EXPERIENCING THE PAST

On the character of archaeology

MICHAEL SHANKS

ROUTLEDGE



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INTRODUCTION

This book is less about archaeology the academic subject than it is about aspects of experience which might be termed archaeological. It is a story of what archaeologists and others do and might do, rather than a theory of what archaeology is or should be. I do consider ideas within the discipline about what archaeology is and archaeologists should be doing, summarizing the condition of the discipline, at least in terms of its theory and from my personal viewpoint as a participant in an ongoing debate over the scientific character of archaeology. But I focus more widely on what it means to do archaeological things such as excavating, surveying and collecting the material past, visiting and valuing collections and monuments of the past, asking what it is that might make these attractive to many people. I am also interested in how archaeology is basically about particular experiences of the object world. I emphasize experience because, with others, I try to understand archaeology in materialist terms, that is not so much as a set of ideas or body of knowledge, but as a collection of things people do.

It is often an image which initially takes me to investigate particular aspects of the past. I distinctively remember how it began when I was still at junior school with a photograph in Peter Green's book *Alexander the Great* of the ruins of one of the Alexandrias in Afghanistan: romance and remoteness. Imagery is a significant vehicle of the emotive or the affective in archaeological experience; archaeology abounds in striking, strange and fascinating images. This is one reason why there are many images in this book: I want to consider all dimensions of archaeological experience, not just the intellectual or the cognitive. I see this as part of a project of embodiment, of locating the practices and pleasures of archaeology not just within the mind but within the body: embodied experience.

In exploring such embodied experience I see a way of enabling archaeology to make more of its potential in the present, in productively and critically engaging with cultural experiences within which the archaeological past is a vital reference point—in local historical identity, the heritage industry, the cultural consciousness of groups such as Native American Indians as well as nationalist movements. I try to draw together those aspects of the archaeological which I find vital and invigorating, but it is often more of a vision of what archaeology could become rather than what it already is. Much fascinating work of interpreting and presenting the past is being produced, but it is nevertheless correct to write of potential rather than reality.

The book is arranged in four parts which discuss the state of archaeology the discipline (Part 1); images, ideas and the attractions of archaeology (Part 2); artifacts, objects and experience of them—the encounter with the past (Part 3); and a connection or an analogy between archaeology and craft—a sketch of archaeology as an embodied practice of sensuous receptivity (Part 4). The different parts are not at all exclusive. Similar points and particular issues are reviewed or picked out again in different ways

and different contexts, building up ideas in layers rather than in strict linear argument or exposition. Interludes present illustrations and impressions of some work and material that has a personal connection—pottery from Archaic Greece, castles in the North East of England, and megalithic tombs: my education was in Classics which I taught for some years in Northumberland where my family belongs, and where I began archaeological fieldwork; at Cambridge I studied prehistoric archaeology and anthropology and am now working on the design of pottery from Korinth. These are not intended as definitive statements (this is not the place), but as narratives, interpretations or constructions which draw on or add to the main discussions in the book; they lie in apposition. In these interludes I am also to a degree trying to make sense of the archaeological experiences I have; this is the relevance of the personal connection.

When asked whether archaeology was a science or an art, Mortimer Wheeler is reported to have replied 'neither, it's a vendetta' (against the past; in the present?). I think a lot of archaeologists would accept how appropriate this judgement is insofar as it applies to the character of archaeological experience within a competitive discipline full of contention and debate. As in many other disciplines, Anglo-American archaeologists have been arguing to what degree their subject is a science and how it may aspire to objective accounts of the past. My previous work with Chris Tilley—the books *Re-Constructing Archaeology* (1987a) and *Social Theory and Archaeology* (1987b)—fits in this context. They were an attempt, for me at least, to make sense of an archaeology which fascinated me but which also frustrated in its attenuation or dismissal of feeling which seemed so important; a scientific and academic archaeology seemed to lose so much of what made the past human and attractive. But my work was produced in the difficult, esoteric and sometimes narrow terms of academic debate. Afterwards I began to explore imagery and what it indicated about the character of popular archaeological experiences. (I had worked as draughtsman and photographer on site.) If the project of a scientific and objective archaeology was a faulty one, as we had argued, it seemed right to experiment with what were conventionally held to be the more subjective aspects of archaeological practices, to question the nature of subjective and objective. This was another origin of this book and its title. Images evoke, with connotation and association, and because they cannot be reduced to words. I am keen to explore this poetic.

The idea of archaeology being a vendetta would place it firmly in the present and give it a distinctive cultural politics. That archaeology is as much about the present as the past is one of the main points to have come out of the debates in theory and archaeology in the 1970s and 1980s. But the position I take in this book is not a vendetta against a scientific archaeology. I consider what may be archaeology's cultural politics and decide on a liberal and critical practice of the technical, ethical, and poetic. I try to outline what this means to me in Part 4 through analogy with craft.

In accordance with the expressive and suggestive purpose of the book, I have not aimed to be exhaustive in the references I provide. Given the wide scope, a full bibliography would be quite exhausting, indeed distracting. The citation I give is selective; but it is not random. The references and notes are intended to point directions, to provide routes for an exploration of the ideas, if such is desired. Most point outside the discipline. As I have indicated elsewhere (Shanks 1991), I am concerned with ways of reading (particularly non-archaeological authors) and what these imply about authority and the academy. I am wary of those syntheses and abstracts which package newly

fashionable great thinkers for the academy, of citation which aims to provide authority for what is being written, and I am eager to encourage a various reading which would locate what is being read relative to the purpose held in reading, to a political or cultural project. Relating what I read to myself and archaeology, to experience and politics. I think of such a way of reading as involving something of a rescue of meaning. In the gap between a text and myself lies the possibility of a redemption of meaning, a particular meaning born in my creative encounter, a reading which overshoots what I have read. So I make no claim to providing 'correct' readings of Gadamer, Derrida or Hodder; but I conceive of these hopefully as 'true' readings in the sense that a true reading is a new one located in the moment of reading, saturated with prospect, project, questioning. This has meant that some writers whom I have found particularly stimulating hardly appear in this book; theirs is often a presence which cannot easily be referenced. They are John Berger, Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Georges Bataille. I happily acknowledge my debt to their writing.[1]

Most of the photographs, illustrations and figures are by myself and Helen Simpson. Acknowledgement is given where they are not. I printed most of the photographs in the Cambridge University Faculty of Classics darkroom. They were taken on Canon T90 and EOS cameras. Canon UK provided help with the equipment. Thanks also to Stefan Rousseau for film.

Many of the ideas of the book have been aired in seminars and talks. I learned much from discussion at Cambridge, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Durham, York, Lampeter, Sienna, Harvard, Binghampton, Minneapolis, Amherst, Tempe, and Las Vegas. Thanks to all who contributed. I would like to make particular mention of talking with and listening to Martin Carver, Randall McGuire, Robert Preucel and Charles Redman. Thanks to Robert Paynter for showing me round Deerfield. At Cambridge Anthony Snodgrass has given great encouragement and support as has Ian Hodder, whose incisive comment always makes me think. Thanks to Mick Casson at Cardiff for talking to me about pottery. And to my Greek friends for spurring me into reflection. I thank my college, Peterhouse, for much more than grant assistance for photography and travel. Philip Pattenden, Senior Tutor, particularly has helped and advised.

My mam, who collects, and dad, a true craftsman, have given so much to this book over the years. And it would have been inconceivable without Helen. With her work she shows me such a vital artistic sensibility.

PRELUDE: THE VISIT

I remember visits to the castles in the 1960s. A school trip up the Northumberland coast; driving out from where we lived in the south east of the county on summer weekend afternoons. I think back of the scale of the building, great gateways, estimating the thickness of the walls, worn and battered loop-holes, spiral stairways, pit-dungeon prisons, looking for rooms that still had their roofs intact (barrel vaulting), damp whatever the weather, and their smell of disinfectant (the custodians had to deal with visitors who couldn't find the public conveniences), masons' marks on the ashlar blocks (signs of distant anonymous personality), suits of armour and halberds in the armoury. Groundsmen, lawns and motor-mowers. Buying another official blue-covered pamphlet guide, produced by the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works (I liked the name). I found the historical notes very dull reading; the site descriptions were accessible; I liked the plans best of all—their transparent coded precision and testimony to materiality appealed to me.

Some of the castles are great impositions on the land, marks of punctuation in my looking at the border landscape of sand-dunes, woodland, and moors. Deep geologies: the Whin Sill, carboniferous lava upheaval, outcropping crags for Lindisfarne, Bamborough and Dunstanburgh.

The castles were knitted into many myths, stories and experiences. The general ambience and character of the borders of England and Scotland: histories of raiding, insurrection, sheep-stealing; but also the sharp separation of industrial Newcastle and Tyneside from the rural remainder of the county, with its towers and clinging remains still feudal (so too in the remaining aristocratic holdings, big private estates). At school I heard the myths of northern origins: Romans and Hadrian's Wall, Christian conversions and Saint Cuthbert, the Percys of Alnwick and Harry Hotspur, Wardens of the Northern Marches, nineteenth-century industrialists and national figures: heroes and heroines. It didn't really fit with my home in a colliery and shipbuilding town; it wasn't meant to. And the castles in the land were the presence of that romantic other, distant from everyday life but easily reached with a thirty-minute drive.

I watched TV a lot and loved film: Errol Flynn adventuring as *Robin Hood* (the idyllic pastoral of the woods), Peter O'Toole in *The Lion in Winter* (a scene shot on the beach at Bamborough), but also Michael Caine in *Get Carter* (running down the Dog Leap Stairs on Castle Hill, Newcastle).

Associations: of experiences of learning, of interpretations offered, of leisure-time, of school and family, of History, of the identity of the North East of England, of its landscape and the picturesque. The castles resonate. Bamborough is emblematic, appearing on tourist posters, in the title sequence of the local TV news magazine. Such resonances are the raw material of the commercial appropriation of heritage, and memories are coloured by such. It is also easy to find oneself lapsing into nostalgia and sentimentality. I suppose that these resonances were part of what took me to archaeology.

Bamborough Castle, Northumberland:
8.35 a.m. 8 March 1989

I still feel them strongly, albeit in a transformed mode. This is nothing exceptional. There may be as many comparable complexes of resonating sentiment and meaning around the

material past as there are thinking and feeling people; and of course different places and items evoke their own particular resonances.

Archaeology is the discipline which occupies itself with the study of the material remains of the past. But what is the connection between archaeology as study of the material past, and the resonances sounded by things found and remaining in the land? Is it possible to delimit a rational discipline archaeology, and separate it from the more diffuse emotive and affective? What is the connection between the visit and archaeology?

The answer which may be given is that the past is indeed stirring and evocative, but such feelings are separate from the study of the material past within an academic discipline. Archaeologists may be attuned to the meanings and associations which the material past holds for themselves and for others, but such feelings are not part of the primary production of the past which is the concern of the archaeologist. As in society there is a division between production and consumption. The archaeologist labours with the raw material past, source and origin of what we may archaeologically know. The labour is conceived as rational and disciplined. Academic training is needed to master the labour which is controlled and channelled by institutional structures of university and state. The products of this labour may be diversely received and used—consumed. In the case of something like a ruin in the landscape the labour of the archaeologist may even be ignored. We may choose to react to the castle in whatever way we wish. All the archaeologist might do is hope and encourage us to have an informed reaction, informed by their labour. But it is not within the field of archaeology proper to deal with popular consumption, commercial use, affective response. These are conceived as belonging with the present rather than the past. Such responses treat the remains of the past more as resource for present purpose and interest, rather than as a source of knowledge.

This separability of visit and archaeological study does not disaffirm the significance and importance of authentic response, of making some part of the past one's own in a sentimental appropriation. The popular, commercial or sentimental response to the material past is separable from professional and academic study, but there is a strong relationship of *relevance*. This is not simply to say that archaeologists need to be concerned with the relevance of their labours to others, nor just that archaeological work needs explaining to others, to be accessible. Especially since the 1970s the issue of relevance has grown into several sub-disciplines.

Native American Indians have forcefully pushed the questions of who owns the material remains of their past, what should happen to them, who has a right to study them, and who should be involved in deciding how this study should go on. Similar questions have been raised by other indigenous peoples who until recently have not usually been involved in the academic study of the material past. Also notable has been the request by the Greek government for the return of the Parthenon marbles from the British Museum in London—unique encapsulation of Greek pride in the past and national identity.

The growth of the leisure industries has involved the development of ways of presenting and interpreting things, from graphics to interactive video to actor-interpreters playing a role from the past and meeting with visitors. Such modes of interpretation are related to reflections on the production and curation of the past as a medium of education. They pose the question of how people might be taught effectively on their visit to the

past. They mould the experience of the visit to a castle, or any encounter with the material past.

A major role of the archaeologist is now that of consultant to decisions of planning and development. Legislation on both sides of the Atlantic requires account to be taken of any impacts on the archaeological past made by development and building projects. The archaeologist is expert to client developer or public-sector planner. Such work, of commercial organizations (for consultancy and fieldwork) or of local and national government boards, committees and units, has incited the refinement of an archaeological ethics which is concerned with codes of conduct, ethics of conservation and presentation, the form and standard of publication: regulating the professional body of archaeology.

All of these mediate the visit and the discipline of archaeology; they are the relation of relevance. It comes under various names: the politics of the discipline (as its place in contemporary society); interpretation and museum studies; cultural resource management or archaeological heritage management; the ethics of archaeology and conservation.

I have been working within and around archaeology for some years now. I revisit many of the places and sites I grew up with, and my fascination with visiting the past and encountering its remains continues. But there is an uneasiness. The separations and distinctions between a private affective response and the packaging, managing, presentation, interpretation of those within a more public arena of professional and academic archaeology often does an injustice to the complexity of the sentiments and thoughts evoked in the visit to the past. I am not happy with the notion of relevance and what becomes of the emotive or the affective in archaeology. For some there may be consolation in poetic or artistic treatments: from a poem by Seamus Heaney about ancient corpses from peat bogs to a historical novel by Walter Scott to a Hollywood epic. There are also those archaeologists who draw on the legacy of archaeology as primarily a humanities subject, enlivening the dry and dusty relics, or cold scientific analysis, with warm imagination and literary elaboration. But the former are marginalized as subjective response and may have little to do with what actually remains of the past; and I am unhappy with the latter for its assumptions about what the past is and how we may explain it (such archaeologies are often trapped within the old cliches of narrative history). There seems to be presented a choice: write poems, novels, paint watercolours—subjective fictions; or do archaeology—concerned with the past itself. I want to deny that there is this simple choice.

And this is more than my personal reaction to a gap between wandering around an ancient site and doing archaeology. The separations between present and past, response and original source, affective and rational, popular public and professional or academic go deep into the character of archaeology. This is where I begin Part 1 of this book. I ask—what is the character of an archaeology which involves such separations? This is to ask—what is archaeology? Or to make the question more tractable—what do archaeologists do?

Historic Deerfield, colonial Massachusetts, New England. Here is the rebuilt 'Indian House' (the original was demolished in 1848), monument to the attack on residents by French and Indians in 1704. The village speaks of order, cleanliness, colonial style and taste, the pioneer spirit, and of course lineage.

Mitford, Northumberland: within the castle bailey

Part 1
ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD

TREES AND GARDENS

A topography of archaeological interpretation

ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD: THE SOVEREIGNTY OF SCIENCE

What do archaeologists do? I shall begin with the answer given by academic and professional archaeologists. It is the answer: archaeological method.

A quick assessment of any introductory text will reveal one aspect of archaeological method: the mechanics of fieldwork—survey, excavation and post-excavation work on recovered materials. These are the technical matters of different means of surveying regions, sites and features, choice of appropriate excavation strategies, recording procedures and means of objective presentation, including perhaps some statistical summarizing. Scientific analysis of artifacts, biological and environmental materials (studies of artifact composition, identification and characterization of plant and animal remains) might be included here as might be work on conserving and consolidating things which are perishable or in a ruinous state. These are all things that a lot of archaeologists do for most of their time. Perhaps much less time is spent on interpreting and explaining what is found, but it is on this that I wish to concentrate in considering some assumptions and ideas underlying archaeological method, lying within the things that archaeologists do.

There are a set of ideas which make up an orthodoxy concerning the way archaeologists go about doing archaeology. There is a methodological hegemony; it is the sovereignty of science. Archaeology is a science. This orthodoxy is not a tightly organized or formal set of procedures and conditions. The hegemony is flexible and accommodating, within reason.

Fundamentalism

That archaeology should model itself on the natural sciences was vigorously proposed in the 1960s and after. The name of Lewis Binford is particularly associated with this proposal, part of the inauguration of ‘New archaeology’. At first this was a rigid fundamentalism. Certain features of scientific method were defined, often with reference to what philosophers of science had written (in practice this meant Carl Hempel), and archaeology was construed accordingly. The dogmatism and fundamentalism—strict adherence to the arguments of a particular philosophy and rigidity of method—have now mostly gone. Neither is there a simple and abstract understanding of the character and form of what natural scientists do. Enthusiastic theory building also proved too rigid or abstract when archaeologists went out into the field. The code of tight deductive

reasoning tied to explaining particulars by referring them to general laws was not very useful when an archaeologist had to plan a survey of a canyon in the American South West. The laws with which science supposedly works were not at all obviously around in archaeology.[2]

Critical rationalism and realism

So another line taken by New archaeology was, and is, to conceive of archaeology as science, but to characterize science in different ways. This has been the main thrust of theory produced within the methodological hegemony. Some make a stand for varieties of a scientific realism. This is basically the plausible idea that archaeologists can gain objective or approximately true knowledge of an independently existing past reality (which may not be directly observable), if they are careful and 'scientific'.[3]

The views of Karl Popper have had a significant effect on how many archaeologists think of what archaeologists should be doing, though he is not frequently cited. This is an argument that archaeology should be a form of critical rationalism. As rational study, archaeology should struggle against irrational beliefs about the past. This involves testing ideological and other claims about the past (its form and meaning) with reason. Reason is the means of advancing knowledge (as opposed to irrational and ideological beliefs) and takes the form of critical testing; science is the model of such controlled reason. To be knowledge a claim or proposal must correspond with the facts—the 'reality' beyond the knowing archaeologist. This is fundamental to testing. There is a strong *methodological* premise; by which I mean the procedures adopted (as opposed to the values or motivations of the archaeologist, or the actual character of the past being studied) are of vital importance in doing this critically rationalist archaeology. It doesn't matter who or what is being studied as long as certain procedures are followed. This premise is that the only meaningful (or rational) statements are those which are founded in the facts. This is taken to mean that only those statements can be considered as empirically based about which it can be said that they can be disproved by an empirical method. All other statements or claims about the past are superfluous, ideological or irrational.

This is a very cognitive form of reason. There is no place for sentiment or emotion. This may be so, but an ethics is implied in the procedures adopted. The possibility of critical testing implies open communities. The only criterion of a claim being meaningful is that it is open to testing against the bedrock of the factual. Anything which hinders testing is therefore undesirable, providing we wish to live in 'knowledge' and not in 'ignorance' or 'superstition'. Liberal and open debate about everything is part of critical rationalism. But not everyone may agree with such a definition of reason, or believe such a cognitive ideal; and what about faith, intuition and emotion? So the only restriction on open communities is that they may be required to be under the 'guidance' of experts in critical rationalism. Experts are needed.



Some recent trends in archaeological thinking

Archaeology has changed much in Britain and the United States over the last twenty-five years. The pace of change, the polemic, the variety of new and imaginative insights into the past can be largely attributed to an ethic of liberal debate. No longer did the authority of the professor count in relation to critical testing; anyone could be challenged on the grounds of testing. Literary skills were irrelevant in comparison to furthering archaeological knowledge with the democratic falsification of some unexamined assumption. Careers could develop very early without the discipline of academic hierarchies, especially when there was an expansion in the number of available posts. Compare the situation in Europe still now with its entrenched authorities and hierarchies unassailable.

At least this is one story. To what degree the ethic of liberal debate actually exists, or whether it depends in any way on reason, never mind testing, is very debatable.

Positive knowledge and empiricism

A scientific archaeology may be a more general or less developed idea. To some it may mean positive knowledge. Within a positive knowledge archaeologists would be working to acquire more knowledge of the past. The reason for such acquisition may be simply that knowledge is a good thing to have for its own sake; anyway the reason is less important than the knowledge being objective. Archaeological knowledge is positive and of the past if objective and so neutral and timeless (the past happened in the way it did and that much will not change). The timeless quality of knowledge is important if we are to aim to acquire it and build on what is already known; it would be no good building on

facts we cannot rely on, because they might change. Timeless and neutral knowledge also enables specialization, knowledges isolated in their own field, and disconnected from the present. Cultural politics of the 1990s do not affect what happened in Archaic Greece; the archaeologist can live with one while quite separately gaining knowledge of the other. Reference to a discipline other than archaeology might help with new ideas or questions, but it will not change the object of archaeological knowledge.

It will be clear that this idea of archaeology as positive knowledge did not arrive with the urges for archaeology to be explicitly scientific; it is a much more general project. But it does knit without contradiction with the project of a scientific archaeology. It is perhaps a more unexamined set of assumptions about what archaeologists do. We might easily resort to notions of positive knowledge if asked for justification when we had not reflected in detail on what archaeologists do.

Scientific archaeology being a form of empiricism is another general position. Empiricism is to conceive ourselves as fundamentally subject to the empirical world. This is to affirm that what matter are the facts of the past. These are the origin and end of what archaeologists do. Empiricism has formed a significant part of theories about what science is. And it seems to permit an emphasis on the acquisition and processing of facts about the past. This is certainly what many archaeologists do with their time, even seeing it as their role.

Reason, facts, models

Fundamentalism, critical rationalism, positive knowledge, empiricism: these are the main aspects of the sovereignty of science in archaeology, the methodological hegemony that would have of archaeology an empirical science. It can be summarized perhaps as an emphasis on reason and the facts.

In terms of what archaeologists do, how they go about the subject, it often appears as problem orientation and the application of models. Total recovery of all the surviving past is not possible; some selection must be made. The most efficient and rational way to make selection is to pose meaningful questions and set about answering them. Although flexibility is important (questions may need redefinition or even abandoning in the light of data recovered), posing questions and testing out ideas pertinent to their answering is the procedure for applying reason to the past.

This application often takes the form of model building and testing. Models are ideas or sets of ideas which simplify the complexity of archaeologically observed remains, isolating those aspects considered important from irrelevant facts and information, and offering an explanation of what has been observed. A favourite set of models has been systems. (The use of systems to explain the archaeological past is almost a defining characteristic of New archaeology and its later variant processual archaeology.) A system is an interconnected network of parts which form a complex whole. So society (the whole) may be divided into subsystems of economy, religion, technology, whatever, relationships between the parts specified, and then archaeological data fitted within. Testing models involves applying them to data—fitting data within a model to see if it works as expected.[4]

The methodological sovereignty of science has had a great deal of success in generating new types of facts (for example palaeobotanical and environmental evidence)

sought in addressing new and different questions. It has produced finer definition and control of the empirical, achieved particularly through the widespread use of quantification. There have been new insights into the workings of the past with the development of powerful and integrating holistic models, bringing different types of data together. There has been useful insistence on making the application of reason explicit with tight definitions of concepts and a shift towards theory-building—bringing out into discussion assumptions and aims. And simple description of the past or descriptive narratives telling what happened in ancient times have given way to explanation and the search for causal processes. The idea of archaeology as a social science can be connected with a re-evaluation of the relation between archaeology and anthropology. Archaeology has been predominantly a branch of anthropology in the United States. Archaeology as anthropological science means producing social explanations for what archaeologists find (a social archaeology), not writing historical narratives.[5]

Criticism and debate are very much part of the methodological hegemony and this has made archaeology stimulating for some people.[6] And there have always been challenges to the sovereignty of science.

CHALLENGES

Traditional humanist and antiquarian archaeologies are still around. Apart from some adoption of scientific recovery techniques, large sections of archaeology remain untouched by the developments in archaeological thinking of the last three decades. This is particularly the case in Britain and in Classical and Near Eastern archaeology (see the comments in Tim Champion's (forthcoming) review of theory in Britain). Some still aim to piece together a story of what happened in ancient and prehistoric times unencumbered by theoretical apparatus and worries. Such stories often stick closely to descriptive accounts of the changes archaeologists find in the material culture they excavate. There may be a gloss of the historical and human drama over the remains set in their time and location; often the stone axes, bronze swords and potsherds stand as their own testimony. There is a melancholy about such archaeologies—that so much of the past is lost, that all that is left to do is to recite the list of survivor traces, that human reason is inadequate to the task of reconstructing the past. And scepticism, of attempts to move beyond the only certainties we have—the remains, scepticism also of the shaky theoretical structures of scientific archaeology set on thin scapings of detritus. Some, the antiquaries, find fascination in simply objects brought to light, their qualities, typification, codification. This traditional outlook can be seen most clearly in the established archaeological journals in Britain, and in artifact typology studies (see also the comments in Shanks and Tilley 1987b, Chapters 1 and 2).

Traditional archaeologies are still firmly rooted in countries other than the United States and Britain. The methodological hegemony I am sketching is a hegemony of Anglo-American archaeology. Different interests, histories, and institutional structures (organizing career paths and the hierarchies of archaeological services) create markedly different national archaeologies. Contrasts pertinent to this book are between the object of American archaeology conceived ethnographically as the remains of another culture, and the object of British archaeology conceived as the past remains of British history—

the *Blood of the British* (to use the title of a television series and book by Catherine Hills). I think this is a deep contrast and comes through in the tighter hold of images of science in American archaeology. That the archaeology of Classical Greece and Rome is not located within departments of anthropology in the United States, and often not in departments of archaeology but Classics in Britain, is part of Classical archaeology's markedly traditional orientations in both Britain and the United States.[7]

The claims of scientific reason have no hold on some of what have been termed fringe archaeologies. These are archaeologies in that they are concerned with material traces of the past, but many decry the lack of humanity in scientific reason or indeed any orthodox academic study, and they may not hold the same reverence for facts. Something has been lost: ancient and mysterious wisdoms, human communion with nature's powers perhaps; but it can be regained somewhat. The means of contact are primarily mystical—beyond scientific reality, and often ignored or denied; dowsing is a favourite. Conceptions of the past which escape science may be put forward (they may be claimed as consonant with science if it were more open). Visitors from alien worlds, great catastrophes (floods, volcanoes, wayward movements of planets) change history and are yet forgotten but for the dim memory of myth and the more enigmatic aspects of the archaeological record.

The writings that archeologists produce have changed significantly with the sovereignty of science. Theoretical debate and innovation, new terminologies, presentation of quantified analyses, and less emphasis on descriptive historical narrative in the terms of common sense mean that archaeology is much less accessible to non-specialists. This has been an object of complaint (for example Hawkes 1968). And while not directly challenging technical and specialist work, there are those who fix on the popular attractions of archaeology, spectacular sites and finds, mysterious pasts and the romance of discovery, in journalistic writing designed to be accessible to a wide audience (for example Wood 1985). The concern with spectacle, romance and discovery can far remove such work from professional archaeology; it may be closer to a genre of travel writing. Popular archaeologies merge with tourist guides, into general historical writing, and into novels. Such archaeology may indeed be taken to complement specialist work, adopting a role of presenting difficult jargon and ideas.

The sovereignty of science has been challenged on deeper philosophical and methodological grounds within the discipline. Before I come to this body of critique I want to take some steps back.

TREES AND TREE-THINKING

Archaeology under the sovereignty of science, the methodological hegemony of processual archaeology and its variants, together with the alternatives, challenges and complements represent, I claim, a sort of *tree-thinking*. Their disciplinary topography is arboreal. I shall explain what I mean by this.

Trees signify. As much as a material resource, trees provide a rich symbolism. Noble, solid, upstanding, stable, deep-rooted, aged, trees have evocative ideological power. Cultivated and managed in forestry and the designer landscape estates of the aristocracy, yet products of nature, trees and woodland are a particular compound of a social relationship with the natural world. In an especially clear example Stephen Daniels has

shown how ‘in later Georgian England woodland imagery was deployed to symbolize, and so naturalize, varying and conflicting views of what social order was or ought to have been’ (1988, p. 43). Property, ownership, social hierarchy, a working yet charming countryside, shelter, conscious design and cultural identity (great oaks of England) were all written into the landscape works of Capability Brown, Uvedale Price and Richard Payne Knight. Tree-thinking draws on all these associations.

Trees are hierarchical. In a tree system order is fixed (the structure of trunk, branches, twigs) and materials or information flow along pre-established lines. Individual points can be plotted in a tree system according to place in the flows. Armies are trees—each individual is integrated into the whole by an allotted space, a rank, a point fixed in the whole. And individuals receive orders, determinations from more integrated levels—higher ranks; responses and information from those of lower and less integrated rank. The individual is subject in their allotted place.



An archaeological tree

Trees have a unity to their multiple elements, from roots to leaves. The trunk stands solid at the centre; it segments, splits into branches but always supplies the higher unity. Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (to whom I owe much of this image) relate this centring and segmentation as a law of reflection—a binary logic of the one that becomes two (1988). This is how the multiple is created in tree-thinking. Or the trunk is severed and multiple branches sprout: pollarding. Radicles and fascicles. But the many branches or rootlets still depend on a higher or lower unity.

Trees have an identity. Particular identities and types can be specified. The unity of tree-order is an organic and internal one. The tree grows in its wood or field separate and with its own identity. Chain-saw the trunk or axe the roots and the tree dies; order is no more. And it is internal—the order is fixed according to relations within and between the different branches, roots or parts. This fixing of order and plotting of points depends on a principle of identity. In tree-thinking it is possible to specify identities (of objects, substances, concepts), to relate what something is. Tree-thinking depends on the notion of *being:* this object/ substance/concept *is* something: *A* is *B*. This principle of identity involves attribution and classification. And in depending on being, it is an ontological principle.

The sexuality of trees is a reproductive one. By this is meant that trees are organic and a significant purpose of theirs is reproduction. In tree-thinking the world is reproduced in thought. The tree-book represents its object either by means of external image, or in terms of an internal structure held in common. This reproductive logic depends on there being an identity of something which is to be reproduced, on it being something in the first place.

Trees are genealogical. Family trees, lines of descent, roots and ancestors. In tree-thinking we need to dig deep to find origins and our identities. Authenticity comes with depth. And this entails that there are only a limited number of authentic entry points; the tree begins in the roots. Trees cannot be grown from dry leaves.

In sum, tree-thinking has these characteristics: it is unified and hierarchical, concerned with the meanings and identities of things (what they are), conceives that there are roots or bases to what we know, aims to reproduce its object in thought. The symbolism of trees implies that such reasoning is solid, upstanding, and stable.

Tree-thinking in archaeology. In the arboreal topography of their subject archaeologists identify things and attribute the things they find to types and classes. Digging deep; the past is the root, origin of archaeological thought; the roots are objective data. I do not mean that this tree-logic is inductive reasoning, whereby general conclusions are drawn from a set of factual premises; the roots do depend on the whole for their existence. It is conceived as reasonable to identify objects from the past not simply as axes or vessels, but more generally as objects with attributes. The past *is* something, if nothing else an array of objects with contexts.

There is a hierarchical order of practices in archaeology—from excavating roots through syntheses to interpretations. And I think that the pre-established order into which are assimilated individual items, be they artifacts or analyses, implies a concern with method and procedures (their efficiency and fitness) which comes before the particulars to which method is applied. It is thought possible to detail method without reference to the actual data, archaeologists and situations in which it will operate.

Archaeological texts reproduce the world of archaeology in this tree-thinking. There is, of course, a recognized difference—the excavation report must select and order the material excavated, treated, classified, scrutinized, as appropriate. The interpretation may be within a fashionable theoretical framework. But nonetheless the past is final point of reference. They may be descriptive images of how the past was, or explanatory models of how it worked, but it is as accounts of the past and of the material world that archaeological texts are produced.

Finally, arboreal archaeology has a unity and an identity. Even though it has immense diversity, from conservation chemistry to faunal analysis to grand philosophy of history, and it may be similar to the anthropological tree, archaeology nevertheless has its objects, purposes and practices. At a very practical level it exists in disciplinary form as a subject in museums and institutions of education.

CRITIQUE

The sovereignty of science has been subject to considerable criticism in the last ten years and more. The criticism comes from what is often called post-processual archaeology. There are convenient introductions to this work and here I will only sketch the main outlines of the critique.[8]

The critique of positivism

Elements of the methodological hegemony of processual archaeology have been identified as positivist; and in philosophy and social theory a positivist is not a good thing to be. A positivist archaeology might hold to the following.

- Archaeology is to be a science, modelled on scientific principles.
- What is important is not the particularity of the material past (the infinity of minute detail) but *generalization,* bringing the past under the control of general statements, subsuming the meaningless particular find under meaningful general statements which account for the particulars found. This means that descriptions of the past which involve staying at the level of sequences of particular changes are not enough. Explanations involving generalization about causal processes are what are needed. Not a descriptive narrative of how ideas about farming spread throughout Europe, but why it happened, and this question involves general processes such as how ideas are passed on, how populations spread.
- In such explanations societies can be treated as if they were like the natural objects of science. This means that social practice (social actions with all their meanings, implications, motivations and intentionality) is treated as behaviour (actions as bodily movements stripped of meaning and intentionality).
- Positivism's theory of knowledge (its epistemology) involves our explanations corresponding with the facts as we experience them with our senses, primarily as we observe. Facts are given primacy.
- And facts, good facts that is, are neutral, free of people's bias and values which would spoil neutral explanation, since explanation must correspond with the facts.

The criticisms which have been made of these points are now very well known in archaeology and have been advanced elsewhere for some decades. I shall repeat them in summary for the sake of clarity.

There is the problem, indeed the impossibility of devising a totally neutral observation language (words which describe the reality encountered in archaeology). Descriptive terms, as words, are always burdened and charged with meaning and associations which are not neutral. More generally this is the great philosophical question of the relation between the senses and language, between consciousness and language, between the object world and language. There is no simple correspondence and the attempts to define links have not been successful. This means that facts cannot be separate from values. There is no bedrock—the factual past as it is—separate from the value-laden terms which apply to those facts.

There is a related question of experience. Archaeological data are created in people's experience, through their senses, their application of terms of description and attribution, their social practice of archaeology. In the account of positivism this experience is sanitized and reduced to controlled observation and recording. But what happens to the social and personal elements? After all, in creating a body of data in their work, noting and describing their excavation and finds, archaeologists are performing acts of autobiography, albeit strange ones. Positivists (and others) dismiss such elements as sources of bias, at the best irrelevancies.

Another general issue inadequately resolved is that of the relation between the observer and the observed, the knowing (epistemological) subject and object. Separating and collapsing one into the other (the observing subject having to discard subjectivity in deference to the object; an object world created entirely within consciousness) leads to the philosophical problems of idealism (that there is some 'substance' or 'essence' named objectivity which imposes itself on perceptive subjectivity; that reality is created in thought).

Finally, to treat society as second nature, social practice as bodily behaviour, is to miss what makes society what it is—meanings and the intentions of its individual members, their power to act (their agency), and their relation with the form and structure of their society.

On one hand such criticisms have brought forward new approaches to explaining past societies. These emphasize archaeology as a study of social practices through material remains recovered archaeologically. Much work has gone into questioning how society is organized (stressing the importance of power), into examining the whole notion of structure (of society and of action), into understanding action, agency (people's power to act), the meaning (a key concept) of the things people do and the things they make.[9]

On the other hand such criticisms force archaeologists to ask just what the object past is supposed to be and how archaeologists are to deal with the facts of the material past if it is not a simple matter of describing them, orientating problems around them and finding explanations which correspond with them.

From ideology to critical archaeology

Another line of criticism has been that of ideology critique. In part this is an extension of the argument that facts and values are inseparable, that subjectivity and objectivity are

much more closely related than some might wish. In tightly relating the observing archaeological subject and object past (the factual past as imbued with the forms, meanings and significances of the archaeologist), past and present are treated no longer as separate temporal realms but as informed by each other. The past exists as part of the present in terms of the aims, assumptions and conceptual frameworks of the archaeologist; and these may be political.

Archaeologies which celebrate national or cultural identity, or which imperialistically impose a cultural identity, are obvious and prevalent outside Anglo-American archaeology. Such archaeologies definitely have a political point to prove. But the relation of ideology between past and present can be more subtle. The sovereignty of science has been criticized as belonging with a social interest in controlling the natural world through reason (with nature as object and stuff of manipulation), in reducing questions of the meaning of the past and social practice to technical questions of how best to operate efficient methods for bringing the past, classified and explained, to order. Such a use of reason is described as instrumental and is the dominant form of reason in contemporary capitalism. The advocacy of this form of reason to the exclusion of others is therefore criticized as ideological in its disparagement of alternative relationships with the past and its implicit support for the more inhuman and execrable aspects of contemporary society, in particular reification—the treatment of (natural and social) others as objects, of development, management, exploitation.

Other criticism has been levelled at particular social models of the past. Much work goes into making sense of the animal and plant remains of ancient economic activities. Archaeologists dig up great quantities of such material and certainly more can be said than simply which animals were hunted or kept and which plants eaten. But some economic reconstructions have assumed that economic principles operating in the contemporary capitalist market operated also in the past and in simpler societies—principles of a rational labour market such as efficiency of effort and maximization of output or profit. This projects our present on to the past, and so it is criticized as ideological in the failure to consider that the past may be different, and in justifying the present through the assumption that it is based on universal and so natural principles.

