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EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

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EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME IX


SOPHISTS

PART 2

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HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
LONDON, ENGLAND
2016



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First published 2016

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Library of Congress Control Number 2015957358
CIP data available from the Library of Congress

ISBN 978-0-674-99710-3

*Composed in ZephGreek and ZephText by
Technologies 'N Typography, Merrimac, Massachusetts.
Printed on acid-free paper and bound by
The Maple-Vail Book Manufacturing Group*

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THE 'SOPHISTS'
PART 2

37. ANTIPHON [ANTIPH.]

Already the ancients disagreed on the question of how many Antiphons were active in Athens in the second half of the fifth century BC, and even today the problem remains unresolved. An Antiphon from the Athenian deme of Rhamnous who lived from ca. 480 until 411 BC is well known from various historical sources that mention his activities as an orator and politician, and a collection of three of his political speeches as well as three judiciary tetralogies survives. Is this Antiphon the same person as the Antiphon who is called a 'sophist' and to whom writings are attributed on epistemology, natural phenomena, mathematics, moral theory, and political life (*On Truth, On Concord*), to say nothing of a variety of other activities such as soothsaying and dream interpretation (which some people have assigned to yet another Antiphon)? Modern scholars (following ancient ones) have cited numerous arguments both for the identification of these two men and for their separation. None of the arguments in support of their separation seems decisive, and the improbability of two men of the same name operating in Athens at the same time in such closely related fields as rhetoric and politics suggests instead that it is one and the same man at issue. We have therefore, like a number of recent scholars, assigned to a single Antiphon reports that other scholars distribute among different persons. However, for the sake

ANTIPHON

of prudence, we have placed in the section **R** a number of reports, notably on Antiphon's place in the history of rhetoric, which could in principle also have been located in **D**, in order to collect in **D** what are for the most part only original texts. For reasons of space, we do not include the preserved and fragmentary political and judicial speeches transmitted under Antiphon's name, as the hypothesis of a single author would suggest doing; these are easily available in volume 1 of the Loeb Classical Library *Minor Attic Orators* (LCL 308) and elsewhere. Instead, we limit ourselves to the fragments surviving from both of Antiphon's major treatises and from his other works; indeed, we are rather well informed about *On Truth* because an Oxyrhynchus papyrus transmits a continuous portion of its text and, more marginally, because later lexicographers were interested in the idiosyncratic use Antiphon made of numerous terms. Xenophon reports a discussion between Socrates and Antiphon; given the difficulty of assessing how reliable this report is, we include it not in the main section on Antiphon's doctrines, but in an appendix to it.

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See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

- How Many Antiphons?* (P1–P2)
Origin and Chronology of the Orator (P3–P5)
The Soothsayer and Interpreter of Dreams (P6–P7)
The Poet? (P8)
The Psychotherapist (P9–P11)
The Politician (P12–P14)
Trial and Death (P15–P18)

D

- Fragments Attested for or Attributable to On Truth* (D1–D40).
Fragments Attested for or Attributable to Book 1 (D1–D16)
Thought (D1)
Some Epistemological Terms (D2–D6)
Nature and Matter (D7–D8)
Other Isolated Words Attested for Book 1 (D9–D16)
Fragments Attested for or Attributable to Book 2 (D17–D35)

ANTIPHON

- Time and Eternity* (D17–D18)
The World Order (D19–D20)
The Vortex (D21)
The Heavenly Bodies (D22–D24)
The Sun (D22)
The Moon (D23–D24)
Meteorology (D25)
The Earth (D26)
The Sea (D27)
Human Anatomy and Medicine (D28–D35)
Fragments Not Assigned to a Specific Book of On Truth (D36–D40)
Geometry (D36)
Rejection of Divine Providence (D37)
Justice and Nature (D38)
Wealth (D39)
Precautions (D40)
Fragments Attested for On Concord (D41–D49)
Organization of the Discourse (D41)
Human Pretentions (D42)
Human Realities: Names of Barbarian Peoples (D43–D45)
Good and Bad Characteristics and Sentiments (D46–D49)
Moderation (D46)
Hesitation (D47)
Regret (D48)
False Friends (D49)
Fragments Attributable to On Concord (D50–D63)
The Unsuccessful Life (D50–D59)
The Defects of Human Life (D50–D51)
Anxieties (D52–D53)

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- Cowardice* (D54)
- False and True Temperance* (D55–D56)
- Marriage and Family* (D57–D58)
- Wealth and Foolishness* (D59)
- Aspects of Life in Society* (D60–D63)
- Friendship* (D60–D61)
- Education* (D62–D63)
- Other Isolated Words Attested for On Concord* (D64–D68)
- Fragments Attested for or Attributable to Politicus* (D69–D74)
 - Computation* (D69–D70)
 - Disorderliness* (D71)
 - Intemperance and Wastefulness* (D72–D74)
- Fragments Attributable to Interpretation of Dreams* (D75–D77)
 - Theory of the Interpretation of Dreams* (D75)
 - Reported Interpretations of Dreams* (D76–D77)
- Divination* (D78)
- Isolated Words Attributed to Antiphon but Not Attributable to a Specific Treatise* (D79–D82)
 - Crafts* (D79–D80)
 - Weights and Measures* (D81)
 - Another Isolated Word* (D82)
- Appendix: Xenophon's Representation of Antiphon* (D83–D84)

R

- The Identity of the Orator and the Sophist in the Lexicographical Tradition: An Example* (R1)
- Antiphon as Rhetorician and Orator* (R2–R9)
- His Place in the History of Rhetoric* (R2–R6)

ANTIPHON

- Judgments on His Style* (R7–R9)
- His Fame as an Interpreter of Dreams* (R10–R12)
- His Fame as a Soothsayer* (R13)
- Reactions to Antiphon's Attempt to Square the Circle* (R14–R16)
 - Two Interpretations Deriving Probably from Eudemus* (R14–R15)
 - A Discussion about the Nature of the Error in Antiphon's Reasoning* (R16)
 - A Christian Polemic* (R17)

ANTIPHON [87 DK]

P

How Many Antiphons? (P1–P2)

P1 *Suda*

a (< A1) A.2744

Ἀντιφῶν Ἀθηναῖος τερατοσκόπος καὶ ἐποποιὸς καὶ σοφιστής· ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Λογομάγειρος.

b (T3 Pendrick) A.2745

Ἀντιφῶν, Σοφίλου, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δῆμων Ῥαμνούσιος· διδάσκαλος δὲ αὐτοῦ οὐδεὶς προγινώσκειται ἀλλ' ὅμως ἤρξε τοῦ δικανικοῦ χαρακτήρος μετὰ Γοργίαν. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδου γενέσθαι διδάσκαλος. ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ Νέστωρ.

c (< A1) A.2746

Ἀντιφῶν Ἀθηναῖος ὄνειροκρίτης· Περὶ κρίσεως ὀνείρων ἔγραψεν.

ANTIPHON

P

How Many Antiphons? (P1–P2)

P1 *Suda*

a (< A1)

Antiphon, Athenian, soothsayer, poet, and sophist. He was called 'Speech Chef.'

b (≠ DK)

Antiphon, son of Sophilus, Athenian, from the deme Rhamnous. No earlier teacher of his is known; nonetheless, he began the judicial genre after Gorgias. He is also said to have been Thucydides' teacher. He was called 'Nestor.'

c (< A1)

Antiphon, Athenian, interpreter of dreams. He wrote *On the Interpretation of Dreams*.

P2 (< A2) Hermog. *Ideis* 2.11 (399.18–400.21 Rabe)

περὶ δὲ Ἀντιφῶντος λέγοντας ἀνάγκη προειπεῖν, ὅτι καθάπερ ἄλλοι τέ φασιν οὐκ ὀλίγοι καὶ Δίδυμος ὁ γραμματικός, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἱστορίας φαίνεται, πλείους μὲν γεγόνασιν Ἀντιφῶντες, δύο δὲ οἱ σοφιστεύσαντες, ὧν καὶ λόγον ἀνάγκη ποιήσασθαι. ὧν εἷς μὲν ἔστιν ὁ ῥήτωρ, ὃπερ οἱ φονικοὶ φέρονται λόγοι καὶ <οἱ>¹ δημηγορικοὶ² καὶ ὅσοι τούτοις ὅμοιοι, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ καὶ τερατοσκόπος καὶ ὄνειροκρίτης λεγόμενος γενέσθαι, ὃπερ οἱ τε Περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι λέγονται λόγοι καὶ ὁ Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς³ καὶ ὁ Πολιτικός.⁴ Ἐγὼ δὲ ἔνεκα μὲν τοῦ διαφόρου τῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις ἰδεῶν πείθομαι δύο τοὺς Ἀντιφῶντας γενέσθαι (πολὴ γὰρ ὡς ὄντως τὸ παραλλάττον τῶν ἐπιγραφομένων τῆς Ἀληθείας λόγων πρὸς τοὺς λοιπούς), ἔνεκα δὲ τοῦ καὶ παρὰ Πλάτωνι καὶ παρ' ἄλλοις ἱστορουμένου πάλιν οὐ πείθομαι. Θουκυδίδην γὰρ Ἀντιφῶντος εἶναι τοῦ Ῥαμνουσίου μαθητὴν ἀκούω πολλῶν λεγόντων, καὶ τὸν μὲν Ῥαμνουσίον εἰδὼς ἐκείνον, ὃπερ εἰσὶν οἱ φονικοί, τὸν Θουκυδίδην δὲ πολλῶ κεχωρισμένον⁵ καὶ κεκοινωνηκότα τῷ εἶδει τῶν τῆς Ἀληθείας λόγων, πάλιν οὐ πείθομαι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴτε εἷς ὁ Ἀντιφῶν ἐγέ-

P2 (< A2) Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*

When one speaks about Antiphon, it is necessary to state beforehand that, as Didymus the grammarian and many other authors say, and as is apparent from historical research as well, there were several Antiphons, of whom two were sophists, who must be taken account of. One of these is the orator, whose homicide speeches, public speeches, and all the other speeches of the same kind are extant; while the other is the one who is also said to have been a soothsayer and interpreter of dreams, and to whom the discourses *On Truth*, and *On Concord* and *Politicus*, are attributed. As for me, when I consider the difference in style among these discourses, I am persuaded that there were two Antiphons; for the disparity between the discourses entitled *On Truth* and the other ones is really very large. But then again, because of what Plato¹ and other authors report, once again I am persuaded of the opposite view [i.e. I am persuaded that there was only one Antiphon]. For I have read in many authors that Thucydides was a student of Antiphon of Rhamnous, and I am aware that it is the one from Rhamnous to whom the homicide speeches belong but that Thucydides is very remote from these and shares the style of writing of the discourses *On Truth*; so that once again I am persuaded of the opposite view. But whether there was one Antiphon who used two

¹ <οἱ> Waltz et Spengel ² καὶ ὁ πολιτικός post δημηγορικοί add. Waltz et Spengel
³ καὶ οἱ δημηγορικοί post ὁμοιοῦς hab. mss. plerique, del. Sauppe, post λέγονται λόγοι transp. Lb ⁴ καὶ οἱ πολιτικοί Md ⁵ <τούτου> κεχωρισμένον Blass

¹ Plato, *Menexenus* 236a: "the man who learned music from Lamprus and rhetoric from Antiphon of Rhamnous."

νετο, δύο λόγων εἶδεσι τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων διεστη-
κόσι⁶ χρησάμενος, εἴτε καὶ δύο, χωρὶς ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν
τοῦτο, ὁ δὲ ἐκείνο μετελθών, ἀνάγκη χωρὶς περὶ ἑκα-
τέρου διελθεῖν· πλείστον γὰρ ὡς ἔφαμεν τὸ μεταξύ.

⁶ διεστηκότων mss., corr. Blass

Origin and Chronology of the Orator (P3–P5)

P3 (≠ DK) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.79.3

[. . . = **R5**] Ἀντιφῶντα <Σω>φίλου¹ Ῥαμνούσιον, ὧς
φησι Διόδωρος² [. . .].

¹ φίλου ms., corr. Potter ² Ἀπολλόδωρος Wilamowitz

P4 (≠ DK) Hermog. *Ideis* 2.11, p. 401.5–6

[. . . = **R3**] καὶ γὰρ ἔστι τοῖς χρόνοις τῶν δέκα ῥη-
τόρων τούτων πρεσβύτατος ἀπάντων [. . . = **R8**].

P5 (> 82 A6) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 832F

γένεον δὲ κατὰ τὰ Περσικὰ καὶ Γοργίαν τὸν σοφι-
στήν, ὀλίγω¹ νεώτερος αὐτοῦ, καὶ παρατέτακεν ἕως
καταλύσεως τῆς δημοκρατίας ὑπὸ τῶν τετρακοσίων
γενομένης [. . .].

¹ ὀλίγω <ῶν> Herwerden

kinds of discourses so different from each other, or two,
of whom separately the one adopted this kind of style and
the other that one, each of them must be discussed sepa-
rately, for the distance between them is, as we said, very
large.

Origin and Chronology of the Orator (P3–P5)

P3 (≠ DK) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

[. . .] Antiphon of Rhamnous, the son of Sophilus, as Dio-
dorus¹ says [. . .].

See also **R4**

¹ Not identified. Wilamowitz proposed correcting to Apol-
lodoros.

P4 (≠ DK) Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*

[. . .] in terms of chronology he is the oldest of all of these
ten [scil. Attic] orators [. . .].

P5 (> 82 A6) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

He was born at the time of the Persian Wars [i.e. 480 BC]
and of Gorgias the sophist, being a little younger than the
latter; and he lived until the Four Hundred overthrew the
democracy [i.e. 411] [. . .].

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY IX

*The Soothsayer and Interpreter
of Dreams (P6–P7)*

P6 (T5 Pendrick) Arist. Frag. 75 Rose in Diog. Laert. 2.46

τούτω τις, καθά φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τρίτῳ Περὶ
ποιητικῆς, ἐφιλονεῖκει Ἀντίλοχος Λήμνιος καὶ Ἀντι-
φῶν ὁ τερατοσκόπος [. . .].

P7 (A8) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7.24.4

χαρίεν τὸ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος οἰωνισαμένου τινός, ὅτι
κατέφαγεν ὕς τὰ δελφάκια, θεασάμενος αὐτὴν ὑπὸ
λιμοῦ διὰ μικροψυχίαν τοῦ τρέφοντος κατισχυαμέ-
νην. “χαῖρε,” εἶπεν, “ἐπὶ τῷ σημείῳ, ὅτι οὕτω πεινώσα
τὰ σὰ οὐκ ἔφαγεν τέκνα.”

The Poet? (P8)

P8 (< A6) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 833C

λέγεται δὲ τραγωδίας συνθεῖναι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ σὺν Δι-
ονυσίῳ τῷ τυράννῳ [. . . = **P10**].

ANTIPHON

*The Soothsayer and Interpreter
of Dreams (P6–P7)*

P6 (≠ DK) Aristotle, Fragment of *On Poetry* in Diogenes
Laertius

As Aristotle says in Book 3 of his *On Poetry*, a certain
Antilocheus of Lemnos and Antiphon the soothsayer en-
gaged in rivalry with him [i.e. Socrates] [. . .].

P7 (A8) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

Antiphon's remark is pleasant: when someone took as an
omen the fact that a sow had eaten its piglets, he observed
that it was emaciated from starvation because of its keep-
er's stinginess and said, “Rejoice at this omen: hungry as
it was, it was not your own children that it ate.”

See also **P1a**, **P1c**, **P2**

The Poet? (P8)

P8 (< A6) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

He is said to have composed tragedies, both on his own
and in collaboration with Dionysius the tyrant [. . .].

The Psychotherapist (P9–P11)

P9 (A6) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.15, pp. 15.32–16.3 Kayser
πιθανώτατος δὲ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν γενόμενος καὶ προσρηθείς
Νέστωρ ἐπὶ τῷ περὶ παντὸς εἰπῶν ἂν πείσαι νηπεν-
θείς ἀκροάσεις ἐπήγγειλεν, ὡς οὐδὲν οὕτω δεινὸν
ἐρούτων ἄχος, ὃ μὴ ἐξελεῖν τῆς γνώμης.

P10 (< A6) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 833C–D

[. . . = **P8**] ἔτι δ' ὦν πρὸς τῇ ποιήσει τέχνην ἀλυπίας
συνεστήσατο, ὥσπερ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν ἢ παρὰ τῶν ἰα-
τρῶν θεραπεία ὑπάρχει ἐν Κορίνθῳ τε κατεσκευα-
σμένος οἴκημά τι παρὰ τὴν ἀγορὰν προέγραψεν, ὅτι
δύναται τοὺς λυπουμένους διὰ λόγων θεραπεύειν, καὶ
πυθάνομενος τὰς αἰτίας παρεμβέτο τοὺς κάμνον-
τας. νομίζων δὲ τὴν τέχνην ἐλάττω ἢ καθ' αὐτὸν εἶναι
ἐπὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀπετράπη [. . .].

P11 (< B93) Philod. *Poem.* (P. Herc. 994), xxxviii.14–23
(p. 113 Sbordone)

εὐδηλὸς ἢ τῶν ἄλλων φληναφ[ία φ]αίνεται τῶν ἢ |
ταῦτ' ἀτέρπειν καὶ ὀχλεῖν | ἢ διάφορα κατηξικότων,
ὡς καὶ τινος τῶν ἀρχαίων Ἀντιφῶντος, | εἴτ' οὖν ῥη-
τορικὸς εἶτε | καὶ φιλόσοφος ἢ βούλειτ' εἶναι.

The Psychotherapist (P9–P11)

P9 (A6) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

When Antiphon had attained a great degree of persuasive power and was nicknamed 'Nestor' because he could succeed in persuading people when he spoke about anything, he announced that he would give lectures capable of eliminating pain, as he supposed that no one could name to him a grief so terrible that he could not banish it from that man's thought.

P10 (< A6) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

[. . .] While he was still engaged in poetry he invented an art of eliminating pain, just as there is a kind of treatment provided by doctors for people who are sick. In Corinth he established an office next to the marketplace and advertised that he was able to treat grief-stricken people by means of his speeches. And he inquired into the causes and thereby consoled those people who were suffering. But then, considering that this art was beneath him, he turned to rhetoric [. . .].

P11 (< B93) Philodemus, *On Poems*

It is easy to see the nonsense those other people utter who have claimed that either the same ones [i.e. sounds] or different ones cause pleasure and pain, like for example one of the ancients, Antiphon, whether he wanted to be thought of as a rhetorician or as a philosopher.

*The Politician (P12–P14)***P12** (≠ DK) Thuc. 8.68.1

ἦν δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν γνώμην ταύτην εἰπὼν Πείσανδρος, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς προθυμώτατα ξυγκαταλύσας τὸν δῆμον· ὁ μέντοι ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυμβεῖς ὅτῳ τρόπῳ κατέστη ἐς τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ πλείστου ἐπιμεληθεῖς Ἀντιφῶν ἦν ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος καὶ ἂν γνοίη εἰπεῖν, καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριῶν οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἐκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτως τῷ πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοὺς μέντοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δῆμῳ πλείστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ὅστις ξυμβουλευσαίτο τι, δυνάμενος ὠφελεῖν [. . . = P15].

P13 (≠ DK) Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 32.2

ἡ μὲν οὖν ὀλιγαρχία τοῦτον κατέστη τὸν τρόπον, ἐπὶ Καλλίου μὲν ἄρχοντος, ἔτεσι δ' ὕστερον τῆς τῶν τυράννων ἐκβολῆς μάλιστα ἑκατὸν, αἰτίων μάλιστα γενομένων Πεισάνδρου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος καὶ Θηραμένους, ἀνδρῶν καὶ γεγενημένων εὖ καὶ συνέσει καὶ γνώμῃ δοκούντων διαφέρειν.

P14 (≠ DK) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.15, p. 15.16–26 Kayser

Ἀντιφῶντα δὲ τὸν Ῥαμνούσιον οὐκ οἶδ', εἴτε χρηστὸν δεῖ προσεῖπειν, εἴτε φαῦλον. χρηστὸς μὲν γὰρ προσ-

*The Politician (P12–P14)***P12** (≠ DK) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*

The man who proposed this resolution [scil. to establish the regime of the Four Hundred] was Peisander, who on other occasions too had publicly demonstrated great eagerness to overthrow the democracy. But the man who contrived the whole plan to bring matters to this point and who had devoted his attention to it for the longest time was Antiphon, a man second to none of the Athenians of his time in excellence and one who was extremely forceful in thinking and in saying what he thought; and though he did not willingly appear before the assembly or take part in any other debate, and was suspect in the eyes of the populace because of his reputation for great cleverness, he was nonetheless the one man who was most able to help whoever asked his advice when they were involved in contests, both in the law court and in the assembly [. . .].

P13 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *The Constitution of the Athenians*

So this is how the oligarchy was established, under the archonship of Callias, about one hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants; the principal men responsible were Peisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes, men who were well born and were thought to possess superior intelligence and judgment.

P14 (≠ DK) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

As for Antiphon of Rhamnous, I do not know whether he should be called a good man or a wicked one. For on the

ειρήσθω διὰ τάδε· ἐστρατήγησε πλείστα, ἐνίκησε πλείστα, ἐξήκοντα τριήρεσι πεπληρωμέναις ηὔξησεν Ἀθηναίους τὸ ναυικόν, ἰκανώτατος ἀνθρώπων ἔδοξεν εἰπεῖν τε καὶ γνῶναι· διὰ μὲν δὴ ταῦτα ἐμοὶ τε ἐπαινετέος καὶ ἐτέρῳ. κακὸς δ' ἂν εἰκότως διὰ τάδε φαίνοιτο· κατέλυσε τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ἐδούλωσε τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον, ἐλακόνισε κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἀφανῶς, ὕστερον δ' ἐπιδήλως, τυράννων τετρακοσίων δῆμον ἐπαφήκε τοῖς Ἀθηναίων πράγμασιν.

Trial and Death (P15–P18)

P15 (≠ DK) Thuc. 8.68.2

[. . . = **P12**] καὶ αὐτός τε, ἐπειδὴ τὰ τῶν τετρακοσίων ἐν ὑστέρῳ μεταπεσόντα ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου ἑκακοῦτο, ἄριστα φαίνεται τῶν μέχρι ἐμοῦ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτων αἰτιαθεῖς, ὡς ξυγκατέστησε, θανάτου δίκην ἀπολογησάμενος.

P16 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plut. Vit. X Orat. 833D–F, 834A–B

ψήφισμα ἐπὶ Θεοπόμπου ἄρχοντος, ἐφ' οὗ οἱ τετρακοσίοι κατελύθησαν, καθ' ὃ¹ ἔδοξεν² Ἀντιφῶντα κριθῆναι, ὃ Καικίλιος παραθέθειται. “ἔδοξε τῇ βουλῇ μὴ καὶ εἰκοστῇ τῆς πρυτανείας· Δημόνικος Ἄλωπεκῆθεν

¹ ψήφισμα ante καθ' ὃ hab. mss.: secl. Duebner

² ἔδοξαν mss., corr. Reiske

one hand he is to be called a good man for the following reasons: he often held the office of general, he often gained victories, he increased the Athenian fleet by sixty fully equipped triremes, he was considered to be, of all men, the one most capable of speaking and understanding. For these reasons he deserves to be praised by me and by anyone else. But on the other hand he showed himself to be a wicked man in the following ways: he overthrew the democracy, he enslaved the Athenian populace, he supported the Spartan cause, at first in secret, but later in public, and he set loose the mob of the Four Hundred against the Athenian state.

Trial and Death (P15–P18)

P15 (≠ DK) Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*

[. . .] And later, when the actions of the Four Hundred had been reversed and were being assailed by the assembly and he was accused because he had helped to establish that regime, he was clearly the man who delivered the best speech of those who lived before me, when he defended himself on a capital charge regarding these same matters.

P16 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

Caecilius has preserved the decree dating from the archonship of Theopompus [= 411 BC], when the regime of the Four Hundred was overthrown, which resolved that Antiphon should be tried: “Resolved by the Council on the twenty-first day of the prytany, Demonicus of Alo-

ἐγραμμάτευε, Φιλόστρατος Παλληνεὺς³ ἐπεστάτει Ἄνδρων εἶπε περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὓς ἀποφαίνουσιν οἱ στρατηγοὶ πρεσβευομένους εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐπὶ κακῷ τῆς πόλεως τῆς Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐκ⁴ τοῦ στρατοπέδου πλεῖν ἐπὶ πολεμίας νεῶς καὶ πεζεῦσαι διὰ Δεκελείας, Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ὀνομακλέα καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα⁵ συλλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὅπως δῶσι δίκην [. . .].” τούτῳ ὑπογέγραπται τῷ δόγματι ἢ καταδίκη. “προδοσίας ὄφλον Ἀρχεπτόλεμος Ἴπποδάμου Ἀγρύλληθεν παρῶν, Ἀντιφῶν Σωφίλου Ῥαμουσίσιος παρῶν τούτων ἐτιμήθη τοῖς ἕνδεκα παραδοθῆναι καὶ τὰ χρήματα δημόσια εἶναι καὶ τῆς θεοῦ τὸ ἐπιδέκατον, καὶ τὰ οἰκία κατασκάψαι αὐτῶν καὶ ὄρους θείναι τοῖν οἰκοπέδων, ἐπιγράψαντας ΑΡΧΕΠΤΟΛΕΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΤΙΦΩΝΤΟΣ ΤΟΙΝ ΠΡΟΔΟΝΤΟΙΝ. [. . .] μὴ ἐξεῖναι θάψαι Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα Ἀθήνησι, μηδ' ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσιν καὶ ἄτιμον εἶναι Ἀρχεπτόλεμον καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ γένος τὸ ἐκ τούτων, καὶ νόθους καὶ γνησίους· καὶ ἐάν τις ποιήσῃται τινα τῶν ἐξ Ἀρχεπτολέμου καὶ Ἀντιφῶντος, ἄτιμος ἔστω ὁ ποιησάμενος. ταῦτα δὲ γράψαι ἐν στήλῃ χαλκῇ· καὶ ἥπερ ἀνάκειται τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ περὶ Φρυνίχου, καὶ τοῦτο θέσθαι.”

³ Πελληνεὺς mss., corr. Taylor

⁴ ἐκ secl. Reiske

⁵ Ὀνομαλέα et Ἀρχιφῶντα mss., corr. edd.

pece being secretary and Philostratus of Pallene chairman. Andron moved concerning those men—Archeptolemus, Onomacles, and Antiphon—who the generals declare went as ambassadors to Lacedaemon to the detriment of the city of Athens, sailed from the camp on an enemy ship, and traveled by land through Decelia: that they be arrested and confined in prison in order to be punished. [. . .]” After this decree there follows the sentence: “Archeptolemus of Agryle, son of Hippodamus, present, and Antiphon of Rhamnous, son of Sophilus, present, were condemned for treason. They were sentenced to be delivered to the Eleven [i.e. the executioners], their property to be confiscated after one tenth had been dedicated to the goddess [i.e. Athena], their houses to be demolished, and boundary stones to be placed on their estates, bearing the inscription, [scil. the property] of Archeptolemus and Antiphon, the traitors.’ [. . .] it is forbidden to bury Archeptolemus and Antiphon in Athens or in any other land ruled by the Athenians. Archeptolemus and Antiphon are to be deprived of their civic rights and so too their descendants, both illegitimate and legitimate ones; and anyone who adopts any of the descendants of Archeptolemus and Antiphon shall himself be deprived of his civic rights. This is to be inscribed on a bronze column; and this as well is to be erected in the place where the decrees regarding Phrynichus¹ are set up.”

¹ One of the principal instigators of the oligarchic coup of June 411.

P17 (≠ DK) Arist. *EE* 3.5 1232b6-9

[. . .] καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος, τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, ὥσπερ Ἀντιφῶν ἔφη πρὸς Ἀγάθωνα κατεψηφισμένος τὴν ἀπολογία ἐπαινέσαντα.

P18 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 833A-C

οἱ δ' ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀνηρήσθαι αὐτὸν ἱστοροῦσιν, ὥσπερ Λυσίας ἐν τῷ ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἀντιφῶντος θυγατρὸς λόγῳ [Frag. 25a Carey]: ἐγένετο γὰρ αὐτῷ θυγάτριον, οὗ Κάλλαισχος ἐπεδικάσατο. ὅτι δ' ὑπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἀπέθανεν, ἱστορεῖ καὶ Θεόπομπος ἐν τῇ πεντεκαιδεκάτῃ τῶν Φιλιππικῶν [FCrHist 115 F120]: ἀλλ' οὗτός γ' ἂν εἴη ἕτερος, Λυσιδανίδου πατρός [. . .]. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἄλλος λόγος περὶ τῆς τελευταίας αὐτοῦ πρεσβευτῆν γὰρ ὄντα αὐτὸν εἰς Συρακούσας πλεύσαι, ἠνίκα ἤκμαζεν ἡ τοῦ προτέρου Διονυσίου τυραννίς· γενομένης δὲ παρὰ πότον ζητήσεως, τίς ἄριστός ἐστι χαλκός, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν διαφερομένων, αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν ἄριστον εἶναι ἐξ οὗ Ἄρμόδιος καὶ Ἀριστογείτων πεποιήνται· τοῦτο δ' ἀκούσαντα τὸν Διονύσιον καὶ ὑπονοήσαντα προτροπὴν εἰς ἐπίθεσιν εἶναι τὸ ῥηθὲν προστάξαι ἀναιρεθῆναι αὐτόν· οἱ δέ, ὅτι τὰς τραγωδίας αὐτοῦ διέσυρε, χαλεπήναντα.

P17 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*

[. . .] a great-souled man would be much more concerned about the opinion of a single serious man than about that of a multitude of ordinary ones, as Antiphon said, when he had been condemned, to Agathon, who was praising his defense speech.

P18 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

Others report that he was killed by the Thirty, for example Lysias in his speech on Antiphon's daughter;¹ for he left behind a young daughter, whom Callaeschrus sought to marry. Theopompus too, in Book 15 of his *Philippics*, reports that he was put to death by the Thirty; but this must be a different one [i.e. a different Antiphon], the son of Lysidonides [. . .]. There is also another story about his death: viz. that he sailed as ambassador to Syracuse, when the tyranny of the earlier Dionysius was at its height. During drinks the question arose, what was the best bronze, and many people proposed different answers; but he said that the best kind was that from which [scil. the statues of] Harmodius and Aristogeiton were made. When Dionysius heard this, he suspected that these words were an instigation to assassinate him and he ordered that he be killed. Others say that he was angry with him because he was disparaging his tragedies.

¹ This speech is lost.

ANTIPHON [87 DK]

D

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable to
On Truth (D1–D40)*

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable to
Book 1 (D1–D16)
Thought (D1)*

D1 Gal. *In Hipp. Med. off.* (XVIII.2, p. 656 Kühn)

a (> B1)

καὶ πολλάκις [. . .] ἀντιδιαίρων ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὴν γνῶμην, πολλάκις εἴρηκεν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ τῆς Ἀληθείας οὕτω λέγων· “ταῦτα δὲ γνοὺς εἴσ<η> ἔν τι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν, οὔτε ὧν ὄψει ὀρᾶ <ὁ ὀρῶν> μακρότατα οὔτε ὧν γνῶμη γινώσκει ὁ μακρότατα γινώσκων”¹ [. . . = **D1b**].

¹ οὕτω λέγων. . . γινώσκων] locum variis corruptelis adfectum ita restituit Pendrick post Diels

¹ The text of this sentence is very corrupt in the manuscripts and is very uncertain.

ANTIPHON

D

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable to
On Truth (D1–D40)¹*

¹ Most of these texts are explicitly attributed by their sources. For the others, especially for the papyri fragments, the attribution is based on inference.

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable to
Book 1 (D1–D16)
Thought (D1)*

D1 Galen, *Commentary on Hippocrates' On the Office of the Doctor*

a (> B1)

[. . .] often distinguishing ‘thought’ (*gnômê*) from the sensations, he [scil. Critias, 88 B40] has often used the term, just like Antiphon, who says in the first book of *Truth*: “**even if you perceive these things, you will not know at all any one of them, neither those which <he who sees> farthest sees by sight nor those which he who perceives farthest perceives by thought** (*gnômê*)”¹ [. . .].

b (B2)

[. . . = D1a] καὶ “πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποις ἡ γνώμη τοῦ σώματος ἡγέται¹ καὶ εἰς ὑγίειαν καὶ νόσον καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα.”

¹ ἡρείται M: αἰεταί P, corr. edd.

Some Epistemological Terms (D2–D6)

D2 (B4) Harpocr. A.167

ἄοπτα: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀόρατα καὶ οὐκ ὀφθέντα, ἀλλὰ δόξαντα ὀρᾶσθαι. Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄.

D3 (B5) Harpocr. A.170

ἀπαθῆ: ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς γεγυότα πάθη. Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄.

D4 (B6) Pollux *Onom.* 2.58–59

[. . .] καὶ διοπτρεύειν Κριτίας καὶ Ἀντιφῶν, Ἀντιφῶν δὲ καὶ εἴσοπτοι.

D5 (B7) Pollux *Onom.* 2.57

Ἀντιφῶν δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀψόμενον εἶπε καὶ τῇ ὄψει οἶον τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ ὀπτῆρ καὶ ἄοπτα.

b (B2)

[. . .] and “for thought leads the body, for all humans, toward health and disease and toward everything else.”

Some Epistemological Terms (D2–D6)

D2 (B4) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘unseen things’: instead of ‘invisible ones’ and ‘ones that are not seen, but are thought to be seen.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

D3 (B5) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘things not experienced’: instead of ‘experiences which did not truly happen.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

D4 (B6) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[. . .] and ‘to inspect,’ Critias and Antiphon; and Antiphon also ‘visible.’

D5 (B7) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

Antiphon also said “what will see,” and “by sight” to mean ‘by the eyes,’ and “eyewitness,”¹ and “unseen things” [cf. D2].

¹ The term is used by Antiphon the orator (5.27).

D6 (< B8) Pollux *Onom.* 2.76

παρὰ μόνῳ δ' Ἀντιφῶντι ὀσμὰς καὶ εὐοδμίαν εὔροι τις ἄν.

*Nature and Matter (D7–D8)***D7** (B15) Harpocr. E.42

ἔμβριος Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α'. "καὶ ἡ¹ σηπεδῶν τοῦ ξύλου ἔμβριος γένοιτο" ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐν τῷ ζῆν, τούτεστι ζήσειε καὶ μὴ ξηρανθείη μηδ' ἀποθάνοι.

¹ γῆ post ἡ hab. A, del. Dindorf post Bekker: ἐν γῆ prop. Sedley

D8 (< B15) Arist. *Phys.* 2.1 193a9–14

δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐννέπαρχον ἐκάστῳ ἀρρυθμιστον <ὄν>¹ καθ' ἑαυτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ' ὁ χαλκός. σημείον δέ φησιω Ἀντιφῶν ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξειε κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἡ σηπεδῶν ὥστε ἀνείναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον [. . .].

¹ <ὄν> Ross

D6 (< B8) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

Antiphon is the only one [scil. among the Attic prose authors] in whom one would find 'smells' and 'fragrance.'¹

¹ Poetic terms found also in non-Attic prose.

*Nature and Matter (D7–D8)***D7** (B15) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

'alive': Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*: "and the rotting of the wood would be alive" instead of 'in the condition of life,' that is, 'would live and not dry out or die.'

D8 (< B15) Aristotle, *Physics*

Some people think that the nature and the substance of the things that are by nature is what is present first of all in each thing, without possessing configuration (*arrhuthmistos*) in itself, as the nature of a bed is the wood, and that of a statue the bronze. Antiphon says that evidence of this is the fact that if one were to bury a bed and the rotting could acquire the power of sending up a shoot, it would not become a bed, but wood [. . .].

