | 7.3 | 9.4 | 10.9 | 14.3 | 11.9 | 16.4 | 15.1 | 14.3 |
|  | 0.75 | 0.65 | 0.41 | 0.53 | 0.58 | 0.64 | 0.61 | 0.52 | 0.71 | 0.50 | 1.14 | 0.87 |
| Decentralization | 12.9 | 12.5 | 10.5 | 13.0 | 10.1 | 14.1 | 6.3 | 12.7 | 2.8 | 8.0 | 13.3 | 2.4 |
|  | 0.80 | 1.23 | 0.97 | 1.03 | 0.58 | 0.76 | 0.60 | 0.82 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 1.94 | 0.72 |
| Environment | 11.8 | 2.5 | 2.5 | 10.6 | 8.7 | 10.6 | 12.0 | 14.4 | 12.0 | 16.0 | 15.7 | 15.0 |
|  | 0.98 | 0.41 | 0.43 | 0.77 | 0.77 | 0.56 | 0.70 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 0.67 | 0.60 |
| EU: authority | 11.5 | 6.8 | 7.2 | 8.1 | 8.4 | 6.8 | 6.7 | 8.2 | 9.9 | 8.1 | 17.7 | 15.8 |
|  | 0.15 | 0.70 | 0.72 | 0.67 | 0.64 | 0.60 | 0.58 | 0.74 | 1.05 | 0.81 | 0.59 | 0.81 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 10.8 | 10.2 | 10.4 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 5.3 | 5.9 | 3.9 | 11.2 | 5.3 | 13.5 | 14.7 |
|  | 0.51 | 1.39 | 1.19 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.54 | 0.77 | 0.63 | 0.80 | 0.77 | 2.73 | 1.14 |
| EU: accountability | 10.2 | 4.2 | 4.0 | 6.4 | 5.7 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 8.8 | 7.5 | 18.0 | 16.9 |
|  | 0.16 | 0.70 | 0.64 | 0.80 | 0.75 | 0.88 | 0.88 | 1.05 | 1.16 | 1.06 | 1.12 | 0.83 |
| Sympathy | . | 8.4 | 7.9 | 10.5 | 6.8 | 10.2 | 10.7 | 12.5 | 13.3 | 12.6 | 19.2 | 18.3 |
|  | . | 1.21 | 0.99 | 1.07 | 0.69 | 0.97 | 1.19 | 1.00 | 1.24 | 0.95 | 0.53 | 0.86 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

| Policy dimension | Importance | SDP | SPRS | SNSD | PDP | SBiH | SDA | SDS | HDZ |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| *Vote share 2002* | . | *10.4* | *1.9* | *9.8* | *4.6* | *10.5* | *21.9* | *14.0* | *9.5* |
| Left–right | . | 5.5 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 17.0 | 18.0 | 18.5 |
|  |  | 1.50 | 5.00 | 4.00 | 1.50 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 |
| Nationalism | 16.5 | 5.0 | 16.0 | 13.0 | 13.0 | 15.0 | 19.0 | 20.0 | 20.0 |
|  | 1.89 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | 0.00 |
| Privatization | 14.1 | 10.0 | 10.5 | 14.0 | 16.0 | 13.5 | 14.5 | 15.0 | 17.5 |
|  | 0.53 | 2.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 1.50 | 2.00 | 2.50 |
| EU joining | 13.0 | 20.0 | 15.5 | 18.5 | 17.5 | 16.0 | 15.0 | 14.0 | 16.0 |
|  | 1.31 | 0.00 | 2.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 | 0.00 |
| Urban–rural | 12.9 | 4.0 | 8.0 | 9.0 | 8.5 | 11.0 | 16.5 | 18.0 | 15.0 |
|  | 1.47 | 2.00 | 4.00 | 3.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Religion | 12.3 | 19.5 | 14.0 | 14.5 | 16.5 | 11.0 | 7.0 | 2.0 | 2.0 |
|  | 1.28 | 0.50 | 4.00 | 4.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 1.00 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.7 | 9.5 | 8.5 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 9.0 | 14.0 | 11.0 | 14.5 |
|  | 1.22 | 4.50 | 1.50 | 3.00 | 2.50 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 1.00 | 4.50 |
| Decentralization | 11.6 | 2.0 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 9.0 | 13.0 | 17.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 |
|  | 2.35 | . | . | . | . | . | . | . | . |
| Former communists | 9.4 | 2.0 | 1.0 | 6.5 | 5.5 | 12.0 | 16.0 | 11.5 | 16.5 |
|  | 0.91 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 3.50 | 2.50 | . | 0.00 | 1.50 | 0.50 |
| Social | 8.3 | 9.0 | 14.0 | 13.5 | 14.5 | 15.0 | 18.0 | 18.5 | 19.0 |
|  | 1.34 | 1.00 | 4.00 | 4.50 | 2.50 | 3.00 | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| Foreign land ownership | 8.2 | 10.5 | 12.0 | 9.5 | 7.0 | 7.0 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 5.0 |
|  | 0.89 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 1.50 | 1.00 | 3.00 | 4.00 | 3.50 | 3.00 |
| Media freedom | 7.6 | 4.5 | 10.5 | 7.5 | 8.5 | 15.0 | 16.5 | 15.0 | 16.5 |
|  | 2.07 | 1.50 | 4.50 | 2.50 | 2.50 | . | 1.50 | 2.00 | 0.50 |
| Environment | 6.6 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 12.5 | 13.5 | 14.5 | 16.0 | 15.5 | 16.5 |
|  | 1.40 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 2.50 |
| Sympathy | . | 4.5 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 15.0 | 16.5 | 18.5 | 19.0 | 20.0 |
|  | . | 2.50 | 9.50 | 7.50 | 3.00 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 1.00 | 0.00 |

Notes

| | |
|---|---|
| HDZ | Croatian Democratic Community |
| PDP | Party for Democratic Progress |
| SBiH | Party for Bosnia and Hercegovina |
| SDA | Party of Democratic Action |
| SDP | Social Dem. Party of Bosnia and Hercegovina |
| SDS | Serbian Democratic Party |
| SNSD | Party of Independent Social Democrats |
| SPRS | Socialist Party of Republic of Srpska |

**Britain**

| Policy dimension | Importance | PCy | SNP | LD | Lab | Con |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | | *0.7* | *1.8* | *18.3* | *40.7* | *31.7* |
| Left–right | . | 6.0 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 10.9 | 16.4 |
| | | 0.33 | 0.39 | 0.28 | 0.39 | 0.24 |
| EU: authority | 15.2 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 5.1 | 10.0 | 17.6 |
| | 1.26 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.35 | 0.38 | 0.25 |
| Taxes vs spending | 15.0 | 5.2 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 8.1 | 15.3 |
| | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.40 | 0.40 |
| Deregulation | 14.1 | 6.4 | 7.2 | 10.0 | 11.5 | 17.0 |
| | 1.08 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.35 | 0.43 | 0.24 |
| EU: accountability | 13.7 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 4.6 | 11.8 | 17.8 |
| | 1.15 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0.31 |
| Immigration | 13.3 | 8.2 | 8.3 | 6.0 | 9.0 | 13.8 |
| | 0.63 | 0.73 | 0.66 | 0.35 | 0.52 | 0.51 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 12.6 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 4.7 | 8.1 | 15.0 |
| | 0.94 | 0.68 | 0.46 | 0.35 | 0.49 | 0.57 |
| Social | 12.3 | 7.7 | 8.1 | 4.1 | 6.9 | 15.3 |
| | 0.94 | 0.48 | 0.41 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Decentralization | 12.0 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.4 | 10.7 | 12.6 |
| | 0.85 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.31 | 0.47 | 0.52 |
| Northern Ireland | 11.6 | 5.9 | 6.9 | 9.8 | 11.1 | 16.4 |
| | 0.93 | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.39 |
| Environment | 10.9 | 7.3 | 9.8 | 7.0 | 12.4 | 15.6 |
| | 0.98 | 0.54 | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.31 |
| Sympathy | . | 10.5 | 11.0 | 7.8 | 8.9 | 16.5 |
| | . | 0.71 | 0.62 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 0.58 |

Taxes vs spending

Social liberalism

Notes
**Labour Party**
Conservative Party
Liberal Democrats
Plaid Cymru
Scottish National Party

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Lab
Con
LD
PCy
SNP

# Bulgaria

| Policy dimension | Importance | BKP | BSP | BSDP | DPS | NDST | BBB | BZNS | G | VMRO | BNDP | ODS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | *0.2* | *22.1* | *22.1* | *10.4* | *9.6* | *0.0* | *2.7* | *1.3* | *1.3* | *0.0* | *20.6* |
| *Left–right* | *.* | *1.6* | *6.1* | *8.6* | *9.1* | *11.5* | *11.6* | *12.5* | *13.0* | *13.4* | *14.8* | *15.7* |
| | *.* | *0.34* | *0.73* | *0.52* | *0.93* | *1.38* | *0.87* | *0.87* | *0.63* | *0.85* | *0.87* | *0.62* |
| EU joining | 17.3 | 6.4 | 16.6 | 18.1 | 17.9 | 19.0 | 15.6 | 18.0 | 16.8 | 13.7 | 18.6 | 19.8 |
| | 0.42 | 2.02 | 1.07 | 0.62 | 0.64 | 0.68 | 1.33 | 0.86 | 1.02 | 1.58 | 0.80 | 0.20 |
| Privatization | 14.6 | 1.8 | 9.1 | 11.6 | 12.2 | 15.2 | 14.1 | 13.9 | 14.1 | 12.0 | 14.6 | 16.5 |
| | 0.56 | 0.70 | 1.35 | 1.15 | 1.26 | 1.30 | 1.65 | 0.99 | 1.18 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.92 |
| Urban–rural | 13.9 | 16.0 | 14.5 | 7.5 | 16.6 | 11.2 | 9.6 | 14.9 | 5.4 | 10.9 | 4.6 | 4.8 |
| | 0.49 | 1.22 | 0.96 | 0.79 | 0.89 | 1.29 | 1.02 | 0.90 | 1.03 | 1.25 | 0.96 | 0.87 |
| Foreign land ownership | 13.8 | 20.0 | 13.6 | 10.0 | 7.3 | 7.5 | 13.5 | 12.6 | 9.7 | 15.5 | 7.8 | 6.5 |
| | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.02 | 1.14 | 1.44 | 1.49 | 1.73 | 1.38 | 1.25 | 0.79 | 1.46 | 1.44 |
| Decentralization | 13.5 | 15.8 | 10.5 | 7.9 | 11.5 | 12.1 | 8.4 | 10.3 | 6.2 | 11.4 | 9.3 | 9.8 |
| | 0.44 | 1.72 | 1.40 | 1.37 | 1.48 | 2.06 | 1.15 | 1.82 | 1.49 | 1.34 | 1.82 | 1.99 |
| Media freedom | 13.4 | 17.1 | 10.8 | 7.1 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 10.2 | 9.7 | 6.1 | 11.6 | 8.6 | 9.5 |
| | 0.41 | 0.93 | 1.50 | 1.09 | 1.52 | 1.86 | 1.44 | 1.54 | 1.77 | 1.11 | 1.62 | 1.78 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.9 | 4.3 | 6.5 | 9.8 | 9.9 | 11.4 | 14.4 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 11.2 | 12.9 | 12.4 |
| | 0.41 | 1.81 | 0.89 | 1.12 | 1.38 | 1.69 | 1.43 | 0.93 | 1.38 | 1.09 | 1.27 | 1.27 |
| Former communists | 12.4 | 1.0 | 2.3 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 5.1 | 6.6 | 15.5 | 7.4 | 10.9 | 15.3 | 14.7 |
| | 0.29 | 0.00 | 0.41 | 1.13 | 1.06 | 1.00 | 1.12 | 0.97 | 1.66 | 1.31 | 0.99 | 1.02 |
| Nationalism | 11.8 | 16.8 | 11.9 | 9.1 | 8.0 | 6.6 | 13.9 | 10.2 | 8.8 | 18.6 | 8.0 | 7.1 |
| | 0.41 | 1.82 | 1.00 | 0.95 | 1.63 | 1.17 | 1.09 | 1.14 | 1.40 | 0.40 | 0.82 | 0.83 |
| Environment | 10.2 | 14.2 | 11.5 | 11.0 | 13.6 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 11.8 | 9.5 | 12.8 | 11.7 | 12.8 |
| | 0.39 | 1.36 | 1.06 | 1.00 | 0.74 | 0.97 | 1.22 | 1.06 | 1.37 | 0.85 | 1.16 | 1.26 |
| Religion | 9.7 | 17.6 | 16.2 | 14.3 | 15.0 | 11.5 | 15.4 | 12.2 | 13.8 | 12.3 | 9.2 | 8.5 |
| | 0.79 | 1.89 | 1.03 | 1.42 | 1.80 | 1.48 | 0.94 | 1.44 | 1.33 | 1.38 | 1.82 | 1.81 |
| Social | 8.1 | 15.9 | 9.6 | 7.5 | 11.4 | 6.6 | 10.9 | 12.3 | 6.4 | 13.5 | 9.6 | 6.9 |
| | 0.25 | 1.46 | 1.07 | 1.49 | 1.43 | 1.44 | 1.37 | 0.97 | 1.29 | 0.89 | 1.51 | 1.49 |
| Sympathy | . | 18.2 | 14.4 | 12.7 | 15.6 | 16.1 | 17.0 | 13.7 | 13.0 | 15.4 | 11.8 | 10.2 |
| | . | 1.12 | 1.32 | 1.47 | 1.38 | 1.37 | 0.79 | 1.73 | 1.81 | 0.78 | 2.10 | 2.19 |

Social liberalism

Privatization

BKP

VMRO

DPS

BZNS

BBB

BNDP

BSP

BSDP

G

ODS

NDST

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Notes

| | |
|---|---|
| National movement "Simeon II" | NDST |
| Movement for Rights and Freedoms | DPS |
| Bulgarian Business Bloc | BBB |
| Bulgarian Communist Party | BKP |
| Bulgarian National Democratic Party | BNDP |
| Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party | BSDP |
| Bulgarian Socialist Party | BSP |
| Bulgarian Agricultural National Union | BZNS |
| St. George Day Movement | G |
| Union of Democratic Forces | ODS |
| Bulgarian National Movement | VMRO |

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Vote shares are based on a poll taken in May 2003 by Vitosha Research.

**Canada**

| Policy dimension | Importance | GPC | NDP | BQ | LPC | PC | CA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2000* | . | 0.8 | 8.5 | 10.7 | 40.8 | 12.2 | 25.5 |
| Left–right | . | 4.6 | 4.9 | 7.2 | 11.1 | 13.6 | 17.5 |
|  |  | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 0.19 |
| Quebec | 15.3 | 12.4 | 14.8 | 1.3 | 18.5 | 16.4 | 16.7 |
|  | 1.38 | 0.68 | 0.42 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.35 | 0.39 |
| Health care | 15.2 | 4.1 | 1.8 | 4.4 | 5.3 | 9.7 | 14.8 |
|  | 0.71 | 0.42 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 0.28 | 0.39 | 0.37 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.4 | 5.3 | 4.6 | 6.9 | 11.2 | 14.2 | 17.7 |
|  | 1.22 | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.18 |
| Deregulation | 14.1 | 4.9 | 4.5 | 6.9 | 11.3 | 14.4 | 18.2 |
|  | 1.28 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.18 |
| Immigration | 13.6 | 6.4 | 4.5 | 7.9 | 5.0 | 9.3 | 13.6 |
|  | 0.62 | 0.50 | 0.25 | 0.46 | 0.28 | 0.37 | 0.42 |
| Decentralization | 13.5 | 11.1 | 14.1 | 3.8 | 12.9 | 8.9 | 4.4 |
|  | 1.06 | 0.80 | 0.34 | 0.46 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 0.28 |
| US affairs | 13.5 | 17.7 | 18.0 | 15.6 | 11.9 | 7.8 | 4.0 |
|  | 0.79 | 0.34 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 0.31 |
| Social | 13.4 | 4.9 | 3.1 | 5.2 | 7.6 | 12.4 | 18.2 |
|  | 1.20 | 0.36 | 0.15 | 0.31 | 0.21 | 0.31 | 0.16 |
| Environment | 11.5 | 1.6 | 5.7 | 8.5 | 10.8 | 13.4 | 16.7 |
|  | 0.62 | 0.09 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.24 |
| Sympathy | . | 9.4 | 7.6 | 12.7 | 8.5 | 12.0 | 17.1 |
|  | . | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.61 | 0.43 | 0.42 | 0.46 |

Notes
**Liberal Party of Canada**          **LPC**
Bloc Québécois                        BQ
Canadian Alliance                     CA
Green Party of Canada                 GPC
New Democratic Party                  NDP
Progressive Conservative
Party of Canada                       PC

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Croatia

| Policy dimension | Importance | HNS | LS | SDP | IDS | LIBRA | DC | HSS | HDZ | HSLS | HSP | HB |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | 7.3 | 1.1 | 17.9 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 7.2 | 31.2 | 2.7 | 6.4 | 2.7 |
| Left–right | . | 4.5 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 7.5 | 8.2 | 12.3 | 12.8 | 14.5 | 14.7 | 17.7 | 18.8 |
| | | 1.06 | 1.15 | 0.79 | 1.52 | 0.75 | 0.33 | 0.70 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 0.49 | 0.60 |
| EU joining | 16.7 | 18.0 | 17.3 | 17.7 | 18.5 | 17.5 | 15.0 | 12.8 | 14.5 | 10.7 | 7.3 | 4.5 |
| | 0.50 | 0.68 | 0.80 | 0.76 | 0.50 | 0.67 | 1.26 | 1.28 | 1.73 | 1.96 | 1.41 | 1.67 |
| Nationalism | 14.2 | 2.8 | 3.7 | 6.3 | 2.3 | 6.2 | 12.5 | 15.3 | 15.7 | 15.7 | 19.0 | 19.2 |
| | 0.98 | 0.95 | 0.67 | 1.05 | 0.33 | 1.28 | 0.62 | 0.84 | 1.20 | 0.80 | 0.37 | 0.31 |
| Religion | 13.6 | 18.2 | 16.8 | 16.8 | 16.5 | 15.2 | 5.8 | 4.2 | 3.7 | 8.5 | 6.0 | 3.2 |
| | 0.78 | 0.87 | 0.91 | 0.95 | 1.31 | 1.11 | 1.33 | 0.87 | 0.95 | 1.98 | 1.21 | 0.54 |
| Foreign land ownership | 13.0 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 7.8 | 9.3 | 7.7 | 10.8 | 13.8 | 12.2 | 11.8 | 16.0 | 13.2 |
| | 0.74 | 2.41 | 2.18 | 1.70 | 2.28 | 2.20 | 1.42 | 2.09 | 1.47 | 1.35 | 2.44 | 3.38 |
| Privatization | 12.3 | 15.3 | 14.0 | 12.7 | 10.3 | 13.5 | 8.5 | 7.5 | 8.8 | 10.7 | 9.7 | 6.4 |
| | 0.67 | 1.63 | 1.61 | 1.09 | 2.32 | 1.84 | 1.34 | 2.16 | 1.28 | 1.41 | 2.42 | 1.81 |
| Social | 12.0 | 4.3 | 3.7 | 5.5 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 13.3 | 15.8 | 14.2 | 11.5 | 15.0 | 15.6 |
| | 0.47 | 1.54 | 1.69 | 1.95 | 1.45 | 1.85 | 1.50 | 1.25 | 2.20 | 2.45 | 2.73 | 2.99 |
| Media freedom | 11.4 | 7.5 | 6.0 | 7.8 | 7.3 | 6.5 | 9.8 | 10.3 | 11.0 | 8.5 | 10.3 | 11.8 |
| | 0.39 | 1.67 | 1.06 | 1.66 | 2.22 | 0.96 | 1.82 | 1.61 | 2.28 | 1.71 | 1.65 | 2.44 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.2 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 11.5 | 12.8 | 13.8 | 10.2 | 9.2 | 11.8 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 7.0 |
| | 0.68 | 1.15 | 1.38 | 0.81 | 0.95 | 1.25 | 2.13 | 2.07 | 1.62 | 1.92 | 1.87 | 1.70 |
| Decentralization | 11.1 | 5.3 | 4.5 | 6.7 | 1.2 | 5.4 | 12.0 | 11.0 | 16.3 | 11.5 | 15.0 | 17.6 |
| | 0.67 | 0.80 | 0.67 | 0.92 | 0.17 | 0.68 | 1.03 | 1.53 | 0.67 | 2.16 | 1.63 | 1.03 |
| Urban–rural | 11.0 | 4.3 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 8.5 | 6.0 | 9.2 | 18.0 | 13.2 | 9.0 | 11.3 | 15.2 |
| | 0.88 | 1.33 | 0.65 | 1.33 | 1.38 | 1.48 | 1.08 | 0.52 | 1.66 | 1.24 | 0.92 | 0.97 |
| Environment | 8.9 | 14.3 | 3.8 | 12.0 | 9.8 | 8.2 | 13.0 | 8.5 | 15.3 | 12.0 | 5.3 | 11.2 |
| | 0.77 | 1.91 | 1.47 | 1.86 | 1.76 | 1.77 | 1.84 | 1.36 | 0.42 | 1.61 | 1.20 | 2.96 |
| Former communists | 8.8 | 3.7 | 4.8 | 2.3 | 4.3 | 4.8 | 10.0 | 10.7 | 12.2 | 14.0 | 18.0 | 16.0 |
| | 1.17 | 1.09 | 1.33 | 0.67 | 1.26 | 1.02 | 2.61 | 2.32 | 2.12 | 1.90 | 0.77 | 1.44 |
| Sympathy | . | 7.7 | 8.7 | 4.0 | 10.0 | 8.5 | 12.2 | 13.3 | 14.2 | 11.2 | 15.2 | 18.5 |
| | . | 2.76 | 1.94 | 0.68 | 2.25 | 2.08 | 1.70 | 0.49 | 1.54 | 2.64 | 1.87 | 0.9 |