Systems theory (which often comes with the idea that past societies are like organisms living and functioning in environments) has been criticized for its inherent conservative bias and implied opposition to social change (organisms stay in balance; imbalance constitutes illness and threatens: societies tend towards stability; change is disturbance of this natural state).

Museums have also come under criticism for projecting the present on to the past.

Rather than continue this rapid review of ideology critique in archaeology, I want to map the directions it has pointed.

Historicism is one. This is to hold that every present understands the past in terms of its own historical location. History is constantly rewritten as the present changes. So archaeology is inevitably affected by its present. The optimism of some archaeologists in the 1960s regarding the promise and universality of science might be related to the aspiring fortunes of the professional middle classes, with economic expansion in the United States (Trigger 1981, 1989a; see also Patterson 1986). We should expect archaeological explanations to reflect the present; there is nothing particularly worrying about this, it is argued; we should just take note.

If past and present are inextricably linked, pluralism may be entailed. Under such a view different social groups in the present may well develop different pasts. This has been a particularly interesting and important issue with the emergence of groups outside the professional academy who claim a right to think their own pasts in the public sphere. The issue is also one of relativism—are all such pasts which arise authentically (a difficult term) out of social experience valid? If archaeological pasts are always part of the present, are we to expect a multiplicity of equally valid pasts? How are such competing pasts to be judged?

For some, ideology critique is a way through this question. Critique could show us how a museum exhibit distorts, raise such unwanted bias to consciousness and so bring about its avoidance. Self-consciousness is what is needed. There could be a distinct and separate politics of archaeological interpretation, relating pasts to presents.

Pragmatism is another related but more radical proposal. In brief the argument is that the meaning and justification of different pasts depends on their 'practical' effects or practical content. Knowledges are related to social interests in an inseparable nexus of power, knowledge and a will-to-truth. Some interests are good, so some knowledges are good. Alternatively knowledge is what it is good to know. In either case it is necessary to shift argument to ethical matters, questions of value, of politics. Accordingly values as yet not forcibly championed in archaeology are advocated in some recent works; they are against authority and for a more participatory archaeology, challenging archaeology's exclusivity, its institutional and hierarchical organization, countering archaeological pasts which trap us in the ideas and structures of a faulty present. Archaeology is to be political practice.[10]

In sum, this body of critique has questioned the validity of what a lot of archaeologists are doing or think they are doing. Serious doubt has been cast on the sort of procedures which are taken to go with a scientific archaeology. An increasing awareness of archaeology's place in the present and the refinement of a politics of archaeological interpretetion is showing that archaeologists cannot just get on with a neutral study of the past. They may even be proferring views which arise more from present concerns and interests.

In asking questions of the language used to describe the 'reality' of the past, objectivity is bracketed with the theoretical aims, interests, and subjective orientations of the archaeologist. This subversion of objectivity is taken to a fitting end in post-structuralism. It is to this that I now move.

Post-structuralism

Post-structuralism is a dislocated commixture of writings in various fields—philosophy, literary studies, cultural criticism, social thought, and history. Although it is not immediately apparent, the work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida in particular has had a significant effect on some archaeologists.[11]

The characteristic enemy is metaphysics. It cannot be said that there is a recognizable archaeological metaphysics, but metaphysical notions there are. These are judgements about what really exists (the primary component of metaphysics is ontology), and the archaeological relationship with it. A dominant archaeological metaphysic is that the object of study is the origin or source of what archaeologists do. The past, present in its

traces, is the beginning and end of archaeology. The word itself—archaeology—contains all that exists in its project: 'archaeology' comes from the Greek *archē* meaning origin and beginning, power and sovereignty; its adjective *archaios* meaning from the beginning, ancient; and *logos* meaning account, reason, explanation, expression, discourse. That these elements have presence and meaning in themselves is to be questioned in a post-structuralist account; in particular all ideas of identity, origin, and meaning. It is argued that the past has no determinate meaning, that it has no final meaning but constantly slips from our conceptual hold, that it is not the origin or source of what archaeologists know or do (Yates 1990, p. 261).

A key to understanding this is to realize that it depends on foregrounding language and its structure. Language is argued as central to what it is to be human, and language is primarily signification—communication in and through signs. Saussure's structuralist linguistics established a fundamental split within the sign: between the (differential and sensible) *signifier,* a sound or image which acts as a vehicle; and the (formal and intelligible) *signified,* a concept referred to. Signifiers have no necessary meaning in themselves (words are arbitrary sounds), but hold potential. This potential comes from signifiers being located in systems or structures of signifiers which differ from each other. The word 'pot' on its own means nothing. What brings meaning is that the sound or marks on a page are different from 'axe' or 'bone'. This structure of difference enables the signifier to be tied to the signified. It can be noted that the signified is still *within* the sign. It is not the actual thing to which the sign refers. This is known as the referent. The relation between sign and referent, between the components of our language and the 'real' world is also in question here.

So such structuralism might lead us to doubt the tightness of the link between sign and meaning. We get to meaning in realizing that it involves signifiers located in structures of differences. Jacques Derrida takes this differential or relational conception of language further. It is encapsulated in his term *différance*. The word 'pot' involves us in a move to other (coded) sounds or words in determining its significance. We relate the word and its associations to others. Nothing can function as a sign without referring to another element which is not present. The result is a texture, each dimension or element being formed on the basis of traces within it of other elements. Nothing is ever simply present or absent. And there can be no end to this differing. We are always delayed in reaching meaning. Meaning is constantly deferred, divided from itself. There are only webs of signifiers. This entails meaning always being absent in some way. It is not present in the sign.

If signification is a primary aspect of the world we live (objects, utterances, inscriptions, experiences signifying to us), if our hold on 'reality' is primarily through language, then identity and meaning are elusive and not as readily available as common sense would have us think.

I hold a piece of pot. I can attribute an identity to it: it is not a stone or metal blade but a fragment of pottery of a certain size, perhaps with decoration of a particular type, with colour and markings, a particular ceramic fabric. I can perhaps relate such attributes to styles of pottery, to production centres, to places where such pots are found. This is not what the piece of pot *is*. Ontology (being) is in question. These attributes are not present *within* the potsherd, giving it an identity. I might see in the marks on the broken fragment a reminder of a pebble found on the beach. Its colour may bring me to think of a picture on my wall at home. Its painted strutting lions may remind me of my cat. I may think of

the first occasion I came across this potsherd, my mood or circumstance when I did so. All is shifting. It would be better to talk of the piece of pot becoming rather than being something. It does not have identity and being, so much as difference and becoming. I am led into associations and periphrasis, metaphor.

The piece of pot is old. Is it the past? Does it bring the past to me? Is it a sign of the past, its trace? Is the past its meaning? The past and the potsherd cannot be reduced to promises of communion with a definitive or transcendent meaning. The meaning is here and dispersed elsewhere. The potsherd is always more. I try to remove my feelings and perceptions and see through to what the potsherd actually is. Its existence is simply and grossly material, and even its chemical and physical composition leads me off into associations. It is always referred to something else. Where do I begin? How do I know which lines of flight from the object, which deferrals to take? Only according to a law—being told the 'right' chains of relation.

The signifier is subverted; instead of the sovereign signifying potsherd there are webs of difference. The past is not the origin of meaning, but neither is the archaeologist. Archaeologists write: their excavations, the finds, interpretations. But given that there is no ultimate meaning to such works, no unity of signifier (the archaeological text) and the signified (the past), what is the origin of meaning of the texts? We do not find the past in the archaeological work, nor do we find the archaeologist. There are no origins of the meanings we read through archaeological books. There is no sovereign archaeological subject dreaming and communicating meanings behind or beyond the words and images we see. The author is dead. Authorship gives way to text; authors as fixed points of identity and origin give way to discourse. Discourse consists of sets of practices, values, concepts, powers which enable the production of what are considered as meaning and knowledge, and of texts produced within its structures and law. We are inserted into such discourse.

Such post-structuralist argument should not be taken to say that there is nothing that we can know, only uncertainty, that there is no past and present, or indeed objects from the past which may mean or be known. It does not question truth to replace it with a free-play of signifiers. What is questioned is the hope that the truth in archaeology (however far we may be from it), the truth of the past, is one of presence and being, meanings within and belonging to the past and brought to us in the presence of the potsherd. These are transcendental notions: the presence and being of a past existing before signification, without necessary relation with anything else, in and for itself, immediate, beyond our question. Instead the truth of the past (a reasonable aim) is material and institutional, social and personal; and archaeologists write in the space between past and present.

So objectivity slips off into lines of affiliation and association. Archaeology seems less to do with the past than contemporary interests. What is to become of archaeology if such critique is accepted? What are archaeologists to do?

What is a post-structuralist archaeology to be?

The critique I have sketched is in no way widely accepted. I am in sympathy with a lot of it, will try to show how and why, and I have given it support in my other work in archaeology. But others are suspicious of the critique of the sovereignty of science and are not happy with what it would seem to make of archaeology.[12]

It may be considered that the questioning of objectivity as guide and aim leads to an incapacity to prefer one interpretation of the past to another. Anything goes and interpretation may proliferate according to subjective will. Objectivity questioned may be taken to mean subjectivity unleashed. The doubting of objectivity may mean removing the surest ground for judging what people may make of the past. How are we to decide between mainstream academic archaeology and the fancies of those who may believe that ancient monuments lie on lines of earth force and were to guide incoming spacecraft?

I have mentioned pluralism as an option implied when interpretation is retated to social interest, and archaeological work is located within different social contexts. A past which cannot be reduced to singular meaning and which is caught in expansive webs of association would also seem to permit multiple interpretations of the same archaeological reality. This pluralism may be criticized as a decadent voluntarism—that it is a luxury of comfortable and isolated academics to be able to exercise choice between different pasts, playing with text and meaning. They may have the power and opportunity to do so; others do not and do not want fragmented and indeterminate pasts which have lost their power and authority to be relevant. Archaeologists should draw on their authority to present for people a coherent and authentic past, not dissolve into vapid speculations.

A lot of the critique is difficult reading. It is thick with new terminologies, references to debates in other fields which can be very specialized, and goes on a great deal about theoretical and other matters without getting straight down to what archaeologists do or may do. Much of the critique has come from just a few university centres and individuals within them. Some suspect that what is happening is a mystification of what are relatively straightforward issues. This mystification creates a class of experts in the difficult matters, and the apparent expertise furthers academic careers. Create a trend and wait for promotion. I think that there is something to this suspicion.

I have talked of critique. What is it? Later I will draught out critique as a tradition of negative thinking. But it can also simply mean being critical as part of the cycle of (archaeological) method. I tried to show how a critical attitude is an important part of the success of the sovereignty of science. I see this as a taming of the potential of critique. Critique becomes ‘liberal’ and open debate within the academy and profession. Its character is often not a pleasant one: chastisement (how could you have got it so wrong and how dare you); legality (you can’t do that, it’s not allowed); prescription (don’t do that, you must do this); and authority (I know, you don’t). There is now a well-established pattern to the development of academic archaeology and critique is incorporated. Ideas are borrowed and adapted from another discipline; other archaeologies are criticized on the basis of these borrowings; a new archaeological approach is outlined and prescribed; application is made to archaeological data; polemic follows. This has happened many times with borrowings from the philosophy of science, mathematics, geography, sociobiology, social theory, Marxism, anthropology, biology, ethology, ecology, linguistics, philosophy, and literary criticism. It has indeed enabled some to establish their academic and individual worth by figuring in the cycle. That many more grow tired and cannot or will not keep up with the carousel of approaches is understandable. Value can be seen in sticking with an idea and thoroughly working it out in the data, or it can be enjoyable watching from the sidelines.

But the suspicion of careerist elitism is also an unjust one. I believe that there is much more to the critique than that. I also believe that the dreadful spectres of unchecked

subjectivity and relativism can be avoided without lapsing into the problems of the sovereignty of science. Before this though another image.

WEEDS, RABBITS AND POTATOES

In the North East of England it's called wicken grass. Scutch or twitch grass, couch grass. You can't get rid of the stuff. It sends out creeping white underground stems. Chop it up and each piece grows again. Mint grows anyhow too. Throw a piece away in the garden and next year there'll be a mint plant. Mint and iris grow from their rootstock. Thick crawling crabwise stalks underground sprouting more plants. Extensions then focus in tubers and bulbs. Rhizomes: this is a favourite metaphor of Deleuze and Guattari (1988). Invasive and spreading weeds sometimes; but potatoes are also rhizomes.

Prairie dogs and rabbits live in great burrows or warrens which provide shelter, supply and movement; they allow evasion and escape, breakout. Animal rhizomes. Ants also form a sort of insect rhizome.

Rhizomes-thinking is conjunctive. Its principle is not, as in tree-thinking, an ontological one, of *being* something (*A* is *B*), but of connection and lines of sequence *(A, B, C, D...)*. Its character is multiplicity, in contrast to the multiple of tree-thinking. Trees can have multiple branches and leaves on the basis of segmentation of a higher unity or pollarding, but rhizomes are always already more than one—multiplicity. There is no unity in a rhizome in the sense of a centre or focus which can support attributes (*A* is *B* and *C* and…) or a pivot of division and segmentation. The rhizome is not a multiple unit derived from the division of a central unit or trunk. There are no points, pivots, positions of a fixed structure (arboreal and hierarchical) in a rhizome; any point can be connected with any other. Rather than points there are lines, of sequence, of connection which have no beginning or end, but middles in motion: dimensions and direction. So you can never feel secure with a binary division or dichotomy in a rhizome; the division may turn back on itself with new organization, re-entering the sequence. There is no fixed entrypoint, but many. The rhizome is anti-genealogy. There is no meaningful sequence from origin or ancestor to descendant. Rhizomes move sideways; they do not dig deep. The rhizome is not itself by virtue of its own form, like a tree. It is constantly in movement, shifting. The lack of centre and clear structure means that it is defined more by the outside. And if certain lines are followed we end elsewhere, in another multiplicity, deterritorialized, in another patch of wicken grass, out of the burrow, in a line of flight.

The sexuality of wicken grass, of rhizomes, of the burrow is not really reproductive but erotic. Open and conjunctive, it is about fostering connections and associations. This is an oneiric desire: desire like dreamwork in which the deep and forbidden meaning of our dreams and fantasies is turned into the dream stories we have. Rhizomes are not so much about being, identity and reproduction, as becoming something else, movement and relationality.

There is an aspect of signification in tree-thinking. Trees stand for other things, and this signifying depends on principles of identification—specifying points of identity and of representation. Unlike the tree-book, which is a model or representation of its object, the rhizome-book connects with its object—it does not represent but constructs with and for the object. Rhizome-writing forms an assemblage with what it is about.

What are the implications for the archaeological garden? The characteristics of rhizomes-thinking are: making connections, anarchic associations rather than hierarchical procedures of thinking, denial of final and definitive identities of things in reconstructions of the object world, rather than reflections. I have introduced the images of trees and rhizomes to raise some old questions of how archaeologists represent or write the past, give it identity and classify it, relate the different things we find to each other and to ourselves, how we understand the things archaeologists do. I am not going to say that tree-thinking is out. I shall try to see through the images to the fertility of a rhizomes-thinking augmenting tree-thinking in a more varied topography of archaeological interpretation.

A WIDER VIEW: PHILOSOPHY AND MODERNITY

Can archaeologists afford to lose their hold on what may be considered objective reality? Can they afford to admit that the facts of the past may not be at all what they were but are inextricably wrapped up in our subjective present? Are archaeologists, with the authority of objective source material gone, to be on an equal footing with novelists and mystics? What is to be made of the fears of relativism, of not being able to judge different archaeologies? I want to try to answer these questions by considering the intellectual context of the criticisms which have been levelled at the methodological hegemony of archaeological science, by thinking again what critique may be, and then by picking out some ways of working archaeology which promise much to me.

Archaeology can be a narrow and parochial subject. It can be very secure and rewarding to excavate or survey, conserve and describe, photograph and collect archaeological materials. These are all necessary parts of doing archaeology. But I think the fears of losing a hold on the past, of multiple and incommensurable explanations at the whim of present political interests are, unfortunately and as unacceptably, as insular, when the intellectual context of the questions raised in the last fifteen years is considered.

I think of the philosophical challenges which have been made to some of the premises of archaeology's methodological hegemony. The distinction between analytic and synthetic statements is a vital one for an archaeology which wants to hold on to the empirical. (Analytic statements are those which can be shown to be true by laws of logic and definitions which are grounded in meanings independent of facts; for example, 'this axe is a cutting implement'. Synthetic statements are those, often grounded in fact, where what is asserted of the subject does not repeat all of the meaning of the subject; for example, 'this axe is large'.) With the dissolution of the distinction by Quine and others, it is difficult to maintain the distinction between facts and meanings. The logical atomism of Russell and Wittgenstein's early work, and analogous philosophies such as positivism, have also lost credit. These hold that atomic propositions (or protocol or basic propositions) are elementary terminal or originary statements established in philosophical analysis which reveal the actual structure of facts, directly picturing them, mirroring the world. It does not seem possible to reduce statements to terms which refer directly to immediate experience of reality, and to define meaning or significance on the basis of this reduction. It is not so easy to hold a distinction between metaphysics and another more secure reason such as science.

More generally such philosophical doubts belong with a failure of the compact between word and world. 'In the beginning was the word and the word was with god' (in Greek: *en archē ēn ho logos—archē* and *logos,* here are some pertinent reflections for archae-ology). We read in the Gospel of Saint John of an original compact between speaking the meaning of the world and divinity, its foundation. But Nietzsche, and modernity, write of the death of god. The link between the words we use and the world we live seems no longer so trustworthy. We have had thrown in doubt our ability to say the meaning of the world.

It is with this reference that we may think of the attacks by Derrida and others on what they call *logocentrism* and *ontotheology* and which are argued as lying within much of western thought. Logocentrism is the centring of thought on *logos,* which is an order of meaning conceived as existing in-itself, in communion with reality, a foundation—thought, truth, reason, logic, the Word of God. And it holds that we need not go beyond this foundation. Onto-theology is a theology in that it assumes a transcendental existence of some sort as foundation. Existing in-itself as presence, it is a divine first principle. In logocentrism the potential compact between word and world means that being is sayable, that language is a direct analogy of existence. But this forgets about the signifier. The word is not a unity of neutral vehicle (the sound) and meaning. Expression, the realm of the signifier, is material and differential; it is not a transparent and neutral vehicle bringing to us the presence of the world. Derrida takes us from presence to *différance,* from speech as a direct and natural relation with meaning to signifiers constantly deferring absolute meaning. There is no simple correspondence between word and world.

Logos and cosmos no longer meet. And this is not some empty intellectual motif. It is part of the experience of our (post)modern condition. To this experience belong not only philosophical but also moral, psychological, social and political configurations. In this context of my speculation on the character of archaeology I am interested in the cultural and aesthetic responses to (post)modernity: the visual, tactile, textual experiment around perception and representation, the questioning of what realism may be, of what our knowing and being are in contemporary modernity: these are the characteristics of the movements of modernism and postmodernism. World and word, being and reference are separated, and left are absence or language and imagery themselves. From the saying of meaning to deafness—absurdity (Latin: *surdus* means deaf). To an absence of the world as its truth. I say this is a pot, but the word pot is not the real ceramic object, and to use the word as if it were stand-in is to abuse the word. With Mallarmé: the force and vitality, the meaning of the word I form is the absence of that ceramic. Jean Cocteau: the only work which succeeds is that which fails (see Steiner 1989).

Art not as imitator of the world, but referring to itself, self-consciously aesthetic. Where does perception and representation begin, the world end? Collage draws in the world as aesthetic material. A surrealist searches the flea-market for the ready-made art-object. An object world no longer secure and familiar but strange and shocking, though media saturation dulls the sharpness. With the death of God as the omniscient narrator comes a many-sided world, secret and unconscious worlds, paradox and ambiguity as opposed to single objective reality. What story-telling can now cope with the world? And what has happened to the faith in progress and the exponential growth of technological reason and knowledge? Linear and consoling time gives way to synchronous montage.

With modernity came revolutionary change. The aftermath of the defeat of revolutionary political movements outside the Soviet Union after the Great War of 1914–18 brought a crisis in orthodox Marxism. Western Marxism—writers such as Lukács, Gramsci, Adorno, Marcuse and the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, to Sartre and Althusser—was a decisive shift in attention away from economic and political structures as central concerns of Marxist theory to questions of culture and consciousness. These were conceived as the ideological locus of the stabilizing features of capitalism which worked against revolutionary political change. As well as managing a major critique of 'bourgeois' philosophy, a considerable theoretical apparatus has been developed for understanding culture and ideology (cultural constructions which misrepresent or deny a contradictory social reality). There has been innovative work on the constitution of subjectivity, and on the analysis and reception of art and literature. The latter has raised serious questions of the place of the artist or cultural worker in society (Brecht's theatre and Adorno's avant-garde have had considerable influence). Western Marxism has also been a revitalization of dialectical and relational thinking which finds a major recent origin in Hegel (I shall come to this soon). Nor is western Marxism over and done with; Habermas notably continues in a similar but extended trend. And without it contemporary European thought is inconceivable (Anderson 1976).

However naive and unsophisticated, much recent archaeological work is also in debt to this branch of critical Marxism. This is visible in the use of the concept ideology, the influence of French structural-Marxist anthropology on social archaeology, and the branch of archaeology termed critical by Mark Leone and others (Leone *et al.* 1987; see also Shanks and Tilley 1987b).

Another important context is that of feminist critique with its politics of the personal and scrutiny of androcentric bias. Sandra Harding has written a particularly relevant introduction to a gendered critique of science (1986) from which I have gained much.

NEGATIVE THINKING (AND DIOGENES)

This brings me back to 'critique'. I have written how critique may simply be the element of criticism in the rise and demise of different approaches to the archaeological past. It is part of the liberal open debate of the academy. The critique of the methodological hegemony in archaeology belongs with this somewhat. But I see there is more.

Critique also refers to a tradition in western philosophy which goes back to Kant and Hegel especially. In the Kantian line critique is reflection on the conditions of possible knowledge, a rational reconstruction of the conditions which make language, cognition and action possible. It is in this sense that the term comes into Popper's critical rationalism as described above in its archaeological variant.

It is the other line of descent from Hegel and through Marx that I make much more of. This is critique as negative thinking, in contrast to positive knowledge.[13] Its characteristics include an aversion to neat systems of thought on the grounds that they are inadequate to reality, thinking instead according to the task at hand, shifting and adapting. It aims to subject everything to rational scrutiny, with oppositional unveiling and debunking, reflecting on the constraints to which people succumb in the historical process of their self-formation. These are questions of people's identity, their

subjectivity, power as people's ability to act and their subjection to power beyond them. Negative thinking includes ideology critique as the scrutiny of sedimented meanings in our cultural works which serve particular social interests, and as a project of liberation from distortions, constraints and tradition by critical insight into relations of power.

Negative critical thinking implies a tighter and reciprocal relation with the present; it is situated knowledge. I have learned much from work in this tradition, so much so that Chris Tilley and I have argued that archaeology is nothing if it is not critique (1987b). But critique is not a panacea for archaeological ills. It is not a body of theory which can be 'applied' to the past, not a prescription. There are other problems with critique too which concern its arguing from 'truth'. To take the line that people are subject to distorted views of the past or of what they are doing as archaeologists, that they are in a state of false consciousness, implies that the critic has the missing truth and is enlightened. This begs the question of the source of that enlightenment, the grounds for claiming truth.

And more. Peter Sloterdijk, in his book *Critique of Cynical Reason* (1988), holds that the old strategies of enlightenment, correcting people's errors and false consciousness, do not work any more. In part this is because Marxist ideology critique turned into political legitimation in the Soviet Union (and in this version is now even more discredited with the political modernization of Eastern Europe). More importantly it is because of cynicism. Sloterdijk sees this as a predominant mindset or social character which has emerged since the 1960s. 'Cynicism is enlightened false consciousness' (1988, p. 5). This unhappy condition is one where the lessons of enlightenment have been learned (we know that the philosophy of science is not the answer; whoever really was a positivist? Of course archaeology is part of the present; whoever denied that there is an unavoidable subjective element in what we do in archaeology?), but they have not been followed up with an enlightened practice. 'Well off and miserable at the same time, this consciousness no longer feels affected by any critique of ideology; its falseness is already reflexively buffered' (Sloterdijk 1988, p. 5). This may not capture precisely how archaeologists feel (how many are miserable in not being able to realize the claims of post-structuralism?!), but I sense some of this cynicism in archaeology. I ask, what is the reflexive buffering which holds people from acting, from taking seriously the subjective, feeling, and the ethical dimensions of archaeology? Is it not that there is too much to lose? In for a penny, in for a pound. The job, the committees and institutional structures, the administration all have a pull, and you have to survive in the real world. So you come to terms *privately*. You accept the problems of the sovereignty of science, the great philosophical problems. You know, but…there are all those engagements to get on with, getting on with real archaeology.

It reminds me of something Theodor Adorno wrote. 'There are no more ideologies in the authentic sense of false consciousness, only advertisements for the world through its duplication and the provocative lie which does not seek belief but commands silence' (1981, p. 34).

There is also the unpleasant subjective side of much ideology critique. It becomes a relation of power in which the opponent is put down, depersonalized; the ideas to be criticized take on a life of their own, the person criticized identified with the ideas. Enlightenment claims to liberate, but so much enlightening critique seems to involve domination and exclusion, putting down the archaeologist who does not agree and

excluding them from the coterie of practitioners of the new enlightened approach. There has certainly been some of this in archaeology.

Sloterdijk reclaims another cynicism—the kynicism of Diogenes, the ancient philosopher. Diogenes lived in a barrel outside Athens. Provoking and joking, he mocked the pompous pretensions of Plato's philosophical system (as an answer to his theory of eros, Diogenes tossed himself off), the values of the city state (Diogenes was self-sufficient and ascetic; he pissed in the market place), and the claims of imperial power and fame (when Alexander the Great visited the famous philosopher and offered anything he wished, Diogenes asked him to move to one side as he was blocking the sun). Sloterdijk sees this cheekiness as part of a 'low' theory, rooted in the animal in the human (Diogenes was called a dog—*kuōn*—hence kynicism), as opposed to the 'high' theory of Plato, rarified and abstract, detached from the material body. Sensual, joking, irreverent rationality. I shall have more to say about this prospect of subjective embodiment.

> The objection, the side-leap, light-hearted mistrust, the pleasure in mockery are signs of health. Everything that is unqualified belongs to pathology.
>
> (Nietzsche)

In plotting these intellectual contexts I am asking us to dare to think on a grander scale. Not to be affected and self-important, but to appreciate what archaeologists are and may be doing; to appreciate that archaeology too brings us to limitless questions of what we are in relation with the object world. We might see written in even the potsherd our modernity.

All the same I need to give more particular attention to what archaeologists might do in answer to questions raised of relativism and pluralism, of archaeologists losing hold on what makes them what they are—the past.

THINKING THROUGH DICHOTOMIES: RELATIONAL THINKING

It is now quite commonplace to note the dichotomies which run through western culture. They are very evident too in much archaeology and I introduced some in the Prelude:

professional	popular
past facts	present response
intelligible	sensible
truth	beauty
public	private
rationality	emotion
detached	involved

I asked the question of the character of archaeology which involved such separations and have tried to give an answer at one level by outlining archaeological method under what I have termed the sovereignty of science. This brought further dichotomies:

objectivity	subjectivity
science	humanities
facts	values
generalization	particularities
reason	commitment

Some see the critique of the methodological hegemony of scientific archaeology as aiming to shift the balance in these dichotomies from one side to the other in a revaluation of the emotive and subjective appreciation of the particular. There is also the worry that neutral reason may give way to social and political commitment as archaeologists apply their work to the present.

Post-structuralist questionings have disclosed other hidden dichotomies, particularly:

presence	absence
identity	difference

Are archaeologists to just live with these fissures and trust to a liberal academic environment which can cope with different archaeological approaches? This must be partly the case because these dichotomies go very deep into the whole way we live. And there have been swings along these axes before: in anthropology for example, from nineteenth-century schemes of cultural and social evolution to the exclusive study of particular societies. Some might be more positive about finding a middle road—the moderation of science with an appreciation of the human aspects of the past, mingling statistical analysis with poetry.

I see another way. The aim is a materialist sublation of the dichotomous thinking. This sounds very cryptic and esoteric; I shall explain and show it need not be.

Sublate is the word usually used to translate the German *aufheben* (*aufhebung* in its noun form). *Aufheben* is to take up, save, but also to cancel, terminate, annul, suspend. *Aufheben* is a Hegelian term used of overcoming an opposition. To sublate, for example, the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity is not to find a middle way—a bit of both. It is to transcend or suspend the distinction without suppressing either element. Sublation contains a notion of preserving, and also of reconciliation. It means that objectivity and subjectivity lose their immediacy, but are not destroyed by the loss; the loss of immediacy is mediation by the other. So in the sublated relation the object is mediated by subjective factors. The reality of the past is not simply its factuality, its raw existence as fact, as that which is there remaining after decay and loss. The reality of that piece of pot is *realization,* the process of it becoming other than itself. This becoming-other-than-itself involves the intercession of subjectivity, of the perceiving, feeling, analysing archaeologist. The piece of pot is not defining itself as anything, but depends on its relation with me (as I do with it). Subjectivity is the form of the objective. This concept of sublation is part of relational thinking, and all the dichotomies I have listed are

relations. Relational thinking holds that to know what something really is, what its concrete reality is, we have to get beyond its immediately given state, which is a tautology (the potsherd is a potsherd), and follow the process in which it becomes something else, as in the proposition 'the piece of pot is yellow'. But in the process of becoming yellow, however, the potsherd still remains a potsherd. This is sublation—the dynamic of turning into something else and effecting reconciliation.

Relational thinking maintains that things, states (like presence), and concepts (such as fact and objectivity) exist in their relation with other things, states and concepts. So relations are not links between things which exist in themselves separate from the relations. Relations are internal. The concrete world is permeated by negativity, and identity is otherness. Another name for this is non-identity thinking. I hope it is clear that it is analogous with my reading of Derrida's *différance*.

Abstract now comes to mean the piece of pot devoid of (abstracted from) the particular and negative otherness which gives it concrete form and which depends on the mediation of my subjectivity. Common sense might have us believe that the potsherd is concrete in itself, while my following of the negations of the piece of pot (tracing it through its contexts, associations and relations) involve abstractions.[14]

MATERIALISM

> The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as *sensuous human activity, practice,* not subjectively.
>
> (Marx, 'First Thesis on Feuerbach')

Archaeology might seem to be inherently materialist, dealing as it does with the material remains of the past. But I am using the term to mark a move from metaphysical notions such as objectivity, identity and presence, to thinking of archaeology as the practices of archaeologists. Materialism as embodiment. In contrast to abstract definitions and pre-defined rules of procedure, materialism, as I intend it, is not a methodology.

What do archaeologists do? I want to abandon the answer that it should be archaeological method. Instead: to begin with the imperfections of the particular encounter with the past, with interests and aspirations, no clearly defined premises, but to follow the movement of the piece of pot in its concrete affiliation or connection. This occurs in the job of the archaeologist and in cultural experiences of contemporary society. Understanding archaeology necessarily involves reflection on the wider relations of our archaeological practice now. It is to move from a subject or discipline archaeology, to think of experiences and practices which can be called archaeological. Through this book I shall try to unfold what such a materialism means to me.

HERMENEUTICS

Hermeneutics is the theory and skill of interpretation, of understanding the significance of actions, writing, institutions and products. It is concerned with studies of essentially meaningful subject matter. The classic recent formulation of hermeneutics is Hans-Georg Gadamer's book *Truth and Method* (1975). I shall pick out some pertinent points.[15]

A major distinction can be drawn between the object of scientific work and that of historical and social studies. There is a valid place for the technical knowledge of a scientific analysis and understanding of materials from the past. But the things archaeologists deal with are also of a different order. They are and were part of social practices, and this entails an assessment of their meaning as precondition of understanding them. Hermeneutics gives an account of how such understanding may proceed.

We cannot transcend the located nature of historical understanding. It is always historically located itself, from the viewpoint of whoever seeks to understand, understanding in the light of subsequent events and unintended consequences of people's actions (history does not happen as people intend in their present). Historical knowledge is thus partial. Neither has the past any particular or original meaning, for the same reasons. Rejected is any metaphysical category of the past 'in-itself' as origin of meaning; there can be no pure reception of a 'raw' past. Rather, understanding an object from the past is always understanding it as something. The act of looking and sensing the object always involves an intentional act of giving meaning—it is never raw object but *becomes* potsherd or ceramic. This is a pre-judgement. And according to Gadamer, all understanding is so pre-judiced. The past is always *for* something else; it is a projection, part of our archaeological project; it is understood in terms of its possible applications in the present. Meaning, in going beyond the simple given, is seated in the situation of the interpreting archaeologist (its significance to interests, concerns, politics). This is the fore-structure of understanding into which we are 'thrown' or projected.

Gadamer argues that prejudice (as prejudgement) is not bias or faulty reason, but essential to understanding. The archaeologist participates in the meaning the object has. Understanding involves mediating the meaning of the past with one's own situation. Gadamer calls this a 'fusion of horizons'. So the prejudice of the archaeologist's social and personal situation is not a barrier but the medium of understanding the past. We have to have some way of approaching the object, some orientation, and this orientation belongs with us. Partiality and prejudice, in Gadamer's terms, are not limitations on objectivity at all.

This is maintaining that all understanding (indeed the argument can be extended to include all knowledge) is grounded in a *traditional* orientation. We always prejudge, and the terms of that prejudgement are given to us or are informed by the history of the society and culture to which we belong. Even standards of rationality may be included in prejudice; reason too is embedded in our experience and language. (This may be an attack on the autonomous rational subject and on the idea of an invariant and universal reason.) But does this involve an acquiescence to the norms of the tradition to which we

belong? Many see this as where Gadamer leads us. We can construe some ways out (see Warnke 1987).

For Gadamer understanding is like a dialogue or conversation (not a monologue). In a dialogue we move from initial statements towards a consensus (of sorts) which is more than the sum of the initial positions. This fusion of horizons is potentially a learning experience in which one takes account of the other, their objections and views, even if we are not won over. Sublation, as cancellation and preservation, captures this movement. Our assumptions and approach can prove faulty and needing change. We do not have to accept given traditional forms. And we discover their inadequacy in the confrontation or dialogue with the other. Dialogue depends in its nature on being open, on a willingness to put ourselves in a larger perspective, under a wider horizon. This condition is the rescue of reason. Rationality is not some absolute for which we can formulate rules and procedures, but is the willingness to recognize our partiality, that our knowledge and reasoning are open to challenge and modification. Dialogue is also the basis upon which we may judge our approaches. Their degree of openness is potential subject of critique: philosophical, political, ideological and social. We can ask of the assumptions and orientations of the archaeology whether its philosophical structure, ideological and political stand, its model of society, will allow it to listen.

I have given some answers to the question of what archaeologists do. They practise the mechanics of fieldwork and finds analysis. They engage in scientific method, acquire positive knowledge of the past, propagate ideological views in support of contemporary capitalism; they engage in cultural work to achieve a liberation of consciousness, further their academic careers, write texts within a discourse archaeology. I have omitted something they have in common with others: they administer museums and departments of archaeology, institutions of education. This may well involve imparting the discipline—finds, methods and theories—to students and others who may wish to listen.

What is the purpose of archaeology? Is it a quest for objectivity; to acquire more facts; to understand or even explain the truth of the past? Is it even to provide justification for an epistemology which holds that truth is to correspond with the facts of the past? Might it not be to foster an open reason, an acceptance of fallibility. In doing archaeology we might not just gather more facts, approaches, explanations, but also acquire the ability to engage in understanding, a learning of tact and judgement in a dialogue with the past.



An archaeological rhizome.

A field of archaeological discourse.

Plotting pathways.

We might begin with the relation of the archaeological subject and object (archaeologist and perhaps an artifact from the past)—cubed in the figure. Brought together in the subject discipline archaeology—discourse. Which depends on signification, turning to signs—a plane through the figure. Its tangents narrative text, science (discourse of the empirical and analytical treatment of the object), and material culture (itself signifying and meaning). And auto-biography—the subjective constitution of the object, the form in which it appears. The

object and material culture point to the past and slip off. (Subjective) experience of discourse is of agency (the power to act on the object past), and of discipline (authority and the conventions of the academy). In the auto-biographical constitution of the factual past is also formed part of the identities of archaeologists; pasts produced relate to social and cultural identities, class, the state and its institutions which facilitate archaeological study—the power to produce pasts.


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Part 2
ARCHAEOLOGICAL INTERESTS

DESIRE AND METAPHOR

An archaeological erotics

Part 1 considered some of the answers archaeologists might be expected to give in answering the question of what archaeologists do. I want to stay with the question but delve deeper and present some images which are suggested when thinking of archaeology and its practices. These contain for me some of the aspirations, feelings and desires which may take us to archaeology. They are a field of erotic reference, where by erotic I mean the play of desire and attachment, energies and figurations which condense and displace the archaeological into other fields and arenas. These are root metaphors which barbed and snagging bind archaeology within its cultural medium. Teasing out mythologies. It is a wider field than archaeology the discipline; I am trying to get to some of what makes archaeology popular with more than those for whom it is a line of work. It will be clear that this is a personal pallet.

