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WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH ET AL. (EDS.)

THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS
SOURCES FOR HIS LIFE, WRITINGS
THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE



THEOPHRASTUS OF ERESUS

SOURCES FOR HIS LIFE, WRITINGS
THOUGHT AND INFLUENCE

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY

WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH, PAMELA M. HUBY
ROBERT W. SHARPLES (GREEK AND LATIN)
AND DIMITRI GUTAS (ARABIC)

TOGETHER WITH

ANDREW D. BARKER, JOHN J. KEANEY, DAVID C. MIRHADY
DAVID SEDLEY AND MICHAEL G. SOLLENBERGER

PART ONE

Life, Writings, Various Reports, Logic, Physics
Metaphysics, Theology, Mathematics



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CONTENTS

PREFACE	vii
INTRODUCTION	
Background	1
Methodology	4
Arabic Texts	11
Commentaries	13
ABBREVIATIONS	15
TEXTS	
Life	
Biographies 1-4	20
Name and Manner of Speaking 5-7	52
Student and Successor of Aristotle 8-11	58
Teacher and Students 12-18	62
Private Affairs 19-23	70
Leisure and Political Affairs 24-33	76
Last Words 34	84
Testamentary Matters 35-36	86
Sayings	88
Writings	
Preservation and Publication 37-41	90
Kinds and Characteristics 42-55	94
Various Reports	
Favorable and Unfavorable Judgments 56-65	104
Named in Various Lists 66	110
Named Only as an Example 67	112
Logic	
Titles of Books 68	114
Logical Writings 69-76	122
Logic is Not a Part of Philosophy 77	134
Statement 78-89	136
Categorical Syllogism 90-97	154
Modal Logic 98-109	172

Prosleptic Syllogism	110	230
Hypothetical Syllogism	111-113	236
Demonstration	114-117	254
Definition	118-121	256
Topics	122-136	260
Physics		
Titles of Books	137	276
Writings on Physics	138-141	290
Principles of Natural Science	142-145	296
Place	146-149	302
Time	150-151	304
Motion and Change	152-157	308
Heavenly Region	158-168	318
Sublunary Region: Elements and Principles	169-183	334
The Eternity of the Universe	184-185	342
Meteorology	186-194	356
Earthquakes and Volcanoes	195-196	364
Metals	197-205	366
Stones	206-209	372
Waters	210-221	376
Salt and Soda	222-223	398
Doxography on Nature	224-245	402
Metaphysics		
Titles of Books	246	436
Writings on Metaphysics	247-249	438
Inseparables	250	440
Theology		
Titles of Books	251	442
God and the Divine	252-263	442
Mathematics		
Titles of Books	264	456
Appendix		
Nos. 1-4		460

PREFACE

The task of collecting, editing and translating the texts included in these volumes has taken over ten years. Four of us have performed the role of editor, while many others have made substantial contributions. A brief history of these efforts—the work accomplished by Project Theophrastus—is given in the Introduction. Here we want to thank the contributors, both those officially associated with Project Theophrastus and those outside the Project who generously offered their knowledge and advice. Among the latter belong Klaus Alpers, Han Baltussen, Henry Blumenthal, Charles Burnett, Scott Carson, the late Harold Cherniss, Cecil Clough, Walter Cockle, Rainer Degen, Mervin Dilts, Carlotta Dionisotti, Tiziano Dorandi, Thomas Figueira, Lenn Goodman, George Goold, Woldemar Görler, Hans Gottschalk, Alan Griffiths, Barrie Hall, Eric Handley, Peter Hansen, Doreen Innes, Robert Kaster, Ian Kidd, the late William Kneale, Martha Kneale, P. Sjoerd van Koningsveld, John Lindon, Antony Lloyd, Geoffrey Lloyd, David Marsh, David Minter, Moshe Negbi, Dirk Obbink, Jan van Ophuijsen, Peter Parsons, Marlein van Raalte, Michael Reeve, Robert Renehan, the late Charles Schmitt, Eckart Schütrumpf, Danuta Shanzer, Yegane Shayegan, Richard Sorabji, Peter Steinmetz, Steve Strange, Josip Talanga, Richard Taylor, Robert Temple, Malcolm Willcock, Jacob Wisse, and Fritz Zimmermann. We also wish to recognize the help provided by Suzanne Zatkowsky, formerly secretary of the Classics Department at Rutgers University, and by Frances Mills, secretary in the Department of Greek and Latin, University College London. Lisa Jacobs Carson put the Arabic texts on diskettes and helped with proof-reading. Diane Smith produced the camera-ready copy which has been used in the printing of these volumes. She began with considerable expertise, mastered difficulties that arose along the way and now deserves our warmest thanks.

A project such as ours becomes much easier when some organization provides financial support. In our case this support has been given by several groups but most especially by the National Endowment for the Humanities, Washington D.C. We are grateful to the officers of the Endowment for their encouragement and helpful advice, above all for their confidence over a period of ten years.

Other contributors in America were the Cape Branch Foundation, the Day Family Foundation, the J.C. Kellogg Foundation, the Rutgers Univer-

sity Research Council and the Associate Alumnae of Douglass College; in Britain, the British Academy and the Leverhulme Foundation; in Germany, the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung; in Holland, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study. Their gifts were needed and often of especial value because timely. Our thanks are offered with sincerity.

Our work benefited significantly from biennial conferences which brought together not only the members of Project Theophrastus but also interested scholars representing many different countries. Our hosts on these occasions were Rutgers University (1979, 1981), the University of Liverpool (1983), the Institute of Classical Studies and University College London (1985), the University of the Saarland (1987) and the town of Eresus on Lesbos, Greece (1989). The four named universities provided excellent facilities and in various other ways made us feel most welcome. The town of Eresus did the same. It provided an attractive meeting hall next to the Theophrasteion (the local school), decorated the hall with a portrait of Theophrastus and on the first night of the conference held a festival which featured the unveiling of a marble bust of Theophrastus, the town's most famous son.

We are, then, indebted to a great many individuals and organizations. We thank all those named above and conclude by mentioning our spouses: Connie, Ron, Grace and Ioanna. Their role took many forms, but it was always supportive. We thank them most sincerely here.

WWF, PMH, RWS & DG

Dedicated to
GEORGE KERFERD

sine quo non

INTRODUCTION

Background

Theophrastus was born at Eresus on the southwestern coast of Lesbos in 372/1 or 371/0 B.C., i.e., some fifteen years after the foundation of Plato's Academy. He is said to have studied first in his native city under Alcippus and then in Athens under Plato. If this report is correct, Theophrastus will have enjoyed an exceptional educational experience. As a young man, say, eighteen years of age, he will have interacted not only with Plato but also with other members of the Academy including Speusippus, Xenocrates and above all Aristotle. But whatever the truth concerning his study in Plato's Academy, Theophrastus seems to have formed an early association with Aristotle. After Plato's death (348/7 B.C.), the two were probably together at Assos in the Troad, and we may suppose that Theophrastus influenced Aristotle's move to Mytilene on the island of Lesbos (345/4 B.C.). When Aristotle was called to be tutor of Alexander, Theophrastus will have accompanied him to the court of Philip, king of Macedonia (343/2 B.C.). Eight years later, the two returned to Athens, where Aristotle founded the Peripatos (335 B.C.) and for the next thirteen years directed the activities of this school. Upon the death of Alexander (323 B.C.), anti-Macedonian feeling forced Aristotle to leave Athens for Chalcis, where he died within a year. Theophrastus remained behind, took over leadership of the Peripatos and brought it to a high point of activity and success. He acquired property for the school and is said to have had two thousand students—a round number, but one which testifies to Theophrastus' appeal as teacher-scholar. For some thirty-six years Theophrastus remained head of the Peripatetic School, and when he died (288/7 or 287/6 B.C.), the Athenians are said to have shown their respect by accompanying his bier on foot.

Theophrastus' academic interests were as varied as those of Aristotle. He is today best known for his *Characters* and his ground-breaking work in botany. However, his studies in logic, metaphysics, ethics and politics, rhetoric and poetics were significant and, in many cases, represented advances far beyond their Aristotelian antecedents. His contribu-

tions to modal logic have begun to attract scholarly attention and to generate a respectable body of secondary literature. The same is true of his thoughts on animal psychology—thoughts so modern that one is tempted to compare Theophrastus with Konrad Lorenz. Also worthy of special mention is Theophrastus' study of human personality and in particular the difference between superficial traits and deeper-lying motives, for this work had (and still has) consequences not only for psychology and ethics but also for the comic stage. Put boldly, one cannot properly understand New Comedy (the plays of Menander) and the subsequent development of this genre without an appreciation of Theophrastus' work.

Diogenes Laertius attributes some 225 works of varying length to Theophrastus. (The longest is a work on comparative law in 24 books.) Diogenes' list contains some duplication, but it is a fairly accurate indication of Theophrastus' extraordinary productivity and therefore a measure of how much has been lost. We do have two large treatises on botany, smaller pieces on natural science, sense perception and metaphysics as well as the widely-known *Characters*. But, for the most part, Theophrastus survives only in quotations and reports scattered throughout writers of later Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Some of these texts are short and of slight value, others are of great interest and considerable length. This material has now been brought together in two volumes—our edition. This is a sizeable corpus and one which should be of interest not only to students of the Peripatos but also to those working on Stoic and Epicurean philosophy. For it was during Theophrastus' headship of the Peripatos that Zeno founded the Stoa and Epicurus the Garden. Theophrastean influence has long been recognized, but perhaps now the extent and details of this influence can be better understood.

During the nineteenth century, two collections of Theophrastean texts were produced in Germany: Schneider's edition of 1818-21¹ and Wimmer's of 1854-62,² republished four years later with a Latin translation.³ Wimmer's edition is still the best general collection available to scholars and a photographic reproduction published in 1964 has made it quite accessible.⁴ Nevertheless, the edition is sadly incomplete. Excluding texts that have their own manuscript tradition (i.e., texts whose survival does not depend upon quotations and reports in later writers, nos. 1-9, 12,

¹ J.G. Schneider, *Theophrasti Eresii quae supersunt opera et excerpta librorum*. Leipzig: Vogel vols. i-iv 1818, vol. v 1821.

² F. Wimmer, *Theophrasti Eresii opera quae supersunt omnia*, Leipzig: Teubner vol. 1-2 1854, vol. 3 1862.

³ Paris: Didot 1866.

⁴ Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva 1964.

171), Wimmer's collection contains a mere 179 texts, and of these only two are drawn from Latin authors and none from Arabic sources. The collection can also be misleading. This is immediately clear when one considers, say, the ethical texts. While Wimmer has almost all the texts which deal with *eros* and drunkenness, he has less than a fifth of those concerned with education, virtue and happiness. Such a one-sided collection cannot help but promote a false picture of Theophrastus' ethical interests, and the same is true of other important areas such as logic, physics and politics.

The importance of producing a more representative, indeed a complete collection was quickly realized. Already in the nineteenth century Gustav Heylbut made a first step by collecting ethical and political texts, but the material seems to have been lost. In the twentieth century, Otto Regenbogen and Franz Dirlmeier addressed the problem, as did Olof Gigon. None of them reached the stage where publication of the amassed material could be envisaged. Several partial editions have, however, appeared. In the area of psychology, there is Edmond Barbotin's collection of texts dealing with the intellect.⁵ In logic, there are two collections: that of Andreas Graeser⁶ and that of Luciana Repici.⁷ In the areas of ethics, religion and politics, there are also new editions: William Fortenbaugh's collection of sources for recovering the ethical thought of Theophrastus,⁸ Walter Pötscher's edition of fragments from the work *On Piety*⁹ and Andrew Szegedy-Maszak's collection of texts relating to the *Laws*.¹⁰ Each of these editions has its merits, but neither taken singly nor in combination can partial editions take the place of a full edition. For this reason Project Theophrastus was founded in the spring of 1979.

The opportune moment—the *καίρος*, as Theophrastus might have said—was provided by a conference on the School of Aristotle held at Rutgers University. Persons interested in a cooperative effort came together, discussion ran over three days and much correspondence and many phone calls followed. Ultimately a team was put together for the expressed purpose of collecting, editing, translating and writing commentaries on all the ancient and medieval sources which quote, report or otherwise refer to Theophrastus by name. The working members of this initial team were William Fortenbaugh (esp. ethics, religion, rhetoric and poetics),

⁵ *La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste*, Louvain: Publications Universitaires 1954.

⁶ *Die logischen Fragmente des Theophrast*, Berlin: De Gruyter 1973.

⁷ *La logica di Teofrasto*, Bologna: Il Mulino 1977.

⁸ *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts*, Amsterdam: Grüner 1984.

⁹ *Theophrastos ΗΕΠΙ ΕΥΣΕΒΕΙΑΣ*, Leiden, Brill 1964.

¹⁰ *The Nomoi of Theophrastus*, New York: Arno 1981.

Pamela Huby (logic, psychology and metaphysics) and John Keaney (politics and generally textual problems). Three advisers were also picked: Michael Frede, Herwig Görgemanns and George Kerferd. A proposal for funding was submitted to the National Endowment for the Humanities in Washington D.C., and the subsequent success of this proposal as well as several follow-up proposals for further funding ensured that the project would not fail through lack of resources.

Over the twelve years between the founding of Project Theophrastus and the completion of these text-translation volumes, changes inevitably occurred. Anthony Long replaced Michael Frede as Adviser to the Project, and Robert Sharples (physics and biology) became a working member of the team. So did Andrew Barker (music) and David Sedley (papyrology). Dimitri Gutas became our specialist on Arabic texts, and Michael Sollenberger and David Mirhady, who both served initially as research assistants, acquired areas of special concern (Theophrastus' life and politics, respectively).

The contributions of the several working members, their edited texts and translations, were reviewed by Fortenbaugh, Huby and Sharples and then collected at Rutgers University, where the Project acquired a headquarters within the Alexander Library. The task of organizing the contributions and making final corrections began in January 1988 and proceeded in two stages over three years. During the first stage, much of the work was done at Rutgers. Josip Talanga, a visiting Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, participated on a regular basis; Mirhady, Sollenberger and Scott Carson, who taught at Rutgers during the academic year 1988-1989, joined in at different times. All suggestions for changes in the texts and translations were passed on by Fortenbaugh to Huby and Sharples in England and to Gutas, who was first in Greece and later at Yale. They responded with their own suggestions. During the second stage, 1990-1991, Fortenbaugh was a fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, so that correspondence circulated between Holland, England and the United States. Han Baltussen in Utrecht and Jan van Ophuijsen and Marlein van Raalte in Leiden contributed significantly by reading and commenting on numerous sections. After a normal amount of pushing and pulling, agreement was achieved and our collection acquired the form in which it appears within these volumes.

Methodology

The task of editing an author whose work survives only or primarily in secondary reports involves special problems which may be resolved in more than one way. The matter has been discussed in some detail by

several recent editors: e.g., by Ludwig Edelstein and Ian Kidd in their edition of the fragments of Posidonius,¹¹ by Jan Kindstrand in his edition of Bion of Borysthenes¹² and by William Fortenbaugh in his collection of Theophrastean ethical texts.¹³ Also of interest are articles by Hans Gottschalk¹⁴ and David Runia.¹⁵ Our decision here has been to produce a source book and not a collection of fragments narrowly construed. In what follows we shall explain the decision, all the while aiming at brevity and focusing on those matters which seem especially relevant to our collection of Theophrastean texts.

First, we are excluding those *opuscula* that are transmitted directly from antiquity by continuous manuscript tradition. Our concern is primarily with quotations, reports and references found only in ancient and medieval authors. In other words, we are interested in adding to Wimmer's texts nos. 10-11, 13-170 and 172-190. Drawing a neat distinction between medieval and Renaissance authors is, of course, notoriously difficult. Our general policy has been to exclude authors whose *floruit* belongs to the middle of the fifteenth century or later. This means that writers like Georgius Trapezuntius (1396-1486), Johannes Bessarion (1403-1472) and Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) have not been included. On the whole, their sources are quite clear, and they do not add any further information. The exceptional case is the rare author of this period who does contribute new information or who *appears* to do so. Examples are Dionysius Cartusianus (1402-1471) and Pico della Mirandola (1436-1494). The reader should also be aware that the value of many medieval texts as evidence for the actual thought of Theophrastus is questionable; there is a continuous gradation from the relatively reliable to the notoriously unreliable (e.g., the *Lumen animae* or *Light of the Soul*). Because of inherent difficulties in drawing a sharp distinction between reliable and unreliable sources, we have chosen to be inclusive rather than exclusive. In this, we have been influenced in part by the belief that, while our main concern is to present the evidence for the reconstruction of the thought of the historical Theophrastus, our

¹¹ *Posidonius I. The Fragments*, ed. L. Edelstein and I. Kidd, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 1989², p.xvii-xxv.

¹² *Bion of Borysthenes*, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, Studia Graeca Upsalensia, Uppsala 1976, p.188-96.

¹³ *Op. cit. (supra, n.8)* p.1-5.

¹⁴ "Prolegomena to an edition of Theophrastus' fragments," in *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung: Paul Moraux gewidmet*, ed. J. Wiesner vol.1, Berlin: De Gruyter 1985 p.543-56.

¹⁵ "Aristotle and Theophrastus Conjoined in the Writings of Cicero," *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*, vol.4, New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1989, p.23-38.

collection will also be found useful by those who are concerned to trace the significance of Theophrastus and the way he was understood in different ages and in different intellectual milieux. A fuller discussion of the sources will be found in the first volume of commentary.

A fundamental decision has been to concentrate on texts in which Theophrastus is explicitly named. Our reason for making this decision is the belief that the study of any author surviving only or primarily in fragmentary form should begin from texts that explicitly refer to the author in question. This is not to say that the simple occurrence of an author's name constitutes an infallible guide to correct attribution. Mistakes and even deliberate falsification are all-too-common phenomena. Furthermore, a named text may be attributed to several other authors or perhaps contradicted by a second text considered central to the author under study. But recognizing these problems, it has seemed to us best to offer a collection of named texts, for it is precisely these texts which are fundamental both to a careful consideration of problematic material and to questions of influence upon, or reflections in, later authors.

We have, however, recognized certain exceptions, which fall into two main groups. First, there are *codices* and *papyri* containing anonymous material which scholars have attributed to Theophrastus with some degree of plausibility. Here we may be dealing with fragments of a lost treatise and therefore with material of especial importance to anyone interested in reconstructing the thought of Theophrastus. For this reason and because most of the texts in question are not readily available (especially in translation), we have decided to print the texts, nine in all, as appendices to our collection. Those dealing with logic and physics (nos. 1-4) will be found at the end of the first volume, and those concerned with politics, rhetoric and poetics (nos. 5-9) will be found at the end of the second volume. In each case, a reference to the appendix has been placed in the appropriate place within the collection of texts proper. In this way, we hope to call attention to these documents without giving the impression that the attribution to Theophrastus is certain or, in some cases, even highly probable.

The other main group is composed of secondary reports. In some cases, a work is cited which is elsewhere attributed to Theophrastus. The fact that different authors occasionally wrote works that carried the same title is, of course, grounds for caution, and we have printed only a few texts of this kind within our collection. A different case is a pair of texts which Hermann Diels identified as coming from Theophrastus' *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers*. They belong to a sequence of texts that appear to have a single source, and for that reason we have included them. Finally there are other texts which are closely related in content to named texts and

which occasionally provide information helpful for interpreting these texts. In dealing with such material, we have observed considerable restraint; only the most important cases have been printed, and of these the majority appear together with named texts as part of an 'A', 'B' ('C' etc.) series.

An 'A', 'B' series is composed of parallel texts which differ in ways that are important for our understanding of what is being said and so ultimately for developing a clear picture of Theophrastus and his influence on the subsequent tradition. Since most parallel texts are not important in this way, they will not be printed in an 'A', 'B' series but will be mentioned only in the upper *apparatus*. And when it is clear whether or not a parallel text includes a reference to Theophrastus and therefore qualifies as a named text, the *apparatus* need say nothing. But when it is unclear (typically, when the portion of printed text referred to mentions Theophrastus, but the parallel text does not), then the *apparatus* will clarify the matter.

A further problem concerns the order of this collection. We have considered several possible arrangements and opted for one by theme, because we see this order as best suited to our material. A section on Theophrastus' life has been placed first, after which come texts that deal generally with his writings and offer various reports and judgments. The bulk of our collection then follows—fifteen sections each of which focuses on a different aspect of Theophrastus' thought: i.e., logic, physics, metaphysics and theology, etc. Such an arrangement has the virtue of highlighting important topics and bringing together closely related texts. It cannot, however, exhibit all possible relationships and has difficulty with texts which can be located in more than one section. To deal with such cases, we have occasionally introduced cross-references, but we have limited ourselves to the clearest and most important cases. For the rest, we think the matter best handled in the commentaries which will accompany this edition.

We have decided against a division into "genuine" fragments (i.e., Theophrastus' own words) and *testimonia* (i.e., texts which report views of Theophrastus without quoting him). Such a division is attractive when a large number of excerpts (quotations) are preserved, but with Theophrastus that is not the case. Moreover, even when one has a large number of genuine fragments, two negative features weigh heavily. First, there are inevitably texts which cannot easily be assigned to one category or the other, and second the division all too often separates closely related texts, so that the reader is frequently jumping back and forth between fragments and *testimonia*.

Another division which we have rejected is that according to known works. This division is attractive when a large percentage of the collected texts makes specific reference to some work by the author in question, but

in our collection the number of such texts is not high. Those brought together under the heading "Logic" may constitute an exception, but on the whole a division by known works would force us either to assign numerous texts to works, often without good reason, or to create a large category of unassigned texts which would result in separating many closely related texts. We have, therefore, rejected a division by works, but in order to make clear which texts do name a specific work we have decided to print at the front of each topical section (i.e., Logic, Physics, etc.) a list of relevant titles with references to the texts which mention these titles. This means that the interested reader can quickly determine how often and where a particular Theophrastean work is explicitly referred to.

Since our sources also refer to the surviving works of Theophrastus—the botanical works, the *opuscula* and the *Characters*—we have included the titles of these works in the appropriate lists, even though the works themselves are not printed in these volumes. And since source authors sometimes differ in the titles they use to refer to a specific Theophrastean work, we have introduced a system of numbers and letters. Different titles brought under the same number and marked off by letters are thought to refer to a single work. In addition to the original, such titles may be simple translations into another language, variations on the original and titles referring to some portion of the work in question. Titles under different numbers normally refer to different works, but where there is a substantial difficulty in grouping titles (i.e., in assigning a title to one numbered group as against another numbered group), we have preferred to assign separate numbers rather than force a decision between different possibilities. Titles found in Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Theophrastus* are normally given pride of place, but in cases where Diogenes has no corresponding title or where the correct title seems to be preserved elsewhere, another title, that which we consider most likely to be correct, occupies the first position.

A different problem is the printing of context material. Recognizing that there are many cases where the intelligibility of a text depends upon or is greatly increased by its context, we have decided to include some context material.¹⁶ This is not to overlook the fact that excessive use of context material can create a false impression: namely, that the surviving quotations and reports are larger than in fact they are. But acknowledging this danger, we nevertheless think that the utility of context material far out-

¹⁶ For the sake of continuity in presenting a context whose structure needs to be considered as a whole, we have on occasion included remarks which are unlikely to come from Theophrastus, as when Simplicius in his account of the natural principles refers in passing to the Stoics.

weighs the dangers of excessive use. In this regard, we once considered printing all context material in small type, but in time we decided against the idea. Quite apart from technical printing problems, it is often very difficult to decide where a change in type should occur. Indeed, it is misleading to impose a sharp difference in type on a text in which fragment and context are not clearly distinguishable from each other.

Where there are already editions of a source text, we have generally considered those available and selected that one which we believe best. The edition is identified in the heading to each text, and the *sigla* of that edition are used in the lower *apparatus criticus*. We have simplified this *apparatus* by omitting material of little interest in a collection of texts like ours. For example, we have omitted obvious misspellings found only in one or two manuscripts or a simple inversion in word order which has no effect upon the sense of the text. Nevertheless, we are not offering a bare-bones *apparatus*. In addition to referring to parallel texts in the upper *apparatus* and occasionally including in the lower *apparatus* a reading found only in some parallel text, we have from time to time included conjectures which postdate the selected edition.

There are, however, cases where we have had recourse to photographs of the manuscripts themselves. The most striking example is the text of Diogenes Laertius' *Life of Theophrastus*. Here eighteen different manuscripts were read either in full or in part before the text was considered well-established. A different case is the commentary of John the Deacon on Hermogenes' *De methodo*. No complete edition of this work exists, and a reading of the relevant manuscript led to the discovery of a new Theophrastean text. The manuscripts of gnomologies have also received some attention, and that occasionally resulted in both improved readings and references of greater accuracy than those previously available in the scholarly literature.

In the case of papyri, we have most often used printed editions as our source text, but in the case of papyri from Herculaneum David Sedley has checked editions against the papyri and enabled us to improve some readings printed in the standard editions. In regard to format, we have not always followed these editions. Given a well-preserved text, we have preferred to abandon columns and to use vertical bars in order to indicate divisions between lines on the papyrus. With less well-preserved texts, we have maintained the columnar format, believing this most helpful for anyone who wishes to consider textual problems.

We have tried to offer an *apparatus* that is both readable and economical. This has not always been easy, for on occasion readability seems to require a fuller statement than economy might demand. Moreover, the

users of our collection will not all be equally familiar with the abbreviations and formulae preferred by trained philologists. Accordingly we have done some compromising. Where space permits, we have minimized the use of shortened forms and telegraphic style, but where space is a consideration (typically, an *apparatus* of unusual length), we have not hesitated to increase our use of abbreviations. In general, we have followed standard practice: i.e., used the shortened forms of Latin words recommended by Bidez and Drachmann (Delatte and Severyns), the forms of Greek titles listed by Liddell and Scott in their *Greek-English Lexicon* and the forms of Latin titles given in the new *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. But sometimes these guides are of no help (e.g., Liddell and Scott ignore the titles of individual works in Plutarch's *Moralia*), and on other occasions we have preferred a slightly longer form in order to facilitate recognition (e.g., Aristotle's *Anal. pr.*, not *APr*). In regard to standard collections and scholarly journals, we have most often adopted the abbreviations listed in the works just cited and/or in *L'année philologique*; but since these forms are less well-known and since we occasionally adopt abbreviations of our own, we offer a list with explanations immediately after this Introduction.

Two further decisions in regard to the *apparatus* should be mentioned. First, in order to simplify the production of these volumes, we have decided to put the *apparatus* at the end of most texts and not to divide it if a text runs on to a second page. The exceptions are comparatively long texts, where an *apparatus* placed at the end would be difficult to use. In these cases we have split the *apparatus* according to the lines found on any given page. Second, we have sometimes run the *apparatus* on to the right hand (translation) page. The reason for doing this is economy. We want both to print the translation opposite the ancient text and to avoid large blank areas on the right hand page opposite the *apparatus*. To accomplish the latter goal we have not hesitated to cross pages with the *apparatus*. This should cause no confusion, but as a safeguard we have placed an arrow (→) at the end of the *apparatus* on the left hand page. It points right and tells the user that the *apparatus* continues on the facing page.

Finally mention should be made of the concordances and indices that accompany our collection of Theophrastean texts. At the end of Volume II, we have provided eight different concordances relating our texts to those collected by Wimmer and to the several partial editions that have appeared in recent years. In addition, there is a list of all texts printed in our collection together with all named texts not printed but mentioned either in lists or in the *apparatus* to a printed text. For lists of proper names and important words the user of our collection is referred to the commentary volumes. Each volume will have its own partial lists relating to the

particular topics covered by the volume, and the last of the commentary volumes will contain complete lists that can serve as indices both to the text-translation volumes and to the commentaries. We are aware that these lists of proper names and important words are indices to our collection of sources and not, strictly speaking, indices to Theophrastus. We believe, however, that the lists will be of use to persons working with our collection, and therefore we have included them.

Arabic Texts

The establishment of the Arabic texts included in this collection has presented special problems. While the works of most Greek and Latin authors are available in critical editions that can be drawn upon with confidence, the state of affairs with classical Arabic texts is very different. First, the editions of Arabic texts all too often lack even a rudimentary *apparatus criticus*, and when one is provided, more often than not it is inaccurate and incomplete. To complicate matters, some texts are now available in two, three, or even more editions which do not refer to each other, which occasionally neglect to identify their manuscript sources, and which give sometimes widely divergent readings both in the text and, when they have it, in the *apparatus*. The result is that the reader is unable to judge which manuscript a particular reading belongs to, or even whether the reading accepted in the text may not actually be a tacit and arbitrary emendation of the editor, a practice not uncommon among those who bring out Arabic texts.

Second, numerous classical Arabic texts have not yet been published at all and still await, in manuscript, their editors. This state of affairs has generated difficulties not only in regard to procuring microfilms of the relevant manuscripts (assuming they were correctly identified in the first place as containing Theophrastean material), but also in spotting, in an unindexed manuscript, the relevant passages. The latter difficulty is also present even in some of the editions that have no indices. This fact alone makes the Arabic evidence collected in these volumes not nearly as exhaustive as that of the Greek and Latin authors.

Third, there are the particular problems that inhere in the edition of Greek texts preserved in Arabic translation. These problems have been met, to the extent possible, along the lines discussed by Dimitri Gutas in his article "The Life, Works, and Sayings of Theophrastus in the Arabic Tradition".¹⁷ This article is recommended both for an overview of the prin-

¹⁷ *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*, vol.2, New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1985, p.63-102.

ciples that have guided the editing of our Arabic texts and for an evaluation of the use which may be made of their evidence.

Under these circumstances, and in order to present Arabic texts that would not be inordinately inferior in authoritativeness to those in Greek and Latin, it has been necessary to do much re-editing. Use has been made of readily obtainable manuscripts of the available edition or editions, of the secondary transmission of the text (if any) and of the medieval Latin translation (if any). What was attempted, in other words, was not a full-blown *editio maior* of the texts concerned—something unfeasible in the time available and undesirable in the scope envisaged—but rather as close an approximation to such an edition as balancing the disposable time against the expected benefits would allow.

The conventions followed in editing the Arabic texts are for the most part immediately intelligible. They are either the same as those followed in the case of Greek and Latin texts or simple variations (adaptations). Here only a few peculiarities need be mentioned.

In the headings of the Arabic texts, the author or compiler of the source text and its title (i.e., that of the book) as well as specific chapter or section titles and numbers are normally given in transliteration. However, when the chapter or section title consists only of the name of the philosopher treated, then the heading contains, after the title of the book, the name of the philosopher in its Latin form introduced by the words *cap(ut) de* ("chapter on"); and when the text presented is a stray saying attributed to Theophrastus in some Arabic work, then the heading contains, after the title of that work, the words *dictum Theophrasti* ("saying of Theophrastus"). In the case of the gnomology *Šiwān al-ḥikma* (*Depository of Wisdom Literature*), references that follow on the chapter title are to the order of the sayings according to the reconstruction of Gutas.¹⁸

Concerning the transliteration of Arabic names, our procedure is bipartite. In the headings to Arabic texts, we have followed standard practice among Arabists, but in the headings to translations we have connected with a hyphen all the discrete words that form an indivisible unit of nomenclature: e.g., Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a (text) and Ibn-Abī-Uṣaybi'a (translation). In addition, the article *al-* introducing single-word proper names is retained in the transliterations introducing Arabic texts but removed elsewhere.

In accordance with convention, parallel texts are listed in an upper *apparatus*. We have also found it useful on occasion to introduce an "upper upper" *apparatus* of *fontes*. This contains references to all the sources that

¹⁸ *Op. cit.* (*supra*, n.17) p.83-96.

were used to establish the text of the fragment. These sources and the *ratio edendi* followed in the establishment of texts will be discussed in the chapter on sources in the first volume of commentary.

In order to reflect the state of affairs already described, the following specific conventions, apart from those commonly employed, have been used in the lower *apparatus criticus*. The name of an editor is given *by itself* after a reading only when it is explicit in the edition that the reading in question is the conjecture of the editor against the evidence of the manuscript(s). When this is not explicit in the edition, i.e., when it is not clear whether a variant reading represents the evidence of one or more manuscripts, or all of them, or is the editor's tacit emendation, then after the recording of the variant reading the words *ed. cuiusquam* are written to indicate that this is the reading of the printed text. Finally, the initials *s[ine] p[unctis]* refer to the lack, in the manuscript, of diacritical points in the Arabic words.

Commentaries

We have already made reference to the commentaries which will accompany this collection of sources. Here we wish to give a somewhat clearer, albeit brief, indication of what may be expected, and in particular how the several commentaries will relate to the text-translation volumes.

Each major area, either individually or in combination, will be the subject of a commentary, and *deo volente* each commentary will be written by that member of our team who has had primary responsibility for the area or areas in question. This means, for example, that the commentary on the first three sections: namely, Life, Writings and Various Reports, will be written by Michael Sollenberger and that on the Logic section will be written by Pamela Huby. Whenever Arabic material is part of a section, then the relevant commentary will either include contributions written by Dimitri Gutas or at least report whatever observations he thinks helpful for understanding the Arabic sources.

Following established practice, the commentaries will include a discussion of each individual text, and various things which were not (could not or should not be) done in the text-translation volumes will be accomplished. Textual problems mentioned only briefly in the lower *apparatus* and perhaps ignored in translation or merely mentioned in a footnote will be spelled out with greater clarity. Interesting relationships existing between parallel texts listed in the upper *apparatus* will be pointed out and occasionally discussed with reference to the later tradition. When the extent of the Theophrastean material, as against context material, contained

in a text is not clear, the alternatives will be set forth and argued for. Similarly, questions of misattribution, *dubia* and *spuria*, will be aired and a verdict will be suggested. In other words, we will not hesitate to present our views in the commentaries, but in the text-translation volumes we have opted for restraint. In cases of outrageous attribution, we sometimes introduce a *perperam* ("falsely"), but on the whole we prefer not to play God. Such matters are better reserved for the commentaries where fuller discussion will be possible.

In addition to text-by-text analysis, each commentary will offer a short survey of the relevant scholarship together with an inclusive bibliography. In some areas completeness will not be possible and perhaps not desirable, but we shall aim at bibliographies which are both helpful and representative of work done in the field.

Finally, our commentaries will include one or more general essays which place Theophrastus' work within its historical setting. No fixed length is being imposed on these essays, and there is no thought that these essays will be full-blown histories of the subject. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to offer an overview which at very least relates Theophrastus to Aristotle and to the Hellenistic Schools which were founded during his lifetime. Here the commentator will be presenting a personal picture which may or may not be controversial.

ABBREVIATIONS

The following list explains the abbreviations used in this collection to refer to other standard collections and scholarly journals.

- AABT = I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Göteborg 1957.
 ADAW = *Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Klasse für Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst*.
 AHAW = *Abhandlungen der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse*
 AHMA = *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*
 AOCAC = *Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis*, Venice 1562-74
 Artium script. = *Artium scriptores: Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik*, ed. L. Radermacher, *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte* 227.3, Wien 1951
 ASNP = *Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere e Filosofia*
 Barigazzi = A. Barigazzi, *Favorino di Arelate, Opere*, Firenze 1966
 Bibl. Gr. Med. Aev. = *Bibliotheca Graeca Medii Aevi*, ed. K. N. Sathas, Venetia 1872-94
 BICS = *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London*
 BT = *Bibliotheca Teubneriana* (used for all Teubner texts including those which predated the BT proper)
 BZ = *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*
 CAF = *Comicorum Atticorum fragmenta*, ed. Th. Kock, Leipzig 1880-88
 CAG = *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, ed. Academia litterarum regia Borussica, Berlin 1882-1909
 CB = *Collection des universités de France*, publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé
 CCAA = *Corpus commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem*, ed. H. A. Wolfson, D. Baneth et F. H. Fobes, Cambridge, Mass. 1949-
 CCSL = *Corpus Christianorum, series Latina*, Brepols, Turnhout 1953-
 CE = *Chronique d'Égypte*
 CErc = *Cronache Ercolanesi*
 CIC = *Corpus iuris civilis*, ed. Th. Mommsen et P. Krüger, Berlin 1868

- CGrF = *Comicorum Graecorum fragmenta in papyris reperta*, ed. C. Austin, Berlin 1973
 CMG = *Corpus medicorum Graecorum*, ed. Academia Berolinensis, Leipzig 1908-
 CP = *Classical Philology*
 CQ = *The Classical Quarterly*
 CSEL = *Corpus Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, ed. Academia litterarum Caesarea Vinobonensis, Wien 1866-
 DG = *Doxographi Graeci*, ed. H. Diels, Berlin 1897
 Döring = K. Döring, *Die Megariker, Kommentierte Sammlung der Testimonien*, Amsterdam 1972
 Edelstein-Kidd = L. Edelstein and I. Kidd, *Posidonius, Volume I, The Fragments*, Cambridge 1972
 FGrH = *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, ed. F. Jacoby, Leiden 1926-58
 FHG = *Fragmenta historicorum Graecorum*, ed. C. Müller, Paris 1841-70
 FVS = *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz, 6th edn. Zürich 1951-2
 GCS = *Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte*, Berlin 1897-
 GG = *Grammatici Graeci*, ed. G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1883
 GL = *Grammatici Latini*, ed. H. Keil, Leipzig 1874
 GRBS = *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies*
 GRF = *Grammaticae Romanae fragmenta*, ed. H. Funaioli, Leipzig 1907
 ICS = *Illinois Classical Studies*
 JHS = *Journal of Hellenic Studies*
 Jb. class. Phil. = *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*
 Kindstrand = J. F. Kindstrand, *Bion of Borysthenes*, Uppsala 1976
 Körte-Thierfelder = A. Körte et A. Thierfelder, *Menandri quae supersunt*, Leipzig 1959
 LCL = *Loeb Classical Library*
 LG = *Lexicographi Graeci*, Vol. 1 (*Suda*) ed. A. Adler, 1928-38, reprint Stuttgart 1967-71; Vol. 9 (*Pollux*) ed. E. Bethe, 1900-37, reprint Stuttgart 1966
 Martina = A. Martina, *Solon, Testimonia veterum*, Rome 1968
 Med. & Ren. St. = *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*
 Mensching = E. Mensching, *Favorin von Arelate*, Berlin 1963
 Mette = H. Mette, "Zwei Akademiker heute: Krantor und Arkesilaos," *Lustrum* 26 (1984) 41-94
 MGH = *Monumentum Germaniae historiae*, t.11.2, ed. Th. Mommsen, Berlin 1894

- Myth. Gr. = *Mythographi Graeci*, ed. E. Martini, Leipzig 1902
 NGG = *Nachrichten von der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Göttingen*
 OCT = *Oxford Classical Text (Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis)*
 Ofenloch = E. Ofenloch, *Caecilii Calactini fragmenta*, Leipzig 1907
 Op. omn. = (in this collection) *Alberti Magni Opera omnia*, ed. B. Geyer et al., Münster 1957-
 Or. Att. = *Oratores Attici*, ed. G. Baiter et H. Sauppe, Turici 1845-50
 Pack² = R. A. Pack, *The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Greco-Roman Egypt*, 2nd edn. Ann Arbor 1967
 Parad. Gr. = *Paradoxographorum Graecorum reliquiae*, ed. A. Giannini, Milan 1967
 PG = *Patrologia cursus completus, series Graeca*, ed. J.P. Migne, Paris 1857-66
 P.Hamb. = *Griechische Papyri der Hamburger Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek, Veröffentlichungen aus der Hamburger Staats- und Universitäts-Bibliothek*, Bd.4, Hamburg 1954
 P.Herc. = *Papyrus Herculanensis* (various editions as reported in the headings to individual texts)
 P.Hib. = *The Hibeh Papyri*, Part I, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt; Part II, ed. E. G. Turner, London 1906, 1955
 PL = *Patrologia cursus completus, series Latina*, ed. J. P. Migne, Paris 1844-55
 PMG = *Poetae melici Graeci*, ed. D. L. Page, Oxford 1962
 Poet. Min. Gr. = *Poetae minores Graeci*, ed. Th. Gaisford, Oxford 1814-20
 P.Lit. Lond. = H. J. M. Milne, *Catalogue of the Literary Papyri in the British Museum*, London 1927
 P.Oxy. = *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, ed. B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt et al., London 1898-
 PP = *La Parola del Passato*
 P.Petrie = *The Flinders Petrie Papyri*, Vols. I and II ed. J. P. Mahaffy, Vol. III ed. J. P. Mahaffy and J. G. Smyly, Dublin 1891, 1893, 1905
 PRIMI = *Papiri della Regia Università di Milano*, Vol. I, Milano 1937
 PSI = *Pubblicazioni della Società Italiana per la Ricerca dei Papiri Greci e Latini in Egitto*
 QEThs = W. Fortenbaugh, *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts = Studien zur antiken Philosophie* 12, Amsterdam 1984
 RGVV = *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*
 RhG = *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. Chr. Walz, Stuttgart 1832-36
 RhGr = *Rhetores Graeci*, ed. L. Spengel, C. Hammer et H. Rabe, Leipzig 1853-56, 1894, 1913-31
 RhLM = *Rhetores Latini minores*, ed. K. Halm, Leipzig 1863
 RhM = *Rheinisches Museum*

- RHT = *Revue d'histoire des textes*
 Rose³ = V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta*, 3rd edn. Leipzig 1886
 RUSCH = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*
 SC = *Sources chrétiennes*. Les éditions du Cerf, Paris 1942-
 SIFC = *Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica*
 SR = *Socraticorum reliquiae*, ed. G. Giannantoni, Naples 1983-5
 Suppl. Arist. = *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, ed. Academia litterarum regia Borussica, Berlin 1855-93
 SVF = *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed. H. v. Arnim, Leipzig 1903-24
 TAPA = *Transactions of the American Philological Association*
 TGF² = *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, ed. A. Nauck, 2d edn. Leipzig 1889, with Supplementum, ed. B. Snell, Hildesheim 1964
 TrGF = *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, Vol. 1 ed. B. Snell, Vol. 2 ed. R. Kannicht and B. Snell, Vol. 3 ed. S. Radt, Vol. 4 ed. S. Radt, Göttingen 1971-1985
 Wehrli = F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles*, Bde. I-X, Suppl. I-II, 2d edn. Basel 1967-74
 West = M.L. West, *Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum cantati*, Vol. I-II, Oxford 1971-2
 WSt = *Wiener Studien*

TEXTS

VITA

Vitae descriptiones

- 1 Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 5.36-58 (RUSCH t. 2 [1985] p.10-43 et CP t.82 [1987] p.230 Sollenberger)

ΘΕΟΦΡΑΣΤΟΣ

Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἐρέσιος κναφέως υἱός, ὡς φησιν Ἀθηνόδωρος ἐν ἡ' Περιπάτων. οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἤκουσεν Ἀλκίππου τοῦ πολίτου ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, εἴτ' ἀκούσας Πλάτωνος μετέστη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην· κάκεινον εἰς Χαλκίδα ὑποχωρήσαντος, αὐτὸς 5 διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν Ὀλυμπιάδι τετάρτῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ· φέρεται δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ δούλος φιλόσοφος ὄνομα Πομπύλος, καθὰ φησι Μυρωνιανὸς Ἀμαστριανὸς ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Ὁμοίων ἱστορικῶν κεφαλαίων.

ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος γέγονεν ἀνὴρ συνετάτατος καὶ φιλοπονάτατος 10 καί, καθὰ φησι Παμφίλη ἐν τῷ τριακοστῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Ὑπομνημάτων, 37 διδάσκαλος Μενάνδρου τοῦ κωμικοῦ· ἄλλως τε καὶ εὐεργετικὸς καὶ φιλόλογος. Κάσανδρος γοῦν αὐτὸν ἀπεδέχετο καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἔπεμψεν ἐπ' αὐτόν. τοσοῦτον δ' ἀποδοχῆς ἤξιούτο παρ' Ἀθηναίους ὥστ' Ἀγνων-

2 Ἐρέσιος] *Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae* 3.26 83C et 9.37 387B = **371**, *Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus* 5.66.5 (GCS t.1 p.51.4-5) = **252B**, *Stromata* 1.16 77.1 (GCS t.2 p.50.11) = **728** et ap. *Eusebium in Praeparatione evangelica* 10.6.14 (GCS t.8.1 p.577.15), *Stephanus Byzantius, Ethnica, s.v. "Ἐρεσιος* (p.275.17-18 *Meineke*), *Anonymus, Vita Arist. Marciana* 82-3 (p.3.20-1 *Gigon*), *Vita Arist. Latina* 18 (AABT p.153 *Düring*) et *Vita Arist. vulgata* 17 (AABT p.134 *Düring*) 4-5 *Diogenes Laertius, Vitae* 3.46 (t.1 p.141.3-4 *Long*) et *Anon., In librum De causis (cod. Vind. Lat. 5500 f.48'* [*Pattin, Tijdschr. v. Philos.* t.28 (1966) p.91.4-6]) 4-5 μετέστη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην] *vid.* **10**, et *de pap. Berol.* 9780 col. 5.54 *vid. comm.* 5-7 κάκεινον—ἑκατοστῇ] *Apollodorus, fr. 72a Jacoby* = *FGrH* 224 F 349a; *similia, sed sine verbis* αὐτὸς—σχολῆν, *habent Apollodorus ap. Diog. Laert.* 5.10 (*fr. 56.VII Jacoby* = *FGrH* 244 F 38a) et *Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Epist. ad Amm.* 5 (t.1 p.263.8-9 *Usener et Radermacher*) = *Aris-*

LIFE

Biographies

- 1 Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of the Philosophers* 5.36-58 (RUSCH vol.2 [1985] p.10-43 and CP vol.82 [1987] p.230 Sollenberger)

THEOPHRASTUS

Theophrastus of Eresus was the son of Melantas, a fuller, as Athenodorus says in the eighth book of *Walks (Peripatoi)*. At first he was a pupil of Alcippus, a fellow-citizen in his homeland, and then, after having been a student of Plato, he passed over to Aristotle. When Aristotle withdrew to Chalcis, Theophrastus took over the school in the 114th Olympiad. It is reported that even his slave, named Pompylus, was a philosopher, as Myronianus of Amastris says in the first book of *Summary of Historical Parallels*.

Theophrastus was a very intelligent and industrious man and, as Pamphila says in the thirty-second book of the *Commentaries*, a 37 teacher of the comic poet Menander. He was above all ever ready to do a kindness and a lover of words. At any rate, Cassander welcomed him and Ptolemy sent for him. His acceptance among the Athenians was so great that when Agnonides dared to indict

toteles, AABT T1d Düring 5-6 αὐτὸς—σχολῆν] *vid.* **11** 7 *Gellius, NA* 2.18.8, *ex quo pendet Macrobius, Saturnalia* 1.11.42 (p.52.1-4 *Willis*), *quo loco servus ille Pompylus Philostrati servus appellatur, quod Meurs in Theophrasti servus commutari voluit* 7-9 *Myronianus Amastrianus, fr.5 (FHG t.4 p.455)* 10-12 *Pamphila, fr. 10 (FHG t.3 p.522)*

1 ΘΕΟΦΡΑΣΤΟΣ PQCo: om. BFWV (*sed spatium relictum BFW*) 3 πρῶτον F: πρότερον BPQCoWV 4 Ἀλκίππου BP^{ms} CoW: Ἀλκίππου P^oV: Λευκίππου Q: Ἀκίππου F 11 Ὑπομνημάτων BPQCoWV: Ὑπομνημνευμάτων F 12 κωμικοῦ aWV: ποιητοῦ c 12 εὐεργετικὸς aWV: ἐνεργητικὸς Richards: εὐρετικὸς Hecker 14-15 Ἀγωνίδης BFP QWV: Ἀγωνίδης Co

νίδης τολμήσας ἀσεβείας αὐτὸν γράψασθαι μικροῦ καὶ προσώφλεν.¹⁵
 ἀπήντων τ' εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ πρὸς δισχιλίους. οὗτος
 τὰ τ' ἄλλα καὶ περὶ δεικτηρίου τοιαῦτα διείλεκται ἐν τῇ πρὸς Φανίαν
 τὸν Περιπατητικὸν ἐπιστολῇ· “οὐ γὰρ ὅτι πανήγυριν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ
 συνέδριον ῥάδιον, οἷόν τις βούλεται, λαβεῖν. αἱ δ' ἀναγνώσεις
 ποιῶσιν ἐπανορθώσεις. τὸ δ' ἀναβάλλεσθαι πάντα καὶ ἀμελεῖν οὐκέτι²⁰
 φέρουσιν αἱ ἡλικίαί.” ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστολῇ “σχολαστικὸν” ὠνόμακεν.

38 τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν, ὅμως πρὸς ὀλίγον ἀπεδήμησε καὶ οὗτος καὶ πάντες
 οἱ λοιποὶ φιλόσοφοι, Σοφοκλέους τοῦ Ἀμφικλείδου νόμον εἰς-
 ενεγκόντος μηδένα τῶν φιλοσόφων σχολῆς ἀφηγείσθαι ἂν μὴ τῇ βουλῇ
 καὶ τῷ δήμῳ δόξη· εἰ δὲ μὴ, θάνατον εἶναι τὴν ζημίαν. ἀλλ' αὖθις²⁵
 ἐπανήλθον εἰς νέωτα, Φίλωνος τὸν Σοφοκλέα γραψαμένου παρανόμων,
 ὅτε καὶ τὸν νόμον μὲν ἄκυρον ἐποίησαν Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν δὲ
 Σοφοκλέα πέντε ταλάντοις ἐζημίωσαν, κάθοδόν τε τοῖς φιλοσόφοις
 ἐνηφίσαντο, ἵνα καὶ Θεόφραστος κατέλθῃ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἦ.

39 τοῦτον Τύρταμον λεγόμενον Θεόφραστον διὰ τὸ τῆς φράσεως³⁰
 θεσπέσιον Ἀριστοτέλης μετωνόμασεν· οὐ καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ Νικομάχου
 φησὶν ἐρωτικῶς διατεθῆναι, καίπερ ὄντα διδάσκαλον, Ἀριστιπ-
 πος ἐν τετάρτῳ Περὶ παλαιᾶς τρυφῆς. λέγεται δ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τε καὶ
 Καλλισθένους τὸ ὅμιον εἰπεῖν Ἀριστοτέλην, ὅπερ Πλάτωνα, καθὰ
 προείρηται, φασὶν εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τε Ξενοκράτους καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου· φάναι³⁵
 γάρ, τοῦ μὲν Θεοφράστου καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὀξύτητος πᾶν τὸ νοηθὲν
 ἐξεργνηνόντος, τοῦ δὲ νοητοῦ τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχοντος, ὡς τῷ μὲν

16 Hesychius Milesius, fr. 7.35 (FHG t.4 p.167) 16-21 Pha(i)niás, fr.
 4 Wehrli 22-5 Pollux, Onomasticon 9.42 (LG t.9.2 p.158.2-5 Bethe) et Alexis
 Comicus ap. Athenaeum 13.92 610E-F = Alexis, fr. 94 (CAF t.2.1 p.327) 26
 Athenaeus 11.119 508F et 13.92 610F 30-1 Proclus, In Plat. Crat. prooem.
 16.7 (p.6.26-7 Pasquali), Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr. 1 16a3-9 (CAG t.4.5
 p.20.18-19), Olympiodorus, In Plat. prim. Alcib. 2.41-3 (p.3.2-4 Westerink),
 Anonymus, Proleg. in Plat. philos. 1.18-19 (p.3.18-19 Westerink), Stephanus
 Byzantius, Ethnica s.v. “Ἐρεσος (p.275.19-276.1 Meineke), Io. Tzetzes, Historiae
 6.412 et 415-17, 9.928, et 11.850-2, scholion in Tzetzi Historias 9.928 et
 Theophylactus Bulgariae Archiepiscopus, Epistula 34 ad Theophylactum Romanum
 (PG t.126 col.556D); vid etiam 5A-D 31-3 Aristippus Cyrenaeus, no.
 157 (SR t.1 p.242 Giannantoni); Suda, s.v. Νικόμαχος (no. 398, LG t.1 pars
 3 p.469.15-16 Adler) 34-8 verba similia Aristoteli attribuantur in Gnom.
 Vat. no. 52 Sternbach et in cod. Vind. Gr. theol. 149 f.304^r (Syll. Vind. no. 83
 Wachsmuth); cf. Diogenis Laertii Vitas 4.6, quo loco similia dicuntur a Platone
 de Aristotele et Xenocrate; Isocratem fere eadem dixisse de auditoribus suis Ephoro
 et Theopompo narrat Cicero, Ad Att. 6.1.12, Brutus 204 et De or. 3.36, Quintilianus,
 Inst. 2.8.11, Anon. (vel Zosimus), Vita Isocr. 3 (p.257.99-102 Westermann),
 et Suda, s.v. “Ἐφορος (no. 3953, LG t.1 pars 2 p.490.6-7 Adler); Isocratis

him on a charge of impiety, (Agonides lost and) even came close
 to incurring a fine. About two thousand students came to his
 school. In the letter to Phaniás the Peripatetic he discussed, among
 other things, matters concerning the lecture-hall as follows: “Not
 only is it not easy to get a public assembly, but not even a small
 company of listeners such as one would like. Public readings lead
 to revisions. The present generation no longer tolerates the deferring
 of everything and lack of care.” In this letter he used the term
 “scholastic”.

38 Even though he was of such (repute), he nevertheless went
 away for a little while, both he and all the other philosophers,
 after Sophocles, the son of Amphiclides, introduced a law that none
 of the philosophers be in charge of a school if it were not approved
 by the council and the people. Otherwise, death was the penalty.
 But they returned again the next year after Philon indicted So-
 phocles for proposing an illegal measure. The Athenians render-
 ed the law invalid and fined Sophocles five talents, and they voted
 for the return of the philosophers, in order that Theophrastus, too,
 might come back and be in the same circumstances (as before).

He was called Tyrtamus, but Aristotle changed his name to
 Theophrastus on account of the divine character of his speech.
 39 Aristippus in the fourth book of *On Ancient Luxury* says that he
 was erotically attracted to Aristotle's son Nicomachus, although he
 was his teacher. It is related that Aristotle said the same thing about
 him and Callisthenes which they say Plato said, as was stated
 previously, about Xenocrates and Aristotle himself. For since
 Theophrastus interpreted every thought with excessive quickness
 and the other one (Callisthenes) was naturally sluggish, (Aristotle)
 said that the one (Theophrastus) needed a bridle and the other

iudicium de Ephoro solo tradit Quintilianus, Inst. 10.1.74 35 προείρηται]
 Diogenes Laertius, Vitas 4.6

17 δεικτηρίου BV^{ac}: δικτηρίου F^{ac}P^{ac}Q: δικαστηρίου F^{ac}P^{ac}CoWV^{ms}: διδασ-
 καλίου Wyse: διδακτηρίου Apell τοιαῦτα BFPCoW: ταῦτα QV 20
 οὐκέτι aWV: (ὁ) οὐκέτι Boyancé 21 σχολαστικὸν aWV: σχολαστικὸν
 (αὐτὸν) Ménage: σχολαστικὸν (ὄνομα) Gigante 26 ἐπανήλθον aWV:
 ἐπανήλθεν Frob. Φίλωνος Ménage sec. Athen. 13.610F: Φιλίωνος FCo:
 Φιλίωνος PQVW: Φαλλίωνος B 29 κατέλθῃ...ἦ aWV: κατέλθοι...εἶη
 Cobet 30 φράσεως aWV: φρονήσεως καὶ φράσεως c 32 διατεθῆναι
 BFPCoV: διασωθῆναι QW 37 φύσιν BFCoWV et fort. P (in compendio
 scriptum): φήμην Q (in compendio scriptum)

χαλινού δέοι, τῷ δὲ κέντρον. λέγεται δ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἴδιον κήπον σχεῖν μετὰ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους τελευταίην, Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως, ὃς ἦν καὶ γνῶριμος αὐτῷ, τοῦτο συμπράξαντος.

φέρειται δ' αὐτοῦ ἀποφθέγματα ταυτὶ χραιώδη. θάττον ἔφη πισ-
40 τεύειν δεῖν ἵππῳ ἀχαλίνῳ ἢ λόγῳ ἀσυντάκτῳ. πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ σιωπῶντα τὸ ὄλον ἔφη, "εἰ μὲν ἀμαθὴς εἶ, φρονίμως ποιεῖς· εἰ δὲ πεπαιδευσαι, ἀφρόνως." συνεχῆς τε ἔλεγε πολυτελὲς ἀνάλωμα εἶναι τὸν χρόνον.

ἐτελεύτα δὴ γηραιός, βιωὺς ἔτη πέντε καὶ ὀγδοήκοντα, ἐπειδήπερ ὀλίγον ἀνήκε τῶν πόνων. καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτόν·

οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτο μάταιον ἔπος μερόπων τινὶ λέχθη,
ρήγνυσθαι σοφίης τόξον ἀνιέμενον·
δὴ γὰρ καὶ Θεόφραστος ἕως ἐπόνει μὲν ἄπυρος
ἦν δέμας, εἴτ' ἀνεθείς κάτθανε πηρομελής.

φασὶ δ' αὐτὸν ἐρωτηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν μαθητῶν εἰ τι ἐπισκίπτει, εἰπεῖν ἐπισκίπτειν μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν, πλὴν ὅτι "πολλὰ τῶν ἡδέων ὁ βίος διὰ
41 τὴν δόξαν καταλαζονεύεται· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ὀπὸτ' ἀρχόμεθα ζῆν, τότε ἀποθνήσκομεν. οὐδὲν οὖν ἀλυσιτελέστερόν ἐστι φιλοδοξίας. ἀλλ' εὐτυχεῖτε, καὶ ἤτοι τὸν λόγον ἄφετε, πολὺς γὰρ ὁ πόνος, ἢ καλῶς αὐτοῦ πρόστητε, μεγάλη γὰρ ἡ δόξα. τὸ δὲ κενὸν τοῦ βίου πλέον τοῦ συμφέροντος. ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἐκποιεῖ βουλεύεσθαι τί πρακτέον, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐπισκέψασθε τί ποιητέον." ταῦτα, φασίν, εἰπὼν ἀπέπνευσε. καὶ αὐτόν, ὡς ὁ λόγος, Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ κατέπεμψαν
60 ποσὶ τὸν ἄνδρα τιμήσαντες. Φαβωρίνος δὲ φησι γηράσαντα αὐτόν ἐν φορείῳ περιφέρεισθαι· καὶ τοῦτο λέγειν "Ἐρμιππον παρατιθέμενον

38-40 *Demetrius Phalereus*, fr. 5 Wehrli 42-4 *Antonius Melissa*, *Loci comm.* 1.73 (PG t.136 col.992D), *Maximus Confessor*, *Loci comm.* 20 (PG t.91 col.848B), *Gnom. Vat.* no. 333 *Sternbach*, *cod. Par. Gr.* 1168 f.114^r v.13-18 = *Flor. Par.* XXIX.10, *cod. Vat. Gr.* 1144 f.229^r v.15-18 = *App. Vat.* II.34, *cod. Ottob. Gr.* 192 f.208^r v.3-8, *cod. Par. Gr. suppl.* 134 f.253^r v.22 - 253^r v.2 = *Gnom. Par.* 180, *Muntahab Siwān al-hikma* v.2069-71 *Dunlop*; *al-Mubaššir*, *Muhtār al-hikam* p.315.2-3 *Badawi*, *cuius versiones mediaevales sunt Bocados de oro* 23.87 (p.177.20-2 *Crombach*) et *Liber philosophorum moralium antiquorum* p.570.23-571.1 *Franceschini*, et *florilegium quod Pčela inscribitur cap.20* (p.199a5-10 *Semenov*); *vid.* Γνωμικά τινα (*Boissonade*, *Anecdota Graeca* t.2 p.467.9-11), *quo loco dictum sine auctoris nomine reperitur sed ante dictum quod Theophrasto non nullis locis adsignatur (perperam, ut videtur; vid. 22); vid. etiam Plut. Quaest. conv. 3.1 644F, quo tamen loco dictum simile Simonidi attribuitur, Max. Conf. Loc. comm. 47 (PG t.91 col.940C-D), quo loco dictum proxime idem Demostheni attribuitur, et Gnom. Vat. no. 159 Sternbach, quo loco dictum simile, ratione mutata, Bioni (fr. 77 Kindstrand) ascribitur 46 Apollodorus, fr. 72b Jacoby*

(Callisthenes) a spur. It is said that he even came into possession of his own garden after the death of Aristotle, since Demetrius of Phalerum, who was also his friend, helped him to obtain it.

The following useful apophthegms are also reported to be his. He said that one ought sooner trust in an unbridled horse than
40 in disorganized speech. To a man who remained wholly silent at a symposium, he said, "If you are uneducated, you are behaving sensibly, but if you are educated, foolishly." And he constantly used to say that time is a costly expenditure.

He died when quite old, having lived eighty-five years, after he had relaxed for a short time from his labors. And our verses on him are (as follows):

Not in vain was this verse spoken by one of mankind,
That the bow of wisdom, when slackened, breaks.
For indeed Theophrastus, too, while he labored, was
not crippled
In bodily frame, but when he did relax, he died
crippled in the limbs.

They say that when he was asked by his students if he had any command, he said that he could command nothing, except that "Life greatly depreciates many pleasures on account of glory (and
41 does so wrongly), for no sooner do we begin to live than we die. Nothing, therefore, is more profitless than love of glory. But farewell, and either forsake my teaching — for there is much labor — or champion it well — for the glory is great. The empty part of life is more than the advantageous. But I am no longer allowed to determine what must be done. You consider what must be undertaken." Saying this, they say, he expired. And, as the story goes, the Athenians publicly escorted him on foot, in honor of the man. Favorinus says that when Theophrastus had grown old, he was carried around in a litter. (He) also (says) that this is stated

= *FGrH* 244 F 349b 48-51 *Anthologia Palatina* 7.110 50-1 *Suda*, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 200, *LG t.1 pars 2* p.702.1-2 *Adler*) 61-2 *Favorinus*, fr. 53 *Mensching* = fr. 92 *Barigazzi* 61-4 *Hermippus*, fr. 53 *Wehrli*, *fort. in opere Περὶ Θεοφράστου quod Diog. Laert. 2.55 Hermippo attribuit (Hermippus, fr. 52 Wehrli); Arcesilaus, T1a Mette*

40 τοῦτο *FPQCoWV*: τούτῳ *B* 47 post ἀνήκε *B add.* τῆς φράσεως θεσπέσιον Ἀριστοτέλης μετωνόμασεν *ex 5.38, quae verba m. rec. del.* 54 ἀρχόμεθα *Stephanus*: ἠρχόμεθα *aWV* 57 αὐτοῦ *FCo*: αὐτῷ *BPQWV* 61 ποσὶ *aWV*: οὕτως *Ménage*

ἱστορεῖν Ἀρκεσίλαον τὸν Πιταναῖον ἐν οἷς ἔφασκε πρὸς Λακύνην τὸν Κυρηναῖον.

42 καταλέλοιπε δὲ βιβλία καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι μάλιστα πάμπλειστα, ἃ καὶ αὐτὰ ἄξιον ἡγησάμην ὑπογράψαι διὰ τὸ πάσης ἀρετῆς πεπληρωσθαι. ἔστι δὲ τάδε·

Ἄναλυτικῶν προτέρων α'β'γ'
Ἄναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'

Περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν α' 70

Ἄναλυτικῶν ἐπιτομὴ α'

Ἀνηγμένων τόπων α'β'

Ἀγωνιστικῶν (ἦ) τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους θεωρίας

Περὶ αἰσθήσεων α'

Πρὸς Ἀναξαγόραν α' 75

Περὶ τῶν Ἀναξαγόρου α'

Περὶ τῶν Ἀναξιμένους α'

Περὶ τῶν Ἀρχελαίου α'

Περὶ ἁλῶν, νίτρου, στυπτηρίας α'

Περὶ τῶν αἰθομένων α'β'

Περὶ τῶν ἀτόμων γραμμῶν α' 80

Ἀκροάσεως α'β'

Περὶ ἀνέμων α'

Ἄρετῶν διαφοραὶ α'

Περὶ βασιλείας α' 85

Περὶ παιδείας βασιλέως α'

Περὶ βίων α'β'γ'

43 Περὶ γήρας α'

Περὶ τῆς Δημοκρίτου ἀστρολογίας α'

Τῆς μεταρσιολεσχίας α' 90

Περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων α'

Περὶ χυμῶν, χροῶν, σαρκῶν α'

68 *inscr.* = 68 *no.6a*

71 *inscr.* = 68 *no.8*

74 *inscr.* = 265 *no.4a*

77 *inscr.* = 137 *no.27*

80 *inscr.* = 137 *no.23*

83 *inscr.* = 137 *no.16a*

86 *inscr.* = 589 *no.13*

89 *inscr.* = 134 *no.33*

92 *inscr.* = 137 *no.36*

69 *inscr.* = 68 *no.7a*

72 *inscr.* = 68 *no.18a*

75 *inscr.* = 137 *no.30*

78 *inscr.* = 137 *no.31*

81 *inscr.* = 264 *no.4a*

84 *inscr.* = 436 *no.7*

87 *inscr.* = 436 *no.16*

90 *inscr.* = 137 *no.34*

70 *inscr.* = 68 *no.9a*

73 *inscr.* = 68 *no.26*

76 *inscr.* = 137 *no.29a*

79 *inscr.* = 137 *no.25*

82 *inscr.* = 727 *no.1*

85 *inscr.* = 589 *no.11*

88 *inscr.* = 436 *no.18*

91 *inscr.* = 137 *no.35*

63 Λακύνην FPQCoWV: Ἀλκύνην B

65 καὶ αὐτὸς BPQCoWV: om.

by Hermippus, who adds that Arcesilaus of Pitane narrated it in his remarks to Lacydes of Cyrene.

42 And he, too, has left behind books in extremely great numbers, and I have deemed these also worth listing, since they are filled with every excellence. They are as follows:

Prior Analytics, 3 books

Posterior Analytics, 7 books

On the Analysis of Syllogisms, 1 book

Epitome of (the) Analytics, 1 book

The Reduction of Topics, 2 books

Polemics, or The Theory of Eristic Arguments

On Sensations, 1 book

In Reply to Anaxagoras, 1 book

On the (Doctrines) of Anaxagoras, 1 book

On the (Doctrines) of Anaximenes, 1 book

On the (Doctrines) of Archelaus, 1 book

On Salts, (Types of) Soda, and Alum, 1 book

On Burning (Stones), 1 book

On Indivisible Lines, 1 book

Lecture(s), 2 books

On Winds, 1 book

Varieties of Virtue, 1 book

On Kingship, 1 book

On the Education of a King, 1 book

On Lives, 3 books

43 *On Old Age*, 1 book

On the Astronomy of Democritus, 1 book

Meteorology, 1 book

On Images, 1 book

On Flavors, Colors, Fleshes, 1 book

F: καὶ αὐτὰ *Ménage* ὅτι μάλιστα πάμπλειστα BPQCoWV: πλείστα

F ἃ BPQCoWV: om. F 66 αὐτὰ aWV: αὐτὸς c 72 τόπων

aWV: λόγων *Alex. Aphr.*, In *Arist. Anal. Pr.* p.340.14 73 Ἀγωνιστικῶν

FPQCoWV: Ἀγωνιστικῶν B (ἦ) τῆς *Schmidt*: τῆς aWV: (ἦ) τῶν *Usener*: ἦ

pro τῆς *Bocheński* τοὺς om. F 74 αἰσθήσεων BFPQCoWV:

αἰσθήσεως Co^{dc} 80 αἰθομένων *Rose*: αἰθουμένων B: λιθουμένων FPQ

CoWV: (ἀπολε)λιθωμένων *Usener*: (ἀπο)λιθουμένων *Regenbogen* 81 τῶν

BPQCoWV: om. F 82 Ἀκροάσεως aWV: Ἀκροάσεων *Usener* 90

Περὶ ante τῆς add. *Usener* 92 Περὶ BPQCoWV: Περὶ τῶν F

Περὶ τοῦ διακόσμου α'	
Περὶ τοῦ Περὶ ἀνθρώπων α'	
Τῶν Διογένους συναγωγή α'	95
Διορισμῶν α'β'γ'	
Ἐρωτικὸς α'	
ἄλλο Περὶ ἔρωτος α'	
Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας α'	
Περὶ εἰδῶν α'β'	100
Περὶ ἐπιλήψεως α'	
Περὶ ἐνθουσιασμοῦ α'	
Περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέους α'	
Ἐπιχειρημάτων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'θ'ι'ια'ιβ'ιγ'ιδ'ιε'ις'ιζ'ιη'	
Ἐνστάσεων α'β'γ'	105
Περὶ ἐκουσίου α'	
Ἐπιτομὴ τῆς Πλάτωνος Πολιτείας α'β'	
Περὶ ἑτεροφωνίας ζῶων τῶν ὁμογενῶν α'	
Περὶ τῶν ἀθρόον φαινομένων α'	
Περὶ δακετῶν καὶ βλητικῶν α'	110
Περὶ τῶν ζῶων ὅσα λέγεται φθονεῖν α'	
Περὶ τῶν ἐν ξηρῷ διαμενόντων α'	
44 Περὶ τῶν τὰς χροῶς μεταβαλλόντων α'	
Περὶ τῶν φαλευόντων α'	
Περὶ ζῶων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'	115
Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης α'	
Περὶ ἡδονῆς ἄλλο α'	
Θέσεις κδ'	
Περὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ α'	
Περὶ ἰλίγγων καὶ σκοτώσεων α'	120
Περὶ ἰδρώτων α'	

93 *inscr.* = 137 no.3794 *inscr.* = 137 no.3895 *inscr.* = 137 no.3996 *inscr.* = 68 no.1297 *inscr.* = 436 no.2998 *inscr.* = 436 no.30a99 *inscr.* = 436 no.12a100 *inscr.* = 246 no.4101 *inscr.* = 328 no.5a102 *inscr.* = 328 no.9a103 *inscr.* = 137 no.28104 *inscr.* = 68 no.22105 *inscr.* = 68 no.24106 *inscr.* = 436 no.6107 *inscr.* = 589 no.9108 *inscr.* = 350 no.3a109 *inscr.* = 350 no.5a110 *inscr.* = 350 no.6a111 *inscr.* = 350 no.7a112 *inscr.* = 350 no.8a113 *inscr.* = 350 no.9a114 *inscr.* = 350 no.10115 *inscr.* = 350 no.1116 *inscr.* = 436 no.26117 *inscr.* = 436 no.27a118 *inscr.* = 68 no.34119 *inscr.* = 137 no.12120 *inscr.* = 328 no.1a121 *inscr.* = 328 no.12

→

<i>On the World Order</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the (Work) On Mankind</i> , 1 book	
<i>Collection of the (Doctrines) of Diogenes</i> , 1 book	
<i>Definitions</i> , 3 books	
(Dialogue) concerning Love, 1 book	
another (work) <i>On Love</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Happiness</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Forms</i> , 2 books	
<i>On Epilepsy</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Inspiration</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (the Doctrines of) Empedocles</i> , 1 book	
<i>Epicheiremes (Dialectical Arguments)</i> , 18 books	
<i>Objections</i> , 3 books	
<i>On the Voluntary</i> , 1 book	
<i>Epitome of Plato's Republic</i> , 2 books	
<i>On Difference of Voice in Creatures of the Same Kind</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Creatures) That Appear in Swarms</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Creatures) That Bite and Sting</i> , 1 book	
<i>On as Many Creatures as are said to be Grudging</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Creatures) That Remain on Dry Land</i> , 1 book	
44 <i>On (Creatures) That Change Colors</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Creatures) That Hibernate</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Living Creatures</i> , 7 books	
<i>On Pleasure</i> , like (that of) Aristotle, 1 book	
<i>On Pleasure</i> , another (work), 1 book	
<i>Theses</i> , 24 books	
<i>On Hot and Cold</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Vertigo and Dizziness</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Types of) Sweating</i> , 1 book	
<hr/>	
93 τοῦ BPQCoWV: om. F	94 Περὶ τοῦ Περὶ ἀνθρώπων BPQCoWV:
Περὶ ἀνθρώπων F: Περὶ τοῦ Περὶ ἀνθρώπου N: Περὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου Frob.:	
Περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων Meurs α' BPQCoWV: om. F	100 εἰδῶν
BFCoW ^m V: om. W ^m : εἰδώλων PQ: ἡθῶν Meurs	103 Περὶ aWV: Περὶ
(τῶν) Usener	105 Ἐνστάσεων aWV: Ἐνστάσεως Ald.
aW: λόγων V	109 ἀθρόον FPQCoWV: ἀθρόων B
110 Περὶ aWV:	
περὶ (τῶν) Meurs α' BPQCoWV: β' F	111 φθονεῖν aWV: φρονεῖν
Frob.	112 ἐν FPQCoWV: ἐν τῷ B
115 Περὶ BPQCoWV: Περὶ	
τῶν F	116 ἡδονῆς BFPQWV: ἡδονῶν Co
121 ἰδρώτων F: ἰδρώτος	
BPQCoWV	

Περὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως α'		
Καλλισθένης ἢ περὶ πένθους α'		
Περὶ κόπων α'		
Περὶ κινήσεως α'β'γ'	125	
Περὶ λίθων α'		
Περὶ λοιμῶν α'		
Περὶ λειποψυχίας α'		
Μεγαρικὸς α'		
Περὶ μελαγχολίας α'	130	
Περὶ μετάλλων α'β'		
Περὶ μέλιτος α'		
Περὶ τῶν Μητροδώρου συναγωγῆς α'		
Μεταρσιολογικῶν α'β'		
Περὶ μέθης α'	135	
Νόμων κατὰ στοιχεῖον κδ'		
Νόμων ἐπιτομῆς α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'θ'ι'		
45 Πρὸς τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς α'		
Περὶ ὁδμῶν α'		
Περὶ οἴνου καὶ ἐλαίου		
Πρώτων προτάσεων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'θ'ι'ια'ιβ'ιγ'ιδ'ιε'ις'ιζ'ιη'	140	
Νομοθετῶν α'β'γ'		
Πολιτικῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'		
Πολιτικῶν πρὸς τοὺς καιροὺς α'β'γ'δ'		
Πολιτικῶν ἐθῶν α'β'γ'δ'	145	
Περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας α'		
Προβλημάτων συναγωγῆς α'β'γ'δ'ε'		
Περὶ παροιμιῶν α'		
Περὶ πήξεων καὶ τήξεων α'		
Περὶ πυρὸς α'β'	150	
Περὶ πνευμάτων α'		
Περὶ παραλύσεως α'		
122 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 <i>no.3a</i>	123 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 <i>no.15a</i>	124 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 <i>no.10</i>
125 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.2</i>	126 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.21</i>	127 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 <i>no.6</i>
128 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 <i>no.2a</i>	129 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 <i>no.20</i>	130 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 <i>no.7</i>
131 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.20b</i>	132 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 <i>no.5</i>	133 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.40</i>
134 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.15a</i>	135 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 <i>no.31</i>	136 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.17a</i>
137 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.18</i>	138 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 <i>no.13</i>	139 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 <i>no.2g</i>
140 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 <i>no.2f</i>	141 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 <i>no.5</i>	142 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.16</i>
143 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.1</i>	144 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.4a</i>	145 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.3</i>
146 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 <i>no.6</i>	147 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 <i>no.3</i>	148 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 <i>no.14</i>
149 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.14</i>	150 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 <i>no.13</i>	151 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 <i>no.15</i>
152 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 <i>no.4</i>		

<i>On Affirmation and Denial</i> , 1 book	
<i>Callisthenes, or On Grief</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Types of) Tirednesses</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Motion</i> , 3 books	
<i>On Stones</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Plagues</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Fainting</i> , 1 book	
<i>Megarian (Dialogue)</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Melancholy</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Metals</i> , 2 books	
<i>On Honey</i> , 1 book	
<i>Collection concerning the (Doctrines) of Metrodorus</i> , 1 book	
<i>Meteorology</i> , 2 books	
<i>On Drunkenness</i> , 1 book	
<i>Laws, in alphabetical order</i> , 24 books	
<i>Epitome of Laws</i> , 10 books	
45 <i>Regarding Definitions</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Odors</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Wine and (Olive) Oil</i>	
<i>Primary Propositions</i> , 18 books	
<i>Legislators</i> , 3 books	
<i>Politics</i> , 6 books	
<i>Politics Regarding Crises</i> , 4 books	
<i>Political Customs</i> , 4 books	
<i>On the Best Constitution</i> , 1 book	
<i>Collection of Problems</i> , 5 books	
<i>On Proverbs</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Solidifying and Melting</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Fire</i> , 2 books	
<i>On Breaths (or On Winds)</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Paralysis</i> , 1 book	
<hr/>	
122 α' post καὶ ἀποφάσεως <i>transp. Frob.</i> : ante καὶ ἀποφάσεως <i>aWV</i> καὶ ἀποφάσεως <i>del. Fortenbaugh (RUSCH t.2 p.21)</i>	124 κόπων <i>aW</i> : κόπου
V	128 λειποψυχίας <i>FPQCoV</i> : λιποψυχίας <i>BW</i>
133 Περὶ <i>aWV</i> : <i>del. Usener</i> συναγωγῆς <i>BFPCoWV</i> : συναγωγῶν <i>Q</i> : συναγωγή <i>Burn</i> α'	
<i>aWV</i> : β' c	136 Νόμων <i>BPQCoWV</i> : Περὶ νόμων <i>F</i>
139 ὁδμῶν <i>aWV</i> : ὁσμῶν <i>DGS</i>	142 Νομοθετῶν <i>aWV</i> : (Πολιτεύματα) νομοθετῶν <i>Usener</i>
144 Πολιτικῶν <i>aWV</i> : Πολιτικῶν <i>Meibom</i> α'β'γ'δ' <i>BFPV</i> : α'β'γ'δ'ε' <i>PQCoW</i>	145 Πολιτικῶν ἐθῶν α'β'γ'δ' <i>BPQCoWV</i> : Πολιτικῶν ε' <i>F</i>
151 πνευμάτων <i>aWV</i> : πνεύματος <i>Meurs</i>	

Περὶ πνιγμοῦ α'		
Περὶ παραφροσύνης α'		
Περὶ παθῶν α'	155	
Περὶ σημείων α'		
Σοφισμάτων α'β'		
Περὶ συλλογισμῶν λύσεως α'		
Τοπικῶν α'β'		
Περὶ τιμωρίας α'β'	160	
Περὶ τριχῶν α'		
Περὶ τυραννίδος α'		
Περὶ ὕδατος α'β'γ'		
Περὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐνυπνίων α'		
Περὶ φιλίας α'β'γ'	165	
46 Περὶ φιλοτιμίας α'β'		
Περὶ φύσεως α'β'γ'		
Περὶ φυσικῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'θ'ι'ια'ιβ'ιγ'ιδ'ιε'ισ'ιζ'ιη'		
Περὶ φυσικῶν ἐπιτομῆς α'β'		
Φυσικῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'	170	
Πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς α'		
Περὶ φυτικῶν ιστοριῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'θ'ι'		
Φυτικῶν αἰτιῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'		
Περὶ χυλῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'		
Περὶ ψευδοῦς ἡδονῆς α'	175	
Περὶ ψυχῆς θέσις α'		
Περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων α'		
Περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν διαφορημάτων α'		
'Αρμονικῶν α'		
Περὶ ἀρετῆς α'	180	
'Αφορμαὶ ἢ ἐναντιώσεις α'		
Περὶ ἀποφάσεως α'		
153 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 no.3	154 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 no.8	155 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.5
156 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.17	157 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.31	158 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.9c
159 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.17	160 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.22	161 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 no.13
162 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.14	163 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.18b	164 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 no.11a
165 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.23a	166 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.21	167 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.3
168 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.4a	169 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.7a	170 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.1a
171 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.8	172 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 no.1c	173 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 no.2a
174 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 no.3a	175 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.28	176 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.36
177 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.8	178 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.32	179 <i>inscr.</i> = 714 no.3
180 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.8	181 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.25	182 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.4

	<i>On Choking</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Derangement</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Emotions</i> , 1 book
	<i>On (Weather) Signs</i> , 1 book
	<i>Sophisms</i> , 2 books
	<i>On the Solution of Syllogisms</i> , 1 book
	<i>Topics</i> , 2 books
	<i>On Retribution</i> , 2 books
	<i>On (Types of) Hair</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Tyranny</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Water</i> , 3 books
	<i>On Sleep and Dreams</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Friendship</i> , 3 books
46	<i>On Ambition</i> , 2 books
	<i>On Nature</i> , 3 books
	<i>On Natural Things (or On the Natural Philosophers)</i> , 18 books
	<i>Summary on the Natural Philosophers (or Summary on Natural Things)</i> , 2 books
	<i>Physics (or Natural Things)</i> , 8 books
	<i>In Reply to the Natural Philosophers</i> , 1 book
	<i>Researches on Plant (Matters)</i> , 10 books
	<i>Plant Explanations</i> , 8 books
	<i>On Flavors (or On Juices)</i> , 5 books
	<i>On False Pleasures</i> , 1 book
	<i>A Thesis on the Soul</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Non-technical Proofs</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Simple Problems</i> , 1 book
	<i>Harmonics</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Virtue</i> , 1 book
	<i>Subjects for Argument, or Controversies</i> , 1 book
	<i>On Denial</i> , 1 book

153 α' aWV: α'β' Ald. 158 Περὶ συλλογισμῶν λύσεως α' BF^mPQCoWV: om. F^c: Συλλογισμῶν λύσεως α' Frob.: Περὶ συλλογισμῶν (ἀνα)λύσεως α' Usener 160 om. F 169 om. F 170 Φυσικῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η' BPQCoWV: ἔ(ε)ρ(ον) Περὶ φυσικῶν η' F 172 φυτικῶν Casaubon: φυσικῶν aW^mV: om. W^c ιστοριῶν FQ: ιστορικῶν BPCoW^mV: om. W^c 173 Φυτικῶν Casaubon: (Περὶ) φυτικῶν Meibom: Φυσικῶν BPQCoW^mV: om. FW^c (tota inscriptio omittitur) 176 θέσις FPQCo WV: θέσεις B α' aW: μία V: μᾶ Meurs 177 τῶν BFPCoWV: om. Q α' ac: om. aWV 180 om. F 182 ἀποφάσεως BFPQWV: ἀποφάσεων Co: ἀποφά(ν)σεως Usener

Περὶ γνώμης α'	
Περὶ γελοίου α'	
Δειλινῶν α'β'	185
Διαίρεσεις α'β'	
Περὶ τῶν διαφορῶν α'	
Περὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων α'	
Περὶ διαβολῆς α'	
Περὶ ἐπαίνου α'	190
Περὶ ἐμπειρίας α'	
Ἐπιστολῶν α'β'γ'	
Περὶ τῶν αὐτομάτων ζῳῶν α'	
Περὶ ἐκκρίσεως α'	
47 Ἐγκώμια θεῶν α'	195
Περὶ ἑορτῶν α'	
Περὶ εὐτυχίας α'	
Περὶ ἐνθυμημάτων α'	
Περὶ εὐρημάτων α'β'	
Ἠθικῶν σχολῶν α'	200
Ἠθικοὶ χαρακτήρες α'	
Περὶ θορύβου α'	
Περὶ ἱστορίας α'	
Περὶ κρίσεως συλλογισμῶν α'	
Περὶ θαλάττης α'	205
Περὶ κολακείας α'	
Πρὸς Κάσανδρον περὶ βασιλείας α'	
Περὶ κωμῳδίας α'	
Περὶ μετεώρων α'	
Περὶ λέξεως α'	210
Λόγων συναγωγή α'	
Λύσεις α'	

183 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.7	184 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.23	185 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.2
186 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.15	187 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.16	188 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.10
189 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.13	190 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.12	191 <i>inscr.</i> = 265 no.7
192 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.15	193 <i>inscr.</i> = 350 no.5c	194 <i>inscr.</i> = 328 no.14
195 <i>inscr.</i> = 580 no.1	196 <i>inscr.</i> = 580 no.2	197 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.14
198 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.6	199 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.11	200 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.3
201 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.4a	202 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.14	203 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.8
204 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.10	205 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.19	206 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.25
207 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.12	208 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.22	209 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.15e
210 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.17a	211 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.37	212 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.21

<i>On the Maxim</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the Ludicrous</i> , 1 book	
<i>Afternoon (Discussions)</i> , 2 books	
<i>Divisions</i> , 2 books	
<i>On Differentiae</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Injustices</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Slander</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Praise</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Experience</i> , 1 book	
<i>Letters</i> , 3 books	
<i>On Creatures Produced Spontaneously</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Secretion</i> , 1 book	
47 <i>Encomia of Gods</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Festivals</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Good Fortune</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Enthymemes</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Discoveries</i> , 1 book	
<i>Ethical Lectures</i> , 1 book	
<i>Ethical Characters</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Clamor</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Research</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the Deciding of Syllogisms</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the Sea</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Flattery</i> , 1 book	
<i>To Cassander on Kingship</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Comedy</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Things in the Sky</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Style</i> , 1 book	
<i>A Collection of Arguments</i> , 1 book	
<i>Solutions</i> , 1 book	

185 Δειλινῶν BQ: Δειληνῶν FPCoWV	187 Περὶ τῶν διαφορῶν α'
BPQCoWV: om. F ^{ac} : Περὶ διαφορῶν α' F ^{ms} : Περὶ τῶν (κατὰ τόπους) διαφορῶν α' Usener, qui Athenaeum 7.104 317F = 365B confert	188 Περὶ τῶν (κατὰ τόπους) διαφορῶν α' Usener, qui Athenaeum 7.104 317F = 365B confert
(δικαιωμάτων (vel δικαιοπραγημάτων) καὶ τῶν) ἀδικημάτων dubitanter conii. Fortenbaugh, coll. Arist. Rhet. 1373b1 et EN/EE 1135a8-15	191 α' om.
B 202 α' F: om. BPQCoWV	203 om. F
205 κινήσεως ante θαλάττης add. Usener	α' aV: β' W
207 Πρὸς Κάσανδρον περὶ βασιλείας α' PQCoWV: Πρὸς Κάσανδρον· Περὶ βασιλείας α' B: Περὶ βασιλείας α'· Πρὸς Κάσανδρον α' F	209 μετεώρων BPQCoWV: μέτρων F
210 Περὶ λέξεως α' BF ^{ms} PQCoWV: om. F ^{ac} : Περὶ λέξεως δ' Usener	

Περὶ μουσικῆς α'β'γ'		
Περὶ μέτρων α'		
Μεγακλῆς α'		215
Περὶ νόμων α'		
Περὶ παρανόμων α'		
Τῶν Ξενοκράτους συναγωγῆς α'		
'Ομιλητικὸς α'		
Περὶ ὄρκου α'		220
Παραγγέλματα ῥητορικῆς α'		
Περὶ πλούτου α'		
Περὶ ποιητικῆς α'		
Προβλήματα πολιτικά, φυσικά, ἐρωτικά, ἠθικὰ α'		
48 Προομιῶν α'		225
Προβλημάτων συναγωγῆς α'		
Περὶ τῶν προβλημάτων φυσικῶν α'		
Περὶ παραδείγματος α'		
Περὶ προθέσεως καὶ διηγήματος α'		
Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλο α'		230
Περὶ τῶν σοφῶν α'		
Περὶ συμβουλῆς α'		
Περὶ σολοικισμῶν α'		
Περὶ τέχνης ῥητορικῆς α'		
Περὶ τεχνῶν ῥητορικῶν εἶδη † ξα'		235
Περὶ ὑποκρίσεως α'		
'Υπομνημάτων Ἀριστοτελικῶν ἢ Θεοφραστειῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'		
Φυσικῶν δοξῶν α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'ζ'η'θ'ι'ια'ιβ'ιγ'ιδ'ιε'ις'		
Φυσικῶν ἐπιτομῆς α'		
Περὶ χάριτος α'		240
Χαρακτήρες ἠθικοί		

213 <i>inscr.</i> = 714 no.1	214 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.19	215 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.15
216 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.19	217 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.20	218 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.41
219 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.32	220 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.22	221 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.3
222 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.19a	223 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.20	224 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.4
225 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.15	226 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.3	227 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.26a
228 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.5	229 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.16	230 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.21
231 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.12	232 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.11	233 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.18
234 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.1	235 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.2a	236 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.24
237 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.6	238 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.6a	239 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.7b
240 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.24	241 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.4a	

213 Περὶ μουσικῆς α'β'γ' BF^{ms} PQCoW: om. F^{ac}: Περὶ μουσικῆς α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'V →

<i>On Music</i> , 3 books	
<i>On Meters</i> , 1 book	
<i>Megacles</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Laws</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Illegalities</i> , 1 book	
<i>Collection of the (Doctrines) of Xenocrates</i> , 1 book	
<i>(Dialogue) concerning Social Interaction</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (Swearing an) Oath</i> , 1 book	
<i>Rhetorical Precepts</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Wealth</i> , 1 book	
<i>On (the Art of) Poetry</i> , 1 book	
<i>Political, Natural, Erotic, and Ethical Problems</i> , 1 book	
48 <i>Introductions</i> , 1 book	
<i>Collection of Problems</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the Problems concerning Nature</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Example</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Statement and Narration</i> , 1 book	
another (work) <i>On (the Art of) Poetry</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the Wise (Men)</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Counsel</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Solecisms</i> , 1 book	
<i>On the Art of Rhetoric</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Kinds of Rhetorical Arts</i> , † 61 books	
<i>On Delivery</i> , 1 book	
<i>Aristotelian or Theophrastean Memoranda</i> , 6 books	
<i>Opinions of the Natural Philosophers (or Opinions concerning Natural Things)</i> , 16 books	
<i>Summary of Natural Things</i> , 1 book	
<i>On Kindness (or Grace)</i> , 1 book	
<i>Ethical Characters</i>	

214 ante Περὶ μέτρων V *transp. vv.* 238-44 Περὶ μέτρων α' BPQCoWV: om. F^{ac}: Περὶ μετεώρων α' F^{ms} 220 ὄρκου aWV: ὄρκου d 221 om. F 222 α' BPQCoWV: om. F 224 πολιτικά BFPCoWV: ποιητικά Q 225 Προομιῶν aWV: (Περὶ) προομιῶν Usener 227 Περὶ τῶν BPQCoW: om. F: Περὶ τοῦ V φυσικῶν aW: φυσικοῦ V 230-70 om. V, *spatio ca.* 50 *litt. relicto* 230 Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἄλλο α' BPQCoW: om. F^{ac}: περὶ ποιητικῆς F^{ms}: Περὶ ποιητικῆς α' c 231 σοφῶν aW: (ζ') σοφῶν Usener 235 ῥητορικῶν aW: φρασεῶν ῥητορικῶν c *crucem posuit Sollenberger*: ξα' BF^{ac}P^{ac}: ξ' F^{ac}: ζα' P^{ac}QCoW: ιζ' de 237 Θεοφραστειῶν BPQW: Θεοφραστειῶν FCo: Θεοφραστειῶν Ald. 238-44 *transp. V inter v.* 214 et 215 239 Φυσικῶν ἐπιτομῆς aWV: Φυσικῶν (δοξῶν) ἐπιτομῆς Meurs

- Περὶ ψευδοῦς καὶ ἀληθοῦς α'
- Τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορίας α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'
- Περὶ θεῶν α'β'γ'
- Ἱστορικῶν γεωμετρικῶν α'β'γ'δ'
- 49 Ἐπιτομῶν Ἀριστοτέλους Περὶ ζῴων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς'
- Ἐπιχειρημάτων α'β'
- Θέσεις γ'
- Περὶ βασιλείας α'β'
- Περὶ αἰτιῶν α'
- Περὶ Δημοκρίτου α'
- Περὶ διαβολῆς α'
- Περὶ γενέσεως α'
- Περὶ ζῴων φρονήσεως καὶ ἤθους α'
- Περὶ κινήσεως α'β'
- Περὶ ὄψεως α'β'γ'δ'
- Πρὸς ὄρους α'β'
- Περὶ τοῦ δεδόσθαι α'
- Περὶ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος α'
- Περὶ τῶν μουσικῶν α'
- Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας α'
- Προτρεπτικὸς α'
- Πῶς ἄριστ' ἂν πόλεις οἰκοῖντο ὑπομνήματα α'
- Περὶ ῥύακος τοῦ ἐν Σικελίᾳ α'
- Περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων α'
- Περὶ τῶν προβλημάτων φυσικῶν α'
- Τίνες οἱ τρόποι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι α'
- Περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου α'β'γ'

242 <i>inscr.</i> = 246 no.5	243 <i>inscr.</i> = 251 no.1	244 <i>inscr.</i> = 251 no.2
245 <i>inscr.</i> = 264 no.3	246 <i>inscr.</i> = 350 no.2	247 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.23
248 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.35	249 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.10	250 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.9
251 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.32	252 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.13	253 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.10b
254 <i>inscr.</i> = 350 no.11	255 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.2	256 <i>inscr.</i> = 265 no.6
257 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.14	258 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.29	259 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.30
260 <i>inscr.</i> = 714 no.2	261 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.13	262 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.33
263 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.8	264 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.24	265 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.28
266 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.26a	267 <i>inscr.</i> = 265 no.8	268 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.33

245 Ἱστορικῶν BPQCoW: Π(ερὶ) ἱστοριῶν F 246 Ἐπιτομῶν Ἀριστοτέλους Περὶ ζῴων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς' BW: Ἐπιτομῶν Ἀριστοτέλους Περὶ ζῴων α'β'γ'δ'ε'ς' PQCo: Ἐπιτομῶν Ἀριστοτέλους πεζῶν 5' F 247-53 *om. dc* 247 α'β' BPQCoW: ἐπτά F 248 γ' aWE: 5' HIY 253 Περὶ

- On False and True, 1 book
- Research on the Divine, 6 books
- On the Gods, 3 books
- Geometrical Researches, 4 books
- 49 Epitomes of Aristotle's On Living Creatures, 6 books
- Epicheiremes (Dialectical Arguments), 2 books
- Theses, 3 books
- On Kingship, 2 books
- On Causes, 1 book
- On Democritus, 1 book
- On Slander, 1 book
- On Coming-to-be, 1 book
- On the Intelligence and Habits of Living Creatures, 1 book
- On Motion, 2 books
- On Vision, 4 books
- Regarding Definitions (or Terms), 2 books
- On Having Been Granted, 1 book
- On Greater and Lesser, 1 book
- On the Musicians, 1 book
- On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics, 1 book
- Exhortation, 1 book
- Notes on How Cities May Best be Governed, 1 book
- On the Lava Flow in Sicily, 1 book
- On Agreed (Premises), 1 book
- On Problems concerning Nature, 1 book
- What Are the Ways of Knowing?, 1 book
- On the Liar (Paradox), 3 books

γενέσεως α' aW: Περὶ (ζῴων) γενέσεως α' Meurs, qui Apuleii Apologiam 36 = 351 *confert*: Περὶ (τῆς τῶν στοιχείων) γενέσεως α' Steinmetz, qui Simplicii *comm. In Arist. De caelo p.700.6-7 = 171 confert* 254-9 *om. c* 257 Πρὸς ὄρους α'β' BPQW: Περὶ ὄρους α'β' Co: *om. F^{nc}*: Περὶ ὄρου F^{ms} 258 δεδόσθαι aW: δίδοσθαι Meurs 259 Περὶ aW: Περὶ τοῦ h 260 *ante hunc titulum* Περὶ κινήσεως *perperam inserit F* τῶν BFPQCoW: *om. F* 261 Ἀκαδημείας B: Ἀκαδημίας FPQCoW α' *post* εὐδαιμονίας *add. Meurs* 263 Πῶς ἄριστ' ἂν πόλεις οἰκοῖντο (οἰκοῖντο B) ὑπομνήματα α' BPQCoWDGT: Πῶς ἂν ἄριστα πόλεις οἰκοῖντο α' F: Πῶς ἂν ἄριστα πόλεις οἰκοῖτο ὑπομνήματα α' c: Πῶς ἂν ἄριστα πόλεις οἰκοῖντο ὑπομνήματα α' h: Πῶς ἄριστ' ἂν πόλεις οἰκοῖν α' τὰ ὑπομνήματα α' S: Πῶς ἄριστ' ἂν πόλεις οἰκοῖτο α' τὰ ὑπομνήματα α' Meurs: Πῶς ἄριστ' ἂν πόλεις οἰκοῖτο α' τὰ ὑπομνήματα (sic) (ἱστορικὰ) α' Usener 266 τῶν BPQCoW: *om. F*

- 50 Τὰ πρὸ τῶν τόπων α'
 Πρὸς Αἰσχύλον α' 270
 Ἀστρολογικῆς ἱστορίας α' β' γ' δ' ε' ζ'
 Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν περὶ αὐξήσεως α'
 Ἀκίχαρος α'
 Περὶ δικανικῶν λόγων α'
 Περὶ διαβολῆς α' 275
 Ἐπιστολαὶ αἱ ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀστυκρέοντι, Φανία, Νικάνορι
 Περὶ εὐσεβείας α'
 Εὐιάδος α'
 Περὶ καιρῶν α' β'
 Περὶ οἰκειῶν λόγων α' 280
 Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς α'
 ἄλλο διάφορον α'
 Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ἀρετῶν ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης α'
 Προτρεπτικὸς α'
 Περὶ ἀριθμῶν α' 285
 Ὅριστικὰ περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν α'
 Περὶ οὐρανοῦ α'
 Πολιτικοῦ α' β'
 Περὶ φύσεως
 Περὶ καρπῶν 290
 Περὶ ζῳῶν

ἃ γίνονται στίχων μκγ, βων·

- 51 τοσαῦτα μὲν οὖν καὶ τῷδε τὰ βιβλία. εὐρον δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ διαθήκας
 τοῦτον ἐχοῦσας τὸν τρόπον·

ἔσται μὲν εὐ. ἐὰν δέ τι συμβῆ, τάδε διατίθεμαι. τὰ μὲν οἴκοι ὑπάρ- 295
 χοντα πάντα δίδωμι Μελάντη καὶ Παγκρέοντι τοῖς υἱοῖς Λέοντος. ἀπὸ
 δὲ τῶν παρ' Ἰππάρχου συμβεβλημένων τάδε μοι βοῦλόμαι γενέσθαι.

269 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.19	270 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.42	271 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.43
272 <i>inscr.</i> = 264 no.2	273 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.13	274 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.9
275 <i>inscr.</i> = 666 no.13	276 <i>inscr.</i> = 727 no.16	277 <i>inscr.</i> = 580 no.3
278 <i>inscr.</i> = 580 no.4	279 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.5	280 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.27
281 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.10	282 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.11	283 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.9a
284 <i>inscr.</i> = 436 no.33	285 <i>inscr.</i> = 264 no.1	286 <i>inscr.</i> = 68 no.11
287 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.1c	288 <i>inscr.</i> = 589 no.2	289 <i>inscr.</i> = 137 no.3
290 <i>inscr.</i> = 384 no.4	291 <i>inscr.</i> = 350 no.1	

271 *a verbo* (Ἀστρολο)γικῆς *rursus incipit V* 272 Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν
 (ἱστορικῶν Q) περὶ αὐξήσεως α' BFPQWV: Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν· Περὶ αὐξ-

- 50 *Preliminaries to the Topics*, 1 book
In Reply to Aeschylus, 1 book
Astronomical Research, 6 books
Arithmetical Researches concerning Increase, 1 book
Acicharus, 1 book
On Judicial Speeches, 1 book
On Slander, 1 book
Letters to Astycreon, Phantias, Nicanor
On Piety, 1 book
Bacchant, 1 book
On Crises, 2 books
On Relevant Arguments, 1 book
On Bringing Up Children, 1 book
 another (work on the same topic) with a different treatment, 1 book
On Education, or On Virtues, or On Temperance, 1 book
Exhortation, 1 book
On Numbers, 1 book
Definitions connected with the Language of Syllogisms, 1 book
On Heaven, 1 book
Political (Dialogue), 2 books
On Nature
On Fruits
On Living Creatures

These books amount to 232,850 lines.

- 51 So numerous, then, are the books of this man, too. I have also
 found his will, which runs in this manner:

"It will be well. But in case something happens, I make the
 following dispositions. All the property at home I give to Melantes
 and Pancreon, the sons of Leon. Out of the funds collected by
 Hipparchus, I want the following to be done for me. First, I want

ήσεως α' Co: Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν (α')· Περὶ αὐξήσεως α' Meurs 273
 Ἀκίχαρος F^m PQCōWV: om. F^c: Ἀκίχαρος B 276 αἱ ἐπὶ BFPQWV:
 ἐπὶ Co: αἱ ἐπι(γραφομέναι) Usener Φανία PQCōWV: Φανεία B: Φιλ-
 ανία F 278 Εὐιάδος PQCōWV: Εὐειάδος B: Εὐιδάος F: Θυιάδες Usener
 280 α' FPQCōWV: α' β' B 281 ἀγωγῆς FPQCōWV: ἀπαγωγῆς B
 285 ἀριθμῶν aWV: ῥυθμῶν Meurs 288 Πολιτικοῦ BPQWV: om. F^c:
 Πολιτικὰ F^m Co: Πολιτικῶν cdA: Πολιτικὸς hη 291 sine numero FPQCō
 WV: α' B 292 ἃ FPQCōWV: om. B μκγ, βων BPQCōWV: μβων
 F τῷδε FPQCōWV: τάδε B: τοῦδε C 295 ἔσται FPQCōWV: ἔστε
 B 296 Μελάντη BF: Μέλαντι PQCōWV

πρῶτον μὲν βούλομαι γενέσθαι τὰ περὶ τὸ μουσεῖον καὶ τὰς θεὰς
 συντελεσθῆναι κἄν εἴ τι ἄλλο δύναται περὶ αὐτὰς ἐπικοσμηθῆναι πρὸς
 τὸ κάλλιον. ἔπειτα τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους εἰκόνα τεθῆναι εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ 300
 τὰ λοιπὰ ἀναθήματα, ὅσα πρότερον ὑπῆρχεν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ. εἶτα τὸ
 στοῖδιον οἰκοδομηθῆναι τὸ πρὸς τῷ μουσεῖῳ μὴ χεῖρον ἢ πρότερον.
 ἀναθεῖναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς πίνακας, ἐν οἷς αἱ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι εἰσιν, εἰς
 52 τὴν κάτω στοῖαν. ἐπισκευασθῆναι δὲ καὶ τὸν βωμόν, ὅπως ἔχη τὸ τέλειον
 καὶ τὸ εὐσχημον. βούλομαι δὲ καὶ τὴν Νικομάχου εἰκόνα συν- 305
 τελεσθῆναι ἴσην. τὸ μὲν τῆς πλάσεως ἔχει Πραξιτέλης· τὸ δ' ἄλλο
 ἀνάλωμα ἀπὸ τούτου γενέσθω. σταθῆναι δὲ ὅπου ἂν δοκῇ τοῖς καὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἐπιμελουμένοις τῶν ἐν τῇ διαθήκῃ γεγραμμένων. καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ
 τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὰ ἀναθήματα τούτων ἔχει τὸν τρόπον.

τὸ δὲ χαρίον τὸ ἐν Σταγείροις ἡμῖν ὑπάρχον δίδωμι Καλλίνῳ· τὰ 310
 δὲ βιβλία πάντα Νηλεΐ. τὸν δὲ κῆπον καὶ τὸν περίπατον καὶ τὰς οἰκίας
 τὰς πρὸς τῷ κήπῳ πάσας δίδωμι τῶν γεγραμμένων φίλων αἰεὶ τοῖς
 53 βουλομένοις συσχολάζειν καὶ συμφιλοσοφεῖν ἐν αὐταῖς, ἐπειδήπερ οὐ
 δυνατὸν αἰεὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐπιδημεῖν, μήτ' ἐξαλλοτριῶσι μήτ'
 ἐξιδιαιομένου μηδενός, ἀλλ' ὡς ἂν ἱερὸν κοινῇ κεκτημένοις καὶ τὰ 315
 πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἰκείως καὶ φιλικῶς χρωμένοις, ὥσπερ προσήκον καὶ
 δίκαιον.

ἔστωσαν δὲ οἱ κοινωοῦντες Ἴππαρχος, Νηλεὺς, Στράτων,
 Καλλίνος, Δημότιμος, Δημάρατος, Καλλισθένης, Μελάντης, Παγκρέων,
 Νικίππος, ἐξεῖναι δὲ βουλομένῳ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει τῷ 320
 Μητροδώρῳ καὶ Πυθιάδῳ υἱῷ καὶ μετέχειν τούτων. καὶ αὐτοῦ πᾶσαν
 ἐπιμέλειαν ποιῆσθαι τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους, ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα προαχθῆ
 κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.

θάψαι δὲ καὶ ἡμᾶς ὅπου ἂν δοκῇ μάλιστα ἀρμόττον εἶναι τοῦ
 κήπου, μηδὲν περιέργον περὶ τὴν ταφὴν μήτε περὶ τὸ μνημεῖον 325
 54 ποιοῦντας. ὅπως δὲ συνείρηται μετὰ τὰ περὶ ὑμᾶς συμβάντα (τὰ) περὶ
 τὸ ἱερὸν καὶ τὸ μνημεῖον καὶ τὸν κῆπον καὶ τὸν περίπατον θερ-

320-1 *Sext. Emp., Adv. Math.* 1.258 (t.3 p.64.23-4 *Mau*)

299 δύναται *BPQCoWV*: ἰσχὴ *F* ἐπικοσμηθῆναι *PWV*: ἐπικομισθῆ-
 ναὶ *BFQCo* 302 χεῖρον ἢ *BF*: χεῖρον *Co*: χεῖρονι *PQWV* 306 πλά-
 σεως *aWV*: πράξεως *chT* 309 ἔχει *aWV*: ἐχέτω *Cobet* 313 συσχολάζειν
FPQCoWV: σχολάζειν *B* αὐταῖς *F*: αὐτῷ *BPQCoWV* 315 ἄλλ' ὡς
FPQCoWV: *om. B et lac. ca. 35 litt.* 319 Καλλίνος *BPQCoW*: Καλλίνικος
FV 319 Μελάντης *BFCo*: Μέλαντις *PQWV* 321 Μητροδώρου *corr.*
Nunnesius et Schottus sec. Sext. Emp.: Μειδίῳ *FPQCoWV*: Μηδίου *B*
 324 ἀρμόττον *aWV*: ἀρμόδιον *d* 325 περιέργον *BPQCoWV*: περιέργον

the matters concerning the sanctuary of the muses to be done and
 (the statues of) the goddesses to be completed, and if anything else
 can be added as adornment for their beautification; next, I want
 the statue of Aristotle to be put into the shrine and the rest of the
 votive offerings, which were in the shrine formerly; then (re)build
 the small portico next to the sanctuary of the muses no worse than
 before; also set up in the lower portico the tablets on which are
 52 the maps of the earth. The altar is to be repaired in order that
 it may be perfect and elegant. I also want the life-size statue of
 Nicomachus to be completed. Praxiteles has (received the cost) of
 the sculpturing, and let any other expenditure come from this. It
 is to be placed wherever seems appropriate to the executors of the
 other things also set down in the will. And this is the manner
 (of arrangements) concerning the shrine and the votive offerings.

The estate in Stagira belonging to me I give to Callinus. All
 the books (I give) to Neleus. The garden and the walk and all
 the dwellings next to the garden I give to those of (my) friends
 listed below who wish at any time to study and to philosophize
 53 together in them — since it is not possible for all men to be always
 in residence — (on the condition that) they neither alienate (them)
 nor anyone appropriate (them) for his own private use, but rather
 that they possess (them) in common, as if a shrine, and that in
 matters of mutual concern they use (them) in a familiar and friendly
 manner, just as is fitting and just.

Let the common partners be Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato,
 Callinus, Demotimus, Demaratus, Callisthenes, Melantes, Pancreon,
 Nicippus. It is to be possible also for Aristotle, the son of Metro-
 dorus and Pythias, if he wishes, to study philosophy and to share
 in these things, and the oldest ones are to take thorough care of
 him, in order that he may be led on in philosophy as much as
 possible.

Bury me wherever seems to be especially suitable in the garden,
 doing nothing excessive concerning the burial nor concerning the
 54 monument. In order that the maintenance of the shrine and the
 monument and the garden and the walk may be continued after

μήτε *F* μήτε *FPQCoWV*: μηδὲ *B* 326 συνείρηται *aWV*: συνήται
 (sic) *Salmasius* 326 τὰ . . . συμβάντα *aWV*: τὸ . . . συμβάν, τὰ *Roepfer*
 τὰ *ante* περὶ (*alt.*) *add. Cobet* 327-8 θεραπευόμενα *aWV*: ὑπὸ τῶν
 ὀργεῶνων *Salmasius*

απευόμενα, συνεπιμελείσθαι καὶ Πομπύλον τούτων ἐποικοῦντα αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενον ἦν καὶ πρότερον· τῆς δὲ λυσιτελείας ἐπιμελείσθαι αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἔχοντας ταῦτα. 330

Πομπύλῳ δὲ καὶ Θρέπτη πάλαι ἐλευθέρους οὖσι καὶ ἡμῖν πολλὴν χρεῖαν παρεσχημένοις, εἴ τι πρότερον ἔχουσι παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ εἴ τι αὐτοὶ ἐκτήσαντο, καὶ ἃ νῦν παρ' Ἰπάρχου αὐτοῖς συντέταχα, δισχιλίας δραχμάς, ἀσφαλῶς οἶμαι δεῖν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ταῦτα, καθάπερ καὶ αὐτοῖς διελέχθην Μελάντη καὶ Παγκρέοντι πλεονάκις καὶ πάντα μοι 335 συγκατετίθεντο. δίδωμι δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ Σωματάλην καὶ τὴν παιδίσκην. 55 τῶν δὲ παίδων Μόλωνα μὲν καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Παρμένοντα ἤδη ἐλευθέρους ἀφίημι. Μάνην δὲ καὶ Καλλίαν παραμείναντας ἔτι τέτταρα ἐν τῷ κήρῳ καὶ συνεργασαμένους καὶ ἀναμαρτήτους γενομένους ἀφίημι ἐλευθέρους. τῶν δ' οἰκηματικῶν σκευῶν ἀποδιδόντας Πομπύλῳ 340 ὅσα ἂν δοκῆ τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς καλῶς ἔχειν, τὰ λοιπὰ ἐξαργυρίσαι. δίδωμι δὲ καὶ Καρίωνα Δημοτίμῳ, Δόνακα δὲ Νηλεΐ. Εὐβοῖον δ' ἀποδόσθαι.

Δότῳ δ' Ἰππαρχος Καλλίνῳ τρισχιλίας δραχμάς. Μελάντη δὲ καὶ Παγκρέοντι εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐωρῶμεν Ἰππαρχον καὶ ἡμῖν πρότερον χρεῖαν 345 παρεσχημένον καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις μάλα νευαναγηκότα, προσετάξαμεν ἂν μετὰ Μελάντου καὶ Παγκρέοντος ἐξάγειν αὐτά. ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὔτε ἐκείνοις ἐώρων ῥάδιον ὄντα συνοικονομεῖν λυσιτελέστερόν τε αὐτοῖς ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι τεταγμένον τι λαβεῖν παρ' Ἰπάρχου, δότῳ 56 δ' Ἰππαρχος Μελάντη καὶ Παγκρέοντι ἑκατέρῳ τάλαντον. διδόναι δ' Ἰππαρχον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς εἰς τὰ ἀναλώματα τὰ ἐν τῇ διαθήκῃ γεγραμμένα κατὰ τοὺς ἐκάστου καιροῦς τῶν δαπανημάτων. οἰκονομήσαντα δὲ ταῦτα Ἰππαρχον ἀπηλλάχθαι τῶν συμβολαίων τῶν πρὸς ἐμὲ πάντων· καὶ εἴ τι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος συμβέβληκεν Ἰππαρχος ἐν Χαλκίδι, Ἰπάρχου τοῦτό ἐστιν. 355

ἐπιμεληταὶ δ' ἔστωσαν τῶν ἐν τῇ διαθήκῃ γεγραμμένων Ἰππαρχος, Νηλεΐς, Στράτων, Καλλίνος, Δημοτίμος, Καλλισθένης, Κτήσαρχος.

328 τούτων B: τούτων FPQCoWV αὐτὸν aWV: αὐτοῦ d 330
αὐτοῦ Ménage: αὐτὸν F^aPQCoWV: αὐτοῦς F¹: αὐτῶν B 335 αὐτοῖς
aWV: αὐτὸς Reiske διελέχθη BW: διελέχθη CoV: διελέχθη P:
διελέχθημεν F: διηλέχθη Q 336 καὶ (alt.) om. Frob. 337 Μόλωνα
BPQCoWV: Μάλωνα F Κίμωνα BPQCoWV: Τίμωνα F: Σίμωνα
Cobet 342 Εὐβοῖον FPQWV: Ἐβοῖον B: Εῦβοῖον Co: Εῦβοιον Frob.: Εῦβοιον
Meineke 344 Καλλίνῳ BPQWV: Καλλινίῳ FCo 345 ἡμῖν BPQCo
WV: μῖν F 348 συνοικονομεῖν a: συνοικοδομεῖν WV 350 δ' (alt.)
BPQCoWV: καὶ δ' F 353 οἰκονομήσαντα aWV: οἰκοδομήσαντα d 354
ἐπὶ BPQCoWV: περὶ F συμβέβληκεν BPQCoW: συμβέβηκεν FV 355

→

what happens to me, Pompylus, too, is to have joint charge of these things, living nearby and giving attention to the other matters as (he did) even formerly. And those who hold (title to) these things are to be attentive to his welfare.

To Pompylus and Threpte, who have been free for a long time and have been a great help to me, if they have anything formerly from me and if they have acquired anything themselves, I think that these things and what I have now arranged for them from Hipparchus, two thousand drachmas, ought to be securely theirs, just as I have often discussed also with Melantes and Pancreon themselves, and they have agreed with me in everything. I also give to them Somatale and the maidservant.

55 Of the slaves, Molon and Cimon and Parmeno I immediately set free. Manes and Callias, when they have remained in the garden for four years and have worked together and kept out of trouble, I set free. Of the household furniture, the executors are to hand over to Pompylus as much as they think appropriate and to sell all the rest. I also give Carion to Demotimus, Donax to Neleus. Eubous is to be sold.

Let Hipparchus give Callinus three thousand drachmas. If I had not seen that Hipparchus had helped Melantes and Pancreon, and formerly me, and that he has now been quite shipwrecked in his own affairs, I would have appointed (him) along with Melantes and Pancreon to execute these provisions. But because I repeatedly saw that it is not easy for them to administer (these things) together (with Hipparchus), and I supposed it more profitable for them to receive from Hipparchus a fixed sum, let Hipparchus give Melantes and Pancreon a talent each. Hipparchus is also to give (funds) to the executors for the expenses set down in the will at the times of each of the expenditures. Once he has administered these matters, Hipparchus is to be freed from all obligations to me. And if in Chalcis he has made any contracts in my name, it is his business.

Let there be appointed as executors of the things set down in the will Hipparchus, Neleus, Strato, Callinus, Demotimus, Callisthenes, Ctesarchus.

Ἰπάρχου τοῦτό ἐστιν aWV: Ἰπάρχῳ τοῦτο ἔσται DGS: Ἰπάρχῳ τοῦτο ἐστὶν T: Ἰπάρχῳ τοῦτο ἔστω Hermann 357 Καλλίνος BFPCoWV: Καλλίνος Q

57 αἱ διαθήκαι κείνται ἀντίγραφα τῷ Θεοφράστου δακτυλίῳ σεσημασμένοι, μία μὲν παρ' Ἡγησία Ἰππάρχου· μάρτυρες Κάλλιπος Παλληνεύς, Φιλόμηλος Εὐωνυμεύς, Λύσανδρος Ὑβαίης, Φιλίων 360 Ἀλωπεκῆθεν. τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔχει Ὀλυμπιόδωρος· μάρτυρες δ' οἱ αὐτοί. τὴν δ' ἑτέραν ἔλαβεν Ἀδείμαντος, ἀπήνεγκε δ' Ἀνδροσθένης ὁ υἱός· μάρτυρες Ἀείμνηστος Κλεοβούλου, Λυσίστρατος Φίδωνος Θάσιος, Στράτων Ἀρκεσιλάου Λαμψακηνός, Θήσιππος Θησίππου ἐκ Κεραμῶν, Διοσκουρίδης Διονυσίου Ἐπικηφίσιος." 365

ὧδ' ἔχουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ αἱ διαθήκαι.

ἀκοῦσαι δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἐρασίστρατον τὸν ἱατρὸν εἰσι δ' οἱ λέγουσι· καὶ εἰκός. διεδέξατο δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν σχολὴν Στράτων.

358 ἀντίγραφα aWV: ἀντίγραφοι C: ἀντίγραφοι (τρῆς) Reiske: (κατ') ἀντίγραφοι Richards 360 Παλληνεύς Ménage: Πελλανεύς BPQCoWV: Πελανεύς F Φιλόμηλος (Φιλόμιλος B) Εὐωνυμεύς BPQCoWV: om. F Ὑβαίης BPQCoWV: Ὑβαίου F: Ὑβάδης Ménage Φιλίων BFPCoW: Φιλίης Q: Φίλων I: Λίων V: Λέων d 362 δ' ἑτέραν aWV: δὲ τρίτην →

2 Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.21-34 Adler)

Θεόφραστος, Μελάντα γναφέως, οἱ δὲ Λέοντος· ἀπὸ Ἐρεσοῦ, ἀκουστῆς Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ διάδοχος τῆς σχολῆς τῆς ἐν τῷ περιπάτῳ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καταλειφθείσης εἰς Χαλκίδα ἐκδημήσαντος. οὗτος πρότερον ἑκαλείτο Τύρταμος· διὰ δὲ τὸ θείως φράζειν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἐκλήθη Εὐφραστος, εἶτα Θεόφραστος· ὡς περ Πλάτων διὰ τὸ 5 ἐν τοῖς λόγοις πλάτος τοῦτο ἐπωνομάσθη, πρότερον καλούμενος Ἀριστοκλῆς. μαθητὰς δὲ ἔσχε πλεῖον ἢ β', ἐρώμενον δὲ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους υἱὸν τοῦ φιλοσόφου Νικόμαχον. ἐτιμήθη δὲ παρὰ Κασσάνδρῳ τῷ Ἀντιπάτρῳ, καὶ τελευτᾶ κατάποντος ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ γράφειν γενόμενος, εἶτα ἐνδοῦς ἐπὶ βραχείας ἡμέρας διὰ μαθητοῦ γάμου. βιβλία δὲ αὐτοῦ 10 πάμπλειστα, ὧν καὶ ταῦτα·

Ἄναλυτικῶν προτέρων τρία

Ἄναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων ζ'

Ἄναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν

Ἄναλυτικῶν ἐπιτομῆν

Ἄνηγμένων τόπων 15

57 Copies of the will are on deposit, sealed with the signet ring of Theophrastus. One is with Hegesias, the son of Hipparchus. Callippus of Pallene, Philomelus of Euonymon, Lysander of Hyba, Philion of Alopece are witnesses. Olympiodorus has another (copy). The same men are witnesses. Adeimantus received another (copy); Androsthenes, the son (of the like-named Androsthenes), took it to him. Aeimnestus, son of Cleobulus, Lysistratus of Thasus, son of Phidon, Straton of Lampsacus, son of Arcesilaus, Thesippus from Cerameis, son of Thesippus, Dioscurides of Epicephisia, son of Dionysius, are witnesses."

This is the way in which his will runs, too.

There are those who say that Erasistratus the physician was also his pupil, and it is likely. Strato took over his school.

Reiske Ἀδείμαντος BFV: Ἀδήμαντος PQCoW 363 Ἀείμνηστος aWV: Ἀρίμνηστος Ménage Φίδωνος BPQW: Φείδωνος FCoV Θάσιος BPQCoWV: Θάσειος F 367 εἰσι δ' οἱ λέγουσι PQCoWV: εἰσιν οἱ λέγουσι F: εἰσι δ' οἱ λέγοντες B 368 αὐτοῦ FCoD: αὐτὸν BPQWV Στράτων d: om. aWV

2 Suda, on Theophrastus (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.21-34 Adler)

Theophrastus was the son of Melantas, a fuller, but some say of Leon. (Coming) from Eresus, he was the pupil of Aristotle and successor (as head) of the school in the Peripatos left behind by him (Aristotle) when he retired to Chalcis. He was formerly called Tyrtamus, but on account of the divine character of his speech he was called Euphrastus by Aristotle, and then Theophrastus, just as Plato was named on account of the breadth of his discussions, being formerly called Aristocles. He (Theophrastus) had more than 2,000 students and had as beloved the son of Aristotle the philosopher, Nicomachus. He was honored at the court of Cassander, the son of Antipater, and he died after becoming worn out from continual writing and then letting up for a few days on account of a student's marriage. His books are very numerous, among which are these, too:

Prior Analytics, three books

Posterior Analytics, 7 books

Analysis of Syllogisms

Epitome of (the) Analytics

The Reduction of Topics

Περὶ λίθων
Περὶ φυτῶν
Περὶ μετάλλων
Περὶ ὀσμῶν
καὶ ἄλλα.

20

5-7 ὄσπερ—'Ἀριστοκλή[ς] Neanthes ap. Philodemum in *Indice Acad. Herc. col.* 2.36-42 (p.21-2 Mekler) = FGvH 84 F 21b, *Seneca, Epist.* 58.30, *Apuleius, De Platone* 1.1, *Sextus Emp., Adv. math.* 1.258, *Diog. Laert., Vitae* 3.4, *Serius, In Verg. Aen.* 6.668 (t.2 p.93.22-5 Thilo), *Proclus, In Plat. Crat. proem.* 16 (p.6.26-7.1 Pasquali) et 123 (p.73.3-4), *Boetius, In Arist. De interpr. sec. ed.* 12 (p.56.1-3 Meiser), *Ammonius, In Arist. De interpr. 1* 16a3-9 (CAG t.4.5 p.20.18-19), *Olympiod., In Plat. prim. Alcib.* 2.36-41 (p.2-3 Westerink), *Anon., Proleg. in Plat. philos.* 1.14-18 (p.3 Westerink), *Stephanus, In Arist. De interpr. 1* 16a27

3A Ibn an-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* 7.1, cap. de Theophrasto (p.252.5-11 Flügel)

ثاؤفرسطس أحد تلاميذ أرسطاليس وابن أخته وأحد الأوصياء الذين وصى
إليهم أرسطاليس وخلفه على دار التعليم بعد وفاته
وله من الكتب
كتاب النفس مقالة
كتاب الآثار العلوية مقالة⁵
كتاب الأدب مقالة
كتاب الحس والمحسوس أربع مقالات نقله ابرهيم بن بکوش
كتاب ما بعد الطبيعة مقالة نقلها أبو زكريا يحيى بن عدي
كتاب أسباب النبات نقله ابرهيم بن بکوش والذي وجد تفسير بعض المقالة الأولى
ومما ينحل إليه تفسير كتاب قاطيفورياس¹⁰

fontes: *Fihrist (codd. CHLV), ex quo pendet Ibn Abi Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā'* t.1 p.69.22-6 Müller (IAU)

1 اخته *Ishāq b. Hunayn, Ta'rīḥ al-aṭībbā' ap. Šiwān al-ḥikma prooemium* (v.375-6 Dunlop, p.109.5 Badawī): ارسطوطاليس و ثاؤفرسطس ابن أخته: *Ibn an-Nadīm, Fihrist* 7.1, cap. de Aristotele, p.247.19 Flügel; *az-Zawzani, Muntahabāt, cap. de Aristotele, p.32.15 Lippert; vid. notam 1 ad versionem Anglicam*

1-2 ارسطوطاليس IAU bis 1 اخته LV: اخته CH: خالته IAU 3 وله Fihrist :
بکوس IAU om. 7 نقله ... بکوش 7 IAU om. 7 et 9
نقله 9 IAU om. 8 نقلها ... عدي 8
CH Flügel: نکوش s.p.L.: نکوس
add. قاطيفورياس post. IAU om. 10
وما ... اليه 10 IAU om.
IAU وقيل انه منحول اليه كتاب الى ديمقراط في التوحيد كتاب في المسائل الطبيعية

On Stones
On Plants
On Metals
On Odors
and others.

(CAG t.18.3 p.9.29-32), *Suda, s.v. Πλάτων* (no. 1707, LG t.1 pars 4 p.141.14-16 Adler), *Geo. Cedrenus, Hist. compend.* 160C (PG t.121 col.317A), *Io. Tzetzes, Hist.* 6.413-14 et 11.848-9, et *Io. Saresberiensis, Polycraticus* 7.5 (t.2 p.105 Webb = PL. t.199 col.644A), *qui scribit se ex Apuleio dependere*

12 et 13 'Αναλυτικῶν Kuster sec. *Diog. Laert.* 5.42: 'Αναλυτικὰ codd. 14
Περὶ ἀναλύσεως T et *Diog. Laert.* 5.42

3A Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Theophrastus (p.252.5-11 Flügel)

Theophrastus was one of Aristotle's pupils and his sister's son.¹ He was also one of the executors whom Aristotle appointed (in his will). He (Aristotle) designated him to succeed as head of the school after his own death.

He wrote the following books:

On the Soul, one book

Meteorology, one book

On Education, one book

On Sensation and the Sensible, four books; translated by Ibrāhīm ibn-Bakkūš

Metaphysics, one book; translated by Abū-Zakarīyā Yahyā ibn-'Adī

The Causes of Plants, translated by Ibrāhīm ibn-Bakkūš; what is extant is a commentary on some (portions) of the first book

Among what is (falsely) attributed to him is a commentary on the *Categories* (of Aristotle).²

¹ Theophrastus' relationship to Aristotle is variously and erroneously reported in Arabic sources: son of Aristotle's sister (Ishāq ibn-Hunayn, text in app. to 3A, and Ibn-an-Nadīm 3A), son of his brother (Zawzanī 3B), and son of his maternal aunt (Mas'ūdī 596).

² Ibn-Abī-Uṣaybi'a adds two more titles to the list: *On Asserting the Oneness (of God)*, to *Democrates* = 251 no. 3, and *On Problems concerning Nature* = 137 no. 26b.

- 3B az-Zawzanī, al-Muntaḥabāt min Aḥbār al-ḥukamā' li-l-Qiftī, cap. de Theophrasto (p.106.16-107.6 Lippert)

ثاؤفرسطس الحكيم كان ابن أخي ارسطوطاليس وأحد تلاميذه الآخذين
الحكمة عنه وأحد الأوصياء الذين وصى إليهم ارسطوطاليس وهو الذي تصدر
بعده للإقراء بدار التعليم

107

وكان فهماً عالياً حاذقاً مقصوداً لهذا الشأن وقرئت عليه كتب عمه
وصنّف التصانيف الجليلة واستفيدت منه ونقلت عنه
وتصانيفه

5

كتاب الآثار العلوية مقالة واحدة
كتاب الأدب مقالة واحدة

كتاب ما بعد الطبيعة مقالة واحدة نقلها يحيى بن عدي
كتاب الحسّ والمسوس نقل ابراهيم بن بكوش أربع مقالات
كتاب أسباب النبات نقله ابراهيم بن بكوش
ومما يُنحل إليه «تفسير» كتاب قاطيفورياس

10

fontes: az-Zawzanī qui hanc vitam cum additamentis sua sponte a Fihrist
(3A) et fortasse a Ṣiwān al-ḥikma (4A) sumpsit; ex az-Zawzanī dependet
Barhebraeus, Duwal p.55-6 (BH)

BH وكان لارسطو ابن اخ اسمه ثاؤفرسطس وهو احد :Zawzanī ثاؤفرسطس ... وأحد 1
Zawzanī: وتصانيفه 6 om. BH حاذقاً 4 واحد ... ارسطوطاليس 2
Zawzanī: نقلها ... عدي 9 om. BH مقالة واحدة 9 et 8 et 7 BH فمنها
BH نقله أيضا :Zawzanī نقل 10 BH نقله من السرياني الى العربي يحيى بن عدي
11 post om. BH اربع مقالات BH :Zawzanī بكوش : corr. Gutas بكوش
BH المذكور :Zawzanī: بكوش : corr. Gutas بن بكوش BH أيضا add. نقله
om. BH ... قاطيفورياس 12 <...> rest. Gutas ex Fihrist (3A) v.10

- 4A Ṣiwān al-ḥikma, cap. de Theophrasto (vid. fontes in apparatu)

ثاؤفرسطس كان من أصحاب الحكيم ارسطوطاليس وتلامذته واستخلفه
على كرسى حكمته بعد وفاته
فأعانه على تعليم المتفلسفة والمبتدئين والقيام بما فوض إليه اوديموس
واسحولوس وكانا أيضاً من تلامذة ارسطوطاليس الكبار منهم

- 3B Zawzanī, *Selections from Qiftī's History of the Philosophers*, chap. on Theophrastus (p.106.16-107.6 Lippert)

Theophrastus the philosopher was the son of Aristotle's brother and one of his pupils who learned philosophy from him. He was also one of the executors whom Aristotle appointed (in his will). He is the one who was promoted to head the instruction in the school after him (Aristotle).

Theophrastus was quick-witted, learned, proficient and meant 107 for this career. People studied his uncle's (Aristotle's) books under him.

He composed significant works, which derived from and were based upon him (Aristotle).

His works are:

Meteorology, one book

On Education, one book

Metaphysics, one book translated by Yahyā ibn-ʿAdī¹

On Sensation and the Sensible, translated by Ibrāhīm ibn-Bakkūš, four books.

The Causes of Plants, translated by Ibrāhīm ibn-Bakkūš

Among what is (falsely) attributed to him is <a commentary on>² the *Categories* (of Aristotle).

¹ Barhebraeus adds, "from Syriac into Arabic."

² See the last sentence of 3A.

- 4A *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus (see the sources in the apparatus)

He (Theophrastus) was one of the companions and pupils of the philosopher Aristotle. He (Aristotle) appointed him to succeed him after his death in his chair of philosophy.

He (Theophrastus) was assisted in the instruction of the students of philosophy and of beginners, and in the performance of the tasks entrusted to him, by Eudemus and 'shwłws¹, both of

وله الكتب الكثيرة والتصانيف الجلية والشروح الكبيرة لكتب ارسطوطاليس
الاصول

fontes: *Munṭaḥab Šiwān al-ḥikma (Mḥb)*, in ed. Dunlop v.1171-5 (codd. AB CD), et in ed. Badawī p.176.4-10; *Muḥiaṣar Šiwān al-ḥikma (Mṣr)* in cod. Constant. Fatih 3222 f.33^v v.7-8

1-2 *al-Mubaššir, Muḥtār al-ḥikam* p.183.6-10 *Badawī (versio Anglica ap. Gutas, RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.78-9 no.IV.1-2, et vid. p.79 notas b et e)* 3-5 *al-Mubaššir, Muḥtār al-ḥikam* p.183.10-11 *Badawī (versio Anglica ap. Gutas, RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.79 no.IV.3, et vid. p.79 notam f); Im Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā'* t.1 p.57.4-11 Müller

4B aš-Šahrastāni, *al-Milal wa-n-niḥal, ḥikam Tāwufraštīs* (p.337.14-16 Cureton)

كان الرجل من تلامذة ارسطوطاليس وكبار أصحابه واستخلفه على كرسى
حكيمته بعد وفاته وكانت المتفلسفة تختلف إليه وتقبس منه
وله تركيب الشروح الكثيرة والتصانيف المعتمدة وبالخصوص فى الموسيقى

fontes: ed. Cureton, ut supra; ed. Kaylānī t.2 p.147.13-16; ed. Cahirae a.1948 p.425-6; cod. *Yalensis Lanberg* 615 f.116^v v.20-2 (Y)

1 كان هذا الرجل من كبار تلامذة ... كان ... تلامذة 1 ed. Cureton, ed. Cahirae, Y: ed. Kaylānī 2 post المتفلسفة add. فى عهده ed. Kaylānī 3 تركيب ed. Cureton: ed. Cahirae, ed. Kaylānī: التركيب و Y الكثيرة om. Y ed. Cureton: الموسيقى Y: الموسيقى ed. Cahirae: الموسيقى ed. Kaylānī; vid. etiam Gutas, RUSCH t.2 (1985) p.75 notam e

Nomen et modus loquendi

5A Strabo, *Geographica* 13.2.4 (BT t.3 p.864.19-25 Meineke)

Τύρταμος δ' ἐκαλεῖτο ἔμπροσθεν ὁ Θεόφραστος, μετωνόμασε δ' αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλης Θεόφραστον, ἅμα μὲν φεύγων τὴν τοῦ προτέρου ὀνόματος κακοφωνίαν, ἅμα δὲ τὸν τῆς φράσεως αὐτοῦ ζῆλον ἐπισημαινόμενος· ἅπαντας μὲν γὰρ λογίους ἐποίησε τοὺς μαθητὰς Ἀριστοτέλης, λογιώτατον δὲ Θεόφραστον.