Privatization

Social liberalism

Notes
**Croatian Democratic Community**       **HDZ**
**Democratic Center**                   **DC**
**Croatian Social Liberal Party**       **HSLS**
Croatian Block                          HB
Croatian People's Party                 HNS
Croatian Rights Party                   HSP
Croatian Peasant Party                  HSS
Istrian Democratic Union                IDS
Party of Liberal Democrats (Libra)      LIBRA
Liberal Party                           LS
Social Democratic Party of Croatia      SDP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Cyprus

| Policy dimension | Importance | AKEL | EDEK | DIKO | KOP | EDI | ADIK | DISI | NEO |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | . | *34.7* | *6.5* | *14.8* | *2.0* | *2.6* | *2.2* | *34.0* | *3.0* |
| Left–Right | . | 3.0 | 7.3 | 10.8 | 12.0 | 14.5 | 15.8 | 17.5 | 18.8 |
|  | . | 0.71 | 0.75 | 1.31 | 1.63 | 1.85 | 1.11 | 0.29 | 0.25 |
| EU joining | 16.6 | 12.8 | 17.8 | 16.3 | 15.3 | 19.5 | 16.5 | 19.0 | 15.5 |
|  | 0.47 | 2.56 | 0.48 | 0.75 | 1.38 | 0.29 | 0.65 | 0.41 | 1.04 |
| Deregulation | 15.8 | 3.0 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 11.5 | 16.8 | 11.3 | 16.8 | 12.3 |
|  | 0.89 | 0.91 | 1.19 | 1.31 | 1.94 | 1.11 | 2.17 | 1.03 | 1.70 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.5 | 6.0 | 10.0 | 8.8 | 11.5 | 12.5 | 11.0 | 15.0 | 13.5 |
|  | 0.92 | 2.27 | 1.08 | 0.48 | 1.71 | 1.71 | 0.58 | 0.41 | 1.76 |
| NATO/peacekeeping | 14.3 | 14.0 | 8.8 | 10.0 | 13.0 | 5.0 | 8.5 | 4.0 | 11.7 |
|  | 1.02 | 2.38 | 1.11 | 1.58 | 1.47 | 2.00 | 0.96 | 1.08 | 2.03 |
| Decentralization | 12.8 | 14.0 | 10.0 | 11.3 | 10.0 | 6.3 | 10.8 | 6.5 | 7.8 |
|  | 0.85 | 2.12 | 0.71 | 0.63 | 0.91 | 0.85 | 0.85 | 1.50 | 1.03 |
| Immigration | 11.9 | 7.5 | 9.5 | 13.0 | 9.5 | 5.5 | 14.0 | 11.5 | 14.8 |
|  | 0.41 | 0.65 | 1.19 | 1.29 | 1.94 | 1.04 | 0.71 | 1.94 | 1.49 |
| Environment | 10.2 | 7.8 | 7.5 | 13.5 | 3.8 | 9.0 | 13.8 | 13.0 | 10.3 |
|  | 0.46 | 1.03 | 0.50 | 1.19 | 2.75 | 1.91 | 1.11 | 2.08 | 2.29 |
| Social | 10.1 | 12.8 | 12.3 | 12.5 | 12.0 | 9.3 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 14.5 |
|  | 0.56 | 2.87 | 0.85 | 2.47 | 1.78 | 2.50 | 3.30 | 0.87 | 1.32 |
| Sympathy | . | 15.8 | 14.8 | 16.0 | 13.8 | 9.5 | 16.8 | 12.3 | 18.5 |
|  | . | 3.61 | 2.50 | 1.73 | 1.55 | 2.87 | 2.14 | 3.35 | 1.19 |

Taxes vs spending

Social liberalism

Notes
**Dimokratikos Sinagermos**                              **DISI**
**Enomeni Dimokrates**                                   **EDI**
Agonistiko Dimokratiko Kinima                            ADIK
Anorthotikon Komma Ergazemenou Laou                      AKEL
Dimokratikon Komma                                       DIKO
Kinima Sosialdimokraton EDEK                             EDEK
Kinima Oikologon Perivallontiston                        KOP
Neoi Orizontes                                           NEO

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Czech Republic

| Policy dimension | Importance | KSCM | SZJ | CSSD | SZ | KDU | SNK | MDS | ODS | RMS | US | NKL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2002* | . | 18.5 | 0.9 | 30.2 | 2.4 | 10.1 | 2.8 | 0.3 | 24.5 | 1.0 | 4.1 | 0.0 |
| Left–right | . | 2.6 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 7.4 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 12.0 | 15.5 | 15.3 | 15.6 | 20.0 |
|  | . | 0.22 | . | 0.39 | 0.74 | 0.41 | 0.61 | . | 0.40 | 1.04 | 0.49 | . |
| EU joining | 15.4 | 4.9 | . | 17.1 | 14.2 | 16.9 | 15.4 | 15.0 | 11.6 | 4.4 | 18.4 | 1.0 |
|  | 0.68 | 0.50 | . | 0.48 | 0.82 | 0.41 | 0.69 | . | 0.62 | 0.97 | 0.35 | . |
| Privatization | 14.3 | 4.0 | 7.0 | 8.7 | 7.4 | 12.7 | 13.5 | 15.0 | 17.5 | 9.3 | 17.2 | 6.0 |
|  | 0.81 | 0.45 | . | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.54 | 0.84 | . | 0.37 | 0.76 | 0.51 | . |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.9 | 4.4 | 7.0 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 12.4 | 16.0 | 16.3 | 11.5 | 15.3 | 6.0 |
|  | 0.73 | 0.53 | . | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.75 | . | 0.38 | 1.02 | 0.63 | . |
| Foreign land ownership | 13.1 | 18.3 | 12.0 | 13.0 | 11.2 | 9.9 | 9.4 | 11.0 | 11.3 | 18.6 | 6.2 | 20.0 |
|  | 0.87 | 0.40 | . | 0.68 | 0.75 | 0.67 | 0.76 | . | 0.80 | 0.29 | 0.58 | . |
| Nationalism | 13.1 | 16.6 | 18.0 | 10.5 | 6.1 | 9.8 | 10.0 | 17.0 | 15.3 | 19.2 | 5.6 | 20.0 |
|  | 0.86 | 0.67 | . | 0.54 | 0.83 | 0.63 | 0.82 | . | 0.60 | 0.21 | 0.62 | . |
| Former communists | 13.0 | 1.6 | 2.0 | 7.4 | 9.9 | 14.5 | 11.2 | 12.0 | 14.2 | 16.5 | 16.7 | 20.0 |
|  | 0.86 | 0.29 | . | 0.52 | 0.75 | 0.58 | 0.99 | . | 0.70 | 0.72 | 0.65 | . |
| Decentralization | 12.8 | 12.9 | 15.0 | 8.8 | 6.4 | 8.9 | 3.5 | 4.0 | 11.7 | 12.8 | 7.1 | 18.0 |
|  | 0.51 | 0.86 | . | 0.64 | 0.84 | 0.60 | 0.48 | . | 0.88 | 0.89 | 0.75 | . |
| Media freedom | 12.4 | 14.9 | 4.0 | 11.1 | 6.1 | 11.5 | 7.8 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 13.3 | 4.8 | 17.0 |
|  | 0.41 | 0.72 | . | 0.72 | 0.73 | 0.76 | 0.76 | . | 0.86 | 1.08 | 0.46 | . |
| Social | 11.0 | 8.2 | 7.0 | 7.1 | 4.3 | 18.1 | 9.0 | 18.0 | 9.3 | 15.9 | 5.1 | 20.0 |
|  | 0.87 | 0.84 | . | 0.55 | 0.62 | 0.44 | 0.86 | . | 0.70 | 0.86 | 0.61 | . |
| Environment | 10.8 | 11.5 | 16.0 | 10.2 | 4.1 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 11.0 | 15.9 | 13.3 | 12.7 | 5.0 |
|  | 0.63 | 0.78 | . | 0.62 | 1.02 | 0.53 | 0.92 | . | 0.52 | 0.66 | 0.64 | . |
| Religion | 10.7 | 18.0 | 14.0 | 15.7 | 15.2 | 3.1 | 12.3 | 13.0 | 13.9 | 15.3 | 12.2 | 8.0 |
|  | 0.88 | 0.58 | . | 0.62 | 0.88 | 0.59 | 1.02 | . | 0.65 | 0.90 | 0.92 | . |
| Urban–rural | 10.3 | 11.9 | 5.0 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 15.1 | 11.4 | 11.0 | 6.0 | 9.7 | 5.7 | 10.0 |
|  | 0.68 | 0.63 | . | 0.44 | 0.89 | 0.49 | 0.94 | . | 0.57 | 0.81 | 0.58 | . |
| Sympathy | . | 15.2 | 10.0 | 9.3 | 11.3 | 12.7 | 11.5 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 17.4 | 13.2 | 1.0 |
|  | . | 0.95 | . | 0.77 | 0.95 | 0.73 | 1.03 | . | 0.86 | 0.90 | 0.96 | . |

# Denmark

| Policy dimension | Importance | Ø | SF | SD | RV | KrF | CD | V | KF | DF | FrP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2001 | | 2.4 | 6.4 | 29.1 | 5.2 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 31.3 | 9.1 | 12.0 | 0.6 |
| Left–Right | . | 2.3 | 4.6 | 7.6 | 9.3 | 11.2 | 11.3 | 15.1 | 15.2 | 15.3 | 18.3 |
| | | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.37 | 0.42 | 0.32 | 0.60 | 0.30 |
| Immigration | 15.7 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 11.4 | 4.4 | 8.6 | 6.2 | 15.1 | 15.7 | 19.4 | 19.3 |
| | 0.59 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.56 | 0.48 | 0.56 | 0.76 | 0.64 | 0.45 | 0.15 | 0.29 |
| EU: authority | 14.2 | 17.4 | 14.5 | 8.3 | 6.6 | 11.6 | 4.8 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 18.5 | 17.7 |
| | 0.54 | 0.82 | 0.61 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.58 | 0.61 | 0.28 | 0.59 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.2 | 3.8 | 4.8 | 7.4 | 10.4 | 9.5 | 9.2 | 14.8 | 15.3 | 10.0 | 17.8 |
| | 0.78 | 0.75 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.48 | 0.45 | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.43 | 0.80 | 0.49 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 13.5 | 16.3 | 12.7 | 6.8 | 7.3 | 8.8 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 6.0 | 15.8 | 15.7 |
| | 0.34 | 1.00 | 0.99 | 0.66 | 0.90 | 0.72 | 0.80 | 0.57 | 0.52 | 0.92 | 0.88 |
| EU: accountability | 12.4 | 16.3 | 14.0 | 11.3 | 8.4 | 12.6 | 7.3 | 10.3 | 12.1 | 17.6 | 16.0 |
| | 0.56 | 1.06 | 0.99 | 0.62 | 0.77 | 0.73 | 0.87 | 0.75 | 0.78 | 0.87 | 1.17 |
| Environment | 11.3 | 2.4 | 3.6 | 9.0 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 11.7 | 15.3 | 14.5 | 14.9 | 16.6 |
| | 0.74 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.51 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.45 | 0.41 | 0.50 |
| Decentralization | 10.6 | 9.8 | 8.1 | 12.4 | 7.5 | 10.1 | 10.5 | 7.0 | 12.2 | 12.1 | 8.7 |
| | 0.63 | 1.16 | 0.75 | 0.44 | 0.62 | 0.39 | 0.65 | 0.74 | 0.76 | 0.58 | 1.00 |
| Social | 10.5 | 3.5 | 4.3 | 7.8 | 4.1 | 17.5 | 8.0 | 9.8 | 12.5 | 14.4 | 11.8 |
| | 0.57 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.56 | 0.36 | 0.44 | 0.59 | 0.81 | 0.65 | 0.88 | 1.40 |
| Sympathy | . | 13.6 | 10.5 | 8.6 | 6.0 | 11.1 | 11.0 | 10.6 | 11.0 | 17.3 | 18.0 |
| | . | 1.19 | 1.10 | 1.07 | 0.84 | 0.98 | 0.93 | 1.29 | 1.14 | 0.71 | 0.82 |

Notes

**Konservative Folkeparti**    K
**Venstre, Danmarks liberale parti**    V
Centrumdemokraterne    CD
Dansk Folkeparti    DF
Enhedslisten    Ø
Fremskridtspartiet    FrP
Kristeligt Folkeparti    KrF
Radikale Venstre    RV
Socialdemokratiet    SD
Socialistisk Folkeparti    SF

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Estonia**

| Policy dimension | Importance | ESDTP | EÜRP | Kesk | Mõõd | RL | Isam | EKRP | ResP | Ref |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | 0.0 | 2.2 | 25.4 | 7.0 | 13.0 | 7.3 | 1.1 | 24.6 | 17.7 |
| Left–right | . | 4.0 | 8.3 | 8.9 | 9.1 | 10.4 | 14.1 | 15.4 | 17.1 | 19.3 |
| | | 0.87 | 1.82 | 1.55 | 1.22 | 1.41 | 0.77 | 1.81 | 1.03 | 0.29 |
| EU joining | 15.8 | 4.0 | 12.3 | 9.5 | 18.6 | 14.0 | 17.0 | 3.0 | 18.6 | 17.2 |
| | 0.65 | 1.84 | 3.48 | 1.85 | 0.51 | 1.67 | 1.10 | 1.53 | 0.68 | 0.97 |
| Privatization | 13.6 | 4.8 | 6.5 | 10.8 | 12.0 | 8.0 | 16.2 | 6.0 | 16.4 | 19.4 |
| | 1.08 | 1.89 | 1.50 | 1.11 | 1.52 | 0.84 | 1.02 | . | 1.57 | 0.24 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.4 | 5.8 | 7.8 | 8.0 | 7.3 | 11.8 | 12.8 | 10.0 | 16.7 | 19.3 |
| | 1.50 | 0.48 | 1.03 | 1.00 | 1.20 | 1.08 | 1.22 | . | 1.20 | 0.42 |
| Decentralization | 12.9 | 11.0 | 9.3 | 12.8 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 10.5 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 12.3 |
| | 0.76 | 0.00 | 2.46 | 1.08 | 0.83 | 2.67 | 1.57 | 3.00 | 2.27 | 2.04 |
| Urban–rural | 12.3 | 8.3 | 4.2 | 9.7 | 9.7 | 19.1 | 8.4 | 10.0 | 5.1 | 1.7 |
| | 1.18 | 0.42 | 0.87 | 0.42 | 0.75 | 0.34 | 1.09 | 0.00 | 1.28 | 0.29 |
| Foreign land ownership | 11.8 | 16.3 | 8.0 | 11.2 | 8.5 | 16.8 | 7.4 | 18.0 | 4.5 | 2.2 |
| | 1.26 | 0.85 | . | 0.49 | 1.50 | 0.80 | 1.75 | . | 1.71 | 0.73 |
| Nationalism | 11.2 | 9.2 | 3.3 | 11.9 | 10.7 | 17.6 | 19.1 | 16.7 | 12.1 | 9.1 |
| | 1.44 | 1.56 | 0.76 | 1.28 | 1.51 | 0.87 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 1.93 | 1.30 |
| Former communists | 11.1 | 2.1 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 10.0 | 5.0 | 17.9 | 14.5 | 11.0 | 7.2 |
| | 0.70 | 0.55 | 0.98 | 1.51 | 2.00 | 1.21 | 0.63 | 1.50 | 1.80 | 2.47 |
| Environment | 10.4 | 10.5 | 10.5 | 12.8 | 9.8 | 8.0 | 13.0 | 8.7 | 14.5 | 16.0 |
| | 1.01 | 1.50 | 0.50 | 1.31 | 1.25 | 2.42 | 2.12 | 3.18 | 1.85 | 2.35 |
| Media freedom | 9.8 | 14.5 | 14.0 | 11.8 | 6.6 | 11.8 | 7.6 | 14.7 | 5.8 | 3.4 |
| | 0.92 | 0.50 | . | 1.98 | 1.86 | 0.85 | 2.38 | 1.67 | 1.66 | 0.81 |
| Religion | 9.1 | 17.0 | 7.5 | 14.2 | 13.2 | 9.6 | 6.6 | 2.2 | 8.4 | 12.6 |
| | 0.86 | 0.71 | 3.50 | 2.01 | 1.46 | 2.20 | 1.29 | 0.97 | 2.48 | 2.06 |
| Social | 8.3 | 13.3 | 13.0 | 12.0 | 6.6 | 16.0 | 14.6 | 19.6 | 12.6 | 10.4 |
| | 0.96 | 1.67 | 1.00 | 1.64 | 1.12 | 1.70 | 1.03 | 0.24 | 2.62 | 1.29 |
| Sympathy | . | 13.7 | 13.8 | 10.4 | 5.4 | 11.7 | 11.4 | 16.7 | 13.9 | 16.9 |
| | . | 1.34 | 1.70 | 0.92 | 1.29 | 1.98 | 1.66 | 1.41 | 2.12 | 1.08 |

Privatization

Social liberalism

EKRP

ESDTP  EÜRP

RL

Isam

Kesk

ResP

Mõõd

Ref

Notes
**Eestimaa Rahvaliit**                      **RL**
**Eesti Reformierakond**                    **Ref**
**Ühendus Vabariigi Eest – Res Publica**    **ResP**
Eesti Kristlik Rahvapartei                  EKRP
Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Tööpartei        ESDTP
Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei              EÜRP
Erakond Isamaaliit                          Isam
Eesti Keskerakond                           Kesk
Rahvaerakond Mõõdukad                       Mõõd