*Other Isolated Words Attested
for Book 1 (D9–D16)***D9 (B10)****a** *Suda* A.435

ἀδέητος· ὁ μηδενὸς δεόμενος καὶ πάντα ἔχων. Ἀντιφῶν ἐν Ἀ' Ἀληθείας· “διὰ τοῦτο οὐδενὸς δέεται, οὐδὲ προσδέχεται οὐδενὸς τι, ἀλλ' ἄπειρος καὶ ἀδέητος.”

¹ οὔτε mss., corr. Bernhardy**b** Harpocr. A.26

ἀδέητος· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀνευδεής, παρ' Ἀντιφῶντι Ἀληθείας α'.

D10 (B11) Harpocr. Δ.8

δεήσεις· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐνδείας. Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α'.

D11 (B17) *Anecd. Gr.* 1.173.5 Bachmann

Ἀφροδίτης· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀφροδισίων. οὕτως Ἀντιφῶν ἐν Ἀληθείας πρώτῳ¹.

¹ πρώτα ms., corr. Bachmann*Other Isolated Words Attested
for Book 1 (D9–D16)***D9 (B10)****a** *Suda*

'unlacking': he who lacks nothing and possesses everything. Antiphon in Book 1 of *Truth*: “**that is why he** [i.e. perhaps: god] **lacks nothing and receives nothing from anyone, but is unlimited and unlacking.**”

b Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

'unlacking': instead of 'lacking nothing,' in Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

D10 (B11) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

'lackings': instead of 'needs.' Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

D11 (B17) *Anecdota Graeca*

'of Aphrodite': instead of 'of sexual acts.' So Antiphon in the first book of *Truth*.

D12 (B18)

a Harpocr. A.121

ἀναποδιζόμενα· ἀντὶ τοῦ¹ ἐξεταζόμενα, ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ
ἄνωθεν τὰ αὐτὰ πολλάκις λεγόμενα ἢ πραπτόμενα.
Ἄντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄.

¹ τοῦ <πάλιν> Diels (cf. D12b)

b Pollux Onom. 2.196

ἀναποδιζόμενα Ἄντιφῶν τὰ πάλιν ἐξεταζόμενα.

D13 (B19)

a Harpocr. A.140

ἀνήκει· παρ' Ἄντιφῶντι Ἀληθείας α΄ ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ τοῦ
ἦκει, ἢ οἶον ἀνεβιβάσθη καὶ προελήλυθεν.

b Anecd. Gr. 1.96.25 Bachmann

ἀνήκει· Ἄντιφῶν μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ καθήκει [. . .].

D14 (B14) Harpocr. Δ.42

διάθεσις· [. . . = R1] καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα διαθέσθαι
λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ διοικῆσαι. Ἄντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄·
“γυμνωθεῖσα δὲ ἀφορμῆς πολλὰ ἂν καὶ κατὰ κακῶς
διαθεῖτο.”

D12 (B18)

a Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

[scil. things] ‘reexamined’: instead of ‘closely examined’
or instead of ‘the same things being said or done many
times from the beginning.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

b Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[scil. things] ‘reexamined’: Antiphon, “closely examined
again.”

D13 (B19)

a Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘comes up’: in Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*, instead of the
simple form ‘comes,’ or like ‘has stepped up’ and ‘has gone
forward.’

b *Anecdota Graeca*

‘comes up’: Antiphon instead of ‘arrives’ [. . .].

D14 (B14) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘organization’: [. . .] For they use the verb ‘to organize’
for ‘to arrange.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*: “stripped of
resources (*aphormê*) it [i.e. thought?] would organize
badly many fine things.”

D15 (B20) Harpocr. E.77

ἐπαλλάξεις· ἀντὶ τοῦ συναλλαγᾶς ἢ μίξεις. Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄.

D16 (B21) Harpocr. O.31

ὀριγνηθῆναι ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι. Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄.

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable
to Book 2 (D17–D35)
Time and Eternity (D17–D18)*

D17 (< B9) Aët. 1.22.6 (Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας χρόνου]

Ἀντιφῶν [. . .] νόημα ἢ μέτρον τὸν χρόνον [. . .].

D18 (cf. B22) Phot. *Lex.* A.422 (cf. Harpocr. A.38)

ἄειεστώ· Ἀντιφῶν τὴν αἰδιότητα ἐν Ἀληθείας β΄ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν αἰεὶ ἐστάναι [. . .].

The World Order (D19–D20)

D19 Harpocr.

a (B23) Δ.40

διάστασις· Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας β΄· “περὶ τῆς νῦν κρατούσης διαστάσεως” ἀντὶ τοῦ διακοσμῆσεως τῶν ὄλων.

D15 (B20) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘interchanges’: instead of ‘exchanges’ or ‘mixtures.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

D16 (B21) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘to stretch toward’: instead of ‘to desire.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*.

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable
to Book 2 (D17–D35)
Time and Eternity (D17–D18)*

D17 (< B9) Aëtius

Antiphon [. . .]: time is a thought or a measure [. . .].

D18 (cf. B22) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘eternal being’: Antiphon in the second book of *Truth*, eternity and always being in the same condition [. . .].

The World Order (D19–D20)

D19 Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

a (B23)

‘separation’: Antiphon, Book 2 of *Truth*: “about the separation prevailing now” instead of ‘the ordering of the world.’

b (B24) A.30

ἀδιάστατον τὸ μήπω διεστηκὸς μηδὲ διακεκριμένον
Ἀντιφῶν εἶπεν.

D20 (B24a) *Suda* Δ.557

διάθεσις καὶ διατίθεσθαι [. . . = D41b] ἐν τῷ β' τῆς
Ἀληθείας ὁ αὐτὸς κέχρηται αὐτῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διακο-
σμῆσεως.

The Vortex (D21)

D21 (B25) Harpocr. Δ.12

δίωψ· ἀντὶ τοῦ δινήσει. Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας β'.

*The Heavenly Bodies (D22–D24)**The Sun (D22)*

D22 (B26) Aët. 2.20.15 (Stob.) [περὶ οὐσίας ἡλίου]

Ἀντιφῶν πῦρ ἐπιγεμόμενον μὲν τὸν περὶ τὴν γῆν
ὑγρὸν ἀέρα, ἀνατολὰς δὲ καὶ δύσεις ποιούμενον τῷ
τὸν μὲν ἐπικαιόμενον αἰεὶ προλείπειν, τοῦ δ' ὑπονοτι-
ζόμενου πάλιν ἀντέχεσθαι.

b (B24)

'unseparated': Antiphon called by this term what has not
yet been separated nor differentiated.

D20 (B24a) *Suda*

'organization' and 'to be organized': [. . .] In Book 2 of
Truth the same man [i.e. Antiphon] has also applied the
term to the world ordering.

*The Vortex (D21)*D21 (B25) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

'by the vortex': instead of 'by the whirling motion.' Anti-
phon, Book 2 of *Truth*.

*The Heavenly Bodies (D22–D24)**The Sun (D22)*

D22 (B26) Aëtius

Antiphon: [scil. the sun consists of] fire that is nourished
by the moist air surrounding the earth, and that rises and
sets because each time it leaves behind the air that has
been burned and in turn adheres to the air that possesses
some moisture.

The Moon (D23–D24)

D23 (B27) Aët. 2.28.4 (Stob.; cf. Plut.) [περὶ φωτισμῶν σελήνης]

Ἀντιφῶν ἰδιοφεγγή μὲν τὴν σελήνην, τὸ δὲ ἀποκρυπτόμενον περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῆς προσβολῆς τοῦ ἡλίου ἀμαυροῦσθαι, πεφυκότος τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου πυρὸς¹ τὸ ἀσθενέστερον ἀμαυροῦν· ὃ δὲ συμβαίνειν καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄστρα.

¹ πυρὸς om. Stob.

D24 (B28) Aët. 2.29.3 (Stob.) [περὶ ἐκλείψεως σελήνης]
[. . .] Ἀντιφῶν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σκαφοειδοῦς στροφῆν καὶ τὰς περικλίσεις.

Meteorology (D25)

D25 (< B29) Gal. *In Hipp.* Epid. 3.33, p. 129.1–6

οὕτω [scil. εἰλλόμενον] δὲ καὶ παρ' Ἀντιφῶντι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τῆς Ἀληθείας ἔστιν εὐρεῖν γεγραμμένην τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐν τῇδε τῇ ῥήσει· “ὅταν οὖν γίνωνται ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ὄμβροι τε καὶ πνεύματα ὑπεναντία ἀλλήλοις, τότε συστρέφεται τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ πικνοῦται κατὰ πολλὰ· ὃ τι δ' ἂν τῶν ξυμπιπτόντων κρατηθῆ,¹ τοῦτ' ἐπυκνώθη καὶ συνεστράφη ὑπὸ τε τοῦ πνεύματος εἰλλόμενον² καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς βίας.”

The Moon (D23–D24)

D23 (B27) Aëtius

Antiphon: the moon possesses its own light, but the obscured area around it is made dim by the impact of the sun, since what is stronger by nature makes dim what is weaker. This is what happens in the case of the other celestial bodies as well.

D24 (B28) Aëtius

[. . .] Antiphon: [scil. the lunar eclipse occurs] because of the rotation of the bowl-shaped body and its inclinations.

Meteorology (D25)

D25 (< B29) Galen, *Commentary on Hippocrates' Epidemics*

In Antiphon too [scil. as in Plato], in the second book of *Truth*, one can find the term [i.e. 'compressed'] written in this way [scil. *ellomenon*] in the following passage: “**so whenever rains and winds that oppose one another form in the air, the water comes together and condenses in many places; and, among the aggregates, whatever is dominated, undergoes condensation and aggregation, being compressed by both the air and its violence.**”¹

¹ This probably describes the formation of hail.

¹ *κρατήση* mss., corr. Sauppe, ut corruptum not. Pendrick

² *verbum leviter corruptum in mss. rest.* Wenkebach

*The Earth (D26)***D26**

a (B30) Harpocr. Γ.18

γρυνπάνιον· Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας β· “καίον γὰρ τὴν γῆν καὶ συντήκον γρυνπάνιον ποιεί.”

b (cf. B31) Phot. *Lex.* Γ.220 (et al.)

γρυνπανίξειν· σείεσθαι τὴν γῆν παλλομένην¹ καὶ ὡσπερ ῥυσοῦσθαι² ἀπὸ σεισμοῦ· οὕτως ἐχρήσατο Ἀντιφῶν.

¹ παλλομένην *Anecd. Gr.* 1.228 Bekker et *Etym. Mag.* s.v. γρυνπάνειν· βαλλομένην ms. ² ῥυσοῦσθαι *Etym. Gen.* et *Etym. Mag.*: ῥυποῦσθαι ms.: γρυνποῦσθαι Theodoridis

The Sea (D27)

D27 (B32) Aët. 3.16.4 (Plut.) [περὶ θαλάσσης πῶς συνέστη καὶ πῶς ἐστὶ πικρά]

Ἀντιφῶν ἰδρώτα τοῦ θερμοῦ, ἐξ οὗ τὸ περιληφθὲν ὑγρὸν ἀπεκρίθη, τῷ καθεψηθῆναι παραλυκίσαντα,¹ ὅπερ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἰδρώτος συμβαίνει.

¹ παραλυκίσασα Mm: παρακυλίσασα Π: corr. Xylander

*The Earth (D26)***D26**a (B30) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**wrinkled**’: Antiphon, Book 2 of *Truth*: “**for burning the earth and making it melt, it makes it wrinkled.**”

b (cf. B31) Photius, *Lexicon*

‘**to become wrinkled**’: for the earth, to quake when it is shaken and as it were to shrivel because of an earthquake. This is how Antiphon used it.

*The Sea (D27)***D27** (B32) Aëtius

Antiphon: [scil. the sea is] the sweat that comes from heat from which the enclosed moisture has separated out, and that has turned salty from having been boiled, which is what happens to every kind of sweat.

Human Anatomy and Medicine (D28–D35)

D28 (B29a, Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 426.17–35) Gal. *Nom. med.*, p. 34.9–38 Meyerhof-Schacht

وإن احتجت مني إلى شهادة استدل بها من كلام أصحاب الریطوريقى لتعلم أن أولئك أيضا إنما كانوا يريدون بقولهم حمى الحرارة النارية الخارجة عن الطبع فاسمع قول أنطيفون حيث يقول فهذه أشياء قد أخبرتك أن المرة كانت تفعلها لأنها كانت في اليدين والرجلين وأما التي كانت تتأدى إلى اللحم فإنما كانت إذا كان مقدارها كثيرا أحدثت حميات دائمة لأن اللحم إذا صارت إليه حدث به منها فساد في نفس جوهره وتورم فالحرارة الخارجة عن الطبع تكون من هذا الموضع فأما دوامها وأطباقتها فيكون من قبل المرة إذا كانت كثيرة في اللحم لم تنصب وتخف سريعا بل كانت تبقى بأن تصبر عند الحرارة الخارجة عن الطبع . فأنت تجد أنطيفون في كلامه هذا لم يقتصر على أن يسمي الحرارة الخارجة عن الطبع بالاسم الذي يسميها به جميع اليونانيين من أهل اللغة المعروفة بأطيقى وهو بُرِيتى فقال إن في جميع المحمومين حرارة تسمى بهذا الاسم دون أن أخبرك كيف تكون هذه الحرارة فسبب السبب في كونها إلى المرار . وكذلك قال أيضا في هذه المقالة

Human Anatomy and Medicine (D28–D35)

D28 (B29a, Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 426.17–35) Galen, *On Medical Names*

If you require me to provide you with a quotation from the rhetoricians that illustrates that when they say ‘fever’ they mean ‘an unnatural fiery heat’ (so that you can know this), then listen to what Antiphon said: “I have informed you that these are things that bile produces, because it is present in the hands and feet. If the quantity of bile which reaches the flesh is great, it brings about constant fevers. For if it arrives at the flesh, this produces putrefaction in its very essence, so that it [i.e. the flesh] swells. Unnatural heat is generated from this location [i.e. where the flesh putrefies and produces a swelling]. Their [scil. the fevers’] length and extent is determined by the bile: if it is plentiful in the flesh, they do not dissipate and diminish quickly, but rather remain, because the unnatural heat endures.” You can see that Antiphon does not limit himself to calling ‘unnatural heat’ by the word used by all Greeks speaking the dialect known as Attic, namely *puretoi*.¹ For he said that in all patients suffering from fever, there is a heat called by this word, before informing you how this heat is generated: he attributes the cause for its generation to bile. In the same second book of his treatises *On Truth*, he has a passage attributing the cause for the generation of fever to bile, saying: “Whatever [scil. bile] reaches the flesh, generates severe and long-lasting fevers.” After-

¹ The Arabic text only offers traces of letters (the so-called *rasm*), and can be read in a variety of ways; the previous editors restored ‘*θέρμη*,’ but they recognized that this makes little sense in this context.

الثانية يعينها من مقالاته في الحق قولاً نسب فيه السبب في كون الحمى إلى الممرار فقال وأما كل شيء منها يتأدى إلى اللحم فإنه يولد حميات شديدة طويلة المدة. ثم إنه من بعد هذا إذا أمعن في القول قليلاً يلقب الحرارة التي تكون على غير المجرى الطبيعي في النقرس بغير اللقب الذي يلقبها به جميع أصحابه فيسميها فلغموني وحمى وهذان اسمان يدلان في هذا الموضع على اللهب. [. . .] وأما أنهم كانوا يسمون ذلك أيضاً حمى فأنت تستدل على ذلك من هذا القول الذي أنسخه لك من قول أنطيفون فالعروق إذا وردوا أكثر مما تحتمل انفتحت وبسبب هذا يحدث بها فلغموني فإذا حدث بها فلغموني وصارت توجع صاحبها وإذا استحك ذلك سميت هذه العلة نقرسا.

D29 (B33) Harpocr. Π.65; cf. Φ.25 (F33b Pendrick)

[. . .] ὅτι γὰρ καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων τάσσοσι τὴν φορίνην δῆλον ποιεῖ Ἀντιφῶν ἐν β' Ἀληθείας.

D30 (B38) Pollux *Onom.* 2.7

[. . .] καὶ ἄμβλωμα ὡς Ἀντιφῶν.

D31 (B34) Pollux *Onom.* 2.41

[. . .] καὶ καρηβαρικὸν ποτὸν ἢ βρῶμα· τὸ δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν καρῶν Ἀντιφῶν φησίν.

ward, he continues his discussion for quite a while, employing a term for the unnatural heat during gout which is different from that used by all the patients having it [i.e. the unnatural heat]: he calls it 'phlegmonē' and 'fever.' At this place, these two words refer to 'burning [*lahīb*]' [. . .] They [scil. the ancients] used to call this [scil. *phlegmonē*] also fever. You can deduce this from the quotation from Antiphon which I have copied for you [scil. here]: "If more than they can tolerate comes to the blood vessels, they burst. For this reason, *phlegmonē* occurs in them. When *phlegmonē* occurs and they [i.e. the blood vessels] cause the patient pain, and if it [i.e. the *phlegmonē*] becomes inveterate, then this disease is called gout."²

² Translated by Peter E. Pormann.

D29 (B33) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

[. . .] For Antiphon makes it clear in Book 2 of *Truth* that they also apply the term 'hide'¹ to human beings.

¹ Usually used for the thick skin of certain animals, like the tortoise or elephant.

D30 (B38) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[. . .] and 'abortion,' like Antiphon.

D31 (B34) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[. . .] and a drink or food that causes headache: this effect Antiphon calls 'stupefying.'

D32 (B39) Pollux *Onom.* 2.61

Ἀντιφῶν δ' ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἀληθείας καὶ ἀνάπηρα εἶρηκεν.

D33 (B35) Pollux *Onom.* 2.215

[. . .] καὶ ἐναιμῶδες παρὰ Ἀντιφῶντι.

D34 (B36) Pollux *Onom.* 2.223

καὶ Ἀντιφῶν δ' εἶρηκεν “ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἔμβρυον αὐξάνεται τε καὶ τρέφεται, καλεῖται ‘χόριον.’”

D35 (B37) Pollux *Onom.* 2.224

[. . .] ἐπίπλους [. . .] Ἀντιφῶν δ' αὐτὸν καὶ ἀρρενικῶς καὶ οὐδετέρως καλεῖ.

*Fragments Not Assigned to a Specific
Book of On Truth (D36–D40)
Geometry (D36)*

D36 (< B13)

a Arist. *Phys.* 1.2 185a16–17

[. . . = R16a] τὸν τετραγωνισμόν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλύσαι, τὸν δὲ Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ.

D32 (B39) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

Antiphon in his books *On Truth* has also said ‘**mutilated.**’

D33 (B35) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[. . .] and ‘**blood-like**’ in Antiphon.

D34 (B36) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

And Antiphon has said, “**that in which the fetus grows and is nourished is called the ‘chorium’** (‘afterbirth’).”

D35 (B37) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[. . .] *epiplus*¹ [. . .] Antiphon uses the word both as masculine and as neuter.

¹ The omentum, a fold of peritoneum that connects the stomach with other organs of the abdomen.

*Fragments Not Assigned to a Specific
Book of On Truth (D36–D40)
Geometry (D36)*

D36 (< B13)

a Aristotle, *Physics*

[. . .] it is up to the geometer to refute the squaring [scil. of the circle] by means of segments, but it is not up to the geometer [scil. to refute] that of Antiphon.¹

¹ Aristotle also mentions Antiphon’s procedure, without giving further details, at *Sophistic Refutations* 172a7.

b Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 54.12, 20–22

τὸν γὰρ τετραγωνισμόν τοῦ κύκλου πολλῶν ζητού-
ντων [. . . cf. R16b], ὁ δὲ Ἀντιφῶν γράψας κύκλον
ἐνέγραψέ τι χωρίον εἰς αὐτὸν πολύγωνον τῶν ἐγγρά-
φεισθαι δυναμένων [. . . = R15].

Rejection of Divine Providence (D37)

D37 (< B12) Orig. *Cels.* 4.25

[. . .] Ἀντιφῶν ἄλλος ῥήτωρ νομιζόμενος εἶναι καὶ τὴν
πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγεγραμμένοις Περὶ ἀλη-
θείας [. . . = R17].

Justice and Nature (D38)

D38 (B44) P.Oxy. 1364 + 3647 + 1797 (CPF Antipho 1–2)

a (B44A) P.Oxy. 1364, Frag. 1

[Col. 1] μὲ [. . .]¹ δικα[ισο]ύνη | [δ' οὖν] τὰ² τῆς πό[λι]ε-
ως νόμιμα, | [ἐν ᾗ] ἂν πολί[τε]υ[η]ταί τις, μὴ | [παρ]-
αβαίνειν. | χροῦτ' ἂν οὖν | ἄνθρωπος μάλιστα εἰναι

ordo fragmentorum D38a, b, c incertus; frustula cum paucis
litteris omittimus; supplementa variorum virorum doctorum non
indicamus nominatim Col. 1¹ νόμι[μον] CPF

² δ' οὖν τὰ CPF: πάν]τα <τὰ> Grenfell et Hunt (= GrH)

b Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Many people were looking for how to square the circle
[. . .]. Antiphon drew a circle and then inscribed within it
one of the polygons that can be inscribed in it [. . .] [cf.
R14–R16].

Rejection of Divine Providence (D37)

D37 (< B12) Origen, *Against Celsus*

[. . .] Antiphon, who is thought to be another orator [scil.
besides Demosthenes], and who abolishes providence in
his books entitled *On Truth* [. . .].

Justice and Nature (D38)

D38 (B44) Oxyrhynchus papyri¹

¹ The original sequence of the fragments printed here as
D38a and b is uncertain: we adopt the order proposed by the first
editors, Grenfell and Hunt, followed by DK, but Funghi has ar-
gued that the sequence of the fragments should be inverted (cf.
CPF Antipho 1–2, vol. 1*, p. 183).

a (B44A)

[Col. 1] . . . <therefore> **justice is not to <trans>gress
against the legal institutions (nomima) <of whatever>
city one happens to be a citizen of. So a man would
make use of justice in the way that would be most
advantageous for himself if, in the presence of wit-
nesses, he considered that it is the laws that are
great, but, alone and without witnesses, that it is
what belongs to nature. For what belongs to the laws**

| ξυμφ[ε]ρόντως | δικαιο[σ]ύνη, εἰ | μετὰ μὲν μαρτύ-
ρων τ[ο]ῦς νόμους μεγά[λο]υς | ἄγοι,³ μονούμεινος
δὲ μαρτύρων τὰ τῆς φύσεως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ | τῶν
νόμων | [ἐπίθ]ετα, τὰ δὲ | [τῆς] φύσεως ἀ[ναγ]καίαι·
καὶ τὰ | [μὲν] τῶν νό[μω]ν ὁμολογη[θέντ]α οὐ φύν[τα
ἐστίν], τὰ δὲ | [τῆς φύσ]εως φύν[τα οὐχ] ὁμολο-
γη[Col. 2]θ[έ]ντα. τὰ οὖν νόμιμα παραβαίνων | εἰ ἀν-
λάβῃ τοὺς | ὁμολογήσαντας | καὶ αἰσχύνῃς | καὶ
ζημίας ἀπήλλακται, μὴ | λαθῶν δ' οὐ τῶν | δὲ τῆ
φύσει ξυμφύτων ἕαν τι² | παρὰ τὸ δυνατὸν | βιάζη-
ται, ἕαν | τε πάντας ἀνθρώπους λάθῃ, | οὐδὲν ἔλατ-
τον | τὸ κακόν, ἕαν τε | πάντες ἴδωσιν, | οὐδὲν μείζον·
| οὐ γὰρ διὰ δόξαν | βλάπτεται, ἀλλὰ | δι' ἀλήθειαν.
ἔστι | δὲ τῶνδε πάντων³ ἕνεκα τούτων ἡ σκέψις, ὅτι
τὰ πολλὰ | τῶν κατὰ νόμον δικαίων | πολεμῶς τῆ |
φύσ[ει] κείται· νεῖνο[μο]θ[έ]τηται | γὰρ [ἐ]πί τε τοῖς
ὀφ[θ]αλμοῖς, ἃ δεῖ | [Col. 3] αὐτο[ῦ]ς ὄραν καὶ | ἃ οὐ
[δε]ῖ· καὶ ἐπὶ | τοῖς ὠσίν, ἃ δεῖ αὐτὰ ἀκούειν καὶ |
ἃ οὐ δεῖ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῆ | γλώττῃ, ἃ τ[ε] | δεῖ αὐτὴν λέγειν
| καὶ ἃ οὐ δεῖ· καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς χερσίν, | ἃ τε δεῖ αὐτὰς
δρᾶν | καὶ ἃ οὐ δεῖ· καὶ | ἐπὶ τοῖς ποσίν, ἔφ' ἃ τε
δεῖ αὐτοὺς | ἵεναι καὶ ἐφ' ἃ οὐ | δεῖ· καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ νῷ,
| ὧν τε δεῖ αὐτὸν | ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ | ὧν μὴ. [ἦ]ττο]ν¹ οὖν
| οὐδὲν τ[ῆ] φύσει | φιλιώτ[ερ]α οὐδ' οἰκειότε[ρα] ἄφ'

³ cf. Harpocration A.7 (Anecd. Gr. 13 Bachmann): Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ἀληθείας φησὶ τοὺς νόμους μεγάλους ἄγοι, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡγοῖτο.

is <adventi>tious, but what belongs to nature is neces-
sary. And what belongs to the laws is the product of
an agreement, not of nature, but what <belongs to
nature> is the product of nature, not of an agree-
ment. [Col. 2] So if someone transgresses against le-
gal institutions without being noticed by those who
agreed upon them, he escapes shame and punish-
ment; but if they notice, he does not. But if, contra-
vening what is possible, he does violence to anything
produced by nature, the harm is not less if no man
notices him, and it is not greater if all men see him.
For it is not because of opinion that he is harmed,
but because of the truth. Our examination of all
these points is for the sake of the following thesis:
that most of the things that are just according to the
law are established in a way that is hostile to nature.
For laws have been established regarding the eyes,
[Col. 3] saying what they must see and what they
<must> not; and regarding the ears, what they must
hear and what they must not; and regarding the
tongue, what it must say and what it must not; and
regarding the hands, what they must do and what
they must not; and regarding the feet, where they
must go and where they must not; and regarding
thought, what it must desire and what it must not.
But what the laws deter people from is not <less>

Col. 2¹ εἰ ἀν C¹PF: ἦ ante, ἦμ post corr.: ἕαν Pendrick: εἰάν Wilamowitz
Wilamowitz ² ἕαν τι GrH: εαντε pap.

³ τῶνδε a.c.: παντων p.c. (παν suprascr.): πάν<τως> τῶνδε
Diels Col. 3¹ [ἦ]ττο]ν C¹PF: [ἔ]στειν GrH, Pendrick: [οὐ μέ]ν
Diels: [οὐ]κ Wilamowitz

ὦν | οἱ νόμο[ι] ἀποτρέπουνσι τ[οὺς] ἀν[θ]ρώπ[ους] | ἢ
 ἐφ' ἃ [ἐπιτρέ]²[πουσ[α]ν]. τ[ὸ] γὰρ³ | ζῆν [ἐ]στὶ τῆς
 φύσεως κ[αὶ] τ[ὸ] ἀποθαν[εῖν]. καὶ τὸ | μὲν [ζ]ῆν
 ἀστ[οῖς]⁴ | ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν | ξυμ[φερό]ντων. | τὸ δὲ
 ἀποθανεῖν | ἀπὸ τ[ῶν] μὴ ξυμ-|[Col. 4]φερόντων. τὰ
 | δὲ ξυμφέρ[οντα] | τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν | νόμων | κε[ε]-
 μενα¹ δεσμ[οῖ]² | τῆς φύσεως ἐ[στι]. | τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῆς
 φύσεως ἐλεύθερα. [οὔ]κουν τὰ ἀλγύνοντα ὀρθῶ γε
 λ[ό]γω ὀνύνησι τῆν | φύσιν μάλλον | ἢ τὰ εὐφραί-
 νοιτα. οὔκουν [ἄ]ν οὐδὲ ξυμφέροντ' εἶη τὰ λυποῦ-
 ντα | μάλλον ἢ τ[ὰ] ἡ[δο]ντα. τὰ γὰρ τῶ | ἀλη[θε]ῖ
 ξυμφέρ[οντ]α οὐ βλάπτειν δεῖ ἀλλ[λ' ὦ]φ[ε]λεῖν.
 τὰ τοῖνυ[ν] | τῇ φύσει ξυμφέροντα τ[α]ντ[α]. [25-31a
 illegible] [. . .]πται κα[ὶ] | [οὔ]τινες ἄν | πα[ρ]α[Col. 5]
 [θόν]τες ἀμύνων[ται] κ[αὶ] μὴ αὐτοὶ | [ἄ]ρχωσι τοῦ
 δρᾶν. | [καὶ] οὔτινες ἄν | [τοὺς] γειναμέ[νου]ς καὶ
 κακοὺς | ὄντας εἰς αὐτοὺς | εἰ ποιῶσιν. καὶ οἱ | κα-
 τόμνησθαι | διδόντες ἐτέρους, αὐτοὶ δὲ μὴ | κατομνύ-
 με[νοι]. καὶ τούτων | τῶν εἰρημένων | πόλλ' ἄν τις
 εἶροι πολέμια τῇ | φύσει. ἔνι τ' ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀλγύνε-
 σθαι | τε μάλλον ἐξὸν | ἦττω, καὶ ἐλάττω ἡδεσθαι
 ἐξὸν | πλείω, καὶ κακῶς | πάσχειν ἐξὸν | μὴ πάσχειν.
 | εἰ μὲν οὖν τις | [τ]οῖς τοιαῦτα προσ>[ι]εμένοις¹
 ἐπικού[ρ]ησις ἐγίγνε[το] παρὰ τῶν νό[μ]ων, τοῖς δὲ
 μὴ | [π]ροσ>ιεμένοις,² ἀλλ[λ' ἐ]ναντιουμέ[ν]οις ἐλάτ-

² [ἐπιτρέ]- Schöne, CPF: [προτρέ]- GrH

agreeable or akin to nature than what they <indu>ce them toward. <For> to live and to die belong to nature; and to live comes <for them> from what is be<ne>ficial, <to die> from <what is not [Col. 4] bene>ficial. As for what is beneficial, what is established <by the> laws are fetters upon nature, while what is established by nature is free. If one reasons correctly, what causes pain does <not> help nature more than what causes pleasure; and so what causes pain would not be more beneficial either than what pleases. For what is truly beneficial must be not harmful but helpful. So what is beneficial to nature . . . and <those who> [Col. 5] defend themselves after they have suffered some harm, and do not themselves <seize the init>iative in acting; <and those> who treat <their> parents well, even if these have been bad to them; and those who allow other people to swear an oath, but do not themselves swear an oath. And many of the things mentioned will be found to be hostile to nature: for they entail that people suffer more pain, when less would be possible, and that they have less pleasure, when more would be possible, and that they undergo suffering, when it would be possible not to do so. Well then, if the laws provided some help for those who submit to such situations, and loss for those who do not submit to them

³ τ[ὸ] γὰρ] GrH, CPF: τ[ὸ] δὲ] Pendrick; τ[ὸ] δ' ἀδ] Diels:
 π[ἄ]λιν τὸ] Wilamowitz ⁴ ἀστ[οῖς] GrH, CPF: ἀστ[ῆ] Pendrick
 Col. 4 ¹κε[ε]μένα GrH: κεκ[ρ]υμένα von Arnim: κεκ[ε]λευσ-
 μένα Diels ² δεσμ[οῖ] CPF: δεσμ[α] GrH
 Col. 5 ¹,² προσ>[ι]εμένους GrH

τωσις, | [Col. 6] οὐκ ἀν[ωφελὲς ἀν]¹ | ἦν τ[ὸ ἐν τοῖς νό]μοις πεί[σµα· νῦν]² | δὲ φαίνε[ται τοῖς] | προσι-
 εµ[ένοις] | τὰ τοιαῦτα τὸ ἐ[κ] | νόµου δίκαι[ον] | οὐχ
 ἱκανὸν ἐπικουρεῖν· ὁ γε πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιτρέπει τῷ
 πάσχοντι παθεῖν καὶ τῷ | δρῶντι δρᾶσαι· | καὶ οὔτε
 ἐνταῦθα διεκώλυε τὸν | πάσχοντα μὴ | παθεῖν οὔτε
 τὸν | δρῶντα δρᾶσαι· | εἷς τε τὴν τιµωρίαν ἀναφερό-
 µενον οὐδὲν | ἰδιώτερον ἐπὶ | [τ]ῷ πεπονητό | ἦ³
 τῷ δεδρακό[τι] πεί[σ]αι γὰρ δι[εῖ] | ἀ[ὐ]τὸν⁴ [το]ῦς
 τ[ι]μω[ρ]ήσου[σ]ας⁵ ὡς ἔπαθεν, [ἦ]⁶ δύνασθαι ἀπ[άτ]
 ἠ δίκην [ἔ]χειν. ταῦτὰ⁷ δὲ κ[α]ταλείπετα[ι] καὶ
 τῷ δρᾶσαντι ἀ[ρ]ρεῖσθαι | [Col. 7] [1–4 illegible]
 [. τῷ | ἀπο]λογ[ο]ῦντί ἐ[σ]τιν ἡ ἀπ[ο]λο-
 γία | ὁσηπερ τ[ῷ] κα[τ]ηγοροῦν[τι] ἡ | κατηγορ[ία], ἡ
 δὲ | πειθῶ ἀν[τί]παλος | τῷ γε πε[σ]πουθό[τι] καὶ τῷ
 [δεδρα]κότι ἐγίγ[νετο]¹ | γὰρ ν[]

Col. 6¹ ἀν[ωφελὲς ἀν] GrH: ἀν[όνητον ἀν] Diels² τ[ὸ
 ἐν τοῖς νό]μοις πεί[σµα· νῦν] CPF: τ[ὸ τοῖς νό]μοις πεί[σµα·
 νῦν] Diels: τ[ὸ τοῖς νό]μοις πεί[θεσθαι· νῦν] GrH³ Δ (i.e.
 l. 400) ante ἡ hab. in marg. pap. ⁴ πεί[σ]αι γὰρ δι[εῖ] ἀ[ὐ]τὸν
 CPF: πεί[σ]αι γὰρ ἀ[ν] ἔλ[οι]το Diels⁵ [το]ῦς τ[ι]μω-
 ρ[ήσου]σας CPF post Diels: [το]ῦς τ[ι]μω[ρ]οῦν[σ]ας GrH
⁶ [ἦ] CPF: [καὶ] Diels⁷ ταῦτα CPF: ταῦτα Janko,
 Pendrick Col. 7¹ ἐγίγ[νετο] CPF: γίγ[νεται] GrH

b (B44 Fragment B) P.Oxy. 1364, Frag. 2 + P.Oxy. 3647

[Col. 1] [Illegible]

[Col. 2] . . . ρων¹ ἐπ[ιστάµε]θά τε κ[αὶ] σέβοµεν· | τοὺς

but who oppose them, [Col. 6] it would not <be use>less
 <to obey the laws. But as it is,> it is evident that, for
 those who submit to such situations, a just outcome
 deriving from a law is not enough to provide them
 help. First, it permits the sufferer to suffer and the
 doer to do. And just as, at that time [i.e. before the
 crime], it did not prevent either the sufferer from
 suffering or the doer from doing, so too when refer-
 ence is made to it for the purpose of punishment, it
 is not more on the side of the one who has suffered
 than on that of the one who has done. For it is neces-
 sary that he persuade <those people who will exact pun-
 ishment> that he has suffered, <or> that he be capable
 of <obtaining> justice by deceit. But the doer too is
 permitted to deny the same things. [Col. 7] . . . exactly
 as much of a <defense> is available to the <defendant>
 as the accusation that is available to the accuser, and
 persuasiveness is <balanced> for the one <who has suf-
 fered> and for the one <who has done>. For it hap-
 pened . . .