1-4 de mutatione nominis vid. 1 (Diog. Laert. 5.38) et 2

whom were also among the eminent pupils of Aristotle.

He (Theophrastus) is the author of many books, significant works, and large commentaries on Aristotle's books, which are the fundamental texts.

¹ This person, whom one would expect to be Clearchus or Dicaearchus, remains unidentified.

1 وتلامذته ... وتلامذته 1 Mṣr تلامذة الحكيم ارسطو: Mḥb اصحاب ... وتلامذته 1 فوخس 3 Badawī الفلسفة المبتدئين: C الفلسفة المبتدئين: ABD المتفلسفة والمبتدئين Badawī 4 اسمولوس ABD اسمولوس 4 Dunlop: اسخنولوس ed. Badawī (؟) منهم ed. Dunlop A: فيهم ed. Badawī 5 الكبيرة s.p. A: الكبيرة ed. Dunlop: الكبيرة ed. Badawī Dunlop: الكبيرة ed. Badawī Dunlop A: كتب ed. Badawī

4B Šahrastāni, *Religions and Sects, Sayings of Theophrastus* (p.337.14-16 Cureton)

The man (Theophrastus) was one of the pupils and eminent companions of Aristotle. He (Aristotle) appointed him to succeed him after his death in his chair of philosophy. Students of philosophy used to go to him frequently to learn from him.

He composed many commentaries as well as independent works, especially about the musician.

Name and Manner of Speaking

5A Strabo, *Geography* 13.2.4 (BT vol.3 p.864.19-25 Meineke)

Theophrastus was called Tyrtamus before, but Aristotle changed his name to Theophrastus, partly avoiding the ugly sound of the former name, partly signifying his keenness for speech. For Aristotle made all his students eloquent, but Theophrastus most eloquent.

5B Cicero, Orator 62 (BT p.21.10-17 Reis)

quanquam enim et philosophi quidam ornate locuti sunt — si quidem et Theophrastus divinitate loquendi nomen invenit, et Aristoteles Isocraten ipsum laccessivit, et Xenophontis voce Musas quasi locutas ferunt, et longe omnium quicumque scripserunt aut locuti sunt exstitit et gravitate et suavitate princeps Plato — tamen horum oratio neque nervos neque aculeos oratorios ac forensis habet.

2-3 Quintilianus, *Inst.* 10.1.83, Plinius, *NH* 1, *praef.* 29 = 61B, [Sergius], *Expl. in Donat.* 1 (GL t.4 p.530.13-15) = 682, Hieronymus, *Interpr. Chron. Euseb.* 2, *ad Ol.* 115.2 (GCS t.24 [Eusebius t.7.1] p.125.24-6), et Vincentius Belkvoacensis, *Speculum hist.* 5.2 (t.4 p.137 col.2 v.22-3 ed. Duac. a. 1624); cf. Senecae *NQ* 6.13.1 = 180 2-3 Aristoteles—laccessivit] Cicero, *De off.* 1.4, *De or.* →

5C Boetius, Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 2 16a19-20, secunda editio, 1.2 (BT p.56.1-5 Meiser)

quem enim nunc vocamus Platonem, Aristocles ante vocabatur, et qui Theophrastus nunc dicitur, ante Aristotelen a suis parentibus Tyrtamus appellabatur.

1 Aristocles Meiser: Aristoteles *codd.*

5D Eustathius, Epistulae 19.63-4 (p.327B14-15 Tafel)

τὸν Τύρταμον ἢ καλλιρημοσύνη μετέγραψε καὶ μετέθετο εἰς Θεόφραστον.

1 Τύρταμον *Regenbogen*: Τυρταῖον *codd.*

6 Ioannes Scotus Eriugena, Adnotationes in Marcianum 9.923 p.490.20 Dick (p.203.7-8 Lutz)

Theophrastus dei expositio vel deum exponens; θεός deus, φράζω

5B Cicero, Orator 62 (BT p.21.10-17 Reis)

For although some philosophers have spoken elegantly — if indeed Theophrastus acquired his name from his divine manner of speaking, and Aristotle challenged Isocrates himself, and they say that the Muses, as it were, spoke in the voice of Xenophon, and of all by far who ever wrote or spoke Plato stood out as leader both in dignity and in charm — nevertheless, their style has neither the sinew nor the sting of orators and the forum.

3.141, *Tusc. disp.* 1.7, et *Quint., Inst.* 3.1.4 2-4 Aristoteles—ferunt] Nonius Marcellus, *De compendiosa doctrina* 2 (p.133.31-134.1 Mercier) 3-4 Xenophontis—ferunt] *Quint., Inst.* 10.1.33, et *Diog. Laert., Vit.* 2.57; cf. *Cic. Or.* 32 5-6 Cicero, *De or.* 1.47; cf. *Cic. De off.* 1.4, *Brut.* 121 = 52 et *Plut. Vit. Ciceronis* 24.5-6 = 53

1 et L: etiam Heerdegen 2 a divinitate λ 5 et gravitate et suavitate Sauppe: et suavitate et gravitate duo *codd. deteriores*: et gravitate *codd. meliores*: [et] gravitate Heerdegen qui et suavitate interpolatum esse censet

5C Boethius, Commentaries on Aristotle's Book De interpretatione 2 16a19-20, second edition, 1.2 (BT p.56.1-5 Meiser)

For the one whom we now call Plato was called Aristocles before, and he who is now called Theophrastus, was, before Aristotle, named Tyrtamus by his parents.

5D Eustathius, Epistles 19.63-4 (p.327B14-15 Tafel)

The beauty of his language rewrote (the name of) Tyrtamus and changed it to Theophrastus.

6 John the Scot of Ireland, Remarks on Martianus 9.923 p.490.20 Dick (p.203.7-8 Lutz)

Theophrastus (means) setting forth of god or one who sets forth

expono.

1-2 *Ioannes Scotus Eriugena, Adnot. in Marc. 9.926 p.493.3 Dick (p.204.21-2 Lutz) et Remigius Autissiodorensis, Commentum in Martianum Capellam 9.923 p.490.20 Dick (t.2 p.323.22-4 Lutz)* →

vid. 735

7A Cicero, *Brutus* 172 (BT p.51.3-10 Malcovati)

ut ego iam non mirer illud Theophrasto accidisse quod dicitur, cum percontaretur ex anicula quadam quanti aliquid venderet et respondisset illa atque addidisset, "hospes, non pote minoris", tulisse eum moleste se non effugere hospitis speciem, cum aetatem ageret Athenis optimeque loqueretur omnium. sic, ut opinor, in nostris est quidam urbanorum, sicut illic Atticorum sonus. 5

4-5 *aetatem ageret Athenis] cf. al-Mas'ūdī, at-Tanbih wa-l-išraf p.180 de Goeje (versio Anglica ap. Gutas, RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.80)*

5 omnium *L.*: omnino *codd. dett.* 5-6 omnium. sic, ut opinor, in nostris *ed. Rom.*: omnino sic [ut], opinor, in nostris *Stangl.*: omnium hic [ut opinor in nostris] *Martha*

7B Quintilianus, *Institutio oratoria* 8.1.2 (OCT t.2 p.425.12-17 Winterbottom)

multos enim, quibus loquendi ratio non desit, invenias quos curiose potius loqui dixeris quam Latine, quo modo et illa Attica anus Theophrastum, hominem alioqui disertissimum, adnotata unius adfectione verbi hospitem dixit, nec alio se id deprendisse interrogata respondit quam quod nimium Attice loqueretur. 5

1 invenias *ed. Camp.*: inveniam *A*

god; *theos* (means) god and *phrazō* (means) I set forth.

1 *post Theophrastus habet Remigius proprium nomen auctoris et interpretatur expositio] expositor Remigius: compositio Ioannes 204.22 exponens] componens Ioannes 204.22 2 expono] expositor Remigius: compono Ioannes 204.22*

see 735

7A Cicero, *Brutus* 172 (BT p.51.3-10 Malcovati)

So¹ I am not surprised at what is said to have happened to Theophrastus when he asked a little old lady how much she would sell a certain item for. She answered, and added, "Foreigner, it's not possible (to sell it) for less." It annoyed him that he did not escape the appearance of being a foreigner, although he spent his life in Athens and of all people spoke excellent (Attic Greek). Similarly, in my opinion, there is among us a certain accent characteristic of the people of the city (Rome), just as there, of the people of Athens.

¹ Cicero has just taken note of the fact that Romans are distinguished by a peculiar quality of voice.

7B Quintilian, *Oratorical Education* 8.1.2 (OCT vol.2 p.425.12-17 Winterbottom)

For you will find many in whom the art of speaking is not lacking, whom you would say spoke carefully rather than with Latin elegance, even as that old Attic woman said of Theophrastus, a man in other respects most articulate. When the affectedness of one word had been perceived, she called him a foreigner. And when asked, she replied that she had perceived this by no other indication than that he spoke too much like a person from Attica.

Discipulus et successor Aristotelis

8 Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 13.5.1-12 (OCT t.2 p.387.2-29 Marshall)

De Aristotele et Theophrasto et Eudemo philosophis; deque eleganti verecundia Aristotelis successorem diatribae suae eligentis

1 Aristoteles philosophus annos iam fere natus duo et sexaginta
 2 corpore aegro adfectoque ac spe vitae tenui fuit. tunc omnis eius
 3 sectatorum cohors ad eum accedit orantes obsecrantesque, ut ipse
 4 deligeret loci sui et magisterii successorem, quo post summum eius
 5 diem proinde ut ipso uterentur ad studia doctrinarum complenda
 6 excolendaque, quibus ab eo inbuti fuissent. erant tunc in eius ludo
 7 boni multi, sed praecipui duo, Theophrastus et Eudemus. ingenio
 8 hi atque doctrinis ceteros praestabant; alter ex insula Lesbo fuit,
 9 Eudemus autem Rhodo. Aristoteles respondit facturum esse quod
 10 vellent, cum id sibi foret tempestivum.
 11 postea brevi tempore cum idem illi, qui de magistro destinando
 12 petierant, praesentes essent, vinum ait, quod tum biberet, non esse
 13 id ex valitudine sua, sed insalubre esse atque asperum, ac propterea
 14 quaeri debere exoticum vel Rhodium aliquod vel Lesbium. id sibi
 15 utrumque ut curarent petivit, usurumque eo dixit quod sese magis
 16 iuvisset. eunt, quaerunt, inveniunt, adferunt. tum Aristoteles
 17 Rhodium petit, degustat: "firmum", inquit, "hercle vinum et iucun-
 18 dum." petit mox Lesbium. quo item degustato: "utrumque", inquit,
 19 "oppido bonum, sed ἡδίον ὁ Λέσβιος." id ubi dixit, nemini fuit
 20 dubium, quin lepide simul et verecunde successorem illa voce sibi,
 21 non vinum delegisset. is erat e Lesbo Theophrastus, suavitate homo
 22 insigni linguae pariter atque vitae. itaque non diu post Aristotele
 23 vita defuncto ad Theophrastum omnes concesserunt.

1-25 *Aristoteles*, AABT T47 *Düring*; *Eudemus*, fr. 5 *Wehrli*; *Vincentius Bellovacensis*, *Speculum hist.* 5.2 (t.4 p.137 col.2 v.24-39 ed. *Duac. an.* 1624), *Gualterius Burlaeus*, *De vita et moribus philosophorum* 52 (p.244.27-246.15 *Knust*) et 68 (p.282.16-25) et [*Brunetto Latini*], *Fiori e vita di filosafi e d'altri savi e d'imperadori* 12 (p.134.1-135.2 *Agostino*), qui omnes e Gellio dependere videntur

1 Eudemo *Vossius*: Menedemo ω 6 deligeret *Fγ*: diligeret *X¹δ* 9
 Eudemus *T²Y*: Menedemus ω 11 Eudemus *T²*: Menedemus ω
 12 et 16 sibi *FNδ*: cibi *OXII* 17 sese *FNδ*: esse *OXII*

Student and Successor of Aristotle

8 Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 13.5.1-12 (OCT vol.2 p.387.2-29 Marshall)

On the Philosophers Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus and the Elegant Tact of Aristotle in Choosing the Successor (to the Headship) of his School

1 When the philosopher Aristotle was almost 62 years old, he
 2 was sick and feeble in body and had slim hope of (longer) life.
 3 At that time the whole company of his followers approached him,
 4 praying and begging that he himself select a successor to his
 5 position and office with whom they might associate after his final
 6 day, just as with him, in order to complete and refine their studies
 7 of the teachings with which they had been imbued by him. There
 8 were then many good men in his school, but two were preeminent,
 9 Theophrastus and Eudemus. These men surpassed the others in
 10 talent and learning. The one was from the island of Lesbos, but
 11 Eudemus was from Rhodes. Aristotle replied that he would do what
 12 they wished when the time was right for him.
 13 A short time later, when those same ones who had asked about
 14 appointing a (new) master were at hand, he said that the wine
 15 which he was then drinking was not in accord with his health, but
 16 unwholesome and sour, and for this reason an exotic wine should
 17 be looked for, either some Rhodian or Lesbian. He asked them to
 18 secure both kinds for him and said he would take the one which
 19 helped him more. They went and looked, found and brought
 20 (them). Then Aristotle took the Rhodian, tasted it and said, "A full-
 21 bodied wine, by Hercules, and agreeable." Then he took the
 22 Lesbian, and when it, too, had been tasted, he said, "Both are
 23 exceedingly good, but the Lesbian is more pleasant." When he said
 24 this, no one doubted that by that utterance he had selected in a
 25 charming and also tactful manner a successor to himself, not a wine.
 26 Theophrastus was from Lesbos, a man of remarkable pleasantness
 27 in language as well as in his style of life. And so not long afterward,
 28 when Aristotle had departed from life, all took themselves to Theo-
 29 phrastus.



- 9 Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 1.14-15 (OCT t.1 p.6.3-4 et 14-16 Long)

καταλήγει δὲ ἡ μὲν εἰς Κλειτόμαχον καὶ Χρυσίππον καὶ Θεόφραστον [ἢ Ἰωνική] . . . εἰς δὲ Θεόφραστον οὕτως· Πλάτωνος Ἀριστοτέλης, οὐ Θεόφραστος.

1-3 *Socratici*, no. 6 (SR t.1 p.6 Giannantoni)

2 ἡ Ἰωνική *secl.* Huebner

- 10 Loci in his voluminibus non alibi exscripti, in quibus Theophrastus vel discipulus vel auditor vel socius Aristotelis nominatur

- 1 Anonymus, *Vita Aristotelis Latina* 18 (AABT p.153 Düring)
- 2 Anonymus, *Vita Aristotelis Latina* 47 (AABT p.157 Düring)
- 3 Anonymus, *Vita Aristotelis Marciana* 82-3 (p.3.20-1 Gigon)
- 4 Anonymus, *Vita Aristotelis Marciana* 196 (p.6.32 Gigon)
- 5 Anonymus, *Vita Aristotelis Syriaca* II.6 (AABT p.188 Düring)
- 6 Anonymus, *Vita Aristotelis vulgata* 17 (AABT p.134 Düring)
- 7 Francesco da Barberino, *I documenti d'amore* 7 (t.3 p.194.22-3 Egidi)
- 8 Cicero, *De finibus* 4.3 (BT p.121.1 Schiche)
- 9 Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* 6.7 57.3 (GCS t.2 p.460.23 Stählin)
- 10 Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* 6.18 167.2 (GCS t.2 p.518.2-3 Stählin)
- 11 Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 5.35 (OCT t.1 p.214.22-3 Long)
- 12 Ioannes Italus, *Quaestiones quodlibetales* 49 (p.62.8-9 Ioannou)
- 13 Michael Psellus, *De Gregorii characteribus* 6 (BZ t.20 [1911] p.51.108-9 Mayer)
- 14 Stephanus Byzantius, *Ethnica*, s.v. "Ἐρεσος (p.275.18 Meineke)

- 11 Loci non alibi in his voluminibus exscripti, in quibus Theophrastus successor Aristotelis nominatur

- 1 Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 1.6.11 (p.28.19-20 Massa)
- 2 Roger Bacon, *Moralis Philosophia* 2.2.3 (p.42.16 Massa)
- 3 Francesco da Barberino, *I documenti d'amore* 7 (t.3 p.194.22-3 Egidi)
- 4 Bar Hebraeus, *Maqṭānūt zaḥnē* 6 (p.34.24-6 Bedjan; versio Anglica ap. E. Budge, *The Chronography of Bar Hebraeus* [Oxford 1932 t.1 p.37.24-6]), et cf. 3B

- 9 Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of Philosophers* 1.14-15 (OCT vol.1 p.6.3-4 and 14-16 Long)

The (Ionic branch of philosophy) terminates in Clitomachus and Chrysippus and Theophrastus; . . . It terminates in Theophrastus in the following way: Aristotle was the student of Plato and Theophrastus was the student of Aristotle.

- 10 Passages Not Printed Elsewhere in These Volumes, in which Theophrastus is Named as the Disciple or Pupil or Associate of Aristotle

- 1 Anonymus, *Latin Life of Aristotle* 18 (AABT p.153 Düring)
- 2 Anonymus, *Latin Life of Aristotle* 47 (AABT p.157 Düring)
- 3 Anonymus, *Marcian Life of Aristotle* 82-3 (p.3.20-1 Gigon)
- 4 Anonymus, *Marcian Life of Aristotle* 196 (p.6.32 Gigon)
- 5 Anonymus, *Syriac Life of Aristotle* II.6 (AABT p.188 Düring)
- 6 Anonymus, *Vulgate Life of Aristotle* 17 (AABT p.134 Düring)
- 7 Francesco da Barberino, *The Documents on Love* 7 (vol.3 p.194.22-3 Egidi)
- 8 Cicero, *On Ends* 4.3 (BT p.121.1 Schiche)
- 9 Clement of Alexandria, *Patchwork* 6.7 57.3 (GCS vol.2 p.460.23 Stählin)
- 10 Clement of Alexandria, *Patchwork* 6.18 167.2 (GCS vol.2 p.518.2-3 Stählin)
- 11 Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.35 (OCT vol.1 p.214.22-3 Long)
- 12 John of Italy, *Various Questions* 49 (p.62.8-9 Ioannou)
- 13 Michael Psellus, *On the (Rhetorical) Character of Gregory* 6 (BZ vol.20 [1911] p.51.108-9 Mayer)
- 14 Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethnica*, on *Eresos* (p.275.18 Meineke)

- 11 Passages Not Printed Elsewhere in These Volumes, in which Theophrastus is Named as Aristotle's Successor

- 1 Roger Bacon, *Moral Philosophy* 1.6.11 (p.28.19-20 Massa)
- 2 Roger Bacon, *Moral Philosophy* 2.2.3 (p.42.16 Massa)
- 3 Francesco da Barberino, *The Documents on Love* 7 (vol.3 p.194.22-3 Egidi)
- 4 Barhebraeus, *Chronography* 6 (p.34.24-6 Bedjan; English version in E. Budge, *The Chronography of Bar Hebraeus* [Oxford 1932] vol.1 p.37.24-6), and cf. 3B

- 5 Clemens Alexandrinus, *Stromata* 1.14 63.4 (GCS t.2 p.40.11 Stählin)
 6 [Galenus], *De historia philosopha* 3 (DG p.600.21-601.1) ὅσπερ Θεόφραστον προεστήσατο τῆς κατ' αὐτὸν αἰρέσεως
 7 Hesychius, *Vita Aristotelis* 9 (AABT p.82 Düring)
 8 Petrus de Alvernia, *Sententiae super librum De vegetabilibus et plantis* (cod. Paris. Lat. 16097 f.204^v [Théry, AHMA t.18 (1950-1) p.142 n.3]), quo loco scribitur "ab aliis Theophrastus fuit in magistratum praelectus"
 9 [Plutarchus], *Vitae decem oratorum* 850C (BT t.5.2.1 p.43.16-17 Mau) = Caecilius Calactinus, fr. 149 Ofenloch
 10 Michael Psellus, *Opuscula* 16 (BT t.2 p.77.27 O'Meara)
 11 [Robertus Grosseteste], *Summa philosophiae* 4 (p.279.1-2 Baur)
 12 Stephanus Byzantius, *Ethnica*, s.v. Ἐρεσος (p.275.18 Meineke)
 13 Suda, s.v. Ἀριστόξενος (no. 3927, LG t.1 pars 1 p.357.10-11 Adler)

Magister et discipuli

- 12 Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 1.38 21A-B (BT t.1 p.46.4-9 Kaibel)

Ἑρμιππος δὲ φησι Θεόφραστον παραγίνεσθαι εἰς τὸν περίπατον καθ' ὥραν λαμπρὸν καὶ ἐξησκημένον, εἶτα καθίσαντα διατίθεσθαι τὸν λόγον οὐδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενον κινήσεως οὐδὲ σχήματος ἑνός. καὶ ποτε ὀψοφάγον μιμούμενον ἐξείραντα τὴν γλῶσσαν περιλείχειν τὰ χεῖλη.

1-4 *Hermippus*, fr. 51 *Wehrli*

4 ἐξείραντα *Küster*: ἐξάραντα *codd.*

- 13 Cicero, *De fato* 7 (BT p.153.5-10 Giomini)

Athenis tenue caelum, ex quo etiam acutiores putantur Attici, crassum Thebis, itaque pingues Thebani et valentes. tamen neque illud tenue caelum efficiet ut aut Zenonem quis aut Arcesilam aut Theophrastum audiat, neque crassum ut Nemea potius quam Isthmo victoriam petat.

1-5 *Zeno*, *SVF* t.2 p.274.38-42, fr. 950 et *Arcesilaus*, T7 *Mette*

- 5 Clement of Alexandria, *Patchwork* 1.14 63.4 (GCS vol.2 p.40.11 Stählin)
 6 pseudo-Galen, *On the History of Philosophy* 3 (DG p.600.21-601.1) "who (Aristotle) put Theophrastus at the head of the school after him"
 7 Hesychius, *Life of Aristotle* 9 (AABT p.82 Düring)
 8 Peter of Auvergne, *Opinions concerning the Book On Vegetables and Plants* (cod. Paris. Lat. 16097 f.204^v [Théry, AHMA vol.18 (1950-1) p.142 n.3]), where it is written "Theophrastus was elected into office by the others"
 9 pseudo-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 850C (BT vol.5.2.1 p.43.16-17 Mau) = Caecilius Calactinus, fr. 149 Ofenloch
 10 Michael Psellus, *Opuscula* 16 (BT vol.2 p.77.27 O'Meara)
 11 pseudo-Robert Grosseteste, *The Principles of Philosophy* 4 (p.279.1-2 Baur)
 12 Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethnica*, on *Eresos* (p.275.18 Meineke)
 13 *Suda*, on *Aristoxenos* (no. 3927, LG vol.1 part 1 p.357.10-11 Adler)

Teacher and Students

- 12 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 1.38 21A-B (BT vol.1 p.46.4-9 Kaibel)

Hermippus says that Theophrastus used to arrive punctually at the Peripatos, looking splendid and all decked out. Then sitting down, he (used to) present his lecture, refraining from no movement nor any gesture. And once while imitating a gourmet, having stuck out his tongue, he repeatedly licked his lips.

- 13 Cicero, *On Fate* 7 (BT p.153.5-10 Giomini)

At Athens the climate is rarefied, and on account of this the people of Attica are considered more sharp-witted. At Thebes the climate is dense, and so the Thebans are slow-witted and robust. Nevertheless, that rarefied climate will not bring it about that someone should listen to Zeno or Arcesilaus or Theophrastus, nor will the dense climate bring it about that he should seek (to carry home) a victory from Nemea rather than from the Isthmus.

14 Michael Psellus, Oratio 24.14-18 (BT p.84.30-85.3 Littlewood)

Πλάτων μὲν οὖν καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος, οἱ δὲ φιλοσοφίας προῦκάθητο, ὀργίλοι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι τῶν μαθημάτων ἐφαίνοντο, μηδὲ τὴν πηγὴν τῶν λόγων οὕτως ἀφθόνως προχέοντες, ἀλλ' ἀρχὰς τινὰς καὶ σπέρματα τοῖς μαθηταῖς προτιθέμενοι, εἶτα δὴ καὶ ἀπῆλθον ὧν κατεβάλλοντο τὸ πολλαπλάσιον. 5

15 Plutarchus, Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus 6 78D (BT t.1 p.156.24-6 Paton, Wegehaupt, Pohlenz, Gärtner)

ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ὁρῶν τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐπὶ τῷ πολλοῦς ἔχειν μαθητὰς θαυμαζόμενον, “ὁ ἐκείνου χορός”, ἔφη, “μείζων, οὐμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος.”

1-3 *Zeno Citiensis, SVF t.1 p.64, fr. 280; verba fere eadem Zenoni ascribit Plutarchus, De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando 17 545F; in libro ps. Boetii De disc. scol. 6.19-20 (p.129.6-14 Weijers) quidam Theophrastus commemoratur.* →

16 Numenius Apamensis, fr. 25 Des Places, ap. Eusebium, Praeparatio evangelica 14.6.4 (GCS t.8.2 p.273.11-14 Mras)

συμβαλὼν γὰρ ἐν παισὶ Θεοφράστῳ, ἀνδρὶ πρᾶφ καὶ οὐκ ἀφνεῖ τὰ ἐρωτικά, διὰ τὸ καλὸς εἶναι ἔτι ὧν ὡραῖος τυχὼν ἐραστοῦ Κράντορος τοῦ Ἀκαδημαϊκοῦ, προσεχώρησε μὲν τούτῳ, . . .

1-3 *Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 4.22 et 29 = Arcesilaus, T1a Mette, et Numenius ap. Euseb. in Praep. evang. 14.5.12 (GCS t.8.2 p.271.17-18) = Numenius, fr.* →

17 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum 6.95 (OCT t.2 p.289.20-290.3 Long)

οὗτος τὰ συγγράμματα ἑαυτοῦ κατακαίων, ὡς φησιν Ἑκάρτων ἐν πρώτῳ Χρειῶν, ἐπέλεγε,

τὰ δ' ἔστ' ὄνειρων νεπτέρων φαντάσματα,
οἷον λῆρος· οἱ δ', ὅτι τὰς Θεοφράστου ἀκροάσεις καταφλέγων

14 Michael Psellus, Oratio 24.14-18 (BT p.84.30-85.3 Littlewood)

However, Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle and Theophrastus, who did indeed preside over philosophy, appeared inclined to anger toward those who esteemed their studies lightly, yet they did not pour forth a fountain of words so ungrudgingly, but set certain principles and seeds before their students and then indeed demanded back much more than what they laid down.¹

¹ Literally, “threw down”, perhaps picking up the metaphor in “seeds”.

15 Plutarch, How One May Be Aware of His Progress in Virtue 6 78D (BT vol.1 p.156.24-6 Paton, Wegehaupt, Pohlenz and Gärtner)

Zeno, seeing that Theophrastus was admired for having many pupils, said, “His chorus is larger, but mine is more harmonious.”

qui paucos discipulos habuit, sed hic magister non fuit successor Aristotelis, ut videtur

16 Numenius of Apamea, fr. 25 Des Places, in Eusebius, Evangelical Preparation 14.6.4 (GCS vol.8.2 p.273.11-14 Mras)

For in his childhood he (Arcesilaus) fell in with Theophrastus, a man of gentleness and naturally of erotic bent, (and next) on account of being beautiful, while still in his prime, he found a lover in Crantor the Academic and went over to him, . . .

25 *Des Places = Arcesilaus, T2 Mette = Crantor, T3 Mette*

1 οὐκ ἀφνεῖ I: οὐκ εὐφνεῖ GO (*dubium*) N

17 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 6.95 (OCT vol.2 p.289.20-290.3 Long)

While this man (Metrocles) was burning his own writings, as Hecato says in the first book of *Chriae*, he chanted,

These are phantoms of dreams of the world below,
i.e., nonsense. But some people say that as he was burning up

ἐπέλεγε,

Ἕφοιστε, πρόμολ' ὦδε, Θέτις νύ τι σεῖο χατίζει.

1-6 Metrocles Maroneus, no. 1 (SR t.2 p.763 Giannantoni) 1-3 Hecato,
fr. 23 Gemoll 3 Adesp. F 285 (TrGF t.2 p.90) 6 Homerus, Ilias
18.392; cf. etiam Diog. Laert. 3.5 et Olympiod. comm. In Plat. primum Alcib.
2.79 (p.4.6 Westerink) et 2.82 (p.4.9), quibus locis versus idem invenitur, sed
→

18 Tabula discipulorum et auditorum

- 1 Aenesias] Stephanus Byzantius, *Ethnica*, s.v. Μεγάλη πόλις (p.438.4-5 Meineke)
- 2 Arcesilaus Pitaneus] Philodemus (?), *Index Academicorum Herculaneensis* col.15.3-6 (p.55.5-8 Mekler) = Arcesilaus, T1a Mette, et col.17.37 (p.65.13) = T1b; Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 4.22 (OCT t.1 p.176.5 Long) = Arcesilaus, T1a Mette, 4.29 (p.179.18-19) = T1a, et 4.30 (p.179.26-180.2) = T1a; Numenius Apamensis, fr. 25 Des Places, ap. Eusebium in *Praeparatione evangelica* 14.5.12 (GCS t.8.2 p.271.17 Mras) = Arcesilaus, T2 Mette, et 14.6.4 (p.273.11-12) = **16** = Arcesilaus, T2
- 3 Bion Borysthenius] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 4.52 (OCT t.1 p.190.7-8 Long) = Bion, T19 Kindstrand; Demetrius Lacon, *De natura deorum* (?) (P. Herc. 1055, col.18.1-8 [p.75 De Falco]), quo loco iudicium Theophrasti de Bione invenitur: Βίωνος τοῦ κατὰ Θεοφράστον πρώτου φιλοσοφίαν ἀνθινοῖς κοσμήσαντος = Bion, T13 Kindstrand; iudicium tamen idem de Bione Eratostheni attribuitur a Diogene Laertio 4.52 = Bion, T11, et a Strabone in *Geographica* 1.2.2 = Bion, T12 = Eratosthenes, FGrH 241 T 10
- 4 Demaratus] Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 1.258 (BT t.3 p.64.23-4 Mau)
- 5 Demetrius Phalereus] Cicero, *De finibus* 5.54 = Demetrius, fr. 62 Wehrli, *De legibus* 3.14 = **591** = fr. 72, *De officiis* 1.3 = **52B** = fr. 73, et *Brutus* 9.37-8 = fr. 175; Strabo, *Geographica* 9.1.20 = fr. 27; Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.39 = **1** = fr. 5, et 5.75 (OCT t.1 p.236.21-2 Long) = fr. 2; P. Herc. ined. 453, fr. 4.9 (Kolotes und Menedemos

the lectures of Theophrastus, he chanted,

Hephaestus, come hither. Thetis now has need of you.

Ἠλλάτων (Φάρος Olympiod. 2.82) pro Θέτις inseritur

3 νεπτέρων codd.: νυκτέρων Nauck 4 οἶον λήρος secl. Cobet ἀκροά-
σεις BP: γραφὰς F

18 List of Disciples and Pupils

- 1 Aenesias] Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethnica*, on *Megalopolis* (p.438.4-5 Meineke)
- 2 Arcesilaus of Pitane] Philodemus (?), *Herculaneum Index of Academics* col.15.3-6 (p.55.5-8 Mekler) = Arcesilaus, T1a Mette, and col.17.37 (p.65.13) = T1b; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 4.22 (OCT vol.1 p.176.5 Long) = Arcesilaus, T1a Mette, 4.29 (p.179.18-19) = T1a, and 4.30 (p.179.26-180.2) = T1a; Numenius of Apamea, fr. 25 Des Places, in Eusebius, *Evangelical Preparation* 14.5.12 (GCS vol.8.2 p.271.17 Mras) = Arcesilaus, T2 Mette, and 14.6.4 (p.273.11-12) = **16** = Arcesilaus, T2
- 3 Bion of Borysthenes] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 4.52 (OCT vol.1 p.190.7-8 Long) = Bion, T19 Kindstrand; Demetrius of Laconia, *On the Nature of the Gods* (?), (P. Herc. 1055, col.18.1-8 [p.75 De Falco]), where Theophrastus' judgment of Bion is found: "according to Theophrastus, Bion was the first to deck out philosophy with flowers" = Bion, T13 Kindstrand; the same judgment of Bion, however, is attributed to Eratosthenes by Diogenes Laertius 4.52 = Bion, T11, and by Strabo, *Geography* 1.2.2 = Bion, T12 = Eratosthenes, FGrH 241 T 10
- 4 Demaratus] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 1.258 (BT vol.3 p.64.23-4 Mau)
- 5 Demetrius of Phalerum] Cicero, *On Ends* 5.54 = Demetrius, fr. 62 Wehrli, *On Laws* 3.14 = **591** = fr. 72, *On Duties* 1.3 = **52B** = fr. 73, and *Brutus* 9.37-8 = fr. 175; Strabo, *Geography* 9.1.20 = fr. 27; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.39 = **1** = fr. 5, and 5.75 (OCT vol.1 p.236.21-2 Long) = fr. 2; P. Herc. ined. 453, fr. 4.9 (Kolotes und Menedemos

- p.67 Crönert = fr. 159; Suda, s.v. Δημήτριος (no. 429, LG t.1 pars 2 p.40.24 Adler) = fr. 3
- 6 Democles] [Plutarchus], *Vitae decem oratorum* 842E (BT t.5.2.1 p.26.5-6 Mau)
- 7 Dinarchus] Dionysius Halicarnassensis, *De Dinarcho* 2 (BT t.5 p.299.16-19 Usener et Radermacher), ex quo dependent, ut videtur, [Plutarchus], *Vitae decem oratorum* 850B-C (BT t.5.2.1 p.43.12-17 Mau) = Caecilius Calactinus, fr. 149 Ofenloch, et Photius, *Bibliotheca cod.* 267 496b8-13 (CB t.8 p.72.24-7 Henry)
- 8 Erasistratus] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.57 = 1; Galenus, *An in arteriis natura sanguis contineatur* 7 (p.17.1-5 Albrecht) = 47; cf. etiam Galeni *librum De naturalibus facultatibus* 2.4 (BT p.165.8-10 et 166.15-16 Helmreich) cum 2.4 (p.165.12-13) = 331D
- 9 Hippolochus] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 4.1 128A (BT t.1 p.291.15-16 Kaibel); vid. Dalby, CQ 41, 1991
- 10 Lynceus Samius] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 3.58 100E (BT t.1 p.231.13 Kaibel), 4.5 130D (p.296.5-8 = Hippolochus, *Ad Lynceum*) = 76, 8.18 337D (t.2 p.241.27); Suda, s.v. Λυγκεύς (no. 776, LG t.1 pars 3 p.292.3 Adler)
- 11 Lysimachus] Hermippus ap. Athenaeum in *Deipnosophistarum libro* 6.60 252C (BT t.2 p.63.7-8 Kaibel) = Hermippus, fr. 56 Wehrli
- 12 Menander Comicus] Pamphila ap. Diogenem Laertium in *Vitis* 5.36 = 1 = Menander, T7.1 Körte et Thierfelder = Pamphila, fr. 10 Müller; cf. Alciphronis *Epistulas* 4.19.14 (BT p.152.2-7 Schepers = Menander, T7.2), quo loco Theophrastus amicus Menandri esse dicitur
- 13 Metrocles Maroneus] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 6.94 (OCT t.2 p.289.10-11 Long) = Metrocles, no. 1 (SR t.2 p.763 Giannantoni) = 17; Teles, *De paupertate et divitiis* fr. 4A (p.40.4-5 Hense) = Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 4.33.31 (t.5 p.813.14-16 Hense) = Crates, no. 44 (SR t.1 p.724 Giannantoni)
- 14 Metrodorus Theoreticus] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 2.113 (OCT t.1 p.105.8-9 Long) = Megarici, no. 164A Döring

- p.67 Crönert] fr. 159; Suda, on Dēmētrios (no. 429, LG vol.1 part 2 p.40.24 Adler) = fr. 3
- 6 Democles] pseudo-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 842E (BT vol.5.2.1 p.26.5-6 Mau)
- 7 Dinarchus] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Dinarchus* 2 (BT vol.5 p.299.16-19 Usener and Radermacher), on whom depend, as it seems, pseudo-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators* 850B-C (BT vol.5.2.1 p.43.12-17 Mau) = Caecilius of Calacte, fr. 149 Ofenloch, and Photius, *Library cod.* 267 496b8-13 (CB vol.8 p.72.24-7 Henry)
- 8 Erasistratus] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.57 = 1; Galen, *Whether Blood is Naturally Contained in the Arteries* 7 (p.17.1-5 Albrecht) = 47; cf. also Galen, *On the Natural Faculties* 2.4 (BT p.165.8-10 and 166.15-16 Helmreich) with 2.4 (p.165.12-13) = 331D
- 9 Hippolochus] Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 4.1 128A (BT vol.1 p.291.15-16 Kaibel); see Dalby, CQ 41, 1991
- 10 Lynceus of Samos] Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 3.58 100E (BT vol.1 p.231.13 Kaibel), 4.5 130D (p.296.5-8 = Hippolochus, *To Lynceus*) = 76 and 8.18 337D (vol.2 p.241.27); Suda, on Lunkeus (no. 776, LG vol.1 part 3 p.292.3 Adler)
- 11 Lysimachus] Hermippus in Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.60 252C (BT vol.2 p.63.7-8 Kaibel) = Hermippus, fr. 56 Wehrli
- 12 Menander the Comic (Poet)] Pamphila in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.36 = 1 = Menander, T7.1 Körte and Thierfelder = Pamphila, fr. 10 Müller; compare Alciphron, *Epistles* 4.19.14 (BT p.152.2-7 Schepers = Menander, T7.2), where Theophrastus is called Menander's friend
- 13 Metrocles of Maroneia] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 6.94 (OCT vol.2 p.289.10-11 Long) = Metrocles, no. 1 (SR vol.2 p.763 Giannantoni) = 17; Teles, *On Poverty and Riches* fr. 4A (p.40.4-5 Hense) = Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.33.31 (vol.5 p.813.14-16 Hense) = Crates, no. 44 (SR vol.1 p.724 Giannantoni)
- 14 Metrodorus the Theoretician] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.113 (OCT vol.1 p.105.8-9 Long) = Megarici, no. 164A Döring

- 15 Nicomachus] Aristippus ap. Diogenem Laertium in Vitis 5.39 = 1 = Aristippus, no. 157 (SR t.1 p.242 Giannantoni); Suda, s.v. Νικόμαχος (no. 398, LG t.1 pars 3 p.469.15-16 Adler)
- 16 Polystratus] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 13.86 607F (BT t.3 p.340.18-19 Kaibel)
- 17 Praxiphanes] Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 17A (BT t.1 p.14.20-3 Diehl) = Praxiphanes, fr. 19 Wehrli, et In Hesiodi Opera et Dies, prolegomena Ac (p.2.9-10 Pertusi) = fr. 22A; Ioannes Tzetzes, In Hesiodi Opera, comm. 1, Μοῦσαι Πιερίηθεν (p.1.23-6 Pertusi) = fr. 22B
- 18 Procles] Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* 1.258 (BT t.3 p.64.23-4 Mau)
- 19 Strato Lampsacenus] Cicero, *De finibus* 5.13 = Strato, fr. 12 Wehrli, *Academici* 1.34 = fr. 13, et *De natura deorum* 1.35 = fr. 33; Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica, coroll. de tempore (CAG t.9 p.788.36-789.1) = fr. 75 = 151B, et ad 6.4 234b10-20 (CAG t.10 p.965.7-8) = fr. 74; Suda, s.v. Στράτων (no. 1185, LG t.1 pars 4 p.442.7-8 Adler) = fr. 2
- 20 Timagoras Gelensis] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 2.113 (OCT t.1 p.105.8-10 Long) = Megarici, no. 164A Döring
- cf. etiam [Luciani], *Demosthenis encomium* 12 (OCT t.3 p.267.17 MacLeod), quo loco Theophrastus nominatur inter philosophos quorum ad portas Demosthenes iit

Res privatae

- 19 Aristoteles, Testamentum, praescriptio et 1-2, ap. Diogenem Laertium in Vitis philosophorum 5.12-13 (Aristotelis privatorum scriptorum fragmenta, BT p.38.2-21 Plezia)

ἔσται μὲν εὖ· ἐὰν δέ τι συμβαίῃ, τάδε διέθετο Ἀριστοτέλης·
 1 ἐπίτροπον μὲν εἶναι πάντων καὶ διὰ παντὸς Ἀντίπατρον· ἕως δ'

- 15 Nicomachus] Aristippus in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.39 = 1 = Aristippus, no. 157 (SR vol.1 p.242 Giannantoni); Suda, on *Nikomachos* (no. 398, LG vol.1 part 3 p.469.15-16 Adler)
- 16 Polystratus] Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 13.86 607F (BT vol.3 p.340.18-19 Kaibel)
- 17 Praxiphanes] Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 17A (BT vol.1 p.14.20-3 Diehl) = Praxiphanes, fr. 19 Wehrli, and *On Hesiod's Works and Days*, forward Ac (p.2.9-10 Pertusi) = fr. 22A; John Tzetzes, *On Hesiod's Works*, comm. 1, "Pierian Muses" (p.1.23-6 Pertusi) = fr. 22B
- 18 Procles] Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 1.258 (BT vol.3 p.64.23-4 Mau)
- 19 Strato of Lampsacus] Cicero, *On Ends* 5.13 = Strato, fr. 12 Wehrli, *Academics* 1.34 = fr. 13, and *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.35 = fr. 33; Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics*, coroll. on time (CAG vol.9 p.788.36-789.1) = fr. 75 = 151B, and on 6.4 234b10-20 (CAG vol.10 p.965.7-8) = fr. 74; Suda, on *Stratōn* (no. 1185, LG vol.1 part 4 p.442.7-8 Adler) = fr. 2
- 20 Timagoras of Gela] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 2.113 (OCT vol.1 p.105.8-10 Long) = Megarici, no. 164A Döring
- cf. also pseudo-Lucian, *Encomium of Demosthenes* 12 (OCT vol.3 p.267.17 MacLeod), where Theophrastus is named among philosophers to whose doors Demosthenes went

Private Affairs

- 19 Aristotle, *Will*, preface and 1-2, in Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 5.12-13 (*Fragments of Aristotle's Private Writings*, BT p.38.2-21 Plezia)

It will be well. But in case something should happen, Aristotle has made the following dispositions.¹

1 Executor of all matters and in general is Antipater. But until

ἂν Νικάνωρ καταλάβῃ, ἐπιμελίσθαι Ἀριστομένην, Τίμαρχον, Ἴπ-
παρχον, Διοτέλη, Θεόφραστον, ἐὰν βούληται καὶ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ, τῶν
τε παιδίων καὶ Ἑρπυλλίδος καὶ τῶν καταλειμμένων.

2 καὶ ὅταν ὥρα ἢ τῇ παιδί, ἐκδόσθαι αὐτὴν Νικάνωρι· ἐὰν δὲ τῇ
παιδί συμβῆ τι — ὃ μὴ γένοιτο οὐδὲ ἔσται — πρὸ τοῦ γήμασθαι ἢ
ἐπειδὴν γήμηται, μήπω παιδίων ὄντων, Νικάνωρ κύριος ἔστω καὶ περὶ
τοῦ παιδίου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διοικεῖν ἀξίως καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἡμῶν.
ἐπιμελίσθω δὲ Νικάνωρ καὶ τῆς παιδὸς καὶ τοῦ παιδίου Νικομάχου,
ὅπως ἂν ἀξιοὶ τὰ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς καὶ πατήρ ὢν καὶ ἀδελφός.

ἐὰν δὲ τι πρότερον συμβαίῃ Νικάνωρι — ὃ μὴ γένοιτο — ἢ πρὸ
τοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν παῖδα ἢ ἐπειδὴν λάβῃ, μήπω παιδίων ὄντων, ἐὰν μὲν
τι ἐκεῖνος τάξῃ, ταῦτα κύρια ἔστω.

ἐὰν δὲ βούληται Θεόφραστος εἶναι μετὰ τῆς παιδὸς, καθάπερ
πρὸς Νικάνωρα· εἰ δὲ μή, τοὺς ἐπιτρόπους βουλευσαμένους μετ'
Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ περὶ τῆς παιδὸς καὶ περὶ τοῦ παιδίου διοικεῖν,
ὅπως ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ ἄριστα εἶναι.

2-18 *versio Arabica Ptolemaei pinacographi in cod. Constantinopolitano Aya Sofya*
4833 f.13^vult.-13^vult. (*versio Latina ap. Plezia p.39.1-21, ex quo pendet Ibn an-*
Nadīm, Fihrist (t.1 p.247.20-30 Flügel), Ibn Abi Usaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' (t.1
p.60.22-61.2 Müller), az-Zawzanī, Muntahabāt (p.32.16-33.8 Lippert), et omnes
scriptores Arabi ceteri qui infra citantur 2-5 *al-Mubaššir, Muhtār al-*
hikam p.183.13-15 Badawī (versio Anglica ap. Gutas, RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.79
no.IV.4) 4 *Abū Sulaymān as-Siġistānī, at-Ta'āliq ap. Ibn Abi Usaybi'a,*
'Uyūn al-anbā' (t.1 p.57.19-20 Müller; versio Anglica ap. Gutas, RUSCH t.2
[1985] p.78 no.III) 6 *Anon., Vita Arist. Marciana 18-20 (p.1.18-20 Gigon),*

20 Aristocles Messenius, fr. 2 Heiland, ap. Eusebium in Praeparatione
evangelica 15.2.15 (GCS t.8.2 p.349.11-14 Mras)

μετὰ δὲ τὴν Πυθιάδος τῆς Ἑρμείου τελευτῆν Ἀριστοτέλης ἔγημεν
Ἑρπυλλίδα Σταγειρίτιν, ἐξ ἧς υἱὸς αὐτῷ Νικόμαχος ἐγένετο. τοῦτον
δέ φασιν ὄρφανὸν τραφέντα παρὰ Θεοφράστου καὶ δὴ μεираκίσκον ὄντα
ἀποθανεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ.

1-4 *Aristoteles, AABT T58m Düring* 1-2 *Timaeus ap. Proclum in comm.*
In Hesiodi Opera et dies 403 = FGvH 566 F 157, Hesychius, Vita Aristotelis
4 (AABT, p.82 Düring) et Suda, s.v. Ἀριστοτέλης (no. 3929, LG t.1 pars 1
p.357.27-8 Adler) 2 *Timaeus ap. Diogenem Laertium 5.1 et Suda, s.v.*
Ἀριστοτέλης (no. 3929, LG t.1 pars 1 p.357.26-7 Adler); vid. etiam Hermippum
ap. Athenaeum in Deipnosoph. 13.56 589C = Hermippus, fr. 46 Wehrli

Nicanor arrives, Aristomenes, Timarchus, Hipparchus, Dioteles,
Theophrastus, if he should be willing and it should be possible for
him, are to have charge of the children and Herpyllis and the things
left behind.

2 And when it is the right time for the girl, she is to be given
(in marriage) to Nicanor. But in case something happens to the girl
— may it not happen nor will it be — before marrying or after
she is married, but there are no children yet, let Nicanor be guardian
and administer matters concerning the boy and concerning the other
things worthily both of himself and us. Let Nicanor take care of
the girl and the boy Nicomachus however he thinks fit in regard
to what concerns them, as if he were both father and brother.

But in case something happens to Nicanor before — may it not
happen — either before marrying the girl or after he is married,
but there are no children yet, if he has made any arrangements,
let these be valid.

But if Theophrastus wishes to be with the girl, (let matters stand
in regard to him) just as (they stand) in regard to Nicanor. Otherwise
the executors, deliberating with Antipater, are to administer matters
concerning the boy and the girl however seems to them to be best.

¹ The words "Aristotle has made" are attributable to Diogenes or to
an intermediary like Favorinus. Cf. the wording at the beginning of
Theophrastus' will, Diog. Laert. 5.51 = 1

Vita Arist. vulg. 2 (AABT p.132.1-2 Düring), et Vita Arist. Lat. 3 (AABT
p.151.16-17 Düring); cf. etiam Sext. Emp. Adv. math. 1.258

5 παιδίων B^vP: παίδων B^vF 6 ἐκδόσθαι BP: ἐκδιδώσθαι F: ἐκδίδοσθαι
edd. pl.: ἐκδεδώσθαι dz 9 παιδίου] παιδὸς F αὐτοῦ Huebner: αὐτοῦ
codd. 10 παιδίου Plezia: παιδὸς *codd.* 12 συμβαίῃ P: συμβαίῃ F:
συμβῆ Cobet 13-14 μέν τι] μέντοι BFudz 15-16 εἶναι—Νικάνωρα
corrupta susp. Düring 16 πρὸς om. F βουλευσαμένους] βουλομένους
Fdz: βουλενομένους Heitz 17 παιδίου] παιδὸς PQCoF *vulg.*

20 Aristocles of Messene, fr. 2 Heiland, in Eusebius, *Evangelical Prepa-*
ration 15.2.15 (GCS vol.8.2 p.349.11-14 Mras)

After the death of Pythias, the daughter of Hermias, Aristotle
married Herpyllis the Stagirite, from whom he had a son Nicoma-
chus. They say that he (Nicomachus), being an orphan, was reared
in the house of Theophrastus and indeed died as a youth in battle.

- 21 Gnomologium Vaticanum, no. 330 (WSt t.10 [1888] p.259 Sternbach)

ὁ αὐτὸς πρὸς Νικόμαχόν ποτε τὸν Ἀριστοτέλους υἱὸν ἀργῶς φιλοσοφοῦντα καλὸν ἔφη μὴ μόνον εἶναι τῆς οὐσίας τῆς πατρῴας κληρονόμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐκείνου.

1-3 *exhortatio Theophrasti ad Nicomachum eadem invenitur in cod. Vat. Gr. 1144 f.229^v v.11-13 (App. Vat. II.31 Sternbach), cod. Neapol. II C 37 (sent. 6 Sbordone p.183), et cod. Paris Gr. 2571 f.14^v*

- 22 Codex Vaticanus Graecus 742 f.66^v v.9-12 (QETHs no. L85 Fortenbaugh)

Θεόφραστος, μεμφομένης αὐτῷ τῆς γυναικός, ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν οὐ προσίεται ἄχρηστον ὄντα καὶ λεγούσης ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἶη, ἀποκτύσας· “καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο”, εἶπεν, “ἐξ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐ χρήσιμον.”

1-3 *Theophrasto apophthegma perperam attribuitur etiam in cod. Par. Gr. 1168 f.152^v v.16-20 (Apoph. Par. no. 76), cod. Laur. 86.8 f.315^v v.10-11, cod. Par. Gr. suppl. 690 f.19^v col.1 v.20-3, et cod. Ottob. Gr. 192 f.208^v v.15-208^v v.2; Socrati attribuitur Maximus Confessor, Loci comm. 23 (PG t.91 col.860C) et florilegium quod Pčela dicitur, cap.23 (p.221.11-16 Semenov); cf. etiam verba Socratis ap. Arist. in EE 7.1 1235a37-9; Aristippo adsignatur in Stobaei Anth. 4.24b.30 (t.4 p.611.9-12 Hense), Gnom. Vat. no. 25 Sternbach, cod. Vat. Gr. 1144 f.216^v v.5-9, et cod. Neapol. II D 22 (sent. 35 Sbordone p.174) = Aristippus, fr. 95B-C Mannebach, et no. 136 (SR t.1 p.236 Giannantoni); cf. etiam quae de Aristippo feruntur a Diogene Laertio 2.81 = fr. 95A Mannebach, et no. 135 (SR t.1 p.235-6 Giannantoni); dictum quoque reperitur inter sententias Diogenis Cynici et Alexandri Magni in cod. Par. Gr. 1168 f.111^v v.15-18 (Flor. Par. XXV.37); auctori*

- 23 Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum 6.90 (OCT t.2 p.287.26-288.2 Long)

ὑπο τῶν Ἀθῆνησιν ἀστυνόμων ἐπιτιμηθεὶς ὅτι σινδόνα ἡμφίεστο, ἔφη, “καὶ Θεόφραστον ὑμῖν δεῖξω σινδόνα περιβεβλημένον.” ἀπιστούντων δέ, ἀπήγαγεν ἐπὶ κουρείον καὶ ἔδειξε κειρόμενον.

1-3 *Crates Thebanus, no. 35 (SR t.2 p.719 Giannantoni)*

- 21 Gnomologium Vaticanum, no. 330 (WSt vol.10 [1888] p.259 Sternbach)

The same man (Theophrastus) said to Nicomachus, the son of Aristotle, who was idle in doing philosophy, that it was a good thing not only to be the heir of his paternal property, but also of that man's habits.

- 22 Vatican Codex, Greek 742 f. 66^v l. 9-12 (QETHs no. 85 Fortenbaugh)

When his wife¹ scolded him for not allowing his useless son to come near, and said that (the son) was his,² Theophrastus spat and said, “And indeed this too is mine, but it is not useful.”

¹ Or perhaps “the woman”, but either way this text is not a historical document. At best it reflects a later and almost certainly confused tradition.

² Literally, “from him”: i.e., his own flesh and blood.

sine nomine attribuitur in collectione quae Γνωμικά τινα inscribitur (Boissonade, Anecd. Gr. t.2 p.467.12-15), sed post apophthegma quod plurimis locis Theophrasto adsignatur (vid. app. crit. ad Diog. Laert. 5.40 = 1)

1 μεμφομένης αὐτῷ] μεμφ. αὐτὸν Par. 1168 f.111^v: μεμφομένος αὐτὸν Laur. et Par. 690 γυναικός] συνεόνου Boiss. αὐτοῦ post γυναικός add. Par. 1168 f.111^v et Max. υἱὸν] βίον Vat.742 αὐτοῦ post υἱὸν add. Par 1168 f.111^v, Par. 690, Max., et Boiss 2 ἄχρηστον ὄντα om. Stob.

- 23 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 6.90 (OCT vol.2 p.287.26-288.2 Long)

When (Crates) was reprimanded by the city-magistrates in Athens because he was wearing linen, he said, “I’ll show you even Theophrastus wrapped in linen.” And when they did not believe him, he led them off to a barber shop and showed them Theophrastus having his hair cut.

Otium et res civiles

24 Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 5.107 (BT p.452.5-14 Pohlenz)

iam vero exilium, si rerum naturam, non ignominiam nominis quaerimus, quantum tandem a perpetua peregrinatione differt? in qua aetates suas philosophi nobilissimi consumpserunt: Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, Aristoteles, Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Carneades, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Panaetius, Posidonius, innumerabiles alii, qui semel egressi numquam domum reverterunt.

1-7 Crantor, T6 Mette; Arcesilaus, T6 Mette; Antipater, SVF t.3 p.244.8-11, fr. 3; Carneades, fr. 44 Wiśniewski; Antiochus, fr. 6 Luck; Panaetius, fr. 32 van Straaten; Posidonius, T3 Edelstein-Kidd; vid. etiam Rogeri Baconis *Moralem philosophiam* 3.2.1.1-3 (p.60.21-61.12 Massa), qui locus ex Cicerone dependet

25 Plutarchus, *De exilio* 14 605A-B (BT t.3 p.525.23-526.4 et 526.8-11 Paton et Pohlenz et Sieveking)

εἰ δὲ φήσει τις ὅτι δόξαν οὐτοὶ καὶ τιμὰς ἐθήρευον, ἐπὶ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐλθὲ καὶ τὰς σοφὰς Ἀθήνησι σχολὰς καὶ διατριβάς· ἀναπέμψασαι τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ, τὰς ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ, τὴν Στοᾶν, τὸ Παλλάδιον, τὸ Ὀιδεῖον. εἰ τὴν Περιπατητικὴν ἀσπάζῃ μάλιστα καὶ τεθαύμακας, Ἀριστοτέλης ἦν ἐκ Σταγίρων, Θεόφραστος ἐξ Ἐρέσου, Στράτων ἐκ Λαμψάκου, Λύκων ἐκ Τρωάδος, Ἀρίστων ἐκ Κέω, Κριτόλαος Φασηλίτης· . . . τίς οὖν τούτους ἐδίωξεν; οὐδεὶς· ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ διώκοντες ἡσυχίαν, ἧς οὐ πᾶν μέτεστιν οἴκοι τοῖς ἡντιναοῦν δόξαν ἢ δύναμιν ἔχουσι, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λόγοις τοῦτο δ' ἔργοις ἡμᾶς διδάσκουσι.

5-7 Stobaeus, *Anth.* 4.40.4 (t.5 p.736.8-10 Hense) 5-6 Straton, fr. 4 I Wehrli 6 Lycon, fr. 1 Wehrli 6-7 Ariston, fr. 3 Wehrli, et Critolaus, fr. 1 Wehrli

26 Plutarchus, *De tuenda sanitate praecepta* 24 135C (BT t.1 p.278.16-22 Paton et Wegehaupt et Pohlenz)

ἥκιστα δὴ τὴν ἀργίαν ὑγιεινὸν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ τὸ τῆς ὑγείας τέλος ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ οὐδ' ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ μᾶλλον ὑγιαίνειν τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας· οὔτε γὰρ Ξενοκράτης μᾶλλον διωγίανε Φωκίωτος οὔτε

Leisure and Political Affairs

24 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.107 (BT p.452.5-14 Pohlenz)

But now exile, if we are inquiring into the nature of things and not the dishonor associated with a term, how much, in the final analysis, does it differ from constant travel abroad? The noblest philosophers spent their lives in it: Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, Carneades, Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, Panaetius, Posidonius, countless others. Once they left, they never returned home.

2 tandem a Davis: damna a V³: damna X 3-6 ordinem philosophorum temporum disciplinarum ratione ita rest. Heine: codd. aliter

25 Plutarch, *On Exile* 14 605A-B (BT vol.3 p.525.23-526.4 and 526.8-11 Paton, Pohlenz and Sieveking)

If someone will say that these men (Euripides, Aeschylus, and others) were hunting for glory and honors, go to the wise men and the wise schools and haunts in Athens. Consider those in the Lyceum, those in the Academy, the Stoa, the Palladium, the Odeum. If you cling especially to the Peripatetic school and have admired it, Aristotle was from Stagira, Theophrastus from Eresus, Strato from Lampsacus, Lyco from the Troad, Ariston from Ceos, Critolaus a Phaselian; Who chased these men? No one. But they themselves chased after leisure, which is totally lacking at home to persons possessing any reputation or power. They teach us other things by their words, but this by their deeds.

5 Ἐρέσου Victorius: Ἐρεσίου Stob.: Ἐφέσου O 6 Λύκων Xylander: Γλύκων ω: Γλαύκων Stob.

26 Plutarch, *Rules for Preserving Health* 24 135C (BT vol.1 p.278.16-22 Paton, Wegehaupt and Pohlenz)

Least of all, indeed, should one suppose that laziness is healthy, if it destroys the goal of health, and it is not true that those who are at leisure are in better health. For Xenocrates was not generally

Δημητρίου Θεόφραστος, Ἐπίκουρον δὲ καὶ τοὺς περὶ Ἐπίκουρον οὐδὲν ὤνησε πρὸς τὴν ὑμνουμένην σαρκὸς εὐστάθειαν ἢ πάσης φιλοτιμίαν 5 ἐχούσης πράξεως ἀπόδρασις.

4-6 *Epicurus, fr. 8 Usener*

- 27 Philodemus, *De rhetorica hypomnematicon*, P. Herc. 240 fr. 16.3-10 (BT t.2 p.277.13-20 Sudhaus)

μη̄ δύνασθαι πε[ρι πολι|τε]ίας γράφειν, τὸ μη̄ . . . | . . . εθεῖσθαι διαδηλ | Θεόφραστον ἀλλὰ τὸ [δι|η]χέναι τὸν ἅπαντα [χρό|νο]ν ἐν ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ [φιλο|σο]φίαι καὶ βασ[ιλι]κ[ῶν ἀ|πειρ]ίαι π[ραγ]μάτ[ων].

2-4 *verba similia habet P. Herc. 1506 (= Philodemus, De rhetorica hypomnema-*

- 28 Aelianus, *Varia historia* 4.19 (BT p.71.21-7 Dilts)

Φίλιππος ὁ Μακεδῶν οὐ μόνον ἐλέγετο εἶναι τὰ πολέμια ἀγαθὸς καὶ εἰπεῖν δεινός, ἀλλὰ καὶ παιδείαν ἀνδρειότατα ἐτίμα. Ἀριστοτέλει γοῦν χορηγῆσας πλοῦτον ἀνευδεῖα, αἴτιος γέγονε πολλῆς καὶ ἄλλης πολυπειρίας, ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὰ ζῷα· καὶ τὴν ἱστορίαν αὐτῶν ὁ τοῦ Νικομάχου διὰ τὴν ἐκ Φιλίππου περιουσίαν 5 ἐκαρπώσατο. καὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ ἐτίμησε καὶ Θεόφραστον.

1-6 Φίλιππος—ἐκαρπώσατο] *Aristoteles, AABT T26b Düring; Plinius, NH 8.44 (AABT T26a) et Athen. 9.58 398E (AABT T26c) Alexandrum pro Philippo nominant*

- 29 Themistius, *Orationes* 21 252B (BT t.2 p.31.5-6 Downey et Norman)

πότε διεώσω χάριτας ἐμμίσθους ἀρχόντων, ὥσπερ Θεόφραστος τὰς παρὰ τοῦ Φαληρέως;

1-2 *Demetrius Phalereus, fr. 41 Wehrli*

1 διεώσω *w mg*: διεώσω *rell.*: διώσω *Petavius* ἐμμίσθους] ἐμμίθου
a: ἀμίσθου *a corr.*: ἀμίσθους *a*²

healthier than Phocion, nor Theophrastus than Demetrius, and running away from every activity involving ambition did not benefit Epicurus and his followers in regard to (their) celebrated soundness of body.

- 27 Philodemus, *Notebook on Rhetoric*, P. Herc. 240 fr. 16.3-10 (BT vol.2 p.277.13-20 Sudhaus)

was not capable of writing on government . . . but Theophrastus spent his whole life in private and (in) philosophy and (in) ignorance of the affairs of monarchs.

ticon fr. 4.5-9 [t.2 p.197.20-5 Sudhaus]

1 μη̄ (alt.) *coni. Sedley* 3 βασ[ιλι]κ[ῶν *Sudhaus*: πολ[ιτι]κ[ῶν *Hubbell*

- 28 Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 4.19 (BT p.71.21-7 Dilts)

Philip the Macedonian not only was said to be skilled in warfare and a forceful speaker, but he also used to value education very highly. At any rate, by supplying Aristotle with wealth beyond need, he was responsible for much of (Aristotle's) wide experience and therefore also for his knowledge of animals. And Nicomachus' son reaped the fruits of the investigation of these things on account of resources supplied by Philip. And he (Philip) also honored Plato and Theophrastus.

- 29 Themistius, *Orations* 21 252B (BT vol.2 p.31.5-6 Downey and Norman)

When did you¹ reject the financial favors of the archons, as Theophrastus did those from the Phalerean?

¹ The pseudo-philosopher or sophist to whom Themistius addresses this oration.

- 30 Dionysius Halicarnassensis, *De Dinarcho* 2 (BT t.5 [Opusc. t.1] p.300.3-15 Usener et Radermacher)

ἐπὶ δὲ Ἀναξικράτους ἄρχοντος, ἐφ' οὗ κατέλυσαν τὴν ἐν τῇ Μουνυχίᾳ φρουρὰν ὑπὸ Κασσάνδρου κατασταθεῖσαν οἱ περὶ Ἀντίγονον καὶ Δημήτριον (τούς) βασιλεῖς, αἰτίαν ἔχων ἅμα τοῖς ἐπιφανεστάτοις Ἀθηναίων, καίτοι ξένος αὐτὸς ὢν, καταλύσαι τὸν δῆμον, ὁρῶν ἠρεθισμένους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ μάλιστα τῷ πλουτεῖν 5 ἑαυτὸν ὑφορωμένους, μὴ διὰ τοῦτο πάθῃ τι δεινόν, εἰσελθεῖν μὲν εἰς δικαστήριον οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν, ἐξελθὼν δὲ τῆς πόλεως καὶ ἐλθὼν εἰς Χαλκίδα τὴν ἐν Εὐβοίᾳ, τὸν ἀπ' Ἀναξικράτους χρόνον ἕως Φιλίππου, πεντεκαίδεκαετη γένομενον, ἐκεῖ διέτριπεν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ γένοιτο διὰ Θεοφράστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων κάθοδος περιμένων. 10

1-10 [Plutarchus], *Vitae decem oratorum* 850D (= Caecilius Calactinus, fr. 149 Ofenloch), et Photius, *Bibliotheca cod.* 267 496b23-9 (t.8 p.73.11-17 Henry)
1-3 Dionysius Halicarnassensis, *De Dinarcho* 9 (p.310.13-16 Usener et Radermacher), *Diodorus Siculus* 20.45.1-46.1, *Plutarchus, Demetrius* 10.1 et *Suda*, s.v. Δημήτριος (no. 431, LG t.1 pars 2 p.41.23-8 Adler) 9-10 Dionysius Halicarnassensis, *De Dinarcho* 9 (p.309.20-2 et 310.19-21), *Theophrasto non nominato*

2 ὑπὸ Sylburg: ἀπὸ F 3 τοὺς add. Radermacher 4 Ἀθηναίων Blass:

- 31 Plutarchus, *Quaestiones convivales* 2.1.9 633B (BT t.4 p.51.25-9 Hubert)

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ σωματικὰ τοιαῦται διαφοραὶ τῶν πολλῶν. οἷον εἰς γρυπότητα καὶ σιμότητα σκωπτόμενοι γελῶσιν, ὡς ὁ Κασσάνδρου φίλος οὐκ ἠχθέσθη τοῦ Θεοφράστου πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπόντος, “θαυμάζω σου τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ὅτι οὐκ ἄδουσιν, τοῦ μυκτῆρος αὐτοῖς ἐνδε- 5 δωκότος.”

1 πολλῶν T: ποιῶν Madwig: ποιότητων Helmbold: γελοίων Pohlenz 3 φίλος T: Φίλιππος Xylander

- 32A Aelianus, *Varia historia* 8.12 (BT p.97.12-19 Dilts)

οὐ μόνος δὲ τοῦτο ἔπαθε Δημοσθένης ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, καίτοι δεινότατος ὢν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόφραστος ὁ Ἐρέσιος. ἐξέπεσε γὰρ καὶ οὗτος ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς λέγων, καὶ ταύτην

- 30 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Dinarchus* 2 (BT vol.5 [Opusc. vol.1] p.300.3-15 Usener and Radermacher)

During the archonship of Anaxicrates¹, when the followers of kings Antigonos and Demetrius destroyed the garrisons stationed in Munychia by Cassander, Dinarchus was accused, together with the most distinguished Athenians, although he was a foreigner, of subverting the democracy. And seeing the Athenians provoked and regarding him with suspicion especially because of his wealth, (Dinarchus), in order not to suffer anything horrible on this account, did not wait around to come before the court but, leaving the city, went to Chalcis in Euboea. There he spent the period from Anaxicrates' archonship until that of Philip², fifteen years, waiting (to see) if he might have (some means of) return through the agency of Theophrastus and his other friends.

¹ 307/6 B.C.

² 293/2 B.C.

Ἀθηναίους F^{pc}: Ἀθηναίους F^{ac} 6 ὑφορωμένους Radermacher: ὑφορώμενος F 9 καὶ αὐτὸν ante πεντεκαίδεκαετη add. Reiske

- 31 Plutarch, *Table Talk* 2.1.9 633B (BT vol.4 p.51.25-9 Hubert)

Such differences also exist in many things about the body.¹ For example, men laugh when they are teased about a hooked or snub nose, as the friend of Cassander was not offended when Theophrastus said to him, “I am amazed at your eyes, for they do not sing, though your nose gives them the pitch.”

¹ Plutarch has just distinguished between diseased and normal habits and now turns to bodily phenomena.

- 32A Aelian, *Miscellaneous History* 8.12 (BT p.97.12-19 Dilts)

Not only did Demosthenes suffer this in Macedonia,¹ although he was a very forceful speaker, but also Theophrastus the Eresian. For even he broke down while speaking before the council of the Areopagus and put forward this excuse: that he was dumbstruck

ἀπολογία προεφέρετο, ὅτι κατεπλάγη τὸ ἀξίωμα τοῦ συνεδρίου. πικρότατα οὖν ἀπήντησε καὶ ἐτοιμότατα πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον ὁ Δημοχάρης εἰπὼν· “ὦ Θεόφραστε, Ἀθηναῖοι ἦσαν ἄλλ’ οὐχ οἱ δώδεκα θεοὶ οἱ δικάζοντες.”

1-4 Gellius, NA 8.9 capitulum (OCT t.1 p.19.32-5 et 275.17-20 Marshall) 1
Aelianus, VH 8.12 (p.97.3-6 Dilts), Aeschines 2.34, Philostratos, Vitae sophist.
1.18 et Io. Tzetzes, Hist. 6.191-8 et 12.574-7 3-7 cod. Paris. Gr. suppl. 134
f.236' v.17-21 (Gnom. Par. no. 29 Sternbach = no. 19 Lampros, Νέος
Ἑλληνομνήμων 6 [1909] 140)

32B Proclus, In Platonis Primum Alcibiadem 114B-D (p.144.12-16 Westerink)

οὐκ ἄρα δεῖ λέγειν τοὺς ἐνισταμένους, “πῶς οὖν ὁ Θεόφραστος οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο πείθειν τοὺς Ἀρεοπαγίτας, ὁ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πιθανώτατος;” οὐ γὰρ οἱ ἰδίᾳ πειθόμενοι τῶν πολλῶν ἦσαν τῶν μὴ πεπεισμένων οὐδὲ ἐν οἷς ἐπιστήμων ἦν ὁ Θεόφραστος, ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἐπίεσθησαν, ἀλλ’ ἐν οἷς ἀπείρωσ εἶχεν.

33A Plutarchus, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum 15 1097B (BT t.6.2 p.149.5-11 Pohlenz et Westman)

τίνας οὖν οἰόμεθα καὶ πηλίκας ἡδονὰς εἶναι τὰς Πλάτωνος, ὀπνηκίκα Δίων ὀρμήσας ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ κατέλυσε Διονύσιον καὶ Σικελίαν ἡλευθέρωσε; τίνας δ’ Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅτε τὴν πατρίδα κειμένην ἐν ἐδάφει πάλιν ἀνέστησε καὶ κατήγαγε τοὺς πολίτας; τίνας δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ Φαινίου τοὺς τῆς πατρίδος ἐκκοψάντων τυράννους;

1-5 Aristoteles, AABT T27d Düring et Phainias, fr. 7 Wehrli 1-3 similia
habent Plutarchus, Adv. Col. 32 1126C-D et Vita Dionis 22.1-30.8, Nepos, Dion
3.1-4.2, Aelianus, VH 3.17, Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 3.21, Philostratus, Vita
Apollonii 7.2, et Olympiodorus, In Plat. Prim. Alcib. 2.114-33 Westerink 3-
4 Aelianus, VH 3.17 et 12.54, Valerius Maximus 5.6.5, Dio Chrys., Or. 2.79
et 47.8, et Anon., Vit. Arist. Latina 17 (AABT p.153 Düring); vid. etiam Plin.
NH 7.109, Anon., Vit. Arist. Marc. 83-5 (p.3.21-3 Gigon), Vit. Arist. vulg. 17
(AABT p.134 Düring) et Io. Tzetz. Hist. 7.433-7, quibus locis non Aristote-

at the majesty of the council. Then in a very stinging and quick-witted manner Demochares replied to his explanation, saying, “Theophrastus, the judges were Athenians, not the twelve gods.”

¹ Aelian has just related that Demosthenes once broke down and fell silent while speaking on an embassy to Philip.

32B Proclus, On Plato's First Alcibiades 114B-D (p.144.12-16 Westerink)

Therefore objectors ought not to say, “Then how was Theophrastus, who was most persuasive in his private conversations, unable to persuade the members of the Areopagus?” For those persuaded in private were not part of the unpersuaded many, nor were they unpersuaded in matters in which Theophrastus was knowledgeable, but in matters in which he was inexperienced.

33A Plutarch, A Pleasant Life Is Impossible Following Epicurus 15 1097B (BT vol.6.2 p.149.5-11 Pohlenz and Westman)

What pleasures, then, and how great do we suppose were those pleasures felt by Plato, when Dion, setting out from him, destroyed Dionysius and liberated Sicily? And what were those of Aristotle, when he raised again his fatherland which had been levelled to the ground and brought back the citizens? And what were those of Theophrastus and Phainias, who drove out the tyrants from their fatherland?

les sed Alexander Magnus Stagiram recondidisse dicitur; cf. Plut. Alex. 7.2, quo loco Stagirae reconditio Philippo Macedonio attribuitur 4-5 Vit. Arist. Marc. 79-83 (p.3.17-21 Gigon) = Phainias, fr. 6 Wehrli, Vit. Arist. vulg. 17 (AABT p.134 Düring), et Vit. Arist. Lat. 18 (AABT p.153 Düring)

5 Φαινίου Rasmus: φεινίου g: φειδίου E

- 33B** Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem* 33 1126F (BT t.6.2 p.213.29-214.3 Pohlenz et Westman)

τί οὖν εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἐπέπρακτο αὐτοῖς οἷον Ἀριστοτέλει, τὴν πατρίδα κτίσαι διεφθαρμένην ὑπὸ Φιλίππου, Θεοφράστῳ δὲ δις ἐλευθερῶσαι τυραννομένην;

1-3 *Aristoteles, AABT T27d Düring*

Verba ultima

- 34A** Cicero, *Tusculanae disputationes* 3.69 (BT p.352.3-10 Pohlenz)

Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui.

1-6 *Gualterus Burlaeus, De vita et moribus philos.* 68 (p.284.12-286.2 Knust); *Vincentius Bellovacensis Speculum historiale* 5.2 (t.4p.138 col.1 v.7-13 ed. Duac. a. 1624); *Francesco da Barberino, I documenti d'amore* 7 (t.3 p.194.25-9 Egidi);

- 34B** *Şiwān al-ḥikma*, cap. de Theophrasto, dictum no. 22 (vid. fontes in apparatu)

وَأَ حَضْرَتِهِ الْوَفَاةَ أَقْبَلَ عَلَى لَوْمِ الطَّبِيعَةِ فَقَالَ كَيْفَ فَعَلْتَ أَنْكَ بَنِيَتِ الْكِرَاكِي وَالْفِرَابِينَ وَالنَّسُورَ بَنِيَةَ تَقْبَلُ حَيَوَةَ كَثِيرَةً وَبَنِيَتِ الْإِنْسَانَ بَنِيَةَ تَقْبَلُ حَيَوَةَ قَلِيلَةً فَصَارَ الَّذِي يَحْتَاجُ إِلَى الْحَيَوَةِ يَدْتَرُ سَرِيعاً وَالَّذِي لَا يَحْتَاجُ إِلَى حَيَوَةِ يَبْقَى كَثِيراً

fontes: *Muntaḥab Şiwān al-ḥikma (Mḥb)*, in ed. Dunlop v.1196-9 (codd. ABCD), et in ed. Badawī p.178.12-15

1-4 *summatim e Şiwān al-ḥikma etiam ap. aš-Şāhrazūri, Nuzhat al-arwāḥ* t.1 p.303.10-11 Ahmed (RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.100 no. 22 Gutas)

2 *الغرابيين corr. Gutas : الغرابيين ABCD : الغرابيين con. Dunlop : الغرابيين ed. Badawī*

- 33B** Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 33 1126F (BT vol.6.2 p.213.29-214.3 Pohlenz and Westman)

What if such a great thing had been done by them (the Epicureans) as by Aristotle, who (re)built his fatherland after Philip had destroyed it, and by Theophrastus, who twice liberated (his fatherland) from tyranny?

Last Words

- 34A** Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.69 (BT p.352.3-10 Pohlenz)

However, as Theophrastus was dying, he is said to have reproached nature because she had given stags and crows a long life, to whom it is of no interest, (while) to men, to whom it was of great interest, (she had given) such a short life; and if their lifetime could have been longer, it would have been the case that when all the arts had been perfected, the life of men would be polished by all learning. Therefore he was complaining that he was dying just when he had begun to understand those things.

cf. etiam *Fr. Petrarcae Familiares res* 8.4.10 (p.208.20-2 Dotti) 1-4 *Benevenuto da Imola, Comentum super Dantis Aldigherij Comoediam, cant.* 15 (t.1 p.517.8-12 Vernon); *verba similia Aristoteli tribuit Seneca, De brevitate vitae* 1.2 6 *similia verba sapienti cuidam Graeco attribuit Hieronymus, Epist.* 52.3.5 (CSEL t.54.1 p.417.12-14), quo tamen loco codices alii nomen nullum, alii Themistoclem offerunt

3 tam] tamen KR¹ 6 querebatur] quarebatur VK² et Vinc.: quaerebat GK¹: querebat R

- 34B** *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 22 (see the sources in the apparatus)

On his deathbed Theophrastus set to reproaching nature. He said, "How did you manage to fashion cranes, crows, and eagles with a constitution capable of longevity, while man you fashioned with a constitution capable of a short life, so that those who need to live waste away quickly, while those who do not need to live last a long time?"

Res testamentariae

- 35 Harpocratio, *Lexicon*, s.v. ὀργεῶνας (t.1 p.224.17-225.6 Dindorf)

ὀργεῶνας· Ἰσαίου λόγος ἐστὶ Πρὸς ὀργεῶνας, ὀργεῶνες δ' εἰσὶν οἱ ἐπὶ τιμῇ θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων συνιόντες· ὀργιάζειν γὰρ ἐστὶ τὸ θύειν καὶ τὰ νομιζόμενα δρᾶν, ἤτοι παρὰ τὸ ὀρέγειν τῷ χεῖρι, ἢ παρὰ τὰ ὄργια, ἢ διὰ τὸ ἐν ταῖς ὀργάσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ ἱερά δρᾶν. οἱ μέντοι ποιηταὶ ἔταττον τοῦνομα ἀπλῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἱερέων, ὡς Ἀντίμαχος τέ που καὶ Αἰσχύλος ἐν Μυσοῖς. μήποτε δὲ ὕστερον νερόμισται τὸ ἐπὶ τιμῇ τινᾶς τῶν ἀποθανόντων συνιέναι καὶ ὀργεῶνας ὁμοίως ὀνομάσθαι, ὡς ἔστι συνιδεῖν ἐκ τῶν Θεοφράστου διαθηκῶν.

1-8 *Suda*, s.v. ὀργεῶνας (no. 512, LG t.1 pars 3 p.553.5-12 Adler) 1
Isaeus, fr. XXXV.27 *Thalheim* 5 *Antimachus*, fr. 67 *Wyss* 6 *Aeschylus*, fr. 144 (TGtF t.3 p.259 *Radt*) 8 non in testamento ap. *Diogenem Laertium*, sed vid. 1 (app. crit. ad 5.54)

- 36 Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 5.2 185C-186A (BT t.1 p.404.20-405.2 Kaibel)

τῶν δὲ νῦν δείπνων προνοοῦντες οἱ νομοθέται τὰ τε φυλετικὰ [δείπνα] καὶ τὰ δημοτικὰ προσέταξαν, ἔτι δὲ τοὺς θιάσους καὶ τὰ φρατρικὰ καὶ πάλιν (τὰ) ὀργεωνικὰ λεγόμενα. πολλῶν γοῦν εἰσι φιλοσόφων ἐν ἅσται συνοδοὶ τῶν μὲν Διογενιστῶν, τῶν δὲ Ἀντιπατριστῶν λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ Παναητισταῶν. κατέλιπε δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην σύνοδον χρήματα, μὰ Δί' οὐχ ἵνα ἀκολασταίνωσι συνιόντες, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὰ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ συμποσίου λόγον σωφρόνως καὶ πεπαιδευμένως διεξάγωσι.

3-5 πολλῶν—Παναητισταῶν] *Antipater*, SVF t.3 p.246.5-7, fr. 14 et *Panaetius*, fr. 29 *van Straaten*

2 δείπνα del. *Kaibel* 3 τὰ add. *Kaibel* 4 Διογενιστῶν *Wilamowitz* 7 τὰ κατὰ—λόγον (νόμον *Wilamowitz*) A: τοὺς κατὰ τὸ συμπόσιον λόγους C

Testamentary Matters

- 35 Harpocratio, *Lexicon*, on *orgeōnas* (vol.1 p.224.17-225.6 Dindorf)

orgeōnas: There is a speech of Isaeus *Regarding the Orgeōnes*, and *orgeōnes* are those who assemble to honor gods or heroes. For *orgiazēin* means to sacrifice and to do what is customary, either because of the stretching out (*oregein*) of the hands or because of the secret rites (*orgia*) or on account of doing what is holy in the sacred precincts (*orgades*) and the groves. However, the poets used to apply the name simply to the priests, as (does) Antimachus somewhere and Aeschylus in *The Mysians*. Possibly later it became customary for certain men to come together to honor the dead and likewise to be called *orgeōnes*, as is to be seen from the will of Theophrastus.

3 δρᾶν *Valesius*: ὀρᾶν *codd.* et *Suda* 5-6 ὡς—Μύσοις *om.* *Suda* 6 Μύσοις *Blancardus*: μύσταις *BC Ald.* et *fort.* A

- 36 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 5.2 185C-186A (BT vol.1 p.404.20-405.2 Kaibel)

The law-givers, providing for the dinners of the present day, arranged the dinners of the tribes, and of the demes and further religious gatherings and the dinners of the brotherhoods and again of the so-called *orgeōnes*. At any rate, of the many philosophers in the city there are the meetings of the Diogenists, of the so-called Antipatrists and of the Panaetiaists. Theophrastus even left money for such a meeting, not — god forbid! — that those coming together might behave in a debauched manner, but that they might conduct matters according to the rule of the symposium in a moderate and educated manner.

Dicta

de dictis Theophrasti in vitae descriptionibus vel gnomologiis et similibus collectionibus repertis vid. 1, 21-22, 34A-B, 163, 253, 256, 272, 306, 442-445, 448, 451-459, 469-474, 476-478, 485, 487, 506, 508-510, 517, 519-522, 524-525, 527-528, 536-540, 544-546, 557-558, 565-566, 601, 610, 621, 628, 634, 661-662, 722, 725; de aliis textibus qui inter eos dicta praebentes enumerari possint vid. commentarium

Sayings

For sayings of Theophrastus found in biographies or gnomologies and similar collections, see 1, 21-22, 34A-B, 163, 253, 256, 272, 306, 442-445, 448, 451-459, 469-474, 476-478, 485, 487, 506, 508-510, 517, 519-522, 524-525, 527-528, 536-540, 544-546, 557-558, 565-566, 601, 610, 621, 628, 634, 661-662, 722, 725; for other texts that might be enumerated among those containing sayings of Theophrastus, see the commentary.

SCRIPTA

Conservatio et editio

37 Strabo, *Geographica* 13.1.54 (BT t.3 p.851.24-852.30 Meineke)

ἐκ δὲ τῆς Σκῆψεως οἱ τε Σωκρατικοὶ γεγόνασιν Ἐραστός καὶ Κορίσκος καὶ ὁ τοῦ Κορίσκου υἱὸς Νηλεὺς, ἀνὴρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἠκροαμένος καὶ Θεοφράστου, διαδεγεμένος δὲ τὴν βιβλιοθήκην τοῦ Θεοφράστου, ἐν ᾗ ἦν καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ὥπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, 5
 852 πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν. Θεόφραστος δὲ Νηλεῖ παρέδωκεν· ὁ δ' εἰς Σκῆψιν κομίσας τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν παρέδωκεν, ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, οἱ κατάκλειστα εἶχον τὰ βιβλία οὐδ' ἐπιμελῶς κείμενα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἦσθοντο τὴν σπουδὴν τῶν Ἀτταλικῶν βασιλέων ὑφ' οἷς ἦν ἡ πόλις 10
 ζητούντων βιβλία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἔκρυψαν ἐν διάρυγι τινι· ὑπὸ δὲ νοτίας καὶ σητῶν κακωθέντα ὁπέ ποτε ἀπέδοντο οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους Ἀπελλικῶντι τῷ Τηίῳ πολλῶν ἀργυρίων τὰ τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία· ἦν δὲ 15
 ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος· διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπαν- ὀρθῶσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ, καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἀμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία.

συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις 20
 ληκυθίζειν· τοῖς δ' ὕστερον, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προήλθεν, ἀμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελεῖζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μὲντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθὺς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευταίην 25
 Σύλλας ἦρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐλὼν, δεῦρο δὲ κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς διεχειρίσατο φι-

WRITINGS

Preservation and Publication

37 Strabo, *Geography* 13.1.54 (BT vol.3 p.851.24-852.30 Meineke)

From Scepsis were the Socratics Erastus and Coriscus and Coriscus' son Neleus, a man who studied under Aristotle and Theophrastus. He received the library of Theophrastus, which contained also Aristotle's library. For indeed Aristotle gave his own library to Theophrastus, and also left his school to him. Aristotle was the first man we know to have collected books, and he taught the kings 852 in Egypt how to organize a library. Theophrastus gave (the library) to Neleus. But Neleus brought it to Scepsis and gave it to his heirs, ordinary men who kept the books shut up and carelessly stored. And when they learned that the Attalid kings, to whom their city was subject, were eagerly searching for books for the provision of the library in Pergamum, they hid them in a place dug in the ground. After some length of time their descendants sold the books of Aristotle and Theophrastus, which were damaged by dampness and moths, to Apellicon of Teos for a large sum of money. But Apellicon was more a bibliophile than a philosopher. For this reason, though he attempted to correct parts that had been eaten through, he transferred what was written to new copies, making restorations that were not good, and published the books full of errors.

Since the ancient members of the Peripatos after Theophrastus were entirely without the books, except a few, and these were mostly the exoteric writings, it happened that they were unable to do philosophy in a systematic way, but could (only) hollowly declaim theses. Those who came later, after these books (re)appeared, were better able than they to philosophize and to expound Aristotle. Nevertheless they were forced in many cases to state what was probable due to the great number of errors. Rome also added much to this (situation). For immediately after Apellicon's death, Sulla, who had taken Athens, seized Apellicon's library, and after it had been brought here (to Rome), Tyrannion the grammarian, a lover

αριστοτέλης ὄν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ βιβλιοπῶλαι
τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες — ὅπερ καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πράσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ
ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ἀπόχρη. 30

1-30 *Aristoteles*, AABT T66b *Düring* 3-4, 7 *Diogenes Laertius*, *Vitae* 5.52
= 1 13-15 *Posidonius ap. Athenaeum in Deipnos*. 5.53 214D-E = *Posidonius*,
fr. 253 Edelstein et Kidd, et Aristoteles, AABT T66a *Düring*, *Aristotele nominato*
sed non Theophrasto

18 ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου *Düring*

38 Plutarchus, *Sulla* 26.1-3 (BT t.3.2 p.170.17-171.4 Ziegler)

ἀναχθεὶς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου, τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεὶ
καθωρμίσθη, καὶ ἤμνηθεις ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶνος τοῦ Τηίου
βιβλιοθήκην, ἐν ἣ τὰ πλείστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου
2 βιβλίων ἦν, οὐπω τότε σαφῶς γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται
δὲ κομισθεῖσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην, Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν 5
ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλά, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον
εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς
3 νῦν φερομένους πίνακας. οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι Περιπατητικοὶ φαίνονται
μὲν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς γενόμενοι χαριέντες καὶ φιλόλογοι, τῶν δ' Ἀρισ-
τοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου (συγγραμμάτων οὔτε πολλοῖς οὔτ' ἀκριβῶς 10
ἐντετυχηκότες, διὰ τὸ τὸν Νηλέως τοῦ Σκηπίου κληρὸν, ᾧ τὰ βιβλία
κατέλιπε Θεόφραστος, εἰς ἀφιλοτίμους καὶ ἰδιώτας ἀνθρώπους
περιγενέσθαι.

1-13 *Aristoteles*, AABT T66c *Düring* 1-4 *Io. Antiochenus*, *De consulibus*
4 (*Lampros*, *Néos Ἑλληνομήμων t.1* [1904] p.23.1-5), et *Suda*, s.v. Σύλλας
(no. 1337, LG t.1 pars 4 p.456.8-13 Adler) = *Aristoteles*, AABT T66e *Düring*

2 *crucem posuit* Ziegler μνηθεῖς] (ἐκπλεῖν) ὀρηθεῖς *vel sim.* *Düring*,
→

39 Porphyrius, *Vita Plotini* 24 (OCT p.32.20-9 Henry et Schwyzer)

ἐπεὶ δὲ αὐτὸς τὴν διάταξιν καὶ τὴν διόρθωσιν τῶν βιβλίων
ποιεῖσθαι ἡμῖν ἐπέτρεψεν, ἐγὼ δὲ κάκεινφ ζῶντι ὑπεσχόμεν καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις ἑταίροις ἐπηγγειλάμην ποιῆσαι τοῦτο, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ βιβλία
οὐ κατὰ χρόνους ἕασαι φύρδην ἐκδεδομένα ἐδικαίωσα, μιμησάμενος
δ' Ἀπολλόδωρον τὸν Ἀθηναῖον καὶ Ἀνδρόνικον τὸν Περιπατητικόν, ὃν 5

of Aristotle, got his hands on it by playing up to the person in
charge of the library; and some booksellers, employing poor scribes
and not comparing (manuscripts)¹ — which also happens in the
case of other books copied for sale, both here and in Alexandria.
But enough about these matters.

¹ The sentence is incomplete, but Strabo's thought is clear: the scribes
produced faulty copies.

38 Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1-3 (BT vol.3.2 p.170.17-171.4 Ziegler)

Having put out from Ephesus with all his ships, (Sulla) an-
chored on the third day in Piraeus. And after being initiated into
the mysteries,¹ he carried off for himself the library of Apellicon
2 of Teos, in which were most of the books of Aristotle and Theo-
phrastus, at that time not yet clearly known to many. When it (the
library) was brought to Rome, Tyrannion the grammarian is said
to have prepared many (of the books) and the Rhodian Andronicus,
3 obtaining the use of copies from him, published them and drew
up the lists now in circulation. In themselves the elder Peripatetics
appear to have been elegant and fond of learning, but neither to
have read many of the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus nor
(to have done so) with care, since the estate of Neleus of Scepsis,
to whom Theophrastus left his books, passed to men who lacked
aspiration and were ordinary.

¹ Ziegler marks the text as corrupt.

AABT p.383 10 συγγραμμάτων *Robbe*: γραμμάτων *codd.* ἀκρι-
βῶς (γεγραμμένοις) *Reiske*: ἀκριβέσιν *Coraes* 11 τὸ *add.* *Musurus*
κληρὸν *Reiske*: κληρονόμον *GL*: κληρονομίαν *Musurus et Anon.* 13
περιγενέσθαι *Reiske*: παραγενέσθαι *codd.*

39 Porphyry, *Life of Plotinus* 24 (OCT p.32.20-9 Henry and Schwyzer)

Since he himself (Plotinus) has entrusted it to us to make the
arrangement and the recension of his books, and since I myself
promised him while he was still alive and have announced it to
his other companions that I would do this, I first deemed it right
not to leave them in utter confusion according to the chronological
order in which they were produced, but to imitate Apollodorus the
Athenian and Andronicus the Peripatetic, of whom the former
collected (the writings of) Epicharmus the comic writer, bringing

ὁ μὲν Ἐπίχαρμον τὸν κωμωδιογράφον εἰς δέκα τόμους φέρων
συνήγαγεν, ὁ δὲ τὰ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου εἰς πραγματείας
διείλε τὰς οἰκείας ὑποθέσεις εἰς ταὐτὸν συναγαγών.

1-8 *Aristoteles*, AABT T75g *Düring* 3-8 *Apollodorus*, FG7H 244 T 18 6-
7 *Epicharmus*, FVS 23A7; *vid. etiam Epicharm. fr. 202 Kaibel* (= *Apollodorus*,
FG7H 244 F 213)

40 Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 1.4 3A-B (BT t.1 p.4.27-5.11 Kaibel)

ἦν δέ, φησί, καὶ βιβλίων κτήσις αὐτῷ ἀρχαίων Ἑλληνικῶν τσο-
αύτη ὡς ὑπερβάλλειν πάντας τοὺς ἐπὶ συναγωγῇ τεθραυμασμένους,
Πολυκράτην τε τὸν Σάμιον καὶ Πεισιστρατὸν τὸν Ἀθηναίων τυραν-
νήσαντα Εὐκλείδην τε τὸν καὶ αὐτὸν Ἀθηναίων καὶ Νικοκράτην τὸν
Κύπριον ἔτι τε τοὺς Περγάμου βασιλέας Εὐρυπίδην τε τὸν ποιητὴν
Ἀριστοτέλην τε τὸν φιλόσοφον (καὶ Θεοφραστον) καὶ τὸν τὰ τούτων
B διατηρήσαντα βιβλία Νηλέα· παρ' οὗ πάντα, φησί, πριάμενος ὁ ἡ-
μεδαπὸς βασιλεὺς Πτολεμαῖος, Φιλάδελφος δὲ ἐπὶ κλην, μετὰ τῶν
Ἀθήνηθεν καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ Ῥόδου εἰς τὴν καλὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν μετήγαγε.

1-9 *Aristoteles*, AABT T42d *Düring*

6 καὶ Θεοφραστον *add. Adam*

41 al-Fārābī, *Fī zuhūr al-falsafa*, ap. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā'
fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā' 15, cap. de al-Fārābī (t.2 p.135.2-4 Müller)

وكان آخر هؤلاء الملوك المرأة فغلبها أوغسطس الملك من أهل رومية وقتلها
واستحوذ على الملك فلما استقر له نظر في خزائن الكتب وصنعها فوجد فيها
نسخاً لكتب أرسطوطاليس قد نسخت في أيامه وأيام ثاوفرسطس

Genera et qualitates

42 Galenus, *De substantia naturalium facultatum* (t.4 p.758.6-9 Kühn)

διαφωνίαν οὐ χρῆ τοῦτο νομίζειν εἶναι, τάνδρὸς ἑαυτῷ τάναντία
λέγοντος, ὡσπερ οὐδ' Ἀριστοτέλους ἢ Θεοφράστου, τὰ μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς
γεγραφότων, τὰς δὲ ἀκροάσεις τοῖς ἑταίροις.

1-3 *Aristoteles*, AABT T76g *Düring*; cf. *Cic. De fin.* 5.12 = 498

(them) into ten volumes, while the latter divided the works of
Aristotle and Theophrastus into treatises, bringing together related
subjects into the same work.

40 Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 1.4 3A-B (BT vol.1 p.4.27-5.11
Kaibel)

He (Athenaeus) says¹ that he (Larensis) possessed such a great
number of ancient Greek books that he outdid all those who have
been admired for their collections: Polycrates the Samian and Pei-
sistratus, who was tyrant of the Athenians, and Euclid, who was
also an Athenian, and Nicocrates the Cypriot and, moreover, the
kings of Pergamum and Euripides the poet and Aristotle the phi-
losopher <and Theophrastus>, and Neleus, who preserved their
B books. From him, he says, Ptolemy, surnamed Philadelphus, the
king of our country, purchased all of them and transferred them
along with those from Athens and Rhodes to beautiful Alexandria.

¹ The phrase "he says", here and below, reflects the fact that we are
dealing with an excerpt from Athenaeus' work.

41 Fārābī, *On the Appearance of Philosophy*, in Ibn-Abī-Uṣaybi'a, *Essen-
tial Information on the Generations of Physicians* 15, chap. on Fārābī
(vol.2 p.135.2-4 Müller)

The last of these rulers (the Ptolemies in Alexandria) was the
woman (Cleopatra). The Roman Emperor Augustus defeated her,
put her to death, and took over the rule. When he had secured
it, he inspected the libraries and the (dates of) production of books,
and found there manuscripts of Aristotle's works, written in his
lifetime and in that of Theophrastus.

Kinds and Characteristics

42 Galen, *On the Substance of the Natural Faculties* (vol.4 p.758.6-9 Kühn)

One should not think that this is an inconsistency, with the man
(Plato) contradicting himself, just as neither Aristotle nor Theo-
phrastus (are contradicting themselves), when they write some
things for the multitude, but their lectures for their associates.

- 43 Basilus Magnus, *Epistulae* 135 (Ad Diodorum Antiochiae Presbyterum).1 (CB t.2 p.49.20-50.3 Courtonne)

ἐκείνο γὰρ πάντως συνειδέ σου ἡ ἀγχίνοια, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἕξωθεν
50 φιλοσόφων οἱ τοὺς διαλόγους συγγράφαντες, Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν καὶ
Θεόφραστος, εὐθὺς αὐτῶν ἤψαντο τῶν πραγμάτων, διὰ τὸ συνειδέναί
ἑαυτοῖς τῶν Πλατωνικῶν χαρίτων τὴν ἔνδειαν.

- 44 Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem* 1, prooemium (col.659.20-3 Cousin)

τὸ δὲ παντελῶς ἀλλότρια τὰ προοίμια τῶν ἐπομένων εἶναι, καθάπερ
τὰ τῶν Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ποντικοῦ καὶ Θεοφράστου διαλόγων, πᾶσαν
ἀνὰ κρίσεως μετέχουσαν ἀκοήν.

1-3 *Heraclides, fr. 23 Wehrli*

- 45 Hieronymus, *Epistulae* 49 (Ad Pammachium).13.3 (CSEL t.54.1 p.369.3-8 Hilberg)

legite, obsecro vos, Demosthenen, legite Tullium; ac ne forsitan
rhetores vobis displiceant, quorum artis est verisimilia magis quam
vera dicere, legite Platonem, Theophrastum, Xenophonta, Aris-
totelen et reliquos, qui de Socratis fonte manantes divisim cucurrere
fluminibus.

1 ne] si AD

- 46 Cicero, *Academici libri* 1.10 (BT p.5.10-13 Plasberg)

quanto magis philosophi delectabunt, si ut illi Aeschylum So-
phoclen Euripiden sic hi Platonem imitentur Aristotelem Theophras-
tum?

2 imitentur] mirentur Γ

- 47 Galenus, *An in arteriis natura sanguis contineatur* 7 (p.17.1-5 Albrecht)

θαυμάζω δ' ὑμῶν, ὃ Ἐρασιστράτειοι, πῶς ὑμνοῦντες ἐκάστοτε τὸν
Ἐρασιστράτην τὰ <τ'> ἄλλα καὶ ὡς Θεοφράστῳ συνεγένετο, φεύγειν

- 43 Basil the Great, *Epistles* 135 (To Diodorus, Presbyter of Antioch).1 (CB vol.2 p.49.20-50.3 Courtonne)

For surely your (Diodorus') clever mind recognizes this, that
50 even those of the pagan philosophers who wrote dialogues, Aris-
totle and Theophrastus, at once fastened on to the subject matter
itself, because of their recognition that they lacked the Platonic
graces.

- 44 Proclus, *On Plato's Parmenides* 1, Introduction (col.659.20-3 Cousin)

But the fact that the introductions are completely foreign to
what follows, just as (are) those of the dialogues of Heraclides
Ponticus and Theophrastus, annoys every ear that has judgment.

- 45 Jerome, *Epistles* 49 (To Pammachius).13.3 (CSEL vol.54.1 p.369.3-8 Hilberg)

Read, I beg you, Demosthenes, read Tully; and if perchance you
do not like the orators, whose art is characterized by speaking like-
lihoods rather than truths, read Plato, Theophrastus, Xenophon,
Aristotle and the rest, who, springing from their source Socrates,
proceeded by different streams.

- 46 Cicero, *Academic Books* 1.10 (BT p.5.10-13 Plasberg)

How much more will philosophers delight them¹ if, just as those
others² (imitated) Aeschylus, Sophocles, (and) Euripides, so these
imitate Plato, Aristotle, (and) Theophrastus?

¹ Those Romans who can read Greek literature.

² The older Roman poets like Ennius, Pacuvius, and Accius.

- 47 Galen, *Whether Blood is Naturally Contained in the Arteries* 7 (p.17.1-5 Albrecht)

I am amazed at you, followers of Erasistratus, how it is that
while you constantly sing the praises of Erasistratus and make a
special point that he was an associate of Theophrastus, you dare

τολμάτε τὰς λογικὰς μεθόδους, ὧν χωρὶς οὔτε Θεόφραστος οὔτ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἐνεχείρουν τι γράφειν.

2 τὰ (τ') ἄλλα Kühn: τὰ ἄλλα LV: τὰλλα a

48 Galenus, *De optima doctrina* 2 (BT p.84.21-85.3 Marquardt)

ἔτι δ' οὐ δεησόμεθα τὴν ἀρχὴν ἡμεῖς τοιούτων διδασκάλων, δυνάμενοι γε καὶ αὐτοὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰρέσεων ἀντιδιηρημένον ἀναγνώσκων καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν εἰδέναι, ἐὰν ἀσαφὲς αὐτῶν τι ᾖ, τὸ μὲν παρὰ [τῷ Χρυσίπῳ] τοῖς Στωικοῖς διδασκάλοις, [ἀσφαλέστερον ὀνομάζειν ἐστὶ] τὸ δὲ παρὰ 5 [Θεοφράστῳ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει] τοῖς Περιπατητικοῖς. οὕτω δὲ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' οὐδὲν ἂν τι λείποιο πρὸς διδασκαλίαν τοῖς Ἀκαδημαϊκοῖς, ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ Φαβρίνου λόγῳ.

1-8 Favorinus, fr. 28 Barigazzi

1-8 ut *glossema* secl. Marquardt 1 ἔτι δ' οὐ O: ὅτι δὲ καὶ L: δῆλον ὅτι δ' οὐ coni. Marquardt 3 ἀντιδιηρημένον om. L 4 ἐὰν Marquardt: κἄν O τῷ Χρυσίπῳ secl. Marquardt ut *interpolationem secundae manus* 5 ἀσφ.—ἐστὶ secl. Marquardt ut *interpol.*: ἀναφέρειν ἐστὶ L 6 nomina Theophrasti et Aristotelis secl. Marquardt ut *interpolata* 8 ὅσον ἐπὶ Charterius: ὡς ἐπὶ Goulston: ὄν ἐπὶ L et cod. Lond. ap. Goulston: ὄν ἐπὶ Ald. et ed. Basil.: οἷα coni. Marquardt

49 Theodorus Metochita, *Miscellanea philosophica et historica* 80 (p.526.13-19 Mueller et Kiessling)

καὶ τοιαῦτα μὲν τὰ Ζήνωνος, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ Χρυσίππου, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ Θεοφράστου, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινων ἄλλων πάντα παραπλήσια, ἃ καὶ κακῶς γε ποιῶν ὁ χρόνος ἐλέγχει καὶ ἀφανῆ τίθησιν, ὡς ἀσυντελεῆ καὶ ἀνόνητα τῷ βίῳ, καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἢ γέλωτα πλατῶν κατὰ τῶν συνταξαμένων κινεῶντα. 5

50 Cicero, *De finibus* 1.6 (BT p.3.16-18 Schiche)

quid? Theophrastus mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos?

1-2 cf. Boet. comm. In lib. Arist. De interp., sec. ed., 1 prooem. (BT p.12.3-16 Meiser) = 72A →

to avoid logical methods, without which neither Theophrastus nor Aristotle attempted to write anything.

48 Galen, *On the Best Education* 2 (BT p.84.21-85.3 Marquardt)

Moreover,¹ we will not need the leadership of such teachers since we ourselves are quite able to read the things written by those from the opposed sects and to understand them no less than the Academics, if something in them is obscure, as the (obscurity) in the writings of the Stoic teachers on the one hand, and in those 85 of the Peripatetics on the other.² And likewise in other matters too, so that nothing is left for the Academics to teach, at least according to the report of Favorinus.

¹ The entire passage is regarded as a gloss by the editor Marquardt.

² Before "the Stoic teachers" the manuscripts include a reference to Chrysippus, and before "the Peripatetics" there is a reference to Theophrastus and Aristotle. Both references are bracketed as interpolations by Marquardt.

49 Theodorus the Metochite, *Philosophical and Historical Miscellanies* 80 (p.526.13-19 Mueller and Kiessling)

And such¹ are the writings of Zeno, and such those of Chrysippus, and such those of Theophrastus, and similar are all the writings of I do not know how many others, writings which time has treated badly, refuted, and obliterated as being useless and unprofitable to life, and stimulating nothing other than loud laughter toward their authors.

¹ Theodorus has been attacking philosophers in general on the grounds that in their writings, although many are worthy of admiration in some respects (e.g., style, clarity of thought), they deal with matters that are theoretical and speculative and do not concern themselves with what is practical.

50 Cicero, *On Ends* 1.6 (BT p.3.16-18 Schiche)

Well? Is Theophrastus (only) moderately delightful when he deals with topics dealt with before by Aristotle?

1 Theophrastus Aldus Manutius: theophrastum RNV: theophastrum A: theoprastum BE

51 Cicero, *De oratore* 1.49 (BT p.21.2-8 Kumaniecki)

et si Plato de rebus ab civilibus controversiis remotissimis divinitus est locutus, quod ego concedo, si item Aristoteles, si Theophrastus, si Carneades in rebus iis de quibus disputaverunt eloquentes et in dicendo suaves atque ornati fuerunt, sint eae res de quibus disputant in aliis quibusdam studiis, oratio quidem ipsa propria est huius unius rationis de qua loquimur et quaerimus.

3-5 *Carneades, fr. 61 Wisniewski* 4 suaves] *Cicero, Acad. libri 1.33 = 497 et Aulus Gellius, NA 13.5.11 = 8*

3-4 eloquentes] intellegentes *Kayser*

52A Cicero, *Brutus* 121 (BT p.36.10-13 Malcovati)

quis enim uberius in dicendo Platone? Iovem sic aiunt philosophi, si Graece loquatur, loqui. quis Aristotele nervosior, Theophrasto dulcior?

1-2 Iovem—loqui] *Dionysius Halicarnassensis, Demosthenes 23 (Opusc. t.1)*

52B Cicero, *De Officiis* 1.3 (BT p.2.5-10 Atzert)

et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.

1-6 *Demetrius Phalereus, fr. 73 Wehrli*

2 laboraret *codd.*: elaboraret *Lambinus*

53 Plutarchus, *Cicero* 24.5-6 (BT t.1.2 p.337.26-338.3 Ziegler)

πολλὰ δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπομνημονεύουσιν, ὅσον περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅτι χρυσοῦ ποταμὸς εἶη βέροντος, καὶ περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος διαλόγων, ὡς

51 Cicero, *On the Orator* 1.49 (BT p.21.2-8 Kumaniecki)

And if Plato spoke divinely about things very far away from civil disputes, and I grant that he did, if likewise Aristotle, if Theophrastus, if Carneades were eloquent in the subjects they discussed and pleasant and ornate in speaking, (then) granting that these subjects which they discuss belong to certain other studies, yet speech itself is the property of this one pursuit about which we are speaking and investigating.

52A Cicero, *Brutus* 121 (BT p.36.10-13 Malcovati)

For who was more copious in speaking than Plato? The philosophers say that Jupiter would speak in his manner, if he spoke Greek. Who was more sinewy than Aristotle, sweeter than Theophrastus?

p.178.15-16 *Usener et Radermacher* et *vid.* 53

1 aiunt *Schütz*: ut aiunt *L*: ut illum aiunt *Reis*

52B Cicero, *On Duties*, 1.3 (BT p.2.5-10 Atzert)

And indeed I observe that as of yet it has not been true of any Greek that being one and the same person he has worked in each area and pursued both that forensic mode of speaking and this quiet (philosophic) kind of discussion; unless perhaps Demetrius of Phalerum can be counted in this number, (for he was) clever in discussion, an orator rather lacking in force and yet sweet, so that you can recognize him as the pupil of Theophrastus.

53 Plutarch, *Cicero* 24.5-6 (BT vol.1.2 p.337.26-338.3 Ziegler)

Many of his (Cicero's) sayings are also recorded, like the one on Aristotle, that he was a river of flowing gold, and on Plato's dialogues, that Zeus, if it were his nature to use human speech,

- 6 τοῦ Διός, εἰ λόγῳ χρησθαι πέφυκεν, οὕτως (ἄν) διαλεγόμενον. τὸν δὲ Θεόφραστον εἰώθει τρυφήν ἰδίαν ἀποκαλεῖν.

1-2 *Aristoteles, AABT T55a Düring* 2 *Cicero, Acad. libri 2.119, ex quo pendet Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 27.4-8* →

- 54 Cicero, *De finibus* 1.14 (BT p.7.2-5 Schiche)

sed existimo te, sicut nostrum Triarium, minus ab eo delectari, quod ista Platonis, Aristoteli, Theophrasti orationis ornamenta neglexerit.

- 55 Suda, s.v. Διογένης (no. 1141, LG t.1 pars 2 p.101.15-17 Adler)

Διογένης· . . . τί χρῆ περὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας Διογένους λέγειν, τῆς πραότητος Ξενοκράτους, τῆς Ἀριστοτέλους εὐμουσίας, τῆς Θεοφράστου βαρύτητος,

2 *Xenocrates, fr. 67 Parente* 2-3 *Aristoteles, AABT T55e Düring*

- 6 would speak in that manner. And he used to call Theophrastus his own private pleasure.

2 χρυσῶ *Schaefer: χρυσίου NT* 3 ἄν *add. Naber*

- 54 Cicero, *On Ends* 1.14 (BT p.7.2-5 Schiche)

But I (Torquatus) think that you (Cicero), just like our friend Triarius, are less delighted with him (Epicurus) because he has neglected those ornaments of language characteristic of Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus.

- 55 Suda, on *Diogenēs* (no. 1141, LG vol.1 part 2 p.101.15-17 Adler)

Diogenes (the Cynic): . . . Why should one speak of Diogenes' bravery, Xenocrates' gentleness, Aristotle's sense for beauty and art, Theophrastus' gravity,

RELATIONES VARIAE

Iudicia secunda et adversa

- 56 Cicero, *De finibus* 4.79 (BT p.155.7-14 Schiche)

quam illorum tristitiam atque asperitatem fugiens Panaetius nec acerbitatem sententiarum nec disserendi spinas probavit fuitque in altero genere mitior, in altero illustrior semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magnopere censeo.

1-6 *Panaetius, fr. 55 van Straaten; Dicaearchus, fr. 3 Wehrli*

- 57 Anonymus (Gaius vel Caius?), *Parvus labyrinthus*, ap. Eusebium in *Historia ecclesiastica* 5.28.14 (GCS t.9 p.504.16-21 Schwartz)

καταλιπόντες δὲ τὰς ἀγίας τοῦ θεοῦ γραφάς, γεωμετρίαν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν, ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ὄντες καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαλοῦντες καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενον ἀγνοοῦντες. Εὐκλείδης γοῦν παρὰ τισιν αὐτῶν φιλοπόνως γεωμετρεῖται, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος θαυμάζονται. Γαληνὸς γὰρ ἴσως ὑπὸ τινῶν καὶ προσκυνεῖται.

1-5 *Rufinus, Interpretatio Eusebii Historiae ecclesiasticae 5.28.14 (GCS t.9 p.505.18-23 Mommsen)*

- 58 Theophylactus Simocatta, *Quaestiones naturales* 19 (p.35.1-8 Positano)

οὐδὲ τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον ἀστεφάνωτον καταλίπομι, οὐ Πρόκλον, οὐ Γαληνόν, τοὺς ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ κομψούς, οὐ Πλάτινον, οὐ Σωτίωνα, οὐκ Ἀλέξανδρον, οὐ Θεόφραστον τὴν τῆς γνώσεως θάλατταν,

VARIOUS REPORTS

Favorable and Unfavorable Judgments

- 56 Cicero, *On Ends* 4.79 (BT p.155.7-14 Schiche)

Avoiding their (sc. the Stoics') austerity and roughness, Panaetius approved of neither the severity of their opinions nor the thorns of their logic, and in the former he was milder and in the latter more lucid, and always had Plato, Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus, Dicaearchus on his lips, as his own writings show. And these men especially I strongly recommend you to study attentively and diligently.

- 57 Anonymous (Gaius or Caius?), *Little Labyrinth*, in Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 5.28.14 (GCS vol.9 p.504.16-21 Schwartz)

Abandoning the holy scriptures of God, they (heretics) pursue geometry, as if they were from the earth and babbled from the earth and were ignorant of the one who comes from above. At any rate, Euclid's geometry is studied diligently by some of them, and Aristotle and Theophrastus are admired. Galen is perhaps even worshipped by some.

- 58 Theophylactus of Simocatta, *Natural Questions* 19 (p.35.1-8 Positano)

Nor would I leave Iamblichus uncrowned, nor Proclus, nor Galen, who were subtle in their knowledge, nor Plotinus, nor Sotion, nor Alexander, nor Theophrastus, the ocean of knowledge,

- 59 Michael Psellus, *Epistulae* 182, Ad Metropolitanum Euchaitonem (Bibl. Gr. Med. Aev. t.5 p.462.24-9 Sathas)

καὶ πῶς γὰρ οὐ σοφώτερος τῶν ἄλλων ἐγὼ καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αἰῶνος ἐπὶ λόγοις εὐδοκιμησάντων ἔλλογιμώτερος; Πλάτωνα μὲν γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπῆνεσε, καὶ τοῦτον Θεόφραστος, καὶ τοῦτον Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντίνος, ἄνδρες φιλόσοφοι μὲν, καὶ γενναῖοι τὴν γλῶτταν, οὐκ ἐν πάσαις δὲ ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ἀκριβῆ τὴν πείραν παρεσχηκότες.

- 60 Plutarchus, *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum* 2 1086E (BT t.6.2 p.125.9-14 Pohlenz et Westman)

τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἴσχιστα ῥήματα — βωμολογίας, ληκυθισμούς, ἀλαζονείας, ἑταιρήσεις, ἀνδροφονίας, βαρυστόνους, πολυφθόρους, βαρυσκεφάλους — συναγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἰππαρχίας καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκέδασαν, . . .

1-5 *Epicurus*, fr. 237 *Usener*; *Heraclides*, fr. 20 *Wehrli*

5 Ἰππαρχίας Xgc: Ἰπάρχου Π

- 61A Cicero, *De natura deorum* 1.93 (BT p.36.24-9 Plasberg et Ax)

istisne fidentes somniis non modo Epicurus et Metrodorus et Hermarchus contra Pythagoram Platonem Empedoclemque dixerunt, sed meretricula etiam Leontium contra Theophrastum scribere ausast? scito illa quidem sermone et Attico, sed tamen. tantum Epicuri hortus habuit licentiae.

1-2 *de disputationibus horum Epicureorum contra Pythagoram, Platonem, et Empedoclem vid., e.g., Athen. 8.50 354B, Cic. De fin. 2.3-4, Diog. Laert. Vit. 10.8 et 25, Plut. Non posse suav. vivi sec. Epic. 2 1086E, et Sext. Emp. Adv. math. 1.1 3-4 Fr. Petrarca, De sui ipsius et multorum ignorantia 5 (t.2 p.1150.5-7 Bufano),*

- 61B Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 1, praef. 29 (CB t.1 p.55.20-3 Beaujeu)

ceu vero nesciam adversus Theophrastum, hominem in eloquentia tantum, ut nomen divinum inde invenerit, scripsisse etiam feminam, et proverbium inde natum suspensio arborem eligendi.

1-2 *de mutatione nominis Theophrasti vid. 1 (Diog. Laert. 5.38), 2, 5 et 6*

- 59 Michael Psellus, *Epistles* 182, To Metropolitan Euchaito (Bibl. Gr. Med. Aev. vol.5 p.462.24-9 Sathas)

For how indeed (am) I not wiser than the others and of more account than those of old who were distinguished in letters? For Aristotle praised Plato, and Theophrastus praised Aristotle, and Archytas of Tarentum praised Theophrastus, men of philosophy, and noble in speech, but not furnished with complete experience in all the excellences.

- 60 Plutarch, *A Pleasant Life is Impossible Following Epicurus* 2 1086E (BT vol.6.2 p.125.9-14 Pohlenz and Westman)

For collecting the most reproachful phrases used by men — buffoonery, hollow-sounding, boastfulness, prostitution, murder, heavy groaner, utterly corrupted, heavy-headed — they (Epicurus and Metrodorus) poured (them) on Aristotle and Socrates and Pythagoras and Protagoras and Theophrastus and Heraclides and Hipparchia, and indeed on what eminent person did they not do so? . . .

- 61A Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.93 (BT p.36.24-9 Plasberg and Ax)

Was it by relying on those dreams¹ that not only Epicurus and Metrodorus and Hermarchus spoke against Pythagoras, Plato and Empedocles, but also the prostitute Leontium dared to write against Theophrastus? She did indeed say witty things, and in Attic dialect, but really! — Such great license did the garden of Epicurus have.

¹ By “dreams” is meant Epicurean views on the nature and forms of the gods which have just been discussed.

G. Boccaccio, *De mulieribus claris* 60.2 (t.10 p.244.23-7 Branca)

- 61B Plinius, *Natural History* 1, Preface 29 (CB vol.1 p.55.20-3 Beaujeu)

Just as if I don't know that even a woman wrote critically of Theophrastus, a man so great in eloquence that he acquired a divine name from it, and that from this (criticism) arose the proverb of choosing a tree for hanging (oneself).

- 62A** Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem* 29 1124C (BT t.6.2 p.208.22-7 Pohlenz et Westman)

“σοφισταί” δ’ εἰσὶ καὶ “ἀλαζόνες” οἱ πρὸς ἄνδρας ἐλλογίμους οὕτως ἀσελγῶς καὶ ὑπερηφάνως γράφοντες, καίτοι Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ Δημόκριτος ἀντειρήκασιν τοῖς πρὸ αὐτῶν βιβλίον δὲ τοιαύτην ἐπιγραφὴν ἔχον ὁμοῦ πρὸς ἅπαντας οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐξενεγκεῖν ἐτόλμησεν.

1-2 cf. *Plut. Adv. Col.* 20 1118D (BT t.6.2 p.196.26-7)

- 62B** Themistius, *Orationes* 23 286B (BT t.2 p.80.3-5 Downey et Norman)

ὁ γὰρ “σοφιστής” καὶ “ἀλαζών” καὶ ὁ “καινοτόμος” πρῶτον μὲν Σωκράτους ὀνειδή ἦν, ἔπειτα Πλάτωνος ἐφεξῆς, εἶθ’ ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου.

1 πρῶτον *Downey et Norman*: πρῶτον Δ

- 63** Themistius, *Orationes* 21 255D (BT t.2 p.36.19-37.3 Downey et Norman)

ἀλλ’ οὐχ οἱ παράξενοι οὗτοι καὶ ψευδώνυμοι, ἀλλ’ ἐάν τις ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἔχων ἕτερόν τι περιεργάζεσθαι ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῷ κλινιδίῳ διαβουκολῆται Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Θεοφράστῳ, ὀξέως τε ἐπύθοντο, καὶ ἐπαράμενοι πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν ἐπικαλοῦνται τοὺς βασιλέως ὀφθαλμούς, εἰ ἀναπνεῖ ἔτι καὶ τὸν ἥλιον ἀφορᾷ ὁ μαιφόνος καὶ ἀλιτήριος καὶ πατραλοίας καὶ φαρμακεύς.

2 φιλοτιμίας | φιλολογίας *Φο vulg.*

- 64** Iulianus, *Antiochicus aut Misopogon* 12.24 353B (CB t.2.2 p.177.10-22 Lacombrade)

“εἶν· ἀλλὰ τί παθὼν αὐτὸς ἐπιχειρεῖς ἀκροῦσθαι περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων καὶ δικάζειν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τοῦτό σε ὁ παιδαγωγὸς ἐδίδασκειν, ὃς οὐδὲ εἰ ἄρξεις ἠπίστατο.” δεινὸς δὲ ἀνέπεισε γέρον, ὃν καὶ ὑμεῖς ὡς ὄντα μάλιστα αἰτιώτατον τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ὀρθῶς ποιοῦντες ξυλλοιδορεῖτέ μοι. καὶ τοῦτον δέ, εἰ ἴστε, ὑπ’ ἄλλων ἐξηπατημένον.

- 62A** Plutarch, *Against Colotes* 29 1124C (BT vol.6.2 p.208.22-7 Pohlenz and Westman)

“Sophists” and “impostors” are those who write so outrageously and arrogantly against highly esteemed men. And indeed Plato and Aristotle and Theophrastus and Democritus did speak against their predecessors. But a book bearing such a title against everyone altogether no one else dared to publish.¹

¹ I.e., no one besides Colotes, who entitled his broadside attack *On the Fact that It is Impossible to Live in Conformity with the Doctrines of the Other Philosophers* (*Against Colotes* 1 1107E)

- 62B** Themistius, *Orationes* 23 286B (BT vol.2 p.80.3-5 Downey and Norman)

For “sophist” and “impostor” and “innovator” were first reproaches against Socrates, and then Plato, and then later Aristotle and Theophrastus.

- 63** Themistius, *Orationes* 21 255D (BT vol.2 p.36.19-37.3 Downey and Norman)

But not these half-foreigners going under false names, but if anyone, because of vanity and also having nothing else to busy himself with, should beguile himself in his house and on his couch with Aristotle and Theophrastus, they (public officials) soon hear about it, and putting a curse on the whole city they summon the eyes of the king, if (such a person) even takes a breath and looks up at the sun, this bloodthirsty and sinning father-slayer and poisoner.

- 64** Julian, *Discourse at Antioch or Beard-Hater* 12.24 353B (CB vol.2.2 p.177.10-22 Lacombrade)

“Very well. But what is the matter with you (Julian) that you undertake to hear and decide about contracts? For certainly your tutor did not teach you this, too, because he did not know whether you would rule.” A clever old man persuaded me, and you too (the people of Antioch) are right to join with me in reviling him as most responsible for the things I do. And he, too, understand, had been

ὀνόματα ἤκει πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολλάκις κωμωδούμενα, Πλάτων καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος.

7 cf. *Libanii Orationes* 15.28 (t.2 p.129.21-130.8 Foerster)

1 παθὼν a: μαθὼν V

65 Hieronymus, *Apologia contra Rufinum* 2.9 (CCSL t.79 p.40.27-30)

antequam de sensibus disputem, Theophrasti verba mirabor: "audio," inquit, "de anima quaestiones esse commotas. de qua re utrum recipi debeat querimonia aut abici, vos probate."

2-3 *Rufinus, Apologia ad Anastasium* 6 (CCSL t.20 p.27.3-4) = *Hieronymus, Apologia contra Rufinum* 2.8 (CCSL t.79 p.40.6-8)

In tabulis variis nominatus

66 Loci non alibi in his voluminibus exscripti in quibus Theophrastus in tabula nominatur

- 1 Anonymus Matritensis, *Chronographia Syntomos* (BT p.39.1-2 Bauer), qui Theophrastum philosophum in tabula chronographica nominat
- 2 Georgius Cedrenus, *Historiarum compendium* 193D (PG t.121 col.377A), qui etiam Theophrastum philosophum in tabula chronographica nominat
- 3 Georgius Hamartolus, *Cronicon* 3 (PG t.110 col.508C), quo loco Theophrasti philosophi nomen in tabula chronographica invenitur
- 4 Georgius Syncellus, *Chronographia* 275B (BT p.331.25 Mosshammer), qui etiam Theophrastum philosophum in tabula chronographica nominat
- 5 Hieronymus, *In Amos* 1.1.2 (CCSL t.76 p.115.14 Adriaen), quo loco Theophrastus in tabula philosophorum includitur
- 6 Ioannes Saresberiensis, *Metalogicon* 2.16 (p.90.12 Webb), qui Theo-

deceived by others. (Their) names often come to us lampooned: Plato and Socrates and Aristotle and Theophrastus.

65 Jerome, *Defence against Rufinus* 2.9 (CCSL vol.79 p.40.27-30)

Before I discuss the senses, I shall express surprise at the words of this Theophrastus: "I hear," he says, "that questions have been raised concerning the soul. Whether a complaint about this matter should be accepted or rejected is for you to decide."

¹ That is, Rufinus; "Theophrastus" is used as a term of mild abuse.

Named in Various Lists

66 Passages Not Printed Elsewhere in These Volumes in which Theophrastus is named in a list

- 1 Anonymous of Madrid, *Concise Chronography* (BT p.39.1-2 Bauer), who names Theophrastus the philosopher in a chronological table
- 2 George Cedrenus, *Compendium of Histories* 193D (PG vol.121 col.377A), who also names Theophrastus the philosopher in a chronological table
- 3 George Hamartolus, *Chronicle* 3 (PG vol.110 col.508C), where the name of Theophrastus the philosopher is found in a chronological table
- 4 George the Secretary, *Chronography* 275B (BT p.331.25 Mosshammer), who also names Theophrastus the philosopher in a chronological table
- 5 Jerome, *On Amos* 1.1.2 (CCSL vol.76 p.115.14 Adriaen), where Theophrastus is included in a list of philosophers
- 6 John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* 2.16 (p.90.12 Webb), who names Theo-

phrastum inter expositores Aristotelis nominat

- 7 Isidorus Iunior, *Chronica* 4913.198 (MGH t.11.2 p.449 Mommsen), qui nomen Theophrasti philosophi in tabula chronographica includit
- 8 al-Mas'ūdī, *at-Tanbīh wa-l-išrāf* p.115 de Goeje (versio Anglica ap. Gutas, *RUSCH* t.2 [1985] p.79-80), quo loco Theophrasti nomen in tabula philosophorum invenitur
- 9 Pap. Dukensis inv. G 178 col.2 v.19 (Willis, *ICS* t.3 [1978] p.46), quo loco Θεόφραστος Ἴων nominatur in successione philosophorum Graecorum
- 10 Photius, *Bibliotheca* 167 114b2 (CB t.2 p.156.2 Henry), quo loco Theophrastus nominatur inter philosophos ex quibus Stobaeus excerptis
- 11 Seneca, *De brevitae vitae* 1.14.5 (CB p.69.13 Bourgery), qui Theophrastum in tabula philosophorum nominat; ex Seneca dependet Roger Bacon, *Moralis philosophia* 3.5.4.11 (p.142.19-22 Massa)

Tantum ut exemplum nominatus

- 67 Loci non alibi in his voluminibus exscripti in quibus Theophrastus tantum ut exemplum nominatur
- 1 [Alexander Aphrodisiensis], In *Aristotelis Metaphysica* 6(E).2 1026a33 (CAG t.1 p.448.20-1 Hayduck)
- 2 Galenus, *De temperamentis* 1.6 (BT p.22.18 Helmreich)

phrastum among the interpreters of Aristotle

- 7 Isidore the Younger, *Chronicles* 4913.198 (MGH vol.11.2 p.449 Mommsen), who includes the name of Theophrastus the philosopher in a chronological table
- 8 Mas'ūdī, *Noting and Reviewing* p.115 de Goeje (English version in Gutas, *RUSCH* vol.2 [1985] p.79-80), where Theophrastus is named in a list of philosophers
- 9 Pap. Duke inv. G 178 col.2 v.19 (Willis, *ICS* vol.3 [1978] p.46), where "Theophrastus the Ionian" is named in a succession of Greek philosophers
- 10 Photius, *Library* 167 114b2 (CB vol.2 p.156.2 Henry), where Theophrastus is named among philosophers from whom Stobaeus excerpted
- 11 Seneca, *On the Brevity of Life* 1.14.5 (CB p.69.13 Bourgery), who names Theophrastus in a list of philosophers; on Seneca depends Roger Bacon, *Moral Philosophy* 3.5.4.11 (p.142.19-22 Massa)

Named Only as an Example

- 67 Passages Not Printed Elsewhere in These Volumes in which Theophrastus is Named Only as an Example
- 1 pseudo-Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 6(E).2 1026a33 (CAG vol.1 p.448.20-1 Hayduck)
- 2 Galen, *On Temperaments* 1.6 (BT p.22.18 Helmreich)

LOGICA

Inscriptiones librorum

68 Tabula inscriptionum ad opera logica spectantium

- 1a Κατηγορίαι] Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prooemium (CAG t.13.1 p.7.21) = **71E**; Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prolegomena (CAG t.12.1 p.13.24, 25 et 24.13) = **71F**; [Elias], In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (p.63.23 Westerink) = **71C**; [Ammonius], In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1973 f.21^v ap. Rose, *Ar. ps.* p.129.16) = app. **71B**; Anonymus, In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (cod. Laur. 85.1 f. 17 ap. Rose, *Ar. ps.* p.129.21) = app. **71C**; vid. etiam Davidis comm. In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (CAG t.18.2 p.102.5) = **71B**
- b Tafsīr Kitāb Qāfiḡūriyās] Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist* 7.1, cap. de Theophrasto (p.252.10-11 Flügel) = **3A**; az-Zawzanī Muntahabāt, cap. de Theophrasto (p.107.6 Lippert) = **3B**; vid. etiam Ibn an-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* 7.1, cap. de Aristotele (p.248.20-1 Flügel) = **71I**
- 2 Ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὰς οἰκειᾶς Κατηγορίας] Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prolegomena (CAG t.12.1 p.13.30) = **71F**
- 3a Περὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.44 = **1** (ex corr.); Galenus, *De suis propriis libris* 14 (p.123.2-3 Mueller) = **73**; cf. *ibid.* 11 (p.118.15) = app. **73**
- b De affirmatione et negatione] Boethius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione, secunda editio, 1 prooemium (p.9.25 et 12.5-6 Meiser) et 2.5 (p.102.27) = **79, 72A, 118**
- c Περὶ καταφάσεως] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.1 (CAG t.2.1 p.11.14-15), 1.4 (p.66.7), 1.37 (p.367.13-14), 1.41 (p.378.19-20 et 379.9-10) = **81A, 82A, 88, 110A**; In Aristotelis Metaphysica 4(Γ).4 (CAG t.1 p.273.18-19) = **85A**; In Aristotelis Topica 3.6 (CAG t.2.2 p.290.29) = **89**; vid. etiam In Aristotelis Metaphysica

LOGIC

Titles of Books

68 List of Titles Referring to Logical Works

- 1 *Categories*] Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Introduction (CAG vol.13.1 p.7.21) = **71E**; Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Prologue (CAG vol.12.1 p.13.24, 25 and 24.13) = **71F**; pseudo-Elias, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.1.3 (p.63.23 Westerink) = **71C**; pseudo-Ammonius, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.1.3 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1973 f.21^v in Rose, *Ar. ps.* p.129.16) = app. **71B**; Anonymus, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.1.3 (Cod. Laur. 85.1 f.17 in Rose, *Ar. ps.* p.129.21) = app. **71C**; see also David, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.1.3 (CAG vol.18.2 p.102.4, 7, 8) = **71B**
- b *Commentary on the Categories* (of Aristotle)] Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Theophrastus (p.252.10-1 Flügel) = **3A**; Zawzanī, *Selections from Qiftī's History of the Philosophers*, chap. on Theophrastus (p.107.6 Lippert) = **3B**; see also Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Aristotle (p.248.20-1 Flügel) = **71I**
- 2 *Commentary on his own Categories*] Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Prologue (CAG vol.12.1 p.13.30) = **71F**
- 3a *On Affirmation and Denial*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = **1** (as corrected); Galen, *On his own Books* 14 (p.123.2-3 Mueller) = **73**; compare *ibid.* 11 (p.118.15) = app. **73**
- b *On Affirmation and Denial*] Boethius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione*, second edition, 1 introduction (p.9.25 and 12.5-6 Meiser) and 2.5 (p.102.27) = **79, 72A, 118**
- c *On Affirmation*] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.1 (CAG vol.2.1 p.11.14-15), 1.4 (p.66.7), 1.37 (p.367.13-14), 1.41 (p.378.19-20 and 379.9-10) = **81A, 82A, 88, 110A**; *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 4(Γ).4 (CAG vol.1 p.273.18-19) = **85A**; *On Aristotle's Topics* 3.6 (CAG vol.2.2 p.290.29) = **89**; see also *On Aristotle's Metaphys-*

- 4(Γ).7 (CAG t.1 p.328.18) = **86**, auctore non nominato
- d Kitāb al-mūǧiba wa-s-sāliba] Al-Fārabi, Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs Fī l-ḥibāra, prooemium (p.22.7-8 Kutsch et Marrow) = **81B**; cf. **72B** et **87F**
- e Περί ἑρμηνείας] Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prooemium (CAG t.13.1 p.7.21-2) = **71E**; cf. Ammonii comm. In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (CAG t.4.3 p.26.15) = **71A**
- 4 Περί ἀποφάσεως α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.46 = **1** (Περί ἀποφά(ν)σεως coni. Usener)
- 5 Πρώτων προτάσεων α'—η'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.45 = **1**
- 6a Ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων α'—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = **1**; Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.31 Adler) = **2**, et ordine verborum inverso, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.8 (CAG t.2.1 p.123.19), 1.13 (p.156.29), 1.29 (p.326.22), 1.44 (p.388.18) = **104**, **100B**, **113B**, **112B** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ omnibus locis); Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 3.1 (CAG t.7 p.553.3) = **112C** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ)
- b Anālūtīqā al-ūlā] Ptolemaeus, Wašīyat Aristūṭālīs wa-fihrist kutubihī wa-šay' min aḥbārihī ilā Ġalus, Fihrist (cod. Constantinopolitanus Ayasofya 4833, f.16^v v.12-13 et ap. Ibn Abī Ušaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' 4, cap. de Aristotele, t.1 p.68.22 Müller) = **121**
- c Ἀναλυτικά] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.29 (CAG t.2.1 p.328.2) = **113B**, quo loco Προτέρων fortasse addendum est, 1.44 (p.390.2) = **111E**; Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prooemium (CAG t.13.1 p.7.22) = **71E**, ubi inscriptio etiam ad Analytica posteriora pertinet
- 7a Ἀναλυτικῶν ὑστέρων α'—ζ'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = **1**; Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.32 Adler) = **2**, et ordine verborum inverso, Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Quaestiones et solutiones 1.26 (Suppl. Arist. t.2.2 p.42.28-9) = **117**
- b Δεύτερα ἀναλυτικά] Galenus, De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis 2.2.4 (CMG t.5.4.1.2 p.104.3) = **114**
- c vid. 6c ad fin.