I again bracket and omit certain aspects. For some archaeology may mean simply academic labour without specific reference to subject matter. For someone delivering a lecture the experience of encountering and having to teach a group of students may override more archaeological aspects of its subject content. The politics of an institutional committee meeting may nullify its archaeological purpose. I will not be considering directly these valid aspects of what archaeologists do. I will not directly consider archaeology abstractly as a discipline or discourse, or as a forum and technology of power. My focus is on archaeology as a relationship with the (anthropological) object from the past.

THE DETECTIVE

The private dick. Philip Marlowe. Smart, and owing nothing to anyone; individual. He's on the edge, poking into the darker and grubbier corners of society and the psyche. Not knowing sometimes quite where he stands, on which side of the law. Sometimes he has to bend the rules; sometimes he has to be tough. Piecing the scraps together, following a line, tailing a scent. And then he has it; it fits into place. Marlowe always comes out clean.

Sherlock Holmes. Unique and eccentric. His eye for significant fact and his pure deductive logic brings enlightenment and clears mysteries when all others fail. Ready with his ingenious and intriguing forensic gadgetry, always probing with his magnifying glass. He too is at the edge with his singular abilities. He is not a member of Scotland Yard, something of a mystery himself. Sometimes you don't recognize him in his

remarkable disguises. Didn't he use drugs? And just what was his relationship with Watson?

To see archaeology as a form of detective work is to refer to the fascination of following a scent, solving a puzzle, piecing together the fragments of the past, living with mystery. It also draws in all the ambiguities, the interplay of law and criminality, light and dark, morality and corruption, turpitude and clean respectability. The archaeologist as detective is perhaps a bit of a rebel. It might not be quite certain where they fit in the academic and professional community. Then there are the individuals, the characters, Mortimer Wheeler, Lewis Binford.

The criminal is brought to justice.

THE LAW COURT

Archaeology is a judiciary. The archaeologist is judge and clerk of court. The past is accused. The finds are witnesses. As in Kafka we do not really know the charge. There is plenty of mystery. Archaeology follows the process of the law: inquiry (the accused and witnesses are observed and questioned, tortured with spades and trowels); adjudication (the archaeologist reflects on the mystery and gives a verdict); inscription (the archaeologist records trial and sentence, publishes for record of precedence).

What is the law in this court? Is it the law of reason, rules of logic and reason? But this surely is not enough—abstract reason has no form or content. It might also be wondered whether reason is a natural law which archaeologists follow when questioning the past. If it is, how do archaeologists know what their law of reason is? How do they know what to do? Do they follow intuition? Archaeologists as judges put themselves beneath an obligation or imperative to act in certain ways to be archaeologists, to make certain judgements which are considered legal. There is also a negative aspect of the law. The accused, the past, is being brought to order with prohibitions on certain things. You hope you are only accused and brought to court when you have done something wrong. But in archaeological terms this bringing to order implies censorship and an imposition of order and uniformity. Is this a distortion of the past? What are these obligations to act in certain ways to be a (legal) archaeologist? To what is the archaeologist-judge and the past subjected? Is the answer not the *discipline* of archaeology?

By what right does the archaeologist pass judgement? The archaeologist is seen as having expertise. They have the ability to make archaeological inquiries, speak verdicts and write them down as record. Where does this agency, the power to act as an archaeologist come from? Why does society sanction such activities? Archaeology is hardly a natural custom. Do people really believe that archaeology is a natural thing to do? Is archaeology really gathering knowledge for the sake of knowledge? The law is supposedly based on values and morality (or is it morally correct to keep to the law?). Where do archaeological values come from? (Values concerning what it is better and worse to do in archaeology.) Is it not that the power to adjudicate the past comes from being an archaeologist, being a member of the community of archaeologists?

There is a darker side too. There may be the desire simply to exercise power, ordering the past, acting as authority. There is gratification perhaps in the destruction which

excavation inevitably entails, the irreplacable loss, and the significance this confers on the destroyer.

If we begin with the dichotomy of archaeologist as subjectivity and the accused past as objectivity, we can follow through another set of dichotomies—antinomies of the law.[16]

law	its power
legality	morality
structure	action
subjection	agency
rights	things
necessity	freedom

It comes down to a relationship between subjectivity and the law. We have a responsibility to ourselves in front of the law and can act as we wish; at the same time we are subject to the law. Archaeologists act in doing what they will with the past; they are also responsible to the discipline of archaeology. It is all about power: the discipline of archaeology and the community of archaeologists. I think it has to be accepted that archaeology has no inherent values, no particular or necessary activities or methods. Otherwise we are led to believe that archaeologists directly receive the imperatives of reason through intuition, perceiving the force of objectivity, or simply they must base what archaeologists do on what has been done by archaeologists, following customs and traditions. How and why did these begin? If the question is not answered, archaeologists become subject to history.

What is this archaeology which is all about power? It need not be about the sadistic mutilation of the past. In the courtroom the law exists only in interpretation, in the act of applying principles to a concrete situation. These principles are precedents and have no force of their own which makes them rigid and unchangeable. There is no necessity to do archaeology in any particular way.

And as in another sort of law court. In Homer's *Iliad,* on the shield of Achilles, we read of the archaic Greek *istōr* (from which is ultimately derived our word history). These judges were arbitrators to whom disputes were brought. Often judging on panels, they gave interpretations of the dispute which could be accepted or disregarded by the disputants; they judged and in turn were judged themselves. The particular event of the dispute illuminated the ambiguity of the law. Both judges and disputants were subjects of the law which was recreated in the event of arbitration. The law was simply the way of life and all the cultural, political and psychological baggage it carried.

In archaeology this takes me to the hermeneutic circle of a 'dialogue' between archaeology and the object past in which alternate interpretation and 'response' of the past. Not subjecting the past to order through the structures of a predefined archaeological method. We might also see archaeologists as arbitrators to whom are brought disputes by others who are not archaeologists. No laws of archaeological reasoning or inherent archaeological values applied to the past, but a circle of dialogue which relates to how archaeology suits a way of living and which involves a responsibility to the partner in dialogue rather than to the 'law'.

I immediately think of the disputes which have arisen over the remains of Native American communities in the United States (Native Americans have been disputing absolute archaeological rights to their past). Here are arguments of different types of values (scientific as opposed to religious), rights (the use and ownership of the past), and obligations (to allow anthropologists access to Native American remains, or to return bodies and things which have been collected by archaeologists). These are rooted in different ways of life. They seem wrapped in the antinomies I have outlined.

ADVENTURE

The archaeologist could be a bit of a rebel. And of course their work could lead to wild places. The romantic image of the archaeologist as explorer of the unknown is still a real one. In the United States archaeologists may still appear as the cowboys of science.



Robin in Nottingham Castle

TOURISM

> The visa of the past for entry into the future…is stamped with exoticism and folklore.
>
> (Dorfman and Mattelart 1975, p. 86)

There is an escapist attraction to archaeology (and anthropology) with the exotic and mysterious taking us away from the commonplace. Archaeology can appropriately accompany the tourist: journeys to landscapes steeped in history, archaeological sites marking the cultural form and significance of the land. There is a journalism to this archaeology: its writings are not specialist, but popular and anecdotal, and great reliance is placed on myths and the mysterious, folklore and fascination. These supply the attraction, something that makes somewhere worth visiting. The site or object almost has to speak directly to the visitor, of great artistic skill, of knowledge, religious devotion, of wealth and power, or war and brutality. It may speak through myth and folklore—labyrinth of Knossos, Arthur's Britain; or it may reference popular philosophies of history—the fall of the great, progress and decline, cycles of civilization. Like Stonehenge and Nasca Peru it may attest to a gulf of incomprehension, a loss of knowledge. The fascination, the attraction is spell-binding; it is an entry into myth and magic. I shall expand on this.

DISCOVERY, COLLECTION AND IMMEDIACY

Archaeology hooks us with discovery. Finding something, however apparently insignificant, which was previously not known. Everyone on an excavation can do this, and all the apparently trivial finds can add up to something significant. Discovery asserts our autonomy; it means the past in some sense belongs to us because we found it; it thus asserts our significance.

Discovery is also about immediacy. To find something is to have immediate contact of a sort with its original owner; and this is as close as we can get. It is the power of the edge between ourselves and the past, or rather an other; it is both proximity and distance. Is this not part of the affective significance of archaeology's layers, with their edges being so important in establishing sequence and meaning?

I think that treasure hunters using metal detectors may not be deliberately setting out to wreck the past, the crucial layers, in search of material gain. Using metal detectors is a hunt, a search for discovery and an undisputed ownership of something which originates beyond us. And what immediately seems a trivial find may be the more significant if it belonged to someone and meant something to them, even just simply in its use. This brings contact. Those using metal detectors may not only be after treasure; rich and grand finds do not really belong to anyone, their human significance is less than the incidental.

Collecting old things is another channelling of desire to make some part of the world one's own. Knowing the details of each collected item in its similarities and differences to others, or in a fetishism which fixes on the individual item itself, the collector knows the uniqueness of the collection. And it belongs to the collector through the autonomous act of collecting and through the consequent uniqueness. There is also something of an act of saving, of some sort of life which would otherwise not be. The collected things are 'saved'. They would otherwise be dead. This is a religious allegory of redemption: the past is dead but brought to life in its redeeming collection.

Passers-by looking through the fence around an excavation in a town seemed often to ask if any bodies had been found, or gold. The earth holds treasure and death. I used to dismiss such inquiries as a morbidity which had little to do with archaeology. But

archaeology is so much about death and not just immediately in terms of dealing with the remains of the dead and mortuary rituals. Again, there is an element of contact with the other, and an edge—between life and death. I shall return to the theme of death.

NOSTALGIA, FANTASY AND THE NEW AGE

Every year from 1974 there was the Stonehenge People's Free Festival, held around the time of the summer solstice and at the prehistoric monument in Wiltshire. All sorts of people attended: travellers, free-thinkers, people of a 'counter-culture', those simply interested. Up to 35,000 may have been at the larger meetings. The festival was suppressed in 1984, violently prevented from gathering in 1985, abolished since in the name of archaeology.

The Ancient Order of Druids was formed in the late eighteenth century, a mystical and at first secret society. Taking its image from the ancient Celtic druids described in Caesar, the order harks back to an antique era of initiated knowledge. Since 1905 Druids have also held summer meetings at Stonehenge (Chippendale *et al.* 1990).

Stonehenge signifies. The monument, with its astronomical alignments, with theories of its relation to esoteric knowledges of earth and heavens, an order of archaeo-astronomy, and being the grandest of so many stone circles, alignments and tombs of its prehistoric age, speaks to some as testament to the inadequacies of the present's understanding. The aura and ambience of such sites, their mystery (not so much now at Stonehenge, walking with the crowds from the car park), cannot be captured by science. They are experienced as having a sacred power.

Dowsing, the idea that a pendulum or other indicator can allow energies or powers to manifest themselves through the unconscious medium of the body, may be a way of gaining contact with these forgotten sacred powers; so some believe. A sort of synaesthesia, dowsing allows them, like the ancients, to be 'in touch'. And the stones speak. Of such sentience almost lost, of an age of primaeval ecologists erecting sacred networks of monuments in harmony with the earth. The past gains new significance. Alive with contemporary sacred power, it is no longer the dead and dry stuff of science, but moist and of the earth.

Ancient sites are sometimes rich in folklore, magical stories which tell of the power of the monuments, distorted oral memories more human than official written record. The human factor is sometimes taken to be more important than empirical fact. (I refer the reader to Peter Ackroyd's 1989 novel *First Light*.)

The touch of the past. Rock carvings at Namförsen, Sweden: pecked-out figures thousands of years old. At a dramatic river rapids. Gustav Hallstrom spent decades clinging to rocks, shining lights at night, watching at different seasons, feeling to find the carvings, to trace them (1960). Chris Tilley has written an interpretation of the elks, boats and people (1991).

The theme of contemporary loss and of the past as a qualitatively different realm, as advanced, but in a different way, relates with the alternative worlds of Faery Fantasy whose seminal works include those of J.R.R.Tolkein. Here we enter worlds of other beings, fairy-tale creatures but enacting familiar stories of battles between good and evil, journeys, the rise and fall of kingdoms. Swords and sorcery, role-playing games of dungeons and dragons draw on similar images as do fantasy movies like *Labyrinth* and *Dark Crystal,* children's TV cartoons like *Masters of the Universe*. It is also a science-fiction genre. This is a major cultural industry; bookshelves are crammed with such work: witches, goblins, heroes, magic, mystical kingdoms. I do not wish to reduce such a quantity of material to a formula, but many are wholesome allegories, consolations of lost or parallel worlds where individuality and character mattered; romantic nostalgias for a pre-industrial order.

'New Age' is a collective term for cultural phenomena which together are meant to herald a new age (almost coinciding with the millennium)—the Age of Aquarius. In astrological history this is a dawn of harmony, understanding and spiritual growth. Its concerns are with esoteric and spiritual traditions, health through self-help therapy, environmental balance. Science, technology and standard of living are considered false idols; we have much to learn from knowledges hitherto hidden and occult (Campbell and Brennan 1990).

This is all a powerful and emotive 'counter-cultural' mix of the developed west since the 1960s. Oriental spirituality, wisdom found in drug use, martial arts, magic, tarot, astrology, comic-book art, science-fiction, a valuation of the body and sensuality, popular anthropology and a valuation of the way of life of other cultures and times (especially North American Indians); also art movements, far-left politics, Marxism and feminism. It is not, I believe, stretching the point to string these all

Nasseröd round dolmen, Sweden

together with an archaeological site. Here are deeply felt convictions and faiths that conventional thinking is not enough, that missing is a crucial human or subjective factor, an embodied knowledge. The perceived mystery and fascination of aspects of the archaeological past can be allied with mysticism and primitivism, but however facile and academically discredited, key aspects of archaeological experience are foregrounded: contact, recovery or gain and loss, the otherness of the past.

EXCAVATION AND GENEALOGY

The idea that we may dig deep to find authentic meaning and truth is so much a part of what we are. Root metaphor. Freud's layered psyche comes to mind; psychoanalysis as excavation. Genealogy also implies the vertical, lines of descent, that deep family roots confer some sense of cultural authenticity. Lineage, familial depth, has been a powerful mode of justification. The weight of the past.[17]

But I have also indicated a way in which meaning is not something hidden beneath the surface. We do not get to the past simply by digging deep. There is a way in which understanding involves *projection*. We are expectant. We always pre-understand what we have found as something. This involves situating it within our way of reasoning and understanding of our world. It is not getting down to the original meaning it had before it was buried. Understanding something I have found is to take up its proposals, the things evoked but not actually present in it, following its references. Exploring the variations which the object undergoes through the action of our imagination is to trace an emergent meaning in front of the object and sideways; this following of chains of association is not vertical.

Now I do not wish to deny the evocations of digging. The things we find take us back to dig down for others to which they seem to allude. This is the research and exploration, empirical and often scientific, which we may undertake in reactivating the meaning of the object for ourselves. What I wish to avoid is the notion that the authentic and objective past is down there with ourselves in the present above. The past is as much an extension of ourselves here as it is down there. And we are digging down not just to the past but to ourselves. We find ourselves in that deep otherness.

On the emotive power of the idea of excavation I wish to end with something Walter Benjamin wrote. It is from his 'Berlin Chronicle'.

> Language shows clearly that memory is not an instrument for exploring the past but its theatre. It is the medium of past experience, as the ground is the medium in which dead cities lie interred. He who seeks to approach his own buried past must conduct himself like a man digging. This confers the tone and bearing of genuine reminiscences. He must not be afraid to return again and again to the same matter; to scatter it as one scatters earth, to turn it over as one turns over soil. For the matter itself is only a deposit, a stratum, which yields only to the most meticulous examination what constitutes the real treasure hidden within the earth: the images, severed from all earlier associations, that stand—like precious fragments or torsos in a collector's gallery—in the prosaic rooms of our later

> understanding. True, for sucessful excavations a plan is needed. Yet no less indispensable is the cautious probing of the spade in the dark loam, and it is to cheat oneself of the richest prize to preserve as a record merely the inventory of one's discoveries, and not this dark joy of the place of the finding itself. Fruitless searching is as much a part of this as succeeding, and consequently remembrance must not proceed in the manner of a narrative or still less that of a report, but must, in the strictest epic and rhapsodic manner, assay its spade in evernew places, and in the old ones delve to ever-deeper layers.
>
> (Benjamin 1979, p. 314)

THE LOOK

As an archaeologist I look at the past, what's left. I am constantly observing. Does the past look back? It seems a silly question. My look seems to be one of surveillance. This one-way watching means I am free to do what I wish, even if objectivity (that quality the past is meant to have) is supposed to guide me, even if I am told what to do according to archaeological method. The past isn't watching. Of course not. I'm free to have an archaeological adventure.

I take a measured section of the site and a plan, put them together and do a perspective drawing. This is an objective rendering of the past, what's left; isn't it? But through its vanishing points a perspective drawing is centred on the eye of the observer. A perspective is not just another way of looking, as in the measured plan and section. Observing the past is meant to provide me with an objective base from which I can work. A way of looking at things (formulated as archaeological method) is for many archaeologists a standard of objectivity. Is a way of looking not subjective, however? Because looking implies no necessary responsibility towards what is being looked at. The past doesn't come into it.

The past doesn't kick up a fuss at being looked at. (But what of all the troubles and hitches of excavation?) The past is found, it seems, ready to behold, and ready to be acted upon—dug up. And what is left is the fundamental separation of the archaeologist and the past. The past is dead and blind. The archaeological task is to know it, to trace its form. How is this to be done? Is a replica of the past to be produced? Simple demonstration? But this would be meaningless and impossible. The past is to be explained—but how? How is the material past to be inserted into our minds without it all depending on the look of subjective experience? These are all the problems of method I discussed in Part 1.

The one-way look confirms our self-coherence, command and confidence in acting as we do. But what would it be if the past did look back?



National Museum, Athens, July 1989

The separation of the archaeologist from the past contained in that one-way look is related to an aged separation of the holy and the lucky, as discussed by John Dewey (see Rorty 1982). The holy was that which endured and was the concern of religion and philosophy. The lucky was day-to-day matters, the concern of technology and workers. A social division is involved between free-person and slave; the free-person contemplating

the enduring, and giving orders to the slave who worked at producing things. Thinking was what the free-person did because thought was of things that did not change; knowledge was a task of uncovering and representing the real in the mind. Slaves got on with practical jobs of material production, experience in the object-world. This division of labour is argued by Dewey to be the root of the problems of relating thinking and practice, knowledge and experience.

TOOLS

While I am on about thinking and doing in the minds of philosophers and in the hands of slaves, a few words about tools.

Archaeologists use tools and gadgets. Mathematics and statistics are often referred to as tools, as method is the instrument for producing knowledge. These real and metaphorical tools knock the past into shape, bring it to order so that it can be known or explained. This is instrumental reason.

But there is another way of thinking of tools and the past. Martin Heidegger (1962) contended that science operated on objects from a particular viewpoint. In science objects are treated as things simply at hand. This is not so much a privileged viewpoint as a specialized one. More generally we are practically engaged with the things we deal with. We are always pre-occupied and inserted into the world. We might want to stand back and take a look, as in science, but this 'standing back' is from first being 'thrown' into the world. This is a condition not of ourselves being in a world of things separate from us, but of being-in-the-world. Our self is being engaged and occupied, concerned with the things around us. The things around us are thus in a condition of being ready-to-hand. They are like tools. In this condition of being *ready-to-hand* the objects of the past are like tools for creating something else. They are ready to be used in our archaeology. But this does not mean that we can make anything with them. Tools have particular purposes and uses. We can use tools in the wrong way or have a poor design in mind, or a pointless project. In the same way we can make poor archaeologies with the things we find and not think very well about what sort of projects we want to undertake. Our craft skills can be poor.

OUTER EXPERIENCE AND THE PURITAN ARCHAEOLOGIST

Poor craft skills because the experience of the contemplating free philosopher is not a very wide or practised one. This philosopher thinks that knowledge means direct familiarity with the object-world, getting acquainted with an outer domain of reality which is opposed to an inner domain of impressions. The problem of knowing becomes one of justifying how our ideas correspond with reality. So the philosopher-archaeologist is bothered about how to keep to the past out there, down there. And it is quite a worry because if we do not get our pictures of the past right, there is nothing left down there to correct them; the past is being dug away as we look at it.

As an archaeologist I'm looking at what I'm finding. With my trained and scientific eye, seeing what is relevant to the research plan, checking that what I see coming up

doesn't require a change of plan. But I'm not there. I'm drinking in the bar with friends, enjoying the slippy clay after rain, helping out a hedgehog trapped overnight in a deep trench. My eyes are to be transparent, pure signs of the reality dug. Disembodied eyes, disembodied hands working the site. This is a horror show. This is outer experience.

I have to note what is being dug. It all has to be put into words so it can be properly written up later. It's difficult trying to get it as objective as possible, copying down what has been found. Computers help (lots of storage), and pictures, and numbers. Writing-up, we are told, should be as transparent as possible. The ideal would probably be a direct injection into your mind, if you wanted to know about the past discovered in the excavation. In this spectator-based knowledge what is wanted is exhibition, gazing at the world, not the problems of representing and writing it. Like a visit to the site I should be able to show and tell about what has been found, face to face.

Writing-up is a translation of archaeology's outer experience. Outer experience is experience in which my self was absent or denied. This denial of self is about purifying and making virtuous our faculties of perception and sensibility; it is about being ascetic, a negative obsession with the body. (Theodor Adorno came up with something which makes me think of this ascetic outer experience: 'the best magnifying glass is a splinter in the eye'.) And in doing archaeology in this outer experience I worry. That I might slip up and get it wrong, failing in those scholarly virtues to which it is my duty to conform. About letting myself and the present spoil the past. About letting reason be tainted. These are worries about conforming with what other archaeologists are doing, with the authority of archaeology the discipline. They are worries about what the Father requires of us.

You can be neurotic, believing you suffer from diseases (not rigorous enough, not enough evidence, too much distracting theory, too subjective) and these are symptoms of the problem. Illusions of grandeur (great schemes which explain all prehistory, the past entirely within your hands) because of a basic inability to come to terms with the past. And repetition (going through the same outer experiences, copying down list after list of facts) because of the uncured condition.

What is the character of the puritan archaeologist? Hard and serious man of action and science. Demonstrating and showing the past with authority. He doesn't let feelings and emotions get in the way. He's straight—in every sense. He's not some perverse deviant; he's into good clean reproductive sex—reproducing the past.

STRIPTEASE

Excavation is striptease. The layers are peeled off slowly; eyes of intent scrutiny. The pleasure is in seeing more, but it lies also in the edges: the edge of stocking-top and thigh. There is the allure of transgression—the margin of decorum and lewdness, modesty and display. The hidden past brought into the stage-light of the present. Audience keeps its distance; the stage is for performer only. The split heightens the enticement. Just as the gap between past and present draws us to wonder in fascination. Discovery is a little release of gratification. A pleasure comes from interruption, costume tossed to the side little by little; or the smooth line of breast punctuated by nipple bared. Perhaps above all is the excitement of not seeing, of anticipation of human form outlined in dance, costume and dim lights, but kept from full view.

The energies of striptease and the dance can be peculiarly masculine and saturated with a patriarchal power. But they are not simply this. The energy or force of the allure of striptease is not the performer alone but the *process* of laying bare. It is the performance, the medium of discovery, how we come to see and know. This performance can involve a different sort of looking to the penetrating and one-way gaze of surveillance which sees everything. It colludes in a game of tease. This pleasure of coming to know is not about taking and raping. This is a pleasure existing in the interplay of performer and audience.

Excavation as striptease is about edges. Margins and limits: these are prohibitions. In striptease they are to do with modesty, decorum and eroticism. In excavation and archaeology these limits and prohibitions are on the object-world and ourselves (keeping object and self, past and present apart) and on our practices (maintaining the propriety of archaeology the discipline). I ask again the best way of thinking about these prohibitions on what archaeologists may do. If these are external limits (edges imposed from the outside in the form of definitions of what the object past is, of what reason is, defining our bodies as self-contained with an inside and an outside, the present as not being the past) then we are led into problems and metaphysics. Questions of what constitutes our self in its essence, of what the past is and where it ends. On the other hand these limits can be viewed as internal. This is to say that prohibitions imply their transgression. Order implies disruption; reason implies irrationality, sensibility intelligibility, past present. This is how we know: in the discovery of one in the other. We experience the meaning of the objective past in the transgression of its limits, in it becoming something other, in it changing.

Transgressions are implied by prohibitions. Is this not the origin of the thrill?

This takes me to something I have already mentioned—the vitality of absence. Things can be thought as defined not by what they are but by what they are not, absence. And we collude in this process of becoming, laying down those defining absences which are decided meaningful. In this connection Nietzsche has a variation on the analogy of striptease. He talks of truth becoming woman. Truth no longer comes from the Father whose absolute authority of presence gives us truth and enlightenment, the Father who prohibits. Truth instead is a playful dance of veils, revealed in concealment. But we should add that the woman as performer knows that this is no truth of hers. She is not revealing herself but an other in the costume of striptease and dance, a character for an audience. The dance is performance and the audience collude in a play of revellation (see Derrida's discussion in *Spurs* 1978, pp. 51f.).

In true striptease there is always more. The performance ends not with seeing and knowing all, but with desire.

We get to know as much about the past from what we do with what remains and its pleasures, as from fixing a hope of scrutinizing the past itself.

EXCREMENT

Good archaeologists may want pure clean eyes, but there is an excremental element to archaeology. Archaeology and scatology. Archaeologists grub around in the remains of past societies and a lot of the remains are the 'garbage' of those societies. But I do not just mean this. There is often not much remaining of many past societies and because of

this it might be thought that archaeology is about scarcity. In another way though it is about excess. There is in archaeology an unceasing demand for more facts, more documentation, more detail, more approaches. And although I hesitate to say it, a lot of this is waste matter; it is redundant.

Here are two anecdotes. Some years ago I was researching the earthen and stone-chambered tombs built in the Wessex region of England by the people who first practised farming. There are many of these tombs and a significant proportion have been excavated in the last century and since. I searched all the publications for material with which I could work; I was looking for information about their strange burial practices. It is a common experience to find that work done in the past is of little use to archaeology now; the excavators did not look for or record the things archaeologists have come to value. And this is indeed what I found. There were only three tombs in my region which I could use for statistical analysis. But what surprised me was the proportion of reports I consulted which clearly had never been read. Older periodicals were often issued with their pages untrimmed and still joined at the edge. I had to slit pages in many, and this was in the Haddon Library in Cambridge, one of the main archaeological research libraries. Archaeologists get very concerned about saving and publishing the past so that it can be used in the future. I wonder how much will be read.

In April 1990 I attended a public conference at Hunter College, Manhattan, a gathering of Native Americans, anthropologists and archaeologists as well as others who were interested. The subject was conflicting claims to cultural property; whether the cultural remains of Native Americans were public property or still belonged to contemporary Native American groups. I have already mentioned this issue. The Smithsonian Institution in Washington has a considerable collection of skulls and bones collected particularly in the last century. Many want these reburied. Something Walter Echo-Hawk, a Native American attorney, said has stuck in my mind. ‘What are you doing with all those bones?’ he asked. A valid question.

This argument of waste does not just apply to the past I fear. But neither is it an argument for abandoning archaeology.

Pot washing, Back Swinegate, York:
excavations February 1990

There is a nervous and neurotic feel to some archaeology; of researchers working on compiling complete inventories of sites and finds. A fixation on the past as somehow complete in itself. We only need, or rather are obliged, to copy. And there is a feeling of

retention. Holding back on oneself. Not committing oneself (reasonably perhaps) until all the facts have been gathered. But also retention in the sense of not letting go. The feeling that we cannot let go of the past but must preserve and conserve. Robert Hewison identifies this retention in Britain with a cultural and commercial complex he calls the 'heritage industry' and which proffers a consoling and spurious preserved past in a society in decline (1987).

It seems difficult to find fault with an ethic of conservation—the code of conserving things from the past considered valuable in some way. Conservation is a powerful seductive logic. And the gratification or satisfaction which comes from conserving the past is a significant impulse to carry out archaeological work. It is a little sickening to think of the loss of so much of the past due to contemporary development and neglect. There is gratification in ridding oneself of this nausea. Conservation stems loss and decay, and I would connect it with a series of drives: ridding oneself of nausea, of decay; there is a sense of illness, and holding off death. The past is gone, its absence marked by decayed and disordered remnants. Perhaps archaeology can fill the gaping hole of the absent past. But with what? Scientific archaeology purifies the past with clean reason; order is brought to the disorder of decay which putrifies. The past is cleaned up; dirt and decay removed or transformed into knowledge. A conserved past contributes to the health of the present; it is wholesome and nourishing. But the sanitation operates against another disorder, that of irrationality which is associated with magic, emotion and sentiment. In archaeology it is thought that these may lead to problems; they have to be controlled. The body is dirt. Archaeology achieves its ends partly through a sacrifice of the body (I almost say flesh) of the archaeologist. The movement of our life-cycles, the personal, subjectivity, feeling seem irrelevant to archaeological discipline. This sacrifice is weighed against saving the past.

In Britain many ancient sites, usually architectural, are in the care of the state and are open to the public. There is a very distinctive style to most of these sites. Many are ruins, but consolidated. Loose stones are mortared in position. Walls are cleaned and repointed. Paths tended or created. Fine timber walkways constructed. The ground is firm with neatly trimmed lawns. Park benches are provided. This is all justified in terms of health (stopping the further decay of the monument) and safety (of the visiting public). However reasonable such a justification, it creates a distinctive experience of the visit to such an ancient monument. Masonry, grass and sky; such monuments are almost interchangeable, if it were not for their setting.

I think of the contrast of much archaeological excavation. Excavating in the North East of England, particularly on inner-city sites in Newcastle upon Tyne, firmly reinforced my fascination for archaeology. Thick disturbed deposits, complex and indeterminate; there were several metres of remains from pre-Roman to twentieth century. Damp earthiness and the never ending succession of interpretive decisions, deciding on what to make of the flows of clay, silts, sands, rubbles, interruptions of later insertions, drains, constructions. At the castle, work was beneath a Victorian railway viaduct only metres away from the still-standing keep of the thirteenth century. Complex experiences.

Norham, Northumberland

Haga dolmen, Bohuslan, Sweden

The excremental culture of archaeology, which may wish to avoid the nausea of loss and an absent past, finds gratification in a purifying, but perhaps neurotic, desire to hold on and to order. It is allied with the marginalization of feeling and of heterogeneity, the irreducible otherness of the past. And there is the failure (for me conspicuous) to theorize death and decay. These are tamed in archaeology as mortuary analysis,[18] or understood as obstacles to a clearer (cleaner) knowledge of the past.

scarcity	excess
conservation	loss
order	disruption
static things	cycles of life and death
clean (spiritual) knowledge	dirty fleshy earthiness
nutrition	excretion

My argument is not to find fault with conservation so much as to point out its dynamic, its other side. In the tension between the two, in realizing one within the other, I find the energy and attraction of archaeology.

ALCHEMY AND PHARMACOLOGY

Archaeology can be seen as a motion upwards from past to present, from a base and material fundament to knowledge which is of the mind. There are archaeological alchemists. Obsessed with the problem of matter, the alchemist seeks a method of transmuting one kind, base metal, into another kind, gold. Moving from the real and mundane to the shining and enduring gold of truth.

There are also archaeological pharmacologists, white-coated, bringing purity and health from dirt and illness. In the cycle of archaeological method I described in Part 1 an approach to the past is criticized and a solution to its problems proposed, perhaps a new method. These illnesses are usually of method and knowledge; the remedies are to cure weaknesses in the sorts of knowledge produced of the past, weaknesses such as bias, subjectivity or simply faulty reasoning.

So there is a therapeutic dimension to archaeology. But the therapy need not be pharmaceutical.

PSYCHOTHERAPY

Psychotherapy involves a relationship, hopefully a productive one, in which the therapist listens to what someone says and considers what they have done, and in a dialogue aims to make sense of these. Neurotic or pathological expression and behaviour are treated as symptoms of traumatic or otherwise disturbing experience, perhaps in a childhood past. For the patients this experience has been repressed and withdrawn from what is meaningful to them. Their behaviour seems to them partly out of control. The aim of psychotherapy is to restore some understanding and sense to the patient; it is not just to explain what the causes of their neurotic and pathological behaviour are. The point is to help patients reflect about themselves and sort out the relation between their past experience and present behaviour. This is not just thinking but may involve an acting out,

Mitford, Northumberland

Mitford, Northumberland.

Benjamin: today's allegory is of decay, of tradition; a transient, fragmentary world always disappearing, needing reconstruction, like a ruin.

combining an affective and emotional understanding as well as intellectual. The relation between past and present is a symbolic one with the pathological behaviour repeating in condensed or displaced form the originating experience.

Meaning is a key in psychotherapy. The therapist is concerned not only with the patient's competence in social action (the ability to carry on normal behaviour), but also with the content or quality of the patient's behaviour, its meaning or significance. Psychoanalysis has developed theories of the qualities and meanings of human experiences, what it is to grow up and enter society, through clinical encounters. The acceptability of these theories is not so much their predictive power, their ability to predict certain types of pathological behaviour occurring after certain childhood experiences. It is their persuasive power in the therapeutic relationship, how they bring about changes in behaviour, understanding and relationships, their consistency and usefulness in interpretation. The symbolic and internal relation between traumatic experience and symptomatic behaviour, the emphasis on meaning and persuasive power in a relation between two particular people means there is no one correct analysis of the meaning of an action or expression. There are many psychoanalytical theories.

The vitality of psychoanalysis must surely be that it questions ideas of what it is to be someone, breaking up the idea of the self, unravelling its components and investigating the nature of personal experience. It is critical of the idea of a central self which has a category of experience, a self which is the origin of personal meanings. Instead the self only becomes fixed through the workings of society (necessarily historical) and desire.

Because of the distortions present within the patient, the relationship with the therapist is not a balanced one. A key aspect is transference, in which the patient invests the therapist with positive and negative qualities according to the repressed memories of the significant experiences. The circumstances of the traumatic experience are transferred to the clinical encounter. The therapist is not an equal partner and may adopt a strategic attitude to allow symptoms to be revealed and traumatic experience to be re-encountered

through transference. This analytic stance attempts to expose contradictions and defences in the patient, but leaves it up to them to act.

Psychotherapy is understanding through dialogue. I have already had a good deal to say about interpretation which makes a dialogue of the relation between interpreter and that interpreted. The analogy of psychotherapy adds and clarifies. Archaeology in this model knows no unitary past, just as there is no self-contained self. Indeed the category in question is subjectivity—attempting to understand our feelings and experiences of the material past, as well as interpreting the past in terms of meaning. Meaning involves significance and quality as well as what we observe and is a move beyond or accompanying explanation of the mechanics and functioning of the past. Such significance and quality is less about representing the past object than following its symbolic displacement, its translation and transference through different contexts, practices and experiences. This means that there is no one necessarily correct interpretation of the past. Past and present are partners in dialogue; the dialogue is the means of creating meaning. It is an active making of sense, producing a meaning which was not there in the beginning. One aim of the encounter is to bring about a release, of meanings of the past which will prove to be of use. This is a practical reasoning.[19]

TRANSLATING THE PAST

The proposition that human phenomena are structured like language has had a tremendous impact on what the social sciences are today. It has also affected archaeology. The idea is that material culture is like a text, with individual objects or parts of objects words in a language (albeit simpler and more ambiguous). Some have looked for grammars, formal logics which lie behind decorative patterns for example, rules which when applied can generate the patterning observed in the past. Others have gone for meaning with the idea that objects are connected in systems which speak the structure of society or human life; cemeteries have been treated as transformations of society, revealing and distorting (there may be interests working to misrepresent the structure of society). Others again have looked at the use of material objects in different contexts, at how the meaning may change with different use. A pot in a house may mean one thing, something very different at a tomb.[20]

With material culture conceived as sharing some of the structure and characteristics of language it is appropriate to think of translation as a metaphor of interpretation. What does it involve? A poor translation is produced if we try to create and use a set of fixed rules for exchanging an item in one language for an item in the translator's. The equivalence between translation and original is not a direct one. Translation is to say in the words of one language what one finds in the words of another—another language, another person. Translation involves a translator who makes sense and this requires reference to the translator's social experience and context. Translation is embodied interpretation (see Benjamin 1970b).

GAMES

Post-structuralists often write of the play of meaning, the meaning of something shifting with its context and associations. Games are played. In what sense might archaeology be a game?

Games have rules which the players follow. But the game really exists only through being played. There may be a rule book and equipment but what really matters is its playing. The rules guide, but every game is different. Soccer players apply their understanding of the game, and skills, to the particular circumstances of each new match. Indeed games exist 'only in being different' (Gadamer). Games also take us out of our ordinary experience; they may be played in a special ground or arena.

If the past sets the rules (we should want this surely), as archaeologist I am the player and archaeology is a particular strategy or option I use in playing the game of interpretation. The rules take me out of ordinary experience, and exert an authority over me. But at the same time the past takes on concrete existence only in being played; in this I am essential to the past. Archaeology the discipline is only one strategy adapted to each 'playing', each particular project. There can be good and bad matches, good and bad archaeological approaches and projects. These are judged not just according to how closely the rules are followed, but also according to how much the players (archaeologists) get out of the game, and how it looks to an audience.

Some questions are raised. How do I know the rules of the game? How does the past guide me in my archaeological interpretation? And is archaeology simply entertainment for players and audience? It helps to shift from playing games to theatre performance.