b (B44B)

[Col. 1] [Illegible]

[Col. 2] . . . <we know them and we respect them>; but

Col. 2¹ [τῶν μὲν ἐγγυτέ]ρρων vel [οἰκειοτέ]ρων Funghi:
 [τῶν πατέ]ρων CPF: [τῶν ἐγγώ]ρων Pendrick, alii alia

δὲ [τῶν τη]λλοῦ οἰκ[οῦν]των | οὔτε ἐπι[στ]άμεθα οὔτε
σέβομεν. | ἐν τ[ο]ύτῳ οὖν | πρὸς ἀλλήλους | βεβαρ-
βαρώμεθα· ἐπεὶ φύσει γε | πάντα πάντες | ὁμοίως
πεφύκ[α]μεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἑλλην[ες] | εἶναι.
σκοπεῖν | δι[ε] παρέχει τὰ | τῶν φύσει ὄντων² | ἀναγ-
καί[α ἐν]³ | πᾶσιν ἀν[θρώ]ποις π[ο]ριζόμενά | τε κατὰ
τ[ὰς αὐτὰς] | δυνα[μ]εῖς ἅπασιν. | καὶ ἐν [αὐτοῖς
τοῦ]τοις οὔτε β[άρβα]ρος ἀφώρι[σται] | ἡμῶν οὐδ-
εῖς | οὔτε Ἑλλην· ἀναπνεόμεν | τε γὰρ εἰς τὸν
ἀίε[ρ] αἵ ἅπαντες | κατὰ τὸ στόμα | [καὶ κατὰ] τὰς
ῥίνας· κ[αὶ γελῶ]μεν⁴ | χαίροντες τῷ⁵ | [τῷ ἡ] δα-
κρῦ[Col. 3]ομεν | λυπούμενοι· καὶ τῇ ἀλοκῇ τοῦς
φθόγγους εἰσδεχόμεθα· καὶ τῇ αὐγῇ | μετὰ τῆς
ὄψεως ὀρώμεν· καὶ | ταῖς χερσὶν ἐργαζόμεθα· καὶ |
τοῖς ποσὶν βαδ[ί]ζομεν. υββ[]

² ὄντων GrH: ὁμοίως Fränkel ³ ἀναγκαία[α ἐν] CPF:
ἀναγκαί[ων] GrH: ἀναγκαί[α] Funghi ⁴ κ[αὶ γελῶ]μεν
Funghi ⁵ χαίροντες τῷ Funghi: χαίρον- Luppe

c (B44) P.Oxy. 1797

[Col. 1]. . . .] τοῦ δικαίου | [. . . .]. ου δοκουν | [. . .
τὸ] μαρτυρεῖν | [ἀλ]λήλους¹ τἀληθῆ | [δίκαιο]ν νομίζε-
ται | [εἶναι] καὶ χρήσιμον | [οὐδὲν] ἤττον εἰς | [τὰ τῶν]
ἀνθρώπων | [ἐπι]τηδεύματα. | [τοῦτο] τοίνυν οὐ
δί[καιο]ς ἔσται ὁ ποιῶν, | [εἶπε]ρ² τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν |
[μηδ]ένα μὴ ἀδικούμενον αὐτὸν | [δίκ]αίον ἔστιν
ἀνάγ[κη] γὰρ τὸν μαρτυ[ροῦ]ντα, κἂν ἀλη[θῆ] μαρ-

those [scil. probably laws] of those people who live far
away we neither know nor do we respect them. Thus
in this regard we have become barbarians toward
each other, since, in nature at least, we are all fitted
similarly by nature in all regards to be both barbar-
ians and Greeks. But it is possible to examine what
is necessary <in what exists> by nature for all humans
and <what is provided to them> in conformity with <the
same> properties, and in <these things none> of us has
been defined as either b[arbarian] or Greek. For we
all breathe into the air through our mouth and nose;
<we laugh when we are happy in our mind> [Col. 3] or we
weep when we are grieved; we take in sounds by our
hearing, and we see by means of light with our vi-
sion; we do work with our hands and we walk with
our feet . . .

c (B44)

[Col. 1] . . . of what is just . . . to provide true testimony
to one another is considered <to be just> and to be
<not at all> less useful for people's <act>ivities. But a
man who does <this> will not be <just, if it is true that>
not to commit injustice against anyone, if one has
not suffered injustice oneself, is just. For necessar-
ily a man who provides testimony, even if he pro-
vides true testimony, all the same commits injustice

¹ [ἀλ]λήλους Pendrick: ἐν ἀλ[λ]ήλους GrH: ἐπ' ἀλ[λ]ήλους
Fränkel ² εἶπερ Bignone: καὶ γὰρ GrH

τυρῆ, ὁμῶς | [ἄλλον π]ως ἀδικεῖν | [. α]ὐτὸν³
 ἀ[δι]κεῖσθαι | | [. . .] νενε[.]⁴ | [ἐ]ν ᾧ διὰ τ[ἀ
 ὑπ' ἐκεί][ν]ου μαρτ[υρηθέν]τα ἀλίσκε[ε]ται ὁ καίτα-
 μαρτυρούμενος | καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν ἢ | χρήματα ἢ αὐτὸν
 | [δ]ιὰ τοῦτον ὃν οὐδὲν | [ἀ]δικεῖ· ἐν μὲν οὖν | τούτῳ
 τὸν κατα[μ]αρτυρούμενον | [ἀ]δικεῖ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀδι[κο]-
 ῦντα ἑαυτὸν ἀ[δι]κεῖ· αὐτὸς δ' ἀδικεῖ[ται ὑ]πὸ τοῦ
 καταμαρ[τ]υρηθ[έν]τος, ὅτι μι[σ]εῖται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ
 τὰ[Col. 2] ληθῆ μαρτυ[ρῆ]σας· καὶ οὐ μόν[ον] | τῷ
 μίσει, ἀλλὰ [καὶ] | ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸν τ[ὸν] | αἰῶνα πάντα
 φυλάττεσθαι τοῦτο[ν] | οὐ κατεμαρτύρ[η]σεν ὡς
 ὑπάρχει[ι] | γ' αὐτῷ ἐχθρὸς τοιο[ῦ]τος, οἶος καὶ λέ-
 γειν | καὶ δρᾶν εἴ τι δύν[αι]το κακὸν αὐτόν. κα[ί]τοι
 ταῦτα φαίνεται | οὐ σμικρὰ ὄντα τὰδικήματα, οὔτε
 | ἂ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖται | οὔτε ἂ ἀδικεῖ· οὐ γὰρ | οἷόν τε
 ταῦτά τε δίκαια εἶναι καὶ τὸ μη[δ]ὲν ἀδικεῖν μη[δ]ὲ
 αὐτὸν ἀδικεῖσθαι, | [ἀλ]λ' ἀνάγκη ἐστίν | [ἢ] τὰ ἕτερα
 αὐτῶν | [δ]ίκαια εἶναι ἢ ἀμ[ι]φότερα ἄδικα. φαίνεται
 δὲ καὶ τὸ δικαί[ζειν] καὶ τὸ κρίνειν | καὶ τὸ διαιτᾶν,
 ὅπως | ἂν περαίνηται, οὐ | δίκαια ὄντα· τὸ γὰρ | [ἀ]-
 λλους ὠφελούν ἄλ[λο]υς βλάπτει· ἐν δὲ | [τού]τῳ οἱ
 μὲν ὠφελού[με]νοι οὐκ ἀδικου[ν] | [ται, οἱ] δὲ βλαπτό-
 με[νοι] | [ἀδικο]ῦντα[ι].

³ [εἶτα δὲ α]ὐτὸν CFF

⁴ [ἐν μίσει οὖ]ν ἐνε[χόμενος CFF

against <another person> in some way. . . . to suffer
 injustice himself . . . in which, <because of the testi-
 mony that man provides,> the one against whom he
 testifies is convicted and loses either his money or
 his life because of this man against whom he com-
 mits no injustice. Thus in this case he commits injus-
 tice against the one against whom he provides testi-
 mony, because he commits injustice against someone
 who is not committing injustice against himself; and
 he himself suffers injustice from the one against
 whom he provides testimony, because he <is hated>
 by him for having [Col. 2] provided true testimony—
 and not only because of the hatred, but <also> be-
 cause for the rest of his whole life he must be on his
 guard against this man against whom he has pro-
 vided testimony, for he has the sort of enemy who
 would do him any harm he could, in word and in
 deed. And yet it is evident that these are not petty
 injustices, neither the ones that he himself suffers
 nor the ones he commits. For it is not possible both
 that these things be just, and at the same time that
 one not commit injustice nor suffer injustice oneself;
 <but> it is necessary <either> that [scil. only] one of
 them be just or that both of them be unjust. It is also
 evident that judging, deciding, and adjudicating, in
 whatever way these are performed, are not just. For
 what benefits some harms others; and in this case,
 the ones who are benefited do not suffer injustice,
 while those who are harm<ed do suffer injust>ice . . .

*Wealth (D39)***D39**

a (< B43) Harpocr. A.2

ἄβιος· τὸν ἄβιον Ἀντιφῶν ἐπὶ¹ τοῦ πολλὸν τὸν² βίον
κεκτημένου ἔταξεν [. . .].

¹ ἐπὶ Epitome Harp.: ἀντὶ mss. ² τὸν Epitome Harp.:
om. mss.

b (B43) Hesych. A.127

ἄβιος· πλούσιος ὡς Ἀντιφῶν ἐν Ἀληθείᾳ.

*Precautions (D40)***D40** (B3) Pollux *Onom.* 6.143

[. . .] ἀπαρασκευῶ γνώμη ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ἀληθείας Ἀντι-
φῶν εἶπεν, ἀπαρασκευάστον δ' ἐν ταῖς ῥητορικαῖς
τέχναις—δοκοῦσι δ' οὐ γνήσια [. . .].

Fragments Attested for On Concord (D41–D49)
Organization of the Discourse (D41)

D41

a (B63) Harpocr. Δ.42

διάθεσις· [. . .] ἀντὶ τοῦ διοίκησις ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ
ὀμοιοίας· “ἀλλὰ εἰδότες τὴν διάθεσιν ἀκούουσιν.”

*Wealth (D39)***D39**a (< B43) Harpocr. *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**opulent**’ (*abios*): Antiphon applied ‘**opulent**’ to the man
who possesses a large livelihood (*bios*) [. . .].

b (B43) Hesychius, *Lexicon*

‘**opulent**’: ‘wealthy,’ as Antiphon in *Truth*.

*Precautions (D40)***D40** (B3) Pollux, *Onomasticon*

[. . .] ‘**with unprepared thought**,’ says Antiphon in his
writings *On Truth*, but ‘unreadied’ in his technical hand-
books of rhetoric (but these are considered to be inau-
thentic) [. . .].

Fragments Attested for On Concord (D41–D49)
Organization of the Discourse (D41)

D41a (B63) Harpocr. *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**organization**’: [. . .] instead of ‘arrangement,’ the same
man [i.e. Antiphon] in his *On Concord*: “**but, knowing
the organization, they listen.**”

b (B24a) *Suda* Δ.557

διάθεσις καὶ διατίθεσθαι [. . .] Ἀντιφῶν δὲ τῇ διαθέσει ἐχρήσατο ἐπὶ γνώμης ἢ διανοίας· ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ διαθέειναι λόγον, τουτέστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐξαγγεῖλαι τι. [. . . = D20]

Human Pretentions (D42)

D42 (B48) Phot. *Lex.* Θ.48

θειδέστατον θεοῦ ἰδέαν ἔχον. εἶπε δὲ Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς οὕτως· ἄνθρωπος, ὃς φησι μὲν πάντων θηρίων θειδέστατον γενέσθαι.

*Human Realities: Names of
Barbarian Peoples (D43–D45)*

D43 (B45) Harpocr. Σ.28

Σκιάποδες· Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς. ἔθνος ἐστὶ Λιβυκόν.

D44 (B46) Harpocr. M.2

Μακροκέφαλοι· Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς. ἔθνος ἐστὶν οὕτω καλούμενον [. . .].

b (B24a) *Suda*

‘**organization**’ and ‘**to be organized**’: [. . .] Antiphon applied ‘**organization**’ to an intention or thought. The same man also applied it to organizing a discourse, that is, to proclaiming something. [. . .]

Human Pretentions (D42)

D42 (B48) Photius, *Lexicon*

‘**most godlike**’: possessing the outward appearance of a god. Antiphon spoke as follows in his *On Concord*: “**a human being, who on the one hand claims to be the most godlike of all the beasts.**”

*Human Realities: Names of
Barbarian Peoples (D43–D45)*

D43 (B45) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**Shadowfeet**’: Antiphon in his *On Concord*; it is a people of Libya.

D44 (B46) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**Longheads**’: Antiphon in his *On Concord*. There exists a people called by this name [. . .].

D45 (< B47) Harpocr. T.8

ὑπὸ γῆν οἰκοῦντες· λέγοι ἂν τοὺς [. . .] λεγομένους
 Τρωγοδύτας¹ [. . .]. Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοίας.

¹ Τρωγλοδύτας mss., corr. Untersteiner

*Good and Bad Characteristics
 and Sentiments (D46–D49)
 Moderation (D46)*

D46 (B70) Harpocr. E.156

εὐηνιώτατα Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοίας. εὐήνιος ὁ¹
 πρᾶος καὶ μέτριος καὶ μὴ ταραχώδης. ἡ μεταφορὰ
 ἀπὸ τῶν ἵππων.

¹ ὁ Epit. Harp: ἐστι mss.

Hesitation (D47)

D47

a (B55) Phot. *Lex.* I.133

ἵνα· ὅπου. Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῆς ὁμοιοίας· “ὀκνεῖν¹
 ἵνα οὐδὲν ἔργον ὀκνεῖν.”

¹ ὀκνεῖν *Suda* I.360: om. Phot.

D45 (B47) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**Those who dwell under the earth**’ (perhaps he is speaking of the ones [. . .] called ‘Trogodytes’ [. . .]. Antiphon in his *On Concord*.

*Good and Bad Characteristics
 and Sentiments (D46–D49)
 Moderation (D46)*

D46 (B70) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**most obedient to the reins**’: Antiphon in his *On Concord*. Obedient to the reins is someone who is tame, moderate, and not disordered. The metaphor comes from horses.

Hesitation (D47)

D47

a (B55) Photius, *Lexicon*

‘**where**’: in the place in which. Antiphon in his *On Concord*: “**to hesitate where it does no good to hesitate.**”

b (B56) *Suda* O.116

ὀκνῶ φοβοῦμαι. [. . .] καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες οὐκ ἐπὶ δειλίας καὶ ῥαθυμίας ἐχρήσαντο τῷ ὀνόματι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ φόβου καὶ τοῦ φοβεῖσθαι. Ἀντιφῶν: “κακὸς δ' ἄν, εἰ ἀποῦσι μὲν καὶ μέλλουσι τοῖς κινδύνοις τῇ γλώττῃ θρασύνεται καὶ τῷ θέλειν ἐπέιγει, τὸ δ' ἔργον ἄν παρῆ, ὀκνεῖ.”

1 ἄν, εἰ] ἀεὶ Gaisford: ἄν <εῖη> εἰ Diels: ἄν εἰ <ἐπ'> Sauppe

Regret (D48)

D48 (B52) Harpocr. A.111

ἀναθέσθαι Ἀντιφῶν Περὶ ὁμοιοῖας: “ἀναθέσθαι δὲ ὡς περὶ πεττὸν τὸν βίον οὐκ ἔστιν” ἀντὶ τοῦ ἄνωθεν βίωναι μετανοήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ. εἰρηται δὲ ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν πεττενομένων.

False Friends (D49)

D49 (B65) *Suda* Θ.434

θωπεία· κολακεία [. . .] Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοῖας: “πολλοὶ δ' ἔχοντες φίλους οὐ γινώσκουσιν, ἀλλ' ἑταίρους ποιοῦνται θῶπας πλοῦτου καὶ τύχης κόλακας.”

b (B56) *Suda*

'I hesitate': I am afraid. [. . .] and the orators did not use the word for cowardice and laziness, but for fear and being afraid. Antiphon: “**he would be worthless, if about absent and future dangers he is bold with his tongue and presses on with desire, but hesitates when the task is at hand.**”

Regret (D48)

D48 (B52) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

'to retract': Antiphon, *On Concord*: “**it is not possible to retract one's life like a move in checkers,**” instead of 'to live one's life again as one regrets one's earlier life.' The expression comes from the metaphor of checkers.

False Friends (D49)

D49 (B65) *Suda*

'flattery': adulation. [. . .] Antiphon in his *On Concord*: “**many men who have friends do not know them, but they take as their companions people who flatter their wealth and adulate their good fortune.**”

*Fragments Attributable to
On Concord (D50–D63)
The Unsuccessful Life (D50–D59)
The Defects of Human Life (D50–D51)*

D50 (B51) Stob. 4.34.56

Ἀντιφῶντος.¹ εὐκατηγόρητος πᾶς ὁ βίος θαυμαστῶς,
ὦ μακάριε, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχων περιττὸν οὐδὲ μέγα καὶ
σεμνόν, ἀλλὰ πάντα σμικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆ καὶ ὀλιγο-
χρόνια καὶ ἀναμειγμένα λύπαις μεγάλαις.

¹ Ἀντιφῶντος ed. Trincav.: ἀντιφάνους mss.

D51 (B50) Stob. 4.34.63

Ἀντιφῶντος. τὸ ζῆν ἔοικε φρουρᾷ ἐφημέρῳ τό τε μῆ-
κος τοῦ βίου ἡμέρα μιᾷ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἢ ἀναβλέψαν-
τες πρὸς τὸ φῶς παρεγγῶμεν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις
ἑτέροις.

Anxieties (D52–D53)

D52 (B53) Stob. 3.10.39

Ἀντιφῶντος. οἱ δὲ ἐργαζόμενοι μὲν καὶ φειδόμενοι καὶ

*Fragments Attributable to
On Concord (D50–D63)
The Unsuccessful Life (D50–D59)
The Defects of Human Life (D50–D51)*

D50 (B51) Stobaeus, *Anthology*¹

Of Antiphon: It is astonishingly easy to find fault with all of life, my friend, since it possesses nothing exceptional nor great and imposing, but everything in it is little, weak, ephemeral, and mixed with great pains.

¹ There is some doubt in the case of this and the following quotations from Stobaeus regarding which Antiphon is involved, which work, and whether they are genuine: cf. Pendrick 2002, pp. 39–40. But the grounds for suspicion about their authenticity seem less weighty than in the case of e.g. Pythagoras (cf. **PYTHS. R36**) or Democritus (cf. **ATOM. D227** and the following), and we have therefore not printed these fragments in italics (but we have not set them in boldface either).

D51 (B50) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: Living is like a day-long sentry duty,¹ and the whole length of life is like a single day, as it were, during which no sooner have we raised our eyes toward the light than we pass on the baton to other people who come after us.

¹ Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 62b.

Anxieties (D52–D53)

D52 (B53) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: People who work and economize, and toil

ταλαιπωρούντες καὶ προστιθέντες ἤδονται οἷα δὴ τις
 ἂν εἰκάσειεν ἤδεσθαι· ἀφαιρούντες δὲ καὶ χρώμενοι
 ἀλγοῦσιν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ τῶν σαρκῶν ἀφαιρούμενοι.

D53 (B53a) Stob. 3.16.20

Ἀντιφῶντος. εἰσὶ τινες οἱ τὸν παρόντα μὲν βίον οὐ
 ζῶσιν, ἀλλὰ παρασκευάζονται πολλῇ σπουδῇ ὡς ἕτε-
 ρόν τινα βίον βιωσόμενοι, οὐ τὸν παρόντα· καὶ ἐν
 τούτῳ παραλειπόμενος ὁ χρόνος οἴχεται.

Cowardice (D54)

D54 (B57) Stob. 3.8.18

Ἀντιφῶντος. νόσος δειλοῦσιν ἑορτή· οὐ γὰρ ἐκπορευ-
 οῦνται ἐπὶ πρᾶξι.

False and True Temperance (D55–D56)

D55 (B58) Stob. 3.20.66

Ἀντιφῶντος. ὅστις δὲ ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὸν πλησίον κακῶς ποι-
 ῆσων δειμαίνει μὴ ἂ θέλει ποιῆσαι ἀμαρτῶν τούτων
 ἂ μὴ θέλει ἀπενέγκηται, σωφρονέστερος. ἐν ᾧ γὰρ
 δειμαίνει, μέλλει· ἐν ᾧ δὲ μέλλει, πολλάκις ὁ διὰ μέ-
 σου χρόνος ἀπέστρεψε τὸν νοῦν τῶν θελημάτων· καὶ
 ἐν μὲν τῷ γεγενῆσθαι οὐκ ἔνεστιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μέλλειν

and accumulate, feel a pleasure of the sort that one might
 guess them to feel. But when they take some of it [scil.
 what they have acquired] away and make use of it, they
 feel a pain as though it were some of their own flesh they
 were taking away.

D53 (B53a) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: There are some people who do not live the
 present life but make preparations with great effort as
 though they were going to live some different life, and not
 the present one. And while they are doing this, the time
 that they are neglecting is gone.

Cowardice (D54)

D54 (B57) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: For cowards, illness is a holiday; for then
 they do not have to set out for action.

False and True Temperance (D55–D56)

D55 (B58) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: Someone who sets out against another man
 intending to do him harm, and fears that he will fail in his
 purpose and will obtain what he does not want, demon-
 strates a certain temperance. For as long as he fears, he
 hesitates; and while he hesitates, it often happens that the
 lapse of time deters his mind from its intentions. And this
 is not possible for what is past, but it is possible for this to

ἐνδέχεται¹ γενέσθαι. ὅστις δὲ δράσειν μὲν οἶεται τοὺς πέλας κακῶς, πείσεσθαι δ' οὐ, οὐ² σωφρονεῖ. ἐλπίδες δ' οὐ πανταχοῦ ἀγαθόν· πολλοὺς γὰρ τοιαῦται ἐλπίδες κατέβαλον εἰς ἀνηκέστους συμφοράς, ἃ δ' ἐδόκουν τοὺς³ πέλας ποιήσειν, παθόντες τὰτα ἀνεφάνησαν αὐτοί. σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ ἂν ἄλλου⁴ ὀρθότερόν τις κρίνειεν, ἢ ὅστις τοῦ θυμοῦ ταῖς παραχρήμα ἡδοναῖς ἐμφράσσει αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κρατεῖν τε καὶ νικᾶν ἡδυνήθη αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. ὅς δὲ θέλει χαρίσασθαι τῷ θυμῷ παραχρήμα θέλει τὰ κακίω ἀντὶ τῶν ἀμεινόνων.

¹ ἐνδέχεται <μῆ> Bücheler ² οὐ om. MA ³ τοὺς
Meineke: τοῖς S ⁴ ἄλλου Jacoby: ἄλλος S

D56 (B59) Stob. 3.5.57

Ἀντιφῶντος. ὅστις δὲ τῶν αἰσχυρῶν ἢ τῶν κακῶν μήτε ἐπεθύμησε μήτε ἤψατο, οὐκ ἔστι σώφρων· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ὅτου κρατήσας αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν κόσμιον παρέχεται.

Marriage and Family (D57–D58)

D57 (B49) Stob. 4.22.66

Ἀντιφῶντος. φέρε δὴ προελθέτω ὁ βίος εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν καὶ γάμων καὶ γυναικὸς ἐπιθυμησάτω. αὕτη ἢ ἡμέρα, αὕτη ἢ νύξ καινοῦ δαίμονος ἄρχει, καινοῦ πότμου. μέγας γὰρ ἀγὼν γάμος ἀνθρώπων. εἰ γὰρ τύχοι μὴ ἐπιτηδεία γενομένη, τί χρῆ τῇ συμφορᾷ χρῆ-

happen for something in the future. But someone who supposes that he can do harm to other men, without himself suffering, does <not> show temperance. Hopes are not always a good thing: for hopes of this sort have cast many men into incurable misfortunes, and the evil they expected to inflict on others they turned out to suffer themselves. One would attribute temperance most correctly only to that man who blocks himself from the immediate pleasures of his desire and is himself capable of dominating and defeating himself. But someone who wants to satisfy his desire immediately wants what is worse instead of what is better.

D56 (B59) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: Someone who has not desired nor touched what is shameful or evil is not temperate: for there is nothing in which he shows himself to be well-ordered by dominating it.

Marriage and Family (D57–D58)

D57 (B49) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: Come then, let us suppose that someone's life has moved forward and that he feels a desire for marriage and a wife. This very day, this very night is the beginning of a new personal fortune, of a new destiny. For marriage is a great trial for a man. For if the woman turns out to be unsuitable, what is he to do about this misfor-

σθαι; χαλεπαὶ μὲν ἐκπομπαί, τοὺς φίλους ἐχθροὺς
 ποιῆσαι, ἴσα φρονούντας ἴσα πνέοντας, ἀξιώσαντα
 καὶ ἀξιώθεντα· χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ ἐκτῆσθαι¹ κτῆμα τοι-
 οῦτον, δοκούντα ἡδονὰς κτᾶσθαι λύπας ἀγεσθαι.

φέρε δὴ, μὴ τὰ παλίγκοτα λέγωμεν, λεγέσθω τὰ
 πάντων ἐπιτηδεϊότατα. τί γὰρ ἡδιον ἀνθρώπῳ γυναι-
 κὸς καταθυμία; τί δὲ γλυκύτερον ἄλλως τε καὶ νέφ;
 ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δέ γε τούτῳ, ἔνθα τὸ ἡδύ, ἔνεστι πλησίον
 που καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν· αἱ γὰρ ἡδοναὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ σφῶν
 αὐτῶν ἐμπορεύονται, ἀλλ' ἀκολουθοῦσιν αὐταῖς λύπαι
 καὶ πόνοι. ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀλυμπιονίκαι καὶ πυθιονίκαι καὶ
 οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἀγῶνες καὶ σοφίαι καὶ πᾶσαι ἡδοναὶ ἐκ
 μεγάλων λυπημάτων ἐθέλουσι παραγίνεσθαι τιμαὶ
 γάρ, ἄθλα—δελέατα, ἃ ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκεν ἀνθρώποις—
 μεγάλων πόνων καὶ ἰδρώτων εἰς ἀνάγκας καθιστά-
 σιν.² ἐγὼ γάρ, εἴ μοι γένοιτο σῶμα ἕτερον τοιοῦτον³
 οἷον ἐγὼ ἑμαυτῷ, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ζῆν, οὕτως ἑμαυτῷ
 πολλὰ πράγματα παρέχων ὑπὲρ τε τῆς ὑγιείας τοῦ
 σώματος ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ καθ' ἡμέραν βίου ἐς τὴν ξυλλο-
 γῆν ὑπὲρ τε δόξης καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ εὐκλείας καὶ
 τοῦ εὖ ἀκούειν· τί οὖν, εἴ μοι γένοιτο σῶμα ἕτερον
 τοιοῦτον, ὃ γέ μοι οὕτως ἐπιμελὲς εἶη; οὐκ οὖν δῆλον,
 ὅτι γυνὴ ἀνδρὶ, εἰ ἢ καταθυμία, οὐδὲν ἐλάττους τὰς
 φιλότητας παρέχεται καὶ τὰς ὀδύνας ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ
 ὑπὲρ τε τῆς ὑγιείας δισώων σωμαίων ὑπὲρ τε τοῦ
 βίου τῆς συλλογῆς⁴ ὑπὲρ τε τῆς σωφροσύνης καὶ τῆς
 εὐκλείας;

tune? Divorce is difficult: to make enemies out of his
 friends, people who think the same as he does and who
 breathe the same, after he has given them his esteem and
 received theirs. But it is also difficult to hold onto a pos-
 session of this sort, when, imagining that he was acquiring
 pleasures, he brings home pains.

Come then, let us not speak of disagreeable matters,
 let it be the most suitable things of all that we speak of.
 For what is more pleasant for a man than a woman that is
 in accord with his own heart? And what is sweeter, espe-
 cially for a young man? And yet precisely where there is
 pleasure, pain too is somewhere near at hand. For plea-
 sures do not travel on their own, but are accompanied
 by pains and toils. Olympian and Pythian victories, other
 contests of this sort, the forms of wisdom (*sophiai*), and
 all pleasures tend to be attained at the cost of great suf-
 ferings. For honors, prizes—these lures that god has set
 out for humans—impose on them the constraint of great
 toil and sweat. As for me, if I had a second body like the
 one I have for myself, I could not live, so many are the
 troubles I give myself for my body's health, for earning a
 living every day, and for a reputation, for temperance, for
 renown, and for a good name. What then if I had a second
 body like this to which I had to devote such care? Is it not
 evident that a wife causes her husband, when she is in
 accord with his spirit, just as many pleasures and pains as
 he causes himself for the sake of the health of two bodies
 and for earning a living, for temperance, and renown?

¹ καὶ ἐκτῆσθαι Diels: κεκτῆσθαι mss. ² καθιστώσιν
 mss., corr. Sauppe ³ τοιοῦτον <ἐπιμελὲς ὄν> Diels, alii alia

⁴ καὶ post συλλογῆς hab. mss., secl. Sauppe

φέρει δὴ καὶ παῖδες γενέσθωσαν φροντίδων ἤδη πάντα πλέα καὶ ἐξοίχεται τὸ νεοτήσιον σκίρτημα ἐκ τῆς γνώμης καὶ <τὸ>⁵ πρόσωπον οὐκέτι τὸ αὐτό.

⁵ <τὸ> Sauppe

D58 (B66) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6.19.7

Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ῥήτωρ λέγει: “γηροτροφία γὰρ προσείοικεν παιδοτροφία.”

Wealth and Foolishness (D59)

D59 (B54) Stob. 3.16.30

Ἀντιφῶντος. ἔστι δέ τις λόγος, ὡς ἄρα ἰδὼν ἀνὴρ ἄνδρα ἕτερον ἀργύριον ἀναιρούμενον πολὺν ἐδεῖτό οἱ δανείσθαι ἐπὶ τόκῳ· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἠθέλησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν οἷος ἀπιστεῖν τε καὶ μὴ ὠφελεῖν μηδένα· φέρων δ' ἀπέθετο ὅποι¹ δὴ· καὶ τις καταμαθὼν τοῦτο ποιῶντα ὑφέλιετο· ὑστέρῳ δὲ χρόνῳ ἐλθὼν οὐχ εὔρισκε τὰ χρήματα ὁ καταθέμενος· περιελθὼν οὖν τῇ συμφορᾷ τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχρησε τῷ δεομένῳ, ὃ ἂν αὐτῷ καὶ σῶον ἦν καὶ ἕτερον προσέφερεν, ἀπαντήσας δὲ τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῷ τότε δανειζομένῳ ἀπωλοφύρετο τὴν συμφορὰν, ὅτι ἐξήμαρτε καὶ ὅτι οἱ μεταμέλει οὐ χαρισαμένῳ, ἀλλ' ἀχαριστήσαντι, ὡς² πάντως οἱ ἀπολόμενον³ τὸ ἀργύ-

¹ ποῖ mss., corr. Blass

² ὡς Blass: καὶ mss.

³ οἱ ἀπολόμενον: verba leviter corrupta in mss. corr. Gesner

Come then, and let us suppose that children are born too: now everything is full of worries, youthful frolicking is gone from the mind, and one's face is no longer the same.

D58 (B66) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

Antiphon the orator says, “**Taking care of the elderly is like taking care of children.**”

Wealth and Foolishness (D59)

D59 (B54) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: There is a story that when one man saw another man taking out some money, he implored him to lend it to him at interest. But the other man refused—he was a distrustful kind of man, disinclined to help anyone. He carried the money away and hid it somewhere; but someone noticed him doing this and stole it. When the man who had hidden the money came back later he could not find it. In great distress at his misfortune—especially because he had not lent his money to the man who needed it, for it would not only have been safe for him, it would also have brought in more—he ran into the man who had wanted to borrow money at that time and he lamented his misfortune, saying that he had made a mistake and that he regretted that he had refused to do this favor instead of granting it, since in any case he had lost the money. The

ριον. ὁ δ' αὐτὸν ἐκέλευε μὴ φροντίζειν, ἀλλὰ νομίζειν αὐτῷ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀπολωλέναι καταθέμενον λίθον εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ χωρίον "πάντως γὰρ οὐδ' ὅτε ἦν σοι, ἐχρῶ αὐτῷ, ὅθεν μηδὲ νῦν νόμιζε στέρεσθαι μηδενός." ὅτω γάρ τις μὴ ἐχρήσατο μηδὲ χρήσεται, ὄντος ἢ μὴ ὄντος αὐτῷ οὐδὲν οὔτε πλεόν οὔτε ἔλασσον βλάπτεται. ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς μὴ παντελῶς βούληται ἀγαθὰ διδόναι ἀνδρὶ, χρημάτων πλοῦτον παρασχών, τοῦ φρονεῖν <δὲ>⁴ καλῶς πένητα ποιήσας, τὸ ἕτερον ἀφελόμενος ἐκατέρων ἀπεστέρησεν.

⁴ <δὲ> Sauppe

Aspects of Life in Society (D60–D63)
Friendship (D60–D61)

D60 (B62) Stob. 2.31.41

ὅτω¹ τις ἂν τὸ πλείστον τῆς ἡμέρας συνῆ, τοιοῦτον ἀνάγκη γενέσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν τοὺς τρόπους.

haec sententia caret lemmate in Stob., sed sequitur duas sententias Antiphonti attributas; eam refinxit Spengel ut duos versus Menandri ¹(δ)τω ms., corr. Pendrick

D61 (B64) Φιλοσόφων λόγοι 62 (11 Schenkl) = Excerpta Vind. 44 (4.293 Meineke)

Ἀντιφῶν· αἱ νέαι φιλῖαι ἀναγκαῖαι μὲν, αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ ἀναγκαϊότεραι.

other man told him not to worry but to imagine that he still possessed his money and had not lost it, and to set down a stone in the same place: "In any case, when you had it, you did not use it; so don't think that you have been deprived of anything now either." For someone who has not used something and will not use it is not harmed either more or less, whether he possesses it or not. For when a god does not wish to give entirely good things to a man, he gives him wealth of money but makes him poor in good sense, thereby depriving him of both things by taking away one of them.

Aspects of Life in Society (D60–D63)
Friendship (D60–D61)

D60 (B62) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

One necessarily oneself becomes similar in character to whomever one spends most of the day with.

D61 (B64) *Words of Philosophers*

Antiphon: New friendships constrain, but old ones constrain even more.

*Education (D62–D63)***D62** (B60) Stob. 2.31.39

Ἀντιφώντος. πρῶτον, οἶμαι, τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις¹ ἐστὶ παιδείους· ὅταν γάρ τις πράγματος κἄν ὄτουσιν τὴν ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς ποιήσῃται, εἰκὸς καὶ τὴν τελευτὴν ὀρθῶς γίγνεσθαι· καὶ γὰρ τῇ γῆ ὄλον ἂν τις τὸ σπέρμα ἐναρόσῃ, τοιαῦτα καὶ τὰ ἔκφορα δεῖ προσδοκᾶν· καὶ ἐν νέῳ σώματι ὅταν τις τὴν παιδευσιν γενναίαν ἐναρόσῃ, ζῆ τούτο καὶ θάλλει διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, καὶ ἀπὸ οὔτε ὄμβρος οὔτε ἀνομβρία ἀφαιρεῖται.

¹ ἀνθρώποις Pflugk: οὐρανοῖς ms.

D63 (B61) Stob. 2.31.40

τοῦ αὐτοῦ. ἀναρχίας δ' οὐδὲν κάκιον ἀνθρώποις· ταῦτα γινώσκοντες οἱ πρόσθεν ἄνθρωποι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴθιζον τοὺς παῖδας ἄρχεσθαι καὶ τὸ κελεύομενον ποιεῖν, ἵνα μὴ ἐξανδρούμενοι εἰς μεγάλην μεταβολὴν ἰόντες ἐκπλήσσοιντο.