- ics 4(Γ).7 1011b13 (CAG vol.1 p.328.18) = **86**, though no author is named
- d *The Book of Affirmative and Negative (Propositions)*] Fārabi, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione*, Introduction (p.22.7-8 Kutsch and Marrow) = **81B**; cf. **72B** and **87F**
- e *De interpretatione*] Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Categories*, introduction (CAG vol.13.1 p.7.21-2) = **71E**; cf. Ammonius, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.1.3 (CAG vol.4.3 p.26.15) = **71A**
- 4 *On Denial*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1** (Usener has conjectured *On Statement*)
- 5 *Primary Propositions*, 18 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**
- 6a *Prior Analytics*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = **1**; Suda, on *Theophrastus* (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.31 Adler) = **2**, and with the order of the (Greek) words reversed, Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.8 (CAG vol.2.1 p.123.19), 1.13 (p.156.29), 1.29 (p.326.22), 1.44 (p.388.18) = **104**, **100B**, **113B**, **112B** ("in the first book" in all places); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* (CAG vol.7 p.553.3) = **112C** ("in the first book")
- b *Prior Analytics*] Ptolemy, *The Will of Aristotle, the Pinax of His Works, and a Brief Life, to Gallus*, from the Pinax (cod. Istanbul, Ayasofya 4833, f.16^v v.12-13 and ap. Ibn-Abī-Ušaybi'a, *Essential Information on the Generations of Physicians* 4, chap. on Aristotle (vol.1 p.68.22 Müller) = **121**
- c *Analytics*] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.29 (CAG vol.2.1 p.328.2) = **113B**, where perhaps "Prior" should be added; 1.44 (p.390.2) = **111E**; Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Introduction (CAG vol.13.1 p.7.22) = **71E**, where the title refers also to the *Posterior Analytics*
- 7a *Posterior Analytics*, 7 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = **1**; Suda, on *Theophrastus* (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.32 Adler) = **2**, and with the order of the (Greek) words reversed, Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Questions and Solutions* 1.26 (Suppl. Arist. vol.2.2 p.42.28-9) = **117**
- b *Second Analytics*] Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 2.2.4 (CMG vol.5.4.1.2 p.104.3) = **114**
- c see the end of 6c

- cf. **285**, sed dubium ad quod opus quemque auctorem textus spectet
- 8 Ἀναλυτικῶν ἐπιτομὴ α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.42 = **1**; Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.32-3 Adler) = **2**
- 9a Περὶ ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.42 = **1**; Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.32 (CAG t.2.1 p.340.21) = **97**
- b Ἀνάλυσις συλλογισμῶν] Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.32 Adler) = **2**
- c Περὶ συλλογισμῶν λύσεως α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.45 = **1** et vid. infra, no. 21
- 10 Περὶ κρίσεως συλλογισμῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.47 = **1**
- 11 Ὅριστικά περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.50 = **1**
- 12 Διορισμῶν α—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = **1**
- 13 Πρὸς τοὺς ὀρισμοὺς α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.45 = **1**
- 14 Πρὸς ὄρους α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.49 = **1**
- 15 Διαρέσεις α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.46 = **1**
- 16 Περὶ τῶν διαφορῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.46 = **1**
- 17 Τοπικῶν α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.45 = **1**; Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 1.6 (CAG t.2.2 p.55.24) = **124A**; In Aristotelis Metaphysica 5(Δ).10 (CAG t.1 p.381.13) et 5.15 (p.408.19) = **127B** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ) et **131** (ἐν τῷ β'); Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categoriae 11 (CAG t.8 p.415.16) = **127A**
- 18a Ἀνηγμένων τόπων α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.42 = **1**; Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.32-3 Adler) = **2**
- b Ἀνηγμένων λόγων εἰς τὰ σχήματα (δύο)] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.32 (CAG t.2.1 p.340.14-15) = **97**

- cf. **285**, but it is uncertain to what work and what author the text refers
- 8 *Epitome of the Analytics*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = **1**; Suda, on *Theophrastus* (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.32-3 Adler) = **2**
- 9a *On the Analysis of Syllogisms*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = **1**; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.32 (CAG vol.2.1 p.340.21) = **97**
- b *The Analysis of Syllogisms*] Suda, on *Theophrastus* (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.32 Adler) = **2**
- c *On the Solution of Syllogisms*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1** and see below, no. 21
- 10 *On the Deciding of Syllogisms*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = **1**
- 11 *Definitions connected with the Language of Syllogisms*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = **1**
- 12 *Definitions*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = **1**
- 13 *Regarding Definitions*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**
- 14 *Regarding Definitions (or Terms)*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = **1**
- 15 *Divisions*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1**
- 16 *On Differentiae*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1**
- 17 *Topics*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 1.6 (CAG vol.2.2 p.55.24) = **124A**; *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 5(Δ).10 (CAG vol.1 p.381.13) and 5.15 (p.408.19) = **127B** ("in the first book") and **131** ("in Book 2"); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 11 (CAG vol.8 p.415.16) = **127A**
- 18a *The Reduction of Topics*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = **1**; Suda, on *Theophrastus* (no. 199 LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.32-3 Adler) = **2**
- b *Arguments Reduced to the Figures (two books)*] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.32 (CAG vol.2.1 p.340.14-15) = **97**

- 19 Τὰ πρὸ τῶν Τόπων α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.50 = 1
- 20a Περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 2.3 (CAG t.2.2 p.154.16) = **133**; vid. etiam Galeni librum De suis propriis libris 14 (p.123.2-3 Mueller) = **73**
- b Περὶ τοῦ πολλαχῶς] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 5.2 (CAG t.2.2 p.378.27) = **134**, sed aliqui codices ποσαχῶς exhibent
- 21 Λύσεις α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.47 = 1; vid. supra, no. 9c
- 22 Ἐπιχειρημάτων α'—η'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.43 = 1
- 23 Ἐπιχειρημάτων α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, vitae 5.49 = 1
- 24 Ἐνστάσεων α'—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.43 = 1
- 25 Ἀφορμαὶ ἢ ἐναντιώσεις α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.46 = 1
- 26 Ἀγωνιστικῶν ἢ τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικούς λόγους θεωρίας] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 (ex corr.) = 1
- 27 Περὶ οἰκείων λόγων α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.50 = 1
- 28 Περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = 1
- 29 Περὶ τοῦ δεδῶσθαι α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = 1
- 30 Περὶ μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = 1
- 31 Σοφισμάτων α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.45 = 1
- 32 Περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν διαπορημάτων α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.46 = 1
- 33 Περὶ τοῦ ψευδομένου α'—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = 1
- vid. **246** no. 5 (Περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθοῦς α')

- 19 *Preliminaries to the Topics*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = **1**
- 20a *On How Many (Senses)*] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 2.3 (CAG vol.2.2 p.154.16) = **133**; see also Galen, *On his own Works* 14 (p.121.2-3 Mueller) = **73**
- b *On Many (Senses)*] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 5.2 (CAG vol.2.2 p.378.27) = **134**, but some manuscripts have "How Many"
- 21 *Solutions*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1; see above, no. 9c
- 22 *Epicheiremes (Dialectical Arguments)*, 18 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 23 *Epicheiremes*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- 24 *Objections*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 25 *Subjects for Argument or Controversies*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1
- 26 *Polemics or The Theory of Eristic Arguments*] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 (as corrected) = 1
- 27 *On Relevant Arguments*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1
- 28 *On Agreed (Premises)*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- 29 *On Having been Granted*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- 30 *On Greater and Lesser*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- 31 *Sophisms*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = 1
- 32 *On Simple Problems*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1
- 33 *On the Liar (Paradox)*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- see **246** no. 5 (*On False and True*, 1 book)

- 34 $\Theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \kappa\delta'$] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.44 = 1; Aelius Theon, *Progymnasmata* 2 (RhGr t.2 p.69.1-4 Spengel) = 74; cf. Diogenes Laertius 4.27 = 75, ex quo pendet Suda, s.v. $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma$ (no. 262, LG t.1 pars 2 p.709.8-9 Adler) = app. 75; etiam Hippolochus ap. Athenaeum 4.5 130D = 76 et Alexandri Aphrodisiensis comm. In Aristotelis *Topica* 1.2 101a26 (CAG t.2.2 p.27.17) = 135, ex quo pendet Suda, s.v. $\gamma\upsilon\mu\lambda\alpha\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (no. 479, LG t.1 pars 1 p.546.14-15 Adler) = app. 135
- 35 $\Theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \gamma'$] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.49 = 1
- 36 $\Pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\ \psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma\ \theta\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma\ \alpha'$] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.46 = 1
- 37 $\Lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega\upsilon\alpha\ \sigma\upsilon\lambda\lambda\alpha\gamma\omega\gamma\acute{\eta}\ \alpha'$] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.47 = 1

Scripta logica

- 69 Ibn an-Nadīm, *Kitāb al-Fihrist* 7.1, *asmā' falāsifa ṭabī'iyīn* (p.255.13-14 Flügel)

وجدت على ظهر جزء بخط عتيق مكتوب تسمية من خرج إلينا اسمه من
مفسرى كتب الفيلسوف فى المنطق وغيره من الفلسفة وهم ثاوفرستس ...

- 70 Theodorus Metochita, *Miscellanea philosophica et historica* 12 (p.90.12-91.1 Mueller et Kiessling)

“καὶ μόνος ἄλιος ἐν οὐρανῷ,” φησὶ Σιμωνίδης, καὶ μόνος Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου συντάγματα πᾶσα πρόθεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ λογικῶν κατάληψιν σπουδάζειν αἰρουμένοις. καίτοι οὐκ ὀλίγοι μὲν ἐκδόσεις εἰσὶ Θεοφράστου, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ Χρυσίππου καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς διαδόχων κατεπανιστάμεναί γε αὐταὶ δριμύτεραι μάλιστα τῶν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐκείνου, οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ χρόνοις ὕστερον ἐπὶ τούτοις αὐτοῦ Γαληνοῦ,

- 34 *Theses*, 24 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1; Aelius Theon, *Preliminary Exercises* 2 (RhGr vol.2 p.69.1-4 Spengel) = 74, cf. Diogenes Laertius 4.27 = 75, on which depends Suda, on *theseis* (no. 262, LG vol.1 part 2 p.709.8-9 Adler) = app. 75; also Hippolochus in Athenaeus 4.5 130D = 76 and Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 1.2 (CAG vol.2.2 p.27.17) = 135, on which depends Suda, on *gymnasia* (no. 479, LG vol.1 part 1 p.546.14-15 Adler) = app. 135
- 35 *Theses*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- 36 *Thesis on the Soul*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1
- 37 *A Collection of Arguments*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1

Logical Writings

- 69 Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, *The Names of Natural Philosophers* (p.255.13-14 Flügel)

I found on the flyleaf of a volume, written in an old hand, the names that have reached us of the commentators on the logical and other philosophical books by Aristotle. They are Theophrastus,

.....

- 70 Theodorus the Metochite, *Philosophical and Historical Miscellanies* 12 (p.90.12-91.1 Mueller and Kiessling)

“And the sun (is) alone in the sky,” says Simonides, and Aristotle too (stands out) alone, and his treatises are the whole concern of those who choose to study philosophy and especially the apprehension of physics and logic. And yet the publications of Theophrastus are not few, nor are those of the Stoic Chrysippus and his successors. These (publications) indeed rise up in revolt in a rather fierce fashion especially against those of that man (Aristotle). And not a few are those of Galen himself, later in time after these (the

φιλονεικῶς καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ διαφόρως πάνυ τοι κατ' Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ
91 τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο μὲν περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν, τοῦτο δὲ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν.

1 *Simonides, fr. 100 (PMG p.307 Page)*

1 ἄλιος *codd.*: ἄγιος *coni. Mueller* οὐρανῶ *Schneidewin*: οὐρανοῖς *codd.*

71A Ammonius, In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (CAG t.4.3 p.26.11-17 Busse)

ἄλλως τε “τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει” εἶπεν, ἐπειδὴ συμβάλλεται οὐ
μόνον εἰς τὸ βιβλίον τῶν Κατηγοριῶν Ἀριστοτέλους, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς
ἄλλων Κατηγορίας· εἰδέναι γὰρ χρὴ ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους
ἐταίρων κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ διδασκάλου ἔγραψαν Κατηγορίας καὶ Περὶ
ἑρμηνείας καὶ Ἀναλυτικά. συμβάλλεται οὖν τὸ βιβλίον τοῦτο οὐ μόνον
εἰς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους Κατηγορίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς Ἀρχύτου καὶ εἰς
πᾶσας τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων πραγματείας.

1 καὶ εἰς τὴν *post te Laur. 72,7 p*: καὶ εἰς *mg.E* 2-3 τὰς ἄλλων
Busse: τὰς ἄλλας *DEMP*: ἐτέρων *V*

71B David, In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (CAG t.18.2 p.102.1-9 Busse)

ζητοῦσι δὲ τινες διὰ τί εἰρηκῶς τῶν Κατηγοριῶν λέγει “τῶν παρὰ
Ἀριστοτέλει”· ἤρκει γὰρ “τῶν Κατηγοριῶν” εἰπεῖν. καὶ τινὲς φασιν ὅτι
πρὸς ἀντιδιαστολὴν ἄλλων εἶπε “παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει”· βούλεται γὰρ
δείξαι ὅτι συμβάλλεται εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ οὐκ
ἄλλων· ἔγραψε γὰρ καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ Εὐδήμος περὶ κατηγοριῶν
κατὰ μίμησιν τοῦ οἰκείου διδασκάλου. κακῶς δὲ οὗτοι ἐπελύσαντο·
εἰ γὰρ ἅπαξ συμβάλλεται ταῖς Κατηγορίας Ἀριστοτέλους, καὶ πᾶσαι
ταῖς Κατηγορίας συμβάλλεται. τοῦτο δὲ ἔδει εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ μείζονος
θέλει δείξαι ὅτι πᾶσαι ταῖς Κατηγορίας συμβάλλεται, εἰ καὶ ταῖς
Ἀριστοτέλους.

3-6 [*Ammonius*], In *Porph. Isag. p.1.3 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1973 f.21^o ap. Rose, Arist. pseud. p.129.14-17)* 5-6 *Eudemus, fr. 8 Wehrli*

71C [Elias], In Porphyrii Isagogen p.1.3 (p.63.13-14 et 20-5 Westerink)

20 “καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν παρὰ Ἀριστοτέλει Κατηγοριῶν”· ζητοῦσι διατί
20 πρόσκειται ὁ “καὶ” σύνδεσμος· καὶ φαμέν . . . ἢ οὖν τοῦτο ἢ ὅτι οὐ

Stoics), and these too are contentious and really at odds with
91 Aristotle and his writings, now concerning physics, now logic.

ἔστιν *post ἄλιος coni. Koster* 4 καίτοι *Mueller*: καίτοιγε *codd.* 7
χρονοῖς cod. Mon.: χρόνους *cod. Aug.*

71A Ammonius, On Porphyry's Isagoge p.1.3 (CAG vol.4.3 p.26.11-17 Busse)

And on another interpretation he (Porphyry) said “the (*Cate-*
gories) of Aristotle” because (his own book) helps us to understand
not only the book of Aristotle's *Categories* but also the *Categories*
of others. For you must know that many of Aristotle's colleagues
wrote (books called) *Categories* and *De interpretatione* and *Analytics*,
in emulation of their teacher. This book, then, helps us to under-
stand not only Aristotle's *Categories*, but also that of Archytas and
all the works of the philosophers.¹

¹ This passage is part of a section (p.26.9-17) which Busse athetizes.

71B David, On Porphyry's Isagoge p.1.3 (CAG vol.18.2 p.102.1-9 Busse)

Some enquire why, in speaking of the *Categories*, he (Porphyry)
says “of the (*Categories*) of Aristotle”; for it would have been suf-
ficient to say “of the *Categories*”. Some say that he said “of Aristotle”
to distinguish his from others; for he wants to show that he is con-
tributing to (our understanding of) the *Categories* of Aristotle and
not of others; for Theophrastus and Eudemus also wrote about cate-
gories in imitation of their master. But these give a poor solution:
for if he is at all concerned with Aristotle's *Categories*, he is also
concerned with all *Categories*. They should have said that he wants
to show *a fortiori* that he is concerned with all the *Categories*, if he
is also concerned with Aristotle's.

71C pseudo-Elias, On Porphyry's Isagoge p.1.3 (p.63.13-14 and 20-5 Westerink)

20 “Also for the (explanation) of the *Categories* of Aristotle”: They
20 enquire why the conjunction “also” is added; and we say . . . either

μόνον εἰς τὰς τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους Κατηγορίας συμβάλλεται ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας Κατηγορίας· ἔγραψαν γὰρ κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ Κατηγορίας, ὁ τε Θεόφραστος καὶ Εὐδημος· καὶ εἰς ταῦτα οὖν συμβάλλεται τὸ παρὸν βιβλίον καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸν “καὶ” σύνδεσμον.

4-6 Anonymus, In Porph. Isag. p.1.3 (cod. Laur. 85.1 f.17 ap. Rose, Arist. pseud. →

- 71D Abū l-Farağ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, Tafsīr Kitāb Īsāgūğī li-Furfūriyūs p.1.3 (p.48.21-4 Gyekye)

فأما تخصيصه (أي فرفوروريوس) مقولات ارسطو فإن ذلك ليس من قبل أن هذه الخمسة تنفع في مقولات ارسطو وكتبه فقط — لكن في مقولات قوم آخرين وكتب فلاطن وبوثاغورس وثاوفرسطس وجالينوس وغيرهم — لكن من قبل أن خروساوريا إنما كتب ليشكو صعوبة مقولات ارسطو حسب

2 خروساوريوس pro خروساوريا 4
scripsit Gutas : ارسطوطاليس ed. Gyekye siced. Gyekye

- 71E Philoponus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prooemium (CAG t.13.1 p.7.16-17 et 19-22 Busse)

19 τρεῖς γὰρ ἀφορμαὶ γέγονασι τοῦ νοθεύεσθαι τὰ συγγράμματα τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους. . . . δευτέρα δὲ ἡ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ὁμωνυμία· οἱ γὰρ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ Εὐδημος καὶ Φανίας καὶ Θεόφραστος κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ διδασκάλου γεγράφασι Κατηγορίας καὶ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας καὶ Ἀναλυτικά.

1-5 Eudemus, fr. 7 Wehrli; Phainias, fr. 8 Wehrli

- 71F Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Categorias, prolegomena (CAG t.12.1 p.13.23-35 et 24.12-14 Busse)

δι' ὁμωνυμίαν δὲ συγγραμμάτων ἐνοθεύοντο τὰ βιβλία, διότι μὴ μόνος Ἀριστοτέλης ἔγραψε Κατηγορίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ

this (explanation), or that it contributes to our understanding not only of the *Categorias* of Aristotle, but also of the other *Categorias*. For, in emulation of Aristotle, his colleagues, Theophrastus and Eudemus, wrote *Categorias*. The present book, then, contributes to our understanding of these too, and for this reason it has the conjunction “also”.

p.129.20-1), quo loco Cleinias (error pro Phainias, ut videtur), Eudemus et Theophrastus nominantur

- 71D Abū-l-Farağ Ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib, *On Porphyry's Isagoge* p.1.3 (p.48.21-4 Gyekye)

Porphyry singled out the categories of Aristotle not because these five (predicables) are useful just for Aristotle's categories and his books — they are useful for the categories of other people and for the books of Plato, Pythagoras, Theophrastus, Galen, and others — but because Chrysaorius had written to complain about the difficulty of Aristotle's categories¹ only.

¹ It is not clear from the Arabic text whether “categories” refers to the title or the teaching.

- 71E Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Categorias*, Introduction (CAG vol.13.1 p.7.16-17 and 19-22 Busse)

19 For there have been three reasons for branding the writings of Aristotle as spurious. . . . The second is the similarity of the titles of the writings. For his pupils, Eudemus and Phainias and Theophrastus, in emulation of their teacher, wrote (works entitled) *Categorias* and *De interpretatione* and *Analytics*.

- 71F Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Categorias*, Prologue (CAG vol.12.1 p.13.23-35 and 24.12-14 Busse)

Books were branded as spurious through the similarity of title of the writings, because not only Aristotle wrote *Categorias*, but also

Εὐδημος, οἱ τούτου μαθηταί. πολλάκις οὖν τις περιτυχὼν ταῖς Κατη-
 γορίαις Θεοφράστου, εἰ τύχοι, ἐνόμισεν αὐτὰς εἶναι Ἀριστοτέλους.
 ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ οὐδὲ διὰ ὁμωνυμίαν συγγραφέων ἐνοθεύοντο τὰ βιβλία οὐδὲ
 5 διὰ ὁμωνυμίαν συγγραμμάτων, ἀλλὰ διὰ ὁμωνυμίαν ὑπομνημάτων,
 διότι πολλάκις ὑπόμνημά τις ἐποίησεν εἰς ὁμώνυμον πραγματείαν καὶ
 ἐνομίσθη ἄλλης εἶναι· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐποίησεν Ὑπόμνημα
 εἰς τὰς οἰκείας Κατηγορίας, καὶ πολλάκις τις ἀποπλανᾶται ὅτι τῶν
 10 Ἀριστοτέλους ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπόμνημα. ἢ πολλάκις ἐντυγχάνων τις τῶ ὑπο-
 μνήματι Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Ἀφροδισιέως εἰς τὰς Κατηγορίας ἐνόμιζεν
 αὐτὸ πάντως εἶναι τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους, λανθάνον ὅτι οὐ μόνον γέγραπ-
 ται αὐτῷ εἰς τὰς Ἀριστοτέλους ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς Θεοφράστου. . . .
 24 καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ οἱ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ζῆλον τοῦ οἰκείου δι-
 15 δασκάλου ἔγραψαν Κατηγορίας, πῶς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ὅτι γνήσιον αὐτοῦ
 ἐστὶ τὸδε τὸ σύγγραμμα;

10-12 cf. *Eliae comm. In Arist. Cat., prooemium* (CAG t.18.1 p.128.15-18)
 14-16 cf. *Eliae comm. In Arist. Cat. p.133.9-14 et Anon. comm. In Arist. Cat.,
 prolegomena* (cod. Urbin. 35 = p.33b25-8 Brandis) 14-15 cf. *Eliae comm. In
 Porph. Isag., prooemium* (CAG t.18.1 p.36.32-6 et 38.15-16)

71G Anonymus Coislinianus, *In Aristotelis De interpretatione* (CAG
 t.4.5 p.xxiii.29-30 et 34-6 Busse)

γνήσιον οὖν Ἀριστοτέλους πανταχόθεν δεικνύται . . . καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ
 γεγράφθαι ἐτέροις κατὰ ζῆλον Ἀριστοτέλους ὁμώνυμα συγγράμματα
 καὶ φέρεσθαι ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ μὲν τῶν Κατηγοριῶν τὸ Περὶ λέξεως, ἀντὶ
 δὲ τοῦ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας τὸ Περὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως.

71H Abū l-Farağ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, *Tafsīr Kitāb al-Maqūlāt li-Aristūṭālīs*,
 prooemium (p.82 Badawī ap. Mohaghegh et Izutsu)

من شهادة المفسرين الموثوق بهم . . . يعلم أن هذا الكتاب (أي قاطيفورياس)
 هو له (أي لارسطو) وذلك أن المفسرين يشهدون بصحة ذلك حتى تنتهي الشهادة
 إلى ثاوفرسطس واوديموس تلميذيه الخاصين به

1-3 cf. *Anonymi comm. In Arist. Cat., De int., Anal. pr. et Anal. post. p.69
 Badawī ap. Mohaghegh et Izutsu*

Theophrastus and Eudemus, his pupils. Often, then, someone com-
 ing across the *Categories* of Theophrastus, as it might be, thought
 they were Aristotle's. And sometimes books were branded as spu-
 rious neither through the similarity of the names of the authors,
 nor through the similarity of the titles of the writings, but through
 the similarity of the titles of commentaries, because often someone
 wrote a commentary on a work with a similar title, and it was
 thought to be on a different one; thus Theophrastus wrote a com-
 mentary on his own *Categories*, and often someone is misled into
 thinking that it is the commentary on the *Categories* of Aristotle.
 Or often someone coming across the commentary of Alexander of
 Aphrodisias on the *Categories* thought that it was entirely concerned
 with Aristotle's, not knowing that it was written by him not only
 on Aristotle's, but also on that of Theophrastus. . . .

24 And (it can be shown to be genuine) in another way: if his
 (Aristotle's) pupils, in emulation of their own teacher, wrote *Cate-
 gories*, how is it not clear that this treatise is a genuine (work) of
 his?

71G Anonymous Coislinianus, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione* (CAG
 vol.4.5 p.xxiii.29-30 and 34-6 Busse)

That it (the *De interpretatione*) is a genuine work of Aristotle
 is proved in every way . . . including the fact that works of the
 same name have been written by others in emulation of Aristotle,
 and traditionally included with them are the *On Style* in place of
 the *Categories* and the *On Affirmation and Denial* in place of the *De
 interpretatione*.

71H Abū-l-Farağ Ibn-aṭ-Ṭayyib, *On Aristotle's Categories*, Introduction
 (p.82 Badawī in Mohaghegh and Izutsu)

From the attestation of trustworthy commentators . . . it is
 known that this book (*Categories*) is by him (Aristotle). That is, com-
 mentators going back to Theophrastus and Eudemus, his very own
 two disciples, attest to the soundness of this (attribution).

- 71I Ibn an-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist 7.1, cap. de Aristotele (p.248.20-1 Flügel)

قاضيغورياس ... فممن شرحه وفسره ... ثاوفرستس

¹ ex Ibn an-Nadīm pendet amplior versio ap. az-Zawzanī, *Muntaḥabāt* p.35.2-5 Lippert: قاضيغورياس ... وشرحه وفسره جماعة من يونان ومن العرب: ثاوفرستس يوناني ... منهم; cf. 3A et 3B quo tamen loco quasi spurium hoc opus commemoratur

- 72A Boetius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione, secunda editio, 1 prooemium (BT p.11.30-2 et 12.3-16 Meiser)

his Alexander multa alia addit argumenta, cur hoc opus
 12 Aristotelis maxime esse videatur. . . . et quod Theophrastus, ut
 in aliis solet, cum de similibus rebus tractat, quae scilicet ab
 Aristotele ante tractata sunt, in libro quoque De affirmatione et
 negatione isdem aliquibus verbis utitur, quibus hoc libro
 Aristoteles usus est. idem quoque Theophrastus dat signum hunc
 5 esse Aristotelis librum: in omnibus enim, de quibus ipse disputat
 post magistrum, leviter ea tangit quae ab Aristotele dicta ante
 cognovit, alias vero diligentius res non ab Aristotele tractatas
 exsequitur. hic quoque idem fecit. nam quae Aristoteles hoc libro de
 10 enuntiatione tractavit, leviter ab illo transcurra sunt, quae vero
 magister eius tacuit, ipse subtiliore modo considerationis adiecit.

2 et b: vel *codd.*

- 72B Ibn an-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist 7.1, cap. de Aristotele (p.249.1-3 Flügel)

باري ارمينياس ... المفسرون ... وئاوفرستس ***

¹ az-Zawzanī, *Muntaḥabāt*, cap. de Aristotele p.35.16-36.1 Lippert

¹ lacunam ind. Gutas, qui > في هذا كتاب الموجبة والسالبة < coni; cf. az-Zawzanī (codd. ABCGMV): باريرمينياس ... والذين تولوا تفسيره ... وئاوفرستس *** (sic lege; ثاوفرستس AM: ائاوفرستس BCG: ائاوفرستس V: لippert)

- 71I Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Aristotle (p.248.20-1 Flügel)

Categories: . . . Among those who interpreted and commented on it are the following: . . . Theophrastus.¹

¹ This report is amplified by Zawzanī (*Selections from Qifī's History of the Philosophers*, article on Aristotle, p.35.2-5 Lippert) as follows: "*Categories*: . . . It was interpreted and commented upon by a number of Greeks and Arabs. Among them are the following: . . . Theophrastus the Greek, . . ." See, however, 3A and 3B where Ibn-an-Nadīm, followed by Ibn-Abī-Uṣaybi'a and Zawzanī (Ibn-al-Qifī) expresses himself in a way which indicates that there was some doubt in his sources about the authenticity of the attribution of such a commentary to Theophrastus.

- 72A Boethius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione, Second edition*, 1 Introduction (BT p.11.30-2 and 12.3-16 Meiser)

To these Alexander adds many other arguments why this work
 12 (*De interpretatione*) seems certainly to be Aristotle's. . . . There is also the fact that Theophrastus, as is his custom in other works as well, when he is dealing with matters similar to those which have been dealt with by Aristotle, in the book *On Affirmation and Denial*, too, uses some of the same words as Aristotle used in this book (*De interpretatione*). Again, Theophrastus gives another indication that this book is by Aristotle: on all matters about which he argues after his master, he touches lightly on those which he knows have been said by Aristotle earlier, but follows up more diligently other things not dealt with by Aristotle. Here too he did the same thing. Aristotle's treatment of statements in this book was covered by him lightly, but matters on which his master was silent he added with a more exact kind of consideration.

- 72B Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Aristotle (p.249.1-3 Flügel)

De interpretatione: . . . The commentators are . . . ; and by Theo-

- 73 Galenus, *De suis propriis libris* 14 (BT p.122.19-123.9 Mueller)

Περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους φιλοσοφίαν ἀνηκόντων

Εἰς τὸ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας ὑπομνήματα τρία· Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦ προτέρου (ὑπομνήματα τέτταρα, τοῦ δευτέρου τέτταρα, Δευτέρων 123 δὲ τοῦ προτέρου) ἕξ· τοῦ δευτέρου ὑπομνήματα πέντε· Εἰς τὰς δέκα κατηγορίας ὑπομνήματα τέτταρα· Εἰς τὸ Περὶ καταφάσεως καὶ ἀποφάσεως Θεοφράστου ὑπομνήματα ἕξ· Εἰς τὸ Περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς τὰ ὑπομνήματα τρία· Εἰς τὸ πρῶτον κινῶν ἀκίνητον· Εἰς τὸ Περὶ λέξεως Εὐδήμου ὑπομνήματα τρία· Περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸ διότι ἀποδείξεων ἕν· Περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων προτάσεων καὶ συλλογισμῶν ἕν· Περὶ τῶν ἐκ μικτῶν προτάσεων συλλογισμῶν ἕν· Περὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων. 10

5-6 Galenus, *De suis propriis libris* 11 (p.118.14-16 Mueller) 6-7 *ibid.*
p.121.2-3 7-8 *ibid.* p.118.16-17 8 *ibid.* p.119.15-16 9 *ibid.*
p.119.24-120.2 10-11 Galenus, *De sophisticis seu captationibus penes dictionem* (t.14 p.582-98 Kühn) →

- 74 Aelius Theon, *Progymnasmata* 2 (RhGr t.2 p.69.1-4 Spengel)

παρδείγματα δὲ τῆς τῶν θέσεων γυμνασίας λαβεῖν ἐστὶ παρὰ τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου· πολλὰ γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν βιβλία θέσεων ἐπιγραφόμενα.

vid. 135

phrastus * * *.¹

¹ After "Theophrastus" there is almost certainly a lacuna in the text. Zawzani (Ibn-al-Qifti), who copies Ibn-an-Nadim, reproduces the lacuna: "*De interpretatione*: . . . Those who undertook to comment on it are . . .; and by Theophrastus * * *" (*History of the Philosophers*, p.35.16-36.1 Lippert). It would appear that the lacuna is to be supplemented as follows: "and by Theophrastus <there is on this subject *The Book of Affirmative and Negative (Propositions)*>"; for this title, see 81B.

- 73 Galen, *On His Own Books* 14 (BT p.122.19-123.9 Mueller)

On the Works relating to Aristotle's Philosophy

On the *De interpretatione*, three commentaries; (*On the First Book of the Prior Analytics*, four commentaries; (*On the Second*, four; 123 (*On the First of the Posterior*, six; (*On the Second*, five commentaries; *On the Ten Categories*, four commentaries; *On Theophrastus' On Affirmation and Denial*, six commentaries; *On the On How Many (Senses)*, three commentaries; *On the First Unmoved Mover*; *On Eudemus' On Style*, three commentaries; *On Proofs concerned with Why*, one; *On Problematic Premises and Syllogisms*¹, one; *On Syllogisms with Mixed Premises*, one; *On Sophisms based on Language*.

¹ At p.119.24 the title *On Problematic Premises* without the addition of "and Syllogisms" is found.

3-4 ὑπομνήματα—προτέρου *inser. Mueller, conferens p.118.4-12* 7 *post*
ἀκίνητον *add. αὐτό Mueller, conferens Arist. Metaph.4(Γ).8 1012b31* 9-
10 Περὶ—ἐν *secl. Mueller, conferens p.119.24-120.1* 10 παρὰ *Mueller,*
conferens t.14.582-98 Kühn: κατὰ Q libri

- 74 Aelius Theon, *Preliminary Exercises* 2 (RhGr vol.2 p.69.1-4 Spengel)

Examples of the exercise with theses can be obtained from Aristotle and Theophrastus, for many of their books are entitled *Theses*.

see 135

- 75 Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 4.27 (OCT t.1 p.178.17, 19-20 Long)

ἦν δὲ καὶ δεινὸς ὀνοματοποιῆσαι. . . . καὶ τὰς Θεοφράστου θέσεις ὀστρέφω γεγράφθαι.

1-2 Crantor, *Tla Mette* ex *Diogene Laertio pendet Suda*, s.v. *θέσεις* (no. 262, LG t.1 pars 2 p.709.8-9 Adler)

- 76 Hippolochus, *Epistula ad Lynceum*, ap. *Athenaeum in libro Deipnosophistarum* 4.5 130D (BT t.1 p.296.5-11 Kaibel)

σὺ δὲ μόνον ἐν Ἀθήναις μένων εὐδαιμονίζεις τὰς Θεοφράστου θέσεις ἀκούων, θύμα καὶ εὐζῶμα καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς ἐσθίων στρεπτούς, Λήναια καὶ Χύτρον θεωρῶν. ἡμεῖς δ' ἐκ τοῦ Καράνου δείπνου πλοῦτον ἀντὶ μερίδων εὐωχηθέντες νῦν ζητοῦμεν οἱ μὲν οἰκίας, οἱ δὲ ἀγρούς, οἱ δὲ ἀνδράποδ' ἀνήσασθαι.

I μόνον A: om. C: μάλλον Meyer

Logica non est pars philosophiae

- 77 Ioannes Italus, *Quaestiones quodlibetales* 16 (p.18.1-22 Ioannou)

πρὸς οὖν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον γενναίως ἀπηντήκασιν οἱ τε περὶ Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Θεόφραστον, ἐλλιπῶς ἔχειν τὸν λόγον φάσκοντες ὡς πορρωτάτω τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπφικισμένον· ἔδει γὰρ οὕτω τοὺς Στωϊκοὺς τὸν λόγον ἐκφέρειν· εἰ μὴ εἴη ἕτερας τέχνης ἢ μέρος ἢ μόριον εἴτε μὴν καὶ ὄργανον, τῆς καταγινομένης περὶ αὐτὸ ἢ μέρος ἢ μόριον ἢ καὶ ὄργανον, ὡς εἰκός, ἔσται· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἡ λογικὴ πραγματεία οὔτε μέρος ἔστιν οὔτε μόριον ἄλλης ἐπιστήμης οὔτ' αὐθις ὄργανον, τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἂν εἴη ἢ μέρος ἢ μόριον ἢ καὶ, ὡς εἴρηται, ὄργανον· ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι μέρος οὔτε πάλιν μόριον ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων φανερόν· τὰ γὰρ μέρη τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ὅλῳ ὕλην ἔχει καὶ τέλος τὸ αὐτό· ὅπερ οὐχ ὁράται ἔχουσα ἢ λογικὴ· ταύτη μὲν γὰρ προτάσεις ὕλη ὑποκειμένη καὶ τέλος συμπεράσματα, ὄντα δὲ ἢ ἔστι ἀνθρώπινά τε καὶ θεία τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα, καὶ τέλος, ὃ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφοῦσι γνώριμον,

- 75 Diogenes Laertius, *The Lives of the Philosophers* 4.27 (OCT vol.1 p.178.17, 19-20 Long)

He (Crantor) was also clever at coining terms. . . . And (he said) that the theses of Theophrastus had been written with purple coloring.

- 76 Hippolochus, *Letter to Lynceus*, in *Athenaeus, The Sophists at Dinner* 4.5 130D (BT vol.1 p.296.5-11 Kaibel)

You (Lynceus) simply remain in Athens and declare as sheer happiness the theses of Theophrastus, as you listen to them, the thyme and rocket and the fine rolls, as you eat them, the Lenaea and the Festival of the Pots, as you celebrate them. But we have been feasted at Caranus' table with wealth rather than with portions, and now some of us are looking for houses to buy, some fields, some slaves.

Logic Is Not a Part of Philosophy

- 77 John of Italy, *Various Questions* 16 (p.18.1-22 Ioannou)

Those associated with Aristotle and Theophrastus met this argument¹ nobly, saying that it was incomplete and as far removed from the truth as it could be; for the Stoics ought to set out their argument thus: if it (logic) is not a part or a sub-part, or again a tool, of another art, it will be a part or a sub-part, or again a tool, as it seems, of the art which is concerned with it. But since the discipline of logic is neither a part nor a sub-part of some other branch of knowledge, nor again a tool (of it), it should be a part or a sub-part of philosophy, or again, as has been said, a tool of it. That it is not a part or again a sub-part of it is clear from the following: the parts have the same matter as the whole, and the same goal, which logic is seen not to have; for its underlying matter is premises, and its goal is conclusions, but the things which are the underlying (matter) of philosophy are beings, human and divine, as beings, and its goal, which is known to all who

μελέτη θανάτου καὶ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ ἑξομοίωσις. ἔτι, εἰ ἦν φιλοσοφίας μέρος ἡ λογική, οὐκ ἂν ταύτη συνέβαινε, ὃ 15 πεπονηθῆ φαίνεται· λειπομένης γὰρ τῆς λογικῆς, ἀφαίρεσιν ὑπομένειν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν λέγομεν· ὃ οὐκ ἂν ἐγγόνει, εἴ γε μέρος ἦν· διαίρεσιν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν μερῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀφαίρεσιν λέγομεν, ὅτι τὸ διαιρούμενον ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται κατὰ σύνθεσιν ὄν, τὸ δὲ ἀφαιρούμενον κατὰ 20 πρόσθεσιν· ἔστιν ἄρα φιλοσοφία καὶ μὴ οὐσης λογικῆς· οὐ γὰρ τῷ εἶναι ταύτην ἐκείνη ἐστὶ, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἡμᾶς εἶναι, εἴποι δ' ἂν τις καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς· ὁδὸς γὰρ ἡμῖν διὰ ταύτης ἐπ' ἐκείνην ῥαδιὰ καὶ ταύτης, ὡς οἶμαι, χωρὶς, ἀδύνατος. διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ὄργανον μὲν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡ λογικὴ εἰκότως λεχθεῖη, μέρος δὲ οὐδαμῶς.

1-5 *Philoponus, In Arist. Anal. pr., prooemium* (CAG t.13.2 p.7.11-23), *Olympiodorus, In Arist. Cat., prolegomena* (CAG t.12.1 p.16.10-30), *Anonymus, De arte logica disputatio* (CAG t.12.1 p.xi-xii), *quibus locis Theophrastus non nominatur* 2-8 *Elias, In Arist. Anal. pr. (Mnemosyne 4.14 [1961] p.137.17-21 Westerink), Theophrasto non nominato* 4-6 *scholion in Arist. Anal. pr. 1 (p.140b7-11 Brandis)* 9 *cf. Alex. Aphrod. In Arist. Anal. pr. (CAG t.2.1 p.1.19-2.2)* 14 *μελέτη θανάτου*] *Plato, Phaedo 81A* θεοῦ ... ἑξομοίωσις] *Plato, e.g., Theaetetus 176B; vid. 483 et 584B* 14-20 *Ammonius, In Arist. Anal. pr. (CAG t.4.6 p.10.9-11), Philoponus, In Arist. Anal. pr., prooemium* (CAG t.13.2 p.8.27-9) *et Olympiodorus, In Arist. Cat., prolegomena* (CAG t.12.1 p.17.4-17) 16-17 *Elias, In Arist. Anal. pr. (Mnemosyne 4.14*

Enuntiatio

- 78 *Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 4 17a1* (CAG t.4.5 p.65.31-66.10 Busse)

διττῆς γὰρ οὐσης τῆς τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως, καθὰ διώρισεν ὁ φιλόσοφος Θεόφραστος, τῆς τε πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, οἷς καὶ σημαίνει τι, καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ λέγων πείσαι 66 προτίθεται τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, περὶ μὲν τὴν σχέσιν αὐτοῦ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς καταγίνονται ποιητικὴ καὶ ῥητορικὴ, διόπερ ἔργον αὐταῖς 5 ἐκλέγεσθαι τε τὰ σεμνότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ δεδημευμένα, καὶ ταῦτα ἑναρμονίως συμπλέκειν ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε διὰ τούτων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἐπομένων, οἷον σαφηνείας γλυκύτητος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδεῶν ἔτι τε μακρολογίας καὶ βραχυλογίας, κατὰ καιρὸν πάντων παραλαμβανομένων, ἦσαι τε τὸν ἀκροατὴν καὶ ἐκπλήξαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν 10 πειθῶ χειρωθέντα ἔχειν. τῆς δὲ γε πρὸς τὰ πράγματα τοῦ λόγου σχέσεως

philosophize truly, is practicing death and becoming like god, as far as that is possible for man. Again, if logic were a part of philosophy, it (philosophy) would not be affected in the way it clearly is. For when (only) logic is left, we say that philosophy has undergone removal. This would not have happened, if it (logic) were a part. For in the case of parts we speak of division rather than removal. "Divided" is applied to what was in a substance as a result of composition;² "removed" to what was simply added on. Philosophy exists, then, even when logic does not, for the existence of the former does not depend on that of the latter, but on being in relation to us, and, one might say, in us. For the road to philosophy by way of logic is easy for us, and, as I think, impossible without it. For these reasons, then, it would be reasonable to say that logic is the tool of philosophy, but in no way a part of it.

¹ The Stoic argument that logic is part of philosophy.

² More literally, "Divided" is applied to what is (divided) from a substance, being in it by composition".

[1961] p.135.30-1 et 137.33-138.1 Westerink

23-4 cf. *Alex. Aphrod. In Arist. Anal. pr. (CAG t.2.1 p.3.2-4)*

10 ὄλω p.176b10 *Ioannou (index verborum)*: ὄρω p.18.9 (*error typographicus*)
20 τῷ] τὸ Vm

Statement

- 78 *Ammonius, On Aristotle's De interpretatione 4 17a1* (CAG vol.4.5 p.65.31-66.10 Busse)

Since the sentence is related to two things, according to the distinction made by the philosopher Theophrastus, on the one hand to its hearers, to whom it also conveys some meaning, and on the other to the facts, about which the speaker aims at convincing his hearers, poetry and rhetoric are concerned with its relation to the audience. Hence it is their business to select more dignified words, and not common and hackneyed ones, and to weave them together harmoniously, so that through them and what goes with them, like clarity and sweetness and other qualities of style, and again length and brevity of speech, all used on the right occasions, the hearer is pleased and amazed and forced into conviction. But the philoso-

ὁ φιλόσοφος προηγουμένως ἐπιμελήσεται τό τε ψεύδος διελέγχων καί τὸ ἀληθές ἀποδεικνύς, ὡν ἐκάτερον ἀπόφανσίν τινα ἀμφισβητουμένην δι' ἐναργῶν ἀποφάνσεων προτίθεται συμπεραίνεσθαι.

1-12 *Anonymus Coislinianus, In Aristotelis De interpretatione (CAG t.4.5 p.xxiii.15-17)*

- 79 Boetius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione, secunda editio, 1 prooemium (BT p.9.24-6 Meiser)

et Theophrastus quidem in eo libro, quem De adfirmatione et negatione composuit, de enuntiativa oratione tractavit.

- 80 Boetius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 1 16a1, secunda editio, 1.1 (BT p.17.24-7 Meiser)

sed Porphyrius ait sese docuisse species enuntiationis esse adfirmationem et negationem in his commentariis quos in Theophrastum edidit.

- 81A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.1 24a16 (CAG t.2.1 p.11.13-16 Wallies)

ὡς δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένης τῆς προτάσεως ἔοικε καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ καταφάσεως φρονεῖν. αὐτὴν γοῦν οὐχ ὀρίζεται, ἀλλὰ κατάφασιν καὶ ἀπόφασιν.

- 81B Al-Fārābī, Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭalīs Fī l-ṭibāra, prooemium (p.22.1-9 Kutsch et Marrow)

ليس هو (أي كتاب العبارة لارسطو) في المقدمات بل إنما تعرّف فيه المطلوبات التي لأجلها القياس ... أنه (أي ارسطو) لم يذكر شيئاً من المقدمات في هذا الكتاب ... لكن ذكر في هذا الكتاب المطلوبات مستقصاة وذكر من المقدمات جنسها الذي يعمها والمطلوبات وخلقى عن ذكر المقدمات من حيث هي

pher will take care especially of the relation of the sentence to the facts, refuting the false and demonstrating the true, in each case aiming to deduce the truth or falsity of a disputed statement by means of statements that are self-evident.

- 79 Boethius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione, Second edition*, 1 Introduction (BT p.9.24-6 Meiser)

Theophrastus, too, in that book which he wrote *On Affirmation and Denial*, dealt with indicative speech.

- 80 Boethius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione 1 16a1, Second edition*, 1.1 (BT p.17.24-7 Meiser)

But Porphyry says that he has shown that affirmation and denial are species of statement, in those commentaries which he produced on Theophrastus.

- 81A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.1 24a16* (CAG vol.2.1 p.11.13-16 Wallies)

But Theophrastus too, in the *On Affirmation*, seems to think that "proposition" has several senses. At any rate he defines not it, but "affirmation" and "denial".

- 81B Fārābī, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione*, Introduction (p.22.1-9 Kutsch and Marrow)

It (*Aristotle's De interpretatione*) is not about premises, but rather contains a description only of things sought, for the sake of which syllogisms (are constructed). . . . He (Aristotle) did not say a word about premises in this book, . . . but discussed in depth the things sought. Of premises he discussed their genus, which they share with things sought, and left aside any discussion of premises as such; he devoted his attention to a discussion of things sought and to

مقدّمات وأقبل على ذكر المطلوبات وتمييزها من سائر أصناف المتقابلات وكان
قصده الأول في هذا الكتاب هو تمييز المطلوبات من سائر المتقابلات ولذلك
سمى ثاوفرسطس كتابه الذي عمله في مثل الغرض الذي عمل هذا الكتاب فيه
كتاب الموجبة والسالبة ولم يسمه كتاب المقدمات

- 82A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.4
26b15 (CAG t.2.1 p.66.2-10 Wallies)

τὸ “τινὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχει” λέγεται ἀδιορίστως· καὶ γὰρ μηδενὶ
ὑπάρχοντος ἀληθὲς τὸ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ εἰ τινὶ· τὴν γὰρ οὐχ
ὠρισμένον τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχουσαν ἀδιορίστον εἶπε νῦν· τινὶ γοῦν χιόνι τὸ
θερμὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀληθὲς ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν, καίτοι οὐδεμιᾶ χιόνι τὸ
θερμὸν ὑπάρχει· ὁμοίως καὶ ἵππῳ τινὶ ἄνθρωπον μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ὅτι καὶ
οὐδενί· ἐμνημόνευκε (δὲ) τοῦ οὕτως ἀδιορίστου καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ
Περὶ καταφάσεως· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι τι τούτων καὶ τὸ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι
ἀδιορίστα λέγει, τὸ μὲν εἶναι τι τούτων, ὅτι καὶ πάντων ὄντων ἀληθὲς
καὶ τῶν μὲν ὄντων τῶν δὲ μὴ, τὸ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι, ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθὲς
καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου μόνου.

3 Aristoteles, *Anal. pr. 1.4 26a28*

6 δὲ add. a: om. BLM 9 τὸ (alt.) om. LM

- 82B Boetius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 7 17a38, secunda editio
2.7 (BT p.140.3-12 Meiser)

quidam enim homo potest esse et Socrates et Plato et Cicero
et unusquisque singulorum quorum proprietates a se in singulari-
tatis ratione et natura diversae sunt. unde commodissime Theo-
phrastus huiusmodi particulares propositiones, quales sunt “qui-
dam homo iustus est”, particulares indefinitas vocavit. partem

their discrimination from other kinds of opposite pairs; his primary
intention in this book was to discriminate things sought from the
rest of opposite pairs. This is why Theophrastus named his own
book, which he wrote for the same purpose as this book was
written, *The Book of Affirmative and Negative (Propositions)* and did
not name it *The Book of Premises*.

- 82A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.4 26b15*
(CAG vol.2.1 p.66.2-10 Wallies)

“It does not belong to some” is used in an indefinite sense; for
not belonging to something is true both when it belongs to nothing
and if it belongs to something; for just now he (Aristotle) called
a proposition whose truth is not defined “indefinite”; for example,
it is true to say that warmth does not belong to some snow, although
warmth belongs to no snow; and similarly that man does not belong
to some horse, because in fact it belongs to none. Theophrastus too
mentioned this sense of “indefinite” in the *On Affirmation*; for both
the statement that some of these are, and the statement that one
or the other is he called “indefinite”, that some of these are because
it is true when all are and when some are and some are not, and
that one or the other is because this too is true both when both
are, and when one alone is.

- 82B Boetius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione 7 17a38, Second edition 2.7*
(BT p.140.3-12 Meiser)

For *some man* can as well be Socrates as Plato or Cicero or any
one of the individuals whose properties differ naturally by reason
of their individuality. Hence Theophrastus very aptly called par-
ticular propositions of this kind, like “Some man is just”, “indefinite
particular”. For it takes a part from *man*, which is universal in name

namque tollit ex homine quod est universale vel vocabulo vel natura, quae tamen ipsa sit pars et qua proprietate descripta non determinat nec definit.

3-4 Theophrastus] cf. Sigerum de Curtraco, In Arist. De int. 7 17a38 (p.54.46-)

82C Anonymus, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 7 17a38 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2064 = p.32.15-33.6 Tarán)

διὰ τί δὲ ἀξιουμέν ἄλλως τὸ “τις ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ” καὶ τὸ “οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος περιπατεῖ” καθόλου εἶναι καίτοι μερικόν τι σημαίνουσιν; λέγομεν ὅτι τὸ μερικόν ὁ προσδιορισμός ἐστίν ὁ σημαίνων, ἐπεὶ δηλοῖ ἢ φωνῇ ὅτι ἐκ πολλῶν ἓνα τινὰ ἀφαιρεῖται, ἀδιόριστον δὲ τοῦτο· δύναται γὰρ πολλῶν ἅμα ὄντων καὶ Σωκράτης 5 (τις) εἶναι καὶ Πλάτων τις εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἐν πλήθει ὄντων. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν διορισμένως εἰκότως λέγεται καθόλου, διότι δὲ μερικόν λαμβάνει προσδιορισμὸν ἤξιουν αὐτὸν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καλεῖν καθόλου ὡς μερικόν. εἰδέναι δὲ δεῖ ὅτι διὰ τὴν γενομένην ἀπορίαν Θεόφραστος μερικὴν ἀπροσδιόριστον 10 ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀντίθεσιν, καὶ δῆλον διὰ τί.

6 τις add. Tarán

82D Anonymus, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 7 17b16 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2064 = p.37.15-21 Tarán)

		ἐναντία	
καθόλου ὡς καθόλου	ὑ π α λ λ ή λ ο	πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστίν	οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστίν
		ἀντιφατικοί	
		ἀντιφατικοί	
καθόλου ὡς μερικὴ ἢ ὡς Θεόφραστος μερικὴ ὡς ἀπροσδιόριστος	ἰ ἰ ἰ ἰ ἰ ἰ ἰ ἰ	τις ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστίν	οὐ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος ζῷόν ἐστίν
		ὑπεναντία	

or in nature, but it does not determine or define which part it is, or by what property it is described.


8 Verhaak) qui per errorem Aristotelis definitionem, a Boetio p.140.13-18 laudatam, ad Theophrastum transfert

82C Anonymous, On Aristotle's De interpretatione 7 17a38 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2064 = p.32.15-33.6 Tarán)

Why do we think in general that “Some man is walking” and “Not every man is walking” are universal although they signify something particular? We say that what signifies the particular is the quantifier, since the word shows that it removes some one thing from many, but this is undetermined. For when there are many together Socrates can be *someone*, and Plato can be *someone*, and so can each of those that are in the group. Since, therefore, it applies alike over all, and no one thing is distinguished, it is with good reason said to be universal, but because it takes a particular quantifier the ancients saw fit to call it “universal *qua* particular”. You should know that because of the problem that arose Theophrastus called the antithesis¹ “unquantified particular”, and it is clear why.

¹ I.e., “Some A is B”, and “Not every A is B”.

82D Anonymous, On Aristotle De interpretatione 7 17b16 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2064 = p.37.15-21 Tarán)



- 82E Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 7 17a38-b12 (CAG t.4.5 p.90.12-20 Busse)

διαφέρουσι δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα αἰ μερικαὶ τῶ τὰς μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τινος ἐνὸς ὄρισμένου ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, οἷον Σωκράτους, τὰς δὲ μερικὰς, εἰ καὶ πρὸς ἓν τι βλέπουσαι ἀποφαίνονται, μηδὲν ὄρισμένον σημαίνειν ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τινος τοῦ τυχόντος δύνασθαι ἀληθεύειν, ὡς ὅταν εἴπωμεν “τις ἄνθρωπος δίκαιός ἐστιν”. οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον 5 Σωκράτους χάριν ἀληθεύει ἢ πρότασις ἢ Πλάτωνος ἢ Ἀριστείδου· διόπερ ὀρθῶς ὁ Θεόφραστος τὴν μὲν καθ' ἕκαστα ὄρισμένην καλεῖ τὴν δὲ μερικὴν ἀόριστον. καὶ ἀντιδιαίρεται πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀπλῶς καθόλου ἢ καθ' ἕκαστα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν καθόλου ὡς καθόλου ἢ μερικῇ.

- 83 Scholion in Philoponi In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.1 24a15 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1917 = p.145a30-7 Brandis)

τὸ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ὁ μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος, ὡς καὶ ὁ παρὼν Φιλώπωνος, οἶεται μόνῃ τῇ προφορᾷ διαφέρειν. ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος καὶ τῶ σημαυνομένῳ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν δηλοῖ τὸ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνί. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην προτάττοντα τὸ μὴ παντὶ ἐπάγειν τὸ τινὶ μὴ 5 ὑπάρχειν, ἢ καὶ τὸ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐπιφέρειν ἐνίοτε τὸ ἢ μὴ πάντα κατὰ τὴν μεγαλεπήβολον τοῦ Θεοφράστου ἔννοιαν τοῦτο ποιῶντα.

1-2 Alexander Aphrod., In Arist. Anal. pr. 1.4 26a36 (CAG t.2.1 p.62.11-13)
4-6 Aristoteles, Anal. pr. 1.4 26b15-16 6-7 *ibid.* 1.1 24a19, 1.4 26a37 et 26b3-4

6 τὸ (pr.)] τῶ Prantl πάντα] παντὶ *coni. Huby*

- 84 Scholion in Aristotelis De interpretatione 7 17b14 (cod. Ambros. Gr. 490 [olim L 93] f.64^v = CAG t.4.5 p.xxxiii.34-7 Busse)

πρὸς τοῦτο φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος ὅτι ἐπὶ τινῶν, εἰ μὴ ὁ προσδιορισμὸς ἢ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου, ἢ ἀντίφασιν συναληθεύσει, οἷον, φησὶν, εἰ μὴ λέγωμεν “Φαινίας ἔχει ἐπιστήμην· Φαινίας οὐκ ἔχει

- 82E Ammonius, On Aristotle's De interpretatione 7 17a38-b12 (CAG vol.4.5 p.90.12-20 Busse)

Particular (propositions) differ from singular ones in that singular ones make their statement about some one definite thing, like Socrates, but particular ones, even if they show that they are looking towards some one thing, indicate nothing definite, but are capable of being true of any chance thing, as when we say, “Some man is just”; for this proposition is true no more on account of Socrates than of Plato or Aristides. Therefore Theophrastus is correct in calling the singular definite but the particular indefinite. And the singular on the one hand is opposed to the simple universal, and the particular on the other to the universal *qua* universal.

- 83 Scholium on Philoponus' On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.1 24a15 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1917 = p.145a30-7 Brandis)

Alexander, as also this writer Philoponus, thinks that “not belonging to all” and “not belonging to some” differ only in expression, but Theophrastus thinks they differ in meaning too. For “not belonging to all” indicates “belonging to many”, but “not belonging to some” indicates “belonging to one”. For this reason it is possible to find Aristotle putting first “not (belonging) to all” and inferring “not belonging to some”, or again (putting first) “not belonging to some” (and) sometimes adding “or not all”, doing this according to the lofty idea of Theophrastus.

¹ Or, “to the majority”.

² The translation is neutral between πάντα and παντὶ, but there may be a deeper corruption.

- 84 Scholium on Aristotle's De interpretatione 7 17b14 (cod. Ambros. Gr. 490 [formerly L 93] f.64^v = CAG vol.4.5 p.xxxiii.34-7 Busse)

On this point Theophrastus says that in some cases, if the quantifier¹ does not apply to the predicate too, the contradictory is true as well, as for instance, he says, if we say “Phainias has knowledge; Phainias does not have knowledge”, both can be true. For it is possi-

ἐπιστήμην", δύναται εἶναι ἀμφοτέρω ἀληθῆ· ἐγγωρεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν εἰ τύχοι γραμματικὴν μὲν ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην, ἰατρικὴν δὲ μή.

85A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Metaphysica 4 (Γ).4 1006a11 (CAG t.1 p.273.8-19 Hayduck)

ἔτι ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ λαμβάνων τε καὶ τιθεὶς πᾶν εἶναι τοῦτο ὃ λέγει ἢ μὴ εἶναι δόξει τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ ζητούμενον προλαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τοῦτου ἡ ζήτησις ἦν. ὁ μὲντοι ἔλεγχος ἐπεὶ πρὸς ἄλλον γίνεται καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος τίθησιν (ἔστι γὰρ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμὸς δι' ἐρωτήσεως εἰς ἀντίφασιν ἄγων), δύναται γίνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τῶν 5 τοιούτων. οὐκέτι γὰρ οὔτε διὰ πρώτων ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμὸς, οὔτε τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν τις παρ' αὐτοῦ δόξει, ἂν ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος συγχωρήσῃ πᾶν ἢ εἶναι τι ὃ λέγεται ἢ μὴ εἶναι. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ αἴτιος τοῦ τοιοῦτου ὁ ἀξιῶν δεικνυσθῆναι τε τὰ αὐτόθεν γνώριμα καὶ διδόναι τὰ 10 ἀναγκαζόμενός τε καὶ δυσωπούμενος, ἃ εἰ ὁ ἀποδεικνύς ἐτίθει ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ, ἐδόκει ἂν τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι· ὡς γὰρ εἶπε Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ καταφάσεως, βίαιος καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ἡ τοῦτου τοῦ ἀξιῶματος ἀπόδειξις.

1 ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ] ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ LF 7 αὐτοῦ *coni. Sepulveda*: αὐτοῦ ALF

85B Syrianus, In Aristotelis Metaphysica 4(Γ).4 1006a11 (CAG t.6.1 p.68.26-36 Kroll)

τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθὲς μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς παρελάβομεν, ὅτι μὴ δύναται συνεῖναι τῷ εἶδει ἢ στέρησις· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδ' ἂν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἄνθρωπος εἴη· οὐ μὲντοι ἐπίσης ἐναργὲς τῷ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ἀξιῶματι· ὥστε κρατεῖν τὸ τοῦ Θεοφράστου, ὃς ἀγνωμονεστάτους εἶναι φησι καὶ βιαιοτάτους τοὺς ἀναγκάζοντας λόγον ὑπέχειν 5 τοῦτου τοῦ ἀξιῶματος· αὐτόθεν γὰρ (ὁ) τοῦτω ἐνιστάμενος λόγου

ble for him to have, perhaps, knowledge of letters, but not knowledge of medicine.

¹ Or, "extra qualification".

85A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 4(Γ).4 1006a11 (CAG vol.1 p.273.8-19 Hayduck)

Again, if he starts with his own premises and posits that everything is this which he says (it is), or is not, he will appear to beg the question and preempt the issue, since the enquiry was about this very matter. The refutation, however, since it comes about in argument with another, and from what the opponent posits (for a refutation is a syllogism leading to a contradiction through questioning), can also be produced by methods of this kind. For such a syllogism is not any longer from unsupported¹ premises, nor will anyone seem to be taking as his own starting-point the very point at issue, if his opponent agrees that everything that is said either is so or is not so.² For that (opponent) is responsible for such a statement, he who was asking for proof of things self-evident, and was put out of countenance and forced to grant these things which would have seemed to involve begging the question if the man providing the proof had posited them on his own account. For, as Theophrastus said in *On Affirmation*, the proof of this axiom³ is forced and unnatural.

¹ Literally, "first".

² Or, "that everything is either something that it is said (to be), or is not".

³ The law of non-contradiction.

85B Syrianus, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 4(Γ).4 1006a11 (CAG vol.6.1 p.68.26-36 Kroll)

But we too assumed this to be true, that the privation cannot coexist with the form; but if this is true, neither would man as man be not man. It is not, however, equally as obvious as the axiom of contradiction, so that the view of Theophrastus prevails. He said that those who force us to give an argument for this axiom are most unpardonable and violent. For he who opposes this (axiom) immediately does away with the use of reasoning and demon-

χρείαν ἀναίρει καὶ ἀποδείξεως. εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τότε ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τίς ἦν χρεία καὶ λόγου καὶ κατασκευῆς καὶ συμπεράσματος; τίς δὲ ὁ καρπὸς ταύτης πάσης τῆς πραγματείας, ὅταν ὁ πειρώμενος αὐτῷ παρίστασθαι τῶν ἡττόνων αὐτοῦ τι πρὸς ἐνάργειαν εἰς κατασκευὴν αὐτοῦ παραλαμβάνειν ἀναγκάζεται;

6 ἀξιώματος Usener: ὀνόματος C αὐτόθεν Kroll: αὐτός τε C ὁ
add. Usener

- 86** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Metaphysica 4(Γ).4 1011b13 (CAG t.1 p.328.14-18 Hayduck)

δεῖ δὲ μίαν λαμβάνειν ἀντίφασιν· τοῦτο δὲ εἶη ἂν, εἰ ἔν καθ' ἑνὸς εἶη καὶ τὸ καταφασκόμενον καὶ τὸ ἀποφασκόμενον· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔν καθ' ἑνὸς εἶη, οὐ μία ἔτι καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀντίφασις, ἀλλὰ πλείους ἔσονται αἱ τε καταφάσεις καὶ ἀποφάσεις. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ πλέον ἔν τε τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ καταφάσεως.

5 Aristoteles, De int. 7-8 17a38-18a27

- 87A** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.46 51b5 (CAG t.2.1 p.396.34-397.4 Wallies)

πρὸς τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ κατασκευάζειν τι ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν τι δύνασθαι διὰ συλλογισμοῦ διαφέρειν φησὶ τὸ εἰδέναι διακρίνειν καὶ χωρίζειν τὰς προτάσεις τὰς ἀποφατικὸν μὲν ἔχουσας τὸ σχῆμα οὖσας δὲ καταφάσεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποφάσεων. λέγει δὲ περὶ προτάσεων ὡς θεόφραστος κατὰ μετάθεσιν λέγει· εἴρηκε δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας δεικνύς ὅτι οὐκ εἰσι καταφάσεων ἀποφάσεις.

5-6 Aristoteles, De int. 10 19b19-20b12

- 87B** Ammonius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 10 19b19 (CAG t.4.5 p.161.5-11 et 24-32 Busse)

τῶν δὴ γινόμενων ἐν ταῖς νῦν προκειμέναις ἡμῖν προτάσεσι δύο ἀπροσδιορίστων ἀντιφάσεων τὴν μὲν ἑτέραν καλεῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπλήν, τὴν ὀρισμένον τὸ κατηγορούμενον ἔχουσαν, ὡς κατ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο

stration. For if nothing is more this than its opposite, what was the use of reasoning and dialectical proof and conclusion? And what was the fruit of all this activity, when he who tries to defend it (the axiom) is forced to use in its proof something inferior to it in respect of self-evidence?

- 86** Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Metaphysics 4 (Γ).7 1011b13 (CAG vol.1 p.328.14-18 Hayduck)

We must take a single contradiction. This would be a case where both what was affirmed and what was denied was one of one. For if it were not one of one, the contradiction would not be one and the same, but the affirmations and the negations would be more than one. These matters have been discussed at greater length in the *De interpretatione* and the *On Affirmation*.¹

¹ No work with this title has been attributed to Aristotle anywhere else, but we have several references to Theophrastus' work of that name.

- 87A** Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.46 51b5 (CAG vol.2.1 p.396.34-397.4 Wallies)

He (Aristotle) says that for syllogizing and for being able to argue constructively or destructively by means of a syllogism, it makes a difference to know how to distinguish and separate propositions which have a negative form but are in fact affirmations from negations. He is talking about propositions which Theophrastus calls "by transposition"; he himself also spoke about these in the *De interpretatione*, showing that they are not negations of affirmations.

- 87B** Ammonius, On Aristotle's De interpretatione 10 19b19 (CAG vol.4.5 p.161.5-11 and 24-32 Busse)

Of the two unquantified contradictions in the propositions with which we are now concerned, Aristotle calls the one "simple", because it has a definite predicate, and for this very reason is simpler

τῆς ἐτέρας ἀπλουστέραν οὖσαν, τὴν δὲ ἐτέραν ἀόριστον διὰ τὸ ἀόριστον εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ κατηγορούμενον. ὁ μὲντοι ἐταῖρος αὐτοῦ Θεόφραστος ὀνομάζει αὐτὴν ἐκ μεταθέσεως, δι' ἣν ἐξῆς ἐροῦμεν αἰτίαν. . . . ἐκτιθέμενος οὖν ἐπὶ διαγράμματος τὰς προτάσεις, ὅπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑπετάξαμεν, καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπλὴν κατάφασιν τάξας τὴν ἀόριστον ἀπόφασιν, ἀναγκαίως λοιπὸν ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπόφασιν τὴν ἀπλὴν τίθησι τὴν ἀόριστον κατάφασιν. διὸ καὶ ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὰς Θεόφραστος ἐκ μεταθέσεως, ὅτι μετατίθεται αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ διαγράμματι ἡ τάξις καὶ ὑπὸ μὲν τὴν ἀπλὴν κατάφασιν τέτακται ἡ τούτων ἀπόφασις, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἀπλὴν ἀπόφασιν ἡ κατάφασις, ἢ καὶ ὅτι μετατεθέντος τοῦ ὀρισμένου κατηγορουμένου καὶ τεθέντος τοῦ ἀόριστου γεγονάσιν.

1-7 *Ioannes Italus, Quaestiones quodlibetales* 28 (p.35.26-8 *Ioannou*) 4-6 *ibid.* 49 (p.62.4-9) 5-13 *Thomas Aquinas, In Arist. De int. 2 lectio* 2.7 7-13 *cf. Pselli comm. In Arist. De int. (CAG t.4.5 p.xlix-1), ex quo pendet Neophyti scholion (Waitz, Organon t.1 p.41-2 et CAG t.4.5 p.xlix-1)*

87C [Magentinus], *In Aristotelis De interpretatione* 10 19b19 (CAG t.4.5 p.xliv.11-14 Busse)

καὶ ταύτας μὲν τὰς ἐκ μεταθέσεως αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀόριστους ἐκάλεσεν, αἱ δὲ μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον ἐκ μεταθέσεως ἢ διὰ τὸ μετατεθεῖσθαι τοὺς ὅρους τῆς προτάσεως ἢ διὰ τὸ τὴν “οὐ” δίφθογγον μὴ μείναι ἐν τοῖς ἰδίους ὅροις ἢ διὰ τὸ τὴν πᾶσαν πρότασιν μετατεθεῖσθαι.

87D *Stephanus Alexandrinus, In Aristotelis De interpretatione* 10 19b19 (CAG t.18.3 p.40.22-8 Hayduck)

γίνεται ἀόριστος κατάφασις, ἣν ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐκ μεταθέσεως ἐκάλεσεν, ἢ διὰ τὸ μετατίθεσθαι τὴν “οὐ” ἄρνησιν ἐκ τοῦ “ἔστι” τρίτου προσκατηγορουμένου ἐπὶ τὸν κατηγορούμενον, ἢ ὅτι μετατίθεται αὐτῶν ἡ τάξις ἐν τῷ διαγράμματι· γίνεται γάρ, ὡς μαθησόμεθα, οὐκέτι ἡ κατάφασις ὑπὸ τὴν κατάφασιν καὶ ἡ ἀπόφασις ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπόφασιν. διὰ ταύτας οὖν τὰς αἰτίας ὁ Θεόφραστος ἠξίωσεν τὰς τοιαύτας προτάσεις ἐκ μεταθέσεως ὀνομάζειν.

than the other, but the other “indefinite”, because the predicate in it is indefinite. But his colleague Theophrastus names it “from transposition”, the reason for which we will give later. . . . Setting out the propositions in a diagram, which we too have set out below,¹ and putting the indefinite negation under the simple affirmation, he necessarily puts the remaining indefinite affirmation under the simple negation. Hence Theophrastus called them “from transposition”, because their order is transposed in the diagram, and under the simple affirmation is placed the negative member of this pair, and under the simple negation the affirmation, or because they are formed when the definite predicate is replaced² by the indefinite.

¹ This diagram has been lost.

² This represents the two words μετατεθέντος (“transposed”) and τεθέντος (“placed”) which cannot both be translated together.

87C *pseudo-Magentinus, On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 10 19b19 (CAG vol.4.5 p.xliv.11-14 Busse)

And these (propositions) from transposition Aristotle himself called “indefinite”, but his pupils, those associated with Theophrastus, “from transposition”, either because the terms of the proposition are transposed, or because the diphthong “not”¹ does not remain with its own terms, or because the whole proposition is transposed.

¹ The Greek word οὐ (“not”) is a diphthong.

87D *Stephanus of Alexandria, On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 10 19b19 (CAG vol.18.3 p.40.22-8 Hayduck)

There is an indefinite affirmation, which Theophrastus called “from transposition”, either because the negative “not” is transposed away from the “is”, which is an additional element in the predicate, making three elements in all,¹ to the predicate proper, or because their order is transposed in the diagram; for, as we shall learn, the affirmation no longer comes under the affirmation, nor the negation under the negation. For these reasons, therefore, Theophrastus saw fit to call such propositions “from transposition”.

¹ I.e., the subject, the predicate, and “is”.

- 87E Anonymus, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 10 19b19 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2064 = p.71.1-7 Tarán)

ταύτας τὰς ἐκ μεταθέσεως ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης (ἀορίστους) ἐξ ἀορίστου τοῦ κατηγορουμένου καλεῖ, οἱ δὲ περὶ Θεόφραστον ἐκ μεταθέσεως, διότι μετατίθεται αὐτῶν ἢ τάξις· τάττεται γὰρ ἢ μὲν ἐκ μεταθέσεως ἀπόφασις ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπλὴν κατάφασιν ἢ δὲ ἐκ μεταθέσεως κατάφασις ὑπὸ τὴν ἀπλὴν ἀπόφασιν· οὕτω γὰρ εὐρεθήσονται ἀλλήλαις ἐπόμεναι.

1 ἀορίστους *add. Huby*

- 87F Ibn Buṭlān ap. Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā' 14, cap. de Ibn Riḍwān (t.2 p.102.18-20 Müller)

ما قاله المفسرون في الاعتياض عن السالبة البسيطة بالموجبة المعدولة :
فإنهم مجمعون على أن هذا الفصل لو لم يسمعه من ارسطوطاليس تلميذاه
ثاوقرسطس واوديموس لما فهم قط من كتاب

- 88 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.37 49a6 (CAG t.2.1 p.367.7-14 Wallies)

“ἐπισκεπτέον δέ,” φησί, “ταῦτα καὶ διοριστέον βέλτιον,” ἐπεὶ τῶν συγκειμένων ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις τὰ μὲν μίαν πρότασιν ποιεῖ, τὰ δ’ οὐ μίαν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν ἰδίᾳ κατηγορουμένων ἀληθῶς τὰ μὲν καὶ συνθέντας ἀληθῶς κατηγορῆσαι, τὰ δὲ συνθέντας οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῶς κατηγορῆσαι. περὶ τούτων ἀξιοὶ ἄμεινον δεῖν ἐπεσκεῖσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὧν τὰ κεφάλαια ἐκτίθεται. καὶ αὐτὸς μὲν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἑρμηνείας, ἐπὶ πλέον δὲ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ καταφάσεως περὶ τούτων λέγει.

6-7 *Aristoteles, De int. 11 20b31-21a33*

- 89 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 3.6 120a20 (CAG t.2.2 p.290.1-2 et 9-10 et 24-9 Wallies)

εἰ δὲ διορισμένον εἴη τὸ πρόβλημα, ὃ θέσιν εἶπε, καὶ εἰ εἴη διορισμὸς τοιοῦτος ἐν τῷ προβλήματι, εἰ τις μὲν ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, τις δὲ

- 87E Anonymous, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 10 19b19 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2064 = p.71.1-7 Tarán)

Aristotle calls these (propositions) from transposition <“indefinite”> because the predicate is indefinite, but those associated with Theophrastus call them “from transposition” because transposition occurs in their order. For the negation from transposition is placed under the simple affirmation, and the affirmation from transposition under the simple negation; for in this way they will be found to follow one another.

- 87F Ibn-Buṭlān in Ibn-Abī-Uṣaybi'a, *Essential Information on the Generations of Physicians* 14, chap. on Ibn-Riḍwān (vol.2 p.102.18-20 Müller)

What the commentators have said about the substitution of the simple negative (proposition) by the modified (/equivalent) affirmative (proposition): they agree that this section would have never been understood from (the reading of) a book had not Aristotle's two disciples, Theophrastus and Eudemus, heard it (explained) from him.

- 88 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.37 49a6 (CAG vol.2.1 p.367.7-14 Wallies)

“We must look into these matters further,” he (Aristotle) says, “and define them better,” since when predicates are joined together some produce a single proposition, and some do not. And of those which are predicated truly by themselves some are also predicated truly when combined, but others when combined are not truly predicated. About these he thinks it proper to enquire further and better, and also about the other matters which he summarises. He himself discusses them in the *De interpretatione*, and, at greater length, Theophrastus in the *On Affirmation*.

- 89 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 3.6 120a20 (CAG vol.2.2 p.290.1-2 and 9-10 and 24-9 Wallies)

But if the problem, which he (Aristotle) called a thesis, were made determinate, and if there were in the problem a determination

οὐ, . . . διχῶς δὴ, φησίν, ἐνδέχεται τὴν οὕτω διωρισμένην ἐπὶ μέρους ἀναιρεῖσθαι. . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ κείμενον εἴη τρεῖς μόνως τάσδε τινὰς ἀρετὰς ἐπιστήμας εἶναι, πενταχῶς ἂν ἀναιροῖτο κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγοῦμενον τρόπον· καὶ γὰρ διὰ τοῦ πᾶσα καὶ διὰ τοῦ οὐδεμία καὶ διὰ τοῦ πλείους καὶ διὰ τοῦ ἐλάττους καὶ διὰ τοῦ οὐ καὶ αὐταὶ αἱ τρεῖς αἰ ἦσαν ὠνομασμένοι ἐν τῷ προβλήματι. περὶ τούτων καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐπὶ τέλει τοῦ Περὶ καταφάσεως δοκεῖ πεποιησθαι λόγον.

5 ὑφηγοῦμενον] ὑφηγημένον *coni. Wallies* 7 διὰ τοῦ οὐ καὶ αὐταὶ *Wallies*: δι' αὐτοῦ οὐ καὶ αὐταὶ *libri*: διὰ τοῦ οὐ καὶ αὐταὶ *Van Ophuijsen*

Syllogismus categoricus

90A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.2 25a14 (CAG t.2.1 p.31.4-10 et 34.13-15 Wallies)

Θεόφραστος μὲν καὶ Εὐδήμος ἀπλούστερον ἔδειξαν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφουσαν ἑαυτῇ· τὴν γὰρ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ὠνόμασε καθόλου στερητικὴν. τὴν δὲ δεῖξιν οὕτως ποιοῦνται· κείσθω τὸ Α κατὰ μηδενὸς τοῦ Β· εἰ κατὰ μηδενός, ἀπέζευκται τοῦ Β τὸ Α καὶ κεισθῶ τὸ Β κατὰ μηδενός, ἀπέζευκται τοῦ Α· καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα παντὸς ἀπέζευκται τοῦ Α· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κατὰ μηδενός αὐτοῦ. οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐκέينو. . . . ἄμεινον οὖν λέγειν τὰ εἰρημένα δεικτικὰ εἶναι τοῦ δεῖν ἀπεξεῦχθαι καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α, εἰ τὸ Α τοῦ Β ἀπέζευκται, ὃ οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον ὡς ἐναργὲς ὄν λαμβάνουσι χωρὶς δείξεως.

1-6 *Eudemus, fr. 10a Wehrli*

3 ὠνόμασε *BM*: ὠνόμασαν *aL*

90B Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.2 25a16 (CAG t.13.2 p.48.11-18 Wallies)

οὕτω μὲν οὖν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δείκνυσι τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀντιστρέφουσαν. οἱ δὲ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταῖροι οἱ περὶ τὸν Θεόφραστον καὶ Εὐδήμον σαφέστερον καὶ ἀπλούστερον τὸ αὐτὸ

like this: if some pleasure is a good, and some is not, . . . there are two ways, he says, in which the particular thesis made determinate in this way can be refuted. . . .¹ And again, if it were propounded that these three particular virtues alone were knowledge, it could be refuted in five ways, according to the preceding method. For (it can be done) by means of "all" and by means of "none" and by means of "more" and by means of "fewer" and by means of "not precisely these three" which were named in the problem". Theophrastus too seems to have written about these matters at the end of the *On Affirmation*.

¹ The omitted section follows Aristotle's account in 120a21-31.

² Or, with Van Ophuijsen, "not the same three"

Categorical Syllogism

90A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.2 25a14 (CAG vol.2.1 p.31.4-10 and 34.13-15 Wallies)

Theophrastus and Eudemus gave a simpler proof that the universal negative is convertible; he¹ called the universal negative "universal privative". They give this proof thus: let it be assumed that A is of no B; if of none, A has been disjoined from B and separated from it; but what is disjoined has been disjoined from that which has been disjoined from it; B too, then, has been disjoined from every A; but if so, it is of none of it. This then is their proof. . . . It is better, then, to say that what we have stated proves that B too must have been disjoined from A, if A has been disjoined from B, which those associated with Theophrastus take as being self-evident without proof.

¹ The singular form has better manuscript support. If it is correct, either Theophrastus or Eudemus may be the subject.

90B Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.2 25a16 (CAG vol.13.2 p.48.11-18 Wallies)

In this way, then, Aristotle proves that the universal negative converts. But the colleagues of Aristotle, those associated with Theophrastus and Eudemus, demonstrate the same point more clearly

τοῦτο κατασκευάζουσι. φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ τὸ Α κατὰ μηδενός ἐστι τοῦ Β, πάντων τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ κεχώρισται· τὸ δὲ κεχωρισμένον κεχωρισμένου κεχώρισται· ὥστε καὶ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α ὑπάρξει. τὸ γὰρ κεχωρισμένον τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστι· τινὸς γὰρ ἐστι κεχωρισμένον· τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πρὸς ἀντιστρέφοντα λέγεται· εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ τὸ Β οὐδενὶ τῷ Α ὑπάρχει.

2-9 Eudemus, fr. 10b Wehrli

3 post καὶ (pr.) add. τὸν Q

91A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.4 26b30 (CAG t.2.1 p.69.26-70.21 Wallies)

αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοὺς ἐκκειμένους συλλογισμοὺς τέσσαρας ἔδειξε προηγουμένως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι γινομένους. Θεόφραστος δὲ προστίθησιν ἄλλους πέντε τοῖς τέσσαρσι τούτοις οὐκέτι τελείους οὐδ' ἀναποδείκτους ὄντας, ὧν μνημονεύσει καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῶν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ προελθάν, τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς, τῶν μὲν τριῶν τῶν κατὰ ἀντιστροφὴν τῶν συμπερασμάτων γινομένων, τοῦ τε πρώτου ἀναποδείκτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ τρίτου, ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς ζητεῖ, εἰ ἐνδέχεται πλείονα συμπεράσματα γενέσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς κειμένοις, τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων δύο ἐν τούτοις, ἐν οἷς λέγει, ὅτι τῶν ἀσυλλογίστων συζυγιῶν αἱ μὲν ὁμοιοσχήμονες τέλεόν εἰσιν ἀσυλλόγιστοι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀσυλλογίστοις ταῖς ἐχούσαις τὸ ἀποφατικὸν καθόλου καὶ οὐσαις ἀνομοιοσχήμοσι συνάγεται τι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ὅρου πρὸς τὸν μείζονα. αὗται δὲ εἰσιν ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι δύο συμπλοκαί, ἢ τε ἐκ καθόλου καταφατικῆς τῆς μείζονος καὶ καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς τῆς ἐλάττονος καὶ ἢ ἐξ ἐπὶ μέρους καταφατικῆς τῆς μείζονος καὶ καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς τῆς ἐλάττονος. αἱ γὰρ παρὰ ταύτας συζυγίαι ἢ συλλογιστικαὶ εἰσιν ἢ ὁμοιοσχήμονες ἢ οὐκ ἔχουσι τὴν ἐλάττονα καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν· ὧν τὸν μὲν ὄγδοον τὸν δὲ ἕνατον Θεόφραστος λέγει. συνάγεται δὲ ἀντιστρεφομένων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προτάσεων ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφατικὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ὅρου πρὸς τὸν μείζονα τὸ συμπέρασμα. ὃ εἰ μὲν ἀντέστρεφεν, ἦν ἂν ἀναγκαίως καὶ προηγουμένως ἑκατέρα τῶν συζυγιῶν συλλογιστικὴ, δι' ἀντιστροφῆς τοῦ συμπεράσματος δεικνύσα τὸ προκειμένον. ἐπεὶ δὲ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει, πρὸς μὲν τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου δείξιν ἀσυλλόγιστοι αἱ συζυγίαι, ἄλλο μὲντοι τι δύναται δι' αὐτῶν

and more simply. For they say that, if A is of no B, it is separated from all its parts; but what is separated is separated from that from which it is separated; so that B too will belong to no A. For "separated" is one of the relatives, for it is separated *from something*, and relatives are used relatively to others with which they convert;¹ it is reasonable then that B belongs to no A.

¹ The Greek cannot be reproduced exactly, for it ignores the distinction between word and object.

91A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.4 26b30 (CAG vol.2.1 p.69.26-70.21 Wallies)

He himself (Aristotle) showed that these four syllogisms set out here¹ took the first places in the first figure. But Theophrastus adds five others to these four, which are neither perfect nor undemonstrated; these Aristotle will mention too, some later on in this book, and some in its successor, the second, at the beginning. Those three which are formed by the conversion of the conclusions of the first undemonstrated, and the second, and the third², he mentions in the second book at the beginning, where he enquires if it is possible for several conclusions to follow from the same assumptions, and the remaining two at the place where he says that, of the pairs which do not lead to a syllogism, those where the premises are of the same form lead to absolutely no conclusion, but in those non-syllogistic pairs which have the negative universal³ and are not of the same form, a conclusion can be drawn, going from the minor term towards the major. These are two combinations in the first figure, that with universal affirmative major and universal negative minor,⁴ and that with particular affirmative major and universal negative minor.⁵ The remaining pairs either lead to syllogisms, or have premises of the same form, or do not have a universal negative minor. Theophrastus calls one of these the eighth, and the other the ninth. After converting both premises a particular negative conclusion is drawn, going from the minor term to the major. If this were convertible, each of the pairs would necessarily and primarily lead to a syllogism proving what was propounded by conversion of the conclusion. But since it is not convertible, the pairs do not lead to the proof of what was propounded, but something

συλλογιστοκῶς συνάγεσθαι. ἐπισημανούμεθα δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴν κατ' ἐκείνους γενώμεθα τοὺς τόπους.

2-26 scholion in *Arist. Anal. pr. 2.1 53a4* (codd. *Paris Gr. 1873 et 1917, Oxon. Bodlei. 155 et Coll. Nov. 230 = p.188a4-12 Brandis*), *Theophrasto nominato 6-9 Aristoteles, anal. pr. 2.1 53a3-14 9-14 ibid., 1.7 29a19-26*

11 τέλειόν Wallies (*Add. et Corr. p.426*): τέλειοί codd. et ed. Wallies (CAG t.2.1) 23 συλλογιστική αβ: συμπλοκή M

91B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.7 29a19 (CAG t.2.1 p.110.12-21 Wallies)

οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ δύο συλλογισμοὶ τελευταῖοι τῶν πέντε, οὓς Θεόφραστος προστιθεὶς τοῖς ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι κειμένοις τέσσαρσιν ἑννέα λέγει γίνεσθαι συλλογισμοὺς ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι, ὄντες τελευταῖοι, διότι οὐδ' ὅλως οὗτοι τὸ προκείμενον δεικνύουσιν, ὡς οἱ πρὸ τούτων τρεῖς ἀντιστρεφόμενου τοῦ συμπεράσματος. τῶν δὲ καταλειπομένων τριῶν τῶν κατ' ἀντιστροφήν τῶν συμπερασμάτων γινομένων, τοῦ τε πρώτου καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τοῦ τρίτου τῶν ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι, μνημονεύει καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀρχόμενος τοῦ δευτέρου τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν, ὡς φθάσαντές τε εἰρήκαμεν κάκει πάλιν ἐπισημανούμεθα, οἱ πρὸ τούτων τῶν δύο ἔχουσι τὴν τάξιν παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ.

8-9 *Aristoteles, Anal. pr. 2.1 53a10-14*

91C Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Fī n'ikās al-muqaddimāt (p.60.8-9 Badawī)

القياسات الخمسة التي تزداد على الأربعة الأولى التي لا تحتاج إلى برهان الشئ - قد أكثر ثاوفرسطس من ذكرها - تحتاج إلى انعكاس المقدمات والتناج

2 ذكرها ... قد ed. Badawī: ان ذكرها coni. Badawī تحتاج scripsit Gutas: يحتاج ed. Badawī

else can through them be proved syllogistically. We will have more to say about them when we reach that place.

¹ Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio.

² Baralipon, Celantis and Dabitis.

³ This must be the minor premise.

⁴ Fapesmo.

⁵ Frisesomorum.

91B Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.7 29a19* (CAG vol.2.1 p.110.12-21 Wallies)

These¹ are the two last syllogisms of the five which Theophrastus added to the four already lying in the first figure, saying that the syllogisms in the first figure came to nine. These came last, because they do not completely prove what was propounded, as do the three before them, by conversion of the conclusion. The remaining three of those which are formed by conversion of the conclusion, the first and second and third of those in the first figure, are mentioned by Aristotle at the beginning of the second book of the *Prior Analytics*, as we said before and will indicate at that point again. They are placed by Theophrastus before these two in his arrangement.

¹ Fapesmo and Frisesomorum.

91C Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On the Conversion of Premises* (p.60.8-9 Badawī)

The five syllogisms that are added to the first four which need no demonstration¹ — Theophrastus discussed them at length — require the conversion of the premises and conclusions.

¹ The phrase translated as "which need no demonstration" (*allatī lā tahtāḡu ilā burhāni š-say'i*) may stand for the Greek ἀναπόδεικτος in the Alexander passage 91A.

- 91D Boetius, *De syllogismo categorico* 2 (PL t.64 col.813B-C et 814C et 815A-816C Migne)

habet enim prima figura sub se, Aristotele auctore, modos
 C quatuor; sed Theophrastus vel Eudemus super hos quatuor quinque
 alios modos addunt, Aristotele dante principium in secundo pri-
 orum Analyticorum volumine, quod melius postmodum expli-
 cabitur. secunda vero figura habet sub se quatuor modos; tertia
 5 vero, auctore Aristotele, sex; addunt etiam alii unum, sicut ipse
 814C Porphyrius, superiores scilicet sequens. . . . hos ergo quatuor in
 prima figura modos in Analyticis suis Aristoteles posuit. caeteros
 vero quinque modos Theophrastus et Eudemus addiderunt, quibus
 Porphyrius, gravissimae vir auctoritatis, visus est consensisse. . . .
 10 hoc autem quod nuper diximus, in secundo Priorum analyticorum
 815A libro ab Aristotele monstratur, quod scilicet Theophrastus et
 B Eudemus principium capientes ad alios in prima figura syllogismos
 adiiciendos animum adiecerunt, qui sunt huiusmodi qui κατὰ ἀνάκλα-
 σιν vocantur, id est per refractionem quamdam conversionemque
 15 propositionis. et est quintus modus ex duabus universalibus affir-
 mationibus, particularem colligens affirmativam hoc modo: si A
 fuerit in omni B, et B fuerit in omni C, posset equidem concludi
 quod A terminus esset in omni C termino. sed quoniam ista
 universalis propositio, ut dictum est, particulariter convertitur,
 20 praetermisso eo quod A terminus de omni C termino praedicatur,
 conclusio esse dicitur quod C terminus de quodam A termino
 praedicatur, quod hoc exemplo monstrandum est. si enim sint
 C propositiones sic, omne iustum bonum est, omnis virtus iusta est,
 posset concludi equidem quoniam omnis virtus bonum est. Sed
 25 quoniam ita propositio sibi convertitur, ut sit, quoddam bonum
 virtus est particulariter, particularis syllogismus conclusioque col-
 ligitur ex duabus universalibus affirmativis. eius vero forma talis
 est, A terminus in omni B, B terminus in omni C, igitur C terminus
 30 in quodam A, ut est:

omne iustum bonum est
 omnis virtus iusta est
 quoddam bonum virtus est.

per conversionem refractionemque dicitur, quoniam quod univer-
 saliter colligebatur, conversum particulariter collectum est. sextus
 35 modus est primae figurae qui fit ex universali negativa et universali
 D affirmativa universalem conclusionem per conversionem colligens.

- 91D Boetius, *On the Categorical Syllogism* 2 (PL vol.64 col.813B-C and 814C and 815A-816C Migne)

For on the authority of Aristotle the first figure has four moods
 C under it; but Theophrastus or Eudemus add five others over and
 above these four, taking their starting-point from Aristotle in the
 second book of his *Prior Analytics*, as will be explained better later.
 The second figure has four moods under it, and the third, on the
 authority of Aristotle, six; others add yet one more, like Porphyry
 814C himself, following earlier writers. . . . These four moods, then, Aris-
 totle put in the first figure in his *Analytics*, and Theophrastus and
 Eudemus added five other moods, with which Porphyry, a man
 815A of the weightiest authority, seems to have agreed. . . . That which
 we have said just now, is proved by Aristotle in the second book
 B of his *Prior Analytics*, and Theophrastus and Eudemus took it as
 a starting-point and applied their minds to adding other syllogisms
 in the first figure, which are of the kind that is called "by reflexion",
 that is by a kind of reflexion or conversion of the proposition. The
 fifth mood is from two universal affirmations, implying a particular
 affirmative in this way: if A were in all B, and B were in all C,
 it could certainly be concluded that the term A was in all the term
 C. But since that universal proposition, as has been said, partially
 converts, passing over the fact that the term A is predicated of all
 the term C, the conclusion is said to be that the term C is predicated
 of some of the term A, which must be shown by the following
 C example. If the propositions are like this: everything just is good,
 every virtue is just, it can be concluded that every virtue is good.
 But since the proposition converts like this, to "some good thing
 is a virtue" as a particular proposition, a particular syllogism and
 conclusion is drawn from two universal affirmatives. Its form is
 this: the term A in all B, the term B in all C, therefore the term
 C in some A, like:

Everything just is good
 Every virtue is just
 Something good is a virtue.

It is called "by conversion and reflexion", because what was
 deduced as a universal, when converted is deduced as a particular.
 The sixth mood in the first figure is formed of a universal negative
 D and a universal affirmative, implying a universal conclusion by con-

nam si A terminus in nullo B fuerit, B vero terminus in omni C termino fuerit, posset equidem colligi quoniam A terminus in nullo C termino est; sed quoniam universalis negativa convertitur, dicitur quoniam C terminus in nullo A termino est, ut sit hoc modo:

nullum bonum malum est
omne iustum bonum est.

posset colligi:

nullum iustum malum est.

sed ex his per conversionem colligimus:

nullum malum iustum est.

816A septimus modus primae figurae est, qui ex universali affirmativa et particulari affirmativa per conversionem particularem colligit affirmativam. si enim fuerit A terminus in omni B, et B terminus de quodam C termino praedicatur, potest A terminus de quodam C termino praedicari. sed quoniam particularis affirmatio sibi ipsi convertitur, per conversionem fit conclusio, et dicitur C terminus de quodam A termino praedicari, ut sit sic:

omne bonum virtus est
quoddam iustum bonum est.

posset equidem concludi, quoniam quoddam iustum virtus est, sed quia particularis affirmatio convertitur, dicimus quoniam quaedam virtus iusta est. octavus modus primae figurae est, quoties ex universali affirmatione et universali negatione particulariter colligitur. si enim A terminus de omni B termino praedicatus fuerit, B vero terminus de nullo C termino praedicatur, non posset colligi quoniam A terminus de nullo C termino praedicatur. cur autem non possit, in Resolutoriis dictum est. sed quoniam universalis negativa sibi ipsa convertitur, potest dici et converti, quoniam C terminus de nullo B termino praedicatur, B vero terminus de quodam A termino dicitur, quoniam universalis affirmativa particulariter sibi ipsa convertitur; quare C terminus de quodam A termino non praedicabitur, ut sit sic: omne bonum iustum est, nullum malum bonum est, non posset colligi, quoniam nullum malum iustum est, sed convertitur sic:

nullum bonum malum est
quoddam iustum bonum est
quoddam igitur iustum malum non est.

version. For if the term A were in no B, but the term B were in all the term C, it could be deduced that the term A is in no term C; but since the universal negative converts, we say that the term C is in no term A, like this:

Nothing good is bad
Everything just is good.

We can deduce:

Nothing just is bad.

But from these by conversion we deduce:

Nothing bad is just.

816A The seventh mood in the first figure is that which from a universal affirmative and a particular affirmative derives by conversion a particular affirmative. For if the term A were in every B, and the term B were predicated of some term C, the term A can be predicated of some term C. But since the particular affirmation converts, the conclusion is reached by conversion, and the term C is said to be predicated of some term A, like this:

Every good thing is a virtue
Something just is good.

B It can be concluded that something just is a virtue, but because the particular affirmation converts, we can say that some virtue is just. The eighth mood in the first figure is when from a universal affirmation and a universal negation a particular conclusion is drawn. For if the term A were predicated of every term B, and the term B were predicated of no term C, it could not be deduced that the term A was predicated of no term C. Why it could not has been said in the *Analytics*.¹ But since the universal negative converts, it can be said by conversion that the term C is predicated of no term B, and the term B is said of some term A, since the universal affirmative partially converts. So the term C will not be predicated of some term A, so let it be like this: every good thing is just, nothing bad is good: it could not be deduced that nothing bad is just, but it is converted like this:

Nothing good is bad
Something just is good
Something just, therefore, is not bad.

nonus modus primae figurae est, qui ex particulari affirmativa et universali negativa particularem colligit negativam per conversionem. si enim A terminus de quodam B termino, B vero terminus de nullo C termino praedicetur, non potest quidem dici quoniam A terminus de quodam C termino non praedicabitur. cur autem 80 non possit, hoc quoque in Resolutoriis diximus; sed quoniam universalis negatio converti potest, dicitur quoniam C terminus de nullo B termino praedicatur, et B terminus de quodam A praedicatur; C igitur terminus de quodam A non praedicabitur, ut sit sic:

quoddam bonum iustum est 85
 nullum malum bonum est
 quoddam igitur iustum malum non est.

2-5 *Eudemus*, fr. 17a Wehrli 7-10 *Eud.*, fr. 17b Wehrli 8-9 *Anonymus*,
Ars burana 3 (p.199.20-2 et 201.19-20 *De Rijk*) 8-10 *Abaelardus*, *Dialectica*
 2.3 (p.238.2-4 *De Rijk*) 11-85 *Eud.*, fr. 17c Wehrli 12-16 *Abael.*,
loc. cit. (p.238.4-7) 31-3 *ibid.* (p.238.10-12) 42-8 *ibid.* (p.238.10-
 12) 83-5 *ibid.* (p.238.16-18)

33 virtus *Spengel*: iustus *Basil. Rota et ed. Migne* (cf. *Abael.* p.238.12) 61
 particulariter] particularis negativa *Spengel* 68 termino *om. EF et Spengel*

91E Boethius, De syllogismo categorico 2 (PL t.64 col.829D Migne)

haec de categoricorum syllogismorum introductione, Aristotelem plurimum sequens, et aliqua de Theophrasto et Porphyrio mutuatus . . . expressi.

92 Apuleius, De interpretatione 13 (BT p.193.7-13 Thomas)

verum Aristoteles in prima formula quattuor solos indemonstrabiles prodidit, Theophrastus et ceteri quinque enumerant. nam propositionem iungens indefinitam colligensque illationem indefinitam * * * hoc supervacaneum est tradere, cum indefinita pro particulari accipiatur et idem futuri sint modi, qui sunt ex 5 particularibus.

4 *lac. ind. Goldbacher* 5 accipiatur *Floridus*: accipitur ω (*om. LB*)

The ninth mood of the first figure is that which from a particular affirmative and a universal negative derives a particular negative conclusion by conversion. For if the term A were predicated of some term B, and the term B of no term C, it cannot be said that the term A is not predicated of some term C. Why it cannot we have also said in the *Analytics*.² But since the universal negation can be converted, it can be said that the term C is predicated of no term B, and the term B is predicated of some A: the term C, therefore, will not be predicated of some A, like this:

Something good is just
 Nothing bad is good
 Something just, therefore, is not bad.

¹ and ² These must be references either to Boethius' own version of Aristotle's *Analytics* (26a3 and 26a37), or to his lost commentary on it, unless he is slavishly following a Greek model.

91E Boethius, *On the Categorical Syllogism* 2 (PL vol.64 col.829D Migne)

As regards the introduction to categorical syllogisms, I have expressed myself in this way, for the most part following Aristotle, and borrowing some things from Theophrastus and Porphyry.

92 Apuleius, *De interpretatione* 13 (BT p.193.7-13 Thomas)

But in the first figure Aristotle admitted only four indemonstrables, Theophrastus and the rest count five. For joining an indefinite premise and deducing an indefinite conclusion * * * .¹ This it is unnecessary to report, since the indefinite is taken as particular, and there will be the same moods as there are from particular (propositions).

¹ There seems to be a lacuna of some length here.

- 93 Aratus, *Philosophia*, cod. Paris. Gr. suppl. 645 f.197^r (Jb. class. Phil. suppl. 23 [1897] p.707.5-9 Kalbfleisch)

Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ Εὐδήμος καὶ τινες ἐτέρας συζυγίας παρὰ τὰς ἐκτεθείσας τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει προστεθήκασιν τῷ πρώτῳ σχήματι, περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα ἐροῦμεν, ὡς καὶ τέταρτον ἀποτελεῖν σχῆμα τῶν νεωτέρων φήθησάν τινες, ὡς πρὸς πατέρα τὴν δόξαν τὸν Γαληνὸν ἀναφέροντες.

1-5 Eudemus, fr. 18 Wehrli

- 94 Themistius, *Fī r-radd 'alā Maqsimūs fī tahlil aš-šakl at-tānī wa-t-tālīl ilā l-awwal* (p.314.5-6, 324.16-325.22 Badawī)

314 القول بأن الشكلين يتولدان من الشكل الأول ليس من قول ارسطوطاليس ولا ثاوفرسطس ولا اودنيمس لكنه قول الحدث من المشائين ...

324 فقد بقي لنا أن نتبين السبب الذي له لم ير ارسطو أنه ينبغي أن يكتفى بالشكل الأول حتى أثبت معه الثاني والثالث وإن كانا لا يصححان بوجه من الوجوه إلا به

وقد يقول ثاوفرسطس واودنيمس أيضاً بعد تمييز ارسطو لذلك الأشياء التي أحسن مقسيمس في استعمالها وهي أن الأشياء التي تحمل في المقدمات منها ما يحمل حملاً ملائماً ومنها ما يحمل على غير ملاءمة والحمل الملائم كقولنا «سقراط عدل» أو «إنسان عدل» وما كان حملاً على غير ملاءمة فمعه ما هو على غير المجرى الطبيعي ومنه ما هو بالعرض فالحمل الذي بالعرض كقولنا «الأبيض يمشى» لأننا نقول إن الشيء الذي عرض له أن يكون أبيض عرض له أيضاً أن يمشى والحمل الخارج عن المجرى الطبيعي كقولنا «الأبيض قنص»

325 فقد يعرض في بعض المسائل والقياسات أن تكون المقدمات إذا وضعت في الشكل الثاني والشكل الثالث لم يكن الحمل فيها حملاً عرضياً ولا خارجاً عن المجرى الطبيعي فإذا نقلت إلى الشكل الأول صارت بعضها عرضياً وبعضها خارجاً عن المجرى الطبيعي وذلك أننا إذا قلنا «إن الحركة على الاستدارة توجد لكل كوكب ولا توجد لشيء من النار» كان هذا الحمل حملاً تباعياً وتأليفاً المقدمتين في الشكل الثاني فإن قلنا «إن كل كوكب يتحرك على استدارة وليس شيء مما يتحرك على استدارة ماء» كان هذا التأليف تأليف الشكل الأول والمقدمة السالبة خارجة عن المجرى الطبيعي وكذلك يجري الأمر في الشكل الثالث لأننا

- 93 Aratus, *Philosophy*,¹ cod. Paris. Gr. suppl. 645 f.197^r (Jb. class. Phil. suppl. 23 [1897] p.707.5-9 Kalbfleisch)

Theophrastus and Eudemus added some combinations, besides those set out by Aristotle, to the first figure, about which we will say something later. Some of the younger men thought that they made up a fourth figure, ascribing the doctrine to Galen as its father.

¹ The author and title seem to be reported in a Moscow manuscript; see Kalbfleisch p.706. In the edition of Menas (1844), the author is anonymous.

- 94 Themistius, *Against Maximus, On the Reduction of the Second and Third Figure to the First* (p.314.5-6, 324.16-325.22 Badawī)

314 The view that the two figures are generated from the first is held neither by Aristotle nor Theophrastus nor Eudemus, but by the modern Peripatetics. . . .

324 There remains for us to try to ascertain the reason why Aristotle did not think that one ought to be content with the first figure but proceeded to establish, next to it, the second and the third, despite the fact that there is no way of verifying them except through it.

325 After the distinctions which Aristotle made in this matter, Theophrastus and Eudemus also sometimes say the things which were made excellent use of by Maximus, namely, that of the things which are predicated in premises, (a) some are predicated appropriately and (b) others inappropriately. (a) Appropriate predication is like our statement, "Socrates is just," or "a just person." (b) Inappropriate predication is either (1) unnatural or (2) accidental. (2) Accidental predication is like our statement, "The white thing walks," because we are saying that the thing which happened to be white also happened to walk. (1) Unnatural predication is like our statement, "The white thing is swan."

It may happen in some problems and syllogisms that when the premises are put in the second and third figures, the predication in them would be neither accidental nor unnatural, but when they are transformed into the first figure some of them become accidental and others unnatural. That is, when we say that "circular motion belongs to every star but not at all to fire," this predication is natural and the combination of the two premises is in the second figure. But if we say that "every star moves in a circle and nothing that moves in a circle is water," this combination is of the first figure

إذا قلنا «كل قنص أبيض وكل قنص موسيقار» كان حملنا حملاً طبيعياً
 فإذا عكسنا إحدى المقدمتين صار الحمل حملاً خارجياً عن المجرى الطبيعي
 وإنما ينكر تأليف الخارج عن المجرى الطبيعي ولا يقع لنا به غلط ألفنا
 المقدمات في أول وهلة في الشكل الثاني والثالث ليسهل تسليماً وإنما يغلط من لا
 حنكة له بأمر المقدمات فإن الجمهور من الناس يظنون بما كان خارجاً عن
 الطبع أنه لا محالة كاذب فإذا سلمت وهي على ترتيبها الطبيعي سهل تأليفها
 وانعكاسها هذا إن سلم الإنسان المقدمات وناقض في تأليفها على أنه غير منتج
 فظاهر إن كان ما يجرى به أمر هذا القياس شيئاً أحدهما تسليم المقدمات
 والثاني حال التأليف أن تسليم المقدمات يوجد لهذين الشكلين من ذاتهما خاصة
 وحال تأليفها من ردها إلى الشكل الأول فإذا كانا يفضلان على الشكل الأول
 بأحد هذين الشكلين وينقصان عنه بالآخر فليس هما من الفضل ولا مما حدث
 باطلاً أصلاً لكن من طريق ما يحملان الحمل أبين في بعض الأوقات احتياج
 إليهما حاجة تخصهما ومن طريق صورة القياس فيهما حصة صاراً دون الأول
 ولأن كل واحد من الأشياء المركبة إنما يكون وجوده بحسب صورته كان حكمنا
 على أن هذا من الأشكال أول وهذا ثان وهذا ثالث حكماً عادلاً

1-6 cf. Ammonii comm. In Arist. Anal. Pr. 1.1 24b18 (CAG t.4.6 p.31.11-15 et 22-3)

ولا : ed. Badawī corr. Gutas; cf. v.22 infra 21
 ماء : ed. Badawī 27
 ألفنا : ed. Badawī scripsit Gutas : ألفنا
 يوجد : ed. Badawī 28
 يفضلان : ed. Badawī corr. Gutas : يفضلان
 الفصل : ed. Badawī scripsit Gutas : الفصل 29

95A Apuleius, *De interpretatione* 11 (BT p.189.19-27 Thomas)

in tertia formula primus modus est qui conducit ex dedicativis
 universalibus dedicativum particulare tam directim quam reflexim,
 ut:

and the negative premise is unnatural. Similar is the case with the third figure, because when we say, "Every swan is white, and every swan is a musician," our predication is natural; but when we convert one of the two premises, then the predication will become unnatural.

But lest the combination of the unnatural (predication) be rejected and thereby errors be committed, we combine premises initially in the second and third figures in order to facilitate their admission and save the person inexperienced with premises from falling into error — for the majority of the people believe that whatever is unnatural is inevitably false. So when (premises) are admitted while they are (expressed) in their natural order, this combination and conversion of theirs becomes easy if one admits the premises but disputes their combination on the grounds that it yields no conclusion.

If then the question of this syllogism entails two things, one of which is admitting the premises and the other is the state of the combination, it is clear that one admits the premises of these two figures (the second and the third) specifically because of themselves, while the state of their combination (is resolved) through their reduction to the first. So when they are superior to the first figure in one of these two things and inferior in the other, they are by no means either superfluous or worthless, but by way of their predication they are at certain times clearer and there is a special need for them, while by way of what they share of the syllogistic form they stand below the first figure. And because the existence of every single one of the compound things is commensurate only with its form, our judgment that this figure is first, that one second, and the other third is fair.

95A Apuleius, *De interpretatione* 11 (BT p.189.19-27 Thomas)

In the third figure, the first mood is that which leads from affirmative universals to an affirmative particular, both directly and by conversion, like:

omne iustum honestum
 omne iustum bonum
 quoddam igitur honestum bonum

5

vel sic:

quoddam igitur bonum honestum.

quippe non interest ex utra[que] propositione facias particulam
 subiectivam, quoniam non interest utram prius enunties. ideo non
 recte arbitratus est Theophrastus propter hoc non unum modum
 hunc, sed duos esse.

10

1-8 Cassiodorus, *Institutiones* 2.3.12 (p.117.20-118.1 Mynors)

9 ex utra Goldbacher: ex utraque GCSLB (quam ante ex superscr. L): si ex
 utraque cett.

95B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.6 28a10
 (CAG t.2.1 p.95.25-32 Wallies)

ἕξ δὲ ὄντων συλλογισμῶν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι πρῶτος μὲν ἂν
 αὐτῶν εἴη τῇ τάξει ὁ ἐκ δύο καθόλου καταφατικῶν ἐπὶ μέρους κατα-
 φατικὸν συνάγων κατὰ ἀντιστροφὴν τῆς ἐλάττονος προτάσεως, δύναται
 δὲ καὶ τῆς μείζονος ἀντιστραφείσης γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεήσει καὶ τὸ
 συμπέρασμα ἀντιστρέφειν· διὸ καὶ τοῦτόν τινες τὸν συλλογισμὸν
 προστιθέντες ὡς ἄλλον τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐπτά φασιν τοὺς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ
 σχήματι συλλογισμούς. πρώτη δὲ αὕτη ἡ συμπλοκὴ διὰ τὸ καὶ ἐκ
 καθόλου ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι καὶ καταφατικῶν.

5

96A Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.6 28b5 et 31 (CAG t.13.2
 p.105.28-30 et 110.4-7 Wallies)

τοῦτον δὲ τὸν συλλογισμὸν οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον τέταρτον ἔταξαν,
 ὅτι ἐδεήθη δύο ἀντιστροφῶν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τρίτον. . . .

110 ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον πέμπτον
 τάττουσι προτάττοντες αὐτὸν τοῦ προειρημένου, διότι οὗτος μὲν δι'
 ἀντιστροφῆς κατασκευάζεται, ἐκείνος δὲ διὰ μόνης τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον
 ἀπαγωγῆς.

5

Everything just is honourable
 Everything just is good
 Something honourable, therefore, is good;

or like this:

Something good, therefore, is honourable.

Indeed it does not matter from which premise you make the subject
 term, since it does not matter which you utter first. Therefore Theo-
 phrastus was not correct in thinking that, for this reason, this is
 not one mood but two.

95B Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.6 28a10
 (CAG vol.2.1 p.95.25-32 Wallies)

There are six syllogisms in this (the third) figure, and the first
 of them in order would be that from two universal affirmatives
 leading to a particular affirmative conclusion, by conversion of the
 minor premise.¹ It can also be done by conversion of the major
 premise, but the conclusion will have to be converted too. Hence
 some² add on this syllogism too as a different one from the one
 before it, and say that the syllogisms in this figure are seven. But
 this combination comes first because it is made up of premises
 which are both universal and affirmative.

¹ Darapti.

² These include Theophrastus.

96A Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.6 28b5 and 31 (CAG
 vol.13.2 p.105.28-30 and 110.4-7 Wallies)

This syllogism (Disamis) those connected with Theophrastus
 ranked fourth, because it needed two conversions, but Aristotle
 (placed it) third. . . .

110 You must know that those connected with Theophrastus rank
 this mood (Ferison) fifth, placing it before the one mentioned before
 (Bocardo), because this one is proved by conversion, but that only
 by *reductio ad impossibile*.

- 96B** Scholion in Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.6 28a17 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2061 = p.155b8-18 Brandis)

ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος ὁ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους μαθητὴς καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ ἀμφοτέρων ἐξηγητὴς ἑτέραν τάξιν παραδεδώκασιν ἀφεωρακότες πρὸς τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀποδείξεως, τὴν γὰρ παρ' ἡμῖν τρίτην, τὴν ἔχουσαν τὴν ἐλάττονα "παντί" τὴν δὲ μείζονα "τινί", τετάρτην τάττει ὡς δεομένην δύο ἀντιστροφῶν, ὡς δεχθήσεται, τὴν δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν τετάρτην τρίτην τάττει ὡς μιᾶς καὶ μόνης δεομένην ἀντιστροφῆς, καὶ πάλιν τὴν πέμπτην τὴν "παντί" καὶ "οὐ παντί" ἕκτην τάττει ὡς χηρεύουσαν τῆς κρείττονος πασῶν ἀποδείξεως τῆς ἐπ' εὐθείαν, μόνον δὲ διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς δεικνυμένης. τὴν δ' ἕκτην τὴν "τινί" καὶ "οὐδενί" πέμπτην τάττει ὡς κατὰ ἄμφω δεικνυμένην, καὶ ἐπ' εὐθείας καὶ δι' ἀδυνατοῦ.

1-10 *Alexander Aphrod., In Arist. Anal. pr. 28b5 (CAG t.2.1 p.102.14-15), in 28b12 (p.102.32-103.2), in 28b15 (p.104.9-10) et in 28b31 (p.106.16-19)*

- 97** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.32 46b40 (CAG t.2.1 p.340.13-21 Wallies)

οὐ ταῦτόν δέ ἐστιν ἀνάγειν τε λόγους εἰς τὰ σχήματα, ὡς ἔχει τὰ Θεοφράστου δύο τὰ ἐπιγραφόμενα Ἀνηγμένων λόγων εἰς τὰ σχήματα, καὶ μέθοδον ὑπογράψαι, δι' ἧς πάντα τὰ προβληθέντα ἀναλύειν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀνάγειν δυνασόμεθα. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τὴν μέθοδον τοῦ ἀναλύειν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων πάντας οἷός τε ἔσται καὶ τοὺς μήπω γνωρίμους ἀνάγειν ὁ δὲ τινὰς ἔχων ἀνηγμένους τούτους ἂν ἀνάγοι μόνους ὡς ἂν ἔχων τήρησιν αὐτῶν ἀναίτιον ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐπιστήμην. ὑπογράφει δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν ταύτην μέθοδον καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφόμενῳ Περί ἀναλύσεως συλλογισμῶν.

4 ἀναλύειν B: ἀνάγειν a

Logica modalis

- 98A** Ibn Sīnā, an-Nağāt, al-qism al-awwal fī l-mantiq, faṣl fī l-muṭ-laqāt (p.34.3-35.4, 36.6-12, 36.15-37.3 ed. Cahirae a. 1913)

34 المطلقه فيها رأيان رأى ثاوفرستس ثم تامسطيوس وغيره وهو أنها هي

- 96B** Scholium on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* 1.6 28a17 (cod. Paris. Gr. 2061 = p.155b8-18 Brandis)

Theophrastus, the pupil of Aristotle, and Alexander, the commentator on both, have handed down another order, having regard to the method of proof used. Our third (Disamis) which has the minor "to all" and the major "to some", he ranks fourth as needing two conversions, as will be shown, but our fourth (Datisi) he ranks third as needing only one conversion. Again the fifth (Bocardo), with "to all" and "not to all", he ranks sixth because it lacks the most powerful means of proof, the direct, but is only proved by *reductio ad impossibile*. But the sixth (Ferison), with "to some" and "to none", he ranks fifth, as being proved by both methods, both directly and *per impossibile*.

- 97** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.32 46b40 (CAG vol.2.1 p.340.13-21 Wallies)

Reducing arguments to figures, as in the two books of Theophrastus called *Arguments Reduced to Figures*, is not the same as outlining a method by which we will be able ourselves to analyse what has been propounded and reduce it. For the man who has the method and the understanding of analysis will be able to reduce all arguments, including those he is not yet familiar with. But the man who has some particular ones reduced could reduce only these, because he has learnt them off without explanation, and does not understand them. Theophrastus too outlines this same method in the work entitled *On the Analysis of Syllogisms*.

Modal Logic

- 98A** Avicenna, *The Salvation*, Part One on Logic, Section on Absolute Premises (p.34.3-35.4, 36.6-12, 36.15-37.3 ed. Cairo 1913)

There are two opinions concerning absolute premises. (The first is) the opinion of Theophrastus and then of Themistius and others,

التي لم تُذكر فيها جهة ضرورة الحكم أو إمكان للحكم بل أُطلق إطلاقاً فيجوز أن يكون الحكم موجوداً بالضرورة ويجوز أن يكون الحكم موجوداً لا بالضرورة أي لا دائماً

- 5 وليس يبعد أن يكون هذا رأى الفيلسوف في المطلقة على أن الفيلسوف
يجوز أن تكون كَلَيْتَانِ موجبة وسالبة مطلقتين صادقتين كقولك «كل فرس نائم»
35 «ولا شيء مما هو فرس بنائم» وأن يُنقل الحكم الكلي الموجب المطلق إلى الحكم
الكلي السالب المطلق وأصحاب هذا الرأي يرون أن ذلك جائز وليس بواجب لأن
الفيلسوف قد يورد أيضاً في المطلقات أمثلة لا يجوز فيها ذلك بل هي ضرورية
دائماً ... 10
- 36 فقوانا «كل ب أ» بالإطلاق معناه أن كل واحد مما يوصف عند العقل أو
الوجود بانه ب سواء كان يوصف بأنه ب دائماً أو يوصف بأنه ب وقتاً ما بعد
أن لا يكون ب فذلك الشيء يوصف بأنه أ لا ندرى متى هو أعند ما يوصف بأنه
ب أو في وقت آخر ودائماً أو لا دائماً هذا على رأى ثاوفرسطس
15 وأما الرأى الثانى فلا يخالف الرأى الأول من جهة الموضوع ... لكنهم
يخالفون فى جانب المحمول لأن الأولين أخذوا الحكم بالمحمول أعم ما يمكن أن
يفهم منه من غير شرط دوام أو لا دوام البتة وهؤلاء خصصوه بشرط اللادوام
فيكون معنى قوانا «كل ب أ» عندهم أن كل ما يوصف بـ — كيف وُصف به
37 بالضرورة أو بغير الضرورة — فذلك الشيء موصوف بأنه أ لا بالضرورة بل
وقتاً ما 20

fontes: ed. Cahirae a. 1331/1913, ut supra (C1); et ed. Cahirae a. 1357/1938, p.23.4-12, 24.12-16, 24.19-25.4 (C2)

1-4 Averroes, *Epitome in libros logicae Aristotelis* (AOCAC t.1.2b f.45L)
Theophrasto et Themistio nominatis; (f.47M) *Theophrasto nominato* 6 cf.
Arist. Anal. pr. 1.11 31b8-10

C2 [ورأى الاسكندر وعدة من المحصلين] أما الاول فهو: C1 وهو 7
C1 (أ) عندهم: C2 هو أعند C1 لا 13 prior C2: om. C1

namely, that it (an absolute premise) is that in which neither the mode of the necessity nor that of the possibility of the statement has been mentioned, but rather that which is strictly absolute. The statement may thus exist necessarily and it may also exist not necessarily, that is, not always.

- It is not unlikely that this is Aristotle's own opinion concerning absolute premises, since he allows that two universal premises, an affirmative and a negative, may both be absolute and true — e.g.,
35 "Every horse sleeps" and "Nothing that is a horse sleeps" — and that an affirmative absolute universal statement may be transformed into a negative absolute universal. The followers of this opinion hold that such (a transformation) *may* be feasible but not that it *must* be feasible (if a premise is to be absolute), because Aristotle occasionally cites among absolute premises also examples in which it is not feasible, (the premises in these examples) being always necessary. . . .¹

- 36 When we say "Every B is A absolutely" it means that (in the case of) every single thing of which B is predicated either in the mind or in existence, regardless of whether B is predicated of it always or at a certain time after not being B, A is predicated of that thing without our knowing whether that is at the moment when B is predicated of it or at another time, and whether always or not always. This is according to the opinion of Theophrastus.

- The second opinion is not contrary to the first with regard to the subject. . . . (The followers of the two opinions) do disagree, however, with regard to the predicate, because the first party (that of Theophrastus) took the statement made by the predicate in as general a way as it can be understood, without any condition of duration or non-duration whatsoever, while the second party (that of Alexander) restricted the predicate specifically to the condition of non-duration. According to the latter party, then, when we say "Every B is A (absolutely)", it means that of everything of which
37 B is predicated, regardless of whether the predication is necessary or not necessary, A is predicated not necessarily but at a certain time.

¹ The omitted portion contains the second opinion, that of Alexander and others.

98B Ibn Rušd, al-Masā'il 4 (p.114.5-116.2 'Alawī)

الغرض في هذا القول أن نفحص عن المقدمة التي تسمى الوجودية والمطلقة ما هي وما مذهب أرسطو في ذلك فإن المفسرين اختلفوا في ذلك فنقول إن الذي تأدّى فيها إلينا عن المفسرين بحسب ما نجده في كتاب ثامسطيوس وبحسب ما حكاه أبو نصر إبان أحدهما مذهب ثاوفرسطس وأوذيموس وثامسطيوس والثاني مذهب الاسكندر ومن جاء بعده من المفسرين فيها خلا ثامسطيوس

115 فأما مذهب ثاوفرسطس فهو أن المقدمة المطلقة والوجودية هي التي حُذِفَ منها جهة الإمكان وجهة الاضطرار ولم يصرح فيها بواحدة منهما والمادة في نفسها إما اضطرارية وإما ممكنة فالمقدمة الوجودية عند هؤلاء هي مقدمة غير ذات جهة وكانت كالجنس للضرورية والممكنة إذ كانت معدة أن يزداد عليها إحدى هاتين الجهتين وذلك بحسب المادة فهذا هو مذهب قدماء المشائين في المطلقة وأما الاسكندر ومتأخرو المفسرين فيرون أن المقدمة الوجودية هي المقدمة الممكنة إذا وُجِدَت بالفعل — أعنى إذا وجد بالفعل محمولها لموضوعها أي في الزمان الحاضر

15 وكل واحد من هؤلاء يزعم أن مذهبه في ذلك هو مذهب أرسطو ولكل واحد من الطائفتين احتجاج من جهة الأمر نفسه واحتجاج من كلام أرسطو نفسه ومن أقوى ما تمسك به من احتجاج لمذهب ثاوفرسطس أما من قيل الأمر نفسه فإن المقدمة الوجودية على مذهب الاسكندر يعسر وجودها كليةً فإنما توجد بالاتفاق وفي الأقل من الزمان وأمثلة هذه المقدمات ليس تستعملها صناعة البلاغة فضلاً عن صناعة الجدل وصناعة البرهان وأما احتجاجهم من جهة 20 كلام أرسطو نفسه فإنه قد أوصى عند خلط الممكنة مع المطلقة — أعنى إذا كانت المطلقة هي الكبرى — ألا تستعمل في ذلك أمثلة هذه المطلقات — أعنى

98B Averroes, Questions 4 (p.114.5-116.12 'Alawī)

Our purpose in this essay is to enquire into the premise which is called existential and absolute: what it is and what Aristotle's doctrine about it is, for the commentators have disagreed about this matter.

We say: According to what we find in the book of Themistius and to what Abū-Naṣr (Fārābī) reported, two opinions have been transmitted to us from the commentators about this (premise). One is the doctrine of Theophrastus, Eudemus, and Themistius, and the other the doctrine of Alexander and subsequent commentators, except Themistius.

115 The doctrine of Theophrastus is the following: an absolute and existential premise is one from which have been omitted both the mode of possibility and the mode of necessity, neither one having been explicitly stated in it, while the matter in itself is either necessary or possible. According to these people, then, an existential premise is a premise without modality, being, as it were, like the genus of necessary and possible premises, since, in accordance with its matter, it is disposed to have added to it one of these two modes. This is the doctrine of the ancient Peripatetics about absolute premises.

Alexander and the later commentators are of the opinion that an existential premise is a possible premise when it actually exists, that is, when the predicate actually belongs to the subject, namely in the present time.

Each one of these people claims that his doctrine about this (subject) is that of Aristotle. Both parties present arguments based on the subject-matter itself and others based on the text of Aristotle himself.

The strongest line of argument adhered to by those who support the doctrine of Theophrastus is:

(a) On the basis of the subject-matter itself: it is difficult for an existential premise according to Alexander's doctrine to exist universally; it exists only by chance and in the shortest time. Premises like these are not even used in the discipline of rhetoric, let alone in the disciplines of dialectic and demonstration.

(b) On the basis of the text of Aristotle himself: Aristotle prescribed that when mixing the possible with the absolute premise, that is, when an absolute is the major premise, one should not use in this case absolute premises like these, that is, premises which

التي تصدق كليةً وقتاً ما مشاراً إليه وفي الأقل— وذلك أنه زعم أن هذا النوع من الاختلاط قد ينتج كذباً قالوا فهذا تصريح منه أنه ينبغي أن يتجنب أمثال هذه المطلقات وتستعمل المطلقة التي هي غير مقيدة لفظ أرسطو هو هذا قال 25

وينبغي أن تؤخذ المقدمات الموجودة في الكل في غير زمان محدود مثل الآن أو زمان ما مشار إليه ولكن مرسل لأن يمثل هذه المقدمات تعمل المقاييس لأنه إن أخذت المقدمات موجودة في وقت محدود لا يكون قياس 116

ولما قال هذا القول أتى بحود تنتج الصادق في هذا الاختلاط وحود تنتج الكاذب فمثال ما ينتج الكاذب قولنا 30

كل إنسان يمكن أن يتحرك
وكل متحرك الآن فرس
فيلزم عنه أن يكون كل إنسان فرساً

وذلك كذب ومثال ما ينتج الصادق 35

كل إنسان يمكن أن يتحرك
وكل متحرك الآن حتى إذا اتفق ألا يتحرك شيء غير حتى
فكل إنسان حتى

وهذا صدق فهذا أقوى ما احتج به هؤلاء من كلام أرسطو ومن الأمر نفسه وأما الفريق الثاني فإنهم أيضاً احتجوا لذلك من الأمر نفسه ومن كلام أرسطو 40

أما من الأمر نفسه فإنهم زعموا أن القصد هاهنا — أعني في كتاب القياس — إنما هو التكلم في أنحاء المقدمات من جهة ما هي مطابقة للموجود خارج الذهن لا من جهة ما هي في الذهن فقط والمطلقة على رأى الفريق الأول-

are true universally for a certain designated and very short time; he claimed, in other words, that this sort of mixing may yield false conclusions. They said that this is an express statement by Aristotle that one ought to avoid absolute premises like these and use those that are unrestricted. These are Aristotle's own words:

Premises which exist universally ought to be taken not in a limited time, like "now" or some designated time, but simply, because syllogisms are constructed with premises like these, since if premises are taken as existing in a limited time, there will be no syllogism. 116

Having said this, Aristotle then set out terms which yield, in this mixture, true conclusions and others which yield false conclusions. An example of what yields a false conclusion is the following:

It is possible that every man is in motion:
Everything in motion now is a horse:
Therefore every man is a horse.

This is false. An example of what yields a true conclusion is the following:

It is possible that every man is in motion:
Everything in motion now is a living being, since it happens that a non-living being is not in motion:
Therefore every man is a living being.

This is true. This, then, is the strongest line of argument followed by these people, based both on Aristotle's text and on the subject-matter itself.

The second party also argued in support (of their view) on the basis of the subject-matter itself and of Aristotle's text:

On the basis of the subject-matter itself, they claimed that what is intended here, that is, in the *Prior Analytics*, is a discussion of the aspects of premises in so far as they correspond to what exists outside the mind only, not in so far as they exist exclusively in the mind, whereas according to the opinion of the first party, that

45 - أعنى رأى ثاوفرسطس - ليس لها وجود إلا فى الذهن

fontes: ed. 'Alawī, ut supra; ed. Dunlop ap. *Islamic Studies* 1(1962) p.26.6-28.9; lectio cod. *Escorialensis secundum Dunlop*; versio Latina (*Quaesitum* 2) ap. AOCAC t.1.2b f.78D-K (B); concordantia omnium fontium Arabicorum (Arab.)

1-6 cf. *Avver. Media expositio in Aristotelis Anal. pr.* 1.8 29b26-30a2 (*Talḥiṣ al-Qiyās* p.176.1-3 Jéhamy); haec verba a versione Latina ap. AOCAC absunt 26-9 *Arist. Anal. pr.* 1.15 34b7-11 32-4 cf. *ibid.* 34b11-14 36-8 cf. *ibid.* 34b14-17

2 فى ذلك فان Arab.: et B 3 نجد ed. Dunlop 4 post مذهب ثاوفرسطس in v.5
transp. B جاء Arab.: Themistii et Eudemi B 5
ed. 'Alawī: كان Dunlop 6 فيها ed. Dunlop
ed. 'Alawī حكي corr. Gutas: praeter post المفسرين in v.12 transp. B: 7
Arab. 5-7 فاما... الاسكندر om. B 7 Arab.: i.e. de inesse
الوجودية B 8 منها ed. Dunlop: deficit B
Gutas: منها Arab. 10 احدى هاتين Arab.: oratio Huby) B
'Alawī: احداهما بين Dunlop: alter horum duorum B
11 post om. B 12 post المفسرين add. praeter Themistium B; vid. supra v.6

98C Ibn Rušd, al-Māsā'il 8 (p.177.4-13 'Alawī)

وسواء كانت المقدمة المطلقة هي الموجودة في زمان محدود على ما يذهب
إليه الاسكندر أو كانت صنفى الموجودة في زمان محدود والموجودة في زمان
غير محدود - مثل قولنا «كل انسان يوجد نائماً» أى في وقت من الأوقات غير
محدود - على ظاهر كلام ارسطو فإن المطلقة على رأى ثاوفرسطس
وثامسطيوس قد ظهر في غير ما موضع أنها ليست هي المطلقة التي أراد
5 ارسطو وذلك أنهم زعموا أن التي يسميها ارسطو مطلقاً ووجوديات هي التي
تفهم أن المحمول موجود للموضوع إما بإمكان وإما بالضرورة وعلى هذا تكون
المطلقة ليس لها طبيعة محدودة بل تكون مرة ضرورية ومرة ممكنة وهو بين من
أصول ارسطو أن المقاييس المؤلفة من مقدمات غير محدودة [انه] ليس يتولد
10 عنها نتيجة محدودة

9 secl. Gutas

is, the opinion of Theophrastus, an absolute premise exists only in the mind.