THEATRE, FILM AND INTERPRETATION

A play is performed. Like a game, a play has priority over its actors, but it only takes on concrete existence in performance. Performances differ, so much so that the idea of there being one definitive performance goes against the nature of the creative arts. The understanding of director, actors and designer, as well as their skill, comes between a play and its performance. It can also be argued that performance is not about defining and following an author's intentions at all. The play is independent of author and open to reading and interpretation in the light of performers' abilities and aims. And a good performance is one which reveals meanings for an audience. The audience is final judge of the worth of a performance, judging critically how it speaks to them, how it enlarges their understanding. A play may have a story which makes sense (or denies that there is sense) and we may try to understand this sense which is internal to the play. But the story has also a dimension of reference; it tells of the world and what it is like; it evokes things not directly present in the play. The skills of the actors as well as the quality of the interpretation are involved in another interplay of presence and absence. The good actor is not taken literally (as actor) but through their performance is evoked a character or part; the absent character appears as a magical presence. This transference takes place as the work of the audience's imagination on the skilled performance of the actor.

In watching a movie we may first be taken in and absorbed by the spectacle, effects, movement, realism. But sooner or later comes realization that this is just a movie; we're in a cinema and this is a business product to get money out of us. We may still follow the story but the fascination, and with it a lot of the pleasure, is gone. There's something missing. *Suture* is a term which has been used to describe how spectators, as coherent subjects, are brought into movies (and other discourses) to create its meanings. Suture is a set of effects which mean the spectator recognizes themself in the movie as its subject; they recognize the images as their own. These effects are to do with composition and editing, how the viewer's look is identified with a character's. Suturing draws in the spectator as an element bringing coherence or meaning, getting rid of that feeling of absence, bringing one of recognition. But suture may assume a coherent self for the effects to work, for recognition, satisfaction and pleasure to ensue. It may thus structure and encourage certain types of subjectivity. And we may not agree with these; we may not like what the film makes of our selves. It may be ideological (Heath 1981).

All forms of discourse including archaeology have these suturing effects which draw us in as coherent subjects of the discourse. These effects are often specific to the discourse, be it drama, film or photography. These are not natural effects but functions of their medium. For example in viewing a photograph we often identify with the camera position; it makes sense if we do this and in turn the sense confirms a conception of the self (regarding such things as what is involved in the look) (Burgin 1982).

In the archaeological theatre the discovered past is the play and archaeologists the actors who work on the text producing a performance, releasing some meanings of the past for an audience. Much is relevant to the performance. Reference may be made to commentaries in giving the text a close reading, attempting to understand its sense. For archaeologists these may be explanatory analyses of archaeological materials, scientific and specialist reports. Reference may be made to other performances for comparison, to other archaeologies. And there are essential considerations of audience in connection with the aims and interests of the archaeologist-performers (see also Tilley 1989). And archaeology as (dramatic) discourse has suturing effects drawing us within.

This is the work of interpretation: explanation, the decipherment and communication of meaning and significance. As in prophecy it involves reading for significance and inferring courses of action. It may involve translation. It is the performance of a work, acting out to bestow intelligible life. Performance involves choice of how to perform, to enact certain meanings, and this choice implies a commitment (to those social, political, and personal stands taken in the performance). It is also answerable to the source and to the critique of other interpretations and audience. It is itself both analytic (of its source) and critical in its choice of some meanings and not others, in its reference to other interpretations. Interpretation is an active apprehension which makes of something produced in the past a presence to us now (see Steiner 1989).

For me archaeology is the skill of interpreting the past.

ANALOGY AND EMBODIMENT

I have presented a series of analogies and metaphors which might be applied to archaeology, mapping similarities and differences to other things we do and know. The

point of these images and reflections is not really to illustrate archaeology. There have been some specialized discussions of what archaeology may be. In Part 1 I referred to notions of relational thinking, deferred meaning and chains of signifiers, and materialist sublation as parts of the current debate in archaeology. A lot of archaeologists justifiably would like to get beyond the often abstract argument to see what these ideas really mean and look like in practice. In one way the images are meant to clarify, and not just the difficult newer ideas of what archaeologists may do. But there is more.

I want to avoid an opposition between an abstract logical systematizing of archaeology (abstract definitions of what archaeology is or should be, based on ideas of logic and reasoning—definitions which can be taken and applied to the real world) and the expression of such ideas in concrete and so understandable terms. There can be suspicion of the use of analogies; it may be thought that they say what something is like or what it is similar to, but this doesn't get down to what something really is. Archaeologists have been very sceptical of the use of analogy in interpreting the past because analogies come from present understanding and so may confuse what the past really is. A collection of stone tools associated with a hunting and gathering life-style in a present community does not mean that a similar collection of stone tools found by archaeologists belonged to a similar prehistoric community (see also Wylie 1985, 1988).

In our understanding of what archaeologists do I argue that analogies are not illustrations or aids to understanding, heuristics or supplements to what is really going on. They are essential and integral parts of what archaeology is and can be. In drawing on widely understood and felt meanings, analogies make what archaeologists are and may be doing intelligible. In this they perform a communicative role of presentation or illustration. But analogy and metaphor are also essential to knowledge-in-the-world, practical reasoning engaged with the world we live, allowing the abstract to be integrated into a world of lived experience. Archaeology can produce knowledges of the form: 'we know that this happened there and then'. Such knowing-that is a valid part of archaeology. But also valid is know-how, the skills of archaeological reasoning and interpretation which relate to the quality of our lives now. Analogy and metaphor are of this knowledge.

What I have tried to do is follow the process of archaeology and its object becoming something else, be it theatre, striptease or neurosis. These different experiences and conditions make of archaeology what it is, and archaeology makes them too! Perhaps I should add, for me at least. This is a necessarily personal exploration, depending on my experiences. It depends on my social and cultural background and belonging; but neither of these are 'accidental'.

Here is an argument for archaeology having an embodied dimension which is not cognitive and of the mind alone but also of the body. To say this is not very exceptional. I have had cause several times to remind that the past arouses powerful feelings. But I have tried to indicate that archaeological knowledge cannot be isolated as neutral cognition. This has been one of the main thrusts of the critique of archaeology I discussed in Part 1. Archaeology is also immediately emotive, sentimental. Not so much a method or set of procedures, archaeology is its experiences—the past in the present and what is done with it. It includes how archaeologists and others see themselves. This is another major feature of changes that have occurred in the discipline. The changes are as much to do with archaeologists' images of themselves and the nature of archaeological experience as they

are to do with traditional archaeology losing to the arguments of scientific rationality which in turn has been assaulted by ideology critique.

So analogy is central to a description of what archaeology is. It is allegorical. In the same way allegory (stories in which the people, things and events have different levels of meaning) is a vital part of our understanding of the past. Just as there is no simple, neutral and cognitive description of archaeological method, so too there is no direct experience of the past. I shall move to this in Part 3.

Here then are some of the attractions and characteristics of archaeology. Dynamics of individuality, power and agency (in acquisition of knowledge, acting on the past, subjection to rules and values of discipline and propriety), of discovery and loss, past and present, absence and presence. Mysteries and nostalgias in the movement between self and other. There has been particular focus on the nature of the relationship between the subjective self and the object found, and I have picked out features of what can be called an understanding of the past through dialogue.

This is what I hope for. An archaeology wider than the acquisition of knowledge of the past through the application of rational method. An archaeology of concrete and sensuous practice for and in the present. There is clearly a valid place for a scientific and explanatory attitude. That this is so is one argument against the fear that an archaeology of the present loses the past. I do not think that an embodied archaeology is an unrealistic hope for a 'new' discipline or cultural field. That this chapter could be written shows that all the aspects of such an archaeology are with us already. They may be put to one side in much academic work, but the tools are around. They are at work in very recent archaeology, in interpretive anthropology.[21] Historical writing has many rich interpretive textures. There has always been a vital current of critical alternative thought from pre-Socratic Herakleitos through Diogenes and represented by relational and dialectical philosophies; Marx, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida are more recent figures in this stream. But we need only look to our experience.

PERFUME AND VIOLENCE

Impressions of some aryballoi (perfume jars) from archaic Korinth[22]

Some of the perfume jars come from Perachora, a sanctuary of Korinth. Dedications to goddess Hera Limenaia, with cups, wine ewers, boxes; some were dedicated elsewhere. The Korinthian Gulf opens blue to the west. Many more were carried to new Greek settlements in Sicily and Italy to turn up in graves. Tiny jars, to be held easily in the palm of a hand or between finger and thumb. A few dozen stowed in an aristocrat's ship. A ship? Well perhaps fifty oared. Aristocrats? Sons, perhaps not yet with their inheritance which would mainly be land. Setting out to travel. The pots were popular in the west. A few potters produced the figured jars crammed with animals, people, stylized flowers (most were still abstractly patterned with many lines), and sometimes still working perhaps on a seasonal basis. In the 'city' of Korinth, though it still looked more like a collection of villages. You wouldn't have seen these pots fifty years earlier. Things were changing. People knew it.

Early Greek history abounds in grand stories. The birth of political man from a dark age. The emergence of western rationalism, of the western tradition of representational art. A classical apogee; inspirational and seminal art, thought and literature. Stories also of economic empires: Korinthians from the seventh century BC dominating the western Mediterranean with their manufactures, to be ousted by the Athenians. These perfume jars and wine jugs have been seen to fit in these narratives, key pieces in transmitting oriental ideas to western art, the beginning of Korinth's commercial success. Such narratives, many the legacy of nineteenth-century fantasies of classical Greek excellence, are tired. They are being challenged.

Where might I start with these aryballoi? There are the syntheses which gather the pots to compare, contrast and establish types and stages of development. There are the stylistic analyses which attempt to attribute pots and fragments to individual artist hands: the 'Macmillan' painter or 'Boston' painter (named after former owner of a particular pot, or museum), 'Head-in-air' painter (after the look of the animals), the Cumae group (after the main findspot). Comment on these gatherings includes conventional art history, describing and appreciating the sequence of stylistic change and influence. Such is the traditional work of Classical archaeology.

I might take a more progressive line and follow the methodology and theory of processual or post-processual archaeology. Many pots occur in graves. I might attempt a mortuary analysis. This would involve establishing patterning in the cemeteries (certain pots being regularly associated with certain others on the basis of type, style, positioning relative to body for example, and with particular individuals). Computer-based statistical analysis of the many variables would probably be used. The patterning discovered in the cemeteries would then be correlated with 'society' on the assumption that the treatment

of the dead is related to the way people organize society (social hierarchy, for example, being mirrored in the particular forms of burial). I could alternatively focus on the pot designs themselves and attempt to identify the function of their style (in expressing a social role or persona).

A more 'post-processual' approach might specify the pots as elements of the society's 'ideology', the way it represents its social reality to itself and in a way which disguises social inequalities or exploitations. I would identify the 'semiotic structure' of the pots using a formal analysis (often quantified) of their designs. This would mean identifying key features of the grammar or structure of the designs (contrasts for example between bounded and open designs, left and right, or symmetrical patterning, or order to pattern sequences). Such structuring would be argued as being located within particular social relations of domination and subordination. Here I begin not with methodology and a theory (of material culture and its place in society), but with a map. A production map of a network of connections which relate the character, style, production anc consumption of these pots—their empirical occurrence.

The pot itself is the product of technique which involves questions of the possibility of individual creative input into the design, which in turn begs the question of the control and organization of production. Questions of how production was scaled according to perceived demand, questions of patronage and information flow, as well as more practical issues of workshop organization and ownership. (It is assumed that it is meaningful to identify individual artist styles, but this assumption implies much about the whole ethos of material production and so should be carefully examined.) The style of the pot may be interrogated, from creativity of design through its iconography to its referencing of structures of social relationships—ideology. This latter involves considering the occurrence of particular designs within their apparent location of consumption as accessories to death and worship. The use of miniature figured perfume jars and drinking accoutrement in ritual and religion suggests questions of the subjective identity of people who used such pots in this way; what does it mean to associate such style with religion and ritual? That the pots were exported to be consumed in such ways involves questions of value and the mechanisms which achieved the widespread dissemination of the pots. This is not a simple matter of abstract exchange values and market mechanism (there was no market system of monetary exchange). It references also social distinctions such as class (the absence of merchant middle class), as does the possible function of jars as perfume containers (rare and perhaps expensive) and vessels accompanying (aristocratic?) drinking parties, as does the control and organization of production (free artisans or functionaries for social groups looking for stylistic emblems of social status?).

These are some of the questions suggested by the pots. It is the matter of 'design', a term which disperses into style, the technical, economic relations of production, class and social or subjective identity. Some of these may be treated relatively autonomously, such as technical matters and workshop organization, but all come back to the pot, its tracings through production, style, distribution and consumption; energies, powers and desires. There is no hierarchy to these questions, no primacy of the economic or of artistic creativity over other aspects of design. And the description of an aryballos immediately implies a constellation of concepts (of theory): style, value, ideology, class, creativity, identity. Such concepts are like tools for constructing descriptions and stories of the design of these proto-Korinthian pots.


ARCHAIC ECONOMY
PRODUCTION
scale control organization
CLASS
VALUE
pot function
exchange mechanisms
TECHNIQUE
CONSUMPTION
STYLE
RELIGION
individual creativity
IDEOLOGY
SELF
SUBJECTIVITY

The starting point is an interpretive choice. This is an inappropriate place to be definitive and authoritative. I wish to give some impressions. I shall begin with style and iconology and follow some themes and connections.

A design from an aryballos: a centaur fights with a swordsman brandishing something; another swordsman; two birds of prey (I shall call them eagles) on either side of a krater or dinos (mixing bowl) on a stand, decorative eagles on the rim. The air is filled with 'decorative' devices.

Eagles: they appear as devices on soldiers' shields, fly beneath horses, on other pots, are associated with 'heroes'. In Homer soldiers swoop on enemies as victims, prey, as eagles—birds which hunt. Marcel Detienne comments on their association with the sun, flying high, with spices, with perfume (1977). And eagles are sometimes gods incarnate. Lions on the pots may appear to spring in hunting attack. Dogs have speed and race round so many aryballoi, chasing hares. Eagles fly as swiftly and can spring.

Heroic eagles. The krater and stand are perhaps prize in the games for a victorious hero (as were tripod cauldrons used). Or from which he may take wine mixed for the cup. Aristocratic, symbol of the *agōn* (the contest) and the *symposion* (drinking party), and charged with magical meaning. On other pots robed figures stand apparently in judgement, overlooking contests.

Looking at these images perhaps they oiled their bodies, floral perfume after the *agōn*. Perfumes were also aphrodisiac, of seduction. Or of death: placed in a grave in Korinthian Syracuse. Scent of death; sacrificial spices carried on smoke to divinities.

All this is antinomial to the world of marriage. In the poems of Hesiod, Pandora, the first woman, broke the utopian prehistory of men. With her arrival came sexual reproduction and marriage, agriculture and sacrifice. None of these appear on the pots.

The swordsman fights a centaur. Wild and drunken, these were enemies of order and the polis. Creatures of violence. Fitting enemies for the hero. And these composite creatures were part of an old prehistoric order, at least according to philosopher Empedokles who spoke of three stages in the emergence of animals. At first animals and plants were disassembled in component bits and pieces. Then the parts came together incongruously in strange jumbled forms. Only in the third stage of evolution did animals emerge in their whole and natural forms. The swordsman fights this creature which is doubly male, and horses were the most sexual of beasts for these Greeks. Fighting then a negation of marriage and ordered reproductive sexuality.

Another aryballos: monsters face a soldier who carries an eagle shield. A big cat looks at us.

Monstrosity is the erasure of difference in the mixing of different parts. This is what all the monsters are on the pots—bits and pieces, heads, bodies, limbs, wings recombined. So in one way the monsters are all equivalent, many variations on sphinx, siren, centaur, griffon, chimaera. Loss of difference is intimately related to violence in that order and peace depend on difference. It is equilibrium which can lead to violence as an attempt to establish a preponderance of one over another, good over evil, a boundary between pure and impure. Justice is an imbalance, winners and losers.

The historical moment of the pots: *dikē* (justice), order, its administration and codification, are a focus of a seventh-century crisis in many archaic city-states, including Korinth.

We can define ourselves through animals. Lions are pre-eminently the animal mirror of the hero for Homer. This lion looks at us. The look of animals may enter into definitions of the self. The lion does not attack the soldier but looks at us. It is different, not a person, but through the look, the meeting of gazes, similar. We too are lions, like the soldier, individuals who attack and are opposed to the (peasant) herd. The look of this lion other confirms our self-coherence, and here draws us into the

The Macmillan aryballos (reproduced by courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum)

scene. The lion may be a panther (felines in such a posture are later labelled panther; some carry spots), a unique creature which according to the Greeks hunts by using its perfume-like scent to attract its prey.

Animals came to figure predominantly on the pots. Lions, bulls, boars, deer, rams and billy-goats. Stylized and lined up, sometimes arranged in symmetries, heraldically facing. Marching around the pots. Sometimes they fight or are fought by men.

Soldiers fight each other on some aryballoi and these scenes have been scrutinized to see if they show a change in warfare suspected at around this time, war becoming more open, from aristocratic heroes fighting singly to formations of citizens fighting together, hoplites. (Was it ever as simple as this?) On the lion-headed aryballos from the British Museum appears a battle in progress, helmeted, round shielded, armoured fighting machines or heroes. One side loses. Beneath, a race of horses, and then a hare hunt again.

Violence and war; the hunt; the games. Definitions of masculinity. Proving to have the prowess of a lion. Dreams of an original masculine culture? A discourse on aristocracy?

The life of the lord is one of living pleasure. Pure consumption of goods produced by the subordinate class. Lifestyle. Gifts, wine, the games, perfume. And war. Risking death on the battlefield, or in the hunt, risking and surviving for recognition by the herd of others. War becomes luxury, wealth and festival. (The soldiers decked out in panoply, crests nodding, accompanied by piper, run into formation on the Chigi olpe.) War is excess—the cost of the weaponry, horses, time, and risk. War is transgression; the law is against murder because vengeance and blood feud result. But war is the transgression implied by the law. It is an *economic* calculation whereby that which is desired is denied for the increased reward in taking it. Accessible to those of wealth who may fight the risk, display their sovereignty. So war, violence, power and the law are related here, and through vengeance and the feud, the family. Vengeance is an exchange between families, as were women. War bypasses this blood exchange with an exchange of sovereignty displayed to others.

But the law was changing, war was becoming differently public, lifestyles open to redefinition. By the middle of the seventh century it would seem from what historical records there are that Korinth's traditional rulers were finished in a social revolution led by Kypselos, a military leader on the fringe of Korinth's ruling aristocratic dynasty.

A major focus of the iconography is bodily form—human, monstrous, animal; fighting, torn, mixed, stylized animal form. The body is a primary site for the political ethos of war, a political aesthetics.

The physique of the heavy infantryman is hardened and held together by his bronze armour. In formation phalanx bodies unite and their integration fears disruption, break-up. In the fighting formation the armoured soldier's torso has a closer functional connection to the torso of his neighbour than to his own helmeted head or greaved calf. The formation forms new, centred bodies, and provides identity. His armour and fighting equipment hold him together but in the violence of war the soldier risks death. Death does not oppose life (its excess, luxury and transgression are part of the life of the lord). Death is opposed to the consciousness of life which is cultured, life-style, and which is a negation of the animal. Animals are animated, complex, various, like but unlike man, changeable, unpredictable. The fighting man is opposed to this complex multiplicity which overflows the conceptual boundaries meant to contain it. The soldier fights an internal war, engaging those animal forces which threaten to turn his unified body back

into a disorganized jumble of flesh, hair, skin, limbs. We have seen the new fighting man, integrated, synthesized amalgam of parts, subduing monsters, forces threatening and fearful in their disorganized jumble of bits and pieces, creatures of old. And the animal friezes on the aryballoi and particularly on the later larger vessels stylize and deanimate their animals, lined up in formal sequence. But the soldier may recognize himself in the lion, and may attach an eagle to his shield. Violence allows the soldier to find identity with his bestial interior while avoiding being devoured by it. War animates the dead within him. The fighting man is both hunter and hunted, finding the identity of his self in hunting and fighting the other.

Such aesthetics of war is far removed from the world of work and is a repudiation of the everyday. This is the way the new style (proto-Korinthian as archaeologists call it) began at the end of the eighth century BC. With symbols of the exotic, motifs from the east. Lines of stylized herons on severe geometric cups become strutting cocks. Zig-zag friezes become fabulous lotus and palmette, elaborated into fantastic floral garlands on shoulders of aryballoi.

The exotic, flowers, perfumes, heroes, masculinities, war and violence, contests, monsters, hunts, animals. Popular particularly in the new states of the west, presented with the dead or with divinities. Images of the limits of culture, warrior self and the animal, death and divinity, mortal and hero, masculinity and the female.

Perfumed oil and the massage of style. Style wars. Is that what these vessels are about? Images acquired to express social meanings deemed significant, emulating an aristocratic ethos? Visible representations of ideal aspirations? The presencing of style—bringing forward key aspects of imagined class ideologies, what it was to belong to a particular section of the community? To place an aryballos in a grave.

Interpretation of style leads back into the map of production, particularly to questions of social strategy, of social definition and opposition and conflict (through styles). To questions of why such style appeared when it did in the eighth and seventh centuries, its historical moment.

Each pot, in its imagery and through reflection on its use and where it was found, leads off into spirals of associations, like dream-work. This is that aspect of style which is a reworking, remodelling, transformation of ideas, codes and imagery already known or familiar. And like dream-work the style of the aryballoi is not a representation of meanings which can be exhaustively expressed verbally, either by the Korinthians or by me. Style *requires* interpretation, the interpretive act of Korinthian, colonist in Italy, or contemporary archaeologist. This cannot be separated from the pots and their representations. Just as an understanding of the aryballoi requires their relating to aspects of the productive map I have illustrated—the general economy of the production of these pots.

A floral garland from the shoulder of an aryballos

The figurative designs on the pots represent animals and people. What is the significance of this? What is the nature of the worlds of meanings signified on the pots? What do the designs represent? Are they a realistic portrayal of social relationships in the seventh century? Do they represent what was going on in the mind of the potter-painter?

Are they illustrations of myths and legends? Are they expressions of class ideologies—an aristocratic ethos perhaps? I would argue that understanding the design of these pots and following the spirals of association, transformations through their imagery and contexts, would deny any easy separation of pots from economic relations from art from class. Given the insertion of the pots within a network of productive relations, it is not enough to conceive of the figured designs as representing or illustrating something else such as archaic Korinthian society, or a change in ways of fighting, or legends and myths. Nor can they be simply understood as a relay carrying a message from potter to consumer, or from archaic potter to contemporary archaeologist. Such views treat the pots as secondary representation of something more primary or material, or real. Instead, the design of these pots necessarily involves their material location within the work of potter, acts of exchange and consumption, rituals of death and dedication. The design of the pots is a material part of what they may be showing us. Archaic Korinthian society, ideologies, aspirations of potter or of citizen, are not experienced now or then directly and in themselves (what would their reality be?). They appear sphinx-like in the riddles of the object, its design.

Part 3
THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE PAST

WHAT IS THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL PAST?

Full fathom five thy father lies.
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange.
(Shakespeare, *The Tempest* I, 2)

In archaeology the past, it seems, is encountered in its material remains. Scatterings of tools and debris recorded in field-walking survey, sites discovered and excavated, material recovered. Ruins, remains, reconstructions may be visited, collections viewed in museums. In this part of the book I shall investigate further the character of archaeological finds, aspects of the physical encounter with the past.

COLLECTING: MEMORIES AND THINGS VALUED[23]

The antiquary collects the past, fixing on objects themselves, qualities and features, attractions and distinguishing marks. The figure of the antiquary is not a popular one in archaeology. Their concern is with objects stripped of their context, or at least those contexts which the archaeologist values—the object's place in the ground, its identity in situ. But there is also an unease about the antiquary's concern itself, that here is a passion a little too intimate with the past, a fetishism.

Fetishism: here is a desire to hold, look, touch; captivation by the consecrated object. The antiquary's vase is past frozen, a fixed moment. The wholeness of the past is lost in the melancholic holding of the vase; the past, longed for, is missing. The vase fills the gap. Touching, viewing what once was there, part of what is desired. But the fixation on the vase, the antiquary's contact, is the condition of the past being absent. The vase commemorates the past which is missing, but denies this. The fetish object combines gratification and distress: being sometimes the presence, and sometimes the absence of that which is desired. The archaeological suspicion is that antiquarian desire effaces the past. The object merely mirrors the antiquary's impoverished world in which knowledge (of the lack, and of gaining knowledge by overcoming the separation) is replaced by blind desire. There is a morbidity about the antiquary too: images of skulls, dusty gloom, yellow parchment of decay. The antiquary is dead to all sensuality save the body of the past. The past is dead and gone; but here is a beautiful and fascinating vase. Perhaps

though we should remember the sensuality present through its absence in the antiquary's desire to hold the past.

Putting the object in its context regains some knowledge, but what exactly is the object's context? And is it only to do with knowing the past?

Archaeological objects are collected for various reasons. As curiosities, as art. This of course was particularly the case with the nineteenth-century museums, and still is the case with many private collectors today. The art object may be taken to be iconic representation of some enduring human qualities such as beauty or sensibility, a cultural sign. Objects are also collected as being evidence; here again they are cultural signs. They are collected because they are believed to be meaningful in some way, of value.

In contemporary capitalism value is especially related to a notion of property. If something is valuable it can command a high price in the market, and this sort of value can be owned. The nature of the object's value, the means by which the antique vase achieves its sale price are irrelevant to the owning. An object may possess beauty, a collector may own a classical vase, a museum may own (in the name of a country or institution) a collection of artifacts. The common factor is possession. (The word 'property' can mean possessions, something of value, the right to possess and use something, a piece of land (intrinsically valuable), and also the qualities or attributes something possesses.) The public collections held in the great national museums are the material embodiment of culture. It can be said that nation states 'have' culture, found in its theatres, galleries and museums. Such culture may be cosmopolitan western high culture, or specific to the nation state. States compete to possess cultured individuals producing 'great' human works, and to have a distinctive national identity. This is the ambiguity of 'culture' as a noun denoting national traditional folkculture, or the achievements of cultural progress and civilization, intellectual and artistic works. So the collections held in museums are conceived as part of national culture and identity. And having a wealth of culture can be associated with identity being a sort of wealth. Identity also implies belonging to somewhere or some community.

Value (as related to ownership) may be based on various perceived qualities of the object. It may be aesthetic quality; and objects may have qualities which it is believed can lead to knowledge. This latter is of course archaeological value. For objects to be witnesses to the past they must have age and authenticity. Their age implies that they have been saved from decay while authenticity implies that their origin or context is known, we know where they belong. These qualities of age and authenticity are essential, it would seem, to the possibility of archaeological knowledge. If objects are not authentic they are either mistakes or fakes. Fakes are the *bêtes noires* of archaeology and the art market. Authenticity is also a concern of cultural identity. The ideal is the aboriginal, that which is indigenous, which has been there from the beginning.

So archaeological objects are collected into systems of value and meaning according to principles of authenticity and originality. All classifications of the object by date, provenance and type depend on these qualities. Dispelling the anxiety of placing confidence in the fraud or simulation, they order the world of objects, separating positive from negative, orthodox article from heretical fake. They are the basis for a secure archaeological past. But how secure are these qualities? Can they be so relied upon?

It has frequently been pointed out that personal as well as cultural identity is associated with acts of collecting. And not just material goods but also memories and

knowledges. Unpacking his library, Walter Benjamin writes of the similarities between collecting and memory. 'Every passion borders on the chaotic, but the collector's passion borders on the chaos of memories' (1970a, p. 60). Here then is a constellation of collection, identity, memory, objects, value and knowledge. Memory is not like a journal, an objective record of life in the sequence it occurred. Memory is of the present and a disorder of select moments, impressions and subjective states.

9. I remember that on the original LP sleeve of 'My Fair Lady' a benign Bernard Shaw, esconced in heaven, dangled Rex Harrison and Julie Andrews on puppet strings. I also remember a fad for cashmere cardigans a la Professor Higgins.
10. I remember tasting Coca-Cola for the very first time. It was at Prestwick Airport (or 'Aerodrome', as it was then known) and was offered me by an American serviceman.
11. I remember Spinola, the Portugese 'Kerensky', with his monocle, his flamboyantly braided uniform and his resemblance to a decadent aristocrat in a Simenon novel.
12. I remember the craze for matching shirts and ties, usually of a flower pattern.
13. I remember that Sophia Loren served a two week prison sentence for tax evasion.

(Gilbert Adair, *Myths and Memories,* 1986, p. 158)

Or an *apparent* arbitrariness. These fragments are charged and encapsulating, crystallizing. Personal and cultural gems, or needle points; stigmata; states of contentment, dull visceral aches. And memory is not passive: it is an active act of remembering from the present, albeit one in which the present may play a role of precipitant rather than choosing at will. 'For what else is this collection', comments Benjamin, 'but a disorder to which habit has accommodated itself to such an extent that it can appear as order… "The only exact knowledge there is," said Anatole France, "is the knowledge of the date of publication and the format of books." And indeed, if there is a counterpart to the confusion of a library, it is the order of its catalogue' (1970a, p. 60). We do acquire our memories, as a collector may acquire collectibles, and order them from our different vantage points.

The collector focuses on the object, getting to know and cherishing the background, anything it suggests—period, method of production, previous owners, place and occasion of acquisition, history of the object in the collector's possession, the memories and associations it evokes for the collector. 'For a true collector the whole background of an item adds up to a magic encyclopaedia whose quintessence is the fate of his object' (Benjamin 1970a, p. 60). This magic encyclopaedia, a physiognomy of the object, is full of commentary, review, classification, association, evocation, and is never complete with a growing collection and the collector's ongoing life. It is the object's resistance to classification and order.

The physiognomy of the collected and personal object is a power to fixate. As with memories, this is a quality of uniqueness. Collectibles and memories do not just inform or educate. They return to haunt. Their disconcerting fascination is one of dis-ease and disruption. 'The true, greatly misunderstood passion of the collector is always anarchistic, destructive. For this is its dialectics: to combine with loyalty to an object, to individual items, to things sheltered in his care, a stubborn subversive protest against the typical, the classifiable' (Benjamin, quoted by Arendt 1970, p. 45). Collection and travel tap this interplay of order and fascination; tourism holds it out as promise.

Gilbert Adair lists his four hundred memories. There is an order to them. Not their numbering, but a coherence given to them by our recognition of things held in common with him, and the significance of the memories he notes. We all have such collections of memories which are vital components of personal and cultural identities.

Ornamental fountain before a Vanbrugh stately home; Sunday cricket on a village pitch; the smell of wild garlic in a bluebell wood; a drovers' track over a sheep moor; disused lime kilns; war memorials; oak trees; steam traction engines; a pint of cask ale; a moated castle; cuckoos in spring; a Norman parish church; fish and chips. These might be some of

Drawing by Ann Hartshorne

the things which would come under a heading of 'English Heritage'. These are bizarre juxtapositions, but loaded and directed towards particular ends by personal interests, commercial and political powers.

SURREALISM

> Wherever the living pursue particularly ambiguous activities, the inanimate may sometimes assume the reflection of their most secret motives: and thus our cities are peopled with unrecognized sphinxes which will never stop passing dreamers and ask them mortal questions unless they project their meditation, their absence of mind towards them. But if the wise have the power to guess their secret, and interrogate them, all that these faceless monsters will grant is that the dreamer shall once more again plumb their own depths.
>
> (Aragon, *Paris Peasant*)

Surrealism is an aesthetic strategy which directs fragments into unexpected juxtapositions and exotic collections. As a literary and artistic movement it made a plea for a revival of imagination as irruption of otherness from the unconscious, and championed irrationality, accident, magic, dreams and symbols. Its intelligibility, or rather accessibility (especially through the polished figurative techniques of Magritte and Dali), has enabled its takover by the advertising industry, from *Vogue* to corporate imaging. And in our (post)modern condition we all make sense with wildly eclectic cultural mixes, massive surreal image and memory banks in our heads.

But surrealism was also part of a distinctly modern sensibility of revolt. Fascinated with the profusion of cultural objects, surrealist art arranged incongruous meetings of everyday objects (Lautreamont's summation: beauty as the chance encounter on an operating table of sewing machine and umbrella), evoking childhood astonishment and mocking confidence in reality's external form. The forms of things mutate in the defamiliarized and permeable world of surrealist painting, while fetishistic objects, fur tea cups and mannequin sex dolls, disturb the repressed calm of bourgeois reproductive sexuality. Not all of this looks dated now in its professed revolutionary subversion. It may no longer shock, but it adds to a considerable tendency in capitalist modernity to question a reality with identity defined in terms of an exclusion of otherness.

Archaeology has its immediate surrealist elements: juxtapositions of fibula and quernstone, gold ring and ox scapula in sifting through the cultural rubbish tip; the strangeness of some of those things which mystify archaeologists and which they call 'ritual' objects. This may often be just a momentary feeling of the bizarre, it may not.

The archaeologist gathers objects, selecting those to be studied on the basis, ultimately, of age and authenticity, originality. But these are not intrinsic values, essential qualities. What would be an essential quality of 'authenticity'? Truth to self? The hope for such a quality involves abstract definitions of self (object self) and truth, on the basis of which the inessential may be excluded, it would seem. Alternatively the archaeologist prefers to guarantee authenticity through context—where the object comes from, the traces remaining of the objects 'present'. Though the traces are of our present, the

object's value depends on it being removed from the present. And to return to the question of value. Value may be exchange value, what something means to someone else, its value for an other. Or it may be use value, the object's relevance to some interest or purpose. This makes of the object a tool. Tools are fitted to particular purposes, are useless for others. In the same way choice may be exercised in selecting and gathering objects, in this case for archaeological purpose. Both these forms of value include acts of choice and selection on the part of agencies beyond the object itself. Value is about *desire*.

To think of age and authenticity as essential and intrinsic disguises the relation of exchange which exists between past and present. It is to forget that an object's value is decided in moving from past to present through the work of desire. Archaeologists *want* what they find. What is found is not naturally 'authentic; its 'original' context is not natural. (What is natural about the commingling of the cultural garbage heap, of the abandoned home? Only perhaps the decay and entropy; disruption and disorder.) There is no 'archaeological record' as such. What is found becomes authentic and valuable because it is set by choice in a new and separate environment with its own order and its own temporality—the time coordinates of the discipline archaeology which give the object its date. This is a moral setting.

The systems of value according to which archaeologists gather and order their 'finds' are not natural then, but tactical and strategic. This is *not* to say arbitrary. I am not saying that the archaeologist's choice is arbitrary, though if I were a surrealist I might well say that the archaeologist's choice was as meaningful as the irruptions of irrationality and the unconscious represented by the surreal object. Archaeologists gather with particular meanings in mind. And we may wish to think of the purpose and interests lying in the archaeological order and use of the past. To this I shall return.[24]

HERITAGE AND SYMBOLIC EXCHANGE

The fragmentary experiences and impressions of Heritage, such as those I have listed, seem to speak of a (post)modern condition, especially of the 1980s and beyond.

Those visits I made to the castles in Northumberland some twenty years ago, collecting the guide books which explained the castle's history, its lords and lieutenants, locating the place in a rational account of local and national history, consistent and as complete as could be. Technical and official history, didactic, explained by learned authority. I never read them. Yes, they were about the part of the castles in history and may have described life within; the guide books were deeply concerned with the meaning of the monuments. But not to me. Too distant. Now the heritage site of the 1990s may not fit into a coherent and chronological account. Sites are interpreted for me, much more now, but in spite of the didactic reliance on words (all the interpretive signs for me to digest scattered around the site), the experience of heritage is about encounter and images. Not the objects and sites themselves so much as what they say of *us,* of national or local identity, what they symbolize and evoke. These are not primarily cognitive experiences where facts and knowledge about the past are acquired from the official learned guide book. They are affective. And like the disorder of memory, heritage is piecemeal. In Britain heritage places considerable emphasis on this relationship with

memory, relating sites and objects with images, sounds, impressions of a sort of cultural collective memory. Things we think we may hear from our grandparents.

Amgueddfa Werin Cymru, the Welsh National Folk Museum, at Saint Fagan's, Cardiff, is a setting for reconstructed cottages, farmhouses, rural industrial buildings, chapel, schoolhouse. The familiar interpreting 'inhabitants' explain things; the guide book gives a little information. But wandering around the sites is about fragmented evocation of premodern, pre-industrialized times. Spare puritan methodism, dark smoky interiors, rural labour. Schoolchildren visit, dress up, sit in old school benches and listen to teacher forbid them to speak in Welsh. Complaint may justifiably be made that this is a very particular authentic Welshness which is being presented. What of the major nineteenth- and twentieth-century experiences of the South Wales valleys—coal-mining and steel production? The major complaint against heritage in general is that it involves a distortion of the 'real' past. Sometimes that it is incoherent and more to do with spectacle and entertainment than the 'real' past (Hewison 1987). A typical response of archaeologist or historian may be to produce an ideology critique revealing the distortions engendered by the heritage display, oppose it with the 'better' (more real or authentic) accounts produced by those more in line with the disciplines of

Warkworth Castle, Northumberland, August 1989

archaeology and history. I have taken this line myself (see for example Shanks and Tilley 1987a, Chapter 4). It seems a natural impulse to defend the rational values which constitute part of one's identity as an archaeologist. But such ideology critique makes little difference to the many people who visit, and only perhaps to some future heritage managers. I think such responses to heritage miss a vital point.