*Other Isolated Words Attested for
On Concord (D64–D68)*

D64 (B67) Harpocr. A.43

ἀθεώρητος· ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀθέατος παρ' Ἀντιφώντι ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοῦς.

*Education (D62–D63)***D62** (B60) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of Antiphon: The foremost thing in human affairs, I think, is education. For in any action whatsoever, if one begins in the right way, then it is likely that the end will turn out right too. For so too whatever kind of seed one sows in the earth, one should expect the same kind of produce. And if someone sows a noble education in a young body, it lives and flourishes for his whole life, and neither rain nor drought destroys it.

D63 (B61) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

Of the same man [i.e. Antiphon]: Nothing is worse for human beings than the lack of rules. The men of earlier times, recognizing this, accustomed their children from the beginning to obey and to do what they were told, so that when they became adults they would not be thrown into turmoil if they encountered some great change.

*Other Isolated Words Attested for
On Concord (D64–D68)*

D64 (B67) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

'unobserved': instead of 'unseen' in Antiphon in his *On Concord*.

D65 (B67a) Harpocr. A.131 (et Erit.)

ἀνδρεία· ἡ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡλικία. Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμονοίας.

D66 (B68) Harpocr. A.265

αὐλιζόμενοι ἀντὶ τοῦ κοιμώμενοι. Ἀντιφῶν Περὶ ὁμονοίας.

D67 (B69) Harpocr. B.1 (et Erit.)

βαλβίσιων Ἀντιφῶν Περὶ ὁμονοίας ἀντὶ τοῦ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.

D68 (B71) Harpocr. Φ.12

φηλάματα Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμονοίας ἐξαπάτας· φηλοῦν γὰρ τὸ ἐξαπατᾶν.

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable
to Politicus (D69–D74)
Computation (D69–D70)*

D69 (B74) Harpocr. E.168

εὐσύμβολος· ἀντὶ τοῦ ραδίως καὶ εὖ συμβάλλων, τουτέστιν ἀγαθὸς συμβάλλειν. Ἀντιφῶν Πολιτικῷ.

D65 (B67a) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**manhood**’: the age of men. Antiphon in his *On Concord*.

D66 (B68) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**spending the night**’: instead of ‘sleeping.’ Antiphon *On Concord*.

D67 (B69) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**starting lines**’ [scil. of a race]: Antiphon *On Concord* instead of ‘beginnings.’

D68 (B71) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**cheatings**’: Antiphon in his *On Concord*, deceits. For to cheat is to deceive.

*Fragments Attested for or Attributable
to Politicus (D69–D74)
Computation (D69–D70)*

D69 (B74) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**good at computing**’: instead of ‘computing easily and well,’ that is, good at performing computation. Antiphon *Politicus*.

D70 (B75) Harpocr. H.12 (et Epit.)

ἡμολιασμός· Ἀντιφῶν Πολιτικῷ· ‘διπλασιασμοῦ’ καὶ ‘ἡμολιασμοῦ’¹ ἀντὶ τοῦ ‘τὸ ἡμόλιον δοῦναι’ ἐν τοῖς λογισμοῖς.

¹ ἡμόλιστον mss., corr. Schneider

Disorderliness (D71)

D71 (B72) Anecd. Gr. I.78.20 Bekker

ἀπειθαρχία· Ἀντιφῶν Πολιτικῷ.

Intemperance and Wastefulness (D72–D74)

D72 (< B76) Prisc. Inst. 18.230

Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Πολιτικῷ· μήτε φιλοπότην κληθῆναι καὶ δοκεῖν τὰ πράγματα καταμελεῖν ὑπὸ οἴνου ἤσώμενον.

D73 (B73) Athen. Deipn. 10 423A

καταριστᾶν δὲ εἴρηκεν ἐν τῷ Πολιτικῷ Ἀντιφῶν οὕτως· “ὅτε δὴ¹ τις πράγματα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ τὰ τῶν φίλων κατηρίστηκεν.”

¹ ὅτ’ ἄν ms., corr. Kaibel

D70 (B75) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘**multiplying by one and a half**’: Antiphon *Politicus*. ‘**multiplying by two**’ and ‘**multiplying by one and a half**’ instead of ‘making one a half times as much,’ in calculations.

Disorderliness (D71)

D71 (B72) *Anecdota Graeca*

‘**disobedience to authority**’: Antiphon *Politicus*.

Intemperance and Wastefulness (D72–D74)

D72 (< B76) Priscian, *The Institutions*

Antiphon in his *Politicus*: “**and not to be called bibulous either, and to have the reputation of neglecting one’s affairs because one is overcome by wine.**”

D73 (B73) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

Antiphon said, “**to consume in breakfasts**” in his *Politicus* as follows: “**when someone has consumed in breakfasts his own property or his friends’.**”

D74 (B77) Plut. *Ant.* 28

ἀναλίσκειν καὶ καθηδυναθεῖν τὸ πολυτελέστατον, ὡς Ἀντιφῶν εἶπεν, ἀνάλωμα, τὸν χρόνον.

*Fragments Attributable to Interpretation
of Dreams (D75–D77)*

Theory of the Interpretation of Dreams (D75)

D75

a (< B79) Cic. *Div.* 1.51.116

hic magna quaedam exoritur neque ea naturalis sed artificiosa somniorum Antiphontis¹ interpretatio eodemque modo et oraculorum et vaticinationum.

¹ Antiphontis *secl. edd.*

b (< A9) *Gnomol. Vind.* 50 (14 Wachsmuth) = *Gnomol. Vat.* 71, p. 1 Sternbach

Ἀντιφῶν ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ἐστὶ μαντική, εἶπεν “ἀνθρώπου φρονίμου εἰκασμός.”

Reported Interpretations of Dreams (D76–D77)

D76 (B78) Artem. *Oneiro.* 1.14

σηπία: αὕτη δὲ μόνη καὶ τοὺς ἀποδρᾶναι πειρωμένους ὠφελεῖ διὰ τὸν θολόν, ᾧ χρωμένη πολλάκις φεύγει. μέμνηται δὲ τούτου τοῦ ὄνειρου καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος.

D74 (B77) Plutarch, *Antony*

To use up and squander what, as Antiphon said, is **the expense that costs the most—time.**

*Fragments Attributable to Interpretation
of Dreams (D75–D77)*

Theory of the Interpretation of Dreams (D75)

D75

a (< B79) Cicero, *On Divination*

At this point one should mention Antiphon's celebrated interpretation of dreams, which is based not on a natural capacity but on a technical skill, just like that of oracles and prophecies.

b (< A9) Vienna and Vatican Gnomologies

When Antiphon was asked what divination is, he said, “It is the conjecture of an intelligent human being.”

Reported Interpretations of Dreams (D76–D77)

D76 (B78) Artemidorus, *Interpretation of Dreams*

Cuttlefish: Only this one also helps those who are trying to run away, because of its ink by making use of which it often escapes. Antiphon of Athens too mentions this dream.

D77

a (< B80) Cic. *Div.* 2.70.144

cursor ad Olympia proficisci cogitans visus est in somnis curru quadrigarum vehi. mane ad coniectorem. at ille "vinces," inquit; "id enim celeritas significat et vis equorum." post idem ad Antiphontem. is autem "vincare," inquit, "necesse est; an non intellegis quattuor ante te cucurrisse?" ecce alius cursor [. . .]: ad interpretem detulit aquilam se in somnis visum esse factum. at ille: "vicisti; ista enim avis volat nulla vehementius." huic eidem¹ Antipho "baro," inquit, "victum te esse non vides? ista enim avis insectans alias avis et agitans semper ipsa postrema est."

¹ huic equidem *vel* est quidem *mss.*: *corr.* Lambinus

b (F80b Pendrick) Diog. Oen. 24.II-III Smith

. . . | [Col. II] δη μέλλοντος [Ὁ]λυμπίασιν ἀγωνιῆσθαι
| ὅτι λελείψεται. ὁ μὲν | γάρ, φησίν, ἀετὸν ἔφη | [5]
δόξαι διώκειν ἐν τοῖς | οὐνεροῖς, ἐπερωτῶν | τὸν Ἀντι-
φῶντα. ὁ δ' αὐτ[τ]όθεν κελ . . . [ἔπε] | [Col. III] ρφ[τη-
θέντα οὐκ] ἀντικρυς εἰπὲν τῷ | δρομεῖ τὸν θεόν | ὅτι
λελείψη, καὶ | [5] τὸν ἀετὸν μηδὲν | ὀχλεῖν. εἰ μὴ τι δι'
| Ἀντιφῶντα παρέ[δ]εξεν αὐτόν, ἦ' ε . . .

Col. II et III suppl. dub. Smith II.8 κελ[εύσας] *vel*
κελ[εῖ] Smith

D77

a (< B80) Cicero, *On Divination*

[Cicero reporting examples found in the Stoics:] A runner who was thinking of setting out for the Olympian games dreamed that he was being conveyed in a four-horse chariot. The next morning he went to an interpreter of dreams, who told him, "You will gain the victory; for this is what the horses' speed and power signifies." Then the same man went to Antiphon; but he said, "You will necessarily be defeated; or do you not understand that there were four running in front of you?" And here is another runner: [. . .]. He reported to an interpreter that he had dreamed that he had been transformed into an eagle, and that man said, "You have gained the victory: for no bird flies more powerfully than that bird of yours." To the same man Antiphon said, "You fool, do you not see that you have been defeated? That bird of yours is always the very last one, because it pursues other birds and drives them before it."

b (≠ DK) Diogenes of Oenoanda, Epicurean inscription

. . . [Col. II] who was planning to compete at Olympia, that he would be left behind. For, he [i.e. probably: Chrysisippus or Antipater] says, that man [i.e. that runner] said when he consulted Antiphon that he had dreamed that he was pursuing an eagle. And he [i.e. Antiphon] told him on the spot . . . [Col. III] when he was asked, he said that the god had not said outright to the runner that he would be left behind, and that the eagle was not a problem. If he had not indicated him with the help of Antiphon, so that . . .

*Divination (D78)***D78** (B81a) Melamp. *Περὶ παλμῶν μαντική* 18–19

ὀφθαλμὸς δεξιὸς εἰάν ἄλληται, κατὰ Φημονόην καὶ Αἰγυπτίους καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα ἐχθροὺς ὑποχειρίους ἕξει ἄγει δὲ καὶ ἀποδήμους. ὀφθαλμοῦ δεξιοῦ τὸ ἄνω βλέφαρον εἰάν ἄλληται, ἐπίκτησιν πάντως δηλοῖ, κατὰ δὲ Ἀντιφῶντα πρᾶξιν καὶ ὑγείαν, δούλῳ ἐπιβουλήν, χήρᾳ ἀποδημίαν.

*Isolated Words Attributed to Antiphon but Not
Attributable to a Specific Treatise (D79–D82)
Crafts (D79–D80)*

D79 (B40) Pollux *Onom.* 7.169

Ἀντιφῶν βάψιν χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου.

D80 (B41) Pollux *Onom.* 7.189

[. . .] βιομήχανοι ὡς Ἀντιφῶν.

*Weights and Measures (D81)***D81****a** (B42) Pollux *Onom.* 9.53

ἡ μὲν γὰρ Ἀντιφῶντος ταλάντωσις τὸ βάρος δηλοῖ.

*Divination (D78)***D78** (B81a) Melampus, *On Divination by Vibrations*

If the right eye quivers, according to Phe-monoe, the Egyptians, and Antiphon you will have your enemies in your power; it also guides travelers abroad. If the upper lid of the right eye quivers, this signifies profit in general, and according to Antiphon success and health, for a slave a conspiracy, for a widow travel abroad.

*Isolated Words Attributed to Antiphon but Not
Attributable to a Specific Treatise (D79–D82)
Crafts (D79–D80)*

D79 (B40) Pollux, *Onomasticon*Antiphon: ‘**dipping**’ of bronze and iron.**D80** (B41) Pollux, *Onomasticon*[. . .] ‘**people who are good at contriving a living,**’ as Antiphon.Cf. **D39***Weights and Measures (D81)***D81****a** (B42) Pollux, *Onomasticon*For Antiphon’s ‘**weighing**’ means the weight.

b (F42b Pendrick) Hesych. T.61

ταλαντώσει· σταθμήσει, στήσει.

Another Isolated Word (D82)

D82 (B16) Anecd. Gr. 1.171.15 Bachmann

ἀφήκοντος· Ἀντιφῶν ἀντὶ τοῦ διήκοντος.

*Appendix: Xenophon's Representation
of Antiphon (D83–D84)*

D83 (< A3) Xen. Mem. 1.6.1–4, 10–15

ἄξιον δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἂ πρὸς Ἀντιφῶντα τὸν σοφιστὴν διελέχθη μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ποτε βουλόμενος τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς αὐτοῦ παρελῆσθαι προσελθὼν τῷ Σωκράτει παρόντων αὐτῶν ἔλεξε τάδε [2] “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ μὲν ὦμην τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας εὐδαιμονεστέρους χρῆναι γίγνεσθαι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ ναντία τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀπολελαυκέσαι. ζῆς γοῦν οὕτως ὡς οὐδ' ἂν εἰς δούλου ὑπὸ δεσπότη διαιτώμενος μένιει· σῦτά τε σιτεῖ καὶ ποτὰ πίνει τὰ φανύτατα, καὶ ἱμάτιον ἠμφίεσαι οὐ μόνον φαῦλον, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ θέρους τε καὶ χειμῶνος, ἀνυπόδητός τε καὶ ἀχίτων διατελεῖς. [3] καὶ μὴν χρήματά γε οὐ λαμβάνεις, ἂ καὶ κτωμένους εὐφραίνει καὶ κεκτημένους ἐλευθεριώτερόν τε καὶ ἥδιον ποιεῖ ζῆν. εἰ οὖν ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργων οἱ διδάσκαλοι τοὺς μαθητὰς μιμητὰς ἑαυτῶν

b (≠ DK) Hesychius, *Lexicon*

‘**by weighing**’: by measuring the weight, by placing it on the scales.

Another Isolated Word (D82)

D82 (B16) *Anecdota Graeca*

‘**arriving at**’: Antiphon instead of ‘extending to.’

*Appendix: Xenophon's Representation
of Antiphon (D83–D84)*

D83 (< A3) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

The discussion he [i.e. Socrates] had with Antiphon the sophist also deserves not to be omitted. For one day Antiphon, wanting to detach Socrates' companions from him, came to Socrates while they were present and spoke as follows: [2] “Socrates, I for one used to think that those who practice philosophy must become happier. But you yourself seem to have obtained the opposite from philosophy. For at any rate you live in such a way as not even a single slave spending his life under a master would endure: you eat and drink the cheapest food and drink; and not only is the cloak you wear cheap but it is also the same one, summer and winter; and you never have shoes or a shirt on. [3] And yet you do not accept money, which is what makes people happy when they acquire it and lets them live more freely and pleasantly when they possess it. If then, just as teachers of other subjects make their disciples imitators of themselves, so you too are going to

ἀποδεικνύουσιν, οὕτω καὶ σὺ τοὺς συνόντας διαθήσεις, νόμιζε κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος εἶναι.” [4] καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπε· “δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, ὑπειληφέναι με οὕτως ἀνιαρῶς ζῆν, ὥστε πέπεισμαι σὲ μᾶλλον ἀποθανεῖν ἢ ἐλέσθαι ἢ ζῆν ὥσπερ ἐγώ. ἴθι οὖν ἐπισκεψώμεθα τί χαλεπὸν ἦσθησαι τοῦ ἐμοῦ βίου. [. .] [10] ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφῆν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δ’ ἐνόμιζον τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δ’ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δ’ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.” [11] πάλιν δέ ποτε ὁ Ἀντιφῶν διαλεγόμενος τῷ Σωκράτει εἶπεν· “ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ τοί σε δίκαιον μὲν νομίζω, σοφὸν δὲ οὐδ’ ὀπωστιοῦν· δοκεῖς δέ μοι καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο γινώσκειν· οὐδένα γοῦν τῆς συνουσίας ἀργύριον πράττη. καίτοι τό γε ἱμάτιον ἢ τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι ὧν κέκτησαι νομίζων ἀργυρίου ἄξιον εἶναι οὐδεὶν ἂν μὴ ὅτι προῖκα δόιης, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας λαβών. [12] δῆλον δὴ ὅτι εἰ καὶ τὴν συνουσίαν ᾧον τινὸς ἀξίαν εἶναι, καὶ ταύτης ἂν οὐκ ἔλαττον τῆς ἀξίας ἀργύριον ἐπράττου. δίκαιος μὲν οὖν ἂν εἴης, ὅτι οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, σοφὸς δὲ οὐκ ἂν, μηδενὸς γε ἀξία ἐπιστάμενος.” [13] ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης πρὸς ταῦτα εἶπεν· “ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, [. .] ὅστις [. .] ὄν ἂν γινῶ εὐφυῆ ὄντα διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχῃ ἀγαθὸν φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἂ τῷ καλῷ κάγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν. [. .]” [15] καὶ πάλιν ποτὲ τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ἐρομένου αὐτόν,

have the same effect upon your own companions, then acknowledge that you are a teacher of misfortune.” [4] And Socrates replied, “You seem to me, Antiphon, to suppose that I live so wretchedly that I am convinced that you would prefer to die rather than to live as I do. Come, then, let us consider what you perceive to be difficult in my life. [. .] [10] You, Antiphon, are like someone who thinks that happiness consists of luxury and expense; but I have always thought that to be in need of nothing is what is divine, and that to be in need of as few things as possible is the closest thing to what is divine, and that what is divine is the thing that is best, and that what is closest to what is divine is what is closest to what is best.”

[11] And on another occasion, when Antiphon was discussing with Socrates, he said, “Socrates, I myself consider you to be just, but not at all wise; and I think that you yourself know this. At least you do not charge any money for your company. And yet your cloak, your house, or any of your other possessions that you think is worth money, you would not give them to anyone for free, nor would you be willing to sell it for less than it is worth. [12] It is quite clear that if you thought that your company was worth something, you would not charge less money for it than it is worth. So while you might well be just, since you do not deceive people for the sake of your own advantage, you would not be wise, since what you know is worth nothing.” [13] And Socrates replied, “Antiphon, [. .] whoever makes someone he knows to have a good natural disposition his friend and teaches him whatever good he might possess, we think that this man is doing what is fitting for a fine and noble citizen. [. .]”

[15] And on another occasion, when Antiphon asked him

πῶς ἄλλους μὲν ἡγοῖτο πολιτικούς ποιεῖν, αὐτὸς δ' οὐκ πράττει τὰ πολιτικά, εἴπερ ἐπίσταιτο· “ποτέρως δ' ἄν,” ἔφη, “ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, μᾶλλον τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττοιμι, εἰ μόνος αὐτὰ πράττοιμι ἢ εἰ ἐπιμελοίμην τοῦ ὡς πλείστους ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πράττειν αὐτά;”

D84 (< A4) Athen. *Deipn.* 15.15 673F

[. . .] σφετερισάμενος καὶ ταῦτα ἐπέγραψεν τι βιβλίον Περὶ τοῦ παρὰ Ξενοφῶντι ἐν τοῖς Ἀπομνημονεύμασιν Ἀντιφῶντος, οὐδὲν ἴδιον προσεξευρών.

how he could make other men good at politics when he did not engage in politics himself, if indeed he knew how to do so, he replied, “Antiphon, would I be engaging in politics more if I were to engage in it alone or if I took care that as many men as possible were competent at engaging in it?”

D84 (< A4) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*

[. . .] he [i.e. Hephaestion] took over these [scil. statements by Adrastus about Antiphon the tragedian] and wrote a book *On the Antiphon in Xenophon's Memorabilia* without adding anything of his own that he had discovered himself.

ANTIPHON [87 DK]

R

*The Identity of the Orator and the Sophist in the
Lexicographical Tradition: An Example (R1)*

R1 (cf. B14, B63) Harpocr. Δ.42

διάθεσις· ἀντὶ τοῦ πρᾶσις Ἰσοκράτης Βουσίριδι [Isoc. 11.14]. ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀποδεδόμεθα “διεθέμεθα” εἶπεν Ἀντιφῶν ἐν τῷ Πρὸς τὴν Καλλίου ἔνδειξιν [Frag. 17 Blass], καὶ ἀντὶ τοῦ διοικήσις ὁ αὐτὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ὁμοιοίας “ἀλλὰ εἰδότες τὴν διάθεσιν ἀκούουσιν.” Φρύνιχος Τραγωδοῖς “τῇ διαθέσει τῶν ἐπῶν” φησί. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ῥῆμα διαθέσθαι λέγουσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ διοικῆσαι Ἀντιφῶν Ἀληθείας α΄: “γυμνωθεῖσα δὲ ἀφορμῆς πολλὰ ἂν καὶ καλὰ κακῶς διαθεῖτο.”

*Antiphon as Rhetorician and Orator (R2–R9)
His Place in the History of Rhetoric (R2–R6)*

R2 (≠ DK) Quintil. *Inst. or.* 3.1.11

Antiphon [. . .] et orationem primus omnium scripsit, et

ANTIPHON

R

*The Identity of the Orator and the Sophist in the
Lexicographical Tradition: An Example (R1)*

R1 (cf. B14, B63) Harpocraton, *Lexicon of the Ten Orators*

‘organization’: instead of ‘sale’, Isocrates in *Busiris*. Instead of ‘we have given,’ Antiphon in his *Against the Accusation by Callias* said, “we have organized”; and instead of ‘arrangement,’ the same man in his *On Concord*: “**but, knowing the organization, they listen**” [= D41a]. Phrynichus in his *Tragic Actors* says, “by the organization of the words.” For they use the verb ‘to organize’ for ‘to arrange.’ Antiphon, Book 1 of *Truth*: “**stripped of resources (aphormē) it [i.e. thought?] would organize badly many fine things**” [= D14].

*Antiphon as Rhetorician and Orator (R2–R9)
His Place in the History of Rhetoric (R2–R6)*

R2 (≠ DK) Quintilian, *Training in Oratory*

Antiphon [. . .] was the first of all to write a speech but

nihilominus artem et ipse composuit et pro se dixisse optime est creditus.

R3 (< A2) Hermog. *Ideis* 2.11 (401.3–5 Rabe)

[. . . = **R8**] ἐπεὶ καὶ πρῶτος λέγεται τοῦτο μετελθεῖν τὸ εἶδος καὶ ὅλως εὐρετῆς καὶ ἀρχηγὸς γενέσθαι τοῦ τύπου τοῦ πολιτικοῦ [. . . = **P4**].

R4 (≠ DK) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.15, p. 15.27–32 Kayser

ῥητορικὴν δὲ τὸν Ἀντιφῶντα οἱ μὲν οὐκ οὔσαν εὐρεῖν, οἱ δ' εὐρημένην αὐξήσαι, γενέσθαι τε αὐτὸν οἱ μὲν αὐτομαθῶς σοφόν, οἱ δὲ ἐκ πατρός. πατέρα γὰρ εἶναι δὴ αὐτῷ Σώφιλου διδάσκαλον ῥητορικῶν λόγων, ὃς ἄλλους τε τῶν ἐν δυνάμει καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κλεινίου ἐπαίδευσεν.

R5 (≠ DK) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1.79.3

φασὶ δὲ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ διατριβὴν λόγους καὶ τὰ ῥητορικὰ ιδιώματα εὐρεῖν καὶ μισθοῦ συνηγορήσαι πρῶτον δικανικὸν λόγον εἰς ἔκδοσιν γραψάμενον Ἀντιφῶντα <Σω>φίλου¹ Ῥαμνούσιον [. . . cf. **P3**].

¹ φίλου ms., corr. Potter

R6 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 832C–D, E

καὶ τινὰς λόγους τοῖς δεομένοις τῶν πολιτῶν συν-

nonetheless he both composed a technical manual himself, and is thought to have spoken excellently in his own defense [cf. **P15**].

R3 (< A2) Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*

[. . .] since he is said to have been the first to have practiced this genre and in general to have been the inventor and founder of the political kind [scil. of oratory] [. . .].

R4 (≠ DK) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

Some people say that Antiphon discovered rhetoric and that it did not exist before him, others that it had already been discovered but that he developed it further; some people say that he became expert on his own, others thanks to his father. For his father was Sophilus, a teacher of rhetorical speeches who taught the sons of powerful people, including Clinias' [i.e. Alcibiades].

R5 (≠ DK) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

They say that Antiphon of Rhamnous, the son of Sophilus, invented speeches for study and the styles specific to oratory, and that he was the first to deliver publicly a judicial speech for a fee after having written it for publication [. . .].

R6 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

And he wrote some speeches for contests in the law courts

ἔγραφεν εἰς τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἀγῶνας πρῶτος ἐπὶ τοῦτο τραπεῖς, ὥσπερ τινές φασιν τῶν γούν πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενομένων οὐδενὸς φέρεται δικανικὸς λόγος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν κατ' αὐτόν, διὰ τὸ μηδέπω ἐν ἔθει τοῦ συγγράφειν εἶναι [. . .]. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ ῥητορικὰς τέχνας ἐξήνεγκε [. . .].

Judgments on His Style (R7–R9)

R7 (B44a) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1.15, p. 17.22–28 Kayser

λόγοι δ' αὐτοῦ δικανικοὶ μὲν πλείους, ἐν οἷς ἡ δεινότης καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἐκ τέχνης ἔγκειται, σοφιστικοὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι μὲν, σοφιστικώτατος δὲ ὁ ὑπὲρ τῆς ὁμοιοίας, ἐν ᾧ γνωμολογία τε λαμπραὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι σεμνὴ τε ἀπαγγελία καὶ ἐπηριθμισμένη ποιητικοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ τὰ ἀποτάδην ἐρμηνευόμενα παραπλήσια τῶν πεδίων τοῖς λείοις.

R8 (cf. A2) Hermog. *Ideis* 2.11 (400.22–401.2, 6–23 Rabe)

ὁ τοῖνυν Ῥαμνούσιος Ἀντιφῶν, οὗπερ οἱ φονικοὶ φέρονται, πολιτικὸς μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τὸ ἄλλως ἠθικόν, ὥστε καὶ πιθανός, ἦττον δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα ἢ κατὰ τοὺς ἄλλους: [. . .] = **R3** μεγέθει δὲ χρήται μὲν οὐκ ὀλίγω, καλῶς δὲ πως συννφασμένω καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν Ἐπερίδην διεστηκότι τῶν ἄλλων οὐδ' αὖ κατὰ τὸν Αἰσχίνην σοφιστικῶ,

for the use of his fellow citizens who needed them, being the first person to have turned to this, as some people say; at least there is no judicial speech extant composed by any of his predecessors, nor of his contemporaries either, since it was not yet the custom to write them down [. . .]. And he was the first person to publish technical manuals of rhetoric [. . .].

Judgments on His Style (R7–R9)

R7 (B44a) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

There exist many judicial discourses of his, which display great skill and everything that derives from art. Others are sophistic, and the most sophistic of all is the one *On Concord*, where there are maxims that are brilliant and philosophical, a mode of style that is lofty and embellished by poetic diction, and lengthy expositions similar to level plains.

R8 (cf. A2) Hermogenes, *On Types of Style*

The Antiphon from Rhamnous, whose homicide speeches are extant, is a political speaker with regard to clarity, sincerity, and other aspects of ethical character, so that he is also believable, but he is inferior in regard to all this than are the other ones [i.e. the Attic orators]. [. . .] He employs an amplitude that is not inconsiderable, but is woven finely [scil. into the tissue of the speech] and is not, as in Hyperides, separated from the rest nor, as in Aeschines, sophis-

καίτοι τῆς λέξεως αὐτῷ πολλαχοῦ διηρημένης. ἐπι-
 μελῆς γε μὴν οὕτως ὡς μὴ εἶναι προσκορῆς, γοργὸς
 δὲ μετρίως ἐστὶ καὶ δεινὸς ὡσαύτως. ὁ δ' ἕτερος Ἀντι-
 φῶν, οὐπερ οἱ τῆς Ἀληθείας εἰσι λεγόμενοι λόγοι,
 πολιτικὸς μὲν ἤκιστα ἐστὶ, σεμνὸς δὲ καὶ ὑπέρογκος
 τοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ τῷ δι' ἀποφάνσεων περαίνειν τὸ
 πᾶν, ὃ δὴ τοῦ ἀξιωματικοῦ τε λόγου ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς
 μέγεθος ὀρῶντος, ὑψηλὸς δὲ τῇ λέξει καὶ τραχύς,
 ὥστε καὶ μὴ πόρρω σκληρότης εἶναι. καὶ περιβάλ-
 λει δὲ χωρὶς εὐκρινείας, διὸ καὶ συγγεῖ τὸν λόγον καὶ
 ἐστὶν ἀσαφῆς τὰ πολλά. καὶ ἐπιμελῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν
 συνθήκην καὶ ταῖς παριστώσεσι χαίρων. οὐ μὴν ἤθους
 γέ τι οὐδ' ἀληθινοῦ τύπου μέτεστι τῷ ἀνδρί, φαίην δ'
 ἂν ὡς οὐδὲ δεινότητος πλὴν τῆς φαινομένης μὲν, οὐ
 μὴν οὔσης γε ὡς ἀληθῶς.

R9 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plut. *Vit. X Orat.* 832E

ἐστὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀκριβῆς καὶ πιθανὸς καὶ δεινὸς
 περὶ τὴν εὑρεσιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπόροις τεχνικὸς καὶ
 ἐπιχειρῶν ἐξ ἀδήλου καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ πάθη
 τρέπων τοὺς λόγους τοῦ εὐπρεποῦς μάλιστα στοχα-
 ζόμενος.

¹ καὶ <οὐ> Cernet

tic, even though his style is often lofty. He takes care not
 to be tedious, he is moderately vehement and forceful in
 the same way. The other Antiphon, who is the author of
 the discourses called *Of Truth*, is not in the least political,
 but is lofty and very weighty, especially because he pro-
 ceeds entirely by means of declarative statements, which
 is something characteristic of a dignified discourse that
 aims for grandeur. His diction is sublime and rugged, to
 the point of not being far from harshness. And he amplifies
 without clarity; and this is why his discourse becomes con-
 fused and is often obscure. He is careful with regard to
 composition and is fond of balanced clauses. But the man
 has nothing of a determinate character or sincerity, and, I
 would say, not even of forcefulness, except for what is ap-
 parent but is not so in reality.

R9 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plutarch, *Lives of the Ten Orators*

In his speeches he is precise and persuasive, very forceful
 in invention and skillful in dealing with difficulties, ven-
 turesome when the matter is unclear, and he directs his
 speeches toward the laws and the passions, aiming above
 all at decorum.

See also **THRAS. D8**

*His Fame as an Interpreter of Dreams (R10–R12)***R10** (B79) Cic. *Div.* 1.20.39

de quibus disputans Chrysippus multis et minutis somniis colligendis facit idem quod Antipater ea conquirens quae Antiphontis interpretatione explicata declarant illa quidem acumen interpretis [. . .].

R11 (B81) Sen. *Contr.* 2.1.33

Otho Iunius pater [. . .] edidit quidem quattuor libros Colorum, quos belle Gallio noster 'Antiphontis libros' vocabat, tantum in illis somniorum est.

R12 (> A7) Luc. *V. hist.* 2.33

ἐν μέσῃ δὲ τῇ ἀγορᾷ πηγὴ τίς ἐστίν, ἣν καλοῦσι Καρεῶτιν· καὶ πλησίον ναοὶ δύο Ἀπάτης καὶ Ἀληθείας· ἐνθα καὶ τὸ ἄδυντόν ἐστίν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ μαντεῖον, οὗ προειστήκει προφητεύων Ἀντιφῶν ὁ τῶν ὀνείρων ὑποκριτῆς ταύτης παρὰ τοῦ Ὕπνου λαχὼν τῆς τιμῆς.

*His Fame as a Soothsayer (R13)***R13** (T11a Pendrick) Ps.-Call. *Hist. Alex.* rec. vet. 11.1–4, p. 11.6–17, 20–21

μετ' ὀλίγας δὲ παντελῶς ἡμέρας ἐν τινι συμφύτῳ τόπῳ τῶν βασιλείων καθεζομένου τοῦ Φιλίππου, παν-

*His Fame as an Interpreter of Dreams (R10–R12)***R10** (B79) Cicero, *On Divination*

When Chrysippus discusses these [scil. dreams], he does the same thing as Antipater: he collects many trivial dreams and tries to find the ones that manifest the interpreter's intelligence when they are explained by means of Antiphon's interpretation [. . .].

R11 (B81) Seneca the Elder, *Controversies*

Junius Otho senior [. . .] published four books of 'colors' [i.e. arguments presenting the facts of a case under a favorable color], which our friend Gallio wittily called 'the books of Antiphon,' so full of dreams were they.

R12 (> A7) Lucian, *True Histories*

In the middle of the marketplace [scil. in the City of Dreams] there is a spring that they call Careotis. And nearby are two temples, of Deceit and of Truth. There too are their sacred precinct and oracle; in front of this stood Antiphon, the interpreter of dreams, prophesying, since he had received this office from Sleep.

*His Fame as a Soothsayer (R13)***R13** (≠ DK) Ps.-Callisthenes, *History of Alexander the Great*

Some days later, while Philip [scil. of Macedon] was sitting in a thickly wooded area of the palace, with all kinds of

τοίων ὄρνεων παρ' αὐτοῦ τρεφομένων καὶ ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ νεμομένων, πρὸς τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐν φιλολόγοις βιβλίοις γενομένου αὐτοῦ ὄρνις ἡμέρος νεοττός¹ εἰς τοὺς κόλπους αὐτοῦ ἀλλομένη ἔτεκεν ὠόν, ὃ κατακυλισθέν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἐρράγη. ἀφ' οὗ ἐξεπήδησε μικρὸν δρακόντιον κυκλεύσαν δὲ τὸ ὠόν, ὅθεν ἐξῆλθε, καὶ εἰσελθεὶν βουλόμενον, πρὶν βαλεῖν ἔσω τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐτελεύτησεν. τοῦτου γεναμένου ταραχθεὶς οὐ μετρίως ὁ Φίλιππος μετεπέμψατο τὸν κατὰ ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν ἐπίσημον σημειολύτην Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ ὑψηγῆται αὐτῷ τὸ γενόμενον. ὁ δὲ πρὸς τοῦτο εἶπεν· "υἱός σοι ἔσται, ὃς βασιλεύσει καὶ περιελεύσεται τὸν ὅλον κόσμον, τῇ ἰδίᾳ δυνάμει πάντας ὑποτάσσει· οὗτος δὲ εἰς τὰ ἴδια συστρέφων ὀλιγοχρόνιος τελευτήσει [. . .]." οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἐπιλύσας τὸ σημεῖον δωνατισθεὶς ἐξῆι.

¹ νεοττός Müller: νόθος mss.

*Reactions to Antiphon's Attempt to Square
the Circle (R14–R16)*

*Two Interpretations Deriving Probably from
Eudemus (R14–R15)*

R14 (< B13) Them. In *Phys.*, p. 4.3–8, Schenkl

[. . .] ὃς ἐγγράφων τρίγωνον ἰσόπλευρον εἰς τὸν κύκλον καὶ ἐφ' ἐκάστης τῶν πλευρῶν ἕτερον ἰσοσκελὲς συνιστὰς πρὸς τῇ περιφερείᾳ τοῦ κύκλου καὶ τοῦτο ἐφεξῆς ποιῶν ἕτερό ποτε ἐφαρμόσειν τοῦ τελευταίου τριγώνου τὴν πλευρὰν εὐθείαν οὐσαν τῇ περιφερείᾳ.

birds that he kept and that were feeding in that place, a tame young bird jumped into his lap, while he was spending some time at leisure among his scholarly books, and laid an egg, which rolled down onto the ground and broke open. From it leaped forth a small snake, which coiled itself around the egg out of which it had come and wanted to go back into it, but which died before it could put its head inside. Philip was very troubled by this incident and sent for the soothsayer Antiphon, who was very celebrated at that time, and he reported to him what had happened. And he replied, "You will have a son who will be a king and will travel about the whole world, subjecting all men to his own power. But while he is returning to his own country he will die while he is still young. [. . .]." And thus, after he had deciphered the omen, Antiphon received gifts and departed.¹

¹ This fictional anecdote presupposes that Antiphon the soothsayer was active in the middle of the fourth century BC.