18 يعسر ed. 'Alawī: difficile est B: ليس ed. Dunlop 19 صناعة البلاغة Arab.:
agricolae (< الفلاحة >) B 21 قد اوصى om. B عند ed. 'Alawī: apud B:
لا يستعمل (Dunlop) cod. لا استعمل ed. 'Alawī: 22 لا تستعمل ed. Dunlop
Dunlop Arab.: non fiunt tales absolutae de inesse per se B
23 تصدق ed. 'Alawī: sint verae B: تصور ed. Dunlop 25 وتستعمل Arab.: et
fiat B 26 مقيدة Arab.: non connexa, i.e. non limitata secundum quid B
31 فمثال ed. Dunlop: مثال ed. 'Alawī 34 فرسا ed. Dunlop: فرس cod. (Dunlop), ed. 'Alawī
37 شىء ed. 'Alawī: res B: 42 القصد ed. Dunlop: intentio Philosophi (Philosophi
Huby) B 43 القياس corr. in marg. cod. ex المقاييس in libro Priorum B
45 وجود om. B مطابقة Arab.: absoluit B

98C Averroes, *Questions* 8 (p.177.4-13 'Alawī)

Regardless of whether the absolute premise is that existing in a determinate time, as Alexander thought, or is of two sorts, that existing in a determinate time and that existing in an indeterminate time — e.g., "Every man sleeps", i.e. at some indeterminate time — according to the apparent sense of Aristotle's words, it became evident in another place that the absolute premise according to the opinion of Theophrastus and Themistius is not the absolute premise meant by Aristotle. That is to say, they claimed that the premises which Aristotle called absolute and existential are those in which it is understood that the predicate belongs to the subject either possibly or necessarily. On this basis then the absolute would have no determinate nature, but at one time it would be necessary and at another possible; and it is clear from the principles laid down by Aristotle that from syllogisms combined from indeterminate premises determinate conclusions cannot be generated.

98D Ibn Rušd, al-Masā'il 7 (p.156.11-157.1 'Alawī)

وأما المقدمة الوجودية أي مقدمة هي فإن المفسرين اختلفوا في ذلك فقال بعضهم إنّه يعني بالوجودية أن يكون المحمول موجوداً للموضوع بإطلاق وأن هذه تعم الضرورية والممكن والموجود بالفعل وهذا حكى أبو نصر أنه مذهب 157 ثاوفرسطس وأوذيموس ومن قال بقولهما ويحتمل عندي أن يريد هؤلاء بالوجودية ما يعم الضرورية والموجود بالفعل الذي من طبيعة الممكن وهو الأظهر من كلامهم 5

1-5 versio Latina (Quaesitum 4) ap. AOCAC t.1.2b f.82K (B)

4 Themistii et Ammonii B عندي om. B

98E Ibn Rušd, al-Masā'il 6 (p.148.5-7 'Alawī)

وأعني بالمطلق هاهنا ما يجري مجرى الجنس للجهات الثلاث وهو الذي ظنّ ثاوفرسطس أنه الذي عناه أرسطو في هذا الكتاب بالقضايا المطلقة

1-2 versio Latina (Quaesitum 6) ap. AOCAC t.1.2b f.91K (B)

1 et verificatur de singulis ipsorum post الثلاث add. B 2 seu de inesse post المطلقة add. B

98F Ibn Rušd, Talhīṣ al-Qiyās 1.2 24b31-25a5 (p.143.18-144.2 Jéhamy)

ولا هي (أي المقدمات الوجودية) أيضاً شئ يشمل الضرورية والممكن على ما يذهب إليه ثاوفرسطس وغيره إلا أن يريد المعلومة الوجود المجهولة كونها 144 ضرورية أو ممكنة فإن المقصود هاهنا هو قسمة المقدمة إلى أقسام الوجود أو إلى أقسام المعارف الأول الموجودة لنا بالطبع في المقدمات

fontes: ed. Jéhamy, ut supra; ed. Butterworth p.69.8-11; versio Latina ap. AOCAC t.1.3 f.3H-I Burana

4 cf. Arist. De an. 3.6 430a2-7; 3.8 432a12

2 المعلومة Arab.: rationem B

98D Averroes, Questions 7 (p.156.11-157.1 'Alawī)

The commentators disagreed about what sort of premise the existential premise is. Some of them said that what is meant by the existential premise is that the predicate belongs to the subject absolutely, and that this (premise) subsumes the necessary, the possible, and the actually existent. Abu-Naṣr (Fārābī) related that this is the doctrine of Theophrastus and Eudemus¹ and of those who professed their view. I think that what these people probably meant by the existential premise is the one which subsumes the necessary and the actually existent which has the nature of the possible. This is the clearest (implication) of their statements. 157

¹ The Latin translation has "Themistius and Ammonius", apparently through a misreading of a corrupt form of the two names in Arabic.

98E Averroes, Questions 6 (p.148.5-7 'Alawī)

I mean by "absolute" here that which is like a genus of the three modes.¹ This is what Theophrastus thought that Aristotle meant in this book (*Prior Analytics*) by absolute propositions.²

¹ The Latin translation adds: "and is valid for (or, applies to) each one of them".

² The Latin translation adds: "that is, existential".

98F Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.2 24b31-25a5 (p.143.18-144.2 Jéhamy)

Nor again is it (the existential premise) something that includes the necessary and the possible, as Theophrastus and others think, unless he means the one of which we know that it exists, but do not know whether it is necessary or possible. For what is intended 144 here is to divide premises either according to the parts of existence, or according to the parts of primary intuitions, which we have by nature, concerning premises.

98G Ibn Rušd, *Talḥiṣ al-Qiyās* 1.15 34b7-8 (p.200.15-22 Jéhamy)

وليس هذه الوصية أيضاً مما يفهم منها أن المقدمة الوجودية عنده هي التي تشمل الضروري والممكن كما فهم ذلك عنه ثامسطيوس فإن هذه المقدمة — أعنى المطلقة التي بهذه الصفة — ليس لها وجود خارج الذهن والقصد هاهنا إنما هو إحصاء جهات المقدمات المطابقة لأصناف الوجود أو للمعارف الأولى فأمّا إن كان قصد أرسطو بالجهات إحصاء فصول المقدمات من جهة الوجود والمعرفة فليس ينتفع بالمطلقة على رأى ثاوفرسطس و ثامسطيوس وإن كان أراد إحصاءها من جهة المعارف الأولى التي لنا بالطبع فقد ينتفع بها فإننا كثيراً ما نعلم أن المحمول موجود للموضوع ونجهل هل هو موجود بإمكان أو باضطرار

fontes: ed. Jéhamy, ut supra (codd. FL); ed. Butterworth, p.148.10-149.3 (codd. FL); versio Latina ap. AOCAC t.1.1.2 f.45M-46A (B)

المعارف: ed. Butterworth: للمعارف الأولى 4 F: om. ليس 3 L: om. عنه 2
F: فان لنا 7 L: فاننا 7 Arab.: vero necessario 8 باضطرار 8 ed. Jéhamy

99 Ibn Sīnā, *al-Masā'il al-ḡarība al-ʿiṣrīniya*, mas'ala fī bayān anna n-natīḡa kayfa yanbaḡī an yakūna 'an ṣuḡrā mumkina wa-kubrā muḡlaqa (p.96.22-97.4 Dāneš-Pajūh, ap. Mohaghegh et Izutsu)

فإذا الوجود لا يمنع الإمكان الحقيقي وإن كان اعتبار الوجود غير اعتبار الإمكان وليقرأ هذا من شرحنا لأنواعها وبياننا
أن الرأى الذى قيل «فيه» الممكن — وهو منسوب إلى ثاوفرسطس — إنه الذى ليس بوجوده وإذا فرض موجوداً لم يفرض محالاً كيف يجب أن يتصور حتى يكون حدّاً

97

98G Averroes, *Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.15 34b7-8 (p.200.15-22 Jéhamy)

Nor can it be understood from this recommendation¹ (of Aristotle) that the existential premise, according to him, is the one which includes the necessary and the possible, as Themistius understood it from him. For this premise, that is, the absolute with such a nature, does not exist outside the mind, whereas the intention here is to enumerate the modes of premises that correspond only to the kinds of existence or primary intuitions. If Aristotle intended by the modes to enumerate the differentiae of premises from the standpoint of existence and knowledge, then the absolute (premise) according to the opinion of Theophrastus and Themistius will be of no use; but if he wanted to enumerate them from the standpoint of primary intuitions which we have by nature, then it may be of use, because frequently we know that the predicate belongs to the subject without knowing whether it does so possibly or necessarily.

¹ The Arabic translation of the Aristotelian passage used by Averroes is to be found in 98B, lines 26-29, (p.115-16 'Alawī).

99 Avicenna, *Twenty Difficult Questions*, Question on What Conclusion a Possible Minor and an Absolute Major Ought to Yield (p.96.22-97.4 Dāneš-Pajūh, in Mohaghegh and Izutsu)

Existence does not preclude real possibility, even though the way in which existence is considered is different from that of possibility. I refer the reader to my commentary on the *Prior Analytics*¹ where I explain

(a) how the opinion attributed to Theophrastus, namely, that "The possible is that which does not exist; but when it is assumed to exist, no inconsistency² is assumed," ought to be conceived so that it can become a definition (of the possible), and

وأنه ليس من شرط ما هو ممكن أن لا يكون موجوداً في الحال

2 cf. *Arist. Anal. Pr. 1.12 32a18-20*

3 *suppl. Gutas* 3 *ثاوفرطس* *scripsit Gutas: ثاوفرطس ed. Dāneš-Pajūh*

100A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.3 25a29 (CAG t.2.1 p.36.25-32 Wallies)

ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ δὲ μετὰ διορισμοῦ λέγεται, ὡς τὸ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ γραμματικῷ, ἔστ' ἂν ἢ γραμματικός (αὐτὴ γὰρ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶν ἡ πρότασις ἀναγκαῖα· δέδειχε δὲ αὐτῶν τὴν διαφορὰν καὶ Θεόφραστος· οὐ γὰρ αἰεὶ γραμματικός ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ ἄνθρωπος γραμματικός), ἐπεὶ τοίνυν διαφέρει, δεῖ ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι, ὅτι περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶς καὶ κυρίως λεγομένων ἀναγκαίων τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται νῦν Ἀριστοτέλης· αἱ γὰρ οὕτως ἀναγκαῖαι ἀντιστρέφουσιν.

5 οὐδ' ὁ BM: οὐδὲ aL 6 λεγομένων om. aLM

100B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.13 32a19 (CAG t.2.1 p.156.26-157.2 Wallies)

ἢ διὰ τοῦ εἰπεῖν “οὐ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου” ἀπέφησεν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον· κατηγορεῖται γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ γὰρ ὑπάρχον τινὶ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ, ἔστ' ἂν ὑπάρχη. ὁ γοῦν Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν λέγων περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου σημαινομένων οὕτως γράφει·

157 “τρίτον τὸ ὑπάρχον· ὅτε γὰρ ὑπάρχει, τότε οὐχ οἶόν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν.”

3 cf. [Ammonii] *comm. In Arist. Anal. pr. 1.8 29b29 (CAG t.4.6 p.37.4)*

2 αὐτὸν Wallies: αὐτοῦ KM: αὐτοῦς a 4 ὑπάρχη BM: ἢ a

(b) that it is not a condition of its being possible that it not exist right now.³

¹ Cf. Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* 1.12 32a18-20. Avicenna's reference to his commentary on the *Prior Analytics* would appear to be to that part of the lost *al-Hāṣil wa-l-maḥṣūl* (*The Available and the Valid [of Theoretical Philosophy]*).

² Literally, “impossibility”, “absurdity”, *muḥāl*.

³ Avicenna goes on to explain the position of Theophrastus as follows: “For when one posits a possible whose condition is that it not be, (it will be non-existent,) because something which has this sort of possibility, since a certain necessity would enter into it, would lead to the assumption of something like the non-existent; except that (we said that) when it is assumed to exist, this does not lead to the assumption of an inconsistency. (And assuming that the non-existent exists is an inconsistency.)”

100A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.3 25a29 (CAG vol.2.1 p.36.25-32 Wallies)

But since of the necessary one kind is absolutely necessary, and the other is used with a qualification, as in the case of “man of necessity to every literate being, while it is literate” — for this proposition is not absolutely necessary; and Theophrastus also has shown the difference between them; for a literate being does not always exist, and neither is man always literate — since, then, there is a difference, we must know that Aristotle is now discussing things called “necessary” in its absolute and proper sense, for propositions necessary in this sense convert.

100B Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.13 32a19 (CAG vol.2.1 p.156.26-157.2 Wallies)

Or is it that by saying “when it is not necessary” he (Aristotle) excluded from it (the possible) the existent also. For according to him the necessary is predicated also of the existent: for what is (belonging) to something, is necessarily (belonging) to it, while it is (belonging).¹ Theophrastus, at any rate, in the first book of his *Prior Analytics*, speaking about the meanings of “necessary”, writes this: “Third the existent: for when it actually is (belonging), it cannot then not be (belonging).”

¹ “Existent” and “is (belonging)” are both used for ὑπάρχον, ὑπάρχειν, etc.

- 100C Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *Maqāla fī r-radd ‘alā qawl Ġalīnūs fī l-mumkin* (cod. Escorialensis 798 Derenbourg, f.59¹)

قال جالينوس إن المعنى المفهوم من لفظة «ضرورة» وإن كان في القولين جميعاً معنى واحد — يعنى في قول القائل «الشمس مضيئة ضرورة» وفي قوله «الانسان أيضاً ناطق ضرورة» — وذلك أنه ليس يدل [على] لفظة «ضرورة» في هذين القولين على شيء غير أن الضياء موجود للشمس وأن النطق موجود للانسان وجوداً غير مفارق فإن شيعاً ثاوفرسطس غلطوا في الفصل الموجود بين الأمرين الموضوعين في هاتين المقدمتين فنقلوه إلى المجهول المحمول فيهما جميعاً فلما كانت الشمس أبدية * * * من قبل ذلك صار النطق يفسد بفساده توهموا أن الأمر الضروري أيضاً ينتظم معنيين

2 *scripsit* فيها 6 *secl.* على 3 *cod.* من *cor.* *Gutas* (prior) في 2
 < ومن قبل ذلك كان خبيلاً ما *Gutas* qui lacunam ind. 7 *ut vid.* فيها *Gutas* >
coni. أبدياً وكان الانسان فاسداً و.

- 100D Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristotelis Analytica priora* 1.10 30b37 (CAG t.2.1 p.140.14-18 et 141.1-6 Wallies)

διὰ δὲ τοῦ εἰπεῖν “οὐ μέντοι ἕως ἄν ζῶν μηδενὶ λευκῷ ὑπάρχη, ὥστε τούτων μὲν ὄντων ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἀπλῶς δ’ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον”, διὰ δὲ ταύτης τῆς προσθήκης ἐδήλωσεν, ὅτι ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν, ὅταν ἀναγκαῖον λέγη γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀναγκαῖον λέγει καὶ οὐ τὸ μετὰ διορισμοῦ. . . ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀναγκαίου διαίρεσιν ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς οἶδεν, ἦν οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ πεποίηται, δεδήλωκε διὰ τῆς προσθήκης, ἦν φθάσας ἤδη καὶ ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἔρμηνείας δέδειχεν, ἐν οἷς περὶ τῆς εἰς τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον λεγομένης ἀντιφάσεως περὶ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον εἰρημένων λέγει “τὸ μὲν οὖν εἶναι τὸ ὄν, ὅταν ᾗ, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι, ὅταν μὴ ᾗ, ἀνάγκη.” τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀναγκαῖον τοιοῦτόν ἐστι.

6-10 *Eudemus*, fr. 12 *Wehrli*

9-10 *Aristoteles*, *De int.* 9 19a23-4

- 100C Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Refutation of Galen’s Essay on the Possible* (cod. Escorial 798 Derenbourg, f.59¹)

Galen said: The meaning understood by the term “necessity”, even though present in the two statements together — that is, in the statements, “the sun illuminates of necessity,” and “man is endowed with speech also of necessity” — is one and the same. The reason is that the term “necessity” in both these statements refers only to the fact of the inseparable existence of light in the sun and of speech in man. The party of Theophrastus erred with regard to the *differentia* which exists between the two things posited as subjects in these two premises and transferred it (the *differentia*) to the unknown that is predicated of them jointly: Since the sun is eternal * * *¹ consequently speech perishes along with him, they imagined that the necessary also subsumes two meanings.

¹ In order to complete the thought, it is necessary to assume a lacuna in the text, to be supplemented as follows: “<and consequently its light is eternal, and since man perishes and>”.

- 100D Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle’s Prior Analytics* 1.10 30b37 (CAG vol.2.1 p.140.14-18 and 141.1-6 Wallies)

By saying, “not, however, while animal belongs to no white thing, so that in these conditions the conclusion will be necessary, but not absolutely necessary”, by this addition he (Aristotle) made clear that in mixed syllogisms, when he says that the conclusion is necessary, he means absolute necessity and not qualified. . . .

- 141 At the same time he has made clear by the addition that he too knows the classification of necessity which his colleagues¹ have made, which he explained earlier² also in the *De interpretatione*, when, in connection with the so-called contradiction about the future, he says about statements about individuals, “That what is, is, when it is, and what is not, is not, when it is not, is necessary.” For the hypothetically necessary is like this.

¹ These are almost certainly Theophrastus and Eudemus.

² Or, “anticipating them”.

- 101 Boetius, In Aristotelis De interpretatione 12 21a34, secunda editio 5.12 (p.387.27-389.20 Meiser)

388 an magis illud dicendum est, quod sicut se in adfirmationibus
habet, ita quoque in negationibus, ut Theophrastus acutissime
perspexit? fuit enim consequentia in adfirmativis, ut necessitatem
et esse consequeretur et possibilitas, possibilitatem vero nec esse
nec necessitas sequeretur. idem quoque penitus perspicentibus in 5
negationibus adparebit. veniens namque negatio in necessario
faciensque huiusmodi negationem quae dicit non necesse est vim
necessitatis infringit et totam propositionem ad possibile duxit.
quod enim non necesse est esse fracto rigore necessitatis ad
possibilitatem perductum est. sed possibilitatem nec esse sequeba- 10
tur nec necessitas. recte igitur fractam necessitatem et ad possibile
perductam, cum negatio dicit non necesse esse, nec non esse nec
non contingere esse consequitur.

rursus qui dicit possibile esse, si ei disiunctio negationis
addatur, tollit possibile et ad necessitatis perpetuitatem negativa 15
forma totam propositionem revocat, ut est non possibile. quod enim
non possibile est fieri non potest ut sit, quod autem fieri non potest
ut sit necesse est ut non sit. ergo necessariam quandam vim habet
haec propositio in qua dicimus non posse esse aliquid. sed neces-
sitate sequatur et essentia et possibilitas. non necesse autem 20
esse ad possibilitatem respicit. recte igitur non necesse esse, quod
est iam possibilitatis, sequetur propositionem quae dicit non posse
esse, quod est necessitatis. alii ergo ordines propositionum sunt, vis
tamen eadem, ut necessitatem cuncta sequantur, possibilitatem vero
necessitas non sequatur. 25

389 hic oritur quaestio subdifficilis. nam si necessitatem sequitur
possibilitas, non necesse autem possibilitati confine est, cur non
necesse esse sequatur id quod dicimus non necesse esse? nam si
possibilitas sequitur necessitatem, non necesse autem esse possibili-
tatem, sequi debet necessitatem id quod non necesse praedicamus. 30
quae hoc modo dissolvitur: non possibile esse quamquam vim
habeat necessitatis, differt tamen a necessitate, quod illud adfirma-
tivam habet speciem, illud vero negativam. sic etiam possibile esse
et non necesse esse differunt eo tantum, quod illud est adfirma-

- 101 Boethius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 12 21a34, *Second edition* 5.12 (p.387.27-389.20 Meiser)

388 Or should that rather be said, that what holds for affirmations
also holds for negations, as Theophrastus most acutely perceived?
For there was a sequence in affirmatives, that both actuality and
possibility were consequences of necessity, but neither actuality nor
necessity were consequences of possibility. The same will be seen
to be the case with negations to those who look deeply. For a
negation coming in a necessary proposition and producing a
negation of this kind, which says "it is not necessary", breaks the
force of necessity and has reduced the whole proposition to the
possible. For what is not necessarily the case, since the force of
necessity is broken, is reduced to possibility. But neither actuality
nor necessity were consequences of possibility. It is correct therefore
that when necessity is broken and reduced to possible, when the
negation says "it is not necessarily the case", neither "it is not so"
nor "it is not possibly so" are consequences.

Again, in the statement "it is possibly so", if the negative particle
is added to it, it destroys "possibly" and by the negative form brings
back the whole proposition to the eternity of necessity, so that it
is not possible.¹ For what is not possible cannot come to exist and
what cannot come to exist necessarily does not exist. Therefore this
proposition, in which we say that something cannot be, has a sort
of necessary force. But both actuality and possibility followed neces-
sity. But "not necessarily the case" looks back at possibility. It
is right, therefore, that "not necessarily the case", which is now a
matter of possibility, should be a consequence of a proposition
which says "it cannot be the case", which is a matter of necessity.
The order of the propositions differs, then, but their strengths are
the same, in that all the others are consequences of necessity, but
necessity is not a consequence of possibility.

389 Here a somewhat difficult question arises. For if possibility is
a consequence of necessity, and "not necessary" is akin to possibility,
why is what we call "not necessarily so" not a consequence of being
necessarily so? For if possibility is a consequence of necessity, but
"not necessarily the case" is a consequence of possibility, that which
we describe as not necessary ought to be a consequence of neces-
sity. This difficulty is resolved in this way: "is not possibly the
case", although it has the force of necessity, yet differs from necessity
in that the one has an affirmative aspect, the other a negative.

tivum, illud vero negativum, cum vis significationis eadem sit. sed³⁵ necessitatem adfirmatio possibilitatis et contingentis sequebatur. quamquam tamen possibilitatem imitetur eique consentiat id quod dicimus non necesse esse, tamen negatio quaedam est. recte igitur adfirmationem quod est necesse esse non sequitur negatio per quam aliquid non necesse esse proponimus. et hanc quidem huius solutionem quaestionis Theophrastus vir doctissimus reperit.⁴⁰

14 quij] quae E² 16 post possibile add. b quod enim est possibile, non est adhuc, quando dicitur, sed in futuro, sic quidem negatio illius in necessitatem versa de eo quod est mutare non poterit 22 iam] etiam Rota 29 post esse add. F² quod diximus: post esse add. Rota sequitur 29-30 post possibilitatem add. S² tenet

102A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.17 36b35 (CAG t.2.1 p.220.9-221.5 Wallies)

Θεόφραστος μέντοι καὶ Εὐδημος, ὡς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐμνημονεύσαμεν, ἀντιστρέφειν φησὶ καὶ τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν αὐτῇ, ὡπερ ἀντέστρεφε καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχουσα καθόλου ἀποφατικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀναγκαία. ὅτι δὲ ἀντιστρέφει, δείκνυσιν οὕτως· εἰ τὸ Α τῶ Β ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ τὸ Β τῶ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῶ Β μηδενί, ὅτε ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, τότε ἐνδέχεται ἀπεζεύχθαι τὸ Α πάντων τῶν τοῦ Β· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ', ἔσται τότε καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α ἀπεζευγμένον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ Β τῶ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί.

ἔοικε δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης βέλτιον αὐτῶν λέγειν μὴ φάσκων ἀντιστρέφειν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἑαυτῇ τὴν κατὰ τὸν διορισμόν. οὐ γάρ, εἴ τί τις ἀπέζευκται, ἤδη καὶ ἐνδεχομένης ἀπέζευκται αὐτοῦ· ὥστε οὐκ αὐτάρκες τὸ δεῖξαι, ὅτι, ὅτε ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τοῦ Β ἀπέζευχθαι, τότε καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α ἀπέζευκται, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ ἐνδεχομένης ἀπέζευκται. εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο δειχθεῖ, οὐ δέδεικται ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ἀντιστρέφουσα, ἐπεὶ ἀπέζευκται μὲν καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὸς κεχωρισμένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐνδεχομένης.

ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει, δείκνυσιν τῇ εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῇ προσχρόμενος Ἀριστοτέλης. εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν, κείσθω ἀντιστρέφουσα, καὶ

And so too "is possibly the case" and "is not necessarily the case" differ only in this, that the one is affirmative and the other negative, while the force of their meaning is the same. But the affirmation of possibility and contingency was a consequence of necessity. And although what we say is not necessarily the case imitates possibility and is in harmony with it, yet it is a kind of negation. It is right, therefore, that the negation by which we state that something is not necessarily the case is not a consequence of the affirmation that it is necessarily the case. And Theophrastus, a most learned man, discovered this solution to this problem.

¹ The Basle edition adds: "For what is possible, is not yet, when it is said, but in the future, and so the negation of that, turned into necessity, will not be able to change from what is the case." The last few words might also be rendered: "turned into necessity concerning what is the case, will not be able to change."

102A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.17 36b35 (CAG vol.2.1 p.220.9-221.5 Wallies)

Theophrastus however, and Eudemus, as we mentioned at the beginning as well, says¹ that the universal negative (problematic) converts, just as the assertoric universal negative and the necessary convert. That it converts, he shows like this: if A possibly belongs to no B, B also possibly belongs to no A; for since A possibly belongs to no B, when it possibly belongs to none, then A may possibly be disjoined from all the (things under) B, and if so, B too will then be disjoined from A: and if so, B too possibly belongs to no A.

But Aristotle seems to give a better account than they do, when he says that the universal negative which is problematic according to the definition does not convert. For it is not the case that if something has been disjoined from something, it has also been disjoined from it in the problematic mode; hence to show that, when A may possibly be disjoined from B, then B too has been disjoined from A, is not sufficient to show this too, that it has also been disjoined in the problematic mode. But if this has not been shown, it has not been shown that the problematic converts, since that which is of necessity separated from something is also disjoined, but not in the problematic mode.

That it does not convert, Aristotle shows, using *reductio ad impossibile* too. If it is possible, suppose that it converts, and if A pos-

εἰ τὸ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενὶ τῷ Β, καὶ τὸ Β ἐνδεχέσθω μηδενὶ τῷ Α. ἀλλὰ
 μὴν κεῖται ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ αἱ ἀποφατικαὶ ἐνδεχόμεναι πρὸς τὰς κατα- 20
 φατικὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀντιστρέφουσι· κεῖται δὲ τὸ Β ἐνδέχεσθαι τῷ Α
 μηδενί. δηλον οὖν, ὡς καὶ παντὶ αὐτῷ ἐνδέχεται. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος· οὐ
 γὰρ, εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται παντί, διότι κεῖται ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενί,
 ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεσθαι παντί· γίνεται γὰρ οὕτως ἡ καθόλου 25
 καταφατικὴ ἐνδεχομένη ἑαυτῇ ἀντιστρέφουσα, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές
 οὐδὲ κατ' ἐκείνους. ἰδοὺ γοῦν τὸ μὲν λευκὸν ἐνδέχεται παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ,
 ἐπεὶ καὶ μηδενί, οὐκέτι μὲντοι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐνδέχεται παντὶ λευκῷ·
 τισὶ γὰρ λευκοῖς ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὡς κύκνῳ, χιόνι καὶ ἄλλοις
 μυρίοις. εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον παντὶ [τῷ] λευκῷ,
 221 ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενί. ὥστ' οὐκ, εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται 30
 μηδενί, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχον
 ἤδη καὶ ἐνδεχομένως οὐχ ὑπάρχει. ἀκολουθῶν δὲ λέγοντες τὴν καθόλου
 ἀποφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν τοῖς ὅροις οὐκέτι λέγουσι τὴν καταφατικὴν
 ἐνδεχομένην τῇ ἐνδεχομένῃ ἀποφατικῇ ἀντιστρέφειν· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε
 τῷ μηκέτι μόνῃ ἐνδεχομένην γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτοὺς τὴν κατὰ τὸν 35
 διορισμόν.

1-16 cf. [Ammonii] comm. In Aristotelis Anal. pr. 36b35 (CAG t.4.6 p.58.19-23), qui Platonicos solos nominat 1-8 Eudemus, fr. 16 Wehrli 1-3 Alexander Aphrod., supra p.41.21-3 2-3 scholion in Philoponi comm. In Arist. Anal. pr. 1.3 25b14 p.61.14-62.1 (cod. Paris Gr. 1917 = p.150a8-10 Brandis) Theophrasto nominato 10-11 τὴν κατὰ τὸν διορισμόν] cf. Arist. Anal. pr. 1.14 33b22-4; 1.15 33b28, 30 et 34b27-8 26-32 cf. [Ammon.] op. cit. p.57.38-58.1

2 φησὶ Β: φασὶ α et Wallies 4 δεικνυσιν αΒ: δεικνῦσιν Wallies 13
 τοῦτο Wallies: τούτῳ αΒ 29 τῷ Β: om. α et del. Wallies

102B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.17 37a9 (CAG t.2.1 p.223.3-15 Wallies)

δόξει τισὶ διὰ γε τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς δύνασθαι δεικνυσθαι
 ἡ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴ ἐνδεχομένη ἀντιστρέφουσα. τῇ αὐτῇ δεῖξει καὶ
 οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ κέρηνηται. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ
 τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· εἰ γὰρ ψεῦδος τοῦτο, τὸ ἀντικείμενον
 ἀληθές· ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί τὸ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, 5
 ὃ ἴσον δοκεῖ δύνασθαι τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινί. τὸ ἄρα Β τῷ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης
 τινὶ ὑπάρχει. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ἢ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀναγκαῖα καταφατικὴ ἀντιστρέφει,
 καὶ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· ὑπέκειτο γὰρ
 τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τὸ ἐκ τοῦ διορισμοῦ.

sibly belongs to no B, let B too possibly belong to no A. But it is assumed by us that negative problematics also convert with affirmative problematics: and it is assumed that B possibly belongs to no A. It is clear, then, that it also possibly belongs to all of it. But this is false: for it is not the case that, if A possibly belongs to all B, because it possibly belongs to none, as was assumed, it is necessary that B too possibly belongs to all A: for in this way it comes about that the universal affirmative problematic converts, which is not true even according to them (Theophrastus and Eudemus). Take at any rate this case: white possibly belongs to every man, because also to none, but yet it is not the case that man possibly belongs to all white things: for there are some white things to which of necessity it does not belong, like swan, snow, and a thousand others. And if it is false that man possibly belongs to all white things, it is false too that it possibly belongs to none. Hence it is not true that, if A possibly belongs to no B, B too will 221 possibly belong to no A; for it is not the case that what in fact belongs to nothing does not belong in the problematic mode also. Accordingly, when they (Theophrastus and Eudemus) say that the universal negative is convertible in its terms,² they are not also saying that the affirmative problematic converts with the problematic negative: for that is not possible, because according to them the problematic according to the definition is not simply problematic.

¹ The singular verb "says" corresponds to the manuscript reading. The same is true of "shows" in 1.4. See the *apparatus criticus* and the commentary.

² Simple, as opposed to complementary, conversion.

102B Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.17 37a9 (CAG vol.2.1 p.223.3-15 Wallies)

It will seem to some that it can be shown at least by *reductio ad impossibile* that the universal negative problematic converts. The same proof is used also by his (Aristotle's) colleagues¹. For if A possibly belongs to no B, B too possibly belongs to no A. For if this is false, the opposite is true: but the opposite of "possibly belongs to none" is "does not possibly belong to none", which seems to be equivalent to "of necessity belongs to some". B, then, of necessity belongs to some A. But since the particular necessary affirmative converts, A too of necessity belongs to some B, which is impossible; for it was supposed that A possibly belonged to no

εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον, ἀδύνατος καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις, ἢ τοῦτο ἠκολούθησεν· ἦν δὲ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ ὑπάρχειν μεταληφθὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί. τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἄρα ἀληθὲς τὸ τὸ Β ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενί τῷ Α. ταύτην δὴ τὴν δεῖξιν διαβάλλει ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὡς μὴ ὑγιῶς γινομένην.

1 γε Wallies: τε αβ

8 ὑπάρχει Wallies: ὑπάρχειν Β: ὑπάρξει α

102C Anonymus, In Aristotelis De interpretatione et Analytica (p.100.1-22 Menas)

περὶ τῆς καθόλου ἀποφατικῆς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης Θεόφραστος διηνέχθη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Εὐδήμους, οἷς καὶ τῶν νῦν σχεδὸν πάντες κατακολουθοῦσιν. ἀντιστρέφειν γὰρ φασι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ὕλης πρὸς ἑαυτήν, ὡς περ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης καὶ ἀναγκαίας. καὶ τοῦτο ἐμπεδῶσαι περῶνται δυσὶν ἐπιχειρήμασι, διὰ τε

δεξιῶς ἐκθετικῆς καὶ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀγωγῆς.
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκθετικὴ δεξις ἐστὶ τοιαύτη· εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ λευκὸν ἐν μηδενί εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ, ἐνδέχεται τὸ λευκὸν ἀπεξευχθῆαι παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ ὁ ἀνθρώπος ἀπεξευγμένος παντὸς ἔσται λευκοῦ.

ἡ δὲ εἰς ἀδύνατον δεξις ἐστὶ αὕτη· ἐπεὶ ψεῦδος τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ λευκῷ τὸν ἀνθρώπον εἶναι, ὡς περ “μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐνδέχεται τὸ λευκὸν” ἀληθές, ἀληθὲς ἔσται τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ λευκῷ τὸν ἀνθρώπον εἶναι. κατὰφασις γὰρ καὶ ἀπόφασις ταυτά. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές, καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ λευκῷ ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἀνθρώπον ἀληθές. αἱ γὰρ τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου προτάσεις πρὸ τοῦ τρόπου λαβοῦσαι τὴν ἄρνησιν ἰσοδυναμοῦσι ταῖς ἀναγκαίαις. εἴαν δὲ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ λευκῷ ὑπάρχει ὁ ἀνθρώπος, καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει τινί. ὑπέκειτο δὲ καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ λευκόν. τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα καὶ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ τὸ αὐτό, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀντίφασις.

1-20 Eudemus, fr. 15 Wehrli

13 ταῦτά Graeser: ταῦτα ed. Menas

B, according to the sense of “possibly” which is according to the definition. If indeed this is impossible, the hypothesis from which it followed is also impossible. That was that B belongs of necessity to some A, which was substituted for “does not possibly belong to none”. The opposite then is true, that B possibly belongs to no A. It is this proof that Aristotle attacks as not being valid.

¹ Theophrastus and Eudemus.

102C Anonymus, On Aristotle's De interpretatione and Analytica (p.100.1-22 Menas)

Concerning the universal negative with problematic matter, Theophrastus differs from Aristotle, and Eudemus likewise, and they are followed by almost all present-day thinkers. They say that it converts simply¹ even with problematic matter, as with assertoric and necessary, and they try to establish this with two proofs, by an expository demonstration and by *reductio ad impossibile*.

The expository demonstration is this: if it is possible for white to be in no man, it is possible for white to be disjoined from every man, and man will be disjoined from all white.

The *ad impossibile* proof is this:² since it is false that it is possible for man to apply to no white, just as “It is possible for white to apply to no man” is true, it will be true that it is not possible for man to apply to no white. For the affirmation and the denial are the same.³ And if this is true, it will also be true that of necessity man belongs to something white. For propositions of the problematic, which have the negative before the modal word, are equivalent to necessary ones. But if “Man of necessity belongs to something white” is true, so is “White of necessity belongs to some (man).” But it was assumed that it was possible for white to belong to no man. The same thing, then, both possibly belongs to none, and of necessity to some, which is a contradiction.

¹ Lit., “with itself”.

² The argument that follows seems to be confused.

³ Menas' text would give: “For these are affirmation and denial.”

103A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.13 32a29
(CAG t.2.1 p.158.24-5 et 159.8-15 Wallies)

ἴδιον τοῦ ἐνδεχομένου τὸ ἀντιστρέφειν, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἀντα-
 κολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις τὰς κατ' αὐτὸ γινομένας καταφάσεις τε καὶ
 159 ἀποφάσεις. . . . δεῖ μέντοι εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν προτάσεων
 ἀντιστροφή οὐκ ἔστιν ὑγίης κατὰ τοὺς περὶ Θεόφραστον, οὐδὲ χρῶνται
 αὐτῇ· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τὴν τε καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἐνδεχομένην 5
 ἀντιστρέφειν αὐτῇ λέγειν παραπλησίως τῇ τε ὑπαρχούσῃ καὶ τῇ
 ἀναγκαίᾳ καὶ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν τὰς καταφατικὰς ἐνδεχομένας ταῖς
 ἀποφατικαῖς ἐνδεχομένας, ὃ ἀξιοῖ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἐπισημανοῦμεθα δὲ
 περὶ τούτου, ὅταν περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἀντιστροφῆς τῆς κατὰ 10
 τοὺς ὅρους λέγη.

8-10 Alexander Aphrod. ad 1.17 36b35 p.220.9-16) = **102A**

7 μὴ BM: τοῦ a

103B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.15 34b27
(CAG t.2.1 p.198.5-199.10 Wallies)

ἢ τούτοις χρώμενον οἷον τέ ἐστιν λέγειν μηδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς προειρημένης
 συζυγίας τῆς ἐκ καταφατικῶν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν ἐνδεχομένου τὸ
 συμπέρασμα γίνεσθαι. καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' ἐκείνης ἡ μετάληψις τῆς οὐκ
 ἐνδέχεται παντὶ εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ οὐ ἐγένετο· τῇ γὰρ εἰς ταύτην 5
 μεταλήψει τὸ ἀδύνατον δείκνυται. ἂν γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ μετ-
 αληφθῇ ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παντί, οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον συμβαίνει, ὥσπερ οὐδ'
 ἐπὶ ταύτης, ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀνάγκη τινὶ μὴ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, τὸ ἰδίως ἀντικείμενον
 τῷ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν εἴη ἂν κατασκευαζόμενον, ὃ εἴη ἂν
 τὸ οὐδενὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ὑπάρχειν ἴσον ὃν τῷ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ
 οὐκ ὑπάρχει. ὃ εἰ μὲν μόνον τῇ φωνῇ διαφέρει τοῦ ἐνδέχεται παντί, 10
 εἴη ἂν τοῦ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν ἐνδεχομένου τὸ συμπέρασμα.

εἰ δὲ δύναται εὐρεθῆναι ἐπὶ τινος ὕλης ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν τινὶ
 ὑπάρχον, μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ τινὶ οὐκ ὑπάρχον, εἴη ἂν ἐπ' ἐκείνου τὸ
 μὲν οὐδενὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ὑπάρχει ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ἐνδέχεται παντί
 οὐκέτι, εἴ γε, ὃ ἐνδέχεται παντί, ἐνδέχεται καὶ μηδενί, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης 15
 τινὶ ὑπάρχον ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενὶ λέγειν ψεῦδος. οὕτως τε οὐδὲ ἐπ'
 ἐκείνης ἂν τῆς συμπλοκῆς τὸ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν ἐνδεχόμενον
 συναγοίτο. ἢ μὲν οὖν λέγουσα πρότασις "οὐδὲν ζῶον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ
 ἔστιν ἀναπνευστικόν" οὐκ ἂν εἴη τοιαύτη· ἀληθὴς γὰρ αὕτη τῷ τι μὲν
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης ζῶον ἀναπνευστικὸν εἶναι, τὶ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὴ εἶναι 20

103A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.13 32a29
(CAG vol.2.1 p.158.24-5 and 159.8-15 Wallies)

It is peculiar to the problematic that it converts, i.e. the affirma-
 tions and negations in that mode are consequences of one another.
 159 . . . You must know, however, that this kind of conversion of these
 propositions is not valid according to those associated with Theo-
 phrastus and they do not use it. For there is the same reason for
 saying that the universal negative problematic converts like the as-
 sertoric and the necessary, as that affirmative problematics do not
 convert with negative problematics, which Aristotle postulates. But
 we will go further into this matter when he talks about conversion
 with regard to terms in the problematic.

103B Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.15 34b27
(CAG vol.2.1 p.198.5-199.10 Wallies)

Or, using these arguments, it is possible to say that from the
 aforesaid pair with affirmative premises¹ the conclusion is not prob-
 lematic according to the definition. For in that too a change from
 "not possibly belongs to all" to "of necessity to some not" took place,
 for by this change the impossibility is proved. For if "not possibly
 belongs to all" were changed into "of necessity to some", nothing
 impossible results, and the case is the same with the change of the
 latter into "of necessity to some not". But if this were so, the proper
 contradictory of "of necessity not belonging to some" would have
 been proved constructively, i.e. "not belonging of necessity to none",
 which is equivalent to "does not of necessity not belong to some".
 If this differs only verbally from "possibly belongs to all", the con-
 clusion would be problematic according to the definition.

But if some subject-matter can be found in which something
 belongs of necessity to some, but does not of necessity not belong
 to some, with regard to that "There is nothing to which of necessity
 it does not belong" would be true, but "It possibly belongs to all"
 not, if, at least, what possibly belongs to all possibly belongs to
 none, and it is false to say that what belongs to some of necessity
 may possibly belong to none. So neither with that combination of
 premises would the conclusion be problematic according to the defi-
 nition. At any rate the proposition which says, "No animal of
 necessity does not breathe" would not be of this kind, for this is
 true by virtue of the fact that some animals do of necessity breathe,

ἀναπνευστικόν, καὶ εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κυρίως ἀντικειμένη τῇ ἐνδέχεται
μηδενί. τοιαύτη δὲ ἡ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· καὶ γὰρ αἰεὶ κατὰ τῆς τινὶ
ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ ὑπάρχει καὶ κατὰ τῆς τινὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει ὁμοίως
ἢ τοιαύτη ἀληθῆς ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί ζῶν τὸ ἀναπνευστικόν. εἴη
δ' ἂν καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐνδέχεται παντί ἀπόφασις ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται παντί ἐπὶ
τῆς κειμένης ὕλης ἀληθῆς ὁλοκλήρως· ἀληθὲς γὰρ ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ οὐκ
ἐνδέχεται μηδενί. ἑκατέρω γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀληθεύεται κατ' ἀμφοτέρων· καὶ
γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ καὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ μὴ.
ἐπισκεπτέον δέ, μὴ δύναται εἶναι τοιαύτη ἡ λέγουσα “οὐδὲν λογικὸν
ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ νοεῖ” ἢ “οὐδὲν νοῦν ἔχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ νοεῖ”· εἰ γὰρ
199 ὑπάρχει τὸ νοεῖν, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης λογικῶ τὸ μὴ νοεῖν. δόξει
τοιαύτη εἶναι καὶ ἡ οὐδὲν σῶμα φυσικὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ κινεῖται κατὰ
φορὰν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ κυκλοφορία φορὰ, τῷ μὲν κυκλοφορητικῶ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης ὑπάρξει ἢ φορὰ, οὐδὲν δὲ ἔσται σῶμα, ᾧ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐκ
25 ὑπάρχει ἢ φορὰ. εἰ δὲ ἀληθῆ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἂν
εἴη οὐκ ἢ κατὰ τὸν διορισμὸν ἐνδεχομένη συναγομένη ἀλλ' ἢ
προειρημένη ἀντικειμένη τῇ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τινὶ μὴ, εἰς ἣν μετελήφθη ἢ
ἀπόφασις τῆς ἐνδεχομένης. εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ ταύτας ἐνδεχομένας τὰς κατὰ
τὸν διορισμὸν λέγοι, ὥσπερ οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον λέγουσιν, οὐκέτ' (ἂν)
ἀληθὲς εἴη τὸ τὰς ἐνδεχομένας καταφατικὰς τε καὶ ἀποφατικὰς
ἀντιστρέφειν ἀλλήλαις.

8 ὑπάρχειν *a*: ὑπάρχον *BM*
lies

15 δ *Wallies*: τὸ *libri*

40 ἂν *add. Wal-*
lies

103C [Ammonius], In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.13 32a16 (CAG t.4.6 p.45.42-46.2 Wallies)

οἱ δ' ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ, Θεόφραστος καὶ Εὐδημος, καὶ ἔτι οἱ
Πλατωνικοὶ, οὐ βούλονται ἐνδεχομένην ἀπόφασιν ἀντιστρέφειν πρὸς
ἐνδεχομένην κατάφασιν, ἐπειδὴ οὐ μένει τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχ-
όμενον, περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος. οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ὑπὸ τεχνῶν προβάλλον-
46 ται, αἱ περὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχόμενον ἔχουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται 5

and some of necessity do not breathe, and this would be the proper
contradictory of “possibly belongs to none”. But “not possibly
belongs to none” would be of this kind, for through “of necessity
it does not belong to some” and through “of necessity it does belong
to some” alike, the proposition “It is not possible for breathing to
belong to no animal” is true. But the negation of “possibly belongs
to all” — “not possibly belongs to all” is also equally true with this
subject-matter. For “not possibly belongs to none” is likewise true,
for both of these expressions are true of both cases, both of the
“of necessity to some”, and of the “of necessity to some not”. We
must enquire whether the proposition which says “No rational
thing of necessity does not think,” or “Nothing with a mind of
necessity does not think,” can be of this kind; for if one allowed
that the divine were rational too, thinking belongs to this of
199 necessity, and not thinking does not belong to anything rational
of necessity. “No physical body of necessity does not move in space”
will also appear to be of this kind: for if rotation is motion, motion
will belong of necessity to the rotating sphere, and there will be
no body to which of necessity motion does not belong. But if these
things are true, with that combination too the conclusion would
not be problematic according to the definition, but would be the
aforesaid contradictory of “of necessity to some not”, into which
the negation of “possibly belonging” was changed. For if one were
to say that these too were problematic according to the definition,
as those connected with Theophrastus say, it would no longer be
true that problematic affirmatives and negations convert with one
another.

¹ Assertoric universal major, problematic universal minor. Aristotle
tried to prove that the conclusion was problematic by *reductio ad impos-*
sibile, using *Bocardo* with a necessary major premise.

103C pseudo-Ammonius, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.13 32a16 (CAG vol.4.6 p.45.42-46.2 Wallies)

His (Aristotle's) colleagues, Theophrastus and Eudemus, and
also the Platonists, do not want the problematic negative to convert
with the problematic affirmative, since being more probable than
not, which is what reasoning¹ is about, is not retained. For there
are put forward syllogisms connected with technical matters which
46 involve being more probable than not: for if it is possible, looking

μηδένα άνθρωπον ἑξαδάκτυλον εἶναι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, ἐνδέχεται πάντα
 ἄνθρωπον καὶ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἑξαδάκτυλον εἶναι ἐπ' ἑλάττων.

1-7 Eudemus, fr. 13 Wehrli 2-5 cf. [Ammonium], *infra* p.57.32-4, *Platoni-*
cis solis nominatis 2-7 cf. *ibid.* p.58.4.7

103D [Ammonius], In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.14 32b38 (CAG t4.6
 p.49.7-12 Wallies)

εἰ δ' αἱ ἐνδεχόμεναι ἀντιστροφῶν οὐ παραδεκταὶ εἰσὶν ὡς μὴ
 φυλάττουσαι τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐνδεχόμενον, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ τὰς περὶ
 τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος ἐννοίας μετακινήσουσι Θεόφραστος καὶ Εὐδήμος
 καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος· διὰ γὰρ τὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀντιστροφῶν καὶ
 ἀτελεῖς ἦσαν ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι καὶ συλλογιστικοὶ τὴν ἐλάττονα
 ἀποφατικὴν ἔχοντες καὶ ὀκτὼ τὸν ἀριθμὸν.

1-6 Eudemus, fr. 14 Wehrli

104 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.8 30a9
 (CAG t.2.1 p.123.18-24 Wallies)

ὁ μὲντοι Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν αὐτοῦ Προτέρων ἀνα-
 λυτικῶν περὶ τούτων λέγων οὐ χρῆται τῷ δι' ἐκθέσεως τρόπῳ πρὸς τὴν
 δεῖξιν τοῦ συλλογιστικῶς εἶναι τὰς προκειμένας συμπλοκάς, ἀλλ'
 ὑπερέθετο τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον ὡς δεόμενον μὲν τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον
 ἀπαγωγῆς μηδέπω δὲ ὄντος προδήλου τοῦ συμβαινόντος διὰ τὸ μῆξιν
 γίνεσθαι προτάσεων, μηδέπω δ' εἶναι γνώριμον τὸ ἐκ τῶν μίξεων
 συναγόμενον.

105 Ibn Rušd, al-Masā'il 5 (p.123.5-8, 125.3-7, 127.7-18, 137.1-16 'Alawī)

الغرض في هذا القول أن نبيّن أن مذهب ارسطو في جهات النتائج الحادثة
 عن المقييس المركبة من مقدمات مختلطتين من المقدمات نوات الجهات الثلاث —
 أعني الوجودية والضرورية والممكنة — هو المذهب الحق الذي لا يصحّ غيره لا ما
 توهمه ثاوفرسطس وثامسطيوس وكثير من قدماء المشائين ...

at the majority, that no man has six fingers, it is possible, looking
 at the minority, for all men and for some man to have six fingers.

¹ Or, "the argument".

103D pseudo-Ammonius, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.14 32b38 (CAG
 vol.4.6 p.49.7-12 Wallies)

But if the conversion of problematic propositions is not accept-
 able because it does not preserve the majority aspect of probability,
 it is clear that Theophrastus and Eudemus and the Platonists will
 not change their ideas about the first figure either; for through the
 conversion of problematics there were arguments in the first figure
 with a negative minor which were both imperfect, and valid, syllogisms —
 bringing the total to eight in number.

104 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.8 30a9
 (CAG vol.2.1 p.123.18-24 Wallies)

Theophrastus, however, talking about these matters in the first
 book of his *Prior Analytics*, does not use the method of exposition
 for the proof that the combinations set out earlier lead to syllogisms,
 but he postponed discussion of them because it needed *reductio ad*
impossibile, and it was not yet clear what the result would be be-
 cause of the mixture of premises,¹ and because what conclusion
 could be drawn from mixed premises was not yet known.

¹ Aristotle was here considering a syllogism with premises and con-
 clusion all necessary. *Reductio ad impossibile* would mean combining one nec-
 essary premise with the negation of the necessary conclusion, i.e. with a
 problematic premise.

105 Averroes, *Questions* 5 (p.123.5-8, 125.3-7, 127.7-18, 137.1-16 'Alawī)

Our purpose in this essay is to make clear that Aristotle's doc-
 trine about the modes of conclusions arising from syllogisms con-
 structed from two premises that are a mixture of premises having
 the three modes, that is, the existential, the necessary and the pos-
 sible, is the true and only valid doctrine, and (that the case is) not
 as Theophrastus, Themistius and many of the ancient Peripatetics
 imagined. . . .

- 125 وأما متى كانت الصغرى هي الممكنة وكانت الكبرى موجبة وجودية فإنه قال
فيها إن النتيجة تكون ممكنة وقال إن هذا الاقتران غير تام وبينه بطريق
الخلف ولم يرد هاهنا بقوله هذا أن النتيجة تكون ولا بد ممكنة كما توهمه عليه
ثاوفرسطس وغيره واحتجوا عليه بأنه قد يرى أن جهة النتيجة قد تكون تابعة
لأخس الجهتين الموضوعتين في مقدمتي القياس ...
- 127 وأما ثاوفرسطس وأوزيموس وكثير من قدماء المشائين وثامسطيوس من
المتأخرين فإنهم جزموا بتغليطه وتخطئته في قوله في المقاييس المختلطة من
الوجودية والضرورية أن جهة النتيجة فيها تابعة لجهة المقدمة الكبرى وقالوا بل
جهة النتيجة تابعة في كل ضرب من ضروب الاختلاط لأخس الجهتين
الموضوعتين في المقدمتين فتكون النتيجة وجودية في المقاييس المركبة من
الوجودي والضروري وكذلك تكون ممكنة عندهم في المركبة من الممكن والضروري
أو الممكن والوجودي واحتجوا لذلك بما يظهر من ذلك في المقاييس المختلطة من
المواد الممكنة والضرورية والممكنة والوجودية ويجعل ارسطو الإنتاج في هذه
المواد لأخس الجهتين وذلك بحسب ظنهم الذي ظنوا في هذا الإنتاج من أنه أراد
أن نتائجها إنما تكون ممكنة فقط وقالوا في هذا إنها قياسات تامة كما تلك وإنه
لا فرق بين التي تكون في هذا الاختلاط والتي تكون في اختلاط الوجودي مع
الضروري ...
- 137 وأما ثاوفرسطس وثامسطيوس وغيرهم من المشائين فإنهم لما ظنوا أنه لا
فرق بين المفهوم من قولنا «كل ب أ» إذا أردنا أنه ليس بعض ب أ بل جميع
أجزاء ب أ وبين المفهوم من قولنا «كل ب أ» إذا أردنا أن كل ما هو ب فهو
أ بل توهموا أن هذا المعنى الثاني هو الأول بعينه وأنه ليس يفهم في الحمل إلا
الشيء الأول فقط لا المعنيين جميعاً كما نعتقد نحن وذلك أنه من البين بنفسه أن
قولنا «كل ب أ» معناه أن كل جزء من ب وكل ما هو موصوف ب ب «ف» هو أ

- 125 He (Aristotle) said that when the minor is the possible premise
and the major is affirmative existential, the conclusion will be possible.
He said that this conjunction is imperfect and explained it by *reductio ad impossibile*.
By this statement he did not mean here that the conclusion cannot but be possible,
as Theophrastus and others imagined him to have said and argued against him by saying
that he sometimes thinks that the mode of the conclusion may follow the inferior of
the two modes posited in the two premises of the syllogism. . . .
- 127 Theophrastus, Eudemus and many of the ancient Peripatetics,
and Themistius among the later ones, charged Aristotle emphatically with having
committed an error when he said about syllogisms containing a mixture of existential
and necessary premises that the mode of their conclusion follows the mode of the major
premise. They said that on the contrary the mode of the conclusion follows in every
kind of mixture the inferior of the two modes posited in the two premises, so that
the conclusion of syllogisms composed of the existential and the necessary would be
existential, and similarly, according to them, that (of syllogisms) composed of the
possible and the necessary, or the possible and the existential, would be possible.
In support of their view they advanced the argument that this is what appears from
syllogisms containing a mixture of possible and necessary matters and of possible
and existential matters, and that Aristotle assigns the derivation of the conclusion
with these matters to the inferior of the two modes. This (argument) is in accordance
with what they thought about this derivation of the conclusion, namely, that he
(Aristotle) meant that their conclusions can be possible only; and they further said
about them that they are perfect syllogisms like the others, and that there is no
difference between syllogisms with this mixture and those with a mixture of the
existential and the necessary. . . .
- 137 Theophrastus, Themistius and other Peripatetics thought that there is no
difference between what is understood from the statement "Every B is A" when we
mean that it is not the case that some B is A but all parts of B are A, and what is
understood from the statement "Every B is A" when we mean that everything that is
B is A. They imagined that this second meaning is exactly the same as the first,
and that what is understood in the predication is the first thing only, not both
meanings together, as we believe. That is to say, it is self-evident that our
statement "Every B is A" means that every part of B, and everything qualified as B,
is A,

حتى تكون الكلية حاصرة لجميع الأجزاء التي من قبل الكمية والتي من قبل
الكيفية - أعني الحمل

30 فلما ظننا كما قلنا أن المفهوم من قولنا إن «كل ب أ» أي كل جزء من ب
«ف» هو أ قالوا فواجب متى كانت كل ب «أ» باضطرار وكانت ح ب بالفعل ألا
تكون أ موجودة باضطرار على ح وإلا فمن أين وجد لها الاضطرار لأنها
إنما فرضت باضطرار على جميع أجزاء ب وح ليس جزءاً من ب وإنما هي
غيرها وإذا كان شئ يحمل على شئ حمل اضطرار ويحمل ذلك الشئ المحمول
35 على شئ ثالث يغير اضطرار فليس يلزم أن يكون حملاً على الثالث باضطرار
وذلك إلزام صحيح إذا سلمنا لهم أن المفهوم من الحمل الكلي هو هذا
المعنى فقط - أعني ما يفهم من المقدمة الكلية من جهة ما هي مقابلة للجزئية -
إلا أنه ليس يلزم من هذا أن تكون النتيجة إذا سلمنا هذا تابعة لجهة المقدمة
الكبرى كما يقوله ارسطو

5-7 قال ... قوله هذا Aristoteles, Anal. Pr. 1.15 34a1-5, 34a34-b2

الموضوعية: corr. Gutas: الموضوعتين 9 ed. Alawī نرى: corr. Gutas: يرى 8
ed. Alawī 13 تابعة corr. Gutas: تابع ed. Alawī 27
1 add. Gutas ف 31 add. Gutas ف 31 add. Gutas ف 31
1 add. Gutas ف 31

106A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9
30a15 (CAG t.2.1 p.124.8-30 Wallies)

οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὕτως λέγει. οἱ δὲ γε ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ οἱ περὶ Εὐδημόν
τε καὶ Θεόφραστον οὐχ οὕτως λέγουσι, ἀλλὰ φασιν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐξ
ἀναγκαίας τε καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συζυγίαις, ἐὰν ὅσι συγκείμεναι
συλλογιστικῶς, ὑπάρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοῦτο λαμβάνοντες
ἐκ τε τοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς τὸ συμπέρασμα αἰεὶ τῷ ἑλάττονι
καὶ χείρονι τῶν κειμένων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι. ἂν τε γὰρ ἐκ καταφατικῆς καὶ
ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως, συνάγεται ἀποφατικὸν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἂν τ'
ἐκ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. τὸν αὐτὸν
δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν ἔχειν. ὑπάρχον γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς
ἐξ ἀναγκαίας καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συμπλοκαῖς τῷ ἑλάττον εἶναι τὸ
10 ὑπάρχον τοῦ ἀναγκαίου. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο δεικνύουσιν. εἰ γὰρ
τὸ Β τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει μὲν παντί, οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐνδέχεται ποτε αὐτὸ
καὶ ἀπορριπθῆναι αὐτοῦ. ὅτε δὴ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ ἀπέξευκται, τότε καὶ τὸ

so that the (concept of) totality would encompass all parts, both
from the point of view of their quantity and from that of their
quality, i.e., the predication.

Now since they thought, as we said, that what is understood
from our statement "Every B is A" is that every part of B is A,
they said: When every B is necessarily A, and C is B actually, A
must not exist necessarily for C; for if it did, where would it have
gotten the necessity from? Because it (A) was postulated necessarily
for all parts of B only, while C is not a part of B but merely
something else. When something is predicated of something else
necessarily, and this (first) predicated thing is predicated of yet a
third not necessarily, it does not follow that its predication of the
third thing would be necessary.

This is a valid sequence, should we grant them that what is
understood from universal predication is this meaning only, i.e.,
what is understood from the universal premise in so far as it is
the opposite of the particular. Except that should we grant that,
it does not follow from this that the conclusion would follow the
mode of the major premise, as Aristotle says.

106A Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.9 30a15
(CAG vol.2.1 p.124.8-30 Wallies)

He (Aristotle) then says this, but his colleagues, those associated
with Eudemus and Theophrastus, do not say this, but say that in
all the pairs with a necessary and an assertoric premise, if they
are so related as to lead to a syllogism, the conclusion is assertoric,
taking this from the claim that in all combinations the conclusion
always resembles the inferior and weaker of the assumptions; for
if, from an affirmative and a negative premise, the conclusion drawn
is negative, and if from a universal and a particular the conclusion
is also particular, the same holds for mixed modes: for the
conclusion is assertoric in combinations of necessary and assertoric,
because the assertoric is inferior to the necessary. But they also
prove it by this argument: if B belongs to all C, but not of necessity,
it is possible for it also at some time to be disjoined from it: when

Α αὐτοῦ ἀποζευχθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ὑπάρξει.
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης δεικνύουσι τοῦτο ἔχον οὕτως. λάβοντες γὰρ τὴν
 μείζονα καθόλου ἀναγκαίαν ἀποφατικὴν ἢ καταφατικὴν καὶ τὴν
 ἐλάττωνα καθόλου καταφατικὴν ὑπάρχουσαν δεικνύουσιν ὑπάρχον
 γινόμενον τὸ συμπέρασμα. τὸ γὰρ ζῶον παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης,
 ὁ ἄνθρωπος παντὶ κινουμένῳ ὑπαρχέτω· οὐκέτι τὸ ζῶον παντὶ
 κινουμένῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν κατὰ παντὸς
 γραμματικῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ γραμματικὸν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου
 ὑπαρχόντως, οὐκέτι τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης. καὶ τὸ μὲν κινεῖσθαι διὰ σκελῶν κατὰ παντὸς περιπατούντος
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ περιπατεῖν παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπαρχέτω· οὐκέτι γὰρ τὸ
 κινεῖσθαι παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐξ ἀνάγκης.

1-25 *Eudemus, fr. 11a Wehrli*

106B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9 30a15
 (CAG t.2.1 p.132.23-34 Wallies)

Θεόφραστος δὲ, ὅτι μὴ ἀναγκαῖον γίνεται τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐν τῇ
 τοιαύτῃ συμπλοκῇ, οὕτω λέγει· “εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν Β τῷ Γ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ
 δὲ Α τῷ Β μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης κἂν χωρισθεῖη, φανερόν,
 ὡς τοῦ Β χωριζόμενον καὶ τοῦ Γ χωρισθήσεται τὸ Α, ὥστ’ οὐκ ἐξ
 ἀνάγκης διὰ τῶν κειμένων”. ἢ δειχθέντι προστίθῃσιν “ὡσαύτως δὲ, καὶ
 εἰ ἀναγκαῖα ἢ μείζων· ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ μέσον οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, κἂν
 χωρισθεῖη· τούτου δὲ χωριζομένου καὶ τὸ μείζον. εἰ γὰρ τις οὕτως
 λάβῃ ‘καθ’ οὗ τὸ Β, καὶ τὸ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης’ ὡσπερ ἀναγκαίως ἀμφοτέρως
 λαμβάνει· μὴ γὰρ οὕτως λαβόντος ψεῦδος”. διὰ γὰρ τούτων δείκνυσι
 Θεόφραστος, ὅτι ἐν αἷς μίξεσιν ὑπάρχουσα καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐστίν,
 ὁποῦρα ἂν αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖα ἦ, ὑπάρχον τὸ συμπέρασμα.

106C Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9 30a15
 (CAG t.2.1 p.126.29-127.16 Wallies)

ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς εἰσὶ τινες οἱ τὸ λεγόμενον
 ὑπ’ Ἀριστοτέλους, ὅτι καλῶς εἴρηται, δεικνύουσι πειρώμενοι. ἔστω γὰρ
 ἢ μίξις ἐκκειμένη, καὶ τὸ μὲν Α τῷ Β παντὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχέτω, τὸ
 δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπαρχέτω μόνον· λέγω ὅτι τὸ Α τῷ Γ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντί.

B has been disjoined from C, then A too will have been disjoined
 from it: but if this is so, then it will not belong to it of necessity.
 And they also show that this is so by examples. For, taking the major
 as universal necessary, negative or affirmative, and the minor as
 universal affirmative assertoric, they show that the conclusion is
 assertoric. For let animal belong to every man of necessity, man in
 fact to every moving thing: yet animal does not belong to every
 moving thing of necessity. Again, if having knowledge is of every
 literate being of necessity, and being literate in fact is of every man,
 yet having knowledge is not of every man of necessity. And let
 moving on legs be of every walking thing of necessity, and let
 walking belong in fact to every man: yet moving (on legs) does
 not belong to every man of necessity.

106B Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.9 30a15
 (CAG vol.2.1 p.132.23-34 Wallies)

Theophrastus, to show that the conclusion in a combination of
 this kind¹ is not necessary, says this: “For if B is of C of necessity,
 and A of B not of necessity, and if what was not of necessity were
 separated, it is clear that, when separated from B, A will also be
 separated from C, so that on the assumptions it is not of it of
 necessity.” He adds to this demonstration: “Likewise too if the major
 is necessary; for since the middle is not of necessity, it might be
 separated, but if this is separated, so is the major (term). For if some-
 one takes ‘of what B, A too of necessity’ like this, he takes both
 as necessary. For if he does not take it like this, it is false.” Through
 these arguments Theophrastus shows that in those mixtures in
 which there is an assertoric and a necessary, whichever of them is
 necessary, the conclusion is assertoric.

¹ With one premise necessary and the other assertoric.

106C Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.9 30a15
 (CAG vol.2.1 p.126.29-127.16 Wallies)

But there are some who try to show by *reductio ad impossibile*
 that what Aristotle has said has been well said. Let the mixture (in
 Barbara) be assumed, and let A belong to all B of necessity, but
 let B belong only as a matter of fact to all C. I say that A belongs

εἰ γὰρ μή, τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Γ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· κείται ⁵
 δὲ καὶ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης· γίνεται δὴ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι
 συζυγία ἐκ καθόλου καταφατικῆς τῆς μείζονος ἀναγκαίας καὶ ἐπὶ
 127 μέρους ἀποφατικῆς ἐνδεχομένης τῆς ἐλάττονος ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφατικῶν
 ἐνδεχόμενον συνάγουσα, καθ' ἃ καὶ Θεοφράστῳ τε καὶ Εὐδήμῳ δοκεῖ.
 τὸ ἄρα Β τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεται τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· ἀλλ' ὑπέκειτο παντὶ ¹⁰
 ὑπάρχειν.

ἔστι δὲ πιστώσασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ὑγιές
 ἐστὶ, μάλιστα διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς τῆς γινομένης ἐν τρίτῳ
 σχήματι. κείσθω γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α παντὶ τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ
 τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν· λέγω ὅτι τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ γὰρ μή, τὸ ¹⁵
 ἀντικείμενον τὸ Α τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεται τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· κείται δὲ καὶ τὸ
 Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν· γίνεται ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι συζυγία ἐξ
 ὑπαρχούσης καθόλου καταφατικῆς τῆς ἐλάττονος καὶ ἐνδεχομένης ἐπὶ
 μέρους ἀποφατικῆς τῆς μείζονος ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφατικῶν ἐνδεχόμενον
 συνάγουσα. τὸ ἄρα Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται τινὶ μή, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον· κείται ²⁰
 γὰρ παντὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἐν γὰρ τῇ τοιαύτῃ συζυγίᾳ τῇ ἐν τρίτῳ σχήματι
 καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἐταίροις αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐνδεχόμενον
 ἀποφατικῶν γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα. τοσοῦτοις καὶ τοιοῦτοις ἂν τις
 χρήσαιτο παριστάμενος τῇ περὶ τούτων Ἀριστοτέλους δόξῃ. τί δὲ
 τούτων ὑγιῶς ἢ μὴ ὑγιῶς λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ, ἐν ἄλλοις ἡμῖν, ὡς ἔφην, μετὰ ²⁵
 ἀκριβείας εἴρηται.

1-11 Eudemus, fr. 11b Wehrli 24-6 Alexander Aphrod. ad 1.9 30a15
 (p.125.30) et cf. ad 1.16 35b37 (p.207.35-6); ad 1.16 36a25 (p.213.25-7); ad 1.19
 38b3 (p.238.36-8); ad 1.22 40a4 (p.249.37-250.1)

106D Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9 30a15 (CAG t.13.2
 p.123.12-20 et 124.9-125.18 Wallies)

καὶ ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος, ὡς περ εἶπομεν, βούλεται αἰεὶ τῇ μείζονι
 ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ συμπέρασμα· διὸ καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὕτως ἔχουσῶν τῶν
 προτάσεων ἀναγκαῖον φησι συνάγεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα. οἱ δὲ ἐταῖροι
 αὐτοῦ οἱ περὶ Θεοφράστον καὶ Εὐδήμον καὶ ἔτι οἱ ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος οὐ
 φασιν οὕτως ἔχειν οὐδὲ πάντως τῇ μείζονι ἀκολουθεῖν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ⁵
 ἀλλ' ὑπάρχον αἰεὶ γίνεσθαι. ἄξιον οὖν ἐκθέσθαι πρότερον τὴν τε
 Ἀριστοτελικὴν δεῖξιν καὶ ὅσα οἱ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ συνηγοροῦντες εἰς
 ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ τοιοῦτου προστιθέασιν, εἶτα καὶ ἄπερ οἱ τῇ ἐναντία
 παριστάμενοι δόξῃ φασί, καὶ οὕτως τὰ ἰκανὰ διαστήσαι τῷ ¹⁰
 λόγῳ. . . .

to all C of necessity. For if not, the opposite is that it is possible
 for A not to belong to some C. But it is assumed that A belongs
 also of necessity to every B: there arises then a combination in
 the second figure from a major universal affirmative necessary and
 a particular negative problematic minor, implying a particular
 negative problematic conclusion (Baroco), according to what both
 127 Theophrastus and Eudemus also think. B, then, may possibly not
 belong to some C: but it was supposed to belong to all.

It is possible to confirm that what Aristotle says is valid, es-
 pecially through *reductio ad impossibile* using the third figure. As-
 sume that A belongs to all B of necessity, and B in fact to all C.
 I say that A belongs to all C of necessity. For if not, the opposite
 is that it is possible for A not to belong to some C. But it is assumed
 that B belongs to all C: there arises then a combination in the third
 figure, with the minor assertoric universal affirmative and a
 problematic particular negative major, implying a particular nega-
 tive problematic conclusion (Bocardo). A, then, may possibly not
 belong to some B, which is impossible; for it is assumed that it
 belongs to all of necessity. For in this kind of combination in the
 third figure it seems to both Aristotle and his colleagues¹ that the
 conclusion is particular problematic negative. So many and such
 arguments a man might use supporting the opinion of Aristotle on
 these points. But which of these seems to be stated validly or
 invalidly, I have said in detail elsewhere, as I said.

¹ I.e., Theophrastus and Eudemus.

106D Philoponus, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.9 30a15 (CAG vol.13.2
 p.123.12-20 and 124.9-125.18 Wallies)

And the philosopher (Aristotle), as we said, wants the conclu-
 sion always to agree with the major premise. So here too, with the
 premises being like this,¹ he says that they lead to a necessary con-
 clusion. But his colleagues, those associated with Theophrastus and
 Eudemus, and again the followers of Plato, say that it is not so,
 and that the conclusion does not in every case follow the major
 premise, but is always assertoric. It is worthwhile, therefore, to set
 out first the proof of Aristotle, and what those who agree with the
 philosopher add to the demonstration of this matter, and then what
 those supporting the opposite opinion say, and so sort out what
 is relevant to the argument. . . .

124 οἱ δὲ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ ἐνίστανται πρὸς τὰ εἰρημένα, καὶ πρῶτον πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτελικὴν δεῖξιν οὕτως ἐξ αὐτῆς (τῆς) τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος σημασίας. ἀναγκαῖον, φασίν, ἐστὶν ὃ παντὶ καὶ αἰεὶ ὑπάρχει, ὑπάρχον δὲ ὅπερ ἐστὶ μὲν ἐν τῷ πράγματι, δύναται δὲ καὶ ἀπογενέσθαι αὐτοῦ. εἰ τοίνυν τὸ Β τῷ Γ οὐκ ἀναγκαίως ὑπάρχει, 15 δύναται ἄρα χωρισθῆναι αὐτοῦ· εἰ δὲ χωρίζεται τὸ Β τοῦ Γ, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρξει τῷ Γ τὸ Α. εἰ γὰρ χωρισθεῖ τὸ μέσον τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὐκ ἔξει τὸ ἄκρον δι' ὅτου συναφθῆ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ· ὥστε εἰ ὑπάρξει τῷ Γ τὸ Α, οὐκ ἀναγκαίως αὐτῷ ὑπάρξει. καὶ γὰρ κακῶς ὑπέθεσθε, φασίν, ὅτι εἰ τὸ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, μέρος δὲ τοῦ Β τὸ Γ, τὸ ἄρα Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ κυρίως αὐτοῦ 20 μέρεσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε τοῖς ποτὲ μὲν οὖσιν αὐτοῦ μέρεσι ποτὲ δὲ μή. τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ παντὶ μὲν ὑπῆρχεν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δέ, ὥστε δύναται καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος φύσις, τὸ ὑπάρχον μὲν δυνάμενον δὲ καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. εἰ τοίνυν 25 δυνατὸν τὸ Γ τοῦ Β μὴ εἶναι μέρος (οὕτω γὰρ ἐδείχθη), πρόδηλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.

ὅτι γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πρόδηλον καὶ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὄρων παραθέσεως· ἔστωσαν γὰρ ὅροι “κίνησις”, “βάδισις”, “ἄνθρωπος”. κίνησις μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάση βαδίζει ὑπάρχει, βάδισις δὲ παντὶ 30 ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπαρχόντως, καὶ συνάγεται κίνησις παντὶ ἀνθρώπῳ ὑπαρχόντως, καὶ πάλιν “ἀρετή”, “φρόνησις”, “ἄνθρωπος”. καὶ καθόλου δεῖ λαμβάνειν καὶ καθολικώτερον τι καὶ μερικώτερον καὶ τι τούτων ὑπαρχόντως μετέχον καὶ τὸ μὲν καθολικώτερον τιθέναι μείζονα ὄρον, 35 τὸ δὲ μετέχον ἐλάττωνα.

πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεῖξιν οὕτως ἐνίστανται, ὅτι τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ δεῖξομεν οὐ μόνον ἀναγκαῖον καταφατικὸν συναγόμενον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ καθόλου καταφατικὸν ὑπάρχον καὶ ἔτι τὸ καθόλου καταφατικὸν ἐνδεχόμενον. λέγομεν γὰρ, φασίν, ὅτι συνάγεται συμπεράσμα τὸ Α 40 παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ψεῦδος, ἀληθὲς τὸ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ Α τῷ Γ. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ Α τῷ Γ οὐ παντὶ ὑπάρχει, ὑπέκειτο δὲ καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Γ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ ἄρα Α οὐ παντὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρξει· γίνεται γὰρ τὸ τρίτον σχῆμα ἐκ τῶν δύο ὑπαρχουσῶν προτάσεων. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ· τὸ ἄρα Α τῷ Β καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ ὑπάρχει καὶ ὑπάρχει οὐ παντὶ, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ δῆ, φασί, καὶ τὸ καθόλου 45 ἐνδεχόμενον δυνατὸν συναγαγεῖν. λέγω γὰρ ὅτι οὕτως ἐχουσῶν τῶν προτάσεων συνάγεται τὸ Α τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεσθαι παντὶ ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ψεῦδος, ἀληθὲς τὸ ἀνάγκη μὴ παντὶ. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν Α τῷ Γ ἀνάγκη μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ Β τῷ Γ παντὶ ὑπῆρχε, τὸ ἄρα Α

124 But his (Aristotle's) colleagues object to what has been said, and first to the proof given by Aristotle. (They object) in the following manner from the very meaning of necessary and actual: necessary, they say, is what belongs to everything and always, actual what is indeed in the thing, but can also become apart from it. If therefore B belongs to C not necessarily, it can then be separated from it: but if B is separated from C, A will not belong to C of necessity. For if the middle (term) were separated from the last, the first will not have a means of being joined to the last; so that even if A will belong to C, it will not belong to it of necessity. For you supposed wrongly, they say, that if A of necessity belongs to all B, and C is a part of B, A will then of necessity belong to all C. For it belongs of necessity to all its parts which are real parts of it, but not to those which are sometimes parts of it and sometimes not. And B belonged to all C, but not of necessity, so that it can also not belong; for this is the nature of the actual, that it is what actually belongs but can also not belong. If then it is possible for C not to be a part of B (for this was proved), it is clear that it (A) will not belong of necessity to all C.

That this is so, is clear also from instances of terms: for let the terms be “movement”, “walking”, “man”: movement of necessity belongs to all walking, and walking to all men in fact, and the conclusion is drawn that movement belongs to all men in fact. And again, “virtue”, “prudence”, “man”. And in general we must take something more universal and something more particular, and something partaking of these in fact, and make the more universal the major term, and that which partakes the minor.

To the proof *per impossibile*² they object like this, that in this way we will prove not only a necessary affirmative conclusion but also a universal affirmative assertoric, and even a universal affirmative problematic. For we say, they say, that the implied conclusion is that A belongs to all C; for if this is false, it is true that A does not belong to all C. Since, then, A does not belong to all C, and it was assumed that B belonged to all C, A, then, will not belong to all B: for the third figure arises from the two assertoric premises. But it originally belonged to all of necessity. A, then both belongs to all B of necessity and does not belong to all, which is impossible. But further, they say, it is possible to draw also a universal problematic conclusion. For I say that when the premises are like this, the conclusion is that A may possibly belong to all C. For if this is false, it is true that necessarily (it does) not (belong) to all.

τῷ Β ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐ παντὶ ἢ ὑπάρχει οὐ παντί· τοῦτο γὰρ ποτέρας⁵⁰
 ἔχει, ἔτι ἀμφισβητήσιμον. ἦν δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α· τὸ
 αὐτὸ ἄρα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ καὶ ὑπάρχει οὐ παντὶ ἢ ἀνάγκη
 οὐ παντί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. ὥστε, φασίν, ἢ εἰς ἄτοπον ἀπαγωγή οὐδὲν
 ἦττον δείξει καθόλου καταφατικὸν ἀναγκαῖον συνάγεσθαι τὸ συμ-
 πέρασμα ἢ ἐνδεχόμενον καθόλου καταφατικὸν ἢ ὑπάρχον καθόλου⁵⁵
 καταφατικόν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐκείνοι τὴν εἰς ἄτοπον δεῖξιν ψευδῆ
 δεικνύουσι διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι τῇ αὐτῇ εἰς ἄτοπον δεῖξει ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν
 προτάσεων πλείονα συνάγεσθαι συμπεράσματα.

1-6 Eudemus, fr. 11d Wehrli 2 ὅσπερ εἶπομεν] p.122.28 11-12
 Aristoteles, Anal. pr. 1.9 30a21-3; Philoponus, In Arist. Anal. pr. p.123.21-5
 36 Philoponus, In Arist. Anal. pr. p.123.25-124.1

12 τῆς (pr.) add. Wallies 13 φασίν Υ: φησὶν BVt 15 ἀπογενέσθαι]
 ἀπάγεσθαι Vt 27 τῷ Γ τὸ Α conī. Wallies 35 τὸ δὲ μερικώτερον
 μέσον, τὸ δὲ conī. Wallies 39 λέγομεν] λέγω Vt φασίν Υ: φησὶν
 BVt 52-3 τῷ αὐτῷ . . . ἀδύνατον Vt: καὶ παντὶ καὶ οὐ παντὶ δ' ἄτοπον Β
 53 φασίν Υ: φησὶν BVt

106E [Ammonius], In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9 30a15 (CAG t.4.6
 p.38.38-39.10 Wallies)

οἱ δ' ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ, Θεόφραστος καὶ Εὐδήμος, καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ
 Πλάτωνος καθόλου καὶ νῦν τῇ χεῖρονι ἔπεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα φασίν
 ὅσπερ καὶ ἐν ποσῶ καὶ ἐν ποιῶ. τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων ἠκολούθησαν
³⁹ Ἀριστοτέλει μὲν Ἀλέξανδρος καὶ Ἰάμβλιχος, Θεοφράστῳ δὲ καὶ
 Εὐδήμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος Θεμιστίος, Συριανός, Πρόκλος. ὅτι⁵
 τοῖνον ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τῆς μείζονος καὶ ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἐλάττονος
 ἀναγκαῖον συνάγεται, δεικνύσιν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης οὕτως· εἰ τὸ Α παντὶ
 τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπαρχόντως, τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ
 ἐξ ἀνάγκης διὰ τὸν ὅρον τοῦ "κατὰ παντός". ἀλλ' οὐ παντὶ μέρει, φασί,
 τοῦ Β τὸ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει, ἀλλὰ μόνοις τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοις αὐτοῦ¹⁰
 μέρεσιν· ὧν οὐκ ἔστιν τὸ Γ διὰ τὸ ὑπάρχουσαν εἶναι τὴν ΒΓ πρότασιν·
 διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο δύναται τὸ Γ τοῦ Β μηδὲν ὑπάρχον μέρος εἶναι, ὅτε
 χωρίζεται αὐτοῦ. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ Α τοῦ Β ἀχώριστόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ Β τοῦ

Since, then, it is necessary that A does not belong to all C, but B
 belonged to all C, A then either of necessity does not belong to
 all B, or in fact does not belong to all. For which of these is so
 is still uncertain. But originally A belonged to all B of necessity.
 The same belongs to the same, then, both of necessity to all and
 in fact not to all, or necessarily not to all, which is impossible. So
 that, they say, the *reductio ad impossibile* will show no less that the
 conclusion is universal affirmative necessary than problematic uni-
 versal affirmative or assertoric universal affirmative. In this way,
 then, they show that the *ad absurdum* proof is false by showing that
 in the same *ad absurdum* proof with the same premises several con-
 clusions are drawn.

¹ major apodeictic, minor assertoric.

² This argument is not attributed to Aristotle, but to others who sup-
 ported his views.


106E pseudo-Ammonius, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.9 30a15 (CAG
 vol.4.6 p.38.38-39.10 Wallies)

But his (Aristotle's) colleagues, Theophrastus and Eudemus,
 and the followers of Plato, generally, and here in particular, say
 that the conclusion agrees with the weaker (premise), as it does
³⁹ in quantity and quality. Of the younger men, Alexander and
 Iamblichus followed Aristotle, but Themistius, Syrianus and Proclus
 followed Theophrastus, Eudemus, and the followers of Plato. That
 therefore from a necessary major and an assertoric minor a
 necessary conclusion is drawn, Aristotle shows like this: if A
 belongs to all B of necessity, but B to all C in fact, A belongs to
 all C of necessity through the definition of "of all". But it is not
 to every part of B, they say, that A of necessity belongs, but to
 its necessary parts alone. C is not one of these because the BC
 premise is assertoric. For because of this, C can be no actual part
 of B, when it is separated from it. And since A is inseparable from

Γ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ Α τοῦ Γ χωρίζεται, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. 15

1-3 [Ammonius], *infra* in 40a13 (p.65.14-15), *comitibus (Aristotelis) et Platonicis nominatis* 1-5 Eudemus, fr. 11c Wehrli 5-7 cf. Arist. Anal. pr. 1.1 24b26-30

13-15 *ad hos versus signum appictum est, cui respondent in mg. haec:* ὅτι γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πρόδηλον καὶ ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὄρων παραθέσεως



καὶ καθόλου δεῖ λαμβάνειν καθολικώτερον τι καὶ μερικώτερον καὶ τι τούτων ὑπαρχόντως μετέχον καὶ τὸ μὲν καθολικώτερον τιθένα μείζονα ὄρον, τὸ δὲ μετέχον ἐλάττονα

106F [Ammonius], In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9 30a15 (CAG t.4.6 p.40.2-16 et 37-40 Wallies)


οἱ δὲ περὶ Θεόφραστον δικαιολογῶνται οὕτως· τίς ἢ ἀποκλήρωσις μὴ καὶ ἐπὶ (τούτων) τῶν τρόπων τῆ χειρόνι ἔπεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα; ἢ τίς ἢ ἀποκλήρωσις ἐν μόνῳ τῷ τετάρτῳ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τῷ πέμπτῳ τοῦ τρίτου τῆ χειρόνι κατ' Ἀριστοτέλη ἔπεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα; διὰ τί δὲ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τὰς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον συναγούσας οὐ δείκνυσι διὰ τῶν ὄρων ἀλλὰ διὰ μόνου τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, τὰς δ' ὑπάρχον καὶ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου λόγου καὶ δι' ὄρων; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ ὑπάρχον συνάγεσθαι καὶ μὴ εὐπορεῖν ὄρων τὸ ἀναγκαῖον συναγόντων, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς καθόλου λόγοις παρακρούεσθαι ἡμᾶς· ἅπας δὲ λόγος, ἂν ἀπῆ τὰ ἔργα, μάταιόν τι φαίνεται καὶ κενόν. 10

καὶ εἰ ἐν δευτέρῳ σχήματι τῆ γινομένη μείζονα ἐν τῆ εἰς τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα ἀναγωγῆ ἔπεται τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ τοῦ τρίτου σχήματος ἐξ ὑπαρχούσης καὶ ἀναγκαῖας καὶ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον συνάγεται τῷ δύνασθαι ἐκατέραν μείζονα γενέσθαι ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι, εἰ καὶ ὅπου μὲν μίας ἀντιστροφῆς δεόμεθα, ὅπου δὲ δύο. 15

ἢ οὐκ ἀτοπον τοῦτο· ἐν γὰρ τῷ τρίτῳ σχήματι μερικὰ πάντα συνάγεται· δύναται δὲ τὸ μερικόν καὶ ὑπάρχον εἶναι καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· οἶον λευκὸν τινὶ ζῴῳ ὑπαρχόντως δι' ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀναγκαῖως διὰ

B, but B is separable from C, A is also separated from C, and because of this does not belong to it of necessity.¹

¹ There is a marginal note to this (see *apparatus criticus*): "For that this is so, is clear also from the setting out of terms:



And in general we must take something more universal and something more particular, and something partaking of these in fact, and make the more universal the major term, and that which partakes the minor."

106F pseudo-Ammonius, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.9 30a15 (CAG vol.4.6 p.40.2-16 and 37-40 Wallies)

But the associates of Theophrastus plead their case thus: by what random chance is it not the case that in these moods too the conclusion agrees with the weaker premise? Or by what random chance is it that only in the fourth mood of the second figure (Baroco) and the fifth of the third (Bocardo) does the conclusion, according to Aristotle, agree with the weaker premise? And why does Aristotle in the case of those leading to a necessary conclusion not show it by means of examples but only by a general argument, whereas with those leading to an assertoric conclusion he does it both by a general argument and by examples? It is clear that it is because the conclusion is always assertoric and he has no examples available leading to a necessary conclusion, but he leads us astray in his general arguments; every argument, if there are no facts, seems a vain and empty thing.

And if in the second figure the conclusion agrees with the premise which becomes the major in the reduction to the first figure, in the first mood of the third figure (Darapti), from assertoric and necessary premises both assertoric and necessary conclusions are drawn, because either premise can become the major in the first figure, even if in the one case we need one conversion, but in the other two.

But this is not paradoxical: for in the third figure all conclusions are particular; and the particular can be both assertoric and necessary, like white belonging to some animal in fact in the case of

κύκνον. . . .

ὅτι ἄπορος ἢ μίξις ὑπάρχοντος καὶ ἀναγκαίου· οὔτε γὰρ αἰεὶ 20
ὑπάρχον συνάγεται, ὡς οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ καὶ Θεόφραστος, διὰ τοὺς ὅρους
τούτους·



οὔτε τῆς μείζονος ἀναγκαίας οὔσης ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

4-10 cf. [Ammonium] p.41.18-19

2 τούτων add. Huby

106G Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.9 30a32 (CAG t.13.2 p.129.16-19 Wallies)

τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ πάλιν φασὶ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ
Εὐδημον· ὁπότερος γὰρ ἂν ἢ τῶν ὄρων ἀναγκαῖος, θατέρου ὄντος
ὑπάρχοντος τὸ συμπέρασμα ὑπάρχον ἔσται. καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρὸς τῷ
ἐλάττωι ἐχούσης τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνομολογεῖ.

1-3 Eudemus, fr. 11e Wehrli


1-2 καὶ Εὐδημον om. Vt

106H Ibn Rušd, Talhīs al-Qiyās 1.9 30a33-30b6 (p.179.8-180.4, 180.18-20, 180.24-26 Jéhamy)

وثاوفرسطس واوذيمنس من قدمات المشائين وثامسطيوس من متأخريهم ومن
تبعهم يرون أن جهة النتيجة تابعة لأخس الجهتين — أعنى أنها توجد أبداً في
مثال هذا التأليف تابعة للمقدمة المطلقة — فإن الوجود المطلق أخس من الوجود
الضروري

man and necessarily in the case of swan. . . .

That the mixture of assertoric and necessary is undecidable.¹
For neither is an assertoric conclusion always drawn, as the Pla-
tonists and Theophrastus (say), because of these terms:



nor when the major is necessary is the conclusion always necessary,
as Aristotle (says).

¹ The sentence is incomplete. The omitted (immediately preceding) sec-
tion contains an argument derived from Iamblichus, but here the views of
Theophrastus, Aristotle and Iamblichus are being rejected. We should there-
fore probably supply at the beginning of the sentence words like "I (pseudo-
Ammonius) say".

106G Philoponus, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.9 30a32 (CAG vol.13.2 p.129.16-19 Wallies)

About these (syllogisms¹), too, those associated with Theophras-
tus and Eudemus say the same things. For whichever of the terms²
is necessary, if the other is assertoric, the conclusion is assertoric.
And with regard to that (pair) which has necessity connected with
the minor, Aristotle himself also agrees.

¹ Those with one necessary and one assertoric premise, the major being
negative.

² I.e., premises.

106H Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.9 30a33-
30b6 (p.179.8-180.4, 180.18-20, 180.24-6 Jéhamy)

Theophrastus and Eudemus among the ancient Peripatetics,
Themistius among the later ones, and those who followed them
are of the opinion that the mode of the conclusion follows the
inferior of the two modes, that is, that in such a combination it
is found invariably to follow the absolute premise, since absolute
existence is inferior to necessary existence.

5 ومن أقوى ما يتمسكون به في ذلك أنهم يرون أن كل شيء كان فيه شيء
يجرى مجرى الجزء «شيء يجري مجرى» الكل فإنه متى حمل شيء حملاً ما على
الكل بجهة «ما» فيجب أن يحمل على الجزء بتلك الجهة بعينها ومتى حمل أيضاً
الجزء على شيء ما حملاً بجهة ما فيجب أن يحمل الكل على ذلك الشيء بتلك
الجهة بعينها ولما كان كل قياس فيه شيء يجري مجرى الكل «شيء يجري»
10 مجرى الجزء فمتى كانت إحدى المقدمتين مطلقة والأخرى ضرورية فلا يخلو ذلك
من أن تكون الضرورية هي الصغرى والمطلقة هي الكبرى أو الضرورية هي

الكبرى والمطلقة هي الصغرى

قالوا فإن كانت الضرورية هي الصغرى ففيها شيء يجري مجرى الكل وفيها
شيء يجري مجرى الجزء أما الذي يجري مجرى الكل فالحد الأوسط وأما الذي
15 يجري مجرى الجزء فالحد الأصغر فيجب متى حمل شيء بجهة ما على الكل الذي
هو الحد الأوسط أن يكون بتلك الجهة بعينها يحمل على الجزء الذي هو الطرف
الأصغر

ومتى كانت الضرورية هي المقدمة الكبرى كان الكل والجزء موجوداً فيها
أيضاً وأما الذي يجري مجرى الكل فالطرف الأكبر وأما الذي يجري مجرى
الجزء فالحد الأوسط فيجب متى حمل الجزء الذي هو الحد الأوسط على الطرف
20 الأصغر بجهة ما أن تكون تلك الجهة بعينها هي جهة حمل الكل الذي هو الطرف
الأكبر عليه قالوا فكيف ما كان يجب أن تكون جهة الحمل في النتيجة تابعة
لجهة المقدمة المطلقة ...

25 وأما ما يحتجون به أيضاً من أنه يجب أن تكون جهة النتيجة تابعة لأخص
جهتي المقدمتين كالحال في الإيجاب والسلب — أعني أنه متى كانت إحدى
المقدمتين موجبة والأخرى سالبة ان النتيجة تتبع السالبة التي هي أخص ...
وأما ما يحتجون به أيضاً من أنه قد يوجد في بعض المواد ما ينتج المطلق
وهو مؤلف من مطلقة صغرى وضرورية كبرى — مثال ذلك قولنا

The view to which they most strongly adhere in this regard is the following: in every case where something contains one thing that is like the part and <another that is like> the whole, whenever something is predicated of the whole in a <certain> mode then it must also be predicated of the part in that very mode, and whenever the part also is predicated of something in a certain mode then the whole must be predicated of that thing in that very mode. Now since every syllogism contains something that is like the whole and <something that is> like the part, whenever one of the two premises is absolute and the other necessary, inevitably either the necessary will be the minor and the absolute the major, or the necessary the major and the absolute the minor.

They said: if the necessary is the minor, then it contains something that is like the whole and something that is like the part. That which is like the whole is the middle term, while that which is like the part is the minor term. Whenever, therefore, something is predicated in a certain mode of the whole which is the middle term, it must also be predicated in that very mode of the part which is the minor extreme.

Whenever, on the other hand, the necessary is the major premise, both the whole and the part would also be present in it; that which is like the whole would be the major extreme, while that which is like the part would be the middle term. Whenever, then, 180 the part, which is the middle term, is predicated of the minor extreme in a certain mode, this very same mode must also be the mode in which the whole, which is the major extreme, is predicated of it. They said: whatever the case may be, then, the mode of predication in the conclusion must follow the mode of the absolute premise. . . .

They also advance arguments to support (their thesis) that the mode of the conclusion must follow the inferior¹ of the two modes of the premise, as is the case in affirmation and negation — that is, when one of the two premises is affirmative and the other negative, the conclusion follows the negative premise, which is the inferior one. . . .

They also advance arguments to support (their thesis) that some matters (of syllogisms) may contain something which will yield a conclusion that is absolute, when it is composed of an absolute minor and a necessary major — an example of this is the following:

كل إنسان يمشي أى بالفعل
وكل ماش متحرك باضطرار
فكل إنسان متحرك لا باضطرار ...

30

fontes: ed. Jéhamy, ut supra (codd. FL); ed. Butterworth p.120.3-121.8, 122.6-8, 122.12-15 (codd. FL); versio Latina ap. AOCAC t.1.3 f.27^b33M-28^a14G (B)

1-23 Ibn Rušd, *Talḥiṣ al-Qiyās* 211.15-25 Jéhamy (= *Quaesitum* 8, ap. AOC AC t.1.2b f.99EG)

1 *Arab.*: qui B
necessaria B
om. ed. Jéhamy
suppl. Gutas; cf. v.8
ed. Jéhamy
et Butterworth
B
debiliorem B
positionis)

3-4 *Arab.*: فان ... الضرورى
6 *suppl. Gutas ex B* (et aliquid ut; cf. v.13):
om. ed. Jéhamy
7 *ed. Jéhamy*: om. FLB, ed. Butterworth
9 *suppl. Gutas ex B* (aliquid; cf. v.13): om.
om. B
15 *ed. Jéhamy*
16 *scripsit Gutas*: تكون *ed. Jéhamy*
L
F: تحمل
L
تلك
FB (hoc ... modō)
B
18 *ed. Jéhamy et Butterworth*
pro موجودين
24 *ed. Jéhamy et Butterworth*: dubitaverunt
B
25 *ed. Butterworth*: om. ed. Jéhamy, B (pro-
positionis)

106I Ibn Rušd, *al-Masā'il* 8 (p.176.7-8, 176.12-177.4 'Alawī)

ان جميع المفسرين اتفقوا على أن مذهب ارسطو هو أن جهة النتيجة هي
تابعة لجهة المقدمة الكبرى في الشكل الأول والثاني والثالث ... ولم يساعده
على ذلك أحد من المتقدمين كثاوفرستس واوديمس ومن المتأخرين تامسليوس
وقال هؤلاء إن جهة النتيجة هي تابعة لجهة المقدمة الأخرى - أعنى أنها في هذا
النحو من الاختلاط تتبع أبداً المقدمة المطلقة ولا تتبع الضرورية بوجه
5 وأقوى حجة لهم في ذلك ما ظهر من أمور المواد أنه متى ألف قياس من
مقدمتين إحداهما مطلقة الحقيقية والأخرى ضرورية أن النتيجة توجد غير
ضرورية مثال ذلك قولنا «كل إنسان ماش وكل ماش متحرك» فإن النتيجة هي
177 أن «كل إنسان متحرك» وذلك بغير الضرورة والكبرى في هذا القياس هي
ضرورية وكذلك قولنا «كل أبيض إنسان وكل إنسان حيوان» فإنه ينتج أن «كل
10 أبيض هو حيوان» وليس كل ذلك بالضرورة

Every man walks, that is actually:
Every walker is necessarily in motion:
Therefore every man is in motion not necessarily. . . .

¹ The Latin translation has "weaker" (*debilior*) here for "inferior" (*vilior*, *ahass*), the word used consistently in the Arabic.

106I Averroes, *Questions* 8 (p.176.7-8, 176.12-177.4 'Alawī)

All commentators agree that Aristotle held that the mode of the conclusion follows the mode of the major premise in the first, second and third figure No one among the ancients, like Theophrastus and Eudemus, nor Themistius among the later authors supported him in this view. They said that the mode of the conclusion follows the mode of the inferior premise, i.e., that in this sort of mixture it follows invariably the absolute premise and not the necessary in any way.

Their strongest argument about this is what emerges from (consideration of) the matters (of the syllogisms): when a syllogism is combined from two premises, one of which is absolutely true¹ and the other necessary, the conclusion is found to be not necessary.

177 An example of this is our statement, "Every man walks: Every walker is in motion:" for the conclusion then is, "Every man is in motion," and this is not necessarily so, while the major in this syllogism is necessary. The same applies to our statement, "Every white thing is a man: Every man is an animal:" for the conclusion is, "Every white thing is an animal," and none of all this is necessary.

¹ What appears to be meant by "absolutely true" (literally, "absolute of truth") is "actually true," i.e., existing now. Cf. the same example given by Averroes in 106H.

107A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.15 33b25
(CAG t.2.1 p.173.32-174.6 et 174.9-13 et 17-19 Wallies)

174 Θεόφραστος μὲν οὖν καὶ Εὐδήμος οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ
ἐνδεχομένης καὶ ὑπαρχούσης μίξει φασὶν ἔσεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα
ἐνδεχόμενον, ὅποτέρα ἂν τῶν προτάσεων ἐνδεχομένη ληφθῆ· χεῖρον γὰρ
πάλιν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος, ὃ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης οὐχ οὕτως,
ἀλλὰ τῆς μείζονος ἐνδεχομένης οὐσης ὑπαρχούσης δὲ τῆς ἐλάττονος
καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμά φησιν ἐνδεχόμενον ἔσεσθαι τὸ κατὰ τὸν διορισμόν,
ὃ ἐστὶν “οὐ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαίου τεθέντος δὲ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἀδύνατον
ἔπεται”. . . . ἂν δ’ ἡ ἐλάττω ἐνδεχομένη γένηται τῆς μείζονος
ὑπαρχούσης οὐσης ἀτελεῖς τέ φησιν ἔσεσθαι πάντας τοὺς τοιοῦτους
συλλογισμοὺς καὶ προσέτι τοὺς τὸ ἀποφατικὸν συνάγοντας οὐ τὸ κατὰ
τὸν διορισμόν ἐνδεχόμενον συνάξειν ἀλλὰ τὸ κατὰ ψιλὴν ἀπόφασιν
τοῦ ἀναγκαίου λεγόμενον. . . . οἱ μὲντοι περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ ταύτας
ἐνδεχομένας λέγοντες εἰκότως ἐνδεχόμενόν φασὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ
ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις γίνεσθαι συμπλοκαῖς.

1-4 Eudemus, fr. 19 Wehrli 7-8 Aristoteles, Anal. pr. 1.13 31a18-20

2 τὸ Wallies: τε BM: τι a

107B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.21 39b32
(CAG t.2.1 p.248.19-30)

Θεόφραστος δὲ οὐ ποιεῖται ἀπλῶς διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς
τὴν δεῖξιν τῆς προειρημένης συζυγίας, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον τὸ ἐνδέχεται τινὶ
μὴ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν τινὶ μεταλαβὼν οὐκ ὄν ἀδύνατον καὶ ποιήσας
δύο ὑπαρχούσας, τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποφατικὴν τὴν μεταληφθεῖσαν
τὴν δὲ καθόλου καταφατικὴν τὴν κειμένην, φησὶ συμπέρασμα ἔσεσθαι
τὸ τὸ A ἐνδέχεσθαι τινὶ τῷ B μὴ ὑπάρχειν· εἰ γὰρ μὴ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον
τὸ παντὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ [τὸ] A τῷ B· καὶ οὕτως διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον
ἀπαγωγῆς εὐρῶν ἀδύνατον τι ἐπόμενον (συνάγεται γὰρ τὸ A τῷ Γ παντὶ
ὑπάρχον, ὃ ἔκειτο τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν), ἐπεὶ οὐ παρά τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ
ἀδύνατον ἀπήντηκεν (ἡ γὰρ ὑπόθεσις οὐκ ἦν ἀδύνατος λαμβάνεσθαι),
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης παντὶ τεθῆναι· τὸ ἄρα ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἐξ
ἀνάγκης παντί· τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι τινὶ μὴ.

7 τὸ (tert.) del. Wallies 11 ἀλλὰ superscr. B³: om. a

107A Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.15 33b25
(CAG vol.2.1 p.173.32-174.6 and 174.9-13 and 17-19 Wallies)

174 Theophrastus and Eudemus, his (Aristotle's) colleagues, say
that with the mixture of problematic and assertoric premises too
the conclusion will be problematic whichever of the premises be
taken as problematic. For the problematic is weaker again than the
assertoric. But Aristotle does not hold this view: but when the
major is problematic and the minor assertoric he says the conclusion
too will be problematic according to the definition, which is: “what
is not necessary, but if it is assumed to be the case, nothing
impossible follows”. . . . But if the minor is problematic when the
major is assertoric, he says that all such syllogisms will be imperfect,
and in addition those leading to a negative conclusion will lead
to one that is problematic not according to the definition, but what
is said to be in accordance with the bare negation of the necessary.
. . . . But those associated with Theophrastus, saying that these too
are problematic, state with good reason that the conclusion is prob-
lematic in such combinations too.

107B Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.21 39b32
(CAG vol.2.1 p.248.19-30)

But Theophrastus does not produce his proof of the aforemen-
tioned combination¹ by a simple use of *reductio ad impossibile*, but
first changes “possibly does not belong to some” into “not belonging
to some in fact”, which is not impossible, and so produces two as-
sertorics, the one particular negative — the changed one — and
the other, as it stands, universal affirmative, and says that the con-
clusion will be that A may possibly not belong to some B; for if
not, the opposite, “A of necessity to all B” (will be true). And in
this way, by *reductio ad impossibile* he finds that something impos-
sible follows — for it implies that A belongs to all C, but it was
assumed that it did not belong to some — since the impossible
was encountered not in connection with the original premise —
for the original premise was not incapable of being assumed —
but through the supposition “of necessity to all”; therefore the
opposite of “of necessity to all” (is true): this is “possibly to some
not”.

¹ Bocado with problematic major and assertoric minor, giving a prob-
lematic conclusion.

108A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.21 39b32 (CAG t.2.1 p.247.39-248.5 Wallies)

248 κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν δόξαν τὴν αὐτοῦ πρόεισιν ἢ δεῖξις ἢ δι' ἄδυνατον ἐν τῇ ἐκκειμένη συζυγίᾳ τῷ ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τῆς μείζονος καὶ ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἐλάττονος ἀναγκαῖον κατ' αὐτὸν γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα. κατὰ μὲντοι τοὺς ἐταίρους αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχον λέγοντας 5 συναγεσθαι οὐδὲν ἄδύνατον ἀκολουθήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἄδύνατον τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ τινὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.

108B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.19 38a16 (CAG t.2.1 p.235.20-30 Wallies)

δεῖ δὲ εἰδέναι, ὅτι ἡ δεῖξις αὕτη καὶ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτῆς [ἄν] ἄδύνατον ἠκολούθησε, διότι ἡγεῖται ἀληθὲς εἶναι ἐν πρώτῳ σχήματι ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τῆς μείζονος καὶ ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ἐλάττονος ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα. ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε τοὺς ὑπάρχον λέγοντας γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις μίξεσιν οὐ προχωρεῖ ἢ 5 τοιαύτη δεῖξις· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄδύνατον ἔπεται. γίνεται γὰρ συναγόμενον ἕκ τε τῆς ὑποθέσεως τῆς τὸ Β τινὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχειν λεγούσης καὶ ἐκ τῆς κειμένης τῆς ἀναγκαίας τῆς τὸ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδενὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Γ μὴ ὑπάρχον, ὃ οὐδὲν ἄδύνατόν ἐστι κειμένου τοῦ τὸ Α παντὶ τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεσθαι· ἅμα γὰρ ἀληθῆ οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι τὸ τε παντὶ 10 ἐνδέχεσθαι τὸ Α τῷ Γ καὶ τὸ τινὶ αὐτῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν.

1-11 [Themistius], In Arist. Anal. pr. 38a16 (CAG t.2.3 p.58.4-13)

1 ἄν del. Wallies : om. [Them.]

109A Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.16 36b21 (CAG t.13.2 p.205.13-27 Wallies)

οἱ μὲντοι περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτης τῆς συζυγίας ἐνδεχόμενον λέγουσιν εἶναι τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἵνα καὶ ἐναντῶθα τῇ χειρόνι τῶν προτάσεων ἔπεται τὸ συμπέρασμα. καὶ τοῦτο δεικνύουσι τῇ εἰς ἄδύνατον ἀπαγωγῇ οὕτως. ἔστωσαν γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις οὕτως ὡς εἶπομεν· λέγω ὅτι συνάγουσι “τὸ Α τῷ Γ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί”. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο ψεῦδος, 5

108A Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.21 39b32 (CAG vol.2.1 p.247.39-248.5 Wallies)

248 According to his (Aristotle's) opinion, the proof proceeds by *reductio ad impossibile* in the pair of premises before us, with necessary major and assertoric minor, and the conclusion according to him is necessary. But according to his colleagues¹, who say that the conclusion is assertoric, nothing impossible will follow. For it is not impossible for A to belong to all C, if it is possible for it not to belong to some.

¹ Theophrastus and Eudemus.

108B Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.19 38a16 (CAG vol.2.1 p.235.20-30 Wallies)

You must know that this proof¹ and the *reductio ad impossibile* which comes from it followed because he (Aristotle) considers it true that the conclusion from a necessary major and an assertoric minor in the first figure is necessary. For according to those² who say that the conclusion is assertoric in such combinations, this kind of proof does not succeed; for nothing impossible follows. For the inference drawn from the hypothesis that says that B belongs to some C, and the necessary premise “A of necessity to no B” is that A does not belong to some C, which is not impossible on the assumption that A possibly belongs to all C. For nothing prevents both “A possibly belongs to all C” and “it does not belong to some” being true together.

¹ Aristotle is trying to prove Cesare with necessary major, problematic minor and assertoric conclusion.

² These include Theophrastus and Eudemus.

109A Philoponus, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.16 36b21 (CAG vol.13.2 p.205.13-27 Wallies)

Those associated with Theophrastus, however, say that from this pair¹ too the conclusion is problematic, so that here too the conclusion agrees with the weaker of the premises. They show this by *reductio ad impossibile* thus: let the premises be set up as we said: I say that they imply “A possibly belongs to no C”. For if

ἔσται ἀληθὲς τὸ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, ὅπερ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνάγκη
 τινί· ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει ἡ μερική καταφατική, καὶ τὸ Γ ἄρα τινὶ τῶν
 Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχει. εἰ τοίνυν τὸ μὲν Β κείται ἐνδέχεσθαι παντὶ τῷ
 Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ τινὶ τῶν Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ὑπόκειται, τὸ ἄρα Β τινὶ
 ἐνδέχεται τῶν Α. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ὑπέκειτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐξ ἀνάγκης 10
 μηδενί, καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα τῷ Α ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδενί· ὑπέκειτο δὲ καὶ
 ἐνδέχεσθαι τινί, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. τὸ ἀδύνατον ἠκολούθησε διὰ τὸ
 ὑποθέσθαι ἡμᾶς τὸ Α τῷ Γ οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι μηδενί, ὅπερ ἐστὶ ταῦτόν
 τῷ ἀνάγκη τινί· ψεῦδος ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀληθὲς δὲ τὸ ἀντιφατικῶς
 ἀντικείμενον τὸ ἐνδέχεται μηδενί. τοῦτο ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ συναγόμενον. 15

3 δεικνυσιν *Ut* 11 τῷ] τῶν *t* 13 ἐνδέχεσθαι *t*: ἐνδέχεται *BU*

109B Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.34 47b40-48a28 (CAG
 t.13.2 p.328.1-9 Wallies)

ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ σχήματι τῶν ἕξων ἐν τοῖς
 ὅροις κειμένων κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην συνήγето τὸ ψεῦδος· αὐτῷ γὰρ δοκεῖ
 τῇ μείζονι ἀναγκαίᾳ οὔσῃ ἔπεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τῶν περὶ Θεόφρασ-
 τον οὐχ οὕτως οἰομένων ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐνδεχομένῃ, ὡς εἴρηται. ἐν μέντοι τῷ 5
 τρίτῳ σχήματι κατὰ τὰ πᾶσι δοκοῦντα παρὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν τὸ
 ψεῦδος συνάγεται, λέγω δὴ τὸ τὰς ἕξεις εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ὅροις. πᾶσι γὰρ
 δοκεῖ καὶ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον τῶν δύο προτάσεων ἐνδεχομένων οὐσῶν
 ἐνδεχόμενον εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἀναγκαῖον καὶ
 ὑπαρχουσῶν ὑπάρχον εἶναι καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα.

4 ὡς εἴρηται] p.205.13-15 = **107A**

109C Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.19 38a25
 (CAG t.2.1 p.236.11-14 Wallies)

καθ' οὗς μέντοι ἐνδεχόμενον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπάρχον γίνεται τὸ
 συμπέρασμα ἐν τῇ ἐκκειμένῃ δείξει, τὸ προκείμενον συναχθήσεται

this is false, "it does not possibly belong to none" will be true, which
 is the same as "necessarily to some". Since, then, the particular
 affirmative converts, C too therefore of necessity belongs to some
 As. If, therefore, it is posited that B possibly belongs to all C, and
 it is already supposed that C necessarily belongs to some As, B
 then possibly belongs to some As. Since, then, it was originally
 supposed that A necessarily (belonged) to no B, B too then (belongs)
 necessarily to no A: but it was supposed also that it possibly
 belonged to some, which is impossible. The impossible conclusion
 followed because we supposed that A did not possibly belong to
 no C, which is the same as "necessarily to some": this, then, is
 false, but the contradictory opposite, "possibly to none", is true.
 This, then, is the inference.

¹ Celarent with necessary major and problematic minor.

109B Philoponus, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.34 47b40-48a28 (CAG
 vol.13.2 p.328.1-9 Wallies)

So in the first and second figures, when states¹ were placed
 as terms the conclusion was false according to Aristotle; for it
 appeared to him that the conclusion agreed with the major premise,
 which was necessary, though those associated with Theophrastus
 thought it was not like this, but that (the conclusion agreed with)
 the problematic (premise) as has been said. In the third figure,
 however, in accordance with what seems to everybody to be the
 case, the conclusion is false for the stated reason, I mean that states
 are placed as terms. For it appears to everybody, and is necessary,
 that when the two premises are problematic the conclusion is
 problematic also, and (when they are) necessary (it is) necessary,
 and (when they are) assertoric (it is) assertoric.

¹ E.g., health or disease.

109C Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.19 38a25
 (CAG vol.2.1 p.236.11-14 Wallies)

But according to those for whom the conclusion in the proof
 set out¹ is problematic and not assertoric, the conclusion with which
 we are concerned will be universal problematic negative, because

καθόλου ἐνδεχόμενον ἀποφατικόν, καθ' ὅτι ἀρέσκει αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἐνδεχομένην ἀντιστρέφειν ἑαυτῆι.

Syllogismus proslepticus

110A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.41 49b27-30 (CAG t.2.1 p.378.12-23 et 378.30-379.11 Wallies)

ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις προτάσεσιν, αἱ δυνάμει τοὺς τρεῖς ὄρους ἐν αὐταῖς ἔχουσιν, ὁποῖαί εἰσιν, ἄς ἐξέθετο νῦν, καὶ ὅλως αἱ κατὰ πρόσληψιν ὑπὸ Θεοφράστου λεγόμεναι (αὗται γὰρ τοὺς τρεῖς ὄρους ἔχουσί πως· ἐν γὰρ τῇ “καθ' οὗ τὸ Β παντός, κατ' ἐκείνου καὶ τὸ Α παντός” ἐν τοῖς δύο ὄροις, τῷ τε Β καὶ τῷ Α, τοῖς ὀρισμένοις ἤδη πως 5 περιεῖληπται καὶ ὁ τρίτος, καθ' οὗ τὸ Β κατηγορεῖται, πλὴν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις ὀρισμένος καὶ φανερός), ἐν δὴ ταῖς τοιαύταις προτάσεσιν, αἱ τῇ λέξει μόνον τῶν κατηγορικῶν διαφέρειν δοκοῦσιν, ὡς ἔδειξεν ἐν τῷ Περὶ καταφάσεως ὁ Θεόφραστος, φησὶν, ὅτι ἡ οὕτως λαμβανομένη, ὅτι καθ' οὗ τὸ Β παντός, κατ' ἐκείνου παντός τὸ Α, σημαίνει τὸ καθ' 10 ὅσων τὸ Β λέγεται, κατὰ πάντων τούτων λέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ Α. τοῦτο γὰρ ἐδείχθη. . . .

λαβὼν ἐν τῷ καθ' οὗ τὸ Β παντός τὸ Α λέγεσθαι τὴν μείζονα πρότασιν τὴν ΑΒ καθόλου (ἴσον γὰρ τῷ καθ' οὗ τὸ Β παντός τὸ Α τὸ κατὰ παντός τοῦ Β τὸ Α), ἐπειδὴ τῆς ἐλάττονος προτάσεως καὶ ἐπὶ 15 μέρους οὔσης καταφατικῆς καὶ καθόλου συλλογιστικῆς ἢ συζυγίας, ἀλλὰ καθόλου μὲν οὔσης καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καθόλου, ἐπὶ μέρους δὲ τοιοῦτον καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, διὰ τοῦτο προσέθηκε τοῦτου ὄν δηλωτικὸν τὸ καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ παντός τὸ Β, καὶ τὸ Α οὕτως· εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ παντός, ὡς εἶναι τὴν πρότασιν τοιαύτην καθ' ὅσων ἂν τὸ Β, κατὰ 20 πάντων τὸ Α, ἔπειτα τὸ δὲ Β κατὰ τινὸς τοῦ Γ, καὶ τὸ Α ἄρα, ἢ τὸ δὲ Β κατὰ παντός τοῦ Γ, ὥστε καὶ τὸ Α. τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντός ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ οὐδὲ τὸ Α κατὰ παντός συλλογιστικῶς τοῦ ὑπὸ τὸ Β κατηγορηθῆσεται, εἰ τὸ Β αὐτῷ τινὶ ὑπάρχοι. ὁ μὲντοι Θεόφραστος

they are satisfied that the problematic universal negative also converts.

¹ Aristotle is concerned with a syllogism in the second figure with problematic universal affirmative major and necessary universal negative minor premises (Camestres).

Prosleptic Syllogism

110A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.41 49b27-30 (CAG vol.2.1 p.378.12-23 and 378.30-379.11 Wallies)

In propositions of this kind, which have three terms in them potentially, like those which he (Aristotle) set out just now, and in general those called by Theophrastus “by *proslēpsis*” — for these have three terms in a way: for in “A also of all of that of all of which B”, in the two terms, B and A, which are determinate, the third is also already contained in a way, the term of which B is predicated, except that it is not determinate and clear like them — in such propositions, which seem to differ from categoricals only in expression, as Theophrastus showed in the *On Affirmation*, he (Aristotle) says that a proposition of the form “A of all of that of all of which B” means “Of all the things of which B is said, of all of these A is said too”. For this was shown. . . .

In “A is said of that of all of which B”, taking as the major premise “A of B universally” — for the equivalent of “A of that of all of which B” is “A of all B” — when the minor premise is 379 particular affirmative or universal affirmative the pair leads to a syllogism. But when it is universal the conclusion is universal, and when it is particular the conclusion is so too. For this reason he added, as indicative of this, “and if B of all, so too A; but if not of all, (not necessarily A of all)”,¹ so that the premise is like this: “Of whatever things B might be, of all these A”, then “But B of some C: A also then”, or “But B of all C, so that A also”. But “not necessarily A of all” is equivalent to “neither will A be predicated of all that is under B as a matter of syllogistic proof, if B were to belong to some of it (only)”. Theophrastus, however, in the *On*

ἐν τῷ Περὶ καταφάσεως τὴν καθ' οὗ τὸ Β, τὸ Α ὡς ἴσον δυναμένην 25
λαμβάνει τῆ καθ' οὗ παντός τὸ Β, κατ' ἐκείνου παντός τὸ Α.

3-7 cf. Philoponi comm. In Arist. Anal. pr. 58a21 (CAG t.13.2 p.417.8-12)
18-22 cf. Alex. Aphrod., supra p.264.2-5 = 112A

20 πρότασιν aB: τάξιν Wallies

110B Scholion in Aristotelis Analytica priora 2.6 58a21-30 (p.189b43-190a5 et 190a18-25 Brandis)

ὑπογράφει οὖν ἡμῖν εἶδος ἕτερον προτάσεων, ὅπερ ὁ Θεόφραστος
καλεῖ κατὰ πρόσληψιν. σύγκεινται δὲ αἱ τοιαῦται προτάσεις ἐξ
ἀορίστου τοῦ μέσου καὶ ὀρισμένων τῶν ἄκρων δύο ὄρων, οἷον ἐν μὲν
τῷ α' σχήματα "ὁ κατὰ τοῦ Γ, κατ' ἐκείνου τὸ Α". ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ 5
"ὁ κατὰ τοῦ Α, τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ τοῦ Β". ἐν δὲ τῷ γ' "καθ' οὗ τὸ Α, κατ'
ἐκείνου τὸ Β". δοκοῦσιν οὖν αἱ τοιαῦται προτάσεις μὴ εἶναι ἄπλαϊ
190 ἀλλὰ δυνάμει περιληπτικαὶ εἶναι συλλογισμοῦ. λέγει δὲ ὁ Θεόφραστος
ὅτι δυνάμει ἴση ἐστὶ τῆ κατηγορικῆ, οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν τὸ λέγειν "τὸ
Α κατ' οὐδενὸς τοῦ Β" τοῦ λέγειν "καθ' οὗ τὸ Β παντός, κατ' οὐδενὸς
ἐκείνου τὸ Α" ἢ πάλιν τὸ λέγειν "τὸ Α κατὰ παντός τοῦ Β" τοῦ λέγειν 10
"καθ' οὗ τὸ Β παντός, κατ' ἐκείνου καὶ τὸ Α παντός." . . .

αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' πρόσληψιν πρότασις· κατὰ πρόσληψιν δὲ
καλεῖται ὅτι τοῦ ἐν τῇ συνθέτῳ προτάσει ἀορίστου ὄρου, τουτέστι τοῦ
μέσου, ὀρισθέντος τε καὶ προσληφθέντος ὁ συλλογισμὸς ἐπιτελεῖται καὶ
γνώριμον ἐπιφύεται τὸ συμπέρασμα. ἔοικε δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη πρότασις 15
ὑποθετικῷ τῷ συνημμένῳ· ἐστὶ δὲ αὕτη ἐν τῇ ῥητῇ προτάσει ἐν τρίτῳ
σχήματι· τὸν γὰρ μέσον καὶ ἀόριστον ὑποκείμενον ἔχει τοῖς δύο, καὶ
τοῦτο ἔσχε πλεονέκτημα τὸ ἐν τρίτῳ συνάγειν καθόλου συμπέρασμα.

1-12 scholion in Philoponi comm. In Arist. Anal. pr. 2.5 58a21 (cod. Paris. suppl.
Gr. 1156 = CAG t.13.2 p.xxxiii.19-24), Theophrasto nominato

110C Galenus, Institutio Logica 19.1-5 (BT p.47.18-48.21 Kalbfleisch)

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ (περὶ) τῶν κατὰ πρόσληψιν ὀνομαζομένων συλλογισμῶν
οἱ ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου γεγράφασιν ὡς χρησίμων, ἐμοὶ δὲ περιττοὶ
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καθότι δέδεικται μοι κἀν τῇ Περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως
2 πραγματεία, προσῆκον εἶη ἂν τι καὶ περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν. πόσοι μὲν οὖν
καὶ τίνες εἰσὶν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνταῦθα διεξέρχεσθαι τελείως εἰρηκῶτι 5
περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν· ὁποῖον δὲ τι τὸ εἶδος αὐτῶν,

Affirmation, takes "Of what B, A" as equivalent to "A of all of that of all of which B".

¹ The clause in brackets is not given by Alexander.

110B Scholium on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* 2.5 58a21 (p.189b43-190a5 and 190a18-25 Brandis)

He (Aristotle) therefore sketches for us another kind of proposition, which Theophrastus calls "by proslepsis". Such propositions are formed from an indeterminate middle and two determinate extreme terms, like, in the first figure, "What is of C, of that A"; in the second, "What is of A, that is of B too"; and in the third, "Of what A, of that B." Such propositions appear to be not simple, but 190 to contain a syllogism potentially. Theophrastus says that it is equivalent to the categorical: for there is no difference between saying "A of no B", and saying "A of none of that of all of which B", or, again, between saying "A of all B", and saying "A also of all of that of all of which B." . . .

This¹ is the proposition by proslepsis. It is called "by proslepsis" because when the indefinite term in the compound proposition, i.e. the middle term, is made determinate and taken in addition, the syllogism is completed and the conclusion is known and inferred. A proposition like this is similar to the conditional hypothetical syllogism. This, in the proposition described, is in the third figure. For it has the middle and indefinite term as the subject of the two premises, and it had this advantage, that in the third figure it leads to a universal conclusion.

¹ I.e., "A of none of that of all of which B."

110C Galen, *Introduction to Logic* 19.1-5 (BT p.47.18-48.21 Kalbfleisch)

Since the Peripatetics have written <of> the syllogisms called "by proslepsis" as being useful — but they seem to me to be superfluous, as has been shown by me in my work *On Proof* — it would be fitting to say something about them. Since I have spoken fully about them in those commentaries, it is not necessary here to go at length into their number and nature; but their form will be stated

3 εἰρήσεται διὰ παραδειγμάτων δυοῖν. ἔν μὲν οὖν εἶδος ἐστὶ τοῖον “καθ’ οὗ τόδε, καὶ τόδε· (ἀλλὰ τόδε κατὰ τοῦδε· καὶ τόδε) ἄρα κατὰ τοῦδε” καὶ ἐπ’ ὀνομάτων “ἐφ’ οὗ δένδρον, καὶ φυτὸν· δένδρον δὲ ἐπὶ πλατάνου· καὶ φυτὸν ἄρα ἐπὶ πλατάνου”· προσυπακοῦσαι δὲ δηλονότι δεῖ τῷ κατὰ 10 τὸν λόγον τὸ κατηγορεῖται ἢ λέγεται, ὡς εἶναι τὸν ὀλόκληρον λόγον τοιόνδε “καθ’ οὗ δένδρον κατηγορεῖται, κατὰ τούτου φυτὸν κατηγορεῖται· δένδρον δὲ πλατάνου κατηγορεῖται· καὶ φυτὸν ἄρα 4 πλατάνου κατηγορηθήσεται.” ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος συλλογισμῶν ἐκ τῶν κατὰ πρόσληψιν “ὃ κατὰ τοῦδε, καὶ κατὰ τοῦδε· (τόδε δὲ κατὰ τοῦδε· ὥστε 15 καὶ κατὰ τοῦδε)”· ἐπ’ ὀνομάτων δὲ “ὃ κατὰ δένδρου, καὶ (κατὰ) 5 πλατάνου· φυτὸν δὲ κατὰ τοῦ δένδρου· καὶ κατὰ πλατάνου ἄρα”. (ὅτι) δ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι συλλογισμοὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν ἐπιτομαὶ τινές εἰσιν, οὐχ ἕτερον γένος αὐτῶν, ἐπιδειχθῶς [οὖν] ἐν οἷς εἶπον ὑπομνήμασιν οὐδὲν 20 ἔτι δέομαι λέγειν ἐνταῦθα περὶ αὐτῶν·

1 περὶ *add.* Prantl 4 εἴη ἂν *Kalbfleisch*: εἶναι P 8 ἀλλὰ—τόδε
add. *Kalbfleisch* 15-16 τόδε—τοῦδε *add.* *Kalbfleisch* 16 κατὰ *add.*
Kalbfleisch 17 ὅτι *add.* *Kalbfleisch* 19 οὖν *del.* *Kalbfleisch*


110D Scholion in Aristotelis Analytica priora (CAG t.4.6 p.xii.3-10 Wallies)

ἔστιν γὰρ καὶ τρίτον εἶδος συλλογισμοῦ μετὰ τὸ κατηγορικὸν καὶ ὑποθετικὸν τὸ λεγόμενον παρὰ Θεοφράστῳ “κατὰ πρόσληψιν”, ὃ κατὰ τὰ τρία σχήματα πλέκεται οὕτως·

A ΣΧΗΜΑ· ὃ κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, κατ’ ἐκείνου παντὸς οὐσία· ζῷον δὲ κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου· καὶ οὐσία ἄρα κατὰ παντὸς ζῷου. 5

οὐσία ζῷον ἄνθρωπος.

B ΣΧΗΜΑ· ὃ κατὰ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου, τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἵππου.



(Γ ΣΧΗΜΑ·) καθ’ οὗ παντὸς ζῷον, κατὰ τούτου καὶ λογικόν. 10



3 by means of two examples. One form then is like this: “Of what this, also this; <but this of this: this also> then of this”; and with names, “Of what tree, also plant; but tree of plane: plant also then of plane”; clearly we must understand, in addition to the actual words, “is predicated”, or “is said”, so that the complete argument will be like this: “Of what tree is predicated, of this plant is predicated; but tree is predicated of plane: plant also therefore will 4 be predicated of plane.” Another form of syllogism of those by proslepsis: “What of this, of this also; <but this of this: hence of this also>”; and with names: “What <of> tree, of plane also; 5 but plant of tree: of plane also then.” But <that> such syllogisms are as it were condensed categoricals, and not a kind different from them,¹ I have shown in the commentaries to which I have referred, and I need not say anything more about them here.

¹ Or “another kind of them”.

110D Scholium¹ on Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* (CAG vol.4.6 p.xii.3-10 Wallies)

For there is also a third kind of syllogism, after the categorical and the hypothetical, that called “by proslepsis” in Theophrastus. It is formed according to the three figures thus:

First figure: what is of every man, of all of that is substance; but animal is of every man: substance then too is of every animal.

substance animal man

Second figure: what is of every man, that is of every horse.



Third figure: Of that, of all of which animal, of this rational too.



ἐν δὲ τοῖς τριῶν σχήμασιν ὁ μέσος πάντως καὶ μόνος ἀόριστος.

1-13 cf. [Ammonii] comm. In Arist. Anal. pr. 41a39 (CAG t.4.6 p.67.27-8 et 69.29-42)

10 Γ ΣΧΗΜΑ add. Wallies

Syllogismus hypotheticus

111A Boetius, De hypotheticis syllogismis 1.1.3-4 (p.206.4-17 Obertello)

quod igitur apud scriptores quidem Graecos perquam rarissimos strictim atque confuse, apud Latinos vero nullos repperi, id tuae scientiae dedicatum noster etsi diuturnus, coepti tamen efficax labor excoluit. nam cum categoricorum syllogismorum plenissime notitiam percepisses, de hypotheticis syllogismis saepe quaerebas, in quibus nihil est ab Aristotele conscriptum. Theophrastus vero, vir omnis doctrinae capax, rerum tantum summas exsequitur; Eudemus latiore docendi graditur viam, sed ita ut veluti quaedam seminaria sparsisse, nullum tamen frugis videatur extulisse proventum. nos igitur, quantum ingenii viribus et amicitiae tuae studio sufficimus, quae ab illis vel dicta breviter vel funditus omissa sunt, elucidanda diligenter et subtiliter persequenda suscepimus.

1-10 Eudemus, fr. 21 Wehrli 6-8 Ioannes Saresberiensis, Metalogicon 4.4 (p.168.13-15 Webb) 6-10 Abaelardus, Dialectica 1 introductio (p.145.25-9 De Rijk)

111B Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.23 40b17 (CAG t.13.2 p.242.14-243.1 Wallies)

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν ἐπαύσατο καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἐποιήσατο, ἅτε δὴ τούτων μὲν τελείων ὄντων καὶ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ὑποθετικῶν δεομένων τῶν κατηγορικῶν, εἴπωμεν ἡμεῖς βραχέα περὶ αὐτῶν. ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι πολυστήχους πραγματείας περὶ τούτων κατεβάλλοντο οἱ μαθηταὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Εὐδήμον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ ἔτι οἱ Στωικοί. εἴπωμεν οὖν τίσιν ὀνόμασιν ἐχρήσαντο ἐν

In the three figures the middle term, alone and always, is indeterminate.

¹ This is thought to derive from Ammonius.

Hypothetical Syllogism

111A Boethius, On Hypothetical Syllogisms 1.1.3-4 (p.206.4-17 Obertello)

What, then, even among the Greeks, I have found treated by very few, and by them briefly and without order, and not at all by Latin writers, my toil, long indeed but sufficient to fulfil the undertaking, has brought to perfection, and I dedicate it to your¹ knowledge. For when you had fully absorbed a knowledge of categorical syllogisms, you often enquired about hypothetical syllogisms, on which there is nothing written by Aristotle. Theophrastus, however, a man in possession of all knowledge, deals only with the chief points of these matters: Eudemus advances along a broader path of teaching, but in such a way as to appear to have scattered some seeds on his plot, but not to have reaped any harvest. We, therefore, so far as the power of our intellect and desire for your friendship suffice, have undertaken to elucidate carefully, and follow through in detail, what has either been said shortly by them, or completely left out.

¹ The dedicatee is uncertain. De Rijk rejects Symmachus and suggests Patricius.

111B Philoponus, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.23 40b17 (CAG vol.13.2 p.242.14-243.1 Wallies)

Since, after saying this much about hypotheticals, Aristotle stopped and taught us nothing about them, but put all his energy into the categorical syllogism, on the ground that these are perfect and need nothing external, but hypotheticals need categoricals, let us say a little about them. You should know that Aristotle's students, those associated with Theophrastus and Eudemus and the others, wrote lengthy works about them, and also the Stoics. Let us say,

τε τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ καὶ οἱ Στωικοί, καὶ ἔτι τὴν διαίρεσιν αὐτῶν, καὶ πόσοι τρόποι ἐκ ταύτης ἡμῖν ὑποθετικῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀναφαίνονται.

ἰστέον οὖν ὅτι ἐφεξῆς τούτων ὄντων ἀλλήλοις, πραγμάτων, νοημάτων, φωνῶν, πάλιν δ' αὐ καὶ τούτων ἐφεξῆς ὄντων ἐν τοῖς ὑποθετικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, ὡς γνωσόμεθα, τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τοῦ ἐπομένου, τοῦ συνημμένου, τῆς προσλήψεως, τοῦ συμπεράσματος, οἱ μὲν Περιπατητικοὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ κεχρημένοι τὰ μὲν πράγματα αὐτὸ τοῦτο "πράγματα" ὠνόμασαν, καὶ τὰ νοήματα ὡσαύτως, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς φωνάς, ἔτι τε τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τοῖς ὑποθετικοῖς συλλογισμοῖς αὐτὸ τοῦτο "ἡγούμενον", καὶ τὸ ἐπόμενον ὡσαύτως. οἶον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ", τοῦτο ἡγούμενον· τὸ δὲ "ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆν", τοῦτο ἐπόμενον· ἔπεται γὰρ τῷ πρώτῳ τὸ δεύτερον. τὸ δὲ ὅλον τοῦτο τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆν ἐστὶ", τοῦτο "συνημμένον" διὰ τὸ συνηφθαι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις. τὸ δὲ "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστὶ", τοῦτο οἱ Περιπατητικοὶ "μετάληψιν" καλοῦσι διὰ τὸ μεταλαμβάνεσθαι ἐκ δευτέρου· ἤδη γὰρ ἐλήφθη ἐν τῷ ἡγουμένῳ. τὸ δὲ "ἥλιος ἄρα ὑπὲρ γῆν", τοῦτο συμπέρασμα. οὕτω μὲν οἱ Περιπατητικοί.

