

A COMMENTARY ON
THUCYDIDES

Simon Hornblower

Volume I
Books I-III

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

A COMMENTARY ON
THUCYDIDES

*This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification
in order to ensure its continuing availability*

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide in

Oxford New York

Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai
Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi
São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

© Simon Hornblower 1991

The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)

Reprinted 2003

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,
Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

ISBN 0-19-815099-7

CONTENTS

<i>Abbreviations</i>	x
BOOK I	i
BOOK II	233
BOOK III	379
<i>Index</i>	537

ABBREVIATIONS

Aesch. Aeschylus	Eur. Euripides
Ar. Aristophanes	Hdt. Herodotus
Arist. Aristotle	Plut. Plutarch
Dem. Demosthenes	Pol. Polybius
Diod. Diodorus	Th. Thucydides

<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History.</i>
<i>Ath. Pol.</i>	<i>Athenaion Politeia</i> (Athenian Constitution), attributed to Aristotle.
<i>ATL</i>	B. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. McGregor, <i>The Athenian Tribute Lists</i> , 4 vols. (Cambridge, Mass., 1939-53).
Beloch, <i>Gr. Gesch.</i> ²	K. J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> , 2nd edn., 4 vols. in 8 (Strasburg, Leipzig, and Berlin, 1912-27).
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History.</i>
<i>Catling Studies</i>	Jan Sanders (ed.), <i>ΦΙΛΟΛΑΚΩΝ: Lakonian Studies presented to Hector Catling</i> (Athens, 1992).
Classen/Steup	<i>Thukydides erklärt</i> von J. Classen, bearbeitet von J. Steup, 3rd to 5th edns. (Berlin, 1900-22).
<i>CRUX</i>	P. Cartledge and F. D. Harvey (eds.), <i>CRUX: Essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th Birthday</i> (London, 1985).
Davies, <i>APF</i>	J. K. Davies, <i>Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 BC</i> (Oxford, 1971).
de Ste. Croix, <i>OPW</i>	G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, <i>The Origins of the Peloponnesian War</i> (London, 1972).
DK	H. Diels and W. Kranz (eds.), <i>Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> ⁶ , 3 vols. (Berlin, 1952).
<i>FGrHist</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , 15 vols. (Berlin, 1923-30; Leipzig, 1940-58).
Fornara	C. W. Fornara, <i>Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, i. Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War</i> (Cambridge, 1983).
<i>Greek World</i>	S. Hornblower, <i>The Greek World 479-323 BC</i> (London, 1983; revised edition, 1991).
Hammond, <i>Epirus</i>	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>Epirus</i> (Oxford, 1967).
— <i>Hist. Mac.</i>	— <i>History of Macedonia</i> (Oxford): i (1972); ii (with G. T. Griffith; 1979); iii (with F. W. Walbank; 1988).

Abbreviations

Hammond, <i>Studies</i>	N. G. L. Hammond, <i>Studies in Greek History</i> (Oxford, 1973).
Harding	P. Harding, <i>Translated Documents of Greece and Rome</i> , ii. <i>From the End of the Peloponnesian War to the Battle of Ipsos</i> (Cambridge, 1985).
HCP	F. W. Walbank, <i>Historical Commentary on Polybius</i> , 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957-79).
HCT	A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, <i>A Historical Commentary on Thucydides</i> , 5 vols. (Oxford, 1945-81).
<i>Hell. Oxy.</i>	<i>Hellenica Oxyrhynchia</i> or Oxyrhynchus Historian.
Hill ²	G. F. Hill, revised R. Meiggs and A. Andrewes, <i>Sources for Greek History 476-431 BC</i> (Oxford, 1951).
Hude	C. Hude, <i>Thucydidis Historiae</i> (Leipzig, 1898-1901).
IG	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> .
LACTOR	London Association of Classical Teachers, Original Records: a series of translations of sources for Ancient History.
LCM	<i>Liverpool Classical Monthly</i> .
Lewis, <i>Towards a Historian's Text</i>	D. M. Lewis, <i>Towards a Historian's Text of Thucydides</i> , Princeton dissertation, 1952.
— <i>Sparta and Persia</i>	— <i>Sparta and Persia</i> (Leiden, 1977).
LSJ ⁹	H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, <i>Greek-English Lexicon</i> , 9th edn., revised by H. Stuart Jones (Oxford, 1925-40).
Macleod	C. Macleod, <i>Collected Essays</i> (Oxford, 1983).
<i>Mausolus</i>	S. Hornblower, <i>Mausolus</i> (Oxford, 1982).
Meiggs	Unless otherwise stated this refers to R. Meiggs, <i>The Athenian Empire</i> (Oxford, 1972).
ML	R. Meiggs and D. M. Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century BC</i> , revised edn. (Oxford, 1988).
Morrison and Coates	J. Morrison and J. Coates, <i>The Athenian Trireme</i> (Cambridge, 1986).
OCD ²	N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard (eds.), <i>The Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1970).
OCT	Oxford Classical Text.
OGIS	W. Dittenberger, <i>Orientalis Graecae Inscriptiones Selectae</i> , 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1903-5).
Parker, <i>Miasma</i>	R. Parker, <i>Miasma: Pollution and Purification in Greek Religion</i> (Oxford, 1983).
Pritchett	W. K. Pritchett, <i>The Greek State at War</i> , 5 vols. (Berkeley, 1971-91).
Rhodes, <i>Ath. Pol. Comm.</i>	P. J. Rhodes, <i>Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenian Politeia</i> (Oxford, 1981).

Abbreviations

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--|
| — <i>Th. ii Comm.</i> | — <i>Thucydides Book ii</i> (Warminster, 1988). |
| Rusten | J. S. Rusten, <i>Thucydides Book ii</i> (Cambridge, 1989). |
| R-E | A. Pauly and G. Wissowa, <i>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , 83 vols. (Stuttgart, 1894–1980). |
| Salmon, <i>Wealthy Corinth</i> | J. B. Salmon, <i>Wealthy Corinth</i> (Oxford, 1984). |
| SEG | <i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.</i> |
| Syll ³ | W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edn., 4 vols. (Leipzig, 1915–24). |
| <i>Thucydides</i> | S. Hornblower, <i>Thucydides</i> (London, 1987). |
| Tod | M. N. Tod, <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , 2 vols. (Oxford, 1946, 1948). |
| Westlake, <i>Essays</i> | H. D. Westlake, <i>Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History</i> (Manchester, 1969). |
| — <i>Studies</i> | — <i>Studies in Thucydides and Greek History</i> (Bristol, 1989). |
| Xen. <i>Hell.</i> | Xenophon, <i>Hellenica</i> . |

Note: Except where stated, the text of Thucydides used in this commentary is the OCT, edited by H. Stuart Jones and J. E. Powell.

In the dates given on the shoulder heads in books ii and iii, s. refers to summer and w. to winter.

BOOK I

1-23. INTRODUCTION

After introducing himself, Th. introduces his subject, the 'war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians'. The first twenty chapters of Th., which include an account of earlier Greek history, are called the *Archaeology*. This does not mean that he uses archaeological evidence alone; the word 'archaeology' here means a λόγος, account, of early, ἀρχαία, events. Th.'s objects in this section seem to be: first, to prove at length his initial aggressive assertion, that 'his' war is more important and considerable than earlier wars. This proof takes the form of what later handbooks of rhetoric would call an ἀΰξησης or amplification of the theme 'my war was the greatest war ever'. His second aim is to demonstrate the importance of sea power, which played so large a part in the rise of Athens as an imperial power, and in the actual course of the Peloponnesian War. It was true of the Greeks in general, and specially true of Th.'s fellow-Athenians, that they were used to rowing and ships from boyhood (so says the pamphlet called the *Old Oligarch* of the Athenians in the 420s, i. 20). This was inevitable given the long ragged Greek coastline and the huge number of inhabited islands. Political power in the East Mediterranean was naturally diffused by sea. Th.'s stress on this recalls Homer's 'Catalogue of Ships' in Book ii of the *Iliad* (see R. Hope Simpson and J. F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of the Ships in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford, 1970)). But it is surprising that Th. concentrates so heavily on sea power, in view of the fact that the power of Sparta (a land power) is equally important to the demonstration that this is a big war. Perhaps the explanation is that explicit discussion of 'thalassocracy' or sea power was something new in the 420s—see Momigliano, 'Sea-Power' (below, 2. 2n. on κατὰ γῆν etc.)—and Th. wished to have his say in a contemporary debate. This raises a third aspect of the *Archaeology*: it carries an ever-growing weight of material on how to do history. But even before the explicitly methodological chs. 20-3, Th.'s approach in the *Archaeology* is pugnacious and polemical, as we shall see. Finally, Th. uses these early chs. to introduce a number of key themes and words; these will be noticed as they arise.

On Th.'s methods in the *Archaeology* see introductory n. to ch. 2 below.

1. *Introduction and announcement of theme*

The first ch. of Th., and especially the first sentence, is well discussed by N. Loraux, 'Thucydide a écrit la guerre du Péloponnèse', *MHTIS Revue d'anthropologie du monde grec ancien*, 1 (1986), 139 ff.: by writing about the war, Th. in some sense *created* it (146); compare the opening of D. M. Lewis's ch. on the Archidamian War in *CAH* v²: 'it is not an unreasonable attitude to be interested in the Peloponnesian War for what [Th.] made of it and not for its own sake'.

1. **Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος**: 'Thucydides, an Athenian'. On the third person singular here see M. J. Wheeldon in Averil Cameron (ed.), *History as Text* (London, 1989), 45 ff., who sees it as a device intended to produce a 'truth-effect' and follows R. Scholes and R. Kellogg, *The Nature of Narrative* (Oxford, 1976), in saying that the third person derives from the formal narrative of epic [? and Herodotus]. 'Formal' is obviously right, but in fact Th. is not simple and can oscillate between persons within a single ch. (v. 26). As for Homer, he can intrude, if that is the right word, his personality to the extent of addressing a hero direct: 'but the gods did not forget you, Menelaos . . .' (*Iliad*, iv. 127). This is in 'narrative', but it is not 'formal'. In any case Homer does not refer to himself in the third person, unless we count *Hymn to Apollo* (for the first person see e.g. *Iliad*, ii. 488–900, *Odyssey*, i. 1). For all this see I. J. F. de Jong, *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad* (Amsterdam, 1987), esp. 227: Homer not 'impersonal' nor on the other hand 'subjective', but 'multiple'. On the first person singular in Th. see also Loraux (above, introductory n.), 156.

Th. introduces himself by his city of Athens, but not by his deme (village) of Halimous, although it was part of his official name (his 'demotic'). That would have been inappropriate in a work intended for the wider world (ii. 55 nn.) and for posterity (i. 22. 4), although Hdt.—not a native Athenian—had included demotics; see *Thucydides*, 97 n. 98. Th.'s deme (for which see *Thucydides*, 2) is known from the Hellenistic *Life of Thucydides* printed at the beginning of the Oxford text: his verse epitaph began *Θουκυδίδης Ὀλόρου Ἀλιμούσιος*, 'Thucydides son of Oloros of Halimous'.

But when describing himself and his actions as a historical person in Book iv (104. 4) Th. will call himself *Θουκυδίδης Ὀλόρου*, 'Th. the son of Oloros' (though he will add 'who wrote this'): see G. T. Griffith, 'Some Habits of Thucydides when Introducing Persons', *PCPhS* 187 (1961), 21 ff. at 22 n. 2. Name plus father's name ('patronymic') is Th.'s standard way of specifying historical agents. But here (in i. 1) Th. conforms to *literary* tradition: Hekataios and Hdt. had introduced themselves as a Milesian

and a Halikarnassian respectively in their prefaces (*FGrHist* 1 F 1; Hdt. i. 1). The distinction author/agent is precisely, even quaintly, observed, in i. 1, given that Th. is talking about himself.

Oloros was a royal Thracian name (Hdt. vi. 39. 2), which helps to explain Th.'s financial interests there (iv. 105); he had Thracian blood. For further material and speculation about his life see *Thucydides*, 2–7.

ξυνέγραψε: 'wrote the history of'. The word 'history' is not in the Greek. The verb is a very interesting word indeed. It just means that he 'collected and wrote things down', an unpretentious word. But what follows is thoroughly polemical, and we should not mistake avoidance of pretentiousness for diffidence. Rather, we should realize that 'history' (Greek *ιστορία*, 'inquiry') was not yet a technical term for what Th. was doing, and would not be technical until Aristotle a century later. So Th. does not use it. The words *ιστορία* or *ιστορεῖν* would have suggested Hdt. to Th.'s readers (Hdt. had called his work the 'publication of an inquiry'). Having conformed to Herodotean tradition in his first two words Th. distances himself with the third. For Th.'s use of *ξυγγράφειν* and related words see *Thucydides*, ch. 1, and for the early senses of *ιστορία* J. H. Oliver, *The Civilising Power* (1968), 27, and the works cited in his n. 5; also Loraux (above, introductory n.), 145 ff.

τὸν πόλεμον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς ἐπολέμησαν: 'the war in which the Peloponnesians and the Athenians fought . . .' [lit. 'the war of the P. and A., how they fought . . .']. 'The War' (*τὸν πόλεμον*), i.e. that which began in 431 BC; although there had been a 'First Peloponnesian War' between 461 and 446 BC. For a 'work destined to last for ever' (22. 5) this is a remarkably abrupt way of announcing the subject of the next eight books. For Hdt., whose theme of Greek–Persian conflict was not restricted to 490–479, it was natural to refer loosely to 'why the Greeks and Barbarians fought each other', *δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοις*, especially since he has already referred to the 'marvellous deeds' of Greeks and Barbarians.

Th.'s 'war of the Peloponnesians and Athenians' is an impartial formulation. For an Athenian, the natural expression would be *πόλεμος ὁ πρὸς τοὺς Πελοποννησίους*, 'the war against the Peloponnesians', and perhaps a trace of this can be seen in his mentioning the Peloponnesians first.

ὡς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους: 'in which [they] . . . fought against one another'. For Hdt.'s almost identical, but in the context more legitimate, formulation see previous note.

ἀρξάμενος: 'He began'. That is, Th. sat down to record a set of events which were still in the future. On the problems of historians who, like

Th., chronicle 'events [which] unwind with the text' see the thought-producing remarks of J. Henderson in Cameron (I. I n. on *Θουκυδίδης*), 66 ff., at 77.

ἐλπίσας: 'believing'. The word here means 'expecting', 'anticipating', rather than 'hoping' the war would be a great one.

ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενημένων: 'more memorable than any previous war'. In effect a comparative, although superlative in form; the Greek 'superlative' is more flexible than the English: cp. below, i. 23. 6 n. on *ἀληθεστάτην*.

Here, then, in the very first sentence we have a polemical claim: Th.'s theme is more worthy of note than those of his predecessors. This kind of competitive and aggressive claim has been illuminated by above all G. E. R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience* (Cambridge, 1978), who shows that the competitive or 'agonistic' rhetorical habits of the law-courts and the political assemblies spilled over into the polemical prefaces of e.g. medical writings and what we would call 'historiography'. (But as pointed out above on *ξυνέγραψε* the definition of literary genres like 'history' was not yet sharp, so that such 'spilling over' was natural.) **τεκμαιρόμενος:** 'For he argued' [lit. 'inferring']. The word is quasi-technical; for this feature of Th.'s vocabulary for evidence see *Thucydides*, 100 ff.

ἀκμάζοντες: 'at the full height of their military power' lit. 'in their prime'; a biological metaphor. Such metaphors are frequent in Th. and tell against attempts to argue that he distinguished between the behaviour of states and the behaviour of individuals.

τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικόν: 'the rest of the Greeks'. A favourite expression of Th.: cp. i. 15. 3 (the Lelantine War) or iv. 20. 4, where the Spartans at Athens in 425 say that if they and Athens do a deal 'the rest of Greece' will respect them.

2. κίνησις: 'movement' (or 'convulsion'). Perhaps another biological metaphor, 'disturbance' of an organism. But there is much to be said for the suggestion of Hammond (below, 3. 1 n. on *δηλοῖ*, etc.), 132 f., that Th. is not here claiming special magnitude for the 'disturbance' that was the Peloponnesian War itself (the usual interpretation, which would convict Th. of absurd exaggeration), but is referring to the *whole movement which culminated in the Peloponnesians and Athenians reaching the acme of their power*.

μεγίστη: 'greatest'. See Macleod, 153, for a remarkable string of instances of this word in Th. (ii. 64. 3). 'Greatness' and *ἀρχή* ('empire') are obsessions of Th.

3. σαφῶς μὲν εὐρεῖν διὰ χρόνου πλήθος ἀδύνατα ἦν: 'owing to the lapse of time cannot be made out with certainty'. Th.'s self-conscious

discussion of the methods of his intellectual undertaking, of which this is the first instance, is not the least of his intellectual achievements. (Lloyd would say that this awareness of what we call 'second-order' questions was one of the great advances of the early Greek scientists, even if they do not actually *achieve* results commensurate with their claims.) There is very little 'methodology' in Hdt., though he does say despairingly at one point (vi. 14. 1) that 'it was difficult to find out which Samians fought well and which badly at the battle of Lade, because they all accuse each other'. Here (in Th.) we have, in effect, a statement that clarity is his aim. (Truth will come a little later, i. 22.) The emphasis on difficulties is characteristic of Th., and is part of the polemical stance discussed above under *ἀξιολογώτατον*: the implication (which he will spell out later) is that earlier inquirers have been sloppy. See 20. 1 n.

ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ μακρότατον σκοποῦντί μοι πιστεῦσαι ξυμβαίνει: 'but judging from the evidence which I am able to trust after most careful inquiry'. For *τεκμήριον*, 'evidence', see 6. 2 n. below (on *σημείον*). For *σκοποῦν* as a word for intellectual investigation favoured by both Th. and the inquiring Oedipus of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus*, see B. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (Oxford, 1957), 120f., and for *εὔρείν* 128f.

2. Weakness of early Greece proved by constant population movements

Here the *Archaeology* proper begins. Th.'s method calls for a word. The modern reader's first reaction to Th.'s reconstruction of early Greece is surprise at its sophistication. In particular his emphasis on economic factors (see esp. 13) impresses us in our post-Marxist world (on the view of Austin and Vidal-Naquet that, despite the stress on economic factors in the present ch., Th. gives very little space to economic factors in the history of his own time, see iii. 84, introductory n.). And Th. occasionally uses what we should call archaeological arguments, i.e. arguments from material remains. But there were inevitably severe limits on what Th. could do with this kind of evidence: modern books about early Greece can make appeal to the published results of deliberate and systematic excavations. Th. had to rely on Homer, on oral tradition, on his own observation of standing ruins or chance finds, and on his powers of extrapolation—very much the techniques of Herodotus, who used (ii. 99) *ὄψις*, *γνώμη*, and *ἱστορίη* ('my eyes, my judgement, and my searching', as David Grene well renders the phrase in his 1987 translation). We may think Th. did not do too badly—a very intelligent man making a remarkable attempt to invent critical prehistory.

Modern experts on ancient history, from George Grote to M. I. Finley, have, however, been crushing about Th.'s efforts in these chapters: 'the

narrative of Th. is a mere extract and distillation from their [sc. the poets] incredibilities', Grote, *History of Greece* (London, 1888), i. 363; 'this theory [sc. Th.'s view about the development of power in early Greece] is a theory derived from prolonged meditation about the world in which Th. lived, not from a study of history', Finley, 'Myth, Memory and History', *The Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1986), 18.

But Finley goes on to give Th. credit for his 'bold suggestion that there was a continuity and a development in Greece from the most ancient (mythical) times to his own'. That is an important point, but we could be more positive still. Th. was not trying to write a miniature history of early Greece, after which he could say 'Now Read On'; in any case the poverty of decent evidence available to him would have made such an undertaking impossible. He was trying to establish the first two theses set out at the beginning of this commentary (about the importance of the Peloponnesian War and of sea-power).

There is a further dimension to the *Archaeology*. We have noticed (cp. n. on *μεγίστη* at i. 2) and shall notice below that again and again key concepts or emotive phrases from the later books (e.g. *γῆ καὶ θάλασσα*, 'land and sea', 2. 2n.) are introduced very early in the *Archaeology*: this is surely *programmatic*. Equally, the *Archaeology* (like the Athenian and Spartan material at Hdt. i. 59ff.) introduces us to Athens and Sparta and their characteristics (Sparta, which features five times in the *Archaeology*, is particularly prominent in its closing sections, down to the three mistakes corrected in ch. 20, two of which concern Spartan institutions). To say this is not to overlook the introductory function of the mentions of, for instance, Corinth, Corcyra, and Samos in chs. 13–14f., three states whose navies would still be a factor in fifth-century history; or of Delos and the Cyclades in chs. 4 and 8. We misunderstand the *Archaeology* if we treat it as a unit apart; and if we neglect its *literary* function through concentrating too severely on its historical failings.

For a general treatment of the *Archaeology*, bringing out some thematic points, see V. Hunter, *Past and Process in Herodotus and Thucydides* (Princeton, 1982), ch. 1, a revised version of an article in *Klio* (1980); also G. Howie, below 10. 1n.

1. **βιαζόμενοι ὑπό τινων αἰεὶ πλειόνων**: 'whenever they were overpowered by people more numerous than themselves'. The notion of *force majeure*, to which so many of the speeches and esp. the Melian Dialogue in Book v will return, here makes its first appearance.
2. **ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὔσης**: 'There was no commerce'. Th.'s picture of primeval barbarism owes something to contemporary speculation about

human progress towards organized society; see E. R. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford, 1973), ch. 1, and the texts discussed in *Thucydides*, 129ff. For ἐμπορία, 'commerce', see n. on περιουσίαν χρημάτων below.

κατὰ γῆν . . . διὰ θαλάσσης: 'by land or sea' [Latin *terra marique*]. In both Greek and Latin an emotive expression. Pericles will claim at ii. 62. 2 (see also ii. 41. 4) that Athens has control of both elements, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης; cp. too Archidamos at i. 81. 2. See A. Momigliano, *Secondo Contributo*, 431ff., 'Terra Marique', and 57ff., 'Sea Power in Greek Thought'; P. Hardie, *Virgil's Aeneid: Cosmos and Imperium* (Oxford, 1986), 302ff. For an intellectual exploration of the land/sea antithesis see *Old Oligarch*, ii. 2, rightly stressed by Momigliano (the O.O. is perhaps 425 BC—and so known to Thucydides?). Th.'s use—neutral, but very early in his work—of the phrase in the present passage is surely deliberate: above, introductory n., on programmatic terms.

περιουσίαν χρημάτων: 'reserves of wealth'. Money and commerce (ἐμπορία, at the beginning of the sentence) are leading themes not just in the *Archaeology* but elsewhere, e.g. ii. 13. 2 which verbally echoes the present passage; and most notably in Archidamos' speech at i. 80–5, which like the *Archaeology* constantly pairs sea power and wealth (e.g. 80. 4; 81. 4; 82. 1 ἢ ναυτικοῦ ἢ χρημάτων δύναμιν, 'ships and money'). The most famous remark of the Thucydidean Archidamos is 'War is not a matter of weapons, but of money' (83. 2). If this was Thucydides' view also, it helps to explain the insistence on finance in these preparatory chs.

οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες: 'and did not plant the ground'. How then did Th. think they lived? Presumably by hunting (and gathering). If so, note that he has inverted one normal Greek mythical picture, according to which the 'murder' of the plough-ox was 'preceded by an age of modest vegetarianism': W. Burkert, *Homo Necans*, tr. P. Bing (Berkeley, 1983), 22. Instead Th. implies what Burkert regards as the modern view, that 'man became man through the hunt'; organized agriculture came later. I do not mean to suggest that Th. miraculously anticipated modern prehistorical study; but he does deserve credit for willingness to depart from the traditional myths in order to establish his own a priori (and actually correct) view. A. M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment* (London, 1980), 37, argues for a connection between 'the advent of the polis and the economic one of the switch to arable farming'. Snodgrass is thinking of the eighth century, but Th. may just possibly have this dimly remembered eighth-century change in mind when he attempted his own purely intellectual reconstruction of an even more remote age. (It cannot be emphasized too often that Th. had no good evidence for his reconstruction of early Greek prehistory. He proceeded

by analogy, and by the constant application of a crucial assumption, namely that less complicated and less organized = early; what can be called a dogma of progress.)

Alternatively, we could suppose that Th. was aware of *another* normal mythical picture, that which threw the invention of agriculture back to very early times: Erechtheus introduced agriculture in 1409/8 BC according to *FGrHist* 239 (the Parian Marble) A 13, cp. *FGrHist* 328 Philochoros F 104, a very popular myth which may go back to Th.'s time.

M. Marshall, *CQ* 25 (1975), 32, glosses this section as 'the early Greeks did not invest in long-term crops but operated a subsistence economy'. Th. does not say this (*καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκαίου τροφῆς*, 'a bare subsistence', below, can refer to hunting).

Note that Th.'s picture ('no agriculture') is not entirely consistent with the picture elsewhere in the present ch., of a scramble for good land.

ἀτειχίστων ἄμα ὄντων: 'being without walls'. These early communities were unfortified. Walls are another important notion for Th., a point rightly stressed by Y. Garlan, 'Fortifications et histoire grecque', in *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, ed. J.-P. Vernant (Paris, 1968), 255 f.: 'la notion d'enceinte urbaine est inséparable du concept de cité . . . l'absence de fortifications ne peut, selon lui, [sc. Th.] se concevoir, sauf circonstances exceptionnelles comme celle de l'Ionie, [a reference to iii. 33. 2: see my n. there] que dans une société primitive qu'il situe dans le temps aux origines de l'humanité.'

οὔτε μεγέθει πόλεων: 'they had neither great cities'. Perhaps incautiously (see below, i. 10. 2 n., on synoikism), Th. here implies and accepts the *existence*, even in this primitive stage, of cities; he merely disputes their size and wealth. (Marshall (38) strangely thinks that these three words 'could mean not only that the settlements did not grow much but that they were not cities either'.)

οὔτε τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ: 'and no other resources'. For the possibility that what Th. wrote was *διανοία*, 'intention', see E. G. Turner, 'Two Unrecognised Ptolemaic Papyri', *JHS* 76 (1956), 98, citing K. J. Dover (see also Dover in *Thucydides: Greece and Rome New Survey*, 7 (1973), 6). However, it is not easy to see what this could mean: 'they had no great cities, nor did they think big in other ways?'

3. τῆς γῆς ἡ ἀρίστη . . . ἣ τε νῦν Θεσσαλία: 'The richest districts . . . the countries which are now called Thessaly . . .' For the undoubted fertility of Thessaly see now the chronologically wide-ranging study by P. Garnsey, T. Gallant, and D. Rathbone, 'Thessaly and the Grain Supply of Rome during the Second Century B.C.', *JRS* 74 (1984), 30 ff.; but the authors point out that, in classical times, Thessalian productivity was variable and that her communities were sometimes forced to *import* (see

e.g. Tod 196 of the 320s: corn supplied to Thessaly by Cyrene). Th.'s picture is, however, basically right. But what was his evidence? Garnsey and co. can look up official modern Greek government statistics for comparison. Th. probably went simply by his own first-hand impression of density of population and intensity of cultivation: see next n.

καὶ Βοιωτία: 'and Boiotia'. Again, there is no doubt that Th. is right about the fertility of Boiotia, which was watered by Lake Copais (drained in the nineteenth century by a British company). This is one area of Greece whose ancient settlement patterns and density of population have been studied, at least in part; see J. Bintliff and A. Snodgrass, 'Settlement in South-Western Boeotia', in *La Béotie antique* (Paris, 1985; Colloques Internationaux du C.N.R.S), 49 ff. (and Snodgrass, *An Archaeology of Greece* (Berkeley and London, 1987), 100 ff.) for the results of an intensive surface survey of part of Boiotia (the area of the Teneric Plain west of Thebes). It seems that in archaic and classical times—Th.'s own day—the territory of Boiotia was indeed exploited very thoroughly, and the population was exceptionally dense. This was less true, on the evidence of the area studied, in prehistoric times on the one hand and Hellenistic on the other. Th. knew nothing of this sort of evidence, which essentially consists of picking up pot-sherds and counting them. His method here (see previous n.) was simply to infer prehistoric settlement patterns from those of his own day, but if Bintliff and Snodgrass are right this was not an altogether reliable method. On present showing we should perhaps say that Th. was right about the fertility of Boiotia but not necessarily right in the demographic conclusions he drew from it. See further below on 2. 5 for another explanation of immigration into these areas.

Πελοποννήσου τε τὰ πολλὰ πλὴν Ἀρκαδίας: 'the greater part of the Peloponnese with the exception of Arkadia'. Arkadia was notoriously poor, see Hdt.'s description of the Arkadians as 'acorn-eaters', i. 66. 2 (in an oracular response from Delphi), and their reputation throughout their history as mercenaries (for which see e.g. Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 23): Arkadia was a place to get away from. Like the Athenians (see below, para. 5 n.) the Arkadians were allegedly indigenous, 'Older than the Moon' (see e.g. *FGrHist* 554 F 7); but see Rosivach (below, para. 5 n.), 305 f.

4. δυνάμεις ... στάσεις ... ἐφθείροντο: 'power ... quarrels ... ruined'. Control of good land makes possible the growth of *power* which leads to internal *strife*, which leads to the *destruction* of the community. These are all leading notions in Th., as is the idea of the causal relation between them. Rather than deriding Th. for perpetrating anachronisms, we should recognize that he is once again using the opportunity of the

Archaeology to introduce themes which will be basic to the rest of the work. It is possible (Marshall, 33) that *δυνάμεις* means 'sources of power' in the sense of human resources, population.

5. **τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλείστον διὰ τὸ λεπτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν:** 'Certainly Attica, where the soil was poor and thin, enjoyed for a long time freedom from civil strife [*stasis*]'! How serious a drawback was this 'thin soil' of Attica (the name of the territory of Athens)? Th. clearly intends a contrast between it and the excellence, *ἀρετή*, of the parts of Greece he has just mentioned. Until recently scholars accepted Th.'s picture, but there has been a reaction; see P. D. Garnsey, 'Grain for Athens', *CRUX*, 69, who says 'in fact, the "deficiencies" of Attica are somewhat exaggerated in the literature'. He cites with approval A. Philippson's comment that 'the light soil of the Athens and Eleusis plains and slopes brings very good returns of grain, oil and wine, and the plains of Marathon and especially that of Mesogeia actually have relatively rich soil with a relatively deep plough-zone'. But he agrees with Philippson that Attica 'could not *by itself* support a state of any size'. R. Osborne goes even further than Garnsey, suggesting that 'the whole Athenian population *could* have been supported from the territory of Attica itself alone': *Classical Landscape with Figures: The Ancient Greek City and its Countryside* (London, 1987), 46 and 99. He means, if Athenians had farmed more intensively and been prepared to eat more barley instead of imported wheat. See also R. Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World* (London, 1991), 314ff., 389.

Again, Th. was going by the evidence available to him, which included the certain fact that classical Athenians imported a great deal of corn. Perhaps it is true that they did not need to do so; but they had not had the benefit of studying Garnsey's and Osborne's tables. Th., at least, makes Nikias (vi. 20. 4) allude to Athens' need to import corn; for the rest of the evidence see S. Isager and M. H. Hansen, *Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century BC* (Odense, 1975), 19ff.

Strictly it is a *non sequitur* to say 'Athens was free from *stasis* because of her thin soil', but Th. here assumes his earlier point about good land creating powerful individuals or groups, who in turn create *stasis* (2. 4).

ἄνθρωποι ἄκουσιν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ: 'so was occupied by its original inhabitants'. The Athenians cherished the idea that they were 'autochthonous', that is, that they had always inhabited Attica. For autochthony as 'the Athenian myth par excellence' see N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, tr. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 148–50, and in *Annales* (ESC), 34 (1979), 3ff., and 'Kreousa the Autochthon: A Study of Euripides' *Ion*', in J. Winkler and F. Zeitlin, *Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context* (Princeton, 1990), 168ff.; S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1987), 66ff.; R. Thomas,

Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens (Cambridge, 1989), 218. See, however, V. Rosivach, 'Autochthony and the Athenians', *CQ* 37 (1987), 294ff., suggesting that in its developed form the 'myth' was a relatively late invention, specifically a concoction of the fifth-century democracy. Similar though less drastic conclusions are reached independently by R. Parker, 'Myths of Early Athens', in *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*, ed. J. Bremmer (London, 1987), 187ff., at 195. Parker notes the anti-Dorian implications of the myth (the Dorians were newcomers to Greece). Cp. also E. Kearns, *The Heroes of Attica* (London, 1989 = *BICS* supp. 57), 110ff. Pericles picks the theme up at ii. 36. 1: see n. there.

But is the factual component of the myth (and of the comparable though less famous myth about Arkadia: see above) true? The Athenians were Greeks, and to the extent that the myth implies that there was never a 'time before the Greeks' in Attica, the myth is false: the arrival of the Greeks in Greece is a fact, whether that arrival be put c.2000 BC or (if one doubts the Greekness of Linear B, the writing of the Greek Bronze Age, 14th and 13th centuries BC) in about 1200 BC. For an accessibly written discussion, preferring the second of these alternatives, see Sinclair Hood, *The Home of the Heroes* (London, 1974), ch. 7.

But there is something to be said for Th.'s view: as Hood observes, the evidence of dialect suggests that the Ionians (of whom the most famous were the Athenians), the Arkadians, and the Cypriots, whose dialect resembles Arkadian, remained distinct from and probably preceded the Dorian Greeks, the Ionians etc. arriving (on Hood's assumptions) c.1200 and the Dorians c.1100. See Hammond, *Studies*, 33: 'Attica remained an island of Ionic speech, having been settled early', and his *Hist. Mac.* i (Oxford, 1972), 274.

If on the other hand one prefers to see the Bronze Age inhabitants of Greece as Greek, one may appeal in Th.'s support to Attica's political independence from the Peloponnese in Mycenaean times (see *CAH* ii³. 2 (1975), 166, 170f., admittedly drawing on Th. himself to some extent!) after her undeniable subjection to Minoan Crete: *CAH* ii². 2 (1975), 657.

If we now ask, *why* were Arkadia and Athens less subject to disruption and immigration, Th.'s answer in terms of poverty may seem less satisfactory than a simpler one in terms of geographical position: these two areas were off the main lines of penetration from the north.

6. καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα [read τὰ ἄλλα, deleting ἐς] μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι: 'The facts about Attica are proof of my point that it was because of migrations that the rest of Greece did not develop to the same extent as Attica'. The reason for that lack of development being, on

Th.'s view, that those other areas were less physically secure and so could not peacefully absorb new citizens in the way that Attica could.

παράδειγμα, 'proof', rather than 'example', as in the Penguin tr. (The peculiar history of Attica does not *exemplify* Th.'s point about the effects of migration because Attica is not an example of a place which experienced migration. But her peculiar history helps *prove* the point.) For the semi-technical or legal word *παράδειγμα* see *Thucydides* 106.

This sentence is discussed at length by M. H. Marshall, 'Urban Settlement in the Second Chapter of Thucydides', *CQ* 25 (1975), 26–40. Following H. W. Stubbs, *CQ* 22 (1972), 74 ff., Marshall rightly defends the MS reading *μετοικίας* against the emendation *μετοικήσεις*, accepted by Gomme. *μετοικίας*, as Stubbs and Marshall show, can yield the required meaning 'migrations'.

In other respects it is less easy to think that we have exactly what Th. wrote. I would accept, with Gomme but against Stubbs and Marshall, that *ἐς τὰ ἄλλα* ('in other respects') is difficult here, and that *τὰ ἄλλα* (meaning 'Greek states other than Attica') is needed.

τόδε ('the facts') clearly refers to the information about Attica which Th. is supplying, both before and after the disputed sentence (2. 5, Attica was autochthonous; rest of 2. 6, she was a refuge for other Greeks). Marshall poses too starkly the choice between a 'prospective' and a 'retrospective' sense for *τόδε*, which seems to me quite loosely used.

ἐς Ἴωνίαν . . . ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψαν: '[Athens] sent out . . . colonies to Ionia'. The first mention in Th. of the tradition that Ionia, in the geographical sense of Western Anatolia, was colonized from Athens in the Dark Ages after the collapse of Mycenaean civilization. (For this colonization see nn. on i. 12 below.) Here Th. is concerned with the tradition of an immediately preceding event, the entry into Attica itself of Greeks from other, troubled parts of Greece. Strictly, this event is inconsistent with Th.'s own theory that good land changes hands often, so Attica with its wretched land was always free from immigration. But his point is that it was precisely because of the agricultural insufficiency of Attica (*οὐχ ἰκανῆς οὖσης τῆς Ἀττικῆς*) that these refugees had to be passed on to Ionia. They did not cause *stasis* because they were made citizens, and their despatch to Ionia was therefore an organized state-sponsored matter. (Th. exaggerated the organized character of the colonization of Ionia because he was influenced by fifth-century imperial propaganda: see 12. 4 n. on *ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε*.) The presence in Attica of these refugees cannot be proved archaeologically, but there is confirmation in Hdt. (i) Hdt. i. 146 says that Boiotians, Euboians, etc. joined in the colonization of Ionia, a tradition supported by dialect evidence and accepted in M. Sakellariou, *La Migra-*

tion grecque en Ionie (Athens, 1958), 301 f.; V. Desborough, *The Greek Dark Ages* (London, 1972), 323, 354; A. M. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (Edinburgh, 1972), 301 f. It is natural to suppose that they went from Boiotia, etc. to Ionia *via* Attica. (ii) A strong tradition claimed that Messenians thrown out of Pylos by Dorian newcomers took refuge in Attica and even that they supplied a king, Melanthus. See P. J. Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 79 for the evidence; the earliest is Hdt. v. 65. 3.

3. *Further evidence for the weakness of early Greece: no common enterprise undertaken by 'the Greeks'—and no common name for the Greeks, either*

1. **δηλοῖ δέ μοι καὶ τόδε τῶν παλαιῶν ἀσθένειαν οὐχ ἥκιστα:** 'The weakness of antiquity is further proved to me by the fact that . . .'. N. G. L. Hammond, 'The Arrangement of the Thought in the Proem and in Other Parts of Thucydides i', *CQ* 2 (1952), 127 ff., points out that there is a good deal of ring composition in the *Archaeology*, often taking the form 'thesis-proof-thesis' (he notes, 138 ff., parallels with Sophocles' *Ajax*, the pre-Socratic philosopher Melissus, Euclid, and the *Old Oligarch*). He gives this chapter as an example (127 f.): the argument is 'early weakness—no common undertaking—weakness' (3. 4 δι' ἀσθένειαν). For ring-composition in the *Archaeology* generally see also W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), appendix 1, at 251.

ἡ Ἑλλάς: 'Greece'. There is a slight illogicality here. The thought runs 'Greece, Ἑλλάς, undertook nothing collectively *before* the Trojan War; indeed the notion of Greece did not exist *at the time of the Trojan War*, nor even at the time of Homer who lived *long after* the Trojan War'. The reason is that Th. is led from thinking about Greece as a geographical expression (the subject of ch. 2) to thinking about Greece in the sense of the people who lived there (a perfectly respectable Thucydidean idiom; cp. for the most striking instances ii. 8. 1, the whole of Ἑλλάς was μετέωρος, 'excited', 'poised in suspense', about the outcome of the impending war, and a little later, ii. 8. 4, the Spartans announce they are going to liberate Ἑλλάς).

Th. does not mean to imply that there was ever a Greek 'nation-state' either at the time of the Persian Wars or later. Even in the present ch., where he is speaking about political activity, his word Ἑλλάς has to do with culture, language, and descent. That is also the conception we find in Hdt., who in a famous passage makes a speaker define Greekness, τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, as 'shared descent, language, religion, and customs' (viii. 144). For a good modern treatment see F. W. Walbank, 'The Problem of Greek Nationality', in *Selected Papers* (Cambridge, 1985), 1 ff. (stressing such political unity as there was); but for very different conclusions, see

M. I. Finley, 'The Ancient Greeks and their Nation', *The Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1986), 120ff.: talk of Greek 'failure' to achieve unity imputes aims which the Greeks themselves never thought possible or desirable.

As Finley (234 n. 6) points out, Th. in the present passage confines Ἑλλάς to 'Old Greece', in the 'narrow sense of the Greek world before the great north-eastern and western expansion' (cp. Walbank, 7 n. 29).

2. δοκεῖ δέ μοι: 'I am inclined to think'. This unconfident and subjective formula is commoner in the unfinished Book viii than elsewhere (*HCT* v. 399; *Thucydides*, 155f.), but there are quite a few instances in these early chapters of Book i; naturally, given the uncertain subject-matter. See ii. 5. 6 n.

Ἕλληνας τοῦ Δευκαλίωνος: 'Hellen the son of Deukalion'. The scholiast tells us, quoting Hesiod (frag. 7 Rzach), that the sons of Hellen were Doros, Xuthos, and Aiolos. Xuthos was the step-father of Ion (whose real father was Apollo, at least according to Euripides' *Ion*: see R. Parker, 'Myths of Early Athens', (above, 2. 5 n.) at 206f.). The story is clearly a personalized way of expressing a belief that speakers of the Doric, Aiolic, and Ionic dialects of Greek (for which see A. Morpurgo-Davies (iii. 112. 4n.)) were united by shared descent as well as shared language, to put it in Herodotean terms (see above). Cp. Finley, 125 and Walbank, 7.

In fact, modern study of what is meant by 'The Greeks' starts with language, not race; for an emphatic pronouncement to that effect see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 269ff.

τὸ Πελασγικόν: 'Pelasgian'. A vague word used by the Greeks for pre-Greeks, or for non-Greeks displaced by Greeks ('*inter alia* non-Greek speakers', as Hammond calls the Pelasgians, *Hist. Mac.* i. 274). At *Hdt.* i. 56 the Pelasgians are implied to be precursors of the Dorian rather than the Ionian strain of Greeks (that is, they are pre-Greeks). The term does not (unlike 'Ionian', 'Dorian', or 'Aiolian') correspond to anything traceable by the study of archaeology or language, so does not feature much in modern scholarship (except that archaeologists sometimes speak of 'Pelasgic', i.e. primitive-looking, walls). It is perhaps best avoided.

ἐν τῇ Φθιώτιδι: 'in Phthiotis'. Phthiotic Achaia, a region of Thessaly. This picture of the 'Hellenes' as originally just a tribal group in Central Greece (and Epirus) is accepted by modern scholars; see Hammond, 271f., and his *Epirus*, 370.

ἑκνικῆσαι: 'the name [i.e. 'Hellene' in a more general sense] prevailed'. For this verb see the striking use at 21. 1, the only other instance in Th.

There it refers to stories which have ‘passed into the region of romance’, lit. ‘won their way through to the status of the mythical’.

3. τεκμηριοὶ δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος: ‘Of this Homer provides the best evidence’. Th. cites Homer for detail, and is inevitably indebted to him for much of his material in these early chapters. But Th.’s own avowed rejection of ‘stories’ (see nn. on 21. 1; 22. 4) explains his occasional use of distancing formulae like those at 9. 4 and 10. 3: ‘if Homer is sufficient evidence for anybody’; ‘if one may believe Homer’. Th.’s use of the Homeric *Hymn to Apollo* is in strong contrast: see iii. 104 introductory n.

On τεκμηριοὶ see nn. on i. 1. 1 (τεκμαιρόμενος) and 6. 2 (σημείον).

Δαναοὺς . . . ἀνακαλεῖ: ‘He calls them Danaans’. Th.’s approach is intelligent and recognizably similar to sophisticated modern arguments; see for instance A. M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece* (London, 1980), 28. But (i) as remarked by Helen Thomas, in Wace and Stubbings, *A Companion to Homer*² (Oxford, 1962), 285, the disunity of the Greeks in Homer ‘should not be pressed’. She points to the way in which Παναχαιοί, [‘All the Achaeans’] is occasionally used ‘to stress their oneness’; note that Πανέλληνες (‘All-Greeks’) at *Iliad*, ii. 530 may be an interpolation—see Walbank (above para. 1 n.), 6 n. 23—and in any case may not be a generic term for ‘Greeks’ but a way of referring to the northern as opposed to the southern Greeks, so M. L. West, commentary on Hesiod, *Works and Days*, line 528, and Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition Through Tragedy* (Oxford, 1989), 7, and already G. Autenrieth’s *Homeric Dictionary* (1877); (ii) metrical convenience goes some way to explain the Homeric variants commented on by Th.: his three examples all scan differently.

οὐδὲ βαρβάρους εἶρηκε: ‘Nor is there any mention of barbarians’. There are, however, ‘barbarian-speaking Karians’ at *Iliad*, ii. 867; it seems improbable that this word represents a post-Thucydidean intrusion into the epic as Hall (above), 9, appears to suggest. See, on the history of the word ‘Barbar’, the interesting footnote of Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. Bury (London, 1896), v. 469 n. 190 (occasioned by a discussion of the Berbers of North Africa). Th. is however right (despite these Karians, and despite the points made in the preceding n.) to imply that ‘the Greeks learned to define themselves . . . in the course of their contacts with the Persians’: so Oswyn Murray, *CAH* iv². 461, echoing a point made frequently by A. Momigliano, e.g. in *Persia e il mondo greco-romano* (Rome, 1966), 137 = *Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography*, ch. 3. Walbank (7) says that ‘those who argue that Ἕλληνες [“Greeks”] form a cultural group over against the βάρβαροι [“barbarians”] would perhaps win more support for their thesis if they could point to an eponymous Barbar as ancestor to the βαρβαρόφωνοι [“barbarian speakers”]; but

this is more witty than convincing. For the view that the notion of the barbarian was 'invented' only in the fifth century see Edith Hall (preceding n.).

ἀσθένειαν: 'weakness'. See above on 3. 1.

ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτην τὴν στρατείαν θαλάσση: 'And they only made the expedition against Troy . . . by sea'. This sentence is a bridge from the Trojan War to the thalassocracy or naval supremacy of Minos—which actually preceded the Trojan War. The transition will seem less abrupt if we remember (i) that the Trojan War was adduced in ch. 3 only to make a point about nomenclature—the full treatment of that War is reserved for chs. 9 ff. below; (ii) that the two main theses of the *Archaeology* (see introductory n. to 1–23) are closely connected. Early military activity, Th. says, was not very significant; but such as it was, it owed its significance to control of the sea. The first naval activity worth mentioning was that of Minos . . .

4. *The thalassocracy of Minos*

This has been much discussed since the decipherment of Linear B as a form of Greek; this reopened the question of relations between Crete and the mainland. Recent discussion began with C. G. Starr, 'The Myth of Minoan Thalassocracy', *Historia*, 3/4 (1955), 343 ff. For Starr, Minoan thalassocracy (that is, the sea hegemony of Bronze-Age Crete) was a myth put about by fifth-century Athens to magnify Minos' opponent Theseus. This provoked some protest, e.g. from R. J. Buck, 'Minoan Thalassocracy Re-examined', *Historia*, 11 (1962), 129 ff.; F. Matz, *CAH* ii². 1 (1973), 160. But everything written on this topic before 1984 is superseded by the publication of a symposium held at the Swedish Institute in Athens in 1982: see R. Hägg and N. Marinatos, *The Minoan Thalassocracy: Myth and Reality*, Skrifter Utgivna av Svenska Institutet, 1 Athen 4, xxxii (Stockholm, 1984). The participants (including Starr) discuss the nature and extent of Bronze-Age Cretan influence in the Aegean; Sinclair Hood (33–7) cautiously answers in the affirmative his own question 'A Minoan Empire in the 16th and 15th centuries BC?'. There seems general agreement (216 ff.) on a 'Minoanization' of the Aegean, the mainland, and coastal Asia Minor.

But there are two separate questions, which are sometimes (see below on *ληστικόν*) confused. (i) What does such 'Minoanization' amount to? E. Schofield (47) points out that settlers are not necessarily conquerors, cp. the most radical of the contributors, Jack L. Davis (165): 'little more is to be gained by continuing to confound economic and social change with migrations and conquests'. (ii) What have Th. and his notions of

thalassocracy to do with any of this? Note Davis again (218): 'some of us who have worked with the Cyclades feel that the concept of Minoan thalassocracy has done Cycladic archaeology quite a disservice. It has channelled us into examining something which is a historical question, which the archaeological evidence cannot really answer.' I sympathize with this; but it might be better to say 'a historical and historiographical question'. That is, we should approach the topic of Minoan thalassocracy as we approach the Trojan War (below, 9-11, introductory n.), not looking in a simple way to archaeology to 'confirm' epic traditions. Such traditions are Th.'s ultimate sources. It is surprising to the student of Th. to see how often, in the Swedish symposium, appeal is made to his authority; but see N. Marinatos (158); and cp. now the review of the symposium volume by K. Petruso, *AJA* 91 (1987), 335 f.

We may conclude that it is possible that some memory of Cretan Bronze-Age greatness came down to Thucydides, but that his presentation of it is riddled with suspiciously fifth-century features: to this extent Starr is right. But the tradition of the thalassocracy was established by the time of Hdt. (iii. 122), a fact more significant than Hdt.'s own scepticism, for which see Starr, *Mnemosyne*, 31 (1978), 345 n. 1. It shows that Th. did not invent the tradition. But again we should not deride his anachronism. He was, like one of the Attic tragedians, reworking a myth for his own purposes, which were partly literary and have to do with the structure of the *Archaeology* as introduction.

Μίνως: 'Minos'. Since Sir Arthur Evans, the first excavator of palatial Crete, 'Minos' has been supposed to be a dynastic title, like 'Pharaoh'. This would conveniently remove the need to try and date 'him'. Actually, there is no evidence on the point: as observed by S. Dow in G. S. Kirk (ed.), *The Language and Background of Homer* (Cambridge, 1966), 169 n. 39, 'no name "Minos" has been read' on Linear B tablets.

ὧν ἀκοῇ ἴσμεν: 'to whom tradition ascribes' [lit. 'of whom we know by hearsay']. For another tentative first-person formula see 3. 2 n. on *δοκεῖ δέ μοι*. But the present phrase is of great interest for another reason: the way it illustrates the complexity of Th.'s relation to Hdt.

For *ἴσμεν*, 'we know', see the very similar language of Hdt. iii. 122 on precisely Th.'s subject here, the first thalassocracy, which, however, Hdt. attributes to Polykrates mentioning Minos only in a dismissive afterthought (*Πολυκράτης γὰρ ἐστὶ πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Ἑλλήνων ὃς θαλασσοκρατεῖν ἐπενοήθη, παρέξ Μίνω . . .*, 'Polykrates is the first Greek whom we know to have aimed at control of the sea, apart from Minos . . .'). He goes on to say that at any rate Polykrates was the first human [? as opposed to mythical] thalassocrat. This kind of thing is

sometimes called by Herodotean scholars 'correction in stride'.) As so often over a question of earlier history, Th.'s debt to Hdt. is large and his language closely similar—but not exactly: see below.

The word *ἀκοή* means 'hearsay'. It is rare for Th. thus to appeal to hearsay evidence. (The word *ἀκοή* is Herodotean—see Hdt. ii. 29. 1—but notably absent from Hdt. iii. 122, the passage on which Th. here draws.) For the most remarkable instance of such a claim in Th. see vi. 55. 1, where he says that from knowledge derived from *ἀκοή* he is particularly sure that Hippias was Pisistratus' eldest son. For that passage see *Thucydides*, 90. Here one might be tempted to suggest that Th. refers ultimately perhaps to epic poems, but the immediate explanation of the phrase is surely more simple: Th. is operating closely with the Hdt. passage. (It is even possible that Hdt.'s less specific phrase could cover thalassocracy lists, for which see 13. 3 n.) On the one hand Th. is *more* sceptical, or perhaps merely more precise, than Hdt., in that he adds the word 'hearsay' after the shared word for 'we know'; on the other hand he is *less* sceptical in that he develops the theme of the thalassocracy of Minos as a historical phenomenon, whereas Hdt. dismisses it in the way we have seen. On the general topic of Th.'s use of Hdt., and this passage in particular, see my article in *Catling Studies*.

τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων: 'The Cyclades islands'. The Cyclades were the islands in a circle, *κύκλος*, round Delos. Delos itself was to be the object of attentions by Polykrates of Samos (i. 13. 6) and Pisistratus of Athens (iii. 104); eventually it would be the site of the imperial treasury of fifth-century Athens (i. 96. 2). It is surely not accidental that the Cyclades and Delos itself (i. 8) feature early and prominently in the *Archaeology*.

Various speakers in the Swedish symposium discuss the degree of actual contact between Bronze-Age Crete and the Aegean islands (not just the Cyclades); see the sections by Barber (Melos), Davis (Keos), Laffineur and N. Marinatos (Thera), Coldstream and Huxley (Kythera). But see above, my general remarks on the thalassocracy.

οἰκιστής: 'colonizer'. Oikists or *κτισταί* were founders of Greek colonies. After their deaths they were regularly given cult as heroes: see Hdt. vi. 38. 1 for Miltiades' cult as *οἰκιστής* of the Chersonese. (And for general surveys see now W. Leschhorn, *Gründer der Stadt*, Palingenesia, vol. xx, 1984, and I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1987), 189 ff.) The institution of the *οἰκιστής* does not feature much in Th., partly because the great period of colonization lay back in the archaic period. (See, however, i. 24. 2 and vi. 2–5, the *Sikelika*; and, for the fifth century, iii. 34. 4, Athenian oikists sent to Notion; 92. 5, Spartan oikists of Herakleia in 426; and v. 11. 1, Amphipolis honours first Hagnon then Brasidas as oikists. See nn. on all those passages.) But Tod

200 = Fornara 121 of the 320s BC (colony sent by Athens to the Adriatic under an oikist interestingly called Miltiades) shows that the institution continued long after Th.'s day. Athenian imperial ventures abroad in the fifth century will have been commanded by oikists, more often than we know of. (Cp. i. 98. 2, Skyros, no oikist mentioned, but see Diod. xi. 60. 2 for the—unnamed—Athenian oikist.) So when Th. speaks of Minos as oikist of the Cyclades he is importing an idea from the world with which he was familiar. On the second millennium reality cp. the scepticism of K. Branigan, 'Minoan Colonialism', *BSA* 75 (1981), 23 ff., and at 49 ff. of the Swedish symposium. Schofield (symposium, 44), acknowledging J. Caskey, adds the further thought that 'our nineteenth-century European heritage has coloured our interpretations of Thucydides' account of Minos as the first *oikistes*. In effect we have confused colonization with colonialism (or imperialism).' Whatever the reality (and Schofield's scepticism is generally persuasive) she here goes too far: Th. certainly *thought* in terms of control (*ἐκράτησε* . . . ἡρξέε, 'master . . . conquered') and in terms of analogies with Cypselid Corinth, whose control of her colonies was exceptionally close.

On the book of M. Casewitz, *Le Vocabulaire de la colonisation en grec ancien* (Paris, 1985), see the review by A. J. Graham, *CR* 37 (1987), 237 ff., concluding that it is an unreliable guide to Th.'s usage.

Κᾶρας ἐξελάσας: 'expelling the Karians'. Hdt., who himself came from Halikarnassos in Karia, believed that the Karians were themselves originally Cretan, i. 171. To this extent he shares Th.'s belief (for which see further ch. 8 below) in a Karian presence on the islands. But Hdt. makes Minos employ the Karians rather than evicting them. For this discrepancy, and for the Karian-Cretan link (which finds some support in archaeology) see *Mausolus*, 12 and nn. On this detail in particular, and in his greater inclination to believe in Minos' thalassocracy generally (see the end of the introductory n. to this ch.), Th. parts company with Hdt., his first disagreement with his predecessor on a point of fact, though polemic is implied already at i. 1: see n. there on ἀξιολογώτατον.

καὶ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας ἡγεμόνας ἐγκαταστήσας: 'appointing his own sons to govern them'. The idea that Minos installed cadet members of his own family as rulers of the islands is another obvious anachronism. It is borrowed from the age of the tyrants; see Hdt. iii. 52. 6, Periander of Corinth sends his son Lycophron to his dependency Corcyra, presumably not as a private citizen; or Hdt. v. 94, Pisistratus rules Sigeion through his son Hegesistratos. The anachronism may already have been present in whatever poetic tradition Th. was drawing on, depending on its date. In which case he was uncritical rather than inventive.

τό τε ληστικὸν . . . καθήρει: 'cleared the sea of pirates'. If Th. intends

to suggest another parallel with the developed Athenian empire, and I think he does, it is odd that he does not make more, in his subsequent narrative, of the theme of anti-piratical activity by Athens. Protection against pirates, no less than against Persians, was surely one of the justifications of her empire, but finds no mention at i. 97. Kimon's capture of Skyros was described as an eviction of pirates by Plutarch, *Kimón*, 8. 3, but there is nothing of this in Th.'s version (98. 2). In the main narrative there is Athenian action against piracy at ii. 69 (see n. there), surely not a purely war-time phenomenon.

It is surprising to read in the Swedish symposium (31) the following intervention by Ch. Doumas: 'But Thucydides is quite clear on this: the Aegean was full of pirates and it was Minos who cleared the seas. How could the Minoans do that without controlling the islands?' (but see Starr's warning further down the page). We have no idea whether there were really what we would call pirates in the world of Minoan Crete [but see now Pritchett, v (1991), 325 n. 468]. It is just possible that Th. recalled the mention of pirates in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, line 454: Apollo is here addressing the sailors who come from *Minoan Crete* (line 393). For Th.'s familiarity with this poem see iii. 104.

The present passage has the function of preparing us for the mentions of piracy in the narrative proper, see nn. on ii. 32 and 69. 1.

ὡς εἰκός: 'probably'. For this phrase see H. D. Westlake, *Essays*, 153 ff. It can mean either 'as was natural' or 'as was likely'. Westlake suggests that on the six occasions when Th. uses it, it always means 'as was natural'; but for a different view on viii. 88 see Andrewes, *HCT*, v. 456 and my *Thucydides*, 107 n. 142. If Westlake is wrong on viii. 88, we are free to re-examine the present passage, on which Westlake, 156 f., who translates 'it was natural that Minos should make every effort to suppress piracy because its suppression would benefit him financially'. Again, I am not convinced that Westlake is right; given Th.'s murky subject-matter we need from him some formula indicative of uncertainty. Westlake thinks we have got it in *ὡν ἀκοῆ ἴσμεν*, but that phrase (see above) is a claim to *knowledge* of a sort. See further below, 9. 4 n. on *εἰκάζειν*.

On Th.'s fondness for the quasi-legal *ὡς εἰκός* see *Thucydides*, 106f. **τοῦ τὰς προσόδους μᾶλλον ἰέναι αὐτῷ:** 'from a desire to protect his growing revenues'. The first use of the important word *πρόσοδοι*, 'revenues', which will recur both in the *Archaeology* (i. 13, a key ch.) and in some later chapters which give essential material about Athenian imperial finance (ii. 13, resources at the beginning of the war; iv. 108, Amphipolis; vii. 28, economic damage suffered after Spartan occupation of Dekeleia), not to mention various speeches on this theme.

Starr in the Swedish symposium (217) writes '[Th.] suggests that

Minos tried to regularize his revenues, which is a possible hypothesis but for which there is no evidence'. That is right.

5-8. 1. *Digression on piracy and the gradual spread of peaceful habits*

The structure of these chapters can again be called 'ring-composition': at 8. 2 Th. will return briefly to the particular topic of Minos' suppression of piracy, with which he had concluded ch. 4.

5.1. ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ: 'on the mainland'. That is, of Asia Minor.

ἐτράποντο πρὸς ληστείαν: 'turned to piracy'. For an excellent discussion of piracy, going well beyond its ostensible theme of Hellenistic piracy, see J. K. Davies, *CAH* vii. 1 (1984), 285 ff., 'Piracy and its Ramifications'. It was not only in the world of the Greek epics (see para. 2 below, and above for the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*) that the status of pirates was ambiguous: *συλᾶν* or seizure arrangements meant that, throughout Greek history, there were legally recognized ways of getting recompense for goods seized (Davies explains the precise mechanism). This implies that piratical practices were to some extent condoned.

For Peloponnesian War piracy, a phenomenon for which the present passage prepares us, see ii. 69. 1 n. on *καὶ τὸ ληστικόν* etc.

ἠγουμένων: 'who hoped'. This innocuous-looking word ['thinking'] deserves comment. Th. is here claiming to *know* people's motives when in fact he is guessing: he certainly did not know what was in the heads of hypothetical Minoan pirates. (Contrast what he says about Minos in ch. 4, on my interpretation of *ὡς εἰκός*). This has prompted one recent scholar to suggest that *whenever* Th. attributes a motive in this confident way, it is simply the result of intelligent inference. See Chr. Schneider, *Information und Absicht bei Thukydides* (Göttingen, 1974); see also V. Hunter, *Thucydides the Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973). There is much to be said for this view if it is not pushed to an absurd extreme, see *Thucydides*, 78 ff. On Hunter, note Cawkwell, *CR* 28 (1978), 233 f., for some reservations about the (unitarian) compositional implications: 'is he to be seen as so often wise before the event because in fact he is wise after the event . . .?' See also now Westlake, *Studies*, ch. 14.

ἀτειχίστοις: 'unwalled'. See above on 2. 2 for this word, and for the importance of walls to Th.

κατὰ κώμας: 'as villages'. As 10. 2 makes clear (see n. there), a community so inhabited was the opposite of a 'synoikized' community, that is, one whose inhabitants had been politically or physically concentrated by an act of *συνοικισμός*.

2. καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν: 'the ancient poets'. Th. is thinking of *Odyssey*, iii. 73 ff. = ix. 252 ff. = *Hymn to Apollo*, 452 ff.; see next n.

οὐκ ὄνειδιζόντων: 'nor do those . . . censure'. Not entirely true: the Homeric passages say that pirates bring *κακά*, 'evils', to other people; see also S. West, in A. Heubeck, S. West, J. B. Hainsworth, *Commentary on Homer's Odyssey i: Introduction and Books i-viii* (Oxford, 1987), 165, n. on *Odyssey*, iii. 71-4, who remarks on the 'double standard' in Homer, and cites *Odyssey*, xiv. 85 ff. (Eumaios condemns marauders).

3. τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ: 'the old practices'. The phrase will recur at ch. 10, to describe *κατὰ κῶμας* or 'village-based' settlement; on both occasions there is the implication that physical insecurity and unwalled settlements are signs of primitiveness: see n. on 2. 2 above on walls and *polis*-ideology.

περί τε Λοκροῦς τοὺς Ὀζόλας καὶ Αἰτωλοῦς καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας: 'among the Ozolian Lokrians, Aitolians, Akarnanians'. These were areas (in Central Greece, north of the Gulf of Corinth) where the basic unit of human organization was, longer than elsewhere in Greece, the *ἔθνος* or tribe ('clan', as Walbank translates it, *Selected Papers*, 14) rather than the *πόλις*. In classical and Hellenistic times, the formulae *ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις* ('peoples and cities') or later *ἔθνη, πόλεις, καὶ δύνασται* ('peoples, cities, and princes') are often used 'almost as a synonym for the content of political history': Walbank, p. 58, in another reprinted article on 'Nationality as a Factor in Roman History'; see also Rostovtzeff, *Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941), 1439 n. 277.

The reference to the Lokrians is controversial; see P. M. Fraser, *Gnomon*, 26 (1954), 248f., against the attempt of L. Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, Paris (1952), ii. 115 ff., to show (from inscriptions) that Th. was wrong because the classical Lokrians had reached a high stage of development. See independently J. Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford, 1968), 58. It is true that in the mid-fourth century the Western (Ozolian) Lokrians had a *κοινόν* or league, as shown by a remarkable and neglected inscription (no mention for instance in Larsen): [ἔ]δοξε τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Λοκρῶν τῶν Ἐσ[περίων], 'it seemed good to the league of the Western Lokrians'; see Lerat, i. 133 ff. (= *SEG* xii. 280) and ii. 55 ff., with Fraser, 252. So, like the Aitolians, for whose fourth-century *κοινόν* see Tod 137 = Harding 154 (and see below), the Western Lokrians were organized in a sophisticated way not many decades after Th.'s time, so that Th. in the present passage is arguably unfair to both Aitolians and Lokrians. But between Th. and the mid-fourth century falls the great period of federalizing activity which has sometimes been associated with the Theban Epaminondas (see Fraser, above, and *Greek World*, 168 and 232). Moreover, as Fraser says, 'it may well be that Thucydides was thinking not of towns (the existence of which he does not explicitly deny) but of the perichora, and even of the mountain regions'.

Note in any case the fifth-century West Lokrian inscription Tod 34 (= Fornara 87, not in ML) which lays down rules about seizure; this implies piratical activity, and Tod rightly adduces the present passage of Th.

For Aitolia see, in addition to the old book by W. J. Woodhouse, *Aetolia* (Oxford, 1897), the recent field surveys by S. Bommeljé and others (iii. 94. 4 n. on τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος etc.) and C. Antonetti (iii. 94. 5 n.).

τό τε σιδηροφορεῖσθαι: 'the fashion of wearing arms'. Th. is led from piracy to one of its consequences, the need to carry (defensive) weapons. This general subject of dress, as an index of civilization, will occupy him until the end of ch. 6. Th.'s verb means literally 'to carry iron', which as Snodgrass says (*Dark Age of Greece*, 8) is an 'uncomfortable anachronism for a historian who knew and trusted Homer', but I doubt if this 'suggests an almost intentional vagueness over the distinction of the bronze-using contemporaries of Minos from their iron-armed successors'.

6. 1. τὴν δίαίταν: 'way of life'. See ii. 16. 2. It was nostalgia, πόθος, for their Greek δίαίτα which led the Greeks settled in Bactria by Alexander the Great to set out on the long walk home after his death: Diod. xviii. 7. 1.

2. σημεῖον δ': 'indicates'. Th. makes frequent use, esp. in the first two books where there is so much antiquarian material, of such tags as σημεῖον δέ, τεκμήριον δέ, μαρτύριον δέ. This is the first instance of such a usage. Attempts have been made (e.g. H. Diller, *Hermes* 67 (1932), 22 ff.) to prove that Th. means different things by the different words he uses, but they all seem to mean simply 'and this is proof of what I say . . .'. For discussion see *Thucydides*, 100 ff. A clear case is i. 132, where σημεῖον and τεκμήριον are used in different paragraphs to refer to the same idea. This is purely literary variation. It remains significant that Th. should be so fond of such quasi-legal language, see ch. 4 n. on ὡς εἰκός.

3. ἐν τοῖς πρώτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι: 'The Athenians were the first'. The rest of this chapter is remarkable for giving space to topics usually neglected by Th. He normally shows little visual sense (*Thucydides*, 93) or interest in athletics (but see *Thucydides*, 139 and n. 10). This is a rare excursus into 'social history'. Hdt. (v. 88) had described a change in the dress of Athenian women (from 'Doric' to 'Ionic'; for these terms see next n.). Th. on the other hand seems to be concerned only with men, and implies the opposite change in dress, that is, from 'Ionic' to 'Doric' (see further below). Th. is not necessarily contradicting Hdt., since they are concerned with the different sexes; but it is characteristic of Hdt. that on this issue he shows interest in women and characteristic of Th. that he does not, even in a ch. which in other respects ranges unusually

widely for him. For Th. and women see below 136. 3n. and ii. 4. 2n., citing T. Wiedemann and N. Loraux.

καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαιμόνων διὰ τὸ ἄβροδίαιτον οὐ πολὺς χρόνος ἐπειδὴ χιτῶνάς τε λινοὺς ἐπαύσαντο φοροῦντες: 'Quite recently the old-fashioned refinement of dress still lingered among the older men of the richer class, who wore tunics of linen'. The dress which Th. here describes is the long flowing Ionic *chiton* or tunic. See further iii. 104, where Th. quotes the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* with its reference to *ἐλκεχίτωνες Ἴάονες*, 'Ionians in long *chitons*'. If Th. accepted this picture, and he presumably did, it confirms that he believed that Athenian men originally wore the Ionic dress. In the present passage Th. implies that in the very recent past (Th.'s own lifetime?) Athenian men had changed from 'Ionic' to 'Doric' (i.e. to the short or 'Doric' *chiton*—a type of *chiton* sometimes called a *peplos*—which had to be fastened at the shoulder with a brooch; see *OCD*³, entry under 'Dress'). If Th. was right, and vase-painting and sculpture suggest that he was, it is at first sight strange and remarkable that Athenian men gave up luxurious clothes at precisely the moment when Athens' prosperity was at its greatest: this observation is the starting-point of an interesting article by A. D. Geddes, 'Rags and Riches', *CQ* 37 (1987), 307ff. Geddes offers an explanation, for the change recorded by Th., in terms of the fifth-century adoption of democratic hoplite values of equality and physical fitness. It certainly seems that the short *chiton* was specially appropriate for men leading active lives, suitable for workmen or heroes, as J. Boardman puts it, *Athenian Black-Figure Vases* (London, 1974), 205. If all this is true, we can offer an answer to Dionysius' objection that the present passage is a mere irrelevance (*On Thucydides*, ch. 19): one of Th.'s concerns in the *Archaeology* is to introduce us to Athens and Sparta.

Hdt.'s claim that women went over from Doric to Ionic dress is problematic but need not concern us.

χρυσῶν τεττίγων: 'golden fastenings in the form of grasshoppers'. These golden grasshopper brooches were symbols of 'autochthony' (on which notion see above, 2. 5n.). For the explanation of this, see M. Davies and J. Kathirithamby, *Greek Insects* (London, 1986), 124ff. (Cicada larvae are buried beneath the ground, from which they emerge. They are thus 'earth-born', *γηγενεῖς*, as the scholiast to this passage puts it.)

ἐνερσις: A rare word for a 'fastening'. Perhaps read *ἐν ἔρσει*, 'in a band'.

κρόβυλον: 'knot', referring to the way the hair was pinned back.

κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές: 'having been derived from their Athenian ancestors' [lit. 'in virtue of kinship']. Thus casually Th. introduces a powerful notion of recurrent importance in the rest of the work. It was

'in virtue of kinship' (the Greek is identical to that used here) that 'the Greeks and especially the Ionians' turned to Athens for leadership after the Persian Wars, i. 95. 1 and n.; and see nn. on iii. 86. 3-4, vi. 6. 1 and 88. 7. The reference in the present passage is to Athens' colonization of Ionia, i.e. Western Anatolia, for which see i. 12. 4 n.

4. **ἰσοδίαιτοι**: 'common'. Perhaps an early instance of the Spartan myth of 'equality' between Spartan citizens, for which see M. I. Finley, 'Sparta', *The Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1986), ch. 10, esp. 166: 'the Equals [Greek ὅμοιοι, the word used by full Spartan citizens to describe themselves] turned out, in the end, to be meshed in a complex of inequalities'.

5. ἐγυμνώθησάν τε πρῶτοι καὶ ἐς τὸ φανερόν ἀποδύντες λίπα μετὰ τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι ἠλείψαντο· τὸ δὲ πάλαι καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπικῷ ἀγῶνι διαζώματα ἔχοντες περὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα οἱ ἀθληταὶ ἠγωνίζοντο, καὶ οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη ἐπειδὴ πέπαυται: 'the Spartans too were the first who in their athletic exercises first stripped naked and rubbed themselves over with oil. But this was not the ancient custom; athletes formerly, even when they were competing at Olympia, wore loincloths to cover their genitals. This practice lasted until quite recently ...'.

An inscribed epigram, Hicks and Hill, *Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1901), 1, tells us that the first athlete of all to run naked in the Olympic Games was called Orsippos of Megara; his Olympic victory was in 720 BC, the fifteenth Olympiad. If Th. is right about Spartan priority, Orsippos might simply have copied a practice adopted by Sparta, for routine athletics, at an even earlier date, and there would be no necessary contradiction between Th. and the Orsippos tradition. It must however be said that Th.'s words οὐ πολλὰ ἔτη below ('until quite recently', lit. 'not many years ago') suggest a later date than 720 for the introduction of naked running at the Olympics. This might be held to strengthen the arguments of those scholars who on other grounds seek to down-date Orsippos; but there is no good reason to do this: the epigram is sophisticated, but 'was no doubt composed long after the event': Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 71, who keeps to the traditional date, but without going into the Thucydidean aspect. The best solution is to keep Orsippos in 720 and assume that Th. deliberately or unwittingly neglected what was only a patriotic Megarian anecdote. Other rationalizations of the chronological contradiction (720/'not many years ago') are possible: see A. Hönle, *Olympia in der Politik der griechischen Staatenwelt* (diss. Tübingen, 1964, (1968)), 32: maybe boxers remained partially clothed, runners went naked.

Orsippos led his countrymen to victory in a boundary dispute,

probably—though not certainly, see J. Salmon, *BSA* 67 (1972), 199 and n. 137—with Corinth. (See below, 103. 4n., for the most serious such dispute). Thus Orsippus is an early example of a phenomenon we shall meet again (126. 3n.): an athlete, probably an aristocrat, who achieved success in other ways too.

For Greek athletic nakedness see H. A. Harris, *Greek Athletes and Athletics* (London, 1964), 64f.; see also his *Sport in Greece and Rome* (London, 1972), 19f. He observes that ‘the Greeks always regarded their own readiness to appear naked before their fellows as one of the traits which marked them out from the barbarians’. He cites Xen. *Ages.* 1. 28, which tells how Agesilaus displayed naked Persian prisoners to his troops so that the sight of their white flabby bodies would raise morale. For an attempted explanation of Greek athletic nakedness in terms of primitive hunting practice see D. Sansone, *Greek Athletics and the Genesis of Sport* (Berkeley and London, 1988), 107 ff.; but he leaves the switch from near to complete nakedness unexplained. Hönle (above) 31, following Nilsson, *Klio*, 12 (1912), 337, notes that nakedness was specially Dorian.

What is the force of ‘even (καί) when they were competing at Olympia? See S. Instone, *JHS* 109 (1989), 256, with acknowledgement to S. C. Humphreys: Th. may be making a distinction between what was worn in Th.’s day for training (loincloth) and what was worn at the Olympic Games (nothing). This is one way of accounting for depiction of loincloths on vases of c.500 BC, on which see also J. C. Mann, ‘*ΓΥΜΝΑΖΩ* in Thucydides i. 6. 5–6’, *CR* 24 (1974), 177f.

αἰδοῖα, ‘genitals’, are mentioned only here, and at ii. 49. 8 (the plague), in all Th., but sixteen times (singular as well as plural) in the less austere Hdt. On vi. 27. 1 see R. Osborne, ‘The Erection and Mutilation of the Herms’, *PCPhS* 211 (1985), 47 ff., at 65: by saying that the Herms were mutilated on the face (*τὰ πρόσωπα*) Th. is ‘not being prudish’. Osborne’s explanation of the face-mutilation is interesting, but it remains true that Th. suppresses the undoubted fact, admitted by Osborne, that the genitals were also mutilated. See n. there. Explicitness in a medical or athletic context is a different matter.

7.1. τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὄσαι μὲν νεώτατα ᾠκίσθησαν καὶ ἤδη πλωιμωτέρων ὄντων: ‘In later times, when navigation had become more common’ [lit. ‘of the cities which were founded later and were more nautical’]. After the digression on dress Th. returns, abruptly, to the general topic of security against pirates, of which arms-bearing was a particular manifestation.

ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς τείχεσιν ἐκτίζοντο . . . αἱ δὲ παλαιαί: ‘cities were built on the sea-shore and fortified . . . but the older towns’.

Th.'s view that the older Greek communities were settled inland, and that occupation of the coastal areas came later, may be conditioned by developments in his own day, when places like Athens, Megara, and Corinth constructed Long Walls down to the sea from an inland settlement. Coastal sites were fortified, e.g. Sounion, viii. 4, or had towers, *πύργοι*: R. Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures* (above, 2. 5 n.), 67. F. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (London, 1971), 8 ff., has a useful discussion of the present passage.

The actual situation of the earliest *colonial* Greek cities was rather different. Here the early pattern was for an off-shore island to be occupied and then for the colonists to establish a bridgehead and move across permanently when they were strong enough to maintain themselves against native resistance. A good example is the settlement, in c.750, first of the island of Pithecusae in the Bay of Naples, then of Cumae on the mainland: 'primo in insulas Aenariam et Pithecusas egressi, deinde in continentem ausi sedes transferre', Livy, viii. 22. 6, confirmed by archaeology. It is in fact to this second, 'colonial', pattern that a number of other early Greek sites conform—sites, that is, which are earlier than the period normally thought of as the historical 'colonizing' period, which began in the eighth century: not just Miletos, a Dark Age foundation, and other Ionian peninsular sites, but Lefkandi between Chalkis and Eretria in Euboia. Here a peninsula site was occupied early in the second millennium. The Kolonna site at Aigina, with its acropolis on a headland, is also comparable. Th.'s remarks about the occupation of peninsular sites fit this second sort of settlement: see Winter, 11.

For *τείχεσιν ἐκτίζοντο*, 'fortified' [lit. 'built with walls'], see 2. 2 n. on *ἀτειχίστων*.

8. 1. οἱ νησιῶται: 'the islanders'. The 'ring-composition' which began at 4 is almost complete. We are back with the topic of the Aegean islands, left behind in that chapter in favour of the long excursus on piracy, etc. The sequence of thought is that islands are natural piratical bases (*καὶ ἐν ταῖς νήσοις*, 'both in the islands', in ch. 7 probably suggested the thought to Th., although there the islanders were victims not predators).

Κάρεις τε ὄντες καὶ Φοίνικες: 'Karian or Phoenician'. We have met the Karians before (ch. 4, and see further below); the Phoenicians are new, though they are lost sight of in the 'proof', *μαρτύριον*, which follows. For Phoenicians in the (North) Aegean see Hdt. vi. 47, with A. J. Graham, 'The Foundation of Thasos', *BSA* 73 (1978), 88 ff., returning to a long unfashionable belief in a Phoenician presence in the Aegean. For

the 'Phoenician' debate see now M. Bernal, *Black Athena* (London, 1987), 373 ff., referring to this passage of Th.

μαρτύριον δέ: 'This is proved'. See above 6. 2 n. on σημείον δέ.

Δήλου γὰρ καθαιρομένης ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ: 'when the Athenians purified Delos during the Peloponnesian War' [lit. 'this war']. This 'purification' took place in 426/5 BC; it is described more fully at iii. 104: see my long n. there. 'Purify' meant to 'expel the existing graves from the sacred island and protect it in future from all taint of birth and death': Parker, *Miasma*, 163. Since this event occurred in the Archidamian War of 431–421 we have no way of telling whether 'this war' means the whole war or just the Archidamian, and the passage is thus useless as evidence for the date of composition. Cp. 13. 3 n. This early mention of Delos is preparatory, cp. p. 20.

ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ Κάρεις ἐφάνησαν: 'more than half of them were found to be Karians'. As we saw above on 4, Th. may well have been right to believe in an early Karian presence on the islands, but it is probable that he mistook Greek grave-finds of geometric date for Karian remains: see R. M. Cook, 'Thucydides as Archaeologist', *BSA* 50 (1955), 267 ff.; later literature is cited in *Mausolus*, 12 nn. See also M. I. Finley, *Use and Abuse of History*², 19 f.

The fact that Th. was wrong (if he was, and not everybody agrees with Cook) does not reduce the interest or impressiveness of his attempt to argue from archaeological evidence. He tends (see *Thucydides*, 91 ff.) to draw on material evidence only when he wishes to make points about the distant past. For the suggestion that Th. personally had something to do with organizing the 'purification' or investigating its results see *Thucydides*, 184. (Kleonymos and Nikias have also been suggested, see iii. 104 n.)

8. 2–4. *Minos to the Trojan War*

2. καταστάντος δὲ τοῦ Μίνω ναυτικοῦ: 'After Minos had established his navy'. The 'ring' is finally complete. In the lines which follow, Th. repeats various key notions: acquisition of money (κτησίαν τῶν χρημάτων, περιουσίαι), walls (τείχη), coercion of weaker by stronger (οἷ τε ἡσσοὺς ὑπέμενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν). On these notions see above nn. on 2. 1, 2. 2.

4. ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἐστράτευσαν: 'at the time of the Trojan War' [lit. 'they attacked Troy']. Th. now, as part of his general argument (see introductory n. to 1. 1) that wars earlier than the Peloponnesian were insignificant, turns to the Trojan War, glanced at already in ch. 3 (see n. there).

9–11. *Discussion (with digressions) of the Trojan War*

Th. himself does not doubt that the Trojan War happened. Modern inquirers have oscillated between belief and scepticism. The most recent approaches are to be found in Lin Foxhall and John K. Davies, *The Trojan War: Its Historicity and Context* (Bristol, 1984). In their summary the editors incline to scepticism: the archaeological record, they say, does not by itself explain why Troy, rather than (e.g.) the equally powerful and strategically-sited Miletos, should have been chosen as the object of an epic siege. In fact (they suggest), it is time that study of Homer and archaeological study went their different ways. There is much good sense in this; compare what was said above on ch. 4, about the Minoan thalassocracy: on that topic too, scholars have been too keen to marry literary with archaeological evidence. This can lead to circularity, as when prehistorians, setting out to examine the credit of Th.'s tradition of a thalassocracy, appeal to Th. to 'prove' that there were Minoan pirates, etc. (But Foxhall and Davies go further than some would wish to follow them, when they claim that archaeology has now become an autonomous and independent science: see M. I. Finley, *Use and Abuse of History*², ch. 5, 'Archaeology and History', esp. 91, against attempts to 'establish archaeology as a discipline in its own right'.) In a commentary on Th. it will be enough to register Th.'s basic acceptance of the epic tradition, critical though he is of some of the detail. Note that 'epic' does not just mean Homer; much of the content of 9 is not in Homer.

9. 1. Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ: 'I am inclined to think that Agamemnon'. See above on 3. 2 for *δοκεῖ*.

δυνάμει: 'most powerful'. See above, 2. 4n.: this will be an important notion in the rest of the work.

οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὄρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστήρας: 'not so much because the suitors of Helen had bound themselves by oath to Tyndareus'. Tyndareus was Helen's father. The oath of the suitors to protect her (Paus. iii. 20. 9) is not found in Homer.

Note that *οὐ τοσοῦτον* does not deny that the oath motive was relevant. Compare the famous passage at ii. 65. 11, where Th. says that the Sicilian expedition was *not so much, οὐ τοσοῦτον*, a policy mistake as marred in the execution, see n. there. Here Th. is, we may say, looking for the 'true cause' rather than the 'publicly alleged reasons' for the Trojan War, see ch. 23, where again we will be offered an explanation for a war in terms of power politics, an explanation which does not exclude but *underlies* what was openly said. See Westlake, *Essays* 163.

2. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ οἱ . . . : ‘those who preserve . . . say’. Hellanikos, for whom see i. 97. 2 n., gave some of the material also found in this ch. of Th., see *FGrHist* 4 F 157, but Th. need not have had him in mind in particular. There were surely other writers who could be said to ‘preserve Peloponnesian tradition clearly’. (The Hellanikos fragment is a quotation by the Homeric scholiast on *Iliad*, ii. 100ff., the ‘sceptre of Agamemnon’ passage (see para. 4 below), which baldly gives the royal sequence Pelops–Atreus–Thyestes–Agamemnon. Hellanikos explained and amplified the myth as there given by Homer; but the story of the house of Atreus was so popular in literature and art that many other writers must have done the same as Hellanikos.) According to Th.’s version of the myth, Pelops son of Tantalos was an oriental from Lydia or Phrygia; Eurystheus was grandson of Perseus and son of Sthenelos. Sthenelos had married Nikippe the sister of Atreus and Thyestes. Chrysis was the half-brother of Atreus and Thyestes, son of Pelops by a previous marriage (so Hellanikos). Atreus and Thyestes killed Chrysis and were banished by Pelops; Eurystheus, embarking on an expedition to Attica against the children of Herakles, entrusted his kingdom of Mycenae to his uncle, the banished Atreus. This temporary arrangement became permanent when Eurystheus was killed in Attica.

πλήθει χρημάτων: ‘the great wealth’. See 2. 2 n. on *περιουσία χρημάτων*.

κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον: ‘because he was a relative’. See 6. 3 n. on *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*.

φόβῳ τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν . . . δυνατόν . . . καὶ τὸ πλήθος τεθεραπευκότα: ‘fearing the Herakleidai . . . a powerful man . . . had ingratiated himself with the common people’. All this makes Atreus sound much like one of the later Greek tyrants, but we should remember the possibility that such ‘anachronistic’ features were already present in the tradition when Th. took it over.

3. ναυτικῶ . . . ἰσχύσας: ‘naval ruler’. The stress on the naval aspect (as on the financial) is perhaps Th.’s only original contribution to the legend, although modern reference books cite Th. himself in the present ch. as authority for a number of the items which he here gives.

οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλεόν: ‘not so much from goodwill’. Again (see 9. 1 n.) the more honourable or sentimental motive is not excluded but is ranked as secondary.

φόβῳ: ‘from fear’. This recurs as the driving and underlying motive for a war at i. 23. 6, cp. 33. 3. ‘Wars were also fought out of fear, as [Th.] believed in the case of the Peloponnesian War . . . What was there to fear? The possibility that another state would by use of force seek to raid and loot one’s territory or to conquer, to subjugate in one way or

another. These were far from imaginary, neurotic fears at any time in antiquity': M. I. Finley, *Ancient History, Evidence and Models* (London, 1985), 75 f.

4. **ὡς Ὅμηρος τοῦτο δεδήλωκεν, εἰ τῷ ἱκανὸς τεκμηριῶσαι:** 'if the evidence of Homer is accepted'. For Th.'s use of and attitude to the factual testimony of Homer see above on 3. 3.

πολλῆσι νήσοισι καὶ Ἄργεϊ παντὶ ἀνάσσειν: 'the king of many islands, and of all Argos'. *Iliad*, ii. 108.

εἰκάζειν: 'form our conjectures'. This verb is related to *εἰκός* (for which see 4 n.). It means 'to conjecture', and Th.'s use of it in this sense a few chapters after ch. 4 strengthens the case for taking *εἰκός* there in sense of 'as was probable' rather than 'as was natural'.

10. 1-2. *Digression on buildings as indices of greatness*

1. **καὶ ὅτι μὲν Μυκῆναι μικρὸν ἦν . . .:** 'when it is said that Mycenae was only a small place'. On this surprising passage see R. M. Cook (8. 1 n.). 'Surprising' because to us Mycenae, with its Lion Gate etc., *does* seem impressive. Cook suggests that the explanation is that Mycenae would have looked to Th. like an inferior vision of what he was used to already.

The sequence of thought from 9-10 is: Agamemnon was powerful, and the admitted insignificance of Mycenae is not evidence to the contrary (but even Agamemnon and the Trojan expedition were insignificant by Peloponnesian War standards). On the method of argument hereabouts see G. Howie, 'Thukydides' Einstellung zur Vergangenheit: Zuhörerschaft und Wissenschaft in der Archäologie', *Klio*, 66 (1984), 502ff., at 530, who makes a comparison with Pindar, *Nemean*, vii. 20ff.: Pindar unexpectedly emerges as more sceptical than Th. in his treatment of Homer and myth. Howie's article (which has an English summary at 532) has valuable general remarks on the *Archaeology*, and on Th.'s intended 'panhellenic' audience, which Howie suggests was comparable to that of Pindar.

ἀκριβεῖ: 'valid' [lit. 'precise' or 'accurate']. For this word see 22. 2 n.

σημείω: 'proof'. It has been claimed that this word is appropriate to a *fallible* sign as opposed to a *certain* indication. Here, it is true, the evidence under discussion (smallness of Mycenae) is a fallible sign. But see above, 6. 2 n.

2. **Λακεδαιμονίων γάρ εἰ ἡ πόλις. . .:** 'Suppose the city of Sparta . . .'. This paragraph is very illuminating for Th.'s outlook. For Hdt., the marvellous *ἔργα*, 'works', which he set out to record, included physical monuments as well as political actions (examples are the great constructions on Samos, iii. 60, or the pyramids, etc., in ii). Th. reacts strongly

against Hdt., and rarely gives space to this kind of thing (ii. 100 on Archelaos is an exception). For him ἔργα usually means political or military actions, as at i. 22. 2. See *Thucydides*, 30ff., where it is suggested that Th. took the reaction against Hdt. too far. See further below on οὔτε etc.

τά τε ἱερά: 'the temples' (cp. below, οὔτε ἱεροῖς). The emphasis on temples is striking; cp. F. de Polignac, *La naissance de la cité grecque* (Paris, 1984), arguing for the importance of sanctuaries in the development of the city-state, but stressing rural not urban sanctuaries. Judging from the present passage Th. seems to have put the emphasis the other way round.

Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοίρας νέμονται: 'And yet they own two fifths of the Peloponnese'. A characteristically confident assertion (cp. *Thucydides*, 33 n. 81 and 36 n. 13). But how did Th. *know* that the fraction of the Peloponnese which the Spartans occupied was two fifths? Probably this is not so much a statistical guess (so Gomme and all commentators and translators) as a way of referring to Sparta plus Messenia, two of the μοῖραι ('parts' in a loose sense rather than arithmetical fractions) into which the Peloponnese was traditionally divided. The other three, according to the scholiast, were Arkadia, the Argolid, and Elis, but this—though in my view on the right lines, against Gomme and the other modern interpreters—leaves out Achaia. Which would make six parts, and this is too many. Rather than throwing out the scholiast and going off with Gomme on a 'fractional' tack, we should assume that Elis and Arkadia were reckoned as one unit; see for this usage E[rnst] M[eyer] in *Kleine Pauly*, iv (1975), col. 604 (who says that the Peloponnese was usually divided into five parts—not six as Gomme and others assume, thus getting into difficulties). So the five μοῖραι in Th.'s mind were, I suggest, Sparta, Messenia, Elis + Arkadia, Achaia, the Argolid.

οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως: 'their city is not concentrated'. The words which follow are a classic text for the definition of 'synoikism' in one of its senses (physical rather than political; for political see ii. 15 and nn.). Places not synoikized were inhabited κατὰ κώμας, 'by villages', like Mantinea, which was 'dioikized' or broken up into villages again in 385 after its fifth- or sixth-century synoikism (Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 5). See generally *Mausolus*, 83ff., and for Sparta specifically, M. Moggi, *I sinecismi greci* (Pisa, 1976), no. 6, and 'Συνοικίζειν in Tucidide', *ASNP* iii. 5 (1975), 915ff.

The clear implication of 'by villages' is that Sparta was unwalled (an important concept for Th. as we have seen at 2. 2 n.): cp. iii. 94. 4 on the Aitolians, where the whole phrase 'settled by unwalled villages' is used;

and see my piece in *Catling Studies*. There is an implied inconsistency here: elsewhere walls matter, but in Sparta's case absence of them does not. Perhaps Th. is merely stressing Sparta's unusualness. But it is also possible that his desire to part company with Hdt. on the general question of ἔργα (see above) has led him to underrate a physical feature to which he normally attaches importance. The lack of a specific reference to 'walls' may be a symptom of unease.

τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἑλλάδος τρόπῳ: 'in the old Greek way'. See ch. 2 above.

Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο παθόντων . . .: 'Whereas if Athens were to suffer the same fate . . .'. This passage is virtually unique in Th. (but see ii. 13. 3 and n.) for its mention of the great buildings which we regard as one of Athens' most memorable achievements (rather than the political power for which Th. makes Pericles say Athens will be remembered. See ii. 64. 3 with *Thucydides*, 92). This whole passage is in fact polemic against Hdt.'s conception of ἔργον, 'work': don't worry about δψεις, the visual evidence, look at δυνάμεις, power.

3. εἰκός . . . κοσμησαι: 'may be . . . expected to exaggerate'. Perhaps the first ever expression of the idea of 'poetic licence'. [But cp. Pind. *Nem.* 7.]

4. τὰς μὲν Βοιωτῶν . . . τὰς δὲ Φιλοκτῆτου . . .: 'those of the Boiotians . . . those of Philoktetes'. *Iliad*, ii. 509f., 719f.

τὰς μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας . . .: 'the largest and the smallest sized ships'. An over-rational argument.

ἐν νεῶν καταλόγῳ: 'in the Catalogue of Ships'. Like the mention of the σκήπτρου παράδοσις at 9. 4, this academic-sounding expression for a part of the work shows that the *Iliad* was already the object of literary study in Th.'s time.

αὐτερέται δὲ ὅτι ἦσαν καὶ μάχιμοι πάντες: 'all fighting men as well as rowers'. J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge, 1968), 46, 68, think Th. was wrong and that some of Homer's totals were passengers; that is, the crews were smaller than Th. thought. L. Casson, *Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1973), 63 n. 103, defends Th., but only by (circular) reference to Th.'s trustworthiness as a historian; also to his naval experience (which is not a decisive consideration on what for Th. was an antiquarian point).

περίνεως: 'many who were not sailors'. For this word, which means basically 'one who is on a ship but not of the ship's company', see Casson, 319 n. 83. It came to mean a cargo clerk, but Th. uses it in its more general and original sense.

κατάφαρκτα: 'fenced in', by a raised deck above, and, at the sides, by a leather screen which went round the ship. See Casson, 88.

ληστικώτερον: 'piratical'. See Casson, 88 n. 58: this 'must refer to fast, undecked craft'.

5. τὸ μέσον σκοποῦντι: 'if we take a mean'. See above, para 4 n. on *μεγίστας καὶ ἐλαχίστας*.

11. 1. ὀλιγανθρωπία: 'lack of men'. For this word, normally associated with Spartan manpower shortages because of a passage in the *Politics* of Aristotle (1270^a33), see de Ste. Croix, *OPW*, app. xvi; see also below, iii. 93. 2 n. (Herakleia Trachinia).

τῆς γὰρ τροφῆς ἀπορία: 'the difficulty of obtaining supplies'. Much of what follows is sheer guesswork. Nor do all of Th.'s remarks make very good sense. He argues that the Greeks must have been poor because they did not bring plenty of food supplies with them. Without tinned food there was not much that Greek armies of Th.'s own day (which is what he has in mind) could do after a day or two except what he describes the army before Troy as doing, viz. to forage. Th.'s remarks must, however, be taken as evidence that fifth-century Greek armies did bring *some* supplies with them. Keeping besieging armies supplied with food must have been one factor in the high cost of sieges: see ii. 70 (Potidaia: 2000 talents) and ML 55 = Fornara 113 (Samos; see 117. 3 n. on *καὶ χρήματα*).

τὸ γὰρ ἔρυμα . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐτειχίσαντο: 'they could not have fortified their camp' [lit. 'they could not have built the wall']. No obvious Homeric fortification wall is here referred to, except perhaps the wall (*Il* vii. 327ff.) which Nestor suggests should be built; against the idea (D. L. Page, *History and the Homeric Iliad* (Berkeley, 1954), 315ff.) that this passage is an interpolation in the text of Homer, dating from after Th.'s time, see most recently M. Davies, 'Nestor's Advice in *Iliad* 7', *Eranos* 84 (1986), 69ff. More likely, Th.'s point is that the Greeks must have fought and won an initial battle, otherwise they could not have fortified their camp, as they must have done for there to be a camp at all in the poems.

πρὸς γεωργίαν τῆς Χερσονήσου τραπόμενοι: 'driven . . . to the cultivation of the Chersonese'. This has been queried by Y. Garlan, *War in the Ancient World* (London, 1975), 137f.: 'according to Homer, the Achaeans were able to subsist beneath the walls of Troy by raiding the northern coasts of the Aegean Sea, without being compelled, contrary to what Thucydides supposed (i. 11. 1) to cultivate the Chersonese.' Actually Th. goes on to speak of just such raiding, see next n. As for the 'cultivation of the Chersonese', this may be just guesswork, unless Th. had access to some part of the epic tradition unknown to us. Cultivation and raiding were in any case not the only possibilities: at *Iliad*, vii. 467ff. there is mention of gifts of food from Lemnos, which Stubbings, *Com-*

panion to Homer, 523, describes as almost the only reference in the *Iliad* to the problem of victualling the host.

καὶ ληστεῖαν: ‘and to pillage’. See Jebb’s n. on Sophocles, *Ajax*, 343, citing *Iliad*, i. 366, ix. 328.

2. ῥαδίως ἂν μάχη κρατοῦντες εἶλον: ‘they would easily have been masters of the field and have taken the city’. The last two words are not in the Greek, but are supplied by Jowett to give an object for the word *εἶλον*, ‘would . . . have taken’; but in fact this word should probably be deleted: it is repeated at the end of the para. On the whole sentence see A. Parry, *AJP* 79 (1958), 283 ff. = *The Language of Achilles and Other Papers* (Oxford, 1989), ch. 3.

ἄχρηματίαν: ‘poverty’. Ring composition: this was one of the first words of the chapter.

12. *The Dark Ages: Prehistoric colonization*

This is an exceptionally important chapter; in the course of it (see 12. 2 n.) Th. moves on from Homeric topics—where his method is for the most part intelligent interpretative guesswork—to a period, knowledge of which is more likely to have filtered down to his own day, preserved perhaps in the traditions of aristocratic families. See H. T. Wade-Gery, *The Poet of the Iliad* (Cambridge, 1952), for this possibility. It is also a period very obscure to us. Th.’s own testimony thus begins for the first time to be of prime value for itself. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² i. 2, 31, went too far when he said of the whole of the *Archaeology* that ‘we learn from it scarcely anything which we do not know anyway’.

1. μετανίστατό τε καὶ κατωκίζετο: ‘was still in a process of upheaval and settlement’. Th. repeats, for this later period, the theme of ch. 2 above: restless movements of peoples make prosperity impossible.

μὴ ἡσυχάσασαν: ‘had no time for peaceful growth’ [lit. ‘not being at peace’]. Picked up, by another piece of ring-composition, at para. 4 below, *μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα* . . .

2. στάσεις: ‘quarrels’. See on 2. 4 above. The classic instance of a city being founded after *stasis* at home was Taras (Tarentum) in South Italy, a Spartan foundation of the late eighth century bc. (The story was that during the First Messenian War half-breed Spartans were born who were then thrown out by the Spartan men on their return from the fighting. These became the colonists of Taras. See Strabo, 278 ff. = *FGrHist* 555 Antiochos F 13 + 70 Ephoros F 216.) But Th. is here talking about a much earlier period, for which his talk of *stasis* is not appropriate, as is shown by V. Desborough, *The Last Mycenaeans and their Successors*

(Oxford, 1964), 250. Th. is still, as in the preceding chapters, extrapolating from events he knew about to others he did not.

But *stasis* apart, there was indeed a firm tradition that cities were founded by Greek heroes returning from Troy; the most famous example is Aeneas' foundation of Rome, a story known to Th.'s contemporary Hellanikos, *FGrHist* 4 F 84. See T. Cornell, 'Aeneas and the Twins: the Development of the Roman Foundation Legend', *PCPhS* 102 (1975), 1 ff., at 3.

3. **ἕξηκοστῷ ἔτει μετὰ Ἰλίου ἄλωσιν:** 'in the sixtieth year after the fall of Troy'. Here for the first time Th. gives us a date, and it is (for us) a very unsatisfactory one, because we do not know when he put the fall of Troy. For an absolute date we have to go to v. 112 where the Melians say their city was founded 700 years before 416 BC = 1116 BC. True, this is not an authorial statement, but it is the kind of tradition which Th. and his chronologically-minded contemporaries (see *Thucydides*, 128), such as Hippias and Hellanikos, had to work with. If Th. accepted 1116 for the settlement of Sparta's colony Melos, he must have put Sparta's own occupation, i.e. the Dorian invasion (or Return of the Herakleidae, as the Greeks called it) a little earlier still, and the fall of Troy 80 years before that (below). All this, as Andrewes says in *HCT* on v. 112, 'rather suggests that Th. had a relatively high date for the fall of Troy, something like the date implied in Hdt. ii. 145. 4' (= about 1250 BC). Th. was perhaps following Hellanikos (so Jacoby, on *FGrHist* 70 F 223) though this is by no means certain. By contrast, Ephoros' date (F 223) for the fall of Troy was about 1129 BC and he put the Dorian invasion only 60 years later (as opposed to Th.'s 80) i.e. in 1069 BC. The impetus to, and basis for, the construction of these various chronologies was provided by the Spartan king-lists, for which see P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), app. 3.

ἕξ Ἄρνης ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν: 'having been expelled from Arne by the Thessalians'. There were two mainland Greek places called Arne, as Stephanus of Byzantium clearly says. One, in Boiotia, was the 'grape-rich Arne' of *Iliad*, ii. 507. Its precise location is a mystery; see Hope-Simpson and Lazenby, *Catalogue of the Ships* (introductory n. to 1. 1), 31 f., who conclude that the search is hopeless. The modern site of Gla goes in and out of fashion as a candidate for Arne; for this site see R. V. Schoder, *Ancient Greece from the Air* (London, 1974), 78 ff. For other candidates see R. J. Buck, *A History of Boiotia* (Edmonton, 1979), 6 f. The other Arne was in Thessaly and was also called Kierion; its site is known. It is the second of these to which Th. here refers. (But I offer the conjecture that *Iliad* ii, which put the Boiotians in Boiotia although they had not yet arrived there from Thessaly—Buck, 78—has transferred

Thessalian Arne to Boiotia. If so, 'rich-graped [Boiotian] Arne' would be a phantom, appearing otherwise only in the Hellenistic poet Lycophron who will have followed *Iliad* ii. If this is right it is not surprising that its site should be an object of modern dispute. On the other hand Stephanus of Byzantium says that Thessalian Arne was a 'colony of Boiotia'. This implies some connection between the two places called Arne, which is encouraging for my conjecture; but it cannot be right that Boiotian Arne was prior to Thessalian Arne—if anything one would expect it to be the other way round.)

ἀναστάντες ὑπὸ Θεσσαλῶν: 'having been expelled by the Thes-salians'. Modern scholars agree, on the evidence of cults and dialect, that the Boiotoi came from Thessaly originally; see Buck, 75. Cp. iii. 61. 2n.

Δωριῆς τε ὀγδοηκοστῷ ἔτει ξὺν Ἡρακλείδαις Πελοπόννησον ἔσχον: 'In the eightieth year after the war, the Dorians led by the Herakleidai conquered the Peloponnese'. The Return of the Herakleidai is what is now called the Dorian Invasion, that is, the arrival of newcomers to Greece from the North-West. The historicity of this event has been doubted, notably by Beloch (*Gr. Gesch.*² i. 2,76ff.), but archaeologists now generally accept the ancient tradition of a change in the population, though they differ widely about the date. The most authoritative modern view, that of V. Desborough, is that there may have been an *invasion* by Dorians around 1200, but that this invasion (for which the archaeological evidence is negligible) should be distinguished from the *occupation of Peloponnesian territory by North-Western newcomers*, an occupation which took place in the late eleventh century. See *The Last Mycenaean and their Successors*, 250ff.; *The Greek Dark Ages* (London, 1972), 111, 321ff., 336ff.; *CAH* ii². 2. 658ff.; cp. also A. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (Edinburgh, 1971), 313ff. for the weakness of the archaeological case for an invasion. Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 405f. (and see *Epirus*, 254ff.) argues for a twelfth-century date, which would be roughly compatible with the Ephoran or even the Thucydidean chronology. But others prefer much later dates. See Cartledge, ch. 7 (summed up at 92), for a break in the Lakonian (i.e. Spartan) pottery record around 900: Protogeometric differs markedly from the Mycenaean pottery which preceded it. Cartledge puts the arrival of the newcomers in the later tenth century and observes (78) that Th. in the present passage distinguishes between the Dorians and the Herakleidai who led them. A tenth-century date for the invasion is far too late to be reconciled with Th.'s '80 years after the fall of Troy'. Th. was working from the Spartan king-lists (above), and he cannot be right in his absolute chronology. If Cartledge is right, it follows that *either* Th. was wrong to equate the Return of the Herakleidai with the much later Dorian Invasion, *or* (the

preferable alternative) the two events were identical but Th. put them too early (his date, above, was 80 years after c.1250, i.e. early twelfth century).

The Herakleidai in the myth were descendants of Herakles. They led the reconquest of the Peloponnese three generations after the expulsion of Herakles' sons. See *OCD*², entry under 'Heraclidae' for the full story.

4. **μόλις τε ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἡσυχάσασα ἢ Ἑλλὰς βεβαίως καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε:** 'A considerable time elapsed before Greece became finally settled; after a while, however, she recovered tranquillity and began to send out colonies'. With this sentence Th. passes rapidly over what we call the Dark Ages. Wade-Gery said of it 'I know no other passage in ancient literature which recognises so clearly the twelfth-century catastrophe and the very slow recovery from it' (*Poet of the Iliad*, 63 n. 12). There is something in this, despite Finley's statement in 'Myth, Memory and History' (*Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1986), 19f.) that Th. was 'clearly unaware . . . of the catastrophic destruction of Mycenaean civilization near the end of the second millennium BC and of the profound discontinuity between Mycenaean civilization and Greek civilization proper'. (Finley may, however, be right to add that Th. seems to have made serious mistakes about the date and character of Greek Geometric pottery, which he put too early and thought was non-Greek: see 8. 1n. on ὑπερ ἡμῶν.) Desborough, *Greek Dark Ages*, 323 n. 2, writes, in similar vein to Finley, that Th.'s picture of a gradual improvement differs from the modern picture of the Dark Age as a trough between the high points of Mycenaean and archaic/classical civilization, but adds the interesting point that Th.'s picture also differs from Hesiod's picture according to which 'things just went on getting worse'.

For up-to-date accounts of what is still a dark period (especially the extremely impoverished years 1050–900) see Snodgrass and Desborough. But the spectacular tenth-century finds made at Lefkandi on Euboea in 1981 have forced a partial modification. For an illustration and description see *Oxford History of the Classical World* (1986), 21. The female burial, including gold jewellery, 'seems to suggest a rich, dynastic society, with overseas connections'.

ἡσυχάσασα, as we have noted, picks up ἡσυχάσασαν at para. 1. **ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμψε:** 'began to send out colonies'. Wade-Gery (4f.) thinks Th. was right to regard the main expansion into Asia as an 'organized and not a tumultuary undertaking' and to distinguish between the 'tumultuary' Dorian Invasion on the one hand and, on the other, the 'non-tumultuary' undertakings in Asia and the West. But he rightly says that Th.'s view is not the whole truth. In fact, we must make a large allowance for the fifth-century Athenian tendency to exaggerate their

colonizing role in the East. (For this see J. Barron, 'Religious Propaganda of the Delian League', *JHS* 84 (1964), 35 ff., at 46 ff.; note also 'The Fifth-Century *horoi* of Aigina', *JHS* 103 (1983), 1 ff., and my comments in the LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 90f.) Th. was surely influenced, consciously or not, by this propaganda, though it was not entirely a fiction: see (for archaeological evidence, in the form of an Athenian influence on the Protogeometric pottery of Dark Age Western Asia Minor) Desborough, *The Greek Dark Ages*, 179 ff., and J. M. Cook, *CAH* ii². 2. 784 f.; cp. above 2. 6 n. on ἐς Ἰωνίαν . . . , and below 95. 1 n.

Ἴωνας . . . Ἰταλίας δὲ καὶ Σικελίας . . . : 'Ionia . . . the greater part of Italy and Sicily'. It was certainly a distortion (see previous n.) to treat the colonization of Ionia and the islands as an operation comparable and coordinate to the colonization of Italy and Sicily. There were much firmer and more detailed traditions about the colonization of Italy and Sicily (a topic to which Th. returns at vi. 2-5, where he probably draws on Antiochus of Syracuse, *FGrHist* 555).

Note that Th. does not use the expression 'Greater Greece' (*Μεγάλη Ἑλλάς*, Latin *Magna Graecia*) for S. Italy, although that expression was probably current in his time. See G. Maddoli, in *Magna Graecia*, ii, ed. G. Pugliese Carratelli (Milan, 1985), 35 ff.

13. *Tyrannies and other naval powers in the Archaic Period*

1. Δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης: 'As Greece grew more and more powerful and the acquisition of wealth increased'. If Th. is here offering an explanation of the rise of tyranny (that is, if the words 'as Greece grew' are not purely temporal) then the explanation is economic, a line of explanation pursued, though with serious anachronisms, in P. N. Ure, *Origin of Tyranny* (Cambridge, 1922). But the reaction against Ure has been too severe, e.g. R. Drews, 'The First Tyrants in Greece', *Historia*, 21 (1972), 130, can even write 'the economic explanation for the rise of the Greek tyrants has no classical antecedents and was first formulated in the nineteenth century'. He never mentions Th. i. 13 at all. The economic explanation however returns to favour in Oswyn Murray, *Early Greece* (London, 1980). It is worth noting that Th. here gives no support whatever to the very influential theory which explains the rise of tyrants by reference to their support among hoplites, formulated in M. Nilsson, *Klio* 22 (1929), 240 ff. and A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956). So, rightly, R. M. Cook, *CR* 7 (1957), 142, reviewing Andrewes. See also Snodgrass, *JHS* 85 (1965), 110 ff., Cartledge, *JHS* 99 (1977), 11 ff. (Th. knew how hoplites fought: v. 71. 1).

Th. may have talked to descendants of the Pisistratids of Athens (vi. 55. 1 n.); but for the seventh- and early sixth-century tyrannies he must have been dependent on local traditions, oral and written, and on Hdt. It is remarkable that when Th. gives us some solid dates (para. 3 below) they appear to be pre-tyrannical. Did he not have a date for Kypselos, the first tyrant of Corinth?

τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο: 'tyrannies were established in most of the cities'. E. Ruschenbusch has argued that tyranny was much less widespread than is usually thought. In most states, he thinks, the population was so small that the aspirations of ambitious men could be satisfied by the holding of legitimate office. See his *Untersuchungen zu Staat und Politik in Griechenland vom 7.-4. Jh. v. Chr.* (Bamberg, 1978), with D. M. Lewis, *CR* 30 (1980), 77. This is an interesting and partly valid point, but the present passage (esp. τὰ πολλά, 'in most of them') shows that as early as Th.'s day archaic tyranny was *thought* to have been widespread.

τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων: 'as revenues grew greater'. Gomme remarks that wealth was both a cause and an effect of tyranny, but the revenues appear to be those of the tyrants (rather than the cities), as the contrast with the fixed perquisites of the kings makes clear. **πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασι πατρικαὶ βασιλείαι:** 'previously there had been hereditary kingships with fixed prerogatives'. For this passage, an example of a kind of analytical writing rare in Th., see *Thucydides*, 127, comparing Arist., *Politics*, 1285^b3. (See also below iii. 62. 3 n. on *δυναστεία*). Hdt. vi. 56 ff., which Th. perhaps has in mind, gives the 'stated privileges' of the Spartan kings. But Hdt. has no idea of the *development* of Greece through the various constitutional stages. For a recent suggestion that these early 'kings' were not real kings at all, but groups of hereditary nobles whose position was misunderstood by later Greeks, see R. Drews, *Basileus: The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece* (New Haven, 1983) but cp. P. Carlier, *La royauté en Grèce* (1984). **ναυτικά:** 'navies'. We are back on to the subject of fleets, left behind at the end of ch. 10. The word and thought will be picked up at 15. 1. The main emphasis in the present ch. is on the way prosperity leads to sea-power; both tyrants and kings are incidental to this.

2. πρῶτοι δὲ Κορίνθιοι λέγονται ἐγγύτατα τοῦ νῦν τρόπου μεταχειρίσαι τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς καὶ τριήρεις ἐν Κορίνθῳ πρῶτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος . . .: 'The Corinthians are said to have first adopted something like the modern style of ship-building, and the oldest Greek triremes to have been constructed at Corinth'. Now that a life-size working trireme has been built in modern Athens we can understand how these 'famous and quite extraordinary warships' really worked. See

Morrison and Coates, *The Athenian Trireme*. One long dispute has been settled: the trireme was powered by men pulling three superimposed banks of oars; the 'three' implied by the word 'trireme' (Latin 'triremis'; Greek *τριήρης*) does not mean that three men pulled each oar, as stated in *OCD*², entry under 'trireme' (Chester Starr).

Who built the first trireme, and when, are controversial questions. If Th. here means to say that priority should be given to seventh-century Corinth, he is probably right despite Hdt. ii. 159, who says that the Egyptian Pharaoh Necho, 610–594 BC, built some triremes. (These have, however, been taken to be the work of Phoenicians who, it is further suggested, pioneered trireme-building. That would not strictly contradict Th. who says *πρώτον τῆς Ἑλλάδος*, 'the first Greek triremes'). See Morrison and Coates, 38, and the articles by Basch and Lloyd in their bibliography, esp. Lloyd, *JHS* 95 (1975), 45 ff., also Morrison, 'The First Triremes' in *Mariners' Mirror*, 65. 1 (1979), 53 ff. Note that, as T. F. R. G. Braun, *CAH* iii². 3. 49, points out, Necho could perfectly well have employed both Greek and Phoenician shipwrights.

However, it is possible that the whole argument is misconceived, and that Th. does *not*, as is usually thought, mean to imply that the first triremes were first built at Corinth 300 years before the end of the Peloponnesian War, in the time of Ameinokles. See F. Meijer, 'Thucydides i. 13. 2–4 and the Changes in Greek Ship-Building', *Historia*, 37 (1988), 461 ff., who argues (i) that the change referred to by Th. in the first part of the sentence is some unspecified naval innovation, nothing to do with the invention of the trireme; (ii) that the words which follow, about triremes having been first built in Corinth, are a parenthesis; and (iii) that the *dated* change (that is, the change dated by reference to Ameinokles and his Samian visit 300 years before the end of the Peloponnesian War) should be identified with the unspecified innovation of (i) above, which Meijer speculates may have been the introduction of decked ships. Meijer is right to point out that Th.'s remarks about Corinthian innovativeness go beyond the invention of triremes (otherwise the two halves of the sentence would mean the same thing, and this redundancy is un-Thucydidean). But the suggestion about decked ships is not attractive (why should Th. have expressed himself so obscurely?); and it does seem to me natural to take Th. to be moving from the general (naval innovativeness) to the particular (triremes), then to the very particular (Ameinokles), and then offering a date for what he has just been talking about—that is, for the triremes and Ameinokles.

On *λεγόνται* here see Westlake, 'λέγεται in Thucydides', *Mnemosyne*, 30 (1977), 358 and n. 35; cp. below, next n., for Th.'s possible sources.

3. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ Σαμίοις Ἀμεινοκλῆς Κορίνθιος ναυπηγὸς

ναῦς ποιήσας τέσσαρας: 'A Corinthian ship-builder, Ameinokles, is known to have built four ships for the Samians'. [For the tr. of φαίνεται see *Greek Historiography*, 159, also R. Stroud, *Chiron*, 24 (1994), 272 n. 7. No uncertainty is conveyed, contrary to Jowett's tr. which I wrongly adopted in 1991.] The information about Ameinokles is very specific (the proper name; the date; the number of the ships). W. G. Forrest, 'Two Chronographic Notes', *CQ* 19 (1969), 99, suggests that Th. got his information from a written fifth-century list of sea-powers (a so-called 'thalassocracy list'), with a Corinthian bias to it. (But see *Mausolus*, 15 n. 80: I reject Forrest's substitution of 'Corinthians' for 'Karians' at Diod. vii. 11). F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), 361 n. 56 (see Westlake, previous n.) suggested that Th. got the date (and perhaps more?) from the local fifth-century chronicle Euagon of Samos, *FGrHist* 535. These are both intriguing guesses which cannot be substantiated.

Co-operation between Corinth and Samos goes back to the time of the (? eighth-century) Lelantine War, on which see below 15. 3n.

ἔτη δ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τριακόσια ἐς τὴν τελευταίην τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου: 'about three hundred years before the end of the Peloponnesian War' [literally 'this war']. That is, 404 (though it is possible that he meant 421, the end of the Archidamian War, see 8. 1 n.). But we cannot tell if this means that Th. wrote the whole *Archaeology* after 404: this passage could be an insertion, and that is unfortunately true of most such firmly datable 'late' passages.

Th. was probably counting in terms of generations of perhaps 40 years (and half-generations of 20 years) and then turning those generation counts—which are too long—into absolute periods of time. If so, his date (704) is too early, and Ameinokles and his ship-building should be 'left to drift somewhere in the third quarter of the seventh century': Forrest 106. See too Morrison and Coates, 39f.: 'c.650' as the rough date for the invention of the trireme at Corinth. See, however, H. T. Wallinga, 'The Trireme in History', *Mnemosyne*, 43 (1990), 132ff., who, in the course of a very critical review of Morrison and Coates, considers the 650 date 'arbitrary'. Note that if Meijer is right (above, para. 2 n.), Th.'s 'date'—whether it be understood as 704 or 650—should be attached, not to the first trireme, but to some other naval innovation; Ameinokles is after all said to have built 'ships'; the more specific word 'triremes' is not used in the present sentence.

4. ναυμαχία τε παλαιτάτη ἣν ἴσμεν γίγνεται Κορινθίων πρὸς Κερκυραίων: 'the earliest sea-battle on record is that between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans'. Corcyra was a Corinthian colony, but relations between mother and daughter cities were evidently strained

from the start (see Hdt. iii. 49. 1 and next n.). The history of this tension, unusual between cities so linked, is explored in the speeches at i. 32 ff., for which the present passage prepares us. Here Th. has in fact touched with seeming casualness on an issue which was very relevant to the outbreak of the main Peloponnesian War. This is surely deliberate artistry; see introductory n. to ch. 2 above for the preparatory function of the *Archaeology*.

ἔτη δὲ μάλιστα καὶ ταύτη ἑξήκοντα καὶ διακόσιά ἐστι . . . : 'about forty years later' [literally, 'about two hundred and sixty years before the same date', i.e. before the end of the Peloponnesian War]. This date (260 years before 404 = 664 BC) should also be lowered, to the late seventh or early sixth century. See Morrison and Coates, 39, and Forrest, who points out that this would fit into the general context of the Corcyran-Corinthian hostility at the end of Periander's reign, Hdt. iii. 49 ff.

5. ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἴσθμοῦ αἰεὶ δὴ ποτε ἐμπόριον εἶχον: 'being situated on an isthmus, was naturally from the first a centre of commerce'. The Isthmus of Corinth was strategically and commercially a key area, controlling as it did both north-south and east-west traffic (in this it is comparable to Chalkis on Euboia; it was for this sort of reason that in Hellenistic times these two sites were called the 'handcuffs of Greece', see *Greek World*, 95). In what follows immediately (see next n.) Th. seems to have his mind on the north-south, i.e. the land, route (more accurately, north-east to south-west), though he goes on to say that Corinth later provided markets on both elements. But in fact the commercial success of Corinth was always owed largely to east-west traffic (or rather, south-east to north-west and *vice versa*) between the Corinthian and Saronic gulfs. She possessed outlets both to the eastern Mediterranean (the port called Kenchreai, from which one embarked for places like Samos: see para. 3 n. above); and to the western Mediterranean, that is, to the Corinthian gulf, the Adriatic including Corcyra (see on para. 4 above), and to Italy and Sicily. The western harbour was Lechaion, which was also the embarkation point for Perachora, directly opposite. Goods were moved across the Isthmus on the so-called *diolkos* (the word is found in Strabo, 380; the whole passage, 378 ff., is important on Corinthian prosperity). This artificial stone track has been much studied in recent years; see B. MacDonald, 'The Diolkos', *JHS* 106 (1986), 191 ff., concluding that the diolkos was a success, and citing earlier literature (of which note esp. R. M. Cook, *JHS* 99 (1979), 152 ff., and in *Webster Studies*, i. 1986 (see iii. 15. 1 n.); Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 136 f.). It is now clear that it was cargoes rather than ships which were usually pulled across the *diolkos*, though occasionally warships (but probably not merchantmen) were transported. See on iii. 15 and viii. 7-8 below.

τὸ πάλαι κατὰ γῆν τὰ πλείω ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν, τῶν τε ἐντὸς Πελοποννήσου καὶ τῶν ἔξω, διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων παρ' ἀλλήλους ἐπιμισγόντων: 'for the Greeks, both those within and those outside the Peloponnese, in the old days when they communicated by land more than by sea, had to pass through her territory in order to reach one another'. The expressions 'within/outside the Peloponnese' are most naturally taken to refer to the Peloponnese itself on the one hand and the rest of Greece, to the north-east, on the other. See preceding n.

For γῆ καὶ θάλασσα see 2. 2 n. above. Th. seems to be thinking in ascending terms. At 2. 2 men had control of neither land nor sea communications. (Note that ἐπιμισγόντων, 'communicated', here picks up ἐπιμειγνύντες at 2. 2.) Then they had control of land communications, especially by exploiting isthmuses (the present passage, anticipated at ch. 7. See n. there). Finally, like the Athenians at ii. 62. 2, they have control of both elements, ἀμφότερα; cp. below ἐμπόριον παρέχοντες ἀμφότερα, 'they offered a market by both sea and land'.

ἀφνειόν: 'wealthy'. Homer, *Iliad*, ii. 570. See *Thucydides*, 87.

ἐπειδὴ τε οἱ Ἕλληνες μᾶλλον ἔπλωζον . . . καθήρουν . . .: 'When the Greeks took more to the sea'. The subject of the sentence changes confusingly: 'when the Greeks took more to the sea, they [understand 'the Corinthians'] cleared up piracy', etc. There is no doubt that this is right, in view of τὴν πόλιν, 'their city', at the end of the sentence.

6. καὶ Ἴωσιν . . .: 'Later . . . the Ionians'. This 'Ionian thalassocracy' may also, like the Corinthian, have featured in a list (see on para. 3 above). B. Mitchell, *JHS* 95 (1975), 80 n. 79 takes Th.'s mention (below) of Polykrates and the Phokaiaians to be merely examples of this Ionian thalassocracy, but here and at ch. 16 Th. may be thinking of the Ionians generally; Polykrates and the Phokaiaians were special and separate. Hdt. reports (at i. 170. 2) a proposal by Bias of Priene that the Ionians should sail west in a κοινὸς στόλος, a joint navy or expedition. Otherwise there is not much evidence for Ionian naval resources, but they surely existed. καὶ Πολυκράτης: 'Polykrates, too'. For the thalassocracy of Polykrates see Hdt. iii. 122, using the word θαλασσοκρατεῖν (cp. above, ch. 4 n.). See Mitchell, 80 f.

ἄλλας τε τῶν νήσων ὑπηκόους ἐποίησατο: 'subdued a number of the islands'. For Polykrates' subjection of islands see also Hdt. iii. 39, and on Polykratean 'imperialism' generally, G. Shipley, *A History of Samos 800-188 BC* (Oxford, 1987), 94 ff. (cautious).

Ῥήνειαν ἐλὼν ἀνέθηκε: 'among them Rheneia'. The island immediately west of Delos. H. W. Parke, *CQ* 40 (1946), 105 ff., puts this event late in P.'s reign on the evidence of an oracle. For the dedication of Rheneia to Apollo cp. iii. 104. 2 n. Why does Th. insert these details

about Polykrates in the two books? We cannot say, but one effect is to make the point that the Delos-centred Athenian empire was not an inevitability: Samos was once a proud tyrannically-ruled power, not always the rebellious subject of i. 115 ff.

Sieveking (i. 24. 1 n.), 171, ingeniously suggests that the dactylic rhythm of this phrase (repeated at iii. 104. 2) may indicate that Th.'s source was a dedicatory epigram. For 'verse' in Th. see ii. 61. 2 n.

Φωκαῆς τε Μασσαλίαν οἰκίζοντες: 'the Phokaians, when they were colonizing Massalia [Marseilles]'. This was about 600 BC, *FGrHist* 566 Timaios F 71. Note, however, M. Vickers, 'Hallstatt and Early La Tène Chronology in Central, South and East Europe', *Antiquity*, 58 (1984), 208 ff., who rejects Timaios and argues that the foundation of Massalia should be put in the 540s. It is not, however, clear that Th. himself put this event in the 540s as Vickers thinks. (See also R. M. Cook, *JHS* 109 (1989), 165, sceptical of Vickers on this point.) For interesting remarks on early Massalia see B. Cunliffe, *Greeks, Romans and Barbarians* (London, 1988), ch. 1.

Scholars have emended 'Massalia' to 'Alalia' (in Corsica), so most recently Mitchell 81 n. 33. The idea is to bring Th. into line with Hdt. i. 166 f., a known event of c.546 BC. But we should not assume that events not otherwise known to us did not happen, nor should we force into agreement all those pieces of evidence which happen to survive. Lewis (*Towards a Historian's Text*, 140) notes that the manuscripts have *Μεσσαλίαν*. Just possibly Messalia was indeed, as the scholiast says, a (to us) unknown place in Africa. This is perhaps more thalassocracy list material.

14. *Early thalassocracies: concluded*

1. πεντηκοντόροις. 'Pentekontors' ('fifty-oared ships') were predecessors of triremes (but were not altogether displaced by them; Polykrates still used pentekontors, at least initially). They were powered by twenty-five men on each side, in one or two banks. See Morrison and Coates, 8 n. 3, and for Polykrates, 40 f.

πλοίοις μακροῖς: 'long ships'. That is, warships (other than pentekontors) as opposed to merchant vessels, which were rounder. For this usage see C. Storr, *Ancient Ships* (Cambridge, 1895), 22-3 n. 59.

2. περί τε Σικελίαν τοῖς τυράννοις: 'the Sicilian tyrants'. See T. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (Oxford, 1948), 404 f. Hippokrates of Gela and Anaxilas of Rhegion are probably meant.

3. Αἰγινήται γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι, βράχεια ἐκέκτηντο καὶ τούτων τὰ πολλὰ πεντηκοντόροις: 'The Aiginetans,

Athenians, and a few others had small fleets, mostly pentekontors'. For Aigina see T. Figueira, *Aegina: Society and Politics* (Salem, New Hampshire, 1985), 166ff., 'Aegina and the Sea'; for Athens see C. Haas, 'Athenian Naval Power before Themistocles', *Historia* 34 (1985), 46, and note Lewis's suggestion (*CAH* iv². 298) that Miltiades in 514 may already have possessed the five triremes he had by 493, Hdt. vi. 41.

Ἀθηναίους Θεμιστοκλῆς ἔπεισεν Αἰγινήταις πολεμοῦντας, καὶ ἅμα τοῦ βαρβάρου προσδοκίμου ὄντος, τὰς ναῦς ποιήσασθαι αἰσπερ καὶ ἐναυμάχησαν: 'It was only recently, when the Athenians were at war with the Aiginetans and expecting the invasion of the Barbarians [i.e. Persians] that Themistokles persuaded them to build the ships with which they fought in the great sea-battle [Salamis]'. This echoes, but modifies (by the addition of 'expecting the invasion . . .'), the line taken by Hdt. (vii. 144), whose sources minimized Themistokles' farsightedness: on Hdt.'s view he created the Athenian navy in order to combat the immediate threat of Aigina, not the more remote menace from Persia. At 93. 3-4, Th. is fairer to Themistokles than is Hdt. on the particular issue of naval preparations (see n. there), as also in his general summing-up of Themistokles' abilities at 138. See 17n. below.

οὐπω εἶχον διὰ πάσης καταστρώματα: 'were not completely decked'. A characteristic return to the technicalities of warfare (see *Thucydides*, 158f.). This refers to the decks, for which see Morrison and Coates, 159ff., who conclude that by the vague phrase *διὰ πάσης* ('overall', as they translate it) Th. means that Themistokles' triremes were undecked 'throughout the breadth' (rather than 'throughout the length'). That is, there was a gap down the middle of the ship.

15. *Summing-up: no early land-empires, and no general wars before the Lelantine*

1. **χρημάτων τε προσόδω:** 'by the increase of their revenues'. See on 2. 2 above.

ἄλλων ἀρχῆ: 'rule over others'. This phrase will recur in Diodotos' speech, iii. 45. 6: *ἐλευθερία ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχή*, 'freedom, or rule over others': see *Greek World*, 69.

2. **κατὰ γῆν δὲ πόλεμος, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο . . .:** 'Whereas by land, no conflict of any kind which brought increase of power ever occurred'. This reminds us that Th.'s mind is really on Greece (despite *μέρει τινὶ τῶν βαρβάρων*, 'many of the Barbarians' at 1. 2): he shows no knowledge of the great land empires of the ancient world such as Egypt, Assyria, or places further east.

ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ' ἄλλων κατα-

στροφή: 'foreign or distant expeditions of conquest'. Like the Sicilian expedition of 415 BC. But the allusion is not specific enough to guarantee that the present passage was written after that date.

3. μάλιστα δὲ ἐς τὸν πάλαι ποτὲ γενόμενον πόλεμον Χαλκιδέων καὶ Ἐρετριῶν καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ἐς ξυμμαχίαν ἐκατέρων διέστη: 'The best exception is the war fought long ago between the Chalkidians and Eretrians in which the rest of the Greek world was divided in alliance with one side or the other' [for the translation of the sentence—'best exception', not 'best example'—see S. D. Lambert, *JHS* 102 (1982), 216f.]. This was the Lelantine War, so called because it was fought between the two Euboian cities Chalkis and Eretria for control of the rich plain of Lelanton which lay between them. Hdt. also mentions the war, v. 99, where he provides more detail about the ἄλλο Ἑλληνικόν, the rest of the Greek world which, as Th. more briefly tells us, took part. Chalkis was supported by Samos, Eretria by Miletos. There were other allies. The involvement of such distant powers is certainly remarkable, but note the context: Th.'s point is that the Lelantine War was the *nearest thing* to concerted Greek action of a kind which was normally lacking. So the organized, international character of the war should not be exaggerated, as it has sometimes been. The date of the war is not certain; it was perhaps over by 700 BC, by which time Lefkandi (the site of 'Old Eretria?') was abandoned in favour of the site of classical and modern Eretria, at the east end of the Lelantine plain. (See 12. 4 n. above. Lefkandi is on the coast, half-way along the plain.) See Boardman, *CAH* iii². 1. 763, with bibliography. Archaeology has helped a little: we can now see that Euboian overseas enterprise started spectacularly early, which helps to explain the geographical range of the 'allies': J. N. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (London, 1977), 199–201, and note the tenth-century Euboian material mentioned above, 12. 4 n. on μόλις. And see J. McK. Camp II, 'A Drought in the Late Eighth Century BC', *Hesperia*, 48 (1979), 406f. and n. 42: drought and crop failure may have sharpened tensions and have contributed to the end of Lefkandi.

On Th.'s non-mention of the First Sacred War see *Catling Studies*.

16. Obstacles to naval success

This ch. develops 13. 6, with the difference that there the rise of Persia is merely *synchronized* with the period of Ionian naval strength: the former was not there invoked as a way of *explaining* the decline of the latter.

κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι: 'obstacles to the progress'. Cp. below 89. 1 n.

Κροῖσον: 'Kroisos'. The subject of so much of Hdt. Book i, mentioned

here only in all Th. For the Halys see Hdt. i. 72. 3. The defeat of Kroisos was in c.544 BC: see J. Cargill, 'The Nabonidus Chronicle and the Fall of Lydia', *AJAH* 2 (1977), 97 ff. (eliminating the oriental evidence which had previously been thought to indicate 546).

Δαρείος τε ὕστερον τῷ Φοινίκων ναυτικῷ κρατῶν καὶ τὰς νήσους: 'Darius, relying on his possession of the Phoenician fleet, conquered the islands also'. For Darius' Phoenician fleet see Hdt.'s account of the battle of Lade at the beginning of Book vi. (See also Hdt. iii. 19. 3.) Of the big Ionian islands, Chios had already been subjected by Cyrus (Hdt. i. 160, with C. Roebuck in *Chios: A Conference at the Homereion in Chios, 1984*, ed. J. Boardman and C. E. Vaphopoulou-Richardson (Oxford, 1986), 86). Samos fell to Persia in Darius' time, Hdt. iii. 149.

17. *The contribution (or lack of it) made by the tyrants*

τύραννοί τε ὅσοι ἦσαν ἐν ταῖς Ἑλληνικαῖς πόλεσι, τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι: 'Nor did the tyrants of the Greek cities extend their thoughts beyond their own interests'. This kind of generalization about the interests of Greek tyrants is worth noting; there is nothing comparable in Hdt.

ἐπράχθη δὲ οὐδὲν ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔργον ἀξιόλογον, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι πρὸς περιόικους: 'nothing considerable was ever achieved by them, except in wars against their neighbours'. This (cp. *οἱ τε Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι*, 'the tyrants ... at Athens', at 18. 1 below) seems to echo Hdt. on the Athenian Pisistratids at v. 78: 'while the Athenians were ruled by the tyrants they were militarily no better than any of their neighbours', *τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων*. (But Th. speaks of aggression against, Hdt. makes a comparison with, *περίοικοι*.) Hdt.'s view is, however, unjust to the Pisistratids, no doubt because those were the views of his oral informants. Does Th. share that view? In the present passage it seems that he does (though he no doubt has other tyrants in mind as well as those of Athens). But at vi. 54. 5 he speaks of *τοὺς πολέμους*, 'the wars', of the Pisistratids, a general expression which indicates a more vigorous foreign policy than that implied here. As at 14. 3 (Themistokles and Aigina: see n. there) Th. incautiously reproduces Herodotean judgements without discounting for the bias of Hdt.'s informants; and as with Themistokles he will come to a different conclusion when he moves outside the *Archaeology*.

Note the purely political sense of *ἔργον*, 'work': 'nothing considerable' was done by the tyrants [lit. 'no remarkable work']. See 10. 2n. on *Λακεδαιμονίων γάρ*. ... As the context makes clear, Th. is thinking of wars; not of the great building projects, *ἔργα* in the other sense, of the

tyrannical age. For competitive building by the tyrants see T. Leslie Shear in *Athens Comes of Age* (Princeton, 1978), 1 ff.

οἱ γὰρ ἐν Σικελίᾳ: 'as in Sicily'. This is elliptically put: the thought is that the Sicilian tyrants, though more powerful than tyrants elsewhere, still failed to achieve anything except against neighbours. (This is true, in that the tyrants of the West declined involvement in Old Greece, at least before the fourth century. The most notable refusal was that of Gelon in 480: Hdt. vii. 163.) Hude's text follows those who deleted this sentence.

18. *Rise of Sparta and Athens: the Persian Wars*

1. **ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων κατελύθησαν:** 'were put down by the Spartans'. For the deposition in 510 BC of the Athenian tyrant Hippias, by the Spartan king Kleomenes, see Hdt. v. 65. But tradition held that the Spartans put down tyrannies elsewhere too; see Plut. *Mor* 859C-D and the fragmentary 'Rylands papyrus', *FGrHist* 105, no. 1 = Fornara 39B, discussed by D. Leahy, *Bulletin of the Rylands Library*, 38 (1956), 406ff. Note, however, R. Bernhardt, 'Die Entstehung der Legenden von der tyrannenfeindlichen Aussenpolitik Spartas im 6. und 5. Jhd. v. Chr.', *Historia*, 36 (1987), 257ff. The Peloponnesian War may itself have contributed to the articulation of the 'giant-killing' role.

The connection between chs. 17 and 18 is not easy to see: perhaps one linking idea is ability to act at a distance from one's own frontiers. The tyrants did not have it; Sparta, by putting down those same tyrants, showed that she *did* have it.

The Penguin translation, apparently following Crawley, arbitrarily omits **οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ**, 'at least . . . the majority of them. These were, with the exception of the Sicilian tyrants, the last who ever ruled'; and produces an easy rendering only by simplifying in this respect and others. Gomme uncharacteristically makes light of the very real difficulties of translating this sentence; I have found it necessary to amplify and re-punctuate Jowett a little. Classen/Steup suggest the deletion of **πλείστοι καί**, but this makes the sentence only slightly less clumsy.

The stress on 'Sparta as liberator from tyranny' has, like much of the *Archaeology* (see introductory n. to ch. 2 above) a preparatory function; see i. 122. 3 and ii. 8. 4 and nn. for this theme in the run-up to the Peloponnesian War, when Athens could be depicted as the new tyrant; and for references to it during the war see e.g. iii. 59. 4; viii. 46. 3 and nn. **ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαίμων . . . ἡννομήθη καὶ αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος ἦν:** 'Sparta . . . obtained good order . . . and has never been subject to tyrants'. This is roughly what Hdt. says at i. 65. 2. Both authors speak of a change

to *εὐνομία* ('obedience to laws' irrespective of content, not 'a condition of the state in which the laws are good'; see Andrewes '*Εὐνομία*', *CQ* 32 (1938), 89 ff.) after a long period of the opposite. Heavy weather has been made of the Hdt. and Th. passages and the issues they raise. Hdt. associates the change to good government with the name of Lycurgus the lawgiver, about whom Plutarch wrote despairingly that 'it is impossible to say anything that is beyond dispute' (Plut. *Lyc.* 1). But Hdt.'s picture, which Th. seems to accept, is clear enough both generally and in its chronology. He says that in the sixth century the Spartans had trouble with their Arkadian neighbour Tegea, despite successes elsewhere. *At an even earlier date* (*τὸ δὲ ἔτι πρότερον τούτων*) they had been badly governed (*κακονομώτατοι*, i.e. in the opposite condition to *εὐνομία*; cp. Th.'s *στασιάσασα*, 'long unsettled'). Then Hdt. describes the change, which he associates with Lycurgus the uncle and guardian of Leobotes (date perhaps ninth century; see below). There is no confusion here (see the words italicized above) between ninth- and sixth-century events, such as to justify modern scholarly jettisoning of Hdt. (and Th.) as badly muddled. Hdt. and Th. may have been wrong, but they are quite clear: Lycurgus and the change to *εὐνομία* happened in the ninth century. There is nothing here to justify Gomme's charge that this is 'perhaps the most remarkable instance of a carefree chronology in his [Hdt.'s] history'. See A. Toynbee, *Some Problems in Greek History* (Oxford, 1969), 225 n. 1.

There is, however, a modern near-consensus that the 'Lycurgan' changes belong in or even at the end of the seventh century (Wade-Gery, *Essays* (Oxford, 1958), 37 ff.; G. L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London, 1962), 37 ff.; W. G. Forrest, *Phoenix* 17 (1963), 157 ff.; Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London, 1956), ch. 6; Toynbee, 225; and general books on archaic Greece by L. H. Jeffery and O. Murray). The only specific ancient evidence for this is very poor: the arguments of Forrest and Huxley in particular rest on what Hammond (*Studies*, 99) has rightly called a 'highly selective' use of some passages in Pausanias which cannot be discussed here. The best reasons (they are nevertheless less than compelling) for down-dating the changes are general. First, negative: the Lycurgus legend (Hdt.; Plut. *Lyc.* 6) associates him with Delphi, whence he brought a written, prose, reply. But (i) a politically prominent Delphi, (ii) writing, and (iii) prose are all impossible as early as the ninth century. (It is a defect of Hammond's discussion that he ignores these negative points.) Second, positive: the reform of Lycurgus, as given in Plutarch, took the form of a tribal reorganization of a kind which happened elsewhere in the Mediterranean world in the late archaic period. (Cp. Wade-Gery, 77, for the analogy with Kleisthenic Athens; R. M. Ogilvie, *Livy*

1-5 *Comm.*, 166, citing H. Last for Servian Rome; Hdt. iv. 161 for Cyrene; Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, app. 1, for Corinth). At Rome and perhaps Athens (see P. Siewert, *Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes* (Munich, 1982)), there was a military aspect to these tribal changes, which may therefore have been connected with the chief military change of the age, the introduction of hoplite fighting; see above on 13. 1 for the supposed link between hoplites and tyranny.

But what of Sparta, which, as Th. says, was *αἰεὶ ἀτυράννευτος*, 'never subject to tyrants'? Andrewes's ingenious solution (*The Greek Tyrants*) is that the Spartan reforms were—on his late dating—a kind of 'alternative to tyranny', a recognition of the political claims of the hoplites. Certainly the Spartan ἀγωγή or strict military regime did not antedate c.600 (see Finley, 'Sparta' in *Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1985), 161 ff.).

These general considerations, positive and negative, are powerful arguments against the very early dates for 'Lycurgus' which Hdt. and Th. imply. (And we may add that Plutarch could find no-one earlier than the late archaic poet Simonides to quote for Lycurgus, which perhaps suggests that the latter was not mentioned in earlier writers such as Tyrtaios or Alkman.) But it is important to face the consequence squarely: a late date for the Lycurgan changes means throwing out our earliest and best evidence, that of Hdt. (whose account and *generally* early chronology is followed by Th., though with a later date within that early framework; see below). Hammond, with greater respect for the weight of the direct evidence than the other scholars cited in this note, declines to do that and is forced to find an alternative political context for the tribal change at Sparta. He sees it not as a late archaic or 'Kleisthenic' change carried out in the age of the hoplite, but as a reference to a Dark Age synoikism (for this term see 10. 2 n. above). But, as we have seen, he ignores the negative points (i), (ii), and (iii) mentioned above. That is not satisfactory; but nor I believe is the modern consensus which makes light of Hdt. and Th. Writing and Delphi would be just thinkable in perhaps the eighth century, which is where I would prefer to put the change—that is, the introduction of the social and military institutions which Hdt. describes. This date is compatible with Th.'s 400+ years (see next n.).

On Th.'s attitude to Sparta generally see the long but balanced and sensible article of P. Cloché, 'Thucydides et Lacédémone', *Les Études classiques* 12 (1943), 81-113. See also *Thucydides*, 162 ff.

ἔτη γὰρ ἔστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλείω ἐς τὴν τελευτὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου: 'for rather more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the Peloponnesian War' [lit. 'this war'; cp.

8. 1 and 13. 3]. This gives 804 BC, but if Th. was using generation counts of 40 years ($400 = 10 \times 40$) we might reduce the total to 350 ($= 10 \times 35$). This gives an eighth-century date, which is just within the upper limits imposed by the 'negative' points mentioned above (Delphi, writing). Hdt.'s date (tenth-century) would be earlier; perhaps Th. intends a correction of Hdt. But the two are nearer to each other than either is to the 600 BC date of modern scholars.

However, it is possible (as D. M. Lewis points out to me) that Th. merely counted 12 generations back from Leonidas at three to a century, adding *ὀλιγῶ πλείω* ('rather more') for the period of Lycurgus' guardianship of his nephew Leobotes. In other words, without knowing whether Th. or a predecessor did the calculations, we cannot assume a fixed figure for a Thucydidean generation.

καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι καθίστασαν: 'and thus enabled her to regulate the affairs of other states'. The other point of the digression. For the character of Spartan interference see ch. 19.

μετὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον: 'not long after the expulsion of the Greek tyrants by the Spartans'. The language is vague, but the reference is clearly to the Pisistratids of Athens: in the first place, the chronology (Marathon *οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον*, 'not long after') fits them better than most other tyrannies; in the second place, the Athenians are mentioned immediately afterwards, as the victors of Marathon. The connection of thought is loose: deposition of tyranny at Athens by one of the two great powers of fifth-century Greece, namely Sparta, leads Th. to discuss the other great power, Athens herself.

2. δεκάτῳ δὲ ἔτει . . . ὁ βάρβαρος: 'ten years later . . . the barbarian [i.e. the Persians]'. Lit. 'in the tenth year'. Salamis: 480 BC. It is not sensible to press these words chronologically in an attempt to date Marathon precisely. For the battle of Marathon see Hdt. vi. 102ff.

ἔς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο: 'took to their ships and became sailors'. The so-called 'Themistokles Decree', a fourth-century BC inscription found at Troizen in 1959, deals with the Athenian mobilization arrangements, but its authenticity is doubtful: see ML 23 for text and comm. (= Fornara 55). For Hdt.'s assessment that the Athenians saved Greece by taking to their ships see Hdt. vii. 137, 144. We should not, however, forget the last two words *ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο*, 'became sailors', which suggest that Th.'s mind was more generally on the development of an Athenian naval tradition than on the specific mobilization and evacuation before Salamis.

ἰσχυον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσίν: 'the Spartans powerful by land, and the Athenians by sea'. For this important polarity, land/sea,

see above 2. 2n. The present passage is of great programmatic importance for the wartime narrative which is to come.

3. ὥστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἔς τόνδε αἰεὶ τὸν πόλεμον ... ποιοῦμενοι: 'so that from the Persian to the Peloponnesian War'. A telescoped account of the *Pentekontaetia*, the 'Fifty Years', 480-430, which will be more fully described at chs. 89-117. It is relevant to Th.'s view of the much-discussed 'Origins of the Peloponnesian War', usually discussed primarily with reference to 23 below, that in the present passage he sees the imperial development of the two powers as proceeding absolutely *pari passu*: neither side is implied to be more aggressive than the other.

19. Spartan and Athenian methods of control compared

καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ἔχοντες φόρου τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἡγούντο, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφίσι αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες: 'The Spartans did not take tribute from those who acknowledged their leadership, but took care that they should be governed by oligarchies in the exclusive interest of Sparta'. An excellent and rightly famous summing-up of Spartan imperial methods. ML 67 = Fornara 132, an inscription of either the 420s or the 390s, listing some haphazard-looking contributions to Sparta's war effort, confirms that she did indeed suffer from lack of tribute reserves of the Athenian type. Note also ii. 7. 2, where her Western allies are asked to 'provide a fixed sum of money', ἀργύριον ῥητὸν ἐτοιμάζειν. As for support of congenial oligarchies, cp. *Ar. Pol.* 1307^b22ff.: Athens everywhere tended to put down oligarchies, Sparta democracies. The best positive illustrations of Th.'s point are in Xenophon's *Hellenica*, e.g. the treatment of Mantinea in 385, *Xen. Hell.* v. 2.

Ἄθηναῖοι δὲ ναῦς τε τῶν πόλεων τῷ χρόνῳ παραλαβόντες πλὴν Χίων καὶ Λεσβίων, καὶ χρήματα τοῖς πᾶσι τάξαντες φέρειν: 'The Athenians, on the other hand, after a time deprived the subject cities of their ships and made all of them pay a fixed tribute, except Chios and Lesbos'. [Actually the Greek says 'deprived the subject cities of their ships, except Chios and Lesbos, and made them all pay tribute', as in the LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, no. 30. But Chios and Lesbos were certainly not tributary, see *ATL* iii. 249f. etc., and the word πᾶσι, 'all', has to be taken as meaning 'all except Chios and Lesbos'. It is impossible to convey this in English without recasting the sentence.] See 99. 3 for the commuting of ship- into money-payments, and the extra power this gave to Athens. For the special status of Chios and Lesbos see *Ath. Pol.* 24. 2,

adding Samos. This is not necessarily inconsistent with *Politics* 1284^a38 (Samos, Chios, and Lesbos *humbled* by Athens); see my note in the LACTOR, *Athenian Empire*³, 42: all those places were indeed humbled later, Samos and Lesbos after spectacular revolts in 440 and 428, while Chios was made to pull down her walls in 425; see iv. 51 n.

αὐτοῖς . . . ἡ ἰδία παρασκευή: 'the power of Athens alone' [lit. 'their private or separate power']. Th. probably means that the power of Athens alone (rather than the power of Athens *and Sparta put together*) in 431 was greater than the power of Athens and Sparta put together at the time of the Persian Wars (lit. 'when the alliance between the two was still inviolate'). That is a more natural way of taking 'their', *αὐτοῖς*, and the emphatic *ἰδία*, 'alone' (lit. 'private'), shows that Th.'s mind is still on Athens alone in the first part of the sentence. Contrast 1. 1 *ἀμφότεροι παρασκευῆ*, 'both states were then at the full height of their military power', where the reference *ἰς* to the power of both parties. Note that the present passage recalls that one; the ring of the *Archaeology* is almost complete.

20–21. *Digression on method: sloppiness of earlier inquirers*

On Th.'s programme in these chs. see Averil Cameron in Cameron (ed.), *History as Text* (London, 1989), 208, noting the coexistence in Th. of an attitude involving 'close scrutiny of sources', of the kind insisted on in ch. 20, with a 'strong sense of drama and emotion'. The latter, says Cameron, has 'only relatively recently' attracted attention from the point of view of 'an interest in rhetoric and textuality' (she cites V. Hunter's 1973 book (5. 1 n.) on Th.). On this general topic see below 23. 3 n. discussing Woodman, etc.

20. 1. τὰ μὲν οὖν παλαιά: 'early Greece' [lit. 'antiquity']. The word *παλαιά* is picked up from 3. 1, near the beginning of the whole *Archaeology*.

ἠϋρόν: 'inquiries'. For this word as specially appropriate to describe discovery of the past see B. Knox (1. 3 n. on *ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων*), 128 ff.; and see 1. 3 n.

χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι: 'difficult though it is to believe every piece of evidence that we look at in turn'. This slightly odd phrase seems to mean that we can trust the general sequence without being confident about any individual item. *χαλεπά*, 'difficult', is attracted into the accusative plural by *παλαιά*, 'early', although we might have expected *χαλεποῦ ὄντος* (a genitive absolute construction, 'it being difficult'). On *τεκμήριον* see above, 1. 3 n.

ἀβασανίστως ... δέχονται: 'Men do not discriminate' [lit. 'they accept things *untested*'], a word with legal connotations, see *Thucydides*, 107. (Antiphon, i. 13, uses it of slaves who have not been tortured.)

2. Ἀθηναίων γοῦν τὸ πλῆθος Ἱππάρχον οἴονται: 'For example, most Athenians think that Hipparchos ...'. The story of the assassination of Hipparchos, younger son of Pisistratus, seems to have fascinated Th. He returns to it at much greater length in Book vi (54–9). For the points at issue see my nn. there, discussing R. Thomas, *Oral Tradition and Written Record in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1989). Essentially, Th. is correcting a popular version, found in Plato's *Hipparchus*, according to which Hipparchos was the elder son and the ruling tyrant. Hdt., who is Th.'s target later in the present ch., cannot be aimed at here because he and Th. agree on the essential points (Hdt. v. 55 ff.). Perhaps Hellanikos was the culprit. For good discussion see Davies, *APF* 446 ff. Perhaps one or other version would have been removed or reduced in a final draft, but we do not know which, nor do we know which version was written first. But it is just possible that both versions would have survived; note that (i) they illustrate different points (cp. vi. 54. 1 n.) and (ii) it was less easy for ancient readers, than for us, to turn from Book i to Book vi. The repetition thus seems to us, with a finger in each passage, more glaring. Finally (iii), there was much repetition in epic. See now *CAH* iv². 288.

οὐκ ἴσασι: 'they are not aware'. On this point Th. claimed personal knowledge from oral information, ἀκοῇ, vi. 55. 1—despite what he says in the present passage (para. 1) about τὰς ἀκοὰς τῶν προγεγενημένων, 'ancient traditions'. But (he would say) his own oral knowledge is 'tested', it has not been arrived at ἀβασανίστως.

τὸ Λεωκόρειον: 'the Leokoreion'. A shrine to the daughters of Leos. They were sacrificed to save the city from plague or famine. A possible site was excavated in 1971/2, a shrine at the north-west corner of the Agora by the Panathenaic Way, but no cult objects earlier than the third quarter of the fifth century have been found here. For this reason John Camp, Assistant Director of the Agora excavations, remains doubtful; see his *The Athenian Agora: Excavations in the Heart of Classical Athens* (London, 1986), 79.

3. τοὺς τε Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέας μὴ μιᾷ ψήφῳ ... ἀλλὰ δυοῖν: 'They think that the kings of Sparta have not one but two votes each'. A clear reference to Hdt. vi. 57. 5 δύο ψήφους τιθεμένους 'casting two votes' (but Hdt., who is there speaking of proxy votes for the two kings, may have meant that the two proxies cast a *total* of two votes, not two each. See How and Wells on the Hdt. passage). Note that both Th.'s final examples concern Sparta; see introductory n. to ch. 2 above.

καὶ τὸν Πιτανάτην λόχον: 'the Pitanaite division'. Again, a clear

reference to Hdt. (ix. 53. 2). For the problem see D. H. Kelly, 'Thucydides and Herodotus on the Pitane *Lochos*', *GRBS* 22 (1981), 31 ff., with bibliography, to which add N. Jones, *Political Organisation in Ancient Greece* (Philadelphia, 1987), 119, accepting Wade-Gery's view, *Essays in Greek History*, 76 f., that Th. has 'slipped up badly' and that, as Jones puts it, Th.'s point turns 'on the nomenclature, not the existence, of the *lochos* of Pitana'. Kelly, however, concludes that Th. was right and Hdt. wrong on the substantive point, i.e. the *existence* of the Pitane *lochos*. Pitana was a locality (Hdt. iii. 55. 1, calling it a *δήμος*), but a *λόχος* is a military unit or company. Many scholars, conjecturing that the Spartan army was once brigaded territorially, think that Hdt. was right against Th. and that Hdt. ix. 53 is evidence for that original territorial brigading: P. Cartledge, *Agésilao*s (London, 1987), 428 ff., Wade-Gery, and others. There is some special pleading in all this; one might as well say that Th.'s emphatic denial is evidence against what is only a conjecture and that there was no such territorial brigading (note Th.'s *πώποτε*, which might have been included expressly in order to deal with the conjecture that Hdt. gives the original, Th. the reformed, organization of the army). Th. found the Spartan system inscrutable (v. 68), but when, as here, he offers a firm statement he is I believe to be preferred to Hdt., who may have been speaking loosely.

It remains true that Th.'s polemic is harsh and bad-tempered; but that was a usual feature of intellectual debate at this time; see 1. 1 n. above, on *ἀξιολογώτατον*, 'memorable'.

ἀταλαίπωρος: 'so little trouble'. For this rare word see Aristophanes, frag. 254. It was echoed by Arrian (*Anab.* vi. 11. 8) in a similarly polemical context. For other echoes of Th. in Arrian see A. B. Bosworth, *Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, i (Oxford, 1980), 36.

ἀληθείας: 'truth'. This notion here makes its appearance for the first time in Th. (but he then uses it three times more in rapid succession, 21. 1, 22. 1, 23. 6). Previously he has expressed a less ambitious concern for clarity, 1. 3 n. on *σαφῶς*. For the *ἀληθ-* root, which may originally have meant just 'not forgotten', see *Thucydides* 19 n. 13.

21. 1. οὔτε ὡς ποιηταί . . . οὔτε ὡς λογογράφοι: 'the poets, or . . . the chroniclers'. This distinction between literary genres is new and remarkable. (Hdt. had referred to Aesop and Hekataios as *λογοποιοί*—'makers of *λόγοι* or tales—but only for purposes of identification: *Ἀἴσωπος ὁ λογοποιός*, as one might say 'Cinna the Poet' or as Th. himself refers to *Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητής* 'Hesiod the Poet', iii. 96. 1.) See *Thucydides*, 9 n. 4. Note that Th. manages to avoid saying what he himself is; he implies only that he is neither a poet nor a logographer (a term which would have included Hdt. but especially such writers as Hekataios

whose mythical content was greater than Hdt.'s). Essentially logographers were men who wrote about the past in *prose*, see L. Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians* (Oxford, 1939), 7, and this formal difference, rather than any greater reliability of content, was what in Th.'s view set them apart from the poets.

ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει: 'to please the ear rather than . . .'. This anticipates 22. 4 where Th. again makes a disparaging connection between recitation and τὸ μυθῶδες, 'the romantic', for which see Flory (22. 4n.). But see n. there.

ἀνεξέλεγκτα: 'cannot be tested'. The idea that statements should be tested is not new in itself (cp. 1. 3n. above for Hdt. vi. 14) but the self-conscious assertion *is* new.

ἐκνενικηκότα: 'passed into the region of' [lit. 'won their way through to']. For this word see 3. 2n. and on the whole phrase Flory (22. 4n.).

2. σκοποῦσι: 'examined in the light of'. See 1. 3n. above. The *αὔξησις*, or rhetorical amplification of the theme, is apparently complete (though ch. 23 starts it up again).

22. Th. on his own method

A very important chapter indeed. There is nothing like it in Hdt. More remarkably, it is hard to parallel in any writer *later* than Th. In particular, most historians went on making up speeches without showing any kind of bad conscience about doing so. See generally F. W. Walbank, 'Speeches in Greek Historians', in his *Selected Papers* (Cambridge, 1985), 242ff. It seems that medieval historiography inherited this tradition: in 1095, the speech of Pope Urban II proclaiming the First Crusade was recorded by four chroniclers including one eye-witness, 'but it is clear that each author wrote the speech that he thought that the Pope ought to have made and added his own favourite rhetorical tricks': S. Runciman, *The Crusades*, i (Cambridge, 1951), 108 n. 1. The difficulties with Th. arise only because he made so strong a claim to truthful reportage.

Methodological prefaces of any kind, discussing how one has arrived at the truth, are rare in the historians of antiquity (the opening of Arrian's *Anabasis* is an honourable exception for which he too rarely gets credit); though writers of oratorical or other *treatises* (Cicero, Lucian) talk about the 'laws of history', etc.

1. καὶ ὅσα μὲν λόγῳ εἶπον ἕκαστοι: 'As to the speeches which were made'. I have discussed this para., esp. the difficult sentence *ὡς δ' ἂν ἐδόκουν ἐμοί*, 'as I thought', in *Thucydides*, 45ff.; to the refs. there add F. Egermann, 'Thucydides über die Art seiner Reden und über seine Darstellung der Kriegsgeschehnisse', *Historia*, 21 (1972), 575ff. I agree

with those who believe the two halves of the sentence to be incompatible: the criterion of the first half is subjective appropriateness, that of the second half is fact, 'what was actually said'. John Wilson, 'What does Thucydides claim for his speeches?', *Phoenix*, 36 (1982), 95–103, tries to save Th. from the inconsistency. He thinks that any translation which makes Th. claim to have given what speakers ought to have said, rather than what they actually did say, must be wrong; for Wilson, τὰ δέοντα seems to mean 'appropriate' in the sense 'appropriate given the other things the speaker is known to have said'. Wilson has many good incidental remarks, but I am not persuaded by his central thesis about τὰ δέοντα, 'appropriate', because he ignores the rhetorical uses of this phrase, which go back to Gorgias: cp. Macleod, *Essays*, 52.

2. τὰ δ' ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων: 'the events', lit. 'what was done' as opposed to what was said; see above 10. 2n. for the difference between Th.'s and Hdt.'s conception of ἔργον, 'work', 'act', 'achievement'.

οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος: 'chance information'. Not necessarily a hit at Hdt., or if so an unfair one: Hdt.'s informants were on the whole well placed both socially and in terms of opportunity to observe. (Against D. Fehling's sceptical view of Hdt.'s use of oral informants, see *Thucydides*, 17ff.) This is perhaps undirected polemic against 'not taking trouble'.

οὐδ' ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει: 'nor to reconstruct events according to ideas of my own'. See J. M. Marincola, *CP* 84 (1989), 216ff.

οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρήν: 'I . . . saw myself'. Note Th.'s stress on autopsy and on his own participation; Hdt. could not claim the second.

ἀκριβεία: 'accurate', 'in conformity with reality', i.e. the meaning is objective, rather than the subjective 'with care'. There is also present the idea of *precise* conformity with reality. See *Thucydides*, 37, with refs.

περὶ ἐκάστου: 'on each point'. Here and at ii. 1 (ἐξῆς ὡς ἕκαστα ἐγίνετο, 'the narrative', lit. 'each thing in order as it happened'), Th. perhaps suggests that his aim is the (impossible) one of recording *all* the events of the war; though in both places we could take the words to mean 'all the things which I have chosen to write about'. See *Thucydides*, ch. 2 (the tension in Th. between comprehensiveness and selectivity).

3. οὐ ταῦτά: 'different accounts'. This is very like Hdt.'s complaint at vi. 14, for which see above 1. 3n. on σαφῶς.

4. ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν: 'to the ear'. This sentence does not actually exclude the possibility that Th.'s own work will be recited; it merely says that some might find such a recitation a joyless occasion. For a suggestion that some of the more highly-wrought bits of Th., e.g. the account of the Corcyraean *stasis*, could have been read out at a *symposium* or drinking-party, of an admittedly highbrow sort, see *Thucy-*

dides, 29 and n. 65. See further below, on μάλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα, 'rather than a prize composition'.

τὸ μὴ μυθῶδες: 'the unromantic [lit. 'unstory-like'] character of my narrative'. See on this phrase S. Flory, *Classical Journal*, 85 (1990), 193 ff.: the 'stories' Th. has in mind are patriotic ones.

τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν: 'have a clear picture'. Cp. I. 3 nn. and *Thucydides*, 102.

καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον: 'similar events which may be expected to happen in the future'. Th. does not here imply a cyclical view of history, i.e. that events repeat themselves precisely; but equally, it has been said, 'the opposite opinion is just as inexact': P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Divine Time and Human Time', *The Black Hunter* (Baltimore, 1986), 46, discussing this passage, and invoking a distinction between logical time and historical time: the Minoan thalassocracy did not repeat itself in historical time, but it did recur in logical time (the Athenian thalassocracy of the fifth century). κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον is broader than 'according to human nature'; it means something more like 'the human condition' or 'situation': so rightly H.-P. Stahl, *Thukydides* (Munich, 1966), 33 (despite de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 32, whose whole discussion, pp. 29–33, is however very valuable).

ὠφέλιμα κρίνειν: 'judge . . . to be useful'. See *Thucydides*, 133; Th.'s aim is purely intellectual; he does not seek to improve his readers, in the sense of making them morally better people (he does wish to 'improve' them intellectually). This sets him apart from the doctors, who wish to 'make their patients better' in another sense of 'better'. But Th. does resemble the doctors in other ways (notably a wish to forecast the future on the basis of the past, see *Thucydides*, 132 and G. P. Carratelli, 'Ippocrate e Tucide', *Scritti sul mondo antico* (Naples, 1976), 460 ff.).

κτῆμά τε ἐς αἰεὶ μάλλον ἢ ἀγώνισμα ἐς τὸ παραχρήμα ἀκούειν: 'an everlasting possession, rather than a prize composition which is heard and then forgotten' [lit. 'heard for the moment']. This famous announcement does not quite exclude (cp. above on ἐς μὲν ἀκρόασιν) the possibility that parts at least of Th.'s own work were recited: he wants it to be thought of as a possession for ever *rather than* a prize recitation piece. Hdt. may have recited his work (Th. is said to have burst into tears on hearing it: Marcellinus, *Life*, para. 54, not however a very reliable source). Presumably Th. here has Hdt. primarily in mind. The words κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί, 'everlasting possession', should be taken to mean, in a general way, 'having permanent value', in the sense of being ὠφέλιμον, 'useful', in the way discussed in the preceding n. Problems arise if we take 'possession for ever' too literally: Th. is not systematic about explaining technical terms (*Thucydides*, 96 ff.) and takes a great deal for granted. By 'prize recitation' (ἀγώνισμα)

I guess Th. means sophistic displays of the kind Kleon speaks of at iii. 38. 7, cf. 3 (prizes), 4 (contests). For the word cf. iii. 82. 7.

23. *Greatness of the Peloponnesian War: its causes*

1. **δυσὸν ναυμαχίαιν καὶ πέρζομαχίαιν**: ‘two battles by sea (*ναυμαχίαιν*)’, Salamis and either Artemisium or Mykale; ‘two by land’ (*πέρζομαχίαιν*), Thermopylae and Plataia (Marathon is surely excluded as not being part of the Persian War proper). David Lewis has noted that Th. could have diminished the Persian War much more effectively by attacking Hdt.’s inflated *numbers* for the Persian host (over 5,000,000!). See *Thucydides*, 108, 202. Th.’s view that the Peloponnesian War was more important than the Persian War is defended by Gomme in ‘The Greatest War in Greek History’, *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford, 1937), 116ff. See, however, I. 2 n. on *κίνησις*: Th. may not have been claiming as much for ‘his’ war as is sometimes thought.

Note in any case that different and more usual priorities are implied at iv. 36. 3. There Th. apologizes for comparing small (Sphakteria) with great (Thermopylai).

2-3. **οὔτε γὰρ πόλεις τοσαῖδε ληφθεῖσαι ἡρημώθησαν . . . ἡ λοιμώδης νόσος**: ‘Never were so many cities captured and depopulated . . . the plague’. Instances of most of these phenomena can be cited from Th.’s narrative, e.g. earthquakes at iii. 87. 4, 89; iv. 56. 2; v. 45. 4, 50. 5; vi. 95. 1; viii. 6. 5, 41. 2; solar eclipses at ii. 28 and iv. 52. 1. We should add that he mentions some phenomena here which do not feature in the narrative, e.g. droughts, *αὐχμοί*; but equally some other phenomena feature in the narrative but are not mentioned here as we would expect, such as the eruption of Mt. Etna at iii. 116. So Th.’s remarks can be more or less justified by reference to his narrative. But we may, while establishing this point, lose sight of a more fundamental one, namely that these two chapters prepare us for a very different kind of narrative from what, for the most part, we will actually get. They suggest a sensational and rhetorical narrative with plenty of natural disasters, vividly described human suffering, and portents in the manner of Livy. (For Tacitus, see further below.) But in fact, the phenomena here listed by Th. are rarely, sporadically, and very briefly recorded in his narrative, except for the Great Plague, with which this section ends and which is fully written up at ii. 47ff. (And perhaps *φόνος . . . διὰ τὸ στασιάζειν*, ‘slaughter . . . civil strife’, prepares us for the Corcyraean events of iii. 82ff.) Clearly, exile, death, civil strife, etc., were directly and causally related to the war. And drought and famine can be caused or aggravated by war, as well as occurring naturally. As for the plague, Th. shows (see ii. 54. 5n.)

awareness that crowded war-time conditions made things worse. But what of the rest?

Th.'s claim that disastrous *natural* phenomena were more frequent during the Peloponnesian War is an embarrassment to his commentators. (The remark at viii. 41. 2, that the Koan earthquake of 412 BC was the worst in living memory, gets no comment from Andrewes in *HCT*. For earthquakes in that part of the world see L. Robert, *Documents d'Asie Mineure* (Paris, 1987), 91-104, esp. 97 and 99 = *BCH* 102 (1978), 395 ff.) One might be tempted to insist that the present passage is not overtly irrational or superstitious, because Th. alleges no explicit causal connection (he does not say, like Hdt. at the otherwise analogous vi. 98, 'this showed that the gods were angry'), but merely records, as a matter of fact, even of coincidence (note the neutral *μετὰ τοῦδε*, 'simultaneously with the war'), that the 27 years of his narrative were unusually rich in such calamities. Certainly, we are expected to remember that in the austere human pages which follow. But this will not quite do. The better view is that Th.'s attitude is not wholly consistent. True, the main plague section in Book ii contains much that is precise and 'scientific' (we shall see that there are problems about just how technical Th. is trying to be); but the *second* occurrence of the plague at iii. 87. 1-3 is accompanied, at 87. 4, by a statement about a simultaneous outbreak of earthquakes. This (see n. there) looks like a return to the 'irrational' manner of the present para. (For another example see iv. 52. 1: eclipse and earthquake about the same time.) On the other hand this is only a partial victory for irrationality, because at iii. 104 (the purification of Delos; see introductory n. there) he will entirely suppress the motivation in terms of purification for the plague.

A closely comparable introductory remark is Tacitus, *Historiæ*, i. 3, which asserts that signs and prodigies accompanied the strictly human events about to be described; but the narrative which follows does not resemble Livy in giving systematic coverage to such portents. (The Tacitus of the *Historiæ* seems more influenced by Th. than the Tacitus of the *Annals*; see iii. 81. 5 n. on *καὶ πατήρ*, etc.)

The present passage is emphasized and indeed over-emphasized by A. J. Woodman, *Rhetoric in Classical Historiography* (London, 1988), 28 ff., in support of his thesis that Th. is rhetorical rather than 'scientific'. See further ii. 47. 3-54, introductory n. (at end): Woodman's view requires him to stress certain features of the main plague description at the expense of others. But he is right to insist that we do not lose sight of the Th. who could write in the manner of the present passage. For a good discussion of Woodman see J. L. Moles, *History of the Human Sciences*, iii (1990), 317 ff.

Generally, see H. Strasburger, *Studien zur alten Geschichte* (Hildesheim and New York, 1982), ii. 989, for *suffering* as Th.'s criterion of the greatness of the Peloponnesian War, and comparing, with the present passage, Hdt. vi. 98.

4. **λύσαντες τὰς τριακοντούτεις σπονδὰς:** 'broke the Thirty Years Peace'. Concluded after the reduction by Athens of the Euboian revolt in 446. See 115. 1 n.

5. **τοῦ μή τινα ζητῆσαί ποτε:** 'so that in time to come no one may be at a loss to know'. At first sight this claim to be foreclosing future inquiry seems an expression of arrogant modernity, an anticipation of the confidence and intolerance of Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists. But 22. 4 makes it clear that Th.'s aim is *usefulness* to the future inquirer. In the present passage Th. means no more than that nobody for the future need be at a loss for *an* answer to the question, 'why did Athens and Sparta come to blows?' See Loraux (introductory n. to ch. 1 above), 159 f.

6. **τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν, ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἠγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. αἶδ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι αἶδ' ἦσαν ἐκατέρων:** 'The true though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of Athenian power, which terrified the Spartans and forced them into war; but the reasons publicly alleged on either side were as follows'. The celebrated statement of the 'true cause' of the Peloponnesian War. The phrase *ἀληθεστάτη πρόφασις*, 'true cause', recurs at vi. 6. 1, to describe the Athenian motives for the Sicilian expedition—see n. there; the repetition is obviously deliberate, see H. Rawlings, *The Structure of Thucydides' History* (Princeton, 1981), 68—but nowhere else in Greek literature.

The word *πρόφασις* could be derived either from *πρόφημι*, from a root meaning 'say' or 'speak'; or from *προφαίνω*, from a root meaning 'show'. If the first sense is uppermost the word means roughly 'reason given', and has a causal sense, otherwise it means the 'preappearance' of a phenomenon. This latter is the secondary or medical use: see H. Rawlings, *A Semantic Study of Prophasis to 400 BC*, *Hermes Einzelschrift* 33 (1975), who prefers the secondary meaning in the present passage. But A. Heubeck, 'πρόφασις und keine Ende (zu Thuk. i 23)', *Glotta* 58 (1980), 222 ff., rejects Rawlings's conclusion, and takes the word to refer here to what was *said* (though he wisely adds that Th.'s usage is deliberately challenging, and that we are here dealing neither with a simple case of the general nor of the medical use). See also J. S. Richardson, 'Thucydides i. 23. 6 and the Debate About the Peloponnesian War', in E. M. Craik (ed.), *Owls to Athens: Essays in Classical Studies Presented to Sir*

Kenneth Dover (Oxford, 1990), 155 ff. Richardson stresses that Th. is aiming not at remote posterity but is describing and contributing to a current debate; hence the language of 'speaking' must be right.

Prophasis here, whatever its etymology (and Heubeck is surely right that the alternatives should not be too starkly posed) must mean 'underlying cause' as opposed to the 'reasons openly given out at the time' (*αἱ δ' ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι*). The word *ἀληθεστάτη*, 'true', makes the causal sense absolutely clear (see also below, ii. 49. 2 n.). Th.'s choice of nouns is arresting; we might have expected some word like *προσχήματα*, 'pretexts', instead of *αἰτίαι*, 'reasons' (but that might have suggested actual fraudulence rather than secondary importance. Th. is *not* denying that the *αἰτίαι* have 'genuine explanatory force', so correctly M. Heath, 'Thucydides I. 23. 5-6', *LCM* 11 (1986), 104). And words in *προ-* might be thought to imply something held out or offered, i.e. a pretext rather than a real cause (but see above on the conclusive *ἀληθεστάτη*). Note that at 118. 1 *πρόφασις* is used, by implication, of the *Kerkyraika* and *Potidaika*! See generally L. Pearson, 'Prophasis and Aitia', *TAPA* 83 (1952), 205 ff. = D. Lateiner and S. Stephens (eds.), *Selected Papers of Lionel Pearson* (Chico, California, 1983), 91 ff.

The explicit formulation of a distinction between profound and superficial causes is arguably Th.'s greatest single contribution to later history-writing: see *Thucydides*, 30, 191. Momigliano has claimed that Hdt. 'already instinctively knew' this distinction, and used it to better effect; Th. (says Momigliano) merely gave it a more precise formulation: *Studies in Historiography* (London, 1966), 118. It is true that there are passages in Hdt. (e.g. iv. 167. 3, with *Thucydides*, 15; vi. 44. 1; vi. 133. 1) which give pretexts for actions and go on to say 'but really ...'. That sort of 'instinctive' knowledge is, however, not the same as an explicit, formal, and thought-out statement on the main theme of his book, of the kind Th. gives us here.

On the causes of the war, G. de Ste. Croix, *OPW*, is a powerful examination, but does not convince me that Th. was wrong to think that Athenian imperialism, and Spartan fear of it, caused the war; see *Greek World*, ch. 8. See also above, 18. 3 n. De Ste. Croix can certainly find plenty of support in Th. for his view of Spartan culpability; but see, for the suggestion that Th. systematically misrepresented the Spartans as hypocritical and treacherous in the run-up to the war, the acute paper of E. Badian, 'Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War: A Historian's Brief', in *From Plataea to Potidaea* (see above, 1997 preface), 125-62.

Against the theory that Th. changed his mind about the causes of the

war, see *Thucydides*, 60, 144. (The theory is based partly on the idea that the present passage sits uneasily in its context.)

The words ἀφανεστάτη δὲ λόγῳ, 'unavowed', lit. 'not put forward openly in words', do not quite have the force of an English superlative: since Th. puts an open statement of the 'true cause' into the mouth of a Corcyraean speaker at Athens in 33. 3, it would be nonsense for Th. to suggest that there was total silence on the 'true cause' at Athens (he certainly allows speakers to mention it at *Sparta*, 86 below, though even there Sthenelaidas makes no mention of Spartan *fear*, which is arguably an integral part of the 'truest cause'). The superlative has, in fact, the force of a comparative: it was relatively little mentioned, by comparison with the particular grievances. This is highly plausible in the run-up to a war. See P. J. Rhodes, 'Thucydides on the Causes of the Peloponnesian War', *Hermes*, 115 (1987), 154ff., who thinks that in his account of the war Th. was 'taking pleasure in showing that he knows better than popular opinion' (160). 'Unavowed' would then be an aggressive way of saying that most people did not realize the truth.

Much has been written about ἀναγκάσαι, 'forced', and Th.'s concept of ἀνάγκη, 'necessity'; I agree with Macleod, who translates the noun as 'necessity' or 'pressure', that it 'need not imply predetermination or total lack of choice': Macleod, 88 and n. 1, and works there cited, esp. Dover, *JHS* 93 (1973), 58ff., on Agamemnon's dilemma; and add M. Ostwald, *ΑΝΑΓΚΗ in Thucydides* (Atlanta, Ga., 1988) = *American Classical Studies* 18.

24-55. THE CORCYRA EPISODE (THE *KERKYRAIKA*)

This quarrel, like the Potidaia episode which follows, is a quarrel between Corinth and one of her colonies. On each occasion, Athens is drawn in, and fights Corinthian forces.

The whole section is studied, with text, translation and explanatory notes, by J. B. Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra: Strategy and Tactics in the Peloponnesian War* (Bristol, 1987). This is useful within the obvious limits of its title.

Th. gives us very little about the Corinthian north-western expansion in 480-435 which formed the background to the Corinthian-Corcyraean tension described in chs. 24-55. This was no doubt 'for fear of diverting attention from what he saw as the more important Spartan fear of Athens': Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 279 n. 30. Salmon's ch. 20 gives a good, coherent account of the fifth-century development of Corinthian

interests in the region. For the Epidamnus and Corcyra incidents see his ch. 21.

Another issue on which Th. is silent here is the date of Athens' alliance with Akarnania, casually mentioned at ii. 68. 8. Scholars are divided about whether to put this in the 450s, or in the early 430s—in which case it would be very relevant to the Corinthian–Athenian tensions in the north-west because of Corinth's interests elsewhere in this general region. Gomme originally inclined to 432 but eventually opted for the 450s. See my n. on ii. 68.

Except for the vague *πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου*, 'before the . . . war', at 24. 5, Th. does not date the Epidamnus prelude to the Corcyra episode, but the battle of Sybota (chs. 52 ff.) was in August 433 (see ML 61 comm.), and 31. 1 shows that the battle of Leukimne (chs. 29–30) was two full years before that. The tension between Epidamnus and Corcyra must therefore belong in the months before August 435.

On the Kallias decrees (ML 58 = Fornara 119) and their relevance to the Corcyra debate see below, 44. 2 n.

Athenian alliances or rather renewals of alliances in 433/2 with the western cities of Rhegion and Leontini (ML 63 and 64 = Fornara 124, 125) are also relevant to Athens' Corcyraean commitment. See below, 115. 1 n. It is possible that Athens' proxeny grant to Artas of Messapia belongs now; see vii. 33. 4 n., citing M. Walbank, *Athenian Proxenies of the Fifth Century BC* (Toronto and Sarasota, 1978), comm. on his no. 70, and Santoro in *Chiarelli Studies* (1972). Another possible context is 427; see iii. 86. 3 n. Equally, this may be the context of the original alliance with Italian Metapontion/Metapontum, alluded to at vii. 33. 5; so P. Wuilleumier, *Tarente des origines à la conquête romaine* (Paris, 1939), 60.

24. 1. Ἐπίδαμνός ἐστι πόλις: 'The city of Epidamnus is situated'. On this 'Homeric' opening see *Thucydides*, 116, and for such 'topographical' introductions to a new development see A. Hoekstra in A. Heubeck and A. Hoekstra, *Commentary on Homer's Odyssey*, ii: Books ix–xvi (Oxford, 1989), 169, on xiii. 96. Dionysius of Halikarnassos, *On Literary Composition* 4 (= S. Usher, Loeb, *Critical Essays*, ii (Harvard, 1985), 39) thought this an example of 'direct and forensic' writing (*ὀρθὸν καὶ ἐναγώνιον*).

Hammond (*Epirus*, 449) thinks that Th. here drew on Hekataios; that if true would not reduce the literary effectiveness of the opening. E. M. W. Tillyard, *The English Epic and its Background* (Oxford, 1954), 40 ff., denied the title of epic to Th.'s work, preferring to see its affiliations with tragedy. This neglects Th.'s own personal education, which surely included a grounding in the great epic poems. For the poetic affiliations of Th. see *Thucydides*, ch. 5.

See also F. Sieveking, 'Die Funktion geographischer Mitteilungen im Geschichtswerk des Thukydides', *Klio*, 42 (1964), 73-179, at 119ff. (in the course of a long and valuable article which, however, exaggerates the extent to which all Th.'s geographical information is directly relevant to the narrative; for counter-instances see iii. 96. 1 n.; or iv. 24. 5 n. on Charybdis).

2. οἰκιστῆς δ' ἐγένετο Φάλιος . . . Κορίνθιος: 'under the leadership of a Corinthian, Phalios'. The material in these chapters is very revealing about colonial relations with mother-cities; see A. J. Graham, *Colony and Mother-City in Ancient Greece*² (Chicago, 1983), 31, 147-50. For oikists generally see above, ch. 4 n., and for the summoning of an oikist from the original mother-city, when a colony itself founded a colony, see I. Malkin, *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece* (Leiden, 1987), 132f. Note that Th. makes no connection with 13. 4 where the relationship between Corcyra and her mother-city Corinth has already been adumbrated.

3. δύναμις μεγάλη καὶ πολυάνθρωπος: 'powerful and populous'. Epidamnus was the later Dyrrachium (Durazzo), at the western end of the later Via Egnatia. It controlled the shortest crossing from Greece to Italy, which ran a little to the south, and was always a place of importance, in Byzantine times 'the western key of the empire': Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ed. Bury (London, 1896), vi. 196.

4. ὡς λέγεται: 'is said'. By whom? Probably oral informants. Contrast iii. 94. 5, a mere expression of caution (the Aitolians 'are said' to eat raw meat; see n. there). Westlake, 'λέγεται in Thucydides', *Mnemosyne*, 30 (1977), 345ff., at 357, suggests Hekataios as the source here.

5. ὁ δῆμος αὐτῶν ἐξεδίωξε τοὺς δυνατούς: 'the leading men were overthrown and driven out by the people'. The first relevant event of the whole war-narrative is an episode of the 'class struggle', on which see further iii. 82-3, introductory n.

6. δεόμενοι . . . καταλύσαι: 'begging . . . put an end to'. In effect a small speech—the first in Th.—though given in indirect speech. It should be judged by the criteria given at 22. 1. It would be foolish to deny it the status of ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα, 'what was actually said', although it is repeated, *mutatis mutandis*, at 25. 2 and Th. could have worked out the necessary differences (appeal to metropolis; appeal to supplier of oikist) for himself.

7. ταῦτα δὲ ἰκέται καθεζόμενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον: 'sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera'. For 'supplication', ἰκετεία, see the excellent article by J. Gould, 'Hiketeia', *JHS* 93 (1973), 74ff.; supplication might be face to face, as on the battlefield, or—as in the present passage—by contact with an altar or other sacred ground. See also

Parker, *Miasma*, 181 ff., who develops this distinction between ‘help me’ supplication (as here) and ‘spare me’ supplication, for which see iii. 70 ff. and nn. (Corcyra). Gould and Parker agree that ‘spare me’, or ‘battle-field’, supplication is a ‘crisis extension’ of the other, primary, kind.

25. 1. ἐν ἀπόρῳ εἶχοντο θέσθαι τὸ παρόν: ‘did not know what to do’ [lit. ‘they were inclined to place the present affair in doubtfulness’]. A quaint expression perhaps suggested by the solemn religious context. The closest parallel in Th. is at iii. 22. 6.

ἐς Δελφούς: ‘to Delphi’. On this consultation see the important study by R. C. T. Parker, ‘Greek States and Greek Oracles’, *CRUX*, 298 ff., at 310: it was appropriate for Delphi to deal with ritual ties arising from colonization, but on the present occasion the issue had serious political implications. Texts like this support Parker against the wholly secular picture in M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), 92 ff., against which see also M. Goodman and A. J. Holladay, ‘Religious Scruples in Ancient Warfare’, *CQ* 36 (1986), 151 ff.

Note that the Epidamnians consult Delphi, not the older and (for them) much nearer oracle at Dodona: this shows that Delphi’s prestige was still paramount after the Persian Wars (against the idea that Delphi ‘medized’ see Parker, 318). On *Syll*³ 73 (Athenian dedication at Dodona, ??429) see Parker, 329, and below, ii. 92. 4 n. and introductory n. to iii. 104, sect. A (iv).

εἰ παραδοίεν: ‘if they should hand over’. For this kind of surrender see ii. 68. 7–8 n. on *διδόασιν* etc.

2. ἐλθόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάμνιοι: ‘the Epidamnians went’. For this Epidamnian ‘speech’ see 25. 6 n. above.

3. κατὰ τε τὸ δίκαιον . . . ἅμα δὲ καὶ μίσει: ‘partly to vindicate their own rights . . . partly too because they hated’. As so often, Th. is very confident about motive; but see above 5. 1 n. on *ἠγουμένων*, ‘hoped’: he was probably extrapolating from the facts known to him. Th.’s account is perfectly satisfactory without invoking commercial motives (desire for Adriatic silver or other trading commodities) on Corinth’s part: see Finley, below, 37. 3 n.

3–4. ὅτι αὐτῶν παρημέλουν ὄντες ἄποικοι· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νομιζόμενα: ‘who were their own colony but slighted them. In their common festivals they would not allow them the customary privileges of founders’ [the last two words are not in the Greek, but that is what is referred to]. For a good illustration of what this means, see a fourth-century decree about the relations of Athens and Paros. The Parians are to bring an ox and panoply to the Panathenaia and an ox and phallus to the Dionysia,

ἐπειδὴ [τ]υγχάνουσ[ι] ἄποικοι ὄντες (note that Th. has this exact phrase) τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων, 'since they are colonists of the people of the Athenians'. Text in S. Accame, *La lega ateniese del sec. iv a.c.* (Rome, 1940), 230.