*Reactions to Antiphon's Attempt to Square
the Circle (R14–R16)*

*Two Interpretations Deriving Probably from
Eudemus (R14–R15)*

R14 (< B13) Themistius, *Paraphrase of Aristotle's Physics*

[. . .] by inscribing an equilateral triangle in a circle, constructing on each of its sides another isosceles triangle touching the circumference of the circle, and doing this in succession, he [i.e. Antiphon] thought that at some time the side of the final triangle, though being straight,

τοῦτο δὲ τὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον τομὴν ἀναιροῦντος, ἣν ὑπόθεσιν ὁ γεωμέτρης λαμβάνει.

¹ δὲ ἦν <τοῦ> Diels

R15 (< B13) Simplic. *In Phys.*, pp. 54.20–55.11

[. . . = **D36b**] ὁ δὲ Ἀντιφῶν γράψας κύκλον ἐνέγραφέ τι χωρίον εἰς αὐτὸν πολύγωνον τῶν ἐγγράφεισθαι δυναμένων. ἔστω δὲ εἰ τύχοι τετράγωνον τὸ ἐγγεγραμμένον. ἔπειτα ἐκάστην τῶν τοῦ τετραγώνου πλευρῶν δίχα τέμνων ἀπὸ τῆς τομῆς ἐπὶ τὰς περιφερείας¹ πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἦγε γραμμὰς, αἱ δηλονότι δίχα ἔτεμνον ἐκάστη τὸ καθ' αὐτὴν τμήμα τοῦ κύκλου. ἔπειτα ἀπὸ² τῆς τομῆς ἐπεζεύγνυν ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν γραμμῶν τοῦ τετραγώνου εὐθείας, ὡς γίνεσθαι τέτταρα τρίγωνα τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν εὐθειῶν, τὸ δὲ ὅλον σχῆμα τὸ ἐγγεγραμμένον ὀκτάγωνον. καὶ οὕτως πάλιν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν μέθοδον, ἐκάστην τῶν τοῦ ὀκταγώνου πλευρῶν δίχα τέμνων ἀπὸ τῆς τομῆς ἐπὶ τὴν περιφέρειαν πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἄγων καὶ ἐπιζευγνὺς ἀπὸ τῶν σημείων, καθ' ἃ αἱ πρὸς ὀρθὰς ἀχθείσαι ἐφήπτοντο τῶν περιφερειῶν, εὐθείας ἐπὶ τὰ πέρατα τῶν διηρημένων εὐθειῶν, ἑκκαδεκάγωνον ἐποίει τὸ ἐγγραφόμενον. καὶ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν πάλιν λόγον τέμνων τὰς πλευρὰς τοῦ ἑκκαδεκαγώνου τοῦ ἐγγεγραμμένου καὶ ἐπιζευγνὺς εὐθείας καὶ

¹ τὴν περιφέρειαν Torstrik

² ἀπὸ Ald.: ἐπὶ DE³F

would coincide with the circumference. But this belongs to someone who violates divisibility to infinity, which the geometer takes as an assumption.

R15 (< B13) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

[. . .] Antiphon drew a circle and then inscribed within it one of the polygons that can be inscribed in it. Let the inscribed figure be for example a square. Then, dividing each of the sides of the square in half, he drew perpendicular lines from the point of division to the circumference; clearly each one divided in half its corresponding arc of the circle. Then from the point of division [scil. on the circumference] he connected straight lines to the end points of the sides of the square so that four triangles would be produced from the straight lines and the whole inscribed figure would be an octagon. And so again according to the same procedure: by dividing in half each of the sides of the octagon, drawing perpendicular lines from the point of division to the circumference and connecting straight lines from the points at which the perpendicular lines that had been drawn touched the circumference, to the end points of the divided sides [scil. of the octagon], he made the inscribed figure a sixteen-sided polygon. And again according to the same method: by dividing the sides of the inscribed sixteen-sided polygon, connecting straight lines, and doubling the inscribed polygon, and repeating

διπλασιάζων τὸ ἐγγραφόμενον πολύγωνον καὶ τοῦτο αἰεὶ ποιῶν ᾧετό³ ποτε δαπανωμένου τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἐγγραφῆσεσθαι τι πολύγωνον τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐν τῷ κύκλῳ, οὗ αἱ πλευραὶ διὰ σμικρότητα ἐφαρμόσουσι τῇ τοῦ κύκλου περιφερείᾳ. παντὶ δὲ πολυγώνῳ ἴσον τετράγωνον δυνάμενοι θέσθαι, ὡς ἐν τοῖς Στοιχείοις [Eucl. 2.14] παρελάβομεν, διὰ τὸ ἴσον ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ πολύγωνον τῷ κύκλῳ ἐφαρμόζον αὐτῷ, ἐσόμεθα καὶ κύκλῳ ἴσον τιθέντες τετράγωνον.

³ ᾧετό coni. Diels: ὥστε vel ὡς τό mss.



A Discussion about the Nature of the Error in Antiphon's Reasoning (R16)

R16

a (B13) Arist. *Phys.* 1.2 185a14–17

ἄμα δ' οὐδὲ λύειν ἅπαντα προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἐκ

this in succession, he thought that at some point, the area [scil. of the circle] being exhausted, in this way there would be inscribed within the circle some kind of polygon, whose sides, because of their smallness, would coincide with the circumference of the circle. But since we are able to construct a square equal to any polygon, as we have learned in the *Elements* [scil. of Euclid], because the polygon that coincides with the circle is assumed to be equal to it we shall have constructed a square that is also equal to a circle.¹

¹ This description, like those found in other testimonia (F13c–I Pendrick), probably reflects Antiphon's method in global terms, but the details doubtless derive from reconstructions.

A Discussion about the Nature of the Error in Antiphon's Reasoning (R16)

R16

a (B13) Aristotle, *Physics*

At the same time, it is not necessary to solve all difficulties

τῶν ἀρχῶν τις ἐπιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐδὲ οἷον τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλύσαι, τὸν δὲ Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ.

b (B13) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 54.12–16

τὸν γὰρ τετραγωνισμὸν τοῦ κύκλου πολλῶν ζητούντων (τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ κύκλω ἴσον τετράγωνον θέσθαι) καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ἐνόμισεν εὐρίσκειν καὶ Ἱπποκράτης ὁ Χίος ψευσθέντες. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν Ἀντιφῶντος ψεύδος διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ γεωμετρικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀρμῆσθαι [. . .] οὐκ ἔστι γεωμετρικοῦ λύειν [. . .].

c (< F13e Pendrick) Simpl. *In Phys.*, p. 55.12–24

καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ συναγωγή παρὰ τὰς γεωμετρικὰς ἀρχὰς γέγονεν οὐχ ὡς ὁ Ἀλέξανδρός φησιν, ὅτι ὑποτίθεται μὲν ὁ γεωμέτρης τὸ τὸν κύκλον τῆς εὐθείας κατὰ σημεῖον ἄπτεσθαι ὡς ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ Ἀντιφῶν ἀναιρεῖ τοῦτο. οὐ γὰρ ὑποτίθεται ὁ γεωμέτρης τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἀποδείκνυσιν αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ¹ βιβλίῳ [cf. Eucl. 3.2 et 3.16]. ἄμεινον οὖν λέγειν ἀρχὴν εἶναι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι εὐθείαν ἐφαρμόσαι περιφερεία, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἐκτὸς κατὰ ἐν σημεῖον ἐφάπεται τοῦ κύκλου, ἡ δὲ ἐντὸς κατὰ δύο μόνον καὶ οὐ πλείω, καὶ ἡ ἐπαφή κατὰ σημεῖον γίνεται. καὶ μέντοι τέμνων αἰεὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς

¹ τρίτῳ Diels: γ DF: ὀγδόῳ E^b

either, but only those that someone falsely demonstrates on the basis of the principles—the others, not: for example, it is up to the geometer to refute the squaring [scil. of the circle] by means of segments, but it is not up to the geometer [scil. to refute] that of Antiphon.

b (B13) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

Many people were looking for how to square the circle (this is the construction of a square equal to a circle), but both Antiphon and Hippocrates of Chios thought they had discovered it—mistakenly. But it is not up to the geometer to refute the fallacy of Antiphon since it does not arise from geometrical principles [. . .] [cf. **D36**].

c (≠ DK) Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*

And it is clear that the conclusion goes against the principles of geometry, but not, as Alexander says, because the geometer assumes as a principle that a circle touches a straight line at a point, and that Antiphon violates this. For the geometer does not assume this, but he demonstrates it in the third book [scil. of Euclid's *Elements*: it is a consequence of 3.2 and 3.16 with the corollary]. So it is better to say that the principle is that it is impossible to make a straight line coincide with an arc of a circle, but that an external line will touch the circle in one point, while an internal one will do so in two points and not in more, and that the contact takes place at a point. And if he divides in

εὐθείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ κύκλου περιφερείας ἐπίπεδον οὐ
δαπανήσει αὐτὸ οὐδὲ καταλήψεται ποτε τὴν τοῦ
κύκλου περιφέρειαν, εἴπερ ἐπ' ἄπειρόν ἐστι διαιρετὸν
τὸ ἐπίπεδον. εἰ δὲ καταλαμβάνει, ἀνήρηται τις ἀρχὴ
γεωμετρικὴ ἢ λέγουσα ἐπ' ἄπειρον εἶναι τὰ μεγέθη
διαιρετά. καὶ ταύτην καὶ ὁ Εὐδῆμος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναι-
ρεῖσθαι φησιν [Frag. 140 Wehrli, p. 159] ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀντι-
φώντος.

A Christian Polemic (R17)

R17 (< B12) Origen, *Cels.* 4.25

[. . .] Ἀντιφῶν ἄλλος ῥήτωρ νομιζόμενος εἶναι καὶ τὴν
πρόνοιαν ἀναιρῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐπιγεγραμμένοις Περὶ ἀλη-
θείας [. . .] οὐδὲν ἥττον εἰσιν οὗτοι σκώληκες ἐν βορ-
βόρου γωνία τοῦ τῆς ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀγνοίας καλινδού-
μενοι.

succession the plane surface between the straight line and
the circumference of the circle, he will nonetheless not
exhaust it and he will never reach the circumference of the
circle, since the area is divisible to infinity. And if he does
reach it, a geometric principle, which says that magni-
tudes are divisible to infinity, has been violated. And it is
this principle that Eudemus too says has been violated by
Antiphon.

A Christian Polemic (R17)

R16 (< B12) Origen, *Against Celsus*

[. . .] Antiphon, who is thought to be another orator [scil.
besides Demosthenes], and who abolishes providence in
his books entitled *On Truth* [. . .]: these people are not less
[scil. than any other evil people] worms rolling around in
a corner of the mire of stupidity and ignorance.

38. LYCOPHRON [LYC.]

Aside from an (often suspected) allusion in the second Pseudo-Platonic letter (P1) to Lycophron's presence at the court of Dionysius II, nothing whatsoever is known about Lycophron beyond the information provided by Aristotle—Alexander of Aphrodisias seems to have no other basis, for the explanations he provides for a passage in the *Sophistic Refutations* (D5b), than his own hypotheses. Aristotle, who mentions Lycophron six times, calls him a 'sophist.' Some modern scholars, on the basis of his definition of law (D3), have considered him an important forerunner of social contract theory; Aristotle's own interest in him appears to have been directed above all to his definitions, his innovative use of language, and his rhetorical techniques. To judge from the few surviving traces, he seems to have been a lesser Gorgias.

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See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31-42.

LYCOPHRON

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

P

Lycophron at the Court of Dionysius II in Sicily? (P1)

D

A Radical Solution to the Problem of Multiple Predication (D1)

Three Definitions (D2-D4)

Definition of Knowledge (D2)

Definition of Law (D3)

Definition of Nobility (D4)

Rhetorical Issues (D5-D6)

A Loophole (D5)

The Use of Compound and Rare Terms (D6)

LYCOPHRON [83 DK]

P

*Lycophron at the Court of
Dionysius II in Sicily?* (P1)

P1 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plat. *Epist.* 2 314d1–5

ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ περὶ Λυκόφρονος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν παρὰ
σοὶ ὄντων λέγω καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον,
ὅτι πρὸς τὸ διαλεχθῆναι καὶ φύσει καὶ τῇ μεθόδῳ τῶν
λόγων πάμπολυ διαφέρεις αὐτῶν [. . .].

LYCOPHRON

P

*Lycophron at the Court of
Dionysius II in Sicily?* (P1)

P1 (≠ DK) Ps.-Plato, *Letter 2*

But, with regard to both Lycophron and the other men
who are with you, I have been saying for a long time the
same thing, and I say it again now: that you [i.e. Dionysius]
are far superior to them in the art of discussion, both by
your natural talent and by your mode of argument
[. . .].¹

¹ According to this indication, Lycophron would have lived in
the first part of the fourth century BC. But this testimonium has
often been considered suspect.

LYCOPHRON [83 DK]

D

A Radical Solution to the Problem of Multiple Predication (D1)

D1 (< A2) Arist. *Phys.* 1.2 185b25–31

ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ
ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν
τὸ ἔστι ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, [. . .] ἵνα μὴ ποτε
τὸ ἔστι προσάπτουτες πολλά εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἐν.¹

¹ τὸ ἐν Λ, add. E¹: τὸ ὄν S

Three Definitions (D2–D4) Definition of Knowledge (D2)

D2 (< A1) Arist. *Metaph.* H6 1045b9–11

οἱ δὲ συνουσίαν,¹ ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων φησὶν εἶναι τὴν
ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ψυχῆς.

¹ ψυχῆς post συνουσίαν hab. mss., del. Bonitz

LYCOPHRON

D

A Radical Solution to the Problem of Multiple Predication (D1)

D1 (< A2) Aristotle, *Physics*

Among the ancient thinkers, those who were later [scil. than Parmenides and Melissus] were also troubled by the question of knowing how to avoid that the same thing be at the same time one and many for them. That is why some of them suppressed the word ‘is,’ like Lycophron, [. . .] in order not to make the one be many by adding the word ‘is.’

See also **PROT. R26**

Three Definitions (D2–D4) Definition of Knowledge (D2)

D2 (< A1) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

Some people [scil. speak, in order to explain how the terms of a definition are united,] of ‘**coexistence**,’ as Lycophron says that **knowledge** (*epistēmē*) **is** [scil. the co-existence] **of the act of knowing** (*epistasthai*) **and the soul**.

*Definition of Law (D3)*D3 (< A3) Arist. *Pol.* 3.9 1280b8–12

γίνεται [. . .] ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καί, καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ' οὐχ οἶος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.

*Definition of Nobility (D4)*D4 (A4) Arist. *Nob. Frag.* 91 (p. 92.5–10 Rose) = Stob. 4.29.24

λέγω δὲ τοῦτο, πότερον τῶν τιμίων ἐστὶ καὶ σπουδαίων ἢ, καθάπερ Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής ἔγραψε, κενόν¹ τι πάμπαν. ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ἀντιπαραβάλλων ἑτέροις ἀγαθοῖς αὐτήν “εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν” φησίν² “ἀφανὲς τὸ κάλλος, ἐν λόγῳ δὲ τὸ σεμνόν,” ὡς πρὸς δόξαν οὐσαν τὴν αἰρέσειν αὐτῆς, κατὰ δ' ἀλήθειαν οὐθὲν διαφέροντας τοὺς ἀγενεῖς τῶν εὐγενῶν.

¹ καινὸν mss., corr. Jacobs

² εὐγενείας . . . φησίν Jacobs: εὐγένεια . . . ἦς mss.

*Definition of Law (D3)*D3 (< A3) Aristotle, *Politics*

Law becomes [. . .] a [scil. mere] contract and, as Lycophron the sophist said, **‘the guarantor for each other of what is just,’** but not capable of making the citizens good and just.

*Definition of Nobility (D4)*D4 (A4) Aristotle, *Fragment On Nobility*

I mean this: whether it [i.e. nobility] belongs to the things that are honorable and worth taking seriously, or whether, as Lycophron the sophist wrote, it is something entirely empty. For that man, comparing it to other good things, said, **“the beauty of nobility is invisible, dignity exists in speech,”** on the idea that the preference accorded to it is based on opinion, while according to the truth those people who are not noble do not differ in any way from the ones who are noble.

Rhetorical Issues (D5–D6)
A Loophole (D5)

D5

a (A6) Arist. SE 15 174b30–33

ἐπιχειρητέον δ' ἐνίοτε καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τοῦ εἰρημένου,
 ἐκεῖνο ἐκλαβόντας, εἰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον ἔχη τις
 ἐπιχειρεῖν ὅπερ ὁ Λυκόφρων ἐποίησε προβληθέντος
 λύραν ἐγκωμιάζειν.

b (> A6) Alex. In SE, pp. 118.30–119.3

καὶ ὁ σοφιστῆς Λυκόφρων τοὺς λυρικοὺς ἐπαινῶν ἐπὶ
 τὴν λύραν μετήνεγκε τὸν ἔπαινον ἢ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ
 ὑπὸ τινῶν ἠναγκάζετο ἐπαινεῖσαι τὴν λύραν, εἶτα μὴ
 λόγων εὐπόρει πολλῶν, μικρόν τι ἐπαινέσας τὴν
 αἰσθητὴν ταύτην λύραν ἐπὶ τὴν οὐράνιον ἀνηνέχθη
 ἔστι γὰρ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄστρον τι ἐξ ἄστρον πολλῶν
 συγκείμενον λύρα ὀνομαζόμενον, εἰς ἣν πολλοὺς κα-
 λοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς λόγους ἐξεύρειν.

Rhetorical Issues (D5–D6)
A Loophole (D5)

D5

a (A6) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

Sometimes one must undertake something different from what has been said, interpreting this [scil. in a certain way], if one is not able to undertake what has been laid down—this is what Lycophron did when the proposal was made to deliver an encomium on the lyre.

b (> A6) Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's Sophistic Refutations*

And while the sophist Lycophron was praising the lyric poets, he transferred his praise to the lyre; or rather, when he was obliged by certain people to praise the lyre but did not have available much to say about it, first he briefly praised the perceptible lyre that we know and then he moved upward to the lyre in the heavens. For in the heavens there is a constellation made up of a number of stars called 'the Lyre,' concerning which he found many fine and excellent things to say.¹

¹ The double explanation suggests that these are simple hypotheses and that no other information about the incident mentioned was available.

The Use of Compound and Rare Terms (D6)

D6 (A5) Arist. *Rhet.* 3.3 1405b34–37, 1406a7–8

τὰ δὲ ψυχρὰ ἐν τέτταρσι γίνεται κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἔν τε τοῖς διπλοῖς ὀνόμασι, οἷον Λυκόφρων τὸν πολυπρόσωπον οὐρανὸν τῆς μεγαλοκορύφου¹ γῆς καὶ ἀκτὴν δὲ στενόπορον [. . .]· τὸ χρῆσθαι γλώτταις, οἷον Λυκόφρων Ξέρξην τὸν πέλωρον ἄνδρα καὶ Σκίρων σίνις ἀνὴρ [. . .].

¹ μεγαλοκορύφου mss.: μελανοκ-ανον.

The Use of Compound and Rare Terms (D6)

D6 (A5) Aristotle, *Rhetoric*

Frigidity in style is produced in four ways: by compound terms, as in Lycophron ‘**the many-faced heavens of the great-summitted earth**’ and ‘**narrow-passaged promontory**’ [. . .]; by the use of rare terms, as in Lycophron ‘**Xerxes, the monstrous (*pelōros*) man**’ and ‘**Sciron, a ravaging (*sinis*) man**’ [. . .].¹

¹ Both terms are otherwise exclusively poetic. *pelōros* is not usually applied to human beings; *sinis* is usually not an adjective but a substantive.

39. XENIADES [XENI.]

Our only source for the philosophical views of Xenias of Corinth is Sextus Empiricus, who mentions him seven times; one of these passages (D1) provides a summary of his four principal theses and what is probably a report (unless it is merely a reconstruction) of Xenias' argument for one of them. The nature of his ontological theses and his epistemological nihilism are the only evidence for counting Xenias among the 'sophists'; they seem to be linked less closely to Gorgias (with whom he has often been connected) than to Protagoras' epistemological doctrine. It is probably for this reason that he attracted Democritus' attention (cf. **ATOM. P25**).

Scholars disagree about whether this Xenias of Corinth is to be identified with a Xenias of Corinth, mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (6.30, 36, 74), who bought Diogenes the Cynic as a slave; the chronology makes this unlikely, even if we assign our Xenias a relatively late date (the beginning of the fourth century BC).

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See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

D

Sextus Empiricus' Report on Xenias' Theses (D1)

R

A Rapprochement between Xenias and Xenophanes (R1)

A Contrast with Protagoras (R2)

A Skeptical Criticism of Xenias (R3)

XENIADES [81 DK]

D

*Sextus Empiricus' Report on
Xeniades' Theses (D1)*

D1 (> 81., 68 B163) *Sext. Emp. Adv. Math.* 7.53

Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος, οὗ καὶ Δημόκριτος μέμνηται, πάντ' εἰπὼν ψευδῆ καὶ πάσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον φθείρεσθαι [. . . = **R1**]. τὸ δ' ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτα, δείκνυται ἐκ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων διαβολῆς· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ ψευδές, ἔξ ἀνάγκης καὶ πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ. τὸ δέ γε ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις, καὶ δείκνυται ψευδεῖς πάντα ἄρα τὰ πραγματὰ ἐστὶ ψευδῆ.

XENIADES

D

*Sextus Empiricus' Report on
Xeniades' Theses (D1)*

D1 (> 81., 68 B163) *Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians*

Xeniades of Corinth, whom Democritus mentions [cf. **ATOM. P25**], and who asserted that all things are false, that every representation and opinion is false, that everything that comes to be comes to be out of what is not, and that everything that perishes perishes into what is not [. . .]. And it is demonstrated on the basis of slandering the senses that all things are false and for this reason cannot be known: for if the highest criterion of all things is false, then of necessity all things too are false. Now the highest criterion of all things are the perceptions, and it is demonstrated that they are false; therefore all things are false.

XENIADES [81 DK]

R

A Rapprochement between Xenias and Xenophanes (R1)

R1 (> 81.) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.53

Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος [. . . = **DI**] δυνάμει τῆς αὐτῆς
ἔχεται τῷ Ξενοφάνει στάσεως. μὴ ὄντος γάρ τινος
ἀληθοῦς κατὰ διαφορὰν τοῦ ψεύδους, ἀλλὰ πάντων
ψευδῶν ὄντων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀκαταλήπτων, οὐδὲ δια-
κριτικόν τι τούτων ἔσται κριτήριον.

A Contrast with Protagoras (R2)

R2 (≠ DK) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.388

εἰ γὰρ κριτήριον ἀπολειπτέον¹ τὴν φαντασίαν, ἥτοι
πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν λεκτέον εἶναι, καθὼς ἔλεγεν

¹ ἀπολειπτέον N: ἀποληπτέον LES

XENIADES

R

A Rapprochement between Xenias and Xenophanes (R1)

R1 (> 81.) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

Xenias of Corinth [. . .] occupies potentially the same position as Xenophanes. For if nothing true exists that would be different from what is false, but all things are false and for this reason cannot be known, there will not exist either any criterion that could distinguish among them [cf. **XEN. R21b**].

A Contrast with Protagoras (R2)

R2 (≠ DK) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

For if one admits that the representation (*phantasia*) is the criterion, then one must say either that every representa-

ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἢ πᾶσαν ψευδῆ, ὡς ἔφασκε Ξενοκράτης
ὁ Κορίνθιος [. . .].

A Skeptical Criticism of Xenocrates (R3)

R3 (≠ DK) Sext. Emp. *Adv. Math.* 7.399

εἰ γὰρ πᾶσαι αἱ φαντασίαι εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ οὐδὲν
ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἀληθές ἔστι τὸ 'οὐδὲν ἔστιν ἀληθές.' εἰ
ἄρα μηδὲν ἔστιν ἀληθές, ἔστιν ἀληθές· καὶ οὕτως εἰς
τοῦναντίον τῆ προθέσει περιήχθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξε-
νοκράτην, λέγοντες πάσας τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ψευδεῖς
καὶ μηδὲν ὅλως ἐν τοῖς οὖσι ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές.

tion is true, as Protagoras said, or else that every one is
false, as Xenocrates of Corinth asserted [. . .].

A Skeptical Criticism of Xenocrates (R3)

R3 (≠ DK) Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*

For if all representations (*phantasiai*) are false and noth-
ing is true, the proposition 'nothing is true' is true: if there-
fore nothing is true, there is something true. And in this
way Xenocrates and his followers are led by reversal to af-
firm the contrary of their thesis, when they say that all
representations are false and that there is nothing true at
all among the things that are.

40. THE ANONYMOUS OF IAMBlichUS [ANON. IAMBL.]

In one section of his *Protrepticus*, the Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus presents a series of paragraphs on the subjects of how one can achieve excellence (*aretê*), how one's own excellence can be made to benefit other people, and why one should practice temperance and respect for the laws and justice. In 1889 Friedrich Blass identified these paragraphs as an extract, almost entirely continuous (setting aside transitions added by Iamblichus), from a treatise on ethics and politics from the time of the Peloponnesian War. Since then scholars have attributed them to a number of possible authors, including Antiphon, Antisthenes, Critias, Protagoras, or one of his followers. But even if some suggestions are more plausible than others, any such attribution is destined to remain arbitrary in the absence of any decisive evidence. And even the traditional dating of the text to the fifth century and its identification as belonging to the 'sophistic' movement are not certain; indeed, recently the proposal has been made to date it as late as the fourth century BC on the basis of certain affinities with Xenophon's writings.

For this text and its translation, we have adopted the following conventions:

THE ANONYMOUS OF IAMBlichUS

- (1.) = reference to the numbering in DK
[. . .] = lines of the text of Iamblichus that are omitted here
[1] = indications taken from the text of DK

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See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31-42.

THE ANONYMOUS OF
IAMBlichUS [89 DK]

(> DK) Anon. in Iambl. *Protr.*

[Excellence derives from a combination
of natural disposition and training]

p. 95.13–24 Pistelli

(1.) [. . .] [1] ὃ τι ἂν τις ἐθέλη ἐξεργάσασθαι εἰς τέλος τὸ βέλτιστον, εἴαν τε σοφίαν εἴαν τε ἀνδρείαν εἴαν τε εὐγλωσσίαν εἴαν τε ἀρετὴν ἢ τὴν σύμπασαν ἢ μέρος τι αὐτῆς, ἐκ τῶνδε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατεργάσασθαι. [2] φύνηαι μὲν πρῶτον δεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν τῇ τύχῃ ἀποδεδόσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἤδη τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τάδε εἶναι, ἐπιθυμητὴν γενέσθαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν φιλόπονον τε καὶ πρωιαίτατα μαυθάνοντα καὶ πολλὸν χρόνον αὐτοῖς συνδιατελοῦντα. [3] εἰ δέ τι ἀπέσται τούτων καὶ ἔν, οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔστω οὐδὲ¹ ἐς τέλος τὸ ἄκρον ἐξεργάσασθαι, ἔχοντος δὲ ἅπαντα ταῦτα, ἀνυπέρβλητον γίγνεται τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἂν ἀσκήῃ τις τῶν ἀνθρώπων. [. . .]

¹ οὐδὲν Kaibel

THE ANONYMOUS OF
IAMBlichUS

(> DK) Anonymous, in Iamblichus, *Protreptic*

[Excellence derives from a combination
of natural disposition and training]

(1.) [. . .] [1] whatever one wishes to bring to perfection in the finest terms possible—whether wisdom, manly valor, eloquence, or virtue, either as a whole or in some part of it—one can achieve this in the following way. [2] First one must have a certain natural disposition, and while this has been assigned by chance, the following things are already within a person's own power: to become desirous of fine and good things and to become industrious, learning these things as early as possible and also continuing to spend a long time with them. [3] If any of these [scil. factors] is absent, even if only one of them, it is not possible to bring to perfection what is highest either; but if one possesses all of these, then whatever a person works at turns out to be unsurpassable. [. . .]

[This combination is most effective when
it is practiced over a long period of time]

pp. 96.1–97.8

(2.) [. . .] [1] ἐξ οὗ ἂν τις βούληται δόξαν παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις λαβεῖν καὶ τοιοῦτος φαίνεσθαι οἷος ἂν ᾦ, αὐτίκα δεῖ νέον τε ἄρξασθαι καὶ ἐπιχρῆσθαι αὐτῷ ὁμαλῶς ἀεὶ καὶ μὴ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως. [2] συγχρονισθὲν μὲν γὰρ ἕκαστον τούτων καὶ αὐτίκα τε ἀρξάμενον καὶ συναυξηθὲν εἰς τέλος λαμβάνει βέβαιον τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὸ κλέος διὰ τὰδε, ὅτι πιστεύεται τε ἡδὴ ἀνειδοι-
άστως, καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ προσγίγνεται, δι' ὃν τὰ μὲν οὐκ αὐξουσιν οὐδ' εὐλόγως μηνύουσι, τὰ δὲ καταψεύδονται μεμφόμενοι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον. [3] οὐ γὰρ ἡδὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄλλον τινὰ τιμᾶν (αὐτοὶ γὰρ στερίσκεσθαι τινος ἠγοῦνται), χειρωθέντες δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης αὐτῆς καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐπαχθέντες ἐπαινέται καὶ ἄκοντες ὅμως γίγνονται. [4] ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλουσιν, εἴτε¹ ἄρα τοιοῦτος ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν οἷος φαίνεται, ἢ ἐνεδρεύει καὶ θηρεύεται τὴν δόξαν ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ, καὶ ἃ ποιεῖ, ταῦτα καλλωπίζεται ὑπαγόμενος τοὺς ἀνθρώπους· ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ τρόπῳ, ᾧ ἐγὼ προείπον, ἀσκηθεῖσα ἡ ἀρετὴ πίστιν ἐμποιεῖ περὶ ἑαυτῆς καὶ εὐκλειαν. [5] ἐάλωκότες γὰρ ἡδὴ κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οἱ ἀνθρωποι οὔτε τῷ φθόνῳ ἔτι δύνανται χρῆσθαι οὔτε ἀπατᾶσθαι ἔτι οἴονται. [6] ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὁ χρόνος συνῶν μὲν ἐκάστῳ ἔργῳ καὶ πρά-

¹ *ei* Diels

[This combination is most effective when
it is practiced over a long period of time]

(2.) [. . .] [1] from the moment that one forms the desire to obtain renown among men and to show oneself to be the sort of man one is, one must begin straightaway while young and one must practice it always in the same way and not in different ways at different times. [2] For when each of these [scil. good] things has lasted a long time and has begun straightaway and has grown to fulfillment, he obtains a secure renown and fame for the following reasons: because by now he is trusted without hesitation, and the envy of humans does not adhere to him—envy, on account of which people do not extol certain things or speak in praise of them, and speak falsely about other things, criticizing them unjustly. [3] For it does not provide pleasure to people to assign honor to another person (for they suppose that they themselves are being deprived of something); but if they are defeated by necessity itself and have been influenced little by little over a long time, they become praisers, even if unwillingly. [4] At the same time, they do not doubt whether a person really is then just as he appears to be, or is setting a trap and hunting for renown by means of deceit, or [scil. suspect] that whatever he does he is only putting on a show and misleading people. But if virtue is practiced in the way I just mentioned, it produces trust in itself and a good reputation. [5] For when people have already been strongly won over, they are no longer capable of feeling envy and they do not think any longer that they are being deceived. [6] Moreover, a long duration of time too, when it accompanies each deed and action, at length provides confirma-

γματι πολὺς καὶ διὰ μακροῦ κρατύνει τὸ ἀσκούμενον, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγος χρόνος οὐ δύναται τοῦτο ἀπεργάζεσθαι. [7] καὶ τέχνην μὲν ἂν τις τὴν κατὰ λόγους πυθόμενος καὶ μαθὼν οὐ χείρων τοῦ διδάσκοντος ἂν γένοιτο ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἥτις ἐξ ἔργων πολλῶν συνίσταται, ταύτην γε² οὐχ οἶόν τε ὀψὲ ἀρξαμένῳ οὔτε³ ὀλιγοχρονίως ἐπὶ τέλος ἀγαγεῖν, ἀλλὰ συντραφῆναι τε αὐτῇ δεῖ καὶ συναυξηθῆναι τῶν μὲν εἰργόμενον κακῶν καὶ λόγων καὶ ἡθῶν, τὰ δ' ἐπιτηδεύοντα καὶ κατεργαζόμενον σὺν πολλῷ χρόνῳ καὶ ἐπιμελείᾳ. [8] ἅμα δέ τις καὶ τῇ ἐξ ὀλίγου χρόνου εὐδοξία προσγίγνεται βλάβη τοιάδε: τοὺς γὰρ ἐξαπινάιως καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγου χρόνου ἢ πλουσίους ἢ σοφοὺς ἢ ἀγαθοὺς ἢ ἀνδρείους γενομένους οὐκ ἀποδέχονται ἡδέως οἱ ἄνθρωποι. [. . .]

² δὲ ms., corr. Kiessling: δὴ Pistelli ³ οὐδὲ Pistelli

[Excellence must be applied to good ends]

p. 97.16–24

(3.) [. . .] [1] ὅταν τις ὀρεχθείς τινος τούτων¹ κατεργασάμενος ἔχη αὐτὸ εἰς τέλος, ἕαν τε εὐγλωσσίαν ἕαν τε σοφίαν ἕαν τε ἰσχύν, τούτῳ εἰς ἀγαθὰ καὶ νόμιμα καταχρῆσθαι δεῖ: εἰ δὲ εἰς ἄδικά τε καὶ ἄνομα χρῆσται τις τῷ ὑπάρχοντι ἀγαθῷ, πάντων κάκιστον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἀπεινὰ κρείσσον αὐτὸ ἢ παρῆναι. [2] καὶ ὡσπερ ἀγαθὸς τελέως ὁ τούτων τι ἔχων γίγνεται εἰς τὰ ἀγαθὰ αὐτοῖς καταχρώμενος, οὕτω πάλιν πάγκακος τελέως ὁ εἰς τὰ πονηρὰ χρώμενος.

tion for what one is devoting one's efforts to, whereas a short period of time is not able to accomplish this. [7] And in the case of an art, it is possible for someone who learns and is taught the art of speeches to become as good as his teacher in a short time; but it is not possible to bring virtue, which is made up of a large number of deeds, to perfection if someone begins late, or to do so in a short time, but one must be raised together with it and must grow together with it, avoiding both wicked words and wicked habits, and instead practicing and achieving ones of the other kind over a long time and with diligence. [8] At the same time, there is a drawback adhering to a good reputation acquired in a short time, namely that people do not accept with pleasure those who, suddenly and in a short time, have become either wealthy or wise or good or valorous. [. . .]