1-26 Eudemus, fr. 22 Wehrli
43a8 (CAG t.23.3 p.91.21-38)

5-26 [Themistius], In Arist. Anal. pr. 1.26

111C Al-Fārābī, Šarḥ li-Kitāb Aristūṭālīs Fi l-tibāra 4 17a6-7 (p.53.6-12 Kutsch et Marrow)

فهو (أى أرسطو) ليس ينظر في تأليف الشرطية في هذا الكتاب أصلاً وينظر فيه في كتاب القياس نظراً يسيراً وقد نظر فيه أصحاب الرواق وأخروسييس وغيره من الرواقيين نظراً مستقصياً وأفرطوا فيه واستقصوا أمر القياسات الشرطية— وكذلك ثاوفرستس وأوذيمنس بعد أرسطوطاليس— وزعموا أن لأرسطوطاليس كتباً في المقاييس الشرطية وأما في كتبه في المنطق فما نعلم أنه أفرد قولاً في المقاييس الشرطية وإنما يوجد ذلك في تفاسير المفسرين يحكونها عن ثاوفرستس

then, what names the Peripatetics and the Stoics used about the parts and the wholes, and further how they classified them, and how many moods of hypothetical syllogisms are revealed from this.

You should know that these are interconnected: things, concepts, words, and, again, that, as we shall see, these are interconnected in hypothetical syllogisms: antecedent, consequent, conditional, additional assumption, and conclusion. The Peripatetics, following common usage, called things just "things", and concepts likewise, and similarly words; and again the antecedent in hypothetical syllogisms (they called) just "antecedent", and the consequent likewise. Thus "if it is day", this is the antecedent; and "the sun is above the earth", this is the consequent. For the second follows on the first. But the whole, "If it is day, the sun is over the earth", is called "joined"¹, because they are joined to one another. And "but it is day", this the Peripatetics call "substituted assumption"², because it is substituted as a second step; for it was already included³ in the antecedent. And "the sun is over the earth" is the conclusion. So the Peripatetics.

¹ This word is usually translated "conditional", as earlier in this paragraph.

² Or "changed assumption".

³ In Greek the words translated "assumption", "substituted" and "included" are all cognate.

111C Fārābī, On Aristotle's De interpretatione 4 17a6-7 (53.6-12 Kutsch and Marrow)

He (Aristotle) examines the composition of hypothetical (statements) not at all in this book, and only slightly in the *Prior Analytics*. The Stoics, on the other hand, Chrysippus and others, examined it thoroughly to the point of excess, made a thorough study of hypothetical syllogisms — as Theophrastus and Eudemus had done after Aristotle's time — and claimed that Aristotle wrote books on hypothetical syllogisms. But we have no knowledge of any separate treatment by him (Aristotle) of hypothetical syllogisms in his books on logic; this (claim) is found rather in the commentaries of the commentators who give an account of them (hypothetical syllogisms) on the authority of Theophrastus only.

111D Galenus, *Institutio logica* 3.3-5 (BT p.8.7-9.16 Kalbfleisch)

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐπειδὴν ὑπάρχον τι πιστεύεται δι' ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν [ἦ] "κατὰ συνέχειαν ὑποθετικῆ" πρὸς τῶν παλαιῶν φιλοσόφων ὀνομάζεται (ἢ) πρότασις, ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἐπειδὴν [μέντοι] διότι μὴ ἔστι τόδε, εἶναι τόδε νοῶμεν, οἶον (ὅτι) νύξ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἡμέραν εἶναι· μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὀνομάζουσι τὴν τοιαύτην πρότασιν "διαιρετικῆν", οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ "διεzeugμένον ἀξίωμα" τισι τῶν νεωτέρων φιλοσόφων ὀνομάζεται, καθάπερ γε καὶ "συνημμένον" τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν προτάσεων τῶν ὑποθετικῶν ἄς "κατὰ συνέχειαν" ἐλέγομεν γίνεσθαι· οἰκειότερα δὲ ἔστι λέξις [τὸ τὰ διεzeugμένα] τοῖς ἀξιωμασιν, ἄς δηλονότι "διαιρετικὰς προτάσεις" ἔφαμεν ὀνομάζεσθαι, διὰ τοῦ "ἦτοι" 10 συνδέσμου — διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν "ἦ" διὰ μιᾶς συλλαβῆς λέγειν ἢ διὰ δυοῖν — τοῖς συνημμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ "εἰ" (ἢ "εἴπερ"), εἴπερ ἔν καὶ οὗτοι 4 σημαίνουσιν. ὡς ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον λόγον· εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ὁ ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς ἐστίν, "συνημμένον ἀξίωμα" κατὰ γε τοὺς νεωτέρους φιλοσόφους, κατὰ μέντοι τοὺς παλαιούς "πρότασιν ὑποθετικῆν κατὰ 15 συνέχειαν". τοὺς δὲ γε τοιοῦτους· ἦτοι γ' ἡμέρα ἐστίν ἢ νύξ ἐστίν, "διεzeugμένον" μὲν "ἀξίωμα" παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις φιλοσόφοις, "πρότασιν" δὲ "ὑποθετικῆν κατὰ διαίρεσιν" παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς. ἴσον δὲ ἢ διαιρετικῆν πρότασιν δύνανται τῷ τοιοῦτῳ λόγῳ· εἰ μὴ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, νύξ ἐστίν, ὃν ἐν σχήματι λέξεως συνημμένῳ λεγόμενον, ὅσοι μὲν ταῖς 20 φωναῖς μόνον προσέχουσι, "συνημμένον" ὀνομάζουσιν, ὅσοι δὲ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων, "διεzeugμένον"· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῆς λέξεως· εἰ μὴ νύξ ἐστίν, ἡμέρα ἐστίν, διεzeugμένον ἐστίν ἀξίωμα τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῇ, συνημμένου δὲ ἰδέαν ἔχει τῇ 25 λέξει.

1-7 Galenus, *Inst. log.* 14.2 (p.32.11-15)2-3 *ibid.* 5.5 (p.13.10-11)

2 ἢ *secl. Huby* συνέχειαν *Menas*: συνήθει(αν) *P* 3 ἢ *inser. Kalbfleisch* 3 μέντοι *secl. Kalbfleisch* 4 ἐστὶ τόδε *P*²: ἐστὶν *P*¹
 ὅτι *inser. Prantl* 7 συνημμένον *Menas*: συνημμένως *corr. P* 7-8
 τῶν προτάσεων *Kalbfleisch*: τῆς προτάσεως *P* 9 τὸ τὰ διεzeugμένα *secl. Kieffer*: τὸ διεzeugμένον *Kalbfleisch* 10 δηλονότι *P*² δηλονότι *P*¹ *ante*
 διὰ *inser. ἢ Kieffer* 12 *ante* τοῖς *inser.* ὅτι *Menas in P*: ἔτι *Prantl*: ἢ *Kalb-*

111E Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis *Analytica priora* 1.44 50a39 (CAG t.2.1 p.389.31-390.9 Wallies)

εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν ἐξ ὁμολογίας καὶ τῶν διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀδύνατον ἀπαγωγῆς λέγει καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαίνεσθαι, περὶ

111D Galen, *Introduction to Logic* 3.3-5 (BT p.8.7-9.16 Kalbfleisch)

To resume, then, when it is believed that something is the case because something else is the case, the premise is mostly called "hypothetical by connection" by the old philosophers; again, when we think that because *this* is not the case, *this* is the case, like "Because it is not night, it is day," they mostly call a premise of this kind "separative". But by some of the more recent philosophers it is called a "disjunctive proposition", just as the other kind of hypothetical premise which we called "by connection" becomes "conditional". The more appropriate form of expression for the propositions, i.e., those which we said were called "separative premises", is by means of the conjunction "or" — it makes no difference whether we say "or" using one syllable or two¹ — and for conditionals by means of "if" or "since", since these also have 4 the same meaning. So that a statement like: "If it is day, the sun is above the earth", is called a "conditional proposition" according to the more recent philosophers, but according to the old ones a "premise hypothetical by connection". But those like: "Either it is day or it is night", are called a "disjunctive proposition" in the usage of the more recent philosophers, but in that of the old a "premise 5 hypothetical by separation". The separative premise is equivalent to a statement like this: "If it is not day, it is night", which is stated in the conditional form of speech, and those who attend only to the words call it a "conditional", but those who attend to the nature of the facts call it "disjunctive"; similarly, a form of speech like this: "If it is not night, it is day", is a disjunctive proposition by the very nature of the facts, but in expression it has the form of a conditional.

¹ The Greek words ἦ and ἦτοι both mean "or".

fleisch δὲ *P*¹: ἢ *P*²: ἢ *Kieffer* *post* εἰ *tres litt. in ras. P*: ἢ *εἴπερ Kieffer*: ἢ ἐπεὶ *Prantl* 14 νεωτέρους *Menas*: παλαιούς *P* 20 συνημμένῳ *Kalbfleisch*: συνημν. *P*: συνημμένον *Menas* 23 λέξεως *Menas*: δείξεως *P*

111E Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.44 50a39 (CAG vol.2.1 p.389.31-390.9 Wallies)

After speaking about arguments based on agreement and those proved by *reductio ad impossibile*, he (Aristotle) says that many other conclusions are reached by hypothesis; he puts off dealing with

390 ὧν ὑπερτίθεται μὲν ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπιμελέστερον, οὐ μὴν φέρεται αὐτοῦ
 σύγγραμμα περὶ αὐτῶν· Θεόφραστος δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις Ἀναλυ-
 τικοῖς μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὐδήμος καὶ τινες ἄλλοι τῶν ἑταίρων 5
 αὐτοῦ. λέγοι δ' ἂν τοὺς τε διὰ συνεχοῦς, ὃ καὶ συνημμένον λέγεται,
 καὶ τῆς προσλήψεως ὑποθετικούς καὶ τοὺς διὰ τοῦ διαιρετικοῦ τε καὶ
 διεζευγμένου ἢ καὶ τοὺς διὰ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς, εἰ ἄρα οὗτοι
 ἕτεροι τῶν προειρημένων· παρὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους εἶεν ἂν καὶ οἱ ἐξ
 ἀναλογίας καὶ οὐς λέγουσι “κατὰ ποιότητα”, τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ 10
 ἦττον καὶ ὁμοίως, καὶ εἰ τινες ἄλλαι τῶν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως διαφοραὶ
 προτάσεων εἴσι, περὶ ὧν ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται.

1-6 Eudemus, fr. 20 Wehrli 9-10 [Themistius], In Arist. Anal. pr. 50a39
 (CAG t.23.3 p.152.5-17) 12 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Arist. Anal. pr.
 45b15 (CAG t.2.1 p.324.16-325.24)

6 λέγοι Wallies: λέγει aB 9 παρὰ (δὲ) conī. Barnes (RUSCH t.2 p.139
 n.2) 12 προτάσεων del. Barnes (ibid. n.3)

112A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.23 41a37
 (CAG t.2.1 p.262.28-264.31 Wallies)

“δι’ ὑποθέσεως δὲ ἄλλης”, ὡς εἶπεν, εἶεν ἂν καὶ οὐς οἱ νεώτεροι
 συλλογισμοὺς μόνους βούλονται λέγειν· οὗτοι δ’ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τροπικοῦ,
 ὡς φασι, καὶ τῆς προσλήψεως γινόμενοι, τοῦ τροπικοῦ ἢ συνημμένου
 ὄντος ἢ διεζευγμένου ἢ συμπεπλεγμένου, οὐς οἱ ἀρχαῖοι λέγουσι 5
 μικτοὺς ἐξ ὑποθετικῆς προτάσεως καὶ δεικτικῆς, τοῦτ’ ἔστι
 κατηγορικῆς. εἰ γὰρ εἴη ὑποκείμενον συνεχὲς καὶ συνημμένον τὸ εἰ
 ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετῆ, διδασκόν ἐστὶν ἀρετῆ, εἶτα δεικνύοιτο, ὅτι
 ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἀρετῆ ἐστὶν, δεδειγμένον (ἂν) εἴη, ὅτι καὶ διδασκῆ· οὕτως
 γὰρ ἂν προσληφθεῖ ὡς οὕτως ἔχον, εἰ δειχθεῖ, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη. ὁ μὲν 10
 263 οὖν συλλογισμὸς πάλιν ἂν εἴη πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τούτου κατηγορικὸς· οἷον
 “πᾶσα ἕξις ἀμετάπτωτος ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ψεῦδος ἐπιστήμη· ἢ δ’ ἀρετῆ
 ἕξις ἀμετάπτωτος ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς εἰς ψεῦδος· ἢ ἀρετῆ ἄρα ἐπιστήμη”.
 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλως ἂν τεθεῖη, ὅτι ἡ ἀρετῆ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ, διὰ συλλογισμοῦ,
 εἰ μὴ διὰ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ. δειχθέντος δὲ τούτου διὰ συλλο-
 γισμοῦ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίνεται κατασκευαζόμενον διὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν· 15
 ὑπετέθη γὰρ ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ τὸ εἰ ἡ ἀρετῆ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν, διδασκῆ
 αὐτὴν εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ εἴη τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον δεῖξεως μὴ δεόμενον
 ἀλλὰ φανερόν καὶ γνώριμον ὡς καὶ τὸ συνημμένον, οὐδὲ συλλογισμὸς
 ἔτι ὁ λόγος (ἂν) εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐδὲ γὰρ χρεῖαν συλλογισμοῦ τινα τὴν
 ἀρχὴν τὸν τοιοῦτον παρέχεσθαι λόγον οἷόν τε· δεῖ γὰρ τὸν συλλογισμὸν 20

390 them, because he is intending to speak of them more carefully, but
 in fact there is in circulation no work of his about them. But Theo-
 phrastus mentions them in his own *Analytics*, and also Eudemus
 and some of his (Aristotle's) other colleagues. He would be referring
 to arguments which are hypothetical through a connection, which
 is also called a conditional, and an additional assumption, and those
 through a division or a disjunction, or again those through a nega-
 tive conjunction, if indeed these are different from those mentioned
 before. Besides those mentioned there would also be those from
 analogy, and those which they call "from quality" (which are) those
 from more and less and equal, and any other different kinds of
 hypothetical premises that there may be, about which I have spoken
 elsewhere.

112A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.23 41a37
 (CAG vol.2.1 p.262.28-264.31 Wallies)

“By some other hypothesis” — his (Aristotle's) words — would
 also be those which the younger men¹ want alone to call syllogisms.
 These are those which are formed from a “tropic”, as they say, and
 an additional premise, the “tropic” being a conditional or a disjunc-
 tive or a conjunctive. The older men² call these “mixed” from a
 hypothetical premise and a “deictic”, i.e., categorical. For if the sup-
 position were the “continuous” or conditional (premise), “If virtue
 is knowledge, virtue is something that can be taught”, and then
 it were shown that virtue is knowledge, it would have been shown
 that it is also teachable. For it would in this way have been taken
 in addition that it is so, if it were shown that it is knowledge. So
 263 the syllogism again would be related to the latter, and a categorical
 proof of it; like, “Every disposition which cannot be changed from
 true to false is knowledge: but virtue is a disposition which cannot
 be changed from true to false: virtue, then is knowledge.” For in
 no other way would it be laid down by a syllogism that virtue
 is knowledge, except by a categorical syllogism. And if this is shown
 by a syllogism, the original proposition is proved constructively
 through the hypothesis. For it was assumed in the “continuous”
 proposition, that if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable. For if the
 additional premise did not need proof, but were obvious and
 known, like the conditional, such an argument would again not
 be a syllogism, for an argument of this kind could not give any
 scope for a syllogism at all.³ For a syllogism must prove what is

δεικνύναι, ὃ ἄνευ τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι οὐκ ἔστι γνώριμον.

τὸ μὲν οὖν συνημμένον ὡς γνώριμον ἐν τοῖς ὑποθετικοῖς, ἃ τροπικὰ λέγουσι, λαμβάνεται τε καὶ τίθεται, ἐν οἷς γε οὕτως ἔχει. λείπεται δὲ τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον ἀμφιδοξούμενον εἶναι, ὡς φησι Θεόφραστος, καὶ δεόμενον δείξεως. ὃ δὲ συλλογισμὸς τοῦ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν ἔσται 25 κατηγορικός τε καὶ δευκτικός, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑποθετικοῖς τοῖς ἐκ τροπικοῦ συνημμένου συλλογισμοῖς τὸ μὲν κατασκευαζόμενον καὶ δεόμενον δείξεως διὰ κατηγορικοῦ δείκνυται συλλογισμοῦ, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς προκείμενον δείκνυται οὐ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ὑποθέσεως τῆς ὑποτεθείσης· ἦν δὲ αὕτη τοῦ συνημμένου. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν 30 τε τὸ μὴ γνώριμον δειχθῆναι, ὅτι τόδε τί ἐστίν ἢ τοιόνδε, ἢ ὅλως κατασκευασθῆναι τι καὶ τεθῆναι κυρίως, εἰ μὴ διὰ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ. κὰν τὸ συνεχὲς δείξεως δέηται συλλογιστικῆς, κακεῖνο διὰ κατηγορικοῦ δειχθήσεται συλλογισμοῦ· εἰ γὰρ εἴη ζητούμενον, διὰ τί, εἰ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη, διδακτὴ, ληφθείσης καθόλου προτάσεως τῆς 35 πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διδακτόν, ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ ἐπιστήμη γίνεται κατηγορικός συλλογισμὸς.

διαφέρειν δὲ δοκεῖ κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους τὸ μεταλαμβανόμενον τοῦ προσλαμβανόμενου. ἐφ' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς εἰλημμένοις ἔγκειται τε καὶ ἔστι τὸ λαμβανόμενον, οὐ μὴν οὕτως οὐδὲ τοιοῦτον, οἷον λαμβάνεται, 40 ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ λαμβανόμενον μεταλαμβανόμενόν ἐστιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔξωθεν προστίθεται, ἀλλὰ κείμενον ἄλλως μεταλαμβάνεται εἰς ἄλλο. ἐν γὰρ τῷ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστὶ τὸ [εἰ] ἡμέρα ἐστίν, ὃ προσλαμβανόμενον οἱ νεώτεροι λέγουσιν, ἔγκειται μὲν, οὐ μὴν τοιοῦτον, ὅποιον λαμβάνεται· τίθεται μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ ἐν ὑποθέσει τε καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ, 45 λαμβάνεται δὲ ὡς ὑπάρχον. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μετάληψιν γίνεσθαι λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ κείμενον οὐχ ὡς κείται λαμβανόμενον μεταλαμβανόμενον γίνεται· κείμενον γὰρ ἐν σχέσει καὶ ἀκολουθίᾳ καὶ ὑποθέσει μεταλαμβάνεται εἰς ὑπαρξιν.

προσλαμβανόμενον δὲ λέγουσιν, ἐφ' ὧν τοῖς κειμένοις ἔξωθὲν τι 50 264 προστίθεται δυνάμει πως ἐν αὐτοῖς περιεχόμενον οὐ μὴν ἐνεργεῖα, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ πρόσληψιν γινόμενων συλλογισμῶν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ καθ' οὐ τὸ Β, κατ' ἐκείνου τὸ Α, κατὰ δὲ τοῦ Γ τὸ Β, ἔξωθεν τὸ κατὰ δὲ τοῦ Γ τὸ Β προσείληπται· οὐ γὰρ ἔκειτο ἐνεργεῖα ἐν τῇ προτάσει τῇ καθ' οὐ τὸ Β, κατ' ἐκείνου τὸ Α τὸ κατὰ τοῦ Γ τὸ Β λέγεσθαι. χρῶνται 55 μέντοι καὶ τῇ προσλήψει ἀντὶ τῆς μεταλήψεως.

not known without using a syllogism.

So then, the conditional, in the hypotheticals which they call "tropic", is taken and posited as known, at least where this is the case. It is left that the additional premise is doubtful, as Theophrastus says, and needing proof. The syllogism showing that this is true will be categorical and "deictic", so that even in hypothetical syllogisms with a "tropic" conditional, that which is to be proved constructively and needs demonstration is shown by a categorical syllogism. But the original proposition is shown not by a syllogism but by the hypothesis laid down. This was that of the conditional. For it is not possible for what is not known, either that this is something or is of such a kind, to be shown, or in general for anything to be proved constructively and settled properly, except by a categorical syllogism. And if the "continuous" (premise) needs syllogistic proof, that too will be shown by a categorical syllogism: for if it were asked why, if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable, taking the universal premise "Every kind of knowledge is teachable" and "Virtue is knowledge" a categorical syllogism is formed.

In the usage of the older men the term "*metalambanomenon*" seems to differ from "*proslambanomenon*". In those cases where the *lambanomenon* (assumed) is included in the assumptions and exists, but not in the way or in the form in which it is assumed, the *lambanomenon* is *metalambanomenon* (assumed in changed form). For it is not added from outside, but, posited in another way, is assumed in a different form. For in "If it is day, it is light", "it is day", which the younger men call "*proslambanomenon*", is included, but not in the form in which it is assumed. For it is placed in the conditional as part of a hypothetical and a sequence, but it is assumed as an assertion. In these and similar cases they say that *metalēpsis* occurs; for the proposition, being assumed not in the way it was first set down, becomes assumed in a changed form: for having been set down in a relative form and in a sequence and a hypothetical, it is assumed in a changed form as an assertion.

264 But they say "*proslambanomenon*" (assumed in addition) in those cases when something is added from outside to the assumptions, which is contained in them in a way potentially, but not actually, as is the case with syllogisms formed by *proslēpsis*; for in "of what B, of that A, but B of C", "B of C" is assumed in addition from outside; for it was not actually stated in the proposition "of what B, of that A" that B was said of C. However they also use "*proslēpsis*" instead of "*metalēpsis*".

ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαιρετικοῦ ἦτοι τότε ἢ τότε, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκ τροπικοῦ καὶ τῆς προσλήψεως λέγουσιν· ὅποιον γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶν λαμβάνηται δεῖξωσ δεόμενον, δεῖται κατηγορικοῦ πρὸς τὸ δειχθῆναι [διὰ] συλλογισμοῦ. οἷον εἰ ληφθεῖ διαιρετικὸν πρὸς τὸ σωμά ἐστιν ἢ ψυχὴ ἢ ἀσώματος, εἴτα κατασκευάζοιτο, ὅτι οὐ σῶμα (οὕτως γὰρ ἂν προσληφθεῖ τὸ ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ σῶμα, ἀσώματος ἄρα), ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸ δειχθῆναι διὰ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ· οἷον πᾶν σῶμα ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείων· ἢ δὲ ψυχὴ οὔτε στοιχεῖον οὔτε ἐκ στοιχείων· ἢ ψυχὴ ἄρα οὐ σῶμα.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς, εἴ γε καὶ αὐτὸς ἄλλος τῶν προκειμένων τρόπων καὶ μὴ ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ διὰ συνημμένου τοῦ ἀρχομένου ἀπὸ καταφατικοῦ καὶ λήγοντος εἰς ἀποφατικόν, οἷον ἐστὶν τὸ εἰ τὸ Α, οὐ τὸ Β· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις, εἰ εἴη τὸ μεταλαμβανόμενον δεῖξωσ δεόμενον, διὰ κατηγορικοῦ δειχθήσεται συλλογισμοῦ· οἷον οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ ἠδέως ζῆν τέλος καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετή· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡ ἀρετὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετή· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ἠδέως ζῆν τέλος. τὸ γὰρ μεταληφθὲν τὸ ἡ ἀρετὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετή διὰ κατηγορικοῦ δείκνυται συλλογισμοῦ· οἷον ἀφ' ἧς ἔξεως αὐτό τε τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἄριστα ἔχει καὶ κάλλιστα τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον ἐπιτελεῖ, αὐτὴ δι' αὐτὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετή· ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔξεως οὔσης αὐτό τε τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἄριστα ἔχει καὶ κάλλιστα τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον ἐπιτελεῖ· ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα δι' αὐτὴν ἐστὶν αἰρετή.

εἰ μέντοι εἴη ὑποθετικῶς τὸ αὐτὸ εἰλημμένον τόνδε τὸν τρόπον εἰ ἠδονὴ τέλος, οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρετὴ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετή, δείκνυτο ἂν καὶ ἡ ἀκολουθία διὰ συλλογισμοῦ τοιούτου· πᾶν, ὃ ὡς ποιητικόν τινος αἰρετόν ἐστὶν, οὐκ ἐστὶ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν· ἢ δ' ἀρετὴ, εἰ ἡ ἠδονὴ τέλος, ὡς ποιητικὴ τῆς ἠδονῆς αἰρετὴ γίνεται· ἡ ἀρετὴ ἄρα, εἰ ἡ ἠδονὴ τέλος, οὐκ ἐστὶ δι' αὐτὴν αἰρετή.

1-83 [Themistius], *In Arist. Anal. pr.* 41a37 (CAG t.23.3 p.73.19-75.15), *Theophrasto non nominato* 52-5 cf. *Alex. Aphrod., infra* p.379.2-7 = 110A 61 ἐξ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς] cf. *scholion in Arist. Anal. pr.* (CAG t.4.6 p.xi.30-2) et *Philop. comm. In Arist. Anal. pr.* 40b17 (CAG t.13.1 p.245.23-4)

8 ἂν ex [Them.] add. Wallies 19 ἂν ex [Them.] add. Huby: ante συλλογισμὸς (v.18) add. Wallies τὴν aB: καὶ [Them.] 25 τοῦ τοῦτο Wallies: τούτο τὸ Β [Them.]: τούτου τῷ a 40 λαμβανόμενον] μεταλαμβανόμενον [Them.] 43 εἰ Β [Them.]: om. a 60 διὰ Β: om. a [Them.] ἢ [Them.]: ἢ aB 61 κατασκευάζοιτο a: κατασκευάζει τὸ Β [Them.] 68 ἀπὸ καταφατικοῦ a: ἀποφατικοῦ Β [Them.] 75 αὐτὴ Wallies: αὐτὴ aB 78 ὑποθετικῶς [Them.]: ὑποθετικῶς aB 81 εἰ ἡ Wallies: εἰ Β³ (superscr.), [Them.]: εἴη aB 82 εἰ ἡ post corr. Β: εἰ εἴη a et ante corr. Β: εἰ [Them.]

The same argument holds for the disjunctive "Either this or this", which also they say is from a "tropic" and an additional assumption: for whichever of them is taken as needing proof, needs a categorical syllogism for its proof. For example, if the disjunctive "The soul is either body or bodiless" were taken, and it were then proved constructively that it is not body (for in this way there would be added "But it is not body, it is bodiless, then"⁴), it is necessary that that should be proved through a categorical syllogism, like: "Every body is either an element or made up of elements: but the soul is neither an element nor made up of elements: the soul, then, is not body."

It is even the same with the (mood) from a negative conjunction, if at least that is different from the moods mentioned before, and not the same as the (mood) through the conditional with an affirmative antecedent and a negative consequent, like "If A, not B". For in these too, if the "changed assumption" needed proof, it would be proved through a categorical syllogism: for example, "It is not true both that a pleasant life is the goal, and that virtue is to be chosen for itself: but virtue is to be chosen for itself: a pleasant life is not therefore the goal." For the changed assumption: "Virtue is to be chosen for itself", is proved through a categorical syllogism, e.g. "From what disposition that which has it fares best itself, and performs its proper function most nobly, this is to be chosen for itself; but from virtue, which is a disposition, that which has it fares best itself and performs its proper function most nobly: virtue, then, is to be chosen for itself."

If however, the same subject were taken hypothetically in this way: "If pleasure is the goal, virtue is not to be chosen for itself", the sequence too would be proved through a syllogism like this: "Everything which is to be chosen as being productive of something, is not to be chosen for itself; but virtue, if pleasure is the goal, becomes a thing to be chosen as being productive of pleasure: virtue, then, if pleasure is the goal, is not to be chosen for itself."

¹ The Stoics.

² The Peripatetics.

³ Or, with pseudo-Themistius' reading, "or a starting-point".

⁴ This is not wholly satisfactory. Possibly "but it is not body: it is bodiless, then", would make better sense.

- 112B** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.44 50a16 (CAG t.2.1 p.388.17-20 Wallies)

καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν λέγει τὸ προσλαμβανόμενον ἢ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς τίθεσθαι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἢ δι' ἐναργείας ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ.

3 δι' ἐναργείας] cf. *Sext. Empir. Adv. math.* 7.218 = 301A

- 112C** Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 3.1 298a27 (CAG t.7 p.552.31-553.4 Heiberg)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὑποθετικοῖς ἐν οἷς τὸ ἡγούμενον οὐ μόνον ἀληθές ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναργές καὶ ἀναμφίλεκτον, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰ συνδέσμου τῷ ἐπεὶ 533 χρῶνται παρασυναπτικῶ ἀντὶ τοῦ συναπτικοῦ, διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξίωμα οἱ νεώτεροι παρασυναπτικὸν καλοῦσι· καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τοιαύτης χρήσεως ἐδήλωσεν. 5

2-3 cf. *Sext. Empir. Adv. math.* 8.109-10 (t.2 p.127.20-128.3 Mutschmann); *Galen. Instit. logic.* 3.3 (p.8.19-9.1 Kalbfleisch) = 111D

- 113A** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.29 45b19 (CAG t.2.1 p.326.8-12 Wallies)

δόξουσι γὰρ οἱ δι' ὄλων ὑποθετικοί, οὓς Θεόφραστος κατὰ ἀναλογίαν λέγει, οἷοί εἰσιν οἱ διὰ τριῶν λεγόμενοι, μηκέτι ὑποπίπτειν τῇ διὰ τῆς ἐκλογῆς δείξει. λέγει δὲ αὐτοὺς ὁ Θεόφραστος κατὰ ἀναλογίαν, ἐπειδὴ αἱ τε προτάσεις ἀνάλογον καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ταῖς 5 προτάσεσιν· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότης ἐστίν.

- 113B** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.29 45b19 (CAG t.2.1 p.326.20-31 et 327.2-5 et 13-16 et 33-328.6 Wallies)

ἀνάγονται μέντοι καὶ οἱ δι' ὄλων ὑποθετικοί εἰς τὰ τρία τὰ προειρημένα σχήματα ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ, ὡς καὶ Θεόφραστος δέδειχεν ἐν τῷ

- 112B** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.44 50a16 (CAG vol.2.1 p.388.17-20 Wallies)

Theophrastus, too, in the first (book) of his *Prior Analytics*, says that the additional assumption is posited either by induction, or itself also¹ from a hypothetical argument, or as self-evident, or by a syllogism.

¹ I.e., as well as the main conclusion.

- 112C** Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 3.1 298a27 (CAG vol.7 p.552.31-553.4 Heiberg)

In hypothetical arguments in which the antecedent is not only true, but also self-evident and undisputed, instead of the conjunction "if" they use "since", which is parasynaptic instead of syntactic. 533 Hence the younger men call this kind of proposition "parasynaptic"; Theophrastus also, in the first book of his *Prior Analytics*, explained the reason for this usage.

- 113A** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.29 45b19 (CAG vol.2.1 p.326.8-12 Wallies)

For the totally hypothetical (syllogisms), which Theophrastus calls "by analogy", such as those called "in threes", will be seen not to fall under proof by selection (of terms)¹. Theophrastus calls them "by analogy" because the premises are analogous, as is the conclusion to the premises.² For in them all there is similarity.

¹ Earlier, at p.325.34, Alexander has used the full expression τῶν ὄρων ἐκλογῆ, which is the clue to the meaning here.

² "Analogous" here means "similar in form". It distinguishes these "hypotheticals" from others which have one categorical premise and a categorical conclusion.

- 113B** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Prior Analytics* 1.29 45b19 (CAG vol.2.1 p.326.20-31 and 327.2-5 and 15-16 and 33-328.6 Wallies)

Totally hypothetical (syllogisms), however, are reduced to the three figures mentioned before in another way, as Theophrastus too

πρώτῳ τῶν Προτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν. ἔστι δὲ δι' ὅλων ὑποθετικὸς τοιοῦτος· εἰ τὸ Α, τὸ Β, εἰ τὸ Β, τὸ Γ, εἰ ἄρα τὸ Α, τὸ Γ· τούτων γὰρ καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ὑποθετικόν· οἷον "εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, ζῷον ἐστίν," 5 εἰ ζῷον ἐστίν, οὐσία ἐστίν, εἰ ἄρα ἄνθρωπός ἐστίν, οὐσία ἐστίν". ἐπεὶ τοίνυν δεῖ καὶ ἐν τούτοις μέσον τινὰ ὄρον εἶναι, καθ' ὃν συνάπτουσιν αἱ προτάσεις ἀλλήλαις (ἄλλως γὰρ ἀδύνατον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων συνακτικὴν συζυγίαν γίνεσθαι), οὗτος ὁ μέσος τριχῶς καὶ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συζυγίαις τεθήσεται. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἡ μὲν τῶν προτάσεων 10 λήγῃ, ἐν ἡ δὲ ἀρχῆται, τὸ πρῶτον ἔσται σχῆμα· οὕτως γὰρ ἔξει, ὡς καὶ 327 ὅτε τοῦ μὲν τῶν ἄκρων κατηγορεῖτο, τῷ δὲ ὑπέκειτο. . . . εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ διαφόρων ἀρχόμεναι αἱ ὑποθετικαὶ προτάσεις λήγουσιν εἰς ταυτό, ἔσται τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα δευτέρου ἀνάλογον ὃν τῷ ἐν τοῖς κατηγορικαῖς δευτέρῳ, ἐν οἷς ὁ μέσος ὄρος ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἄκρων κατηγορεῖτο. 15 . . . εἰ δὲ γε ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχόμεναι αἱ προτάσεις λήγουσιν εἰς ἕτερα, ἔσται ἀνάλογον τοῦτο τὸ σχῆμα τῷ τρίτῳ· τὸ γὰρ ἡγούμενον ὑποκειμένου χῶραν ἔχον ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ταῖς προτάσεσι ταυτόν ἐστιν. . . . παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ αἱ ἀναλύσεις τῶν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ καὶ τρίτῳ σχήματι ἐς τὸ πρῶτον ἔσονται σχῆμα, ἐξ οὗ καὶ αἱ γενέσεις αὐτοῖς, 20 ὡσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατηγορικῶν.

328 οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀπλοῖ τε καὶ πρῶτοι ὑποθετικοὶ δι' ὅλων λεγόμενοι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ καὶ οἱ σύνθετοι πάντες τὴν σύστασιν ἔχοντες δειχθήσονται. Θεόφραστος μέντοι ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ τῶν Ἀναλυτικῶν δευτέρου σχῆμα λέγει ἐν τοῖς δι' ὅλων ὑποθετικοῖς εἶναι, ἐν ᾧ 25 ἀρχόμεναι ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἱ προτάσεις λήγουσιν εἰς ἕτερα, τρίτον δέ, ἐν ᾧ ἀπὸ διαφόρων ἀρχόμεναι λήγουσιν εἰς ταυτόν. ἀνάπαλιν δ' ἡμεῖς ἐξεθέμεθα. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἰδίᾳ καιρὸς ἂν εἴη λέγειν.

5-6 cf. *Arist. Anal. pr.* 1.32 47a29-31
6 (p.159.10-12 Hermann)

27-8 *Albinus/Alcinous, Didasc.*

7 μέσον Wallies: μέσον aB 24 προτέρῳ τῶν] πρώτῳ τῶν a: πρώτῳ τῶν
προτέρων fort. Huby 25 post ὅλων add. εἶναι a εἶναι] ἐκεῖνο
tempt. Prantl

113C Philoponus, In Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.29 45b18 (CAG t.13.2 p.302.6-23 Wallies)

ἀπορεῖ δὲ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος περὶ τῶν λεγομένων παρὰ τῷ Θεοφράστῳ δι' ὅλου ὑποθετικῶν· οὐ γὰρ δέονται οὗτοι κατηγορικῶν συλλογισμῶν, ὥστε οὐδὲν χρησιμεύσει πρὸς τούτους ἡ παραδεδομένη μέθοδος. δι' ὅλου δὲ ὑποθετικούς ἐκάλει ὁ Θεόφραστος τοὺς καὶ τὰς

has shown in the first book of his *Prior Analytics*. A totally hypothetical (syllogism) is like this: If A, B; if B, C; if then A, C. For even the conclusion of these is hypothetical: like, "If man is, animal is; if animal is, substance is; if then man is, substance is."¹ Since therefore in these too there must be a middle term, through which the premises are joined to one another (otherwise it would be impossible with these too to have a logically effective pair) this middle term will have three positions in such pairs too. When it is at the end of one premise and the beginning of the other, it will be the first figure: for it will be like the situation when it is predicated of one of the extremes, and is the subject of the other. 327 . . . But if the hypothetical premises have different antecedents but the same consequent, the figure will be the second by analogy with the second in the categoricals, in which the middle term is predicated of both the extremes. . . . But if the premises start with the same but end differently, the figure will be analogous to the third; for the antecedent, which has the position of the subject, is the same in both premises. . . . And the reduction of those in the second and third figures to the first figure, from which they came in the first place, will be carried out in a way similar to the categoricals.

328 These, then, are the simple and first hypotheticals called "total". All the compound ones derive their constitution and will be demonstrated from them. Theophrastus, however, in the first book of his *Analytics*,² says that the second figure in the totally hypotheticals is that in which the premises begin with the same and end with different and the third that in which, beginning with different they end with the same. But we set them out in the opposite way. It would however be opportune to write about these matters separately.

¹ Or, "If it is a man, it is an animal, etc."

² Perhaps "in the first book of his *Prior Analytics*".

113C Philoponus, On Aristotle's Prior Analytics 1.29 45b18 (CAG vol.13.2 p.302.6-23 Wallies)

At this point Alexander finds a difficulty about those (arguments) called by Theophrastus "totally hypothetical". For they do not need a categorical syllogism, so that the traditional method will be of no use with them. Theophrastus called "totally hypothetical"

προτάσεις καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνοντας· οἷον “εἰ τὸ 5
 Α, καὶ τὸ Β· εἰ δὲ τὸ Β, καὶ τὸ Γ· εἰ τὸ Α ἄρα, καὶ τὸ Γ.” σκόπει γὰρ
 ὅτι ἐξ ὑποθέσεως καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα εἰληπταί. φησὶν οὖν πρὸς τοῦτο
 ὅτι οὐδὲ ὅλως εἰσι συλλογισμοὶ οἱ δι’ ὅλου ὑποθετικοί· ἀκολουθίαν
 γὰρ μόνην σημαίνουσιν. ὥστε ἡ μέθοδος κοινὴ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν 10
 συλλογισμῶν. ἔλεγε δὲ ὁ Θεόφραστος ὅτι δύνανται καὶ οὗτοι ὑπὸ τὰ
 τρία σχήματα ἀνάγεσθαι. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν “εἰ τὸ Α, καὶ τὸ Β, εἰ τὸ
 Β, καὶ τὸ Γ”, εἶτα συμπεράνωμεν “εἰ τὸ Α ἄρα, καὶ τὸ Γ”, ἀναλογεῖ
 τὸ μὲν Α ἐλάττωνι ὄρφ καὶ ὑποκειμένῳ, τὸ δὲ Β μέσῳ κατηγορουμένῳ
 μὲν τοῦ Α ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ τῷ Γ, ὅπερ ἀναλογεῖ μείζονι ὄρφ· ὥστε οὕτως 15
 ἔσται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα. γίνεται πάλιν δεύτερον, ὅταν οὕτως εἴπω· “εἰ
 τὸ Α, καὶ τὸ Β· εἰ μὴ τὸ Γ, οὐδὲ τὸ Β· εἰ μὴ τὸ Α ἄρα, οὐδὲ τὸ Γ.”
 ὁμοίως καὶ τὸ τρίτον οὕτως· “εἰ μὴ τὸ Β, οὐδὲ τὸ Α· εἰ τὸ Β, καὶ τὸ
 Γ· εἰ μὴ τὸ Α ἄρα, οὐδὲ τὸ Γ.”

7-10 Alexander Aphrod., In Arist. Anal. pr. 45b19 (CAG t.2.1 p.326.12-19)

15 post πάλιν add. τὸ t

113D Scholion in Aristotelis Analytica priora 1.29 45b18 (cod. Flor. bibl. nat. centr., Conv. Soppr. J 6.34 = Arist. Lat. t.3.4 p.320.7-16 Minio-Paluello)

hic Theophrastus conatur redarguere, per totum hypotheticos syllogismos inquiring non indigere huiusmodi via. dicit autem “per totum hypotheticos” qui et propositiones omnes et conclusionem habent hypotheticam, quique videlicet secundum tres figuras fiunt; ut “si est homo, animal est; si animal est, substantia est; igitur, si 5
 homo est, substantia est.” hi ergo, quia nullam habent categoricam propositionem, non probantur categorico syllogismo; neque enim hypothetica propositio categorici syllogismi conclusio fit. sed Alexander et plurimus chorus philosophorum nec syllogismos huiusmodi contendunt; nil enim nisi consequentiam eos aiunt 10 ostendere.

vid. Appendicem no. 1

those which take both the premises and the conclusion hypothetically, like “If A, B too, but if B, C too; if A then, C too.” Notice that even the conclusion is taken hypothetically. He (Alexander) says with regard to this, then, that totally hypotheticals are not even totally syllogisms, for they indicate nothing more than consequence. As a result the method is common to all (true) syllogisms. But Theophrastus said that these, too, can be brought under the three figures, for when we say, “If A, B too; if B, C too” and then conclude “If A then, C too”, A is analogous to the minor term and the subject, and B to the middle term, being predicated of A, and the subject of C, which is analogous to the major term; so that this will be the first figure. Again, the second is formed when I say this: “If A, B too; if not C, not B either; if not A then, not C either.” Similarly the third too thus: “If not B, not A either; if B, C too; if not A then, not any of C, either.”

113D Scholium on Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* 1.29 45b18 (cod. Flor. bibl. nat. centr., Conv. Soppr. J 6.34 = Arist. Lat. vol.3.4 p.320.7-16 Minio-Paluello)

Here Theophrastus tries to argue to the contrary, saying that totally hypothetical syllogisms do not need this kind of method.¹ He calls “totally hypothetical” those that have their premises and their conclusion all hypothetical, and which evidently are formed according to the three figures: like “If it is man, it is animal; if it is animal, it is substance: therefore, if it is man, it is substance.” These, then, because they have no categorical premise, are not proved by a categorical syllogism, for a hypothetical proposition cannot be the conclusion of a categorical syllogism. But Alexander and a very large chorus of philosophers claim that these are not syllogisms at all, for they say that they display nothing but consequence.

¹ I.e., the method of categorical syllogisms.

see Appendix no. 1

Methodus demonstrativa

- 114 Galenus, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis* 2.2.3-5 (CMG t.5.4.1.2 p.102.25-104.8 DeLacy)

τὰ δὲ οὐκ οἰκεία τῶν λημμάτων ὅποσα τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, εἴρηται
 μὲν ἐπὶ πλείστον ἐν τοῖς Περι ἀποδείξεως ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν οἷς ἅπασαν
 ἐδήλωσα τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν μέθοδον ὅποια τίς ἐστιν, παρεκάλουν τε διὰ
 τοῦ πρώτου τῶνδε τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ἐν ἐκείνῃ γυμνάσασθαι πρότερον,
 4 ὅστις ὅτιοῦν ἀποδεικνύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ. γεγράφθαι δὲ λέγω ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς 5
 ἄριστα τοῖς παλαιοῖς φιλοσόφοις τοῖς περὶ Θεόφραστον τε καὶ
 Ἀριστοτέλην κατὰ τὰ τῶν Δευτέρων ἀναλυτικῶν βιβλία καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
 πρὸς ἐκείνους μὲν οὐδὲ μακρὸν ἔσσεσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐλπίζω περὶ τῶν
 5 τριῶν ἀρχῶν τοῦ ζῴου· τὰ γὰρ ἰδιωτικά τε καὶ ρητορικά λήμματα
 αἰδοῦνται παραλαμβάνειν εἰς ἀποδείξεις ἐπιστημονικάς, ὧν πέμ- 10
 πλησται τὰ Χρυσίππου βιβλία.

7 κατὰ τὰ τῶν Mueller: κατὰ τῶν MA: τὰ τῶν C

- 115 Themistius, *Aristotelis Analyticorum posteriorum paraphrasis*, ad 1.2 72a8-24 (CAG t.5.1 p.7.3-6 Wallies)

ὁ γὰρ Θεόφραστος οὕτως ὀρίζει τὸ ἀξίωμα· ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ δόξα
 τις ἢ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ὁμογενέσιν, “ἐὰν ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων”, ἢ δὲ ἀπλῶς ἐν ἅπασιν,
 οἷον “τὴν κατάφασιν ἢ τὴν ἀπόφασιν”· ταῦτα γὰρ καθάτερ σύμφυτα
 καὶ κοινὰ πᾶσι.

1-2 *cod. Vat. Gr. 246 f.12^v (Cod. Vat. Gr. t.1 p.319.30-1)*

2 οἷον *post* ὁμογενέσιν *inserendum coni. Wallies*

- 116 Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Analytica posteriora* 1.4 73a27 (CAG t.13.3 p.71.4-14 Wallies)

ἰστέον τοίνυν ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ φησὶν εἶναι
 τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ἢ αὐτὸ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Θεόφραστον διαφέρειν ταῦτα
 λέγουσι· καθολικώτερον γὰρ εἶναι τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ ἢ αὐτὸ· εἴ τι μὲν
 γὰρ ἢ αὐτὸ, τοῦτο καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ· οὐκ εἴ τι δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ, πάντως καὶ
 ἢ αὐτὸ. τῷ γὰρ τριγώνῳ, ἢ τρίγωνόν ἐστιν, ὑπάρχει τὸ τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας 5
 δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ· τῷ δὲ ἰσοσκελεῖ καθ' αὐτὸ

Demonstration

- 114 Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 2.2.3-5 (CMG vol.5.4.1.2 p.102.25-104.8 De Lacy)

I have discussed the number and nature of the assumptions
 which are irrelevant in full in my memoranda *On Demonstration*,
 in which I explained the nature of the whole method of demon-
 stration, and throughout the first book of these memoranda I urged
 anyone who tries to demonstrate anything to exercise himself first
 in that. But I declare that the best writings on it are by the old
 4 philosophers associated with Theophrastus and Aristotle, in the
 books of the *Posterior Analytics*, and for that reason I do not expect
 that there will be a long argument against them about the three
 5 principles of a living being. For they would be ashamed to bring
 into scientific demonstrations the amateurish and rhetorical as-
 sumptions with which the books of Chrysippus are filled.

- 115 Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics*, on 1.2 72a8-24 (CAG vol.5.1 p.7.3-6 Wallies)

Theophrastus defines *axiom* like this: an axiom is an opinion
 either about homogeneous matters, (like) “if equals from equals”,¹
 or about absolutely everything, like “the affirmation or the nega-
 tion”.² For these are as it were innate and common to all.

¹ and ² Both quotations are just the opening words of complete axioms.

- 116 Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* 1.4 73a27 (CAG vol.13.3 p.71.4-14 Wallies)

You must know then that Aristotle in these (words) says that
 “in itself” and “*qua* itself” are the same, but those associated with
 Theophrastus say that they differ, for “in itself” is more general than
 “*qua* itself”. For if something is *qua* itself, this is also in itself, but
 it is not the case that if something is in itself, it is also in all cases
qua itself. For a triangle has the property of having its three angles
 equal to two right angles *qua* being triangle but also in itself. But

μὲν ὑπάρχει, οὐκέτι δὲ ἢ αὐτό· οὐ γὰρ ἢ ἰσοσκελὲς ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ τὸ τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχειν (εἰ γὰρ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἂν τῷ ἰσοπλευρῷ ἢ σκαληνῷ ὑπῆρχεν. ἐπεὶ μὴ ἰσοσκελεῖ) ἀλλ' ἢ ἀπλῶς τριγώνον ἐστὶ. ταῦτα μὲν οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον. ὁ μὲντοι Ἀριστοτέλης εὐρὼν ἐπὶ τινῶν ταῦτα συντρέχοντα ταῦτόν εἶναι ἔφη ἄμφω. 10

1 τοῖνον *Sa*: δὲ *RU et ed. CAG* 6 δύο *RU*: δυσὶν *Sa* 8 δύο *RU*: δυσὶν *Sa*

- 117 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *Quaestiones et solutiones* 1.26 (Suppl. Arist. t.2.2 p.42.27-31 Bruns)

ἦν καὶ ἄλλος τρόπος τοῦ καθ' αὐτό, οὗ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Ὑστέροις ἀναλυτικοῖς μνημονεύουσιν, οὗτος δ' ἐστὶν καθ' ὃν ἐλέγετο καθ' αὐτό ὑπάρχειν τινί, οὗ ἐν τῷ ὀρισμῷ τὸ ὃ ὑπάρχει παραλαμβάνεται, καθ' ὃν τρόπον τοῦ καθ' αὐτό ὁ περιττός ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἄρτιος ὑπάρχουσιν τῷ ἀριθμῷ. 5

1 *Aristoteles, Anal. post. 1.4 73a34*

4-5 ὁ περιττός—ὑπάρχουσιν] τὸ περιττόν καὶ ἄρτιον ὑπάρχει *tempt. Moraux (Le comm. d'Alex. d'Aphrod. aux Secondes anal. p.18-19)*

Definitio

- 118 Boetius, *In Aristotelis De interpretatione* 5 17a8, *secunda editio* 2.5 (BT p.102.26-103.11 Meiser)

Theophrastus autem in libro *De adfirmatione et negatione* sic docuit: definitionem unam semper esse orationem eamque oportere continuatim proferre. illa enim una oratio esse dicitur, quae unius substantiae designativa est. definitio autem, ut verbi gratia hominis 103 “animal gressibile bipes”, una est oratio per hoc, quoniam unum subiectum id est hominem monstrat. si ergo continue proferatur et non divide, una est oratio, et quia continue dicitur et quia unius rei substantiam monstrat; sin vero quis dividat et orationem unam rem significantem proferendi intermissione distribuat, multiplex fit oratio. ut si dicam “animal gressibile bipes”, unam rem mihi tota 10 monstrat oratio et continue dicta est; sin vero dicam “animal” et

an isosceles (triangle) has it in itself, but not *qua* itself. For it is not *qua* isosceles that it has the property of having its three angles equal to two right angles — for if that were so, equilateral and scalene (triangles) would not have had it, since they are not isosceles — but simply *qua* being triangle. This is what the associates of Theophrastus say, but Aristotle found that in some cases these coincide, and so says that both are the same.

- 117 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Questions and Solutions* 1.26 (Suppl. Arist. vol.2.2 p.42.27-31 Bruns)

There was another sense of “in itself”, of which both Aristotle and Theophrastus, in the *Posterior Analytics*, speak; this is that according to which that was said in itself to belong to something, in the definition of which that to which it belongs is included, in the sense of “in itself” in which odd number and even belong to number.

Definition

- 118 Boethius, *On Aristotle's De interpretatione* 5 17a8, *Second edition* 2.5 (BT p.102.26-103.11 Meiser)

But Theophrastus, in his book *On Affirmation and Denial*, taught this, that a definition is always a single utterance, and one ought to produce it without a break. For that is said to be one utterance, which signifies one substance. And a definition, for example, of man 103 as “animal walking with two feet”, is one utterance through this, that it indicates one subject, that is, man. If, therefore, it is produced without a break and not split up, it is one utterance both because it is spoken without a break and because it indicates the substance of one thing; but if anyone were to split up and divide an utterance which signified one thing by an interval in producing it, it would become a multiple utterance. Thus, if I say “animal walking with two feet”, my whole utterance indicates one thing and is spoken

rursus "gressibile" et sub intermissione repetam "bipes", multiplex fit distributa intermissione oratio.

2-13 cf. *Ammonii comm. In Arist. De int. 5 17a19* (CAG t.4.5 p.70.30-71.32)
2-3 *Sigerus de Curtraco, In Arist. De int. 5 17a13* (p.43.30-1 *Verhaak*), *Theophrasto nominato*; *Guillelmus de Ockham, In Arist. De int. 1.4.3* (t.2 p.393. 14-15 *Gál*), *Theophrasto non nominato* 11-13 *Boetius, In Arist. De int., prima editio 2.11* (p.151.20-2)

3 proferrel proferri b

- 119 Eustratius, *In Aristotelis Analytica posteriora* 2.3 90b23 (CAG t.21.1 p.44.1-7 Hayduck)

ἴσως δὲ τὸ τοῦ γὰρ ἑνὸς ἢ ἓν μίᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ οὐχ ὡς λήμμα προτέτακται, ἀλλ' ὡς κατασκευαστικὸν τοῦ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τὸ ἀποδεικτὸν εἶναι τὸ ἔχειν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ κυρίως ἐπιστήμας ταύτας τὰς δύο τίθεται, ὀριστικὴν τε καὶ ἀποδεικτικὴν, ὡς Θεόφραστος μαρτυρεῖ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος, φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ ἓν ὀρισμὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀπόδειξιν. διὸ οὔτε ὀριστὸν ἢ ἓν ἄνευ ὀρισμοῦ γνωστὸν ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀποδεικτὸν ἄνευ ἀποδείξεως.

- 120 Leo Magentinus, *Prooemium ad Aristotelis Analytica posteriora* 2 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1917 f.257^v et iterum 272^v = p.240a46-7 et b1-4 Brandis)

νῦν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τῆς Ἀποδεικτικῆς . . . ζητεῖ περὶ ὀρισμοῦ οὐ κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον, ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρῳ δοκεῖ τῷ Ἀφροδισιεῖ ὄς καὶ τὸν Θεόφραστον αὐτὸν ἐπιφέρειται μάρτυρα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ δεύτερον λόγον καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ζητεῖ περὶ ὀρισμοῦ.

1 post ζητεῖ *add.* οὐ C (f.272^v)

- 121 Ptolemaeus, *Waṣīyat Aristūṭālīs wa-fihrist kutubihī wa-ṣay' min aḥbārihī ilā Ḡalus, Fihrist* (cod. Constantinopolitanus Ayasofya 4833, f.16^v v.12-13)

كتابه الذي رسمه في صناعة التحديد الذي استعمله ثاورسطس لانالوطيقا

without a break, but if I say "animal", and again "walking", and after an interval I go on with "with two feet", the utterance becomes multiple because it is divided up by intervals.

- 119 Eustratius, *On Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* 2.3 90b23 (CAG vol.21.1 p.44.1-7 Hayduck)

But perhaps the words "of one thing as one, there is one (mode of) understanding" are put first not as a (syllogistic) premise, but as part of a constructive (dialectical) proof that to understand what is to be proved is to have the proof; for since he (Aristotle) holds the view that properly speaking there are these two (modes of) understanding, that of definition and that of proof, as Theophrastus testifies, and Alexander (too), he is meaning to say that it is not possible for there to be definition and proof of one thing as one. Hence neither can what is definable, as one thing, be known without a definition, nor can what is provable be known without a proof.

- 120 Leo Magentinus, *Introduction to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics* 2 (cod. Paris. Gr. 1917 f.257^v and again 272^v = p.240a46-7 and b1-4 Brandis)

Now in the second book of the *Apodeictic*¹ . . . he (Aristotle) enquires about definition not as his primary interest — as Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks, who brings in Theophrastus himself too as a witness — but as a secondary interest and incidentally he enquires about definition.

¹ I.e., the *Posterior Analytics*.

- 121 Ptolemy, *The Will of Aristotle, the Pinax of His Works and a Brief Life, to Gallus*, from the *Pinax* (cod. Istanbul, Ayasofya 4833, f.16^v 12-13)

His (Aristotle's) book which he entitled *On the Discipline of De-*

الأولى وهو مقالة واحدة

fontes: *cod. Constantin., ut supra; invenitur opusculum Ptolemaei etiam ap. Ibn Abī Uṣaybī'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā', t.1 p.68.22 Müller (IAU); sed hic titulus deest ap. az-Zawzani, Muntahabāt p.46.14-15 Lippert*

1-2 *textum Ptolemaei graecum deperditum* τέχνη ὀριστική, ἢ κέχρηται Θεόφραστος 'Αναλυτικούς προτέροις conī. esse A. Baumstark, *Aristoteles bei den Syrern, Lipsiae 1900, p.82; cf. etiam AABT p.228*

Topica

122A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 1, prooemium (CAG t.2.2 p.5.21-7 Wallies)

ἔστι γὰρ ὁ τόπος, ὃς λέγει Θεόφραστος, ἀρχὴ τις ἢ στοιχεῖον, ἀφ' οὗ λαμβάνομεν τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήσαντες τὴν διάνοιαν, τῇ περιγραφῇ μὲν ὀρισμένος (ἢ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου, ἃ ἔστι τὰ κύρια τῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἢ δύναται γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα δεῖκνυσθαι τε καὶ λαμβάνεσθαι), τοῖς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀόριστος· ἀπὸ τούτων γὰρ ἔστιν ὀρμώμενον εὐπορεῖν προτάσεως ἐνδόξου πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡ ἀρχή.

1-3 *Ibn Rušd, Talhīs al-Ġadal 2, prooemium (p.525.5-7 Jéhamy)* 1-7 *Suda, s.v. τόπος (no. 783, LG t.1 pars 4 p.572.21-7 Adler), Theophrasto non nominato*

3 *supra* ὀρισμένος *scriptum* ἦτοι (?) καθόλου B: ὀρισμένον A: ὀρισμένως a *Suda*

122B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 2, prooemium (CAG t.2.2 p.126.11-21 Wallies)

ἔστι δὲ ὁ τόπος ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀφορμὴ ἐπιχειρήματος· ἐπιχείρημα δὲ καλοῦσι τὸν διαλεκτικὸν συλλογισμόν. διὸ καὶ ὀρίζεται ὁ Θεόφραστος τὸν τόπον, ὃς ἤδη ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις εἴρηται, οὕτως· “τόπος ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τις ἢ στοιχεῖον, ἀφ' οὗ λαμβάνομεν τὰς περὶ ἕκαστον ἀρχὰς, τῇ περιγραφῇ μὲν ὀρισμένος, τοῖς δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα ἀόριστος.” οἷον τόπος ἐστὶν “εἰ τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον”. οὗτος γὰρ ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ πρότασις αὕτη τῷ μὲν καθόλου ὀρίσται (ὅτι γὰρ περὶ ἐναντίων καθόλου λέγεται, δηλοῖ), οὐκέτι μέντοι, εἰ περὶ

fining, used by Theophrastus for the Prior Analytics. One book.

1 *cod.: كتابه الذي رسمه IAU صناعة om. cod. الذي استعمله IAU التي استعملها IAU باورفسطس لابالوطيقا sic cod. 2 الاولى om. cod. وهو om. IAU واحدة om. IAU*

Topics

122A Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Topics 1, Introduction (CAG vol.2.2 p.5.21-7 Wallies)

For the topic is, as Theophrastus says, a starting-point or fundamental principle, from which we take the starting-points (of argument) about each matter by turning our attention to it. It is limited in compass — for either it includes the common and universal, which govern syllogisms, or at any rate from them such things can be demonstrated and grasped¹ — but unlimited with respect to individual cases: for starting from these it is possible to obtain a probable premise relevant to the problem one has been set; for this is the starting-point.

¹ This is obscure. In spite of being plural αὐτῶν (“them”) seems to pick up “it”, “the topic”, as does the plural τούτων (“these”) which follows.

122B Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Topics 2, Introduction (CAG vol.2.2 p.126.11-21 Wallies)

The topic is the starting-point and source of the epicheireme, and epicheireme is what they call the dialectical syllogism. Hence also Theophrastus defines topic, as we have already said at the beginning, like this: “The topic is a starting-point or fundamental principle, from which we take the starting-points (of argument) about each matter. It is limited in compass, but unlimited with respect to individual cases.” For example, “If the one contrary (of a pair) belongs to the one contrary (of another pair), so will the other contrary belong to the other contrary” is a topic. For this statement and this proposition is limited with regard to the universal — for it shows that it is stated about contraries universally

τῶνδε ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται, ἔστιν ὠρισμένον ἐν αὐτῷ. οὐ μὴν ἄλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ὀρμωμένους ἔστιν ἐπιχειρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐναντίων. ¹⁰

1-2 et 10 cf. Ciceronis Top. 7-8, Anon. Segueriani Art. rhet. (RhGr. t.1 p.382 Spengel-Hammer), Aelii Theonis Progymnasmata 7 (RhGr. t.2 p.106 Spengel), Quintiliani Inst. orat. 5.10.20-2

- 123 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 2.2 109a34 (CAG t.2.2 p.135.2-18 Wallies)

δεῖ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι Θεόφραστος διαφέρειν λέγει παράγγελμα καὶ τόπον· παράγγελμα μὲν γὰρ ἔστι τὸ κοινότερον καὶ καθολικώτερον καὶ ἀπλουστέρον λεγόμενον, ἀφ' οὗ ὁ τόπος εὐρίσκεται· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τόπου τὸ παράγγελμα, ὡσπερ ὁ τόπος ἐπιχειρήματος, οἷον παράγγελμα μὲν τὸ οὕτως λεγόμενον, ὅτι δεῖ ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων, ἀπὸ τῶν συστοίχων, τόπος δὲ οἷον “εἰ τὸ ἐναντίον πολλαχῶς, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον”, ἢ “εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὑπάρχει τῷ ἐναντίῳ”, καὶ πάλιν “ὡς ἐν τῶν συστοίχων, οὕτως καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ”. ὁ γὰρ τόπος πρότασις ἤδη τις ἀπὸ τοῦ παραγγέλματος γεγονυῖα. ταύτην δὲ [λέγω] τὴν διαφορὰν παραγγέλματος τε καὶ τόπου εἰδῶς ὁ Θεόφραστος τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὁποῖός ἐστιν ὁ πρῶτος εἰρημένος τόπος, παραγγέλματα λέγει καὶ τόπους παραγγελματικούς· τὸ γὰρ ἐπιβλέπειν δεῖν, εἰ τὸ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ὑπάρχον ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἀποδέδωκε, παραγγελματικόν. τόπος δ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ εἴη ὁ λέγων “εἰ τὸ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἀποδομένον κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον ὑπάρχει, οὐ καλῶς ἀποδέδοται”, ἢ ἔτι προσεχέστερον “εἰ τὸ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἀποδομένον γένος εἴη ἢ πάλιν ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον”. ¹⁵

1-9 Suda, s.v. τόπος παραγγέλματος διαφέρει (no. 784, LG t.1 pars 4 p.573.3-10 Adler), Theophrasto non nominato 12-14 Aristoteles, Top. 2.2 109a34-5

10 λέγω aABD: om. Z: del. Wallies 11 post παραγγέλματα add. δὲ B

- 124A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 1.6 102b27 (CAG t.2.2 p.55.24-7 Wallies)

καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ Τοπικοῖς καθόλου μίαν μέθοδον παραδιδόναι σπουδάσας ἐχώρισε μὲν τῶν ἄλλων τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς μὴ ὑπαγόμενον τῷ ὄρφ, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ πειραθεῖς τῷ ὀρισμῷ ὑποτάσσειν ἀσαφεστέραν ἐποίησε τὴν πραγματείαν.

— but it is not also laid down in it whether it is said about these or these particular contraries. It is, however, possible for those starting from it to argue dialectically about every set of contraries.

- 123 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 2.2 109a34 (CAG vol.2.2 p.135.2-18 Wallies)

We must not ignore the fact that Theophrastus says that *precept* and *topic* differ, for a precept is what is stated in more common and universal and simple terms, and from it the topic is discovered. For the source of the topic is the precept, just as the topic is the source of the epicheireme. For instance, a precept is stated like this: “We must argue from the contraries, from coordinate items”, but the topic is like “If the one contrary has several senses, the other has too”, or, “If the one contrary (of a pair) belongs to the one contrary (of another pair), the other contrary also belongs to the other contrary”, and again, “As is one of the coordinate items, so are the rest.” For the topic is a premise derived from the precept. Theophrastus, then, knowing this difference between precept and topic, calls principles like the topic first mentioned (by Aristotle)¹ *precepts* and *preceptive topics*. For “We must consider if he has treated what belongs in some other way as an accident”, is preceptive. But the topic from this would say, “If what is treated as an accident belongs in some other way, it has not been treated correctly”, or, still most particularly, “If what is treated as an accident were a genus, or again a definition or a property”.

¹ This refers to the example discussed by Aristotle at 109a34-5, which is repeated by Alexander in the next sentence.

- 124A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 1.6 102b27 (CAG vol.2.2 p.55.24-7 Wallies)

Theophrastus too, in his *Topics*, being eager to provide a single universal method, separated accident from the rest as not being subsumed under definition, but, in trying to subordinate the rest to definition, he made the subject less clear.

124B Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem 1, prooemium (col.635.2-12 Cousin)

τοσοῦτον μέντοι διαφέρειν τῆς τοπικῆς τῆς παρὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει μεθόδου ταύτην φασίν, ὅτι ἐκείνη μὲν εἶδη προβλημάτων διεστήσατο τέτταρα καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον τούτων εὐπορίαν ἐξεῦρεν ἐπιχειρήσεων, εἰ καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος τὴν τετράδα συνελών ἐν δύο μόνοις προβλήμασι περιγράφει τὴν μέθοδον, οἷον τὸ μὲν πρὸς ὄρον εἶναι τίθεται, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὸ συμβεβηκός, τὰ μὲν γενικὰ προβλήματα τοῖς πρὸς ὄρον νεύμασι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἴδιον τοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκός συναριθμῶν.

1-7 cf. Arist. Top. 1.4-5 101b17-102b26

125 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 1.5 102a1 (CAG t.2.2 p.45.10-13 Wallies)

δεῖ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι Θεόφραστος τὰ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προβλήματα ὑποτάσσει τοῖς γενικοῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν διαφορῶν· λέγει γὰρ “καὶ τὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὴν ταυτότητα γενικὰ θῶμεν.”

1 τοῦ αὐτοῦ D: αὐτοῦ A: ταυτοῦ aBP

126 Ibn Rušd, Talhīṣ al-Ġadal 3.3 118b10-19 (p.556.8 et 13-16 Jéhamy)

والموضع السادس والثلاثون هو مأخوذ من الزيادة ... وثامسطيوس
وثاوفرسطس يريان أن قوة هذا الموضع ظاهرة جداً وذلك أن الأمر الأعظم هو
الذي يصير به شيء واحد أعظم وإذا نقص منه يصير بنقصانه أقل وهو عام
في جميع مطالب المقايسة

fontes: ed. Jéhamy, ut supra (codd. FL); ed. Butterworth p.106.6 et 12-15 (codd. FL); versio Latina ap. AOCAC t.1.3 f.57M-58A (B)

3 يصير (prior) om. ut vid. B يصير (posterior) L: om. F

127A Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categoriae 11 14a19 (CAG t.8 p.415.15-19 Kalbfleisch)

Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ Τοπικοῖς τάδε γέγραφεν ἀπορότερον ἔτι ποιοῦντα τὸν λόγον· “ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐναντία τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ ἀρχαί, δηλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ἐν ἐνὶ γένει ταῦτα, καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν

124B Proclus, On Plato's Parmenides 1, Introduction (col.635.2-12 Cousin)

They (some commentators) say that this (method of arguing) differs from Aristotle's method of topics to this extent, that that (method) distinguished four kinds of problem and discovered a wealth of dialectical arguments for each of these, although Theophrastus did away with the quartet and limited the method to two kinds of problem only. He related the one to definition and the other to accident, assigning problems about genus to the group connected with definition, but counting those about property with the group connected with accident.

5 οἷον] ὄν coni. Stallbaum

125 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Topics 1.5 102a1 (CAG vol.2.2 p.45.10-13 Wallies)

We must not ignore the fact that Theophrastus subordinates the problems about “the same” to matters of genus, like those about differentiae. For he says, “Let us treat both the differentia and sameness as matters of genus.”

126 Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics 3.3 118b10-19 (p.556.8 and 13-16 Jéhamy)

The thirty-sixth topic is taken from addition. . . . Themistius and Theophrastus think that the power of this topic is extremely obvious; that is to say, the greatest matter is that by means of which something becomes greater, and when it is subtracted from that thing, the thing diminishes through its subtraction. It is (a topic) common in all questions of comparison.

127A Simplicius, On Aristotle's Categories 11 14a19 (CAG vol.8 p.415.15-19 Kalbfleisch)

But Theophrastus in his own *Topics* wrote the following, which makes the argument still more difficult: “Since the principles of contraries are contrary, it is clear that these too are not in one genus,

καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐναντία γε καὶ ἀρχαί, καὶ εἶδος καὶ στέρησις.”

1-5 cf. *Aristotelis Topica* 4.3 123b1-37

2 ai om. JA

127B Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In *Aristotelis Metaphysica* 5(Δ).10 1018a25 (CAG t.1 p.381.11-15 Hayduck)

ἐναντία γὰρ γένη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν ταῖς Κατηγορίαις εἶρηκε καὶ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Τοπικῶν καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Τοπικῶν, ἃ οὐχ οἶά τε τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὰ ἅμα τινὶ ὑπάρξαι. τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ στάσιν.

1-2 *Aristoteles, Cat. 11 14a23-5 et Top. 4.3 123b9*

128 Galenus, *De methodo medendi* 1.3 (t.10 p.26.11-16 Kühn)

εἴτ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ Πλάτωνος οὕτω μέγα καὶ χαλεπὸν εἶναι νομιζόντων εἰς τὰς οικείας διαφορὰς ἀκριβῶς τὰ γένη τέμνειν, καὶ μετ' αὐτοὺς Θεοφράστου τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων ἐξεργάζεσθαι πειρωμένων τὸν τρόπον, ὡς οὐπω καταρωθῆμεν οὐδὲ παρ' ἐκείνους

1-4 *Galenus, Adversus Lycum* 3.7 (CMG t.5.10.3 p.10.5-10)

129A Galenus, *Adversus Lycum* 4.2 (CMG t.5.10.3 p.14.14-16 Wenkebach)

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων οἶεται δυνατὸν εἶναι, καθάπερ γε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος, ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ ταῦτ' ὄν τῷ γένει, τοσαύτην ὁμῶς ἔχειν τὴν ἐν εἴδει διαφορὰν, ὡς ἐναντιώτατον ὑπάρχειν.

129B Galenus, *De methodo medendi* 2.7 (t.10 p.137.9-138.2 Kühn)

ἄρ' οὐδ' οὐκ ἐσχάτης ἀναισθησίας, ἢ φιλονεικίας, ἢ οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τί ποτε καὶ προσεπειν ἄξιον, ἓνα μὲν ὁμολογεῖν εἶναι τὸν φρενιτικὸν ἢ φρενιτικὸς, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸν ληθαργικὸν τε καὶ πλευριτικὸν, οὐδένα δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ τὸν μὲν ἐμπειρικὸν ἓνα λέγειν ἢ ἐμπειρικὸς, οὐχ ἓνα δὲ τὸν ἵππον ἢ ἵππος, ἐνὸν ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος 5

just as good and bad, and movement and rest, are not. And excess and deficiency would be contraries and principles, and form and privation.”

127B Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 5(Δ).10 1018a25 (CAG vol.1 p.381.11-15 Hayduck)

For good and bad are contrary genera, as he himself (Aristotle) says in the *Categories* and in the fourth book of his *Topics*, and Theophrastus in the first book of his *Topics*. They cannot belong at the same time to anything subordinated to them. Such too are the things under motion and rest.

128 Galen, *On the Method of Treatment* 1.3 (vol.10 p.26.11-16 Kühn)

Then, when Aristotle and Plato¹ think it is so great and difficult a thing to divide up the genera accurately into their proper differentiae, and after them Theophrastus and the other philosophers try to work out the method, on the grounds that it had not been done successfully even by them,

¹ Galen has just referred to Plato's *Philebus*, *Sophist*, and *Politicus*, and Aristotle's *On the Parts of Animals* 1.

129A Galen, *Against Lycus* 4.2 (CMG vol.5.10.3 p.14.14-16 Wenkebach)

Plato thinks it possible, as do at least Aristotle and Theophrastus, for one thing to be the same as another in genus, but yet to have so great a difference at the species level as to be completely contrary to it.

129B Galen, *On the Method of Treatment* 2.7 (vol.10 p.137.9-138.2 Kühn)

Is it not then a matter of extreme stupidity, or contentiousness, or I do not know what other name it deserves to be called by, to agree that the phrenetic is one *qua* phrenetic, and likewise the lethargic and “pleuritic”, but not man one *qua* man; and to say that the empiric is one *qua* empiric, but not horse one *qua* horse, when it is possible to hear both Aristotle and Theophrastus saying that

Ἄριστοτέλους τε καὶ Θεοφράστου δύνασθαι τι τῷ μὲν εἶδει ταῦτόν
 ὑπάρχειν ἕτερον ἕτερον, τῷ δ' ἀριθμῷ μὴ ταῦτόν, ἔτι δὲ τούτων ἔμ-
 138 προσθεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κἀκεῖνους ὑφηγησαμένου τὴν τοιαύτην διαστολὴν
 τῶν σημαινομένων ἐπακοῦσαι λέγοντος, ὡς οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν ἐστιν ἐν
 εἶναι τὰ πολλὰ καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἐν. 10

6-7 Galenus, *De meth. med.* 2.7 p.142.2-4; Aristoteles, *Metaph.* 5(Δ)6 1016b
 31-6 9-10 Plato, *Philebus* 14C

130 Galenus, *De methodo medendi* 1.3 (t.10 p.19.13-17 et 22.5-16 Kühn)

ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντας ἀνθρώπους καθίζει δικαστάς, ἐκ τῶν πάντων δ' ἐστὶ
 δῆπου καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἄριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ Χρῦσιππος,
 22 οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσας μόνος ἀποστρέφοιτο τὰς ψήφους, . . . ὁμοίας οὖν
 οὔσης τῆς ζητήσεως ἐπὶ τοῦ τῶν νοσημάτων ἀριθμοῦ παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς
 παλαιοῖς ἰατροῖς, καὶ τῶν μὲν εἰπόντων ἑπτὰ τὰ πάνθ' ὑπάρχειν αὐτά, 5
 τῶν δ' ἐλάττω τούτων ἢ πλείω, πάντων δ' οὖν εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν
 εἶδη βλέπόντων, οὐκ εἰς τὰ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἦν οὕτως
 ἀπαίδευτος οὐδ' ἀμαθὴς λογικῆς θεωρίας ὡς διαφορὰν εἰδῶν εἰπεῖν
 ἀντ' οὐσίας· ὁ δ' ἐκ τῆς γυναικωνίτιδος ἐκπηδήσας Θεσσαλὸς ἐπιτιμᾶ
 τηλικούτοις ἀνδράσιν, οὐ γένος ἔχων εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἀνατροφὴν, οὐ 10
 παιδείαν οἷαν ἐκείνων ἕκαστος, ὁ μὲν Ἄριστοτέλους, ὁ δὲ Πλάτωνος,
 ὁ δὲ Θεοφράστου γενόμενος ὁμιλητής, ἢ τινος ἄλλου τῶν ἐν τῇ λογικῇ
 θεωρίᾳ γεγυμνασμένων ἀνδρῶν.

1-13 cf. Galeni *librum De meth. med.* 1.3 (p.28.2-4)

131 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica* 5(Δ).15
 1021a31 (CAG t.1 p.408.18-22 Hayduck)

ὅτι δὲ λέγεται πρὸς ταῦτα ἐν οἷς ἐστίν, ὑπὸ μὲν Θεοφράστου ἐν
 τῷ Β τῶν Τοπικῶν οὕτως εἴρηται· “ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστα λέγεται, καὶ
 ὑπάρχει τούτοις, ὥσπερ ἡ συμμετρία καὶ ἡ ἕξις καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις· μνήμη
 δὲ καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ὑπόληψις οὐδενὶ τῶν ἀψύχων, οὐδὲ ἡ ἑτέρου κινήσις 5
 ἄλλω. διὸ δὴ καθ' ἕκαστα διοριστέον.”

1-3 Aristoteles, *Top.* 4.4 124a33-5

vid. *Appendicem* no. 2

something can be the same as another in species, but not the same
 in number, and again, earlier than them, to hear the man (Plato)
 138 who showed them the way stating his distinction of meanings like
 this, that there is nothing remarkable in one being many and many
 one.

130 Galen, *On the Method of Treatment* 1.3 (vol.10 p.19.13-17 and 22.5-
 16 Kühn)

But since he (Thessalus) sets up all men as judges, and among
 all men are assuredly Plato, and Aristotle, and Theophrastus, and
 Chrysippus, he will no longer divert all the votes (to himself) alone,
 22 There was a similar investigation into the number of diseases
 among the doctors of old, some saying that their total amounted
 to seven, others less than that, or more, but all looking at the species
 with regard to substance, not at those with regard to differentia.
 For no one was so uneducated or ignorant of logical theory as to
 speak of the differentia of species instead of speaking of the
 substance. But Thessalus leaps out from the harem and upbraids
 these great men, although he can make no claim to high birth, or
 breeding, or education, like each one of them, the one being a
 disciple of Aristotle, another of Plato, another of Theophrastus, or
 of some other man well practised in logical theory.

131 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 5(Δ).15
 1021a31 (CAG vol.1 p.408.18-22 Hayduck)

That it (“harmony”) is used in relation to those things in which
 it exists, is stated by Theophrastus in Book 2 of his *Topics* thus:
 “Of what things each thing is said, to these it also belongs, like
 symmetry, and disposition, and synthesis; but memory, and sleep,
 and thought, belong to nothing lifeless, and the movement of
 another thing does not belong to something else. So indeed we must
 define according to each thing.”¹

¹ I.e., each thing to which they are related.

see *Appendix* no. 2

- 132 Ibn Rušd, *Talḥiṣ al-Ġadal* 6.5-14 (p.602.14-603.6 et 603.23-604.2 et 620.7-8 Jéhamy)

وينبغي أن تعلم أن المواضع المأخوذة من أن الحد ليس بحد
منها مواضع مأخوذة من أن الجنس ليس بجنس لا من جهة ما هو جنس
بإطلاق فإن مواضع الجنس قد سلفت بل من جهة ما هو جنس مأخوذ في الحد
ومنها مواضع مأخوذة من الفصول

ومنها مواضع مأخوذة من الحدود بأسرها وهذه

منها مواضع مأخوذة في حدود مقولة مقولة من المقولات العشر

ومنها مواضع مأخوذة في حدود الأعدام

ومنها مواضع نحو حدود الأشياء المركبة

ومنها مواضع عامة نحو جميع المقولات

ومنها مواضع نحو حدود الأشياء المدلول عليها بأسماء مركبة

ونحن فسنعدد هذه المواضع على هذا الترتيب وبهذه القسمة فإن ذلك قد

فعله ثامسطيوس وقبله ثاوفرسطس وإن كان في ذلك مخالفة لتعليم أرسطو في

ترتيبه فإن هذا يشبه أن يكون أكثر صناعياً وأعون على الحفظ والتحصيل ...

وبيّن أن التبكيث الذي يكون من قبل بعد الجنس أو قربه أو ترتيبه غير

التبكيث الذي يكون من قبل الجنس المطلق ولذلك لم يكن هذا التبكيث داخلاً في

مواضع الجنس المطلق كما يقول ثاوفرسطس ويعذل أرسطو في تكريره مواضع

الجنس هاهنا ...

620 فهذه هي مواضع الحدود قد رتبناها على ما رتبها عليه ثاوفرسطس

وثامسطيوس إذ كان أدخل في الترتيب الصناعي وأسهل الحفظ

fontes: ed. Jéhamy, ut supra (codd. FL); ed. Butterworth p.170.1-11, 171.11-14, 193.12-13 (codd. FL); versio Latina ap. AOCAC t.1.3 f.101E-G, K-L, 113M (B)

6 العشر ... في Arab.: in definitionibus alicuius decem praedicamentorum, et quaedam sunt loca sumpta in singulis decem praedicamentis B 7 في حدود
بأسماء مركبة 10 B (في حد العدم <) Arab.: in privationis definitione
المطلق 16 FLB (nominibus compositis): بقول مركب in marg. L, Butterworth
الجنس 17 LB (loci generis simpliciter): المطلق F Jéhamy Butterworth
Arab.: om. B

- 132 Averroes, *Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Topics* 6.5-14 (p.602.14-603.6, 603.23-604.2, 620.7-8 Jéhamy)

One ought to know that of the topics which are taken from the fact that a definition is not a definition,

(1) some are topics taken from the fact that the genus is not a genus — (genus is here to be understood) not from the point of view that it is genus absolutely, because the topics of genus have already been covered, but from the point of view that it is a genus taken up in the definition —

(2) some are topics taken from the differentiae,

(3) and some are topics taken from the definitions as a whole; of these,

(a) some are topics taken in the definitions of each one of the ten categories,

(b) some are topics taken in the definitions of privations,

603 (c) some are topics related to the definitions of composite things,

(d) some are common topics related to all the categories,

(e) and some are topics related to the definitions of things indicated by compound names.

We will enumerate these topics according to this order and in this division, for this is what Themistius did and before him Theophrastus; and although this procedure is at variance with the order in Aristotle's book, it nevertheless appears to be more in accordance with the discipline (of dialectic) and more helpful for memorization and study. . . .

It is clear that the objection which is raised on the basis of the remoteness or nearness or order of the genus is different from the objection which is raised on the basis of absolute genus. This objection therefore was not included among the topics of absolute genus, as Theophrastus says, reproaching Aristotle for having repeated here the topics of genus. . . .

604 These, then, are the topics of the definitions, which we have arranged according to the order given to them by Theophrastus and Themistius, since it fits better the order of the (dialectical) discipline and is easier to memorize.

- 133 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 2.3 110b16 (CAG t.2.2 p.154.16-23 Wallies)

ὁμοιον τοῦτο, οὐ καὶ αὐτοῦ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν ποσαχῶς μέμνηται, τὸ ἐπίστασθαι πᾶν τρίγωνον ὅτι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας· ἢ γὰρ ὡς καθόλου ἢ ὡς καθ' ἕκαστα πάντα. ἀνασκευάζειν οὖν θέλοντας τὸ ὅτι ὁ γεωμέτρης ἐπίσταται πᾶν τρίγωνον δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχον τὰς τρεῖς γωνίας, χρὴ ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα μετὰγειν τὸν λόγον (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο σημαίνεται) καὶ λαβόντας ὅτι ὁ μὴ οἶδέ τις ὅτι ἐστὶ τρίγωνον, οὐδ' εἰ δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει οἶδε, τότε τι προχειρισμένους λέγειν ὅτι "τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ οἶδεν· οὐδ' ἄρα, εἰ δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει, οἶδεν· οὐ πᾶν ἄρα οἶδε."

- 134 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 5.2 130a8 (CAG t.2.2 p.378.24-379.3 Wallies)

πολλὰ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλὰ σημαίνοντων, συντεθέντα δὲ ἀλλήλοις πλείω σημαίνει· καὶ πάλιν ἔστιν ἃ καθ' αὐτὰ μὲν λεγόμενα πλείω σημαίνει, συντεθέντα δὲ οὐκέτι, ὡς ἐδείχθη ἐν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ πολλαχῶς Θεοφράστου. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπίστασθαι γράμματα τὸ συναμφοτέρων ἀμφίβολον μηδετέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμωνύμου ὄντος καθ' αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ τὸν Δίωνα τὸν Πλάτωνα τύπτει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὀνόματα ἀπλᾶ, ὁ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν 379 συγκείμενος λόγος ἀμφίβολος· πάλιν ἐν τῷ ἀετὸς πέτεται, κύων ὑλακτεῖ τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα ὁμώνυμα, οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀπλοῖ.

1-9 *Aristoteles, Soph. el. 4 166a14-21*

4 πολλαχῶς] ποσαχῶς BP

- 133 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 2.3 110b16 (CAG vol.2.2 p.154.16-23 Wallies)

A similar case is this, which in fact Theophrastus mentions in the *On How Many (Senses)*, the knowledge that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles; for it is known either universally or of each particular case. So that those wishing to disprove the proposition that the geometer knows that every triangle has its three angles equal to two right angles, must divert the argument to individual cases — for this too (the individual case) is signified — and, taking the position that of that of which a man does not know that it is a triangle, he does not know either if it has angles equal to two right angles, holding up something like this¹ they must say, "But he does not know this; therefore he does not know if it has angles equal to two right angles: therefore he does not know it of all."

¹ E.g., a triangle of wood.

- 134 Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Topics* 5.2 130a8 (CAG vol.2.2 p.378.24-379.3 Wallies)

For many (words) when used by themselves are not among those that have several meanings, but when put together with one another they mean more than one thing; and, by contrast, there are some which when used by themselves have more than one meaning, but not when they are put together, as was shown in the *On Many (Senses)*¹ of Theophrastus. For in "knowing letters" the total expression is ambiguous, although neither of the words is homonymous by itself. And the same is true of "Dion Plato beats", for the words have each but one meaning, but the sentence put together from them is ambiguous; by contrast, in the sentences "The eagle flies," "The dog barks," the words are homonymous, but the sentences have but one meaning.

¹ The alternative *On How Many Senses* also has manuscript support.

- 135 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Topica 1.2 101a26 (CAG t.2.2 p.27.11-18 Wallies)

ἢ γυμνασίαν λέγοι ἂν τὴν εἰς ἑκάτερον μέρος ἐπιχειρήσιν. ἦν δὲ σύνηθες τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῶν λόγων τοῖς ἀρχαίοις, καὶ τὰς συνουσίας τὰς πλείστας τοῦτον ἐποιοῦντο τὸν τρόπον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βιβλίων ὥσπερ νῦν (οὐ γὰρ ἦν πω τότε τοιαῦτα βιβλία), ἀλλὰ θέσεάς τινος τεθείσης εἰς ταύτην γυμνάζοντες αὐτῶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιχειρήσεις εὐρετικὸν ἐπε-
χειροῦν, κατασκευάζοντές τε καὶ ἀνασκευάζοντες δι' ἐνδόξων τὸ
κείμενον. καὶ ἔστι δὲ βιβλία τοιαῦτα Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ Θεοφράστου
γεγραμμένα ἔχοντα τὴν εἰς τὰ ἀντικείμενα δι' ἐνδόξων ἐπιχειρήσιν.

1-8 *Suda*, s.v. γυμνασία (no. 479, LG t.1.1 pars 1 p.546.8-15 Adler) 7
Ἀριστοτέλους] *Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.24, index Hesychii no. 65 (p.13 Rose)*
et *index Ptolemaei no. 55 (p.20 Rose)* Θεοφράστου] 68 no. 34, 35 et 36

- 136 Anonymus, In Aristotelis Analytica posteriora 2.15 98a24 (CAG t.13.3 p.590.4-10 Wallies)

διὰ τούτων δὲ διδάσκει ἡμᾶς, πῶς γνωσόμεθα ὅσα ταῦτά ὄντα ἀλλήλοις προβλήματα μὴ δοκεῖ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ διαφόρου ὕλης ἐρωτᾶσθαι, ὡς δύνασθαι πρὸς ἓν αὐτῶν εὐπορήσαντας τῆς αἰτίας ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως λέγειν. καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐπραγματεύσατο περὶ τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν ὁμοίων προβλημάτων. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἰστορεῖ ἐν ἐκείνοις τίνα ὅμοια ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ τῶν προβλημάτων. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ νῦν διδάσκει τίτι κρινόμεν τὰ ταῦτά ἀλλήλοις προβλήματα.

3 ἔχειν] ἐκείνην *coni. Wallies* 4 λέγειν *Ua*: ἔχειν *R* καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ *Wallies*: Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ *Ua*: Θεόφραστος δὲ *R*

- 135 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Topics 1.2 101a26 (CAG vol.2.2 p.27.11-18 Wallies)

Or he (Aristotle) might mean by "gymnasia" the attempt at defending either side of a dispute. Such a form of arguing was customary among the ancients, and they held the majority of their meetings in this way, not with books as now — for there were not yet then books of this kind — but once a thesis was propounded, then in regard to this (thesis) they exercised their capacity for discovering arguments arguing constructively and destructively about the set (thesis) through probable premises. There are books of this kind written by Aristotle and by Theophrastus, containing argument towards opposite conclusions from probable (premises).

- 136 Anonymous, On Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 2.15 98a24 (CAG vol.13.3 p.590.4-10 Wallies)

By means of these remarks he (Aristotle) teaches us how we may recognise those problems which are the same as one another, although they seem not to be because they are formulated with different subject-matter, so that if we are provided with an explanation about one of them, we are able to speak in a similar way about the others. Theophrastus, too, busied himself about the collection of problems which are similar. But he is enquiring in those (works) about which of the problems are similar to one another; Aristotle, on the other hand, is here teaching about how we may decide problems which are the same as one another.

PHYSICA

Inscriptiones Librorum

137 Tabula inscriptionum ad opera physica spectantium

Cum de nonnullis inscriptionibus dubitetur utrum opera physica an doxographica indicent, nec quomodo haec inter se relata sint pateat, physicae omnes ac doxographicae una in hac tabula conlocantur; quoniam autem de inscriptionibus generalibus magis ambigitur quam de particularibus, generales omnes utriusque generis in initio tabulae ponuntur (no. 1-8), deinde particulae et physicae (no. 9-26), postremo particulae et doxographicae (no. 27-43).

- 1a Φυσικῶν ἀ'—η'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.46 = **1**; Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 1.25.1b (t.1 p.207.23 Wachsmuth) = **232**; Diogenes Laertius 9.22 = **227D**; Simplicius, In *Aristotelis Categorias* 14 15b1-16 (CAG t.8 p.435.27) = **153A** (ἐν πρώτῳ); Simplicius, In *Aristotelis Physica* 1.1 184a10-16 (CAG t.9 p.9.7) = **144B** (ἐν ἀρχῇ); 1.1 184a6-b14 (CAG t.9 p.20.20) = **143** (ἐν πρώτῳ); corollarium de loco (CAG t.9 p.604.5-6) = **146**; corollarium de loco (CAG t.9 p.639.13-14) = **149**; 5.2 226a23-6 (CAG t.10 p.860.19-20) = **153C** (ἐν πρώτῳ); 8.5 257b6-13 (CAG t.10 p.1236.1) = **176** (ἐν τρίτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν ἢ Περί οὐρανοῦ, cf. **137** no. 1c); Simplicius, In *Aristotelis De caelo* 3.1 299a2-11 (CAG t.7 p.564.24) = **238**; Simplicius, In *Aristotelis De anima* 2.7 419a13-29 (CAG t.11 p.136.26) = **279** (sed cf. Steinmetz in app. crit.); 3.9 432a15 (CAG t.11 p.286.31) = **298A**; Themistius, In *Aristotelis De anima* 3.5 430a25 (CAG t.5.3 p.108.11) = **307A** (ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν, δευτέρῳ τῶν Περί ψυχῆς; cf. **265** no. 1a); cf. quoque Priscianum Lydum, *Metaphr. in Theophrasti De anima disputationem* 1.49 (Suppl. *Arist.* t.1.2 p.22.34) = **297**, qui τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον sine inscriptione operis commemorat
- b Naturalis auditus] Priscianus Lydus, *Solutiones ad Chosroem, proemium* (Suppl. *Arist.* t.1.2 p.42.5); cf. **137** no. 5b

PHYSICS

Titles of Books

137 List of Titles Referring to Works on Physics

Since in the case of some titles it is doubtful whether they refer to works on nature or on doxography, nor is it clear how these titles are related to each other, all titles concerning nature and doxography are grouped together in this list. And since there is greater uncertainty in the case of general titles than in that of particular ones, all the general titles of both kinds are placed at the beginning of the list (no. 1-8), then come particular titles that concern nature (no. 9-26), finally the particular ones that concern doxography (no. 27-43).

- 1a *Physics* (i.e. *Writings concerning Nature*), 8 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1**; Stobaeus, *Anthology*, 1.25.1b (t.1 p.207.23 Wachsmuth) = **232**; Diogenes Laertius, 9.22 = **227D**; Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 14 15b1-16 (CAG vol.8 p.435.27) = **153A** ("in the first book"); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.1 184a10-16 (CAG vol.9 p.9.7) = **144B** ("at the beginning"); 1.1 184a16-b14 (CAG vol.9 p.20.20) = **143** ("in the first book"); Corollary on Place (CAG vol.9 p.604.5-6) = **146**; Corollary on Place (CAG vol.9 p.639.13-14) = **149**; 5.2 226a23-6 (CAG vol.10 p.860.19-20) = **153C** ("in the first book"); 8.5 257b6-13 (CAG vol.10 p.1236.1) = **176** ("in the third book of the *Physics* or *On Heaven*", cf. **137** no. 1c); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 3.1 299a2-11 (CAG vol.7 p.564.24) = **238**; Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 2.7 419a13-29 (CAG vol.11 p.136.26) = **279** (but cf. Steinmetz in app. crit.); 3.9 432a15 (CAG vol.11 p.286.31) = **298A**; Themistius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 3.5 430a25 (CAG vol.5.3 p.108.11) = **307A** ("in the fifth book of the *Physics*, the second of *On the Soul*," cf. **265** no. 1a); cf. also Priscian of Lydia, *Paraphrase of Theophrastus' Discourse On the Soul* 1.49 (Suppl. *Arist.* vol.1.2 p.22.34) = **297**, who mentions "the fifth book" without the title of the work
- b *Lecture(s) on Nature*] Priscian of Lydia, *Answers to Chosroes*, preface (Suppl. *Arist.* vol.1.2 p.42.5); cf. **137** no. 5b

- c Περί οὐρανοῦ α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.50 = 1; Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 35A (BT t.2 p.122.17 Diehl) = **159**; Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 1, prooemium (CAG t.7 p.1.8-10) = **169**; Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 8.5 257b6-13 (CAG t.10 p.1236.1) = **176** (ἐν τρίτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν ἢ Περί οὐρανοῦ, cf. **137** no. 1a)
- 2 Περί κινήσεως α'—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.44 = 1; 5.49 = 1 (α'β'); Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.3 186a13 (CAG t.9 p.107.12) = **155C** (ἐν τῷ α'); 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG t.9 p.412.35-413.1) = **153B** (ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ); 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG t.9 p.413.5 et 7-8) = **153B** (ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ); 6.4 234b10 (CAG t.10 p.964.30-1) = **271** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ); 6.5 236a7-27 (CAG t.10 p.986.5-6) = **156B** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ); Themistius, In Aristotelis Physica 6.4 234b10-17 (CAG t.5.2 p.192.2) = **155A** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ)
- 3 Περί φύσεως α'—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.46 = 1; 5.50 = 1, sine numeris librorum; Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physica 1.1 184a10-12 (CAG t.16 p.4.9) = **144A** (ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ Περί φύσεως πραγματείᾳ)
- 4a Περί φυσικῶν α'—η'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.46 = 1
 b Περί τῶν φυσικῶν] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis *Metaphysica* 1(A).3 984b3-4 (CAG t.1 p.31.7-16) = **227C** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ)
- 5a Φυσικὴ ἱστορία] Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.3 186a24 (CAG t.9 p.115.11-13) = **234** (ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ); 1.4 187a21 (CAG t.9 p.154.17) = **228B**
 b *Naturalis historia*] Priscianus Lydus, *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, prooemium (Suppl. Arist. t.1.2 p.42.5); cf. **137** no. 1b
 c Ἱστορία] Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.4 187a12-16 (CAG t.9 p.150.1) = **226B**
- vid. **727** no. 7 (Ἱστορικὰ ὑπομνήματα)
- vid. **727** no. 8 (Περί ἱστορίας α')
- 6a Φυσικῶν δοξῶν α'—ις'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.48 = 1
 b Περί τῶν φυσικῶν δοξῶν] Taurus ap. Philoponum, *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum* 6.8 (BT p.145.21 Rabe) = **241A**; 6.27 (BT p.223.14-15 Rabe) = app. **241A**

- c *On Heaven*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1; Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 35A (BT vol.2 p.122.17 Diehl) = **159**; Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 1, preface (CAG vol.7 p.1.8-10) = **169**; Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 8.5 257b6-13 (CAG vol.10 p.1236.1) = **176** ("in the third book of the *Physics*, or *On Heaven*", cf. **137** no. 1a)
- 2 *On Motion*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1; 5.49 = 1 ("2 books"); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.3 186a13 (CAG vol.9 p.107.12) = **155C** ("in book 1"); 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG vol.9 p.412.35-413.1) = **153B** ("in the second book"); 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG vol.9 p.413.5 and 7-8) = **153B** ("in the third book"); 6.4 234b10 (CAG vol.10 p.964.30-1) = **271** ("in the first book"); 6.5 236a7-27 (CAG vol.10 p.986.5-6) = **156B** ("in the first book"); Themistius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 6.4 234b10-17 (CAG vol.5.2 p.192.2) = **155A** ("in the first book")
- 3 *On Nature*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1; 5.50 = 1, without book numbers; Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.1 184a10-12 (CAG vol.16 p.4.9) = **144A** ("in his own work *On Nature*").
- 4a *On Natural Things* (or *On the Natural Philosophers*), 18 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = 1
 b *On Natural Things* (or *On the Natural Philosophers*)] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 1(A).3 984b3-4 (CAG vol.1 p.31.7-16) = **227C** ("in the first book")
- 5a *Research concerning Nature*] Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.3 186a24 (CAG vol.9 p.115.11-13) = **234** ("in the first book"); 1.4 187a21 (CAG vol.9 p.154.17) = **228B**
 b *Research concerning Nature*] Priscian of Lydia, *Answers to Chosroes*, preface (Suppl. Arist. vol.1.2 p.42.5); cf. **137** no. 1b
 c *Research*] Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.4 187a12-16 (CAG vol.9 p.150.1) = **226B**
- see **727** no. 7 (*Research Memoranda*)
- see **727** no. 8 (*On Research*, 1 book)
- 6a *Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* (or *Opinions concerning Natural Things*), 16 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1
 b *On the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* (or *On Opinions concerning Natural Things*); Taurus in Philoponus, *Against Proclus, on the Eternity of the Universe* 6.8 (BT p.145.21 Rabe) = **241A**; 6.27 (BT p.223.14-15 Rabe) = app. **241A**

- vid. **265** no. 4a (Περὶ αἰσθήσεων α')
- vid. **265** no. 4b (Περὶ αἰσθήσεως)
- vid. **265** no. 4c (Kitāb al-hiss wa-l-mahsus, arba' maqalat)
- 7a Περὶ φυσικῶν ἐπιτομῆς α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.46 = **1**; cf. etiam Simplicii comm. In Aristotelis De anima 2.7 419a13-29 (CAG t.11 p.136.29) = **279**, quo loco Steinmetz inscriptionem per emendationem legit (vid. app. crit.)
- b Φυσικῶν ἐπιτομῆς α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.48 = **1**
- c Φυσικῶν δοξῶν ἐπιτομαί] Galenus, In Hippocratis De natura hominum 1.2.25 (CMG t.5.9.1 p.15.22) = **231**
- d Ἐπιτομή] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 9.21 = **227D**
- 8 Πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.46 = **1**; Plutarchus, Adversus Colotem 14 1115A (BT t.6.2 p.189.14-15 Pohlenz-Westman) = **245**
- 9 Περὶ αἰτιῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = **1**
- 10a Περὶ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων γενέσεως] Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 4.3 310b8-15 (CAG t.7 p.700.7) = **171**
- b Περὶ γενέσεως α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = **1** (Περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως Meurs)
- vid. **264** no. 2 (Περὶ ἀδξήσεως, per coniecturam)
- 11 De distinctionibus elementorum] Lumen animae B, caput 23, De amaritudine, N (ed. a 1477² Farinator) = **181**; maxime dubitatur an haec inscriptio cuiquam vero Theophrasti libro referenda sit
- 12 Περὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.44 = **1**; Galenus, In Hippocratis Aphorismos 14 (t.17.2 p.405.2-3 Kühn) = **172**
- 13 Περὶ πυρός α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.45 = **1**; codices Theophrasti (sed unus tantum liber; neque alterum revera scripsisse videtur Theophrastus)
- 14 Περὶ πήξεων καὶ τήξεων α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.45 = **1**
- 15a Μεταρσιολογικῶν α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.44 = **1**; cf. Theophrasti librum De ventis 1 (p.376.37-8 Wimmer): ἡ τῶν ἀνέμων φύσις

- see **265** no. 4a (*On Sensations*, one book)
- see **265** no. 4b (*On Sensation*)
- see **265** no. 4c (*On Sensation and the Sensible*, 4 books)
- 7a *Summary on the Natural Philosophers* (or *Summary on Natural Things*), 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1**; cf. also Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On the Soul* 2.7 419a13-29 (CAG vol.11 p.136.29) = **279**, where Steinmetz reads the title by emendation (see the apparatus criticus)
- b *Summary of (Writings concerning) Nature*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = **1**
- c *Summaries of the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* (or . . . of *Opinions concerning Natural Things*); Galen, *On Hippocrates' On the Nature of Man* 1.2.25 (CMG vol.5.9.1 p.15.22) = **231**
- d *Summary*] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 9.21 = **227D**
- 8 *In Reply to the Natural Philosophers*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.46 = **1**; Plutarch, *In Reply to Colotes* 14 1115A (BT vol.6.2 p.189.14-15 Pohlenz-Westman) = **245**
- 9 *On Causes*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = **1**
- 10a *On the Coming-to-be of the Elements*] Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 4.3 310b8-15 (CAG vol.7 p.700.7) = **171**
- b *On Coming-to-be*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = **1** (*On the Coming-to-be <of Animals>* Meurs)
- see **264** no. 2 (*On Increase*, conjectural reading)
- 11 *On the Differences between the Elements*] *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 23, *On Bitterness*, N (ed. 1477² Farinator) = **181**; it is very doubtful whether this title is to be related to any genuine work of Theophrastus
- 12 *On Hot and Cold*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = **1**; Galen, *On Hippocrates' Aphorisms* 14 (vol.17.2 p.405.2-3 Kühn) = **172**
- 13 *On Fire*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**; manuscripts of Theophrastus (but only one book; nor does it seem that Theophrastus in reality wrote a second)
- 14 *On Solidifying and Melting*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**
- 15a *Meteorology*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = **1**; cf. Theophrastus, *On Winds* 1 (p.376.37-8 Wimmer): "the nature of winds,

- ἐκ τίνων μὲν καὶ πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας γίνεται θεωρήσθαι πρότερον, quae verba ad Meteorologica spectare videntur
- b Kitāb al-āṭār al-ʿulwīya, maqāla] Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist* 7.1, cap. de Theophrasto (p.252.7-8 Flügel) = **3A**; az-Zawzanī, *Muntaḥabāt*, cap. de Theophrasto (p.107.3 Lippert) = **3B**
- c Qawl Ṭāwufraṣṭus fi l-āṭār al-ʿulwīya] cod. Rampur Riḍā 2906, f.61^r; cod. Aligarh, University Collection 119, f.1^r; cod. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh Library, falsafa 63, f.309^r (vid. H. Daiber in *Manuscripts of the Middle East* 1 [1986] p.27 no. 3)
- d Περί μεταρσίων] Plutarchus, *Quaestiones Graecae* 7 292C (BT t.2 p.338.26-7 Titchener) = **192** (ἐν τετάρτῃ)
- e Περί μετεώρων α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.47 = **1**
- f Μετέωρα] Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 1.13 349a12-b1 (CAG t.12.2 p.97.6-7) = **186B**
- 16a Περί ἀνέμων α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.42 = **1**; codices Theophrasti; Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 361b30-5 (CAG t.3.2 p.97.11) = **189** no. 1
- b De ventis] Priscianus Lydus, *Solutiones ad Chosroem*, prooemium (Suppl. Arist. t.1.2 p.42.6) vid. **328** no. 15 (Περί πνευμάτων α')
- 17 Περί σημείων α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.45 = **1**; ita quoque codices Theophrasti, sed textus in his traditus non est pristinum Theophrasti opus; Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 40D (BT t.3 p.151.1-9 Diehl) = **194**
- 18a Περί ὑδάτων] Anonymus, in Antimachum Colophonium = Pack² 89 (PRIMI 1.17 col.2.53) = **213A**; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 2.15 41F (CB t.1 p.102.20-1 Desrousseaux) = **214A**; cf. Theophrasti librum De ventis 5 (p.377.42-3 Wimmer, ed. a. 1866): ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν ὑδάτων ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται διὰ πλειόνων
- b Περί ὕδατος α'β'γ'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.45 = **1**; Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis De sensu 4 441b3-7 (CAG t.3.1 p.72.4) = **212**
- 19 Περί θαλάττης α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.47 = **1**
- 20a Περί τῶν μεταλλευομένων] Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 3.6 378b5-6 (CAG t.3.2 p.178.14) = **197A**; cf. Theophrasti librum De lapidibus 1 (p.340.49-341.1 Wimmer, ed. a. 1866), ubi περὶ τῶν μεταλλευομένων se scripsisse dicit, et Gennadii comm.

- from what and how and on account of what causes they occur, has been considered before", which seems to be a reference to the *Meteorology*
- b *Meteorology*, one book] Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Theophrastus (p.252.7-8 Flügel) = **3A**; Zawzanī, *Selections from Qiftī's History of the Philosophers*, chap. on Theophrastus (p.107.3 Lippert) = **3B**
- c *Essay by Theophrastus on Meteorology*] cod. Rampur Riḍā 2906, f.61^r; cod. Aligarh, University Collection 113, f.1^r; cod. Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh Library, falsafa 63, f.309^r (see H. Daiber in *Manuscripts of the Middle East* 1 [1986] p.27 no. 3)
- d *On Things in the Sky*, one book] Plutarch, *Greek Questions* 7 292C (BT vol.2 p.338.26-7 Titchener) = **192** ("in the fourth book")
- e *On Things in the Sky*, one book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = **1**
- f *Things in the Sky*] Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 1.13 349a12-b1 (CAG vol.12.2 p.97.6-7) = **186B**
- 16a *On Winds*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = **1**; manuscripts of Theophrastus; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 361b30-5 (CAG vol.3.2 p.97.11) = **189** no. 1
- b *On Winds*] Priscian of Lydia, *Answers to Chosroes*, preface (Suppl. Arist. vol.1.2 p.42.6) see **328** no. 15 (*On Breaths*, 1 book)
- 17 *On (Weather) Signs*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**; so also the manuscripts of Theophrastus, but the text transmitted in these is not the original Theophrastean work; Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 40D (BT vol.3 p.151.1-9 Diehl) = **194**
- 18a *On Waters*] Anonymus, *On Antimachus of Colophon* = Pack² 89 (PRIMI 1.17 col.2.53) = **213A**; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 2.15 41F (CB vol.1 p.102.20-1 Desrousseaux) = **214A**; cf. Theophrastus, *On Winds* 5 (p.377.42-3 Wimmer, ed. of 1866): "remarks on waters have been made elsewhere at greater length"
- b *On Water*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.45 = **1**; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's On Sensation* 4 441b3-7 (CAG vol.3.1 p.72.4) = **212**
- 19 *On the Sea*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = **1**
- 20a *On Things that are Mined*] Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 3.6 378b5-6 (CAG vol.3.2 p.178.14) = **197A**; cf. Theophrastus, *On Stones* 1 (p.340.49-341.1 Wimmer, ed. 1866), where he says that he has written "on things that are mined", and Gennadius,

- In Aristotelis Meteorologica 3.6 378b5-6 (Oeuvres complètes t.7 p.481.18 Petit et Siderides et Jugie) = app. **197A**, quo loco Theophrastus dicitur πραγματείαν περὶ μεταλλευτῶν fecisse
- b Περὶ μετάλλων α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.44 = **1**; Harpocration, Lexicon, s.v. κεγγρεῶν (t.1 p.173.2-3 Dindorf) = **201**; Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 1.1 338a20 (CAG t.12.2 p.6.6) = **197C** (Aristoteles auctor dicitur fuisse); Philoponus, In Aristotelis De generatione et corruptione 1, prooemium (CAG t.14.2 p.2.18) = app. **197C** (Περὶ τῶν μετάλλων; Aristoteles auctor dicitur fuisse); Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physica 1, prooemium (CAG t.16 p.2.1) = app. **197C** (Aristoteles auctor dicitur fuisse); Pollux, Onomasticon 7.99 (LG t.9.2 p.80.3-5 Bethe) = app. **198** (Aristoteles vel Theophrastus auctor fuisse dicitur); Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1, prooemium (CAG t.9 p.3.4) = app. **197B** (nullo auctore nominato); Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 1, prooemium (CAG t.7 p.3.2) = **197B** (nullo auctore nominato); Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.33 Adler) = **2**; cf. etiam, sine inscriptione libri, Olympiodori comm. In Aristotelis Meteorologica 3.6 378b5-6 (CAG t.12.2 p.266.36) = app. **197A**, ubi Theophrastus dicitur περὶ ἐκάστου μετάλλου scripsisse
- c De metallicis [Aquinas], In Meteor. t.3 p.cx ed. Leonina = app. **197A** (incertum an Theophrasto ipsi liber hoc loco attribuat)
- d Μεταλλικόν] Hesychius, Lexicon, s.v. προσφανῆ (no. 3920, t.3 p.392 Schmidt, ed. a. 1861) = **199** et s.v. σκαρφῶν (no. 874, t.4 p.40 Schmidt, ed. a. 1862) = **201** (nullo auctore nominato) et s.v. σύζωμα (no. 2212, t.4 p.92 Schmidt, ed. a. 1862) = **203** (nullo auctore nominato); Pollux, Onomasticon 10.149 (LG t.9.2 p.234.25 Bethe) = **198**
- 21 Περὶ λίθων α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.44 = **1**; codices Theophrasti; Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 3.45 93A-B (BT t.1 p.214.17-18 Kaibel) = **209** no. 12; Cyrillus, Lexicon, s.v. σάππειρος (p.190.1 Cramer, *Anecdota Parisiensia* 4 [Oxford, 1841]) = **209** no. 2 et 4; Photius, Lexicon, s.v. ἀμέθυστον (no. 1175, t.1 p.124.3-4 Theodoridis) = **209** no. 9 et s.v. τγγάβαρι (t.2 p.592.7-10 Porson) = **209** no. 14; Suda, s.v. Θεόφραστος (no. 199, LG t.1 pars 2 p.701.33 Adler) = **2**
- 22 Kitāb al-aḥḡār] ar-Rāzī (Rhazes), Kitāb al-Ḥawāṣṣ, cap. de electro (cod. Constantinopolitanus Murad Molla 1826, f.83^v v.12); vid. Irene Fellmann, Das Aqrābādīn al-Qalānīsī [Beiruter Texte und Studien

- On Aristotle's Meteorology* 3.6 378b5-6 (Oeuvres complètes vol.7 p.481.18 Petit, Siderides and Jugie) = app. **197A**, where Theophrastus is said to have written "a treatise about things mined"
- b *On Metals*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = **1**; Harpocration, *Lexicon*, on *kenchreōn* (vol.1 p.173.2-3 Dindorf = **201**; Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 1.1 228a20 (CAG vol.12.2 p.6.6) = **197C** (Aristotle is said to have been the author); Philoponus, *On Aristotle's On Coming-to-be and Passing Away* 1, preface (CAG vol.14.2 p.2.18) = app. **197C** ("On the Metals"; Aristotle is said to have been the author); Philoponus, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1, preface (CAG vol.16 p.2.1) = app. **197C** (Aristotle is said to have been the author); Pollux, *Nomenclature* 7.99 (LG vol.9.2 p.80.3-5 Bethe) = app. **198** (Aristotle or Theophrastus is said to have been the author); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1, preface (CAG vol.9 p.3.4) = app. **197B** (no author named); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 1, preface (CAG vol.7 p.3.2) = **197B** (no author named); Suda, on "Theophrastus" (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.33 Adler) = **2**; cf. also, without the book-title, Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 3.6 378b5-6 (CAG vol.12.1 p.266.36) = app. **197A**, where Theophrastus is said to have written "about each metal"
- c *On Metals*] pseudo-Aquinas, *On (Aristotle's) Meteorology*, vol.3 p.cx in the Leonine edition = app. **197A** (it is uncertain whether here the book is attributed to Theophrastus himself)
- d *The Metals (or Mining) book*] Hesychius, *Lexicon*, on *prospanē* (no. 3920, vol.3 p.392 Schmidt, ed. 1861) = **199** and on *skarphōn* (no. 874, vol.4 p.40 Schmidt, ed. 1862) = **201** (no author named) and on *syzōsma* (no. 2212, vol.4 p.92 Schmidt, ed. 1862) = **203** (no author named); Pollux, *Nomenclature* 10.149 (LG vol.9.2 p.234.25 Bethe) = **198**
- 21 *On Stones*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = **1**; manuscripts of Theophrastus; Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 3.45 93AB (BT vol.1 p.214.17-18 Kaibel) = **209** no. 12; Cyril, *Lexicon*, on *sappheiros* (p.190.1 Cramer, *Anecdota Parisiensia* 4 [Oxford, 1841]) = **209** no. 2 and 4; Photius, *Lexicon*, on *amethuston* (no. 1175, vol.1 p.124.3-4 Theodoridis) = **209** no. 9 and on *tingabari* (vol.2 p.592.7-10 Porson) = **209** no. 14; Suda, on "Theophrastus" (no. 199, LG vol.1 part 2 p.701.33 Adler) = **2**
- 22 *The Book of Stones*] Rāzī (Rhazes), *The Book of Magical Properties*, chap. on amber (cod. Istanbul, Murad Molla 1826, f.83^v v.12); see Irene Fellmann, *Das Aqrābādīn al-Qalānīsī* [Beiruter Texte und Studien

- 35], Beirut 1986, p.112 no. 36 et p.126; textus in his traditus non est pristinum Theophrasti opus
- 23 Περὶ τῶν αἰθομένων α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1 (αἰθομένων Rose: αἰθουμένων B: ἀπο)λελιθωμένων Usener: λιθουμένων FPQCoWV: ἀπο)λιθουμένων Regenbogen)
- 24 Περὶ ῥύακος τοῦ ἐν Σικελίᾳ α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = 1
- 25 Περὶ ἄλων νίτρων στυπτηρίας α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1
- 26a Περὶ τῶν προβλημάτων φυσικῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.48 = 1; 5.49 = 1 (α')
- b Kitāb fi l-masā'il aṭ-ṭabi'īya] Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' 4, cap. de Theophrasto (t.1 p.69.26 Müller) = app. 3A; al-Bīrūnī, al-Ġamāhīr fi ma'rīfat al-ḡawāhīr, cap. de plumbo (p.258.15 Krenkow) = 180
- vid. 727 no. 3 (Προβλημάτων συναγωγῆς α'—ε')
- vid. 727 no. 4 (Προβλήματα πολιτικά, φυσικά, ἐρωτικά, ἠθικά α')
- vid. 727 no. 5 (Kitāb masā'il Tāwufraṣṭus)
- 27 Περὶ τῶν Ἀναξιμένους α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1
- 28 Περὶ (τῶν) Ἐμπεδοκλέους α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.43 = 1 (suppl. Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast* 335)
- 29a Περὶ τῶν Ἀναξαγόρου α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1
- b Περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου] Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.4 178b13-21 (CAG t.9 p.166.17) = 235 (ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ)
- 30 Πρὸς Ἀναξαγόραν α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1
- 31 Περὶ τῶν Ἀρχελαίου α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1
- 32 Περὶ Δημοκρίτου α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.49 = 1

- 35], Beirut 1986, p.112 no. 36 and p.126; the text transmitted in these is not the original Theophrastean work
- 23 *On Burning (Stones)*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1 ("On Things That are Burned" Rose, based on manuscript B: "On Things That have been Turned to Stone", Usener, based on manuscripts FPQCoWV; "On Things That are Turned to Stone" Regenbogen)
- 24 *On the Lava-flow in Sicily*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1
- 25 *On Salts, (Types of) Soda, and Alum*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1
- 26a *On the Problems concerning Nature*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1; 5.49 = 1 (1 book)
- b *On Problems concerning Nature*] Ibn-Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Essential Information on the Generations of Physicians* 4, chap. on Theophrastus (vol. p.69.26 Müller = app. 3A); Bīrūnī, *Collected Information on Precious Stones*, chap. on lead (p.258.15 Krenkow) = 183
- see 727 no. 3 (*Collection of Problems*, 5 books)
- see 727 no. 4 (*Political, Natural, Erotic, Ethical Problems*, 1 book)
- see 727 no. 5 (*The Problems by Theophrastus*)
- 27 *On the (Doctrines) of Anaximenes*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1
- 28 *On <the (Doctrines) of> Empedocles*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1 (supplemented by Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast* 335)
- 29a *On the (Doctrines) of Anaxagoras*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1
- b *On Anaxagoras*] Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.4 178b13-21 (CAG vol.9 p.166.17) = 235 ("in the second book")
- 30 *In Reply to Anaxagoras*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1
- 31 *On the (Doctrines) of Archelaus*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1
- 32 *On Democritus*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.49 = 1

- 33 *Περὶ τῆς Δημοκρίτου ἀστρολογίας α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1
- quae sequuntur quinque inscriptiones (no. 34-no. 38) praecedenti (no. 33) in tabula Diogenis subiuncta sunt et rebus ita cohaerent, ut non modo in eo libro ad quem prima inscriptio spectat sed etiam in ceteris de Democrito agi videatur.
- 34 *(Περὶ) τῆς μεταρσιολεσχίας α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1 (*Περὶ* suppl. Usener)
- 35 *Περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1
- 36 *Περὶ χυμῶν, χροῶν, σαρκῶν α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1
- 37 *Περὶ τοῦ διακόσμου α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1
- 38 *Περὶ τοῦ Περὶ ἀνθρώπων α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1
- 39 *Τῶν Διογένους συναγωγή α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1
- 40 *Περὶ τῶν Μητροδώρου συναγωγῆς α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.44 = 1
- 41 *Τῶν Ξενοκράτους συναγωγῆς α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.47 = 1
- 42 *Πρὸς Αἰσχύλον α'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.50; verisimile est hanc inscriptionem ad discipulum Hippocratis Chii (vid. Aristotelis *Meteorologica* 1.6 342b36) spectare, non ad tragicum praeclarum
- 43 *Ἀστρολογικῆς ἱστορίας α'—ς'*] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.50 = 1; fortasse revera Eudemi opus; cf. Simplicii comm. In Aristotelis *De caelo* 2.12 292b10 (CAG vol.7 p.488.19-20) = Eudemus, fr. 148 Wehrli; Clementis Alexandrini *Stromateis* 1.14 65.1 (GCS t.2 p.41.9-10) = Eudemus, fr. 143 Wehrli; Theonis Smyrnaei *Expositionem rerum mathematicarum* p.198 Hiller = Eudemus, fr. 145 Wehrli; Diogenis Laertii *Vitas* 1.23 = Eudemus, fr. 144 Wehrli

- 33 *On the Astronomy of Democritus*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- The next five titles (nos. 34-38) are subjoined to the preceding title (no. 33) in Diogenes' list and are so closely related in subject matter, that not only the book referred to by the first title but the rest as well seem to concern Democritus.
- 34 *On the Meteorology*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1 (Usener supplied "On")
- 35 *On the Images*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 36 *On Flavors, Colors, Fleshes*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 37 *On the World-Order*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 38 *On the (work) On Mankind*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 39 *Collection of the (Doctrines) of Diogenes (of Apollonia)*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1
- 40 *Collection concerning the (Doctrines) of Metrodorus (of Chios)*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.44 = 1
- 41 *Collection of the (Doctrines) of Xenocrates*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.47 = 1
- 42 *In Reply to Aeschylus*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1; it is probable that this title refers to the pupil of Hippocrates of Chios (see Aristotle, *Meteorology* 1.6 342b36) and not to the famous tragedian
- 43 *Astronomical Research*, 6 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1; perhaps really the work by Eudemus; cf. Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 2.12 292b10 (CAG vol.7 p.488.19-20) = Eudemus, fr. 148 Wehrli; Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1.14 65.1 (GCS vol.2 p.41.9-10) = Eudemus, fr. 143 Wehrli; Theon of Smyrna, *Explanation of Mathematical Matters* p.198 Hiller = Eudemus, fr. 145 Wehrli; Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 1.23 = Eudemus, fr. 144 Wehrli

Scripta physica

- 138 Plinius in primo libro *Naturalis historiae* materiam ex Theophrasti scriptis in his libris componendis se desumpsisse asseverat:

- lib.3] NH 1.[3] (CB t.1 p.63.2-3 Beaujeu)
 lib.8] NH 1.[8] (CB t.1 p.73.9 Beaujeu)
 lib.9] NH 1.[9] (CB t.1 p.77.3 Beaujeu)
 lib.10] NH 1.[10] (CB t.1 p.80.30 Beaujeu)
 lib.11] NH 1.[11] (CB t.1 p.86.8 Beaujeu)
 lib.12] NH 1.[12] (CB t.1 p.88.25 Beaujeu)
 lib.13] NH 1.[13] (CB t.1 p.90.36 Beaujeu)
 lib.14] NH 1.[14] (CB t.1 p.92.19 Beaujeu)
 lib.15] NH 1.[15] (CB t.1 p.94.18 Beaujeu)
 lib.16] NH 1.[16] (CB t.1 p.98.10 Beaujeu)
 lib.17] NH 1.[17] (CB t.1 p.100.2 Beaujeu)
 lib.18] NH 1.[18] (CB t.1 p.103.2 Beaujeu)
 lib.19] NH 1.[19] (CB t.1 p.104.30 Beaujeu)
 lib.20] NH 1.[20] (CB t.1 p.108.12 Beaujeu)
 lib.21] NH 1.[21] (CB t.1 p.112.31 Beaujeu)
 lib.22] NH 1.[22] (CB t.1 p.115.33-4 Beaujeu): "ex auctoribus isdem quibus priore libro"
 lib.23] NH 1.[23] (CB t.1 p.118.30 Beaujeu)
 lib.24] NH 1.[24] (CB t.1 p.122.36 Beaujeu)
 lib.25] NH 1.[25] (CB t.1 p.127.11 Beaujeu)
 lib.26] NH 1.[26] (CB t.1 p.130.2 Beaujeu)
 lib.27] NH 1.[27] (CB t.1 p.134.13 Beaujeu)
 lib.28] NH 1.[28] (CB t.1 p.136.3 Beaujeu)
 lib.31] NH 1.[31] (CB t.1 p.143.32 Beaujeu)
 lib.33] NH 1.[33] (CB t.1 p.148.22 Beaujeu)
 lib.35] NH 1.[35] (CB t.1 p.154.2 Beaujeu)
 lib.36] NH 1.[36] (CB t.1 p.157.2 Beaujeu)
 lib.37] NH 1.[37] (CB t.1 p.161.12 Beaujeu)

ex quibus libris Theophrastus in his nusquam nominatim memoratur: 12; 14; 18; 23; 24; 35. Theophrastus in septimo libro nominatur (731, 732, 733) sed in indice huius libri auctorum in primo libro non recensetur (NH 1[7], CB t.1 p.69.34-70.15 Beaujeu).

Writings on Physics

- 138 Pliny in the first book of the *Natural History* says that he has taken material from Theophrastus in composing the following books:

- Book 3] NH 1.[3] (CB vol.1 p.63.2-3 Beaujeu)
 Book 8] NH 1.[8] (CB vol.1 p.73.9 Beaujeu)
 Book 9] NH 1.[9] (CB vol.1 p.77.3 Beaujeu)
 Book 10] NH 1.[10] (CB vol.1 p.80.30 Beaujeu)
 Book 11] NH 1.[11] (CB vol.1 p.86.8 Beaujeu)
 Book 12] NH 1.[12] (CB vol.1 p.88.25 Beaujeu)
 Book 13] NH 1.[13] (CB vol.1 p.90.36 Beaujeu)
 Book 14] NH 1.[14] (CB vol.1 p.92.19 Beaujeu)
 Book 15] NH 1.[15] (CB vol.1 p.94.18 Beaujeu)
 Book 16] NH 1.[16] (CB vol.1 p.98.10 Beaujeu)
 Book 17] NH 1.[17] (CB vol.1 p.100.2 Beaujeu)
 Book 18] NH 1.[18] (CB vol.1 p.103.2 Beaujeu)
 Book 19] NH 1.[19] (CB vol.1 p.104.30 Beaujeu)
 Book 20] NH 1.[20] (CB vol.1 p.108.12 Beaujeu)
 Book 21] NH 1.[21] (CB vol.1 p.112.31 Beaujeu)
 Book 22] NH 1.[22] (CB vol.1 p.115.33-4 Beaujeu): "from the same authorities as in the preceding book"
 Book 23] NH 1.[23] (CB vol.1 p.118.30 Beaujeu)
 Book 24] NH 1.[24] (CB vol.1 p.122.36 Beaujeu)
 Book 25] NH 1.[25] (CB vol.1 p.127.11 Beaujeu)
 Book 26] NH 1.[26] (CB vol.1 p.130.2 Beaujeu)
 Book 27] NH 1.[27] (CB vol.1 p.134.13 Beaujeu)
 Book 28] NH 1.[28] (CB vol.1 p.136.3 Beaujeu)
 Book 31] NH 1.[31] (CB vol.1 p.143.32 Beaujeu)
 Book 33] NH 1.[33] (CB vol.1 p.148.22 Beaujeu)
 Book 35] NH 1.[35] (CB vol.1 p.154.2 Beaujeu)
 Book 36] NH 1.[36] (CB vol.1 p.157.2 Beaujeu)
 Book 37] NH 1.[37] (CB vol.1 p.161.12 Beaujeu)

Of these books Theophrastus is nowhere mentioned by name in the following: 12; 14; 18; 23; 24; 35. Theophrastus is mentioned by name in Book 7 (731, 732, 733), but he is not listed among the sources for this book in Book 1 (NH 1.[7], CB vol.1 p.69.34-70.15 Beaujeu).

- 139 Heliodorus, Theophrasti De arte sacra versus iambici, inscriptio et 21-66 (RGVV p.34.21-22 et 35.12-36.23 Goldschmidt)

Θεοφράστου φιλοσόφου περί τῆς αὐτῆς θείας τέχνης διὰ στίχων
ιάμβων. . . .

- 35 ἡμεῖς μὲν ἄστρον τάξιν ὡσπερ καὶ θέσιν
φύσιν τε καὶ ὕψωσιν ὡς διάστασιν,
μέτρων ὀρισμοὺς ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἀνατολὰς
κρύψεις τε δείξει προλέγοντες καὶ δύσεις
οὐ σφαλόμεθα, μακρὰν ὄντων τὴν θέαν
τούτων ἀφ' ἡμῶν καὶ νοὸς γνῶσει μάλα
ὄρωντες, ὡσπερ εἰσὶν, αἰσθήσει φρενῶν
γινώσκωμεν ἀληθῆς ὡς εἶναι ἐκεῖ
ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοεῖν ὄλωσ
τελουμένων ἐκέισε· πάντα δ' αὖ σοφῶς
λέγειν ὀρίζειν τοῖς ἐχέφροσι βροτοῖς
ἐγνωμεν, ὡς ἡ πείρα μαρτυρεῖ τάδε.
καὶ οὐ μόνον ταῦτ', ἀλλὰ καὶ παθημάτων
τὰς αἰτίας φαίνοντες ἐν τῷ σώματι
ιατρικῆς τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης
ἐμπειρίαν καὶ πράξιν ἐντέχνου τέλους
ὀρίζομεν μύησιν, ὥστε καὶ λέγειν
προγνωστικῶς μέλλοντα γίνεσθαι πάθη
καὶ ἔκβασιν νόσου τε καὶ ἄκος φέρειν
καὶ μηνύειν ἔκδημον ἐκ νοσήματος
βίου τελευτήν, ὡς προγινώσκειν σαφῶς
καὶ τοὺς πόνους τῆ πείρα καὶ παύειν νόσον.
καὶ οὐχὶ ταῦτ' ἐγνωμεν ὡς σοφοὶ μόνον,
36 καίτοι γε ὄντων παμμεγίστων θαυμάτων,
ἀλλ' αὖθις ἀνθρώπων τὰς τε ποίας καὶ κράσεις
καὶ εἶδος ὡς καὶ γεῦσιν ἀκριβῶς λέγειν
ὅπῃ τε τῶν ἐν ξηρῷ καὶ βλαστημάτων
φυομένων γένος πᾶν ἔγγραφον λόγῳ
ἐθήκαμεν πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀκριβῶν ἐπῶν.
καὶ τῶν λίθων τὰς χροίας εἶδη καὶ τόπους,
καὶ τὰς μετάλλων, ἐνθα γίνονται, σαφῶς
ἐγνωμεν ὠφελείας ὡς καὶ τὰς βλάβας.
καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης ζῶα παντοίων γενῶν
καὶ σχημάτων μορφάς (τε) οἶδαμεν πάσας,
καὶ ὠφελείας ἐκφέρειν τούτων βροτοῖς,
καὶ τὰς βλάβας φεύγειν δὲ καὶ μὴ λανθάνειν,
πτηνῶν τε τὰς ποικίλας ιδέας γενῶν

- 139 Heliodorus, *Theophrastus' Iambic Verses on the Sacred Art*¹, title and 21-66 (RGVV p.34.21-22 and 35.12-36.23 Goldschmidt)

By Theophrastus the philosopher on the same sacred art¹ in iam-
bic verses. . . .

- 35 We do not go astray in (stating) the arrangement and placing of
the stars, and their nature and exaltation and distance, their definite
measures, and in predicting by demonstrative argument risings and
occultations and settings, (even though) these things are far off from
us to behold; it is by the knowledge of our mind that we indeed see
them as they are, and by the sensation of our minds we know the
truth, so that we are there in heaven and do not fail to know any-
thing at all of the things that are brought to pass there². And we
know how to say (and) determine them all wisely for mortals who
have understanding, as experience bears witness to these things.
And not these things only: revealing the causes of bodily afflic-
tions, we lay down the experience and practice of medical craft and
science as an initiation into the perfection of skill, so as (to be able) to
state a prognosis of the afflictions that are going to occur, and to
provide an escape and cure for disease, and to publish abroad the
departure, the end of life that results from a disease; so as both to
know clearly beforehand from experience the sufferings and to put
an end to the disease.
36 And it is not only these things we know, being wise, though they
are indeed very great wonders; but (we also know) how to state
accurately the plants on which flowers grow and their mixtures and
types and also taste, and we have laid down in writing the whole
family of saps and sprouts growing by nature in dry earth, so that
(men shall have) knowledge of accurate words. And we know well
the colors, types and places of precious stones, and the benefits and
also the harmful effects of metals, where they occur. And we know
the creatures of the sea, of all types and shapes, all their forms and
how to bring benefit from these to mortals and how to escape their
harmful effects and not be caught unawares; and (we know) the

ἀλλοιοφόνους καὶ ξένας τοῖς σχήμασιν
 ὄντων πρὸς ὠφέλειαν ἀνθρώπων φύσει
 ἐσχηκότων (θ') ὑπαρξιν εἰς τέρψιν βίου.
 οὕτως δὲ καὶ πᾶν κτῆνος, ὡς καὶ ἔρπετῶν
 εἶδος γένος τε ἐξεφίναμεν λόγοις.
 ἐπὼν γὰρ ἔργον μηδὲν εἰς ψεύδος φέρειν

* * *
 μνήσεως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ μάλα
 εἰρήκαμεν τὰ πάντα καὶ ἐδείξαμεν
 βροτοῖσι καὶ εἰς κέρδος εὐεκτεῖν βίῳ.

1-2 de Theophrasto alchemico cf. 204, 205 27-31 cf. 384 no. 1 (Theophrastus, Hist. Plant.) et no. 3 (De sucis) 32 cf. 134 no. 21 (Theophrastus, De lapidibus) 33 cf. 197-205 35-6 cf. 350 no. 8 (Theophrastus, De [animalibus] in sicco degentibus) et 367-369, 375 37-42 cf. fort. 360-362 39-40 355

1 Θεοφράστου φιλοσόφου τάδε φάσκει· περὶ τὸ τῆς θείας καὶ ἱερᾶς τέχνης cod. Paris. gr. 2327 et cod. Escorialiensis 431 6 δείξει Boll: δείξεις codd. δόσεις Goldschmidt: λύσεις codd.: λύσει Boll 7 temptes ἐσφαλλόμεθα: sed metrica ubique claudicant θέαν] θέσιν con. Reitzenstein 27 ποίας Ideler: ποιὰς Goldschmidt 30 λόγῳ Görgemanns: λόγον codd. 31 πρὸς γνῶσιν Reitzenstein: πρόγνωσιν codd. 33 μετάλλων Reitzenstein:

- 140 Dionysius Cartusianus, Protestatio ad superiorem suum (t.41 p.625bB-626aB ed. a. 1896-1913)

626aA multos legi auctores . . . et quidquid naturalium philosophorum
 626aB habere potui, Platonis, Procli, Aristotelis, Avicennae, Algazelis, Anaxagorae, Averrois, Alexandri, Alphorabii, Abubatheris, Avempote, Theophrasti, Themistii, ac aliorum.