4. οὔτε Κορινθίῳ ἄνδρι προκαταρχόμενοι τῶν ἱερῶν: 'At their sacrifices they did not give priority to Corinthians'. For the elucidation of this see W. Burkert, *Homo Necans*, tr. P. Bing (Berkeley, 1983), 37 and n. 14: Burkert compares Andoc. i. 126 (ἐκέλευον κατάρξασθαι τὸν Καλλίαν, 'they ordered Kallias to begin [the sacrifice]') and translates Th. as follows: 'they did not perform the rites of "beginning" for a man of Corinth' i.e. give Corinthians priority in the gruesome preliminary rituals. Burkert writes 'the hierarchies manifested in the ceremony are given great social importance and are taken very seriously. An ancient epic, the *Thebaid*, relates that Oedipus cursed his sons because he was given the wrong piece of sacrificial meat'. See also Ar. *Peace*, 1056, with Sommerstein's good n.

κατὰ τὴν Φαιακῶν προενοίκησιν . . . κλέος ἔχόντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς: 'they . . . would claim for themselves the naval renown of the Phaiakians, who were the ancient inhabitants'. Scheria, the island of the Phaiakians described in *Odyssey*, vi-vii, was an idealized colony: see L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* (London, 1976), 51; Corcyra was an early and famous example of the colonial reality. The equation was apt. On the relation of Corcyra to the Homeric Scheria see the interesting discussion of J. G. Howie, 'The Phaeacians in the *Odyssey*: Fable and Territorial Claim', *Shadow* 6 (1989), 25 ff., and cp. iii. 70. 4 (the precinct of Alkinoos at Corcyra) and n. there. See also Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge, 1968), 186: 'there was a sail store in the well planned port of Homeric Phaeacia, which the later Corcyraeans claimed as the forerunner of their city.'

ἐξηρτύοντο: 'to strengthen' [lit. 'fit out']. A favourite verb of Th. for fleets. See 1. 1 and frequently.

τριήρεις γὰρ εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατόν: 'a hundred and twenty triremes'. A very impressive navy indeed, see 29. 1 n. We do not have the evidence to say confidently why Corcyra needed such a navy, but the expansion of Corinthian interests in the north-west during the *pentekontaetia* must be relevant (for this development see Salmon, ch. 20). Lewis, *CAH* v². 374, suggests that Corcyra needed to deal with Adriatic pirates (as well as wanting to maintain old Phaiakian traditions, for which see above). Note, however, against the idea that there was much Adriatic piracy before the second half of the fourth century, H. J. Dell, 'The Origin and Nature of Illyrian Piracy', *Historia*, 16 (1967), 344 ff.

26. 1. οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπεμπον ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαμνον ἄσμενοι: 'The Corinthians were very happy to send help to Epidamnus'. Epidamnus may have issued a special coinage in connection with these events, a Corinthian-style Pegasus but with ε instead of the usual Corinthian Ϝ: C. M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (London, 1976), 84 and pl. 248. Kraay suggests that this brief issue was to finance Corinthian aid. **οἰκήτορά τε:** 'as colonists'. Lewis, *CAH* v². 374, suggests that the Corinthians were competing with the Athenian-sponsored foundation of Thurii (443 BC).

2. Ἀπολλωνίαν, Κορινθίων οὔσαν ἀποικίαν: 'Apollonia, which was a colony of theirs'. Th. here implies that Apollonia was a purely Corinthian colony, but as both Hammond and Salmon point out (*Epirus*, 424 and n. 2; *Wealthy Corinth*, 211), it was a joint foundation of Corinth and Corcyra: Strabo, 316, and Ps.-Skymnos (author of a Hellenistic geographical poem), line 440. However, this tradition may be the result of Corcyraean manipulation of the facts. See also P. Calligas, 'An Inscribed Lead Plaque from Korkyra', *BSA* 66 (1971), 79ff., at 84. See further 30. 2 n. for the formula 'which was a colony of theirs'; the present passage is a straightforward example (Apollonia was a natural base for Corinth), but sometimes the effect of the formula is subversive in that what is being described violates colonial norms.

3. κατ' ἐπήρειαν: 'In insulting language'.

τάφους τε ἀποδεικνύτες: 'pointing to the tombs'. For such an appeal to ancestral tombs cp. Aesch. *Persai*, 405. But here the appeal may have been quite literal: having arrived at Corcyra, the exiles no doubt made speeches in the theatre and waved in the direction of the necropolis outside the walls. Compare the Plataians' appeal to tombs and ancestors (iii. 53-69, introductory n.).

καὶ συγγένειαν: 'kinship'. See 95. 1 n. on *κατὰ τὸ συγγενές*, 'because of their kinship with them'.

27. 1. Κορίνθιοι δέ: 'the Corinthians'. At this point, says Salmon (283) with some justice, 'it would have been wise for Corinth to desist' (although the loss of face would have been enormous); cp. his 291: 'in the whole Corcyra affair the Corinthians had acted with thoughtless aggression.'

ἐκήρυσσον: 'they proclaimed'. See 67. 3 n.

ἐπὶ τῇ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ: 'and enjoy equal rights of citizenship' [lit. 'on equal and like terms']. For this phrase see ML 5 = Fornara 18, lines 27-8 (the fourth-century inscription from Cyrene containing the oath sworn by the original settlers in c.630 BC) and for discussion see A. J. Graham, *JHS* 80 (1960), 108. (The closest parallel in time and place is in the Athenian

regulations for the Euboian town of Hestiaia in c.446, *IG* 1³. 41, line 52, but there some of the words ἐπι ἴσε[ι καὶ ἁμοίαι . . .] have obviously been restored from the present passage of Th.). For the idea of equal shares at the foundation of a colony see *Syll*³ 141 (fourth-century text from Black Corcyra, an island further up the Adriatic coast from Corcyra proper). The Cyrene arrangements dealt with a *new* colony, where equal shares were natural. If the idea was that here at Epidamnus there should be an equal share-out of land, it is hard to see how some kind of redistribution could be avoided (the Epidamnian democrats of 24. 5 were presumably now in occupation of the entire civic area). One might reply that ἴση, 'equal', etc. just means that none of the *new* colonists were to be politically privileged as against each other, whatever their status back home had been (Graham, *Colony and Mother City* (24. 2 n.), 59, discussing Th. i. 27, renders the words in question 'they assured their equality of status', though even he seems, despite this general formulation, to have land distribution specifically in mind). But see next n.

πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς καταθέντα: 'if he made a deposit of fifty Corinthian drachmae'. These words do suggest that some sort of redistribution was anticipated; a deposit would secure an allotment when the land was divided up (for such land-division see the Athenian rules for Brea in Thrace c.446, *ML* 49 = Fornara 100).

2. Θηβαίους . . . χρήματα: 'From the Thebans . . . they asked for money', i.e. not ships. Thebes made little attempt to be a naval power till the 360s.

τρισχίλιοι ὀπλίται: 'three thousand hoplites'. See 29. 1-2 n., at end.

28. 1. μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Σικυωνίων: 'taking with them Spartan and Sikyonian delegates'. For Spartans and Sikyonians as appropriate mediators on this occasion see Audrey Griffin, *Sikyon* (Oxford, 1982), 63. It is significant, for the question of responsibility for the Peloponnesian War, that Sparta is clearly willing to defuse the situation. It is also significant that their role is so ineffective and 'inglorious' on this, their first appearance in the narrative proper. For this point see Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 129.

2. τούτους κρατεῖν: 'Their [the arbitrators'] decision was to be final'; Jowett's rendering is loose but right. The verb means that whichever party was judged by the arbitrators to be successful in the arbitration would *prevail* (absol^u+ely). See Graham, *Colony and Mother City*, 134 f., against those translations (including, incidentally, Brunt's 1963 revision of Jowett) which take κρατεῖν to mean 'control', understanding Epidamnus as the object. That is, the passage implies nothing portentous about metropolitan control of colonies.

τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς μαντεῖῳ ἐπιτρέψαι: 'leave the matter in the hands of the Delphic oracle'. For Delphic arbitration between states (rare, but attested) see Parker, *CRUX*, 309f., and M. N. Tod, *International Arbitration amongst the Greeks* (Oxford, 1913), 95, who explains the surprisingly insignificant part played by the Delphic oracle in interstate arbitration by pointing to the unsatisfactory (Parker says 'whimsical') procedure at Diod. xv. 18 (fourth-century Delphic arbitration between Klazomenai and Kyme): 'no board of judges is appointed, no inquiry is held, no witnesses are heard' (Tod). On the Delphic *amphictionic* arbitration between Athens and Delos in 345 about control of Delos see H. Wankel's commentary (Heidelberg, 1976) on Dem. xviii. 134: the facts are not as certain as usually thought, and the involvement of Delphi has a special explanation just after 346, when Philip for the first time got control of a vote in the Amphictiony. But in any case Wankel is wrong, in his otherwise extremely valuable long n., to cite the present passage of Th. as an analogy. The reference here is to the *oracle* not the amphictiony, for Th.'s silence on which see 112. 5n.

3. οὓς οὐ βούλονται: 'whom they would rather not'. This is a threat that they will join Athens.

4-5. οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι . . . ἕως ἂν ἡ δίκη γένηται: 'The Corinthians . . . until the decision was given'. See Salmon, 284.

29. 1-2. Κορίνθιοι δὲ . . . Ἰσάρχου: 'The Corinthians . . . son of Isarchos'. These two paragraphs are characteristic of Th. in one of his moods; they contain much detailed factual information. Some of it, like the patronymics, is hard to account for except by assuming that Th. intended in some sense to be comprehensive. [See Stroud, *Chiron*, 1994.]

As for the particular numbers, Morrison and Coates (62 n. 1) suggest that the 75 Corcyraean ships and 2000 men can be broken down as follows: 42 troop-carriers and 33 fast triremes = 2010 hoplites (42 × 40) + (33 × 10). '2000 is a round number', they say. It is, I think, futile to worry about the 'discrepancy' between the numbers here and those at 27. 2, where we hear of 3000 hoplites. That ch. was concerned, as Th. stresses more than once, with *preparations*. But note that Lewis (*Towards a Historian's Text*, 54) showed an easy way in which the present manuscript reading could have been corrupted from '70 ships and 5000 hoplites'.

3. ἀκατίῳ: 'a small boat'. For this kind of small sculling-boat see Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge, 1968), 245.

ζεύξαντές τε τὰς παλαιὰς ὥστε πλωίμους εἶναι: 'strengthened [lit. 'yoked'] their old ships to make them seaworthy'. For the translation and probable explanation of this passage see Morrison and Williams, 295:

'this practice is probably that of fitting *hupozomata* to ships which are not on the active list'. For *hupozomata* ('undergirdles'), which were perhaps cables running internally from bow to stern, see now Morrison and Coates, 170–2, 197–9, 220–1. There may be some relation between the 'yoking' in the present passage and the word *διάζυξ*, which appears in fourth-century navy-lists, for instance, *IG* ii². 1632, line 123. However, the meaning of this word is obscure, see A. Boeckh, *Urkunden über das Seewesen* (Berlin, 1840), 104.

30. 1. τῆς Κερκυραίας: 'on Corcyraean territory'. A more precise expression than the usual tr. 'of Corcyra': see Hammond, *Epirus*, 446.

2. Λευκάδα τὴν Κορινθίων ἀποικίαν: 'Leukas, a Corinthian colony'. This and 26. 2 (see n. there) are the first occurrences in Th.'s routine narrative (24. 1 is more formal and elaborate) of a kind of label which occurs frequently in his work. In part this is inherited from Hdt. (see e.g. Hdt. i. 174. 1); but Th. makes special use of it: sometimes a colonial relationship is mentioned precisely because the context, or the behaviour described, violates expected obligations of kin. See LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 90f. So here two Corinthian daughter-cities come to blows. See also i. 56. 1 (Potidaia) and iii. 102. 2 (Molykreion), both Corinthian colonies within the Athenian Empire; and above all vii. 57. But the label does not always flag an abnormality: sometimes the expectation is fulfilled, not violated (see e.g. 26. 2 and n.); and sometimes the colonial relationship mentioned has no obvious special significance at all (see iv. 88. 2 and n.). See also iv. 7. 1, where the label may perform more than one function, and n. there.

Κυλλήνην τὸ Ἠλείων ἐπίγειον: 'Kyllene, where the Eleans had their docks'. The site is west of Elis between Capes Araxos and Chelonatas (Strabo, 337); it is still strictly unidentified, see Walbank on Polybius, iv. 9. 9, but R. Baladié, *Le Péloponnèse de Strabon: Étude de géographie historique* (Paris, 1980), 64, puts it on Cape Chelonatas, the more southerly of the two capes, more than 20 km. from the *polis* of Elis. This is the site formerly called Glarentza (Frankish 'Clarence'), near Chlemoutsi Castle. The alternative site (for which see Baladié, 89) is at Kounoupeli, further north towards Araxos, and even further from Elis. It was not rare for the harbour of a *polis* to be some distance from the main settlement; the most striking case is Gytheion, 45 km. south of Sparta.

31. 1. καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος: 'from the rest of Greece'. See 35. 4 n.

4. τοιάδε: 'as follows' [lit., 'approximately this']. Th.'s most usual formula for introducing speeches. Against attempts to use this formula, or departures from it, to determine the degree of authenticity of the speeches, see i. 85. 3 n. on *ἔλεξεν*, etc. and iii. 29. 2 n. on *ἔλεξεν* . . . *τάδε*.

32–43. *Speeches at Athens of the Corcyraeans (32–6) and Corinthians (37–43)*

These speeches well illustrate the difficulties raised by Th.'s programmatic statement at i. 22. 1; different scholars have taken them to illustrate the two very different elements in the programme, the truthful and the appropriate: for N. G. L. Hammond, 'The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches in Thucydides, With Special Reference to That of Hermokrates at Gela' in P. Stadter (ed.), *The Speeches in Thucydides* (Chapel Hill, 1973), 49ff., at 41f., the present debate is 'a model of the extreme instance when [Th.] reported the general sense of what was actually said'. Macleod (55), on the other hand, takes almost exactly the opposite view. For him, the Corinthian speech represents, broadly, 'justice', and the Corcyraean speech represents 'expediency' (but see 32. 1 n. on *δίκαιον* and M. Heath, *Historia*, 39 (1990), 389).

The structure of this pair of speeches is not complex. The Corcyraeans, after an apology for their previous isolationism, begin by saying that it will be in Athens' interests to help Corcyra, particularly because Corcyra has a large navy to offer. At ch. 34 they address the issue of justice, dealing (i) a little defensively with the argument that as Corinthian colonists they owe special obligations; then (ii) pointing out that they themselves offered arbitration, and (iii) anticipating in ch. 35 an objection in terms of Athens' own treaty obligations under the Thirty Years Peace. Ch. 36 returns to considerations of expediency (the desirable Corcyraean navy). The Corinthians begin by picking up the reference to Corcyraean isolationism and placing it in a discreditable light (ch. 37). They then cover the arguments (i) from colonial obligation (ch. 38), (ii) arbitration (ch. 39, but they have already touched on the theme at 37. 5; see n. there), and (iii) the Thirty Years Peace (ch. 40). So far they have taken the Corcyraeans' points more or less in order, but now they put forward new and positive arguments of their own, namely the benefits they have conferred on Athens in the past (in effect, ch. 40. 4 to the end of the speech at 43. 4). They notice the point about the Corcyraean navy only briefly, at 42. 2.

The Corcyraean speech raises interesting questions about the relation of Th. to the rhetorical handbooks of the fourth century and later, in particular, the 'Rhetoric to Alexander' (for text see Loeb Aristotle, vol. xvi) sometimes attributed to Alexander and sometimes to Anaximenes. At 1424^b28ff., the author of that work gives instructions to an orator seeking an alliance. Th.'s Corcyraeans seem to have 'followed' that advice remarkably closely—or is the truth rather that the fourth-century compiler of the handbook followed the fifth-century Th.? See *Thucydides*,

47 ff., (but see Heath, above) and for a historical instance of a set of speeches modelled on Th.'s Corcyra debate see M. Frederiksen, *Campaignia*, ed. N. Purcell (London, 1984), 183 (Livy's account of Rome's acceptance of the Capuan *deditio* or formal surrender).

It is possible that two of the Corcyraean envoys, named Thersandros and Simylos, died at Athens on this mission (rather than on a fourth-century Corcyraean mission with which their funerary epigram in the Kerameikos was formerly associated. Their funerary monument was perhaps repaired at the time of the second mission, which was in 375 BC). See *Archaeological Reports* for 1972–3, 5, and, for a convenient text of the epigram but with the old dating, Tod, ii, p. 84; also U. Knigge, *Der Kerameikos von Athen* (Athens, 1988; see ii. 34. 5 n.), 99 ff., giving photograph. Until recent times the death of a diplomat while on a temporary mission was a common phenomenon; see Fraser, *Berytus* 13 (1960), 161, for the third century BC, Pol. xxx. 21. 2 for the second, and for another fifth-century example ML, p. 175 (man from Rhegion dies at Athens). The reasons were the slow pace of transport, combined with the age of ambassadors (the word *πρεσβευτής*, 'ambassador' comes from a root meaning 'old'). For the 'dangers' of foreign diplomatic travel see *Syll*³ 591, line 13.

32–36. *Speech of the Corcyraeans*

32. 1. **δίκαιον**: 'it is right'. The whole sentence is in fact about expediency, which bears out Macleod's view (introductory n. above) that the Corcyraeans' speech as a whole broadly represents expediency. But it is striking that the very first word of their speech means 'right' or 'just'. Th. cunningly represents them as paying lip-service to the principle, found in the rhetorical treatises, that when asking for an alliance you should show that your cause is just: see iii. 10. 1 n. on *περὶ γὰρ δικαίου*. In fact, the best the Corcyraeans can manage in this department is to claim that the Athenians, by helping them, will not actually be doing wrong: see 34. 1 and 35. 1 and nn.

ὡς καὶ ξύμφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ μή, ὅτι γε οὐκ ἐπιζήμια: 'will be expedient, or at any rate not positively damaging'. With this programme cp. the definition of the doctor/statesman's aim which Th. puts into the mouth of Nikias at vi. 14: *ὅς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλείστα ἢ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάβῃ*, 'to help or at least not willingly to harm'. Cp. *Thucydides*, 131.

3. **τετύχηκε δέ . . . ἀξύμφορον**: 'inconsistent . . . present moment'. A perfectly balanced sentence [the literal meaning of the relevant phrases is as follows:

πρὸς τε ὑμᾶς . . . ἄλογον, 'inconsistent . . . as far as you are concerned'

ἐς τὰ ἡμέτερα . . . ἀξύμφορον, 'contrary to interests . . . as far as we are concerned'].

However, as Classen-Steup observe in their ed., the antithesis between the two adjectives ('inconsistent . . . contrary to our own interest') is a little forced. They also note the variation *πρός* . . . *ἐς*. For this kind of 'antithesis with variation' see A. Parry, 'Thucydides' Use of Abstract Language', *Yale French Studies*, 45 (1970), 3 ff., at 8 f. (reprinted in *The Language of Achilles and Other Papers* (Oxford, 1989), ch. 14). Th. evidently applied much polish to this first speech of the work.

4. περιέστηκεν ἡ δοκοῦσα ἡμῶν πρότερον σωφροσύνη: 'instead of being wisdom, as we once thought, has now . . . proved' [lit. 'what we formerly thought of as our wisdom has now turned out . . .']. The use of an abstract noun in this dynamic active way is very Thucydidean, see Parry (above), 13 f. Parry thinks Th. belongs at the stage of what he calls 'social abstraction' (which is a little further on from concrete abstraction and proverbial abstraction). In this stage the abstract words 'are independent entities, and they can dominate whole passages of writing. But they are *social* because they always imply a clear human state or a clear mode of behaviour: they have not lost dramatic and human reference'.

On the word *σωφροσύνη* (wisdom, prudence, moderation) see H. North, *Sophrosyne* (Cornell, 1966); and *Thucydides*, 162 and n. 32. Often in Th. (though not here) the word has conservative, oligarchic connotations. K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford, 1974), 119, says that the criterion of *σωφροσύνη* is 'the overcoming of the impulse to immediate or short-term pleasure or gain' and cites Antiphon the Sophist, fr. B 58. See also H. Lloyd-Jones, 'Ehre und Schande in der griechischen Kultur', *Antike und Abendland*, 33 (1987), 1 ff., at 3 ff.

νῦν ἀβουλία καὶ ἀσθένεια φαινομένη: 'has now proved to be folly and weakness'. It is perhaps an accidental irony that it should be precisely the Corcyraeans who are made thus to describe a change in the verbal evaluation of a particular human tendency (in this case, isolationism). In the description of the Corcyraean *stasis*, Th. will show how this kind of change happens under stress of war: iii. 82. 4 with J. B. Wilson, *CQ* 32 (1982), 18 ff. It is appropriate, to say the least, that here we should be offered an illustration by the Corcyraeans themselves in the stress of the prelude to the war.

5. ἀπραγμοσύνη: 'lazy neutrality'. For the meaning of this word here, see L. B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian* (Oxford, 1985), 45: maintaining peace by avoiding conflict, roughly equivalent to *ἡσυχία*, 'peace', at 71. 1 (Carter aptly observes that at 70. 8 we have *ἡσυχία ἀπράγμων*, 'the quiet of inaction', lit. 'peaceful *ἀπραγμοσύνη*'). The opposite, Athenian,

quality, was *πολυπραγμοσύνη*, imperialistic restlessness or meddlesomeness, about which much has been written—too much, according to J. Allison, *AJAH* 4 (1979), 10 ff., who notes that the noun is found once only in Th. (vi. 87. 3). See also P. Harding, 'In Search of a Polypragmatist', in *Classical Contributions: Studies in Honour of M. F. McGregor*, ed. G. Shrimpton and D. McCargar (New York, 1981), 41 ff. See also below, ii. 40. 2 n. on *μόνοι γάρ* and ii. 63. 3 nn.

33. 2. ναυτικόν τε κεκτήμεθα: 'we have a navy'. Cp. the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, 1424^b40, with Macleod, *Essays*, 88: the state asking for an alliance should show that it has *δύναμιν μεγάλην*, 'powerful resources'. See also 36. 3 n. and iii. 11. 4 n.

3. τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ πολεμῆσειόντας: 'that the Spartans, fearing the growth of your power, are eager for war'. This important sentence, a clear echo of the 'true cause' of 23. 6, is decisive against attempts to argue that 23. 6 is a later insertion and out of keeping with its context. See n. there. The present passage also shows that, whatever *ἀφανεστάτη δὲ λόγῳ*, 'unavowed', means, it cannot mean that the 'true cause' was not mentioned at Athens. But perhaps Th. merely meant that neither *Athenians* nor *Spartans* themselves made much use of the idea.

φόβῳ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ means 'fear of you'; cp. two lines below, *τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν* = 'an attempt on you' (LSJ⁹).

4. προεπιβουλεύειν αὐτοῖς μᾶλλον ἢ ἀντεπιβουλεύειν: 'to forestall their designs instead of waiting to respond to them'. For this kind of variation (the verbs are closely related) see *Thucydides*, 94.

34. 1. ἤν δὲ λέγωσιν ὡς οὐ δίκαιον: 'if they say that . . . you have no right'. Note the negative way of presenting the case: see 32. 1 n.

ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τοῖς λειπομένοις: 'the equals of those who remain at home'. This assertion is illustrated by Tod 195 of c330 BC, a treaty between Miletos and Olbia, her daughter-city on the Black Sea. 'There is no hint of any kind of inferiority in the status of Olbia, but the privileges accorded . . . are shared on the basis of complete reciprocity' (Tod). But the assertion is not the whole truth; see Th.'s authorial comments at 25. 3–4 above and nn. there; in practice a 'proper respect' might be expected, as the Corinthians will say at 38. 3 (the Greek there is *τὰ εἰκότα θανμάζεσθαι*). (Not that the Corinthian claim is the whole truth either; see n. there.) The truth is that these relationships varied, see Frederiksen, *Campania* (introductory n. to 32–43), 197 and n. 160.

3. τεκμήριον: 'warning' [lit. 'evidence']. Their behaviour to us is evidence of what they would be like towards you.

35. 1. **λύσετε δὲ οὐδὲ τὰς Λακεδαιμονίων σπονδάς:** ‘you will not be breaking the treaty with the Spartans’. Again (as at 34. 1) the most the Corcyraeans can do is counter accusations of *in*justice. See 32. 1 n.

2. **εἶρηται γὰρ ἐν αὐταῖς:** ‘The treaty says that’. This statement of the relevant clause of the peace between Athens and Sparta of 446 (for which see generally 115. 2) is much likelier to be right than that given by the Corinthians at 40. 2: see n. there.

3. **ὑπηκόων:** ‘subjects’. The choice of word is surprisingly blunt in a speech designed to capture Athenian goodwill; but this is problematic only if we assume that the Corcyraeans, rather than Th., made that choice. In other words this is not likely to be *ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα*, ‘what was actually said’. See next n.

4. **τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ὑμετέρας μισθοφόρους:** ‘Hiring soldiers in your empire’. The interesting allegation here and at 3 above (*ὑπηκόων*) that Athens’ subject allies served in the Corinthian navy goes a little further than 31. 1, which speaks vaguely of Corinthian recruitment from the Peloponnese ‘and the rest of Greece’. At 121. 3 Th. makes the Corinthians *suggest*, as a new idea, that the Peloponnesians should recruit a navy by offering inducements to foreign sailors in the Athenian fleet, out of the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia. That is not quite consistent with the implication of the present passage, though it might be said that there is a difference between simple hiring in the empire and luring away rowers that the Athenians themselves might need. But in any case, both passages are in speeches, and neither may be sound evidence for the historical reality. See n. on 121. 3. Pre-war Corinth was a wealthy and cosmopolitan place and it is not unthinkable that Athenian subjects should seek employment there; after all, the Athenian empire even included, as we shall see, Corinthian colonists like the Potidaians.

5. **ναυτικῆς καὶ οὐκ ἡπειρώτιδος:** ‘Of a maritime and not of an inland power’. The first appearance, in a speech, of the land/sea anti-thesis, for which see above, 2. 2 n. on *οὔτε κατὰ γῆν* etc.

36. 1. **καὶ ὅτῳ τάδε ξυμφέροντα μὲν δοκεῖ . . . ἀδεέστερον ἐσόμενον:** ‘Some may think that the course which we recommend is expedient . . . less terrifying’. An elaborate way of inviting the Athenians to put prudential considerations before moral ones.

μετὰ μεγίστων καιρῶν: ‘not . . . without momentous consequences’. For good or bad. See J. R. Wilson, ‘“Kairos” as Profit’, *CQ* 31 (1981), 418 ff., at 419: he thinks that *καιροί* here means ‘advantage’, ‘profit’ (certainly one of the word’s meanings). The Corcyraeans have in mind what Wilson calls the ‘negative opportunities’ resulting from making an enemy of Corcyra, as well as the positive opportunities of friendship with her.

2. τῆς γὰρ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς παράπλου κείται: 'Corcyra . . . is conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily'. Th. is thinking of warships, not trading vessels; see de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 75 (finds such as Athenian pottery at Spina on the Adriatic, *JHS* 56 (1936), 179, are thus irrelevant). On the strategic importance of Corcyra, see P. Lévêque, *Pyrrhos* (Paris, 1958), 125 n. 5, aptly citing Xen. *Hell.* vi. 2. 9, and for a strong statement of the importance of Corcyra see now J. Wilson (above, introductory n. to 24-55), 119ff. There is no reason to dismiss the present passage as hindsight, a reflection of the use made of Corcyra in 415, for which see vi. 30.

ὥστε μῆτε ἐκεῖθεν ναυτικὸν ἔασαι Πελοποννησίοις ἐπελθεῖν: 'it stands in the way of any fleet coming from there to the Peloponnese'. This seems to envisage interference in mainland Greek affairs by a Western (presumably Syracusan) fleet; for Greek fear of this see what Alcibiades is made to say at vi. 18. 1, with n. there.

3. τρία μὲν ὄντα λόγου ἄξια τοῖς Ἑλλησι ναυτικά: 'Greece has only three navies of any size'. Again, the Corcyraeans carry out what would later be the text-book injunction to show that their power is worth having; see 33. 2n.

37-43. *Speech of the Corinthians*

37. 2. τὸ σῶφρον: 'a wise moderation'. For this word see above 32. 4n. Later in Book i another pair of speakers throw the same idea back and forth: see 68. 1 ≈ 84. 2, with *Thucydides*, 60.

ξύμμαχόν τε . . . οὔτε παρακαλοῦντες αἰσχύνεσθαι: 'They did not want to have an ally . . . who would shame them whenever they called him in'. The approximate meaning is not in doubt, but the text may be slightly corrupt (τε . . . οὔτε is very rare). See Gomme, and add a ref. to Denniston, *Greek Particles*² (Oxford, 1954), 509.

3. δικαστὰς . . . κατὰ ξυνηΐκας: 'judges appointed under treaties'. Foreign judges were especially (but as the present passage shows, not exclusively) a feature of the Hellenistic age; for references see Walbank *HCP* on Pol. xxviii. 7. 9. Litigation involving foreigners was regulated in the classical and Hellenistic periods by agreements called *symbola*: see 77. 1n. below, and generally P. Gauthier, *Symbola* (Nancy, 1972). It is unlikely that the Corcyraeans got along without such institutions: see next n.

διὰ τὸ ἥκιστα ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας ἐκπλέοντας: 'They hardly ever visit their neighbours'. In fact, an inscription happens to attest Corcyraean involvement in international diplomacy at a very early date: see ML 4 = Fornara 14 (Corcyraean *proxenos* or consul at Lokris, late seventh century BC). Note also, perhaps, Calligas (26. 2n.) 86: the plaques he

discusses, which date from c.500 BC, may be evidence of a system of bottomry (maritime) loans, and so of a very well-organized trade.

ἀνάγκη: ‘by necessity’. Gomme takes this to refer to commercial needs; but see some trenchant pages of M. I. Finley, *Trade and Politics in the Ancient World* (Aix-en-Provence, 1965), ‘Classical Greece’, 14 ff., esp. 17 n. 2, against modern writers—see most recently J. B. Wilson (above, introductory n. to 24–55), 26, not aware of Finley—who see here evidence for Corinth’s interest in a conjectural Adriatic trade-route in silver, controlled by Corcyra. But equally Jowett’s ‘stress of weather’ is too specific and I have changed it. The Greek is quite vague, and the thought should be left vague in translation.

δέχεσθαι: ‘receive visits from’. It is not clear why Gomme thought the speaker ‘means, practically, “robbing”’. The point, which is made more explicit at 5 below (see n. there) is merely to do with the acceptance of arbitration.

5. τόσω δὲ φανερωτέραν ἔξῃν αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀρετὴν διδοῦσι καὶ δεχομένοις τὰ δίκαια δεικνύουσι: ‘the clearer they should have made their honesty appear, by a willingness to submit differences to arbitration’ [lit. ‘giving and receiving what is just’]. The reference is to para. 3 with its complaint about the one-sidedness of Corcyraean legal practices. Gomme’s odd n. does not grasp that the two verbs (‘giving and receiving’) go closely together.

Note the alliteration (διδούσι . . . δεχομένοις . . . δίκαια δεικνύουσι): as remarked above, 32. 3 n., these two speeches are in very high finish.

There is a slight inconsistency with 39, where the Corinthians admit the Corcyraeans did, in fact offer arbitration on the present occasion (see 28. 2). The explanation, as Classen/Steup note, is that the Corinthians cannot resist making a general criticism of Corcyraean behaviour even when it is not justified in this particular instance.

38. 2. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι: ‘that we might be recognized as their leaders and receive proper respect’. See above 34. 1 n.; and 25. 3–4 n. for what ‘proper respect’ consisted of in concrete terms. ‘Recognized as their leaders’ is a different and much stronger claim, one which few colonies would have accepted. (See next n. for Syracuse).

The Greek sentence is, with elisions, a perfect accidental hexameter, of a kind commoner in the fourth-century orators, to whose productions this speech has other affiliations, than in the normally crabbed prose of Th. For verse rhythms in Th., see ii. 61. 2 n.

3. αἱ γοῦν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα: ‘Our other colonies at any rate honour us; no

city is more beloved by her colonies [strictly, 'colonists'] than Corinth'. Impossible now to prove or disprove; but a recent study of Corinth's relations with a famous and well-attested colony, Syracuse, concludes that in the classical period there was 'no special relationship' between the two cities: R. Talbert, *Timoleon and the Revival of Greek Sicily* (Cambridge, 1974), 52–5 (but on the years around 400, touched on by Talbert, 53 f., see *Greek World*, 190). Neither Corcyra nor Syracuse adopted the famous Corinthian coin type, the 'pegasus' or 'winged horse'. In this they were unlike later colonies which did adopt the 'pegasus'—but this type was widely adopted in the West even by places with no connection with Corinth. (See Graham, *Colony and Mother City*, 121 f., 125).

5. Ἐπίδαμνον ἡμετέραν οὔσαν: 'our colony of Epidamnus'. But as 24. 2 makes clear, it was a *joint* colony, or rather a Corcyraean colony with a Corinthian oikist.

39. 2. οὐ ξυμμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ ξυναδικεῖν: 'not their allies, but their accomplices in crime'. Cp. Sophocles, *Antigone*, 523 οὔτοι συνέχθειν, ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυν, 'I was not born to join in hating, but to join in loving' (produced in perhaps 441 BC, well before Th. wrote this passage).

40. 1. βίαιοι καὶ πλεονέκται: 'violent and greedy', two key notions in Th. See esp. iii. 82 (the Corcyraean *stasis*), paras. 2 (war as a violent teacher or teacher of violence) and 8 (greed and ambition), with *Thucydides*, 156, 119. The notion of greed, *πλεονεξία*, here appears for the first time; for violence see 2. 1 n. on *βιαζόμενοι*, but this is the first occurrence of the favourite adjective *βίαιος*.

μαθεῖν χρή: 'we will now show you'. The Corinthians move on to item (iii) in the list of arguments from justice: see introductory n. to 32–43.

2. εἰ γὰρ εἴρηται ἐν ταῖς σπονδαῖς: 'It is true that the treaty allows'. This picks up 35. 2, εἴρηται, etc. The word *εἰ* here does not mean 'if'; the sense is rather 'although'. For another non-concessive use of *εἰ* cp. *Odyssey*, ix. 529, where Polyphemus appeals for help to Poseidon 'since [*εἰ*] you are my father'.

οὐ τοῖς ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἑτέρων ἰοῦσιν ἡ ξυνθήκη ἐστίν: 'This provision does not apply to those who intend to injure others'. On the point at issue between the Corcyraeans and Corinthians the Corcyraeans are clearly right; see *Greek World*, 93: treaties are not concerned with states of mind; though, as Salmon says (*Wealthy Corinth*, 286), the Athenians were indeed worried by the implications of a full alliance with Corcyra: see 44. 1 n.

There is some similarity with the argument (again in Corinthian mouths) at 71. 5.

5. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων ψῆφον προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίαν ὑμῖν: 'At the revolt of Samos . . . we voted in your favour'. For the revolt of Samos in 440 see 115. The present passage of Th. is our only evidence for the discussion and voting on this topic in the Peloponnesian League, indeed it is valuable evidence for the League's voting system generally. It seems that the system was bicameral; Sparta took her own decision first and could by a negative vote prevent an item coming before the League at all: see A. H. M. Jones, 'Two Synods of the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues', *PCPhS*, 182 (1952-3), 43 ff. This meant incidentally that Sparta had two chronologically separate votes, which she could have cast in opposite directions. See *Greek World*, 46 and n. 18 (citing Adcock and Mosley, *Diplomacy in Ancient Greece* (London, 1975), 40, for this possibility, which for reasons given there would not have been irrational in 440. ML 56 = Fornara 115 (Athenian settlement of Samos after the revolt) opens with a fragmentary reference to the Peloponnese or Peloponnesians, which it is tempting to connect with the debate alluded to in the present passage: see ML, p. 153, and P. Cartledge, 'Sparta and Samos: a Special Relationship?', *CQ* 32 (1982), 262.

The present passage is also valuable evidence for Corinthian-Athenian relations in the period *before* the Peloponnesian War. Those relations had, in the archaic period and well on into the *pentekontaetia*, been generally good, but they deteriorated in the late 460s and were bad again in the 430s: for the evidence and the reasons see *Greek World*, 38-9. The reasons have to do with Megara, which was a source of friction in the 460s (see 103. 4) but had ceased to be so after 446, when she returned to the Peloponnesian League. The Samos incident belongs in the lull between 446 and the revival of tension in the 430s when Athens passed the Megarian decrees. In this lull, relations between Athens and Corinth seem on the evidence of the present passage to have reverted to what they were before 461. That is, they were good. (Or at least, Corinth had had such a hard war in 460-446 that she did not want more in 440. That she now claims credit for it is another matter.)

This is one of the passages which can be adduced as evidence for Spartan aggressiveness towards Athens; cp. below 101. 2 n. (Thasos), but note also iii. 2. 1 and n. (Sparta *refuses* to help Lesbos revolt in some year before 431; cp. above 28. 1 n.). On the face of it, the Spartan vote over Samos is indeed evidence of aggressiveness, and that is how it is usually taken. But why does Th. not report it in its proper place at 115. 2 ff.? On this point see Badian, 'Th. and the Outbreak' (23. 6 n.), 61 ff., esp. 67: by omitting this debate, 'one of the most important incidents in the *Pentekontaetia*', Th. artfully conceals the point that Sparta could legitimately

have claimed that Athens' action against Samos was (i) an infringement of the latter's autonomy and (ii) a breach of an undertaking about autonomy (a clause never spelt out in black and white by Th.) in the Thirty Years Peace.

This sort of narrative device is found elsewhere in these early books: that is, Th., by reporting an event at a point other than its obvious place in the narrative, reduces or conceals its significance. In this way a number of aggressive acts by Athens (or pacific acts by Sparta) have their significance reduced by artful misplacement: see iii. 2. 1 (cp. above), the rebuff of Mytilene by Sparta would make more impact if mentioned in Book i instead of retrospectively; ii. 68. 8, the Akarnanian alliance, which belonged somewhere in Book i; iv. 102. 3, the Athenian foundation of Amphipolis in 437, a disquieting act from Corinth's point of view; and (a very good example) the casual mention *in the military narrative* at i. 50. 5 of the additional 20 ships sent by Athens to Corcyra to reinforce the original 10 whose sending was recorded, together with a 'scrupulous' motive for the small number, at i. 45. A report, in the context of the political debate at or just after 45, of the Athenian decision to escalate the commitment, would have produced a more aggressive effect. A related Thucydidean habit is the *amplification*, in a later context, of an item barely reported on its first occurrence; cp. vi. 31. 2, which amplifies ii. 56 (Pericles' attack on Epidauros. Here the effect of the initial reticence is to reduce the impact on the reader of an item which tells against a 'defensive' view of Periclean policy.) Sometimes the explanation seems to lie merely in the narrative scale of the original report: thus ii. 21 amplifies i. 114. 2, invasion of Pleistoanax; ii. 27. 1 and iii. 54. 5 amplify i. 102 on Sparta's allies at Ithome. Here Th. is filling in *pente-kontaetia* detail.

This reference to the Peloponnesian League debate about Samos is one of the very few references *in a speech* to past events which are not already known to us from Herodotus. See my paper in *Caating Studies*.

41. 2. νεῶν γὰρ μακρῶν σπανίσαντές ποτε πρὸς τὸν Αἰγινήτων ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ πόλεμον παρὰ Κορινθίων εἴκοσι ναῦς ἐλάβετε: 'There was a time before the Persian invasion when you were in need of ships for the Aiginetan war, and we Corinthians lent you twenty'. For this loan see Hdt. vi. 89, and for the small size of the pre-Persian War Athenian navy see Haas, *Historia* 34 (1985), cited above, 14. 3 n. on *Αἰγινήται*. For the war between Athens and Aegina see L. H. Jeffery, 'The Campaign Between Athens and Aegina in the Years Before Salamis (Herodotus, VI, 87-93)', *AJP* 83 (1962), 44 ff.: the main campaign probably fell shortly before Marathon. See also A. Podlecki, 'Athens and

Aigina', *Historia*, 25 (1976), 396ff., with refs. to other discussions (to which add now Hammond, *CAH* iv². 501). For Themistokles' role see above 14. 3 n. on *Ἀθηναίους*.

As so often in Thucydidean speeches referring to past events, Th. follows Hdt. closely; I follow the view which Jeffery, 49 n. 10, rejects, that Th. based himself on Hdt. (rather than that, as she thinks, Hdt. made some insertions in his work as a result of things actually said by the historical Corinthians). Contrast 40. 5 (the vote over Samos) where Th. is our only informant. But that was outside the period systematically covered by Hdt. See iii. 54. 5 and n. for a comparable though less striking instance (Plataian help to Sparta at Ithome. Here the *general* fact—Sparta received help from outsiders on that occasion—was well known.)

παρέσχεν ὑμῖν Αἰγινήτων μὲν ἐπικράτησιν, Σαμίων δὲ κόλασιν: 'gave you the victory over the Aiginetans . . . enabled you to punish Samos'. For Samos see above 40. 5 and n. The abstract nouns here (victory, punishment) are good examples of Thucydidean 'social abstractions', as Parry calls them (see 32. 4 n.). Here the repeated *-σιν* ending enables Th. to pass off two rather unsymmetrical ideas symmetrically.

It has been noted by Andrewes, 'Athens and Aegina', *BSA* 37 (1936/7), 1 ff., at 5 (cp. Podlecki (above), 401) that this reference to Aigina presupposes a war in which Athens was victorious, as in Hdt.'s narrative at vi. 87–93 they are not; and yet this is the section in which Hdt. records the loan of the ships (ch. 89). I doubt, however, if this entitles us to assign the loan of the ships to a separate and subsequent phase of fighting; Th. is merely telescoping (the Athenians were *ultimately* victorious in fighting spread out through the whole period 505–458).

3. φίλον τε γὰρ ἡγούνται τὸν ὑπουργούντα . . . τῆς αὐτίκα: 'and think that the man who helps them is a friend . . . immediate struggle'. Macleod points out (*Essays*, 136 n. 11) that this '*sententia* [or rhetorical maxim] is true, but also reveals that the argument it is meant to support is doomed to fail'.

42. 1. καὶ νεώτερός τις: 'let the younger among you'. See also 72. 1.

2. τὸ μέλλον τοῦ πολέμου ᾧ φοβούμενός ὑμᾶς Κερκυραῖοι κελεύουσιν ἀδικεῖν ἐν ἀφανεί ἔτι κείται: 'The war with which the Corcyraeans would frighten you into doing wrong, by telling you it is imminent, is distant and may never come'. See also 33. 3, and esp. 36. 1, *τὸν μέλλοντα*, which this passage echoes. A translation ought to reflect this echo, so I have added 'by telling you it is imminent' to Jowett's version.

τῆς δὲ ὑπαρχούσης πρότερον διὰ Μεγαρέας ὑποψίας: ‘the suspicion which your treatment of the Megarians has already inspired’. A notorious historical crux. Does this refer to the ‘Megarian decrees’ passed by Athens in the 430s, for which see 67. 4 below with n. there; or to the First Peloponnesian War which began in 461 on account of Megara? (See 103. 4 for the ‘intense hatred’ between Athens and Corinth which Th. says began at that time; see above 40. 5 n.) One, linguistic, argument in favour of the second interpretation can be refuted first: the word *πρότερον* does *not* necessarily refer to a state of affairs which existed in the past (the 460s) but exists no longer (in 433): the word can mean ‘previously existing and still continuing’. A clear example in Th. is at 72. 1, where the Athenian embassy at Sparta has been there for some time previously (*πρότερον*) and is still there. Jowett’s vaguer ‘already’ is preferable to e.g. Hobbes’s ‘former jealousies’. There is thus no linguistic obstacle to the first interpretation, which seems to me preferable historically: grievances of the 460s were now ancient history. See for useful and full discussion C. J. Tuplin, ‘Thucydides i. 42. 2 and the Megarian Decree’, *CQ* 29 (1979), 301 ff. (who, however, comes down in favour of c.460).

43. 1. **ἐν τῇ Λακεδαίμονι:** ‘at Sparta’. The 440 Congress again: see 40. 5.

44. 1. **γενομένης καὶ δις ἐκκλησίας:** ‘They held two assemblies’. M. H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford, 1987), 88, citing this passage, writes: ‘the passing of some decrees required a debate in two successive sessions of the *ekklesia*, but a vote to be taken only in the second session. Conclusions of peace and alliances seem to have belonged to this group of decrees.’ This means that de Ste. Croix’s suggestion, that on the first day the issue was whether to accept or reject a full alliance or *ξυμμαχία* with Corcyra, but then on the second day a defensive alliance or *ἐπιμαχία* ‘was proposed as an acceptable compromise’, is unnecessary (though possible). Th.’s language (‘influenced by’; ‘changed their minds’; ‘inclined’) does not definitely imply that any actual decision was reached during the first day and then reversed on the second; he may just be describing the fluctuating progress of a two-day debate. See *OPW* 72 and Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 287. Note in any case that there was a decision at some point to send reinforcements: see 50. 4, 51. 4, and nn. Was there another full-dress debate about this? We are not told.

μετέγνωσαν Κερκυραίοις ξυμμαχίαν μὲν μὴ ποιήσασθαι ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν ... ἐπιμαχίαν δ’ ἐποίησαντο ...: ‘They changed their minds ... they would not go so far as to make a full offensive and defensive alliance with them, [lit., ‘an

alliance having the same friends and enemies’], but they concluded a purely defensive alliance’, etc. For the terms *ξυμμαχία* and *ἐπιμαχία*, full and purely defensive alliances, see above all de Ste. Croix, *OPW* app. xiii. As he shows, citing Andrewes, *HCT* on v. 48. 2, the word *ἐπιμαχία* is rare, but only because ‘from the late fifth century onwards new alliances were normally defensive in form, so that the specialized term was no longer needed’ (Andrewes). This is, then, a nice example of a Thucydidean technical term, but it fits the conclusion on this topic reached at *Thucydides*, 96 ff.: technical terms tend to be found in the narrative rather than in the speeches.

On the policy issues see Salmon, 286: the Athenians evidently saw the force of the Corinthian argument, illegitimate in itself, at 40. 2 (see n. there). A full alliance would indeed cause harm, *βλάβη*, if it precipitated a general war.

τῆ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν: ‘to help each other’ [lit. ‘to help each others’ territory’]. For the expression compare 15. 2, *πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐαυτῶν*, ‘distant’ (lit. ‘far from their own [country]’), and for such undertakings in defensive alliances compare *SEG* xxvi. 461 = ML 67 *ὅς* (in the 1988 reprinting): ‘if anyone attacks the territory of the Erxadieis with warlike intent’, etc. The territorial point will become important later: see 53. 1 n., cp. 45. 3 n.

2. ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίουσ πόλεμος καὶ ὡς ἔσσειαι αὐτοῖσ: ‘For they knew that in any case the war with the Peloponnesians was inevitable’. That is, the Athenians accepted the Corcyraean rather than the Corinthian assessment (33. 3 and 36. 1 as opposed to 44. 2). See next n. on this statement about Athenian mental processes. There is some independent evidence that the Athenians were indeed convinced of the imminence of war, and actually preparing for it, even before the Corcyra debate: see ML 58 = Fornara 119, the Kallias decrees, with ML, p. 158, on the precise date within 433 (Lewis in *CAH* v² is less confident but still thinks this dating probable). The first Kallias decree orders that the temple treasures of the rural demes and lower city should be concentrated for security on the Acropolis, a ‘drastic step’ which implies a belief that war was imminent. So ML, accepted by P. J. Rhodes, *Hermes*, 115 (1987), 164. This is the most probable dating and interpretation, but some (see Fornara’s bibliography) have put the decrees in the 420s or even later. [See L. Kallet-Marx, *CQ* 39 (1989), 94–113.]

ἐβούλοντο: ‘Their plan was . . .’. See P. A. Stadter, ‘The Motives for Athens’ Alliance with Corcyra (Thuc. 1. 44)’, *GRBS* 24 (1983), 131 ff.

Note that the present sentence (desire to embroil Corinth and Corcyra with each other) is exceptional within this ch.: the other considerations merely look like a list of those Corcyraean points which had most weight with the Assembly.

3. ἄμα δὲ τῆς τε Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας καλῶς ἐφαίνετο αὐτοῖς ἡ νῆσος ἐν παράπλῳ κείσθαι: 'They also considered that Corcyra was conveniently situated for the coast voyage to Italy and Sicily'. This closely echoes 36. 2: see n. there. Again the Corcyraean argument is accepted.

As always we should ask, what was Th.'s evidence for these confident statements about knowledge and motive? (See above 5. 1 n. on ἡγουμένων). This was one assembly meeting which he could have attended himself; but mass meetings are swayed by all kinds of considerations, rational and irrational. The whole of paras. 2 and 3 are a generalized rationalization, which goes a long way beyond what Th. can have known. See also H. Kitto, *Poiesis* (Berkeley, 1966), 293, on Th.'s handling of this debate: 'what persons, considerations, passions, produced the change? [that is, the mood on the second day]. He has no interest in this; he treats it all externally', etc.

45. 1. τοιαύτη μὲν γνώμη: 'Under the influence of these feelings'. See previous n.

οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον: 'not long afterwards'. J. D. Smart, 'Thucydides and Hellanicus', *Past Perspectives*, ed. I. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, A. J. Woodman (Cambridge, 1986), 1 ff., at 28f. (see further ii. 1 n. on μετ' Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν) speculates that here and elsewhere ('wherever Hellanicus' scheme suggested discontinuity'), Th. sought to correct the jerky chronology of Hellanikos, for whom see 97. 2.

δέκα ναῦς: 'ten ships'. Plutarch, *Pericles*, 29. 1-4 says 'only ten ships' and personalizes the issue, saying that Pericles sent so small a force as an insult to Lakedaemonios (for whom see next n.) and in the hope that the expedition would be a failure. See Philip A. Stadter, *Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Pericles* (Chapel Hill, 1990), n. on the Plut. passage. In fact a further twenty ships were to be sent as reinforcements; see below 50. 5 and n.

2. Λακεδαιμόνιος τε ὁ Κίμωνος καὶ Διότιμος ὁ Στρομβίχου καὶ Πρωτέας ὁ Ἐπικλέους: 'Lakedaimonios the son of Kimon, Diotimos the son of Strombichos, and Proteas the son of Epikles'. See ML 61 = Fornara 126, an inscription recording the expenses of the two squadrons sent to Corcyra (for the second see below, 50. 5-51. 4). The amounts were probably 26 and 50 talents respectively. The inscription illuminates Th.'s method, by providing some material which he does and some which he does not give. The names of the commanders are the same, which encourages trust in Th.'s detailed veracity (for a problem about one of the second batch see 51. 4n.). But Th. gives their patronymics, not their demotics; for his avoidance of this manifestation of

parochialism see *Thucydides*, 97 n. 98. The inscription gives their demotics, not their patronymics (in fact Proteas' demotic alone survives on the stone; the name is lost). The inscription provides us with a precise date for the battle of Sybota (August 433: see ML, p. 168), something Th. characteristically does not give. Above all, it is striking that Th. provides none of the financial information recorded on the stone; this is usual though not invariable with him: see *Thucydides*, 33 n. 81; and see *ibid.* 91 for the general problems about 'correcting' Th. from inscriptions.

For a new attestation of Lakedaimonios see *IG* i³. 48 bis, line 12, an inscription which also mentions Arcestratos, for whom see below 57. 6. The inscription records an award of privileges; Lakedaimonios and Arcestratos are two of five men chosen by the honorand to carry out certain duties in respect of his privileges.

Of the three names in the present passage, Lakedaimonios is interesting in the most obvious ways. His name announces his famous father Kimon's political or at least cultural sympathy with Sparta: see E. Rawson, *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought* (Oxford, 1969), 18, for this and other displays of 'Laconism' at fifth-century Athens. He was a *ἵππεύς* or cavalryman, as happens to be attested by a dedication from the Acropolis, Raubitschek and Jeffery, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis*, no. 135 = Fornara 83, discussed by G. R. Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens* (Princeton, 1988), 46 ff. Can this cavalry status tell us anything about Lakedaimonios' politics? The cavalry were politically suspect c.400 as wealthy potential oligarchs: Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 4, with Bugh, 120 ff., and I. Spence, *The Athenian Hippeis* (Oxford, forthcoming), and see further below ii. 22. 2 n.; certainly, horses were expensive to maintain (see vi. 12. 2 n. below on *ἵπποτροφία* or horse-breeding) and although the Periclean democracy organized its own large cavalry force (Bugh, 77), the Athenian cavalryman was 'ultimately responsible for the expense of his mount—or rather, as we know now, of his successive mounts': J. Kroll, *Hesperia* 46 (1977), 98, publishing an archive of the Athenian cavalry. Nevertheless 433 was not 400: in between those dates the empire had come to an end, and rich upper-class men like Lakedaimonios had by 400, perhaps even by 413, lost some of the motives which had (surely) kept them patriotic and loyal to the democracy; see Andrewes, *JHS* 98 (1978), 1 ff., 'The Opposition to Pericles', and below viii. 1 n. on the reasons for the oligarchic reaction after the Sicilian disaster in 413, and generally viii. 48. 6 n. Despite Plutarch's story (see previous n.) about Pericles' antagonism to Lakedaimonios, which speaks of the latter's 'Laconism', there is not the slightest reason to suspect the patriotism of Lakedaimonios, or to suppose that his appointment was deliberate sabotage. Davies, *APF* 306, is harsh on Lakedaimonios.

Diotimos is interesting in subtler ways. He is known from the Hellenistic writer Timaios to have visited Naples: *FGrHist* 566 F 98 (with Lykophron, *Alexandra*, 731ff.); and for an excellent discussion of Diotimos, 'geographer and diplomat', see M. Frederiksen, *Campania* (introductory n. to 32-43), 104ff. (better than D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Archidamian War* (Cornell, 1969), 385f.). Frederiksen puts Diotimos' Neapolitan activity earlier than the Corcyraean command; this is surely right, and helps to explain his suitability for the later command which was also in the west. Another view: S. Cataldi, *Riv. Fil.* 117 (1989), 129ff. For the family's wealth see Davies, *APF* 161ff.

3. ἤν μὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ μέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων: 'unless they sailed against Corcyra or to any place belonging to the Corcyraeans'. See above 44. 1 n. on τῇ ἀλλήλων βοηθεῖν for the territorial point; and 53. 4 n. below. So far, the Athenians have kept to the terms of the *epimachia*: the commanders of the first Athenian contingent have no mandate to do more than defend Corcyraean territory, so their assistance at the end of ch. 49 will be unjustified, despite the protestations of 53. 4. Note that the attitude of the Athenian Assembly had grown more reckless by the time the second contingent of 20 ships was sent. See 50. 5, where we are told that they were sent because the Athenians feared that the first ten would be 'insufficient to protect' the Corcyraeans—a very vague expression, which could cover more than mere defence of territory. But this statement of motive may be just Th.'s own gloss on the situation, the historian attributing motives as usual on the basis of his own reading of the facts. In any case the change in the situation at Athens was not known to the commanders of the first contingent at the moment (ch. 49) when they allowed themselves to fight the Corinthians openly.

προεῖπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὴ λύειν ἔνεκα τὰς σπονδὰς: 'These orders were intended to prevent a breach of the treaty'. See preceding n. For a comparable set of unrealistic Athenian instructions cp. Dem. xv. 9 (Timotheos in 366) with *Mausolus*, 198.

46. 1. ναυσὶ πενήκοντα καὶ ἑκατόν ... αὐτῶν δὲ Κορινθίων ἐνενήκοντα: 'a hundred and fifty ships ... and ninety of their [the Corinthians'] own'. For the impressive increase in the Corinthian turnout since Leukimme see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 289 and n. 21 (criticizing R. P. Legon, 'The Megarian Decree and the Balance of Greek Naval Power', *CP* 68 (1973), 161ff.: the fleet as a whole had been doubled and the Corinthian element trebled).

2. πέμπτος αὐτός: 'with four others'. For expressions of this sort see 61. 1 n. on *Καλλίαν* etc.

4. ἔστι δὲ λιμὴν . . . : 'Cheimerion is a harbour . . .' etc. Hammond (*Epirus*, 447) argues that this passage derives from Hekataios (cp. above 24. 1 n.). For the site of Ephyra see Hammond, 372, 379—but in fact the present passage of Th. is the chief evidence. The site was notable for an Oracle of the Dead nearby, the so-called Nekyomanteion, for which see S. Dakaris' article in the *Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites* (1976). It was at the junction of the River Acheron, which Th. mentions, and the Kokytos, 'named of lamentation loud', which he does not. The entrance to Hades was supposed to be here. Note the absence of any of this interesting material in Th.; contrast ii. 102. 5 and n. there.

47. 1. τῶν νήσων αἱ καλοῦνται Σύβοτα: 'the islands called Sybota'. For a useful study of the ensuing battle, with map, see Morrison and Coates, ch. 4 (61 ff.), drawing on Hammond, 'Naval Operations off Corcyra', *Studies*, ch. 13, reprinted from *JHS* 65 (1945), 26 ff.

3. ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων: 'a large force of barbarians, which collected on the mainland'. As Morrison and Coates (63) point out, these non-Greeks provided the reason for the Corcyraean ships bivouacking on the Sybota islands rather than on the mainland opposite. Cp. also Morrison and Coates, 66, for the heavy dependence of the Corinthian triremes on a friendly land-base; Th.'s whole narrative in these chapters illustrates this point.

48. 4. ταῖς ἄριστα τῶν νεῶν πλεούσαις: 'with their fastest ships'. This means the ships whose hulls were best-maintained and whose crews were best-trained; or, less probably, it means that these ships were not troop-carriers: see Morrison and Coates, 64 n. 4.

49. 1. ἀκοντιστάς: 'javelin-men'. For javelin-men on board ship see Morrison and Coates, 161 f., citing Th. vii. 67. 2 (speech of Gylippos, see n. there). As Gylippos says, landlubberly javelin-men who (like those in the present passage?) had not been taught to throw from a sitting position would cause the trireme to roll. On javelin-men generally see iii. 97. 2 n. on ψιλῶν etc.

1-2. τῷ παλαιῷ τρόπῳ ἀπειρότερον ἔτι παρεσκευασμένοι . . . πεζομαχία δὲ τὸ πλεόν προσφερῆς οὐσα: 'their naval arrangements were still of the old clumsy sort . . . it had almost the appearance of a battle by land'. That is, the fighting men were crammed on the decks and the fighting consisted of repelling boarders and boarding vessels oneself. (The Athenians themselves, who have not yet joined battle, are obviously not included in the description: see J. S. Morrison, *JHS* 104 (1984), 58.) The implied contrast is with the more sophisticated use of the trireme as a weapon in its own right, above all by the use of the

bronze ram which was built into the bow at water-level. This technique had in fact already been used at Artemisium and Salamis nearly fifty years earlier. See Morrison and Coates, 66–7, who observe that Th. was not quite fair to the Corinthians on the present mission: their ships were over-loaded with men and supplies, not so much through old-fashioned thinking as through the need to establish a tenable and properly provisioned beach-head.

For the paradoxical notion of a land-battle or *πεζομαχία* by sea cp. ii. 89. 8, iv. 14. 3 and vii. 62. 2. (The last passage echoes the present one in an odd way: *πεζομαχία πρόσφορα ἔσται* there reads and sounds very like *πεζομαχία . . . προσφερέης* here, but the adjectives mean quite different things. *πρόσφορα* is from *πρόσφορος* and means ‘advantageous’, not ‘similar’. But surely Th. was unconsciously influenced in Book vii by his own phrase in Book i.)

3. διέκπλοι δ’ οὐκ ἦσαν: ‘There were no attempts to break the enemy’s line’. This famous manœuvre probably means punching a hole in the enemy’s line and then turning to ram his ships amidships. But was the manœuvre carried out by individual ships, or by a whole fleet deploying in line ahead against an enemy deployed defensively in line abreast? For the second view see Morrison and Coates, glossary at 244, entry under *diekplous*, and their index under ‘breakthrough’. But in favour of the first view, see two attractive and convincing articles by J. F. Lazenby and Ian Whitehead in *Greece and Rome* 34 (1987), 169ff. and 179ff., ‘The Diekplous’ (Lazenby) and ‘The Periplous’ (Whitehead); also A. J. Holladay, ‘Further Thoughts on Trireme Tactics’, *Greece and Rome* 35 (1988), 149ff., who, however, rightly reasserts against Lazenby the older view that one main object of *diekplous* was to shear away the enemy’s oars as you broke through his line. *Diekplous* and *periplous* are mentioned together, as naval manœuvres, at vii. 36. 4; for *periplous* see n. there, also ii. 91. 3n.

7. ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης ὥστε ἐπιχειρήσαι ἀλλήλοις τοὺς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἀθηναίους: ‘the time had arrived when Corinthians and Athenians were driven to attack one another’. A solemn moment, clearly and splendidly signalled by these clear and emphatic words after the brisk and varied narrative of this long chapter: Corinthians and Athenians have come to blows. The desire to record this critical moment in its context is part of Th.’s reason for giving these Corcyraean events in such detail; a second part is the consciousness (see next n.) of the magnitude of the forces involved. There may also be a third and related motive, a wish to describe ‘paradigmatically’ a piece of crude sea-fighting such as would characterize the early phases of the imminent war (more sophisticated techniques will be described in Book ii). But that

would make flat reading without the second and first motives—scale and significance.

50. 1. φονεύειν διεκπλέοντες μᾶλλον ἢ ζωγρεῖν: ‘they rowed up and down and killed them, rather than taking them prisoner’. This is detached and chilling prose of a peculiarly soldierly sort; see John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme* (London, 1976), 29f., on the ‘featureless prose’ of the *British Official History of the First World War*, whose compilers ‘have achieved the remarkable feat of writing an exhaustive account of one of the world’s greatest tragedies without the display of any emotion at all’. He quotes an extract which describes in neutral language ‘something very nasty indeed’. There is as Keegan allows much more to Th. than this; at pp. 65ff. he quotes Th. on the battle of Mantinea (see further below v. 68 nn.) and compares Th. to his advantage with Caesar, because the former lets us see how individuals react. But even this does not quite give Th. his due—although Th. is one of the few military historians whom Keegan, a Sandhurst lecturer, approves of. Keegan (31) speaks of the “official historians’ decision to deal with the emotive difficulty in military historiography by denying themselves any explicit emotional outlet whatsoever”. This, as Keegan says, is unsatisfactory; but note two further points about Th., who often admittedly keeps his emotions out of sight when describing something very nasty: (i) colourless language can have a shocking power of its own; see *Thucydides*, ch. ii and Conclusion. Keegan does not allow for this. (ii) Th. is capable of outbursts of indignation: see iii. 98. 4 and n.

2. ναυμαχία γὰρ αὕτη Ἑλλησι πρὸς Ἕλληνας νεῶν πλήθει μεγίστη δὴ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς γεγένηται: ‘For never before had two such numerous Greek navies met in battle’. A characteristic statistic; cp. *Thucydides*, 38. The qualification (‘Greek’) is necessary because of the Persian wars, when Greek fleets met Persian or rather Phoenician ones.

3. Σύβοτα . . . λιμὴν ἐρήμος: ‘Sybota, a deserted harbour’, as opposed to the islands called Sybota. (Jacoby, *FGrHist* 323a Hellenikos F 24 comm., n. 18, wished to delete these words as a gloss, and iii. 76. 1 might be thought to support this (see n. there). On this view the dead were taken to Sybota island. But Jacoby did not explain how he thought the land forces of the barbarians could have got to the island, nor what he proposed to do about 54. 1, which implies a mainland and an island Sybota. The text should be retained. Hammond, *Studies*, 466 f., does not discuss the point but accepts the existence of a ‘mainland Sybota’, as does J. B. Wilson (introductory n. to 24–55), 41.)

4. οἱ δὲ ταῖς πλωίμοις καὶ ὄσαι ἦσαν λοιπαί: ‘such ships as had not

been disabled, and any others which they had left'. See Hammond, *Studies* 466 n. 1, and Morrison and Coates, 65: I have changed Jowett's 'had in their docks' to 'had left'.

5. ἐπεπαιάνιστο: 'the Paian had already been sounded for the attack'. Normally, well-disciplined crews were expected to stay silent. The singing of the Paian or battle-song was a way of showing recognition of the signal for attack. The scholiast says that before a battle the Paian was to Ares the god of war, afterwards (that is, presumably, after a victory) to Apollo. See Aesch. *Per.* 393; Morrison and Coates, 67, 75 n. 13.

εἴκοσι ναῦς Ἀθηναίων προσπλευούσας, ἃς ὕστερον τῶν δέκα βοηθοῦς ἐξέπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι: 'sailing towards them twenty ships which the Athenians had sent to reinforce the first ten'. This is surprisingly casual after Th.'s careful account of the agonizing in ch. 44, which resulted in the original ten ships. Now we are suddenly told that the force was trebled. As a story-teller, Th. was faced with an awkwardness: he did not wish, having got the fleet to the Corcyra region, to go back to describing debates at Athens. (There presumably *was* yet another debate, which must have happened well before the events now being described, and in fact not long after the first two days' debate, for the ships to have time to arrive before the battle was over. There are 23 days between the two sets of payments in ML 61.) So he inserts the decision to send the new ships at the point where they arrive (we do not get the commanders' names till 51. 4!). It remains definitely odd that Th. should have decided not to record the third debate in its proper place. For discussion of this and comparable narrative displacements see 40. 5 n.: the effect here is to minimize Athenian aggressiveness by leaving in the reader's mind the impression of scrupulousness created by 45. 3.

The second squadron is attested by ML 61 (see below 51. 4 n.) and by Plutarch, *Per.* 29. 3. Th. gives a collective, Athenian motive for the decision to send the reinforcements (*δείσαντες*, 'fearing', etc.); Plutarch again (cp. above, 45. 1 n. on *δέκα ναῦς*) personalizes the issue, making Pericles react to criticism of his spiteful treatment of Lakedaimonios. Our instinct that Th. is preferable to Plutarch is probably right (Pericles was not an autocrat), but see nn. on 44. 2: Th.'s attribution of motive there, as here, may be no more than conjecture (see 45. 3 n. on *ἦν μὴ* etc.). See J. B. Wilson, 52 f. But as often with Th., we are left in the dark about any possible involvement of the *boule* or council of 500, of the *strategoí* (generals), etc., all of whom had a legitimate interest in a decision of this sort.

51. 2. τινες ἰδόντες εἶπον ὅτι νῆες ἐκεῖναι ἐπιπλεύουσιν. τότε δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀνεχώρουν· ξυνεσκόταζε γὰρ ἤδη . . .: 'some of them

who saw the advancing fleet exclaimed 'there are ships coming up over there!'; and then the Corcyraeans also retreated, as it was getting dark . . .'. The writing here is exceptionally vivid; with the last three words *cp.* the opening of Demosthenes' celebrated description of the panic reaction at Athens to Philip's seizure of Elatea, *ἑσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν*, 'it was evening . . .'. (Dem. xviii. 169).

4. Γλαύκων τε ὁ Λεάγρου καὶ †Ἄνδοκίδης ὁ Λεωγόρου†: 'Glaukon the son of Leagros, and Andokides the son of Leogoras'. This is an exceedingly rare instance of a factual statement in Th. which can be shown from an inscription to be wrong. (It is often possible to *supplement* Th. from inscriptions, in which case we may complain that he did not provide the information in question; but that is a different criticism, see *Thucydides*, 91.) The issue is this: ML 61 gives the names of the commanders of the second Corcyra squadron as Glaukon, Metagenes, and Drakontides. There is no easy explanation for the omission of Metagenes; but it may not be coincidence that from other evidence we can piece together a Drakontides, of the deme of Thora, whose father's name was Leogoras. For Th. to substitute for this name the better-known name Andokides, also known to have been son of a Leogoras, would be a possible slip. Jacoby, *FGrHist* 323a F 24 comm., objected to this solution, but see J. K. Davies' rather cryptic remarks at *APF* 173. The issue between Jacoby and Davies is too fine to be gone into properly here. Essentially Jacoby tried to eliminate the literary evidence that Drakontides' deme was Thora, by arguing that the evidence in question related to the family of Andokides. But Davies appears to think that Andokides' family connections were with Thorikos, not Thora. So the existence of Drakontides son of Leogoras of Thora has not been disproved and the solution given above is after all the best. It remains to be seen whether Davies' promised study does away with all Jacoby's objections and suggestions. But the latter cannot really get round Th.'s omission of Metagenes. This—unlike the omission of the *financial* information in ML 61—is culpable.

On Glaukon see Davies, *APF* 91, putting him in his late fifties at the time of the Corcyra command, though note also E. D. Francis and M. Vickers, 'Leagros Kalos', *PCPhS* 207 (1981), 108f., part of a complicated argument one result of which is to make Glaukon rather younger (born perhaps mid-470s). This is in itself attractive.

As for Metagenes, Wade-Gery (in the margin of my copy of Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, which belonged to him), wondered whether he was 'another philo-Spartan?' (cf. Spartan Metagenes in the negotiations in Bk. 5): Pericles has got them anxious for Lakedaimonios, after they have seen the fleet sail from Korinth'. See above, 45. 2 n., on the first

philo-Spartan Lakedaimonios, and below, v. 19 and 24, for the Spartan Metagenes.

Drakontides was a known enemy of Pericles: see Plut. *Per.* 32. 3, with F. J. Frost, 'Pericles and Dracontides', *JHS* 84 (1964), 68 ff., and Stadter's commentary (45. 1 n.).

5. (ἦν γὰρ νύξ) . . . : 'in the darkness . . .'. See 2 n. above; the effect of these monosyllabic words in a parenthesis is staccato and, with the three piled-up verbs which follow ('feared . . . recognized . . . came to anchor'), effectively conveys a sense of jumpiness. Cp. iv. 25. 2 n. on *καὶ νύξ*. . .

52. 1. ἐν τοῖς Συβότοις λιμένα: 'the harbour at Sybota', i.e. that at 50. 3.

53. 1. ἐς κελήτιον: 'in a boat'. This was a type of small boat (smaller even than the ἀκάτιον of 29. 3) particularly used when speed mattered: see L. Casson, *Ships and SeamanSHIP in the Ancient World* (Princeton, 1973), 160.

ἄνευ κηρυκείου: 'without a flag of truce'. This is important: they are not accepting that there is a war on.

πέμπαντές τε ἔλεγον τοιάδε: 'They delivered the following message'. If we imagine a scale from 'rhetorically appropriate' to 'what was really said' (see 22. 1), this unadorned exchange surely belongs at the latter end of the scale, see *Thucydides*, 53.

4. οὔτε ἄρχομεν πολέμου, ὦ ἄνδρες Πελοποννήσιοι, οὔτε τὰς σπονδὰς λύομεν: 'Peloponnesians, we are not starting a war, and we are not breaking the treaty'. Certainly, their original instructions from the Assembly had been precisely to avoid breaking the treaty, 45. 3. That was why only ten ships were sent. But the alliance stipulated that Athens should help if [and only if] Corcyraean *territory* was attacked, and this restriction was reflected in the orders at 45. 3 n. In fact the Athenian commanders, whatever they now say, have gone beyond their instructions and the terms of the alliance (49. 7 is categorical that the Corinthians and Athenians came to blows). The Corinthians would seem to be in the right, on the evidence Th. supplies.

As we have seen, that same Assembly had later sent reinforcements because it thought ten ships would not be enough to 'protect', ἀμύνειν, the Corcyraeans: 50. 5. To that extent the Assembly had extended its original mandate. But the commanders of the first squadron do not yet know this: see 45. 3 n. on ἦν μὴ etc.

54. 2. ναῦς τε καταδύσαντες περὶ ἑβδομήκοντα . . . : 'had disabled about seventy ships . . .'. Here for the first time Th. gives casualties and losses. The Corcyraean losses, seventy out of 110 ships disabled, are

believable but very severe. (Hammond, *Studies*, 463 and n. 2. In fact, only twenty ships can have survived the main battle intact. But in addition we must allow for the twenty victorious Corcyraean ships who went off at 49. 6.) Th. does not rub the point in, but it is not less effective for that, and for the delayed summary. Elsewhere and with equal but differently achieved effectiveness he might, as at the end of Book vii, use the language of superlatives to describe heavy losses.

**55. 1. ὅπως αὐτοῖς τὴν Κέρκυραν ἀναχωρήσαντες προσποιή-
σειαν:** 'in the hope that, when they returned, they might win over Corcyra to the Corinthian side'. A kind of literary time-bomb: these words sound innocent enough, but they will be specifically recalled at iii. 70, where Th. introduces his account of the appalling Corcyraean *stasis* as follows: 'now Corcyra had been in an unsettled state ever since the return of the prisoners who were taken at sea in the Epidamnian war, and afterwards released by the Corinthians'.

2. αἰτία δὲ αὕτη πρώτη: 'This was the first of the causes'. These words bring us back to 23. 6. So far, Corinth is formally in the right, however irresponsibly we may think she has behaved at the more general level. The second of the causes will be less legally straightforward.

56-67. THE POTIDAIA EPISODE (THE *POTIDAIATIKA*)

These events, for no obvious reason, fill only ten chapters or so as opposed to the thirty for Corcyra.

As with Corcyra, there is relevant background information which Th. does not give us. If modern scholars have put this together correctly, the implications for the veracity of Th.'s account are perhaps a little more serious this time.

The chief difficulty is that at 56. 2 Th. clearly implies that the Potidaia affair flowed out of Corcyra, in the sense that the Corinthians were getting their own back, *πρασσόντων ὅπως τιμωρήσονται αὐτούς*, after their reverse at Corcyra, and the Athenians suspected this and acted preemptively. But there are two pieces of evidence which suggest that Athenian pressure on Potidaia went back to the mid or even early 430s.

First there is the evidence of the tribute lists, which show that Potidaia's tribute was raised from 6 to 15 talents either in 439/8, or in 435/4, or some year in between. 'This', as Meiggs (529) says, 'would suggest a longer history to Athenian suspicions of Potidaia' (though he oddly goes on 'but that is not necessarily inconsistent with Thucydides');

cp. *ATL* iii. 65: 'the trouble in Potidaia begins earlier than we have supposed, for Athens is adopting disciplinary measures at least as early as 435/4'. For the epigraphic issue, which is not straightforward, see Meiggs, 528f., following *ATL* (whose solution is also accepted by Lewis in *IG* i³. 278): it seems that the stonemason transposed the names of Skione and Potidaia. Otherwise we would have a dramatic and inexplicable increase for Skione. But 'inexplicable', in a patchily-documented period like the 430s BC, does not mean 'impossible'. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 292 n. 26, accepts that Potidaia's tribute was raised, but minimizes the significance of the increase, on the grounds that similar increases were imposed on other places nearby (see *ATL* 318-19 and Kagan, *Outbreak* (i. 45. 2 n., at end), 275; but de Ste. Croix, *OPW*, app. xiv, is less impressed by the evidence on this point). In that case it seems illogical of Salmon to accept the substitution of Potidaia for Skione, which is also on the Pallene peninsula. (Kagan, 274f., rejects the substitution.) What should we conclude? It does seem that, at a minimum, Athens was throwing her weight around in the Pallene peninsula area in the mid-430s and that this tendency is reflected in the tribute lists. Here is a development which we would not suspect from Th., and it is relevant to the *Potidaiaitika*. That remains true even if we are not convinced that Potidaia herself was singled out for a vicious tribute increase. If we are so convinced, and I think that on balance I am, then Th.'s narrative will seem even less satisfactory. Here is an instance where inscriptions if rightly interpreted modify Th. on a point of substance (ML 61 (see 51. 4 n. above) concerned points of detail). [But see iv. 120. 1 n. on *Σκιώνη* . . .].

The second piece of evidence is the foundation of the large Athenian colony at Amphipolis in 437. The event is mentioned out of chronological sequence in the important digression at iv. 102. (The date has to be reached by combining the material in that chapter with the scholiast to Aischines ii. 3: see below, 100. 2-3 nn. and iv. 102 n.) Now Amphipolis lay at the eastern edge of the Chalkidic peninsula, on whose western prong (Pallene) lay Potidaia. In order to grasp on a map how the new Athenian presence is likely to have been viewed at Potidaia (and therefore at Corinth, the mother-city of Potidaia), we must think away Thessalonike, a Hellenistic foundation (the modern Salonika), and Olynthos, not synoikized till ch. 58 below and a small place before that event. In other words, Potidaia had few major rival consumers in the area, when suddenly the Athenians succeeded, after several abortive efforts earlier in the century, in securing this wealthy and strategically important site (for its value see iv. 108. 1). 437 was surely an unpleasant moment for Potidaia as for Corinth ('these Athenians are everywhere', must have been the reaction of Potidaians and Corinthians alike). We

can reasonably complain that Th. found no space in Book i for the foundation of Amphipolis. Either he should have mentioned it somewhere here, or he should have continued his account of the *pentekontaetia* beyond 439 (which is certainly true for other reasons).

For general discussion of the *Potidaiaitika* see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 292–6.

56. 2. οἱ οἰκοῦσιν: ‘who live’. These words (in the present tense) were not necessarily written before 429 when the Athenians re-colonized the place; cp. ii. 70. Th. is merely giving a topographical pointer: see Dover, *HCT* v, app. 2, 406.

Κορινθίων ἀποίκους: ‘Corinthian colonists’. The oikist (above, ch. 4 n.) was Euagoras, son of the Cypselid tyrant Periander, and the foundation took place in c.600 BC: *FGrHist* 90 Nikolaos F 59.

φόρου ὑποτελεῖς: ‘tributaries’. See above, introductory n.

ἐπιδημιουργούς: ‘the magistrates’. For the word see L. H. Jeffery, ‘Demourgoi in the Archaic Period’, *Archaeologica Classica*, 25–6 (1973–4), 319ff., esp. 320 and n. 4 on the present passage: originally *δημοεργοί* (‘skilled workers of public things’) included heralds (*Odyssey*, xix. 135) and other officials; the word could then ‘reasonably be used by a large bloc of mainland Greek states to denote a high-ranking statesman’. (Against Palmer’s view that *demourgoi* originally worked public land see M. I. Finley, *Historia* 6 (1957), 156 n. 4.) As Jeffery says, with acknowledgement to C. Vatin, *BCH* 85 (1961), 253 and n. 4, the prefix *ἐπι-* narrows the general title; the Corinthian *ἐπιδημιουργοί* were thus officials whose jurisdiction was understood to be limited (to Potidaian territory? or to the one year of their command? or both?). We do not hear of these officials in other Corinthian territories so cannot say whether Corinth’s hold on Potidaia was unusually or unduly close. What *was* remarkable was Potidaia’s dual status, as an Athenian tributary and a Corinthian dependency. This arose from the fact that Potidaia was a Corinthian enclave in the north-east, where Athens had a long history of involvement, unlike the north-west, where Corinth’s empire had always been solid until well on into the *pentekontaetia*. See the map of the Athenian empire in the *Oxford History of the Classical World* (1986), 134.

That Potidaia received magistrates from Corinth is evidence that it was one of the *oligarchic* members of the Athenian empire, so Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 299 (on 24. 2). See below, 117. 3 n. on *προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία*.

Περδίκκου: ‘and Perdikkas’. King of Macedon from c.452 (undisputed king from c.435) to 413. For his reign see Hammond, in Hammond and Griffith, *Hist. Mac.* ii (Oxford, 1979), 115ff. It is remarkable that Th.

introduces him thus casually, without even explaining until the following ch. that he was king of Macedon. Th. never evaluates him like his son Archelaos (ii. 100): we are simply left to infer from the narrative that Perdikkas was an unreliable ally. Ethnographic information about Macedonia is delayed until ii. 99 ff. (See below on Derdas.)

57. 2. ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος: 'hitherto the friend and ally of Athens' [the last two words are not in the Greek but that is what it means]. There is an inscription (*IG* i³. 89) recording an alliance between Athens and Perdikkas, and scholars have naturally been tempted to connect it with these words of Th. But it probably belongs later; it is not difficult to find other suitable contexts in view of Perdikkas' many changes of alliance. Lewis in his commentary favours a date between 417 and 413 on the grounds that Archelaos, Perdikkas' son, is already grown up. Hammond may nevertheless be right that Th.'s language implies 'a formal decree by the Athenian demos', i.e. one which happens not to have survived on stone (*Hist. Mac.* ii. 122).

3. Φιλίππῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφῷ: 'his brother Philip'. A fragmentary inscription once thought to relate to Athenian relations with Mytilene on Lesbos or (as Lewis prefers) some unknown place, and can therefore be ignored in the present context (*IG* i³. 67). See iii. 50. 2 n. on κλήρους etc. **καὶ Δέρδα:** 'and with Derdas'. A Derdas is mentioned ([Δέ]ρδας) at line 69 of the Athenian alliance with Perdikkas (see above, 2 n.), and in the 380s a Derdas was ruler, ἄρχων, of the kingdom of Elymiotis, in Upper Macedonia (i.e. the inland region in the Pindus mountain range): Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 38. Elymiotis was on the middle stretch of the great River Haliakmon. The scholiast to the present passage says that the fifth-century Derdas was son of Arrhidaios and cousin of Philip and Perdikkas: see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* ii. 18. The Elymiot royal family has been much discussed, partly because of the possibility that Harpalos, Alexander the Great's famous treasurer, and perhaps nephew of a Derdas, belonged to it: Badian, *JHS* 81 (1961), 22, criticized by R. Lane Fox, *Alexander the Great* (London, 1973), 506. For a sensible summary of the evidence see Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² iii. 2. 72 ff. (but he was wrong to say that the Derdas of the fragmentary fifth-century inscription is called king, βασιλεύς: the title goes with the name which follows). Putting all this together we can say that, although the princely houses of Macedonia inter-married and so were inter-related (see above for the scholiast's evidence), Derdas, the (probable) ruler of fifth-century Elymiotis in Upper Macedonia, was still independent of Perdikkas, the ruler of Lower, i.e. coastal Macedonia. (For this term see ii. 99. 1 n. and for the

kingdoms, Upper and Lower, see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i, 93 ff.) The full absorption of Upper by Lower Macedonia was not achieved until the reign of Philip II (359–336).

5. τοῖς ἐπὶ Θράκης Χαλκιδεῦσι: 'to the Thraceward Chalkidians'. See below, 58. 2 n. 'Thraceward' (a variant for *Θράκιος*, 'Thracian') was the name of one of the five districts into which the Tribute Lists divided the Athenian Empire, the others being the Island, Hellespontine, Ionian, and (at one time) Karian.

καὶ Βοττιαίοις: 'and to the Bottiaians'. These Bottiaians (for whom see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 191 f.) were the inhabitants of Bottike, the central part of the Chalkidic peninsula, between Lake Bolbe and the three prongs of Pallene, Sithone, and Akte (Athos). They are not to be confused with the Bottiaians who inhabited Bottiaia, to the west round Pella, between the rivers Axios and Haliakmon (the similarity of name is due to an original emigration from Bottiaia of the men of the future Bottike). See Bosworth's note on Arrian, *Anabasis*, i. 2. 5, and Hammond, maps at 150 and 180; but M. Zahrnt, *Olynth und die Chalkidier* (Munich, 1971), 171 ff. and map opposite 136, gives Bottike a more restricted extension, by the coast to the west. An inscription of 422 (*IG* i³. 76) records an alliance between Athens and the Bottike Bottiaians; it contains an oath with an interesting mutual undertaking 'not to bear grudges for the past', οὐ μνησικακήσω. This formula is specially appropriate for settlements after revolts or other upheavals (cp. Tod 142 and 202 = Harding 55 and 122), and is intelligible in the light of the revolt mentioned in the present passage of Th.

6. Ἀρχεστράτου τοῦ Λυκομήδους: 'Archestratos son of Lykomedes'. For a new attestation of this man (with patronymic) see *IG* i³. 48 bis, line 11, where he is named alongside Lakedaimonios: see 45. 2 n.

μετ' ἄλλων ἑδέκα στρατηγούτων: 'and two others'. The Greek has 'and ten others', but this must be wrong because there were ten Athenian generals, not eleven, in any one year, and in this year some of the ten are otherwise accounted for. We do not know how many colleagues Archestratos had, but the number must be small. (Earlier editors emended *δέκα* to *τεσσάρων*, 'four', and this is actually promoted by Hude to his text; but see Griffith in *Hist. Mac.* ii. 529 against the belief that these two numerals were specially liable to be confused with each other in the process of manuscript transmission.) The likeliest number is two, *δύο* or *δύοις*: see Wade-Gery, *JHS* 53 (1933), 135; so too Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 123. But we should reject Wade-Gery's further suggestion that we should read 'Eukrates, [x, and Archestratus]' at line 5 of *IG* i³. 365, Athenian financial accounts relating to the operations in Macedon and Potidaia. See Gomme, *CR* 55 (1941), 59 ff., on this

tantalizing inscription, whose exact relation to Th.'s narrative remains uncertain: so Lewis in *IG* i³. In particular, the inscription does not settle the precise date of Arcestratos' mission, which fell in about spring 432, or perhaps the beginning of June: see W. Thompson, 'The Chronology of 432/1', *Hermes*, 96 (1968), 216ff., at 223 n. 3 and 232.

58. 1. τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων: 'the Spartan authorities'. I have changed Jowett's 'magistrates'. This expression is distinct from *οἱ ἐν τέλει*, 'those in authority', being in one way narrower and in another wider. Narrower, because Th. confines it to Sparta; wider, because it can, as here, refer to the whole Spartan assembly. See Andrewes, *HCT* on v. 27. 2 and 77. 1.

ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐσβαλεῖν: 'they would invade Attica'. The first mention of what was to be a familiar Spartan diversionary tactic: see 101. 2 (Thasos revolt) and 114. 1-2 (Euboia).

κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦτον ἀφίστανται μετὰ Χαλκιδέων καὶ Βοττιαίων κοινῇ ξυνομόσαντες: 'So they seized the opportunity and revolted: the Chalkidians and Bottiaians swore alliance with them and joined in the revolt'. See A. B. West, *The History of the Chalcidic League* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1918), 18ff.; Zahrnt (above, 57. 5n.), 49ff.

2. καὶ Περδίκκας πείθει Χαλκιδέας τὰς ἐπὶ θαλάσση πόλεις ἐκλιπόντας καὶ καταβαλόντας ἀνοικίσασθαι ἐς Ὀλυνθὸν μίαν τε πόλιν ταύτην ἰσχυρὰν ποιήσασθαι: 'Perdikkas persuaded the Chalkidians to abandon and pull down their towns on the sea-coast, and settle at Olynthos inland, forming one strong city there'. This is the synoikism (for this word see 10. 2n.; ii. 14. 2, introductory n.; iii. 2. 3n. on *ξυνοικίζουσι*) of Olynthos, a famous event which gave a lead to other communities in similar situations like the cities on the island of Rhodes in 408 bc. Like some of the Hellenistic synoikisms it was done at the instance of a powerful ruler, though unlike Antigonos who synoikized Teos and Lebedos in the late fourth century (Welles, *Royal Correspondence of the Hellenistic Period* (Yale, 1934), nos. 3/4) Perdikkas was not in a position to do more than suggest. (An even closer analogy would be Kassander's suggestion that the Akarnanians should synoikize: Diod. xix. 67. 3-4.) The move to a safe inland position anticipates Archelaos' move of Pydna: Diod. xiii. 49. 2, with Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 128. (The process in fact reverses that postulated by Th. at 7. 1 above: see n. there.) The synoikism of Olynthos (or anoikism as Zahrnt calls it, echoing Th.) is well studied in what is still an excellent treatment of the whole topic of synoikism, E. Kuhn, *Die Entstehung der Städte der Alten* (Leipzig, 1878), 283ff. It was of both kinds, physical and political: the Chalkidians evidently moved physically, though unlike the Rhodians they did not

build a wholly new city, and they became a new political unit, the Chalkidic league, for which see Larsen, *Greek Federal States* (Oxford, 1968), 58 ff., West, and above all Zahrnt. The Chalkidic federal state is illuminated for us above all by two very interesting fourth-century inscriptions, Tod 111 (alliance of Amyntas with the Chalkidians) and 158 (alliance with Amyntas' famous son Philip II) = Harding 21 and 67. The great new city Olynthos has been called 'the Greek Pompeii' (see D. M. Robinson's article of that title in *Archaeology*, 5 (1952), 228 ff., and his multi-volume study of the site): it was destroyed by Philip in 348 and so is important archaeologically because most of the remains, which are splendidly illuminating about town-planning and domestic architecture, can be securely dated to the years of the city's synoikized existence, 432–348. See for photographs R. Schoder, *Ancient Greece from the Air* (London, 1974), 166 ff. It grew to a city of perhaps 30,000 souls.

Some of the places absorbed by the synoikism paid tribute to Athens at the Dionysia of 432, so the sequence went on longer than the reader of Th. might have thought. See Zahrnt, 50 ff.

τοῖς τ' ἐκλιποῦσι τοῦτοις τῆς ἑαυτοῦ γῆς τῆς Μυγδονίας περὶ τὴν Βόλβην λίμνην ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι: 'When they moved he gave them part of his own territory round lake Bolbe to cultivate'. For Mygdonia see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 182 ff. The phrase 'gave them to cultivate', ἔδωκε νέμεσθαι, is found in Hdt., e.g. viii. 136. 1 where it refers to a feudal gift of the *revenues* or produce from the cultivation of territory in Phrygia. Cities, πόλεις, needed territory, χώρα, from which to feed themselves; either the citizens would work this themselves (perhaps using slaves); or in an area like Phrygia the subjugated natives would hand over the produce. Perdikkas' gift is a recognition of the realities of life for a πόλις of any size; on these realities see R. Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures: The Greek City and its Countryside* (London, 1987).

60. 1. οἰκείον τὸν κίνδυνον ἡγούμενοι: 'they felt that the danger had come home to them'. Cp. Hdt. on the Athenian punishment of Phrynichos, whose tragedy on the fall of their daughter-city Miletos (494) reminded them of troubles 'too close to home', οἰκῆμα κακά, vi. 21. 2. The word was evidently appropriate to the special feeling of kinship for a colony.

2. Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Ἀδειμάντου: 'Aristeus son of Adeimantos'. For this man see Westlake, *Essays*, ch. 4, 'Aristeus, the Son of Adeimantos', suggesting that he was a direct informant of Th., whose material about Aristeus is unusually warm and full. There is a further aspect (Westlake, 83): Aristeus' father Adeimantos did not cut an altogether favourable

figure in Hdt. (viii. 5; 94) and Th. may have enjoyed 'reinstating the house of Adeimantos' (as Westlake puts it), especially if this could be done at Hdt.'s expense.

61. 1. ἐπιπαρόντας: 'had come'. An emendation for the manuscripts' ἐπιπαρόντας, 'were present', which Aristeus and his men were not, except in a very geographically loose sense.

Καλλίαν τὸν Καλλιᾶδου πέμπτον αὐτὸν στρατηγόν: 'Kallias the son of Kalliadēs and four others' [literally 'himself the fifth']. This and similar expressions have been discussed by K. J. Dover in an important article, 'ΔΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ', *JHS* 80 (1960), 61 ff., who argues that when Th. says that Pericles was 'himself the tenth' he does not mean that Pericles possessed any superior authority; it is merely that Pericles (or Kallias) was for whatever reason uppermost in his mind at the time of writing, perhaps because he was 'a more impressive man than the others' (68). Such a description fits this Kallias, who was certainly 'no nonentity' as Lewis puts it, *JHS* 81 (1961), 118: he proposed the financial decrees named after him, ML 58 = Fornara 119 (see above, 44. 2 n.) and the alliances with Rhegion and Leontini, ML 63 and 64 = Fornara 124 and 125 (for which see above, introductory n. to 24-55). Even more relevant, perhaps, he may (Lewis thinks) have been a general as early as 439/8; for this see also ML, p. 153. This would mean he had been a big enough name for long enough to be singled out over his fellow-commanders, ξυνάρχοντες (cp. 62. 4). But *fellow*-commanders they all were: see, for Kallias, Dover, 65 (1).

2. Θέρμην: 'Therme'. Roughly on the site of later Thessalonike, modern Salonika. See Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 148 ff., and for the events here described, vol. ii, pp. 122 f.

3. Πύδναν: 'Pydna'. See Hammond, i. 127 ff.; iii (1988), 547 ff.; and his 'The Battle of Pydna', *JHS* 104 (1984), 31 ff. (The battle was that in which the Romans defeated King Perseus of Macedon in 168 BC; Hammond re-studies the topography.) As noted above on 58. 2, the site was moved some years later by Archelaos.

4. καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέροϊαν κάκειθεν ἐπὶ Στρέψαν: 'They arrived at Beroia and then at Strepssa'. A famous crux, or rather two. First, editors have altered 'Beroia' to 'Brea', which is a Thracian site to which Athens sent a colony in the 440s, ML 49 = Fornara 100. The site of Brea is in fact unknown, and the purpose of this alteration is manifestly to give an approximate location to the place. But Beroia, modern Veria, was a strategically important town which fits Th.'s narrative perfectly well. On the problem see J. Vartsos, 'The Foundation of Brea', *ΑΡΧΑΙΑ ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑ = Ancient Macedonia*, ii (Salonika,

1977), 13 ff. (against the alteration; gives earlier literature), and for Beroia generally see Hammond, i. 158 ff.

'Strepsa', by contrast, is the result of a very ingenious emendation indeed. The manuscripts of Th. have the participle ἐπιστρέψαντες, 'turning round'. But 'they arrived at Beroia, turned round, and tried to take the place' makes no sense. So Pluygers in the nineteenth century suggested ἐπὶ Στρέψαν, 'to Strepsa', a 'city of Thrace' mentioned in several literary sources and in the Tribute Lists. From this non-Thucydidean evidence it is clear that Strepsa (for which see Hammond, i. 183 f. and map 13; also ii. 123 and n. 2) must be north-west of Therme on the road to Pella. Which suits Th. perfectly. See also *ATL* i. 551 f. and Zahrnt, 244.

On this whole passage it is very well worth reading Wade-Gery's review of Gomme, *HCT* i, in *JHS* 69 (1949), 84 f. Note also Gomme, iii. 726 f., 735.

4. καὶ Πausανίου: 'and Pausanias'. Whom Th. has not, however, introduced to us. He was probably a brother of Derdas: see 59. 2.

5. ἐς Γίγωνον: 'at Gigonos'. On the west coast of the Chalkidic peninsula about half way between Therme and Potidaia. For the probable location see Zahrnt, 179 f., independent of but agreeing with Hammond, i. 188.

62. 1. ἀγορὰν ἔξω τῆς πόλεως ἐπεποίητο: 'they held a market outside the walls of Potidaia'. For this way of provisioning an army far from home see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, i. 45 f., though I do not understand his comment on the present passage, 'so that the men need not leave the camp in order to bring supplies into [should this be 'from?'] the city'. See also (correctly) de Ste. Croix, *OPW*, app. xlvi, at 400.

2. Ἰόλαον ἀνθ' αὐτοῦ καταστήσας ἄρχοντα: 'having appointed Iolaos to take his place with the expedition'. This translation was offered by Jowett as an alternative in a footnote; it is clearly right. In his text, however, Jowett printed 'having appointed Iolaos to be his lieutenant at home'. Most commentators assume the correctness of this latter translation (Gomme, Classen/Steup, Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* ii. 123, Iolaos 'regent at Aegeae'). Gomme then accuses Th. of inconsequentiality. It is perfectly true that Macedonian domestic arrangements would be irrelevant here, but that is an argument against the translation. Moreover, as Jowett noticed in his footnote, Th.'s language further down (para. 3) actually implies that Perdikkas is absent from events at Pallene. He speaks of the cavalry 'provided by', lit. 'from' Perdikkas, παρὰ Περδίκκου.

63. 2. ἀπέχει δὲ ἐξήκοντα μάλιστα σταδίου: 'which is only about seven miles [11.1 km.] distant' [the word 'only' is an insertion by Jowett

to clarify the sense]. The Greek means 'about sixty stades'. A stade is usually reckoned at about 606 feet, 202 yards, or 185 m. (There were 8 stades to the Roman mile of c.1.5 km. A *στάδιον* or stadium came to be a regular word for a race-course for running, because the most famous track, that at Olympia, was a stade long. See *Kleine Pauly*, v. 335f.) However, the collection of the evidence for Th.'s stade distances made by R. A. Bauslaugh, *JHS* 99 (1979), 5f. with n. 22, shows that the 'Thucydidean stade' fluctuates widely: 'although Thucydides no doubt had one particular stade length in mind, his informants could have been thinking in terms of any one of a number of divergent stades. Since he fails to mention regional standards for linear measurements (as he incidentally does for money [see below on this]) we cannot establish the exact length of his stade.' Dover, *HCT* iv. 468, compares the American 'block' as an indicator of place. In the present instance Bauslaugh reckons that the true distance Olynthos to Potidaia was c.10.5 km. or 6½ miles, i.e. Th. was operating with a stade of 175 m., not 185; but I do not feel confident enough to change Jowett's tr. (Incidentally, Th. does indeed mention regional money, e.g. Aiginetan obols at v. 47. 3 or 'Doric', i.e. Persian, staters at viii. 28. 4, but he does not 'translate' these into Attic or any other system. For a serious monetary ambiguity see iii. 70. 4n.)

Cp. ii. 1 n., on chronology: Th.'s 'precision' had its limits.

3. **Ἀθηναίων δέ:** 'of the Athenians'. These Athenian dead were commemorated in the Kerameikos district of Athens, site of the state burial ground (see ii. 34. 5 n.); their verse epitaph survives (Tod 59 = *IG* i³. 1179 = D. Bradeen, *The Athenian Agora*, xvii, no. 16, not in ML) and is now in the British Museum. For a photograph see B. F. Cook, *Reading Texts: Greek Inscriptions* (London 1987), 34. For the language of the epitaph ('the city *ποθεῖ*, feels longing regret for, the dead', 'the ether has received their souls and the earth their bodies'), see N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens*, tr. A. Sheridan (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 47, 117, 278, etc.: the text is a remarkable document of Athenian civic attitudes to and responsibility for the war dead. See also Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv. 88, 186.

Socrates and Alcibiades served at Potidaia, and Alcibiades distinguished himself in this battle, Plato, *Symp.* 219-20.

64. 1. τὸ δ' ἐς τὴν Παλλήνην ἀτείχιστον ἦν: 'but the side towards Pallene was left open' [lit. 'unwalled']. At 56. 2 we heard of a 'wall facing Pallene', but the reference here must be to a different sort of wall.

2. **Φορμίωνα τὸν Ἀσωπίου στρατηγόν:** 'under the command of Phormio the son of Asopios'. The first mention of this great commander. **ἐξ Ἀφύτιος:** 'he made Aphytis his headquarters'. Aphytis was on the

east side of the Pallene promontory. Two Athenian inscriptions of the early 420s regulate the affairs of Aphytis, including the right of Aphytis to import corn through the Hellespont (*IG* i³. 62 and 63, translations in LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 160 and 161). See further below, ii. 70. 4 n., for Aphytis' relations with the Athenian colonists eventually planted at Potidaia.

66. αἰτίαι μὲν αὐται: 'These were the causes'. See 55. 2 n.

τοῖς μὲν Κορινθίοις (ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους): 'the Corinthians complaining that the Athenians . . .'. The words ἐς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, 'the Athenians', are a modern editor's probably correct insertion; the word 'complaining' is not in the Greek but has to be supplied.

ὁ γὰρ πόλεμος: 'the Peloponnesian War' [lit. 'the war']. See next n.

ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ταῦτα οἱ Κορίνθιοι ἔπραξαν: 'so far the Corinthians had acted alone', i.e. independently of the Peloponnesian League. This, rather than that Aristeus' expedition was a private venture not sanctioned by the Corinthian state, is what Th. means: see Andrewes, *HCT*, on v. 30. 2. As Andrewes says, when Th. spoke of 'the war' just above, he 'was of course thinking of the League war'.

67-88. DEBATE AT SPARTA

In form, this debate is unique in Th. because there are four speeches instead of the usual one or two (in the Athenian debate before Sicily there are three, two of Nicias and one of Alcibiades). This allows Th. to give a Corinthian, an Athenian, and two Spartan viewpoints, surely a conscious decision marking the gravity of the moment when full-scale war was in prospect: elsewhere (e.g. i. 139. 4) he is content to register the fact that other speeches were made which he has not recorded. We may call the four speeches A (Corinthian), B (Athenian), C (Archidamos, one of the two kings of Sparta), and D (Sthenelaidas, the Spartan ephor or magistrate). It has been noticed that speeches B and D go more directly to the issue of the 'true cause' of ch. 23, i.e. Athenian imperialism and Spartan desire to contain it. It is also true that there are verbal and conceptual correspondences between A and C on the one hand and B and D on the other. But none of this compels the conclusion that B and D are later insertions, reflecting a revised view of the causes of the war, formed at a time when Corinthian nagging seemed less important than the power of Athens. See *Thucydides*, 60, arguing that the fabric of all four speeches is in fact seamless and closely woven. (And see below nn. on e.g. 75. 5, 79. 1, 80. 3, 82. 1, 84. 1, 86. 2 and 3.) It is also relevant that at

79 below the public phase of the discussions is terminated in favour of a private Spartan discussion; in this way Th. draws a firm line between A + B and C + D. The view here rejected is that of Ed. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*² (Bonn, 1929), modified by Andrewes in 'Thucydides and the Causes of the War', *CQ* 19 (1959), 223 ff. Note also the remarks of F. E. Adcock, 'Thucydides in Book I', *JHS* 71 (1951), 5 ff., and J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism*, tr. P. Thody (Oxford, 1963), 242-72.

Th. is enabled through these speeches to explore, early in the work, Spartan and Athenian national characteristics (as well as the ultimate political issues; unlike the Corcyraean/Corinthian debate at 32 ff., these speeches have little to say on immediate grievances, though cp. 71. 4 n.). We might compare Hdt.'s chapters in Book i on Lycurgan Sparta and Pisistratid Athens, which have something of the same function: cp. *Thucydides*, 33 and n. 80 (discussing the Pausanias and Themistokles excursions at 128 ff. below, which are also comparable in this respect). See also, on Sparta and Athens in the *Archaeology*, introductory n. to ch. 2 above. On the contrasts between Athens and Sparta drawn here, particularly in the Corinthians' speech, see R. Parker, 'Spartan Religion', in A. Powell (ed.), *Classical Sparta: Techniques Behind her Success* (London, 1989), 142 ff. at 162, citing Mary Douglas, *Natural Symbols*² (London, 1973).

67. 1. παρεκάλου: 'they invited'. Some such informal word as Jowett's is needed (rather than 'summoned', 'attempted to summon', 'called a conference', the expressions used by de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 201, Andrewes, *CQ* 9 (1959), 228, 235 n. 4). De Ste. Croix, who insists on the imperfect force of the verb ('attempted to summon') is right against Andrewes that the Corinthians could not constitutionally summon a Peloponnesian League meeting; only the Spartans could do that. But de Ste. Croix goes on to assert very strongly that the meeting which followed was not a League meeting but a meeting of the Spartan assembly (*ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν*, para. 3), addressed as such by speakers, and from which outsiders were told to withdraw at 79. 1. He thinks a 'proper League Congress', also addressed as such, did not happen till ch. 119. De Ste. Croix, when he wishes to show that a real Congress could not be summoned by Corinth, puts weight on 'the Spartans proceeded to invite in addition', *προσπαρακαλέσαντες*, at para. 3 below. But at 119 Th. says that the Spartans 'again invited the allies', *αὐθις δὲ τοὺς ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες*. Th.'s language is in fact virtually identical, and if we were pressing the language of the admitted League summons of 119 we would have to say (implausibly) that at 67. 3 Th. must have been describing the

same process. (Steup, *Thukydideische Studien*, ii (Freiburg i. Br., 1886), 49f., wanted to take ἀὖθις at 119. 1 in a weaker sense, in the way we sometimes begin a sentence with 'Again', i.e. to pass to a new item; hardly more than 'And'. See e.g. 70. 3. This is perverse here, but he did at least see the difficulty.)

To sum up. At 67 ff. we do not have a Congress, but perhaps Andrewes is justified in calling this momentous occasion a congress, with a small 'c'; that is, Th. should not be pressed too hard.

2. Αἰγινῆται τε φανερώς μὲν οὐ πρεσβευόμενοι, δεδιότες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, κρύφα δὲ οὐχ ἥκιστα μετ' αὐτῶν ἐνήγον τὸν πόλεμον: 'The Aiginetans did not send envoys openly, through fear of the Athenians, but secretly they acted with the Corinthians, and were among the chief instigators of the war'. And paid for their instigating role: see ii. 27. 1 and n. The present passage comes closer than any other in Book i to explaining the treatment of the Aiginetans described at ii. 27, and the explanation there given for it. But it remains true that the language of ii. 27 is surprising, given that the Aiginetan grievance is so little prominent (below, 4 n.) in Book i. οὐχ ἥκιστα, 'chief', recurs at ii. 27.

The Aiginetan complaints, though here said to be made 'secretly', were in the public domain by chs. 139 and 140. Did the Athenian envoys of 72. 1 get to hear of them? The motive for the secrecy ('fear of the Athenians') may be no more than an inference by Th., rather than constituting a report of anything said at Sparta by the Aiginetans or anybody else.

λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς: 'the Aiginetans . . . said that they had been robbed of the autonomy which the treaty guaranteed them'. The Aiginetans had revolted and were subjugated in 457 (below, 105 and nn.), but the reference here is probably not to the settlement after that revolt but to the Thirty Years Peace of 446. (So M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (1982), 23 and n. 110; see also E. Lévy, 'Autonomia et Éleuthéria au V^e Siècle', *Rev. Phil.* 57 (1983), 249ff., at 250f. with n. 16: apparently preferring 446 to 457, and suggesting on the evidence of 144. 2 (see n. there) that Athens claimed that in 446 she *left* Aigina autonomous rather than that she *gave* her autonomy. This seems an improbably rosy view of the events of 457.)

In what sense did the Aiginetans have autonomy after 446? And how had the Athenians infringed it by 432? Meiggs (183f.) thinks in terms of independence of local law-courts and perhaps freedom from garrisons, etc. A fragmentary fifth-century inscription, *IG* i³. 38, concerns Athenian relations with Aigina, and has sometimes been invoked to explain the present passage of Th., but all arguments are precarious. See, for a useful discussion and summary of views, A. G. Woodhead, 'Before the Storm',

Mélanges Daux (Paris, 1974), 375ff. (a study of the run-up to the Peloponnesian War in the light of some items of epigraphy), at 378–80: the Athenians may have acted recently to tighten up security on Aigina. The stone mentions *φυλακή*[ν, ‘security’, ‘defence’ (rather than ‘garrison’): see Lewis, *BSA* 49 (1954), 24). For a sceptical view see also T. Figueira, *CP* 76 (1981), 22 n. 104.

Badian (i. 23. 6n.) 61f. explains Aigina by reference to a *general* autonomy clause in the Thirty Years Peace.

3. προσπαρακαλέσαντες τῶν ξυμμάχων τε καὶ εἴ τις τι ἄλλο ἔφη ἡδίκησθαι ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων: ‘proceeded to invite in addition any of their own allies, and anyone else, who had other charges to bring against the Athenians’. (This reading, with *τε* after *ξυμμάχων*, is relegated by Jowett to a footnote; but it is preferable. The alternative would according to Jowett mean ‘any of the allies who had other charges’, but on this reading it is hard to see what sense can be given to *καὶ*. But if we want the general sense ‘non-allies as well as allies’ we can get it much more easily if with Hude we adopt the emendation *ἄλλο* to *ἄλλος*. If so, *τε* will still be necessary, unless with Steup we want the sense ‘other allies apart from the Corinthians’.) The mechanics of a Spartan summons to her allies are easily imagined; such things had happened before, and the runners would know where to go. But how are we to imagine Sparta, in an age before newspapers, radio, and television, broadcasting so general an appeal to the Greek world as one ‘to anyone who thought they had been wronged by Athens’? We do hear of general proclamations, e.g. of colonial ventures (cp. Diod. xii. 10. 4 where the Athenians send heralds round the Peloponnese to invite settlers for Thurii), but such a broad trawl was unusual: at 27 above the ‘proclamation’ for the new colony was largely aimed at Corinthians. Sparta’s ‘liberation’ claim at ii. 8. 4 hardly took the form of a circulated pronouncement despite Th.’s language (*προειπόντων*). In later times Delphi was used to provide publicity for international grievances, e.g. *Syll*³ 643, tr. M. Austin, *The Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1981), no. 76), but anything so provocative in 432 would surely rate more than this casual mention. Perhaps the Olympic Games of 432, never mentioned by Th., would have been a suitable venue; cp. the use made of the 428 Olympics at iii. 8ff. (But on 432 see vol. 2 Appendix I, Chronology).

ξύλλογον σφῶν αὐτῶν: ‘their own ordinary assembly’. ‘Ordinary’ is supplied by Jowett to make the meaning clearer; this was a meeting of the Spartan assembly, not the Peloponnesian League, but see above 1 n.

4. Μεγαρήs, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ λιμένων τε εἶργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηναίων ἀρχῇ καὶ τῆs Ἀττικῆs ἀγορᾶs παρὰ τὰs σπονδάs: ‘The Megarians alleged,

among other grounds of complaint, that they were excluded from all harbours within the Athenian empire and from the Athenian market-place, contrary to the treaty'. The celebrated Megarian decrees, perhaps already alluded to at 42. 2: see n. there. They are strictly undatable but were probably passed in the early 430s, ostensibly in punishment for cultivation of sacred land, and were maintained thereafter (detailed account in Plut. *Pericles*, 29ff.). In the non-Thucydidean tradition they were thought to be a major cause of the war; cp. Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 529ff., Diod. xii. 39. 4ff., from Ephoros. In this tradition Pericles' personal part was magnified discreditably. The scope, purpose, and effect of the decrees are controversial. Much of de Ste. Croix's *OPW* is devoted to the decrees; he shows that exclusion from 'harbours and market-place' (he is more interested in the second than the first) is particularly appropriate for religious offences, citing Plato, *Laws*, 871A (such exclusion as a punishment for homicide): the *ἀγορά* of a Greek city, a word for which 'market-place' is too narrow a translation, was the sacred focus of the community. He then minimizes the economic intention and effect of the decrees, seeing them as essentially religious and concluding that Th. was right merely to glance at them. He is right to stress the religious aspect, but: (i) the Plato passage is more clearly religious than Th.: Plato speaks of 'pollution', and of exclusion from *ἱερά*, 'sacred things', i.e. temples, as well as the harbours, etc. It is striking that Th. gives only those two places where commerce went on (for the conjunction 'harbours and market-places', *τοὺς λιμένας καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς*, in a strictly financial context see Dem. i. 22). It seems the Athenians were anxious *both* to make the punishment religiously appropriate *and* to do economic damage; (ii) actual economic damage is clearly implied by Aristophanes. De Ste. Croix's view that the starvation referred to in the *Acharnians* was merely the result of routine blockades of the Megarid is wildly improbable. The lines clearly link the decrees and starvation as cause and effect. See further *Greek World*, 91f. De Ste. Croix's view is rejected by R. Parker, a student of Greek religion (*Miasma*, 166 and n. 129), no less than by P.J. Rhodes, a political historian (*Hermes*, 115 (1987), 155 n. 3; see above, 23. 6n.).

Why is there not more about all this in Th.? He found the personal aspect of the vulgar story distasteful, perhaps; Pericles' mistress Aspasia was supposedly behind it, and it would be out of character for Th. to give prominence to this Herodotean female angle; cp. *Thucydides*, 15, 42.

Dover, *HCT* v. 422f., anyway thinks Th. may once have written a draft in which there was more about Megara (and Aigina), but I doubt whether Th. even in his earliest and most Herodotean mood could have brought himself to make Aspasia a prime historical agent. Aigina is a

different matter; para. 2 above could do with some amplification, but Aigina hardly ranked with Corcyra and Potidaia where Athenians and Corinthians came to blows. See, for a similar view on this latter point, Rhodes, *Hermes* 117 (1987), 161 ff.

See Lewis, *CAH* v² (1992), 388, for the attractive view that Th. had a blind spot about Megara, which was considered at Athens to be of great military importance, as shown both by the twice-yearly invasions of the Megarid in the Archidamian War (ii. 31. 3; iv. 66. 1) and by the strenuous efforts against the city in 424 (iv. 66ff.). On this view the Megarian decrees are 'not so much a cause of the war but a first blow in it, designed to force Megara into the empire'. See also ii. 31. 3 n.

68–71. *Speech of the Corinthians*

68. 1. τὸ πιστὸν ὑμᾶς, ὦ Λακαδαιμόνιοι, τῆς καθ' ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς πολιτείας καὶ ὁμιλίας ἀπιστοτέρους ἐς τοὺς ἄλλους, ἣν τι λέγωμεν, καθίστησιν: 'Spartans, the spirit of trust which you show towards each other in your political and social life, makes you distrust others who, like us, have something unpleasant [lit. just 'something'] to say'. Compare iii. 37. 2 n. on διὰ γὰρ etc. The Corinthian point in the present passage is that the Spartans trust each other but do not extend that trust to foreigners, at least when those foreigners have something disagreeable to say. Classen/Steup take πιστόν passively, 'your reliability'; but though this nicely matches σωφροσύνη, 'prudence', below, it is very harsh to have a passive expression followed by an active one, ἀπιστοτέρους, 'you distrust' [lit. 'distrustful'].

σωφροσύνη: 'prudence'. See for this word 32. 4 n. above. The Corinthians' point is echoed and answered by Archidamos at 84. 2, σωφροσύνη ἐμφρων, 'good sense and prudence'. But see also 86. 2 n. (the word recurs in Sthenelaidas' speech) and introductory n.

2. ἔνεκα τῶν αὐτοῖς ἰδίᾳ διαφόρων: 'from selfish motives', lit. 'because of private [i.e. specifically Corinthian] quarrels with them' [i.e. the Athenians].

3. τί δεῖ μακρηγορεῖν: 'what need of long speeches?' Th. is fond of this verb, which he uses only in speeches (none of them particularly short), and only to make this kind of point. See ii. 36. 4 and iv. 59. 2, where different speakers, Pericles and Hermokrates, couple the verb with ἐν εἰδόσι, 'discoursing at inordinate length among those who understand', as Syme renders it, *PBA* 48 (1962), 56. Note also Eur. *Hipp.* 704.

69. 1. τό τε πρῶτον ἔασαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τείχη: 'you originally

allowed them to fortify their city after the Persian Wars and afterwards to build their Long Walls'. See below 89-93 (city and Piraeus walls, in 479), 107 (Long Walls, about 457). The Spartans could perhaps have stopped the first of these operations (as some nameless allies of theirs wanted, 90. 1); but hardly the second (Athens was then too powerful and confident). So these criticisms are unreasonable. (Note, however, that 107. 4 shows that some Athenians hoped that Sparta might stop the Long Walls: see n. there.) The present passage may suggest that Corinth was prominent among the complaining allies of 90. 1: see n. there.

εἴπερ καὶ τὴν ἀξίωσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς ὡς ἐλευθερῶν τὴν Ἑλλάδα φέρεται: 'all the more if he has a fine reputation as the champion of the freedom of Greece'. This theme of the Spartans as 'liberators of Greece' is important in Th. and runs through the whole work, from i. 18. 1 and 2 (Spartans liberate Greece from the tyrants and from Persia) to viii. 46. 3 (it will be against Persian interests to let the Spartans win the war because of their claim to be liberators; this actually anticipates developments as late as the 390s: see *Thucydides*, 152). The most important statement of the theme is at ii. 8. 4, 'the feeling of mankind was strongly on the side of the Spartans, because they professed to be the liberators of Greece', where the scope of 'mankind', ἀνθρώπων, has been made clear at para. 1, ἢ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλάς ἅπασα μετέωρος ἦν, 'all the rest of Greece was excited . . .' See *Thucydides*, 181: because this is authorial, we can be sure that Sparta really did claim this role; it was not just a motif found in speeches. The slogan 'freedom of the Greeks' later, certainly after the King's Peace of 386, suggested specifically 'the Greeks in Asia'; so R. Seager and C. Tuplin, *JHS* 100 (1980), 141 ff. (see also Seager, *CQ* 31 (1981), 106 ff.), but in Th. the Asiatic Greeks are not yet clearly differentiated. See however below, viii. 46. 3 n.: the distinction is there already perhaps implicit.

2. οὐ μέλλοντες: 'no longer merely threatening' [lit. 'intending', 'delaying']. See 69. 4, 70. 4, 84. 1, 86. 2 for μέλλω, a key word in these speeches.

3. διὰ τὸ ἀναίσθητον ὑμῶν: 'you are too insensitive', the word from which our 'anaesthetic' derives. Again this is echoed and answered by Archidamos, at 82. 1; but see introductory n.

4. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ, μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὧ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: 'Of all Greeks, you Spartans are the only people who never do anything'. For ἡσυχία, 'quietism', see 32. 5 n. on the related notion of ἀπραγμοσύνη.

οὐ τῇ δυνάμει τινά, ἀλλὰ τῇ μελλήσει: 'not by power but by procrastination'. This passage is well discussed by A. Parry, 'Thucydides' Use of Abstract Language', *Yale French Studies*, 45 (1970), 7 (reprinted in *The Language of Achilles and Other Papers* (Oxford, 1989), 177 ff.), pointing out that though the two abstract words have the same ending, the

rhythm is different, the first word rapid, the second slow, an anapaest then a molossus (⊃ ⊃ — then — —). This kind of subtlety should be remembered when we read in the *OCD*² 888, entry on 'Prose Rhythm', that Th. has been 'proved' to be almost 'unmetrical' in the sense that he 'departs very little from the natural rhythms of the language'. [Contrast *OCD*³.] I have tried in translation to capture something of the effect.

On *μελλήσει*, 'procrastination', see above, para. 2 n. and refs. there given.

5. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῷ τὰ πλείω σφαλέντα: 'And you know that Xerxes failed chiefly through his own errors'. Not quite Hdt.'s view; he preferred to stress the Athenian contribution and sacrifice, vii. 139, but in the present context the rhetoric requires a different view.

καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἤδη τοῖς ἀμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἀφ' ὑμῶν τιμωρία περιγεγενημένους: 'we have more often been saved from these very Athenians by blunders of their own, than by any help from you'. See below, 144. 1, where Pericles says he is more afraid of Athenian mistakes than of their enemies' plans; but see viii. 96. 4-5 for extended Thucydidean comment on an instance of the opposite, Athens capitalizing on Spartan errors due to congenital slowness and lack of initiative.

6. αἰτία μὲν γὰρ . . . κατηγορία δέ: 'men criticize . . . but they bring accusations . . .'. This kind of fine distinction is said to have been in the manner of Prodikos, from whom allegedly Th. derived the technique, Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides*, para. 36. Archidamos retorts to the word *κατηγορία* at 84. 2.

70. 1. πρὸς οἷους ὑμῖν Ἀθηναίους ὄντας: 'what sort of people these Athenians are'. What follows is, in its way, as glowing a tribute as anything which Th. puts into the mouth of an Athenian speaker and is more effective coming from an enemy. Th.'s speeches (see *Thucydides*, ch. 3 and elsewhere) cannot be used as a statement of Th.'s views except where they correspond to an explicit authorial judgment. This Corinthian sketch of Athenian national characteristics, for which see also above (introductory n. to 67-88, at end), is in fact embroidery of viii. 96, so for once we can say that Th. endorses a speaker: see *Thucydides*, 163 and n. 38; and W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 41. For some similarities with Kleon's assessment of Athens at iii. 37-8 see Macleod, 95.

2. νεωτεροποιοί: 'revolutionary'. A word of approval in the context, but hardly one to commend itself to Sparta; note that it is exactly the 'bold and revolutionary spirit of the Athenians', τὸ τολμηρὸν [lit.

'boldness'; cp. below, para. 3, *τολμηταί*, 'bold'] *καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν*, which causes the Spartans to dismiss the Athenians at Ithome (102. 3 below; narrative but not quite authorial because it is a statement about motive—however little evidence Th. had for it).

ὄξεις: 'quick' [the word has in fact most of the associations of English 'sharp']. Endorsed by Th. at viii. 96. 4–5: Athenians quick, *ὄξεις*, Spartans slow, *βραδεῖς*.

3. **αὐθις δὲ οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταί**: 'they are bold beyond their strength'. Cp. viii. 96. 5, *οἱ μὲν ἐπιχειρηταί, οἱ δὲ ἄτολμοι*, 'the one [people, that is, Athens] adventurous, the other [Sparta] timid' [lit. 'bold in nothing']. Both Th. in Book viii, and the Corinthians here, underestimate Spartan readiness to take military initiatives: see *Thucydides*, 199.

εὐέλπιδες: 'full of hope'. See vi. 24. 3n. for the significance of Aristophanes' use, in the *Birds* of spring 414, of the name *Euelpides*, 'Hopeful'.

4. **μελλητάς**: 'dilatatory'. See above, 69. 2 and 4, and below, 84. 1 and 86. 2.

ἀποδημηταὶ πρὸς ἐνδημοτάτους: 'they are always abroad, while you are always at home'. Nicely illustrated by Xenophon's description of the exceptional Spartan Derkyllidas as *φιλαπόδημος*, a man who liked going abroad: *Hell.* iv. 3. 2.

8. **μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων**: 'full of toil and danger'. For Athens as city of *πόνοι*, 'exertions', see ii. 36. 2, and compare Euripides, *Suppliants*, lines 189, (with Collard's n.), 323, *ἐν γὰρ τοῖς πόνοισιν αὔξεται*, 'Athens grows great through her exertions' (in the next line there is a sneer at those who prefer quietism, the *ἡσυχιοί*: see 69. 4 above); and above all the famous exchange at lines 576–7:

Herald: *πράσσειν σὺ πόλλ' εἴωθας ἢ τε σὴ πόλις.*

Theseus: *τοιγὰρ πονοῦσα πολλὰ πόλλ' εὐδαμονεῖ.*

'You and your city are too busy' [the Greek words suggest the idea of meddlesomeness, *πολυπραγμοσύνη*; cp. 32. 5n.]—'Yes, but our great exertions bring great prosperity.' Not that Euripides' views, any more than Th.'s, were necessarily those of his speakers: see *Thucydides*, 169ff.

For another verse celebration of Athens as a city of toil see H. W. Parke and D. E. W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle*, ii (Oxford, 1956), 53, no. 121, the famous oracle hailing her as an 'eagle in the clouds for all time'; though the verb there used is *μογησαν*.

ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα: 'the quiet of inaction'. See 32. 5n. and Macleod, 82f.

71. 2–3. **ἀρχαιότροπα ὑμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρατεῖν**: 'your

ways are old-fashioned compared with theirs. In politics as in other skill, the new must always prevail over the old.' For the idea of progress here implied, reminiscent of one of the strains of thought in the *Archaeology*, see E. Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford, 1973), 11 (also *Thucydides*, 130). We should recall that at 13 above, in the *Archaeology*, the Corinthians, whose representatives are now speaking, were singled out as technical innovators.

3. **ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα**: 'traditional institutions are best' [lit. 'unchanged institutions']. Jowett, who translated 'the traditions of government should be observed', was probably right to take this as referring primarily to political institutions (see next n.), but here as there the Greek is a little vaguer and more neutral than his translations suggest. For the thought cp. Kleon at iii. 37. 3 and Alcibiades at vi. 18. 7, with Macleod, 85f., who also compares Hdt. iii. 82 (Darius).

τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων . . . ἐπὶ πλεον ὑμῶν κεκαινώται: 'their state has undergone much more extensive reforms than yours' [lit. 'the affairs of the Athenians have been renewed . . .'; Jowett had 'the administration of their state has been greatly reformed']. If Jowett, whose tr. I have modernized here, is right to refer this primarily to politics, and I think he is (see previous n.), this is the nearest Th. ever gets to mentioning Ephialtes and the events of 462, which are wholly absent from the *Pentekontaetia* apart perhaps from 'revolutionary spirit' at 102, on which see 2n. above. (See, however, Cawkwell, 'NOMΟΦΥΛΑΚΙΑ and the Areopagus', *JHS* 108 (1988), 1 ff., at 11, who sees in ii. 37. 2—Pericles on the lack of censorious mutual surveillance in Athenian life—an oblique reference to 'what Athens has rid herself of by the reforms of Ephialtes'.) But the reference in the present passage is no doubt wider than Ephialtes, taking in Kleisthenes and Solon, both equally absent from Th. As for the words 'than yours', we are no doubt meant to remember that political reform at Sparta had been early and drastic but stopped at that early date: see 18 above.

4. **βραδυτής**: 'slowness'. See below, 78. 1 n.

Ποτειδεάταις, ὥσπερ ὑπεδέξασθε, βοηθήσατε: 'help the Potidaians, to whom your promise is given'. See 58. 1. This is the first reference to the immediate situation since 68 above; it certainly cannot be argued on the basis of this speech that speeches A and C (see introductory n. to 67–88) are specially concerned with the immediate as opposed to the profound causes of the war.

πρὸς ἑτέραν τινὰ ξυμμαχίαν: 'the alliance of others'. Surely Argos (the scholiast); hardly Athens (as de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 60). But it is deliberately vague.

5. **πρὸς θεῶν τῶν ὀρκίων:** ‘the gods who are witnesses of our oaths’. See 78. 4 n. on the near-repetition of this phrase.

λύουσι γὰρ σπονδάς . . .: ‘for the true breakers of treaties . . .’. Jowett rightly compares 123. 2, where another set of Corinthians make just this point. See also 40. 2 and n.; also 69. 1.

72. 1. **ἔτυχε . . . παροῦσα:** ‘there happened . . . to be staying’ [but the Greek scarcely means more than ‘there was’]. On the presence of this embassy, the historicity of which there is no overwhelming reason to doubt, see Gomme, *Essays* (i. 23. in.), 158 n. 1, an amusing note singled out as characteristic of Gomme by Kitto, *PBA* 45 (1959), 338. However, Lewis in *CAH* v². 378 remains uneasy: ‘it would be easier to believe in the historicity of this embassy if the “other business” [see below] had been identified’.

πρότερον: ‘already’. See above, 42. 2 n.

περὶ ἄλλων: ‘on other business’. Raubitschek (see below, introductory n. to 73–78) guesses, not very convincingly, that this ‘other business’ may have concerned the Megarian Decrees.

ᾧν αἱ πόλεις ἐνεκάλουν: ‘the accusations brought against them by the cities’. This phrase may be an indication that the real Corinthian speech had rather more to say about the *αἰτίαι* or publicly alleged reasons (see 23) than Th. allows us to suppose. See also 88 below, where τῶν ξυμμάχων, ‘speeches of their allies’, is in effect a reference to the present passage.

καὶ ἅμα τὴν σφετέραν πόλιν ἐβούλοντο σημήναι ὅση εἴη δύναμιν: ‘They also wanted to set out the power of their city’. See below, introductory n. to 73–78.

καὶ τοῖς νεωτέροις: ‘the younger’. See above, 42. 1; for the younger/older contrast.

73–78. *Speech of the Athenians*

Some have thought this speech impossibly provocative and therefore invented from start to finish, but see *Thucydides*, 55. In any case, the desire (see 72. 1 above) to ‘set out the power of Athens’, that is, remind the Spartans of the might of the Athenian empire, was compatible with a desire for peace. That said, it is also true that the speech (and ch. 76 in particular) is a lucid exploration of certain harsh views, about imperialism and its ‘philosophy’, which would be an amazing *tour de force* from an embassy which never expected to deal with such large issues. The speech is discussed by A. E. Raubitschek, ‘The Speech of the Athenians at Sparta’, in P. Stadter (ed.), *The Speeches in Thucydides* (Chapel Hill, 1973), 32 ff.

73. 2. δι' ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις: 'we have brought them forward so often that the repetition of them is disagreeable to us' [rather than 'must be disagreeable for you', though that tr. is also possible, either by taking the participle as passive or by emending it to προβαλλόμενα: αἰεὶ, 'so often', really means 'on each occasion that it is done' which makes better sense if we imagine the Athenians as constantly repeating to all sorts of audiences, rather than the Spartans as constantly listening to the Athenians]. Elsewhere Th. probably gave less space in his speeches to traditional themes, esp. the Persian Wars, than did the more conventional orators of his own day; see esp. H. Strasburger, 'Thukydides und die politische Selbstdarstellung der Athener', *Hermes*, 86 (1958), 498ff. = *Studien zur alten Geschichte* (Hildesheim, 1982), 676ff. But it is hard to be certain about this, when so little else survives from the fifth century as opposed to the fourth when attitudes may have been different and styles less astringent: see *Thucydides*, 63. Anyway, the present passage shows that 'the Persian Wars are . . . an argument that no one can omit when trying to justify the city's ambitions: Thucydides' Athenians themselves conformed to this practice': N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens* (i. 63. 3n.), 156, citing the present passage. So one is tempted to wonder whether it is Th., rather than his speakers [or listeners, if we prefer that tr.], who finds the Persian Wars a 'disagreeable' theme. In any case the present passage, despite the initial disclaimer, is easily the longest treatment in a speech of the Persian Wars. We should not forget a structural point: Th. will soon be passing, at 89, to the aftermath of the Persian Wars; the present speech prepares us for that leap back in time. (We shall return to this whole topic when discussing ii. 35 ff., the Funeral Oration, esp. ii. 36. 4 which declines to μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσῳ—cp. above 68. 3n.—about the Persian Wars.)

For the facts in the following lines (Marathon; Salamis) see also above, 18nn.

4. φημὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδευεῦσαι τῷ βαρβάρῳ: 'we tell you that we, first and alone, dared to fight the Persians at Marathon . . .'. For the exaggeration here (the Plataians are overlooked) see K. R. Walters, "'We Fought Alone at Marathon": Historical Falsification in the Attic Funeral Speech', *Rh. Mus.* 124 (1981), 204ff. (dismissing modern attempts to justify the claim by reference to the closeness between Athens and Plataia, for which see iii. 55. 3n.).

5. τεκμήριον δὲ μέγιστον αὐτός: 'Xerxes himself is the best witness to the truth of what we say' [I have supplied 'Xerxes'; the Greek just has 'he', referring to ὁ βάρβαρος, lit. 'the barbarian', above, which as usual I have rendered 'the Persians']. For the tag τεκμήριον δέ see above 6. 2n.

74. 1. ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλιγῶ ἑλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: 'four hundred . . . nearly two-thirds'. A slight exaggeration of the grand total, and a rather larger exaggeration of Athens' share. The exaggerations should not however be laid at Th.'s own door, as by N. Loraux, *Invention of Athens*, 157 (the statement in her text badly needed qualifying in view of her corresponding n. 118, on p. 403). The true proportion was not c.267 out of 400 but 200 out of 378 (or 366: Hdt.'s internal arithmetic is astray); i.e. nearer $\frac{1}{2}$ than $\frac{2}{3}$. See Hdt. viii. 1, 14, 61 and perhaps ML 23 (see above, 18. 2n.) for Athens and viii. 48 for the grand total. It is pointless (with Poppo/Stahl) to emend Th.'s 400 to 300 (though 300, *τριακοσίας*, has some manuscript authority, and it has been ingeniously but not conclusively noticed that the well-established figure of 200 for Athens is $\frac{2}{3}$ of the round 300 grand total which we sometimes encounter in other sources). Against other attempts to get round the plain meaning of the Greek see K. R. Walters, 'Four Hundred Ships at Salamis', *Rh. Mus.* 124 (1981), 199 ff.

ἐν τῷ στενῷ: 'in the strait'. Cp. Hdt. viii. 60β, knowledge of which is surely here assumed. See also Morrison and Coates, ch. 3; and Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford, 1982), 126, who points out that one reason why Themistokles wanted to fight in the narrows was that the Athenian ships were made from unseasoned timber, which would reduce their manoeuvrability in more open waters.

καὶ αὐτὸν διὰ τοῦτο ὑμεῖς ἐτιμήσατε μάλιστα δὴ ἄνδρα ξένον τῶν ὡς ὑμᾶς ἐλθόντων: 'for this service you yourselves honoured him more than any other foreigner who ever visited you'. See Hdt. viii. 124. 2: as so often, particularly in speeches, Th. draws on, and expects his readers to be familiar with, Hdt. See iii. 55. 1n.

2. μὴ ὀργισθῆναι ὅτι ἡμῖν οὐ προουτιμωρήσατε: 'taking no offence at your failure to help us sooner'. This swipe (for which cp. Hdt. viii. 40. 2, a passage of problematic origin) is the first suggestion in Th. of a theme which will be elaborated in chs. 89–95, early tensions between Athens and Sparta. But whereas the tension there described happens straight after the Persian Wars, here it is implied to have begun earlier still; cp. Hdt. ix. 6 (cp. Plut. *Arist.* 10), an embassy sent from Athens during the war to complain about Spartan failure to help. That evidence of dissatisfaction is superficially contrary to the implication of the present passage of Th., though by saying 'we did not take offence' the Athenians are here saying in effect 'we might well have taken offence, but didn't'.

3. ἀπό τε τῆς οὐκ οὔσης: 'a city which no longer existed' [*πόλεως*, 'a city', has to be supplied from *πόλεων*, 'the cities', above]. This recalls the sneer of Adeimantos the Corinthian at Themistokles as a 'man

without a city', τῷ μὴ ἔστι πατρίς and an ἀπόλι ἀνδρί, Hdt. viii. 61. 1.

75. 1. Ἄρ' ἄξιοι ἔσμεν . . .: 'do we deserve?' The question, just what the Athenians do deserve, is pungently answered by Sthenelaidas at 86. 1: διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοι εἰσιν, 'they *deserve* to be punished twice over' if they behaved well in the Persian Wars and are now behaving badly. But on such echoes see introductory n. to 67–88.

2. ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἔβελησάντων παραμείναι: 'you were not prepared to stay'. Spartan acquiescence or otherwise, in the assumption by Athens of the leadership of the Greeks in 479, is a vexed question: at 95. 7 below Th. seems to echo the view here taken (not surprisingly) by the Athenian speakers; but a different authorial view is implied at 92 and by some non-Thucydidean evidence. See nn. on these passages.

See 97. 2 n. on ἄμα δε etc. for Winton's view of the relation between this ch. and that.

3. μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελίας: 'fear was our first motive, afterwards honour, and finally advantage'. On the psychology of this passage, or rather on the second and third motives (which go closely together), see P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire* (*Greece & Rome* New Surveys in the Classics, no. 17, 1985), 42. The economic and other 'advantages' of the empire to Athens and to individual Athenians are never spelled out by Th.; they benefit the upper as well as the lower classes: see below, viii. 48 n. See generally M. I. Finley, 'Empire in the Greco-Roman World', *Greece & Rome* 25 (1978), 1 ff., and 'The Fifth-Century Athenian Empire: A Balance-Sheet', in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. P. Garnsey and C. Whittaker (Cambridge, 1978), 301 ff.

But what of the first motive for starting the empire, namely, 'fear'? At 95 and 96 below, Th. speaks of appeals to Athens by the allies, to respond to which would be a matter of honour and advantage, not fear; and of desire for revenge on Persia—honour and advantage again, one would have thought. In fact no doubt there was still fear of Persia (as the scholiast thought), perhaps also fear of the implications of Pausanias' behaviour (although the only fears mentioned are *Spartan* fears which caused them to send out no more commanders, 95. 7). Fear of Sparta is certainly implied in 75. 4 (ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων, 'suspicious and hostile'), although strictly those words refer to a subsequent phase when Athens realized she could not now *relax* her hold, ἀνέντας.

4. τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους: 'when we had incurred the hatred of most of our allies'. Compare ii. 63. 1 n. on κινδύνου etc., and for the

question of the popularity or otherwise of the Athenian Empire see ii. 8. 5n.

ὑμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων: 'and you were no longer the friends to us which you had once been, but were suspicious and hostile'. See end of n. on para. 3.

5. ἀνεπίφθονον: 'no man is to be reproached'. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 63 n. 87, suggests that this is echoed by Archidamos at 82. 1, further evidence if true of the complex interweaving of the four speeches.

76. 1. ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον: 'to suit your own interests'. Cp. above, ch. 19, and below, 144. 2. This argument, that Spartan control of the Peloponnese disqualifies her from demanding that other cities give autonomy to their subjects, becomes topical in the fourth century when the various Common Peaces, starting in 386, contained autonomy clauses which Sparta could evade by claiming that her League was a voluntary and ancient association. (Eventually Pelopidas the Theban, in 367, invoked against Sparta her control of Messenia: see *Greek World*, 199.) But evidently Th.'s realistically-minded Athenians treat Peloponnesian subservience to Sparta as an involuntary matter, cp. 144. 2.

2. οὐδ' ἡμεῖς θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου . . . ὑπὸ (τριῶν) τῶν μεγίστων νικηθέντες, τιμῆς καὶ δέους καὶ ὠφελίας . . . ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καθεστῶτος τὸν ἥσσω ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου κατείργεσθαι: 'it is not surprising that, acting in the way that human beings always will . . . constrained by three all-powerful motives, honour, fear, advantage . . . it has always been the rule that the weaker is held down by the stronger' [the word (τριῶν), 'three', has been supplied by an editor, probably rightly]. This is a clear statement of the doctrine that 'might excludes right'. (A brutal doctrine, but not the same thing as the attempts of contemporary sophists to 'prove' that 'might is right': see *Thucydides*, 185-6 and n. 99, 189 and n. 105.) Andrewes, *HCT* iv. 174f., cites the present passage as an expression of 'the "law" of the rule of the stronger' comparable to v. 105. 2 which he is discussing. But here in 76, Th. seems to be referring only to *established practice*, with none of the sophistic equivocation on νόμος, 'law', which in my view causes the difficulty of v. 105: νόμος in a fifth-century context could mean either 'custom', i.e. convention, or 'law' in a normative sense: see Macleod, 108; and see further my n. at v. 105 for the contemporary debate about the relation between νόμος and φύσις, 'nature'. The 'nature' aspect of that debate may be faintly echoed in the present passage, with its reference to 'the way that human beings behave', τοῦ ἀνθρωπείου τρόπου; and is more clearly echoed at para. 3 below, χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει, 'in accordance with human

nature'. But φύσις is not used in the present passage, so I have changed Jowett's 'human nature' to 'the way . . .', etc. [Note: at *Thucydides*, 186 n. 99 I regret that in the quotation from Andrewes (see above) the words 'rule of the' were accidentally omitted.]

On τιμή, δέος, ὠφελία see above, 75. 3 n.

καὶ ὑμῖν δοκοῦντες: 'there was a time when you thought so too'. See above, 75. 2 n.

τὰ ξυμφέροντα λογιζόμενοι τῷ δικαίῳ λόγῳ νῦν χρήσθε: 'now you calculate what is in your own interests and then talk about justice'. The behaviour here described does not amount to a sophistic equation (see para. 2 n. above) between justice and advantage. The Athenians are describing—rather unfairly because no Spartan has said anything yet!—a combination of high-minded but hypocritical talk of justice, and cynical underlying aims. For the thought cp. v. 105. 4 (Athenians generalizing about Sparta).

3. χρῆσάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει: 'in accordance with human nature'. See para. 2 n. above.

4. περιέστη: 'turned'. Cp. 32. 4 above.

77. 1. καὶ ἐλασσούμενοι γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν: 'for because we find ourselves at a disadvantage in law-suits against our allies, in cases controlled by inter-state agreements, and so have transferred such cases to Athens where the laws are equal for all, we are supposed to be too fond of dragging people into court'. This is a difficult sentence. I have followed the view which sees one set of cases here. The alternative rendering is to take the first clause as co-ordinate with the second, 'although we have allowed ourselves to be at a disadvantage in cases controlled by inter-state agreements . . . and have provided equal laws for all in those [different] cases which we have transferred to Athens . . .' This, however, ignores the different tenses—present in the first clause, aorist in the second—which make it natural to dissociate the functions of the two halves of the sentence. The first half ought to *explain* the second.

And there are historical grounds for preferring this interpretation also. ξύμβολα were inter-state agreements, known from inscriptions, above all the Athenian decree about Phaselis from the mid-century, ML 31 = IG i³. 10 = Fornara 68 (for this and other material see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 164 ff.). What Th. calls ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις are often called δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβολῶν, 'cases arising from inter-state agreements', in the inscriptions. ξύμβολα agreements were quite general, not merely commercial as was once thought: see de Ste. Croix, *CQ* 11 (1961), 101 ff.,

P. Gauthier, *Symbola* (Nancy, 1972), with Lewis, *CR* 25 (1975), 262 f. The Phaselis inscription shows that in cases involving Phaselite defendants, those defendants were indeed compelled to come to Athens. See now C. W. Fornara, *CQ* 29 (1979), 49 ff., stressing that the word *πρός*, 'against', at line 8, restricts the scope of the decree to Phaselite *defendants*. Fornara takes Th. i. 77. 1 accordingly: subject to this restriction of scope, compulsion *was* exercised, contrary to the view of Meiggs (228–33), and Th. should be taken to refer to one set of cases, not two, i.e. he is talking about *ξύμβολα* throughout. See Fornara 52 and n. 2 (where *πρός τοὺς ξυμμάχους* has dropped out of his quotation from Th.).

As to *φιλοδικεῖν*, Meiggs (229) is right that the usual translation 'litigious', i.e. 'going to law unnecessarily', is not altogether satisfactory. I have adopted (and adapted) a suggestion of his.

The passage is of stylistic interest also. Note the sudden switch to a concrete instance, after the extreme generality of what has gone before: evidently legal interference was a grievance deeply felt, see *Old Oligarch*, i. 16. But despite the concreteness, the Athenians' precise point is left unclear. Note also that, unusually in a speech, Th. permits himself a technical term, *ξύμβολαίαις δίκαις*. Again, this can be explained only by supposing that such topics were very frequently discussed. See *Thucydides*, 98.

3. οἱ δὲ εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὀμιλεῖν: 'we are in the habit of meeting our allies on terms of equality'. The reference here may be broader than para. 1 above, which concerned law-suits only: perhaps we are meant to think of allied-Athenian relations generally, including meetings of the synod of the Delian League; note *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου* at iii. 10. 4 below with n. there and cp. i. 99. 2 n.

6. ὑμεῖς γ' ἂν οὖν εἰ καθελόντες ἡμᾶς ἄρξαιτε, τάχα ἂν τὴν εὐνοίαν ἣν διὰ τὸ ἡμέτερον δέος εἰλήφατε μεταβάλοιτε: 'if your empire should ever replace ours, you would soon lose the goodwill which you owe to the fear of us'. Exactly this did indeed happen in the early fourth century, when the Corinthian War broke out through general resentment of Sparta, and like other passages which appear to 'predict' what Sparta would do after the war it has added point if we think that Th. was still alive and working in the 390s: see *Thucydides*, 152. But see *ibid.* 65: it is hard to find any such remark—and there are several of them in speeches—which could not have been made by a shrewd observer at their dramatic date (432 in the present instance). See anyway next n.

εἰς ἕκαστος ἐξιών: 'when any of you goes abroad'. Gomme, *HCT* iii. 550, remarked that this sneer did not fit Brasidas very well, and that so far from insisting on a post-war date for this ch. (see previous n.) one

might as well argue that it must have been written before Brasidas' northern operations in 424. Gomme's point was that all such arguments tend to be inconclusive.

The theme of the bad behaviour by individual Spartans which tended to erode the general popularity enjoyed by the 'liberator' Sparta in 431 (see ii. 8. 4 for this) is an important one in Th. Note especially iii. 93 on the harsh and unjust governors of Herakleia in Trachis; the language there used is exactly echoed at v. 52 (also about Herakleia).

οὐθ' οἷς ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς νομίζει: 'which the rest of Greece observes'. For *νομίζει*, 'observes', see Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley and London, 1986), 103 and n. 62, citing ML 20 = Fornara 47 (East Lokrian law about Naupaktos, c.500-475 BC), line 26.

78. 1. βουλευέσθε οὖν βραδέως: 'do not then be hasty in deciding' [lit. 'deliberate slowly, therefore']. An obvious hit at Sparta's famous slowness; see viii. 96. 5 for the Spartans as *βραδεῖς* and 71. 4 where the *Corinthians* refer to Spartan 'slowness', *βραδύτης* (cp. 84. 1: Archidamos). This, see introductory n. to 67-88, is an example of a correspondence between speeches A and B and C which has to be set against the more obvious A:C and B:D correspondences and is evidence that the texture of all four speeches is interwoven.

ἄλλοτρίαις: 'which are no concern of yours'. Answered by Sthenelaidas at 86. 2: see n. there on *οὐδε μελλήσομεν* etc.

4. τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκη λύεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ξυνηθήκην: 'let our differences be determined by arbitration according to the treaty'. This is one of a number of important passages which show that there was an arbitration clause in the Thirty Years Peace of 446; all the Book i passages are to be found in speeches. The others are i. 85. 2 (and perhaps 82. 1), 140. 2, and 144. 2. See nn. to those passages. The other passage is vii. 18. 2, which should probably be treated as authorial although in fact it describes what the Spartans were thinking (and saying?) when they looked at the Archidamian War in retrospect.

θεοὺς τοὺς ὀρκίους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι: 'we call to witness the gods by whom your oaths were sworn'. This picks up the reference at 71. 5 (another A:C correspondence), though the oaths are different.

79. 1. μεταστησάμενοι πάντας: 'they ordered everybody but themselves to withdraw'. A reminder that this is a meeting of the Spartan assembly: see 67. 1 n.

2. ἀνὴρ καὶ ξυνετὸς δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ σώφρων: 'who was held to be both an intelligent and a prudent man'. For *δοκῶν* here see G. O. Hutchinson, *Commentary on Aeschylus: Septem Contra Thebas* (Oxford,

1985), n. on line 592: it refers not merely to appearance but to repute. On ξυνετός, 'intelligent', see Syme, *PBA* 48 (1962), 39–56 at 55, listing the other holders of the title in Th. (Theseus, the Pisistratids, Themistokles, Brasidas, Hermokrates, Phrynichos, the oligarchs of 411 generally; add the Scythians, ii. 97. 6), and ingeniously explaining Pericles' absence from the list thus: 'for Thucydides it was idle and superfluous thus to specify that paramount talent'. However, G. F. Bender, *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides* (Würzburg, 1934), 20 n. 53 may be right that at 140. 1 below Pericles is represented as claiming personal ξύνεσις; and note the implication at ii. 34. 6 that Pericles is 'not un-ξυνετός'. Syme is right that ξυνετός is one of Th.'s highest words of praise, but note Rose Zahn, *Die erste Periklesrede* (Kiel dissertation, 1934), 76–8: ξύνεσις has its attendant risks, either when it is super-subtle (as at iii. 37. 3) or when over-intelligence paralyses—Hamlet would say 'loses the name of'—action, below 84. 3. She concludes that when Th. wishes to confer the supreme accolade on a true leader he joins ξυνετός to some other quality which will exclude the risks, often a quality with 'Spartan' associations, like σώφρων, 'prudent', in the present passage (see for this word 32. 4 n. on σωφροσύνη, 'prudence'). Badian 'Th. and the Outbreak' (23. 6 n.), 230 n. 40, notes that Archidamos is the only individual in Th. to be called σώφρων. [Syme: now in *Roman Papers*, vi (1991), 72–87.]

80–85. *Speech of Archidamos*

This speech is discussed by E. L. Hussey, 'Thucydidean History and Democritean Theory', *CRUX*, 123 ff. and 128 f. Hussey is specially interested in Archidamos' defence of the Spartan way of life at 84 below ('undisguisedly a product of the sophistic age', unlike the blunter military analysis of 80–83): like Th.'s Pericles, and like Demokritos, the Archidamos of Th. is convinced of the importance of education as 'a firm foundation for civic life'. (But see ii. 41. 1 n.)

Archidamos as portrayed in this speech owes something (as does Nikias in vi. 9 ff.) to earlier literary 'warner' figures, in Homer and Herodotus: see H. Bischoff, 'Der Warner bei Herodot', in *Herodot.*, ed. W. Marg, *Wege der Forschung* xxv. i (Darmstadt, 1962), 302 ff., and Pelling (below 81. 2 n.). See also *Thucydides*, 66 [and D. P. Tompkins in *Nomodeiktēs*].

80. 3. καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ ἵπποις: 'ships, horses . . .'. This is echoed by Sthenelaidas at 86. 3, νῆες καὶ ἵπποι. Again (see introductory n. to 67–88 and 79. 1 n.) this is relevant to the inter-relation of the four speeches: here we have a correspondence between C and D to set against those between A:C and B:D. Compare also vii. 55. 2.

4. οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ ἔχομεν: 'we have none in a common treasury'. True; see 19n. above.

81. 1. ὥστε τὴν γῆν δηοῦν ἐπιφοιτῶντες: 'which will enable us regularly to invade and devastate their territory'. See below, 6n.

2. τοῖς δὲ ἄλλῃ γῆ ἐστὶ πολλὴ ἧς ἄρχουσι, καὶ ἐκ θαλάσσης ὧν δέονται ἐπάξονται: 'but their empire extends to distant countries, and they will be able to introduce supplies by sea'. The land/sea antithesis again; cp. 2. 2n. on οὔτε κατὰ γῆν. For sea imports cp. the whole of *Old Oligarch*, ch. 2 and Winfried Schmitz, *Wirtschaftliche Prosperität, Soziale Integration und die Seebundpolitik Athens: Die Wirkung der Erfahrungen aus dem ersten attischen Seebund auf die athenische Aussenpolitik in der ersten Hälfte des 4. Jhrts. v. Chr.* (Munich, 1988), 116ff. See also below, ii. 38. 2n.

For the relation of Archidamos' advice in the present ch. (the Athenians do not need to come out and fight) to the rather different line which he takes in ii. 11 (the Athenians may come out after all) see C. Pelling, 'Thucydides' Archidamos and Herodotus' Artabanus', in *Georgica: Greek Studies in Honour of George Cawkwell*, ed. M. Flower and M. Toher (London, 1991), 120ff.; see also introductory n. to ii. 11.

5. κὰν τούτῳ οὐδὲ καταλύεσθαι ἔτι καλόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ εἰ δόξομεν ἄρξαι μᾶλλον τῆς διαφορᾶς: 'and having gone so far, we shall no longer be able even to make peace honorably, especially if we are believed to have begun the quarrel'. I have slightly changed Jowett's 'peace with honour', surely an inappropriately topical phrase at the time when he was working on the first edn. of 1881 (it was famously used by Disraeli about the Berlin Congress of 1878), and one with too many resonances even after more than a century.

The reference to Sparta having begun the quarrel is to the Athenian offer to implement the arbitration clause: see i. 140. 2 and vii. 18. 2 and nn.

6. μὴ γὰρ δὴ ἐκείνη γε τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρώμεθα ὡς ταχὺ παυσθήσεται ὁ πόλεμος, ἢν τὴν γῆν αὐτῶν τέμωμεν: 'We must not for one moment deceive ourselves that if only we devastate their territory the war will be at an end'. The view here put into Archidamos' mouth is supported by V. D. Hanson, *Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece* (Pisa, 1983), who concludes that in Archidamos' day devastation of crops was not very effective in the long term; on this book see, however, the slight qualifications (as far as late fifth-century Attica is concerned) of C. Carey, *Lysias: Selected Speeches* (Cambridge, 1990), 123. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν: 'No, I am afraid that we shall bequeath it to our children'. For this 'prophecy' see above, 77. 6n.

82. 1. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀναισθήτως κελεύω: 'Not that I want you to be so insensitive as . . .'. This echoes 69. 3; see n. there.

ἀλλὰ ὄπλα μὲν μῆπω κινεῖν, πέμπειν δὲ καὶ αἰτιᾶσθαι: 'But do not take up arms yet. Let us first send and complain to them'. Not an explicit reference to the arbitration procedure (see 78. 4 and 140. 2n.) but rightly seen as relevant to it by Dover, *HCT* vii. 18. 2 (the present passage, with its reference to the taking up of arms, looks forward to the language of vii. 18. 2); see below 85. 2 for a clearer reference by Archidamos to arbitration.

κἂν τοῦτῳ καὶ τὰ ἡμέτερ' αὐτῶν ἐξαρτύεσθαι: 'we should make our own preparations'. What follows is entirely sensible given Sparta's financial deficiencies (for which see *Greek World*, 101, 127): Hussey, 129, is perhaps a little unfair to view Archidamos' position as entirely negative.

ἀνεπίφθονον δέ: 'cannot be reproached'. A possible echo of 75. 5; see n. there.

καὶ βαρβάρων: 'but of barbarians'. [In a Persian War context this word can usually be translated 'Persians', but here it is better kept general so as to cover northern barbarians (cp. ii. 80. 5); though we are probably meant to think of Persia as the primary 'barbarian' source of *financial* help despite e.g. Odrysian Thracian wealth at ii. 97. See also ii. 7. 1 and n. for Spartan financial appeals to the Persians and *other* barbarians.] For the difficulties of Sparta's position see *Greek World*, 102, 127: the Persian king was an obvious financial backer, but his involvement would make nonsense of Sparta's liberation propaganda (ii. 8), at least as far as the Asiatic Greeks were concerned. See P. A. Brunt, 'Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War', *Phoenix*, 19 (1965), 255 ff., esp. 262 on the present passage, on which see also Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 63 and n. 86, pointing out that the present passage—assuming that it is an authentic Spartan utterance, not Thucydidean hindsight—marks a departure in Spartan policy: in the 450s they had apparently not been interested in Persian 'cheque-book diplomacy': see below 109. 2n.

ὅσοι ὡσπερ καὶ ἡμεῖς: 'those who, like ourselves . . .'. Lewis (above) comments that the wording suggests Athenian 'plots against barbarians as well' [that is, as well as against Greeks], and rightly notes that Corinth has said nothing of such plots.

6. ἐγκλήματα μὲν γὰρ καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν: 'charges brought by cities or individuals against each other'. It is passages like this which convince me that it came naturally to Th. to speak of states as moral agents and that he thought that moral judgements could be made about them: he uses the same vocabulary about both, and brackets them as here. See *Thucydides*, 178.

83. 2. ἔστιν ὁ πόλεμος οὐχ ὀπλων τὸ πλέον ἀλλὰ δαπάνης, δι' ἣν τὰ ὄπλα ὠφελεί: 'war is not a matter of weapons, but of money which gives weapons their usefulness'. A famous remark, on which see above, 2. 2 n. on περιουσία χρημάτων.

84. 1. τὸ βραδύ: 'the slowness'. See 78. 1 n. For the praise of Spartan values in this ch. see Hussey (above, introductory n. to 80–85), pointing out that Archidamos is depicted as aware of Spartan limitations.

καὶ μέλλον: 'and procrastination'. See 69. 2 and 4, 70. 4, and next n. This idea, like 'prudence', σωφροσύνη, an important notion which speeches A and C have in common (see introductory n. to 67–88). But note that Sthenelaidas makes pointed and repeated use of it in speech D. ὁ μέμφονται: 'they are so fond of charging you'. Who are 'they'? Primarily the Corinthians, but note also 78. 1 n. for Athens' point-scoring use of βραδέως, 'slowly'.

ἐλευθέραν: 'free'. See *Thucydides*, 162: the fact that Pericles uses the same emotive word about *Athens* (ii. 37. 2, where he is made to say that the Athenians live ἐλευθέρως, 'in a free way') is a warning that Th.'s speeches cannot be taken straightforwardly to represent his own views. See also ii. 36. 1 n. on ἐλευθέραν δι' ἀρετήν etc.

καὶ εὐδοξοτάτην: 'most illustrious'. εὐδοξος, a slightly poetic word, occurs here only in Th., sometimes in Pindar, never in Demosthenes. It is, however, found at Hdt. vii. 99. 3, in the superlative form, as here. But the scholiast here has ἐνδοξοτάτην, a more usual word with a similar meaning; this may well be right.

2. σωφροσύνη ἔμφρων: 'good sense and prudence'. An obvious reply to 68. 1: see n. there; a clear A:C correspondence: see introductory n. to 67–88. But the word also features in D: see 86. 2 n.

μόνοι γὰρ δι' αὐτὸ εὐπραγίαις τε οὐκ ἐξυβρίζομεν καὶ ξυμφοραῖς ἥσσον ἐτέρων εἴκομεν: 'it is a policy which has saved us from growing insolent in prosperity or giving way under adversity, like other men'. The theme of response to triumph and disaster recurs at iv. 17. 4–18. 4. But iv. 55 shows the prediction was incorrect.

ξὺν κατηγορία: 'by accusations'. This is meant to recall 69. 6: see n. there.

3. τὸ εὐκοσμον: 'our habits of discipline'. There are several Spartan 'code words' in this section; for the idea of discipline see what is said about εὐνομία 'obedience to laws' at 18. 1 n. above. With Archidamos' remarks in the present passage, on law as a beneficial constraint, Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty* (above, 77. 3 n. on οὐδ' οἷς etc.), 254, compares Kleon at iii. 37. 3–4: see nn. there.

αἰδῶς σωφροσύνης πλεῖστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνης δὲ εὐψυχία:

'moderation is the greatest part of the sense of shame, and a sense of shame is the greatest part of courage' [for clarity I have rendered the words *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη* by the same English expression, 'sense of shame'; for the argument to work in Greek they must be taken as more or less identical]. On the translation and interpretation of this difficult passage I agree with M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness, Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1986), 508 n. 24 (see also *Thucydides* 186 n. 100): her chief concern is the even harder passage iii. 83. 1: see my n. there and *Thucydides* (above). Both passages say that one thing (call it *x*) *πλείστον μετέχει* another (call it *y*). Does this mean that *x* shares in *y* or *y* shares in *x*? In the present passage it is clear that as Nussbaum says Th. is tracing courage back via shame to moderation (instilled by discipline, *τὸ εὐκοσμον*), rather than seeking to explain the origins of moderation. So the above tr. is preferable, and this will be relevant to iii. 83. 1. (But see *Thucydides*, above, for Classen/Steup's rendering of iii. 83. 1; it is possible that the Greek in both places refers more vaguely to 'intimate connexion' between the two listed qualities.' Dover in *Greek Popular Morality* (see next n.) appears to take the view of the passage here adopted: 'we are good soldiers . . . because a sense of shame is founded above all on discipline (*sôphrosyne*) and valour (*eupsuchia*) upon fear of reproach'.

τὰ ἀχρεία ξυνετοί: 'useless over-intelligence'. See above, 79. 2n., for the word *ξυνετός* and its dangers, and note that like Marius in Sallust's *Jugurtha*—and like cunning orators in any age—Archidamos is made very cleverly to reject cleverness. See K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford, 1974), 118f., comparing Kleon at iii. 37. 3f.

4. ὡς ἀμαρτησομένων: 'the probability of their making mistakes'. The idea that the Athenians were prone to make mistakes is a recurrent one; see, in Book i, 69. 5n. on *καὶ πρὸς* etc., and 144. 1. The most famous and sweeping statement is at ii. 65. 11, referring primarily to the great Sicilian expedition of 415. The motif need not have entered Th.'s thinking in a big way only after 415; we need look no further than (for instance) the Egyptian Disaster of the 450s.

85. 2. πέμπετε δὲ περὶ ὧν οἱ ξύμμαχοί φασιν ἀδικεῖσθαι, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐτοιμῶν ὄντων αὐτῶν δίκας δοῦναι: 'and also complain about the other injustices which your allies say they have suffered. The Athenians say they are willing to submit to arbitration . . .'. See 78. 4, 82. 1, 140. 2, 144. 2, and vii. 18. 2 for the arbitration motif; but Dover, *HCT* vii. 18. 2, is right that when the Spartans do send to complain at 126. 1, it is not with arbitration in mind. As Th. presents matters, the Spartans have already decided on war; but see Badian (23. 6n.).

3. ἔλεξεν [τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις] ᾧδε: 'and addressed the Spartans as follows' [lit. 'spoke to the Spartans thus']. It has been noticed that the word ᾧδε, 'thus', is even vaguer than Th.'s usual τοιάδε, '[approximately] this' (see 31. 4n.), but I doubt if Th. intends, by such introductory formulae, to signal closeness to or remoteness from what was actually said: see *Thucydides*, 53 n. 31, and compare iii. 29. 2n. for the opposite phenomenon, a speech introduced by τάδε, a *more* precise word than τοιάδε for 'this'.

The words 'to the Spartans' were bracketed by Krüger, a distinguished nineteenth-century editor of Th.; perhaps rightly.

86. *Speech of Sthenelaidas*

This blunt, brief, 'laconic' speech is an effective piece of characterization (something of which Th. is occasionally said to be incapable), though the characterization is perhaps only of a type rather than of an individual. (Nothing else is known of Sthenelaidas.) It is essentially an aggressive reply to the Athenians, who are mentioned in the first rude opening sentence, but does also show awareness of what Archidamos has said: see nn. on 2 and 3 below. The speech is discussed by E. F. Bloedow, 'Sthenelaidas the Persuasive Spartan', *Hermes*, 115 (1987), 60ff.

1. διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν: 'they deserve to be punished twice over'. See 75. 1 and n.: this answers, with a verbal echo, the Athenians' question about what they deserve. For the rhetorical device—a standard way of reducing the effectiveness of an opponent's argument from previous good character—see iii. 67. 2, the Thebans say that the Plataians deserve to be punished twice over, διπλασίας ζημίας, if their present bad behaviour is out of character. On this see Macleod 116f. and n. 33, also A. R. Hands, 'Postremo suo tantum ingenio utebatur', *CQ* 24 (1974), 313ff. (an excellent study), at 313: he rightly rejects the idea that Sthenelaidas, by recognizing the possibility of a change in character, showed himself a 'better psychologist' than the Thebans who at iii. 64. 4 spoke of the Plataians as having now shown their true nature, an argument in terms of 'dissimulation'. (Hands's point is that all these arguments are merely forensic tricks.) But the idea that the Thebans are the worse psychologists is more easily disposed of than Hands implies, if we notice that the Thebans actually use *both* arguments, the 'double punishment for out-of-character behaviour' argument at 67. 2 and the 'dissimulation' argument at 64. 4. See *Thucydides*, 63 and n. 71 (where, however, I did not mean to imply that Hands himself believed that Sthenelaidas was the better psychologist), also 75f., showing the ways in which arguments from character could be used and countered.

2. ἦν σωφρονῶμεν: 'if we are prudent'. See 68. 1 n.: this is an echo in speech D of a theme crucial in A and C: see introductory n. to 67–88.

οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν τιμωρεῖν· οἱ δ' οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶς πάσχειν: 'we will not . . . put off [lit. 'delay'] helping them, for they cannot put off their troubles'. Again the important notion of delay, μέλλησις: see above nn. on 69. 2 and 4 and 84. 1. Like σωφροσύνη this is a notion from A and C, now picked up in D; though speech D primarily answers B, the Athenians (for instance, the present passage is to some extent an answer to 78. 1: Sthenelaidas is making clear to the Spartans that the troubles of the allies are *not* as the Athenians had alleged, ἀλλότριοι, no concern of Sparta's). All four speeches are in fact stylistically and conceptually interrelated.

3. νῆες καὶ ἵπποι: 'ships and horses'. An echo of Archidamos at 80. 3, further confirmation of the conclusion in the preceding n. For the literary device see *OCD*³, entry under 'priamel'.

87. *The Spartans vote*

2. κρίνουσι γὰρ βοῆ καὶ οὐ ψήφῳ: 'they decide by shouting and not by voting'. For this 'archaic procedure' see de Ste. Croix, *OPW*, app. xxiv, concluding that 'its survival was due to the absence of any true democratic spirit in those who had political power at Sparta'. But note (i) Lewis's remark that 'the anonymity of the system might have made it relatively free from external pressures' (*Sparta and Persia*, 42), and (ii) that M. H. Hansen has concluded that no formal count was taken in the *Athenian* assembly either: see his 'How did the Athenian *Ecclesia* Vote?', *GRBS* 18 (1977), 123 ff. = *The Athenian Ecclesia* (Copenhagen, 1983), ch. 6 (the presiding officers made their decision on a rough estimate, though at iii. 49. 1 there is surely a count). This weakens de Ste. Croix's implied contrast between Sparta and Athens.

βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερώς ἀποδεικνυμένους τὴν γνώμην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὀρμήσαι: 'wanting to make the Spartans declare themselves openly and to urge them on more effectively to war'. See on this passage Lewis (previous n.), against Gomme: as Lewis says, Sthenelaidas' aim 'was not to expose the size of his majority but to apply moral pressure to possible waverers'.

On τὸ πολεμεῖν, 'to war' [lit. 'to make war'], see de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 65, who in his desire to exonerate Athens from the charge of aggression contrasts 127. 3, where it is said that Pericles urged the Athenians on to the war, ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὄρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, the alleged difference being that by then the war was already decided on—by the Spartans. This is an ingenious point but (i) it has to be set against evidence like

44. 2 above, which implies that the Athenians thought the war inevitable even before the debate at Sparta (see n. there, discussing the Kallias decrees); (ii) there is in any case no actual war in existence even at 127. 3: see n. there and at 88 and 125. 1; (iii) the Peloponnesian War is already 'the war' in the first sentence of Th., i. 1. 1: it is in fact a natural way for Th. to refer to a war the outbreak of which was a well-known fact to his readers from the opening page onwards; (iv) note finally that at 127. 3 de Ste. Croix seriously misinterprets the Greek: the verbs used of Pericles' policy are all imperfect and surely cover a far longer time than de Ste. Croix allows: see n. there.

ὄτῳ μὲν ὑμῶν, ὃ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: 'any of you Spartans'. A speech which is likely to be authentic, 'really said', in the language of ch. 22: as Lewis says, Sthenelaidas' procedure broke with convention. The details were likely to be remembered.

4. τοὺς πάντας ξυμμάχους παρακαλέσαντες: 'hold a general congress of the allies'. A reminder that this is not yet a League occasion: see 67. 1 n. and 119 below.

6. ἡ δὲ διαγνώμη αὕτη τῆς ἐκκλησίας, τοῦ τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι: 'the Spartans decided that the treaty had been broken'. These words (the last four of which have sometimes been deleted unnecessarily) will be picked up at 118. 2, after the substantial digression of the *Pentekontaetia*: see n. there on *καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας* etc.

ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ καὶ δεκάτῳ ἔτει: 'the fourteenth year had begun'. See below, 115: the Thirty Years Peace was in 446/5. We are now in mid 432. See further ii. 2. 1 n.

88. *Reason for the Spartan decision*

καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι: 'and that they should go to war'. As Badian points out, these words, unlike the decision that the treaty had been broken, are not likely to have been in the motion put before the Spartans; they are Th.'s own gloss or invention: *From Plataea to Potidaea* [see above, 1997 preface], 114, and esp. 147 f. That is, we cannot say that war has yet been definitely decided on. As Badian says (in the second of the places cited), 'the actual import of the vote—that the treaty had been broken by the Athenians—is not thought worth wasting a word on'.

οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις: 'influenced, not so much by the speeches of their allies . . .'. For *οὐ τοσοῦτον*, 'not so much', see 9. 1 n. Even if we give that expression its full weight—that is, the motive thus introduced is not actually denied (so correctly M. Heath, (23. 6n.) 105, whose view is preferable to de Ste. Croix, *OPIW* 59)—this

passage illustrates Th.'s small faith in λόγοι, 'words', 'speeches', even 'rational considerations'. See *Thucydides*, 67f., citing other instances where after Th. has reported eloquent speeches he says that actually other, sometimes non-rational, considerations were decisive (e.g. iv. 88. 1, viii. 47. 2).

φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους μὴ ἐπὶ μείζον δυνηθῶσιν: 'by fear of the Athenians and of further increases in their power'. The ἀληθεσ-τάτη πρόφασις, 'true cause', of 23. 6 reiterated.

89-117. THE *PENTEKONTAETIA* OR 'FIFTY YEARS' (c. 480-430)

The Greek word *πεντηκονταετία* means 'the account of the fifty years'. The word is used by the scholiast on 89. 1 (so that K[onrad] K[inzl] is wrong in the entry in *Kleine Pauly* to say that it is a modern expression). On any view the period covered is less than 50 years: the period covered in detail is not 480-430, but 479 to the beginning of the 430s. The Epidamnus affair then begins in 435. We have seen already (introductory n. to the Corcyra episode, 24-55; introductory n. to the *Potidaiaitika*, 56-65; nn. on 67. 2 and 4) that this defective coverage of the first half of the 430s produced serious distortions. (Add the omission of the Spartan refusal to help a Lesbian revolt at some time in the 430s, iii. 2. 1 n.) It is unsatisfactory of Th. to say at 118. 1 that the Corcyra and Potidaia affairs happened 'not many years after', οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον, the end of the Samian revolt in 439, when these years seem to have been so eventful.

Th.'s aim is not to give an abridged history of the period—compare what was said about the *Archaeology* at 2. 1 n. above—but is more restricted: he aims to describe the growth of Athenian power, 89. 1, by way of amplification of his reference to Athenian power at 88 (see also below, 97. 2 n. on Ἑλλάνικος etc.). We can add that he surely aims to give particular coverage to those events which most alarmed the Spartans (cp. 23. 6, 88, 118. 2). This may help explain some otherwise odd omissions like the Peace of Kallias in 449 or the Foundation of Thurii in 443: see 112. 4 n. and 115. 1 n.

Th.'s literary technique is selective; to some extent he allows instances to stand for categories. This is a technique which Tacitus uses later; see my note in *LCM* 12 (1987), 114. See P. K. Walker, 'The Purpose and Method of "The Pentekontaetia" in Thucydides, Book I, CQ 7 (1957), 27 ff., at 34 n. 1 (although this article is mostly devoted to chronology, for which see below, 98. 1 n.); Westlake, *Essays*, ch. 2, modified at CQ 27

(1977), 95f. = *Studies*, 1ff. For an interesting detailed attempt to detect patterns in the *Pentekontaetia*, see R. A. McNeal, 'Historical Methods and Thucydides 1. 103. 1', *Historia*, 19 (1970), 313ff. He attaches particular importance to the categories of 'enemy' at 97. 1 (Persians, allies, Peloponnesians), and tries to distribute the narrative items accordingly, in a 'chiastic' arrangement.

On the *Pentekontaetia* in relation to the 'composition' problem see 118. 2n. on *καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας* etc.

89. 1–3. *The Siege of Sestos* (479)

1. **ἐν οἷς ηὐξήθησαν**: 'in which they rose to greatness'. An organic metaphor (lit. 'they were increased'): see also 16 above. See *Thucydides*, 172. G. L. Huxley, 'Thucydides on the Growth of Athenian Power', *Proc. Royal Irish Acad.* 83 (1983), 192, insists that Th. is not saying that Athenian power grew continuously from 479 BC onwards, but that at the end of the period their power was greater than at the start and was still growing. 'There had been set-backs, as the narrative makes clear.'

2. **ἐπειδὴ Μῆδοι**: 'when the Persians . . .'. It is immediately noticeable that Th.'s style becomes narrative, easy, chatty, and (esp. from 90. 1 onwards) almost Herodotean in its interest in personalities, though by no means all the detail is from Herodotus even where they overlap. These are all features which chapters 89–95 have in common with the excursuses on Pausanias and Themistokles later in the book. Cp. Westlake, *Essays*, 54, and *CQ* 27 (1977), 96 = *Studies*, 2: it is tempting to put these chapters early in Th.'s writing career. For this problem, and the question of Th.'s sources for those excursuses see 126. 2n. Meanwhile see 95. 7n. for the problem of Th.'s view on the question of Spartan acquiescence in Athenian leadership.

καὶ ναυσὶ καὶ πεζῶ: 'on sea and land'. Cp. Aesch. *Persai*, 728 (with *Thucydides*, 148 n. 50).

οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ξύμμαχοι, ἤδη ἀφροστῆκότες ἀπὸ βασιλῆως: 'the Athenians and their allies from Ionia and the Hellespont, who had now revolted from the King'. For the siege of Sestos see Hdt. ix. 114ff. Th. here implies that mainland Ionians were included, but Hdt. (ix. 106) speaks only of islanders, and scholars have treated this as a clash between the two ancient authorities. (In favour of Th. see e.g. C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford, 1963), 261; in favour of Hdt. see Meiggs, 35, though even he allowed that 'the Athenians may have been joined by near neighbours of Sestos'.) Some mainland Ionian participation should be accepted. In any case, there is no real contradiction between Hdt. and Th.: for Hdt., Ionia has

already revolted (ix. 104, end), and the fact that the Peloponnesians would accept only islanders (for this see 95n.) is not necessarily relevant to the composition of the force which Th. here describes. As Gomme says, the mainlanders here referred to must have joined Athens later, and 'this detail Herodotus does not mention'.

ἐκλιπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων: 'which the Persians abandoned'. This is surely a reference to the detailed story at Hdt. ix. 118, and is in fact unintelligible without knowledge of Hdt. Th. here has Hdt. open in front of him and comes close to assuming that the same is true of his readers. See my paper in *Catling Studies*.

89. 3-93. 2. *The rebuilding of the city walls of Athens*

I have called this section the 'rebuilding' rather than the 'building' of the city walls, although the existence of a pre-479 city wall has been doubted. Certainly, as Dr Catling (himself a non-believer) kindly tells me, it remains true in 1990 that no trace has ever been found. But see E. Vanderpool, 'The Date of the Pre-Persian City Wall of Athens', *ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt*, ed. D. W. Bradeen and M. F. McGregor (Locust Valley, N.Y., 1974), 156ff., giving modern references, accepting that there was a 'pre-Persian wall', chiefly on the evidence of Hdt. ix. 13, 2 and on Th. i. 89. 3 (see below, n.), and concluding that it 'had been built certainly by 566 BC and probably some years previously'. Of Vanderpool's modern references see esp. Winter (below, 89. 3n.).

These chapters deal with the walls *round* the city, and 93. 3-8 with the walls of the Piraeus, the harbour town of Athens. The famous Long Walls, which *joined* Athens city to the Piraeus and to Phaleron, were not built until the 450s: see below, 107. 1 and 108. 3.

On Th.'s motive for including so much on these walls see R. A. McNeal (above, introductory n. to 89-117), 312, rightly stressing the importance of walls in the *Archaeology* (see 2. 2n. above on ἀτειχίστων): as he says, walls were for Th. 'the ultimate symbol of power'.

89. 3. Ἀθηναίων δὲ τὸ κοινόν: 'the Athenian people' [lit. 'the common thing of the Athenians']. Th.'s use of this expression is loose; here it scarcely means more than 'the Athenians', or perhaps 'the Athenian government' (cp. Hdt. i. 67. 5, v. 85. 1, vi. 50. 2, ix. 117, etc., Th. ii. 12. 2 and possibly i. 90. 5). See J. Tréheux, 'Koinon', *REA* 89 (1987), 39ff. (specifically discussing iv. 78. 3: see n. there), for κοινόν as virtually equivalent, on occasion, to πόλις or δῆμος. In other contexts, we would assume that τὸ κοινόν was evidence of a *league*: see Tod 137 (the

Aitolians) and above 5. 2n. for Western Lokris. As so often, Th. is untechnical: see *Thucydides*, 96ff. Here he uses the expression to distinguish the Athenians at home from the Athenians in the fleet. In the present passage Th.'s use was perhaps triggered by the occurrence of the phrase at Hdt. ix. 117; see above, 2n. on ἐκλιπόντων etc., for Th.'s dependence on Hdt. here.

For a different sense of the phrase ('the common good') see below, 91. 4 and 7, and 92. 1.

ὄθεν ὑπεξέθεντο: 'from the places in which they had been deposited'. Chiefly Troizen: see Hdt. viii. 41 and perhaps the 'Troizen Decree', ML 23 = Fornara 55 (see above, 18. 2n.). Hdt. adds Aigina and Salamis.

καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἀνοικοδομεῖν παρεσκευάζοντο καὶ τὰ τεῖχη. τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βράχεια εἰστήκει: 'set to work, rebuilding the city and the walls. Only a small part of the old circuit was left standing'. As Vanderpool says (see introductory n. above) this seems a clear enough statement that there had been a wall before the Persian invasion: ἀν- means 're-' build. See also F. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (London, 1971), 61 ff., appendix on 'City-circuits in Archaic Greece, especially Athens', at 63, against attempts to take τὰ τεῖχη, 'the walls', as an afterthought, 'to which the force of the ἀν- prefix should not be applied'; or to take τοῦ περιβόλου otherwise than as 'city circuit' (e.g. as a reference to the walls of the Acropolis). Note that 93. 2, ὁ περιβόλος, and vi. 57. 3 are also relevant: see nn. there.

90. 1. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δέ: 'the Spartans'. Lewis in an unpublished paper (see n. 2 to my paper in *Catling Studies*) notes a parallelism between this embassy and that at Hdt. ix. 7-11, an *Athenian* embassy kept waiting while the *Spartans* do some wall-building.

τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων: 'pressure from their allies'. See 69. 1n. (Corinth); Plut. *Them.* 19. 2 (Aigina).

2. καὶ τῶν ἔξω Πελοποννήσου: 'other towns outside the Peloponnese'. The Spartan suggestion that all walled cities outside the Peloponnese should have their fortifications dismantled is ambitious, perhaps incredibly so; R. Sealey, *History of the Greek City-States* (Berkeley and London, 1976), 240, even doubts whether the Spartans could seriously have hoped to stop Athens, given that all Greek cities (except Sparta) had walls.

ὥσπερ νῦν ἐκ τῶν Θηβῶν: 'as they had recently made Thebes'. This, as Lewis points out (above, 1n.), requires knowledge of the Plataia campaign in Hdt. ix and perhaps specifically of the siege described at Hdt. ix. 86. 2-88.

3. Θεμιστοκλέους γνώμη: 'by the advice of Themistokles'. What

follows is a thoroughly Herodotean story, although the type of the 'trickster' hero goes back further still, to the Homeric Odysseus. But that does not mean we should disbelieve the story, it merely shows that resourcefulness of this kind was admired and cultivated by the Greeks in fact just as it was a favourite theme in literature: see M. Detienne and J.-P. Vernant, *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, tr. J. Lloyd (Brighton, 1978). The story is also in Plut. *Them.* 19 and Diod. xi. 39-40.

J. S. Boersma, *Athenian Building Policy from 561/0 to 405/4 B.C.* (Groningen, 1970), 46, notes that Themistokles was involved only at the 'executive', not the 'preparatory' stage, and then only for political reasons to do with Spartan displeasure.

5. ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν: 'before the assembly'. For the word κοινόν, which is quite vague, see above, 89. 3 n.

91. 4. ὡς πρὸς διαγιγνώκοντας τὸ λοιπὸν ἰέναι τὰ τε σφίσι αὐτοῖς ξύμφορα καὶ τὰ κοινά: 'henceforward . . . they must deal with the Athenians as with men who knew quite well what was for their own and the common good'. The first suggestion that Athens sees herself as an imperial power: see *Greek World*, 22; this is not inconsistent with 93. 4: see n. there.

7. ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλευέσθαι: 'at meetings to decide common policy'. Another sense of τὸ κοινόν, 'the common good', as at 4 above and 92. 1 below.

92. 1. ὀργὴν μὲν φανεράν οὐκ ἐποιοῦντο . . . ἀδήλως ἤχθοντο: 'they did not show open anger . . . they were annoyed . . . but they did not show it'. This is important evidence for the general question of Spartan acquiescence in Athenian leadership: Sparta is *not* happy, and this passage should be ranged with the other, mostly non-Thucydidean evidence, for Spartan disquiet: see below, 95. 7 n. and *Greek World*, 21 ff. δῆθεν: 'they claimed'. The particle δῆθεν here conveys 'that the words used are untrue', according to J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles*² (Oxford, 1954), 265, section 4. E. Badian, 'The Deification of Alexander the Great', *Edson Studies* (Thessaloniki, 1981), 56 n. 49, says that δῆθεν 'hardly occurs in Attic prose, except for five instances in Thucydides (notoriously refractory)'.

τῷ κοινῷ: 'for the common good'. That, presumably, is the meaning here. See above 91. 7 n.

93. 2. καὶ δῆλη ἡ οἰκοδομία ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ὅτι κατὰ σπουδὴν ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ θεμέλιοι παντοίων λίθων ὑπόκεινται: 'to this day the structure shows evidence of haste. The foundations are made up of all sorts of stones . . .'. This has been confirmed to some extent by

excavation: for instance, some fine relief sculpture from statue bases has been found built into the wall: see for illustrations J. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (London, 1971), figs. 401–3 (dog-and-cat fight; wrestlers etc.; ball game). For the celebrated ‘hockey-players’ relief see plate 46 of H. A. Harris, *Sport in Greece and Rome* (London, 1972). But R. E. Wycherley, *The Stones of Athens* (Princeton, 1978), 11, thinks Th. ‘exaggerates the impromptu character of the work. Though a certain amount of odd material was indeed incorporated in places . . . the stone socle was built solidly enough.’ See his plates 3–4 or Travlos, figs. 223–4. It remains of interest that Th. should—unusually for him—cite material remains as evidence in this way; cp. G. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* (Cambridge, 1966), 427 with n. 3, and for Th.’s principles in using such archaeological evidence see *Thucydides*, 91 ff.

R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (London, 1985), 4 and 122, suggests, with perhaps a little exaggeration, that there may have been political implications to this destruction of grave monuments (‘provocative and expressive symbols of aristocratic privilege and grandeur’). Cp. 126. 12 n.

μείζων γὰρ ὁ περίβολος πανταχῆ ἐξήχθη: ‘the circuit of the city was extended in every direction’. See above, 89. 3 n.: the natural way to take this is as implying a pre-existing smaller circuit; as Winter says (89. 3 n.), 63, it is not convincing to take *περίβολος* in a vaguer sense, ‘city area’.

93. 3–8. *The Piraeus Walls*

For the Piraeus generally see R. Garland, *The Piraeus* (London, 1987); R. E. Wycherley’s useful article in the *Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites* (1976); and, for Themistokles’ building work there, Boersma (90. 3 n.), 47 ff. (also discussing the evidence for the involvement of the celebrated town-planner Hippodamos of Miletos). A fragment of the Themistoklean wall can be seen *in situ* inside the Maritime Museum (and see Garland, 163 ff., for other fragments of archaeological evidence); but most of what is visible above ground dates from the rebuilding by Konon in the early fourth century.

3. ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς ἧς κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίοις ἦρξε: ‘in his year of office as Archon’ [one of nine senior magistrates]. Themistokles’ archonship can be dated to 493/2 (Dionysius of Halikarnassos, *Roman Antiquities*, vi. 34. 1, with T. J. Cadoux, *JHS* 68 (1948), 116 and n. 252: Themistokles’ archonship of 493 was the eponymous archonship, i.e. he gave his name to the year). Some have found this difficult to reconcile with Hdt. vii. 143 (480) which says that Themistokles had *recently* come

to prominence. Gomme, uncharacteristically unconvincing, thought that Th.'s Greek might mean some minor office other than archon, such as Dockyard Superintendent (the words ἀρχῆς and ἡρξε are just the noun and verb from a root meaning to rule or hold office) and that Dion. Hal. might have meant an otherwise unknown Themistokles (in this he is followed by Chambers: see below). But see D. M. Lewis, 'Themistocles' Archonship', *Historia*, 21 (1973), 757f., a brief and elegant note, the upshot of which is that when, as in the present passage of Th., we find a form of ἀρχεῖν in conjunction with the word Ἀθηναίοις (as in the first of the inscribed Tribute Lists) the reference is normally to the eponymous archon (there is, however, one Thucydidean exception not far away from the present passage: see below, 96. 2, for the Hellenotamiai). As for the words κατ' ἐνιαυτόν, which have caused trouble, Lewis shows that they can mean 'for a year' rather than 'year by year', though M. Chambers remains unconvinced ('Themistocles and the Piraeus', *Studies presented to Sterling Dow on his Eightieth Birthday* = GRBS Monographs 10 (1984), 43ff.). Other bibliography is cited by R. Develin, *Athenian Officials 684-321 B.C.* (Cambridge, 1989), 55, entry under the year 493/2: he accepts an archonship for Themistokles in this year.