Heritage's choice of things is made according to criteria which are very different to those of archaeology. Heritage is not about the attractive *presentation* of a past as it is

understood by archaeology. The power of heritage is that it is about signification—things meaning *for* what we are now. Life in the North East of England in its Victorian 'Geordie' heyday at the European Museum of the Year, Beamish, County Durham. Pioneer colonial spirit and culture at historic Deerfield, Massachusetts. Heritage is symbolic exchange; it is a sacrifice of the past for the present. This does not mean that the past is necessarily of no importance. In fact the opposite is true of sacrifice. It is vital that the victim is correct for its purpose. It must be scrutinized thoroughly to achieve the power of sacrifice which is communion with an other. Heritage's symbolic exchange is about sacrifice and consumption rather than accumulation and hoarding. In this logic the meaning of the past does not lie in the dusty cellars of a museum. The meaning is what the past can do for the present. Consumption does not necessarily mean the past is served up for consumer society suitably trimmed and cooked. Consumption means that it is taken in within the self. I believe that this symbolic exchange is the vital energy of heritage. Above all it is accessible to people other than those acquainted with the academic value system of archaeology.

The symbolic exchange of heritage is not primarily about the past at all; it includes so much more, as any listing of its elements shows. Heritage is about this surplus over and beyond the past. But it does make claims about the past, about what it was like. This is to be criticized if it is a presentation of another 'authentic' past, root of an authentic cultural identity. But according to my argument, this criticism is not to be made from the vantage point of a more authentic archaeological or historical past. It is better to criticize on the grounds that an authentic past is really a past within a particular moral and evaluative setting, a past with a purpose which we might not wish to support. Heritage quotes the past; this is to be criticized if it is in favour of a consumerist order designed to console and keep people happy, if it is to sell another hollow experience for the benefit of a commercial concern. The vital potential energy of symbolic exchange is one of disruption, just as the collector's object is resistant to classification. The quotation of a genuine past explodes petty moral orderings. The sacrifice of a genuine past points us to the boundaries of our moral and social order, to the other beyond.

THE GENUINE ARTICLE

Can archaeology not learn from the collector and from heritage? Does the increasing commercialization of archaeology and the expansion of consumer leisure industry not demand that archaeology looks beyond its academic comforts, understands what is happening to the object past? Producing the defined orders of a past through its material traces is valid and essential but only as the counterpart of another knowledge. Following the interplay of past and present, order and disorder, where the accumulation and preservation of a separate authentic past is disrupted by the quotation of the past in the present. Following the fate of the object, its decay and emergence in the life of the present. Following not authenticity but the material content of the past, the directions the look of the past points, anywhere, anything. Writing those magic encyclopaedias of Walter Benjamin. Heritages of dreamings and desires, longing and belonging.

The past is dead and decayed, but it has suffered a sea-change. We can dive for those pearls and coral, bring them up to the surface. We can accept change and loss, the decay, because the sea-change may be crystallization, past and present reflected within.[25]

What is a genuine object? As we commonly use the word, genuine means not pretending, frank and sincere, original. But it holds a deep cultural meaning. Genuine ultimately comes from the Latin *gignere,* the Greek *gignomai,* the Sanskrit *gán, gánami*—beget, give birth, come into being, become, produce, cause.

NON-IDENTITY

What is this bicycle of mine?

The word bicycle already seems to speak of what it is not: heavy, black, neglected, basic; not up with high-tech 1990s sixteen-valve fuel-injected turbo-charged twin-cam automobile.

A means of transport; yes, I use it to get around.
Crowds of Chinese.
Tubing: fine, rigid but springy.
Materials science.
Component brakes, gearing, bearings.
Italian style, or the infuriating practice of
Japanese technologists to modify every few months.
Geometry and mechanics;
the subtleties and feel of changing an angle by just
a degree.
Joe Waugh who built the frame;
workshop factory down by the shipyards.
Efficiency;
taking a bend at speed, but speed of a human scale.
Naked, open;
it shows all without embarrassment.
Nervous, tense, tight; not rigid,
but a lithe sensuality.
Balancing weight.
Narrow alloy rims.
In touch;
I feel the ground.
Cadence and flow;
blood flow.
Flies sticking to me on a hot afternoon;
empty water bottles.
The muscles in the back of my neck on a climb,
shifting position.
Wide landscapes; or pressed by grimy traffic;
they don't see you.
Bike-shop enthusiasts;

electric-blue lycra shorts.
Histories of bike styles;
their evolution.
'Push-bikes' and working-class culture.
(Doesn't design include all of this?)

I have written of a subversion of identity and of origin, meaning deferred, of differing and becoming other, rather than being something. But the past seems a vital field of cultural and personal meanings and identities. How are these two dimensions to be reconciled? I shall try to clarify.

A common view of archaeological finds is that they are brought into order by processes and forces which are beyond them. This can be part of an instrumental view of the object world, that it is open to manipulation and control by human reason and action, and this is its meaning. So archaeological finds may be considered as the product of social behaviour. Archaeologists interested in an economic analysis may conceive the natural world of the past as material resources to be exploited, controlled and exchanged. This has been a major focus of social archaeology: formulating social logics of exchange networks and consumption of luxury 'prestige' goods controlled by elites. Such social networks or prestige goods economies can be held to explain the exploitation of distant materials and their distribution often far from their source, or elaborate items found far from their place of manufacture. Objects may also be treated as signs of social interaction, their similarities, differences and distribution reflecting contact between separate communities. Objects may be considered simply as by-products, secondary to the primary goings-on of society. This may make it very difficult to get to the primary essence or structure of society. Objects may simply be 'rubbish', and the most secure thing archaeologists can do is concentrate on the things themselves, as art or technology.

The archaeological object may also be treated as a sort of relay, the pot taking the archaeologist to the mind of the potter; images and the symbolic logic of objects taking the archaeologist to the social reality represented therein; objects as sources leading the archaeologist to knowledge.

This treatment of the object world as secondary to people and what they do or want to do may even be connected with contemporary society's attitude towards the natural world—that it is raw material for development and exploitation, the stuff of progress. (On a recent visit to the United States I asked archaeologists and anthropologists their opinion of the Native American claim to have a say in the fate of the material remains of their ancestors. A phrase cropped up a couple of times: 'My God, they're taking away our data base!' Walter Echo-Hawk, Native American: 'We want to be treated like people, not dinosaurs or snails.')

'Raw material': the term suggests that particular uses are being subsumed under a more general idea. In archaeology particular objects are brought under more general concepts. The particular pot becomes an expression of a style, of a social group, or of a strategy of an elite group designed to bolster their position by hanging on to the supply of luxury goods. Objects are suspended in a relation between particularity and the general. But usually with a distinct separation of the two: the object is representative of its type, style, group. This is what classification is all about, and it is a vital part of archaeology.

To write of non-identity involves taking another look at this relation, but more from the point of view of the particular object itself.

A beginning is to deny that history or the past or society actually have material existence. Society may be taken to explain why something is the way it is, but this does not mean that society is somewhere to be found. And the past is not an untold story. To think so is a paradox of unknown knowledge and involves a project of finding and revealing this story-for-all-time; this is a theology. A denial that society or the past can be found seems unexceptional. Most field archaeologists, I think, would willingly accept that they recover data and not a past society. And the denial does not threaten the past. The past (or society) may determine what objects are, but only by virtue of what archaeologists (and others) are doing in the present. And others: archaeologists have no natural right to discovery, appropriation and work on the material past. As the usurpation of heritage has shown.

Non-identity means accepting a dynamic to objects; they are now *and* then. They do not necessarily belong in museums which would involve their assignation simply to the past, to the categories of art or material culture. The Zuni of New Mexico have objected to the display of their war god figures—Ahauuta—in museums and have reclaimed them as stolen traditional property of the Zuni nation. The significance of the dynamic object is not that it is a case of the general but that it is contingent, particular. Not an example of a wider and perhaps universal timeless category such as society, social structure, nature, the past, art, mind; but transitory. The object found is not a 'pot' or 'ceramic', an absolute identification. It is of a moment. It is not identical to itself because of the dynamic it has suffered, what has happened to it, its relationship with its maker, those who used it, its society; and later, the archaeologist and their context. The significance of the object is that it is elusive, its particularity defying the very categories (style, social class …) it expresses. It cannot be decided how to finally classify the pot I have found; it is undecidable. There is always an excess which overflows the categories. The need to select out those attributes of an object relevant to a particular question or project has long been recognized in archaeology. It is part of the notion of problem orientation. Objects are selected in excavations and from museums according to their relevance to a problem; others discarded. Not everything can be recovered in excavation. No explanation is ever complete. But the excess is more. Every new insight about an object literally changes what that object is, its identity, and thus our attitudes and actions towards it. That piece of pot cannot be held still as substance with attributes; we always understand it already as something else. In this dynamic the ordering of archaeological things is checked and subverted by a sensuous receptivity to the particularities of the object. What I found is always different to the identity given to it. It could be said that the object possesses heterogeneity. This is non-identity.

Sensuous receptivity makes me think of something that Ian Hodder has written. Those specialists who study plant remains from the past—palaeoethnobotanists—tend to classify according to contemporary scientific species lists. But it could be equally possible to consider plants according to their qualities of scent, stickiness, leaves, period of flowering (1986, p. 133).

In this incongruence between word and world archaeological description always *fails*. It can never really be said what something is; undecidable meaning is unsayable. We only

ever say what something is not. Meaning involves us in moving off into paraphrase, circumlocution,



metaphor. Irony seems ever necessary. The question arises of how to represent such non identity. I shall consider this in Part 4.

DEATH AND NECROMANCY

In the excavation the raw existence of the past is impenetrable. The sands and rubbles are merely what they are. Absurdity, not fitting with reason. They are beyond, transcendent. And with the loss of tradition (and the death of God) there are no answers to this element of beyond. It is the nausea of the physical existence of the self confronted with what it will become. Morbidity and decay.

The particularity of what I find is fascinating, unsayable, uncanny. It is dis-covery, uncovering what was hidden, showing our homely and familiar categories and understanding to be insufficient. It also declares a gap between what I find and what is said of it. The uncanny is a confrontation with absence; the pot is not what it is. Here is a hidden lack of being. It is death. The sands and rubbles are merely what they are and absolute signification or meaning never arrives. The only absolute signifier is death.

Archaeology excavates a hollow. There is an emptiness. The raw existence of the past is not enough, insufficient in itself. Waiting for an epiphany is in vain. What is needed is our desire to fill the hollow, raise the dead. This is archaeology's necromancy.

Fringe archaeologies can be read in this context. Leyliners, dowsers, New Age mystics explicitly or implicitly pose the question of the identity of the past, recognizing some element of transcendence, the unsayable, the spiritual. They assert the necessity of a human involvement in perceiving the past. Scientific rationality is conceived as partial at best, harmful and destructive at worst.

The notion of non-identity I would relate to the criticism of archae-ology's apparent reliance on ideas of objectivity and a method for gaining knowledge of an objective past analogous with science. I have already mentioned how some see such criticism as leading to difficulties in preferring one account of the past to another: what sure ground is there if there is no objective reality or absolute identity? Colin Renfrew, a significant figure in the discipline and articulate proponent of what I have termed a critically rationalist archaeology, has asked if there is any difference between fringe archaeologies and those which question the sovereignty of science (1989, pp. 37–8).

I do not think that fringe archaeologists should be dismissed out of hand as cranks, weirdos and hippies. I have tried to show that the impulse to think and mine the subjective and affective, holistic and meaningful aspects of the past is a reasonable one. What is perhaps more unreasonable is a social science which is not very able to deal with these aspects of the past, creating a gap filled by popular, media and fringe archaeologies. No, the problem with fringe archaeologies, with their mysterious powers in the past, spacemen and catastrophes, is the overwhelming tendency to mysticism and irrationalism. Intuition, inspiration, extra-sensory perception, initiated wisdoms, mystic energies are fertile ground for nonsense. They can certainly lead to a past-as-wished-for rather than a past as it is. And is science as rationalist as it might wish, according to its own standards? Since Thomas Kuhn there have been many, notably Paul Feyerabend and Richard Rorty, who have pointed to features of the social organization and development of science which are little to do with method and objective reality and more to do with power and consensus (Kuhn 1970; Feyerabend 1975; Rorty 1980). And these are only at the end of a long tradition of such thought. Nor does science have a monopoly on

rationality and reason. I am trying to show how there are reasonable ways of extending science's partial view to include reflection on the vital human dimension of the past.

CULTURE AND IDENTITY

What is it to belong? (After the critique of authenticity and identity the question is not 'what is it to be?') Our cultural identities are not something inherent in us or essential. Archaeological things and collections are so often taken as components of national and ethnic heritages and identities. Monuments and artifacts are brought together in narratives, experiences, evocations of histories and myths which help provide a meaningful shape to the experience of a social group. Of course archaeological monuments and artifacts are only one raw material in the construction of cultural identity. It is also misleading to write of 'raw materials'. They are always encoded already, these forms of everyday life and experience, things signifying within which analogies and correspondences can be formed.

Identities are strategic constructions, by which is meant not that they are necessarily conscious projects, but that they are constructed in relation to others. Heritage and nationalist identities may implicitly deny the active component in their images of community and belonging which they articulate. Central ideas here are those of natural unity, of tradition and continuity, a depth to the belonging, anchors in locality and history, perhaps language. Greek men still sit round on the sidewalks in discussion, as in the great days of Socrates. Places, landscapes and communities are fixed like fetishes. This is making an aesthetics of politics: overlaying negotiation, relationship, mediation, transaction, the active constitution of social forms with the emotive power of the components of identity and heritage—myths of blood and soil, race, fatherland, destiny. The focus is on the experience of owning culture and belonging. It is also ideological, presenting what is fabricated as natural, perhaps establishing an emotive and sentimental unity in place of reflection on social division.

Punk in the 1970s: anything as long as it was out of place, ruptured from accepted (and suffered) commonsense. Hair dyed conspicuously; make-up obvious marking out the face; kitsch, lurid, torn, uselessly zipped, graffitied school shirts, T-shirts; fly-boy drainpipes; rubber mini skirts; sex-fetish leather, fishnet, stilettos; bondage chains and belts. Was it Sid Vicious who never cleaned his teeth? It may have defined itself simply as rupture and revolt against the accepted, but Punk tore a space for its sub-culture of bizarre combinations of what were often mundane items. Spectacular and animated display of defining oneself not so much in negotiation as confrontation with others (Hebdige 1979).

In 1976 the Wampanoag of Mashpee, Cape Cod, filed a law suit reclaiming 16,000 acres for their tribe. Other land claims were being filed by Native American groups in the late 1960s and in the 1970s. When it came to court in 1977 the issue was more about whether the Indians of Mashpee were a tribe. James Clifford gives his anthropologist's account of the proceedings in his book *The Predicament of Culture* (1988, Chapter 12).

There had been what was known as Indian Town on Cape Cod for some three centuries, but the Massachusett language had disappeared from use around 1800 and there seemed little evidence of institutions of Indian tribal government. The town was

Presbyterian and Baptist and intermarriage meant that none of the plaintiffs looked distinctively 'Indian'. They were also very much incorporated in Massachusetts social and business life. The defence brought in an expert historian witness who presented the documentary record of Mashpee's history. The case was that there never had been a Mashpee tribe, that the Indian community was formed in the colonial encounter. In conventional terms of authenticity based on continuity of formal tribal structures and ancestry, the case was against the Mashpee Indians. In their turn they talked of their experiences as Native Americans: attending pow-wows (summer gatherings), peace-pipe ceremonies, learning and teaching crafts and traditions. Medicine man John Peters, Slow Turtle, talked of his training, though there were no formal ceremonies or rites of passage. He and Chief Flying Eagle were said to be much respected. For the plaintiffs expert witness anthropologists presented a flexible concept of tribe, stated that the Mashpee were a distinct cultural group, indeed a tribe. They were a group of people knowing who and where they were.

The verdict went against the Mashpee Indians.

Clifford challenges the organic metaphor at the heart of the conventional understanding of culture: wholeness, continuity, growth, roots, stable and local existence. This metaphor does not account for actual historical and cultural practices of compromise, subversion; it masks invention and revival, and being both Indian and American. And in cultural contact it need not be a case of absorption *or* resistance. All the 'critical' elements of identity—language, blood, leadership, religion—are replaceable. Clifford was convinced that organized Indian life had been going on in Mashpee for the past three hundred years, that a revival and reinvention of tribal identity was underway.

Archaeological sites and finds play a vital role in the construction of cultural identity. Visible in the landscape, subject of visits, viewed, felt, contemplated, whatever. They may be brought into narratives and myths. The role of academic archaeology is a restricted one at the moment. It does help recover the archaeological past and its theories and explanations may be cited and used in interpretations. But a distinction is made between sources and resources. The archaeologist is primarily recovering and dealing with the past as a source; further interpretation may use the source as resource, for popular writing, literature, journalism, creative arts; but this is separate. Liberties may be taken and archaeologists may wish to comment, perhaps, as I have said, on distortions and mistakes; but that is the limit of their role as archaeologist.

I have been arguing that the separation of source and resource is not a good one. It depends on notions of past as origin (the real context of the archaeological object), discovered by archaeologists and passed on for preservation, display, whatever. Instead I say that the past is dynamically formed; archaeological finds are resources from the outset, tools for constructing the past. And present. To return to the question of identity: to belong is not about ownership and being. The past cannot be owned, only taken. To belong is about use and becoming. Places and things from the past are resources for invention. The directions this can take depend on our purposes, interests, experiences, skills, and may have more or less to do with cultural identity. But I argue against one particular invention being somehow authentic in the sense of primary and original. The inventions may be torn and vulgar, of confrontation and dispute—punk archaeology. They may be about a nation state asserting its political identity in a region. But, and this

is crucial, responsibility is owed to the past. To ignore what the past is and use it to justify any desired invention is an injustice against the past and an offence against reason.

Of Stonehenge Peter Fowler has written (1990, p. 128) that rights of access to the monument itself (closed off to the many tens of thousands of visitors) contain an obligation to contribute as well as consume. Most consuming interests are erosive, introverted, self-gratifying; and the monument is suffering. I read this as an obligation to construct and invent. Invention is a process which includes dimensions of creativity and reason; it can also be inept and unreasonable. So I would hold on to the notion of authenticity. In respect of the past it means being true to the genuine object, following its interplay of order and disruption, its fate, its physiognomy. Authentic identity: not ownership, but exchange (the symbolic exchange I have described), and also dialogue, conversation and dispute, and hospitality. How are people to know that their reception of the past is a hospitable one, that they are fulfilling their responsibility to the past? Is this not the role of the archaeologist? The object past will be used whether academic archaeologists are bothered or not. They might want to focus on their traditional concerns with gaining knowledge of the past. But might not this also include producing those magic encyclopaedias to which others might look in *their* cultural invention?

Of course this already happens. I worked for some years investigating the remains of a medieval friary in Newcastle upon Tyne. Much of it had remained in some sort of use after Henry VIII dissolved the Church. The city wanted to do something with the place. Archaeologists were consulted (in excavating the site). The refectory was sensitively restored (windows reinvested, fourteenth-century flooring and layout adapted) to be used as a café-restaurant. And it contains pleasing evocations of monastic dining. This is a straightforward example and it owed much, I think, to the architects as well as the archaeologists and planners. But it illustrates an archaeological component in planning and development. The object past is all around. Archaeologists can do much to make more of this presence and of their role in community futures.

Archaeology is a cultural activity. With James Clifford and others it is right to question notions of organic, wholesome and unified cultures, to uproot them and think instead of syncretic strategies—practices which combine diversity and cultural fragments. But this is not to privilege fragmentation and dispersal; order is reasserted in the diversity. And I would like to hold on to the organic metaphor sedimented in the word culture. Culture as a process: tending to or a tending of. Horticulture: fostering, tending to growth in a creative and perhaps aesthetic whole—the garden. But containing also an essential diversity. Archaeological gardeners.

WALLINGTON HALL

Wallington is a country house in Northumberland, England. Like Belsay to the south and other local halls, it began as a stronghold tower up in the moorland middle marches of the border county. Now the only remains of the medieval tower are in the cellars. With its Tudor house it was demolished in the eighteenth century to make way for the present mansion, overflowing with rich rococo plasterwork, set in parkland. Built with the coal fortunes of the Blacketts, it was the family home of the Trevelyans, a family with political and intellectual aspirations.

House and gardens are open to the public now; the family no longer live there. As with many such halls, a visit to Wallington is an experience of a domestic interior, a house, an ancestral and private interior; and in this the experience is familiar to most visitors, especially in those smaller rooms where there is an element of undesigned and 'homely' clutter or personal accoutrement. There is an aspect of voyeurism, of being allowed a glimpse of the private life of the wealthy upper classes of days gone by. This domestic is unfamiliar too. The larger scale of some rooms designed for more public use is hardly domestic. The wealth and opulence are perhaps unfamiliar, but more distinct is the labour and craft invoked in the appearance of much of the interior, from woodwork finish, cabinet fittings to paint and plasterwork (elaborate and Italian at Wallington). Wealthy items are more familiar, I think, than living with such labour visible in the hand-finished interior fittings. The interior evokes the craftsman, its size the servants, portraits the family ancestry: a differentiated and wholesome community (to produce such a domestic interior).

There is a strong sense not just of a wealthy family, but one of distinct and diverse abilities, characters, and of social and intellectual connection. Here are the desks at which Macaulay wrote his *History of England,* George Otto Trevelyan his history *The American Revolution*. The well-known English social historian George Macaulay Trevelyan was also of the family. Several were members of government. Pauline, Lady Trevelyan, knew and supported the Pre-Raphaelite art movement. All sorts of culture crowds stayed at Wallington in the nineteenth and early part of this century. This hall was a heart not just of the private and incidentally intimate, but also of the great and significant. The central courtyard was roofed over in the 1850s at Ruskin's suggestion and decorated in Pre-Raphaelite style by William Bell Scott (with a little help from Lady Pauline, Ruskin and Arthur Hughes). Panels show figures and scenes from the history of Northumberland. With its great figures, actions and deeds this decoration marries well with the sense of the family being at the heart of things. This is their history of their Northumberland, it might seem.

Wallington, Northumberland

Romans, medieval knights and later industrialists are interspersed with floral decoration and foliage. There are stuffed birds, books on natural history, a picture of poodles from which a Blackett bred the local Bedlington terriers. And Wallington is the centre of a designed rural landscape. Ceremonial arches, grand stone arches span the little river Wansbeck in a bridge by Paine; woodland park grounds (Capability Brown, born in nearby Cambo it is said, may have played a part in their design). A pillared sundial stands on the terrace overlooking parkland which runs right up to classical pediment front of the house. Upon the sundial an inscription reads *Horas non numero nisi serenas,* I count not the hours unless they are peaceful. Hardly the time of colliery or factory shift. Items of classical connection abound—stone urns in the grounds, to aspects of architecture and interior decoration, to the complete library of pristine leather-bound classical texts in elegant glass cabinet.

Maps on the wall show the Wallington estate. The English aristocracy have been country-based for centuries, farming and estate management their central concerns. The land designed for profit and recreation.

> Agriculture stood to land as did cooking to raw meat. It converted nature into culture. Uncultivated land meant uncultivated men; and, when seventeenth-century Englishmen moved to Massachusetts, part of their case for occupying Indian territory would be that those who did not themselves subdue and cultivate the land had no right to prevent others from doing so.
>
> (K.Thomas 1983, p. 15)

Natural and academic history. Nature loved and exploited. On the way to the walled garden the visitor enters the East Wood and passes by larches given by the Duke of Atholl in 1738, a megalith known as Poind's Man and moved there from Shaftoe Crags in

about 1830, the classical Portico House, a pond of carp and tench. By the walled garden is a conservatory built in 1908 by George Otto Trevelyan for his collection of fuschias, geraniums, bougainvillaea, heliotrope and exotic climbing plants.

Wallington is a story of a cultured class perfectly at home in their world. It is also an allegory. Of public and private, classical cultivation of nature, the agency and place of the individual. Wallington is the hearth and home of the country, consolations of the private and of a differentiated community, sensual experiences of art, craft, ancestry and history, parkland and the natural weathering of stone and brick. These contrast with the urban, industrial and institutional, the uniform and classless welfare state, municipal grey and egalitarian modernity. Stately home and council house.

This allegory of city and country (and its variants) is written deep within contemporary consciousness of course (Williams 1973), and is frequently referenced in heritage, cultural politics (municipal authority versus entrepreneurial individualism for example), and in cultural style (country house decor, high-tech urbanity, classical and modern). Ultimately this division and opposition of city and country, state and private individual, is part of that conception of culture and labour which I have been describing as riven by dichotomy. It is the split between reasoned action and contemplative, feeling leisure. It is the split which takes the beauty and history of Wallington from me.

The conservatory, Wallington. Michael Shanks (senior), with Carl Otto Trevelyan as god Apollo

EXPERIENCE AND THE PAST

The encounter with the artifacts and monuments of the past occurs within experience; we visit places and museums, conduct archaeological excavations and surveys. I shall now consider the connection between our knowing the past and our personal being in society through the notion of experience.

KNOWLEDGE AND INTEREST

To do archaeology implies interest. As commonly used, the word 'interest' has two shades: a sense of curiosity, an impulse towards something which is of concern; and something in which we are concerned. I have already written much about the desires which take us to archaeology and the material past, the fascination the past can exert. I have argued that the object past exists not so much in itself but in a state of being *for* some purpose; the past which concerns us is always relevant to a project within which it is actively constructed. Selection and collection of object pasts also imply interests beyond the things themselves. Projects and interests are about power: the ability to collect, the power to carry out particular projects. That these aspects of interest involve choice also means power is involved.

What are these archaeological projects?

Jurgen Habermas has presented a theory of cognitive interests, particularly in his book *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1972). For him, interests come between life and knowledge and arise from particular dimensions of social organization and social practices. They form the conditions within which experience is possible and meaningful; they form the domain of objects which is relevant to our experience.

Rational labour which is dedicated to a purpose is associated with an interest in technical control and uses empirical and analytic inquiry. Communication and interaction with others involves an interest in understanding and interpreting the interaction, and uses historical and hermeneutic inquiry. Finally self-reflection involves an interest in freeing oneself from domination and systematically distorted ideas and communication; this involves critique and the analysis of power and ideology. According to Habermas then, there are three types of scientific inquiries, each associated with a particular type of experience and each constituted by a corresponding interest.

Labour is the experience associated with the development of science and technology. Its purpose is technical control and manipulation of a world of objects. It is rational in that the total environment is treated as object, systematically observed in controlled experiment, and described in a monologue of abstract language which is different from what is used in day-to-day experience. General propositions are formulated according to which predictions are made. This is empirical and analytical inquiry. But because an interest in technical control links science to 'labour' which is a particular and restricted human interest, it cannot be exhaustive. It cannot do justice to other forms of experience.

One of these is communication and interaction with others which depends on signs and signification. Here objectivity refers not to a world of object things but to people who are trying to communicate. The interest is in understanding the dialogue, finding intelligibility and removing confusion. Understanding proceeds in the manner of historical inquiry and hermeneutics which I have already described as involving a process of anticipating what is being said or communicated and then checking it out. However, communication, language and signs are also the scene for dominating others, the use of social force, and for ideology. Power interests may distort our communication.

This is the subject of the critical social sciences. Their analysis of power and ideology is related to the experience of self-reflection and involves an interest in emancipation. A model of such activity and inquiry is held by Habermas to be psychoanalysis which aims in psychotherapy to free the subject from symbolic distortions underlying things done.

Archaeology can be seen now to incorporate these three orientations. Archaeology practised within the sovereignty of science; approaches which treat archaeological finds as the meaningful product of social interaction; and archaeology which emphasizes ideology critique and an interest in removing distorted views of the past (Preucel, forthcoming).

It is important to realize that this typology of interests, experiences and sciences need not be a rigid one. They seem very intellectually orientated too. The relevance of other experience and orientations seems vital to me, in particular an affective and communicative relationship with nature and the emotional dimension of human relationships. The separation of work and interaction may be important in challenging the importation of technical reasoning into social issues, but labour does not necessarily involve a total subjugation of the object world. Craft skills are about creative response to materials as well as control and manipulation. And more generally an aesthetic response to the object world can, I think, be brought within reason. This is an experience of nature and objects not under an interest of control. Nature itself transcends people's attempts at control, as contemporary environmental issues and problems dramatically show; there are limits to exploitation when nature clearly responds. Communicative action and interaction are also about self-understanding and may be critical. Dialogue and communication are not just about consensus; they may also be about emancipation which involves an understanding of interaction and the organization of society.

The vital thrust of what Habermas has written is that science is not dis-interested, and that practical issues (of the organization, purpose and practice of archaeology for example) cannot be reduced to technical problems with which science concerns itself. This is not a new recognition; it goes back at least to Aristotle, who argued that social life and politics are about the good and just life, that these are not technical matters but questions of practical knowledge *(phronesis)* and of guides to action, educational projects of the cultivation of character. In archaeology a scientific approach is part of a particular experience of the things we find and involves technical problems. More importantly here is another argument that reason can be applied to other experiences and interests which are of at least equal worth. These relate to the human meaning and political significance of the past. For me, this work of Habermas again raises the question of the nature of our *reasoned* response to the object past and prompts a multi-dimensional and critical labour of archaeology. With the demotion of practices which treat the things we find as 'objects'

and raw material, here is a prospect of a 'green' archaeology of sensuous receptivity to the past.

EXPERIENCE AND (POST)MODERNITY

Habermas gives one classification of interests and attendant experiences. These are rooted in ideas of what it is to be human: survival, relationships and self-reflection. I have already referred to John Dewey's distinction between the 'holy' experience of what is taken to endure, and the 'lucky' experience of day-to-day work. Perhaps more directly relevant are reflections on our historical experience of (post)modernity.

Modernity arrived with urban industrial labour and mechanization. Prospects of progress, growth, emancipation from toil and prospect of political revolution combined with disintegration of old answers, the death of God, dissolution of traditional social bonds and their consolations, uncertainties of self, loss of location, time driving all before it. The experience of modernity is still with us, augmented now by a new descendant: 'postmodernity is modernity without the hopes and dreams which made modernity bearable' (Hebdige 1988, p. 195). This experience is of image overload, TV and media advertising, disintegrated consumer instants, information excess, referencing the past as consolation of nostalgia, doubt, surfaces—no depth, the implosion of meaning, an association of the banal with the apocalyptic (TV game show and global catastrophe), cynicism and the end of utopia, no more 'meta-narratives'—those grand narratives and systems such as the progress of civilization or the triumph of reason, Marxism or positivism, which provide overarching significances.[26]

Such experience is related to a shift in the organization of the capitalist nation states of western Europe and the United States. David Harvey (1989) describes it as a transition from *Fordism* (corporate power, mass production and consumption) to *Flexible Accumulation* (flexible with respect to labour, production and patterns of consumption). The following listing captures the main aspects of this shift:

Extractive and manufacturing industries	Organizational and service sectors
Articulation of state and monopoly capitalist industries	Independent multinational monopolies
	Challenges to centralized state bureaucracy
Regional concentrations of labour force	Dispersed and diversified labour
Specialized work	Flexible worker
Protestant work ethic	Temporary contract
State power	Financial power
Interest group politics	Charismatic popularist politics
National collective bargaining	Attacks on union power
Class politics	Social movements and politics of issues
State welfare	Neo-conservatism
	Privatisation of collective needs

Metropolis—industrial cities dominating regions	Counter-urbanization, suburbia and refashioning of inner cities
Mass consumption of consumer durables	Individualized consumption of style packages
Technical-scientific problem solving and progress	Cultural fragmentation and pluralism

(from Harvey 1989)

The experience of (post)modernity is of process and change, dislocation, as traditional coherence and meaning are supplanted by the logic of the market which says anything can be bought; everything becomes the same with the common denominator of money. But this homogeneity depends on fragmentation, on pulverizing the world into bits to be purchased and owned, on shattering time into units of labour time, into ephemeral instants of 'experience'. Anything can be bought, and everything changes. Fashion and cultural styles feed on novelty and incite the urge to be individual. The decline of traditional community makes us look for identity and belonging. And new commodities and style packages are produced to answer the impulse: buy your identity and belonging, pay for the authentic experience of belonging, of nostalgic reminder of past belonging (that never was). This furthers the commodification of the world.

This is the cultural counterpart to the entrepreneur's search for competitive advantage in a global market; capital is mobile, but different places lure according to their particular characteristics or identities.

Archaeology and heritage are tied into the cycle. Both can supply images and meanings which may be used as commodities to feed this nexus of capital and commercial interest. But archaeology and heritage need not be part of consumer culture, of course, and I have argued the grounds on which authentic use of the material past (in constructing cultural identities) may be distinguished. Real differences, identities, and genuine pasts *can* be ascertained on the basis of criteria which are not part of economic growth and capital accumulation. Fragmented postmodern experience is not total, having supplanted all others. It may be the 'rush' of experience of New York city executive yuppy living a 25-hour day, eating in sushi bar, listening to portable compact disc player, dressed in silk Hong Kong suit and Italian shoes and planning the next stock market deal or ski trip. It may indeed be the experience of French intellectuals who seem to revel in discussions of the postmodern. But the atomized experience of abstract information and moments of cultural spectacle are necessarily countered by those experiences around which life organizes itself—growing up in the social world, partnership, home, birth and death. I argue that there are experiences which are peculiarly one's own. There is heterogeneity which implies qualitative difference and not just fragmentation. There is still a poetry of the life-world, as Henri Lefebvre described it.



Heritage and the commodity:
homogeneity and heterogeneity

I raise some questions. What are archaeology's interests in relation to such experiences? What strategies might archaeology take in this condition of (post)modernity? What are archaeology's projects? (Are they to aid cultural fragmentation? To produce an homogeneous past, object of scientific method?) I want to sketch some more dimensions of personal experience before returning to these questions.

THE PERSONAL AND THE SUBJECTIVE

Of course there is a personal element to the practice of archaeology. As I have described, the orthodox attitude to this dimension is varied. The personal and the subjective may be disavowed—given acknowledgement as the experiences of actually doing archaeology (rainy days and mud) and as the impossibility of ever reaching a purely objective account, but then ignored in a method which supposedly aims to stick just to the facts. There may be a negative scepticism of what can be said with certainty of the past (because of the inevitable subjective dimension), and of the person of the archaeologist. There is an idealism (of perhaps some fringe archaeologists) which would have only

personal pasts. Often the archaeologist and the past are put in separate compartments. A personal and subjective aspect of archaeology may be recognized as having to do with feelings, ethics and values—orientations towards the past and its study, guides to the most appropriate behaviours in a profession dealing with a product (the past) for a client (public, state, student, development corporation). Finally critique and analysis may be offered as a means of controlling the personal and subjective bias—a self-reflecting and self-regulating discipline.

I am arguing that these orthodox attitudes to the feelings engendered of the material past and its study in archaeology are inadequate.

Archaeology is immediately biography. The material remains of the past are brought to light in practices which are part of people's lives. Archaeology is people's jobs. Excavation is a particular type of living or doing which produces facts or data. Central to its experience, and therefore to the construction of the facts of the past, is the telling of stories. As I excavate I talk with others, describing what I have been doing, trying out ideas which give some order to the things I have found. This verbal account takes the form of a kind of story and is accompanied by a written account of some sort (notes, records and such have to be kept). The final report of the excavation is only a story of what a group of people did, but a story with a particular rhetoric (I shall return to this rhetoric). Selecting and discarding, fitting together into a whole (which need not be singular or coherent—the site may have been poor, for example) are this activity of narrative. My recounting of what I have been doing involves thinking of other related stories, what someone else tells me they have been doing. Together we may relate our ideas to wider narratives which give another order of sense. These may be grand stories such as the death and decay of the past and its saving, its redemption through reason, or more particular stories of the historical place of the site. Narrative provides a plot for what I am doing; it is a basic means of making sense.

In telling my stories of how I dug and what I found I construct myself as a coherent (perhaps!) interpreting and communicating archaeologist. My self-identity is bound up with these stories, with archaeology. This is *suturing* which I have already mentioned. I recognize myself in archaeology the discourse, the set of practices and their effects which create meanings. I may say that I am an archaeologist, and, whatever I mean by that, my conception of myself is bound up with what archaeological things I do and the experiences they involve. Hence the attention I gave in Part 2 to images and analogies of archaeology.

This does not just apply to archaeology of course. Stories and their retelling are vital components of personal and cultural identity generally. We tell our stories to others, selecting and amending; and we listen to theirs. These knit into cultural narratives, together making sense of experience, but a sense which is never final.

Academic archaeology encourages the creation of particular selves or characters. These are to do with aptitudes to engage in the cycle of archaeological method and include traits such as rational assertiveness, reasoning out in the open for attention and scrutiny, appearing decisive and positive in belief and action, perhaps following an academic career path. There is a place for feeling and for emotion, but in the character of an ascetic idealist. Such a character has had the sensibilities trained, refined and heightened so that they may appropriately describe the values within the archaeological object. The response to a pot may be described in terms of the quality of ceramic form, its

tectonics, the character of its line. These may be conceived not as subjective but objective qualities disconnected from the present and the perceiving archaeologist, objective in the sense of subjectively true and revealed through carefully controlled senses. I think here of the more traditional Classical archaeology and its approach to its 'artistic' ceramics, sculpture, architecture and jewellery. These cultured objects are held to require a cultured response; a rhetoric of culture. We read of monumentality, maturity, fussiness, decorative effect, vivid humour, subtle sinuosity, unruffled dignity, etc. (Boardman 1973). Bernard Schweitzer describes the transition from Greek Mycenaean pottery to its successor Geometric as a shift from 'voluminosity', a quality of space, to vertical and sculptural form (1971). These appear as precise and abstract principles, rooted in the sensuous response of a purified self.