2-4 cf. Dionysii Cartusiani librum De quattuor hominis novissimis 13 (t.41 p.511bB ed. a. 1896-1913): omni schola et secta Peripateticorum, Avicenna, Andronico, Algazele, Themistio, Averro, Alphorabio, Theophrasto, Simplicio; etiam 300.

- 141 Theodorus Metochita, Miscellanea philosophica et historica 23 (p.165.16-166.5 Mueller)

ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ Παρμενίδαι καὶ Ζήνωνες καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέες τε καὶ Δημόκριτοι καὶ Ἀναξαγόραι καὶ Ἀναξιμένεις καὶ Ἀναξίμανδροι καὶ

varied forms of winged kinds, with differing voices and strangers (to one another) in form, which are of benefit to human kind and have their existence to bring enjoyment to life. And so too we have set forth in words every beast and species and genus of reptile. For it is the task of words to be in no way conducive to falsehood ***³ relating to initiation, but we have indeed stated everything well, and declared to mortals how to be in a good state for advantage in life.⁴

¹ The preceding text is entitled "On the Mystic Art of the Philosophers", meaning alchemy. The verses printed here are apparently composed by Heliodorus and placed in the mouth of Theophrastus.

² This could refer just to what happens in the heavens, but there may be a reference to the astrological influence of the heavens on occurrences on earth. (We owe this point to Dirk Obbink.)

³ Something seems to have dropped out of the text here.

⁴ The pretended Theophrastus goes on to speak of the making of gold; cf. 204, 205.

μετάλλους codd. 34 γενῶν Reitzenstein: γένη codd. 36 τε add. Reitzenstein 40 ἀλλοιοφόνους Huby: ἀλληλοφόνους MC: ἀλληλοφόνους G 41 φύσει Reitzenstein: φύσιν codd. 42 θ' add. Reitzenstein 45 lacunam post φέρειν ind. Reitzenstein 46 μνήσεως schol. C: μήσεως CMG 48 καὶ] fort. ὡς Reitzenstein

- 140 Denis the Carthusian, Declaration to His Superior (vol.41 p.625bB-626aB, ed. of 1896-1913)

626aA I have read many authors . . . and whatever I could obtain by the
 626aB natural philosophers, by Plato, Proclus, Aristotle, Avicenna, Ghazali, Anaxagoras, Averroes, Alexander, Farabi, Abubather, Avempace,¹ Theophrastus, Themistius and others.

¹ Arabists are agreed that Abubather and Avempace (of whose name Avempote in the Latin text is a form) are the same person: namely, Abu-Bakr Ibn-Bajja. See the commentary.

- 141 Theodore the Metochite, Philosophical and Historical Miscellanies 23 (p.165.16-166.5 Mueller)

So people like Parmenides and Zeno and Empedocles and Democritus and Anaxagoras and Anaximenes and Anaximander and

Λεύκιπποι καὶ Ἡράκλειτοι καὶ Χρυσίπποι καὶ Θεόφραστοι καὶ οἱ κορυφαῖοι τὴν σοφίαν ἅπασαν Ἀριστοτέλεις καὶ Πλάτωνες εἰς πολλὰς τὴν περὶ φύσεως θεωρίαν κατατεμόντες αἰρέσεις καὶ διάφορα δόγματα, πάντες μὲν ἔχουσιν οὐκ ἀκαιρῶς, ὡς ἔφην, λέγειν καὶ διατρίβειν ἐνταῦθα, πάντες δὲ καὶ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐλέγχονται τε καὶ περιτρέπονται.

6 *Theodorus Metochita, Miscellanea* 23 (p.163.3-6 Mueller)

Principia naturalis scientiae

- 142 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.1 184a16-b14 (CAG t.9 p.18.29-34 Diels)

καὶ καλῶς ὁ Πλάτων τὴν φυσιολογίαν εἰκοτολογίαν ἔλεγε εἶναι, ᾧ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης συμμαρτυρεῖ τὴν κυρίως ἀπόδειξιν ἐξ ἀμέσων καὶ αὐτοπίστων ἀρχῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν κυρίως αἰτίων καὶ τῇ φύσει προτέρων εἶναι βουλόμενος. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον διὰ τοῦτο φυσιολογίαν, ἀλλ' ἀρκεῖσθαι χρή τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν καὶ δύναμιν, ὡς καὶ Θεοφράστῳ δοκεῖ.

1 *Plato, Timaeus* 29C 2-4 *Aristoteles, Anal. post.* 1.2 71b20-3

- 143 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.1 184a16-b14 (CAG t.9 p.20.17-26 Diels)

ἄλλως δὲ ὡς κοινῶς εἰπεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὴν περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀλήθειαν ἀνιχνευτέον καὶ Θεοφράστῳ πειθομένους, ὅς περὶ τούτου ζητῶν ἐν πρώτῳ Φυσικῶν τάδε γέγραφεν· “ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν κινήσεως οὐδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς λεκτέον (πάντα γὰρ ἐν κινήσει τὰ τῆς φύσεως), ἄνευ δὲ ἀλλοιωτικῆς καὶ παθητικῆς οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν περὶ τὸ μέσον, εἰς ταῦτά τε καὶ περὶ τούτων λέγοντας οὐχ οἷόν τε καταλιπεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀρχομένους πειράσθαι χρή θεωρεῖν, ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα λαμβάνοντας καθ' αὐτὰ ἢ ἀπὸ τούτων εἴ τινας ἄρα κυριώτεροι καὶ πρότεροι τούτων ἀρχαί.”

4 οὐκ *del.* Torstrik

Leucippus and Heraclitus and Chrysippus and Theophrastus and the leaders of all wisdom, people like Aristotle and Plato, dividing up the contemplation of nature into many schools and differing opinions, are all able to speak about these things¹ not inappropriately, as I said, and to occupy themselves with them, but they are all also refuted and overturned by one another.

¹ Theodore has been arguing that the study of changeable subject matter must necessarily lead to disagreements.

Principles of Natural Science

- 142 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.1 184a16-b14 (CAG vol.9 p.18.29-34 Diels)

Plato was right to call natural science “an account of probabilities”; and Aristotle too bears witness with him, wanting demonstration, in the proper sense, to be from principles which are immediate and credible in themselves, and from explanations which are explanations in the proper sense and naturally prior. But natural science is not for this reason to be scorned; rather, we should be satisfied with what is in accordance with our nature and capacity, as Theophrastus, too, thinks.

- 143 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.1 184a16-b14 (CAG vol.9 p.20.17-26 Diels)

And in short, speaking generally we must search out the truth about natural principles (starting) from the senses and from what is perceived, obeying Theophrastus, too, who wrote as follows when enquiring about this in the first book of (his) *Physics*: “Since it is not possible without reference to motion to speak of any single thing — for all natural things are in motion — and (since it is not possible to speak) about the things in the central region without reference to alteration and being affected, when we are speaking with regard to these things and concerning them we cannot dispense with sense-perception; but we must begin from this in attempting our consideration, either taking the phenomena in themselves, or (starting) from these, if indeed there are any more fundamental and prior principles than these.”

144A Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physica 1.1 184a10-12 (CAG t.16 p.4.8-5.6 Vitelli)

ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀριστοτέλης οὕτως, Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ ὅλον τὸν συλλογισμόν ἔθηκεν ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ Περὶ φύσεως πραγματεία, παραμυθίας τινὸς ἀξιόσας καὶ τὴν ἐλάττονα πρότασιν τὴν ὅτιπερ τῆς φυσιολογίας εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἰτία καὶ στοιχεῖα. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ πρόδηλον. κατασκευάζει γοῦν αὐτὴν τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· τὰ φυσικὰ, φησί, πράγματα ἢ 5 σώματά ἐστιν ἢ ἐν σώματι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, οἷον αἱ ῥοπαὶ καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις καὶ τὰ ὅμοια· πάντα δὲ τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι τὸ εἶναι ἔχοντα σύνθετά ἐστι.

καὶ ὅτι μὲν τὰ σώματα σύνθετα πρόδηλον. συνθέτους δὲ φησι καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις τὰς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις τοῖς σώμασι τὸ εἶναι ἐχούσας καὶ 10 ἀπλῶς πάντα τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ εἶδη, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ ἐκ γενῶν εἶναι καὶ διαφορῶν, ἔπειτα εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ὀριστικὸν λόγον θεωρούμενα ἀπλᾶ ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὁ ὀριστικὸς λόγος οὐκ ἐν ὑπάρξει, ἀλλ' ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. ὡς μέντοι ἐνυπόστατα ὄντα μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου θεωρεῖται· ἢ γὰρ ἐνεργεῖα οὐσα ὄψις οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῆ ἢ δύναμις μόνον, 15 ἀλλὰ μετὰ τοῦ ὀπτικοῦ πνεύματος, ἄλλως τε οἱ φυσικοὶ ὡς φυσικὰ καὶ ἐν ὑπάρξει πράγματα αὐτὰ θεωροῦντες μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αὐτὰ θεωροῦσιν. ὁ γὰρ ὀριστικὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς εἶπον, λόγος ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει· ταύτη δὲ οὐδὲ ιδέας αὐτῶν εἶναι βούλεται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ τὰ φυσικὰ εἶδη μὴ ὑφίστασθαι ἐξηρημένα σωμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐν ψιλῇ 20 μόνον εἶναι ἐπινοίᾳ. ἄλλως τε οὐδὲν διοίσει ταῦτα τοῦ εἶδους τοῦ σώματος. ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἴδιον λόγον ἀπλοῦν ἐστίν, τὸ τριχῆ λέγω διαστατόν, πρὸς μέντοι τὴν ὑπαρξίν αὐτοῦ χρεῖα καὶ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ οὕτω λοιπὸν τὸ ἐν ὑπάρξει σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπλοῦν, ἀλλὰ σύνθετον ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους, οὕτω κατὰ τούτων ἔχει· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν 25 ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον θεωρούμενα ἀπλᾶ ἐστίν, ὅταν μέντοι ὡς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἐνεργεῖα αὐτὰ ὄντα θεωρήσωμεν, μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου σώματος αὐτὰ θεωροῦμεν. καὶ οὕτως οὐχ ἀπλᾶ ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σύνθετα.

εἰ τοίνυν τὰ φυσικὰ πράγματα ἢ σώματά ἐστίν ἢ ἐν σώματι τὸ εἶναι ἔχει, ταῦτα δὲ σύνθετα, τὰ φυσικὰ ἄρα πράγματα σύνθετά ἐστίν. πάντα 30 δὲ τὰ σύνθετα στοιχεῖα καὶ αἰτία καὶ ἀρχὰς ἔχει· τὰ γὰρ ἀπλᾶ τοῦ συνθέτου ἐστὶ στοιχεῖα· τὰ φυσικὰ ἄρα πράγματα ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτία καὶ στοιχεῖα ἔχει. οὕτω μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐλάττονα κατεσκεύασε πρότασιν· ἢ

144A Philoponus, On Aristotle's Physics 1.1 184a10-12 (CAG vol.16 p.4.8-5.6 Vitelli)

Thus, then, Aristotle; but Theophrastus stated the whole syllogism in his own work *On Nature*, thinking that some explanation was also needed for the minor premise, that natural science involves principles and causes and elements. For this is not obvious. Well, he establishes it in the following way: natural things, he says, either are bodies or have their being in bodies — for example, tendencies and capacities and the like; and all bodies, and things that have their being in bodies, are composite.

Now, that bodies are composite is obvious; but he also says that capacities which have their being in bodies which underlie them are composite, and in general that all forms that are in something that underlies them (are composite), firstly because they are (composed) of genera and differentiae, and then because, even if they *are* simple when they are considered with reference to their definition, nevertheless the definition exists not in reality, but only in thought. But when they are considered as really existing, they are considered along with what underlies them; for sight which exists in actuality is not just the capacity itself, but (the capacity) together with the visual *pneuma*. As a matter of fact, the natural scientists, who consider these things as natural things and in their real existence, consider them along with what underlies them. For their definition, as I said, exists only in thought. And this is why Aristotle does not wish that there should be (Platonic) forms of them, on the grounds that natural forms have no reality when they are removed from bodies, but (then) only exist in mere thought. As a matter of fact, these things will in no way differ (as far as the point at issue is concerned) from the form of body. This too is simple as far as the account that is proper to it is concerned — I mean, (that it is) what is extended in three dimensions — but, for it really to exist, matter is needed as well, and so, then, body which exists is not simple but a composite of matter and form. Accordingly it is just like this in the case of these things too. When they are considered with reference to the account that is proper to them they are simple, but when we consider them as really existing and as existing in actuality, then we consider them along with the body that underlies them. And in this way they are not simple, but composite.

If then natural things either are bodies, or have their being in bodies, and (both of) these are composite, then natural things are 5 composite. But all composite things have elements and causes and principles; for it is the simple things that are the elements of what is composite. So natural things have principles and causes and ele-

προσθεῖς τὴν μείζονα, ὅτι πᾶν ὃ ἔχει ἀρχὰς ἢ αἷτια ἢ στοιχεῖα
γινώσκειται τούτων ἐγνωσμένων, οὕτω συνάγει ὅτι τὰ φυσικὰ ἄρα
πράγματα γινώσκειται τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐγνωσμένων.

1-4 Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physica 1.5 188a19 (CAG t.16 p.108.22-6)

144B Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.1 184a10-16 (CAG t.9 p.9.5-10 Diels)

ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν εἰσιν ἀρχαὶ τῶν φυσικῶν, ἐφεξῆς ἅπας ὁ λόγος δείξει
καὶ οὐ δεῖται νῦν ἀποδείξεως· διὸ οἶμαι ταύτην αὐτὸς τὴν πρότασιν
παρήκην. ὁ μὲντοι Θεόφραστος ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ Φυσικῶν καὶ ταύτην
ἀπέδειξε λέγων, "τὸ μὲντοι τῶν φυσικῶν ἀρχὰς εἶναι δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ τὰ
μὲν φυσικὰ σώματα εἶναι σύνθετα, πᾶν δὲ σύνθετον ἀρχὰς ἔχειν τὰ
ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται· ἅπαν γὰρ τὸ φύσει ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἔχει γε σῶμα· ἄμφω
δὲ σύνθετα."

3-7 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.21.8-10);
Gennadius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.1 184a10-16 (Oeuvres complètes t.7
p.486.6-9 Petit et Siderides et Jugie)

145 aš-Šahrastānī, al-Milal wa-n-nihāl, ra'y Tāmistiyyūs (p.343.15-344.2 Cureton)

ونقل تامسطيوس عن ارسطوطاليس وافلاطن وثاوفرسطس وفرقريوس
وفلوپرخيس وهو رآه في أن العالم أجمع طبيعة واحدة عامة وكل نوع من أنواع
النبات والحيوان مختص بطبيعة خاصة وحنوا الطبيعة العامة بأنها مبدأ الحركة
في الأشياء والسكون فيها على الأمر الأول من نواتها وهي علّة الحركة في
المتحركات وعلّة السكون في الساكنات وزعموا أن الطبيعة هي التي تدبر الأشياء
كلها في العالم حيوته ومواته تدبيراً طبيعياً وليست هي حية ولا قادرة ولا مختارة
ولكن لا تفعل إلا حكمة وصواباً وعلى نظم صحيح وترتيب محكم

fontes: ed. Cureton, ut supra; ed. Kaylānī t.2 p.154.1-7

3-5 [وحنوا الطبيعة العامة ... في الساكنات cf. Aristotelis Physica 2.1 192b8-23 et
Themistii comm. In Phys. (CAG t.5.3 p.36.1-2).

1 post ارسطوطاليس add. وثاؤون ed. Kaylānī 2 ان في ed. Cureton: ان في
Kaylānī 3 بانها ed. Kaylānī: انها ed. Cureton الحركات ed. Cureton:
ed. Kaylānī 6 حيوانه ونباته ed. Cureton: حيوته

ments. It is in this way, then, that (Theophrastus) established the
minor premise; and adding to this the major, that everything that has
principles or causes or elements is known when these are known, in
that way he concludes that natural things are known when their
principles are known.

144B Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 1.1 184a10-16 (CAG vol.9 p.9.5-10 Diels)

But that there are principles of natural things, the whole subse-
quent argument will show, and it does not need to be demonstrated
now; and it was for this reason, I think, that (Aristotle) passed over
this premise. But Theophrastus, at the beginning of his own *Physics*,
gave a demonstration of this too, saying, "But that there are prin-
ciples of natural things is clear from the facts that natural bodies are
composite, and that everything that is composite has as principles
the things of which it is composed. For everything that is natural
either is a body or at any rate has body; and both of these are com-
posite."

145 Šahrastānī, Religions and Sects, The Views of Themistius (p.343.15-344.2 Cureton)

From Aristotle, Plato,¹ Theophrastus, Porphyry and Plutarch,
Themistius transmitted his own opinion that the world consists in its
entirety of a single general nature, and that every species of plant
and animal is distinguished by a specific nature. Their definition of
general nature is that in things, as the primary quality of their
essences, it is the principle of motion and of rest, being the cause of
motion in the things that move and the cause of rest in those that are
at rest. They claimed that nature is the one which manages naturally
all things in the world, both animate and inanimate, while itself has
neither life nor potency nor volition; and yet it acts only wisely and
correctly, and in accordance with sound order and precise planning.

¹ Kaylānī's edition adds "Theon" before Plato.

- 146 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica, Corollarium de loco (CAG t.9 p.604.5-11 Diels)

ιστέον δὲ ὅτι καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς ἀπορεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ τόπου λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τοιαῦτα· ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ, ὅτι κινούμενος ἔσται ὁ τόπος, ὅτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀπλανής), ὅτι ἐὰν συναχθῶσιν αἱ σφαῖραι, καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα μηδὲν αὐτὰ μετακινηθέντα, ἐὰν ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ περιέχοντα αὐτὰ, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ.

1-2 *Aristoteles, Physica 4.4 212a20-1* 2-4 cf. *Philoponi comm. In Aristotelis Physica, Corollarium de loco (CAG t.17 p.563.26-565.9), Theophrasto non nominato*

- 147 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica, Corollarium de loco (CAG t.9 p.606.32-5 Diels)

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἀκίνητον εἶναι τὸν τόπον ὁ μὲν Θεόφραστος καὶ Εὐδήμος ὡς ἀξίωμα καὶ αὐτὸ προσλαμβάνουσιν, ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ ὀρισμῷ προστίθησι λέγων, “ὥστε τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας πρῶτον ἀκίνητον τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ τόπος”.

1-4 *Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physica 4.4 210b32-211a7 (CAG t.17 p.541.7-9), Theophrasto et Eudemo non nominatis* 2 *Eudemus, fr. 79 Wehrli* 1-2 *Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 4.4 210b32-211a7 (CAG t.9 p.566.18-19) et 212a14-16 (CAG t.9 p.583.10-12)* 3-4 *Aristoteles, Physica 4.4 212a20-1* →

- 148 Proclus ap. Simplicium, In Aristotelis Physica, Corollarium de loco (CAG t.9 p.612.1-7 Diels)

εἰ δὲ σῶμά ἐστιν, ἢ ἀκίνητον ἢ κινούμενον ἔστιν· ἀλλ’ εἰ κινούμενον ὁπωσοῦν, ἀνάγκη καὶ κατὰ τόπον αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν κινούμενον δεῖ κατὰ τόπον κινεῖσθαι· ὥστε πάλιν ὁ τόπος δεῖσεται τόπου· τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ὡς καὶ Θεοφράστῳ δοκεῖ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει μέντοι. φησὶ γοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀγγεῖον τόπον εἶναι κινήτον, τὸν δὲ τόπον ἀγγεῖον ἀκίνητον, ὡς ἂν ἀκινήτου τοῦ τόπου κατὰ φύσιν ὄντος.

1-4 *Proclus, In Platonis Rempublicam 10 616A-C (BT t.2 p.198.16-17 Kroll), Theophrasto non nominato* 5-6 *Aristoteles, Physica 4.4 212a14-16*

- 146 Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics, Corollary on place (CAG vol.9 p.604.5-11 Diels)

One should know that Theophrastus too,¹ in his *Physics*, raises difficulties like the following against the account that Aristotle gives of place: (1) that body will be in surface, (2) that place will be moving, (3) that not every body will be in a place — for the (sphere of) the fixed (stars) will not —, (4) that if (all) the spheres are taken together, even the whole heaven will not be in a place, (5) that the things which are in a place will no longer be in a place if the things which surround them are removed, (even though) they have not been moved themselves.

¹ Or “even Theophrastus”.

- 147 Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics, Corollary on place (CAG vol.9 p.606.32-5 Diels)

But that place is unmoved Theophrastus and Eudemus add (to the list of attributes of place), regarding this too as axiomatic in itself, while Aristotle adds it to the definition, saying, “so that place is the first unmoved boundary of what surrounds”.

2 αὐτὸ τὸ *coni. Spengel* 3-4 ἀκίνητον πρῶτον *Aristoteles (et Simplicius, In Arist. Physica, Coroll. de loco, CAG t.9 p.605.33)*

- 148 Proclus in Simplicium, On Aristotle's Physics, Corollary on place (CAG vol.9 p.612.1-7 Diels)

If (place) is a body,¹ it is either unmoved or moved. But if it is moved in any way, it is necessary that it also be moved in place; for it has been shown that everything that is moved in any way at all must be moved in place. Accordingly, place will again need (another) place. And this is impossible, as both Theophrastus and indeed Aristotle think. At any rate (Aristotle) says that a vessel is a movable place, and place an immovable vessel, regarding place as immovable in its nature.

¹ Proclus is arguing that place is immaterial, unmoved, but corporeal.

- 149 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica, Corollarium de loco (CAG t.9 p.639.13-22 Diels)

καὶ γὰρ καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς φαίνεται τὴν ἔννοιαν ταύτην ἐσχηκῶς περὶ τόπου, ἐν οἷς φησιν ὡς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ προάγων τὸν λόγον· “μήποτε οὐκ ἔστι καθ’ αὐτὸν οὐσία τις τόπος, ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλων τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν εἴτε ἐμψύχων εἴτε ἀψύχων, ἔμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων. καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ λέγεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιποθήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἀπαιτήσειε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν.”

1-10 Simplicius, In Arist. Physica, Coroll. de loco (CAG t.9 642.14-18); cf. etiam *ibid.* 641.17-19, Theophrasto non nominato

8 αὐτοῦ a: αὐτοῦ EF

Tempus

- 150 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 4.10 218a31-b9 (CAG t.9 p.700.16-19 Diels)

ἄδηλον οὖν καὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν, εἴπερ οἱ μὲν τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν καὶ περιφορὰν τὸν χρόνον εἶναι φασιν, ὡς τὸν Πλάτωνα νομίζουσιν ὃ τε Εὐδήμος καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος καὶ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος.

1-2 Aëtius, *Placita philosophorum* 1.22.1 (DG p.318a9-10 et 318b11-12), *Theophrasto non nominato* 2. cf. *Platonis Timaeum* 37D (sed etiam 38B) 3

- 151A Iamblichus ap. Simplicium, In Aristotelis Categoriae 9 11b10 (CAG t.8 p.346.14-18 Kalbfleisch)

Στράτων μὲν γὰρ τὸ πόσον τῆς κινήσεως εἰπὼν τὸν χρόνον ἀχώριστον τι αὐτὸν ὑπέθετο τῆς κινήσεως, Θεόφραστος δὲ συμβεβηκός τι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀριθμὸν εἰπὼν ὡς χωριστὸν ἐθεάσαντο· ἡνίκα δὲ

- 149 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics*, Corollary on place (CAG vol.9 p.639.13-22 Diels)

And Theophrastus too, in his *Physics*, clearly had this conception of place, where he says, as one who in an impasse tries to advance the argument: “May it not be that place is not something that exists in its own right, but is spoken of according to the arrangement and position of bodies, with reference to their natures and capacities? And similarly in the case of animals and plants and in general all things with a differentiated structure, whether living or not, provided that their nature involves a shape. For in these too there is an arrangement and position of the parts with reference to the whole being. And for this reason each thing is said to be in its own space by virtue of its having its proper ordering; for each of the parts of the body, too, might (be said to) desire and require its own space and position.”

Time

- 150 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 4.10 218a31-b9 (CAG vol.9 p.700.16-19 Diels)

So it is unclear, too, what (time) is, since some say that time is the motion and rotation of the universe, as Eudemus and Theophrastus and Alexander think Plato (says).

Eudemus, fr. 82a Wehrli *Alexander*, In Aristotelis Physica, ap. Simplicium, In Arist. Phys. 4.10 218a31 (CAG t.9 p.700.18 Diels); cf. *Alexandri librum De tempore* p.93.10 Théry (*Bibliothèque Thomiste* 7 [1926])

- 151A Iamblichus in Simplicium, *On Aristotle's Categories* 9 11b10 (CAG vol.8 p.346.14-18 Kalbfleisch)

For Strato, calling time the quantitative aspect of motion, supposed that it was something inseparable from motion; but Theophrastus, calling it some accidental attribute (of motion), and Aristotle, calling it the number (of motion), regarded it as separable. However, when (Aristotle) calls it a condition or affection of motion, he too treated it

ἔξιν ἢ πάθος κινήσεως λέγει, ὡς ἀχωρίστω καὶ αὐτὸς ἐχρήσατο.

2 συμβεβηκός] cf. p.351.4-8, ubi Theophrastus non nominatur 3 Aristoteles, *Physica* 4.11 219b1, 220a24 3-4 *ibid.* 4.14 223a18, cf. 8.1 251b28 →

151B Simplicius, In Aristotelis *Physica*, Corollarium de tempore (CAG t.9 p.788.34-789.4 Diels)

καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ Εὐδημος οἱ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταῖροι τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνονται τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει περὶ χρόνου δοξάσαντές τε καὶ διδάξαντες. ὁ μὲντοι Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων αἰτιασάμενος τὸν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ
789 χρόνου ὀρισμὸν αὐτὸς καίτοι Θεοφράστου μαθητῆς ὢν τοῦ πάντα 5
σχεδὸν ἀκολουθήσαντος τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καινότεραν ἐβάδισεν ὁδὸν· ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ κινήσεως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οὐκ ἀποδέχεται, διότι ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς διωρισμένον ποσόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος συνεχῆς, τὸ δὲ συνεχῆς οὐκ ἀριθμητόν.

1 *Eudemus*, fr. 91 Wehrli 3 *Strato*, fr. 75 Wehrli →

151C Albertus Magnus, *Physica* 4.3.4 (*Op. omn.* t.4.1 p.266.83-267.5 Hossfeld)

propter quod respondent viri illustres in philosophia, Avicenna, Alexander, Themistius et Averroes, Theophrastus et Porphyrius, quod tempus non est passio nisi unius mobilis per motum suum,
267 et hoc est primum mobile; et hic motus percipitur in omni motu
sicut causa in suo effectu, et non est necessario in hac perceptione 5
collatio effectus ad causam, quia quidquid est in effectu, hoc est a causa, sive hoc advertatur et percipiatur distincte sive non.

2 Alexander] *De tempore* p.94.16 Théry (*Bibliothèque Thomiste* 7 [1926]) Themistius] ap. Averroes, *In Arist. Phys.* 4 comm. 132 (fol. 203L, ed. a. 1562); cf. Themistii comm. *In Arist. Phys.* 4.14 223b12-224a2 (CAG t.5.2 p.163.11-164.1 Schenkl) Averroes] *In Phys.* 4 comm. 98 (fol. 179G, ed. a. 1562)

7 percipiatur *HPPIU*rY: participatur *S* *edd.*

as inseparable.

1 Στράτων JLKA: Πλάτων v

151B Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics*, Corollary on Time (CAG vol.9 p.788.34-789.4 Diels)

And both Theophrastus and Eudemus, the associates of Aristotle, clearly held and taught the same opinions as Aristotle concerning time. But Strato of Lampsacus criticized the definition of time
789 given by Aristotle and his associates, and, although he was a pupil of Theophrastus who followed Aristotle in almost everything, he took a new path. For he did not accept that time was the number of motion, because number is discrete quantity, but motion and time are continuous, and the continuous is not numerable.

6 σχεδὸν *om.* aF

151C Albert the Great, *Physics* 4.3.4 (*Op. omn.* vol.4.1 p.266.83-267.5 Hossfeld)

It is for this reason¹ that distinguished philosophers, Avicenna, Alexander, Themistius and Averroes, Theophrastus and Porphyry answer that time is an affection of a single moved thing only, on
267 account of its movement; and this is the *primum mobile*². And this movement is perceived in every movement, as a cause is perceived in its effect, and it is not necessary that in this perception there should be a connection of the effect with its cause; for whatever is in the effect is from the cause, whether this is noticed and perceived clearly or not.

¹ Albert has been stating objections to the identification of time with movements in individual souls, referring to Galen and Augustine as proponents of this view.

² The outermost sphere of the heavens.

Motus et mutatio

- 152 Iamblichus ap. Simplicium, In Aristotelis Categorias 9 11b1-8 (CAG t.8 p.304.32-305.4 Kalbfleisch)

ἔτι δὲ δεῖ πείθεσθαι Θεοφράστῳ· τούτῳ γὰρ δοκεῖ μὲν χωρίζεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν τῆς ἐνεργείας, εἶναι δὲ τὴν μὲν κίνησιν καὶ ἐνέργειαν ὡς ἂν ἐν αὐτῇ περιεχομένην, οὐκέτι μὲντοι καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν κίνησιν· τὴν γὰρ ἐκάστου οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ οἰκείον εἶδος ἐνεργειῶν εἶναι ἐκάστου, μὴ 305 οὐσαν αὐτὴν κίνησιν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τελειότης καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ φύσει ἀκινήτοις εἶναι οὐ κεκάλυται· εἰσὶν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς πολλὰ τοιαῦται, οἷον [τὴν] κατὰ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ ἀνδριάντος· ἔστηκε γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τελειότητα.

7 τὴν *del.* Kalbfleisch: ἡ Brandis

- 153A Simplicius, In Aristotelis Categorias 14 15b1-16 (CAG t.8 p.435.17-31 Kalbfleisch)

πῶς δὲ αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῆς Φυσικῆς σαφῶς εἰπὼν, “ὥστε κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔστιν εἶδη τοσαῦτα ὅσα τοῦ ὄντος”, ὅμως καὶ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῆς πραγματείας ἐκείνης καὶ ἐνταῦθα οὐκέτι δέκα ἀλλὰ τέσσαρα εἶδη κινήσεως ἀπαριθμεῖται; ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ τῆς Φυσικῆς ἀκρόασεως καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἀποδιδόναι προτίθεται ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, δι’ ὧς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσιν οὐ φησιν εἶναι κίνησιν ἢ μεταβολήν, πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀπολογισμοὺς ἐπειράθητι τι λέγειν ἐν ταῖς εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν πραγματείαν σχολαῖς, ἵνα δὲ μὴ τολμηρὸν τις ἡγήται με λῖαν, “ἀκράντως γαρυόμενον Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον” κατὰ Πίνδαρον, ἐθέλω καὶ τὸν ἄριστον τῶν αὐτοῦ μαθητῶν τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐπιδείξει ταῖς ἐμαῖς ὑπονοίαις συμψηφίζομενον. λέγει γὰρ ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν οὕτως: “περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τὸν μὲν κοινὸν καὶ καθόλου λόγον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶν ἀτελής τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον καθ’ ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν, ὃ καὶ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως σχεδὸν φαίνεται.”

1-2 Aristoteles, *Physica* 3.1 201a8-9 2-4 Aristoteles, *Physica* 5.1 224b35-5.2 226b10 4-7 Aristoteles, *Physica* 5.2 225b10-226a23 7-8 Simplicius, In Arist. *Phys.* 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG t.9 p.408.15-413.11) et 5.2 226a2-26 (CAG t.10 p.859.16-861.28) 9 Pindarus, *Olympica* 2.87 13-14 cf. Aristotelis *Physica* 3.2 201b31-2; etiam 307A v.25 et 307D v.6-7

9 ἄκραντα *codd.* Pindari 11 πρώτῳ J^p: ια' L: ιδ' A

Motion and Change

- 152 Iamblichus in Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 9 11b1-8 (CAG vol.8 p.304.32-305.4 Kalbfleisch)

And, further, one should believe Theophrastus; for he thinks that motion is separate from activity, and that motion, on the one hand, is also activity, since it is included within (the latter), but activity, on the other hand, is not also motion. For it is the substance and the peculiar form of each thing that is the being-in-actuality¹ of each thing, and this is not motion. For perfection is not prevented from being present in intelligible things too and in those that are unmoved by their nature. And among perceptible things too there are many like this, for example (perfection) in respect of the shape of a statue; for the shape is at rest in respect of one and the same perfection.

¹ Literally “the activity”.

- 153A Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* 14 15b1-16 (CAG vol.8 p.435.17-31 Kalbfleisch)

And how is it that Aristotle himself, after clearly saying in the third (book) of the *Physics*, “so that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are of being”, nevertheless both in the fifth (book) of that work, and here, counts no longer ten kinds of motion, but four? Since in the fifth (book) of the lectures on *Physics* Aristotle also sets himself the task of giving the reasons why he says that there is not motion or change in the other kinds (of predication), I tried to say something against those defences (of his position) in my commentary on that work; but so that no one should think me excessively bold, “uttering vain cries against the holy bird of Zeus” as Pindar says, I wish to show that the best of his pupils, Theophrastus, casts his vote with my supposition. For in the first (book) of his *Physics* he speaks as follows: “Concerning motion it is not difficult to give and state the general and universal account, that it is some incomplete activity of that which is potentially, as such (i.e. as being potentially), in each category¹; and this is pretty clear even from perception.”

¹ Literally, “in each of the genera of predication”.

153B Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG t.9 p.412.31-413.9 Diels)

καὶ οἶδα μὲν ὅτι προπετὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀφιέναι τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει φωνῇ, ἕως δ' ἂν γνῶναι δυναθῶμεν ἀκριβῶς τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς τοιαύτης αὐτοῦ διατάξεως, ἀρκούμεθα πρὸς παραμυθίαν τῇ τε Εὐδήμου συνηγορίᾳ ἐπὶ τῆς ποτὲ κατηγορίας ῥηθείᾳ καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῇ Θεοφράστου σαφῶς τὴν κίνησιν καὶ μεταβολὴν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς 5
413 κατηγορίαις θεωροῦντος. λέγει γοῦν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῶν Περι κινήσεως· “οἰκειότερον δὲ (ἔπερ καὶ λέγομεν καὶ ἔστιν) ἐνέργειαν τοῦ δυνάμει κινήτου ἢ κινήτου κατὰ γένος ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγοριῶν οἷον οὐσίας ποιοῦ ποσοῦ φορητοῦ τῶν ἄλλων. οὕτω γὰρ ἀλλοίωσις αὐξήσις φορὰ γένεσις καὶ αἱ ἐναντίαι ταύταις.” ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον οἶμαι 10
τάδε γέγραπεν· “ἐν μὲν τῷ ἀφορισμῷ τῆς κινήσεως τοσαῦτά φαμεν αὐτῆς εἶδη, ὅσαι κατηγορίαι· τὴν γὰρ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον ἐντελέχειαν κίνησιν.” καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ βιβλίῳ φησί· “τοῦ δὲ πρὸς τι κίνησις τοῦ μὲν κατὰ λόγον οὐκ ἔστι, τοῦ δὲ κατὰ δυνάμιν ἔστιν. 15
ἢ γὰρ ἐνέργεια κινήσις τε καὶ καθ' αὐτό.”

3-4 Eudemus ap. Simplicium, In Aristotelis Physica 201a3-9 (CAG t.9 p.411.15-18) = Eudemus, fr. 59 Wehrli 7-8 cf. Aristotelis Physica 3.2 202a7-8 (sed ἐντελέχεια pro ἐνέργεια) 12-13 cf. *ibid.* 3.1 201a10-11, 201b4-5 13-15 cf. Aristotelis Metaphysica 5(Δ).15 1021a14-21

13 post κίνησιν excidisse λέγομεν vel sim. existimavit Spengel 15 ἢ γὰρ ἐνέργεια κίνησις τοῦ καθ' αὐτό temptavit Zeller (Phil. der Griech.³ t.2.2 p.831 n.2)

153C Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 5.2 226a23-6 (CAG t.10 p.860.19-28 et 861.19-26 Diels)

ὁ μὲντοι Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ Φυσικῶν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν τὴν κίνησιν θεωρεῖσθαι φησι γράφων οὕτως· “περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τὸν μὲν καθόλου καὶ κοινὸν λόγον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἐνέργειά τις ἐστὶν ἀτελής τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἢ τοιοῦτον καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν.” εἶκοι δὲ νῦν κίνησιν 5
κοινῶς τὴν μεταβολὴν λέγειν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ὀρισμὸς ὁ λέγων ἐντελέχειαν τοῦ δυνάμει, ἢ τοιοῦτον ἐστὶν, οὐ τῆς κυρίως κινήσεώς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ ἄλλως πάσης μεταβολῆς. διὸ καὶ προελθὼν ὀλίγον ὁ Θεόφραστος “ζητεῖν δεῖ,” φησί, “περὶ τῶν κινήσεων, εἰ αἱ μὲν

153B Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 3.1 201a3-9 (CAG vol.9 p.412.31-413.9 Diels)

And I know that it seems rash to express the opposite opinion to Aristotle, but until we can clearly determine the reason for his adopting this arrangement, we will be sufficiently consoled by the advocacy of Eudemus in the case of the category of time, and still more by that of Theophrastus, who clearly considers motion and change in all 413 the categories. At any rate, in the second (book) of his *On Motion* he says, “More properly — as we say, and as the fact of the matter is — (motion is) the activity *qua* moveable of what is potentially moveable, in each category: for example, of a substance, of a quality, of a quantity, of a thing which can change its place, and the rest. For it is in this way that (there are) alteration, growth, change of place, coming-to-be and their opposites.” And in the third (book) he wrote, even more clearly I think, as follows: “In our definition of motion we say that there are as many species of it, as there are categories; for it is the actualization of that which is potentially, as such,¹ (that we call) motion.” And he says this too in the same book: “There is no motion of what is in a relation according to a proportion,² but there is of what is (in a relation) with respect to a potentiality; for the activity³ (of this) is a motion, and (is so) *per se*.”

¹ I.e., its actualization *qua* potential. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 3.1 201b10-13.

² E.g., as being double or half something else, rather than being related to something else as agent to patient or vice versa.

³ I.e., actualization.

153C Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 5.2 226a23-6 (CAG vol.10 p.860.19-28 and 861.19-26 Diels)

However, Theophrastus in the first (book) of his own *Physics* says that motion is considered in each kind of category, writing as follows: “Concerning motion it is not difficult to give and state the universal and general account, that it is some incomplete activity of that which is potentially, as (being potentially), in each category.” But it looks as if he is now speaking of change, in general, as motion; for the definition which says that it is the activity of what is potentially, as (being potentially), is not (the definition) of motion in the proper sense, but also of coming-to-be and passing away and in general of every change. And for this reason a little later, too, Theophrastus says, “We must consider with reference to motions whether some of them are comings-to-be, and others, as it were, activities of certain

861 γενέσεις εἰσὶν, αἱ δὲ ὡσπερ ἐνέργειαι τινες.” . . . καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀληθὲς 10
οἶμαι λέγειν, ὡς εἰ τὰ κατὰ μέρος κινούμενα μὴ ἀξιοῖ καθ’ αὐτὸ λέγειν
κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κινουμένοις αὐτὰ συντάττει,
πολλῶ μᾶλλον τὰ κατὰ σχέσιν καὶ τὰ ἄλλων κινουμένων αὐτὰ
μεταβάλλοντα οὐκ ἂν εἶποι καθ’ αὐτὰ κινεῖσθαι. περὶ δὲ τῶν καθ’ αὐτὸ 15
κινουμένων ἦν ἡ ζήτησις, ὥστε καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν πάσαις εἶναι λέγει
ταῖς κατηγορίαις τὴν κίνησιν, ἀδιορίστως εἶπεν μήπω μήτε τὴν κίνησιν
τῆς μεταβολῆς διορίσας μήτε τὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς.

10-12 cf. *Aristotelis Physica* 5.11 224a23-6

5 νῦν κίνησιν F: καὶ νῦν κίνησιν a: καὶ κίνησιν νῦν M

- 154 Thomas Aquinas, In *Aristotelis Physica*, 5.6 lectio 10 (747, p.367b18-26 Maggioli)

deinde cum dicit, “dubitabit autem quis” etc., ponit quaedam ad manifestationem praemissorum, quae tamen in exemplaribus graecis dicuntur non haberi: et Commentator etiam dicit quod in quibusdam exemplaribus arabicis non habentur; unde magis videtur esse assumpta de dictis Theophrasti vel alicuius alterius expositoris Aristotelis. 5

1-3 cf. *Simplicii comm. In Aristotelis Physica* 5.6 231a2-5 (CAG t.10 p.918.11-15), *Theophrasto non nominato* 1 *Aristoteles, Physica* 5.6 231a5

- 155A Themistius, In *Aristotelis Physica* 6.4 234b10-17 (CAG t.5.2 p.191.22-192.2 Schenkl)

πότερον δὲ ἄρα ἅπαν τὸ μεταβάλλον διαιρετὸν ἢ καὶ ἀμερὲς ἐνδέχεται, καθάπερ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ φασὶ τὴν στιγμὴν φέρεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν τῇ φορᾷ τὴν γραμμὴν, ἐπισκεπτέον. εἰ τοίνυν ἀνάγκη τὸ μεταβάλλον μήτε ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ μεταβάλλει (μεταβεβηκὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη) μήτε ἐν ἐκείνῳ, ἐξ οὗ μεταβάλλει (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὕτως ἂν μεταβάλλοι), δῆλον ὡς περιλείπεται τὸ μὲν τι αὐτοῦ ἐν τούτῳ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν θατέρῳ· οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὔτε ἐν οὐδετέρῳ δυνατόν, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἂν εἴη διαιρετὸν. 5

861 types.” . . . And I think (Aristotle) says this¹ rightly, because if he does not think it right to say that things move *per se* if their parts move, but ranks these with things that move *per accidens*, still less would he say that things move *per se* if they are changed (only) in their relation (to other things) and when other things move. But the enquiry was about things which move *per se*, so that even if Theophrastus says that there is motion in all the categories, he spoke without drawing distinctions, and without yet having distinguished either motion from change or (motion) *per se* from (motion) *per accidens*.

¹ Simplicius has been attributing to Aristotle the view that change in the category of relation, though not *per se* movement (κίνησις), is a species of change (μεταβολή); cf. *Arist., Phys.* 5.2 225b11-13 as interpreted by Simplicius, *On Arist. Phys.* 835.12-20.

- 154 Thomas Aquinas, *On Aristotle's Physics* 5.6 lectio 10 (747, p.367b18-26 Maggioli)

Next, when (Aristotle) says, “Someone might also be puzzled” etc.,¹ he makes certain points to demonstrate what has preceded; but these (points) are said not to be present in the Greek copies, and the Commentator² also says that they are not present in certain Arabic copies. From this it seems that they have rather been taken over from the remarks of Theophrastus or of some other interpreter of Aristotle.

¹ The text of Aristotle continues, “concerning rest, whether there is a rest opposed to each unnatural movement”.

² Averroes, presumably.

- 155A Themistius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 6.4 234b10-17 (CAG vol.5.2 p.191.22-192.2 Schenkl)

We must consider, then, whether everything that changes is divisible, or whether (what changes) can also be without parts, as the mathematicians say when the point travels and produces the line by its motion. Well, if it is necessary for what changes neither to be in that (state) to which it is changing — for it would have changed (already) — nor in that from which it is changing — for in that case it would not even be changing — it is clear that what is left is for part of it to be in this (state) and part in the other; for it could not be in both, nor yet in neither. So of necessity it will be divisible.

ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς κατὰ τόπον μεταβολῆς καὶ αὐτόθεν ἐναργῆς ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, γνωριμώτερον δὲ ἐπὶ ἀλλοιώσεως ἢ αὐξήσεως. ἐφ' ὧν δὲ συμβαίνει ποτὲ ἀθρόαν εἶναι τὴν μεταβολήν, πῶς ἀναγκαῖον τὸ μὲν 10 ἐν τῷ λευκῷ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ μέλανι; τοῦτο δὲ ὁ Θεόφραστος ἀπορεῖ διαρρήδην ἐν τῷ Περὶ κινήσεως πρώτῳ, καὶ τοῖς ἐξηγηταῖς ὄχλον παρέσχεν.

1 cf. Michaelis Pselli opusculum 16 (BT p.77.22-8 O'Meara), quo loco Theophrastus cum aliis philosophis nominatur; vid. comm. 10-13 Averroes, Commentarium medium in Aristotelis Physica 6.7 (versio Hebraica apud H.A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique of Aristotle, p.542), Theophrasto nominato

155B Themistius, In Aristotelis Physica 6.6 237a17-b9 (CAG t.5.2 p.197.4-8 Schenkl)

Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν οὖν οἶεται πᾶσαν μεταβολήν εἶναι ἐν χρόνῳ; Θεόφραστος δὲ ἔοικε διαποροῦντι καὶ ἴσως ὑφεωρᾶτο τὰς ἀπὸ σκοτῶτος εἰς φῶς μεταβολάς, οἷον εἰσκομισθέντος εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον λύχνου πᾶς ὁ οἶκος ἀθρόως ἀναπλησθῆ τῆς αὐγῆς καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς ἀνευ χρόνου.

1 Ἀλέξανδρος] in commentariis deperditis in Aristotelis Physica, ut videtur 1-4 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 6.6 237b9-22 (CAG t.10 p.998.13-16)

155C Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.3 186a13-16 (CAG t.9 p.107.12-16 Diels)

καὶ ὁ Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τῷ α' Περὶ κινήσεως ταῦτα περὶ τούτου δοξάζων φαίνεται. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· "ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον καὶ κενεῖσθαι τὸ κενημένον δεῖν ἀρὰ γε ἐνδέχεται λέγειν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν, ὡς οὐκ αἶε τὸ ἥμισυ πρώτον ἀλλ' 5 ἐνίοτε ἀθρόον γε;"

1 α' Usener: α' codd.: δεκάτῳ α 3 ἀρὰ Diels: ἄρα codd.

156A Themistius, In Aristotelis Physica 6.5 236b7-27 (CAG t.5.2 p.195.8-26 Schenkl)

θαυμαστὸν τοίνυν, καθάπερ φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος, καὶ λίαν παρὰ τὰς ἐννοίας, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, πέρας δὲ ἔστιν, καὶ ὅλως εἰ μὴ ἄμφω πεπερασμένα, ἀλλὰ τέλος μὲν ἔστι τοῦ βαδίζειν, ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐ, καὶ τέλος μὲν τοῦ πλεῖν, ἀρχὴ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ ἡνίκα μὲν ἐπαύσατο

In the case of change of place this is immediately clear from adducing examples; it is (even) more familiar in the case of alteration or growth. But in cases where change sometimes occurs all at once, 192 how is it necessary for part of a thing to be white, and part black? Theophrastus explicitly raises this problem in the first (book) of his *On Motion*, and caused trouble for the commentators.

155B Themistius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 6.6 237a17-b9 (CAG vol.5.2 p.197.4-8 Schenkl)

Well, Alexander thinks that all change is in time, but Theophrastus seems to be in doubt; and perhaps he was unsure about changes from darkness to light, for example when a lamp is brought into a chamber, and all the room is at once filled with brightness and light with no (interval of) time.

155C Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.3 186a13-16 (CAG vol.9 p.107.12-16 Diels)

And Theophrastus, in the first (book) of his *On Motion*, clearly holds the same opinion about this. He speaks as follows: "Concerning the necessity for what is in movement to be in movement and for what has moved to have moved, is it permissible to say, what also applies to bodies where alteration is concerned, that the half does not always precede (the whole) but sometimes (the change takes place) all at once?"

156A Themistius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 6.5 236b7-27 (CAG vol.5.2 p.195.8-21 Schenkl)

It is surprising then, as Theophrastus says, and very far from agreeing with our conceptions, if there is no beginning of motion but there is an end; and in general if it is not the case that both are limited, and there is an end of walking but no beginning, and an end of a voyage but no beginning, and if it is possible to say when the

τοῦ τρέχειν ὁ ἵππος, ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἠνίκα δὲ ἤρξατο, οὐκ ἔστιν. ἢ οὐ τοῦτο⁵
 φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν
 αὐτὴν λαβεῖν; ἀλλ' (εἰ) ἐκεῖνο, πῶς τὸ μὲν πέρας τῆς κινήσεως
 ἀδιαίρετον ἀποδείκνυσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι φησι ληπτόν, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν
 οὔτε ἀδιαίρετον οὔτε ληπτήν; καίτοι τοῖς πέρασιν ὁμοίως ἔχουσιν αἱ
 ἀρχαί. εἰ γὰρ σημείον πέρας γραμμῆς καὶ ἀρχὴ σημείου, καὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτο¹⁰
 ἀξίωμα εἶναι τὸ μὴ ταῦτόν εἶναι ἀρχὴν καὶ οὐ ἔστιν ἀρχή, ὥστ' οὐδὲ
 κίνησις ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως· εἰ δὲ μὴ κίνησις, οὐδὲ διαιρετὴ οὐδὲ ἐν
 χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ νῦν, καθάπερ τὸ πέρας. τάχα οὖν τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν τῆς
 κινήσεως δώσει ληπτήν εἶναι, καθάπερ τὸ πέρας, τὴν δὲ πρώτην κίνησιν¹⁵
 ἄληπτον, καὶ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ αὐτὴ καὶ τὸν χρόνον εἰς
 ἄπειρα διαιρεῖν δυνατόν. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς γνώριμον ποιεῖ προῖόν
 τῷ ἐπιμελῶς προσέχοντι. δῆλον δέ, ὅτι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ἡ
 ἐσχάτη κίνησις οὐκ ἂν εἴη ληπτή καὶ τὸ πέρας αὐτῆς ληπτόν τε καὶ
 ἀδιαίρετον.

1-19 Averroes, *Epitome Aristotelis Physicorum* p.105.16-106.6 Puig, ex Themistio, *Theophrasto Themistioque nominatis*

7 εἰ *addendum conii*. Schenkl

156B Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 6.5 236a7-27 (CAG t.10 p.986.3-17 Diels)

ἐν δὴ τούτοις ἄπορον δοκεῖ, πῶς πέρας μὲν εἶναι λέγεται καὶ τῆς
 κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ χρόνου, καθ' ὃ τὸ μεταβάλλον μεταβεβληκέναι
 λέγεται, ἀρχὴ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ
 κινήσεως. "θαυμαστά," φησί, "φαίνεται κατ' αὐτὴν ὄντα τὴν φύσιν (τά)
 τῆς κινήσεως, οἷον εἰ μὴ ἔστιν αὐτῆς ἀρχή, πέρας δέ ἐστι." πῶς δὲ τὸ⁵
 μὲν πέρας ἀδιαίρετον ἐλάμβανεν, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον διαιρετὴν;
 δυνατόν γὰρ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώμενον λόγοις καὶ τὸ πέρας τοῦ συνεχοῦς
 ἐπ' ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν λαβεῖν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀδιαίρετον. εἴκειν οὖν καὶ
 τὸ πέρας διττὸν εἶναι καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ διττὴ τῆς τε κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ χρόνου¹⁰
 καὶ παντὸς συνεχοῦς, τὸ μὲν ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἢ τὸ ἐσχάτον μέρος τοῦ
 συνεχοῦς, τὸ δὲ ἀρχὴ καὶ πέρας, τὰ μηκέτι μέρη μηδὲ ὅμοια τῷ ὅλῳ.
 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἠξίωται τὸ μὴ εἶναι ταῦτόν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ οὐ
 ἔστιν ἀρχὴ μηδὲ πέρας καὶ τὸ οὐ ἔστι πέρας, ὥσπερ τὸ σημείον καὶ ἀρχὴ
 καὶ πέρας ἐστὶ τῆς γραμμῆς οὐκ ὄν αὐτὸ γραμμῆ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν¹⁵
 τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ κίνημα τῆς κινήσεως· καλοῦσι γὰρ οὕτω τὸ τῆς
 κινήσεως πέρας.

4 τὰ *add.* Diels

horse stopped running but not when it started. Or is it not this that Aristotle is saying, that there is no beginning of the motion, but (only) that it cannot be apprehended? But if so, how is it that he shows that the end of the motion is indivisible, and on account of this says that it can be apprehended, but (says that) the beginning is neither indivisible nor apprehensible? And yet the beginnings are similar to the ends. For if the end of a line is a point and the beginning is a point, this too seems to be axiomatic, that the beginning is not the same as that of which it is a beginning; so that the beginning of a motion will not (itself) be a motion either. But if it is not a motion it is neither divisible nor in time, but at an instant, like the end. Perhaps then (Aristotle) will grant that the beginning of the motion can be apprehended, like the end, but that the first movement cannot be; and this is true. For it is in time, and time can be infinitely divided. And this (Aristotle) himself makes known, as he continues, to the person who pays careful attention. And it is clear that, by the same argument, the last movement could not be apprehended, but its end can be apprehended and is indivisible.

156B Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 6.5 236a7-27 (CAG vol.10 p.986.3-17 Diels)

In these matters there seems to be a problem, over how there is said to be an end both of the motion and of the time, (an end) at which the thing that is changing is said to have changed, but not to be a beginning. And indeed Theophrastus in the first (book) of his *On Motion* says: "The facts about motion seem surprising in their very nature, for example, if it has no beginning, but does have an end." Yet how is it that (Aristotle) has supposed that the end is indivisible, but the beginning is infinitely divisible? For by using the same arguments one could suppose that the end of the continuum is infinitely divisible and the beginning indivisible. So it seems that both the end and the beginning of the motion and the time and of every continuum are double, in one way as the first or last part of the continuum, but in the other (they are) the beginning and the end, which are no longer parts of the whole or even like it. For in such cases it is laid down that the beginning is not the same as that of which it is a beginning, or the end as that of which it is an end, just as the point is both beginning and end of the line, not itself being a line; and similarly the instant (is beginning and end) of a time and movement (is beginning and end) of a motion. For that is how they speak of the limit of a motion.

- 157 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 6, prooemium (CAG t.10 p.923.7-16 Diels)

εἴρηται δὲ καὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν πέντε βιβλία τὰ πρὸ τούτου Φυσικὰ καλοῦσιν, τὰ δὲ ἐντεῦθεν τρία Περὶ κινήσεως· οὕτω γὰρ καὶ Ἀνδρόνικος ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους βιβλίων διατάσσεται, μαρτυροῦντος περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ Θεοφράστου γράψαντος Εὐδήμου περὶ τινος αὐτῶ τῶν ἡμαρτημένων ἀντιγράφων κατὰ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον· “ὑπὲρ ὧν,” φησὶν, “ἐπέστειλας κελεύων με γράψαι καὶ ἀποστέλλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἥτοι ἐγὼ οὐ ξυνίημι ἢ μικρόν τι παντελῶς ἔχει τὸ ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ ὅπερ ἠρεμεῖν καλῶ τῶν ἀκινήτων μόνον· ἐναντίον γὰρ ἠρεμία κινήσει, ὥστε στέρησις ἂν εἴη τοῦ δεκτικοῦ,” ὥστε καὶ τὸ πέμπτον βιβλίον ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν ὁ Θεόφραστος νομίζει.

1-2 Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 1 prooemium (CAG t.9 p.4.14) et 5 prooemium (CAG t.10 p.801.13) 4 Eudemus, fr. 6 Wehrli 8-9 Aristoteles, Physica 5.2 226b14-16

Caelum

- 158 Iulianus, Orationes 8(5).3 162A-C (CB t.2.1 p.107.13-108.1 Rochefort)

B ἄλλ' ὀρώμεν, φησὶ Περιπατητικὸς τις ἀγγίνους ὡπερ ὁ Ξεναρχος, τούτων αἴτιον ὄν τὸ πεμπτὸν καὶ κυκλικὸν σῶμα. γελοῖος δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὑπὲρ τούτων ζητῶν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος, ἠγνόησε γοῦν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φωνήν. ὡπερ γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐλθὼν καὶ νοητὴν, ἔστη μὴ πολυπραγμονῶν τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ φῶς οὕτω ταῦτα πεφυκέναι· χρῆν δὲ δήπουθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πεμπτοῦ σώματος τὸ πεφυκέναι ταύτῃ λαμβάνοντα μηκέτι ζητεῖν τὰς αἰτίας, ἵστασθαι δὲ μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἐκπίπτειν ὄν μὲν C οὐθὲν φύσει καθ' ἑαυτό, ἔχον δὲ ἄλλως κενὴν ὑπόνοιαν. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ μέμνημαι τοῦ Ξεναρχοῦ λέγοντος ἀκηκοῶς.

6 δὲ del. Theiler, JHS 77 (1957) 128

- 157 Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 6, Introduction (CAG vol.10 p.923.7-16 Diels)

It has been stated already that they call the five books before this one *Physics*, but this and the next two *On Motion*. For this is how Andronicus too arranges them in the third of (his) volumes of Aristotle; and Theophrastus too bears witness about the first (five books). For when Eudemus wrote to him about one of the defective copies, with reference to the fifth book, he says, "Concerning the points about which you wrote, asking me to copy them out of the *Physics* and send them to you, either I do not understand (your point), or else there is very little difference indeed from 'which alone, of things that are not in movement, I describe as resting; for rest is opposite to motion, so that it will be privation in that which is capable (of movement)'. So (it is clear that) Theophrastus regards the fifth book too as part of the *Physics*."

Heavenly Region

- 158 Julian, *Speeches* 8(5).3 162A-C (CB vol.2.1 p.107.13-108.1 Rochefort)

B But some shrewd Peripatetic like Xenarchus says: we see that the cause of these things (i.e., of the coming together of form and matter) is the fifth bodily substance that moves in a circle (the heavenly *aithêr*). It was ridiculous for Aristotle, too, to enquire into these matters and investigate them closely, and similarly too for Theophrastus (to do so). At any rate, (Theophrastus) did not take into account what he himself had said. For just as, when he came to incorporeal and intelligible substance he came to a stop and did not investigate its cause, but said that this was how these things were by nature; (similarly) in the case of the fifth bodily substance too he should surely have assumed that it is so by nature, and not have enquired further into its causes, but have come to a stop with them C and not strayed towards the intelligible, which is nothing by nature in its own right, and is besides a matter of empty supposition. — For I remember hearing that Xenarchus says things like these.

- 159 Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 35A (BT t.2 p.120.8-22, 120.29-121.7, 121.21-122.1 et 122.10-17 Diehl)

καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τινες ἐπέπληξαν τῷ Πλάτῳ λέγοντες ὡς “οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀρχὴν ἀρχῆς ἐπιζητεῖ καὶ γένεσιν ἀγενήτου πράγματος· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν πρώτων τὰ αἰτία ζητήσομεν καὶ τῶν ἀθύποστατων γενέσεις ἐπινοήσομεν, εἰς ἀπειρον προϊόντες λησόμεθα καὶ τέλος οὐδὲν ἔχον τῆς θεωρίας· ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ πάντα ἀποδεικτὰ νενομικῶς αὐτὴν μάλιστα τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρεῖ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον καὶ ὁ πάντων αἰτίας ἐπιζητῶν ἄρδην ἀνατρέπει τὰ ὄντα πάντα καὶ τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν τὴν ἀπὸ τινος ὀρισμένης ἀρχῆς προϊούσαν.” τοιαῦτα μὲν ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐπιτιμᾷ τῷ Πλάτῳ περὶ τῆσδε τῆς ψυχογονίας, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τῶν φυσικῶν πάντων λέγων δεῖν ἡμᾶς ἐπιζητεῖν τὸ διὰ τί· γελοῖον γὰρ φησὶν ἀπορεῖν, διὰ τί καίει τὸ πῦρ καὶ διὰ τί ψύχει ἡ χιών. . . .

ἡδέως δ' ἂν ἐροίμεθα τὸν Θεόφραστον πρότερον αὐτόν, πότερον οὐδενὸς αἰτίαν ἀποδοτέον ἢ τινος· εἰ γὰρ μηδενός, πρὸς τῷ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀναιρεῖν, τὴν μάλιστα τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζουσαν, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ κατηγορήσει ζητούντος, πόθεν μὲν αἰ βρονταί, πόθεν δὲ ἄνεμοι, ποῖαι δὲ αἰτίαι κεραυνῶν, ἀστραπῶν, πρηστήρων, ὑετῶν, χιόνος, χαλάζης, ἃ δὴ καλῶς ποιῶν ἐν τῇ τῶν μετεώρων αἰτιολογίᾳ τῆς πρέπουσης εἰκοτολογίας καὶ αὐτὸς ἤξιασεν. . . .

ἰδίᾳ δὲ ἑκατέρους ἐρωτήσαντες πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἀμφοτέρων ἀπορήσομεν, διὰ ποῖαν αἰτίαν ὁ μὲν Πλάτων καὶ ψυχῆς γένεσιν πλάττει καὶ τὴν ἀπ' αἰτίας πάροδον, ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος διαγράφει πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην διδασκαλίαν· καὶ ἀποφήσαντες ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι Θεοφράστῳ μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ Περιπάτου πᾶσι μέχρι τῶν κινητικῶν τοῦ πάντος εἰδῶν ἢ τῆς θεωρίας ἀνοδος γέγονεν, εἴτε ψυχᾶς ταῦτα δεῖ καλεῖν εἴτε νόας, τῷ δὲ Πλάτῳ ταῦτα μὲν, ὡς μεθεκτά, τοῦ τὴν πρώτην ἔχει ἐν τοῖς οὐσίᾳ ἀξίαν παρηρημένα πολλοστήν ἔχει τάξιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν, . . .

τοῦτων τοίνυν οὕτω παρ' ἀμφοτέροις δεδομένων ὁ μὲν Θεόφραστος εἰκότως ἀρχὴν κινήσεως τὴν ψυχὴν εἰπὼν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πρὸ αὐτῆς ὑποθέμενος, ἀρχῆς οὐκ οἶεται δεῖν ἀρχὴν ἐπιζητεῖν· ἔμψυχον γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι δίδωσι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θεῖον· εἰ γὰρ θεῖός ἐστί,

- 159 Proclus, On Plato's Timaeus 35A (BT vol.2 p.120.8-22, 120.29-121.7, 121.21-122.1 and 122.10-17 Diehl)

And some of the early philosophers criticized Plato, saying “He is not right to search for the principle of what is (itself) a principle, or for the origin of a thing that has no origin. For if we look for the explanations of things that are primary and conceive of the origins of things that exist *per se*, without realizing it we will go on for ever and have no end to our speculation. For just as the person who thinks that everything can be demonstrated does away above all with demonstration itself, in the same way the person who looks for explanations of everything turns completely upside down all the things there are, and their order which proceeds from a certain definite first principle.” Such are Theophrastus' criticisms of Plato concerning this account of the creation of the soul: he says that we should not enquire into the reason “why” in the case of all natural things either. For it is absurd, he says, to be puzzled as to why fire burns and why snow chills. . . .

We would gladly first ask Theophrastus himself, whether we should give the explanation of nothing (at all), or of something. For if of nothing (at all), (then) in addition to doing away with knowledge, which above all is acquaintance with explanations, he will also be accusing himself, since he enquires what is the origin of thunder and of winds, what are the explanations of thunderbolts, lightnings, fiery hurricanes, rain, snow, hail; for he too himself was quite right to think all these things deserving of a probable account in his explanations of things in the sky. . . .

And having questioned each party¹ separately, we shall ask ourselves on behalf of both of them, why Plato on the one hand constructs an account of the origin of the soul and its progression from its cause, and why Theophrastus on the other strikes out all such teaching; and having asked (this) we shall say, that for Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics their speculation ascends as far as the forms that move the whole, whether these should be called souls or minds, but for Plato these, being participated in, are deprived of having the primary worth among the things that are and have a rank many times removed from the first principles, . . .

These then being the opinions of them both, it is reasonable for Theophrastus to say that the soul is the source of movement without postulating anything else before it, and to think that there is no need to search for the principle of what is (itself) a principle. For he too grants that the heavens are animate and for this reason divine. If it is

φῆσι, καὶ τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχει διαγωγὴν, ἔμψυχός ἐστιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τίμιον ἄνευ ψυχῆς, ὡς ἐν τῷ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ γέγραφεν.

2-8 cf. *Theophrasti Metaphysica* 26 9b16-24 15-18 *Theophrastus, Meteorologica*; cf. *infra* 186-194 30-1 cf. *Aristotelis Metaph.* 12 (A).7 1072b14-15
31-2 *Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum* 40B-C (t.3 p.136.1-2 Diehl) et *Theol. Plat.*
1.14 (t.1 p.64.17-18 Saffrey-Westerink), *Theophrasto utrobique nominato* →

160 Pico della Mirandola, *Conclusiones* (p.38.24-39.4 Kieszkowski)

Conclusiones secundum Theophrastum numero IV

- 1 si celum inanimatum esset, esset quocumque animato corpore ignobilius, quod dicere impium est in philosophia.
- 2 quidditas est sola forma.
- 3 ita se habet intellectus agens ad producenda intelligibilia in possibilem intellectum, sicut se habet forma artis ad producendas formas in materiam artis.
- 4 deus movet celum ut finis.

5-7 cf. 308A

5 intelligibilia] intelligibilis *ed. Kieszkowski (error typographicus, ut videtur)*

vid. 255

161A Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum* 13.15 (BT p.520.4-521.6 Rabe)

Ταύρου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνημάτων προκειμένης τῆς παρ' ἡμῶν προεκτεθείσης τοῦ Πλάτωνος περικοπῆς "σωματοειδὲς δὴ καὶ ὁρατὸν ἄπτὸν τε τὸ γενόμενον" καὶ τῶν ἐξῆς.

"ὁ δημιουργὸς ἤρχετο τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ κόσμου ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς, δεῖ δὲ τὸ γενησόμενον σωματοειδὲς ἀντιτυπητικὸν εἶναι καὶ ὁρατὸν. τὸ μὲν εἶναι ὁρατὸν ἐκ τοῦ πυρὸς αὐτῷ γίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἄπτὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ στοιχεῖον αἴσθησις, κατὰ τὸ πῦρ ἡ ὄρασις (ὁρατὸν ὄρασις, ὁρατὸν δὲ χρῶμα), κατὰ τὴν γῆν ἡ ἀφή (ἄπτου ἀφή), κατὰ τὸ ὕδωρ ἡ γεῦσις (γευστοῦ γεῦσις), κατὰ τὸν ἀέρα ἡ ἀκοή (ἀκουστοῦ ἀκοή). τί οὖν; τῇ ὁσφρήσει ποῖον ἀπονεμοῦμεν στοιχεῖον; ἀναμέσον τοῦ ὕδατος

divine, he says, and has the best mode of existence, it is animate; for nothing that is honorable is without soul, as he wrote in his *On Heaven*.

¹ Theophrastus on the one hand, and the partisans of Plato on the other.

4 ἔχοντες *coni. Usener* 17 αἰτιολογία *coni. Schneider*: ἀπολογία *PQ: om. Thomaei versio latina* 28 οὐδὲν *PQ: οὐδὲ γ: καὶ οὐδὲν coni. Kroll*: neque ... quippiam *Thomaeus* 31 *post τίμιον add. τῶν σωμάτων Proclus, Theol. Plat.*

160 Pico della Mirandola, *Conclusions* (p.38.24-39.4 Kieszkowski)

Conclusions according to Theophrastus, four in number:

- 1 If the heavens were inanimate, they would be more ignoble than any animate body whatsoever, and to say that is impious in philosophy.
- 2 Quiddity is form alone.
- 3 The agent intellect is related to the producing of intelligibles in the possible intellect as the form of a craft is to producing forms in the material of the craft.
- 4 God moves the heavens as a final cause.

see 255

161A Philoponus, *Against Proclus, on the Eternity of the Universe* 13.15 (BT p.520.4-521.6 Rabe)

From Taurus the Platonist, from the first (book) of his *Commentary on the Timaeus*, with reference to the passage (from the *Timaeus*) of Plato which we have already quoted, "what has come to be is corporeal, visible and tangible" and the rest.

"The Craftsman took fire and earth as his starting-points in the construction of the universe; it is necessary, for what is to become corporeal, to offer resistance to the touch and to be visible. It has its visibility from the fire and its tangibility from the earth. For there is sensation with reference to each element; sight with reference to fire — sight is of what is visible, and what is visible is color —, touch with reference to earth — touch is of what is tangible —, taste with reference to water — taste is of what can be tasted —, and hearing with reference to air — hearing is of what can be heard. Well then, what element shall we assign to the sense of smell? One intermediate

καὶ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὡς κατὰ τὸν τόπον γενόμενοι ἐροῦμεν. Θεόφραστός φησιν
'εἰ τὸ ὄρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀπτὸν ἐκ γῆς καὶ πυρός ἐστιν, τὰ ἄστρα καὶ ὁ
οὐρανὸς ἔσται ἐκ τούτων· οὐκ ἔστιν δέ.' ταῦτα λέγει εἰσάγων τὸ πέμπτον
σῶμα τὸ κυκλοφορητικόν. ὅταν οὖν ἐκεῖνο παραστήσῃ, ὅτι ἔστιν, τότε
πρὸς ταῦτα ἐνιστάσθω."

σκοπεῖν ἄξιον, πῶς οὐ μόνον ἀληθὲς οἶεται Πλάτωνα ἐκ τῶν
τεσσάρων μόνων στοιχείων συγκείσθαι τὸν κόσμον λέγειν ὁ τούτου
521 ἐξηγητῆς Ταῦρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ Θεοφράστῳ μάχεται λέγοντι μὴ εἶναι ἐκ
τούτων τὸν οὐρανόν (τῆς γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλους διατριβῆς ὁ Θεόφραστος),
καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ οἶεται ὁ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητῆς τὸ πέμπτον ἀποδειχθῆαι
στοιχείον, ὅτι ἔστιν, ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους· "ὅταν" γὰρ "ἐκεῖνο παρ-
αστήσῃ," φησίν, "ὅτι ἔστιν, τότε πρὸς ταῦτα ἐνιστάσθω."

3 *Plato, Timaeus 31B*

3 δὲ δὴ *Plato* τε δεῖ τὸ *Plato* 11 *fort.* στοιχείον; (τὴν ἀτμίδα, ἦτις)
ἀνάμεσον (cf. p.521.6-7) *Rabe*

161B Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 31B (BT t.2 p.6.1-28 Diehl)

νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν, ὡς ἐπεὶ διαστατὸς ἐστὶν ὁ κόσμος καὶ αἰσθήσει
ληπτὸς, διὰ τε ὀράσεως γνωρίζεται καὶ ἀφῆς, ὡς μὲν ὅλος δι' ὅλου φωτὸς
πεπληρωμένος ὀρατὸς ὢν, ὡς δὲ στερεὸς ἀπτὸς ὑπάρχων. ἐξαρκεῖ γὰρ
αὐτῷ διὰ τῶνδε τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ περιλαβεῖν. καὶ ἔστιν
ὡς ἐν τοῖς τέτρασι στοιχείοις ἀεὶ οὖσιν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ νοουμένοις ἐναντία
ταῦτα, τὸ ὄρατὸν καὶ (τὸ) ἀπτόν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὡς πλείστον ἀφροστώτα καὶ
ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος ἐναντία· καὶ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ ἄμφω, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτῶν
τὸ κοινὸν γένος, καὶ πλείστον ἀφροστέθηκεν, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν ἀμέσως αἰσθητόν,
τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἀμέσως, εἰ δὲ ζητοῦμεν τὰ ὡς ἐν μεταβλητοῖς ἐναντία τῶν
στοιχείων, οὐ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐροῦμεν.
10 μάλιστα γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ σβέννυσι τὸ πῦρ. καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάτερος τῶν λόγων
ἀληθής. κοινὸν δὲ ἀμφοῖν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις τιθέναι τὴν ἐναντίωσιν,
καὶ ταύτη συμφωνοῦσιν αἱ αἰρέσεις, ὡς μὲν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τῷ πυρὶ τῆς
γῆς ἐναντίας οὖσης, ὡς δὲ ἐν τοῖς μεταβλητοῖς τῷ πυρὶ τοῦ ὕδατος. διὸ
καὶ αὐτὸς τῷ ἀπτῷ τὸ ὄρατὸν ἀντέθηκεν, ἢ αἰσθητὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα
15

between water and air,¹ as we will say when we reach the relevant
context.² Theophrastus says, 'If what is visible and tangible is com-
posed of earth and fire, the heavenly bodies and the heaven will be
composed of these; but they are not.' This he says introducing the
fifth bodily substance that moves in a circle. Well, when he proves
that this exists, then let him raise objections to these (views of
Plato's)."

It is worthy of note how Taurus, the commentator on Plato, not
only thinks that Plato is right when he says that the universe is
composed of four elements only, but also opposes Theophrastus
521 when he says that the heaven is not composed of these — for Theo-
phrastus belongs to the school of Aristotle; and (it is worthy of note)
that the commentator on Plato does not think that Aristotle demon-
strated the existence of the fifth bodily substance. For he says, "When
he proves that this exists, then let him raise objections to these
(views)."

¹ Vapor (ἀτμίς) according to Philoponus' subsequent remarks.

² Presumably in Taurus' commentary on *Timaeus* 66D-E.

161B Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 31B (BT vol.2 p.6.1-28 Diehl)

Now let us say that since the universe is spatially extended and
can be apprehended by sensation, it is known by sight and by touch;
it is visible because it is entirely filled with light, and it is tangible
because it is solid. For it is sufficient for it that, through these (two)
senses, it includes within itself all the objects of sense. There is a way
in which, among the four elements which are apprehended as al-
ways being present in the universe, the visible and the tangible are
contraries; for these (are) removed (from one another) as far as pos-
sible and (are) opposites falling under the same genus¹. Both can be
apprehended by sensation, this being their common genus; and they
are furthest removed (from one another), since one can be perceived
without an intermediary and the other cannot. If we were looking for
contraries among the elements as things subject to change, we would
not say fire and earth, but fire and water; for it is water most of all
that quenches fire. Both of these accounts are true; it is common to
both of them that they locate the contrariety in the extremes, and in
this respect the (two) selections are in agreement; if (the elements)
are considered as apprehended by sensation earth is contrary to fire,
but if they are considered as subject to change water is contrary to
fire. And it is for this reason that (Plato) himself contrasted the vis-

λαμβάνων, ὡς ἂν μήπω τὴν μεταβολὴν αὐτῶν ἐπισκοπῶν, καθ' ἣν
 μᾶλλον ἠναντιῶται τῷ πυρὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τῆς γῆς, καὶ οὐκ ὡς οἴεται
 Θεόφραστος, ἀτελής ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος, ἀπορεῖ γὰρ οὕτως· τί δὴ ποτε πυρὸς
 μὲν ἴδιον εἶπε τὸ ὄρατόν καὶ γῆς τὸ ἀπτόν, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν στοιχείων
 οὐδέν; λέγομεν δὴ οὖν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς ὀρώμεν τὸν κόσμον ²⁰
 καὶ ἀπτόμεθα αὐτοῦ, γευόμεθα δὲ ἢ ἀκούομεν αὐτοῦ ἢ ὄσφραϊνόμεθα
 οὐκέτι, καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος ἑαυτῷ καὶ ὄρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπτός.

5 οὐσιν] εἶναι (fort.) Diehl 6 τὸ add. Diels 7 post γένος add. ὄντα Diehl
 15 ἢ del. Diels

162 Epiphanius, *De fide* 9.35-9 (GCS t.3 p.508.4-15 Holl et Dummer)

Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ Νικομάχου, κατὰ μὲν τινὰς Μακεδῶν ἀπὸ
 Σταγείρων, ὡς δὲ ἐνιοὶ Θρᾶξ ἦν τὸ γένος. ἔλεγε δὲ δύο ἀρχὰς εἶναι,
 θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπεράνω τῆς σελήνης θείας προνοίας
 τυγχάνειν, τὰ δὲ κάτωθεν τῆς σελήνης ἀπρονοήτα ὑπάρχειν καὶ φορᾶ
 τινὶ ἀλόγῳ φέρεσθαι ὡς ἔτυχεν. εἶναι δὲ λέγει δύο κόσμους, τὸν ἄνω ⁵
 καὶ τὸν κάτω, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἄνω ἀφθαρτον, τὸν δὲ κάτω φθαρτόν. καὶ
 τὴν ψυχὴν ἐνδελέχειαν σώματος λέγει.

- 36 Θεόφραστος Ἐρέσιος τὰ αὐτὰ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐδόξασε.
 37 Στράτων [ῶν] ἐκ Λαμψάκου τὴν θερμὴν οὐσίαν ἔλεγεν αἰτίαν
 πάντων ὑπάρχειν. ἄπειρα δὲ ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου, καὶ πᾶν ¹⁰
 ζῶον ἔλεγε νοῦ δεκτικὸν εἶναι.
 38 Πραξιφάνης Ῥόδιος τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Θεοφράστῳ ἐδόξασε.
 39 Κριτόλαος ὁ Φασηλίτης τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει ἐδόξασε.

1-13 *hunc ordinem philosophorum (nullis doctrinis memoratis) exhibet P.Duk. inv.G 178 col.2 v.18-22 (Willis, ICS 3 [1978] 146, cf. 148) 1-7 et 13 Critolaus, fr. 15 Wehrli 3-6 Aëtius, Placita 2.3.4 (DG p.330a5-12 et b8-15); Diogenes Laërtius 5.32; Atticus ap. Eusebium, Praep. ev. 15.5.9 et 14 (GCS t.8.2 p.357.22-3 et 358.19-359.1; Atticus fr. 3.69-71 et 97-100 des Places), ex quo Eusebium, Praep. ev. 15.15.1 (GCS t.8.2 p.355.15-16); Tatianus, Adv. Graecos 2 (p.23.4-8 Schwartz); Athenagoras, Pro Christianis 25 (p.33.25-6 Schwartz); Hippolytus, Refut. 7.19.2 (p.284.5-10 Marcovich); Clemens Alexandrinus, Protrepticus 5.66.4 (GCS t.1 p.51.2-3) et Strom. 5.14 90.3 (GCS t.2 p.385.19-21), ex quo Eusebium, Praep. ev. 13.13.4 (GCS t.8.2 p.199.4-6); Calcidius, In Platonis Timaeum 250 (p.260.7-8 Waszink); Theodoretus, Graec. affect. cur. 5.47 (p.136.22-4 Raeder) et 6.7 (p.151.9-13 Raeder) 6-7 Cicero, Tusc. disp. 1.22; Iamblichus ap. Stobaeum 1.49.32 (t.1 p.367.1-2 Wachsmuth) = 269 9-11 Strato, fr. 48 Wehrli 12 Praxiphanes, fr. 2 Wehrli*

ible and the tangible, considering the elements as apprehended by sensation, and not yet considering change among them, with regard to which water is more contrary to fire than earth is. And the argument is not incomplete, as Theophrastus thinks. For he raises the following difficulty: why did (Plato) speak of being visible as proper to fire and being tangible (as proper) to earth, but not (say) anything about the other elements? Well, we say to him that we see the universe and touch it, but we do not also taste or hear or smell it; and the universe too can both see and touch itself.

¹ Proclus is alluding to Aristotle's definition of contraries, *Categories* 6 6a18.

162 Epiphanius, *On Faith* 9.35-9 (GCS vol.3 p.508.4-15 Holl et Dummer)

Aristotle, son of Nicomachus, was a Macedonian from Stagira according to some, but a Thracian in race according to others. He said that there are two principles, god and matter, and that the things above the moon are objects of divine providence, but the things below the moon exist without providence and are borne along in some irrational motion as chance has it. He says that there are two world-orders, that above and that below, and that that (which is) above is imperishable, but that (which is) below is subject to passing-away. And he says that the soul is the continuous activity of the body.

- 36 Theophrastus of Eresus held the same opinions as Aristotle.
 37 Strato of Lampsacus said that the hot substance was the cause of all things. He said that the parts of the world are infinite¹ and that every living creature is capable of possessing intellect.
 38 Praxiphanes of Rhodes held the same opinions as Theophrastus.
 39 Critolaus of Phaselus held the same opinions as Aristotle.

¹ I.e., matter is infinitely divisible.

7 ἐνδελέχειαν] ἐντελέχειαν coni. Wehrli 8 Ἐρέσιος] Ἴων P.Duk. inv. G 178
 9 Στράτων [ῶν] Diels: Στρατωνίων J 11 ἔλεγε νοῦ Zeller: ἔλεγεν οὐ J: vim
 opinandi habere Cornarius

- 163 Šiwān al-ḥikma, cap. de Theophrasto, dictum no. 5 (vid. fontes in apparatu)

وكان يقول إن السماء فيها مسكن جميع الكواكب فأما الأرض ففيها مسكن
جميع الناس لأنهم شبهة ومثل لهم هم الآباء وهم مدبرونا - وذلك أن لها أنفساً
وعقلاً مميزة وليس لها أنفس نباتية لأنها لا تقبل الزيادة والنقصان

fontes: *Muntaḥab Šiwān al-ḥikma* p.177.12-15 *Badawī* (codd. ACD); v.1186-88 *Dunlop* (codd. ABCD); f.30^v v.14-16 *cod. Constant. Murad Molla 1408 (A)*

1-3 *aliter ap. aš-Šahrastānī, Milal* (p.337.18-20 *Cureton*), a quo *doctrinae causa mutatum*; *vid. Gutas, RUSCH t.2* (1985) p.86-7 *notam b*

1 *فأما A, ed. Dunlop*; *وأما ed. Badawī* 2 *هم الآباء A, ed. Dunlop*; *هم الآباء bis C: فهم الآباء ed. Badawī* 3 *لا C: om. ABD*

- 164 Apuleius, De mundo, prooemium (BT p.137.1-5 Thomas)

nos Aristotelem prudentissimum et doctissimum philosophorum et Theophrastum auctorem secuti, quantum pssumus cogitatione contingere, dicemus de omni hac caelesti ratione naturasque et officia complexi et cur et quemadmodum moveantur explicabimus.

- 165A [Alexander], In Aristotelis Metaphysica 12(Λ).8 1073b17-1074a14 (CAG t.1 p.703.17-23 Hayduck)

καὶ οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ ἡλίου πρώτην σφαῖραν ἀπλανῆ ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τοῦ Κρόνου καὶ τὴν τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τὰς ἐκάστου τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων πρώτας καὶ μείζονας ἀπλανεῖς ἔλεγεν, ὡς εἶναι μίαν μὲν ἀπλανῆ τὴν πρώτην, ἐν ἣ τὸ χῆμα τῶν τὰ ζῳδία ἀναπληρούντων ἀστέρων εἰσιν, ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν τοῦ Κρόνου, καὶ ἄλλην τὴν τοῦ Διὸς, καὶ ἐφεξῆς ἄς "ἀνάστρους" Θεόφραστος ἔλεγεν.

3 μὲν L: καὶ A 4 χῆμα A: σχῆμα L 6 ἀνάστρους LM: ἀνάστρα A

- 165B Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 2.12 293a4-14 (CAG t.7 p.491.17-28 Heiberg)

λέγει οὖν, ὅτι ἡ σφαῖρα ἢ τὸ ἐν ἄστρον ἔχουσα τὸ "πλανᾶσθαι" λεγόμενον ἐν πολλαῖς σφαῖραις ταῖς "ἀνελιττούσαις" καλουμέναις ἢ,

- 163 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 5 (see the sources in the apparatus)

He (Theophrastus) used to say: Heaven is the abode of all stars; as for earth, it is the abode of all humans, because the latter are the image and likeness of the former: they (the stars) are the parents and our managers. — That is to say, they (the stars) have rational souls and intellects but no vegetative souls, because they are not subject to growth and diminution.¹

¹ The parenthetic final sentence appears to have been added by a commentator in Arabic. The word translated as "rational" literally means "discriminating", *mumayyiza*.

- 164 Apuleius, *On the Universe*, Introduction (BT p.137.1-5 Thomas)

Following Aristotle, the wisest and most learned of philosophers, and Theophrastus as an authority, we will say as much as we can apprehend by thought concerning the whole of this heavenly system, including the natures and functions (of each part), and we will explain why and how (the parts) are moved.

- 165A pseudo-Alexander, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 12(Λ).8 1073b17-1074a14 (CAG vol.1 p.703.17-23 Hayduck)

And (Aristotle) not only said that the first sphere of the Sun does not wander,¹ but he also said that (the first sphere) of Saturn, and that of Jupiter, and the first and greatest spheres of each of the other planets do not wander. Thus one sphere that does not wander is the first one, in which is located the mass of stars that make up the Zodiac, the second is (the first sphere) of Saturn, and another (the first sphere) of Jupiter, and then in succession those which Theophrastus called "starless".

¹ I.e., it has a simple daily rotation from East to West, corresponding to that of the sphere of the "fixed" stars (the *primum mobile*).

- 165B Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 2.12 293a4-14 (CAG vol.7 p.491.17-28 Heiberg)

So (Aristotle) says that the sphere which holds the single heavenly body which is said to "wander" is carried round and held

ὡς Θεόφραστος αὐτὰς καλεῖ, ταῖς "ἀνάστρους" ἐνδεδεμένη φέρεται
τελευταία οὐσα τῆς ὅλης αὐτῶν συντάξεως, οἷον τῶν τὸν Κρόνον ἢ τὸν
Δία ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ κινουσῶν· καὶ ἐκάστη μέντοι τούτων τῶν 5
σφαιρῶν τῇ τε ἄστρον ἐχούσῃ καὶ ταῖς ταύτην περιεχούσαις ἴδιόν ἐστι
κατὰ φύσιν ἀπλή κίνησις, ἢ δὲ ποικιλία καὶ ἀνωμαλία τοῦ ἀστέρος
προποδίζειν τε καὶ ὑποποδίζειν δοκοῦντος καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ
ἀφαιρεῖν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ στηρίζειν ἕξωθεν πρόσκειται· ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν 10
ἀνελιττουσῶν γίνεται κινουμένης μὲν ἐκάστης αὐτῶν, ὡς εἴρηται, κατὰ
τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἰδίαν κίνησιν, κινουμένης δὲ τὴν τὸ ἄστρον ἔχουσαν ἄλλως
ἄλλως κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς οἰκείαν κίνησιν.

6 ἴδιόν A: ἴδιός D et (in ras.) E²

165C Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 2.12 293a4-14 (CAG t.7 p.493.17-20 Heiberg)

διὰ τοῦτο οὖν ἐν τρισὶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι ἔλεγον σφαίραις, ἃς ὁ
Θεόφραστος "ἀνάστρους" ἐκάλεῖ ὡς μηδὲν ἐχούσας ἄστρον καὶ
ἀνταναφερούσας μὲν πρὸς τὰς κατωτέρω, ἀνελιττουσῶν δὲ πρὸς τὰς
ἀνωτέρω.

3 τὰς (pr.) A: τὰ DEFc τὰς (alt.) AD: τὰ EFc

165D Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 2.12 293a4-14 (CAG t.7 p.504.4-15 Heiberg)

προστίθησι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὁ Σωσιγένης δῆλον εἶναι λέγων ἐκ τῶν
εἰρημένων, ὅτι κατ' ἄλλο μὲν "ἀνελιττουσῶν" αὐτὰς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης
προσαγορεύει, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ Θεόφραστος "ἀνταναφερούσας"· ἔστι γὰρ
ἄμφω περὶ αὐτὰς· ἀνελιττουσι γὰρ τὰς τῶν ὑπεράνω κινήσεις καὶ
ἀνταναφέρουσι τοὺς τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοὺς σφαιρῶν πόλους, τὰς μὲν ἀφαι- 5
ροῦσαι, τὰς δὲ εἰς τὸ δέον καθιστῶσαι. δεῖ γὰρ τὰς μὲν ἄνωθεν κινήσεις
μὴ διικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς τῶν κατωτέρων διαφορὰς ἄστρον, τοὺς δὲ τῶν
ὑποκάτω πόλους ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν κάθετον τοῖς τῶν ὁμοίων σφαιρῶν
πίπτειν πόλοις, ὅπως εἰς ταῦτον εἶεν ἀποκαθεστηκυῖαι τῇ θέσει,
καθόπερ φησὶν, αἱ πρῶται σφαῖραι τῶν ὑποκάτω τεταγμένων ἄστρον 10

within a number of spheres, those which are called "counteracting"
or, as Theophrastus calls them, "starless", (itself) being the last of the
whole system of them — for example, of those which move Saturn or
Jupiter or one of the other (planets). And each of these spheres, both
that which holds the heavenly body and those which surround this,
has its own individual and simple natural motion. The complexity
and unevenness of (the motion of) the heavenly body which seems to
move forward and to retrace its path, and to be in advance or to be
retarded in its position, and to stand still, is added from outside. For
it is brought about by the counteracting spheres, each of them being
moved, as has been said, according to its own motion, but each mov-
ing the sphere that holds the heavenly body in a different way in
accordance with its own proper motion.

165C Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 2.12 293a4-14 (CAG vol.7 p.493.17-20 Heiberg)

So for this reason they¹ said that (the Sun) is carried round in
three spheres, which Theophrastus called "starless" as having no
heavenly body and, with regard to those below, carrying (them)
round in the opposite direction, but with regard to those above,
counteracting (them).

¹ Eudoxus (F124 Lasserre) and predecessors.

165D Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 2.12 293a4-14 (CAG vol.7 p.504.4-15 Heiberg)

Sosigenes adds the following too, saying that it is clear from
what has been said, that it is in one respect that Aristotle calls them
"counteracting" (spheres), in another that Theophrastus calls them
"carrying round in the opposite direction". For both apply to them.
They counteract the motions of the (spheres) above them, and they
carry round in the opposite direction the poles of the spheres be-
neath them, removing the former (motions), and making the latter
move as they should. For it is necessary that the motions of the
higher spheres should not extend to the diverse (motions) of the
lower heavenly bodies, and that the poles of the lower spheres
should fall on the same perpendicular as those of the similar spheres,
so that the first spheres of the heavenly bodies which are lower in the
order may be restored to the same position, as (Aristotle) says, and,

καὶ δηλονότι διὰ τὰς πρώτας καὶ αἱ μετ' αὐτάς· οὕτως γὰρ μόνως, φησὶν, ἐνδέχεται τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν φορὰν ἅπαντα ποιεῖσθαι, καθάπερ ἦδη ἔφαμεν, εὖ λέγων.

7 διαφορὰς AF: lationes b: φορὰς c
ἅπαντα b: ἅπαντες A: ἅπαντας Fc

12 φορὰν Fb: σφαιρῶν A

- 166 Macrobius, In Ciceronis Somnium Scipionis 1.15.4 (BT p.61.17-20 Willis)

Theophrastus lacteum dixit esse compagem qua de duobus haemisphaeriis caeli sphaera solidata est, et ideo ubi orae utrimque convenerant notabilem claritatem videri.

1-3 *citat haec ex Macrobio Remigius Autissiodorensis, In Martianum Capellam 2 p.77.15 Dick (p.205.28-206.1 Lutz); cf. etiam (Theophrasto non nominato) Philonis Judaei librum De providentia 2.89 (p.101 Aucher); Achilles Isagogen in Arati Phaenomena 24 (Comm. in Aratum rell. p.55.17-18 Maass); [Bedae] librum De mundi celestis terrestisque constitutione 370 (p.50.9-11 Burnett, ed. a. 1985); fort. etiam Manilii Astronomica 1.723-8*

- 167 Lumen animae B, caput 7, De beata Virgine, Ob (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

ait enim Plato in Phedrone galaxiam nil aliud fore quam congregationem partium ignis in etherea regione. Theophrastus vero aliter opinatus est; dicit enim quod galaxia sit aliqua pars aeris accensa apparens in sibi supposita regione.

1-2 *haec apud Platonem non reperiuntur* 3-4 *cf. auctores apud Aristotelem, Meteor. 1.8 345b10 (de lumine solis reflecto)*

2 Theophrastus ed. 2: The(us) per compendium ed. 1

- 168 Lumen animae B, caput 39, De culpa, G (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

aiebant enim physici quendam vaporem subtilissimum occupare ipsos caelos; quam quidem vaporem antiqui aquae habere speciem autumabant, ut refert Theophrastus libro Commentatorum.

vid. 139 v.3-14

clearly, on account of the first (spheres) those after them too. For only thus, (Aristotle) rightly says, is it possible for them all to move with the motion of the fixed stars, as we have already said.

- 166 Macrobius, On Cicero's Dream of Scipio 1.15.4 (BT p.61.17-20 Willis)

Theophrastus said that the Milky Way is the junction, by which the heavenly sphere is fastened together from two hemispheres, and that for this reason, where the edges have come together from each side, a striking brightness is apparent.

1 *post lacteum habet circulum Remigius compaginem Remigius qual*
quae Remigii codd. IIGC 2 sphaera om. Remigii cod. C post orae
habet id est fines Remigius

- 167 Light of the Soul B, chapter 7, On the Blessed Virgin, Ob (ed. 1477² Farinator)

For Plato in the *Phaedro* (sic) says that the Milky Way is nothing other than a collection of particles of fire in the region of the aether. Theophrastus however thought otherwise; for he says that the Milky Way is a certain part of the air, which is on fire, appearing (sc. by reflection) in the region opposite to it.

- 168 Light of the Soul B, chapter 39, On Guilt, G (ed. 1477² Farinator)

For the natural philosophers said that a certain very fine vapor filled the heavens themselves; and the ancients asserted that this vapor had the form¹ of water, as Theophrastus relates in his book of *Commentaries*.

¹ Or "appearance".

see 139 l.3-14

Regio sublunaris: elementa et principia

- 169 Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 1, prooemium (CAG t.7 p.1.8-10 Heiberg)

καὶ τὸν Θεόφραστον δὲ μαρτύρεται ἐν τῷ Περὶ οὐρανοῦ μὴ περὶ τοῦ θείου σώματος λέγοντα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν γενέσει καὶ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀρχῶν.

- 170 Lumen animae B, caput 74, De superbia, A (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

terra non cadit sed stat quia a caelo sustentatur, ut ait Theophrastus.

- 171 Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 4.3 310b8-15 (CAG t.7 p.700.3-8 Heiberg)

ἄλλος δὲ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἐστὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ εἰδικὰ καὶ ὑλικά τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων διαιρέσεως καὶ ἄλλος ἐκεῖνος, καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν βαρέα καὶ ψυχρά ὑλῆς λόγον ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ κοῦφα καὶ θερμὰ εἶδους, αὐτὸς τε Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν ἄλλοις λέγει καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς τῶν στοιχείων γενέσεως, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ὁ Στωικὸς παρὰ τούτων λαβῶν πανταχοῦ χρῆται.

3-4 cf. Aristotelis librum De caelo 4.4 312a12-21

5 Posidonius, fr. 93a

Edelstein-Kidd

3 ἔχειν DE: ἔχει Ab: ἐπέχειν C

4 (ὡς) αὐτὸς K^c

- 172 Galenus, In Hippocratis Aphorismos 14 (t.17.2 p.404.12-405.3 Kühn)

τὸ τοίνυν ὄνομα τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ θερμὸν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ποιότητα φέρομεν, ἥς ἴδιον ὄνομα "θερμότης" ἐστίν, ἐνίοτε δὲ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς θερμότητος ὅλον τὸ σῶμα "θερμὸν" προσαναγορεύομεν. καὶ ἐστὶν ἡ 405 χρῆσις ἥδε πολλή κατὰ τὸν βίον ἅπαντα καὶ παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, ὡς καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐδήλωσεν ἐν τῷ Περὶ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ γράμματι.

Sublunary Region: Elements and Principles

- 169 Simplicius, On Aristotle's On Heaven 1, Introduction (CAG vol.7 p.1.8-10 Heiberg)

And (Alexander) calls Theophrastus as a witness¹, since in his *On Heaven* he did not speak only about the divine (i.e. heavenly) body, but also about things that are subject to coming-to-be and about principles of this sort.

¹ Alexander was arguing that Aristotle's *On Heaven* is concerned not just with the heavenly region, but with the universe as a whole.

- 170 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 74, On Pride, A (ed. 1477² Farinator)

The earth does not fall, but stays at rest, because it is supported by the heavens, as Theophrastus says.

- 171 Simplicius, On Aristotle's On Heaven 4.3 310b8-15 (CAG vol.7 p.700.3-8 Heiberg)

This is one way of dividing the four elements into formal and material (elements),¹ and another is that the heavy and cold (elements) are reckoned as matter, the light and hot ones as form, as both Aristotle himself says elsewhere and Theophrastus (says) in his *On the Coming-to-be of the Elements*, and Posidonius the Stoic takes this (doctrine) over from them and uses it everywhere.

¹ Sc. that the extremes, fire and earth, impart form to the intermediates, air and water — fire giving lightness to air and earth giving heaviness to water.

- 172 Galen, On Hippocrates' Aphorisms 14 (vol.17.2 p.404.12-405.3 Kühn)

Well, we sometimes apply this name, "hot", to the quality, the 405 proper name of which is "heat", but sometimes we call the whole body "hot", by a derivative use from the (quality of) heat. And this usage is frequent both in everyday life and in the ancients, as Theophrastus too showed in his work *On the Hot and the Cold*.

- 173 Plutarchus, *Aetia physica* 13 915B (BT t.5.3 p.12.19-13.1 Hubert, Pohlenz, Drexler)

διὰ τί χειμῶνος μᾶλλον ἢ θέρους τὰ τῶν ἀλιέων σήπεται δίκτυα, καίτοι τὰ γ' ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ θέρει τοῦτο πάσχει; πότερον, ὡς Θεόφραστος οἶεται, τῷ ψυχρῷ τὸ θερμὸν ὑποχωροῦν ἀντιπερισταταὶ καὶ θερμότερα ποιεῖ τὰ ἐν βάθει τῆς θαλάττης, ὡσπερ τῆς γῆς; διὸ καὶ τὰ πηγαία τῶν ὑδάτων χλιαρώτερα τοῦ χειμῶνος ἐστὶ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀτμίζουσιν αἱ λίμναι καὶ οἱ ποταμοί· κατακλείεται γὰρ εἰς βάθος ἡ θερμότης ὑπὸ τοῦ ψυχροῦ κρατήσαντος.

3-4 cf. *Aristotelis Meteorologica* 1.12 348b2 4-5 *Theophrastus, De igne* 16

- 174 Plutarchus, *De primo frigido* 16 952A-B (BT t.5.3 p.105.13-20 Hubert, Pohlenz, Drexler)

ἐν δὲ τοῖς δυσχειμέροις κλίμασι πολλὰ ῥηγνύει τὸ ψύχος ἀγγεῖα καὶ χαλκᾶ καὶ κεραμεᾶ· κενὸν δ' οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ πάντα πλήρη, βιαζομένου τῆ ψυχρότητι τοῦ ὕδατος. καίτοι φησὶ Θεόφραστος τὸν ἀέρα ῥηγνύειν τὰ ἀγγεῖα τῷ ὑγρῷ καθάπερ ἥλω χρώμενον· ὅρα δὲ μὴ τοῦτο κομψῶς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθῶς εἰρημένον ἐστίν· ἔδει γὰρ τὰ πίττης γέμοντα μᾶλλον ῥηγνύσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τὰ γάλακτος.

4 ῥηγνύειν JgA²: ῥηγνύναι cett. ἥλω Turnebus: ἥλιφ codd. 6 ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος secl. Pohlenz

- 175 Plutarchus, *De primo frigido* 18 953C (BT t.5.3 p.108.24-6 Hubert, Pohlenz, Drexler)

ἰχθύς μὲν γὰρ ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος ὑπὸ ῥίγους πεπηγότας, ἂν ἀφεθῶσιν ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, κατάργυσθαι καὶ συντριβεσθαι δίκην ὑελῶν ἢ κεραμῶν σωματίων.

- 176 Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physica* 8.5 257b6-13 (CAG t.10 p.1236.1-9 Diels)

διαίρει δὲ ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τρίτῳ τῶν Φυσικῶν ἢ *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ* τὰ γινόμενα οὕτως· “ἢ γὰρ ὑπὸ ὁμοίου γίνεται,” φησίν, “ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπου καὶ θερμὸν ὑπὸ θερμοῦ, ἢ ὑπὸ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὀρῶμεν τοὺς κεραυνούς καὶ τὰς ἀστραπάς· ὑπὸ γὰρ ψυχρότητος ἢ τούτου τοῦ πυρός

- 173 Plutarch, *Natural Explanations* 13 915B (BT vol.5.3 p.12.19-13.1 Hubert, Pohlenz, Drexler)

Why do fishermen's nets rot more in winter than in summer, although this happens to other things more in summer? Is it, as Theophrastus thinks, that the warm retreats before the cold, is compressed, and makes the depths of the sea warmer, as it does those of the earth? This is why spring-waters, too, are warmer in winter, and why lakes and rivers give off more vapor. For the warmth is confined in the depths by the cold which has prevailed over it.

5 χλιαρώτερα Ba: χλιαρώτατα Bon.Est.nAE: χλιαρότατα u ἐστὶ Bernadakis: εἰσι codd.

- 174 Plutarch, *On the Principle of Cold* 16 952A-B (BT vol.5.3 p.105.13-20 Hubert, Pohlenz, Drexler)

In regions where the winters are hard the cold breaks many vessels, both bronze and earthenware — none when it is empty, but only full ones, the water exercising force by means of its coldness. Theophrastus, however, says that it is the air that breaks the vessels, using the moisture as if it were a nail. But be careful that this is not an ingenious statement rather than a true one; for (if it were true, vessels) full of pitch should be broken by the air more readily (than those full of water, as should) also those (full) of milk.

- 175 Plutarch, *On the Principle of Cold* 18 953C (BT vol.5.3 p.108.24-6 Hubert, Pohlenz, Drexler)

Theophrastus relates that fish which are rigid with frost, if they are dropped on the ground, are shattered into tiny pieces in the same way as objects of glass or earthenware.

- 176 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 8.5 257b6-13 (CAG vol.10 p.1236.1-9 Diels)

Theophrastus, in the third (book) of the *Physics*, or *On Heaven*, divides things that come to be as follows. “Either they are produced by something which is similar,” he says, “as a man (is produced) by a man and heat (is produced) by heat; or by the opposite, as we see with thunderbolts and lightnings. For it is by cold that this fire is

ἐν τῷ ἀέρι γένεσις ἀθροίζοντος εἰς ἐν τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς θερμὸν καὶ⁵
ἐκπυροῦντος. ἢ τρίτον ὑπὸ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὅλως ὄντος, ὡς καὶ ὁ μάλων· ὑπὸ
γὰρ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐσης τῆς μάλιστα γίνεται, οὔτε δὲ ὁμοίας ἔτι οὔτε
ἐναντίας τῷ γινόμενῳ. καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου δέ," φησί, "γινόμενα ὑπὸ
ἐντελεχείᾳ γίνεται· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς οὔτε ὁμοιος οὔτε ἐναντίος τοῖς¹⁰
γινόμενοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ."

5 αὐτοῖς *codd.*: *fort.* αὐτῷ (*sc.* τῷ ἀέρι) *Diels*

- 177 Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 1.3 339b2-3 (CAG t.12.2 p.18.13-16 Stüve)

ἡ ἐπιχείρησις αὕτη τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει εἴρηται ἐπὶ μόνου τοῦ πυρὸς
διὰ τὴν δραστηκὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἄλλων
στοιχείων, ὡς φησι καὶ Θεόφραστος, τὰ παρακείμενα αὐτῷ ἐξισχύει
ὅμοια ποιῆσαι.

2-4 *Olympiodorum spectare ad librum Theophrasti De igne 6 suspicatur Ideler*

- 178 Lumen animae B, caput 49, De amore Dei, Na (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

nam sicut ignis quidem omnis non habens respiraculum suffo-
catur, ut ostendit Theophrastus libro Commentorum

1-2 *Theophrastus, De igne 23 (p.359.34-5 Wimmer, ed. a. 1866)*

- 179 Lumen animae B, caput 3, De passione Christi, Ia (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

nam sursum tendit omnis ignitio extenuata, ut ait Theophrastus.

1 *cf. Theophrasti librum De igne 50 (p.359.34-5 Wimmer, ed. a. 1866)*

- 180 Lumen animae B, caput 7, De beata Virgine, A (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

Theophrastus libro Commentorum: duo ligna actu ardentia
adinvicem complosa confricata quoque pariter et collisa pulchre
ardent et lucent.

2 confricata quoque *Sharples*: \wp confricata *liber*

produced in the air, when it gathers the heat in them into a single
place and turns it to fire. Or, thirdly, (things are produced) by what is
in actuality, quite generally, as with a weal; for it is produced by the
whip, which is in actuality, but is neither similar to what is produced
nor opposite to it. And the things that are produced by the sun," he
says, "are produced by an actuality; for it itself is neither similar nor
opposite to the things that are produced by it."

- 177 Olympiodorus, On Aristotle's Meteorology 1.3 339b2-3 (CAG vol.12.2 p.18.13-16 Stüve)

Aristotle has advanced this dialectical argument only in the case
of fire, because of its power of acting; for it alone of all the elements,
as Theophrastus too says, has the strength to make the things adja-
cent to it similar (to itself).

- 178 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 49, On the Love of God, Na (ed. 1477² Farinator)

For just as every fire, indeed, which does not have a way of
breathing is snuffed out, as Theophrastus shows in the book of *Com-
mentaries*

1 quidem] quidam *libri*

- 179 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 3, On the Passion of Christ, Ia (ed. 1477² Farinator)

For all combustion, becoming rarefied, has an upwards ten-
dency, as Theophrastus says.

- 180 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 7, On the Blessed Virgin, A (ed. 1477² Farinator)

Theophrastus, in the book of *Commentaries*: When two pieces of
wood that are actually ablaze are struck together, equally also when
they are rubbed together¹ and crushed together, they blaze and shine
beautifully.

¹ Or "also when they are rubbed together equally".

- 181 Lumen animae B, caput 23, De amaritudine, N. (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

nam sic sal sparsum cum modica aqua super ignem ferventius validiusque exardescere facit, ut dicit philosophus in *Problematis* . . . et sic in mediocri quantitate proiectus in ignem strepitum sonitumque facit, sed non salis valida massa et magna, ut ostendit Theophrastus libro *De distinctionibus elementorum*.

3-4 cf. [Aristotelis] *Problemata* 11.26 902a1 et 11.43 904a13-16 4 aliter [Aristoteles], *Problemata* 11.42 904a4

- 182 Loci in opusculo Theophrasti *De igne ad quos auctores posteriores Theophrastum nominantes spectant*

1 § 14] Olympiodorus, In *Aristotelis Meteorologica* 1.5 342b1-4 (CAG t.12.2 p.47.10 Stüve), qui per errorem sententiam a Theophrasto repudiatam ipsi Theophrasto attribuit; vid. Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast* p.43 adnot. 2, sub finem.

2 § 72] Hesychius, *Lexicon*, s.v. δύσκαπνος (no. 84, t.1 p.486.1 Latte)

- 183 al-Bīrūnī, *al-Ġamāhir fī maʿrifat al-ġawāhir*, cap. de plumbo (p.258.15-17 Krenkow)

وفي مسائل ثاوفرسطس الطبيعية أن الأنية الواحدة إذا ملئت جرادة أسرب تكون أثقل منها إذا ملئت بالذهب والفضة

- 181 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 23, On Bitterness, N (ed. 1477² Farinator)

For in this way salt which is scattered on a fire with a moderate amount of water makes it blaze up more fiercely and strongly, as the Philosopher¹ says in the *Problems* . . . and thus, if it is thrown on the fire in a moderate quantity, it makes a noise and a crackling, but a large and powerful lump of salt does not do so, as Theophrastus shows in his book *On the Differences between the Elements*.

¹ Aristotle.

- 182 Passages in Theophrastus' work *On Fire* to which later authors refer mentioning Theophrastus by name

1 § 14] Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 1.5 342b1-4 (CAG vol.12.2 p.47.10 Stüve), who erroneously attributes to Theophrastus himself the view which he in fact rejects; see Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast* p.43 n. 2, at the end.

2 § 72] Hesychius, *Lexicon on duskapnos* (no. 84, vol.1 p.486.11 Latte)

- 183 Bīrūnī, *Collected Information on Precious Stones*, chap. on lead (p.258.15-17 Krenkow)

In the *Problems concerning Nature* of Theophrastus (it is stated) that when one and the same container is filled with parings of lead, it is heavier than when it is filled with gold or silver.

Aeternitas mundi

- 184 Philo Iudaeus, *De aeternitate mundi* 23.117-27.149 (t.6 p.108.12-119.2 Cohn)

Θεόφραστος μέντοι φησὶ τοὺς γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου κατηγοροῦντας ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀπατηθῆναι τῶν μεγίστων, γῆς ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἐκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὄλου μερῶν δι-
 118 αλύσεως, χειρσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζώων. κατασκευάζειν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον οὕτως· εἰ μὴ γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔλαβεν ἡ γῆ, μέρος ὑπανεστός
 οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι αὐτῆς ἑωρᾶτο, χθαμαλὰ δ' ἤδη τὰ ὄρη πάντα ἐγεγένητο καὶ οἱ γεώλοφοι πάντες ἰσόπεδοι τῇ πεδιάδι· τοσοῦτων γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον
 ἔνιαυτὸν ὄμβρων ἐξ αἰδίου φερομένων, εἰκὸς ἦν τῶν διηρμένων πρὸς ὕψος τὰ μὲν χειμάρροις ἀπερρήχθαι, τὰ δ' ὑπονοστήσαντα κεχαλάσθαι,
 119 πάντα δὲ διὰ πάντων ἤδη λελειάνθαι. νυνὶ δὲ συνεχεῖς ἀνωμαλῖαι καὶ παμπόλλων ὄρων αἰ πρὸς αἰθέριον ὕψος ὑπερβολαὶ μηνύματ' ἐστὶ τοῦ
 τὴν γῆν μὴ αἰδίου εἶναι. πάλαι γάρ, ὡς ἔφη, ἐν ἀπειρῷ χρόνῳ ταῖς ἐπομβρίαις ἀπὸ περάτων ἐπὶ πέρατα πᾶς ἂν λεωφόρος ἐγεγένητο·
 πέφυκε γὰρ ἡ ὕδατος φύσις καὶ μάλιστα ἀπὸ ὑψηλοτάτων κατα-
 15 ράττουσα τὰ μὲν ἐξωθεῖν τῇ βίᾳ, τὰ δὲ τῷ συνεχεῖ τῶν ψεκᾶδων κολάπτουσα κολαίνειν ὑπεργάζεσθαι τε τὴν σκληρόγεω καὶ λιθω-
 δεστάτην ὀρυκτῆρων οὐκ ἔλαττον.
 120 καὶ μὴν ἢ γε θάλασσα, φασίν, ἤδη μεμείωται. μάρτυρες δ' αἱ νήσων εὐδοκιμώταται Ῥόδος τε καὶ Δῆλος· αὐταὶ γὰρ τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἠφανισμένα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐδεδύκεσαν ἐπικλυζόμεναι, χρόνῳ δ'
 ὕστερον ἐλαττουμένης ἡρέμα, κατ' ὀλίγον ἀνίσχουσαι διεφάνησαν, ὡς
 121 αἱ περὶ αὐτῶν ἀναγραφεῖσαι μηνύουσιν ἱστορίαι. τὴν δὲ Δῆλον καὶ Ἀνάφην ὠνόμασαν δι' ἀμφοτέρων ὀνομάτων πιστούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀναφανείσα δῆλη ἐγένετο, ἀδηλουμένη καὶ

in omnibus locis, qui huic textui comparantur, Theophrastus non memoratur 1-79 doctrina hic enuntiata Zenoni Citiensi fortasse attribuenda est, et Arnim hos versus in SVF (t.1 p.29.25-31.29, fr. 106 et 106a) ideo accepit; sed de 59-79 (= SVF fr. 106a) dubitatur 18-22 Plinius, NH 2.202; Ammianus Marcellinus, Res gestae 17.7.13 22-5 cf. Apollonii Rhodii Argonautica 4.1709; Apollodori Bibl. 1.9.26; Callimachi Hymni 4.53; Oracula Sibyllina 3.363

4 κατὰ πάντα γένη· *Cumont* κατασκευάζειν *Usener*: κατασκευάζει *codd.*:
 κατασκευάζουσι *coni. Mangey* 13 πᾶς ἂν *Buecheler*: πᾶσα *codd.*
 16 σκληρόγεω *Cohn*: σκληρόγεω *codd.* 23 Ἀνάφην *Turnebus*: ἀνα-
 γραφὴν *UHP*: ἀναγράφειν *M*

The Eternity of the Universe

- 184 Philo the Jew, *On the Eternity of the Universe* 23.117-27.149 (vol.6 p.108.12-119.2 Cohn)

Theophrastus, however, says that those who assert that the universe is subject to coming-to-be and passing away were led astray by four principal (considerations): (1) the unevenness of the land, (2) the withdrawal of the sea, (3) the dissolution of each of the parts of the
 118 whole, (4) the perishing of (whole) kinds of land animals. (1) They construct the first argument as follows. If the land had not had a beginning at which it came to be, no part of it would still be seen to be raised, but all the mountains would by now have become low and all the hills level with the plain; for with so much rain falling every year from eternity some of the parts that were raised in height would naturally have been broken off by torrents, others would have been loosened and subsided, and all everywhere would by now have been
 119 made smooth. But as it is the continual unevennesses and the great number of mountains which rise up to the heights of heaven are indications that the land (has) not (existed from) eternity. For in the infinity of time, as I said, with the constant rainfall it would all long ago have become a highway from one boundary to the other; for it is the nature of water, especially when it rushes down from great heights, that it can push (obstacles) out of its way by its force, but that it can also, lightly tapping away with a perpetual succession of drops, hollow out (things) and thus break up (material) even if it consists of solidified earth and has quite the character of stone, just as efficiently as miners.

120 (2) Moreover, they say, the sea has already been diminished in size. Of this the very famous islands, Rhodes and Delos, are witnesses; for in ancient times these were invisible and sunk below the sea which washed over them, but subsequently, as it gradually diminished, in the course of time they emerged little by little and be-
 121 came visible, as the accounts recorded of them show. And they also named Delos "Anaphe"¹, vouching by both names for the truth of what is said, since it "appeared" (*anaphaneisa*) and became "clearly

¹ This seems to be a confusion: Anaphe is an island near Thera and south of Amorgos, different from Delos. Apollonius and Apollodorus derive the name from its *being seen* unexpectedly by the Argonauts and giving them refuge in a storm, not from its physical emergence from the sea. Delos too is usually described not as an island that emerged from the sea, but as a floating island that became fixed.

ἀφανῆς οὐσα τὸ πάλαι, διὸ καὶ Πίνδαρος ἐπὶ τῆς Δήλου φησί· 25

χαῖρ', ὦ θεοδμάτα, λιπαροπλοκάμου
παίδεσσι Λατοῦς ἡμεροέστατον ἔρνος,
πόντου θύγατερ, χθονὸς εὐρείας ἀκίνητον τέρας, ἄν τε βροτοὶ
Δᾶλον κυκλήσκουσιν, μάκαρες δ' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ τηλέφαντον
κυανέας χθονὸς ἄστρον. 30

- 122 θυγατέρα γὰρ πόντου τὴν Δήλον εἶρηκε τὸ λεχθὲν αἰνιττόμενος. πρὸς
δὲ τούτοις μεγάλων πελαγῶν μεγάλους κόλπους καὶ βαθεῖς ἀναξηραν-
θέντας ἠπειρώσθαι καὶ γεγενῆσθαι τῆς παρακειμένης χώρας μοῖραν οὐ
λυπρὰν σπειρομένους καὶ φυτευομένους, οἷς σημεῖ' ἄττα τῆς παλαιᾶς
ἐναπολελειφθαι θαλαττώσεως ψηφιδᾶς τε καὶ κόγχας καὶ ὅσα ὁμοί- 35
123 ὄτροπα πρὸς αἰγιαλοὺς εἴωθεν ἀποβράττεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μειοῦται ἢ
θάλαττα, μειωθήσεται μὲν καὶ ἡ γῆ, μακραιὲς δ' ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδοις καὶ
εἰς ἅπαν ἐκάτερον στοιχείον ἀναλωθήσεται, δαπανηθήσεται δὲ καὶ ὁ
σύμπας ἄηρ ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐλαττούμενος, ἀποκριθήσεται δὲ τὰ
πάντα εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν τὴν πυρός. 40
- 24.124 πρὸς δὲ τὴν τοῦ τρίτου κεφαλαίου κατασκευὴν χρῶνται λόγῳ
τοιῷδε· φθίρεται πάντως ἐκεῖνο, οὐ πάντα τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστί, τοῦ
δὲ κόσμου πάντα τὰ μέρη φθαρτά ἐστί, φθαρτὸς ἄρα ὁ κόσμος ἐστίν.
125 ὁ δ' ὑπερεθέμεθα, νῦν ἐπισκεπτέον. ποῖον μέρος τῆς γῆς, ἴνα ἀπὸ ταύτης
ἀρξώμεθα, μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον, οὐ χρόνῳ διαλύεται; λίθων οἱ κραταιότα- 45
τοι ἄρ' οὐ μωδῶσι καὶ σήπονται (καὶ) κατὰ τὴν ἕξωσ ἀσθένειαν —
ἢ δ' ἐστὶ πνευματικὸς τόνος, δεσμὸς οὐκ ἄρρηκτος ἀλλὰ μόνον
δυσδιάλυτος — θρυπτόμενοι καὶ ῥέοντες εἰς λεπτὴν τὸ πρῶτον
ἀναλύονται κόνιν, εἴθ' ὕστερον δαπανηθέντες ἐξαναλοῦνται; τί δ', εἰ
μὴ πρὸς ἀνέμων ῥιπίζοιτο τὸ ὕδωρ, ἀκίνητον ἑαθὲν οὐχ ὑφ' ἡσυχίας 50
νεκροῦται; μεταβάλλει γοῦν καὶ δυσωδέστατον γίνεται, οἷα ψυχὴν
126 ἀφηρημένον ζῶον. αἶ γε μὴν ἀέρος φθορὰ παντὶ τῷ δῆλαι· νοσεῖν γὰρ
καὶ φθίνειν καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀποθνήσκειν πέφυκεν. ἐπεὶ τί ἂν τις μὴ
στοχασάμενος ὀνομάτων εὐπρεπείας ἀλλὰ τὰληθοῦς εἴποι λοιμὸν εἶναι

26-30 *Pindarus, fr. 87 Bergk (78 Bowra)* 31-6 *cf. Alberti Magni Meteora*
2.15 41-3 *Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 7.141 = SVF t.2 p.182.1-3, fr. 589* 41-
59 *Lucretius, De rerum natura 1.235-317*

25-31 διὸ—αἰνιττόμενος *post* ἀποβράττεσθαι (36) *exhibent codd., huc transpon-*
denda esse vidit Buecheler 32 *μεγάλων* μεγάλην *M: μεταλλαγῆ coni. Diels*
34 *σημεῖ' ἄττα Bernays: σημεῖα τὰ codd.* 41 *χρῶνται UE: χρῶται M:*
χρήται Bernays: χρήσεται HP: χρήσονται Mangey 45 *διαλύεται Mangey:*
διαλύσεται MUHP: διαλυθήσεται E 46 *καὶ add. Wendland* 49 *ἐξ-*
αναλοῦνται Bernays: ἐξαναλῶνται UHPE: ἐξανήλωνται coni. Mangey 52
ἢ γε μὴν ἀέρος φθορὰ Cohn δῆλαι *Bernays: δῆλον codd.: δῆλοι coni.*
Cumont

visible" (*dālē*), having been "invisible" and "not apparent" before. And for this reason Pindar, too, says of Delos:

"Hail, god-founded one, scion most lovely
to the children of Leto of the gleaming locks,
daughter of the sea, immovable wonder of the broad earth,
called Delos by mortals, but by the blessed ones on
Olympus
Star seen from afar in the darkness of the earth."

- For he calls Delos "daughter of the sea" hinting at what has been
122 said. And in addition to these (arguments) they say that great and
deep bays of great seas have dried up and have become land, and
have become a fertile part of the adjoining land, being sown and
planted; but certain signs are left in them that they were formerly
submerged, pebbles and shells and all the similar things that are
123 customarily cast ashore on sea-coasts. Well, if the sea is diminishing
the earth too will be diminished, and in the long cyclings of the years
both elements will be completely used up; and all the air, too, will be
consumed, being diminished little by little, and all things will end up
reduced to a single substance, that of fire.
- 24.124 (3) To establish their third main point they use an argument like
the following. That thing by all means perishes, of which all the parts
are perishable; but all the parts of the universe are perishable; so the
125 universe is perishable. But we must now consider what we previ-
ously postponed. What part of the earth — to begin with this —
whether greater or smaller, is not dissolved in time? Do not the
strongest stones moulder and decay, and because of the weakness of
their constitution — that is the tension of their *pneuma*, a bond which
is not unbreakable but only difficult to undo — do they not crumble
and dissolve, at first into fine dust, and then later on are they not
completely consumed and annihilated? What? If water is not fanned
by winds but left undisturbed, does it not mortify as a result of
remaining still? At any rate it changes and becomes most malodor-
ous, like a living creature whose soul has been taken from it. And the
126 ways in which air perishes are clear to everyone; for it is its nature to
become sickly and to decay and, in a way, to die. For what else
would someone, whose aim was not seemliness in words but rather
the truth, say that plague is, if not the death of the air, which spreads

πλὴν ἀέρος θάνατον τὸ οἰκεῖον πάθος ἀναχέοντος ἐπὶ φθορᾷ πάντων 55
 127 ὅσα ψυχῆς μεμοίραται; τί χρὴ μακρηγορεῖν περὶ πυρός; ἀτροφήσαν γὰρ
 αὐτίκα σβέννυται, χωλόν, ἢ φασιν οἱ ποιηταί, γεγονὸς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ· διὸ
 σκηριπτόμενον ὀρθοῦται κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀναφθείσης ὕλης μονήν,
 128 ἐξαναλωθείσης δ' ἀφανίζεται. τὸ παραπλήσιον μέντοι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ
 τὴν Ἰνδικὴν δράκοντάς φασι πάσχειν· ἀνέρποντας γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ μέγιστα 60
 τῶν ζώων, ἐλέφαντας, περὶ νῶτα καὶ νηδὺν ἅπασαν εἰλεῖσθαι, φλέβα
 δ' ἣν ἂν τύχη διελόντας ἐμπνέειν τοῦ αἵματος, ἀπλήστως ἐπισπωμένους
 βιαίῳ πνεύματι καὶ συντόνῳ ῥοίζῳ· μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινος ἐξανα-
 λουμένους ἐκείνους ἀντέχειν ὑπ' ἀμηχανίας ἀνασκιρτῶντας καὶ τῇ
 προνομαίᾳ τὴν πλευρὰν τύπτοντας ὡς καθιζομένους τῶν δρακόντων, 65
 εἶτα αἰεὶ κενουμένου τοῦ ζωτικοῦ, πηδᾶν μὲν μηκέτι δύνασθαι,
 κραδαινομένους δ' ἐστάναι, μικρὸν δ' ὕστερον καὶ τῶν σκελῶν
 ἐξασθηθέντων, κατασεισθέντας ὑπὸ λιφαιμίας ἀποψύχων, πεσόντας
 129 δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους τοῦ θανάτου συναπολλύναι τρώφῳ ταιφῶδε· μηκέτ'
 ἔχοντες τροφήν οἱ δράκοντες ὄν περιέθεσαν δεσμόν ἐπιχειροῦσιν 70
 ἐκλύειν ἀπαλλαγὴν ἤδη ποθοῦντες, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ βάρους τῶν ἐλεφάντων
 θλιβόμενοι πιέζονται, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴν τύχη στέριφον καὶ
 λιθῶδες τὸ ἔδαφος· ἰλυσπώμενοι γὰρ καὶ πάντα ποιοῦντες εἰς διάλυσιν,
 ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ πιέσαντος βίας πεδηθέντες, ἑαυτοὺς πολυτρόπως ἐν
 ἀμηχανίᾳ καὶ ἀπόροις γυμνάσαντες ἐξασθενοῦσι (καὶ) καθάπερ οἱ 75
 καταλευσθέντες ἢ τείχους αἰφνίδιον ἐπενεχθέντος προκαταληφθέντες,
 οὐδ' ὅσον ἀνακύβαι δυνάμενοι, πνιγῇ τελευτῶσιν. εἰ δὲ τῶν μερῶν
 ἕκαστον τοῦ κόσμου φθορὰν ὑπομένει, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ ἐξ αὐτῶν παγεις
 κόσμος ἄφθαρτος οὐκ ἔσται.
 130 τὸν δὲ τέταρτον καὶ λοιπὸν λόγον ἀκριβατέον ὧδε, φασίν· εἰ ὁ 80
 κόσμος αἰδῖος ἦν, ἦν ἂν καὶ τὰ ζῶα αἰδία καὶ πολὺ γε μᾶλλον τὸ τῶν
 ἀνθρώπων γένος, ὅσῳ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄμεινον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὀψίγονον
 φανῆναι τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐρευνᾶν τὰ φύσεως· εἰκὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον δ'
 ἀναγκαῖον ἀνθρώποις συνυπάρξαι τὰς τέχνας ὡς ἂν ἰσηλικας, οὐ μόνον
 ὅτι λογικῇ φύσει τὸ ἐμμέθοδον οἰκεῖον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ζῆν ἄνευ τούτων 85
 131 οὐκ ἔστιν. ἴδωμεν οὖν τοὺς ἑκάστων χρόνους ἀλογήσαντες τῶν
 ἐπιτραγομένων θεοῖς μύθων * * * εἰ (δὲ) μὴ αἰδῖος ἄνθρωπος, οὐδ'

56-8 *Heraclitus Homericus, Quaestiones Homericæ* 26.6-10 (p.32.13-33.6 Buffière);
Plutarchus, De facie in orbe lunæ 5 992A; *Cornutus, De nat. deorum* 19 (p.33.14-
 20 Lang) 59-68 *Aelianus, NA* 6.21 59-76 *Plinius, Nat. hist.* 8.32-4;
Ambrosius, Hexaemeron 3.9.40 80-9 *Lucretius* 5.324-337

58 μονήν] νομήν *Usener et Arnim SVF* t.1 fr. 106 72 στέριφον (ὄν) *Diels*
et Arnim SVF t.1 fr. 106a 75 καὶ *add. Bernays* 87 *lac. stat. Mangey*
 εἰ (δὲ) μὴ *Zeller*: εἰ μὴ *MUE*: μὴ *HP*

widely what happens to itself, to the destruction of everything which
 127 shares in life? What need is there to speak at length about fire? If it
 lacks nourishment it is at once quenched, being lame, as the poets
 say, as far as concerns itself;² and for this reason it is propped up-
 right as long as the matter which has been kindled remains, but
 128 when that is used up the fire disappears. Indeed, they say that some-
 thing similar happens to the snakes in India. They creep up to the
 largest of animals, the elephant, and wind themselves around its
 back and the whole of its belly; and opening some vein, whichever it
 may be, they drink the blood, sucking it greedily with violent breath-
 ing and continuous hissing. For a while (the elephants) hold out as
 they are drained (of their blood), leaping about in their helplessness
 and beating their sides with their trunks in an attempt to reach the
 snakes; but then, as their life-force is continually being drained from
 them, they can no longer leap but stand trembling, and soon after-
 wards, when their legs have lost their strength, they collapse and die
 129 through loss of blood. But when they fall they also destroy those
 who were the causes of their deaths, in the following way. The
 snakes, no longer having their food, try to undo the bond which they
 put round (the elephants), now desiring a release; but they are
 crushed and weighed down by the weight of the elephants, and
 much more so if the ground happens to be firm and stony. They try
 to crawl out, and do everything to get free, being fettered by the
 force of what presses down on them; and exerting themselves in
 many ways in their helpless and hopeless situation they grow weak,
 and, like people who have been buried under (a hail of) stones or
 trapped by a wall which has suddenly fallen, they cannot even raise
 their heads, and die from suffocation. — So, if each part of the uni-
 verse suffers destruction, it is clear that the universe which is put
 together from them will not be imperishable.

130 (4) The fourth and remaining argument is to be stated precisely
 in the following way, they say. If the universe were eternal, living
 creatures too would be eternal, and especially the race of men, in so
 far as it is superior to the others. But that (man's) origin is recent is
 clear to those who wish to enquire into natural matters; for it is
 reasonable, no, rather, necessary that the crafts should exist along-
 side mankind and be of the same age, not only because what is
 systematic is proper to what is rational by nature, but also because it
 131 is not possible to live without these. So let us consider the date of
 each (craft), disregarding the stories told about the gods by the tragic

² An allusion to allegorical interpretations of the lameness of Hephaes-
 tus.

ἄλλο τι ζῶον, ὥστ' οὐδ' αἱ δεδεγμένα ταῦτα χῶραι, γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ
 ἀήρ· ἐξ ὧν τὸ φθαρτὸν εἶναι τὸν κόσμον δῆλόν ἐστιν.

- 132 ἀναγκαῖον δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοσαύτην εὐρεσιλογίαν ἀπαντήσαι, μή τις 90
 τῶν ἀπειροτέρων ἐνδοῦς ὑπαχθῆ· καὶ ἀρκτέον γε τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως ἀφ'
 οὐ καὶ τῆς ἀπάτης οἱ σοφισταί. τὰς ἀνωμαλίας οὐκέτ' ἐχρῆν εἶναι τῆς
 γῆς, εἴπερ αἰδιός ἦν ὁ κόσμος; διὰ τί, ὦ γενναῖοι; φήσουσι γὰρ ἕτεροι
 παρελθόντες, ὅτι δένδρων οὐδὲν αἱ φύσεις τῶν ὀρῶν διαφέρουσιν, ἀλλὰ
 καθάπερ ἐκεῖνα καιροῖς μὲν τισι φυλλορροεῖ καιροῖς δὲ πάλιν ἀνηβᾶ 95
 — διὸ καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν εὖ εἴρηται

φύλλα τὰ μὲν τ' ἄνεμος χαμάδις χέει, ἄλλα δὲ θ' ὕλη
 τηλεθώσα φύει, ἔαρος δ' ἐπιγίγνεται ὥρη —

- τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν ὀρῶν τὰ μὲν ἀποθραύεται μέρη, τὰ δὲ
 133 προσφύεται, μακροῖς δὲ χρόνοις ἢ πρόσφους καθίσταται γνώριμος, 100
 διότι τὰ μὲν δένδρα ὠκυτέρᾳ χρώμενα τῇ φύσει θάπτον κατα-
 λαμβανομένην ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, τὰ δ' ὄρη βραδυτέρᾳ, διὸ καὶ τὰς
 ἐκφύσεις αὐτῶν αἰσθητὰς ὅτι μὴ χρόνῳ μακρῷ μόλις εἶναι συμβέβηκεν.
 134 εἰκόασι γε τὸν τρόπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῶν ἀγνοεῖν, ἐπεὶ κἂν ἴσως
 αἰδεσθέντες ἡσύχασαν. φθόνος δ' οὐδεὶς ἀναδιδάσκειν· ἔστι δ' οὔτε
 νέον τὸ λεγόμενον οὔτε ῥήμαθ' ἡμῶν, ἀλλὰ παλαιὰ σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἷς
 135 οὐδὲν ἀδιερεύνητον τῶν εἰς ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖων ἀποτέλειται. ὅταν
 τὸ κατακεκλεισμένον ἐν τῇ γῇ πυρῶδες ἄνω τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐλαύνηται
 φυσικῇ δυνάμει, πρὸς τὸν οἰκείον τόπον στείχει, κἂν τινος λάβηται
 βραχέας ἀναπνοῆς, ἄνω μὲν συνανασπᾶ πολλὴν τῆς γεώδους οὐσίας, 110
 ὅσπην ἂν οἴον τε ἦ, ἢ δ' ἔξωθεν ἐπιγενόμενη φέρεται βραδύτερον, [ἦ]
 καὶ μέχρι πολλοῦ συμπαραλθεῖν βιασθεῖσα, πρὸς μήκιστον ἀρθείσα
 ὕψος, στέλλεται κορυφομένη καὶ πρὸς ὀξείαν ἀποτελεντᾶ κορυφὴν τὸ
 136 πυρὸς σχῆμα μιμουμένη. γίνεται γὰρ τοῦ κουφοτάτου καὶ βαρυτάτου
 τότε, τῶν φύσει ἀντιπάλων, ἀναγκαῖα συρραξάντων διαμάχη, πρὸς τὴν 115
 οἰκείαν ἑκατέρου χώραν ἐπειγομένου καὶ (πρὸς) τὸ βιαζόμενον
 ἀντιτείνοντος· τὸ μὲν δὴ πῦρ συνανέλκον γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ περὶ αὐτὴν
 νευστικῷ βρῖθειν ἀναγκάζεται, ἢ δὲ γῆ καταπάτω ταλαντεύουσα τῷ
 τοῦ πυρὸς ἀνωφοίτῳ συνεπελαφρισθεῖσα μετέωρος ἐξαιρεται καὶ

97-8 *Homerus, Ilias* 6.147-8

107-121 *Albertus Magnus, Meteora* 2.18

101 φύσει] προσφύσει *coni. Mangey* 102 βραδυτέρᾳ *Turnebus*: βραχύτερα
codd.: βραδύτερα *Bernays* 106 παλαιὰ σοφῶν] παλαιῶν καὶ σοφῶν *E*
 111 ἢ δ' ἔξωθεν ἐπιγενόμενη *Bernays*: ἔξω δ' ἐπιγενόμενον *codd.* (ἐπιγινόμενον
E): ἔξω δ' ἐπιγενόμενον *Buecheler* φέρεται βραδύτερον *Mangey*: φέρ-
 εσθαι βραχύτεραν *codd.*: φέρεσθαι βραδύτερον *Cumont* 111-12 [ἦ] καὶ
Bernays: ἦ καὶ *MUHP*: ἦ καὶ *E*: ἢ δὲ *Diels* 113 στέλλεται] συστέλλεται
E 116 πρὸς *add. Turnebus*

poets ***³ But if man(kind) is not eternal, neither is any other living
 creature; so neither are the places in which these live, earth and
 water and air. And from this it is clear that the universe is perishable.