There is no real problem about Hdt., whose sources were hostile to Themistokles and treated him (or his family: Davies, *APF* 213) as upstarts; actually there is plenty of evidence for Themistokles between 493 and 480, collected by How and Wells in their n. We do not even have to assume that his archonship in 493 was held at the earliest possible age, i.e. 30. See W. G. G. Forrest and D. L. Stockton, *Historia*, 36 (1987), 236 n. 4 and 237: it is possible that Themistokles had already held one of the other eight archonships before his 'eponymous' year, if that was constitutional as their article argues. See also J. A. S. Evans, 'The "Recent" Prominence of Themistocles', *AJP* 108 (1987), 382ff.

As Lewis points out, Themistokles' farsightedness in fortifying the Piraeus in 493/2 should not be exaggerated: 'the Aeginetan raids on Phaleron of Hdt. v. 81. 3 will have provided some evidence of the possible advantages of a fortified harbour'.

νομιζων τό τε χωρίον καλὸν εἶναι, λιμένας ἔχον τρεῖς αὐτοφυεῖς: 'he realized that the situation of the place, which had three natural harbours, was excellent'. Why then had the Athenians not developed Piraeus earlier? (Previously they had used Phaleron Bay, as Hdt. vi. 116 explicitly tells us.) Part of the answer must be that Salamis became Athenian only in the course of the sixth century, and use of Piraeus was unthinkable as long as Salamis opposite was in hostile, specifically Megarian, hands: part of Salamis, where the modern Megara ferry crosses to the island, is a few yards from Megarian territory.

The three harbours were Zea, Mounychia, and Kantharos, the main harbour. For νομίζων, 'he realized', see 5. 1 n. on ἡγουμένων.

4. τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν: 'he lost no time in helping to lay the foundations of their empire' ['helping to' because of the prefix ξυν- i.e. 'with']. Or does the Greek mean 'he helped to make a beginning on the work' (ἀρχή can mean 'a beginning' as well as 'an empire')? In favour of 'he helped to make a beginning' one can argue (i) that this would nicely answer τὰ λοιπά and ὑπῆρκετο at para. 3 above ('to finish the Piraeus' . . . on which 'he had made a start' in 493); (ii) that a reference to the foundation of empire is premature in 493. On this see further below (2).

In favour of 'empire' one can argue (1) that the sentence rises to a climax from δύναμιν, 'power', through ἀνθεκτέα, 'they must make the sea their domain' [lit. 'embrace it'], to the solemn ξυγκατεσκεύαζε τὴν ἀρχήν, 'he helped to lay the foundations of their empire'. The alternative is bathos. (2) that Th.'s comment is no more than the truth. Note that the verb is indicative: we are no longer being told what Themistokles is supposed to have *thought*—so there is no suggestion that in 493 he farsightedly planned the Athenian empire. (As noted on 91. 4, that passage is the first explicit imperial *assertion*). In fact, the Athenian empire had its origins in sixth-century developments: see my note in *LACTOR Athenian Empire*³, pp. xxii ff. But it would be fatuous to deny the importance of the Piraeus. The tr. 'empire' should be preferred. For the naked τὴν ἀρχήν, in the sense of 'the empire', see viii. 73. 4, where however we find the additional word αὐτοῖς, 'for them', that is to say 'their empire'. In the present passage we can surely supply some such word.

7. πρὸς ἅπαντας: 'the world' [lit. 'everybody']. Cawkwell, 'The Fall of Themistocles' (below, introductory n. to 128–135. 1), 44, observes that Th. by this vague phrase 'clearly had in mind, to some degree, the Spartans'. See above 92. 1 n.

94. *Greek capture of most of Cyprus, and of Byzantium (478)*

1. Πausanίας ὁ Κλεομβρότου: 'Pausanias son of Kleombrotos'. Regent for Pleistarchos; victor of the battle of Plataia. See further 128. 5.

2. καὶ ἐστράτευσαν ἐς Κύπρον καὶ αὐτῆς τὰ πολλὰ κατεστρέψαντο: 'they first made an expedition against Cyprus and subdued most of it'. See Diod. xi. 44. 2, Plut. *Aristides* 23 and *Kim.* 6, with G. F. Hill, *History of Cyprus* i (Cambridge, 1940), 121: Aristides and Kimon commanded the Athenian contingent. Aesch. *Pers.* 891–2 implies the capture of Soli, Salamis, and Paphos (cp. Meiggs, 38f. and 482), but his

interpretation of the expedition is strongly criticized by F. G. Maier, 'Factoids in Ancient History: the Case of Fifth-Century Cyprus', *JHS* 105 (1985), 32 ff.; see also *CAH* vi². 308. (Meiggs thought in terms of Greek support for independence movements among Cypriote communities who now began briefly to 'reassert their hellenism'. This support, he thinks, took the form of expulsion of garrisons, see Diod. (above). Maier denies cultural antagonisms of this sort. There is more to be said on this issue; I hope to return to it.)

All modern authorities agree that this Greek success and presence on Cyprus was short: 'Achaemenid rule soon reasserted itself', as Maier says in *CAH*. See, for the next phases of hostility, 104. 2 and 112. 2 below.

Cyprus has usually been thought to be of the greatest possible strategic importance—it was, for instance, the most heavily garrisoned Ptolemaic possession; Ed. Will calls it a 'pistol pointed at the heart of Syria', *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique*², i (Nancy, 1979), 67. If its advantages were really as overwhelming as, say, Hill asserts, it is a little surprising that the fifth-century Athenians did not make more strenuous efforts to take and hold it. For an unorthodox suggestion that Cyprus, though always assigned this importance by the great powers in history, has usually turned out something of a strategic disappointment ('more ornamental than effective'), see Brian Lapping, *End of Empire* (London, 1987), 311 f.; note also R. Blake, *Disraeli* (London, 1966), 651.

καὶ ὕστερον ἐς Βυζάντιον: 'and afterwards against Byzantium'. See Meiggs, 39, for the strategic reasons for this, and see further below, 128. 5.

95. *Arrogance of Pausanias and its consequences*

1. ἤδη δὲ βιαίους ὄντος: 'he had already begun to behave violently'. See below, 130. On this ch. see Andrewes, 'Spartan Imperialism?', in *Imperialism in the Ancient World*, ed. P. Garnsey and C. Whittaker (Cambridge, 1979), 91 ff., at 92. Hdt. viii. 3. 2 gives the behaviour of Pausanias as an excuse, under cover of which the Athenians took the hegemony. For Th., 'Pausanias' violence is mere fact, not anyone's pretext' (Andrewes). Not for the only time in his story of Pausanias and Themistokles, Th. seems actually to have been less critically alert than Hdt. (Cp. e.g. 128. 7 n. on *θυγατέρα*). For the general question of Spartan attitudes to Athens' assumption of the leadership see below, 7 n. and 96. 2 n. on *πρόσχημα γάρ* etc.

οἱ Ἴωνες καὶ ὅσοι ἀπὸ βασιλέως νεωστὶ ἠλευθέρωντο: 'the Ionians and others who had recently been freed from the Persian king'. By this time the mainland Ionians are certainly included: see 89. 2 n.: the

present phrase taken as a whole is more explicit than that used there, though I believe that there too 'Ionians' should be taken to include mainlanders. It is interesting that Th. omits the Spartan reluctance to defend the mainlanders (Hdt. ix. 106), relevant though that surely was to the Athenian assumption of the leadership. So Lewis (90. 1 n.).

For the notion of liberation from Persia cp. Hdt. ix. 104, speaking of these events as a 'second' revolt of Ionia from Persia. Since the first liberation, i.e. the Ionian revolt of 500 BC, affected more than strictly the Ionians (Aiolians and Dorians as well), Hdt. ix. 104 should probably be taken equally loosely. That goes for the present passage of Th. also, despite the specifically Ionian implications of *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*, 'because of their kinship with them': see next n. Cp. Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* on 23. 4. See further below, 116. 1 n.

κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές: 'because of their kinship with them'. This notion of Athenian-Ionian kinship (considerably watered down from Hdt ix. 106, as Lewis notes, 90. 1 n.) was the product of the tradition that Ionia was colonized from Athens: see above, 6. 2 n. on the identical phrase there; cp. also 12. 4 and nn. for the reality (Athens' role historical, but exaggerated later). We may now consider the distinct question, how far the Ionian-Dorian distinction affected attitudes and behaviour in the *fifth* century. Ed. Will, *Doriens et Ioniens* (Strasbourg, 1956), denied its importance, but see now J. Alty, 'Dorians and Ionians', *JHS* 102 (1982), 1 ff., for a forceful protest, appealing to the present passage (see esp. his n. 26) among other evidence, but accepting a propaganda element in Athens' later use of the 'mother city' idea (nn. 20, 46). He thinks (n. 3) that 'Ionians' could be shorthand for 'Asiatic Greeks', so that the wide scope of Th.'s words above (see preceding n.) is not a difficulty. See also J. M. Barron, in Boardman and Richardson (above, 16 n.), 90f., and J. Heinrichs, *Ionien nach Salamis: Die kleinasiatischen Griechen in der Politik und politischen Reflexion des Mutterlands* (Bonn, 1989) = *Antiquitas*, vol. 39, at 159ff., cp. 113 n. 385.

5. κατηγορεῖτο δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα μηδισμός: 'the principal charge against him; this was that he had conspired with the Persians . . .'. For 'conspiracy with the Persians', lit. 'medism', see D. Graf, 'Medism: the Origin and Significance of the Term', *JHS* 104 (1984), 15 ff. (The first Greek use of it dates from a time when the Median element in Persia was more important than it became under Darius.) For the 'medism' of which Pausanias was now acquitted but subsequently convicted see further 132. 4 n.: it was largely a fabrication.

7. ἀπαλλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους νομίζοντες ἰκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῷ τότε παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους: 'they had had enough of the Persian War;

and they thought that the Athenians were fully able to lead, and at that time believed them to be their friends'. This is a clear authorial endorsement of the line taken by the Athenians at e.g. 75. 2–76. 2 above: the Spartans were not prepared to do the job and were happy to see the Athenians do it instead. The puzzle about this, from the point of view of the student of Th., is not so much that this conflicts with a disquieting amount of non-Thucydidean evidence for Spartan unease (discussed in *Greek World*, 21 ff.: it includes Hdt. viii. 3. 2 (on which see above, para. 1 n. on ἤδη etc.), *Ath. Pol.* 23. 2, and the Spartan debate reported at Diod. xi. 50), but that it implies a view different from the equally authorial ch. 92 above, with its talk of Spartan 'anger' and 'annoyance' at the new and defiant walls of Athens. There too friendly feelings were mentioned, but only as the reason why Spartan anger was concealed not open. If Th. wrote the anecdotal chs. 89–93 early in his career, and if it is right that the Spartans *were* uneasy—and they surely were, see *Greek World*, above—we have the awkward consequence that Th.'s first and most stylistically 'Herodotean' thoughts were different, and that they were best. These two conclusions seem to me unavoidable. It matters less that his second thoughts were wrong, if they were (and that cannot be *proved*), than that in closely juxtaposed authorial passages he expresses inconsistent views on a major issue. (See also nn. below on 96. 1, πρόσχημα etc. and 128. 3, τῷ μὲν λόγῳ etc.)

Facts, no less than attitudes, are relevant and important. Sparta did *not* withdraw from an active foreign policy altogether; see Hdt. vi. 72, with 102. 4 n. below, for an expedition into Thessaly in perhaps 476, and Plut. *Them.* 20 with *Greek World*, 33, 81 for a Spartan attempt around the same time to get control of the Delphic Amphictiony. (See further iii. 92. 1 n. on Ἡράκλειαν etc. for the Delphic aspect of Spartan foreign policy in the fifth century.)

The discrepant line taken from that in Hdt. viii. 3 is interesting as showing that Th. parted company with his predecessor on this major issue, although elsewhere in this section there is dependence on points of detail (see 89. 2 n. on ἐκλιπόντων τῶν βαρβάρων).

96. Formation of the Delian League

This took place in 478/7. See also Diod. xi. 47, *Ath. Pol.* 23, Plut. *Arist.* 25. Th.'s account, in the present ch., of this inaugural phase keeps the personal element to an absolute minimum (contrast the preceding chs.). In fact the assessment of tribute in the new league was the work of the Athenian Aristides, as Th. himself casually lets out at v. 18 below. For good modern discussions see 'The Foundation of the Delian League' in

Meiggs (ch. 3), and Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire* (*Greece & Rome* New Surveys in the Classics, no. 17, 1985), ch. ii. These give refs. to other recent work. Note also M. F. McGregor, *The Athenians and their Empire* (Vancouver, 1987), ch. iv, 'The Meeting of Delos', though this book lacks footnotes; A. French, 'The Guidelines of the Delian League', *Antichthon* 22 (1988), 12 ff.; W. T. Loomis, *Historia*, 39 (1990), 487 ff.

A. Giovannini and G. Gottlieb, *Thukydides und die Anfänge der athenischen Arche* (Heidelberg, 1980), see the league as a mere continuation of the original anti-Persian alliance of 481, but is clear that Th. thought of it as a wholly new phase of alliance even if he does not describe its formation in so many words. See Westlake, *CR* 32 (1982), 60 f., and Rhodes (above), 6.

1. **πρόσχημα γὰρ ἦν ἀμύνεσθαι ὧν ἔπαθον δηοῦντας τὴν βασιλείωσ χώραν:** 'a pretext being to revenge themselves and the allies for their losses by devastating the Persian king's territory'. The first word is of interest. (i) 'a' not 'the'. (There is no definite article in the Greek. Against this it might be objected that there is no definite article before *ταμειῶν τε Δήλος* either, but that is slightly different: see 2 n. below. The emphasis is on Delos, the word in apposition: 'Delos was for them a treasury ...') (ii) the word *πρόσχημα* itself does not mean 'avowed object' (so Jowett, whose version I have changed) or 'announced intention' (Gomme) or 'declared purpose' (Meiggs, 44). It means 'pretext', so rightly H. Rawlings, 'Thucydides on the Purpose of the Delian league', *Phoenix*, 31 (1977), 1 ff. (see also A. French, *Phoenix*, 33 (1979), 134 ff., and N. Robertson, *AJAH* 5 (1980), 73 ff.). This difference is not trivial: if revenge was a mere pretext, and (cp. i above) not even the whole pretext but one among unspecified others, what was the real purpose and who was the real enemy? I have discussed this in *Greek World*, 26. It has been suggested that the real enemy was all along envisaged as *Sparta* (cp. 95. 7 n.), but this does not seem borne out by the chapters which follow, which document the increasing harshness of Athens to her *allies*. Hence a second suggestion, that the 'real' aim was the coercion of those allies, i.e. the empire was planned all along. But this seems to impute too great foresight to the Athenians of 478; and there is non-Thucydidean evidence that the mood at the outset was more idealistic than that (see esp. *Ath. Pol.* 23. 5 for the dropping of weights into the sea, a solemn act indicating intended permanence. Th. characteristically passes over this action which has religious connotations. See *Greek World*, above, for Athens as 'liberator' in 478; and for this concept in a Thucydidean speech see e.g. iii. 10. 3). In that case we can say, as I prefer to do, that the Athenians' real aim was *leadership* absolutely; that is, we do not need to posit a particular enemy other than Persia.

The word *δηοῦν* means 'devastating'; the idea of 'getting booty' is secondary at most, and was wrongly stressed as the purpose of the League by R. Sealey, 'The Origin of the Delian League', *Ancient Society and Institutions*, Ehrenberg Studies, ed E. Badian (Oxford, 1966), 233 ff. (against, see A. H. Jackson, 'The Original Purpose of the Delian League', *Historia*, 18 (1969), 12 ff.; K. Raaflaub, 'Beute, Vergeltung, Freiheit?', *Chiron*, 9 (1979), 1 ff.; and M. I. Finley, 'War and Empire', ch. 5 of *Ancient History: Evidence and Models* (London, 1985), 77 and n. 23). In any case, as we have seen, 'purpose' (Sealey, 237) is not an admissible tr. for *πρόσχημα*.

2. καὶ Ἑλληνοταμίαι τότε πρῶτον Ἀθηναίοις κατέστη ἀρχή: '*hellenotamiai*' (Greek treasurers) were then first instituted as an Athenian office' [the Greek of the last four English words is just *ἀρχή*, 'office', with 'Athenians' in the dative]. For this translation see Meiggs, 44 f., against A. G. Woodhead, 'The Institution of the Hellenotamiae', *JHS* 79 (1959), 149 ff., who thinks the Greek means that the office was set up 'for' the Athenians, in the sense that they always held it (which he accepts), but not in the extra sense that only they had the right to appoint to it. That is, he thinks the allies had a say, at least initially. But on the linguistic point *ἀρχή . . . Ἀθηναίοις* at 93. 3 is relevant (see n. there): Th. is here using language appropriate to an Athenian magistracy (though the present passage also shows that the combination of the two words *ἀρχή*—or a variant—and *Ἀθηναίοις* does not point inescapably to the eponymous archonship).

οἱ ἐδέχοντο τὸν φόρον· οὕτω γὰρ ὠνομάσθη τῶν χρημάτων ἡ φορά. ἦν δ' ὁ πρῶτος φόρος ταχθεὶς τετρακόσια τάλαντα καὶ ἑξήκοντα: 'who received the tribute, for so the contributions of money were called. The first assessment of tribute was 460 talents'. Two different but related nouns are used here, *φόρος* (twice) and *φορά* (once). The purpose of this deliberate variation, in a passage without literary or emotional resonance, can only be clarity. Th. is telling us that the word *φόρος*, 'tribute', means the 'bringing in' or 'contribution' (*φορά*, evidently intended as a more general word) of money. This means that the 460 talents can only refer to money payments, not to ships as well as money, as scholars have tried to take it, on the grounds that 460 talents is impossibly high (so most recently McGregor, 36). If Th. had used *φόρος* in his explanatory note ('tribute of money' as opposed to some other kind) it would perhaps be possible to argue that the word 'tribute' in 'first assessment of tribute' meant ships + money. As it is, we cannot. See M. Chambers, 'Four Hundred Sixty Talents', *CP* 53 (1958), 26 ff., and Finley, 'The Fifth-century Athenian Empire: A Balance-Sheet', in *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (95. 1 n. on ἡδη), 103 ff., at 111 (though

note Rhodes, *Athenian Empire* (introductory n. to 96), 10 n. 16: it is all very well to say, as Finley does, that Athens wanted not cash but a fleet, but what about places which could not even afford one whole ship? Both types of 'payment' must have been equally allowed for, i.e. Th. thought there were 460 talents *plus* however many ships he thought there were).

What then is wrong with '460 talents'? The difficulty is that mid-century tribute assessments were of this order, at a time when the league was much bigger and many allies had commuted from ship to money payments; cp. 99 below. So 460 (it is said) is too big for 478 BC. But the evidence derived from the tribute lists is not full enough for us to say that Th. is wrong, here or at ii. 13, where his 600 talents is credible.

ταμειῶν τε Δῆλος ἦν αὐτοῖς: 'the island of Delos was the treasury'. Despite the absence of definite articles, it is legitimate to translate in this way: see above, 1 n. on *πρόσχημα* etc.

We have already (in the *Archaeology*) been introduced to the idea of the importance of Delos: see 4 n. on *Κυκλάδων νήσων* and 8. 1 n.

The treasury (as Th. does not bother to tell us here or later) was subsequently moved to Athens, Plut. *Arist.* 25. 2–3, mentioning the move as a mere proposal and giving no date. The date of the move was probably 454, when the so-called 'Athenian tribute lists' (see below) began to be inscribed at Athens (see J. K. Davies, *LACTOR Athenian Empire*³, 58); but for the view that this is a baseless dogma see W. K. Pritchett, *Historia*, 18 (1969), 17 ff. (following a suggestion of Jowett). Pritchett, whose suggestion Finley, 306 n. 6, seems to approve, would prefer an earlier date, perhaps in the 460s. See now Huxley, *RFIC* 118 (1990), 319.

The 'Athenian tribute lists' are in fact the records of the payments of one-sixtieth of the tribute to Athena, as the 'firstfruits' or *ἀπαρχή*. For this religious concept of *ἀπαρχή*—on which Th. is silent—see W. Burkert, *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual* (Berkeley, 1979), 52 ff.

For Delos and its religious importance as a centre of Ionianism, an importance exploited by Athens for imperial purposes, see B. Smarczyk, *Untersuchungen zur Religionspolitik und politischen Propaganda Athens im delisch-attischen Seebund* (Munich, 1990), 464 ff., and below, iii. 104, introductory n.; but see also Hicks, introduction to W. R. Paton and E. L. Hicks, *The Inscriptions of Cos* (Oxford, 1891), p. xxiv, for a refreshing view of Th. i. 96: he notes that Delos 'appealed to the sympathies not only of the Ionian but of the Dorian islanders', and gives the evidence.

αἱ ξύνοδοι: 'the meetings'. These ceased to happen at some time, probably in the 430s, see *LACTOR Athenian Empire*³, 29: there was perhaps a meeting in 440 to discuss the revolt of Samos, if it is legitimate to argue from the way the Mytileneans at iii. 9 ff. abstain from using any

argument on the lines 'we did not raise our voice against the suppression of Samos because there was no longer a forum in which to raise it'. But we hear of no meeting in the preliminaries to the Peloponnesian War. See also next n.

97. *Athenian policy in the Pentekontaetia:*
Th.'s reasons for describing the period

1. ἡγούμενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνόδων βουλευόντων: 'at first the allies were autonomous and deliberated in a common assembly under the leadership of Athens'. The meaning of αὐτονόμων, 'autonomous', is 'political independence of small settlements with the implication that this independence is contingent on the tolerance of a larger power', cp. Ostwald, *Autonomia* (above, 67. 2 n.), esp. his p. 13 for the definition. Ostwald shows that the word in its adjectival form was a favourite in Th. and argues convincingly that the original alliance did not specify the autonomy of the allies: this is Thucydidean analysis.

As for κοινῶν ξυνόδων, 'common assemblies', I have argued in the LACTOR (above) that there was only one chamber; attempts to show that the arrangement was bicameral like the Second Athenian Confederacy a century later are misguided: that later organization aimed at the outset to avoid the more unpopular features of the earlier league. See P. Culham, 'The Delian League: Bicameral or Unicameral?', *AJAH* 3 (1978), 27 ff.; Ostwald, 33.

τὸν βάρβαρον ... ξυμμάχους νεωτερίζοντας ... Πελοποννησίων: 'Persians ... their own rebellious allies ... Peloponnesians'. For the idea that Th. systematically arranges the ensuing narrative according to these three headings see McNeal (above, introductory n. to 89-117). For νεωτερίζοντας, 'rebellious', lit. 'hatching something new', compare the language used about the Athenians themselves at 102. 3 below.

2. ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτὰ καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποιησάμην: 'I have gone out of my way to speak of this period' [lit. 'I have written about it and have made this digression from my account'].

Ἑλλάνικος: 'Hellanikos'. He was a contemporary of Th., a native of Lesbos, who wrote the first *Atthis* or local history of Attica. See L. Pearson, *The Local Historians of Attica* (Oxford, 1942), ch. 1; F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949) and *FGrHist* iii. B supp. no. 323a intro. Th. *names* no other target: see *Thucydides*, 83 ff. with references, to which add O. Lendle, 'Die Auseinandersetzung des Thukydides mit Hellanikos', *Hermes*, 92 (1964), 129 ff. = Herter, ed., *Thucydides*, 661 ff., who at n. 44 accepts Jacoby's view, *FGrHist* iii B supp. (text vol.), p. 5, that the present

para. of Th. was an afterthought. That is certainly indicated by comparison of this passage and 89. 1, where Th. undertakes to describe how the Athenians 'rose to greatness'; his motive is to amplify his statement about Athenian power at 88. This is a first-order reason for treating the period (see introductory n. to 1-23 for such *αὔξησης* or amplification). The present passage gives an additional, second-order, reason for treating the period between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War, namely the inadequacy of previous accounts. (The final sentence of 97. 2 in effect repeats the first-order reason given at 87. 1.)

When was the present passage inserted? The answer to this depends in part on the date at which Hellanikos published his *Attike Xyngraphe*. In F 25-6 Hellanikos mentions events of 407/6, and it is a usual and reasonable assumption that the whole work went down to the end of the war in 404/3 and that Th. made his hostile insertion after that.

βραχέως τε καὶ τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς: 'very brief, and inaccurate in his chronology'. The pot calls the kettle black, as far as the layout of Th.'s own *Pentekontaetia* goes. What then does the phrase refer to? See *HCT* v. 381: 'one can only suppose that the criticism of Hellanikos relates to some specific chronological errors in his work'. On *οὐκ ἀκριβῶς*, 'inaccurately', see above 22. 2n., and note esp. v. 20. 2, where Th. again uses the word in an aggressive sentence about chronology, again perhaps with Hellanikos in mind: see (provisionally) ii. 2. 1 n. on *ἐπι Χρυσίδος* etc.

Th. was, for all we know, justified in his criticisms, but he was a little ungracious: after all, as Jacoby remarked (at the end of his intr. to *FGrHist* 323 a), Hellanikos was a citizen of a town in the Athenian Empire who was nevertheless the first man to write a book on the history of Athens, and did so at a time when other East Greeks were showering flattery on the Spartan Lysander.

ἅμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπόδειξιν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐν οἷῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη: 'the narrative will also serve to explain how the Athenian empire grew up'. See above, n. on *Ἑλλάνικος*, for this motive. The word *ἀπόδειξις*, a 'setting-forth' or 'demonstration', is surely intended to recall the famous use of the word in the preface of Hdt. (elsewhere only at ii. 13. 9 in all Th.).

On this passage see R. H. Winton, "The "arche of the Athenians" and the "Athenian Empire", *Mus. Helv.* 38 (1981), 147ff., suggesting that what Th. meant was 'my account shows the character which the Athenian empire took on', the point being that elsewhere (e.g. i. 75. 1) Th. treats the *arche* as having already begun with the formation of the Delian League. This very severe view does not allow for the late date at which the *Pentekontaetia* was inserted; we should not insist on strict

uniformity of outlook on Th.'s part. In any case Jowett's tr. allows for some ambiguity of interpretation. See also iii. 11. 3 n.

98–117. *Narrative of events to the end of the Samian Revolt*

For Th.'s aim in this part of the work see above, introductory n. to 89–117. From now on the pace speeds up, and we are given no more lavish detail as in 89–93 (see 89. 3, introductory n., for the motive for that), nor institutional material bearing on the league/empire, like that in 96–97. 1. What follows in Th. is skeletal in the extreme. The chronological problems of the *Pentekontaetia* have been much discussed. Gomme's chart at i. 394–6 is still helpful; for the period 465–431 note also P. Deane, *Thucydides' Dates 465–431* (Ontario, 1972), with Cawkwell, *CR* 26 (1976), 121. For recent discussions see Rhodes, *The Athenian Empire (Greece & Rome New Surveys in the Classics, no. 17, 1985)*, ch. iii, and add (for the period 466–449) R. K. Unz, 'Chronology of the Pentekontaetia', *CQ* 26 (1986), 68 ff.; and (for the period 478–449) E. Badian, 'Towards a Chronology of the Pentekontaetia Down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias', *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 73–107.

98. 1. *Conquest of Eion on the Strymon and other places*

1. **πρῶτον μὲν Ἡϊόνα τὴν ἐπὶ Στρυμόνι . . . πολιορκία εἶλον:** 'first . . . the Athenians besieged and took Eion upon the Strymon'. For the resources of this region, desire for which was a factor in Athenian foreign policy for much of the fifth and fourth centuries, see iv. 108. 1. (Cp. introductory n. to 56–67 above for the colony established at nearby Amphipolis in 437, after a number of failures.) Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* ii. 102, sees the capture of Eion by Athens, and the slightly earlier capture of Nine Ways or Ennea Hodoi (the predecessor of Amphipolis) by Alexander of Macedon, as 'rival attempts to control the exit of the Strymon basin'. The site of Eion has been identified by R. W. V. Catling (unpublished); and see below, iv. 102. 3 n. The capture of Eion is usually put in 476, following a scholiast on Aischines ii. 31 = Fornara 62 (see below 100. 2 and 3 nn.); J. D. Smart, 'Kimon's Capture of Eion', *JHS* 87 (1967), 136 ff., wished to put it in 470/69, but (as critics have said) it is hard to believe that Th. recorded no league activity in the 470s at all. The capture of Eion led to the setting-up of three famous inscribed herms (for these square statues see vi. 27. 1 n.): see Aischines, iii. 183 ff., with R. Osborne, 'The Erection and Mutilation of the Herms', *PCPhS* 211 (1985), 47 ff., at 58 ff.

It now seems likely, from a fragment of a casualty list published in 1967, that Eion was the base for the Ennea Hodoi operations described in ch. 100 below; see D. Bradeen, 'The Athenian Casualty List of 464

B.C.', *Hesperia* 36 (1967), 321 ff., at 326 f. (= *Athenian Agora*, xvii. 1, line 142): [ἐ]ν Ἐιονί, 'In Eion'.

The Eion at iv. 7. 1 is a different place, though also in the Chalkidike. **Κίμωνος τοῦ Μιλτιάδου**: 'Kimon the son of Miltiades'. Pericles' famous rival, already mentioned at 45 above, but there only as the name of Lakedaimonios' father.

2. ἔπειτα Σκύρον: 'then . . . Skyros'. Also 476 acc. to Plut. *Thes.* 36. 1. Th. does not mention that this expedition too was led by Kimon, or that he brought back the bones of Theseus from the island: Plut. *Kim.* 8, *Thes.* 36 (a characteristic omission, given Th.'s tendency to under-report religious factors; though the omission here is forgivable in view of the generally brief and economical character of the *Pentekontaetia* narrative). This piece of Athenian propaganda was perhaps imitated from Sparta's sixth-century recovery of the bones of Orestes, Hdt. i. 67 ff. On Kimon and Theseus see A. J. Podlecki, 'Cimon, Skyros and Theseus' Bones', *JHS* 91 (1971), 141 ff.; C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Theseus Lifting the Rock and a Cup Near the Pithos Painter', also *JHS* 91 (1971), 94 ff., at 108 f., J. P. Barron in *Chios*, 1986 (16 n.), 93, and E. Kearns (2. 5 n. on ἀνθρωποι φκουν), 53. Theseus was an appropriate imperial hero because he had an Ionian aspect: see K. Tausend, 'Theseus und der delisch-attische Seebund', *Rh. Mus.* 132 (1989), 225 ff., and below, iii. 104, introductory n.

For Kimon's dedication at Delphi for Skyros see Forrest's review of R. Flacelière, *Fouilles de Delphes*, iii. 4: *Revue belge*, 34 (1956), 542. The Dolopians were the indigenous inhabitants of Skyros; Plut. *Kim.* 8. 3 calls them pirates. This may be tendentious, but it is a reminder that keeping the seas safe for commerce was no doubt seen as one of the functions and justifications of Athens' empire. For the colony, or rather cleruchy, see above, ch. 4 n. on οἰκιστής. (Cleruchs were Athenian settlers.) In the fourth century, Skyros, along with Lemnos and Imbros, was regarded as Athenian property in a specially strong sense, Xen. *Hell.* iv. 8. 15, v. 1. 31. As a cleruchy Skyros paid no tribute.

Note an important distinction in terminology: Eion and Skyros were 'enslaved', ἡνδραπόδισαν, in the literal sense that their inhabitants were individually sold into slavery; Naxos (below) was 'enslaved', ἐδουλώθη, in the different (it would be wrong to say 'figurative') sense that she was deprived of her political liberty. (See P. Ducrey, *Le Traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique* (Paris, 1968), 131, though I am not sure that he is right to say that Naxos' slavery was a mere 'expression rhétorique'; cp. 101. 2 n. on δουλωθέντων.) I have changed Jowett's tr. accordingly.

3. πρὸς δὲ Καρυστίους: 'the Karystians'. Not dated; perhaps 472. Ostwald, *Autonomia* (above, 67. 2 n.), 38, adopts a view of E. Lévy

according to which Skyros (in defiance of Plutarch, above) and Karystos are put in 469; their reduction is then held to have precipitated the Naxos revolt. We should not, however, seek to bring every one of our handful of facts for this period into causal relationship when Th. does not expressly authorize it. The incorporation of the Karystians is perhaps mentioned as the first of a *category*, allies forcibly brought into the league, just as Naxos is the first to be reduced after rebellion. Cp. Meiggs, 69f.: 'Carystus did not wish to become a member; Naxos did not wish to remain one.' (See also his 123 for the later cleruchy, c.450?) For this sort of selectivity see introductory n. at 89 above. The community of Karystos was on the south of Euboia. Hdt. ix. 105 also speaks of these operations as 'war', a strong word. This aggressive view of the event is confirmed by the presence on a later casualty list of an Athenian with the curious name Karystonikos, 'victory at Karystos' (ML 48, line 27, not in the translated sourcebooks).

4. **Ναξίοις δὲ ἀποστᾶσι . . . πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις ξυμμαχίς παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη:** 'then the Naxians revolted . . . this was the first of the allied cities which was deprived of its freedom contrary to Greek custom'. For the word ἐδουλώθη, 'deprived of its freedom', see above, 2n. The words παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκός, here rendered 'contrary to custom' [the word 'Greek' has been supplied to clarify the sense] literally mean 'contrary to what was established'. *ATL* iii. 156f. wrongly take this to mean 'in breach of the constitution of the league', but the words are more general than that; cp. below, vii. 67. 2. See Ostwald, *Autonomia*, 39, who glosses the Greek words with the English 'unprecedented'. It is not agreed what form the 'enslavement' of Naxos took. It is possible that Naxos originally contributed ships instead of money, in which case it may be that her fleet was now taken away (see Meiggs, 63 n. 2; 70). But Th. is silent on this point whereas elsewhere he is specific (101. 3: Thasos), and the alternative view is that this silence is significant and Naxos did not have a fleet, or a fleet worth the name, to start with. See W. Schuller, *Die Herrschaft der Athener im Ersten Attischen Seebund* (Berlin and New York, 1974), 104ff. On this view 'enslavement' will have been a matter of demanding pledges of loyalty. But Meiggs's view—concrete penalties and the surrender of any Naxian fleet—is on balance to be preferred. Certainly no arguments based on Th.'s silences in the *Pentekontaetia*, whether about whole items or points of detail, are worth much.

The date is probably early 460s, working back from Thasos in 465 (this date is very probable: see 100. 2n.), which is after Eurymedon which is after Naxos. The main difficulty is posed by 137. 2 below, which says that Themistokles in his flight passed the siege of Naxos (?465: see

n. there, esp. the Milton article), but I agree with Rhodes, *Historia*, 19 (1970), 387 ff., that the details of this romantic story, whether in Plutarch or in a rather uncharacteristic section of Th., are not a sound basis for chronological reconstruction.

For remarks about the whole section 98. 4–99 see below, end of introductory n. to 99.

99. *How Athens' relations with her allies worsened*

This ch., which is the subject of extended comment in *ATL* iii. 244 ff., provides the best evidence that the 'Delian League', which is a modern term, became an empire in the sense that the voluntary element became less and the Athenians became harsher. It also provides the best argument against the extreme scepticism of M. I. Finley in *Imperialism* (95. 1 n. on ἡδῆ), 106; 'there is no difference in "harshness" between the treatment of the people of Eion and Skyros in Cimon's day and Cleon's proposal nearly half a century later to massacre the people of Mytilene.' Finley is right that the second half of the fifth century is much better documented than the first, and to warn against facile contrasts between the two halves; but his formulation 'of course the Athenian empire underwent significant changes' (105) minimizes unduly the implication of the present ch., which is clearly that the change was, from the allied point of view, steadily for the worse. (At 110 Finley does indeed cite ch. 99 for the 'change in the pattern' whereby the league fleet became an Athenian fleet, which he rightly calls an 'abject surrender'; but he never brings out the impact of the ch. as a whole.)

The whole section 98. 4–99 has some notable features, and carries at least one dubious implication. First, the section is a point of repose and discussion of a type we would hardly expect from Th.'s introduction to it at 97. But second, not all the generalizations are as helpful as they could be; in particular the concept of 'enslavement', *δουλεία*, is rather loosely used (see above on Naxos). Third, there does seem (despite the looseness) to be a clear implication that 'enslavement' was something that did not happen to you until you had revolted and been recovered, and this is not likely to be historically correct.

1. αἰτίαι δέ . . .: 'the causes'. See also, for what follows, vi. 76. 3.

καὶ μέγιστα αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἔκδειαι: 'The main ones were their failure to pay the tribute or to provide ships'. There is a certain illogicality here: 'strictly . . . these were not in themselves causes; they became causes only after the Athenians brought pressure on defaulters' (*ATL* iii. 246).

ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον: 'were exacting'. Jowett's tr. admirably recalls the sense of exactness or precision which was a secondary meaning of

ἀκριβεία at 22. 2: see n. there. (In modern Greek ἀκριβῶς is a very common and idiomatic word for 'exactly!'.) But here the ref. is to harshness in extracting the uttermost farthing. See above, introductory n.

2. ἦσαν δέ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες: 'And for various reasons they began to prove less congenial leaders than at first'. Cp. ii. 8. 5 (Athenian unpopularity in 431 among existing and potential subjects). A. Giovannini, 'Le Parthénon, le Trésor d'Athéna et le tribut des alliés', *Historia*, 39 (1990), 129ff., argues (144) that it was not with the tribute of the allies that Athens financed the buildings on the Acropolis, and generally insists that passages like the present one show that Th. (unlike modern scholars who think in terms of a crisis in 449) sees the worsening of relations with the allies as a gradual process. [See also L. Kallet-Marx, *CA* 8 (1989), 252-66.]

καὶ οὔτε ξυνεστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου: 'they no longer fought from a position of equality'. The phrase ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, 'from a position of equality', is a constant theme in the Mytilenean speech at Olympia (where it is used, as here, in a discussion of Athens' role inside her empire) and in the Mytilene Debate at Athens: see iii. 10. 4n. and iii. 37. 4n. on κριταί etc. See also i. 77. 3n.

3. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκνησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἱκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν: 'the majority of them disliked military service and absence from home, and so they agreed to contribute their share of the expense instead of ships'. The majority of all allies, or the majority of those who later revolted? *ATL* iii. 248 emphatically argue for the second interpretation, but I doubt if Th. intended his words to be pressed so strictly.

100. 1. *The Battle of the Eurymedon*

ἐγένετο δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα: 'after this'. Perhaps 467, if we disregard the supposed synchronism of Themistokles' flight with the siege of Naxos: see above, 98. 4n. Unz (72) wishes to put the battle of the Eurymedon before the battle of Naxos, but see Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 203 n. 6. (For these two studies see 98-117, introductory n.)

The battle of the Eurymedon brought many new members into the league, from southern Asia Minor; Phaselis actually joined just before the battle: see *Plut. Kim.* 12. 3-4, with *ML*31 = Fornara 68. Kimon enlarged the decks of his triremes to enable more hoplites to be carried, according to Plutarch's account of the battle, *Kim.* 12. 2. Eurymedon is a reminder that Kimon's achievements were naval no less than those of his rivals, although the fleet was usually associated with more radical politics than Kimon's; cp. *Greek World*, 34. The victory, by land and sea, made a great

impression: see the famous epigram at Diod. xi. 62 (see ML 93 for a Lycian imitation of the opening); the dedication of a bronze date-palm (*φοῖνιξ*, a pun on 'Phoenicians') by Athens at Delphi, Paus. x. 15. 3; and the extraordinary vase at Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Oxford, 1978), 105 (but see *JHS* 104 (1984), 181 ff.). On Paus. i. 29. 14 (burial of the Eurymedon dead in the Kerameikos) see below, ii. 34. 1 n. The famous general Eurymedon was presumably named after the battle: see iii. 80. 2 n.

100. 2-101. *Thasos Revolt put down by Athens; Athenian disaster at Drabeskos; Spartan helots occupy Ithome*

2. χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον: 'after a while'. This episode can be dated with the (doubtful) help of a scholiast to Aischines, ii. 31 = Fornara 62 (see 98. 4 n.), together with Th. iv. 102. 2-3. See Rhodes (introductory n. to 98-117), 12. In Book iv Th. dates the unsuccessful attempts at a colony 29 years before the successful foundation. The latter event fell in 437, on the evidence of the scholiast to Aischines, with which Diod. xii. 32. 3 agrees. This produces a date in 465/4 for the relevant earlier attempt (there had been one earlier still, in 476: see 98. 1 and n.). It is tempting to emend another passage in the scholiast so as to bring it into line with this 465 date, and most scholars have succumbed to the temptation. (The scholiast gives the name Lysikrates as that of the archon in whose year the colony was destroyed. Lysikrates was archon in 453, whereas the archon in 465/4 was called Lysitheos. 'Lysikrates' is usually taken to be a mistake in the scholiast for 'Lysitheos', in which case the scholiast dates the disaster to 465. See, however, para. 3 n. below for Badian's view that 453 is the correct date for the *destruction* of the colony, which was *founded* some twelve years earlier.)

On the usual view, which I accept, Th. intends roughly to synchronize the beginning of the war against Thasos with a Thracian disaster to an Athenian force at Drabeskos, see para. 3 of the present ch. The date of these events is 465/4.

διενοχθέντας: 'a quarrel had arisen'. The reasons are evidently the mineral wealth of Thasos in the *peraia* or mainland opposite: see some polemical pages of M. I. Finley, *Trade and Politics* (above 37. 3 n.), 28-32, and for the mines see Meiggs, 571 f. R. Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures* (i. 2. 5 n.), ch. 4, is good on the mineral resources of Thasos itself but is less interested in the mainland opposite. More balanced are L. Nixon and S. Price, 'The Size and Resources of Greek Cities', in *The Greek City From Homer to Alexander*, ed. O. Murray and S. Price (Oxford, 1990), 137 ff., at 152 f. For the French excavations on Thasos see *Guide de Thasos* (Paris, 1968).

De Ste. Croix's attempt (*OPW* 42f.) to deny that Athens was

the aggressor is not convincing. This looks like a clear case of an economic war.

See further iv. 104. 4n.

3. ἐπὶ δὲ Στρυμόνα πέμψαντες μυρίους οἰκήτορας αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους . . . διεφθάρησαν ἐν Δραβησκῷ τῇ Ἡδωνικῇ ὑπὸ τῶν Θρακῶν ξύμπαντες: 'about the same time they sent ten thousand of their own people and of their allies to the Strymon . . . they were all destroyed at Drabeskos in Hedonia by the Thracians'. Badian, 'Chronology' (introductory n. to 98–117), argues that the two events described here should be chronologically dissociated: the disaster at Drabeskos (he thinks) was much later than the foundation in the Strymon region; in fact (he suggests) the disaster was in 453/2, in the archonship of Lysikrates, the unemended date given by the scholiast to Aischines, ii. 31. (Badian, however, accepts that the disaster happened under Leagros; on this point Badian accepts an emendation in the text of the scholiast. That text has Leogoras. But Francis and Vickers—(above, 51. 4n.), 107—refuse to emend the scholiast, and incline to the retention of Leogoras; for this see also W. E. Thompson, *ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to B. D. Meritt* (New York, 1974), 149.) Badian's view does not seem to me necessary, at least as a treatment of what Th. implies. Badian (86) wishes to give the colony a 'perfectly plausible life of about twelve years', that is, 465–453. But Th. does not, in the present passage, read as if he is aware of so long an interval. I accept a date for the Drabeskos disaster soon after the foundation of the colony in 465.

See further iv. 102. 2 n., also vol. 3 Appendix I, Chronology, discussing both passages.

Drabeskos was, in fact, a major disaster, mentioned again at iv. 102. 2. We do not know the proportion of Athenians to allies. The expedition was led by Leagros father of the Glaukon of 51. 4 above: see Fornara 62 and Paus. i. 29. 4. Francis and Vickers seek to show that the disaster was only modest (in particular, that Leagros himself survived). See esp. 105. They do not make clear that there is a textual problem. They follow the Oxford Classical Text which prints *ξύμπάντων*, the reading of the manuscripts, instead of the last Greek word quoted above, where I have preferred *ξύμπαντες*, 'all' [i.e. all the settlers]. That is, they assume that the word agrees with *Θρακῶν*, i.e. they think that the, or rather some, settlers were killed by 'the *united* Thracians'. It is, however, important to realise that *ξύμπαντες* is not just—as you might think from Jowett's footnote—the emendation of the nineteenth-century German editor Poppo, but a genuine manuscript variant and a good one. It was evidently read by Lorenzo Valla in the fifteenth century, whose Latin

translation of Thucydides was commissioned by Nicholas V, the first great humanist pope. Valla's version went 'omnes interempti sunt'. Of Valla, L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, *Scribes and Scholars*² (Oxford, 1974), 137, remark that his 'contributions to the text of Thucydides are more probably due to the merits of the manuscripts he used than to his own ingenuity'; for Valla generally, a figure of the first importance, see R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship*, ii (Oxford, 1976), 33-41, or Wilamowitz, *History of Classical Scholarship* (London, 1982), 24f. ('a genuine scholar', 25); and on the Thucydidean aspect F. Ferlauto, *Il testo di Tucidide e la tradizione latina di Lorenzo Valla* (Palermo, 1979), with Lewis's review, *CR* 30 (1980), 276ff.; cp. *HCT* v. 457.

If the disaster was on the scale here assumed, we can understand why it was on this occasion, as it probably was, that the Athenians introduced state burial in the Kerameikos for war dead: see ii. 34. 1 n. discussing Jacoby, 'Patrios Nomos: State Burial in Athens and the Public Cemetery in the Kerameikos', *JHS* 64 (1944), 37ff. = *Abhandlungen*, 260ff., an article whose conclusions are too lightly rejected in some recent works. For the monument to the dead see D. W. Bradeen, *The Athenian Agora*, xvii: *Inscriptions, The Funerary Monuments*, no. 1.

Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* ii. 102f. notes that the mention of Thracians implies that Alexander had lost ground in the region: see above, 98. 1 n. and see E. N. Borza, *In the Shadow of Olympus: The Emergence of Macedon* (Princeton, 1990), 122 and n. 56 (numismatic evidence).

For the spelling *Hedonians* I am indebted to Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 43.

101. 1. Λακεδαιμονίους ἐπεκαλοῦντο καὶ ἐπαμύνειν ἐκέλευον ἔσβαλόντας ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν: 'appealed to the Spartans and asked them to invade Attica'. See 58. 1.

2. καὶ ἔμελλον: 'and they would have done so'. Th. shows his usual confidence about states of mind; cp. 5. 1 n. on ἡγουμένων. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 208 n. 31, notes that the meaning of the words is obscure: 'were they about to consult the allies? or to call out the ban? or are we still merely talking about a genuine intention?'

Sparta's readiness to intervene on this occasion—if we could be sure that Th. was right about it, and that is far from certain—has a bearing on her general foreign policy position in 479-431, a badly documented subject. See A. J. Holladay, 'Sparta's Role in the First Peloponnesian War', *JHS* 97 (1977), 54ff., discussing de Ste. Croix, *OPW*; for Thasos, Holladay, 55 and 62 with n. 42. As Th. represents things, Thasos, like Pleistoanax's invasion of 446 (114. 2) and the Samos episode in 440 (40. 5, but see n. there), is clear evidence of Sparta's occasional aggressive-

ness in the period. Note, however, that it is most unlikely that news of the Spartan promise leaked out until after 462, and Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 134 ff., has a strong attack on the whole story of the Spartan promise.

τοῦ γενομένου σεισμοῦ: 'the earthquake which had happened'. For this, the great earthquake of Spartan history, see also Plut. *Kim.* 16 and Diod. xi. 63, with P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), 216 ff., and his 'Seismicity in Spartan Society', *LCM* 1 (1976), 25 ff. (for the frequency of earthquakes in Lakonia). Cartledge minimizes the effects of the great earthquake on Spartan citizen numbers, always a worry in classical Sparta, but is criticized for his assumptions by M. H. Hansen, 'Demographic Reflections on the Number of Athenian Citizens 451-309 B.C.', *AJAH* 7 (1982), 173.

On the participle *γενομένου*, 'which had [previously] happened', see R. Sealey, 'The Great Earthquake in Lacedaemon', *Historia*, 6 (1957), 368 ff., followed by Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 92 ff.: Badian uses this to argue that the earthquake happened as early as 469/8 (this enables him to put the end of the Ithome war in 458). There is no doubt that their translation is correct, but the interval intended by Th. could have been much shorter than this.

Note 'the' earthquake, i.e. the well-known one. When Xenophon does this sort of thing (e.g. 'the temple' at *Hell.* iv. 3, 20 or 'the sea-battle' at iv. 3, 10, where the reference is to Knidos, 394) he is censured for being irritating and allusive.

οἱ Εἰλωτες: 'the Helots'. Sparta's 'unfree agricultural labourers' (Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 3), here mentioned by Th. for the first time. See esp. iv. 80. 3 for Spartan repressive policy towards them, and Cartledge, ch. 10 generally. There were helots in Lakonia itself as well as in Messenia; Th.'s account implies that the 465 revolt was a largely Messenian affair involving descendants of the Messenians subjected in the eighth century: see below; but Diod. xi. 63 ff., defended by Cartledge, 219, adds Lakonian helots. See J. Ducat, *Les Hilotes* (Paris, 1990), 138.

καὶ τῶν περιόικων Θουριᾶται τε καὶ Αἰθαίῃς: 'and with them the Perioikoi of Thouria and Aithaia'. The communities of *perioikoi*, 'those who dwelt round about [Sparta]', were politically, and probably economically, subject to Sparta, but their inhabitants were personally free, unlike the helots. See Cartledge, 178 ff. For the site of Thouria in Messenia (not to be confused with Thyrea on the Argive frontier) see Cartledge's map (200); the exact site of Aithaia is unknown but it is assumed to be Messenian also: see G. L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* (London, 1962), 131 n. 396.

δουλωθέντων: 'enslaved'. In the eighth century; note the literal

use here of the word differently used about Naxos at 98. 4 above: see 98. 2 n.

3. **πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν Ἰθώμῃ πόλεμος:** 'war with the men at Ithome'. For this internal siege as a 'war' see Hdt. ix. 35 (if *Ἰσθμῶ* there has been rightly emended to *Ἰθώμῃ*), listing Ithome as one of five Spartan 'contests' in this period, where the other four are against *foreign* enemies.

χρήματά τε ὅσα ἔδει ἀποδοῦναι: 'to pay what was required of them'. Th. gives no financial details. We do not know what indemnity was charged; Samos (for comparison) had to pay the huge sum of c.1400 talents: ML 55 = Fornara 113 (with 117. 3 n. on *καὶ χρήματα*). As for regular tribute, Thasos' annual 30 talents after 443 was one of the two highest known (equal with Aigina in the 450s and later). But in the first period of tribute payment known to us Thasos paid only 3 talents; this is normally explained by the confiscation of her mainland resources (see the end of Th.'s sentence) which—it has to be assumed—were returned to her in the 440s. But Meiggs (86) prefers to explain it by reference to the indemnity; when this was paid off, the tribute went up. We might assume, purely for the sake of example, an indemnity of 1000 talents, payable by 20 annual instalments of 50 talents, not counting 3 talents of tribute. After that, even a 30 talent tribute would seem a relief.

102. *Athenians summoned to Ithome, then dismissed: the consequences*

1. **ἄλλους τε ἐπεκαλέσαντο ξυμμάχους:** 'called in various allies'. From later books we learn the identity of two of these, the Aiginetans (ii. 27. 2) and the Plataians (iii. 54. 5). (We can add that Mantinea was a third, on the evidence of Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 3.) For another example of an amplification by Th., in a later book, of the *Pentekontaetia* narrative, see ii. 21. 1 and nn.

καὶ Ἀθηναίους: 'including the Athenians'. For what follows, and for the Athenian domestic aspect which Th. ignores (but see 71. 3 n. for a possible reference to the reforms of Ephialtes) see *Greek World*, 34f. One of the results was that Kimon was ostracized: see below, introductory n. to 107–8 (Tanagra campaign).

See also Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 1137 ff., with J. Henderson's commentary (Oxford, 1987).

The description of the Athenians as allies need not imply formal obligations towards Sparta; the Greek word *ξύμμαχοι* simply means 'fellow-fighters' and refers to the role which the Athenians were *about* to play; see K. Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges* (Erlangen dissertation, 1961), 49. See further below para. 4 n.

2. **τειχομαχεῖν ... δυνατοί:** 'skilful in siege operations'. Heavy weather has been made of this; the reference is presumably to the Thasos siege, which had been decisively successful. (True, it had been long; but that merely reflects the conditions of contemporary warfare.) And note Hdt. ix. 70. 2; 102. 2-4.

3. **τὸ τολμηρὸν καὶ τὴν νεωτεροποιίαν:** 'the bold and revolutionary character'. See above, 70. 2 and 3 with nn.

καὶ ἄλλοφύλους: 'aliens in race'. That is, Ionians not Dorians, as the scholiast correctly says. This passage is rightly adduced by J. Alty (above, 95. 1 n.), 5 n. 26, in support of his general thesis.

4. **οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι ἔγνωσαν:** 'now the Athenians realized ...'. One of the more remarkable instances of ascription of collective knowledge by Th.: see *Thucydides*, 80.

ἀφέντες τὴν γενομένην ἐπὶ τῷ Μήδῳ ξυμμαχίαν: 'they immediately abandoned the alliance which they had made with them against the Persians'. Here (contrast para. 1 above, with n. there) the reference is to an antecedent Athenian-Spartan alliance, that made in 481 (or possibly earlier still, in 492/1: see Wickert, 50). See also de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 380, app. xxxii.

Ἀργείοις ... Θεσσαλοῦς: 'Argos ... Thessaly'. The Argive alliance, a major change in Athenian foreign policy, is alluded to in Aeschylus, *Eumenides* (lines 762 ff.), produced in 458. His attitude is usually taken to be straightforward political approval, but see Macleod, 22 f., stressing the purely poetic and dramatic appropriateness of the Argive references. And note that the choregos or man who paid for the trilogy to which the play belongs is (not a famous politician, like Pericles who was choregos for the *Persai*, but) called Xenokles of Aphidna and is otherwise unknown: see A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals of Athens*³, revised J. Gould and D. M. Lewis (Oxford, 1988), 90. This might be held to tell against a crudely political view of the play. Nevertheless Sommerstein seems right (see his ed. of the play (Cambridge, 1989), 25 ff.) to regard Aeschylus as 'personally a strong supporter of the Argive alliance'. As Jacoby insisted, *FGrHist*, comm. on 323a Hellanikos, n. 7 on F 22, 'there is no doubt that Aischylos chose Argos [rather than Mycenae, as the residence of King Agamemnon] in view of the treaty between Athens and Argos in 461/1 B.C.' See further 107. 5 n.

For the reasons for the importance of Thessaly see *Greek World*, 80-1; that book attempted at many places to bring out the Thessalian thread in classical Greek history. Note that Hdt. vi. 72 (cp. 95. 7 n.) attests a Spartan intervention in Thessaly in the 470s; like the promise to invade Thasos this shows that Sparta was still capable of contemplating energetic action far from home, despite her acquiescence in the

formation of an Athenian-led league. On both the Argive and the Thessalian alliances see L. H. Jeffery, 'The *Battle of Oinoe* in the Stoa Poikile: A Problem in Greek Art and History', *BSA* 60 (1965), 41 ff., at 52 f. and on Thessaly cp. G. Herman, *PCPhS* 216 (1990), 95.

103. 1-2. *End of helot revolt; Messenians settled at Naupaktos*

1. **δεκάτῳ [ῥπέμπτῳ] ἔτει:** 'in the tenth [perhaps this should be 'fifth'] year'. If 'tenth' is right, Th. has narrated the end of the war (c.455) out of chronological sequence. There have been many attempts to emend. McNeal (above, introductory n. to 89-117) retains 'tenth', after a long discussion.

3. **κατ' ἔχθος ἤδη τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ἐς Ναύπακτον κατώκισαν, ἣν ἔτυχον ἤρηκότες νεωστὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀζολῶν ἐχόντων:** '... who were now the avowed enemies of Sparta, gave them a home at Naupaktos, a place which they had captured from the Ozolian Lokrians, who had recently occupied it'. The background is this: the Opuntian or East Lokrians had colonised Naupaktos, a key site at a narrow point at the western end of the Corinthian gulf, at some time in the first quarter or so of the fifth century. The Lokrians so settled could thereafter be called Ozolian (or West) Lokrians, as here by Th. This colonization is fortunately attested by a lengthy inscription, ML 20 = Fornara 47.

Previous editors and translators have virtually without exception taken 'recently', *νεωστὶ*, to refer to the Athenian capture (Jowett: 'a place which they had lately taken from the Ozolian Locrians'). So e.g. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 261. Salmon, discussing the implications of the word 'recently', says 'the city was not captured [by Athens] in order to settle the helots, but had already been taken'. If the Athenian seizure came before the outbreak of war, it was a provocative act. It must have alarmed Corinth, and would indeed (as Salmon implies) have to be given full weight as one of the causes of the ensuing war. Diod. xi. 84. 7, however, implies that it was not till 456, and Tolmides' circumnavigation of the Peloponnese, that Naupaktos was captured, and this date is accepted by Lewis in *CAH* v². 117, 501.

But E. Badian, 'Athens, the Locrians and Naupactus', *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 163-9 (partly drawing on W. Oldfather, *RE* articles on Lokris and Naupaktos), acutely notes that the Greek should mean that the *Lokrian* seizure of the place was recent and suggests that Th., by stressing that the Lokrian occupation was recent, thereby palliates the aggressiveness of the subsequent Athenian seizure. Badian, who accepts Diodorus' version of the settlement (see above), connects the whole episode with 108. 3 below, the demand for hostages from the *Opuntian* Lokrians. See n. there. On Badian's view no less than on Salmon's, the Athenian

seizure is an act of aggression; but Tolmides' act was 'a story Thucydides did not want to tell'.

See ML 74 = Fornara 135 for a dedication at Olympia by these Naupaktian Messenians (and the original Naupaktians), evidence of their pro-Athenian activity and sympathies later in the century (see ML comm.).

For an unpublished inscription relating to the settlement of the Messenians at Naupaktos, see Lewis, *CAH* v². 118. The inscription lays down the arrangements under which the Messenians and native Naupaktans (whose continued existence thus becomes certain) should live together.

On *κατ' ἔχθος ἦδη*, 'who were now the avowed enemies' [lit. 'through a hatred already felt'], see Holladay (101. 2n.), 54 and n. 4.

103. 4. *Megara joins Athens; Origins of First Peloponnesian War (461/0)*

The First Peloponnesian War of 460–446, for which the following chapters of Th. are our main source, has, after some neglect, been the subject of several valuable recent studies: de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 180–200; A. J. Holladay, 'Sparta's Role in the First Peloponnesian War', *JHS* 97 (1977), 54 ff.; D. M. Lewis, 'The Origins of the First Peloponnesian War', in *Classical Contributions* (above, 32. 5n.), 71 ff. (see already his *Sparta and Persia*, 1977, 63 n. 85); Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, ch. 19 and app. ii; Holladay, 'Sparta and the First Peloponnesian War', *JHS* 105 (1985), 161f. (a reply to Salmon). Disagreement concerns the reasons for Sparta's relative inactivity; for de Ste. Croix and Salmon the constraints were military: Sparta lacked the power, not the political will, to engage Athens; Holladay prefers the political explanation: Spartan policy in the *pentekontaetia* was not sufficiently or consistently aggressive (for the admitted exceptions—Thasos, Samos, Pleistoanax's invasion of 446—see 101. 2n. above). Lewis stresses Corinthian expansionism in the period before 460, and at 76f. (esp. 77 n. 37) seems slightly to favour Holladay over de Ste. Croix. Lewis's article (unfortunately unknown to Salmon) provides incomparably the best analysis of the issues at stake in the war and the motives of the combatant powers; in *CAH* v². 111–20, Lewis gives a helpful up-to-date narrative. See also S. Hornblower, 'The Religious Dimension to the Peloponnesian War, Or, What Thucydides Does Not Tell Us', *HSCP* 94 (1992), 169–97.

προσεχώρησαν δὲ καὶ Μεγαρήϊς Ἀθηναίοις ἐς ξυμμαχίαν Λακεδαιμονίων ἀποστάντες: 'the Megarians allied themselves with Athens; they revolted from Sparta'. For the background of relations between Corinth, Athens, and Megara, see above 40. 5n.; see also 42. 2n. It is agreed that this new alliance of Megara automatically produced a state of war between Athens and Corinth: de Ste. Croix, 213, and

Holladay (1977), 55, 57; but that did not necessarily commit the *Spartans* to war with Athens: on this Holladay, 57f., seems clearly right against de Ste. Croix, 187. The point is important: it helps to determine whether we should take 'Peloponnesians' at 105. 1 and 105. 3 (see nn. to those passages) to include Sparta; if not, the war was not yet, in this early phase at least, 'Peloponnesian' in the way the main Peloponnesian War of 431–404 was (as Lewis says, 72, the term 'First Peloponnesian War' has no ancient authority).

ὅτι αὐτοὺς Κορίνθιοι περὶ γῆς ὄρων πολέμῳ κατεῖχον: 'because the Corinthians were winning a war arising out of a border dispute'. On this see esp. Lewis, *Classical Contributions*, 78 (suggesting some population pressure in Corinth); but as he says at 74 such trouble was nothing new: see above 6. 5 n. on ἐγυμνώθησαν etc. for the Orsippus evidence (as traditionally interpreted). Note also K. Adshead, *Politics of the Archaic Peloponnese: The Transition from Archaic to Classical Politics* (Aldershot and Brookfield, Vermont, 1986), 72ff., for Corinthian expansionism in this period, emphasizing even more strongly than Lewis the significance of Corinthian attempts to control the Nemean Games.

καὶ ἔσχον Ἀθηναῖοι Μέγαρα καὶ Πηγάς: 'So Athens gained both Megara and Pegai'. For Megara see R. P. Legon, *Megara: The Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 B.C.* (Ithaca and London, 1981); possession of Pegai, for which see Legon, 32f., 184f., gave Athens another outlet (see above for Naupaktos) on the Corinthian Gulf. The site of Pegai (= modern Alepochori) is certainly identified, unlike Nisaia (below) or Minoa (for which see iii. 51. 1 n.). Lewis in *CAH* v². 111, argues, against earlier views, that Athenian policy in all this was vigorously expansionist.

καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τεῖχη: 'the long walls'. For Megara's 'Long Walls' see Legon, 185, 188ff., and map 3 at 31; cp. below 107. 1 n.

ἔς Νίσαϊαν: 'to Nisaia'. Legon, 32 (and on map 3 at 31), conjectures that Nisaia was the modern Paleokastro.

οὐχ ἥκιστα ἀπὸ τοῦδε τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος ἤρξατο πρῶτον: 'this was the original and main cause of the intense hatred . . .'. The statement that this *began* the hatred is emphatically put: ἤρξατο means 'began' and πρῶτον means 'first' [here translated 'original'], so the idea is repeated. (De Ste. Croix is right, 181f., that πρῶτον here means 'first', not 'especially', but his argument, that πρῶτον must not be allowed pleonastically to duplicate οὐχ ἥκιστα, 'especially' [here translated 'main'], is special pleading, since on his own correct view it pleonastically duplicates ἤρξατο). See de Ste. Croix, 213, for the reasons for the 'intense hatred', and see above, 40. 5 n.

104. *Athenian expedition to Egypt*

For this see F. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Ägyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jhd. vor der Zeitwende* (Berlin, 1953); P. Salmon, *La Politique égyptienne d'Athènes* (Brussels, 1965); Westlake, 'Thucydides and the Athenian Disaster in Egypt', *Essays*, ch. 4 (reprinted from *CP* 45 (1950), 209ff.); Meiggs, ch. 6, also ch. 7 on the aftermath (Westlake is rejected by Meiggs, but note Holladay (1989): see below, 110. 1n.); and P. Briant, 'Ethno-classe dominante et populations soumises', in A. Kuhrt and H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (eds.), *Achaemenid History*, iii. *Method and History* (Leiden, 1988), 137ff., at 147ff. Note that ML 33 = Fornara 78, an Athenian casualty list of the Erechtheid tribe, shows that there was also fighting at this time in Cyprus, Egypt, *Phoenicia*, Halieis, Aigina, and the Megarid. (Phoenicia is not mentioned by Th.) ML 34 = Fornara 77 attests Samian participation on the Athenian side, perhaps in events round Memphis, mentioned by Th. below. See also ML (1988 reissue), p. 310, addendum to no. 34, for a new Samian inscription recording the award of a prize by Inaros to a Samian commander.

For Ktesias' account see *FGrHist* 688 F 14, paras. 36ff. = Fornara 72; see also Diod. xi. 71 and 74. For a suggestion about Th.'s sources see 2n. below on *Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων*.

Diodorus (i. 37) unreasonably complains that Th. (and Xenophon) completely ignored Egypt. See also ii. 48. 1.

1. **Ἰνάρωσ δὲ ὁ Ψαμμητίχου, Λίβυς, βασιλεὺς Λιβύων**: 'Meanwhile the Libyan Inaros son of Psammetichos, king of the Libyans'. It is possible that the word *Λίβυς*, 'the Libyan', should be omitted: see A. Bülow-Jacobsen, 'A Third-Century Codex of Thucydides', *BICS* 22 (1975), 65ff., at 69.

ἀπὸ βασιλέως Ἀρταξέρξου: 'from King Artaxerxes'. It is possible that the word *βασιλέως*, 'King', should be omitted: see Bülow-Jacobsen (above).

2. **οἱ δὲ (ἔτυχον γὰρ ἐς Κύπρον στρατευόμενοι ναυσὶ διακοσίαις αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν) ἦλθον ἀπολιπόντες τὴν Κύπρον**: 'they were just then engaged in an expedition against Cyprus with two hundred ships of their own and of their allies; and, leaving the island . . .'. See above, 94. 2n.: Th. has not bothered to tell us that Cyprus had been lost again. It was a base for a Persian reserve fleet at the time of the Eurymedon, Diod. xi. 60, Plut. *Kim.* 12 = *FGrHist* 70 Ephoros F 192; but though Kimon captured these ships off Cyprus, he evidently did not follow the victory up by landing on the island, since escapers were able to go inland.

J. Barns, 'Cimon and the First Athenian Expedition to Cyprus',

Historia, 1 (1953/4), 163 ff., at 171, took the present passage to mean that the Athenians were merely 'on their way' to Cyprus, and adopted an ingenious suggestion of Wade-Gery's that ἀπολιπόντες ['leaving (the island)'] could mean 'giving Cyprus a miss'. On this view (which does considerable violence to Th.'s Greek, and is not accepted here) Th. totally omitted a major Cyprus campaign in 462 supposedly alluded to by Plut. *Kim.* 15 (cp. Κύπρον αὖθις, 'Cyprus again', at 18. 1 with Blamire's n.). At 15. 2 Plutarch says that Kimon ἐξέπλευσε, 'sailed out', to some campaign. This, as scholars have pointed out from time to time, is an odd way of referring to Kimon's normally presumed destination, namely Ithome, because he would not have gone there by sea. The Plutarch passage is puzzling, but Alec Blamire in his commentary on Plutarch's *Kimon* rejects Barns's view: 'it is difficult to believe that Kimon, if he had returned in humiliation from Ithome in 463 [the date which Barns's view requires], would have been appointed to command a naval enterprise at the beginning of the next campaigning season.' Plutarch, as Blamire mildly puts it, has 'sacrificed whatever chronological or causal relationships he found in his sources'. I have dwelt on the point only because Barns's view attributes a serious error to Th., who cannot so lightly be corrected out of Plutarch.

Maier in *CAH* vi², ch. 11(c), observes of the present expedition that since Cypriots are found supplying the Persian fleet in 456 (Diod. xi. 75) 'there can have been no lasting successes'.

καὶ τῆς Μέμφιδος: 'of Memphis'. See above for ML 34.

Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων: 'Persians and Medes'. A Russian scholar, pointing out that Th.'s knowledge of the Egyptian expedition is actually fuller about the Persian side than about the Athenian (I am not sure about this), suggests that he could have got some material from Zopyros, son of the 'Megabyzus son of Zopyros' at 109. 3 below. The younger Zopyros deserted from Persia to Athens at some point, Hdt. iii. 160. 2, and has often been put forward as a source for Hdt.: J. Wells, *Studies in Herodotus* (Oxford, 1923), 95 ff.; but see Lewis, 'Persians in Herodotus', in *The Greek Historians: Literature and History: Papers Presented to A. E. Raubitschek* (Stanford, 1985), 101 ff., at 105 f. Whatever the truth about Hdt., it is a possibility (but no more) that Th. spoke to Zopyros. See the English summary at *Vestnik Drevnei Istorii* (1983), 111, of an article by R. Ghimadayev. This idea if accepted should not, however, be used to support the view that Th.'s account is vitiated by the major errors discussed at 110. 1 n. below. He surely spoke to Athenian survivors also.

105-6. *Operations in the First Peloponnesian War (460-459)*

105. 1. Ἀθηναίοις δὲ ναυσὶν ἀποβάσιν ἐς Ἀλιᾶς πρὸς Κορινθίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίου μάχῃ ἐγένετο: 'An Athenian fleet landed at

Halieis, where a battle took place against some Corinthian and Epidaurian troops'. An inscription recently published (but found in 1940) shows that we should add the Sikyonians to those who fought Athens on this occasion, *SEG* xxxi (1981), no. 369; see Holladay (1977: introductory n. to 103. 4n.), 57 n. 24; Lewis (as Holladay) 75 n. 26, and A. Griffin, *Sikyon* (Oxford, 1982), 62: 'the Sikyonians dedicated to Zeus these spoils taken from the Athenians at Halieis', τοὶ Σικυόνιοι ἀνέθεν τῶι Διὶ ἐξ Ἀλιέο[v] Ἀθηναίων ἡ(ε)λώντες. See below, 114. 1: later Sikyonian co-operation with Corinth and Epidauros.

Th. gives the impression that Athens struck the first blow by making this assault on Halieis, which is on the mainland opposite the modern island of Spetsia in the Argolic gulf. Is this impression right? Two items have been cited against it. (i) Hdt. vii. 137. 2 mentions a *Spartan* seizure of Halieis to which the Athenian move may have been a reaction; cp. Meiggs, 97. (ii) There is a very obscure tradition (which cannot be gone into here) about an Athenian victory over Sparta in a battle at Oinoe in the Argolid. This is strictly undateable but may have happened even earlier than anything at Halieis (this would help explain its absence from Th., for whom it was overshadowed by later greater happenings): perhaps, it has been suggested, Sparta had tried to strike at Argos straight after the Argive–Athenian alliance. See Jeffery (above, 102. 4n.); Meiggs, 95f. and app. 5; Andrewes, 'Could There Have Been a Battle at Oinoe?', in *The Ancient Historian and his Materials: Essays in Honour of C. E. Stevens on his Seventieth Birthday*, ed. B. Levick (Farnborough, 1975), 9ff.; and two articles by E. D. Francis and M. Vickers, 'Argive Oenoe', *L'Antiquité classique*, 54 (1985), 105ff., and 'The Oenoe Painting in the Stoa Poikile and Herodotus' Account of Marathon', *BSA* 80 (1985), 99ff.

Neither (i) nor (ii) is, however, proof of Spartan aggression in this early phase. (ii) proves nothing without some circular assumptions. As for (i) note Lewis, 77, apparently suggesting that the Spartan capture of Halieis was later in the war, after (presumably) an unattested reversal of the outcome described by Th. in the present passage. Lewis (75f.) provides the best analysis of the Halieis/Aigina episodes, in terms of Corinthian ambitions (abetted by Epidauros) in the eastern Argolid and the Saronic gulf; Athens on this view acts to counter those ambitions and to secure the Saronic gulf for herself. Lewis is right that the campaigning of Corinthian and Sikyonian forces so far from home demands an explanation in terms of considered long-term objectives.

ἐναυμάχησαν ἐπὶ Κεκρυφαλείᾳ Πελοποννησίων ναυσί: 'the Athenians fought at sea off Kekryphaleia with a Peloponnesian fleet'. Kekryphaleia is a small island off Aigina, to the west. Th. uses the term 'the Peloponnesians' here and at para. 3 below (battle of

Aigina). Are the Spartans included on both occasions, or neither, or one only? De Ste. Croix (*OPW* 188) thinks both; Holladay (58) thinks neither; Gomme apparently thought one only, because he commented on 105. 3 that 'the "first Peloponnesian War" has begun'. This certainly seems arbitrary. The view of Holladay is preferable: as Lewis shows, the issues in this chapter of Th. are chiefly between *Corinth* (including her dependencies) and Athens. ('Peloponnesians' at 105. 1 and 3 must then be taken as a geographical rather than a political expression).

2. **πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις**: 'between the Aiginetans and the Athenians'. D. MacDowell, 'Aigina and the Delian League', *JHS* 80 (1960), 118 ff., thinks that Aigina was one of the original members of the Delian League and had revolted; but see Meiggs, 51 f., and T. Figueira, *CP* 76 (1981), 20.

3. **τὰ δὲ ἄκρα τῆς Γερανείας**: 'the heights of Geraneia'. The mountainous region in the northern part of Megarian territory. Geraneia is the cornerstone of de Ste. Croix's 'military' explanation for Spartan inactivity in the first part of the war (see 103. 4, introductory n.). At 107. 3 (see n. there) we will be told that Geraneia was difficult, *δύσσοδος*, for the Peloponnesians to pass, and was 'always guarded by the Athenians'. Holladay (58 and n. 28) cites the present passage to show that difficult is not the same as impossible.

4. **οὐκ ἐκίνησαν . . .**: 'without moving . . .' See *Greek Historiography*, 153.

6. **τροπαῖον ἔστησαν**: 'erected a trophy'. See Pritchett, ii. 246 ff.

κακιζόμενοι: 'irritated by the taunts' [lit. 'being taunted']. For such taunts, often (though not here) made by women, see Connor, 'Early Greek Land Warfare . . .', *Past and Present*, 119 (1988), 23 and n. 87.

106. 1. **οἱ δὲ νικώμενοι ὑπεχώρουν**: 'the defeated Corinthians now retreated . ..'. What follows is remarkably detailed, vivid, and also moving (despite or because of the plain and unadorned language used); the change of pace is the more effective after the previous chapter, in which a few dry words were used to despatch whole campaigns, let alone the political and strategic reasons for them (the nn. above show the need to supplement Th. with a good deal of analysis on the lines of Lewis). See Kitto, *Poiesis* (Berkeley, 1966), 271, on the present chapter: 'this section of the *History* is written with such concentration that the events of nearly fifty years are packed into what becomes only sixteen pages of the Teubner text (and without any dates), yet Thucydides could spare half a page for this one afternoon's horrible work.' See also *Thucydides*, 35; 116. See W. R. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 200 and n. 40, for this as a 'scene of encirclement' of a kind found elsewhere in Th., e.g. at vii. 81, whose language is certainly comparable.

107. 1. *The Long Walls begun (c.458)*

τὰ μακρὰ τείχη: 'the Long Walls'. As opposed to the City Walls and the Piraeus Walls, for which see 89–93. There were two Long Walls at first, one running from Athens to the Piraeus, the other to Phaleron. These are the two Th. mentions. Later a third was added, close to and parallel to the first City–Piraeus wall (for this, the 'middle wall' see Plato, *Gorgias*, 455E with scholion = Fornara 79, which translates other evidence also; note, however, Gomme, *HCT* i. 303 n. 1). The line of the resulting parallel walls is roughly followed by the modern Piraeus railway and it can thus be easily made out from the Philopappos monument. See Wycherley, *Stones of Athens* (Princeton, 1978), 16, with map. The inclusion by Th. of this sentence about the walls in the middle of a military and 'foreign policy' narrative underlines the importance of walls to Th. as symbols of power; see above, introductory n. to 89. 3, and 2. 2 n. on ἀτειχίστων, for this theme. The destruction of the Long Walls was thought of as equivalent to the destruction of the democracy; cp. para. 4 below, and Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 20; but note that oligarchic Corinth also had 'Long Walls' running down from the city to Lechaion, her harbour on the Corinthian gulf (see *Greek World*, 97). For Megara's Long Walls, built for her by Athens, see 103. 4 above. We might compare the 'synoikism' of Athens, which came to be thought of as fundamental to the democracy, although it ante-dated it, and although some oligarchic places were synoikized too; for this point see *Mausolus*, 79 and 105; see also below, ii. 15. 2 n. One reason why synoikism came to have this tinge was that Sparta was not synoikized: see above, 10. 2 n.; similarly the associations of the Long Walls can be explained partly by reference to Sparta's famously unwalled state—and perhaps to her attempts to stop the wall building of Athens, 90. 2. True, that attempt related to Athens' City Walls; but if the Corinthian speech at 69. 1 can be relied on (see n. there) it was held against Sparta, however unreasonably, that she failed to stop the building of Athens' Long Walls also. For the completion of the walls see 108. 3 below.

107. 2–108. 4. *Tanagra campaign and Battle of Oinophyta (458/7)*

See Diod. xi. 79–83 (confused: see Meiggs, 12. The confusion is elegantly explained by A. Andrewes, 'Diodorus and Ephoros: One Source of Misunderstanding', in *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, ed. J. W. Eadie and J. W. Ober (New York, 1985), 189ff.: Diodorus was confused by his source Ephoros' habit of including mini-prefaces in his narrative, as well as book-proems.) See also Plut. *Kim.* 17–18. 1, *Per.* 10, for the story, omitted by Th., that Kimon tried to fight on

the Athenian side at Tanagra despite his ostracism, which had happened at the end of the 460s (102. 1 n.), and was then recalled from ostracism prematurely.

See also *FGrHist* 115 Theopompos F 88 = Fornara 76, with W. R. Connor, *Theopompos and Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, 1968), 24 ff., discussing the chronological problem raised by Theopompos, who has Kimon, on his early return, arranging peace with Sparta, which if true cannot refer to anything in Th. before the truce of 112. 1, best put in 451. See n. there. Against the attempt of P. Deane, *Thucydides' Dates*, 46–62, to date Tanagra to 454 in order to remove some of the difficulties in Kimon's career, see Blamire, comm. on Plut. *Kim.* 17. 3; and against the suggestion of Unz (see 89–117 introductory n.) to put Kimon's recall in 454 (where Diod. puts the truce normally dated to 451) see Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 191 n. 25. See also Stadter, comm. on Plut. *Per.* (45. 1 n.); Plutarch and Theopompos both guilty of some 'telescoping'.

2. **ἔς Δωριᾶς τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων μητρόπολιν:** 'the Dorians ... who are the mother people of the Spartans'. A reference to the Dorian Invasion (see 12. 3 n. above): the invaders were supposed to have entered the Peloponnese after a stay in Doris. This passage is striking additional evidence that such 'kinship' ties were still, in the fifth century, reckoned to make real claims; cp. Alty (95. 1 n. on *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*); and see iii. 92. 3; an appeal by these central Greek Dorians (it contributed to the founding of Herakleia Trachinia). Recognition of all this need not prevent us from asking whether Sparta, who minded less than did Corinth about control of the Saronic gulf (above 105. 1 n.), nevertheless had central Greek ambitions which such an appeal to kinship might allow her to satisfy. There is certainly other evidence for such a policy, however fitfully and unsystematically carried through, in the fifth and early fourth centuries in general (see further iii. 92 n. on *Ἡράκλειαν* etc.), and in the *pentekontaetia* in particular; there is also evidence that Athens was aiming at influence in precisely the same areas.

For instance (i) in the 470s Sparta tried to extend her influence—which was actually very slight, see below—in the Delphic Amphictiony (the organization of 12 peoples and 24 votes which ran the affairs of the sanctuary of Delphi, a little to the south of Doris), by a move to expel the medizing states (Plut. *Them.* 20). However, Themistokles put a stop to this, showing that Athens too was concerned about control of the Amphictiony; consistent with this concern, we find Athens making an alliance with the Amphictiony at some time in the mid fifth century (see 111.1 n.). But Sparta did not give up: her foundation of Herakleia Trachinia in the 420s was perhaps motivated in part by a desire to exercise influence over one of the Malian votes: see iii. 92 n. (as above).

See further 112. 5, the Second Sacred War. As for the present expedition, note that in the manuscripts of Plut. *Kim.* 17. 4 the Spartans attack Delphi rather than Doris, though editors have emended *Δελφούς* to *Δωριεῖς* so as to bring Plutarch into line with Th. It is important to grasp that Sparta had no Amphictionic vote herself, nor did she even have a share in the vote of the 'Dorians of the Peloponnese'. The closest she came to a direct vote was *via* the other of the two Dorian votes, the vote of the 'Dorians of the Metropolis': see G. Daux, 'Remarques sur la composition du conseil amphictionique', *BCH* 81 (1957), 95 ff., at 106 ff.; G. Zeilhofer, *Sparta, Delphoi und die Amphiktyonen im 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus* (diss. Erlangen, 1959), 36 ff. The metropolitan Dorians were thus vital to Sparta; hence her protection of them, as in the present passage. Both here, and at 112. 5, 132. 3, and iii. 92 (see nn.), Th. characteristically omits all mention of the Amphictiony. (See also 121. 3 n. on *καὶ ἀπό* etc.) Cp. S. Hornblower, *HSCP* 1992. [And vol. ii, 69 ff.]

The preponderance (ii) of *Thessaly* in Amphictionic voting must have given it special value in Spartan as well as Athenian eyes; see 107. 8 for the desertion to Sparta, during the battle of Tanagra in 457, of some of Athens' Thessalian cavalry allies, and 111 for Athens' attempted Thessalian intervention.

Then there is (iii) the Delphic oracle, which ought always to be considered separately from the Amphictiony, which did not directly control it. On the one hand, Athens was hailed in the (?) mid fifth century as an 'eagle in the clouds for all time' (Parke/Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1956), ii, no. 121); on the other hand, the oracle definitely favoured Sparta at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (below, 118. 3, and for Athenian resentment of this, ii. 54. 4). So both sides wanted the favour of Pythian Apollo. (And Sparta's greater success in that department is relevant to Athens' cultivation of *Delian* Apollo in 426: see iii. 104, introductory n.).

Sparta also had ambitions (iv) in Boiotia, where we are told that she wished to establish Thebes as a counterweight to Athens (Diod. xi. 81. 3); for Athenian control of Boiotia see below, 108. 3.

See for all this *Greek World*, 42 f., 85, for Boiotia; and 81, for Thessaly and the Delphic Amphictiony. Note Meiggs, 417 f., endnote 5, 'The Tanagra Campaign'; and n. below on *καὶ τῶν συμμάχων*.

τοῦ Κλεομβρότου: 'the son of Kleombrotos'. But it is possible that this should read *τοῦ Κλεομένους*, 'the son of Kleomenes'; so Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 140, adducing Diod. xi. 75. 2. This would be remarkable if right.

ἑαυτῶν: 'of their own'. Does this really mean 1,500 full Spartan hoplites? Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), 227, suggests that the

very high total may include contingents of *perioikoi* (for this term see 101. 2 n.), perhaps in a ratio of half to half, and that 'their own' should be understood accordingly.

καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων μυρίοις: 'and ten thousand of their allies'. It has been suggested by D. W. Reece, 'The Battle of Tanagra', *JHS* 70 (1950), 75 f., that these might have included a large proportion of *Boiotians* (see Paus. i. 29. 9 and Plato, *First Alcibiades*, 112 c). This would greatly reduce the size and significance of the original Peloponnesian commitment to this campaign. But see Jeffery, *BSA* 60 (1965), 55 n. 58, and Meiggs, 417 f.; there probably were *some* Boiotians at Tanagra, but most of the 10,000 were surely Peloponnesians. So too R. J. Buck, *A History of Boeotia* (Edmonton, 1979), 143 and n. 24 (generally helpful on this period).

3. καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν μὲν αὐτοὺς, διὰ τοῦ Κρισαίου κόλπου εἰ βούλοιντο περαιούσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι ναυσὶ περιπλεύσαντες ἔμελλον κωλύσειν: 'now, if they wished to go by sea and cross the Gulf of Krisa, the Athenians had sailed round with their fleet and were intending to block their way'. Lewis (*Towards a Historian's Text*, 180 n. 82) suggests the insertion of *πεντήκοντα*, 'fifty', before *ναυσί*, making an Athenian fleet of fifty ships, which is what Diodorus specifies at xi. 80. 1. (In a manuscript the abbreviation for this number would be ν', so it is easy to see how an original ν' *ναυσί* could be copied as *ναυσί*.)

The translation and interpretation of this sentence have been much improved by T. T. B. Ryder, 'Thucydides and Athenian Strategy in the Early 450s', *Greece & Rome*, 25 (1978), 121 ff. All previous translations had taken *περιπλεύσαντες*, 'sailing round', as part of a hypothetical calculation by the Spartans (i.e. they feared that if they wanted to go by sea the Athenians 'would be sure to sail round . . .' [Jowett]). Ryder shows that the participle means that the Athenians had actually done the sailing round, which was thus a historical fact to be taken into account by the Spartans in their calculations. I have changed Jowett's tr.

δύσσοδός τε γὰρ ἡ Γερανεΐα καὶ ἔφρουρεῖτο αἰεὶ ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων: 'the pass through Geraneia was difficult and was always guarded by the Athenians'. See above 105. 3 n. for this sentence; it has been argued, not entirely convincingly, that this 'difficulty' was the main obstacle to earlier Spartan involvement in the war.

4. τὸ δέ τι καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐπήγον αὐτοὺς κρύφα, ἐλπίσαντες δὴμόν τε καταπαύσειν καὶ τὰ μακρὰ τείχη οἰκοδομούμενα: 'certain Athenians were secretly making overtures to them, in the hope that they would put an end to the democracy and the building of the Long Walls'. See above, 107. 1 n., for the association between the democracy and the Long Walls. This passage is of great interest as one of the very few pieces of solid evidence for anti-democratic feeling and

activity at Athens between Kleisthenes in the late sixth century and the oligarchic coup of 411 BC. (For the most part, all classes were united behind the imperial democracy for the benefits it gave them in terms of τιμή and ὠφελία, 'honour' and 'advantage', in the language of 75. 3 above: see n. there.) In the above I have not followed Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 213 n. 50, who is 'inclined to discount [Th.'s] allegation' here. Some concrete facts surely lay behind the 'allegation', though it is true that we should always be wary when Th. gives a statement about motive (here, 'in the hope that'): see 5. 1 n. on ἡγουμένων.

Aeneas Tacticus in the fourth century has more to say about such betrayal from within, as a way of taking a city, than he does about direct assaults or other military methods. It is a pity that L. Losada, *The Fifth Column in the Peloponnesian War* (Leiden, 1972), defined his subject so as to exclude discussion of the present passage. See A. Brown, n. on Sophocles, *Antigone*, 289.

5. καὶ Ἄργείων χίλιοι: 'a thousand Argives'. An inscription from Athens commemorates the Argive dead at Tanagra, 'perhaps up to 400 in number': ML 35, not in Fornara. Part of the stone was found in the Kerameikos where Pausanias says they were buried, i. 29. 8. This help fulfilled Orestes' promise at Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 773: see Sommerstein's n. on the line in his commentary (Cambridge, 1989) and for the relation of the play to Athenian foreign policy see his intro., 25 ff. (the play shortly antedates Tanagra and the internal trouble mentioned at para. 4 above).

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ξυμμάχων ὡς ἕκαστοι: 'and contingents from the other allies'. These included Ionians: see below, 108. 1 n., for the 'Ionians' on the victory dedication.

7. ἦλθον δὲ καὶ Θεσσαλῶν ἰππῆς τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις κατὰ τὸ ξυμμαχικόν, οἱ μετέστησαν: 'among them were some Thessalian cavalry who came to their help in accordance with the treaty, but these deserted . . .'. See 102. 4 for the treaty, and for Thessalian behaviour on this occasion cp. perhaps Hdt. v. 64. 2, where the Thessalian allies of the Pisistratids withdraw 'after a [suspiciously] short time', οὐ μετὰ πολλὸν ἐτράπετο, from their cavalry engagement with the Spartans. The Athenian involvement in Thessaly continues despite Tanagra: see 111 below. For Thessaly see generally 107. 2 n.

108. 1. ἐν Τανάγρα: 'at Tanagra'. There is some numismatic evidence that at this time Tanagra had pretensions to lead Boiotia instead of Thebes, whose medism (cp. above, 95. 5 n.) had discredited her after 479: see B. Fowler, 'Thucydides i. 107-8 and the Tanagra Federal Issue',

Phoenix, 11 (1957), 164ff. If Sparta intended to intervene in Boiotian politics in Thebes' favour (see above), Tanagra would be an obvious stopping-point. It was strategically well-placed also, commanding the route to Athens: Meiggs, 99.

ἐνίκων Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι: 'the Spartans and their allies were victorious'. For the commemorative inscription see ML 36 = Fornara 80, a golden shield dedicated at Olympia 'from the Argives, Athenians, and Ionians'. As always, Olympia is the great *Dorian* sanctuary; are the Argives here mentioned first as traitors to Dorianism?

The interpretation of καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, 'and their allies', is disputed: see above, 107. 2 n.

3. καὶ μάχη ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς νικήσαντες τῆς τε χώρας ἐκράτησαν τῆς Βοιωτίας καὶ Φωκίδος: 'there was a battle at Oinophyta in which they defeated the Boiotians and became masters of Boiotia and Phokis'. A very bald summary of an extremely important development indeed, the ten-year Athenian control by Athens of Boiotia, amounting to a 'Land Empire' in the fullest sense: see *Greek World*, 43, arguing that there is no reason to dissociate the land empire policy from Pericles; see also above, 107. 2 n., for the collision between Spartan and Athenian ambitions in central Greece. Lewis, 'The First Peloponnesian War' (above 103. 4, introductory n.), 77 n. 43, has suggested that the Boiotian community of Orchomenos can perhaps be read in the second of the Athenian Tribute Lists, and Lewis now adds (*CAH* v². 116 n. 72) that Boiotian Akraiphia should perhaps be read in *IG* i³. 259, column iii, line 20, tribute list of 453. These startling suggestions would mean that Athens was prepared to regard the inland Boiotian communities as tribute-paying subject allies and Boiotia as part of the empire—a notable piece of assertiveness.

The evidence for the political character of Athenian control of Boiotia points to toleration, for at least part of the time, of some kind of oligarchy; Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* iii. 11 (the treatise known as the 'Old Oligarch') claims that Athens supported the 'Best Men' in Boiotia (and Miletos: see below, 115. 2 n.), but that this policy was a failure; and Aristotle (*Politics*, 1302^b25) says that in the period after Oinophyta a badly administered democracy was overthrown by contemptuous wealthy men. Lewis in *CAH* v² is surely right to say that 'there is little point in trying speculative combinations; Athens will have backed whatever groups seemed likely to support her'. For what happened after the Athenians left see 113. 3-4 n.

καὶ Λοκρῶν τῶν Ὀπουντίων ἑκατὸν ἄνδρας ὁμήρους τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους ἔλαβον: 'and took as hostages from the Opuntian Lokrians a hundred of their richest citizens'. Why are the Opuntians

singled out for this harsh treatment? Badian, 'Athens, the Locrians ...' (103. 3 n.), 368, conjectures that the Athenians were already planning the *periplous* of Tolmides and the settlement of the Messenians at Naupaktos; the Athenians planned to require the Opuntian (East) Lokrians to take back their colonists the Ozolian (West) Lokrians, under the terms of the colonization decree ML 20, and were now demanding 'the most solid guarantees on the part of the Opuntians'.

Why exactly one hundred? It has been ingeniously suggested that the hostages may have been representatives of the famously pre-eminent 'Hundred Families' of Lokris, who supplied the 'Lokrian Maidens' penitentially sent to Troy; see Walbank, *HCP* ii. 334, and, for the Lokrian Maidens generally, Momigliano, *Secondo Contributo* ... (Rome, 1960), 446 ff.

τά τε τείχη ἑαυτῶν τὰ μακρὰ ἀπετέλεσαν: 'they then completed their own Long Walls'. See above, 107. 1 and 4 and nn.

4. ὠμολόγησαν δὲ καὶ οἱ Αἰγινῆται: 'soon after, the Aiginetans came to terms with the Athenians ...'. About 457. Aigina's tribute was 30 talents, as high as Thasos, for which see 101. 3; note the close similarity of the terms there. For the problems of Athens' subsequent relations with Aigina see above, 67. 2 n.

The coercion by Athens of proud, rich, Dorian Aigina marks an epoch in classical Greek history; on Aiginetan traditions and society see T. Figueira, *Aegina: Society and Politics* (Salem, New Hampshire, 1986).

108. 5. *The Periplous of Tolmides (456/5)*

Cp. Diod. xi. 84; scholiast to Aeschines, ii. 75 = Fornara 84.

109-110. *End of the Egyptian expedition (454)*

See references at 104 above. Had he wished to do so, Th. could evidently have treated the Egyptian expedition as a tragic disaster like the Sicilian expedition of Books vi and vii (see 110. 1 n. below for a notable similarity of phrasing). One *probable* result of the failure in Egypt was that the tribute was moved from Delos, but the date of this is not quite certain: see 96. 2 n. on *ταμειῖόν τε Δήλος ἦν αὐτοῖς*.

109. 1-3 is resumptive, not in chronological order.

109. 1. πολλὰ ἰδέαι πολέμων κατέστησαν: 'they experienced the many different forms and fortunes of war'. As the scholiast noted, both notions (forms, fortunes) are probably conveyed by *ιδέαι*, lit. 'kinds'. Phrases like this one, often expressed in the words *πάσα ἰδέα κατέστη*, 'there was every form of ...', are frequent in Th., esp. with words meaning death (*θανάτου, ὀλέθρου*). Cp. iii. 81. 5, 83. 1, 98. 3; vii. 29. 5;

also ii. 19. 1. Th.'s fondness for the locution has not interested commentators, though Classen/Steup do give parallels. It has been studied by K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratischen Schriften* (Heidelberg, 1953), 26f. As he says, the Hippocratic corpus of medical writings uses *ιδέα* with the genitive to differentiate particular instances of a general phenomenon, e.g. four kinds of fluid (blood, bile, etc.): *τέσσαρες ιδέαι χόλου*, *On Diseases*, iv. 32. Cp. 'all the discharges of bile' to which doctors have given names, *ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πάσαι*, at Th. ii. 49. 3 (though this is really a way of disclaiming excessive technicality; cp. *Thucydides*, 97, 134). Note also ii. 51. 1, in the description of the plague, where we have *ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ιδέαν*, 'in all its forms', used of the plague itself. These Hippocratic usages are discussed in C. M. Gillespie, 'The Use of *Εἶδος* and *Ἰδέα* in Hippocrates', *CQ* 6 (1912), 179ff., a sensible reply to some needlessly complicated pages of A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, i (Oxford, 1911). (Note Gillespie, 202: 'in Thucydides, *πάσα ιδέα* has become so much a formula that it does not matter whether we translate *form*, *mode* or *kind*'.) Taylor is, however, useful for his collection of all (but see below) relevant passages in Th. and other relevant fifth-century authors. He points out that Th. uses *κατέστη* only with *ιδέα*, not with the closely related word *εἶδος*. Of *κατέστη* Taylor claims (189) that it is 'itself a word of medicine' and concludes (190) that 'the repeated conjunction *πάσα ιδέα τινος κατέστη* points to a borrowing by Thucydides from the language of medicine'. Taylor gives no authority for the claim about *κατέστη* (nor does Weidauer, quoting Taylor), nor in fact does it seem to be particularly 'medical' (the treatises sometimes use the verb in the special sense 'recover', but that is not relevant here). Perhaps Taylor is thinking of the undoubted medical connotations of the related noun *κατάστασις*, 'constitution' (three instances in one Hippocratic paragraph at *Epidemics*, iii. xvi (Loeb Hippocrates, i. 256)). Even if *κατέστη* could be shown to be frequent in the Hippocratic writings, it is too common and favourite in Th., as are the other parts of the verb from which it comes, for this to mean much (there are over five pages on *καθίσταται* in Bétant's *Lexicon Thucydideum*). Equally, *ιδέα* is clearly not a *recherché* word, though it was perhaps a fashionable one: see below (it is relevant that Hdt. anticipates Th.'s use of *ιδέα*, vi. 119. 2: *τριφασίας ιδέας*).

Weidauer (above), discussing *ιδέα* and *κατέστη*, says that Th. and the Hippocratics use some of the same language not because of any borrowing but because they are both fond of tracing divergent phenomena. One can perhaps go a little further than this (though less far than Taylor wanted): if Th.'s language in the present passage sounds semi-technical, or rather—given that the context is warfare, not death or disease—a little

pretentious, that is perhaps because such terms as he uses were the small change of philosophical or rhetorical discussion. Cp. Demokritos, DK 68 B 11, 'there are two kinds, *ιδέαι*, of knowledge, *γνώμη*, one genuine, the other bastard [or 'obscure']. (I do not know why Taylor's section on sophists and Presocratics omits this interesting passage, which is quoted by Sextus Empiricus); and the Hdt. passage cited above. See above, I. 1 n. on *ἀξιολογώτατον* for the indebtedness of both Th. and the doctors to the language and methods of rhetorical debate.

But what of Th.'s fondness for the *whole phrase* *πάσα ιδέα κατέστη* or the similar phrase found here, *πολλὰι ιδέαι κατέστησαν*? This seems, despite Taylor, to be an idiosyncrasy of his own.

2. βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαίμονα Μεγάβαζον: 'the King sent to Sparta Megabazos ...'. The correct form of the name may be *Μεγάβυξον*, 'Megabyxos'.

This is the first use of a new and ultimately (ii. 65. 12) decisive Persian tactic: financial instead of military pressure, though we should not forget Hdt. iii. 120 ff., Oroites in the sixth century lures Polykrates with hopes of money, and earlier still Alkaios and his friends were offered 2000 staters by some Lydians, if they took the sacred city. See Alkaios D 11, with D. L. Page, *Sappho and Alcaeus* (Oxford, 1955), 226 ff.; Lewis, 'Persian Gold in Greek International Relations', *REA* 91 (1989), 227 ff. See S. K. Eddy, 'The Cold War between Athens and Persia ca. 448-412 BC', *CP* 68 (1973), 245, for Megabazos; Eddy rightly draws attention to ML 40 = Fornara 71, Athenian regulations for Erythrai in Ionia in c.453, showing that Persia was pursuing other indirect policies by supporting an exiled faction there ('those who have fled to the Medes') which Athens had probably expelled. See also 115. 4 below for Pissouthnes. (Note also the mysterious Persian Rhoisakes who arrived at Athens with a large amount of money and was a target for sycophants, i.e. malicious prosecutors, Plut. *Kim.* 10. 9; though he is expressly called a *rebel* from the king, Blamire nevertheless thinks, from the activity of the sycophants, that he may have been suspected of espionage or of being an agent of Artaxerxes. Rhoisakes is in any case a very fourth-century-looking figure. For Zopyros, another interesting Persian refugee, see above 104. 2 n.)

3. τὰ χρήματα ἄλλως ἀνηλούτο: 'the money was spent in vain'. De Ste. Croix (*OPW* 189f.) observes 'one would like to know who received it, and when; perhaps the autumn of 457 is the most likely date (*ATL* iii. 178)'. Sparta was evidently not yet interested in the kind of approach mooted by Archidamos at 82. 1 (see n. there), if Th. has correctly reported him. Diod. xi. 74. 6 says that the Spartans refused the money, but this is probably just a guess: see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 62 n. 84.

Fourth-century orators knew of a traitor called Arthmios of Zeleia who brought Persian gold to the Peloponnese. Meiggs, 508ff., gives the evidence. It is tempting to associate Arthmios and Megabazos or -byxos, but see Meiggs, 512 f., preferring a date in the 460s; Lewis, 'Persian Gold' (above, 2 n.), 230.

110.1 ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν πορευόμενοι διὰ τῆς Λιβύης ἐς Κυρήνην ἐσώθησαν, οἱ δὲ πλείστοι ἀπώλοντο: 'a few survivors of their great army found their way through Libya to Cyrene; by far the greater number perished'. At some time in the mid fifth century the Persian-backed Battiad monarchy in Cyrene fell, and the present passage of Th. has sometimes been used to date its fall, e.g. S. Applebaum, *Jews and Greeks in Ancient Cyrene* (Leiden, 1979), 31: 'when the remnants of the Athenian expedition returned from Egypt through Cyrene in 457 [NB this is too early] they were not molested, showing that by this time Persian control of Cyrene had ended.' Another view in B. M. Mitchell, 'Cyrene and Persia', *JHS* 86 (1966), 99ff.: 'the Cyrenaeans would probably have helped them out of common humanity, under the monarchy or any other régime.' Possibly, but the absence of Persian reprisals does indicate a general loosening of control: see *Greek World*, 61. Note anyway Mitchell's suggestion that the role of the Libyan Inaros in Egypt may have encouraged revolt against the Persian-backed monarchy in Cyrene, a revolt which she seems to put not much later. This may be right, although there was nothing very encouraging about what happened to Inaros personally. Against the idea of a formal alliance between Cyrene and the rebels see F. Chamoux, *Cyrène sous la monarchie des Battiades* (Paris, 1953), 203, surely correct.

For one Samian who got back alive see above, introductory n. to 104 (ML 34, 1988 addendum).

Th.'s formulation is of great interest. It is closely similar to the language with which he concludes the Sicilian expedition, especially the final words of vii. 87. 6, ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν . . . ἀπενόστησαν, 'few out of many returned'. On this passage see *Thucydides*, 116f.: Th. here borrows Homer's technique of comparison, using similarities of phrasing instead of spelling the comparison out. Cp. also iii. 112. 8, Ambrakia, ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν. (The Sicilian expedition was mainly composed soon after 413 (see *Thucydides*, 150) but that does not help us with the composition date of the present passage since we do not know which was written first.)

It has been claimed (Meiggs, 105) that there are important historical consequences: Th., in his account at 104 and 109–110, means us to think that the entire force of 200 ships mentioned at 104. 2, plus some of the

relief force of 110. 4, was lost, an utter catastrophe comparable to Sicily. Westlake, *Essays*, 67f., though conceding the force of the Sicilian parallel, nevertheless believes that Th. should be corrected out of Ktesias (and Justin, iii. 6. 6f.), who can be taken to imply much smaller losses, perhaps because the greater part of the fleet had been withdrawn (Justin). A. J. Holladay, 'The Hellenic Disaster in Egypt', *JHS* 109 (1989), 176ff., also argues for a smaller total, perhaps 100 ships. He is unimpressed (181f.) by arithmetical arguments based on the Sicilian analogy. Certainty is not possible, but on balance Holladay seems right that the higher total of losses has not been securely established. See further 4n. below.

2. ἔλους . . . ἔλειν: 'capture . . . marshes'. The two Greek words begin with the same syllable. E. Powell, 'Puns in Herodotus', *CR* 51 (1937), 103ff., detected a deliberate pun here, but on the absence of such puns in Th. (contrast Hdt.) see *Thucydides*, 94.

4. πεντήκοντα τριήρεις διάδοχοι: 'fifty relief triremes'. Westlake, as part of his general thesis (see previous n.), argues (*Essays*, 70) that διάδοχος always means 'relief', i.e. 'substitute', never 'reinforcement', so I have changed Jowett's tr. As Westlake puts it, the word implies 'succession, not assistance and co-operation'. Others have argued similarly: see A. J. Holladay (above, para. 1 n.), 179ff.: if the translation 'relief' is right, Th.'s language here fits the lower better than the higher view of the scale of the disaster (above, para. 1 n.). Fifty ships would be a plausible total for a relieving force only if the force to be relieved were considerably smaller than 200.

τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν: 'Thus ended the great Egyptian expedition of the Athenians and their allies'. Again (see para. 1 n. above) the scale is clearly thought of as large. It is worth considering this episode from the Persian point of view: the re-subjugation of Egypt meant the recovery of the enormous revenues of that country, from which absentee Persians profited in ways illuminated for us by Aramaic documents on leather and papyrus: A. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1923); E. Kraeling, *The Brooklyn Aramaic Papyri* (New Haven, 1953); and esp. G. R. Driver, *Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford, 1957). See *Greek World*, 64f., and for an excellent general account of Achaimenid Egypt, J. D. Ray, *CAH* iv², ch. 3g, esp. 271 for the Persian estates. Persian wealth (see above 109. 2n. on Megabazus) was an increasingly important factor in the period covered by Th.; Egypt is one of the great sources of that wealth. Egypt revolted again in 404 (outside the period covered by Th.'s completed narrative, but within his lifetime; cp. *Thucydides*, ch. vi) and was independent for

half a century after that. For the possibility that Persia was having trouble with Egypt in 411 see below, viii. 88 n.

111. 1. Thessalian expedition by Athens (454/3?)

Cp. Diod. xi. 83. For this expedition see *Greek World*, 81 f., and see above, 107. 7 and n., also 107. 2 n. for Sparta. At about this time Athens made an alliance with the Delphic Amphictiony (*IG* i³. 9 of ?458 = Fornara 82); this may be relevant to the Thessalian adventure because Thessaly controlled a majority of votes in the Amphictiony. See 112. 5 below (Second Sacred War). Note, however, that there is a difficulty about the usual reading and interpretation of *IG* i³. 9: it ought (it is claimed) to be possible to read traces of κ in line 7 if the restoration Ἀμφικτίοσι were correct, but no such trace can be read. See G. Roux, *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au iv^e siècle* (Lyon, 1979), 239 f. (The summary of this in *SEG* xxix. 4 is inadequate.)

111. 2-3. Pericles in the Corinthian Gulf (454/3?)

2. Περικλέους τοῦ Ξανθίππου: 'Pericles the son of Xanthippos'. Here introduced for the first time, without particular ceremony.

3. διαπλεύσαντες πέραν τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας ἐς Οἰνιάδας ἐστράτευσαν καὶ ἐπολιόρκουν οὐ μέντοι εἰλόν γε: 'they sailed to the opposite coast and attacked and besieged Oiniadai, a town of Akarnania, but failed to take it'. See Diod. xi. 85. 2 (emending πλῆσιον Οἰνιαδῶν, 'near Oiniadai', to πλὴν Οἰνιαδῶν, 'except for Oiniadai'), also Th. ii. 102. 2, where Oiniadai is said to have been long hostile to Athens, αἰεὶ ποτε πολεμίους. The present passage is relevant to the question when Athens made the (strictly undated) alliance with Akarnania mentioned at ii. 68. 8 below; see Hammond, *Epirus*, 496 f., arguing that the alliance preceded the operations mentioned in the present passage. I postpone discussion to ii. 68. 8 n. For the significance of the alliance see above, introductory n. to 24-55.

Strategically Oiniadai was an important asset for control of the western end of the Corinthian gulf (though for the view that Polybius, vi. 65. 8 ff., exaggerated its usefulness for crossing to the Peloponnese, see Walbank's n.). It held out longer than any other Corinthian north-western possession against Athenian encroachment, but its final loss at iv. 77. 2 meant that that encroachment was complete by 424. See Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 266 and n. 41; 318.

Paus. iv. 25 records a seizure of Oiniadai, probably in the 450s, by the (pro-Athenian) Messenians settled at Naupaktos, for whom see 103. 3.

112. 1. *Five-Year Truce (451)*

See Diod. xi. 86, putting this truce in 454/3, and see above, introductory n. to 107. 2 for the tradition (and the difficulties arising from it) that Kimon made peace with Sparta after returning from ostracism. That 'peace' may be the truce mentioned in the present passage of Th., in which case Kimon's return from ostracism will hardly have been premature as Theopompos claimed.

112. 2-4. *Kimon campaigns and dies in Cyprus (451)*

For earlier operations see 94. 2, 104. 2 and nn. For this campaign see Meiggs, 124 ff., arguing strongly for 451 not 450 as the year of Kimon's death; P. Stylianou, *Proc. Archbp. Makarios III Foundation* 1989, 365 ff.

This (or hereabouts) is the point at which we would have expected a reference to the 'Peace of Kallias' of 450 between Athens and Persia (Diod. xii. 4-5), which if historical is one of the most serious (it is certainly the most famous) of all the omissions in Th. By 'omission', however, we mean only that he does not record it at this point in the narrative of the *Pentekontaetia*; there are a number of passages elsewhere in Th. which are not intelligible except on the assumption that there was a peace. For the literary evidence, and for bibliography up to about 1970, see Meiggs, ch. 8 and app. 8 (arguing for a peace in 450), and for more recent work, Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 1-72, arguing for a peace in the mid 460s with a renewal in mid-century, and leaning heavily on Hdt. vii. 151 (Kallias goes to Susa at the same time as an Argive deputation). Badian is right to insist on the often neglected evidence that something happened in the 460s, but the case would be more compelling if any *one* source could be produced in support of the hypothesis that there were *two* peaces. Nor does the theory adequately explain why in 464 the Argives should be worried, as Hdt. says they were, that the Persian king might consider them to be *enemies*. In 449, by contrast, they had good reason to be worried, after they had been allied for over a decade with Persia's arch-enemy Athens: Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, ii (Halle, 1899), 75. See also A. B. Bosworth, 'Plutarch, Callisthenes and the Peace of Callias', *JHS* 110 (1990), 1 ff. A. J. Holladay, 'The Détente of Kallias', *Historia*, 35 (1986), 503 ff., argues interestingly for an informal deal. Fornara 95 translates much of the evidence, including material relating to the 'missing tribute list', for which see ML 50. (There was one year in which tribute may not have been levied, and it is an attractive suggestion that the Peace of Kallias had something to do with this.) I restrict myself to giving the relevant *Thucydidean* considerations: see further the notes to each

passage mentioned. (I have not here included iii. 10. 4: see n. there against Holladay's interpretation of this passage.)

(i) There is an argument from the change in the nature of hostilities after 450. After Kimon's death there is no more open warfare against Persia (at least, Th. describes none); instead there was a phase of Cold War (in S. K. Eddy's phrase, above 109. 2 n., though as that passage showed, Persia was already practising the indirect techniques of economic and political subversion even before 450). Only with Athens' support of the Persian rebel Amorges did Persia move into open hostility to Athens again. This leads to—

(ii) the language of viii. 5. 5 of 413 BC, which mentions the revolt of Amorges, although with less detail than we should like, and says that Tissaphernes had 'recently', νεωστί, been sent by the Persian King to recover Ionian revenues. The word 'recently' implies that the situation had changed in some respect, and the obvious inference is that the king was angered by Athens' support first of Pissouthnes and then of his bastard son Amorges. This, which amounted to an Athenian breach of the peace, was the 'recent' development. At any rate, as late as the mid 420s Athens had still been anxious to reaffirm good relations with Persia on the evidence of ML 70 (with addendum in the 1988 reprint) = Fornara 138, an inscription of 424/3 apparently referring to a renewal of the peace of Kallias (see also ML 71 = Fornara 139). The evidence of viii. 5, with its implication that there was a peace, outweighs the puzzling silence of Th. in Books iv and v, first about the renewal and any other official diplomacy there may have been, and second about Athens' support of Amorges. (Th. mentions a *Spartan* delegation to Persia at iv. 50: see my discussion of the whole problem in the n. to that passage.) Th.'s silence about Pissouthnes and Amorges in Books iv and v is no problem for Westlake, 'Athens and Amorges', *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 319ff. = *Studies*, ch. 4, surprisingly followed by Sommerstein in his commentary on Ar. *Birds*, 1028. They think that Aristophanes' reference, in a play produced in 415/14, to negotiations with the loyal satrap Pharnakes, makes it unlikely that Athens was in alliance with Persian rebels before that date. This is to press a comic reference too hard: the pompous *episkopos* or Inspector, who is speaking at line 1028, is merely dropping the name of a grand-sounding Persian, as if to say 'I must be going, I'm having dinner with Mr Gorbachev'. Even if real negotiations are implied, we have no idea what kind they were; perhaps Pharnakes was remonstrating with Athens over the Amorges affair. For an early date (late 420s?) for Pissouthnes' revolt see *Mausolus*, 31 n. 198.

(iii) The most telling evidence in Th. is, however, contained in the Greco-Persian diplomacy in Book viii, where at more than one point we

are told that some treaty or draft treaty stipulates that the Persian king is to be free to do this or that. The particular stipulations (see esp. viii. 56. 4 and 58. 2) make sense only if we suppose that there had previously been restrictions on the king's freedom to act, i.e. a peace of Kallias.

Finally (iv) the description of Ionia as 'unwalled' at iii. 33. 2 is probably evidence of some formal pledge given by Athens to Persia. See n. there. (Also nn. on iii. 31. 2 and 34. 1, passages which have been held to tell *against* a peace, in that they attest hostile activity by Persia inside the Athenian sphere of influence at a time when the peace was supposedly in force.)

We are left with the problem of Th.'s silence in the *Pentekontaetia*. It is not his only major silence, and there is perhaps a clue: he is very thin on Athens' western interests as well (see introductory n. to 24 above), although these certainly alarmed Corinth. But Sicily was to receive two whole books to itself, with a formal antiquarian introduction (although even there the aspect of earlier Athenian involvement is not brought out). It may be that Th., who certainly treats the Persian factor as decisive at ii. 65. 12 where he anticipates the end of the war, knew that he would eventually have to give proper weight and space to Persia but was postponing the moment. Andrewes, 'Thucydides and the Persians', *Historia*, 10 (1961), 1 ff., rightly stressed the inadequate coverage of Persian involvement *throughout* the narrative: perhaps Th. woke up too late to the importance of his theme. To this Meiggs objects (494) that this explanation will not do, if the *Pentekontaetia* was itself written late. This is perhaps too literal: what was needed was more than the plugging of gaps—Amorges could surely not be made intelligible without some reference to the peace of Kallias—but some recasting for which Th. was not prepared. (Unless he planned to make amends with a full-dress introduction to an unwritten book to be dominated by the activity of Cyrus the Younger. This would have had to do more for Persian background than the early chapters of Book vi did for Sicilian.)

112. 5. *The Second Sacred War* (449)

The First Sacred War, or war for control of Delphi, was in the early sixth century. Its historicity was denied by N. Robertson, 'The Myth of the First Sacred War', *CQ* 28 (1978), 38 ff., who claimed that it was an invention of the age of Philip, but see G. A. Lehmann, 'Der "erste Heilige Krieg"—eine Fiktion?', *Historia*, 29 (1980), 242 ff., citing Isok. xiv. 31 (373 BC). [See now J. Davies in *Greek Historiography*, 193–212].

Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα τὸν ἱερὸν καλούμενον πόλεμον ἐστράτευσαν: 'after this the Spartans fought the so-called Sacred War ...'. See R. Parker, 'Greek States and Greek Oracles' (above, 25. 1 n.),

325, discussing the small quantity of evidence for Delphic partisanship, including 'the repeated attempts of the Athenians in the fifth century to put Delphi under Phocian control, and the corresponding Spartan interventions to restore Delphic autonomy (only relevant if we think that the Athenians were chiefly moved by the hope of securing favourable prophecies, such as the famous one from roughly this period comparing Athens to 'an eagle in the clouds' [above, 107. 2 n.]; perhaps consequent on this, the oracle's promise of Apollo's aid in the Peloponnesian War [cp. 118. 3 below]'. See generally 107. 2 n. above.

Even allowing for the breakneck speed of Th.'s narrative, it is remarkable how little he tells us. There was presumably an unattested seizure of the sanctuary by the Phokians from the Delphians before the Spartans restored it to them. Equally, there must, after the Athenian action, have been an unattested recovery by the Delphians. (See J. Buckler, *Philip II and the Sacred War* (Leiden, 1989), 11.) Zeilhofer (107. 2 n.), 45 (and elsewhere in his book), thinks in terms of a tussle, throughout the fifth century but especially at this moment, between the Amphictiony (including Phokis) and Athens on the one hand, and Delphi + Sparta on the other. This certainly explains some of the data, but does not take account of the possibility, never considered by Zeilhofer, that one purpose of the Spartan foundation of Herakleia Trachinia in 426 was to secure a better amphictionic position for Sparta: see iii. 92, introductory n.

But, apart from his generally very sketchy account of the present incident, another silence by Th. is more remarkable, and characteristic: what was the Amphictiony (the organization of states which controlled the sanctuary's affairs) doing when all this was happening? It was supposed to prevent just this kind of thing. Th. in fact never mentions the Amphictiony (though for the use in a sacred, actually Delian, context, of the word *περικτιόνων*, which has a sense similar to 'amphictions', see iii. 104. 2). By contrast Hdt. mentions the amphictions five times, the *pylagoroi* twice and the *pylata* (the amphictionic twice-yearly meeting) once. Moreover on at least one of these Herodotean occasions they are found doing a political act, punishing the traitor Epialtes (vii. 214). The Amphictiony was surely active and important in the mid fifth century; certainly we should not assume otherwise just on the basis of Th.'s policy of silence. (This policy was incidentally perpetuated by the Oxyrhynchus Historian and by Xenophon, who had a—very slight—cue to mention the Amphictiony in the context of the Phokian/Lokrian dispute of the 390s: HO 19–21 Chambers and Xen. *Hell.* iii. 5. 5; but this did not rank in the tradition as a Sacred War proper. Note also Xenophon's silence about the Amphictiony at vi. 4. 30,

discussing Jason of Pherai's big plans for the Pythia of 370; but these plans remained unfulfilled and so obscure, although 'the Delphians' were worried enough to consult 'the god', i.e. the oracle. The Amphictiony becomes historiographically respectable again in Diodorus, xvi and xvii. 4; note also that Kallisthenes and Aristotle did research on the history of Delphi, actually compiling a list of Pythian victors: Tod 187, of the 330s.) See further below, i. 121. 3 n.; i. 132. 3 n., iii. 92, introductory n., iv. 118. 1 n., and v. 1 n. on the textually problematic *μέχρι Πυθίων*. This whole topic is, in fact, one of the many religious silences of Th. and should be recognized as such; another reason for Th.'s silence may be that here, as so often, he wishes to differ from Hdt. (Xenophon is not, of course, generally silent about religion, and his silence about the Amphictiony needs to be explained differently; I would stress the importance of Th.'s example: see above. It is certain that the Amphictiony was active in the 'Xenophontic' period, see *Syll*³ 145 of 380 BC, the important Amphictionic Law; and from the 360s, the amphictionic expulsions attested by *Syll*³ 175 = *IG* ii². 209 = M. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens* (Brussels, 1981), i. 49 ff., with Buckler (above) 9 ff.)

It might be objected that in his account of the Second Sacred War Thucydides does after all zero in on the sanctuary of Delphi; he merely ignores the organizational aspects. But this is to admit that he treats religion as a thing apart, not often (but see v. 49–50) paying attention to the ways in which religion and politics could interact. Nor should it be objected that the great sanctuaries did not count politically in the age of the classical superpowers. That is anachronism, as if one were to apply to the fifth century BC Stalin's famous question 'how many divisions has the Pope?'. See on all this S. Hornblower, *HSCP* 1992.

καὶ αὐθις ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι ἀποχωρησάντων αὐτῶν: 'but immediately after they had they retired the Athenians again ...'. The implication of this—a fairly rapid sequence—is not quite consistent with *FGrHist* 328 Philochoros F 34b which says that the Athenians restored Delphi to the Phokians 'in the third year', *ἔτει*. Jacoby emends this to 'in the third month', *μηνί*, but I have misgivings about this: Philochoros speaks of two separate 'wars' on this occasion, *πόλεμοι*, which does suggest a proper interval (Jacoby smooths this over by translating the word as 'campaigns'). It is better to admit that the two authors disagreed; hardly seriously because Th. is vague. Plutarch (*Per.* 21) seems to have agreed with Th. (he has *εὐθύς*, 'immediately').

113. *Battle of Koroneia: Athenian loss of Boiotia* (446)

Cp. Diod. xii. 6 and Plut. *Per.* 28. For a useful modern discussion see Buck, *History of Boeotia* (above, 107. 2 n.), 150 ff.

2. καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες: 'some Euboian exiles'. This strongly suggests that the revolts of Euboea (next ch.) and Boiotia were somehow connected or concerted, but we cannot say more than that.

3-4. καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν ... καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι ἐγένοντο: 'The Athenians then evacuated Boiotia ... and all the Boiotians regained their independence'. It was perhaps now that the federal constitution describes in the Oxyrhynchos Historian was set up; or perhaps revived after the decade of Athenian control so briefly mentioned at 108. 3. The chief evidence for an earlier federal phase consists in Hdt.'s mention of federal Boiotian officials in 479. See generally ii. 2. 1 n. on βoιωπαρχοῦντες.

114. *Revolts of Euboeia and Megara (446)*

Cp. Diod. xii. 5-7 and Plut. *Per.* 22-3. Importance of Euboea: viii. 96. 2 n.

1. Εὐβοια ἀπέστη: 'Euboeia revolted'. We do not know why, but note P. A. Brunt, 'Athenian Settlements Abroad in the Fifth Century B.C.', in *Ehrenberg Studies* (see above, 96. 1 n. on πρόσχημα), 71 ff., at 81, for the suggestion that the Athenians under Tolmides had provoked this revolt by establishing a new cleruchy (see above, 97. 2 n.) on Euboeia in, as he believed, 447/6: 'It may be conjectured that the cleruchs had actually been sent there to keep the Euboians under control; very likely the settlement only aggravated discontent, just as Claudius' colony at Camulodunum, founded as *subsidium adversus rebelles*, was not only ineffective for its purpose but was actually one factor in extending Boudicca's rising.' In the same way, we can add, the foundation of the colony of Fregellae in 328 BC had helped to precipitate the Second Samnite War: see T. Potter, *Roman Italy* (London, 1987), 73. For the Euboian cleruchy and its background see Brunt, 87, appendix. Brunt's general point is not much weakened if with Meiggs, 123, we put the Euboian cleruchy in 450 (or even a year or two earlier: see E. Erxleben, 'Die Kleruchien auf Euböa und Lesbos und die Methoden der attischen Herrschaft im 5. Jh.', *Klio*, 57 (1975), 83 ff., at 85 ff.): Meiggs (124) sees the cleruchies on the islands (there were others on Andros and Naxos) as intended 'to act as garrisons and maintain security' in the disaffected atmosphere after the Egyptian disaster. (For the evidence, provided by the tribute lists, for unease in the empire in the late 450s and early 440s, see above all the commentaries to ML 39 and 50. It is not the purpose of this commentary to go in detail into such evidence, which is now accessibly discussed there and in Meiggs, *Athenian Empire*³, 58 ff.)

There is another category of evidence which can be mentioned here, though this is not the place for discussion. A number of sacred ὄροι or

boundary stones, mostly from sanctuaries of Athena, have been found at places some of which are known from Th. to have been restless: Chalkis on Euboia is one of them (others are Aigina, Kos, and Samos; see Hill², B 96, and translations in LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, p. 145; discussions in J. Barron, 'The Fifth-Century *horoi* of Aigina', *JHS* 103 (1983), 1 ff.; S. Sherwin-White, *Ancient Cos* (Göttingen, 1978), 37 f.; Barron, 'Religious Propaganda of the Delian League', *JHS* 84 (1964), 35 ff., with Meiggs, 295-8; and G. Shipley, *A History of Samos* (Oxford, 1987), 114 ff., see below). The interpretation of these *horoi* is disputed, and their individual dates often uncertain. Like cleruchies, they may represent punitive confiscations after revolts; cp. iii. 50. 2 (Mytilene). But equally, and again like cleruchies, they may be evidence of encroachments which helped to *cause* revolt. Another related category of encroachment attested for Euboia among other places is ownership of land by individual rich Athenians, see LACTOR, p. 149, for a translated document of great interest and importance. Again, we should like to know more about when and in what circumstances such land was acquired: see LACTOR, pp. 146 ff. Note that such ownership of land puts classical Athens on a par with republican Rome, the acquisitiveness of whose upper classes is not in dispute: see, for estates of wealthy Romans in the provinces, M. H. Crawford, 'Rome and the Greek World: Economic Relationships', *Econ. Hist. Rev.* 30 (1977), 42 ff., at 48 and n. 4, also 49 for an explicit comparison with imperial Athens. [See now Parker, *ARH* 144 f.]

Another factor of possible relevance is Pericles' law of 451/0 (Fornara 86, LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, nos. 175 and 176 = *Ath. Pol.* 26. 4, Plut. *Per.* 37. 3) restricting citizenship and its benefits—such as participation in cleruchies—to those with citizen parents on both sides. Th. does not mention this, but it is the kind of exclusive measure which confirms his general picture at 99 above (see n. there) of Athens' increasing harshness towards her allies. But here he is content to leave the various revolts unmotivated.

Κορινθίους καὶ Σικυωνίους καὶ Ἐπιδαυρίους: 'Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Epidaurians'. See above, 105. 1 n.: with the recent publication of the inscription about the Sikyonians there mentioned, we can now see that the same three Peloponnesian cities co-operated there as here.

ὁ δὲ Περικλῆς πάλιν κατὰ τάχος ἐκόμιζε τὴν στρατιὰν ἐκ τῆς Εὐβοίας: 'Pericles in haste withdrew his army from Euboia'. In fact the Athenians did more, they moved rapidly west into the Megarid, as an inscription reveals, ML 51 = Fornara 101 (cp. also Diod. xii. 5. 2). This makes the sequence of events clear, as in Th.'s very abbreviated narrative it is not.

2. **καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ... ἐσβαλόντες:** 'the Peloponnesians then invaded ...'. See further ii. 21 for this and what follows, adding that Pleistoanax was exiled because he was thought to have been bribed to retreat; see the scholiast to Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 858f. = Fornara 104. In fact we can conjecture that he withdrew because some preliminary understanding had been reached. The invasion, and the angry Spartan treatment of Pleistoanax, are important items of evidence for Spartan aggression towards Athens in the *pentekontaetia*; see above 101. 2n. for the comparable episode of Thasos and its significance. It remains true that now as then the invasion is not carried through, though this time something concrete is done.

3. **τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ὁμολογία κατεστήσαντο, Ἑστιαίᾳ δὲ ἔξοκίσαντες αὐτοὶ τὴν γῆν ἔσχον:** 'they settled most of the island by agreement, but they ejected the Hestiaians from their homes and appropriated their territory'. We have the inscribed settlements with Chalkis, ML 51 = Fornara 103, Eretria, *IG* i³. 39, and Hestiaia, *IG* i³. 41. The Athenians who settled in Hestiaia were probably cleruchs (note Th.'s untechnical language, though iii. 50. 2 shows that he did not mind using the word 'cleruchs' when he felt like it; cp. below, 115. 4n. on *ὁς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε* as a way of saying 'satrap'). So rightly Graham, *Colony and Mother City*, 170ff., and Lewis in *IG* i³, pointing out that the mention of deme judges in the inscription strengthens Graham's view.

115. 1. *The Thirty Years Peace (446)*

For the terms of the Thirty Years Peace see de Ste. Croix, *OPW*, app. 1 (but see below, 140. 2n.). Th., who has lost sight of Argos since the alliance with Athens of 102. 4 (he never tells us in Book 1 about her separate Thirty Years Peace with Sparta in 451, for which see v. 14. 4), omits to say that by a clause of the Peace described in the present passage, Argos could enter into friendly relations with Athens if she wished: Paus. v. 23. 4. See R. A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid* (London, 1972), 116. For Argive neutrality in 431 see below, ii. 9. 2.

The four specified territorial concessions, Nisaia, Pegai (the two harbours of Megara), and the two Peloponnesian places Troizen and Achaia, will recur at iv. 21. 3 when the Athenians, elated by success at Sphakteria, demand them back.

For the possibility that there was a general autonomy clause in the Peace see Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 137-42; cp. 40. 5 n.

For a clause about arbitration see 140. 2n.; cp. vii. 18. 2 (on which see Badian, 143).

For an assessment of the Thirty Years Peace see *Greek World*, 46: although Athens had to give up her land empire and some valuable

individual possessions, she could expand freely in all directions and did so. (But 140. 2 is not, as is sometimes said, evidence of an explicit recognition of her empire: see n. there.) To that extent the Peace was a qualified victory for her. (There was also Naupaktos, which was hostile to Sparta after the peculiar arrangements of 103. 3, arrangements which the Peace did not disturb because Naupaktos did not count as an actual Athenian possession.) On the other hand the Athenians are represented at iv. 21. 3 (see above) as saying in 425, at Kleon's prompting, that in 446 they had been more anxious to make peace; that, if it reflects genuine opinion, might imply that the 446 peace was thought disadvantageous: see Lewis in *CAH* v (1992), 137.

There is now a jump in Th.'s narrative. He does not record the foundation of Thurii in 443, for which see Diod. xii. 9–11 and the texts in Fornara 108. Thurii was a largely Athenian foundation in southern Italy. We may note here Th.'s generally poor coverage of Athens' western expansion, known to us in part through inscriptions, such as the alliance with Eggesta in Sicily of probably 457, ML 37 = Fornara 81. See also above, introductory n. to 24: the alliances with Leontini and Rhegium, there mentioned as having been renewed in 433, were probably originally made in the 440s; for the suggestion that the Rhegium one may be connected with the foundation of Thurii, see D. M. Lewis, 'The Treaties with Leontini and Rhegium', *ZPE* 22 (1976), 223 ff., at 225. The background to the Thurii project has been much discussed; the most sensible treatment is A. Andrewes, 'The Opposition to Pericles', *JHS* 98 (1978), 1 ff., at 5 ff.

115. 2–117. *Revolt of Samos and its suppression (440–39)*

See Plut. *Per.* 24–8 and Diod. xii. 27–8. For a general discussion citing earlier literature see Shipley, *Samos* (above, 114. 1 n. on *Εὐβόια ἀπέστη*), 112 ff. (The so-called Coinage Decree, ML 45 = Fornara 97, has been introduced into the discussion: this decree enforced the use of Athenian coins, weights, etc. See Barron, *The Silver Coins of Samos* (London, 1966). But to Shipley's references add T. Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton, 1985), 196 ff., arguing convincingly against any interpretation of the decree in terms of autonomy and sovereignty.) There are, as noted at 114. 1 n. above, fifth-century religious *horoi* or boundary-stones on Samos as on other politically sensitive places; for the possibility that this is evidence of a cleruchy on the island before the revolt, and that this helped to provoke the revolt, see Shipley, 115. Otherwise Th.'s account is exceptionally and surprisingly full: it has not only crowded out some events before 441 (see 115. 1 n.) but also a number of critical events which happened or may have happened in the

early 430s (see introductory nn. above to 24 ff. and 56 ff., also 67. 4 n., for the Athenian alliance with Akarnania, the foundation of Amphipolis, the financial pressure applied to Potidaia, and the Megarian decrees, and add Pericles' Pontic expedition of—as we now know—436/5, for which see Develin (i. 93. 3 n.), 95). [See now *IG* i³. 1180.] That is, the long description of Samos' revolt and its suppression ends the *Pentekontaetia* in the literary sense of that word, i.e. Th.'s account; though it did not end the *pentekontaetia* as a historical period. For a possible explanation see *Greek World*, 47: Th. concludes emphatically with Samos, as the last major Athenian violation of autonomy which Sparta would permit (albeit grudgingly: see above, 40. 5 and n. We do not know whether the abortive Lesbian revolt of the 430s (see 40. 5 n. and iii. 2. 1 n.) was prompted by any particular Athenian outrage committed by Athens.) To suggest that the Samian narrative is out of proportion is not to deny the importance of the Samian revolt, or rather its perceived importance: see viii. 76. 4, where Samos is said to have come close on the present occasion to depriving Athens of her control of the sea. (But Shipley, 118, should not have cited this as Th.'s own claim; the context is rhetorical, the democrats encouraging each other in 411 by reflecting on the importance of Samos.)

For the division within the Peloponnesian League over the Samos issue see 40. 5 n., in particular Badian there cited on the reasons for Th.'s strange omission of the entire Peloponnesian debate in the present section, where it really belongs.

115. 2. ἕκτω δὲ ἔτει: 'six years later'. That is, 441/0. See generally C. W. Fornara, 'The Chronology of the Samian War', *JHS* 99 (1979), 7 ff., whose conclusions are, however, rejected by B. D. Meritt, *Proc. Amer. Philos. Assoc.* 128. 2 (1984), 128 ff., summarized in *SEG* xxxiv (1984), no. 31.

καὶ Μιλησίοις: 'and Milesians'. The history, internal and external, of fifth-century Miletos is complicated (*Old Oligarch*, 3. 11, is explicit that Athens supported an oligarchy at some point: see 108. 3 n.); but new evidence has for once made things simpler. I have attempted a reconstruction in *LACTOR Athenian Empire*³, p. 114. It now seems probable that a 'democratic' régime was put in place by Athens at the end of the 450s and remained in power thereafter; we have a fragmentary text from c.437 which uses Athenian-style formulae: *Klio*, 52 (1970), 163 ff. But the complexities of Samian and Milesian history, as far as they can be reconstructed in this period, are a warning against a crude categorization of oligarch versus democrat. It is also too crude to 'speak too glibly about Athens' encouragement of democracy, without asking what was involved . . . a great deal could have been done, and no doubt was done,

simply by control of personnel, making sure that undesirables left the city concerned . . . we may overestimate the extent to which Athens intervened in detail': see, with attention to Miletos among other places, D. M. Lewis, 'Democratic Institutions and their Diffusion', in the *Proceedings of the Eighth Epigraphic Congress 1982* (Athens, 1984), i. 55ff. (the quotations are from 59, a page with some illuminating remarks on the supposedly 'non-democratic' features of *Inscripfen von Erythrai* 2, an internal constitutional document). All this will be very relevant to the question of what sort of political settlement was imposed on Samos: see below, 117. 3 n. For the moment we should note merely that the political complexion of the régime in Miletos throws no light on her age-old quarrel with Samos: see next n. Cp. also *SEG* xxxvii (1987), 981.

περὶ Πριήνης: 'about Priene'. An exceptionally long-lived quarrel even by Greek standards; see Meiggs, endnote 14, at p. 428. For the suggestion that the present dispute was what Diodorus (xv. 48. 1 ff.) meant by 'the wars' which caused the move of the Panionian festival from near Priene to Ephesos see my article 'Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, and the Ephesia (iii. 104)', *Historia*, 31 (1982), 241 ff., at 245. See below, iii. 104 n. (at p. 528) for the significance of this move.

3. δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν: 'established a democracy'. See above, para. 2 n. on *καὶ Μιλησίοις*, and below 117. 3 n.

κατέθεντο ἐς Λήμνον: 'deposited at Lemnos'. Lemnos was a cleruchy (cp. 98. 2 n.), whose acquisition went back before the Persian Wars: Hdt. vi. 137 ff. for Miltiades' conquest of c. 500. See *Archaeological Reports* 1985-6, 17 = *Εργον* 1984, 54 = *SEG* xxxv. 24 = *IG* i³. 522, a dedication to Nemesis by Rhamnousians. These were at first thought to be Rhamnousian demesmen who had served in Miltiades' Lemnos campaign, but Lewis in *IG* i³ dates the text 475-50. The 'Rhamnousians' are surely cleruchs. For the cleruchy see Brunt (114. 1 n.), 80 f. The use of Lemnos on the present occasion illustrates the military and security aspect of cleruchies.

4. Πισσοῦθνη τῷ Ὑστάσπου: 'Pissouthnes the son of Hystaspes'. For this sort of Persian involvement in Greek politics see above, 109. 2 n., particularly the Erythrai evidence. For Pissouthnes himself see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 55: he was probably Xerxes' nephew.

ὃς εἶχε Σάρδεις τότε: 'then governor of Sardis' [lit. 'who then held Sardis']. In fact he was a satrap; Th.'s avoidance of the word *ξατράπης* or *σατράπης* is remarkable, in view of 129. 1 where he does use the word *σατραπείαν*. (But see n. there: the anomalous use of this technical word in the Pausanias excursus fits Westlake's view, *CQ* 27 (1977) = *Studies*, ch. 1, that Th.'s vocabulary in this section was uncharacteristic, though Westlake does not mention *σατραπείαν*.) See Andrewes, *HCT* v. 15 f. on

viii. 5. 4. Like ‘cleruchy’ (see above, 114. 3 n., and below, iii. 50. 2 n.) this shows how Th.’s terminology fluctuates; sometimes it is technical sometimes not: see *Thucydides*, 96 ff.

ἐπικούρους: ‘mercenaries’. This mention of mercenaries, if that is what they are, is interesting as the first attested classical instance of what in the fourth century was to be a very important phenomenon indeed, the *casual* (contrast 121. 3 n.) use of mercenary soldiers: see J. Roy, ‘The Mercenaries of Cyrus’, *Historia* 16 (1967), 287 ff., at 322 (and n. 141, noting that ‘Pissouthnes perhaps only gave the Samians permission to recruit in his satrapy . . . ; in any case there were mercenaries or potential mercenaries in Asia Minor’). See also G. Seibt, *Griechische Söldner im Achaimenidenreich* (Munich, 1977), 39 ff., arguing vigorously that ἐπικούρους here does indeed mean mercenaries (rather than ‘Anhänger’ = ‘supporters’, ‘partisans’) and that the mercenaries were Greeks. As far as the present passage goes, Seibt is right, but note B. M. Lavelle, ‘*Epikouroi* in Thucydides’, *AJP* 110 (1989), 36 ff., agreeing with Seibt on the present passage but arguing, against earlier views and with particular reference to iii. 18. 2 (see n. there), that the word *can* sometimes mean “fighters alongside”, without any hint of pay or professionalism’. Again this is probably right, but Seibt and Lavelle assume too sharp a distinction between mercenaries and other kinds of soldiers.

5. **ξυναπέστησαν δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ Βυζάντιοι**: ‘the Byzantines joined in their revolt’. Fornara (115. 2 n.) 8 seeks, a shade too vigorously, to detach events in Byzantium from those on Samos. He may well be right that Byzantium’s rising happened later than that of Samos.

116. 1. **αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου καὶ Λέσβου περιαγγέλλουσαι βοηθεῖν**: ‘others to summon help from Chios and Lesbos’. Why did the Chians and Lesbians not turn on Athens and co-operate with the Samians instead? An ‘awkward question’ indeed, as Gomme called it (*HCT*, n. on iii. 11. 4), and one which, as that passage shows, was put at the time—or rather in 428 when the Mytilenean inhabitants of Lesbos revolted in their turn and wanted help from Sparta. For the problems see T. Quinn, *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios* (Manchester, 1981), esp. 24 f., 40, 50 ff. He rightly points out that the individual subject allies felt and behaved pretty selfishly throughout the century. This does not necessarily show that the ‘kinship’ talk of 95. 1 above was entirely bogus. One might follow up a hint of Lewis, who in reviewing Quinn wondered, ‘what was the attitude of the Aeolian Lesbians to a league with such strong Ionian overtones?’: *CR* 33 (1983), 146. That is, racial considerations may after all have been relevant to some extent—but as a divisive, not a uniting force. (Compare v. 84 for Chian and Lesbian, i.e. Ionian and Aeolian,

help in attacking Dorian Melos.) That does not explain the participation of Ionian Chios in the suppression of Ionian Samos; for this, selfishness and fear must suffice as explanations.

Περικλέους δεκάτου αὐτοῦ στρατηγούντος: 'Pericles and nine others'. For this formula see 61. 1 n., esp. Dover there cited.

καὶ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναῖοι: 'the Athenians were victorious'. Perhaps with the help of treachery by a Samian called Karystion, who was rewarded with Athenian citizenship (scholiast on Ar. *Wasps*, 283): see M. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens*, iii/iv (Brussels, 1983), 25f., conjecturing that Karystion's activity should be placed in this, the second phase of Athenian hostilities against Samos.

3. **Στησαγόρας:** 'Stesagoras'. It is unlike Th. to introduce a name in so unclear a way, without patronymic or other description to help us. The man is a Samian, as the scholiast tells us. We would rather Th. had told of the participation of Sophocles, Ion, and the Samian philosopher Melissos (see *OCD*² for these).

117. 2. Θουκυδίδου: 'Thucydides'. Unlikely to be the historian, because he insists at v. 26. 5 that he was fully mature at the beginning of the war, perhaps with the implication 'only just', i.e. perhaps 30. Had he served as general ten years earlier, this defensive-sounding claim would be less intelligible.

There is a further argument, tempting but probably incorrect, from the absence of patronymic. It might be thought that this feature proves that the present passage cannot have been the first mention of Th. as a historical agent (i. 1. 1 is a purely literary self-introduction). It is true that he calls himself 'Th. son of Oloros, who wrote this' at iv. 104. 4, which thus looks like his first appearance. But Archidamos and Melesippos are both introduced without patronymic, only to receive one later: i. 79. 2 and ii. 19; i. 139. 3 and ii. 12. 1. See Griffith, *PCPhS* 187 (1961), 22f.

καὶ Ἄγωνος: 'and Hagnon'. Father of the Theramenes who is so prominent in Book viii, and himself distinguished as the leader of the colony sent to Amphipolis in 437: see iv. 102. 3, and see v. 11. 1 n. for the possibility that he received some kind of worship there in his lifetime, an astonishing fact at this date. See also ii. 58. 1 n. He was one of the elderly *probouloi* or Counsellors appointed in the first wave of anti-democratic feeling of 413 BC (viii. 1. 3 n.).

καὶ Φορμίωνος: 'and Phormio'. See 64. 2. If he was from the same tribe as Hagnon (namely Pandionis), that tribe will have provided two generals this year instead of the normal one. Each of the ten tribes normally supplied one of the ten generals, but there are exceptions: see Lewis, *JHS* 81 (1961), 118ff., esp. 118 for Phormio (note, however,

Bloedow, below, iii. 91. 4 n.); see also C. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501-404* (*Historia Einzelschrift* 16, Wiesbaden, 1971), 48 ff. and note C). It is not certain, however, that Phormio was from Pandionis, see Lewis, 118, and ML, p. 153 (above, 61. 1 n.). For the problem see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, p. 100. See also Bridges in next n.

Τληπολέμου: 'Tlepolemos'. It is natural to assume that he was a general, but this has been doubted by A. P. Bridges, 'The Athenian Treaty with Samos, ML 56', *JHS* 100 (1980), 185 ff., at 187.

3. προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία: 'were forced to surrender. The terms of capitulation were as follows . . .'. What does follow is problematical. The financial terms are recorded in an inscription: see next n. The difficulty concerns the political settlement: did the Athenians set up a democracy? (For the various pieces of evidence see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, p. 100.) It is not an invented problem. Since Th. expressly says at 115. 3 of the earlier Athenian intervention that 'they set up a democracy', *δημοκρατίαν κατέστησαν*, it is reasonable (i) to pose the question in these terms (but see final para. below) and (ii) to ask whether the Athenians imposed a democracy on this occasion also.

In favour of thinking they did, it can be said (i) that Diod. xii. 28. 4 says so explicitly and (ii) that it would be normal Athenian practice, as 115. 3 shows. Neither (i) nor (ii) is decisive: Diodorus may have described what he ignorantly assumed to be the truth. And 'normal practice' was not doctrinaire: see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, pp. 101 f., for occasional toleration of some non-democratic régimes. These include such powerful and important places as Miletos in perhaps the 450s (*Old Oligarch*, iii. 11, but see 115. 2 for the later position) and Chios for many years (below, viii. 9. 3; 14. 2 n.). See also, for Potidaia, 56. 2 n. on *ἐπιδημιουργούς*. As for the arrangements of 115. 3, Th. may expect us to understand that they were repeated as a matter of course, or that they were reversed because of their failure, equally as a matter of course.

The main evidence *against* thinking that a democracy was imposed is at viii. 21 below, describing a Samian rising by the *δῆμος* ('people' or 'democratic faction') against the *δυνατοί* or 'powerful men', usually taken to mean 'oligarchs'. This was in 412. If this is a democratic rising against oligarchs, it can be reconciled with a belief in a democratic settlement in 439 only by the hypothesis of an unrecorded oligarchic coup between 439 and 412. Various other solutions have been suggested; we may note here that, although we have an inscription recording the settlement of Samos (as well as one recording the financial arrangements: see next n.), this is less helpful than might have been hoped because it is fragmentary, and the vital missing part can be supplemented so as to suit

either interpretation. See ML 56 (= Fornara 115 = LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 107), with Meiggs, *CR* 26 (1976), 108f., reviewing D. W. Bradeen and M. F. McGregor, *Studies in Fifth-Century Attic Epigraphy* (Norman, 1973). The natural supplement of line 22, retained in *IG* i³. 48, is τῶι δέμοι τῶι Σαμίον, 'to the people [democracy] of the Samians'. Bradeen/McGregor 120 prefer the neutral πόλει, 'city', of the Samians (βολέι, 'to the council', would also fit the space, and would be an even stronger indication of an oligarchy: Quinn (116. 1 n.) 15). But Meiggs in the review just cited points out the similarity of Th.'s phrasing in the present passage to that at 114. 3 above (Euboia), where oligarchy is even less likely.

The key to the problem is the word δυνατοί in viii. 21, which should not in fact be glossed 'oligarchs' (so rightly Andrewes in *HCT* on that passage). Recalling Lewis's remarks quoted at 115. 2 n. we should reflect that control of personnel was more important than political labels. Institutions might be formally democratic, but 'powerful men' would in practice dominate: what mattered was that the 'powerful men' held to their loyalty to Athens. viii. 21 means that one set of people calling themselves democrats attacked another powerful group 'that had gained control of a governmental machine that was not in itself undemocratic' (Andrewes). For a solution along these lines see A. Lintott, *Violence, Revolution and Civil Strife in the Classical City* (London, 1982), 102 ff. See too Shipley, 120 ff., and Andrewes's n. on viii. 21. [And Ostwald, *SCI* 12 (1993), 51-66; Whitehead in *Nomodeiktes*.]

καὶ χρήματα τὰ ἀναλωθέντα ταξάμενοι κατὰ χρόνους ἀποδοῦναι: 'and to pay a full indemnity by regular instalments'. See for this ML 55 = Fornara 113, recording the expenses of the Samian War. (See also ML 68, line 20 = Fornara 133, and the collection at LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 125 of probable epigraphic references to payments of the indemnity.) The total cost to Athens was perhaps between 1,404 and 1,410 talents: see Shipley (above, 114. 1 n. on *Εὐβοία ἀπέστη*), 118, accepting the arguments of Fornara, *JHS* 99 (1979), 9 ff., that the 1,276 talent figure argued for in ML is too low. Note in any case that the figures suggested in ML represent what came from Athena; presumably some current income was spent as well.

Parker (*Miasma*, 173) remarks that ML 55 provides the first known evidence for the financing of Greek wars by public borrowing from temple funds. See further below, 121. 3 n.

118. RECAPITULATION; ATHENIAN
CONSOLIDATION OF THEIR POWER; THE
SPARTANS CONSULT THE DELPHIC ORACLE

On the views expressed in this ch., and their relationship to the *Pentekontaetia* which precedes it, see below, para. 2n. on *καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας* etc.

1. **μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ ἤδη . . . οὐ πολλοῖς ἔτεσιν ὕστερον:** 'not many years afterwards'. A very casual way of disposing of the important period 439-435, as I have commented already: see introductory n. to 115. 2.

καὶ ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου: 'the various other causes of the war'. Here (contrast 23. 6: see n. there) the word *πρόφασις* covers the kind of grievances (the Corcyra and Potidaia affairs) which at 23. 6 were called *ἐς τὸ φανερόν λεγόμεναι αἰτίαι*, reasons publicly alleged. The difference is that at 23. 6 *πρόφασις* was combined with *ἀληθεστάτη*, 'true', and it was this, rather than the word *πρόφασις*, which expressed the idea of *underlying* cause. With the present passage compare 126. 1.

2. **ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα:** 'about fifty years'. This is the closest Th. gets to characterizing the preceding digression as a *pentekontaetia* or fifty-year period; the period referred to is very roughly 480-430, but as we have seen, the digression stops in 439. See below, n. on *καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας* etc.

ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζονται: 'they had never been quick to go to war unless they were compelled'. This authorial, and therefore valuable, remark is the title of a whole section (94f.) of de Ste. Croix, *OPW*. He stresses the qualification ('unless . . .'), and complains that others have stressed the main part of the sentence ('never quick to go to war . . .'). I doubt whether one aspect of the sentence should be stressed at the expense of the other, or that Th. is saying much more here than at the equally authorial viii. 96. 5, which comments on Spartan slowness. Much has been written about 'compulsion' in Th., for which see above 23. 6n. For a concrete instance of Spartan reluctance to go to war see iii. 2. 1 and n. (refusal to help Mytilene before the war).

τότε δ' ἔτι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι: 'and they were in some difficulties through wars near home'. Sparta's troubles in the Peloponnese in the first half of the *pentekontaetia* (we know little about the second half) included a long period of intermittent fighting against Arkadians and Argives, Hdt. ix. 35, and an Argos generally resurgent, after her defeat at the hands of Kleomenes in 494; for this revival cp.

Hdt. vi. 83. The best modern reconstruction of all this is now Lewis, *CAH* v². 101–10.

καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἤπτοντο: ‘and were laying hands on their allies’. There is no contradiction between this and 88 above, where we are told that the Spartans had *not* been persuaded by the speeches of their allies: they are concerned for their alliance as a whole, the break-up of which would damage themselves. See de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 59 and n. 2.

Indeed it is fundamentally wrong to think in terms of ‘contradictions’ in this connection. The *Pentekontaetia* is a fragment: it stops in 439, despite the implication earlier in the present para. (see above) that the relevant period is of fifty years. When Hellanikos published his work, perhaps not before the end of the whole war (see 97. 2 n.), Th. realized that he needed to do more work, but did little more than register an objection to Hellanikos’ methods. The present passage thus represents the latest part of a late insertion, and so represents Th.’s final thoughts on the causes of the war. It is misguided to treat Book i as if it were all thought at one time, and to try to iron out all apparent inconsistencies. To say so much is not to imply that it is right to slice up Th.’s text into many different strata of composition; but the unique naming of Hellanikos at 97. 2 is an indication which cannot be overlooked. Note in any case that the beginning of para. 3 below is written so as to get us back to where the narrative stopped in 87. 6.

3. διέγνωστο λελύσθαι τε τὰς σπονδάς: ‘they had already voted . . . that the treaty had been broken’. See end of preceding n.: this picks up 87. 6, with verbal echoes.

καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀδικεῖν: ‘and that the Athenians were guilty’. But see vii. 18. 2: Th. suggests that the Spartans later came to think that the ‘wrong’ had been on their own side, and that they had deserved to be defeated, as in effect they were, in the Archidamian War. Above all, as Th. is anxious to stress at vii. 18, the Spartans had declined arbitration although it was offered: see i. 78. 4 and 140. 2 and nn. The Spartans would have accepted the view of their admirer Xenophon that ‘the gods do not overlook impiety’: *Hell.* v. 4. 1. The outcome of the Archidamian War revealed the unsuspected or neglected power of divine displeasure in the same way as would the Spartan defeat at Leuktra (*Hell.* vi. 4. 3). Note, however, Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 143, on Th. vii. 18: ‘we are meant to see the Spartans as developing a conscience only when things begin to go wrong.’ See also v. 32. 1 n.

πέμψαντες δὲ εἰς Δελφούς: ‘they now sent to Delphi’. The religious association between this part of the sentence and the first part is more obvious in the Greek: the word *σπονδάς*, ‘treaty’, comes from the word *σπένδομαι*, ‘I pour a libation’, and was a religious act.

τὸν θεόν: 'the god'. N. Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion* (Königstein, 1981), 52 and 55 n. 28, follows Classen's view that this formulation for Apollo shows a 'positive' religious attitude on Th.'s part, but, as she admits, the expression is conventional ('formulaic').

ὁ δὲ ἀνείλεν αὐτοῖς, ὡς λέγεται, κατὰ κράτος πολεμοῦσι νίκην ἔσεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς ἔφη ξυλλήψεσθαι καὶ παρακαλούμενος καὶ ἄκλητος: 'He is reported to have answered that, if they did their best, they would win, and that he himself would help them whether they asked him to or not'. For this consultation see 112. 5n. above, citing Parker. The oracle covers itself against an Athenian victory by adding that the Spartans must do their best. See J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley, 1978), 33, 239, 246. This response is one of only 75 which Fontenrose classifies as historical, as opposed to 268 'quasi-historical', and 156 legendary. On the other hand Westlake, *Mnemosyne*, 1977 (13. 2 n.), 350 and 354, detects 'uneasiness' in Th.'s word *λέγεται*, 'it is reported'. This is too sceptical, and Fontenrose's view is to be preferred. With *ξυλλήψεσθαι*, 'he would help them', Lewis (*CR* 33 (1983), 176) aptly compares Ar. *Knights*, 229, *χὼ θεὸς ξυλλήπεται*, 'the god [Apollo] will lend his assistance'.

God on whose side? The Spartans' position was perhaps not quite unassailable: the Eleans at Xen. *Hell.* iii. 2. 22 are reported to have invoked against Sparta, on one occasion, an old tradition that you did not consult oracles about intended wars against other Greeks. But it is not certain how genuine this tradition was; the present passage is not the only exception to the 'rule'.

Note, with Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 148, that the Spartans' question to the god presumably took the usual form 'whether it would be better to go to war'; they had therefore not yet finally decided on war. (As he puts it, the Spartan mission to Delphi 'was far from comparable, say, to a request to the pope to bless the armed forces of Italy'.)

Athenians remembered and resented this oracle: ii. 54. 4.

119-125. MEETING OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

119. 1. **αὐθις:** 'again'. See above, 67. 1 n.

120-124. *Speech of the Corinthians*

This speech is answered, to a degree which some readers have found implausibly exact, by Pericles at 140ff. below; see introductory n. there.

The 'correspondences' are not really troubling: the ideas voiced by the Corinthians were very probably in the air at the time, and Athenians surely heard reports of what was said and done at this meeting. The most striking single parallel is perhaps 122. 1 (\approx 142. 2), ἐπιτειχισμός, 'planting a fort in their country'; cp. n. there.

120. 2. τοῖς κάτω ἦν μὴ ἀμύνωσι: 'if they do not protect those on the coast . . .'. If we could be sure that this part of the Corinthian speech was historical, this whole sentence would be the clearest statement in all Th. that Spartan allies were suffering economic damage, contrary to one main thesis of de Ste. Croix, *OPW*. See R. P. Legon, *Megara: the Political History of a Greek City-State to 336 BC* (Cornell, 1981), 218.

3. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ σωφρόνων μὲν ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀδικοῖντο, ἡσυχάζειν: 'wise men refuse to move until they are wronged' [lit. 'it is characteristic of *wise*, *σωφρόνων*, men to remain *quiet*, *ἡσυχάζειν*, etc.]. For these two Greek words see above nn. on 32. 4-5, also from a passage containing Corinthian judgements about Sparta. (The second Corinthian speech, 68 ff. above, is also full of the same sort of vocabulary, from *σωφροσύνη* at 68. 1 onwards.)

4-5. ὁ τε γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ὀκνῶν . . . ἐλλείπομεν: 'the man whom pleasure makes a coward . . . and fail'. On these paragraphs see Macleod, 124, commenting of the Corinthians that 'the historian uses these rhetorical *sententiae* [or maxims] to expose their own rashness'. See further below, 122. 1 n. on πόλεμος, 'war'.

121. 3. ναυτικόν τε, ᾧ ἰσχύουσιν: 'they are certainly strong at sea'. Cp. ii. 13. 2 for almost exactly this phrase and thought, also 142. 4.

καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν Δελφοῖς καὶ Ὀλυμπία χρημάτων: 'partly out of the funds at Delphi and Olympia'. For the interesting topic of use (or proposed use) of sacred treasures and money see Parker, *Miasma*, 170 ff. He starts by stating that 'sacred equipment belongs on sacred premises and is not to be put to profane use', but goes on to show in some very illuminating pages how this rule was to some extent got round: there were, however, always limits to what would be tolerated by Greek opinion (see below). We shall discuss at 143. 1 n. Parker's suggestion that when Pericles comes to 'answer' the Corinthians on this point he will use language which carries a slight hint of sacrilege. If Delphic treasure were used in this way, the members of the Amphictiony would have something to say about it, but Th. here and at 143. 1 ignores their existence—as usual: see 107. 2 n.; however, in speeches, like those of the Corinthians here and Pericles there, it is not surprising that Th. avoids the technical language which would be necessary to express an 'amphictionic' point.

Parker says (174) that there was talk 'on the Spartan side' of exploiting

Delphic and Olympic treasure; he is right not to attribute the proposal to the pious Spartans themselves. It has been noted that the proposal is coolly discussed only by the more 'enlightened' Corinthians and Athenians: see Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² 1. 302 and n. 4, and independently Brunt, *Phoenix*, 19 (1965), 261 (Corinthians more exposed than other Peloponnesians to the influence of the sophistic enlightenment). But, for Athenian reactions, or rather those of the Thucydidean Pericles, see above.

As Parker says (173), borrowing from one's own protecting gods or goddesses was one thing (see above 117. 3n. for the Samian war, financed by loans from Athena); but stealing, even if you called it borrowing, from the public sanctuaries of Greece was another. In the fourth century there were states or groups who helped themselves to the treasuries of both Olympia (Arkadians in the 360s) and Delphi (Phokians in the 350s), but eventually they found themselves isolated and condemned.

Was any money borrowed in the way here suggested? It is usually assumed not, but see the enigmatic iv. 118. 3: undertakings to bring to justice those who have committed crimes against sacred treasures (see n. there).

ὤνητή γὰρ ἢ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μᾶλλον ἢ οἰκεία: 'Athenian power consists of mercenaries [lit. 'is bought'], and not of their own citizens'. The use in translation of the word 'mercenaries' is not intended to suggest the kind of casual hiring of mercenaries, which was so frequent in the fourth century (see 115. 4n.). That was for particular campaigns, usually on land.

How far is it true that Athens' fleet (the army hardly comes into question here) was 'mercenary' in this sense, i.e. composed of paid foreigners? First, we should note that, as D. Whitehead has observed, the passage implies a false distinction because *citizen* sailors were also paid and in that sense the entire navy was 'bought': as he puts it, 'what is overlooked is that rowing a trireme was a paid job for all concerned': *The Ideology of the Athenian Metec* (Cambridge, 1977), 86. But evidently the Corinthians' point is that the fleet was largely foreign.

The remark is made in a speech with a particular persuasive intention, and by itself should not be cited as evidence for the historical reality. The same is true of Pericles' reply at 143. 1, below (see n. there); but that is slightly different: it is (it can be said) unlikely that Th. would allow Pericles to accept, as he is made to do, that there is some small degree of truth in the Corinthian claim if there were no truth in it at all. See Amit, *Athens and the Sea* (Brussels, 1965), 43, following Gomme. But in fact Pericles' remarks elsewhere in that speech are almost equally persuasive

in intention, and equally rhetorical: see 142. 7 for *ὕμεις*, 'you', with its implication of a primarily citizen fleet. Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, i. 20, is useful but perhaps too inclined to take both Pericles' and the Corinthians' words at their face value. Some of the other evidence is equally suspect; Isok. viii. 48 makes a rhetorical contrast between the fourth century (citizen fleet, mercenary hoplites) and the good old fifth (citizen hoplites, fleet manned by mercenaries and slaves; the word here translated 'mercenaries' is *ξένοι*, 'foreigners'). No, or very little, use should be made of this. Xen. *Hell.* i. 5. 4 is better: it implies that there were sailors in the Athenian fleet who could be lured away by offers of higher pay than they had been getting. But even this is not a narrative or authorial statement but part of an attempt by Sparta to get more money from Cyrus. That there were some mercenary sailors in the Athenian fleet in 431 is probable enough. It is also possible that the proportion of foreigners and mercenaries to citizens increased by 413: see Dover, *HCT* on vii. 63. 3, where Nikias is made to treat the sailors as non-Athenians. Dover says that, if this was right, 'the Corinthian reproach *ὠνητή ἢ Ἀθηναίων δύναμις μάλλον ἢ οἰκεία* (i. 121. 3) had come half true by 413—the other half depends on what one regards as *οἰκείον* [lit. 'their own']'. But as I argued in *Thucydides*, 98, the sailors addressed by Nikias in that passage may be metics rather than mercenaries (so too Whitehead, 43). However, when I said in *Thucydides* that metics are never referred to as such in Thucydidean speeches, I overlooked 143. 1 below (Pericles; ii. 13. 7 also has the word, but that is not a clear case—encouragement of Pericles reported in indirect speech). For vii. 63. 3 see my n. there.

σώμασι . . . χρήμασιν: 'men . . . money'. Closely echoed at 141. 5.

4. **μῖᾷ τε νίκῃ:** 'in a single naval engagement'. For the phrase compare 141. 6.

καὶ ὅταν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐς τὸ ἴσον καταστήσωμεν: 'as soon as we have brought our skill up to the level of theirs'. This passage should be borne in mind when we read ii. 85. 2: see n. there.

122. 1. **καὶ ἐπιτειχισμὸς τῇ χώρᾳ:** 'we may plant a fort in their territory'. This suggestion is answered by Pericles (at 142. 2), who uses the closely related word *ἐπιτείχισις*. The word is striking and technical; it is this correspondence above all which has led scholars to denounce the two speeches as an artificial pair. But (see introductory n. above) it is not unthinkable that the same notions should have been discussed in both Corinth (or rather by Corinthians at Sparta) and Athens. It has further been held that the two speeches must be artificial in another sense, namely that they were written after and under the influence of

events which had not occurred at their 'dramatic' date, i.e. the date at which they purport to have been delivered. The point is that the most celebrated 'fort planned in enemy territory' was that at Pylos, in 425 (iv. 3. 3, where Demosthenes' colleagues are hostile to the idea). Against this see G. L. Cawkwell, 'Thucydides' Judgment of Periclean Strategy', *YCS* 24 (1975), 67: '... it seems quite probable that the idea would be current. Naxian refugees had been settled in forts on Naxos in 499 (Hdt. 5. 34. 3), presumably not just for the view ... 'Επιτειχισμός was no great leap of the imagination.'

On *epiteichismos* generally see H. D. Westlake, 'The Progress of Epiteichismos', *CQ* 33 (1983), 12 ff. = *Studies*, ch. 3; and see below, iii. 85. 2 n. on τῆς πέραν ...

ἤκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ: 'war, least of all things; conforms to prescribed rules' [lit. 'proceeds in ways that have been laid down']. For this striking personification see Macleod, 124, and *Thucydides*, 156. The most famous example in Th. is iii. 82. 2, War as a 'violent schoolmaster', see n. there on ὁ δὲ πόλεμος. According to Theopompos (*FGrHist* 115 F 127) Philip II of Macedon related to the Chalkidian leaders a fable (Babrius F 30) about the marriage of Polemos (War) and Hubris. It is possible that Pericles' remark that he saw War coming, perhaps 'striding', προσφερόμενον, from the Peloponnese (Plut. *Per.* 8. 7) was intended as a personification.

ἐν ᾧ ὁ μὲν εὐοργήτως ...: 'to keep one's temper under control ...'. On this passage see Macleod, *ibid.*, observing that Th. here subtly subverts what has just been said: the idea that war with its unpredictable hazards will actually improve things by bringing with it greater inventiveness is quietly refuted out of the Corinthians' own mouths: 'events have to be endured, more or less cheerfully, by all the combatants alike'. That is, passion and loss of temper merely make things worse.

2. ἀντικρυσ δουλείαν: 'downright slavery'. See above, 98. 2 and 4 nn., for this non-literal sense of 'slavery'; for ἀντικρυσ, 'downright', see viii. 64. 5 n. (ἀντικρυσ ἐλευθερίαν, 'absolute freedom', the opposite of the present notion) and 92. 11 n. (ἀντικρυσ δῆμον, 'outright democracy').

3. τύραννον ... πόλιν: 'a tyrant city'. For this powerful expression see C. J. Tuplin, 'Imperial Tyranny: Some Reflections on a Classical Greek Metaphor', *CRUX*, 352f.: the Corinthians 'want to exploit Sparta's reputation for hostility to tyrants in the archaic era [but see 18. 1 n.], and they want to underline what might be called the theme of "one against many"'. The notion of the τύραννος πόλις has been much discussed recently; Tuplin gives references. See also below, 124. 3.

As so often (144. 3 n. and esp. my n. on the authorial iii. 82. 2, ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ etc.), Th. makes a speaker assimilate states and individuals,

using about states the kind of moral language or metaphor appropriate to individuals: a tyrant is essentially an individual. This point is perhaps illustrated most clearly by the expression used by Euphemos at vi. 85. 1, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἢ πόλει, lit. 'a tyrant man or polis'.

4. **καταφρόνησιν . . . ἀφροσύνη μετωνόμασται:** 'contemptuous attitude . . . only deserves to be called folly'. Compare the Corcyraeans' self-reproach at 32. 4 above; and for the play on *καταφρόνησις* below, ii. 62. 3 n. on *φρονήματι . . . καταφρόνηματι*.

123. 1. **τοῦ τε θεοῦ χρήσαντος:** 'Apollo [lit. 'the god'] has spoken'. See above, 118. 3 n.

καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης ξυναγωνιουμένης, τὰ μὲν φόβῳ, τὰ δὲ ὠφελίᾳ: 'all Greece will fight on our side, from motives either of fear or of advantage'. For Th.'s authorial endorsement of the view that the sympathies of Greece inclined towards the Peloponnesian side see below, ii. 8. 4 and n.; and for 'fear' and 'advantage' (together with *τιμῆ*, 'honour') as motivating forces see above, 75. 3 and 76. 2, speech of the Athenians at Sparta.

2. **λύουσι γάρ:** 'the real treaty-breakers . . .'. The Corinthians have used this argument already: see 71. 5 above.

124. 1. **καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις:** 'both to states and individuals'. See 144. 3 n.

Δωριεῦσι καὶ ὑπὸ Ἴωνων πολιορκουμένοις, οὗ πρότερον ἦν τοῦναντίον: 'who are Dorians and are now besieged by Ionians (for times have changed)'. See Alty (above, 95. 1 n.) for such appeals to the racial factor, esp. 7 n. 39 and 11 n. 57 for the present passage, pointing out that the Dorian/Ionian distinction is more frequently invoked on the Peloponnesian than the Athenian side, and that the Athenians themselves are sometimes (as here) included in disparaging references to Ionians. The remark here about times having changed [lit. 'which is the opposite of what used to be true'] is simply an assertion of this traditional low view.

3. **πόλιν τύραννον:** 'tyrant city'. See above, 122. 3 n.

125. *The Peloponnesians vote; their preparations*

1. **τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν:** 'the majority voted for war'. See 88 nn. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 149 f., suggests that here too, as at 88, Th. has radically distorted matters: once again the vote was a mere vote that the Athenians had broken the treaty. If so (and it is certainly true that negotiations continue for some considerable time)

Th. has distorted matters in Athens' and Pericles' favour. See 127. 3 n. on ἡγαντιούτο etc.

2. ἐνιαυτὸς μὲν οὐ . . . ἔλασσον δέ: 'nearly a whole year'. See ii. 2. 1 n.

126. THE KYLON AFFAIR

The motive for this Spartan demand becomes clear at 127 below: the Spartans hope to get rid of or at least to discredit Pericles, who was a remote descendant, on his mother Agariste's side, of one of the Kylonian killers, Megakles of the Alkmaionid family. (I write 'Kylonian killers' not 'killers of Kylon' because, in Th.'s version at least, Kylon himself escaped.) The 'curse' described in this chapter was very old, and had damaged the Alkmaionidai only intermittently. Such a μῖασμα or pollution might 'go to sleep', as Aeschylus put it in the *Eumenides*, line 280: βρίζει γὰρ αἷμα καὶ μαραίνεται χερὸς, 'the blood sleeps and dies away from my hand' (Orestes about his own matricide). But it might also 'wake up'—or be woken up. See the excellent discussion of Parker, *Miasma*, 16f., who discusses this phenomenon in general and the fluctuating importance of the Alkmaionid curse in particular. He concludes that this pollution 'had soon ceased to be an actual source of religious anxiety, and become instead an inherited disgrace, one factor among others in the general reputation of the family, which enemies would denounce and friends ignore'. See also M. Jameson, 'Notes on the Sacrificial Calendar from Erchia' [for which see below], *BCH* 89 (1965), 154ff., pointing out that Zeus Meilichios (below) was a prominent deity of purification; this would mean that the timing of the attempted coup made it specially impious. If so, the killing of Kylon's supporters could have been justified at the time or later by arguing that 'the violence initiated by the conspirators . . . could have been interpreted as putting them religiously in the wrong on that day of all days'. This might help to explain any ambiguity in the way in which the curse was later regarded.

There remains Th.'s motive for giving the background at such length. Part of the motive seems to be the desire to correct Hdt. on a crucial detail: see para. 8 n.

Another function of the Kylon digression is simply to provide a bridge to the more substantial excursions on Pausanias and Themistokles, the motive for which will be considered at the introductory n. to 128–138. The story of Pausanias' killing, and the curse which arose from it, is nearer in time than Kylon to the events of the late 430s, but in another way it is more remote: the Kylon curse attached to a famous living

politician and is politically the more intelligible of the two demands, to which the later Athenian demand is an obviously cooked-up reply. The Pausanias episode in its turn leads naturally on to the Themistokles episode; not because there was any 'Themistoklean curse' to be expiated (or rather, none that Th. knew of or thought worth mentioning: see below) but because Themistokles was allegedly incriminated by Pausanias' downfall. Th. is thus able to balance a prominent Spartan with a prominent Athenian. (Possible Themistoklean curse: note a still unpublished ostrakon describing Th. as 'liable to a curse', *ὑπέγγυος ἄγος* [*sic*]: D. M. Lewis, postscript to A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*² (London, 1984), 605 f.)

But that is not all, because there are after all three stories not two, an Athenian, a Spartan, and an Athenian, arranged in that order (a:b:a); they all concern exceptional men with aspirations to leadership (Kylon by far the least successful of the three). The 'a:b:a' arrangement brings Th. naturally back to Athens and a fourth exceptional man and—unlike the other three—a *successful* leader, namely Pericles. (We shall see at 138 nn. below that the account of Themistokles' qualities prepares us for those of Pericles.) But Pericles, or rather the Spartans' wish to get rid of him, was the motive for introducing the first story, that of Kylon. This is therefore a piece of ring composition. The organization of this whole final section of Book i is extremely skilful; the transitions are all natural, but all different. Pre-war diplomacy introduces Kylon; a curse involving breaches of the rights of suppliants links Kylon and Pausanias (see J. Gould, *JHS* 93 (1973), 74); evidence of treachery links Pausanias and Themistokles, whose outstanding qualities link him to Pericles, who shares the taint of the Kylonian killing, and who will in his final speech close the phase of pre-war diplomacy in favour of the active fighting which begins Book ii.

1. ἐγκλήματα ποιούμενοι: 'and made various complaints'. See 86. 2 n.: these complaints were not made with arbitration in view, at least as Th. has presented things.

πρόφασις εἶη τοῦ πολεμεῖν: 'their grounds for going to war'. See 118. 1 n. for this use of *πρόφασις*. Without the addition of *ἀληθεσάτη*, 'true', the word *πρόφασις* can virtually stand for 'pretext'.

3. Κύλων ἦν Ἀθηναῖος ἀνὴρ: 'there was once an Athenian named Kylon . . .'. What Th. does, and what he does not, bother to tell us about Kylon, are equally surprising. Many of his contemporary readers, and all the Athenians among them, must have known that Kylon was an Athenian. (This item, and his Olympic victory, may simply be taken from Hdt. v. 71. Not so the information that he was Theagenes' son-in-law: see my article in *Catling Studies*.) But that posterity which Th. claims as

his audience at 22. 4 above would welcome a little more information about Kylon, e.g. his approximate date. And in fact the century, let alone the precise year, of his attempted coup is not quite certain, although the most probable date is in the 630s or possibly 620s (perhaps 636: see below, para 5 n.). The starting-point must be the statement that Kylon was an Olympic victor (below). From a reliable list of victors preserved by Eusebius (92 in Kaerst's edn. of the Armenian version) we learn that Kylon's victory was in the 35th Olympiad. The Olympic games, which happened every four years, began in 776 BC. This gives 640 as the date for Kylon's victory. This fits well with what is known of Theagenes, tyrant of Megara (below). It also makes good sense in terms of Athenian history: the Athenians in c.630 were not yet ready for a tyrant. During the next generation their economic and social difficulties worsened, and Solon legislated as reformer, but still not as tyrant, in 594. But Solon's solution failed, and in the course of the sixth century a real tyrant, Pisistratus, took power. This is an intelligible progression: see J. H. Wright, *The Date of Cylon* (Boston, 1892), reprinted from *HCSP* 3 (1892).

The main difficulty with this dating has always been felt to be Hdt.'s statement that Kylon was 'before the time of Pisistratus' (v. 71. 2). If we had no other evidence we would naturally understand this to mean 'shortly before the time of Pisistratus'. The expression is vague, but however loosely we take it, it remains surprising (on the orthodox dating) that Hdt. did not say 'before the time of Solon' [rather than 'of Pisistratus']. Hdt. in fact hardly mentions Solon's reforms at all. This led Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² i. 2. 302 ff., to put Kylon in the mid *sixth* century, in the disturbed interval between Solon and Pisistratus, more precisely between the first and second tyrannies of Pisistratus. Beloch simply threw out the inconvenient item about the 35th Olympiad. Other, more recent, scholars have also sought to put Kylon in the sixth rather than the seventh century but have tried to explain the tradition of the Olympic lists. The most ingenious suggestion is that the early Olympic games were annual, not quadrennial. See Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 81, citing T. Lenschau, *Philologus*, 91 (1936), 396 ff., and E. Lévy, *Historia*, 27 (1978), 513 ff. But Rhodes's account of this suggestion is not intelligible as it stands because he does not mention that the Lenschau view requires the further (arbitrary) assumption—see Lenschau—that the first Olympic games were held not in 776 but in 632. Only thus can the 35th Olympiad have fallen in 598 where, as Rhodes says, Lenschau and Lévy put it. There are other complications in the various traditions, notably Plato's statement, *Laws*, 642, that Athens was 'purified' (for this notion see 8. 1 n. above) from the pollution of the Kylonian killing, at a much later date than Hdt. implies. For this see Rhodes, and on Epimenides the

Cretan, who carried out the purification, see M. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford, 1983), 45 ff. These 'sixth-century' theories are all more or less far-fetched; for the reasons given above a seventh-century date remains preferable. Hdt.'s formulation at v. 71. 2 remains odd on this view; but no odder than his (and Th.'s) curious reticence about Solon generally.

For a good modern discussion of Kylon in his context see Andrewes, *CAH* iii². 3. 368 ff. Note that the law-code of Drakon (621/0), discussed by Andrewes, provides further support for the traditional date for Kylon: Drakon's laws, particularly his rules about murder, make good sense in the aftermath to Kylon. This was not a problem for Beloch, for whom Drakon was not a man but a snake (Greek δράκων), a theory revived by R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States* (Berkeley, 1976), 104.

Ὀλυμπιονίκης: 'who had been an Olympic victor'. See above, 6. 5 n. (about Orsippus) for the political prestige conferred by athletic success in archaic Greece.

ἐγεγαμήκει δὲ θυγατέρα Θεαγένους Μεγαρέως ἀνδρός, ὃς κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ἐτυράννει Μεγάρων: 'he had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarian who was at that time tyrant of Megara'. This illustrates a characteristic of Greek tyrants, their tendency to intermarry. See L. Gernet, 'Marriages of Tyrants', *The Anthropology of Ancient Greece* (Baltimore, 1981), 289 ff. Note also *Mausolus*, app. 2, with references, for a more extreme instance of such endogamy, namely brother-sister incest within a ruling family.

For Theagenes see Legon, *Megara* (120. 2 n.), 93 ff. A mid-seventh-century date for the beginning of Theagenes' tyranny would approximately synchronize him with the rise of the other 'Isthmus tyrannies', i.e. those in the states near the Isthmus of Corinth (Corinth herself, Sikyon, Argos). This is further support for the traditional date for Kylon (above). But we must beware of circularity: most of the books which mention Theagenes date him by reference to Kylon whose dates are assumed to be certain.

4. **ἀνείλεν ὁ θεός:** 'the god replied'. See 118. 3 n. on τὸν θεόν.

ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τῇ μεγίστῃ ἑορτῇ καταλαβεῖν τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἀκρόπολιν: 'to seize the acropolis of Athens at the greatest festival of Zeus'. For two similar ruses in the Peloponnesian War see iii. 3. 3 and 56 with nn. In particular note the repetition of πανδημεί, 'the whole population' (para. 6, below, see n. there = iii. 3. 3).

5. **ἐπειδὴ ἐπήλθεν Ὀλύμπια τὰ ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ:** 'when the time of the Olympic festival in the Peloponnese came round'. That is, the attempt was made in an Olympic year. This, on the normal assumptions about quadrennial Olympic dates (see above), restricts the possible years

of Kylon's attempted coup. 636, the next Olympiad after his victory, is an obvious possibility, but later Olympiads cannot be ruled out.

6. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἡ μεγίστη ἐορτὴ εἶρητο, οὔτε ἐκεῖνος ἐτι κατενόησε τό τε μαντεῖον οὐκ ἐδήλου: 'but whether the greatest festival spoken of was in Attica or somewhere else was a question to which he gave no further thought, and the oracle said nothing about it'. See Andrewes (above, para. 3 n. on *Κύλων*), 369, following Jameson (above, introductory n.), for the possibility that Th.'s version here is polemic against a tradition according to which the coup was attempted at the Diasia, not the Olympia. See further para. 7 n.

K. J. Dover, 'Thucydides on Oracles', *The Greeks and Their Legacy* (Oxford, 1988), 65 ff., at 71, regards the present passage as evidence that Th. was not, after all, a sceptic (as Dover once thought): 'if [Th.'s] work were lost and survived only in excerpts and one of those excerpts were the story of Cylon, no one would ever have thought [Th.] a sceptic.' He thinks that Th.'s remark that Kylon did not reflect long enough on the meaning of the oracle 'goes far beyond necessary explanation'. Dover concludes, with acknowledgment to S. Oost, ('Thucydides and the Irrational: Sundry Passages', *CP* 70 (1975), 186 ff.), that Th. moved from credulity to cynicism (though Oost charts a different spiritual progress for Th.). I am not convinced by this conclusion, though it may well be true that the whole Kylon-Pausanias-Themistokles section was written early. (i) The better conclusion seems to me that Th. was capable of expressing different attitudes in different parts of his work, and that the reasons for this are often literary. As Dover himself once put it, Th. has more than one 'register' (*HCT* v. 388). An exceptionally good example of this kind of thing is Th.'s attitude to earthquakes and other portents, and their relation (merely coincidental? or somehow causal?) to outbreaks of plague. At i. 23 he runs together eclipses, earthquakes, and the great plague; in the main plague description in Book ii he operates at a purely rational level; but at iii. 87 he disconcertingly returns to the manner of i. 23 and tells us that there was a second outbreak of the plague, and then almost in the same breath (para. 4) that this was a time when there was a large number of earthquakes. See nn. on all those passages. It would be very unconvincing to argue that i. 23 and iii. 87 were written first, then the main plague description at a 'cynical' later date. (ii) As for the present passage, it seems to me that Th. is telling us in effect that an intelligent archaic man, in Kylon's position and with a belief in oracles, should have thought a bit harder. This does not seem to me to commit Th. himself very far. It is true that, as Dover says, Th.'s comment is strictly unnecessary, but he is here writing in discursive and Herodotean vein, and in a manner appropriate to the subject-matter (though there

are also contemporary, Peloponnesian War, resonances: see para. 4n. above). Cp. ii. 102. 6n.

ἔστι γὰρ καὶ Ἀθηναίοις Διάσια: 'the Athenians also have a great festival of Zeus . . .'. As Andrewes, 369, says, this note is added for the benefit of non-Athenian readers; see para. 3n. above. This kind of material is most unusual in Th. (but see below on *θύουσι*).

For the Athenian Diasia see E. Simon, *Festivals of Attica: An Archaeological Commentary* (London, 1983), 12 ff. New light has been thrown on the festival by the discovery of a religious calendar from the deme of Erchia, *SEG* xxi. 541, an inscription first published in 1963: see following nn. and above all Jameson (above). The festival was agricultural and held in early spring. See also Connor, *JHS* 107 (1987), 41.

Μειλιχίου: 'Meilichios' ['gracious', 'kindly']. For this Zeus see above all Jameson, showing that the god may have been connected with the Lesser Mysteries (the first stage of the initiation rites associated with Eleusis). The title 'kindly' was probably apotropaic, i.e. intended to ward off evil (compare the 'Eumenides' or 'Kindly Ones' as a title for the Furies): it now seems that the cult of Zeus Meilichios was purificatory and chthonic, i.e. connected with death and the underworld.

ἔξω τῆς πόλεως: 'outside the city'. Actually we know from the Erchia inscription (column A, lines 38–9) that it was held at Agrai, which was on the banks of the Ilissos—the site of the later temple of Olympian Zeus which is still so prominent a feature of the area: see J. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (London, 1971), 112. The inscription describes Agrai as being *ἐν ἄστει*, 'in the city', but in its context this must mean 'in the city as opposed to in the deme'. Agrai was outside the physical city. As H. W. Parke remarks, 'the implication is that, if Cylon had chosen this festival he would have found Athens deserted as the populace would have mostly gone outside to take part in the rite of Zeus Meilichios': *Festivals of the Athenians* (London, 1977), 120. See also R. Parker, 'Festivals of the Attic Demes', in *Boreas*, 15 (1987) [a symposium called *Gifts for the Gods*], 137 ff., at 140 and n. 35: 'at Agrai *just outside Athens*' (my italics).

πανδημεί: 'the whole people'. The meaning of this word has now been made clear by the inscription: see J. D. Mikalson, 'Religion in the Attic Demes', *AJP* 98 (1977), 429f., and Parker (above): it means '*en masse*' (Parker). (Mikalson takes it to mean 'all the demes together . . . rather than by all the demes individually'. The latter notion is certainly excluded by the new inscription, but Parker doubts whether 'every deme, including the most distant, took part in the central rite', as Mikalson supposes.)

'That this participation of all the demes together in a festival was

somewhat irregular is itself suggested by Thucydides' inclusion of this detail in his brief description of the festival' (Mikalson; but see next n.) **θύουσι πολλοὶ οὐχ ἱερεῖα, ἀλλὰ θύματα ἐπιχώρια**: 'many people do not sacrifice ordinary victims, but local kinds of offering'. The correct text, and the meaning, of this troubled sentence have now been clarified by Jameson, with the help of the Erchia inscription (neither Parke nor Simon is satisfactory on the sentence because they show no awareness of Jameson's discussion). The Erchia inscription shows that a sheep was sacrificed at the Diasia; this (see Jameson, 163, 165) would be a perfectly normal sacrifice, and rules out the emendation *πολλὰ οὐχ ἱερεῖα*, the upshot of which would be 'people made many offerings, none of which were sacrifices of a normal kind'. Instead we must retain what is the reading of all manuscripts, *πολλοὶ οὐχ ἱερεῖα*, which would mean in effect 'although some people made normal sacrifices, many did not [but made local-type offerings instead]'. Jameson further shows (166 and n. 4) that the word *ἀγνά* ['pure', i.e. 'bloodless'] should not be introduced into the text before *θύματα*, 'offerings'. The justification for this was thought to be contained in an entry of the *Lexicon* of the late writer Pollux (i. 26) who cites Thucydides for the expression *ἀγνά θύματα*. Jameson suggests that 'Thucydides' in Pollux may be a confusion for 'Plato'. Jameson concludes, 'the Erchian sheep is indeed a *hiereion*, but the use of wineless libations could properly be described as *epichorion*, a distinctive local custom, and thus the sacrifice as a whole falls between Thucydides' alternatives'. As for the 'local offerings', the scholiast says that these were cakes in the form of animals; Jameson thinks this is plausible (cakes were the poor man's substitute for animal sacrifice), but I doubt if it was more than a guess.