[Excellence must be applied to good ends]

(3.) [. . .] [1] whenever someone desiring one of these [scil. good] things, has obtained it by his labor, and possesses it to perfection, whether it is eloquence, wisdom, or strength, he must use it for good and lawful ends; but if anyone uses what is good for unjust and unlawful ends, this sort of thing is the worst of all, and it is better that it be absent rather than present. [2] And just as someone who possesses one of these [scil. good things] shows himself to be a perfectly good man if he uses it for good ends, so too in turn he shows himself to be a perfectly wicked one if he uses it for evil ends.

¹ τοῦτο ms., corr. Töpfer: secl. Blass

[The greatest excellence is what
benefits the most people]

pp. 97.25–98.11

[3] τόν τε αὖ ἀρετῆς ὀρεγόμενον τῆς συμπάσης σκεπτόεν εἶναι, ἐκ τίνος ἂν λόγου ἢ ἔργου ἄριστος εἴη τοιοῦτος δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ πλείστοις ὠφέλιμος ὢν. [4] εἰ μὲν τις χρήματα διδοὺς εὐεργετήσῃ τοὺς πλησίον, ἀναγκασθήσεται κακὸς εἶναι πάλιν αὖ συλλέγων τὰ χρήματα· ἔπειτα οὐκ ἂν οὕτω ἄφθονα συναγάγοι ὥστε μὴ ἐπιλείπειν διδόντα καὶ δωρούμενον· εἶτα αὕτη αἰθῆς δευτέρα κακία προσγίγνεται μετὰ τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν χρημάτων, ἐὰν ἐκ πλουσίου πένης γένηται καὶ ἐκ κεκτημένου μηδὲν ἔχων. [5] καὶ προσέτι δωρούμενος πῶς ἂν ἔχοι τὴν δόσιν ἀνέκλειπτον;¹ πῶς ἂν οὖν δῆ τις μὴ χρήματα νέμων ἀλλὰ ἄλλω δῆ τινι τρόπῳ εὐποητικὸς ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ταῦτα μὴ σὺν κακίᾳ ἀλλὰ σὺν ἀρετῇ; [6] ὦδε οὖν ἔσται τοῦτο, εἰ τοῖς νόμοις τε καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ ἐπικουροίη· τοῦτο γὰρ τὰς τε πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὸ συνοικίζον καὶ τὸ συνέχον.² [. . .]

¹ καὶ . . . ἀνέκλειπτον post ἀρετῇ; infra hab. ms., transp. nos
² post συνέχον hab. ms. εἶναι, secl. Wilamowitz

[One must practice temperance,
especially regarding money]

pp. 98.17–99.15

(4.) [. . .] [1] ἐγκρατέστατόν γε δεῖ εἶναι πάντα ἄνδρα διαφερόντως· τοιοῦτος δ' ἂν μάλιστα, εἴ τις¹ τῶν χρη-

[The greatest excellence is what
benefits the most people]

[3] One must now consider on the basis of what speech or what deed the man who desires the whole of virtue could become best. Such a man would be the one who is beneficial to the most people. [4] For if someone does a good deed to his neighbors by giving them money, he will be obliged to be wicked again in turn when he collects the money; and then, it would not be possible for him to accumulate resources in such abundance that he would not end up being in need if he made gifts and presents; then again, here is a second drawback that comes about from accumulating money, if, after having been rich, one becomes poor, and, after having been affluent, one possesses nothing. [5] And furthermore, if he gives presents, how could he continue to do so without interruption? How then could someone do a good deed to people not by distributing money but in some other way, and do this not with wickedness but with virtue? [6] That will happen in the following way: if he comes to the aid of the laws and of justice. For this is what brings together cities and people and holds them together. [. . .]

[One must practice temperance,
especially regarding money]

(4.) [. . .] [1] it is necessary that every man be surpassingly temperate. That person would most of all be a man of this

¹ μάλιστα εἴη, εἰ Diels: μάλιστα εἴη, εἴ τις Kiessling

μάτων κρείσσων εἶη, πρὸς ἃ πάντες διαφθείρονται, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφειδῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαίοις ἐσπουδακῶς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν μεταδιώκων· πρὸς ταῦτα γὰρ δύο οἱ πλείστοι ἀκρατεῖς εἰσι. [2] διὰ τοιοῦτον δέ τι ταῦτα πάσχουσιν φιλοψυχούσι μὲν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἡ ζωὴ ἐστίν, ἡ ψυχὴ² ταύτης οὖν φείδονται καὶ ποθοῦσιν αὐτὴν διὰ φιλίαν τῆς ζωῆς καὶ συνήθειαν ἣ συντρέφονται· φιλοχρηματοῦσι δὲ τῶνδε εἵνεκα, ἅπερ φοβεῖ αὐτούς. [3] τί δ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα; αἱ νόσοι, τὸ γῆρας, αἱ ἐξαπιναιῖοι ζημίαι, οὐ τὰς ἐκ τῶν νόμων λέγω ζημίας (ταύτας μὲν γὰρ καὶ εὐλαβηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ φυλάξασθαι), ἀλλὰ τὰς τοιαύτας, πυρκαϊάς, θανάτους οἰκετῶν, τετραπόδων, ἄλλας αὖ συμφοράς, αἱ περὶ κερταῖαι αἱ μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν, αἱ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς, αἱ δὲ τοῖς χρήμασι. [4] τούτων δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα πάντων, ὅπως ἐς ταῦτα ἔχωσι χρῆσθαι τοῖς χρήμασι, πᾶς ἀνὴρ τοῦ πλοῦτου ὀρέγεται. [5] καὶ ἄλλ' ἅττα δέ ἐστίν ἅπερ οὐχ ἦσσαν ἢ τὰ προειρημένα ἐξορμᾷ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπὶ τὸν χρηματισμόν, αἱ πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλοτιμίαι καὶ οἱ ζῆλοι καὶ αἱ δυναστεῖαι, δι' ἃς τὰ χρήματα περὶ πολλοῦ ποιούνται, ὅτι συμβάλλεται εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα. [6] ὅστις δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνὴρ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθός, οὗτος οὐκ ἀλλοτριῶ κόσμου περικειμένῳ τὴν δόξαν θηρᾶται, ἀλλὰ τῇ αὐτοῦ ἀρετῇ. [. . .]

² ἡ ζωὴ ἐστίν ἡ ψυχὴ ms., corr. Diels: ταῦτο ἡ ζωὴ ἐστίν τῇ ψυχῇ Kiessling: alii alia

sort if he were superior to money, which is what corrupts all men, and if, without caring about his life, he bestowed his pains on things that are just and pursued virtue. For these are the two areas in which most men lack temperance. [2] It is for the following reason that they suffer this. On the one hand they are pusillanimous [*philopsukhein*, literally 'they love their souls'], because this is what their life is, namely their soul [*psukhê*]; hence they care about this and they feel a great desire for it because of their love for life and because of their familiarity with what they were raised with. And on the other hand they love money because they fear the following things. [3] What are these? Diseases, old age, sudden adversities—I do not mean adversities from the laws (for one can take precautions against these and guard against them), but instead ones of the following sort: house fires, the deaths of members of one's household, of animals, and again other misfortunes, some of which concern bodies, others souls, and others money. [4] It is because of all these things that every man desires wealth, so that he can use his money against these eventualities. [5] And there are some other reasons that, no less than the ones I have mentioned, drive people to moneymaking: rivalries with each other, jealousies, political powers, because of which they attach great importance to money, because it makes a contribution in situations of this sort. [6] But whoever is a truly good man seeks a renown not by means of an ornament that does not belong to him but by means of his own virtue. [. . .]

[Arguments against pusillanimity]

p. 99.19–28

(5.) [1] [. . .] ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ὑπῆρχε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἰ μὴ ὑπ' ἄλλου ἀποθάνοι ἀγῆρω τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθανάτῳ τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον, συγγνώμη ἂν¹ πολλὴ τῷ φειδομένῳ τῆς ψυχῆς· [2] ἐπεὶ δὲ ὑπάρχει τῷ βίῳ μηκνυομένῳ τό τε γῆρας κάκιον ὄν ἀνθρώποις καὶ μὴ ἀθάνατον εἶναι, καὶ² ἀμαθία ἤδη ἐστὶ³ μεγάλη καὶ συνήθεια πονηρῶν λόγων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμημάτων, ταύτην περιποιεῖν ἐπὶ δυσκλείᾳ, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀθάνατόν <τι>⁴ ἀντ' αὐτῆς λείπεσθαι,⁵ ἀντὶ θνητῆς οὐσης εὐλογίαν ἀέναον καὶ αἰεζῶσαν. [. . .]

¹ ἂν <ῆν> Blass ² post καὶ hab. ms. ῆ, del. Pistelli]

³ an δῆ ἐστὶ scribendum? ⁴ <τι> nos

⁵ λείπεσθαι <κλέος> Wilamowitz

[Respect for the laws and justice]

pp. 100.5–101.6

(6.) [1] [. . .] οὐκ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν ὀρμῶν δεῖ, οὐδὲ τὸ κράτος τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πλεονεξίᾳ ἡγέισθαι ἀρετὴν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τῶν νόμων ὑπακούειν δειλίαν¹ πονηροτάτη γὰρ αὕτη ἢ διάνοιά ἐστι, καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς πάντα τὰναντία τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς γίνεται, κακία τε καὶ βλάβη. εἰ γὰρ ἔφυσαν μὲν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀδύνατοι καθ' ἕνα ζῆν, συνῆλθον δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῇ ἀνάγκῃ εἰκοντες, πᾶσα δὲ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῖς εὖρηται καὶ τὰ τεχνήματα πρὸς αὐτήν, σὺν ἀλλήλοις δὲ εἶναι αὐτοὺς κἀν² ἀνομία διατᾶσθαι οὐχ οἶόν τε (μείζω γὰρ αὐτοῖς ζημίαν³ οὕτω

[Arguments against pusillanimity]

(5.) [1] [. . .] if it befell the man who cared about his life, unless he was killed by someone else, to be ageless and deathless for the rest of time, then he would be easily forgiven. [2] But since what befalls a life that is prolonged is old age, which is worse for people, and not to be deathless, it is truly both a great foolishness and the effect of habituation to wicked words and desires to preserve this [scil. life] at the cost of a bad reputation, and not to leave behind in its place something deathless, a renown that is everlasting and always alive instead of one that is mortal. [. . .]

[Respect for the laws and justice]

(6.) [. . .] [1] one must not be greedy to have more, nor think that power founded upon greed is virtue while obedience to the laws is cowardice. For this is the most evil idea of all, and it is the source of all the things that are the contrary of good ones: viz., iniquity and harm. For if by nature people have been born unable to live alone, and came together with one another yielding to constraint, and discovered all the means of life and the technical resources to achieve it, and if it is also not possible for them to live with one another and to spend their lives without laws (for a greater tribulation happens to them in this way than

¹ δεῖ λίαν ms., corr. Arcertus

² καὶ ms., corr. Diels

³ ζημίαν <ἂν> Diels

γίγνεσθαι ἐκείνης τῆς κατὰ ἕνα διαίτης), διὰ ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς ἀνάγκας τὸν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ οὐδαμῇ μεταστῆναι ἂν αὐτά: φύσει γὰρ ἰσχυρᾷ⁴ ἐνδεδέσθαι ταῦτα. [2] εἰ μὲν δὴ γένοιτό τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς φύσιν τοιάνδε ἔχων, ἄτρωτος τὸν χρῶτα ἄνοσός τε καὶ ἀπαθῆς καὶ ὑπερφυῆς καὶ ἀδαμάντινος τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, τῷ τοιούτῳ ἴσως ἂν τις ἀρκεῖν ἐνόμισε τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ πλεονεξία κράτος (τὸν γὰρ τοιοῦτον τῷ νόμῳ μὴ ὑποδύοντα δύνασθαι ἀθῶον εἶναι), οὐ μὴν ὀρθῶς οὗτος οἴεται [3] εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοιοῦτός τις εἴη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, τοῖς μὲν νόμοις συμμαχῶν καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ καὶ ταῦτα κρατύνων καὶ τῇ ἰσχύι χρώμενος ἐπὶ ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἐπικουροῦντα, οὕτω μὲν ἂν σφῆζοιτο ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἄλλως δὲ οὐκ ἂν διαμένειν [4] δοκεῖν γὰρ ἂν τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους τῷ τοιούτῳ φύντι πολεμίους κατασταθέντας διὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν εὐνομίαν, καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἢ τέχνη ἢ δυνάμει ὑπερβαλέσθαι ἂν καὶ περιγενέσθαι τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἀνδρός. [5] οὕτω φαίνεται καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ κράτος, ὅπερ δὴ κράτος ἐστί, διὰ τε τοῦ νόμου καὶ διὰ τὴν δίκην σφζόμενον. [. . .]

⁴ ἰσχυρὰ ms., corr. Blass et iam MT

[Positive consequences of respect for the laws]

pp. 101.17–102.24

(< 7.) [. . .] [1] πίστις μὲν πρώτη ἐγγίγνεται ἐκ τῆς εὐνομίας μεγάλα ὠφελοῦσα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς

from living alone)—because of all these constraints, law and justice rule over people and could not be altered in any way. For these [scil. law and justice] are bound together by a strong nature. [2] Indeed, if someone were born possessing from the beginning such a nature as to be invulnerable in his flesh, immune to illness and suffering, extraordinarily large, and indestructible in body and soul, one might perhaps think that, for someone like that, power founded upon greed might be sufficient: for a man like that could live in impunity without submitting to the law. And yet to think like this is incorrect. [3] For even if someone like this, such as could never come about, actually existed, it would only be by allying himself with the laws and justice, and fortifying these, using his strength for the benefit of them and of what comes to their aid, that someone like this could preserve himself; otherwise he could not survive. [4] For all men would decide to make themselves the enemies of the man who had this nature, because of their respect for the laws: and their multitude, either by skill or by strength, would surpass such a man and would prevail over him. [5] In this way it is evident that even force itself, as force, is preserved by law and justice. [. . .]

[Positive consequences of respect for the laws]

(< 7.) [. . .] [1] Trust is the first thing that comes about from respect for the laws; it greatly benefits all people, and it

σύμπαντας, καὶ τῶν μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν τούτο ἐστὶ κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ χρήματα γίνεταί ἐξ αὐτῆς, καὶ οὕτω μὲν εἴαν καὶ ὀλίγα ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ ὁμως κυκλούμενα, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης οὐδ' ἂν πολλὰ ἢ ἐξαρκεῖ. [2] καὶ αἱ τύχαι δὲ αἰ εἰς τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὸν βίον, αἶ τε ἀγαθαὶ καὶ μὴ, ἐκ τῆς εὐνομίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προσφορώτατα κυβερνῶνται· τοὺς τε γὰρ εὐτυχοῦντας ἀσφαλεῖ αὐτῇ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀνεπιβουλεύῳ, τοὺς τε αὖ δυστυχοῦντας ἐπικουρεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εὐτυχοῦντων διὰ τὴν ἐπιμιξίαν τε καὶ πίστιν, ἅπερ ἐκ τῆς εὐνομίας γίνεταί. [3] τὸν τε αὖ χρόνον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διὰ τὴν εὐνομίαν εἰς μὲν τὰ πράγματα ἀργὸν γίνεσθαι, εἰς δὲ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ζωῆς ἐργάσιμον. [4] φροντίδος δὲ τῆς μὲν ἀηδεστάτης ἀπηλλάχθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῇ εὐνομίᾳ, τῇ δὲ ἡδίστῃ συνεῖναι πραγμάτων μὲν γὰρ φροντίδα ἀηδεστάτην εἶναι, ἔργων δὲ ἡδίστην. [5] εἷς τε αὖ τὸν ὕπνον ἰοῦσιν, ὅπερ ἀνάπανμα κακῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώποις, ἀφόβους μὲν καὶ ἄλυπα μεριμνῶντας ἔρχεσθαι εἰς αὐτόν, γιγνομένους δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, καὶ μὴ ἐμβόβους ἐξάπινα καθίστασθαι, οὕτω δ' ἐκ μεταλλαγῆς ἡδίστης τὸ γνωστὴν τὴν ἡμέραν εἶναι προσδέχεσθαι, ἀλλὰ ἡδέως φροντίδας μὲν ἀλύπους περὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ζωῆς ποιουμένους, τοὺς πόρους δὲ τῇ ἀντιλήψει ἀγαθῶν ἐλπίσιν εὐπίστοις καὶ εὐπροσδοκῆτοις ἀνακουφίζοντας, ὧν πάν-

¹ ἐπ' ms., corr. Wilamowitz ² οὐδ' ms., corr. Töpfer: ᾧδε
δὲ Vitelli ³ τοῦ ms., corr. Vitelli ⁴ ἀδεῶς Wilamowitz

belongs among the great good things. For because of this, resources are shared in common, and in this way, even if they are scarce, nonetheless they suffice because they circulate, while, without this, they would not suffice even if they were abundant. [2] And the most suitable way for people to navigate the uncertainties of fortune that affect money and life, both those that are favorable and those that are not, is for them to base themselves on respect for the laws: for those people who have good fortune enjoy it in safety and freedom from intrigues, while on the contrary those who have bad fortune receive assistance from the fortunate ones on the basis of the interconnection and trust that come about from respect for the laws. [3] Again, thanks to respect for the laws, people's time is freed from legal matters and can be devoted to the activities of their own life. [4] When the laws are respected, men are relieved of the most disagreeable kinds of thoughts and spend their time on the most agreeable ones: for thinking about legal matters is most disagreeable, but thinking about one's own activities is most agreeable. [5] Again, when they go to sleep, which for people is a repose from evils, they do so without fear and painful thoughts; and when they wake up they feel the same way, and they are not suddenly filled with fear, nor in this way, after a most agreeable respite, do they wait for the day to make itself known, but agreeably thinking painless thoughts about the activities of their life, they lessen their troubles by thinking instead about good things, with confident and optimistic hopes. For all these things, respect for the laws is the

των τὴν εὐνομίαν αἰτίαν εἶναι. [6] καὶ τὸ κακὰ μέγιστα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πορίζον, πόλεμον ἐπιφερόμενον εἰς καταστροφὴν καὶ δούλωσιν, καὶ τοῦτο ἀνομοῦσι μὲν μᾶλλον ἐπέρχεσθαι, εὐνομούμενοις δ' ἦσσαν. [7] καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλά ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ εὐνομίᾳ ἀγαθὰ, ἅπερ ἐπικουρήματα τῇ ζωῇ καὶ παραψυχὴ τῶν χαλεπῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς γίγνεται.

[Negative consequences of lack of respect for the laws]

p. 102.26–104.16

[. . .] [8] ἄσχολοι μὲν πρῶτον οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὰ ἔργα γίνονται καὶ ἐπιμελοῦνται τοῦ ἀηδεστάτου, πραγμάτων ἄλλ' οὐκ ἔργων, τὰ τε χρήματα δι' ἀπιστίαν καὶ ἀμυξίαν ἀποθησαυρίζουσιν ἄλλ' οὐ κοινοῦνται, καὶ οὕτως σπάνια γίγνεται, εἴαν καὶ πολλὰ ἦ. [9] αἱ τε τύχαι αἱ φλαῦραι <. . .¹ καὶ αἱ ἀγαθαὶ εἰς τὰναντία ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ τε γὰρ εὐτυχία οὐκ ἀσφαλῆς ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ ἀνομίᾳ ἄλλ' ἐπιβουλεύεται, ἢ τε δυστυχία οὐκ ἀπωθεῖται ἀλλὰ κρατύνεται διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν καὶ ἀμυξίαν. [10] ὁ τε πόλεμος ἔξωθεν μᾶλλον ἐπάγεται καὶ ἡ οἰκεία στάσις ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς αἰτίας, καὶ εἴαν μὴ πρόσθεν γίγνηται, τότε συμβαίνει ἐν τε πράγμασι² συμβαίνει καθεστάναι³ αἰεὶ διὰ ἐπιβουλὰς τὰς ἐξ ἀλλήλων, δι' ἅσπερ εὐλαβουμένους τε διατελεῖν καὶ ἀντεπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλους.

¹ lac. pos. nos, e.g. <ἐτι βαρύτεραι γίνονται> vel <οὐ (ἀνα-) κοφίζονται> vel <οὐκ ἐπανορθοῦνται> ² πράγματι ms., corr. Cobet ³ καθιστάνα ms., corr. Cobet

cause. [6] And what is responsible for the greatest evils for people, war, which leads to subjugation and enslavement, this too happens more to people who do not respect the laws, less to those who respect them. [7] And in respect for the laws there are many other good things that provide assistance to life and consolation for the difficulties that come from it.

[Negative consequences of lack of respect for the laws]

[. . .] [8] first, people do not have time for their own activities and busy themselves with what is most disagreeable, legal matters and not their own activities, and they hoard their money out of a lack of trust and interconnection and do not share it in common, and in this way it becomes scarce, even if it is abundant. [9] Adverse fortunes <e.g. become even worse> and good ones serve contrary ends: for good fortune is not safe when the laws are not respected, but instead is the object of intrigues, while misfortune is not expelled, but instead is exacerbated by lack of trust and interconnection. [10] War is introduced all the more from abroad, and internal dissension too, for the same reason, and if it did not come about earlier, it happens then: it happens that people are always involved in legal matters because of intrigues devised by each other, because of which they spend all their time on their guard and devising intrigues against each other in return.

[11] καὶ οὔτε ἐγρηγορόσιν ἡδέϊας τὰς φροντίδας εἶναι οὔτε ἐς τὸν ὕπνον ἀπερχομένους ἡδέϊαν τὴν ὑποδοχὴν ἀλλὰ ἐνδείματον, τὴν τε ἀνέγερσιν ἔμφοβον καὶ πτοοῦσαν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ μνήμας κακῶν ἐξαπναιούς ἄγειν ἄπερ ἐκ τῆς ἀνομίας ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κακὰ τὰ προειρημμένα ἅπαντα ἀποβαίνει.

[12] γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἡ τυραννίς, κακὸν τοσοῦτόν τε καὶ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἀνομίας. οἴονται δὲ τινες τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅσοι μὴ ὀρθῶς συμβάλλονται, τύραννον ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς καθίστασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους στερίσκεσθαι τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐκ αὐτοὺς αἰτίους ὄντας, ἀλλὰ βιασθέντας ὑπὸ τοῦ κατασταθέντος τυράννου, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ταῦτα λογιζόμενοι. [13] ὅστις γὰρ ἡγείται βασιλέα ἢ τύραννον ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἐξ ἀνομίας τε καὶ πλεονεξίας, μωρὸς ἐστίν. ἐπειδὴν γὰρ ἅπαντες ἐπὶ κακίαν τράπωνται, τότε τοῦτο γίγνεται· οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε ἀνθρώπους ἄνευ νόμων καὶ δίκης ζῆν. [14] ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους ἐκλίπη, ὃ τε νόμος καὶ ἡ δίκη, τότε ἡδη εἰς ἓνα ἀποχωρεῖν τὴν ἐπιτροπίαν τούτων καὶ φυλακὴν. πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἄλλως εἰς ἓνα μοναρχία περισταίη, εἰ μὴ τοῦ νόμου ἐξωσθέντος τοῦ τῷ πλήθει συμφέροντος; [15] δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον, ὃς τὴν δίκην καταλύει⁴ καὶ τὸν νόμον τὸν πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ συμφέροντα ἀφαιρήσεται, ἀδαμάντινον γενέσθαι, εἰ μέλλει συλήσειν ταῦτα παρὰ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ὧν παρὰ πολλῶν. [16] σάρκινος δὲ καὶ ὅμοιος τοῖς λοιποῖς γενόμενος ταῦτα μὲν οὐκ ἂν δυναθῆναι ποιῆσαι,

[11] And neither when they awaken are their thoughts agreeable, nor when they go to sleep is their expectation agreeable, but fearful, and their frightened and terrifying awakening brings a man to sudden memories of evils. These things, and the other evils I mentioned earlier, all derive from lack of respect for the laws.

[12] And tyranny, which is so great an evil and one of such a kind, comes about for no other reason than from lack of respect for the laws. Some people—those who reason incorrectly—think that a tyrant comes to power for some other reason and that people are deprived of their freedom without their being responsible themselves, but because they have been coerced by the tyrant who has come to power. But to reason like this is incorrect. [13] For whoever supposes that a king or tyrant comes to power for any other reason than from lack of respect for the laws and from greed is a fool. For when everyone turns to iniquity, then this is what happens; for it is not possible for people to live without laws and justice. [14] So when these two things, law and justice, are lacking for the multitude of the people, then the power of decision over them and their custody pass over to a single man. For otherwise how could a monarchy devolve upon a single man, unless the law, which is beneficial to the multitude, has been expelled? [15] This man, who overthrows justice and will abolish the law, which is shared in common and is beneficial for all, must of necessity be made of steel, if, being only one man, he is planning to deprive of these things the multitude of people, though they are many. [16] But if he were made of flesh and were similar to the rest of man-

⁴ καταλύσει Kiessling

τάναντία⁵ δὲ ἐκλελοιπότα καθιστάς μοναρχήσειεν ἄν-
διὸ καὶ γιγνώμενον τοῦτο ἐνίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαν-
θάνει.

[17] εἰ τοίνυν τοσοῦτων μὲν αἰτία κακῶν ἐστὶν ἀνομία,
τοσοῦτον δὲ ἀγαθὸν⁶ εὐνομία, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔνεστι τυ-
χεῖν εὐδαιμονίας εἰ μὴ τις νόμον ἡγεμόνα προστή-
σαιτο τοῦ οἰκείου βίου. [. . .]

⁵ συλῆσαι, τούναντίον Vitelli: ποιῆσαι τὰ πάτρια vel ποιῆ-
σαι τούναντίον <τὰ πάτρια> Diels

⁶ τοσοῦτων δὲ ἀγαθῶν ex Ciz. Kiessling

kind, he would not be able to do this; [scil. only] if he made
the opposition cease to exist, could he become a monarch.
And this is why some people do not notice that this is hap-
pening.

[17] If then lack of respect for the laws is the cause of so
many evils, and if respect for the laws is such a great good,
then it is not possible to achieve happiness in any other
way than by establishing law as the guide for one's own
life.¹ [. . .]

¹ Diels does not include this sentence at the beginning of
section 17; Untersteiner adds a few more lines.

41. PAIRS OF ARGUMENTS (DISSOI LOGOI) (DISS.)

The manuscripts that transmit the works of Sextus Empiricus append at their end a further text for which they do not indicate either the title or the author. It was first published in 1570 by Henri Étienne, under the arbitrary title *Διαλέξεις* (*Arguments*), as an appendix to his edition of Diogenes Laertius; the name by which modern scholars refer to this text, *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* (*Pairs of Discourses* or *Arguments*), is not so much a title (and is certainly not its author's intended title) as rather a description of its contents, derived from the opening words of the text (which are repeated three times in what follows). The treatise does in fact begin with a series of four opposing arguments presenting two contrasting positions on the same issue indicated by titles—whether good and bad, seemly and unseemly, just and unjust, true and false are identical with one another or not; occasionally the author expresses a preference for one position or the other. But then, after a lacuna of indeterminable extent, the text goes on to deal with a variety of heterogeneous topics—insanity and sanity, wisdom and foolishness, whether wisdom and virtue (*aretê*) can be taught and learned, whether political offices should be assigned by lot, whether someone who knows the art of speeches can speak on all subjects, and how to

DISSOI LOGOI

exercise one's memory—in five further sections that do not all propose contrasting arguments and that are not furnished with titles. Shortly after the beginning of the ninth section, the manuscripts indicate that the text breaks off. The treatise is written for the most part in a Doric dialect; its date is unknown, but on the fragile basis of a reference to the end of the Peloponnesian War it is usually assigned to sometime between the last decades of the fifth and the first decades of the fourth centuries BC. A number of subjects discussed in Plato's dialogues, especially the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras*, can be recognized, particularly in the final sections.

The reader should note that, whereas elsewhere in our edition we have indicated by boldface the words that we consider to be exact verbal citations from the works of the early Greek philosophers, considerations of appearance have led us in the present chapter to use plain characters for this text, which has reached us *in extenso* by direct transmission via medieval manuscripts.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Edition

T. M. Robinson. *Contrasting Arguments. An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi* (New York, 1979).

See also the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

Δισσοὶ λόγοι (vel Διαλέξεις)
[90 DK]

1. Περὶ ἀγαθῶ καὶ κακῶ

[1] δισσοὶ λόγοι λέγονται ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων περὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ λέγοντι ὡς ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν· τοὶ δὲ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθὸν εἶη, τοῖς δὲ κακόν, καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν ἀγαθόν, τοτὲ δὲ κακόν. [2] ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῖσδε ποτιτίθεμαι. σκέψομαι δὲ ἐκ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ, ^φ¹ ἐπιμελὲς βρώσιός τε καὶ πόσιος καὶ ἀφροδισίων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσθενοῦντι μὲν κακόν, ὑγιαίνοντι δὲ καὶ δεομένῳ ἀγαθόν. [3] καὶ ἀκρασία τοίνυν τούτων τοῖς μὲν ἀκρατέσι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ πωλεῦντι ταῦτα καὶ μισθαρνέοντι ἀγαθόν. νόσος τοίνυν τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενέοντι κακόν, τοῖς δὲ ἰατροῖς ἀγαθόν. ὁ τοίνυν θάνατος τοῖς μὲν ἀποθανοῦσι κακόν, τοῖς δ' ἐνταφιοπώλαις καὶ τυμβοποιοῖς ἀγαθόν. [4] γεωργία τε καλῶς ἐξενείκασα τῶς καρπῶς τοῖς μὲν γεωργοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἐμπόροις κακόν. τὰς τοίνυν ὀλκᾶδας συντρίβεσθαι καὶ παραθραύεσθαι τῷ μὲν ναυκλήρῳ κακόν, τοῖς δὲ

PAIRS OF ARGUMENTS
(DISSOI LOGOI)

1. On Good and Bad

[1] A pair of arguments is stated in Greece by those who philosophize about good and bad. For some people say that the good is one thing, the bad another; but other people say that they are the same thing, and that for some people it is good, for others bad, and for the same person at one time good and at another time bad. [2] As for me, I agree with these latter. I shall consider this question in terms of human life, which is concerned for food, drink, and sex; for these things are bad for a sick person but good for a healthy one who needs them. [3] And so intemperance (*akrasia*) in these matters is bad for intemperate people (*akrateis*); but it is good for those who sell them and profit from them. So illness is bad for sick people, but it is good for doctors. So death is bad for those who die, but it is good for undertakers and gravediggers. [4] Farming that produces crops in abundance is good for the farmers, but it is bad for merchants. So when trading vessels are staved in and smashed this is bad for the ship owner,

¹ ὄν mss., corr. Wilamowitz

ναυπαγοῖς ἀγαθόν. [5] ἔτι <δὲ>² τὸν σίδαρον κατέσθθ-
σθαι καὶ ἀμβλύνεσθαι καὶ συντριβεσθαι τοῖς μὲν
ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ δὲ χαλκῇ ἀγαθόν. καὶ μὰν τὸν
κέραμον παραθραύεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τοῖς
δὲ κεραμεύσιν ἀγαθόν. τὰ δὲ ὑποδήματα κατατρίβε-
σθαι καὶ διαρρήγνυσθαι τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις κακόν, τῷ
δὲ σκυτῇ ἀγαθόν. [6] ἐν τοίνυν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς γυμνι-
κοῖς³ καὶ τοῖς μωσικοῖς καὶ τοῖς πολεμικοῖς· αὐτίκα ἐν
τῷ γυμνικῷ, τῷ σταδιοδρόμῳ ἂ νίκα τῷ μὲν νικῶντι
ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ ἡσασαμένοις κακόν. [7] καττωτὸ⁴ δὲ
καὶ τοὶ παλαισταὶ καὶ πύκται καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες
μωσικοί· αὐτίκα ἂ κιθαρωδία⁵ τῷ μὲν νικῶντι ἀγαθόν,
τοῖς δὲ ἡσασαμένοις κακόν. [8] ἔν τε τῷ πολέμῳ (καὶ
τὰ νεώτατα⁶ πρῶτον ἐρῶ) ἂ τῶν⁷ Λακεδαιμονίων νίκα,
ἂν⁸ ἐνίκων Ἀθηναίως καὶ τὼς συμμάχως, Λακεδαιμο-
νίοις μὲν ἀγαθόν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις
κακόν ἂ τε νίκα, ἂν τοὶ Ἕλληνας τὸν Πέρσαν ἐνίκα-
σαν, τοῖς μὲν Ἕλλασι ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ βαρβάροις
κακόν. [9] ἂ τοίνυν τοῦ Ἰλίου αἵρεσις τοῖς μὲν Ἀχαι-
οῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Τρωσὶ κακόν. καδδὲ ταῦτόν καὶ
τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἀργείων πάθη. [10] καὶ
ἂ τῶν Κενταύρων καὶ Λαπιθᾶν μάχα τοῖς μὲν Λαπί-
θαις ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Κενταύροις κακόν. καὶ μὰν καὶ
ἂ τῶν θεῶν καὶ Γυγάντων λεγομένα μάχα καὶ νίκα
τοῖς μὲν θεοῖς ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ Γίγασι κακόν.

² <δὲ> Vossianus³ γυμναστικοῖς mss., corr. Blass⁴ καὶ τοῦτο mss., corr. Matthew de Varis

but it is good for the shipbuilders. [5] Furthermore, when
an iron tool rusts, loses its edge, and is broken, this is bad
for other people, but it is good for the blacksmith. And
certainly when a clay pot is smashed this is bad for other
people, but it is good for the potters. When sandals are
worn out and split apart this is bad for other people, but
it is good for the cobbler. [6] And so in competitions, ath-
letic, musical, and military ones: for example in the ath-
letic one, the victory is good for the runner in the stadium
race who wins, but it is bad for the losers. [7] The same
holds for the wrestlers and boxers and for all the musi-
cians: for example singing to the cithara is good for the
winner, but it is bad for the losers. [8] And in war (I shall
speak first about the most recent events), the victory of the
Spartans that they won over the Athenians and their allies
was good for the Spartans, but it was bad for the Athenians
and their allies. And the victory that the Greeks won over
the Persian was good for the Greeks, but it was bad for the
barbarians. [9] So the capture of Troy was good for the
Achaean, but it was bad for the Trojans. And the same
holds for what happened to the Thebans and the Argives.
[10] And the battle of the Centaurs and Lapiths was good
for the Lapiths, but it was bad for the Centaurs. And cer-
tainly the battle that is reported between the gods and the
Giants and the victory was good for the gods, but it was
bad for the Giants.

⁵ ἂ κιθαρωδία mss. (ὁ κιθαρωδός P1 P2): ἂ κιθαρωδίας
Diels: <ἂ νίκα> ἂ κιθαρωδίας Kranz ⁶ τὰ νεώτατα Koen:
τῆ νεότατι mss. (τὰ P2, νεώτατοι M S): τὰ νεωστὶ North

⁷ ἂ τῶν Koen: αὐτῶν mss.⁸ ἂν Weber: ἐν ἔ mss.