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Finland

| Policy dimension | Importance | VAS | VIHR | SDP | KESK | SFP | KD | PS | KOK |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | . | *9.9* | *8.0* | *22.9* | *24.7* | *4.6* | *5.3* | *1.6* | *18.5* |
| Left–right | . | 4.5 | 7.5 | 8.4 | 12.0 | 13.8 | 14.3 | 15.4 | 15.6 |
|  |  | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.44 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.59 | 0.30 |
| Deregulation | 14.1 | 4.5 | 8.1 | 8.6 | 9.6 | 14.0 | 10.2 | 10.2 | 16.8 |
|  | 0.82 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.67 | 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.66 | 0.38 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.0 | 4.3 | 7.1 | 8.4 | 9.5 | 12.9 | 8.5 | 9.4 | 15.8 |
|  | 0.77 | 0.40 | 0.38 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.40 |
| EU: authority | 13.4 | 11.9 | 8.9 | 6.8 | 15.1 | 8.4 | 14.4 | 17.8 | 7.6 |
|  | 0.45 | 0.57 | 0.67 | 0.50 | 0.34 | 0.55 | 0.57 | 0.35 | 0.58 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 13.3 | 15.4 | 13.0 | 7.5 | 14.0 | 7.1 | 13.2 | 15.0 | 6.3 |
|  | 0.34 | 0.63 | 0.80 | 0.71 | 0.62 | 0.68 | 0.76 | 0.82 | 0.54 |
| Environment | 12.5 | 8.3 | 2.3 | 12.4 | 11.3 | 10.5 | 10.3 | 12.8 | 15.0 |
|  | 0.81 | 0.63 | 0.27 | 0.59 | 0.55 | 0.65 | 0.44 | 0.66 | 0.59 |
| EU: accountability | 12.5 | 10.8 | 7.0 | 10.6 | 14.3 | 9.9 | 13.9 | 14.6 | 11.6 |
|  | 0.35 | 0.89 | 0.73 | 0.71 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 0.64 | 1.03 | 0.65 |
| Decentralization | 12.2 | 10.9 | 7.3 | 13.5 | 6.2 | 6.8 | 8.9 | 9.0 | 11.3 |
|  | 0.74 | 0.71 | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0.74 | 0.53 | 0.54 | 0.76 | 0.78 |
| Social | 11.7 | 5.5 | 3.0 | 7.6 | 14.6 | 6.6 | 18.6 | 17.3 | 12.3 |
|  | 0.90 | 0.45 | 0.31 | 0.47 | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.58 |
| Immigration | 10.9 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 7.9 | 12.3 | 6.0 | 11.5 | 18.8 | 12.8 |
|  | 0.77 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.42 | 0.56 | 0.59 | 0.64 | 0.25 | 0.58 |
| Sympathy | . | 9.5 | 7.6 | 9.3 | 11.3 | 9.8 | 15.7 | 18.4 | 12.2 |
|  | . | 0.91 | 0.90 | 0.75 | 0.77 | 0.73 | 0.56 | 0.41 | 0.65 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

KD
PS
KESK
KOK
SDP
SFP
VAS
VIHR

Notes
**Suomen Keskusta**                          **KESK**
**Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue**      **SDP**
**Svenska Folkepartiet i Finland**           **SFP**
Suomen Kristillisdemokraatit                 KD
Kansallinen Kokoomus                         KOK
Perussuomalaiset                             PS
Vasemmistoliitto                             VAS
Vihreä Liitto                                VIHR

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**France**

| Policy dimension | Importance | PCF | V | PS | RPF | UDF | RPR | UEM | MPF | FN |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2002* | | 4.8 | 4.5 | 24.1 | 0.4 | 4.8 | 33.7 | . | 0.8 | 11.3 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.4 | 2.4 | 4.6 | 7.1 | 13.9 | 14.0 | 14.3 | 14.3 | 15.6 | 16.7 |
| | 0.45 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.39 | 0.48 | 0.38 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 0.52 | 0.42 |
| EU: larger/stronger | 14.3 | 5.7 | 14.6 | 15.7 | 3.1 | 17.5 | 12.4 | 14.1 | 2.9 | 1.9 |
| | 0.63 | 0.38 | 0.48 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.28 | 0.54 | 0.44 | 0.32 | 0.15 |
| Immigration | 13.7 | 5.8 | 2.4 | 6.3 | 15.2 | 10.5 | 12.4 | 11.7 | 17.2 | 19.3 |
| | 0.87 | 0.42 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.55 | 0.31 | 0.17 |
| Globalization | 13.4 | 3.4 | 5.5 | 10.7 | 5.7 | 14.7 | 12.6 | 13.5 | 4.8 | 3.1 |
| | 0.74 | 0.26 | 0.61 | 0.48 | 0.53 | 0.36 | 0.41 | 0.47 | 0.53 | 0.29 |
| Social | 12.6 | 7.9 | 2.5 | 5.1 | 17.2 | 12.0 | 14.4 | 13.4 | 18.3 | 18.9 |
| | 0.89 | 0.57 | 0.17 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.50 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.17 |
| Decentralization | 12.2 | 13.3 | 4.8 | 7.4 | 14.6 | 4.5 | 10.0 | 9.1 | 11.9 | 15.6 |
| | 0.95 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 0.67 | 0.44 |
| Environment | 10.9 | 12.8 | 2.2 | 8.4 | 15.0 | 12.0 | 13.6 | 13.3 | 14.0 | 14.8 |
| | 1.15 | 0.62 | 0.19 | 0.44 | 0.30 | 0.43 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.44 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

FN
MPF
RPF
RPR
UEM
UDF
PCF
PS
V

Notes
**Union pour la Démocratie Française**          UDF
Rassemblement pour la France                    RPF
Rassemblement pour la République                RPR
Union en Mouvement                              UEM
Front National                                  FN
Mouvement pour la France                        MPF
Parti Communiste Français                       PCF
Parti Socialiste                                PS
Les Verts                                       V

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Germany

| Policy dimension | Importance | DKP | PDS | GRÜ | SPD | FDP | CDU/CSU | Schil | Rep | DVU | NPD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 |  | 0.0 | 4.3 | 8.6 | 38.5 | 7.4 | 38.5 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 |
| Left–right | . | 2.0 | 3.6 | 7.1 | 8.4 | 13.4 | 13.6 | 17.5 | 18.8 | 19.4 | 19.7 |
|  | . | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.07 |
| Taxes vs spending | 15.9 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 11.0 | 9.3 | 18.7 | 14.4 | 14.1 | 10.8 | 0.6 | 9.0 |
|  | 0.47 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.14 | 0.26 | 0.69 | 0.80 | 0.85 | 0.72 |
| Immigration | 14.1 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 2.7 | 7.7 | 7.9 | 14.6 | 18.2 | 19.4 | 19.5 | 19.8 |
|  | 0.54 | 0.67 | 0.36 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.24 | 0.13 | 0.12 | 0.06 |
| Social | 13.6 | 6.1 | 4.9 | 2.4 | 7.3 | 5.3 | 15.9 | 17.3 | 18.8 | 19.0 | 18.9 |
|  | 0.64 | 0.71 | 0.33 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 0.17 | 0.21 | 0.29 |
| Environment | 12.8 | 9.8 | 9.1 | 3.2 | 10.9 | 16.8 | 14.5 | 15.8 | 14.4 | 14.6 | 14.7 |
|  | 0.65 | 0.71 | 0.42 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.51 | 0.67 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 12.7 | 15.4 | 14.2 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 6.7 | 6.6 | 14.6 | 16.7 | 17.1 | 17.3 |
|  | 0.15 | 1.17 | 0.62 | 0.43 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 0.36 | 0.94 | 0.58 | 0.55 | 0.58 |
| EU: accountability | 11.3 | 5.4 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 7.8 | 7.9 | 10.6 | 12.2 | 13.8 | 13.8 | 14.8 |
|  | 0.29 | 1.15 | 0.39 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 1.06 | 1.05 | 1.10 | 1.19 |
| EU: authority | 11.3 | 13.8 | 10.7 | 6.9 | 8.0 | 10.0 | 10.8 | 16.5 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 18.5 |
|  | 0.29 | 0.72 | 0.48 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0.42 | 0.35 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.31 |
| Decentralization | 10.4 | 15.4 | 13.6 | 5.4 | 11.7 | 5.9 | 8.5 | 10.5 | 14.3 | 14.9 | 15.4 |
|  | 0.28 | 0.84 | 0.49 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 0.46 | 0.40 | 0.85 | 0.79 | 0.82 | 0.89 |
| Sympathy | . | 17.9 | 13.7 | 6.6 | 8.0 | 12.0 | 11.3 | 18.4 | 19.6 | 19.7 | 19.9 |
|  | . | 0.41 | 0.53 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.31 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.07 |

Notes

| **Social Democratic Party of Germany** | **SPD** |
| **Green Party** | **GRÜ** |
| Christian Democratic Union/Christian | CDU/CSU |
| Social Union | |
| German Communist Party | DKP |
| German People's Union | DVU |
| Free Democratic Party | FDP |
| National Democratic Party | NPD |
| Party of Democratic Socialism | PDS |
| Republicans | Rep |
| Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive | Schil |

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Taxes vs spending

Social liberalism

**Greece**

| Policy dimension | Importance | KKE | SYN | PASOK | ND |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2004* | . | 5.9 | 3.3 | 40.6 | 45.4 |
| **Left–right** | . | 6.4 | 6.5 | 10.4 | 15.6 |
|  |  | 1.36 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 0.56 |
| **Deregulation** | 15.4 | 2.3 | 6.7 | 11.4 | 16.7 |
|  | 0.69 | 0.25 | 0.72 | 0.94 | 0.55 |
| **Taxes vs spending** | 14.2 | 4.4 | 6.5 | 10.9 | 14.8 |
|  | 0.27 | 0.53 | 0.65 | 0.91 | 0.66 |
| **EU: authority** | 13.7 | 19.2 | 6.4 | 5.9 | 7.3 |
|  | 0.57 | 0.23 | 0.85 | 0.74 | 0.83 |
| **Immigration** | 13.5 | 8.7 | 3.4 | 9.3 | 14.6 |
|  | 0.60 | 1.20 | 0.36 | 0.96 | 0.80 |
| **EU: peacekeeping** | 13.1 | 19.0 | 12.1 | 5.8 | 6.2 |
|  | 0.58 | 0.44 | 1.01 | 0.69 | 0.76 |
| **Decentralization** | 11.8 | 8.9 | 4.4 | 8.8 | 10.6 |
|  | 0.98 | 1.28 | 0.45 | 0.88 | 0.86 |
| **EU: accountability** | 11.0 | 13.4 | 5.5 | 8.8 | 10.1 |
|  | 0.55 | 1.67 | 1.14 | 0.87 | 0.96 |
| **Environment** | 11.0 | 10.3 | 5.1 | 11.4 | 13.8 |
|  | 0.88 | 1.27 | 0.76 | 0.86 | 0.75 |
| **Social** | 9.1 | 10.5 | 4.8 | 7.8 | 14.0 |
|  | 0.99 | 1.08 | 0.78 | 0.76 | 0.81 |
| **Sympathy** | . | 16.7 | 8.6 | 9.0 | 14.6 |
|  | . | 1.06 | 0.89 | 1.13 | 1.12 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

ND

PASOK

KKE

SYN

Notes
**Nea Dimokratia**                          ND
Kommunistiko Koma Ellados                    KKE
Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima               PASOK
Synaspismos                                  SYN

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Hungary

| Policy dimension | Importance | MUNKÁS | MSZP | SZDSZ | CENTR. | MDF | FIDESZ | FKGP | MIÉP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2002* | . | 2.8 | 42.1 | 5.5 | 3.9 | 5.1 | 35.1 | 0.8 | 4.4 |
| Left–right | . | 2.2 | 7.0 | 8.2 | 9.8 | 13.6 | 15.1 | 17.2 | 19.1 |
|  |  | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.24 | 0.30 | 0.27 | 0.22 |
| EU joining | 16.9 | 7.3 | 19.0 | 19.2 | 15.8 | 16.3 | 12.9 | 8.0 | 2.5 |
|  | 0.89 | 0.74 | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 0.68 | 0.36 |
| Nationalism | 14.2 | 8.1 | 8.4 | 4.8 | 10.4 | 16.0 | 16.2 | 18.2 | 19.8 |
|  | 1.15 | 0.65 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.62 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 0.08 |
| Privatization | 13.9 | 3.6 | 13.0 | 17.1 | 11.4 | 10.4 | 9.1 | 10.7 | 5.9 |
|  | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.67 | 0.38 | 0.53 | 0.89 | 0.62 |
| Media freedom | 13.8 | 13.3 | 7.1 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 11.2 | 11.4 | 15.2 | 16.0 |
|  | 0.53 | 0.80 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.69 | 0.62 | 0.83 |
| Foreign Land | 13.8 | 14.9 | 6.8 | 4.1 | 8.6 | 14.6 | 15.8 | 18.9 | 19.0 |
|  | 1.07 | 0.68 | 0.56 | 0.53 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.48 | 0.32 | 0.46 |
| Former communists | 13.5 | 1.7 | 3.6 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 12.8 | 15.0 | 17.2 | 18.9 |
|  | 0.96 | 0.23 | 0.44 | 0.75 | 0.66 | 0.59 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.26 |
| Social | 12.9 | 12.0 | 7.4 | 2.3 | 9.8 | 14.9 | 15.1 | 17.4 | 19.0 |
|  | 0.87 | 0.65 | 0.44 | 0.25 | 0.53 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.23 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.9 | 6.1 | 10.5 | 15.2 | 11.2 | 9.9 | 9.3 | 10.0 | 7.9 |
|  | 0.47 | 1.02 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 0.55 | 0.47 | 0.45 | 0.64 | 0.67 |
| Urban–rural | 12.8 | 6.1 | 8.0 | 3.8 | 9.5 | 12.9 | 13.3 | 17.9 | 10.9 |
|  | 0.59 | 0.61 | 0.48 | 0.42 | 0.60 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.47 | 0.82 |
| Decentralization | 12.6 | 12.2 | 8.4 | 5.4 | 8.3 | 10.7 | 12.6 | 13.0 | 15.6 |
|  | 0.36 | 0.91 | 0.66 | 0.50 | 0.59 | 0.38 | 0.57 | 0.58 | 0.79 |
| Religion | 12.5 | 17.3 | 15.8 | 17.7 | 11.6 | 4.8 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 5.0 |
|  | 1.23 | 0.78 | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.64 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.81 | 0.61 |
| Environment | 11.5 | 10.7 | 11.9 | 10.6 | 8.8 | 9.5 | 10.4 | 10.1 | 9.1 |
|  | 0.34 | 0.91 | 0.56 | 0.68 | 0.57 | 0.47 | 0.54 | 0.61 | 0.75 |
| Sympathy | . | 17.6 | 8.9 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 10.7 | 12.0 | 17.1 | 18.0 |
|  | . | 0.60 | 0.74 | 0.87 | 0.64 | 0.60 | 0.78 | 0.62 | 0.60 |

Notes

**Hungarian Socialist Party**              **MSZP**
**Alliance of Free Democrats**             **SZDSZ**
Fidesz – Civic Party                       FIDESZ
Hungarian Democratic Forum                 MDF
Independent Smallholders                   FKGP
Hungarian Justice and Life                 MIÉP
Workers' Party                             MUNKÁS
Center Party                               CENTRUM

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Iceland

| Policy dimension | Importance | X-U | X-N | X-S | X-B | X-F | X-D |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | *8.8* | *1.0* | *31.0* | *17.7* | *7.4* | *33.7* |
| Left–right | . | 3.3 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 12.8 | 12.8 | 16.3 |
| | | 0.45 | 1.34 | 0.65 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 0.45 |
| Deregulation | 14.2 | 2.9 | 7.6 | 10.0 | 10.4 | 11.4 | 16.8 |
| | 1.15 | 0.60 | 2.16 | 0.87 | 0.77 | 0.86 | 0.33 |
| Environment | 13.9 | 2.2 | 9.2 | 10.2 | 15.8 | 10.2 | 17.2 |
| | 1.43 | 0.42 | 1.78 | 0.85 | 0.76 | 0.86 | 0.64 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.6 | 3.8 | 8.3 | 9.2 | 11.8 | 11.6 | 15.5 |
| | 1.15 | 0.73 | 1.94 | 0.71 | 0.74 | 0.59 | 0.50 |
| Decentralization | 10.1 | 12.6 | 9.0 | 8.7 | 10.8 | 8.3 | 8.0 |
| | 0.40 | 1.48 | 1.97 | 1.02 | 0.89 | 0.88 | 1.14 |
| Immigration | 8.1 | 5.2 | 7.8 | 5.5 | 9.2 | 7.7 | 9.6 |
| | 0.58 | 0.74 | 1.02 | 0.71 | 1.01 | 0.82 | 1.13 |
| Social | 8.0 | 4.2 | 8.4 | 2.9 | 8.3 | 6.7 | 8.7 |
| | 1.23 | 1.24 | 1.72 | 0.50 | 1.09 | 1.07 | 0.96 |
| Sympathy | . | 15.8 | 11.2 | 6.0 | 10.8 | 12.4 | 11.8 |
| | . | 1.35 | 3.13 | 1.05 | 1.37 | 1.31 | 1.49 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

X-D
X-B
X-F
X-N
X-S
X-U

Notes
**Sjaelfstaedisflokkur**          **X-D**
**Framsoknarflokkur**             **X-B**
Frjalslyndi flokkurinn            X-F
Nytt afl                          X-N
Samfylkingin (alliance)           X-S
Vinstrihreyfíngin graent frambod  X-U

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Ireland**

| Policy dimension | Importance | GR | SF | LB | FG | FF | PD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 | . | 3.8 | 6.5 | 10.8 | 22.5 | 41.5 | 4.0 |
| Left–right | . | 5.7 | 6.3 | 7.4 | 12.7 | 13.3 | 16.4 |
|  |  | 0.33 | 0.59 | 0.30 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.28 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.9 | 5.8 | 4.9 | 6.6 | 12.5 | 13.8 | 17.4 |
|  | 0.63 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.25 |
| Northern Ireland | 13.9 | 8.7 | 1.5 | 9.1 | 11.0 | 6.4 | 11.0 |
|  | 1.35 | 0.41 | 0.19 | 0.35 | 0.48 | 0.37 | 0.45 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 12.4 | 17.5 | 17.8 | 9.7 | 4.9 | 7.2 | 6.7 |
|  | 0.78 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.37 | 0.49 | 0.45 |
| EU: Strengthening | 12.3 | 17.1 | 17.0 | 10.2 | 8.3 | 12.7 | 13.2 |
|  | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.46 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.57 |
| EU: Enlargement | 12.0 | 9.8 | 12.0 | 5.6 | 5.2 | 7.0 | 6.7 |
|  | 0.54 | 0.78 | 0.75 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.55 | 0.54 |
| Immigration | 11.6 | 5.8 | 8.6 | 6.7 | 12.9 | 14.7 | 14.1 |
|  | 0.49 | 0.35 | 0.63 | 0.42 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.53 |
| Social | 11.1 | 5.6 | 9.6 | 6.0 | 11.5 | 14.8 | 7.0 |
|  | 0.70 | 0.47 | 0.62 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.47 |
| Environment | 10.8 | 2.3 | 10.1 | 9.5 | 13.8 | 16.0 | 15.5 |
|  | 0.89 | 0.23 | 0.65 | 0.44 | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.44 |
| Decentralization | 10.3 | 4.5 | 6.6 | 8.6 | 11.8 | 13.1 | 12.0 |
|  | 0.42 | 0.37 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.54 |
| Sympathy | . | 8.7 | 15.7 | 6.9 | 11.1 | 13.1 | 13.4 |
|  | . | 0.61 | 0.70 | 0.59 | 0.65 | 0.59 | 0.81 |

Social liberalism

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Taxes vs spending

FF

FG

PD

SF

GR LB

Notes
**Fianna Fáil**
**Progressive Democrats**
Fine Gael
Greens
Labour
Sinn Féin