- 25.132 It is necessary to counter so much ingenious argument, in case
 anyone who lacks experience should submit and be led on; and the
 refutation should begin from the point from which these sophists be-
 gan their deception. (1) There should no longer be unevennesses of
 the land, if the universe were eternal? Why so, my dear fellows? For
 others will come forward and say that mountains are no different in
 their nature from trees, and just as the trees at certain times shed
 their leaves and at others are rejuvenated — so that the poet well
 said:

The leaves are scattered on the earth by the wind,
 but the forest flourishing brings forth others,
 and the season of spring comes in its turn —

- in the same way of the mountains too some parts are broken off, but
 133 others are added. But it takes a long time for the addition to become
 apparent, since in the case of trees, which grow more quickly, their
 increase is apprehended more swiftly, while mountains grow more
 slowly, and for this reason their growth is scarcely perceptible except
 134 over a long period of time. It seems that (these people) do not know
 how mountains come to be, for (if they had known) they would
 perhaps have kept silent for shame. But we do not grudge telling
 them; for what is said is nothing new, nor any words of ours, but the
 ancient words of wise men, who left nothing that is necessary for
 135 knowledge uninvestigated. When the fiery element that is enclosed
 in the earth is driven upwards by the natural force of fire, it moves
 towards its own proper place, and if it finds any short route by
 which to escape, it drags up with it a great amount of earthy sub-
 stance, as much as it can. But this, surrounding the fire from outside,
 is carried (upwards) more slowly; but being compelled to accom-
 pany (the fire) for a great distance it is lifted up to a great height,
 contracts as it reaches a summit and ends up as a sharp peak which
 136 imitates the shape of fire. For there is an inevitable conflict then,
 when what is lightest and what is heaviest, being naturally opposed,
 clash with each other, each hastening to its own proper place and
 struggling against what forcibly resists it; the fire, dragging earth up
 with it, is necessarily weighed down by the earth's tendency to fall,
 and the earth, though it inclines downwards, is made light by the
 fire's mounting upwards and lifted up in the air, and, being over-

³ The account of the dates of origin of the various crafts is missing.

κρατηθεῖσα μόλις ὑπὸ δυνατωτέρας τῆς ἐπικουφιζούσης ἰσχύος ἄνω
 137 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς ἔδραν ὠθεῖται καὶ ἴσταται. τί οὖν θαυμαστόν, εἰ
 μὴ τὰ ὄρη ταῖς τῶν ὑετῶν φοραῖς ἐξανήλωται, τῆς συνεχούσης αὐτὰ
 δυνάμεως, ὑφ' ἧς καὶ διανίσταται, μάλα παγίως καὶ κραταιῶς
 ἐνειλημμένης; λυθέντος γὰρ δεσμοῦ τοῦ συνεχόντος, εἰκὸς ἦν
 26 τοῦ πυρὸς στεγανώτερον πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὑετῶν φορὰς ἀντέχει. ταῦτα μὲν
 οὖν ἡμῖν λελέχθω περὶ τοῦ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς γῆς πίστιν οὐκ εἶναι
 γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς κόσμου.
 138 πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μειώσεως τῆς θαλάττης ἐπιχειρηθὲν ἐκεῖνο
 δεόντως ἂν λέγοιτο· μὴ τὰς ἀνασχούσας νήσους αὐτὸ μόνον αἰεὶ μῆδ'
 εἴ τινας ἀποτομαὶ κατακλυζόμεναι τὸ πάλαι χρόνους αἰθῆς ἠπειρώθησαν
 σκοπεῖτε — φυσιολογίας γὰρ ἀντίπαλον φιλονεικία τριπόθητον ἡγου-
 μένης ἀλήθειαν ἰχνηλατεῖν —, ἀλλὰ πολυπραγμονεῖτε καὶ τούναντίον,
 ὅσαι μὲν ἐν ἠπείροις οὐ παράλαιοι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μεσόγειοι μοῖραι
 καταπόθησαν, ὅση δὲ χέρσος θαλαττωθεῖσα μυριοφόροις ναυσὶν
 139 ἐμπλεῖται. (ἦ) τὴν περὶ τὸν ἱερώτατον Σικελικὸν πορθμὸν ἄδομένην
 ἱστορίαν ἀγνοεῖτε; (ἦν μὲν γὰρ) τὸ παλαιὸν ἠπειρῶ Ἰταλία Σικελία
 συνάπτουσα, μεγάλων δὲ τῶν παρ' ἐκάτερα πελαγῶν βιαίοις πνεύμασιν
 ἐξ ἐναντίας ἐπιδραμόντων, ἡ μεθόριος ἐπεκλύσθη καὶ ἀνερράγη, παρ'
 ἦν καὶ πόλις ἐπόνυμος τοῦ πάθους Ῥήγιον κτισθεῖσα ὀνομάσθη. καὶ
 140 τούναντίον οὐ προσεδόκησεν ἂν τις ἀπέβη· συνεζεύχθη μὲν γὰρ τὰ τέως
 διεστῶτα πελάγη κατὰ τὴν σύρρυσιν ἐνωθέντα, ἡ δὲ ἠνωμένη γῆ τῷ
 μεθορίῳ πορθμῷ διεζεύχθη, παρ' ὃν ἠπειρος οὐσα Σικελία νῆσος
 140 ἐβιάσθη γενέσθαι. πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ἄλλας λόγος τῆς θαλάττης
 ὑπερσχούσης ἠφανίσθαι πόλεις καταποθείσας, ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ Πελο-
 πόννησόν φασι τρεῖς

Αἴγειραν Βοῦράν τε καὶ ὑψηλὴν Ἑλίκειαν,
 τείχεσιν ἢ τάχ' ἔμελλε περὶ βρῦα μυρία φύσειν,

137-44 *Diodorus Siculus*, 4.85.3; *Strabo*, 6.1.6 = *Aeschylus*, fr. 402 (*TrGF* t.3 p.439); *Seneca*, *Nat. quaest.* 6.30.3; *Plinius*, *NH* 3.86 145-50 *Polybius*, 2.41.7; *Ammianus Marcellinus*, 17.7.13; *Seneca* (*qui utroque loco Callisthenem nominat*), *Nat. quaest.* 6.23.4 et 7.5.3-4; *Plinius*, *NH* 2.206; *Pausanias*, 7.24.5-6 et 12-13, 7.25.8; *Ovidius*, *Metamorph.* 15.293-5; *Strabo*, 8.7.2

121 καὶ ἴσταται] καὶ διανίσταται *coni. Mangey*: κἀνίσταται *Diels* 130 αἰεὶ *Bernays*: εἰ *MUHP*: ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ *E* 133 πολυπραγμονεῖτε *Mangey*: πολυπραγμονεῖται *UHPE*: πολυπραγμονεῖν ἔστι *M* 136 ἢ *add. Cohn*: ἢ *add. Diels* 136-7 τὴν—ἀγνοεῖτε] ἢ περὶ τὸν Σικελικὸν πορθμὸν ἄδομένη ἱστορία ἀγνοεῖται παρ' οὐδένοσ τῶν ἐλλογίμων *E* 136 ἱερώτατον] εὐρώτατον *coni. Diels* 137 *ante* τὸ *add.* ἦν μὲν γὰρ *Cohn*: *post* τὸ *add.* μὲν *Diels* ἠπειρῶ] (ἦν) ἠπειρος *Buecheler* Σικελία *Buecheler*: Σικελίαν *codd.*

come with difficulty by the more powerful force that raises it up, is
 137 driven upwards towards the place of fire and comes to rest. So how
 is it surprising that the mountains are not consumed by the on-
 slaught of the rain, when the force which holds them together, and
 which also raised them up, is contained within them with such firm-
 ness and strength? If the bond that holds them together were loosed,
 it would be reasonable for them to be dissolved and scattered by the
 water; but being bound together by the power of fire they are suffi-
 26 ciently waterproof to resist the onslaught of the rain. Well, let this be
 our argument that the unevenness of the land is not proof that the
 universe is subject to coming-to-be and passing away.

138 (2) Against the argument from the diminution of the sea one
 might well say, do not just consider always the islands which have
 emerged, or any parts that were submerged long ago but in course of
 time became joined to the mainland again — for contentiousness is
 hostile to the study of nature, which holds tracking down the truth
 to be a thing to be longed for three times over — but consider also
 the opposite point in detail, how many parts of the mainland have
 been swallowed up, not only on the coasts but even inland, and how
 much dry land has become sea and is sailed over by ships of great
 139 tonnage. Or do you not know the celebrated story about the sacred
 Sicilian strait? In ancient times Sicily was joined to the mainland of
 Italy, but when the great seas on each side rushed in from opposite
 directions, (driven) by violent winds, the land between was flooded
 and broken; and the city that was founded beside it was called
 Rhegium ("Breaking"), named after the disaster. And the opposite
 result occurred from what one might have expected; the seas which
 had once been separated were joined together, being united by their
 flowing together, and the land which had been united was separated
 by the strait in between, as a result of which Sicily, which had been
 140 (part of the) mainland, was compelled to become an island. And the
 story is told of many other cities which disappeared and were swal-
 lowed up when the sea overwhelmed them; for in the Peloponnese
 too they say that three (cities),

Aigeira and Bura and lofty Heliceia,
 which was soon to grow much sea-moss on its walls,

εὐδαιμόνας τὸ πάλαι γενομένης πολλῆ τοῦ πελάγους ἐπικλυσθῆναι
 141 φορᾶ. ἡ δὲ Ἀτλαντὶς νῆσος, “ἄμα Λιβύης καὶ Ἀσίας μείζων”, ἢ φησιν 150
 ἐν Τιμαίῳ Πλάτων, ἡμέρα μιᾶ καὶ νυκτὶ “σεισμῶν ἐξαισίῳν καὶ
 κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων δῦσα κατὰ τῆς θαλάττης ἐξαίφνης ἠφανίσθη”,
 142 γενομένη πέλαγος, οὐ πλωτόν, ἀλλὰ βαραθρῶδες. οὐδὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ
 φθεῖρεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ἢ πλασθεῖσα τῷ λόγῳ μείωσις τῆς θαλάττης
 συνεργεῖ· φαίνεται γὰρ ὧν μὲν ἐξαναχωροῦσα, τὰ δ’ ἐπικλύζουσα. 155
 ἐχρῆν δὲ μὴ θάτερον τῶν γινομένων ἀλλὰ συνάμφω θεωροῦντας
 ἐπικρίνειν, ἐπεὶ κἂν τοῖς βίον ἀμφισβητήμασιν ὁ νόμιμος δικασ-
 τῆς, πρὶν [παρὰ] τῶν ἀντιδίκων ἀκούσαι, γνώμην οὐκ ἀποφανεῖται.
 27.143 καὶ μὴν ὁ τρίτος λόγος ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ διελέγχεται, μὴ ὑγῶς ἐρωτηθεὶς
 ἀπὸ τῆς εὐθύς ἐν ἀρχῇ φάσεως. οὐ γὰρ δήπουθεν οὐ πάντα τὰ μέρη 160
 φθείρεται φθαρτόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ἀλλ’ οὐ πάντα τὰ μέρη ἄμα καὶ ἐν
 ταύτῳ (καὶ) ἀθρόα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄκρον ἀποκοπεῖς
 τις δάκτυλον ζῆν οὐ κεκάλυται, εἰ δὲ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν μερῶν καὶ
 144 μελῶν πᾶσαν, αὐτίκα τελευτήσει. τὸν αὐτὸν οὖν τρόπον, εἰ μὲν
 συλλήβδην ἀπαξάπαντα τὰ στοιχεῖα ὑφ’ ἑνα καιρὸν ἠφανίζετο, 165
 φάσκειν ἐνδέχεσθαι τὸν κόσμον φθορὰν ἢ ἀναγκαῖον· εἰ δ’ ἕκαστον
 ἰδίᾳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ γείτονος μεταβάλλει φύσιν, ἀθανατίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ
 φθείρεται κατὰ τὸ φιλοσοφηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ τραγικοῦ

θνήσκει δ’ οὐδὲν τῶν γινομένων,
 διακρινόμενον δ’ ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο 170
 μορφήν ἑτέραν ἀπέδειξεν.

145 παντελής γε μὴν εὐήθεια τὸ γένος τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν
 ἐξετάζεσθαι· τῇ γὰρ περὶ τὸν λόγον ἀτοπία τις ἀκολουθήσας νέον τὸν
 κόσμον ἀποφανεῖ κομιδῇ μόλις πρὸ χιλίων παγέντα ἐνιαυτῶν, ἐπεὶ καὶ
 οὓς παρελήφαμεν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὐρετάς τὸν λεχθέντα τῶν ἐνιαυτῶν 175
 146 ἀριθμὸν οὐχ ὑπερβάλλουσιν. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ λεκτέον τὰς τέχνας ἰσῆλικας
 ἀνθρώπων γένει, μεθ’ ἱστορίας φυσικῆς ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ
 ῥαθύμως λεκτέον. ἢ δ’ ἱστορία τίς; φθοραὶ τῶν κατὰ γῆν, οὐκ ἀθρόων

150 Plato, *Timaeus* 24E 151-2 Plato, *Timaeus* 25C-D 160-8 Alexander
Aphrodisiensis, Quaestiones 1.23 (*Suppl. Arist.* t.2.2 p.36.23-37.9) 162-4 cf.
Lucretium 3.403 169-71 *Euripides, fr.* 839.12-14 (*TGF²* p.633) 174-
 76 Plato, *Leges* 3 677D 178-97 Plato, *Timaeus* 22C-D 178-81 *Philo*
Iudaicus, De Abrahamo 1; *id.*, *Vita Moysis* 2.63

153 βαραθρῶδες] βορβορῶδες *coni.* Colson 155 ὧν μὲν] τῶν μὲν *coni.* Diels
 158 παρὰ secl. *Buecheler*: καὶ Diels: ἐκατέρου *coni.* Usener 162 καὶ *coni.*
Cumont, add. Cohn: πάντ’ *coni.* Reiter 166 ἐνδέχεσθαι] δέχεσθαι Usener:
 μὲν δέχεσθαι *Gomperz* 170 πρὸς ἄλλο] πρὸς ἄλλου *Nauck*: πρὸς ἄλλῳ
Bernays

which had once been flourishing, were flooded by a great onslaught
 141 of the sea. And the island of Atlantis, “greater than Libya and Asia
 together” as Plato says in the *Timaeus*, in a single day and night, “as
 the result of extraordinary earthquakes and floods sank below the
 sea and suddenly disappeared”, becoming a sea which was not navi-
 142 gable, but full of chasms⁴. So the diminution of the sea, which they
 fabricate in their argument, does not help at all to show that the
 universe is perishing; for it is clear that (the sea) is retreating from
 some parts, but flooding others. They should have made their judg-
 ment considering not just one of the things that happen but both
 together; for in disputes in everyday life too the law-abiding judge
 will not declare his decision before he has heard the other side.
 27.143 (3) Moreover, their third argument is refuted by itself, being un-
 soundly stated from the very first assertion. For it is clearly not the
 case that that thing is perishable, of which all the parts perish, but
 that (that thing is perishable) of which all the parts perish together
 and simultaneously and all at once at the same time; for if the tip of
 someone’s finger has been cut off he has not been prevented from
 living, but if the whole combination of parts and limbs (is cut off), he
 144 will die at once. So, in the same way, if all the elements were de-
 stroyed together at a single time, it would be necessary to say that
 the universe admits of perishing; but if each individually changes to
 the nature of its neighbor, it is made immortal rather than perishing,
 in accordance with the philosophical remarks of the tragic poet:

Nothing of the things that come to be dies,
 but its parts are scattered and unite with different things
 and display another form.

145 (4) Certainly, to continue, it is complete foolishness to judge (the
 antiquity) of the human race from the crafts. For if someone follows
 this absurd argument he will show that the universe is quite new,
 having been put together hardly a thousand years ago, since those
 who we are told were the discoverers of the crafts do not go back
 146 more than that number of years. If then we are to say that the crafts
 are as old as mankind, we must do so not carelessly and lazily, but
 with the help of research concerning nature. What does that research
 (tell us)? Destructions of things on the earth, not of all of them to-

⁴ I.e. “reefs” (Rouse), the gaps between them being thought of as chasms? But perhaps we should read “full of mud” (Colson).

ἀπάντων ἀλλὰ τῶν πλείστων, δυσὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις αἰτίαις ἀνατίθενται, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἀλέκτοις φοραῖς· κατασκήπτειν δ' ἑκατέραν ἐν μέρει 180
 147 φασὶν ἐν πάνυ μακραῖς ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδοις. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἔμπρησις καταλαμβάνη, ρεῦμα αἰθερίου πυρὸς ἀνωθεν ἐκχέομενον πολλαχῆ σκεδάννυσθαι, μεγάλα κλίματα τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπιτρέχον· ὅταν δὲ κατακλυσμός, ἅπασαν τὴν ὕδατος [κατομβρίαν] κατασύρειν φύσιν, αὐθιγενῶν καὶ χειμάρρων ποταμῶν οὐ πλημμυρούτων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ 185
 καθεστὸς προσυπερβαλλόντων τῆς ἐπιβάσεως καὶ τὰς ὄχθας ἢ τῇ βίᾳ παραρρηγνύτων ἢ ὑπερπηδῶντων ἀναβάσει τῇ πρὸς μήκιστον ὕψος· ὅθεν ὑπερβλύσαντας εἰς τὴν παρακειμένην ἀναχεῖσθαι πεδιάδα, τὴν δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς μεγάλας λίμνας διανεμέσθαι, πρὸς τὰ κοιλότερα αἰεὶ τοῦ ὕδατος συνίζοντος, αὐθις δ' ἐπιρρέοντος καὶ τοὺς μεθορίους 190
 148 πελάγους κατὰ τὴν πολλῶν ἔνωσιν ἀποκρίνεσθαι. πρὸς δὲ μαχομένων δυνάμεων ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις οἰκοῦντας τόποις ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ὄρεσι καὶ γεωλόφοις καὶ δυσύδροις χωρίοις, ἅτ' οὐκ ἔχοντας φύσει πυρὸς ἀμυντήριον ἄφθονον ὕδωρ, ἔμπαλιν δ' ὕδατι τοὺς 195
 149 παρὰ ποταμοῖς ἢ λίμναις ἢ θαλάττῃ· γειτόνων γὰρ ἄπτεσθαι φιλεῖ τὰ κακὰ πρῶτων ἢ καὶ μόνων. κατὰ δὲ τοὺς λεχθέντας τρόπους δίχα μυρίων ἄλλων βραχυτέρων φθειρομένου τοῦ πλείστου μέρους ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιλείπειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὰς τέχνας· δίχα γὰρ τοῦ μεθοδεύοντος οὐκ εἶναι καθ' αὐτὴν ἰδεῖν ἐπιστήμην. ἐπειδὴν δὲ αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ νόσοι 200
 χαλάσωσιν, ἄρξῃται δὲ ἀνηβᾶν καὶ βλαστάνειν τὸ γένος ἐκ τῶν μὴ προκαταληφθέντων τοῖς ἐπιβρίασσι δεινοῖς, ἄρχεσθαι καὶ τὰς τέχνας πάλιν συνίστασθαι, οὐ τότε πρῶτον γενομένης, ἀλλὰ τῇ μειώσει τῶν ἐχόντων ὑποσπανισθείσας.

195-200 *Plato, Leges* 3 677A-C

184 κατομβρίαν *om. E, secl. Diels* : ὀμβρίου *coni. Cohn* 195 φύσει *Turnebus* : φησί *codd.* : φυσικὸν *coni. Buecheler* 197 ἢ καὶ μόνων *Diels* : ἡγεμόνων *UHP* : ἡγουμένων *M* : ἢ γε μόνων *Turnebus* 203 οὐ τότε *Buecheler* : οὔτε *codd.* : οὐ τὸ *Turnebus*

vid. 254B

185 Censorinus, *De die natali* 4.2-4 (BT p.6.26-7.15 Hultsch)

alii semper homines fuisse nec umquam nisi ex hominibus natos atque eorum generi caput exordiumque nullum exstitisse arbitrati sunt, alii vero fuisse tempus cum homines non essent, et his ortum

gether but of most of them, are attributed to two principal causes, indescribable onslaughts of fire and water; they say that each of these 147 descends (on the world) in turn, after very long cycles of years. So, when a conflagration occurs, a stream of fire from heaven is poured out from above and scattered far and wide, spreading over great regions of the inhabited earth; when there is an inundation, every sort of water rushes down; rivers fed by their own springs, and winter torrents, not only flow in spate but exceed the usual level to which they rise and either break down their banks or leap over them, rising to the greatest height. Then they overflow and pour out over the adjacent plain. This is first of all divided into great lakes, as the water always settles into the hollow parts, but as the water continues to flow in and submerges the intervening strips of dry land by which 148 the lakes are separated, in the end it becomes a great expanse of sea as the many (lakes) are joined together. And by these conflicting forces those who dwell in opposite places are destroyed in turn. The fire destroys those (who dwell) on the mountains and hills and in places where water is scarce, since they do not have abundant water, which is the natural defence against fire. And conversely the water (destroys) those who (dwell) by rivers or lakes or the sea; for evils are accustomed to fasten on those close at hand, at first or even 149 solely. When the greater part of mankind perishes in the ways stated, apart from countless other minor (ways), of necessity the crafts fail too; for it is not possible to see knowledge on its own, apart from its practitioner. When the common ills abate, and the race begins to grow and flourish from those who were not previously overcome by the troubles that pressed upon them, then the crafts too begin to arise again; they have not come into being for the first time then, but were (previously) neglected because of the reduction in number of their possessors.

see 254B

185 Censorinus, *About the Day of Birth* 4.2-4 (BT p.6.26-7.15 Hultsch)

Some have thought that human beings have always existed and have never been born except from human beings, and that there has been no head or origin of their race; others, however, that there was a time when human beings did not exist, and that some origin and

3 aliquem principiumque natura tributum. sed prior illa sententia, qua
semper humanum genus fuisse creditur, auctores habet Pythagoran
Samium et Occelum Lucanum et Archytam Tarentinum omnesque
adeo Pythagoricos. sed et Plato Atheniensis et Xenocrates et Di-
caearchus Messenius itemque antiquae Academiae philosophi non
aliud videntur opinati, Aristoteles quoque Stagiritis et Theophrastus
multique praeterea non ignobiles Peripatetici idem scripserunt.
eiusque rei exemplo [dicunt quod] negant omnino posse reperiri,
avesne ante an ova generata sint, cum et ovum sine ave et avis sine
4 ovo gigni non possit. itaque et omnium, quae in sempiterno isto
mundo semper fuerunt futuraeque sunt, aiunt principium fuisse
nullum, sed orbem esse quendam generantium nascentiumque, in
15 quo uniuscuiusque geniti initium simul et finis esse videatur.

1-16 *Dicaearchus*, fr. 47 *Wehrli* 4-10 *Xenocrates*, fr. 59 *Heinze* = fr. 164
Isnardi-Parente 4-7 *Occelus*, FVS 48.2 6 [*Occelus Lucanus*], *De*
universi natura 3.38-42 (p.20.12-21.14 *Harder*); cf. *Philonis Iudaei librum De aet.*
mundi 3.12 (t.6 p.76.12-14 *Cohn*) 9 *Aristoteles*, *De gen. anim.* 2.1 731b
35-6

1 nec umquam nisi ex] nec numquam ex *Fuhr* 5 creditur] traditur
→

Meteorologica

186A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.4 361a22-
b1 (CAG t.3.2 p.93.26-94.2 Hayduck)

ἀπορήσαι δ' ἂν τις, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο οἱ ἄνεμοι λοξοὶ καὶ εἰς τὰ πλάγια
φέρονται, διότι καὶ ὁ ἀήρ, ἐν ᾧ ἡ σύστασις αὐτῶν, κύκλῳ συμπεριάγεται
ὑπὸ τοῦ κυκλοφορητικοῦ σώματος, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι μὴ ἔσται ἡ κατὰ
φύσιν κίνησις αὐτῆ τῶν ἀνέμων· οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος ταύτην λέγομεν
εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῆδε κινεῖται· τίς οὖν ἡ κατὰ φύσιν
κίνησις αὐτοῖς; δεύτερον δέ, εἰ διὰ τοῦτο εἰς τὰ πλάγια κινούνται, διὰ
τὴν περιφορὰν τὴν τοῦ παντός, ἔδει καὶ τοὺς ἀνέμους ἀεὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτα
φέρεσθαι. νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως· εἰσὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ καὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν πνέουσι
τῇ περιφορᾷ, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ' ἀνατολὴν πνέοντες. Θεόφραστος
94 δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς κινήσεως τῆς λοξῆς τοῖς ἀνέμοις φησὶ γίνεσθαι διὰ

3 beginning was assigned to them by nature. The former opinion, ac-
cording to which the human race is believed always to have existed,
has as its supporters Pythagoras of Samos and Occelus of Lucania
and Archytas of Tarentum and absolutely all the Pythagoreans.
Moreover Plato the Athenian and Xenocrates and Dicaearchus of
Messana and likewise the (other) philosophers of the Old Academy
do not seem to have held a different opinion; and Aristotle of Stagira
too and Theophrastus and many not undistinguished Peripatetics
besides wrote the same. And as an illustration of this point they say
that it is altogether impossible to find out whether birds or eggs were
created first, since it is the case both that the egg cannot come to be
without the bird and that the bird cannot come to be without the egg.
4 And so they say that of all the things, which always have existed in
this eternal universe and always will exist, there has been no begin-
ning; rather, there is a certain cycle of those who produce and of
those who are born, in which the beginning and end of each and
every thing that is begotten seem to coincide.

Wehrli 6 *Occelus Diels*: *Ocellum codd.*: *Ocellum Canter* 11 eiusque
rei exemplo *Hultsch*: eiusque rei exempla *codd.*: eius quaeri exemplo *Lach-*
mann dicunt quod *secl. Hultsch*

Meteorology

186A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 2.4 361a22-b1
(CAG vol.3.2 p.93.26-94.2 Hayduck)

But if it is for this reason that the winds are carried obliquely and
sideways, (namely) because the air, in which they are formed, is
moved round in a circle by the rotating body (i.e. the heavens),
someone might raise the objection, firstly, that (in that case) this is
not the natural motion of the winds; for we do not say that this is the
natural motion of the air either, since it is not moved in this way of
itself. What then is the natural motion of (the winds)? And, secondly,
if it is on account of the rotation of the whole that they are moved
sideways, the winds too should always move in the same direction.
But in fact it is not so; for there are some which even blow in the
opposite direction to the rotation, as with those which blow from
94 west to east. Theophrastus says that the cause of the sideways mo-

τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς αὐτοὺς ἐκ ξηρᾶς τε καὶ θερμῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως γίνεσθαι· ἄνω γὰρ ἂν ἐφέροντο.

9-12 *Theophrastus, Meteorologica, versio Arabica* 13.21 (RUSCH t.5 cap.8 Daiber); cf. *eiusdem librum De ventis* 22; [Aristotelis] *Problemata* 25.14 939a38-b4 et 26.48 945b30-4; *Adamantii librum De ventis* 2 (p.37.15-25 Rose), *Theophrasto non nominato*

186B Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 1.13 349a12-b1 (CAG t.12.2 p.97.5-17 Stüve)

τῆς δὲ λοξῆς κινήσεως τῶν ἀνέμων ἄλλην μὲν αἰτίαν ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις Μετεώροις ἀποδίδωσιν, ἄλλην δὲ νῦν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης. ὁ γὰρ Θεόφραστος φησιν ἐν τῇ καπνώδει ταύτῃ ἀναθυμιάσει μεμῖχθαι τινὰ πυρώδη οὐσίαν καὶ γῆνιν, αἵτινες τὴν ἐναντίαν κίνησιν κινούμεναι καὶ μαχόμεναι λοξὴν ποιοῦνται τὴν κίνησιν. μὴ γὰρ τις λεγέτω, ὅτι διὰ τί γὰρ μὴ ὑφίεται ἢ ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄνω κινήσεις τοῦ γεώδους ἐπικρατοῦντος ἢ ἢ ἐπὶ τὰ κάτω τοῦ πυρώδους πλεονάζοντος ἐπ' εὐθείας τῆς κινήσεως γινομένης; ῥητέον γάρ, ὅτι τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται ἐπὶ σωματῶν κεκραμένων· ἐπὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων ἀνάγκη ὑφῆσιν γενέσθαι ἐκατέρας ἀμετρίας κολαζομένης, ἐπὶ δὲ σωματῶν κατὰ παράθεσιν ἐνωθέντων οὐχ ἔπεται τοῦτο· ἐκάτερον γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχον ἰσχὴν μένει ἀπομαχόμενον. διὸ μηδενὸς ὑπείκοντος ἐκ περιστάσεως τὸ ὅλον εἰς τὰ πλάγια φέρεται. οὕτω μὲν ὁ Θεόφραστος.

3-5 *Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteor.* 1.13 349a12-b1 (CAG t.12.2 p.97.25, 28, 31 Stüve), 2.4 361a22 (CAG t.12.2 p.175.6-11), 2.4 361a24 (CAG t.12.2 p.178.4-7), *Theophrasto nominato*; cf. *etiam* 1.13 349a32-b2 (CAG t.12.2 p.102.1-3), *quo tamen loco Empedocles, non Theophrastus, nominatur*

6 ἢ ἢ Stüve: ἢ V: ἢ G: om. A 8-9 κεκραμένων] κρεμαμένων et Aldina et CAG, sed permixtis temperatisque Camotius, recte ut videtur

187 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.6 364b14-17 (CAG t.3.2 p.112.26-34 Hayduck)

τὰς δὲ μεταβάσεις αὐτῶν καὶ περιστάσεις φησὶ γίνεσθαι πανομένων τῶν πρώτων εἰς τοὺς ἐχόμενους καὶ ἐφεξῆς αὐτοῖς κατὰ τοῦτο, καθ' ὃ μέρος ὁ ἥλιος μεθίσταται προϊών, διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι μὲν μετὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸ ἐχόμενον καὶ ἐφεξῆς τῇ ἀρχῇ, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ πρώτου πνεύματος ὡς ἀρχῆς τὰ καθ' ἃ ὁ ἥλιος κινεῖται μέρη γειννιώντα αὐτῷ· οὗτος γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτίος τῆς τῶν ἀνέμων κινήσεως. λέγει μέντοι Θεόφραστος ἐνίοτε

tion of the winds is that they do not simply come to be from the dry and warm exhalation; for (if they did) they would be carried upwards.

7 τὴν περιφορὰν] τὸ καὶ AWa ἀεὶ om. AWa ἐπὶ ταῦτα AWa 11 μὴ] μήτε A

186B Olympiodorus, On Aristotle's Meteorology 1.13 349a12-b1 (CAG vol.12.2 p.97.5-17 Stüve)

Theophrastus gives one explanation of the sideways motion of the winds in his own *Meteorology*¹, Aristotle here another. Theophrastus says that in this smoky exhalation there is a mixture of a certain fiery substance and of an earthy one; and that, being moved in opposite directions and conflicting with each other, they make the motion a sideways one. No one should object, why does not either the upward motion give way, when the earthy (substance) prevails, or the downward motion, when there is an excess of the fiery (substance), the motion coming to be in a straight line? For one should reply, that this is correct where mixed bodies are concerned; for in the case of these it is necessary that there should be a giving way, as each of the disproportions² is suppressed. But in the case of bodies which are unified by juxtaposition this does not follow; for each of (the constituents), having the same force, remains and resists. And for this reason, as neither yields, by a change of direction the whole is moved sideways. Thus, then, Theophrastus.

¹ Literally, *Things in the Sky*.

² That is, an excess of the fiery substance over the earthy one, or vice versa.

187 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Meteorology 2.6 364b14-17 (CAG vol.3.2 p.112.26-34 Hayduck)

(Aristotle) says that the changes and shifts of the winds come about when the first (winds) give place to those that are next and adjacent to them, according as the sun moves advancing from one quarter to another. For what is next and adjacent to the starting-point is moved after the starting-point, and the quarters which are next to the first wind as their starting-point are those through which the sun moves and which are adjacent to it; for (the sun) is the starting-point and cause of the motion of the winds. However, Theophrastus says

καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἐναντίους μεθίστασθαι τοὺς ἀνέμους· ὅταν γὰρ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ἀπώσωνται τὰ νέφη, πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα.

1-6 *Theophrastus, De ventis* 52; [*Aristoteles, Problemata* 26.12 941b11, 26.31 943b28, 26.35 944a32, 26.55 946b26] 6-8 cf. *Theophrasti opusculum De ventis* 52 *sub finem, quo tamen loco de nubibus non agitur; ita quoque* [*Aristoteles, Problemata* 26.12 941b11, 26.31 943b28] →

- 188** Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.6 363b24-5 (CAG t.3.2 p.108.30-3 Hayduck)

καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε . . . τὸν ὑπὸ τινῶν μὲν Ἀργέστην καλούμενον, Ὀλυμπίαν δ' ὑπ' ἄλλων καὶ Σκίρωνα, ὀνομάζουσι δέ τινες τὸν ἀνεμὸν τοῦτον καὶ Ἰάπυγα, ὡς Θεόφραστος λέγει.

1-2 ὑπὸ τινῶν—καὶ Σκίρωνα] *Aristoteles, Meteorologica* 2.6 363b24-5; *Theophrastus, De ventis* 62 (*ex correctione*) 2-3 ὀνομάζουσι—Ἰάπυγα] *haec non reperiuntur apud Theophrastum, sed cf. [Aristotelis] librum De situ ventorum* 973b17

- 189** Loci in opusculo Theophrasti De ventis ad quos auctores posteriores nominantes spectant

- 1 § 55] Alexander, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.5 361b30-5 (CAG t.3.2 p.97.10-17 Hayduck)
- 2 § 62] Alexander, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.6 363b13 (CAG t.3.2 p.108.20-3), qui Siculos Apeliotem ventum Hellespontiam nominare dicit, textu Theophrasti iam corrupto usus

- 190** Lumen animae B, caput 10, De sanctis, P (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

Theophrastus libro Commentatorum: regiones caelestes valide inflammatae frigus magnum efficiunt circa terram; cuius causa est quod frigus et calor sibi naturaliter conversantur atque unum ab altero repellitur et figuratur. regiones itaque caelestes vehementer inflammatae frigus aeris pellunt versus terram sua caliditate. et ideo ait Philosophus in ii Meteorum quod frigora et venti idem finiunt, id est eodem modo finiuntur.

6-8 *haec apud Aristotelem non reperiuntur; vid. comm.*

that sometimes the winds also shift (directly) to their opposites; for when the clouds are pushed into the opposite (quarter), the wind begins to blow back from there again.

1 μεταβάσεις] μεταβολάς AWa

- 188** Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 2.6 363b24-5 (CAG vol.3.2 p.108.30-3 Hayduck)

And at point E (the west-north-west wind¹) . . . (the wind) which is called Argestes by some and Olympias or Sciron by others; and some also name this wind Iapyx, as Theophrastus says.

¹ This is only an approximation; Aristotle's wind-rose is divided into twelve, rather than sixteen points.

- 189** Passages in Theophrastus' work *On Winds* to which later authors refer mentioning Theophrastus by name

- 1 § 55] Alexander, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 2.5 361b30-5 (CAG vol.3.2 p.97.10-17 Hayduck)
- 2 § 62] Alexander, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 2.6 363b13 (CAG vol.3.2 p.108.20-3 Hayduck), who says that the Sicilians call the East wind "Hellespontine", employing a text of Theophrastus that was already corrupt

- 190** *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 10, *On the Saints*, P (ed. 1477² Farinator)

Theophrastus in the book of *Commentaries*: When the heavenly regions are greatly ablaze they produce great cold in the region of the earth; the explanation of this is that cold and heat are naturally related reciprocally and the one is driven back and delimited by the other. And so when the heavenly regions are fiercely ablaze they drive the cold of the air towards the earth by their own heat. And for this reason the Philosopher (Aristotle) says in the second (book) of the *Meteorology* that cold and wind have the same limit, that is, they are limited in the same way.

- 191 Lumen animae B, caput 7, De beata Virgine, Mb (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

item eos qui dicebant tonitruum esse concussionem ventorum: sic Theophrastus ac Alfarabius hoc idem dicere necessario asserere oportet, videlicet quod concussio ventorum prius fiat antequam ex tali concussione ignis proveniat.

¹ Theophrastus, *Meteorologica, versio Arabica* 1.3 (RUSCH t.5 cap.8 Daiber) *sed de concussionibus nubium, non ventorum*

- 192 Plutarchus, Quaestiones Graecae 7 292C-D (BT t.2 p.338.25-339.4 Titchener)

τίνας αἱ πλωϊάδες νεφέλαι;
τὰς ὑπόμβρους μάλιστα καὶ περιφερομένας ἐκάλουν “πλωϊάδας”,
ὡς Θεόφραστος ἐν τετάρτῃ Περὶ μεταρσίων εἶρηκε κατὰ λέξιν, “ἐπεὶ
D καὶ αἱ πλωϊάδες αὐταὶ νεφέλαι καὶ αἱ συνεστῶσαι, ἀκίνητοι δὲ καὶ
τοῖς χρώμασιν ἐκλευκοὶ, δηλοῦσι διαφορὰν τινα τῆς ὕλης, ὡς οὐτ’
ἐξυδατουμένης οὐτ’ ἐκπνευματουμένης.”⁵

- 193 Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones 7.28.2-3 (BT p.262.18-263.5 Gercke)

hoc ut scias ita esse, non statim cometes ortus ventos et pluvias minatur, ut Aristoteles ait, sed annum totum suspectum facit; ex quo apparet illum non ex proximo, quae in proximum daret, signa
3 traxisse sed habere reposita et comprehensa legibus mundi. fecit hic cometes, qui Paterculo et Vopisco consulibus apparuit, quae ab
Aristotele Theophrastoque sunt praedicta; fuerunt enim maximae et
continuae tempestates ubique, at in Achaia Macedoniaque urbes
terrarum motibus prorutae sunt.

1-2 et 5-7 cf. *Aristotelis Meteorologica* 1.7 344b19-26 et *Theophrasti opusculum De signis* 34

⁸ prorutae *Fortunatus*: pruruptae Φ: praeruptate δ

- 194 Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 40C-D (BT t.3 p.151.1-9 Diehl)

θαυμασιωτάτην δὲ εἶναι φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς κατ’ αὐτὸν

- 191 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 7, On the Blessed Virgin, Mb (ed. 1477² Farinator)

The same applies to those who say that thundering is the collision of winds. Thus it is necessary for Theophrastus and Farabi to say and assert this same thing, namely that the collision of the winds occurs before fire is produced from such a collision.¹

¹ And hence that the thunder should occur before the lightning, which does not fit the facts.

- 192 Plutarch, *Greek Questions* 7 292C-D (BT vol.2 p.338.25-339.4 Titchener)

What are the floating clouds?

They used to call clouds which are especially full of rain and which move around “floating”, as Theophrastus says in the fourth (book of his) *Meteorology*¹, the text being: “Since these floating
D clouds, too, and these compact ones which do not move and are quite white in color display a certain difference in their matter, which is neither altogether watery nor altogether vaporous.”

¹ Literally, *On Things in the Sky*.

- 193 Seneca, *Questions about Nature* 7.28.2-3 (BT p.262.18-263.5 Gercke)

So that you may know that this is so, a comet does not threaten wind and rain at once when it appears, as Aristotle says, but makes the whole year treacherous; and from this it is clear that it does not derive the signs that it gives from what is immediately adjacent to that to which the signs relate, but rather they are stored up and
3 contained in the laws of the universe. This comet, which appeared in the consulship of Paterculus and Vopiscus¹, had the effects that Aristotle and Theophrastus foretold; for there were great and continuous storms everywhere, and in Achaia and Macedonia towns were overthrown by earthquakes.

¹ 60 A.D.

- 194 Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 40C-D (BT vol.3 p.151.1-9 Diehl)

Most wonderful in his time, Theophrastus says, was the theoriz-

χρόνους τὴν τῶν Χαλδαίων περὶ ταῦτα θεωρίαν, τὰ τε ἄλλα προ-
λέγουσαν καὶ τοὺς βίους ἐκάστων καὶ τοὺς θανάτους, καὶ οὐ τὰ κοινὰ
μόνον, οἷον χειμῶνας καὶ εὐδίας, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ἀστέρα τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ
χειμῶνος μὲν ἐκφανῆ γενόμενον ψύχη σημαίνειν, καύματα δὲ θέρους
εἰς ἐκάστους ἀναπέμπειν· πάντα δ' οὖν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰ ἴδια καὶ τὰ κοινὰ
προγινώσκειν ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανίων ἐν τῇ Περί σημείων βίβλῳ φησὶν
ἐκεῖνος.

1-3 et 6-8 haec in Theophrasti opusculo De signis non reperiuntur 4-6 cf.
De signis 46

vid. 211A-D

Motus terrae et montes ignem eructantes

195 Seneca, Naturales quaestiones 6.13.1 (BT p.209.4-14 Gercke)

In hac sententia licet ponas Aristotelem et discipulum eius
Theophrastum (non, ut Graecis visum est, divini, tamen et dulcis
eloquii virum et nitidi sine labore). quid utrique placeat exponam:
semper aliqua evaporatio est a terra, quae modo arida est, modo
umido mixta; haec ab infimo edita et in quantum potuit elata, cum
ulteriorem locum, in quem exeat, non habet, retro fertur atque in
se revolvitur; deinde rixa spiritus reciprocantis iactat obstantia et,
sive interclusus sive per angusta enisus est, motum ac tumultum
ciet.

4-9 Aristoteles, *Meteorologica* 2.8 365b21-366a5; Albertus Magnus, *Meteora* 3.2.7
(t.4 p.622a11-22 Borgnet; cf. p.621b36-8), ex Seneca, *Theophrasto nominato*; cf.
Theophrasti Meteorologica, versio Arabica 15.10-15 (RUSCH t.5 cap.8 Daiber)

5-6 quantum—ulteriorem] tantum elata ut ulteriorem δ 6 habeat δ

196A Scholion in Apollonii Rhodii Argonautica 4.834 (p.295.24-296.4 Wendel)

“εἰ μὲν δὴ μαλεροῖο πυρός”· περὶ τὸν πορθμὸν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ πυρὸς
ἀναφωσθήματα γίνονται, ὥστε καὶ τὴν θάλασσαν θερμαίνεσθαι, ὡς φησι

ing of the Chaldeans about these matters, foretelling, among other things, especially the course of individuals' lives and their deaths; and not only things that affect many people in common, like storms and fair weather — as the planet Mercury, when it appears in winter, indicates cold, but in summer sends everyone hot weather. No, in his book *On Signs* he says that they had foreknowledge of all things from the heavenly bodies, both those that affect individuals and those that are common to many people.

6 ἀναπέμπειν Fortenbaugh: ἀναπέμπει ed. Diehl

see 211A-D

Earthquakes and Volcanoes

195 Seneca, *Questions about Nature* 6.13.1 (BT p.209.4-14 Gercke)

(Among those who support) this opinion¹ you can reckon Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus, a man who did not possess divine eloquence, as the Greeks thought,² but none the less an eloquence that was pleasing and effortlessly polished. I will state (the view) that they both hold. There is always (they claim) an exhalation from the earth which is sometimes dry, sometimes mixed with moisture. This is given off from the lowest part and travels upwards as far as it can. But when it has no further place to pass into it is carried back and turns back upon itself; and the conflict (caused by) the breath moving in opposite directions tosses about the things that are in the way, and, whether (the breath) is shut in or struggles out through narrow spaces, it brings about movement and disturbance.

¹ Seneca is discussing the causes of earthquakes.

² An allusion to the customary etymology of Theophrastus' name; cf. 1, 2 and 5A-7B

196A Scholium on the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes 4.834 (p.295.24-296.4 Wendel)

“If indeed (the force) of raging fire (will cease)”: in the region of the strait (of Messina) fire is vented up in the sea, so that the sea too

καὶ Μητρόδωρος ἐν α΄ Περὶ ἱστορίας καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν Ἱστορικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν. καὶ φησι τὸν βρόμον τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν Αἰόλου νήσων ἀκούεσθαι ἕως ,α σταδίων· περὶ Ταυρομένιον γοῦν ἀκούεσθαι βροντῆ 5 παραπλήσιον ψόφον.

1-2 cf. *Strabonem* 6.2.11, ubi *Theophrastus non nominatur* 2-3 *Metrodorus Scepsius*, *FGrH* 184 F 2

3 Περὶ ἱστορίας] Περιηγήσεως *Keil*: Περὶ (παραδόξου) ἱστορίας *vel* Περὶ (Τιγράνου) ἱστορίας *Jacoby*: Ποικίλης ἱστορίας *coni. Wendel* 4 τῶν *P*:
→

196B Antigonus, *Historiarum mirabilium collectio* 130 (*Parad. Gr.* p.88.673-5 *Giannini*)

Θεόφραστον δὲ τὴν περὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους ἀναζειν οὕτως ἐπὶ δύο πλέθρων τὸ μήκος, ὥστε μὴ δυνατὸν εἶναι διὰ τὴν θερμασίαν εἰσβῆναι εἰς αὐτήν.

1-3 *Callimachus*, *fr.* 407(II) *Pfeiffer*

1 Θεόφραστον *Bentley*: Θεόφραστος *P* τὴν . . . Αἰόλου *Meurs*: τας . . . αἰολους *P* 3 αὐτήν *Giannini*: τούτην *P*

Metalla

197A Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In *Aristotelis Meteorologica* 3.6 378b5-6 (*CAG* t.3.2 p.178.10-15 *Hayduck*)

εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα καθόλου μὲν φησι καὶ κοινῶς εἰρησθαι περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν τε ὀρυκτῶν καὶ τῶν μεταλλευτῶν, τίς τε αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ πόθεν ἡ γένεσις καὶ ποῦ· ἰδίᾳ δὲ δεῖν φησιν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων γενῶν προχειρίζομένους τὰ οἰκεία αὐτοῖς ἐπισκοπεῖν. περὶ ὧν Θεόφραστος 5 πεπραγμάτευται ἐν τε τῷ Περὶ τῶν μεταλλευομένων καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις τισίν.

1-5 *Olympiodorus*, In *Aristotelis Meteor.* 3.6 378b5-6 (*CAG* t.12.2 p.266.33-6), *Theophrasto nominato* 3-5 [*Thomas Aquinas*], In *Aristotelis Meteor.* 3.6 378b5-6 (t.3 [continuatio] p.cx b11-19 ed. *Leonina*, a. 1886) *Theophrasto et Commentatore (Alexandro?) hoc loco nominatis sed ipso De metallicis libro nulli auctori expressis verbis attributo*; *Gennadius*, In *Aristotelis Meteor.* 3.6 378b5-6 (*Oeuvres complètes* t.7 p.481.16-20 *Petit et Siderides et Jugie*), *Theophrasto nominato*
→

grows warm, as both Metrodorus says in his first book *On Research*¹, and Theophrastus in his *Research Memoranda*. And he says that the roar from the Aeolian islands can be heard for up to a thousand stades² away; at any rate, around Tauromenium a sound like thunder is heard.

¹ This title for Metrodorus' work may be incomplete.

² Approximately 115 miles or 185 km.

τοῦ *L* ἀκούεσθαι *ed. pr.*: καίεσθαι *codd.* ,α σταδίων *Keil*: χίλια στάδια *ed. pr.*: ἐνὸς σταδίου *codd.*

196B Antigonus, *Collection of Amazing Stories* 130 (*Parad. Gr.* p.88.673-5 *Giannini*)

(*Callimachus* says) that Theophrastus (says) that the (sea) around the Aeolian islands boils to such an extent, for a distance of two *plethra*¹, that it is not possible to go into it because of the heat.

¹ Circa 200 feet or 60 meters.

Metals

197A Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Meteorology* 3.6 378b5-6 (*CAG* vol.3.2 p.178.10-15 *Hayduck*)

After saying these things, (*Aristotle*) says that he has spoken in general and in a universal way both about things that are quarried and about those that are mined — what the difference between them is, and whence and where they come to be. And he says that it is necessary to examine each of the kinds that have been mentioned individually, and to consider their particular properties. Theophrastus has dealt with these matters in his *On Things That are Mined* and in certain other (works).

5 τῷ] τοῖς *B* ἐν ἄλλοις τισίν] ἐν ἄλλοις συγγράμμασι περὶ τῶν τέκτων *Gennadius*

- 197B Simplicius, In Aristotelis De caelo 1, prooemium (CAG t.7 p.2.32-3.2 Heiberg)

τῶν γενητῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις διὰ τῶν
3 Μετεωρολογικῶν παραδέδωκεν, τῶν δὲ ἐν γῆ συνθέτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν
ἔμψυχα, τὰ δὲ ἄψυχα· καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀψύχων τὰ Περὶ μετάλλων
γεγραμμένα διδάσκει.

1-4 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Phys. 1, prooemium (CAG t.9 p.3.1-4), Theophrasto
non nominato →

- 197C Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 1.1 338a20 (CAG t.12.2 p.6.2-6 Stüve)

ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν συνθέτων ἐμνήσθημεν, χρὴ μὲν εἰδέναι, ὅτι
τῶν συνθέτων τὰ μὲν ὁμοιομερῆ, τὰ δὲ ἀνομοιομερῆ. καὶ ἐκάτερον
τούτων τριττὸν ἐστὶ· σύνθετα ὁμοιομερῆ ἄψυχα, ἅπερ διδάσκει ἐν τῷ
πέρατι τοῦ τρίτου λόγου τῆς παρούσης πραγματείας καὶ ἐν τῇ
μονοβίβλῳ Περὶ μετάλλων ἐπιγεγραμμένη. 5

3-5 Philoponus, In Aristotelis De gen. et corr. 1, prooemium (CAG t.14.2 p.2.16-17), et In Aristotelis Phys. 1, prooemium (CAG t.16 p.1.26-2.2) 3-4 Aristoteles, Meteorologica 3.6 378a15-b6

- 198 Pollux, Onomasticon 10.149 (LG t.9.2 p.234.23-7 Bethe)

μεταλλέως σκευὴ θύλακες, περίοδος, σάλαξ· καὶ θυλακοφορεῖν μὲν
τοὺς μεταλλέας οἱ κωμφοδοὶ λέγουσιν, περίοδον δὲ καὶ σάλακα
Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Μεταλλικῷ, περίοδον μὲν τὸ ἀγγεῖον ᾧ κατακερ-
αννύουσι τὸν σίδηρον, σάλακα δὲ τὸ τῶν μεταλλέων κόσκινον.

1-2 Aristophanes, fr. 789 Kock 2-3 Pollux, Onomasticon 7.99 (LG t.9.2 p.80.2-5 Bethe), Aristotelem vel Theophrastum libri auctorem dubitanter nominans →

- 199 Hesychius, Lexicon, s.v. προσφανῆ (no. 3920, t.3 p.392.30 Schmidt, ed. a. 1861)

προσφανῆ· Θεόφραστος ἐν Μεταλλικῷ χρυσοῦ συρροάς.

1 cf. [Aristotelis] Mir. ausc. 42 833a28-30

- 197B Simplicius, On Aristotle's On Heaven I, Introduction (CAG vol.7 p.2.32-3.2 Heiberg)

Of the things that come to be and pass away, (Aristotle) has
3 taught about those in the sky in the *Meteorology*; but of the composite
things on the earth some are alive and others lifeless. And the writ-
ings *On Metals* teach about those that are lifeless.

2 ἐν γῆ Db: ἐγγύς AB 3-4 τὰ—διδάσκει] ἐν ταῖς Περὶ μετάλλων πραγ-
ματείαις διδάσκουσιν (sic DF: διδάσκει [sc. Aristoteles] a) Simplicius, In Phys.

- 197C Olympiodorus, On Aristotle's Meteorology 1.1 338a20 (CAG vol.12.2 p.6.2-6 Stüve)

Since we have mentioned homoeomerous composite things, one
must know that, of composite things, some are homoeomerous and
some not;¹ and each of these is three-fold. (Some things are) compos-
ite, homoeomerous, and lifeless; and (Aristotle) teaches about these
at the end of the third book of the present inquiry and in the work of
one book entitled *On Metals*.

¹ Homoemerous things are uniform "stuffs", a part of which has the
same nature as the whole.

- 198 Pollux, Nomenclature 10.149 (LG vol.9.2 p.234.23-7 Bethe)

The implements of the miner are bags, crucible, riddle. The
comic poets say that miners are "bag-carriers", and the crucible and
the riddle (are mentioned) by Theophrastus in *On Metals*, the cru-
cible being the vessel in which they mix the iron, the riddle the
miners' sieve.

1 θύλακες BL: θύλακοι AC 3 ἐν τῷ Μεταλλικῷ om. A 4 σάλακα
Jungermann: ἄλακα BC: ἄλλακα AL

- 199 Hesychius, Lexicon, on προσφανῆ (no. 3920, vol.3 p.392.30 Schmidt, ed. 1861)

prospanê (visible): Theophrastus, in *On Metals*, (applies this) to
accumulations of gold.

- 200 Theophrastus, *De odoribus quae fertur sectio 71* (p.376.32-6 Wimmer, ed. a. 1866)

... Ἀθήνησι λέγειν εἰς πάντα χαλκὸν κοῖλον ἐμβάλλεσθαι σίδηρον, ὁμοίως ἐρυθρὸν καὶ λευκόν. εἶναι δὲ τινα λόγον πρὸς τὸν καττίτερον· συμβάλλεσθαι δ' οὐ μεγέθους χάριν ἀλλὰ τῆς πυκνότητος

1 Ἀθήνησι λέγειν] ἅ τινας λέγουσιν *coni.* Turnebus, qui haec sectioni 70 *continuat*: ἄτινα συλλεγόμενα *coni.* Vasconius πάντα *codd.*: ταῦτα *vulg.* χαλκὸν κοῖλον] καττίτερον *coni.* Vasconius σίδηρον] χαλκὸν *coni.* Vasconius; delendum *coni.* Schneider post σίδηρον *interpunxit* Burnikel, →

- 201 Harpocration, *Lexicon in decem oratores Atticos*, s.v. κεγχρέων (t.1 p.172.15-173.5 Dindorf)

173 κεγχρέων· Δημοσθένης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Πανταίνετον παραγραφῇ· “κἄπειτ' ἔπεισε τοὺς οἰκέτας τοὺς ἐμοὺς καθέζεσθαι εἰς τὸν κεγχρέωνά”, ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς τὸ καθαριστήριον, ὅπου τὴν ἐκ τῶν μετάλλων κέγχρον διέψυχον, ὡς ὑποσημαίνει Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ μετάλλων.

1-4 Photius, *Lexicon*, s.v. (*pars* 1 p.152.1-5 Porson), *Suda*, s.v. (no. 1221, LG t.1 *pars* 3 p.87.6-9 Adler), *Theophrasto non nominato* 1-2 Demosthenes 37.26 3-4 cf. *Lectiones rhetoricas*, p.271.23-5 Bekker, et *Photii Lexicon*, s.v. (*pars* 1 p.151.26-8 Porson), *Theophrasto non nominato*

1 παραγραφῇ Ald.: γραφῇ *Harpocratonis codd. et epitome*, Photius, *Suda* → 2

- 202 Hesychius, *Lexicon*, s.v. σκαρφῶν (no. 874, t.4 p.40.10 Schmidt, ed. a. 1862)

σκαρφῶν· εἶδος καμίνου ἐν τῷ Μεταλλικῷ.

- 203 Hesychius, *Lexicon*, s.v. σύζωσμα (no. 2212, t.4 p.92.22 Schmidt, ed. a. 1862)

σύζωσμα· ἐν τῷ Μεταλλικῷ τὸν ἐκρέοντα χαλκόν.

vid. *Appendicem* no. 3

- 200 Theophrastus, *On Odors*, “section 71”¹ (p.376.32-6 Wimmer, ed. 1866)

. . . to say that at Athens iron is put in all the hollow bronze, “red” and “white” alike. There is a certain proportion between (it and) the tin. It is included not for the sake of bulk, but (rather for the sake of) the density (of the bronze)

¹ This is one of two paragraphs (cf. 364) transmitted at the end of Theophrastus' *On Odors* which are not in fact part of that work but disjointed fragments.

Textgeschichtliche Untersuchungen (Palingenesia 8 [1974]) p.168 n.45 3
πυκνότητος A: κυκρότητος L: πικρότητος *vulg.*: στερεότητος *coni.* Vasconius

- 201 Harpocration, *Lexicon on the Ten Attic Orators on kenchreōn* (vol.1 p.172.15-173.5 Dindorf)

kenchreōn (place of granulation): Demosthenes, in the plea of in-
173 admissibility against Pantainetus: “and then he persuaded my slaves to sit in the *kenchreōn*”, instead of “the place of purification”, where they cleaned the grains¹ (of silver) from the mines, as Theophrastus indicates in *On Metals*.

¹ *kenchros*: hence the name *kenchreōn*.

ἔπεισε] ἐποιήσε C: πέισαξ Demosthenes 4 ὡς—μετάλλων *om.* *Harpocratonis epitome*

- 202 Hesychius, *Lexicon*, on *skarphōn* (no. 874, vol.4 p.40.10 Schmidt, ed. 1862)

skarphōn: a type of furnace, in *On Metals*.

- 203 Hesychius, *Lexicon*, on *syzōsma* (no. 2212, vol.4 p.92.22 Schmidt, ed. 1862)

syzōsma: in *On Metals*, the bronze that flows out (of the crucible?).

see *Appendix* no. 3

- 204 Michael Psellus, *Accusatio patriarchae* (Scripta minora t.1 p.322.15-20 Kurtz)

ὡςπερ δὲ τὰλλα εἰδῶς, ἃ νόμος εἰδέναι, καὶ τὰς μεταβολὰς τῶν ὑλῶν περιῆει ζητῶν καὶ δεινὸν ἐποιεῖτο, εἰ μὴ τὸν μὲν χαλκὸν ἄργυρον, τὸν δὲ ἄργυρον χρυσὸν ἀπεργάσαιτο. ἐνταυθα τοίνυν μόνον Ζώσιμοί τε αὐτῷ ἐσπουδάζοντο καὶ Θεόφραστοι καὶ ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐζήτειτο ἔκδοσις· οὕτω γὰρ ἐπιγράφεται τὰ βιβλία.

- 205 Cod. Paris. Gr. 2327 fol. 195^v (Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs, pars 3 p.25.10 et 17 Berthelot)

Γίνωσκε, ὦ φίλε, τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ποιητῶν. . . . Θεόφραστος

¹ *similiter cod. Paris. 2327 fol. 294^v; cod. Paris. 2249 fol. 213^v; cod. Paris. 2419 fol. 245^v (Berthelot p.25.6-7)*

vid. 139 v.33

Lapides

- 206 Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 3.25.7-8 (BT p.121.9-11 Gercke)

sunt enim multi pumicosi et leves, ex quibus quae constant insulae in Lydia natant: Theophrastus est auctor.

² Lydia Hermolaus Barbarus ad Plinii Nat. hist. 2.209: india codd.

- 207 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 36.134 (CB t.36 p.96.11-14 André)

idem Theophrastus et Mucianus esse aliquos lapides qui pariant credunt; Theophrastus et ebur fossile candido et nigro colore inveniri et ossa e terra nasci inveniri que lapides osseos.

1-2 cf. *Theophrasti opusculum De lapidibus* 5 2 *ibid.* 37

- 204 Michael Psellus, *Accusation of the Patriarch* (Scripta minora vol.1 p.322.15-20 Kurtz)

As if he knew the other things which it was law (he) should know, he went around seeking transformations of materials, and was annoyed if he did not make copper into silver and silver into gold. Here, therefore, his enthusiasm was entirely for (works attributed to authors like) Zosimus and Theophrastus, and he looked for the actual publication (in each case); for the books were inscribed in this way.¹

¹ I.e., with names of authors like Zosimus and Theophrastus.

- 205 Cod. Paris. Gr. 2327 fol. 195^v (Collection des anciens alchimistes grecs, part 3 p.25.10 and 17 Berthelot)

Learn, O friend, the names of the makers (of gold) . . . Theophrastus

see 139 l.33

Stones

- 206 Seneca, *Questions about Nature* 3.25.7-8 (BT p.121.9-11 Gercke)

For many (stones) are light and like pumice. The islands composed of these in Lydia float, as Theophrastus states.

- 207 Pliny, *Natural History* 36.134 (CB vol.36 p.96.11-14 André)

Theophrastus, again, and Mucianus believe that there are some stones which give birth (to other stones); Theophrastus also (believes) that ivory is found which is dug up, white and black in color, and that bones are produced from the earth and stones like bones are found.

² colore inveniri h: inveniri FRda: varium Detlefsen 2-3 colore—nasci om. B

- 208 Solinus, *Collectanea rerum mirabilium* 15.23 (p.97.17-18 Mommsen)

smaragdis hic locus patria est, quibus tertiam inter lapidum dignitatem Theophrastus dedit.

1-2 *smaragdo tertium locum dedit Plinius, Nat. hist. 37.62, et ex eo Isidorus, Etymol. 16.7.1, Theophrasto tamen non nominato*

vid. 139 v.32

- 209 Loci in opusculo Theophrasti De lapidibus ad quos auctores posteriores Theophrasto nominato spectant

- 1 §§ 6-7] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 36.132, ubi Plinius quaedam omittit et plura lapidum genera expressis verbis corpora defuncta servare dicit
- 2 § 8] Cyrillus, *Lexicon*, s.v. σαπφείρος (*Anecdota Parisiensia* t.4 p.190.1 Cramer)
- 3 §§ 12-13] Antigonus, *Historiarum mirabilium collectio* 168, Theophrasti nomine in lacuna suppleto; Antigonus duo genera lapidum confundit necnon Bottiaeos pro Binis scribit
- 4 § 23] Cyrillus, *Lexicon*, s.v. σαπφείρος (*Anecdota Parisiensia* t.4 p.190.1 Cramer)
- 5 § 24] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 37.74
- 6 § 25] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 37.75
- 7 § 27] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 37.75
- 8 § 29] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 37.33
- 9 § 31] Photius, *Lexicon*, s.v. ἀμέθυστον (no. 1175, t.1 p.124.3-4 Theodoridis), verbis paululum mutatis
- 10 § 32] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 37.193, Alexandri Magni nomine addito
- 11 §§ 33-4] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 37.97-8

- 208 Solinus, *Collection of Amazing Facts* 15.23 (p.97.17-18 Mommsen)

This place (Scythia) is the homeland of emeralds, to which Theophrastus has given the third rank among (precious) stones.

see 139 1.32

- 209 Passages in Theophrastus' work *On Stones* to which later authors refer mentioning Theophrastus by name

- 1 §§ 6-7] Pliny, *Natural History* 36.132, where Pliny omits some points and says of more types of stone explicitly that they preserve dead bodies
- 2 § 8] Cyril, *Lexicon*, on *sappheiros* (*Anecdota Parisiensia* vol.4 p.190.1 Cramer)
- 3 §§ 12-13] Antigonus, *Collection of Amazing Stories* 168, Theophrastus' name being restored in a lacuna; Antigonus confuses two types of stones and has "Bottiaei" in place of "Binae"
- 4 § 23] Cyril, *Lexicon*, on *sappheiros* (*Anecdota Parisiensia* vol.4 p.190.1 Cramer)
- 5 § 24] Pliny, *Natural History* 37.74
- 6 § 25] Pliny, *Natural History* 37.75
- 7 § 27] Pliny, *Natural History* 37.75
- 8 § 29] Pliny, *Natural History* 37.33
- 9 § 31] Photius, *Lexicon*, on *amethuston* (no. 1175, vol.1 p.124.3-4 Theodoridis), with slight change in the wording
- 10 § 32] Pliny, *Natural History* 37.193, with the addition of the name of Alexander the Great
- 11 §§ 33-4] Pliny, *Natural History* 37.97-8

- 12 § 36] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 3.45 93A-B, ubi Athenaeus plura exhibet; cf. Clementis Alexandrini *Paedagogum* 2.12 118.4 (GCS t.1 p.228.1-3), Theophrasto non nominato
- 13 §§ 46-7] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 33.126, ubi quaedam etiam ex eiusdem operis *De lapidibus* capite quarto male comprehenso trahuntur
- 14 §§ 58-9] Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 33.113-14, qui Theophrasti sententias gravius mutat; Photius, *Lexicon*, s.v. *τηγγάβαρι* (pars 2 p.592.7-10 Porson), qui plura refert quam apud Theophrastum leguntur sed haec illi expressis verbis non attribuit

vid. 351

Aquae

- 210 Vitruvius, *De architectura* 8.3.27 (CB t.8 p.24.1-8 Callebat)

ex his autem rebus sunt nonnulla, quae ego per me perspexi, cetera in libris graecis scripta inveni, quorum scriptorum hi sunt auctores: Theophrastus, Timaeus, Posidonius, Hegesias, Herodotus, Aristides, Metrodorus, qui magna vigilantia et infinito studio locorum proprietates, aquarum virtutes ab inclinatione caelique regionum qualitates ita esse distributas scriptis dedicaverunt.

5 caelique *E^H*: caeliquae *GW*: caeli *E²* 6 regionum qualitates *post* proprietates (*v.5*) *transposuit Schneider*, -que *omisso*

- 211A Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum* 22E (BT t.1 p.120.21-121.1 Diehl)

εἰ δέ τις αἰτιάται ταύτην τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, διότι τῶν ὑπὸ ὄμβριων ἀύξανων οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὔξησις τεταγμένη, λεκτέον, ὅτι γίνονται μὲν καὶ ἀποβάσεις τοῦ Νείλου πολλάκις, ὅμως καὶ ἡ συνέχεια τῶν ὄμβρων αἰτία τῆς ἀδιακόπου τοῦ ὕδατος αὔξησεως, καὶ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ὄρων, ἐν οἷς αἱ πηγαὶ τοῦ Νείλου· δεχόμενα γὰρ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν συνωθουμένων ἐκ τῶν ἐτησίων εἰς αὐτὰ νεφῶν ὄμβρους κατὰ πάσας ἑαυτῶν τὰς λαγόνας ἐπιρρεῖ ταῖς πηγαῖς ἀδιακόπως, αἱ δὲ τὸν ποταμὸν αὔξουσι πληθύνουσαι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐν εἶναι αἴτιον ὄμβρων φησὶν ὁ

- 12 §36] Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 3.45 93A-B, where Athenaeus gives more material; cf. Clement of Alexandria, *Paedagogus* 2.12 118.4, not naming Theophrastus
- 13 §§ 46-7] Pliny, *Natural History* 33.126, where some material is also derived from a misunderstanding of the fourth section of the treatise *On Stones*
- 14 §§ 58-9] Pliny, *Natural History* 33.113-14, seriously altering Theophrastus' points; Photius, *Lexicon on tingabari* (part 2 p.592.7-10 Porson), reporting more than is found in Theophrastus but not explicitly attributing it to him

see 351

Waters

- 210 Vitruvius, *On Architecture* 8.3.27 (CB vol.8 p.24.1-8 Callebat)

Of these matters there are many that I have seen for myself; the rest I have found written in Greek books, the authors of which are the following: Theophrastus, Timaeus, Posidonius, Hegesias, Herodotus, Aristides, Metrodorus. With great attention and with infinite application they have declared in their writings that the properties of localities and the powers of waters are distributed in this way, and, as a result of the degrees of latitude,¹ the characteristics of regions.

¹ I.e., as a result of the climate.

- 211A Proclus, *On Plato's Timaeus* 22E (BT vol.1 p.120.21-121.1 Diehl)

But if anyone criticizes this explanation, because (rivers) that rise on account of rain do not rise in a regular way, it should be said that the Nile often flows slackly too; but nevertheless the continuity of the rain is the cause of the unfailing rise of the water, as is also the height of the mountains, in which the springs of the Nile are. For these receive the rain from the clouds which are pushed together against them by the Etesian winds, and the springs on all their flanks

αὐξουσι πληθύνουσαι. καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔν εἶναι αἴτιον ὄμβρων φησὶν ὁ
121 Θεόφραστος, τὴν τῶν νεφῶν πίλησιν πρὸς τινα τῶν ὄρων.

4-9 Scholion in Platonis Timaeum 22E (p.284.5-9 Greene), Theophrasto
nominato 8-9 Theophrastus, De ventis 5; [Aristoteles], Problemata 26.7
940b33; Vitruvius, De architectura 8.2.2, Theophrasto nominato, 8.3.27 =
210; cf. [Theophrasti] librum De signis 3

211B Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 1.9 346b30 (CAG t.12.2
p.80.30-81.1 Stüve)

ιστέον δέ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης αἴτιον λέγει τῆς εἰς ὕδωρ
μεταβολῆς τὴν ψύξιν μόνον. Θεόφραστος δὲ οὐ μόνον τὴν ψύξιν αἰτίαν
φησὶ τῆς τοῦ ὕδατος γενέσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πίλησιν. ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἐν
Αἰθιοπία μὴ οὐσης ψύξεως ὄμως ὑετὸς κατάγεται διὰ τὴν πίλησιν. φησὶ
γὰρ ὄρη εἶναι ἐκεῖσε ὑψηλότατα, εἰς ἃ τὰ νέφη προσπταίουσι, καὶ εἰθ' 5
οὕτως καταρρήγνυται διὰ τὴν γινομένην πίλησιν. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
81 λεβήτων ὑγρότης, φησὶν, ἀντικαταρρεῖ, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν θόλων τῶν
λουτρῶν μὴ παρούσης ψύξεως, διὰ τὴν πίλησιν δηλονότι τούτου γινομένου.

2-3 Theophrastus, Meteorologica, versio Arabica 7.5-6 et 7.28-8.2 (RUSCH t.5 cap.9
Daiber); Epicurus, Epist. ad Pythoclem 99, quo loco Theophrastus non nominatur;
Lucretius, De rerum natura 6.510-12, Theophrasto non nominato; Arrianus, ap.
Stobaeum, Anthol. 1.31.8 (t.1 p.246.6-10 Wachsmuth) Theophrasto non nominato

211C Galenus, Tafsīr Kitāb Buqrāṭ Fī l-ahwiya wa-l-azmina wa-l-miyāh
wa-l-buldān 8.6 (cod. Cahirae Ṭal'at Ṭibb 550, f.55^v v.6-7)

فَأَمَّا ثَاوْفَرَسُطُسُ وَأَشْيَاعُهُ فَبَيْنَهُمْ قَالُوا إِنَّ الْأَمْطَارَ إِنَّمَا تَكُونُ مِنَ الْإِضْغَاطِ
وَالْإِعْصَارِ

1-2 In versione Hebr. 440-1 Wasserstein (Hierosolymis 1982), Nicodemus (?)
pro Theophrasto inuenitur

211D Seneca, Naturales quaestiones 3.26.1 (BT p.122.25-132.2 Gercke)

aestate quaedam flumina augentur ut Nilus, cuius alias ratio
reddetur. Theophrastus est auctor in Ponto quoque quosdam amnes
crescere tempore aestivo.

1 alias] Seneca, naturales quaestiones 4a.1

flow without failing, and these, swelling, make the river rise. For
121 Theophrastus says that this too is one cause of rain, the compression
of clouds against certain mountains.

4 διακόπου C 6 ὄμβροις C 9 πρὸς τινα om. P

211B Olympiodorus, On Aristotle's Meteorology 1.9 346b30 (CAG vol.12.2
p.80.30-81.1 Stüve)

One should know that Aristotle says that the cause of the change
to water is the cooling only; but Theophrastus says that not only
cooling is the cause of the coming-to-be of the water, but also com-
pression. For consider; there is no cooling in Ethiopia, but neverthe-
less rain falls because of compression. For he says that there are very
high mountains there, against which the clouds strike, and then in
this way rain bursts out because of the compression that takes place.
Moreover, in the case of cauldrons too moisture, he says, runs down
again, and also in the case of the domed rooms in baths, where there
81 is no cooling, this clearly coming about because of the compression.

4-6 [Aristoteles], Liber de Nilo fr. 248 (p.197.9-11 Rose³) et Lucretius, De re.
nat.6.729-34, Theophrasto non nominato 7-9 Theophrastus, Meteorologica,
versio Arabica 7.7-9 (RUSCH t.5 cap.8 Daiber); cf. Vitruvii librum De architectura
8.2.4 (Theophrasto nominato, 8.3.27 = 210) et [Aristotelis] librum De plantis 2.1
822b21 et 2.3 824b24, Theophrasto non nominato

211C Galen, On Hippocrates' Airs, Seasons, Waters, Places 8.6 (cod. Cairo,
Ṭal'at Ṭibb 550, f.55^v v.6-7)

As for Theophrastus and his followers, they said that rains result
just from compression and pressure.¹

¹ Both words, compression and pressure, would appear to be a double
translation of the Greek πίλησις in 211B.

211D Seneca, Questions about Nature, 3.26.1 (BT p.122.25-123.2 Gercke)

In summer some rivers swell, like the Nile; the reason for this
will be given elsewhere. Theophrastus states that in Pontus, too, cer-
tain rivers rise in summer.

- 212 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis De sensu 4 441b3-7 (CAG t.3.1 p.71.24-72.4 Wendland)

τά τε γὰρ ἄλμυρά τῶν ὑδάτων τῷ διὰ τῆς τοιαύτης γῆς διηθεῖσθαι τοιαῦτά ἐστιν· οἱ γὰρ ἄλλες εἶδος τι τῆς γῆς εἴσι, δι' ὧν τὸ διηθούμενον ὕδωρ ἄλμυρόν γίνεται. καὶ καθόλου ὅποια ἂν ἡ τῆς γῆς ποιότης ᾖ, τοιοῦτος καὶ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ δι' αὐτῆς βέοντος γινόμενος ὄραται, διὰ μὲν ἀσφαλτώδους ἀσφαλτώδης, διὰ δὲ πικρᾶς πικρός· τὰ γοῦν διὰ τῆς 5
72 τέφρας διηθούμενα πικρὰ γίνεται. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ πλείστοι πηγῶν καὶ κρηνῶν εἴσι διαφοραί· αἱ μὲν γὰρ πικραὶ τῶν κρηνῶν εἴσιν, αἱ δὲ ὀξεῖαι παρὰ τὰς τῆς γῆς δι' ἧς βέουσι διαφοράς. ἰστόρηται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα Θεοφράστῳ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ὕδατος.

1-8 cf. Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.3 359b7-15 et Alexandri comm. ad loc. (CAG t.3.2 p.88.26-34), Theophrasto non nominato 3-5 cf. Theophrasti CP 6.3.1; Arit Didymi Epit. phys. fr. 14a (p.854.4-7, 14-18 Diels) = Stobaei Anthol. 1.39.1 (t.1 p.253.27-254.3 et 254.8-11 Wachsmuth), Aristotele nominato; Senecae Nat. quaest. 3.24.4, Theophrasto non nominato 5-6 cf. [Aristotelis] Problemata 24.17 937b15-18

- 213A Anonymus, In Antimachum Colophonium = Pack² 89 = P. Milan. 17, col. 2.53-8 (PRIMI t.1 p.53 Vogliano)

καὶ Θεόφραστος δ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ὑδάτων γράφει οὕτως· ὅσα δὲ δὴ [- - - |] τοιοῦτ[ω]ν πλείους αἱ φύσ[ε]ις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶ[ν οὐ] πότιμα τυγχάν[ει | - - - τὰ δὲ π]αντὶ ζώ[ω]ι π[ό]τιμα μὲν[...]ν[.....]ον[.].[...]. [- - - | - - - τὰ Σ]τυγὸς [ὑδ]ατα ἔχει τοῦτ[ο - - - | - - -] διατ[ι [...]. α. δηλοῖ[- - - | - - -]ρα....[...] πο. ζοννη[5

cuncta suppl. Vogliano, PRIMI t.1 p.53, nisi aliter dictum est 1 δὴ Castiglioni: δη[λα Vogliano ap. B. Wyss, Antimachi Colophonii reliquiae 85-7: δη[κτικὰ von der Mühl ibidem 2 τῶν ὑδάτων τοιοῦτων con. Vogliano ap.

- 213B Antigonus, Historiarum mirabilium collectio 158 (Parad. Gr. p.100.786-91 Giannini)

περὶ τῶν [αὐτῶν] ὑδάτων Θεόφραστον φησι τὸ καλούμενον “Στυγὸς ὕδωρ” λέγειν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐν Φενεῷ, στάζει δ' ἐκ τινος πετριδίου· τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους αὐτοῦ ὑδρεύεσθαι σπόγγους πρὸς ξύλοις δεδεμένους λαμβάνειν. διακόπτειν δὲ πάντα τὰ ἀγγεῖα πλὴν τῶν κερατίνων. τὸν

- 212 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's On Sensation 4 441b3-7 (CAG vol.3.1 p.71.24-72.4 Wendland)

Brackish waters are like this because they have filtered through earth of this sort. For salts are a sort of earth, and water that filters through them becomes brackish. And in general it is observed that the flavor of (water) corresponds to the quality of the earth through which it has flowed; (if) through bituminous (earth), (its flavor is) 72 like bitumen, (if) through bitter (earth), (its flavor is) bitter — at any rate, (waters) that have filtered through ashes become bitter. It is this that causes most of the differences between (one) well or spring (and another); for some are bitter, and others acid, as a result of differences in the earth through which (their waters) flow. Theophrastus has enquired into such matters in his *On Water*.

4 post βέοντος add. ὕδατος T, fort. recte

- 213A Anonymous, On Antimachus of Colophon = Pack² 89 = P. Milan. 17, col.2.53-8 (PRIMI vol.1 p.53 Vogliano)

And Theophrastus, in *On Waters*, writes as follows: “As many as . . . , of such there are several (different) natures; for some of them are not drinkable . . . others are for every creature drinkable, indeed . . .

. . . the waters of the Styx have this (property) . . .

Wyss 4 μὲν [πλή]ν Morel [ὑδ]ατα Körte, Archiv. f. Papyrusforschung 13 (1938-9) 84 5 τοῦτ[ο Körte

- 213B Antigonus, Collection of Amazing Stories 158 (Parad. Gr. p.100.786-91 Giannini)

Concerning waters (Callimachus) says that Theophrastus says of the so-called “water of Styx” that it is at Pheneos, and trickles from a certain cliff. Those who want to collect it catch it in sponges tied to sticks. It breaks all vessels except those made of horn. The person

δὲ ἀπογευσάμενον τελευτᾶν.

1-5 Callimachus fr. 407 (XXX) Pfeiffer 1-4 Vitruvius 8.3.16, *quo loco*
Theophrastus non nominatur, *sed. vid.* 8.3.27 = 210 1-2 Pausanias 8.17.6,
Theophrasto non nominato

213C Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.26 (CB t.31 p.36.4-8 Serbat)

in Arcadia ad Pheneum aqua profluit e saxis "Styx" appellata, quae ilico necat, ut diximus; sed esse pisces parvos in ea tradit Theophrastus, letales et ipsos, quod non in alio genere mortiferorum fontium.

2 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 2.231

1 Arcadia Hermolaus Barbarus, *cf.* 31.54, *etc.*: achaia RdTEaX: achia VF ad Pheneum RVFTd: ad ap(pp r)aneum rEaX

214A Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 2.15-17 41F-43B (CB t.1 p.102.20-105.12 Desrousseaux)

Θεόφραστος δὲ φησιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὑδάτων τὸ Νείλου ὕδωρ πολυγονώτατον καὶ γλυκύτερον· διὸ καὶ λύειν τὰς κοιλίας τῶν πινόντων μίξιν ἔχον λιτρώδη. ἐν δὲ τῷ Περὶ φυτῶν ἐνιαχοῦ φησιν ὕδωρ γίνεσθαι παιδογόνον ὡς ἐν Θεσπιαῖς, ἐν Πύρρα δὲ ἄγονον. καὶ τῶν γλυκέων δὲ 42 φησιν ὑδάτων ἔνια ἄγονα ἢ οὐ πολύγονα, ὡς τὸ Ἀφροδίσιον τὸ ἐν Πύρρα. ἀγχιμῶν δὲ ποτε γενομένων περὶ τὸν Νεῖλον ἐρρῦν τὸ ὕδωρ ἰῶδες καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἀπώλοντο. μεταβάλλειν τέ φησιν οὐ μόνον τὰ πικρὰ τῶν ὑδάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀλυκὸν καὶ ὄλους ποταμούς, καθά

1-3 Eustathius, *In Homeri Odysseam* 4.351 (p.1499.59-61 ed. Rom.) Theophrasto non nominato 1-2 Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* 3.25.11; *cf.* Plutarchi *Quaest. conviv.* 8.5 725E; *quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat* 3-4 Theophrastus, *HP* 9.18.10 (*etiam CP* 2.6.4); Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 31.10, *Theophrasto non nominato* 6-7 Eustathius, *In Homeri Iliadem* 11.55 (t.3 p.150.15-16 van der Valk), *Theophrasto non nominato*; *aliter tamen Plinius, Nat. hist.* 31.52, *Theophrasto non nominato* 8-9 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 31.54, *Theophrasto non nominato*; Aristoteles *ap. Michaellem Psellum, Quaest. var.* 134 (Aristoteles, *fr.* 218 Rose³)

2 post γλυκύτερον lacunam indic. Schneider διὸ καὶ ὅτι Eustathius 3 νιτρώδη Eustathius 4 παιδογόνον Theophrastus: παιδογόνιον E: παιδογονίας C 5 Ἀφροδίσιον Einarson ex Plinio: ἐν Φεία καὶ CE: ἐν Φεραῖς καὶ vel ἐν Ἀφεταῖς καὶ Casaubon: ἐν Φεία καὶ Schneider et Desrousseaux 8 πικρὰ] μικρὰ Kaibel

who tastes of it dies.

1 τῶν [ἀντῶν] Giannini: δ' αὖ τῶν Westermann: δὲ τῶν ἄλλων Keller: fort. δὲ τῶν ἰδίων Giannini 2 Φερεῶ Meurs: Φοινίω P

213C Pliny, *Natural History* 31.26 (CB vol.31 p.36.4-8 Serbat)

In Arcadia, at Pheneos, there flows from the rocks water which is called "the Styx". It kills instantaneously, as we have said. However, Theophrastus records that there are small fish in it, which are themselves deadly. This does not happen in any other kind of deadly spring.

214A Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 2.15-17 41F-43B (CB vol.1 p.102.20-105.12 Desrousseaux)

Theophrastus says, in *On Waters*, that the water of the Nile encourages the production of offspring and is very fresh; and for this reason it loosens the bowels of those who drink it, having an admixture of washing-soda. And somewhere in the (*Research*) *on Plants* he says that (some) water encourages the production of offspring, as at Thespieae, whereas that at Pyrrha prevents it. And of fresh waters too he says¹ that some prevent the production of offspring or do not 42 encourage it, like the Aphrodision at Pyrrha. Once, when there were droughts in the region around the Nile, the water ran poisonous² and many of the Egyptians died. And he says that not only bitter waters change in character, but also brackish ones and whole rivers, like

¹ This is no longer from the *Research on Plants*; presumably we are back with *On Waters*.

² Or "rust-colored", or "verdigris-colored".

τὸν ἐν Καρίᾳ, παρ' ᾧ Ζηνὸς Ποσειδῶνος ἱερόν ἐστιν. αἴτιον δὲ τὸ
πολλοὺς κεραυνοὺς πίπτειν περὶ τὸν τόπον. 10

ἄλλα δὲ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ σωματώδη ἐστὶ καὶ ἔχει ὡσπερ τι βᾶρος
ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, ὡς τὸ ἐν Τροίῳζήνι· τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τῶν γενομένων εὐθὺς ποιεῖ
B πλήρες τὸ στόμα. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τοῖς περὶ Πάγγαιον μετάλλοις τοῦ μὲν
χειμῶνος τὴν κοτύλην ἄγουσαν ἔχει ἐνενήκοντα ἔξ, θέρους δὲ τεσ-
σαράκοντα ἔξ. συστέλλει δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ πυκνοὶ μᾶλλον τὸ ψυχρός. διὸ καὶ 15
ἐν τοῖς γνώμοσι ῥέον οὐκ ἀναδίδωσι τὰς ὥρας ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι, ἀλλὰ
περιτεύει βραδυτέρας οὔσης τῆς ἐκροῆς διὰ τὸ πάχος. καὶ ταῦτά περὶ
Aἰγύπτου φησὶν, ὅπου μαλακώτερος ὁ ἀήρ. τὸ δὲ ἀλυκὸν ὕδωρ
γεωδέστερον ἐστὶ καὶ πλείονος δεῖται κατεργασίας, ὡς [καὶ] τὸ
C θαλάσσιον, θερμότεραν ἔχον τὴν φύσιν καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως πάσχον. μόνον 20
δ' ἀτέραμνον τῶν ἀλυκῶν τὸ τῆς Ἀρεθοῦσης. χεῖρω δ' ἐστὶ τὰ βαρυσ-
ταθμότερα καὶ τὰ σκληρότερα καὶ τὰ ψυχρότερα διὰ τὰς αὐτὰς αἰτίας·
δυσκατεργαστότερα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν τῷ πολὺ τὸ γεῶδες ἔχειν, τὰ δὲ
ψυχρότητος ὑπερβολῇ. τὰ δὲ ταχὺ θερμαινόμενα κοῦφα καὶ ὑγιεινά. ἐν
Kραννῶνι δ' ἐστὶν ὕδωρ ἡσυχῇ θερμόν, ὃ (θερμόν) διατηρεῖ κραθέντα 25
τὸν οἶνον ἐπὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας. τὰ δ' ἐπίρρυτα καὶ ἔξ ὀχετοῦ ὡς
ἐπίπαν βελτίω τῶν στασίμων, κοπτόμενά τε μαλακώτερα γίνεται. διὰ
D τοῦτο καὶ (τὰ) ἀπὸ τῆς χιόνος δοκεῖ χρηστὰ εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ ἀνάγεται
τὸ ποτιμώτερον καὶ τοῦτο κεκομμένον ἐστὶ τῷ ἀέρι — διὸ καὶ τῶν
ὀμβρίων βελτίω· καὶ τὰ ἐκ κρυστάλλου δὲ διὰ τὸ κουφότερα εἶναι· 30
σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ ὁ κρυστάλλος αὐτὸς κουφότερος τοῦ ἄλλου ὕδατος.
τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ σκληρά, διότι γεωδέστερα. τὸ δὲ σωματώδες καὶ θερμανθὲν
θερμότερον καὶ ψυχθὲν ψυχρότερόν ἐστι. κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δ' αἰτίαν
καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι ποτιμώτερα τῶν ἐν τοῖς πεδίοις· ἦτιον γὰρ μέμικται
E τῷ γεῶδει. ποιεῖ δὲ τὸ γεῶδες καὶ τὰς ἐπιχρόας τῶν ὑδάτων. τὸ γοῦν 35
τῆς ἐν Βαβυλῶνι λίμνης ἐρυθρὸν γίνεται ἐπὶ τινὰς ἡμέρας· τὸ δὲ τοῦ

12-13 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 31.36, *Theophrasto non nominato* 24-6 *ibid.* 31.20,
Theophrasto non nominato 26-31 *ibid.* 31.31-2, *Theophrasto non nominato*
33-5 Plutarchus, *Quaest. conviv.* 8.5 725D, *Theophrasto non nominato* 35-
8 Eustathius, *In Homeri Iliadem* 11.55 (t.3 p.150.23-4, 26-7 van der Valk),
Theophrasto non nominato 35-6 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 31.55, *Theophrasto non*
nominato 36-9 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 31.56, *Theophrasto non nominato*

9 Καρίᾳ] Κιθαιρῶνι Casaubon Ζηνὸς ποσειδῶνος CE: Ζηνοποσειδῶνος
Porson (ex Athenaeo 8.18 337C): Ζηνός, (καὶ τὸν ἐν Καρίᾳ, παρ' ᾧ) Ποσειδῶνος
Casaubon: Neptuni Plinius 11 ἐστὶ Dindorf: εἰσὶ CE 19 καὶ del.
Kaibel 21 ἀλυκῶν] γλυκῶν Kaibel 25 θερμόν add. Casaubon, Plinium
conferens 27 post τε add. τῷ ἀέρι Kaibel 28 τὰ add. Musgrave

that in Caria, besides which there is a temple of Zeus-Poseidon. The
reason is that many thunderbolts fall around the place.

Other waters both are substantial and have, as it were, a certain
weightiness in themselves, like that at Troezen; for this at once
B makes full the mouths of those who even taste it. The (waters) near
the mines around Mount Pangaeum weigh 96 (drachmas) to the half-
pint in winter, but 46 in summer.³ The cold makes it contract and
makes it more dense. And for this reason, when it flows in water-
clocks it does not give the hours correctly in winter, but makes them
too long, the outflow being slower on account of the density. And he
says the same thing about Egypt, where the air is milder. Brackish
water is more earthy and needs longer boiling than does sea water,
C which is warmer in its nature and not affected in the same way.⁴ The
only brackish water that is hard is that of Arethusa. (Waters) that are
heavier and harder and colder are inferior for the same reasons; they
are harder to boil in some cases because they have a large proportion
of the earthy, in others through excess of cold. But those that are
heated swiftly are light and healthy. In Crannon there is water which
is slightly warm, and which keeps wine that is mixed with it warm
for two or three days. Running waters, and those from a conduit, are
on the whole better than those that are stationary, and being dashed
about they become softer. And for this reason (waters) from snow,
D too, are thought to be wholesome; for the part that is better to drink
is drawn up, and this is dashed about by the air — for which reason
(these waters) are better than those from rain. And those from ice
(are wholesome) too, because they are lighter; this is shown by the
fact that ice itself too is lighter than other water. But cold (waters) are
hard, because they are more earthy; what is (more) substantial is
both warmer when it is heated, and colder when it is cooled. And for
the same reason (waters) on mountains are better to drink than those
in the plains; for they contain less admixture of what is earthy. The
earthy (part) also causes the colored tints in waters; at any rate, that
E in the lake at Babylon becomes red for some days⁵, and that of the

³ On the Attic standard these weights are approximately 413 and 198
grams. The "half-pint" (*kotylē*) was about 240 or 270 cc.

⁴ Or, retaining καὶ with the manuscripts, "Brackish water is more earthy
and needs more boiling (than fresh water) — as does also sea water — for it
is warmer in its nature and not affected in the same way (as fresh water)"; so
the Budé translation.

⁵ Pliny says, "for eleven days in summer".

Βορυσθένου κατά τινες χρόνους ἰοβαφὲς καίπερ ὄντος καθ' ὑπερβολὴν λεπτοῦ· σημεῖον δέ· τοῦ Ὑπάνιος ἐπάνω γίνεται διὰ κουφότητα τοῖς βορείοις.

πολλαχού δ' εἰσὶ κρήναι αἱ μὲν ποτιμώτεραι καὶ οἰνωδέστεραι, ὡς 40
 ἢ περὶ Παφλαγονίαν, πρὸς ἣν φασι τοὺς ἐγγωρίους ὑποπίνειν προ-
 σιόντας, ἀλμώδεις δ' ἅμα τῷ ὄξει ἐν Σικανοῖς τῆς Σικελίας. ἐν τῇ
 F Καρχηδονίων δὲ ἐπικρατεία κρήνη ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἐπιστάμενον ἐλαίφ ἐστὶν 45
 ὁμοιον, μελάντερον (δὲ) τὴν χροάν· ὁ ἀποσφαιροῦντες χρῶνται πρὸς τὰ
 πρόβατα καὶ τὰ κτήνη. καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις δ' εἰσὶ λίπος ἔχουσαι τοιοῦτον,
 ὡς ἡ ἐν Ἀσίᾳ, ὑπὲρ ἧς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐπέστειλεν ὡς ἐλαίου κρήνην
 εὐρηκώς. καὶ τῶν θερμῶν δ' ἐκ φύσεως ὑδάτων ἔνια γλυκέα ἐστίν, ὡς
 43 τὰ ἐν Αἰγαίς (τῆς) Κιλικίας καὶ περὶ Παγασὰς τὰ τ' ἐν τῇ Τρωικῇ
 Λαρίσση καὶ περὶ Μαγνησίαν καὶ ἐν Μήλῳ καὶ Λιπάρα· ἐν δὲ Προύσῃ
 τῇ πρὸς τὸν Μύσιον Ὀλυμπον τὰ βασιλικὰ καλούμενα. τὰ δ' ἐν Ἀσίᾳ 50
 περὶ Τράλλεις καὶ τὸν Χαρακωμήτην ποταμόν, ἔτι δὲ Νῦσαν πόλιν
 οὕτως ἐστὶ λιπαρὰ ὡς μὴ δεῖσθαι τοὺς ἐναπολουμένους ἐλαίου. τοιαῦτα
 καὶ τὰ ἐν Δασκύλου κόμῃ. τὰ δ' ἐν Καρούροις κατάξηρα καὶ σφόδρα
 B θερμά· τὰ δὲ περὶ Μηνὸς κόμην, ἢ ἐστὶ Φρυγίας, τραχύτερά ἐστι καὶ
 λιτωδέστερα, ὡς καὶ (τὰ) ἐν τῇ καλουμένῃ Λέοντος κόμῃ τῆς Φρυγίας. 55
 τὰ δὲ περὶ Δορύλαιον καὶ πινόμενά ἐστιν ἥδιστα· τὰ γὰρ περὶ Βαΐας
 ἢ Βαίου λιμένα τῆς Ἰταλίας παντελῶς ἄποτα.

40-2 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 2.230, et 31.16, *Theopompo nominato*; Vitruvius, *De arch.* 8.3.20, *Theophrasto cum aliis nominato* 8.3.27 = 210 42-5 Antigonus 139 (qui *Lycum nominat*); Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 35.179 (qui *duo genera κρηνῶν confundit*); ita quoque Discorides, *De materia medica* 1.73, et Solinus, *Coll. rerum mirabilium* 5.22 (p.52.16 Mommsen); ex his omnibus nemo *Theophrastum nominat*
 42 Aristoteles, *Meteor.* 2.3 359b14-16 42-5 Vitruvius, *De arch.* 8.3.8, *Theophrasto cum aliis nominato* 8.3.27 = 210 42-4 [Aristoteles], *Mir. ausc.* 113 841a10; *Paradoxographus Florentinus* 29, *Aristotele nominato*; cf. *Gratii Falisci Cynegetica* 433-4, *nullo auctore nominato* 45-7 *Paradoxographus Florentinus* 5; *Strabo* 11.11.5; *Plutarchus, Alexander* 57.5-7; *quorum nemo Theophrastum nominat* 47-9 Plinius, *Nat. hist.* 31.61 et 76, *Theophrasto non nominato* 52-3 cf. *Pausaniam* 4.35.11, *qui aquam Dascyli lacte dulciorem esse asseverat, Theophrasto non nominato*

41 ὑποπαροινεῖν Courier 42 fort. ἀλμώδης Kaibel, *Antigonum* 139 *conferens* 44 δὲ add. Kaibel ἀφαιροῦντες coni. Schneider 47 γλυκέα] fort. ἀλμυκὰ Kaibel, *Plinium* 31.76 *conferens* 48 τῆς add. Musgrave: *totum locum ita fortasse restituendum censuit Schweighäuser, Plinium* 31.61 *conferens*: γλυκέα ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ περὶ (Αἰγέστην τῆς Σικελίας· ἄλλα δὲ ἀλμυκὰ, ὡς τὰ περὶ) Αἰγὰς Κιλικίας τὰ τ' ἐν Casaubon: τὰς ἐν CEB 50 βασι-
 λικὰ] βαρβαρικὰ B Ἀσίᾳ] Λυδία Schweighäuser: Καρία Kaibel 53

Bug is violet-colored at certain times, although it is exceptionally light — as is shown by the fact that, when there is a north wind, it flows above the Dnieper⁶ on account of its lightness.

In many places there are springs of which some are better to drink and more like wine, as is the one in Paphlagonia, to which the inhabitants are said to go and to become rather tipsy as a result; others are both brackish and acid, among the Sicani in Sicily. In the F dominion of the Cathaginians⁷ there is a spring on the surface of which there collects a substance like olive-oil, but darker in color; they make it into balls⁸ and use it for sheep and cattle. And among other peoples too there are (springs) which have this sort of fatty substance, like the one in Asia, about which Alexander (the Great) sent word that he had found a spring of oil. And of naturally warm 43 waters, too, some are fresh⁹, like those in Aegae in Cilicia and in the region of Pagasae, and those in Trojan Larissa, around Magnesia, and in Melos and Lipara; and in Prusa, near the Mysian Olympus, those that are called “royal”. Those in Asia, in the region of Tralles and of the river Characometes, and also near the city of Nysa, are so oily that those who wash in them do not need oil. And those in the village of Dascylum, too, are like this. Those in Carura are dry and B very warm; those around the village of Men, which is in Phrygia, are rougher and more like soda, as are also those in the village called Leon in Phrygia. Those around Dorylaeum are very pleasant when drunk; for¹⁰ those around Baiae, or the harbor of Baium, in Italy are altogether undrinkable.

⁶ I.e., at the point where the rivers flow into a single estuary. “Borysthenes” is usually the name for the Dnieper and “Hypanis” for the Bug. For the reversal of the normal identifications here, cf. Steinmetz, *Die Physik des Theophrast* p. 272, and the Commentary.

⁷ I.e., in the part of Sicily ruled by the Carthaginians.

⁸ Or, “skim it off in globules”, Gulick; or, emending with Schneider, simply “remove it”.

⁹ Kaibel emends to “brackish”. Schweighäuser suggests that a reference to fresh waters at Segesta in Sicily has fallen out of the text.

¹⁰ Gulick suggests “a noteworthy fact, for”, but the disjointed nature of the text surely reflects abbreviation.

fort. κατάσκληρα Kaibel
 Casaubon: δονόλαιον CE
 rousseaux

55 τὰ add. Musgrave 56 Δορύλαιον
 post Δορύλαιον lac. (propter γὰρ) ind. Des-

214B Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 4a.2.16 (BT p.150.8-9 Gercke)

Nilum aliquando marinam aquam detulisse Theophrastus est auctor.

1-2 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.52, *Theophrasto non nominato*

214C Plutarchus, *Aetia physica* 7 914A (BT t.5.3 p.9.12-15 Hubert et Pohlenz et Drexler)

ἐν δὲ Θράκη περὶ τὸ Πάγγαιον ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος εἶναι κρήνην, ἀφ' ἧς ταῦτὸ γέμιον (ἀγγεῖον) ὕδατος ἰστάμενον χειμῶνος ἔλκειν διπλάσιον σταθμὸν ἢ θέρους.

2 ἀφ' Turnebus : ἐφ' codd. ἀγγεῖον add. Wyttenbach

214D Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.17 (CB t.31 p.33.1-3 Serbat)

Polyclitus Lipari iuxta Solos Ciliciae ungui, Theophrastus hoc idem in Aethiopia eiusdem nominis fonte.

1-2 Vitruvius, *de arch.* 8.3.8, *Theophrasto cum aliis nominato* 8.3.27 = 210
1 Antigonus, *Hist. mir.* 135; *Paradoxographus Palatinus* 16 2 Herodotus
3.23; *Paradoxographus Florentinus* 23 (qui Herodotum nominat); Pomponius
Mela, *De chorographia* 3.88, Solinus, *Coll. rer. mir.* 30.11 (p.132.2-3
Mommsen), et Isidorus, *Etymol.* 13.13.2, sine auctoris nomine

215 Galenus, *Tafsīr Kitāb Buqrāṭ Fī l-ahwiya wa-l-azmina wa-l-miyāh wa-l-buldān* 8.8 (cod. Cahirae Ṭal'at Ṭibb 550, f.56^r v.16-18)

قال جالينوس ما أبين قول بقراط وأوضحه وقد وافقه ارسطاطاليس
وثاوفرستس فيما كتبوا قى الجليد وأن لطيف الماء وخفيفه يتواري ذاتياً ويبقى
الكبر الثقيل منه

1-3 om. versio Hebr. 458-9 Wasserstein (*Hierosolymis* 1982)

2-3 أثقلت (تفلت) من الجمود ... بقى على حاله ... لا يذوب ويتقى ذاتياً ويبقى 215
ἐκπύονται καὶ ἀφανίζεται ... λείπεται = بقى على حاله ... لا يذوب ويتقى ذاتياً ويبقى 215
textus Hipp. 8.8, p.77 Mattock et Lyons

214B Seneca, *Questions about Nature* 4a.2.16 (BT p.150.8-9 Gercke)

Theophrastus records that the Nile has sometimes brought down sea (i.e. salt) water.

214C Plutarch, *Natural Explanations* 7 914A (BT vol.5.3 p.9.12-15 Hubert and Pohlenz and Drexler)

And in Thrace, in the region of Mount Pangaeum, Theophrastus records that there is a spring; if one and the same vessel is filled with water from it and weighed, it weighs twice as much in winter as in summer.

214D Pliny, *Natural History* 31.17 (CB vol.31 p.33.1-3 Serbat)

Polyclitus (says) that (people) are anointed (with water) from the river Liparis¹ near Soli in Cilicia; Theophrastus (says) the same (is done) with a spring of the same name in Ethiopia.

¹ The name of the river is derived from λιπαρός meaning oily.

1 Polyclitus *codd. et Paradox. Palat.*: Polycritus Hardouin ex Antigono Lipari *Urlichs*: experi R: expleri *cett.*: ex Lipari *Detlefsen*

215 Galen, *On Hippocrates' Airs, Seasons, Waters, Places* 8.8 (cod. Cairo, Ṭal'at Ṭibb 550, f.56^r v.16-18)

Galen said: How clear and obvious Hippocrates' statement is! As a matter of fact, Aristotle and Theophrastus are in agreement with him in what they wrote about ice: that the fine and light (part) of water vanishes as it melts, while the muddy and heavy (part) of it is left behind.

- 216 Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 3.11.2-5 (BT p.103.7-21, 104.7-12 Gercke)

apud nos solet evenire, ut amisso canali suo flumina primum refundantur, deinde, quia perdidit viam, faciant. hoc ait accidisse Theophrastus in Coryco monte, in quo post terrarum tremorem nova vis fontium emerit. sunt qui alias quoque causas intervenire opinantur, quae aliter evocent aquas aut cursu suo deiciant et avertant: fuit aliquando aquarum inops Haemus, sed cum Gallorum gens a Cassandro obsessa in illum se contulisset et silvas cecidisset, ingens aquarum copia apparuit, quas videlicet in alimentum suum nemora ducebant; quibus eversis umor, qui desiit in arbusta consumi, superfusus est. idem ait et circa Magnesia accidisse. sed pace Theophrasti dixisse liceat: non est hoc simile veri. . . . idem ait circa Arcadium, quae urbs in Creta insula fuit, fontes et rivus substitisse, quia desierit coli terra diruta urbe, postea vero quam cultores receperit aquas quoque recepisse. causam siccitatis hanc ponit, quod obduruerit constricta tellus nec potuerit imbres inagitata transmittere.

1-4 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.54, *Theophrasto non nominato* 4-16 *ibid.*
31.53, *Theophrasto non nominato*

4 sunt qui Φ : sicut δ : sic et ϵ : scilicet *Rosbach*: [sunt] cui *Gercke* 5
opinatur Φ : opinatur *Gercke* evocent *Fortunatus*: vocent Δ : vocant
 Φ 12 rivus *EOT*: lacus Δ 14 receperit *Erasmus*: exceperit λ :
perceperit *cett.*

- 217 Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 3.16.4-5 (BT p.110.3-16 Gercke)

sunt et sub terra minus nota nobis iura naturae sed non minus certa: crede infra, quicquid vides supra. sunt et illic specus vasti [sunt] ingentesque recessus ac spatia suspensis hinc et inde montibus laxa; sunt abrupti in infinitum hiatus, qui saepe illapsas urbes receperunt et ingentem ruinam in alto condiderunt — haec spiritu plena sunt, nihil enim usquam inane est — et stagna obsessa tenebris et lacus ampli. animalia quoque illis innascuntur, sed tarda et informia ut in aere caeco pinguique concepta et aquis torpentibus

- 216 Seneca, *Questions about Nature*, 3.11.2-5 (BT p.103.7-21, 104.7-12 Gercke)

It usually happens, in our experience, that rivers which have lost their channel at first overflow and then, because they have lost their route, make (themselves a new one). Theophrastus says that this happened on Mount Corycus, where, after an earthquake, a new abundance of springs appeared. There are those who think¹ that other causes too intervene, bringing forth waters in other ways or checking them in their courses and turning them aside. Mount Haemus was once lacking in water, but when a tribe of Gauls, who had been hemmed in by Cassander, fled to it and cut down the forests, a great abundance of waters appeared; clearly the woods were taking this for their own nourishment, and when they were cut down the moisture, which was no longer used up in the trees, overflowed. He² says that the same thing also happened in the area of Magnesia. But, if one may be permitted to speak against Theophrastus, this is not plausible. . . . The same man (Theophrastus) says that in the area of Arcadia, which was a city on the island of Crete, the springs and rivers ceased to flow, because, when the city was destroyed, the ground was no longer cultivated. But afterwards, when the land was cultivated again, the waters too returned. He advances the following as the explanation of the dryness, that the earth had become compacted and hard, and that the rain could not pass through it as it was untilled.

¹ Or, with the variant readings or emendations, "Similarly he (Theophrastus) thinks" or the like.

² Presumably Theophrastus.

- 217 Seneca, *Questions about Nature* 3.16.4-5 (BT p.110.3-16 Gercke)

There are also laws of nature beneath the earth, less known to us but no less certain: believe that whatever you see above the earth also exists beneath it. There too there are vast caverns and great recesses and open spaces with mountains overhanging on this side and that; there are chasms gaping open to infinity which have often swallowed up cities which have fallen into them and buried their vast ruins in the deeps — these places are filled with air, for there is no void anywhere — and there are marshes enveloped in darkness and wide lakes. Living creatures too are born in these, but they are sluggish and unformed, being conceived in dark and heavy air and

situ, pleraque ex his caeca ut talpae et subterranei mures, quia deest lumen, quod supervacuum est. inde, ut Theophrastus affirmat, 10 pisces quibusdam locis eruuntur.

1-11 *haec omnia ex Seneca Theophrasto attribuit Albertus Magnus, Meteora 2.2.9 (t.4 p.553a36-b12 Borgnet)* 10-11 *Theophrastus, De piscibus 7 (p.456.50-457.5 Wimmer ed. 1866)*

3 sunt del. Gercke cum f 7 lacus ampli Haupt: locis amplis codd.: fort. →

218A Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.13-14 (CB t.31 p.31.13-32.6 Serbat)

Eudicus in Hestiaeotide fontes duos tradit esse, Ceronam ex quo bibentes oves nigras fieri, Nelea ex quo albas, ex utroque varias; Theophrastus Thuriis Crathim candorem facere, Sybarim nigritiam 14 bubus ac pecori. quin et homines sentire differentiam eam; nam qui e Sybari bibant nigriores esse durioresque et crispo capillo, qui e Crathi candidos mollioresque et porrecta coma. item in Macedonia 5 qui velint sibi candida nasci ad Haliacmonem ducere, qui nigra aut fusca ad Axium. idem omnia fusca nasci quibusdam in locis dicit et fruges quoque, sicut in Messapis. at in Lusia Arcadiae quodam fonte mures terrestres vivere et conversari. Erythris Aleos amnis 10 pilos gignit in corporibus.

1 *Eudoxus, F364 Lasserre* 1-2 [*Aristoteles*], *Mir. ausc.* 170 846b37; *Callimachus ap. Paradoxographum Palatinum* 15; *Antigonus, Hist. mir.* 78; *Strabo* 10.1.14, ex quo et *Priscianus Lydus, Sol. ad Chosroem* 8 (*Suppl. Arist. t.1.2 p.91.11*) et *Eustathius, In Homeri Iliadem* 2.536 (t.1 p.428.8-10 van der Valk) pendent; *Isidorus, Etymol.* 13.13.5, qui ex *Plinio* pendet; quorum nemo *Theophrastum* nominat 9-10 [*Aristoteles*], *Mir. ausc.* 125 842b6-9; *Antigonus, Hist. mir.* 137, qui *Theopompum* nominat; *Paradoxographus Florentinus* 10, qui *Aristotelem* nominat

1 *Hestiaeotide Gelenius: hestiaeotice vel sim. codd.*; *Hestiaea Euboica Mayhoff: Eὐβοία [Aristoteles]*, *Strabo: ἐν τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ κατὰ τὴν Ἰστυαίωτιδα Antigonus: Thessalia Isidorus: Θράκη Par. Palat.* Ceronam] *ceronem X: Κέρων An-* →

218B Aelianus, *De natura animalium* 12.36 (BT t.1 p.311.10-13 Hercher)

τὸ ὕδωρ ὃ Κράθις λευκῆς χροῆς ποιητικὸν μεθήσει [ποταμὸς ὄν]. τὰ γοῦν πρόβατα πίνοντα αὐτοῦ καὶ οἱ βόες καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τετράπους ἀγέλη, καθά φησι Θεόφραστος, λευκὰ ἐκ μελάνων γίνεται ἢ πυρρῶν.

1 ποταμὸς ὄν del. Hercher

in waters that are torpid and motionless; many of these are blind, like moles and subterranean mice, because they have no sight, since it would be superfluous. And from here, as Theophrastus asserts, fish are dug up in certain places.

luto amplissima Gercke 9 quia] quibus ET Albertus 10 quod] quia φ Albertus 11 post eruuntur aliquot verba excidisse velut adhuc spirantia vel qui reviviscunt cum coquantur censuit Gercke Theophrastum, De piscibus 7-8 con- ferens

218A Pliny, *Natural History* 31.13-14 (CB vol.31 p.31.13-32.6 Serbat)

Eudicus¹ records that there are two springs in Hestiaeotis, Cero- na and Neleus; sheep that drink from Ceroana become black, those that drink from Neleus become white, and those that drink from both become piebald. Theophrastus (says) that at Thuriis the (river) 14 Crati makes cattle and flocks white, the Coscile black. Moreover, men too are affected differently by them; for those who drink from the Coscile are darker and more hardy and have curly hair, those who drink from the Crati are fair-complexioned and more delicate and have straight hair. Similarly, in Macedonia those who want to have white (animals²) born lead (their flocks) to the Haliacmon, those who want black or dark-colored ones to the Vardar. The same man (Theophrastus) says that all the (animals) born in certain places are dark-colored, and the crops too, as among the Messapi. But in a certain spring at Lusi in Arcadia land-mice, (he says), live and have their homes. At Erythrae the river Aleos makes hair grow on the body.

¹ I.e., Eudoxus; see H. Oehler, *Paradoxographus Florentinus* 5 n.3.

² That the reference is to sheep is made clear by 218D.

igonus: Κέρως Par. Palat.: Cereus Strabo: Κέρβης [Aristoteles]: Ceroana Urlichs 2 Nelea Hardouin, et ita [Aristoteles], Antigonus, Strabo: mellea vel sim. codd.: Μηλέα Par. Palat. 6 mollioresque edd. vett.: madidiores codd. plerique: om. X 7 Haliacmonem Sillig: halacmonem rEaX: ha monem R

218B Aelian, *On the Nature of Animals* 12.36 (BT vol.1 p.311.10-13 Hercher)

The Crati flows with water that produces a white color. At any rate sheep that drink of it, and cattle, and every four-footed herd become white instead of black or red, according to what Theophrastus says.

218C Scholion in Theocriti Idyllium 5.14-16 (k, p.161.2-4 Wendel)

ὡς Νυμφόδορος δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος φασι, τοῦ Κράθιδος τὸ ὕδωρ
ξανθίζει.

1-2 [Aristoteles], *Mir. ausc.* 169 846b33, et ex eo Strabo 6.1.13, ex quo rursus Priscianus Lydus, *Sol. ad Chosroen* 8 (Suppl. Arist. t.1.2 p.91.4) et Eustathius, *In Homeri Iliadem* 2.536 (t.1 p.536.10 van der Valk), idemque in Dionysium Periegetam 373 (p.283.38-42 Müller), 414 (p.293.8-10 Müller); Antigonus, *Hist.*

218D Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 3.25.4 (BT p.119.21-120.5 Gercke)

in Macedonia quoque, ut ait Theophrastus, qui facere albas oves volunt, <ad Haliacmonem> adducunt, quem ut diutius potavere, non aliter quam infectae mutantur; at si illis lana opus fuit pulla, paratus gratuitus infector est: ad Peneion eundem gregem appellant.

3-4 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 2.230, *Theophrasto non nominato*

219 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.19 (CB t.31 p.33.12-15 Serbat)

Theophrastus Marsyae fontem in Phrygia ad Celaenarum oppidum saxa egerere. non procul ab eo duo sunt fontes Claeon et Gelon ab effectu Graecorum nominum dicti.

1-2 *Isidorus, Etymol.* 13.13.7, *Theophrasto non nominato*

2 Claeon *Hermolaus Barbarus*: cleon *EaX*: cyllon *cett.*

220 Olympiodorus, In Aristotelis *Meteorologica* 2.3 358a3 (CAG t.12.2 p.156.26-157.1 et 157.6-8 Stüve)

τίς ἄρα ἢ κατὰ Ἀριστοτέλην αἰτία τῆς ἀλμυρότητος τῆς θαλάττης; ἄρα ἢ ὑποκειμένη γῆ τῇ θαλάττη; οὐ δῆτα. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ Περιπατητικόν, ἀλλὰ Θεοφράσειον, εἴ γ' ἄρα Θεόφραστος τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ὅτι ἡ ὑποκειμένη γῆ αἰτία ὑπάρχει τῆς ἀλμυρότητος. . . . λέγομεν, ὅτι τις ἀπεπτος οὐσία παρεμπίπτουσα ἐργάζεται τὴν ἀλμυρότητα, τουτέστιν ἡ 5
καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ὑποκειμένης γῆς ἀνιούσα, ὡς Θεόφραστος ἔλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πέριξ γῆς.

3 γ' ἄρα *A.H. Griffiths*: γὰρ *codd.*

218C Scholion on Theocritus' *Idyll* 5.14-16 (k, p.161.2-4 Wendel)

As Nymphodorus and Theophrastus say, the water of the Crati produces a golden color.

mir. 134, et *Paradoxogr. Palatinus* 13; quorum uterque *Timaeum nominat*; Ovidius, *Metamorphoses* 15.315-6; Vibius Sequester, *Flumina* 54 (p.11 Gelsomino); *Parmeniscus ap. scholion in Euripidis Troiades* 228 (p.355.1-7 Schwartz); quorum omnium nemo *Theophrastum nominat*

218D Seneca, *Questions about Nature* 3.25.4 (BT p.119.21-120.5 Gercke)

In Macedonia too, as Theophrastus says, those who want to make their sheep white lead them to the Haliacmon; if they have drunk of this for a considerable time, they are changed (in color) just as if they had been dyed. But if they need dark-colored wool, there is a dyer ready who makes no charge; they drive the same flock to the Peneius.

1 qui] amnis est ad quem qui ET: est flumen ad quod qui Δ 2 ad Haliacmonem *add. Gercke, Plinii Naturalem historiam* 3.14 = 218A *conferens*

219 Pliny, *Natural History* 31.19 (CB vol.31 p.33.12-15 Serbat)

Theophrastus says that the spring of Marsyas in Phrygia near the town of Celaenae casts out rocks. Not far from it there are two springs called "Claeon" and "Gelon" from the force of the Greek names.¹

¹ "Weeping" and "Laughing" respectively.

220 Olympiodorus, *On Aristotle's Meteorology*, 2.3 358a3 (CAG vol.12.2 p.156.26-157.1 and 157.6-8 Stüve)

What then, according to Aristotle, is the cause of the saltiness of the sea? Is it the earth beneath the sea? No, for this is not the Peripatetic view, but that of Theophrastus, if, indeed, Theophrastus said that the earth beneath is the cause of the saltiness. . . . We say that some unconcocted substance entering into it produces the saltiness, and this is the smoky exhalation, which arises not from the earth beneath the sea, as Theophrastus said, but from the surrounding earth.

221 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteorologica 2.1 353a32-b17 (CAG t.3.2 p.67.3-22 Hayduck)

οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὑπόλειμμα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὴν θάλασσαν τῆς
πρώτης ὑγρότητος. ὑγροῦ γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ περὶ τὴν γῆν τόπου κάπναια τὸ
μὲν τι τῆς ὑγρότητος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐξατμίζεσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι πνεύματά
τε ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τροπὰς ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης, ὡς διὰ τὰς ἀτμίδας ταύτας
καὶ τὰς ἀναθυμιάσεις κάκεινων τὰς τροπὰς ποιουμένων, ἔνθα ἡ ταύτης
αὐτοῖς χορηγία γίνεται, περὶ ταῦτα τρεπομένων· τὸ δὲ τι αὐτῆς
ὑπολειφθὲν ἐν τοῖς κοίλοις τῆς γῆς τόποις θάλασσαν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ
ἐλάττω γίνεσθαι ξηρανομένην ἐκάστοτε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου καὶ τέλος
ἔσεσθαι ποτε ξηρὰν. ταύτης τῆς δόξης ἐγένετο, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος,
'Αναξίμανδρός τε καὶ Διογένης· Διογένης δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀλμυρότητος
ταύτην αἰτίαν λέγει, ὅτι ἀνάγοντος τοῦ ἡλίου τὸ γλυκὺ τὸ κατα-
λειπόμενον καὶ ὑπομένον ἀλμυρὸν εἶναι συμβαίνει. οἱ δὲ τινὲς φασιν
οἷον ἰδρωτά τινα τῆς γῆς εἶναι τὴν θάλασσαν· θερμαινομένην γὰρ
αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ταύτην ἀφιέναι τὴν ὑγρότητα· διὸ καὶ ἀλμυρὰν
αὐτὴν εἶναι· τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ ἰδρῶς. ταύτης τῆς δόξης Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
γένετο. τρίτη δὲ δόξα περὶ θαλάσσης ἐστὶν ὡς ἄρα τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ διὰ τῆς
γῆς διηθούμενον καὶ διαπλύνον αὐτὴν ἀλμυρὸν γίνεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν
γῆν τοιοῦτους χυμοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ· οὗ σημεῖον ἐποιοῦντο τὸ καὶ ἄλας
ὀρύττεσθαι ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ νίτρα· εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὀξείας χυμοὺς πολλαχοῦ τῆς
γῆς. ταύτης πάλιν τῆς δόξης ἐγένοντο Ἀναξαγόρας τε καὶ Μητρόδωρος.

1-9, 12-15, 16-18 *Aristoteles, Meteor. 2.1 353b6-17*; cf. *Alexandri Aphrodisiensis Quaestiones 3.10 (Suppl. Arist. t.2.2 p.98.20-8)*, nullis doctrinarum auctoribus nominatis 10 *Anaximander, FVS 12A27*; *Diogenes 64A17*; cf. *Alexandri comm. In Arist. Meteor. 2.2 354b33-355a2 (CAG t.3.2 p.73.22)* 10-12 *Aëtius, Plac. 3.16.1 (DG p.381a15-19)*, sed *Anaximandro pro Diogene nominato*; item *Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.59.1 (GCS t.43.2 p.420.2-4)*; quorum neuter *Theophrastum nominat* 12-15 cf. *Lucretii poema De rerum natura 5.487-8* 12-16 *Aëtius, Placita 3.16.3 (DG p.381a25-7)*; *Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.59.3 (GCS t.8.2 p.420.8-9)*; quorum neuter *Theophrastum nominat* 15-16 cf. *Aristotelis Meteor. 2.3 357a25*; *Empedocles, FVS 31A25* 16-20 *Aëtius, Placita 3.16.5 (DG p.382a4-7)*; *Eusebius, Praep. ev. 15.59.5 (GCS t.8.2 p.420.12-13)*; *Hippolytus, Ref. 1.14.4*

vid. Appendicem no. 4

221 Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle's Meteorology 2.1 353a32-b17 (CAG vol.3.2 p.67.3-22 Hayduck)

For some of them (the natural philosophers) say that the sea is a remnant of the original moisture. The region around the earth was moist; then part of the moisture was evaporated by the sun and produced winds and turnings of the sun and moon — for these too make their turnings on account of these vapors and exhalations, turning to those regions where there is a supply of this (moisture) for them. But part of it was left behind in the hollow places of the earth, and this is the sea. And for this reason it is becoming less, as it is dried up (more) every day by the sun, and in the end it will one day be (completely) dry. This was the opinion, as Theophrastus records, of Anaximander and Diogenes; and Diogenes also says that this is the reason for its saltiness, because the sun draws up the sweet part, and so it results that what is left behind and remains is salty. Certain others say that the sea is, as it were, a sort of perspiration of the earth; for it is warmed by the sun and emits this moisture. And this is also why it is salty; for perspiration is like that. This was the opinion of Empedocles. The third opinion about the sea is that the water that is filtered through the earth and washes it becomes salty because the earth has flavors of this sort in itself; and as a sign of this they cite the fact that salt and soda are dug up from it, and that there are sharp tastes in many parts of the earth. And this, again, was the opinion of Anaxagoras and Metrodorus.

(DG p.565.35-566.1), qui omnes *Metrodorum solum, non Anaxagoran memorant, Theophrasto non nominato* 20 *Anaxagoras, FVS 59A90* *Metrodorus, FVS 70A19*

2-3 κάπναια τὸ μὲν τι I: τὰ πρῶτα AWa lat. 4 ταύτης coni. Diels 5
ἔνθεν Usener 9 ἐγένετο I: ἐγένοντο AWa lat. 18 αὐτῇ Hayduck:
αὐτῇ codd. 20 ἐγένοντο AWa lat. : ἐγένετο I

see Appendix no. 4

Sal et nitrum

- 222 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.83 (CB t.31 p.60.16-18 Serbat)

apud Theophrastum invenio Umbros harundinis et iunci cinerem decoquere aqua solitos donec exiguum superesset umoris.

1-2 *Aristoteles, Meteorologica* 2.3 359a35-b4

- 223 Plinius, *Naturalis historia* 31.106-115 (CB t.31 p.70.14-74.7 Serbat)

non est differenda et nitri natura, non multum a sale distans et eo diligentius dicenda, quia palam est medicos qui de eo scripserunt ignorasse naturam nec quemquam Theophrasto diligentius tradidisse. exiguum fit apud Medos canescentibus siccitate convallibus, quod vocant halmyraga, minus etiam in Thracia iuxta
 107 Philippos, sordidum terra quod appellant agrium. nam quercu cremata numquam multum factitatum est et iam pridem in totum omissum. aquae vero nitrosae plurimis locis reperiuntur, sed sine viribus densandi. optimum copiosumque in Clitis Macedoniae, quod
 108 cessat. quo apparet soli naturam esse quae gignat, quoniam compertum est nec soles proficere quicquam, cum cesset, nec imbres. mirum et illud, scatebra fonticuli semper emicante lacum neque
 109 imbres, salsius nitrum faciunt, aquilones deterius, quia validius commovent limum.

et hoc quidem nascitur, in Aegypto autem conficitur multo abundantius, sed deterius. nam fuscum lapidosumque est. fit paene eodem modo quo sal, nisi quod salinis mare infundunt, Nilum

Salt and Soda

- 222 Pliny, *Natural History* 31.83 (CB vol.31 p.60.16-18 Serbat)

I find in Theophrastus that the Umbrians were accustomed to boil down the ashes of reeds and rushes in water until only a very little moisture was left.¹

¹ Pliny is discussing methods of extracting salt.

- 223 Pliny, *Natural History* 31.106-115 (CB vol.31 p.70.14-74.7 Serbat)

Nor should I put off discussing the nature of soda, which is not very different from that of salt, and needs to be the more carefully described because it is clear that the doctors who have written about it do not know its nature and that no one has recorded it more carefully than Theophrastus. A little is formed in Media, in valleys that are white through dryness; they call it *halmyrax*.¹ And there are even smaller quantities in Thrace near Philippi, but contaminated by
 107 earth; this they call "wild". For it was never made in large quantities by burning oak-wood, and (this method) has long been completely abandoned. However, water full of soda is found in very many places, but without the power of solidifying. The best is found in abundance at Clitae in Macedonia; they call it "Chalestrian", and it is white and pure, very like salt. There is a lake, full of soda, with a spring of pure water rising in the middle. Soda is formed there, around the rising of the Dog-star, for nine days; then it ceases for the same number of days; then it floats on the surface again, and then it
 108 ceases again. From this it is clear that it is the nature of the soil that produces it, since it has been found that neither sunshine helps at all, when it ceases, nor rain. And this too is remarkable, that although there is always a bubbling up of water from the spring, the lake neither rises nor overflows. If there is rain on the days when the soda forms, it makes it more salty; if there are north winds, they make it inferior, because they stir up the mud with more force.

109 This (soda) indeed is produced naturally, but in Egypt it is made artificially, in much greater quantity, but inferior in quality; for it is dark and gritty. It is produced in almost the same way as salt, except that they cause the sea to flow into the salt-pans, but the Nile into the

autem nitrariis. hae cedente Nilo siccantur, decedente madent suco
 nitri XL diebus continuis, non ut in Macedonia statis. si etiam imbres
 adfuerunt, minus ex flumine addunt, statimque ut densari coeptum
 est, rapitur, ne resolvatur in nitrariis. sic quoque olei natura 25
 intervenit, ad scabiem animalium utilis. ipsum autem conditum in
 110 acervis durat. mirum in lacu Ascanio et quibusdam circa Chalcida
 fontibus summas aquas dulces esse potarique, inferiores nitrosas.
 in nitro optimum quod tenuissimum, et ideo spuma melior, ad
 aliqua tamen sordidum, tamquam ad inficiendas purpuras tinctu- 30
 111 rasque omnis. magnus et vitro usus, quod dicitur suo loco. nitrariae
 Aegypti circa Naucratin et Memphin tantum solebant esse, circa
 Memphin deteriores. nam et lapidescit ibi in acervis, multique sunt
 cumuli ea de causa saxei. faciunt ex eis vasa, nec non et frequenti 35
 liquatu cum sulphure coquentes. in carnibus quoque quas inveterari
 volunt illo nitro utuntur. sunt ibi nitrariae in quibus et rufum exit
 a colore terrae.
 112 spumam nitri, quae maxime laudatur, antiqui negabant fieri nisi
 cum ros cecidisset praegnantibus nitrariis, sed nondum parientibus.
 itaque non fieri incitatis, etiamsi caderet. alii acervorum fermento 40
 113 gigni existimare. . . . optimum putatur Lydium; probatio, ut sit
 minime ponderosum et maxime fricabile, colore paene purpureo. hoc
 in pastillis adfertur, Aegyptium in vasis spissatum ne liquecat. vasa
 quoque ea sole inarescentia perficiuntur.
 114 nitri probatio, ut sit tenuissimum et quam maxime spongeosum 45
 fistulosumque. adulteratur in Aegypto calce, deprehenditur gustu.
 sincerum enim statim resolvitur, adulteratum calce pungit et aspersu
 reddit odorem vehementer. uritur in testa opertum ne exultet, alias
 igni non exilit nitrum. nihilque gignit aut alit, cum in salinis herbae
 115 gignantur et in mari tot animalia, tantum algae. sed maiorem esse 50
 acrimoniam nitri apparet non hoc tantum argumento sed et illo quod
 nitrariae calciamenta protinus consumunt, alias salubres oculorum-

soda-beds. As the Nile recedes these become dry, and while it is
 falling they are moist with liquid soda for forty days continuously,
 but, not, as in Macedonia, at a fixed time. If it rains in addition, they
 add less (water) from the river; and as soon as it begins to solidify,
 they gather it quickly, in order that it may not liquefy again in the
 soda-beds. In a similar way an oily substance too forms among (the
 soda), and this is useful for the scab in animals. The soda itself lasts
 110 for a long time when it is stored in heaps. It is remarkable that in
 Lake Ascanius and in certain springs around Chalcis the water on
 the surface is fresh and is drunk, but (the water) beneath is full of
 soda.

The best soda is that which is finest, and so froth of soda is
 better, but for some purposes the contaminated kind is (better), as for
 coloring purple cloth and for every sort of dyeing. It is also used to a
 great extent in glass-making, as will be described in its proper place.
 111 The soda-beds in Egypt used only to be found around Naucratis and
 Memphis, and those around Memphis are inferior. For these it even
 turns to stone in the heaps, and for this reason there are many heaps
 that have turned to rock. They make vessels from these, and also by
 repeatedly liquefying (soda) by heating it with sulphur. They also
 use this soda for the meat that they want to preserve. There are soda-
 beds there which produce red soda, too, from the color of the earth.
 112 Froth of soda, which is greatly praised, the ancients said was
 only formed when dew had fallen on soda-beds that were ready to
 produce soda but had not yet done so; and so it was not produced by
 (soda-beds) that were active, even if (dew) did fall. Others have
 thought that it is produced by the fermentation of the heaps (of
 113 soda). . . . The best (froth of soda) is thought to be that from Lydia;
 the test is that it should be as light and crumbly as possible, and
 almost purple in color. This is imported in tablets, but the Egyptian
 soda in vessels, packed tightly so that² it should not liquefy; and
 these vessels too are finished off by being dried in the sun.
 114 The test of soda is that it should be very fine and as spongy and
 porous as possible. In Egypt it is adulterated with lime, but this is
 detected by the taste; for the pure (soda) melts at once, but that
 which has been adulterated with lime stings and, when sprinkled
 (with water), gives off a strong smell. It is burnt in an earthenware
 vessel, covered in order that it may not leap out; otherwise soda does
 not leap out in fire, and it does not produce or nourish anything,
 although in salt-pits plants grow, and in the sea there are so many
 115 creatures and so much sea-weed. But that soda is more pungent is
 shown not only by this evidence but also by the fact that soda-beds
 immediately consume shoes — although in other respects they are

que claritati utiles. in nitrariis non lippiunt. ulcera allata eo celerrime sanantur, ibi facta tarde. ciet et sudores cum oleo perunctis corpusque emollit. in pane salis vice utuntur Chalestraeo, ad raphanos Aegyptio, teneriores eos facit, sed obsonia alba et deteriora, olera viridiora.