Why Th. introduced this detail about the sacrifices is beyond me, and I cannot help wondering if some of the round-bracketed material in the Oxford text is a gloss; that is, explanatory material by a later commentator which has crept into the text. (It encourages me that Jacoby (above, 50. 2n.) thought this sort of thing commoner in Th. than is usually realized, although I did not there accept his suggestion about *Σύβοτα*). Perhaps the bracket should be cut off after *ἔξω τῆς πόλεως* and everything after that to *ἐπιχώρια* deleted. But in my commentary on this chapter I have treated the text as if it were essentially sound. Cp. the similar problem at ii. 15. 4: see n. there on *ὧ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια*.

(A final point: it is odd that the word *πανδημεί*, 'the whole people', 'en masse', is used again a line or two later; but the occurrence of the word at iii. 3. 3—see above, 4n.—where it is used about the celebration of a Mytilenean festival by the whole population, to some extent

protects this, the first and more religious occurrence of the word in the present ch.)

7. **πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν:** 'en masse from the countryside'. Jameson, struck by the similarity between the word ἀγρῶν and the location (Agra or Agrai) of the Diasia, as revealed by the Erchia text, ingeniously suggests that, in the version which Th. is combating in this chapter (see above, first n. on para. 6), it may have been related that the Athenians came in 'en masse from Agrai', πανδημεὶ ἐκ τῶν Ἀγρῶν. The coincidence is certainly remarkable (but the Greek for 'from Agrai' would more naturally be ἐξ Ἀγρῶν). See also Lambert, below, next n.

8. **ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἄρχουσι . . . τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἔπρασσον:** 'telling the nine archons to keep guard . . . public affairs were chiefly administered by the nine archons'. This is the most obvious contradiction of Hdt. in this ch. Hdt. says (v. 71) of the Kylonian affair that the *prytaneis* of the *naukrarias* governed Athens at that time. This has usually been held to reflect Hdt.'s partiality for his Alkmaionid informants. One of the archons was the Alkmaionid Megakles, and the statement that power lay in the hands, not of the archons, but of the obscure officials whom Hdt. mentions, seems designed to exonerate Megakles. But see R. Thomas (20. 2 n.) 272 ff. A recent study seeks to avoid the contradiction by cleverly pressing Hdt.'s word for 'at that time' (τότε). On this view the archons were only temporarily absent for the festival and the *prytaneis* of the *naukrarias* were 'minding the shop' for them. (Compare perhaps Roman arrangements during the Latin Festival, Tacitus, *Annals*, vi. 11.) See S. D. Lambert, 'Herodotus, the Cylonian Conspiracy, and the ΠΡΥΤΑΝΙΕΣ ΤΩΝ ΝΑΥΚΡΑΠΙΩΝ', *Historia*, 35 (1986), 105 ff. But Andrewes (above), 369, is surely right that the conflict between our two authorities is 'beyond resolution'. For the literature on the naukrarion problem see T. Figueira, 'Xanthippus and the *Prutaneis* of the *Naukraroi*', *Historia*, 35 (1986), 257 ff. Andrewes 387 stresses the people's role.

10. **ὁ μὲν οὖν Κύλων καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ἐκδιδράσκουσιν:** 'So he and his brother made their escape'. Contrast Hdt., who clearly implies that Kylon was killed with the rest.

11. **τῶν σεμνῶν θεῶν:** 'the solemn goddesses'. That is, the Erinyes or Eumenides ('Kindly Ones'): for the identification see H. Lloyd-Jones, 'Les Erinyes dans la tragédie grecque', *REG* 102 (1989), 1 ff.; English version in *Owls to Athens* (i. 23. 6 n.), 203 ff. For their cult, and cult-place on the Areopagus (a place and institution never mentioned by Th.) near the Acropolis, see A. Sommerstein, ed., *Aeschylus: Eumenides* (Cambridge, 1989), 6–12. (For another possible cult at or near Kolonos see *Arch. Reps.* 1988/9, 13 f., roof tile stamped ΣΕΜΝΩΝ ΘΕΩΝ.) The cult of the Solemn Goddesses was the responsibility of the *genos* or family of the

Hesychidai: see the scholiast on Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus* 489 (quoting Polemon and Kallimachos, F 681 Pfeiffer), with Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford, 1952), 315 f. [Parker, *ARH* 298 f.]

ἄλιτήριοι: 'offenders against'. This word, 'one of the strongest terms denoting a religious offender' (Parker, *Miasma*, 270), is used on an ostrakon cast against Pericles' father Xanthippos, found in 1940 and first published in 1947. See ML 21 = Fornara 41 D 5. Even if Meiggs and Lewis are right that the word refers, not to Xanthippos specifically, but to the whole class of 'offending', i.e. 'accursed', leaders to which he belongs, it is interesting to find the word used both about Xanthippos on the ostrakon, and here by Th. about the men whose actions bequeathed the curse to Xanthippos' son Pericles. See further Figueira (above, para. 8n.), 261 ff.

12. καὶ Κλεομένης: 'and Kleomenes . . .'. His only mention in Th. For what follows see Hdt. v. 70 and 72. These events took place in 508.

καὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων τὰ ὄστα ἀνελόντες ἐξέβαλον: 'digging up and throwing out the bones of the dead'. There is a possibility that we have archaeological evidence for this. See G. M. A. Richter, *The Archaic Gravestones of Attica* (London, 1961), 29, for a broken-up funerary monument from Anavyssos (the ancient Attic deme of Anaphlystos). Note that Richter should have referred, not to Isok. xiv. 21 (read 26), but to the present passage of Th. It is also possible that Phrasikleia and her brother had their statues buried in order to avoid the same fate: see for these statues E. Mastrokostas, *AAA* (= *Athens Annals of Archaeology*), 5 (1972), 298 ff.; G. Daux, *CRAI* 1973, 382 ff.; other references in J. Travlos, *Bildlexikon zur Topographie des antiken Attika* (Tübingen, 1988), 366. For the burial see also Jesper Svenbro, *Phrasikleia: anthropologie de la lecture en grèce ancienne* (Paris, 1988), 17.

Note that the exile and disinterment took place a long time after the original sacrilege; see Diggle (below, 138. 6n.).

127. THE SPARTAN MOTIVE

1. εἰδότες . . . νομίζοντες: 'they knew . . . they thought . . .'. In this whole chapter Th. is characteristically confident about the precise thoughts of the Spartans. See above, 5. 1 n. on *ἡγουμένων*.

κατὰ τὴν μητέρα: 'by his mother's side'. See above, introductory n. to 126.

2. οὐ . . . τοσοῦτον: 'not so much'. See above, 9. 1 n.

3. ὢν γὰρ δυνατώτατος τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄγων τὴν πολιτείαν: 'for he was one of the most able men of his day and the leader of the state'. This is not the first mention of Pericles, who has featured

more than once in the *Pentekontaetia* (which may, however, have been written very late indeed: see 97. 2 n. and 118. 2 n. on *καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας*); but it is his formal introduction (or one of them: 139. 4 repeats the point about his ability: see n. there). For 'leader' cp. ii. 65. 8 n. on *καὶ οὐκ . . . ἠναντιοῦτο πάντα τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, καὶ οὐκ εἶα ὑπέικειν, ἀλλ' ἐς τὸν πόλεμον ὄρμα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους*: 'his policy was utterly opposed to the Spartans. He would not allow the Athenians to give way, but was always urging them on to the war'. See above, 87. 2 n.: de Ste. Croix (*OPW* 65) makes much of the analogy between what is said about Sthenelaidas there and about Pericles here, but overlooks the tenses in the present passage, which are all imperfect: Pericles went on urging them. This means it is incorrect to say, as de Ste. Croix does, that Pericles urged the Athenians 'at a later stage in the proceedings, when both the Spartan Assembly and the Peloponnesian League Congress had taken formal decisions in favour of war'. Actually, war has not yet been decided on: see 125. 1 n. (On de Ste. Croix's stress on the definite article in the present passage—'the' war—see 87. 2 n.)

128-135. 1. THE CURSE OF TAINARON; THE
CURSE OF ATHENA OF THE BRAZEN HOUSE
(THE PAUSANIAS EXCURSUS)

The two excursuses on Pausanias and Themistokles (and the Kylon episode which precedes them) are in a different style from the rest of Book i, and indeed from the rest of Th. They are in easy narrative Greek (the scholiast remarked of the Kylon chapter, 'here the lion laughed'); and the general handling recalls even when it corrects Hdt. (For such corrections see above, 126. 8 n., and 128. 7 below.) It has therefore been suggested that Th. drew here on a written source: see H. D. Westlake, 'Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles: a Written Source?', *CQ* 27 (1977), 95 ff. = *Studies*, ch. 1. This idea is based on some undoubted linguistic oddities which will be noted as they occur. It is hardly worth trying to give a name to the written source, if there was one, though he may have written in the Ionic dialect of Greek (Westlake, 106; see also Hammond, below, 136. 1 n.). Another popular idea has been that Th. was reacting against some earlier literary treatment: see E. Carawan, 'Stesimbrotus and Thucydides on the Exile of Themistocles', *Historia*, 38 (1989), 144 ff. [and now C. Patterson in *Nomodeiktēs*].

It is more important to note that Th. was doing something unusual in these chapters. (The Pausanias excursus in particular involved him in some awkward and uncharacteristic recapitulation.) What was his aim?

At the very end of the section (138. 6) he concludes, 'that is the end of the histories of the two most famous, λαμπρότατοι, Greeks of their time'; one is a Spartan, the other an Athenian. Like Hdt. in *his* first book (i. 59–68, the Lycurgan and Pisistratid digressions), Th. is here introducing us to the two great protagonists, Sparta and Athens, via a sketch of a great citizen of each (see *Thucydides*, 33). But it is also significant that, like some of the prominent individuals on both sides in the Peloponnesian War itself, these two commanding personalities fell foul of their fellow-citizens.

For an examination of the historical background to both the Pausanias and Themistokles stories, and the difficulties involved, see G. L. Cawkwell, 'The Fall of Themistocles', *Auckland Classical Studies Presented to E. M. Blaiklock* (London, 1971), 39ff. For the various chronological problems, which it is not my intention to discuss in any detail in this commentary, see P. J. Rhodes, 'Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles', *Historia*, 19 (1970), 387ff. (also containing general sceptical remarks on the excursuses), and M. P. Milton, 'The Date of Thucydides' Synchronism of the Siege of Naxos with Themistokles' Flight', *Historia*, 28 (1979), 257ff. Both these articles give references to earlier literature.

The whole Pausanias–Themistokles excursus is printed, with valuable commentary, in U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Griechisches Lesebuch* (Berlin, 1902), i (Text), 1. 50ff. and ii (Erläuterungen), 1. 26ff.

See above, introductory n. to 126; also *Thucydides*, 26 and A. Momigliano, *The Development of Greek Biography* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 34: the Pausanias–Themistokles excursus shows that Th. had an interest in biography; but he was prepared to indulge it only when, as here, there was a non-Greek, specifically a Greco-Persian, angle. (Note that this does not account for Th.'s interest in Kylon: 126. 3 starts in very 'once-upon-a-time' fashion.)

128. 1. τὸ ἀπὸ Ταϊνάρου ἄγος: 'the curse of Tainaron'. Tainaron was at the tip of what is now the Mani peninsula. It was and is inaccessible. This explains not only why it was a helot refuge but also why, in Alexander's time and later, it was to be a great centre for recruiting mercenaries: Diod. xvii. 108. 7 and 111. 1, with E. Badian, *JHS* 81 (1961), 27f. **τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος [ἀπὸ Ταϊνάρου]:** 'of Poseidon at Tainaron'. I follow Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, in retaining the square-bracketed words (that is, the brackets should be removed); Lewis's discussion also shows that it is possible that what Th. actually wrote was Ποσειδῶνος τοῦ Ταϊναρίου, 'the Tainarian Poseidon' (compare the scholiast on Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 510, apparently drawing on the present passage of Th.).

We know nothing about this episode except that it was before 465; nor do we know how the Athenians got to hear about it. See Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), 214, guessing that there was an abortive helot rising in about 470.

For temples as slave-refuges ('sanctuaries' in both senses) cp. Hdt. ii. 113, and see K. A. Christensen, 'The Theseion: A Slave Refuge at Athens', *AJAH* 9 (1984), 23 ff.

τὸν μέγαν σεισμόν: 'the great earthquake'. See 101. 2 and n.

3. ἐπειδὴ Πausanίας ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὸ πρῶτον μεταπεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Σπαρτιατῶν: 'when Pausanias the Spartan was originally summoned by the Spartiates . . .'. For this acquittal see 95. 5 above. This passage contains one of four unusual uses, in this section, of 'Spartiates'. This is the normal term for 'full Spartan citizens' (see Andrewes, *HCT* on viii. 22. 1); but here, and at 131. 1, 132. 1 and 5, Th. uses it to describe the Spartan decision-making body. See Westlake (above), 97 ff., showing that here Th. follows not his own normal practice but that of Hdt., and concluding that here Th. 'may be using as his source the work of some predecessor who wrote in the Ionian manner and, like Herodotus, had little interest in official nomenclature'.

τῷ μὲν λόγῳ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον, τῷ δὲ ἔργῳ τὰ πρὸς βασιλέα πράγματα πράσσειν: 'pretending that he had gone there to fight in the cause of the Greeks [lit. 'to the Greek war']'. In reality he wanted to carry on an intrigue with the king . . .'.
 On *λόγῳ/ἔργῳ* ('pretending'/'in reality') see ii. 35. 1 n. The meaning of 'the Greek war' is 'the war fought by the Greeks', rather than 'the war against the Greeks'. The words are taken in the latter sense by those scholars (Cawkwell and de Ste. Croix, though his final view is unclear to me) who accept that there was almost open hostility between Athens and Sparta straight after the Persian Wars: see *Greek World*, 23 f. and n. 14 giving modern references. For the other evidence of hostility see above, nn. on 92, and 96. 1. The best discussion is Andrewes, 'Spartan Imperialism?', in *Imperialism* (above, 96. 2 n.), 303 n. 11, who admits at the end that a 'shade of doubt' remains, but prefers *either*, with Gebhardt, to emend 'Greek' to 'Persian' (*Μηδικὸν* instead of *Ἑλληνικὸν*) or to take the expression as meaning 'war fought by the Greeks' (compare *IG* ii². 505, line 17, where the fourth-century Lamian War fought by Greeks against Macedon is called 'the Greek War') or else to take the expression geographically, 'the war fought in Greece' (compare 112. 1). Of these possibilities the second ('war fought by the Greeks') is surely preferable; *IG* ii². 505 has not always been given sufficient weight. Jowett got the point right in his tr.

Westlake, 100 f., notes (see also Andrewes) the relevance of this

abnormal expression for his thesis, above, that Th. is here following a written source.

4. **εὐεργεσίαν**: 'an obligation' [lit. a benefaction]. See 136. 1 n.

5. **Βυζάντιον γὰρ ἔλων . . . μετὰ τὴν ἐκ Κύπρου ἀναχώρησιν**: 'after the return from Cyprus, when he captured Byzantium'. See above, 94. 2 ff.

6. **Γογγύλου τοῦ Ἐρετριῶς**: 'Gongylos the Eretrian'. This man was given a fief by the Persian king, and his descendants settled in Western Asia Minor, where Xenophon and his companions met him around 400 bc. See Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 6 and *Anab.* vii. 8. 8. For such Greeks 'enfeoffed' by Persia, a very interesting phenomenon, see *Greek World*, 19 and ch. 6 with references, to which add Cartledge, *Agesilaos* (London, 1987), 196 ff. For Gongylos' fief in particular see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 54 and n. 29, and G. Fogazza, 'Sui Gongilidi di Eretria', *Parola del Passato*, 27 (1972), 129 ff.

See Andrewes's study of 'Spartan Imperialism?', in *Imperialism* (96. 2 n.), 91 ff., esp. the excellent section on 'Pausanias and the Hegemony' at 91-5. Andrewes (93) notes of the gifts by the Persian king to Gongylos that they are 'one factual detail which shows that Pausanias did indeed have some dealings with the Persian king'. Otherwise, the extent of Pausanias' 'medism' has been reasonably doubted by modern scholars: see 132. 4 n. for his dealings with the helots, which Cawkwell thinks was the real offence.

ἐπιστολήν: 'a letter'. See W. V. Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), 88: this is a very early, perhaps the first, use of the word in the specific sense of 'letter' as opposed to 'instruction'.

ἐνεγέγραπτο δὲ τάδε ἐν αὐτῇ: 'the terms were as follows'. What follows is, however, unusually suspect: see Cawkwell, and Westlake, 102 f., section on 'the letters'. (Andrewes, 92 f., remarks that 'the letters are not very palatable'.)

ὡς ὕστερον ἀνηυρέθη: 'as was afterwards discovered'. The verb is a Herodotean word not found elsewhere in Th.: Westlake, 105.

7. **δορὶ ἔλών**: 'captives of his spear'. A poetic expression: see Wilamowitz (above), 27, and *Thucydides*, 28; the old, Homeric idea of 'spear-won territory' was revived in the Hellenistic age: see W. Schmitthenner, 'Über eine Formveränderung der Monarchie seit Alexander der Grosse', *Saeculum*, 19 (1968), 31 ff.; A. Mehl, 'ΔΟΡΙΚΤΗΤΟΣ ΧΩΡΑ', *Ancient Society*, 12/13 (1980/81), 173 ff. [See now my n. on iv. 98. 8.]

θυγατέρα τε τὴν σὴν γῆμαι: 'to marry your daughter'. Hdt. v. 32 says that Pausanias, 'if the story is true', actually married a daughter of Megabates, for whom see below. If Th. here corrects Hdt., it is noticeable that Hdt.'s version is for once the more sceptical and less far-fetched. But

there is, as Gomme says, no necessary contradiction between proposing to marry one girl and actually marrying another.

129. 1. Ξέρξης δὲ ἤσθη: 'Xerxes was delighted'. A Herodotean touch, as Gomme noted. There is not much delight or laughter in Th.: see D. Lateiner, 'No Laughing Matter: A Literary Tactic in Herodotus', *TAPA* 107 (1977), 201 ff., and below, iii. 83. 1 n.

Ἀρτάβαζον τὸν Φαρνάκου: 'Artabazos the son of Pharnakes'. This Pharnakes is now (since 1971) attested by evidence from the Persian side, the Persepolis Fortification Tablets, which are documents in the Elamite language recording the payment of rations in kind to high-ranking officials. Pharnakes features as Parnaka, and was evidently one of the highest-ranking ration-recipients of all. For him, and for the other evidence about his family, who held the Daskyleion satrapy in a quasi-hereditary way, see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 7 ff., 52, and Andrewes, *HCT* on viii. 6. 1. For another, related, Pharnakes see below, ii. 67. 1 and n.

τὴν τε Δασκυλίτιν σατραπείαν: 'the satrapy of Daskyleion'. Th. never uses the word 'satrap', and uses 'satrapy' here only in the whole work: see above, 115. 4 n., for this linguistic peculiarity, which lends further support to Westlake's case, though he does not specifically discuss it. Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian* (3. 3 n.), 95 n. 180, does not discuss the present passage and is therefore misleading: 'the word *satrapes* ... is not attested until the beginning of the fourth century. Herodotus and Thucydides use *huparchos*.' (This is incidentally misleading about Hdt. as well: for 'satrapy' in Hdt. see i. 192. 2 and iii. 89. 1.)

For the results of excavations at Daskyleion see *Archaeological Reports* 1959/60, 72, and the other material cited at my *Greek World*, 72.

ὃς πρότερον ἦρχε: 'who had governed it before'. The word ἄρχω, 'I rule', is a fairly strong one but it can be used of satraps: see e.g. the inscription at *Mausolus*, 366, M 7 = J. Crampa, *Labraunda: The Greek Inscriptions*, ii (Stockholm, 1972), no. 40, and Powell's *Lexicon to Herodotus*, 48, entry under ἄρχω, section A. 1. 5. The *verb* does not, however, seem to be used of satraps by Th.; the only Persian he uses it about is the king, e.g. at viii. 37. 5. (Note, however, 138. 5 below, where he uses it of Themistokles who 'governed' or controlled Magnesia for the Persians—but not as satrap as far as we know, despite ML 12 = Fornara 35 which has been taken to show that Magnesia on the Maiander was a satrapal base if not capital.) But I doubt if this means that the present usage ranks as a peculiarity like 'satrapy' (see preceding n.), in view of viii. 5 where the *noun* ἀρχή, 'province', is used about Tissaphernes, who is in effect a satrap (cp. e.g. *IG* ii². 207, Orontes in the fourth century). In all this it should be remembered that the same Greek words ἀρχή and

ἀρχω did duty for a number of concepts ranging from ‘a magistrate/magistracy/office’ (as at 96. 2, the *Hellenotamiai*) and ‘I hold a magistracy’, right through to ‘rule’ (as a noun) and ‘I exercise rule over’—not to mention other meanings such as ‘a beginning’ and ‘I begin’ (see above, 93. 4, for a famous ambiguity between ‘empire’ and ‘beginning’).

3. κείσεται σοι εὐεργεσία ἐν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ οἴκῳ: ‘the benefit . . . is recorded in my house for ever’. This is a splendidly authentic-sounding expression; for the exact phrase see ML 12 = Fornara 35 (Darius’ letter to Gadates). ML cite as parallels Hdt. viii. 85. 3 and Esther, ch. vi, where King Ahasuerus, not being able to sleep, ‘commanded to bring the book of records of the chronicles’ and realizes when it is read out to him that Mordecai has received no ‘honour and dignity’ for a past service. For other uses in Persian contexts of ‘the king’s house’ see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 146, and Cawkwell, ‘The King’s Peace’, *CQ* 31 (1981), 72 and n. 10. But, as Cawkwell says of Themistokles’ comparable letter (below, 137. 4n.), ‘presumably the phrase was used by Thucydides because he knew it would sound authentic’.

μήτε νύξ μήθ’ ἡμέρα: ‘neither night nor day’. Another poetic expression, in iambic verse rhythm: see above, 128. 7n.; cp. Hdt. viii. 98. 1 on the Persian postal system. For ‘verse’ in Th. see ii. 61. 2n.

130. 1. σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδύομενος: ‘he wore Persian dress’. For Alexander’s adoption of Persian dress as a source of Macedonian grievance see e.g. Arr. *Anab.* vii. 8. 2. For the Herodotean verb, Westlake (introductory n. to 128–135. 1), 105.

On the whole of the present ch. see Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian* (i. 3. 3n.), 204.

τράπεζάν τε Περσικὴν παρετίθετο: ‘he had his table served in the Persian way’. Westlake, 106 n. 60, compares Hdt. vi. 139. 3 and DK 68 Demokritos B 210 (but to Westlake’s references add Ath. 145f. = *FGrHist* 689 Herakleides of Kyme F 2, lines 24–5, which is exactly similar; and Plut. *Artox.* 22. 11, which is comparable: the expression may not be all that unusual).

2. δυσπρόσοδον: ‘difficult to approach’. See Hdt.’s story of the Median Deiokes at i. 96 ff.: he was supposed to have been the first man to grasp the connection between autocracy and inaccessibility. For this general topic see A. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Civilis Princeps: Between Citizen and King’, *JRS* 72 (1982), 33.

δι’ ὅπερ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: ‘this was one of the chief reasons . . . the Athenians’. See 95. 1ff., and for the possibility that Pausanias’ behaviour was seen as specifically anti-Athenian, 128. 3n. on *Ἑλληνικὸν πόλεμον*. For Hdt. (viii. 3. 2) the bad behaviour of Pausanias was a mere

excuse, *πρόφασις*. Here, as elsewhere in the present section (see 128. 7 n.), Hdt. for once shows himself the more cautious of the two writers: see Forrest, *CQ* 10 (1960), 238 n. 2.

131. 1. ἀνεκάλεσαν: 'had recalled him'. See 95. 3.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βία ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων ἐκπολιορκηθεῖς: 'when he had been forced out of Byzantium and the gates shut against him by the Athenians'. The period of Pausanias' stay is controversial: see Rhodes (introductory n. to 128–135. 1), 397; Justin, ix. 1. 3, has sometimes been invoked as evidence that his stay was as long as seven years ('per septem annos possessa est', invoked by e.g. Forrest, 'Pausanias and Themistokles Again', *Λακωνικάί Σπουδαί*, 2 (1975), 117); Lewis in *CAH* v². 100, 499 (who adduces other material); and Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 86 f., following Fornara (*Historia*, 1966, 257 ff.); but this period seems excessive: see Cawkwell (introductory n. to 128–135. 1), 58 n. 28.

ἐς δὲ Κολωνὰς τὰς Τρωάδας: 'at Kolonai in the Troad'. For this site see J. M. Cook, *The Troad* (Oxford, 1973), 219 ff. and map at 190. It is a few kilometres south of the later Alexandria Troas, which is itself south of Troy.

καὶ σκυτάλην: 'a *skytale*'. A stick round which an otherwise indecipherable (!) message on strips of cloth could be wrapped; the system called for two *skytalai*, one kept by the sender, one by the recipient. See T. Kelly, in J. W. Eadie and J. W. Ober (eds.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian: Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr* (New York, 1985), 141 ff. Cawkwell, 57 f. nn. 27 and 33, notes that if Pausanias had gone out in a private capacity (*ιδίᾳ* above) it is odd that he still had the use of a *skytale*; but the system was hardly like a ministerial telephone which could be cut off.

Σπαρτιάτας: 'the Spartiates'. See above, 128. 3 n.

2. εἶρκτήν: 'prison'. See Westlake, 105, for the Herodotean word, not found elsewhere in Th.

ἔξεστι δὲ τοῖς ἐφόροις τὸν βασιλέα δράσαι τοῦτο: 'the ephors, who have the power to imprison the king himself'. Jowett, by adding 'himself', translates as if there were a *καί* before τὸν βασιλέα ('even the king'), but unless a *καί* has indeed dropped out of the text it looks as if Th. has temporarily forgotten that Pausanias was not king.

132. 1. οἱ Σπαρτιάται: 'the Spartiates'. See above, 128. 3 n.

σημεῖον: 'trustworthy evidence'. See below, 132. 5, where the same idea is expressed by the words *ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων*. This, I have argued, is fatal to attempts to argue that Th. distinguished rigidly between these two words for 'evidence'. See *Thucydides*, 103; the present

passage is perhaps the most important, because the clearest, text illustrating this general point about Th.'s attitude to technical language (which he cannot be relied on to use precisely, though sometimes he does).

2. ἀκροθίνιον: 'firstfruits'. The word is found in Hdt., but not elsewhere in Th.: Westlake, 106. For the word see G. Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore, 1979), 125 and n. 2 to his para. 9; also Connor, 'Early Greek Warfare as Symbolic Expression', *Past and Present*, 119 (1988), 16, for *akrothinia* as 'the top of the pile' of spoils. See also 96. 2 n. on *ταμιεῖόν τε*.

τὸ ἐλεγείον τόδε: 'this elegiac couplet'. A rare use by Th. of epigraphic evidence—of a kind; the inscription was erased almost immediately. See for Th.'s citation of inscriptions *Thucydides*, 89ff. The eventual inscription, recording the names of the victorious Greek combatants, does survive and can still be seen in the Hippodrome in Istanbul: see ML 27 = Fornara 59. ML remark 'it is uncertain where Pausanias engraved the boastful epigram' which Th. quotes; 'perhaps it was inscribed on the uppermost of the three circular limestone steps which formed the base of the monument.' Assertive personal dedications in sacred surroundings were slow to win respectability; I have discussed this topic in *Mausolus*, ch. x. (The mid-fourth-century Hekatomnid satraps of Karia, of whom Mausolus was one, undoubtedly made such dedications at their sanctuary of Labraunda, and thus perhaps opened a new era. In and after Alexander's time the idea was no longer controversial or unusual.) See also next n.

ἐπεὶ στρατὸν ὤλεσε Μήδων | Πausανίας Φοῖβω: 'Pausanias . . . to Phoibos . . . when he had destroyed the Persian army'. J. Barron, *CAH* iv². 617, notes that 'the ambiguity—*who* destroyed the Medes?—was no doubt intended'. See previous n.

3. οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐξεκόλαψαν: 'the Spartans . . . erased'. The erasure is represented by Th. as the work of the Spartans only, but in fact there was an amphictionic aspect ([Dem.] lix. 98) which Th. characteristically ignores; cp. 107. 2 n., 112. 5 n., iii. 92 n. See R. J. Bonner and G. Smith, 'Administration of Justice in the Delphic Amphictyony', *CP* 38 (1943), 1 ff., at 2 with n. 10: 'Thucydides is interested in the incident merely as an illustration of the presumption of Pausanias and naturally omits details.' The omission is actually less 'natural', in this ample and Herodotean stretch of narrative, than are the comparable omissions of the Amphictyony in the *Pentekontaetia*. That is, the explanation lies in Th.'s prejudices. Against the scepticism about [Dem.] lix. 98 of C. W. Fornara, 'Two Notes on Thucydides', *Philologus*, 111 (1967), 291 ff., see J. Trevett, 'History in [Demosthenes] 59', *CQ* 40 (1990), 407 ff., at 411.

Plut. *Mor.* 873c (*On the Malice of Herodotus*) slightly supports the idea of an amphictionic involvement.

4. ἐπυνθάνοντο δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς Εἰλωτας πράσσειν τι αὐτόν, καὶ ἦν δὲ οὕτως: 'they were also informed that he was intriguing with the Helots; and this was true ...'. Note Th.'s striking confidence; see Cawkwell, 51, suggesting that 'helotizing' was Pausanias' real offence and the whole medism story was a fabrication. This is a little too strong; see (for Gongylos) Andrewes, cited at 128. 6n. above. D. Lotze, 'Selbstbewusstsein und Machtpolitik', *Klio*, 57 (1970), 255ff., at 271-4, argues that Pausanias' contemplated actions (liberation of helots) were defensible in terms of Sparta's military interests. For other evidence of difficulties with helots in the first quarter of the fifth century see *Greek World*, 24.

For the parenthesis ('and this was true') compare the rare authorial interjection at viii. 48. 4 (Phrynichos' suspicions about Alcibiades endorsed by Th.: ὅπερ καὶ ἦν, 'and rightly').

ἐλευθέρωσιν . . . καὶ πολιτεῖαν: 'freedom and citizenship'. See below, iv. 80. 3n., and Cawkwell, 52.

ξυγκατεργάσωνται: 'help to carry out his whole plan'. For the word see Westlake, 106.

5. ἄνευ ἀναμφισβητήτων τεκμηρίων: 'without incontestable proof'. See above, 132. 1n.

ὡς λέγεται: 'so it is said'. Westlake (103f.) thinks this indicates that Th. was using what he thought a trustworthy source.

ἄνηρ Ἀργίλιος: 'a certain man of Argilos'. For this whole very fishy story see Cawkwell, 58 n. 27.

κατὰ ἐνθύμησίν τινα: 'the thought struck him'. See Westlake, 106 n. 62.

133. ἐπὶ Ταίναρον ἰκέτου οἰχομένου: 'the man went to Tainaron as a suppliant'. Th. gives no impression of the great distance which separates Sparta from Tainaron; one suspects that he may not have been very clear himself.

διακόνων: 'messengers'. For the word, unique in Th., Westlake, 106.

134. 1. λέγεται: 'It is said'. See above, 132. 5n.

3. ἀποψύχειν; 'expiring'. See Westlake, 106 n. 62, for the word.

4. κατορύξαι: 'buried'. See Westlake, 106 and n. 61, for the word.

135. 2-138. THE STORY OF THEMISTOKLES

See the introductory nn. to 126 and 128 above.

135. 2. τοῦ δὲ μηδισμοῦ τοῦ Πausανίου . . . ξυνεπητιῶντο καὶ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα: 'the evidence which proved that Pausanias was in league with Persia implicated Themistokles . . .'. But if (see 132. 4n. above) the story of Pausanias' medism was largely a fabrication, so too was that of Themistokles' medism.

3. ἔτυχε γὰρ ὡστρακισμένος καὶ ἔχων δίαιταν μὲν ἐν Ἄργει, ἐπιφοιτῶν δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην Πελοπόννησον: 'but having been ostracized he was living at the time in Argos, where he used to visit other parts of the Peloponnese'. The first of the only two mentions of ostracism in all Th. (the other is viii. 73. 3, Hyperbolos); but he gives no explanation of the word. For Themistokles' ostracism and its connection with the time spent in Argos see Forrest, 'Themistocles and Argos', *CQ* 10 (1960), 221 ff., an ingenious attempt to explain some poetic evidence by reference to the vicissitudes of Themistokles' career. But the chronological and other uncertainties of this reconstruction were pointed out by M. Wörrle, *Untersuchungen zur Verfassungsgeschichte von Argos im 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus* (Erlangen, 1964), 121. Beyond saying that Themistokles' ostracism and condemnation occurred some time in the late 470s–early 460s we must agree with Rhodes (398) that the dates of these events 'cannot be established'. It is equally uncertain how great a role Themistokles played (he surely played *some* role) in the confused Peloponnesian politics of the period. To Wörrle's doubts add S. and H. Hodkinson, 'Mantineia and the Mantinike', *BSA* 76 (1981), 261, and J. L. O'Neill, 'The Exile of Themistokles and Democracy in the Peloponnese', *CQ* 31 (1981), 335 ff., who attempts to dissociate Themistokles from Peloponnesian democratic developments altogether. Lewis in *CAH* v². 107 f., is also sceptical, noting that the present section of Th. shows that 'Themistocles did not think he could rely on Argive resistance to the demand [for Themistocles' arrest]'; this suggests an equivocal attitude to Sparta on Argos' part.

136. 1. Κέρκυραν, ὧν αὐτῶν εὐεργέτης: 'the Corcyraeans [lit. 'Corcyra'], whose benefactor he was'. See above, 36. 2n. The emphasis here and at 137. 4 (cp. also 128. 4) on benefaction, and the expectation of a *quid pro quo*, is Herodotean: see J. Gould, *Herodotus* (London, 1989).

ἐς τὴν ἡπειρον τὴν καταντικρῦ: 'to the mainland opposite'. See Hammond, *Epirus*, 492: Th.'s use of the whole phrase makes it impossible to take the word as a geographical proper name, ἡπειρος = 'Epirus'.

2. παρὰ Ἄδμητον τὸν Μολοσσῶν βασιλέα ὄντα αὐτῷ οὐ φίλον: 'at the house of Admetos, king of the Molossians, who was not his friend'. The Greek in fact suggests that Admetos was a positive

enemy. The Molossians were a people living in Epirus; for this episode see Hammond, *Epirus* (above). As he says, we do not know what the particular cause of the enmity was (but we know slightly more than Hammond implies: Th. goes on to say that Themistokles had opposed a request made by Admetos to the Athenians).

3. τῆς γυναικός: 'his wife'. This anonymous lady (Plut. *Them.* 24. 3 gives her name as Phthia) is one of the few women in all Th.: *Thucydides*, 42 and n. 41. See T. Wiedemann, 'ἐλάχιστον . . . ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος: Thucydides, Women and the Limits of Rational Analysis', *Greece & Rome*, 30 (1983), 163 ff., suggesting that Th. was more inclined to mention women when, as here, they were in some way 'marginal' to the main conflict between Athens and Sparta. Molossia was certainly geographically marginal, as Wiedemann notes, and the Themistokles story as a whole is in another sense 'marginal' to Th.'s main narrative, because of its Herodotean character; Hdt. is much more inclined than Th. to give a prominent role to women, so the present passage is at least in keeping with its context. For the general topic of women in Th. see further below, ii. 4. 2 n., citing Loraux in *Pallas*, 32 (1985).

137. 1. καὶ μέγιστον ἦν ἰκέτευμα τοῦτο: 'which was the most solemn form of supplication'. It has often been noted that this supplication by means of the child has resonances from tragedy, notably the *Telephos* of Euripides: see *Thucydides*, 15 and 28. Hammond (above) adds the consideration that this form of supplication was specially appropriate 'at the court of a descendant of Neoptolemus, who had killed Priam at the altar of his court and had been killed later by Apollo for this act of sacrilege (Pindar, *Paeon* 6, 113 f.)'. See also J. Gould, 'HIKETEIA', *JHS* 93 (1973), 74 ff., at 97.

ἔς Πύδναν τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου: 'Pydna (which was in the kingdom of Alexander)'. For Pydna see above, 61. 2 n. Hammond observes that Admetos was evidently not bound by any of the covenants about medizers which had been sworn by the Greeks who combined against Persia.

Νάξον: 'Naxos'. See above, 98. 4. There is a famous difficulty about the reading here, because one good manuscript of Plutarch, who apparently followed Th. in this section of his *Themistokles*, has Θάσον, 'Thasos', instead of 'Naxos' at 25. 2. This if right would affect the chronology radically: the siege of Thasos (see above, 100–101) began in 465, and this would fit the information given at para. 3 below about Artaxerxes' 'recent' succession (we know from oriental sources that he succeeded in 465). The siege of Naxos on the other hand is strictly undated, but was certainly earlier than Thasos (perhaps early 460s). And Naxos would fit

those ancient literary sources which named Xerxes rather than Artaxerxes as the Persian king whom Themistokles met (see *FGrHist* 262 Charon F 11 = Plut. *Them.* 27. 1-2).

The problem has been endlessly discussed: see Frost, *Plutarch's Themistocles: A Historical Commentary* (Princeton, 1980), 206-8, retaining 'Naxos', as does Milton (see introductory n. to 128 above). Forrest, 'Pausanias and Themistokles Again' (above, 131. 1 n.) adopts a suggestion of Lewis, most fully developed in *Towards a Historian's Text*, 66 ff., 160 ff. (see also *Historia*, 2 (1953/4), 418 n. 1), that the text of Th. was altered from *Θάσον* to *Νάξον* by a scholar in antiquity who 'knew' from Ephorus that Themistokles was received by Xerxes, not Artaxerxes, i.e. in the early 460s, and went past Naxos, not Thasos. On this view 'Thasos' is right. But I incline to agree with Rhodes that neither the Thasos nor the Naxos tradition should be used for the reconstruction of chronology, both being equally worthless.

3. Ἄρταξέρξην τὸν Ξέρξου νεωστὶ βασιλεύοντα: 'Artaxerxes the son of Xerxes, who had just succeeded to the throne'. See preceding n.

4. τὸν ὑμέτερον οἶκον: 'your house'. See above, 129. 3 n.

εὐεργεσία ὀφείλεται: 'there is a debt of gratitude due to me'. See 136. 1 n. on *εὐεργέτης*.

(γράφας τήν τε ἐκ Σαλαμίνοσ προάγγελσιν τῆσ ἀναχωρήσews . . .): ('here he mentioned how he had warned Xerxes at Salamis of the decision of the Greeks to withdraw . . .'). The whole of this bracket, with its string of definite articles, is an exceptionally clear case of how reading of Hdt. is taken for granted; see Hdt. viii. 75, 110. 3. See my article in *Callling Studies*.

138. 1. ὡσ λέγεται: 'is said'. See above, 132. 5 n.

τῆσ τε Περσίδοσ γλώσσης ὅσα ἐδύνατο κατένοησε καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων τῆσ χώρασ: 'he learnt the Persian language as far as he could, and the customs of the country'. This was very unusual for a Greek: see A. Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* (Cambridge, 1975). For Peukestas, the only one of Alexander's Macedonian officers who learned Persian and adopted Persian habits, see Arrian, *Anab.* vi. 30. 3.

What exactly did Themistokles learn? See C. Nylander, 'ΑΣΣΥΡΙΑ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ: Remarks on the 21st "Letter of Themistocles"', *Opuscula Atheniensia*, 8 (1968), 119 ff., at 122 n. 16: he may have learned Old Persian and possibly also the Aramaic language and script, but hardly the little- (only monumentally) used Old Persian cuneiform. See also iv. 50. 2 n.

3. οἰκεία γὰρ ξυνέσει: 'from his own native acuteness . . .'. The switch to a more abstract and compressed style in this para. is very striking after

the 'Herodotean' chapters which precede it: see *Thucydides*, 26f. For *ξύσεις* see above, 79. 2n.

οὔτε προμαθῶν . . . οὔτ' ἐπιμαθῶν: 'without any study either before or at the time'. For the word-play compare 33. 4 and n.

ἄριστος εἰκαστής: 'could best conjecture'. Euripides says that 'the best prophet is the man who is good at guessing', *μάντις δ' ἄριστος ὅστις εἰκάξει καλῶς*, fragment 973 Nauck. R. C. T. Parker, 'Greek States and Greek Oracles', *CRUX*, 323f. and n. 88, puts the two passages side by side in an excellent discussion: 'new skills were developed in the fifth century that claimed to make inroads on the realm of the indeterminate. Rhetoric was a secular mode of divination, probing past and future by the light of probability.' As Parker says, citing Lloyd, doctors as well as rhetoricians—like Themistokles and Pericles: see above and below for their *explanatory* gifts—laid claim to 'divination'. Th.'s praise of Themistokles is couched in thoroughly secular and sophistic terms.

ἐξηγήσασθαι οἶός τε: 'he had the power of explaining'. See below.

φύσεως μὲν δύναμει . . .: 'by natural power of mind . . .'. On this sentence in particular see *Thucydides*, 27.

αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα: 'to improvise the right thing to be done'. This is obviously and deliberately echoed by Pericles' claim to be able to 'devise and explain a sound policy', *γνώναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι πάντα*, ii. 60. 5. The praise of Themistokles forms a natural bridge to Pericles (see above, introductory n. to 126), 'the greatest orator and statesman' of his day (as Th. calls him at 139. 4 below), just as Themistokles was of his. (With Pericles' ability to *ἐρμηνεύσαι*, 'explain', compare *ἐξηγήσασθαι* above.)

4. **λέγουσι δέ:** 'some say'. It is unusual for Th. thus to give a variant (see *Thucydides*, 155f.), though here he seems clearly to reject the poison version. See Westlake, 105. For the story, here rejected by Th., that Themistokles (like Midas: Strabo 61) drank bull's blood, see Ar. *Knights*, 83-4; Diod. xi. 58. 2-3.

5. **μνημεῖον μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν Μαγνησίᾳ ἐστὶ τῇ Ἀσιανῇ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ:** 'there is a monument of him in the agora of the Asiatic Magnesia'. Th. means Magnesia on the Maiander, not the more northerly Magnesia (the large modern town of Manisa) which was the site of the defeat of Antiochus III by the Romans in 190 BC. He calls it 'Asiatic' because there was an area called Magnesia to the east of Thessaly. There is some independent evidence that Themistokles did indeed live there: see the coins at *NC* 1988, 13-20, with Frost (137. 1n. on *Νάξου*), 227: it is possible that the statue on (δ) depicts the 'monument' mentioned by Th. See also Kraay (above, 26. 1n.), 244 and n. 906. Compare the statues to Mausolus and his sister-wife Artemisia in

the agora at Erythrai, Tod 155 (not in Harding, but see his no. 28) with *Mausolus*, 107 n. 4: such honours stop only just short of heroization, and in the case of Themistokles we know that a festival in his honour was held in Hellenistic times—but at Lampsakos, not Magnesia (see below). Actual burial in the agora was an even greater honour: see below, v. 111. 1 and n., for Brasidas ('in front of' the agora at Amphipolis). Plut. *Them.* 34 mentions an Athenian of his own day called Themistokles who received honours at Magnesia as the great man's descendant; for such 'cultural archaism' see A. J. Spawforth and S. Walker, *JRS* 76 (1986), 104.

ταύτης γὰρ ἦρχε τῆς χώρας: 'where he was governor'. For the verb, and for Themistokles' status, see above, 129. 1 n. On the present passage see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 122 and n. 100.

Μαγνησίαν μὲν ἄρτον . . . Λάμψακον δὲ οἶνον . . . Μυοῦντα δὲ ὄψον: 'for bread, Magnesia . . . for wine, Lampsakos . . . and Myous for meat'. We can now see that such rewards or payments in kind were very much an organized feature of Persian administration: see Lewis, ch. i, drawing on the Persepolis Fortification Tablets (above, 129. 1 n. for Pharnakes/Parnaka). An inscription of about 200 BC from Lampsakos attests a festival to Themistokles: Hill², B 122; see above on *μνημεῖον*.

The information in the present passage has been brought into arguments about the original extent of the Delian League: if the King could make a present of these places they cannot (it is said) have joined Athens at the outset. But see Meiggs, 53 ff., Frost, 219 ff., Rhodes (introductory n. to 128–135. 1), 395 and n. 47: loyalties could have changed later and were in any case not mutually exclusive: see O. Murray, *Historia*, 15 (1966), 142 ff.

6. τὰ δὲ ὄστᾶ . . .: 'his bones . . .'. Pausanias, i. 1. 2; 37. 1, says that Themistokles was honourably buried in Attica after a revulsion of feeling in his favour. For the idea, in an effectively Athenian context despite the Theban dramatic setting, that traitors could not be buried on their native soil, see most famously the *Antigone* of Sophocles, with the interesting discussion by G. Steiner, *Antigones* (Oxford, 1984), 116 f. Steiner cites the present passage of Th., and others to the same effect (Xen. *Hell.* i. 7. 22, Plato, *Laws*, 909A ff.; add Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 834B and Tod 123, lines 61–2), but also notes that the remains even of an accursed figure like Oedipus of the *Oedipus Coloneus* (again a play by Sophocles) 'can bestow lasting good fortune on the ground and bounds in which they have been honourably sepulchred'. Hence perhaps the ambiguous treatment of, or tradition about, Themistokles, whose bones would be powerful 'prudential magic' indeed. See also Parker, *Miasma*, 45 and n. 47.

There is, however, a problem; if it was accepted Athenian practice towards those guilty of treason or sacrilege, Kreon cannot have been

wrong to deny burial to a traitor; yet we are meant to conclude that he *is* wrong. See J. Diggle, *CR* 31 (1981), 107f., an approving review of G. Cerri, *Legislazione orale e tragedia greca* (Naples, 1979): perhaps the rules were not as clear as Steiner and others have thought, and the treatment of the Alkmaionids (126. 12n.) and Themistokles (the present passage of Th.) were the result of special decisions. See further ii. 67. 4n. **φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες**: 'his family says that his bones were carried home . . .'. Jowett's tr. is correct; contrast Warner's 'it is said that his bones were . . . brought home by his relations'. That is, the subject of *φασί*, 'they say', is Themistokles' family.

λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων: 'the two most famous Greeks of their day'. Cp. Hdt. ix. 64. 1 for Pausanias; Th. expected his readers to know what had made the two men famous.

139. FINAL DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

For the demands in this chapter see the nn. on 67 above.

3. **Μελησίππου**: 'Melesippos'. For this man see ii. 12, and for the 'impressive formulation' here (all three Spartan ambassadors' names given) see Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), 307 n. 41. We have to wait till ii. 12. 1 for Melesippos' patronymic: see n. there.

αὐτονόμους ἀφείτε: 'restore autonomy'. For this vague phrase see Ostwald, *Autonomia* (above, 67. 2n.), 42 and nn.; also below, 144. 2n.

ἄπαξ περὶ ἀπάντων βουλευσαμένους ἀποκρίνασθαι: 'to make up their minds and give a complete and final answer'. See Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 157, suggesting that hitherto the Spartan proposals had not been put before the People, i.e. the assembly/*ekklesia*, but were dealt with by the *boule* or council of 500 alone. In which case this is a concealed reference to the *boule*, an institution notably absent from Th. for the most part: see iii. 36. 5n. and iv. 118. 11n. (text disputed).

4. **παριόντες ἄλλοι τε πολλοί**: 'many came forward to speak . . .'. This is one of the clearest proofs of the selectivity of Th.'s technique in recording the speeches: only Pericles is given coverage: see *Thucydides*, 56, suggesting that Kleon may be one of those here anonymously dismissed. For a comparable but less striking example see iv. 58.

Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου: 'Pericles the son of Xanthippos'. A second formal introduction with description (see 127. 3 and n. for the first): we have in any case already met Pericles before at 111. 2 and 114ff. (the Samian revolt). I doubt if 139 'resumes' 127 (Gomme).

λέγειν τε καὶ πράσσειν δυνατώτατος: 'and a very able man in speech and action'. See above, 138. 3nn. There are Homeric precedents

for this description of a leader: as Lloyd-Jones remarks, citing *Iliad*, ix. 443 (μύθων τε ῥητῆρ' ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρα τε ἔργων, 'a speaker of words and a doer of deeds'—note the order), 'a great chief was expected to be a speaker of words as well as a doer of deeds': *The Justice of Zeus*² (Berkeley and London, 1983), 181. Of course poets, like historians, have an occupational interest in valuing words higher than actions.

140–144. PERICLES' FIRST SPEECH

For a fine analysis of this speech see a 1934 dissertation by Rose Zahn, with notes by F. Jacoby (above, 79. 2 n.). See also H. Herter, 'Zur Ersten Periklesrede des Thukydides', *Studies Presented to D. M. Robinson*, ii (St Louis, 1953), 613 ff. The changes in mood, and in degree of detail and specificity, have worried some scholars; for a discussion see *Thucydides*, 54. The speech notoriously answers and echoes, at many points, the Corinthians' speech at 120 ff. above. None of the particular correspondences is by itself fatal to the authenticity of either: see *Thucydides*, 59; but the general effect is disconcerting. (There are also echoes of, and replies to, points made by Archidamos at 80 ff. above.)

On the strategy outlined by Pericles see the works cited at 144. 1 n. below. Individual points are dealt with in the notes as they arise, but note that the actual strategy pursued was not quite as passive as Pericles is made to recommend: (i) for Athenian cavalry harassment of the invading enemy see i. 143. 5 n.; (ii) for the regular invasions of the Megarid see ii. 31 and iv. 66 and nn.; (iii) for other ambitious-looking operations see individual passages in the first half or so of Book ii, esp. ii. 56. 4 (Epidauros).

140. 1. τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ᾧ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι: 'Athenians, my opinion is what it has always been'. For the echo of this by Kleon see iii. 38. 1 n. on ἐγὼ μὲν etc. Note also ii. 13. 2 n. on ἀπερ καὶ πρότερον. For politicians preening themselves on their own consistency cp. Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, iii. i. 60, 'But I am constant as the northern star . . .'

τὰς γνώμας: 'their resolutions'. On the idea of γνώμη, 'resolution' (as here and at para. 5 below), 'opinion' (as in the third word of the present para.), 'intelligence', see L. Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), arguing that in the course of Th.'s work 'intelligence'—which he thinks is particularly associated with Pericles—gradually loses ground to 'chance'; note that in the present passage the two ideas are balanced against each other, as also at the important

v. 75. 3. See also M. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1986).

ἀμαθῶς: 'wayward'. Syme (above, 79. 2 n.), 56, says of this: '[Pericles] reminds them that events can turn out stupidly, just like the designs of men (i. 140. 1). The adverb he uses is ἀμαθῶς. This, I think, has not a passive meaning (that you cannot learn about events) but an active meaning. Pericles is speaking ironically, as befits an intellectual and one of the men of understanding whom Thucydides admired. You cannot teach events. They are stubborn, but reason is all we have.' See also Dodds, *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford, 1973), 12 f.

2. εἰρημένον γὰρ δίκας μὲν τῶν διαφορῶν ἀλλήλοις δίδοναι καὶ δέχεσθαι, ἔχειν δὲ ἑκατέρους ἃ ἔχομεν, οὔτε αὐτοὶ δίκας πω ἤτησαν οὔτε ἡμῶν διδόντων δέχονται: 'Our agreement says that when differences arise, the two parties shall refer them to arbitration, and in the mean time both are to retain what they have. But they never ask for arbitration, and when it is offered by us, they refuse it' [the words 'in the mean time' are not in the Greek; for the important point here involved see below]. For the arbitration clause in the Thirty Years Peace see above, 78. 4: this is the last of the Book i passages, all in speeches, bearing on the topic. There will be a slightly different emphasis in the authorial or semi-authorial (see 78. 4 n.) reference at vii. 18. 2, where the relevant terms are given as 'although the previous treaty forbade the making of an armed attack if the other side was willing to submit to arbitration'. For de Ste. Croix (*OPW* 259) this is a significant difference and vii. 18. 2 is the preferable formulation: the Thirty Years Peace was not 'requiring the settlement of every dispute, great and small, by arbitration, but essentially *forbidding a resort to armed force* if the other side wanted to arbitrate' [his italics]. Lewis in *CAH* v² is less confident than de Ste. Croix that this (the arbitration clause) was 'a single sentence in the original'. That is, the arbitration clause may have been separate and independent, not merely a subordinate clause. This is surely right; it may be added (see provisionally 78. 4 n.) that vii. 18. 2 does not have quite the status of an authorial comment by Th. (if it did, we might have to say that it should carry more weight than any of the Book i passages).

There is a further point of importance, the provision about each side keeping what it held. For de Ste. Croix this is a major stipulation, wrongly omitted from modern lists of the terms of the Thirty Years Peace, such as Bengtson, *Staatsverträge des Altertums*, ii (Munich, 1967), 75. If the clause was indeed a separate and absolute clause, as de Ste. Croix's list implies, its scope was indeed wide, no less than a recognition of the Athenian empire. But we cannot be sure of this: Jowett (and Warner) take it more restrictively, supplying words like 'in the mean

time' (Jowett), 'pending arbitration' (Warner). On this view 'each side keeping what it held' is narrow and provisional, referring only to territory about which disputes have already arisen. It is indeed hard to see why Th. should make Pericles cite these words unless they have some direct bearing on the arbitration issue with which the rest of the sentence is concerned. On the other hand the words supplied by Jowett and Warner do not appear in the Greek, and de Ste. Croix might perhaps claim that we should supply some thought like 'otherwise'. That is, the meaning would be 'there is to be arbitration about disputed territory. But otherwise each side is to keep what it holds at the time of making the treaty.' Nevertheless I now (contrast *Greek World*, 46) reject de Ste. Croix's view and would prefer the more restricted interpretation, which makes much better sense of the Greek.

In any case we should not forget that we are not dealing with an authorial narrative statement of the terms of the Peace, but with a speech in which originally distinct terms may have been paraphrased, telescoped, tendentiously juxtaposed, or otherwise distorted (this consideration also applies to the problem addressed in the first para. of the present n.).

5. **καὶ τοῦτο ὑπακούσαντες**: 'that you will give way over that too'. The word for 'give way' recurs in Pericles' final speech at ii. 61. 1, but the sense there is different (more extreme and absolute); see Andrewes, 'The Melian Dialogue and Perikles' Last Speech', *PCPhS* 186 = NS 6 (1960), 1 ff., at 7, and below, ii. 61. 1 n. On the Megarian decrees see 67. 4 n.

141. 1. **ἢ ὑπακούειν**: 'either to give way'. See above, 140. 5 n.

2. **αὐτουργοί τε γὰρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι**: 'The Peloponnesians cultivate their own lands'. This was more true of the Spartans, who cultivated their own lands, including the fertile Messenia, by means of helots, than of some other Peloponnesians: see below, iii. 86. 4, for the import of corn into the Peloponnese, which Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 129f., plausibly takes to refer primarily to Corinth.

3. **οὔτε ἰδία οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματα**: 'no wealth either public or private'. See above, 19 n., for the lack of tribute; but the idea that there were no individually wealthy Spartans, if they are here referred to, was something of a fiction: see Finley, *Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1986), 168. But perhaps the reference is to individual Peloponnesian *states*. In which case the remark is equally false. However, Pericles here seems to echo Archidamos at 80. 4, where the reference seems more clearly to be to individual contributions.

5. **σώμασι . . . χρήμασι**: 'persons . . . property'. A close echo of 121. 3. **βίαιοι ἐσφοραί**: 'forced contributions'. But see iii. 19. 1 n. on *καὶ*

αὐτοί etc.: Athens was soon forced to adopt just such expedients, and we are surely intended to bear in mind the present passage when we reach Book iii. That is, the combination of the two passages is subversive: Pericles' financial foresight, praised at ii. 65, was not, even on the evidence of Th.'s own text, perfect.

6. **μάχη μὲν γὰρ μιᾷ**: 'in a single pitched battle'. This reads like an anticipation of Mantinea (v. 75; vi. 16. 6), but the thought is not so remarkable that it could only have been written after 418. The phrase picks up 121. 4.

ἰσόψηφοι: 'have equal votes'. This word is problematic at iii. 11. 4; I postpone discussion to the n. there. The meaning here is straightforward.

142. 2. **καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἡ ἐπιτείχισις**: 'no fortified place which they can build against us'. See above, 122. 1 n. Note the definite article, lit. 'the fortification-in-enemy-territory', which reads like a back-reference to 122; or does it mean 'the *epiteichisis* which is so much talked about these days'?

4. **αὐτομολῖαις**: 'and the slaves may desert to them'. True; see vii. 27. 5 for the consequences of the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in 413, but again this hardly ranks as an 'impossible' piece of foreknowledge on Pericles' part.

ἥπερ ἰσχύομεν: 'which is our strong arm'. See 121. 3 and n.

143. 1. **εἴ τε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπίασιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων**: 'suppose, again, that they lay hands on [lit. 'move'] the treasures at Olympia and Delphi'. See above, 121. 3 n., and note Parker's interesting suggestion (*Miasma*, 174 n. 171) that Th.'s choice of verb in the present passage carries a hint of impiety. See, however, ii. 24. 1 and viii. 15. 1, where *κινεῖν* in a similar context carries no such implication.

τοὺς ξένους τῶν ναυτῶν: 'our mercenary sailors'. This is problematic; see above 121. 3 n.

τῶν μετοίκων: 'metics'. The only occurrence of the word in a speech; at *Thucydides*, 98, I wrongly said that it never occurs in speeches; see 121. 3 n.

καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν: 'the rest of our specialist crews'. For the meaning of this term, as denoting (not ordinary rowers but) the thirty assistants to the trierarch, see Morrison, 'Hyperesia in Naval Contexts in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC', *JHS* 104 (1984), 48 ff.

5. **μέγα γὰρ τὸ τῆς θαλάσσης κράτος**: 'such is the power which control of the sea gives'. One of the main messages of the *Archaeology*; see also 81. 2 and n.

εἰ γὰρ ἤμεν νησιῶται . . .: 'if we were islanders . . .'. Compare *Old Oligarch*, 2. 14–16.

τὴν μὲν γῆν καὶ οἰκίας ἀφείναι: 'let us give up our land and our houses'. How completely was this proposed abandonment of Attica carried through? I. Spence, 'Pericles and the Defence of Attika During the Peloponnesian War', *JHS* 110 (1990), 91 ff., argues plausibly that in fact Pericles did all he could, by cavalry harassment, to limit the damage caused by the ravaging Peloponnesian troops. See ii. 19. 2, 22. 2, iii. 1. 2 and nn.

οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται: 'such things do not win men, though men may win them'. For the thought see vii. 77. 7 and n.

144. 1. τοῦ περιέσεσθαι: 'you will win through'. For this 'ambiguous' Greek word, which nicely conveys the implications both of winning and of surviving (and survival was all that Athens had to achieve in order to 'win' the war, which was fought for the destruction of her empire by the liberator Sparta), see Brunt, *Phoenix*, 19 (1965), 259 and n. 17, followed by de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 208. I have adopted Brunt's tr. See also ii. 65. 7.

μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες: 'you must not extend your empire in wartime'. Cp. ii. 65. 7. This idea was basic to the strategy of the historical Pericles; see Cawkwell (above, 122. 1n.) and A.J. Holladay, 'Athenian Strategy in the Archidamian War', *Historia*, 27 (1978), 399 ff. Note the qualification 'in wartime'; see below, ii. 62. 2n. The Sicilian Expedition of 415 was not strictly contrary to Periclean strategy thus defined: Athens at the time was not at open war with Sparta. See, however, iii. 91. 1n.: the attack on Melos does look like an attempt to round off the Aegean empire.

τὰς οἰκίας ἡμῶν ἀμαρτίας: 'our own mistakes'. See 69. 5n. on *καὶ πρὸς* etc., and 84. 4 and n.

2. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα μὲν καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ λόγῳ ἅμα τοῖς ἔργοις δηλωθήσεται: 'But I will speak again about all this when the time for action comes'. It is very tempting to look forward to ii. 13. 2 (see n. there): Pericles 'repeated his previous advice'. But the present passage is hardly more than an undertaking to offer the right kind of detailed advice at the right time, and the function of the phrase used at ii. 13. 2 is merely to obviate the need for Th. to repeat things already said about the evacuation of Attica etc. If a cross-reference *is* intended (Periclean or authorial? see ii. 13. 2n.) it is not very exact. The 'speech' at ii. 13 does not develop the theme of Athenian mistakes (if that is what is meant by *ἐκεῖνα*, 'all this'); instead, it speaks in detail about finance.

τὰς δὲ πόλεις ὅτι αὐτονόμους ἀφήσομεν, εἰ καὶ αὐτονόμους

ἔχοντες ἐσπεισάμεθα: 'we will concede independence to the cities if they were independent when we made the treaty'. See Ostwald *Autonomia* (above, 67. 2 n.), 42: 'by avoiding explicit mention of Aegina, by leaving open the question of which cities were autonomous in 446/5 BC, and by claiming that *αὐτονομία* is as much of a problem in the Peloponnesian as it is in the Delian League, he brushes aside the entire issue of *αὐτονομία* as meaningless when it comes to dealings between two power blocks.' See also 67. 2 n. for Lévy's unconvincing use of this passage to argue that in 446 Athens claimed to *leave* Aegina autonomous rather than to be *making* her autonomous; but this is an improbable view of the 457 settlement. Lévy's case would be stronger if Aegina were mentioned by name in the present passage. See Badian, 140.

3. καὶ πόλει καὶ ἰδιώτῃ: 'by men and states'. For this kind of expression see *Thucydides*, 178 and n. 84. The present passage is not authorial but can be paralleled by passages which are, and which suggest that Th. was prepared to speak in a similar way about states and individuals. For the significance of that see *Thucydides*, ch. vii.

4. πατέρες ἡμῶν ὑποστάντες Μήδους: 'our fathers, when they withstood the Persians'. For the 'Persian Wars' theme, and the relatively little coverage it gets in Th.'s speeches, see above 73. 2 n.

γνώμη τε πλέονι ἢ τύχῃ: 'not by good fortune but by wisdom'. See above, 140. 1 n. Here too there is probably a suggestion of 'resolution', i.e. moral strength, as well as intellectual power.

ἀμύνεσθαι ... μὴ ἐλάσω παραδοῦναι: 'resist ... hand down unimpaired to posterity'. P. Siewert, 'The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens', *JHS* 97 (1977), 102ff., an interesting study, notes (104) a similarity of language here with that of the fourth-century ephebic oath (the oath sworn by young Athenian recruits). See Tod 204 = Harding 109, lines 8-9. Siewert thinks, on the basis of evidence like the present passage of Th., that the ephebic system went back to the fifth century. The military conclusion is plausible enough (see ii. 39, introductory n., esp. Vidal-Naquet there cited), but the rhetoric of the present passage looks fairly conventional; compare 71. 7 (the Corinthians) and 85. 1 (Archidamos). See also ii. 37. 3 n. on *διὰ δέος*.

145-146. THE SPARTANS REBUFFED; RECAPITULATION

Ch. 146 sums up the book. It takes us back to the 'publicly alleged reasons', *αἰτίαι*, of 23. 6 above (which introduced the Corcyra and Potidaia chapters), while the last-but-three word of the whole book is

πρόφασις, which suggests (though it is not actually a specific reference to) the issue of Athenian imperialism which occupied much of the rest of the book—not just the *Pentekontaetia* but many of the speeches as well, not to mention the *Archaeology* with its stress on that sea-power which was Athens' source of imperial strength.

BOOK II

Note: the following commentary was essentially completed before the appearance of two single-volume commentaries on Thucydides Book ii, by P.J. Rhodes (Warminster, 1988), and J. S. Rusten (Cambridge, 1989). I have, however, taken account of those works.

1. THE WAR BEGINS; PRINCIPLES ON WHICH NARRATIVE IS ARRANGED

This short chapter is often neglected though it contains a valuable further sentence (see. i. 22 and nn.) on Th.'s own method. See below.

γέγραπται δὲ ἐξῆς ὡς ἕκαστα ἐγίγνετο κατὰ θέρος καὶ χειμῶνα:
'Events have been described in chronological order, as each occurred, in a narrative arranged by summers and winters'. The words 'as each occurred' could be taken as evidence that Th. intended his account to be, as near as humanly possible, comprehensive—unless we take the words to mean 'each of the things which I have chosen to describe'. In any case Th. soon departs from the principle here laid down: see 31. 3 n.

Greek warfare in the fifth century was still more or less seasonal, so the decision to arrange the narrative by summers and winters, i.e. campaigning seasons, is a clear programmatic assertion of the military character of the work. Such an arrangement was a novelty; it is one of the features of Th.'s writing which most obviously betrays his own military training and experience. (See, however, Jacoby, *RE*, 'Herodotos', col. 440, for the possibility that in this respect Hdt. anticipated Th. in his account of the Ionian Revolt, which has traces of a similar arrangement: Hdt. v. 115. 2; vi. 18; vi. 31. 1.) Weidauer (i. 109. 1 n.), 73 f., makes the interesting suggestion that the seasonal arrangement may reflect the influence of medical writing: the Hippocratic *Epidemics* are careful to note the season at which an illness occurs. This is not entirely convincing, though it is accepted by Smart, 'Thucydides and Hellenicus' (i. 45. 1 n. on οὐ πολὺ ὕστερον), 34 n. 57. (Note in any case that the references to the seasons are more or less confined to *Epidemics*, iii. 2–16, which recognizes spring and autumn as well.) Military conditions are the easy and obvious explanation for Th.'s system.

The question whether Th. had in mind a firm date for the beginning of summer, based on astronomical calculations, has been much discussed. Gomme (*HCT* iii. 699 ff.) thought so and suggested the evening rising of Arktouros for the beginning of spring (spring was for Th. included for this purpose in summer). But the better view (Andrewes, *HCT* v. 148 f. with references) is that Th.'s summer had no such fixed beginning. See

further below, ἀμα ἤρι ἀρχομένῳ, 'at the beginning of spring', and v. 20, 26. 3 nn. O. Wenskus, *Gnomon*, 1990, 577, thinks this chronological looseness was a primitive feature of Th.'s historical outlook.

2-6. THEBAN ATTACK ON PLATAIA, WITH CHRONOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION

It is only now, after a long postponement, that Th. gives a precise chronology for the beginning of the Archidamian war: none of the immediately pre-war material in Book i, though so close in time to the attack on Plataia, was dated at all. Part of Th.'s motive is surely, by giving no less than six indicators of date, to give solemnity to the first event of the war proper. Another part is pedantic and polemical (see further below): he wished to correct Hellanikos, and perhaps others, in principle and in detail. It is also relevant (a related point) that there is evidence for a general interest in questions of periodization and chronology in the Athens of the 420s: see *Thucydides*, 128, citing the inscribed archon-list ML 6 = Fornara 23, and the researches of Hippias and Hellanikos himself. (But note on this point the scepticism of R. S. Stroud, *Athens Comes of Age* (Princeton, 1978), 33.) See also below on Charon.

Th. here clearly implies—note the first word of the book, which is ἀρχεται, 'begins'—that the Theban attack began the war. (Compare with this vii. 18. 2, where the attack on Plataia is implied to have been the original impiety or breach of truce.) But at 10 ff., especially the solemn 19. 1, the invasion of Attica by Sparta and her allies is treated as the critical event. (Compare with this v. 20. 1, where the invasion of Attica and the beginning of the war are in effect equated. But see my n. there: the text is often emended so as to remove the reference to the invasion.) There is some inconsistency in this double view; of the two 'beginnings' the invasion rather than the attack best fits the approach in Book i, where acts by Corinth unsupported by Sparta and the allies are emphatically said not to have started the war (i. 66, at end); perhaps Th. in Book i was controverting a popular view which saw the Corcyraean commitment as the beginning of the war: see Ar. *Peace*, 990, with Sommerstein's n. (in 421 the war is said to have lasted 'thirteen years', i.e. 433-421). It was arbitrary of Th. to treat an unsupported attack by Thebes as initiating the war when he had refused to do the same for comparable actions by Corinth. For an attempt to evade the conclusion that Th. regarded the attack on Plataia as the beginning of the war see H. Rawlings III, 'The *Arche* of Thucydides' War', in *Arktouros, Hellenic Studies Presented to B. M. W. Knox on ... his 65th Birthday*, ed.

G. Bowersock, W. Burkert, and M. C. J. Putnam (Berlin, 1979) 272 ff. I do not find this convincing; Th. is surely saying more in the present passage than that the war began *later than* this point. Nor was it so terrible a *faux pas* if Th. entertained—at different times, or for different purposes (below), or at different levels of his thinking—more than one notion about when the war began.

Smart (below, 2. 1 n.) explains Th.'s emphasis on Plataia, which happened at the beginning of spring (below), by supposing that Th. wished to avoid starting a war with a new archon, which is what Hellanikos had done! (Athenian archons took office in the summer.) But it seems far-fetched to suppose that Th. was prepared in this way to adopt—even half-heartedly—an unsatisfactory historical interpretation just out of loyalty to one chronological system or dislike of another. Rather we should recall vii. 18 and the great emphasis accorded to the treatment and fate of Plataia in Books ii and iii: it was perhaps for literary reasons that Th. represents the attack on her in 431 as a turning of the page.

One detail about the attack on Plataia does not emerge till Book iii (see 56. 2 and 65. 1): it was made during a sacred time of month. Badian (ii. 71–78, introductory n.), 98, notes Th.'s silence on the point in Book ii, and puts this down to 'prejudice' ('contempt for established religion') which blinded Th. to its actual as opposed to rhetorical importance. There is much truth in this, but (as with the monosandalism of iii. 22. 2: see n. there) it would be churlish to forget that it is to Th. that we owe our knowledge of the fact whose significance he fails fully to bring out.

2. 1. μετ' Εὐβοίας ἄλωσιν: 'after the recovery of Euboeia'. See i. 114. 3. In fact the present passage, with its Athenian archon-date, is the best evidence for the dating of Euboeia (446), rather than the other way round: despite Th.'s objection at v. 20 to dating by archon years, they provide the framework for the modern inquirer.

The chronological problems, and the emendations they have led to in the present passage and in Book i, may be briefly dealt with here. The battle of Sybota is firmly dated by an inscription to August 433, as we saw (introductory n. to i. 24–55). The revolt of Potidaia was spring 432, perhaps as late as 1 June. But the battle at Potidaia, referred to in the present passage, is strictly undated; so rightly Wesley Thompson, 'The Chronology of 432/1', *Hermes*, 96 (1968), 234: 'the battle of Potidaia may have occurred several months after the revolt.' If (as Thompson suggests) the battle was as late as October, Th.'s *μηνὶ ἕκτῳ*, 'in the sixth month', can stand without emendation (the usual emendation is *δεκάτῳ*, 'in the tenth . . .'). That would mean that Plataia was attacked in April 432/1, when Pythodoros' archonship at Athens still had two

months to run (it expired in June); more precisely, since 3. 2 tells us that it happened at the time of the new moon, on 8 April.

This figure of 'two months', δύο μῆνας, has also caused offence, and scholars have emended it to τεσσέρας, 'four'. Their main reason is to be found at 19. 1, where we are told that the invasion of Attica happened 80 days after the attack on Plataia, and that at the time of the invasion the corn was 'in full ear'. Gomme, for instance, thought that June was too late for the harvest, and that Pythodoros' archonship ended in July not June, so preferred to believe that the attack on Plataia happened around the time of the *March* new moon and the invasion in the fourth month thereafter. This cannot be dogmatically rejected but equally it cannot be said to be necessary. Thompson retains Th.'s text, correctly remarking that the burden of proof is on those who would change it. He shows that a harvest as late as late May/early June is possible and that the archon year of Pythodoros could have ended in June. The whole issue is well discussed by J. D. Smart, 'Thucydides and Hellanicus' (i. 45. 1 n. on οὐ πολὺ ὑστερον), 19 ff., with references to earlier discussions. He accepts Thompson's general position but sees Th.'s handling as hostile to Hellanikos at every turn. I have retained Th.'s text in the present chapter but see more fully my vol. 3, App. I.

Finally, we may return to i. 125. Here Gomme (on ii. 2) defends Th.'s text against Wade-Gery, *JHS* 69 (1949), 85. Th. remarks at i. 125 that 'not a year, but less' (to translate the Greek literally), elapsed between the Peloponnesian League conference and the invasion of Attica. Th. is here stressing the delay (so, rightly, Smart, 26 f.), but he has expressed himself strangely. (The thought is 'although there was a delay it was less than a year'.) In fact the conference happened after the battle at Potidaia, say November 432, and it is a considerable exaggeration to say that the period November to June is nearly a year. Th.'s aim is perhaps polemical (Smart, 27), but if so we do not know what precise view he was contradicting. Nevertheless there is no overwhelming case for emending.

ἐπὶ Χρυσίδος ἐν Ἄργει τότε πενήκοντα δυοῖν δέοντα ἔτη ἱερωμένης: 'when Chrysis the high-priestess of Argos was in the forty-eighth year of her priesthood'. We know that Hellanikos compiled a list of priestesses of Hera at Argos and used it for chronological purposes; Th.'s objection at v. 20 to dating by years of magistrates is evidently directed at least partly against Hellanikos' approach. Syme (i. 79. 2 n.), 41, notes that Chrysis is one of the very few women in Th. (see i. 136. 3 n.): 'there are no women as agents in his writings and no gods: or rather, perhaps, only one woman, the priestess of Argos who accidentally set fire to the Temple of Hera and had to flee. She comes in handy for chronology' (for the fire see iv. 133. 3). Chrysis' period of office seems amazingly long but note ML,

p. 109: Myrrhine the first priestess of Nike at Athens seems to have served for some 45 years, and Lysimache served for even longer (64 years). For women in Th. see below, 4. 2 n. On Hellanikos see i. 97. 2 n.

Αἰνησίου ἐφόρου ἐν Σπάρτῃ: 'when Ainesias was ephor at Sparta'. The lists of Spartan magistrates were collected for chronological purposes by one Charon of Lampsakos at some time in the later fifth century, but the date of Charon's activity (in particular, his relation to Hdt. and Th.) is disputed: see Jacoby, *Abhandlungen zur griechischen Geschichtsschreibung* (Leiden, 1956), 178 ff. and R. Drews, *The Greek Accounts of Eastern History* (Washington, 1973), 24 ff. Ainesias recurs in the list of ephors at Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 9 (the list may be interpolated, but that does not mean it is less likely to be accurate than if it were the work of Xenophon. The opposite may be true.)

καὶ Πυθοδώρου ἔτι δύο μῆνας ἀρχοντος Ἀθηναίοις: 'and at Athens Pythodoros had two months of his archonship to run'. See above. **μετὰ τὴν ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ μάχην μηνὶ ἕκτῳ:** 'in the sixth month after the battle at Potidaia'. See above, and (for the battle) i. 63.

καὶ ἅμα ἤρι ἀρχομένων: 'and at the beginning of spring'. See above. **ἄνδρες ὀλίγῳ πλείους τριακοσίων:** 'rather more than three hundred men'. Not the 400 of Hdt. vii. 233: see below, para. 3 n. on *Εὐρυμάχου*. That is, Th. is here polemical. For a suggestion about Th.'s source for the detailed factual material about the Plataian siege see iii. 20. 3 n. on *Εὐπομπίδου τοῦ Δαιμάχου*.

βοιωταρχοῦντες: 'Boiotarchs'. These were federal officials of the Boiotian league, supplied by the geographical and population units into which Boiotia was divided, in the way made clear to us by the Oxyrhynchos Historian (*Hell. Oxy.*), ch. 19 Chambers (translation in Harding 15; see also the tr. and comm. by S. Kern and P. McKechnie, Warminster, 1988). Unless Hdt. ix. 15 is anachronistic (which I do not believe), Boiotarchs, and thus some kind of Boiotian League, already existed at the time of the Persian Wars. The league was then reconstituted, after the decade of Athenian control, in (probably) 446: see i. 108. 3 and 113. 3-4 nn.

Th. mentions these Boiotarchs because they were the leaders of the expedition, rather than for dating purposes (despite the preceding material, which is heavily chronological. For inscriptions dated by Boiotarchs see e.g. *Syll.*³ 179 or *SEG* xxxiv (1984), 355, 12 ff.) The further question, why should he insist that they were the leaders, must be answered out of Hdt.: see n. on *Εὐρυμάχου* at para. 3 below. The present passage is, in fact, implicitly polemical. No doubt Th. also wished to underline the seriousness of the moment; cp. his solemn treatment of Archidamos at ch. 19.

Πλάταιαν τῆς Βοιωτίας: 'Plataia, a city of Boiotia'. In the geographical sense, that is; see Losada and Buck, cited at para. 2 n. below.

οὔσαν Ἀθηναίων ξυμμαχίδα: 'which was an ally of Athens'. Since the late sixth century: see Hdt. vi. 108. The date is probably 519 BC: see iii. 68. 5 n. and for Athenian–Plataian relations generally iii. 55 n.

2. ἐπηγάγοντο δέ: 'they were invited ...'. On the motives of this group see Losada (i. 107. 4 n.), 60f. Plataia, though geographically part of Boiotia (above), was certainly not a member of the Boiotian Confederacy at this time; so, rightly, I. A. F. Bruce, 'Plataea and the Boiotian Confederacy', *Phoenix*, 22 (1968), 190ff., and Buck (above, i. 107. 2 n.), 153 f.: at iii. 65. 2 the Thebans are made to contrast, as two incompatibles, the Athenian alliance of the Plataians on the one hand and the 'ancestral arrangements' of the Boiotians on the other (for this notion see further below 4 n.), that is, the Confederacy. Actually, despite this implied contrast between the Athenian alliance and 'ancestral' arrangements, the alliance and the development of the Boiotian Confederacy were roughly contemporaneous: Hdt. says that the Plataians in 519 were looking for an ally because they were being coerced by Thebes, probably an allusion to the emergent Confederacy under Theban leadership. For the kind of fifth-column activity here described compare countless instances in the fourth-century writer Aeneas Tacticus; indeed Aeneas, ii. 3, actually quotes Th. ii. 3. 2 verbatim in his account of these Plataian events. E. Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen zu Staat und Politik in Griechenland vom 7.-4. Jh. v. Chr.* (Bamberg, 1978), 31, adduces this betrayal of Plataia as an example of his thesis that internal quarrels and constitutional changes in classical Greece tended to be motivated by foreign policy considerations (but see below on *ιδίας* etc.). Here the issue is whether Plataia should align itself with Thebes or with Athens. See also H. J. Gehrke, *Stasis: Untersuchungen zu den inneren Kriegen in den griechischen Staaten des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* = *Vestigia*, 35 (Munich, 1985), 132f., and Lintott (below, para. 4 n. on *θέμενοι*), 103f.

ιδίας ἔνεκα δυνάμεως: 'in the hope of getting power into their own hands'. This statement of motive, in as far as it is reliable (and I think it is), tells against Ruschenbusch (see preceding n.). Cp. also iii. 62. 4.

3. Εὐρυμάχου τοῦ Λεοντιάδου: 'Eurymachos son of Leontiades'. In the fourth century a Leontiades, perhaps the son of this Eurymachos, is known to have been the leader of the pro-Spartan group at Thebes: *Hell. Oxy.* 20. 1 Chambers, and Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 5, with Bruce, *Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* (Cambridge, 1967), 111. Note also the Leontiades of Hdt. vii. 233: 'a long-lived and mischievous family', as Gomme says. In that passage Hdt. digresses to tell us that Leontiades' son Eurymachos (the man mentioned by Th. in the present passage) was

in command of 400 Theban troops when he was killed at Plataia. Th. corrects Hdt. both on the numbers involved and on the names of the commanders: see nn. on 2 above. On this passage see my paper in *Catling Studies*: concealed polemic may sometimes, as here, help to explain Th.'s 'conscientious' mention of a proper name. [See Rubincam, *LCM* 6 (1981), 47–9.]

4. **θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ὄπλα:** 'they grounded their arms in the Agora'. See on this action A. Lintott, *Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City* (London, 1982), 104: 'This was well planned to forestall resistance, as it prevented the inhabitants uniting and organising themselves. Aeneas, the fourth-century writer on sieges, recommended [i. 9; ii. 1] that all open spaces, including the *agora* and the theatre, should be either guarded by the defenders or, if useless, blocked up.'

κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμαχεῖν: 'to become their ally and return to the ancestral constitution of Boiotia' [lit. 'the ancestral things']. The 'ancestral constitution', *πάτριος πολιτεία* or just as here *τὰ πάτρια*, was an elastic term much appealed to in the late fifth century, see M. I. Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History*² (London, 1986), 34 ff., and viii. 86. 6n. Here the meaning is very vague indeed, apparently (see above, para. 2n.) no more than a reference to membership of the Boiotian Confederacy. Cp. K. Walters, *AJAH* 1 (1976), 133 and n. 23.

3. 1. **ἐς οὐδένα οὐδὲν ἐνεωτέριζον:** 'offered violence to no-one'. For the verb see i. 97. 1, 102. 3. Here the meaning seems more immediate, personal, and specific than constitutional change; violence against individuals is probably meant.

2. **ἐπιθέμενοι ῥαδίως κρατήσιν:** 'they could easily attack and master them'. Th. is fond of using 'easily' in descriptions of motive; see esp. ii. 80. 1 (Knemos), iii. 94. 3 and 5 (Demosthenes), with nn., also iv. 5. 1. People in Th. who think things can be done 'easily' tend to be wrong.

τῷ γὰρ πλῆθει τῶν Πλαταιῶν οὐ βουλομένῳ ἢ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀφίστασθαι: 'the majority [Jowett's 'the commons' is tendentious] at Plataia did not want to abandon the Athenian alliance'. See nn. on 2 above. The present passage bears out, as far as it goes, Diodotos' claim about the *demos* or people being everywhere favourable to Athens (see iii. 47. 2 and n.); but the status of Plataia, as a long-standing ally of Athens, is enough to explain the loyalty to Athens here mentioned, and Plataia should therefore count as a special case.

4. 2. **καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν:** 'the women and slaves'. See *Thucydides*, 42 n. 41, for women as city-defenders; on this topic see especially N. Loraux, 'La Cité, l'historien, les femmes', *Pallas*, 32 (1985), 7 ff.: women do feature in Thucydidean warfare but only against a background of turmoil, *θόρυβος*, or as irrational, 'marginal' agents: see

T. Wiedemann in *Greece & Rome*, 30 (1983), 163 ff., full ref. at i. 136. 3 n.; cp. too D. Harvey, 'Women in Thucydides', *Arethusa*, 18 (1985), 67 ff. (independently reaching conclusions some of which are similar to Wiedemann's); D. Schaps, 'The Women of Greece in Wartime', *CP* 77 (1982), 193 ff.; Emily Kearns, 'Saving the City', in *The Greek City* (i. 100. 2 n.), 323 ff., at 339 n. 26; and Connor, 'Early Greek Land Warfare . . .', *Past and Present*, 119 (1988), 3 ff., at 23. See 2. 1 n. on Chrysis for the rarity of women as agents in Th., but note the woman who gives the Thebans an axe at para. 4 below. See also 34. 4, 45. 2 nn.: women as mourners. For the (unusual) participation of the slaves see Y. Garlan, *War in the Ancient World* (London, 1975), 80.

καὶ γὰρ τελευτώντος τοῦ μηνὸς τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν: 'the affair happened at the end of the month when there was no moon' ['when . . . moon' is not in the Greek]. See 2. 1 n. for this indicator of date.

4. διωκόμενοι δέ: 'they were chased . . .'. A paragraph of exceptionally vivid description, rightly singled out by P. A. Brunt, *CR* 19 (1969), 201: 'Thucydides was of all ancient historians the most vivid and exciting teller of a story—each phrase can be like a camera shot (e.g. ii. 4. 4) . . .' See further Connor, 'Narrative Discourse . . .' (below, iii. 20–24, introductory n.); and cp. iv. 4. 2 n.

οἱ δὲ κατὰ πύλας ἐρήμους γυναικὸς δούσης πέλεκυν λαθόντες καὶ διακόψαντες τὸν μοχλὸν ἐξῆλθον: 'Others got out unnoticed by a deserted gate, cutting through the bar with an axe which a woman had given them'. On this woman see para. 2 n.

The order of words in this sentence has been suspected (see H. J. Dixon, *CR* 7 (1957), 198), but Rusten in his comm. has a good shot at explaining the jerky word order as an attempt to 'reproduce the sequence of events'. Dixon further suggests that we read *καταλαβόντες*, 'finding [the gates deserted]' for *κατά*, 'by [a deserted gate]'.

5. 6. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ταῦτα λέγουσι καὶ ἐπομόσαι φασὶν αὐτούς· Πλαταιῆς δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι . . .: 'This is the Theban account, and they add that the Plataians took an oath. The Plataians do not admit . . .'. This is a very interesting and unusual instance where Th. gives two versions of the same event. Moreover he makes no attempt at adjudication. (Hdt. often does both.) In fact, Th. must very often have been faced with more than one account and have decided which was likelier to be true, without telling us either that there was a variant or that he has rejected it. See *Thucydides*, 155 f., for the rarity in Th. of expressions of doubt or of instances of refusal to adjudicate between accounts; and add v. 68 (with *Thucydides*, 7) for the famous remark about the difficulty of penetrating the political secrets of Sparta, also i. 138. 4 on the cause of Themistokles' death, and iii. 87. 3 with n. (difficulty of ascertaining thetic

losses from the plague: for ‘thetes’ see below, 13. 6–7n. Thetes are referred to at iii. 87. 3, though the word is not used.) Here Th., after interrogating both sides, was evidently unable to decide on the facts about the morally crucial question, whether an oath was sworn. It is not decisive, either for the truth of the situation or for Th.’s perception of it, that the Thebans at iii. 66 claim that the Plataians promised, *ὑποσχόμενοι*, to spare the prisoners; one might as well say that the word ‘promise’ is a weak way of describing an oath and that the Thebans would have made more of the point if an oath *had* been sworn. It is true that the Plataian speech, which precedes the Theban, keeps clear of the issue altogether, but this is not surprising nor should it be taken as an admission of guilt about the oath-taking: one would cut a poor figure if one was reduced to saying ‘yes, we promised, but it was not a binding promise because we did not swear an oath’. Much better to do what the Plataians actually do and stick to generalities. The speakers in Book iii in fact say more or less ‘what was appropriate’, *τὰ δέοντα* (see i. 22), for their positions as set out in the present passage of Book ii.

6. 2. **μηδὲν νεώτερον ποιεῖν**: ‘to do no violence’. See 3. 1 n.

7–17. FINAL PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

7. 1. **λελυμένων λαμπρῶς τῶν σπονδῶν**: ‘a glaring violation of the truce’. That is, the attack on Plataia violated the Thirty Years Peace. See introductory n. to 2–6 and vii. 18. 2 with i. 140. 2n.: there was to be no armed attack by either side while arbitration was on offer.

παρεσκευάζοντο δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ξύμμαχοι, πρεσβείας τε μέλλοντες πέμπειν παρὰ βασιλέα καὶ ἄλλοσε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους . . . προσλήψεσθαι: ‘The Spartans and their allies made similar preparations. Both they and the Athenians planned to send embassies to the Persian King and to the other barbarians from whom either side might hope for help’. In this paragraph the subjects of the sentences are not always made clear; in the translation above, the words ‘both they and the Athenians’ are an amplification of the Greek, which continues, after ‘preparations’, with a simple plural, ‘they planned . . .’. But the word *ἐκάτεροι*, ‘either side’, a little further down, makes it clear that the scope of the sentence has now expanded. See i. 82. 1 n. for the topic of Spartan financial hopes from Persia and other barbarian powers.

2. **καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν πρὸς ταῖς αὐτοῦ ὑπαρχούσαις ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ Σικελίας τοῖς τὰκείνων ἐλομένοις ναῦς ἐπετάχθη ποιεῖσθαι κατὰ μέγεθος τῶν πόλεων, ὡς ἐς τὸν πάντα ἀριθμὸν**

πεντακοσίων νεῶν ἔσομένων: ‘The Spartans ordered their friends in Italy and Sicily to build ships in numbers proportionate to the size of their cities, in addition to those which they already had; for they intended to raise the Peloponnesian fleet to a total of five hundred’. The words ‘their friends’ [lit. ‘those who *had chosen* the Spartan side’] are interesting; see ML. p. 173, commenting on Athens’ alliance with Rhegion (see introductory n. to i. 24–55): it would be wrong to conclude, from the fact that only *Athenian* alliances with western states survive on stone, that none of those states preferred Sparta (Dorian states in particular are likely to have done so). Inscriptions from classical Sparta are much rarer than from Athens.

The total of 500 ships has caused unnecessary difficulty. Jowett’s translation, an amplification of the Greek by the addition of the reference to the entire Peloponnesian fleet, is correct. The Greek just has ‘so as to reach a total of 500 ships’, and scholars have gone wrong by taking this to refer merely to the total demanded from the west. If that were right the figure would indeed be absurdly high. For the correct interpretation see Andrewes, *HCT* v. 10 [and Brunt, *Studies in Greek History and Thought* (1993), 91]. An alternative is to read ἐπετάχθη σ’ (where σ’ means ‘200’) and so bring Th. into line with Diod. xii. 41. 1.

J. B. Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra* (introductory n. to i. 24–55), 109f., insists that western ships were an important factor in the thinking of both sides, and cites viii. 1. 2 (see n. there).

καὶ ἀργύριον ῥητὸν ἐτοιμάζειν: ‘to provide fixed sums of money’. An interesting and unusual reference to financial contributions levied by Sparta: see i. 19n. ῥητόν, ‘fixed’, lit. ‘stated’ (cp. i. 13. 1; ii. 70. 3) is strong, and implies instructions given with the expectation of obedience. Did any money come through? We cannot say for sure, but note that the Peloponnesian-sponsored privateering of 69. 1 must have cost money.

3. ὀρώντες, εἰ σφίσι φίλια ταῦτ’ εἴη βεβαίως, περίξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσοντες: ‘realizing that, if they could only rely on the friendship of these states, they would be able to reduce the Peloponnesians by surrounding it’. I have taken *καταπολεμήσοντες* to mean ‘reduce’ (so LSJ⁹ and Brunt’s revision of Jowett’s ‘completely encircle Peloponnesus with war’), admittedly a bold claim by the Athenians. Gomme, comparing iv. 1. 2 and 86. 5, took the word more neutrally (‘bello infestare’) and took the Athenians to be saying ‘seeing that we should then be fighting all round the Peloponnesians’. But he did not take account of the strikingly similar words of Alcibiades at vi. 90. 3, τὴν Πελοπόννησον περίξ πολιορκούντες . . . καταπολεμήσειν (‘to blockade the Peloponnesians . . . to crush you’), where the stronger idea of reduction or exhaustion is surely present. The repetition of the three key

words *περίξ* . . . *Πελοπόννησον* . . . *καταπολεμήσειν* is hardly accidental.

See further 30. 2 and n. for the sequel to this mission.

8. *State of opinion in Greece*

An important chapter, because it contains so many authorial comments on issues normally dealt with in speeches. Even the statement that the Spartans 'professed' to be liberators of Greece is valuable, because here for once we *know* from the context (as we do not normally know about things merely said) that this was indeed said at the time, and that it had powerful effects.

1. **τότε δὲ καὶ νεότης πολλὴ μὲν οὔσα ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ, πολλὴ δ' ἐν ταῖς Ἀθήναις:** 'At that time the young men both of the Peloponnese and of Athens were numerous; they had never seen war, and so grasped eagerly at the prospect of it'. Wade-Gery says of Th. himself that he was 'part of that ardent youth whose abundance on both sides seemed to him to distinguish the war he wrote of' (*OCD*³ 1517). See also 20. 2.

ἢ τε ἄλλη Ἑλλὰς ἅπασα μετέωρος ἦν: 'All the rest of Greece was excited . . .'. See 4 n.

2. **καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγετο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ἦδον:** 'Many prophecies were circulated, and many oracles chanted by diviners'. For the various sorts of oracle in circulation, and for Th.'s vocabulary on this topic, see iii. 104. 1 n., and for Athenian diviners see generally R. Garland, 'Priests and Power in Classical Athens', in M. Beard and J. North (eds.), *Pagan Priests* (London, 1990), 82–5.

3. **ἔτι δὲ Δῆλος ἐκινήθη ὀλίγον πρὸ τούτων, πρότερον οὐπω σεισθεῖσα ἀφ' οὗ Ἑλλήνες μέμνηνται:** 'Quite recently the island of Delos had been shaken by an earthquake for the first time within Greek memory'. But notoriously Hdt. vi. 98 says that the earthquake on Delos in the 490s, before the battle of Marathon, was the *first and last* ever. Gomme, *Essays* (i. 23, 1 n.), 122 n., is no doubt right that there are earthquakes and earthquakes, some violent, some not; that is, both Hdt. and Th. may be correctly reporting what they were told. Indeed, there is no necessary factual inconsistency if we suppose that the Hdt. passage was either written before, or not corrected in the light of, the earthquake of 431. Fornara, *JHS* 91 (1971), 32f., thinks Hdt. vi. 98 as a whole was written at the end of the Archidamian War because of the implied reference to Artaxerxes' death, but he does not consider the relation to the present passage of Th. and the 'two earthquake' problem. The problem is of interest for Th.'s attitude to Hdt. Although I believe there is no

factual inconsistency, I am not as sure as Gomme that Th. is not here gently correcting Hdt. (or somebody: see D. M. Lewis, 'Apollo Delios', *BSA* 65 (1960), 190 ff., at 194 with n. 15, offering a number of interesting suggestions, including the idea that Th., unlike Hdt., did not believe in a 490 earthquake and 'says so with customary indirectness'. It seems from the epigraphic evidence published, discussed, and combined by Lewis, for which see now *IG* i³. 130, that the Athenians may have sought to appease Apollo Delios in the aftermath of the earthquake by building him a new shrine at Phaleron).

See also W. Laidlaw, *A History of Delos* (Oxford, 1933), 61.

4. ἡ δὲ εὐνοία παρὰ πολὺ ἐποίει τῶν ἀνθρώπων μᾶλλον ἐς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, ἄλλως τε καὶ προειπόντων ὅτι τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦσιν: 'Feeling in Greece was strongly on the side of the Spartans; for they professed to be the liberators of Greece'. I have changed Jowett's 'the feeling of mankind', although that tr. is literally correct. Th. does not, however, really mean 'mankind'—he is not concerned with, for instance, the views held by Bactrian subjects of the Persian king—but Greeks. That is made clear by the reference at para. 2 to all Greece being excited about the impending war, ἥ τε ἅλλη Ἑλλάς ἅπασα μετέωρος ἦν. The generalization about support throughout Greece for Sparta is nevertheless a remarkably sweeping one, perhaps the most extravagant in all Th. The sentence is an important and interesting authorial comment, but as with other such confident attributions of opinion, we should ask, what was Th.'s evidence for it? The statement that Sparta claimed to be a liberator is important in another way: it is definite authorial evidence that Sparta claimed, as she was certainly expected, to be the liberator of Greece from what the speeches call 'the tyrant city': see i. 122. 3 and 123. 1 n.

At vii. 28. 3 Th. gives further information about the state of opinion in Greece at the beginning of the war: people thought that, if the Peloponnesians invaded Attica, Athens might hold out for between one and three years, but no longer. No doubt the preference which Th. reports in the present passage was partly conditioned by the factual expectation reported in vii. 28.

If Th., when he wrote this, knew of events at about the end of the Peloponnesian War, when Sparta was throwing her weight around and (for instance) actually helping the tyrant Dionysius to power in Sicily (see *Greek World*, 187 ff., and for Greek resentment of this see Isok. viii. 99), the present passage takes on extra and ironical significance. Spartan 'liberation' was to prove hollow (see already iii. 32. 2, viii. 46. 3, with nn.). For Th.'s awareness of the end of the war see ii. 65. 12 and for possible awareness of post-war events see ii. 100. 2 n.

ἔρρωτό τε πᾶς καὶ ἰδιώτης καὶ πόλις: 'cities and individuals were eager'. Note the bracketing of cities and individuals, both evidently being considered by Th. to be moral agents about whom the same sort of language could be used: see i. 144. 3 n.

ἐν τούτῳ τε κεκωλύσθαι ἐδόκει ἐκάστῳ τὰ πράγματα ᾧ μὴ τις αὐτὸς παρέσται: 'and where a man could not hope to be present, it seemed to him that everything was at a standstill'. See the very similar iv. 14. 2, where, however, the thought fits its context better than here: see n. there.

5. οὕτως (ἐν) ὀργῇ εἶχον οἱ πλείους τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, οἱ μὲν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀπολυθῆναι βουλόμενοι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἀρχθῶσι φοβούμενοι: 'For the general indignation against Athens was intense; some were longing to be freed from their control, others were afraid of falling under it'. With this sentence, especially the first half, compare i. 99 and n., where Th. clearly states his view that Athens' relations with her subject-allies deteriorated. How far is it true that Athens was unpopular with her subject-allies? The question has been much discussed since an influential study by G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, 'The Character of the Athenian Empire', *Historia*, 3 (1954/5), 1f., who argued that Th. was misled by oligarchic informants into thinking that Athens was more unpopular than she really was. See, however, LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 19ff., and the modern works cited at 154: the charter of the Second Athenian Confederacy (Tod 123 = Harding 35, of 377 BC), and the history of the early years of that organization, suggest that Athens' behaviour in the fifth century had left deep scars and suspicions. (The fourth-century Athenian promises to avoid cleruchies, garrisons, tribute, etc., give a good idea of what were considered to be grievances.) On the question whether 'democrats' in the subject cities of the empire felt solidarity with the Athenian 'democrats' who ran the empire see iii. 47. 2 n., where it will be suggested that Diodotos' assertion to that effect is not the whole truth.

9. *List of allies on each side*

There is a fuller and more imposing catalogue of allies at vii. 57-8, before the final sea-battle at Syracuse. On both occasions the effect is more than purely to supply factual information; like Book ii of Homer's *Iliad* (the *Catalogue of Ships*) or the material in Hdt. vii. 61ff. (the rehearsal of the Persian imperial forces before Salamis) these lists have an artistic function: they provide a pause before the conflict proper and they solemnly emphasize the magnitude of the opposing forces. Compare *Thucydides*, 35, citing the Aristotelian doctrine, *Rhetoric*,

1365^a, that 'a single subject when divided into parts seems more impressive'. Smart, *GRBS* 18 (1977), 33 ff. thinks ch. 9 interpolated.

2. Πελοποννήσιοι μὲν οἱ ἐντὸς Ἰσθμοῦ: 'all the Peloponnesians inside the Isthmus'. There is no need to delete either 'the Peloponnesians' or 'inside the Isthmus'; Th. is emphasizing that he is here using 'Peloponnesian' in the geographical sense rather than the political (the members of the Peloponnesian alliance). A. B. Bosworth, 'The Mission of Amphoterus and the Outbreak of Agis' War', *Phoenix*, 29 (1975), 35 n. 43, sees here a possible instance of an extended geographical use of 'Peloponnesian' which would include Crete, but that interpretation is not necessary on the view taken above.

πλὴν Ἀργείων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν (τούτοις δὲ ἐς ἀμφοτέρους φιλία ἦν . . .): 'with the exception of the Argives and the Achaeans—they were both neutral . . .'. For the status of Argos under the Thirty Years Peace of 446 see i. 115. 1 n.

Λόκροι, Φωκῆς: 'Lokrians, Phokians'. These Lokrians must be those of the north (the Opuntian and Epiknemidian Lokrians); the western, Ozolian Lokrians were Athenian allies: see iii. 95. 3 and 101. 1. The Italian (Epizephyrian) Lokrians are different again, see iii. 86. 2 n.

4. Μεσσηνιοὶ οἱ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ: 'the Messenians of Naupaktos'. See i. 103. 3 n.

Ζακύνθιοι: 'of . . . Zakynthos'. See 66. 1 n.

ἐν ἔθνεσι τοσοῖσδε: 'in many other regions' [lit. 'peoples']. The word *ἔθνος* is not really a geographical term, but the largest available expression for a 'people', 'clan', or 'tribe': see i. 5. 2 n. But the groupings which Th. proceeds to follow show some similarity to those found in the geographically-organized Athenian Tribute Lists, which are divided into an Island, a Thraceward, a Hellespontine, an Ionian, and until about 438 a Karian, panel. For the amalgamation of the Ionian and Karian panels see Meiggs, 306f. Th.'s list reflects the pre-438 arrangement, which enables him to mention the Dorian neighbours of Karia, that is, places like Knidos and perhaps the Dorian islands such as Kos and Rhodes. However, Th. presumably includes Samos under 'Ionia', so the language is not altogether that of the lists; quite apart from the fact that he makes no distinction between the empire and the other allies.

πλὴν Μήλου καὶ Θήρας: 'with the exception of Melos and Thera'. At v. 84. 2 Th. says that Melos was neutral at the beginning of the war; that is compatible with, but a little more specific than, the present passage. For the interesting and important problem of Melos' status in the years between 431 and 416 see iii. 91. 1 n. on *ἐξήκοντα* etc.

For the status of Thera (modern Santorini) see ML, p. 187: Thera (like Melos) was assessed for Athenian tribute in 425 (ML 69 = Fornara 136)

and in 426 made some payment which was not tribute payment (ML 68 = Fornara 133). This may have been an indemnity imposed on her when she was forced into the league in perhaps 431 or 430: so B. D. Meritt, *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), 36 ff. She was perhaps, like Melos, technically neutral in 431.

All this, if right, has implications for Th.'s method: he does choose to tell us about the Athenian moves, unsuccessful and eventually successful, to coerce Melos, though apparently omitting some very material points (see nn. on iii. 91 and v. 84. 2). About any attack on Thera he is absolutely silent; indeed this is the only mention of the island in all Th. [See Piérart, *BCH* (1984).]

10. 1. ἐπὶ ἔξοδον ἔκδημον: 'for a foreign expedition'. See Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, i. 38f.: these provisions were supplemented by plundering, 22. 2; see also 23. 3n.

2. τὰ δύο μέρη: 'two-thirds'. This was normal for a foreign expedition; if the campaign was in your own territory you were expected to provide a full turnout: see iii. 15. 1 and v. 57. 2.

11. *Speech of Archidamos*

On the relation of this speech to ch. 13, see introductory n. to that ch., and on the relation of the Archidamos of Book i to the Archidamos of Book ii see i. 81. 2n. with Pelling, there cited. See also V. Hunter, *Thucydides the Artful Reporter* (Toronto, 1973), ch. 1, 'Archidamos' Invasion of Attica', for the way Archidamos in his speech is made to anticipate events (albeit imperfectly: the Athenians are indeed angry as Archidamos hopes, but Pericles restrains them). Similar conclusions had already been reached by J. de Romilly, 'Les Intentions d'Archidamos et le livre ii de Thucydide', *RÉA* 64 (1962), 287 ff. See also June W. Allison, *Power and Preparedness in Thucydides* (Baltimore and London, 1989), 54 ff.

The structure of the present speech is simply but carefully arranged. The speaker begins with the theme of ancestors and the past, which leads to the reflection that the present operation is greater than any previously undertaken. This brings him to the enemy and his resources and psychology. (The speech in fact contains more about Athens than about Sparta, underlining the message of i. 23 and ii. 8 that the war was fought in order to destroy Athenian power, not—or at least, not ostensibly—for the aggrandisement of Sparta. See para. 2n. for an obvious echo of ch. 8.) The centre of the speech, paras. 4 and 5, consists of some generalizations on the nature of war. Archidamos then returns to the question of Athenian preparedness (para. 6), and the likelihood that the

Athenians will after all succumb to anger and fight (7–8). Finally (9) he returns to the idea of the ancestors with whom the speech began. He concludes with an exhortation to discipline.

2. **εὐνοίαν ἔχουσα**: ‘friendly towards us’. See 8. 4n.

7. **ὀργή προσπίπτει**: ‘... men are angry’. For *ὀργή* as a persistently important theme in Book ii see Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 252, app. 2, with a chart to illustrate the ring composition of the book. At the centre of the ring are the Funeral Speech and the Plague as a matching pair.

12. *Melesippos’ mission*

1. **διαλύσας τὸν ξύλλογον**: ‘Archidamos dismissed the meeting’. Apparently without inviting any one else to speak: see Westlake, *Studies*, 288 n. 39 (Spartan kings might but did not have to seek advice, and might but did not have to follow it if it was given).

Μελήσιππον: ‘Melesippos’. For this man see i. 139. 3, where however he was not given his patronymic. For the reason see G. T. Griffith, *PCPhS* 1961 (i. 1 n. on *Θουκυδίδης*), 22f.: Melesippos gets ‘the full treatment’ at this more solemn moment.

2. **οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τὸ κοινόν**: ‘or the assembly’. See i. 89. 3n.

3. **ὁ δ’ ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρίοις ἐγένετο**: ‘When he arrived at the Athenian frontier . . .’. This solemn and strikingly described moment is out of Th.’s usual narrative character; but with Melesippos’ terse farewell compare perhaps iv. 40. 2, where one of the Spartan prisoners at Athens bitterly replies to taunts by remarking that the spindle or arrow would be a good judge if it could distinguish brave men from cowards. Like Hdt., Th. seems occasionally to have enjoyed recording such memorable and ‘laconic’ utterances. Cp. Hdt. iii. 46. 2.

ἦδε ἡ ἡμέρα τοῖς Ἕλλησι μεγάλων κακῶν ἄρξει: ‘This day will be the beginning of great sorrows for Greece’. There are Herodotean, and Homeric, resonances to this: see *Iliad*, v. 63; xi. 604; Hdt. v. 30. 1; 97. 3. Note also Ar. *Peace*, 435–6, which Sommerstein in his ed. (Warminster, 1985) sees as a direct allusion to Melesippos’ words. Since Th.’s work was presumably not yet available to Aristophanes, the allusion—if it is an allusion to Melesippos at all—can only be to the real-life, not the Thucydidean, Melesippos, and this would make it likely that Th.’s report of Melesippos’ words is authentic rather than not.

5. **Βοιωτοὶ δὲ μέρος μὲν τὸ σφέτερον καὶ τοὺς ἰππέας παρείχοντο Πελοποννησίοις**: ‘the Boiotians, who had sent their contingent, including their cavalry, to the Peloponnesian army’. Jowett inserts ‘of two-thirds’ after ‘contingent’, in view of 10. 2, but Gomme suggested (*HCT* ii. 10. 3, but see his n. on iv. 93. 3) that their contribution

may have been smaller. For Boiotian cavalry see *Hell. Oxy.* 19. 4 Chambers: the full federal cavalry force was 41100, 100 from each of the eleven sub-divisions of the league. See further iv. 93. 3 n.

13. *Pericles encourages the Athenians*

Clearly, this important ch. balances Archidamos' speech in ch. 11, though it does not answer it; rather, it reinforces it: Archidamos had stressed Athenian power and warned the Spartans not to underestimate it, and Pericles is made to give a more precise assessment of that power. Why then is the one speech in direct and the other in indirect speech? Perhaps because the material put into Pericles' mouth is too technical and precise, including a statement of financial (3–6) and human (6–8) resources. Th. tended to avoid being technical in speeches, and the present ch. should be treated as in effect a speech, although it enables Th. to provide some material which we are surely meant to treat as factual. [See L. Kallet-Marx in *RFP*.]

1. **δέκατος αὐτός**: 'one of the ten Athenian generals'. See i. 61. 1 n. **ὑποτοπήσας, ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος αὐτῷ ξένος ὦν ἐτύγχανε**: 'suspected that Archidamos . . . because he happened to be his guest-friend'. Compare Plut. *Per.* 23, where the same story is given, but there is a near-doublet of the story in Plutarch's Life of Fabius Maximus Cunctator, ch. 7, the parallel life to his *Pericles*. (Hannibal spares the estates of Fabius when devastating Italy, so as to embarrass him.) For the difficulties presented by such 'roving anecdotes' see *Thucydides*, 22 ff., and note that B. Campbell, 'Teach Yourself How to be a General', *JRS* 77 (1987), 24 and n. 68, interestingly cites, in his section on 'seemingly obvious ploys', Tac. *Hist.* v. 23 (Petilius Cerealis ravages the land of the Batavians but leaves *Civilis*' property untouched, *nota arte ducum*).

J. V. A. Fine, *Horoi* (*Hesperia* Supplement ix, 1951), 192 f., thought, perhaps rightly, that Pericles' gift to the state was of the usufruct, not the ownership of the land. On the *xenia* or guest-friendship of Archidamos and Pericles, and the complications it produced, see G. Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City* (Cambridge, 1987), 3, 144 f., valuable generally for the notion of guest-friendship. See further 18 n. It has been suggested that the *xenia* mentioned in the present passage was inherited, and dates from 479 BC when Xanthippos, Pericles' father, and Archidamos' grandfather Leotychidas, were joint commanders of the Greek fleet (Hdt. viii. 131): Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 47. Stadter in his commentary on Plut. *Per.* 33. 3 (see i. 45. 1 n.) is not persuaded.

τὰ ἄγη ἐλαύνειν: 'that the curse should be got rid of'. See i. 126 nn. **ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ**: 'in the assembly'. Oddly emphatic.

2. παρήνει . . . ἄπερ καὶ πρότερον: ‘he repeated his previous advice’. At i. 144. 2 (see n. there) Pericles was made to say that he would ‘speak again about all this when the time for action comes’. But that passage was no more than a general promise not to keep silent when the hour for action struck, and in any case at i. 144 the phrase ‘all this’ appeared to refer to Athenian mistakes, which are not a leading theme of ii. 13. The present passage enables Th. to pass quickly over those points, such as the evacuation of Attica and the avoidance of open battle (see the rest of para. 2), which had been developed in Book i. It is thus an unusually explicit illustration of Th.’s selective method (as is the final sentence of the present ch.: see 13. 9n.). How far the historical Pericles unfolded his speeches in this logical, self-referential, way may be doubted (that is, we do not know whether the present phrase renders an opening on the lines of ‘my advice to you is what it was before’). On the one hand, real-life politicians never have the slightest scruple about repeating themselves without any such stylistic apology in the form of a reminder. On the other hand, they may well start—whether their advice has actually changed or not—by saying (with Th.’s Pericles and Th.’s Kleon) ‘I am the same man and do not change’: see i. 140. 1n.

τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν: ‘they should keep their allies well in hand’. Andrewes, *HCT* v. 185, discussing the Melian Dialogue, says of the present passage that its ‘concrete implications . . . are not reassuring’. That is, the present vaguely but slightly sinister phrase is a warning to us: it should not too easily be assumed that Th. intends to imply that the Athenians of the Dialogue represent a decline from the standards of Pericles (Andrewes, 184). This will become relevant when we note the parallels between things said by Pericles and by Kleon, the advocate of harsh treatment of the Mytilenean rebel subjects (see ii. 63. 2n.). As for the attitudes—and actions—of the historical Pericles, note Plut. *Per.* 28, citing the Hellenistic historian Duris of Samos (with Meiggs, 191f.) for savage treatment of Samian rebels in 439, on Pericles’ orders. See LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 19.

χρημάτων περιουσία: ‘reserves of money’. See i. 2. 2n.

3. θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε προσιόντων μὲν ἑξακοσίων ταλάντων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φόρου κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων τῇ πόλει ἄνευ τῆς ἄλλης προσόδου: ‘The state of their finances was encouraging; they had on an average 600 talents of tribute coming in annually from their allies, to say nothing of their other revenue’. Contrast i. 96, where we were told that the original annual contribution was fixed at 460 talents: see n. there. It is impossible to say, from the evidence of inscriptions, that Th.’s figure of 600 is too high, because the so-called tribute lists—which admittedly suggest totals for the late 430s

of less than 400 talents—do not include all the revenues received from the allies. For instance, to take only the best-known example, we know from iv. 108. 1 that Amphipolis (which does not feature on the tribute lists at all) was a valuable source of financial revenue, *χρημάτων προσόδω*.

Two major categories of revenue are scarcely touched on in the present chapter, although they come under the general heading of ‘other revenue’, namely (i) the revenue from the silver-mines (on which see ii. 55. 1 n.) and (ii) the *private* resources of wealthy Athenians (but see below for the trierarchic system). From iii. 19, where a capital levy of 200 talents is mentioned, we can see that this was a far from negligible factor. Why then is there nothing about it here? The answer surely lies in the notion of *encouragement*. It might not sound very encouraging to say ‘and if the worst comes to the worst you can dig a bit deeper into your own pockets’. (In any case, at i. 141. 5 Pericles had said—wrongly: see iii. 19 n.—that wars are supported by accumulated wealth, not by ‘forced contributions’, *βίαιοι ἐσφοραί*, from individuals. So at least his silence here is consistent with the view expressed there.) On the other hand, I can think of no good reason why Pericles is not allowed an encouraging mention of (i) the silver-mines, proudly mentioned at Aeschylus, *Persians*, 238 (240).

There were sources of ‘other revenue’ in addition to these two: see Ar. *Wasps*, 657 ff., with Sommerstein’s nn. (Warminster, 1983).

Inscriptions show that Pericles’ confidence was in fact misplaced, an issue which I postpone to 65. 5 n.

ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει ἔτι τότε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων ταλάντων (τὰ γὰρ πλείστα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα μύρια ἐγένετο . . .): ‘... there were still remaining in the Acropolis six thousand talents of coined silver. The whole amount had once been as much as 9,700 talents . . .’. I accept the manuscript figure in particular and the manuscript reading of the sentence in general. Earlier in the present century it was fashionable to prefer the readings of a scholiast on Aristophanes, *Wealth*, 1193, which quotes a text of this sentence of Th. which differs from our manuscripts in several ways. The most important variants are *αἰεὶ ποτε* for *ἔτι τότε*, and *περιεγένετο* for *μύρια ἐγένετο*. These changes would (it is claimed) produce the following, very different, meaning: ‘... there was, he said, a regular standing amount of 6,000 talents on the Akropolis. The greater part of this, actually 5,700 talents, was in fact still there . . .’. See *ATL* iii. 131. The historical and financial support for this interpretation is, however, extremely shaky. The main prop is the so-called ‘Papyrus Decree’ (Fornara 94), actually an extract from a Hellenistic commentary on a

speech of Demosthenes (xxii. 13 ff.). The commentary purports to quote a decree on finance moved by Pericles. But the status and text of this document are alike uncertain. And the arithmetic by which the authors of *ATL* seek to arrive at their conclusion that there was a steadily maintained reserve of 6,000 talents depends on some further items of evidence whose reliability or relevance is very doubtful indeed: see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 18. The best modern discussion is by Gomme, 'Thucydides ii 13, 3', *Historia*, 2 (1953/4), 1 ff.; Gomme retains the manuscript text of Th.

P. J. Rhodes in his 1988 comm. suggests a new emendation, taking the scholiast's text as his starting-point but turning it into better Greek: *ὑπαρχόντων δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει αἰεὶ ποτε ἀργυρίου ἐπισήμου ἑξακισχιλίων τάλαντων (ἑξακισχίλια μὲν γε τάλαντα τριακοσίων ἀποδέοντα περιέγενετο) ...*, which he renders 'they had always kept on the Acropolis six thousand talents of coined silver, and there still remained three hundred talents short of the six thousand'. I continue to find the financial implications of this incredible. (Rusten is no help here.)

ἀφ' ὧν ἔς τε τὰ προπύλαια τῆς ἀκροπόλεως καὶ τὰλλα οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἔς Ποτειδαίαν ἀπανηλώθη: 'but from this had to be deducted 3,700 talents spent [lit. 'what was spent'] on various buildings, such as the Propylaia of the Acropolis, and on Potidaia'. We have the building-accounts of the Propylaia, or ceremonial gateway to the Acropolis, for the five years during which building work was carried out, 437–432 BC: *IG* i³. 462–466. (The accounts for the fourth year, 434/3, are printed as ML 60 = Fornara 118B.) They are too bitty for us even to guess at the total amount spent, though the extract for the fourth year reveals the interesting fact that money was handed over to the commissioners direct from one of the Laurion silver mines. A writer called Heliodorus, of perhaps the second century BC, confirms the five-year period (though with a wrong implication that the job was finished); he also says that the work cost 2,012 talents, which, as Lewis says (in Latin) in his commentary to *IG* i³. 466, 'nobody now believes'. (*FGrHist* 373 F 1 = Fornara 118A, with J. J. Keaney, *Historia*, 17 (1968), 507 ff.) It hardly seems worth saving Heliodorus' figure by taking it to refer to the Parthenon (on which see R. Stanier, *JHS* 73 (1953), 68 ff.) and the cult-statue of Athena as well as the Propylaia; for this idea see ML, p. 165 (commenting on their no. 59, the Parthenon accounts), with references. But there can be no doubting the expense of the gateway or the reason why Th. singles it out: as ML says (p. 166): 'grandeur in a temple need cause no surprise. Such magnificence in a secular building was a splendid extravagance.' Too often Th. neglects buildings, i. 10. 2 and 17 nn.

The cost of the Potidaia siege *is*, however, known: see ii. 70 where we

are told it cost 2,000 talents. But this relates to the total cost, and Potidaia did not fall until the beginning of 429. We do not know how much of the 2,000 had been spent by 431 (though the percentage spent on the initial phases was probably large) and so we cannot even say how much of the 3,700 talents was attributable, in Th.'s view, to building work and how much to Potidaia.

4. **καὶ σκῦλα Μηδικά:** 'the Persian spoils'. See iii. 57. 1 n. for this word for spoils.

οὐκ ἐλάσσονος [ἦν] ἢ πεντακοσίων ταλάντων: 'at least 500 talents more'. We have no idea where Th., or Pericles, got this figure from. Temple inventories existed, but we should remember that the aim of all this information is *encouragement* (*θαρσεῖν τε ἐκέλευε*, para. 3).

5. **τεσσαράκοντα τάλαντα σταθμὸν χρυσοῦ ἀπέφθου καὶ περιαιρετὸν εἶναι ἅπαν:** 'weighed forty talents, and were of refined gold, which was all removable'. Diod. xii. 40. 3 says 'fifty talents'. Plutarch, *Per.* 31. 3, confirms the point about the gold being removable, the idea being to make theft easier to detect.

χρησαμένους τε ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ ἔφη χρῆναι μὴ ἐλάσσω ἀντικαταστήσαι πάλιν: 'They might use this treasure in self-defence, but they were bound to replace all that they had taken'. See Parker, *Miasma*, 173 and nn. 168–9 on this proposal: 'as an initial justification, there was the interpretation of such requisition as mere borrowing, with interest payable; Thucydides' Pericles insists on this.' It is not clear whether Pericles' vague words imply an obligation to pay interest, which has been defined as payment by time for the use of money. In fact, as Parker notes, the Athenians began by paying interest at 'more or less the going rate' but dropped it to an almost nominal rate; the capital was for the most part never repaid. On the use of temple treasures see also an interesting study by T. Linders, 'Gods, Gifts, Society', *Boreas*, 15 (1987), 115 ff. (above, i. 126. 6 n. on ἐξω), arguing, with good remarks on the present passage, against the view that the object of piling up such treasures was precisely to create a financial reserve.

6–7. **ὀπλίτας δὲ τρισχιλίου καὶ μυρίου εἶναι ἄνευ τῶν ἐν τοῖς φρουρίοις καὶ τῶν παρ' ἐπαλξιν ἑξακισχιλίων καὶ μυρίων. τοσοῦτοι γὰρ ἐφύλασσαν τὸ πρῶτον ὅποτε οἱ πολέμιοι ἐσβάλοιν, ἀπὸ τε τῶν πρεσβυτάτων καὶ τῶν νεωτάτων, καὶ μετοίκων ὅσοι ὀπλίται ἦσαν:** 'He added that they had 13,000 hoplites, besides the 16,000 who occupied the fortresses or who manned the walls of the city. For this was the number engaged on garrison duty at the beginning of the war, whenever the enemy invaded Attica. They were made up of the oldest and youngest men, and of those metics who bore heavy arms'. Cp. iii. 87. 3 and n.; that passage supports the

implication of Th.'s silence about thetes in the present ch.: it was harder for Th. to get information about them; this conclusion remains true even if we accept that there was no formal hoplite register (see (iii) below).

Hoplites were heavy-armed soldiers; in terms of the four census-ratings into which Solon in the 590s had divided the Athenian citizen body, they correspond most closely to the third or 'zeugite' class (but see below). For the elucidation of this passage see now M. H. Hansen, 'The Number of Athenian Hoplites in 431 B.C.:', *Symbolae Osloenses*, 56 (1981), 19 ff., citing and superseding previous discussions. The difficulty which scholars have always felt is that 'the home guard outnumbered the field army', as Hansen puts it. Hansen's solutions are that (i) the 'oldest and youngest' men are not just the oldest and youngest of hoplite or 'zeugite' census but the oldest and youngest from all four classes. (The other three were the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, who were the top class; the second was the *hippeis* or cavalry class (see above, i. 45. 2 n.); the 'thetes' were the bottom class, from whose numbers the fleet was largely manned. But no doubt zeugites as well as thetes served in the fleet, just as some thetes surely served as hoplites; and the cavalry was drawn from the top two classes, not the second only. See iii. 16. 1 for a mention by Th. in a military context of the top two classes, with n. there.) If Hansen is right in his plausible suggestion about the 'oldest and youngest' their numbers would be considerably greater than has been hitherto supposed. That is, there is no need to emend Th.'s 16,000 so as to produce a smaller figure (Beloch wanted 6,000). (ii) A related point: the scope of the words *δοσοι ὄπλαται ἦσαν* 'who bore heavy arms' is confined to metics; not to all three groups, youngest, oldest, and metics. (iii) There was, contrary to what most modern authorities have assumed, no such thing as a central hoplite *κατάλογος* or register, so that expressions like 'who bore heavy arms' in the present passage merely refer, as Jowett's tr. correctly implies, to those 'liable to be called up for hoplite service', not to census ratings: Hansen, 29; see also his *Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century B.C.* (Herning, 1986), 83 ff. See also Andrewes, 'The Hoplite *Katalogos*', in *Classical Contributions*, 1981 (above, i. 32. 5 n.), 1 ff. At 3 n. 2 Andrewes comes close to the Hansen view while still accepting the basic premise that there was a formal register.

The present passage is valuable evidence for the size of the Athenian military forces, but leaves many questions about *population* figures unanswered; for stress on this distinction see Hansen, *Demography*, 16. It is not therefore strictly necessary in this commentary to go into the question of population, but Hansen in another article (above, i. 101. 2 n. on *τοῦ . . . σεισμοῦ*) accepts a total of c.40,000 adult males or even more, but rejects some of the particular premises which led Gomme to argue

for 47,000. For *metic* numbers see R. P. Duncan-Jones, 'Metic Numbers in Periclean Athens', *Chiron*, 10 (1981), 101ff. (accepted in principle by Hansen), arguing for a very high figure, perhaps in five figures. The numbers of *thetes* is quite uncertain. See now the valuable appendix on population in Rhodes's Th. ii commentary.

τοῦ τε γὰρ Φαληρικοῦ τείχους . . .: 'The Phaleric Wall . . .'. For the three walls joining Athens to the sea (the two parallel Long Walls to Piraeus and the single wall to Phaleron) see i. 107. 1 and 108. 3, and for the walls of the city and of Piraeus see i. 89. 3-93. 8, with nn. to those passages.

8. ἵππέας: 'The Athenian cavalry . . .'. For the 'hippeis' or cavalry see paras. 6-7 n. and i. 45. 2 n., also below, ii. 22. 2 n.

ξὺν ἵπποτοξόταις: 'including mounted archers'. For these, and for the growing importance of archers generally at Athens in the fifth century see A. M. Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (London, 1967), 98, pointing out that mounted archers are an un-Greek phenomenon. (Compare the horse-javelin men of Alexander: Arrian, *Anabasis*, iii. 24. 1 and Bosworth's note, though against Bosworth I suspect that these are Oriental recruits, not Macedonians.) The Athenian mounted archers were occasionally used on campaign (e.g. at Melos, v. 84).

ἑξακοσίους δὲ καὶ χιλίους τοξότας: '1,600 foot-archers'. For citizen foot-archers, used more frequently on campaign than the mounted archers, see the casualty list ML 33 = Fornara 78; but note that barbarian archers were also included in the civic casualty lists: below, 34. 3 n. All the archers mentioned in this and the previous n., whether citizen or barbarian, should be distinguished from the contingent of Scythian archers maintained by the city; these had purely policing functions and lower status.

καὶ τριήρεις τὰς πλωίμους τριακοσίας: 'and the city had 300 triremes fit for service'. The inscribed navy lists, which throw some light on fourth-century numbers and naval arrangements generally, do not survive from this period; they first begin to be informative in the last years of the Peloponnesian War; and note esp. *IG* ii² 1951. See G. L. Cawkwell, 'Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century', *CQ* 34 (1984), 334ff., an excellent study which despite its title contains comparative remarks about the wealthier fifth century. In the fourth century, in the days of Athens' Second Confederacy, we do know from the lists that there were, on occasion, between 300 and 400 hulls in the dockyards. The equipping of those hulls was the financial responsibility of trierarchs, for whom see ii. 24. 2 n. We do have a figure for the total of trierarchs in the Archidamian War, the 400 mentioned in the *Old Oligarch*, iii. 4. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Th.'s 300; it would

be sensible for Athens to have more trierarchs than triremes. For what it is worth, Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 545, also has the figure 300 ships. At iii. 17. 2 Th. has a total of 250 ships, but there are serious problems about that ch.: see n. there.

9. **ἀλλὰ οἷάπερ εἰώθει:** 'such as he was in the habit of using'. Another indication by Th. of his own selectivity: see para. 2 n. on *παρήνει* etc.

ἐς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ: 'to prove that they would win through in the war'. For 'winning through' see i. 144. 1 n. and refs. there given. The tr. 'winning through' is Brunt's.

For *ἀπόδειξιν* [lit. 'demonstration'] see i. 97. 2 n.

14. 1. *Evacuation of the countryside; animals moved to Euboeia*

ἔσεκομίζοντο: 'brought into the city'. How complete was this evacuation of the Attic countryside? In *Greek World*, 128, I gave a number of reasons for thinking that it was incomplete, despite the effect on morale which Th. goes on to describe. Add that V. D. Hanson has argued that devastation of crops was not very effective in the ancient world, though he has his critics: see i. 81. 6 n. See further below, n. on Euboeia.

καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν οἰκιῶν καθαιροῦντες τὴν ξύλῳσιν: 'and even the woodwork of their houses, which they took down'. Removing the woodwork of a house when you left it was not quite so extraordinary in ancient Greece as it would be now: a late fourth-century BC lease of a sanctuary in Attica contains the provision that the tenant shall at the end of the ten-year period of the lease 'take away with him the woodwork, the roof-tiles, and the doors and posts' but none of the other furnishings. See *Syll.*³ 1097 = Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris, 1969), 47, translated in D. G. Rice and J. E. Stambaugh, *Sources for the Study of Greek Religion* (Williamstown, 1979), 125. But the picture of refugees streaming into the city in 431, carrying or pushing carts full of possessions including such bulky wooden fittings, is a vivid and extraordinary one. For a fascinating discussion of this passage (though with a persistently wrong ref. to Th. ii. 4. 1) see Meiggs, *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World* (Oxford, 1982), 208: 'of the woodwork the door was the most valuable part and the most vulnerable . . . the same contrast between plain walls and highly decorative doors can be seen in old Arab houses and even in African villages.'

Note, however, that roof-tiles and timber were left, after the completer evacuation in 413, for the Thebans to remove: *Hell. Oxy.* 20. 4 Chambers. Bruce in his commentary (ii. 2. 3 n. on *Εὐρυμάχου* etc.) wonders why the Athenians did not behave in 413 as they did in 431.

πρόβατα δὲ καὶ ὑποζύγια ἐς τὴν Εὐβοίαν διεπέμψαντο καὶ ἐς

τὰς νήσους τὰς ἐπικειμένας: 'Their flocks and beasts of burden they shipped over to Euboia and the adjacent islands'. This helps to explain why the loss of Euboia in 411 was felt to be such a disaster (viii. 96. 2) and why Th. can say there that it was more important to the Athenians than Attica itself. See n. on that passage, also vii. 28. 1 and n. for the route, via Oropos and Dekeleia, by which provisions were brought from Euboia to Athens by a largely overland route which was closed by the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in 413. This supports the view (see above and iii. 26. 3 n.) that in 431 to 421 Attica was not given up entirely. Between 413 and 411 the transport of goods from Euboia was by sea.

On the flocks see S. Hodkinson, 'Animal Husbandry in the Greek Polis', in C. R. Whittaker (ed.), *Pastoral Economies in Classical Antiquity* (Cambridge, 1988 = *PCPhS* supp. 14), 35 ff., at 37: the present passage evidence that 'the agro-pastoral farm' was 'not merely an upper-class phenomenon in Attica'. [And see Jameson at 96 on absence of cattle.]

14. 2-16. *Digression on Athenian settlement habits and the synoikism*

This interesting digression is arranged according to the same principles of 'ring composition' which we noticed in another antiquarian section, the *Archaeology* (see i. 3. 1 n. on *δηλοὶ δέ*). In the present digression the idea that the Athenians took their uprooting badly (*χαλεπῶς*) is the linking word and thought. (With 14. 2 compare 16. 2.)

Th. distinguishes firmly and clearly between two kinds of synoikism (for this term see i. 10. 2 n. on *οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης*). The two kinds are *political* and *physical* (see *Mausolus*, 79, 83 f.). On the one hand, there is (to confine ourselves to the Attic example, which is Th.'s concern in these chapters) the political synoikism of Attica, an event which Th. dates, rightly or wrongly, to the time of Theseus, i.e. the Bronze or Mycenaean Age. This means the surrender to Athens, by the communities of Attica, of their political sovereignty, and is dealt with in ch. 15. On the other hand, there is the physical synoikism of Attica, the concentration, in the city, of the inhabitants of Attica. Th. dates this to the year 431 BC, and deals with it in ch. 16, where he says that 'although they were now [that is, after Theseus] united in a single city', *καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνοικίσθησαν*, they continued to live in the countryside until the present war, *μέχρι τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου*. This is a direct contrast between the two kinds of synoikism, or (if one prefers) between synoikism in its two aspects. The decision reported in ch. 15 is essentially a political decision (although it had, as we shall see, a physical result within Athens city, the expansion and re-orientation of the central area). Strictly speaking, the decision is not the kind of change which archaeology could be

expected to give a date for, any more than it can be expected to settle the question whether, say, there was or was not a Peace of Kallias; at least, not without some question-begging assumptions about which physical features of a site are or are not compatible with subordination to central government.

14. 2. χαλεπῶς: 'painful'. See above, beginning of introductory n.

15. 1. ἑτέρων μᾶλλον: 'more than any other people'. For the myth of Athenian 'autochthony' see i. 2. 5 n. on *ἄνθρωποι ᾧκουν* . . .

πρυτανεῖά τε: 'town halls'. See S. G. Miller, *The Prytaneion* (Berkeley, 1978): in the historical period, *prytaneia* were used for the formal dining of honorands, for the housing of archives, as a religious focus for the community, and probably also as a centre for the distribution of maintenance to such people as war orphans. There was, at Athens at least, nothing intrinsically democratic about the institution (Miller, 66, 129), so Th.'s idea that there were *prytaneia* in the once autonomous *poleis* of pre-democratic Attica is not impossible, however anachronistic it may sound.

ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνιοι μετ' Εὐμόλπου πρὸς Ἐρεχθέα: 'such as the Eleusinians under Eumolpos against Erechtheus'. Erechtheus was the sixth king of Attica and preceded Theseus by several generations. R. M. Simms, 'Eumolpos and the Wars of Athens', *GRBS* 24 (1983), 197 ff., defends the ancient tradition of two wars, one under Erechtheus, one under Theseus.

For the early history of Athens' relations with Eleusis, see N. J. Richardson (ed.), *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford, 1974), 6 ff., and n. on line 154 for Eumolpos, on whom see also H. Lloyd-Jones, *Maia* 19 (1967), 213. Eumolpos' descendants, the Eumolpidae, were one of the two families, the other being the Kerykes, who provided the most important priests of the Eleusinian Mysteries, which were sacred to Demeter and her daughter Kore. See further R. Garland, 'Religious Authority in Archaic and Classical Athens', *BSA* 79 (1984), 96 ff., also discussing the date for Athens' first involvement in the Mysteries.

Richardson argues that Athenian interest in the Mysteries grew markedly after the middle of the sixth century BC. But this is not conclusive evidence that the political incorporation of Eleusis into Attica was as late as the sixth century, because there is a tradition that, as a result of the war of Erechtheus against Eumolpos, Eleusis became subject to Athens in other respects but kept control of the Mysteries (Paus. i. 27. 4; 38. 3). The tradition in Pausanias is not necessarily inconsistent with the present passage of Th.: Th. may have thought that the incorporation of Eleusis happened under Erechtheus and that it ante-

dated the incorporation, under Theseus, of the other 'cities' of Attica. In the present passage Th. is merely giving an example of an internal Attic war without implying anything about the outcome.

As Richardson rightly says (7 n. 2) the war in Hdt. i. 30 is not evidence for a late archaic war against Eleusis: see How and Wells commentary. Hdt., through the mouth of Solon, speaks merely of a war in which one Tellos, at a date perhaps (but even this is quite uncertain) shortly before Solon's own time, fell *at* Eleusis fighting against neighbours of Athens (*πρὸς ἀστυγείτονας ἐν Ἐλευσίνι*). The Penguin Hdt. perpetuates an old mistranslation by translating this 'in a battle with the neighbouring town of Eleusis'. The neighbours could have been Megarians or anybody.

R. A. Padgug, 'Eleusis and the Union of Attica', *GRBS* 13 (1972), 135 ff., concludes that Eleusis was incorporated early, not late. See also, on Athens' relations with Eleusis, R. Osborne, *Demos: The Discovery of Classical Attica* (Cambridge, 1985), 172 ff. (esp. 251 n. 34), rejecting the 'evolutionary approach which looks for political takeover by Pisistratus or by the Athenian *demos*' (178). He is right that the hypothesis of Pisistratid attention to Eleusis has often been accepted uncritically, but the military importance of Eleusis if nothing else (for this see 19. 2n.) makes the hypothesis attractive. (For the aggressiveness of Pisistratid foreign policy, masked by Hdt., see iii. 68. 5n.)

2. μετὰ τοῦ ξυνητοῦ: 'as well as a wise . . .'. For this word of commendation see i. 79. 2n. See also below for the possibility that Th.'s characterization here differed from that of Hellanikos.

καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τὰ τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχάς: 'he . . . dissolved the councils and separate governments in the other cities of Attica'. Th. is describing a purely political change in the status of the local *bouleuteria*, namely their subordination to the central authority. He does not mean, so to speak, that the bulldozers were sent in to demolish the physical *bouleuteria* or council-chambers (although this word can, and frequently does, refer to the physical building: for a clear instance see the end of *Syll*³ 336). On the contrary, we know from archaeology and from epigraphy that deme, i.e. local, meeting places in Attica continued in use in the classical period. Th.'s word for these meeting places may be anachronistic but there is nothing absurd about the idea he is expressing.

As for the identity of 'the other cities' (apart from Athens and Eleusis) we know that Thorikos claimed to have been a city at one time (*FGrHist* 1 Hekataios F 126 and 328 Philochoros F 94, with Andrewes, *HCT* v. 317) and that there was an organization called the Tetrapolis of Marathon (*FGrHist* 328 Philoch. F 75; it was still cultically active in the fourth century: *Syll*³ 930).

ἐν βουλευτήριον ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανεῖον: 'established one council and town hall'. Again, this is a political or symbolic change; see preceding n. No doubt Th. believed that after Theseus there was a physical council chamber and *prytaneion*, but he is not necessarily saying that there were no such buildings before Theseus. It was their status which changed. For a somewhat inconclusive discussion of the site of the early Athenian *prytaneion* see Miller, ch. 3; he insists that from Th.'s words at para. 3 below (the original or pre-synoikism city was on the Acropolis and its south slope) it follows that Th. thought that 'the *prytaneion* founded by Theseus was in some area other than the original city' (Miller, 40). That is, an Acropolis or south slope site is, he thinks, ruled out for the Thesean *prytaneion*. This does not follow except by supposing that Theseus' 'establishment' of a *prytaneion* necessarily and immediately involved a new physical building. Th. should not be so pressed; he does imply that as a result of the political synoikism and the greater *use* now being made of Athens (χρῆσθαι, below, see n.), there was a physical shift of gravity within Athens away from the old south slope area. But in the present passage he is merely contrasting the disuse into which the local *bouleuteria* etc. now fell, with the greater use now made of, and status accorded to, their central equivalents.

The *prytaneion* was on the north slope by the time of the second-century AD writer Pausanias (i. 18. 2 ff.), and it is tempting to argue from continuity of site for so focal a building. But the argument from continuity works either way: one might just as well say that Theseus would have respected the south slope position of the pre-synoikism *prytaneion*, if there was one (and as noted above, I do not think Th. means to exclude the possibility that there was). Plut. *Thes.* 24 is derivative from Th. See also D. M. Lewis, postscript to A. R. Burn, *Persia and the Greeks* (London, 1984), 607 f., for some new Hellenistic evidence which may imply that at one time the *prytaneion* was located at the *east* end of the acropolis. The whole argument is misconceived: archaeology cannot settle, and Th. does not mean to settle, the sites of these buildings.

As for the *bouleuterion* established by Theseus, the same considerations apply; there is no evidence for saying with Travlos (i. 93. 2 n.), 198: 'the oldest Bouleuterion, founded by Theseus when he effected the *synoikismos*, probably had stood on the site of the Eleusinion.'

ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὖσαν . . . ξυνωκίσε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκάστους ἄπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἠνάγκασε μιᾷ πόλει ταύτη χρῆσθαι: 'uniting all the inhabitants of Attica in the present city. They continued to live on their own lands, but he compelled them to use Athens as their capital . . .'. Th. distinguishes the physical and political aspects: see introductory n. On the word *ξυνωκίζω* (for which

cp. i. 10. 2) see Hope Simpson and Lazenby (introd. n. to i. 1–23), 58 n. 5: ‘a more correct technical term for a number of communities becoming associated in political rights is *συμπολιτεύω*.’

Did Theseus synoikize Attica politically? Or to put it in modern terms, was there a Bronze Age or Mycenaean political synoikism? Archaeological evidence cannot answer this, though it has been adduced. See on the one hand F. H. Stubbings, *CAH* ii². 2. 169 (1975), for distribution through Attica of ‘well-furnished Mycenaean tombs’ as an index of a prosperity which ‘was due to or combined with the political maturity implied by the ascription to Theseus of the *συνοικισμός*, the political unification of Attica’; though he also adduces the dismantling of Mycenaean Attic citadels as ‘part of the scheme of unification’. Contrast A. M. Snodgrass, who takes the same Mycenaean tholos-tombs to ‘indicate the place of residence of an independent ruler’ and thus to be evidence *against* a Bronze Age synoikism: communication of 2 November 1987, confirming the thesis of a paper delivered in Oxford, cp. *CAH* iii². 1. 668 (1982): ‘some aspects of the material evidence from Mycenaean Attica are hard to reconcile with the idea of a centralized political organization dominated by Athens.’ He there puts the synoikism in the tenth or ninth centuries, but still claims the support of Th. (he now puts the synoikism in the eighth century, perhaps as late as 700; and see his paper ‘Interaction by Design: The Greek City-State’, in C. Renfrew and J. F. Cherry, *Peer-Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change* (Cambridge, 1986), 47 ff., at 48 ff.). For a compromise view see Andrewes: ‘if there was ever a unified Mycenaean kingdom of Attica . . . it is hard to believe that this survived the collapse, and we must look to the Dark Age for the historical union of Attica’: *CAH* iii². 3. 362. He discounts the evidence of the Homeric Catalogue of Ships (which mentions no Attic sites other than Athens and so has been taken to support a Mycenaean date for the political synoikism).

Material evidence can not settle the date of what is, as Th. describes it, a political decision. Splendid tombs prove nothing about the political status of the (no doubt rich and powerful) men buried in them, although archaeologists sometimes speak of ‘boss-man architecture’. There were rich and powerful men in Athens down to the time of Alcibiades; some of them were buried in expensive style in deme cemeteries like Vari: C. W. J. Eliot, *Coastal Demes of Attica* (1962), 39. Nor is political subordination proved by the ‘dismantling’ (a tendentiously political word) of citadel sites. Again, there were fine classical deme temples, but that does not show that fifth-cent. Attica was not yet politically synoikized; it proves only, what Th. tells us, that settlement went on outside Athens city.

If we ask for support for a Dark Age date (perhaps even as late as the

eighth century) for the political synoikism of Attica, where can it be found if not from archaeology? We should look to Athens' neighbours: there are literary traditions about synoikisms at Corinth and Megara, and reasons for thinking that they happened in the eighth century. Perhaps all these states 'got their act together' at similar dates. See C. Roebuck, 'Some Aspects of Urbanization in Corinth', *Hesperia*, 41 (1972), 96ff., at 115, distinguishing the physical from the late eighth-century political synoikism. For the Megarian synoikism see Hammond, *Studies*, 89f., dating to the early eighth century the emergence of Megara as a *polis* in the political sense. But Andrewes's date of about 900 for Attica makes it easier to understand how the event was attached to the remote figure of Theseus. This is an objection to 700, the date which Snodgrass now prefers. See also n. below on the festival of the Synoikia; also n. above on the 'other cities', that is, Thorikos, the Marathonian Tetrapolis, etc.: it is hard to believe that the tradition about these developed as late as 700. It cannot be Hellenistic antiquarianism, because of the fragment of Hekataios (a predecessor of Hdt.), who as we saw mentions Thorikos as a *polis*. Compare also i. 18 n. (Sparta).

See also S. Diamant, 'Theseus and the Unification of Attica', *Hesperia*, Supplement 20 (1982), 38ff. (the synoikism Dark Age, not Mycenaean).

To sum up, Th.'s Bronze Age or Mycenaean date for some sort of political unification has not been either 'proved' or 'disproved' by archaeology. Analogy with Athens' neighbours suggests a Dark Age date. But what Th. says at 16 below about continued physical settlement in the countryside *can* be checked, and has been confirmed, by archaeology and epigraphy.

On Th.'s relation to Hellanikos, who must have treated the synoikism, see Jacoby, comm. on *FGrHist* 323a Hellanikos F 13 and on *FGrHist* Philochoros F 94, n. 10: Hellanikos and Th. are in general accord on the Thesean synoikism, but Th.'s characterization is different from that of the Atthidographers and more realistic (more autocratic and less democratic).

μῆ πόλει: 'capital' [lit. 'one city']. This and similar expressions meaning 'into one city' or even just 'into one' (*εἰς μίαν* or *εἰς*) are frequently found in literary descriptions of synoikisms: see *Mausolus*, 83, to which add a ref. to Ar. *Birds*, 172, with Sommerstein's n. (Warminster, 1987), cp. 550: the birds in Ar.'s play are in fact being encouraged to create a city by physical and political synoikism. Sommerstein could have made this clearer. Compare Th. i. 58. 2 on Olynthos (*μίαν τε πόλιν*), with n. there. In the present passage the political not the physical aspect of the synoikism is being stressed, so we have the dative with a

verb meaning 'use', instead of the accusative after a verb of motion. (The Olynthos synoikism as we saw was of both kinds.)

χρήσθαι: 'use'. See preceding n., and n. on *ἐν βουλευτήριον*. The greater *use* now made of the city centre led to its expansion (see next n.) and to its reorientation (see 3 n. below): to this extent and only to this extent was the synoikism physical, but it is the reason for Th.'s topographical digression.

μεγάλη: 'a great city' ['city' has been supplied by Jowett]. The word for 'great' is as ambiguous in Greek as in English, and should be left that way. Th. is perhaps led from the thought of Athens as a powerful city to Athens as a large one physically; hence the material below about the original site, which he says was confined to the Acropolis and the area to the south. (Gomme takes *μεγάλη* to mean 'a powerful state', not 'a large city'. I agree with him if we have to choose, but I do not think we do.)

καὶ ξυνοίκια . . . ἑορτὴν δημοτελεῖ: 'the publicly financed festival of the Synoikia'. For this festival see Parke, 31 f., and Simon, 50 (for these two works see above, i. 126. 6 n.). Precious information about it came to light in the 1930s, with the publication of an inscription found in the Agora: Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplément* (Paris, 1962), 10A, second column. The interest of this is that it shows that the C 5th festival was celebrated by the four old, i.e. pre-Kleisthenic, tribes. This means that the Synoikia, though later strongly associated with the democracy, as Theseus himself came to be, was actually an ancient Ionian ritual. Wade-Gery, writing before the discovery of this inscription, had already argued that the Synoikia was an old Eupatrid ritual: *Essays*, 97 n. 2; see *Mausolus*, 79 n. 9. This (see above) makes it undesirable, though not formally impossible, to put the synoikism as late as 700. The Synoikia is also mentioned in the Skambonidai deme inscription of pre-460, *IG* i³. 244C, line 16: see J. K. Davies, *CAH* iv² (1988), 381 f. For the word *δημοτελεῖ*, 'publicly financed', see Davies, 379. (The word is found here only in Th., a point relevant to my next para.)

However, as with the Diasia (i. 126. 6 n.) I have qualms: was the present sentence really written by Th. or is it a commentator's gloss? The sequence of thought is very smooth without it: 'a great city thus arose which was handed down by Theseus to his descendants; before his time, what is now the Acropolis . . . was the city'. See also 4 n. on the Dionysia and 5 n. on Enneakrounos.

3. τὸ δὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἢ ἀκρόπολις ἢ νῦν οὔσα πόλις ἦν, καὶ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον μάλιστα τετραμμένον: 'Before his time, what is now the Acropolis and the ground lying under it to the south was the city'. It seems that Th. was right about this, whatever the force of the reasons he himself gives: see H. Thompson and R. Wycherley, *The*

Agora of Athens (*The Athenian Agora*, xiv, 1972), 1, for Neolithic occupation of the caves and sheltered ledges on the south slope of the Acropolis; also Travlos (i. 93. 2 n.), 289, for recent prehistoric discoveries in the whole Ilissos area. The later north-westward shift of settlement is probably to be explained (as Thompson and Wycherley say) by the incorporation of Eleusis.

4. **τεκμήριον δέ:** 'proof of this is as follows'. For this tag see above i. 6. 2 n.

τὰ γὰρ ἱερὰ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει (καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶς) **καὶ ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἔξω πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος τῆς πόλεως μᾶλλον ἴδρυται** [the words in brackets are not in the text but were supplied by Classen; something like them is needed]: 'The temples of (Athena and of) other gods and goddesses are situated on the Acropolis itself; and those that are not lie mostly to the south of it'. I have changed Jowett's faithful but misleading 'lie chiefly thereabouts' [lit. 'towards that part'] to the freer but more explicit 'lie mostly to the south of it', because I agree with Gomme that that is what Th. means. The reference is not to the area of the Acropolis, as most versions allow you to think, but back to ὑπ' αὐτὴν πρὸς νότον, 'under it, to the south'.

τό τε τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου καὶ τὸ Πύθιον καὶ τὸ τῆς Γῆς καὶ τὸ (τοῦ) ἐν Λίμναις Διονύσου: 'the temples of Olympian Zeus, for example, and of Pythian Apollo, and the temple of Earth and of Dionysus in the Marshes'. For these buildings see Travlos, 402 (Olympieion); 100ff. (Pythion, i.e. the Temple of Pythian Apollo, on which see also R. Garland, *BSA* 79 (1984), 87); 100 and 290 (Ge Olympia); 332 (Dionysus in the Marshes). For a general map of the whole area south of the Acropolis, giving the probable locations of all four of these temples, see Travlos, 101, fig. 130, and on the temple of Dionysus in the Marshes see (in addition to the works cited by Travlos) A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*² (rev. J. Gould and D. M. Lewis, Oxford, 1988), 19ff., esp. 24f. Gould and Lewis are properly cautious about locating it in the Ilissos area, but this seems the best of the possibilities; see also A. S. Hollis, *Callimachus: Hecale* (Oxford, 1990), 274. For this Dionysus see E. Rohde, *Psyche* (Freiburg i. Br., 1894), 333 n. 2. For a 'Herakles in the Marshes' see now *SEG* xxxi. 122. 4f. **ὧ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα Διονύσια [τῇ δωδεκάτῃ] ποιεῖται ἐν μηνὶ Ἄνθεστηριῶνι, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀπ' Ἀθηναίων Ἴωνες ἔτι καὶ νῦν νομίζουσιν:** 'in honour of whom the more ancient Dionysia are celebrated on the twelfth day of the month Anthesterion, a festival which continues to be observed by the Ionian descendants of the Athenians'. For the three-day festival of the Anthesteria see Parke, 107ff., Simon, 92ff. (i. 126. 6n.). The twelfth of the month, the second

and central day of the festival, was known as *Choes* or the Day of Wine Jugs. But here too we must ask, how much (if any) of this material about the festival is Thucydidean? Most editors agree that the words 'on the twelfth' should be deleted as a commentator's gloss. I would add that the final clause (*ὥσπερ καὶ . . .*, 'a festival which continues . . .', etc.) could also be interpolated. The words closely resemble iii. 104. 3, *ὥσπερ νῦν ἐς τὰ Ἐφέσια Ἴωνες*, 'as the Ionians now do at the Ephesian festival'. I discussed the Book iii passage in *Historia*, 31 (1982), 241, where I noted P. M. Fraser's suggestion that the words just quoted were an interpolation. I then proceeded on the assumption that Th. wrote iii. 104. 3 as we have it, in part precisely because of the similarity with the present passage, ii. 15. 4—where, however, a comparison between the past and the present is more relevant to Th.'s general argument than at iii. 104. 3 (which could be merely imitated by a commentator from the authentic ii. 15. 4): see further below for a comparable point about Enneakrounos. But we should certainly bear in mind the possibility that both the ii. 15. 4 and the iii. 104. 3 passages are the work of the same interpolator. However, as with i. 126. 6 n., and as in my *Historia* article, I have commented as if the text were genuine.

Finally, we should consider the obvious possibility that the whole sentence, from *ὡ τὰ ἀρχαιότερα . . .* to *νομίζουσι*, should be deleted. As with the sentence about the Synoikia (above, 2 n.), the transition is certainly smooth and easy without it. But (see immediately above) the argument from the antiquity of the Dionysia is relevant to Th.'s general argument about the early occupation of the area south of the Acropolis—more so than the kind of sacrifices made at the Diasia were relevant to Kylon at i. 126. The difficulty is to know how *much* antiquarian material to retain.

5. Ἐννεακρούνη καλουμένη: 'Enneakrounos, or the Nine Fountains'. See Travlos, 204 and Andrewes, *CAH* iii² 3. 414.

ἐκεῖνοι . . .: 'the ancient Athenians . . .'. Here too we might suspect some interpolation (perhaps some of the detail about marriages), but the general 'then/now' form of the argument (compare above) is not irrelevant to the whole line of thought.

Unfortunately each of these problematic items must (I think) be taken on its merits: a decision that one particular item is genuine does not necessarily protect any other, as we noted above when discussing the relation of ii. 15. 4 and iii. 104. 3. An ancient commentator might continue a passage in Th.'s own manner, or imitate his manner as displayed elsewhere.

6. πόλις: '*Polis* or City'. That the Athenians called the Acropolis the *πόλις* is true, see ML 58 = Fornara 119, the Kallias Decrees; see also

Ath. Pol. 8. 4 with Rhodes's n. (the usage old-fashioned by the fourth century). But the same was true of places with (as far as we know) less complicated histories than Athens: see Harding 28A, a recently-discovered fourth-century decree from Erythrai in Ionia.

16. 1. καὶ ἐπειδὴ ξυνοκίσθησαν: 'although they were now united in a single city'. See introductory n. to 14. 2. Th. now turns to the migration in 431 BC into the city, an event which we may see as the long-postponed physical synoikism or synoikism in its physical aspect (for a simultaneous political and physical synoikism see i. 58, Olynthos). But Th. here stresses that for a long time before 431 they had lived in the country *despite* the (political) synoikism. This is undeniably true; see D. Whitehead, *The Demes of Attica* (Princeton, 1986), for the extraordinarily rich evidence for Attic centres other than Athens. If we wish to do justice to Th.'s picture of the synoikism we should cite ch. 16 as well as ch. 15.

The shift of population from countryside to city, here remarked on by Th., seems never to have been reversed: see the important but provisional study by A. Damsgaard-Madsen, 'Attic Funeral Inscriptions: Their use as Historical Sources and some Preliminary Results', in *Studies in Ancient History and Numismatics presented to R. Thomsen* (Copenhagen, 1988), 55 ff.: study of the funeral inscriptions (plenty of country demesmen buried in city, few city demotics in country deme contexts) suggests that 'classical Athens witnessed a considerable migration into the city area from the rest of Attica'. However, it must be stressed that of the 140 classical demes we have information from only a handful: in particular the well-excavated and epigraphically fruitful deme of Rhamnous tends to feature unduly prominently in modern discussion.

διὰ τὸ ἔθος ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς: 'generally [lived] in the country'. Just how physically tight-knit these Attic country communities were is disputed; in modern parlance, was 'nucleated' or 'non-nucleated settlement' the rule in Attica? These terms are shorthand for, respectively, the view that Attica was a land of communities clustered together, i.e. the deme was the basic agricultural unit, a view found in G. Stanton, *BSA* 79 (1984), 303-6; and for the view that there were plenty of isolated farmsteads ('non-nucleated' settlement). An emphatic statement of the first view is to be found in Osborne, *Demos* (ii. 15. 1 n.). But H. Lohmann, reporting a survey in S-W Attica (Atene deme area), 'Landleben im klassischen Attika', *Ruhr-Universität Bochum Jahrbuch* 1985, 71 ff., suggests a more isolated i.e. non-nucleated picture. This would fit the suggestions of P. Halstead, 'Traditional and Ancient Rural Economy ...', *JHS* 107 (1987), 77 ff., provided we accept that farming in Attica was of what he calls the 'intensive' kind, for which dispersed settlement was more

suited: isolated agricultural units could be located nearer to the arable land. See Halstead, 83. Against one particular argument of Osborne, based on Dem. iv, see J. Roy, 'Dem. 55 as Evidence for Isolated Farmsteads in Classical Attika', *LCM* 13 (1988), 57ff. See also J. Ober, *CP* 83 (1988), 75 and n. 7 (review of Osborne); Langdon, *CJ* 86 (1991), 233ff.

But whatever the physical facts, and I suspect Osborne's conclusions are premature and more evidence for 'non-nucleated' settlement will appear, the psychological links between demesmen were strong: see 2 n. below.

πανοικεσία: 'with their entire households'. I follow editors who transpose this to after *ῥαδίως* from after *πολέμου*, and have adjusted Jowett's tr. accordingly.

2. ἐβαρύνοντο δὲ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔφερον . . . οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πόλιν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπολείπων ἕκαστος: 'They were depressed and took it hard . . . each of them felt as if he was leaving his native city'. For the ring composition see 14. 2, introductory n. R. Parker, 'Festivals of the Attic Demes' (above, i. 126. 6n.), 137, calls this paragraph 'the best introduction to the world of the Attic demes', and stresses the final words ('. . . native city'): 'such was the emotional significance of his deme to an Attic countryman.' The passage is also stressed by Osborne, 19, and by me in *Greek World*, 109.

17. *Evacuation of Attica (resumed from 14. 1)*

1. ὀλίγοις μὲν τισιν ὑπήρχον οἰκῆσεις καὶ παρὰ φίλων τινὰς ἢ οἰκείων καταφυγή: 'a few of them had houses or could find homes among friends or relatives'. See Osborne, *Demos* (above), 52f., 61, for an example of a man owning both country property and a house in the city (the fourth-century politician Philokrates; we have the stone recording the sale of his various properties). For a suggestion that, even in peacetime, some Athenians living in distant demes probably had to stay with relatives or fellow-demesmen if the political system was to work properly, see M. H. Hansen, 'Political Activity and the Organization of Attica in the Fourth Century B.C.', *GRBS* 24 (1983), 237.

οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τὰ τε ἐρήμα τῆς πόλεως ᾤκησαν καὶ τὰ ἱερά καὶ τὰ ἥρωα πάντα: 'But many squatted in the vacant spaces of the city, and in the temples and shrines of heroes'. As vividly described in *Ar. Knights*, 792-3, produced in 424; see Sommerstein's n. (Warminster, 1981).

καὶ τοῦ Ἐλευσινίου: 'and the Eleusinion'. See Travlos, 198f.

τό τε Πελαργικὸν καλούμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν: 'The Pelargikon, as it was called, below the Acropolis'. The Pelargikon or Pelasgikon was the ancient wall of the Acropolis: see Travlos, 52.

But Gomme says that Th. 'is clearly distinguishing the Pelargikon from the Akropolis wall'. (So too ML, p. 221: 'Th ... contrasts it [the Pelargikon] with the Akropolis'.) If so, we must (with Gomme) say that we do not know precisely where Th.'s Pelargikon was, except that it must on Th.'s evidence have been an area lower than the ancient Akropolis wall also known as the Pelargikon.

See also Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* on 19. 5..

καὶ Πυθικοῦ μαντείου ἀκροτελεύτιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγων ὡς 'τὸ Πελαργικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον': 'there was also a half-line of a Pythian oracle to the same effect: "Better the Pelargikon left unworked ...". For this prohibition, and others of the sort, see Parker, *Miasma*, 164 and n. 115, citing the epigraphic evidence (ML 73 = Fornara 140) for contemporary concern over the Pelargikon (on this evidence see also S. Aleshire, *The Athenian Asklepieion* (Amsterdam, 1989), 9 n. 1), and mentioning the ingenious suggestion of Ziehen that the oracle was a misquotation and misunderstanding of an oracular fragment τὸ Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος ἄμεινον ('Pelasgian [for this term see i. 3. 2 n.] Argos is best'): *Anth. Pal.* xiv. 73. 1.

2. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ μαντεῖον τοῦναντίον ξυμβῆναι ἢ προσεδέχοντο ... ὃν οὐκ ὀνομάζον τὸ μαντεῖον προήδει μὴ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ποτὲ αὐτὸ κατοικισθησόμενον: 'And in my opinion the oracle came true in a sense exactly contrary to what people expected ... the oracle without mentioning the war foresaw that the place would be inhabited some day for no good'. The passage is of interest for Th.'s attitude to oracles; it has given rise to some dogmatic pronouncements, such as P. Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes?* (Paris, 1983), 84, who writes 'Thucydide croyait aux oracles', and cites only the present passage in support. See N. Marinatos, 'Thucydides and Oracles', *JHS* 101 (1981), 238ff., at 240 (and in *Thucydides and Religion* (Königstein, 1981), 50ff.), rightly rejecting the emendation of προήδει ('foresaw', 'foreknew') to προῆδε 'sang in advance' (?), the object of the emendation being to remove a word which appeared to make Th. too much of a believer. The emendation is hardly plausible; but nor does the word προήδει prove Th. a believer, unless we are to deny him the luxury of occasional irony. Take the following sentence from Gibbon: 'it may seem somewhat remarkable that Bernard of Clairvaux, who records so many miracles of his friend St. Malachi, never takes any notice of his own, which, in their turn, however, are carefully related by his companions and disciples': ii. 30 n. 82 (Bury edn.). It would be a literal-minded critic who here insisted that the unqualified reference to St Bernard's 'own' miracles proved Gibbon to have been a believer.

3. **ἐν τοῖς πύργοις τῶν τειχῶν**: 'in the towers of the walls'. See F. E. Winter (89. 3 n. on *καὶ τὴν πόλιν*), 162, on this passage: the towers, he thinks, must have had chambers at ground-floor level.

τά τε μακρὰ τεῖχη: 'the Long Walls'. The comic poet Eupolis, in a fragment of his play *The Demes*, produced in 412, referred to these 'Long Wall residents', *τοὺς ἐν μακροῖν τειχοῖν*: D. L. Page, *Loeb Select Papyri*, iii. 207 (no. 40, lines 12-13) = *Poetae Comici Graeci*, ed. R. Kassel and C. Austin (Berlin and New York, 1986), Eupolis F 99; though the specific reference may, as Page prefers, be to the later evacuation of Attica after the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in 413.

4. **ἑκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλουν**: 'an expedition of a hundred ships'. See 23. 2, 25. 1, 30. 1, 31. 1.

18-23. FIRST PELOPONNESIAN INVASION OF ATTICA

18. 1. **ἐς Οἰνόνην**: 'at Oinoe'. See below, 2 n.

μηχαναῖς τε καὶ ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ: 'by means of siege engines and in other ways'. The 'engines' are probably battering-rams rather than scaling-ladders: see F. Winter, *Greek Fortifications* (London, 1971), 86 n. 44.

2. **ἡ γὰρ Οἰνὴ οὖσα ἐν μεθορίοις τῆς Ἀττικῆς καὶ Βοιωτίας ἐτετείχιστο**: 'Oinoe is a fortress on the borders of Attica and Boiotia'. For Oinoe, which Hdt. v. 74 mentions as one of the outlying demes of Attica, see Y. Béquignon in *The Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites*, 641, and J. Ober, *Fortress Attica: Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier 404-322 B.C.* (Leiden, 1985), 224, both identifying it with the modern site of Myoupolis, for which see Ober, 154f. and map at 105. A great deal of work and ingenuity has gone into attempts to correlate the names of such ancient fortified places (Eleutherai and Panakton are two others) with the various remarkable fortress remains in north-west Attica. But much of what survives looks fourth-century in appearance, and it has even been suggested that many of the existing remains may be Theban and not Athenian at all, and date from the time of the Theban Hegemony (360s): F. A. Cooper, 'Epaminondas and Greek Fortifications', *AJA* 90 (1987), 195, summary of a paper; see too J. Ober, *AJA* 91 (1987), 602.

3. **τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπιτήδειος**: 'to have shown himself friendly to the Athenians'. G. Herman (above 13. 1 n.), 143 ff., explains Archidamos' alleged dilatoriness in terms of his *xenia* with Pericles. But, as Herman

honestly accepts (144), the dilatoriness *is* only an allegation: the whole of ch. 19 presents information by the technique of *mimesis*, or presentation of events through the eyes and emotions of participants; here, the participants are the soldiers of the Peloponnesian army.

5. **ὡς λέγεται**: 'he is said'. See Westlake (i. 13. 2 n.), 352.

19. 1. **πάσαν ιδέαν πειράσαντες**: 'after trying everything'. For the phrase *πάσα ιδέα*, a favourite with Th., see i. 109. 1 n.

μετὰ τὰ ἐν Πλαταιᾷ [τῶν ἐσελθόντων Θηβαίων] γενόμενα ἡμέρα ὀγδοηκοστῇ μάλιστα, θέρους καὶ τοῦ σίτου ἀκμάζοντος: 'about the eightieth day after the entry of the Thebans into Plataia, when it was summer and the corn was in full ear'. See 2. 1 n. Classen may be right to delete the words in square brackets, in which case the reference would be more vague: 'after the events in Plataia'. But the sense intended is the same.

ἦγείτο δὲ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς: 'under the command of Archidamos the son of Zeuxidamos the Spartan king'. A formal introduction at this solemn moment for a man we have met several times already; compare i. 139. 4 n. for the similar treatment of Pericles, and see iii. 1. 1 n. On the present passage in particular see Griffith, *PCPhS* 1961 (i. 1 n. on *Θουκυδίδης*), 22: Th. held up his formal introduction until this 'point of no return'.

2. **καθεζόμενοι ἔτεμνον πρῶτον μὲν Ἐλευσίνα καὶ τὸ Θριάσιον πέδιον**: 'they encamped and devastated, first of all, Eleusis and the Thriasian plain'. This probably means Eleusinian *territory*, not the citadel; so rightly Classen/Steup. Eleusis was a key fortress in the Attic defence system, and it would be surprising if Th. told us thus casually that it had fallen. But, as I have suggested elsewhere (*Greek World*, 128 and n. 8), it is possible that we should read some phrase meaning 'Eleusinian territory' instead of *Ἐλευσίνα* in the present passage, perhaps *τὴν Ἐλευσινίαν*.

For the military importance of Eleusis see *Greek World*, 110: it was a crucial position for offence or defence, commanding as it did the main military route to and from the Peloponnese (as well as one main route to and from Boiotia). For Eleusis as a point of muster see H. Wankel's good n. on Dem. xviii. 177 = *Rede für Ktesiphon über den Kranz* (Heidelberg, 1976), ii. 875, and ancient refs. there given. For Eleusis as a frontier fort alongside Panakton and Phyle see the third-century inscription *Syll*³ 485; compare also the fourth-century ephebic inscription *Syll*³ 957.

καὶ τροπήν τινα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἱππέων: 'they routed some Athenian cavalry . . .'. For such cavalry activity see below, 22. 2 n. citing Spence.

διὰ Κρωπιᾶς: 'through the district of Kropia'. J. S. Traill, *Demos and Trittyis* (Toronto, 1986), 131, writes as follows of the deme Kropidai, which he puts west of Ano Liosia (see his map at end): 'deme-site (unpublished) at army car-dump, location suitable to description in Thucydides (ii. 19), very probably identified as Kropidai.'

ἐς Ἀχαρνάς, χωρίον μέγιστον τῆς Ἀττικῆς τῶν δήμων καλουμένων: 'Acharnai, which is the largest of the Attic demes, as they are called'. Acharnai is indeed the largest deme by some way (see below, 20. 4 n.).

Here only (and at the related 23. 1) does Th. use the word *δήμος* in this semi-technical sense, but note that he finds it necessary to apologise for it with the word *καλουμένων*, 'so-called'. See *Thucydides*, 97 n. 98.

χρόνον τε πολὺν ἐμμέναντες ἔτεμνον: 'remained there a considerable time devastating the country'. V. D. Hanson argues that such devastation was indeed time-consuming and ineffective in classical Greece (cp. i. 81. 6 n. and ii. 14. 1 n.).

20. 1. γνώμη δὲ τοιᾶδε λέγεται τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον . . . μέναι: 'Archidamos is said to have lingered . . . in the hope'. This ch. is largely about the state of Archidamos' mind, just as ch. 18 had been about morale in his army (see 18. 2 n.). Hence *λέγεται* here and *ὡς λέγεται* at 18. 5. See Westlake (above, i. 13. 2 n.), 353. For the relation between Archidamos' plans and the reality, see Hunter and de Romilly (introductory n. to ii. 11; *RÉG* 53 (1990), 370ff.; and *La construction de la vérité chez Thucydide* (Paris, 1990), 90ff.) and Pelling (i. 81. 2 n.).

2. ἀκμάζοντάς τε νεότητι πολλῇ: 'who had an abundant supply of young men'. See 8. 1 n.

4. οἱ Ἀχαρνῆς μέγα μέρος ὄντες τῆς πόλεως (τρισχίλιοι γὰρ ὀπλίται ἐγενοντο): 'who were a considerable section of the city and provided 3,000 hoplites'. It is true that Acharnai was a 'large part' of the city: it was the largest deme—though possibly split into two for some purposes: see Traill (19. 2 n. on *διὰ Κρωπιᾶς*), 142 ff.—and provided 22 out of the 50 councillors of its tribe, that is, 44% of its tribe and so 4.4% of the entire citizen body of ten roughly equal tribes. (No other deme supplied more than Aphidna's 16.) Even so, this percentage—on the plausible assumption that council quotas reflect the population of the demes represented—should give a rough citizen hoplite total of about 1,100, not 3,000 (it is not, however, certain whether council quotas reflect total population or just hoplite population). If *ὀπλίται* is right (but see below) we should have to assume that Th.'s figure is wrong or

corrupt. See Whitehead (above, 16. 1 n.), 397ff., appendix 5, 'Acharnai', accepting the need for emendation of the numeral, and citing the extensive earlier literature. If with Hansen, 'The Number of Athenian Hoplites' (above, 13. 6-7 n.) we allow that the term 'hoplites' is flexible and refers not to people on some formal list but to anybody (including metics) capable of bearing hoplite arms, we might raise that figure of 1,100; but 3,000 would still be astonishingly high. And Th. seems to be thinking of full citizens, not reservists. See further 21. 3 n.

However, there is a good possibility that Th. wrote not *ὀπλίται* but *πολίται*, not 'hoplites' but 'citizens' (an old conjecture of Polle). Though Whitehead (398) rejects this, Mogens Hansen (in a letter dated 10 December 1987) tells me that he thinks there is a case for Polle's conjecture, on the assumption (which he favours) of a citizen total of 55-60,000 in 431. He writes 'the calculation is: 55-60,000: 500 = 110-120 × 22 = 2,440-2,640. If Acharnai was only slightly under-represented in the *boule*, and/or if Thuc. brings a rounded figure, a total of 3,000 adult male Acharnians is perfectly possible, and now there certainly is a case for the elegant conjecture.' See also now Rhodes, Th. ii comm. 276.

21. 1. μεμνημένοι καὶ Πλειστοάνακτα τὸν Πausανίου Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέα, ὅτε ἐσβαλὼν τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐς Ἐλευσίνα καὶ Θριῶζε στρατῷ Πελοποννησίων πρὸ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου τέσσαρσι καὶ δέκα ἔτεσιν ἀνεχώρησε πάλιν ἐς τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθών: 'They remembered how, fourteen years before, the Spartan king Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias invaded Attica with a Peloponnesian army, and how after advancing as far as Eleusis and Thria he came no further but retreated'. For the events of 446 here described see i. 114. 2, with a number of close verbal echoes, the most striking being *τὸ πλέον οὐκέτι προελθόντες* at i. 114, with which compare the last four words of the present passage. Here, however, Th. gives a little more detail: see next n. (and 27. 2 n. on *καὶ ὅτι σφῶν* etc.). As for the date, it looks as if Th. has confused that of Pleistoanax's invasion with that of the Thirty Years Peace.

δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡ φυγὴ αὐτῷ ἐγένετο ἐκ Σπάρτης δόξαντι χρήμασι πεισθῆναι: 'And indeed the retreat was the cause of his exile; for he was thought to have been bribed'. See i. 114. 2 n. for this tradition, also for the broader political significance of the retreat for Spartan foreign policy.

2. ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς, ὡς εἰκός . . . δεινὸν ἐφαίνετο: 'naturally appeared to them a horrible thing'. Here I agree with Westlake who in his study of the phrase *ὡς εἰκός* (above, i. 4 n.), 157, says it here means 'as was natural' not 'as was probable'.

3. οὐκ ἐλαχίστην μοῖραν: 'no small part'. See 20. 4 n. and Whitehead, 399 (on the whole section ii. 19 ff.): 'it is the only occasion in Thucydides' work when any individual Athenian deme *qua* deme is prominent in events ... and the vignette is a vivid one. The Acharnians are represented as fully aware of their numerical and psychological influence in the polis ...' (he then cites the present passage).

ἐκάκιζον ὅτι στρατηγὸς ὢν οὐκ ἐπέξαγοι: 'they abused him for not leading them to battle, as their general should'. If we had no other evidence about the status of Athenian *strategoí* we would not guess from this sentence (or the matching one at 55. 2) that Pericles was one of an annually elected and strictly accountable panel of ten. Discussion of Pericles' standing has tended to concentrate on 22. 1: see e.g. Dover (above, i. 61. 1 n.), 74 f., and contrast 61 where he cites, but does not discuss, the present passage.

From Plut. *Per.* 33 it seems that Pericles' critics on this occasion included Kleon (see i. 139. 4 n. for the possibility that he is among those collectively referred to in that passage, and iii. 36. 6 n. for the probability that his political career began considerably earlier than we would guess from his relatively late appearance in Th.).

22. 1. ἐκκλησίαν τε οὐκ ἐποίει αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ξύλλογον οὐδένα: 'he ... did not summon an assembly or a military meeting ...'. This statement, with its implication of sweeping powers for Pericles, has always troubled students of the Athenian democracy (see previous n.), and it has been whittled down; Dover (above, i. 61. 1 n.) shows by the citation of linguistic parallels that Th. could just mean that Pericles prevailed upon his colleagues to convene no assembly, and offers the following interpretation: 'he was opposed to the convening of any assembly ...'. Christensen and Hansen (below), 21 f., add that since the 431 invasion lasted about a month (23. 3 n.), Pericles 'may, quite constitutionally, have prevented the summoning of any *ecclesia* during this month simply by not taking any initiative himself and by persuading the council not to summon the *ἐκκλησία κυρία* [the one obligatory meeting of the month] until late in the (next) prytany [a period of rather more than a month] ...', by which time the Peloponnesians had left Attica. See also Hansen's *Athenian Assembly* (above, i. 44. 1 n.), 22.

On the meaning of *σύλλογος*, I have altered Jowett's 'meeting of any kind' to 'military meeting' in order to take account of a short but elegant study by J. Christensen and M. H. Hansen, 'What is *syllogos* at Thucydides 2. 22. 1?', *Classica et Medievalia*, 34 (1983), 17 ff. = Hansen, *The Athenian Ekklesia*, ii (Copenhagen, 1989), 195 ff. (with addenda at 210 f. discussing E. Bloedow, 'Pericles' Powers in the Counterstrategy of 431',

Historia, 36 (1987), 9 ff.). Christensen and Hansen argue that the sense argued for by Gomme, 'informal meeting of citizens (Latin *contio*)', is impossible, and argue plausibly that the word here means a military meeting or assembly of soldiers. See, however, 59. 3 n.

Despite all the above, Th.'s language here and at 21. 3 is surprisingly absolute: scholars have been almost too conscientious in their efforts to minimize the powers of Athenian generals (see further *Greek World*, 120 f.). [On *sylogos* see now R. M. Errington, *Chiron*, 24 (1994), 138 n. 7.] 2. ἵππείας μέντοι ἐξέπεμπεν αἰεὶ: 'he sent out horsemen from time to time'. Spence (i. 143. 5 n.) adduces cavalry activity of this kind to show that Pericles' war policy was not after all completely supine; see also ii. 19. 2 n. Spence has a good point (though not quite a new one: see Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*² (Gotha, 1893–1904), iii. 897), but neither here nor at 19. 2 above are the cavalry actually successful. Better evidence for their success comes at iii. 1. 2. On the present passage see also Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens* (i. 45. 2 n.), 81 f. We might have expected the large cavalry force of ii. 13. 8 to feature more prominently in the war narrative. It is tempting to think that one reason why classical Athens did not make more use of cavalry was that they could on occasion at least be regarded as politically suspect, in fact as oligarchic sympathizers: see P. Siewert, 'Poseidon Hippios am Kolonos und die athenische Hippeis', in *Arktouros: Hellenic Studies pres. B. Knox* (Berlin, 1979), 280 ff.: choice of Kolonos as oligarchic meeting-place in 411 partly determined by fact that there was a cult of Poseidon the 'Horsey' there (see below, viii. 67 n.); and for a clear statement that the cavalry were regarded as compromised by their later role under the Thirty Tyrants see Xen. *Hell.* iii. 1. 4 (cp. ii. 4. 2 and 8). But as we have seen (i. 45. 2 n.), there were special factors at work in the closing phases of the war. In any case, Athens eventually deployed 650 cavalry in Sicily: see vi. 98. 1 with M. Frederiksen, 'Campanian Cavalry: a Question of Origins', *Dialoghi di archeologia*, 2 (1968), 3 ff., at 10 ff., an important discussion. See vi. 20. 4 n., vi. 98. 1 n.

ἐν Φρυγίῳις: 'at Phrygia'. The scholiast says this place was in the deme of Athmonon, which is north-west of Athens towards Mt. Pentelikon. The name is curious; S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria* (Oxford, 1926), 102, cites it as evidence that the population of Central Greece was originally Thracian, a view followed in K. Hanell, *Megarische Studien* (Lund, 1934), 39. (Casson believes the Phrygians of Asia Minor came ultimately from Thrace; for this view see more recently Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 410 ff.) A likelier possibility is that there was a community of Phrygians in Attica: see the fifth-century Attic funerary inscription for the 'best of the Phrygians', Mannes Orumaios: P. Hansen, *Carmina*

Epigraphica Graeca (1983), no. 87, as elucidated by A. Wilhelm, *Beiträge zur griechischen Inschriftenkunde* (Vienna, 1909), 36f.

τέλει ἐνί: 'one of the units'. On this vague word for a cavalry unit see Bugh, 81 n. 7.

3. **ἡ δὲ βοήθεια αὕτη τῶν Θεσσαλῶν κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ξυμμαχικὸν ἐγένετο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις:** 'The forces which the Thessalians brought to the help of the Athenians, according to the terms of their old alliance'. See above, i. 102. 4 for the alliance of 462; since then Thessalian cavalry had changed sides at the battle of Tanagra (i. 107. 7 and n.), and Athens had tried in 454 to restore the exiled Orestes, from the Aleuad family (i. 111. 1 and n.). For the period in between see Andrewes, 'Two Notes on Lysander', *Phoenix*, 25 (1971), 219: from *Syll*³ 274 (VI) we learn that a ruler from another family, Daochos of Pharsalos, gave Thessaly peace and prosperity (but not, on the evidence of the present passage, very solid unity) for 27 years, a period which Andrewes suggests began c.440. The help attested by the present passage would on this view fall within that period. See next n. Cp. Herman (i. 102. 4 n.), 96.

ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων: 'the Pharsalians were commanded by Menon'. If Andrewes is right about the Pharsalian Daochos (previous n.), the latter was ruler of all Thessaly at this time and Menon must have been just the local Pharsalian commander. For Menon see M. Walbank, *Athenian Proxeny of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Toronto and Sarasota, 1978), 385, suggesting that he was son of the Thoukydides of Pharsalos mentioned at viii. 92. 8 below (see n. there) as an Athenian *proxenos* (for this term see 29. 1 n. below): we know from Marcellinus (28) that the father of Thoukydides of Pharsalos was called Menon. Walbank thinks the proxeny was hereditary and that Menon was *proxenos* also. But this reconstruction is not possible if (as is usually thought) Menon was identical to, or the grandson of, the Menon of Pharsalos who was naturalized in the 470s; for this naturalization see M. J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens*, iii/iv (Brussels, 1983), 20ff. = T 1. If the Menon mentioned in the present passage of Th. was an Athenian citizen or inherited that citizenship from his grandfather, he cannot have been the father of a mere *proxenos*: a man acting as *proxenos* for a given city was by definition not a citizen of that city (but was appointed by that city; in early Sparta *proxenoi* were appointed *by the kings* from among the Spartan citizens, Hdt. vi. 57. 2, but as C. Marek, *Die Proxenie* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1984), 129, says, against that passage we have to place the testimony of many thousands of later Greek inscriptions which show that proxeny was conferred by the city represented). In and after the fourth century a grant of proxeny on such an outsider would often be combined with or follow a grant of citizenship: see

E. Szanto, *Das griechische Bürgerrecht* (Freiburg, 1892), 12 ff. No doubt the Menon of ii. 22 and the Thoukydides of viii. 92 are closely related, but that is as far as we can go. Andrewes's n. on viii. 92. 8 in *HCT* was written before Walbank or Osborne was available; more now needs to be said.

For Thessalian politics see further iii. 93. 2 and iv. 78. 1 n.

καὶ Ἀριστόνους: 'and Aristonous'. An inscription shows that he was made *proxenos* by Athens: M. Walbank (above), 158 ff. no. 29 = *IG* i³. 55. It is a plausible guess that he and Menon (see preceding n.) were made *proxenoi* at the same time, that is, now; if so note that Th. does not bother to tell us so; contrast the explicit statement about Nymphodoros, 29. 1 and n.

23. 1. τῶν δήμων τινὰς ἄλλους: 'some of the other demes'. See 19. 2 n.

Βριλησσοῦ: 'Pentelikon'. Brilessos seems to have been the more ancient name for what Pausanias (i. 32), and Vitruvius (ii. 8. 9) call Pentelikon (the modern Pendeli); Strabo 399 has both names. The statement (*Kleine Pauly*, entry under Pentelikon; Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*, i. 322) that there was a deme called something like Pentele, which gave its name to Pentelikon, seems to be without foundation. We do however find the word *Πεντελήθεν*, 'from Pendeli': *IG* i³. 446, line 331 (about stone quarries), with R. E. Wycherley, 'Pentelethen', *BSA* 68 (1973), 349 ff., at 351.

2. τὰς ἑκατὸν ναῦς: 'the fleet of a hundred ships'. See 17. 4, 25. 1, 30. 1, 31. 1.

Καρκίνος τε ὁ Ξενοτίμου: 'Karkinos son of Xenotimos'. We have a dedication by this man as trierarch: see Hill², B 42 (about 450 BC). Cp. below, 24. 2 n.

3. οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι χρόνον ἐμμείναντες ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ὅσου εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια: 'the Peloponnesians remained in Attica as long as their provisions lasted'. See Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, i. 38f.: this invasion lasted at least 15 days (the length of the shortest invasion, iv. 6. 2) and not more than 40 days (the longest, ii. 57. 2). See 22. 1 n.: the length of the Peloponnesian stay has constitutional implications for Pericles' behaviour.

τὴν γῆν τὴν Πειραικὴν καλουμένην: 'the country called Peiraike'. This is the reading of the manuscripts, and is retained by Jowett; the Oxford text prints *Γραικὴν*, 'Graike', which is found in Stephanus of Byzantium. Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 113, 158 supports the MS reading, which as he says (without mentioning Jowett) had 'vigorous defenders' in the nineteenth century. He notes (i) that P. Oxy. 878, a papyrus of the first century AD, already had *Πειραικὴν*, and (ii) that at

Hdt. viii. 44. 1 the area in question is called ἡ περαιή, 'the land opposite'. (Jowett had already compared Th. iii. 91. 3, ἐς Ὀρωπὸν τῆς πέραν γῆς, but as we shall see in the n. to that passage, editors have tried to instal Γραϊκῆς there as well, despite the unanimity of the MSS.) There is much to be said for Lewis's—and Jowett's—view; Gomme's objection, that to speak of Oropian territory as 'the land opposite' betrays a Euboian viewpoint, overlooks Athens' extensive interests on Euboia: 'Peraia' was the regular word for the mainland opposite an island: i. 100. 2 n. and *Mausolus*, 128.