**FF**
**PD**
FG
GR
LB
SF

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Israel

| Policy dimension | Importance | Hada | Bala | Raam | Merz | AE | Lab | Shin | Lik | Shas | YbT | NRP | IHUD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2003 | | 3.0 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 5.2 | 2.8 | 14.5 | 12.3 | 29.4 | 8.2 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 5.5 |
| Left–right | 12.9 | 1.5 | 2.4 | 3.0 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 7.5 | 11.4 | 13.7 | 14.4 | 14.2 | 17.4 | 19.2 |
| | 1.25 | 0.17 | 0.49 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.51 | 0.28 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.38 | 0.22 |
| Security | 15.9 | 1.1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 2.7 | 8.2 | 5.5 | 8.8 | 13.7 | 13.3 | 13.7 | 18.6 | 19.8 |
| | 1.02 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.34 | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.48 | 0.50 | 0.67 | 0.65 | 0.36 | 0.11 |
| Palestinian State | 15.4 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 8.3 | 5.1 | 8.7 | 13.1 | 13.5 | 13.5 | 18.7 | 19.7 |
| | 1.07 | 0.08 | 0.38 | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 0.27 | 0.15 |
| Religion | 14.7 | 19.0 | 12.6 | 6.3 | 19.3 | 13.0 | 14.4 | 19.7 | 9.0 | 1.4 | 1.9 | 2.8 | 6.5 |
| | 1.14 | 0.24 | 1.18 | 1.02 | 0.20 | 0.60 | 0.43 | 0.15 | 0.47 | 0.14 | 0.69 | 0.62 | 0.70 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.0 | 2.5 | 5.6 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 4.2 | 9.8 | 17.4 | 15.2 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 8.4 | 12.0 |
| | 0.87 | 0.36 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.57 | 0.78 | 0.53 | 0.58 | 0.57 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 0.46 | 0.61 |
| Deregulation | 12.8 | 2.6 | 8.4 | 7.3 | 8.4 | 3.7 | 11.0 | 18.6 | 16.6 | 5.9 | 8.4 | 8.3 | 14.0 |
| | 1.06 | 0.36 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.77 | 0.36 | 0.53 | 0.33 | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.74 | 0.59 | 0.74 |
| Social | 11.0 | 4.9 | 10.9 | 16.1 | 2.3 | 9.3 | 7.1 | 4.3 | 12.4 | 19.4 | 19.5 | 18.8 | 16.5 |
| | 1.31 | 0.78 | 1.26 | 1.05 | 0.25 | 0.67 | 0.52 | 0.54 | 0.43 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.18 | 0.67 |
| Environment | 6.8 | 8.3 | 10.9 | 12.7 | 4.6 | 12.1 | 11.1 | 10.9 | 13.9 | 14.4 | 13.0 | 12.8 | 14.4 |
| | 0.74 | 1.23 | 1.07 | 1.48 | 0.36 | 0.74 | 0.58 | 0.82 | 0.60 | 0.74 | 1.05 | 0.85 | 0.87 |
| Sympathy | . | 12.3 | 14.8 | 15.1 | 6.9 | 8.4 | 6.6 | 10.4 | 13.0 | 16.9 | 17.7 | 16.7 | 17.8 |
| | . | 1.36 | 1.15 | 1.11 | 1.26 | 0.78 | 0.77 | 1.09 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.64 | 0.78 | 0.77 |

**Taxes vs spending** (x-axis), **Social liberalism** (y-axis)

Plot labels: Shas, YhT, NRP, Raam, IHUD, Lik, Shin, Bala, AE, Hada, Lab, Merz

Notes
**Likud** — **Lik**
**IHUD LEUMI** (National Unity) — **IHUD**
**National Religious Party** — **NRP**
**Shinui** — **Shin**
Am Ekhad (One Nation) — AE
Al Tahammmy al-Tatani al-Dimiqrati — Bala
Hazit Democratit le-Shalom ve-Shivayon — Hada
Labor — Lab
Meretz — Merz
United Arab List — Raam
Shas — Shas
Yahadut HaTorah — YhT

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Italy

| Policy dimension | Importance | RC | PDCI | Green | DS | Marg | SDIIt. | Val. | Pann | UDC | FI | AN | LN | MSFT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | | *5.0* | *1.7* | *1.1* | *16.6* | *14.5* | *1.1* | *3.9* | *2.3* | *3.2* | *29.4* | *12.0* | *3.9* | *0.4* |
| Left-right | . | 2.1 | 3.3 | 4.0 | 6.0 | 8.0 | 8.6 | 10.1 | 12.0 | 12.4 | 15.6 | 16.9 | 16.9 | 19.0 |
| | | 0.20 | 0.23 | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.27 | 0.34 | 0.52 | 0.22 | 0.31 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 0.27 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.7 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 4.9 | 6.7 | 8.5 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 15.2 | 10.6 | 17.5 | 10.1 | 15.1 | 6.7 |
| | 0.65 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.42 | 0.59 | 0.36 | 0.28 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.64 |
| Immigration | 14.3 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 4.4 | 5.4 | 7.3 | 7.8 | 5.1 | 8.9 | 14.4 | 15.7 | 19.3 | 17.9 |
| | 0.57 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.36 | 0.52 | 0.38 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.59 | 0.16 | 0.51 |
| Deregulation | 14.3 | 2.7 | 3.4 | 5.9 | 7.5 | 9.2 | 9.8 | 8.9 | 17.8 | 10.5 | 16.6 | 7.8 | 15.2 | 4.7 |
| | 0.65 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.52 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 0.44 | 0.55 | 0.61 | 0.55 |
| EU: authority | 13.8 | 10.7 | 8.4 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 4.6 | 6.6 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 8.3 | 14.6 | 13.5 | 17.9 | 16.8 |
| | 0.40 | 0.62 | 0.50 | 0.36 | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.39 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.31 | 0.62 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 13.2 | 16.7 | 15.4 | 14.7 | 7.3 | 6.9 | 6.5 | 8.6 | 6.3 | 6.8 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 13.0 | 12.5 |
| | 0.33 | 0.57 | 0.60 | 0.76 | 0.48 | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.55 | 0.71 | 0.37 | 0.72 | 0.51 | 0.60 | 1.35 |
| Social | 12.9 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 3.4 | 5.0 | 11.9 | 7.1 | 9.9 | 2.0 | 16.0 | 12.9 | 18.3 | 17.1 | 18.5 |
| | 0.67 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.30 | 0.29 | 0.59 | 0.57 | 0.67 | 0.24 | 0.51 | 0.53 | 0.30 | 0.43 | 0.36 |
| EU: accountability | 12.7 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 5.7 | 7.3 | 7.4 | 5.3 | 9.5 | 14.2 | 14.7 | 16.5 | 15.9 |
| | 0.32 | 0.69 | 0.60 | 0.49 | 0.28 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.43 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.67 | 0.92 |
| Decentralization | 12.3 | 13.4 | 12.5 | 9.5 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 8.9 | 9.1 | 6.8 | 10.5 | 8.9 | 14.9 | 2.4 | 16.2 |
| | 0.61 | 0.68 | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.60 | 0.56 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.55 | 0.35 | 0.83 |
| Environment | 10.6 | 5.6 | 6.4 | 1.7 | 7.3 | 8.3 | 9.6 | 8.3 | 9.3 | 11.7 | 17.2 | 13.5 | 15.3 | 10.7 |
| | 0.61 | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.20 | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.46 | 0.47 | 0.65 | 0.47 | 0.35 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.85 |
| Sympathy | . | 11.6 | 10.7 | 8.3 | 5.5 | 6.4 | 9.8 | 11.3 | 11.3 | 13.6 | 17.1 | 16.8 | 18.5 | 18.8 |
| | . | 0.79 | 0.76 | 0.66 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.69 | 0.69 | 0.76 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 0.42 | 0.28 | 0.39 |

**Forza Italia**     **FI**
**Alleanza Nazionale**     **AN**
**Lega Nord**     **LN**
Democratici di Sinistra     DS
Federazione dei Verdi     Green
Lista di Pietro Italia dei Valori     It.Val.
Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore     MSFT
La Margherita     Marg
Partito dei Comunisti Italiani     PDCI
Lista Pannella Bonino     Pann
Rifondazione Comunista     RC
Socialisti Democratici Italiani     SDI
Unione di Centro     UDC

**Bold** parties in government during survey.



Plot axes: Taxes vs spending (horizontal, 1–20), Social liberalism (vertical, 1–20). Party labels: FI, LN, AN, MSFT, UDC, Marg, It.Val., SDI, DS, Green, PDCI, RC, Pann.

**Japan**

| Policy dimension | Importance | JCP | SDP | DP | Kom. | LDP | NCP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | 7.7 | 5.2 | 37.4 | 14.8 | 34.9 | 0.0 |
| Left–right | . | 3.1 | 5.1 | 11.6 | 12.2 | 15.8 | 16.7 |
| | | 0.30 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.38 |
| Defense policy | 15.6 | 2.1 | 2.9 | 11.6 | 11.2 | 17.0 | 17.0 |
| | 1.10 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.47 | 0.52 | 0.33 | 0.40 |
| US Affairs | 15.1 | 1.6 | 3.1 | 10.7 | 12.2 | 17.4 | 17.0 |
| | 1.10 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.31 | 0.41 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.2 | 8.7 | 8.9 | 10.6 | 9.5 | 10.1 | 11.7 |
| | 0.40 | 0.63 | 0.48 | 0.60 | 0.52 | 0.70 | 0.78 |
| Deficit bonds | 13.7 | 7.4 | 7.6 | 11.9 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 10.7 |
| | 0.83 | 0.50 | 0.49 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.75 | 0.76 |
| National identity | 13.5 | 4.0 | 7.4 | 14.4 | 12.5 | 17.7 | 17.0 |
| | 1.46 | 0.55 | 0.66 | 0.46 | 0.57 | 0.47 | 0.56 |
| Deregulation | 13.4 | 3.8 | 5.5 | 12.7 | 10.2 | 12.9 | 13.6 |
| | 1.13 | 0.36 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 0.55 |
| Decentralization | 12.9 | 10.4 | 8.8 | 5.0 | 9.4 | 10.6 | 10.3 |
| | 1.25 | 0.68 | 0.63 | 0.37 | 0.46 | 0.56 | 0.55 |
| Environment | 11.6 | 5.3 | 5.5 | 10.3 | 10.7 | 15.0 | 14.6 |
| | 1.25 | 0.41 | 0.44 | 0.45 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.42 |
| Immigration | 11.0 | 7.7 | 6.5 | 8.5 | 11.0 | 14.4 | 15.3 |
| | 0.35 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.57 |
| Social | 10.4 | 8.7 | 6.9 | 8.9 | 12.9 | 15.8 | 16.3 |
| | 0.52 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.53 |
| Sympathy | . | 14.0 | 11.6 | 8.9 | 16.0 | 11.6 | 14.6 |
| | . | 0.81 | 0.89 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.91 | 0.91 |

Notes

| Liberal Democratic Party | LDP |
| Democratic Party | DP |
| Japan Communist Party | JCP |
| Komeito | Kom. |
| New Conservative Party | NCP |
| Social Democratic Party | SDP |

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Latvia

| Policy dimension | Importance | PCTVL | TSP | ZZS | LPP | TB/LNNK | JL | TP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2002* | | *10.0* | *10.0* | *9.5* | *9.6* | *5.4* | *24.0* | *16.7* |
| Left–right | . | 3.4 | 6.9 | 11.0 | 13.4 | 16.3 | 16.5 | 18.1 |
| | | 0.80 | 0.88 | 0.60 | 0.92 | 1.16 | 0.42 | 0.35 |
| EU joining | 14.7 | 7.4 | 12.5 | 13.9 | 17.3 | 15.6 | 18.6 | 18.4 |
| | 0.90 | 0.80 | 0.91 | 0.61 | 0.59 | 1.12 | 0.42 | 0.65 |
| Privatization | 14.1 | 4.5 | 7.4 | 12.0 | 14.9 | 13.9 | 16.4 | 17.4 |
| | 1.32 | 0.38 | 0.84 | 0.46 | 0.79 | 0.74 | 0.50 | 0.42 |
| Nationalism | 13.7 | 3.5 | 4.4 | 15.0 | 11.6 | 19.3 | 13.3 | 16.0 |
| | 0.86 | 1.54 | 0.84 | 0.42 | 0.86 | 0.49 | 0.90 | 0.63 |
| Former communists | 13.3 | 1.8 | 3.5 | 10.6 | 13.6 | 17.1 | 14.3 | 14.4 |
| | 0.95 | 0.37 | 0.76 | 1.25 | 0.72 | 1.42 | 1.11 | 1.21 |
| Decentralization | 12.3 | 7.7 | 7.2 | 9.9 | 10.7 | 12.5 | 17.3 | 14.1 |
| | 0.50 | 0.99 | 0.91 | 0.88 | 0.64 | 0.50 | 0.64 | 1.81 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.1 | 7.0 | 7.4 | 11.3 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 14.8 | 14.9 |
| | 0.71 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 0.94 | 1.60 | 0.74 | 1.53 | 0.61 |
| Foreign land ownership | 12.0 | 9.9 | 8.6 | 15.3 | 7.9 | 17.3 | 10.3 | 9.5 |
| | 1.01 | 2.42 | 2.20 | 0.70 | 1.55 | 0.90 | 1.49 | 1.76 |
| Religion | 11.0 | 18.0 | 16.6 | 11.6 | 3.3 | 12.5 | 10.1 | 12.0 |
| | 1.74 | 0.68 | 0.78 | 1.53 | 0.94 | 1.31 | 1.82 | 1.71 |
| Media freedom | 10.7 | 10.1 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 10.1 | 9.3 | 12.1 | 8.0 |
| | 0.32 | 1.77 | 1.39 | 0.82 | 1.22 | 1.66 | 1.42 | 1.13 |
| Social | 10.4 | 12.3 | 10.5 | 12.6 | 18.4 | 14.5 | 11.6 | 13.6 |
| | 1.30 | 1.54 | 1.54 | 1.15 | 0.32 | 0.78 | 1.59 | 1.69 |
| Urban–rural | 9.7 | 5.1 | 5.8 | 17.0 | 7.3 | 11.0 | 7.0 | 8.4 |
| | 1.22 | 1.14 | 1.05 | 0.71 | 1.46 | 0.91 | 0.93 | 1.05 |
| Environment | 9.5 | 10.9 | 11.1 | 6.5 | 12.3 | 11.1 | 13.1 | 14.8 |
| | 1.19 | 1.10 | 0.81 | 1.28 | 1.29 | 1.59 | 0.69 | 0.77 |
| Sympathy | . | 17.3 | 12.4 | 11.6 | 12.9 | 13.3 | 9.3 | 10.9 |
| | | 1.90 | 2.15 | 1.34 | 1.06 | 1.77 | 2.26 | 2.08 |

Notes
**Latvia's First Party**                                          **LPP**
For Human Rights in a United Latvia                               PCTVL
**Alliance Fatherland and Freedom-LNNK**                         **TB/LNNK**
**People's Harmony Party**                                       **TSP**
New Era                                                           JL
People's Party                                                    TP
Green and Farmers Union                                           ZZS

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Lithuania**

| Policy dimension | Importance | LSDP | VNDPS | NS/SL | LDP | LKDS | LKD | LiCS | TS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2000* | . | 31.1 | 7.5 | 19.6 | 17.3 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 8.6 |
| Left–right | . | 6.7 | 7.2 | 9.1 | 11.9 | 13.0 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 15.7 |
|  |  | 0.57 | 0.66 | 0.46 | 0.73 | . | 0.80 | 0.49 | 0.52 |
| EU joining | 15.0 | 16.6 | 11.1 | 16.5 | 13.9 | 14.0 | 15.6 | 18.5 | 18.7 |
|  | 0.85 | 0.49 | 0.95 | 0.58 | 0.95 | . | 0.78 | 0.40 | 0.37 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.8 | 6.5 | 8.1 | 8.8 | 11.8 | 13.0 | 9.1 | 16.6 | 12.6 |
|  | 0.84 | 0.66 | 0.55 | 0.56 | 0.51 | . | 0.72 | 0.54 | 0.65 |
| Neighbor Relations | 12.6 | 11.9 | 9.8 | 12.2 | 9.9 | 16.0 | 16.7 | 16.7 | 18.6 |
|  | 0.92 | 0.73 | 0.74 | 0.60 | 0.85 | . | 0.47 | 0.51 | 0.35 |
| Civil Liberties | 12.3 | 10.2 | 13.2 | 9.4 | 14.3 | 11.0 | 14.9 | 5.6 | 12.3 |
|  | 0.71 | 0.79 | 0.59 | 0.86 | 1.08 | . | 0.46 | 0.78 | 0.81 |
| Privatization | 12.3 | 8.6 | 8.8 | 11.7 | 13.3 | 14.0 | 10.2 | 17.9 | 15.4 |
|  | 0.74 | 0.67 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 0.59 | . | 0.86 | 0.33 | 0.57 |
| Foreign land ownership | 11.4 | 9.5 | 16.7 | 8.6 | 9.8 | 9.0 | 13.3 | 3.7 | 6.8 |
|  | 0.62 | 0.67 | 0.43 | 0.76 | 1.12 | . | 0.86 | 0.32 | 0.81 |
| Urban–rural | 11.1 | 11.3 | 16.4 | 8.9 | 12.0 | 15.0 | 13.2 | 4.9 | 9.4 |
|  | 0.91 | 0.69 | 0.89 | 0.61 | 0.85 | . | 0.65 | 0.81 | 0.69 |
| Decentralization | 11.1 | 10.6 | 10.5 | 9.7 | 8.9 | 4.0 | 10.6 | 6.8 | 9.2 |
|  | 0.68 | 0.98 | 1.00 | 0.82 | 1.22 | . | 0.96 | 1.04 | 0.94 |
| Media freedom | 10.9 | 9.5 | 9.8 | 8.1 | 11.1 | 8.0 | 15.8 | 3.6 | 13.2 |
|  | 0.67 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 1.12 | . | 0.92 | 0.45 | 1.00 |
| Nationalism | 10.1 | 9.4 | 13.1 | 8.4 | 13.6 | 11.0 | 15.9 | 5.6 | 14.8 |
|  | 0.87 | 0.59 | 0.95 | 0.54 | 1.04 | . | 0.76 | 0.72 | 0.60 |
| Social | 9.6 | 10.1 | 12.1 | 9.2 | 11.7 | 19.0 | 18.4 | 6.4 | 15.8 |
|  | 0.94 | 0.70 | 0.80 | 0.57 | 0.63 | . | 0.85 | 0.82 | 0.74 |
| Religion | 9.1 | 15.5 | 12.3 | 15.1 | 11.1 | 8.0 | 3.5 | 15.4 | 6.7 |
|  | 1.18 | 0.70 | 0.82 | 0.61 | 0.89 | . | 0.66 | 0.88 | 0.74 |
| Environment | 8.8 | 11.8 | 10.2 | 11.5 | 11.5 | 7.0 | 10.4 | 13.2 | 10.8 |
|  | 0.40 | 0.71 | 0.79 | 0.66 | 0.86 | . | 0.78 | 0.77 | 1.02 |
| Sympathy | . | 10.9 | 14.5 | 10.4 | 14.7 | 15.0 | 14.8 | 6.0 | 10.7 |
|  | . | 0.82 | 0.87 | 0.90 | 0.97 | . | 0.68 | 0.91 | 1.41 |

Notes

**Lithuanian Social Democratic Party**      **LSDP**
**Union of Liberals and Center**            **LiCS**
**Union of Peasant and New Democracy**      **VNDPS**
**Parties**
Liberal Democratic Party                    LDP
Lithuanian Christian Democrats              LKD
Union of Lithuanian Christian Democrats     LKDS
New Union – Social Liberals                 NS/SL
Homeland Union (Conservatives,              TS
Christian Democrats, Freedom Fighters)

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Luxembourg

| Policy dimension | Importance | DL | G | LSAP | CSV | DP | ADR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2004* | . | *1.9* | *11.6* | *23.4* | *36.1* | *16.1* | *9.9* |
| Left–right | . | 2.0 | 5.8 | 7.3 | 13.3 | 13.5 | 17.8 |
|  |  | 0.58 | 0.48 | 0.85 | 0.75 | 1.26 | 0.48 |
| Immigration | 15.0 | 1.3 | 1.8 | 5.5 | 14.5 | 13.0 | 17.5 |
|  | 0.57 | 0.33 | 0.48 | 1.66 | 2.96 | 2.08 | 1.04 |
| EU: authority | 14.5 | 18.3 | 5.8 | 7.5 | 6.8 | 9.3 | 17.5 |
|  | 0.25 | 1.20 | 1.80 | 1.76 | 1.97 | 2.14 | 0.87 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.3 | 2.7 | 4.0 | 8.5 | 13.8 | 15.0 | 13.0 |
|  | 0.28 | 0.67 | 1.08 | 1.55 | 1.93 | 2.38 | 3.06 |
| Social | 13.6 | 3.0 | 2.5 | 3.5 | 15.3 | 6.3 | 15.3 |
|  | 0.65 | 1.00 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 2.21 | 0.95 | 1.89 |
| EU: accountability | 13.5 | 17.7 | 9.8 | 9.8 | 10.5 | 11.5 | 17.0 |
|  | 0.57 | 1.20 | 1.38 | 1.11 | 1.50 | 1.04 | 1.08 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 12.9 | 19.7 | 10.5 | 5.0 | 3.8 | 4.0 | 11.5 |
|  | 1.04 | 0.33 | 1.89 | 0.82 | 1.11 | 1.00 | 0.96 |
| Deregulation | 12.7 | 1.0 | 4.8 | 6.3 | 9.8 | 16.0 | 10.3 |
|  | 0.71 | 0.00 | 1.44 | 1.38 | 2.39 | 1.47 | 2.17 |
| Environment | 12.6 | 7.0 | 2.0 | 10.3 | 10.5 | 15.8 | 13.5 |
|  | 1.32 | 1.00 | 0.71 | 1.45 | 1.32 | 1.93 | 2.66 |
| Decentralization | 11.4 | 12.7 | 5.0 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 9.3 | 9.3 |
|  | 0.43 | 4.91 | 1.29 | 1.93 | 1.11 | 2.17 | 3.20 |
| Sympathy | . | 13.5 | 6.3 | 7.0 | 9.0 | 13.3 | 16.7 |
|  | . | 2.50 | 3.33 | 1.53 | 2.08 | 2.91 | 1.76 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