The characters of orthodox archaeology are gendered; they are masculine. They fit with the masculine-centred focus of much social science. This involves an emphasis on rationality, with the personal and emotion tamed in the concepts of intentionality (motivation and aims) and agency (the personal ability to achieve desired ends); or it may be put to the margins as irrational and natural instinct, impulse and behaviour. Interest in androcentric social science centres on the public, visible and official, with dramatic role players, situations defined. This is set against private, informal and unofficial 'support spheres'. There is the tendency to instrumental knowledge involving control and manipulation through precision, quantification and abstraction. Knowledge may be conceived as decentred, public and a property of a transcendental ego (a self abstracted from the particular circumstances of history, society and experience) (see Harding 1986). To return to the list of distinctions introduced in Part 1:

Through their experiences and interests, knowledges are gendered. My proposal is that a reasonable objective would be not a patriarchal or matriarchal archaeological self (taking one or other side of this list), but a 'sublated' self: the masculine and feminine reconciled in difference. (Whether these are definite differences is to be questioned anyway.)

objectivity	subjectivity
abstract	concrete
rationality	emotion
truth	beauty
culture	nature
public	private
detached	involved
MASCULINE	FEMININE

THE CASTRATED ARCHAEOLOGIST: SUBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM

Subjectivism refers to a position which would celebrate those elements which are conventionally identified with the feminine (some are listed here); it is the triumph of subjectivity; it is this matriarchal order which would castrate the archaeological self. The archaeologist who follows the conventional order of knowledge gendered masculine fears the Father who disciplines his self with the authority of reason. There is the fear of disappointing and of succumbing to the other, the bestial, mythical, magical whose penalty is the castrating loss of reason and security (if objectivity gives way to beauty, the emotional, the body, how can the past ever be known with security?). The objective look of surveillance watching and observing the past, making it the object of reason, keeps the past in its place. The fear is that the past might not only look back, it might bite! Nevertheless the past fascinates the archaeologist, it fixes; there is desire to know.

Subjectivism, or the rule of the personal and the subjective, brings also the fear of relativism. What might relativism mean? It may be the idea that any explanation of the past is as good as any other since all are value-laden, part of the present and so not objective. But this assumes that values are subjective. Surely our experience would indicate that this is not so; we do not just make up values on our own. Is there therefore not an ethics of explaining the past? Our explanations of what happened in the past may be distinguished on ethical grounds (some proceed from better values), on grounds of purpose (some serve more appropriate purposes than others), and on objective grounds (some objects from the past are better to study than others). This would mean looking at why archaeologists are doing what they are, and whether it is worth it.

There are undoubted difficulties with another relativism. This may arise from a humanist and romantic respect for other cultures, proclaiming their potential absolute difference to what we have ever encountered; they cannot be compared. Consequently cross-cultural study of other cultures and evolutionary schemes which compare cultures and rank them in types of societies must be abandoned. These latter are major components of how contemporary archaeology explains the past. Schemes of cultural evolution in archaeology involve types of societies (such as chiefdom, band, lineage-based tribe) together with logics of social change which move societies through different stages (models of relations between core and periphery economic systems, inflationary economic spirals, types of contradiction within societies) (see Shanks and Tilley 1987b, Chapter 6). We may wish to find fault with the reliance on notions of social progress in some forms of cultural evolution, or with the way societies and their institutions are classified into types. But there are major problems with maintaining that different societies and social groups cannot be compared because they are fundamentally different in terms of the way they see the world. This entails there being separate social worlds each with its own knowledge and means that the past (as a different society) can never really be known. It also means that each society or social group will have its own past. As to what these different life-worlds are, together with their attendant sets of truths, we shall presumably never know. The past will also fragment into many parts, all dependent on the particular viewing community, and all incomparable and equal.

Richard Rorty has mounted an attack on epistemology (1980) as the search for secure (rational) foundations of knowledge. He holds that reason, objectivity, rationality and truth have been *set up* as values, as moral principles, and adopted for various historical and social reasons. Might there be a relativism of reasoning? This would not question the ultimate existence of a real world, or that societies can get to know each other, or that they can be compared, or that different views of the past can be compared. But it would maintain that the criteria for deciding whether something is reasonable are not fixed for all time and space; reason is not absolute. There may be different ways of reasoning, styles of reasoning (Hacking 1982), different ways of working towards truth and falsity which would focus on different aspects of the world. This idea may be compared with the cognitive interests of Habermas.

My argument is that reason (as applied to the past) is not a set of rules received from authority; it involves ways of thinking about something (the things found by archaeologists). We form ourselves historically and reason emerges in our experience of things, our dialogue with the world. And a not insignificant part of this experience is archaeological.

SELF AND OTHER

What then of the archaeologist experiencing the archaeological world, and their 'self'? I have argued that experience is never a full encounter with primary 'raw' reality, and that we find ourselves in the otherness of existence. I shall expand.

Psychoanalysis displays the absence of something whole and of itself which we could call the self at the centre of the individual, sensing and experiencing. To look for the meaning of what archaeologists do cannot involve looking outside of the archaeologist to the things found which somehow find their way into the archaeologist. It means looking within to those internally located elements which fix archaeological thoughts and experiences. In a psychoanalytic account these elements are sexuality, consumption, life and death; desires and the social.

Jacques Lacan's scenario for the formation of the subject is a provocative one (1977). For him identity arises from an insertion of the self into an external order. What we think of as the self is constructed in a series of partitions and in its eventual insertion into the symbolic order of language and culture (structured like a language). Subjectivity is a trace created in the otherness of existence. I know myself only through that which is not I, identifying with something other than me, and entering into a symbolic system, the domain of the Law in which I know myself only through language and discourse (thinking of myself is possible only in terms of the discourse which is not me). Lacan's incomplete subject, always other, is concerned with loss and lack. Desire is the impossibility of satisfaction; in order to long for something it must already have been separated from the self, lost.

This psychology may be taken to imply a subject with no real identity, fully determined by culture. But here also are insights of a subject never separated from the social and object world, and I have already used the idea that our subjective experience is always an imaginary 'as if' relationship with a world which is socially organized, not a direct experience of the 'real'. Even if the parts do not add up, we can know ourselves as

constructed, as reasoning selves, and recognize our partiality. Reasoning implies a willingness to change and an openness to the object world which is resource for constructing our identities. I have claimed that narrative plays a vital part in this.

POETRY, FANTASY AND HORROR

We always need to go beyond the object we have found, follow it in becoming something else. It cannot be brought down to the results of empirical and analytic treatment. There is a necessary creative component in coming to know—being open to the other, receptivity, metaphor, the circumlocution, writing the genuine and generating object. Because meaning is ultimately unsayable, poetry is necessary. And discovery is invention. As an archaeologist I un-cover or dis-cover something, come upon it (*invenire* in Latin, from which is derived invent, means to find, to come upon, to invent). Invention is both finding and creative power. The logic of invention, poetry and the imaginary is one of conjunction, making connections. It is both/and, between self and other, not either/or. The thing I have found, the site I visit is both this and that, it is there and here, past and of the present. Archaeology's poetry is to write what the found object is not, overshooting and exaggerating. This is the work of fantasy.

> The task of [poetry's] unceasing labour is to bring together what life has separated or violence has torn apart. Physical pain can usually be lessened or stopped only by action. All other human pain, however, is caused by one form or another of separation. And here the act of assuagement is less direct. Poetry can repair no loss but it defies the space which separates. And it does this by its continual labour of reassembling what has been scattered…. Poetry's impulse to use metaphor, to discover resemblance, is not to make comparisons (all comparisons as such are hierarchical) or to diminish the particularity of any event; it is to discover those correspondences of which the sum total would be proof of the indivisible totality of existence.
>
> (Berger 1984, pp. 96–7)

We all know Dracula is un-dead, and his bite drains the victim of life. Frankenstein created his creature out of dead bits, reanimating flesh; but the creature (un-named) turned monster. In Ridley Scott's movie *Alien,* spacecraft 'Nostromo' encounters the creature. It metamorphoses from egg through intestines of human host to phallic devouring alien, purely alien, amoral, silent, creeping the shadows, hunting the crew. John Carpenter's *Thing* is another alien, unnameable. It has survived aeons locked in ice, and discovered by Antarctic scientific mission transforms itself at will into any form, living or inanimate, turning itself into replica humans to take over. Mr Hyde hides within Dr Jeckyll, his bestial other released by metamorphic potion. Full moon and the werewolf walks.



Edlingham, Northumberland

In horror fantasy the world is made strange as we meet the other and otherness within. This is not some exotic alternative, like an interesting stranger on a journey into a dark continent. It is alternate, the other, and it threatens what holds us secure—family, society, sexuality (Dracula's bite). We may even become the other. That it can exist makes the world strange. It is ambiguity, both dead and alive, holding together contradiction, the spiritual in the material world. Gaps, absences, appear within the solidity of the world we live. We seem to see them and do not, sense their presence. Words do not help; it seems nonsense; how do we name the other? Ghosts and dreams: shadows without objects, flesh without life (zombies). Animism: a dead world comes alive, mummies return. Flesh is torn and consumed. Cannibals and human prey. The horror.

This is a confrontation with our existential dis-ease. We are brought to a concern with limits and categories, where we begin and where the world ends. Confrontation with absence and the formless. Horror fantasy is about the conscious and the unconscious, mind or spirit and matter, light and shade, ourselves and the other. And it is not really about fear; it is about fascination. Strange worlds, making visible the unseen, discovery. And a desire to know, to confront the other, the bestial, the imaginary, which has not yet been caught and tamed by society, named by the symbolic (Jackson 1981).

AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL ETHIC: THE PAST LOOKS BACK

What then of archaeological experience? In this sketch of horror I have just distinguished a sense in which things are 'other', and a sense in which they seem different and exotic. Of anthropology Johannes Fabian has written that to treat other societies as object of (anthropological) knowledge means keeping these people separate, distinct and distant, other than the anthropologist. This makes *them* a problem rather than the attitude, method and practice which treats them as object. 'Exotic otherness may be not so much the result as the prerequisite of anthropological inquiry. We do not "find" the savagery of the savage, or the primitivity of the primitive, we posit them' (Fabian 1983, p. 121). Such practice has little to do with finding out about ourselves in confrontation with what is not us because preconceptions of what the difference is are imposed on people through anthropological method. Archaeology is different in dealing with material artifacts. These can legitimately be treated as objects in empirical and analytic study (as can finds which are not artifacts). But they are much more. They are of people.

I have written of non-identity and an understanding which takes the form of dialogue (as of persons), which is not one-way observation and surveillance of the past. What does it mean to say in this way that the past looks back?

The past object exists in its non-identity, a condition which requires me to use my imagination to come to an understanding of it, following its connections and differences, open to its possibilities. But not just anything can be invented of this thing I have found. A responsibility (to the object, and its maker or user) requires me to respect its empirical otherness. As I put it above, I can remain true to the genuine artifact. This is my choice: to make up a fantasy world, or to treat the past as object of empirical study, or to treat it as correspondent in dialogue—the past looks back and answers. Responsibility implies response. Together with the element of imagination it makes an 'exact fantasy'. This responsibility is a demand that the object be respected. So the rules of my engagement with the past are not laid down in method or in a theory of knowledge, but in an ethic which maintains that I acknowledge I do not know but can learn from the past, that the past is ineffable in its difference. This is archaeology's ethic (see Kearney 1988, Conclusion).

And it brings me back to the relation between knowledge, interest and experience. The experience of (post)modernity is one empty of the coherence which tradition carries; it threatens fragmentation, the disintegration of experience into desultory and meaningless consumer spectacle and information. The apparently obsessive nostalgia and pseudo-tradition of the last decade (from architectural pastiche of classical and any other ornament to period-style home decor to the Fonz and *Happy Days*) only emphasizes this draining. I have tried to give impressions of an archaeological project which is sensitive to this experience, an ethical and communicative dialogue between past and present, a poetic strategy of construction which witnesses the past's difference, its otherness, heterogeneity. I believe that such an archaeological knowledge breaks the reciprocating cycle of commodity form and fragmented culture identified as being at the heart of (post)modern experience.

Walter Benjamin reflects: 'Where there is experience in the strict sense of the word' (as opposed to the atrophy of experience in modernity) 'certain contents of the individual past combine with the material of the collective past' (1970c, p. 161). This was the customary function of festival, ceremonies and ritual—to ensure the periodic intermingling of individual and collective pasts. Festivals in a wheel of time, recalling the past; marriage or other ceremony locating people involved in a wider and meaningful whole, a life-story. People actively incorporated in social performances which provide structure and meaning for their individual and particular experience.

> Nature is a temple where the living pillars
> speak sometimes in a babel of words;
> we pass through forests of symbols
> which watch with familiar looks.
>
> As far-off echoes from a distance sound
> in a deep dark unity,
> as vast as night itself and as the light,
> scents, colours, sounds correspond.
>
> (La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers
> Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles;
> L'homme y passe a travers des forêts de symboles
> Qui l'observent avec des regards familiers.
>
> Comme de longs échos qui de loin se confondent
> Dans une ténébreuse et profonde unité,
> Vaste comme la nuit et comme la clarté,
> Les parfums, les couleurs et les sons se répondent.)
>
> (Charles Baudelaire, 'Correspondances')

Charles Baudelaire's poem, of which these are the first two stanzas, evokes an animistic relation with a Nature, primaeval partner to humanity, which 'talks' and 'watches'. This communication is a ritual one. For Benjamin such experience was implicit condemnation of a relation with Nature based on technical mastery. He links it with the concept of *aura* which rests on treating the object world generally as a correspondent, granting it capacity to signify and not just 'be there'. 'To perceive the aura of an object means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return' (1970c, p. 190). Aura is a sense of the associations which cluster around the object of perception: correspondences and interrelations engendered by an object, rather than a fixed image. These correspondences are similar to the associations between individual and collective past in 'genuine' experience.

Elsewhere Benjamin relates aura to a sense of distance, however close an object may be (1970d, p. 222), an immunity to simple comprehension.



I think that this is a stimulating scrutiny of planes of experience directly relevant to archaeology with its roots in academic science and also in popular perception of mystery and discovery, its complex mediation of material culture from the past in the present. There is an increasing contention that analytical monologue is not enough. We can remember ourselves as reasoning subjects trying out our ideas *with* the world rather than *on* it, and the more so since the object world of the archaeologist consists in large part of

the things people have made. If this remembrance makes us think of analogies in 'ritual', then so be it. (And how free from ritual is 'science'?)

RICHARD LONG AND THE WALK

Richard Long walks. Sometimes apparently in arbitrary fashion, sometimes in precisely fixed plan, but always his walks have definitive form. 'A twenty mile walk in Nepal.' 'A two day walk around and inside a circle in the highlands, Scotland.' Wild places often. Along the way he might scrape out a line or cross in the gravel or leaves, construct a circle out of stones lying around: simple rearrangements. At the end there is the line of his walk on a map, photographs and perhaps traces still left along the way. He may put together a few spare words: 'snow: warm gravel: snow: stones rocks: dust: pine needles: powder dust: grit'. In the gallery: circles of slate or sticks; mud hand prints in circles on walls; a line of smooth stones. He says 'my art is in the nature of things'.

The maps, positioned and displaced stones and other unaltered materials, the assembled words and phrases, circles and lines, photographs, are not directly representing anything. Abstract and cultural form of circle, line and rectangle, they are responses to the walk and its conditions, depending on land and weather: a line of stones facing into the wind, a circle of driftwood on a beach, river mud on a wall. Richard Long's works are precipitates of the originating activity—the walk (Golding 1990). His boots scraping a line in desert gravel; his steps as a succession of stones. A straight line walk or a circle on a mountain top requires concentration, if only to get it right; not to be distracted by the picturesque. The walks are not journeys either, more like rituals, and the works its trappings. These condense the experience not so much in metaphor as in metonym: the works are literal parts of the walk on the land, reassembled in the cultural purity of circle or line. Long's rituals evoke sentimental memories of spontaneous play outdoors, collecting stones or shells to be taken home on a (childhood) trip to the beach; walks so popular in the Lake District, wandering; and of course they also bring to mind prehistoric stone circles, chambers and alignments. There is also a mysticism of things which cannot be put into words. The photographs of his walks take us back to the 'distractions' of hills and sky, wide open places and a solitary walker, the contrast between a few pieces of wood and the sea. As Martin Golding has written, this is a version of the Romantic Sublime 'reading like a colloquial expansion of Lucretius ("The person is torn away, the thing remains") which seems echoed in Long's words "Time passes, a place remains"' (1990, p. 51).

Richard Long is producing correspondences from the rhythm of a simple activity, and attended to with a concentration which seems to deny any radical separation of artistic 'representation', activity and land. It makes me mindful of how it is walking which creates landscapes (or driving, riding, flying), creating an experience of a simple sequence of places passed or visited, creating a story to tell someone.

Stones and Stac Pollaidh, Scotland 1981 by Richard Long, from R.H.Fuchs, *Richard Long,* Thames and Hudson, 1986, p. 162

There is a stark contrast with some 'landscape sculpture' produced in the United States by Michael Heizer, Robert Smithson, Christo and others. Smithson's 'Spiral Jetty' is (or rather was, it is inundated) a great curl of thousands of tons of rock bulldozed out into the Great Salt Lake, Utah. It is certainly evocative, a massive gesture of archaic meander, imposing place upon the wilderness. Michael Heizer's 'Double Negative', two enormous excavated earth sections, and 'Complex One', a forty-metre bunker-like construction of earth and concrete in Nevada desert, also speak of land, but hardly the touching of mystic walk. Christo packaged part of the coast of Australia in plastic, drew an orange curtain through miles of California. These are true projects, projections into nature, and as ritualistic as Richard Long's walks, but not like his romantic sublime. Here is nature controlled, land as frontier for human endeavour.[27]

There is a sense in which, when in the United States, the past seems to be in museums or in Europe (and less so, to the south: Aztec, Maya, Inca of central and southern America). The encounter with the land is a different order of relation to the thick palimpsest of history with which I may feel my walk belongs in Britain. The past in the United States does not seem contiguous with the present; the archaeological encounter then becomes anthropological, with their past, not ours. This is not the experience of

many Native Americans, of course, who 'know' the past because it lives spiritually in the present, in ritual, oral tradition, culture.

THE GARDEN

Gardens are interior spaces. They are about bringing the outside in, within the garden wall. This means choice, critical judgement of the suitability and worth of new plants or features; assessment of how individual plants contribute to the purpose or design of the garden, whether it is rows of vegetables or alpine rockery. The form of the garden may be fixed, but there is fascination in the constant checking, replacement and rearrangement of plants; working at the propagation of a particular fuschia, improving skills, trying out new ideas in the cold frame. And sharing: gardens display, others are invited to walk around, plants exchanged. The garden implies the gardener, always indirectly present in the cycles of activities needed. The time which these activities attend varies in its density: the growth of spring and early summer; judging the perfect moment for picking fruit; winter stasis. These are different qualities of time and attendant activity. And such quality denies the repetition of empty instants at work perhaps, or the remorseless bleeding away of living.

Gardens have been colonized. In Britain garden centres selling plants, seeds, equipment and tools are a significant part of the do-it-yourself market, and some may wish to buy a garden off-the-shelf for sake of their suburban standing. The 'cottage' garden is a stock image of rural heritage and nostalgia. Gardens are also full of dead metaphors about cultivating one's garden (I think of Peter Sellars in the movie *Being There* as simple-minded Chauncey (the) Gardener who becomes President of the United States by repeating stories and advice about gardening interpreted by others as deep reflections on the state of the country). But gardens are resistant to this. American back-yard to garden allotment, pigeon loft, leek trench, rose garden, glass house, herbaceous border, to Japanese Zen garden: all are deeply and popularly cherished.

Gardens can relate us to home. By home I do not mean the institution which has become an apology for the patriarchal family, the base for capitalist consumer unit. I mean the sense of feeling at home: security and a space for assessing oneself, establishing a coherence (or not) of self-understanding, identity, and denial of the abstractions of outside living. As with the garden, this is constant movement and rearrangement, creative options (perhaps denied space in the outside).

There is ritual in gardening (if by ritual is meant rulebound activity), signifying, creating space for its participants to encounter objects, thoughts, and feelings which are held to be special.

A SNAPSHOT

To snatch a moment. The aspiration of the snapshot is not to be a great picture, to display its aesthetic qualities. It is to stand for something, to quote something which means something to me. It substantiates my subjective feeling. The camera is brought out on family occasions, recurrent times—Christmas, celebrations, birthdays, holidays—to

capture not the unique, but that which recurs; someone loved, the way they looked. Instants with a past and a future—the turning of life-cycle, everyday life's exemplary returns. Such moments defy the 'history' of people I see on TV and read of in newspapers. Such public time sweeps me away. They are private; a snapshot means nothing to someone else but belongs to me and those who are mine. 'The private photograph is treated and valued today as if it were the materialization of that glimpse through the window which looked across history towards that which was outside time' (Berger 1982, p. 108).

> Every human being is an artist…the essence of man is captured in the description artist. All other definitions end up by saying that there are artists and there are non-artists—people who can do something and people who can't do anything.
>
> (Joseph Beuys, quoted in Nairn *et al.* 1987, p. 93)

Part 3 has been about things from the past and the archaeological encounter with them.

I picture an artifact as somehow always more, dynamic and changing, always becoming; and in questioning notions of authenticity, see the genuine object as animated, generating association and correspondence, working its way into understanding. It possesses aura. It is simultaneously familiar, distant and strange. Objects, not just from the past, are taken as part of cultural identity. An active and strategic use of things, objects as tools for inventing and constructing.

The encounter with a past object is an archaeological experience. It is of the intimate relationship between our interests, knowledge and reasoning, drawing on different experiences such as labour and getting on with others. It is also tied in with notions of heritage, experiences in (post)modernity, and those more to do with tradition and an assertion of some coherence and meaning. Archaeological experience is always personal, even if this is pushed to the margin in orthodox practice; it prompts thinking about the connection of the self to that which is other.

In the archaeological encounter there is the potential of dialogue with the artifact as well as empirical and analytic treatment. With an imaginative component, this is a sensuous and inventive, but also critical, receptivity with roots of interest, desire and fascination. In some ways it suggests ritual, analogies with the romantic sublime of Richard Long, with horticulture, with the snapshot moment. At one extreme its limit is horror fantasy. At another limit is an ethical imperative to respect the empirical otherness of the object and to respect the right of those in the past not to be treated as objects manipulated and controlled, but to be recognized as people expressing themselves in their world.

In Part 4 I move to write of some cultural and aesthetic strategies which apply to such an archaeology.

Blyth, Northumberland, summer 1990

The Lilburn Tower

DUNSTANBURGH CASTLE, NORTHUMBERLAND

There are no roads to the castle. You start to walk from the little fishing harbour of Craster, along a grassy track hard by the rocky foreshore. The view ahead is bare of trees or bushes, a cow fence the only obstruction; the great gatehouse keep and south curtain wall at the end of the summer flow of visitors. From the north, wartime pill boxes watch the wide sand beach by the track over Embleton links. A fold in the layered rock juts out into the sea from a beach turned to round boulders under the black basalt crescent cliff, Gull Crag. The castle promontory falls steeply to the fields of Dunstan which rise again to make Scrog Hill, opposite. The Lilburn Tower sits just inland of the cliff atop the hill above the track. Basalt columns stand on the slope in front of the square turreted tower, drawn up like so many warders, sentinels in stone, as they have been described.

The static immobility of Dunstanburgh seems ours to view. Set in land owned by the National Trust, a public agency dedicated to conservation, uncluttered by any later buildings, it is detached, and seems all the more easily possessed by its visitors; it belongs to all. Its towers and walls are sculptural, natural outgrowths of the rock on which it is set. Dunstanburgh is knitted into the landscape. It is almost not of history, especially since little of conventional historical significance happened here, as the guide tells us. In this the castle reeks of the picturesque: cliff, sea, tower, gate, wall and sky in painterly or photographic co-ordination. The black north cliff always in melancholic shadow, windy isolation, gaunt fossil-ribbed ruin add a tint of the romantic.

> (The romantic brings to mind empty sentimentality, schmaltz, romantic pulp fiction. But there is also romantic resistance to formality and containment, and revolutionary impulses.
>
> > 'By investing the commonplace with a lofty significance, the ordinary with a mysterious aspect, the familiar with the prestige of the unfamiliar, the finite with the semblance of infinity, thereby I romanticize it.' 'The art to estrange in a pleasant manner, to make an object seem strange, yet familiar and attractive, that is romantic poetics.'
> >
> > Novalis)

Guide books and archaeologies of castles are predominantly architectural, describing sequences of change in design and particular features of building: from masonry styles to defensive provisions such as machiolation and loops. The historical context given is of the internecine conflict of aristocratic families of medieval England, sometimes with vignettes or general accounts of everyday life in the castle. These are familiar stories of Norman conquest and feudal barons, lords and peasants, trestle tables and rush-covered floors, and of siege warfare.[28]

I want to describe the architectural experiences in the walk to and around Dunstanburgh.

Embleton Links

From the north

The castle marks the land, a focal point from which the land may be viewed, and itself seen as symbol of the Lord's power and presence. It is a contrast to the earth worked by the peasants (aerial photographs show traces still present of the medieval ploughing of Craster fields). With the peasants the visitor walks to the castle. The Lord rode the land. The horse was the animal which went with the castle. To be Lord was to be mounted. To ride the land was different to the ownership of land which belonged with tilling the soil, to independent peasant ownership of earth, as many Saxons had experienced. The experience of riding the land is of moving *over,* of covering the ground with one's self, looking down. It is ownership by subjugation, by virtue of one's boldness and spirit. In the hunt, favourite occupation of the rider, to be bold is to ride out, fast, respecting only the pace, to be in at the kill, soaking the earth with the blood, intrepid huntsman. To hunt is to ride with others from the meet, a gathering of respect for the qualities of vanquishing knight, a gathering of blood.

Feudal land was owned by permission of monarch; rights to till the soil were granted in return for services of labour or military duty to social superior. Feudal land was written with ties of obligation, surveillance and control (serfs were subjected to all sorts of restrictions, bound to the soil). But there was also the ancient system of common rights which allowed the free appropriation of special common land for individual and social purpose.

(Dunstanburgh was built late, into the thirteenth century. Never the sole or main private residence of feudal lord, how much of feudal relations prevailed?)

Flying from Minneapolis to Cleveland I looked down to the land gridded into square sections. A rationalized break-up of the land as property to be sold, bought and owned. A domination of space in the service of Jeffersonian democratic and enlightened thinking; a world of



land for individuals free to move, buy and settle. This is a challenge to the ownership of subjugation passed through primogeniture, embedded not in areas of land, but in place; a challenge also to common rights in land. Dunstanburgh's display is a creation of a place, of a locale whence the Lord rode. Castles were of course a military architecture of defence, but many rarely met with active use or suffered significant sieges. They are as much, if not more, to do with creating a landscape and experiences of moving, looking, feeling; spatial allegories.[29]

Approaching from the south, the curtain wall bars the way and its stone face draws up to the great height of the two drum towers of the gate, rising more than five storeys high. In front is a rock-cut moat, eighty feet wide. From the north, the castle marries with Gull Crag, 100 feet high, the Lilburn tower on its hill behind its basalt columnar defenders and stark against the sky. The castle encloses and divides off the Lord. Cross the moat, through barbican (now demolished) and into the gateway. The sea wind of Craster fields is channelled through the arched passage, now open but which was in its day furnished with at least two sets of gates and portcullis. It is sometimes said that gateways were the weakest part of a castle circuit and so attracted defensive features. But their elaboration (at Dunstanburgh the gate is also keep and more than dominates, it defines) also draws

attention to the crossing of the boundary wall and moat, to passing within to the defined spaces of the castle baileys and towers. Looking back at the gate tower of Dunstanburgh when inside, a flat and almost blank stone wall still dwarfs the visitor.

Dunstanburgh was mostly occupied by constables who governed castle and land in the absence of owner. Elsewhere castle interiors clearly indicate a main purpose to be lordly consumption: kitchens, butteries, pantries, halls. Apartments are later given over to private use, but consumption was public and conspicuous. Halls were often above vaulted storage rooms and cellars. The Lord sat within and over what he owned, watching and viewed in return. His castle chapels, always well looked after, link with churches outside—communion with heavenly powers too.

If I think of a visit to a castle, I think of entrances and doorways, passages and archways, access to and from enclosed spaces, views from narrow windows directed across and within the castle spaces. Networks of looking and moving. Newel stairways narrow spiralling stone climbing precipitously up the towers. And textures: the stone underfoot, cold, smooth ashlar, now weathered but hard and enduring. A contrast with peasant earth; the leaded roofs with thatch. Windows: often embrasures and slits in dark and confined chambers, sometimes large mullioned, transomed, throwing light into great hall. Heterogeneous ambience of light and dark, unobserved looking through impenetrable boundary, and a viewing from the security of power. Defined spaces.

(Castle interiors, possibly because of their lack of furnishing and reduction to skeletal form, are so much about this lighting of texture, shifting light across stone surfaces, differing in its qualities with time of day, season and weather. It is this which contributes so much to the aura of castles. It makes me think of the lighting found in many museums—singular, controlled and directed, aimed at ‘illuminating’. The aura and character of artifacts, their heterogeneity, also depends much on how different qualities of light play upon them. A uniform and unchanging light may offer designer control of viewing conditions but loses aura.)

Dunstanburgh creates a scene through its manipulation of approaches and channelling of movement, its structuring of space, and through tactile qualities of temperature, humidity, light, materials. There are also its structural aesthetics. The tectonics of the castle are the interplays of loads born and supporting members. Dunstanburgh’s castle heights lift its weight of stone over the basalt columns of Gull Crag and rock outcrop; the drum towers of the gate are squat and rooted to the same ground. Stripped of timber floors and roofing, Dunstanburgh displays its construction markedly now; but castles always seem somewhat naked. Theirs is an open and confident display of material, labour, craft, weight, gravity, ground and sky, in thick walls, arches, vaults, cave-like chambers, lofty towers and halls.

The gatehouse

Architecture is, of course, much more than building techniques and engineering. Setting down limits and boundaries, a building makes room, allows a space within which is gathered and contained experiences and information, the tactile and visual, tectonic and technical. Building is about constructing more than solid forms, and its experiences are intimately of power and authority. And the castle builds the land for knightly rider; and into the picturesque and romantic. Dunstanburgh's location was not a strategic site already there before the impulse to build the castle. The rocky promontory becomes location because of the building of the castle Dunstanburgh.

(The word phenomenology might be used generally to refer to the detailed examination and description of conscious experience and perception. What I have just given is a simple attempt at a phenomenology of a castle visit. The parameters of the experience are the material, perception and imagination: experience of accessibility

(paths, fences, coast, public and private ownership, the walls and gates…), use of materials and spaces, maps and guides; the perception of enclosure and place within the land, mental maps and grammars or logics of space (its perception); the work of imagination in ritual barriers, familiarity and unfamiliarity, fear, the domestic and monumentality, the attractions of the picturesque.[30]



The wall at Tantallon, East Lothian

Is there not a place for a phenomenology of the things archaeologists deal with? An examination of what is meant (in terms of experience and perception rather than abstract measures and definitions) by the names archaeologists give to things found—axes, walls, bones. Might not this lead to some fascinating archaeological stories?)

Harbottle, Northumberland

Mitford

Part 4
WORKING ARCHAEOLOGY

THE CRAFT OF ARCHAEOLOGY

DIFFERENT CULTURAL STRATEGIES FOR ARCHAEOLOGY: WHAT IS THE ARCHAEOLOGIST TO BE?

The critique of scientific archaeology, the questioning of the character of archaeology as a social science, has involved realizing that archaeology is a cultural practice and not simply a neutral quest for more knowledge of the past. The demise of scientific objectivity has raised the issue of the subjective and of the aesthetic, both being neglected under a sovereignty of science. Aesthetic quality is still a focus of some traditional approaches which may also be concerned somewhat with a 'literary' rendition of things found. But matters are much wider and less simple after the critique of science. These are matters of appreciating the past, writing and representing it appropriately, bringing archaeologist and the past together; these are questions of archaeology and value, archaeology as cultural practice. If the archaeologist is now a cultural worker, what should be their cultural politics?

An option is the expression of feeling, articulating an affective response and cherishing it as part of being human. This is quite common outside of academic archaeology and I suspect it will find its way back to theoretical respectability. The Theoretical Archaeology Group Conference at Lampeter, Wales, in 1990 had a session on emotion in archaeology with musical presentation and poetry readings. (See also *Archaeological Review* from Cambridge 9.2 1990 'Affective Archaeology'.)

The social explanations of processual archaeology have been held to be distorted, relying on notions of cultural evolution, societies as systems in equilibrium (naturally resistant to change) and economics of maximization of profit, minimization of effort (just like capitalist business). Alternative *radical* social accounts have been proposed which represent better, more real views, it is claimed, and which emphasize social contradiction, power relations, the subjection of majorities by minorities (see Part 1). A significant influence has been Marxist social science.

Objective academic archaeology can be seen as omitting gender and ethnicity as important factors in the organization of the discipline and explanation of the past. I have referred to the androcentric focus on rationality, action and visibility in contrast to emotional environments which support institutional practices. Women may not progress in the discipline because of a perceived masculinity of interest and aptitude, and because of simple discrimination. The views and attitudes towards the past of groups which are not middle-class, academic and male are now being heard, and they question a neutral past for all (Gero and Conkey 1991).

In a general way (post-processual) archaeologists who oppose the discipline operating entirely under the sovereignty of science (on the grounds that is ideological and so supportive of a particular and perhaps objectionable status quo) may be taken as

operating a strategy of opposition and transgression. Conventions of archaeological respectability are criticized and flouted, archaeological authorities (ideas, institutions, people) condemned. Lately, notions of final truth and neutral representation of archaeological finds and the past have been undermined. Confusion is spread concerning everything once held secure, from ways of describing and explaining the past, to the organization of committees for dispersing archaeological funds, to the running of an archaeological excavation. This critique may pose against the structures of the academy, may oppose the debasement of archaeology in popular and heritage culture, presenting instead a negative release of archaeology's productive forces, pasts created for and with those outside society's dominant interests (Shanks and Tilley 1987b, Chapter 7; Bapty and Yates 1991; Miller *et al.* 1989). Scientific archaeology itself was a radical academic strategy of opposition in the 1960s, standing for the purity of reason, universal method, the power of science and a break with traditional archaeology.

The tendencies of some of this (post-processual) oppositional and transgressing archaeology seem evident now. The theoretical uncertainties and doubtings appear irrelevant to many, and some archaeology threatens to dissolve into the present as part of an ideological or political stance (being radical entails this archaeology, or belonging to a particular social group or community entails another 'authentic' archaeology). We may yet witness a purely subjective and expressionist archaeology—feelings now on show.

Archaeology has already become commodity in the heritage and leisure industries. Scientific archaeology gives, at best, a partial view. Traditional archaeology is no longer respectable on many grounds, theoretical and practical. What is the way forward? Further doubt and questioning; more political awareness; commercial archaeologies produced for clients? What is the archaeologist to be? Avant-garde artist; commercial consultant; investments expert (don't bother with this site, it's not worth it); white-coated expert; inspired aesthete; radical political activist; fervent nationalist; social welfare worker (here, this is the past you need to make you feel better); or teacher? Which cultural strategy is the archaeologist to adopt?

I direct attention to the art movements of (post)modernism. The following lists might be labelled modernism (to the left) and postmodernism. There has been a discernible shift in many cultural fields from one side to the other, left to right. The shift is particularly evident in architecture. From LeCorbusier and internationalism (machines for living in and glass-faced rectangles) to historical preservation, images of locality and place, pleasures and eclectic urban spectacle (London Docklands and Covent Garden, Boston's Faneuil Hall, San Francisco's Fisherman's Wharf, Gateshead Metrocentre and Garden Festival). Analogous shifts in the fine arts and philosophy have attracted much critical attention and speculation.

So, as I have outlined them in this book, different archaeologies and ways of thinking of what archaeologists do fit into some of these pairings. Consider the totalizing and co-ordinated systematics, the designed order of David Clarke's break with tradition in his *Analytical Archaeology* (1968), as compared with the commercial anarchy of heritage quoting and recycling the past, or post-structuralist archaeological speculation on the shifting play of meaning of material past in the present.

What is to be made of this shift and these options, of the apparent opposition between modernist and postmodernist strategies?

originality	intertextuality
novelty	recycling and quoting the past
break with tradition	reference to past in present
simplicity	complexity
clarity	ambiguity
uniformity	eclecticism
purity	ornament
order	contradiction
signified	signifier
semantics	rhetoric
purpose and design	play and chance
hierarchy	anarchy
avant-garde	commercial
mastery	partiality
co-ordination	dispersal
totality	deconstruction
wholes	(cultural) fragments
closed conjunctive form	open disjunction
finished work	process and performance
distance	participation
cause	trace
symptom	desire
genital phallic	polymorphous androgyny
transcendence	immanence
utopia	nostalgia
universal	local
internationalism	pluralism

(based on Hassan 1985; Walker 1983)

Rather than a new cultural phase I see postmodernism as intimately related to modernism. Both are part of the relation between homogeneity and heterogeneity, change and belonging, universal reason and local knowledge, identity and difference which are the cultural contradictions at the heart of capitalism's shifting nature. I described this above and connected it to archaeological and heritage experiences of the past. So much of postmodernism can be found in modernist work; nor is there a neat moment of birth of postmodernism.