ἦν νέμονται Ὀρώπιοι Ἀθηναίων ὑπήκοοι: 'cultivated by the Oropians, who are subjects of the Athenians'. But Oropos was captured by the Boiotians in winter 412/11, so this passage was written before that date: see *HCT* v. 405f. The history of Oropos, constantly disputed between Athens and Thebes, is interesting but interminably complicated. It was of great value for its healing sanctuary of Amphiaraos (for which see P. Roesch, 'L'Amphiaraion d'Oropos', in *Temples et sanctuaires: Séminaire de recherche 1981/3* (Lyon, 1984), 173ff.), and for its agriculturally valuable territory; also, from Athens' point of view, because the food which she now transported from Euboia (14. 1 n.) came via Oropos: see further vii. 28. 1 n. It cannot have been Athenian in 507 because it is not a Kleisthenic deme and so must have been acquired by Athens between that date and 431 (the present passage). Athens lost it again in 411 (viii. 60. 1) but regained it in perhaps 374: D. Knoepfler, 'Un document attique à reconsidérer: Le Décret de Pandios sur l'Amphiaraion d'Oropos', *Chiron*, 16 (1986), 71ff., at 93. Athens lost it in 366 (Xen. *Hell.* vii. 4. 1) but was awarded it by Philip in 338 (Paus. i. 34. 1, with L. Robert, *Hellenica*, xi–xii (Paris, 1960), 189ff.). And so on. (Independent from 322 (Diod. xviii. 56. 6); Boiotian from 312 (Diod. xix. 78. 3); Athenian from 304 (*SEG* iii. 117, with Robert, 200); Boiotian from 287 when Athens revolted against Demetrius.) Even after it became independent for the second time in 171 it continued in dispute with Athens on its own account: Polybius, xxxii. 11. 5 with Walbank's n. (a famous quarrel). For the importance and vicissitudes of classical Oropos see Robert (above), an improvement on the brief pages of F. Gschnitzer, *Abhängige Orte* (Munich, 1958), 82ff.; and note now M. K. Langdon, 'An Attic Decree Concerning Oropos', *Hesperia*, 56 (1987), 47ff., with W. Ameling, *ZPE* 77 (1989), 95ff., and D. M. Lewis, in *The Greek City* (i. 100. 2 n.), 252.

24–33. ATHENIAN COUNTER-ACTIVITY

24. 1. ὥσπερ δὴ ἔμελλον διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου φυλάξειν: 'a precaution which they maintained throughout the war'. Here Th. gives

us a piece of information which we are more or less explicitly told to bear in mind when reading the narrative which follows. Other examples are 31. 3 and 34. 7: see nn. there. Elsewhere the instruction may be implicit (e.g. at 14. 1, where we have to *assume* that the Athenians kept their animals on Euboia for some years).

καὶ χίλια τάλαντα ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει χρημάτων ἔδοξεν αὐτοῖς ἐξαιρέτα ποιησαμένοις χωρὶς θέσθαι καὶ μὴ ἀναλοῦν: ‘They then passed a decree reserving 1,000 talents of the treasure in the Acropolis: this sum was set apart and was not to be spent’ unless (Th. continues) the city was attacked with a fleet. See viii. 15. 1: this ‘iron reserve’ was used in 412 after the revolt of Chios, although the city was not as a matter of fact attacked then with a fleet. For *ἐξαιρέτα*, ‘set apart’, cp. ML 78 d–g line 11 and p. 240.

κινεῖν τὰ χρήματα: ‘to touch the money’. On the verb see i. 143. 1 n.

2. τριῆρεις τε μετ’ αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτους ἑκατὸν ἐποίησαντο κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον τὰς βελτίστας: ‘They also resolved to set apart every year a hundred triremes, the finest of the year’. This decision, unlike that about the iron reserve, was not kept to, although (as Th. goes on to say) the triremes were theoretically reserved for use only in the same emergency: see viii. 1. 2, with Andrewes’s n. in *HCT* (after the Sicilian Disaster, a fleet has to be built from scratch). The decision was in any case idiotic: the ships would rot away and would be better used.

καὶ τριηράρχους αὐταῖς: ‘and to appoint trierarchs for them’. See above, 13. 8 n., for the existing fleet of 300 triremes. Trierarchs, rich men who paid for the equipping of triremes (the hulls were provided by the state), are attested from the middle of the fifth century: see Hill², B 42, the dedication by a trierarch already mentioned above (23. 2 n. on *Καρκίνος*). It is admittedly not certain that that brief epigraphic text proves the existence in c.450 of the later system in its entirety (rather than just the existence of men *in command* of triremes, the sense in which Hdt. uses the word); but the present passage of Th. seems clear evidence for the financial use of the word. (On ML 23 = Fornara 55, the Themistokles Decree, which also mentions trierarchs in the sense of commanders, see i. 18. 2 n.) The germ of the trierarchic system can perhaps be seen in the 480s when Themistokles arranged for the building of a fleet by advancing money to rich individuals (*Ath. Pol.* 22. 7, with Rhodes’s n.); but on that occasion the money was the state’s to begin with. Before that, the financing of the Athenian navy is deeply obscure: see i. 126. 8 n. for literature on the naucraries (Figueira, Lambert), and for the pre-480 navy Haas (above, i. 14. 3 n.).

25. 1. ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσί: 'the hundred ships'. Although Th. has just mentioned a figure of a hundred ships, the reference here is not to these but to the hundred ships of 17. 4, 23. 2, 30. 1, 31. 1.

ἄλλα τε ἐκάκουν περιπλέοντες: 'did considerable damage on the Peloponnesian coast' [lit. 'damaged various places as they sailed round']. One of these areas may have been Akte, the coastal region east of Argos: Diod. xii. 43. 1. Stephanus of Byzantium, entry under Ἄκτη, suggests that there may be a lacuna in Th.'s text here, as he says that Thucydides somewhere mentions a Peloponnesian Akte, which he never does in the surviving text.

ἐς Μεθώνην: 'Methone'. About five miles south of the Bay of Sphakteria, on the Messenian (westernmost) promontory of the Peloponnese.

2. Βρασίδας ὁ Τέλλιδος: 'Brasidas the son of Tellis'. Perhaps Brasidas was himself Th.'s source for this exploit. Th. in his northern exile probably spoke to Brasidas. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge, 1968), 149 n. 1, thinks that Th. would not have reported the present incident 'if he had not wished to prepare the reader for the subsequent exploits of Brasidas'. Compare the equally exceptional description at iv. 121. 1 of Brasidas fêted at Skione 'like an athlete'.

καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦτου τοῦ τολμήματος πρῶτος τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπηνέθη ἐν Σπάρτῃ: 'the exploit was publicly praised at Sparta: Brasidas was the first Spartan who obtained this distinction in the war'. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 42 n. 102, remarks that 'the language suggests some formal institutionalized ἔπαινος ['praise'], for which I know no parallel'. He notes that according to Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 10 Brasidas was ephor in 431, entering office in September, and suggests that this election was influenced by Brasidas' recent achievement (in this he follows Poralla), and was a display of popular enthusiasm of a kind not normally associated with Sparta. (This assumes the authenticity of Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 9-10, but see above, 2. 1 n. on *Αἰνησίου* etc.)

3. τῆς Ἡλείας ἐς Φειάν: 'Pheia in Elis'. Pheia, and the Ichthys ('Fish'-shaped) promontory, are about six miles west of the modern Pirgos. See 27. 2 n. on ἡ δὲ Θυρεάτις.

καὶ τῶν αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς περιοικίδος Ἡλείων: 'as well as some Elean *perioikoi*' [lit. 'Eleans from the *perioikis*']. For the Elean *perioikoi* and *perioikis* (the collective name for the cities subject to Elis) see A. Andrewes, 'Argive *Perioikoi*', in 'Owls to Athens' (i. 23. 6 n.), 171 ff., at 172, and for *perioikoi* see above, i. 101. 2 n., discussing the comparable *perioikoi* of Sparta. (That is, *perioikoi* in a Spartan and Elean context means 'subjects', not just 'neighbours' in the topographical sense the word can also have.)

26. 1. **Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου**: 'Kleopompos the son of Kleinias'. See 56. 1.

2. **Θρόνιον . . . ἐν Ἀλόπη**: 'Thronion . . . at Alope'. South and north respectively of the Maliac Gulf, where the land on each side nearly nips the north-western tip of Euboia. For this campaign see Westlake, *Essays*, 85 and n. 5, suggesting that a 'secondary object' [that is, apart from the Euboian aspect] 'may have been to safeguard communications with the Thessalians'. See further below 32 for the fortification of Atalante off Lokris; as Holladay (above, i. 144. 1 n.), 400, remarks of Thronion and Astakos (below, 31), 'it does not seem that [Pericles'] injunction not to gain new territory can be taken absolutely literally', and that is equally true of Atalante. On Alope see Clairmont (34. 1 n.) 179: the restoration of the name in the casualty list, *Agora* (i. 63. 3 n.), no. 17, line 3, is probably incorrect.

27. 1. **ἐπικαλέσαντες οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι**: 'alleging that they had been the main cause of the war'. See i. 67. 2 and nn. There is no contradiction between the present passage, where Th. merely reports a convenient and retrospective Athenian allegation which may or may not have been sincere, and Book i, where in discussing the prelude to the war he gives Aigina very little prominence among the 'publicly alleged reasons' (*αἰτίαι*) of i. 23. 6. See Stadter, Plutarch *Pericles* commentary (i. 45. 1 n.) on 34. 2: Plutarch personalizes the issue, making Pericles responsible for what was really a collective decision.

John Gould, *Herodotus* (London, 1989), ch. 4, 'Why Things Happen', makes the interesting point that Hdt. saw causation in terms of reciprocity and tit-for-tat; the implication (made explicit at Gould, 111) is that Th.'s view was very different, esp. at the would-be 'definitive' i. 23. This is a good point, but the present passage shows that reprisals, and 'you started it' thinking, were as important for some of the people Th. was writing about, if not for Th. himself, as they were for Hdt. and his agents. Note also Xen. *Hell.* ii. 2. 3: the terrified and insomniac Athenians, on the night after Aigospotami, expect to be dealt with as they have treated others.

τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἐπικειμένην: '[the island] lies close to the Peloponnese'. The text here has been suspected, because it implies an offensive rather than (as the general context is supposed to require) a defensive purpose for Athens' occupation of Aigina; commentators have therefore tried to emend so as to make Th. say 'close to the Peloponnese *and Attica*', or even to bracket the whole phrase as an editorial insertion. But see T. Figueira, 'Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Late Fifth and Early Fourth Centuries', *Rh. Mus.* 133 (1990), 15ff., at 16ff., defending

the text as it stands: Aigina was indeed a good offensive base for Athenian operations against the Peloponnese.

καὶ ἐξέπεμψαν ὕστερον οὐ πολλῶ ἐς αὐτὴν τοὺς οἰκήτορας: ‘so shortly afterwards they sent out settlers’. See further vii. 57. 2n. This eviction is alluded to at Hdt. vi. 91. 1. According to ML 67 addenda (1988 reprinting) an unpublished additional fragment of ML 67 refers to Aiginetan exiles; but I gather from Professor Lewis that there is now some doubt about this. See now ML paperback reprint (1989).

2. καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι: ‘and the surrounding territory to cultivate’. See i. 58. 2n. on *τοῖς τ’ ἐκλιποῦσι*. In 424 these Aiginetans in exile were destroyed by Athens: iv. 56f.

καὶ ὅτι σφῶν εὐεργέται ἦσαν ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμόν: ‘who had done them good service at the time of the earthquake’. See i. 102. 1 and 3, where ‘other allies’ are mentioned, apart from the dismissed Athenians. Here, as at 21. 2 on Pleistoanax, Th. takes the opportunity to fill in a little of the detail he had omitted in the *Pentekontaetia*. Compare iii. 54. 5, where the Plataians also claim to have helped Sparta on that occasion. On these passages see my paper in *Catling Studies*. At iv. 56. 2 Th. repeats the information given in the present passage (see n. there).

ἡ δὲ Θυρεαῖτις . . .: ‘The Thyrean territory . . . [lit. ‘Thyreatis’]. It is capricious of Th. to tell us the whereabouts of Thyreatis after throwing Pheia at us so unhelpfully at 25. 3 above—especially when Thyrea is familiar, to us as to Th.’s contemporary readers, from Hdt. i. 82. It may be that the present sentence is an intrusive gloss, but as with the religious material in 15. 2 and 3 (see nn. there) the difficulty is to know where to draw the line: the explanatory geographical material about Kephallenia and Atalante in 30. 2 and 32 seems innocuous—but it is not very different from i. 50. 3 about Sybota, which Jacoby wanted to delete (see n. there). In any case the material given here is repeated at iv. 56. 2 (see previous n.).

28. τοῦ δ’ αὐτοῦ θέρους νομηνία κατὰ σελήνην, ὥσπερ καὶ μόνον δόκει εἶναι γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ὃ ἥλιος ἐξέλιπε μετὰ μεσημβρίαν: ‘During the same summer, at the beginning of the lunar month (apparently the only time when such an event is possible), and in the afternoon, there was an eclipse of the sun’. This was on 3 August 431. See W. K. C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, ii (Cambridge, 1965), 307f.: Th.’s older contemporary Anaxagoras, who lived in roughly the first three-quarters of the fifth century, knew that solar eclipses could occur only at the new moon. See DK 59 A 42, para. 9, translated in M. R. Cohen and I. E. Drabkin, *A Source Book in Greek Science* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 94, and taken from Hippolytos, *Refutation of all Heresies*—if

Hippolytos is a reliable guide to what Anaxagoras thought; for doubts on this point see C. Osborne, *Rethinking Early Greek Philosophy* (London, 1987). Note that Th.'s word *δοκεῖ*, 'apparently', lit. 'it seems', is quite vague and could refer to Th.'s own observation, to the observations of others, or to non-committal reading of the works of men like Anaxagoras. See i. 23. 3, where he says that solar eclipses were unusually frequent in the war, with n. there.

Pericles is said to have given the Athenians an astronomy lesson on this occasion, drawing on the teachings of his master Anaxagoras: Cic. *de Rep.* i. xvi (25) and Plut. *Per.* 35. 2 (wrongly dated): he explained the phenomenon and so 'released the people from their fears'.

29. Athenian diplomacy with Thrace

The Thracian detail in this long chapter is surely in part a reflection of Th.'s own personal background: see iv. 105. 1 n. But we must allow Th. to make his own judgement on what was more and what was less important: the proxeny of Nymphodoros (see below) had more concrete intentions behind it than those of Menon and Aristonous of Thessaly which—if, as seems plausible, they were granted now—he ignores (22. 3 nn.); and it is important because it introduces us to Sitalkes who will be prominent in 95 ff.; see also 67. (But note that at iv. 78 he does mention a *proxenos* resident at Thessalian Pharsalos, namely Strophakos, who was *proxenos* of the Chalkidians there. We would not guess from iv. 78. 2—Athens said to be popular among the common people of Thessaly; contrast iv. 78. 1 for the sympathies of Brasidas' influential Pharsalian friends—that Athens had sympathizers like Menon in the Thessalian and specifically Pharsalian upper class.)

Nevertheless the mythical material about Tereus and Prokne is very unusual for Th. and cries out for an explanation in terms of local interests.

1. καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θερεί Νυμφόδωρον τὸν Πύθειω ἄνδρα Ἀβδηρίτην, οὗ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν Σιτάλκης, δυνάμενον παρ' αὐτῷ μέγα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πρότερον πολέμιον νομίζοντες πρόξενον ἐποίησαντο: 'In the same summer, Nymphodoros the son of Pythes, a native of Abdera and a man of great influence with Sitalkes who had married his sister, was made *proxenos* at Abdera by the Athenians . . . They had previously regarded him as their enemy . . .'. For this proxeny see M. Walbank (above, 22. 3 n.), 167 ff., no. 30, giving bibliography; also, on Nymphodoros, B. Isaac, *The Greek Settlements in Thrace until the Macedonian Conquest* (Leiden, 1986), 99–104, who thinks that the reason for the previous hostility of Athens to Nymphodoros was

his Odrysian connection and that this is 'indirect but unambiguous confirmation of friction between Athens and the Odrysians before the Peloponnesian War' (but Isaac's idea that the name Nymphodoros is a 'good Thraco-Greek name', in view of the cult of the Nymphs in the area, does not seem necessary; the name is fairly common to judge from Vol. i of the *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, ed. P. Fraser and E. Matthews (Oxford, 1987) which covers the Aegean Islands, Cyprus, and Cyrenaica). See also Gerolymatos (below), 27 ff.

Proxeny is mentioned eleven times by Th.: it was in modern language a 'consular' arrangement by which a citizen of city A looked after the interests of city B in city A; it had its origins in, and did not supersede, the old *xenia* system, for which see 13. 1 n.; proxeny has been called 'the counterpart in private connexions' of *xenia*: S. Perlman, *CQ* 8 (1958), 190. For the informal intelligence-gathering functions of *proxenoi* in the fifth and fourth centuries see A. Gerolymatos, *Espionage and Treason: A Study of the Proxenia in Political and Military Intelligence Gathering in Classical Greece* (Amsterdam, 1986). The proxeny system is itself old: see ML 4 = Fornara 14, from seventh-century Corcyra. See W. B. Wallace, 'Early Greek *Proxenoi*', *Phoenix*, 24 (1970), 189 ff. Walbank's catalogue of Athenian *proxenoi* collects 94 known instances from the fifth century alone, many of them attested by inscriptions and many of them mentioning individuals who to us are otherwise wholly obscure. Only five of this total are known from Th.: (1) Nymphodoros; (2) ii. 85. 5-6, Nikias of Cretan Gortyn—a controversial item (see n. there); (3) iii. 2. 3, *proxenoi* at Mytilene; (4) iii. 70. 3, Peithias at Corcyra, mysteriously omitted by Walbank, perhaps because he was a 'voluntary proxenos', but whatever that means he was a *proxenos* of some kind; (5) viii. 92. 8, Thoukydides of Pharsalos (see n. there and above, 22. 3 n.). In addition, Th. six times mentions *proxenoi* acting for places other than Athens: (6) iii. 52. 3, Lakon, the Spartan *proxenos* at Plataia; (7) iii. 70. 1, Corinthian *proxenoi* at Corcyra; (8) iv. 78. 2, Strophakos, the Chalkidian *proxenos* at Thessalian Pharsalos (see above); (9) v. 43. 2 and vi. 89. 2, Alcibiades, the Spartan *proxenos* at Athens; (10) v. 59, Alkiphron, the Spartan *proxenos* at Argos; (11) v. 76, Lichas, the Argive *proxenos* at Sparta. Of these eleven names Alcibiades is the only Athenian-born *proxenos* of another city, unless Nikias is the famous Athenian, not a Cretan at all (ii. 85. 5 n.). This may say something for Alcibiades' cosmopolitanism, though there were no doubt many unrecorded Athenian *proxenoi* (in the sense of Athenians acting for another city but living at Athens) representing places which did not have the 'epigraphic habit' to the same extent as Athens.

Finally there are persons named by Th. and known (or conjectured), not from him but from other evidence, to have been *proxenoi*: (12)

Aristonous, ii. 22. 3 n.; (13) Artas of Messapia, vii. 33. 4 n., with Walbank, 370 ff., no. 70; (14) Archelaos of Macedon, mentioned at 100 below: for his proxeny see ML 91 = Fornara 161. More doubtful are (15) Menon, see 22. 3 n.: I do not accept Walbank's view that he was hereditary *proxenos*; (16) Perdikkas, king of Macedon, a candidate only if the early fifth-century proxeny of king Alexander was hereditary, Hdt. viii. 136—but the language of ML 91 for Archelaos (see above), which does not read like a renewal, seems to exclude this. (Alexander is one of only two named *proxenoi* in Hdt., the other being Kleades the Plataian, *proxenos* for the Aiginetans, ix. 85. 3.)

Eleven *proxenoi*, and only five of them Athenian appointees, in all Th. is not a large number; we would expect a higher figure if Walbank were right in his idea that Athens systematically aimed to have one, and usually no more than one, formal '*proxenos* in every port' of her empire (against this idea see Lewis, *Phoenix*, 33 (1979), 268).

βουλόμενοι Σιτάλκην σφίσι τὸν Τήρεω, Θρακῶν βασιλέα, ξύμμαχον γενέσθαι: 'they hoped that he would win over to their alliance Sitalkes, who was the son of Teres and king of Thrace'. Th. is confident and expansive on Athenian motives here, and it is tempting to think that he himself had something to do with promoting the proxeny and the alliance. (With the language used to describe Nymphodoros' influence, *δυνάμενον παρ' αὐτῷ μέγα*, compare Th. iv. 105 on his own influence in Thrace, *δύνασθαι ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις*. Up in the north Aegean, as Th. knew better than most people, the conditions of diplomacy had changed little since the sixth century: see vi. 59. 3 on the tyrants of Lampsakos who had great influence with the Persian king Darius, *μέγα παρὰ βασιλεῖ Δαρείῳ δύνασθαι*.) This diplomacy bore early and unexpected fruit: see 67.

For Teres and Sitalkes generally see Archibald, *CAH* vi². 444–54, 'Thracians and Scythians', with next n. below; 67 and 96 ff. below and nn. Sitalkes was killed by the Triballoi in 424: iv. 101. 5. He was the subject of the 'ballad of Sitalkes' which Xenophon in 399 heard a Thracian dancer sing after a performance in full armour, *Anab.* vi. 1.

For Athens' involvement with Sitalkes, and its bearing on her relations with Perdikkas, see J. Cole, 'Athens and Perdikkas', *Phoenix*, 28 (1974), 55 ff., at 58 f. For the idea that the cult at Athens of the Thracian goddess Bendis reflects in some way the politics of these years see most recently R. Garland, *The Piraeus* (London, 1987), 118 f., and in *Pagan Priests* (8. 2 n.), 85 and n. 28: the first evidence that the cult was officially recognized dates from 429 (*IG* i³. 383, line 143). On *IG* i³. 136, a decree about the Bendis cult which has in the past been brought into connection with the present passage of Th. and dated in or close to the year 431

itself, see the sceptical pages of J. Pecirka, *Formula for Enktesis Grants in Attic Inscriptions* (Prague, 1966), 122 ff. His date of ?c.413 is accepted by Lewis in *IG* 1³. For the support and regulation of such private cults by the state see Lewis, *BSA* 55 (1960), 193. If we could give a precise date to the beginnings of the official support and regulation of the Bendis cult, we might indeed want to guess that it was conditioned by diplomatic motives; but the reasons for the *popularity* of the cult are probably more general, to do with general awareness of Thrace in mid-fifth-century Athens, with military service by Athenians in the north, and (a little later) with the presence of Thracian mercenaries in Athens: see *Greek World*, 178 f. (where other evidence for Bendis is given). For new light on Bendis see Hoddinott in the Rogozen catalogue (next n.), 32, suggesting that Bendis was the female equivalent of the 'Thracian Hero' who is so prominent in Thracian art.

2. **Ὀδρύσαις τὴν μεγάλην βασιλείαν:** 'the great Odrysian empire'. See *CAH* vi² (above) for the Odrysian kingdom, and see Fol and others in *The New Thracian Treasure from Rogozen, Bulgaria* (British Museum Publications, London, 1986) for a remarkable silver treasure with inscriptions naming some of the Thracian kings known from literary sources (such as Sadokos: see below 5 n.). Note also B. F. Cook (ed.), *The Rogozen Treasure: Papers of the Anglo-Bulgarian Conference, 12 March 1987* (London, 1989). See further 97. 3 n.

3. **Τηρεί δὲ τῷ Πρόκνην τὴν Πανδίωνος ἀπ' Ἀθηνῶν σχόντι γυναικα προσήκει ὁ Τήρης οὗτος οὐδέν, οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῆς Θράκης ἐγένοντο:** 'He has no connection with Tereus who married the Athenian Prokne, the daughter of Pandion; they do not even belong to the same Thrace' [that is, Tereus came from Thrace = Phokis in Central Greece (see below)]. For the myth of Tereus—the 'barbarous king' of T. S. Eliot's *Waste Land*—Prokne, and Philomela, see *OCD*³ entry under 'Philomela', and for discussion of its origins K. Hanell (above, 22. 2 n.), 37 ff. This extraordinary digression by Th. looks polemical: from his superior knowledge of Thrace he is perhaps correcting Hellanikos, as Gomme suggested; or even Sophocles, who wrote a *Tereus* at a date unknown. But the fragments (Nauck, *TGF*², nos. 523 ff.) do not allow us to say whether he was Th.'s target. [See now Parker, *ARH* 174 and n. 76.]

Th. applies the same kind of reasoning as in the *Archaeology* (see i. 4 n. on ὡς εἰκός, and below, n. on εἰκός τε).

ἐν Δαυλία τῆς Φωκίδος νῦν καλουμένης γῆς ᾧκει, τότε ὑπὸ Θρακῶν οἰκουμένης: 'For Tereus lived in Daulia, a part of the region which is now called Phokis but in those days was inhabited by Thracians'. For what it is worth, some modern archaeologists think this is true: see Casson and Hanell (above, 22. 2 n.)—but partly on the say-so of Th. himself.

πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ἀηδόνας μνήμη Δαυλιᾶς ἢ ὄρνις ἐπωνόμασται: 'Many of the poets, when they mention the nightingale Philomela, call her "the Daulian bird"'. We have no idea who these poets were; Sophocles (*Oedipus Tyrannus*, 734) calls Phokis 'Daulia'; and we have seen that he wrote a *Tereus*, which might (or might not) have used the whole phrase 'Daulian bird'. Rhodes in his commentary on Th. ii (Warminster, 1988) cites Catullus, lxx. 14.

Th.'s use of such arguments from names is rare and restrained: see i. 3 n. on *Δαναοῦς*, and *Thucydides*, 93 f.

εἰκός τε: 'surely'. For this kind of reasoning about the distant or mythical past see J. H. Finley, *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 9. See also C. Collard, comm. on Euripides, *Supplikes*, p. 135.

Τήρης δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄνομα ἔχων: 'the Teres of whom I am speaking ... has not even the same name'. That is, he is not called Tereus. It is ironic, in view of Th.'s firm detachment of the two names, that he is regularly cited as evidence for the Thracian origin of the Tereus myth on the grounds of the near-homonymity between Tereus and Teres: so Hanell (above), 39, and Wilamowitz, *Glaube der Hellenen*, i (Berlin, 1931), 52 n. 2.

ἐν κράτει: 'powerful' [lit. 'in command of']. See H. Lloyd-Jones and N. G. Wilson, *Sophoclea* (Oxford, 1990), 134, discussing Sophocles, *Antigone*, 715. The phrase is unusual, but suited to its place in the present ch. of Th., with its poetic, perhaps actually Sophoclean, content.

5. ἐλθὼν τε ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ὁ Νυμφόδωρος τὴν τε τοῦ Σιτάλκου ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησε καὶ Σάδοκον τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ Ἀθηναῖον: 'So Nymphodoros came to Athens, negotiated the alliance with Sitalkes, and got his son Sadokos made an Athenian citizen'. Sadokos' name is inscribed on two pieces of the Rogozen silver treasure found in Bulgaria in 1985–6: see catalogue (above, para. 2 n.), nos. 27 (*ΣΑΤΟΚ[Ω]Ι*) and 118 (*ΣΑΤΟΚΟ*). See below, 67. 2 n., for Sadokos; and 97. 3 n. for the way this treasure illuminates what Th. says about Thracian society. For the grant of Athenian citizenship to Sadokos see M. J. Osborne (above, 22. 3 n.), 26 f. (= T 4) and 188 with n. 14, pointing out that the honours to Sadokos (and Nymphodoros) anticipate the diplomatic techniques of the fourth century. In his comm. on T 4 he suggests that Aristophanes, *Ach.* 145 f., which mentions Sadokos' participation in the Apaturia, is evidence that Sadokos actually came to Athens and, exceptionally, 'implemented his citizenship'. See also 67. 2 n. (Note that Osborne, 122 = X 3, rejects the statement in Dem. xii. 9 that Sitalkes himself was naturalized; this is a simple confusion for Kotys.)

As with the grant of proxeny, Th. mentions few individual grants of

Athenian citizenship. (For the notorious problem of the bulk enfranchisement of the Plataians see iii. 55. 3 n.) He must have known about the citizenship of Tharyps prince of Molossia, whom he mentions at 80. 6 below: see Osborne T 6 on this naturalization, rightly commenting that it resembles that of Sadokos in many ways. Full naturalization was, however, rare at Athens—unlike proxeny it carried with it the coveted right to own land, γῆς ἔγκτησις—and Th. may simply reflect the rare reality.

καὶ πελταστῶν: ‘and peltasts’. Peltasts were light-armed troops, who derived their name from their shield or *pelta*, made of wicker-work covered with sheep- or goat-skin: see J. G. P. Best, *Thracian Peltasts and their Influence on Greek Warfare* (Groningen, 1969); J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), 112 ff. The present passage foreshadows their importance in the early fourth century, for which see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii. 119 ff.

6. καὶ Θέρμην . . . ἀποδοῦναι: ‘and to restore Therme to them’. See i. 61. 2 and n.

30. 1. ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσί: ‘the hundred ships’. See 17. 4, 23. 2, 25. 1, 31. 1.

Σόλλιον τε Κορινθίων πόλισμα αἰροῦσι καὶ παραδιδάσι Παλαιρεῦσιν Ἀκαρνάνων μόνοις: ‘took Sollion, a town belonging to the Corinthians, and handed it over to the Palaireans of Akarnania, giving to them alone of the Akarnanians . . .’. See Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 307, 318, for Athenian thinking: ‘in the case of minor sites, it was useful to give them to the Acarnanians, for her interest was essentially to deny them to Corinth.’ Sollion is 15 km. south of Anaktorion and 20 west of Medeon.

τὴν γῆν καὶ πόλιν νέμεσθαι: ‘. . . the right of occupying the city and its territory’. See i. 58. 2 n. The mention of the city implies wholesale eviction.

καὶ Ἀστακόν, ἧς Εὐάρχος ἐτυράννει, λαβόντες κατὰ κράτος καὶ ἐξελάσαντες αὐτόν: ‘They also stormed the town of Astakos and drove out Euarchos who was tyrant there’. Note the casual mention of a tyrant at this late date in Greek history, a reminder of our ignorance, and an antidote to Ruschenbusch (above, 2. 2 n.) who stresses the rarity of tyranny. For Euarchos see further 33. 1 and 102. 1 n., and for the relation of the capture of Astakos to Pericles’ strategy see 26. 2 n.

The word *αστακός* means a lobster, but according to some indignant pages in P. Leigh Fermor, *Roumeli* (London, 1966), 148 ff., lobsters are not to be had in modern Astakos.

2. ἐπί τε Κεφαλληνίαν τὴν νῆσον προσπλεύσαντες προσηγάγοντο ἄνευ μάχης: 'they next sailed to the island of Kephallenia, which they won over without fighting'. See 7. 3: the diplomatic softening-up, there mentioned, had evidently been successful. This was another serious blow at Corinth: see Salmon, 307 and n. 6, pointing out that at Leukimme (i. 27. 2) Kephallenia had provided four ships for Corinth. This acquisition, even more than Atalante (below, 32), represents a considerable expansion of the Athenian empire.

κείται δὲ ἡ Κεφαλληνία: 'the island lies . . .'. See above, 27. 2 n.

31. 1. ἐν ταῖς ἑκατὸν ναυσί: 'the hundred Athenian ships'. See 17. 4, 23. 2, 25. 1, 30. 1.

2. στρατόπεδόν τε μέγιστον: 'this was the largest army . . .'. Th. is fond of such statistics of the form 'the greatest/the first/the most deplorable of the war': see e.g. iii. 19. 1; 98. 4; 114. 6, vii. 30. 3. The present passage stresses Athenian vigour by contrast with the horrors to come, note the explicit mention of the plague; in the same way vi. 31 paints a brilliant picture of the Athenian fleet setting out towards disaster in Sicily. (But there Th. makes no overt reference to the outcome, preferring to sow doubts in more subtle ways.)

οὐπω νεοσηκίαις: 'had not as yet suffered from the plague'. We have already had a mention of the plague in i. 23. 3. On this issue, by contrast with the more self-consciously crafted effects of Book vi (above), Th. does not mind spoiling the suspense. The Funeral Speech is sometimes treated as sunshine before the shadow of the plague chapters, but the present allusion shows that that is too simple.

χωρὶς δὲ αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ τρισχίλιοι ἦσαν: 'apart from the 3,000 who were at Potidaia' [lit. 'apart from these, those they had [lit. 'for them'] at Potidaia were 3,000']. In the *Potidaiatika* we were told of 3,000 at i. 61. 4, and of a further 1,600 at i. 64. 2; some of these 4,600 had evidently been withdrawn—perhaps half the original 3,000: see iii. 17. 3 n. on τρισχίλιοι etc. On this view it is mere coincidence that the number 3,000 occurs twice. It is important to remember the literal tr. of the present passage: not 'the 3,000 at Potidaia [whom I mentioned at i. 61. 4]' but 'those who were at Potidaia [now] amounted to 3,000'.

3. ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι ὕστερον ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον ἐσβολαὶ Ἀθηναίων ἐς τὴν Μεγαρίδα καὶ ἵππέων καὶ πανστρατία, μέχρι οὗ Νίσαια ἐάλω ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων: 'they repeated the invasion of the Megarid, sometimes with cavalry, sometimes with the whole Athenian army, every year during the war until Nisaia was taken'. We are meant to bear this in mind in the narrative which follows: see 24. 1 n. on ὡσπερ δὴ ἐμελλον, and 34. 7 n. (the Public Funeral), also

iii. 1. 1 n. on *καὶ προσβολαί*. See also iv. 66. 1, where we will be reminded of these invasions, which in fact (as that passage reveals) took place *twice* a year. Th. has already departed from the principle of ii. 1. 1, where he announces that he will describe events in chronological order.

Why *twice* a year? G. L. Cawkwell, 'Anthemocritus and the Megarians and the Decree of Charinus', *REG* 82 (1969), 327 ff., at 334, suggests a religious reason: 'twice annually instead of offering in the name of the goddess the truce [which normally happened twice a year] Athens would invade the Megarid.' Th. does not make the connection because 'this was not war, but religion, in which he had no great interest'.

The invasions are important for de Ste. Croix's theory about the Megarian decrees. (See *OPW* 243.) He thinks that the Megarian 'starvation' referred to in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes (535) is the result of these routine invasions, rather than (as a natural reading of Aristophanes would suggest) the result of the decrees: see *Greek World*, 92, and more recently A. J. Podlecki, *Plutarch: Pericles* (Bristol, 1987), appendix on the Megarian decrees.

On the military importance to Athens of controlling Megara, and the possibility that the Megarian decrees themselves should be seen as part of the sequence, see i. 67. 4 n. citing Lewis, *CAH* v². 388. See further below, iv. 66-7 and nn., and for the Megarian decrees i. 67. 4, 120. 2, and 139. 1-2 and nn. Lewis thinks that Th. was 'not all that interested in Megara' and has obscured Pericles' aim to 'produce the softening up of Megara which nearly bore fruit in 424'.

Eventual capture of Nisaia: iv. 66-9 (424).

32. ἐτειχίσθη δὲ καὶ Ἄταλάντη: 'the island of Atalante was fortified'. See above, 26. 2 n.

τοῦ μὴ ληστὰς: 'to prevent pirates . . .'. The first mention of piracy in the narrative proper, though we have been prepared for it at i. 4 above: see n. there on *τὸ ληστικόν*. See also ii. 69. 1 n. on *καὶ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων* etc.

33. 1. τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου χειμῶνος: 'During the following winter'. Such winter campaigning was unusual at this period (see Dem. ix. 48 ff., drawing a contrast with the fourth-century position, in the time of Philip II). The Athenian actions must have annoyed the Corinthians a good deal for them to operate out of season in this way.

Εὐαρχος ὁ Ἀκαρνὰν βουλόμενος ἐς τὴν Ἄστακὸν κατελθεῖν πείθει Κορινθίους: 'Euarchos the Akarnanian, who wanted to be restored to Astakos, persuaded the Corinthians . . .'. See 30. 1 and n. with Salmon, 307f.: the Corinthian successes detailed in this ch. were short-lived.

34-46. THE PUBLIC FUNERAL; PERICLES' SPEECH

The public funeral was more of a religious event than would be guessed from Th.'s narrative: the dead were in fact given heroic cult. So rightly Jacoby (above, i. 100. 3 n.), 304, in the course of a fundamental study of the institution of public burial at Athens; see also Loraux (above, i. 63. 3 n.), 18. Jacoby argued that the funeral was associated with a particular festival, the Solonian festival of the Genesia. See also 46. 1 n. on *στέφανον*: there was a funeral contest.

34. 1. *ἐν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ χειμῶνι*: 'During the same winter'. But as Loraux, 37 f., says, we cannot infer from this indication of date that the funeral (as opposed to the associated festival, if there was one) was always held this time of year, since Hyperides' funeral speech in the fourth century was delivered in early spring.

τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ χρώμενοι δημοσίᾳ ταφᾷς ἐποίησαντο τῶν ἐν τῷδε τῷ πολέμῳ πρώτων ἀποθανόντων τρόπῳ τοιῷδε: 'in accordance with ancestral custom, the funeral of those who first fell in this war was celebrated by the Athenians at the public expense'. How 'ancestral' was this ancestral custom? Jacoby (above, i. 100. 3 n.) argued that Th. was wrong and that it was as recent as the post-Persian War period, in fact that it was introduced in 464 after the battle of Drabeskos. He based himself partly on the explicit statement of Pausanias (i. 29. 4), whose credit in general, and as a reliable transmitter of information about Athens in particular, has been defended by C. Habicht, *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, 1985). The issue has been much discussed, but Jacoby's approximate date remains the best: an exhaustive re-examination of all the evidence shows that there are no archaeological or epigraphic grounds for thinking that Athenian casualties were buried in the *demosion sema* (state tomb) before at earliest the end of the 470s. See C. Clairmont, *Patrios Nomos* (Oxford, 1983), 9 ff., arguing for a date slightly earlier than Jacoby. See also the long review of Clairmont by R. Stupperich, *Gnomon*, 56 (1984), 637 ff. Loraux, 30, is unhelpful; she claims that the evidence does *not* support Jacoby but admits to uncertainty and offers a view very close to his. Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iv. 123, accepts Jacoby's date; his whole section 106-24 is excellent. S. Humphreys, *The Family, Women and Death: Comparative Studies* (London, 1983), 89 = *JHS* 100 (1980), 102, points out that, even if Jacoby was right that the ceremony in the Kerameikos dates from 465, the concept of the public funeral, as a tribute paid by the *polis* (not just Athens) to those deserving special honour, is much earlier. See also

R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (London, 1985), 90, who says that the first known funeral speech at Athens (as opposed to the rest of the ceremony) is Pericles' speech for those who died in the fighting against Samos, 439; Garland refers to Plut. *Per.* 28. 4, but this could be read differently (Plutarch says that Pericles gave the address 'as is the custom, ἔθος'). See Rhodes's Th. ii comm. (Warminster, 1988), on ch. 34.

But what of Th.? Does acceptance of Jacoby's approximate date commit us to thinking that Th. was wildly wrong? M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy* (Oxford, 1969), 175, says no. He rightly insists that πάτριος just means 'traditional'; contrast Gomme, 94, who glosses πάτριος νόμος 'at least as early as Solon'. See, accepting Ostwald's point, Pritchett, 118 n. 71; note also Clairmont, 11 f.; and C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles: The Transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the Eighth Century BC* (Cambridge, 1990), 289 n. 36, following L. E. Roller, 'Funeral Games for Historical Persons', *Stadion*, 7 (1981), 1 ff., for the view that the whole festival developed gradually (which would enable us to reconcile apparently conflicting data: the athletic element—for which see below 46 n., discussing Th.'s silence on this whole aspect—could have been added later than the creation of the basic festival).

Th.'s statement about the Marathon dead has caused unnecessary difficulty for the general dating question: see n. on 5 below.

3. λάρνακας κυπαρισσίνας: 'chests of cypress wood'. For the use of cypress wood in fifth-century Athens, and for its advantages (scented, long-lasting) see Meiggs (above, 14. 1 n.), 200.

φυλῆς ἐκάστης μίαν: 'one chest for each tribe'. That is, the ten tribes instituted by Kleisthenes, into which the citizens were organized; casualty lists like ML 48 are arranged by tribes. For tribes in this sense used by Greek states as military units see iii. 90. 2 (Sicilian Messina), vi. 100. 1 (Syracuse), and for Athens specifically see vi. 98. 4, Plutarch, *Aristides*, 5. 4, ML 51 = Fornara 101, Xen. *Hell.* iv. 2. 19 and 21 (cp. Lys. xvi. 15), and generally P. Siewert, *Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes* (Munich, 1982), stressing the military aspect to Kleisthenes' late-sixth-century reforms, in which a reorganization of the 'tribes' was a conspicuous element (Hdt. vi. 131).

The natural implication of Th.'s words in the present passage is that state burial was reserved for citizens, but as Loraux, 32 f., points out, non-Athenians—specifically, 'barbarian archers'—are mentioned on the casualty lists; and the ceremony itself was open to foreigners (para. 4 and Loraux, 80).

4. καὶ γυναῖκες πάρεισιν αἱ προσήκουσαι ἐπὶ τὸν τάφον ὀλοφύρομεναι: 'the female relatives of the dead are present at the place of burial and make lamentation'. We should think of this as noisy.

Mourning was women's work, as we can see from Sophocles' *Antigone* and from the fifth-century law from Iulis on Keos (but modelled on Athenian rules), *Syll.*³ 1218, translated in M. Lefkowitz and M. Fant, *Women's Life in Greece and Rome* (London, 1982), 65, no. 35, with Parker, *Miasma*, 34 ff. See J. Gould, *JHS* 100 (1980), 50, and below, 45. 2 n. Such loud and distressing demonstrations were often restrained by law, as in Solon's law code, and in the Twelve Tables (fifth-century BC legislation at Rome, Lefkowitz and Fant, 188, Table X).

5. **τιθέασιν οὖν ἐς τὸ δημόσιον σῆμα, ὃ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ καλλίστου προαστείου τῆς πόλεως:** 'they bury them in the state tomb [*demosion sema*], which is situated in the most beautiful suburb of the city'. In fact, in the Kerameikos, for which see Travlos (i. 93. 2 n.), 299 ff., and now the excellent annotated monograph of U. Knigge, *Der Kerameikos von Athen: Führung durch Ausgrabungen und Geschichte* (Athens, 1988). For the *demosion sema* in particular, Clairmont, 29 ff.

The comment on the physical beauty of the site is almost unique in Th., who seems to have had little aesthetic sense or interest: see *Thucydides*, 93.

πλὴν γε τοὺς ἐν Μαραθῶνι: 'only after the battle of Marathon'. This has troubled commentators because of the supposed difficulty that the dead of Salamis and Plataia were also buried on or near the place where they fell. See, however, Ostwald, *Nomos*, 175: 'but the *γέ* in the expression ... is in itself sufficient proof that Thucydides had no intention of giving a complete list of exceptions.' This general position is accepted, with reservations about the linguistic argument, by Pritchett, 124, section called 'alleged blunder of Thucydides'; see also Clairmont, 10. For Marathon as a very special symbol see Loraux, 155 ff.

6. **μὴ ἀξύνετος:** 'of known ability'. See i. 79. 2 n.

7. **καὶ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ πολέμου, ὅποτε ξυμβαίῃ αὐτοῖς, ἐχρῶντο τῷ νόμῳ:** 'and the ceremony was repeated from time to time throughout the war'. See above, 24. 1 n.

35–46. *The Epitaphios Logos or Funeral Oration of Pericles*

This very famous speech belongs to a definite and formal literary genre, of which we have fourth-century examples. True, most of the speeches in Th. can be paralleled in whole or part from other writers—speeches by military commanders before battles, speeches requesting an alliance, speeches in self-defence, and so on. It is a matter of degree: as types of literary or oratorical production, the unique and extraordinary Melian Dialogue (v. 85 ff.) is perhaps at one extreme, the *epitaphios logos* at the

other. (At 34. 6–7 above, Th. has made it clear that Pericles' *epitaphios* had predecessors and successors.)

How then does the *epitaphios* of Th. compare, in form and content, with other speeches of the type? The only possible answer is that we have very little idea. In a remarkable study, H. Strasburger (above, i. 73. 2 n.) contrasted the Thucydidean funeral oration with fourth-century examples of the genre. But fashions had changed by the fourth century (see i. 73. 2 n.), and the only meaningful comparison would be with fifth-century *epitaphioi logoi*—which do not survive. (I suggested in *Thucydides*, 62 ff., that the right place to start would be the fragments of a writer like Antiphon, who may have treated certain imperial themes in a Thucydidean way.) Nevertheless it is likely enough, as is argued in two recent studies of funeral speeches as a literary genre, that Th. makes Pericles concentrate to an unusual degree on the present rather than the past, avoiding the traditional themes: J. E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (Salem, New Hampshire, 1981, but originally a Carolina dissertation of 1963); see also Loraux, 123, 290.

The essential difficulty, however, is one which affects all the speeches in Th. to a greater or lesser degree, the question of authenticity. Are we to think of the speech as a Thucydidean invention—in which case the supposed novelties cannot be laid at the door of the historical Pericles—or as a record of what Pericles actually said? (As I pointed out in *Thucydides*, 62 n. 66, Loraux wobbles between the two views. Her book is nevertheless a rich and stimulating, if discursive, treatment of Th. ii. 35–46 in its historical and literary context; note especially her treatment of the Platonic *Menexenos* or *Funeral Oration*, which is derivative from Th.)

There is a valuable detailed study of the speech in H. Flashar, 'Der Epitaphios des Perikles', *Sber. Heidelberg. Akad. Wiss.* (1969), i. 56 ff. See also J. Kakridis, *Der Thukydeische Epitaphios* (Munich, 1961), in effect a second edition of the 1941 treatise in modern Greek cited by Gomme. The pages on the Funeral Speech in Macleod, 149–53, are characteristically thoughtful and sensitive. R. Osborne, 'The Viewing and Obscuring of the Parthenon Frieze', *JHS* 107 (1987), 98 ff., at 100 offers some new arguments for the old idea of a connection between the 'ideology of democracy' in the Funeral Speech and that expressed by the Parthenon Frieze. (See, however, 37. 1 n. below on democracy, and 43. 6 on the young men of the frieze.) Finally, note the suggestive remarks of E. Hussey (above, i. 80–85, introductory n.), 123 ff., comparing this speech with the equally sophistic speech of Archidamos in Book i praising the Spartan way of life.

The structure of the central part of Book ii is elegant and complex: see

Connor (above, 11. 7 n.) on ring composition; and for the relation of Funeral Speech to Plague Account see below, introductory n. to 47. 3-54. Unusually, at 36. 4 Th. makes a speaker give a helpful programmatic statement about the structure of a speech about to be given. After an introduction about ancestors, Pericles announces that he will deal (36. 4-42. 2) with the Athenian constitution and way of life, and then return to the dead themselves. (Though the words chosen in this sentence (see n. there) imply a distinction between Athenian life in its public and private aspects, we should not (see 36. 4 n.) try to separate them too rigidly as some modern commentators have done. For one thing, that is undesirable in view of the close relation which in Th.'s view existed between state and individual (see 60. 2 n.). Certainly, we cannot easily distribute the material in 36. 4-42. 2 between state on the one hand and individuals on the other.) At 42. 2, as promised, the speaker returns to the dead, by a neat transition. They are the subject of 42. 2-43. 6, though even here there is plenty of exhortation to the living, e.g. 43. 1. Chs. 44-5 address the survivors, including women, who get a special word, as do the war orphans. Then comes the dismissal.

35. 1. τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόνδε: 'the man who added this oration to our other customs'. The reference is quite vague, so I have changed Jowett's 'the lawgiver' with its suggestion of Solon. See 34. 1 n. on *πάτριος νόμος*.

ἔμοι δὲ ἀρκοῦν ἂν ἐδόκει εἶναι ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργῳ γενομένων ἔργῳ καὶ δηλοῦσθαι τὰς τιμὰς: 'But I should have preferred that, when men's actions have been brave, they should be honoured only by other actions'. The emphasis here on *ἔργον* (which I have here translated 'action'), as opposed to *λόγος*, 'what is said' (the 'oration' of the previous sentence), is unmistakable. The opposition between the two ideas is the theme of A. Parry, *Logos and Ergon in Thucydides* (New York, 1981, but originally a Harvard dissertation of 1957). Parry, 159 ff., discusses the *λόγος/ἔργον* distinction in the Funeral Speech (and in Pericles' last speech); he claims (159) that the distinction occurs in some form or other approximately 32 times in the whole of this complex speech, 'a concentration greater than in any other part of the work'. See also Kakridis, 55 ff.

2. χαλεπὸν γὰρ τὸ μετρίως εἰπεῖν ἐν ᾧ μόλις καὶ ἡ δόκησις τῆς ἀληθείας βεβαιούται: 'For it is difficult to avoid saying either too little or too much, in an area where nobody's grasp of the truth is sure'. For *δόκησις* ('grasp'), see P. Huart, *Le Vocabulaire de l'analyse psychologique dans l'œuvre de Thucydide* (Paris, 1968), 253 ff. Huart says it is a poetic word, never found even in Plato among classical prose-writers. This is

not quite true, see e.g. Hdt. vii. 185. 1, though Huart is right that it is not in Plato and that it is common in tragedy.

36. 1. προγόνων: 'ancestors'. For the appeal to ancestors (and immediate parents, para. 2 below) see 62. 3 n. on τῶν τε πατέρων.

τὴν γὰρ χώραν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ οἰκοῦντες: 'There has never been a time when they did not occupy this land'. For this, the myth of Athenian autochthony, see i. 2. 5 n. on ἄνθρωποι ὧκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ αἰεὶ, and note the close verbal echo between this passage and that.

With this passage contrast 41. 4 below, θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν, with Loraux, 132 f.: 'of course the funeral oration may extend its view to all the lands and seas where Athenian valour has distinguished itself [she refers here to 41. 4], but the norm remains, for Lysias, for Pericles, or for Demosthenes, the Attic land, the land of the city.'

ἐλευθέραν δι' ἀρετὴν παρέδοσαν: 'it is because of these excellent men that the state we have inherited is free'. For Archidamos' comparable claim about Sparta see i. 84. 1 and n. there. Note that here the idea of freedom precedes that of ruling over others; at iii. 45. 6 Diodotos runs the two notions together, though the order is the same. For Greek ideas of freedom see *Greek World*, 69; if we may borrow Isaiah Berlin's useful distinction between the negative 'freedom from' and the positive 'freedom to', the idea uppermost here is (not individual freedom from state interference, enjoyed by individuals but) that freedom to pursue a foreign policy, enjoyed by a state, which is a precondition for imperialism. For Th.'s use of ἐλευθερία and ἐλεύθερος see E. Lévy (iii. 10. 6 n.) 253 ff., who does not however bring out sufficiently this positive or dynamic sense, though he is right that Th. often uses the word in less restrained and more general and rhetorical contexts than his favourite ἀυτόνομος. See also iii. 39. 2 and 46. 5 nn.

2. οἱ πατέρες: 'our fathers'. As opposed to the remoter ancestors of para. 1 (see n. there), though—as in English—the Greek word for 'fathers' can be used in the wider sense in this kind of context. See 3 n. below.

οὐκ ἀπόνως: 'after many struggles'. For Athens as a city of πόνοι see i. 70. 8 n.

3. τὰ δὲ πλείω αὐτῆς αὐτοὶ ἡμεῖς . . . ἐπηυξήσαμεν: 'we ourselves have expanded the empire in most directions' [lit. 'we have increased most parts of it']. For the thought (increasing one's patrimony) see Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 853, with Sommerstein's n. in his edn. (Cambridge, 1989), though he actually cites not the present sentence but para. 2 above.

4. μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἔάσω: 'I will not speak; for the tale would be long and is familiar to you'. For the word

μακρηγορεῖν, and the phrase *μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν*, see i. 68. 3 n. We saw there that the word is found in Euripides; the phrase in the longer form in which it occurs here is an iambic half-line (cp. 60. 5 and 61. 2 nn.).

See further 43. 1 n. on *πρὸς οὐδέν* etc.

ἀπὸ δὲ οἷας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ' αὐτὰ καὶ μεθ' οἷας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἷων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα δηλώσας: 'I should like to describe the principles underlying our actions in our rise to power, and the institutions and way of life through which our empire became great'. This will be a mirror of the treatment of the Spartan character in i. 68 ff., which in the Corinthian speech takes the form of an unfavourable contrast with, precisely, Athenian *ἐπιτήδευσις* (here translated 'principles underlying actions') and *τρόποι* ('way of life'); note in particular i. 71. 3 where *ἀρχαιότροπα* anticipates *τρόποι* here, and *ἐπιτηδεύματα* anticipates the slightly more abstract *ἐπιτήδευσις*.

On this sentence see Loraux, 173 (though her translation of *ἐπιτήδευσις* as 'practice', also adopted by Brunt—'practices'—in his revision of Jowett, is too concrete; 'principles'—Jowett and Gomme—is right). For *πολιτεία*, I have kept Jowett's 'institutions' (the word can mean just 'constitution', but here should be taken broadly, as at Dem. xxi. 63, where MacDowell in his 1990 edn. of *Demosthenes Against Meidias* paraphrases 'the whole organization of public life at Athens'). This is relevant to the issues discussed in 37 nn. below: Pericles is not being represented as praising a constitution but a way of life (so rightly Andrewes, *HCT* v. 335). See also Rusten (below 40. 1–2 n.), 17: *τρόποι* refers to individuals and *πολιτεία* refers to Athens as a whole: see 41. 1 n. Rusten thinks that *ἐπιτήδευσις*, too, refers to Athens as a whole, not to individuals. Better to say, both.

εἶμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τῶνδε ἔπαινον: 'But before I praise the dead' [lit. 'having first described, *δηλώσας* . . ., I shall then go on to praise . . .']. Pericles returns to the praise of the dead in 42. 2.

37. 1. παράδειγμα: 'example'. The normal meaning in the orators, rather than 'proof', the sense it sometimes has in Th. See *Thucydides*, 106. The present passage is perhaps in Th.'s mind at 41. 1: see n. there on *παίδευσις*.

καὶ ὄνομα μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐς ὀλίγους ἀλλ' ἐς πλείονας οἰκεῖν δημοκρατία κέκληται: 'It is true that we are called a democracy, for the administration is run with a view to the interests of the many, not of the few'. For the translation of *οἰκεῖν ἐς* ('run with a view to') see M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley, 1986), 183 n. 29.

This sentence is the subject of an entire chapter (iv) of Loraux,

treating this section as a eulogy of democracy. See also S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1986), 63, who sees the Funeral Speech as 'the democratic rallying cry of free participation for all' in opposition both to the élitist theories of Plato and to the traditional standards of Homer. Note, by contrast with these two slightly conventional assessments of the Funeral Speech, the refreshing paragraph by Andrewes (*HCT* v. 335), who calls the present passage 'lukewarm' (he notes that the concessive *μὲν*-clause looks forward to the *δέ*-clause with its defensive content) and concludes 'there is hardly anything in the speech that could be called anti-democratic, but Thucydides does not make Pericles speak like an enthusiast for democratic doctrine'. See also, in the same spirit, R. Sealey, *The Athenian Republic* (London, 1987), 101 f. and n. 28, citing R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Verwandtes* (Leipzig, 1907), 263 and n. 8, and J. R. Grant, 'Thucydides 2. 37. 1', *Phoenix*, 25 (1971), 104 ff. Note also J. H. Oliver, 'Praise of Periclean Athens as a Mixed Constitution', *Rh. Mus.* 98 (1955), 37 ff. [and E. Harris, *HSCP* 94 (1992), 157-6.]

For Macleod, 149 ff., the 'glorious ideals' of the Funeral Speech are 'set against the gloomier reality', not just because the Speech anticipates the plague description in ways we shall notice below, but because the Speech itself suggests that there are 'darker aspects' even to what it praises; see next n. but one for an example. Macleod is (despite 'glorious ideals') not far from Andrewes's position. As Macleod (149) says of the present passage 'if Athenian democracy worked, it is because Pericles was in effect a king (2. 65. 9)'; this is an echo of a witty sentence of Andrewes, *Phoenix*, 16 (1962), 82 f.

On the word *δημοκρατία* see now the short but important article by M. H. Hansen, 'The Origin of the Term *δημοκρατία*', *LCM* 11 (1986), 35 f. He shows from Antiphon, vi. 45, that there was cult for Democracy at Athens in about 420. However guarded we think Th.'s own attitude towards democracy to have been, his use of the word in the present context must have had solemn and emotive resonances.

κατὰ μὲν τοὺς νόμους πρὸς τὰ ἴδια διάφορα πᾶσι τὸ ἴσον: 'the law secures equal justice to all in their private disputes'. Compare Eur. *Suppl.* 433 for the idea that through *written* law, *γεγραμμένων νόμων* (contrast 3 below for unwritten law), equal justice for all, *δίκη ἴση*, is secured for all, weak and rich, *ὁ τ' ἀσθενὴς ὁ πλούσιός τε*. Collard's n. on the passage quotes T. C. W. Stinton's interesting comment that the Euripides passage appears unique in the fifth century in its description of *written* law as a guarantee of democracy (though note already Solon F 36 West 18-20). This is true to the extent that the *word* 'written' is not used in the present passage of Th., but the thought here and at 3 below surely resembles what Euripides' speaker is saying. On both the Th. and

Euripides passages see Ostwald (above, 1 n.), 252 f., also noting the very different comment in Eur. *Hecuba*, 864 ff.

On the related concept of *isonomia* see iii. 62. 3 n. on ἡμῖν γάρ etc. and Hansen (below, 3 n.) 21 ff.

For Athenagoras' view see vi. 39. 1 and n. there, and on the relation between the two passages see Saar (introductory n. to iii. 37–50), 20 f. **κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔν τῳ εὐδοκιμεί, οὐκ ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ πλεόν ἐς τὰ κοινὰ ἢ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς προτιμᾶται, οὐδ' αὖ κατὰ πενίαν, ἔχων γέ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, ἀξιώματος ἀφανεία κεκώλυται:** 'the claim of excellence is also recognized; and when a citizen is in any way distinguished, he wins promotion in the state, not in rotation, but as the reward of merit. Nor is poverty a bar, but a man may benefit his country despite his lack of authority'. It is important to be clear what this famous sentence is saying. Two types of men are here referred to: first, exceptional men, promoted as such (see below for how Th. implies this is done); second, ordinary, including poor, men, who can nevertheless contribute, for instance by holding routine office in rotation.

As Andrewes (above) says about Th.'s remarks on the first type, this 'defends the system against a standard charge, that under such a regime men of talent do not get enough weight and opportunity'. For this point see also J. W. Roberts, *City of Sokrates* (London, 1984), 73, 'what Perikles has to say about the radical democracy is defensive: able men *do* have scope (2. 37. 1) . . .'. Roberts plausibly assumes that Th. is thinking primarily of the generalship, which was elective; see for this view L. Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), 51. For the 'elitist' implications of the present passage cp. vi. 39. 1 (Athenagoras) with n. there, also A. W. Lintott, 'Democracy in the Middle Republic', *ZSS* 104 (1987), 37, and the Aristotelian passages there discussed. See also J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People* (Princeton, 1988), 194.

Now for the second type. For ἀπὸ μέρους ('in rotation') see Collard's n. on Eur. *Suppl.* 406–7, *διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει ἐνιαυσίαισι*. (It is true that the more normal Greek for 'in rotation' is ἐν μέρει, the phrase which Euripides uses; and this has led some commentators to prefer, for the present passage of Th., the tr. 'on the basis of party', 'sectionally'; so most recently M. Pope, 'Thucydides and Democracy', *Historia*, 37 (1988), 276 ff., at 292, a passage of polemic against Gomme. But I agree with Gomme, Rhodes, and Rusten that the reference is to rotation. The unusual expression is perhaps due to a desire to balance ἀπ' ἀρετῆς a little later.) Theseus goes on to say at line 408 that the poor man has equality, *χὼ πένης ἔχων ἴσον*, because of this rotation of office.

Accepting Roberts's view (above) about the first, exceptional, type, we may take Th. to be saying now that the man without natural excellence or authority (*ἀξίωσις*, see below) can nevertheless make a satisfying contribution—by holding one of the rotating annual offices, which Th. has just implied would not satisfy the exceptional man.

Macleod (150), however, offers a slightly different view. He notes that the principle 'no man is prevented by lack of authority', *ἀφανεία ἀξιώματος*, was precisely 'the basis on which corrupt leaders can work', and compares the criticisms made by Euripides' herald in *Suppl.* 412 ff. If so, the ulterior implication of Th.'s phrase 'lack of authority' is definitely sinister (because it implies that vulgar adventurers can get real power). This is a valuable suggestion, but in the present passage Th.'s immediate point is surely that the poor man can nevertheless do his city good, *ἀγαθόν*, by holding one of the routine rotating offices. Men with authority, *ἀξίωμα*—and as Macleod (150) says, Pericles himself had such *ἀξίωμα*: see 65. 8—can expect to get power in other ways. (Or rather in other ways *as well*; even a Pericles or a Kleon might not despise office held *ἐν μέρει*, such as service on the Council of 500).

The word *ἀξίωμα* is in fact hard to translate. It renders Augustus' *auctoritas* in the *Res Gestae*; but 'authority' is not quite right at v. 43. 2 (used about Alcibiades' ancestors) or at vi. 15. 3 (Alcibiades himself). There is an element of 'honour', *τιμή*, in it. See vi. 16. 2. 'Excellence' or 'distinction' are close.

2. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν: 'Our public life is conducted in a free way'. Here 'free' still does not quite refer to the condition of citizens *vis-à-vis* the city ('free from state interference'); compare above, 36. 1 n. The idea is surely that the Athenians behave in an open and generous way characteristic of citizens of a state which is free in the 36. 1 sense. See also i. 84. 1 n.

ὑποψίαν: 'we are not suspicious'. I agree with Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 180 n. 58, that there is no need to emend *ἐς τὴν . . . ὑποψίαν* to *ἐς τὴν . . . οὐχ ὑποψίαν*. The Greek means 'in respect of suspiciousness . . .'

Of this passage Cawkwell remarks 'here, I take it, [Th.] is obliquely referring to what Athens has rid herself of by the reforms of Ephialtes': *JHS* 108 (1988), 11.

Note that there was plenty of suspicion of Alcibiades' habits, vi. 15.

3. διὰ δέος μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νόμων: 'we are prevented from doing wrong by fear of the authorities and of the laws'. See above, 1 n., for the laws, and for the possibility that this whole phrase is an echo of the oath sworn by ephebes (recruits), Tod 204 = Fornara 57, see Siewert (below,

39, introductory n.), 105. The startling word δέος, 'fear', should be given its full weight and not watered down into 'respect' or 'reverence'; see M. I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), 134 and n. 34. See also M. H. Hansen, 'Was Athens a Democracy? Popular Rule, Liberty and Equality in Ancient and Modern Political Thought', *Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters*, hist.-fil. Meddelelser, 59 (1989), 1 ff., at 10 and n. 51, objecting, with citation of the present passage, to Isaiah Berlin's claim that Athenians did not need to be coerced to obey the laws; see also on the present passage P. A. Brunt, 'Libertas in the Republic', *Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford, 1988), 318f.

καὶ ὄσοι ἄγραφοι ὄντες: 'as well as for those unwritten laws'. The phrase 'unwritten laws' occurs also in Sophocles, *Antigone*, 454, ἀγραπτα . . . νόμιμα (cf. *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 865 ff.), and the relation between Th.'s phrase and Sophocles' has been much discussed: on the *Antigone* passage see A. Brown's commentary (Warminster, 1987), and on unwritten laws generally J. de Romilly, *La Loi dans la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1971), 25 ff., Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, iii (Cambridge, 1969), 117 ff., and especially M. Ostwald, 'Was There a Concept ἀγραφος νόμος in Classical Greece?', in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. M. Rorty (eds.), *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy presented to G. Vlastos* (= *Phronesis Suppl.* i), 1973, 70 ff., who concludes (101) by answering his own question with a 'modified negative'. Brown says that each time the idea occurs (and he cites other texts) 'there is an explicit or implicit contrast with human laws, which in classical times had to be written down if they were to be valid'. But despite Brown's cautious formulation ('or implicit') it is not clear to me that a contrast with human law is in the front of Th.'s mind. For a sceptical view see B. Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley, 1964), 96 ff.: 'like the Eleusinian mysteries, which have remained a mystery, the unwritten laws of Pericles' speech defy all efforts to read them.' (Knox sees no problem about Antigone's Unwritten Law, which concerns the duty to bury a dead relative.) This is perhaps too gloomy: we may agree that the Sophoclean parallels have seduced commentators into thinking that the Th. passage is more portentous than it is, but if we want to give specific content to ἀγραφοι νόμοι we can look to Xenophon's *Memorabilia* (iv. 4. 19 ff.) where exactly those words are used about family obligations like honouring your parents and avoiding incest. (Antigone's duty to her dead brother would come under this general heading.) Characteristically Xenophon, unlike Th., *does* stress the divine aspect to such 'unwritten laws'.

It happens that we are told by another source that the historical Pericles actually did speak of the ἀγραφοι νόμοι: Ps.-Lys. vi. 10, talking

about the laws concerning impiety which the Eumolpidai expound. On 'unwritten laws' in this sort of context see F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), 19. I do not think that anything follows from this interesting text about what Th. meant, but it is tempting to suppose that the speaker or writer—who is probably not Lysias: see Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiicum* (Berkeley, 1967), 82—had the present passage of Th. at the back of his mind and adapted it for his own purpose.

I add a final point. The scholiast on ὡστ' ἄγραπτα at *Ant.* 454 says 'some people read τὰ γραπτὰ ['like written ones'] because the laws of the gods are not ἄγραφοι'. I have not seen this noticed, let alone taken seriously, by any modern scholar, but it is true that ἄγραπτος in the sense of 'unwritten' is not found elsewhere in Greek. The whole phrase γραπτὰ κάσφαλῆ would then mean 'the ordained and safe laws of the gods'. Or γραπτὰ could even be taken quite literally: funerary and other sacred laws were of course written down in the sense of inscribed (see 34. 3 n.). [I withdraw this para. in light of E. Craik, *LCM* 18 (1993), 123–5.]

38. 1. ἀγῶσι μὲν καὶ θυσίαις διετησίους: 'regular games and sacrifices throughout the year'. As Roberts (above, 37. 1 n.), 74, notes, this is Pericles' only reference to religion in the speech (we saw in the preceding n. that any religious tinge to 'unwritten laws' is not brought out at all strongly).

For the frequency of Athenian festivals see also *Old Oligarch*, iii. 2 and 8, and for the detailed evidence J. Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year* (Princeton, 1975).

For (comic) festivals as a 'ritual relief from the burdens and uncertainties of life' see J. Henderson (ed.), *Ar. Lysistrata* (Oxford, 1987), p. xxxi and n. 6, citing the present passage and *Frogs*, 408–9.

2. ἐπεσέρχεται δὲ διὰ μέγεθος τῆς πόλεως ἐκ πάσης γῆς τὰ πάντα: 'Because of the greatness of our city the produce of the whole earth flows into it'. See i. 81. 2 and n. (from Archidamos' speech, which—see introductory n. above—in many ways forms a pair with this one).

39. *Military arrangements*

I find this chapter puzzling; its message is that Athenian military arrangements are easy-going and unprofessional by comparison with Sparta's—not a very encouraging thing to be told, one would have thought. (The comparison with Sparta is not explicit but it is unmistakable.) Surely neither Th. nor Pericles, who is made to say at i. 142 that naval warfare was a matter of long training, can have thought anything so silly as that effortless superiority could be achieved in land fighting. See Vidal-Naquet (above, i. 22. 4 n. on καὶ τῶν μελλόντων), 89f., who

correctly remarks of Athens, with reference to the present chapter, 'nowhere else is the ideology of non-professionalism pushed so far', and speaks of the 'supreme insolence' of Pericles' remarks. It is not, however, certain that there was as little military training as Th. makes Pericles imply. See Vidal-Naquet, 97f., and P. Siewert, 'The Ephebic Oath in Fifth-Century Athens', *JHS* 97 (1977), 102 ff., for the probability that the *ephebeia* or cadet-training system, well attested for the fourth century, was as old as or older than the fifth. (See above, i. 144. 4 and ii. 37. 3 nn.) There is also a good discussion by G. L. Cawkwell, 'Epaminondas and Thebes', *CQ* 22 (1972), 254 ff., at 262 n. 4, giving reasons for thinking that 'Pericles' words [in the present passage] do not exclude some sort of drill at Athens'. See also his 'Orthodoxy and Hoplites', *CQ* 39 (1989), 375 ff., at 380.

Perhaps Th. has been unconsciously influenced by the insouciant, oligarchic attitudes of the cavalry class.

1. ξενηλασίαις: '... expel a foreigner' [lit. 'expulsions of foreigners']. Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 104, notes that this word is omitted in a quotation of this passage of Th. by the scholiast to Aelius Aristides, and suggests that it should perhaps be deleted on this occasion. (The word is found elsewhere in Th.: see i. 144. 2.)

ἀπάταις: 'trickery'. P. T. Stevens, Euripides, *Andromache* (Oxford, 1971), 148, compares the famous lines 445 ff. of that play; see further iv. 23. 1 nn. We may also note Th. iv. 80, the trick played on the helots, with Rawson, *Spartan Tradition in European Thought* (Oxford, 1969), 24.

εὐθύς νέοι ὄντες: 'from early youth ...'. See Collard, comm. on Eur. *Supplikes*, 882-3, citing the present passage among others.

οὐδὲν ἥσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν: 'we ... are ... equally ready to face the perils which they face'. The Spartans, that is. So Rusten (*Th. ii Comm.*). Rhodes prefers one of the alternatives given (in effect) by Jowett in a footnote, 'the dangers to which we are equal'. See also Loraux, *Invention of Athens* (i. 63. 3 n.), 400 n. 86.

2. τεκμήριον δέ: 'And here is the proof'. See i. 6. 2 n.

40. 1-2. φιλοκαλούμεν τε γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφούμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας ... καὶ ἑτέροις πρὸς ἔργα τετραμμένοις τὰ πολιτικὰ μὴ ἐνδεῶς γνῶναι: 'we are lovers of what is noble with moderation in expense, and lovers of wisdom without becoming soft ... and even those of us who are engaged in business of our own have a good idea of politics'. For the elucidation of this famous but difficult set of thoughts see now J. S. Rusten, 'Two Lives or Three? Pericles on the Athenian Character (Thucydides 2. 40. 1-2)', *CQ* 35 (1985), 14 ff. Against Kakridis's idea (introductory n. to 35-46) that in these lines there

is a straightforward contrast between the active and the contemplative lives, Rusten shows that *three* kinds of life are here enumerated, those of philosophy, of the pursuit of wealth (πλοῦτω . . .), and of politics; and that this threefold division is also present in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. (But I do not see why Rusten, 17, sees as this a 'decisive confirmation that the classification they [Plato and Aristotle] used was independent of the Academy': see *Thucydides*, 120 ff., for the possibility of direct links between Th. and Socrates, to whom the philosophy of the Academy traced its origins.) Rusten is surely right that ch. 40 deals with *individuals* or rather with sets of individuals, just as in 37. 1 above (see n. there) we saw that Th. makes Pericles argue that Athens caters for politically involved individuals whose aptitudes are nevertheless different. Some are exceptional some not.

If this is right (that is, if there are three separate groups here referred to), there is no need to emend *ἑτέροις* to *ἕτερα*: so, rightly, Rusten, 18, following L. Edmunds, *CR* 22 (1972), 171 f.

2. μόνοι γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπράγμονα, ἀλλ' ἀχρεῖον νομίζομεν: 'We alone regard a man who takes no interest in public affairs, not as a harmless [lit., 'inactive'], but as a useless character'. See i. 32. 5 n. on *ἀπραγμοσύνη*, with modern references; and 70. 8 (and n.)—from the exasperated but admiring Corinthian sketch of Athenian character, all of which is very relevant to what Pericles says in the present passage. For the reasons why mere 'inactivity' could be regarded in a positively unfavourable light at Athens see 63. 3 nn.

καὶ αὐτοὶ ἤτοι κρίνομεν γε ἢ ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς τὰ πράγματα [reading *αὐτοί*, 'we ourselves', emphatic, rather than *οἱ αὐτοί*, 'the same people']: 'and if few of us are originators, we are all sound judges of a policy'. This is Jowett's tr.; cp. Rusten in his comm.: 'we at least judge policy correctly even if we do not formulate it' (so too Edmunds, 1 n. above). The version of Classen/Steup, and of Warner in the Penguin ('we Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper discussion') is rather different in its implications; cp. also Rhodes ('judge or plan rightly in our affairs'). The point is important: is Thucydides making Pericles claim that the democracy is actually not fully participatory at all, but run by an élite (Jowett; Rusten)? Or merely that 'we Athenians are all of us, by contrast with the sheep-like Spartans, intelligently involved in policy-making—even when our deliberations result in something less than a definite decision'? Edmunds and Rusten insist that the word *γε* 'stresses the likelier member of the comparison', and this means that the Jowett tr. is preferable. Nevertheless it is important to notice that the opposition between the two groups is much less sharp in the Greek than my choice of tr. suggests: Th.

smoothly runs from one first person plural to another, and the 'elitist' impact of the sentence is thereby much reduced. (It is true that Th. has in para. 1 (see n. there) already implied that some Athenians are more politically active than others who have 'business of their own' to attend to; but that is a less startling concession than saying, in effect, 'though few initiate a policy, many judge it', i.e. some of us are active, some mere bystanders.)

Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, ii (Halle, 1899), 387–8 n. 2, saw in this a Platonic contrasting of knowledge (*κρίνομεν*, 'deciding') and mere 'true opinion' (*ἐνθυμούμεθα ὀρθῶς*). That interpretation, if right, would mean that *ἐνθυμούμεθα*, instead of referring (as on the Crawley–Jowett–Gomme view) to statesmanlike initiation of policies, is actually being opposed as an inferior process to the possession of knowledge in the full sense (*κρίνομεν*), which for Crawley–Jowett–Gomme is a merely passive choice. That is perhaps a little forced, but I think Meyer is right to think that two intellectual processes, rather than two kinds of politician (active and supine) are here being contrasted. (LSJ⁹ translates *ἐνθυμούμεθα* in the present passage as 'lay to heart, ponder'; compare 43. 1 below). It is in Meyer's favour that ἦτοι ought to introduce the more important element in a pair (Classen/Steup).

οὐ τοὺς λόγους τοῖς ἔργοις βλάβην ἡγούμενοι: 'The great obstacle to action is, in our opinion, not discussion . . .'. See Parry (above, 35. 1 n.), 165 ff.

3. περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι: 'to think before we act'. The 'soldier's art', as it has been called. The language (*ἐκλογίζεσθαι*, 'to think', also *λογισμός*, 'reflection', see below) is echoed, but the thought is inverted, by Demosthenes in the very different circumstances of iv. 10. 1, a speech delivered not in a tranquil Athenian suburb but to actual soldiers faced with a sea-borne assault by, among others, Brasidas. Then the thought will be, 'fight first, think afterwards (or not at all)'.
ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει:

'whereas other men are courageous from ignorance but hesitate upon reflection'. On the Platonic character of this see Meyer (above) and now R. Sharples, 'Knowledge and Courage in Thucydides and Plato', *LCM* 7 (1983), 139 ff., citing Plato, *Laches*, 194 E. On this whole section, with its insistence on the connection between practical wisdom and courage, see also Macleod, 127 f.

4. καὶ τὰ ἐς ἀρετήν: 'In doing good'. For this sense of *arete* see iii. 58. 1 n.

οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εὖ, ἀλλὰ δρῶντες κτώμεθα τοὺς φίλους: 'we make our friends by giving favours, not by receiving them'. This is the positive side of Athenian *πολυπραγμοσύνη* or meddlesomeness (for

which see i. 32. 5 n.): see Macleod, 150, comparing Theseus in Euripides' *Supplikes*. See also Mary Whitlock Blundell, *Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: A Study in Sophocles and Greek Ethics* (Cambridge, 1989), 35, citing DK 68 Demokritos B 96; Dem. xviii. 296 and other passages; K. J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford, 1974), 277f. Connor, *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 184 and n. 65, contrasts the present passage with what Th. makes Euphemos say at Camarina in 'exaltation of the profitable', vi. 82 ff. (see further below, 5 n.).

ὁ δὲ ἀντοφείλων ἀμβλύτερος: 'The feelings of the recipient are colder'. The Spartans at iv. 19. 3 take a less subtle view of the psychology of ethical obligation: see n. there.

5. καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μάλλον λογισμῶ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πίστῶ ἀδεῶς τινὰ ὠφελούμεν: 'we alone do good to our neighbours not after a calculation of our own interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit'. We seem to have here a repetition, on a more general plane, of the opposition noticed in this chapter by Meyer (above, 2 and 3 nn.), between guesswork (here 'calculation' of one's own interest, a calculation which would actually prove faulty if relied on) and the confidence of knowledge (the word ἀδεῶς, 'fearlessly', recalls the 'Platonic' definition of courage in terms of knowledge, which Th. has given above in para. 3).

This is a similarity of *thought* with Plato. Note, however, that Th.'s *vocabulary* for this point is the inverse of what Plato will use; for Plato belief is *πίστις*, whereas *λογισμός* tends to suggest arithmetical certainty. Th. is as always loose or even capricious in his use of what may already have been semi-technical language.

Connor, 184 n. 65, contrasts the very different way in which Euphemos uses *πιστόν* at vi. 85. 1: see n. there.

41. 1. ξυνελών τε λέγω: 'to sum up'. On the usual translation of the next section, this is an odd formula because Pericles is not in fact summing up, but introducing a new idea: Athens as an education to Greece. However, the preceding paragraphs are actually very short on cultural content, 38. 1 on festivals (see n. there) coming closest; and the section which follows is positively disparaging about Homer and other poets. But this is to read more into the present sentence than it contains: see on *παιδευσις* below, where we shall see that Pericles is in a way summing up, but only on a narrower front than culture generally.

τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν . . . καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον: 'Athens as a whole . . . the individual Athenian'. Rusten (above, 40. 1 n.), 17, rightly insists that Th. is here treating Athens as a whole on the one hand, and individual

Athenians on the other. See also 36. 4n. I have altered Jowett's tr. so as to bring this out. Here too (see i. 144. 3n.) we have evidence that Th. was happy to generalize about states in the same way as about individuals.

τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδείουσι: 'an example to Greece'. Jowett has 'the school of Hellas', Hobbes 'a school of the Grecians', Warner 'an education to Greece' (the Budé's 'une vivante leçon' [de Romilly] is the least tendentious tr. I have found). Gomme, and Loraux (177 n. 16) compare Plato, *Protag.* 337D, Athens the 'prytaneion of wisdom'. As we have seen, however, this aspect of Athens is not in fact very prominent in the funeral speech as a whole; the present sentence of Th. derives its fame largely from the way in which classical Athens was viewed in subsequent centuries. The cultural image of Athens was already well established by the time of Isokrates, iv. 50, cp. *Syll.*³ 704E; and in the second century AD it was to be the dominant theme of Aelius Aristides' *Panathenaic Oration*: see J. H. Oliver, *The Civilising Power* (1968), a study of that speech in its historical and cultural context. I suggest that Th. means Pericles to say no more than that the rest of Greece would do well to learn from Athens' (political) example, an idea which has already been touched on in a quite specific and prosaic way at 37. 1, where Athens' laws are said to be a *παράδειγμα*. We should not, in fact, be deluded by the later 'invented tradition' about Athens' role in the world. See now, for a view very like that argued for here, C. Habicht, *Athen in hellenistischer Zeit* (Munich, 1994), 230, who insists that 'no notion of cultural values is involved; the context is strictly political'.

What the historical Pericles himself thought is another matter; he may indeed have thought and expressed himself in a more elevated and cultural way.

ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδη καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστα ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκες παρέχεσθαι: 'in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace'. For this sentence, which is closely echoed by one in Plato's *Republic* (563) and itself perhaps echoes Hdt. i. 32, see Macleod, 151. Macleod notes that the phrase *σῶμα αὐταρκες* will be bitterly echoed in the description of the plague: see 51. 3 and n. For *εἶδη* see i. 109. 1n. on the related word *ιδέαι*.

2. καὶ ὡς οὐ λόγων ἐν τῷ παρόντι κόμπος: 'This is no ephemeral boast . . .'. for the word/deed antithesis here see Parry (35. 1n. on *έμοί* etc.), 60.

3. οὔτε τῷ πολεμίῳ ἐπελθόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ' οἶων κακοπαθεῖ, οὔτε τῷ ὑπηκόῳ κατάμεμψιν ὡς οὐχ ὑπ' ἀξίων ἄρχεται: 'No enemy who comes against her is indignant at the defeats which he suffers at the hands of such a city; no subject complains that his

masters are unworthy'. A very carefully arranged antithesis; Kakridis (introductory n. to 35–46), 64, detects here a change in style, to the language of a hymn of praise (he notes ὕμνησα at 42. 2, the word from which our 'hymn' derives). On the second part of the sentence Andrewes, *PCPhS* 186 (1960), 7 n. 1, remarks that it is the only direct reference to the problem of empire in the Funeral Speech, and that it might be more highly appreciated by the ruler than by the ruled.

4. μετὰ μεγάλων δὲ σημείων καὶ οὐ δὴ τοι ἀμάρτυρον: 'And we shall not be without witnesses; there are certainly mighty monuments . . .'. Note the casual juxtaposition of two words for 'proof', which are sometimes thought, wrongly, to be technically used by Th.

οὐδὲν προσδεόμενοι οὔτε Ὀμήρου ἐπαιέτου οὔτε ὅστις ἔπεισι μὲν τὸ αὐτίκα τέρψει: 'we shall not need the praises of Homer or of any other panegyrist whose poetry may please for the moment'. As Jowett's footnote implies, we are irresistibly reminded of i. 21. 1 (see n. there) with its dismissal of what the poets have sung about; also surely of i. 22. 4 with its contrast between Th.'s own permanent but superficially unpleasing work (ἀτερπέστερον; compare τέρψει here) and prize competitions designed for the immediate moment. See also above, 1 n. on ξυνελών etc.

πάσαν μὲν θάλασσαν καὶ γῆν ἐσβατόν: 'we have forced every land and every sea to open a path for our daring'. The language is striking and some oddness should be retained in translation. The important idea of *terra marique*, to which we were introduced early on in the whole work (see i. 2. 2 n. on οὔτε κατὰ γῆν), makes its entry at this solemn moment, though the reference is brief and is not developed (the idea was present, though in a different context, at 39. 2). See also above 36. 1 n. on τὴν γὰρ χώραν. At 62. 1–2 Pericles is made to introduce the idea of Athenian sea-power as a new and reassuring thought ('even I have not mentioned it before'), in apparent forgetfulness of the present passage. For an attempt at an explanation see n. there.

42. 1. δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐμήκυνα τὰ περὶ τῆς πόλεως: 'I have dwelt upon the greatness of Athens'. See for this, especially the verb ἐμήκυνα, *Thucydides*, 32, comparing Hdt. iii. 60, where the same verb is used to excuse a long digression about Samos. But there the great ἔργα which justify the lengthy treatment were concrete buildings, not human actions. See also 43. 1 below, n. on πρὸς οὐδὲν χεῖρον etc.

ἐφ' οἷς νῦν λέγω: 'these men whom I am now commemorating'. This is the point of transition back to the dead: see above, 36. 4 n. The sequence of thought is made clear in what follows: see next n.

2. αὐτῆς τὰ μέγιστα: 'their loftiest praise'. αὐτῆς refers to εὐλογία above.

ἃ γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὕμνησα, αἱ τῶνδε καὶ τῶν τοιῶνδε ἀρεταὶ ἐκόσμησαν . . .: 'I have sung the city's praises in a mere speech, but what really honours her is the achievements of these men and others like them' [I have inserted 'in a mere speech' to bring out the meaning. The word I have translated 'achievements' is ἀρετή, really 'excellence']. An elegant return to the subject of the dead after the digression on the city and Athenian national character announced at 37. 2: 'everything I have *said* in praise of the city is eclipsed by what these people have actually *done*'. In fact, what we have here is, yet again, the λόγος/ἔργον or word/deed antithesis, made explicitly in the rest of the sentence.

For ὕμνησα, 'I have sung', see above, 41. 3 n.

καταστροφή: 'death'. Literally 'end', a rare and poetic word in this sense, found at Sophocles, *Oedipus Coloneus*, 103, though with the explanatory βίου, 'of life'.

3. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τᾶλλα χειρόσι: 'even those who fall short in other ways . . .'. A remarkable inclusion. See Macleod, 150ff., on this whole section: 'there is no praise or blame of individuals. [By this, Macleod clearly means that nobody is singled out.] If any were "worse" (2. 42. 3), it is wiped out by their bravery; if any were more "fortunate", they have crowned their lives with the best possible death (2. 43. 5-6, 44. 1) . . . the sufferings and errors in Thucydides are above all those of the whole state—the state which in war belies its ideals or dismantles its virtues . . .' For the anonymity of the Funeral Speech see also S. Goldhill, 'The Great Dionysia and Civic Ideology', *JHS* 107 (1987), 58ff., at 66 = *Nothing To Do With Dionysos: Athenian Drama in its Social Context*, ed. J. Winkler and F. Zeitlin (Princeton, 1990), 110.

4. καὶ δι' ἐλαχίστου καιροῦ τύχης ἅμα ἀκμῇ τῆς δόξης μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ δέους ἀπηλλάγησαν: 'in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory'. Jowett in a footnote offers as what seems a less good alternative 'or, taking τύχης with καιροῦ: "while for a moment they were in the hands of fortune, at the height, not of terror but of glory, they passed away"'. See Rusten's comm. on the whole difficult para.; also his 'Structure and Style in Interpreting Thucydides: The Soldier's Choice (Thuc. 2. 42. 4)', *HSCP* 90 (1986), 49ff.

It is striking that the Funeral Speech at no point mentions the possibility of an after-life: see A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (Oxford, 1933), 28, and Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (Oxford, 1974), 266. See also 53. 4 n.

43. 1. **προσηκόντως τῇ πόλει:** 'they were worthy of Athens'. As frequently in the speech (see 41. 1 and 42. 3 nn.), Th. balances city and individuals, while singling out nobody (see 42. 3 n.). Surely this constant interplay between the qualities of the state, and of individual members of it, suggests that Th. regarded the state as a suitable subject for moral judgements.

πρὸς οὐδὲν χεῖρον αὐτοὺς ὑμᾶς εἰδότας μηκύνει: 'anyone can lecture you . . . which you know already'. See 36. 4 n. on the similar expression *μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσειν*, and for the word *μηκύνει* 42. 1 n.

τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργω θεωμένους καὶ ἔραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς: 'you should gaze, day after day, upon the greatness of Athens and become her lovers'. A strong metaphor which should not be diluted in translation, as it is by versions such as 'fall in love with her' (Warner), 'filled with the love of her' (Jowett, similarly Crawley). Compare Paphlagon in the *Knights* of Aristophanes, 732, who says 'I love you, Demos [the personification of the Athenian People], and I'm your *erastes*'. See on this, discussing the present passage of Th., W. R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, 1971), 97 and n. 14, suggesting that Pericles' imitator Kleon may in real life have said something like what Paphlagon is made to say. But on the disgraceful implications for Demos—passive and mercenary homosexuality—of the Aristophanes passage see Dover (above, i. 100. 1 n.), 146. It may well be that Aristophanes and Th. have picked up a phrase in contemporary political currency, although as early as 458 BC Aeschylus had used a similar phrase: *Eumenides*, 852, with Sommerstein's n. in his edn. (Cambridge, 1989). It does seem reasonable to suppose that if the pledge at i. 22 about speeches means anything, Th. could have incorporated a few memorable thoughts and phrases such as this one, or that about *ἔρανος* below. See also 60. 5 n. on *φιλόπολις*. . . . On *ἔραστῆς* in Th. see vi. 54. 2 n.

What does *αὐτῆς* in Th. refer to? There are two feminine genitive nouns here, *δύναμις* and *πόλις*. If the Athenians were being urged to become lovers of the *power* of Athens that would be an even more striking and aggressive idea. But Professor Dover kindly tells me that he thinks that in its context, after a series of statements about the city, the word *αὐτῆς* would naturally have been taken with Athens.

κάλλιστον δὲ ἔρανον: 'as the most splendidly generous loan they could make'. On the senses of *ἔρανος*, which originally meant a common dinner or picnic and eventually came to refer to a kind of club, but much more often means a friendly group loan at no interest, see M. I. Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit in Ancient Athens 500–200 B.C.* (Rutgers, 1952), 100ff., and Polybius, xxxviii. 11. 10, a much discussed passage; see Walbank's n., and the Asheri and Fuks refs. there given, to which add

D. MacDowell, *Demosthenes Against Meidias* (Oxford, 1990), 322 ff., n. on Dem. xxi. 101. Jowett's 'offering . . . at her feast' wrongly suggests the first of the word's meanings. Note that as Finley says *eranos*-loans were often made in emergencies; this suits the present passage very well. The word is certainly unusual: see preceding n. For a strikingly similar metaphorical use of the word see Ar. *Lys.* 651 with J. Henderson's n. (1987); see also Sommerstein on *Ach.* 615. It is possible that the use by Th. and Aristophanes of this metaphor, as of the *ἐραστής* metaphor (above), had a common origin in the oratory of the historical Pericles.

3. καὶ οὐ στηλῶν μόνον . . . ἐπιγραφῆ . . . ἄγραφος μνήμη: 'not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions . . . an unwritten memorial . . .'. For the Athenian casualty lists see D. Bradeen, *The Athenian Agora*, vol. xvii (1974), *Inscriptions: The Funerary Monuments*. For the contrast written/unwritten compare 37. 3, and see on the present passage Harris, *Ancient Literacy* (i. 128. 6 n.), 90 and n. 121; for the theme of immortality through widely-diffused reputation see R. Lattimore, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs* (Urbana, 1962), 241 f., and now Rusten's comm.

6. μετὰ ῥώμης . . . ἀναίσθητος θάνατος: 'death striking him down unnoticed when he is at the height of his powers'. Of this sentence Hussey (introductory n. to i. 80–85), 125, writes 'something is rotten in the thought here', because 'from Pericles' original point of view (the moral primacy of private enjoyment of life) the death of a young man in battle is a tragedy for which there can be no justification, except perhaps if he has helped to make it possible for others to live peaceably. For the sake of the continuance, or expansion, of an empire, such a death is inexcusable.' He calls this sentence a 'welter of florid rhetoric', and speaks of Pericles' 'evasive words and distracting sound effects'. That is indignantly put, but if it is right it would say something about Th.'s opinion of Pericles that he could put such unsatisfactory sentiments into his mouth. This is perhaps indirect criticism by Th. We shall have to bear this in mind when considering vi. 16–18 where Macleod has convincingly argued (see nn. there) that we are meant to compare Alcibiades there with Pericles to the latter's advantage.

On the other hand one could argue that if he were indeed treating the dead as young men (but see below) Th.'s Pericles would be following the requirements of the genre of the Funeral Oration; so R. Osborne (above, introductory n. to 35–46), citing Loraux and others for a comparison between the ideology of the Oration and of the Parthenon Frieze. Incidentally Gomme, 126, had already cited Beazley for this comparison; Osborne's own contribution is a stress on the youthfulness of the dead in the Funeral Speech and of the warriors on the frieze. If this is right, Th.'s Pericles would merely be conforming to a literary convention.

But in fact the youth of the dead men is *not* much stressed in the Thucydidean Funeral Oration, though it is true that in *another* oration, that on the dead at Samos a decade earlier, Pericles as reported by Aristotle said of the dead youth of Athens that the spring had gone out of the year. (Arist. *Rhet.* 1365^a, etc. The footnote refs in Osborne, nn. 27 and 28, are muddled at this point; a ref. to Th. has dropped out, and the Aristotle references should refer to n. 28 of his text.) The opposite is clearly implied by the reference at 45. 1 below to the *children* of the dead men: see n. there. To return to Th., the words I have translated 'at the height of their powers', *μετὰ ῥώμης*, literally mean no more than 'with their strength'; Jowett translated 'full of courage', which is *too* vague.

44. 2. καὶ λύπη . . .: 'and sorrow is felt . . .'. For the thought in this sentence compare the famous lines of Dante's *Inferno*, said by Francesca da Rimini:

Nessun maggior dolore
 Che ricordarsi del tempo felice
 Nella miseria
 (*Inferno*, Canto v, lines
 121 ff.)

(The Dante commentators, however, refer not to Th. but to Boethius, *Cons. Phil.* ii. 4. 2.)

3. καὶ ἄλλων παιδῶν ἐλπίδι: 'may hope to have other children'. On the thought here see T. Eide, 'Thucydides' ΛΟΓΟΣ ΠΑΡΑΜΥΘΗΤΙΚΟΣ (Thuc. 2, 44-45)', *Symbolae Osloenses*, 56 (1981), 33 ff., at 43 f., comparing Soph. *Antigone*, 909 ff., Hdt. iii. 119, and Dinarchos, *In Demosthenem*, 71.

οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε . . . βουλευέσθαι: 'For a man's advice . . .'. For the thought see i. 91. 7.

4. τὸ γὰρ φιλότιμον: 'the love of honour'. See 65. 7 n. on the related abstract noun for 'love of honour', namely *φιλοτιμία*. The present passage is relevant to the question of the ambiguity of the abstract noun: here the adjectival noun is used absolutely, and the sense is unequivocally favourable. This surely tells against attempts (see 65. 7 n.) to argue that the abstract noun *on its own* had a bad sense in the fifth century, only acquiring its better meaning in the fourth. It would be better to say that, as far as Th. goes, it has a good or bad sense according to context: cp. Shakespeare's 'if it be a sin to covet honour / I am the most offending soul alive' (*Henry V*, iv. iii. 28-9).

καὶ οὐκ . . . τὸ κερδαίνειν, ὥσπερ τινὲς φασι: 'and not riches, as some say'. See Eide (3, above): this is not a reference to the avarice of old

men, as the scholiast says (for this commonplace see A. S. Owen (ed.), Euripides' *Ion* (Oxford, 1939), pp. xii–xiii), but to the loss of the means of subsistence which might follow from loss of sons.

45. 1. παῖσίν: 'the sons'. See above, 43. 6 n.: R. Osborne (who draws on N. Loraux, 'HBH et ANΔPEIA: Deux versions de la mort du combattant athénien', *Ancient Society*, 6 (1975), 1 ff.) says that the conventions of the funeral oration required that the dead warriors be treated as *young* men, but if so (and I am not convinced), Th. here departs from the convention. The 'sons' are presumably here imagined as being of an age to profit from the advice to imitate their dead fathers. In fact, as Loraux (17) admits, maturity rather than youth is stressed in the Thucydidean Funeral Oration, whatever may have been true of others (Tyrtaios 10 West implies that it is better for young men than for old men to be killed).

2. εἰ δέ με δεῖ: 'if I may speak'. I have changed Jowett's 'if I am to speak' though this is literally correct; as Dover says, *CR* 12 (1962), 103, reviewing Kakridis, the expression is 'not as grudging as it can be made to sound in English [cp. Pl. *Symp.* 173 c 1, *Isoc.* vi. 42]'.
καὶ ἧς ἂν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον ἀρετῆς περὶ ἧ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεσι κλέος ἦ: 'not to be talked about for good or evil among men'. For this sentence, and the whole passage, see W. K. Lacey, 'Thucydides II, 45, 2', *PCPhS* 190, NS 10 (1964), 47 ff., arguing that it is more restricted in scope than is sometimes assumed. Pericles, he suggests, is not being made to say that women should be generally neither seen nor heard, but that they should not parade their grief excessively; see above, 34. 4 n., for the woman's role in mourning. Note, however, that Plutarch took the injunction in a more general sense (woman's place is in the home): see *Mor.* 242E, from the *Virtues of Women*, with P. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* (Harvard, 1965), 3 and 9, and see N. Loraux, *Pallas* 1985 (4. 2 n.), at 21, for another general interpretation: the role marked out for the women by Th.'s Pericles corresponds to their general treatment in Th., which is to present women against a background of turmoil, *θόρυβος*. (That is, their 'virtue' is here being defined against an opposite expectation that they will be noisy and disruptive.) But Lacey is right that the funerary context should not be neglected. See also I. Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society: The Rise of the Greek City-State* (Cambridge, 1987), 32, for the advice here given to women as an example of the way in which funerals are used to play out 'the ideal norms of the social roles of the survivors and the dead'. Cp. also D. Schaps, 'The Woman Least Mentioned', *CQ* 27 (1977), 323 ff. [See now P. Cartledge and L. Kallet-Marx, *Nomodeiktes*, 125–32, 133–43.]

46. 1. τὰ δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς παῖδας τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦδε δημοσία ἢ πόλις μέχρι ἡβῆς θρέψει: 'it remains only that their children should be maintained at the public expense until they grow up'. There is a useful summary of what is known about Athenian public support of war orphans by R. Stroud, 'Theozotides and the Athenian Orphans', *Hesperia*, 40 (1971), 280ff., at 288ff., who publishes a new inscription bearing on the topic. The institution is attributed to Solon, but in fact it may be no earlier than the period 478-462: Stroud (288) citing an inscription recording privileges for orphans (*IG* i³ 6, dating from before 460); but note that *Ath. Pol.* 24. 3, adduced by Stroud, is not good evidence for a pre-462 date: Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 309. See also an interesting inscription from Thasos of about 350 BC, recording privileges granted to the families of war dead: *Nouveau choix d'inscriptions grecques* (Paris, 1971), no. 19 = Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplément* (Paris, 1962), no. 64. [See now L. Kallet-Marx, *Nomodeiktēs*, 140.]

στέφανον . . . ἀγώνων . . . ἄθλα: 'garland . . . prize . . . rewards'. Th.'s use of these words raises the question of a very curious omission in the whole section: a very well-attested part of the public funeral was an *epitaphios agon* or contest, for which see Vanderpool, *Arch. Δελτ.* 24 A (1969), 1ff.; Clairmont, *Patrios Nomos*, ch. 3; Knigge, *Kerameikos von Athens*, 158. (It included a torch-race: *Ar. Frogs*, 129, and *Paus.* i. 30. 2.) Th.'s omission of the whole topic is deliberate and (in view of the choice of words in the present passage) defiant. He eliminates such flashy accretions to the ceremony as inconsistent with his lofty handling. For Th.'s sparing mentions of athletics see nn. on iii. 8; iv. 121. 1; v. 49-50; and on Th.'s silence on the *epitaphios agon* see Loraux, *Invention* (i. 63. 3 n.), 37-9 and my paper in *HSCP* 1992.

2. νῦν δὲ ἀπολοφυράμενοι ὃν προσήκει ἐκάστῳ ἄπιτε: 'when each of you has duly lamented his own dead, you may depart'. M. Guarducci, in G. M. A. Richter, *The Archaic Gravestones of Attica* (London, 1961), 155ff., Epigraphic Appendix, at 158, compares with the present passage the end of *IG* i³ 1194 bis, where the passer-by is told to mourn the dead man and then 'proceed to worthy tasks', *νεσθε ἐπὶ πράγμ' ἀγαθόν*.

On ἄπιτε (if that is the right reading, rather than ἀποχωρεῖτε) see W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, ii (Cambridge, 1948), 452, addendum to 295, with its surprising claim that 'No Greek ever said that'. Tarn meant, no Greek ever said anything as abrupt as ἄπιτε, which he translates in his text as 'Go!' and cites as an instance of Alexander calling a spade a spade (see *Arr. Anab.* vii. 10. 7). As Tarn eventually realized, it is a conventional *envoi* after a funeral speech; see also Brunt, *Loeb Arrian*, ii.

237 n. 8, and A. B. Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 103.

47. 1. τοιούσδε μὲν ὁ τάφος ἐγένετο . . . πρῶτον ἔτος τοῦ πολέμου τοῦδε ἐτελεύτα: 'such was the funeral . . . and so ended the first year of the war'. On this passage and its routine formula after the emotional heights of the preceding paragraphs see *Thucydides*, 116, comparing *Iliad*, xxiv. 1.

47. 3-54. THE GREAT PLAGUE

We have already been prepared at i. 23. 3 for the great plague; see also ii. 31. 2 n. But the scale and detail of the digression is wholly unexpected. The vividness of Th.'s description of the plague causes it to be included as entry no. 1 in John Carey's *Faber Book of Reportage* (London, 1987). Nick Fisher, 'Pericles and After', *Omnibus*, 15 (1988), 13, aptly compares the symbolic use of bubonic plague in Camus' *The Plague*, where it serves as a 'symbol of the German occupation of France in the Second World War, and indeed of the horrors of war in general'.

The identification of the disease in Th. is an insoluble problem: see A. J. Holladay and J. F. C. Poole, 'Thucydides and the Plague of Athens', *CQ* 29 (1979), 282 ff., with additional remarks in *CQ* 32 (1982), 235 ff., and 34 (1984), 483 ff. They point out the strong possibility that the disease described by Th. has either died out or (if it does still exist) has drastically changed its form. This ought to put paid to attempts to identify it with known present-day diseases, such as smallpox, measles, typhus, ergotism, and the others reviewed by Holladay and Poole. But attempts continue to be made; for a recent suggestion that the plague resembled the toxic shock syndrome, see *International Herald Tribune*, 18 October 1985, 1. And the 1984 piece by Holladay and Poole, cited above, was a reply to a suggestion by J. A. H. Wylie and H. W. Stubbs, *CQ* 33 (1983), 6 ff.: leptospirosis or tulaeremia. Finally, see Holladay, 'The Thucydides Syndrome: Another View', *New England Journal of Medicine*, 315 (1986), 1170 ff., against an attempt by A. D. Langmuir, T. D. Worthen, J. Solomon, and E. Petersen in the same journal, 313 (1985), 1027 ff., to identify the 'Thucydides Syndrome' as influenza plus staphylococcal infection. See now Sallares (i. 2. 5 n.) 244 ff.

A more profitable and interesting way forward is to ask how Th.'s language and approach in these chapters is related to that of contemporary medical writings. (A necessary preliminary task is to examine Hdt.'s relation to the medical writers; see D. Lateiner, 'The Empirical Element in the Methods of Early Greek Medical Writers and Herodotus:

A Shared Epistemological Response', *Antichthon*, 20 (1986), 1 ff.) On terminology see especially D. L. Page, 'Thucydides' Description of the Great Plague at Athens', *CQ* 3 (1953), 97 ff.; K. Weidauer, *Thukydides und die hippokratischen Schriften* (Heidelberg, 1954); A. Parry, 'The Language of Thucydides' Description of the Plague', *BICS* 16 (1969), 106 ff. = *The Language of Achilles* (i. 69, 4 n.), 156 ff. On Th.'s general approach, there has been a recent tendency, already noticeable in Parry (see 49, 2 below, n. on *καὶ φλόγῳσις*), to deny close similarity with or debt to the 'Hippocratic' writers, the corpus of medical writings dating in part from the fifth century. (See however Carratelli (i. 22, 4 n.) and the studies by Jouanna and Demont, cited by O. Wenskus at *Gnomon*, 1990, 577 n. 2). The second part of Holladay and Poole's 1979 study goes furthest in this direction, claiming that Th., who grasped the concepts of contagion and of acquired immunity, was in these respects ahead of the medical science of his time. On the question of contagion, they have been challenged by J. Solomon, 'Thucydides and the Recognition of Contagion', *Maia*, 37 (1985), 121 ff., with Holladay's reply, *Maia* 39 (1987), 95 f.; see below, 51, 5 and 6 nn.

However 'scientific' we judge Th. to have been in these chapters, we should remember that there was more than one Thucydides: the rhetorically-minded Th. of i. 23, 3 was prepared to range the Great Plague along with eclipses of the sun, earthquakes and so on, as portentous things which 'accompanied' the war. There is in the Book i passage, which (as we saw) promises a very different sort of narrative from what we actually get, more than a hint of a causal connection between the war and these portentous events, as in Shakespeare's 'In the most high and palmy state of Rome / A little ere the mightiest Julius fell / the graves stood tenantless and the sheeted dead / Did squeak and gibber in the Roman streets'. It could of course be said that the plague flowed from the war in a direct sense (because the crowding of the city and Piraeus was a consequence of the war), but that is not, I think, uppermost in Th.'s mind at the time. We might compare the difference between i. 23, 3 on eclipses of the sun and the sober and scientific ii. 28.

In support of his generally 'rhetorical' account of Th., Woodman (i. 23, 3 n.), 32 ff., stresses the vivid (38), exaggerated (39), and even derivative (39) character of Th.'s description. He singles out chs. 50–51, with their references to birds and dogs, and compares Homer, *Iliad*, i. 50 (mules and dogs). One can agree that these final chapters of the plague description, including those on moral degeneration (53–4) are in Th.'s richest and most generalizing manner, and look forward to the Corcyraean *stasis* description (see e.g. ii. 53, 3 n.). But the central ch. 49 is not in this

manner. We may call it half-technical or at worst pseudo-technical writing (see 49. 3 n.). Woodman's view (39) that Th. here simply raided the medical writers for his own rhetorical purposes will not quite do (for one thing, we need to accommodate the view of Holladay and Poole that Th.'s position was scientifically more sophisticated than those writers). Agreed, such precision has a rhetorical effect of its own—an effect, it should be noted, which is equally telling on the assumption that the medical factors reported are true and the result of genuine research, as on the assumption they are false or merely a string of medical terms copied from some handbook; but it is a *different* effect from that produced by the moral generalizations of ii. 53, or by i. 23. 3 with its reckless causal implications. I prefer to say that Th.'s approach to his subject-matter was complex and that he could think and therefore write about it in different ways in different moods.

A final point: Woodman (39), as part of his thesis, claims that the plague has left no trace at all on any independent piece of evidence or inscription. The suggestion here appears to be that Th. may have made the whole thing up. But we should not forget the purification of Delos conducted at iii. 104, a major episode, the evidence for which goes beyond Th., and one motive for which was surely the wish for purification after the pollution of the plague. See introductory n. there and below, ii. 47. 4 n. *ὁ μαντείοις*. . . .

47. 3. λεγόμενον μὲν καὶ πρότερον πολλαχόσε ἐγκατασκήψαι: 'is said to have previously attacked many places . . .'. Here and at 48. 1 below (*ὡς λέγεται*) Th. is merely reporting what was said at the time; these formulae do not imply use of written sources. See Westlake, *Mnemosyne*, 30 (1977), 350. For the poetic flavour of *ἐγκατασκήψαι* see Parry, 114, who claims that we have 'the suppressed image here of a thunderbolt', and compares Soph. *OT* 27–8—a work which may, as Parry notes, have been 'inspired by the same Plague'. As for the 'poetic' flavour of the word, it is true that it does not occur in the Hippocratic writers, but there are some later medical instances (Aetios, Pseudo-Galen, etc.) according to the IBYCUS programme, a computerized collection of Greek literary texts. These authors may, however, have had Th. in mind. **καὶ περὶ Λήμνον:** 'particularly Lemnos'. We should recall that Th. was specially familiar with the North Aegean.

4. ἀγνοία: 'in ignorance of the nature of the disease'. This is what is meant, although the Greek just means 'in ignorance'; see H. Erbse, 'Thukydides über die Ärzte Athens', *Rh. Mus.* 124 (1981), 28ff., against attempts (which are as old as the scholiast) to take *ἀγνοία* with *θεραπεύοντες*, which would mean that the doctors treated it *because of*

ignorance, i.e. because they did not yet know that treatment was hopeless.

μαντείοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις . . . πάντα ἀνωφελῆ ἦν: 'enquiries of oracles and the like . . . were utterly useless'. For the slightly dismissive phrase 'and the like' cp. vii. 50. 4 n. (on Nikias). J. Mikalson, 'Religion and the Plague', *Studies pres. Sterling Dow = Gk. Roman & Byzantine Monograph* 10 (1984), 217 ff., at 221, argues that this passage is evidence against Diodorus' statement (xii. 58) that Delos was purified after and because of the plague: for this statement see iii. 104, introductory n., A (ii). Mikalson argues that if the plague and the oracularly-sanctioned purification were connected in the popular mind, then the eventual end of the plague would have been credited to the oracle. But Th. shows that no such credit was given; therefore, no such connection was really made. Mikalson is right that the oracular sanction for the purification is not likely to have come from Apollo at Delphi (see iii. 104. 1 n.), but I doubt if the present passage will bear the weight Mikalson puts on it: Th. is merely saying in rhetorical language that piety and religion were quite useless.

48. 1. καὶ ἐς τὴν βασιλέως γῆν τὴν πολλήν: 'the greater part of the Persian empire'. A rare flash of awareness by Th. of the world beyond Greece. But the claim is huge and perhaps doubtful.

2. ἐς δὲ τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ἑξαπινάιως ἐνέπεσε: 'it suddenly fell on Athens'. For such medical use of words in *πιπτ-*, root meaning 'fall', see iii. 82. 2 n. on *ἐπέπεσε*, and below, 48. 3 and 49. 6; vol. 2, App. 2.

καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν τῷ Πειραιεὶ ἤψατο τῶν ἀνθρώπων . . . ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄνω πόλιν ἀφίκετο: 'It first attacked the inhabitants of the Piraeus . . . it afterwards reached the upper city'. See Holladay and Poole (1979), 294: this is evidence against modern suggestions that the plague was a simultaneous outbreak of two or more distinct diseases.

καὶ ἐλέχθη ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι φάρμακα ἐσβεβλήκοιεν ἐς τὰ φρέατα: 'it was supposed that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the wells'. A surprising suspicion, with its implication of 'total war'. Allegations of well-poisoning were made against minority groups (Jews, Arabs, pilgrims, lepers) at the time of the Black Death. See P. Ziegler, *The Black Death* (Harmondsworth, 1970), 97 ff., and W. Burkert, *Structure and History* (i. 96. 2 n. on *ταμειῖον* . . .), 70. The undocumented statement of L. H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* (London, 1976), 46, that in the ancient Delphic Amphictiony the poisoning of wells was forbidden, seems to be an incorrect rendering of Aischines, ii. 115, which records an ancient oath which includes among other things a prohibition on the cutting off of supplies of running water. (There is nothing

relevant that I can see in the later Amphictionic oaths *Syll*³ 145 and 826.) Genuine instances in antiquity of poisoning of water supplies are rare, but note Florus, i. 35 (ii. 20. 7): M'. Aquillius poisons the wells in 129 BC during the Roman war in Asia (= Greenidge and Clay, *Sources for Roman History 133-70 B.C.*³ (Oxford, 1987), 23). See also R. Hercher (ed.), *Epistolographi Graeci*, 314, para. 17 (with N. Robertson, *CQ* 28 (1978), 68f.), not historical, but proof that the allegation was sometimes made. For the *recommendation* to 'make the still waters undrinkable' see Aineas Tacticus, viii. 4, with D. Whitehead (ed.), *Aineas the Tactician: How to Survive Under Siege* (Oxford, 1990), 115; but Whitehead, like Jeffery, reads too much into the Amphictionic oath.

3. ἐγὼ δὲ οἶόν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐθις ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδῶς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω: 'But I shall describe its actual course, and the symptoms by which anyone who knows them beforehand may recognize the disease should it ever reappear'. An interesting sentence, whose importance should not, however, be exaggerated by over-interpretation. Parry (above, introductory n.), 109ff., argues, against earlier views, that Th.'s view is 'pessimistic' both here and in his work as a whole, and that Th. did not intend his account to be a guide to future treatment of the disease. So too S. Radt, 'Zu Thukydides' Pestbeschreibung', *Mnemosyne*, 31 (1978), 233ff., at 244f. This may be right as far as the plague is concerned, see below, 51. 2 (though Erbse (47. 4n.), 40, drily points out that Th.'s description might still be of practical use: in future, people would be able to recognize the plague symptoms by referring to their Th. and could then fly to the ends of the earth before catching it themselves). But the present passage does not imply that Th. was *generally* pessimistic: knowledge will enable the statesman to predict and interpret, and so to do his job better. In this way Th.'s material enables the statesman to 'make people better', and so indirectly Th.'s own writings aim at improving people. But Th. does not offer straight-forward cures, unlike the doctor who aims to 'help or at least not to harm' (ὠφελεῖν ἢ μὴ βλάπτειν, Hippocrates, *Epidemics*, i. 11, Loeb, vol. i. 164, closely echoed by the definition of the doctor's task offered by Th.'s Nikias at vi. 14 below: see n. there and ii. 51. 2n., with Weidauer, 72f.). Medical failure in face of the great plague implies nothing about Th.'s conception of the normal aims and achievements of doctors, still less about Th.'s conception of his own political inquiries.

The words οἶόν τε ἐγίγνετο, 'its actual course', lit. 'what kind of thing it was', have been hailed as an anticipation of a famous nineteenth-century definition of history by Leopold Ranke, who thought that the historian should say 'what actually occurred', 'wie es eigentlich gewesen'

(for the dictum itself see G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (London, 1913), 101). See K. Repgen, 'Über Rankes Dictum vom 1824, "bloss sagen, wie es eigentlich gewesen"', *Historisches Jahrbuch*, 102 (1982), 439ff., approved by M. I. Finley, *Ancient History: Evidence and Models* (London, 1985), 47f. and 116 n. 4, who actually speaks of Repgen's 'discovery' that Ranke's dictum was a 'direct quotation, previously unnoticed, of [Th.] 2. 48. 3'; but this has been convincingly challenged by R. S. Stroud, "'Wie es eigentlich gewesen" and Thucydides ii. 48. 3', *Hermes*, 115 (1987), 379ff., who replies that *οἶον* means 'what kind of thing', not 'how'; and that the word *τε*, 'and', is not, as Repgen thought, specially emphatic.

On the (medical) word *ἐπιπέσοι*, used of diseases or illnesses occurring, see iii. 82. 2 n.

αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας: 'I myself caught the plague and myself saw others who suffered from it'. A rare autobiographical statement, followed by an emphatic (note the repeated 'myself') claim to autopsy. It is unusual for Th. to put forward his credentials in this way, but compare the general promise at i. 22. 2 to offer the results of autopsy, *αὐτὸς ἰδῶν*, 'what I . . . saw myself'.

49. 1. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ὁμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ ἐκείνο ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθενείας ἐτύχχανεν ὄν: 'The year was agreed to have been remarkably free from ordinary sickness'. See Holladay and Poole (1979), 294: this passage too (see 48. 2 n.) is evidence against the idea that the plague was a simultaneous outbreak of more than one disease due to exceptionally crowded conditions, for which see above, 17 nn. For medical instances of *ἄνοσον*, 'free from sickness', see Page, 103; G. Maloney and W. Frohn, *Concordance des œuvres hippocratiques* (Quebec, 1984), 276: five instances.

The general description of 'the year' recalls the manner of the Hippocratic *Epidemics*: see e.g. iii. 2 'the year having proved southerly, wet and mild, in the winter the general health was good except for the consumptives . . .'. I owe this point to Edward Hussey.

2. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως: 'without any apparent reason'. Th. is here perhaps echoing medical language: see e.g. Hippocrates, *On the Sacred Disease*, i (Loeb, ii. 140), for people who go mad 'without any *prophasis*, i.e. explanation', *ἀπὸ οὐδεμιᾶς προφάσεως* (the Ionic dialect equivalent of Th.'s Attic phrase); for related Hippocratic examples see Maloney and Frohn, entry under *πρόφασις*. See Pearson, 'Prophasis: A Clarification', *TAPA* 103 (1972), 381 ff. = *Selected Papers* (above, i. 23. 6 n.), 120 ff. In Rawlings's categorization (i. 23. 6 n., *A Semantic Study*) the word is here 'medical' and has the sense

'pre-appearance' (i.e. the etymology *-φαίνω* is paramount). But see Heubeck and Heath, cited at i. 23. 6: the occasional 'medical' flavour of the word should not be allowed to settle its meaning at i. 23, where its force is strongly causal.

θέρμαι ἰσχυραί: 'violent feverishness'. *θέρμαι* is 'common in medical writings and almost wholly confined to them': Page, 101 and n. 1, following W. Jones's view that Th. here, in his description of an unfamiliar disease, deliberately avoided *πυρετός*, a popular word for a *periodic* fever. For *ἰσχυραί*, which the doctors 'notoriously overwork', see Page, 102.

έρυθήματα: 'redness'. Another medical term; not attested before Th. (Page, 101). 28 instances in Maloney and Frohn.

καὶ φλόγωσις: 'and inflammation'. See Page, 101f.: this is the only term used by Th., but missing from the Hippocratic vocabulary, a conclusion confirmed by Maloney and Frohn. For the rich medical vocabulary in the chapters which follow see Page's analysis, detailed references to which will, from this point on, not be given here; for some qualifications to Page's general conclusion that Th. was not at variance with medical usage, see Parry. Parry's arguments are directed less at Page himself than (112) at those scholars who invoke Page's authority for the view that Th. was 'technical'. Parry (113) concludes that Th. had a positive abhorrence of the technical. This goes too far; despite 49. 3 (see n. there) the close collocation of detailed terms for disorders, processes, and parts of the body, creates a sense of *ἀκριβεία* (for this term see i. 22. 2 n.) on Th.'s part which leaves on the reader a strong *impression* of clinical precision, irrespective of the closeness or otherwise of the parallels which can be cited from ancient medical writings.

3. **ὅποτε ἐς τὴν καρδίαν στηρίξειεν, ἀνέστρεφέ τε αὐτήν:** 'settling on the heart it would cause turmoil and disorder there'. For this translation, against versions which introduce the notion of upsetting the stomach (= *καρδία* in an unusual sense), see Page, 100 and 106.

καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι ὅσαι ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὠνομασμένοι εἰσίν: 'all the discharges of bile to which physicians have ever given names'. As several commentators have noted, by this formula Th. distances himself from the more complete technicality of the medical writers: 'I could', he is saying, 'have been even more technical if I had chosen to be.' See Page, 99, Parry, 113, and *Thucydides*, 97, 134.

5. **ἔδρασαν ἐς φρέατα:** 'plunged into the wells'. See Radt (48. 3 n.), 233f.

6. **διαρροίας . . . ἐπιπιπτούσης:** 'diarrhoea . . . set in'. For the verb see iii. 82. 2 n.; cp. above, 48. 2.

50. 1. κρείσσον λόγου: 'beyond description or expectation'. I have expanded Jowett's tr. to take account of a point made by M. Marshall, 'Pericles and the Plague', in *Owls to Athens* (i. 23. 6n.), 163 ff., who compares 64. 1, where Pericles is made to say the plague was unexpected, in language very like that used here. Marshall ingeniously suggests that Th. is here emphasizing the impossibility of predicting the plague so as to save Pericles' reputation for foresight. Even the great man could not predict the unpredictable.

τὸ εἶδος: 'the general character'. See 51. 1 n. on ἐπι πάν τῆν ιδέαυ, and Weidauer, 21 ff.; and above all iii. 82. 2 n.

κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν: 'human nature'. This and similar phrases are favourites of Th.: see i. 76. 2 n. and 76. 3; also iii. 82. 2 n., with Weidauer, 32 ff.

τὰ γὰρ ὄρνεα καὶ τετράποδα . . .: 'the birds and animals . . .'. Th. does not make it clear whether he thought that the birds were absent because they cannily stayed away or because they ate the flesh and perished (he mentions both possibilities). The second is likelier. This aspect of the plague has been discussed recently by Holladay and the other contributors to the exchange in the *New England Journal of Medicine* (see introductory n. above). Langmuir and his collaborators argued that the susceptibility of birds and animals, as described by Th., is an argument for influenza, since the 'host range' of influenza is 'avian and mammalian'. Holladay replied that this was not helpful because such evidence relates to infected living creatures whereas Th. is thinking of the effects, on birds and dogs, of eating diseased corpses. In a letter sent to the editor of *NEJM* but not published, Holladay offered evidence about the effect of diseased corpses on vultures in India during the influenza pandemic of 1918–19. 'Not a single vulture died of eating the flesh.' He concluded, surely rightly, that 'the susceptibility of carnivorous creatures to diseased flesh does not therefore seem to be as helpful a criterion in distinguishing his plague as Thucydides hoped'. I am grateful to the late James Holladay for supplying me in 1988 with his *NEJM* contributions, published and unpublished; see his summary of 'New Developments in the Athenian Plague', *CQ* 38 (1988), 247 ff. See also below 51. 4 n.

See Woodman (introductory n.).

2. τεκμήριον δέ: 'This was proved by . . .'. See *Thucydides*, 101.

οἱ δὲ κύνες: 'the dogs'. D. Harvey (4. 2 n.), 78, drily notes the curious fact that though dogs are mentioned in the plague account, women are not, either as nurses or victims. For the 'echo' of Homer, *Iliad*, i. 50, see Woodman (introductory n.).

51. 1. ἐπὶ πάν τήν ιδέα: 'the general nature'. See i. 109. 1 n. for Th.'s partiality for expressions of this kind, and for the thought (a general phenomenon, what modern historians like Moses Finley would call a 'model', will be different in its various manifestations) see iii. 82. 2 n.

ἐς τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα: 'it ended in the plague'. See 49. 1; the present passage is an uncharacteristic repetition, but compare vii. 48. 2 = 49. 1 (the fifth column at Syracuse, mentioned twice in almost identical language).

2. ἐν τε οὐδὲ ἐν κατέστη ἴαμα: 'Absolutely no single remedy established itself'. A difficult piece of Greek. But Parry (110) is surely wrong to render it 'there was absolutely and utterly no cure at all'. He says that his 'English adverbs are a clumsy attempt to render the stress of the unique Greek syntax'. Parry is right about the syntax, but his rendering, which he uses to support his wide-ranging conclusions about Th.'s pessimism, omits the idea that no *one* cure worked for everybody (as Th. goes on to say, some treatments *did good* to some people while harming others); on this point Gomme and Classen/Steup are right. Th.'s 'pessimism' is therefore not quite as great as Parry supposed. As a rough parallel Classen/Steup cite ἐν οὐδέν at Hdt. i. 32. 8; it is curious that the whole phrase there is σώμα ἐν οὐδέν αὐταρκές ἐστι. The phrase σώμα αὐταρκές will recur in Th. at para. 3 below (see n. there); did he have the Hdt. passage in mind here too?

ὠφελεῖν . . . ἔβλαπτεν: 'did good . . . did harm'. The job of the doctor was 'to do good or at least not to do harm'; for references (Thucydidean and Hippocratic) see above, 48. 3 n. on ἐγὼ δέ. Th.'s use here of the two key verbs in that standard description is surely deliberate.

3. σώμά τε αὐταρκές: 'constitution . . . of itself'. For Herodotean and Platonic parallels to this unusual phrase, and for the grimness of the echo here of the Funeral Speech, see 41. 1 n. See also 2 n. above.

4. ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα ἔθνησκον: 'dying like sheep'. This is wrongly translated 'dying like *the* sheep' by Langmuir *et al.* (above, introductory n.; my italics); they then argue that this supposed mortality among sheep is relevant to the identification of the plague (see 50. 1 n. on τὰ γὰρ ὄρνεα). Holladay is surely right (see 50. 1 n. and *CQ* 1988, 249) to reject this literal rendering; for one thing (as he points out) the sheep of Attica had been moved to Euboea: ii. 14. The expression is simply a vivid metaphor, as we might say 'they dropped off like flies'.

However two possible objections should be mentioned. First, what is the force of the definite article τὰ? This might be thought to strengthen the 'literal' interpretation. But in fact ὥσπερ τὰ πρόβατα is regular Greek for 'like sheep'; cp. Plato, *Symposium*, 190D ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ ὄα τέμνοντες, 'like people picking sorb-apples', or 191D ὥσπερ αἱ ψήτται,

'like flat-fish'. I am grateful for these references, and for general advice on the syntactical point, to Robert Parker. Second, the scholiast evidently took the words in the 'literal' sense. (He says, by way of explanation 'because the sheep caught and transmitted the disease', *ὅτι τὰ πρόβατα μεταληπτικὰ καὶ μεταδοτικὰ τῆς νόσου*.) But this is probably just wrong. **5. εἴτε γὰρ μὴ ἴέλοιεν δεδιότες ἀλλήλοις προσιέναι:** 'When they were afraid to visit one another'. See next n.

εἴτε προσίοιεν, διεφθείροντο: 'if they visited them, they themselves died'. This, together with 58. 2 (see n. there) is rightly hailed by Holladay and Poole (*CQ* 1979, 295 ff.) as the first ever statement of awareness of the effects of contagion. See, however, J. Solomon, 'Thucydides and the Recognition of Contagion', *Maia*, 37 (1985), 121 f., who emphasizes the statement immediately above about people being *afraid*, δεδιότες, to visit each other, which may imply that others besides Th. observed contagion at work. (So too Parker, *Miasma*, 219 n. 68.) But Th. is certainly the first writer to state the doctrine clearly: the Hippocratic treatises have nothing relevant. See Holladay, *CQ* 38 (1988), 250 f.

6. δις γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν, ὥστε καὶ κτείνειν, οὐκ ἐπελάμβανεν: 'For no-one was attacked a second time, or not with a fatal result'. This is a clear statement of what is now called specific acquired immunity (see Holladay and Poole (1979), 295 ff.), and together with his recognition of contagion puts Th. well ahead of the contemporary doctors.

52. 1. ἡ ξυγκομιδὴ ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν ἐς τὸ ἄστυ: 'the crowding of the people out of the country into the city'. See ii. 14 (the language of which is here echoed) and 17.

3. τὰ τε ἱερά ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν: 'the temples in which they squatted were full of the corpses of those who died in them'. Birth and death within a temple was sacrilege, and the present passage is proof of the 'extreme demoralization caused by the plague': so Parker, *Miasma*, 33 n. 5.

καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὀσίων: 'sacred and profane'. For the word *ὄσιον*, which can sometimes mean 'sacred', and sometimes as here 'profane' (because it is permitted by, or not forbidden by, the gods, but instead belongs to the purely human sphere of men), see the interesting article by G. Eatough, 'The Use of *ὄσιος* and Kindred Words in Thucydides', *AJP* 92 (1971), 238 ff. He shows that Th. avoids *ὄσιος* when making authorial judgements, and that on the few occasions when he allows speakers to use it and related words they are 'inoperative', that is, the values they represent do not affect the situation or they are being used [as at iii. 56. 2 or 67. 1, see nn. there] to mask true facts and intentions. (The present phrase he regards (243) as a mere 'trite formula'.) Eatough has identified

a genuine Thucydidean habit, and offered valuable analysis of individual passages, but I do not at all agree with the general conclusions he reaches about Th.'s own attitudes (see iii. 82. 8n. on *εὐσεβεία*, where the particular interpretation, also, seems to me faulty).

See also W. R. Connor, 'Sacred and Secular: *ἱερά καὶ ὄσια* and the Classical Concept of the State', *Ancient Society*, 19 (1988), 161ff., at 168.

4. **νόμοι τε πάντες**: 'the customs . . .'. For these see R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (London, 1985), esp. ch. 3. We are surely meant to contrast the solemnly described 'ancestral custom' of public burial in 34. 1.

For the suggestion that the funerary law at Dem. xliii. 57ff., stipulating the duties of families and demarchs, was passed as a result of the experiences of the plague, see S. Humphreys, *JHS* 100 (1980), 98 = *The Family, Women and Death*, 83, with D. Whitehead (16. 1 n.) 138 n. 99.

53. 1. **πρώτον τε ἤρξε . . . τὸ νόσημα**: 'the plague . . . introduced'. But the Greek verb is (as C. Pelling points out to me) ambiguous: the disorders about to be listed *began* with the plague in the chronological sense; but did the plague directly cause them all?

καὶ τῶν οὐδὲν πρότερον κεκτημένων, εὐθύς δὲ τὰ κείνων ἔχόντων: 'and those who had nothing immediately inherited their property'. A revealing comment, with its implication that a category of 'new rich' suddenly emerged; this may be relevant to the changes in Athenian political attitudes which some have detected in the later 420s. See below 65nn. Fine (above, 13. 1 n.), 200, took the present passage to be evidence for a fundamental change in the system of Athenian land-tenure, towards readier alienation; but this goes too far, see Lewis, *CAH* v². 396 n. 81.

3. **τούτο καὶ καλὸν καὶ χρησιμὸν κατέστη**: 'took the place both of honour and of expediency'. We are very close here to the mood of the Corcyraean *stasis* description (see esp. iii. 82. 8n. on *ἡδονήν*).

4. **θεῶν δὲ φόβος**: 'No fear of Gods . . .'. Note that, in what follows, there is no implication of punishment in an *afterlife*; see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (42. 4 n.), 267, who also, as we have seen, notes (266) that the Funeral Oration says nothing about the afterlife. These, and many other Thucydidean passages discussed, are missing from the index locorum to Dover's book.

For some interesting parallels with reports of reactions to bubonic plague in London in 1665-6 see A. Powell, *Athens and Sparta: Constructing Greek Political and Social History from 478 B.C.* (London, 1988), 158f., a reference I owe to Peter Rhodes.

54. 2. ἤξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος: 'A Dorian war will come'. See on this passage Alty (i. 95. 1 n. on *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*), 6 n. 32: it is illuminating about popular attitudes that the war could be referred to, in a commonplace, as a *Dorian* war. Ethnic feelings counted for more than is sometimes allowed.

3. οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιοῦντο: 'People's memories reflected their sufferings'. N. Marinatos, 'Thucydides and Oracles', *JHS* 101 (1981), 139, claims that Th. 'is not questioning oracles here, but is merely stating that people make them fit their current circumstances'. I am not so sure that a touch of irony can be excluded. See also, on this passage, Dover, 'Thucydides and Oracles' (i. 126. 6 n.), 69 f.

4. μνήμη δὲ ἐγένετο καὶ τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίων χρηστηρίου: 'The answer of the oracle to the Spartans . . . was not forgotten'. This oracle was given at i. 118. 3. See also iii. 104. 1 n.

5. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα: 'the places which were most densely populated'. Surely a further hint that Th. realized that the plague was contagious. But neither here nor elsewhere in the plague description does Th. make a lot of noise about his 'discovery' of contagion, if discover it he did (as Holladay and Poole believe). Given Th.'s fondness for correcting others explicitly, this restraint is (as Edward Hussey points out to me) evidence against the idea that he was engaging in conscious polemic against the Hippocratic doctors. We can still accept that he improved markedly on them.

55-58. THE PELOPONNESIAN INVASION; ATHENIAN COUNTER-ACTIVITY

55. 1. παρήλθον ἐς τὴν Πάραλον γῆν καλουμένην: 'they entered what are called the coast lands (*Paralos*)'. Th. is capricious about what he does and does not think worth introducing by some such formula as 'the so-called': see *Thucydides*, 97 and n. 98. For the Paralos or Paralia (as it is called by the *Ath. Pol.*—and by Th. himself at 56. 1 and 3 below) see *CAH* iii² 3. 394 and Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 185 f. (on 13. 4) and 252 (on 21. 4): it was the coastal area of Attica NW and NE of Sounion.

μέχρι Λαυρείου, οὗ τὰ ἀργύρεια μέταλλά ἐστιν Ἀθηναίοις: 'where the Athenian silver mines are'. For the Laurion mines in the war see C. Conophagos, *Le Laurium antique* (Athens, 1980), 103 ff., R. Osborne, *Demos*, 111, and below, vi. 91 n. (that, and the present passage, are Th.'s only refs. to the mines, which were, however, surely important to Athens' war finances, though they do not feature in the

account of resources at ii. 13. See the fragmentary *IG* i³. 90, line 11, of ?416, cp. ML 60 = Fornara 118B.) Th. does not actually say that the Spartans damaged, or even that they set out to damage, the mines: his comment is strictly just an aid to the location of the district. Note again (see preceding n.) that he thinks it necessary to tell his readers, who have to work out so much else for themselves, the far from arcane fact that the Laurion was the Athenian silver-producing area. (Or are the last six Greek words a scholiast's gloss?)

How far the deserting slaves of vii. 27. 5 are likely to have been mining slaves is a question which I postpone to my n. there. The best way of stopping silver production was not to 'ravage' the mining district but to deprive Athens of the slave force which operated them. (You could perhaps set fire to the pit props—see C. Carey and R. Reid, *Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches* (Cambridge, 1985), 144f. n., on a reading at Dem. xxxvii. 36 which they actually reject—but without high explosives it would be hard to do serious or extensive damage.)

56. 1. ἔτι δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ ὄντων, πρὶν ἐς τὴν παραλίαν ἐλθεῖν, ἑκατὸν νεῶν ἐπίπλου τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ παρεσκευάζετο: 'But before the Peloponnesians had left the plain and moved forward into the coast lands he had begun to equip an expedition of a hundred ships against the Peloponnese'. The Epidaurous expedition is, as Gomme says, 'very precisely dated'; but why? Perhaps Th. wishes to stress Athenian resilience in face of adversity.

The scale of the expedition, which is certainly large, has been much discussed, and Th. has been criticized for his failure to explain its object. At vi. 31. 2, it and Hagnon's force against Potidaia are said to be comparable to the great Sicilian expedition, and inferior to the latter only in respect of expected duration and quality of equipment. Wade-Gery, *OCD*³ 1519, was therefore puzzled by the present passage, esp. para. 4 below where the 'huge effort against Epidaurus . . . is dismissed as a minor futility'; he put the inconsistency between Books ii and vi down to Th.'s sympathies with the 'defeatist officer class against the revived offensive of Cleon'. This is the language of the First World War, during which Wade-Gery served in France and Belgium: Andrewes, *PBA* 59 (1973), 4. The Epidaurous expedition is discussed by Cawkwell (above, i. 122. 1 n.), 69f., who found 'nothing very mysterious about its large size' and generally rejected the Wade-Gery picture: if the object of the expedition was ravaging, the more hands the better—especially when the plague gave a powerful reason for taking hoplites away from Athens. Similarly Holladay (above, i. 144. 1 n.), 401f. Against Wade-Gery's suggestion that the real motive of the attack on Epidaurus is to be found

at v. 53 (desire of Alcibiades and the Argives in 419 to take Epidaurus and so shorten the route from Athens to Argos), Cawkwell correctly objects that that plan was conceived at a time when the Argive-Spartan treaty had expired, and so is not relevant to 430.

2. καὶ ἰππέας τριακοσίους ἐν ναυσὶν ἵππαγωγοῖς πρῶτον τότε ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν νεῶν ποιηθείσαις: 'and three hundred cavalry conveyed in horse transports which the Athenians then constructed for the first time out of their old ships'. See Morrison and Coates, 94, 157: the contrast implied in 'first' is with the special horse-transports of the Persian Wars. The passage is also discussed by Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens* (i. 45. 2n.), 89f. For horse-transports in the Peloponnesian War see Ar. *Knights*, 595–610.

ξυνεστρατεύοντο δὲ καὶ Χίοι: 'the Chians ... joined them'. See J. Barron, 'Chios in the Athenian Empire', in Boardman and Vaphopoulou-Richardson, *Chios* (i. 16n. on *Δαρείος* etc.), 89ff. at 100f.

6. Πρασιάς τῆς Λακωνικῆς πόλις ἐπιθαλάσσιον: 'Prasiai, a small town on the coast of Lakonia'. In fact on the east coast; it is modern Leonidhion. For this success see Ar. *Peace*, 242–3, and Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia* (London, 1979), 238, also 264 for the suggestion that the names Prasiai and Brasidas are connected.

[See iii. 17n. for the possibility that that ch. has been misplaced and really belongs here.]

57. 1. δείσαντας τὸ νόσημα: 'the fear which it [the plague] inspired'. Unlike the Athenian fear at 51. 5, which was of making direct approaches to the sick, and was perhaps compatible with a general awareness of contagion—see n. there—the Peloponnesian fear was felt at a distance and was a general fear of pollution. See *Greek World*, 128.

2. πλείστον τε χρόνον: 'the longest stay'. See 23. 3n. on οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι.

58. 1. Ἄγνω ὁ Νικίου: 'Hagnon the son of Nicias'. Something of a northern expert (see ii. 95. 3); and (referring to an earlier period, 437) iv. 102, v. 11. 1 and n. for his role as founder of Amphipolis. He was father of the famous Theramenes who was prominent in the events of 411 (viii. 68. 4; Lys. xii. 65). See Davies, *APF* 228, and G. E. Pesely, 'Hagnon', *Athenaeum*, 67 (1989), 191 ff. From Lysias we learn that Hagnon, like the poet Sophocles (Ar. *Rhet.* 1419^a26), was one of the *probouloi*, senior figures appointed to steady the crisis after the Sicilian disaster: see viii. 1. 3 and n. there.

Κλεόπομπος ὁ Κλεινίου: 'Kleopompos the son of Kleinias'. See 26. 1.

εὐθύς: 'immediately'. But perhaps there was a short interval: see Bugh, *Horsemen of Athens*, 97 n. 55.

2. ὥστε καὶ τοὺς προτέρους στρατιώτας νοσήσαι τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἀπὸ τῆς ξὺν Ἄγνωνι στρατιᾶς, ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ χρόνῳ ὑγιαίνοντας: 'Even the soldiers who were previously there and had been in good health caught the infection from the forces under Hagnon'. See 51. 5 n.; this is another clear statement of Th.'s belief in the effects of contagion. See Holladay and Poole (1979), 293.

Φορμίων δὲ καὶ οἱ ἑξακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι οὐκέτι ἦσαν περὶ Χαλκιδέας: 'but the army of Phormio escaped; for he and his sixteen hundred troops had left Chalkidike' [lit. 'but Phormio and his sixteen hundred troops were no longer in the Chalkidike region'; Jowett's 'escaped' is an insertion to make the meaning clearer]. On these troops and the numerical problem involved see ii. 31. 2 n. and iii. 17. 3 n. on *τρισχίλιοι*.

3. ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἄγνων ἀνεχώρησε: 'Hagnon returned'. But Bugh, *Horsemen of Athens*, 96 f., suggests that some of the cavalry may have remained.

ἀπὸ τετρακισχιλίων ὀπλιτῶν χιλίους καὶ πενήκοντα τῇ νόσῳ ἀπολέσας: 'having lost by the plague a thousand and fifty out of four thousand hoplites'. As Holladay and Poole (287) observe, this is valuable evidence on the death-rate from the plague and implies that 'the case mortality would have been about 26% if all 4,000 were infected or even higher if some were not'. (See their 286 n. 10 for the difference between death-rate, which is the proportion of individuals dying from a disease in a defined population considered as a whole, and case mortality, which is the proportion of people contracting a disease who die from it.) See further iii. 87. 1 n.

οἱ δὲ πρότεροι στρατιῶται: 'the original force'. See i. 59 and 61. 1 ff.

59-64. DISCONTENT WITH PERICLES; HIS LAST SPEECH

59. 2. καὶ τὸν μὲν Περικλέα ἐν αἰτία εἶχον: 'They blamed Pericles'. A good authorial endorsement (for an even better one see viii. 1. 1) of the *Old Oligarch's* comment (ii. 17) that the Athenians tended to take the credit themselves when things went well but blamed their leaders when they went badly. See *Thucydides*, 167 n. 51 (where for *OO* i. 17 read ii. 17). In the speech which follows, Th. makes Pericles say something like, but not quite identical to, the authorial viii. 1: see below, 60. 4 and n.

καὶ πρέσβεις τινὰς πέμψαντες ὡς αὐτοὺς ἄπρακτοι ἐγένοντο:

'Accordingly ambassadors were sent to Sparta, but they met with no success'. Compare Ar. *Peace* (of 421), 211 ff.: Hermes says, in effect, that the gods are angry with you Greeks because if ever they [i.e. the gods] sent opportunities for peace you all preferred war; so if [as now, in 430: see Sommerstein's n.] Sparta gained some slight advantage her reaction was 'now the Athenians have got it coming to them'. And vice versa: see below, iv. 15 ff., for an Athenian rejection of Spartan overtures in 425. For Th.'s different handling of the two episodes see iv. 21. 1 n.

3. ξύλλογον ποιήσας: 'he called an assembly'. That Th. makes Pericles go on (60. 1) to refer to this as an *ἐκκλησία*, i.e. assembly, is certainly against, but perhaps not fatally against, the conclusion of Christensen and Hansen (above, 22. 1 n.) that in that passage the two words *ξύλλογος* and *ἐκκλησία* have distinct meanings and *ξύλλογος* there means a *military* meeting. (For an honest recognition of this difficulty see Christensen and Hansen, 21.) On the face of it, the subject-matter of the present passage and of 22. 1 are extremely similar. But *ξύλλογος* is variously used in Th., who is not exact over constitutional technicalities (see Hansen, *Athenian Ekklesia*, ii (1989), 210, addenda to original Christensen and Hansen article); so I accept the Christensen/Hansen view.

(ἔτι δ' ἑστρατήγει): 'being still general'. The word 'still' perhaps implies, what Th. does not tell us at 65. 3 (see n. there), that Pericles was deposed from the generalship, as well as fined; but, as Rhodes says in his n. on 65. 3, the implication is not certain.

πρὸς τὸ ἡπιώτερον: 'to a gentler . . . frame of mind'. See Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (Oxford, 1957), 76. With the present passage compare 65. 8.

60-64. Last speech of Pericles

Despite its interest and richness of thought, this speech has received amazingly little attention, compared to the admittedly longer Funeral Speech. For instance, the bibliography on Th.'s speeches by W. C. West III at the end of Stadter's 1973 collection, *The Speeches in Th.* (above, i. 73-8, introductory n.), lists 43 items on the Funeral Speech but only two on the Last Speech, to which should be added A. Andrewes, 'The Melian Dialogue and Pericles' Last Speech', *PCPhS* 186 (1960), 1 ff., at 6 ff. (the speech too extravagant and too pessimistic, to be based on what Pericles actually said. More likely, Andrewes thinks, it was written after 404.) W. Plenio, *Die letzte Rede des Perikles (Thukydides ii 60-64)* (Kiel Dissertation, 1954; microfilm) is a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis, sound, but limited in its range of reference. It collects the parallels with other speeches in Th. and ends with an evaluation at 85 ff. of the different

moods and styles of the various sections. See also Dionysius, *On Thucydides*, chs. 43–7, with the commentary of Pritchett (Berkeley, 1975); Dionysius disliked the speech for its inappropriateness to the occasion (insufficiently conciliatory) and criticized it at length.

The structure of this very polished speech, which rises steadily to a climax of imperial defiance, is as follows: Pericles begins with a frank, even brutal, statement of a totalitarian philosophy (see 60. 2 n.). He then justifies his own behaviour in particular and in general (this prepares us for Th.'s own assessment of him in 65). Ch. 61 deals with the negative aspect of the Athenians' present situation—the unexpectedness of the calamities which have overtaken them, with a reassertion, at the end of the chapter, of the need to put private grief second to the interests of the state. (Compare 44. 3.) Then he offers positive comfort, in the form of a consideration which he says at 62. 1 he has not mentioned before (but 41. 4 came very close: see n. there): Athens' absolute control not just of her existing allies but of the sea in general, which guarantees future acquisitions. Ch. 63 squarely faces the possibility that Athens will incur hatred, but ch. 64 promises that Athens will be remembered for having ruled over more Greeks than any other Greeks.

The speech as a whole complements the Funeral Speech: whereas that speech was primarily concerned with the domestic character of Athens, with only passing reference to her imperial role (see 36. 1 n. on *τὴν γὰρ χώραν*, 38. 2, and 41. 4 n.), imperialism is central to the present speech, while this time it is Athens' character which gets only passing mention (61. 4 n. on *καὶ ἐν ἡθεσιν ἀντιπάλοις*).

60. 1. **ἐκκλησίαν**: 'an assembly'. See 59. 3 n.

2. **ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡγοῦμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην ὠφελεῖν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἀθροῶν δὲ σφαλλομένην**: 'In my judgement it would be better for individuals themselves that the citizens should suffer and the state flourish than that the citizens should flourish and the state suffer'. A remarkable statement, almost an expression of a totalitarian political philosophy, strongly at variance with the Pericles of Sir Karl Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies*, i (London, 1966). Popper holds up Pericles—drawn largely from the Thucydidean Funeral Oration—as the champion of the 'open society' against the assaults of reactionaries like Plato. If the present passage had been written by Plato, what would Popper have said about it? I have discussed this important but neglected passage in *Thucydides*, 123 ff. There I attempt to show, first, that fifth-century Athens, with its stress on hoplite values of solidarity and holding the line, was a more 'collectivist' place than is sometimes allowed; and,

second, that even the historical Socrates, whom Popper thinks Plato traduced in his dialogues, may have held views not altogether remote from those here put into the mouth of Pericles by Th. See for instance *Crito*, 42 E, for an authentic but unexpected claim that Socrates admired *Spartan* arrangements. Finally (for this point see *Thucydides*, 178 ff.) note that the 'totalitarian' view here implied is slightly at variance with the 'organic' view of the state elsewhere implied by Th. and his speakers. Here we have a claim that the individual is definitely subordinate to the state. Plenio (introductory n.), 22 ff., compares Hermokrates at iv. 61. 2 (the interests of Sicily as a whole should be paramount) and contrasts Alcibiades at vi. 16. 3: victories at Olympia, which bring glory to individuals, also help the city—but very much as an afterthought.

4. **καὶ ἐμέ τε τὸν παραινέσαντα πολεμεῖν καὶ ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οἱ ξυνέγνωτε δι' αἰτίας ἔχετε:** 'and condemning not only me who advocated the war but yourselves who consented to it'. See 59. 2 n.: Th. here gives Pericles a slightly softened, and more rhetorically appropriate, version of the more usual charge that the Athenian assembly preferred to blame anybody *except* themselves. At the authorial viii. 1. 1, there is, by contrast, no suggestion that the Athenians blamed themselves at all.

5. **γνώναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα:** 'devising and explaining a sound policy'. For the obvious and surely deliberate echo of the assessment of Themistokles in Book i see i. 138. 3 n. on *αὐτοσχεδιάζειν*. For 'expertise' (as well as 'charisma') as an element in Periclean leadership see 65. 8 n. on *δυνατὸς ὤν* . . .

If *τε* were lengthened the present words would be a hexameter, reminiscent perhaps of a line like *Odyssey*, ii. 159, the description of the interpretative powers of the diviner Halisierthes: *ὄρνιθας γνώναι καὶ ἐναίσιμα μυθήσασθαι*, 'good at understanding bird-lore and interpreting omens'. See also 61. 2 n. Politicians as 'diviners': i. 138. 3 n. on *ἄριστος* . . .

φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων: 'I am a lover of my country and incorruptible'. The word *φιλόπολις* will be picked up by Alcibiades, with considerably less justification, in vi. 92 (three times). See Plenio, 31. For Alcibiades' oratory as both an echo and a contradiction of Pericles' see Macleod, ch. 9. With *φιλόπολις* here, Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (above, 59. 3 n.), 222 n. 91, compares *ἀδύπολις* at *OT* 510, but that means 'sweet to the city'. See also Connor, *New Politicians* (43. 1 n. on *τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν*), 102 f., for *philopoli* as part of 'the new vocabulary of politics', comparable to the idea of 'lover of the city' at 43. 1 (see n. there), and for the whole 'new politicians' issue see 65 nn.

As for the other part of the present claim, that an Athenian politician should find it necessary to say that he has not had his hand in the till should not surprise readers of Aristophanes, or Athenian tragedy: Kreon

in Sophocles' *Antigone* is very free with the accusation of bribery, first against the sentry, then against Tiresias, 302ff., 1055; for Oedipus' suspicions of financial corruption at *OT* 124f. see Knox, 75; see too Eur. *Suppliant Women*, 236. The whole topic of bribery in Greek politics is well treated by F. D. Harvey, *CRUX*, 76ff., and 112 on the present passage; see also R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), 181 ff. The kind of bribery Pericles here claims to have avoided is, in Harvey's terminology, 'catapolitical', i.e. against the interests of the state (other kinds might be condoned). At 65. 8 Th. endorses Pericles' claim here. Not everybody endorsed it: Plut. *Per.* 32.

J. Ober, *Mass and Élite* (37. 1 n. on *κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν*), 311, cites this whole passage as an example of the way an ideal politician could combine mass appeal with élitist claims.

61. 1. τοῖς πέλας ὑπακοῦσαι: 'be immediately subject to their neighbours'. See Andrewes, *PCPhS* 1960, 7: this is more absolute than the superficially similar i. 141. 1: see n. there. Pericles is no longer talking about the narrow issue of the Megarian decree, but about 'plain subjection'. This extreme formulation, Andrewes thinks, points to a date after 404 for the composition of the present passage. See also ii. 63. 1 n. **περιγενέσθαι:** 'win through'. See i. 144. 1 n.

2. καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἐξίσταμαι: 'As for myself, I am the same man and have not shifted my ground'. Unmistakably picked up by Kleon at iii. 38. 1: *ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ*, 'I myself think as I did before'. For such echoes see F. Cairns, 'Cleon and Pericles: A Suggestion', *JHS* 102 (1982), 203 f., noting that all the three echoes by Kleon are of this last speech of Pericles (the other two are from 63. 2: see nn. there); suggesting a parallel with Thersites' echoes of Achilles in Homer; and concluding that Th. 'is assuming as the background to his character portrayals a standard ancient type of moral assessment, in which actions and words take their worth from that of the actor or speaker'. This is illuminating (for the comparison with Thersites see also Macleod, 93 and n. 20, arguing that the echo in Book iii of the present passage 'serves to contrast [Kleon's] pig-headedness with Pericles' firmness'); but we should not rule out the possibility that the real-life Pericles was imitated in real life: see above 43 nn. on *ἐραστός* and *ἔρανον*.

Pericles is also echoing himself: see i. 140. 1 and n. This perhaps tells against the suggestion of M. Haslam, *CP* 85 (1990), 33, that the present sentence, which with elisions forms an iambic line, is a quotation from or echo of a tragedy (he compares Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 557) or Solon. Haslam says there is 'nothing like it anywhere else in the speech, or, I think, anywhere else in [Th.]'; but cp. above, 60. 5 n. (Homer echoed,

perhaps unconsciously), and for more iambic jingles see i. 129. 3 and ii. 36. 4n. on *μακρηγορεῖν* . . .; for hexameters see i. 13. 6, 38. 2nn.

For Greek disapproval, such as is here expressed, of changes of intention, see A. Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity* (Berkeley, 1982), 30f.

3. δουλοῖ γὰρ φρόνημα: ‘breaks a man’s spirit’ [lit. ‘subjugates, enslaves’]. A fairly strong metaphor, made even stronger when picked up by Alcibiades at vi. 18. 4, *Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα*, ‘we shall humble [lit. ‘quench’] the pride of the Peloponnesians’.

4. καὶ ἐν ἤθεσιν ἀντιπάλοις αὐτῇ τεθραμμένους: ‘and educated accordingly’ [lit. ‘in corresponding habits’]. The thought echoes the Funeral Speech (albeit briefly: see introductory n. above), and is in turn echoed by Alcibiades: see Macleod, 82, citing ii. 36. 4 (see my n. there), 40. 1, and vi. 18. 3 (*ἐπιτηδεύματα*). The word *ἤθεσι*, ‘habits’, recurs in the same ch. of Alcibiades’ speech (vi. 18. 7), but nowhere else in Th. in any form.

62. 1. οὔτ’ ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις: ‘I too have never mentioned it before’. But at 41. 4 Pericles had claimed that every land and sea were open to Athenian audacity. The discrepancy is not too serious. In the Funeral Speech passage the thought is considerably more conventional, a passing phrase in a speech which is not primarily concerned with Athens as an empire (see 41. 3n.). The stress on Athenian naval imperialism in the present context is much more specific and rooted in the rhetorical needs of the speech.

2. δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρήσιν φανερώων, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντὸς κυριωτάτους ὄντας: ‘of the two elements which it is open to man to exploit, the land and the sea, there is one of which you are absolute masters’. That is, the sea. See above, i. 2. 2n. on *οὔτε κατὰ γῆν* etc. for the land/sea distinction, of which the present passage is the most solemn expression in Th., though see also ii. 41. 4. It is characteristic of scholarly neglect of the present speech at the expense of the Funeral Oration—see above, introductory n.—that P. Hardie’s excellent discussion (above, i. 2. 2n.), 309 n. 19, refers only to ii. 41. 4 among Thucydidean passages. For the specific idea of Athenian control of land and sea in the Archidamian War see Ar. *Knights*, 310, with Sommerstein’s n. In the present passage control of the land is not actually denied to Athens (who had in fact forfeited her land empire in 446: see i. 115n.): the speaker’s train of thought simply moves on.

With ‘the two elements’ Knox (i. 3n. on *ἐκ δὲ τεκμηρίων*), 221 n. 81, compares Soph. *Antigone*, 335ff.

οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἔθνος: ‘neither the great King nor any nation on earth’. The great King is the king of Persia. The idea here

is perhaps (as George Cawkwell has suggested to me) that Persia is being balanced against *Sicily*. That is, the contrast is between east and west.

The east-west contrast has as long a pedigree in the history of imperial propaganda as has land/sea. Both contrasts may on occasion be combined, as in Propertius' line 'seu pedibus Parthos sequimur seu classe Britannos' (2. 27. 5). But not here: the emphasis is on Athenian expansion by sea alone (see preceding n.).

For east/west in Ptolemaic propaganda see Theoc. *Idyll*, xvii, *OGIS* 54 (the Adulis inscription), and the representation of the Morning and Evening Stars in the great procession of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, Ath. 197^D (with, on this point, my review of E. E. Rice, *The Grand Procession of Ptolemy Philadelphus*, in *JACT Bulletin Review*, Spring 1984, at pp. xxvii-xxviii). For Roman exploitation of the theme note Virgil, *Aeneid*, vi. 794, 'super et Garamantas et Indos'. P. Hardie has no specific discussion of the theme, but see his 311 ff. on the related distinction Europe/Asia, a distinction which may be implied in βασιλεύς/ἔθνος.

If the Thucydidean Pericles is here alluding to possible designs on Sicily, the implications for Pericles' imperial policy, or Th.'s conception of it, are far-reaching. The policy set out at i. 144. 1 and ii. 65. 7 (see nn. there) merely prohibited expansion *in wartime*: the qualification is crucial.

3. κηπίον καὶ ἐγκαλλώπισμα πλούτου: 'the garden of the house, the superfluous ornament of wealth'. A hendiadys: there is an 'and' in the Greek between 'house' and 'the superfluous ornament', but there is only one idea not two. This is the only mention of gardens in Th., and it is a disparaging one. He did not have much visual sense.

τῶν τε πατέρων μὴ χείρους κατ' ἀμφότερα φανῆναι: 'and where your fathers doubly succeeded you will doubly fail'. For the appeal to the achievements of ancestors and immediate parents, see 36. 1-2 above, and note the comic inversion of this in Ar. *Birds*, 540 ff., with Sommerstein's n.: the birds' ancestors *lost* an empire rather than acquiring one. I have changed Jowett's 'ancestors' to the more literally correct 'fathers' (although 'ancestors' is obviously the general sense), in view of the distinction at 36. 1-2 above, a distinction also implied in the present passage where it is said that the *fathers* of the present generation acquired empire not by inheritance (see below) but by their own exertions.

μετὰ πόνων: 'by their own exertions'. See i. 70. 8n.

οὐ παρ' ἄλλων δεξάμενοι: 'not inherited by them from others'. Lit. 'not receiving from others', but I suppose Jowett is right: inheritance is meant.

μὴ φρονήματι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρονήματι: 'not only with

spirit but with disdain'. For the word-play, which Dionysius (*On Thucydides*, 46) considered a puerile embellishment, compare i. 122. 4. The whole passage, including the first part of para. 4, is in the manner of the sophist Prodikos of Keos, as represented above all by Plato. Prodikos' distinctions tended to take the form 'x is not the same as y. For x ... whereas y ...'. See e.g. DK 84 A 13-18. Note, however, that Th. is less mechanical than Prodikos: the words *φρόνημα* and *καταφρόνημα* become, when elucidated in the following sentence, *αὔχημα* (a less favourable word) and *καταφρόνησις*.

4. *αὔχημα μὲν γὰρ ... καταφρόνησις δέ*: 'for ... boast; but ... disdain'. See previous n.

63. 1. *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, ὅπερ ἅπαντες ἀγάλλεσθε*: 'which derives from the empire—an empire in which you all take pride'. A splendid phrase. Note the emphasis on 'you all'. It was true, though not often admitted in the literary sources, that *all* Athenians (not just the lower classes) benefited from the empire: see i. 75. 3n. And perhaps it was equally true that they all took pride in it too: for the absence of principled dissent among the Athenian upper classes from the idea of empire see above all A. Andrewes, 'The Opposition to Pericles', *JHS* 98 (1978), 4f.

δουλείας ἀντ' ἐλευθερίας: 'freedom or slavery'. See Andrewes (above, 61. 1 n.) on this stark opposition.

κινδύνου ὧν ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ἀπήχθεσθε: 'the danger to which the hatred felt for your imperial rule has brought you'. See 8. 5 n. for the question of the unpopularity of the Athenian empire. See also Saar (introductory n. to iii. 37-50), 24, comparing i. 75. 4.

2. *ἧς οὐδ' ἐκοτῆναι ἐτι ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἴ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιῶς ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται*: 'Nor can you resign your power, in case, at this crisis, the timid or inactive among you feel like playing at being noble'. For Kleon's echo of this at iii. 40. 4, see 61. 2 n. See also i. 75. 4. For *ἀπραγμοσύνη* see the references at i. 32. 5 n. and below, 3 n.

ὡς τυραννίδα γὰρ ἤδη ἔχετε αὐτήν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀφείναι δὲ ἐπικίνδυνον: 'for by this time your empire has become like a tyranny, which in the opinion of mankind may have been unjustly acquired [lit. 'which may seem to have been'], but which cannot be safely surrendered'. Again echoed by Kleon, iii. 37. 2: see 61. 2 n. Kleon says that the empire *is* a tyranny, which Pericles thought it is merely *like*, *ὡς*, a tyranny; the difference is worth insisting on so I have changed Jowett's tr. by inserting 'like'. For the line of thought see also i. 75. 4 and Alcibiades at vi. 18. 6-7 with my nn. there, and for the idea of Athens as a

'tyrant city' see i. 122. 3 n. and ii. 8. 4 n. Ar. *Knights*, 1111–15, is also very relevant, despite Sommerstein's silence on the whole passage: see Lewis, *CR* 33 (1983), 176.

3. **ἑτέροους τε πείσαντες ἀπολέσειαν, καὶ εἴ που ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν:** 'if they could find followers, would soon ruin a city, and if they were to go and found a state of their own, would equally ruin that'. Why should non-involvement by these people, either (i) in the existing Athens or (ii) in a new city, be so ruinous? (i) In Ar. *Birds*, 44, the two Athenians are looking for a τόπος ἀπράγμων, a 'trouble-free place', as Sommerstein renders it. The particular 'trouble' which they are escaping is Athenian litigation. Sycophancy or vexatious prosecution by 'public-spirited' individuals was one way of ensuring that the would-be ἀπράγμονες, or 'politically inactive people', were in fact forced to participate politically in, and contribute financially to, Athenian public life: see R. Osborne in *NOMOS: Law and Society in Classical Athens*, ed. Cartledge, Millett, and Todd (Cambridge, 1990). Otherwise the whole system of liturgies, trierarchies and so on would break down (nn. on 13. 3 and 8). So the sycophant in Ar. *Wealth*, 911 ff., can claim without utter absurdity that his πολυπραγμοσύνη or meddlesomeness is actually public-spiritedness, *εὐεργετεῖν*. (See however D. Harvey's objections to Osborne, in the same volume.) (ii) What of the idea that the ἀπράγμονες would make a mess even of a new city, if they went off and founded one? This depends on an assumption which is somewhat illogical, given that the new city will be inhabited by ἀπράγμονες, namely the assumption that such a city would share the essential features and aspirations of imperial democratic Athens—like the city in the *Birds*. (Which has its own sycophant. But the ideas of sycophancy and litigation are not particularly important after the opening scene of the play.)

τὸ γὰρ ἄπραγμον οὐ σώζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον, οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσῃ πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπηκόῳ, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν: 'For the man who is politically inactive survives only by the help of his more dynamic comrades: such inactivity brings no benefit at all in an imperial state, but only in a subject city, because there it amounts to safe servitude'. The words μετὰ . . . τεταγμένον [lit. 'marshalled with'] are a military metaphor, which I have tried to bring out by the word 'comrades'. For this stress, in a civic context, on military or hoplite cohesiveness, see 60. 2 n. See also 40. 2 for the idea—slightly differently put—that political inactivity is useless. Th. seems (see also previous n.) to be making Pericles show how necessary for Athens as an *imperial democracy* is the participation of the upper class, which might otherwise keep its assets and talents to itself.

64. 1. **ὃ καὶ αὐτοὶ ξυндиέγνωτε πολεμείν:** ‘the decision in favour of war was as much yours as mine’. Compare 59. 2 n.

ἢ νόσος ἦδε, πράγμα μόνον δὴ τῶν πάντων ἐλπίδος κρείσσον γεγενημένον: ‘As for the plague, it was an unexpected blow’. See 50. 1 and n., with M. Marshall there cited.

3. **ὄνομα μέγιστον:** ‘glory and greatness’. The frequency of the word for ‘great’ (*μέγιστος* in its various forms) in the present chapter is remarkable: five times in lines 18–31 of the Oxford text. For this point (‘all these superlatives of quantity’), and for a fine analysis of para. 3 as a whole, see Macleod, 153; compare also Plenio, 76, who says that no other speech in Th. has so many superlatives. For Andrewes, *HCT* iv. 184, an excellent discussion of Th.’s own attitude to the Athenian empire, ‘the rhetoric of (for example) ii. 64. 3 is too warm’ to allow serious doubt that Th. admired the empire. However tempting this line of approach, it must be resisted. The present passage, however magnificent and ‘warm’, is a speech, and not evidence for Th.’s own views.

ἦν καὶ νῦν ὑπενδῶμέν ποτε (πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι): ‘And if we ever give way a little (for everything living must eventually wither)’. A famous ‘prediction’ of the end of the Athenian empire in 404, an event which will be mentioned as a fact at the end of the next chapter (65. 12). But we should not too rapidly assume that the present passage also was written or thought by Th. after that date: see *Thucydides*, 65, for the literary, specifically Homeric, parallels to the tranquil pessimism here displayed. An ‘organic’ view of the state is here implied; for this theory of the development of states cp. DK 12 Anaximander B 1, and generally Walbank, *HCP* i. 645 f.; on the present passage note also J. de Romilly, *The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors* (Ann Arbor, 1977), 9 and 13.

εὐπορωτάτην καὶ μέγιστην: ‘wealth and greatness’. The present passage as a whole is frank in its stress on the material power and prosperity which Th. makes Pericles incorrectly identify as the reasons why Athens will be remembered. Nothing here is said about the cultural and artistic greatness for which she is actually remembered; it is normally held that Th. makes Pericles dwell on these in the Funeral Speech, but I have already suggested that even there certain key passages have been over-interpreted: see e.g. 41. 1 n. on τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδευσιν. Other passages in that speech are in the same aggressive vein as the present passage: see e.g. 43. 1 n. on τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν. As for the specific mention of wealth, this is not likely to have struck Th.’s readers or hearers as odd: Aeschylus in the *Eumenides*, 996 (early 450s) made the chorus hail Athens ‘in due apportionment of *wealth*’.

5. ἡ δὲ παραυτίκα λαμπρότης καὶ ἐς τὸ ἔπειτα δόξα αἰείμνηστος: 'and, besides the immediate splendour of great actions, the renown of them endures for ever in men's memories'. See Macleod, 153: 'In this phrase Pericles rolls "present splendour and future fame" into one syntactical ball and tries to tear them through the gates of oblivion; but the reader, again, must see that this sublime conceit remains a conceit . . .' In fact, even here the speaker is granting that 'all this must end', as Macleod puts it.

6. καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοὶ εἰσιν: 'the greatest [lit. 'strongest'] states and the greatest men'. Pericles' last speech, like his first, ends with the thought that the admirable qualities of states and of individuals are identical: see i. 144. 3 and n. for this important idea.

65. FINAL PHASE OF PERICLES' LIFE; HIS 'OBITUARY'

This is one of the most important chapters in Th. for the light it throws on his own political views (for which see M. Heath, *LCM* 15 (1990), 58ff., with good remarks on ii. 65); in this respect it ranks with the Corcyraean *stasis* description at iii. 82–3, but is less forced and paradoxical than that section and altogether more accessible. O. Murray, *Oxford History of the Classical World* (1986), 196, strangely regards these two crucial sections, which he rightly singles out as the two main pieces of sustained political analysis in Th., as 'less successful' than the speeches, which he regards as vehicles for Th.'s own view of politics. This is not a view of the speeches that I accept. Expressions of political opinion by Th., such as richly abound in the present chapter but are so infrequent elsewhere, are all we have and they are precious. (Book viii has more than its share of such authorial comments but they are brief and sometimes difficult.) However, there is force in Murray's objection that ii. 65 and iii. 82–3 are 'both unsatisfactory in their attempt to impose a linear progression on complex phenomena'. For Corcyra see iii. 82–3, introductory n., and *Thucydides*, 188, where I suggested that Th. should not have treated the greed, which on his view caused the Corcyra *stasis*, as if it were a purely war-time phenomenon. The present chapter also, valuable though it is, can be faulted in the way Murray indicates: Th. here implies, surely wrongly, that there was a radical difference between the style and methods of Pericles and those of his successors. The issue has been much discussed, particularly in the aftermath of Connor's important 1971 book on the 'New Politicians' of fifth-century Athens, i.e. the successors of Pericles. For this book see 43. 1 n. on τῆν τῆς πόλεως

δύναμιν, and for objections see the reviews by D. M. Lewis, *CR* 25 (1975), 87 ff., and J. K. Davies, *Gnomon*, 47 (1975), 374 ff.; see also *Greek World*, 123 ff., 129. (53. 1 may be relevant, see n. there.)

3. **ἔζημίωσαν χρήμασι:** 'they . . . fined Pericles'. And, it seems—though Th. does not here say so—they deposed him from the generalship also: see Diod. xii. 45. 4, Plut. *Per.* 35. 4. See also next n., and above, 59. 3 n. (Th. may there imply the subsequent deposition, so his silence may not be quite complete.)

Gomme thought that Th. was 'deliberately silent' at this point about another topic, the attacks on Pericles' associates. But the historicity of some of the 'prosecutions' is doubtful: see K. J. Dover, 'The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society', *The Greeks and Their Legacy: Collected Papers*, ii (Oxford, 1988), 135 ff., and I. F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates* (London, 1988), Epilogue, at 231 ff.: 'Was There a Witch-Hunt in Ancient Athens?'

4. **ὕστερον δ' αὖθις οὐ πολλῶ . . . στρατηγὸν εἶλοντο:** 'but soon afterwards . . . they elected him general again'. This could mean either that they reinstated him as one of the generals of 430/29, or (more likely) that they elected him as one of the new panel of generals for 429/8; the latter solution is preferred by Develin (i. 93. 3 n.), following Fornara, *Generals* (i. 117. 2 n.), 55, who stresses the word εἶλοντο, 'elected' [lit. 'chose'], with its implication of normal election.

ὄπερ φιλεῖ ὄμιλος ποιεῖν: 'with the usual fickleness of the mob'. A characteristic aside: see e.g. iv. 28. 3.

5. **ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτῳ προγνοῦς τὴν δύναμιν:** 'when the war began he showed that here too he had estimated Athenian power correctly'. This appreciation is one of Th.'s most serious misjudgements: from evidence not supplied by him, above all from inscriptions, it can be shown that Pericles' financial optimism (see 13 above and nn.) was misplaced. See, for a good statement of this point, Andrewes, *Didaskalos*, 4 (1972), 161, quoted in *Thucydides*, 168 n. 54. Athenian public borrowing in the first half of the Archidamian War, attested by ML 72 = Fornara 134, was running at very high levels. This necessitated the large tribute increases attested by ML 69 = Fornara 136. There are good grounds for associating these necessary increases with the successors of Pericles in general and Kleon in particular (that is, with the very politicians whom Th. in the present chapter compares, to their disadvantage, with Pericles). The evidence is as follows: (i) the proposer of ML 69 is called Thoudippos, and there are grounds for thinking this man was a son-in-law of Kleon because a Kleon son of Thoudippos, perhaps grandson of the famous Kleon, is known from a fourth-century speech, Isaios, ix. See ML comm. and now B. D. Meritt in *Classical Contributions* (i.

32. 5 n.), 89 ff.; but for objections see F. Bourriot, *Historia*, 31 (1982), 404 ff., and, accepting Bourriot on this point, J. S. Traill, *Demos and Trittyis* (1986), 41. (ii) Ar. *Knights*, 312, attributes to Kleon a special vigilance concerning the collection of tribute; compare *Wasps*, 671. (iii) Plut. *Aristides* 24, a neglected text, specifically says that 'the demagogues' raised the tribute after Pericles' time.

For the kind of expense entailed by Pericles' policy of 'keeping the allies in hand' (13. 2) see below, 70. 2 and n.: 2000 talents spent on the Potidaia siege.

6. ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ: 'his foresight'. See previous n., but note also that the combination of i. 141. 5 ('violent capital levies' will not be needed, according to Pericles) and iii. 19 (swingeing capital levy necessary after all) to some extent undermines the praise here bestowed on Pericles' financial foresight, and we should allow for the possibility that this is deliberate on Th.'s part, an oblique expression of a reservation. See nn. on those passages.

7. καὶ ἀρχὴν μὴ ἐπικτωμένους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ: 'not to try to expand their empire while the war was going on'. See i. 144. 1 and ii. 62. 2 nn.

ἔφη περιέσεσθαι: 'they would win through'. See i. 144. 1 n.

οἱ δὲ ταῦτά τε πάντα ἐς τοῦναντίον ἐπραξαν: 'But they did the exact opposite'. Who are 'they'? We are not told. Classen/Steup take it to mean generally 'the Athenians after his death'; Gomme does not discuss the point, but his long n. appears to take it as a slightly more precise and loaded reference to the *politicians* after his death, and that contrast is certainly made explicit in the paras. which follow (see esp. 10). But the plurals in the *preceding* paras. and in the immediately preceding sentence—e.g. μὴ ἐπικτωμένους (above)—refer to the Athenians generally, albeit a (linguistically if not actually) different set of Athenians, namely the contemporaries of the *living* Pericles. So the view of Classen/Steup is strictly preferable. But here for once—contrast viii. 1—Th. is not concerned to distinguish between the people and its leaders, so to that extent Gomme may be right: Th. intends his strictures to apply to identifiable makers of policy.

As to the substance of Th.'s remark, it is surely too sweeping; but just how sweeping depends on whether 'the war', ὁ πόλεμος, referred to in the present para. (three times) is the Archidamian War of 431–421 or the whole war of 431–404. For this problem see *Greek World*, 129. If the reference is to the Archidamian War the accusation about 'doing the exact opposite' is certainly unjust, as we shall see in the nn. below (compare also *Greek World*, 136f.): for one thing, the Epidaurus expedition (above, 56 nn.) showed that Pericles' own policy was not defensive to the exclusion of large-scale raiding expeditions, or of cavalry

forays (see i. 143. 5 n.). As for the events of 429–421, the disciplining of Mytilene (iii. 50) was in accordance with the advice to keep the allies in hand (ii. 13); the interest in Sicily (iii. 86, iv. 65 nn.) was generally consistent with policy in the *pentekontaetia*, although some Athenians may already in the mid 420s have conceived western ambitions which went beyond what Pericles would have thought advisable *in wartime* (ii. 62. 2 n.); Demosthenes' operations in Aitolia (iii. 94 ff.) had an un-Periclean aspect but could be justified in terms of the security of Attica (*Greek World*, 133); and it is not obvious that Pericles would have accepted the peace offer of the Spartans in 424, though Th. puts Athens' refusal down to greed and the malign influence of Kleon (iv. 21. 2–3 nn.). The un-Periclean features of all this scarcely justify the words 'the exact opposite', and there was much activity, not listed above, that Pericles would have approved of, or in which there were 'mitigating circumstances' as Holladay (i. 144. 1 n.) puts it: he collects and discusses it all at 405 ff.

If, however, we take 'the war' to refer to the whole war—and the whole chapter certainly goes on to mention the final fall of Athens—the chief charge which Th. is making against the Athenians and their leaders after Pericles becomes the main Sicilian expedition of 415–413, specified at para. 11 (see n. there). This is, I believe, the better view. The only difficulty is that it is a little odd to say 'everything went to pieces after Pericles' death in 429. Why, in 415 ...' But perhaps Th., writing this chapter as he did after 404, telescoped events in his mind.

καὶ ἄλλα ἔξω τοῦ πολέμου δοκοῦντα εἶναι: 'and in other things which appeared to have nothing to do with the war'. It is not clear exactly what Th. was thinking of here, which is a pity in view of the elaborate statement of motives and consequences with which he continues. The reference is perhaps to self-seeking diplomacy by individuals: perhaps (i) to Alcibiades' intrigues in the Peloponnese in Book v (so Classen/Steup), if 'the war' means the whole period 431–404 (see previous n.) and the word *δοκοῦντα*, 'appeared', is taken as a kind of apology for the fact that those intrigues actually took place during the uneasy peace of Nicias. Or (ii) to diplomacy in the 420s with Persia like that at Ar. *Acharnians*, 61 ff.; in particular, the involvement with Pissouthnes and Amorgos (i. 112. 2–4 n.) might be relevant—was this deal for Athenian mercenaries another manifestation of tight Athenian finances (see 5 n. above)? Even if so, it was a desperate throw, and certainly one which eventually 'crippled' Athens' conduct of the war; but who was responsible? Again, one might suspect Alcibiades. Or finally (iii), Th. may be thinking of ill-advised policies within the empire: Gomme instanced the sending of the tribute-collecting ships at iii. 19,

and one might add the peremptory-looking order to Chios to dismantle its walls at iv. 51, or even the savage treatment of Melos at the end of Book v (again, a peace of Nikias event). True, toughness towards the allies was Periclean (see previous n. on Mytilene); but—except briefly at ii. 13—Th. does not seem disposed to recognize that aspect of imperial policy anyway (i.e. whether it be regarded as essential to the war, or as *ἔξω*, 'nothing to do with it').

κατὰ τὰς ἰδίαις φιλοτιμίαις: 'honour . . . to individuals' [lit. 'through private seeking after honour']. For the exact phrase *κατ' ἰδίας δὲ φιλοτιμίας* see viii. 89. 3 with n. there: as here, the implication there is unfavourable. But by itself *φιλοτιμία*, 'seeking after honour', might be creditable, as often in the decrees of the fourth century: see D. Whitehead, 'Competitive Outlay and Community Profit: *Philotimia* in Democratic Athens', *Cl. ed. Med.* 34 (1983), 55 ff.; R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (Harmondsworth, 1986), 689 n. 21; D. M. MacDowell, *Demosthenes Against Meidias* (Oxford, 1990), 378 f. on Dem. xxi. 159; F. Frazier, *Revue de philologie*, 62 (1988), 109 ff. (mainly, but not entirely, about *philotimia* in Plutarch's *Lives*); Lloyd-Jones, 'Ehre und Schande' (i. 32. 4 n.), 18; see also Th. iii. 82. 8 and my n. there. Clearly, the addition in the present passage of the word *ἰδίας*, 'private', makes a difference to the question whether the noun is to be taken favourably or unfavourably, and Th. at any rate does not bear out the view the word actually changed its meaning from a bad sense in the fifth century to a good one in the fourth, as Whitehead argues and MacDowell accepts. As for iii. 82. 8, the word there lacks the addition 'private' but is in bad company, namely *πλεονεξία*, 'greed'; this fixes the meaning as securely as the addition of 'private'. In any case, the closely related word *φιλότιμον* at ii. 44. 4 is unequivocally favourable.

8. δυνατὸς ὢν τῷ τε ἀξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ: 'he owed his influence to his personal distinction and ability'. We might invoke the modern vocabulary of political leadership and say that Pericles is here being commended both for 'charisma' and for thinking out good policies. According to Andrewes, 'The Mytilene Debate', *Phoenix*, 16 (1962), 83, as also M. I. Finley, 'Athenian Demagogues', in *Studies in Ancient Society* (London, 1974), 1 ff., and in *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge, 1983), the demagogues, both Pericles and his successors, owed their supremacy chiefly to their 'mastery of finance and administration'. On this view Th. has (i) underrated expertise to the advantage of charisma, except in vague references—as here—to Pericles' 'ability'; and (ii) foisted on posterity an unreal distinction between Pericles and his successors, who were 'indispensable experts' no less than he was, but whom Th. dismisses as greedy self-seekers; see further below, 10 n., for the unreality of the general distinction implied by (ii).

As to (i), Wesley Thompson, 'Athenian Leadership: Expertise or Charisma', *Classical Contributions* (i. 32. 5 n.), 153 ff., now argues against Andrewes that Athens' leaders were after all *moral* leaders whose intention was to arouse the Athenians to action; they did not care about the details of that action but left them to be 'attended to by functionaries' (153) or 'bureaucrats' (157). (He does not say who he supposes these to have been; members of the Boule?) He does, however, allow (154) that some Athenian leaders, such as Nicias before the Sicilian expedition, are represented as combining expertise and charisma; and perhaps we should add the present passage. This scepticism about modern theories of demagogic 'expertise' is in effect a return to a Thucydidean position. Thompson is perhaps right to protest that Athenian accounting methods (on which see R. Macve, *CRUX*, 233 ff.) were too primitive to allow much scope for demagogic financial wizardry. But I have two doubts about his revisionist account. First, he relies on the airy indifference to financial detail of a speech like Demosthenes' *First Olynthiac*. But such speeches may at some stage of production have been pruned of boring detail for literary reasons, just as Th.'s speeches (ii. 13, a kind of speech, is a partial exception) avoid financial technicalities. This may indeed have reflected the realities of public oratory: as Horace Walpole is said to have remarked about the Elder Pitt, 'the multiplication table did not admit of being treated in epic' (H. Brogan, *Pelican History of the United States* (Harmondsworth, 1986), 144). True, passages like Xen. *Mem.* iii. 6 imply that financial knowledge was necessary before you addressed the assembly, but that does not settle the question, how much knowledge of detail orators were expected actually to *display*.

Second, no conclusions, about the degree of Kleon's engagement in *financial and administrative* matters, can be drawn from the undoubted truth (Thompson, 157) that he was 'not personally the man to execute the male population of Mytilene'.

Sinclair (60. 5 n.), 213, speaks of the demagogues as an 'inherent necessity' but does not cite Thompson's counter-argument; P. J. Rhodes, 'Political Activity in Classical Athens', *JHS* 106 (1986), 132 ff. and n. 119, is aware of both views but retains a belief in 'experts'.

διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος: 'of transparent integrity'. See 60. 5 n.

ἐλευθέρως: 'like free men'. See Parry 1989 (i. 11. 2 n.), 144 ff.

καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἡγε: 'he led them rather than was led by them'. In fact it is improbable that the historical Pericles was really so indifferent to popular opinion: see Plato, *Gorgias*, 517 c, with Irwin's comm. Note also the picture at Ar. *Peace*, 606 ff., with Sommerstein's nn., of Pericles as afraid of the ferocious temper of the Athenian people. Th. insists on this 'leading', cp. i. 127. 3 n. on ὧν γάρ. . . .

9. ὁπότε γοῦν αἰσθοιτό τι αὐτοῦς παρὰ καιρὸν ὕβρει θαρσοῦντας . . . : 'When he saw them unreasonably elated and arrogant . . .'. Cp. the definition of rhetorical skill in Plato, *Phaedrus*, 267 CD.

ἐγίγνετό τε λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή: 'So Athens, though still in name a democracy, was in fact ruled by her greatest citizen' [lit. 'became something that was a democracy in name, but actually a rule by the first man']. A famous sentence, but the idea was not original to Th.; scholars have noted the similarity with a sentence in the 'Debate on the Constitutions' in Hdt. iii. 82. 4 (where the advocate of monarchy argues, in a sophistic context, that democracy tends towards monarchy anyway because the champion of the people is virtually worshipped by them and so turns into a monarch), and have reasonably wondered whether Hdt. also had Pericles in mind. But the idea is already present in Solon F 9 West (early sixth century): see F. Stroheker, 'Zu den Anfängen der monarchischen Theorie in der Sophistik', *Historia*, 3 (1953/4), 381 ff., at 389-90 n. 1. ('Control the masses' at 8 above echoes Solon F 37. 7.)

The verb ἐγίγνετο, 'became', has provoked some discussion; for example de Ste. Croix has argued, *OPW* 27 f., that the imperfect tense should be given its full weight, so that Th. is saying that Athens was merely 'on the way to becoming' one-man rule, not that it actually was. Against this see, however, Macleod, 149 n. 1, adducing viii. 20. 1 (with Andrewes's n.) to show that the imperfect 'need not suggest that this process of "becoming" was incomplete'. This is probably right (that is, Th.'s statement is after all categorical); although on viii. 20 note W. Thompson, *CQ* 33 (1983), 293. For 'in name . . . in fact' cp. ii. 35. 1 n. 10. οἱ δὲ ὕστερον . . . : 'But his successors . . .'. This highly controversial claim, that Pericles' successors were on an altogether lower level than he was and indulged the people as he had not needed to, is the foundation of modern theories about the 'new politicians' of the Archidamian War period (see introductory n. above). Lewis in his review of Connor (followed by me in *Greek World*, 124) pointed out that war-time conditions in the 420s, above all the larger assembly attendances resulting from the evacuation of Attica, may have called for different and more strident oratorical techniques. But in most respects it is hard to see what was so 'new' or different about Pericles' successors, especially if they are compared not with Pericles the senior statesman but with Pericles the pushing politician of the 460s and 450s. That there was a change between the politicians of the fifth century and the more professional politicians of the fourth century is harder to deny; but the reasons for that are surely to be found (not in Pericles' death in 429 but) in the loss of empire in 404, which deprived Athens of the material benefits

which had made possible the 'consensus politics' of the years after 478. See further vi. 16. 2n.

ἴσοι μᾶλλον: 'more on a level with each other'. Again, this is misleading if it means that Pericles had no rivals; as we saw (i. 139. 4n.), Kleon may already have emerged as a critic of Pericles at the beginning of the war, though not introduced by Th. till iii. 36. 3. Kleon's prominence in Athenian public life may have started much earlier still, perhaps c.440: see Davies, *APF* 145, 320 (now defended by Traill against Bourriot's objections; for refs. see above, 5n.). For opposition to Pericles in earlier periods see Andrewes, 'The Opposition to Pericles' (63. 1n. on ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν).

ὀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτος ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι ἐτράποντο καθ' ἡδονὰς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδόναι: 'because each was struggling to be first himself, they were ready to sacrifice the whole conduct of affairs to the whims of the people'. Surely the implications of this are too flattering to Pericles: see above, 8n. on καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο. But how fair is it as a summing-up of the 'demagogues' (other than Pericles) themselves, especially Kleon, the most famous of all? The simple, but marvellous, main idea of Aristophanes' *Knights* (produced in 424) is that Demos, the personified Athenian people, is a disgusting old man whose 'lover' (see 43. 1n. on ἐραστάς) is Paphlagon = Kleon, who flatters and fawns on Demos but who is displaced in Demos' affections by the Sausage-Seller whose promises and declarations are more extravagant still. (With this compare the boasts of the demagogues as reported by Bdelykleon at *Wasps*, 666-7.) This picture does full justice to the element of 'charisma' in Athenian leadership, but not much to the financial and administrative 'expertise' which is such a feature of modern rehabilitation of the demagogues (see above, 8n., for these terms); although note that Paphlagon's generosity towards Demos is made possible by the surpluses he was able to raise while on the *boule* (773ff.), and see 5n. above for the link between Kleon and the tribute. So even Ar., while strongly disliking Kleon, seems after all to have recognized that there was more to his ascendancy than mere fawning on the people. This is not the place to discuss Aristophanes' view of Kleon in detail, except to say that in my view M. Heath, *Political Comedy in Aristophanes* (Göttingen, 1987), unduly minimizes the political element in Ar.'s portrayal. For Th.'s view of Kleon, which is more complicated than simple antipathy, see further iii. 37. 2n. on ἰσχύι . . .