Notes
**Christian Social People's Party**              CSV
**Democratic Party**                             **DP**
Action Committee for Democracy and               ADR
Pensions Justice                                 DL
The Left                                         G
The Greens                                       LSAP
Luxembourg Socialist Workers' Party

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Macedonia

| Policy dimension | Importance | SPM | SDSM | DS | DUI | LDP | DA | PDP | LP | DPA | VMRO-DPMNE |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 | . | 2.1 | 31.6 | 1.2 | 11.9 | 8.9 | 1.4 | 2.3 | 3.6 | 5.2 | 20.8 |
| Left–right | . | 3.8 | 6.5 | 7.1 | 9.5 | 9.5 | 9.6 | 10.5 | 11.9 | 14.6 | 15.2 |
|  | . | 0.96 | 0.71 | 1.26 | 1.37 | 0.69 | 1.04 | 0.93 | 0.80 | 1.48 | 0.85 |
| EU joining | 17.2 | 11.4 | 18.5 | 14.6 | 18.3 | 18.3 | 16.4 | 17.5 | 18.5 | 17.1 | 17.4 |
|  | 0.43 | 1.81 | 0.79 | 2.36 | 0.80 | 0.74 | 1.87 | 1.03 | 0.51 | 1.20 | 1.11 |
| Privatization | 15.2 | 9.7 | 13.7 | 12.4 | 14.8 | 14.8 | 15.6 | 13.9 | 16.5 | 14.9 | 16.1 |
|  | 0.50 | 1.71 | 1.76 | 1.25 | 1.61 | 1.35 | 1.09 | 1.50 | 1.56 | 1.67 | 1.42 |
| Decentralization | 13.8 | 12.2 | 6.9 | 10.8 | 2.6 | 7.5 | 8.6 | 2.8 | 10.4 | 2.9 | 12.1 |
|  | 0.97 | 1.44 | 0.88 | 1.76 | 0.69 | 1.11 | 1.39 | 0.69 | 1.42 | 0.67 | 1.68 |
| Nationalism | 12.0 | 9.2 | 6.5 | 12.0 | 11.1 | 5.6 | 7.6 | 14.1 | 7.6 | 15.9 | 17.5 |
|  | 1.64 | 1.78 | 1.43 | 1.65 | 1.69 | 1.33 | 1.76 | 1.42 | 1.45 | 1.31 | 0.67 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.3 | 9.2 | 7.0 | 12.2 | 8.8 | 8.5 | 12.3 | 11.4 | 12.5 | 14.2 | 11.8 |
|  | 0.84 | 2.03 | 1.42 | 1.85 | 1.63 | 1.45 | 1.17 | 1.11 | 1.33 | 1.09 | 1.44 |
| Foreign land ownership | 11.3 | 16.3 | 10.6 | 12.9 | 5.9 | 9.2 | 9.1 | 7.1 | 9.0 | 6.2 | 9.4 |
|  | 0.27 | 1.22 | 1.77 | 1.41 | 1.08 | 1.54 | 1.55 | 1.49 | 1.49 | 1.48 | 1.52 |
| Media freedom | 11.3 | 13.6 | 11.4 | 9.1 | 10.7 | 7.4 | 8.2 | 10.4 | 9.5 | 13.5 | 13.8 |
|  | 0.46 | 1.56 | 1.42 | 1.38 | 1.29 | 1.29 | 1.95 | 1.34 | 1.36 | 1.40 | 1.15 |
| Religion | 10.2 | 17.9 | 18.0 | 14.0 | 9.7 | 16.6 | 15.3 | 7.1 | 14.2 | 4.8 | 4.2 |
|  | 1.47 | 0.66 | 0.62 | 1.63 | 1.24 | 0.82 | 1.01 | 1.09 | 1.66 | 0.85 | 1.05 |
| Urban–rural | 9.2 | 9.0 | 7.1 | 7.6 | 13.5 | 4.2 | 6.0 | 12.6 | 5.6 | 14.8 | 14.1 |
|  | 0.52 | 1.43 | 1.21 | 1.56 | 1.42 | 0.66 | 1.22 | 1.50 | 1.20 | 1.31 | 0.80 |
| Former communists | 8.3 | 2.8 | 3.8 | 6.5 | 9.1 | 6.3 | 4.5 | 5.6 | 8.6 | 11.6 | 14.8 |
|  | 0.62 | 1.15 | 1.05 | 1.95 | 2.31 | 1.25 | 1.48 | 1.44 | 1.72 | 2.66 | 2.22 |
| Environment | 8.1 | 14.8 | 13.6 | 14.1 | 14.5 | 13.5 | 13.4 | 15.3 | 14.3 | 15.3 | 13.5 |
|  | 0.50 | 1.68 | 0.93 | 2.13 | 1.58 | 1.51 | 1.19 | 1.75 | 1.31 | 1.64 | 1.47 |
| Social | 7.2 | 15.3 | 8.7 | 12.2 | 15.7 | 9.3 | 9.2 | 15.5 | 8.5 | 18.7 | 17.3 |
|  | 0.39 | 1.43 | 2.30 | 1.59 | 0.99 | 2.04 | 2.43 | 1.06 | 2.31 | 0.42 | 0.61 |
| Sympathy | . | 14.1 | 7.3 | 13.0 | 15.8 | 7.4 | 11.9 | 15.4 | 10.4 | 18.9 | 12.5 |
|  | . | 1.84 | 1.47 | 1.81 | 1.47 | 1.44 | 1.78 | 1.33 | 1.51 | 0.60 | 1.70 |

Privatization

Social liberalism

VMRO-DPMNE

DPA

DUI

PDP

SPM

DS

LDP

DA

LP

SDSM

Notes
**Social Democratic Union of Macedonia**          SDSM
**Democratic Union for Integrations**             DUI
**Liberal Democratic Party**                      LDP
Democratic Alternative                            DA
Democratic Party of the Albanians                 DPA
Democratic Union                                  DS
Liberal Party                                     LP
Party for Democratic Prosperity                   PDP
Socialist Party of Macedonia                      SPM
Democratic Party for Macedonian
National Unity                                    VMRO-
                                                  DPMNE

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Malta

| Policy dimension | Importance | AD | MLP | NP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | 0.7 | 47.5 | 51.8 |
| Left–right | . | 8.2 | 9.0 | 11.9 |
| EU joining | 14.4 | 18.6 | 5.6 | 18.9 |
| | 4.14 | 0.93 | 1.11 | 0.70 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.3 | 7.2 | 10.7 | 9.9 |
| | 0.76 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 0.88 |
| Deregulation | 12.2 | 12.0 | 12.0 | 13.4 |
| | 1.00 | 2.35 | 0.62 | 1.60 |
| Environment | 11.5 | 5.4 | 14.0 | 13.1 |
| | 0.43 | 2.20 | 1.90 | 2.24 |
| Social | 11.4 | 9.8 | 13.0 | 14.1 |
| | 0.54 | 2.85 | 1.09 | 2.27 |
| NATO/peacekeeping | 10.8 | 13.0 | 15.9 | 7.3 |
| | 0.45 | 1.34 | 2.20 | 1.39 |
| Decentralization | 10.8 | 8.2 | 11.3 | 8.1 |
| | 1.69 | 1.98 | 1.54 | 0.99 |
| Immigration | 8.1 | 7.5 | 13.3 | 14.0 |
| | 0.52 | 1.19 | 1.87 | 2.16 |
| Sympathy | . | 9.5 | 11.0 | 10.3 |
| | . | 2.02 | 1.93 | 2.09 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

NP

MLP

AD

Notes
**Nationalist Party**                           NP
Democratic Alternative                          AD
Malta Labour Party                              MLP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Moldova

| Policy dimension | Importance | PCRM | PDAM | PSD-P | UCM | PDM | ASLMN | PPCD | PSDM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | | 64.4 | *1.9* | *0.0* | 0.0 | 5.9 | 8.3 | 9.7 | 5.6 |
| Left–right | . | **5.4** | 9.4 | 9.4 | 10.7 | 11.3 | 11.6 | 14.4 | **15.5** |
|  |  | 1.64 | 1.53 | 0.95 | 1.00 | 1.41 | 1.32 | 1.32 | 0.64 |
| Decentralization | 14.4 | 13.8 | 11.9 | 8.1 | 6.6 | 7.3 | 6.8 | 6.6 | 6.1 |
|  | 0.43 | 1.66 | 1.53 | 1.13 | 1.28 | 1.31 | 1.24 | 1.61 | 1.58 |
| Urban–rural | 13.2 | 13.7 | 16.2 | 8.3 | 7.2 | 11.3 | 8.4 | 9.3 | 9.8 |
|  | 0.18 | 1.40 | 0.85 | 0.87 | 0.96 | 1.18 | 1.26 | 0.89 | 1.22 |
| Nationalism | 13.2 | 11.0 | 13.0 | 9.3 | 11.3 | 12.1 | 11.3 | 13.4 | 11.5 |
|  | 0.32 | 1.65 | 1.56 | 1.78 | 1.28 | 1.06 | 1.79 | 1.94 | 1.73 |
| Media freedom | 12.7 | 13.5 | 10.5 | 8.4 | 6.9 | 7.1 | 6.3 | 6.5 | 5.9 |
|  | 0.43 | 1.08 | 0.91 | 1.56 | 0.80 | 1.83 | 1.02 | 1.66 | 1.28 |
| EU joining | 12.3 | 10.2 | 9.1 | 15.2 | 12.6 | 14.0 | 12.9 | 16.1 | 17.3 |
|  | 0.99 | 1.35 | 1.66 | 1.04 | 1.52 | 1.60 | 1.64 | 1.35 | 1.02 |
| Foreign land ownership | 12.2 | 13.0 | 14.0 | 7.9 | 7.4 | 8.9 | 7.0 | 10.2 | 8.7 |
|  | 0.21 | 1.33 | 1.01 | 0.59 | 1.28 | 1.98 | 1.52 | 1.44 | 1.29 |
| Privatization | 12.1 | 6.6 | 10.1 | 11.6 | 12.1 | 11.5 | 13.7 | 11.7 | 16.6 |
|  | 0.32 | 1.32 | 1.68 | 1.01 | 1.12 | 1.18 | 1.02 | 1.35 | 1.00 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.6 | 4.2 | 10.8 | 12.7 | 9.9 | 11.3 | 9.7 | 8.5 | 14.3 |
|  | 0.57 | 0.84 | 1.35 | 1.58 | 0.71 | 1.42 | 1.61 | 1.05 | 1.28 |
| Former communists | 11.3 | 5.5 | 7.5 | 10.1 | 8.5 | 7.4 | 10.6 | 14.5 | 13.4 |
|  | 0.16 | 1.38 | 1.26 | 1.47 | 1.07 | 0.96 | 1.31 | 1.26 | 1.51 |
| Environment | 8.4 | 10.2 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 9.8 | 11.2 | 10.4 | 12.3 | 9.9 |
|  | 0.51 | 1.17 | 1.15 | 1.38 | 0.65 | 1.28 | 1.31 | 1.07 | 0.51 |
| Religion | 8.1 | 14.4 | 12.1 | 10.9 | 11.4 | 11.1 | 10.7 | 6.1 | 8.6 |
|  | 1.00 | 1.13 | 0.86 | 1.44 | 1.76 | 0.83 | 1.21 | 1.00 | 1.59 |
| Social | 4.8 | 14.0 | 11.9 | 10.0 | 11.1 | 10.0 | 11.1 | 10.4 | 6.9 |
|  | 0.91 | 0.84 | 1.13 | 1.12 | 1.09 | 1.52 | 1.34 | 1.56 | 1.18 |
| Sympathy | . | 14.5 | 14.5 | 9.8 | 12.5 | 11.6 | 9.1 | 12.6 | 8.6 |
|  | . | 1.76 | 1.31 | 1.23 | 1.02 | 1.11 | 1.22 | 2.28 | 2.21 |

Social liberalism (y-axis, values 1–20)

Privatization (x-axis, values 1–20)

Parties plotted: PCRM, PDAM, UCM, ASLMN, PPCD, PSDM, PDM, PSD-P

## Netherlands

| Policy dimension | Importance | SP | GL | PvdA | D66 | CU | CDA | VVD | SGP | LPF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | *6.3* | *5.1* | *27.3* | *4.1* | *2.1* | *28.6* | *17.9* | *1.6* | *5.7* |
| Left–right | . | 3.1 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 10.4 | 12.2 | 13.6 | 16.3 | 16.5 | 17.6 |
| | . | 0.28 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.41 | 0.70 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 0.44 |
| Immigration | 14.0 | 8.9 | 3.3 | 7.6 | 7.3 | 9.6 | 11.4 | 15.6 | 13.5 | 18.3 |
| | 0.72 | 1.16 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 0.56 | 0.79 | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.78 | 0.32 |
| Deregulation | 13.9 | 2.4 | 4.8 | 8.2 | 12.3 | 9.6 | 12.4 | 17.5 | 13.0 | 16.4 |
| | 0.82 | 0.28 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 0.34 | 0.74 | 0.66 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.5 | 3.6 | 5.1 | 8.1 | 10.0 | 9.7 | 13.3 | 16.8 | 13.1 | 16.3 |
| | 0.60 | 0.51 | 0.34 | 0.49 | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0.47 | 0.49 | 0.68 | 0.48 |
| Social | 11.8 | 7.3 | 2.6 | 5.2 | 2.6 | 17.4 | 13.2 | 4.8 | 19.6 | 8.8 |
| | 0.93 | 0.83 | 0.37 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.65 | 0.49 | 0.53 | 0.19 | 0.88 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 11.7 | 14.9 | 11.1 | 8.4 | 7.4 | 10.2 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 10.3 | 11.3 |
| | 0.39 | 1.25 | 1.23 | 0.62 | 0.63 | 1.27 | 1.04 | 1.28 | 1.78 | 1.68 |
| Environment | 10.5 | 8.5 | 3.3 | 9.3 | 7.5 | 7.8 | 12.7 | 16.8 | 12.1 | 16.5 |
| | 0.75 | 0.79 | 0.30 | 0.46 | 0.56 | 0.88 | 0.52 | 0.42 | 0.91 | 0.73 |
| EU: authority | 10.4 | 15.5 | 9.5 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 12.8 | 9.7 | 12.6 | 14.5 | 15.8 |
| | 0.22 | 0.66 | 0.96 | 0.49 | 0.64 | 1.01 | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.84 | 0.66 |
| EU: accountability | 10.4 | 10.2 | 6.0 | 7.3 | 4.6 | 12.9 | 11.4 | 13.9 | 14.7 | 14.1 |
| | 0.45 | 1.68 | 1.20 | 0.70 | 0.73 | 1.10 | 1.20 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 1.39 |
| Decentralization | 9.2 | 12.5 | 10.4 | 11.1 | 7.2 | 8.9 | 7.9 | 9.4 | 8.2 | 8.6 |
| | 0.48 | 0.68 | 0.97 | 0.52 | 0.96 | 0.96 | 0.66 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 1.22 |
| Sympathy | . | 9.5 | 5.2 | 8.1 | 8.3 | 15.2 | 14.4 | 13.8 | 18.4 | 18.0 |
| | . | 0.93 | 0.58 | 1.01 | 0.92 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.83 | 0.57 | 0.70 |

Notes

**Christen Democratisch Appel** — CDA
**Democraten 66** — D66
**Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie** — VVD
ChristenUnie — CU
Groen Links — GL
Lijst Pim Fortuyn — LPF
Partij van de Arbeid — PvdA
Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij — SGP
Socialistische Partij — SP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## New Zealand

| Policy dimension | Importance | Allc | GPA | PC | NZLP | NZFP | UF | NP | ACT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2002* |  | *1.3* | *7.0* | *1.7* | *41.3* | *10.4* | *6.8* | *20.9* | *7.1* |
| Left–right | . | 3.2 | 4.4 | 6.7 | 9.2 | 12.5 | 12.6 | 14.6 | 18.1 |
|  | . | 0.39 | 0.46 | 0.49 | 0.26 | 0.41 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 0.33 |
| US affairs | 14.9 | 17.2 | 17.4 | 13.9 | 12.0 | 9.9 | 8.3 | 6.2 | 4.9 |
|  | 0.97 | 1.26 | 1.17 | 1.11 | 0.83 | 0.52 | 0.43 | 0.77 | 1.12 |
| Health care | 14.7 | 1.9 | 3.5 | 5.1 | 7.0 | 8.3 | 11.5 | 13.0 | 17.6 |
|  | 0.55 | 0.19 | 0.55 | 0.67 | 0.65 | 0.75 | 0.64 | 0.53 | 0.47 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.8 | 3.1 | 5.3 | 6.0 | 8.6 | 11.3 | 13.0 | 14.7 | 18.1 |
|  | 0.84 | 0.37 | 0.53 | 0.41 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 0.20 | 0.32 |
| Deregulation | 13.8 | 4.0 | 5.4 | 5.9 | 9.6 | 10.8 | 13.1 | 15.3 | 18.9 |
|  | 0.82 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 0.53 | 0.45 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.34 | 0.21 |
| Immigration | 13.2 | 5.1 | 4.4 | 5.9 | 6.5 | 17.0 | 7.8 | 9.6 | 9.5 |
|  | 0.85 | 0.65 | 0.41 | 0.40 | 0.51 | 0.57 | 0.90 | 0.75 | 0.94 |
| Environment | 12.8 | 7.6 | 1.7 | 9.9 | 9.8 | 13.5 | 13.2 | 14.7 | 17.8 |
|  | 1.04 | 1.08 | 0.13 | 1.10 | 0.69 | 0.63 | 0.74 | 0.44 | 0.41 |
| Decentralization | 10.8 | 11.1 | 6.6 | 12.0 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 9.7 | 9.3 | 5.6 |
|  | 0.64 | 1.09 | 0.94 | 0.75 | 0.66 | 0.75 | 0.62 | 0.93 | 0.71 |
| Sympathy | . | 7.7 | 7.1 | 7.0 | 6.1 | 15.8 | 13.1 | 14.5 | 18.0 |
|  | . | 1.24 | 1.03 | 0.90 | 0.71 | 0.87 | 0.80 | 0.80 | 0.81 |

Plot axes:
Immigration (vertical, 1–20)
Taxes vs spending (horizontal, 1–20)