[11] ἄλλος δὲ λόγος λέγεται, ὡς ἄλλο μὲν τὰγαθὸν εἶη, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ κακόν, διαφέρον ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτον διαιρεῦμαι τὸν τρόπον· δοκῶ γὰρ οὐδὲ διάδαλον⁹ ἦμεν, ποῖον ἀγαθὸν καὶ ποῖον κακόν, αἱ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ἐκάτερον εἶη· καὶ γὰρ θαυμαστόν κ' εἶη. [12] οἶμαι δὲ οὐδέ κ' αὐτὸν ἔχεν ἀποκρίνασθαι, αἶ τις¹⁰ ἔροιτο τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα· “εἶπον δὴ μοι, ἦδη τύ τι τοῖ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν;”¹¹ φαίη κα· “καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα.” “τὸ ἄρα κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα καὶ πολλὰ τούτοις ὀφείλεις, αἵπερ τῶντόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ.” [13]—“τί δέ, τὼς συγγενέας ἦδη τι ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας;”¹² τὼς ἄρα συγγενέας κακὸν ἐποίηεις. τί δέ, τὼς ἐχθρῶς ἦδη κακῶς¹³ ἐποίησας; καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μέγαλα¹⁴ ἄρα ἀγαθὰ ἐποίησας.” [14] “ἄγε δὴ μοι καὶ τόδε ἀπόκρινα· ἄλλο τι ἢ τὼς πτωχῶς οἰκτίρεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα <κακὰ>¹⁵ ἔχοντι, <καὶ>¹⁶ πάλιν εὐδαιμονίζεις, ὅτι πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ πράσσοντι, αἵπερ τῶντό κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν;” [15] τὸν δὲ βασιλῆ τὸν μέγαν οὐδὲν κωλύει ὁμοίως διακείσθαι τοῖς πτωχοῖς. τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἀγαθὰ αὐτῷ πολλὰ κακὰ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστίν, αἶ γα¹⁷ τῶντόν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ τῷ παντὸς εἰρήσθω. [16] εἶμι δὲ καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῷ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν καὶ

⁹ διάδαλον <κ'> Blass

¹⁰ post τις hab. mss. αὐτὸν (αὐτὸν αὐτόν P6 V2), del. Diels

[11] Another argument is stated, that the good is one thing, the bad another, which differs, just as in the name, so too in the thing (*pragma*). As for me, I explain the distinction in the following way: for I think that one could not even distinguish what kind of thing is good and what kind of thing is bad, if both of them were the same and not different; and this would be astonishing. [12] I think that the man who affirms this would not even be able to answer, if someone asked him, “Tell me, did your parents already do you any good?” He would say, “Yes, a great deal.” “Then you owe them much that is bad, if indeed the good is the same thing as the bad.” [13] “Well then, have you ever done your relatives any good? Then you have been doing your relatives ill. Well then, have you ever done your enemies ill? Then you have done them a great deal of good.” [14] “Come now and answer me this: do you not pity beggars, because they suffer many bad things; <and> inversely you consider them happy, because they have many good things, if indeed bad and good are the same?” [15] Nothing prevents the Great King [scil. of Persia] from being in the same condition as beggars. For his many great good things are for him many great bad things, if good and bad are the same. And let these arguments be made about everything. [16] I shall consider each case, beginning with

¹¹ τύ τι τοῖ γονέες ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησαν W. Schulze: τι τοὺς (τὼς P1 P2 P4 P6 V2) γονέας ἀγαθὸν ἐποίησας Robinson

¹² ἐποίησας;” <“καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα.”> Diels

¹³ κακῶς mss. (κακὸν P1 P2) ¹⁴ μεγάλα mss. (μέγιστα P1 P2): μεγάλα.” “μέγιστα Diels

Matth. de Varis: κακὰ Diels ¹⁵ μεγάλα <κακὰ>

¹⁶ <καὶ> Schanz

¹⁷ αἶκα mss., corr. Diels

ἀφροδισιάζεν. ταῦτα¹⁸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀσθενεῦντι <ποιῆν κακόν, καὶ πάλιν>¹⁹ ταῦτα ποιῆν ἀγαθόν ἐστιν αὐτοῖς,²⁰ αἴπερ τῶντὸν ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν· καὶ τοῖς νοσέοντι κακὸν ἐστὶ τὸ νοσεῖν καὶ ἀγαθόν, αἴπερ τῶντὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῷ κακῷ. [17] καδδὲ τόδε καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα, τὰ ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν λόγῳ εἴρηται. καὶ οὐ λέγω τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρώμαι διδάσκειν, ὡς οὐ τῶντὸν εἴη κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν,²¹ ἀλλ' <ἄλλο>²² ἑκάτερον.

¹⁸ ταῦτα Mullach: τοῦτο mss.: τῶντὸ Orelli

¹⁹ <ποιῆν κακόν, καὶ πάλιν> Blass ²⁰ αὐτοῖς del. Trieber

²¹ τὸ κακὸν καὶ τὰγαθόν Diels ²² <ἄλλο> Blass

2. Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ

[1] λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ καλῷ καὶ¹ αἰσchrῷ δισσοὶ λόγοι. τοὶ μὲν γὰρ φαντι ἄλλο μὲν ἦμεν τὸ καλόν, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ αἰσchrόν, διαφέρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶνμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ σῶμα· τοὶ δὲ τῶντὸ καλὸν καὶ αἰσchrόν. [2] ἀγὼ πειρασεῦμαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐξαγεύμενος. αὐτίκα γὰρ παιδί² ὠραίῳ ἔραστῆ μὲν χρηστῷ³ χαρίζεσθαι καλόν, μὴ ἔραστῆ δὲ καλῷ⁴ αἰσchrόν. [3] καὶ τὰς γυναικὰς λουσθαι ἐνδοῖ⁵ καλόν, ἐν παλαίστρᾳ δὲ αἰσchrόν (ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐν παλαίστρᾳ καὶ ἐν γυμνασίῳ καλόν). [4] καὶ συνίμεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ ἐν ἀσυχίᾳ

¹ καὶ <τῷ> Trieber ² παιδίῳ mss., corr. Blass

³ χρηστῷ del. Wilamowitz ⁴ καλῷ del. Diels post Wilamowitz, alii alia ⁵ ἐνδοι Vahlen: ἐνιοι P1 P2: ἐνδον cett.

eating, drinking, and sex. For those who are sick these things are <bad to do, and inversely> to do them is good for them, if indeed good and bad are the same thing. And for those who are sick it is bad to be sick, and good, if indeed the good is the same thing as the bad. [17] And the same holds for all the other cases too that I mentioned in the preceding argument. And I am not saying what the good is, but I am trying to teach the following: that bad and good are not the same thing, but each one is <different> [scil. from the other].

2. On Seemly (*kalon*) and Unseemly (*aischron*)¹

¹ We have maintained the translation of *kalon* as 'seemly' and of *aischron* as 'unseemly' throughout, even though in certain cases 'beautiful' and 'ugly' would have been more appropriate in English.

[1] About the seemly and unseemly too a pair of arguments is stated. For some people say that the seemly is one thing, the unseemly another, which differs, just as in the name, so too in the reality named (*sōma*); but other people say that seemly and unseemly are the same. [2] And as for me, I shall try to explain in the following way. For example, it is seemly for a boy in the bloom of youth to give pleasure to a fine lover, but unseemly to do so to one who is not a seemly lover. [3] And it is seemly for women to wash themselves at home, but unseemly in a palaestra (but it is seemly for men in a palaestra or gymnasium). [4] And it is seemly to have sex with her husband when they are alone,

μὲν καλόν, ὅπου τοίχοις κρυφθήσεται· ἔξω δὲ αἰσχροῦν, ὅπου τις ὄψεται. [5] καὶ τῷ μὲν ἑαυτὰς συνίμεν ἀνδρὶ καλόν, ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ αἰσχιστον.⁶ καὶ τῷ γ' ἀνδρὶ τῷ μὲν ἑαυτῷ γυναικὶ συνίμεν καλόν, ἀλλοτρίῳ δὲ αἰσχροῦν. [6] καὶ κοσμεῖσθαι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ χρίεσθαι καὶ χρυσία περιάπτεσθαι, τῷ μὲν ἀνδρὶ αἰσχροῦν, τῷ δὲ γυναικὶ καλόν. [7] καὶ τῶς μὲν φίλῳ εὖ ποιῆν καλόν, τῶς δὲ ἐχθρῶς αἰσχροῦν. καὶ τῶς μὲν πολεμίῳς φεύγεν αἰσχροῦν, τῶς δὲ ἐν σταδίῳ ἀγωνιστὰς⁷ καλόν. [8] καὶ τῶς μὲν φίλῳ καὶ τῶς πολίτας φονεύεν αἰσχροῦν, τῶς δὲ πολεμίῳς καλόν. καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ πάντων.

[9] εἴμι δ' <ἐφ'>⁸ ἂ ταὶ πόλιές τε αἰσχροῦν ἄγνηται καὶ τὰ ἔθνεα. αὐτίκα Λακεδαιμονίοις τὰς κόρας γυμνάζεσθαι <καὶ>⁹ ἀχειριδῶτως καὶ ἀχίτωνας παρέρπεν καλόν, Ἴωσι δὲ αἰσχροῦν. [10] καὶ¹⁰ τῶς παῖδας μὴ μαυθάνειν μουσικὰ καὶ γράμματα καλόν, Ἴωσι δ' αἰσχροῦν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι τὰτα πάντα. [11] Θεσσαλοῖσι δὲ καλόν τῶς ἵππων ἐκ τὰς ἀγέλας λαβόντι αὐτῷ¹¹ δαμάσαι καὶ τῶς ὄρεας, βῶν τε λαβόντι αὐτῷ σφάζει καὶ ἐκδεῖραι καὶ κατακόψαι· ἐν Σικελίᾳ δὲ αἰσχροῦν καὶ δόλων ἔργα. [12] Μακεδόσι δὲ καλόν δοκεῖ ἡμεν τὰς κόρας, πρὶν ἀνδρὶ γάμασθαι, ἐράσθαι καὶ ἀνδρὶ συγγίνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ δὲ κα γάμνηται,¹² αἰσχροῦν. Ἑλλασι δ' ἄμφω αἰσχροῦν. [13] τοῖς δὲ Θραξὶ κόσμος τὰς

⁶ αἰσχιστον F2 P1 P3 R V1 (ex αἰσχροῦν Z, in mg. V2): αἰσχροῦν cett. ⁷ ἀνταγωνιστὰς Orelli

⁸ <ἐφ'> Stephanus

⁹ <καὶ> Blass

where it will be concealed by walls, but unseemly outside, where someone will see. [5] And it is seemly to have sex with her own husband, but most unseemly of all with another woman's husband; and it is seemly for a man to have sex with his own wife, but unseemly with another man's wife. [6] And to adorn oneself, apply makeup, and wear gold jewelry is unseemly for a man, but seemly for a woman. [7] And it is seemly to do good to one's friends, but unseemly to one's enemies. And to run away from one's enemies in war is unseemly, but from one's competitors in the stadium is seemly. [8] And to kill one's friends and fellow citizens is unseemly, but one's enemies in war is seemly. And this can be said about all subjects.

[9] I shall proceed <to> the things that cities and peoples consider unseemly. For example, for the Spartans it is seemly that girls engage in athletics <and> appear in public without sleeves or tunics, but for the Ionians it is unseemly; [10] and it is seemly that their [i.e. the Spartans'] children not learn music and letters, but for the Ionians it is unseemly not to know all these things. [11] For the Thessalians it is seemly that a man select horses and mules from a herd and break them in himself, and that he take a cow and slaughter it himself, skin it, and chop it up, but in Sicily this is unseemly and is the work of slaves. [12] The Macedonians think that it is seemly that girls fall in love and have sex with a man before they get married, but unseemly when they are married; but for the Greeks both are unseemly. [13] For the Thracians it is an adorn-

¹⁰ καὶ <τοῖς μὲν> Diels

¹¹ αὐτῶς mss., corr. Blass

¹² καὶ γαμείται mss., corr. Blass

κόρας στίζεσθαι τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις τιμωρία¹³ τὰ στίγματα τοῖς ἀδικέοντι, τοὶ δὲ Σκύθαι καλὸν νομίζοντι, ὃς ἄνδρα <κα>¹⁴ κατακανὸν¹⁵ ἐκδείρας τὰν κεφαλὰν τὸ μὲν κόμιον πρὸ τοῦ ἵππου φορῆ, τὸ δ' ὀστέον χρυσώσας καὶ¹⁶ ἀργυρώσας πίνη ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ σπένδη τοῖς θεοῖς· ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν οὐδὲ κ' ἐς τὰν αὐτὰν οἰκίαν συνεισελθεῖν βούλοισι¹⁷ τις τοιαῦτα¹⁸ ποιήσαντι. [14] Μασσαγέται δὲ τὰς γονέας κατακόψαντες κατέσθοντι, καὶ τάφος κάλλιστος δοκεῖ ἡμεν ἐν τοῖς τέκνοις τεθάφθαι· ἐν δὲ τῇ Ἑλλάδι αἱ τις ταῦτα ποιήσαι,¹⁹ ἐξελαθεὶς ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδος κακῶς κα²⁰ ἀποθάνου ὡς αἰσχροὶ καὶ δεινὰ ποιέων. [15] τοὶ δὲ Πέρσαι κοσμεῖσθαι τε ὥσπερ τὰς γυναῖκας καὶ τὼς ἄνδρας καλὸν νομίζοντι καὶ τῇ θυγατρὶ καὶ τῇ μητρὶ καὶ τῇ ἀδελφῇ συνίμεν· τοὶ δὲ Ἕλληνας καὶ αἰσχροὶ καὶ παράνομα. [16] Λυδοῖς τοίνυν τὰς κόρας πορνευθεῖσας καὶ ἀργύριον ἐνεργάσασθαι καὶ οὕτως γάμασθαι καλὸν δοκεῖ ἡμεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἑλλασιν οὐδεὶς κα θέλοι γάμαι. [17] Αἰγύπτιοι τε οὐ ταῦτα νομίζοντι καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις· τῆδε μὲν γὰρ γυναῖκας ὑφαίνειν καὶ²¹ ἐργάζεσθαι καλόν, ἀλλὰ τῆδε τὼς ἄνδρας, τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας πρᾶσσειν, ἅπερ τῆδε τοὶ ἄνδρες· τὸν παλὸν δεύειν ταῖς χερσί, τὸν δὲ σῖτον τοῖς ποσί, τῆνοις καλόν, ἀλλ' αἰμὴν τὸ ἐναντίον. [18] οἶμαι δ' ἄν²² τις τὰ καλὰ²³ ἐς ἐν

ment that girls are tattooed, but for everyone else tattoos are a punishment for those who have committed a crime. The Scythians consider it seemly that whoever kills a man cut off his scalp and set it on the front of his horse, and after having covered the skull with a layer of gold and silver to drink from it and to use it to give libations to the gods; but among the Greeks no one would wish even to go into the same house with anyone who did these things. [14] The Massagetes chop their parents up and eat them, and the most seemly burial is thought by them to be if they are buried inside their children; but in Greece if anyone did this he would be driven out of Greece and would die a terrible death for having done unseemly and terrible things. [15] The Persians consider it seemly that men too be adorned like women and have sex with their daughter, mother, and sister; but the Greeks, that this is both unseemly and illegal. [16] So the Lydians think that it is seemly that girls make money by prostituting themselves and then get married in this way, but among the Greeks no one would be willing to marry a girl like that. [17] And Egyptians do not consider the same things to be seemly as other people do: for here it is seemly that women weave and do manual labor, but there it is the men, and the women do what men do here; to moisten clay with the hands and dough with the feet is seemly for them, but the opposite is the case for us. [18] I think that if someone

¹³ τιμωρίαν mss., corr. Weber

¹⁴ <κα> Robinson

¹⁵ κατακανὸν Blass: κατακτανὸν P2: κατκτανὸν P1: κανὸν ZL: κτανὸν BRN

¹⁶ ἢ Wilamowitz: <ῆ> καὶ Diels

¹⁷ βούλοισι' ἄν mss., corr. Blass

¹⁸ τῷ ταῦτα Diels

¹⁹ ποιήσαι uel ποιήσῃ mss. (ποιήσας P2), corr. Blass

²⁰ κακὰ mss., corr. Blass

²¹ καὶ <ῆρια> Valckenaer

²² αἱ Wilamowitz

²³ αἰσχροὶ . . . καλὰ (infra ante λαβέει) North

κελεύοι συννεύεικαι πάντας ἀνθρώπων, ἃ ἕκαστοι νομίζοντι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἀθρόων τούτων²⁴ τὰ αἰσχροῦ λαβέν, ἃ ἕκαστοι ἀγγηται, οὐδὲν²⁵ <κα> καλλειφθῆμεν,²⁶ ἀλλὰ πάντας πάντα διαλαβέν. οὐ γὰρ πάντες ταῦτα νομίζοντι. [19] παρεξοῦμαι δὲ καὶ ποίημά τι [TrGF Adesp. F26].

καὶ γὰρ τὸν ἄλλον ὦδε θνητοῖσιν νόμον
ᾧση διαιρῶν· οὐδὲν ἦν²⁷ πάντη καλόν,
οὐδ' αἰσchrόν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτ'²⁸ ἐποίησεν λαβῶν
ὁ καιρὸς αἰσchrῶ καὶ διαλλάξας καλά.

[20] ὡς δὲ τὸ σύνολον εἶπαι, πάντα καιρῶ μὲν καλά ἐντι, ἐν ἀκαιρίᾳ δ' αἰσchrῶ.

τί ὦν διεπραξάμην; ἔφαν ἀποδείξειν ταῦτα αἰσchrῶ καὶ καλά ἔοντα, καὶ ἀπέδειξα ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι.

[21] λέγεται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ αἰσchrῶ καὶ²⁹ καλῷ, ὡς ἄλλο ἐκάτερον εἶη. ἐπεὶ αἶ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα αἰσchrὸν καὶ καλόν ἐστιν, αἶ ποκά τι αὐτοῖς καλὸν ἔργασται,³⁰ αἰσchrὸν ὁμολογησοῦντι, αἶπερ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸ αἰσchrὸν καὶ τὸ καλόν. [22] καὶ αἶ τινά γα καλὸν οἶδαντι ἄνδρα, τούτου καὶ αἰσchrὸν τὸν αὐτόν· καὶ αἶ τινά γα λευκόν, καὶ μέλανα τούτου τὸν αὐτόν. καὶ <αἶ>³¹ καλόν γ' ἐστὶ τὼς θεῶς σέβε-

²⁴ τούτων Weber: τοι mss. ²⁵ οὐδὲ ἐν Diels

²⁶ <κα> καλλειφθῆμεν Weber: καλλειφθῆμεν P1, καλυφθεῖμεν R, καλυφθῆμεν cett.: κα λειφθῆμεν Matth. de Varis

²⁷ ἄν mss., corr. Nauck ²⁸ ταῦτ' Valckenaer: ταῦτ' mss.: πᾶντ' Wilamowitz ²⁹ καὶ <τῷ> Blass

ordered everyone to gather together the things that each one considered to be seemly and then to take away from the heaps those things that each one considered to be unseemly, nothing would be left, but everything would be divided up by everyone. For all people do not think the same things. [19] I shall also cite some verses:¹

For you will see, if you distinguish, a different law
For mortals, like this: nothing is seemly in every
regard,

Nor unseemly, but the right occasion (*kairos*) takes
the same things

And makes them unseemly and, changing them,
seemly.

[20] To say this in general: all things are seemly when it is the right occasion and unseemly when it is not the right occasion.

What, therefore, have I accomplished? I said that I would show that the same things are unseemly and seemly, and I have shown this in all these cases.

[21] It is also said about the unseemly and seemly that each one is different [scil. from the other]. For if someone were to ask those people who say that the same thing is both unseemly and seemly whether they have ever done anything seemly, they would admit [scil. that it was] unseemly, if both the unseemly and the seemly are the same thing. [22] And if they know some man who is seemly, this same man is unseemly too; and if they know any man who is white, this same man is black too. And if it is seemly to

¹ From an unknown tragic poet.

³⁰ ἔργασται <καὶ> Wilamowitz

³¹ <αἶ> Robinson

σθαι, καὶ αἰσχροὺν ἄρα³² τὼς θεῶς σέβεσθαι, αἵπερ τῶντων αἰσχροὺν καὶ καλὸν ἐστί.

[23] καὶ τάδε μὲν περὶ ἀπάντων εἰρήσθω μοι τρέφομαι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν, ὃν λέγουσι. [24] αἱ γὰρ τὰν γυναῖκα καλὸν ἐστί κοσμεῖσθαι, τὰν γυναῖκα³³ αἰσχροὺν κοσμεῖσθαι, αἵπερ τῶντων αἰσχροὺν καὶ καλὸν καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τῶντων. [25] ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστί καλὸν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, ἐν Λακεδαίμονί ἐστί αἰσχροὺν τὰς παῖδας γυμνάζεσθαι, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως. [26] λέγουσι δέ, ὡς αἶ τινες τὰ αἰσχροὺν ἐκ τῶν ἐθνέων πάντοθεν συννεύκαιεν, ἔπειτα συγκαλέσαντες³⁴ κελεύοιεν, ἃ τις καλὰ νομίζοι, λαμβάνειν, πάντα κα³⁵ ἐν καλῷ ἀπενειχθῆμεν. ἐγὼ θαυμάζω, αἱ τὰ αἰσχροὺν συννεύκθαι καλὰ ἐστίται, καὶ οὐχ οἷαπερ ἦνθεν. [27] αἱ γοῦν ἵππους ἢ βῶς ἢ οἰς ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἄγαγον, οὐκ ἄλλο τί κα ἀπάγον ἐπεὶ οὐδ' αἱ χρυσὸν ἦνευκαν, χαλκὸν ἀπήνευκαν,³⁶ οὐδ' ἄν³⁷ ἀργύριον³⁸ ἦνευκαν, μόλιβδόν κα ἀπέφερον. [28] ἀντὶ δ' ἄρα τῶν αἰσχροῶν καλὰ ἀπάγοντι,³⁹ φέρε δὴ, αἱ ἄρα τις αἰσχροὺν⁴⁰ ἄγαγε,⁴¹ τοῦτον αὖ <κα>⁴² καλὸν ἀπάγαγε,⁴³ ποιητὰς δὲ μάρτυρας ἐπάγονται, <οἶ>⁴⁴ ποτὶ ἀδονάν, οὐ ποτὶ ἀλάθειαν ποιεῦντι.

³² ἄρα vel ἄρ mss.: αὖ Wilamowitz

³³ γυναῖκα <καὶ> Diels ³⁴ συγκαλεῦσαντες vel συγκαλεσούντες mss., corr. Schanz ³⁵ καὶ mss., corr. Orelli

³⁶ ἀπήνευκαν del. Wilamowitz ³⁷ οὐδ' ἄν P1 P2: οὐδέ cett.: οὐδ' αἶ Weber ³⁸ ἄργυρον Blass

³⁹ ἀπάγοντι mss., corr. Wilamowitz

worship the gods, then again [scil. it is] unseemly to worship the gods, if unseemly and seemly are the same thing.

[23] And let these things be said by me about all cases. I shall turn to the argument that they state. [24] For if it is seemly that a woman adorn herself, it is unseemly that a woman adorn herself, if indeed unseemly and seemly are the same thing. And the same applies to all the other cases. [25] In Sparta it is seemly that girls engage in athletics, in Sparta it is unseemly that girls engage in athletics; and in the same way for all the other cases. [26] They say that if some people brought together unseemly things from peoples everywhere, then summoned them and ordered them to take away what each person considered seemly, everything would be taken away, as belonging to what is seemly. As for me, I am astonished that things that were unseemly when they were brought together become seemly, and do not remain as they were when they arrived. [27] At least if they had brought horses, cows, sheep, or people, they would not have taken away something different; for if they had brought gold, they would not have taken away bronze either, and if they had brought silver, they would not have carried off lead. [28] So do they take away seemly things instead of unseemly ones? Come then, if someone brought something unseemly, would he lead it away again as seemly? They introduce poets as witnesses, <but these> compose for the sake of pleasure, not for the sake of truth.

⁴⁰ αἰσχροὺν <ἄνδρα> Diels

⁴¹ ἀπάγαγε mss., corr. Mullach

⁴² αὖ <κα> Robinson: δ' ἄν F2 P1 P4 P6 F; ἄν cett.: δ' αὖ <κα> Diels: ⁴³ ἀπάγε Diels ⁴⁴ <οἶ> Orelli

3. Περὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον

[1] δισσοὶ δὲ λόγοι λέγονται καὶ περὶ τῷ δίκαιῳ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ. καὶ τοὶ μὲν ἄλλο ἦμεν τὸ δίκαιον, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἀδίκον· τοὶ δὲ ταῦτὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἀδίκον· καὶ ἐγὼ τούτῳ πειρασοῦμαι τιμωρέν. [2] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ψεύδεσθαι ὡς δίκαιόν ἐστι λέξῳ καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν, τὼς μὲν πολεμίως ταῦτα ποιῆν¹ αἰσχροὺν καὶ πονηρὸν ἂν ἐξείποιεν,² τὼς δὲ φιλότατος οὐ, αὐτίκα τὼς γονέας· αἱ γὰρ δέοι τὸν πατέρα ἢ τὰν μητέρα φάρμακον πιῆν καὶ³ φαγῆν, καὶ μὴ θέλοι, οὐ δίκαιόν ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ ῥοφήματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποτῷ δόμεν καὶ μὴ φάμεν ἐνήμεν; [3] οὐκῶν⁴ ἤδη ψεύδεσθαι καὶ ἐξαπατᾶν τὼς γονέας καὶ κλέπτειν μὲν τὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ βιῆσθαι τὼς φιλότατος δίκαιον. [4] αὐτίκα αἶ τις λυπηθεὶς τι τῶν οἰκῆσι καὶ ἀχθεσθεὶς μέλλοι αὐτὸν⁵ διαφθεῖρειν ἢ ξίφει ἢ σχοινίῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινί, δίκαιόν ἐστι ταῦτα κλέψαι, αἱ δύναται, αἱ δὲ ὑστερίζαι καὶ ἔχοντα καταλάβοι, ἀφελῆσθαι βίᾳ. [5] ἀνδραποδίζασθαι δὲ πῶς οὐ δίκαιον τὼς πολεμίως,⁶ αἶ τις δύναται ἐλὼν πόλιν ὅλαν ἀποδόσθαι; τοιχωρυχὲν δὲ τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν κοινὰ οἰκήματα δίκαιον φαίνεται, αἱ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ἐπὶ θανάτῳ, κατεστασιασμένος ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, δεδεμένος εἶη, ἄρα οὐ δίκαιον διορύξαντα κλέψαι καὶ σώσαι τὸν πατέρα; [6] ἐπιорκῆν δὲ αἶ τις ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων

¹ ταῦτα <μὴ> ποιῆν Blass: ταῦτα ποιῆν <καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον, τὼς δὲ φίλως> Diels ² ἐξείποιεν <πῶς δὲ τὼς πολεμίως,> Diels ³ ἢ Diels

3. On Just and Unjust

[1] A pair of arguments is stated about the just and the unjust too. And some people [scil. state] that the just is one thing, the unjust another; but other people, that just and unjust are the same thing. And as for me, I shall try to support the latter. [2] And first I shall maintain that it is just to tell lies and to deceive. For they [i.e. the first group] would assert that to do this to enemies in war is unseemly and wicked, but not to those who are dearest, for example, to one's parents: for if one's father or mother were supposed to drink and eat some medicine but refused to do so, is it not just to put it into their porridge or drink and to deny that it is in it? [3] Therefore already to tell lies and deceive one's parents, and certainly to steal what belongs to one's friends and to inflict violence upon those who are dearest, is just. [4] For example, if some member of the household, in a state of grief and distress, were about to kill himself with a sword or rope or something else, it is just to steal it if one can, and if one arrives too late and catches him holding it, to take it away by violence. [5] And how is it not just to enslave one's enemies in war, if one can sell into slavery a whole city after having captured it? And to break in to the public buildings of one's fellow citizens is evidently just. For if one's father has been overthrown by his political enemies and is in prison on a death penalty, is it not just to break in so as to steal one's father away and save him? [6] And perjury: if some-

⁴ οὐκῶν Matth. de Varis: οὐκῶν uel οὐκῶν mss.: οὐκοῦν Mullach: οὐκῶν <δίκαιον> Diels

⁵ αὐτὸν mss., corr. Stephanus

⁶ πολεμίως <καὶ> Diels

λαφθείς ὑποδέξαιτο ὀμνύων ἢ μὰν ἀφεθείς τὰν πόλιν
 προδώσειν, ἄρα οὐτος δίκαιά <κα>⁷ ποιῆσαι εὐορκή-
 σαι; [7] ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐ δοκῶ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰν
 πόλιν καὶ τὼς φίλους καὶ τὰ ἱερὰ σώσαι <τὰ>⁸ πα-
 τρώϊα ἐπιορκήσας. ἤδη ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν.
 καὶ τὸ ἱεροσυλέν [8] τὰ μὲν ἴδια τῶν πόλεων ἐὼ τὰ
 δὲ κοινὰ τὰς Ἑλλάδος, τὰ ἐκ Δελφῶν καὶ τὰ ἐξ Ὀλυμ-
 πίας, μέλλοντος τῷ βαρβάρῳ τὰν Ἑλλάδα λαβεῖν⁹
 καὶ τὰς σωτηρίας ἐν χρήμασιν εἰσάγειν, οὐ δίκαιον
 λαβεῖν¹⁰ καὶ χρῆσθαι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον; [9] φονεῦεν
 δὲ τὼς φιλοτάτως δίκαιον· ἐπεὶ καὶ Ὀρέστας καὶ
 Ἀλκμαίων καὶ ὁ θεὸς ἔχρησε δίκαια αὐτῶν¹¹ ποιῆσαι.

[10] ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς τέχνας τρέφομαι καὶ τὰ τῶν¹² ποιη-
 τῶν. ἐν γὰρ τραγωδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις <κα>¹³
 πλείστα ἐξαπατῆ ὁμοία τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιῶν, οὐτος
 ἄριστος. [11] θέλω δὲ καὶ ποιημάτων¹⁴ παλαιοτέρων
 μαρτύριον ἐπαγαγέσθαι. Κλεοβουλίνης [Frag. 2 West].

ἄνδρ' εἶδον κλέπτοντα καὶ ἐξαπατῶντα βιαίως,¹⁵
 καὶ τὸ βία ῥέξει τούτο δικαιοτάτον.

[12] ἦν πάλοι ταῦτα· Δίσχυλον δὲ ταῦτα [Frag. 301,
 302 Radt].

ἀπάτης δίκαιας οὐκ ἀποστατεῖ θεός·¹⁶
 ψευδῶν δὲ καιρὸν ἔσθ' ὅπου¹⁷ τιμῆ θεός.

⁷ <κα> Matthaei ⁸ <τὰ> Matth. de Varis; <κα> Matthaei;
 <κα τὰ> Diels; <ἀν τὰ> Robinson ⁹ λαβεῖν Diels; λαβέν
 vel λαβέν mss. ¹⁰ λαβέν Fabricius

¹¹ αὐτῶ Blass; αὐτῶ vel αὐτῶ ms.; αὐτῶς Stephanus

one who has been captured by enemies in war promises
 on oath that if he is freed he will certainly betray his city,
 <would> he be acting justly if he kept his oath? [7] For as
 for me, I think he should not [scil. do this], but instead
 should save his city, his friends, and his ancestral temples
 by perjuring himself. So it is already just to commit per-
 jury as well. And to rob temples: [8] I omit the ones at-
 tached to the various cities; but as for the ones belonging
 in common to Greece, those in Delphi and Olympia; when
 the barbarian was about to conquer Greece and safety lay
 in money, was it not just to take them and use them for the
 war? [9] And to murder one's dearest is just. For both
 Orestes and Alcmaeon [scil. did this]; and the god pro-
 claimed that what they both did was just.

[10] I shall turn to the arts and to the works of the
 poets. For in tragedy and painting, whoever deceives the
 most by making things similar to true ones is the best one.
 [11] I wish to introduce the testimony of more ancient
 poems too. From Cleobulina:

A man I saw stealing and deceiving by force,
 And to do this by force was most just.

[12] These lines were ancient. The following ones are
 from Aeschylus:

From just deceit a god does not stand aloof;
 Sometimes a god honors the right occasion for lies.

¹² ταῦτα mss., corr. Diels ¹³ <κα> Blass

¹⁴ ποιήματα τῶν mss., corr. Diels ¹⁵ βία· ὡς mss.,
 corr. Matth. de Varis ¹⁶ <καὶ> post θεός Diels ut separat
 duos versus singulos ¹⁷ ὅπου mss., corr. Hermann

[13] λέγεται δὲ καὶ τῷδε ἀντίος λόγος, ὡς ἄλλο τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικόν ἐστιν, διαφέρον ὡσπερ καὶ τῶ-
 νυμα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐπεὶ αἱ τις ἐρωτάσαι τῶς
 λέγοντας, ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἄδικον καὶ δίκαιον, αἱ
 ἦδη¹⁸ τι δίκαιον περὶ τῶς γονέας ἐπραξαν, ὁμολογη-
 σοῦντι.¹⁹ καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἄδικον καὶ
 δίκαιον ὁμολογοῦντι ἡμεν. [14] φέρε ἄλλο δὴ.²⁰ αἱ τινα
 γινώσκει²¹ δίκαιον ἄνδρα, καὶ ἄδικον ἄρα τὸν αὐτόν,
 καὶ μέγαν τοῖνον καὶ μικρὸν κατὰ τῶντόν. καίτοι²²
 πολλὰ ἀδικήσας ἀποθανέτω, ἀποθανέτω²³ <πολλὰ καὶ
 δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος.²⁴ [15] καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων
 ἄλις. εἴμι δὲ ἐφ' ἃ λέγοντες ἀξιόουντι τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
 δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν. [16] τὸ γὰρ κλέπτεν
 τὰ τῶν πολεμίων δίκαιον, καὶ ἄδικον ἀποδεικνύεν
 τοῦτ' αὐτό, αἱ κ' ἀληθῆς ὁ τήνων λόγος, καὶ τὰλλα
 κατῶντό. [17] τέχναι δὲ ἐπάγονται, ἐν αἷς οὐκ ἔστι
 τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. καὶ τοὶ ποιηταὶ οὕτοι²⁵ ποτ'
 ἀλάθειαν, ἀλλὰ ποτὶ τὰς ἀδονὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὰ
 ποιήματα ποιέουντι.

¹⁸ αἱ κα δὴ mss., corr. Wilamowitz

¹⁹ ὁμολογοῦντι mss. (ὁμολογοσοῦντι P1), corr. Matth. de
 Varis ²⁰ ἄλλον δὲ mss., corr. Diels

²¹ γινώσκει Diels

²² καί τοι mss., corr. Blass: καὶ τοι <ὁ> Diels: καὶ <αἱ> λέ-
 γοιτο Kranz

²³ ἀποθανέτω bis C P6 V2 Y1 Y2, semel cett.

²⁴ <πολλὰ καὶ δίκαια δια>πραξάμενος Blass, alii alia

²⁵ οὕτο vel οὐτό mss., corr. Blass

[13] An opposing argument is stated to this one too: that the just and the unjust are different, differing just as in the name, so too in the thing named (*pragma*). For if someone were to ask those who say that unjust and just are the same thing whether they had ever yet acted justly regarding their parents, they would say yes. But then, unjustly: for they admit that unjust and just are the same thing. [14] Come then, another case: if one knows some man who is just, then therefore this same man is unjust too; and so too certainly large and small, by the same argument. So let him be killed for having performed many acts of injustice—let him be killed for having performed <many acts of justice>. [15] And that is enough about these cases. I shall proceed to what those people say who claim that they prove that the same thing is both just and unjust. [16] For [scil. one can assert] that to steal what belongs to enemies in war is just and also that to prove that this same thing is unjust, if their argument is true, and so too in all the other cases. [17] And they introduce the arts, in which the just and the unjust do not exist. And the poets certainly do not compose their poems for the sake of truth, but for the sake of people's pleasure.