11. ἄλλα τε πολλά . . . ἡμαρτήθη: 'led to many errors' [lit. 'it was erred in respect of many other things']. For the theme of Athenian mistakes see i. 84. 4n.

ὁ ἐς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτον γνώμης ἀμάρτημα ἦν

πρὸς οὓς ἐπήσαν: 'the Sicilian expedition. This failed, not so much through an initial error of judgement about the enemy they were attacking ...'. A very surprising opinion, even when we have allowed full weight to the qualification 'not so much', οὐ τοσοῦτον, which as Westlake insists (*Essays*, 166) does not expressly deny the validity of the view rejected (see above, i. 9. 1 n.). The reason why the opinion here expressed is so surprising is that the narrative of Books vi and vii (particularly the opening of vi) *does* clearly imply that the Athenians had indeed badly underrated their enemy. I postpone discussion of the problem to vi. 1 n.; meanwhile see Dover, *HCT* v. 423-7, 'Alcibiades and Sicily' and H. Erbse, *Thukydides—Interpretationen* (Berlin, 1989), 83 ff.

ὅσον οἱ ἐκπέψαντες οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα τοῖς οἰχομένοις ἐπιγινώσκοντες: 'as because they subsequently took decisions which were against the interests of the expedition which they had already sent out'. The Greek words οὐ τὰ πρόσφορα mean simply 'disadvantageous decisions'; they do not mean, or imply, that the Athenians at home failed to send out 'proper support' as even the revised (1972) Penguin translation has it, despite Westlake, *Essays*, 168f., a study which originally appeared as long ago as 1958. It would be plain false for Th. to suggest that the expedition was inadequately reinforced: on the contrary, the Athenians sent everything they could. (See vii. 11 ff. and nn.) Even M. W. Frederiksen, 'Campanian Cavalry: A Question of Origins', *Dialoghi di archeologia*, 2 (1968), 3 ff., at 27 n. 36, takes the present passage the wrong way; but his discussion (10ff.) of the cavalry aspect to the Athenian failure in Sicily is excellent and of first-rate importance.

The 'disadvantageous decisions' are above all the recall of Alcibiades; probably also the failure to recall Nicias; and just possibly the support of Amorges: see i. 112. 2-4 n. and viii. 5 n.

12. ὄκτω μὲν ἔτη: 'eight years'. The manuscripts have *τρία*, 'three', but this is obviously wrong. [But see Rusten's n.] W. R. Connor, *Arktouros* (introductory n. to 2-6), 269 ff., makes the interesting suggestion that the passage never contained any statement about the number of years for which Athens held out; the text is in fact (he thinks) corrupt. He suggests how this could have come about (perhaps one source of corruption was that *ἔτι*, 'still', got turned into *ἔτη*, 'years').

Κύρω: 'Cyrus'. Th.'s only reference to the final phase of Persian support for Sparta, which won her the war, and which was reported in detail by Xenophon, *Hellenica*, i-ii. The best modern account of this phase is D. M. Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, chs. 5 and 6. Note especially his 132 n. 139 on the present para., pointing out that 'for Th., looking back at the end of the war, the contributions made to the war against Athens by

Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos could be simply ignored and . . . he found Cyrus alone worth mentioning'.

That Th. intended to carry his narrative down to the fall of Athens seems to me certain (though it has, oddly, been doubted: Konishi, *LCM* 1987, 5).

66. PELOPONNESIAN ATTACK ON ZAKYNTHOS

Th. returns to his sparest style after the exalted and highly generalizing material of the past six chapters.

1. τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρος: 'during the same summer'. See 2 n. below.

ἐς Ζάκυνθον: 'Zakynthos'. For Zakynthos as an Athenian ally see below and above, 7. 3 and 9. 4; Hdt. ix. 37 may show earlier hostility to Sparta (Zakynthos as a refuge for an enemy of Sparta). Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 308, plausibly guesses that the object of the present expedition was to 'make Athenian raids on the Peloponnese more difficult by removing one of her bases' (see also 80. 1).

εἰσὶ δὲ Ἀχαιῶν τῶν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ἄποικοι: 'are colonists of the Peloponnesian Achaians'. Or of Arkadia, Paus. viii. 24. 3. Or, as suggested by B. Schmidt, *Die Insel Zakynthos* (Freiburg, i. Br., 1899), 3 f., a joint foundation. (For a wholly different tradition see Dion. Hal. i. 50: a foundation by Aeneas on his way from Troy. Th. passes this over, though see 68. 3 for his mention of a comparable tradition.) Zakynthos was naturally thought of as part of the Peloponnese according to R. Baladié (i. 30. 2 n. on *Κυλλήνην*), 3; but in 191 Flamininus rejected the Achaian claim to the island on the grounds that the Peloponnesian tortoise should stay in its shell, Livy xxxiv. 32.

2. Κνήμος Σπαρτιάτης ναύαρχος: 'Knemos the Spartan admiral'. The first mention of this man, who is so prominent in this book from 80 onwards. That he is navarch both here and at 80 (summer 429) has caused difficulties on the view (Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² ii. 2. 269 ff.; 272 on the present passage) that the navarchy was an annual post, running from autumn to autumn. Beloch had to suppose that the present expedition, dated in para. 1 to the summer, went out as late as September 439, despite the implication of *τελευτώντος* at 67. 1 (see n. there). But it may be better to suppose that the navarchy, at least at this early stage of the Peloponnesian War, was an occasional office, appointed for a specific set of operations: see Andrewes, *HCT* v. 454 f., summarizing and approving R. Sealey, 'Die spartanische Nauarchie', *Klio*, 58 (1976), 335 ff. (on the present passage see Sealey, 336 n. 5, 341). On the navarchy in general see Cartledge, *Agessilaos* (London, 1987), 79, with refs. to recent work.

67. PELOPONNESIAN APPROACHES TO PERSIA

On the general question of Spartan relations with Persia see i. 82. 1 and ii. 81 nn. Lewis, *CAH* v², ch. 9, rightly notes that the embassy to Persia here mentioned is evidence of long-range thinking among the Peloponnesian enemy. I postpone further discussion to iv. 50. 2 n. As at 29, and no doubt for the same reason (see introductory n. there), Th. is extremely well informed on the detail of the present episode. There is an additional reason for fullness, the desire to give the Athenians' deplorable behaviour (para. 4) its full impact.

1. **τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος**: 'At the end of the same summer'. See 66. 2 n.: if the present episode happened at the *end* of the summer of 430, the Zakynthos expedition, which merely took place 'in the summer', should not be placed as late as September.

Ἄριστεύς: 'Aristeus'. Not heard of since i. 65.

Σιτάλκην . . . τὸν Τήρω: 'Sitalkes son of Teres'. See 29 and nn.

Φαρνάκην τὸν Φαρναβάζου: 'Pharnakes, son of Pharnabazos'. For this man's family and satrapy see i. 129. 1 nn. As Beloch suggested (*Gr. Gesch.*² iii. 2. 145f.), the dates make it likely that Pharnabazos was younger brother, rather than son, of the Artabazos of i. 129.

2. **Σάδοκον τὴν γεγενημένον Ἀθηναῖον**: 'Sadokos, who had been made an Athenian citizen'. See 29. 5 n., especially the references to M. Osborne, for the evidence about the grant of Athenian citizenship to Sadokos. Osborne (27 n. 39) cites the present passage as further evidence that Sadokos 'implemented his citizenship', presumably because he regards Th.'s formulation here as emphatic. The grant of citizenship to Sadokos may not have brought all the benefits which Athens had hoped for, but Learchos and Ameiniades, who are not responsible for Athens' shocking subsequent treatment of the prisoners, were able by some quick thinking to turn it to unexpected advantage. Few Athenian citizenship grants can have brought such rapid and concrete benefits. Note that Hdt. (below) holds Sitalkes, father of Sadokos, responsible as no doubt morally he was, and adds that Nymphodoros—mentioned by Th. at 29 but not here—participated. (M. Walbank, see 29. 1., omits this aspect of Nymphodoros' proxeny.)

τὴν ἐκεῖνον πόλιν: 'Athens, which was now his own city'. See previous n.

4. **δείσαντες . . . τὸν Ἄριστεα μὴ αὐθις σφᾶς ἔτι πλείω κακούργη**: 'were afraid that Aristeus . . . would do them still further damage . . .'. See Westlake, *Essays*, 78 and n. 9, suggesting that personal admiration for this man led Th. to give an exaggerated picture of Athenian fears.

ἀκρίτους καὶ βουλομένους ἔστιν ἂ εἰπεῖν αὐθημερόν: ‘on the very day of their arrival . . . without trial and without hearing what they wanted to say’ [lit. ‘wanting to say certain things’]. A notorious incident, mentioned by Hdt. (vii. 137) for whom it represents the final working out of a divine displeasure for the killing of some Persian messengers. Th. disregards that aspect but his precise language shows, in its own way, indignation and shame (although he goes scrupulously on to give the Athenian self-justification further down). For instance, it was basic to the Athenian democratic constitution that it gave the opportunity for those who ‘wanted to say/speak’, to do so; see Dem. xviii. 170 and frequently. Th.’s expression here may therefore be faintly ironic. What would he have made of the Arginusai trial of 406 if he had lived to record it? (Xen. *Hell.* i. 7: the victorious generals who failed to pick up survivors were tried illegally *en masse*).

Note that one of the prisoners was Aristeus the Corinthian; see previous n. and i. 60. 2 n. for Th.’s favourable treatment of this man, with Westlake there cited; personal knowledge may have fuelled Th.’s indignation and explained the fullness of his treatment. Westlake thinks Th. may have interrogated him in captivity either in the north or en route for Athens. This is not impossible, but the Herodotean aspect should not be forgotten: Th. wishes to correct the religious slant which Hdt. gave this well-known incident. See my paper in *Calting Studies*.

καὶ ἐς φάραγγα ἐσέβαλον: ‘they threw their bodies down a precipice’ [lit. ‘into a pit or gully’]. See Diggle (i. 138. 6 n.): it is not clear that this is the same as the *βάραθρον* into which people were thrown alive.

68. AMBRAKIOT ATTACK ON AMPHILOCHIAN ARGOS

For the background to this attack see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 278, suggesting that the preceding aggressions (para. 6) by the Ambrakiot, who were Corinthian colonists, against Amphilochia should be fitted into a pattern of Corinthian encroachment in the north-west in 480–435. As Lewis notes (*CAH* v², ch. 9), the big campaign of 80 below represents a merging of the ideas behind the operations described in 66 above and the present chapter.

3. Ἀμφίλοχος ὁ Ἀμφιάρω: ‘Amphilochos son of Amphiaras’. As in the *Archaeology*, Th. accepts the historical reality of figures from the mythical, Trojan War period. See further 102. 5 n. See also Sieveking (i. 24. 1 n.), 126 ff.; 144.

5. καὶ ἠλληνίσθησαν τὴν νῦν γλώσσαν τότε πρῶτον ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀμπρακιωτῶν ξυνοικησάντων: 'and from their Ambrakiot fellow-settlers they first learned the Greek language which they now speak' [lit. 'and they were then first Hellenized, in respect of the language which they now speak, from their Ambrakiot fellow-settlers']. This is a very interesting passage, in view of the subsequent history of the word ἠλληνισμός, 'Hellenism'. The nineteenth-century German historian J. G. Droysen used 'Hellenismus' to describe an entire period of Greek history, the 'Hellenistic' age which ran from the time of Alexander the Great to the Battle of Actium; the word was appropriate because that period saw the spread of Greek culture in all directions, but particularly towards the east. It was, in fact, a period of 'Hellenization'. As Hammond remarks of the present passage, 'the word ἠλληνίζεσθαι is found here only in fifth-century Greek and its precise implications are uncertain': *Epirus*, 419 (see further below). As for the 'precise implications' of the word, it is arguable that for Th. the verb on its own meant something more general than language; otherwise why add 'as to their language'? In which case the interesting conclusion would follow that Th. took the word ἠλληνίζω to mean 'Hellenization' in a broader sense, referring to general culture, and is the first author so to take it. But this is not quite decisive because of νῦν, 'now', which qualifies 'language' ('the language which they *now* speak'). That is, perhaps ἠλληνίζω did primarily refer to language, but Th. added a specific mention of γλώσσαν, 'language', because he needed the noun as a way of introducing the notion of the Amphiloichians' *present*, νῦν, language. For this point see my review of R. Bichler, *Hellenismus* (Darmstadt, 1983) in *CR* 36 (1984), at 246; Bichler's otherwise useful book does not consider the present passage.

As to the historical point, Hammond thinks the reference is merely to change of *dialect*: the people of Amphiloichian Argos switched under Ambrakiot influence from one kind of Greek (which he thinks they had spoken since the place was founded in the eleventh century) to another, Corinthian Doric, kind. This does not seem to me to do justice to the verb 'Hellenized', which Hammond (420) eventually glosses in a purely political sense (he speaks of 'the Amphiloichians inviting the Ambraciotes into the *polis* and so "being made Hellenes" . . .'). But this, in turn, does not do justice to the reference to γλώσσαν, 'language'. Hammond's account of the language and origins of the Amphiloichian Argives may be right, but I do not think he can claim that it is easily reconciled with Th., who is saying plainly but possibly wrongly that *the Amphiloichian Argives first learnt Greek from the Ambrakiots*.

That Th., the student of war and politics, is interested in social details of this sort is worth noting.

οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι Ἀμφίλοχοι βάρβαροί εἰσιν: 'the other Amphilocheians are barbarians'. Hammond (421) thinks this means that they spoke an uncouth form of Greek, not that they spoke none at all, 'for they could hardly have avoided regular contact with the Doric-speaking Argives and Ambraciotes between whose territories they lay'. This is possible as far as these other Amphilocheians go, though on Hammond's own view it implies a fine distinction between the Argives who spoke a dialect of Greek (see previous n.) and the other Amphilocheians who spoke uncouth Greek.

6. χρόνω: 'after a while'. See Salmon, introductory n. above.

7. διδόασιν ἑαυτοὺς Ἀκαρνανῶσι: 'placed themselves under the protection of the Akarnanians'. For an interesting discussion of this kind of surrender see Frederiksen, *Campania* (i. 32-43, introductory n.), 190, comparing Hdt. vi. 108 and other Greek and Roman instances. Cp. i. 25. 1.

7-8. καὶ προσπαρακαλέσαντες ἀμφοτέροι Ἀθηναίους, οἱ αὐτοῖς Φορμίωνά τε στρατηγὸν ἔπεμψαν καὶ ναὺς τριάκοντα . . . μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἡ ξυμμαχία πρῶτον ἐγένετο Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Ἀκαρνανῶσιν: 'both together called in the Athenians, who sent them a fleet of thirty ships under the command of Phormio . . . That was when the alliance between the Akarnanians and Athenians was first made'. The date of this Athenian intervention and of the Akarnanian alliance, both of which Th. leaves timeless, is controversial. The question is of the first importance because (as we saw in the introductory n. to i. 24-55) a date for the alliance in the early 430s, which is certainly one strong candidate, would be a provocatively anti-Corinthian act by Athens and would have a bearing on the causes of the Peloponnesian War. (Ambrakia was a Corinthian colony.) But some scholars have preferred to put the intervention and the alliance in the mid 450s, when Athenian operations in this area are attested by Diod. xi. 85: Pericles 'crossed over to Akarnania and won over all the cities except Oiniadai.' The arguments against a date in the 430s for Phormio's operations and diplomacy are (i) Th. ii. 102. 1: Oiniadai 'still', αἰεὶ ποτε, the only state in Akarnania hostile to Athens. This, it is said, is an inappropriate formulation if the general winning over of Akarnania was as recent as 437. (ii) At Th. iii. 105. 1, Olpai near Argos is described as a place which was 'once' (the word is again ποτε) jointly fortified by the Akarnanians and Amphilocheians. This joint occupation clearly refers to the state of affairs terminated shortly before Phormio's arrival; again it is said that ποτε is inappropriate if the period in question is as recent as 437. (See, coming down in favour of a mid-century date, Gomme on iii. 105, Hammond, *Epirus*, 496f. with n. 1 on 497, and Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, app. iii, unfortunately not discussing Hammond.) Both these arguments from ποτε strike me as very

forced; the word need only be translated as 'formerly' or 'previously' rather than 'once upon a time'. The early 430s still seems to me (see *Greek World*, 89) the best date: Th.'s silence about Pericles in the present ch. is against any attempt to amalgamate, or even closely to connect Phormio's activity with the expedition reported by Diodorus. Pericles' successes in the 450s were perhaps ephemeral and did not result in solid alliances (hence *πρώτον*, 'first', in the present passage). Develin (i. 93. 3 n.), 96, also takes the view here followed: he puts the Akarnanian action in 436/5. See also Krentz and Sullivan, *Historia*, 36 (1987), 241 ff.

On either view Th. has failed to report Phormio's activity in its proper place in Book i: if it belonged in the *Pentekontaetia* it should have been mentioned there (but is hardly the only such omission); and if it belonged in the 430s it was (see above) very relevant to the causes of the war, in particular to the *Kerkyraika*.

It will be noted that the above discussion assumes, perhaps wrongly, that a date in the 440s is unlikely. The reason for this assumption is to be found at i. 40. 5 (see n. there): Corinth in 440 votes in a way favourable to Athens over the rebellion of Samos. But as Gomme (above) remarks, this piece of 'friendliness' could be explained in more than one way.

On any dating the Akarnanian alliance was relevant to the build-up of tension between Corinth and Athens, the more relevant the later we put it (50s, 40s, 30s), and I take it to be very late and very relevant.

9. καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν πλησιοχώρων βαρβάρων: 'and some of the other neighbouring barbarians'. These were 'presumably the Thesprotians and Molossians': so Hammond, *Epirus*, 500, comparing ch. 80 below.

69. ATHENIAN NAVAL ACTIVITY AND ATTEMPT AT TRIBUTE-COLLECTING

1. ἐκ Ναυπάκτου: 'stationing himself at Naupaktos' [lit. 'from Naupaktos']. For Naupaktos see i. 103. 3 n.

ἑτέρας δὲ ἕξ ἐπὶ Καρίας καὶ Λυκίας καὶ Μελήσανδρον στρατηγόν, ὅπως ταῦτά τε ἀργυρολογῶσι: 'Six other ships were sent to collect tribute in Lycia and Karia; they were under the command of Melesandros . . .'. For the tribute-paying record of this part of the world (not good) see *Mausolus*, 27 ff. Melesandros was probably identical with the Milasandra mentioned on the Lycian part of the 'Xanthian stele' or 'Xanthian obelisk': see P. Demargne, *Fouilles de Xanthos*, v (1974), 113, against the doubts of W. Thompson, *Hesperia* 36 (1967), 105 ff.; note also Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 61 n. 77. For the Greek section of the stele,

a verse commemoration of the victories of Gergis son of Harpagos, see ML 93 + *CRAI* 1975, 138ff., and, for the obelisk generally, a very remarkable monument, G. E. Bean, *Lycian Turkey* (London, 1978), app. at 177ff. + pl. 15. The Lycian inscription has not yet been fully deciphered.

For another, equally disastrous, tribute-collecting expedition to Karia see iii. 19. There, as here, the question arises whether these ships were connected with a reassessment of tribute. This was argued for by B. D. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents* (Ann Arbor, 1932), 19f., but Meiggs (254; accepted by Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 307 on 24. 3) denied that there was any necessary connection with the regular tribute at all: 'the association with new assessments may be mere coincidence.' On this view Lysikles' mission would resemble fourth-century activities by 'cowboy' Athenian commanders like those in Dem. viii. 24. However, I am not convinced by the argument (Meiggs, Rhodes) that ἀργυρολογεῖν and related words are more appropriate to special exactions than to tribute: Th.'s vocabulary for imperial institutions is notably untechnical (*Thucydides*, 97). I prefer, with Meritt, to connect the present passage with tribute after all. [But see 1997 preface.]

For a comparable early fourth-century incident see Xen. *Hell* iv. 8. 30 (Thrasylbulus killed at Pamphylian Aspendos while raising money).

καὶ τὸ ληστικὸν τῶν Πελοποννησίων μὴ ἑῷσιν αὐτόθεν ὀρμώμενον βλάπτειν τὸν πλοῦν τῶν ὀλκάδων τῶν ἀπὸ Φασήλιδος καὶ Φοινίκης καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἠπείρου: 'who was to see that Peloponnesian privateers did not establish themselves in those parts and damage merchant vessels coming from Phaselis and Phoinike and the rest of that coast'. A tall order for a force of six ships. The reference to Peloponnesian-sponsored piratical activity is interesting: with no navy of her own to speak of, Sparta could do one of two things if she wanted to strike at Athens at sea. She could build a navy herself with Persian or other money; or she could require ships from her allies. See 7. 1-2 nn. There was, however, a third possibility: to encourage piracy, on which see i. 5 n. on ἐτράποντο.

As to Phaselis, J. K. Davies (*CAH* vii². 1. 284) writes 'Athens by the 420s was already importing goods to an extent and from within a radius very little different from anything the Hellenistic world can show; Phaselis by 429 (Thuc. ii. 69) was just as much the staging post of Graeco-Levantine trade as Rhodes was to be two centuries later . . .'. See also D. Blackman (in English) in J. Schäfer (ed.), *Phaselis, Istanbul Mitteilungen* Beiheft 24 (1981), 33.

But what of the other place mentioned? This has usually been taken to be 'Phoenicia' (so, among recent writers, Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*,

61f.). But A. Dickinson, 'A Note on Φοινίκη in Thucydides 2. 69. 1', *CQ* 29 (1979), 213f., has made out an ingenious and plausible case for taking the word to refer not to Phoenicia but to Phoinike, the ancient Lycian predecessor of the modern Finike. (See also, apparently independently, K. Buschmann, *Epigraphica Anatolica*, 12 (1988), 1ff., suggesting Lycian Kemer as the site of Phoinike.) The *phoinik-* root merely refers to date-palms, see Bean, *Turkey's Southern Shore*² (London, 1979), 129.

This suggestion makes better sense of τῆς ἐκεῖθεν ἠπείρου, 'the rest of that coast' [lit. 'the mainland starting from those places'], which Jowett has to render vaguely 'all that region'. That, as Dickinson says, is unsatisfactory. I have changed Jowett's tr.

(Finike is not the only candidate. Quite apart from Kemer—see above—note Bean's discussion of Strabo, 666, mentioning at Mt. Phoinikos, which Bean identifies as Musa Dağ, near the town Olympus, half way between Phaselis and the modern Finike. But an approach in terms of south-east Lycian place-names is surely on the right lines. For a comparable problem in Plutarch's *Alexander* see J. R. Hamilton, comm. on 17. 5, citing F. Stark, *JHS* 78 (1958), 114 and n. 23.)

70. FALL OF POTIDAIA

70. 1. καὶ τινες καὶ ἀλλήλων ἐγέγυντο: 'and there were actually cases of cannibalism' [lit. 'some people actually tasted each other'. Note the fastidious formulation]. For cannibalism in sieges see P. Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply in the Graeco-Roman World* (Cambridge, 1988), 28f. (with n. 16: 'it might be well to be suspicious of tales of cannibalism. As anthropologists have noted, it is always enemies or neighbours of a group who eat human flesh, and the stories can seldom be authenticated'.) To Garnsey's references add the material in Gibbon, ed. Bury (London, 1897), vi. 294 and n. 81. Note also Parker, *Miasma*, 98 and 305, for cannibalism as 'one of those extreme pollutions, often imagined, though never experienced'. That is too strong; the present instance is one of the best authenticated allegations.

Ξενοφῶντι τε τῷ Εὐριπίδου: 'Xenophon son of Euripides'. For this man see Davies, *APPF*, 199f. It is likely that all three of the generals here mentioned were killed at Spartolos in early 429 (not just Xenophon, who certainly was): see below, 79.

2. ἀνλωκυίας δὲ ἤδη τῆς πόλεως δισχίλια τάλαντα ἐς τὴν πολιορκίαν: 'and of the 2,000 talents which the city had already spent on the siege'. That this figure is of a believable order of magnitude is

shown by ML 55 = Fornara 133, with i. 117. 3 n. on *καὶ χρήματα* etc. (approx. 1,400 talents spent on the reduction of Samos).

3. *ξὺν ἐνὶ ἱματίῳ, γυναῖκας δὲ ξὺν δυοῖν*: 'the men with one garment, the women with two' (Why two? Modesty? Compassion in winter?) See Pritchett, v (1991), 299 f.

4. *Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τοὺς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπητιάσαντο*: 'the Athenians blamed the generals'. See Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii. 30, 47. The point of the criticism is that the prisoners could have been sold as slaves. *καὶ ὕστερον ἐποίκουσ ἐπεμψαν ἑαυτῶν ἐς τὴν Ποτειδαίαν καὶ κατώκισαν*: 'afterwards they sent colonists of their own there'. 1,000 of them according to Diod. xii. 46. 7. See ML 66 = Fornara 129, a dedication by the departing settlers, and Meiggs, 535. These settlers also feature in *IG* i³. 62, line 8 (428/7: see *SEG* xxx (1980), 10): the inhabitants of nearby Aphytis have to swear to support the Potidaia colonists.

For a fourth-century Athenian cleruchy at Potidaia see Tod 146 = Harding 58 (361).

71-78. SIEGE OF PLATAIA

The material in these chapters, esp. 75-8, is extraordinarily detailed and vivid and is invaluable as an account of a siege in the clumsy days before the introduction of artillery (non-torsion artillery c.400, torsion about half a century later). See E. W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, i (Oxford, 1969), 49f.: the present passage, 'a real show-piece, an example of the best modern methods of attack and defence, technical details receiving full and sympathetic treatment', is one of the strongest pieces of evidence that there was no artillery at this date in the war. ('The presence of even the most primitive *gastrophetes* could not have passed undetected or even unrecorded by the historian'.)

The exchange between Archidamos and the Plataians (71-4) was singled out by Dionysius as particularly fine and clear; see ch. 36, with Pritchett's comm. For this 'little debate' see E. Badian, 'Plataea Between Athens and Sparta', *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 109-23, and note that the translation has been improved at one point (see 71. 2 n. on *ἀπεδίδου*) by N. G. L. Hammond, *JHS* 112 (1992), 145.

71. 1. *τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιγνομένου θέρους*: 'In the following summer', 429.

2. *θύσας ἐν τῇ Πλαταιῶν ἀγορᾷ ἱερὰ Διὶ ἐλευθερίῳ*: 'sacrificed in the Agora of Plataia to Zeus the God of Freedom [Zeus Eleutherios]'. For this altar to Zeus the God of Freedom see Paus. ix. 2. 5ff. and Plut. *Arist.* 20. 4-6. The joint cult of Zeus Eleutherios, and of Concord

(*δμόνοια*), at Plataia is now attested by an interesting inscription of the mid third century BC published in 1975 (previously there was no evidence for the cult from any date earlier than the Roman Imperial period). See M. M. Austin, *The Hellenistic Age* (Cambridge, 1981), 51, translating *BCH* 99 (1975), 51 ff. The inscription refers to 'the sacrifice in honour of Zeus Eleutherios and Concord and the contest which the Greeks celebrate on the tomb of the heroes [so Austin; the Greek is *ἀνδράσιον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς*, lit. 'the good men'] who fought against the barbarians for the liberty of the Greeks'.

ἀπεδίδου Πλαταιεῦσι γῆν καὶ πόλιν τὴν σφετέραν ἔχοντας αὐτονόμους οἰκεῖν, στρατεῦσαί τε μηδένα ποτὲ ἀδίκως: 'conceded to the Plataians that they were to inhabit their territory and city, to possess and occupy it as independent people; that no one was ever to make unjust war against them ...'. For the translation see Hammond (introductory n.). He shows that the verb *ἀπεδίδου* cannot mean simply 'restored' (as most translators have taken it) because of the infinitives which follow. The verb must have the sense of 'concede' (Hammond further suggests that we should translate 'proposed to concede': the idea of 'proposal' is, he thinks, contained in the imperfect tense). This is not however fatal to Badian's interpretation (see below).

On Pausanias' pledge see Badian (above, introductory n.) and G. Shrimpton, 'When Did Plataea Join Athens?', *CP* 79 (1984); 295 ff., at 301 ff. On Badian's view we must reckon with three stages. (i) Plataia was joined to Athens in some sense between 519 (see iii. 68. 5n.) and the Persian Wars. (ii) It was then (on the evidence of the present passage) declared free and autonomous by Pausanias the Regent in 479, or at least he made a proposal to that effect. Finally (iii) 'a friendly relationship [between Athens and Plataia] continued or was soon resumed' after 479. The difference between Badian and Hammond concerns stage (ii). On Badian's view Plataia was restored in the sense that it now ceased to be part of the Attic state (Badian, 119 f.) as it had been since the latter part of the sixth century: see iii. 55n. On Hammond's view the first part of the proposal merely concerns the recovery of the land and the city from the *Persians* (not, as on Badian's view, from the Athenians); the meat of the proposal is the guarantee against aggression. Hammond's translation is correct, i.e. there is no specific mention of restoration, but *pace* Hammond it does not follow from this that the concession, or proposal to concede, Plataia's right to its land and territory had no implications for the status of Plataia *vis-à-vis* Athens. Badian was right to insist on the general implication and importance of the passage.

Note that the present passage is a rare allusion, in a Thucydidean

speech, to an event otherwise unknown to us: see my paper in *Catling Studies*.

4. μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὄρκους: ‘do not violate your oaths’. This is not an allusion to the famous Oath of Plataia, sworn by the Athenians before, rather than (as here) by the Spartans and assembled allies after, the battle of Plataia. The inscribed text of the famous Oath of Plataia was discovered at Acharnai in Attica in 1932: Tod 204 = Fornara 57. The stone is relevant to the present para. only in as far as it contains a pledge not to destroy Plataia (or Athens, or Sparta. The pledge not to destroy Athens, odd in an Athenian context, suggests that the oath may indeed, as some literary sources imply, have been taken by ‘the Greeks’ or at least some group larger than ‘the Athenians’.) The authenticity of the Oath of Plataia remains uncertain despite efforts at vindication by P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataia* (Munich, 1972), and the present passage of Th. is relevant. As Cawkwell remarked, reviewing Siewert, ‘the failure of the Plataeans in 429 [the present passage] and 427 to appeal explicitly to an oath of all the Hellenes not to deprive Plataea of food and drink and never to destroy the city’ is an argument against authenticity: *CR* 25 (1975), 265. Cawkwell’s point has force even if Th. invented the entire speech; but it might be held that the Plataians (or Th.) preferred to stress the positive undertakings made after the battle rather than the negative ones made before it.

72. 1. ξυνελευθεροῦτε: ‘help us to free’. See i. 122. 3, 123. 1, ii. 8. 4 n. **ἧς μάλιστα μὲν μετᾶσχοντες καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐμμείνατε τοῖς ὄρκους:** ‘It would be best for you to join with us and keep the oaths yourselves’. See Badian (introductory n.), 110, 114: the clear implication is that the oaths sworn in 479 after the battle of Plataia required those swearing to participate in the liberation of any who swore then and were subsequently oppressed.

73. 3. ἀφ’ οὗ ξύμμαχοι ἐγενόμεθα: ‘since we first became their allies’. In 519: see iii. 68. 5 n.

74. 2. θεοὶ ὅσοι γῆν τὴν Πλαταιίδα ἔχετε καὶ ἥρωες: ‘Gods and heroes who possess the land of Plataia’. For such invocations of protective gods and heroes, who ‘together circumscribe the sacral sphere’, see W. Burkert, *Greek Religion* (Oxford, 1985), 205, and refs at 430 n. 26. They include Th. iv. 87. 2 (Brasidas at Akanthos) and inscriptions like *Syll*³ 360 (text of oath from Tauric Chersonese in the Black Sea). See also the interesting ch. x of Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, iii. 322 f., on the *epitheiasmos* or ‘appeal to the gods’.

See, however, iii. 56. 2 n. on ἐν σπονδαῖς: the Spartans were

subsequently to recognize (vii. 18. 2) that they had committed an act of impiety despite Archidamos' appeal to the gods of Plataia.

75. 1. τοσαῦτα ἐπιθειάσας: 'After this appeal to the gods'. For the verb see Pritchett (previous n.).

2. ξύλα μὲν οὖν τέμνοντες ἐκ τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος: 'they cut timber from Kithairon'. Probably pine and fir: see Meiggs, *Trees and Timber* (14. 1 n.), 158.

3. ἑβδομήκοντα: 'seventy'. Two months seems far too long and the figure is probably corrupt. Editors have suggested seven or seventeen days.

4. ξύλινον τεῖχος ξυθέντες: 'constructed a wooden frame'. See the discussion by Winter (18. 1 n.), 74 ff., of such emergency walls, which can be found as far back as Homer, *Iliad*, xii. 263 f.

76. 3. μηνοειδές: 'in the shape of a crescent'. For this kind of emergency wall, known as a lunette, see Arr. *Anab.* i. 21. 4 (Alexander's siege of Halikarnassos), with Bosworth's n., to which add a ref. to the present passage.

4. ἀπὸ κεραιῶν δύο: 'from two cranes'. For such cranes see Marsden (introductory n. to 71–8), 52, and cp. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford, 1979), 40.

77. 2. πάσαν γὰρ δὴ ιδέαν: 'devised all sorts of plans'. For Th.'s fondness for expressions like *πάσα ιδέα*, 'every kind', see i. 109. 1 n.

ἄνευ δαπάνης καὶ πολιορκίας: 'not to incur the expense of a regular siege' [lit. 'without expense and a siege']. See 70. 2 n.

4. ἐν ὄρεσιν . . . πῦρ ἀνήκεν: '... fires . . . in the mountains . . .'. W. Calder, 'A Fragment of Anaxagoras in Thucydides?' *CQ* 34 (1984), 485 f., thinks this is; (i) a gloss which (ii) was introduced into Th.'s text by the commentator Antyllos and derives ultimately from Anaxagoras. (i) may well be right.

6. λέγεται: 'it is said that'. Westlake, *Mnemosyne*, 1977 (i. 13. 2 n.), 354, detects 'uneasiness' here, but that is not necessary; cp. i. 118. 3 n. Even if there is a suggestion of 'divine intervention' (which I doubt), Th. is not entirely resistant to explanations along such lines: see iii. 87. 4 n.

78. 1. περιετείχιζον τὴν πόλιν: 'surrounded Plataia with a wall'. On the ineffectiveness of this 'grandiose circumvallation' see Lawrence, 280.

2. περὶ Ἄρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς: 'about the rising of Arktourus'. That is, about the middle of September.

3. γυναῖκες δὲ δέκα καὶ ἑκατὸν σιτοποιοί: 'a hundred and ten women to make bread'. One of the few refs. in Th. to women, and not a very glorious role for them. On the women in Th. and in Greek warfare

generally see 4. 2 n., esp. Loraux there cited, for the kind of role here assigned to them.

79. ATHENIAN DEFEAT AT SPARTOLOS

1. ἐστρατήγει δὲ Ξενοφῶν ὁ Εὐριπίδου τρίτος αὐτός: 'under the command of Xenophon son of Euripides and two others'. For the formula see i. 61. 1 n., and for Xenophon see ii. 70. 1 n. It is likely that Xenophon's two colleagues on the present occasion were the same as at 70. 1 (that is, Hestiodoros son of Aristokleidas and Phanomachos son of Kallimachos). Whoever they were, they shared his fate: see para. 7 below.

2. Σπάρτωνλον τὴν Βοττιακὴν: 'the Bottiaian Spartolos'. For this Bottiaia see i. 57. 5 n. on καὶ Βοττιαίοις, citing Hammond and Zahrnt; for Spartolos, which has not been certainly identified, see Zahrnt, 236f. and map V at 136. It was a few km. west of Olynthos.

4. οὐ πολλοὺς πελταστὰς: 'a few peltasts'. See 29. 5 n. As Beloch noted (*Gr. Gesch.*² i. 310), this passage is interesting from the point of view of military history ('kriegsgeschichtlich interessant') because it shows peltasts and cavalry getting the better of hoplites; this anticipates the successful use of peltasts by (for instance) Kleon at iv. 28. 4 (see n. there)—not to mention the fourth century (but Beloch slightly exaggerated when he implied that the days of the hoplite were numbered. The great battles of the fourth century were still hoplite affairs.)

Th. was interested in this kind of military detail.

ἐκ τῆς Κρουσίδος γῆς καλουμένης: 'from the district called Krousis'. See Zahrnt, 195ff. and map on p. 136, putting this area along the coast running south-east from the southern entrance of the bay of Salonika at Rhaikelos, to roughly the location of Spartolos. See also Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 186ff.

7. καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ πάντες: 'and all their generals'. See above, para. 1 n. For this battle see also Isaios, v. 42, with Wyse's n.: Menexenos son of Dikaiogenes was killed in it; this man was possibly Kleon's brother-in-law, Davies *APF* 145, but see Bourriot (65. 6n.). See Bugh, *Horsemen of Athens* (i. 45. 2 n.), 97.

Cp. also Plut. *Nik.* 6. 3.

80-92. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH-WEST

I have commented in *Thucydides*, 194ff., on the whole initial section chs. 80-82 (the Peloponnesian attack on Akarnania), which is a good

example of Th. at his clear and informative best. The narrative is not, however, boringly prosaic, but is carefully and even artistically arranged, introduced as it is by a general statement of the reason for the sending out of the expeditionary force, analysing its make-up, then passing to its detailed experiences.

For the point that the present operation combined the thinking behind chs. 66 and 68 above, see Lewis (above, 68, introductory n.).

80. 1. βουλόμενοι Ἀκαρνανίαν τὴν πᾶσαν καταστρέψασθαι: ‘they hoped to conquer the whole of Akarnania’. The whole of this paragraph tells against the view of Wade-Gery, *OCD*³ 1518, that Th. tended to neglect considerations of strategy; for another useful piece of strategic analysis see iii. 92. 4 and n. (reasons for Spartan foundation of Herakleia). **πείθουσι Λακεδαιμονίους ναυτικόν τε παρασκευάσαι ἐκ τῆς ξυμμαχίδος καὶ ὀπλίτας χιλίους πέμψαι ἐς Ἀκαρνανίαν:** ‘persuaded the Spartans to equip a fleet from allied forces, and to send a thousand hoplites to Akarnania’. This deserves to rank as a piece of Spartan adventurousness, although the initiative came from elsewhere, and although, as Th. goes on to say, the Corinthians were specially eager for the project. Particular reports of this sort should be set against Th.’s own generalizations about Spartan slowness and timidity (at e.g. viii. 96. 5).

ῥαδίως Ἀκαρνανίαν σχόντες: ‘might easily conquer Akarnania’. See below, 8nn., for the way this anticipates the language used about Demosthenes in Book iii.

καὶ τῆς Ζακύνθου καὶ Κεφαλληνίας κρατήσουσι, καὶ ὁ περίπλους οὐκέτι ἔσοιτο Ἀθηναίοις ὁμοίως περὶ Πελοπόννησον: ‘They could then capture Zakynthos and Kephallenia, and the Athenian fleet would no longer be able to sail round the Peloponnese’. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 309, rightly wonders whether Th. had access to good information about the arguments used, but remarks that ‘the plan seems most unreal’. (For a more optimistic view, Kagan, *Outbreak* (i. 45. 2 n., at end), 107.) Salmon seems right about Zakynthos and Kephallenia, let alone the wilder hopes for Naupaktos (below).

καὶ Ναύπακτον: ‘even . . . Naupaktos’. See i. 103. 3 n.

2. Κνήμον μὲν ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα: ‘Knemos, who was still admiral’. See 66. 2 n.

5. βάρβαροι δὲ Χάονες χίλιοι ἀβασιλευτοί: ‘the barbarians consisted of a thousand Chaonians, who had no king’. For these arrangements, and generally for what follows, see esp. Hammond, *Epirus*, 501, drawing heavily on Th., whose information on the ‘organization and

institution of the Epirote tribes' is very precious indeed. For the Chaonians in particular, and their territorial expansion, see Hammond, 479f., 678f. With the dual command of the Chaonians, Hammond, 501, compares the shared *imperium* of the Roman consuls. See further below, 81. 4 n. [Hammond, 447 f. thinks Th. drew on Hecataeus for Epirus.]

Φώτυος: 'Photyos'. For the correctness of this, the manuscript reading (rather than 'Photios', which is an editor's conjecture), see Hammond, 501 n. 1.

6. Μολοσσούς . . . Θάρυπος: 'Molossian . . . Tharyps'. For Tharyps (on whom cp. 29. 5 n.) see Justin xvii. 3, describing his subsequent role, not here noticed by Th., as a Hellenizer of his kingdom. See Hammond, 526ff. (with some new inscriptions), for the fourth-century growth of the Molossian state, which came to include many of the tribes of Epirus.

Παραυαίους . . . Ὀρέσται: 'Parauaians . . . Orestians'. For Parauaia (= the territory along the river Aoos) see Hammond, *Epirus*, 679f.; and for Orestis, which derives its name from the Greek word for a mountain, see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 110–16, with 310 on derivation. Orestis is the area south of Lake Kastoria; it later formed part of Upper, i.e. western, inland, Macedonia as opposed to Lower, coastal, Macedonia (for these terms see 99. 1 n.). But in the fifth century, as the present passage shows, the Orestians were ranged with Epirus.

7. Περδίκκας: 'Perdikkas'. There is no reason, with R. Hoffmann, *GRBS* 16 (1975), 374, to doubt his involvement.

8. οὐ παραμείνας τὸ ἀπὸ Κορίνθου ναυτικόν: 'without waiting for the ships from Corinth'. See below: iii. 97. 2 is strikingly similar: see n. there.

Στράτον, πόλιν μεγίστην τῆς Ἀκαρνανίας: 'Stratos, which is the largest city in Akarnania'. For the strong site of Stratos see Winter (18. 1 n.), 34f., 112f.; Schoder (i. 12. 3 n. on ἐξ Ἄρνης), 204ff. The extant fortifications are impressive, but probably post-classical.

νομίζοντες, εἰ ταύτην πρώτην λάβοιεν, ῥαδίως σφίσι τὰλλα προσχωρήσειν: 'thinking that, if they could take it, the other places would soon come over to them'. See, for closely parallel language, iii. 94. 3 and 5, used about Demosthenes. H.-P. Stahl, there cited, analyses the parallels (for another see above). Cp. also introductory n. to ii. 93–4 for the possibility that Knemos is presented as a fore-runner of Alkidas.

81. 2. εἰ μὴ λόγοις πείθοιεν, ἔργῳ πειρῶντο τοῦ τείχους: 'if this failed, they would proceed to an attack on the walls' [lit. 'if they did not persuade them by words, they would try the wall by action']. This sentence, a good example of the word/deed antithesis, is analysed by Adam Parry in his 1970 study of Th.'s use of abstract language (i. 69.

4 n.), 8. As Parry says, *ἔργω* is 'adverbial and in a sense unnecessary: they will make an attempt on the wall, and this will be an example of *action*'. Note, however, that the *variatio* detected by Parry between 'words' in the plural and 'action' in the singular disappears if with C. Hude and the Laurentian manuscript we read *λόγῳ* not *λόγοις*.

4. **καὶ ἀξιούμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκείνη ἡπειρωτῶν μαχιμώτατοι εἶναι:** 'and had a great military reputation in that part of the country'. See Ar. *Ach.* 604, with Sommerstein's n.: this was why the Athenians later made efforts to make allies of the Chaonians.

8. **δοκοῦσι δὲ οἱ Ἀκαρνάνες κράτιστοι εἶναι τοῦτο ποιεῖν:** 'The Akarnanians are famous for their skill at using the sling'. Th.'s interest in such points should be noted.

82. **ἀπήλθον:** 'went home'. Unlike modern scholars, Th. does not rub in the complete failure of the whole enterprise.

83–92. *Phormio's operations in the Corinthian Gulf*

Chs. 83–4 are well discussed by Morrison and Coates, 68–71, with a useful sketch-map at 69. They compare the battle of Artemisium in 480, where, as here, 'the slower side, to avoid the breakthrough [*diekplous*], adopted the circular formation, while the faster ships moved round the circle very close in line ahead with the intention of causing confusion' (although, as they say, the slower side at Artemisium was also the smaller in number, unlike here). See also, on the *diekplous* (89. 8) and *periplous* (84; 91) the pair of articles in *Greece & Rome* 1987 by Lazenby and Whitehead, also Holladay in *G&R* (1988) (see i. 49. 3 n.).

The whole section up to ch. 92, speeches included, is worked up 'paradigmatically': Th. wanted to make a number of points about naval skill and power. More than once we are reminded of the introductory statement (i. 18. 2) that Sparta's strength lay on land, Athens' by sea. The present section shows why. See also V. Hunter (i. 5. 1 n. on *ἡγουμένων*), 43 ff., discussing the close relation between the two speeches and the events described; cp. below 84. 2 n. and iv. 10 ff.

83. 3. **τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ:** 'the river Evenos'. The central of the three rivers of southern Aitolia, the others being Acheloos to the west and Daphnos to the east. The area between Evenos and Acheloos was the most 'hospitable and populous' part of Aitolia: for all this see R. Flacelière, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes* (Paris, 1937), 5 f.

5. **καὶ οἱ μὲν Πελοποννήσιοι ἐτάξαντο κύκλον τῶν νεῶν ὡς μέγιστον οἰοί τ' ἦσαν μὴ διδόντες διέκπλου:** 'the Peloponnesians arranged their ships so as to make the largest possible circle without

leaving space to break through'. See Morrison and Coates, 71: the Peloponnesian commanders 'went by the book in adopting the correct defensive formation [which had worked at Artemisium] but were prevented from using it offensively by Phormio's superior knowledge of local weather conditions and by the inexperience of their own oarsmen.'

84. 2. εἴ τ' ἐκπνεύσειεν ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει καὶ εἰώθει γίγνεσθαι ἐπὶ τὴν ἕω: 'if the usual morning breeze, which was what he was waiting for as he sailed round them, came down from the gulf . . .'. See preceding n. for this application of 'superior knowledge of local weather conditions'. Th. is here very sure about Phormio's thinking; presumably he discussed it with him afterwards. On this whole chapter see J. de Romilly, *Histoire et raison chez Thucydide*² (Paris, 1967), 125–8, Chr. Schneider (i. 5. 1 n. on ἡγουμένων), 81, and V. Hunter (also cited i. 5. 1 n.), 43 ff., all discussing the way Th. uses verbal repetitions to bring out the correspondence between calculation and reality. For instance, the expected breeze, πνεῦμα, happens in the next para. and the word duly recurs. Hunter (54) sees here 'the derivation of purposes from results'.

4. Μολύκρειον: 'Molykreion'. On the identification see P. M. Fraser, *Gnomon*, 26 (1954), 250 (review of Lerat); not at Antirrhion, but a little away to the north east.

85. 1. ξυμβούλους: 'commissioners' [lit. 'advisers']. For the sending of such advisers, in panels of various sizes, to commanders who were thought to have done badly, see Cartledge, *Agésilao*s (London, 1987), 212, citing iii. 69. 1 and viii. 39. 2 (sea operations, as here); v. 63. 4 (King Agis: land operations); also S. Hodkinson, 'Social Order and the Conflict of Values in Classical Sparta', *Chiron*, 13 (1983), 239 ff., at 268, and Westlake, *Studies*, 248 and n. 33.

Βρασίδαν: 'Brasidas'. For whom see 25. 2 n. He was probably one of Th.'s informants, and is perhaps the source for the account of Spartan emotions which follows.

2. οὐκ ἀντιτιθέντες τὴν Ἀθηναίων ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐμπειρίαν: 'forgetting that the Athenians were experienced sailors'. See i. 121. 4 n.

3. ὀργῇ: 'in anger'. See para. 1 n. on *Βρασίδαν*.

5. τῷ δὲ κομίζοντι: 'the commander of them'. G. Herman, 'Nicias, Epimenides and the Question of Omissions in Thucydides', *CQ* 39 (1989), 83 ff., suggests that the unnamed commander may have been a member of the famous, Athenian, Nikias' family. Th., he thinks, suppressed the name out of loyalty to the great Nikias ('upper-class solidarity'); Th. was hoping to prevent future forensic use of the information which he was holding back. This is all a little far-fetched.

Agreed, the question of Th.'s inclusion (cp. i. 116. 3 n. on Stesagoras) and omission of names, and of supporting information about the individuals concerned, are all interesting topics; see my article in *Catling Studies*.

ἔς Κρήτην: 'to Crete'. See Lewis, *CAH* v², ch. 9, for this 'small and unimportant job', a piece of folly by the assembly.

Νικίας γὰρ Κρής Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὢν: 'Nikias of Gortyn in Crete [lit. 'the Gortynian Cretan'], who was the proxenos of the Athenians'. For proxeny in Th. see 29. 1 n., and on the present passage see J. K. Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (Hassocks, Sussex, 1978), 83, and generally 81 ff., tracing the way in which the institution of proxeny, transformed under Athenian influence, became an instrument of power, enabling (for instance) Nikias of Gortyn to 'stage manage a coup d'état'. However, W. R. Connor, 'Nicias the Cretan? (Thucydides 2. 85. 4-6)', *AJAH* 1 (1976), 61 ff., argued that the word *Κρής* is a gloss and that *Γορτύνιος* should be emended to *Γορτυνίοις* or *Γορτυνίων*. The result of these changes is to produce a reference to the famous Athenian Nikias, who would then be a proxenos of the Gortynians. But see M. Walbank (22. 3 n. on *ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων*), 174 ff., no. 32, who more plausibly argues that the changes in text and identification are unnecessary. So also Gerolymatos (ii. 29. 1 n. on *καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει* etc.), 61 ff. and app. C at 109 (and more fully in his 'Nicias of Gortyn', *Chiron*, 17 (1987), 81 ff.). For the double ethnic *Κρής Γορτύνιος*, to which Connor objected, see Tod 188 comm., remarking that such double ethnics are 'characteristic of Cretans'. Connor tries to find a Cretan connection, in the person of Epimenides the purifier who was allegedly brought from Crete in the 590s by an ancestor of the famous Nikias; but on this story see Davies, *APF* 403. Finally, Davies points out to me (letter of 1978) that on Connor's view this is Th.'s first mention of the famous Nikias, and that Th. would surely have given him more of an introduction. (A patronymic at least: see iii. 51. 1.) See also G. Daux, 'Thucydide et l'événement', *CRAI* 1979, 89 ff., and Herman (above on *τῷ δὲ κομίζονται*).

86. 2-3. **τὸ Ῥίον τὸ Μολυκρικόν . . . τὸ δ' ἕτερον Ῥίον ἐστὶν ἀντιπέρας, τὸ ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ:** 'the Molykrian Rhion . . . there is another Rhion on the Peloponnesian coast opposite'. Nowadays only the second of these is called Rhion, the Molykrian or Achaian Rhion being called Antirrhion, as it sometimes was in antiquity (as by Strabo, 336). The modern ferry goes between them.

For Th.'s handling of this material see Sieveking (i. 24. 1 n.), 98 ff.

4. **ναυσὶν ἑπτὰ καὶ ἑβδομήκοντα:** 'seventy-seven ships'. It is

possible, as argued by Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 85f., that we should read 'fifty-seven', with one manuscript and the scholiasts to Ar. *Knights*, 562, and Aelius Aristides, i. 159. 1.

5. φοβούμενοι τὸ πρότερον πάθος: 'because they feared a recurrence of the previous disaster'. It is not often that agents in Th. learn from their mistakes, but cp. iii. 78. 2 n. and iv. 30. 1, where Demosthenes applies the experience of his Aitolian reverse (the word is again *πάθος*).

6. ξυνεκάλεσαν τοὺς στρατιώτας πρώτων: 'they assembled their soldiers'. On the shore-line, no doubt. See introductory n. to 87 below.

87. *Speech of the Peloponnesian commanders*

A speech 'delivered' by more than one speaker is a little hard to accommodate to the programme of i. 22. 1, with its promise of authenticity, see *Thucydides*, 51, 53: the commanders did not deliver their address in unison. Presumably the troops, who had been assembled on land (86. 6 n.), were harangued in separate groups but in roughly similar terms, which Brasidas might have reported to Th. However, the harping on the Peloponnesians' fears, inexperience, and previous defeat is remarkable in what is supposed to be a speech of encouragement, and although it begins by asserting that the earlier defeat was due to no cowardice, it ends by threatening would-be cowards. This is not implausible; Frederick the Great got good results by crying to his wavering grenadiers 'Dogs! Would you live for ever?': J. Keegan, *The Mask of Command* (London, 1987), 316.

87. 1. οὐχὶ δικαίαν ἔχει τέκμαρσιν τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι: 'it is really no good reason to be afraid now'. Lit. 'does not have fear as a legitimate inference', 'does not entail fear as a legitimate conclusion'—an awkward expression; but the last two words of the Greek (τὸ ἐκφοβῆσαι, 'fear') may have crept into the text from a commentator's explanatory remark. In which case translate 'but there is really no good reason', with 'for fear' understood. *τέκμαρσις* means 'judging from signs or evidence, τεκμήρια'.

3. ταῖς μὲν τύχαις . . . ταῖς δὲ γνώμαις: 'Fortune . . . resolution'. For this antithesis see above all v. 75, where the resounding Spartan victory at Mantinea in 418 is said to show that their previous reverses had been due to fortune, *τύχη*; their resolution, *γνώμη*, was the same as ever.

4. τέχνη δὲ ἄνευ ἀλκῆς οὐδὲν ὠφελεί: 'skill without courage is no use at all'. In fact, as we are surely meant to recall, Pericles at 40. 3 had claimed for Athens precisely the combination of thought and action which the Peloponnesian commanders here insinuate that she lacks.

Alty (i. 95. 1 n. on *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*), 5 n. 26, suggests that the present

ch., with its stress on the natural superiority of the Peloponnesians (for which see also 89. 2 n.), is intended to read ironically in view of the actual facts described.

88–89. *Speech of Phormio*

Ch. 88, which introduces the speech, is inartistically repetitive and long-winded: 'Phormio thought his soldiers were afraid of the enemy's superior numbers and so wanted to tell them not to be. He had always tried to do this. So now he wanted to do it again.' The speech itself, ch. 89, is a notably implausible set of responses; unlike the Corinthians at i. 120–124 (see introductory n. there), Phormio could not, in all the circumstances, have known—he surely could not have heard—what the Peloponnesian commanders had just said, so as to be able to reply to it.

88. 1. δεδιὼς . . . τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὄρρωδιαν: 'fearing that his sailors might be frightened'. Lit. 'being afraid of the fear of his sailors'; not an elegant thought when the words are varied in this way, especially when yet another word for 'fearing', *έφοβοῦντο*, is used a moment later. (It might have been better if Th. had written the Greek equivalent of 'fearing fear itself', so anticipating President F. D. Roosevelt by making a virtue of the repetition.)

89. 2. ᾧ μάλιστα πιστεύοντες προσέρχονται, ὡς προσήκον σφίσιν ἀνδρείοις εἶναι: 'As for the courage which they seem to think is a special attribute of theirs, and which is the reason for their confidence when they attack us . . .'. This picks up 87. 3–4; for the response see introductory n. to 88–89. For Spartan courage as somehow innate see iv. 126. 2 (Brasidas).

καὶ ἐν τῷ ναυτικῷ ποιήσιν τὸ αὐτό: 'they think it will be the same story by sea'. In fact at i. 83. 2 Archidamos was represented as having a far from insouciant awareness of Spartan weakness by sea, a cautious attitude not shared by the Spartan commanders on the present occasion.

4. Λακεδαιμόνιοί τε ἡγούμενοι αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν ἄκοντας προσάγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐς τὸν κίνδυνον: 'The Spartans lead their allies for their own honour and glory; the majority of them are dragged into battle against their will'. At iv. 126. 2, Th. makes the rhetorically skilful Spartan Brasidas make different, and from his point of view encouraging, use of this idea that the Spartans are few but brave compared with their (on that occasion unreliable Macedonian) allies; the thought there is 'we few, we happy few, we band of brothers'.

8. τὸν δὲ ἀγῶνα οὐκ ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ ἐκὼν εἶναι ποιήσομαι: 'If I can help it I will not give battle in gulf . . .'. See Morrison and Coates, 73: Themistocles had, by contrast, preferred to take on a numerically

superior Persian fleet in the narrows at Salamis, but this was because the Persian fleet had faster ships than the Greeks, whereas Phormio's fleet on the present occasion is faster than its Peloponnesian opponents.

διέκπλοι τε . . . οὐδ' ἀναστροφαί: 'a breakthrough or a sharp turn'.

On the *diekplous* see Lazenby (i. 49. 3 n.).

ἀνάγκη ἄν εἶη τὴν ναυμαχίαν πεζομαχίαν καθίστασθαι: 'the sea-battle will inevitably be reduced to a land-battle'. Cp. i. 49. 2, with Pelling in *Georgica* (i. 81. 2 n.).

9. ἄλλως τε καὶ δι' ὀλίγου τῆς ἐφορμήσεως οὔσης: 'because the enemy is close and is lying at anchor watching us'. See Morrison and Coates, 73 n. 10, for the importance of getting into formation quickly: failure to do this lost the battles of Notion and Arginusai in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War.

σιγῆν: 'silence'. Which would much increase the effectiveness of a properly timed paian, for which see i. 50. 5 n.

90-92. *The second round of fighting off Naupaktos*

See Morrison and Coates, 72-6, with another useful sketch map. As they point out, Phormio was handicapped by the need to protect Naupaktos, which forced him to abandon what Th. gives as his stated intention of staying out of the gulf (89. 8 n.).

90. 6. οἱ Μεσσηνιοί: 'the Messenians'. For the Messenians at Naupaktos see i. 103. 3 and n. It is to this kind of action in support of Athens that ML 74 = Fornara 135 relates (Messenian dedication at Olympia).

παραβοηθήσαντες καὶ ἐπεσβαίνοντες ξὺν τοῖς ὄπλοις ἐς τὴν θάλασσαν καὶ ἐπιβάντες ἀπὸ τῶν καταστρωμάτων μαχόμενοι: 'who came to the rescue. They dashed fully armed into the sea, boarded them, and fought from the decks . . .'. As Morrison and Coates (75) remark, this illustrates the role of supporting land troops in fighting which was taking place (as it must often have done) close to shore.

91. 1. τὸ Ἀπολλώνιον: 'the temple of Apollo'. Which may be mentioned in ML 13 = Fornara 33 (A, line 14).

2. Λευκαδία ναῦς μία πολὺ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων: 'one Leukadian ship far in advance of the rest'. What follows is an admirably lively and precise narrative, surely derived from an eye-witness. A first-rate piece of seamanship, small-scale in itself, turned a defeat into a victory, so Th. describes it in detail—though without naming the hero of the story, the commander of the Athenian ship.

3. περιπλεύσασα: 'rowed round'. For this manoeuvre see I. Whitehead, 'The Periplous', *G&R* 1987 (i. 49. 3 n.), esp. 180f. on the present passage.

92. 3. ἔσφαξεν ἑαυτόν: 'he killed himself'. For this and comparable Spartan suicides see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 30f. n. 27.

4. οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τροπαῖον ἔστησαν: 'The Athenians ... raised a trophy'. And perhaps made the Dodona dedication, *Syll*³ 73, mentioning a sea-battle; for this see iii. 104, introductory n., section A (iv), discussing Athenian access to Delphi, which may have been difficult in the 420s. But if the dedication is rightly associated with this phase of the war, Dodona in north-west Greece was a geographically suitable location anyway.

93-94. ABORTIVE PELOPONNESIAN ATTEMPT ON THE PIRAEUS

For this episode see D. Lateiner, *GRBS* 1975 (introductory n. to iii. 30), 176f.: the language here anticipates at a number of points that used in iii. 29-32 (both the narrative and the speech of Teutiaplos), so that the presentation of Knemos is made to anticipate that of Alkidas. For comparable set of parallelisms see ii. 80. 1 and 8 with iii. 94. 3 and 5, 97. 2 and nn. on all those passages (Knemos and Demosthenes).

93. 1. ἦν δὲ ἀφύλακτος καὶ ἄκκληστος εἰκότως διὰ τὸ ἐπικρατεῖν πολὺ τῷ ναυτικῷ: 'The entrance to the Piraeus was unguarded and open, as was natural, since the Athenians were masters of the sea'. In the early 370s, at the time of the comparable but equally abortive raid on the Piraeus by Sphodrias, the Piraeus was also unguarded: Xen. *Hell.* v. 4. 20. But modern historians tend to explain that in terms of Athenian naval and diplomatic weakness, not strength: see Cawkwell, *CQ* 23 (1973), 54, and 31 (1981), 74f.

In view of this sentence it is a little perverse of Garnsey (above, 70. 1 n.), 132 and n. 28, to cite the 'projected raid on the Piraeus', described in these two chapters of Th., as evidence that after the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War the Athenians 'were not in total control of their own territory'. (I do not dispute that that was to become increasingly true.)

2. τὴν κώπην . . . καὶ τὸν τροπωτήρα: 'his oar with its thong'. Important evidence that each oarsman in a trireme had his own oar: Morrison and Coates, III, 136.

3. ἐπεὶ οὐτ' ἀπὸ τοῦ προφανοῦς τολμῆσαι ἄν, καθ' ἡσυχίαν δ' εἰ διανοοῖντο, μὴ οὐκ ἂν προαισθῆσθαι: 'For they were sure that the Peloponnesians would not dare to make such an attack openly; and if they planned it at leisure they would be detected in advance'. I have here given and translated Hude's emended text rather than the OCT.

4. καί τις καὶ ἄνεμος αὐτοὺς λέγεται κωλύσαι: 'and also the wind is

said to have been unfavourable'. According to Westlake, *Mnemosyne*, 1977 (i. 13. 2 n.), 353, Th. here, by his use of λέγεται ('is said'), shows that he 'contemptuously rejects an excuse put forward in extenuation of irresolute leadership'. Westlake thinks that Th.'s source for this episode may have been Brasidas. For what could be done by a small force with the advantage of surprise, see Xen. *Hell.* v. 1. 21 ff., the Spartan Teleutias' spectacular raid on the Piraeus of 388.

94. 1. καὶ ἔκπληξις ἐγένετο οὐδεμιᾶς τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἐλάσσων: 'nothing which happened in the war caused a greater panic'. But at viii. 96. 1, Th. will say almost exactly this about the revolt of Euboea in 411. Strictly, this should mean that the present passage refers to the Archidamian War only, and consequences about composition dates would follow. But this is to press unduly what is no more than a favourite Thucydidean way of making an emphatic point.

3. λείαν: 'booty'. See iii. 96. 2 n. for this word.

Βουδόρου: 'Boudoron'. On the tip of Salamis closest to Megara; see the map at Legon, *Megara* (i. 103. 4 n. on καὶ ἔσχον), 20. For the site see W. E. McLeod, 'Boudoron, an Athenian Fort on Salamis', *Hesperia*, 29 (1960), 316ff. and plate 72.

95-101. SITALKES, THRACE, AND MACEDONIA

This very substantial digression resumes the story from chs. 29 and 67. In this section the amount of information Th. gives perhaps goes a little beyond the needs of the narrative (though the general Greek panic caused by the threatened Odrysian invasion, 101. 4, no doubt justified the digression for contemporary readers; see H. Münch, *Studien zu den Exkursen des Thukydides* (Heidelberg, 1935), 41); nor is by any means all of the detail, valuable though it is to us, essential for the understanding of later episodes. These chapters are a shining exception to the rule that there is little ethnography in Th. for its own sake. It is possible that Th. drew to some extent on Hekataios of Miletus, but given his own Thracian connections and interests we do not need to suppose so.

See, for a useful map of Sitalkes' route, Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* ii. 128, map 4, and, for Sitalkes' possessions, Archibald in *CAH* vi². 445-51.

95. 2. καὶ Φίλιππον τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πολέμιον ὄντα: 'his brother and enemy Philip'. See i. 57. 3 and n. For the present phase of activity see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* ii. 129f.

3. καὶ ἡγεμόνα Ἄγνωννα: 'Their leader was Hagnon'. See 58. 1 n.

96. 1. Γέταις: ‘the Getai’. For Alexander’s campaigns against the Getai see Arrian, *Anab.* i. 3–4 (with Bosworth’s notes); Arrian puts them north of the Danube, which is not inconsistent with the present passage: Strabo, 295, cited by Bosworth, shows that they lived on both sides of the river.

ἵπποτοξόται: ‘horse-archers’. See 13. 8n.

3. καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα ἔθνη Παιονικά: ‘and the other Paionian peoples’. This was the general name for the tribes between the rivers Axios (modern Vardar) and Strymon; see Bosworth on Arrian, *Anab.* i. 5. 1.

4. Τριβαλλοὺς: ‘Triballians’. Normally remote from the Greek world, but they made one celebrated raid to the south, the attack on Abdera in 376: see Diod. xv. 36, with Bosworth, *From Arrian to Alexander* (Oxford, 1988), 109. The Rogozen hoard was found in Triballian territory: see 97. 3n. For the Triballians as types of extreme barbarian behaviour see Sommerstein on Ar. *Birds*, 1529; note also Dem. liv. 39 (the impious club of young Athenians calling themselves the ‘Triballians’), with C. Carey and R. Reid, *Demosthenes: Selected Private Speeches* (Cambridge, 1985), 100f.

97. 1. νηὶ στρογγύλῃ τεσσάρων ἡμερῶν καὶ ἴσων νυκτῶν: ‘by a merchant ship . . . in four days and nights at the quickest’. Compare vi. 1. 2, describing the circumference of Sicily. Th.’s source at the beginning of Book vi is often thought to have been a written one (see nn.), but not here.

ἄνῆρ εὐζωνος: ‘a man travelling light’. This Herodotean expression (see Hdt. i. 72. 3, 104. 1, ii. 34. 2) is found here only, and in para. 2 below, in Th. Th. is adopting a Herodotean manner to suit the Herodotean ethnographic content; we do not need (compare preceding n.) to posit a written source.

3. ἐπὶ Σεύθου: ‘in the reign of Seuthes’. For Seuthes see *CAH* vi². 454: it was probably this Seuthes who issued some silver drachms and didrachms inscribed ΣΕΥΘΑ ΑΡΓΥΡΙΟΝ and ΣΕΥΘΑ ΚΟΜΜΑ.

καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτων χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου: ‘presents of gold and silver equal in value to the tribute’. This aspect of Thracian culture has been magnificently illuminated by the Rogozen finds from Bulgaria (29. 2n.). These include shallow silver vessels (*phialai*) inscribed with Thracian personal names, some of them well known to us, in Greek. (For instance ΚΕΡΣΕΒΛΕΠΤΟ ΕΞ ΕΡΓΙΣΚΗΣ, ‘. . . of Kersebleptes, from Ergiske’.) However, the site of Rogozen is in the territory of the *Triballians* who, as Th. says (96. 4), were independent of the Odrysians, and indeed killed their king Sitalkes in 424 (iv. 101). So the Odrysian royal names, often in the genitive, on the *phialai* are the names not of the

recipients but of the donors. So Th. was not quite right to imply that the Odrysians received without giving. (But the place-names, like 'from Ergiske', may be evidence that the vessels originally came from somewhere else, perhaps as presents to the Odrysians who then gave them to the Triballians.)

See Archibald, *CAH* vi². 456 for other evidence of material wealth, including imports of Attic pottery, from warrior burials in the Thracian interior.

4. κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τούναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον: 'their custom was the opposite of that which is found in the Persian kingdom'. See on this passage P. Briant, 'Pouvoir central et polycentrisme culturel', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (ed.), *Achaemenid History*, i. *Sources Structures and Synthesis: Proceedings of the Groningen 1983 Achaemenid History Workshop* (Leiden, 1987), 1 ff., at 23 f., and his 'Institutions perses et histoire comparatiste dans l'historiographie grecque', in vol. ii of the same series, containing the 1984 Proceedings: *Achaemenid History*, ii. *The Greek Sources* (Leiden, 1987), ed. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and A. Kuhrt, 1 ff., at 2 f. and 4 ff. (Th. obscures the fact that the Persian kings received as well as giving presents.) For Persian gift-giving see also the evidence collected in *Mausolus*, 157.

καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν: 'the man who asked and was refused was less discredited than the man who refused when he was asked'. Anthropology confirms that the gift-giving found in such primitive societies as the Thracian often has social implications of the kind Th. describes: see above all M. Mauss, *The Gift*, tr. W. D. Halls (London, 1990), originally published in French in 1925, a work which influenced M. I. Finley's *World of Odysseus* (1954). See Finley, 73, comparing Homeric Greece to the Trobriand islanders: 'the word "gift" is not to be misconstrued. It may be stated as a flat rule of both primitive and archaic society that no one ever gave anything, whether goods or services or honours, without proper recompense . . . the act of giving was, therefore, in an essential sense always the first half of a reciprocal action, the other half of which was a counter-gift.' Thus in the Persian empire, the 'generosity' of the king was expected to be matched by reciprocal gifts of goods, tribute, or service; see *Mausolus* (above). Th.'s sharp distinction between Thracians and Persians is therefore to some extent unreal.

98. 1. Σιντρῶν καὶ Παιόνων: 'the Sinti and Paionians'. For the Sinti on the Strymon east of the Paionians, nothing to do with Sindos on the Thermaic gulf, see Hammond, *Hist. Mac.* i. 197 f. They had a city called Sintia (see the entry under that name in Stephanus of Byzantium); in this

respect they are unusual among the peoples mentioned in the present chapters, who are notable for their lack of urban centres.

2. **Δόβηρον:** 'Doberos'. See Hammond, i. 200f. and map 17.

3. **τὸ πᾶν πλῆθος λέγεται οὐκ ἔλασσον πέντε καὶ δέκα μυριάδων γένεσθαι:** 'his whole force is said to have been at least a hundred and fifty thousand'. A tremendous total, and Th.'s formulation is rightly cautious about an army whose size 'can only have been roughly known even to its leaders', as Westlake says, *Mnemosyne*, 1977 (i. 13. 2 n.), 350.

99–100. 2. *Macedonia*

The precious account of Macedonian expansion in ch. 99 is fully discussed by Hammond, i. 435 ff., detecting (437) ring composition in the way chs. 98–9 are arranged (Sitalkes, Perdikkas' Macedonia, upper, lower, then lower, upper Macedonia, Perdikkas, Sitalkes). See also Hammond, *The Macedonian State* (Oxford, 1989), 51 f. For the remarks on king Archelaos at 100. 2, also valuable but in a different way, see n. there.

99. 1. **καὶ παρεσκευάζοντο ὅπως κατὰ κορυφὴν ἐσβαλοῦσιν ἐς τὴν κάτω Μακεδονίαν:** 'they prepared to descend from the heights [lit. 'from the top', see Hammond, i. 200] into lower Macedonia'. The expressions 'lower' i.e. coastal and 'upper' i.e. inland Macedonia are already found at Hdt. vii. 173. 1 and 4. For 'lower' and 'upper' in these senses, see Andrewes's n. in *HCT* on *κάτω* in a Persian context at viii. 5. 4: in the Persian empire, which was differently orientated relative to the sea, the term 'lower' means 'western' and *ἄνω* 'eastern': see ML 12 = Fornara 35. So Xenophon's *Anabasis* was a 'march up country' from the west. This terminology continued into Hellenistic times: see for 'upper satrapies', in the sense of Bactria, etc., Diod. xviii. 4. 8 and 7. 1, with J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford, 1981), 84, and Polybius, frequently.

2. **τῶν γὰρ Μακεδόνων εἰσὶ καὶ Λυγκησταὶ καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν:** 'The Lynkestians, Elymiotis, and other upland tribes also belong to the Macedonians'. For the Lynkestians and their small district Lynkos, north of Lake Kastoria, see Hammond, i. 102 ff., and below, iv. 83. 1 n., for the 'Macedonian Lynkestian' king Arrhambaios. For Elymiotis and its probable fifth-century king Derdas see above i. 57. 3 n. At first sight it is odd that Th., who here and at iv. 83 is explicit that these upper Macedonian kings were independent, nevertheless calls them 'Macedonian'. Hammond, i. 439, thinks that this shows that Th. 'recognized the claim of the Macedonian state to

the territories of Upper Macedonia', a claim which did not become full reality till the time of Philip II.

3. οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ, Τημενίδαι τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄντες ἔξ Ἀργους: 'his ancestors the Temenidai, who originally came from Argos'. The claim of the Macedonian kings to Argive descent is found in Hdt. (v. 22); see generally Hammond, ii. 3 ff. A recent find at the royal Macedonian grave-site of Vergina has illustrated the Argive-Macedonian connection further: it is a bronze tripod won at the Argive games to Hera and inscribed 'I am a prize from Argive Hera': *SEG* xxix (1979), 652; for a similar tripod from Argos itself see *SEG* xi (1954), 330. The new find, by confirming royal Macedonian participation in Greek athletic events, is interesting corroboration of Hdt.'s account of how the early fifth-century Macedonian king Alexander was judged to be of Greek, specifically Argive, descent and so allowed to compete at the Olympic games.

ἐκ μὲν Πιερίας: 'out of Pieria'. For Pieria, the important coastal strip of Macedonian between the rivers Haliakmon and Peneus, see Hammond, i. 123 ff.

Φάγρητα: 'Phagres'. A little to the east of Eion: Hammond, ii. 128, map 4.

(καὶ ἐτι καὶ νῦν . . . πρὸς θάλασσαν γῆ): 'the land . . . Pierian bay'. Perhaps a commentator's gloss.

ἐκ δὲ τῆς Βοττίας: 'out of Bottia'. See i. 57. 5 n. on καὶ Βοττιαίοις.

4. τὴν Μυγδονίαν: 'Mygdonia'. For Mygdonia, between the river Axios to the west and Rendina to the east, see Hammond, 182 ff.

5. ἐκ τῆς νῦν Ἐορδίας . . . καὶ ἐξ Ἀλμωπίας . . .: 'from the country still called Eordia . . . and . . . from Almopia'. For Eordia or Eordaia, the home canton of Ptolemy Lagou, the founder of the Ptolemaic dynasty of Egypt, see Hammond, i. 106 ff. It is between Lynkos, to the north, and, to the south, the bottom of the 'V' described in its middle reaches by the great Haliakmon river. For Almopia on the upper reaches of the river Ludias see Hammond, i. 166 f.

6. τὸν τε Ἄνθεμόντα καὶ Γρηστωνίαν καὶ Βισαλτίαν: 'Anthemous, Grestonia (or Krestonia) and Bisaltia'. See Hammond, i. 190 ff., 179 ff., 192 ff., and map 17 at 181.

100.2. ἀλλὰ ὕστερον Ἀρχέλαος ὁ Περδίκκου υἱὸς βασιλεὺς γενόμενος τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ ᾠκοδόμησε καὶ ὁδοὺς εὐθείας ἔτεμε καὶ τὰλλα διεκόσμησε τὰ [τε] κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἵπποις καὶ ὄπλοις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ παρασκευῇ κρείσσονι ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι βασιλῆς ὀκτῶ οἱ πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι: 'those [forts] which now exist were built by Archelaos son of Perdikkas, who, when he became king, cut straight roads and in various ways improved

the country. In his cavalry and infantry strength [lit. 'with horses and arms'] and in his military arrangements generally he surpassed all the eight kings who preceded him'. Archelaos ruled from 413 to 399 (Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*² iii. 2. 55). It follows that the present passage was written no earlier than 413. And in fact it is surely likely that it was written at or towards the *end* of Archelaos' reign, because it seems to sum up his achievement almost in the manner of an obituary. That might have the interesting consequence that Th. was still working in the fourth century, a conclusion for which there is other evidence: see *Thucydides*, 143, 151 ff. The 'great man' view of history here expressed might fit the late period of Th.'s life, when he came to revise his notions, perhaps impressed by the career of Alcibiades (but the appraisal of Archelaos in terms of his building operations is 'Herodotean', see i. 10. 2, first n.).

The 'eight predecessors' of Archelaos are from Hdt. viii. 137. 1; see Hammond ii. 4 ff., and, for Archelaos' own activity, 137 ff., esp. 140 (roads, including one through the Demir Kapu on the upper Axios) and 145 ff. (fortified points; military reforms). Brunt points out that Th. 'does not refer specifically to any reorganization of either cavalry or foot. His allusion to horses . . . suggests only that Archelaos encouraged horsebreeding and thereby augmented the number of the cavalry'; similarly the reference to 'infantry' [lit. 'arms', *ὄπλοις*] may be merely to 'the increased manufacture of arms for an enlarged cavalry force', and not to the creation of a hoplite army: 'Anaximenes and King Alexander I of Macedon', *JHS* 96 (1976), 151 ff., at 152. This may well be right, but perhaps makes too little allowance for the way such phrases as 'those who help the city with horse and shield' are used (in Athenian contexts) to mean 'cavalry and hoplites': Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 48 and Th. viii. 65. 3 n.

Th.'s account of Archelaos is notably favourable, by contrast with the scandals in Plato, on which see Syme, *PBA* 48 (1960): 'one of the interlocutors in the *Gorgias* of Plato (471 B) comes out with a startling allegation: Archelaos pushed a boy prince down a well. Plato regards Archelaos as the type of bad man.' Th. has a certain respect for men of the autocratic but effective Archelaos type.

3. Εἰδομένην . . . Γορτυνίαν . . . Ἀταλάντην . . . Εὐρωπόν: 'Eidomene [or Idomene] . . . Gortynia, Atalante . . . Europos . . .'. For these places see Hammond, i. 168 ff.; Europos was to give its name to the Hellenistic city of Dura-Europos on the Euphrates, excavated by a team from Yale between the two world wars; and to Europos-Rhagae. Such Seleucid settlements were often named after places in the Macedonian homeland; Europos was the home town of Seleukos I himself, if the entry under 'Oropos' in Stephanus of Byzantium refers to the same place. Hammond, i. 168 f., declines to identify Europos and the

Macedonian Oropos, but the existence of near-eastern Seleucid places called Europos, surely named as a tribute to the birth-place of the dynasty's founder, is in favour of the identification.

101. 4. παρέσχε δὲ λόγον . . . : 'It was widely believed . . .'. This rumour and panic must surely have fed the interest, of Th.'s readers, in Thrace and its rulers (see above, introductory n.) and helped to prompt this whole digression. Compare perhaps Aristophanes, *Birds*, 1520 ff., for the fear of an invasion by northern barbarians from 'up country', ἀνωθεν.

5. τοῦ Σπαραδόκου: 'son of Sparadokos'. For Sparadokos, who issued the first native regal coinage, see Archibald, *CAH* vi². 454, conjecturing that he was one of the inferior princes of the royal house (Th.'s παραδυναστεύοντες at 97. 3). Cp. Spartacus (another Thracian).

6. Στρατονίκην τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφὴν: 'his sister Stratonike'. For the name, also borne by the wife of Antigonos Monophthalmos, see R. A. Billows, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State* (Berkeley, 1990), 17 n. 5.

102-103. ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO AKARNANIA

The narrative is resumed from ch. 92.

102. 1. ἐπ' Ἄστακῶ: 'towards Astakos'. For Astakos and its tyrant Euarchos see 30 and 33 above; Euarchos, who had been restored by the Corinthians, must have fallen from power again.

2. ἐς γὰρ Οἰνιάδας αἰεὶ ποτε πολεμίους ὄντας μόνους Ἄκαρνάνων: 'Oiniadaí, whose inhabitants, unlike the rest of the Akarnanians, had long been their enemies'. How long is 'long', αἰεὶ ποτε? The question is relevant to the date at which Athens first made an alliance with Akarnania: see 68. 8n. and refs. there. The expression is surely quite vague, and could perfectly well cover a period as brief as the decade or so since the early 430s, which is one possible date for the alliance.

ὁ γὰρ Ἀχελῷος ποταμός: 'the river Acheloois'. Sieveking (i. 24. 1 n.), 170, makes the interesting and plausible suggestion that Th. is here deliberately improving on Hdt. (specifically, that we have here a 'Präzisierung', or 'making more precise', of Hdt. ii. 10. 2).

5. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀλκμέωνι τῷ Ἀμφιάρῳ . . . : 'the story is that when Alkmaion son of Amphiaraos . . .'. It is surprising to find this myth, or rather extract from a myth, given so calmly and fully by Th. Westlake, *Mnemosyne*, 1977 (i. 13. 2 n.), 358f., ranges his use of λέγεται here with other 'Herodotean' uses, where Th. is not so much expressing uncertainty

as flagging the story for what it is—a story which like all myths was a ‘*tertium quid*, neither true nor false’: see P. Veyne, *Les Grecs ont-ils cru à leurs mythes?* (Paris, 1983), 40. (See further on para. 6 below.) For Alkmaion’s matricide and pollution see Jebb’s nn. on Sophocles, *Electra*, 836–46, and Parker, *Miasma*, 377.

A final tentative thought: was Th., in his decision to write up this story, influenced at some level of consciousness by a more topical curse, affecting a family which was named from another Alkmaion? For this see i. 126.

τὸν Ἀπόλλω: ‘Apollo’. N. Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion* (Königstein, 1981), 55 n. 28, notes that here, exceptionally, Th. calls Apollo by his name instead of calling him ‘the god’ as at e.g. i. 118. 3. I doubt if this variation is significant for Th.’s religious outlook.

6. μόλις κατενόησε: ‘at last . . . he saw’ [lit. ‘he grasped, understood’]. At *JHS* 101 (1981), 139, Marinatos argues that Th.’s language here, the language of understanding, implies that there was a meaning to be grasped. See, however, Dover, ‘Thucydides on Oracles’ (i. 126. 6n.), 66 and 70, surely correct: this is the reproduction of a tradition about Alkmaion and does not commit Th. himself to belief in the oracle. The case is in fact similar to that of Kylon: see i. 126. 6, where, however, Dover takes a different view.

103. 1. Φορμίων: ‘Phormio’. See iii. 7n. for the problem of Phormio’s disappearance from the scene after the present passage.

BOOK III

1. PELOPONNESIAN INVASION OF ATTICA

1. ἤγειτο δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ Ζευξιδάμου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλεύς: 'under the command of Archidamos son of Zeuxidamos, the Spartan king'. Again (see ii. 19. 1 n.) a very formal, almost epic, introduction of a man we have already met several times. Th. does not intend us to forget the seriousness of these annual invasions. This is in fact the last appearance of Archidamos in Th.; at 89 the abortive invasion of 426 is led by his son Agis (that of 427 (below 26. 2) was led by Kleomenes, uncle of Pausanias, the under-age king from the other, Agid, royal line. Archidamos and Agis were from the other line, the Eurypontids). Archidamos could have died at any time between the end of the 428 invasion and that of 426, but he was probably incapacitated, if not dead, as early as 427, in view of Kleomenes' command of the invasion of that year. Archidamos' death gets no mention from Th.—let alone an obituary like Pericles' at ii. 65—despite the respectful introduction at i. 79. 2. Contrast Xenophon's account of the 'more than human' funeral honours of King Agis at *Hell.* iii. 3. 1, or better still v. 3. 19, Agesipolis dies when campaigning in the north and is taken home embalmed in honey (compare Diod. xv. 93. 6: Agesilaos).

2. καὶ προσβολαί, ὥσπερ εἰώθεσαν, ἐγίγοντο τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἰππέων: 'The Athenian cavalry attacked them as usual . . .'. For such cavalry activity by the Athenians (evidence that the abandonment of Attica was not absolute—even in Pericles' lifetime, note 'as usual') see ii. 22. 2 n. on *ἰππέας* etc., also i. 143. 5 n. and ii. 19. 2 n.; the areas near the city, at least, could be protected in this way, whatever may have been true of outlying areas, see C. Carey, *Lysias: Selected Speeches* (Cambridge, 1990), 123. The words 'as usual' are interesting for another reason also: Th. is often selective, but it is not often that we are in effect told, as here, to bear a generalization in mind. For other examples see ii. 24. 1 n. on *ὥσπερ δὴ ἔμελλον;* 31. 3 and iv. 66. 1 (invasions of the Megarid).

καὶ τὸν πλείστον ὄμιλον τῶν ψιλῶν εἶργον: 'and prevented the great body of the light-armed troops . . .'. For this function of cavalry see I. Spence, *The Cavalry of Classical Greece* (Oxford, 1993), 131 f., cp. 40.

2-19. THE REVOLT OF MYTILENE

In fact (despite my specification '2-19') most of the book up to ch. 50 is concerned either directly or (as in ch. 19) indirectly with Mytilene, except for ch. 7 (Asopios in Akarnania) and 20-24 (the Plataian siege narrative continued; it will be resumed at 52). For discussion of some military and topographical points see J. Wilson, 'Strategy and Tactics in the Mytilene Campaign', *Historia*, 30 (1981), 144 ff.

2. 1. Λέσβος πλὴν Μηθύμνης: 'the whole of Lesbos, with the exception of the Methymnians'. The main communities of Lesbos, other than pro-Athenian Methymna, were Mytilene, Antissa, Eresos, and Pyrrha.

βουλευθέντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου, ἀλλ' οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐ προσεδέξαντο: 'They had wanted to do so even before the war began, but the Spartans did not receive them favourably'. A very interesting piece of information, about which we should like to know more. (The claim is repeated, with slight amplification, in the Mytilenean speech at 13. 1; see n. there and the end of this n.) We have already seen (introductory nn. to i. 89-117 and 115. 2-117) that there are gaps, of which the incident referred to in the present passage is one, in Th.'s coverage of the crucial years between 439 (the end of the Samian revolt) and the beginning of the war. As remarked at i. 40. 5 n. (at end), Sparta's refusal of help to Lesbos contrasts with her apparent readiness to help Samos in 440, not to mention aggressively anti-Athenian promises which Sparta had made earlier in the *pentekontaetia* (see i. 101. 2 n. on *καὶ ἔμελλον*). Without more background knowledge we cannot say why it was that Sparta took a different line over Lesbos; but her refusal to tamper with a prominent Athenian ally is evidence of a correct attitude in a period when some scholars hold that she was eager for war. See for instance de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 204f., who dismisses the evidence of the present passage too easily by putting it 'earlier in the 430s' and then explaining that 'when in 440' Sparta was rebuffed over the Samos affair (see i. 40 n.) she became understandably cool towards approaches by other Athenian allies such as Lesbos. This argument is convincing only if we put the Lesbos appeal nearer to 440 than we have the right to do (de Ste. Croix's words 'when in 440 . . .' look innocent enough but they seduce us into putting the Samian and Lesbian appeals very close together indeed). In fact, at 13. 1 below the Mytileneans say that the Spartans rejected their first appeal 'when it was still [*ἔτι*] peace time'. If this has any independent evidential value (see n. there) the word 'still' implies a recent date, that is, one later, rather than earlier, in the 430s. Again, would the

Mytileneans have revolted straight after the Samian revolt, to whose suppression they themselves had contributed? (See i. 116. 1 n. on *αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ Χίου* etc., citing Quinn, and iii. 11. 4 below; see my n. there).

The present passage should be given its full weight as supporting the first half of the statement at i. 118. 2 that the Spartans were (i) slow to go to war unless (ii) compelled to do so.

2. καὶ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου ἔδει ἀφικέσθαι, τοξότας τε καὶ σῖτον, καὶ ἅ μεταπεμπόμενοι ἦσαν: 'from the Black Sea the force of archers, the corn and the other supplies for which they had sent'. For Mytilenean import of corn from the Black Sea region in the fourth century see Tod 163. But in the period of the Athenian empire, or at least in the early years of the Peloponnesian War, such imports could have been simply held up by Athens at Byzantium. Hence the Lesbians' desire to wait for supplies to arrive before revolting. See Garnsey, *Famine and Food Supply* (ii. 70. 1 n.), 121 f., who thinks that the present passage shows much less 'thoroughgoing interference' than inscriptions like ML 65 = Fornara 128, the decrees about Methone, which mention the 'Guardians of the Hellespont' and set limits to the amounts which could be imported.

Some very assertive electrum coins, struck in preparation for the revolt and bearing the legend *MYTI-* (i.e. Mytilene), have been shown to conform with the monetary standard of Kyzikos on the approaches to the Black Sea: C. M. Kraay, *Gnomon* 54 (1982), 499, who associates them with the present passage.

3. Τενέδιοι γὰρ ὄντες αὐτοῖς διάφοροι: 'the inhabitants of Tenedos, who were not on good terms with them . . .'. Tenedos was consistently loyal to Athens for much of the fifth and fourth centuries: see Tod's commentary on no. 175, an Athenian decree of 339 (= Harding 97).

αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων ἰδίᾳ ἄνδρες κατὰ στάσις, πρόξενοι Ἀθηναίων: 'individual Mytileneans who were of the opposite faction and were proxenoi of Athens'. This is a famous example of Thucydidean reticence: from Aristotle's *Politics* (1304^a4 ff.) we know that part of the trouble arose from a quarrel about heiresses. One Timophanes left two daughters whom the Athenian proxenos at Mytilene, Dexandros, wanted for his sons. When his suit was rejected he stirred up the stasis, invited in the Athenians, and 'began the war in which Paches captured the city'. Clearly, as Meiggs says (312), the story is not necessary for an understanding of the Mytilene revolt, because we have just been told (para. 1) that Mytilene had wanted to revolt earlier. But the story may be true. Why did Th. omit it? Not, surely, because such quarrels about heiresses were by themselves trivial (on this point see the good remarks

of R. Lane Fox, 'Aspects of Inheritance in the Greek world', *CRUX*, 226). Perhaps it was because this story, like the vulgar version of the Megarian decree, involved a feminine aspect: see i. 67. 4 n. To have accepted that disputes concerning women could have touched off either the Peloponnesian War or the Mytilenean revolt would have seemed to Th. a regression to the manner of the opening pages of Herodotus. Ruschenbusch (ii. 2. 2 n.), 26 ff., consistent with his thesis that *stasis* was externally prompted, rejects the heiresses story.

For the activity of the proxenoi here see Gerolymatos (ii. 29. 1 n. on *καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει* etc.), 53 ff.

ξυνοικίζουσί τε τὴν Λέσβον ἐς τὴν Μυτιλήνην βίαι: 'were trying by force to make Mytilene the political centre of the whole of Lesbos'. This is an attempt at a political synoikism (the Greek word for 'synoikize' is used). (For synoikism or concentration of settlements, and for the distinction between political and physical synoikisms, see nn. on i. 10. 2 and 58. 2; also ii. 14. 2–16. 2, introductory n.) That the present attempt did not, whatever may have been intended ultimately, involve the physical abandonment of the other cities of Lesbos, is shown by the way in which Antissa, Pyrrha, and Eresos are spoken of as going concerns at 18. 1 below: so rightly Moggi (i. 10. 2 n. on *οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης πόλεως*), no. 29 at p. 193. Moggi observes the similarity between this attempted synoikism and the synoikisms of Olynthos and Rhodes (i. 58): all anti-Athenian acts.

καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων: 'and with the Boiotians, who were related to the Lesbians'. For the importance in Th. of this notion of kinship through colonization see i. 6. 3 and 95. 1 with nn. The Boiotian colonization of Lesbos is explicitly mentioned at vii. 57. 5, if the text is sound: see n. there (Classen/Steup wish to delete *τοῖς κτίσασσι*, in which case the reference there and here might be to a vaguer notion, namely shared Aiolian descent). See also viii. 100. 3 and n. for the kinship of Boiotia and Lesbos, which is given as the reason for the appointment of a Theban commander for an attack on Lesbos.

3. 1. καὶ τοῦ πολέμου ἄρτι καθισταμένου καὶ ἀκμάζοντος: 'and from the recent outbreak of the war, which was now at its full height' [lit. 'and from the war which had recently broken out, and was at its full height']. The Greek is a little awkward, because the first verb ought to refer to the very beginning of the war—compare i. 1—and the second to its peak or acme. We need to understand 'now' with the second verb, so as to convey the idea of a progression. Both verbs have a medical flavour (both are found, though not immediately together, in i. 1).

2. Κλεῖππίδης δὲ ὁ Δεινίου: 'Kleippides son of Deinias'. This man is

now known, from ostraka cast against him in an ostracism of (probably) 443, to have been an Acharnian. For the large and famously aggressive deme of Acharnai see ii. 20. 4 n.

More interestingly, other ostraka show that his son was the famous late fifth-century demagogue Kleophon, who is sneered at by the literary sources for his obscure parentage. But the present passage of Th. shows that these sneers were inventions, because Kleippides was a *στρατηγός*, a distinguished elective post. For the Kleippides and Kleophon ostraka see ML p. 41 and E. Vanderpool, 'Ostracism at Athens', *Semple Lectures*² (Cincinnati, 1973), 241, with fig. 58 for ΚΛΕΟΦΩΝ ΚΛΕΙΠΠΙΔΟ ΑΧΑΡΝΕΥΣ, 'Kleophon son of Kleippides of Acharnai'.

τρίτος αὐτός: 'and two others'. For formulae of this type see i. 57. 6 and 61. 1 nn.

3. ἐσηγγέλθη γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς εἶη Ἀπόλλωνος Μαλόεντος ἕξω τῆς πόλεως ἑορτή, ἐν ἣ πανδημεὶ Μυτιληναῖοι ἑορτάζουσι: 'they had been told that there was a festival of Apollo Maloeis held outside the walls in which the whole population took part . . .'. A remarkable echo of the story of Kylon the seventh-century Athenian: see i. 126 and nn. (The parallel is noted by Classen/Steup in their n. on i. 126.) This passage is one of only two attempts in Th. (for the other see iii. 56) to exploit an enemy's religious festival: see H. Popp, *Die Einwirkung von Vorzeichen, Opfern und Festen auf die Kriegführung der Griechen im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Diss. Erlangen, 1957), 122, also 125, arguing that disrespect for the other side's gods was a manifestation of Greek 'particularism'. (See also Holladay and Goodman, *CQ* 36 (1986), 153.) In the present instance the Athenians may have found their impious action easier to contemplate precisely because the god in question was so local (see below).

Apollo Maloeis is a specifically Lesbian god: see the scholiast on this passage (the Patmos scholiast, giving an *αἴτιον* or explanation of the cult name in terms of a golden apple, *μῆλον*, Doric and Aeolic *μᾶλον*); *FGrHist* 4 Hellanikos (of Lesbos!) F 33, from Steph. Byz. s.v. *Μαλόεις* (with Jacoby's n. which quotes the Patmos scholiast in full); Callimachus F 485 Pfeiffer (with fragments 91/2 and 111 for the poet's interest in Lesbian antiquities and myth); and finally *SGDI* 255 (= *IG* xii. 2. 484), line 20, an inscription from Lesbos—more precisely from Hiera across the bay from Mytilene—which mentions an *ἀρχίχορος*, or chorus-leader, of Artemis and *Ἀπόλλωνος Μαλόεντος*, which Pfeiffer suggests should be emended to *Μαλόεντος*, a change made without comment in *IG*. See also Wilamowitz, *Glaube der Hellenen*, i. 393 ff., 'Malea'.

For *πανδημεὶ* ('the whole population') see i. 126. 6 n.

Who is the subject of 'they had heard'? See para. 5 n.
καὶ ἦν μὲν ξυμβῆ ἡ πείρα· εἰ δὲ μή: 'the attempt would very

probably succeed. But if not . . .’ [lit. ‘and if the attempt succeeded; but if not’, an elliptical but easily intelligible construction: after ‘succeeded’ one must understand something like ‘well and good’].

4. **κατέσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι:** ‘the Athenians seized them’. D. W. Bradeen, ‘The Popularity of the Athenian Empire’, *Historia*, 9 (1960), 257 ff., at 264 f., notes that this Athenian treatment of Mytilenean rowers, presumably democrats if anyone at Mytilene was, tells against the view that Athenian and allied democrats were automatically in sympathy. See nn. on 27. 3 and 47. 2. Westlake, ‘The Commons at Mytilene’, *Historia*, 25 (1976), 429 ff., appendix on ‘The Crews of the Mytilenean Triremes’ at 437 ff., speculates that these crews were quickly repatriated, in which case their detention would not be politically significant; but there is no evidence for this and on the face of it Bradeen’s view is preferable.

5. **τοῖς δὲ Μυτιληναίοις ἀνὴρ ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν . . . ἀγγέλλει:** ‘but the Mytileneans were warned by a messenger from Athens’. A notably bad piece of military security. It is characteristic of Th. that we are not told where in Athens the plan about the Apollo Maloeis festival was discussed and decided on: in the Assembly? The subject of most of ch. 3 is ‘the Athenians’, which is reasonable in a sentence about the general effects of the plague and the war, but less satisfactory as a description of the agents in a piece of detailed decision-making. In this sort of affair we would expect the *βουλή* or Council of 500 to have had a hand, but it appears very rarely in Th. in an active role (see below, 36. 5 n.). Perhaps the Assembly was indeed the source of the leak. But it is worth noting that in Books iii and iv there is a particularly strong probability that Th. may himself have had access to information about what went on in the Council or among the ten generals (his own military and political career reached its climax with the generalship of 424 but must have started earlier). So did *senior* figures leak the plan?

4. 5. **ἐν τῇ Μαλέᾳ πρὸς βορέαν τῆς πόλεως:** ‘at Malea to the north of the city’. But the well-known Lesbian Cape Malea is to the south of Mytilene: see Strabo, 617. Th.’s geography is at fault, unless he is referring to another Malea. For attempted solutions see Wilson (introductory n. to 2–19), 152 ff. (his own suggestion is that ‘Malea’ is a loose expression and refers to the whole promontory).

5. 2. **Μελέας Λάκων ἀφικνεῖται καὶ Ἑρμαιώνδας Θηβαῖος:** ‘Meleas a Spartan, and Hermaiondas a Theban, had now arrived’. For ‘the mysterious Meleas’ see Cawkwell, *YCS* 24 (1975), 56 and n. 10, observing that if Meleas had been sent by the Spartan state ‘the apologia the Mytileneans deemed necessary (3. 9–12) reads oddly’. Cawkwell thinks that Meleas, whose description *Λάκων* is unusual (we know next

to nothing about *Ξενοφαντίδας Λάκων* at viii. 55. 2), may have been 'like the Argilian man (i. 132. 5) a sort of person who could be sent abroad on private business'; and that this was a 'private mission, contrived by those who wished to get Sparta involved with "other ways" of war'—evidence, in fact, of adventurous thinking at Sparta; cp. ii. 80. 1 n. on *πείθουσι* . . . for the Knemos initiative.

I do not understand Cawkwell's puzzlement about the presence of Hermaiondas the Theban; see 2. 3 n. on *καὶ Βοιωτῶν ξυγγενῶν ὄντων*.

7. *Asopios, son of Phormio, in the North-West*

1. **Ἄσώπιον τὸν Φορμίωνος στρατηγόν, κελευσάντων Ἀκαρνάνων τῶν Φορμίωνός τινα σφίσι πέμψαι ἢ υἱὸν ἢ ξυγγενῆ ἄρχοντα:** 'Asopios son of Phormio; for the Akarnanians had asked them to send out a son or relation of Phormio as commander'. Why was Phormio himself not available? Th., who brought Phormio home at ii. 103 without comment, does not tell us. From a fragment of Androtion, the fourth-century historian of Attica, we learn that Phormio incurred civic disability (*ἀτιμία*) through inability to pay a large sum at his *εὔθυνα* or audit as general, and retired into private life (Pausanias, i. 23. 10 specifies that he went to Paiania, possibly though not necessarily his home deme). But the Akarnanians requested him as general, so the Athenians found a way of paying the debt or fine: *FGrHist* 324 F 8. This story of an Akarnanian request looks too like the present passage of Th. for coincidence, although it is just possible to argue (with, most recently, P. J. Rhodes in his 1988 commentary on Book ii, discussing ch. 103) that Androtion is referring to an earlier and wholly separate occasion. It is certainly true that there is a straight contradiction between Th., who speaks of a gratified request for a son or relative of Phormio, and Androtion, who speaks of a gratified request for Phormio himself. Nevertheless it seems better to suppose (with Jacoby in his enormous commentary on the fragment; see also more briefly Fornara, *Athenian Board of Generals* (Wiesbaden, 1971), 56) that the two stories can be reconciled and refer to the same set of events; that the Akarnanian request, whatever exact form it took (on which more below) caused Phormio's return to favour at Athens; that he then fell ill or died; and that Asopios was either sent or elected in his father's place. As to the precise Akarnanian request, Jacoby ingeniously argued (n. 55 to his comm. on F 8) that the specification 'son or [more distant] relative' shows that the Akarnanians understood the constitutional and legal position: civic disability would affect the son but not a more distant relative. However the facts and possibilities are juggled, Th. has told us

less than we would like. Rhodes (above) suggests that Th. thought he had given the facts about Phormio at ii. 103 and failed to check when he got to iii. 7; but half a dozen chapters is a very small gap.

This tiresome problem should not be allowed to obscure the great interest of the present sentence, with its implication that a request from a foreign power could so promptly be gratified in an election to an Athenian generalship: the Athenians appear to accept the Akarnanian assumption that Phormio's special qualities must somehow run in the family. For analogies one must look to Roman history, perhaps to the election in 210 of the young and untried Scipio Africanus to the Spanish command vacated by the deaths in battle of his father and uncle; local Spanish opinion is not mentioned (Livy, xxvi. 18 ff.) but was surely a factor. (So for instance R. M. Errington, *The Dawn of Empire* (Ithaca, NY, 1972, 86: likely that Scipio 'had first-hand experience of the methods of his father and uncle, and will have shared with them and learned their techniques of dealing with the Spanish tribes'.) See Herman (i. 102. 4n.) 87.

An Akarnanian called Phormio, surely a descendant of a man named after the great Athenian, is honoured at Athens in 337: Tod 178 = Harding 100.

8-14. *Meeting at Olympia addressed by the Mytileneans*

8. 1. ὡς αὐτοῖς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εἶπον Ὀλυμπιάζε παρεῖναι, ὅπως καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ξύμμαχοι ἀκούσαντες βουλευσονται: 'were told by the Spartans to come to the Olympic festival [lit. 'to Olympia'] so that the allies, as well as themselves, could hear them and decide what should be done'. For the Olympic games as a place for inter-state discussions, usually with a Panhellenic flavour, see E. N. Gardiner, *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals* (London, 1910), 137, citing this passage. Consistent with this, Th. has the Mytileneans make use of the Panhellenic theme at a number of points. But it is also relevant that Olympia had a firmly Dorian character: see A. Mallwitz, *Olympia und seine Bauten* (Munich, 1972), 166: 'Olympia war im wesentlichen ein dorisches Heiligtum, und dies nicht nur in architektonischer Hinsicht. Kaum zufällig hat keine ionische Stadt hier ein Schatzhaus errichtet.' This made it an appropriate venue for a meeting with an anti-Athenian purpose. This general situation was complicated after 420, when Sparta fell out with Elis, the state which controlled the sanctuary: see v. 49-50 nn. Note also that pro-Athenian, anti-Spartan dedications could be made at Olympia in this period: ML 74 = Fornara 135, the dedication of the Messenians at Naupaktos. This is dated in ML to 'c.421 BC', presumably because of assumptions about the anti-Athenian character of Olympia in the 420s.

(For the Delphic counterpart to this dedication, *Syll.*³ 81, see below, 104, introductory n., section A (iv).) I postpone to the next n., on Dorieus, the question whether the Athenians and their allies were actually or formally excluded from the Olympic Games in the Archidamian War period. (For Athenian participation in the games in the pre-war period note Gomme's addendum at 727, and Hönlle, below, 195 ff.) Briefly, I do not believe they were so excluded: to say 'the Olympic Games of 428 had an anti-Athenian flavour' is not the same as saying 'no Athenians were or could have been present'.

According to de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 340f., the object of the present Peloponnesian League meeting was not the admission of Mytilene and the other anti-Athenian Lesbian states into the League proper, but their reception into the broader and vaguer category of 'allies of Sparta and her allies'. For this the agreement of League members was desirable (though not strictly necessary), because the best way of helping Mytilene would be by an invasion of Attica, a League affair. This argument falls short of proof, as de Ste. Croix admits, and perhaps requires some excessively fine constitutional distinctions. (I am not at all sure that what Th. is describing was 'probably a formal League congress', as de Ste. Croix says. Gardiner—above—has the Mytileneans 'plead for their autonomy before the assembled Greeks', which is nearer the spirit of the occasion.)

Th. here speaks as if the initiative for the meeting as a whole was Spartan (see also 5. 4n. on Meleas); it is not inconsistent with this that the Mytileneans say at 13. 1 that their own invitation came from the Boiotians.

ἦν δὲ Ὀλυμπιάς ἧ Δωριεύς Ῥόδιος τὸ δεύτερον ἐνίκα: 'The Olympic Games were those in which Dorieus of Rhodes won his second victory'. It is rare for Th. to acknowledge the continuing importance, even in the late fifth century, of athletic success; see, however, v. 49–50 and nn.; also the revealing comparison of Brasidas, ecstatically received at Skione, to a homecoming athlete: iv. 121. 1 and n. (For Alcibiades, perhaps a special case, see vi. 16 and nn.) Dorieus, who emigrated at some point to Thurii in Italy (below), went on after his athletic victories to a prominent political and military career, for which see nn. on viii. 35. 1 and 84. 2. In this respect he recalls such archaic figures as Orsippus and Kylon (i. 6. 5, 126. 3 nn.); but note that Th. does not make the connection between this later prominence and his earlier athletic success. For this reason, and in view of other difficulties to be dealt with shortly, one might feel tempted to bracket the present sentence as a learned gloss. (In which case it would be comparable to the Olympic victories recorded, in language reminiscent of the present passage of Th., at Xen. *Hell.* i. 2. 1 and ii. 3. 1. These are usually regarded as insertions by a later

hand.) But it is not quite the only 'athletic' date in Th.: see v. 49. 1 and n. for Androsthenes the Arkadian as victor for the first time in the pankration.

Dorieus' many victories are listed in the Delphic inscription *Syll*³ 82, which shows that he was three times an Olympic victor. (See also *Inscripfen von Olympia*, 153.) The victories, which were in the pankration or all-in boxing and wrestling event, ought to fall in (i) 432, (ii) 428—on the evidence of the present passage of Th.—and (iii) 424. He came from a family of great athletes: his father was the Diagoras for whom Pindar wrote the Seventh Olympian ode; for the athletic history of the family see Harris, *Greek Athletes* (i. 6. 5n. on ἐγυμνώθησαν), 123f. We now know from *Hell. Oxy.* 19 that the family, under the name Diagoreioi, were synonymous with oligarchy in the Rhodes of the 390s.

There is a difficulty, or rather two difficulties, about Th.'s statement that Dorieus was Rhodian in 428. The first (i) is the explicit statement of Pausanias (vi. 7. 4) that he was proclaimed as a Thurian victor. The second alleged difficulty (ii) is that Rhodians would have been excluded, as Athenian allies, from Olympia for the entire Archidamian War period; therefore, Dorieus can no longer have been a Rhodian in 428 and Th.'s description is wrong. The view that the Athenians and their allies were so excluded is old and widely held (for instance by Beloch, iii². 1. 43 n. 2, and van Gelder, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier* (The Hague, 1900), 80 n. 2, both discussing Dorieus); it seems to go back to Grote's *History of Greece* (v. 454). None of these scholars argues the point; presumably Grote was reasoning from the first clause of the Peace of Nikias of 421 (Th. v. 18. 2), which stipulates that there shall be general access to the common shrines of Greece. This is less than proof of a previous wholesale exclusion from Olympia: the Olympic truce may have held, at least at these first Games of the war. And in any case, athletes themselves were (as even Grote remarked) privileged and even sacred persons. (I discuss elsewhere the question of Athenian access to Delphi: see below, iii. 104, introductory n. section A (iv), *The Imperial Aspect*, and nn. to iv. 118. 1, v. 1 and 18. 2.) It is relevant that in summer 412 the Athenians send representatives to the Isthmian Games, another Panhellenic festival with a Dorian flavour (the sanctuary was in Corinthian territory): viii. 10. 1 and n.; but there Th. specifically says the festival 'had been announced' to the Athenians, which might imply that such announcement was somehow abnormal. A. Höhle, *Olympia in der Politik der griechischen Staatenwelt* (diss. Tübingen, 1968: see i. 6. 5n.), 210, asserts that the Athenians were absent in 428, on the grounds that the Mytileneans would not otherwise have dared to behave as they do; but this assumes what needs to be proved. She disposes of Dorieus by saying, with a

reference to Hiller von Gaertringen, *RE Supp.* V, 'Rhodos', col. 762, that he was already an enemy of Athens by 428, but we do not know this, nor does Hiller say so. (For Dorieus' troubles at Athens see Xen. *Hell.* i. 5. 19 and Paus. vi. 7. 4.)

We are left with the 'clash' between Th. and Pausanias, that is, with difficulty (i). Many (but not all) scholars have accepted the evidence of Pausanias, on the grounds that he had access to good documentary evidence at Olympia itself; see for instance the trenchant n. 3 to Jacoby's comm. on *FGrHist* 324 Androtion F 46 (a fragment which describes Dorieus' eventual death at the hands of the Spartans). If this is right, and it probably is, Dorieus' departure from Rhodes for Thurii happened early, in perhaps the first years of the Peloponnesian War. But it is surely wrong to say (with van Gelder) that Pausanias 'gives Thucydides the lie'. For Th. to describe the famous Dorieus, a member of a famous Rhodian family, as a 'Rhodian', was only natural—especially since Dorieus returned to Rhodes soon after Th.'s narrative ended, a fact which Th. surely knew, at least at a late stage of composition or revision.

Why (finally) did Th. insert this sentence? (If he did: see above.) Not, surely as a date: despite Hippias of Elis' researches in about the 420s into the Olympic victor lists, it was not till Timaios, about 300 BC, that Olympiads caught on as a method of universal dating—and influenced the Thucydidean interpolator, if there was one. (For the problems of the mention of the Pythian games at v. 1 see n. there.) Dorieus' victory, like Dorieus himself, was famous and memorable. Th. is not above including remarkable but inconsequential items for their own sake, like the eruption of Mt. Etna at ch. 116.

9–14. *The speech of the Mytileneans*

See the fine analysis of this speech by Macleod, 'Reason and Necessity: Thucydides iii. 9–14, 37–48', *Essays*, ch. 10, at 88–92 (= *JHS* 93 (1978), 64–8). Macleod (88f.) sees a contradiction between the Mytileneans' need to show that Athens is oppressively strong (if so, they themselves are justified in revolting, because true alliances can only be based on equality); and their need to show that Athens is now weak (if so, their own revolt, and the Spartan help for which they are asking, will seem more sensible). That is, there is a clash between moral and prudential considerations. See further below. The speech contains some very difficult individual thoughts and sentences, but its outline structure is clear and simple: the moral arguments ('we are justified in revolting') occupy chs. 9–12, the prudential arguments ('this is a particularly good moment to strike at Athens') occupy ch. 13; ch. 14 is a peroration which exploits the Panhellenic Olympic context. The speech (as Macleod

notes) resembles that of the Corcyraeans at i. 32 ff., except that Athens' position has now worsened with the plague and the expense of the war (iii. 13. 3).

What then of the main difficulty felt by Macleod? This can be put in a more narrowly historical way. The 'moral' argument from Athenian oppressiveness could have been used at any time during the *pentekontaetia*; why then should Sparta entertain it now that Athens' wartime difficulties, adduced by the Mytileneans for the purposes of their 'prudential' argument (13. 3), have actually reduced Athenian capacity for oppressiveness? Macleod has here identified a real enough difficulty, which leads to the very unconvincing reasoning in chs. 10 and 11 where the Mytileneans try to deal with some unstated but obvious objections ('why did you join in coercing Samos in 440?', and so on). But Macleod should have allowed more weight to the point made at 13. 1, confirmed by the narrative at 2. 1: the Mytileneans *did* bravely contemplate revolt, and appealed to Sparta, even before the war, when Athenian financial and human resources were still intact; but Sparta turned them down. (Macleod, 90, acknowledges this, but his rendering 'we would have revolted before, but ...' is inadequate for a real appeal, authorially vouched for.) This does not dispose of objections in terms of Samos, not to mention earlier episodes; but it does make the Mytileneans look a little less like opportunists. It is a pity (see 2. 1 n.) that we do not know more about this episode—for instance, its date.

9. 2. ἴσοι μὲν τῇ γνώμῃ ὄντες καὶ ἐπινοία: 'are similar in their outlook and intentions'. This very defensive opening chapter serves to introduce the notion of *equality* (or rather, inequality), which occurs again and again in this speech, often but not always as a form of the word *ἴσος*. I have adopted Hude's *ἐπινοία* for *εὐνοία*, 'good will' (OCT).

πρόφασίς τε ἐπιεικῆς μηδεμία: 'no good reason'. Jowett's tr., 'no reasonable excuse' (also in the Penguin), is not really misleading; similarly, Pearson (i. 23. 6 n.), 215 = *Selected Papers*, 101, treats this as an instance of the 'ordinary defensive meaning' of 'excuse'. However, there is force in the objection of Weidauer (iii. 47. 3, introductory n.), 10, that a more positive and less specious sense for the noun is required here, so I have changed the tr.

10. 1. περὶ γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀρετῆς πρῶτον, ἄλλως τε καὶ ξυμμαχίας δεόμενοι, τοὺς λόγους ποιησόμεθα: 'Since we are asking for an alliance, we will first address ourselves to the question of justice and honour [lit. 'virtue, good behaviour']'. This (as noted by Macleod, 88) corresponds to the advice of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (1424^b37) that when you are asking for an alliance you should show that

you have justice on your side; as we saw, the opening of the Corcyraean speech at i. 32. 1 shows awareness of this principle but makes manipulative use of it: see n. there.

οὔτε φιλίαν ἰδιώταις βέβαιον γιγνομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεσιν ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ . . .: ‘friendship between men and alliances between cities can never be permanent unless . . .’. The usual analogy between individuals and states; see e.g. i. 82. 6 and 144. 3 for the significance of this.

3. ξύμμαχοι μέντοι ἐγενόμεθα οὐκ ἐπὶ καταδουλώσει τῶν Ἑλλήνων Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει ἀπὸ τοῦ Μήδου τοῖς Ἕλλησιν: ‘But we did not become the allies of the Athenians in order to enslave Greece; we were really the allies of the Greeks, whom we wanted to liberate from the Persians’. As we saw at i. 96 n., this ‘liberation theme’ is noticeably absent from Th.’s authorial account of the founding of the Delian League, but there is non-Thucydidean evidence to support it, such as *Ath. Pol.* 23. 5, with Rhodes’s n.; Plut. *Arist.* 25. 1. The theme is, however, very apt when addressing the Spartans, the would-be liberators of Greece: see i. 18. 1 and ii. 8. 4 n., and for the contrast between liberation from Persia and submission to the tyranny of Athens see already i. 122. 3 and n. (the Corinthians’ speech), cp. i. 124. 3; also iii. 63. 3 (the Theban speech). It is also particularly apt at Panhellenic Olympia: see introductory n. above.

4. καὶ μέχρι μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἡγούντο: ‘While they led from a position of equality’. The ‘equality theme’ again: see 9. 2 n. The phrase ‘from a position of equality’, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, is repeated from i. 99. 2, the important authorial ch. describing the change in the Athenian empire and growing Athenian unpopularity (see also i. 77. 3 n.), and will be repeated at 11. 1 below.

For reasons explained at 11. 1 n. below, the language of the present passage, together with para. 5, is (making all due allowance for its appearance in a speech, not in narrative) evidence for the proposition, likely on other grounds also, that the Delian League had one chamber, in which the Athenians had only one vote (albeit a massively influential one), rather than the two separate chambers like the Second Athenian Confederacy. See P. Culham, ‘The Delian League: Bicameral or Unicameral?’, *AJAH* 3 (1978), 27 ff. (citing earlier views), at 28, and my n. in the LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 29.

τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας: ‘relaxing their efforts against the Persians’ [lit. ‘relaxing their enmity towards Persia’]. It has been noted that the absence here of a specific reference to the Peace of Kallias shows that there cannot have been clear evidence of a peace, otherwise the Mytileneans ‘could have punched home their point’; so Holladay,

'The Détente of Kallias' (i. 112. 2-4 n.), 504; but speakers in Th. tend to avoid such specific references.

5. ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ' ἕν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνασθαι: 'who could not unite and defend themselves because they had a large number of individual votes'. For the league synod see i. 96. 2 (final n.) and 97. 1 (first n.); also below, 11. 3 n. The use in the present sentence of a compound of *ψηφός*, 'a vote', makes it impossible to argue (as has been done) that the word *ἰσοψηφούς* at 11. 3 (see n. there) can be translated in a metaphorical sense, referring to something nebulous like 'equality of influence'. It must, so soon after *πολυψηφίαν*, which certainly refers in a literal way to votes, be taken equally literally.

οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων: 'so they were all reduced to slavery, except us and the Chians'. For the special status of Chios, Lesbos, and (till 440) Samos see i. 19 n. on *Ἀθηναῖοι δέ* etc.;

ii. 9. 5.

ἡμεῖς δὲ αὐτόνομοι δὴ ὄντες καὶ ἐλεύθεροι τῷ ὀνόματι ξυνεστρατεύσαμεν: 'We were supposedly autonomous and free, as they put it, when we fought at their side'. For 'autonomous' (enjoying limited political independence) see i. 97. 1 n., and for the more resonant and desirable combination of 'freedom and autonomy' see ii. 36. 1 n. on *ἐλευθέραν*. As noted there, the words in combination often denote a fully sovereign state of the kind Lesbos now claims ('supposedly'; 'as they put it') she was emphatically not. (The attempt of E. Lévy, 'Autonomie et éleuthéria au v^e siècle', *Rev. Phil.* 57 (1983), 249 ff., at 261 f., to argue that the Mytileneans are here asserting that their autonomy was real and only their freedom nominal, gives insufficient weight to *δὴ*, 'supposedly'. Lévy wants this rendering in order to reach his somewhat forced reconciliation of Kleon's remarks at 39. 2 and Diodotos' at 46. 5. See 39. 2 n.)

11. 1. ἡμῖν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὀμιλοῦντες: 'our continuing equality' [lit. associating with us from a position of equality]. For *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου*, 'from a position of equality', see 10. 4 n. and Culham, there cited, who argues (28) that here and at 10. 4. Th. must mean that Athens dealt with all the allies individually on a footing of equality, not with all the allies in aggregate, as the 'bicameral' view would require: 'a progression is described here: Athens began *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου* with all of the allies individually, but finally was *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου* with only two of the allies individually. The point is lost, if the phrase is referred to the allied synod in the aggregate.'

καὶ πρὸς τὸ πλεον ἤδη εἶκον τοῦ ἡμετέρου ἔτι μόνου ἀντισουμένου: 'they would contrast us who alone remained their equals

with the majority who had submitted to them'. This sentence does not add much, but there is no reason to bracket it, with some editors.

καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐρημότεροι: 'our isolation was increasing too'. The Mytileneans exaggerate their isolation: see para. 3 n. on τὰ τελευταῖα λιπόντες.

3. ἐς τὴν ἀρχήν: 'to win an empire'. Or perhaps the meaning is 'we were left autonomous because their policy *as regards their empire* was to seize control . . .' See Winton (i. 97. 2 n.), 149.

4. ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσοψήφους ἄκοντας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἷς ἐπήσαν, ξυστρατεύειν: 'On the other hand, our position was a witness to their character. Because we had an equal vote with them, nobody could suppose we fought in their wars against our will: those whom they attacked must have been in the wrong'. We come now to the central weakness in the Mytileneans' position. Th. has been careful at i. 116. 1 (with 117. 2) to tell us that the Chians and Lesbians helped Athens to suppress the revolt of Samos: see n. there. Why did they not vote in the league synod against the coercion of Samos, or even seize their chance and actually back the Samians? The Mytilenean answer has been given at 10. 5: the multiplicity of votes made it hard to take a common stand against Athens, an argument sympathetically viewed by T. T. B. Ryder, *Koime Eirene* (Oxford, 1965), 21, discussing the system of consultation in the Delian League ('the practice of making decisions by majority vote greatly reduced its value to the protesting ally'), and citing Th. iii. 10. 5.

Note the possible defences which the Mytileneans do *not* use: (i) they do not say 'we could not vote against Athens in the league synods because the synod never met'. That is, the present passage is (unless, improbably, Th. has given the Mytileneans a bad argument and denied them an excellent argument when it was available to them) evidence that as late as 440 the synod was still meeting. On the other hand there is no sign of it in the immediately pre-war narrative of Book i. Therefore, meetings presumably ceased some time in the 430s: see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 29. (ii) They do not say 'we had a different régime then, for whose actions we, the present government of Mytilene, cannot be held responsible'. For this way of dealing with a charge of past bad behaviour see the Theban speech later in the present book, at iii. 62. 3 n.

The natural and correct way of taking *ἰσοψήφους* here is 'having an equal vote with', that is, the Mytileneans allege that they and the Athenians had one vote each in a unicameral organization, as did every other member state. Against attempts (for instance, de Ste. Croix, *OPW* 306) to render it 'having the same weight in decision-making' see above 10. 5 n. on ἀδύνατοι etc.

On *μαρτυρίῳ* here see *Thucydides*, 105: the word hardly means more than just 'evidence', and cannot be distinguished from *τεκμήριον*, although some scholars have tried to argue for a regular difference in meaning.

τὰ τελευταῖα λιπόντες: 'they thought they would leave us till last'. An unconvincing point: again, Samos (never mentioned in this speech; contrast the Chians at 10. 6) is the stumbling-block: the Mytileneans' picture of themselves as an isolated great power, whose small neighbours had been picked off one by one, is not true to the position before 440. And Chios, not disciplined until 425/4 (see iv. 51 and n.) is completely ignored as being inconvenient for the present argument.

6. τό τε ναυτικὸν ἡμῶν παρείχε τινα φόβον μή ποτε καθ' ἐν γενόμενον ἢ ὑμῖν ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ προσθέμενον: 'Besides, they were afraid of our navy: we might have joined you, or some other great power'. Compare the Corcyraeans' point at i. 33. 2 and 36. 3, with nn. there; see also 13. 7 n. below. For the Mytilenean navy see Wilson (introductory n. to 2-19).

7. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ θεραπείας τοῦ τε κοινοῦ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν αἰεὶ προεστῶτων περιεργιγνόμεθα: 'For a time, too, we saved ourselves by flattering the people and the popular leaders of the day'. A very revealing comment on the relation between Athens and her empire.

12. 1. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἡμᾶς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ δεδιότες ἐθεράπευον, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐκείνους ἐν τῇ ἡσυχίᾳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐποιούμεν: 'They cultivated us in time of war because they were afraid of us, and we did the same to them in time of peace'. A neat antithesis, the first part of which (as Gomme remarks) serves to 'screen' the Mytileneans' own discreditable flattery, just mentioned at 11. 5 and now more defiantly admitted.

3. εἰ γὰρ δυνατοὶ ἦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ἴσου καὶ ἀντεπιβουλευσαί καὶ ἀντιμελλῆσαι, τί ἔδει ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐπ' ἐκείνοις εἶναι; ἐπ' ἐκείνοις δὲ ὄντος αἰεὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρεῖν καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι δεῖ τὸ προαμύνασθαι: 'If we were really their equals and in a position to counter their attacks and imitate their threatening attitude, we should never, in this position of equality, have been at their mercy [lit. 'how should we ever, in this position of equality, have been at their mercy?']. But as it is, the initiative is always in their hands; so we ought to be allowed to anticipate their attacks'. A very difficult sentence, which problems of emendation have made considerably worse. Many editors, including Gomme, have read *ἀντεπιβουλεύσαι καὶ ἀντιμελλῆσαι τι, ἔδει ἡμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίου ἐπ' ἐκείνους εἶναι. ἐπ' ἐκείνοις δέ* etc. That is, the first *ἐκείνοις* is emended to *ἐκείνους* (and the question mark changed to a full stop). The meaning of this would be something like 'if it were

equally in our power to move against them in our turn, then, we agree, we ought to have waited before attacking them; but since the initiative is always with them' etc. (Gomme's tr.). The main objection to the manuscript reading has always been felt to be that *ἐπ' ἐκείνοις* ought to mean the same thing both times; on Jowett's tr. it means 'at their mercy' (first occurrence) and 'in their hands' (second occurrence). See, however, for a defence of the unemended text, Macleod, 90 n. 8, giving examples of such 'repetition with a change of sense or nuance' in Th. and his contemporaries. So, with no great confidence, I have retained the unemended text and Jowett's tr., more or less. This is not one of those passages in Th. where a difficulty about text or interpretation makes an enormous difference: the Mytileneans' general point here is plain enough.

13. 1. τοιαύτας ἔχοντες προφάσεις καὶ αἰτίας: 'These were the reasons . . . and the grievances'. Here (contrast i. 23. 6) there is very little difference in meaning between the two Greek words used.

After some recapitulation in 13. 1 the Mytileneans pass (13. 2) to the strictly prudential part of their argument: see introductory n.

βουλομένους μὲν καὶ πάλαι, ὅτε ἔτι ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπέμψαμεν ὡς ὑμᾶς περὶ ἀποστάσεως: 'We have wanted to do this for some time; long ago, when it was still peace-time, we sent envoys to you, and proposed to revolt'. For this appeal see 2. 1 (which uses almost identical language) and n. there; also introductory n. to 9-14.

νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ Βοιωτοὶ προκαλέσαντο: 'But now that the Boiotians have invited us . . .'. See ch. 8n. on *ὡς αὐτοῖς* etc., final paragraph.

καὶ ἐνομιζομεν ἀποστήσεσθαι διπλῆν ἀπόστασιν, ἀπὸ τε τῶν Ἑλλήνων μὴ ξὺν κακῶς ποιεῖν αὐτοὺς μετ' Ἀθηναίων ἀλλὰ ξυνελευθεροῦν, ἀπὸ τε Ἀθηναίων μὴ αὐτοὶ διαφθαρήναι ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἐν ὑστέρω, ἀλλὰ προποιῆσαι: 'We intended to make a double secession, from the Greek alliance as a whole, and from the Athenians: from the Greek alliance, which has become an instrument not for liberating the Greeks but for helping the Athenians to oppress them; and from the Athenians, who were sure to destroy us sooner or later, unless we forestalled them'. On this somewhat forced antithesis see Macleod, 90f., calling it 'significantly complex'; as he puts it 'Athens makes the Greeks their own enemies, so that, by a striking paradox, the Mytileneans have to 'secede' from the Greeks in order not to harm them.'

3. νῆες τε αὐτοῖς αἰ μὲν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν εἰσίν: 'some of their ships are cruising about your shores'. A reference to ch. 7 above, the eighteen ships sent home by Asopios. See further 16. 1 and 2nn.

5. **ὥ γὰρ δοκεῖ μακρὰν ἀπεινὰν ἢ Λέσβος:** 'He may think that Lesbos is a long way off'. Macleod, 88, compares i. 36. 2 (the Corcyraeans) and the advice in the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, 1424^b40 ('show that you are nearby').

ἀλλὰ δι' ἣν ἡ Ἀττικὴ ὠφελεῖται: 'but in those countries from which Attica is supported'. Compare Pericles at ii. 13. 2; also viii. 96. 2 on the loss of Euboea, there said to be more useful to the Athenians than Attica itself (the language there recalls the present passage: ἐξ ἧς πλείω ἢ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ὠφελούντο). But here the reference is very generally to Athens' Aegean empire: see Cartledge, *Agesilaos* (London, 1987), 47, who adds 'and more particularly to the Bosphoros and Hellespont bottlenecks through which the literally vital wheat-supply of Athens was transported annually'—on which, however, see Garnsey (ii. 70. 1 n.).

6. **ἔστι δὲ τῶν χρημάτων ἀπὸ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἡ πρόσσδος:** 'the revenues of the Athenians are derived from their allies'. Compare (as well as Pericles in ii. 13. 3) Archidamos at i. 83. 2.

7. **πόλιν τε προσλήψεσθε ναυτικὸν ἔχουσαν μέγα:** 'you will win a great naval power as an ally'. As Macleod, 88, again notes, this claim corresponds to the Corcyraean claim at i. 36. 3, and both claims correspond to *Rhet. Alex.* 1424^b39 ('show that your resources are great').

14. 1. **καὶ Δία τὸν Ὀλύμπιον:** 'Olympian Zeus'. We are not to forget the Olympian, Panhellenic, location of this meeting: see introductory n. And for Zeus as protector of suppliants (*Zeus Hikesios*) see e.g. H. Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*² (Berkeley, 1983), 5, 30.

15-18. *Abortive invasion of Attica; Mytilene blockaded*

15. 1. **τοῖς δύο μέρεσιν:** 'the usual contingent of two-thirds' [lit. 'the two-thirds', where the definite article expresses the idea of 'well-known', 'usual']. For the 'two-thirds' rule see ii. 10. 2 n.

καὶ ὄλκους παρεσκευάζον τῶν νεῶν ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ ὡς ὑπεροίσοντες: 'set to work making slipways so as to haul ships over the isthmus'. For the meaning of ὄλκους here as slipways for the *diolkos* (for which see i. 13. 5 n. on ἐπὶ τοῦ Ἰσθμοῦ), see R. M. Cook, 'A Further Note on the Diolkos', *Studies in Honour of T. B. L. Webster*, i (Bristol, 1986), 65 ff., at 65, comparing Hdt. ii. 154. 5 and 159. 1. Cook thinks that there were no slipways before, because the *diolkos* had previously been used for cargoes only.

16. 1. **δηλῶσαι βουλόμενοι ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐγνώκασιν ἀλλ' οἰοί τέ εἰσι μὴ κινούντες τὸ ἐπὶ Λέσβῳ ναυτικόν . . .:** 'to show them they were mistaken, and to prove that, without moving the fleet from

Lesbos ...'. For the psychology compare i. 105. 4 (Myronides), where Th. uses very similar language about Athens not moving the army on Aigina. Cp. de Jong (i. 1. 1 n.) 61–8 for such negatives ('without moving').

Th. says nothing here about the ships of ch. 7, eighteen of which were still at large round the Peloponnese (at least, according to the Mytileneans at 13. 3). Gomme thought that something has dropped out in the present passage, but that is to expect pedantic accuracy from Th. where the context does not call for it. See further para. 2 n.

ἔσβάντες αὐτοὶ τε πλὴν ἰππέων καὶ πεντακοσιομεδίμων καὶ οἱ μέτοικοι: 'in which they embarked, both metics and citizens, all but the *pentakosiomedimnoi* and the cavalrymen'. For metics see i. 143. 1 and ii. 13. 7 nn. The *pentakosiomedimnoi* or 'five-hundred bushel men' are mentioned here only in all Th., and the words πλὴν . . . πεντακοσιομεδίμων have been bracketed accordingly as the interpolation of a clever reader: U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen* (Stuttgart, 1934), 253 n. 5, sympathetically (but inaccurately) cited by Jacoby, n. 25 to commentary on *FGH Hist* 328 F 119. The *pentakosiomedimnoi* were the top of the four census-ratings used by Solon to define eligibility for political office; for the cavalrymen (*hippeis*), the second category, see i. 45. 2 n. The other two were the zeugites or hoplites, and the thetes. See generally ii. 13. 6–7 n. (The usual view is that even the *epibatai* or marines were normally thetes (see iii. 98. 4 n.), so the use of hoplites/zeugites on the present occasion is exceptional, in whatever capacity they were used.) On Solon's ratings see Connor, *JHS* 1987, 47.

The present passage is good evidence that the old ratings were still important in the military sphere as late as the Peloponnesian War, but exactly what at this period they signified in social and economic terms is less clear. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix is cited by Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 138 (on 7. 3) for an unpublished view that the three lower classes were always based on military status and, unlike the *pentakosiomedimnoi*, may not have been defined in economic terms even after Solon.

For a mention of *pentakosiomedimnoi* in a fourth-century inscription about cleruchs on Lemnos see *IG ii²*. 30, line 12, with the comments of R. S. Stroud, *Hesperia*, 40 (1971), 171 f. with n. 31: it is possible that the property qualifications of the cleruchs were there defined in a way that exactly recalls the present passage of Th. ([πλὴν ἰππέων καὶ] *πεντακοσιομεδίμων*), though, as Stroud remarks, the Thucydidean parallel 'is valuable only for its phraseology, as this passage has nothing to do with cleruchs or colonists'. The Lemnos inscription, so supplemented, supports the view that the rider to the Brea decree (ML 49 = Fornara 100), with its specification that settlers should be drawn from 'thetes and zeugites', was intended as an exclusion of the other two classes, though

this had been doubted by some (Jacoby, above; de Ste. Croix, quoted in *LACTOR Athenian Empire*³, 120f.).

The upshot of all this would seem to be that the *pentakosiomedimnoi* and *hippeis* on the one hand, and the zeugites and thetes on the other, did tend to be distinguished from each other; this corresponds, I believe, to the point in Athens at which the real cleavage lay (in as far as there was one), that is, between *hippeis* and zeugites rather than between zeugites and thetes. This point cannot be argued fully here, but will be relevant in Book viii when we come to discuss the 'hoplite constitutions' which are a feature of the year 411.

2. καὶ ἠγγέλλοντο καὶ αἱ περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον τριάκοντα νῆες τῶν Ἀθηναίων τὴν περιοικίδα αὐτῶν πορθοῦσαι: 'and they heard that the thirty ships which had been sent to cruise round the Peloponnese were devastating their country districts'. There are two possible views about these ships. (i) The reference is to the ships of ch. 7, in which case 'thirty' is a slip (whether by an oversight of Th.; by a mistake in calculation by the Spartans, correctly but improbably reported by Th.; or by the officious intervention of a later reader or copyist) for 'eighteen', the number of ships sent home by Asopios. (ii) Some editors have wanted to delete 'thirty' and take this passage to be a reference to the 100 ships mentioned at the end of para. 1 above, because (a) the eighteen ships of ch. 7 were not mentioned at the beginning of para. 1 (but see n. there, on *δηλώσαι* etc.); and (b) they must—it is alleged—have returned to Athens by now (but we cannot be sure of this). This drastic solution is unnecessary and improbable (as Gomme says, the natural way of referring to the hundred ships of para. 1 would be, precisely, 'the hundred ships'). On either view 'thirty' is wrong, but there are degrees of 'wrongness': it *must* be deleted on view (ii); it should *probably* be deleted or altered on view (i), *unless the mistake was Th.'s own or was a Spartan misapprehension correctly reported by him*. Since these last, italicized, possibilities cannot be quite ruled out, I have retained the numeral.

3. Ἀλκίδαν: 'Alkidas'. We shall be hearing much more of this (for Sparta) disastrous figure. For a more favourable view see J. Roisman, 'Alkidas in Thucydides', *Historia* 36 (1987), 385ff. Note also S. Hodkinson (ii. 85. 1 n.), 261 and Badian (31. 1 n.).

17. *Athenian expenditure*

This chapter contains a number of difficulties of fact and has been deleted by editors outright, or else transferred to Book ii: F. E. Adcock, 'On Thucydides iii, 17', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, 1 (1923-5), 319ff., suggested that it belongs after ii. 56. However, its problems are—as

Pritchett points out, *Greek State at War*, i. 15 n. 46—unlike those of iii. 84, which was condemned in antiquity; nobody saw anything wrong with iii. 17 until Steup wrote an article about it in *Rheinisches Museum* for 1869. (Thus it is interesting that Classen in his 1st edn. of 1867 managed to comment in detail on the entire ch. without qualms.) There is nothing much wrong with the Greek, which looks Thucydidean enough. The question is, to which year (if any) does the information given refer?

There is a reference in 17. 1 to 'the beginning of the war'. As it stands (i) the gist of this section is that 'at the beginning of the war the total of ships was as large or larger; for then ...' If this is right, the material which follows relates to 431 or at a pinch 430. (ii) If, however, the word ἤ, 'than', is inserted, the sense becomes 'the number in 428 was as great as or greater than in 431; for in 428 ...'

On view (ii), whose main advantage is to make the material more directly relevant to its context, an impossibly large total of ships is asserted for 428; the '100 ships round Attica' of para. 2 would be particularly hard to reconcile with the strenuous efforts just recorded in ch. 16. We are therefore forced either to condemn the ch. altogether or to adopt view (i) and relate the material to an earlier period—preferably 430, because the ship totals were greater in 430 than 431. This solution, which is here accepted, is that of Gomme (at p. 277 not p. 273), R. Weil in the 1967 Budé edn., and Pritchett; it involves keeping the ch. where it is in Book iii. (By bodily transposing the ch. to Book ii, with Adcock, we combine elements of views (i) and (ii): on the one hand the material will relate to a year earlier than 428—as in view (i)—but on the other hand we will still need to supply ἤ—as in view (ii)—so as to make a contrast between 430 and 431.)

1. ἐνεργοὶ κάλλει: 'effective and in good trim'. The expression is harsh in Greek (though no worse than some expressions found in Th.'s speeches) and some word or words may have dropped out.

ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου: 'at the beginning of the war'. Some commentators have, for general reasons to do with the interpretation of the ch. as a whole, inserted ἤ, 'than', before these words; see introductory n.

2. τὴν τε γὰρ Ἀττικὴν καὶ Εὐβοίαν καὶ Σαλαμίνα ἑκατὸν ἐφύλασσαν: 'For then there were a hundred ships which guarded Attica, Euboea, and Salamis'. This is the most serious single obstacle to belief in the authenticity of the ch.: the existence of such a fleet is hardly consistent with the situation in 428 (see introductory n.); if it refers to 430 things are not much better, but it can (just) be seen as reference to the 100-ship reserve of ii. 24.

καὶ περὶ Πελοπόννησον ἕτεραι ἑκατόν: 'and another hundred

which were cruising off the Peloponnese'. That is, probably, the ships of ii. 56. (On the view which takes the present passage to refer to 428, the reference must be to the ships of iii. 16. 1 above).

3. μετὰ Ποτειδαίας: 'and the money spent in the war against Potidaia'. See ii. 70. 2 n.

4. (αὐτῷ γὰρ καὶ ὑπηρετῆ δραχμὴν ἐλάμβανε τῆς ἡμέρας): 'one [drachma] for himself, one for his servant'. For attendants of this kind see Pritchett, i. 49–51, showing (against the doubts of Gomme) that they were perfectly normal. As for the rate of hoplite pay, the present passage is one of the most explicit pieces of evidence that we have (which means that the question of the ch.'s authenticity is important for this reason if no other). Other Thucydidean, and most of the non-Thucydidean, evidence makes good sense on the view that the normal rate of pay before 413 was (as here stated) a drachma, i.e. six obols a day, but that in the austere days of 413 (the aftermath of the Sicilian Expedition) the rate was halved to three obols. See vi. 31. 3 and viii. 45. 2 with the nn. of Dover and Andrewes respectively; I defer further discussion until my own nn. on those passages (the text of viii. 45 is problematic). The Dover/Andrewes view is accepted by Pritchett, i. 14 ff., and Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 306 (on 24. 3).

τρισχίλιοι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι, ὧν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διεπολιόρκησαν, ἑξακόσιοι δὲ καὶ χίλιοι μετὰ Φορμίωνος, οἱ προαπήλθον: 'the original force amounted to three thousand, and this number was maintained as long as the siege lasted. Sixteen hundred more came with Phormio, but went away before the end'. For the departure of Phormio's contingent see ii. 58. 2. There are, however, difficulties about this statement, emphatic though it is, that the original 3,000 stayed throughout (which would be contrary to normal besieging practice of withdrawing perhaps half of an investing force once the siege was established); see n. on ii. 31. 2 for the possibility that the 3,000 there mentioned is made up in equal proportions of (i) Phormio's men, not yet withdrawn, and (ii) roughly half the original force. If that is right, the present passage falls under suspicion of being a mechanical conflation of the 3,000 of i. 57 and 61 (1,000 + 2,000) and the 1,600 of i. 64. 2, when in reality the troop movements were more complicated than that. But the 'mechanical' view is simpler. So perhaps we should not use assumptions about Greek warfare to attack the credit of a passage like the present, which can be made to fit the rest of the Thucydidean evidence (provided we assume that the information at ii. 58 about Phormio's departure is recorded later than it should have been).

18. 1. καὶ οἱ ἐπίκουροι: 'and their supporting forces'. I have changed Jowett's tr. 'auxiliaries' here, although it gives a suitably indeterminate sense. Seibt (i. 115. 4n. on ἐπικούρους), 42, thinks that here it means 'mercenaries'. See, however, Lavelle (also i. 115. 4n.), who distinguishes these troops from the archers recruited from the Black Sea regions (see 2. 2), and thinks the ἐπίκουροι are really allies from elsewhere in Lesbos. This is plausible though sharp distinctions are to be avoided.

ἀπήλθον ἐπ' Ἀντίσσης . . .: 'went off to Antissa . . .'. See 2. 3n. on ξυνοικίζουσι . . .: the present passage, with its reference to the defences etc. of Antissa and the other places, shows that the synoikism had not involved a physical evacuation, if that was ever contemplated.

καὶ καταστησάμενοι τὰ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ταύταις βεβαιότερα: 'and seeing to their security'. Classen argued that these measures included the installation of some of the troops called ἐπίκουροι mentioned above, because they feature at Antissa in para. 2 below. This is an acute observation, whatever the precise status of these troops: see above.

2. τῶν Ἀντισσαίων καὶ τῶν ἐπικούρων: 'the people of Antissa and their supporting forces'. See on 1 above.

4. αὐτέρεται: 'who rowed the ships themselves'. See Morrison and Coates, 115, for this emergency procedure, an indication of how stretched Athens' naval resources now were: normally, specialist thetic rowers would man the oars, and hoplites would be carried on deck. But note also the interchangeability, at need, of hoplites and thetes, supporting the general view of the relation between those two classes argued for above, 16. 1n. on ἐσβάντες, at end.

19. Athenian financial measures

This ch. is tantalizing because it shows the kind of financial detail which Th. could have supplied more often had he chosen, and of whose general absence it is reasonable to complain given Th.'s own insistence, from i. 2 onwards, on the importance of πρόσοδοι, 'revenue', and περιουσία χρημάτων, 'reserves of wealth'.

1. καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐσενεγκόντες τότε πρῶτον ἐσφορὰν διακόσια τάλαντα: 'raised among themselves for the first time a property-tax of two hundred talents'. The *eisphora* was an extraordinary levy on capital; we are surely meant to recall Pericles' disparaging remarks at i. 141. 5 about forced contributions, literally 'violent *eisphorai*'. For the *eisphora* see de Ste. Croix, 'Demosthenes' *TIMHMA* and the Athenian *Eisphora* in the Fourth Century B.C.', *Cl. et Med.* 14 (1953), 30ff., arguing that, in the fourth century at any rate, the *eisphora* represented a levy of

as little as 0.25% of taxable capital. This, de Ste. Croix thinks, was not very much; but see J. K. Davies, *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens* (New York, 1981), 82f.: individual payments were sometimes quite large. As an element in Athenian public finance the *eisphora* (along with other ways of getting money from individuals) certainly deserved a mention in the important ch. ii. 13; see ii. 13. 3 n. on *θαρσεῖν* for the rhetorical reasons for Th.'s silence at this point. There has been much recent work on the *eisphora*, but it mostly concerns the fourth century (where the bulk of the evidence is). This is true of for instance R. Thomsen's full-length treatment *Eisphora* (Copenhagen, 1964), though note his pp. 14f. on the present passage; and see P. Brun, *Eisphora-Syntaxis-Stratitotika: Recherches sur les finances militaires d'Athènes au IV^e siècle av. J.-C.* (Paris, 1983), 3-73.

The meaning of the present passage is that this was *the first time the Athenians raised an amount as high as 200 talents* by means of the *eisphora*; he is *not* saying that this was the first ever *eisphora* (which would contradict the clear evidence of the Kallias decrees, as normally dated, which show that the institution existed as early as 433: ML 58 B, lines 17 and 19 = Fornara 119). On this point see the conclusive discussion of J. G. Griffith, 'A Note on the First *Eisphora* at Athens', *AJAH* 2 (1977), 3 ff. Note Th.'s fondness for 'records' of this sort. [See 1997 preface.]

See Sommerstein on Ar. *Knights*, 926, for the possibility that Kleon was specially concerned with the levying of *eisphora* in this period.

ἔξέπεμψαν καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἀργυρολόγους ναῦς δώδεκα: 'and sent out twelve ships to collect tribute among the allies'. See ii. 69. 1 n. on the question whether these ships were connected with a reassessment of tribute; see also iv. 50 and 75.

καὶ Λυσικλέα πεμπτὸν αὐτὸν στρατηγόν: 'under the command of Lysikles and four others'. For the formula see i. 57. 6, 61. 1 nn. Lysikles seems to be the unnamed 'sheep-monger' of Ar. *Knights*, 132-5 (see Sommerstein's n.), there mentioned as a would-be successor of Pericles (whose former mistress Aspasia he lived with); the second '-monger' in chronological sequence after Eukrates, but removed from the running by death (for which see Th. below).

2. τοῦ Σανδίου λόφου: 'the hill of Sandios'. Gomme made nothing of this, but for its identification as an isolated hill at Yürüklü, 5 km. north-east of the dismal modern town of Söke, see L. Robert, *Opera Minora Selecta* (Amsterdam, 1969), 1443 f. (reprinted from *Anatolia* 4 (1959), 1 ff.; see also *Laodicée du Lycos* (Paris, 1969), 348 n. 9), with excellent remarks on the topography and strategy of Lysikles' mission: he needed to avoid larger towns like Magnesia (outside the Athenian empire) and concentrate on villages and open territory. Robert's extended discussion has

harsh remarks about Gomme's failure to cite a conjecture of A. Rehm in *Milet*, iii: *Das Delphinion* 318 = 442, addendum to p. 194 = 349. (The real target is the scholar whom Gomme did briefly cite, namely Bürchner, for whom Robert had no time.) Rehm suggested that Th. wrote τοῦ <Υ>βανδίου λόφου (cp. Plin. *NH* ii. 204). However, Robert himself rejects the emendation: Hybanda, near Myous, is too far south. A position near Söke to the north, under Mt. Mykale, makes better sense of the involvement of the nearby Anaians (below).

καὶ Ἀναϊτῶν: 'the Samians of Anaia' [lit. 'the Anaians']. For the site of Anaia, on the mainland or *peraia* opposite Samos, see the map at Shipley (i. 13. 6 n. on ἄλλας τε) 266, fig. 22, and discussion at 122 (discussing the present incident, but without reference to Robert), 267, etc. These 'Anaiitans' were not, despite the ethnic, a community in their own right (so rightly Shipley, 35), but exiles, presumably as a result of the events of 440/39, for which see above, i. 115–17. For this Anaian presence as a kind of *epiteichismos* (i. 142. 2 n.) see Cawkwell, *YCS* 24 (1975), 67. For the *economic* value of such *peratai* see 85. 2 n. on τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς, a phrase from a chapter which, like the present passage, illustrates the *nuisance* value of possession, by an island's enemies, of that island's *peraia*. At 85. 2 the island in question is Corcyra.

20–24. SIEGE OF PLATAIA CONTINUED: BREAK-OUT BY SOME OF THE DEFENDERS

The narrative is resumed from ii. 78, and is as vivid as the Book ii material. W. R. Connor, 'Narrative Discourse in Thucydides', in *The Greek Historians: Literature and History* (i. 104. 2 n. on Περσῶν etc.), 10, draws on these five chapters to illustrate his point that in Th. there is 'dramatic interaction between abstraction and sudden flashes of vividness' (he cites chs. 20, the measuring of the brick wall, and 22. 2, the 'monosandalism': see nn. there).

20. 1. Θεαινέτου τε τοῦ Τολμίδου, ἀνδρὸς μάντεως: 'Theainetos son of Tolmides, a diviner'. Theainetos' status as a diviner may be relevant to the curious detail recorded at 22. 2: see n. there.

See on this man G. Herman, *CQ* 1989 (ii. 85. 5 n.), 91, noting that the name of the famous Athenian Tolmides' diviner was also Theainetos; perhaps there was a relationship of *xenia* here; cp. below, 52. 5 n.

Εὐπομπίδου τοῦ Δαιμάχου: 'Eupompidas son of Daimachos'. A Daimachos of Plataia wrote about India in the Hellenistic period

(*FGrHist* 716); and this, together with the present passage, makes it likely that the fourth-century historian Daimachos (*FGrHist* 65), whom some hold to be the author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (*FGrHist* 66), was a Plataian, and from the family of Eupompidas. If so it may, in view of Eupompidas' role in the present ch., be more than just coincidence that the fourth-century Daimachos wrote a work about siegecraft (FF 3 and 4). That is, Th. perhaps got his detailed factual information about the siege of Plataia from members of this family, and used the information to correct Hdt.: see ii. 2. 1 and 3 nn.

3. κλίμακας ἐποίησαντο: 'they ... made ladders'. For the careful measuring of the wall, in order to make the ladders just the right length, see Polybius, ix. 19. 5–9 (with Walbank's comm., summarized by A. W. Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford, 1979), 437 n. 1 to ch. 3: 'in later times the height of a wall was reckoned also by comparing the length of shadows cast simultaneously by it and by a pole set upright, or might be calculated by triangulation from a measured distance'). The need for exactness is well explained by G. B. Grundy, *Topography of the Battle of Plataea* (London, 1894), 68: 'Had the ladders been too short by a yard or so, the difficulty of climbing at the top would have immensely delayed the passage. Had they been too long, the guards at the part of the wall, if aroused, would have been able to lay hold of them and thrust them back.' For an occurrence of the first kind of failure see Polyb. v. 97. 6.

οὐκ ἔξαληλιμμένον: 'not ... plastered'. See Winter (ii. 18. 1 n.), 132 and n. 24, for such clay or lime plaster weatherproofing, citing this literary example, i.e. the Spartan wall of circumvallation, and archaeological (Gela) and epigraphic (Athens) evidence.

21. 1. τὸ δὲ τεῖχος ἦν τῶν Πελοποννησίων . . .: 'The Peloponnesian Wall . . .'. On the 'grandiose circumvallation' of Plataia see Lawrence, 280 and 41 f., calling the self-sufficient fortification an 'Asiatic device', and noting that 'no later Greek circumvallation was so elaborate—usually a mere breastwork or a palisade appears to have sufficed'. For the troops' quarters see Winter, 161 f., who compares Th. ii. 18 (this should be ii. 17. 3): the Athenians 'establishing themselves in the towers of the walls'.

22. 2. καὶ τὸν ἀριστερὸν μόνον πόδα ὑποδεδεμένοι ἀσφαλείας ἔνεκα τῆς πρὸς τὸν πῆλον: 'with the right foot bare so that they would be less liable to slip in the mud'. This sentence has provoked some fascinating comment in recent years; it seems that Th. ignored the religious aspect of this 'monosandalism'. See above all (with acknowledgments to J. G. Frazer and W. Deonna) P. Lévêque and P. Vidal-Naquet, 'Épaminondas pythagoricien ou le problème tactique de la droite et la

gauche', *Historia*, 9 (1960), 294 ff., at 298, with n. 29 (reprinted in English tr., with addenda, in Vidal-Naquet's *The Black Hunter* (Baltimore, 1986), 61 ff., at 64: 'the baring of one foot is part of a rite devoted to the chthonian deities; thus the passage in Th[.] can only be understood in connection with the many cases of *monokrepides* (single sandals). The historian is caught—pardon the expression—in *flagrante delicto*, in the act of rationalisation.' In the addenda (70) Vidal-Naquet compares Jason in Pindar's Fourth Pythian Ode, returning, with only one foot shod, to expel the usurper Pelias. Jason (it is said) is an archetypal ephebe; the Plataians were reverting to the rites of adolescence. Th. had the 'honesty' to give us a detail 'which allows us to contradict him'. See also L. Edmunds, 'Thucydides on Monosandalism (3. 22. 2)', *GRBS Monograph 10* (1984) = *Sterling Dow Studies*, 71 ff., another very interesting article, adducing archaeological (sculptural) parallels and even the initiation of Pierre Bezukhov into freemasonry in *War and Peace* (Penguin tr., i. 420), in which something like monosandalism plays a part. Edmunds points out that Th.'s practical explanation, which seemed to satisfy Gomme, does not explain why it was not better to have *both* feet bare; and he notes, in support of the religious interpretation, the relevance of Theainetos' status as *μάντις* or diviner (20. 1, with 22. 1 for his and Eupompidas' leadership of the enterprise). Both Edmunds and Lévêque/Vidal-Naquet compare v. 70, where Th. explicitly but perhaps incorrectly rejects a religious motive for a military practice. Note also that if the 'religious' interpretation is right in the present instance, we have another case of Th. imputing motive (here, the practical point about mud) in the way discussed at i. 5 n. on *ἡγουμένων*.

4. **κατέβαλε γὰρ τις τῶν Πλαταιῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπάλξεων κεραμίδα:** 'One of the Plataians grabbed hold of the battlements and knocked down a tile'. See Winter, 132 n. 25, 139 n. 43. Gomme's preference for 'tiling' (plural), rather than a single tile, seems arbitrary. One tile could make enough of a clatter. In 272 BC, King Pyrrhus was killed by what is evidently a single *κεραμῖς*, thrown from a housetop in Argos by an old woman, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 34. 2 (for thirteen other ancient, and three modern, references to this simple and undisputed event see Briscoe on Livy, xxxi. 7. 9 n. on 'morte Pyrrhi').

6. **ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἦσαν εἰκάσαι τὸ γιγνόμενον:** 'had no idea what was going on'. For the expression see i. 25. 1 n.

23. 1. **τὰς ἐπάλξεις ἀπώσαντες:** 'pushed down the battlements'. Which must have been 'quite as flimsy as those on the Achaian wall at Troy': see Winter, 138.

2. ὁ δὲ διακομιζόμενος αἰεὶ ἴστατο ἐπὶ τοῦ χεῖλους τῆς τάφρου . . . : 'Each of them, as he got to the other side, stopped on the edge of the ditch . . .'. The text is defended by E. L. Harrison, 'The Escape from Plataea': Thucydides 3. 23', *CQ* 9 (1959), 30ff., against attempts at emendation by Gomme, who felt difficulties which do seem imaginary.

5. ἀπηνιώτου ἢ βορέου: 'when the wind is from the east or north'. For this meaning (rather than Jowett's 'from the east and not from the north', which I have changed) see Gomme, *CQ* 42 (1948), 11f.

24. 1. τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρώων: 'the hero-shrine of Androkrates'. Th. expects his readers to remember that this landmark (not yet certainly identified) had featured in Hdt.'s account of the battle of Plataia (ix. 25). For topographical discussion see Pritchett, 'New Light on Plataia', *AJA* 61 (1957), 21f., and *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, i (Berkeley, 1965), ch. viii, 103ff., 'Plataia Revisited', at 111ff.; Burn (below, 2 n.), 95.

Δρυὸς κεφαλᾶς: 'Dryoskephalai'. See Hdt. ix. 39, with Pritchett, *AJA* 1957, 20f.; Ober, however (ii. 18. 2 n.), 119f., following an unpublished thesis of C. N. Edmonson, identifies it with the Kaza pass to the east.

2. ἐς Ἐρυθρας καὶ Ὑσιᾶς: 'to Erythrai and Hysiai'. See Pritchett (1 n. above) in *AJA* 1957, and *Studies*, 103ff. Pritchett's suggestions are based on finds of pot-sherds, a good indication of ancient settlement, and capable of ruling out some earlier candidates. Positive certainty of identification cannot be had, but it now seems right to put these two towns to the east of the Thebes–Athens road. See also A. R. Burn, 'Thermopylai Revisited and Some Topographical Notes on Marathon and Plataia', in K. H. Kinzl (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Schachermeyr Studies* (New York, 1977), 89ff.; also Lewis, postscript to Burn's *Persia and the Greeks*² (London, 1984), 607; and Ober, as above.

The Plataians, by a feint, go initially north and north-east, while their pursuers go in the opposite direction. The Plataians then turn off in the direction of Athens by another route, possibly pass 1 on Pritchett's map in *AJA* 1957, pl. 7, a little further east than the main Dryoskephalai route, Pritchett's pass 2. For these routes see also Ober, 106 map 5, 'The Kithairon region', where Pritchett's pass 1 is labelled 'Kaza pass' and Pritchett's pass 2 is labelled 'Hammond's road'. See above, 1 n. on *Δρυὸς κεφαλᾶς* for Ober's view.

διαφεύγουσιν ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας: 'they escaped to Athens'. And (as Th. does not tell us) were given citizenship there: Dem. lix. 104. See 55. 3 n. for the problems about the status and date of the grant of citizenship to the Plataians.

25-36. MYTILENE FALLS, DESPITE INVASION OF
ATTICA AND ALKIDAS' MISSION

25. 1. **ἐκπέμπεται Σάλαιθος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος**: 'Salaithos the Spartan was sent . . .'. H. W. Parke, 'The Development of the Second Spartan Empire', *JHS* 50 (1930), 37ff., at 43, compares Salaithos' position to that of Gylippos at vi. 93. 2 and following narrative, a 'Spartan General on loan abroad' (allowing for certain differences between the status of Mytilene and Syracuse): 'both arrived without armies, and both proceeded to take charge of the military operations of the besieged.' For Salaithos see also Wilson (introductory n. to 2-19), 161ff.

πεζῇ κατὰ χαράδραν τινά: 'on foot . . . using the channel of a torrent'. This good story no doubt spread quickly, even if Th. did not hear it from the man himself, as is possible (Salaithos himself was brought to Athens, 36. 1, where despite *εὐθύς*, 'immediately', there was evidently time to interrogate him before he was put to death, witness his promises about Plataia). Th.'s account avoids comment, but the degree of detail surely implies admiration for such resourcefulness and determination (Salaithos' penetration of enemy lines seems to have been a solo effort); we are meant to contrast Alkidas.

2. **καὶ τέταρτον ἔτος**: 'and with it the fourth year'. See 47. 1 n. for such formulae; but unlike that passage the present instance does not seem to have any particular literary function (see *Thucydides*, 116f.).

26. 1. **τὰς . . . [δύο καὶ] τεσσαράκοντα ναῦς**: 'the forty ships'. The manuscripts have 'forty-two', but see 16. 3; we should probably emend. (In view of the cross-reference implied by the word 'the', it is not worth thinking of ingenious reasons why there should now be forty-two. At 29. 1 they are 'the forty'.)

2. **ἤγειτο δὲ τῆς ἐσβολῆς ταύτης Κλεομένης**: 'Kleomenes led the invasion'. See 1. 1 n.

3. **καὶ ὅσα ἐν ταῖς πρὶν ἐσβολαῖς παρελέλειπτο**: 'and even the places which they had spared up to now'. We know that Dekeleia was originally spared (Hdt. ix. 73); and so was the Tetrapolis or Marathon area (Diod. xii. 45), both for religious reasons (typically not in Th.). Similarly, Androtion says that the Spartans abstained from destroying the sacred olive trees (*FGrHist* 324 F 39). But even now the devastation was not as bad as that after 413, according to the Oxyrhynchos Historian (20). See *Greek World*, 128 f.

27. 3. **οἱ δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἔλαβον ὄπλα, οὔτε ἠκροῶντο ἔτι τῶν ἀρχόντων, κατὰ ξυλλόγους τε γιγνόμενοι ἢ τὸν σίτον ἐκέλευον**

τοὺς δυνατοὺς φέρειν ἐς τὸ φανερόν καὶ διανέμειν ἅπασιν, ἢ αὐτοὶ ξυγχωρήσαντες πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἔφασαν παραδώσειν τὴν πόλιν: 'But once they were armed, they would no longer obey their leaders; they held meetings of their own and demanded that those in power should bring out the corn and distribute it; if not, they themselves would negotiate with the Athenians and surrender the city'. This incident is certainly evidence that the régime at Mytilene was oligarchic; see LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 102, no. 111 (but on this general topic note i. 115. 2 n. on καὶ Μιλησίοις, about Miletos, and i. 117. 3 n. on προσεχωρήσαν ὁμολογία, about Samos). It has featured in modern discussions of the popularity of the Athenian empire, notably in the argument between de Ste. Croix and Bradeen (3. 4 n.); for de Ste. Croix (4) the readiness of the people to call in the Athenians is specific support for Diodotos' generalization at 47. 2 about the popularity of Athens with the allied *demos*. (So too, with modifications, D. Gillis, 'Revolt at Mytilene', *AJP* 92 (1971), 38 ff.) Bradeen (263 f.) more realistically sees the common people of Mytilene as driven by hunger and despair. So also Macleod, 100, and Andrewes, *Phoenix* 16 (1962), 78 and n. 32, following Bradeen against de Ste. Croix on this point. Westlake (3. 4 n.) thinks Th. has deliberately kept us in the dark as to whether 'the commons' at Mytilene supported the revolt, but this is too gloomy a view.

For the meaning of *δυνατοί* here, which I have translated as 'those in power' instead of Jowett's 'the nobles', see i. 117. 3 n., as above. It is irritating that Th. begins the next ch. with *δυνατοί* used in a quite different sense. (But Ernst Badian acutely suggests that in 27. 3 we translate 'demanded that those who could do so . . .'.)

28. 1. οὐτ' ἀποκωλύειν δυνατοὶ ὄντες: 'that they were helpless' [lit. 'that they were not able to prevent it']. For *δυνατοί* see previous n.

2. ἐς Τένεδον: 'at Tenedos'. See 2. 3 n. on *Τενέδιοι γάρ* etc.

μέχρι οὗ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις τι δόξη: 'until the Athenians should come to a decision'. Meiggs (313), followed by Westlake (*Studies*, 52), suggests that Paches had in mind the fate of the generals at Potidaia (ii. 70), who got into trouble for making terms without reference to the Assembly.

29. 1. ταῖς τεσσαράκοντα ναυσί: 'the forty . . . ships'. See 26. 1 n.

2. ἐς Ἐμβατον τῆς Ἐρυθραίας: 'to Embaton near Erythrai' [lit. 'to Embaton, a place of the Erythraian territory']. This unidentified place (which must be on the Asiatic mainland south of Lesbos, somewhere opposite Chios) features, under the name Embata, in the Social War of the 350s. The difference of name is not significant; the word just means 'the accessible place', i.e. a landing-ground. Th.'s version is singular, the other plural. See for discussion *Mausolus*, 213 nn. 252-3.

ἔλεξεν . . . τὰδε: 'addressed them as follows' [lit. 'said this']. Th. normally introduces speeches with the vaguer *τοιαῦδε*, and scholars have been tempted to build on this and argue that the speech has some special claim to be considered authentic. I doubt this; see *Thucydides*, 53 and n. 31, and compare i. 31. 4 n. for the Corcyraeans and i. 85. 3 n. for Sthenelaidas.

30. *Speech of Teutiaplos of Elis*

For this speech see D. Lateiner, 'The Speech of Teutiaplos (Thuc. 3. 30)', *GRBS* 16 (1975), 175 ff., valuable for its detailed comparison with the language used in ii. 93-4, the abortive attack on the Piraeus: Th. here brings out more explicitly his 'negative attitude towards Spartan faintheartedness in action' (176). Note also, as Lateiner says (180), that this speech is one of those which 'point to the road not taken'. For such deliberate inclusion of ineffective speeches see *Thucydides*, 67 ff.

2. **καὶ ἡμῶν ἢ ἀλκὴ τυγχάνει μάλιστα οὔσα:** 'where at this moment our strength lies'. The words 'at this moment' are an insertion of Jowett's, to meet the objection that Peloponnesian strength is not normally thought to have been naval. Others have tried to get round the supposed difficulty by emendation, as Hude's *μόλις παρούσα*, or Kruger's *μάλιστα ἀπούσα*, which would both mean more or less the opposite, 'where our strength is not', i.e. a naval strike would be a surprise, coming from us. Jowett's solution is preferable. If an emendation is thought necessary, it would be better to change the participle to something less permanent-sounding than *οὔσα*, 'where it lies'; for instance, Schwartz (i. 67-88, introductory n.), 275, suggested *φοβοῦσα*, 'where it is formidable'.

4. **νομίσαντες οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι τὸ καινὸν τοῦ πολέμου ἢ τὸ τοιοῦτον:** 'we should remember that this [that is, attacking an enemy off his guard] is the essence of military surprise' [lit. 'the new/unexpected element of war']. This, the commoner reading, is found in one manuscript written above the other manuscript reading *κενόν*, 'empty', which a number of commentators have retained while not saying exactly what they think it would mean. (For instance, Gomme, and Lateiner, 177 n. 7, who merely refers to Gomme, and himself mysteriously extracts from *κενόν* the admittedly acceptable sense 'opportunity of war'.) Other suggestions are Steup's *κοινόν* 'this is common to all in war', which is not very good because, as Weil says in the 1967 Budé edn., it would hardly arouse much enthusiasm in Teutiaplos' hearers; and (just too late for Gomme to notice)

H.-J. Schulz's *καιρόν*: *Hermes*, 85 (1957), 255. This would mean 'the opportunity of war'—the sense Lateiner wanted to get from *κερόν*!

I have therefore changed the OCT *κερόν* to *καιρόν*.

31. 1. Κύμην τὴν Αἰολίδα: 'Aeolian Kyme'. See G. E. Bean, *Aegean Turkey* (London, 1967), 103ff. It was the home town of the fourth-century historian Ephoros, who mentions the place with suspicious frequency (Strabo claims that when Ephoros could find nothing else to say about it, he would say 'at this time the citizens of Kyme were doing nothing': *FG+Hist* 70 F 236). If Th.'s work was lost and the present sentence survived, scholars would no doubt assign it to Ephoros.

τὴν Ἴωνίαν ἀποστήσωσιν: 'could induce Ionia to revolt'. For this ch. and its implications for Persian-Spartan relations see the important discussions of Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 61 f., 67. See also *Mausolus*, 29.

οὐδενὶ γὰρ ἀκουσίως ἀφίχθαι: 'everyone was glad of his arrival'. See 32. 2 n.

καὶ τὴν πρόσσῳδον ταύτην μεγίστην οὖσαν Ἀθηναίων ὑφέλωσι, καὶ ἅμα, ἣν ἐφορμῶσι σφίσι, αὐτοῖς δαπάνη γίγνηται: 'they could cut off a main source of Athenian revenue, and the Athenians would incur further expense if they blockaded them'. I have translated the Oxford text of this difficult and much emended passage; this involves the deletion of the manuscript reading *ἦν* before *ὑφέλωσι*. I have therefore changed Jowett's tr., which adopted an interpretation (Bekker) which had the Peloponnesians themselves incurring expense through being blockaded.

For the claim itself compare Diod. xv. 90. 4, which claims that the (essentially Anatolian) Revolt of the Satraps in the 360s cut off half the King of Persia's revenue.

πέισειν τε οἶσθαι καὶ Πισσοῦθνην ὥστε ξυμπολεμεῖν: 'Pissouthnes could probably be persuaded to co-operate'. For Pissouthnes see i. 115. 4 (Samos). Just why his co-operation could have been represented as a possibility in the immediate situation emerges only gradually over the next couple of chs., as we find out about recent events in Kolophon and Notion. So rightly Lewis; but note that Pissouthnes' behaviour at Samos many years earlier (above), which is all Th.'s readers have to go on at this point, was enough by itself to make it reasonable to suggest him, see *Mausolus* (as above). E. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 34 f., remarks that the present passage, with its tentative language, shows that, however probable Pissouthnes' intervention could be represented as being, he did not yet consider himself at war; that is, the Peace of Kallias held. Badian adds: 'Alcidas—who perhaps deserves more credit for good sense than [Th.] seems to give him—did

not think much of their [the Ionians'] vague promises and returned home.'

2. τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς γνώμης: 'his main resolve'. Classen detected some irony here: the language of resolution is used for a desire to scuttle back home. Certainly Th. in these chs. brilliantly manages to censure Alkidas without open authorial censoriousness; see also 25. 1 n. (Salaithos). For a more favourable (modern) view of Alkidas see Badian, quoted above.

32. 1. Μυοννήσω τῇ Τηίῳν: 'Myonnesos in the territory of Teos'. See Bean (31. 1 n. on *Κύμην*), 146 ff. Myonnesos, a promontory between Teos and Notion, was a pirates' nest, and the scene of a famous Roman victory over Antiochos III in 190 BC: see Livy xxxvii. 27–30 (including a description of the site) with Briscoe's comm., and, for the battle, J. Thiel, *Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican Times* (Amsterdam, 1946), 350 ff.

2. ἐς τὴν Ἐφεσον: 'at Ephesus'. ML 67 = Fornara 132 is an inscription recording contributions to the Spartan war fund from, among others, Ephesians. The present context, in 427, has long been seen as an attractive date for the inscription, though Lewis (see ML comm.) suggests a 390s date, and this is accepted as probable by Cartledge, *Agesilaos* (London, 1987), 72 f., and supported by Jeffery, 'Laconian Letter Forms: A Reconsideration', *B&A* 83 (1988), 179 ff. According to the paperback reprint of ML (1989; NB different on this point from the 1988 hardback!), addenda at 312, 'an unpublished fragment refers to Aeginetans and shows that the Chian friends of the Spartans [line 9] were in exile'. (This removes one argument in favour of the date in the 420s: see iv. 51 n.)

Σαμίων τῶν ἐξ Ἀναίων: 'Samians of Anaia'. See 19. 2 n. on *Ἀναυιτῶν*. οὐ καλῶς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐλευθεροῦν αὐτόν: 'not a very good way of liberating Greece'. See ii. 8. 4 n. and Lewis, 66. Note that this speech, for speech is what it really is, has a very good claim to be considered authentic: it is very short, and it results in immediate action contrary to a previous line of action (*ἐπίσθη*, 'he was convinced'). This point will be relevant when we discuss similar remarks, in more elaborate and rhetorical speeches, about Sparta's hypocritical behaviour as liberator: see 59. 4 n. For οὐ καλῶς ('not well') see the comparable 93. 2.

Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης ξυμμάχους: 'allies of Athens from necessity'. See, for the general issues raised by this sort of remark, de Ste. Croix and Bradeen, 3. 4 n.; see below, 47. 2 n.

3. ἀλλὰ προσεχώρου μᾶλλον ὡς Ἀττικάις: 'they came close up to them thinking that they were Athenian'. Compare viii. 28. 2 (Iasos) with Andrewes's n.

33. 1. τῆς Σαλαμινίας καὶ Παράλου: 'the Athenian sacred triremes, Salamina and Paralos'. The words 'Athenian sacred triremes' are not in the Greek. For these two fast ships, used for special missions, see *Ar. Birds*, 147 (also 1203), with Sommerstein's n., and Rhodes's n. on *Ath. Pol.* 61. 7. For the justification for calling them 'sacred' see *Dem.* iv. 34, probably referring to the Paralos (so Harpokration's lexicon, entry under *ἱερὰ τριήρης*, citing *FGrHist* 324 Androtion F 24 and 328 Philochoros F 47). For the derivation of 'Paralos' from a hero of that name, and for good comment on the sacred triremes generally, see Jacoby's *Philochoros comm.*

The ships were surely only 'specially fast' (Gomme) in the sense that rowing them fast was a matter of prestige (see *Dem.* xxi. 174); they can hardly have incorporated technical innovations denied to other ships (though it has been suggested that they were always fully manned).

περὶ Κλάρον: 'near Claros'. About 2 km. from Notion up the valley of a small river: see Bean (31. 1 n.), 190 ff. Claros is mentioned here only in Th. (and was even 'emended' out of the text by Bekker in favour of Ikaros, which is why Claros does not feature in Essen's *Index Thucydideus*). But Claros was in later times a famous tourist attraction (see *Tac. Ann.* ii. 54 for a visit by Germanicus) on account of its oracle, for which see R. Lane Fox, *Pagans and Christians* (London, 1986), ch. 5, and above all, for the earlier period, H. W. Parke, *The Oracles of Apollo in Asia Minor* (London, 1985), 12 ff., discussing the site generally, the history of the oracle (which seems to have existed in a small way in Th.'s time, though he has no occasion to mention it), the history of the classical relations of Claros, Kolophon, and Notion, and (at 122) the present ch. of Th.: 'presumably they [Alkidas and party] put in at the beach west of Notion.' See also L. and J. Robert, *Claros*, i. *Décrets hellénistiques*, fasc. i (Paris, 1989).

2. ἀτειχίστου γὰρ οὔσης τῆς Ἴωνίας: 'For because Ionia was not fortified'. This unassuming aside has attracted much comment because it is part of the evidence for a Peace of Kallias: see section (iv) of my long n. at i. 112. 2 on this topic. The argument is, that the cities of Ionia would not have been unwallled unless in obedience to some restriction such as the Peace is assumed to have imposed. See Wade-Gery, *Essays*, 219 (citing Toynbee), followed by Cawkwell, *CQ* 23 (1973), 54 n. 3, Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 153 and n. 118. Others (Brunt, *Ehrenberg Studies*, 84, 92 n. 54; Meiggs, 149 ff.) have preferred to see the unwallled state of Ionia as the result of a specific Athenian imperial decision or of imperial policy generally. Brunt notes that most of the evidence is compatible with dismantling on the *seaward side only*, that is, Athens may in her bilateral dealings with her allies have insisted on guaranteed access for herself.

Disagreement has perhaps been too sharp: see Andrewes on viii. 14. 3, end of n., pointing out that Wade-Gery (219 n. 1) had already recognized that demolition was in Athens' interest, and concluding that, despite the doubts of subsequent scholars about Wade-Gery's diplomatic hypothesis, 'the Peace of Kallias is however relevant in that, so long as it was observed, the East Greek cities could be left undefended on the landward side' by contrast with northern places like Amphipolis. In similar vein note E. Badian, *From Plataea to Potidaea*, 53: 'we may also accept the modern conjecture that the walls of the cities in Asia Minor were demolished, since we have ample evidence, often rehearsed, that both the King and Athens preferred to have their subject cities unwallled. There would be no opposition to this from either side, and the Athenians might claim that it was a necessary concession to the King.' We should accept the likelihood that the unfortified state of Ionia was a result of the Peace of Kallias, a result which, unlike some other aspects of the Peace, Athens had reason to welcome.

J. M. Cook, 'The Problem of Classical Ionia', *PCPhS* 187 (1961), 9ff., at 17, suggests that there may be a reference here not merely to absence of fortifications but to the general material poverty of fifth-century Ionia ('the Ionians were not living in regular urban conditions'). The general point about Ionia may be right (though see Boardman's brief reply at *CR* 14 (1964), 83), but I doubt if it was what Th. was thinking of here.

34. 1. παραπλέων δὲ πάλιν ἔσχε καὶ ἐς Νότιον τὸ Κολοφώνιον, οὗ κατώκηντο Κολοφώνιοι τῆς ἄνω πόλεως ἐαλωκυίας ὑπὸ Ἰταμάνους καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων κατὰ στάσις ἰδία ἐπαχθέντων· ἑάλω δὲ μάλιστα αὕτη ὅτε ἡ δευτέρα Πελοποννησίων ἐσβολὴ ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐγίγνετο: 'As he was sailing along the coast he put in at Notion, the port of Kolophon. Here some inhabitants of the upper town had established themselves; for it had been captured by Itamanes and the barbarians, who had been invited in privately during a *stasis*. The capture took place about the time of the second invasion of Attica'. That is, in 430; it is characteristic of Th., who, as Andrewes showed (i. 112. 2 n.), under-reports the Persian aspect to the war, that we find out about this three years after the event. The name Itamanes looks Persian (see Lewis, *Sparta and Persia*, 61 and n. 76, citing R. Hallock, *Persepolis Fortification Tablets* (Chicago, 1969), 1389, and Xen. *Anab.* vii. 8. 15), and as Lewis says he is evidently a subordinate of Pissouthnes. Was the intervention of Itamanes at Kolophon, and the subsequent intervention of Pissouthnes at Notion (below), in breach of the Peace of Kallias (for which see 33. 2 n.)? Wade-Gery, 219, thought the treaty 'had certainly been strained by Pissouthnes' intervention at Kolophon', but Lewis, 61,

goes less far, pointing out that the Persians were merely backing one side in internal *stasis*; so too Badian, 34 and 38. (Though note that Badian leans on the Greek word *ιδίᾳ*, 'privately'—used of the group which invited in Itamanes—without noting that this is an emendation of the manuscripts' *ιδίαν* ['in a private *stasis*']. The emendation is I believe right but is arrived at by consideration of the historical situation; we ought not therefore to use it to support our view of that situation.) Arist. *Politics*, 1303^b10 characteristically sees the trouble between Kolophon and Notion, which as usual he does not date, in terms of purely local friction; against this see Ruschenbusch (ii. 2. 2 n.), 57, for whom the trouble at Kolophon and Notion is one of many manifestations of 'externally motivated' conflict; also Gehrke (ii. 2. 2 n.), 80 and 281, for the Peloponnesian War as the catalyst of *stasis* at Kolophon. We can accept this correction of Aristotle while agreeing with Badian that Persia was not actually in breach of the Peace of Kallias. For 'barbarians' see below.

On Notion and Kolophon see Ad. Wilhelm, 'Fünf Beschlüsse der Athener', *Jahreshefte*, 21-2 (1924), 156-8; L. and J. Robert, *Claros*, i (33. 1 n.), 71 n. 40. [And M. Piérart, *BCH* (1984).]

2. παρὰ Πισσοῦθνου ἐπικούρους Ἀρκάδων τε καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἐπαγαγόμενοι: 'having introduced Arkadian and barbarian mercenaries whom they had got from Pissouthnes'. See Seibt (18. 1 n.), 42 ff., for this interesting use of Greek mercenaries by a Persian satrap. There are precedents; but Pissouthnes' very extensive use of Greek mercenaries does seem to have been an innovation, even when we have made allowance for how little we know of fifth-century satraps before Pissouthnes. For specifically Arkadian mercenaries see e.g. Xen. *Hell.* vii. 1. 23 and generally *Greek World*, 162, citing J. Roy in *Historia*, 1967. The 'barbarian' mercenaries might be Persians, as assumed by Gehrke, 81, and others, but (here and at 1 above) Karians are another possibility; for Karians as mercenaries see *Mausolus*, 9 and 16.

ἐν διατειχίσματι: 'behind a crosswall'. For such crosswalls, which served to reduce the size, or cordon off a zone, of a city, see F. Maier, *Griechische Mauerbauinschriften* (Heidelberg, 1961), ii. 100; *SEG* xi. 1107 (about Elatea; improved text in *SEG* xxv. 445), line 22 = Maier i (1959), no. 30 = Moretti, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche*, i (Florence, 1967), no. 55 with n. 5, tr. in S. Burstein, *The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII* (Cambridge, 1985), no. 71; *Mausolus*, 321 (Herakleia on Latmos); cp. Pol. xvi. 31. 5 (Abydos). I have changed Jowett's 'a fortified quarter of the town' which gives the right sense but is too vague. The present passage does not count against the general statement in ch. 33 about the unfortified state of Ionia; see Andrewes, *HCT* v. 35f. (n. on viii. 14. 3), listing the known Ionian places which did *not* have

walls, and correctly remarking (36) that ‘the διατείχισμα at Notion in 427 (Th. iii. 34. 2) is explained by the situation there’.

οἱ μηδίσαντες: ‘the pro-Persian faction’ [lit. ‘the medizers’]. For this word and concept see i. 95. 5 n., and for the situation compare that in the Erythrai decree, ML 40 = Fornara 71, which speaks of a party which had fled to the Persians (‘the Mede’); and a more recently published fourth-century text (ii. 15. 6 n. on πόλις), also from Erythrai, which reveals both a political split between two factions, one involved with the barbarians, and a physical split between the upper and lower parts of the city.

3. Ἰππίαν: ‘Hippias’. Seibt (44) conjectures that he was an Arkadian like the troops he commanded, which is reasonable though Th. does not say so.

4. καὶ ὕστερον Ἀθηναῖοι οἰκιστὰς πέμψαντες κατὰ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν νόμους κατῴκισαν: ‘the Athenians afterwards . . . colonized the place, to which they gave laws like their own, under new founders whom they sent out from Athens’. As in the inscription concerning Kolophon from a somewhat earlier period, probably 447/6; see ML 47 with comm. (= Fornara 99). With the phrase about ‘laws of their own’ compare the situation in the *Birds* of Aristophanes, 1021 ff.: the Athenian Inspector arrives with laws for the new ‘colony’, including what looks very like a version of ML 45 = Fornara 97, the Athenian decree about weights and measures. For ‘founders’, οἰκισταί, of colonies, see i. 4 n. on οἰκιστής. Malkin, there cited, suggests (191 n. 69; 256) that the Notion oikists, like those at Sparta’s colony Herakleia in Trachis (below, 92. 5 n.) were really ‘organizers’, and that ‘oikist’, especially when found in the plural, now meant something less distinguished and more temporary than it had once done.

For an inscription, perhaps a proxeny grant, honouring Apollonophanes of Kolophon and usually assigned to this context, see *IG* i³. 65, with discussions in the recent works on proxeny (ii. 29. 1 n. on καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει etc.), namely Walbank, 202 ff. no. 39, and Gerolymatos, 58 ff.

36. 1. τὸν μὲν Σάλαιθον εὐθὺς ἀπέκτειναν: ‘immediately put Salaithos to death’. See 25. 1 n. on πεζῆ etc.

καὶ ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν (ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκούντο) ἀπάξειν Πελοποννησίους: ‘and among other things promised to bring about the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Plataia, which was still blockaded’. Note, with Macleod, 107 (from his study of the Plataian debate, see 53–69, introductory n.), that the Athenians here ignore a chance of getting the Peloponnesian army away from Plataia by sparing the life of a

single Spartan (but it was not very likely that Salaithos could have fulfilled this promise).

2. **ὑπὸ ὀργῆς**: 'in their anger'. For this Thucydidean favourite among the available words for passionate and irrational behaviour see Huart (ii. 35. 2 n.), 155 ff. See also 4 n. below.

οὐ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκτείνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἅπαντας Μυτιληναίους ὅσοι ἤβῳσι, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναῖκας ἀνδραποδίσαι: 'to put to death not only the men then at Athens, but all the adult male citizens of Mytilene, and to enslave the women and children'. There is no doubt that by Greek thinking the victor could dispose absolutely of the persons of the vanquished: see the texts (Herakleitos, Xenophon, Aristotle, Polybius) gathered by Y. Garlan, 'War, Piracy and Slavery in the Greek World', in *Classical Slavery*, ed. M. I. Finley (London, 1987), 7 ff., at 8; but as Ducrey (i. 98. 2 n.), 118 ff., showed, massacre and enslavement of the kind here envisaged was a phenomenon particularly associated with the Peloponnesian War period (Ducrey, 127: 'relatively frequent during the Peloponnesian War . . . rarer in the fourth century', and Garlan, 9, on the 'harshness clearly prevailing . . . in the darkest hours of the Peloponnesian War'). Philip II's enslavement of the Olynthians in 348 (Diod. xvi. 53. 3) was greeted with awe and shock. Note also Connor, 'Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression' (i. 105. 6 n.), 15 n. 59, 'much of the evidence used to suggest that Greeks enslaved other Greeks after battles in fact applies to sieges'—like the siege of Mytilene. On the actual treatment of the Mytileneans see further 50. 1 n.

4. **ὠμὸν . . . καὶ μέγα**: 'savage and excessive'. On the word *ὠμόν*, 'savage'; see G. Hutchinson, *Comm. on Aesch. Septem Contra Thebas*, on line 730, *ὠμόφρων*: 'ὠμός denotes . . . active fierceness and savagery'; he cites Eur. *Suppl.* 186, where *ὠμός* is, as here, linked with *ὀργή* (see 2 n.).