Labels within plot: NZFP, ACT, NP, UF, NZLP, PC, GPA, Allc

**Northern Ireland**

| Policy dimension | Importance | SF | NIWC | PUP | SDLP | APNI | DUP | UUP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | . | 23.5 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 17.0 | 3.7 | 25.7 | 22.7 |
| Left–right | . | 6.3 | 6.8 | 8.1 | 8.5 | 9.9 | 12.7 | 13.8 |
|  |  | 0.83 | 0.90 | 0.80 | 0.55 | 0.82 | 1.24 | 0.60 |
| **Northern Ireland** | 18.0 | 19.5 | 9.7 | 2.6 | 17.3 | 6.9 | 1.0 | 1.8 |
|  | 0.81 | 0.37 | 0.73 | 0.62 | 0.66 | 0.86 | 0.00 | 0.44 |
| EU: authority | 13.6 | 13.2 | 5.9 | 11.8 | 4.5 | 6.0 | 17.4 | 13.8 |
|  | 0.55 | 1.27 | 1.01 | 0.75 | 0.53 | 0.71 | 0.54 | 0.74 |
| **Social** | 12.4 | 9.1 | 5.7 | 7.8 | 12.7 | 5.9 | 18.8 | 13.5 |
|  | 1.22 | 1.13 | 0.88 | 1.26 | 1.21 | 0.78 | 0.35 | 0.56 |
| EU: accountability | 12.2 | 14.0 | 4.2 | 11.0 | 5.9 | 6.3 | 16.1 | 15.0 |
|  | 0.41 | 1.47 | 0.70 | 1.77 | 1.10 | 1.55 | 0.98 | 0.84 |
| **Decentralization** | 10.5 | 7.1 | 4.4 | 6.8 | 7.1 | 5.3 | 10.8 | 12.3 |
|  | 0.43 | 1.76 | 0.95 | 1.58 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 1.32 | 0.80 |
| Deregulation | 10.2 | 5.6 | 8.0 | 6.4 | 8.2 | 12.2 | 8.5 | 13.7 |
|  | 0.43 | 0.77 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.62 | 0.81 | 0.69 | 0.54 |
| **Taxes vs spending** | 10.0 | 4.8 | 6.4 | 4.6 | 6.5 | 10.1 | 7.5 | 12.2 |
|  | 0.30 | 0.60 | 1.06 | 0.63 | 0.71 | 1.10 | 0.77 | 0.42 |
| **Immigration** | 9.1 | 6.6 | 4.4 | 11.0 | 7.4 | 5.6 | 15.4 | 12.3 |
|  | 0.15 | 0.84 | 0.92 | 1.20 | 0.80 | 1.08 | 0.80 | 0.86 |
| **Environment** | 7.0 | 9.3 | 7.3 | 12.0 | 8.4 | 8.4 | 13.8 | 13.4 |
|  | 0.54 | 1.03 | 0.90 | 0.79 | 0.73 | 0.87 | 0.36 | 0.58 |
| **Sympathy** | . | 11.1 | 6.9 | 12.6 | 8.5 | 9.7 | 16.5 | 13.4 |
|  | . | 1.77 | 1.18 | 1.19 | 1.00 | 1.22 | 1.17 | 1.38 |

Taxes vs spending

Northern Ireland

Notes
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland          APNI
Democratic Unionist Party                   DUP
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition          NIWC
Progressive Unionist Party                  PUP
Social Democratic and Labour Party          SDLP
Sinn Féin                                   SF
Ulster Unionist Party                       UUP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Norway

| Policy dimension | Importance | RV | SV | Sp | DNA | KrF | V | FrP | H |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2001 | | 1.2 | 12.4 | 5.6 | 24.3 | 12.5 | 3.9 | 14.7 | 21.2 |
| Left–right | . | 1.9 | 4.5 | 7.4 | 7.9 | 11.0 | 12.5 | 15.8 | 16.6 |
| | . | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.57 | 0.47 |
| Deregulation | 14.2 | 2.0 | 4.1 | 6.2 | 7.9 | 10.8 | 13.5 | 16.3 | 17.5 |
| | 1.09 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.31 | 0.45 | 0.52 | 0.34 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.1 | 2.1 | 3.6 | 6.3 | 6.6 | 9.7 | 12.2 | 15.3 | 16.8 |
| | 1.11 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.75 | 0.39 |
| EU joining | 13.8 | 1.9 | 5.0 | 1.7 | 16.1 | 7.8 | 9.7 | 11.0 | 18.6 |
| | 1.57 | 0.20 | 0.36 | 0.24 | 0.35 | 0.40 | 0.60 | 0.29 | 0.29 |
| NATO/Peacekeeping | 13.0 | 17.7 | 15.3 | 12.1 | 4.2 | 8.1 | 8.5 | 6.1 | 3.7 |
| | 0.83 | 0.59 | 0.69 | 1.05 | 0.32 | 0.68 | 0.68 | 1.08 | 0.71 |
| Environment | 13.0 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 7.9 | 12.8 | 8.2 | 5.5 | 17.7 | 14.0 |
| | 0.71 | 0.66 | 0.30 | 0.57 | 0.71 | 0.41 | 0.41 | 0.35 | 0.62 |
| Immigration | 12.7 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 9.3 | 9.3 | 7.8 | 6.8 | 19.1 | 11.5 |
| | 1.25 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 0.54 | 0.66 | 0.18 | 0.83 |
| Social | 11.6 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 12.0 | 6.2 | 18.5 | 7.2 | 11.5 | 7.8 |
| | 1.25 | 0.44 | 0.49 | 0.68 | 0.59 | 0.28 | 0.55 | 0.58 | 0.51 |
| Decentralization | 11.4 | 7.7 | 8.1 | 3.6 | 13.0 | 7.3 | 7.2 | 12.8 | 12.2 |
| | 0.66 | 0.96 | 0.84 | 0.70 | 0.50 | 0.35 | 0.54 | 1.01 | 0.89 |
| Sympathy | . | 15.7 | 6.7 | 10.4 | 7.3 | 14.6 | 9.4 | 18.0 | 12.8 |
| | . | 1.15 | 0.78 | 1.37 | 0.84 | 0.83 | 0.96 | 0.70 | 1.22 |

Social liberalism

KrF

Sp

V

FrP

H

DNA

SV

RV

Taxes vs spending

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

# Poland

| Policy dimension | Importance | UP | S | SLD | PSL | UW | AWS | PO | PiS | LPR | UPR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2001* | . | 3.0 | 10.2 | 38.0 | 9.0 | 3.1 | 5.6 | 12.7 | 9.5 | 7.9 | 0.0 |
| Left–right | . | 3.0 | 5.5 | 6.0 | 8.7 | 11.3 | 13.4 | 13.4 | 15.4 | 16.4 | 19.5 |
|  |  | 0.28 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.56 | 0.47 | 1.18 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.62 | 0.50 |
| EU joining | 16.6 | 17.3 | 3.6 | 18.3 | 9.8 | 19.2 | 13.9 | 18.4 | 12.5 | 1.5 | 5.5 |
|  | 0.69 | 0.38 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.62 | 0.20 | 1.17 | 0.42 | 0.65 | 0.16 | 3.50 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.3 | 3.9 | 5.2 | 6.0 | 6.1 | 14.4 | 10.2 | 16.5 | 11.5 | 8.2 | 19.0 |
|  | 0.69 | 0.41 | 0.71 | 0.54 | 0.60 | 0.67 | 0.88 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.73 | 0.00 |
| Decentralization | 12.9 | 11.2 | 13.6 | 11.9 | 13.2 | 4.3 | 7.8 | 4.2 | 10.4 | 12.9 | 7.0 |
|  | 0.68 | 0.92 | 0.70 | 0.89 | 0.77 | 0.55 | 1.14 | 0.53 | 0.72 | 0.72 | 4.00 |
| Privatization | 12.6 | 4.9 | 4.4 | 8.3 | 7.4 | 16.8 | 11.8 | 17.5 | 13.6 | 8.5 | 20.0 |
|  | 0.71 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.50 | 0.63 | 0.68 | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.66 | 0.00 |
| Media freedom | 12.5 | 9.3 | 13.0 | 11.7 | 13.4 | 4.1 | 12.4 | 4.8 | 11.1 | 15.6 | 12.0 |
|  | 0.59 | 0.95 | 0.76 | 0.84 | 0.62 | 0.48 | 1.28 | 0.50 | 0.86 | 0.69 | 6.00 |
| Foreign land ownership | 12.4 | 8.3 | 18.5 | 8.0 | 17.5 | 5.8 | 12.8 | 5.6 | 13.5 | 19.3 | 9.0 |
|  | 1.27 | 0.66 | 0.35 | 0.72 | 0.45 | 0.74 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.55 | 0.31 | 6.00 |
| Religion | 12.2 | 18.8 | 9.9 | 17.1 | 7.0 | 14.6 | 4.2 | 13.5 | 5.7 | 1.7 | 5.5 |
|  | 0.94 | 0.32 | 0.73 | 0.44 | 0.58 | 0.77 | 0.42 | 0.74 | 0.63 | 0.17 | 0.50 |
| Social | 12.2 | 3.6 | 13.1 | 5.2 | 14.1 | 6.3 | 17.7 | 8.7 | 15.1 | 19.1 | 16.5 |
|  | 0.81 | 0.45 | 0.57 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.68 | 0.55 | 0.31 | 3.50 |
| Nationalism | 11.8 | 5.9 | 16.1 | 7.0 | 16.1 | 5.3 | 15.7 | 6.9 | 14.7 | 19.0 | 11.0 |
|  | 1.10 | 0.61 | 0.55 | 0.65 | 0.44 | 0.64 | 0.40 | 0.63 | 0.75 | 0.40 | 5.00 |
| Urban–rural | 11.7 | 5.8 | 17.1 | 6.9 | 18.9 | 3.7 | 8.7 | 3.7 | 7.4 | 12.2 | 7.0 |
|  | 1.03 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 0.69 | 0.37 | 0.50 | 0.47 | 2.00 |
| Former communists | 11.6 | 2.7 | 6.6 | 1.4 | 5.6 | 7.8 | 17.2 | 9.9 | 17.3 | 17.6 | 14.5 |
|  | 1.13 | 0.31 | 0.73 | 0.10 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 0.52 | 0.67 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.50 |
| Environment | 8.2 | 11.2 | 12.8 | 12.6 | 11.7 | 10.4 | 11.8 | 11.8 | 10.9 | 11.9 | 15.5 |
|  | 0.38 | 0.80 | 0.67 | 0.69 | 0.71 | 0.74 | 0.76 | 0.76 | 0.59 | 0.74 | 0.50 |
| Sympathy | . | 11.9 | 17.3 | 11.4 | 15.3 | 8.2 | 11.8 | 9.2 | 11.7 | 17.0 | 9.5 |
|  | . | 1.04 | 0.74 | 0.96 | 0.68 | 0.96 | 1.55 | 0.78 | 0.84 | 0.76 | 6.50 |

Notes
**Alliance of Democratic Left**    **SLD**
**Labour Union**    **UP**
Solidarity Election Action    AWS
League of Polish Families    LPR
Citizens' Platform    PO
Polish Peasant Party    PSL
Law and Justice    PiS
Self Defence of the Polish Republic    S
Union for Real Politics    UPR
Freedom Union    UW

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Portugal**

| Policy dimension | Importance | BE | PCP | PEV | PS | PSD | CDS/PP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 | . | 2.8 | 5.8 | 1.2 | 37.9 | 40.1 | 8.8 |
| Left–right | . | 3.0 | 3.7 | 4.2 | 8.7 | 13.9 | 16.9 |
| | | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.38 |
| EU: accountability | 14.2 | 12.2 | 13.2 | 12.0 | 7.7 | 10.8 | 16.1 |
| | 0.32 | 1.56 | 1.18 | 1.43 | 0.56 | 0.89 | 0.79 |
| EU: authority | 14.0 | 13.1 | 14.6 | 11.7 | 6.7 | 9.4 | 15.4 |
| | 0.30 | 1.00 | 0.93 | 1.23 | 0.59 | 0.75 | 0.67 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 13.7 | 13.1 | 14.2 | 14.6 | 6.6 | 7.0 | 10.2 |
| | 0.20 | 1.24 | 1.11 | 1.20 | 0.80 | 0.52 | 1.07 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.5 | 5.1 | 4.1 | 5.1 | 8.6 | 14.5 | 16.5 |
| | 0.52 | 0.97 | 0.61 | 1.12 | 0.49 | 0.83 | 0.72 |
| Decentralization | 13.1 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 10.8 | 14.1 |
| | 0.28 | 1.00 | 0.94 | 0.96 | 0.90 | 1.11 | 1.02 |
| Immigration | 13.0 | 2.6 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 7.7 | 12.2 | 15.3 |
| | 0.61 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.48 | 0.69 | 0.81 |
| Social | 12.3 | 1.8 | 4.1 | 3.5 | 8.1 | 14.9 | 19.1 |
| | 0.80 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.20 |
| Environment | 11.7 | 3.2 | 5.9 | 2.3 | 8.8 | 13.6 | 15.4 |
| | 0.64 | 0.41 | 0.60 | 0.39 | 0.58 | 0.66 | 0.55 |
| Sympathy | . | 12.3 | 14.5 | 12.8 | 9.1 | 10.8 | 14.3 |
| | . | 1.29 | 1.06 | 1.22 | 0.89 | 1.15 | 1.25 |

Social liberalism (y-axis, 1–20)

Taxes vs spending (x-axis, 1–20)

CDS/PP

PSD

PS

PCP

PEV

BE

Notes

**Social Democratic Party** — **PSD**
**People's Party** — **CDS/PP**
Left Block — BE
Portuguese Communist Party — PCP
Ecology Party – Greens — PEV
Socialist Party — PS

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Romania**

| Policy dimension | Importance | PSD | PUR | PD | PRM | PNTCD | UDMR | PNL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2000* | . | 35.2 | 1.4 | 7.0 | 19.5 | 5.0 | 6.8 | 6.9 |
| Left–right | | 6.8 | 9.6 | 11.1 | 11.5 | 12.5 | 12.8 | 14.3 |
| | | 0.51 | 0.81 | 0.66 | 1.77 | 0.70 | 0.66 | 0.46 |
| Decentralization | 16.1 | 13.5 | 11.3 | 5.8 | 16.9 | 7.7 | 1.6 | 4.9 |
| | 0.54 | 0.92 | 1.47 | 0.97 | 0.56 | 0.83 | 0.23 | 0.88 |
| EU joining | 15.9 | 17.4 | 16.4 | 18.5 | 11.0 | 17.8 | 18.6 | 19.0 |
| | 1.10 | 0.64 | 0.77 | 0.34 | 1.30 | 0.51 | 0.71 | 0.31 |
| Nationalism | 14.9 | 12.9 | 12.9 | 7.9 | 19.6 | 11.3 | 2.5 | 7.3 |
| | 1.27 | 0.83 | 0.96 | 0.98 | 0.14 | 1.01 | 0.44 | 0.95 |
| Media freedom | 14.4 | 14.1 | 9.6 | 6.5 | 13.2 | 7.4 | 5.8 | 4.5 |
| | 0.31 | 0.78 | 1.14 | 1.17 | 1.40 | 1.34 | 0.91 | 0.99 |
| Privatization | 14.3 | 7.5 | 12.1 | 12.5 | 4.7 | 14.6 | 14.6 | 15.8 |
| | 0.75 | 0.87 | 0.99 | 0.76 | 0.71 | 0.81 | 0.60 | 0.92 |
| Foreign land ownership | 14.1 | 11.9 | 11.5 | 6.8 | 18.2 | 8.8 | 4.4 | 5.4 |
| | 0.81 | 0.80 | 1.19 | 1.04 | 0.39 | 0.87 | 0.98 | 1.05 |
| Former communists | 12.7 | 3.7 | 6.1 | 10.8 | 2.8 | 17.2 | 13.5 | 14.7 |
| | 0.95 | 0.70 | 0.96 | 1.00 | 0.48 | 0.57 | 0.89 | 0.94 |
| Religion | 12.2 | 14.1 | 12.3 | 15.5 | 8.1 | 5.7 | 12.1 | 15.5 |
| | 0.74 | 0.91 | 1.28 | 0.83 | 1.18 | 1.06 | 1.61 | 1.10 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.9 | 5.0 | 9.7 | 9.0 | 5.6 | 10.4 | 11.3 | 14.1 |
| | 1.22 | 0.65 | 0.77 | 0.87 | 0.57 | 0.67 | 0.66 | 0.53 |
| Social | 11.5 | 12.5 | 13.1 | 8.0 | 18.7 | 14.0 | 7.7 | 6.9 |
| | 1.07 | 0.76 | 1.24 | 1.28 | 0.37 | 1.25 | 1.16 | 1.22 |
| Urban–rural | 10.8 | 11.5 | 6.2 | 5.9 | 10.1 | 11.6 | 10.0 | 5.4 |
| | 0.84 | 0.75 | 0.83 | 0.73 | 0.79 | 0.65 | 0.85 | 0.75 |
| Environment | 7.0 | 12.4 | 11.3 | 10.9 | 10.3 | 11.8 | 9.6 | 13.3 |
| | 0.29 | 1.13 | 1.14 | 1.04 | 1.71 | 1.03 | 0.86 | 1.15 |
| Sympathy | . | 13.5 | 12.9 | 8.6 | 19.4 | 11.8 | 10.9 | 6.8 |
| | . | 0.72 | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.53 | 0.95 | 0.99 | 0.86 |

Social liberalism

Privatization

**Russia**

| Policy dimension | Importance | KPRF | RODINA | YABLOKO | ER | LDPR | SPS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2004* | . | 12.6 | 9.0 | 4.3 | 37.6 | 11.5 | 4.0 |
| Left–right | . | 4.8 | 5.9 | 12.0 | 12.4 | 13.9 | 16.3 |
|  |  | 0.81 | 0.55 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 1.25 | 0.81 |
| Nationalism | 13.5 | 16.3 | 16.2 | 4.7 | 11.7 | 17.5 | 3.5 |
|  | 0.97 | 0.58 | 0.82 | 0.70 | 0.71 | 0.57 | 0.64 |
| Privatization | 12.6 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 12.8 | 10.2 | 7.8 | 17.3 |
|  | 0.98 | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0.73 | 0.76 | 0.83 | 0.49 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.5 | 3.5 | 5.1 | 13.3 | 11.1 | 9.4 | 17.0 |
|  | 1.11 | 0.39 | 0.46 | 0.62 | 0.70 | 0.82 | 0.91 |
| Foreign land ownership | 12.3 | 18.0 | 15.7 | 5.9 | 10.9 | 15.7 | 3.3 |
|  | 1.09 | 0.62 | 0.56 | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.61 |
| Relations with West | 11.7 | 17.2 | 15.3 | 3.6 | 9.6 | 15.9 | 3.2 |
|  | 1.00 | 0.45 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.61 |
| Decentralization | 11.0 | 13.6 | 14.0 | 5.8 | 13.1 | 17.4 | 5.7 |
|  | 0.47 | 1.05 | 0.83 | 0.80 | 0.83 | 1.02 | 1.03 |
| Religion | 11.0 | 8.4 | 7.2 | 16.5 | 9.7 | 10.3 | 17.0 |
|  | 0.76 | 1.32 | 1.20 | 0.60 | 1.16 | 1.27 | 0.78 |
| Urban–rural | 10.8 | 14.8 | 12.9 | 3.8 | 9.9 | 11.0 | 3.2 |
|  | 0.63 | 0.67 | 0.72 | 0.51 | 0.48 | 0.90 | 0.49 |
| Media freedom | 10.6 | 14.8 | 13.1 | 3.4 | 13.1 | 14.4 | 3.0 |
|  | 1.34 | 1.03 | 1.07 | 0.54 | 0.81 | 1.06 | 0.39 |
| Former communists | 8.9 | 2.0 | 3.2 | 9.5 | 4.4 | 12.4 | 11.6 |
|  | 0.90 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 1.44 | 0.76 | 1.43 | 1.42 |
| Social | 8.6 | 14.3 | 12.4 | 5.3 | 10.9 | 14.1 | 5.7 |
|  | 0.83 | 1.09 | 0.99 | 0.72 | 0.98 | 1.07 | 1.11 |
| Environment | 7.9 | 13.1 | 13.0 | 5.5 | 13.5 | 13.9 | 12.4 |
|  | 0.99 | 0.90 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 1.02 | 1.25 |
| Sympathy | . | 14.9 | 13.9 | 8.1 | 11.7 | 17.3 | 10.4 |
|  | . | 0.99 | 1.19 | 0.84 | 0.77 | 0.96 | 1.49 |

Notes
**United Russia**                                 **ER**
**Liberal Democratic Party of Russia**        **LDPR**
Communist Party of the Russian Federation   KPRF
People's Patriotic Block 'Motherland'         RODINA
Union of Right Forces                        SPS
Yabloko                                        YABLOKO