There are two main lines in modernism. One leads through abstraction to an art concerned with itself, in-itself; opposing figurative art went with a concern with the art surface, a concern with purely formal matters (Jackson Pollock and abstract expressionism, one example). The other line leads art to dissolution in life, or the life-world becoming art (from Marcel Duchamp's ready-made art—porcelain urinal displayed in gallery—through Dada and photomontage, surrealist objects, to conceptual and performance art). Both these trends are symptoms of the deep interrogation of the meaning of art which characterizes modernism. Both also are its failure for many people.

The end: an avant-garde practising an art comprehensible only in terms of art. On the other hand is art indistinguishable from everyday life, artists who act as robots performing repetitive motions in a gallery, not producing 'art'. While both may raise questions, the failure is in their *incorporation* and *irrelevance*. Modernism was a radical alternative aiming to shock and transgress in pursuit of cultural liberation. But its cultural field is now hardly oppositional; art is sold like any other commodity and its production feeds the entertainments and culture industries. Meanwhile everyday commodities signify and mean, and often before they are functional; the commodity form in the postmodern west is as much about style and culture as it is about use and economy. There is more shock potential in the latest beer advert on TV than there is in a Manhattan gallery.[31]

What can archaeologists learn from this? Confrontation and opposition are so easily absorbed into orthodoxy, its energies dissipated into unreflective consumption of 'new' ideas in education and the media. This can be the cycle of archaeological method as I described it in Part 1. A radical critique of truth and representation may raise vital questions of what archaeologists do, but may also seem irrelevant to many concerned with more practical issues in the 'real' world of archaeology; those who excavate may fail to see the point of post-structuralist musings on Derrida, or indeed philosophical discussion of scientific method. These, together with a proliferation of different approaches and pluralism, may contribute to an inability to think the present—how can archaeology contribute positively to the present when it is dispersed in contradiction and there is so much to consider, so much in dispute? Traditional forms of meaning associated with family and community may also be eroded—how can a community past be important when it is only one possible meaning among many, or indeed when it is less important than a scientific hope of a cross-cultural generalization?

My argument is that we might realize that the material roots of the cultural options and strategies taken in archaeological work lie in a system which makes commodities of culture and identity. I propose that archaeology's interest is in resisting the past being turned into a commodity. For me this is to work on the *tension* between the benefits of technical reasoning (in scientific analysis for example) and a loss of particular meaning and tradition (referenced in heritage), between the sameness of universal methods and a past which resists its reduction and incorporation into the cultural forms of the present, between a single past-for-all and a plurality of individual pasts. Not a modernist or postmodernist strategy, but learning from both, as responses to the experience of this condition we live. I have called this 'sublation' of those dichotomies which return again and again. I propose that it is fruitful to think of archaeology as craft.

CRAFT

At the craft fair. Market stalls laid with 'hand-made' goods: pottery, especially wheel-thrown bowls and jugs, the more idiosyncratic or upmarket called 'studio' pottery; colourful 'designer' knitwear; silver wire jewellery; basketry (hanging baskets for house plants); furniture perhaps, often made with hardwoods; leather bags and belts; a cake-stall in the corner sells home-made lemonade and sticky buns. The term 'craft' invites caricature: comfortable middle-class people in fishermen's smocks expressing themselves in activities which were once the livelihood of the working class when they were known

as trades. Arty pretence, complacent, conservative, safe. A honey-glazed milk jug sitting on stripped-pine Welsh dresser. It has undertones of regressive ruralism—getting back to the securities of pre-industrial village life and community, preserving 'traditional' ways and natural materials. Overtones of utopian nostalgia.

The potters sitting at their wheel look absorbed in the work. The concentration requires no effort; the work draws the potter in. It looks care-free, far from the pressures of car assembly line. The potter is envied. It looks relaxing. People may take up crafts as hobbies or pastimes for these reasons; physical activities with clear untaxing guidelines in which they can lose themselves and escape.

It is for these reasons also that crafts may not be taken seriously. Traditional and safe, homely and affirmative craft work is not challenging and critical, subversive avant-garde art appearing in public gallery and discussed in the media. The gallery art piece, product of creative inspiration, seems to invite contemplation and close scrutiny. Handling the pot invites consideration of skill and technique, price and decorative appeal. Art is intellectual and singular; craft is practical and everyday. Craft is also associated with provincial folk art and tourist crafts, articles (often considered spurious) produced by locals as souvenirs for a tourist market. This is not the appeal of high-culture art.

Craft work has moved to the gallery. This began in the nineteenth century with museums of style and taste such as the Victoria and Albert in London. It continued with the studio pottery of Bernard Leach and others. Since the 1970s craft criteria of truth to material and suitability for purpose have been questioned, traditional and accepted qualities scrutinized in experimental works in textiles, clay and all the main craft materials. An attempt to question also the boundary between art and craft. This has been particularly evident in the United States. Here are new experiences in woven materials; ceramic sculptural teapots which do not look like fired clay and do not pour tea in the way you might expect.

Especially since the nineteenth century the crafts have been for many an aesthetic in opposition. The arts and crafts movement, defined in the writings of John Ruskin and expressed in the political works of William Morris, was a reaction against the products of the Industrial Revolution. In his business company Morris championed hand craft, workshop-based authentic labour, as opposed to machine-based alienated labour of capitalist industry. This was an attempt to restore a dignity and respectability to labour, to oppose the separation of art and politics, morality and religion. Craft was to be art in society.[32]

Here again in the distinction between contemplative art and practical craft is the free thinker and artisan slave. But here also are aesthetic strategies challenging the separation. I shall go further into these in respect of what archaeologists might be doing.

Craft is the intention of a unified practice—hand, heart and mind combined in critique and affirmation, a harnessing of pleasure to learning. Craft is opposed to alienated labour, the separation of working from what is produced, to a division of labour which separates reasoning from execution (as in management and workers for example) and divides tasks in the making of something (as in a factory production line). It denies the separation of reasoned decision and execution, the freeman and the slave, the philosopher and the artisan. Craft involves a rediscovery of subjugated knowledges, recovering practices

The Plaka, Athens, July 1989

made marginal in the rationalized organization of productive routine. These knowledges are to do with the affective involvement of the body in the things we do: people's experience of themselves in a sensuous understanding of materials lived and worked with. Such forms of knowledge are know-how and may be subjugated, concrete and sensuous, rather than public, abstract and intellectual, but they do not involve a

primitivist reliance on the 'natural'; craft may legitimately draw on any technology relevant to its purpose. Conceiving of archaeology as craft is a focus on what archaeologists do in its human scale and dimensions. In this it is modest, but not inconsequential, because the simple yet creative practice of encountering the past and producing interpretation of it may, as I have claimed, insinuate so much within the particular.[33]

I shall now expand on three basic elements of an archaeology as craft: function, viability, and expression. These include the relations of making and presenting, creation and purpose, expression and form, and archaeology and its public.

PURPOSE AND FUNCTION

Before even the remains of the past or the rules of archaeological method there are interest and purpose. The craft of archaeology begins not with object or method, but with desire: the aim, interest or purpose in doing archaeology. The choice of theory or method with which to approach the past depends on what the archaeologist is trying to do. Interests may include those I discussed in Part 3: technical control, or an understanding of the object past as meaningful product, or freeing others from distorted views of past and present. Whatever, this initial interpretive decision is associated with archaeological method in a logic of particular situations. This does not mean that one universal archaeological method is adapted to particular purposes. It means that theory is a strategic matter, varying not with methodological or epistemological absolutes (abstract theories of what method and archaeological knowledge should be), but with decision. Theory is a sort of tool kit.

In that craft entails a relationship with a client or customer for whom the craftworker labours, this decision is a matter of dialogue, fitting archaeology to community or social purpose and need. I suggest community as an appropriate archaeological client, though it may vary. This fitting of archaeology to social need does imply the possibility of reasoned discussion within an informed public sphere. There is an obligation on the archaeologist to make known what archaeological options are open, indeed to *open* discussion, not to close it down with perhaps an expert pronouncement of singular possibility—this is what archaeology does, take it or leave it. This is the responsibility of service.

Many archaeologists may maintain that a basic purpose of archaeology is to follow the ideals of what archaeological knowledge is. These epistemological ideals include finding correspondence with the facts in which archaeology deals—the recovered remains of past societies. A basic purpose of archaeology is considered to be production of knowledge of the past, knowing what happened. The primary archaeological task is to represent the facts. But this is not at all straightforward, as I have argued throughout; facts and representation are very problematical notions. On inspection there can be no neutral description; representation is always transformation of some sort, into text and images, archaeological words and pictures. Given this, justification must be given for choosing a particular mode of representation of the past, justification provided for the correspondence asserted between the facts recovered and the archaeological account of



Purpose, viability and expression: excavations on Aigina, September 1978

them. Since the 1960s especially this has become a major topic of debate with different attempts to show how the facts can support different accounts, and with different modes of correspondence proposed. These latter include empiricism (the status of fact is uncontroversial and so correspondence is a simple matter of attending to the facts), processual archaeology's subsumption of facts under generalizations and problems (general concepts and logics or processes such as society, economy, technology and feedback came between the facts and their explanation), and a post-processual notion that the facts of the past can be adequately known through considering their context (archaeological accounts correspond not with individual facts but with associations between data). While such debate has raised many vital questions of what archaeologists should be doing, the problem of corresponding with facts has been considered a technical matter. It is usually assumed that archaeology's purpose is to provide knowledge of the past, and it can be left up to archaeologists to work out how to do this. Archaeologists may be called upon for various reasons, but their basic expertise lies in producing knowledge of the past, and this is a technical matter.

I suggest that it is not a technical matter and that archaeological service might not just be restricted to producing knowledge of some things that happened in the past. Rather than attempting to follow an ideal of what knowledge is or should be, archaeology might instead work on those things in our experience which are considered important, reflect on them in an archaeological way, and provide archaeological meanings which may assist in the modification of our beliefs, desires and activities. This would be an archaeology as an active part of living in the world now, contributing to an awareness of coping and managing experience, fostering difference and possibility.

Archaeological knowledge that some things happened in the past may be very edifying, but it may not be. The analogy is not exact, but it is like going to a carpenter and being told that they can construct a table, that is all. There are various ways they may do it, and it may turn out a kitchen table, workbench or occasional ornamental table, but it will be a table. Now a table may be exactly what is wanted, but the customer would like to have a say in what type of table it is to be, a say in the mode of construction. However, a table may not be what is wanted, and in this case the carpenter is hardly contributing to a rich and varied life. So too, the archaeologist may do more than aim simply to produce knowledge that some things happened.

Archaeology cannot escape the present and is responsible to it. So what might archaeology reflect upon; what are the things in our experience considered important and which have a relation to the work of archaeology? They should be decided in dialogue with the people archaeology is serving: local village community, city council, Native American nation. I anticipate that they would include popular issues of identity, belonging, and the quality of the local social and physical environment. The means of producing archaeological knowledge should be included in the dialogue because they are not neutral and technical matters, as I have argued. Empirical and analytic treatment of things found is invested with an interest in technical control, produces particular pasts and contrasts with a more 'human' understanding through a dialogue with the past as other or correspondent.

Such an interchange between archaeologist and client community is not one way. Archaeologists are not simply to accept the terms and interests of the client. A good work of craft enhances, alters, creates new possibilities of experience, however modestly. The

new teapot may be an explicit critique of other teapots, a critique expressed in its design and use. It expresses a way of coping, contributes to quality and style of life; in this it is affirmative. It is also educational; in designing an article the craftworker teaches ways of perceiving and experiencing.

There may be little opportunity for rational dialogue between archaeologist and community. There has been a significant decline in an informed public sphere and it is increasingly replaced by the administrative decision making of experts. Interests and function may also be imposed on archaeology: for example an archaeological service may be required or rigged to produce nationalist accounts of the past (Trigger 1984; Kotsakis, forthcoming). Archaeology has an interest in examining its place in society and, if necessary, to criticize and make a case for productive dialogue between archaeology and community. This is archaeology's cultural politics: it is simply the production of a genuine and edifying or constructive past. The criteria according to which such a past is to be judged are not fixed and absolute. There is no final true or authentic past, nor any political orthodoxy (such as class-based analysis of capitalism) as firm ground on which archaeology may assess its place and the function of its pasts in society. Archaeology's reality, past and present, is a precarious one which can be readily diverted and made rigid for particular sectional interests. In a way archaeology's cultural politic is about finding the first person plural—*'we'* who can reason, argue, discuss the potential and place of past in present, we who struggle to make a better quality present which necessarily includes the past.

Such a cultural politics, with interests in service, obligation and dialogue, involves a strategic logic of particular situations, as I have just claimed. This is a logic attuned to the living textures of *popular* experience, attending to popular concerns rather than abstract and academic philosophies and methodologies (though these may be cited, they exist primarily in relation to practical interest and experience). It means taking the popular seriously. I have tried to address such textures in this book—desire, nostalgia, community, discovery, ownership and so on. So to write of the politics of archaeology is to refer not first to conventional politics of left and right, or to academic or theoretical politics, but to something more radical—people's basic orientations, experiences and hopes as they apply to the material past.

Regional development and education are two fields where archaeologists are already active. Development of an inner city ideally involves the reconciliation of planning, place and community, and archaeologists may well be active in avoiding and mitigating the destruction of the archaeological record, perhaps involving remains or architecture in the project. Their contribution is markedly enhanced if their expertise is not only located in empirical and analytic study of remains, but also includes an interpretive understanding of the meaning and significance of the past in terms of contemporary experience. This is what I have described as understanding through dialogue, past and present brought together. Such an archaeology can be a vital part of something such as Kenneth Frampton's 'critical regionalism' (1985). 'The fundamental strategy of Critical Regionalism is to mediate the impact of universal civilization with elements derived *indirectly* from the pecularities of a particular place' (p. 21). Universal civilization here refers to the trajectory of modernization, from anonymous urban culture to high-rise building techniques. Critical regionalism is regional development conceived in grander terms than a sentimental revival of a region's vernacular. It aims to maintain 'an

expressive density and resonance in an architecture of resistance (a cultural density which under today's conditions could be said to be potentially liberative in and of itself since it opens the user to manifold experiences)' (Frampton 1985, p. 25): an architecture of resistance to homogeneity and placenessness. With its interplay of resonance and correspondence, is this not a place for the genuine archaeological artifact? Inscribed in development projects composed of *building* sites—literally projects which build or cultivate sites.

> This inscription, which arises out of 'in-laying' the building into the site, has many levels of significance, for it has a capacity to embody, in built form, the prehistory of the place, its archaeological past and its subsequent cultivation and transformation across time. Through this layering into the site the idiosyncracies of place find their expression without falling into sentimentality.
>
> (Frampton 1985, p. 26)

This is one role of sensuous receptivity.

Educational work in schools and colleges fosters reflection on the presentation of material and its application to the experiences of both teacher and student. Teaching is belittled and abused if considered as the transmission (however palatable) of a body of knowledge to recipient. A better image surely is that of a creative dialogue between teacher and student around a particular topic which produces something new (such as awareness or ability) within student and perhaps teacher (the act of communication as process of learning). Here a teacher's receptivity to the resonances of the archaeological object is a vital component in communication and experiences of learning. The notion of a craft archaeology addressing itself to the requirements of a client community is directly relevant to work in education, museum and media interpretation. It questions the split between archaeology and its public whereby dialogue is reduced to the packaging and sale of a body of archaeological knowledge to a passive consumer.

VIABILITY

Whatever the craftworker wishes to do, it must be viable and practical. Craft, of necessity, responds to the material which dictates much of what the craft product is. In the same way the archaeologist must be true to the material past, otherwise the archaeological work is impractical, inept, useless, or fraudulent. Viability involves considering the characteristics of the particular piece of stone, wood or clay in relation to the project. These may be technical matters. Archaeology too needs to consider the particular characteristics of each encounter with the past, an attention to empirical detail. There are many scientific and technical aids to this end. I have tried to explain how this does not mean giving absolute primacy to the object past (as objectivity or 'fact'). In this interplay between the archaeological craftworker and object, both are partners in the final product. This means that the things archaeologists work *with* are not raw material but types of tools, autonomous and active in the production of archaeology. This is that simultaneous sense of intimacy and distance that I have often mentioned. A familiarity

through working with the artifacts from the past, but also their resistance to classification and categorization. It is a primary and existential element of interpretation in productive work: the interpretation of purpose and of material.

Is this not also the experience of the potter? Even after a lifetime's working with clay, familiarity seems so partial and superficial. There is always so much more in the inert mineral body; constant learning. Tight control of processing can achieve predictable results, as in industrial production. But this is a deadening and alienation of the craft encounter with clay. In the genuine dialogue the clay *always* replies somewhat unpredictably, perhaps in the response of the body to firing, spectacularly in the varied responses of surface finishes and glazes. Much of the craft is in interpreting and channelling the quality of response, the resistance.

EXPRESSION

Craft is essentially creative; taking purpose, assessing viability, working with material, expressing interpretation to create the product which retains traces of all these stages. The creative element in craft contains an aesthetic of skill, of workmanship. It is directed and restrained—exact fantasy.

Craft's expressive dimension is also about pleasure (or displeasure) and is certainly not restricted to the intellectual or the cognitive. The genuine craft artifact embodies and the response to it is a multifaceted one. Pleasure is perhaps not a very common word in academic archaeology, but an embodied archaeology may certainly invoke it. Here archaeology can learn from Heritage's celebration of common experience, sharing, identity and community. However spurious it may be, people would seem to recognize the appeal.

THE PRODUCT

The craft object is both critique and affirmation, it embodies its creation, speaks of style, gives pleasure in its use, solves a problem perhaps, performs a function with an aesthetic, provides an experience, signifies and resonates. It may also be pretentious, ugly or kitsch, and useless.

Two watches. One a repeating half-hunter. The ritual of taking it from its pocket, its weight on the chain, listening to the ticking, uncatching the cover, touching the engraving, roman numerals, long slim pointers beneath the crystal, give it a wipe, wind it on a little, listen to the repeating chimes. It almost doesn't matter what time it is. Another: black, rectangular wrist watch, quartz digital, accurate to five seconds a month, multi-function technical magic, its stop watch calibrated in hundredths of a second, four alarms, liquid crystal display. Two different experiences. What sort of watch do you want?

The product declares itself. It operates a rhetoric, presents or embodies arguments which intend to persuade (Buchanan 1989). They may be about the way the past was, the way the present is or should be, future will be. (The sentimental nostalgia and impression of lost craft skills in the gold pocket watch; utopian promise of high-tech.) The rhetoric of

the product attempts to persuade on matters such as usefulness, the place of technology in everyday life, style and identity. In doing this it may instruct, provide information and appeal to reason and rationality; it may display its working to convince that it is worthwhile. It may aim to convince on ethical grounds, that it is right and proper (environmentally sound for example). It may simply please and entertain (the murmur of escapement and ticking). Such arguments may be backed up with appeals to authority—a look of credibility and confidence.

These are matters of design, which is the set of decisions about how something is to be made. The question of archaeological design is: what sort of archaeology do we want?

Judging different archaeologies might make reference to any of these aspects of rhetoric. It is like a matter of taste, by which I mean not personal preference as determined by individual sensitivity, but critical discrimination between different styles. Design without style is not possible; the set of decisions made in producing an archaeological work involves conformity with some interests, precepts or norms and not others, and these evoke associations. Archaeological style is the mode of reasoning employed, the relation between ideas and aims and the final product (which is usually a written text). The judgement of archaeological style is partly judging its eloquence (effectiveness and productivity); it is also an ethical appraisal, with reference to aims and purpose, or possible function of the archaeology. Technical matters are implicated, of course, including the essential truth to the past. Judgement refers to all these aspects of archaeology as craft: purpose, viability, expression; design and style.

So what sort of archaeology do I appreciate? Archaeological work which holds new and enlarging experiences and perspectives through the past. Which engages with people's concerns and interests, reflects on assumptions, practices and beliefs. It can be anything produced in a respons-ible encounter with the material past. Archaeology has a topic and an obligation, but no method or singular outcome.

THE ARCHAEOLOGIST AS CRAFTWORKER

Archaeology's craft is to interpret the past. The archaeologist is one skilled in interpretation who provides systems of meanings between past and present which help orient people in their cultural experiences. This skill is the basis of the archaeologist's authority, for not everyone is equipped to deal with the past archaeologically. I see interpretation as a release of meaning which enables people to take the experience of the past as they wish. It is empowerment, giving people the opportunity to think through those aspects of the past which concern them, to discover new aspects, to locate these within their self-understanding. Interpretation is incitement to invent.

I am not proposing another new archaeology. This is not an attempt to mark out the ground for an arts or a humanities archaeology as opposed to scientific: romantic craft artist versus test-tubing scientist. It is just another look at what archaeologists are doing and might make more of. There is much excellent work of interpretation around, particularly in museums, exhibitions, in education: interactive displays, and course work which taps student self-understanding. Too much to list. I have cited some academic work of social archaeology in Part 1. But I believe that now is a time of potential and obligation to clarify what interpretation may be, to think of what archaeologists can be

doing. Advances in archaeological theory have brought sophisticated awareness of how to go about interpreting what is found; the material past is moving away from paternalist state management to become the subject of entrepreneurial agency with the growth of heritage leisure and entertainment; planning and development is more aware of archaeological implications; popular experience of (post)modernity draws on pasts and nostalgias; community identity and individuality are of concern. In this cultural conjuncture archaeologists can act and interpret.[34]

I described some cultural strategies associated with modernism and postmodernism and referred to the failure of oppositional and transgressing cultural politics through incorporation within commercial media and culture, and through irrelevance. The reflections on craft are a way of thinking of an affirmative but critical archaeology. It is clear, I hope, that this does not dismiss the aesthetic means of (post)modernism. I want to draw on some of these now as I consider the question of expression and representation—how is archaeology to represent the past?

AN ARCHAEOLOGICAL POETICS

Invention; non-identity and the necessity of going beyond what I have found; being drawn into metaphor and allegory. As an archaeologist, what constructions might I make? If the facts slip away so easily, how might I represent the past? These are the concerns of an archaeological poetics.

SUGGESTION

In writing of such a poetics I can only be suggestive. Formulae are inimical to it and bring the risk of falling into the old dichotomies with which I began this book, of developing theory and then finding some application for it, of factual past and the response or representation. I have called throughout for a mobility of thought and perception, moving with the artifacts as they come to light and are dispersed and transformed in what archaeology and society does with them. Perceptive to suggestion.

EXPERIMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY

A suggestive artifact, the lack of any final formulae or definitive method in archaeology and our inventive contribution to the past dare us to experiment. To put those disciplinary anxieties to one side and read possibility, not constraints, try out new ways of presenting, representing. This does not mean necessarily lapsing into an avant-garde obscurity; inventive and experimental energies drive the contemporary music scene. Experiment can excite and challenge accessibly. Audience matters. This is one constraint on experiment. To avoid a decadent elitism rooted in a care-free space to experiment, account needs to be taken of the demands of audience. And of the empirical reality of the past. This is the tension between experiment and responsibility.

INTELLECTUAL LABOUR AND PLEASURE

It's that feeling that comes sometimes in the classroom. The teachers obviously suffered in learning their material and now they're inflicting it on you. I sense something of this in much archaeological polemic since the 1960s. Here are difficult technical scientific works, serious and authoritative. There is a sort of puritanism in this, that serious means difficult, and thinking seriously is only incidentally pleasurable, if at all. This also comes into some texts which aim to involve the reader in a co-production, which make the reader think. Intellectual *labour* is good for you. Now there is certainly an ideology of clarity: this is the contention that reality and truth lend themselves to easy exposition in everyday language and the terms of common sense. No, reality is not so transparent. And

there may indeed be too many passive consumer readers who need prodding into thought. But what has happened to pleasure? It seems to have been banished from much academic archaeology to 'popular' genres which are almost by definition not intellectual or frivolous. To resist this puritan equation of intellectual virtue and hard work is not to be anti-intellectual. Nor is pleasure only repectable when in the service of acquiring knowledge. Archaeology is theatre and entertainment, and serious and committed. Might this not be accepted into the heart of archaeology, academic and popular?

Clarity can deceive with its apparent transparency; but the difficult technical work can obscure. Both clarity and the technical are options. Their success or failure depends on the skill of the archaeologist. Archaeological work may be both serious and frivolous; there can be extended technical precision and poetic ambiguity.

Ronald Syme's book *The Roman Revolution* (1939) is not an archaeological work. It is a history of the end of the Roman Republic and the origins of the Principate of Augustus, Rome's first emperor. I do not agree with Syme's historical treatment of his topic. But the book carries such an abrupt, sharp and practical clarity, with both vast biographical detail and epigrammatic encapsulations that I thoroughly enjoy it. For me its style belongs with its subject matter. I am sure that everyone can think of such pleasures. Clifford Geertz has written an alert reading of the classic anthropologists: *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author* (1988). From dense literary rainforests in Claude Lévi-Strauss to Oxford Senior Common Room certainties and transparencies in E.E.Evans-Pritchard. The importance of style; ways of writing becoming what is written.

Archaeology excels in its visual appeal and pleasures, yet the visual has hardly been considered in 'serious' archaeology. And this is in spite of archaeology's reliance on observation in survey, excavation and analysis. Pictures are either informative, or entertaining and illustrative. What of the multifarious pleasures of the image?

FRAGMENTS AND CONSTRUCTION

With the identity of the past and authenticity of the archaeological object challenged, its reality lying in its irreducible particularity, elusive and resistant to definition, the past threatens to explode into fragments. Decision and knowing seem paralysed. I have argued against totalizing definitions and classification of the past because abstractions do not heed the particular pot I have found. But I have also argued for constructions, building the pieces into pasts which mean something to us. There is a constant tension between the ruins and the constructions. On the basis of this tension the archaeological text can contain both poetic particularity and summarizing aphorism—an interplay of particular detail and the general which seems almost a defining characteristic of archaeology.

PLURALISM AND AUTHORITY

Invention and construction imply alternatives: multivocality, different archaeological voices responding to the past. Again though there is a tension between the diversity of voice and expression, and heeding the authority of critique, expertise and the material

past itself. Rather than being critical manoeuvres, pluralism can be a new conformity, institutionalized choice, mere opinions to be consumed, an evacuation of authority.

REALISM

I can say that there is an archaeological reality to be known, but that it is not simply within the material traces of the past. A realistic representation is not only or necessarily naturalistic—replicating external features. This is clear from the experience of photographs of ourselves—how often they do not ressemble us but only duplicate momentary facets. Realism is a project, not a set of formal conventions. As James Clifford puts it: 'realistic portraits, to the extent that they are "convincing" or "rich", are extended metaphors, patterns of associations that point to coherent (theoretical, esthetic, moral) additional meanings' (1988, p. 100). Realism involves allegory.

DOCUMENTARY

Robert Flaherty's documentary movie *Man of Aran* (1934) is about the crofters of the Aran Islands, three rocks in the Atlantic off the west coast of Ireland. It is a story of giant seas wearing away at the cliffs, of seaweed collected as soil for growing potatoes, of fishing for basking shark to provide oil for lamps. It is a story of a way of life. The crofter family and neighbours that the film follows are set against rocks, waves and skies, often solitary and almost lost. This points more markedly to the absence of Flaherty and his camera accompanying them. But Flaherty's absent camera, caption comments, editing and selection of shots, his narrator's role, do not detract from the documentary power. It is a story and we know of its invention and fictional component. It is personal, interested and inflected. I take great pleasure in the narrative and atmosphere. This does not spoil its realism.

Amber Films of Newcastle upon Tyne produce documentary films for Channel Four network TV in Britain. They are about aspects of the North East of England. Their style is distinctive; actors are used in a story which carries the movie's witnessing of real life and politics. *Seacoal* (1985) is the story of someone who joins a group of gypsies who make their living collecting coal from the beaches at Lynemouth, Northumberland. The story irritates me a little in its artificiality and sentimental attitude to community, but the fiction holds the representation of the life of the gypsies: ponies and traps, catching the tides which wash up the coal, struggles over rights to make a living.[35]

This mix of fact, fiction and comment, sometimes including explicit reference to the film maker, is not uncommon. It reminds me that documentary is only indirectly related to reality, of the importance of the story, of creating plots to carry meaning and understanding, that taking pleasure in the story is not necessarily a narcotic dulling me to the facts and making me forget that I am watching a movie.

EXCAVATION

A lot of people are fascinated by excavating the past, the slow painstaking process, the allure of discovery. But it appears in report form; the experience is lost and hardly evoked. It is fixed as an image of the site; in spite of the inclusion often of the sequence of excavation in reports, process is absent from the figures, the photographs, lists, comment. Yet excavation is all about process, unfolding, growth, the cultivation of ideas and prospects. It is never complete; its ending is only an arbitrary closure. It takes us on to compare with other sites, to speculate on what has been found. Might this work in progress not be captured? Journals and notebooks, as in the early (romantic) days of archaeology, but now with a new precision and scope. Stories of excavation. Excavation is deeply structured by plots, as I hoped to show in Part 2: detection, discovery, redemption, death and allure. Documentaries of digging (see Hodder 1989b).

The excavation is not a photograph, a momentary capture of an emanation from the past. In its process and duration it is more like a drawing wherein we follow the artist's line, movements and pauses.

MAPS AND GUIDES

Maps, as they are familiar to us, developed for the ordering of things in a space conceived abstractly. They can belong with the perspective of surveillance—defining domains of administration and control, setting a grid on the world, delimiting territorial boundaries, establishing property rights in land. But maps also guide us. A map does not replicate topography like a landscape photograph; it gives form and constructs. The photo has only one entry point—the perspective eye of the camera. The map opens up the terrain. We can choose where we can begin our walk. Maps imply such a performance; the camera calls only for competence. We can modify maps according to our interests, adding or subtracting features, but the land still lies within. The photo only copies. The guide marks out an itinerary for us, personal and interested, making our visit, drawing out connections, opening up the experience for us, mapping out the land or the site.

Christopher Chippendale's *Stonehenge Complete* (1983) provides a kind of cultural map of the monument. I am not in sympathy with his view of archaeology, but the book puts Stonehenge in its setting, in the accounts given of it now and in the past, in the images produced of it, in the stories constructed of it, in its imaginative evocations.

Archaeological maps and guides? Providing mediations and orientations, pointing directions.

PHOTOGRAPHS

Photographs in archaeological texts usually offer either pictorial atmosphere or act as documentary witnesses. The witness says 'I was there'; the photo says 'Look and see'. But looking is not innocent. The eye of the camera, the look with perspective is often the

gaze of surveillance, the one-way look of which I have written. It belongs with an attitude which would take the past, appropriate the past, pin it down. Mug shots of the past. Inventories. The atmosphere shot may also speak of the restrained immediacy or spectacle of tourism. The act of looking goes with the meanings it finds. Surveillance finds objects to control. How might I wish to look, if appearances belong with the activity and its purpose? I think photographs can embody ways of looking other than surveillance. In being realized as part of differing activities, photographs are better thought of as photo-works; the work of making truth (Burgin 1982).

Rather than reporting to the world what has been found, the camera might record for those involved and interested in the work of archaeology. Photo documentaries of theatres of excavation.

The photo is a fragment, an arrested moment, seeming to need the past and future we may provide. Like the artifact, it is ambiguous—then and now. The photo says 'what has been' and witnesses the absence. The photo decays and fades; the absence is ultimately that of death.

There is ambiguity as well because the fragment is taken from its story. This lack of meaning to the photograph may be remedied by cultural inscription; the photo is recognized as being of a museum piece, or a scientific record, or of the picturesque. This coding can hold our interest. But some photos also disturb. Roland Barthes writes of what he calls a *punctum* (1982). The punctum punctures, pierces the coherent surface of coded understanding. It can be anything in the photograph, perhaps a small accidental detail. It is something extra which points outside the photograph, going beyond and bringing out more reflection and meaning. I understand this as being a 'genuine' moment, a critical moment when ideas and associations are instigated. This is an oracular moment, when the signs may be read by the interpreting prophet for pointers to what lies beyond. This form of time was called *kairos* by the Greeks, heavy with significance, as opposed to time as *chronos,* empty duration (see Shanks and Tilley 1987a, p. 89). Such a photo allows us to construct stories from the elements which lure us beyond. Barthes calls this the 'kairos of desire' (1982, p. 59).

The photo of the sculpted lion of Corbridge (p. 50) and that of the Greek diggers (p. 171) have such an effect on me, albeit a modest one. The wheelbarrow (its particular look), and the expressions on their faces (no more, their presence).

DRAWING

The drawing of an archaeological artifact is often preferred to a photograph; an analytical eye can pick out the significant details, clarify the artifact in its rendition. The same holds for sections through sites where a photograph would not represent the subtlety of the stratigraphy which is much more than its appearance but is also its feel and consistency. Such archaeological drawing is usually quite strictly coded and conventional (Adkins and Adkins 1989). May we not overlook this coding and authorize drawing more widely?

Drawing is a performance of systematic choices and judgements, individual marks on a surface which join to form a translation of their subject. They relate to themselves and to the subject simultaneously. We view the drawing, follow the marks as they remake their subject. The drawing thus makes us conscious of the independence of its surface from what is depicted, and the movement of the drawer's hand in looking and depicting the subject. Surface, movement and judgement are signs of the archaeologist. They do not necessarily compromise the objectivity of the drawing, as the use of conventional archaeological drawing shows. But they are also the media whereby the archaeologist may explore the basic project that subjectivity gives form to the objective world; it is the 'how' rather than the 'what' of the things we find. Drawing is one of the basic planes of experience of the past (the artifact being what is experienced). Should we not work on this and experiment?

The photograph is an excellent means of copying. But with perspective's vanishing points focused on the eye of the viewer it lacks temporal depth; it is an instant glance which directs us to penetrate the surface to what is beyond or beneath the reality of the past, what is shown. Our look at the photograph is that of surgeon cutting through to reality; the look of the drawing conjours evocations of its reality. The loss of time, the fixing in an instant, the ambiguity of apparent past presence of the photographed object and its present absence, are photography's drawbacks; it is of death. But is not the movement of hand and eye across the surface, the mediation of every mark by consciousness, intuitive or planned, the active construction of the artifact from the past, affirmation of life? The time of its making which is contained in the drawing is not uniform, but varies with the attention, judgement and skills of the drawer; choice is exercised in which aspects to focus on. This human motivation is present in an encounter with the past and I would argue is its defining characteristic as *meeting*. The photograph too depends *externally* on the attention and selection of the photographer. Individual photographs may be pieced together into a larger whole or sequence in a semblance of a drawing though. This is what I have done in some of the pictures in this book (Berger 1982, pp. 93–4; Joyce 1988; Hockney 1984).

NARRATIVE

A drawing may be seen as a plane of narration, a sequence of perceptions, intentions, actions inscribed on a surface which we may read in whatever order we wish, and whose story is the depiction of a subject. And just as the life of the drawing is the artist's presence and skill, so too the past lives in its retelling by storyteller.

I argue that stories are a basic means of making sense of the archaeological past. Fitting the particular into meaningful plots and telling to an audience. Sense through the order of a narrative involves story (a temporal sequence) and plot (causation and reasoning behind the story). Stories and plots in archaeology have a great tendency to be allegorical and conform to some familiar types or genres. The story, an imperialist one, of conquest and takeover, invasion and acculturation, was common in traditional archaeology; prehistory used to be explained entirely in this line. Another is the epic of human success, of progress through learning from the great deeds and achievements of society, the advance of humanity through savagery and barbarism to civilization. There

are stories also of the triumph of fate, the force and constraint of nature and society directing people's lives; this is familiar in processual social archaeology. Such stories are familiar because they connect with social experiences and ideologies; they are known and understood elsewhere and in turn they enable us to understand the sense of our own experience. A recent narrative to be found in prehistoric archaeology is that of competition between wealthy individuals and conspicuous consumption of luxury goods. Again it is not an unfamiliar story. These narratives are not found ready to hand but are the results of emplotment, a creative act.

I sometimes wonder if it is curious that the same stories crop up in prehistory over and over again. Are archaeologists missing the unfamiliar? On the other hand might we not expect a common thread of what it is to be human to run through prehistory? But does this common thread have to be power, progress and political position? I think, as do others, that there is much scope for a fresh look at the character of archaeological stories and plots. Gender immediately appears as a vital point of reflection. What is the place of the masculine in power, position and the political, and what of emotional backgrounds and the less visible dimensions of society lying within the archaeological record? New social archaeologies promise a different order of archaeological narrative (see the work cited in note 9).

Narrative involves telling, narration. Its parts are arrangement—not necessarily a linear sequence of events, it may have temporal slips and changes of pace, condensation and focus on key points. Agency—the medium through which the story is told. Point of view—this gives the reader or listener a position in relation to the story (Cohan and Shires 1988). There is not much variety in archaeology's narration. The arrangement is usually linear or analytical, the agency is anonymous or impersonal powers, and the focal point of view is white, academic and western. This holds even in more popular works, though the anonymous agent may be given personal identity, perhaps a charismatic presenter. There is little experiment. But a narrator implies an audience, and for a story to live it must surely engage the interests of both story-teller and audience. Does this not imply a dialogue, listening to the audience's reactions?