5. **τοὺς ἐν τέλει**: 'the authorities'. Who exactly are meant? Not the generals (Gomme) but the *prytaneis*; so, correctly, Andrewes, *HCT* iv. 23 (n. on v. 27. 2). Note Th.'s constitutional imprecision (or rather capriciousness: see below): when we say, as we are strictly entitled to say, that Th. mentions the *boule* (or council of 500) in Books v (45. 4) and viii (66. 1, 69. 4), but nowhere else, not even when the formulaic context requires it (iv. 118. 11 n.), we should not forget that the *prytaneis* were a standing committee of the council, who presided over meetings of the assembly and of the *boule*. The present passage is thus a kind of indirect mention of the *boule*. See also Badian, 'Th. and the Outbreak' (i. 23. 6 n.), 86, on i. 139. 3 (see n. there). Th. is in fact capricious rather than studiously vague: at vi. 14 (which is, moreover, from a speech, i.e. in a context where precision is surprising) we do have a mention of the

word *prytanis*. Th. in fact uses such words if and when he feels like it: see vii. 10 for the ‘city γραμματεὺς’ or secretary at Athens, where Th. is half technical, half not. See also vii. 8. 2 n.

6. καταστάσης δ’ εὐθὺς ἐκκλησίας: ‘an assembly was again summoned’. The word ‘again’ is an insertion by Jowett. For such re-opening of an issue, which Dover has christened *anapsephisis* (the noun is convenient but has no ancient authority), see his article ‘Anapsephisis in Fifth-Century Athens’, *JHS* 75 (1955), 17 ff. = *The Greeks and their Legacy*, ii (Oxford, 1988), 187 ff., where add a reference to Tod 150, line 19, for the verb ἀναψηφίζειν. It seems (despite Kleon’s remarks at 37. 3: see n. there) to have been perfectly legal: see Dover and now Hansen, *Athenian Assembly* (i. 44. 1 n.), 87 and n. 537. See also vi. 14. 1 (where the verb ἀναψηφίζειν, ‘to vote on again’, is used) with n. there.

ἄλλαι τε γνώμαι ἄφ’ ἐκάστων ἐλέγοντο: ‘and different opinions were expressed by different speakers’. As at 139. 4 (see first n. there) Th. is here frankly acknowledging that he has been selective in the speeches he has recorded. We should bear in mind that, although both Kleon and Diodotos speak in a hard-boiled, ‘prudential’ way, some of the other speakers here dismissed may have made more conventional appeals to pity.

Hansen (91 and n. 583) cites this passage to show that there was no limitation on the number of speakers in the Assembly, which may well be right but seems to go beyond what Th. says.

Κλέων ὁ Κλεινέτου: ‘Kleon son of Kleinetos’. For this man, the most famous of Pericles’ successors, see ii. 65. 5 n.; and 10 nn. on ἴσοι μᾶλλον and ὀρεγόμενοι for the way in which modern scholars, notably Connor (see ii. 65, introductory n.), have managed to probe behind the combined hostility of Th. and Aristophanes. One way in which Th. distorts the reality about Kleon is by delaying his ‘entry’ until the present passage, whereas there is reason to think he was already prominent much earlier than 427, perhaps even in c.440 (ii. 65. 10 n. on ἴσοι μᾶλλον). Some items in Kleon’s career remain controversial, but there is no argument about his father Kleinetos’ social and financial standing: an inscription, *Syll.*³ 1078, shows that he was a *choregos*, that is, he financed the production of a play, in 460; this was an expensive and prestigious liturgy or civic contribution. To that extent the gutter Kleon of Aristophanes must be a travesty. Th.’s distortion is subtler, but in Kleon’s speech here, and in Th.’s authorial comments at ii. 65, the picture of Kleon as a traitor to Periclean standards is misleading for reasons already discussed at ii. 65 nn.

ὅσπερ καὶ τὴν προτέραν ἐνεκικήκει ὥστε ἀποκτείνει: ‘in the previous meeting of the assembly . . . had carried the decree condemning

the Mytileneans to death'. As in the Sicilian Debate at the beginning of Book vi, Th. has omitted a whole stage of the discussion. The reportage of speeches is, as so often, selective in this fundamental respect as well in details.

βιαιότατος . . . πιθανώτατος: 'the most forceful [lit. 'violent'] . . . and at that time exercised by far the greatest influence over the people' [lit. 'most persuasive']. The usual and literal translation 'violent' for βιαιότατος is perhaps too unfavourable: Th. is thinking of rhetorical effectiveness, as the following word 'persuasive' makes clear. 'Violent' is, therefore, a kind of metaphor (although admittedly Kleon's proposed Mytilenean solution was violent in the most starkly literal sense), and since 'persuasive' is not an unflattering word (though admittedly used at vi. 35. 2 of Athenagoras, whom Th. does not mean us to admire), we should find some rendering of the other adjective (βιαιότατος) which is not too pejorative. Th.'s attitude to the arguments actually to be used by Kleon in the following chs. is sometimes, as we shall see, ambiguous. For Kleon as 'persuasive' compare iv. 21. 3, where the word is coupled with 'demagogue', for which see n. there. It has often been noticed, e.g. by Saar (below, introductory n. to 37-50), 41, that Kleon's own influence, as represented by Aristophanes in the *Wasps* and *Knights*, was largely a matter of the oratorical techniques which Th. makes him affect to despise—though in a speech which itself displays many tricks of rhetoric.

Lewis, *CAH* v². 406, notes that on this occasion, contrary to what the reader of ii. 65. 10 would expect, Kleon sets himself against the clear tide of public opinion.

37-50. THE MYTILENE DEBATE

These speeches are two of the most important in Th. in terms of the domestic and imperial questions which they raise, and the directness with which those questions are faced. Large issues about the relationships between Athens and her leaders on the one hand, and her allies on the other, are explored seriously if sometimes paradoxically. There is (I have the impression) less than the usual percentage of strained and doubtfully relevant generalization. Naturally, each speaker makes his share of points which do not pick up or are not picked up by points made by the other; but this is not a dialogue of the deaf like some 'arguments' in contemporary tragedy such as that between Kreon and Antigone in Sophocles' *Antigone*, nor are we oppressed by the disparity between the speakers' positions, as we are in the Melian Dialogue in Th.'s own Book v. Kleon and Diodotos are not only offering the same basic

currency, in that they are both concerned primarily with what is expedient or advantageous, *ξύμφορον*, for Athens (40. 4; 44. 2); they use the same small change of argument. (Note, as one example among many, the striking repetition at 46. 3 of the language and thought of 39. 8: if Athens puts down a rebellion successfully she will merely inherit a ruined city which will be unable to pay tribute in future. But the *conclusions* drawn from this agreed point are very different.) On the imperial issue the main difference between Kleon's position and Diodotos' is that Kleon is concerned with both justice and expediency, Diodotos with expediency alone (though note 47. 3 with n.: it would be unjust to kill your benefactors). Neither speaker wastes time appealing to pity, though other speakers are likely to have done so (see 36. 6n. on *ἄλλαι τε γνῶμαι*) and we have been told that the Athenians felt qualms about their 'savage and excessive' decision (36. 4); see also 49. 1n. and 49. 4: the first trireme (which was supposed to carry out the general death-sentence) was not hurrying on its 'horrible mission'.

The structure of both speeches is roughly the same: an introduction about oratory and leadership (37-8; 42-3), including (in Kleon's speech) some harsh knocks at the Athenian character; then (39-40; 44-8) suggestions about the best way of dealing with the Mytileneans in particular and of deterring future revolts in general.

On these much studied speeches see especially Augustus Schaefer, *De Cleonis oratione quae est in libro tertio Thucydidis* (Göttingen, 1865), esp. 7 ff. for the relation of Kleon's speech to the *Rhetoric to Alexander*; L. Bodin, 'Diodote contre Cléon: Quelques aperçus sur la dialectique de Thucydide', *REA* 42 (1940) = *Mélanges Radet*, 36 ff.; J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (introductory n. to i. 67-88), 156-71; H. G. Saar, *Die Reden des Kleon und Diodotos und ihre Stellung im Gesamtwerk des Thukydides* (Hamburg dissertation, 1953—I am grateful to the librarian of the Institut für Griechische und Lateinische Philologie in the University of Hamburg, who kindly sent me a photo-copy of this, a useful chapter-by-chapter discussion, particularly good on the relation to other speeches in Th. and to the Corcyra *stasis* section); P. Moraux, 'Thucydide et la rhétorique: Étude sur la structure de deux discours (III, 37-48)', *Les Études classiques*, 22 (1954), 3 ff. (a somewhat mechanical analysis of the two speeches according to the technical terminology of later Greek rhetorical theory); D. Ebener, 'Kleon und Diodotos: Zum Aufbau und zur Gedankenführung eines Redepaares bei Thukydides (Thuk. III 37-48)', *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg*, 5 (1956), 1085-1160, in double columns (another lengthy chapter-by-chapter, indeed paragraph-by-paragraph, treatment); A. Andrewes, 'The Mytilene Debate', *Phoenix*, 16 (1962), 64 ff.; R. P. Winnington-Ingram,

'*TA ΔΕΟΝΤΑ ΕΙΠΕΙΝ*: Cleon and Diodotus', *BICS* 12 (1965), 70ff.; D. Kagan, 'The Speeches in Thucydides and the Mytilene Debate', *YCS* 24 (1975), 71ff.; Macleod (introductory n. to 9–14), *Essays*, 92–102 = *JHS* 98 (1978), 68–78; Hussey, *CRUX*, 129–31.

37–40. *Kleon's speech*

37. 1. **πολλάκις μὲν ἤδη ἔγωγε καὶ ἄλλοτε ἔγνων δημοκρατίαν ὅτι ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐτέρων ἄρχειν**: 'I have often thought that a democracy cannot manage an empire'. With this aggressive opening compare the first sentence of Sthenelaidas at i. 86. 1, or (with Saar, 19) Athenagoras' *ὦ πάντων ἀξυνετώτατοι*, 'you most senseless of men' (vi. 39. 2); and generally on oratorical abuse of one's audience see Dover, *Greek Popular Morality* (i. 32. 4n.), 24f., with Macleod, 92.

Macleod, 68, thinks that the alternatives empire/democracy, and the alternative policies of Kleon and Diodotos (force/indulgence) are intended to suggest the 'double view' of the empire for which Macleod argued when analysing the speech of the Mytileneans earlier in the book (see 9–14 introductory n.). This is illuminating, but perhaps, if I have understood it correctly, a little remote from the text: the 'double view' is after all a piece of subtle interpretation by Macleod himself, not something asserted by Th. in so many words. And whereas it is obvious that empire can be equated with force, it is not so obvious why democracy and indulgence should go together.

2. **διὰ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀδεῆς καὶ ἀνεπιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους**: 'Because you have no fear or suspicion of each other in daily life'. Kleon's speech contains many echoes of earlier, and pre-echoes of later, Thucydidean speeches. With the present passage compare what was said by Pericles about Athens at ii. 37. 2 or (more surprisingly, perhaps) by the Corinthians about the Spartan national character at i. 68. 1.

τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν: 'your empire is a tyranny'. See ii. 63. 2 and n. for this, the most striking and famous echo by Kleon of Pericles, and, for Kleon's echoes of Pericles generally, ii. 61. 2n.

It has often been said (e.g. Winnington-Ingram, 76, and Macleod, 71) that the admission that Athens is a tyrant empire nullifies all the appeals to justice which are such a feature of Kleon's speech (Winnington-Ingram: 'if ... the imperial city and her subjects are ex hypothesi enemies, then it cannot be unjust for the subject to harm the tyrant, though it is just for him to retaliate'; Macleod adds that the very idea of punishment is out of place if it is true that the subjects of a tyrant empire naturally hate it). However, the inconsistency in Kleon's position will

seem less if we accept that his is a simple retributivist view of justice: see 47. 3ⁿ.

ἰσχύι μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐκείνων εὐνοίᾳ: 'they have no love of you but are held down by force'. For the regular opposition between *εὐνοία*, 'good will', and fear based on force, see J. de Romilly, 'Eunoia in Isocrates or the Political Importance of Creating Good Will', *JHS* 78 (1958), 92 ff., at 92 f., discussing some other Thucydidean passages. The important judgement at ii. 8. 4 (see n. there) shows that Th. himself endorsed Kleon's view that the *εὐνοία* of the Greek world inclined more towards Sparta than Athens. It is a curious but undeniable feature of Kleon's speech that it contains much that Th. himself, who disliked the man, seems to have agreed with.

3. χεῖροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσων ἔστιν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις: 'a city in which the laws are fixed, even if they are not perfect, is stronger than one in which the laws are excellent but not enforced'. Much has been written about this paradoxical assertion, which anticipates Alcibiades at vi. 18. 7. (Winnington-Ingram also compares Eur. *Bacch.* 890 ff. and 430 ff.) Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty* (ii. 37. 1 n. on *καὶ ὄνομα*), 254, sees it as evidence that by the early 420s 'a democratic establishment mentality had developed in Athens' (which may be true, but Thucydidean speeches are treacherous evidence for the historical reality); at 308 Ostwald interestingly suggests that Kleon argues from *nomos* and Diodotos from *physis*, 'nature', two concepts which it was fashionable in sophistic circles to oppose to each other. There is a risk of over-interpretation here: Classen/Steup are right to insist that *κρείσσων*, 'stronger', should be taken absolutely literally (hence I have changed Jowett's tr. 'is better off', which is too general). Kleon is merely talking about what makes cities strong, not about what makes them generally good. The word is echoed by Diodotos at 48. 2, the very end of his speech.

Scholars have objected to Kleon's identification of the decision about Mytilene, which was a *ψήφισμα* or decree, with 'laws', *νόμοι*. Laws were supposed *in the fourth century* to be more general and permanent than decrees; hence (it is said) it is dishonest of Kleon to protest, in language appropriate to laws, at a reconsideration of a mere decree: see Gomme, Winnington-Ingram, 72 (who speaks of Kleon's 'technical error'), and Macleod, 69. But the words 'in the fourth century' are important. M. H. Hansen, 'Nomos and Psephisma in Fourth-Century Athens', *The Athenian Ecclesia* (Copenhagen, 1983), 162 (= *GRBS* 19 (1978), 316) states firmly that 'in fifth-century Athens there is no demonstrable difference between *nomoi* and *psephismata*', and notes that Aristophanes (*Ach.* 532) can even call the Megarian decree a *nomos*. Macleod is aware of the

difficulty ('it is true that there was no formal procedure for distinguishing the two things till 403/2 B.C.') but hankers for the view that 'the distinction was recognized earlier' and cites Ar. *Thesm.* 361. But in the *Thesm.* passage *ψηφίσματα καὶ νόμον* 'decrees and law' are not quite being opposed (*νόμοι* in the plural would be a more natural way of expressing that opposition); this is perhaps no more than redundant and high-flown language. On the technical point Hansen seems right; but there is no denying that Kleon is trading on the reassuring associations of *nomos*: 'what the Athenians resolved yesterday has become a tradition' as Macleod (70, discussing 38. 5), puts it.

ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ὠφελιμώτερον ἢ δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολασίας, οἳ τε φαυλότεροι τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τοὺς ξυνεωτέρους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεόν ἄμεινον οἰκοῦσι τὰς πόλεις: 'Good unsophisticated commonsense is more useful than immoral cleverness, and the more simple sort generally make better citizens than people shrewder than themselves'.

Of the two clauses of this sentence Andrewes (73) remarks that the first begins to twist the argument in a new direction and the second takes us right out of context. That is true, but Th. needs to develop as soon as possible the anti-intellectualism of his Kleon, the clever orator who makes a pose of distrusting clever oratory. (As Winnington-Ingram (81 n. 6) remarks, this is the 'mood which Cleon wishes to establish'.) For Athenian suspicion of practised speakers see Dover (para. 1 n.), 25 f. (but perhaps the best ancient example of a speech by a deceptively self-deprecating 'plain man' is that of Marius in Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum*, 85; Marius at para. 32 can add what Kleon cannot, a contempt for 'Graecae litterae'). Kleon, however, is here represented as going further than expressing mere distrust for clever oratory: *ξυνετός* is a general word for 'intelligent' or 'prudent', normally (though not always) a word of high praise in Th. and his speakers. See i. 79. 2 n. for *ξυνετός* and *ξύνεσις* ('intelligence') and their limits as words of commendation. Despite those limits it is audacious of Kleon to deny civic virtue to the *ξυνετοί*. The approving sense of the word is re-instated by Diodotos at 42. 2.

The word *ἀκολασία* implies self-indulgence or intemperance—the opposite of *σωφροσύνη*. But translations like 'self-indulgent cleverness' or 'the kind of cleverness that gets out of hand' (Warner) miss the *moral* flavour of the word: Aristotle was to use it in Book vii of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to describe moral profligacy, a stage worse than *ἀκρασία* (which sees the best course but does not follow it).

The thought in this passage anticipates 82. 7, where we also have a contrast between clever villains and stupid good men (Saar, 28).

4. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι: 'who always want to be thought wiser than the laws'. Compare i. 84. 3, where Archidamos congratulates the Spartans on avoiding this.

καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: 'and their folly usually ends in the ruin of their city'. For the final phrase, a strong one, see vi. 15. 4 (Th.'s authorial comment on the damage done to Athens because other, inferior, leaders were preferred to the disgraced Alcibiades); it is imitated by Sallust's Marius, *BJ* 85. 43: 'rei publicae innoxiae cladi sunt'. Sallust also imitated the present section of Th. in his *Bellum Catilinae* (the debate between Cato and Caesar).

κριταὶ δὲ ὄντες ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγωνισταί: 'being impartial judges [lit. 'judges from a position of equality'] rather than contestants'. This introduces a main theme of ch. 38, the dangers of Athenian connoisseurship of speeches; for this cf. i. 22. 4 n., at end.

Macleod, 74, with references, notes that both Kleon and Diodotos take up the idea of 'impartiality' or 'equality', ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, from the Mytileneans' speech earlier in the book, where it was such a leading theme (see 9. 2 n. on ἴσοι); and Classen/Steup rightly refer to i. 77. 1 also (for other echoes, in the Mytilenean Debate, of chs. 76 and 77 of the Athenian speech in Book i, see Macleod, 76).

38. 1. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι τῇ γνώμῃ: 'I myself think the same as I did before' [lit. 'I am the same man in respect of my opinion']. Almost the words of Pericles at ii. 61. 2, see n. there (see also i. 140. 1 from Pericles' first speech, where, as in the present passage, the word γνώμη is used: 'my opinion is what it has always been', τῆς μὲν γνώμης . . . αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι). This particular echo is surely intended (after the disreputably philistine sentiments of ch. 37) to make us reflect that Pericles' consistency was one thing, Kleon's obstinacy another. So Macleod, 93 n. 20 ('the echo serves to contrast his pig-headedness with Pericles' firmness'); also Andrewes, 75 f. (who, however, notes that 'we might ourselves wonder if Perikles' insistence on war was not mistaken obstinacy').

ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι: 'the injured side . . . the culprit' [lit. 'the sufferer . . . the doer']. For the range of ideas here, which has much in common with ideas of retaliatory justice found in contemporary tragedy, see Winnington-Ingram, 72 f.; and for the precise combination δράσαντι παθεῖν see Aesch. *Choeph.* 313, treating it as proverbial or gnomic.

ὁ ἀντερῶν: 'who will answer me'. Echoed by Diodotos at 44. 1.

2. τὸ πάνυ δοκοῦν ἀνταποφῆναι ὡς οὐκ ἔγνωσται: 'to argue that you never made the decision you certainly did make'. As if changing one's mind requires a denial that there was ever an earlier state of mind!

Macleod (70) calls this the 'boldest version' of the facts/words contrast which is such a feature of this chapter: anyone who opposes Kleon will have the absurd task of proving that the assembly never resolved what it did resolve, that is that $x = \text{not-}x$. In fact, Kleon is offering a dilemma the first of whose horns is obviously impossible to grasp, so that the hearer or reader is softened up in advance for acceptance of the second ('anyone who opposes me must have been bribed to mislead you').

ἢ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος: 'or else he must be someone who has been bribed'. For the frequency with which accusations of bribery were thrown around see ii. 60. 5n. on *φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων*. Saar (34) shrewdly notes that some Mytilenean envoys were in town (36. 5, 49. 2), which gave plausibility to Kleon's suggestion.

τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου ἐκπονῆσας: 'to elaborate a plausible speech'. Echoed by Diodotos at 44. 4; see also 83. 8 (from the *Corcyra stasis* section) for the very similar phrase *εὐπρεπεῖα δὲ λόγου*. See also Brasidas at iv. 86. 6.

4. θεαταὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων . . . ἀκροαταὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων: 'when speeches are to be heard, you behave like spectators, but, where actions are concerned, you are content to be a mere audience'. A generally brilliant picture, though as Gomme notes, the distinction here made does not stand up to close scrutiny: a theatre audience both sees and listens.

5. καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου ἀπατᾶσθαι ἄριστοι: 'You are easily taken in by any new argument'. Compare *Acts of the Apostles* 17: 21 'for all the Athenians and strangers which were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing' (*τι καινότερον*). Diod. xii. 53 calls the Athenians *φιλόλογοι*, 'lovers of speeches' (Saar, 40), but this may be a reminiscence of the present passage.

Macleod (70) well brings out the 'bad associations' of novelty which Kleon here exploits, though note that no part of the verb he cites (*νεωτερίζειν*, which means to engage in new, in the sense of revolutionary, activity: see i. 70. 2n. on *νεωτεροποιού*) is actually used here.

How justified was the sneer? Note (on the other side) that the constitutional novelty of an oligarchy had to be 'sold' to the Athenians of 411 in terms of an appeal to 'ancestral constitution'—*not* an aspect which is much stressed by Th. in Book viii but a real element in the situation none the less, as we shall see.

6. ὀξέως δὲ τι λέγοντος: 'a sharp remark'. The word 'sharp' is found in other descriptions of the Athenian national character, i. 70. 2 and the authorial viii. 96. 5. See Saar, 39.

For the general thought in this para.—'as an audience, you do not wish

to appear slow'—see V. Bers, 'Dikastic Thorubos', *CRUX*, 1 ff., at 4 n. 13: the reference to men appearing slow implies that they would normally register their reactions by utterances; a nice sidelight on Assembly habits.

7. σοφιστῶν θεαταῖς: 'spectators attending a performance of sophists'. A 'sophist', agent-noun from σοφίζομαι, 'I devise skilfully', is an expert at any art or craft, and in the latter part of the fifth century especially the sophists or experts who claimed to impart their knowledge for a fee; for all this see Barrett on Eur. *Hippolytus*, 921, whom I have followed closely. The sophists came to be seen as specifically professors of the *art of speaking* (see E. L. Hussey, *The Presocratics* (London, 1972), 115, an idea certainly implied in the present passage; and the word 'sophist' often had a derogatory sense, a fallacious reasoner or cheat. This sense is *perhaps* implied in the present passage, which is remarkable as the only mention of sophists in Th.; no individual sophist is mentioned as such (see viii. 68. 1 n. for Antiphon). If the historical Kleon really did refer to sophistic performances, the reference would be topical: see 86. 3 n., citing Diod. xii. 53, for a visit to Athens very soon after this by Gorgias on behalf of his home town of Leontini; this visit, characteristically ignored by Th., seems to have made a great impression. For Protagoras as the first to establish such verbal contests see Saar, 38. Saar rightly notes that Kleon is here attacking not the sophists but their audiences and adds (40) that Pericles himself had issued a kind of protest against oratory when he said (ii. 35. 1) that the reputation of brave men should not have to depend on the eloquence of one man.

39. 2. μετὰ τειχῶν: 'who had walls'. Unlike the Ionians on the mainland: see 33. 2 n. See iv. 51 for the order given by Athens, a couple of years after this, to demolish a new wall.

αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες: 'who were autonomous'. For this concept see Ostwald (i. 67. 2 n.) and, on the present passage, E. Lévy (above, 10. 5 n.). Lévy is troubled by the inconsistency between, on the one hand, Kleon's claim here that the Mytileneans had autonomy but did not have freedom (*ἐλευθέρωσις*, see 7 below) and, on the other hand, Diodotos' implication (46. 5) that they had freedom but were striving for autonomy. Lévy finds a solution in 10. 5: the Mytileneans had genuine autonomy but only nominal freedom. This does not persuade me as a rendering of 10. 5 (see n. there). As to the inconsistency between Kleon and Diodotos, this is only troubling if we demand that Th. be universally strict in his use of technical terms. But this he is far from being, especially in the speeches. (To insist on this is not to deny that there is in Th. and elsewhere a *general* distinction between autonomy and freedom. On

the difference, Lévy's conclusions are—see his final added footnote— independent of Ostwald but very similar. Autonomy is the narrower term; it is defined by reference to dependence of some sort: see Lévy 259.)

ἐπανάστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν: 'they have not revolted . . . but they have betrayed us'. The verbal chime is very difficult to capture in English and I have not tried. (Jowett's distinction between revolt and rebellion conveys nothing and I have changed it.) The best discussion of this 'highly artificial' distinction is by Andrewes, *HCT* v. 45 (on viii. 21): 'the point is probably that the revolt of Mytilene, which kept its autonomy and was highly honoured by Athens, is more like a domestic revolution than the revolt of a subject previously held down by force.' The strong English word 'betrayed', though not strictly accurate as a tr., seems to me to make this point.

Kleon, very soon after his sneer at Athenian enthusiasm for sophists, is himself made to use a transparently sophistic figure of speech (for which see ii. 62. 3 n. on *μη φρονήματι* etc.). Did Th. wish to convey in this way Kleon's insincerity, or is it just that Th. himself could not resist figures of this sort? Note that (as Macleod, 71, says) we are meant to recall the use of *ἀπόστασις* or related verbs by the Mytileneans themselves (five occurrences in 13. 1–2).

3. παράδειγμα δὲ αὐτοῖς οὐτε . . .: 'they learnt nothing . . .' [lit. 'was not an example to them']. For *παράδειγμα*, here 'example' not 'proof', see 57. 1 n. The use of the word here recalls the Mytileneans at 10. 6 (Saar, 11).

ἡ παρούσα εὐδαιμονία: 'the happiness which they were enjoying'. Winnington-Ingram (74) may be right that this slightly unexpected turn of the argument is intended to suggest a tragic or Herodotean sequence, pride and prosperity preceding the fall.

ἐς τὰ δεινά: 'the dangerous steps they took'. Echoed at 45. 1.

θρασεῖς: 'recklessly'. Gomme is good on Kleon's pretended indignation at Mytilene's rashness (would Kleon seriously have preferred that Mytilene should have taken a little more time and trouble over her plans for revolt?).

ἐλπίσαντες: 'and hoped . . .'. The cluster of words and ideas here not only has the tragic effect mentioned above (n. on *ἡ παρούσα εὐδαιμονία*) but prepares us for the splendid set of personifications in Diodotos' speech, 45. 5.

5. τετιμῆσθαι: 'by treating them better'. This (Saar, 10) recalls the Mytileneans at 9. 2.

πέφυκε γὰρ καὶ ἄλλως ἄνθρωπος: 'men naturally . . .'. The first two words contain another slight but perceptible suggestion of Pericles: see

ii. 64. 3, πάντα γὰρ πέφυκε καὶ ἐλασσοῦσθαι, 'for everything living must eventually wither'; see also 45. 3 for an echo by Diodotos.

The admission, that what the Mytileneans have done is natural, sits uneasily with Kleon's claim earlier in the ch. that their behaviour is exceptionally bad (Saar, 46, and see 37. 2 n. on τυραννίδα).

6. καὶ μὴ τοῖς μὲν ὀλίγοις ἢ αἰτία προστεθῆ, τὸν δὲ δῆμον ἀπολύσητε: 'do not punish the oligarchs and let the people off'. See 47. 2 n.

7. τῶν τε ξυμμάχων σκέψασθε εἰ τοῖς τε ἀναγκασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ τοῖς ἐκούσιν ἀποστάσι τὰς αὐτὰς ζημίας προσθήσετε: 'Remember that if you impose the same penalty on those of your allies who voluntarily revolt and on those who are forced to do so by the enemy . . .'. Here we come to the heart of the issue between Kleon and Diodotos: what will be the effect *on the empire* of severity or leniency in the present case? Both men use, for different purposes, the argument that lack of discrimination in the infliction of punishment will be (not only unfair but) actually against Athens' own interests. But they apply it to different groups. (i) Kleon distinguishes between the hypothetical group of subject allied *states* who have revolted through external *force majeure*, and those whose revolt is voluntary or wilful. He implies that he would recommend leniency for the first group of states (his sincerity on this point is not put to the test because the group's existence is hypothetical as far as the present debate goes), and severity for the second. Failure to distinguish the two groups, by sparing Mytilene and thus announcing an intention to treat all rebels equally leniently, will lead to many revolts, all of which will be pushed to the limit (with loss of revenues to Athens) because nothing terribly serious, μηδὲν . . . ἀνήκεστον, will happen to rebel states of whatever description, voluntary or coerced. (ii) Diodotos will argue, ch. 47, that failure to distinguish between *individuals inside a rebel state*, specifically between guilty oligarchs and innocent democrats, will drive the latter to despair and thus participation in extremes of resistance, because they know that innocent and guilty will be treated the same, i.e. equally harshly. (Comparable arguments can be found in recent and not-so-recent times about the advisability, on the part of a victorious or near-victorious power, of pressing for unconditional surrender.)

Diodotos' answer to (i) is psychological dressed up as historical: nobody was yet deterred, by the threatened penalty, from a crime which he thought he could bring off (ch. 45); he adds at 46 an argument from a hypothetical revolt which has got half way but might be abandoned if there were room for clemency. On Kleon's rules such a revolt would be pushed to the limit (with loss of revenues to Athens). [Actually Kleon

could accommodate this point; he nowhere considers the right policy over abortive revolts or revolts abandoned at an early stage, and could in logic agree with Diodotos here. Kleon's arguments for severity concern *crushed* revolts.] An effective reply to Kleon, a reply which Diodotos is not given, is that it is absurd for Kleon to distinguish between the states of mind of wilful and of coerced rebels when he himself admits that Athens is hated by all. (See 37. 2 n. on *τυραννίδα ἔχετε τὴν ἀρχήν*, and compare 40. 4 below.) This reply, though technically available to Diodotos (that is, he could if he chose have answered Kleon on Kleon's own assumptions), is not used by him because he does not accept Kleon's premise about the universal unpopularity of the empire (47. 2). Had Kleon stuck to the simple line that the empire is a hated tyranny held down by fear of force, so that force must be used in test cases, it would have been hard to refute him, except by claiming that Athens was *universally* popular. Even Diodotos cannot claim as much as this; he can only claim that *democrats* everywhere favour Athens.

Kleon's answer to Diodotos' argument (ii), an argument which Kleon is allowed to anticipate, is that Diodotos is wrong on the facts of the particular revolt of Mytilene: the democrats (he says) joined the revolt with gusto.

On *σκέψασθε*, 'you should reflect that', see Bodin (introductory n.), 39 f., 52, pointing out how it is picked up by Diodotos at 46. 2 and 47. 1, introducing passages which also deal, like Kleon here, with the question of the *precedent* to be created.

8. πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην: 'a ruined city'. See 46. 3 for Diodotos' neat appropriation of Kleon's language and thought here. The insistence on Athens' economic interests recalls the Mytileneans at 13. 5-6 and looks forward to v. 93 (the Melian Dialogue): see Saar, 10, 90.

40. 1. ξύγγνωμον δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον: 'Involuntary actions can, I agree, be pardoned' [the words 'I agree' are an insertion by me to make the line of thought clearer]. Compare Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, beginning of Book iii (1109^b30 ff.): 'it is only voluntary actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned (*ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης*) and sometimes even pitied' (Loeb tr. by H. Rackham). Athenian law had long distinguished between voluntary, involuntary, and justified homicide (Saar, 49 and n. 3, pointing out that Plut. *Per.* 36. 5 = *FGrHist* 107 Stesimbrotos F11 records a discussion between Pericles and Protagoras about an involuntary killing with a javelin; for this sort of problem see also Antiphon's Third Tetralogy).

For Diodotos' reply see 45. 1 and n.

2. τρισὶ τοῖς ἀξυμφορωτάτοις τῇ ἀρχῇ, οἴκτω καὶ ἡδονῇ λόγων

καὶ ἐπιεικεία: 'either by pity, or by the charm of words, or by the wish to be fair. These are the three greatest obstacles to empire'. On this oddly-assorted trio (the second is the surprise) see Winnington-Ingram, 75; Kleon slips in between pity and decency that pleasure in speeches against which he has prejudiced his auditors, 'and thereby suggests that the other two emotions are comparable weaknesses, no less incompatible with imperial power'. See also Macleod, 72.

The word *ἐπιείκεια* is hard to translate; Winnington-Ingram suggests 'fairness', 'decency', 'humanity', as well as 'reasonableness', the LSJ⁹ rendering, which is perhaps too intellectual here. Macleod has 'clemency', Crawley 'indulgence'. I have changed Jowett's 'a too forgiving temper' not only because it sounds too archaic today but because it banishes the intellectual element too completely.

At 42. 1 Diodotos will echo the mannerism (for which compare also i. 76. 2).

4. εἰ γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρθῶς ἀπέστησαν, ὑμεῖς ἂν οὐ χρεῶν ἄρχοιτε: 'if they were right in revolting, you must be wrong to keep your empire'. But at 37. 2 Kleon has already admitted that the empire is a tyranny. His thought here recalls Pericles' own formulation (ii. 63. 2) about the empire as a tyranny 'which may have been unjustly acquired, but which cannot safely be surrendered'. Kleon's general line on the empire is not a total travesty of Pericles'; see ii. 13. 2 n. on Pericles' advice *τά τε τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν*: 'keeping the allies well in hand' could be invoked by Kleon—but is vague enough to cover Diodotos' position also: see 46. 5 for the need to practise vigilance *before* an ally revolts.

ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι: 'when virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you please'. See ii. 63. 2 n. on *ἤσ οὐδ' ἐκστῆναι* etc. (the same chapter as the 'empire as tyranny' allusion).

6. μάλιστα δὲ οἱ μὴ ξὺν προφάσει τινὰ κακῶς ποιοῦντες ἐπεξέρχονται καὶ διολλύναι, τὸν κίνδυνον ὑφορώμενοι τοῦ ὑπολειπομένου ἐχθροῦ· ὁ γὰρ μὴ ξὺν ἀνάγκῃ τι παθῶν χαλεπώτερος διαφυγῶν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσῆς ἐχθροῦ: 'For those who gratuitously attack others always rush to extremes, and sometimes, like these Mytileneans, to their own destruction. They know what they can expect from an enemy who escapes: when a man is injured gratuitously he is more dangerous if he escapes than the enemy who has only suffered what he has inflicted'. Winnington-Ingram (77), quoted and approved by Macleod (72), wittily remarks that this amounts to saying 'Be beastly to the Mytileneans. Why? Because they would have been beastly to you. Why? Because you would have been beastly to them' [that is, if you had survived and found yourselves in a position to take reprisals]. The Melian Dialogue (v. 90–91) will return to the topic of

possible harshness by allies against a hypothetically defeated Athens (Saar, 58).

Note that Kleon's suggestion that the Mytilenean 'attack' is 'gratuitous' is hardly consistent with his view that Athens is a hated tyranny.

For the final words τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἰσης ἐχθροῦ, 'lit. an enemy from an equal position', see 37. 4 n. on κριταί etc.

41–48. Diodotos' speech

41. Διόδωτος ὁ Εὐκράτους: 'Diodotos son of Eukrates'. He is usually taken to be wholly unknown, but see M. Ostwald, 'Diodotus, Son of Eukrates', *GRBS* 20 (1979), 5 ff., who suggests, speculatively but not impossibly, that Diodotos held elected office of some kind in view of 43. 4 with its references to accountability; he further speculates that Diodotos may have been a *hellenotamias* (see i. 96. 2) in view of his pre-occupation with the tribute at 46. 3 (but that passage is an exact reply to Kleon at 39. 8). We must in any case assume that Diodotos really existed and spoke (twice) against the death penalty. But it is artistically satisfying to have the famous and raucous Kleon opposed and defeated on his own terms by an utterly obscure figure who then retires into the shadows from which he came.

42. 1. δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλιᾶ: 'the two things most prejudicial to good decision-making . . .'. Though Diodotos deals in logical order with Kleon's two main themes (how to conduct assembly debate; what to do about the Mytileneans), and we are now back with the first theme, nevertheless the mannerism of language here is an obvious rejoinder to 40. 2, from Kleon's treatment of the second theme (see Macleod, 72 f.). This is appropriate because (see n. there) Kleon in that passage had jumped unexpectedly back to the 'charm of words', to warn against which was part of his *first* theme.

On this whole introductory para., and the way Diodotos changes the Athenians' mental picture of themselves—no longer Kleon's 'plain blunt men of action' but 'reverend counsellors'—see Winnington-Ingram, 78.

τάχος . . . ὀργήν: 'haste . . . anger'. Exactly the words used at 36. 2 and 3 to describe the Athenians' original decision (Saar, 61).

2. διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων: 'guides in action'. Lit. 'teachers', but Th. always uses διδάσκαλος metaphorically, sometimes to mean 'instigators' (v. 30. 1; viii. 45. 1, cited by Hutchinson on Aesch. *Septem*, 573). But the most famous metaphorical use is at iii. 82. 2: War personified as a violent διδάσκαλος. The present passage in defence of rational debate ('how else can people decide about the future?') is a

sound commonsense reply to Kleon's attack on fine speaking. (And Diodotos would have done better to leave it there, before getting into the tangles and paradoxes which are to come.) But there are disturbing undercurrents. For one thing, Pericles had remarked that events, *πράγματα*, tend to turn out *ἀμαθῶς*, waywardly, lit. 'unteachably' (i. 140. 1: see n. there). For another, Th.'s own view of the power of speeches to determine the course of events is, I believe, considerably less optimistic than Diodotos' here: see *Thucydides*, 67 ff. This is relevant to the Mytilene debate itself: as we shall see when we come to 49. 1 n., Th. manages, in an admittedly difficult sentence, to convey the suggestion that the eventual decision was taken without reference to the speeches made. (Th. says that Diodotos' *proposal* prevailed, but that is not the same as saying that his reasoning was found persuasive.) Finally, note Macleod (73), who thinks that the twisted word order of the following sentence (see below, n. on *μέλλοντος* etc.) may be meant to invite the reader to ask whether deliberation as such is a 'contradiction in terms', because it is about something (the future) which is not there at all. This is ingenious, but the contradiction, if there is one, is far from obvious.

ἢ ἀξύνετός ἐστι: 'he lacks either sense or ...' [lit. 'is not intelligent']. *ξυνετός*, 'intelligent', a word degraded by Kleon at 37. 3-4, is now reinstated as a word of unconditional approval. For the echo of Kleon (38. 2) in 'he either ... or ...' see Macleod, 73.

μέλλοντος . . . καὶ μὴ ἐμφανοῦς: 'the unknown future'. In the Greek the words for 'unknown' and 'future' are separated artificially. On this 'twisted' word order see above, end of n. on *διδασκάλους* etc.: Macleod thinks that the emphatic postponement of 'unknown', *μὴ ἐμφανοῦς*, is intended to draw attention to a latent illogicality in Diodotos' apparently innocuous position.

τι αἰσχρὸν πείσαι . . . περὶ τοῦ μὴ καλοῦ: 'discreditable . . . in a bad cause'. Winnington-Ingram (78) is excellent on Diodotos' cunning use of these moral terms in a speech which purports to exclude moral considerations: 'the slipping in of value-judgments irrelevant to his main position is one of the tricks of Diodotos.'

5. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου φαίνεσθαι ἄμεινον λέγοντα: 'but by showing in fair argument that his cause is better'. For *ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου*, 'in fair argument', with its literal suggestion of equality, see 37. 4 n. on *κριταί* etc.

43. 2. καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι: 'the man whose cause is right must make himself believed by lying'. The thought here is close to absurdity, and illustrates everything that Kleon had said at 38. 5 about Athenian passion for the novel and unexpected.

On the almost nonsensical paradox here see Andrewes, 74, with his amusing n. 25 ('what should the honest man do? Convey just a flavour of spurious dishonesty, enough to gratify suspicion, but not enough to wreck his proposal?').

On the value-judgement implied by 'whose cause is right' see 42. 2 n. on *τι αἰσχρόν*.

3. μόνην τε πόλιν: 'in this city, and in this city only' [that is, as opposed to other cities]. On the translation of this Jowett and Gomme are surely right against e.g. the Penguin tr. of Warner (following Crawley as usual), who sees a contrast between the city and individuals. ('... the state is put into a unique position; it is only she to whom no-one can ever do a good turn openly' etc.). The whole contrast in this section is between the right way, and the wrong or Athenian way, of running a state (*ἡμεῖς τάναντία δρώμεν*, 'we do the opposite', para. 1). Nothing has been said about individuals, *ιδιωται*. (There are references in 42. 4–5 to *citizens*, but they are referred to as such, *πολίται*; that is, they are defined by their attachment to the *πόλις*, not in opposition to it.)

4. ἀξιοῦν τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας: 'we ought to make some claim to look further ...'. As Saar (70) notes, the farsightedness of the statesman is stressed elsewhere: see e.g. i. 138. 3 on Themistocles or ii. 65. 5 on Pericles.

ὑπεύθυνον ... πρὸς ἀνεύθυνον: 'we are accountable ... but you are accountable to nobody'. See Ostwald (41. 1 n.), who detects here a suggestion that Diodotos held elected office of some kind, and that Kleon did not (but the explicit contrast is between speakers and their audience, not between rival speakers).

5. καὶ οὐ τὰς ὑμετέρας αὐτῶν, εἰ πολλὰ οὔσαι ξυνεξήμαρτον: 'rather than your own mistake, for which you were collectively responsible'. Here, after the slightly shoddy reasoning of the preceding paragraphs, we have a sharp and justified knock at Athens—or, at least, a knock which Th. himself thought justified. See the authorial comment on the aftermath of the Sicilian Disaster: the Athenians blamed their orators, soothsayers and so on *as if they themselves had not voted for the expedition* (viii. 1. 1). See also ii. 60. 4 n.

44. 1. οὔτε ἀντερῶν: 'either as an advocate ...' [lit. 'answering on behalf of']. The word picks up *θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν* at 38. 1.

ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών: 'the question for us'. But the noun literally means a contest; by his choice of word Diodotos may be hinting at the quarrel between himself and Kleon. He needs to show himself as truculent as his opponent; for the use of *ἀγών* in a military speech of encouragement see Aesch. *Persai*, 405, *νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών*, 'everything is at stake', lit.

'the contest is for everything'. For rhetorical duals as 'contests' see above all Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience* (i. 1. 1 n. on ἀξιολογώτατον etc.).

4. τῷ εὐπρεπεῖ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου: 'the apparent plausibility of his proposal'. Another shot out of Kleon's own locker: see 38. 2 for τὸ εὐπρεπές τοῦ λόγου, 'a plausible speech'.

δικαιότερος γὰρ ὢν αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος . . . οὐ δικάζομεθα: 'the greater justice of his argument . . . but we are not at law with them'. De Ste. Croix (*OPW* 17) calls this an 'interesting admission' and takes it to be evidence that Th. himself held the views about inter-state morality, or rather the lack of it, which de Ste. Croix would impute to him. But as I have tried to show in *Thucydides*, esp. chs. 3 and 7, Th.'s speeches simply cannot be used in this way and de Ste. Croix's general picture of Th.'s position is, I believe, not acceptable. Furthermore, Diodotos' treatment of the concept of justice is not as simple as all that: see 47. 3 n.

45. 1. ὁμως δὲ τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐπαιρόμενοι κινδυνεύουσι: 'nevertheless, hope still induces men to risk their lives'. This psychological or historical assertion, elaborated brilliantly in the paras. which follow, is Diodotos' essential reply to Kleon on the main issue of imperial policy: see 39. 7 n. In particular (Macleod, 75), Diodotos' claim that the Mytileneans have acted from a 'necessity of nature' is a reply to Kleon's point at 40. 1 that they acted quite deliberately. Hussey (introductory n.), 130, observes that in Diodotos' analysis of the psychology of law-breaking, in particular the calm emphasis on non-rational factors, there are affinities with the fragments of Demokritos. However, as a general reply to Kleon's 'deterrence theory' of punishment, Diodotos' argument is inadequate. See Ted Honderich, *Punishment: The Supposed Justifications* (London, 1969), 44f.: the deterrence theorist 'may admit without reluctance that many of those who commit offences are for one reason or another not influenced by the possibility of punishment. It certainly does not follow, however, that those who *do* obey the law are not deterred.' In a commentary on Th. I cannot be expected to try to deal with the vast modern literature about 'deterrence' *versus* 'retributivist' theories of punishment in general, or about the effectiveness, as a deterrent, of the death penalty in particular. But Th.'s Mytilene Debate deserves recognition, which it does not usually get, as the first sophisticated exploration of these issues. (In the fourth century Plato, *Protag.* 324^{aff.}, discussed the rational justification of punishment: see Saar, 86.)

On the relation between iii. 45 and iii. 84, whose authenticity is disputed, see nn. on 84.

ἐς τὸ δεινόν: 'on a dangerous enterprise'. The language echoes 39. 3.

3. πεφύκασί τε ἅπαντες: 'men naturally'. This takes up a phrase of

both Kleon and Pericles: see 39. 5 n. on *πέφυκε γάρ*. Knox, *Oedipus at Thebes* (Oxford, 1957), 256 n. 7, remarks that the gods are frequently mentioned by Thucydidean speakers—but not by Pericles, Kleon, Diodotos, or Alcibiades. These four are perhaps represented as more interested in generalizing, as here, at a purely human level.

Note that in this ch. Diodotos moves without embarrassment between the behaviour and appropriate treatment of cities on the one hand and of individuals on the other: Saar, 76 and n. 1.

εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι: ‘in early ages . . . was naturally’. We are suddenly and unexpectedly back in the atmosphere of the *Archaeology*: see e.g. i. 2. 2 n. on *ἐμπορίας οὐκ οὐσης*. See Saar, 78, for an excellent discussion of the contemporary arguments about the development of law and punishment, in Plato’s *Protagoras* and in the writings of Kritias (DK 88 B 25, laws introduced as ‘punishers’, *κολασταί*, after an initial period of brutish anarchy).

4. ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα: ‘poverty makes men daring through sheer necessity’. This passage has interesting social implications, noted by P. A. Brunt, *JRS* 62 (1972), 169 (review of Garnsey’s *Social Status and Legal Privilege in the Roman Empire*, with references, to which add ‘poor but not a bad man’ at Dem. xxi. 95): ‘character was commonly assessed by social and economic status. “Poor but honest” was a very natural antithesis to the Roman mind. Greeks had very much the same conception’, etc.

5. ἡ τε ἐλπίς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δ’ ἐφεπομένη: ‘Desire and hope are always there, the one leading, the other following . . .’. On *ἐλπίς* as particularly appropriate to the foolish hopes of the allies see Saar, 82f., citing iv. 108. 4, *ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτω*, ‘unreflecting hope’, and the exchange in the Melian Dialogue at v. 102–3. See also his 81 n. 4 for the bad associations of ‘hope’ in tragedy, citing Aesch. *Prometheus Bound*, 250, and Eur. *Suppl.* 479. R. W. B. Burton, *The Chorus in Sophocles’ Tragedies* (Oxford, 1980), 109, compares with the present passage the association of *ἐλπίς*, ‘hope’, with *ἀπάτη*, ‘deceit’ at Sophocles’ *Antigone*, 615–17. For Winnington-Ingram, 79, however, ‘Diodotos counters Aeschylus with Euripides’; he is thinking of Kleon’s retributivist or Aeschylean view of justice on the one hand (for which see 37. 2 n. on *ὁ γὰρ παθῶν*, also 39. 3 nn.), and, on the other hand, the passion-led heroines of Euripides’ *Medea* and *Hippolytos*.

On *ἔρως*, ‘desire’, see Saar, 81, for parallels with the prelude to the Sicilian expedition: vi. 13. 1 (speech of Nikias) and vi. 24. 3.

If we were indeed to do what Kleon has warned us against, by awarding points to the two speakers for their oratory (and why not, at this distance in time?) Diodotos must score heavily for the way he improves

on Kleon's pedestrian formulation about hopes and desires at 39. 3 (see Macleod, 75, for a detailed analysis of the echoes of Kleon in 39. 3-4).

ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα: 'the other suggesting that fortune will be kind' [lit. 'supplying the resources of fortune']. For the expression here compare (with Classen/Steup and the good n. of Saar, 81 n. 3), iv. 65. 4. *εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος*, 'which inspired them with powerful hopes', lit. 'supplying the power of hope'.

6. ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς: 'freedom or rule over others'. A very interesting association of concepts. See *Greek World*, 69, citing Hdt. i. 210 and Polybius, v. 106 among other ancient writers who make the association; and, among modern, Sir Isaiah Berlin who distinguishes between positive and negative freedom, 'freedom to' and 'freedom from' (*Four Essays on Liberty*). Diodotos is here talking about 'positive freedom', which includes the freedom to oppress others. For qualifications to Berlin's general position, which do not, however, seriously affect the present point, see Hansen (ii. 37. 3 n.), 8 ff., a valuable discussion of Greek concepts of liberty.

46. 2. σκέψασθε: 'You should reflect that'. See 39. 7 and end of n. there. **εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ δύναται σχολῇ καὶ ταχὺ ξυμβῆναι:** 'knowing that it makes no difference whether they come to terms quickly or slowly'. On this, the argument from a hypothetical revolt which has got half-way, see 39. 7 n.

3. πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην: 'a mere ruin'. The language and thought of this sentence reproduces almost exactly that of Kleon at 39. 8. Diodotos must show himself at least as solicitous for Athenian revenues as Kleon. See also 41. 1 n.

5. ἐλεύθερον . . . πρὸς αὐτονομίαν: 'a free people . . . in the hope of autonomy'. On the inconsistency with 39. 2 which some have detected here see n. there on *αὐτόνομοί τε οἰκοῦντες*. For the implied admission here that in Diodotos' view, as in Kleon's, the empire is intolerable, see Macleod, 76 f.

6. ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἀποστήναι σφόδρα φυλάσσειν: 'we should be extremely vigilant *before* they revolt'. See 40. 4 n. on *εἰ γὰρ . . . ὀρθῶς*: Diodotos' vague suggestion could be seen as a reformulation of the equally vague Periclean maxim 'keep the allies in hand'.

47. 1. σκέψασθε: 'You should reflect that'. See 39. 7 and end of n. there.

2. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὔνους ἐστί: 'at the moment the people are everywhere your friends'. An important and much discussed claim, particularly in the context of the argument about the popularity of the Athenian Empire between de Ste.

Croix and his critics such as Bradeen. See 3. 4n. and 27. 3n. for the bearing, on Diodotos' generalization, of events at Mytilene in particular. As for the generalization itself, it is not authorial (Kleon and Diodotos have both warned against plausible or seductive arguments, τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου); and it must be weighed against the assertion of Phrynichos, in the course of what is in effect a speech (viii. 48. 5 with Andrewes's n.), to the effect that what the allied cities really wanted was neither oligarchy *nor* democracy as such, in a condition of subjection, but freedom absolutely. See my n. on viii. 48 and provisionally in the LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, 19ff.

3. πρῶτον μὲν ἀδικήσετε τοὺς εὐεργέτας κτείνοντες: 'In the first place they are your benefactors, and it would be unjust to kill them'. Here only does Diodotos explicitly invoke considerations of justice: see introductory n. But see Winnington-Ingram, 79: Diodotos here adopts Kleon's simple retributivist view of justice as doing good to your friends and harming your enemies, a view propounded by Kephalos at the beginning of Plato's *Republic*. 'Diodotos introduces the consideration of justice . . . in the only context in which the view of justice which Cleon had made acceptable could safely and effectively be used by him.'

48. 2. κρείσσων: 'more formidable'. Lit. 'stronger', picking up Kleon at 37. 3.

ἰσχύος ἀνοία: 'the severity of unreasoning violence'. There is perhaps an intentional jingle with ἰσχύι . . . εὐνοία at 37. 2.

49. 1. ῥηθειςῶν δὲ τῶν γνωμῶν τούτων μάλιστα ἀντιπάλων πρὸς ἀλλήλας οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἦλθον μὲν ἐς ἀγῶνα ὁμῶς τῆς δόξης καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χειροτονίᾳ ἀγχώμαλοι, ἐκράτησε δὲ ἡ τοῦ Διοδότου: 'and these were the arguments on each side. They were almost equally strong, but there was nevertheless a struggle between the two opinions; the show of hands was very near, but the motion of Diodotos prevailed'. Not an easy sentence. The difficulty is to give the right force to ὁμῶς, 'nevertheless', which some have tried despairingly to emend (Hude actually prints Bredow's suggestion ὁμοίως, 'equally'). If ὁμῶς is retained, and retained in its present position (Gomme arbitrarily transposes it to after ἐκράτησε δέ, 'D.'s motion *nevertheless* prevailed'), and I think it should, it must, I believe, yield some such sense as 'irrespective of the reasoning which had been advanced'. (This is close to the rendering of Classen in his 1st edn. of 1867, who translates ὁμῶς 'without waiting for further grounds for supporting one side or the other' and takes ἀγῶν τῆς δόξης to mean a 'struggle of views' as opposed to a well-founded conviction.) That is (and the implication is important), Th. is, here as elsewhere, saying that the rational effect of the speeches was

of secondary importance compared to the emotional or other factors at work. (Classen's view would also imply this.) For the most famous example of the irrelevance of eloquent speeches see 68. 1 below with n. there. (Steup in Classen/Steup³, of 1892, keeps *ὁμως*, and takes it to refer to the change of heart already mentioned at 36. 4, which—he says—would have led one to expect a decisive majority in favour of leniency. This makes *ὁμως* very allusive indeed. The Budé edn. thinks that *ὁμως* looks forward to the sentence about Diodotos' motion, which would produce Gomme's sense without transposition. It is true that *ὁμως* can sometimes be brought forward like this, but it would be awkward to make the word look so very far ahead.)

The *γνώμη* or 'motion' of Diodotos (the noun, which can mean either 'opinion', i.e. the whole speech, or 'motion', i.e. the narrow proposal, has to be supplied with the words *ἡ του Διοδότου*, 'that of Diodotos') prevailed in the sense that it won more votes. Th. is not necessarily saying that people were convinced by his particular arguments: see 42. 2 n. on *διδασκάλους τῶν πραγμάτων*. These votes were counted: i. 87. 1 n.

The word *ἀγῶνα*, 'struggle', here stresses not so much the competitive aspect of the oratorical display (for which see 44. 2 n. on *ἡμῖν ὁ ἀγών*) but the emotional struggle of the voters, almost an 'agony' (a word derived from *ἀγών*) of decision-making.

2. καὶ τριήρη εὐθὺς ἄλλην ἀπέστελλον κατὰ σπουδῆν: 'The Athenians hastily sent another trireme . . .'. I have discussed this vivid ch. at *Thucydides*, 192 f.

3. ἡσθιὸν τε ἅμα ἐλαύνοντες: 'they continued rowing while they ate their barley'. See Morrison and Coates, 95 f.: this chapter, which clearly describes something exceptional, is good evidence for the normal practice, which was to eat and sleep on land, and to row not, as here, in shifts, but all together.

4. κατὰ τύχην δὲ πνεύματος οὐδενὸς ἐναντιωθέντος: 'Fortunately there was no contrary wind'. Which would have made the whole debate futile, though Th. does not labour the point. For the effect of contrary winds on even oar-powered ships see Morrison and Williams, *Greek Oared Ships* (Cambridge, 1968), 311.

ἐπὶ πρᾶγμα ἀλλόκοτον: 'on her horrible mission'. See introductory n. for the other evidence that the Mytilenean affair was not conducted in quite so hard-boiled a way as the two speeches on their own would suggest, with their frantic disavowals of pity. Note that the sailors on the first trireme had presumably themselves voted on the first day, when the death penalty was decided on; did they undergo a change of heart like the voters at home?

The view that the mission was 'horrible' could be either Th.'s own

judgement or (more likely) represents Th.'s report of or conjecture about the view of the sailors.

παρὰ τοσοῦτον: 'so near . . .'. Compare vii. 2. 4 for an exactly similar expression about Syracuse, saved by Gylippos' arrival.

50. 1. ὁ Πάχης: 'Paches'. The last we hear of him in Th., but Plutarch (*Nikias*, 6; *Aristides*, 26. 5) reveals that he came to an unpleasant end, stabbing himself to death at the audit of his year of office. (For some doubts see Westlake, 'Paches' = *Studies*, ch. 4, reprinted from *Phoenix*, 1975; but see Tuplin, *GRBS* 23 (1982), 329.)

Κλέωνος γνώμη: 'on the motion of Kleon'. Who had evidently not given up.

ἦσαν δὲ ὀλίγῳ πλείους χιλίων: 'about a thousand, or rather more'. The number has been doubted, unreasonably; it is defended by Wilson (introductory n. to 2-19), 147f. The eventual result of the affair would seem ὠμόν, 'savagely', enough, even if we did not know that something appallingly worse had been contemplated.

Μυτιληναίων τείχη καθείλον: 'they demolished the walls of Mytilene'. As usual after the crushing of a revolt: see i. 101. 3 (Thasos) and i. 117. 3 (Samos); for Chios see iv. 51 with iii. 39. 2 n. on μετὰ τειχῶν.

2. ὕστερον δὲ φόρον μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις: 'Afterwards they no longer exacted tribute from Lesbos'. One of Th.'s rare references to the tribute of a specific community; cp. iv. 57. 4.

κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίου, τριακοσίου μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροῦς ἐξείλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχόντας ἀπέπεμψαν οἷς ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τοῦ κλήρου ἐκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μνᾶς φέρειν αὐτοῖς εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν: 'Instead, they divided the whole island, except for the territory of Methymna, into three thousand allotments, of which they dedicated three hundred to the gods; they let out the rest to cleruchs taken from their own citizens, whom they chose by lot and sent to Lesbos. The Lesbians undertook to pay them a yearly rent of two minae for each allotment and cultivated the land themselves'. Presumably the three hundred sacred portions were also leased out and worked, but the rent would go to the gods.

It has been acutely noted that the amount of annual rent charged (two minae = 200 drachmae) more or less corresponds to hoplite pay (for which see 17. 4 n. on αὐτῷ γάρ etc.): see P. Gauthier, 'Les Clérouques de Lesbos et la colonisation athénienne au v^e siècle', *REG* 79 (1966), 64ff. This makes it likely that the cleruch presence was conceived as a garrison of resident hoplites (or thetes upgraded to hoplite economic status, thanks to the rents), and this settles an old dispute about whether

the Athenians were residents in Lesbos or rentiers living in Athens; on this point see also Gauthier, 'A propos des clérouquies athéniennes du v^e siècle', in *Problèmes de la terre en Grèce ancienne*, ed. M. I. Finley (Paris, 1973), 163 ff., at 163 n. 2. The only difficulty is, what happened to these garrisoning cleruchs subsequently? (For instance, they do not feature in the narrative at iv. 52, describing trouble in the region in 424.) Gauthier (1966) thinks they remained until 406 and that their non-mention by Th. in the intervening years is not significant, which is reasonable enough. But equally the garrison may have been withdrawn at some point; so for instance W. Schmitz (i. 81. 2 n.), 103. An inscription, *IG* i³. 66 (= Tod 63, not in ML; tr. in LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, no. 169, with my comments at p. 112), is usually thought to be relevant to the settlement of Mytilene described in the present ch. of Th., but its exact relation is unclear. It may imply that there has been friction between the cleruchs and the Mytileneans, which would suggest a date subsequent to 428. It also speaks of the granting of autonomy to the Mytileneans and the return of land; but without knowing the exact date of the inscription we cannot say without circularity that it solves the problem (above) about how long the cleruch garrison stayed. On the date and precise interpretation the editors of *IG* i³ are agnostic. Note that it is quite uncertain whether *IG* i³. 67, which also seems to refer to the return of land, concerns Mytilene at all (for this inscription see i. 57. 3 n.).

For one motive for such leasing out of distant territory ('management convenience') see R. Osborne, 'Social and Economic Implications of the Leasing of Land and Property in Classical and Hellenistic Greece', *Chiron*, 18 (1988), 279 ff., 314 n. 56 on the present passage.

3. παρέλαβον δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῇ ἡπειρῷ πολίσματα οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὄσων Μυτιληναῖοι ἐκράτουν: 'The Athenians also took possession of the lands on the Asiatic mainland which the Mytileneans held'. For such *peraiiai* see i. 100. 2 n. The cities of the Mytilenean *peraiia* were called the 'Aktaian cities' (iv. 52) and appear separately listed in the tribute lists assessment of 425: see ML, p. 194; they had probably been separately assessed as early as 427: see *ATL* i. 198, 467.

SEG xxviii (1978), 24, dedication of a bronze spear-butt by 'the Athenians from the Lesbians to the Dioskouroi' probably belongs here: acknowledgment for a safe sea passage to Lesbos.

51. ATHENIAN ATTACK ON MINOA

This prosaic and factual ch. provides brief relief between the dramas of Mytilene and Plataia (although, as noted in *Thucydides*, 192 f., there has

already been a 'change of gear' at 50 with its dry account of the cleruchic rents, etc.). We shall see that 69, though more closely related than 51 to what follows it, has a similar function, coming as it does between the killing of the Plataians in 68 and the announcement at the beginning of 70 that Corcyra was in a condition of *stasis*, a phrase which introduces the third great set piece of Book iii.

1. Νικίου τοῦ Νικηράτου: 'Nikias son of Nikeratos'. The first mention by Th. of this famous commander, unless (as I do not believe) he is the Nikias of ii. 85. 5 (see n. there). For his wealth see Davies, *APF* 403 f.

ἐπὶ Μινῶαν τὴν νῆσον, ἣ κεῖται πρὸ Μεγάρων: 'the island of Minoa, which lies in front of Megara'. There is a problem here, because no suitable island (that is, one which matches Th.'s description) exists in modern times. For the various proposed solutions see Legon, *Megara* (i. 103. 4 n. on *καὶ ἔσχον* etc.), 29 ff. Legon's own solution is that the ancient Minoa is now represented by the mainland area now known as Teicho (a finger-like promontory which pokes in between Boudoron on Salamis—for which see ii. 94. 3 n.—and the islet of Tripiko: see Legon's map 3). This theory assumes some silting-up. Since the terrain has obviously changed since antiquity (unless Th. was writing pure fiction) certainty is not attainable.

2. ἐβούλετο δὲ Νικίας: 'Nikias wanted'. No mention of the Assembly. **ληστῶν:** 'privateers'. See ii. 69. 1 n. on *καὶ τὸ ληστικόν* etc.

3. ἀπὸ τῆς Νισαίας: 'on the side of the island towards Nisaia'. For the (unidentified) site of Nisaia, the main harbour of Megara on the Saronic Gulf side, see i. 103. 4 n., citing Legon, 32.

μηχαναίς: 'siege-engines'. It seems that Nikias was specially associated with the ingenious use of siege-engines: see Ar. *Birds*, 363, with Sommerstein's n., Lewis, *CAH* v². 406, and Marsden (ii. 71–78, introductory n.), 50 (who thinks that Ar.'s word *ὑπερακοντίξεις*, 'out-shoot', is *not* a reference to artillery). Marsden thinks that the 'engines' in the present passage were light wooden towers mounted on ships, or small rams, or just scaling-ladders.

52–68. THE END OF PLATAIA

52. 2. βία μὲν οὐκ ἐβούλετο ἐλεῖν (εἰρημένον γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνος, ὅπως, εἰ σπονδαὶ γίγνοιτό ποτε πρὸς Ἀθηναίους καὶ ξυγχωροῖεν ὅσα πολέμῳ χωρία ἔχουσιν ἑκάτεροι ἀποδίδοσθαι, μὴ ἀνάδοτος εἶη ἡ Πλάταια ὡς αὐτῶν ἐκόντων προσχωρησάντων): '[the Spartan commander] did not want to take the place by force; he had instructions from home to this effect, the intention being that if one day a peace treaty was made, and both

parties agreed to give up all the places which they had taken by force of arms [lit. 'by war'], Plataia might be excluded on the grounds that the inhabitants had come to terms of their own accord'. Exactly this happened in 421: see v. 17. 2 and n. (the Thebans resist handing over Plataia at the time of the Peace of Nikias). Gomme notes the interesting apparent implication of these instructions, that the liberator Sparta was already thinking in terms of a negotiated peace; but how did Th. know what the commander had been told? May the present passage not be Thucydidean hindsight, projected on to the commander in Th.'s usual way? (for which see i. 5. 1 n. on ἡγουμένων). That is, Th. is here (I suggest) influenced by the events of 421 and is offering inference about the commander's motives, and speculation that he had actual instructions from Sparta; both the inference and the speculation are then served up as facts.

As Gomme says, echoed by G. Herman, *CQ* 1989 (ii. 85. 5 n.), 92 f., it is odd that the Spartan commander is unnamed. See my paper in *Catling Studies*.

τούς τε ἀδίκους κολάσειν, παρὰ δίκην δὲ οὐδένα: 'the guilty [lit. 'unjust'] would be punished, but no one unjustly'. For the tr. of this see 53. 2 n. on νῦν δέ etc.

3. ἐν ὧσιν οἱ ἐκ Λακεδαιμόνων δικασταὶ πέντε ἄνδρες ἀφίκοντο: 'until the five men who were appointed judges came from Sparta'. For the number five for Spartan travelling commissions see Hdt. i. 67. 5. Are these five judges kept anonymous to make them seem more frightening? See *Catling Studies*. As it happens we know from another source that one of them was Aristomelidas or Aristomenidas, father-in-law of Agesilaos: Paus. iii. 9. 3. For this man see Cartledge, *Agesilaos* (London, 1987), 146 f., and J. E. Lendon, 'The Oxyrhynchus Historian and the Origins of the Corinthian War', *Historia*, 38 (1989), 300 ff., at 309 f.

4. εἴ τι Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς ξυμμάχους ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷ καθεστῶτι ἀγαθόν [τι] εἰργασμένοι εἰσίν: 'whether they had done any kind of service to the Spartans and their allies in the present war'. For the criterion applied in this famous demand compare Xen. *Hell* v. 2. 32 and v. 4. 32 (Agesilaos' view of the criminal behaviour of Phoibidas and Sphodrias conditioned by whether they had benefited Sparta).

5. Ἀστύμαχόν τε τὸν Ἀσωπολάου καὶ Λάκωνα τὸν Αἰμινήστου, πρόξενον ὄντα Λακεδαιμονίων: 'Astymachos son of Asopolaos and Lakon son of Aeimnestos, who was the Spartan *proxenos*'. For these authentic-looking names (Asopolaos a good Boiotian name, Lakon or 'Spartan' a plausible name for a Spartan *proxenos*) see *Thucydides*, 51 (also, on Aeimnestos, 93 and n. 82). These names are surely additional

evidence that a real speech was delivered by real people. For proxeny in general see ii. 29. 1 n. on *καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει*; and for the origins of this particular proxeny see Hdt. ix. 72. 2 (the relevance of which was pointed out to me by D. M. Lewis): a Plataian whom one manuscript calls Aeimnestos (the others have Arimnestos, and this reading—best explained as a mere corruption from 64. 2—is preferred, surely wrongly, in all modern texts) is present at the death from wounds of a beautiful Spartan called Kallikrates at the time of the battle of Plataia. See Stein's n. on the passage, suggesting that the first Aeimnestos called his son Lakon in commemoration of the scene which Hdt. records. The proxeny would be a natural further consequence. See also Herman *CQ* 1989 (ii. 85. 5 n.), 93.

53–69. *The Plataian debate*

The most important modern discussion is by Macleod, *Essays*, 103 ff. = 'Thucydides' Plataian Debate', *GRBS* 18 (1977), 227 ff. As Macleod says in his first para., the debate has been—at least until Macleod's own contribution—neglected by scholars, certainly by comparison with the Mytilene Debate. (Just as, in Book ii, the Funeral Speech has been far more studied than Pericles' Last Speech, rich and fine though that is.) See, however, J. C. Hogan, 'Thucydides 3. 52–68 and Euripides' Hecuba', *Phoenix*, 26 (1972), 241 ff. This is much more about Euripides than about Th., but is valuable for its analysis of the similarities in the way two authors handle appeals to *pity*, the power of which Hogan reasserts against A. Adkins, 'Basic Greek Values in Euripides' *Hecuba* and *Hercules Furens*', *CQ* 16 (1966), 193 ff. Hogan also brings out the differences between what one might call the 'villains' of the two pieces, Odysseus and the Thebans: unlike Th.'s Thebans, Odysseus does not even try to claim that justice is on his side.

The structure of the second speech, that of the Thebans, is clearer and more logical than the first, that of the Plataians. This is an effective device: the Plataians, whose time on earth is to be short, jump nervously around, the implacable Thebans move in orderly fashion from the Persian Wars through the *pentekontaetia* to the events which produced the immediate situation. Furthermore, they 'helpfully' indicate, at the ends of 62 and 64, the point their argument has reached. The effect is that of a nail driven smartly into a coffin.

To be precise, and to take the speeches in reverse order: the Thebans begin (61) by explaining why they feel obliged to speak at all. Then (62–4) they deal with the Persian Wars and the *pentekontaetia*, their own medism (62), and (63–4) the Plataians' alliance with Athens in the

Persian Wars and subsequently (Plataia's behaviour in 480 has also been briefly dismissed at 62. 2). 'So much for our involuntary dealings with the Persians, and your voluntary dealings with the Athenians' (64. 5). Then (65–6) the events of the very recent past are discussed, that is, the Theban attack on Plataia and the Plataians' reaction to it. The three alleged recent crimes of the Plataians are, 'helpfully' again, tabulated at 66. 3 (three more nails). Finally, 67 urges the Spartans to resist feelings of pity for Plataia, suggesting that Thebes deserves pity instead. As with Diodotos, though in a more jeering manner, the Thebans throughout pick up many individual phrases from the preceding speech. These will be noted as they occur.

The Plataians' speech is not so straightforwardly organized. It circles endlessly round the theme of the Plataians' stand on behalf of Greece at a time when Thebes medized; this theme is developed in much more 'traditional' ways than is usual in a Thucydidean speech. The inverted commas round 'traditional' are there because here, as with the Funeral Speech in Book ii, we have so little other contemporary oratory for comparison (but see Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 20ff. with 59. 2n. below for the speech of Kleokritos the herald). But it is safe to say that the elaborate appeals to tombs and ancestors are done in a style which Thucydidean speakers often reject with impatience, though we may recall i. 26. 3 (Corcyra): see n. there on *τάφους* etc. Another comparable exception in Th. is Nikias' 'old-fashioned speaking', *ἀρχαιολογεῖν*, at vii. 69, for which see provisionally *Thucydides*, 193. As Syme says (*PBA* 48 (1962), 52): 'look what happens to those characters in his History who make appeal to the gods—the unfortunate Plataeans, the people of Melos, or the Athenian general, Nicias, in the retreat from Syracuse' [vii. 77]. Contrast with this the avoidance of appeals to the gods in the Mytilene Debate: see 45. 3n. on *πεφύκασι*. In general the Plataian Debate, and especially the Plataians' own speech, is exceptional in Th. for the detailed way it dwells on the past, not just Ithome (54. 5) and the Persian Wars themselves, but events of the sixth century (55. 1, but see n. there) and even the period covered by the *Archaeology* (61. 2, actually from the Theban speech). The speech is much indebted to Hdt. for the history to which it appeals: see 55. 1n. and my paper in *Catling Studies*.

The Plataians begin, naturally enough, with a plea to be allowed to speak at length. Their speech is supposedly a reply to the brief question about services to Sparta in the war, and they try to duck this with a rather contrived reply at 54. 2. But that is not their real reply, which consists in the speech as a whole with its sadly irrelevant appeal to the past, specifically but not exclusively the Persian Wars (see 54. 5 for Ithome). The Thebans' recent attack on Plataia is abruptly introduced at

56. 1, but the speakers soon return to the Persian Wars; the highly emotional chs. 58 and 59 make the appeal more vivid by almost calling back to life the Spartan dead at the battle of Plataia (see 58. 5n. for this rhetorical technique). This brings us to a marked feature of both speeches, their freedom with tenses and moods, which is merely the grammatical expression of a desire on the part of both sets of speakers to roll together past, present, and future on the one hand, and hypothetical and actual on the other, as the rhetorical needs of the moment demand. Thus for the Thebans it is a fact (67. 5, *πείσονται*, future indicative) that the Plataians are *going* to be punished. For other examples see Macleod, 118 (also 111f.), and individual nn. below. To return to the Plataians' speech: other themes are touched on unsystematically—for instance, the Plataians did not surrender to the hated Thebans but to the Spartans, and as suppliants; variants of this theme are sprinkled over the whole speech (53. 1; 58. 3; 59. 3 where it is almost introduced as a new and final thought—a convincing piece of flustered forgetfulness as the moment of decision approaches. At this point the Plataians have almost started to gabble—'it is hard to bring a speech like this to an end', etc.).

But it is more true of these masterly speeches than of perhaps any other or others in Th. that a mere analysis of the speeches themselves cannot bring out the power and pathos of the total effect: for that one must read the narrative ch. 68, where the Spartans simply repeat their original question *as if the speeches had never been delivered at all*. See nn. there. It is this above all which reminds us that although the Spartans have been called 'judges' (52. 3), and both sets of speakers use the language and moves of forensic oratory, it is not really a trial at all, but 'a travesty of legality, as the Melian Dialogue is of dialectic' (Macleod, 109; cp. 105).

There is surely a relation, within the larger structure of Th.'s work, between the themes and outcomes of the Mytilenean and Plataian Debates, and the questions about Athenian and Spartan war-time behaviour which they raise, but I postpone treatment of all this until after 67.

53–59. *Speech of the Plataians*

53. 2. **νῦν δὲ φοβούμεθα μὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἅμα ἡμαρτήκαμεν· τόν τε γὰρ ἀγῶνα περὶ τῶν δεινοτάτων εἶναι εἰκότως ὑποπτεύομεν:**

'But we fear that we are wrong twice over, for we have good reason to suspect that at this trial our lives are at stake [lit. 'the question is about the most extreme things', understand 'penalties'], and that . . .'. The logic of this is not obvious, though it does not seem to bother editors. The implication seems to be that in a trial of a regular sort (1 above, *νομίμων-*

τέραν) there could be no question of the death penalty. In fact, what was said (52. 3) was that the guilty [guilty of what?] would be punished, but nobody would be punished unjustly. This reassurance is sufficiently vague to allow the Spartans to define guilt as they please, and to treat everybody as guilty if they please. But the Plataians are right that for the Spartans to define guilty, lit. 'unjust', as 'not helping Sparta in the war' is a shocking equation of justice with one's own advantage. However, for the Plataians in their position of weakness to point that out in as many words would no doubt have seemed (to Th. or to the Plataians themselves, depending on one's view of the speech's authenticity) to be a suicidal tactic. (The discussion of justice versus advantage in 57 is more generally and tactfully framed.) As for the words 'no one to be punished unjustly' in 52. 2, I have changed Jowett's 'without a just cause', which makes the second part of the sentence repeat the first (if the unjust and only the unjust members of a group are punished, it follows that no one will be punished without just cause. The Penguin has 'no one without a fair trial', which is easier English but imports an idea not in the Greek.) The phrase *παρὰ δίκην* is vague, no doubt deliberately vague, and best left vague in tr., but in its literal meaning 'beyond justice' there is perhaps a hint that the *punishments* to be inflicted will not be excessive. If so, it may be that with the word *δεινοτάτων*, 'extreme penalties', the Plataians are appealing, in the present passage, to the undertaking that the penalties would not be 'beyond justice'.

τό τε ἐπερώτημα βραχύ: 'your question is a short one'. A gentle and dignified reproach. 'An outrageous one' would be more like it.

τὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ ... τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ ...: 'if true ... if false would immediately be exposed as such ...'. Macleod, 227f., who calls this 'bitterly accurate', can (not surprisingly) quote parallels for defendants claiming to speak the truth; it is more unusual, because a little naive, for the Plataians to admit that a lie will do them no good because it will be seen through.

4. ἡ πειθῶ: 'the chance to persuade you'. The word *πειθῶ*, 'persuasion', is found only here in Th. It is also the name of a goddess (as at *Hecuba*, 816); this recalls the personifications at 45. 5. 'Persuasion sat on his lips' was said by the comic poet Eupolis about Pericles (*PCG* F 102. 5). For *πειθῶ* see R. G. A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy: a Study of Peitho* (Cambridge, 1982), who, however, in his discussion (31) of the present passage says that *πειθῶ* is here just an abstract noun.

ἐπὶ διεγνωσμένην κρίσιν καθιστώμεθα: 'the cause which we plead is already prejudged'. Hogan, 243, compares *Hecuba*, 219 (which *precedes* the pleas of Hecuba to Odysseus): *ψήφόν τε τὴν κρανθείσαν*, 'the vote which has been cast'.

54. 2. **πρὸς τὸ ἐρώτημα τὸ βραχύ:** 'In answer to your short question'. See 53. 2 n. on this phrase.

εἰ μὲν ὡς πολεμίους ἐρωτᾶτε . . .: 'if we are enemies'. A rather contrived reply. Note with Macleod, 109 n. 11, that the Plataians 'carefully distinguish between *πολέμιοι* (which is what they are) and *ἐχθροί* (which is what they are not)'. He cites, as well as the present passage, 55. 1 and 58. (Macleod seems to mean that *πολέμιοι* are enemies whose enmity is the result of war, *πόλεμος*, whereas *ἐχθροί* implies a more personal kind of enmity. However, this distinction is blurred in practice; e.g., at i. 44. 1 and elsewhere, *ἐχθρούς* is used in the phrase 'having the same friends and enemies', a regular treaty formula and one in which it can hardly be said that a personal element is being stressed.)

3. **μόνοι Βοιωτῶν:** 'the only Boiotians'. But this ignores the Thespians: see e.g. Hdt. vii. 222 for their refusal to desert Leonidas at Thermopylai. Th. is followed by Dem. lix. 95.

4. **καὶ γὰρ ἡπειρώται τε ὄντες ἐναυμαχῆσαμεν ἐπ' Ἄρτεμισίω:** 'although we are an inland city we joined in the sea-battle off Artemisium'. Hdt. viii. 1. 1 also stresses, and is probably Th.'s source for, the naval ignorance of the Plataians. Note that the battle of Marathon, where the Plataians also fought bravely, is not specifically mentioned (unlike Artemisium). That is no doubt because Marathon was very strongly associated with Athens; contrast the battle of Plataia, won by the 'Dorian spear' of Sparta (*Δωρίδος λόγχης ὕπο*, Aeschylus, *Persai*, 817). This is not entirely logical because Artemisium was also 'Athenian' in the sense that the Athenian contingent was easily the largest, and the Plataians actually helped to man Athenian ships (Hdt., as above); but the Athenian associations of Artemisium were perhaps less inescapable.

5. **μετὰ τὸν σεισμὸν τῶν ἐς Ἴθώμην Εἰλώτων ἀποστάντων:** 'the rebellion of the Helots, who seized Ithome after the earthquake'. See i. 101; also ii. 27. 2 n. on *καὶ ὅτι σφῶν εὐεργέται* etc. (for the Aiginetan help, not specifically mentioned in the *pentekontaetia* in Book i, any more than was the Plataian). See also 55. 1 n.

55. 1. **δεομένων γὰρ συμμαχίας ὅτε Θηβαῖοι ἡμᾶς ἐβίασαντο, ὑμεῖς ἀπεώσασθε καὶ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους ἐκελεύετε τραπέσθαι ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντας, ὑμῶν δὲ μακρὰν ἀποικούντων:** 'We asked for your help against the Thebans when they attacked us, but you rejected us and told us to approach the Athenians, who were near, whereas you were far away'. Again (see 54. 4 n.) this closely follows Herodotus (vi. 108. 1-3). For the date (almost certainly 519 BC) see below 68. 5 n. See above, introductory n., for the concrete reference to the distant past, something of a departure for Th. Where he does allow speakers to do it, the source

often seems to be Hdt., as at i. 41. 2 (the 20 ships supplied to Athens against Aigina). It is rare for a Thucydidean speech to be our sole or primary source of knowledge for such back references, as it is for the item (above) about the Plataian help to Sparta over Ithome, or the Corinthian vote over Samos in 440 (i. 40. 5 and 41. 2). Both of these were too recent for inclusion in Hdt.'s main narrative, though Hdt. does have the odd forward allusion to events in the *pentekontaetia*.

3. **καὶ πολιτείας μετέλαβεν:** 'and shared rights of citizenship with them'. This is an important but historically problematic claim (there is no doubt about the meaning of *πολιτείας*: see 63. 2 and n.). Its clear implication is that the Plataians had had the citizenship since 519 (or possibly since the Persian Wars, or even 431, though the natural interpretation of this passage and even more of 63. 2 is surely that the alliance and the citizenship grant happened at roughly the same time. In any case the implication is that at the time of making the speech the Plataians already have the citizenship.) However, the fourth-century orators say firmly that it was only as a result of the events of 427 that the Plataians—that is the survivors of 24. 2 above (see n. there) plus (presumably) the evacuees of ii. 6. 4, who included some men—were given Athenian citizenship. See Isoc. xii. 94, also Dem. lix. 103–4, which says that the Plataians were admitted into demes and tribes (but does not mention phratries or brotherhoods, membership of which was normally stipulated in citizenship grants to individuals; see further below for the significance of this omission). M. Osborne (ii. 22. 3 n. on *ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων*), ii. 11 ff., commenting on his D[ecree] no. 1, calls the Plataian claim in the present passage an 'obvious untruth' and suggests that the Plataians in 427 'were led to exaggerate the closeness of their relationship with the Athenians in the hope of ameliorating their defence'. So too W. Gawantka, *Isopolitie: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen in der griechischen Antike* (Munich, 1975), 174 ff. See, however, A. Amit, *Great and Small Poleis* (Brussels, 1973), 75–8, a useful discussion (not cited by Osborne, any more than is Gawantka). Amit thinks that the citizenship grant was indeed made to the Plataians in 519 [Amit says 509, but see below, 68. 5 n.] or 'at the time of the Persian invasion' [which Amit suggests as a possible but less likely alternative] but that 'for practical purposes it was only an honorary citizenship since most of the Plataeans remained on Plataean soil'. This is close to Gomme's view that a formal Athenian grant of *isopolity* (an arrangement by which a citizenship grant was merely potential unless and until it was 'cashed' by the citizens of the recipient state arriving and settling in the granting state) was made to Plataia at an early date; *ισοπολιτεία* is, however, too formal a term for these early dates—and in any case the

word is not found in Athenian contexts at any date (Osborne, ii. 16 n. 22; 184). I think that Osborne and Gawantka dispose of Th. a little too easily and that some such solution as Amit's is on the right lines. See also MacDowell, *CR* 35 (1985), 319, against Osborne.

The Plataians (as Osborne, 15, rightly says) remained unusual in that they 'did not really wish to become Athenian citizens' and remained an identifiable and unassimilated group. See v. 32 (they were sent up north to Skione *en bloc* when that recalcitrant town was taken by Athens) and Lysias xxiii, the speech against Pankleon. As we have noted, their status was a little unusual in that Dem. lix shows that they were not admitted to phratries (and, as that speech adds, they could not hold priesthoods or archonships); while Isocrates, in the course of an unreliable speech about the Plataians delivered in the 370s (xiv. 51), which mentions only rights of intermarriage, *epigamia*, may also imply something less than full citizenship. Osborne, however (ii. 15. n. 17 and more fully at iii/iv. 36f. discussing his T[estimonium] 10, about the men who manned the ships for the Arginousai campaign in 406/5), shrinks from the conclusion ('surely more akin to Roman ideas') that 'there was in Athens an inferior set of "citizen rights" known as . . . "Plataian rights" . . .' (iii/iv. 36). As he says (37 n. 78) phratry membership was not strictly an essential element of citizenship (though it was good evidence of it), while exclusion from priesthoods etc. was a disability from which other naturalized citizens suffered. (We may add that 'by tribes and demes' is a formula found in other contexts, where citizenship is not in issue, see Andokides, i. 97.) While Osborne is clearly right to protest against rigid and 'Roman' interpretations, it is equally clear that for a variety of legal and psychological reasons the Plataians, after 427, were seen and saw themselves as something other than full Athenians. To that extent the present passage is misleading even as a description of the situation *after* 427—a situation which may, however, have influenced Th. in his composition of this speech—and it certainly gives a misleading impression of the closeness of Plataia and Athens *before* 427, though I would not go so far as to call it (with Osborne) an 'obvious untruth'.

On Th.'s silence about the treatment of the Plataians after 427 see 68. 5n.

4. οὐχ οἱ ἐπόμενοι αἴτιοι . . . : 'it is . . . not the followers who are to blame'. As Macleod (106, 111) points out, the Plataians are trying to have it both ways: they have just claimed credit for their loyalty to Athens but now seek to excuse themselves by the plea of 'higher authority'.

56. 1. Θεβαῖοι δέ: ‘The Thebans . . .’. The Plataians suddenly swoop down to the present day; for this kind of abruptness as expressive of a mental jumpiness see introductory n.

2. ἐν σπονδαῖς: ‘in time of peace’. See ii. 2–6, introductory n., and vii. 18. 2, where the Spartans are said by Th., in an authorial sentence, to have subsequently acknowledged the truth of this. So much for Archidamos’ invocation of the gods at ii. 74. Note that the word for peace here means literally ‘libations’, so that ‘in time of peace and at a sacred time of month’ (below) in fact contains a double charge of impiety.

καὶ προσέτι ἱερομηνία: ‘at a sacred time of month’. We were not told this in Book ii, but the Thebans in 65 mention, without disputing, the fact. For the kind of military ploy see Popp (3. 3 n. on *ἐσηγγέλη* etc.), 123; this and the Mytilene attempt described at 3. 3 are the only two such attempts in Th.’s wartime narrative to exploit a festival in this way, though as Popp says we cannot be sure (though it is likely enough) that the Thebans deliberately timed their assault to coincide with the festival. (Note that Popp’s next example in chronological sequence has the bitter bit: the Spartan capture of the Theban Kadmeia in the 380s exploited the festival of the Thesmophoria: Xen. *Hell.* v. 2. 29.)

ὀρθῶς τε ἐπιτιμωρησάμεθα κατὰ τὸν πᾶσι νόμον καθεστῶτα, τὸν ἐπιόντα πολέμιον ὄσιον εἶναι ἀμύνεσθαι: ‘we punished them as we were fully entitled to do by the universal law which says that one may defend oneself against an aggressor without offending the gods’ [lit. ‘that to defend oneself . . . is holy’, ‘sanctioned by divine law’; see below]. As Macleod (108) says, the ‘law’, *νόμος*, here invoked is ‘scarcely more than a law of nature’; but I suggest that the ground has been ingeniously prepared, by the reference above to the festival, for this equivocation on *νόμος*: to defend one’s city against impiety could be painted as itself a kind of piety.

For the word *ὄσιον*, which I have here translated ‘without offending the gods’, see Eatough (ii. 52. 3 n.). This is a good example of an ‘in-operative’ use of the word by a speaker (‘a brazen distortion of the true facts’, Eatough, 248).

3. εἰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτίκα χρησίμῳ ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐκείνων πολεμῷ τὸ δίκαιον λήψεσθε: ‘If you let your idea of justice be fixed by your own immediate advantage and the Thebans’ hostility to us . . .’ [‘immediate’ covers both ‘advantage’ and ‘hostility’]. See Macleod, 110, on this para. and the rest of the ch.: the Plataians begin by protesting against the identification of morality with expediency but quickly switch to an attempt to show that the Spartans’ real ‘mistake’ is a wrong assessment of that expediency. That is, to adapt Kant, they begin by asserting that honesty is better than policy and then try to show that honesty is the

best policy. As Diodotos is made to say at 47. 5, justice and expediency cannot so easily be combined.

57. 1. παράδειγμα τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων: 'generally reckoned an example to Greece'. For the range of meanings of the favourite rhetorical word *παράδειγμα*, 'example' (which also features in the Mytilene debate, 39. 3) see *Thucydides*, 106.

σκῦλα ἀπὸ ἡμῶν: 'spoils taken from us'. This word for spoils, used also at ii. 13. 4 for the spoils from the Persians, is said to be appropriate for spoils from the *dead* (Pritchett, i. 55) which might be thought to add poignancy here. For the symbolic importance of such spoils see the interesting study of W. R. Connor, 'Early Greek Land Warfare as Symbolic Expression', *Past and Present*, 119 (1988), 3 ff., at 16.

2. ἐς τὸν τρίποδα τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς: 'on the tripod at Delphi'. See i. 132. 2. For the past/present antitheses in this section see Macleod (111), who also notes that the appeals in this ch. to the *future* (Sparta's tarnished reputation) fall as flat as the appeals to the past which are such a feature of the speech as a whole. At 237 Macleod aptly compares Isoc. xvi. 48 for the various reasons why pity should be felt, which include recognition that a sufferer's present condition is not in accordance with his own worth or that of his ancestors.

3. δύο ἀγῶνας τοὺς μεγίστους: 'two terrible ordeals'. See 66. 3 n.

4. καὶ περιεώσμεθα ἐκ πάντων . . . ἐρήμοι καὶ ἀτιμῶρητοι: 'are now completely rejected, friendless, and unprotected'. Like Polyxena in the *Hecuba*: see Hogan, 243. The first of these words will be turned against the Plataians at 67. 5 (*ἀπεώσαντο*, 'they rejected . . .', from a closely related verb).

58. 1. ἔνεκα . . . τῆς ἀρετῆς τῆς ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας: 'for the sake . . . of our services to the cause of Greece'. This sense of *ἀρετή* is close to that frequently found in honorific inscriptions, 'on account of benefits conferred', *ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα*: the earliest attested prose instance in an inscription seems to be Tod 131, line 14, of the early 360s, but note *IG*¹. 1154 = M. Walbank, *Athenian Proxeniēs* (ii. 22. 3 n.), no. 9, line 1, of c.460–450 BC, *προξενίας ἀρετῆς τε χάριμ*, 'on account of his proxeny and his *arete*'. See also above, ii. 40. 4, and below, iv. 19. 3.

3. . . ὅσια ἄν: 'piety demands'. See Eatough (ii. 52. 3 n.), 248, and above, 56. 2 n. on *ὀρθῶς* etc.

ὁ δὲ νόμος τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ κτείνειν τούτους: 'Greek custom does not allow the suppliant to be put to death'. But the Plataians had themselves put some Theban prisoners to death, ii. 5. 6 and n. there for the Plataians' reasons for passing over this point completely. (The Thebans of course rub the point in (66. 2–3), without, however, relating it as

specifically as they might have done to the Plataians' present situation; though the comparison is implicit in the echo of this passage at 66. 3 (see n. there) and the statement at 66. 4 that the Plataians, not the Thebans, are the real criminals.) For the 'law' here invoked, see Macleod, 108 f.; it is clearly a very different and weaker sort from the law at 56. 2, which was hardly more than a generalization about human nature. In any case the Thebans will claim at 67. 5 that the particular terms of the Plataians' surrender override their status as suppliants.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ εὐεργέτας γεγενημένους διὰ παντός: 'we have always been your benefactors'. See iv. 11. 4n. on ἀντὶ μεγάλων εὐεργεσιῶν: a Spartan speaker (Brasidas) less plausibly claims that Sparta confers benefits on other states rather than receiving them. (Brasidas is addressing Sparta's allies before Pylos.)

4. ἀποβλέψατε γὰρ ἐς πατέρων τῶν ὑμετέρων θήκας: 'Look at the tombs of your fathers'. Really, ancestors. For this very traditional sort of plea see introductory n. The Thebans dismiss it, with a close verbal echo, at 67. 2.

ἑσθήμασι: 'clothes'. For offerings of clothes to the dead see Soph. *Electra*, 452; offerings of clothes were made in other connections also, for instance by women to Artemis at Brauron and elsewhere: see H. King, 'Bound to Bleed', in A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt (eds.), *Images of Women in Antiquity* (London, 1983), 109 ff., at 114. (The garments dedicated were often girdles, like Electra's offering.)

ὁμαίχοις: 'had fought at their side'. A poetic word: see Parry, *Logos and Ergon* (ii. 35. 1 n.), 190.

5. καταλείψετε: 'you will be ... leaving them'. The dead Spartans of the battle of Plataia are here virtually conjured back to life: what will they think about being left in hostile terrain among their murderers, αὐθένταις? For something like this rhetorical device see Cicero, *pro Caelio*, 33-4, where Appius Claudius Caecus, the censor of 312 BC, is conjured up to rebuke Clodia. As R. G. Austin says in his edn. (Oxford, 1960³), 92, 'Cicero made a good choice of this fine old Roman gentleman to rebuke his flighty descendant'.

59. 1. ἐπικλασθῆναι τῇ γνώμῃ: 'let your hearts be moved'. See 67. 2 for a sneering Theban repetition of this highly charged word.

ὡς ἀσάθμητον τὸ τῆς ξυμφορᾶς: 'the uncertainty of fortune'. For ἀσάθμητον, 'uncertain', see also iv. 62. 4 (speech of Hermokrates, the only other occurrence of the word in Th.). Macleod (113) cites Arist., *Rhet.* 1386f. for pity as especially appropriate to sufferings caused by mischance.

2. θεοὺς τοὺς ὁμοβωμίους ...: 'by the gods whom the Greeks

worship at common altars . . .'. For the very heavy concentration of religious words in this section compare Kleokritos at Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 20ff., a highly emotive appeal for civic unity at the time of the political troubles after the end of the Peloponnesian War. Cp. also Th. ii. 16. 2.

3. χαλεπώτατον τοῖς ᾧδε ἔχουσι, λόγου τελευτᾶν: 'To men in our position there is nothing harder than to bring their speech to an end'. See introductory n.

παυόμενοι λέγομεν ἤδη: 'Our last word is . . .'. But they have made this point (that they did not surrender to the Thebans) already; see introductory n. for this repetition, perhaps intended to suggest the forgetfulness of panic.

4. τοὺς ἄλλους Ἑλλήνας ἐλευθεροῦντας: 'You are liberating the other Greeks . . .'. This theme is no mere rhetorical flourish for Th. The inconsistency between Sparta's pretensions as liberator (for which see ii. 8. 4, etc.) and her actual behaviour in the war has already been commented on by the Samians from Anaia at 32. 2, where (as we saw) the Samians' 'speech' has a good claim to be thought authentic. See further n. at end of 67 below.

60–67. *Speech of the Thebans*

60. οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι δέισαντες πρὸς τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν μὴ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τι ἐνδῶσι: 'The Thebans, who were afraid that the Spartans would give way'. This sentence is crucial to Hogan's study of the Plataian Debate: as he says (243) 'the Thebans must be assumed to have a reason for fearing that the Lacedaemonians might be moved to give in somewhat by their speech', and finds that reason in the pity which a speech like the Plataians' might be expected to arouse.

61. 1. τοὺς μὲν λόγους οὐκ ἂν ἤτησάμεθα εἰπεῖν: 'We should never have asked to speak'. The first three words are exactly the same as those of Sthenelaidas at i. 86. 1, who likewise begins by complaining at the long-winded eloquence of another speaker.

2. διάφοροι ἐγενόμεθα τὸ πρῶτον . . .: 'Our quarrel with them first arose'. For the Thebans' more orderly presentation of the Plataians' material see introductory n.; as Macleod (114) says, they pursue their topic chronologically.

ξυμμείκτους ἀνθρώπους ἐξελάσαντες: 'expelling the mixed population . . .'. This amplifies i. 12. 3; but generally in this part of the speech we surely hear the voice of Th., in particular the author of the *Archaeology*, rather than the real-life Thebans of 427.

τὰ πάτρια: 'the traditions of their ancestors'. See ii. 2. 4 n.; the expression here can mean very little, since we are now going back

to a period before the original settlement of Boiotia, itself a very hazy event.

πολλὰ ἡμᾶς ἔβλαπτον: 'they did us a great deal of damage'. This is vague, but for conflict between Athens and Boiotia between 519 and the Persian Wars see Hdt. v. 77, with ML 15 = Fornara 42 (506).

62. 2. ἡμεῖς δὲ μηδίσαι μὲν αὐτοὺς οὐ φαμεν διότι οὐδ' Ἀθηναίους: 'But we say that if they did not side with the Persians, that was only because the Athenians did not'. This recalls Hdt. viii. 30, on the reason why the Phocians did not medize (hatred of Thessaly, which did). **τῇ μέντοι αὐτῇ ιδέα:** 'on the same principle'. This use of *ιδέα* anticipates the use of the related word *εἶδει* at 3 below: see n. there, and viii. 90. 1 n.

ἄπτικίσαι: 'sided with the Athenians' [lit. 'attikize', by analogy with 'medize']. Macleod (116) is right that the word is aptly chosen to suggest that the Plataians are no less traitors to Greece than those states (like the Thebans themselves) who medized, but he goes, I think, too far when he calls the word a 'neologism'. It is true that this is the first occurrence in Th., but the word is after all subsequently used in an unrhettorical section of narrative (iv. 133. 1, Thebes demolishes the Thespians' walls on the grounds of their alleged 'attikism') in a way which suggests it was in ordinary use even if we cannot point to a string of parallels or precedents.

3. καίτοι σκέψασθε ἐν οἷω εἶδει ἐκάτεροι ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἔπραξαν: 'But think how different were the circumstances in which we and they acted'. For *εἶδει* ('circumstances') here see Weidauer (ii. 47. 3-54, introductory n.), 21 ff.: the word, for which see 82. 2 n. below, here means almost 'constitution'—in Greek, as in English, a word with medical associations. See my nn. on vi. 77. 2, viii. 56. 2, and 90. 1 (where Andrewes's nn. are inadequate; Dover on vi. 77. 2 is better). In all these passages the notion of a 'political arrangement' is present, most clearly at viii. 90; in the other passages it has travelled further, and can almost be rendered 'policy' or 'plan'. It is interesting to find *εἶδει* used here in a political sense so soon after the closely related word *ιδέα* (2 n. above) has been used of political motives.

ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύχανεν οὔτε κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα: 'In those days our city was not governed by an oligarchy which granted equal justice to all'. This use of *ισόνομος*, 'which granted equal justice to all', is of great interest. The related noun *ισονομία* is normally, as at 82. 8 below, associated with democracy, though it is not (as is sometimes said by modern scholars) identical with it. In particular, I do not accept the view of Ostwald, *Nomos* (ii. 34. 1 n. on

τῷ πατρίῳ νόμῳ), 155, 157, etc., that the noun was the 'slogan' of Kleisthenic democracy. At Hdt. iii. 80. 6, Otanes is made to say that the rule of the majority has the finest of all names, *ἰσονομία*, but this is merely a way of saying that *ἰσονομία* is something which can be predicated, as the philosophers say, of democracy. More usable is the authorial iii. 83, where Otanes' proposal, which is clearly what we would call democratic, is described in retrospect as an attempt to urge *ἰσονομία* on the other two speakers. But even this is less than a full identification of democracy and *isonomy*. There is a famous drinking song which praised Harmodios and Aristogeiton for murdering the Pisistratid Hipparchos in 514 BC and thus (indirectly) making Athens *ἰσονόμους*: D. Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford, 1962), no. 896 = Fornara 39A. But what the tyrannicides produced was (after the eventual fall of the tyranny in 510) a few years of aristocratic competition of the kind which led Kleisthenes, who was doing badly in the struggle for power (Hdt. v. 70. 1), to propose his reforms. This period could well have been greeted at the time as a period of *isonomy*. Freedom from the interference of the tyrants gave all aristocrats equal rights, a freedom which expressed itself in factional struggle. (Such struggles in antiquity could always be viewed positively; thus a Tacitean speaker can speak of 'ipsa inimicitarum gloria': *Dialogus*, xl. 1.) For a late sixth-century use of *isonomy* in this sense (an equal struggle between warring elements) see the medical writer Alkmaion of Kroton, DK 24 B 4. To return to Th., it is no doubt surprising to find the Thebans speaking of an 'isonomous' oligarchy, but the passages cited above show that it is by no means an actual contradiction or (as Macleod (114) calls it) oxymoron. On *isonomia* see also Hansen (ii. 37. 3 n.), 21 ff.

How factually justified is the Theban claim that their government at the time of the Persian Wars was not an isonomous oligarchy or a democracy but a family clique (*δυναστεία*, see below)? We do not know. The modern books on Theban political history can only refer to the present passage of Th., with appropriate cautions about its rhetorical tendentiousness: see e.g. P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur, 1952), 37, or more recently N. Demand, *Thebes in the Fifth Century* (London, 1982), the two relevant pages of which (16f., more concerned with the oligarchy which is supposed to have succeeded the 'dynasty') are hardly more than a citation of Th. with commentary (but none of the appropriate cautions). No doubt Th. makes his Thebans overdo any contrast there may have been, and the present passage may just be a rhetorically forceful device by which he allows them to dissociate themselves strongly from what happened in the Persian Wars. (Note in any case that the implication of Hdt. ix. 87. 2 is that the city's medism was *not* the

work of a few men.) C. Habicht, *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece* (Berkeley and London, 1985), 111, quotes Paus. ix. 6. 2 as evidence that Paus. himself 'believes that the people are not responsible for the actions of a bad government'. But Habicht does not mention that the sentence in question is lifted straight from the present passage of Th.

The present passage is one of the few passages in a Thucydidean speech which is evidence for a fact about earlier Greek history not otherwise known from Herodotus or from Th.'s own narrative: see my paper in *Catling Studies*. However, the status of the 'fact' is, as we have seen above, questionable.

Note that over Thebes and Plataia as over Mytilene the issue of free will versus *force majeure* is relevant. At 11. 4 (see n. there on *ἄμα* etc.) the Mytileneans are unable to avail themselves of an argument like the Thebans' here (that is, 'we were the slaves of a despotic internal government') just as (see 64. 3) the Plataians cannot plead that they followed Athens only because they were under a form of government which has since been overthrown; but the question of *outside* pressure is very relevant in both debates. (See 37. 7 and n.: Mytilene's action in revolting was voluntary, not forced on her by Sparta; 10–11, Mytilene was not in a position to stand up to Athens alone. In the Plataian Debate (see 55. 4 n.) the Plataians say the leaders, not the followers, should be held responsible, and the Thebans counter this at 63. 2.) See Macleod, 120f. **οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν**: 'nor by a democracy'. In its context this reference to democracy is clearly favourable (even if the use of the favourable word 'isonomous' above is not as strongly associated with democracy as some critics have supposed). For the bearing of this on the Thebans' defence of the help they gave to the Plataian oligarchs see 65. 1 n. on *ἐν σπονδαῖς* etc.

καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον: 'than which nothing is more opposed to . . . moderate government'. See North, *Sophrosyne* (i. 32. 4 n. on *περιέστηκεν* etc.), 112. (I see nothing objectionable in the two superlatives, though some have emended them.) Cp. Hdt. v. 92. a. 1.

δυναστεία ὀλιγῶν ἀνδρῶν: 'a small family clique'. For *δυναστεία*, 'dynasty', as having a family element see Arist., *Politics*, 1293^a25 ff., and 1292^b7 (where, however, W. Newman in his edn. says that Aristotle 'probably has before him here Thuc. 3. 62. 4, where the Thebans say', etc.). The present passage does indeed—like i. 13. 1 (see n. there on *πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν*)—anticipate, in its categorization of constitutional forms, the political theorists of the fourth century.

4. **ιδίας δυνάμεις ἐλπίσαντες ἔτι μᾶλλον σχήσειν**: 'hoping to strengthen their own positions'. See ii. 2. 2 n. on *ιδίας* etc.

5. **καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν χώραν πειρωμένων ὑφ' αὐτοῖς ποιεῖσθαι**

καὶ κατὰ στάσιν ἤδη ἐχόντων αὐτῆς τὰ πολλά: ‘and tried to subdue us . . . Because of our political divisions they actually conquered most of our country’. See i. 108. 3 and n. [On *στάσιν* here see iv. 92. 6 n.] ἐν Κορωνεῖα: ‘at Koroneia’. See i. 113. 2 and iv. 92. 6 (also below, iii. 67. 3).

63. 1. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐς τὸν μηδισμόν τοσαῦτα ἀπολογούμεθα: ‘So much for the accusation of medism’. See introductory n. for the emphatic way the Thebans ‘flag’ their arguments.

2. Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι καὶ πολῖται: ‘allies and citizens of Athens’. See 55. 3 n.: this settles the meaning of the word *πολιτεία* there: it must mean ‘citizenship’, although in other contexts it can have other and vaguer meanings. Note that there as here ‘allies’ and ‘citizens’ go closely together. Though this is slightly illogical—an ally is, in Greek thinking at least, an outsider—it does surely suggest that the alliance and the citizenship grant were thought of as happening at about the same time.

ἀλλ’ ἐκόντες: ‘but you acted willingly’. See 62. 3 n. on *ἡμῖν γάρ* etc., final para.; and generally Macleod, 115.

3. καὶ λέγετε: ‘You say’. What follows is full of contemptuous echoes of the Plataians.

ὡς αἰσχρὸν ἦν προδοῦναι τοὺς εὐεργέτας: ‘that they were your benefactors and that you could not honourably betray them’. For the thought see 55. 3, and for the word *εὐεργέται*, ‘benefactors’, see 57. 1, 58. 3, 59. 1, each time said by the Plataians of their own services to Greece.

4. οὐκ ἴσθη αὐτοῖς τὴν χάριν ἀνταπέδοτε οὐδὲ αἰσχύνης ἀπηλλαγμένην: ‘The way you repaid them was not just inadequate but positively scandalous’. The language here (*χάριν . . . αἰσχύνης*) and in the next sentence (*αἰσχρὸν . . . χάριτας*, ‘ingratitude’ [lit. ‘disgraceful’] . . . ‘kindness’) recalls the conjunction *αἰσχρᾶς . . . χάριν*, ‘in return for the wicked request . . .’, at 58. 1. See also 67. 6.

64. 1. ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐδ’ Ἀθηναῖοι: ‘but because the Athenians did not’. See 62. 1. Despite what was said above (introductory n.) about the greater tightness and logicity of the Theban speech, it has its repetitions.

3. ξυγκατεδουλοῦσθε μάλλον Αἰγινήτας καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς τῶν ξυνομοσάντων ἢ διεκωλύετε: ‘you helped to bring about the enslavement of the Aiginetans and other members of the alliance [lit. ‘fellow-swearers’], instead of preventing it as you should have done’. Note the rhetorically contrasted *ξυν-* prefixes (*joining* in enslaving, *joining* in swearing alliance). For Athens’ coercion of Aigina editors refer correctly to i. 105, 108. 4, and ii. 27. But why is Aigina singled out? It is perhaps

relevant that there was an old tie between Thebes and Aigina, Hdt. v. 79ff.: the river-god Asopos was supposed to have had two daughters, Thebe and Aigina, and it was for this reason that Thebes and Aigina co-operated against Athens in 506. See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros* (Berlin, 1922), 16, 61f. And note that T. Figueira, *Aegina, Society and Politics* (Salem, New Hampshire, 1986), 84f., thinks it politically significant that sixth-century Boiotia struck coins on the Aiginetan standard. See now Jeffery, *CAH* iv² (1988), 365.

καὶ ταῦτα οὔτε ἄκοντες ἔχοντες τε τοὺς νόμους οὔσπερ μέχρι τοῦ δεῦρο καὶ οὐδενὸς ὑμᾶς βιασαμένου ὥσπερ ἡμᾶς: 'And you were not, like us, under compulsion, but free, living under your ancient [lit. 'previous'] laws'. This is all very emphatically put. See, for the thought, 62. 3 n. on *ἡμῖν γάρ* etc., final para.

4. **καὶ ἃ μὲν ποτε χρηστοὶ ἐγένεσθε, ὡς φατέ, οὐ προσήκοντα νῦν ἐπεδείξατε, ἃ δὲ ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο, ἐξηλέγχθη ἐς τὸ ἀληθές:** 'You have proved that you are not really entitled to the credit which you claim for your past actions. Your true nature and motives are now revealed'. This line of attack is a familiar forensic move which I have discussed at i. 86. 1 n.; see the Hands article, and the *Thucydides* references, there cited. On the general question, which the present passage raises, of ancient attitudes to the possibility or impossibility of character-development see the interesting study by C. Gill, 'The Question of Character-Development: Plutarch and Tacitus', *CQ* 33 (1983), 469ff.

5. **τὰ μὲν οὖν . . . :** 'So much for . . .'. See introductory n.

65. 1. ἃ δὲ τελευταία φατε ἀδικηθῆναι: 'The last offence which you accuse us of'. The Thebans move tidily on to the most recent period: see introductory n.

ἐν σπονδαῖς καὶ ἱερομηνία: 'in time of peace and at a sacred time of month'. See 56. 2 n.: the Thebans ignore the second part of this after merely mentioning it; therefore, they do not dispute it. Their (irrelevant) answer to the first part is to say that the discontented Plataian oligarchs who called in the Thebans were more 'representative' of Plataia than the democratic enemies of Thebes. There is some inconsistency and special pleading here: (i) the Thebans now use the language of oligarchy to disparage democracy, but this was not at all the implication of their mention of democracy at 62. 3 (see n. there on *οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν*). (ii) They now, in their treatment of Plataian politics, wish to take the part (the oligarchic and pro-Theban faction) for the whole. This identification is uncomfortably like that which they themselves had rejected for Thebes at 62. 3 ('we were not in control of our city which was run by an irresponsible "dynasty"'). The Thebans if taxed with this

would no doubt reply that dynasty is not oligarchy, but (as we saw) the precise facts about the Theban government before or after 480 are beyond retrieval.

2. ἄνδρες ὑμῶν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ χρήμασι καὶ γένει: ‘some of the noblest and richest of your citizens’. See 3 n. below.

τὰ κοινὰ τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια: ‘the ancestral institutions of Boiotia’ [lit. ‘of all the Boiotians’]. See ii. 2. 4 n. and above, 61. 2 n., on *τὰ πάτρια*.

οἱ γὰρ ἄγοντες παρανομοῦσι μᾶλλον τῶν ἐπομένων: ‘As you say yourselves, the leaders rather than the followers are the real criminals’. The first four words are not in the Greek, but are inserted by Jowett to bring out the obvious jeering reference to 55. 4.

3. καὶ πλείω παραβαλλόμενοι: ‘they had a greater stake in the city than you have’. This whole section is full of oligarchic thought and expression: ‘noblest and richest’ (above) is a euphemism for oligarchs, and *σωφρονισταί* (below) is here an oligarchic word. The suggestion of the present passage, that the richer citizens have more to lose, and so have a greater claim on political rights, is frequently found in oligarchic contexts as an excuse for limiting the franchise. See the ironic remarks of the *Old Oligarch*, ii. 14, and below, viii. 65. 3 n.

This passage is of great interest because it shows Th. was fully aware of the intellectual arguments underpinning contemporary oligarchic theory, although in his narrative in Book viii he keeps these out of sight to a remarkable extent: see *Thucydides*, 141 f, and iv. 86. 4 n.

σωφρονισταί ὄντες τῆς γνώμης: ‘they wanted to change the politics of your citizens for the better’. For the word *σωφρονισταί* see North, *Sophrosyne* (i. 32. 4 n. on *περιέστηκεν* etc.), 112, also Macleod, 115 n. 27.

66. 1. τεκμήριον δέ: ‘And the proof that ...’. For this favourite Thucydidean tag see *Thucydides*, 101 ff.

2. τι ἀνεπεικέστερον: ‘a little inconsiderately’. It is hard to translate this understatement without producing something comic and perhaps one should not try, because it *is* comic, though not intentionally.

κατὰ νόμον γὰρ δὴ τινα ἔπασχον: ‘for there was a kind of justice in what happened to them’. We are back with the sense of *νόμος*, ‘law’, found in 56. 2 (virtually, ‘law of nature’) rather than the more ‘normative’ sense of 58. 3: see nn. on both passages.

οὓς δὲ χεῖρας προῖσχομένους . . . παρανόμως διεφθείρατε: ‘who stretched out their hands to you . . . you later put them to death, in defiance of every law’. The words ‘stretched out their hands to you’ *does* pick up the language of 58. 3 (see n. there), where it was said by the Plataians about themselves, and where (see above on *κατὰ νόμον* etc.)

the normative sense of 'law' was used. This prepares us for *παρὰ νόμῳ*, 'in defiance of every law' (which itself 'answers' 65. 1, from their own speech).

3. τρεῖς ἀδικίας: 'three crimes'. For the tabulation see introductory n. Macleod (109 n. 10) remarks that this trumps the Plataians' *δύο ἀγῶνας τοῦς μεγίστους*, 'two terrible ordeals', at 57. 3.

67. 1. ὀσιώτερον: 'even more justified'. For this word, which has a religious connotation, compare 56. 2 (with Eatough, ii. 52. 3 n.) and 58. 3: like much of the present ch. this word is recycled by the Thebans from the Plataians' speech.

2. παλαιᾶς ἀρετᾶς: 'good record in the past'. For *παλαιάς*, 'in the past', see 55. 1.

ἐπικλασθήτε: 'be moved'. See 59. 1 n. on this word.

ἄ χρῆ τοῖς μὲν ἀδικουμένοις ἐπικούρους εἶναι: 'It is right that an injured party should help himself by invoking such a record'. It is not obvious why the good (or bad) record, in matters unconnected with the issue at stake, of an admittedly injured party should be relevant to anything.

διπλασίας ζημίας: 'a double penalty'. See i. 86 (Sthenelaidas on the Athenians) with n. there, for exactly this thought and phrase.

τάφος . . . ἐρημίαν: 'tombs . . . friendlessness'. See 57. 4, 58. 4-6, 59. 2.

3. Κορωνεία: 'Koroneia'. See 62. 5 n.

5. ἀπέωσαντο: 'they rejected them'. see 57. 4 n. for a closely related word in the Plataians' speech.

ἀνταποδόντες: 'they are not punished' [lit. 'making requital']. For the choice of word see below.

5-6. ἔννομα γὰρ πείσονται . . . νόμῳ . . . ἄνομα: 'they are going to suffer by a lawful sentence . . . law . . . the grossest injustice'. For this dense combination of compounds of the 'law', *νομ-*, stem see 66. 2 n. For the confident indicative 'they *will* suffer' see introductory n.

6. ἀνταπόδοτε χάριν: 'you should compensate us'. See 63. 4 n.; see also 5 above for another use of the verb.

παράδειγμα: 'example'. See 57. 1 n. on this word.

μὴ τοῖς τῶνδε λόγοις περισθῶμεν . . . οὐ λόγων . . . ἀλλ' ἔργων: 'Do not let their speeches cause you to push us aside [lit. 'let us not be pushed aside by their words'] . . . deeds and not words'. See Parry, *Logos and Ergon* (ii. 35. 1 n.), 190f., on this passage in particular, with good remarks about the Plataian Debate generally, which he sees as 'almost a preview of the Melian Conference' . . . 'the Plataeans desperately appeal to the past, which appears as pure *λόγος*'. For the idea of pushing aside with words, a vivid figure in Greek, see also Parry's study of Th.'s use of

abstract language in *Yale French Studies*, 1970 (i. 69. 4n. on οὐ τῆ δυνάμει), 10.

προκαλύμματα: 'are merely cosmetic'. See Parry, 'Abstract Language' (as above).

The two debates, over Mytilene and over Plataia, are juxtaposed in a way which makes some comparison by the reflective reader or listener inevitable. (In what follows I include the Mytileneans' own speech at 9ff.) We must not exaggerate the significance of the juxtaposition: Th. was not responsible for the fact that both events, the fall of Mytilene and of Plataia, happened about the same time (see *Thucydides*, 190, end of the long n. 105). But it was Th.'s choice to deal with these two events in detail: after all, other war-time atrocities were contemplated or committed which rate no more than a mention in the narrative: v. 32. 1 n.

As we have seen (62. 3, end of n. on ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις etc.), both Mytilene and Plataian debates explore issues about the limits of freedom of action by a subject ally. But there are important differences.

As Macleod implies (119, in the course of some valuable remarks comparing and contrasting Mytilene and Plataia) there is nothing in the Plataian debate which corresponds to the discussion of Athenian assembly habits in the Mytilene debate, that is, *how to go about* discussing the Mytileneans. However, as we noted at the very beginning and very end of the commentary on the Theban speech, there is a suggestion that present-day actions should be preferred to fine λόγοι, speeches, about the distant past. But as we shall see there is no sign in 68 that the Spartans take any notice of this way of putting the matter either. The message of the Plataian Debate is that it would have made no difference if there had been no debate at all. This is not true of the Mytilene Debate (although we saw that the word ὁμῶς at 49. 1 may carry the implication that the speeches were after all less potent with the Athenians than their own emotions, emotions which the narrative—unlike the speeches—is at pains to stress).

Then there is the manner in which the themes are handled. In general, the Plataian Debate, especially the Plataians' own speech, appears more traditional, with its talk of tombs, and insistence on that sense of pity which features, in the Mytilene affair, only in the narrative. And both Mytilene speakers keep the gods out of it.

Then there is the contrast between Athenian and Spartan behaviour. In one simple sense, which should not be lost sight of, the Athenians come out better, because they follow the more merciful course (whatever the motivation of individual voters may have been). The question in the Mytilene Debate is 'how should an imperialist power behave?', that

in the Plataian Debate is 'how should a power which claims to be liberating Greece behave?' But again we come up against the fundamental disparity between the two speeches: there is no sign that Sparta was interested in the intellectual exercise of weighing the effects of her actions, that is, in joining the debate, at all. To this extent the Spartan judges at Plataia are actually at a lower level even than the unattractive figure of Alkidas at 32. 2, who was at least 'persuaded' by an argument in terms of Sparta's liberation propaganda. The Spartans care only about winning the war (hence their 'brief question' to the Plataians) and about pleasing the Thebans (as the Plataian speech repeatedly claims) for the Spartans' own advantage (as Th. explains or comments at 68. 4). So the Plataian Debate forms an effective preparation for the examination of the effect on another small state, Corcyra, of war itself.

68. 1. καὶ ὅτε ὕστερον ἃ πρὸ τοῦ περιτειχίζεσθαι προείχοντο αὐτοῖς: 'and just before the siege they had repeated their proposal of neutrality'. See ii. 72. 1. The word ἃ, 'which', makes no sense here and should probably be deleted. 'Of neutrality' is supplied from the earlier part of the sentence.

αὐθις τὸ αὐτὸ ἕνα ἕκαστον παραγάγοντες καὶ ἐρωτῶντες, εἴ τι . . . : 'they again brought up the Plataians one after another, and asked each of them separately "have you . . ."'. For the powerful effect, after all the intervening oratory, of this repetition of the original 'brief question' of 52. 4, see introductory n. and n. at the end of 67.

2. διέφθειραν δὲ Πλαταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐλάσσους διακοσίων, Ἀθηναίων δὲ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι: 'they put to death no fewer than two hundred Plataians as well as twenty-five Athenians'. At ii. 78 we were told that there were 400 Plataians and 80 Athenians. 220 Plataians made their escape at iii. 24. 2, and Gomme explains the missing 40 or so by reference to casualties during the siege. But a few Plataians when asked the 'brief question' may have lost their nerve and persuaded the Spartans that they *had* done Sparta some service in the war (they would then become part of the pro-Theban Plataian group mentioned below). Commentators note that the execution of the Athenians was unjustified on any view, but it was hardly surprising.

3. Μεγαρέων ἀνδράσι κατὰ στάσις ἐκπεπτωκόσι: 'to some Megarians who had been driven out by a revolution'. This anticipates iv. 66.

καταγῶγιον: 'a hostel'. For the visitors to the various festivals which the 'pious' Spartans would have wished to see continued.

τὴν δὲ γῆν δημοσιώσαντες ἀπεμίσθωσαν ἐπὶ δέκα ἔτη: 'They made the Plataean territory into public land, and leased it out for periods of ten years'. See generally R. Osborne (50. 2 n.), and for ten-year leases,

including this one, L. Robert, *Hellenica*, xi/xii (Paris, 1960), 191 n. 7 to 190, citing Jardé; cp. also Lewis, in *The Greek City* (i. 100. 2n.), 252.

4. **Θηβαίων ἔνεκα, νομίζοντες ἔς τὸν πόλεμον αὐτοὺς ἄρτι τότε καθιστάμενον ὠφελίμους εἶναι:** 'prompted by a wish to please the Thebans, who seemed likely to be useful allies to them in the war just beginning'. The first part of this confirms a repeated claim of the Plataians (see e.g. 58. 1); and the statement about the Spartans regarding the Thebans as useful from their own point of view recalls 56. 4, from the Plataians' speech, where the word *ὠφέλιμοι*, 'useful', is used of the Thebans in exactly the same connection. But like many attributions of motive in Th. the present passage should really be treated as his own gloss on the situation, not necessarily based on Spartan information.

5. **ἔτει τρίτῳ καὶ ἐνενηκοστῷ ἐπειδὴ Ἀθηναίων ξύμμαχοι ἐγένοντο:** 'in the ninety-third year after the Plataians entered into alliance with Athens'. This refers to the events of Hdt. vi. 108, which (as we saw) provide the material for ch. 55 above. Th.'s date would take us back to 519, near the beginning of the reign of Kleomenes I of Sparta. However, some scholars have wished to emend the numeral to 'eighty-third'. They have two reasons (apart from a desire to shorten K.'s reign, cp. Hdt. v. 48; but see anyway Hdt. iii. 148). (i) We know that Kleomenes was in the area about 509 BC because he deposed the Pisistratid tyrant Hippias in 510. In 519, on the other hand, we do not know what Kleomenes would have been doing in the area. (ii) The motive for the rebuff of Plataia, as plausibly given by Hdt. vi. 108, is the desire to embroil Athens with Thebes. This (it is said) is impossible in 519 because the Pisistratids were on good terms with the Spartans, and could even be described as their 'guest-friends' (Hdt. v. 63. 3, 90. 1, not however making clear whether the supposed connection, on which see below, went back to Pisistratus' own time: Andrewes, *CAH* iii². 3. 402).

Both arguments are wholly misconceived. (i) We know very few facts and dates from archaic Greek history, certainly not enough to be able to say that Kleomenes could not have been in a given place in 519. The desire to telescope together events of 519 and of a decade later comes from a mistaken but common desire to force our few scraps of archaic evidence into connection with each other. (ii) It is false that Pisistratid Athens and Sparta were on good terms: (a) Eleusis, which controlled the route from the Peloponnese, is always likely to have been an important element in the defences of Attica (see *Greek World*, 110), and this was surely true even in Pisistratid times, whatever the date of the supposedly archaic defensive wall. (G. Mylonas, *Eleusis and the Eleusinian Mysteries* (Princeton, 1961), 96, claimed 'it was in Peisistratean days that the city of Eleusis was surrounded by the fortification wall which served her

throughout her life'; but see Padgug, ii. 15. 1 n. on ὡσπερ καὶ Ἐλευσίνοι etc.) (*b*) The ties between Pisistratus and Sparta's enemy Argos go back to the beginning of the tyranny (Hdt. i. 61. 4, with B. M. Lavalle, *LCM* 11 (1986), 150; Hdt. v. 94. 1; *Ath. Pol.* 17. 4) and help to explain (*c*) the eventual deposition of the tyrant Hippias by Sparta, not the act of a 'guest-' or any other kind of friend. Finally (*d*) we can add that there is evidence that 'Sparta's friend, the Apolline oracle at Delphi' was hostile to the Pisistratids: W. G. Forrest, *History of Sparta*² (London, 1980), 82.

Against all this the supporter of the 'good terms' theory can point only to the 'guest-friendship' mentioned above. But this is easily explained as a fabrication by the Spartans themselves at a time when they regretted having got rid of the tyrants; their regret arose because Athens in the sequel was not the subservient oligarchy which Sparta hoped for and expected (i. 19). So Sparta put it about that it was only through fraudulent oracles that they themselves had been misled into getting rid of their very good friends the Pisistratids. This interpretation would fail only if it could be shown that the story of the bogus oracles and the guest-friendship was put about by the *Athenians*, not the Spartans. There is one and only one piece of evidence which points in that unexpected direction, the expression ὡς ὦν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λέγουσι, 'as the Athenians say', at Hdt. v. 63. 1, and the word 'Athenians' here should perhaps be emended to 'Spartans': so, following a suggestion of Schweighaeuser, W. G. Forrest, 'The Tradition of Hippias' Expulsion from Athens', *GRBS* 10 (1969), 277 ff., at 279 ff. (especially his 281 n. 7 'it is to be noted that with this change all evidence for friendship between the Spartans and the Athenian tyrants disappears (*Ath. Pol.* 19. 4 is of course merely an echo of Herodotus) . . .'); see, however, K. Kinzl, *Rh. Mus.* 98 (1975), 194 f. n. 8.

It has also been suggested that Th.'s 'ninety-third' should be emended to 'fifty-third' (see Shrimpton (ii. 71. 2 n. on ἀπεδίδου), but note Badian, also there cited, for doubts about this, doubts which I share. See Badian 103 n. 16, and 110 n. 29). L. Prandi, *Platea* (Padua, 1988), 27 ff., does not emend.

There are therefore no grounds for emending Th. in the present passage, which should be taken as good and important evidence for the date of the original alliance. Gomme in his n. rightly rejected emendation and left the matter there. There is, however, more to be said. The 'date' here is surely an example of what I have called 'tragic *akribeia*': there is a pathetic precision about that 'ninety-third' (see *Thucydides*, 35). Th. is stressing in an oblique but effective fashion how little use that long-standing alliance was to the Plataians (though we should not forget the honourable handful of individual Athenians who

shared the Plataians' fate). We recall the Athenian message at ii. 73. 3, itself invoking the long alliance and promising not to abandon Plataia.

I have suggested in *Thucydides* (above) that (despite the surprising detail about the construction of the hostel, the temple to Hera, etc.) the account of the fate of Plataia is in one respect deliberately incomplete. Th. does not tell us here that the Plataians were given active, though possibly not full citizenship rights, although his narrative at—for instance—v. 32 assumes their presence as a cohesive group. (See generally 55. 3 n.) I suggested that Th. did not wish, in the present passage, to take away from the emotional power of his ending by recounting the hospitality and improved status accorded to the Plataians at Athens after 427 (we saw that some sort of grant was probably made as early as 519).

69–85. EVENTS AT CORCYRA: THE GREAT *STASIS*

This phase of fighting at Corcyra has now been treated from the narrowly military and political point of view by J. Wilson, *Athens and Corcyra* (i. 24–55, introductory n.), 65 ff. Wilson gives text and tr., with explanatory notes, of chs. 69–81 and 85 but omits the central description of the *stasis*. In particular he seeks to allocate events to days (Day 1, 2, etc.); his timetable, which is not discussed in detail in the commentary which follows, is an impressive intellectual feat but seems to me to ask (in a phrase of Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094^b) for 'more precision than the subject-matter allows'. I have however singled out what I hope are the key chronological issues.

Otherwise the famous Corcyraean *stasis* section has attracted interest from two kinds of scholar: (i) those interested from a literary, rhetorical and ethical point of view in the two main chs. 82–3: see, for bibliography, the separate introductory n. there; (ii) those interested in the Corcyraean events as illuminating the character of Greek *stasis* in an admittedly extreme situation. Th. would perhaps not be very pleased to be told that his two main chs. have played little part in discussions of this second type, which tend to concentrate on the information provided in the narrative section which precedes it. See Ruschenbusch (ii. 2. 2 n.), 37, 40; Gehrke (ii. 2. 2 n.), 88 ff., 279 (as over Plataia and Mytilene—see iii. 2. 3 n. on *αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων*—both these scholars follow Th. in stressing the factor of external interference). A. Fuks, 'Thucydides and the Stasis in Corcyra: Thuc., III, 82–3 Versus [Thuc.], III, 84', *AJP* 92 (1971), 48 ff., argues that in the narrative chs. and in 82–3 the socio-economic

factor is virtually absent and uses the *presence* of that factor in the doubtfully Thucydidean ch. 84 as an argument for its inauthenticity (see n. there). De Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (London, 1981), 547 n. 6 (compare text at 49) briefly records his disagreement with Fuks on the interpretation of the Corcyra *stasis*, noting that 70. 4 shows that ‘some’ of the oligarchs were ‘very rich’ [only five of them, actually] and remarking of the *demos* that ‘some of them were burdened with debt’ and citing 81. 4 for this (but see n. there: in order to incur a debt at all you needed to provide security, often in the form of land, so that ‘debtors’ in antiquity might well be themselves reasonably prosperous people). See also Lintott (ii. 2. 4n. on *θέμενοι* etc.), 106–9, with 273, minimizing Athens’ commitment to the ‘common people’ or to any ‘democratic programme’, and noting that it was only the considerable provocation of 72. 2—in fact, an outright attack on them by the oligarchs—which brought to an end the original acquiescence by the common people in the coup.

69. 1. αἱ δὲ τεσσαράκοντα νῆες τῶν Πελοποννησίων: ‘The forty Peloponnesian ships’. See 33 and, for the numbers, 26. 1 and 29. 1.

ἀπ’ αὐτῆς σποράδες πρὸς τὴν Πελοπόννησον: ‘in a straggling condition from Crete to the Peloponnese’. Th.’s usage here tells against Bosworth’s suggestion (ii. 9. 2n.) that Th. could have included Crete in ‘the Peloponnese’, whatever exactly ii. 9. 2 means.

ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ: ‘at Kyllene’. See i. 30. 2n.

2. ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν . . . στασιάζουσιν: ‘to Corcyra, which was in a state of revolution’. When did Th. take the *stasis* to begin? See Wilson, 92 ff., for the chronology of the events of the next few chs.; Wilson argues (i) that the *stasis* proper broke out *after* the original 13 ships collected at Kyllene but *before* the reinforcement of those 13 with the 40 of Alkidas; (ii) that the news of the outbreak of the *stasis* prompted the Spartan decision to reinforce; but (iii) that the oligarchs were working in conjunction with the Spartans from the beginning (on this view, which is reasonable but not provable, the ships at Kyllene may have been waiting on events, hoping for some successful move by the oligarchs). See also 70. 1 n.

70. 1. οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι ἦλθον: ‘Corcyra had been in a state of revolution ever since the return of the prisoners . . .’. See i. 55. 1 and n. Again (see 69. 2n.) the chronological indicators are vague; Wilson (91 f.) argues that the return of the prisoners from Corinth, and the beginning of their intrigues, may be dated 430 or even earlier—rather than Gomme’s ‘not long before the sedition broke out in Kerkyra in the spring of 427’. But Wilson himself

goes on to argue (92) that the *stasis* proper began only at 70. 6 or even 72. 2, because (he thinks) *stasis* does not just refer to ‘any political disagreement’ but to something more drastic (the ‘central criterion’ is ‘overthrow or disregard of the constitution’ . . . with ‘use of illegitimate force’). Hence Wilson (92, and in his translation) is forced to render *ἐπειδή* in the present passage ‘because’ or ‘after’, rather than ‘ever since’, the return of the prisoners. This seems to me too strict. If Th.’s indicators are accepted—and we have no other evidence—the period of *stasis* could be said to begin in some sense with the return of the prisoners—an event which I would not try to date though I prefer the ‘Gomme’ to the ‘Wilson’ end of the period 431–427—but no doubt Th. would agree that the central period of the *stasis* began with the resort to violence. This means that Th.’s use of *stasis* and the verb *στασιάζω* is looser than Wilson would like, but that does not trouble me.

τοῖς προξένοις: ‘their *proxenoi*’. See Gerolymatos (ii. 29. 1 n. on *καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ θέρει* etc.), 64 ff.

3. καὶ (ἦν γὰρ Πειθίας ἐθελοπρόξενός τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τοῦ δήμου προειστήκει): ‘A certain Peithias, who was voluntary *proxenos* of the Athenians and was the leader of the popular party’. Again, see ii. 29. 1 n. The word *ἐθελοπρόξενος* is found here only in Greek literature (the entry in the lexicographer Pollux, iii. 59, is in fact a citation of the present passage, because it merely says that the word is found ‘in Thucydides’). Presumably a voluntary *proxenos* was so called to distinguish him from a hereditary one (Pollux does not help). It is unusual for Th. to introduce in this way, without apology, what looks like a technical term for an Athenian institution: see *Thucydides*, 99. On the present passage see Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece* (ii. 85. 5 n.), 81 f., pointing out the risks in the position of a Peithias; also Gerolymatos, 70 ff. An inscription of the mid fifth century (*IG* i³. 19, tr. in LACTOR *Athenian Empire*³, no. 147) grants proxeny to one Acheloion, and stipulates what is to happen in the event that he is killed. See also Tod 142 of the fourth century (LACTOR, no. 146) settling the affairs of the island of Keos after a revolt from the Second Athenian Confederacy: a man is sentenced to death ‘for killing the *proxenos* of the Athenians contrary to the decrees of the Athenian *demos*’. See my note at LACTOR, p. 126.

4. φάσκων τέμνειν χάρακας: ‘that they were in the habit of cutting poles for vines’ [the meaning ‘in the habit’ is conveyed by the present infinitive which has a continuous force]. Contrast the prelude to the Mytilene affair, where it seems that Th. suppressed some personal detail (see 2. 3 n. on *αὐτῶν Μυτιληναίων* etc.). It is true that, in the present passage, some explanation of the prosecution was unavoidable, but the

amount of detail remains surprising; in another mood Th. might have said 'on some pretext', ἔγκλημά τι, but the escalation of the Corcyra *stasis* is very carefully managed and the vine-poles are needed. Another contrast should be noted, that between the vivid description of the behaviour of individuals in these early chapters of the *stasis* section, and the highly generalized material in 82-3: see *Thucydides*, 154 and n. 68. (But note that the vine-poles are a good example of the kind of abuse of legal process which is stigmatized at 82. 8.)

On the religious issue see Parker, *Miasma*, 165, arguing that cutting wood in sacred groves was usually tolerated in the sense that it was treated as an offence against property rather than as sacrilege, but adding that 'sacred land did, however, have a special status in that offences against it offered a particularly valuable handle for political manipulation. Accusations under this head could be constructed in such a way as to threaten crippling penalties, which made them an ideal device for the pursuit of personal vendetta or class strife behind a veil of legal process.' Parker then cites the present passage in illustration. A very early and interesting Latin inscription, the Lex Spoletina of (?) soon after the middle of the third century BC, now in the Spoleto museum (Degrassi, *Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae*, 505, cp. 506), prohibits the removal of anything from the sacred grove or *lucus*. But, as with the Greek examples collected by Parker, the penalty is a mere fine, the amount of which is fixed. Obviously, everything depends on the steepness of the fine, but note that in the present passage there is no suggestion that the amount of the fine was fixed arbitrarily or unusually high on the present occasion; the implication seems to be that the legal or 'fixed' penalty (ζημία . . . ἐπέκειτο) of one stater could itself be considered savage and was not normally exacted. Peithias persuades the Council 'to inflict the legal penalty', τῷ νόμῳ χρῆσασθαι. (See nn. below.) This perhaps suggests after all that cutting sacred wood was not, in Corcyra at least, assimilated to ordinary crimes against property. On religious sanctions against cutting sacred wood see also B. Jordan and J. Parkin, *Sterling Dow Studies = GRBM* 10 (1984), 153 ff.

καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου: 'and [the precinct of] Alkinous'. The Homeric king of the Phaiakians on Scheria; for the equation Scheria/Corcyra see i. 25. 4 n., citing Howie. Howie (28) notes that 'the hero-cult of Alcinous . . . shows that the Corcyraeans were concerned to win the supernatural support of these earlier inhabitants of their island'.

ζημία δὲ καθ' ἑκάστην χάρακα ἐπέκειτο στατήρ: 'the penalty for each pole was fixed at one stater'. If this means the ordinary stater, or two drachmas, the oligarchs must have been cutting down a lot of vine-poles (over a period of time; see above on τέμνειν as implying 'in the

habit of'). Otherwise these wealthy men could surely have paid the fine out of their small change. But perhaps gold staters of 20 drachmas are meant (so Classsen/Steup). See i. 63. 2 n.

5. ὀφλόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ ἰκετῶν καθεζομένων: 'They were condemned; but they went and sat in the temples as suppliants'. See Gould, 'HIKETEIA' (i. 24. 7 n.), 83, for the treatment of these suppliants in this and subsequent chapters. Gould is right to speak of 'the traumatic effect, even in the late fifth century, of happenings like these', an effect conveyed in Th.'s generalizations in 82–3 (see esp. 82. 8 n. on *εὐσεβεία*).

διὰ πλήθος τῆς ζημίας: 'the fine was so excessive'. See 4 nn.: it is not implied that the amount was abnormal, merely that it was abnormal to insist on it.

ὅπως ταξάμενοι ἀποδῶσιν: 'to pay the money by instalments'. For such arrangements to pay public debts see D. Asheri, *Leggi greche sul problema dei debiti* (Pisa, 1969) = *Studi classici ed orientali*, xviii, at 88, citing the present passage among others.

ὁ Πειθίας . . . πείθει: 'Peithias . . . persuaded'. E. Powell, *CR* 51 (1937), 103, detects a deliberate pun here, but see *Thucydides*, 94, and i. 110. 2 n.

τῷ νόμῳ χρήσασθαι: 'to inflict the legal penalty'. See 4 and 5 nn.

6. τὸν Πειθίαν, ἕως ἔτι βουλῆς ἔστι: 'Peithias, as long as he remained a member of the Council'. Wilson (89) thinks that the oligarchs may have discovered that Peithias intended to carry through some pro-Athenian initiative while he was still a member of the Council, and that this (rather than the misfortunes of the five rich men) explains their sudden move.

τῶν τε βουλευτῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν ἐς ἑξήκοντα: 'sixty private individuals and councillors'. Lintott (introductory n.), 106 and 108, is right to draw attention to the existence of so relatively large a number of 'leading Corcyreans' ('no doubt those among the *dunatoi* [influential men] who were Athenian supporters') who evidently sympathize with Peithias. Here as elsewhere (i. 117. 3 n. on *προσεχώρησαν ὁμολογία*) Athens had (Lintott suggests) been happy to work with the leading men. This may well be right (but note that the victims include some less immediately influential non-councillors—Th.'s 'private individuals'—who are nevertheless, mysteriously, present in the council chamber).

71. 1. τό τε λοιπὸν μηδετέρους δέχεσθαι ἄλλ' ἢ μιᾷ νηὶ ἡσυχάζοντας: 'In future, they should receive neither the Athenians nor the Peloponnesians unless they came peaceably with one ship'. As Wilson (88) says, this was total withdrawal from any sort of alliance with Athens,

but we need not follow him in thinking that the oligarchs' hands were forced by the Spartans.

72. 1. κατέθεντο ἐς Αἴγινα: 'deposited them on Aigina'. See ii. 27. 1: there was plenty of room.

2. ἐπιτίθενται τῷ δήμῳ καὶ μαχόμενοι ἐνίκησαν: 'attacked and defeated the people'. This raises the question of numbers (the oligarchs were surely inferior numerically but had the advantage of surprise); see 74. 1 n. As Lintott (108 f.) notes, the *demos* had hitherto acquiesced in the coup; it took an outright attack to rouse them, deprived though they now were of the leadership of Peithias and the other 60.

3. ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὰ μετέωρα τῆς πόλεως ... τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα: 'the Acropolis and the higher parts of the city ... the Hyllaic harbour'. The sites of all these are uncertain; Gomme put the Hyllaic harbour at or near the modern harbour (see his map opposite 372) on the grounds that the larger, more southerly harbour of Chalikiopoulo, preferred by earlier scholars, is too shallow. This last consideration is not decisive by itself, but the identification has the advantage that it offers two very suitable sites for the Acropolis and the higher ground (immediately to the south of the modern harbour, where later there were two forts or 'fortezze'). Wilson is not interested in the topography of Corcyra itself; he claims at 87 to accept the 'orthodox view'—which, however, appears from his map at 142 to be that rejected by Gomme, who surely deserved a word.

73. καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἀγροὺς περιέπεμπον ἀμφότεροι, τοὺς δούλους παρακαλοῦντές τε καὶ ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι· καὶ τῷ μὲν δήμῳ τῶν οἰκετῶν τὸ πλῆθος παρεγένετο ξύμμαχον: 'both parties sent messengers round the countryside inviting the slaves to join them, and promising them freedom. Most of the slaves joined the people.' For this and similar appeals see M. I. Finley, 'Was Greek Civilisation Based on Slave Labour?', *Historia*, 8 (1959), 157 and n. 41 (= *Slavery in Classical Antiquity*, ed. Finley (Cambridge, 1960), 65), dismissing them as 'mere tactics ... slaves were resources and they could be useful in a particular situation'; Finley notes that Th. does not return to the slavery point, or generalize about it, in the main *stasis* chapters, 82–3. Similarly Y. Garlan, *Slavery in Ancient Greece*, tr. J. Lloyd (Cornell, 1988), 161 f. (who incidentally draws attention to the words 'in the countryside' in the present passage, and speculates that Corcyra as a colony of Corinth made use of rural dependants like the Killyrians of Corinth's other colony Syracuse); Garlan thinks the number of known appeals to slaves is relatively limited considering all the political disturbances we hear of: 'these were

obviously quite exceptional measures' imposed not under pressure from those who stood to gain [the slaves] but resorted to as 'tactical expedients' (cp. Finley). The fourth-century oath of the League of Corinth contained a clause against freeing slaves with revolutionary intent (Dem. xvii. 15), but as with provisions about redistribution of land this may say more about the prevalence of the fear than about the frequency of the practice. Fuks (introductory n.), 49, notes that the slaves recruited by the *demos* in the present passage correspond to the mercenaries recruited in the next sentence by the oligarchs (who had also tried to recruit slaves) and concludes that 'the only reason for the promise was the wish to obtain man-power for the fighting' and that the freeing of these slaves should not be seen as 'a concomitant of a socio-revolutionary stasis'. This is no doubt true but one might object that we still need an explanation of why the slaves joined the *demos* not the oligarchs. Perhaps they merely made a correct calculation about who would win. See also viii. 15. 2n.

74. 1. χωρίων τε ἰσχύι καὶ πλήθει προύχων: 'in the strength of their position and in numbers'. On the numbers of the oligarchs see Wilson, 97ff. We have no figure for the slaves used by the democrats, to set against the 800 oligarchically-employed mercenaries of ch. 73 (these slink off at the end of 74), and no figures at all for the democrats themselves apart from the 60 supporters of Peithias, already killed. From ch. 75 we have 400 oligarchs *apart from the crews nominated for the five ships* (Wilson seems right against Gomme to insist on this, and he *may* be right that these crews were intended as hoplite *epibatai*, serving on deck, but it is hard to have much faith in his precise figure of 200 = 40 × 5). The only other hard figure we have is that 500 oligarchs, a surprisingly high total after all the slaughter, escape in ch. 85 at the very end of the present phase of *stasis*. One must agree with Lintott that 'the "few" [a word I have usually translated 'oligarchs'] were comparatively numerous'. I do not see that one can safely go beyond that. (Ruschenbusch (37 and 40) is seriously inadequate; his figure of 400 oligarchs ignores the crews and his 400–800 for the democratic party seems to be merely a way of recognizing the democratic numerical superiority which Th. mentions in the present passage; but this is a purely military superiority which takes account of mercenaries on the oligarchic side and slaves on the other. In any case the words 'the strength of their position'—including women hurling tiles etc.—should not be lost sight of. Wilson's guess (98) that there were 5000 members of the *demos*—surely too many—allows too little weight to this, and too much to purely numerical superiority and to the argument that since the oligarchs

were better-armed they must have been not just out-numbered but heavily out-numbered.)

αἱ τε γυναῖκες: 'Their women . . .'. For women as city-defenders in Th. see ii. 4. 2 n. on *καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν* etc., especially (of the works there cited) Loraux, 12ff., and Kearns, 339, both discussing the present passage.

2. ὥστε καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ ἐμπόρων κατεκαύθη: 'A great deal of merchandise was burnt'. Note that this merchandise is stored near the *agora*: M. I. Finkelstein, 'Emporos, Naukleros and Kapelos: a Prolegomena to the Study of Athenian Trade', *CP* 30 (1935), 320ff., at 335, and P. MacKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC* (London, 1989), 194 n. 24.

75. 1. Νικόστρατος ὁ Διτρέφους: 'Nikostratos son of Diitrephes'. Probably the Nikostratos of Skambonidai mentioned at Ar. *Wasps*, 81f., and an associate of Nikias. See C. W. Fornara, 'ΝΙΚΟΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ ΔΙΕΙΤΡΕΦΟΥΣ ΣΚΑΜΒΩΝΙΔΗΣ', *CQ* 20 (1970), 40, noting that the discovery of the name 'Dietrephes son of Euthoinos' on an *ostrakon* (*Hesperia*, 37 (1968), 118f.) provides further support for the identification of N. of Skambonidai and N. son of Dietrephes, argued for by e.g. D. M. MacDowell, 'Nikostratos', *CQ* 15 (1965), 41ff., who, however, was writing before the publication of the *ostrakon*. The point, which is hardly made clear either in Fornara's article or in his *Athenian Board of Generals* (i. 117. 2 n.), 57, is presumably that there is a play on the word εὔθουινος, which means 'eating heavily'. (Aristophanes calls Euthoinos' grandson Nikostratos a 'compulsive entertainer'.)

Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 143, argues for the retention of the manuscript spelling Διτρέφους rather than the epigraphic spelling Δειτρέφους, to which Th.'s spelling of this name, here and elsewhere, is usually emended.

There is a prominent Athenian Diitrephes mentioned at vii. 29. 1 and viii. 64. 2; see Andrewes's n. on the latter passage, arguing for the identification of this man with the upstart politician of Ar. *Birds*, 798f. This Diitrephes is probably a younger relative of the father of Nikostratos.

καὶ Μεσσηνίων πεντακοσίοις ὀπλίταις: 'and five hundred Messenian hoplites'. For the settlement of these Messenians at Naupaktos see i. 103. 3 and n.

2. καὶ . . . ταῦτα πράξας: 'After doing this'. After doing what? We have just been told that he tried to persuade the Corcyraeans (i) to live peaceably and without reprisals (except that ten of the 'most guilty' were to be tried) and (ii) to make an offensive and defensive alliance with

Athens. Wilson reasonably criticizes the diplomatically important assumption (Dover, *HCT* iv. 411, discussing vii. 31. 5 and citing the present passage) that Nikostratos was successful in aim (ii) when he was so clearly unsuccessful in aim (i). That is, the deal proposed by Nikostratos was a sort of package to which the unified or at least reconciled oligarchs and democrats would have been jointly committed. The references to Corcyra in Book vii (see vii. 57. 7 n.) do, however, seem to show that Corcyra was under treaty obligations to Athens by 413. The answer is presumably that a separate and later undertaking was made at some point. So what Nikostratos 'did' on the present occasion was that 'in one sense he persuaded them—i.e. they said they would do certain things—but that they did not in fact do them' (Wilson, 114).

Gomme (366) praised the 'political intelligence and humanity' of Nikostratos; Wilson (105) asserts that 'the reverse is true'. If we are going to make judgements of this sort, we must at least prefer Nikostratos to Eurymedon (see 81. 4 n. below).

4. οὐδέν . . . ὑγιᾶς διανοουμένων: 'vicious intentions' [lit. 'intending nothing healthy']. For οὐδέν ὑγιᾶς, perhaps a colloquialism, see P. T. Stevens, ed., Euripides, *Andromache* (Oxford, 1971), on line 448.

5. οἱ ἄλλοι . . . οὐκ ἐλάσσους τετρακοσίων: 'The rest . . . There were about four hundred of them'. See 74. 1 n. on χωρίων etc.: Th. is explicit that these 400 were distinct from those nominated to serve as crew, and this should be kept in mind when assessing the oligarchs' numbers.

76. Σύβοτα λιμένα τῆς ἠπείρου: 'Sybota, a harbour on the mainland'. See i. 50. 3 n. Note that Th. here explains Sybota as if he had not already done so in Book i, which might be thought to support Jacoby's deletion in i. 50, but the reminder in the present passage is hardly obtrusive.

77. 1. παραινούντων Ἀθηναίων: 'although the Athenians' advice was . . .'. For the engagement described in 77–8, elegantly fought on the Athenian side, see Morrison and Coates, 77 f. (oddly saying that Th. does not give the Athenian commander's name—the commander was surely Nikostratos); also Wilson, 101 ff., and K. Kumanieski, 'Quelques remarques sur les sources orales de Thucydide', *Actes IX Congrès Int. Assoc. Budé* (1975), 155 ff., on the Athenian bias of the battle description.

3. ὧν ἦσαν αἱ δύο Σαλαμινία καὶ Πάραλος: 'of which two were the Salaminia and Paralos'. For these ships, last heard of in the East Aegean, see 33. 1 and n.; Wilson (94) conjectures that they had been sent on to Naupaktos as 'swift ships with some kind of diplomatic status' to wait on events at Corcyra.

78. 1. ἀθρόαις μὲν οὐ προσέπιπτον: ‘did not attack the main body’. This is probably the right tr., though the Greek could mean ‘with their own main body of ships’. See Wilson, 102.

κύκλον ταξαμένων αὐτῶν περιέπλεον: ‘when the enemy formed a circle, they sailed round them . . .’. As Morrison and Coates say, ‘so far, this was according to the book’.

2. δείσαντες μὴ ὄπερ ἐν Ναυπάκτῳ γένοιτο: ‘fearing a repetition of what happened at Naupaktos’. See ii. 84. This passage is interesting as one of the few instances in Th. of people learning from their own or other people’s mistakes: see *Thucydides* 154; others are ii. 86. 5, iv. 30. 1 (Demosthenes does not want a repeat of his own Aitolian disaster) and vii. 42. 3 (Demosthenes again: he does not want to repeat Nikias’ experience). But as always with Th. we must reckon with the possibility that he is inferring motive from circumstances.

4. ἐτελεύτα ἐς ἡλίου δύσιν: ‘ended at sunset’. Wilson (102f.) remarks that this gives a long time for the battle and suggests that much time was spent in inactivity while neither side was prepared to commit itself.

79. 3. καὶ Βρασίδου παραινοῦντος, ὡς λέγεται, Ἀλκίδα: ‘It is said that Brasidas advised Alkidas to make the attempt’. See Westlake (i. 13. 2n.), 353f.: by his use of the formula *ὡς λέγεται*, ‘it is said’, Th. here implies criticism of Alkidas and agreement with Brasidas (Th.’s source?). **ἰσοψήφου δὲ οὐκ ὄντος:** ‘but he did not have an equal vote with him’. For the word *ἰσοψήφου*, ‘having an equal vote’, see 11. 3n. on *ἄμα μὲν γάρ* etc. De Ste. Croix, *OPW* 306, as part of his argument about the meaning of the word in ch. 11, says that in the present passage it cannot refer to voting at all but to equality of influence in decision-making. I do not see why the literal sense cannot apply here (the Spartans believed in such a thing as a chain of command, as Th. reports almost with surprise at v. 66). But even if it could be shown that the word was being loosely used in the present passage, that would prove nothing, at a distance of seventy chapters, about ch. 11 where the interpretation needs to take account of the related word *πολυψηφίαν* in close proximity (10. 5, see my n. there). Th. is capable of using words in different ways or senses, sometimes technical and strict, sometimes not: see 70. 1n. on *οἱ γάρ* etc. for *stasis*, and frequent instances noted in this commentary.

80. 2. καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα τὸν Θουκλέους: ‘Eurymedon son of Thoukles’. The first mention of this general, who was perhaps named after the victory at the Eurymedon in the 460s (i. 100. 1). He seems to have been a western expert.

81. 1. καὶ ὑπερευεγκόντες τὸν Λευκαδίων ἰσθμὸν τὰς ναῦς: ‘and transporting the ships over the Leukadian isthmus’. See iv. 8. 2. At some periods in antiquity the channel between Leukas and the mainland was navigable: see e.g. Arrian, *Indike*, xli. 2, which Brunt in the Loeb Arrian ii (1983) suggests is a comment by Arrian himself, not by his fourth-century BC source Nearchos, and so relates to the second century AD. For other evidence see E. Oberhammer, *Akarmanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas* (Munich, 1887), 7 ff. Today there is a canal between Leukas and the mainland.

4. ἡμέρας δὲ ἑπτὰ, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε: ‘And during the seven days during which Eury-medon remained after his arrival with his sixty ships . . .’. The facts speak for themselves, and Th. does not need to comment on Eury-medon’s behaviour in standing by during the massacre.

ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἔνεκα: ‘some were killed for motives of personal enmity’. For settling of old scores during the French Revolution see S. Schama, *Citizens* (London, 1989), 625.

καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων: ‘and some because money was owing to them; these were killed by their debtors’. De Ste. Croix (introductory n.) sees this mention of indebted members of the *demos* as evidence that this conflict, like other instances of ‘particularly murderous behaviour by those who had the upperhand in a *stasis*’, was basically between social classes (the propertied class and ‘those who were relatively or absolutely propertyless’). This is not the place for a general discussion of the Marxist view of Greek politics (we have already noted that Peithias the leader of the *demos* had as many as 60 supporters in the Council, who are likely to have been influential and well-off). But the argument from indebtedness, to confine ourselves to that, is not straightforward, because debt of the ordinary sort—that is, as opposed to debts secured on the person, or debt-bondage which may be a kind of contract for services, or *eranoi* (ii. 43. 1 n.)—was not generally available in antiquity, any more than it is today, to those with no security to put up. (In antiquity the preferred security was land.) This point was made, in an extreme and characteristically pungent form, by Beloch as long ago as the beginning of the present century: *Gr. Gesch.*² iv. 1. 326 n. 4 (1925, but repeated from the 1st edn. of 1904): ‘the proletarian can have no debts because nobody will lend to him once slavery for debt has been abolished’. For more recent discussions, taking account of Beloch’s point but not necessarily going all the way with him, see D. Asheri (70. 5 n.), 92 ff.; B. Shimron, *Late Sparta: The Spartan Revolution 243–146 BC* (Buffalo, N.Y., 1973), 22 ff.; J. K. Davies, *CAH* vii.². 1. 293: ‘debtors tend to be cultivators’. It may be doubted whether the indebted Corcyraean

members of the *demoi* were absolutely propertyless—or even ‘relatively propertyless’, whatever exactly that means.

The generalization here is—unlike some of the examples in the main *stasis* chapters below—one for which Th. could perfectly well have had solid evidence: see *Thucydides*, 78; L. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons* (1957), 217. 5. **πάσα τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου**: ‘the killing took every conceivable form’. For phrases of this favourite Thucydidean type see i. 109. 1 n. One such phrase (*ἐπὶ πάν τῆν ιδέαν*, ‘the general nature’ of the disease, ii. 51. 1) featured in the plague narrative: we are being prepared for the treatment in 82–3 of the *stasis* as a piece of descriptive pathology (there will be an almost identical phrase, but with ‘criminality’, *κακοτροπία*, instead of ‘killing’, at the beginning of 83. 1). For this reason, and because most of the rest of this para. is in the generalizing style of 82–3, it would—were it not for the specific reference to the temple of Dionysus at the end of the para.—be better to discard the framework of the chapter-numbering (which is not ancient) and take the main *stasis* section as starting here.

καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε: ‘fathers killed their sons’. Edmunds (below, introductory n.) notes that the theme of fathers quarrelling with their sons in time of moral disorder is found, in a less extreme form, in Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 182 ff.; see M. L. West’s commentary (Oxford, 1978) on lines 182–6 of that poem for Near Eastern precedents and parallels. From a later period see the stories in Tac. *Histories*, iii. 25 (where, however, the parricide is unintentional) and (for civil war as literally ‘fratricidal’), 51; and from Shakespeare compare the extraordinary episode at 3 *Henry VI*, ii. v.

82–83. *The main Corcyra stasis section*

These famous two chapters were the subject of severe criticism, on grounds of obscurity, by the ancient critic Dionysius of Halikarnassos, *On Thucydides*, 29–33 (ch. 29 quotes the more straightforward Th. iii. 81. 2 to 82. 1 approvingly). This has given rise to two important modern treatments of the whole section: Macleod’s ‘Thucydides on Faction (3. 82–3)’, *Essays*, ch. 10 (= *PCPhS* 205 (1979), 52 ff.), the second part of which is an answer to Dionysius’ criticisms; and the relevant parts of Pritchett’s 1975 commentary on Dionysius’ treatise. Of other valuable works see especially L. Edmunds, ‘Thucydides’ Ethics as Reflected in the Description of Stasis (3. 82–3)’, *HSCP* 79 (1975), 73 ff. (esp. 82 ff. for an interesting comparison with another text about ‘ethical inversion’, Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, 174–201, and concluding remarks about examples in fifth-century poetry; yet another such text is Book viii of

Plato's *Republic*: see *Thucydides* 121); Hussey, *CRUX*, 133f. (noting similarities with Demokritos and the ethical treatise known as the *Anonymus Iamblichii*, for which see Hussey, 119 n. 2); M. Nussbaum (i. 84. 3 n. on *αἰδώς* etc.), 404 ff.

The importance of this section for the student of Th.'s own opinions cannot be exaggerated. It is the most substantial expression of direct personal opinion in all Th., and whatever its obscurity it cannot simply be dismissed as a 'less successful' vehicle for Th.'s own views than the speeches, which are not a vehicle for his views at all. (Other sections like the *Archaeology* and the Plague description imply strong views, but they are more obliquely expressed.) For this point see the introductory n. to ii. 65, a chapter which is comparable to iii. 82–3: the reflections on Pericles and his successors are shorter than those on the Corcyra *stasis*, but they are more focused and less paradoxical. Paradoxical and difficult the *stasis* chapters certainly are: Andrewes, in the course of his discussion of Diodotos' speech earlier in Book iii (see introductory n. to 37–48), observed in passing (74 n. 26) that the fifth-century Athenian fondness for criticism and analysis was 'sometimes carried too far for coherence: there is for instance some reckless paradox in the celebrated chapters on stasis, 3. 82–3'. Macleod's defence of Th. against Dionysius succeeds on its own terms, by showing that Dionysius' 'improvements' were nothing of the sort and that Th. had stylistic reasons for putting things in the sometimes awkward way that he did. It remains true that the thought in these chapters is for some of the time a display of generalizing fireworks (I suggested at *Thucydides* 29 that despite the disclaimers at i. 22. 4 about 'prize compositions', some parts of his own work, the Corcyra *stasis* in particular, could have been read out for the applause of *symposia* or drinking and dining clubs). That does not detract from the value of the authorial judgements expressed or implied; these will be noted as they occur, but two sentences must be singled out. (i) The first sentence of 83 is the most straightforward authorial expression of conservative, non-sophistical morality in all Th.; and (ii) the remark at 82. 2 about the attitudes of cities and individuals is the strongest evidence (coming as it does in an authorial passage) against the view that Th. distinguished between the moral judgements appropriate to states and those appropriate to individuals (a view which I am glad to see has now also been rejected by C. Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking: The Invention of Politics in Classical Athens* (Cambridge, 1988), 153). For both points, (i) and (ii), see *Thucydides*, 185 (and the individual nn. below on the two passages just mentioned).

The texture of the chapters is dense, but a pattern of sorts is detectable. The introduction (82. 1–2) acknowledges that the phenomenon to

be described, roughly 'factionalism', flows from human nature, but Th. goes on to say (as if in answer to an objection 'then why are you describing these timeless tendencies in a work about a particular, short, period?') that phenomena vary in strength according to circumstances. The conditioning circumstance in 427 BC was *war* which (partly because of the possibilities it presented for buttressing one's position with external help) tended to aggravate the phenomenon, producing a notable *κίνησις* ('movement', 'disturbance', 'convulsion'). 'Convulsion' generally was, after all, what he had set out initially to describe (i. 1. 2). At 82. 3 he notes that *after* the phenomenon had first manifested itself in 'the cities' (plural) it got worse. Formally, there is a contradiction here with 81. 2 where we were told that Corcyra was itself both first and worst, but that passage actually says that it only *seemed* the worst, because it was the first. Why then has Th. described this particular *stasis*? One answer is that Th. likes to describe first occurrences just because they *are* new, a point well made by Saar (introductory n. to 37–48), 13 (the Mytilene episode as the first war-time rift between Athens and her subject-allies; Saar compares the Corcyra *stasis* and the treatment of Pericles' successors at ii. 65).

At 82. 4–7 Th. describes with dazzling if (for the reader or hearer) uncomfortable virtuosity the changes in values brought about by the *stasis*. Then at 82. 8 he 'makes a fresh start, returning to the cause of it all' (Macleod, 128), a cause which he identifies as greed and ambition. Ch. 83 begins with a statement of frank personal regret (see above) and concludes with some reflections about the different fates of the clever and the less clever. This represents something of a return to the particular: see Gomme on 82. 3, n. on *ἐστασίαζε* etc., whose formulation—a progression in ch. 82 from Corcyra, to Greece, to universal experience, then back to *stasis* in Greece and its particular characteristics (and, we might add, back to Corcyra at 85. 1)—is valuable but a little mechanical. After all, the phrase 'in the cities' occurs at intervals through this long chapter, in paras. 2, 3, and 8, and it might be better to see it all as an analysis of *stasis* in Greek cities, punctuated by universal remarks like the beginning of para. 8, and prompted by Corcyra which is never quite lost sight of: see 8n. on *ἡ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου*.

[Ch. 84 is of doubtful authenticity and is dealt with in a separate introductory n.]

For some general references to discussions of the place of the Corcyra *stasis* in the work as a whole, and its relation to the Mytilene and Plataia episodes, see n. at the end of 85.

82. 1. οὕτως ὠμῆ <ῆ> στάσις προύχωρησε: ‘Such was the savage progress of the revolution’. It is usual to take these words as the beginning of the *stasis* section proper but in some ways 81. 5 would make a better beginning (see n. there on *πάσα τε ιδέα* etc.). Jowett, following what I think is just a misprint in Bekker, labels the beginning of ch. 82 even later than most modern texts, half way through the first para. at *ἐπεὶ ὕστερον*, ‘Not long afterwards’. I have changed this.

The flavour of this phrase is undoubtedly medical; for the frequency in medical contexts of *ὠμή*, ‘savage’—a word we have met before in an emphatic context in Book iii (36. 4 and nn.)—see the 113 Hippocratic instances in G. Maloney and W. Frohn, *Concordance des œuvres hippocratiques* (Quebec, 1984). For *προούχωρησε*, ‘progress’ (good or bad) in a medical context see the twelve occurrences of the verb in Maloney/Frohn. (The word is not used by Th. in the Plague description and is therefore not considered by modern writers like D. L. Page: see introductory n. to ii. 47. 3–54.) The nearest approach to the present use that I can find, with the help of the concordance, is at *De Morbis* (*On Illnesses*, in vol. vii of the Littré edn.), iii. 16: *εἰ δὲ καὶ προκεχωρηκυίας τῆς νούσου γένοιτο*, ‘if it [a symptom] occurs when the illness has progressed [further] . . .’ For the *stasis* as a disorder affecting the ‘body politic’ see C. Cochrane, *Thucydides and the Science of History* (Oxford, 1929), 132 ff.; Hussey (introductory n.); and *Thucydides*, 173, 181, 187.

καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο: ‘and this seemed to be the worst of revolutions, because it was the first’. See introductory n.

ἐκινήθη: ‘in convulsion’. See introductory n.

διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἕκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δήμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους: ‘the democratic leaders were struggling to bring in the Athenians, the oligarchs to bring in the Spartans’. This is the worm’s eye view: see i. 19n. on *καὶ οἱ μὲν Λακεδαιμόνιοι*, esp. the Aristotle reference there given for the same tendency seen ‘from above’, Athenian support of democracy and Spartan support of oligarchy. What in time of peace was a mere *tendency* (at i. 19 the Spartans ‘took care’, *θεραπεύοντες*, that their subjects should be oligarchically run) becomes in wartime a *struggle*.

καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ’ ἐτοίμων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς: ‘In peace men would have had no excuse for introducing either, and no wish to do so’. The word Jowett translates ‘and no wish to do so’ (*ἐτοίμων*, lit. ‘ready’) is difficult; it is an adjective and if it is textually sound a participle is needed, so it has been suggested that we should insert *ὄντων*, ‘being’. A more ingenious emendation is *ἐτόλμων*,

‘they dared’, producing the sense ‘nor did they dare to do so’ (but this involves a harsh switch of subject from participle to indicative: we would have to suppose that it was Athens and Sparta who had ‘no excuse’ for intervening, but that it was the factional leaders who ‘did not dare’ to call in Athens or Sparta). Equally clever is M. H. Marshall’s οὐδετέρων for οὐδ’ ἐτοίμων: ‘neither side had an excuse for introducing Athens or Sparta’: *LCM* 15 (1990), 56f. This is the best suggestion to date, from the point of view of sense, though it requires us to suppose that a common word was displaced by a more unexpected one.

2. καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χάλεπὰ κατὰ στάσις ταῖς πόλεσι: ‘And revolution inflicted many terrible disasters on the cities of Greece’ [lit. ‘many disastrous things fell on the cities through *stasis*’]. Again the key word here is medical; of the 22 instances of ἐπιπίπτω in Maloney/Frohn (above) many refer to illnesses, fevers, pains, ‘falling on’ people. A good example is *Airs, Waters, Places*, x, lines 60f. in Loeb Hippocrates, vol. i: [ὥστε] ταῦτα τὰ νοσήματα ἐπιπίπτειν, ‘so that these diseases befall’. Th. himself uses the word in a medical sense at ii. 48. 3 and 49. 6 (the plague); iii. 87. 1 (recurrence of the plague). For the related word ἐπέπεσε see Hussey, 132 and n. 28, and my *Thucydides*, 178 n. 85. Note, however, that the simple verb πίπτω, ‘fall’, is not used in this sense. There are 22 instances of the simple verb in Maloney/Frohn, mostly of people falling in the literal physical sense; there are two figurative examples, of people ‘falling ill’, lit. ‘into illness’—rather than the other way round, illness falling on people—both of them from the *Regimen* (i. 32, line 26; iv. 89, line 81), a treatise whose Greek is anyway said to be ‘often abnormal’ (Jones, Loeb edn. iv. 433 n. 1).

γινόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾗ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαιτέρα καὶ τοῖς εἶδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἰ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται: ‘such as have happened and always will happen while human nature remains the same, but which are more or less severe and differ in form with every new combination of circumstances’. An important sentence for the understanding of Th.’s method, and a pioneering scientific statement in itself, with its clear recognition of the importance of differing combinations of circumstances, an insight which Edward Hussey has compared to the recognition in modern physics of the differing effects of different ‘boundary conditions’. The principle seems simple but had to be stated for the first time: it was Th. who did so. See *Thucydides*, 43.

The word εἶδεσι, ‘in form’ [lit. ‘forms’], is related to another Thucydidean favourite, *ιδέα*: see i. 109. 1 n. and iii. 81. 5 n. on *πάσα τε ιδέα* etc. As we saw at 62. 3 n. on *καίτοι σκέψασθε* etc., the word can have medical connotations (which would be appropriate in view of the other ‘medical’

words we have just been noticing); but it could be used of political arrangements as well, or even—as here—of the ways in which political arrangements broke down.

ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι: ‘in peace, and when times are good, both cities and individuals have better motives’. See introductory n.; I regard this as the most important piece of evidence, coming as it does in a solemn authorial context, against de Ste. Croix’s views (*OPW* 26ff.) that Th. distinguished between inter-state and (as modern philosophers would say) ‘inter-personal’ moral transactions, and that he believed with Hobbes that moral judgements are inappropriate to states—views which I have argued against at length in *Thucydides*, ch. 7. Clearly, the issue must not be prejudged by adopting a translation unduly favourable to a particular view: it might be objected that the force of *γνώμας*, the word I have translated ‘motives’, is sometimes purely intellectual; but I think that in combination with *ἀμείνους*, ‘better’, and in an obviously ethical context (see below for the effects of war, the ‘violent schoolmaster’) there can be no doubt that here we have a clear case where Th. in his own person is assimilating states and individuals in a moral judgement.

ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ’ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοιοῖ: ‘but war, which takes away the comfortable provisions of daily life, is a violent schoolmaster and tends to assimilate men’s character to their conditions’. For this famous personification of war compare i. 122. 1 ἤκιστα γὰρ πόλεμος, with n. there for references. For the metaphor ‘violent schoolmaster’ see Macleod, 124 and n. 8, aptly citing Xen. *Anab.* ii. 6. 12, where the relation between the martinet Klearchos and his troops is said to resemble that between boys and a schoolmaster. (See also above 42. 2n.) The ‘teacher’ metaphor is specially appropriate here because Th. is about to move on to the distortion of *intellectual* progress as people thought up new and worse horrors to inflict on each other (Macleod, 54, and see next n. below). But as we saw above (ἐν μὲν γὰρ n.) he is primarily concerned in the present passage with *morality* and the regulation of passions, emotions, character (*ὀργὰς*).

For the link between material poverty (lack of ‘the comfortable provisions’ etc.) and deterioration in behaviour compare 45. 4.

3. καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύσσει τῶν προγενομένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ’ ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία: ‘those who followed took the desire for novelty further and further, and

decided to outdo the reputation of those who had preceded them by the ingenuity of their plans and the atrocity of the revenge which they took'. For an excellent discussion of this sentence, and the whole section, as a kind of perversion of the philosophy of the *Archaeology* with its tracing of human progress, see Macleod, 124 ff. and 132.

4. καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλαξαν τῇ δικαιοῦσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη: 'And they exchanged their usual verbal evaluations of actions for new ones, in the light of what they thought justified; thus irrational daring was considered courage and loyalty to one's party'. This sentence has been elucidated in the same sense by independent and nearly simultaneous articles: J. Wilson, 'The Customary Meanings of Words Were Changed—Or Were They? A Note on Thucydides 3. 82. 4', *CQ* 32 (1982), 18 ff.; I. Worthington, 'A Note on Thucydides 3. 82. 4', *LCM* 7 (1982), 124. The point, as these scholars have shown, is not that the *meanings* of words actually changed, as in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (Wilson's comparison), but that the use which people made of the available descriptions changed as their evaluation of the relevant actions changed. The present passage features, with the correct tr., in a very stark anthology about the effects of war, N. Shrimpton, *In a Dark Time* (London, 1987), 14 f. See also N. Loraux, 'Thucydide et la sédition dans les mots', *Quaderni di storia*, 23 (1986), 95 ff.

For a comparable picture to what follows in Th., see Plato, *Republic*, 560 E–561 A, describing the turmoil in the soul of the democratic man: it is invaded by pretentious fallacies which 'call shame silliness . . . self-control cowardice . . . they lead in a triumphal torchlight procession of insolence, licence, extravagance, and shamelessness. They praise them all extravagantly and call insolence good breeding, licence liberty, extravagance generosity, and shamelessness courage' (tr. H. D. P. Lee, Penguin).

As Edmunds (75) and others have noted, the phrase ἀλόγιστος τόλμα, 'irrational daring', recurs at vi. 59. 1 (of the tyrant-killers Harmodios and Aristogeiton); it is clearly pejorative on both occasions, though it goes too far to say (with Edmunds) that the tyrannicide was 'an act for which [Th.] has not the slightest admiration'.

μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς: 'farsighted delay'. For μέλλησις, 'delay', see i. 69. 4, where it is used by the Corinthians about the Spartans, with n. there; Edmunds (75 ff.) is generally right that the qualities praised (by implication) in the present section are on the whole Spartan and oligarchic, but note that at iii. 12. 2 μέλλησις is used of the Athenians. It is not such a code word as, say, σώφρων or σωφροσύνη, 'prudence' or 'moderation', for which see below.

προμηθής, 'farsighted', is the word from which the mythical figure of Prometheus got his name, and Edmunds (75 n. 13) suggests, in keeping with his general thesis about this section (see introductory n.), that it adds a 'Hesiodic' flavour. This is audacious; the adjective may, as he says, be used by no other fifth-century prose writer, but there is nothing 'Hesiodic' about the context of the other three uses of it, or the related noun *προμηθία*, in Th. himself. In any case note that Hdt. (i. 88. 1, iii. 36. 1) has the noun *προμηθία*, as does Gorgias (DK 82 B 111, the Encomium of Helen, para. 6).

τὸ δὲ σῶφρον: 'moderation'. See i. 32. 4 n. on *περιέστηκεν* etc., and n. above on *μέλλησις*. Edmunds (76) says that Th. 'never uses *sophrosyne* or a related word of the Athenians'; but he is prepared to allow an Athenian speaker to use it: see Diodotos' *εἰ σωφρονοῦμεν*, 'if we [Athenians] are prudent', at 44. 1. Note also that Edmunds, 79, does not entirely explain Th.'s authorial use of the adjective, *τοῖς σῶφροσι τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, to describe Kleon's *Athenian* opponents at iv. 28. 5.

ξυνητόν: 'clever'. For this word see i. 79. 2 n. and iii. 37. 3 n. on *ἀμαθία* etc., also Edmunds, 80: not a specially Spartan word because 'anyone, Spartan or Athenian, may be intelligent in this sense'.

ἀσφαλεία δὲ τὸ ἐπιβουλεύσασθαι ἀποτροπῆς πρόφασις εὖλογος: 'Prolonged deliberation with a view to avoiding mistakes was thought to be just a plausible excuse for avoiding any kind of action'. A difficult and possibly corrupt sentence, but the scholiast gives the sense.

5. ἐταιρίας διαλυτής: 'a subverter of his party'. The less polite word for such sworn associations was *ξυνημοσίαι*: see viii. 54. 4 (411) with Andrewes's excellent long n. There is, obviously, a potentially oligarchic aspect to these *ἐταιρίαί* or *ἐταιρεΐαι*, as is shown by the way they are exploited at Athens in 411 in the preliminary intrigues which resulted in the overthrow of the democracy; but it is important to note that Th. there says that they '*already* existed' for the carrying on of vague and secret, but not (see 6 n. below) actually illegal, political activities *within*—he implies—*the framework of democracy*; see my n. on viii. 54. 4. Gomme's translation 'subverter of his party' (in his helpful tr. at 383 ff. of the whole section 82–3) is better than Jowett's unfortunate 'breaker-up of parties'.

6. οὐ γὰρ μετὰ τῶν κειμένων νόμων ὠφελίας αἱ τοιαῦται ξύνοδοι: 'For such associations are not based on any established law'; nor are they intended for the public good. That is, Th. is (i) particularizing about associations of 'this [harmful] type' rather than (ii) saying in a didactic way 'let me explain to you about *hetaireiai* in general. They are not . . .', etc. I follow here the interpretation given (by implication) in Andrewes's discussion, above, rather than Jowett, whose rendering 'For party associations are not . . .', etc., implies interpretation (ii). See 5 n.

above and my n. on viii. 54. 4: 'such' associations were not necessarily illegal (though not exactly innocuous either, from the point of an upholder of radical democracy). With this whole section E. Rawson, *Arethusa*, 5 (1972), 161 compares the plotters in Eur. *Orestes*, 1100ff.

πλεονεξία: 'greedy self-interest' [lit. 'grasping for more']. A key idea in this whole section (see 83. 1, with Macleod, 128, 138) and a key word for Th. in general: see iv. 17. 4 and 21. 2, with *Thucydides*, 119, 174ff., etc.

7. καὶ ὄρκοι εἴ που ἄρα γένοιτο ξυναλλαγῆς: 'Any agreements sworn to by either party' [lit. 'if there were any oaths of agreement']. See below, 8n. on *εὐσεβεία*.

ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα: 'a kind of prize for cleverness'. See above, 4n., for *ξυνητόν*, 'cleverness'. The thought here irresistibly recalls Kleon in 37–8. See Macleod, 135: the word for 'prize' was eliminated by Dionysius' paraphrase but is carefully chosen. It will, for instance, be picked up by *ἀθλα*, another word for 'prize', at 8 below. See also i. 22. 4n.

ῥᾶον δ' οἱ πολλοὶ κακοῦργοι ὄντες δεξιοὶ κέκληνται ἢ ἀμαθεῖς ἀγαθοί, καὶ τῷ μὲν αἰσχύνονται, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ ἀγάλλονται: 'As a rule, men are more easily called "clever" when wicked than "good" when stupid; and they are ashamed of the latter name but take a pride in the former'. For the meaning of this sentence see Macleod, 128 and 138 n. 38; I have adopted his tr.

8. πάντων δ' αὐτῶν αἴτιον ἀρχὴ ἢ διὰ πλεονεξίαν καὶ φιλοτιμίαν: 'the cause of all these evils was the love of power, originating in greed and ambition'. There is no need to emend the text so as to eliminate *αἴτιον*—an emendation which would necessitate (i) taking *ἀρχή*, 'love of power' in its other sense, 'cause', and (ii) taking *αἴτιον*, another word for 'cause', as a gloss on *ἀρχή*.

These motives—love of power, greed, ambition—are all of the greatest importance for Th. Many of the higher-ranking cards were (as we saw) first played very early on indeed: see for instance i. 2. 4n. See 6n. above for *πλεονεξία*, 'greed'; and for *φιλοτιμία*—not always a bad word but certainly so here—see ii. 44. 4n. and ii. 65. 7n. on *κατὰ τὰς ἰδίας φιλοτιμίας*.

ἐκ δ' αὐτῶν καὶ ἐς τὸ φιλονικεῖν καθισταμένων τὸ πρόθυμον: 'and the passions which are produced when men are launched on a struggle'. For *πρόθυμον*, 'passions', lit. 'eagerness', 'zeal', see Edmunds, 87, adopting Gomme's 'eagerness to quarrel' and comparing Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 195ff., on *ζήλος*, 'zealous emulation'.

οἱ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι προστάντες: 'For the leaders of each side in the various cities'. Jowett's tr. omits the words *ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι*, lit. 'in the cities', but they ought to be retained in some form: see end of introductory n. For what follows, cp. Sall. *Cat.* 38.

πλήθους τε ἰσονομίας πολιτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατίας σώφρονος

προτιμήσει: 'the one party professing to uphold popular equality before the law, the other the moderation of aristocratic government'. For *ισονομία*, 'equality before the law', see 62. 3 n.: it is often (as here), but by no means exclusively, associated with democracy. For *σώφρονος*, 'moderate', see 4 above and n. with references there; the present passage is a clear case of a loaded right-wing use. The word *ἀριστοκρατία* is probably best rendered as usual by the English word 'aristocracy' which derives from it, although the literal meaning 'rule of the best' should be borne in mind on the present occasion: 'oligarchy' or rule of the few would not, however 'moderate', be attractive as a slogan for general consumption (Megabyxos avoids it at Hdt. iii. 81). On both of the two occasions on which Th. uses the word 'aristocracy' there is more than a tinge of irony: see viii. 64. 3 (Thasos in 411), with Andrewes's n.

Graham and Forsythe *HSCP* 88 (1984) 34 translate 'aristocracy, which is responsible (*σώφρων*) by reason of pre-eminence (*προτιμήσει*)'.

ἄθλα: 'the prize'. See 7 n. above on *ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα*.

ἡδονήν: 'the pleasure of the moment'. For a similar thought see ii. 53. 3 (the moral effects of the Plague).

ἡ μετὰ ψήφου ἀδίκου: 'unjust legal sentences'. See introductory n.: this is more specific than many of the generalizations which precede it, in that it recalls the Corcyraean vine-props of ch. 70—although we are now explicitly talking about what went on in 'the cities', plural: see above.

εὐσεβεία: 'religion'. See Eatough (ii. 52. 3 n.), 242 f. However, I do not follow him in his wish to drain the word here of most of its religious content. (On this point I agree with N. Marinatos, *Thucydides and Religion* (ii. 17. 2 n.), 44 n. 9.) Eatough cites Warner's 'conscientious motives', which is surely too weak, and Gomme's 'scrupulous integrity . . . whether ordained by the gods or not, [Th.] might have said'. Eatough himself admits that the preceding sentences have been concerned with conventions which had religious sanctions. (He cites the 'illegal condemnations' of para. 8; the 'oaths', *δρκοι*, of para. 7, cp. 83. 2, make the point even better.) None of this need imply religious belief on Th.'s own part; but (as with the plague) he deplores that breakdown of values, of which the breakdown of religious observance was a symptom. (For the treatment of the suppliants see Gould, '*HIKETEIA*', cited at i. 24. 7 n.) For these reasons, though I accept much of Eatough's analysis of specific instances of *όσιον* etc., I do not accept his conclusion (251) that Th. 'was completely out of sympathy with the language of *όσιος* etc.'

Note the jingle *eusebeia/euprepeia*.

τὰ δὲ μέσα τῶν πολιτῶν: 'the citizens who were of neither party' [lit. 'the middle element of the citizens' or 'the moderate' etc.]. Gomme translates 'neutral'; Jowett's version, which I have retained, follows the

scholiast's paraphrase or explanation. Gomme's obscure allusion to Solon is to his law prohibiting neutrality in time of *stasis* (Plut. *Solon*, 20. 1, see Rhodes's n. on *Ath. Pol.* 8. 5, noting that Th. ii. 40. 2 attests later Athenian dislike of politically inactive citizens, ἀπράγμονες; see my n.). **διεφθείροντο**: 'were destroyed'. The exact repetition of this word at the end of 83 is the most striking of a number of such echoes of 82. 4–83. 2 in 83. 3–4. For the others see Macleod, 130f.

83. 1. οὕτω πᾶσα ἰδέα . . . κακοτροπίας: 'every form of criminality'. For the expression see 81. 5n., citing i. 109. 1n. The present passage implies a clear value-judgement, and prepares us for the crucial authorial comment which follows.

καὶ τὸ εὐήθες, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλείστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἠφανίσθη: 'the simplicity which is so large an element in a noble character was laughed at and disappeared'. A problematic sentence: does the Greek mean that simplicity is an important ingredient of nobility of character or the other way round? Jowett is clearly right to prefer the first tr.; despite the authoritative support of Gomme and Adcock for the second it is hard to see what it could possibly mean to say that nobility of character is an important ingredient of simplicity. I have argued the point at length in *Thucydides*, 186f. n. 100, and in the interests of space I hope I may be allowed to refer to that discussion and to my n. above on i. 84. 3 αἰδώς etc. The best discussion, which convinced me for one that Gomme was wrong, is in M. Nussbaum, *Fragility of Goodness* (i. 84. 3n.), 507f. n. 24.

The sentence is of the first importance; it is a clear, absolute, and conservative authorial rejection of the 'relativistic' moral teaching of certain of the sophists, whose outlook is too often wrongly ascribed to Th. merely because (as his speakers show) he was familiar with the various moves in their games. See *Thucydides*, 186 to the end of ch. vii.

The present passage is one of the handful of references to laughter in Th. They have been collected in an amusing article by D. Lateiner, 'No Laughing Matter: A Literary Tactic in Herodotus', *TAPA* 107 (1977), 173ff., who shows that each time Th. mentions laughter the laughter is unpleasant (the other two mentions are at iv. 28. 5 and vi. 35); Lateiner contrasts the frequency of delight, laughter, smiling, etc. in Hdt. We might compare Eatough's demonstration (ii. 52. 3n.) that when Th. uses words for 'pious' etc., they usually have some kind of 'spin' to them. For Th.'s sense of humour (wintry rather than actually non-existent) see *Thucydides*, 191 n. 1, 94 n. 88; cp. 42 n. 42. Add perhaps v. 41. 3 (see n. there), the account of the Spartan reaction—more or less 'you people have got to be joking'—to a preposterous Argive suggestion that their

differences should be settled by having 300 champions fight it out as in a famous archaic battle.