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Serbia**

| Policy dimension | Importance | SPS | DS | DSS | SPO | SRS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | | | | | | |
| Left–right | . | 7.7 | 10.7 | 18.0 | 7.7 | 27.7 |
| | | 9.0 | 11.5 | 14.3 | 15.3 | 19.0 |
| | | 3.54 | 1.44 | 1.25 | 0.85 | 0.58 |
| Decentralization | 16.8 | 15.3 | 13.0 | 7.7 | 11.3 | 19.3 |
| | 1.08 | 2.19 | 2.65 | 3.84 | 2.40 | 0.67 |
| Privatization | 16.2 | 5.5 | 18.8 | 17.0 | 14.8 | 11.0 |
| | 0.71 | 1.66 | 0.75 | 1.22 | 1.11 | 1.58 |
| Nationalism | 15.1 | 6.8 | 13.5 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 1.3 |
| | 1.46 | 2.32 | 1.32 | 1.73 | 1.50 | 0.25 |
| Religion | 14.4 | 18.8 | 15.0 | 4.8 | 4.3 | 11.5 |
| | 2.25 | 0.75 | 1.73 | 1.49 | 0.63 | 4.37 |
| EU joining | 12.5 | 8.3 | 18.5 | 12.8 | 15.3 | 4.5 |
| | 2.41 | 2.25 | 0.87 | 1.97 | 1.65 | 1.76 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.4 | 4.0 | 12.0 | 12.8 | 11.3 | 6.5 |
| | 1.67 | 1.35 | 2.68 | 2.53 | 2.17 | 2.25 |
| Social | 11.8 | 10.5 | 5.0 | 12.3 | 13.8 | 16.8 |
| | 1.17 | 3.30 | 0.91 | 2.75 | 1.44 | 1.89 |
| Former communists | 11.2 | 1.0 | 14.3 | 15.5 | 15.0 | 11.0 |
| | 0.99 | 0.00 | 1.49 | 1.66 | 1.58 | 3.67 |
| Media freedom | 11.1 | 13.8 | 8.5 | 9.3 | 8.3 | 14.0 |
| | 1.19 | 1.11 | 2.63 | 2.17 | 1.70 | 2.65 |
| Foreign land ownership | 9.9 | 19.0 | 8.3 | 11.0 | 11.0 | 19.3 |
| | 0.91 | 0.58 | 4.67 | 4.62 | 4.04 | 0.33 |
| Urban–rural | 7.2 | 11.5 | 5.5 | 11.0 | 12.0 | 14.3 |
| | 1.00 | 0.87 | 1.55 | 0.71 | 1.47 | 1.89 |
| Environment | 6.1 | 12.8 | 14.8 | 14.3 | 12.3 | 12.5 |
| | 1.28 | 3.04 | 2.14 | 2.17 | 2.78 | 2.50 |
| Sympathy | . | 16.0 | 9.8 | 15.0 | 15.5 | 19.5 |
| | . | 2.27 | 1.97 | 1.78 | 2.22 | 0.29 |

Social liberalism (vertical axis, 1–20)

Privatization (horizontal axis, 1–20)

SRS

SPS

SPO

DSS

DS

Notes

**Democratic Party of Serbia**     DSS
**Serbian Renewal Movement**     **SPO**
Democratic Party     DS
Serb Socialist Party     SPS
Serb Radical Party     SRS

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Coalition of DSS, SPO/WS (Serbian Renewal Movement/
New Serbia) and G17+ (the latter not included in the
survey)

**Slovakia**

| Policy dimension | Importance | KSS | SDL' | SDA | RPS | Smer | HZDS | SMK | LU | SNS | SKDU | ANO | OKS | KDH |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 |  | 6.3 | 1.4 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 13.5 | 19.5 | 11.2 | 0.0 | 3.3 | 15.1 | 8.0 | 0.3 | 8.3 |
| Left–right | . | 1.8 | 4.9 | 6.8 | 7.0 | 7.7 | 10.9 | 13.6 | 15.0 | 15.1 | 15.6 | 15.8 | 17.0 | 17.1 |
|  |  | 0.24 | 0.68 | 0.52 | . | 0.67 | 0.87 | 0.79 | . | 0.89 | 0.60 | 0.73 | . | 0.64 |
| EU joining | 15.7 | 9.5 | 15.8 | 16.5 | 12.0 | 16.1 | 14.9 | 18.9 | 19.0 | 8.5 | 19.5 | 19.4 | 6.0 | 15.9 |
|  | 0.99 | 1.17 | 0.92 | 0.83 | . | 0.89 | 0.88 | 0.40 | . | 1.38 | 0.31 | 0.42 | . | 0.83 |
| Privatization | 14.6 | 1.9 | 5.8 | 6.9 | 7.0 | 7.8 | 12.2 | 14.5 | 7.0 | 10.4 | 16.6 | 18.8 | 19.0 | 15.4 |
|  | 0.54 | 0.24 | 0.52 | 0.51 | . | 0.69 | 0.70 | 0.59 | . | 0.82 | 0.57 | 0.30 | . | 0.73 |
| Decentralization | 14.0 | 12.3 | 10.9 | 9.6 | 15.0 | 9.4 | 10.4 | 7.0 | 11.0 | 12.5 | 7.4 | 4.9 | 6.0 | 9.9 |
|  | 0.40 | 1.42 | 1.11 | 1.05 | . | 0.96 | 0.98 | 1.27 | . | 0.80 | 1.20 | 0.87 | . | 1.29 |
| Taxes vs spending | 13.4 | 4.1 | 5.9 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 9.4 | 10.2 | 13.1 | 11.0 | 10.3 | 13.9 | 16.9 | 17.0 | 14.4 |
|  | 0.47 | 0.62 | 0.81 | 0.60 | . | 0.94 | 0.64 | 0.85 | . | 0.71 | 1.25 | 0.56 | . | 1.01 |
| Nationalism | 13.4 | 11.3 | 10.1 | 9.3 | 1.0 | 13.1 | 13.8 | 6.4 | 12.0 | 19.4 | 8.9 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 15.7 |
|  | 1.04 | 1.01 | 0.72 | 0.87 | . | 0.72 | 0.92 | 1.23 | . | 0.24 | 1.03 | 0.85 | . | 0.70 |
| Foreign land ownership | 13.4 | 17.1 | 16.2 | 15.1 | 12.0 | 13.8 | 13.9 | 5.6 | . | 19.5 | 8.1 | 5.3 | . | 9.7 |
|  | 0.43 | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.87 | . | 0.77 | 1.06 | 1.08 | . | 0.14 | 0.90 | 0.79 | . | 1.07 |
| Social | 13.2 | 5.2 | 4.6 | 4.3 | 20.0 | 4.9 | 9.5 | 15.0 | 13.0 | 16.1 | 14.5 | 1.8 | 17.0 | 19.7 |
|  | 0.78 | 0.77 | 0.63 | 0.62 | . | 0.74 | 0.71 | 0.83 | . | 0.53 | 1.08 | 0.24 | . | 0.24 |
| Religion | 13.1 | 19.2 | 17.9 | 17.9 | 8.0 | 16.5 | 8.3 | 5.6 | 10.0 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 17.8 | 7.0 | 1.3 |
|  | 0.79 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.41 | . | 0.87 | 0.94 | 1.00 | . | 0.59 | 0.90 | 0.83 | . | 0.17 |
| Former communists | 12.5 | 1.3 | 3.6 | 4.9 | 2.0 | 7.9 | 7.1 | 13.1 | 6.0 | 11.4 | 14.0 | 13.2 | 18.0 | 17.4 |
|  | 0.76 | 0.19 | 0.67 | 0.84 | . | 0.75 | 0.86 | 0.90 | . | 1.21 | 0.95 | 1.29 | . | 0.90 |
| Media freedom | 12.3 | 14.1 | 10.5 | 9.5 | 20.0 | 9.3 | 12.1 | 11.3 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 10.8 | 6.7 | 4.0 | 13.4 |
|  | 0.38 | 0.88 | 1.02 | 0.91 | . | 0.85 | 0.75 | 0.92 | . | 0.79 | 0.94 | 1.17 | . | 1.21 |
| Urban–rural | 11.5 | 12.4 | 11.2 | 8.2 | 18.0 | 8.9 | 14.1 | 13.6 | 7.0 | 13.4 | 4.6 | 3.1 | 6.0 | 13.3 |
|  | 0.43 | 1.05 | 0.75 | 0.79 | . | 0.78 | 0.92 | 1.00 | . | 0.73 | 0.81 | 0.45 | . | 1.11 |
| Environment | 9.2 | 11.0 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 17.0 | 10.5 | 13.6 | 13.1 | . | 12.3 | 15.0 | 15.1 | 17.0 | 12.0 |
|  | 0.24 | 1.07 | 1.17 | 1.14 | . | 1.07 | 1.16 | 1.01 | . | 1.07 | 1.16 | 1.13 | . | 0.91 |
| Sympathy | . | 16.3 | 13.4 | 10.4 | 20.0 | 9.8 | 15.4 | 15.6 | 14.0 | 17.2 | 12.5 | 10.2 | 6.0 | 15.6 |
|  | . | 1.05 | 1.45 | 1.51 | . | 1.36 | 1.00 | 1.26 | . | 0.90 | 1.58 | 1.52 | . | 1.37 |

Social liberalism

Privatization

KDH

SKDU

SMK

SNS

HZDS

Smer

SDL'

SDA

KSS

ANO

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Notes

**Slovak Democratic and Christian Union**          **SKDU**
**Party of the Hungarian Coalition**                    **SMK**
**Christian Democratic Movement**                   **KDH**
New Civic Alliance                                              ANO
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia               HZDS
Slovak Communist Party                                     KSS
Social-Democratic Alternative                            SDA
Party of Democratic Left                                      SDL'
Slovak National Party                                         SNS
Party Direction – Third Way                                Smer

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

Slovenia

| Policy dimension | Importance | ZLSD | DeSUS | LDS | SMS | SNS | SLS | SDS | NSi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote Share 2000* | . | *12.1* | *5.2* | *36.3* | *4.3* | *4.4* | *9.6* | *15.8* | *8.6* |
| Left–right | . | 4.8 | 6.9 | 7.8 | 8.7 | 10.1 | 14.1 | 14.7 | 17.0 |
| | | 0.35 | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.72 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.37 |
| EU joining | 17.0 | 16.7 | 14.8 | 18.5 | 14.8 | 6.8 | 15.4 | 17.0 | 16.9 |
| | 0.71 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.30 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 0.53 | 0.43 | 0.37 |
| Privatization | 13.8 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 11.4 | 11.7 | 9.3 | 11.8 | 12.9 | 14.7 |
| | 0.79 | 0.43 | 0.48 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 0.45 | 0.46 | 0.46 |
| Media freedom | 13.2 | 8.9 | 10.7 | 8.3 | 6.9 | 9.6 | 10.4 | 8.9 | 10.2 |
| | 0.55 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.69 | 0.61 | 0.71 | 0.52 | 0.72 | 0.68 |
| Foreign land ownership | 12.8 | 10.9 | 12.0 | 7.2 | 10.8 | 17.4 | 13.6 | 10.9 | 10.4 |
| | 0.64 | 0.47 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.47 | 0.59 | 0.54 | 0.68 |
| Decentralization | 12.7 | 9.2 | 10.3 | 10.4 | 8.2 | 10.4 | 8.8 | 8.9 | 9.1 |
| | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.65 | 0.50 | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.61 | 0.60 |
| Former communists | 12.6 | 3.4 | 5.1 | 5.2 | 9.6 | 9.3 | 13.9 | 17.5 | 18.1 |
| | 1.04 | 0.42 | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.55 | 0.67 | 0.54 | 0.43 | 0.33 |
| Urban–rural | 12.5 | 6.3 | 8.1 | 4.3 | 6.2 | 8.6 | 17.8 | 12.8 | 15.8 |
| | 0.76 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.34 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 0.24 | 0.47 | 0.40 |
| Social | 12.5 | 5.4 | 10.3 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 11.7 | 15.6 | 14.6 | 17.3 |
| | 0.56 | 0.48 | 0.48 | 0.43 | 0.48 | 0.73 | 0.47 | 0.56 | 0.46 |
| Taxes vs spending | 12.2 | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 9.6 | 10.1 | 10.7 | 11.8 | 13.0 |
| | 0.55 | 0.48 | 0.57 | 0.56 | 0.56 | 0.65 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.48 |
| Religion | 12.1 | 18.3 | 15.7 | 16.8 | 15.6 | 17.7 | 5.4 | 6.6 | 3.6 |
| | 1.09 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 0.41 | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.51 | 0.45 |
| Nationalism | 11.3 | 7.7 | 11.1 | 6.2 | 6.9 | 17.1 | 14.3 | 13.4 | 15.1 |
| | 1.22 | 0.50 | 0.45 | 0.48 | 0.51 | 0.44 | 0.46 | 0.54 | 0.48 |
| Environment | 11.1 | 11.0 | 10.8 | 14.2 | 8.8 | 10.4 | 11.2 | 11.6 | 11.5 |
| | 0.44 | 0.52 | 0.48 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.52 | 0.52 | 0.46 | 0.48 |
| Sympathy | . | 8.9 | 13.3 | 8.3 | 11.4 | 14.9 | 14.0 | 15.1 | 16.0 |
| | . | 0.66 | 0.61 | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.67 | 0.62 |

Notes
**Demokratična Stranka Upokojencev Slovenije**   DeSUS
**Nova Slovenija-Krščanska Ljudska Stranka**   NSi
**Socialdemokratska Stranka Slovenije**   SDS
**Slovenska Ljudska Stranka**   SLS
Liberalna Demokracija Slovenije   LDS
Stranka Mladih Slovenije   SMS
Slovenska Nacionalna Stranka   SNS
Združena Lista Socialnih Demokratov   ZLSD

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

## Spain

| Policy dimension | Importance | IU | PSOE | CiU | PNV | PP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2004* | | *5.0* | *42.6* | *3.2* | *1.6* | *37.6* |
| Left–right | . | 3.6 | 8.2 | 13.7 | 14.5 | 17.0 |
| | . | 0.16 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.24 |
| Deregulation | 15.5 | 4.0 | 9.3 | 14.3 | 12.3 | 17.3 |
| | 0.61 | 0.22 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.32 | 0.25 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.8 | 3.8 | 7.4 | 12.1 | 11.3 | 16.7 |
| | 0.50 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.33 |
| Decentralization | 14.5 | 5.9 | 8.5 | 3.1 | 2.2 | 14.7 |
| | 0.62 | 0.34 | 0.35 | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.49 |
| Immigration | 14.3 | 3.4 | 7.4 | 12.6 | 12.9 | 16.6 |
| | 0.47 | 0.28 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.50 | 0.39 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 13.1 | 15.8 | 7.4 | 8.0 | 11.4 | 4.4 |
| | 0.70 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.45 | 0.62 | 0.41 |
| Social | 12.9 | 2.6 | 5.6 | 12.0 | 13.9 | 17.2 |
| | 0.63 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.32 |
| EU: authority | 12.7 | 9.8 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 8.3 | 12.6 |
| | 0.43 | 0.54 | 0.36 | 0.51 | 0.59 | 0.54 |
| EU: accountability | 11.4 | 6.6 | 8.4 | 7.2 | 8.2 | 14.8 |
| | 0.25 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.49 |
| Environment | 10.5 | 4.3 | 9.1 | 12.8 | 12.0 | 16.6 |
| | 0.97 | 0.29 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.36 | 0.34 |
| Sympathy | . | 8.9 | 7.2 | 12.4 | 15.5 | 16.5 |
| | . | 0.58 | 0.48 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.52 |

Taxes vs spending

Social liberalism

Notes
**Partido Socialista Obrero Español**          **PSOE**
Convergència i Unió de Catalunya               CiU
Izquerda Unida                                 IU
**Partido Nacionalista Vasco**                 PNV
Partido Popular                                PP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Sweden**

| Policy dimension | Importance | V | MP | SAP | C | FP | KD | M |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2002* | . | 8.3 | 4.6 | 39.8 | 6.1 | 13.3 | 9.1 | 15.2 |
| Left–right | . | 3.6 | 7.5 | 8.3 | 12.2 | 14.2 | 16.0 | 17.2 |
| | | 0.18 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.24 | 0.18 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.2 | 3.3 | 7.2 | 7.1 | 11.4 | 13.5 | 13.7 | 17.7 |
| | 1.01 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.25 | 0.21 |
| Deregulation | 14.2 | 3.3 | 7.7 | 7.7 | 11.7 | 16.0 | 14.0 | 17.9 |
| | 1.01 | 0.23 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 0.19 |
| EU: authority | 14.0 | 17.9 | 17.5 | 8.7 | 13.5 | 4.7 | 8.4 | 6.0 |
| | 0.73 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.42 |
| EU: accountability | 13.0 | 15.5 | 14.7 | 14.3 | 13.0 | 5.3 | 10.5 | 10.6 |
| | 0.74 | 0.75 | 0.82 | 0.46 | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.52 |
| EU: peacekeeping | 12.7 | 18.2 | 17.3 | 9.7 | 12.4 | 3.6 | 8.2 | 4.2 |
| | 0.90 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.29 |
| Immigration | 12.4 | 4.2 | 5.2 | 7.4 | 10.0 | 6.0 | 9.5 | 11.0 |
| | 0.85 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.61 |
| Environment | 12.3 | 4.8 | 2.0 | 11.8 | 6.9 | 13.1 | 12.1 | 16.1 |
| | 0.88 | 0.28 | 0.20 | 0.34 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.30 |
| Social | 12.0 | 3.6 | 5.0 | 7.1 | 11.6 | 4.6 | 17.7 | 12.7 |
| | 1.09 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 0.39 | 0.29 | 0.24 | 0.44 |
| Decentralization | 11.5 | 10.3 | 4.9 | 12.6 | 3.7 | 8.9 | 9.1 | 10.5 |
| | 0.83 | 0.56 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.28 | 0.42 | 0.35 | 0.53 |
| Sympathy | . | 11.7 | 11.1 | 8.0 | 12.6 | 8.7 | 15.9 | 13.9 |
| | . | 0.76 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 0.45 | 0.66 | 0.54 | 0.72 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

M

KD

C

FP

SAP

MP

V

Notes
**Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet**   **SAP**
Centerpartiet   C
Folkpartiet Liberalerna   FP
Kristdemokraterna   KD
Moderata Samlingspartiet   M
Miljöpartiet de Gröna   MP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Switzerland**

| Policy dimension | Importance | PdA | GPS | SPS | EVP | CVP | FDP | LPS | EDU | SVP | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Vote share 2003* | . | 0.7 | 7.4 | 23.4 | 2.3 | 14.4 | 17.3 | 2.2 | 1.3 | 26.6 | 1.0 |
| Left–right | 15.4 | 2.0 | 4.2 | 4.6 | 10.4 | 11.8 | 14.5 | 15.6 | 17.5 | 17.9 | 18.9 |
|  | 0.94 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 0.22 | 0.35 | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 0.40 | 0.19 | 0.22 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.9 | 2.1 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 9.5 | 11.7 | 16.2 | 17.1 | 13.1 | 18.0 | 12.9 |
|  | 0.87 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 0.28 | 0.23 | 0.32 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.47 | 0.18 | 0.60 |
| Deregulation | 14.8 | 1.8 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 10.1 | 11.9 | 17.0 | 17.7 | 10.9 | 15.1 | 10.1 |
|  | 1.12 | 0.14 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.37 | 0.29 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.52 | 0.49 | 0.49 |
| EU joining | 14.7 | 14.5 | 14.3 | 17.7 | 9.9 | 10.5 | 10.9 | 13.7 | 2.9 | 1.5 | 1.3 |
|  | 0.95 | 0.64 | 0.60 | 0.24 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.43 | 0.58 | 0.37 | 0.14 | 0.09 |
| Immigration | 13.0 | 3.1 | 3.1 | 3.2 | 9.0 | 10.4 | 13.0 | 12.8 | 16.8 | 18.8 | 19.7 |
|  | 0.64 | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.22 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.45 | 0.53 | 0.16 | 0.09 |
| Social | 11.8 | 4.1 | 3.0 | 3.3 | 15.4 | 14.6 | 7.5 | 9.1 | 18.9 | 16.8 | 18.2 |
|  | 1.15 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.47 | 0.41 | 0.45 | 0.58 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.24 |
| Environment | 11.5 | 6.4 | 1.9 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 11.8 | 15.5 | 16.1 | 11.9 | 16.9 | 10.6 |
|  | 0.38 | 0.48 | 0.14 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.44 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.60 | 0.41 | 0.75 |
| Decentralization |  | 15.8 | 12.4 | 14.3 | 9.4 | 7.4 | 8.1 | 6.4 | 7.9 | 5.3 | 8.3 |
|  |  | 0.68 | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.43 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 0.61 | 0.72 | 0.47 | 0.69 |
| Sympathy | . | 14.2 | 8.1 | 7.1 | 12.0 | 10.3 | 9.6 | 10.9 | 18.4 | 16.3 | 19.4 |
|  | . | 0.77 | 0.75 | 0.74 | 0.56 | 0.61 | 0.68 | 0.78 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 0.18 |