6-8 cf. *Theophrasti HP 3.7.6 et Plinii Nat. hist. 16.31, Theophrasto non nominato* 25-6 cf. [Aristotelis] *Probl. 23.40 936a1* 27 cf. [Aristotelis] *Mir. ausc. 53 834a31-4* 31 *Plinius, Nat. hist. 36.191-9, Theophrasto non nominato* 41-2 *Isidorus, Etymol. 16.2.8, Theophrasto non nominato* 41-2 et 45-6 cf. *Dioscoridis librum De mat. med. 5.113.1 (t.3 p.83.8-9 et 11-12 Wellmann); Oribasii Coll. med. 13.N.1-2 (CMG t.6.1.2 p.174.2-3 et 5-6) et Synopsis ad Eustathium 2.56.82-3 (CMG t.6.3 p.49.3-6); quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat* 49 cf. *Theophrasti CP 2.5.1* 52-3 cf. *Dioscoridis librum De mat. med. 5.113.3 (t.3 p.84.7-8 Wellmann); Oribasii librum Ad Eunapium 4.24.1 (CMG t.6.3 p.447.11-12); quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat* 55-6 *Theophrastus, CP 2.5.3, 3.17.8, 6.10.8-9; Plinius, Nat. hist. 19.84, Theophrasto non nominato* 56-7 *Plinius, Nat. hist. 19.143; Martialis, 13.17; Apicius, 3.1.1; quorum nemo Theophrastum nominat*

Doxographica physica

- 224 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.22.22-23.20 Diels)

ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ μίαν εἶναι ἢ οὐ μίαν, ταῦτόν δὲ εἰπεῖν πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἥτοι ἀκίνητον ἢ κινουμένην. καὶ εἰ ἀκίνητον ἥτοι ἄπειρον, ὡς Μέλισσος ὁ Σάμιος δοκεῖ λέγειν, ἢ πεπερασμένην, ὡς Παρμενίδης Πυρήτος Ἐλεάτης, οὐ περὶ φυσικοῦ στοιχείου λέγοντες οὗτοι, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ὅλως.

μίαν δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἥτοι ἐν τῷ ὄν καὶ πᾶν καὶ οὔτε πεπερασμένον οὔτε ἄπειρον οὔτε κινούμενον οὔτε ἡρεμοῦν Ξενοφάνην τὸν Κολοφώνιον τὸν Παρμενίδου διδάσκαλον ὑποτίθεσθαι φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος ὁμολογῶν ἑτέρας εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας τὴν μνήμην τῆς τούτου δόξης.

τὸ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ πᾶν τὸν θεὸν ἔλεγεν ὁ Ξενοφάνης· ὄν ἓνα μὲν δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ πάντων κράτιστον εἶναι. πλειόνων γάρ, φησὶν, ὄντων ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἀνάγκη πᾶσι τὸ κρατεῖν· τὸ δὲ πάντων κράτιστον καὶ

healthy, and good for clearness of sight. In soda-beds people do not have inflammation of the eyes; sores are healed very quickly if they are brought there, and are formed slowly. It also produces perspiration in those who are anointed with it mixed with oil, and it softens the flesh. They use Chalaestrian soda in bread instead of salt, and Egyptian soda for cabbages; it makes them more tender, but meat white and inferior, and vegetables greener.

¹ The word *halmyrax* appears to be formed from a Greek root but may be corrupt; Steinmetz suggests emending to "salty earth".

² Or, reading *picatum*: "in vessels lined with pitch, so that . . ."

5 quod vacant ἀλμυρὰν γῆν vel quod vocatur ἀλμυρὰ γῆ coni. Steinmetz, *Phys. des Th. p.313 n.2* 22 autem E: autem mo VRd: autem modo Jan: autumno Mayhoff cedente codd. plerique: accedente X: excedente Detlefsen siccantur] rigantur Mayhoff madent rEaX: manant RVFTd 35 carnibus Jan: carbonibus codd.: corporibus (et mox quae) K.C.Bailey, *Hermathena t.44 (1926) p.74* 43 spissatuū ne Detlefsen: spiss.t..n. R: spissa omni VFTd: spissatis ne rEa: picatis ne X 47 aspersu RVF: aspersum TdX: asperum a 49 lacunam ante nihilque coni. Mayhoff

Doxography on Nature

- 224 Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.22.22-23.20 Diels)

So it is necessary for the principle to be either single or not single, which is the same as to say that there are many, and if it is single, it must either be unmoved or in movement. And if it is unmoved it must either be unlimited, as Melissus of Samos seems to say, or limited, as Parmenides son of Pyres from Elea says; these men are not speaking about an element of natural (things), but about being as a whole.

That the principle is single, or that what is and the All is single and neither limited nor unlimited, neither in motion nor at rest, was, Theophrastus says, the supposition of Xenophanes of Colophon, the teacher of Parmenides; (though) he admits that the mention of this man's opinion belongs to another enquiry rather than to that concerning nature.

Xenophanes said that this One and All is god. He shows that it is one from the fact that it is the most superior of all things: for if there were more than one, he says, it would be necessary that they should

23 ἄριστον θεός· ἀγένητον δὲ ἐδείκνυεν ἐκ τοῦ δεῖν τὸ γινόμενον ἢ ἐξ
 ὁμοίου ἢ ἐξ ἀνομοίου γίνεσθαι· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὁμοιον ἀπαθές φησιν ὑπὸ 15
 τοῦ ὁμοίου· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον γεννᾶν ἢ γεννᾶσθαι προσήκει τὸ ἐκ τοῦ
 ὁμοίου· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομοίου γίνοιτο, ἔσται τὸ ὄν ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· καὶ
 οὕτως ἀγένητον καὶ αἰδιον ἐδείκνυ· οὔτε δὲ ἄπειρον οὔτε πεπερασμένον
 εἶναι, διότι ἄπειρον μὲν τὸ μὴ ὄν ὡς οὔτε ἀρχὴν ἔχον οὔτε μέσον οὔτε 20
 τέλος, περαίνειν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πλείω· παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ τὴν
 κίνησιν ἀφαιρεῖ καὶ τὴν ἡρεμίαν· ἀκίνητον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν· οὔτε
 γὰρ ἂν εἰς αὐτὸ ἕτερον οὔτε αὐτὸ πρὸς ἄλλο ἐλθεῖν· κινεῖσθαι δὲ τὰ
 πλείω τοῦ ἐνός· ἕτερον γὰρ εἰς ἕτερον μεταβάλλειν, ὥστε καὶ ὅταν ἐν
 ταύτῳ μένειν λέγειν καὶ μὴ κινεῖσθαι

ἀεὶ δ' ἐν ταύτῳ μίμνει κινούμενον οὐδέν, 25
 οὐδὲ μετέρχεσθαι μιν ἐπιτρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ,

οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡρεμίαν τὴν ἀντικειμένην τῇ κινήσει μένειν αὐτὸ φησιν,
 ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ κινήσεως καὶ ἡρεμίας ἐξηρημένην μονήν.

Νικόλαος δὲ ὁ Δαμασκηνός ὡς ἄπειρον καὶ ἀκίνητον λέγοντος
 αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐν τῇ Περι θεῶν ἀπομνημονεύει, Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ὡς 30
 πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ καὶ σφαιροειδές· ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν οὔτε ἄπειρον οὔτε
 πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ δείκνυσιν, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων δῆλον,
 πεπερασμένον αὐτὸ καὶ σφαιροειδές αὐτὸ διὰ τὸ πανταχόθεν ὁμοιον
 λέγει· καὶ πάντα νοεῖν δέ φησιν αὐτὸ λέγων

ἄλλ' ἀπάνευθε πόνοιο νόου φρενὶ πάντα κραδαίνει. 35

1-35 Xenophanes, FVS 21A31 2-5 cf. Aristotelis Metaph. 1(A).5 986b18-21;
 etiam Philoponi comm. In Arist. Phys. 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.16 p.21.22-4 et 22.15-
 21) 7-8 Parmenides FVS 28A7; Aristoteles, Metaph. 1(A).5 986b22 9-
 10 cf. Aristotelis Phys. 1.2 184b25-185a1 et Metaph. 1(A).5 986b12-17 11
 Aristoteles, Metaph. 1(A).5 986b24-5 11-14 [Aristoteles], De Melisso, Xeno-
 phane, Gorgia 3 977a23-5 14-18 ibid. 977a15-23 18-20 ibid. 977b2-8;
 cf. Aristotelis Metaph. 1(A).5 986b18-23 20-8 [Aristoteles], de Melisso,
 Xenophane, Gorgia 3 977b8-18 25-6 Xenophanes, FVS 21B26 29-30
 cf. Ciceronis librum De natura deorum 1.28, Theophrasto non nominato 30-
 1 ita quoque Hippolytus, Refut. 1.14.2 (DG p.565.25-7); [Galenus], Hist. Philos.
 7 (DG p.604.18-19); Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. Hyp. 1.225; Cicero, Lucullus 118;
 Theodoretus, Graec. aff. cur. 4.5 (p.101.25-6 Raeder); Philoponus, In Arist. Phys.
 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.16 p.21.22-3 et 22.15-16); cf. etiam Simplicii comm. In Arist.
 Phys. 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.28.7-8 = 229 et p.29.8); quorum omnium nemo
 Theophrastum nominat 35 Xenophanes, FVS 21B25

all alike possess superiority; and the most superior and best thing of
 23 all is god. He showed that it did not come to be, from the necessity
 that what comes to be should come to be either from what is like or
 from what is unlike; a thing cannot be affected, he says, by what is
 like it, for it is no more appropriate for a thing to produce what is
 like it than to be produced by it; but if it were to come to be from
 what was not like it, being will come from not-being. And in this
 way he showed that it did not come to be and is eternal. (He showed
 that) it is neither unlimited nor limited, because it is what is not that
 is unlimited, since it has neither beginning nor middle nor end, and
 it is things that are more than one in number that are limited by each
 other. And in a similar way he removes from it both movement and
 rest; for it is what is not that is unmoved, since neither does anything
 else enter it, nor does it approach anything else, and it is things that
 are more than one that move, since one thing changes into another.
 So, when he says that it remains in the same place and does not
 move,

but always remains in the same place, not moving at all;
 nor is it fitting for it to go to different places at different
 times,

he is not saying that it "remains" in the sense in which rest is op-
 posed to motion, but rather in that of "remaining" which transcends
 both motion and rest.

Nicolaus of Damascus, in *On the Gods*, records (Xenophanes) as
 saying that the principle is unlimited and unmoved; Alexander, that
 it is limited and spherical. But that he shows that it is neither limited
 nor unlimited is clear from what has previously been said; he speaks
 of it as limited and spherical, on the other hand, because it is similar
 in every direction. And he says that it thinks all things, saying

but without toil it sways all things by the thought of its
 mind.

4 Πύρρητος Diels: πυρίτης DE 13 ὁμοίως aDE: ἀνομοίως E²: ἀνομοία F
 23 μεταβάλλειν Karsten: μεταβάλλει codd. 25 κινούμενον aDE: κινού-
 μενος E²F 27 αὐτό DE: αὐτόν aE²F 34 λέγει a: λέγειν codd.
 αὐτό DE: αὐτόν aE²F

225 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.23.21-24.12 Diels)

τῶν δὲ μίαν καὶ κινουμένην λεγόντων τὴν ἀρχὴν, οὓς καὶ φυσικοὺς ἰδίως καλεῖ, οἱ μὲν πεπερασμένην αὐτὴν φασιν, ὥσπερ Θαλῆς μὲν Ἐξαμύου Μιλήσιος καὶ Ἴππων, ὃς δοκεῖ καὶ ἄθεος γεγονέναι, ὕδωρ ἔλεγον τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν εἰς τοῦτο προαχθέντες. καὶ γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν τῷ ὑγρῷ ζῆ καὶ τὰ νεκρούμενα 5 ξηραίνεται καὶ τὰ σπέρματα πάντων ὑγρά καὶ ἡ τροφή πᾶσα χυλώδης· ἐξ οὗ δὲ ἐστὶν ἕκαστα, τούτῳ καὶ τρέφεσθαι πέφυκεν· τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὑγρᾶς φύσεώς ἐστὶ καὶ συνεκτικὸν πάντων. διὸ πάντων ἀρχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ' ὕδατος ἀπεφάνησαν κείσθαι. Θαλῆς δὲ πρῶτος παραδέδοται τὴν περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν 10 ἐκφῆσαι, πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἄλλων προγεγονότων, ὡς καὶ τῷ Θεοφράστῳ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸς δὲ πολὺ διενεγκὼν ἐκείνων, ὡς ἀποκρῦσαι πάντας τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ· λέγεται δὲ ἐν γραφαῖς μηδὲν καταλιπεῖν πλὴν τῆς καλουμένης Ναυτικῆς ἀστρολογίας.

24 Ἴππασος δὲ ὁ Μεταποντινὸς καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφεσίου ἐν καὶ 15 οὗτοι καὶ κινούμενον καὶ πεπερασμένον, ἀλλὰ πῦρ ἐποίησαν τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ ἐκ πυρὸς ποιῶσι τὰ ὄντα πυκνώσει καὶ μανώσει καὶ διαλύουσι πάλιν εἰς πῦρ, ὡς ταύτης μᾶς οὐσης φύσεως τῆς ὑποκειμένης· πυρὸς γὰρ ἀμοιβὴν εἶναι φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος πάντα. ποιεῖ δὲ καὶ τάξιν τινὰ καὶ χρόνον ὠρισμένον τῆς τοῦ κόσμου μεταβολῆς κατὰ τινὰ εἰμαρμένην 20 ἀνάγκην.

καὶ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οὗτοι τὸ ζωογόνον καὶ δημιουργικὸν καὶ πεπτικὸν καὶ διὰ πάντων χωροῦν καὶ πάντων ἀλλοιωτικὸν τῆς θερμότητος θεασάμενοι ταύτην ἔσχον τὴν δόξαν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχομεν ὡς ἄπειρον 25 τιθεμένων αὐτῶν. ἐτι δὲ εἰ στοιχεῖον μὲν τὸ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὰ ἄλλα καὶ εἰς ὃ ἀναλύεται, λεπτομερέστατον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ πῦρ, τοῦτο ἂν εἴη μάλιστα στοιχεῖον. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν οἱ ἐν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ πεπερασμένον λέγοντες τὸ στοιχεῖον.

1-14 *Thales*, FVS 11A13 et 11B1 1-6 et 15-16 *Philoponus*, In *Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.16 p.23.2-5 et 7-10), *Theophrasto non nominato* 2-4 *Aristoteles*, *Metaph.* 1(A).3 984a2-5 2-5 *Hippo*, FVS 38A4 2-8 *Aëtius*, *Plac.* 1.3.1 (DG p.276a5-19 et b2-12); *Eusebius*, *Praep. ev.* 14.14.1 (GCS t.8.2 p.293.19-294.2); *quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat* 2-9 *Aristoteles*, *Metaph.* 1(A).3 983b20-7 9 *Aristoteles*, *De caelo* 2.13 294a29 11 cf. *Aristotelis Metaph.* 1(A).3 983b27-984a2 13-14 cf. *Diogenem Laertium* 1.23, *qui Phoco Samio librum attribuit, et Plutarchi librum De Pythiae oraculis* 18 403A 15-16 *Aristoteles*, *Metaph.* 1(A).3 984a7-8; *Theodoretus*, *Graec. aff. cur.* 4.12 (p.103.13-15 *Raeder*) 15-18 *Hippasus*, FVS 18 no. 7; cf. *Lucretium* 1.647-54 et *Simplicii comm.* In *Arist. Phys.* 3.5 205a2 (CAG t.9 p.480.27-8), *Theophrasto non nominato* 15-21 *Heraclitus*, FVS 22A5 18-19 *Heraclitus*, FVS 22B90; *Plutarchus*, *De E* 8 388E; *Diogenes Laertius* 9.8; *Heraclitus*, *Quaes-*

225 Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.23.21-24.12 Diels)

Of those who say that the principle is one and in movement, whom he (Aristotle) calls natural philosophers in the proper sense, some say that it is limited. For example, Thales son of Examyes, from Miletus, and Hippon, who is thought to have been an atheist, said that the principle was water, being led to this (conclusion) from appearances in accordance with perception. For what is hot lives by means of moisture, and dead bodies dry up, and the seeds of all things are moist, and the nourishment of all things is juicy; and each thing is naturally nourished by that from which it has its origin. And water is the principle of what is naturally moist and holds all things together. For this reason they supposed that water was the principle of all things and declared that the earth rests on water. Thales is the first person recorded as having revealed the enquiry concerning nature to the Greeks; many others preceded him, as Theophrastus too thinks, but he himself was far superior to them and so cast into oblivion all those before him. It is said that he left nothing in writing except the so-called *Nautical Star-Guide*.

24 Hippasus of Metapontum and Heraclitus of Ephesus also (said that) the principle was one and in movement and limited, but they made it fire, and (said that) the things that are are made from fire by condensation and rarefaction, and are resolved into fire again, since this is the single underlying nature. For Heraclitus says that all things are an exchange for fire. And he says that there is a certain order and definite fated time for the transformation in the universe, in accordance with some fated necessity.

And it is clear that these thinkers too came to this opinion through considering the (power) that heat has of creating living things and fashioning and concocting and penetrating all things and altering all things; for we do not hear that they postulated that it was unlimited. Moreover, if the element is the smallest thing, from which the others come to be and into which they are dissolved, and fire is rarer than all the other things, this above all will be the element. — And these are those who say that the element is one and in movement and limited.

tiones Homericæ 43 (BT p.65.7-9, ed. a. 1910); *Eusebius*, *Praep. Ev.* 14.3.8 (GCS t.8.2 p.262.22-263.2) 19-21 *Diogenes Laertius* 8.84, *de Hippaso*, *Theophrasto non nominato*

17 ὄντα ex πάντα corr. E^a: πάντα *Simplicius*, In *Arist. Phys.* 480.28 19 τὰ πάντα coni. *Schleiermacher*, ita *Plutarchus*, et alii 21 ἀνάγκην *glossema putavit Usener*

226A Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.24.13-25.13 Diels)

τῶν δὲ ἐν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἄπειρον λεγόντων Ἀναξίμανδρος μὲν Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητὴς ἀρχὴν τε καὶ στοιχείον εἶρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοῦνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὐσί, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι “κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν. δίδοναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν,” ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων· δῆλον δὲ ὅτι τὴν εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολὴν τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων οὗτος θεασάμενος οὐκ ἤξιωσεν ἔν τι τούτων ὑποκείμενον ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο παρὰ ταῦτα. οὗτος δὲ οὐκ ἀλλοιούμενου τοῦ στοιχείου τὴν γένεσιν ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀποκρινόμενων τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τῆς αἰδίου κινήσεως· διὸ καὶ τοῖς περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῦτον ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης συνέταξεν.

Ἀναξιμένης δὲ Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος, ἐταῖρος γεγονῶς Ἀναξιμάνδρου, μίαν μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς τὴν ὑποκειμένην φύσιν καὶ ἄπειρόν φησιν ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος, οὐκ ἀόριστον δὲ ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλὰ ὀρισμένην, ἀέρα λέγων αὐτήν· διαφέρειν δὲ μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι κατὰ τὰς οὐσίας, καὶ ἀραιούμενον μὲν πῦρ γίνεσθαι, πυκνούμενον δὲ ἄνεμον, εἶτα νέφος, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ὕδωρ, εἶτα γῆν, εἶτα λίθους, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐκ τούτων. κίνησιν δὲ καὶ οὗτος αἰδίον ποιεῖ, δι' ἣν καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν γίνεσθαι.

καὶ Διογένης δὲ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης, σχεδὸν νεώτατος γεγονῶς τῶν περὶ ταῦτα σχολασάντων, τὰ μὲν πλείστα συμπεφορημένως γέγραφε τὰ μὲν κατὰ Ἀναξαγόραν, τὰ δὲ κατὰ Λεύκιππον λέγων· τὴν δὲ τοῦ παντός φύσιν ἀέρα καὶ οὗτός φησιν ἄπειρον εἶναι καὶ αἰδίον, ἐξ οὗ πυκνούμενου καὶ μανουμένου καὶ μεταβάλλοντος τοῖς πάθεσι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων γίνεσθαι μορφήν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν Θεόφραστος ἱστορεῖ περὶ τοῦ Διογέτους, καὶ τὸ εἰς ἐμὲ ἔλθόν αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα Περὶ φύσεως ἐπιγεγραμμένον ἀέρα σαφῶς λέγει τὸ ἐξ οὗ πάντα γίνεται τὰ ἄλλα. Νικόλαος μὲντοι τοῦτον ἱστορεῖ μεταξὺ πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος τὸ στοιχείον τίθεσθαι.

226A Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.24.13-25.13 Diels)

Of those who said that (the principle) was single and in movement and unlimited, Anaximander, the son of Praxiades, from Miletus, who was the successor and pupil of Thales, said that the principle and element of the things that are is the unlimited, being the first to introduce this name for the principle.¹ He says that it is neither water nor any other of the things that are called elements, but a certain other unlimited nature, from which come to be all the heavens and the worlds in them. The things that are perish by returning to the things from which they have their origin, “in accordance with necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to one another for their injustice in accordance with the assessment of Time”, as he puts it in these rather poetic terms. It is clear that this man, observing the change of the four elements into one another, did not think it right to make some one of these what underlies, but something else besides these. And he accounts for coming-to-be not by an alteration in the element, but by the separating off of the opposites through eternal motion; and for this reason Aristotle ranked him with the followers of Anaxagoras.

Anaximenes, son of Eurystratus, from Miletus, who was an associate of Anaximander, also says that the underlying nature is single and unlimited, as he (Anaximander) does, but he does not (say that) it is indefinite (in character) as he (Anaximander) does, but (rather) that it is definite; for he says that it is air. It differs in its degree of rareness and density in the (different) substances; when it is rarefied it becomes fire, but when it becomes denser it becomes wind, then cloud, and when still more (dense) water, then earth, then stones; and the other things are made from these. And this man too makes motion eternal, and (says) that change comes about on account of this.

And Diogenes of Apollonia, who was almost the last of those who occupied themselves with these matters, wrote for the most part in an eclectic manner, saying some things in agreement with Anaxagoras, others with Leucippus; but he too says that the nature of the All is air which is unlimited and eternal, and that it is from this, when it becomes denser or rarer and alters in its affections, that the form of other things comes to be. This is what Theophrastus records about Diogenes, and his (Diogenes') treatise that came down to me, entitled *On Nature*, clearly states that air is that from which all the other things come to be. But Nicolaus records that he (Diogenes) made the element intermediate between fire and air.

καὶ οὗτοι δὲ τὸ εὐπαθὲς καὶ εὐαλλοίωτον τοῦ ἀέρος εἰς μεταβολὴν ἐπιτηδείως ἔχειν ἐνόμισαν· διὸ τὴν γῆν δυσκίνητον καὶ δυσμετάβλητον οὖσαν οὐ πάνυ τι ἠξίωσαν ἀρχὴν ὑποθέσθαι· καὶ οὕτως μὲν οἱ μίαν λέγοντες τὴν ἀρχὴν διηρέθησαν.

1-7 *Aëtius, Plac.* 1.3.3 (DG p.277a7-12 et b3-9); *Eusebius, Praep. ev.* 14.14.2 (GCS t.8.2 p.294.8-10); cf. [*Plutarchi*] *Strom.* 2 (DG p.579.7-11); *quorum omnium nemo Theophrastum nominat* 1-14 *Anaximander, FVS* 12A9 1-7 et 12-13 *Hippolytus, Refut.* 1.6.1-2 (DG p.559.15-22), *Theophrasto non nominato* 3-4 *Simplicius, In Arist. Phys.* 1.4 187a20-1 (CAG t.9 p.150.23-4), *Theophrasto non nominato* 5-6 et 12-13 *Simplicius, In Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b16 (CAG t.9 p.41.16-19), *Theophrasto non nominato* 13-14 *Aristoteles, Phys.* 1.4 187a20-3; cf. **228A-B** 15-19 et 21-2 [*Plutarchus*], *Strom.* 3 (DG p.579.21-580.1), *Theophrasto non nominato* 15-21 *Simplicius, In Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b16 (CAG t.9 p.41.19-21); *Cicero, Lucullus* 118; *quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat*

226B *Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica* 1.4 187a12-16 (CAG t.9 p.149.28-150.4 Diels)

καὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὑλικοῦ ἐνὸς τὰ ἄλλα γεννῶσι μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι, ὡς Ἀναξίμενης ἀραιούμενον μὲν τὸν ἀέρα πῦρ γίνεσθαι φησι, πυκνούμενον δὲ ἄνεμον, εἶτα νέφος, εἶτα ἔτι μᾶλλον ὕδωρ, εἶτα γῆν, εἶτα λίθους, τὰ δὲ ἄλλ' ἐκ τούτων. ἐπὶ γὰρ τούτου μόνου Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ Ἱστορίᾳ τὴν μάνωσιν εἶρηκε καὶ πύκνωσιν. δῆλον δὲ ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῇ μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι ἐχρῶντο. καὶ γὰρ Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ πάντων τούτων εἶπε κοίμως, ὅτι τὰ ἄλλα γεννῶσι πυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι πολλὰ ποιῶντες τὰ ἐκ τῆς μῆς ὕλης.

4-5 *aliter* **225** v.17 4-6 *Anaximenes, FVS* 13A5 6-8 *Aristoteles, Physica* 1.4 187a15-16

4 μόνου] πρώτου *coni. Usener*

227A *Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica* 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.25.14-26.4, 26.26-30 Diels)

τῶν δὲ πλείους λεγόντων οἱ μὲν πεπερασμένας, οἱ δὲ ἀπείρους ἔθεντο τῶ πληθει τὰς ἀρχάς. καὶ τῶν πεπερασμένας οἱ μὲν δύο, ὡς Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν πῦρ καὶ γῆν (ἢ μᾶλλον φῶς καὶ σκότος) ἢ ὡς οἱ Στωϊκοὶ θεὸν καὶ ὕλην, οὐχ ὡς στοιχεῖον δηλονότι τὸν θεὸν λέγοντες, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ μὲν ποιῶν τὸ δὲ πάσχον· οἱ δὲ τρεῖς, ὡς ὕλην

These people thought that the ease with which air is affected and altered suited (it) for change; and for this reason they did not at all think it right to suggest earth, which is hard to move and hard to alter, as the principle. And this is how those who say that the principle is single were divided up.

¹ Or perhaps, "the first to introduce this name of 'principle'".

15-22 *Anaximenes, FVS* 13A5; *Hippolytus, Refut.* 1.7.2-3 (DG p.560.18-561.1), *Theophrasto non nominato* 23-36 *Diogenes Apolloniates, FVS* 64A5 24-5 *Leucippus, FVS* 67A3 25-8 *Aristoteles, Metaph.* 1(A).3 984a5-7

3 τοῦτο] αὐτὸ *Usener, Simplicium In Phys.* 150.23-4 *conferens* 5 εἶναι] νοὺν *Usener* 7 ταῦτα *Schleiermacher* 17 ὡσπερ ἐκεῖνος *del. Usener* 19 ἀραιούμενον *Diels ex Simplic. In Phys* 41.7: διαιρούμενον *codd.*

226B *Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics* 1.4 187a12-16 (CAG vol.9 p.149.28-150.4 Diels)

For the one group produces the other things from the material unity by rareness and density, as Anaximenes says that the air when it is rarefied becomes fire, but when it becomes denser then wind, then cloud, and when still more (dense) water, then earth, then stones; and the other things are made from these. For it is with reference to this man only that Theophrastus, in his *Research*, speaks of rarefaction and condensation. But it is clear that the others too employed rareness and density (as explanations). And Aristotle says about all these generally that they produce the other things by making the things composed of a single matter many by means of density and rareness.

227A *Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics* 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.25.14-26.4, 26.26-30 Diels)

Of those who say (that the principles are) many some postulated that they were limited in number, others that they were unlimited. Of those (who postulated that they were) limited some (postulated) two (principles), as Parmenides in the (section of his poem) relating to opinion (postulated) fire and earth — or rather light and darkness¹ — or as the Stoics (postulated) god and matter, not speaking of god as an element, clearly, but of one (principle) as active, the other pas-

καὶ τὰ ἐναντία Ἀριστοτέλης· οἱ δὲ τέτταρας, ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος, οὐ πολὺ κατόπιν τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγινώς, Παρμενίδου δὲ ζηλωτῆς καὶ πλησιαστῆς καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον τῶν Πυθαγορείων. οὗτος δὲ τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ στοιχεῖα ποιεῖ τέτταρα, πῦρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, αἰδία μὲν ὄντα, μεταβάλλοντα δὲ πλήθει καὶ ὀλιγότητι κατὰ τὴν σύγκρισιν καὶ διάκρισιν, τὰς δὲ κυρίως ἀρχάς, ὅψ' ὄν κινεῖται ταῦτα, φιλίαν καὶ νεῖκος. δεῖ γὰρ διατελεῖν ἐναλλάξ κινούμενα τὰ στοιχεῖα, ποτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς φιλίας συγκρινόμενα, ποτὲ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους διακρινόμενα· ὥστε καὶ ἕξ εἶναι κατ' αὐτὸν τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ γὰρ ὅπου μὲν ποιητικὴν δίδωσι δύναμιν τῶ νεΐκει καὶ τῇ φιλίᾳ, ὅταν λέγη

ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ δίχα πάντα φορεύμενα Νείκεος ἔχθει,

ποτὲ δὲ τοῖς τέτταρσιν ὡς ἰσόστοιχα συντάττει καὶ ταῦτα, ὅταν λέγη

26

τοτὲ δ' αὖ διέφω πλέον' ἕξ ἓνός εἶναι
πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ ἠέρος ἄπλετον ὕψος
Νεϊκός τ' οὐλόμενον δίχα τῶν ἀτάλαντον ἑκάστῳ,
καὶ Φιλότης ἐν τοῖσιν ἴση μῆκος τε πλάτος τε.

20

. . . τινὲς μέντοι καὶ μέχρι δεκάδος προήγαγον τὰς ἀρχάς, εἰ καὶ μὴ τὰς στοιχειώδεις, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τοὺς ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀχρι δεκάδος ἀριθμοὺς ἀρχάς ἔλεγον τῶν ἀπάντων ἢ τὰς δέκα συστοιχίας, ὡς ἄλλοι ἄλλως ἀνέγραψαν. καὶ οὕτως μὲν καὶ οἱ πλείους καὶ πεπερασμένας τῶ πλήθει τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγοντες διηρέθησαν.

25

2-3 *Parmenides*, FVS 28A34 3 *cf. Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b19 6-7
Anaxagoras, FVS 59A8 6-8 *Parmenides*, FVS 28A10; *Empedocles*, FVS
31A7 8-14 *cf. Arist. Metaph.* 1(A).3 984a8-11; *Aët. Plac.* 1.3.20 (DG p.286a19-287a4); *Diog. Laert.* 8.76; *Sext. Empir. Adv. math.* 9.10 et 10.317; [*Iustin.*] *Cohort. ad Graecos* 4 (PG t.6 col.249A); *Achill. Isag. in Aratum* (p.31.14-18 *Maas*); *Phil. De prov.* 1.22 (p.11 *Aucher*); *Euseb. Praep. ev.* 14.14.6 (GCS t.8.2 p.296.1-3); *quorum nemo Theophrastum nominat* 8-23 *Empedocles*, FVS 31A28 14
cf. Arist. De gen. et corr. 1.1 314a16-17 17-18 *Empedocles*, FVS 31B17.7-8; *Simplicius*, *In Arist. Phys.* 1.4 187a21-6 (CAG t.9 p.158.7-8) 20-3 *Empedocles*, FVS 31B17.17-20; *Simplicius*, *In Arist. Phys.* 1.4 187a21-6 (CAG t.9 p.158.16-19) 21 *Plutarchus*, *Quomodo adulator* 22 63D; *cf. Clem. Alex. Strom.* 6.2 17.4 (GCS t.2 p.436.6) 21-3 *Sextus Empiricus*, *Adv. math.* 9.10 et 23 *Athenagoras*, *Pro Christianis* 22 (p.26.18-19 *Schwartz*) 22-3 *Sextus Empiricus*, *Adv. math.* 10.317 23 *Plutarchus*, *Amatorius* 13 756D
26-7 *Arist. Metaph.* 1(A).5 986a22

→

sive. Others (postulated) three (principles), as Aristotle (postulated) matter and the opposites. Others (postulated) four (principles), as Empedocles of Acragas, who was born not long after Anaxagoras, and was an admirer and associate of Parmenides and still more of the Pythagoreans. He makes the bodily elements four, fire and air and water and earth; they are eternal, but change in abundance and scarcity by combination and separation. The first principles in the strict sense, by which these are moved, are Love and Strife; for it is necessary that the elements should continually be moved in alternate ways, at one time being brought together by Love, at another being separated by Strife. So the principles are six according to him. And in one place he assigns the active power to Love and Strife, when he says:

at one time all being brought together into a unity by Love,
but at another all being carried apart again by the hatred
of Strife.

But at another time he ranks these too as coordinate with the four,
when he says:

26 but at another time again it grew apart to be many, from
being one;
fire and water and earth and the immense height of air,
and cursed Strife apart from these, equivalent to each,
and Love among them, equal in length and breadth.

. . .² Certain people, however, took the (number of) principles, even if not of those (that were) of the nature of elements, right up to the decad, in the way that the Pythagoreans said that the numbers from the monad to the decad were the principles of all things, or the ten coordinate pairs, which different people recorded differently. And this is how those who say that the principles are many and limited in number were divided up.

¹ This is probably Simplicius' own correction: see below, **227C** and **227D**.

² The omitted portion contains a discussion of Plato as postulating two or three principles; see **230**.

10 μεταβάλλοντα δὲ post ὀλιγότητι *codd.*: *transpos.* *Usener* 21 ἠέρος *FE^aA*,
Sextus, *Athenagoras*: ἀέρος *DE*: αἰθέρος *Plutarchus*, *Clemens* ἄπλετον *Simplicius*,
Clemens: ἤπιον *Plutarchus*, *Sextus*, *Athenagoras* 22 ἀτάλαντον
Diels: ἀτάλαντον ἑκάστον *codd.*: ἀπάλαστον ἑκάστῳ *Usener*: ἀπάλαστον
ἀπάντη (i.e. ἅπαντι? *Diels*) *Sextus* 23 φιλότης *Simplicius*, *Plutarchus*,
Sextus 9.10: φιλίη *Sextus* 10.317, *Athenagoras* ἐν *Simplicius*, *Plutarchus*:
μετὰ *Sextus*, *Athenagoras*

- 227B Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 8.55 (OCT t.2 p.418.21-4 Long)

ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος Παρμενίδου φησὶ ζηλωτὴν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι καὶ μιμητὴν ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνον ἐν ἔπεσι τὸν Περὶ φύσεως ἐξενεγκεῖν λόγον.

1-3 *Parmenides*, FVS 28A9

- 227C Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In *Aristotelis Metaphysica* 1(A).3 984b3-4 (CAG t.1 p.31.7-16 Hayduck)

περὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν οὕτως λέγει· “τούτῳ δ’ ἐπιγεγόμενος Παρμενίδης Πύρητος ὁ Ἐλεάτης” — λέγει δὲ [καὶ] Ξενοφάνην — “ἐπ’ ἀμφοτέρας ἦλθε τὰς ὁδοὺς· καὶ γὰρ ὡς αἰδιὸν ἐστὶ τὸ πᾶν ἀποφαίνεται καὶ γένεσιν ἀποδιδόναι πειρᾶται τῶν ὄντων, οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ ἀμφοτέρων δοξάζων, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν μὲν ἐν τῷ πᾶν καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ σφαιροειδὲς ὑπολαμβάνων, κατὰ δόξαν δὲ τῶν πολλῶν εἰς τὸ γένεσιν ἀποδοῦναι τῶν φαινομένων δύο ποιῶν τὰς ἀρχάς, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην τὸ δ’ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ ποιῶν.”

1-9 *Parmenides*, FVS 28A7 2-9 *Alexander ap. Simplicium*, In *Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.38.18-24); *Hippolytus, Refut.* 1.11.1-2 (DG p.564.19-25); [*Plutarchus*], *Strom.* 5 (DG p.580.20-581.4); *Theodoretus, Graec. aff. cur.* 4.7 (p.102.9-14 *Raeder*); *quorum nemo Theophrastum nominat* 6-7 *Eusebius, Praep. ev.* 15.3.6 (GCS t.8.2 p.263.3-5), *Theophrasto non nominato* 8-9 *Aristoteles, Physica* 1.5 188a20-2; *De gen. et corr.* 1.3 318b6-7, 2.3 330b13-14; *Metaph.* 1(A).5 986b33-987a2 (cf. 1.3 984b3-8); *Cicero, Lucullus* 118, *Theophrasto non nominato* →

- 227D Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 9.21-2 (OCT t.2 p.447.10-14 et 447.18-448.8 Long)

Ξενοφάνους δὲ διήκουσε Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης — τοῦτον Θεόφραστος ἐν τῇ Ἐπιτομῇ Ἀναξιμάνδρου φησὶν ἀκοῦσαι — ὅμως δ’ οὐκ ἀκούσας καὶ Ξενοφάνους οὐκ ἠκολούθησεν αὐτῷ. . . . πρῶτος δ’ οὗτος τὴν γῆν ἀπέφαινε σφαιροειδῆ καὶ ἐν μέσῳ κεῖσθαι. δύο τ’ εἶναι στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆν, καὶ τὸ μὲν δημιουργοῦ τάξιν ἔχειν, τὴν δ’ ὕλης. 5 22 γένεσιν τ’ ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέσθαι· αἴτια δ’ ὑπάρχειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα συνεστάναι. καὶ τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ταῦτόν εἶναι, καθὰ μέμνηται καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς

- 227B Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.55 (OCT vol.2 p.418.21-4 Long)

Theophrastus says that (Empedocles) was an admirer of Parmenides and imitated him in his poems; for (Parmenides) too produced his account *Concerning Nature* in hexameters.

- 227C Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 1(A).3 984b3-4 (CAG vol.1 p.31.7-16 Hayduck)

Concerning Parmenides and his doctrine Theophrastus speaks as follows in the first book of his *On Natural Things*¹: “Coming after this man” — he means Xenophanes — “Parmenides, the son of Pyres, from Elea followed both routes. For he both declares that the All is eternal, and also tries to give an account of the coming-to-be of the things that are. He does not hold the same opinion about both; rather he supposes that in truth the All is one and without beginning and spherical, while in accordance with the opinion of the majority, in order to give an account of the coming-to-be of appearances, he makes the principles two in number, fire and earth — the one as matter, the other as cause and agent.”

¹ Or, *On the Natural Philosophers*; see 137.

3 καὶ *delendum vel* λέγει δὴ καὶ *legendum censuit Diels* 8 τὸ μὲν *codd.*: τὴν μὲν *Diels*

- 227D Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.21-2 (OCT vol.2 p.447.10-14 and 447.18-448.8 Long)

Xenophanes had as a pupil Parmenides, son of Pyres, of Elea — Theophrastus in his *Summary* says that this man¹ was a pupil of Anaximander — nevertheless, although he (Parmenides) was a pupil of Xenophanes, he did not follow him. . . . This man (Parmenides) was the first to declare that the earth is spherical and in the center. (He said that) there are two elements, fire and earth; and the one has the position of craftsman, the other of material. Men first came to be from the sun. The hot and the cold are causes, and all things are composed of these. And mind and soul are the same, as Theophras-

Φυσικοῖς πάντων σχεδὸν ἐκτιθέμενος τὰ δόγματα. δισσήν τ' ἔφη τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ δόξαν. διὸ καὶ φησί 10 που·

χρὲν δὲ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἤμην ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεκέος ἦτορ
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, τῆς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθίης.

1-2 Xenophanes, FVS 21A2; Suda, s.v., Παρμενίδης (no. 675, LG t.1 pars 4 p.59.11-13 Adler), Theophrasto nominato 1-14 Parmenides, FVS 28A1 3-4 Aëtius, Plac. 3.15.7 (DG p.380.13-18), Theophrasto non nominato 12-14 Parmenides, FVS 28B1.28-30; Sextus Empiricus, Adv. math. 7.111 et 114; Simplicius, In Arist. De caelo 3.1 298b14-24 (CAG t.7 p.557.25-7) 13-14 Plutarchus, Adv. Colotem 13 1114D-E; Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. 5.9 59.6 (GCS t.2 p.366.16-17); Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 29C (t.1 p.345.15-16 Diehl)

6 ἡλίον codd., et cf. Parmenidem, FVS 28B12.3-6: ἰλῶος ed. pr. a. 1533 et Aldobrandinus αἴτια Diels: αὐτὸν codd. ὑπάρχειν] ὑπερέχειν coni. Apelt 8 καὶ om. B 9 ἔφη B: εἶναι F: ἔφη in εἶναι corr. P 13 εὐπειθέος FP, Sextus, Plutarchus, Clemens: εὐτίθεος B: εὐκύκλεος Simplicius:

227E Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum 8.48 (OCT t.2 p.415.1 et 4-5 Long)

τοῦτον ὁ Φαβωρίνός φησιν . . . καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν πρῶτον ὀνομάσαι κόσμον καὶ τὴν γῆν στρογγύλην· ὡς δὲ Θεόφραστος, Παρμενίδην.

1-2 Favorinus, fr. 55 Mensching = fr. 59 Barigazzi; Parmenides, FVS 28A44

228A Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.26.31-27.28 Diels)

τῶν δὲ ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει λεγόντων οἱ μὲν ἀπλᾶς ἔλεγον καὶ 27 ὁμογενεῖς οἱ δὲ συνθέτους καὶ ἀνομογενεῖς καὶ ἐναντίας, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν χαρακτηριζόμενας. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν γὰρ Ἡγησιβούλου Κλαζομένιος, κοινωνήσας τῆς Ἀναξιμένους φιλοσοφίας, πρῶτος μετέστησε τὰς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν δόξας καὶ τὴν ἐλλείπουσαν αἰτίαν 5 ἀνεπλήρωσε, τὰς μὲν σωματικὰς ἀπείρους ποιήσας· πάντα γὰρ τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ χρυσόν, ἀγέννητα μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἀφθαρτα,

tus records in his *Physics*² where he sets out the opinions of almost all (natural philosophers). He (Parmenides) said that there were two types of philosophy, one in accordance with truth and the other in accordance with opinion. And for this reason he says somewhere:

It is necessary that you learn all things,
Both the strict heart of persuasive truth,
And the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true belief.

¹ I.e., Xenophanes. But Diogenes' wording is ambiguous, and the *Suda* makes the reference apply unequivocally to Parmenides.

² Diels took this and other references to the *Physics* to be careless forms of reference to *On the Opinions of the Natural* (i.e., *Physical*) *Philosophers*.

εὐφεγγέος Proclus ἀτρεκέος codd., Sextus 7.111, Plutarchus, Proclus: ἀτρεμέος Clemens, Sextus 7.114, Simplicius 14 τῆς Diels: τῆς codd.: ταῖς Clemens, Sextus, Simplicius: αἷς Plutarchus, Proclus οὐκ ἔνι Hübner ex ceteris auctoribus antiquis: οὐκέτι Diogenis codd.

227E Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 8.48 (OCT vol.2 p.415.1 and 4-5 Long)

Favorinus says that he (Pythagoras) . . . first called the universe "cosmos" and (said that) the earth was round; but according to Theophrastus, (it was) Parmenides.

228A Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.26.31-27.28 Diels)

Of those who said that (the principles) are unlimited in number 27 some said that they were simple and similar in kind, others that they were composite and different in kind and opposite, but had their character according to what prevailed (in them). For Anaxagoras, son of Hegesibulus, from Clazomenae, who shared in the philosophy of Anaximenes, was the first to change the opinions about the principles and supply the cause that was lacking (i.e., the efficient cause). He made the bodily (principles) unlimited (in number); for (he said that) all the things whose parts were like the whole, for example fire and water and gold, did not either come to be or pass away, but

φαίνεσθαι δὲ γινόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα συγκρίσει καὶ διακρίσει μόνον, πάντων μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἐνότων, ἐκάστου δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ χαρακτηριζομένου. χρυσὸς γὰρ φαίνεται ἐκεῖνο, ἐν ᾧ πολὺ χρυσίον ἐνι, 10 καίτοι πάντων ἐνότων. λέγει γοῦν Ἀναξαγόρας ὅτι “ἐν παντὶ παντὸς μοῖρα ἔνεστι” καὶ “ὅτων πλείστα ἐνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἐν ἕκαστὸν ἐστι καὶ ἦν.”

καὶ ταῦτά φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος παραπλησίως τῷ Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ λέγειν τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ φησιν ἐν τῇ διακρίσει τοῦ ἀπείρου 15 τὰ συγγενῆ φέρεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλα, καὶ ὅτι μὲν ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρυσὸς ἐνῆν, γίνεσθαι χρυσόν, ὅτι δὲ γῆ, γῆν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, ὡς οὐ γινομένων ἀλλ’ ἐνυπαρχόντων πρότερον. τῆς δὲ κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἴτιον ἐπέστησε τὸν νοῦν ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας, ὅφ’ οὐ διακρινόμενα τούς τε κόσμους καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων φύσιν ἐγέννησαν. 20

“καὶ οὕτω μὲν”, φησί, “λαμβάνοντων δόξειεν ἂν ὁ Ἀναξαγόρας τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπείρους ποιεῖν, τὴν δὲ τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν μίαν τὸν νοῦν· εἰ δὲ τις τὴν μίξιν τῶν ἀπάντων ὑπολάβοι μίαν εἶναι φύσιν ἀόριστον καὶ κατ’ εἶδος καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος, συμβαίνει δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτὸν λέγειν τὴν τε τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν· ὥστε 25 φαίνεται τὰ σωματικὰ στοιχεῖα παραπλησίως ποιῶν Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ.”

καὶ Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, ὅφ’ καὶ Σωκράτη συγγεγονέναι φασὶν Ἀναξαγόρου γενομένῳ μαθητῇ, ἐν μὲν τῇ γενέσει τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πειράται τι φέρειν ἴδιον, τὰς ἀρχὰς δὲ τὰς αὐτὰς ἀποδίδωσιν ὥσπερ Ἀναξαγόρας. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἀπείρους τῷ πλήθει καὶ ἀνομογενεῖς 30 τὰς ἀρχὰς λέγουσι, τὰς ὁμοιομερείας τιθέντες ἀρχὰς.

3-8 *Aristoteles, Phys. 1.4 187a20-6, 187b1-7; Metaph. 1(A).3 984a11-16* 3-
26 *Anaxagoras, FVS 59A41* 4-6 cf. *Arist. Metaph. 1(A).3 984b18-20* 11-
12 *Anaxagoras, FVS 59B12; Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 1.4 187a21-6 (CAG t.9*
p.156.16-17) 12-13 *Anaxagoras, FVS 59B12; Simplicius, In Arist. Phys. 1.4*
187a21-6 (CAG t.9 p.157.4) 23-6 cf. *Aristotelis Metaph. 1(A).8 989a30-b6,*
989b16-21 27-31 *Archelaus, FVS 60A5* 29-30 cf. *Hippolyt. Refut. 1.9.1*
(DG p.563.14-15); Augustin. De civ. Dei 8.2 (p.323.3-4 Dombart); quorum neuter
Theophrastum nominat

9 ἐνότων *Usener, cf. Simplicium p.155.25: ὄντων codd.*

10 ἐνι *Diels:*

228B *Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.4 187a21 (CAG t.9 p.154.14-23 Diels)*

καὶ Θεόφραστος δὲ τὸν Ἀναξαγόραν εἰς τὸν Ἀναξιμάνδρον συνωθῶν καὶ οὕτως ἐκλαμβάνει τὰ ὑπὸ Ἀναξαγόρου λεγόμενα, ὡς δύνασθαι μίαν αὐτὸν φύσιν λέγειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. γράφει δὲ οὕτως

appeared to come to be and to pass away by combination and separation alone; all things were in all things, but each thing had its character according to what prevailed in it. For that thing appears to be gold in which there is much that is gold, even though all things are in (it). At any rate, Anaxagoras says that “in everything there is a portion of everything” and that “each single thing most clearly is and was those things of which there are most (portions) in (it).”

And Theophrastus says that these statements of Anaxagoras are very similar to those of Anaximander; for he says that, in the separation of the unlimited, things similar in kind are brought together with one another, and what was in the whole as gold becomes gold, what as earth, earth, and similarly with each of the other things, since they do not come to be, but were present in (the whole) beforehand. But as cause of motion and of coming-to-be Anaxagoras set up mind; for it is through separation by this that he accounts for the creation of the worlds and of the other natural things.

“And if one takes it this way,” (Theophrastus) says, “Anaxagoras would seem to make the material principles unlimited (in number), and the cause of movement and of coming-to-be single, (namely) mind. But if one were to suppose that the mixture of all things is a single nature indefinite both in kind and in magnitude, the result is that he speaks of the principles as two in number, the nature of the unlimited and mind; so that he clearly gives an account of the bodily elements very similar to Anaximander’s.”

And Archelaus of Athens, of whom they say that Socrates was an associate, and who was (himself) a pupil of Anaxagoras, tried to make some personal contribution in (his account of) the origin of the universe and in other respects, but gave the same account of the principles as did Anaxagoras. So these men say that the principles are unlimited in number and different in kind, laying down as principles those things whose parts are like the whole.

ἐστὶ *codd.* 11 παντὶ πᾶσι *E** 12 ὅτων *Usener, ex Aristotele: ὅτω (sic)*
codd. 16 ἐνῆν *Usener: ἦν codd.*

228B *Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Physics 1.4 187a21 (CAG vol.9 p.154.14-23 Diels)*

And Theophrastus forcibly assimilates Anaxagoras’ position to that of Anaximander, and interprets what Anaxagoras says in such a way that he can be saying that what underlies is a single nature. He (Theophrastus) writes as follows in his *Research concerning Nature*: “If

ἐν τῇ Φυσικῇ ἱστορίᾳ· “οὕτω μὲν οὖν λαμβανόντων δόξειεν ἂν ποιεῖν
 τὰς μὲν ὑλικὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπείρους, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τὴν δὲ τῆς κινήσεως 5
 καὶ τῆς γενέσεως αἰτίαν μίαν. εἰ δὲ τις τὴν μίξιν τῶν ἀπάντων ὑπολάβοι
 μίαν εἶναι φύσιν ἀόριστον καὶ κατ’ εἶδος καὶ κατὰ μέγεθος, ὅπερ ἂν
 δόξειε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, συμβαίνει δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς αὐτῷ λέγειν τὴν τε
 τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσιν καὶ τὸν νοῦν, ὥστε πάντως φαίνεται τὰ σωματικὰ 10
 στοιχεῖα παραπλησίως ποιῶν Ἄναξιμάνδρῳ”.

1-10 *Anaximander, FVS 12A9a*

229 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.28.4-31 Diels)

Λεύκιππος δὲ ὁ Ἐλεάτης ἢ Μιλήσιος (ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ λέγεται περὶ
 αὐτοῦ) κοινωνήσας Παρμενίδῃ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐβάδισε
 Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Ξενοφάνει περὶ τῶν ὄντων ὁδόν, ἀλλ’ ὡς δοκεῖ τὴν
 ἐναντίαν. ἐκείνων γὰρ ἔν καὶ ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀγένητον καὶ πεπερασμένον 5
 ποιούντων τὸ πᾶν, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μηδὲ ζητεῖν συγχαρούντων, οὗτος
 ἄπειρα καὶ αἰεὶ κινούμενα ὑπέθετο στοιχεῖα τὰς ἀτόμους καὶ τῶν ἐν
 αὐτοῖς σχημάτων ἄπειρον τὸ πλῆθος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ
 τοιοῦτον εἶναι [ταύτην γὰρ] καὶ γένεσιν καὶ μεταβολὴν ἀδιάλειπτον
 ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θεωρῶν. ἔτι δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν ὑπάρχειν, 10
 καὶ αἰτία ὁμοίως εἶναι τοῖς γινομένοις ἄμφω. τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἀτόμων
 οὐσίαν ναστὴν καὶ πλήρη ὑποτιθέμενος ὃν ἔλεγεν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ κενῷ
 φέρεσθαι, ὅπερ μὴ ὄν ἐκάλει καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον τοῦ ὄντος εἶναί φησι.

παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης
 ἀρχὰς ἔθετο τὸ πλήρες καὶ τὸ κενόν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν ἐκάλει·
 ὡς (γὰρ) ὕλην τοῖς οὖσι τὰς ἀτόμους ὑποτιθέντες τὰ λοιπὰ γεννώσι ταῖς 15
 διαφοραῖς αὐτῶν. τρεῖς δὲ εἰσιν αὐταὶ ῥυθμὸς τροπὴ διαθιγῆ, ταῦτόν
 δὲ εἰπεῖν σχῆμα καὶ θέσις καὶ τάξις. πεφυκέναι γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ
 ὁμοίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ φέρεσθαι τὰ συγγενῆ πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ τῶν
 σχημάτων ἕκαστον εἰς ἑτέραν ἐγκοσμούμενον σύγκρισιν ἄλλην ποιεῖν 20
 διάθεσιν· ὥστε εὐλόγως ἀπείρων οὐσῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν πάντα τὰ πάθη καὶ

one takes it this way, (Anaxagoras) would seem to make the material
 principles unlimited (in number), as has been said, and the cause of
 movement and of coming-to-be single. But if one were to suppose
 that the mixture of all things is a single nature indefinite both in kind
 and in magnitude, which is what he seems to mean, the result is that
 he speaks of the principles as two in number, the nature of the un-
 limited and mind; so that in any case he clearly gives an account of
 the bodily elements very similar to Anaximander’s.”

229 Simplicius, *On Aristotle’s Physics* 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.28.4-31 Diels)

Leucippus of Elea or of Miletus — for both accounts are given
 concerning him — had associated with Parmenides in philosophy;¹
 however, he did not follow the same path as Parmenides and Xeno-
 phanes concerning the things that are, but rather, as it seems, the
 opposite (path). For they made the All single and unmoved and
 without origin and limited, and agreed not even to enquire into what
 is not; but (Leucippus) supposed elements that were unlimited in
 number and always in movement, (namely) the atoms, and an un-
 limited number of shapes among them, because none was (for any
 reason) of one kind rather than another, and (because) he observed
 that there is incessant coming-to-be and change among the things
 that are. Moreover (he said that) what is does not exist any more
 than what is not, and that both alike are causes of the things that
 come to be. For he supposed that the substance of the atoms was
 compact and solid, and said that this was “being”, and that it moved
 about in the void, which he called “not-being” and said “was” no less
 than being (was).

And similarly his associate Democritus of Abdera laid down as
 principles the solid and the void, of which he called the one “being”
 and the other “not-being”. For supposing that the atoms are the mat-
 ter for the things that are, they account for the other things by the
 differences among them; and these are three, “rhythm”, “turning”
 and “touching”, that is to say shape and position and arrangement.
 Things are naturally moved by what is similar to them, and things of
 similar kinds are (naturally) carried towards one another; and each
 of the shapes, when it is incorporated into a different combination,
 produces a different disposition. Accordingly, since the principles
 were unlimited in number, it was reasonable for them to propose to
 give an account of the causes of all affections and substances and of

τὰς οὐσίας ἀποδώσειν ἐπηγγέλλοντο, ὑφ' οὗ τέ τι γίνεται καὶ πῶς. διὸ καὶ φασι μόνους τοῖς ἀπειρα ποιούσι τὰ στοιχεῖα πάντα συμβαίνειν κατὰ λόγον. καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀτόμοις σχημάτων ἀπειρον τὸ πληθὸς φασι διὰ τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοιοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον εἶναι. ταύτην γὰρ αὐτοὶ τῆς ἀπειρίας αἰτίαν ἀποδίδουσι.

καὶ Μητροδόωρος δὲ ὁ Χίος ἀρχὰς σχεδὸν τι τὰς αὐτὰς τοῖς περὶ Δημόκριτον ποιεῖ, τὸ πληρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ὑποθέμενος, ὦν τὸ μὲν ὄν, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν εἶναι. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἰδίαν τινὰ ποιεῖται τὴν μέθοδον.

αὕτη μὲν ἡ σύντομος περίληψις τῶν ἱστορημένων περὶ ἀρχῶν οὐ κατὰ χρόνους ἀναγραφείσα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς δόξης συγγένειαν.

1-2 *Diogenes Laertius*, 9.30, *Theophrasto non nominato* 1-6 *Parmenides*, *FVS* 28A8 1-14 *Leucippus*, *FVS* 67A8 5-17 *Aristoteles*, *Metaph.* 1(A).4 985b4-20, cf. *De gen. et. corr.* 1.8 325a2-b6; *Eusebius*, *Praep. ev.* 14.3.7 (GCS t.8.2 p.262.19-22); *Hippolytus*, *Refut.* 1.12.1 et 1.13.2 (DG p.564.26-8 et 565.6-9); *quorum nemo Theophrastum nominat* 13-25 *Democritus*, *FVS* 68A38 14 *Aëtius*, *Plac.* 1.3.15 (DG p.285b2-3), *sed de Leucippo* 15-17 *Aristoteles*, *Metaph.* 8(H).2 1042b11-15; *Theophrastus*, *De sensu* 60, *qui μέγεθος addidit* 17-18 *Sextus Empiricus*, *Adv. math.* 7.117-18, *Theophrasto non nominato* 26-9 *Metrodorus*, *FVS* 70A3; *Eusebius*, *Praep. ev.* 14.19.9 (GCS t.8.2 p.315.13-15), *Theophrasto non nominato* →

230 Simplicius, In Aristotelis Physica 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.9 p.26.5-15 Diels)

καὶ Πλάτων τρία μὲν τὰ κυρίως αἴτια τίθησι τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ τὸ τέλος, τρία δὲ τὰ συναίτια τὴν τε ὕλην καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ὄργανον. ὁ μὲντοι Θεόφραστος τοὺς ἄλλους προῖστορήσας, “τούτοις,” φησίν, “ἐπιγεγόμενος Πλάτων, τῇ μὲν δόξῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει πρότερος τοῖς δὲ χρόνοις ὕστερος καὶ τὴν πλείστην πραγματείαν περὶ τῆς πρώτης φιλοσοφίας ποιησάμενος, ἐπέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀνάμενος τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας. ἐν ἧ δὴ δύο τὰς ἀρχὰς βούλεται ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλην ὃ προσαγορεύει ‘πανδεχέ’, τὸ δὲ ὡς αἴτιον καὶ κινεῖν ὃ περιάπτει τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δυνάμει.” ὁ μὲντοι Ἀλέξανδρος ὡς τρεῖς λέγοντος τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπομνημονεύει τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, καίτοι σαφῶς τὸ τελικὸν αἴτιον τοῦ Πλάτωνος προσθέντος.

8-9 *Plato*, *Timaeus* 51A 7-10 *Cicero*, *Lucullus* 118 et *Diogenes Laertius* 3.69, *quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat; etiam Aristoteles*, *Metaph.* 1(A).6 988a7-15, *qui tamen materiam et formas, non deum, principia apud Platonem esse dixit* 10-11 *Alexander apud Simplicium*, In *Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b18-20 (CAG t.9 p.43.4-6); cf. *Aëtii Plac.* 1.3.21 (DG p.287.17-288.6) et *Philoponi comm.* In *Arist. Phys.* 1.2 184b15 (CAG t.16 23.31-24.1); *quorum omnium nemo Theophrastum nominat* →

how they came to be; and for this reason they say that it is only for those who make the elements unlimited that all things come about in accordance with reason. And they say that the number of shapes among the atoms is unlimited because none is (for any reason) more of one kind than of another; for this is the reason that they themselves give for (the shapes') being unlimited.

And Metrodorus of Chios makes the principles more or less the same as do the associates of Democritus, supposing the solid and the void to be the primary causes, and the one of these to be “being”, the other “not-being”; but concerning other matters he puts forward a certain individual system of his own.

This is the summary account of what has been ascertained about the principles, recorded not in a chronological arrangement, but according to affinities of doctrine.

¹ Or perhaps “had had philosophical associations with Parmenides”, indicating connections between their views rather than personal contact.

3 Ξενοφάνει καὶ Ζήνωνι *vel sim. coni.* Diels, DG p.483 n.11, *Diog. Laert.* 9.30 *conferens*: Ζήνωνι *pro* Ξενοφάνει *legendum censuit* McDiarmid, HSCP 61 (1953) p.155 n.212 8 ταύτην γὰρ *del.* Diels *ex v.24 infra per errorem translatum* 15 γὰρ *a*: *om. codd.* 17 θέσις καὶ τάξις DEE*, *Aristoteles*: τάξις καὶ θέσις *aF* 19 ἐγκοσμούμενον *Usener et Torstrik*: ἐκκοσμούμενον *codd.*

230 Simplicius, On Aristotle's Physics 1.2 184b15 (CAG vol.9 p.26.5-15 Diels)

And Plato posits three causes in the strict sense, the maker and the paradigm and the end, and three auxiliary causes, the matter and the (immanent) form and the instrument. Theophrastus, however, after giving his account of the other (natural philosophers), says: “After these came Plato, before them in reputation and ability though after them in date. He concerned himself chiefly with metaphysics, but also attended to phenomena, taking up the enquiry concerning nature; here he wished to make the principles two in number, one underlying (things) as matter — and this he calls ‘receptive of all things’; the other being cause and source of movement, and this he attaches to the power of god and of the good.” Alexander, however, refers to (Plato) as saying that the principles are three (in number), the matter and the maker and the paradigm, even though Plato clearly adds the final cause.

8 τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑποκείμενον τὴν ὕλην *coni.* Torstrik 9 θεοῦ DEE*: θείου *aF*

- 231 Galenus, In Hippocratis De natura hominum 1.2.25 (CMG t.5.9.1 p.15.13-25 Mewaldt)

κακῶς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν ἔνιοι κατεψεύσαντο Ξενοφάνους, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαβίνος, ὡδὶ πως γράψας αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασιν· “οὔτε γὰρ πάμπαν ἀέρα λέγω τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὥσπερ Ἀναξιμένης, οὔτε ὕδωρ ὡς Θαλῆς, οὔτε γῆν, ὡς ἔν τινι ὁ Ξενοφάνης.” οὐδαμῶθεν γὰρ εὐρίσκεται Ξενοφάνης ἀποφηνάμενος οὕτως. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ Σαβίνος αὐτὸς εὐδηλὸς ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ καταψευδόμενος, οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀγνοίας ἐσφαλμένος· ἢ πάντως ἀν ὀνομαστικῶς προσέγραψε τὸ βιβλίον, ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα ἀπεφάνητο· νῦν δ’ οὕτως ἔγραψεν· “οὔτε γῆν, ὡς ἔν τινι Ξενοφάνης”. καὶ Θεόφραστος δ’ ἂν ἐν ταῖς τῶν Φυσικῶν δοξῶν ἐπιτομαῖς τὴν Ξενοφάνους δόξαν, εἴτε οὕτως εἶχεν, ἐγγράφει. καὶ σοι πάρεστιν, εἰ χαίροις τῇ περὶ τούτων ἱστορίᾳ, τὰς τοῦ Θεοφράστου βίβλους ἀναγῶναι, καθ’ ἃς τὴν ἐπιτομὴν ἐποιήσατο τῶν φυσικῶν δοξῶν.

1-5, 8-10 *Xenophanes*, FVS 21A36 2-3 *Anaximenes*, FVS 13A22 2-4 cf. *Hippocratis librum De natura hominum 1* (CMG t.1.1.3 p.164.5-6)

3 post *Ἀναξιμένης add.* οὔτε πῦρ, ὡς Ἡράκλειτος *Mewaldt*

- 232 Stobaeus, Anthologium 1.25.1a-b (t.1 p.207.17 et 207.23-208.2 Wachsmuth)

b Ξενοφάνης ἐκ νεφῶν πεπυρημένων εἶναι τὸν ἥλιον. . . . Θεόφραστος δὲ ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς γέγραπεν, ἐκ πυριδίων τῶν συναθροισζομένων μὲν (ἐκ) τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἀναθυμιάσεως, συναθροισζόντων δὲ τὸν ἥλιον.

1-3 *Aetius*, *Placita philosophorum* 2.20.3 (DG p.348b10-349b3); *Xenophanes*, FVS 21A40; cf. [*Plutarchi*] *librum De plac. philos.* 2.20 890A (DG p.348a10-13) et *Eusebii Praep. ev.* 15.23.2 (GCS t.43.2 p.400.14-15); *quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat* 1 *Theodoretus*, *Graec. aff. cur.* 4.21 (p.105.16-17 *Raeder*), *Theophrasto non nominato* 2-3 *Hippolytus*, *Refut.* 1.14.3 (DG p.565.27-8) et [*Plutarchus*], *Strom.* 4 (DG p.580.13-14); *quorum neuter Theophrastum nominat*

1 *Stobaei culpa testimonium Theophrasti ad Xenophanem pertinens tamquam novam et ipsius Theophrasti opinionem recensum esse iudicavit Diels*: ἢ ὡς Θεόφραστος *coni.* *Usener* 2 *mὲν post συναθροισζομένων exhibit* [*Plutarchus*], *De plac.*: post πυριδίων *Stobaeus* 3 *ἐκ add.* *Diels ex* [*Plutarcho*], *De plac.*: *om.* *Stobaeus* συναθροίσζειν δὲ (vel συναθροισζοντος δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου) *coni.* *Steinmetz*, qui μὲν (n.2) post πυριδίων cum *Stobaeo legit*

- 231 Galen, *On Hippocrates' On the Nature of Man* 1.2.25 (CMG vol.5.9.1 p.15.13-25 Mewaldt)

And some of the commentators have badly misrepresented Xenophanes, like Sabinus who writes as follows in these actual words: “For I do not say that man is entirely air, like Anaximenes, or water, like Thales, or earth, like Xenophanes somewhere.” Xenophanes is nowhere found to state his position thus. And Sabinus himself is clearly shown by his own (words) to be misrepresenting (Xenophanes) rather than to have stumbled through ignorance. Otherwise he would certainly have added the name of the book in which he (Xenophanes) declared this. But as it is he wrote “or earth, like Xenophanes somewhere”. And Theophrastus in the *Summaries of the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers* would have recorded Xenophanes’ opinion, if indeed it was like this. If you enjoy the investigation of these matters you can read the books of Theophrastus, in which he made his summary of the opinions of the natural philosophers.

- 232 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 1.25.1a-b (vol.1 p.207.17 and 207.23-208.2 Wachsmuth)

Xenophanes (said) that the sun is composed of ignited clouds. b . . . Theophrastus wrote in his *Physics* that (it was, according to Xenophanes, composed)¹ of sparks which were formed by coalescence from the moist exhalation, and (themselves) coalesced (to form) the sun.²

¹ The text could also be reporting Theophrastus’ own view, though that is less likely. See the commentary.

² Or, with Steinmetz’ emendation, “. . . from the moist exhalation, and that it was the sun (itself) that caused them to coalesce”.

- 233 Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 9.6 (OCT t.2 p.439.20-1 Long)

Θεόφραστος δέ φησιν ὑπὸ μελαγχολίας τὰ μὲν ἡμιτελῆ, τὰ δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα γράψαι.

1-2 *Heraclitus*, FVS 22A1

- 234 Simplicius, In *Aristotelis Physica* 1.3 186a24 (CAG t.9 p.115.11-13 Diels)

τὸν Παρμενίδου λόγον, ὡς ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος ἱστορεῖ, ὁ μὲν Θεόφραστος οὕτως ἐκτίθεται ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῆς Φυσικῆς ἱστορίας· “τὸ παρὰ τὸ ὄν οὐκ ὄν· τὸ οὐκ ὄν οὐδέν· ἐν ἅρα τὸ ὄν.”

1-3 *Parmenides*, FVS 28A28; cf. *Aristotelis Metaph.* 1(A)5 986b27-30; *Simplicii comm.* In *Aristotelis Phys.* 1.3 186a24 (CAG t.9 p.118.2-3) et 187a1 (CAG t.9

- 235 Simplicius, In *Aristotelis physica* 1.4 187b13-21 (CAG t.9 p.166.15-20 Diels)

εἰπόντος τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου ὅτι “οὔτε τοῦ μικροῦ ἐστὶ τοῦλάχιστον ἀλλὰ ἔλασσον αἰεῖ”, οὔτε τὸ μέγιστον (ὡς καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ λέξις τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου δηλοῖ, καὶ μέντοι καὶ Θεόφραστος ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου δευτέρῳ τάδε γράφων· “ἔπειτα τὸ διὰ τοῦτο λέγειν εἶναι πάντα ἐν παντί, διότι καὶ ἐν μεγέθει καὶ ἐν μικρότητι ἅπειρα, καὶ οὔτε τὸ ἐλάχιστον οὔτε τὸ μέγιστόν ἐστι λαβεῖν, οὐχ ἰκανὸν πρὸς πίστιν”)

1-2 *Anaxagoras*, FVS 59B3; *Simplicius*, In *Aristotelis Phys.* 1.4 187b7-13 (CAG t.9 p.164.17-18) 1-6 *Anaxagoras*, FVS 59A41

1 τὸ γε ἐλάχιστον *Simplicius*, In *Phys.* p.164.17

- 236 Stobaeus, *Anthologium* 1.26.3 (t.1 p.221.20-2 Wachsmuth)

Ἀναξαγόρας, ὡς φησι Θεόφραστος, καὶ τῶν ὑποκάτω τῆς σελήνης ἔσθ' ὅτε σωμάτων ἐπιπροσθούτων.

1-2 *Aetius*, *Placita philosophorum* 2.29.7 (DG p.360b23-6); *Anaxagoras*, FVS 59A77; cf. *Hippolyti Refut.* 1.8.9 (DG p.562.22-4), *Theophrasto non nominato*

- 233 Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.6 (OCT vol.2 p.439.20-1 Long)

But Theophrastus says that on account of his *melancholia* some of the things (Heraclitus) wrote are incomplete and others inconsistent.

- 234 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.3 186a24 (CAG vol.9 p.115.11-13 Diels)

As Alexander relates, Theophrastus set out Parmenides' argument as follows in the first (book) of his *Research concerning Nature*: “What is other than what is, is not; what is not, is nothing; so what is, is one.”

p.134.11-12), *Theophrasto nominato*; *Philoponi comm.* In *Aristotelis Phys.* 1.3 186a22 (CAG t.16 p.62.4-8), *Theophrasto nominato*; [*Plutarchi*] *Strom.* 5 (DG p.581.2-3), *Theophrasto non nominato*

- 235 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.4 187b13-21 (CAG vol.9 p.166.15-20 Diels)

Anaxagoras said “neither is there a smallest part of what is small, but there is always a smaller”, (and that) there is not a largest thing either. — Anaxagoras' own words show this, and (so) furthermore (does) Theophrastus, when he writes as follows in his second book *On Anaxagoras*: “Next, it is not sufficient for proof to say that all things are in each thing because (things) are unlimited both in largeness and in smallness and one cannot apprehend either what is smallest or what is largest” —

- 236 Stobaeus, *Anthology* 1.26.3 (vol.1 p.221.20-2 Wachsmuth)

Anaxagoras, as Theophrastus says, (held that the moon is eclipsed) also when the bodies below it screen it at certain times.

1 τῶν] τινῶν *coni. Usener*

- 237 Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* 9.46 (OCT t.2 p.460.20-2 Long)

φυσικὰ δὲ τάδε· Μέγας διάκοσμος, ὃν οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον Λευκίππου φασὶν εἶναι

1 *Suda, s.v., Democritus (no. 447, LG t.1 pars 2 p.44.15-16 Adler), quo loco opus Democrito attribuitur* 1-2 *Democritus, FVS 68A33, 68B4b = Leucippus, FVS 67B1a*

- 238 Simplicius, *In Aristotelis De caelo* 3.1 299a2-11 (CAG t.7 p.564.24-6 Heiberg)

Δημόκριτος δὲ, ὡς Θεόφραστος ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς ἱστορεῖ, ὡς ἰδιωτικῶς ἀποδιδόντων τῶν κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰτιολογούντων ἐπὶ τὰς ἀτόμους ἀνέβη.

1-3 *Democritus, FVS 68A120; vid. etiam Simplicii comm. In Aristotelis De caelo 3.1 299b23-31 (CAG t.7 p.576.14-16) et 3.7 306a1 (CAG t.7 p.641.5-7), Theophrasto nominato; cf. Theophrasti librum De sensu 63*

- 239 Galenus, *De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia* 1.9 (p.54.4-8 Helmreich)

ὅσα γὰρ ἄλλα ταῖς ἀπαθῆ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν ὑποτιθεμέναις αἰρέσεσι, παραπλεούσαις δὲ τὸ κενὸν ἐναντιοῦται, τὰ μὲν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ Θεοφράστου λέλεκται, τὰ δ' ἂν καὶ ἡμεῖς εὔπομεν ἰδίᾳ πρὸς ἐκάστην τῶν αἰρέσεων ἀντεπώντες.

- 240 Cicero, *Lucullus* 123 (BT p.89.6-12 Plasberg)

Hicetas Syracosius, ut ait Theophrastus, caelum solem lunam stellas supera denique omnia stare censet neque praeter terram rem ullam in mundo moveri, quae cum circum axem se summa celeritate convertat et torqueat, eadem effici omnia quae si stante terra caelum movetur; atque hoc etiam Platonem in Timaeo dicere quidam arbitrantur, sed paulo obscurius.

1-5 *Hicetas, FVS 50 no. 1* 5-6 *Plato, Timaeus 40B*

4 quae si *Manutius*: quasi *codd.*

- 237 Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.46 (OCT vol.2 p.460.20-2 Long)

On natural science the following (are the works of Democritus): The *Great World-System*, which the associates of Theophrastus say is by Leucippus

- 238 Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 3.1 299a2-11 (CAG vol.7 p.564.24-6 Heiberg)

As Theophrastus relates in his *Physics*, Democritus had recourse to the atoms, on the grounds that those who gave explanations in terms of the hot and cold and the like were giving a commonplace account.

- 239 Galen, *On the Elements according to the Opinion of Hippocrates* 1.9 (p.54.4-8 Helmreich)

For, of the other objections to the sects that suppose that substance cannot be affected and introduce the void,¹ some have been stated by Aristotle and Theophrastus, and others we too would state, making our objections against each sect individually.

¹ Those that follow the Atomists.

- 240 Cicero, *Lucullus* 123 (BT p.89.6-12 Plasberg)

Hicetas of Syracuse, as Theophrastus says, supposes that the heavens, the sun, the moon and the stars, and in short all the heavenly bodies are stationary, and that nothing moves in the whole universe except the earth. Since this revolves and rotates about its axis at a very great speed, all the results are the same as if the earth was stationary and the heavens in motion. And some think that Plato too says this in the *Timaeus*, but a little less clearly.

241A Taurus ap. Philoponum, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum 6.8 (BT p.145.20-4 Rabe)

καὶ Θεόφραστος μέντοι ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν δοξῶν κατὰ Πλάτωνά φησι γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον καὶ οὕτω ποιεῖται τὰς ἐνστάσεις, παρεμφαίνει δὲ ὅτι ἴσως σαφηνείας χάριν γενητὸν αὐτὸν ὑποτίθεται.

1-3 ex Tauro iterat Philoponus *ibid.* 6.27 (p.223.14-17 Rabe, cf. p.223.19-24)

241B Taurus ap. Philoponum, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum 6.21 (BT p.188.9-13 Rabe)

ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος εἰπὼν ὅτι “ταχ’ ἂν γενητὸν λέγει σαφηνείας χάριν, ὡς καὶ τοῖς διαγράμμασι παρακολουθοῦμεν γινομένοις,” φησὶν “πλὴν ἴσως ἢ γένεσις οὐκ ὁμοίως ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν διαγραμμάτων.”

1-3 ex Tauro iterat Philoponus *ibid.* 6.27 (p.224.4-8 Rabe, cf. p.223.24-6); Aristoteles, De caelo 1.10 279b32-280a2; Simplicius ad loc. (CAG t.7 p.304.3-15), Theophrasto non nominato

241C aš-Šahrastānī, al-Milal wa-n-niḥal, ra’y Aflāṭun (p.283.11-13 Cureton)

حكي عنه قوم ممن شاهدوه وتلمذ له مثل ارسطوطاليس وطيمائوس
وثاوفرستس أنه قال إن للعالم محدثاً مبدعاً

1-2 Aristoteles, De caelo 1.10 280a28-35, Platonis dialogo Timaeo nominato

242 Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum 31B (BT t.1 p.456.6-18 Diehl)

οὐ γὰρ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ἐλέγχει τοὺς πλῆθος εἶναι λέγοντας τῶν κόσμων, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τοὺς τὴν ἀπειρίαν εἰσάγοντας ἄλλων ἀλλαγῶν διεσπαρμένον καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κενοῦ διαλαμβανομένων, ἀλλ’ ὁμοῦ καὶ τούτους κάκεινους ἀπέφηνε ψευδεῖς, αὐτόθεν κατασκευάσας ὅτι εἰς ὁ κόσμος ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ παραδείγματος μονώσεως. καὶ ἔτι τοὺς ὑλικοὺς παρητήσατο τρόπους τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως· οὐτε ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ὅτι μία, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀπέδειξεν, ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρίσθαι τοὺς κατὰ φύσιν τόπους, οὐτε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἠνῶσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, τούτεστι τὴν ὕλην σῶμα οὖσαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς· ἢ γὰρ

241A Taurus in Philoponus, *Against Proclus, on the Eternity of the Universe* 6.8 (BT p.145.20-4 Rabe)

Theophrastus however, in *On the Opinions of the Natural Philosophers*, says that the universe has an origin according to Plato, and makes his objections accordingly. But he (also) suggests that perhaps (Plato) adopts the hypothesis that it has an origin for the sake of clear exposition.

241B Taurus in Philoponus, *Against Proclus, on the Eternity of the Universe* 6.21 (BT p.188.9-13 Rabe)

But Theophrastus, after saying “perhaps (Plato) speaks of the universe as having an origin for the sake of clear exposition, just as we follow geometrical diagrams, too, when they are being constructed,” (then) says “but perhaps the coming-to-be is not similar in the case of the diagrams.”

3 καὶ *om.* p.224.7

241C Šahrastānī, *Religions and Sects, The Views of Plato* (p.283.11-13 Cureton)

Some of the people who met him (Plato) personally and became his students, like Aristotle, Timaeus, and Theophrastus, reported from him that he said that the world has a creator

242 Proclus, *On Plato’s Timaeus* 31B (BT vol.1 p.456.6-18 Diehl)

For he (Plato) does not refute by separate arguments those who say that there is a plurality of worlds, on the one hand, and those who introduce an infinity of (worlds) scattered each in a different place and separated by the void, on the other; rather, he shows simultaneously that both the former and the latter are mistaken, establishing directly that the world is one from the singleness of its model. Moreover, he declines to use the methods of argument that involve matter; he does not prove it from matter’s being one, like Aristotle, nor from there being definite natural regions, nor from substance, that is matter which is body, being unified, as (do) the Stoics. For Plato was either the only or the principal person to use the explana-

μόνος ἢ μάλιστα Πλάτων τῆ ἀπὸ τοῦ προνοούντος αἰτία κατεχρήσατο, φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος, τοῦτό γε καλῶς αὐτῷ μαρτυρῶν.

10

4-8 SVF t.2 p.170.19-24, fr. 533 6 Aristoteles, *De caelo* 1.9 277b27-279a11
7 *ibid.* 1.8 276a18-b21

- 243 Plutarchus, *Quaestiones Platonicae* 8.1 1006C (BT t.6.1 p.129.25-130.3 Hubert, ed. a. 1954)

130 Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ προσιστορεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι πρεσβυτέρῳ γενομένῳ μεταμέλειν ὡς οὐ προσήκουσαν ἀποδόντι τῆ γῆ τὴν μέσην χώραν τοῦ παντός.

1-3 Plutarchus, *Numa* 11.2, *Theophrasto non nominato*

- 244 Paulus (?), *Kitāb ‘Unṣur al-mūsīqā*, dictum Theophrasti (no. 28, RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.100 Gutas)

وقال ثاوفرسطس إن افلاطن كان إذا جلس على الشراب قال للموسيقار غننا في ثلاثة أشياء في الخير الأول وفي النشأة الثانية وفي إيضاح الأمور

1 ثاوفرسطس *scripsit Gutas*: ثاوفرسطس 1

vid. 150, 159, 161A-B et 268

- 245 Plutarchus, *Adversus Colotem* 14 1114F-1115B (BT t.6.2 p.189.7-19 Pohlenz et Westman)

καὶ πρῶτόν γε τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ πολυμάθειαν τοῦ φιλοσόφου σκεψώμεθα, λέγοντος ὅτι τούτοις τοῖς δόγμασι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐπηκολουθήκασιν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ πάντες οἱ Περιπατητικοί. ποῦ γὰρ ὦν τῆς ἀοικήτου τὸ βιβλίον ἔγραψες, ἵνα ταῦτα συντιθεὶς τὰ ἐγκλήματα μὴ τοῖς ἐκείνων συντάγμασιν ἐντύχης μηδὲ ἀναλάβης εἰς χεῖρας Ἀριστοτέλους τὰ *Περὶ οὐρανοῦ* καὶ τὰ *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, Θεοφράστου δὲ τὰ *Πρὸς τοὺς φυσικούς*, Ἡρακλείδου δὲ τὸν *Ζωροάστην*, τὸ *Περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου*, τὸ *Περὶ τῶν φυσικῶς ἀπορουμένων*, Δικαιάρχου δὲ τὰ *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, ἐν οἷς πρὸς τὰ κυριώτατα

5

tion from the activity of providence¹ (in this connection), (as) Theophrastus says, testifying truly on Plato's behalf in this at least.

¹ Literally "from the one who foresees".

- 243 Plutarch, *Platonic Questions* 8.1 1006C (BT vol.6.1 p.129.25-130.3 Hubert, ed. 1954)

130 Theophrastus even adds the report that when Plato had grown old, he regretted that he had given the earth a place in the center of the universe that was not suited to it.

- 244 Paul (?), *The Element of Music*, saying of Theophrastus (no. 28, RUSCH vol.2 [1985] p.100 Gutas)

Theophrastus said that when Plato sat down to drink he would say to the musician: "Sing to us of three things: of the first Good, of the second(ary) coming into being, and of the manifestation of things."

see 150, 159, 161A-B and 268

- 245 Plutarch, *In Reply to Colotes* 14 1114F-1115B (BT vol.6.2 p.189.7-19 Pohlenz and Westman)

And first let us consider the carefulness and wide learning of the philosopher (Colotes), when he says that these doctrines of Plato were followed by Aristotle and Xenocrates and Theophrastus and all the Peripatetics. In what uninhabited region did you write the book, so that when you put together these accusations you did not come across their compositions or take into your hands Aristotle's *On Heaven* and *On the Soul*, Theophrastus' *In Reply to the Natural Philosophers*, Heraclides' *Zoroaster*, *On the Underworld*, and *On Difficulties in Natural Philosophy*, and Dicaearchus' *On the Soul*; in which they are continually at variance with Plato and wrangling (with him) in rela-

B καὶ μέγιστα τῶν φυσικῶν ὑπεναντιούμενοι τῷ Πλάτῳ καὶ μαχόμενοι 10
διατελοῦσι;

4-11 *Heraclides, fr. 68, 71 Wehrli* 6-11 *Dicaearchus, fr. 5 Wehrli*

7 Ἡρακλείδου *Reiske*: Ἡρακλείτου *FB*

vid. **62A**

vid. **221** (et *Appendicem* no. 4) et **261**

B tion to the greatest and most important matters in natural philoso-
phy?

see **62A**

see **221** (and *Appendix* no. 4) and **261**

METAPHYSICA

Inscriptiones librorum

246 Tabula inscriptionum ad opera metaphysica spectantium

- 1a Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά] codices
 - b Kitāb mā ba'da ḡ-tabī'a, maqāla] Ibn an-Nadīm, *Fihrist* 7.1, cap. de Theophrasto (p.252.9 Flügel) = **3A**; az-Zawzanī, *Muntaḡabāt min Aḡbār al-ḡukamā' li-l-Qiftī*, cap. de Theophrasto (p.107.4 Lippert) = **3B**
 - c liber Aristotelis *De principiis*] cod. Patav. Scaff. xvii 370
- 2 librum primum Aristotelis *Metaphysicorum* Theophrasto attribuunt Albertus Magnus, *Analytica posteriora* 1.2.1 (t.2 p.22a3 Borgnet) = **247**; Sigerus de Brabantia, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysica*: fragmentum commentarii in librum 2 (*Philosophes médiévaux* t.1 p.27.41-3 Graiff) = **248**; Petrus de Alvernia, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*: prooemium (p.151.23-4 Monahan) = app. **248**
 - 3 Liber de causis Aristoteli temporibus mediaevalibus vulgo attribuebatur; sed Theophrasto ab aliquibus attributum esse dicitur in commentario anonymo, cod. Vindob. Bibl. nat. 5500 f.48^r (*Tijdschrift voor filosofie* t.28 [1966] p.91.4 Pattin) = **249A**
 - 4 Περὶ εἰδῶν α'β'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.43 = 1 (*Περὶ εἰδώλων*, codd. PQ, sed haec inscriptio antehac in eadem parte tabulae Diogenis occurrit [vid. **137** no. 35]; *Περὶ ἡθῶν* [436 no. 1] con. Meurs)
 - 5 Περὶ ψεύδους καὶ ἀληθοῦς α'] Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae* 5.48 = 1
vid. **68** no. 32 (*Περὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν διαπορημάτων α'*)
vid. **137** no. 9 (*Περὶ αἰτιῶν α'*)

METAPHYSICS

Titles of Books

246 List of Titles Referring to Metaphysical Works

- 1a *Metaphysics*] manuscripts
 - b *Metaphysics*, one book] Ibn-an-Nadīm, *The Index* 7.1, chap. on Theophrastus (p.252.9 Flügel) = **3A**; Zawzanī, *Selections from Qiftī's History of the Philosophers*, chap. on Theophrastus (p.107.4 Lippert) = **3B**
 - c Aristotle's *Book On Principles*] cod. Patav. Scaff. xvii 370
- 2 The first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is attributed to Theophrastus by Albert the Great, *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.1 (vol.2 p.22a3 Borgnet) = **247**; Siger of Brabant, *Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics*: fragment of a commentary on Book 2 (*Philosophes médiévaux* vol.1 p.27.41-3 Graiff) = **248**; Peter of Auvergne, *Questions on the Metaphysics*: preface (p.151.23-4 Monahan) = app. **248**
 - 3 *The Book about Causes* was commonly attributed to Aristotle in the middle ages; but that some attributed it to Theophrastus is stated in the anonymous commentary, cod. Vindob. Bibl. nat. 5500 f.48^r (*Tijdschrift voor filosofie* vol.28 [1966] p.91.4 Pattin) = **249A**
 - 4 *On Forms*, 2 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.43 = 1 (*On Images*, mss. PQ, but this title occurs earlier in the same section of Diogenes' list [see **137** no. 35]; Meurs conjectured *On Dispositions* [436 no. 1])
 - 5 *On False and True*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1
see **68** no. 32 (*On Simple Problems*, 1 book)
see **137** no. 9 (*On Causes*, 1 book)

Scripta metaphysica

- 247 Albertus Magnus, *Analytica posteriora* 1.2.1 (t.2 p.22a13-34 Borgnet)

haec probatur ex origine scientiae, quae in primo ponitur Primae philosophiae, quod ex admirari et tunc et nunc philosophari inceptum. admiratio enim est suspensio ad causam eius quod apparet et causae ad effectum comparationis quod illius causa sit, et ipsum philosophari sic causatum considerat convenientiam effectus ad causam secundum non contingere aliter se habere. hoc modo naturale desiderium, quo omnes homines scire desiderant, procedit ad scire secundum actum; quod desiderium est in vere scientibus, et in non vere scientibus. hoc igitur modo est vere scire. et hanc probationem ponit Theophrastus, qui etiam primum librum (qui incipit "omnes homines scire desiderant") Metaphysicorum Aristotelis traditur addidisse: et ideo in Arabicis translationibus primus liber non habetur.

2-3 *Aristoteles, Metaphysica* 1(A).2 982b12-13
6-7 *ibid.* 1(A).1 980a21

3-4 *cf. ibid.* 983a13-17

11 *ibid.*

- 248 Sigerus de Brabantia, *Quaestiones in Aristotelis Metaphysica*: fragmentum commentarii in librum 2 (*Philosophes médiévaux* t.1 p.27.41-3 Graiff)

primus autem dicitur fuisse Theophrasti, non Aristotelis, et hoc dicunt expositores Graeci.

1-2 *Petrus de Alvernia, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, prooemium* (p.151.23-4 Monahan)
2 non in operibus commentatorum Graecorum conservatis

- 249A Anonymus, In Librum de causis, cod. Vindob. Bibl. nat. 5500 fol.48^r (*Tijdschrift voor filosofie* t.28 [1966] p.91.4-11 Pattin)

de causa efficiente quidam dicunt quod fuerit Teofrastus, qui fuit discipulus Platonis et Aristotelis. ideo in isto libro collegit tam propositiones Aristotelis quam Platonis. alii dicunt quod iste liber non sit in Graeco inventus sed in Arabico, sed de Arabico in Latinum translatus et quod hunc fecerat quidam nomine David. tertia opinio

Writings on Metaphysics

- 247 Albert the Great, *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.1 (vol.2 p.22a13-34 Borgnet)

This¹ is proved from the origin of knowledge, which is to be found in the first (book) of *First Philosophy*² — that it is from wonder, both then and now, that philosophical activity arises. For wonder is curiosity about the cause of that which appears, and about the relationship of the cause to the effect in that it is the cause of that thing, and the philosophical activity so caused considers the conformity of the effect to the cause on the assumption that it is not possible for it to be otherwise. In this way the natural desire, by which all men desire to know, advances to knowing in actuality; this desire is both in those who really know and in those who do not really know. In this way therefore arises true knowledge. And this proof is given by Theophrastus, who is also reported to have added the first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (the one which begins "All men desire to know"): and for that reason the first book is not given in the Arabic translations.

¹ That knowledge is of the cause of something with the assumption that the cause necessitates the effect.

² I.e., the *Metaphysics*.

- 248 Siger of Brabant, *Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics*: fragment of a commentary on book 2 (*Philosophes médiévaux* vol.1 p.27.41-3 Graiff)

But the first (book) is said to have been by Theophrastus, not Aristotle, and this is said by Greek commentators.

- 249A Anonymous, *On the Book about Causes*, cod. Vindob. Bibl. nat. 5500 fol. 48^r (*Tijdschrift voor filosofie* vol.28 [1966] p.91.4-11 Pattin)

Concerning the efficient cause (i.e., the author of the *Book about Causes*) some say that it was Theophrastus, who was the pupil of Plato and Aristotle. For that reason he collected in that book the propositions of Aristotle as well as of Plato. Others say that that book is not found in Greek but (only) in Arabic, but was translated from Arabic into Latin, and that this had been done by a certain person named David. A third opinion states that that book is drawn

XXV
INDEX
dicit quod ille liber sit extractus de 300is propositionibus Procli. quarta opinio dicit quod sint propositiones Aristotelis et inter suos libros nominentur Canones Aristotelis quos Alfarabius commentavit.

8 Aristotelis] Aristoteles *ed. Pattin*

249B Scholion in Librum de causis, cod. Paris. Bibl. nat. Lat. 6319 f.200^vb in marg. (*Tijdschrift voor filosofie* t.28 [1966] p.114.4-5 Pattin)

commentator huius libri fuit Alfarabius vel Proclus, secundum alios Theophrastus.

1 Proclus] Procrus *ed. Pattin*

Inseparabilia

250 Lumen animae B, caput 66, De separatione, A (ed. a. 1477² Farinator)

commentator Theophrastus super libro De quattuor transcendentibus: quorumcumque est unum esse, unum non separatur ab alio absque corruptione eius.

vid. 160

from the 300 propositions of Proclus. A fourth opinion states that they are the propositions of Aristotle, and that among his books there are mentioned *The Canons of Aristotle* on which Farabi commented.

249B Scholium on the *Book about Causes*, cod. Paris. Bibl. nat. Lat. 6319 f.200^vb in marg. (*Tijdschrift voor filosofie* vol.28 [1966] p.114.4-5 Pattin)

The commentator on this book (the *Book about Causes*) was Farabi or Proclus, according to others Theophrastus.

Inseparables

250 *Light of the Soul B*, chapter 66, On Separation, A (ed. 1477² Farinator)

The commentator Theophrastus on the book *On the Four Transcendent Things*: if the being of two things is one,¹ the one of them is not separated from the other and from its perishing.

¹ Literally, "of whatsoever things the being is one".

see 160

THEOLOGIA

Inscriptiones librorum

251 Tabula inscriptionum ad opera de theologia spectantium

- 1 Τῶν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἱστορίας α'—ς'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.48 = 1
- 2 Περὶ θεῶν α'—γ'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.48 = 1
- 3 Kitāb ilā Dimuqrāt fi t-tawhīd] Ibn Abī Uṣaybi'a, 'Uyūn al-anbā' fi ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbā' 4, cap. de Theophrasto (t.1 p.69.26 Müller) = app. 3A; hoc opus spurium esse videtur

vid. 436 no. 13 (Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ Ἀκαδημείας α')
- vid. 580 no. 1 ('Εγκώμια θεῶν α')
- vid. 580 no. 3 (Περὶ εὐσεβείας α')

Deus et divinum

252A Cicero, De natura deorum 1.35 (BT p.15.6-8 Plasberg et Ax)

nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus.

1-3 *Minucius Felix, Octavius* 19.9 (p.17.7-8 Kutzler)

2 divinum] divinae *codd. dett., Minucius*

THEOLOGY

Titles of Books

251 List of Titles Referring to Works on Theology

- 1 *Research on the Divine*, 6 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1
- 2 *On the Gods*, 3 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1
- 3 *On Asserting the Oneness (of God), To Democritus*] Ibn-Abī Uṣaybi'a, *Essential Information on the Generations of Physicians* 4, chap. on Theophrastus (vol.1 p.69.26 Müller) = app. 3A; this work appears to be spurious

see 436 no. 13 (*On the Divine Happiness in Response to the Academics*, 1 book)

see 580 no. 1 (*Encomia of Gods*, 1 book)

see 580 no. 3 (*On Piety*, 1 book)

God and the Divine

252A Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.35 (BT p.15.6-8 Plasberg and Ax)

Nor indeed is the fickleness of Theophrastus to be borne, for sometimes he assigned divine primacy to mind,¹ sometimes to the heaven, at another time, however, to the heavenly signs and the stars.

¹ Or, with some manuscripts and Minucius, "primacy to the divine mind".

252B Clemens Alexandrinus, *Protrepticus ad Graecos* 5.66.5 (GCS t.1 p.51.4-6 Stählin)

ὁ δὲ Ἐρέσιος ἐκείνος Θεόφραστος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους γνώριμος πῆ μὲν οὐρανόν, πῆ δὲ πνεῦμα τὸν θεὸν ὑπονοεῖ.

253 Anonymus, *Kitāb fīhi āraʿ al-ḥukamāʿ fī ṭ-ṭabʿiyāt wa-fīhi l-ārāʿ wa-l-kalimāt ar-rūḥānīya li-l-mutaqaddimīn*, dictum Theophrasti (RUSCH t.2 [1985] p.105 Daiber)

قال ثاوفرسطوس تلميذ ارسطو عن البارئ فقال سبق الأوقات وجوده والأعصار كونه والدهر مبتدؤه والابتداء أن له بتجهيزه الجواهر وتصويره لها علمنا أن لا جوهر له أنشأ البرايا وكونها ولا منشئ له ولا مكون لم يقارن الأشياء بل ضاها في كل الأمور ولو شاء * * * كلها لكان منها لا قبل له ولا بعد له وسط وآخر كأن له طرفين ليس له آلة السمع فيسمع ولا بصر فيبصر ولا نوق فيتطعم ولا حاسة لمس فيلمس — جل ثناؤه وتقدست أسماؤه

Daiber: ثاوفرسطوس *cod.* 3 *cod.*: fort. مكون له
Daiber: ثاوفرسطوس *con.* يفارق *cod.*: يفارق *Daiber* 4 ضاها *scripsit Gutas*: ضاها
cod.: صارها *Daiber* *lac. con.* *Gutas* 5 *scripsit Gutas*: كان *cod.*: كانا
Daiber طرفين *scripsit Gutas*: طرفين *legit Daiber*: طرفان *cod.*: an كان له طرفان *legendum?*

254A Scholion in Basilii Magni *Homilias in Hexaemeron* 1.3, PG t.29 col.12A (no. 6-7, NGG a. 1910 p.196.14-18 Pasquali)

“οἱ μὲν συνυπάρχειν ἐξ αἰδίου τῷ θεῷ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀπεφάνησαν”· Ἀριστοτέλους ἡ δόξα.

7 “οἱ δὲ αὐτὸν εἶναι θεὸν ἀναρχόν τε καὶ ἀτελεύτητον καὶ τῆς τῶν κατὰ μέρος οἰκονομίας αἴτιον”· λέγουσι τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐπὶ ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς γνώμης.

1-5 *Scholion in Basilii Magni Homilias in Hexaemeron* 1.3, PG t.29 col.12A (RHT t.12-13 [1982-3] p.368 Poljakov)

252B Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Greeks* 5.66.5 (GCS vol.1 p.51.4-6 Stählin)

And the well-known man from Eresus, Theophrastus the associate of Aristotle, supposes in one place that God is the heaven, and in another that he is spirit.

253 Anonymus, *Opinions of the Philosophers on Physics; Spiritual Opinions and Sayings of the Ancients*, saying of Theophrastus (RUSCH vol.2 [1985] p.105 Daiber)

Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus spoke about the Creator and said: His existence antedates temporal periods, his being the ages, his beginning time, and his pre-eternity the beginning. Through the fact that he equipped the substances and gave them form we know that he has no substance. He originated and generated the created beings, while he has neither originator nor generator. He is not associated with the things — even more, he is contrary to them in all matters, but had he wished * * * all of them, he could have been of them. He has no before and no after; middle and end are like two eyewinks to him. He has no organs of hearing to hear (with), of sight to see (with) and of taste to taste (with), nor the sense of touch to touch — great be his praise and sacred his names!

254A Scholium on Basil the Great's *Homilies on the Six Days* (of Creation) 1.3, PG vol.29 col.12A (no. 6-7, NGG 1910 p.196.14-18 Pasquali)

“Some declared that the heaven existed together with God from eternity”: This is the opinion of Aristotle.

7 “Others (declared) that it is God, without beginning and without end, and cause of the organization of its parts”: They say that Theophrastus was of this opinion.

- 254B Scholion in Basilii Magni Homilias in Hexaemeron 1.7, PG t.29 col.17B (no. 20, NGG a. 1910 p.200.6-10 Pasquali)

“πολλοὶ τῶν φαντασθέντων συνυπάρχειν ἐξ αἰδίου τῷ Θεῷ τὸν κόσμον”· περιφανῶς μὲν ταύτης προέστησαν τῆς δόξης Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ ὁ γνῶριμος αὐτοῦ Θεόφραστος καὶ τινες τῶν ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πλάτωνος ὑπὸ τῆς πιθανότητος τοῦ Περιπάτου συναρπασθέντες.

vid. 184

vid. 185

- 255 Dionysius Cartusianus, *Elementatio philosophica* 54 (t.33 p.68bB-C ed. a. 1896-1913)

porro universi qui dixerunt animata esse coelestia corpora posuerunt ea moveri ab animabus suis, tanquam a motoribus propriis, intrinsicis et conjunctis; ab intelligentiis quoque, tanquam a dirigentibus ac regulantibus ipsas animas in movendo; et item a Deo, tanquam a causa prima, universali, efficienti, non immediata, et sicut a causa finali summe ac finaliter desiderata, quæ movet omnes, quemadmodum desideratum movet desiderium seu desiderantem ac operantem, et finis agentem. sicque philosophi posuerunt triplicem causam motus uniuscuiusque orbis cœlestis, videlicet: Deum tanquam causam primam et universalem, intelligentiam tanquam causam specialem extrinsecam, et animam nobilem ut causam specialem intrinsecam. haec fuit celebrior philosophorum opinio, quam constat fuisse de mente Aristotelis, Avicennæ, Algazelis, Averrois, Alphorabii, Theophrasti.

1-14 cf. *Librum de causis* 27-36 (p.51.27-53.35 Pattin)
Metaphysica 1 4b15-5a5

5-9 cf. *Theophrasti*

vid. 159

vid. 160

- 254B Scholium on Basil the Great's *Homilies on the Six Days* (of Creation) 1.7, PG vol.29 col.17B (no. 20, NGG 1910 p.200.6-10 Pasquali)

“Many of those who imagined that the world has existed from eternity along with God”: This opinion was clearly championed by Aristotle and his associate Theophrastus, and by some of the followers of Pythagoras and of Plato who had been carried away by the persuasiveness of the Peripatos.

see 184

see 185

- 255 Denis the Carthusian, *Elements of Philosophy* 54 (vol.33 p.68bB-C ed. 1896-1913)

Further, all those who said that the heavenly bodies were ensouled laid down that they were moved by their own souls, as by their own motors, internal and conjoined; also by the intelligences, as by directors and governors of the souls themselves in moving; and likewise by God, as by a first cause, universal, efficient, not immediate, and as by a final cause, the highest and final object of desire, which moves all in the way that a desired object moves desire, or moves the one who desires and acts and pursues ends. And so philosophers laid down a threefold cause for the movement of each celestial orb, viz: God as the first and universal cause, an intelligence as a special external cause, and its noble soul as a special internal cause. This was the more common view of philosophers, and it is known to have been held by Aristotle, Avicenna, Algazel, Averroes, Farabi, Theophrastus.

see 159

see 160

- 256 *Şiwān al-ḥikma*, cap. de Theophrasto, dictum no. 1 (vid. fontes in apparatu)

الإلهية لا تتحرك

fontes: *Muntaḥab Şiwān al-ḥikma (codd. ABCD)*, v.1175 Dunlop, p.176.11 *Badawī*; *aš-Şahrastānī Milāl* p.337.17 Cureton (Šs); *aš-Şahrazūri Nuzhat al-arwāḥ* t.1 p.303.1-2 Ahmed (Šz) = RUSCH t.2 (1958) p.100 no. 1.3 Gutas

1 الإلهية A, ed. Dunlop, Šs, Šz : الألهية ed. Badawī

- 257A Dionysius Cartusianus, Enarratio in libros Boetii De Consolatione philosophiae 3.10.28 (t.26 p.390aD-bA ed. a. 1896-1913)

“ita vero bonum esse Deum ratio demonstrat, ut perfectum quoque bonum in eo esse convincat”; id est, insolubiliter probet.
 bA propter quod etiam Alphorabius et Theophrastus Peripatetici probaverunt, quod prima causa est bonitas pura, omnifarie simpliciterque perfecta.

1-2 Boetius, *Consolatio philosophiae* 3.10

- 257B Dionysius Cartusianus, De natura aeterni et veri Dei 34 (t.34 p.42bA-B ed. a. 1896-1913)

nonne Alphorabius ac Theophrastus omne bonum deficiens a pura bonitate quae Deus est emanasse fatentur?

- 258 Albertus Magnus, De intellectu et intelligibili 1.1.4 (t.9 p.482a29-47 Borgnet)

omnino igitur eodem modo cum primum effluit bonitates sua super media et ultima, si aliquid esset a mediis influxum super ultima, tamen constitutio ultimorum non erit nisi ex participatione bonitatum primi; et si quid aliud est in eis, est aliquid privationis; et haec sententia optimorum fuit sapientium Graecorum Theophrasti et Dionysii et aliorum philosophorum. adducebant autem simile de lumine solis, quod infundit se aeri limpido et nubibus terrenis

- 256 *Depository of Wisdom Literature*, chap. on Theophrastus, saying no. 1 (see the sources in the apparatus)

Divinity is not in motion.

- 257A Denis the Carthusian, *Commentary on Boethius' books On the Consolation of Philosophy* 3.10.28 (vol.26 p.390aD-bA ed. 1896-1913)

“Indeed reason demonstrates that God is good in such a way that it establishes that perfect good is also in him”; that is, it proves it incontestably. For this reason also Farabi and Theophrastus the Peripatetics proved that the first cause is pure goodness, in every way and absolutely perfect.

- 257B Denis the Carthusian, *On the Nature of the Eternal and True God* 34 (vol.34 p.42bA-B ed. 1896-1913)

Do not Farabi and Theophrastus admit that every inferior good has emanated from the pure goodness which is God?

- 258 Albert the Great, *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* 1.1.4 (vol.9 p.482a29-47 Borgnet)

In general, therefore, in the same way when the First Being has poured out excellences over its middle and outermost parts, if anything were to have overflowed from the middle parts over the outermost, yet the nature of the outermost will be entirely the result of participation in the excellences of the First Being; and if there is anything else in them, it is something of privation; and this was the view of the best Greek sages, Theophrastus and Dionysius and other philosophers. Moreover they brought in a simile from the light of the sun, which pours itself upon the bright air and the opposing¹ earthly clouds; although this is from the air on to the cloud, and

diversis; quod licet ab aere sit in nube, et a nube sit in terra, tamen quia media non dant nisi quod a sole receperunt, totum solis est quod est in ultimis; et si in mediis et ultimis distet lumen a limpitudine solis, hoc potius privationis materiae est, quam alicuius causae hoc efficientis.

1-12 cf. [Dionysii Areopagitae] *librum De div. nom. 4.4* (PG t.3 col. 697-9) 1-4 cf. *Librum de causis 48* (p.56.82-5 Pattin)

- 259 Albertus Magnus, *De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa* 1.3.2 (t.10 p.402b25-403a11 Borgnet)

multi autem Peripateticorum in primo negabant esse voluntatem, scilicet Theophrastus, Porphyrius, Avicenna et Averroes, et de hoc quinque inducebant rationes.

quorum prima est, quod omnis voluntas appetitus est; omnis autem appetitus est non habiti et deficientis; primum autem nobilius omnibus praehabet omnia quae sunt, sicut ars nobilius et perfectius habet omnia artificialia quam materia in quam traducitur forma artis; nihil ergo deficit primo; appetitum ergo nullum potest habere; nullam ergo habet voluntatem.

secunda est, quia appetitus non est nisi imperfecti, sicut materia quae appetit formam, et foemina masculum, et turpe bonum. primum autem imperfectum non est, nec imperfectum intelligi potest; voluntas ergo sibi convenire non potest.

tertia est, quia cui omnia nobilissimo modo insunt nobilia, nihil intelligi potest quod appetat; primo autem omnia nobilissimo modo insunt nobilia, eo quod ipse est archetypus ad omnia; voluntatem ergo non potest habere ad aliquid.

quarta est, quod omnis voluntas diversificatur secundum volita; primum autem nullo modo diversificari potest.

quinta ratio est, quod omne volens est duo; non enim est volens, nisi nuntium fiat de volito; nuntians autem et volens duo sunt; primum autem unum est, in quo nullus numerus est; primum ergo

from the cloud on to the earth, yet because those in the middle give nothing except what they have received from the sun, the whole of what is in the outermost parts is due to the sun; and if in the middle and outermost parts the light differs from the brightness of the sun, this is rather due to the privation implicit in matter than to any (positive) cause which brings this about.

¹ Or "varied".

- 259 Albert the Great, *On the Causes of the Universe and its Origin from the First Cause* 1.3.2 (vol.10 p.402b25-403a11 Borgnet)

Many of the Peripatetics denied that there was a will in the First Being, namely Theophrastus, Porphyry, Avicenna and Averroes. And on this matter they produced five arguments.

The first of these is that all will is desire; but all desire is for what is not possessed and is wanting; but the First Being in its nobility more than all others has everything that there is, just as an art in its nobility and perfection has all the creations of that art more than the matter in which the form of the art is produced; nothing therefore is wanting in the First Being; it can therefore have no desire; it has therefore no will.

The second is that there is no desire except in an imperfect thing, like matter which has a desire for form, and the feminine for the masculine, and the bad for the good. But the First Being is not imperfect, and cannot be understood as imperfect; will therefore cannot be appropriate to it.

The third is that (given something) in which all noble things are present in the most noble way, nothing can be understood which it would desire;¹ but in the First Being all noble things are present in the most noble way, by the very fact that it itself is the archetype for everything; it cannot therefore have a will towards anything.

The fourth is that all will is made different according to the things it wills; but the First Being cannot be made different in any way.

The fifth argument is that all that wills is two (things); for there is nothing willing unless a message comes from that which is the object of will; but that which brings the message and that which wills are two things; but the First Being is one, and there is no num-

volens esse non potest.

1-23 *Dionysius Cartusianus, In Petri Lombardi Quattuor libros sententiarum* 1.45.1 (t.20 p.604bD-605aA ed. a. 1896-1913) 1-2 *id., Enarratio in libros Boetii De consolatione philosophiae* 3.2 (5) (t.26 p.303bA ed. a. 1896-1913), *De lumine Christianae theoriae* 1.38 (t.33 p.281aB-C), *De natura aeterni et veri Dei* 44 (t.34 p.71bB)

2 Theophrastus—Averroes] Aristoteles, Avicenna, Averroes, Algazel, Theo—

- 260 *Dionysius Cartusianus, Enarratio in Evangelium secundum Ioannem* 1.5 (t.12 p.294bC-D ed. a. 1896-1913)

denique, quum secundum Philosophum intellectus noster se habet ad cognitionem intelligentiarum quemadmodum oculus noctuae ad intuitum lucis solaris, patet quod incomparabiliter impotentior sit ad claram ac immediatam divinae essentiae visionem — loquendo de statu eius in praesenti, et naturali virtute. hoc cognoverunt atque professi sunt omnes subtiliores philosophi. unde Alphorabius, Avicenna, Theophrastus, alii quoque innumerabiles dixerunt quod de deo melius cognoscimus quid non sit, quam quid sit, et quod de eo solum cognoscimus quia est, non quid est.

2-3 *Aristoteles, Metaphysica* 2(α).1 993b9-11; cf. *Theophrasti Metaphysica* 9b10-13 7-9 cf. *Theophr. Metaph.* 9a18-23

vid. 484 et 485

- 261 *Philodemus, De deis, P.Herc. 1577/1579 fr. 7.1-8* (p.113 n.512 Crönert)

* * * ||φησὶ τοὺς φυσικοὺς | Θεόφραστος. τοῦ[του] | γούν δι-
επερόμεθ' ἄν | ἢ ταύτας ἔχειν ἄς | νῦν ἔχομεν ὑπολήψεις | ἢ τὰς θεῶν
προνοοῦ|μενον φρονίμως εἰς|αγούσας.

1 *vel* τοῦ[των] *Huby*

- 262 *Damascius, In Platonis Phaedonem* 113E6 (l.157, p.279.14-16 Westerink)

πῶς εἴρηται, “ὅθεν οὐποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν”; ἢ πολιτικῶς. ἀλλ' οὕτω

ber in it: the First Being cannot therefore be a thing that wills.

¹ Or, “nothing which it would desire can be thought by that in which all noble things are present in the most noble way”.

phrastus *Dionysius, De consol.*: Aristoteles . . . Averroes, Avicenna, Theophrastus et Porphyrius *id., De lumine*: Aristotelem, Theophrastum, Porphyrium, Avicennam atque Averroem *id., De nat. veri dei*: Aristoteles, Theophrastus, Averroes, Avicenna, Porphyrius *id., In sent.* 5 *boni ante deficientis habet Dionysius* 18 *voluntas Dionysius: nobilitas Albertus* 21 *ei post nuntium habet Dionysius*

- 260 *Denis the Carthusian, Commentary on the Gospel according to John* 1.5 (vol.12 p.294bC-D ed. 1896-1913)

Finally, since according to the philosopher (Aristotle) our intellect is to the knowledge of the intelligences as the eye of the owl is to the sight of the light of the sun, it is clear that it is incomparably weaker with regard to the clear and immediate vision of the divine essence — speaking of its state in the present, and its natural power. All the more subtle philosophers knew and declared this. Hence Farabi, Avicenna, Theophrastus and countless others also said that of God we know better what he is not than what he is, and that of him we know only that he is, not what he is.

see 484 and 485

- 261 *Philodemus, On the Gods, P.Herc. 1577/1579 fr.7.1-8* (p.113 n.512 Crönert)

* * * Theophrastus says the natural (philosophers?). We might at least then differ from him¹ either in having these concepts that we now have or those that introduce a god who exercises foresight wisely.

¹ Or perhaps “them”.

- 262 *Damascius, On Plato's Phaedo* 113E6 (l.157 p.279.14-16 Westerink)

Why does it say, “From which they never go forth”?¹ One answer

γε καὶ τὰ ἀληθῆ φαίη τις ἄν, ὡς τὸ περὶ προνοίας δόγμα φησὶν ὁ Θεόφραστος.

263 Plutarchus, *De defectu oraculorum* 19-20 420C-D (BT t.3 p.82.23-83.6 Paton et Pohlenz et Sieveking)

“ . . . ἂν δὲ φῆ τις εἶναι δαίμονας οὐ φύσει μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ λόγοις καὶ † αἰεὶ τὸ σφῆζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν πολὺν χρόνον ἔχοντας, δυσκολαίνοντες.”

20 ῥηθέντων δὲ τούτων ὁ Ἀμμώνιος “ὀρθῶς” ἔφη “μοι δοκεῖ Θεόφραστος ἀποφίνασθαι· τί γὰρ κωλύει φωνὴν δέξασθαι σεμνὴν καὶ φιλοσοφωτάτην; καὶ γὰρ ἀθετουμένη πολλὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων
D ἀποδειχθῆναι δὲ μὴ δυναμένων ἀναιρεῖ, καὶ τιθεμένη πολλὰ
συνεφέλκεται τῶν ἀδυνάτων καὶ ἀνυπάρκτων * * *. ὁ μὲντοι μόνον ἀκήκοα τῶν Ἐπικουρείων λεγόντων πρὸς τοὺς εἰσαγομένους ὑπ’ Ἐμπεδοκλέους δαίμονας, ὡς . . . ”

10 *Empedocles*, FVS 31B115

2 *crucem posuit Paton* αἰεὶ] ἀ(ποδέξ)ει *dubitanter Pohlenz* 2-3 δυσκολαίνοντες *Empereius*: δυσκολαίνοντας Ω 7 πολλὰ] οὐ πολλὰ *Xylander*: οὐδὲν *Turnebus* 8 ἀδυνάτων] δυνάτων Γ *lac. indic. Pohlenz, qui e.g.* εἶναι δοκούντων, λόγῳ δὲ πιστουμένων *suppl.*

is for political reasons. But someone might say the same also of true doctrines, as Theophrastus says of the dogma concerning providence.

¹ This refers to the fate of major criminals who are cast into Tartarus.

263 Plutarch, *On the Decline of Oracles* 19-20 420C-D (BT vol.3 p.82.23-83.6 Paton, Pohlenz and Sieveking)

“ . . . ¹ if anyone says that not only according to nature but also according to rational arguments daemons exist, and that they have the power of being preserved and enduring for a long time,² they (the Epicureans) are angry.”

When these remarks had been made Ammonius said, “The declaration of Theophrastus seems to me to be correct. For what prevents our accepting an utterance so august and so extremely philosophical? For if it is rejected it does away with many things that are possible but cannot be proved, and if it is accepted it brings with it many things that are impossible and non-existent * * *. ³ The only thing that I have heard the Epicureans say concerning the daemons introduced by Empedocles, namely that”

¹ Cleombrotus is speaking.

² The text is probably corrupt.

³ Xylander adds a “not” (“it does <not> bring with it many things”), and Turnebus changes “many things” to “nothing”. Pohlenz’ supplement would correct the text to read “many things that seem impossible and non-existent but are confirmed by argument”.

MATHEMATICA

Inscriptiones librorum

264 Tabula inscriptionum ad opera mathematica spectantium

- 1 Περί ἀριθμῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.50 = 1 (Περί ῥυθμῶν Meurs, vid. 666 et 714)
- 2 Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν περὶ αὐξήσεως α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.50 = 1, cuius loci vide adnotationem; fortasse duo inscriptiones, Ἀριθμητικῶν ἱστοριῶν (α') et Περὶ αὐξήσεως α', per errorem coniunctae sunt; Ἀριθμητικὴ ἱστορία Eudemo tribuitur a Porphyrio, In Ptolemaei Harmonica p.115.4-5 Düring = Eudemos, fr. 142 Wehrli
- 3 Ἱστορικῶν γεωμετρικῶν α'—δ'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.48 = 1; fortasse Eudemi opus, cf. Procli comm. In primum librum Euclidis Elem., prop. 26 theor. 17 = Eudemos, fr. 134 Wehrli; Eutocii comm. In Archimedis De dimensione circuli (p.228 Heiberg) = Eudemos, fr. 139 Wehrli (Γεωμετρικὴ ἱστορία); Simplicii comm. In Aristotelis Phys. 1.2 185a14 (CAG t.9 p.60.22, 31) = Eudemos, fr. 140 Wehrli (Γεωμετρικὴ ἱστορία)
- 4a Περί τῶν ἀτόμων γραμμῶν α'] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae 5.42 = 1; sed opus ad quod haec inscriptio spectare videtur in corpore Aristotelico 968a1-972b34 invenitur; Aristoteli opus attribuunt Simplicius, In Aristotelis Phys. 3.6 206a14 (CAG t.9 p.423.3-4) et Ptolemaeus, Index Scriptorum Aristotelis, no. 10 (AABT p.222 Düring); sed vid. Simplicii comm. In Aristotelis De caelo 3.1 299a11-17 (CAG t.7 p.566.25-6): ἐν τῷ Περί ἀτόμων γραμμῶν . . . ὁ τινες εἰς Θεόφραστον ἀναφέρουσιν; similiter Philoponus, In Aristotelis De gen. et corr. 1.2 316b16-19 (CAG t.14.2 p.34.2-3)
- b De insectilibus lineis] Themistius, In Arist. De caelo 3.1 299a6-17, versio Latina (CAG t.5.4 p.148.39-149.2): De insectilibus lineis . . .

MATHEMATICS

Titles of Books

264 List of Titles Referring to Works on Mathematics

- 1 *On Numbers*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1 (*On Rhythm Meurs*, see 666 and 714)
- 2 *Arithmetical Researches on Increase*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.50 = 1, where see the note; perhaps two titles, *Arithmetical Researches*, <1 book> and *On Increase*, 1 book, have been joined together in error; an *Arithmetical Research* is attributed to Eudemos by Porphyry, *On Ptolemy's Harmonics* p.115.4-5 Düring = Eudemos, fr. 142 Wehrli
- 3 *Geometrical Researches*, 4 books] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.48 = 1; perhaps the work by Eudemos; cf. Proclus, *On the First Book of Euclid's Elements*, prop. 26 theor. 17 = Eudemos, fr.134 Wehrli; Eutocius, *On Archimedes' On the Measurement of the Circle* (p.228 Heiberg) = Eudemos, fr. 139 Wehrli (*Geometrical Research*); Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 1.2 185a14 (CAG vol.9 p.60.22, 31) = Eudemos, fr. 140 Wehrli (*Geometrical Research*)
- 4a *On Indivisible Lines*, 1 book] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.42 = 1; but the work to which this title apparently refers is found in the Aristotelian Corpus 968a1-972b34; Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Physics* 3.6 206a14 (CAG vol.9 p.423.3-4) and Ptolemy, *Index of Aristotle's Writings* no. 10 (AABT p.222 Düring) attribute the work to Aristotle; but see Simplicius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 3.1 229a11-17 (CAG vol.7 p.566.25-6): "in the (work) *On Indivisible Lines*, . . . which some attribute to Theophrastus"; similarly, Philoponus, *On Aristotle's On Coming-to-Be and Passing Away* 1.2 316b16-19 (CAG vol.14.2 p.34.2-3)
- b *On Indivisible Lines*] Themistius, *On Aristotle's On Heaven* 3.1 299a6-17, Latin translation (CAG vol.5.4 p.148.39-149.2): "*On Indivisible*

quem (librum) nonnulli Theophrasto ascribunt; cf. eiusdem libri versionem Hebraicam (CAG t.5.4 p. P.22-3); similiter, Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis De caelo et mundo 3 lectio 3 (no. 559, p.287a31-5 Spiazzi)

Lines . . . which (book) some attribute to Theophrastus"; cf. the Hebrew translation of the same work (CAG vol.5.4 p. P.22-3); similarly, Thomas Aquinas, *On Aristotle's On Heaven and the Universe* 3 lectio 3 (no. 559, p.287a31-5 Spiazzi)

APPENDIX

- 1 Anonymus, *Analytica* col.1.1-17 (no. 3320, P.Oxy. vol. 47 p.20 Philips)

]..[
].φθειρε[.....
]την ωσαντω..[
].σ. συλλογισμός
]. πρότασις ἀδιόρισ- 5
]καθόλου λαμβαν[
]γειεαντετ. επι
].δε συλλογισμο[
]τως· ὁ Σωκράτης
 μουσικὸς Σωκράτης ἐστίν· ὁ μου- 10
 σικὸς Σωκράτης φθαρήσεται
 αὔριον· Σωκράτης ἄρα φθαρήσε[τ]αι
 αὔριον. ἀλλ' οὐ καθόλου ἐρωτᾷ
]..[.]λλο[.]μ. [.]α
]ατ.[.....]..φθα 15
]ε.[.....]κου
].ε

9-13 *Aristoteles, Anal. pr. 1.33* 47b29-39

- 2 Fragmentum Florentinum de topicis = Papyrus Pack² 2567, fr. 1 col.2.1-28 (no. 1095, PSI t.9 p.167-8 Vogliano)

[εἰ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ α τοῦ β, καὶ τὸ γ τοῦ δ,] || τὸ
 δὲ α τοῦ β ἐστὶν | ἴδιον, καὶ τὸ γ τοῦ δ | ἐστὶν ἴδιον· καὶ
 εἰ τὸ α | τοῦ β μὴ ἐστίν, οὐδὲ | τὸ γ τοῦ δ· καὶ πάλιν |
 εἰ ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἴδιον τὸ α τοῦ β, καὶ τὸ α | τοῦ γ, καὶ
 κατασκευά|σομεν καὶ ἀνασκευ|άσομεν· καὶ εἰ ὁμοί|ως ἐστὶν 5
 ἴδιον τὸ α | τοῦ β, καὶ τὸ γ τοῦ β, | καὶ ἀνασκευάσομεν |
 καὶ κατασκευάσομεν· | οὗτοι δ' οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ὁ|μοίως ἐχόντων
 ἰδί|ων γ τόποι οὐκ εἰσὶ | οἱ αὐτοὶ τῶι ἔμ|προ|σθεν ἀπο-
 διδομέ|νωι τριακοστῶι τόπῳ· | ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἦν ἐπ[ι] | τῶν

APPENDIX

- 1 Anonymous, *Analytica* col.1.1-17 (no.3320, P.Oxy. vol.47 p.20 Philips)

... (2) destroy ... (3) similarly ... (4) syllogism ... (5) premise
 indeterminate ... (6) universal take ... (7) and if¹ ... (8) syllogism
 ... (9) Socrates is musical Socrates; musical Socrates will be de-
 stroyed tomorrow; Socrates, then, will be destroyed tomorrow. But
 he does not postulate (it) as universal

¹ Reading ἐάν τε as suggested by Philips.

2 fort. τ]ὸ φθειρε]σθαι Philips 3 fort. ὡσαντως Philips 4 fort.]ος ὁ
 συλλογισμός Philips 5-6 ἀδιόρισ]τος Philips 6-7 fort. λαμβάνη vel
 λαμβάνη | [ται Philips 7 fort.]γει ἐάν τε τὸ ἐπι Philips 8 fort. ο]ὐδὲ vel
 το]ῦδε Philips 10-13 restauravit J. Barnes, *Anal. pr. 47b29-39 conferens*
 12-13 fort. φθαρήσε | [ται αὔριον· οὐ καθόλου Philips 15-16 fort.
 Σωκρ]άτης[ς.....]..φθα | [ρήσεται Philips

- 2 Florentine Fragment on Topics = Papyrus Pack² 2567, fr.1 col.2.1-28 (no.1095, PSI vol.9 p.167-8 Vogliano)

<If A is a property of B in the same way as C is of D,> and A is a
 property of B, C is also a property of D; and if A is not a property of
 B, neither is C of D; and again if A is a property of B in the same way
 as A is a property of C, we will produce both constructive and de-
 structive proofs; and if A is a property of B in the same way as C is of
 B, we will produce both destructive and constructive proofs. These
 three topics from properties related (to something) in the same way
 are not the same as the thirtieth topic given before, for that one was

ὁμοίως ἐχόν| [των κ]ατ' ἀναλογίαν | [ἢ ἰσότη]ητα· οὐτοι [δ]ε | 10
[.....]αι προβαί | [.....]ν ὁμοί | [.....]τα ε | [

1-2 *Aristoteles, Topica* 5.8 138a30-b5 3-5 *ibid.* 138b16-22 5-6
ibid. 138b6-15 6-10 *ibid.* 138b23-6 →

3 Codex Bernensis Gr. 402, fol.138^r v.1-6 (p.156 Burnikel)

στόμωμα δὲ γίνεται καὶ ὅταν ὁ πετυρωμένος σίδηρος εἰς
τὸ ψυχρότατον βάπτηται ὕδαρ. ἢ γὰρ τοῦ ὕδατος ψυχρότης,
ἀθρόως προσπεσοῦσα ἐκτὸς καὶ ἰσχύουσα, ὠθεῖ τὸ θερμὸν ἐντὸς
καὶ πρὸς τὸ κέντρον, ὥπερ τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀκολουθεῖ. ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ
θερμὸν, καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἀντιπερίστασιν ἰσχύσαν πλέον, 5
τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ ὑγροῦ συνεξατμίζει καὶ ἀναλίσκει. διὸ
ξηρότερος γινόμενος ὁ σίδηρος μᾶλλον σκληρύνεται, καὶ δύνα-
ται ῥαδίως καὶ τὸν ἄλλον σίδηρον τεμεῖν. παρασκευάζονται δὲ
καὶ τέχνη τινὶ ὕδατα τοιαῦτα ἃ καὶ θαυμαστῶς στομοῦν τὸν
σίδηρον δύναται. 10

1 πετυρωμένος *Burnikel*: πεπυρατωμένος *cod.* 2 βάπτηται *Burni-*
kel: βάπτεται *cod.* ψυχρότης *Burnikel*: ψυχρότητος *aut* ψυχρό-
τητα *aut* ψυχρότητι *cod.*

4 Papyrus Pack² 1499 = P.Hib. 16 col.1.9-16, 2.1-22 et 3.1
(P.Hib. pars 1 p.62-3 Grenfell et Hunt)

διαφωνία μὲν οὖν μάλι|[στά που γεγένηται] περὶ τῆς
γενέσε|[ως τῆς ἀλμυρότητος·] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ὑπό|[λειμμά φασιν τῆς
πρώ]της ὑγρότητος | [ἐξατμισθέντων πλείστων ὑ]δάτων, οἱ δὲ |
[ἰδρωτ' εἶναι τῆς γῆς. Δη]μόκριτος δὲ | [ὁμοίως δοκεῖ τοῖς ἐν
τῇ γῆ]ι ποιεῖν | [τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῆς· οἷον ἀλῶν καὶ νί]τρων 5
col.2 | . . . (desunt 5 versus) . . . ση]||πεδόνος ἀπολ.λιπομένης
απ[.δ].|πρεσθαι φησ[ι]ν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ ὅμοια | πρὸς τὰ
ὅμοια καθάπερ ἐν τῷ παντί, | καὶ οὕτως [γ]εγέσθαι θάλατταν
καὶ | τᾶλλα τὰ ἀ[λμῶν]τα πάντα συνενε[χθέντων τ[ῶν]
ὁμοφύλων. ὅτι δὲ | ἐκ τῶν ὁμογενῶν ἐστιν θάλαττα | καὶ ἐξ 10
ἄλλων εἶναι φανερόν· οὔτε γὰρ | λιβανωτῶν οὔτε θεῖον οὔτε
σίλφιον | οὔτε νίτρον οὔτε στυπτηρίαν οὔτε ἄσφαλον οὔτε
ὅσα μεγάλα καὶ θαυμα[στά] πολλαχοῦ γίνεσθαι τῆς γῆς. τοῦ|ται
μὲν οὖν πρόχειρον εἰ καὶ μηθὲν | ἄλλο σκέψασθαι διότι
μέρος ποιῶν | τὴν θάλατταν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν αὐ|τὸν τρ[ό]πον 15
φησὶ γενέσθαι καὶ τὰ | θαυμαστά καὶ τὰ παραλογώτατα | τῆς

about things which were related similarly by analogy or equality. But
these

1 εἰ—δ *Huby*: ἔτι εἰ τὸ α ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει τῷ β καὶ τὸ γ τῷ δ *Philippson* 7
κατασκευάσομεν *ex* ἀνασκευάσομεν *in pap. correctum* 10 [τῶν κ]ατ'
Vogliano [ἢ ἰσότη]ητα *Philippson*

3 Codex Bernensis Gr. 402, fol.138^r 1.1-6 (p.156 Burnikel)

Steel is also produced when red-hot iron is dipped into very cold
water. For the coldness of the water, striking it all at once from the
outside and prevailing, drives the heat inwards and to the center,
and the moisture follows it. There the heat—which, moreover, has
derived added strength from the mutual displacement of the cold-
ness—causes the greater part of the moisture to evaporate and con-
sumes it. And for this reason the iron, being made drier, becomes
harder, and can easily cut even other iron. By a certain technique,
moreover, they prepare kinds of water which have a marvellous
power for turning iron into steel.

4 Papyrus Pack² 1499 = P.Hib. 16 col.1.9-16, 2.1-22 and 3.1 (*P.Hib.* part
1 p.62-3 Grenfell and Hunt)

The greatest disagreement was about the origin of the saltiness
(of the sea). For some say that it is a remnant of the original moisture,
(left over) when much water has evaporated; others that it is a per-
spiration of the earth. Democritus seems to account for its origin in a
similar way to that of the (salty flavors) in the earth; for example salt
and soda¹ . . . he says that when the decaying part is left
behind everywhere, like is separated out² to join like in the moisture
just as it is in the whole universe, and that this is how the sea and all
the other salty things come to be, when (atoms) of a similar sort are
brought together. And that the sea is composed of (atoms) of a simi-
lar sort is clear from other things too; for neither frankincense nor
sulphur nor silphium nor soda nor alum nor bitumen, nor anything
that is great and wonderful, occurs in many places in the earth. So by
this it is easy to see, if nothing else, that in making the sea a part of
the world, he says that it comes to be in the same way as the most
remarkable wonders of nature, on the view that there are not many

464 ποιούντι | [γε] τοῖς] χυλοῦς διὰ τὰ σχήματα, καὶ | [τὸ]
 ἀ[λ]μυρὸν ἐκ μεγάλων καὶ γωνιο[ει]δῶν οὐκ [ἄ]λογον πῶς περὶ 20
 col.3 τὴν || κτ. [

1-5 *Alexander Aphrodisiensis, In Aristotelis Meteor. 2.1 353a32-b17*
 (CAG t.3.2 p.67.3-22) = 221 1-20 *Democritus, FVS 68A99a* 18-
 19 cf. *Theophrasti librum De sensibus* 66

1 μάλιστα et 2 γενέσεως suppl. Grenfell et Hunt; cetera in 1-5 suppl.
 Diels ex Alexandro 6-7 σηπεδόνος suppl. Diels; σηπεδόνος ἀπάντη
 λειπομένης ἀποκρίνεσθαι φησιν temptavit idem 7 φησὶν et 8 γεν-
 ἔσθαι suppl. Grenfell et Hunt 9 ἀλμῶντα Diels 9 fin.-19 suppl.
 Grenfell et Hunt 20 τὴν γῆν [γενέσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τὴν
 ἀλμυρότητα ὄνπερ καὶ τῇ θαλάττῃ suppl. Diels

differences in the earth. For in a way it is not unreasonable for some-
 one who accounts for flavors by the shapes (of the atoms), and (says
 that) saltiness results from large and angular (atoms), that the salti-
 3 ness in the earth should come about in the same way as that in the
 sea³

¹ Here five lines are lost.

² The translation is based on Diels' supplement.

³ The third column is very badly preserved. Again the translation is
 based upon Diels' supplement.



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