2. **οὔτε ὄρκος φοβερός:** 'no oath terrible enough'. See above, 82. 8 n. on *εὔσεβεία*.

3. **καὶ οἱ φαυλότεροι γνώμην:** 'People with inferior minds'. Again (see 82. 7 n. on *ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα*) we are reminded of Kleon: see 37. 3.

Th. is here moving towards the very edge of plausibility (what would count as evidence, in Corcyra or more generally, for the greater potential for survival of stupider people?). Contrast the reference at 81. 4 to the behaviour of Corcyraean debtors towards their creditors, something for which he could well have had hard information.

4. **διεφθείροντο:** 'were destroyed'. Picked up from 82. 8, the last word of 83 echoing the last word of 82: see n. there.

84–85. *The stasis concluded*

[84. The authenticity of this ch. was already challenged by the scholiast—contrast ch. 17 above. A further argument against authenticity is that it does not feature in Dionysius' critique though it contains things every bit as bad, from his point of view, as 82–3. However, Pritchett (117, n. 7 to the comm. on Dionysius, ch. 33) replies that there are sentences in 82–3 themselves which one might have expected Dionysius to criticize but which he does not. Macleod (135 n.) takes the ch. to be inauthentic.

For a new twist to an old argument see Fuks (introductory n.) who says that the 'economic' points made in 84 mark it off from 82–3, therefore it is not Thucydidean. He is thinking of phrases like 'the property of one's neighbours', *τὰ τῶν πέλας*, in para. 1, 'economics pure and simple' according to Fuks, 53. (For the phrase see the Hellenistic hymn by Hermokles, J. U. Powell, *Collectanea Alexandrina* (Oxford, 1925), 174, at line 29, where the piratical Aitolians are said to be in the habit of snatching *τὰ τῶν πέλας*. But this could either be borrowed from Th. or be the inspiration for the forger.) Fuks's argument is overdone. (i) It is not generally true that Th. 'gives very little space to economic factors in the history of his own time', though even this is sometimes said; the quotation is from M. M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece* (London, 1977), 10, rightly rejected by D. Musti, 'Aspetti economici ed aspetti politici dell'espansione romana nella storiografia polibiana', in W. V. Harris (ed.), *The Imperialism of Mid-Republican Rome* (Papers and Monographs of the American Academy in Rome, 29; Rome, 1984), 35ff. (a paper which contains a surprising

amount about Th. and so deserves a mention in this comm.), at 44. It would be truer to say that Th. does not, or does not often, give us the kind of economic detail we would like. (ii) As for the *stasis* section in particular, the references to poverty in 84. 1 can in fact be matched by the implied reference at 82. 2 (see n. there on *ὁ δὲ πόλεμος* etc.), where Th. speaks of war taking away the comfortable provisions of daily life, a passage not convincingly disposed of by Fuks, 51 f. Again, Fuks's strictly non-economic interpretation of *πλεονεξία* (52) is too one-sided. Not that I wish to defend iii. 84, nor, on the facts of the narrative chapters which precede 82–3, do I endorse de St. Croix's Marxist rejection of Fuks (see introduction n.); but Fuks's surgical instrument for excision is not the right one. Other scholars, like Huart ((ii. 35. 2 n.), 484 n. 1), have merely asserted, without argument, that the sentiments of the ch. are un-Thucydidean, which (for what these subjective impressions are worth) I do not myself feel. Note that the word *όσίου* appears in para. 2 in a straightforward sense which does not suit Eatough's thesis (ii. 52. 3 n.); but at his 238 n. 2 he dismissed the chapter as 'spurious' and the *όσίου* reference with it.

Older bibliography is given by Pritchett (above).

The telling arguments are those from the positive evidence of the scholiast and, despite Pritchett's half-hearted protest, the negative evidence of Dionysius. The chapter should be excised (though one can only speculate on the motives of whoever wrote it and whoever included it in the text that we have, if they were different people). I have, nevertheless, for the convenience of readers, retained it and updated the tr., but I have enclosed it in square brackets, which Jowett did not.]

85. 1. οἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν πόλιν Κερκυραῖοι τοιαύταις ὀργαῖς ταῖς πρώταις ἐς ἀλλήλους ἐχρήσαντο: 'Such were the passions to which the citizens of Corcyra gave way in their dealings with each other. They were the first to do so'. See introductory n. on the structure of the main *stasis* section, which is here brought to a close with a piece of ring-composition (for the idea of the Corcyraean *stasis* as the first and worst see 82. 1).

καὶ ὁ Εὐρυμέδων: 'Eurymedon . . .'. We are back with a bump to Corcyra and the very specific and prosaic, after the raised style of 82–3. Wilson's treatment (see introductory n. to 69–85) now becomes relevant again after a hiatus for 82–4. For this final phase of Corcyraean activity see his 99f.

2. διεσώθησαν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐς πεντακοσίους: 'of whom about five hundred had escaped'. A surprisingly large total, as we noted at 74. 1 n.

τείχη τε λαβόντες, ἃ ἦν ἐν τῇ ἡπείρῳ: 'seized some forts on the mainland'. See Hammond, *Epirus*, 552, and Calligas (i. 26. 2 n.), 84.

τῆς πέραν οἰκείας γῆς: 'the territory on the opposite coast'. For such *peraiiai* see i. 100. 2 and n. there (Thasos, where the word *ἀντιπέρας* is used; compare *πέραν* here). Control of such *peraiiai* was often economically important, as at Thasos and as here: see also, for the valuable Asiatic possessions of the East Aegean islands, *Mausolus*, 128: their probable loss to Persia after the King's Peace of 386 must have been a blow to the islanders. For other exiles from an island making a nuisance of themselves by occupying a *peraiia* see 19. 2 (Samians at Anaia) and n. there; cp. 32. 2. Westlake calls this kind of move 'internal epiteichismos' (for *epiteichismos* see i. 122. 1 n.), and rightly notes that it could have encouraged the belief that *epiteichismos* by one state against another might yield results. See 'The Progress of Epiteichismos', *CQ* 33 (1983), 12 ff., at 15 = *Studies*, 37.

3. τὰ πλοῖα ἐμπρήσαντες: 'burned their boats'. For another literal burning of boats see Livy, xxiv. 40. 17 (Philip V after a defeat, with a rather different motive).

τὸ ὄρος τὴν Ἴστωνῆν: 'Mount Istone'. Gomme, and Wilson (100), agree that this is probably Pantokrator, the highest peak on the island.

So ends the third great set piece of Book iii (the Corcyraean story is resumed at iv. 46–8). There can hardly be any doubt that it was partly his lengthy treatment of Mytilene and Plataia which led Th. to set out his conclusions on the connection between inter-state and intra-state relations in these brilliant chapters 82–3, and this has encouraged reflections of a general sort: see M. Cogan, 'Mytilene, Plataea, and Corcyra: Ideology and Policy in Thucydides, Book Three', *Phoenix*, 35 (1981), 1 ff. But (cp. p. 462 above) it was not Th.'s doing that Corcyra came where it did in the Peloponnesian War. And we noted (82. 1 n.) that one of his motives for 'writing up' *stasis* at Corcyra, rather than *stasis* somewhere else, was that it was the *first* serious wartime instance of what would become a general phenomenon. Again, this (we must accept) is a fact, which did not come out of Th.'s head.

For the elaboration of an interesting idea that Th.'s Book iii and its three great sections, up to the present point, correspond to three episodes or themes in Book viii, see H. Rawlings, *The Structure of Thucydides' History* (Princeton, 1981), ch. iv. (This is part of Rawlings's wider thesis that a finished Thucydidean work would have been in ten books and that the second five would somehow have mirrored the first five, so that i = vi, ii = vii, iii = viii. The existing Books iv and v 'correspond' to the unwritten books ix and x.) Mytilene = Chios (two

rebel subjects of Athens), Plataia = the 'Freedom of the Greeks' theme in Book viii (see iii. 59. 4n.), and the *stasis* at Corcyra = the *stasis* at Athens. This is all worked out with great ingenuity, but I suggested when reviewing the book (*TLS* 12. ii. 1982) that the main thesis requires some distortions of interpretation, and that there is a risk of turning Th. into a cyclical historian, which he certainly was not.

For a different approach to the place of Corcyra within the larger structure see Connor's *Thucydides* (Princeton, 1984), 95–105 and the chart in appendix 3. By contrast with Rawlings, Connor is more impressed by the similarities between the *stasis* in Book iii and the Athenian Plague in Book ii. This is certainly a valid approach: see 82. 1–2 nn. Like Shakespeare, Th. can survive any number of interpretations.

86. ATHENIAN EXPEDITION TO SICILY

For this expedition, the narrative of which is scattered through the rest of Book iii and the first half of iv, see Westlake, *Essays*, ch. 6, complaining that Th.'s narrative is meagre and the Athenian motive inadequately expounded (but see below for Th.'s structural reasons for expounding Sicilian operations here). For the present ch. see esp. Westlake, 105 ff.; and on the 'un-Periclean' character of the whole Sicilian involvement of these years see Holladay (i. 144. 1 n.), 408 ff.; but note what Th. makes Pericles say at ii. 62. 2: see n. there on *οὔτε βασιλεύς*. See also below, 86. 3–4 nn.

C. Ampolo, 'I contributi alla prima spedizione ateniese in Sicilia (427–424 a.c.)', *P. del P.* 232 (1987), 5 ff., argues that *IG* i³. 291 should be reassigned to this, the first Athenian expedition to Sicily (rather than to the main expedition of 415, the usual view).

For the possibility that one result of this expedition was the establishment by Athens of a useful connection with Artas of Messapia in the heel of Italy (cp. vii. 33. 4), see 86. 4n., at end, referring to M. Walbank, *Proxeniēs* (ii. 22. 3 n.), no. 70.

From the point of view of the organization of Th.'s narrative, note that the Sicilian operations here described will be needed at the beginning of Book iv, where Demosthenes' decision to occupy Pylos (iv. 3) flows naturally out of the Sicilian material in iv. 1–2. Corcyra will also feature in iv. 2–3; that is, threads separately given in Book iii come together at the beginning of Book iv.

1. Λάχητα τὸν Μελανώπου: 'Laches son of Melanopos'. For Laches, who gave his name to Plato's dialogue about courage, see Sommerstein's n. on *Ar. Wasps*, 240, of 422 BC, where it is said that 'Laches is going to be

for it today'. His Sicilian command was clearly the inspiration for the mock trial (*Wasps*, 836 ff., 894 ff.) of the dog Labes, 'Grabber', for stealing and eating some Sicilian cheese; the prosecutor is Kleon. Jacoby (*FGrHist* 328 Philochoros F 127, commentary) argues that no real prosecution or trial ever took place (so too Gomme on 115. 2), and this is reasonable caution as far as the Aristophanic evidence goes; but note Lewis, *JHS* 81 (1961), 119f., concluding on other grounds that the deposition of Laches from the generalship of 426/5 is 'at least probable'.

The fragmentary inscription *IG* ii². 150, which appears to mention a 'Melanopos the general' ([*Μελάνω*]πον τὸν στρ[ατηγόν . . .]) may be fifth-century and so refer to Laches' father rather than, as is usually thought, the fourth-century Melanopos who figures in Dem. xxiv, for whom see generally D. J. Mosley, *PCPhS* 188 (1962), 44. For this possibility see *Mausolus* 217 n. 291, citing D. M. Lewis. If so, Laches' otherwise unknown father was a general as well as Laches himself.

2. οἱ γὰρ Συρακόσιοι καὶ Λεοντῖνοι ἐς πόλεμον ἀλλήλοις καθέστασαν: 'Syracuse and Leontini were now at war with each other'. For the build-up of Syracusan power which preceded this see Diod. xii. 30. 1, with J. K. Davies, *Democracy and Classical Greece*, 143 ff.; Diod. xii. 53. 1 describes the war between Syracuse and Leontini but gives no further details.

ξύμμαχοι δὲ τοῖς μὲν Συρακοσίοις ἦσαν πλὴν Καμαριναίων αἱ ἄλλαι Δωρίδες πόλεις: 'all the Dorian cities, except Kamarina, were allied with Syracuse'. The mention of Kamarina prepares us for the great Kamarina debate at vi. 76 ff. As Davies notes, Athens' alliances had tended to be with non-Dorian communities (or non-Greek ones, like Egesta, *ML* 37 = *Fornara* 81, of the 450s). For the importance of the racial factor, especially in Sicily, see Alty (i. 95. 1 n. on *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*), 3 ff.

αἵπερ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ πρῶτον ἀρχομένου τοῦ πολέμου ξυμμαχίαν ἐτάχθησαν: 'they had been included in the Spartan alliance at the beginning of the war'. This looks like a back-reference of some sort, but in fact Th. has not given us any detail about the alignments of the western Greeks, beyond the reference to the Spartans' 'friends' at ii. 7. 2: see n. there.

Λοκροὶ μὲν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν: 'the Lokrians sided with the Syracusans'. This was always a close tie, notably under the later tyranny of Dionysius I, one of whose wives was a Lokrian called Doris. Thus the only non-Sicilian, among all the eleven West Greek victors honoured with Victory Odes by Pindar, is an Epizephyrian Lokrian, Agesidamos (*Olympians*, x and xi). On Lokri (on the eastern side of the 'toe' of Italy) and its military traditions, see the excellent short discussion by

M. Frederiksen, *Atti del Sedecesimo Convegno di Studi sulla Magna Grecia* (Naples, 1977), 204 ff., drawing on Pindar and Th., and suggesting that foreign powers like Athens and Syracuse were interested in Lokrian timber and pitch (mentioned in the Hellenistic 'Lokrian Tables': see v. 5. 2 n.).

Ῥηγῖνοι δὲ κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς Λεοντίνων: 'and the Rhegians with the Leontines, who were their kinsmen'. As Alty (5 n. 26) notes, Th. here accepts the relevance of the racial factor which he doubts at para. 4 below when dealing with Athenian motives. Leontini (modern Lentini) is a close Sicilian neighbour of Syracuse, Rhegion is Reggio di Calabria on the toe of Italy. For the exact phrase *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς* see i. 95. 1.

3. ἐς οὖν τὰς Ἀθήνας πέμψαντες οἱ τῶν Λεοντίνων ξύμμαχοι κατὰ τε παλαιὰν ξυμμαχίαν καὶ ὅτι Ἴωνες ἦσαν: 'The Leontines and their allies appealed to Athens on the grounds of ancient alliance and because they were Ionians'. The reference here to 'ancient alliance' has traditionally been interpreted as if the Greek said 'the ancient alliance' (that is, a particular alliance), and referred to a definite treaty. Argument has then centred on two alliances preserved on stone, (i) ML 63 and (ii) 64 = Fornara 124, 125, renewals of alliances between Athens on the one hand and (i) Rhegion and (ii) Leontini on the other. But see J. D. Smart, 'Athens and Eggesta', *JHS* 92 (1972), 128 ff., appendix at 144 ff., who stresses the absence of the definite article and argues convincingly that the reference in the present passage is not to a particular alliance but to the general 'ancient alliance' between Athens and all her Ionian kith and kin. Smart is probably right, though one might reply that in that case the words 'and because they were Ionians' merely repeat what has already been said, and this redundancy is not in Th.'s manner.

4. καὶ ἔπεμψαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς μὲν οἰκειότητος προφάσει, βουλόμενοι δὲ μήτε σίτον ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἄγεσθαι αὐτόθεν πρόπειράν τε ποιούμενοι εἰ σφίσι δυνατὰ εἶη τὰ ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ πράγματα ὑποχείρια γένεσθαι: 'The Athenians sent the ships, ostensibly on the ground of relationship, but in reality because they did not wish the Peloponnesians to get corn from Sicily. Moreover they wanted to see if they could bring Sicily under their control'. See Alty, 5: 'the emphasis is probably right though we may be suspicious of so neat an antithesis.' The 'Peloponnesians' who are here implied to be in the habit of importing Sicilian corn are probably and primarily the Corinthians: see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 129. For the other 'real' motive see Westlake (above, introductory n.); Th. often (cp. 115. 4 n.) gives two motives, a conservative and a radical, for Athenian involvement in Sicily. See also Holladay (above, introductory n.).

It is possible that the grant of proxeny to the Messapian Artas belongs here: see i. 24–55, introductory n.; see also M. Walbank (ii. 22. 3 n.), no. 40, for another possibly relevant proxeny grant.

87. SECOND OUTBREAK OF THE PLAGUE; EARTHQUAKES IN GREECE

1. τὸ δεῦτερον ἐπέπεσε: ‘again attacked’. For the verb see 82. 2 n.

2. μὴ εἶναι ὅτι μᾶλλον ἐπίεσε καὶ ἐκάκωσε τὴν δύναμιν: ‘Nothing was more exhausting or ruinous to the power of Athens’. Cp. the ἐκάκωσε of vii. 27. 3, said about the damaging effects of Dekeleia, with language (ὀλέθρω, φθορᾶ, said about destruction of life and property) curiously appropriate to the effects of plague. The chronological scope of the present passage is presumably limited to the Archidamian War, whereas the Dekeleian damage refers to the final phase of the war. But this has no real implications for date of composition: Th. is capable of making these rhetorical statements (‘nothing was more’ etc.) with no definite period in mind.

3. τετρακοσίων γὰρ ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τετρακισχιλίων οὐκ ἐλάσσους ἀπέθανον ἐκ τῶν τάξεων: ‘no fewer than 4,400 serving Athenian hoplites died’ [lit. ‘hoplites from the ranks’]. For this passage and its meaning (‘front-line troops’, not ‘citizens of hoplite status’) see M. H. Hansen, ‘Athenian Population Losses 431–403 B.C. and the Number of Athenian Citizens in 431 B.C.’, in his *Three Studies in Athenian Demography* (Copenhagen, 1988) = *Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, Historisk-filosofiske Meddelelser*, 56, 14 ff., at 14; also B. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War* (Beckenham, 1986), 75 f.

The present passage thus implies that about one third of the 14,000 total of hoplites + knights died from the plague. Hansen, who argues that ‘there is no reason to suppose that the plague affected hoplites and knights more severely than other social groups’, arrives at a total of some 15,000 (= c.47,000 ÷ 3) for the number of adult male Athenians killed by the plague between 430/29 and 427/6. We should not, however, be too ready to assume that Th. had access to good official information: see next n.

τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξέυρετος ἀριθμός: ‘it could never be discovered how many of the common people [died]’. See ii. 13. 5–6 n.: Th.’s precise information reaches down only as far as the first three of the four Solonian classes; or rather (a cynical narratologist might wish to say) the confession of ignorance about the ‘other ranks’ is designed to increase confidence in the precise information, just given, about the

cavalry and zeugite casualties. Note that the present passage is in effect one of Th.'s rare admissions of ignorance: see ii. 5. 6n.

4. **ἐγένοντο δὲ καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ σεισμοί:** 'This too was the time when the frequent earthquakes occurred ...'. See i. 23. 2-3n. The present passage seems, disturbingly, to suggest that there was some causal connection between the plague and the earthquakes (cp. iv. 52. 1, eclipse and earthquake bracketed). That is, Th. has returned to the manner of i. 23. 3 rather than the rationalistic mood of the actual plague description in Book ii. We need not suppose, with Gomme, that in the present passage Th. is 'dismissing a popular view': Th.'s guard does occasionally slip. Schwartz (i. 67-88, introductory n.), 172, thought that in what he regarded as the 'first part' of his work (i. 1-v. 25), Th. recorded natural phenomena for their own sake, in the second part he recorded them only when they were relevant politically. But it is not quite certain (see above) that Th. thought the two parts of the present ch. to be unconnected; and anyway see 89. 1: these particular earthquakes *are* politically relevant.

88. ATHENIAN ATTACK ON THE AIOLIAN ISLANDS

For this episode we have a fragment of a papyrus history, possibly by Philistos, which provides us for once (Lewis, *CAH* v², ch. 9) with supplementary detail about the Archidamian War from a reliable-looking literary source other than Th.: *FGrHist* 577, no. 2, with L. Pearson, *The Greek Historians of the West* (Atlanta, Ga., 1987), 26 ff., drawing on new restorations proposed in *Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists*, 20 (1983), 155 ff. The papyrus reveals that the Athenian fleet had been divided, Charoiades operating off Sicilian Megara, where he died of wounds (see below, 90. 2, where this event is alluded to retrospectively and without detail), while Laches operated off Kamarina. One Athenian ship was lost (see 2 n. below). There was an attack with combined forces on the Aiolian islands. As Lewis notes, this implies a greater commitment to the 'main theatre of war' than we would suppose from Th. alone. See also A. Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo* (Rome, 1969), 411 ff. Most scholars regard the Aiolian expedition (resumed at 115 below) as a completely trivial sideshow, but for an attempt to (i) explain it by reference to Athenian desire not only to gratify Rhegion but to deny Syracuse control of the straits, and thus (ii) allot the Aiolian expedition greater importance than is usually done, see D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Cornell, 1974), 189. [See now B. Bosworth, *CQ* 42 (1992), 46-55.]

For the Aeolian islands, north of Sicily, see generally H. L. Allen's entry on 'Aeoliae insulae' in the *Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites* (1976), and Heubeck (i. 24. 1 n.), 44, on *Odyssey*, x. 1-4.

1. **τριάκοντα ναυσί:** 'with thirty ships'. Actually twenty-nine, if the papyrus (above) is right that one of Laches' ships had already been captured: see Pearson, 27.

2. **νέμονται δὲ Λιπαραῖοι αὐτάς, Κνιδίων ἄποικοι ὄντες:** 'they are cultivated by the Liparaians, who are colonists of the Knidians'. As Westlake notes (*Essays*, 104 n. 12), the chatty material about the Aeolian islands is in contrast with the bleakness of the Sicilian narrative hereabouts. Note the usual punctilious colonial reference to the Knidians (see further below). Pausanias (x. 11. 3) gives the Knidian oikist's name as Pentathlos—a rather suspiciously athletic name for a job given to a distinguished athlete—and attributes this and an unascertainable amount of other material about the Aeolian islands, some of which is close but not identical to the present ch. of Th., to the fifth-century BC writer Antiochos of Syracuse (*FGrHist* 555 F 1). Hence it has been suggested (most recently and influentially by Dover, 'Die Kolonisierung Siziliens bei Thukydides', in H. Herter (ed.), *Thukydides, Wege der Forschung*, xcvi (1968), 344 ff. [tr. of an article originally in Italian, *Maia*, 6 (1953), 1 ff.] at 353 f.) that Th. got his material about the Aeolian islands from Antiochos. See, however, Jacoby's commentary on Antiochos F 1, preferring Hekataios. (Note that the studies by Dover and Jacoby are entirely independent, even in the reprint of Dover.)

On the factual point (who actually colonized the islands) it is now claimed that the different tradition in Diodorus (v. 7. 5: from Timaios? See Pearson, 65) of an original 'Ausonian' colonization from Italy, under an eponymous hero Liparos, is 'confirmed' by archaeological evidence for Bronze Age Apennine immigrants: E. Sjöqvist, *Sicily and the Greeks* (Ann Arbor, 1973), 3. However, Diodorus goes on (v. 9) to give a version of the Knidos/Pentathlos story, as a subsequent stage in the colonization process. Compare the discrepant material about Zakynthos, ii. 66. 1 n. (It is a further, minor, complication that Pentathlos' activity is slightly differently given in Diod. and in Paus. For reconciliation of these discrepancies see V. Merante, *Kokalos*, 13 (1967), 88 ff.)

3. **ἐν τῇ Ἱερᾷ ὡς ὁ Ἥφαιστος χαλκεύει:** 'that the forge of Hephaistos is in Hiera'. As Dover notes, the item about Hephaistos is not in Pausanias, whose account of the islands is different in other ways also; for instance Pausanias mentions fire on Strongyle (Stromboli) as well as on Hiera (Vulcano).

89. ABORTIVE PELOPONNESIAN INVASION OF ATTICA: 'TSUNAMI' OFF EUBOIA

1. Ἰ. Ἄγιδος τοῦ Ἀρχιδάμου ἡγουμένου, Λακεδαιμονίων βασιλέως, σεισμῶν δὲ γενομένων πολλῶν ἀπετράποντο πάλιν: 'under the command of Agis son of Archidamos, the Spartan king . . . but were deterred by numerous earthquakes'. For these earthquakes, now revealed to be, after all, 'politically relevant', see 87. 4 and n., and H. W. Catling, *BSA* 85 (1990), 34.

The recall of Pleistoanax fell at around this time (v. 16. 3; cp. ii. 21. 1 and i. 114. 2), but Th. does not say so here, nor does he tell us what relation this decision bore to the death of Agis' father Archidamos, for which see 1. 1 n.

3. καὶ τοῦ τε φρουρίου: 'the Athenian fort'. For the fort on Atalante see ii. 32.

4. ἐν Πεπαρήθῳ: 'At Peparethos'. The modern Skopelos.

5. αἴτιον δ' ἔγωγε νομίζω τοῦ τοιούτου, ἧ ἰσχυρότατος ὁ σεισμός ἐγένετο, κατὰ τοῦτο ἀποστέλλειν τε τὴν θάλασσαν: 'I think that the cause was this: where the force of the earthquake was greatest, the sea was driven back'. Compare ii. 28 for another such (correct) speculation, but here we do not know if Th. was agreeing with or correcting any contemporary scientific view. See Capelle, *RE* supp. iv, entry under 'Erdbebenforschung', cols. 366f., who says 'how much seismological research has been lost to us is shown by a remarkable observation of Th. (iii. 89), where for the first time the natural connection between ordinary earthquakes and underwater tremors [German 'Seebeben'] is clearly recognized'. (However, it is surely significant that earthquakes were popularly thought to be the work of Poseidon, the sea-god. See Hdt. vii. 129. 4, who, however, is open-minded about Poseidon's role.)

The phenomenon described in the present ch. is what is more correctly known as a Tsunami, from the Japanese word for such large sea waves created by earthquakes. See M. J. Selby, *Earth's Changing Surface: An Introduction to Geomorphology* (Oxford, 1985), 351f.; A. N. Strahler, *Physical Geography*⁴ (New York, 1975), 499; W. C. Dudley and M. N. Lee, *Tsunami!* (Hawaii, 1988), a reference I owe to Dr Michael Williams.

90. FURTHER FIGHTING IN SICILY

1. ἃ δὲ λόγου μάλιστα ἄξια ἢ μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἔπραξαν ἢ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους οἱ ἀντιπόλεμοι, τούτων

μνησθήσομαι: 'I will mention the most important actions in which the Athenians and their allies co-operated, whether in attack or defence'. A unique and very interesting programmatic statement by Th. of a general method—selectivity—which in fact he practises throughout his work. But there is nothing comparable in e.g. i. 22. (ii. 1 comes closest: see n. there). See generally *Thucydides*, ch. 2, 'Comprehensiveness or Selectivity?', esp. (on iii. 90) 37 and n. 18, citing Dover (88. 2 n.), 353. As for the present Sicilian section in particular, it contains surprising omissions even granted Th.'s disclaimer; for instance, it is only from the papyrus history mentioned at the introductory n. to 88 above that we know of the circumstances of Charoiades' death, though the bare fact is mentioned, as a past event, at 2 below.

It is true that Antiochus, on whom Th. may have drawn (88. 2 n.), was also explicitly selective (F 2), but Th. cannot here be reproducing Antiochos, because of the avowed Athenian slant of the present passage.

2. Χαροιάδου γὰρ ἤδη τοῦ Ἀθηναίων στρατηγοῦ τεθνηκότος: 'Charoiades, the Athenian general, had been killed . . .'. See above, 1 n. and introductory n. to 88.

δύο φύλαι . . . τῶν Μεσσηνίων: 'two tribes of the Messinians'. The word 'tribe' here refers to a subdivision of the citizen body; for tribes in this sense used as military units at Athens see ii. 34. 3 n. Here and elsewhere I give the modern spelling ('Messina') of the Sicilian town, to distinguish its inhabitants from the Messenians in the Peloponnese. In Greek they are indistinguishable.

91. ATHENIAN EXPEDITIONS (ROUND THE PELOPONNESE; MELOS; TANAGRA)

1. Δημοσθένης τε ὁ Ἀλκισθένης: 'Demosthenes son of Alkisthenes'. The first mention of the famous general, whom Th. seems to have admired greatly, though it is arguable that even so he did not give him enough credit for the success at Pylos: see iv. 30. 4 n. For a summary of his career see Sommerstein's n. on Ar. *Knights*, line 1, and for a fuller assessment M. Treu, 'Der Stratege Demosthenes', *Historia*, 5 (1956), 420 ff.

1-2. ἑξήκοντα δὲ ἐς Μῆλον καὶ δισχιλίους ὀπλίτας ἔστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου. τοὺς γὰρ Μηλίους ὄντας νησιώτας καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας ὑπακούειν οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν ξυμμαχικὸν ἰέναι ἐβούλοντο προσαγαγέσθαι: 'They also sent sixty ships and two thousand hoplites to Melos, under the command of Nikias son of Nikeratos. They wanted to subdue the Melians, who, although they were

islanders, resisted them and would not join their alliance'. This briefly reported expedition acquires interest and importance as a result of the Melian material at the end of Book v, containing the famous Melian Dialogue. I postpone, to the introductory n. to v. 85 ff., discussion of the precise status of the Melians in 416. For the moment we may note (i) that at ii. 9. 4 Melos and Thera were specifically excepted from the Cycladic allies of Athens. (ii) That Melos was allegedly a Spartan colony (v. 84, 89, 106). (iii) That Melos contributed to the Spartan war fund, according to an inscription (ML 67 = Fornara 132, with the addenda at 312 to the *paperback* reprint of 1989) whose date is still uncertain: either the Archidamian War or the 390s. The inscription would be relevant to the present passage of Th. only if it could be proved, as at present it cannot, that it and therefore Melos' contributions to Sparta antedated 426, in which case they might be evidence of a provocatively pro-Spartan attitude on Melos' part which might have led to the present intervention. But the precise dating to 427 (see 32. 2 n.) is no more than an attractive suggestion—though regarded as probable by Andrewes, *HCT* iv. 168—and is certainly not firmly enough established to form the basis of an argument about 426. (iv) That Melos is assessed in the Athenian Tribute Lists in 425, very soon after the abortive expedition which Th. here describes. See ML 69 = *IG* i³. 71 = Fornara 136. The assessment is high (15 talents), but the settlement as a whole is conspicuously optimistic—which is not, however, a reason for denying it *any* relevance to the events of 416. See further below, introductory n. to v. 85 ff., the Melian Dialogue (there is a large literature on whether Melos was in any significant sense tributary after 425 and, if so, whether this contradicts the impression of Melian neutrality given in the Dialogue, at e.g. v. 94).

It seems that the object of the present expedition was simply a desire to 'round off the Athenian Empire in the Aegean': so W. Kierdorf, 'Zum Melier-Dialog des Thukydides', *Rh. Mus.* 105 (1962), 253 ff., at 255. But see, in addition to Gomme's rather sparse commentary, the supplementary remarks, on iii. 91. 1, of Andrewes at *HCT* iv. 156 n. 1, noting that (i) the prearrangement at para. 4 below perhaps implies—despite the large size of Nicias' force, on which Gomme did comment—that he could not have spent too long at Melos without putting his timetable badly out; and (ii) the whole Melos project may just have been 'an excuse to take out a force whose real (and necessarily secret) use was to be against the Boiotians'. See also Holladay (i. 144. 1 n.), 405, 407. On the timetable of Nicias' operations see Bloedow (below, 4 n.), 68, and Develin (i. 93. 3 n.), 124 f. (generally rejecting Bloedow). Develin thinks Nicias' operations on Melos went on into 426/5.

Diod. xii. 65, from Ephoros, suggests that Nicias' operations on Melos were slightly more substantial than Th. allows: see Kierdorf, 253, who, however, ends up rightly bowing to Th.'s greater authority.

3. **ἐς Ὀρωπὸν τῆς πέραν γῆς**: 'to Oropos, opposite Euboia' [the word 'Euboia' is an insertion by Jowett to make the meaning clear]. This is the reading of the manuscripts, discarded by modern editors in favour of *Ὀρωπὸν τῆς Γραικῆς*. But here as at ii. 23. 3 (see n. there on *τὴν γῆν τὴν Πειραικῆν*) the emendation is unjustified, as is shown by Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 113, 158.

For Oropos and its vicissitudes see ii. 23. 3 n. on *ἣν νέμονται Ὀρωπιοί* etc.

4. **οἱ δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως πανδημεὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, Ἴππονίκου τε τοῦ Καλλίου στρατηγούντος καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντος τοῦ Θουκλέους, ἀπὸ σημείου ἐς τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ γῆν ἀπέντων**: 'Meanwhile the entire Athenian force, under the command of Hipponikos son of Kallias and Eurymedon son of Thoukles, marched at a given signal to meet them at the same spot'. This raises very interesting constitutional questions: to what extent was this co-ordinated plan, which depended on secrecy (see Andrewes, above) authorized by or known to the Assembly? Andrewes, in 'The Government of Classical Sparta', *Ehrenberg Studies* (i. 96. 1 n. on *πρόσχημα*), 11, noted that at the comparable though stronger passage iv. 90. 1 (see n. there) Hippokrates is able to order out a levy suddenly and without notice. It is relevant to Th.'s more satisfactory coverage of this kind of issue at this time that these, the middle years of the Archidamian War, are the years when he himself had access to thinking at *strategos* level, see 3. 5 n. on *τοῖς δέ* etc., and *Greek World*, 121 f., for fuller discussion.

For awareness by a Thucydidean speaker of the problem of military security in a democracy see vi. 72. 5: Hermokrates the Syracusan suggests that if there are only a few generals and those few are given full powers, things which ought to be secret will *stay* secret. It is relevant that Hermokrates was perhaps not a very enthusiastic democrat: see n. on vi. 72. 2, Th.'s noticeably warm character assessment.

For Hipponikos son of Kallias, a man of extremely rich and aristocratic family who married Pericles' wife in Pericles' lifetime (Davies, *APF* 262 f.), see Lewis, *JHS* 81 (1961), 121: he seems to have been one of the *two* generals chosen from his tribe in the year 426/5 (normally there was one from each of the ten tribes). This is an honour for which Hipponikos' wealth and birth are sufficient explanation (Lewis). Lewis's suggestion remains attractive despite the attempt of Bloedow, 'Hipponicus and Euthydemus', *Chiron*, 11 (1981), 65 ff., to undermine it by assigning Hipponikos' tenure of the generalship to the previous year

427/6. Develin (i. 93. 3 n.), 126, cp. 125, retains 426/5. On Hipponikos see also Garland, *BSA* 79 (1984), 100.

[5. On this para. see Pritchett, *GSW* iv. 193; below iv. 96. 3 n. on *καὶ ἐπίεσαν* . . .]

92-3. THE SPARTANS SEND A COLONY TO HERAKLEIA TRACHINIA

This is a section whose length shows the importance Th. attached to the project. Certainly Herakleia, even more than Knemos' expedition at ii. 80 (see nn. there) ought to count as a Spartan strategic initiative; see Cawkwell (i. 122. 1 n.), 56. See detailed nn. below for (i) the probability that Th., despite the coverage he gives to the project, nevertheless failed to grasp its significance as a link in a long chain of Spartan interest in central Greece; (ii) the possibility that one additional specific Spartan motive was to get control of a vote on the Delphic Amphictiony, since Herakleia in the fourth cent. at least exercised one of the two Malian votes (for points (i) and (ii) see 92. 1 n. on *Ἡράκλειαν*); and (iii) the possibility that Th. at some stage in the writing of these chs., which he may have tinkered with over a long period, was aware of early fourth-cent. developments at Herakleia (for this point see 92. 4 n. on *ἐπί τε γάρ*). [See I. Malkin, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean* (1994), ch. 8.]

92. 1. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον: 'About the same time'. These two chapters, which are supplemented by Diod. xii. 59, interrupt an essentially Athenian narrative and, like the material about Dekeleia at vii. 27-8, they are unusual in that they anticipate later developments (see 93. 1 n.). Th.'s reasons for including them precisely here presumably include his mention of Lokris, near Herakleia, at the end of the previous chapter. **Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχινίᾳ ἀποικίαν:** 'Herakleia, their colony in Trachinia'. The definite article 'the' implies that it was a well-known place. For basic information about Herakleia in Trachis, at the head of the Malian gulf a little south of the city of Trachis, on a hill just north of the River Asopos, see the article by Y. Béquignon in the *Princeton Encyclopaedia of Classical Sites* (1976). The colony was, as Th. says at 93. 2, a failure: Herakleia's neighbours were hostile from the start and defeated the colonists in a battle in 420/19, whereupon the Boiotians took possession of the place (v. 51-2). But Sparta had probably re-asserted herself by 413 (see Andrewes in *HCT* on viii. 3. 1 *κατὰ τὴν παλαιὰν ἔχθραν* and my n. on that passage). The Herakleiot and a Spartan harmost called Labotes were defeated again in 409/8 (Xen. *Hell.* i. 2. 18), and we hear of *stasis* in 399, which led to the sending out of another

Spartan harmost, Herippidas (Diod. xiv. 38. 4–5). But this situation was again reversed by the Boiotians (Diod. xiv. 82. 6–7, under 395). Finally, Jason of Pherai demolished the place after the battle of Leuktra in 371 (Xen. *Hell.* vi. 4. 27), chiefly to remove an obstacle to his own freedom of movement. The site of Herakleia continued, however, to have strategic importance: see Livy xxxvi. 18 ff., with Briscoe's notes, for Glabrio's Thermopylai campaign of 191 BC, in which Herakleia features prominently. It must have been rebuilt by somebody in the two intervening centuries; certainly it features in post-Leuktran fourth-century, and in Hellenistic, history. For Herakleia at the time of the Gaulish invasion of 280 BC see Paus. x. 21.

For the fourth century see G. Roux, *L'Amphictyonie, Delphes et le Temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon/Paris, 1979), 21: Herakleia supplied one hieromnemon (one of two Malian votes) to the Delphic Amphictiony after 343, something which Flacelière (ii. 83. 3 n.), 40 n. 2, attributed to the Amphictionic influence of the mother-city Sparta. Since no complete Amphictionic lists survive from before 343 it cannot be *proved* that Herakleia had the use of this Malian vote from the beginning of its history in 425—despite the pro-Spartan attitude of the Delphic Oracle at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (see i. 118), and despite the approval of Delphi for the Herakleia project in particular (para. 5 below); Béquignon, *La Vallée du Spercheios* (Paris, 1937), 350 n. 1 noted this approval as an argument in favour of 426. (It is also relevant that at 101. 1 below, Eurylochos assembles his army *at Delphi*.) There is other fifth-century evidence for Spartan interest in the Amphictiony: see Plut. *Them.* 20 for an earlier, failed, attempt in the 470s, and i. 107. 2 n. for the relevance, to the Spartan military initiative there reported, of the Amphictionic vote of the Metropolitan Dorians; also i. 112. 5 n. If Herakleia did not get the Malian vote in 426, what are the alternatives? We should have to find a suitable fourth-century context. Around 400 is one possibility: see for this period generally Andrewes, 'Two Notes on Lysander', *Phoenix*, 25 (1971), 206ff., at 219ff. Or perhaps after the King's Peace of 386—a time of renewed Spartan interest in northern and central Greece. (But not much later; not, surely after the occupation of the Theban Kadmeia later in the 380s.) But 426 is surely very attractive, in which case the important conclusion would follow, that there was an Amphictionic aspect to the Herakleia foundation. For Sparta's weakness in the Amphictiony, where (leaving aside Herakleia) she had to work *via* the one Dorian vote of the 'Dorians of the Metropolis', see i. 107. 2 n. Influence over Herakleia would help to remedy this weakness. Zeilhofer (i. 107. 2 n.), in his otherwise valuable study of Sparta's relations with Delphi and the Amphictiony in the fifth century, does not consider the relevance of the Herakleian vote. See my paper in *HSCP* 1992.

The best discussions of Herakleia from the point of view of Spartan foreign policy are by Andrewes, 'Two Notes ...' (above) and 'Spartan Imperialism?', in *Imperialism in the Ancient World* (i. 75. 3 n.), 91 ff., at 95-9. He argues that the Spartans' ulterior purpose in establishing the colony in 426 went well beyond the three motives, one sentimental and two strategic, given by Th., and that 'there was a continuing group of Spartans who favoured expansion by land to the north': *Imperialism*, 98. Note, however, that one item in Andrewes's argument for particularly vigorous northern expansion in the years around 400 must be left out of account as a concoction of a much later period. The item is the speech *Peri Politeias* attributed to Herodes, on which see now D. Russell, *Greek Declamation* (Cambridge, 1983), 111. Note, with Andrewes 'Lysander', 223, the very significant mention of men of Herakleia, brought by Lysander to Haliartos, at Xen. *Hell.* iii. 5. 6.

We may recall in this general connection the Spartan king Leoty-chidas' Thessalian expedition of the 470s, Hdt. vi. 72, and even such pre-Persian War evidence as Kleomenes' activity in Boiotia at Hdt. vi. 108 (519 BC: see above, 68. 5 n.) and the Thessalian-Spartan connection vaguely alluded to in the opening lines of Pindar's *Tenth Pythian* of 500 BC. See also, for the *pentekontaetia*, i. 107. 2 n. on ἐς Δωριᾶς etc.

As Andrewes notes (*Imperialism*, 97), the 500 Herakleiot hoplites, drafted by Eurylochos at 100. 2 below for an attack on Naupaktos, show the kind of military functions which it was hoped the new colony would perform.

For the name Herakleia see next n., also 5 n. on οἰκισταί etc. ἀπὸ τοιῶσδε γνώμης: 'this was their intention'. To the motives given by Th., Diod. adds that the Spartans were moved by the consideration that their ancestor Herakles was connected with Trachis (at the end of his life: see Sophocles' *Trachiniae*). This may be just embroidery by Diodorus' source Ephoros (see *FGrHist* 70 FF 13-18 for his coverage of the stories of Herakles and the Return of the Herakleidae); but it is just possible that Th. has omitted an argument used at the time of the appeal to Sparta. Cp. perhaps Hdt. v. 43, where the Herakles connection induces Dorieus to try to found a Herakleia in Sicily (late sixth century).

It would be interesting somehow to bring the new Herakleia in Trachis into connection with the more or less contemporary new Herakleia in South Italy ('Lucanian Herakleia'), a refounded version of the old city of Siris; after all, Sparta's nearby colony Taras/Tarentum was the dominant force in the refounded city: Strabo, 264 = *FGrHist* 555 Antiochos F 11, with B. Neutsch, *Siris ed Herakleia* (Urbino, 1968), 6. But though the foundation may date to 433, Antiochos, as I read him, implies

that the new Italian city which replaced Siris was renamed Herakleia at a date somewhat later than the physical refoundation, i.e. (if there was any causal connection at all) the Italian name may just as well have been suggested by the Trachinian, as the other way round.

2. Μηλιῆς οἱ ξύμπαντες εἰσὶ μὲν τρία μέρη, Παράλιοι Ἴριῆς Τραχίνιοι: 'The Malians as a whole are made up of three groups, the Paralians, the Ieraians, and the Trachinians'. Of these three groups the second cannot be precisely located; the first must (to judge from their name) be next to the sea. Trachis is due north of Herakleia.

Οἰταίων: 'the Oitaians'. The region south of Herakleia. Mt. Oita was supposed to be the site of Herakles' funeral pyre: see P. Easterling, Sophocles, *Trachiniai* commentary (Cambridge, 1982), 9f. For the Oitaians see Hdt. vii. 217. 1. We are surely meant to have Hdt.'s Thermopylai campaign generally in mind; compare nn. above on 24 where detailed knowledge of the topography of the battle of Plataia is assumed.

δείσαντες δὲ μὴ οὐ σφίσι πιστοὶ ᾧσι: 'However they were afraid that they could not trust them'. Jowett compares 113. 6 for comparable fears about Athens. Sparta did indeed turn out, as Gomme says, a worse master in the end (see 93 below), but (as we have seen) her military intervention was constantly called for and she always responded; the problems of maintaining so distant, vulnerable, and unpopular an outpost were, however, insuperable, not to be solved by what from the manpower point of view was what Andrewes (*Imperialism*, 98) calls 'imperialism on the cheap'.

ἐλόμενοι πρεσβευτὴν Τεισαμενόν: 'Tisamenos, whom they appointed their envoy'. Why is the name recorded? It may be just the kind of unimportant detail Th. often transmits. But note that, in myth, Tisamenos was the son of Orestes. On the one hand he was an Achaian hero who fought against the Dorian Herakleidai and in one account was killed by them, which would make the choice of a Tisamenos a tactless one in the context of a very Dorian appeal (see 3 below for Doris and 1 n. above on ἀπὸ τοιαύδε γνώμης for Trachis; and note that the Achaians, like the Ionians, are excluded from the Herakleia invitation, 92. 5). On the other hand Tisamenos' bones were brought back to Sparta (Paus. vii. 1. 8) in a gesture which may have been politically motivated: see D. M. Leahy, 'The Bones of Tisamenus', *Historia*, 4 (1955), 26ff. Even if the Trachinian choice of a man named Tisamenos was deliberate it would be a further question whether Th. himself realized or cared about its significance: see 22. 2 n. (on the 'monosandalism' of the fleeing Plataians) for an example of his indifference towards the religious meaning of an item which he nevertheless records. [See A. Wright, *LCM* 19 (1994), 66 f.]

3. **ξυνεπρεσβεύοντο δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ Δωριῆς, ἡ μητρόπολις τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων:** 'The Dorians, who were the mother state of Sparta, joined in the embassy'. See i. 107. 2n. and Alty (i. 95. 1n. on *κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές*), 5 and n. 26. Diod., who is fuller than Th. on the Trachinians, omits Doris.

4. **ἀκούσαντες δέ:** 'When the Spartans heard their appeal'. But see above, 1n. on *Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχινίᾳ ἀποικίαν*: Th.'s formulation conceals a long-standing commitment, at least in some quarters at Sparta, to central and north Greek expansion.

ἐπὶ τε γὰρ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ ναυτικὸν παρασκευασθῆναι ἂν, ὥστ' ἐκ βραχέος τὴν διάβασιν γίγνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θράκης παρόδου χρησίμως ἔξειν: 'A navy could be equipped there if they wanted to attack Euboeia, the crossing to which was short, and it would be very useful for the passage up to Thrace'. For the importance of Euboeia to Athens see ii. 14 and viii. 95. 2, with Cawkwell (i. 122. 1n.), 56. For Thrace, and fears about what Athens was planning there, see ii. 101. 4n., and for Brasidas' campaigns there see Book iv, starting with ch. 78 (where we find Brasidas setting out from, precisely, Herakleia).

The two motives Th. gives are, it has been thought, not quite enough on their own to explain the giant size of the colony: there were surely ways of getting troops across to Euboeia which fell short of building a full-scale navy; and Herakleia is too far west actually to control the Thermopylai pass: Andrewes, *Imperialism*, 96f. (But on the second point it is worth remembering that Herakleia played a key role in the Thermopylai campaign of 191 BC: see above). We can readily agree that Th. failed to bring out important underlying policy considerations. Nevertheless he deserves more credit than he is sometimes given, for this piece of strategic analysis (see *Thucydides*, 196f., against the complaints of Wade-Gery); compare ii. 80. 1n. on *βουλόμενοι* etc. Did Th. live to see the Herakleia trouble of the 390s, discussed above? (Compare ii. 100. 1n. on Archelaos.) That might help to explain the length of the Herakleia digression and the attempt, unusual if not entirely satisfactory, to bring out the longer-term thinking behind it.

5. **πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐν Δελφοῖς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο, κελεύοντας δέ:** 'First they asked the God [Apollo] at Delphi; he told them to go'. On the consultation, so reminiscent of the archaic age of Greek colonization, see Malkin (i. 4n. on *οἰκιστής*), 26, 31, 80 (who thinks that the god's 'command' is really a mere sanction; see, however, *ἐκέλευον* immediately below, where positive encouragement is implied). See also Parker, *CRUX* (i. 25. 1n.), 307: 'though leaving no doubt as to where the initiative lay, Th. does not seem to regard the consultation as an absolute formality.' (On the verb *ἐκέλευον* see Parker's p. 323). For the possibility

that it was now that Herakleia was awarded one of the Malian votes in the Delphic Amphictiony see 1 n. above.

καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκέλευον ἔπεσθαι πλὴν Ἴωνων καὶ Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ἔστιν ὧν ἄλλων ἔθνων: ‘announcing that any Greeks who wished could accompany them, except for the Ionians, Achaians, and some other races’. For the mechanisms of such ‘announcement’ see i. 67. 3 n. (As noted there, the Athenians sent heralds round the Peloponnese before the Thurii project, which was also sanctioned by Apollo, Diod. xii. 10. 4–5). Note, with Alty (above, 3 n.) the evidence for continuing Dorian/Ionian hostility which these exclusions provide.

οἰκισταὶ δὲ τρεῖς Λακεδαιμονίων ἡγήσαντο, Λέων καὶ Ἀλκίδας καὶ Δαμάγων: ‘The leaders of the colony were three Spartans, Leon, Alkidas, and Damagon’. Malkin thinks that this plurality of ‘oikists’ was another example of a new and less distinguished type of oikist, a mere temporary organizer; compare 34. 4 n. above for Notion. How true is it that the three named Spartans were temporary? Malkin (80) appeals to Graham (i. 24. 2 n.), 38 f., who admits that we know nothing further about (i) Damagon (but see below for his name). Graham tabulates (ii) Alkidas’ earlier career (but that is hardly relevant to the position *after* 426). Finally, there is (iii) Leon. Here there is a risk of circular argument. The ‘Leon’ entry in Poralla’s *Prosopographie der Lakedaimonier* (Breslau, 1913), 83 f., cautiously identifies the various Leons in Th., Xenophon, and Plutarch: Th. iii. 92 (the present passage, 426); v. 44, Xen. *Hell.* ii. 3. 10 (ambassador in 420 and ephor in 419); Th. viii. 61 (commander in 411); Plut. *Artax.* 21. 6 (father of Antalkidas, the man responsible for the King’s Peace of 386). There is also an Olympic victory in 440. This identification may well be right, but the argument for identification rests on an unstated assumption that an oikist of 426 *could* be available for service elsewhere, so strictly we cannot use the fullness of Leon’s career, thus conflated, in order to prove that assumption. Höhle, *Olympia* (i. 6. 5 and iii. 8 nn.), 157, identifies oikist and Olympic victor, but not eponymous ephor. [See Woodman and Martin, *Annals of Tacitus Book 3* (1996), 492.]

However, it is likely enough that the original oikists were indeed soon withdrawn, because when we hear next about Herakleia, the Spartan ‘governors’, ἀρχοντες, mentioned are called Xenares and Hegesippidas (v. 51–2); that is, the three oikists are no longer in evidence: Graham, 39. So too Leschhorn (i. 4 n. on οἰκιστής), 162.

Why was Alkidas chosen? Gomme’s explanation is purely political (discredited figure ‘rewarded with an easy [?] post in the aristocratic manner’; compromise between Brasidas and his enemies). But in view of the Herakles connection (above, esp. but not only the Diodorus

evidence: the place was after all being called Herakleia) it may also be relevant that Alkides or Doric Alkidās ('descendant of Alkaios') was one of the names of Herakles, see Wilamowitz, *Herakles*², 49, citing Pindar, *Olympian*, vi. 68 (cp., in Latin poetry, 'Alcides' for Herakles at e.g. Virgil, *Aeneid*, vi. 801). Compare what was said above at 2 n. about Tisamenos. Note also that Damagōn's name, 'leader-out of the *damos* or people', is very appropriate for an oikist. That significant names might be a factor in the selection of oikists is suggested by Miltiades the oikist of an Athenian colony to the Adriatic in the time of Alexander, Tod 200 = Harding 121. A famous Miltiades had been the oikist of the Chersonese back in the sixth century; the choice of a fourth-century descendant or homonym was surely a talismanic gesture.

Th. is generally indifferent to the significance of names as such, and this is one of the things which marks him off from Hdt. and many other classical Greeks, see *Thucydides*, 94 n. 88, and my paper in *Catling Studies*; to the references in those places add Jebb's excellent n. on Sophocles, *Ajax*, 430; and G. Nagy (i. 132. 2 n.), 69 ff., 146 n. 2 to his para. 9, and 297 ff. Thus Hdt. makes Leotychidas say 'I accept the omen' when he hears the name 'Hegesistratos', 'leader of the army', ix. 91. 2 (but D. M. Lewis notes that not even Hdt. picks up everything; he says without comment that Melanthios was the name of the Athenian commander sent to help the Ionian revolt—a suitable name: Melanthos was the mythical king of Attica in whose time the Ionians settled in Athens).

6. καὶ εἶρξαν τὸ κατὰ Θερμοπύλας κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ στενόν: 'and blockaded the defile at Thermopylai'. Commentators have protested that Thermopylai is too far west to block off Herakleia's likely enemies, who were to the north (see Gomme; or Andrewes, *Imperialism*, 305 n. 18, for a succinct statement). But the hostile Thessalians to the north, singled out at 93. 2, were not the only enemies—Herakleia needed protection against attacks from the south as well. It was after all the Boiotians who subsequently did most damage to the place. And the Oitaians were south, not north, of Herakleia.

93. 1. τῆς πόλεως ταύτης ξυνοικιζομένης: 'while the colonists were collecting' [lit. 'when the city was being synoikized']. For synoikism see Moggi (i. 10. 2 n. on οὔτε ξυνοικισθείσης) and generally ii. 15–16 nn. Herakleia is not normally cited as an example of a synoikism—it does not feature in Moggi's collection at all—but it should perhaps count as one, in both the physical and the political senses: what was being created was both a new physical entity (with inhabitants drawn from scattered areas), and a new political centre.

ὅτι βραχὺς ἔστιν ὁ διάπλους: 'the crossing is ... short'. This inelegantly echoes 92. 4; perhaps further evidence that Th. chewed over the Herakleia problem over a long period: see n. there.

τὸ Κήναιον: 'Cape Kenaion'. The cape which juts into the Malian gulf. See Sophocles, *Trachiniai*, 237 f., with Jebb's n.; 753 f.; 788.

οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο ἀπ' αὐτῆς δεινὸν οὐδέν: 'no harm whatever was done'. This (see 92. 1 n. on *ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον*) is clear evidence that Th. is looking back from a later, perhaps a very much later, vantage-point.

2. γενομένων τὸ πρῶτον καὶ πάνυ πολλούς: 'although originally they had been very numerous'. Diod. says there were 10,000, of whom 6,000 were Spartans and other Peloponnesians, while the other 4,000 were supplied by the rest of the Greece. These figures are usually simply rejected as silly exaggeration, but perhaps that is too positivist an attitude; see H. Schaefer, '*ΠΟΛΙΣ ΜΥΡΙΑΝΔΡΟΣ*', *Historia*, 10 (1961), 292 ff., for an interesting collection of material, especially from Diodorus, which suggests that 10,000 was considered a theoretically optimum total for a city. Schaefer's study starts with Herakleia.

οἱ ἄρχοντες αὐτῶν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων οἱ ἀφικνούμενοι τὰ πράγματά τε ἔφθειρον καὶ ἐς ὀλιγανθρωπίαν κατέστησαν, ἐκφοβήσαντες τοὺς πολλοὺς χαλεπῶς τε καὶ ἔστιν ἃ οὐ καλῶς ἐξηγούμενοι. 'But another main cause of the ruin and depopulation of the place was the behaviour of the governors sent out from Sparta, who frightened many people away by their severe and often unjust administration'. Andrewes (*Imperialism*, 99) rightly compares i. 77. 6, from the speech of the Athenians at Sparta. For Herakleia specifically, see v. 52, where Hegesippidas is said to have governed *οὐ καλῶς*, 'unjustly' (the Greek echoes the present passage, which was perhaps written after the Book v passage). It is tempting to think that Th. got his information from a disgruntled settler. We do not have comparable information about archaic colonies; how many failed in the same way and for the same reasons? (Corinth exercised a strong controlling hand on her dependencies, i. 56. 2 n.) For *οὐ καλῶς* cp. 32. 2 n. (Alkidas).

The word for 'depopulation', *ὀλιγανθρωπία*, is more usually associated with Sparta itself (as in a famous remark of Aristotle, *Pol.* 1270^a33).

94-98. ATHENIAN ATTACK ON LEUKAS; DEMOSTHENES IN AITOLIA

For the whole section 94-114 see H.-P. Stahl, *Thukydides: Die Stellung des Menschen im geschichtlichen Prozess* (Munich, 1966 = *Zetemata*, Heft 40), 129 ff.

94. 1. καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα νεῶν Ἀθηναῖοι: 'the thirty Athenian ships'. See 91. 1.

ἐν Ἐλλομενῶ τῆς Λευκαδίας: 'Ellomenos in Leukadia'. Most manuscripts have 'Arkadia'; Leukadia, the reading of one manuscript, is clearly preferable and would mean 'the mainland territory (*peraia*) of Leukas'; see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 316 and n. 23.

Ἀκαρνᾶσί τε πᾶσιν, οἳ πανδημεὶ πλὴν Οἰνιαδῶν ξυνέσποντο: 'the Akarnians, who followed them with their whole army, all but the inhabitants of Oiniadai'. See ii. 102. 2 n.

2. τοῦ Ἴσθμοῦ: 'the isthmus'. See 81. 1 n.

οἱ δὲ Ἀκαρνᾶνες: 'The Akarnanians'. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 316, suggests that Demosthenes' Corcyraean allies joined in the plea.

ῥαδίως: 'easily'. See next n.

3. ῥαδίως καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἡπειρωτικὸν τὸ ταύτη Ἀθηναίοις προσποιήσιν: 'he would easily bring the rest of the mainland under Athenian control'. As Stahl (132) notes, the description of the 'bait' recalls the language of ii. 80. 1, where Knemos was lured by hopes of 'easily', ῥαδίως, winning Akarnania, Zakynthos, and Naupaktos. As we shall see, there are other reminiscences of ii. 80. Note also the repeated ῥαδίως in the present ch. (see 2 above and 5 below with ii. 3. 2 n.). For a comparable parallel presentation see introductory n. to ii. 93-4 (Knemos anticipates Alkidas at iii. 29-32). Cp. also iv. 24. 4.

Throughout the narrative Demosthenes is represented as sole agent, no reference being made to any instructions from, or need to consult, the Assembly (compare what was said above about Hipponikos, 91. 4 n.). It is not until the end of ch. 98 that we are explicitly told that Demosthenes 'feared the anger of the Athenians'; see, however, 95. 1 n. on δύνασθαι etc.

4. τὸ γὰρ ἔθνος μέγα μὲν εἶναι τὸ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν καὶ μάχιμον, οἰκοῦν δὲ κατὰ κώμας ἀτειχίστους, καὶ ταύτας διὰ πολλοῦ: 'The Aitolians, they said, were a large and warlike people, but they lived in unwallled villages, which were widely scattered'. For the Aitolians in particular see i. 5. 3 n., and S. Bommeljé and others, *Aetolia and the Aetolians: Towards the Interdisciplinary Study of A Greek Region* (Utrecht, 1987), 23, claiming on the strength of field surveys that 'contrary to literary references' [like the present passage] a number of fortifications have been found; the authors, however, accept the difficulty of dating these and admit that the most densely inhabited period in Aitolia is the Hellenistic. [See also 97. 2 n. on ἐπὶ Αἰγιτίου: Aigition a *polis*.]

For 'unwallled villages' as general evidence of the vulnerability of early settlements see i. 5. 1, using language very similar to the present passage. (Note, however, i. 10: similar conditions in Sparta were not accompanied

by any military weakness.) Th.'s views in the *Archaeology* were surely conditioned by what he thought he knew about places like Aitolia in his own time.

καὶ σκευῆ ψιλῆ χρώμενον: 'as they had only light-armed soldiers'. There is no contradiction between this passage and the implication of i. 5–6 that the Aitolians (among other primitive races) were conspicuous for carrying weapons; nothing was there said about the *kind* of weapons carried. For the backward Aitolians 'fighting by different rules' from other Greeks see Snodgrass in *Peer-Polity Interaction* (ii. 15. 2 n. on ἐς τῆν νῦν πόλιν), at 52.

5. πρῶτον μὲν Ἀποδωτοῖς, ἔπειτα δὲ Ὀφιονεῦσι: 'the Apodotians, then the Ophioneans'. The Apodotians (for whom see also next n.) lived in south-east Aitolia, adjoining Ozolian Lokris on the River Daphnos; the Ophionians were further north and the Eurytians (below) were the northernmost of all. See Flacelière (ii. 83. 3 n.), 8.

Lewis, *Towards a Historian's Text*, 112, notes the bare possibility that Th.'s text had 'Apobotoi' (the reading of Stephanus of Byzantium).

καὶ μετὰ τούτους Εὐρυτάσιν, ὅπερ μέγιστον μέρος ἐστὶ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν, ἀγνωστότατοι δὲ γλώσσαν καὶ ὠμοφάγοι εἰσὶν, ὡς λέγονται: 'and after that the Eurytians. The last are the largest tribe of the Aitolians; they speak a dialect more unintelligible than any of their neighbours, and are believed to eat raw meat'. Like the Thracian digression in Book ii (see introductory n. to ii. 95–100) this Aitolian material is a rare piece of ethnographic writing in Th. For the interest in language compare ii. 68, the Amphilochian Argives; and for the alleged raw meat-eating habits of these Eurytians (for whose geographical position see previous n.) see J. Hornblower, *Hieronymus of Cardia* (Oxford, 1981), 151, discussing barbarian diet as featured in Greek historians. On the associations of raw meat-eating see also J. M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad* (Chicago, 1975), 197, discussing *Iliad*, xxiv. 207 f. and xvi. 155 ff. Cp. C. Antonetti, *Les Étoléens* (Paris, 1990).

Westlake (i. 13. 2 n.), 350 f., thinks that the words 'are believed', ὡς λέγονται, may indicate that the statements about the Eurytians are based on information from Athenian survivors of the campaign; and calls the whole Eurytian sentence a 'largely irrelevant parenthesis inserted by [Th.] himself'. [On the whole section see P. Funke in *Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre*, 4 (1997), paper discussing *polis*-formation in Aitolia.]

For Philip V in Polybius xviii. 5. 8 it is the Apodotai (along with the Agraioi and the Amphilochians) who are the utter barbarians among the Aitolians, but see Walbank's n., citing Woodhouse for the (not wholly convincing) suggestion that this was just for the alliteration.

ῥαδίως καὶ τὰλλα προσχωρήσειν: 'the others would easily be induced to come over to him'. [lit. 'would easily come over to him' which is not quite English]. Note 'easily', *ῥαδίως*, again: see 3 n.

95. 1. δύνασθαι ἄν κατὰ γῆν ἔλθειν ἐπὶ Βοιωτοῦς: 'he could make his way by land to attack Boiotia'. A very ambitious idea, which, as Holladay (i. 144. 1 n.), 413, remarks, looks back to the First Peloponnesian War when Athens had invaded Boiotia and got control of it (i. 108. 3); then too there was a Phokian aspect (the Phokians were Athens' allies in the 450s (see below) and Demosthenes seeks to co-operate with them now). Of the whole plan Holladay remarks that Demosthenes must have 'been aware of a climate of opinion in Athens which would make it acceptable'; this is so cautiously put that it is hard to quarrel with, but see 94. 3 n.: Assembly approval is conspicuous by its absence in this whole section.

ἐς Φωκέας, οἱ προθύμως ἐδόκουν κατὰ τὴν Ἀθηναίων αἰεὶ ποτε φιλίαν ξυστρατεύειν ἢ κἂν βία προσαχθῆναι: '... the Phokians. They would probably be eager to join the expedition because they had always been friendly to Athens, or, if they were unwilling, they could be coerced'. At ii. 9 the Phokians were listed on the Peloponnesian side, but were allies of the Athenians in the First Peloponnesian War, i. 111. 1 and 112. 5.

ἐς Σόλλιον: 'to Sollion'. See ii. 30. 1 n.

2. τριακοσίοις τοῖς ἐπιβάταις: 'three hundred marines [*epibatatai*]'. See 98. 4 n. Since there were 30 ships (91. 1) it follows that there were normally 10 *epibatatai* to a ship: see Dover on vi. 43.

3. οἱ δὲ Ὀζόλαι οὗτοι Λοκροὶ ξύμμαχοι ἦσαν: 'The Ozolian Lokrians were allies of the Athenians'. As distinct from the northern (Opuntian and Epiknemidian) Lokrians, who were allies of the Spartans, ii. 9 and n. See further 101. 1.

96. 1. ἐν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Νεμείου τῷ ἱερῷ, ἐν ᾧ Ἡσίοδος ὁ ποιητὴς λέγεται ὑπὸ τῶν ταύτη ἀποθανεῖν, χρησθὲν αὐτῷ ἐν Νεμέᾳ τοῦτο παθεῖν: 'at the temple of Nemean Zeus, where the poet Hesiod is said to have been killed by the inhabitants in fulfilment of an oracle which foretold that he should die at Nemea'. The point being that there was a much more famous Nemea in the Peloponnese. See Marinatos, *JHS* 101 (1981), 139, who denies that Th.'s intention was to discredit an oracle which did after all come true in a sense, and compares the oracle about Kambyzes dying at Agbatana, Hdt. iii. 64 (he died not at the famous Agbatana in Media but an obscure place of that name in Syria; How and Wells compare Shakespeare, 2 *Henry IV*, iv. v. Henry dies not in Jerusalem on crusade but in the Jerusalem chamber in London). For

other examples—Epaminondas; Hannibal—see M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* (London, 1981), 3 n. 5. See also Veyne (ii. 17. 2 n.) for a very confident statement that Th. believed in oracles like the present one.

But on 'is said' here see Westlake (i. 13. 2 n.), 359, who does think that Th. wished to express scepticism about the story (which he thinks comes from a source different from that used in the surrounding narrative), and that Th. 'may have been influenced by his customary uneasiness about oracles'. Westlake's n. 37 dismisses a suggestion of Luschnat, *RE Suppl.* xiv (1971), 773, that this and the reference to the barbarous habits of the Eurytians (above) are intended to lend tragic colour.

It seems to me that the present instance is hardly revealing, one way or the other, about Th.'s belief or disbelief in oracles (unlike the Pelargikon oracle at ii. 17 or the 'Dorian War' at ii. 54, nothing hangs on it). It does have this much in common with the Eurytians reference, that Th. uses it to spice the narrative. (Cp. the colourful ch. 104, which relieves a long section of military writing.) The present passage hardly fits Sieveking's rather solemn general thesis (i. 24. 1 n.) about the strict relevance of all geographical information in Th.

On the death of Hesiod see Plutarch *Mor.* 162 and (on the various traditions about the reason why he was killed) Paus. ix. 31. 6, with Peter Levi's n. in the Penguin edn.; also Lefkowitz (above). For 'Hesiod the poet' here see i. 21. 1 n. on *οὔτε ὡς ποιηταί*; unlike i. 21 this is a normal use of the description, comparable to Hdt. v. 95. 1, 'Alkaios the poet'.

2. **Ποτιδανίαν**: 'Potidania'. This and the other two Aitolian places were probably south of the River Daphnos: see Flacelière, 9.

τὴν λείαν ἐς Εὐπάλιον τῆς Λοκρίδος ἀπέπεμψεν: 'and sent back the booty to Eupalion in Lokris'. The word for booty (*λεία*) used here, and on six other occasions in Th., is said to be appropriate to booty taken from captured towns (as at ii. 94. 3), by contrast with *σκύλα*, arms stripped from a dead enemy (ii. 13. 4 n.): see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, i. 55 f. Note the insistence, so true to the facts of Greek warfare, on the booty won (see further n. on 114. 1). The most striking passage in all Th. is at vi. 95, where booty (*λεία*) won by the Argives, as a result of a briefly recorded invasion of the Thyreatis, is said to have realized 25 talents; a large sum which Th.—quantifying for once—found more remarkable than have his commentators.

3. **πολλῇ χειρί**: 'in great force'. According to Stahl (130) this statement of the enemy build-up of forces is indirect criticism of Demosthenes by Th., expressed *even before* the description in the next chapter of his state of mind; see below for Stahl's detection of more direct criticism at 97. 2. **καὶ Καλλιῆς**: 'and Kallieans'. Their city is probably the later Kallipolis,

mentioned at e.g. Polyb. xx. 11. 11 and Paus. x. 22. The site of Kallipolis is not certainly at the strong point of Velouchovo on the road from Delphi to Naupaktos: see Walbank's n. on the Polybius passage, preferring another site; C. Habicht, *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece* (Berkeley and London, 1985), 33, opts too confidently for Velouchovo, without citing Gomme or Walbank. See also 97. 3 n. below on Aigion.

97. 2. τῆ τύχῃ ἐλπίσας, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ ἤναντιοῦτο, τοὺς Λοκροὺς οὐκ ἀναμείνας: 'felt confident in his own good fortune, since everything was going favourably. So he did not wait for the Lokrians'. This (as Stahl notes, 130 n. 6) closely corresponds to what was said about Knemos, who set off 'without waiting for the ships from Corinth' (ii. 80. 8). Stahl regards the reference to confidence in good fortune, τύχῃ, as direct criticism of Demosthenes, but luck is a very desirable quality in a general.

ψιλῶν γὰρ ἀκοντιστῶν ἐνδεῆς ἦν μάλιστα: 'his lack of javelin-men'. For javelin-throwing as the 'time-honoured function of the light-armed soldiers in Greece' see Snodgrass, *Arms and Armour of the Greeks* (ii. 13. 8 n. on ξὺν ἵπποτοξόταις), 78 ff. See ii. 79. 4 n. for Th.'s interest in light-armed troops, whose potential was to be fully realized in the fourth century, though such troops never displace the hoplite in classical warfare. Already in Homer the Lokrians (*which* Lokrians, is not specified) are singled out as light-armed troops, *Iliad*, xiii. 712 ff., with M. L. West, *CR* 29 (1979), 136, review of book by J. Latacz.

ἐπὶ Αἰγιτίου: 'towards Aigion'. Not certainly identified; one possibility is Velouchovo, already mentioned at 96. 3 n. above in connection with Kallipolis; but see Gomme on the present passage and Walbank (cited at 96. 3 n.). On present evidence Aigion should be left without a modern, and Velouchovo without an ancient, equivalent. [Note that Aigion is a *polis* (OCT line 4), cp. 94. 4 n. on τὸ γὰρ . . . , and M. H. Hansen, *Acts . . . Copenhagen Polis Centre*, 2 (1995), 39 f.]

98. 1. μέχρι μὲν οὖν οἱ τοξόται εἶχόν τε τὰ βέλη: 'While their archers had arrows'. On this passage see J. K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), 117: even when the hoplites' auxiliary forces (here, as the archers) out-ranged the enemy, they would eventually run out of ammunition: 'the hoplite must charge out his tormentors'. (Note that at Xen. *Hell.* iv. 4. 16 the light-armed troops will not go within a javelin-throw of the Spartan hoplites.) The narrative in this ch. is exceptionally vivid, culminating in the moving comment at para. 4: see below.

2. πῦρ κομισάμενοι περιεπίμπρασαν: 'brought fire and burnt the

wood around them'. See iv. 30. 1 (Demosthenes draws on his memory of this episode).

3. **πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη τῆς φυγῆς καὶ τοῦ ὀλέθρου:** 'So the Athenian army tried every means of escape and died in all kinds of ways'. For expressions of this favourite Thucydidean type see i. 109. 1 n.

4. **ἀπέθανον δὲ τῶν τε ξυμμάχων πολλοὶ καὶ αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων ὀπλίται περὶ εἴκοσι μάλιστα καὶ ἑκατόν. τοσοῦτοι μὲν τὸ πλήθος καὶ ἡλικία ἢ αὐτῇ οὗτοι βέλτιστοι δὴ ἄνδρες ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τῷδε ἐκ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως διεφθάρησαν.** 'Many of the allies were killed, and about a hundred and twenty of the Athenian heavy-armed, all in the flower of their youth; they were the very finest men whom the city of Athens lost during the war'. On Th.'s attitude to war (as opposed to his interest in warfare) see *Thucydides*, 157 ff.: his explicit authorial comments on the expenditure of human life are so rare that they stand out conspicuously when as here he does make them. See also V. D. Hanson, *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece* (London, 1989), 16. Note, in the present passage, the characteristic superlative, the 'very finest' men . . .

There is a puzzle about Th.'s language here; if the 300 *epibatai* of 95. 2 were drawn from the thetic class, as usual (see Dover on vi. 43 and Andrewes on viii. 24. 2; iii. 16. 1 is explicitly exceptional), it is a little surprising that they are here singled out, and that they are firmly called hoplites: see Andrewes on the crucial passage viii. 24. 2, apparently allowing the possibility that *epibatai* were normally hoplites after all. I defer discussion to my n. on that passage.

5. **φοβούμενος τοὺς Ἀθηναίους:** 'he was afraid of the Athenians'. A revealing remark: see 94. 3 n., and compare Nikias at vii. 14. 2.

99. WARFARE IN THE WEST

These 31 words are an extreme instance of a chopping-up of the narrative so as to distribute it between different areas of warfare.

τῷ ἸΑληκι ποταμῷ: 'The river Alex'. The modern Fiume Piscopi, between Lokri and Rhegion on the very toenail of Italy.

100-102. PELOPONNESIAN INVASION OF LOKRIS AND ATTEMPT ON NAUPAKTOS

100. 1. **Αἰτωλοὶ προπέμψαντες πρότερον ἔς τε Κόρινθον καὶ ἔς Λακεδαίμονα πρέσβεις:** 'the Aitolians, who some time before had

sent . . . an embassy to Corinth and Sparta'. This successful mission may well have resulted in the (certainly fifth-century) alliance, preserved on stone and first published in 1976, between Sparta and the Aitolians; a mysterious community, presumably Aitolian, called the Erxadieis features in the reciprocal military obligations set out at the end of the treaty. For texts see *SEG* xxvi. 461 and ML 67 *bis*, in the addenda to the revised edn. of 1988.

2. τούτων ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι ἐξ Ἡρακλείας τῆς ἐν Τραχίνοι πόλεως τότε νεοκτίστου οὔσης: 'including five hundred from Herakleia, the newly-founded city in Trachis'. See the end of the n. at 92. 1 above on *Ἡράκλειαν* etc., citing Andrewes: this indicates one of the colony's intended functions.

101. 1. ξυλλεγέντος δὲ τοῦ στρατεύματος ἐς Δελφούς: 'When the army had assembled at Delphi'. See 92. 1 n. above on *Ἡράκλειαν* etc. for the close ties between Sparta and Delphi at this time. It is interesting to find Delphi used as a place of muster, one of the advantages (for Sparta) of her close relationship with Delphi. Troops told to assemble at Delphi would have no excuse for failing to find the assembly point.

καὶ ἅμα τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐβούλετο ἀποσῆσαι αὐτούς: 'and he also wished to detach them from their Athenian alliance'. See 95. 3 n.

2. Μυανέας . . . ἔπειτα Ἴπνέας καὶ Μεσσαπίους καὶ Τριταιέας καὶ Χαλαίους καὶ Τολοφωνίους καὶ Ἡσσίους καὶ Οἰανθέας: 'the Myoneans . . . then the Ipneans, Messapians, Tritaean, Chalaian, Tolophonians, Hessians, and Oiantheans'. It seems that these Ozolian Lokrian communities, some of them coastal, are enumerated from east to west: see L. Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest* (Paris, 1952), vol. i, ch. 2, with Fraser's review in *Gnomon* 26 (1954), 251 f. (cp. i. 6. 2 n. on *περὶ τε Λοκρούς* etc.). Lerat offers identifications of the various sites; in particular he identifies Chaleion with the modern Galaxidhi, previously thought to be the site of Oianthea (as by Tod in his introduction to no. 34, a treaty between Oianthea and Chaleion of about 450 BC). Th.'s spellings are not all correct (in the sense that the proper names he mentions are found differently spelt on Delphic inscriptions): see Gomme, 410. But I am not confident enough, about what Th. actually wrote, to feel justified in emending the text or tr.

For Isos/Hessos see Walbank's n. on Polybius xviii. 3. 1; it was the home town of a well-known Hellenistic figure, Alexander Isios.

καὶ Ὑαῖοι: 'the Hyaians'. Not necessarily to be emended to *Ὑλίοι*: see ML, p. 24, comm. on their no. 13.

102. 2. Μολύκρειον: 'Molykreion'. See ii. 84. 4 n.

τὴν Κορινθίων μὲν ἀποικίαν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ ὑπήκοον: 'a colony of the Corinthians subject to Athens'. See i. 30. 2 n. on *Λευκάδα* etc.

3. **Δημοσθένης δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος:** 'Demosthenes the Athenian'. From the way Demosthenes is here described (not 'Demosthenes the general') Fornara, *Athenian Board of Generals* (Wiesbaden, 1971), 57, followed by Develin (i. 93. 3 n.), 127, derives support for the view that Demosthenes was no longer general after the expiry of his generalship for 427/6. This is probably right though the argument from terminology is hardly compelling as far as the present passage goes; more significant is the language of 105. 3 and iv. 2. 2: see nn. there. Briefly, the view here followed is that Demosthenes was general for 427/6, till the end of his term (rather than being actually deposed); stayed in Akarnania in 426/5; was re-elected in spring 425 (and is thus general-elect at iv. 2. 2, where he is described as *ιδιώτης*, 'not in command', lit. 'a private person'), and so general again in 426/5.

τὴν ἐκ τῆς Λευκάδος ἀναχώρησιν: 'his withdrawal from Leukas'. See 94. 3 ff.

5. οὐκ ἐπὶ Πελοποννήσου, ἀλλ' ἐς τὴν Αἰολίδα τὴν νῦν καλουμένην, Καλυδῶνα καὶ Πλευρῶνα καὶ ἐς τὰ ταύτη χωρία: 'did not return to the Peloponnese, but retreated to what is now known as the country of Aiolis: to Kalydon and Pleuron and other places in the neighbourhood'. This punctuation seems preferable to putting a comma after 'Aiolis', which would produce the sense 'to Aiolis, to the places which are now called Kalydon etc.' I have changed Jowett. For a suggestion that this 'Aiolis' was at this time actually under the control (not of the Aitolians as is usually thought but) of the Achaians on the other side of the Corinthian gulf, see S. Bommeljé, 'Aeolis in Aetolia: Thuc. 3. 102. 5 and the Origins of the Aetolian *ethnos*', *Historia*, 37 (1988), 297 ff.

103. MORE FIGHTING IN SICILY

3. **μετὰ Προξένου τοῦ Καπάτωνος:** 'under Proxenos the son of Kapaton'. Or perhaps the second name should be spelt 'Kaparon': see Schwyzer, *DGE* 365 for a fifth-century dedication from Italian Lokri: *Καπάρον καὶ Προξένο ἀνέθηκαν*. The relevance of this inscription to the present passage of Th. was noticed by B. Keil, 'Thucydideum', *Hermes*, 50 (1915), 635f. See also L. Robert, *Collection Froehner*, i. *Inscriptions grecques* (Paris, 1936), no. 82, at p. 128 for another possible Proxenos (as a proper name) in an inscription, also fifth-century, from Italian Lokri. As Robert implies, all three mentions of the name Proxenos—one

Thucydidean and the other two epigraphic—may refer to the same distinguished Lokrian.

104. THE ATHENIANS PURIFY DELOS AND RE-ESTABLISH THE DELIAN FESTIVAL

This 'purification' of Delos had already been mentioned at i. 8. 1. For the present ch. see Westlake, 'Irrelevant Notes in Thucydides', *Essays*, 17 ff., and A. Heubeck, 'Thukydidēs III 104', *Wiener Studien*, 79 (1966), 148 ff., especially on the use of the Homeric Hymn. There are illuminating remarks about the present ch. of Th. in F. Jacoby, 'Der homerische Apollonhymnus', *SBBerl. Akad.* 15 (1933), 680 ff., at 689-92 (= *Kleine philologische Schriften*, i (Berlin, 1961), 139 ff.

(A) The purification and re-establishment of the festival were major events, judging from the space Th. thinks them worth giving (see further (B) below). The purification was ordained by an oracle of some kind (see below, para. 1 n. on *κατὰ χρησμόν δὴ τινα*). Nevertheless it is legitimate to look for reasons of policy which could have led Athens either to solicit, or so wholeheartedly to comply with, such an oracle. In this first section (A), I consider the purification and the re-establishment of the festival in their political and religious aspects, reserving literary questions to (B). See also my article in *HSCP* 1992.

(i) *Who in particular was responsible?* Three names come into question, Nikias, Kleonymos, and Th. himself.

Strictly, we should follow Th. and say 'Athens' or 'the Athenians' purified Delos; there is absolutely no evidence for the common assertion that the purification was the work of Nikias. (The idea is traceable at least as far back as the first edn. of Classen, who however merely says, with a reference to vii. 50, that this was a time when the pious Nikias was very influential, so he may have had something to do with the purification. This is innocuous as far as it goes, but Nikias was neither the only influential, nor the only god-fearing, Athenian of the 420s.) That Nikias 'carried out' the purification is stated as a fact by R. Garland, *The Greek Way of Death* (ii. 34. 1 n.), 45, who cites only the present passage of Th. Only slightly more cautious is M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems* (Oxford, 1985), 51, who says that Nikias led the Athenian contingent in 426/5 to the first of the revived Delian festivals and suggests that Nikias invented the story of an earlier purification by Epimenides as a 'precedent' for his own actions. The only ancient support for any of this is—

(a) Plut. *Nik.* 3. 5, which describes the splendid and extravagant way in which Nikias led the Athenian *theoria* or pilgrimage to Delos in a year which West (51 n. 51) admits is unknown, but is 'usually assumed' to be

426 (not true: he is perhaps thinking of scholars like Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (Gotha, 1893–1904), iii². 1080, or Adcock in *CAH* v¹. 230; but see below for the better view of Boeckh, Kirchner, and J. K. Davies). However, if Nikias was responsible for the actual purification it is surprising, and I stress this, that Plutarch's *Life* at no point comes anywhere near saying so. Moreover, the Plutarch ch. clearly says that Nikias tightened things up at Delos, after an initial period in which the Athenian delegation looked disorganized (the disorganized period is surely not that before 426, when the festival was not just disorganized but more or less in abeyance, para. 6 below). This would actually impose a date *later* than 426. So rightly A. Boeckh, *Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, ii³ (Berlin, 1896), 85, dating Nikias' 'architheoria', or leadership of the delegation, to 418/17. Boeckh is followed by Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* (Berlin, 1901–3), Laidlaw, *History of Delos* (Oxford, 1933), 70, and Davies, *APF*, giving other references. (As Boeckh says, we can hardly suppose Plutarch to have been thinking of the small annual festival, for which see 2 n. below.) [See *IG* i³. 1474.]

(b) An odd story, Diog. Laert. i. 110, that Epimenides the Cretan purified Athens after the Kylonian episode (see i. 126) at the instance of a much earlier 'Nikias son of Nikeratos', on which story see Davies, *APF* 403. This may indeed be a concoction of the Peloponnesian War period, spun out of the famous Nikias' known general tendencies: see Davies's references (to which add G. L. Huxley, 'Nikias, Crete and the Plague', *GRBS* 10 (1969), 235 ff., actually accepting the historicity of a visit to Crete by the famous Nikias after the plague); but that is a far cry from providing a link between the famous Nikias and the Delian purification of 426. (Note that Connor's attempts to provide a hard Cretan link between Epimenides and the famous Nikias, by making the latter a *proxenos* for Cretan Gortyn, fails for reasons given at ii. 85. 5 n.—though the occurrence of the name Nikias on Crete remains interesting in view of the Epimenides story.)

Kleonymos' name entered the discussion in 1985, with the publication by D. M. Lewis of an Athenian decree found on Delos probably proposed by Kleonymos (for whom see ML 65 = Fornara 128, ML 68 = Fornara 133), and dating to 426/5. See *ZPE* 60 (1985), 108, discussing *Inscriptions de Délos* no. 80. It was then suggested by H. Mattingly, 'Methodology in Fifth-Century Greek History', *Échos du monde classique/Classical Views*, 32, ns 7 (1988), 321 ff., at 321, that Kleonymos could now be 'surely' associated with the policy of purifying Delos in 426/5. 'Surely' is too strong (Lewis declined to speculate on the content of the new decree), but the coincidence is certainly worth noting. [See R. Brock, *Mnemosyne*, 49 (1996), 321–7.]

If after expressing all this scepticism I may be allowed a conjecture of my own it would be that Th. himself, with his known antiquarian interests, had something to do with the purification of Delos: see i. 8. 1 for his citation of archaeological evidence discovered at the time, the 'Karian' bones on Delos.

(ii) *The Domestic Aspect: Purification after the Plague.* Diod. xii. 58. 6, from Ephoros, tells us what Th. characteristically does not, that the purification of Delos was undertaken as a result of the plague (whose latest outbreak was described not many chapters before: see 87 above). That is, the Athenians sought purification. Though scepticism has been expressed about this by Mikalson (ii. 47. 4n.), I see no good reason to doubt that this was one motive, both for the purification and for the re-establishment of the festival, which operated on at least one section of 'the Athenians'. (See e.g. Paus. i. 3. 4, discussed at para. 1n. below: J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley, 1978), 330, thinks that behind this mention of a statue to Apollo Preserver from Evil lies a story that the Athenians, consulting Delphi because of the plague, were told to set up an image of Apollo; classed as 'quasi-historical' by Fontenrose). As with the 'monosandalism' of 22. 2, and perhaps the Trachinian choice of a significantly named ambassador at 92. 2 or the Spartan choice of Alkidas at 92. 5, this would be an example of Th. scrupulously recording a fact without however bringing out its religious or mythical significance; contrast v. 70, where he goes out of his way (polemically? see n. there) positively to *deny* religious significance to the use of flute-players by the Spartan army.

(iii) *Between The Domestic and the International Aspects: the Reminiscence of Pisistratus.* For Pisistratus' 'purification' of Delos see—as well as the present ch.—Hdt. i. 64. 2. This was done in deference to oracles, ἐκ τῶν λογίων (for the meaning of this see below, para. 1n. on κατὰ χρησμόν δῆ τινα). That the Athens of the 420s should in this way pick up a thread of Pisistratid policy is notable. (The tyrants evidently did not suffer from the kind of *damnatio memoriae* which would make such a retrospective gesture unthinkable. For an interesting parallel see ML 73 = Fornara 140, the firstfruits inscription from Eleusis, of perhaps 422 BC, which, by inviting *all* Greeks to make offerings, resumes the Panhellenic Pisistratid presentation of the Eleusinian Mysteries as a celebration of the benefits conferred by Athens on mankind generally: Andrewes in *CAH* iii². 3. 413.) The Pisistratid reminiscence implied by the 426 activity on Delos is not, however, purely domestic in character, because the tyrants had a vigorous Aegean foreign policy: see Andrewes, 403. Andrewes adduces, among other evidence, precisely the Pisistratid purification of Delos, rightly calling it 'a notable assertion of Athens' primacy among the

Ionian cities'; cp. H. Shapiro, *Art and Cult under the Tyrants in Athens* (Mainz, 1989), 48ff. By recalling Pisistratus, Athens suggests that she had 'ruled the waves' in the sixth century as well as the fifth.

For speculations about a connection between Pisistratid interest in Delos and in Brauron, with discussion of the present passage of Th., see D. Peppas-Delmousou, 'The *Theoria* of Brauron', in *Early Greek Cult Practice* ed. R. Hägg, N. Marinatos, and G. C. Nordquist (Stockholm, 1988), 255 ff. (the sacred procession of Ar. *Peace*, 874 ff., originally went to Delos via Brauron; but on this see U. Kron's comment at the end of the paper); also Peppas-Delmousou, 'Autour des inventaires de Brauron', *Comptes et inventaires dans la cité grecque: Actes du colloque international d'épigraphie ... en l'honneur de Jacques Tréheux*, ed. D. Knoepfler (Neuchâtel and Geneva, 1988), 323 ff.

Note also that the example of Polykrates, another Ionian thalassocrat or ruler of the sea, is alluded to at para. 2 below.

(iv) *The Imperial Aspect*. That there was a sentimental and religious, particularly Ionian religious, aspect to the Athenian empire, which began as an Ionian appeal to the mother-city (i. 95. 1 n. on κατὰ τὸ ἐγγυγνές), is a truth whose importance even the hard-headed Th. does not wholly obscure. That after all is one main reason for the choice of Delos, the birth-place of Apollo the father of Ion (i. 3. 2 n.), as the site of the League treasury: see i. 96. 2 n. (though as noted there, with reference to E. L. Hicks, Delos had an appeal for the Dorian islanders also). But much of the evidence for this imperial exploitation of religion is non-Thucydidean, that is to say (a) literary and (b) epigraphic; for (a) the non-Thucydidean literary evidence for the manipulation of the Ion myth by fifth-century Athens, see the important discussion by R. Parker, 'Myths of Early Athens', in *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*, ed. J. Bremmer (London, 1987), 187ff., esp. 206ff. For (b) the epigraphic evidence generally see Barron, *JHS* 1964 (i. 114. 1 n.), and for the boundary-stones to Apollo and Athena in particular see i. 114. 1 n., especially Barron in *JHS* 1983 there cited. Barron (1983), 11 f., argues for a shift of emphasis in the league's religious propaganda in the 450s, when Apollo and Poseidon, the league's original 'patrons', were to some extent displaced by Athena, and the treasury was moved from Delos to Athens (but it is not quite certain that 454 is the date of the move: see i. 96. 2 n.). But if this is right it seems that the 426 activity on Delos, not discussed by Barron (1983) in detail, represented a return to the league's *original* propaganda. However, I am not entirely persuaded by Barron's way of putting the matter, that is, I doubt whether there was ever a real drop in Athenian interest in Apollo and Delos: see ML 62 = Fornara 121 of 434-432 BC, accounts of the Delian temples dated by Athenian as well

as Delian magistrates. I would prefer to speak of a stepping-up in 426 of a commitment which had never been lost sight of. (The cessation of the Delian festival described by Homer should presumably be placed much earlier than the fifth century: see below, 6n.)

I would explain the Delian activity of 426, in its imperial aspect, as evidence of an Athenian desire to reaffirm the 'Ionianism' of the Delian league in a period when *Olympia*, with its strongly Dorian associations, had recently been the venue for a meeting which had been markedly hostile to Athens (above, chs. 9 ff.; although—as we saw at ch. 8 n.—that hostility stopped short of an outright exclusion, from Olympia, of Athens and her allies). Actually, Athens to some extent had it both ways, because Delos had its attractions for the people of the Dorian islands like Kos and Rhodes (i. 96. 2 n., and above).

Then there is *Delphi*. We have already noted (i. 118. 3 n.; iii. 92–3, introductory n.; and cp. ii. 54. 4) the pro-Spartan sympathies of Delphi at the beginning of the war, which made it a natural site for assertively anti-Athenian dedications like that of 'Brasidas and the Akanthians from the Athenians', *Syll*³ 79 of 423 (on which see *Mausolus*, 283; it derives from Plutarch, *Lysander*, 1). But note the possibility that the Eleusis firstfruits inscription, which invokes the sanction of Apollo at Delphi for an Athenian invitation with a Panhellenic not to say imperial colouring, dates from the 420s. For this inscription see (iii) above; but since text and oracle are undated no firm argument about the 420s can be constructed out of it. The same is true of the Delphic counterpart (*Syll*³ 81) to the Olympia dedication of the Messenians and Naupaktians, ML 74, for which see ch. 8 n.: both are in effect pro-Athenian offerings. It would be wrong to speak of outright exclusion of Athens from Delphi, but access to Delphi was surely difficult in war-time; note Ar. *Birds*, 188 f., which implies that Boiotia permission was needed before Athenians could visit the oracle at Delphi; see Sommerstein's good n., also Zeilhofer (i. 107. 2 n.), 67 f., though he comes too close to speaking of actual exclusion. As we shall see, access to Delphi and the other Panhellenic shrines, including Olympia, was to be insisted on in the diplomacy at the end of the Archidamian War: see above, ch. 8 n., and below, iv. 118. 1 and v. 18. 2 (the Peace of Nikias). (As Sommerstein notes, it is relevant to the *Birds* passage that Boiotia did not accept the Peace of Nikias. On v. 1, with its possible implication that the Athenians were protected by the Pythian truce, see n. there: the text is unfortunately not secure.) Note also that in this period an Athenian thank-offering for a naval victory is made at *Dodona*, possibly because access to Delphi was difficult (*Syll*³ 73; for a possible context see ii. 94. 2 and n.). See Parker, 'Greek States and Greek Oracles' (i. 25. 1 n. on ἐς Δελφοῦς), 326 and n. 99, citing H. Parke, *Oracles*

of Zeus, 136, 149 (who goes too far in saying that in 429 the Athenians 'probably had no access to Delphi'). There is a risk of circularity in interpreting the undated Dodona text. Finally, there is an inscription attesting dealings between Athens' ally (iv. 42. 1) Andros and Delphi, at some time in this period: F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supp.* (Paris, 1962), 38 = Fornara 137. But the significance of this text is hard to estimate, because (as Smarczyk (i. 96. 2 n.), 513 n. 49) points out, its precise date is uncertain.

So Athens perhaps felt a little friendless at the two greatest Panhellenic shrines, Olympia and Delphi, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and she decided to reassert herself in the sphere of religious propaganda. (See G. Daux, 'Athènes et Delphes', *Athenian Studies pres. W. Ferguson* = *HSCP Supp.* i (1940), 37 ff., at 47, for a moderate statement of the position; also Mikalson (ii. 47. 4 n.), 222.) We can add, with Gomme, that Athens was not very popular at the other two Panhellenic mainland festivals, the *Isthmia* near Corinth, and the *Nemea*, even deeper inside the Peloponnese; note also that at *Ephesos*, the probable site of the Panionian festival (see below), the pro-Spartan element seems now to have been in the ascendant: see 32. 2 n. It is also relevant that the Spartan advertisement for their new colony at Herakleia had specifically excluded Ionians: see 92. 5. The activity at Delos can be seen as in a sense a reply to Herakleia. Another inscription, this time certainly to be attributed to the mid-420s, ML 69 = Fornara 136, fits this general picture: Athens extends to all allies without exception (not just actual colonies) the requirement to bring religious offerings to the mother-city; but this may have started in the 440s: see ML, pp. 120f., comm. on no. 46.

It is important to note that if I was right in 1982 against Nilsson, Gomme, and others in my interpretation of the reference, at para. 3, to the festival of the Ephesia as identical to the old festival of the Panionia (see *Historia*, 31, cited at 3 n. below), the Athenian-sponsored festival of the Delia did not actually *displace* the immemorially ancient Ionian festival of the Ephesia/Panionia. On the contrary, the latter continued to be celebrated on Persian soil throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. Nothing that we know about Persian religious policies precludes this; see especially Tod 113 = Harding 24, where the early fourth-century satrap Strouthas or Strouses co-operates with the Ionian League in an arbitration (illustrating that the arbitration procedures which Persia had stipulated after the Ionian Revolt in the 490s, Hdt. vi. 42. 1, were a historical reality), and—lest that inscription be dismissed as a purely 'political' item—there is the fourth-century Panionion inscription, published in 1967, which has to do with religion. For this see below, 3 n.

(v) *The Theseus Connection*. Finally, note that Theseus, a figure much exploited in domestic and imperial Athenian politics in the classical period, was held (Plut. *Thes.* 21) to have been connected with the original Delian festival; see C. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles* (ii. 34. 1 n.), 206f. The exact moment at which the Theseus myth was turned to political advantage (Pisistratid or Kleisthenic?) is disputed; see the excellent remarks of C. Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Theseus Lifting the Rock and a Cup Near the Pithos Painter', *JHS* 91 (1971), 94 ff., at 98f. One possibility is that he was already exploited under the Pisistratid tyranny, which would give added point to the Pisistratid purification, (iii) above. But even if so, there is no doubt that Theseus was also exploited by imperial Athens in the fifth century: see i. 4, introductory n. on Minos, and above all i. 98. 2 n. on *ἔπειτα Σκύρον*, and K. Tausend, there cited for the Ionian aspects of Theseus. Th., who ignored (admittedly in a very abbreviated narrative) the Thesean aspect of the reduction of Skyros, equally ignores it in the present passage. But it is surely relevant to the events of 426, in which case our 'Theseus' section (v) should really rank as a subsection of our 'imperial' section (iv), as well as of our 'Pisistratid' section (iii).

(B) From the literary point of view, the present ch. is remarkable not only for the length of the digression which it represents (see further below), but for containing what is easily Th.'s longest set of quotations from Homer, or indeed of direct quotation from any literary source. Indeed if M. L. West is right (see 4 n. on *ἀλλ' ὅτε* etc.), Th.'s quotation was originally even longer than modern texts of Th. suggest. (Th. speaks of 'Homer' as the author with no suggestion that the poet was other than the poets of the great epics; on the contrary his reference to the 'blind old man' seems deliberately inserted to suggest identity. However, he treats 'Homer's' evidence in the present passage with none of the caution which characterizes the *Archaeology*.)

The essential literary question is, why did Th. give this whole Delian episode such extensive coverage? There are four possibilities, all I believe simultaneously true. (a) Part of the answer is to be found in (A) above: what happened on Delos in 426 was indeed historically important, from a number of different points of view. (b) The ch. is a very effective piece of writing. The new festival was visually very splendid and the purification itself a memorable event for Th., especially if, as suggested at A(i) above, he himself was involved. Th. does not often allow himself to describe scenes of imperial brilliance, the departure for Sicily of the Athenian fleet being a notable exception, vi. 31-2. The surprising space given to the Delos episode was perhaps the most he would allow himself by way of recognition that it was a spectacular moment in the lives of all eye-witnesses. (But note that he *could not* have witnessed the departure

for Sicily in 415, when he was in exile; he *could have witnessed and perhaps he did* witness the pomp at Delos in 426.) From the structural point of view ch. 104 provides variety and colour, inserted as it is between the Aitolian and Akarnanian military narratives (though these have moments of vividness and theatricality: see 97–8; 113). The ch. has, perhaps, something of the decorative function of a late Euripidean chorus, cp., for Euripides, K. Reinhardt, *Sophocles*, tr. H. and D. Harvey (Oxford, 1979), 242 n. 5—though ‘decorative’ does not imply ‘irrelevant’, either in Th. or in Euripides: on the Euripidean point see S. Goldhill, *Reading Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1986), 268, cp. 251 and 164.

It has been said, with much justice, that Thucydides generally represents a return to the military concerns of the *Iliad*, whereas Herodotus, with his vivid dialogue, his women, and his emphasis on travel, is closer to the *Odyssey*: Jasper Griffin, *Homer: The Odyssey* (Cambridge, 1987), 99. But the present ch. shows that even in Th., there are glimpses of a more attractive world away from the fighting, a world which was indeed Odysseus’ world: at *Odyssey*, vi. 162–4, Odysseus tells Nausikaa that he went to Delos once with a great retinue, and saw the altar of Apollo (that is, he was on a sacred embassy). See further iv. 24. 5 n.: Odysseus and Charybdis.

(c) Then there is the polemical aspect, noted by Classen/Steup. Th. is always ready to spread himself in correction of error, one point of controversy here being the relation between the ancient and the revived Delia, a topic about which Th. detected misunderstandings among his contemporaries. (So Classen/Steup; Allen and Halliday in their edition of the Homeric Hymns observe that Th.’s Homeric citation may have been ‘intended as a reply to Herodotus’ appeal to Olen’s hymn (also with regard to Delos), iv. 35’. That is, we have here concealed polemic against Hdt., as so often in Th.: see e.g. ii. 2. 3 n. on *Εὐρυμάχου*.) This motive would be particularly urgent for Th. if his contemporaries thought that the oracle—on which see first n. below—was sufficient justification for what was being done; Th., the conscientious ancient historian, seeks to show that a proper study of the past provided, by itself, the necessary authority, at least for the revival of the festival. Another point of controversy was the identity of Homer: see Jacoby, ‘Der homerische Apollonhymnus’, 691, for Th.’s interest in this question, as a motive for the citations. (‘One might be tempted’, says Syme, *PBA* 46 (1960), 42, ‘to ask whether [Th.] had not been forming some ideas about the Homeric question’.) (d) Finally, it has been suggested that the dislocated Delians, whose troubles were compounded in 421 (v. 1, see n. there), were for Th. ‘a paradigm of suffering’: D. Lateiner, ‘Pathos in Thucydides’, *Antichthon* 11 (1977), 42 ff., at 45 ff. Lateiner (46) suggests that the lines from the

Homeric Hymn, 'celebrating the peaceful and joyous holy days of the Ionians', have the effect of creating 'a contrast between the quiet, stable past, and the disturbed present'; cp. (*b*) above.

Th. was perhaps not the only writer to be stimulated: for the possibility that the purification 'awakened Euripides' antiquarian interest' see G. W. Bond, *Euripides: Heracles* (Oxford, 1981), 241, n. on line 678.

1. **Δῆλον ἐκάθηραν:** 'purified . . . Delos'. For what this amounted to in practice see i. 8. 1 n. on *Δήλου γάρ* etc., quoting Robert Parker. Note that the Athenians subsequently went further, expelling the Delian inhabitants, v. 1, though they later restored them on the orders of Apollo at Delphi, v. 32. 2. At v. i Th., unusually, makes a specific cross-reference to the present ch.: see n. there. Pisistratid precedent: pp. 519f. above.

κατὰ χρησμὸν δὴ τινα: 'in accordance with some oracle'. What kind of oracle? One might be tempted at first sight to agree with Jeffrey Henderson, who argued in a paper delivered in Oxford in 1988 that this was a proper oracle of Delphic Apollo: he was the god of purification *par excellence*, and allegedly (Paus. i. 3. 4) got his name 'Preserver from Evil', *ἀλεξίκακος*, by putting an end to the plague by an oracle, *κατὰ μάντευμα*. For such a Pythian oracle after a plague, ordaining the setting-up of choruses etc., cp. Dem. xxi. 52 (second oracle) with MacDowell's n. in *Demosthenes Against Meidias*, 1990. (See above, A(ii), but note the scepticism of Fontenrose there cited.) Certainly a major state enterprise of the kind discussed in the present ch. would need some sanction more formidable than an oracle of the type hawked around by oracle-expounders or oracle-mongers (*χρησμόλογοι*) of the kind mentioned at ii. 8. 2, 21. 3, and viii. 1. 1. Oracles of this type are called *λόγια*. On these oracle-mongers see R. Garland, *BSA* 79 (1984), 81f.

However, there are strong reasons for thinking that the oracle alluded to in the present passage was *not* a proper Delphic oracle.

(i) Th. does not say so, although he is perfectly capable of saying so: see (in a Delian context) v. 32. 2, and numerous other examples.

(ii) Th.'s language is a little disparaging; note the *δὴ* which I agree with Gomme is ironic. But I do not think that the irony is at the expense of oracles in general; rather, Th. is suggesting that there was something slightly fishy about this particular one (on this point N. Marinatos, *JHS* 101 (1981), 138 n. 3, seems correct to say that Th.'s 'vagueness here implies that [he] did not vouch for the genuineness of the oracle').

(iii) The purification carried out by Pisistratus was, according to Hdt. i. 64. 2, oracularly ordered, *ἐκ τῶν λογιῶν*. The 426 purification—see above, A(iii)—was surely related to its sixth-century predecessor in its oracular no less than in its other aspects. The 'oracles' referred to by Hdt.

were surely of the type discussed by Lewis in *CAH* iv². 293 f. or Fontenrose, ch. v. This (it may be suggested) makes it likely that the 426 oracle was of the same general type; further speculation would be rash, but it is worth noting, as an indication of a possible source for the oracles about Delos, the tradition that 'Delian prophets' predicted Athenian rule of the sea, *FGrHist* 396 Semos of Delos F 12, an item which Jacoby in his commentary connected with Pisistratus' activity on Delos. Mikalson (ii. 47. 4 n.), 221, is therefore not quite right to say there was no oracle on Delos, though he is right to deny that Pythian Apollo supplied the oracle on the present occasion (he cites ii. 54. 4, which shows Athenian suspicions of Pythian Apollo at the time of the plague).

Not a great deal can be made of Th.'s use in the present passage of *χρησμός* rather than *λόγιον*: it is true that at ii. 8. 2 he talks, in a generally 'chresmologic' context, of *λόγια*; but at 21. 3 he speaks of *χρησμοί* in a similar context.

There was no doubt a spectrum of oracles, ranging from the authenticated pronouncements of Apollo at Delphi, to the rankest forgeries and the kind of nonsense parodied in Aristophanes, *Knights*, 1089ff. Henderson's rigid distinction between 'response oracles' and 'invented ones' is too sharp, and runs up against passages like the present; as Fontenrose (165) says, 'if a chresmologue said an oracle came from Apollo at Delphi, his auditors were likely to believe him'. In the present case, I suggest (i) that there were many at the time who *believed* the purification etc. to have Apollo's sanction, and (ii) that the oracle in question belonged nearer to the respectable end of the spectrum than to the other end; but (iii) that it was not a proper Delphic oracle (see above for a possible source) and (iv) that Th. was not convinced that it was. Hence perhaps (see (B) above) his extensive citation of a better kind of poetic authority.

Sparta's friend Pythian Apollo was not, however, indifferent to what happened at the seat of Delian Apollo: see v. 1 and 32 and nn.

2. μήτε έναποθνήσκειν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ μήτε ἐντίκτειν: 'no-one should die or give birth to a child there'. For birth and death as times when there was a special risk of pollution see Parker, *Miasma*, ch. 2 and (on the present passage) 163.

ἔς τὴν Ῥηνεῖαν: 'to Rheneia'. Delos did not pay tribute to Athens, but Rheneia nearby did; Rheneian land and fishing rights are leased out in the Delian accounts mentioned above, ML 62.

Πολυκράτης: 'Polykrates'. For this episode see i. 13. 6, also A(iii) above. For a modern suggestion that Polykrates' activity at Delos was the setting for the recitation of the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*, which Th. proceeds to quote, see below, 4 n.

Ῥηνεῖαν ἐλὼν ἀνέθηκε: 'Rheneia ... he conquered ... and dedic-

ated'. On this phrase, repeated from i. 13. 6, see n. there, citing Sieveking.

καὶ τὴν πεντετηρίδα τότε πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν ἐποίησαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ Δήλια: 'after the purification the Athenians celebrated the Delian festival for the first time; it was held every four years'. But it may not have displaced an (inconsiderable) annual festival to Apollo: see Laidlaw (ii. 8. 3 n.), 68f. Compare below on the co-existence of Delia and Ephesia/Panionia. On the post-426 history of Delos and the Delia see Tod 85, 125, and the useful nn. of P. J. Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* (Oxford, 1981), 60f., 626, and esp. 693f., commenting on 54. 7, 56. 3, and 62. 2.

3. τῶν Ἴωνων τε καὶ περικτιόνων νησιωτῶν: 'of the Ionians and the neighbouring islanders'. The word for 'neighbouring', *περικτιόνων*, is as LSJ⁹ say, 'rare in prose'. It is in fact epic, and suited to its context. The word is related to a word (and institution) mention of which Th. shuns: amphictiony (see i. 112. 5 n., discussing the Delphic Amphictiony). In fact, in the late fifth and the fourth centuries Athenian officials called 'amphictions' (the word has by now lost its literal sense of 'dwellers round about') were sent to Delos too (cp. Tod 85, etc.): for these Athenian amphictions as in effect the 'deputies of the Ἴωνων καὶ περικτιόνων νησιωτῶν' see Rhodes, *Ath. Pol. Comm.* 693, citing Sandys.

ξύν τε γὰρ γυναῖξι καὶ παισίν: 'with their wives and children'. As T. Wiedemann (i. 136. 3 n.), 165, notes, the order is unusual for Th., who normally prefers to say 'children and women', another manifestation of his neglect of the female factor; but Wiedemann may be right in his explanation in terms of literary variation (the Homeric Hymn below will have the order 'children and women'). See also Harvey (ii. 4. 2 n.), 78.

ὥσπερ νῦν ἐς τὰ Ἐφέσια Ἴωνες: 'as the Ionians now do at the Ephesia festival'. I have discussed this very interesting statement in *Historia*, 31 (1982), 241 ff., 'Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, and The Ephesia (iii. 104)', where I sought to establish against Nilsson (and by implication Gomme, who cites him) that this festival is not identical with the so-called Artemisia, an Ephesian festival to Artemis. Instead I sought to show that the Ephesia here mentioned by Th. is none other than the Panionian festival or Panionia, the Festival of All the Ionians, which was celebrated in very early times, and again in the Roman imperial period, at a different site, one near Priene on Mt. Mykale. The main reason for denying the identity of the Ephesia and the Artemisia is, as Dittenberger noted as long ago as 1903 in footnote 2 to *OGIS* 10, that the two are mentioned together in the same inscription, *British Museum Inscriptions*, iii, no. DCV = *Inscripfen von Ephesos*, v (1980), 1605.

One main reason for asserting the identity of the Panionia and the Ephesia is the statement of Diodorus (xv. 49. 1), under the year 373 BC,

that the Panionia used to be celebrated at Mykale, but later, because of 'wars in those parts', it was moved to a safe place near Ephesos. (But we can add from Strabo and other evidence that later still it was moved back again to Mykale.) We do not know when these 'wars', and therefore the move to the Ephesian site, took place. One obvious guess (see my article) would be 440 BC, in the context of the trouble about Priene mentioned by Th. at i. 115. 2. However, Diod. seems to link the move of site with the earthquake which engulfed the Achaian town of Helike in 373 BC. (A complicated story; the essential point is that the Ionians made a religious appeal to Helike for some model altars, apparently in connection with a reorganization of the Panionia. The request was refused, and Poseidon sent the earthquake against Helike in revenge.) Moreover, as Professor Andrewes reminded me in a letter dated 10 July 1982, which discussed my article ('the main thesis of which', he wrote, 'is clearly right'), there is, in Strabo (385), support for the 373 date for both earthquake and the appeal to Helike.

The difficulty about Diod.'s implication of a fourth-century date for the move would, however, disappear if P. Stylianou is right in his ingenious suggestion ('Thucydides, the Panionian Festival, and the Ephesia (iii. 104), Again', *Historia*, 32 (1983), 245 ff., at 248) that at xv. 49 Diodorus, who will here be guilty of incompetent abbreviation of Ephoros, confused the move of site from Mykale to Ephesos with the subsequent move *from Ephesos back to Mykale*, an event which, Stylianou suggests, we can date to 373 BC—which, we may note, was a peaceful period of Ionian history, after the King's Peace of 386 and before the satrapal disturbances of the 360s. This leaves us free to put the wartime move *to* Ephesos in some more disturbed period than 373, that is, in a period before the time when Th. was writing, and perhaps (as Andrewes suggests to me) considerably earlier. ('It sounds as if the festival at Ephesos was very well established by the time Thuc. wrote iii. 104, whenever that was, and that might suggest a date even earlier [than 440]': Andrewes.) Since Stylianou's own suggestion removes the only difficulty in the way of my identification of Ephesia and Panionia, it is not clear why he should resist the identification. At 248 he leaves open the date of the wars which on his own views resulted in the first relocation of the festival, that from Mykale to Ephesos. I may also note here that at 245 Stylianou says of my argument that the Ephesia cannot be the same as the Artemisia, that it 'may be accepted without further argumentation'.

An inscription published in 1967 mentions on the one hand both Panionian altar and sacrifices, and on the other hand a (cultic) 'king of the Ephesians'. See G. Kleiner, P. Hommel, W. Müller-Wiener, *Panionion*

und Melie (Berlin, 1967), 49, lines 6-7, 22. This inscription is said to be fourth-century, and would fit neatly into the picture suggested above—that is, it would date from the period before the move back from Ephesos to Mykale.

In the above I have assumed that the sentence under discussion was written by Th., and is not a marginal gloss, as Mr P. M. Fraser once suggested to me. Against the idea of a gloss are (i) the closely parallel ii. 15. 4 (see n. there); (ii) the scholiast's n. which shows that at least in his time the sentence stood in the text. But Fraser's further suggestion, that we put a comma after Ἐφέσια, has much to commend it. The sense would then be 'the Ionians brought their wives etc. . . . as they now do to the Ephesia'.

4. ἐκ προοιμίου Ἀπόλλωνος: 'from the *Prooimion* [Hymn] to Apollo'. It seems inescapable that the word *prooimion* here means simply 'hymn': see Allen/Halliday, pp. lxx and xciii ff., citing Pindar, *Nemean*, ii. 1 (at xcv they aptly compare Chopin's Preludes, which are not preludes to anything); F. Cassola, *Inni Omerici* (Verona, 1975), pp. xii ff. Any original sense that the poems, or at any rate the longer among them, were 'introductory' (the literal meaning of the word, compare our 'proem') had vanished by Th.'s time. It is, however, probable, as we shall see, that the (Delian) part of the Apollo Hymn quoted by Th. was, as a matter of fact, a different poem inorganically attached to the rest of the Hymn and thus in a sense 'introductory' to a longer whole; this might tempt one to think that Th. meant the word *prooimion* literally. But, even apart from Pindar's usage (above), there is the decisive point that Th. goes on to speak of lines 'from the same *prooimion*', ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προοιμίου. It would be very odd, in Greek as in English, to say 'from the same Introduction'.

The *Hymn to Apollo* begins with 178 lines about Delian Apollo ('D'), which Wade-Gery in his 'Kynaithos' (*EGH* 17) says 'contain poetry of the first water, full of wilful beauty, unmatched in the Hymns'. The rest of the poem is about Delphi and Pythian Apollo ('P'), and this has often and plausibly been thought to be a separate poem; though see now the arguments for unity presented by A. M. Miller, *From Delos to Delphi: A Literary Study of the Homeric Hymn to Apollo* (Leiden, 1986), approved by N. J. Richardson, *CR* 38 (1988), 5f.; this is a return to the position of Allen and Halliday.

'P' (especially the last lines) can confidently be dated to the early sixth century: see G. Forrest, 'The First Sacred War', *BCH* 80 (1956), 33 ff. (not disputed on this point by N. Robertson, *CQ* 28 (1978), 48f.); and if the poem is a unity there is, obviously, no problem about the date of 'D'. If not, the date of 'D'—the section from which Th. quotes—remains a separate (and controversial) question; M. L. West, 'Cynaethus' Hymn to

Apollo', *CQ* 25 (1975), 161 ff., argues (against earlier views) that 'D' is later than 'P' and derivative from it. He suggests (165) a date, for 'D', later in the sixth century than 'P'. See however R. Janko, *Homer, Hesiod and the Hymns* (Cambridge, 1982), 109 ff., who re-asserts the priority of 'D', drawing on a suggestion of W. Burkert in *Arktouros* (introductory n. to ii. 2-6), 53 ff., 'Kynaithos, Polykrates and the Homeric Hymn to Apollo'. Burkert suggests that the Homeric Hymn was put together for a Delian-Pythian festival of Polykrates of Samos, held in 522 BC on Delos, for which the evidence is an entry in the *Suda*, ταῦτά σοι καὶ Πύθια καὶ Δήλια. For Polykrates and Delos see also 2 above.

From the Thucydidean point of view the only issue that concerns us is whether on any of these sixth-century datings, especially the later of them, Th. could have 'mistaken' a poem only a century or so old for the work of Homer. West (166) rightly sees no problem here: 'if other people said it was by Homer, there was nothing to make him suspect otherwise . . . Stesichorus is said to have known the *Shield of Heracles*, a poem composed in his own life-time, as Hesiod's'.

ἀλλ' ὅτε Δήλῳ, Φοίβῃ . . .: 'At other times, Phoibos, Delos . . .'. The manuscripts of the Hymn quote this line differently; the last few words of the line ('dearest to your heart') are given in a variant form which could be the result of Th. quoting from memory (so West, 170; I prefer with Wilamowitz, *Iliad und Homer*, 440, to think that Th. used 'a book', that is, that he had access to a genuinely variant tradition). The variant at the beginning of the line is more significant: the Hymn (line 146) has ἀλλὰ σὺ, 'but you . . .', which makes sense, unlike Th.'s version as we have it. West makes the interesting suggestion that there is scribal error here and that Th.'s quotation actually began at line 141, which *does* begin ἀλλοτε. The effect of this would be that Th.'s quotation was originally even longer than modern texts of Th. suggest.

ἐλκεχίτωνες Ἴάονες: 'the Ionians in flowing robes'. See i. 6. 3n. on χιτῶνάς τε etc.

5. ἀφήμως: 'gently'. The Hymn (line 171) has ἀφ' ἡμέων, which is usually corrected to ἀμφ' ἡμέων. C. Carey, 'Homeric Hymn to Apollo, 171', *CQ* 30 (1980), 288 ff., exploits Th.'s variant to produce his own suggestion σαφηνέως, 'clearly'. Burkert (above), 61, retains Th.'s reading, to which (following a suggestion of Wilamowitz), he gives the sense 'anonymously' ('no need to say the blind man's name').

“τυφλὸς ἀνήρ, οἰκεῖ δὲ Χίῳ ἐνι παιπαλοέσση”: 'The blind man of Chios' rocky isle'. As Jacoby notes (above) this demonstrates part of Th.'s motive for including the quotations: a biographical and literary interest in Homer himself. (On the 'blind man' point see R. Dyer, *CP* 70 (1975), 171 ff.)

6. **κατελύθη ὑπὸ ξυμφορῶν, ὡς εἰκός:** ‘naturally fell into disuse, owing to the misfortunes of Ionia’. This probably refers, as is usually thought, to the archaic period (see Janko, 111 f.), though see J. M. Cook (33. 2 n.): mid-fifth-century Ionia was not flourishing. For *ὡς εἰκός* here see Westlake, *Essays*, 157, preferring Jowett’s rendering to the alternative ‘were discontinued, probably because of disasters’. The sense ‘probably’ would certainly exclude a fifth-century date, because this was a period of which Th. had actual knowledge. But with the tr. ‘naturally’, there is no implication as to date.

105–114. PELOPONNESIAN DEFEAT IN AKARNANIA

For this campaign see Hammond, *Epirus*, 245 ff., and *Studies*, ch. 14 ‘Military Operations in Amphilochia’ (= *BSA* 32 (1940), 128 ff., but with additions).

105. 1. **ὁ ποτε Ἀκαρνᾶνες τειχισάμενοι κοινῶ δικαστηρίῳ ἐχρῶντο:** ‘which at one time the Akarnanians had fortified and used as a common place of justice’. The meaning of the words ‘at one time’ have a bearing on the problem of the date of the Athenian alliance with Akarnania: see ii. 68. 7–8 n., where the present passage is discussed.

πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι σταδίουσ μάλιστα: ‘about three miles’ [lit. ‘about twenty-five stades’]. After the exotic Delian digression, we are back with a bump to the precise world of the military narrative—though the precision is slightly deceptive: see i. 63. 2 n. for the vagueness of the Thucydidean stade.

3. **τὸν . . . στρατηγήσαντα:** ‘who had led the . . . expedition’. As an authorial introduction of Demosthenes, last encountered as recently as 102, this would indeed be surprising, but surely the point is to tell us what Th. took to be the thinking of these Akarnanians: Demosthenes’ unscheduled expedition against Aitolia (ch. 94) had shown that he was open to persuasion to lead other expeditions of the sort. There is a parallel between Demosthenes’ position and that of the Spartan Salaithos: see 25. 1 n.

Note the tense: he *had* led the Aitolian expedition. This shows that Demosthenes was now no longer general: see Fornara, *Athenian Board of Generals* (i. 117. 2 n.), 57, with 102. 3 n. above and iv. 2. 2 n. below.

106. 1. **ἐν δεξιᾷ μὲν ἔχοντες τὴν Στρατίων πόλιν καὶ τὴν φρουρὰν αὐτῶν:** ‘leaving the city and garrison of Stratos on the right’. For the route see Lévêque, *Pyrrhos* (i. 36. 2 n.), 145 and n. 2.

3. **νυκτὸς ἤδη:** ‘after dark’ [lit. ‘when it was already night’]. For a full

list of such night attacks and movements—contrary to the spirit of hoplite warfare—see Pritchett, *Greek State at War*, ii. 163 ff. It is notable how much in the present section of Th. belongs in the category of the militarily abnormal.

107. 3. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν πέντε ἡσύχαζον: ‘For five days they remained inactive’. Again unusual (see Pritchett, ii. 149) and a reminder that we are not dealing with regular ‘hoplite’ warfare (though hoplites are present): ‘hoplites frequently became impatient at doing nothing’ (Pritchett, 153). On the other hand, securely encamped armies might delay so as not to forfeit an advantage (Pritchett, 152). We are not dealing with that here; the delay develops into a stratagem involving concealed troops.

ἐς ὁδόν τινα κοίλην καὶ λοχμῶδη: ‘in a sunken road overgrown with brushwood’. For this ambush, a rare example in a Greek battle involving hoplites, see Pritchett, ii. 185. It is one of the two stratagems which Polyainos gives to Demosthenes, iii. 1. 2 (the other is from the Pylos campaign). Hammond (*Studies*, 479) attempts an identification of the precise scene of the ambush.

108. 1. καὶ τρέπουσιν: ‘and routed them’. So the Peloponnesian left is defeated, while their right wing is victorious and over-pursues, (para. 2), always a risk in both naval and land warfare. See the section ‘Incautious Pursuit’ at Pritchett, ii. 201 ff. (203 for the present ch.).

109. 2. κρύφα δὲ Δημοσθένης . . . σπένδονται: ‘Demosthenes . . . made a secret treaty’. Demosthenes and his Akarnanian colleagues make this treaty entirely on their own initiative; an exceptionally clear case of diplomacy unauthorized by the Assembly at Athens: see 94. 3 n. Th.’s informant was presumably Demosthenes himself.

Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Πελοποννησίους διαβαλεῖν ἐς τοὺς ἐκείνη χρῆζων Ἑλλήνας: ‘he wanted to lower the reputation of the Spartans and Peloponnesians among the Greeks in those parts’. The battle for the hearts and minds is as important as the military struggle: ii. 8. 4 n.

110. 1. κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκ τῶν Ὀλπῶν ἀγγελίαν: ‘in response to the original message from Olpai’. See 105. 4.

111. 1. ἐπὶ λαχανισμὸν καὶ φρυγάνων ξυλλογὴν: ‘gathering herbs and firewood’. This ch. is as visually imaginable as the Plataia siege, ii. 3. 4 n.

2. ὅσοι †μὲν ἐτύγχανον οὕτως† ἀθρόοι: ‘who had gone out with them in groups’. The text here is corrupt; probably something has dropped out and the exact sense is irrecoverable.

112. 3. **ἔτι ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς**: 'still in bed'. See 106. 3 n. for such night operations, with Pritchett (there cited), 165. Cp. iv. 32. 1; Xen. *Hell.* ii. 4. 6.

4. **Δωρίδα τε γλώσσαν ἰέντας**: 'to speak to the enemy in their own Dorian dialect'. See Pritchett, 165, and cp. iv. 3. 3. A. Morpurgo Davies, 'The Greek Notion of Dialect', *Verbum*, 10 (1987), 8 ff., at 17 f., discusses the present passage, and notes that the obvious distinctions are those between the dialects of specific cities and regions, and yet as early as the fifth century Th. can use expressions of the present kind: 'and yet there was no such thing as Doric; Doric was as abstract a concept as Greek.'

7. **καὶ ἐς πάσαν ιδέαν χωρήσαντες τῆς φυγῆς**: 'Every means of escape was tried'. For expressions of this type in Th., who is very fond of them, see i. 109. 1 n.

8. **ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐσώθησαν**: 'few out of many returned home'. This closely echoes i. 110. 1 (the disaster in Egypt: see n. there) and looks forward to vii. 87. 6 (the disaster in Sicily). These verbal correspondences put the Akarnanian defeat in a very big league indeed.

113. 1. **ἦλθε κῆρυξ**: 'a herald arrived'. This ch., exceptionally, contains some rapid dialogue (the Melian Dialogue is the only other example of this in Th.). This is a tragic feature, and not the only one: see further below, 5 n. The ch. is well analysed by Stahl (iii. 94–98, introductory n.), 134 ff.; see also Lateiner, 'Pathos in Thucydides' (iii. 104, introductory n., at end), 47 ff.

4. **ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς γε οὐδένι ἐμαχόμεθα χθές**: 'But yesterday we did not fight at all'. Lateiner (49) notes the emphatic repetitions in this section, *γε* and *χθές* ('but', 'yesterday') occurring three times in three short sentences.

5. **ὁ δὲ κῆρυξ ὡς ἤκουσε καὶ ἔγνω ὅτι ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως βοήθεια διέφθαρται, ἀνοιμώξας καὶ ἐκπλαγεὶς τῷ μεγέθει τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπήλθεν εὐθὺς ἀπρακτος καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπῆτει τοὺς νεκρούς**: 'When the herald heard this, and realized that the army coming from the city had been destroyed, he uttered a cry of anguish and was overwhelmed by the greatness of the blow. He went away at once without doing his errand, no longer bothering to demand the dead'. This brilliant and moving moment resembles one of the 'recognition scenes' in contemporary tragedy; compare Euripides, *Bacchae*, 1280 ff., where Agave utters a cry as she finally realizes that what she holds in her hands is her son Pentheus' head. For Th.'s literary exploitation of this herald, and the mention of the dead, see D. Lateiner, 'Heralds and Corpses in Thucydides', *Classical World*, 71 (1977), 97 ff., at 101. Cp. iv. 99 n.

6. **πάθος γὰρ τοῦτο μιᾷ πόλει Ἑλληνίδι ἐν ἴσαις ἡμέραις μέγιστον δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε ἐγένετο**: 'And indeed in

the whole war no such disaster happened within so few days to any Greek state'. A characteristic superlative; the closest parallel, noted by Jowett, is the remark about Mykalessos at vii. 30. 4: see n. there (the 'most deplorable' or 'lamentable' wartime catastrophe to happen to any place, considering its size). More immediately in the reader's mind, however, must be the judgement at 98. 4 about the Athenians who died in the Aitolian disaster.

114. 1. τὰ μὲν τῶν Ἀθηναίων πλέοντα ἔάλω: 'The spoils of the Athenians were captured on the voyage'. An obvious hazard in ancient warfare; the most celebrated example is from 189 BC, the capture by Thracians of the Galatian plunder taken by Glabrio. See Livy, xxxviii. 40. However, not all the Athenian booty can have gone astray on the present occasion, because a statue of Athena Nike was paid for out of the spoils of the campaigns in Corcyra, Ambrakia, Olpai, and Anaktorion in these years: see *IG* ii². 403 (a fourth-century inscription recording repairs to the statue), with L. H. Jeffery, 'Some Nikai-Statues at Olympia in the Late Fifth Century BC', *Miscellanea Manni* (Rome, 1979), 1233 ff., at 1237 and n. 15.

The Messenians and Naupaktians, who are so prominent in the fighting in these chapters, seem to have used some of their spoils to pay for one of the most beautiful of all Greek sculptures, the statue of Nike sculpted by Paionios, ML 74 = Fornara 135.

τὰ δὲ νῦν ἀνακείμενα ἐν τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἱεροῖς: 'they are still preserved in the Athenian temples'. It is rare for Th. to cite material evidence in this way, but it is very much in Hdt.'s manner: see v. 77.

τριακόσiai πανοπλίαι: 'three hundred panoplies'. Connor, 'Early Greek Land Warfare . . .' (i. 105. 6n.), 16 n. 64, noting that the amounts of the shares set apart for commanders might be 'very substantial', estimates that these three hundred panoplies might have been worth 3-5 talents. (Compare his 10 n. 30 for the price of armour.) Connor (26) remarks that 'ancient Greek land warfare revolves about bronze armour' and that bronze 'is often linked to the sacral realm' via dedications etc.

ἀδεεστέρα: 'he was less afraid'. See 98. 5.

3. ἑκατὸν ἔτη: 'for one hundred years'. Like the treaty between the Eleans and the Heraians of c.500 BC, ML 17 = Fornara 25. It is said that a century was regarded as a 'practically unlimited' period: ML comm. (Compare the treaty of about 550-525 BC between Sybaris and the Serdaioi, also from Olympia, which actually includes the words 'for ever', ML 10 = Fornara 29, also ML 63-4 = Fornara 124-5: 440s.) On the other hand a treaty between the Anaitans and the Metapians, Bengtson, *Staatsverträge des Altertums*, ii (Munich, 1967), no. 111 (from Olympia,

about 550 BC, stipulates a fifty-year period, which is a more imaginable length of time and might suggest that 'a hundred years' meant what it said. Connor (18 n. 72) says that the impermanence of trophies 'corresponds to the Greek habit of making treaties for a fixed period of time, rather than for ever, as the Romans did', though he rightly goes on to cite ML 10, 63, and 64 on the other side. The situation is complex, but if the 50- and 100-year alliances are included in the argument, I doubt if Connor's point can stand.

καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀνακτόριον μὴ βοηθεῖν: 'and they shall not help Anaktorion'. As Salmon (*Wealthy Corinth*, 318) says, this clause bore fruit the following year: see iv. 49.

115. SICILIAN NARRATIVE RESUMED (FROM CH. 103)

2. Πυθόδωρον: 'Pythodoros'. Like Sophocles and Eurymedon, he will get into trouble at iv. 65 for not winning over the whole of Sicily when it was possible to do so: see n. there for this extravagant ambition.

ὁ Λάχης: 'Laches'. Superseded, but Th. has not told us the circumstances. See 86. 1 n.

4. ναῦς τεσσαράκοντα: 'forty ships'. Bringing the total to sixty. It is important to note that this is exactly the total of ships envisaged *at first* for what turned into the great Sicilian expedition of 415: see vi. 8. 2. In other words, Th.'s clear implication at vi. 1, that that second expedition was a piece of collective insanity from the start, hardly takes account of the size of Athens' previous commitment.

ἄμα μὲν ἠγούμενοι θάσσον τὸν ἐκεῖ πόλεμον καταλυθήσεσθαι, ἄμα δὲ βουλόμενοι μελέτην τοῦ ναυτικοῦ ποιεῖσθαι: 'partly hoping to finish the war in Sicily the sooner, partly because they wanted to train their fleet'. As at 86. 4 (see n. there), we are given a radical and a conservative motive. The conservative motive, practice for the fleet, is by no means absurd: see Morrison and Coates, *Athenian Trireme*, 116. What of the more extreme and radical motive? I postpone discussion of this to iv. 65 nn., but note that from Ar. *Knights*, 1303, performed in 424 BC, we can perhaps see that extravagant ideas were in the air (the talk there is of a proposal by Hyperbolos to send a hundred ships against Carthage).

5. Σοφοκλέα . . . καὶ Εὐρυμέδοντα: 'Sophocles . . . and Eurymedon'. This Sophocles is not the poet, though he too was a general. For Eurymedon see 80 ff.

116. ERUPTION OF MT. ETNA

For such recording of natural phenomena see 87. 4n.

2. τὸ δὲ ξύμπαν τρὶς γεγενῆσθαι τὸ ῥεῦμα: 'altogether three eruptions'. This ch. has a bearing on the date of the composition of Th.'s work; for the problem see *Thucydides*, 144: we know from Diodorus (xiv. 59. 3) that there was an eruption in 396, of which Th. appears to have no knowledge. So he was probably dead, or had stopped working, by that date.

INDEX

- Abstract language in Th. 77, 85, 113-14, 363-4, 461-2
 Abuse of audience 422
 Accounting methods, Athenian 345
 Achaia, Achaians 34, 186, 248, 349, 506, 516
 Achaimenids, *see* Persia
 see also Artaxerxes I; Darius; Xerxes
 Acharnai 273-4, 275
 Accountability 432, 434
 Acropolis 136, 153, 253-4, 262, 265, 267-8, 270, 280
 Adeimantos, father of Aristeus 103-4, 119-20
 Advisers accompanying Spartan commanders 365
 Aeschylus 71, 124-5, 134, 140, 159, 171, 202, 253, 297, 311, 339, 418, 434, 436, 446
 After-life, absent in Th. 310, 326
 Agrai 206
 Agriculture 9-10, 14, 126, 259, 268-9, 279
 Aigina 29, 47-8, 84-5, 109-11, 136, 139, 158, 163, 166, 173, 185, 231, 282-3, 413, 458-9, 471
 Aiolian(s) 16, 191, 384
 Aiolian islands 495-6
 Aitolia(ns) 24-5, 68, 136, 343, 364, 488, 509-10, 514-15, 524, 531
 Akarnania(ns) 24-5, 67, 178, 188, 353-4, 361-2, 364, 377-8, 387-8, 509, 524, 531-3
 Akraiphia 172
 'Aktaian cities' 441
 Akte (in Peloponnese) 281
 Alcibiades 80, 106, 116, 285, 301, 312, 329, 335, 343, 348, 376, 389, 425
 Alexander the Great 100, 222, 257, 315, 372
 Alkidas 363, 370, 400, 409, 413, 463, 475, 506-8
 Alkinoos 70, 469
 Alkmaion of Kroton 456
 Alkmaionids 202, 225, 378
 Alkman 53
 Ambushes 532
 Ambrakia 176, 352-3
 Amorges 180, 343, 348
 Amphictiony, Delphic 73, 143, 168-9, 178, 197, 218-19, 319-20, 501-2, 505-6, *cf.* 527 (*Delian* amphictions)
 Amphilochos, Amphilocheians 351-3
 Amphipolis 20, 84, 98-9, 149, 188, 224, 253
 Amplification (*αὐξήσις*) 3, 59, 148
 Anaia 405, 413, 454, 490
Anapsephsis 419
 Anaxagoras 284, 360
 Anaximander 339
 Ancestors 296-7, 336, 445, 453-4
 'Ancestral Constitution', 'ancestral arrangements' (*πάτριος πολιτεία, τὰ πατρια*) 240-1, 426, 454-5, 460
 Androkrates, hero-shrine of 408
 Andros 184, 522
 Anger (*ὀργή*) 137, 143, 250, 365, 418, *cf.* 247, 432, 482
 Anthesteria 266-7
 Antiochus of Syracuse 41, 496, 498, 504
 Antiphon 427
 Aphytis 106-7
 Apollo 22, 169, 182, 201, 246, 266, 385, 465, 520, 525-6
 see also Delos; Delphi; Maloeis; Pythian Games
 Aramaic 222
 Arbitration 72-3, 75, 81, 124, 127, 129, 186, 195, 203, 227-8
Archaeology the (section of Th.'s work) 3, 7-8, 133, 259, 287, 436, 445, 454, 478, 483
 Archaeology, archaeological evidence, Th. and 3, 80, 138, 259-60, 262-4
Arche 6, 140, 148-9, 215-16, 485
 Archelaos, King of Macedon 34, 100, 102, 286, 374-6, 505
 Archers 257, 293, 383, 403, 513
 Archidamos *see esp.* 124-5, 191 (formal introductions), 381, 497 (death)
 Archons, archonship 138-9, 145, 154-5, 209, 236-8
 Areopagus 116, 209
 Arginusai 351, 369
 Argive Games to Hera 375
 Argos, Argolid 34, 116, 159-60, 165, 171-2, 179, 186, 194, 205, 220, 248, 329, 375
 Argos, Amphilocheian 351-3
 Aristeus son of Adeimantos 103-4, 107, 351-2
 Aristocracy 456, 485-6

Index

- Aristophanes 58, 70 111, 115, 158, 180, 186,
 196, 236, 250, 253, 257, 264, 269, 303,
 311-12, 329, 331, 335-6, 338, 345, 347,
 364, 377, 417, 419-20, 491-2, 526, 535
 Aristotle 5, 42, 183, 247-8, 300, 313, 416, 418,
 453, 466
 Arkadia 11, 13, 34, 194, 349
 Arktouros 235, 360
 Arne 38-9
 Arrian 58-9, 101, 315-16, 372, 476
 Artabazos 215
 Artas of Messapia 67, 286, 491, 494
 Artaxerxes I 163, 175, 221-2, 245
 Artemis 453
 Artemisia (festival) 527-9
 Artemisium, battle of 62, 448
 Artillery 357, 442
 Arthmios of Zeleia 176
 Assembly, Athenian (ἐκκλησία) 86 (cf. 94), 96,
 131, 225, 275, 331-3, 345-6, 366, 386, 419,
 427, 462, 500, 532
 Asopos (river-god) 459
 Astakos 289, 291, 377
 Astronomical calculations, astronomy 235-6,
 284
 Athenagoras 420
 Athenian Empire, *see* Empire
 Athletics, athletes 27-8, 315, 375, 389-91
see also Olympic Games
 Attica 12-14, 206, 224, 259-61
see also Crops, devastation of
 'Attikizing' 455
 Autochthony 11-13, 26, 297
 Autonomy, autonomy clauses 109-10, 121,
 147, 186, 231, 394, 427-8, 437, 441

 Barbarians 17-18, 127, 243, 293, 416, 510
 Bendis, cult of 286-7
 Benefaction, benefactors 214 (cf. 216), 220,
 438, 453, 458
 Biography 212
 Birds 288, 317, 323
 Black Sea 383, 401, 403
see also Pontus
 Boiotia, Boiotians 11, 14, 38-9, 169-70, 184,
 239, 250-1, 279, 448, 455, 511
 Bones 150, 210, 225, 504
 Booty 145, 512, 534
 Borrowing, from sacred funds, *see* Sacred
 Funds
 Bottiaia(ns) 101, 361
 Boudoron 371, 442
Boule 94, 225, 345, 347, 386, 418
Bouleuteria (council chambers) 261-2
 Brasidas 20, 123-5, 224, 281, 284, 306, 329,
 359, 365, 371, 389, 475, 521

 Brauron 453, 520
 Brea decree 72, 104, 399-400
 Bribery 175, 186, 274, 333-4, 426
 Buildings, Th. on 33, 35, 51, 153, 254, 309,
 376
 Burial 224, 292-4
see also Death/Dead; Grave Monuments;
 Kerameikos; State Burial
 Byzantium, Byzantines 190, 214, 217

 Caesar, Julius 93
 Cannibalism 356
 Capital levies (ἐσφοραί, εισφοραί) *see eisphora*
 Carthage 535
 Casualty lists, Athenian 149-50, 163, 257, 312
 Cause, causation 64-6, 78, 107, 194, 282
see also prophasis
 Cavalry 89, 171, 226, 230, 250-1, 256-7, 272-
 3, 276-7, 304, 342-3, 348, 361, 376, 381,
 399-400
 Census-ratings, Solonian 256, 399-400, 494-5
 Chalkidians, Chalkidic league (in N. Greece)
 102-3, 150
 Chalkis in Euboia 45, 49, 185-6
 Chance (τύχη), chance/intelligence (τύχη/
 γνώμη) antithesis 226-7, 367, 513
 Chaonians 362-4
 Character, arguments from 130, 459, cp. 395,
 461
 Characterization 130
 Charisma, charismatic leadership 344-5, 347
 Charon of Lampsakos 236, 239
 Charybdis 68, 524
 Children 313-15, 477
 Chios, Chians 50, 55-6, 190-2, 344, 394, 396,
 413, 440, 530
Choregoi 159, 419
 Chroniclers (λογογράφοι) 58-9
 Chronology, Th. on 38, 44, 47, 52, 67, 88, 102,
 133, 148-9, 154-5, 235-7, 467-8
 Chrysis 238
 Citizens, citizenship, citizenship laws 71-2,
 185, 191, 198-9, 219, 277-8, 288-9, 293,
 350, 399, 449-50, 458, 466
 Claros 414
 Class struggle 68, 241, cf. 386, 410, 466-7
 Cleruchs, cleruchies 150, 184-6, 187, 189, 247,
 357, 399, 440-1
 Cleverness (ξύνεσις) 485
see also Intelligence
 Clothes 453
see also Dress
 Clubs, politics, *see Hetairiai*
 Coins, coinage 71, 82, 106, 171-2, 187, 383,
 459, 469-70
 Colonies, colonization 14-15, 20-1, 27, 40-1,

Index

- 68–70, 74–5, 78, 81–2, 150, 160, 349, 351, 357, 384, 417, 496, 505, 508, 516
- Commerce 8–9, 45, 81
- Composition, date of 5, 23, 30, 44, 65–6, 78, 80, 107, 123, 129, 148, 176, 181, 195, 199–200, 229, 246, 250, 279, 334, 339, 343, 348–9, 371, 376, 391, 494, 505, 508, 536
- Comprehensiveness, *see* Selectivity
- Compulsion (*ἀνάγκη*) 66, 194
- Concord, cult of 357–8
- Congress, of Peloponnesian League 108–9
- Consistency, claimed by politicians 226, 334, 425
- Contagion 317, 325, 329–30
- Corcyra 21, 44–5, 62, 66–8, 80, 88, 112, 133, 194, 220, 231, 340, 392, 463, 466–8
- Corinth 21, 29, 42–4, 66–8, 160–2, 165, 181, 185, 205, 228, 264, 353, 390, 449, 493, 508
- Corn, wheat 12, 107, 383, 398, 410, 493
- Council of 500, *see* *Boule*
- Countryside 103, 258, 471
see also Agriculture; Crops
- Courage 306–7, 367
- Crete 13, 21, 248, 366, 467
- Crops, devastation of 126, 258, 409
- Crosswalls 416
- 'Cultural archaism' 224
- Culture, Athenian 307–8, 339
- Cuneiform 222
- Curses 202–4, 251, 378
- Cyclades 20–1
- Cyprus 13, 140–1, 163–4, 179, 214
- Cypselus, Cypselids 21, 38, 42, 99
- Cyrene 11, 53, 71–2, 176
- Cyrus the Younger 348
- Daimachos of Plataia 405–6
- Damagon 506–7
- Dareios 50, 286
- Daskyleion 215
- Death/dead 93, 106, 309, 453–4
- Death penalty 432, 435, 447
- Debts, debtors 467, 470, 476–7, 488
- Decrees (*ψηφίσματα*) as opp. to laws 423–4
- Dedications 47, 150, 154, 161, 172, 189, 218, 369, 441, 453, 521–2, 534
- Dekeleia 22, 229, 259, 271, 409, 494, 501
- Delia (festival) 527
- Delian League, *see esp.* 83, 143–7, 224, 393
- Delos 8, 20, 30, 46–7, 144, 146, 173, 182, 245–6, 318, 517–19
- Delphi 52–3, 69, 73, 79, 110, 143, 150, 154, 168–9, 178, 181–3, 194–6, 197–8, 218–9, 229, 270, 370, 390, 452, 465, 501–2, 505–6, 515
- Demagogues 342, 345, 347, 385
- Demes, demotics 4, 186, 207–8, 210, 261–3, 268–70, 273, 275–6, 278–9, 449–50
- Demeter 260
- Demourgoi* 99
- Democracy, democrats 55, 167, 170–2, 188–9, 192–3, 220, 241, 249, 298–300, 302, 346, 386, 410, 422, 429–30, 438, 455–6, 459–60, 467, 480
- Demography, *see* Population
- Demokritos 125, 307, 435, 478
- Demosthenes (fifth-century Athenian general) 200, 363, 370, 498, 516
- Demosthenes (fourth-century Athenian orator) 95, 128, 254, 307, 345
- Derdas 100, 374
- Devastation of crops 126, 258, 409
- Diagoreioi of Rhodes 390
- Dialect 13, 16, 211, 352–3, 533
- Diasia* 206–7, 267
- Drekplois* (naval manoeuvre) 92, 364, 369
- Diitrephes 473
- Diodotos 410, 419, 428–30, 432–4
- Diolkos*, the 45, 398
- Dionysia 69, 266–7, 310
- Dionysius I of Sicily 246, 492
- Dionysus 266
- Dioskouroi 441
- Diotimos 90
- Diplomats 76, 90
- Disasters, natural 62
- Discipline 128–9
- Diseases 316, 320–2, cf. 481
- Diviners, divination 223, 245, 405, 407, cf. 434
- Doctors 61, 76, 174, 223, 316–18, 320
- Dodona 69, 370, 521–2
- Dogs 317
- Dorian(s) 16, 25, 28, 38–40, 142, 146, 159, 168–9, 201, 327, 388, 390, 448, 492–3, 502, 504–6, 520–2
- Dorieus (Rhodian athlete) 389–91
- Dorieus (sixth-century Spartan) 503
- Doris 168–9, 502, 504–5
- Doubt/ignorance/uncertainty, admissions of by Th. 16, 223, 242–3, 495
- Drabeskos 155, 292
- Drakon 205
- Drakontides 95–6
- Dress 25–7
- Drought 49, 62
- 'Dynasty' (family clique) 457, 459
- Dynamis*, *see* Power
- Dynatoi* 192–3, 410, 470
- Dyrrachium 68
- Earthquakes 62–3, 157, 206, 245–6, 283, 317, 448, 495, 497, 528

Index

- East/West contrast 336
 Eclipses 62, 206, 283-4, 317
 Economic factors 7, 41, 111, 197, 430, 466-7, 476-7, 488-9
see also Booty; Coinage; Commerce; Money; Trade; Poverty; Revenues; Tribute; Upper classes; Wealth
 Education 125, 307-8 (ii.41.1 *not* a reference to it)
 Egesta 187, 492-3
 Egypt, Egyptian Expedition 48, 129, 163-4, 173-5, 176-8, 184
 Eion 149-50
Epiphora (capital levy) 228, 253, 342, 403-4
Ekklesia (Athenian Assembly), *see* Assembly
 Eleusis, Eleusinian Mysteries 260-1, 266, 272, 274, 302, 516
 Elis, 34, 196, 281, 388
 Elymiotis 100
 Emotive effects in Th. 93, 166, 316, 465-6
see also Narratology/narrative devices
 Empire, Athenian (including popularity of), *see esp.* 120, 126, 140, 144, 152, 247, 309, 332, 337, 339, 410, 422, 429-30, 437-8, 520-1
see also Imperialism; Kinship; Tribute
 Enslavement 150-2
see also Slavery/Slaves
 Epehebes, epehebic oath 231, 272, 301-2, 304, 407
 Ephesia (festival) 267, 522, 267-9
 Ephesos 189, 413, 522, 527-9
 Epialtes 116, 301
 Ephoros 37-9, 111, 163, 167, 222, 412, 503
 Ephors (Spartan magistrates) 217, 239, 281
 Epialtes 182
Epibatari (marines) 399, 511, 514
 Epic 31, 67
see also Homer
 Epidamur 67-9, 133
 Epidauros, Epidaurians 84, 165, 185, 226, 328-9, 342
Epidemiourgoi 99
 Epigraphic evidence, Th. and, *see* Inscriptions
 Epimenides 518
Epitaphios agon (Funeral contest) 315, cf. 292
Epitaphios (logos), *see* Funeral Oration
Epiteichisis, epiteichismos 199-200, 229, 405, 490
Epitheasmos 359
 Epirus 220-1, 362-3
 Equality 27, 122, 153, 299-300, 391-4, 425, 432-3
see also isonomia; isopsephos
Eranos 311-12, 476
 Eretria 49, 186, 214
 Erechtheus 260
Erga 33-5 (cf. 376), 50-1, 60, 309
see also Buildings, Word/Deed antithesis
 Eruptions, volcanic 62, 391, 536
 Erythrai (in Asia Minor) 175, 189, 224, 417, (in Boiotia) 408
Etheloproxenos (voluntary proxenos) 285, 468
 Ethnography in Th. 100, 372-3, 510
 Etna 62, 391, 536
 Euagon of Samos 44
 Euarchos 289, 291, 377
 Euboia 14, 29, 45, 49, 64, 102, 151, 184-6, 237, 258, 279-80, 282, 324, 371, 398, 401, 505
 Euclid 15
 Eumenides or Solemn Goddesses 207, 209-10
 Eumolpidai 303
 Eumolpos 260
Eunomia (obedience to laws) 52-3, 128
 Eupolis 271, 447
 Euripides 16, 112, 115, 221, 298-301, 304, 307, 314, 334, 418, 423, 436, 444, 452, 474, 524-5, 533
 Europos 376-7
 Eurymedon (Athenian general) 154, 474-6, 489, 535
 Eurymedon (battle) 151, 153-4, 163
 Expediency 75, 326, 421, 452
 Experience, *see* Mistakes
 Expertise 344-5 *and see* Sophists, Professionalism
 Famine 62
 Farming, *see* Agriculture
 Fathers/sons 314, 336, 477
 Fear 32-3, 120, 302
 Federalism, federal institutions 24, 103, 184, 239
 Festivals 207, 224, 265, 303, 385, 451 (cf. 459)
see also Anthesteria; Artemisia; Delia; Diasia; Dionysia; Isthmian Games; Nemean Games; Olympic Games; Panathenaia; Panonian festival; Pythian Games; Synoikia
 Field/surface surveys 11, 509
 Finance 12, 127-8
see also Booty; Commerce; Revenues; Trade; Tribute
 First Peloponnesian War 5, 161-2, 164-73, 178-87, 511
 Firstfruits 146, 218, 519
 Fleet(s), *see* Navies; Sea-power; Sailors; Ships; Triremes
 'For all time', treaties 534-5
 Force 8
see also Violence
 Foresight, farsightedness 229, 323, 341-2, 434
 Fortifications 10, 136, 363, 406

Index

- Forts 255, 271, 471, 497
 Founders (of colonies), *see* Colonies, Oikists
 Freedom 48, 113, 128, 219, 297, 301, 394, 437
 see also Liberators
 Funeral Oration 290, 292-316, 332, 335, 339, 445
 Funerary laws 294, 303, 326
 Funerary monuments 138, 210, 268
- Games, *see* Argive Games to Hera; Athletics;
 Isthmian, Nemean, Olympic, Pythian
 Games
 Gardens 336
 Garrisons 247, 255, 440-1
 Generals (*στρατηγοί*), generalship
 (*στρατηγία*) 94, 101, 191-2, 275-6, 300, 331, 341, 357, 385-6, 418, 500, 516, 531
 Genitals, in Th. 27-8
 Geography, in Th. 68, 90, 512
 Geraneia 166, 170
 Gift-giving 373
 Gla 38-9
 Glaukon son of Leagros 95, 155
Gnome (resolution) 226-7, 231, 367, 413
 Gods 196, 205, 326, 359, 378, 385, 436, 440-1, 445, 453
 see also Religion, *also under individual gods*
 Gold 255
 Gongylos the Eretrian 214
 Good will (*εὐνοία*) 246, 250, 423
 Gorgias of Leontini 60, 427, 484
 Grain 12
 see also Corn
 Grasshoppers 29
 Grave monuments 138, 210
 Greed (*πλεονεξία*) 82, 343-4, 485 (twice), 489
 Guest-friendship (*ξενία*) 251, 272, 285, 405
 Gylippos 409
- Hagnon 20, 191, 328-30, 371
 Halieis 163, 165
 Halikarnassos 21, 360
 Harmosts, Spartan 501
 Heiresses 383
 Hekataios of Miletos 67-8, 91, 263-4, 363, 371, 496
 Helen 32
 Hellenikos 32, 38-9, 147-8, 159, 236-8, 261, 264, 287
 Hellen 16
 Hellenization 353, 363
 Hellenotamiai 139, 145, 432
 Hellespont 383, 398
 Helots 157, 212, 219, 304, 448
 Hephaistos 496
 Hera 68, 238, 375, 466
- Herakleia in Trachis, Herakleia Trachinia 20, 36, 124, 168-9, 182-3, 362, 501-3, 522
 Herakleidai 32, 38-9, 503
 Herakles 40, 266, 503, 506-7
 Hermokrates 125, 333, 453, 500
 Herms, mutilation of 28, 149
 Herodotus, Th.'s relation to (polemic against, use/correction of) 5, 19-20, 33-5, 60, 84-5, 104, 111, 119, 125, 143, 182, 202, 214-15, 221-3, 235, 239-41, 245-6, 250, 282, 351, 372, 376-7, 384, 406, 428, 445, 448-9, 457, 459, 504, 524
 Heroes, heroization 20, 214, 359, 224, 269, 292, 359, 408, 414, 469
 Hesiod 16, 58, 477, 485, 511-12
 Hestiaia 72, 186
Hetairiai 484-5
 'Hexameters' in Th. 47, 81, 333, cf. 335
 Hipparchos 57, 456
Hippeis 256-7, 399-400
 see also Cavalry
 Hippias (Pisistratid tyrant) 20, 51, 464-5
 Hippias (sophist) 38, 236, 391
 Hippocratic writings 174, 235, 321-2, 327
 Hippodamos of Miletos 138
 Hipponikos 500-1
 Homer (including refs. to *Iliad* and *Odyssey*) 3, 33, 35-7, 38-9, 67, 70, 82, 99, 125, 137, 176, 214, 225-6, 247, 250, 263, 309, 333-4, 339, 373, 513, 523-5, 529-31
 Homosexuality 311
 Hope 115, 428, 435-6
 Hoplites 41, 53, 73, 153, 169, 199, 255-6, 273-4, 304, 332-3, 361, 376, 399-400, 402-3, 440, 472, 494-5, 513-14, 532
Horoi (boundary-stones) 184-5, 187, 251, cf. 520
 Horses, horse-breeding 89, 125, 276, 329, 376
 Humour in Th. 487-8
Hymn to Apollo, Homeric 4, 17, 23, 26, 523-5, 529-31
Hymn to Demeter, Homeric 260
 Hyperbolos 220, 535
- Iambic rhythms in Th. 216, 298, 334-5
 see also 'Hexameters' and 'verse' (accidental) in Th.
 Ignorance, admissions of by Th., *see* Doubt
Iliad, the, *see* Homer
 Imbros 150
 Immunity, acquired 317, 325
 Imperialism 117, 120, 137, 332, 462, 504 (Spartan)
 see also Empire
 Impiety, impiety trials 341, 360, 451
 Incest 205

Index

- Inscriptions, Th. and 95, 218
see also Dedications
- Interest paid on loans 255
- Intelligence (ξύνεσις) 125, 261, 424, 433, cf. 222-3
- Intermarriage, by tyrants 205
- Ion of Chios 191
- Ionia, Ionians 14-16, 27, 41, 49, 134-5, 141-2, 146, 150, 159, 171-2, 181, 201, 248, 265-6, 412, 415, 493, 506, 520-2, 523, 530-1
- Isonomia*, 'isonomy' 300, 455-7, 485-6
- Isopolity* 449-50
- Isopsephos* 229, 394-5, 475
- Isthmian Games 522
- Italy 41, 187, 244, 496, 504
- Itamenes 415-16
- Ithome 84-5, 115, 158, 164, 445, 448
- Jason (mythical figure) 407
- Jason of Pherai 183
- Javelin-men 91, 257
- Judges, foreign 80
- Justice, in Th.'s speeches 75-6, 82, 392-3, 421, 425, 435, 438, 444, 447, 452
- Kallias, decrees of 67, 87, 132-3, 267, 404
- Kallias, Peace of 133, 179-81, 260, 393-4, 412, 417-19
- Kallisthenes 179, 183
- Kamarina 493
- Karia, Karians 21, 29-30, 248, 354, 416, 519
- Karystos 150-1
- Katalogos* or hoplite register, absence of 256
- Kekryphaleia 165
- Kenchreai 45
- Keos 22
- Kephalenia 290, 362
- Kerameikos 154, 156, 171, 292, 294
- Kimon 22, 89-90, 150, 152-3, 158, 167-8, 179-80
- Kinship 42
- Kinship (τὸ ξυγγενές) 26-7, 32, 71, 74, 142, 168-9, 190, 384, 520
- Kleippides 384-5
- Kleisthenes (Athenian reformer) 52-3, 171, 264, 293, 456, 523
- Kleokritos the herald 445, 454
- Kleomenes King of Sparta 51, 194, 210, 464, 503
- Kleon 114, 116, 187, 225, 252, 275, 311, 334-5, 337, 341-3, 345, 347, 361, 419, 435, 440, 484-5
- Kleonymos 30, 518
- Knemos 349, 362, 370, 509
- Knidos, Knidians 496
- Knights 494
see also Cavalry
- Kolophon 412, 414-6
- Konon 138
- Kore 261
- Koroneia 183, 458, 461
- Kos 63, 146, 185, 248, 521
- Kritias 436
- Kroisos 49-50
- Kyllene 74
- Kylon 202-4, 267, 385, 389
- Kythera 11
- 'Laconism' (admiration for Sparta) 89, 333
- Laches 306, 491-2, 535
- Lakedaimonios son of Kimon 88-90, 94, 101, 150
- Lampsakos 224
see also Charon
- Land empire, Athenian 172, 186
- Land/sea antithesis 8-9, 54-5, 79, 126, 297, 309, 335, 364, cf. 134
- Land-tenure 326
see also Agriculture
- Language 15-16, 222, 352, 510, cf. 483
see also Dialect
- Laughter in Th. 129, 215, 487
- Laurion 254, 327-8
- Law, law-codes, law-suits 52, 122, 205, 299-300, 423-4, 430, 435, 446-7, 451, 453, 460-1
- Leasing of property 441, 463-4
- Lechaion 45, 167
- Lefkandi 29, 40, 49
- Lelantine War 44, 49
- Lemnos 150, 189, 318, 399
- Leokoreion 57
- Leon 506
- Leontini 67, 187, 492-3
- Lesbos 55-6, 83, 133, 147-8, 188, 190-1, 382
- Letters 214
- Leukas 74, 476, 508-9
- Libations 195
- Liberators, Spartans as 51, 113, 127, 200-01, 245-6, 393, 413, 443, 454, 463
- Liberty, *see* Freedom
- Libya 176
- Lichas 285
- Light-armed troops 510, 513
see also Archers; Peltasts
- Linear B 13
- Literacy writing 52-3, 214, 312
see also Oral tradition
- Livy 62, 407, 502, 534
- Logos, logoi*, *see* Word/Deed antithesis
- 'Lokrian Maidens' 173

Index

- Lokrians (of Italy, 'Epizephyrian' Lokrians) 248, 492-3
Lokrians (of Greece) 24, 124, 136, 160-1, 172-3, 182, 248, 282, 511, 513
Long Walls 29, 113, 162, 167, 170, 173, 257, 271
Lovers (*ἐρασταί*) 311, 347
Lycia, Lycians 354-6, 524
Lycurgus, Lycurgan reforms (at Sparta) 51-3, 108, 212
Lysander 148, 502-3
Lysias 303
- Macedon(ia) 99-101, 149, 213, 363, 371-3, 374-6
'Magna Graecia' 41
Magnesia ad Sipylum (modern Manisa) 223
Magnesia on the Maiander 215, 223-4, 404
Malea 386
Malis, Malians 501-3, 506
Malocia (Apollo) 385
Manœuvres, naval 92
 see also Diekplous; Periplous
Mantineia 55, 158, 220, 229
Marathon 12, 54, 62, 118, 165, 245, 261, 294, 448
Market, market-place (*ἀγορά*) 57, 105, 111
Massalia 47
Material evidence remains 30, 138, 534
 see also Archaeology; Buildings
Mausolus 218, 223
Meddlesomeness (*πολυπραγμοσύνη*), 78, 306-7, 338
Medical writers, Medicine 174, 316-8, 384, 480-1
 see also Doctors; Hippocratics
Medism, medizing 69, 142, 171, 175, 214, 219-20, 227, 417, 445, 455-6, 458
Megabazos, Megabaxos 175
Megara 27-8, 83, 111-12, 139, 161-3, 184, 204, 226, 261, 264, 290-1, 442, 463
 see also Megarian Decrees
Megarian Decree(s) 83, 86, 110-11, 117, 188, 291, 334, 384
Melanopos 491-2
Melanthios 507
Melesandros 354-5
Melesippos 225, 250
Melissus 15, 191
Melos, Melians, Melian Dialogue 8, 20, 22, 38, 230, 248-9, 252, 294, 344, 420, 431-2, 436, 445, 461, 498-500, 533
Menon of Pharsalos 277-8
Mercenaries 11, 190, 197-9, 212, 229, 287, 343, 403, 416
- Messapia(ns) 67
 see also Artas
Messene, Messenia, Messenians (in Peloponnese) 15, 34, 121, 157, 160-1, 173, 178, 228, 248, 369, 388, 473, 521, 534
Messina (in Sicily) 498
Metapontion/Metapontum 67
Methone (in Peloponnese) 281
Metics 199, 229, 255-6, 399
Metropolis, mother-city 68, 142, 168, 505, 520
Migrations 13-14
Miletos 29, 49, 78, 103, 188-9, 192
Military matters, *see esp.* 58, 231, 303-4, 361, 364, 388, 399-400, 402, 418
 see also Ambushes; Cavalry; Ephebes; Generals; Hoplites; Night fighting; Persian Wars; Security (military); Tribes, etc.
Miltiades, oikist of Chersonese 507
Miltiades, victor of Marathon 20, 150, 189
Mimesis 272
Mines, silver 263-4, 327-8
Minoa 441-2
Minos, Minoan Civilization 13-14, 30
Mistakes/experience, people in Th. learn from (rarely) 367, 475, 513-14
Mob, the 341
Moderation 128-9, 457, 483-4, 486
 see also Prudence (σωφροσύνη)
Molossians 220-1, 354, 363
Money 128, 175, 244
 see also Finance, Coins
'Monosandalism' 237, 406-7, 504, 519
Morality, moral outlook of Th. 127, 435, 478, 482, 487-9
Mother city, *see* Metropolis
Motive, Th. on 23, 86, 90, 109, 156-7, 171, 210, 240-1, 273, 286, 363, 407, 464, 475, 503, 509
Mounted archers (*ἵπποτοξόται*) 257, 372
Mycenae, Mycenaeans, Mycenaean civilization 13-14, 33, 40, 159, 259, 263-4
Mykale 62, 527-9
Myous 224
Mysteries 260, 302, 519
Myth, Th. and 33, 351, 377-8
Mytilene(ans) 84, 146, 153, 185, 190, 250, 343-4, 382-4, 418-20, 457, 462-3, 468
- Nakedness 27-8
Names, proper, in Th. (including anonymity) 4-5, 191, 285, 288, 310, 369, 443-4, 504, 506-7
Narratology, narrative devices and techniques in Th. 4, 84, 92-4, 97, 133-4, 166, 202-3,

Index

- Narratology (*cont.*)
 235-7, 242, 247-8, 280, 290-1, 362, 419,
 441-2, 494-5, 514, 515
- Naturalization, *see* Citizenship
- Nature, human 61, 121-2, 323, 423, 453, 459,
 479, 481
- Naupaktos 124, 160-2, 173, 178, 187, 248,
 369, 474, 475, 503, 521, 534
- Navarchy, Spartan 349
- Navies 42, 48, 70, 75, 198, 257-8, 355, 398
see also Sea-power; Triremes
- Naxos 149-51, 158, 184, 200, 221-2
- Necessity (*ἀνάγκη*) 66, 194
- Nemea, Nemean Games 162, 511, 522
- Neutrality 186, 248-9, 486-7, 499
- 'New Politicians' at Athens 326, 333, 340-1,
 344-5, 346-7
- Night fighting 531-2
- Nikias of Athens 30, 199, 366, 442, 445, 517-18
- Nikias of Gortyn 366
- Nikostratos 473-4
- Nine Ways 149
- Nisaia 162, 186, 442
- Nomos* (law, convention) 121, 423, 451, 460-1
see also Law; Unwritten Law
- Notion (place in Asia Minor) 20, 369, 412,
 414-16
- Novelty 426
- Nucleated/non-nucleated settlement 268-9
- Oaths 31, 117, 124, 242-3, 319-20, 359, 485-6,
 488
- Odrysians 287, 372-3
- Odysseus 137, 524
- Odyssey*, the, *see* Homer
- Oikist(s) 20-1, 68, 82, 417, 496, 506-7
- Oiniadai 178, 353, 509
- Oinoe (deme of Attica) 271
- Oinoe, battle of 160, 165
- Oinophyta, battle of 167-8, 172
- Oita, Oitaians 504
- Old Oligarch* 3, 9, 15, 126, 172, 257, 303, 330,
 460
- Olen of Lycia 524
- Oligarchy, oligarchs 55, 99, 170-2, 192, 304,
 391, 410, 426, 429, 438, 455-6, 459-60,
 467, 470-2, 480, 486
- Olive trees 409
- Olympia 79, 153, 161, 172, 197-8, 229, 369,
 388-90, 521-2
- Olympic Games, Olympic victors 27, 110,
 203-6, 333, 375, 389-91, 506
- Olynthos, Olynthians 102-3, 264, 268, 384, 418
- Oracles 73, 169, 183, 194-6, 206, 245, 270-1,
 319, 327, 378, 415, 465, 505-6, 511-12,
 517, 519, 525-7
- see also* Claros; Delphi; Dodona; Semos of
 Delos
- Oral tradition, hearsay 7, 20, 42, 57, 60
- Oratory, orators 129, 421, 424, 432, 434
see also Rhetoric
- Orchomenos 172
- Oropos 259, 279, 500
- Orphans, war 260, 315
- Ostracism, ostraka 168, 179, 203, 220, 385
- Oxyrhynchus Historian, the 182, 184, 239, 409
- Paches 440
- Paian (battle-song) 94, 369
- Panathenaia 69
- Panhellenism, Panhellenes, Panhellenic
 sanctuaries 17, 390-1, 398, 521
- Panionian festival 189, 522, 527-8
- Paralia, Paralos (district) 327
- Paralos (sacred trireme) 414, 474
- Paros 69-70
- Parthenon, Parthenon frieze 295, 312
- Party, political (i.e. club) 484
- Patriotism (*φιλόπολι*) 333
- Pausanias (Spartan regent) 108, 120, 134, 140-
 2, 189, 202-3, 211-12, 358
- Pay, military 402, 440
- Peace of Kallias, *see* Kallias, Peace of
- Pegai 162, 186
- Pelargikon 269-70
- Pelagians 16, 270
- Peloponneses, *see esp.* 13, 34, 46
- Peltasts 289, 361
- Pentakostomedimnoi* 256, 399-400
- Pentekontaetia* (50-year period c.480-430) 84,
 133-5, 188, 194
- Pentekontors 47
- Pentelikon 278
- Perachora 45
- Peraia, peraiiai* 154, 278-9, 405, 441, 490, 500
- Perdikkas King of Macedon, *see esp.* 99-100
- Pericles, *see esp.* 178 (actual first appearance),
 210-1, 225 (formal introductions), 340-2
 ('obituary')
- Periodization 236
- Perioikoi* 157, 170, 281
- Periplous* (expedition of Tolmides) 173
- Periplous* (naval manoeuvre) 92, 364, 369
- Persia, Persian, Persians 49, 120, 127, 134-5,
 141-2, 144, 159, 164, 174, 177-9, 216, 218,
 220, 222, 243, 319, 348, 350-1, 373, 393,
 414-16
- Persian War(s) 15, 62, 69, 113, 118-19, 231,
 444-5
see also Marathon; Salamis, etc.
- Personification in Th. 200, 432, 436, 447, 482,
 cf. 227

Index

- Persuasion (*πειθῶ*), persuasive (*πιθανός*) 420, 447
- Peukestas 222
- Phaiaikia 70, 469
- Phaleron 135, 139, 257, 327
- Pharnabazos (1) 350, (2) 349
- Pharnakes (1) 215, 224, (2) 180, 350
- Phaselis, Phaselites, Phaselis Decree 122-3, 153, 355
- Philip II of Macedon 101, 103, 181, 200, 291, 418
- Philistos 495
- Philokrates 269
- Philotimia* (ambition/love of honour) 313, 344, 485
- Phoenicia(ns) 29-30, 50, 154, 163, 355-6
- Phokis, Phokians 172, 182-3, 287, 455, 511
- Phormio 106, 191, 353-4, 364-6, 378, 402
- Phrygia(ns) 103, 276
- Phrynichos 125
- Physis* (nature) 121-2, 323, 423, 459, 481
- Pindar 33, 128, 221, 390, 407, 492-3, 503, 507, 529
- Piracy 23-5, 28, 36, 46, 70, 150, 291, 355, 488
- Piraeus, Piraeus walls 135, 138-40, 167, 257, 370-1
- Pisistratus, Pisistratids 20-1, 42, 50, 54, 57, 108, 125, 204, 212, 261, 456, 464-5, 519-20, 523, 525-6
see also Hippias
- Pissouthnes 180, 189-90, 343, 412-13, 415-16
- Pitana, Pitanate *λόχος* 57-8
- Pitch, for ship-building 493
- Pity 421, 431, 452
- Plague 62-3, 206, 243, 290, 308, 316-30, 339, 392, 478, 481, 494, 518-19
- Plataia(ns) 62, 85, 118, 130, 136, 140, 158, 236-8, 272, 283, 294, 357-9, 405-7, 417-19, 442-4, 464-6, 504
- Plato 111, 204, 295, 306-7, 332-3, 376, 435-6, 438, 478, 483, 491
- Pleistoanax 156, 161, 186, 274, 283, 497
- Pleonexia*, *see* Greed
- Poets, poetry 23, 35, 53, 58-9, 214, 226, 288, 318, 453, 477, 512
see also Aeschylus; Aristophanes; Epic; Hesiod; Homer; Pindar; Sophocles; *also* Verse (accidental) in Th.
- Poisoning of wells and water-supplies 319-20
- Polemic in Th. 3, 6, 58, 206, 236, 239, 241, 287, 327, 524-5
see also Hellanikos; Herodotus
- Pollution 111, 202, 318, 325, 329, 356, 378, 526
- Polykrates 46-7, 175, 520, 530
- Poor, *see* Poverty
- Pontus, Pontic expedition of Pericles 188
see also Black Sea
- Population 11, 36, 157, 162, 256-7, 494-5
- Portents 52-3, 206, 317
- Poseidon 212, 276, 497, 520
- Potidaia 66, 74, 97-9, 112, 133, 188, 192, 194-5, 231, 237, 254-5, 328, 342, 356-7, 402
- Poverty 300, 436, 482, 489, cf. 9-10, 14
- Power (*δύναμις*) 11-12, 31, 35, 113, 117, 140, 240, 311
- Prasiai 329
- Priene 189, 527-8
- Priestesses 238-9
- Priests 260
- Privateering 244, 355, 442
- Prizes, prize recitations 61-2, 315, 478, 485-6
- Prodigies 63
- Prodikos of Keos 114, 337
- Professionalism 304
- Progress, in Th. 10, 116, 482-3
- Prooimion* 529
- Propaganda, religious 14, 41, 142, 150, 185, 520
- Prophasia* 64-5, 133, 194, 203, 231-2, 321-2, 392, 397
- Prophecy, prophets 223, 245
see also Diviners; Oracles
- Propylaia 254
- Protagoras 430
- Proxeny, proxenoi 277-8, 284-6, 350, 366, 383-4, 417, 443-4, 452, 466, 494
- Prudence (*σωφροσύνη*) 77, 112, 124-5, 128-9, 131, 197, 483-4, 486
- Prytaneia* 260
- Prytaneis* 418
- Psephismata* (decrees) 423-4
- Punishment, theories of 422, 435-6, 438
- Puns, absence of in Th. 177
- Purification 30, 63, 204-5, 318-9, 517-19, 525-7
- Pydna 102, 103, 221
- Pylagoroi, pylaia 182
- Pylos 15, 200, 498
- Pythian Apollo, *see* Apollo, Delphi
- Pythian Games, Pythia (festival) 183, 391, 521
- Pythodoros 535
- Race, racial factors 191, 492-3, 506
see also Dorians; Ionians; Kinship
- Raw meat, eating of 510
- Reassessment of tribute 341, 355, 404
- Reciprocity 282, 373, cp. 438, 458, 461
see also Benefactors, Gift-giving
- 'Recognition scenes', in tragedy 533
- Religion, Th. and 68-70, 111, 144, 146, 168-9, 195, 237, 291-2, 351, 378, 407, 409, 454, 486, 504

Index

- Religion, Th. and (*cont.*)
see also Amphictiony; Curses; Dedications;
 Delphi; Delos; Diviners; Heroes; Kinship;
 Oaths; Oracles; Pollution; Purification;
 Sacred Funds/Wars; Sacrilege;
 Sanctuaries; Suppliants; Temples,
 Worship of human beings; *and under names*
of particular gods.
- Reserve of 100 talents 280
- Revenues 22-3, 42, 48, 103, 253, 398, 403, 412
- Revolts, from Athens 184-5, 190-1, 382-4,
 421
- Revolution 114-15, 473
see also stasis
- Rhamnous 189, 268
- Rhegion 67, 187, 244, 493, 495
- Rheneia 46, 526
- Rhetoric, rhetorical devices 3, 60, 62-3, 75-6,
 130, 188, 197, 223, 225-6, 231, 319, 339,
 346, 368, 392-3, 420, 422, 446, 452-3, 456,
 494
- Rhodes 102, 246, 355, 384, 390-1, 521
- Rich, *see* Wealth, Upper classes, *and cf.*
 Oligarchy
- Ring Composition 15, 29-30, 37, 56, 203, 259,
 269, 296, 374
- Rogozen hoard 288, 372-3
- Rome, Romans 38, 52-3, 184, 209, 251, 294,
 336, 450, 453, 535
- Rotation of office 300
- 'Roving anecdotes' 251
- Sacred funds and treasures, borrowing from
 193, 197-8, 229, 255, 341
- Sacred triremes 414, *cp.* 474
- Sacred War (First) 181, 529, (Second) 169,
 181-2
- Sacred wood, cutting of 468-9
- Sacrifice 70, 208
- Sacrilege 197, 210, 221, 224, 325
- Sadokos 287-8, 350
- Sailors 198-9, 229, 403
- Salaithos 409, 417-18, 531
- Salamina (sacred trireme) 414, 474
- Salamis (island near Athens, scene of battle)
 62, 119, 136, 139, 222, 294, 369, 401
- Salamis (town on Cyprus) 140
- Samos, Samians 8, 33, 43-5, 46-7, 49-50, 55-6,
 83-4 (*cf.* 86), 133, 147, 149, 156, 158, 161,
 176, 185, 187-9, 198, 248, 252, 313, 354,
 382, 392, 394, 405, 413, 440, 449, 454, 490
- Sanctuaries 34, 198, 279, 390
see also Delos; Delphi; Olympia, etc.
- Sandios, hill of 404-5
- Satokos, *see* Sadokos
- Satrap, Persian 180, 186, 189, 215, 350, *cf.*
 348-9, 416
- Scheria 70, 469
- Scientific attitudes/evidence, Th. and 63, 317,
 497
see also Medicine
- Scythians 125, 257
- Sea/land antithesis, *see* Land/sea
- Sea-power 3, 8, 19-20, 42, 229, 232, 309, *cf.*
 520
- Security, military 386, 500
- Segesta, *see* Egesta
- Selectivity 60, 225, 235, 290-1, 381, 420, 498
see also Religion; Speeches
- Semos of Delos 526
- Sestos 134-5
- Settlement habits, patterns 11, 34-5, 259-61,
 268-9, 509-10
see also Synoikism, Villages
- Ships, *see esp.* 145-6, 257-8, 439
see also Sea-power; Triremes
- Sicily, Sicilian Expeditions 41, 47, 49, 51, 64,
 129, 173, 175, 181, 187, 230, 244, 246,
 290, 336, 343, 347-8, 372, 491-3, 497-8,
 524, 535
- Sieges 36, 134, 159, 193 (Samian indemnity),
 239, 254-5, 342, 356-8, 405-7, 418, 442,
cf. 402
- Sigeion 21
- Sikyon(ians) 72, 165, 185, 205
- Silver 81, 288
- Silver mines, *see* Mines
- Simplicity of character 487
- Siris 504
- Sitalkes 286, 350, 371-3
- Skione 98, 389, 450
- Skyros 22, 150-1
Skytale 217
- Slavery, slaves, enslavement 150-2, 157-8,
 199-200, 213, 229, 241-2, 328, 357, 418,
 458-9, 471-2
- Socrates 106, 305, 333
- Solon 116, 204-5, 256, 261, 292, 294, 296, 299,
 315, 334, 346, 399, 487, 494
- Soothsayers 434, *cf.* 245
- Sophists, sophistic displays/techniques 62,
 121-2, 125, 198, 223, 295, 346, 423, 427-8,
 487
- Sophocles (Athenian general, not the poet)
 535
- Sophocles (poet) 7, 15, 82, 171, 191, 209, 224-
 5, 287-8, 302-3, 307, 310, 313, 318, 334-5,
 378, 420, 436, 453, 503-4, 507-8, 524
Sophrasyme, *see* Moderation, Prudence
- Sounion 29, 327
- Sources of Th. 6-8, 163-4, 211, 214, 219, 239,

Index

- 318, 351, 369, 371 (twice), 406, 409, 445,
448, 474, 496, 498, 508, 510
see also Antiochos; Daimachos; Euagon of
Samos; Hekataios; Hellanikos; Herodotus;
Inscriptions; Oral tradition; 'Thalassocracy
lists'
- Spartolus 361
'Spear-won' territory 214
Speeches in Th. (general remarks) 59-60, 85,
133, 196-7, 225, 249, 251, 295, 367, 411,
420-2, 432, 435, 444-6
Sphakteria 62, 186
Spoils 255, 452, cf. 512, 534
Spring 235-6
Stades, in Th. 106, 531
Stasis (civil/internal strife) 11, 37-8, 62, 77, 97,
240, 317, 416, 466-8, 477-89
see also Corcyra
State burial, at Athens 156, 293-5
Staters 106, 469
Strategoí, *see* Generals
Strategy, Th. and 362, 505
Stratos 363
Structure of Th.'s work 3, 118, 133-4, 126-7,
223, 237, 251, 290, 382, 441-2, 462-3,
490-1
see also Narratology/narrative devices; Ring
Composition
Strymon 149, 155
Suicide 370
Summer 235-6
Superlatives/records, Th.'s fondness for 6, 93,
97, 290, 339, 371, 404, 514, 534
Suppliants, supplication 68-9, 203, 219, 221,
398, 446, 453 (cf. 460), 470, 486
Surveys, field/surface 11, 509
Sybota, battle of 67, 89, 93, 237, 283
Symbola agreements 80, 122
Symposium, symposia 60-1
Sycophants (malicious prosecutors) 175, 338
Synesis, *synetos* (intelligence, cleverness) 124-5,
424, 433, 485, cf. 222-3, 422
Synods of the Delian League 123, 146-7, 395
Synoikism 10, 34, 53, 102, 167, 259-61, 262-4,
384, 507
Syracuse 81-2, 247, 471, 492-3, 495
- Tacitus 63, 456, 477
Tanagra, battle of 158, 167-8, 169-71, 277
Taras (Tarentum) 37, 504
Teachers 432-3, 482
Technical terms, technicality in Th. 6, 48, 87,
174, 190, 218, 273, 318, 322, 331, 345, 355
Tegea 52
Temple funds, *see* Sacred funds
Temples 34, 213, 238, 254-5, 325, 369
- Tenedos 383
Territory, *χώρα*, *see* Countryside
Teutiaplos of Elis 370, 411-12
Thalassocracy (sea-power) 3, 8, 19-20, 42, 46,
520
'Thalassocracy lists' 44, 47
Tharyps 289, 363
Thasos 29, 83, 102, 150, 154, 156, 158, 161,
173, 221-2, 315, 440, 490
Theagenes of Megara 203-5
Thebes, Thebans 72, 169, 236-8, 271, 384,
454-6, 464
Themistokles 48, 50, 54, 108, 119-20, 125,
134, 138-40, 168, 203, 211-12, 215-17,
219-21, 280, 333 *and see* Troizen
Thera 22, 248-9, 499
Theramenes 191, 329
Thermopylai 62, 448, 504-5, 507
Theseus 125, 150, 259-61, 265, 523
Thespians 448, 455
Thessaly 10-11, 38-9, 143, 159-60, 169, 171,
178, 277-8, 455, 503
Thetes 243, 256, 399-400, 403, 440, 494-5, 514
Thirty Years Peace (of 446) 64, 75, 79, 82, 84,
96, 124, 132, 186-7, 195, 227-8, 243, 274
Thorikos 261, 264
Thoudippos 341-2
Thoria (in Peloponnese) 157
Thrace, Thracians 72, 127, 155-6, 276, 284-6,
371-3, 505
Thurii 71, 133, 187, 289-91, 506
Thyrea, Thyreatis 283, 512
Timaios 47, 90, 391, 496
Timber, wood 119, 258, 293, 360, 492
Tisamenos 504, 507
Tissaphernes 349
Tolmides 160-1, 173, 184, 405
Tombs 71, 210, 445, 453, 462
see also Funerary monuments; Grave
monuments
Totalitarianism 332-3
Trachis 501, 503-5
Trade 69, 80-1, 355
see also Commerce; Megarian Decrees, etc.
'Tradition, Invented' 308
Tragedy, tragic effects 173, 221, 428, 465, 533
see also Aeschylus; Euripides; Sophocles
Treasury 126, 146, 173, 520
Triballians 372
Tribes (sub-divisions of citizen-body) 52-3,
191-2, 293, 449-50, 498, 500
Tribute (paid to Athens), 'Tribute Lists',
Athenian 97-8, 101, 103, 105, 145-6, 152,
158, 173, 228, 247-9, 252-4, 341-3, 347,
355, 404, 440-1, 499
Trickery, Spartan 304

Index

- Trierarchs 229, 253, 257-8, 280-1
 Triremes 42-4, 70, 73, 91-2, 153, 177, 198,
 257-8, 280-1, 414, 535
 Troizen, Troizen decree (Themistokles
 decree) 54, 136, 186
 Troy, Trojan War 15, 30-2, 38-9, 173
 Trophies 166, 370
 'Tsunami' 497
Tyche (chance, fortune) 226-7, 367
 Tyndareus 31
 Tyrants, tyranny 21, 31, 41-2, 47, 50-1, 113,
 200-1, 204-5, 246, 289, 337-8, 393, 422,
 431, 456, 483
 see also Liberators
 Tyrtaios 53, 314

 Uncertainty, admissions of by Th., *see* Doubt
 Unwritten law (*ἀγραφος νόμος*) 299, 302-3
 Upper classes 89, 120, 185, 337-8, 365

 Valla, Lorenzo 155-6
 Vergina 375
 'Verse' (accidental) in Th. 47, 81, 216, 298,
 333-5
 Villages 23-4, 34, 509
 Violence, violent 8, 82, 141, 420, 482
 Visual sense, Th.'s lack of 25, 35, 294, 336
 Voting, at Athens and Sparta 131, 438-9

 Walls, Th. and 10, 23, 29, 135, 181, 509
 Walls, City (Athens) 135-7, 167
 Walls, Long (at Athens and elsewhere), *see*
 Long Walls

 War, Warfare, Th. on 82, 131-2, 200, 361,
 482
 'Warners' in Th. and other writers 125
 Wealth 9, 305, 326, 339, 403, 460, 500
 Well-poisoning 319-20
 West, Athens and the 181, 187, 336
 see also Carthage; Italy; Sicily; Thurii, etc.
 Wisdom (*σοφροσύνη*), *see* Prudence
 'Witch-hunts' 341
 Women in Th. 25-6, 111, 166, 205 (incest,
 intermarriage), 214-15, 221, 238-9, 241-
 2, 293-4, 314, 323, 360-1, 383-4
 (heiresses), 472-3
 Woodwork 258
 Word/deed antithesis 213, 296, 306, 308, 310,
 346, 363-4, 426, 461-2
 Word-play 210, 337
 Worship of human beings 20, 191, cf. 224, 381

Xenia (guest-friendship) 251, 272, 285, 405
 Xenophon 157, 163, 182-3, 302, 418
Xyllogos 275-6, 331
Xynesis, *see Synesis*
Xynomosia 484-5

 Youth, Young 85, 117, 245, 273, 312-14

 Zakynthos 248, 349-50, 362
 Zeugites 256, 399-400, 494-5
 Zeus 165, 202, 266, 357-8, 398, 511
 Zopyros 164, 175