In that the narratives employed in archaeology relate directly to our comprehension of our social and personal life, perhaps we might search our experiences, via the things we find, for dimensions which will deepen and add to those normally the focus of archaeology. I mention again the construction of personal and social identity, issues of family and belonging (central to conceptions of class and race), the intimate experience of the material, architectural, artifact and natural world. Such a project is a major motivation of this book.

RHETORIC

The creative construction of plots and arguments, and attention to audience are the concerns of rhetoric. Rhetoric is now in vogue again; there is even an interest in Quintillian and rhetoric of the Classical world which goes beyond the specialists.[36] Rhetoric is about effective communication, its structure and devices in general; it is about purpose, power (of speech and influence) and persuasion. This focus fits with the concern in contemporary thought with language and discourse in the world, with the relations

between people as subjects rather than those between a knowing subject and the known world. Truth is sometimes bracketed in work which considers, like Nietzsche, the structure of discourse operating under a will-to-power (rules which enable statements to be made are considered more important than their truth). So too the ancient rhetoric of the sophists was caricatured as being the art of successfully arguing a case irrespective of its truth—it was explicitly amoral.

Raising the subject of rhetoric simply involves taking seriously the form that archaeological works assume, asking questions of the story genres and narrative devices adopted, considering the forms of arguments used, thinking of how archaeologists address their audiences via their work or discourse on the past. Rhetoric includes the invention and discovery of ideas, arguments and proofs for a case; the arrangement of these into effective wholes; and the forms of expression used (how appropriate to subject matter and context; comprehensibility; adornment). To think of the variety of rhetorical strategies is, for me, to think of enlarging the encounter with the past, and to think of a vital relationship between archaeologist and audience.

COLLAGE, MONTAGE AND QUOTATION

Collage is an extension of an artist's pallet or a writer's vocabulary, prose and poetic art to include actual pieces of reality or fragments of what the artist-writer is referring to. It is direct quotation, literal repetition or citation of something taken out of its context and placed in another. Montage is the cutting and reassembling of these fragments of meanings, images, things, quotations, borrowings, to create new juxtapositions. Collage is a simple questioning of the notion of representation as finding some correspondence with an exterior reality. 'Reality' is brought into the picture; collage may be tangible representation without attempting some sort of an illusion. It represents in terms of change—the shift of borrowings from one context to another, from 'reality' to 'representation', and from representation to representation. Indeed the distinction is suspended; reality is put in quotation marks.

Collage and montage are strategies which are basic to Derrida's *différance,* non-identity and relational thinking, which I have drawn upon. The aim is to construct something new out of old, to connect what may appear dissimilar in order to achieve new insights and understanding. This emergence of new meaning depends on the perception of instability, of retaining energies of interruption and disruption—the quotation interrupts the smooth surface or text; it is distracting. The interruption of illusion and distraction by collage sets off allusions through the juxtaposed, montaged elements. So the new understanding comes through contaminated representation rather than pure reference to the depicted subject matter. The quotations are cut out of context to create new meanings.

Disruption, cutting and juxtaposition make of language an unstable set of links between words and concepts and the material world, between signifiers and signifieds. Things and words and images can always be disengaged from their meanings and inlayed into new combinations. This dissembly needs to be constant. The discovery of new insight depends on a nervous novelty which avoids the settling of montages into accepted equations and identities. A certain degree of shock and jolt are necessary; moving on

when the juxtaposition becomes too homely. In doing this collage maintains an ambiguity of presence and absence, the presence of fragments of absent items being referenced.

Collage and montage have become paradigms of twentieth-century culture and experience. Film and TV especially are media of montage in their essence. The integrating force of tradition is gone; our experience is of fragments of mass-produced modernity. But the fragmentation and dispersal is counteracted when we creatively take up ready-made items and turn them to new and constructive use. So while photography may represent the culmination of renaissance perspective centred on the individual's 'look', while photographs make an inventory of empty instants, the simple and ubiquitous photographic reproduction of items of experience enables anyone to take, select and recompose. The photograph and its reproduced, printed variants, all systems of reproduction, are primary technical instruments of collage (Benjamin 1970d; Berger *et al.* 1972). The photomontages of Dada and John Heartfield are the classic early instances of such use of photographic images (Ades 1986; Evans and Gohl 1986). 'Scratch and mix' music recordings are another variant. This practical use of ready-made bits and pieces, taking what is ready-to-hand, what is handy, to make something new is called 'bricolage' by Lévi-Strauss (1966). It is not about final schemes of ideas or explanations; meanings are discovered in use and change.

Collage is an art of quotation. I can quote works or archaeological artifacts as illustrations to prove a point; their implied presence supplies authority to what I have said. I illustrate a point I have made about a site with a photograph; it says 'see, he's right'. A quote may also exist in opposition to what I write, not identifying what I say, or authorizing, but acting as a predicate, something *extra*. Such a quote says 'look, he's wrong, there's more to it'.

The things I might quote (artifacts, statements, pictures) do not have inherent meaning ready to communicate itself, a sort of revelation when displayed. In this regard Walter Benjamin writes of quotation as like drilling rather than excavation—snatching the quotation itself rather than the explanations which overlay it with systematics and causal connections (a provocative image for the archaeologist and a reminder that the contexts of the things found are not natural but constructed). Benjamin's major project (incomplete at his suicide in 1940) was a historical work on the Arcades of nineteenth-century Paris, the *Passagen-Werk*. This was to be, in the words of Susan Buck-Morss, 'a historical lexicon of the capitalist origins of modernity, a collection of concrete, factual images of urban experience' (1989, p. 336). Commodities, shopping, fashion, architecture, mass media, street life, engineering, photography, and more were to be brought as quotation into a disconnected construction with neither a formal narrative nor an analytical structure. A collage instead, mobile arrangement and trial combination, potentially responsive to the demands of a changing present. If cultural treasures are passed down usually as the spoils of conquering forces, the *Passagen-Werk* was to be an alternative non-authoritative inheritance (of nineteenth-century Paris), instructing without dominating, like a fairy tale (Buck-Morss 1989, p. 337). Buck-Morss has written a fascinating reading of Benjamin's notes for his rescue of nineteenth-century material experience, a reading from her present, and with intriguing relevence to archaeology's project of material culture.

The art of quotation is that of relating particulars to constructions which go beyond them. Is not one of archaeology's prime concerns to relate the material particulars of the

past to more general processes? And yet also to retain the tension, not reducing the things found to the general (theory, process, classification etc.)? Archaeology's objects are fragments, already cut and torn. Archaeological writings move through juxtapositions of artifacts, bones, material features, plant remains. Quotation, collage, montage: is this not archaeology's allegory? The experience of decay and break-up, of traditional certainties, collecting scraps within which the archaeologist may trace the loss of societies and cultures, the tracks which lead to modernity?

ALLEGORY

An allegory is a story which has a supplement, extra meanings and implications which take us elsewhere. The allegorical archaeologist suspends surface meaning and searches for what is hidden beneath, seeking the hidden signified. Or they might bracket the past and explore the objects and fragments in the present, interrogating things found as strangers in the home.

CONSTELLATIONS

The stars have no necessary patterning. It was given to them, perhaps first by storytellers. The constellations do not look like their names; they are juxtaposed, brought together. Walter Benjamin and others have used the word to refer to montage of concepts—sets or configurations of concepts which represent their subject without pretending to be identical, or to be pictures of reality. Constellations are the theory of montage. Concepts laid over their subject, allowing us to see what may be there; not touching, we cannot hold on to the object past. We need to keep referring back to the stars (do they really shape their names?). We need to keep looking at the thing found in different ways—multiple simultaneous viewpoints, cubist thinking, layers, palimpsest, double exposure. No abstract and precise definitions, but sets of related ideas.

THE SUBLIME

The sublime is that mixture of terror and fascination experienced in the spectacle of stormy sea. In archaeology, for me, it is the experience of difference, the ineffable otherness of the past, and its fascinating presence to me now. For Lyotard the only valid cultural response to postmodern heterogeneity (the endless imagery and allusion resistant to understanding and judgement) is an aesthetic of the sublime. Not supplying a 'copy' of reality, but intimation and citation, witnessing what is unpresentable and unsayable (Lyotard 1986).

PARTICULARITY AND REPRESENTATION

We can never know utter particularity or otherness. It always has to be mediated. But the choice of how I represent the particular thing I have found is not a question of method, of devising categories and types within which the artifact may be set. The choice is a matter of style. I may indeed choose a 'realism' which sets the object within clear and comfortable boundaries. But also: irony and oxymoron (the unity and tension of opposites, as here between particularity and general); momentary and pointed encapsulation and summary, aphorism and icon, poetic imagery. These are just some that I have attempted in this book. And this brings me again to (post)modernism's project of revitalizing expression.[37]

TEACHING

The realization of the potential of archaeology, as I have presented it in this book, must rely in part on how it is taught in schools, colleges and universities. I am not sure how naive it is to hope for courses in 'sensuous receptivity'. I am not sure because of the educational initiatives I have witnessed at pre-university levels in British schools. The General Certificate of Secondary Education, the body of public exams to be taken by students at 16+ stage, has been based, in its early stages, on some excellent and imaginative curricula. These incorporate varied communicative and analytical skills, moving away from pure academic orientation of the traditional disciplines, but not lapsing into simple vocational training (and learning from the mistakes of progressive child-centred education). The form that archaeology takes in its teaching is an essential aspect of what I have described as an archaeological ethic; it is also a concern to archaeology's cultural politics. I say again that archaeology's audience matters. Although things are certainly different between Britain and the United States, where my limited experience indicates undergraduate courses of necessity made attractive and pertinent, archaeologists would do well to look to what the subject may become. Will more facts, statistics and esoteric theorizing be wanted, or an archaeology which contributes critically and directly to the present?

WRITING AND PUBLICATION

There might be the following types of archaeological writing (some are familiar). They are intended to account for both an ethical responsibility in reception of the past, and a critical and creative understanding of it in the present.

Archive material: relating to sites and finds investigated in the past, and to encompass basic excavation site and survey notes, inventories, and pertinent to the types of writing I list. This material may, of course, be stored and accessed electronically.

Ethnographies: transformations of archive material into documentaries and accounts of projects, investigations and discoveries. Emphasizing why and how certain projects were

undertaken, drama and the human encounter with the past. Such ethnographies are one form of account to others of archaeology's significance, of its people and motivations, personalities and politics.

Commentary: on basic archive material. Gathering, collecting together tracings and findings. Embodying detail and particularity, commentary may include relevant scientific and statistical analyses, relevant summary and codification. I emphasize relevant because commentary on the material past is preparatory to interpretation.

Interpretation: in every sense. In terms of the outlines in this book: understanding the past and appreciating it through scientific and technical analysis, drawing together particularity and general notions, achieving release of meanings for archaeology's public. Narratives, collage, magic encyclopaedias, exact fantasy, constructions of the past *for* the present. Interpretation—products of archaeology as a mode of cultural production, of archaeology as craftwork.

DEATH AND THE DOMESTIC

Of flesh, blood and bones[38]

I tell you
    all houses
are holes in an arse of stone

we eat off coffin lids

between evening star
    and milk in a bucket
is nothing

the churn is emptied
    twice a day

cast us
    steaming
    on the fields

(John Berger, 'Poem of Emigration: Village', 1984, p. 57)

Andy Goldsworthy: Royal Botanic Gardens, Edinburgh

'I'll tell you what I did yesterday! I got the sexton, who was digging Linton's grave, to remove the earth off her coffin lid, and I opened it. I thought, once, I would have stayed there, when I saw her face again—it is hers yet—he had hard work to stir me; but he said it would change, if the air blew on it, and so I struck one side of the coffin loose—and covered it up—not Linton's side, damn him! I wish he'd been soldered in lead—and I bribed the sexton to pull it away, when I'm laid there, and slide mine out too. I'll have it made so, and then, by the time Linton gets to us, he'll not know which is which!'

'You were very wicked, Mr Heathcliff!' I exclaimed; 'were you not ashamed to disturb the dead?'

'I disturbed nobody, Nelly,' he replied; 'and I gave some ease to

Tinkinswood, Glamorgan

myself. I shall be a great deal more comfortable now; and you'll have a better chance of keeping me underground, when I get there….

'And if she had been dissolved into earth, or worse, what would you have dreamt of then?' I said.

'Of dissolving with her, and being more happy still!' he answered. 'Do you suppose that I dread any change of that sort?'

(Emily Brontë, *Wuthering Heights,* 1847, ch. 29)

Not far to the west of Cardiff city, where we have our home, are two prehistoric… I hesitate to call them…tombs (the reason for my hesitation will become clear). Cromlechs (arched slabs of stone, in the Welsh); chambered long cairns. They are set in pasture, in rolling agricultural countryside. Maesyfelin or Gwal y Filiast (lair of the grey-hound bitch—a name given to other cromlechs and a reference to the Welsh epic poem, the *Mabinogion*) is near the village of Saint Lythan's. It is a conspicuous mudstone chamber of slabs at the end of a long and low mound reaching out west. In the middle of its field on a rise; the cows have sheltered inside and the earth is bare and muddy in wet weather.

Not a mile down the road is another. Tinkinswood's great yellow capstone is perhaps some forty tons; pitching gently upwards it thickens to present itself sprinkled with lichens at a forecourt of curved drystone walling. This funnel-end of the stone-block cairn I meet first walking from the road across the cropped sheep field. A surrounding fence directs an approach from the south side of the cairn, not the front, past two ancient and associated standing stones, to see a brick pillar supporting the capstone and recording the excavation of 1914. They found the human and animal remains spewed out this ruined and now open side of the chamber; inside was a jumbled mass of bones, the disarticulated broken remains of more than fifty people. Originally the forecourt, like two limbs, gathered its visitors, to crouch down beneath curved arch-stone hole to get in through a short passage.

The cromlech was perhaps two thousand years old when, in times before the Romans, someone lost a gaming die in the chamber. And pottery attests to later visitors. In the cairn is a shallow stone-lined pit. Animal bones were found with it and human nearby. Not sepulchral, but perhaps a focus for eating, and afterwards. Some recent visitors seem to have used the pit for a picnic (or something more sinister?); there is a neat pile of ashes from a camp fire there now.

Maesyfelin and Tinkinswood are familiar. Unusual perhaps in aspects of their design, but there are many similar monuments scattered across the north and Atlantic seaboard of western Europe. They were made by early farmers, about whose settlements little is known in most areas. These megaliths—cromlechs, dolmens, chambers, circles, alignments—fascinate.

Some of the chambers are intimate coffers; some, like Tinkinswood, are great constructions; many hold collections of disarticulated remains of people. Bodies may have been defleshed elsewhere, left out to decay, the member fragments gathered. Sometimes bodies were deliberately disturbed, having lain in the chambers. In the earthen long barrows of England there are signs that bones were moved between barrows and other sites; the bones may be shattered and bleached by the weather. Bones removed from tombs and perhaps circulated, replaced and ordered. These farmers were not making random collections of bones, but selecting and reordering their dead. In some tombs in Scania, Sweden they went for right or left sides of the body. In some tombs they distinguished between male and female. Sometimes, as at Ascott-under-Wychwood and at Fussell's Lodge in England, bones from more than one individual were brought together to make a semblance of an articulated skeleton again. Bones, particularly skulls and limbs, were arranged in patterns and orders. The individual broken and lost in the commingling.

The pit within the cairn at Tinkinswood (although its association with the chamber is uncertain) and fragments of pottery in the forecourt suggest other aspects to these sepulchral manipulations. At the entrance to many tombs in Sweden are found thousands of bits of smashed pottery (whose designs are distinctively different from those on pots found elsewhere). Animal bones, at many sites, may mean joints of meat. At Yorkshire barrows are traces of burnings. The court cairns of Ireland have areas in front of chamber entrances almost wholly enclosed. Courts, forecourts and facades stage a setting.


1914


Long cairn Tinkinswood

Carlshögen, Scania, Sweden

Gatherings, picnics, festivals, feasts, rituals at the great monument. Away from the farmers' homes, at the monument which reminds and advises (monument, from *monere* in Latin—literally, that which brings to mind, advises, instructs, warns, foretells). Beyond the gathering in the forecourt, through the gash in the stone, beyond the blood and the flesh of the meal, are the others. The cromlech gathers people and divides. People united in the collective merging of their dry and broken bones. Those outside divided from what is back in the chamber; those whose bones will mingle, from those who will not receive these rites (for not everyone in the community was interned). And those who enter and know the darkness divided from those who stay outside. These monuments speak of division—sometimes separate chambers and sections, sometimes divisions in the cairn or barrow (lines of upright transverse stones in the cairn at Tinkinswood). Often the focus on the entrance declares a boundary. Having to crouch, squeeze within porthole stone, move along a passage; or remove the material which blocked an entrance. At Tinkinswood a stonefaced rubble bank hides the chamber wall from the forecourt; a stone

Gillhög, Scania, Sweden: the chamber

found nearby was probably a door to the passage. Inside, knowledge of the dry remains perhaps, of what is done with them, of what they mean; of the monument and its ordering; of the monument in the land, its site and orientation (astronomical alignments).

Were these monuments houses of the dead? A connection or resemblance has long been noted between the monumental long houses of early farmers in central Europe and the long earthen mounds or barrows within which are found chambers and remains of the dead.

What is a house? A house is the everyday setting of the domestic. This may be an ethos of property and nuclear family consumer unit. The idea of home is also a sedimentation of more and other than this. It is belonging and identity. Home, as homeland, may be something to defend and die for, a device to get young men to sacrifice themselves for the interests of a ruling class, as in the Great War. Home is where most people were born, are brought up. It is where even death may be calmed and met (as opposed to violent sacrifice or taking of life). A starting point for journeys terrestrial and conceptual, home is whence I set out on a journey and to where I return.

Novalis: philosophy is a homesickness, a longing to be at home everywhere. Home is a centre from which reality may be constructed and known.

Ian Hodder (1990) tells of a new meaning to home which belongs with the change to farming. He names the set of practices, ideas and feelings associated with house and home *domus,* after the Latin.

> I suggest that the social will to sedentism and intensification which ultimately led to economic domestication was created through drama, in the sense that emotions, feelings and fears were aroused in the interplay of concepts surrounding the domus. It was drama that created the will to control the wild.
>
> (Hodder 1990, p. 41)

The domus was a permanent base, the locus of domestic production, of food preparation and cooking, mothering, caring and security. It necessarily implies its opposite, the *agrios* (from the Greek adjective, living in the fields, wild)—that which is outside the domus, the wild, alien, other. House and home, production and emotion: the change to agriculture was made possible by this structure—domus, metaphor and practice, ways of feeling, reasoning and acting. The domus is domestication—construction of what is taken to be real (social and individual) through intervention in nature. Domestic culture, cultivating the wild. Home transforms the other, making it ours, comforting, nurturing. It opposes hunting, male display and prowess, violence, war, the dispersal of settlement, resources to be found in the uplands, things which are the product of natural processes such as milk and animal products, and beer; opposing death and decay.

We still live with some of these principles and feel them. As Ian Hodder says, they cling to the very words we use. They may be thought of as 'human'; perhaps they are not that old.

The cromlech Tinkinswood speaks of its farmers constructing what was to be theirs. Its great capstone alone (more so with its megalithic supports and the cairn blocks up to a metre across) expresses co-operation and communal productivity. The community imposing itself on the landscape, domesticating. The monument punctuates the land, ordering space and place in its visibility and in the repeated journeys and returnings to it of the people. So too in the passing from outside to inside. Those farmers recognizing themselves in this experience of stones in the land, and of remains brought through the tear in the stone. The monument reminding. Sacred marker on the boundary between home and the wild, gateway and threshold, a liminal area where the community gathered to find themselves in the other. But it divides as well. The dead and knowledge of their ways are dark and beyond the everyday, a higher domain and sacred. It is the source of legitimation and authority of those who possess the knowledge.

Maesyfelin and Tinkinswood bring together fragments of lives lived long ago, still rich in their associations and allusions of stone and moisture, cooking and consumption, home and cultivation, darkness and entrances, horror and homeliness. The human body as basic metaphor of social experience.

Evocative dramas of death, decay, and the other.



Luttra, Västergotland, Sweden

Haga dolmen, Bohuslän, Sweden

APPENDIX: SYNOPSIS

PRELUDE

Some remarks on the split between the past itself and the responses we have and make to it. Posing the question: what is the character of an archaeology which makes such a separation?

PART 1 ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD

What is archaeology? What do archaeologists do?

One answer: archaeological *method* and science. An hegemony of ideas concerning what archaeologists should be doing is sketched. It is encapsulated in notions of science and the acquisition of positive knowledge, in an emphasis on *reason, the facts,* and *models*.

Problems are noted with this answer of archaeological method: the place of values in what archaeologists do, and of the problem experience in its widest sense; problems with the idea of objectivity and how it is to be described.

Addressing these problems has led to: pluralism (no one objective past); metaphysical questionings (what is the character of the archaeological past and how do archaeologists deal with it?); new social accounts of the archaeological past; and new values behind what archaeologists may be doing.

The intellectual context of these questions raised about archaeological method is discussed: the loss of confidence in the compact or correspondence between word and world; the philosophical problem of language and representation.

Some ways forward are pointed, alternative and complementary ways of doing archaeology. A tradition of 'negative' thinking. Thinking through the split between cognitive reason and emotional response via the Hegelian idea of 'sublation'. Materialism and an embodied archaeology: archaeology as concrete sensuous human practice. Understanding the past through dialogue, with reference to hermeneutics.

From archaeology to the archaeological.

Two images of complementary styles of reasoning are offered: tree-thinking (unified, hierarchical, and reproducing the identity of the past), as opposed to invasive and disruptive weeds fostering connection and evocation.

PART 2 ARCHAEOLOGICAL INTERESTS

Some images suggested when thinking of archaeology. The attractions of archaeology. Some root metaphors.

Discovery; adventure; puzzles; contact with the other; nostalgia; fantasy; an urge to conserve and save; pursuit of knowledge and truth; theatre.

Sketches of some archaeological characters.

Detective; collector; tourist; mystic; judge; assured and confident (male) academic.

It is argued that such images and analogies are important in understanding what archaeology is, and essential in realizing archaeology's pertinence and relevance to the present. Archaeology is more than an academic discipline and a pursuit of knowledge of the past. Interpretation is outlined as active apprehension. Archaeology produces knowledge *for* (living in the present) and not just knowledge *that* something happened in the past.

PART 3 THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE PAST

Part 3 is about the (archaeological) encounter with the material past. It is divided into two sections. The first considers the character of the things that archaeologists deal with. The second considers aspects of archaeological experience of this material.

What is the archaeological past?

Characteristics of the things archaeologists excavate and interpret. The qualities of valued and collected objects. The questions are posed: What is an authentic or genuine artifact? What is the relation of artifacts and objects to cultural identity? Heritage is considered.

The idea of non-identity is introduced. This captures objects as always more than their description, filled with poetic resonance and reverberation: dynamic objects of both past and present. Solid and single identity and authenticity are undermined.

Cultural identity is considered as construction and cultivation (rather than ownership and being). Objects used inventively and strategically in constructing identities.

A tension is noted between challenging the identity and authenticity of artifacts from the past, and the meanings constructed within cultural identities.

Experience and the past

The relation of knowing and being.

Archaeology's projects and interests (Habermas): explaining and analysing the past; communication and dialogue with others; self-reflection.

Archaeology's projects and experience in (post)modernity. A potential in archaeology for countering the dislocation and spectacle of consumerism.

Archaeology and the personal or subjective. Archaeology and being a person. More reflections on archaeological characters. The threat of subjective desires and interests is considered.

The poetic or inventive dimension of archaeological experience. Archaeological experience is characterized as a dialogue with the past; it therefore involves also an ethical dimension.

PART 4 WORKING ARCHAEOLOGY

The craft of archaeology

It is proposed that archaeology be thought as craft.

The mode of production of archaeological knowledge is related to the cultural experiences of modernism and postmodernism. Craft is presented as a cultural strategy appropriate to archaeology. It is to relate the technical, ethical and aesthetic in a unified practice of embodied knowledge. Archaeology as craft is argued as involving dialogue with the material past, and with client community, incorporating pleasure and learning, having interests in authority and the responsibility of the archaeologist-craftworker. Creative and poetic, as well as ethical, it is described as a sensuous receptivity to the past.

Key concepts are considered and explained: purpose, visibility, expression, responsibility, authority; archaeological interpretation as design.

An archaeological poetics

Strategies for representing the dynamic object past. Aspects of archaeology as craft. Some ideas are offered.

Working through the tensions between

- subjective and objective
- particular and general
- fragments and construction
- experiment and responsibility
- pluralism and authority.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1 John Berger's historical novel *G* (1972) is full of insight, his *And My Heart, Our Faces, Brief as Photos* (1984) concentrated and philosophical reflection on time, place and people. Produced with Jean Mohr, *Another Way of Telling* (1982) gives fertile impressions of narrative released into imagery. Susan Buck-Morss (1977, 1989), Richard Wolin (1982), Michael Jennings (1987) and Julian Roberts (1982) have written introductions to Walter Benjamin. I like Terry Eagleton's *Walter Benjamin: Or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism* (1981). These books have helped me make the most of Benjamin, particularly the collection 'Illuminations' (1970). See also Gillian Rose (1978) and Jameson (1990) for Adorno. Bataille's work resists classification surrealistically. His *Inner Experience* (1988) and writings collected in *Visions of Excess* (1985) have influenced me. See also Richman (1982).

PART 1
ARCHAEOLOGICAL METHOD

2 New archaeology was much more than a proposed scientific fundamantalism or scientism, and it had many antecedents. A significant characteristic is that it was a vigorous *polemic* against what were held to be the procedures and assumptions of traditional archaeology. In its later and developed forms New archaeology is usually known as 'processual archaeology' (the two terms are often used interchangeably). Willey and Sabloff (1980) and Trigger (1989a) provide accounts of its emergence and development with full references. The standard texts are Binford (1972), Watson, LeBlanc and Redman (1971), and Clarke (1968).

3 See for example Salmon (1982) and also Watson (1990). Colin Renfrew, a major proponent of a New archaeology in Britain, has written a concise defence of a critically rationalist archaeology (1989). For accounts of realist or objectivist philosophy as it may be in archaeology see Wylie (1989a; 1989b), and Gibbon (1989).

4 A classic programme for a systems-based archaeology is *Analytical Archaeology* by David Clarke (1968). See also Renfrew (1984). For critical discussion with examples of systems theory in Anglo-American archaeology see Shanks and Tilley (1987a, 1987b).

5 The main features of New or processual archaeology are as follows.

- An anthropological orientation towards explaining the archaeological record in terms of regularities in human behaviour.
- This has often involved specifying connections, in systems terms, between technology, subsistence and the environment.
- Processual archaeology takes its name from a concern with the workings of social groups—social process and change.
- Social change has usually been conceived as cultural evolution.

There was, and still is, a marked optimism about processual archaeology, about how much can be known of the past. The concern for an anthropological archaeology has led to an interest in studying contemporary societies (sometimes in ethnoarchaeology) and this has brought realization of the complexity of the remains that archaeologists deal with; it is not a straightforward matter to correlate archaeological finds with past social process.

6 The main arena for theoretical debate has shifted since the 1970s to Britain and Scandinavia from North America, the heartland of the methodological hegemony.

7 Ian Hodder's edited book *Archaeological Theory in Europe: The Last Three Decades* (forthcoming) provides a detailed outline of archaeological thinking in most countries of western and some of eastern Europe. The contrast with the United States is a sharp one. Many European countries have not gone through a phase of new or processual archaeology, and archaeology is conceived as history rather than as anthropology. While much archaeology is conducted with the aim of producing culture history, there has been significant Marxist critique. And much European archaeology would claim a status of science, readily adopting the scientific techniques of Anglo-American processual archaeology.

8 Hodder (1986), Shanks and Tilley (1987a, 1987b), Miller and Tilley (1984), Leone *et al.* (1987) and Preucel (ed. forthcoming) are reviews and critiques. The label 'post-processual' is not a very satisfactory one as it implies too much of a unity and polarization. Post-processual archaeology represents an opening-up of the debate over the character of archaeology, and an acceptance of theoretical as opposed to methodological diversity (this means a diversity which is more than the acceptance of competing hypotheses under a sovereignty of scientific method). A key word is context—taking account of the vital role in interpretation of the contemporary social and political context of archaeology (and of the social and historical context of an artifact in understanding it).

9 The strengths of a post-processual archaeology in producing social accounts of the past which are, or promise to be, authoritative, comprehensive and finely textured may be seen in the following work: Barrett (1987a, 1987b, 1988); Edmonds and Thomas (1987); Hodder (ed. 1982, 1987a, 1987b); Hodder (1990); Leone and Potter (eds 1988), Miller (1985a, see also 1985b); Miller and Tilley (eds 1984); Paynter and McGuire (eds forthcoming); Richards and Thomas (1984); J.Thomas (1988, 1990, forthcoming); Thorpe and Richards (1984); Tilley (1991).

10 On ideology critique in archaeology see the discussions in Shanks and Tilley (1987a, 1987b).

Trigger's work (1981, 1984) appears in an historicist mould. Leone (1986; Leone *et al*. 1987) argues for an archaeology which is critical in the sense explained, that exploration of social context can help avoid unwanted social bias. Few would hold to relativism; it arises mainly as a problem to be avoided (but see Hodder's comments 1984). Trigger's discussion and review (1989b) opts for a polarization in archaeology between objectivist and empiricist science and its relativist opposition. See also Wylie (1989a). Pluralism, relativism and pragmatism are discussed in Hodder (1986), Shanks and Tilley (1987a, 1987b) and Tilley (ed. 1990). Some of the

publications of the World Archaeological Congress, Southampton 1986, are comprehensive in their illustration of a diverse archaeology conscious of its contemporary location: Miller *et al.* (eds 1989); Gathercole and Lowenthal (eds 1990); Layton (ed. 1989a, 1989b).

11 Reviews and collections of work which may be termed post-structuralist abound. I have found useful the books by Leitch (1983) and Ryan (1982). On post-structuralism and archaeology see Bapty and Yates (eds 1990) and Tilley (ed. 1990). Post-structuralism's influence can be seen as far back as Hodder (ed. 1982).

12 For responses to the critique of processual archaeology and the sovereignty of science see *Norwegian Archaeological Review 1989,* Trigger (1989b), Earle and Preucel (1987), Binford (1989), Watson (1990).

13 I am thinking particularly of the work of the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research which has come to be known as 'Critical Theory'. Excellent introductions of readings are Connerton (ed.) *Critical Sociology* (1976) and Arato and Gebhardt (eds 1978). See also Held (1980). The work of Habermas continues to provoke, published in English by Polity Press.

14 Marcuse (1955) and Ollman (1971) have written clear accounts of a dialectical or Hegelian contribution to Marxism.

15 Warnke (1987) has produced an excellent appraisal of Gadamer. See also the work of Paul Ricoeur (especially 1981) to whom Henrietta Moore has written an introduction for archaeologists (1990). On hermeneutics and archaeology see also Shanks and Tilley (1987a, Chapter 5).

PART 2
ARCHAEOLOGICAL INTERESTS

16 I owe much of this argument on law to reading Gillian Roses's *Dialectic of Nihilism* (1984). See also Shanks and Tilley (1987a, Chapter 1).

17 On Freud and archaeological metaphor see Lowenthal (1985, pp. 252–5).

18 Consider for example the book *The Archaeology of Death* (Chapman *et al.* eds 1981) which presents a cross-section of mortuary analyses in archaeology.

19 The books of Stephen Frosh (1987, 1989) are as good a start as any for thinking about psychoanalysis.

20 On the analogy between material culture and text see Hodder (1986, 1988, 1989a) and Tilley (ed. 1990).

21 See the references in notes 8 and 9. Interpretive anthropology is particularly relevant to archaeology; see the convenient collections Clifford and Marcus (eds 1986) and Marcus and Fisher (eds 1986).

Perfume and violence

22 I have to emphasize that this interlude is not meant as a definitive analysis, but as a series of impressions in tandem with the argument of the book. This is not to say that it is not supported by empirical work; it represents some results of my current research project to be published in full later. Standard works on proto-Korinthian pottery are by Johansen (1923), Payne (1933), Amyx (1988) and Benson (1989). Illustrations can also be found in many general works on early Hellenic archaeology and art. Oswyn Murray's *Early Greece* (1980) is a good introduction to the history of the period; Anthony Snodgrass's *Archaic Greece*

(1980) covers archaeological aspects. Innovative approaches to ceramics and iconography can be found in *La Cité des Images* (1984) and by Anthony Snodgrass (1987). A fine example of a processual Classical archaeology is *Burial and Ancient Society* by Ian Morris (1987). I have drawn on anthropological and structuralist work in Classical Studies as represented, for example, in Gordon (ed. 1981). My presentation also builds on a reading of Theweleit (1987, 1989), Hegel's master-slave dialectic, and Bataille's general economy.

PART 3
THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE PAST

23 This section owes much to James Clifford's essay on collecting (in 1988).
24 James Clifford relates the encounter between ethnography and surrealism in his book *The Predicament of Culture* (1988).
25 I owe the association between Benjamin and the passage from *The Tempest* to Hannah Arendt (1970).
26 There are very many works now on the experience of modernity and post-modernity. I like Berman (1983) and Harvey (1989). See also note 31.
27 Fuchs (1986) has produced a book on Richard Long. For landscape art in general see Sonfist (ed. 1983). Compare also Andy Goldsworthy's sculpture (1990); one is pictured on p. 194.

Dunstanburgh Castle, Northumberland

28 I have used the guide to the castle by Hunter-Blair and Honeyman (1955). A recent archaeological guide to medieval castles is by Kenyon (1990). Medieval archaeology is moving away from a simple support to conventional narrative history: see Austin (1990), Austin and Thomas (1990) and Champion (1990).
29 Pam Graves (1989) and Roberta Gilchrist (1989) have produced interesting analyses of the design of medieval ecclesiastical establishments.
30 Space is of much interest to archaeology and ancient history, is well established almost as a sub-discipline in the former. Much inspiration is taken from geography as might be expected. On the social logic of space see Hillier and Hansen (1984); see also Gregory and Urry (eds 1985). For a poetics of space there is the work of Gaston Bachelard (1969).

PART 4
WORKING ARCHAEOLOGY

31 Works on (post)modernism which I have found stimulating are Appignanensi and Bennington (eds 1986), Foster (1985a) and Foster (ed. 1985b), Harvey (1989), Kroker and Cook (1988), Lunn (1985) and the journal *Theory, Culture and Society* special issues 1985 and 1988, 'The Fate of Modernity' and 'Postmodernism'.
32 That the arts and crafts movement failed (expensive craftworkers ended up producing luxury items for wealthy clientele) is not so much an indictment of its philosophy and conceptions of labour as due to the failure to take strategic account of entering a market dominated and structured by capitalist economic relations.
33 Discussions of craft which have some relevance here are by Fuller (some essays in 1985), articles in Thackera (1988) and David Pye's work (1980, 1983).

34 The things that archaeologists do may be thought as craft or practical reasoning; the artifacts that archaeologists find may be conceived similarly. This is that artifacts from the past are neither simply functional objects nor are they purely arbitrary items and determined by style and the communication of social messages. Their design includes interpretive choices on the part of their makers regarding viability, expression and purpose. It could be said that artifacts are constituted by interpretation—of the material from which they are made, of the purposes to which they will be put (material and conceptual), and of the social and personal meanings they may carry. This interpretation, which is design, is practical reasoning or knowhow. I suggest that thinking of artifacts in this way will help overcome the polarization of style and function which has so dogged archaeology (material purpose versus expressive meaning). It involves reflection on sensuous receptivity to materials and construction (the preceived physical properties of things) as well as on the structures of social meaning which influence design (see *Archaeological Review from Cambridge* 9.1, 1990).
35 Amberside Productions, an organization set up to promote documentary photography in the North East of England can be contacted via their gallery at The Side, Newcastle upon Tyne.
36 See Eagleton (1981b), Young (ed. 1981), Harari (ed. 1980) and Vickers (1988). I have already referred to the use of the concept of rhetoric in analysis of design (Buchanan 1989). It is a powerful tool in understanding advertising too; see Dyer (1982).
37 Eugene Lunn has considered modernist style in *Marxism and Modernism* (1985). Gillian Rose presents an interesting analysis of Adorno's style in her book *The Melancholy Science* (1978). Dynamic and flexible in the use of concepts and ideas, Adorno wrote brittle and pointed essays, interventions and critiques, dialectically advancing by extreme statement, exaggeration and irony, refusing a totalizing form or definitions (which would fix a shifting and slippery reality). His style was designed to be itself a theory of society, a style fitting its content, while refusing to accept the terms of that which it was criticizing, bourgeois philosophy or contemporary capitalist culture.

Death and the domestic

38 I worked on the ritual of early farmers' burial in the Wessex region of England some years ago and published the results with Chris Tilley's work on southern Sweden (Shanks and Tilley 1982). We surveyed most of Sweden's neolithic tombs in the summer of 1988. See also the essay on the pottery outside the tomb Fjälkinge No. 9 (in Shanks and Tilley 1987a). I have used Ian Hodder's account of neolithic burial in his book *The Domestication of Europe* (1990). Julian Thomas's work has been stimulating and informative (1988, 1990, forthcoming). The excavation of Tinkinswood was reported by the excavator Ward in 1915 and 1916.

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