Taxes vs spending

Social liberalism

SVP

CVP

FDP

SPS

EDU
SD

EVP

LPS

GPS

PdA

Notes

**Christlich-Demokratische**
**Volkspartei der Schweiz**                                      **CVP**
**Freisinnig-Demokratische**
**Partei der Schweiz**                                              **FDP**
**Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz**       **SPS**
**Schweizerische Volkspartei**                           **SVP**
Eidgenössisch-Demokratische Union            EDU
Schweizer Demokraten                                       SD
Evangelische Volkspartei der Schweiz          EVP
Grüne Partei der Schweiz                                   GPS
Liberale Partei der Schweiz                                LPS
Partei der Arbeit der Schweiz                            PdA

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**Turkey**

| Policy dimension | Importance | DEHAP | CHP | DSP | ANAP | AKP | DYP | GP | MHP |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 | . | 6.2 | 19.4 | 1.2 | 5.13 | 34.3 | 9.6 | 7.2 | 8.3 |
| Left–right | 15.6 | 5.2 | 7.5 | 9.3 | 12.9 | 14.3 | 15.2 | 16.9 | 18.4 |
|  | 1.19 | 0.56 | 0.53 | 0.62 | 0.35 | 0.73 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 0.35 |
| Religion | 15.6 | 14.0 | 18.7 | 17.2 | 11.3 | 4.7 | 10.4 | 11.3 | 9.6 |
|  | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.71 | 0.76 | 0.68 | 0.62 | 0.71 | 0.92 | 0.82 |
| EU joining | 14.4 | 17.2 | 15.0 | 11.9 | 18.5 | 17.4 | 13.7 | 5.8 | 4.8 |
|  | 0.79 | 0.87 | 0.81 | 0.96 | 0.40 | 0.58 | 0.76 | 0.87 | 0.76 |
| Nationalism | 14.1 | 2.3 | 11.0 | 14.9 | 10.4 | 11.2 | 16.1 | 17.7 | 19.8 |
|  | 0.75 | 0.39 | 0.68 | 0.58 | 0.69 | 0.90 | 0.56 | 0.45 | 0.09 |
| Decentralization | 13.6 | 5.5 | 11.5 | 13.0 | 7.2 | 6.4 | 11.6 | 10.3 | 16.6 |
|  | 0.51 | 1.22 | 0.96 | 1.02 | 0.85 | 0.77 | 0.79 | 1.19 | 0.93 |
| Deregulation | 12.4 | 7.2 | 7.4 | 7.3 | 16.5 | 13.4 | 13.6 | 13.3 | 6.2 |
|  | 0.54 | 0.62 | 0.67 | 0.61 | 0.89 | 0.87 | 0.85 | 1.18 | 0.66 |
| Taxes vs spending | 11.9 | 5.8 | 6.3 | 6.3 | 11.9 | 8.2 | 10.9 | 12.9 | 8.6 |
|  | 0.46 | 0.93 | 0.71 | 0.70 | 1.17 | 1.01 | 1.01 | 1.33 | 0.83 |
| NATO/Peacekeeping | 9.8 | 12.1 | 8.0 | 8.1 | 4.8 | 6.4 | 6.9 | 10.5 | 8.3 |
|  | 0.51 | 1.34 | 0.91 | 1.02 | 0.55 | 0.76 | 0.81 | 1.56 | 1.10 |
| Social | 9.5 | 10.5 | 9.8 | 11.0 | 12.2 | 17.1 | 15.5 | 15.4 | 18.9 |
|  | 0.45 | 0.98 | 0.61 | 0.79 | 0.99 | 0.70 | 0.79 | 0.76 | 0.40 |
| Immigration | 9.1 | 7.0 | 8.4 | 10.1 | 8.9 | 10.4 | 12.7 | 14.5 | 15.9 |
|  | 0.67 | 1.55 | 0.61 | 0.60 | 0.84 | 1.03 | 0.82 | 1.12 | 1.07 |
| Environment | . | 9.1 | 8.6 | 9.9 | 15.6 | 15.7 | 15.6 | 15.8 | 14.6 |
|  | . | 1.16 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 0.86 | 0.81 | 0.74 | 0.95 | 1.01 |
| Sympathy | . | 14.0 | 9.7 | 13.2 | 12.8 | 15.9 | 16.0 | 19.5 | 18.6 |
|  | . | 1.05 | 1.01 | 0.83 | 1.03 | 0.78 | 0.80 | 0.16 | 0.67 |

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

MHP  AKP  DYP  GP  ANAP  DSP  DEHAP  CHP

Notes
**Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi**          AKP
Anavatan Partisi                         ANAP
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi                  CHP
Demokratik Halk Partisi                  DEHAP
Demokratik Sol Partisi                   DSP
Dogru Yol Partisi                        DYP
Genç Parti                               GP
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi               MHP

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

# Ukraine

| Policy dimension | Importance | KPU | SPU | ZYU | SDPU-o | JT | NU |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vote share 2002 | . | 20.0 | 6.9 | 11.8 | 6.3 | 7.2 | 23.6 |
| Left-right | . | 2.3 | 4.8 | 10.6 | 11.4 | 13.8 | 15.6 |
|  |  | 0.19 | 0.52 | 0.32 | 0.64 | 1.50 | 1.06 |
| EU joining | 15.6 | 5.1 | 9.2 | 12.4 | 13.5 | 15.6 | 18.4 |
|  | 1.06 | 0.95 | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.07 | 1.24 | 0.64 |
| Nationalism | 14.9 | 4.9 | 9.9 | 8.7 | 7.9 | 13.7 | 17.0 |
|  | 1.24 | 1.23 | 1.44 | 1.13 | 1.20 | 1.66 | 1.12 |
| Privatization | 14.9 | 3.8 | 6.8 | 10.8 | 11.7 | 12.6 | 13.5 |
|  | 0.57 | 1.44 | 1.02 | 1.13 | 0.90 | 1.22 | 1.18 |
| Taxes vs spending | 14.2 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 10.5 | 8.6 | 11.0 | 9.4 |
|  | 0.63 | 0.71 | 0.56 | 1.08 | 1.14 | 1.44 | 0.78 |
| Media freedom | 13.9 | 13.0 | 7.6 | 12.0 | 11.2 | 5.4 | 5.9 |
|  | 1.44 | 1.58 | 1.06 | 1.57 | 1.49 | 1.31 | 1.01 |
| Former communists | 13.5 | 1.9 | 5.2 | 5.4 | 6.8 | 14.1 | 14.3 |
|  | 1.35 | 0.37 | 1.64 | 0.94 | 1.03 | 0.99 | 1.48 |
| Decentralization | 13.5 | 12.7 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 10.3 | 9.4 | 8.1 |
|  | 0.75 | 1.81 | 1.02 | 1.58 | 1.36 | 1.62 | 1.50 |
| Foreign land ownership | 13.4 | 17.6 | 16.4 | 11.3 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 10.5 |
|  | 0.86 | 1.33 | 1.27 | 0.69 | 0.56 | 1.95 | 1.35 |
| Urban–rural | 11.3 | 11.5 | 15.4 | 8.6 | 7.9 | 10.4 | 12.6 |
|  | 0.76 | 1.37 | 0.94 | 0.87 | 1.00 | 1.21 | 1.19 |
| Environment | 10.8 | 9.2 | 8.1 | 12.2 | 11.6 | 10.7 | 9.2 |
|  | 0.39 | 1.64 | 1.34 | 1.40 | 1.36 | 1.35 | 1.04 |
| Religion | 10.3 | 15.4 | 14.6 | 13.0 | 12.9 | 12.2 | 9.5 |
|  | 0.89 | 1.42 | 0.86 | 1.66 | 1.30 | 1.29 | 1.38 |
| Social | 7.4 | 15.0 | 13.1 | 11.9 | 11.3 | 12.0 | 11.8 |
|  | 0.60 | 1.29 | 1.26 | 1.08 | 1.29 | 1.30 | 1.27 |
| Sympathy | . | 15.8 | 12.2 | 15.1 | 12.6 | 8.2 | 5.4 |
|  | . | 1.52 | 1.41 | 1.29 | 1.40 | 1.43 | 0.97 |

Notes
**For United Ukraine coalition**                                      ZYU
**United Social-Democratic Party of Ukraine**      SDPU-o
Juliya Tymoshenko Election Blok                          JT
Communist Party of Ukraine                                 KPU
Viktor Yushchenko Bloc Our Ukraine                   NU
Socialist Party of Ukraine                                     SPU

**Bold** parties in government during survey.

**United States**

| Policy dimension | Importance | Dem | Rep |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Vote share 2002 | | 46.2 | 51.0 |
| Left–right | . | 7.1 | 16.6 |
| | | 0.18 | 0.18 |
| Taxes vs spending | 15.5 | 6.3 | 16.8 |
| | 2.48 | 0.20 | 0.24 |
| Social | 15.2 | 5.0 | 17.2 |
| | 1.94 | 0.22 | 0.17 |
| Health care | 14.6 | 6.6 | 16.8 |
| | 0.10 | 0.22 | 0.23 |
| Environment | 14.2 | 6.0 | 16.8 |
| | 0.78 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| US affairs | 14.1 | 10.5 | 6.4 |
| | 1.76 | 0.29 | 0.35 |
| Deregulation | 14.0 | 7.8 | 16.6 |
| | 3.23 | 0.21 | 0.20 |
| Immigration | 10.4 | 6.8 | 12.3 |
| | 0.09 | 0.22 | 0.31 |
| Decentralization | 10.0 | 12.2 | 7.8 |
| | 1.78 | 0.21 | 0.29 |
| Sympathy | . | 7.5 | 15.4 |
| | . | 0.34 | 0.40 |

Notes
**Republican Party**
Democratic Party

**bold** party in government during survey

**Rep**
Dem

Social liberalism

Taxes vs spending

Rep

Dem

# Notes

## Introduction

1 Google Scholar registered 206 citations of this work, as of 28 February 2006, for example.
2 The Japanese survey was conducted independently, though in coordination with ours, by Junko Kato.
3 In 2005, these five countries were not rated as "free" by Freedom House, meaning that their combined political and civil liberties scores on the 1 (fully free) to 7 (fully non-free) were below the 1–2.5 range defined as "free." Albania and Moldova were scored as 3 and 3.5 respectively, and classified as "partly free." The Ukraine was also partly free, scored at 3.5, although this represented an improvement from 2003 when it had been scored as 4.0. Both Belarus and Russia were not only classified as non-free in 2005, but suffered declines in the period since our survey. Belarus fell from 6.0 in 2003 and 2004 to 6.5 in 2005, just a half point above the worst offender category of 7.0 (a group which includes North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Burma). Russia was also classified as non-free, having slipped from 5.0 (partly free) in 2003 and 2004 to 5.5 in 2005 (non-free).

## 1 Dimensions of political difference

1 Among, of course, very many other authors, Anthony Quinton lucidly surveys these arguments (Quinton, 1993).
2 In what is again a very crowded field, Alan Ryan provides a very useful overview (Ryan, 1993).
3 Indeed psychoanalysts might tell us they are hidden even from the individual him/herself.
4 The list of respondents, whom we gratefully thank for taking the time to provide their views on the matter, was: Stephen Ansolabehere, Neil Beck, Steven Brams, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randy Calvert, Eric Dickson, Daniel Diermeier, John Ferejohn, Michael Gilligan, Sandford Gordon, Bernie Grofman, Mel Hinich, Shigeo Hirano, Macartan Humphries, Arthur Lupia, Sam Merrill, Rebecca Morton, Adam Przeworski, Howard Rosenthal, Shanker Satyanath, Norman Schofield, Kenneth Shepsle, George Tsebelis.
5 This work was far from secret: Shepard was awarded the National Medal of Science for his part in it in 1995.
6 For two strings of the same length, the Hamming distance is number of positions on which the strings differ. Thus for any pair of binary numbers of equal length, the Hamming and city block distances are the same. The Levenshtein distance is a generalization of the Hamming distance for strings of unequal length and is

used, for example, by computer spellcheckers that suggest the most probable alternative to a misspelled word.

7  We might pause to ponder whether we can be in any way systematic about how an abstract model can give us deep intuitions about politics. But we won't do this, since it would take us into the largely uncharted waters of talking about the aesthetics of abstract models. It is striking, however, that a modeling tradition that to a large extent prides itself on its scientific approach may depend ultimately, in sorting out the good from the bad, on something as vague as an intuition.

8  We may be wrong, but conjecture that an ordinary person who argued publicly in these terms would be considered somewhat deranged by most fellow humans.

## 2  Policy positions and theoretical models of political competition

1  Here we break shamelessly with professional tradition and state clearly that this bigger model is *not* something to which we will return in future work.

2  In this context we can think of the Downsian politician as being like a non-smoking cigarette manufacturer who makes a handsome living by offering smoking to consumers who like to smoke, but who personally detests smoking.

3  Note that observed government durations may well not reflect underlying government durability – for example because a very "durable" government can be terminated by a constitutionally mandated election. This matter is dealt with in the various censoring strategies used by the statistical models to estimate government duration.

4  Although see the work of Laver and Budge on the relationship between coalition and party policy (Laver and Budge 1992).

## 3  Empirical policy spaces

1  "Perish the thought!" do we hear someone say?

2  See Scully and Farrell (2003). The MEP Survey 2000 was co-authored by Simon Hix and Roger Scully in 2000. Details are available from www.lse.ac.uk/depts/eprg.

## 4  Measuring policy positions

1  When such a list included very large numbers of members, such as that of the American Political Science Association, we selected members according to their self-declared areas of expertise—specialists in American politics from the US survey, for instance.

2  The qualification "existing" is required since some parties who may have won seats or votes at the most recent election had changed or ceased to exist by the time of our survey.

3  On the advice of German experts, for instance, we included five parties in Germany that did not meet the first two criteria, including the far-right National Democratic Party that had strong showings in Saxony and several other Länder.

4  In a few cases, this strategy meant that we asked experts to place parties that were on the verge of extinction. In our survey of Canada in late 2003 and early 2004, for instance, experts located both the Canadian Alliance and the Progressive Conservative parties, despite the decision of these two parties in December 2003 to disband and integrate into a new party called the Conservative Party of Canada (not included in our survey). Likewise in France, our 2002 survey

included the *Union pour la democratie Francaise* (UDF), despite the contemporaneous dissolution of this party and its reformation into the UEM.

5  In Belgium, abortion continues to feature in policy discourse, although euthanasia does not. Belgium reported 347 legal acts of voluntary euthanasia in 2004 (*The Economist*, 15 October, 2005, p. 40) generating little or no controversy, while a single act of euthanasia in the United States—the withdrawal of feeding tubes from Terry Schiavo—split the nation in half. Switzerland is another country where euthanasia—legal since 1942—is not an issue of political controversy.

6  In New Zealand, for instance, issues of social values are conspicuously kept out of all political discourse, and we were told it would be both meaningless and potentially bad form to ask experts about party policy on such issues as abortion and homosexuality. Accordingly, this was the only country where this dimension was not applied. (In Belarus a "privacy" dimension substituted for the social policy dimension.)

7  The deregulation/privatization dimension was omitted only from the surveys in Austria, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, France, and Portugal.

8  This was the EU-funded "Domestic Structures and European Integration" (DoSEI) project, directed by Tomas Koenig.

9  This also included countries that had been invited to join but had declined – Norway and Switzerland.

10  The only exception of which we are aware is a recent article by one of the authors (Laver 2005).

11  Belgium and Switzerland are counted twice since we deployed surveys in two different languages in these countries, depending on the respondent's region.

12  Entirely open-source software was used for hosting the survey web pages and database, namely MySQL as a database server, Apache for serving web pages, and Tomcat for providing server-side JSP web scripting functionality. These were hosted on a fairly typical desktop Dell Pentium 4 computer running Linux, connected to the Internet from Trinity College and left running continuously for nearly 18 months. Total infrastructure cost (excluding the cost of the Internet connection): about $1,200.

13  Happily for our purposes, nearly all respondents (87.8 percent) also completed the sympathy dimension.

14  CMP scale positions are taken for the most recent election in the CMP dataset published with *MPP*, and thus are somewhat earlier in time than the estimates from the 2003 expert survey (see Table 4.3 for a list of CMP manifesto dates we used).

15  The OLS regression produces the following results: $N = 114$, $R^2 = 0.40$, Root MSE $= 18.763$, Expert survey coefficient (SE) 3.19 (0.372), Constant −33.06 (4.378).

## 5  The dimensional structure of policy spaces

1  Because our factor analyses use respondent placements of parties as the unit of analysis rather than party mean positions, however, this limitation is a tendency rather than a strict mathematical constraint. In Malta, for instance, with a virtual two-party system, we nonetheless see three dimensions of contestation emerge: the first a main left-right axis, including deregulation, social liberalism, environment, and immigration policy; a second axis consisting of decentralization and NATO peacekeeping; and a third dimension consisting of taxes vs spending economic policy.

2  In this respect our results are similar to results found by Whitefield and Evans (1994), whose surveys from ten post-communist countries found correlations between social and economic indices of just 0.33 (see Kitschelt 1999: 67).

### 6 Left and right in comparative context

1 Each observation in each of these regressions is a set of judgments by a country specialist about a party. In these and all subsequent regressions, cases were weighted by the share of the popular vote won by the relevant party at the election closest to the time of the expert survey.

2 For instance, we excluded Bosnia from the country-level analyses in this chapter because the party scores were based on just two expert respondents, significantly distorting the sample variance.

3 They may have strategic meaning in terms of the primary axis of political competition, but that is a different matter.

4 Closely related to this measure, of course, would have been the R-squared, and a comparison of these with the results from Table 6.a.2 show a close relationship. Here we present the RMSE because of the high correlations between environmental policy and the social and economic policy dimensions included in the restricted model.

5 Albania is an exception to this pattern; other slight exceptions are Serbia and Slovakia. Even though the coefficients on the environment variable are not statistically significant, the lack of individual significance might be caused by high correlations between environmental positions and the placements on the taxes/spending and social policy dimensions.

### Appendix A

1 When the survey instrument was translated, all questionnaire documents and correspondence were translated into the target language. In all printed and electronic letters, and on the Web pages, all language-specific characters, accents, and diacritic marks were preserved.

2 In Albania and Moldova, local collaborators hand-delivered and hand-collected questionnaires for the paper-based surveys. In Australia, we were not allowed access to a list of individual political scientists but did have access to a political science electronic mailing list; we thus issued a general invitation to participate in the expert survey to the electronic list; 11 respondents returned requests for electronic questionnaires, and were assigned identifier codes and e-mailed instructions for accessing the Web survey; an additional four Australian respondents requested and were sent paper questionnaires. In Japan the survey was carried out, by paper and post, by Professor Junko Kato of the University of Tokyo.

3 For paper surveys, this involved marking return envelopes with a tiny anonymous number. For Web surveys, the solicitation e-mail that launched the survey also generated a unique identifier, used to track responses and prevent respondents from completing multiple surveys.

4 The mean was even higher at 32 responses, though this figure is less informative since the distribution is skewed by a handful of high-response countries.

5 The number in brackets following the title of each dimension refers to the numeric code assigned to this dimension in our dataset.

### Appendix B

1 These plots were created in R using the deldir package.

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