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archaic section of the poem (15, 18bis). (d) Fourth, and above all, the contrast between  and  which organizes lines 2730, so far from being an innovation on the part of Simonides, actually occurs frequently as early as the epics of Homer and Hesiod, in which people who do a bad thing  are considered to be more culpable, while those who do a bad thing not  are considered to be less culpable. For example, during the massacre of the suitors in Odyssey 22, the bard Phemius pleads that he should be spared on the grounds that he did not sing to the suitors  but yielded to their overpowering  : whereupon Telemachus recommends mercy and Odysseus obeys.42 Thus, if there is indeed any moral novelty in this section of the poem, it is not in the introduction of the category of intentionality but rather in the use to which that category is put: not being  not only exculpates someone for Simonides, it is now rewarded with the poet's friendship and praise. In other words, what had earlier been a minimal condition (sufficing only to free a defendant from severe penalties) is now a maximal condition (sufficing to guarantee high rewards). But the reasons for such a transformation remain entirely obscure. (iv) And finally, the view that the morality of the poem's conclusion is democratic seems scarcely compatible with Simonides' assertion that the number of fools is infinite (3738); nor does the poet's reference to respect for justice (35) help at all to specify the particular kind of political system he is envisaging for it is not only in a democracy that citizens can exercize justice, and from Hesiod through Pindar and down through the Roman and Byzantine periods, kings, tyrants, and emperors are all praised for observing the justice which makes cities flourish. |
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Some of these objections have been raised by the minority of scholars who have questioned the view that Simonides' poem is centrally addressed to moral issues.43 Nevertheless, the philological community still seems to comprise a "moral" majority. No doubt this is partly due to a lingering influence exerted by Protagoras' assertion that the poem is really about  , merely transferred to the domain of poetry. In other words, as it were, the context of the poem's transmission continues subliminally to shape the views of its general purpose long after it has been consciously discarded as an aid to understanding the meaning of its details. But Protagoras' claim could surely not have imposed itself upon anyone were it not that the poem |
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42 (Hom. Od. 22.35153); in response Telemachus calls Phemius  (356). For other examples, see Hom. Il. 6.523, 13.234, 23.585; Hes. Th. 232, Erg. 282. On free will and compulsion in Homer see Maschke (1926) 47. For the view that  is forgiveable, see e.g. Soph. Trach. 72728; TrGF 80.12; Thuc. 3.40.1; Antiphon Orat. 5.92, Tetral. 3.1.6; Aristot. EN 3.1.1109b30ff., EE 2.8. 1225a21ff. |
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43 See especially Dickie (1978) 213 and Jurenka (1906) 8657. Adkins (1960) 1657, 1967, 3559 criticizes this particular moral reading but remains trapped in other moral concerns. |
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