4. Περὶ ἀλαθείας καὶ ψεύδους

[1] λέγονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῷ ψεύδους καὶ τῷ ἀλαθέος¹ δισσοὶ λόγοι, ὧν ὁ μὲν φασι ἄλλον μὲν τὸν ψεύσταν ἦμεν λόγον, ἄλλον δὲ τὸν ἀλαθῆ· τοὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν αὖ. [2] καὶ γὰρ τὸνδε λέγω πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι λέγονται· ἔπειτα δέ, ὅταν λόγος ῥηθῆ, αἱ μὲν ὡς <κα>² λέγεται ὁ λόγος, οὕτω γεγένηται,³ ἀλαθῆς ὁ λόγος, αἱ δὲ μὴ γεγένηται,⁴ ψευδῆς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. [3] αὐτίκα κατηγορεῖ ἱεροσυλίαν τῷ αἰ γ⁵ ἐγένετο τῶρον, ἀλαθῆς ὁ λόγος· αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐγένετο, ψεύστας. καὶ τῷ ἀπολογουμένῳ ὡς γε ὁ⁶ λόγος. καὶ τὰ γε δικαστήρια τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ψεύσταν καὶ ἀλαθῆ κρίνουντι. [4] ἔπει τοι καὶ⁷ ἐξῆς καθήμενοι αἱ λέγομεν⁸ “μύστας⁹ εἰμί,” τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν πάντες ἐροῦμεν, ἀλαθῆς δὲ μόνος ἐγώ, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰμί. [5] δᾶλον ὧν ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρῆ τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθῆς (ὥσπερ καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὸ αὐτό, καὶ παῖς καὶ νεανίσκος καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρον, ἐστίν).

[6] λέγεται δὲ καὶ ὡς ἄλλος εἴη ὁ ψεύστας λόγος, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἀλαθῆς, διαφέρων τῶνυμα <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα>¹⁰ αἱ γὰρ τις ἐρωτάσαι τὼς λέγοντας, ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος εἴη ψεύστας καὶ ἀλαθῆς, ὃν αὐτοὶ λέ-

¹ ἀληθείας mss. (ἀλαθείας P3 P4), corr. Diels

² <κα> Blass ³ γένηται mss. (<γε>γένηται P4 in mg.),
corr. Blass ⁴ γένηται mss., corr. Blass

⁵ αἰκ' mss., corr. Diels ⁶ αὐτὸς Wilamowitz

4. On True and False

[1] About the true and the false too a pair of arguments is stated, of which the one says that the false speech is one thing, the true one another; while others in turn say that they are the same. [2] And as for me, I maintain the latter: first, because these are stated with the same words; and then, whenever a speech is spoken, if things turn out just as the speech has asserted, the speech is true, whereas if they do not turn out like that, the same speech is false. [3] For example, a man accuses someone of robbing temples: if this deed happened, then his speech is true; if it did not happen, it is false. And the same argument applies to the speech of the defendant. And the law courts judge the same speech to be both false and true. [4] For surely if, sitting in a row, we were to say, “I have been initiated into the mysteries,” we would all be saying the same thing, but I would be the only one to be telling the truth, since I also happen to be [scil. an initiate]. [5] So it is clear that the same speech, when it is accompanied by falsehood, is false, but when it is the truth [scil. that accompanies it], it is true (just as a human being too is the same person, as a boy, a youth, an adult man, and an old man).

[6] But it is also said that a false speech is one thing, a true one another, and that they differ in the name <just as in the thing named>. For if someone were to ask those people who say that the same speech is false and true,

⁷ ἔπειτα τοι Diels

⁸ λέγομι mss. (λέγομεν P4 post corr., λέγοι μὲν Y1 Y2), corr. North ⁹ Μίμας Stephanus: Μίλατας Bergk: alii alia
¹⁰ <ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα> Diels, alii alia

γοντι, πότερός ἐστιν· αἱ μὲν “ψεύστας,” δᾶλον ὅτι δύο εἶη· αἱ δ’ “ἀλαθῆς” ἀποκρίναιτο,¹¹ καὶ ψεύστας ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος. καὶ <αἱ> ἀλαθῆς τί¹² ποκα εἶπεν ἢ ἐξεμαρτύρησε, καὶ ψευδῆ ἄρα τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. καὶ αἱ τινα ἄνδρα ἀλαθῆ οἶδε, καὶ ψεύσταν τὸν αὐτόν. [7] ἐκ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ λέγοντι ταῦτα, ὅτι γενομένῳ μὲν τῷ πράγματος ἀλαθῆ τὸν λόγον,¹³ ἀγενήτω δὲ ψεύσταν. οὐκὼν διαφέρει <αὐτῶν τῶννυμα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐρωτάσαι δὲ κά τις>¹⁴ [8] αἰθις τὼς δικαστάς, ὃ τι κρίνουντο¹⁵ (οὐ γὰρ πάρεντι τοῖς πράγμασιν)· [9] ὁμολογέοντι δὲ καὶ αὐτοί, ᾧ μὲν τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναμέμικται, ψεύσταν ἤμεν, ᾧ δὲ τὸ ἀλαθῆς, ἀλαθῆ. τοῦτο δὲ ὅλον διαφέρει . . .¹⁶

¹¹ ἀποκρίναιτο del. Schanz ¹² <αἱ> ἀλαθῆς τί Blass:
ἀλαθῆς τί mss.: ἀλαθῆ τίς Schanz ¹³ λόγον <λέγοντι>
Diels ¹⁴ <αὐτῶν τῶννυμα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐρωτάσαι
δὲ κά τις> Diels: <ἐρέσθαι> Robinson ¹⁵ κρίνουντι Schanz
¹⁶ lac. post διαφέρει indic. North

5.

[1] “ταῦτά¹ τοὶ μαινόμενοι καὶ τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἀμαθείς καὶ λέγοντι καὶ πράσσοντι. [2] καὶ πρᾶτον μὲν ὀνομάζοντι ταῦτά,² γᾶν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον καὶ πῦρ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα. καὶ ποιεῶντι ταῦτά,³ κάθηνται καὶ ἔσθοντι καὶ πίνοντι καὶ κατέκεινται, καὶ τᾶλλα κατῶντό. [3] καὶ μᾶν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ μέζον καὶ μῆρόν ἐστι καὶ πλέον καὶ ἔλασσον καὶ βαρύτερον καὶ κουφότερον. οὕτω γὰρ <κ’>⁴

which of the two is the one that they themselves say—if it is “false,” then it is clear that these are two things; but if they answer, “true,” then this same speech is also false. And if anyone has ever said something true or borne witness to it, then these same [scil. words] would therefore be false too. And if a man knows that some man is true, then also he also knows that the same man is false. [7] On the basis of this argument they say that if the event occurs then the speech is true, while if it does not, then it is false. So it is not <their names> that are different, <but the thing. One could ask> [8] the jurors again what they are judging (for they are not present at the events themselves): [9] they themselves admit that what the false is mixed in is false, what the true is mixed in, true. But this is completely different . . .¹

¹ The text is doubtless lacunose; Robinson supplies <from their original thesis>.

5.

[1] “The insane and the sane, and the wise and the foolish, both say and do the same things. [2] And first, they use the same names, ‘earth,’ ‘human,’ ‘horse,’ ‘fire,’ and all the others. And they do the same things, they sit, eat, drink, and lie down, and everything else in the same way. [3] And what is more, the same thing is both larger and smaller, and more numerous and less numerous, and heavier and lighter. For in this respect all things would be the same.

¹ ταῦτα vel ταυτα mss., corr. North ^{2,3} ταῦτα bis mss.,
corr. Meibom ⁴ <κ’> Blass

εἴη ταῦτά⁵ πάντα. [4] τὸ τάλαντόν ἐστι βαρύτερον τῆς μῶσ καὶ κουφότερον τῶν δύο ταλάντων τωῦτόν ἄρα καὶ κουφότερον καὶ βαρύτερον.⁶ [5] καὶ ζῶει ὁ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐ ζῶει, καὶ ταῦτά⁷ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ γὰρ τῆδ' ἐόντα ἐν τῇ Λιβύᾳ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδέ γε τὰ ἐν Λιβύᾳ ἐν Κύπρῳ. καὶ ἄλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον. οὐκῶν καὶ ἐντὶ τὰ πράγματα καὶ οὐκ ἐντί.⁸ [6] τοὶ τῆνα⁸ λέγοντες, τὼς μαινομένως καὶ⁹ τὼς σοφῶς καὶ τὼς ἀμαθεῖς ταῦτα διαπράσσεσθαι καὶ λέγειν, καὶ ἄλλα <τὰ>¹⁰ ἐπόμενα τῷ λόγῳ, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λέγουσι. [7] αἱ γὰρ τις αὐτῶς ἐρωτάσαι¹¹ αἱ διαφέρει μανία σωφροσύνης καὶ σοφία ἀμαθίης, φαντί· "ναί." [8] εὖ γὰρ καὶ ἐξ ὧν πράσσουντι ἑκάτεροι δᾶλοί ἐντι, ὡς ὁμολογησούντι. οὐκῶν αἱ¹² ταῦτα πράσσουντι, καὶ τοὶ σοφοὶ μαίνονται, καὶ τοὶ μαινόμενοι σοφοί, καὶ πάντα συνταράσσονται. [9] καὶ ἐπακτέος¹³ ὁ λόγος, πότερον οἶον¹⁴ ἐν δέοντι τοὶ σωφρονοῦντες λέγουσι ἢ τοὶ μαινόμενοι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ φαντι ὡς ταῦτα¹⁵ μὲν λέγουσι, ὅταν τις αὐτῶς ἐρωτῇ· ἀλλὰ τοὶ μὲν σοφοὶ ἐν τῷ δέοντι, τοὶ δὲ μαινόμενοι ᾄ¹⁶ οὐ δεῖ. [10] καὶ τοῦτο λέγοντες δοκούντι μικρὸν ποτιθῆναι <τὸ>¹⁷ ᾄ¹⁸ δεῖ καὶ μὴ δεῖ, ὥστε μηκέτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦμεν. [11] ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ πράγματος τοσοῦτω ποτιτεθέντος ἀλλοιοῦσθαι δοκῶ τὰ πρά-

⁵ ταῦτα mss., corr. Meibom ⁶ lac. post βαρύτερον susp. Diels
⁷ κατὰ ταῦτα mss. (κατ' αὐτὰ Y1 Y2), corr. Mullach
⁸ τινες mss., corr. Diels ⁹ καὶ <τὼς σωφρονοῦντας καὶ> Blass
¹⁰ <τὰ> Blass

[4] A talent is heavier than a mina and lighter than two talents; so that the same thing is both lighter and heavier. [5] And the same man is both alive and not alive, and the same things both are and are not: for the things that are here are not in Libya, and those that are in Libya are not in Cyprus. And the same argument applies to everything else. And so things both are and are not." [6] Those people who say this, that the insane, the wise, and the foolish do and say the same things, and everything else that follows from this argument, do not speak correctly. [7] For if one were to ask them whether insanity differs from sanity and wisdom from foolishness, they would answer, "Yes." [8] For it is quite clear, also on the basis of what both groups do, that they will agree with this. In consequence, if they do the same things, then the wise are insane too, and the insane are wise, and everything is thrown into confusion. [9] And the question should be raised whether it is the sane or the insane who speak as it were at the right moment. For when someone asks them, they answer that they say the same things, but the wise say them at the right moment, the insane when it is not right. [10] And when they say this, they seem to be making a small addition, viz. 'the right moment' and 'when it is not right,' so that it is no longer the same thing. [11] But as for me, I think that things are altered not by the addition of something

¹¹ ἐρωτάσας mss., corr. Fabricius ¹² καὶ mss., corr. Mullach
¹³ ἐπάρτεος vel ἐπ' ἀρτεος mss. (ἐπ' ἀργεος F2, ἐπ' ἄγεος P4 P6), corr. Wilamowitz
¹⁴ ὧν Wilamowitz:
 seel. Koen ¹⁵ ταῦτα mss., corr. Fabricius
¹⁶ αἱ mss., corr. Blass ¹⁷ <τὸ> Diels
¹⁸ αἱ mss., corr. Blass

γματα, ἀλλ' ἁρμονίας διαλλαγείσας ὥσπερ Γλαῦκος καὶ γλανκός καὶ Ξάνθος καὶ ξανθός καὶ Ξοῦθος καὶ ξουθός. [12] ταῦτα μὲν τὴν ἁρμονίαν ἀλλάξαντα διηνεικαν, τὰ δὲ μακρῶς καὶ βραχυτέρως ῥηθέντα. Τῦρος καὶ τυρός, σάκος καὶ σακός,¹⁹ ἄτερα δὲ γράμματα διαλλάξαντα: κάρτος καὶ κρατός,²⁰ ὄνος καὶ νόος. [13] ἐπεὶ ἂν οὐκ ἀφαιρεθέντος οὐδενὸς τοσοῦτον διαφέρει, τί δὴ, αἶ τις ἢ ποτιτίθητι τ²¹ ἢ ἀφαίρει; καὶ τοῦτο δείξω οἷόν ἐστιν. [14] αἶ τις ἀπὸ τῶν δέκα ἐν ἀφέλοι,²² οὐκέτι δέκα οὐδὲ ἐν ἂν²³ εἶη, καὶ τὰλλα καττωυτό.²⁴ [15] τὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἦμεν καὶ μὴ ἦμεν, ἐρωτῶ "τί ἢ τὰ πάντα ἐστίν"; οὐκῶν αἶ τις μὴ φαίη ἦμεν, ψεύδεται "τὰ πάντα" εἰπάν.²⁵ ταῦτα πάντα²⁶ ἂν πῆ ἐστι.

¹⁹ σάκος καὶ σάκκος mss. (σάκκος καὶ σάκκος L, σάκκος καὶ σάκος Z), corr. Weber ²⁰ κράτος mss., corr. Wilamowitz

²¹ ἢ ποτιτιθέει τι mss., corr. nos: τι ποτιτίθητι Diels

²² ἀφέλοι <ἢ τοῖς δέκα ἐν ποτθείη> Diels

²³ ἂν L. om. cett. ²⁴ καττωυτό mss., corr. Meibom

²⁵ εἰπόντες mss., corr. Mullach

²⁶ ταῦτα πάντα (vel πάντως) North: ταῦτά. πάντα Diels

6.¹

[1] λέγεται δὲ τις λόγος οὐτ' ἀλαθῆς οὔτε καινός, ὅτι² ἄρα σοφία καὶ ἀρετὰ οὔτε διδακτὸν εἶη οὔτε μαθητόν. τοὶ δὲ ταῦτα λέγοντες ταῖσδε ἀποδείξεσι χρώνται. [2] ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶη, αἶ τι ἄλλω παραδοίης, τοῦτο αὐτὸν ἔτι ἔχειν. μία μὲν δὴ αὐτα. [3] ἄλλα δέ, ὡς, αἶ δι-

of this size, but rather by a change of the accent: for example, *glaukos* ('Glaucus') and *glaukós* ('light blue'), *xánthos* ('Xanthus') and *xanthós* ('blond'), *xoúthos* ('Xouthus') and *xouthós* ('yellow-brown'). [12] These words differ by a change in accent, the following ones by whether they are pronounced with a long or a short vowel: *Tūros* ('Tyre') and *tūros* ('cheese'), *sākos* ('shield') and *sākos* ('enclosure'); and other ones by a change in the sequence of letters: *kartos* ('strength') and *kratos* ('of the head'), *onos* ('ass') and *noos* ('mind'). [13] So since there is such a big difference even if nothing is taken away, what will happen then, if someone were either to add or to take away something? And I shall show what sort of thing this is. [14] If someone were to take away 1 from 10, it would no longer be 10 or 1; and everything else in the same way. [15] As for the statement that the same man both is and is not, I ask: "Is he in some particular respect, or in all respects?" So that if someone says that he is not, he is making a mistake by saying "in all respects." Therefore all these things are in some way.

6.

[1] A certain argument is stated, one that is neither true nor new: viz. that wisdom and virtue can neither be taught nor learned. Those people who say this make use of the following proofs: [2] That it is not possible, if you pass something on to someone else, to still possess it yourself. This is a first proof. [3] Another one is that, if it could

¹ <Περὶ τᾶς σοφίας καὶ τᾶς ἀρετᾶς, αἶ διδακτόν> Stephanus ² τίς mss., corr. Stephanus

δακτὸν ἦν, διδάσκαλοι κα ἀποδεδεγμένοι ἦν, ὡς τὰς μουσικᾶς. [4] τρίτα δέ, ὡς τοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι γενόμενοι σοφοὶ ἄνδρες τὰ αὐτῶν τέκνα ἂν³ ἐδίδαξαν καὶ τὼς φίλως.⁴ [5] τετάρτα δέ, ὅτι ἤδη τινὲς παρὰ⁵ σοφιστὰς ἐλθόντες οὐδὲν ὠφέληθην. [6] πέμπτα δέ, ὅτι πολλοὶ οὐ συγγενόμενοι σοφισταῖς ἄξιοι λόγῳ γεγένηται. [7] ἐγὼ δὲ κάρτα εὐήθη νομίζω τόνδε τὸν λόγον· γινώσκω γὰρ τὼς διδασκάλως γράμματα διδάσκοντας ἂ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιστάμενος τυγχάνει, καὶ κιθαριστὰς κιθαρίζεν. πρὸς δὲ τὰν δευτέραν ἀπόδειξιν, ὡς ἄρα οὐκ ἐντὶ διδάσκαλοι ἀποδεδεγμένοι, τί μὰν τοὶ σοφισταὶ διδάσκοντι ἄλλ' ἢ σοφίαν καὶ ἀρετάν;⁶ [8] τί δὲ Ἀναξαγόρειοι καὶ Πυθαγόρειοι ἦεν; τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ἐδίδαξε Πολύκλειτος τὸν υἱὸν ἀνδριάντας ποιεῖν. [9] καὶ ἂν⁷ μὲν τις μὴ διδάξῃ,⁸ οὐ σαμῆον· αἱ δ' εἷς τις ἐδίδαξε,⁹ τεκμάριον ὅτι δυνατὸν ἐστὶ διδάξαι. [10] τέταρτον δέ, αἱ μὴ τοὶ παρὰ σοφῶν¹⁰ σοφιστῶν σοφοὶ γίνονται· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλοὶ οὐκ ἔμαθον μαθόντες. [11] ἔστι δὲ τις καὶ φύσις, ἣ δὴ¹¹ τις μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ σοφιστῶν ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο, εὐφυνῆς γὰρ¹² γεόμενος, ῥαδίως συναρπάξαι τὰ πολλὰ, ὀλίγα μαθὼν παρ' ὧν περ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα μανθάνομεν· καὶ τούτων τι ἦτοι

³ τὰν αὐτῶν τέχνας Schulze ⁴ καὶ τὼς φίλως L in mg.; καὶ πῶς φίλωσι vel φίλως cett.: κα τὼς φίλως Schulze

⁵ περὶ mss., corr. Stephanus ⁶ post ἀρετάν; hab. mss. ἦ, del. Wilamowitz ⁷ αἱ mss., corr. Robinson

⁸ ἐδίδαξε Wilamowitz ⁹ δ' ἐστὶ vel δ' ἐστὶ (δ' ἐστιν LZ) διδάξαι mss., corr. Wilamowitz

be taught, there would be recognized teachers of it, as there are of music. [4] A third one is that those men in Greece who showed themselves to be wise would have taught their children and friends. [5] A fourth is that it has already happened that some people who came to study with the sophists derived thereby no benefit at all. [6] A fifth is that many of those who have not studied with sophists have turned out to be noteworthy. [7] As for me, I think that this argument is extremely simpleminded. For I know that teachers teach letters that each one at that moment also knows, and that cithara players [scil. teach how] to play the cithara. Against the second proof, that there are not recognized teachers, what else do the sophists teach, if not wisdom and virtue? [8] What were the Anaxagoreans and the Pythagoreans? The third: Polyclitus taught his son how to make statues. [9] And if someone has not taught, this is not a proof: whereas if any one man has taught, this is proof that it is possible to teach. [10] The fourth, that some people do not become wise from wise sophists: it is also the case that many people have not learned to read in spite of the fact that they have studied how to. [11] But there is also a certain natural predisposition, thanks to which someone who has not learned from the sophists becomes competent, so long as he has a suitable predisposition by nature, at grasping many things easily even though he has learned only a little from the very same people from whom we also learn how to read; and among these people, one man [scil. learns] either more or

¹⁰ σοφῶν del. Blass ¹¹ αἱ δὲ mss., corr. Diels

¹² καὶ mss., corr. Diels; κα Blass; secl. Wilamowitz

πλέον, ἤτοι ἔλασσον, ὁ μὲν παρὰ πατρός, ὁ δὲ παρὰ ματρός. [12] αἱ δὲ τῷ μὴ πιστόν ἐστι τὰ ὄνυματα μανθάνειν ἀμέ,¹³ ἀλλ' ἐπισταμένως ἅμα γίνεσθαι, γνώτω ἐκ τῶνδε· αἱ τις εὐθύς γενόμενον παιδίον ἐς Πέρσας ἀποπέμψαι καὶ τηρεῖ τράφοι, κωφὸν Ἑλλάδος φωνᾶς, περιέζοι καὶ αἱ τις τηρόθεν τῆδε κομίζοι,¹⁴ ἑλλαυίζοι καὶ οὕτω μανθάνομεν τὰ ὄνυματα, καὶ τὼς διδασκάλως οὐκ ἴσαμες.¹⁵ [13] οὕτω¹⁶ λέλεκταί μοι ὁ λόγος, καὶ ἔχεις ἀρχὴν καὶ τέλος καὶ μέσαν· καὶ οὐ λέγω ὡς διδασκτόν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ¹⁷ ἀποχρῶντί μοι τῆνα ταῖς¹⁸ ἀποδείξεις.¹⁹

¹³ ἅμα mss. (ἄμε B P3 P4 P6 R V1), corr. Koen

¹⁴ κομίζοι Wilamowitz ¹⁵ οὐκ ἄμες mss. (οὐκ ἄμες L), corr. Blass ¹⁶ οὐ mss., corr. Diels; οὐ North: secl. Koen

¹⁷ ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ F2: ἀλλ' ὅτι cett.: ἀλλ' οὐκ Diels

¹⁸ αἱ Matth. de Varis ¹⁹ ἀποδείξεις mss., corr. Stephanus

7.

[1] λέγοντι δὲ τινες τῶν δαμαγορούντων ὡς χρῆ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ κλάρῳ γίνεσθαι, οὐ βέλτιστα ταῦτα νομίζοντες. [2] εἰ γάρ τις αὐτὸν ἐρωτῆ τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα, "τί δὴ σὺ τοῖς οἰκέταις οὐκ ἀπὸ κλήρω τὰ ἔργα προστάσσεις, ὅπως ὁ μὲν ζευγηλάτας, αἱ κ' ὀσποιοὺς λάχη, ὀσποιοῖν, ὁ δὲ ὀσποιοὺς ζευγηλατῆ, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τῶντό;¹ [3] καὶ πῶς οὐ καὶ τὼς χαλκῆς καὶ τὼς σκυτῆας συναγαγόντες καὶ τέκτονας καὶ χρυσοχόας διεκλαρώσαμεν² καὶ ἠναγκάσαμεν, ἂν χ'³ ἕκαστος λάχη τέχνην ἐργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἂν ἐπίσταται; [4]

less, one from his father, another from his mother. [12] And if someone finds it plausible not that we learn words, but that we are born already knowing them, let him understand from the following: if a baby were sent to the Persians as soon as he was born and were raised there, so that he heard nothing of the Greek language, he would speak Persian; but if he were brought from there to here, he would speak Greek. It is in this way that we learn words, and we do not know who our teachers are. [13] In this way my argument has been stated, and you have the beginning, the end, and the middle. And what I am saying is not that they are teachable, but that those proofs are not sufficient for me.

7.

[1] Some of the orators who make speeches to the people say that offices should be assigned by lot; but their opinion is not the best one. [2] For if someone were to ask the man who says this, "Why do you not assign your house slaves their tasks by lot, so that the ox driver, if the lot of cook fell to him, would cook, while the cook would drive the oxen, and everything else in the same way? [3] And how is it that we do not bring together the blacksmiths and the cobblers, and carpenters and goldsmiths, and make an assignment by lot, and force each one to work at whichever art happens to fall to him and not at the one he knows? [4]

¹ τοῦτο mss., corr. Koen

² διεκληρώσαμεν mss., corr. Meibom

³ ἀνάσχ' mss. (ἀ ἀν χ' L in mg.), corr. North

τωντὸν δὲ καὶ ἐν ἀγῶσι τὰς μουσικὰς διακλαρώσαι τὼς ἀγωνιστὰς καὶ ὃ τι χ' ἕκαστος⁴ λάχῃ, ἀγωνίζεσθαι· αὐλητὰς κιθαριζέτω⁵ τυχὸν καὶ κιθαρωδὸς αὐλήσει· καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοξότας καὶ ὀπλίτας⁶ ἵππασείται, ὁ δὲ ἵππεὺς τοξέυσει, ὥστε πάντες ἃ οὐκ ἐπίστανται οὐδὲ δύνανται,⁷ πραξοῦντι.” [5] λέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἡμεν καὶ δαμοτικὸν κάρτα· ἐγὼ ἤκιστα νομίζω δαμοτικόν. ἐντὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι μισόδαμοι ἄνθρωποι, ὧν αἱ καὶ τύχη ὁ κύαμος, ἀπολοῦντι τὸν δάμον. [6] ἀλλὰ χρῆ τὸν δάμον αὐτὸν ὀρώντα αἰρεῖσθαι πάντας τὼς εὖνωσ αὐτῷ, καὶ τὼς ἐπιταδείως στραταγέν, ἀτέρως δὲ νομοφυλακὲν καὶ τᾶλλα.⁸

⁴ post ἕκαστος hab. mss. κα (καὶ LZ), secl. Blass

⁵ κιθαριζεῖ Wilamowitz; κιθαριεῖται Robinson

⁶ πολέμῳ τὼς τοξότας καὶ τὼς ὀπλίτας mss., corr. Wilamowitz
⁷ post δύνανται hab. mss. οὐδὲ, del. Schanz

⁸ post τᾶλλα lac. pauc. litt. mss. (praeter L): <ἐπιστατέν> Blass: <καττωτό> Schanz

8.

[1] <τῷ δ' αὐτῷ>¹ ἀνδρὸς καὶ τὰς αὐτὰς² τέχνας νομίζω κατὰ βραχύ τε δύνασθαι διαλέγεσθαι,³ καὶ <τὰν>⁴ ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ δικάσασθαι⁵ ὀρθῶς, καὶ δαμαγορεῖν οἶόν τ' ἡμεν, καὶ λόγων τέχνας ἐπίστασθαι, καὶ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων ὡς τε ἔχει καὶ ὡς ἐγένετο διδάσκειν. [2] καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδὼς πῶς οὐ δυνασεῖται περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς⁶ καὶ πράσσειν; [3] ἔτι δὲ⁷ ὁ τὰς

The same thing in competitions in music too, choose the competitors by lot and, whatever happens to fall to each one, have him compete in that one: let an *aulos* player play the cithara perhaps, and a cithara player will play the *aulos*. And in war a bowmen and an infantryman will ride horseback, and the cavalryman will shoot with the bow, so that they will all do what they do not know how to do and what they are not capable of doing.” [5] And they say that this is a good thing and extremely democratic; but as for me, I do not think that it is in the least bit democratic. For in the cities there are men who hate the people, and if the lot falls to them they will destroy the people. [6] But the people themselves must watch out and choose men all of whom are favorable to them, and suitable men to be generals, and other ones to be guardians of the laws, and so on.

8.

[1] I think that it belongs <to the same> man and to the same art to be able to discuss briefly, to know <the> truth of things, to judge a legal case correctly, to be able to make speeches to the people, to know the arts of speeches, and to teach about the nature of all things, both their present condition and their origins. [2] And first, how would the man who knows about the nature of all things not be able also to act correctly about all things? [3] Furthermore, the

¹ <τῷ δ' αὐτῷ> Robinson post Blass
² κατὰ τὰς αὐτὰς mss., corr. Blass
³ καὶ ἀλέγεσθαι mss., corr. North

⁴ <τὰν> Wilamowitz
⁵ δικάσασθαι F2: διδασκασθαι cett.

⁶ ὀρθῶς <καὶ λέγειν> Blass, alii alia

⁷ δὴ mss., corr. Diels

τέχνας τῶν λόγων εἰδὼς ἐπίστασέεται καὶ περὶ πάντων ὀρθῶς λέγειν. [4] δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν, περὶ ὧν ἐπίσταται, περὶ τούτων λέγειν. <περὶ>⁸ πάντων γ' ἄρ'⁹ ἐπίστασέεται. [5] πάντων μὲν γὰρ τῶν λόγων τὰς τέχνας ἐπίσταται, τοῖ δὲ λόγοι πάντες περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐκόντων ἐντί>.¹⁰ [6] δεῖ δὲ ἐπίστασθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ ὅτων καὶ λέγοι¹¹ . . . ,¹² καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ ὀρθῶς διδάσκειν τὴν πόλιν πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ τῶς¹³ κωλύειν. [7] εἰδὼς δέ γε ταῦτα¹⁴ εἰδήσει καὶ τὰ ἄτερα τούτων πάντα γὰρ ἐπίστασέεται: ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα¹⁵ τῶν πάντων, τῆνα <ὄ>¹⁶ δὲ ποτὶ τῶντῶν τὰ δέοντα παρέξεται, αἰ¹⁷ χρή. [8] καὶ μὴ ἐπίσταται¹⁸ αὐλέν, αἰ δυνασέεται αὐλέν, αἰ κα δέη τοῦτο πράσσειν. [9] τὸν δὲ δικάζεσθαι ἐπιστάμενον δεῖ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπίστασθαι ὀρθῶς: περὶ γὰρ τούτω καὶ δίκαι.¹⁹ εἰδὼς δὲ τοῦτο, εἰδήσει καὶ τὸ ὑπεναντίον αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ . . . <ἐ>τεροῖα.²⁰ [10] δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ τῶς νόμως ἐπίστασθαι πάντας: αἰ τοῖνυν τὰ πράγματα μὴ

⁸ <περὶ> Rohde ⁹ γ' ἄρ' Robinson: γὰρ mss.: del. Diels

¹⁰ post ε vel ε lac. pauc. litt. mss., corr. Orelli ¹¹ καὶ λέγοι mss. (καὶ λέγει F1 F2, δεῖ λέγειν P3): κα λέγει Blass

¹² post λέγοι lac. 4-5 lin. mss. (ἔλλιπές τὸ χωρίον P3 in mg.), <τὰ πράγματα> Diels ¹³ κακὰ τῶς Diels: κακὰ παντῶς Blass ¹⁴ δέ γε αὐτὰ mss., corr. Blass: γε del. Diels

¹⁵ ταῦτα mss., corr. Diels ¹⁶ τῆνα P3: κείνα cett.: τῆνα, <ὄ> Diels ¹⁷ παρασσεύεται. χρή vel πρασσεύεται χρή mss., corr. Robinson (αἰ χρή iam Wilamowitz): πράξει, αἰ Diels

man who knows the arts of speeches will also know how to speak correctly about all things. [4] For it is necessary that the man who intends to speak correctly speak about those things he knows about. Therefore he will know <about> all things. [5] For he knows the arts of all speeches, and all speeches <are> about all of the <things that are>. [6] It is necessary that the man who intends to speak correctly, whatever he would speak about . . . ¹ and teach the city correctly to do beneficial things and to prevent them from doing harmful ones. [7] Knowing all this, he will also know what is different from this, for he will know everything: for these things are the same for all men, while in the same way he will supply of himself what is necessary if it is required. [8] And even if he does not know how to play the *aulos*, he will always be able to play the *aulos*, if it should be necessary that he do this.² [9] It is necessary that a man who knows how to judge a legal case know correctly what is just; for legal cases revolve around this. And knowing this, he will also know what is the opposite of it and what is . . . ³ of a different sort. [10] It is also necessary that he know all the laws: so if he does not know

¹ The mss. have a lacuna of four to five lines at this point.

² The sentence may be corrupt; but cf. perhaps Plato, *Protagoras* 327A-C.

³ The mss. have a lacuna of about ten letters at this point.

¹⁸ καὶ μὴ ἐπίσταται mss., corr. Robinson: καὶ μὲν ἐπιστάται Diels ¹⁹ τὰ δίκαια mss., corr. Blass

²⁰ καὶ vel καὶ τὰ mss. (καὶ τῶς νόμως P4 P6) tum lac. 10 fere litt. tum τέρεια vel τερεία: <ἐ>τεροῖα Mullach: καὶ τὰ <ἄλλα αὐτῷ ? >ἐτεροῖα Robinson: καὶ τὰ <τούτων> ἄτερα Diels

ἐπιστασείται, οὐδὲ τὼς νόμῳ. [11] τὸν γὰρ ἐν μουσικῇ νόμον²¹ ἐπίσταται ὅσπερ καὶ μουσικάν, ὃς δὲ μὴ μουσικάν, οὐδὲ τὸν νόμον. [12] ὅς γα <μᾶν>²² τὰν ἀλάθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίσταται, εὐπετῆς²³ ὁ λόγος, ὅτι πάντα ἐπίσταται [13] ὃς δὲ <κατὰ> βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται>,²⁴ δεῖ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνασθαι περὶ πάντων οὐκῶν²⁵ δεῖ νῦν πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι.

²¹ post νόμον hab. mss. τίς, del. Wilamowitz: ὄντος Diels

²² <μᾶν> Wilamowitz ²³ ἀπετῆς mss. (εὐπατῆς ex ἀπατῆς Y2), corr. Matth. de Varis ²⁴ <κατὰ> βραχὺ <διαλέγεσθαι δύναται> Blass ²⁵ οὐκῶν P3 corr.: οὐκούν Y2: οὐκουν cett.

9.

[1] μέγιστον δὲ καὶ κάλλιστον ἐξέυρημα εὔρηται ἐς τὸν βίον μνάμα καὶ ἐς πάντα χρήσιμον, ἐς φιλοσοφίαν τε καὶ σοφίαν. [2] ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο <πρᾶτον>¹ εἰς προσέχης τὸν νοῦν, διὰ τούτω² παρελθούσα <ἀ>³ γνώμα μᾶλλον αἰσθησέται σύνολον ὃ ἔμαθες.⁴ [3] δευτέρον⁵ δὲ⁶ μελετᾶν,⁷ αἶ κα ἀκούσης· τῷ⁸ γὰρ πολλάκις ταῦτ' ἀκούσαι καὶ εἶπαι ἐς μνάμα παρεγένετο. [4] τρίτον αἶ κα ἀκούσης ἐπὶ τὰ⁹ οἶδας καταθέσθαι, οἶον τόδε· δεῖ μεμνᾶσθαι Χρύσιππον, κατθέμεν ἐπὶ τὸν χρυσοῦν καὶ τὸν ἵππον. [5] ἄλλο· Πυριλάμπη κατθέμεν ἐπὶ <τὸ>¹⁰ πῦρ καὶ τὸ λάμπειν. τάδε μὲν περὶ

¹ <πρᾶτον> Diels post Schanz

² τούτων mss., corr. Orelli

³ <ἀ> Orelli

the things, he will not know the laws either. [11] For that man knows the law in music who also [scil. knows] music, but the man who does not [scil. know] music does not [scil. know] its law either. [12] <Certainly,> whoever knows the truth about things, it is easy to argue that that man knows all things; [13] and whoever <is able to discuss> briefly must answer, when someone questions him, about everything. And so it is necessary that he know everything.

9.

[1] A very great and fine discovery has been made for life, viz. memory, and it is useful for everything, for philosophy and for wisdom. [2] It is this <first of all>: if you pay attention, then your thought, passing [scil. things] in review by this means, will better perceive the totality of what you have learned. [3] Second: to practice, if you hear [scil. something]; for by hearing and saying the same thing many times, it [scil. the totality of what you have learned] comes to be present to your memory. [4] Third: if you hear something, connect it with what you know, as for example the following: it is necessary to remember Chrysippus, connect it with *khrusos* ('gold') and *hippos* ('horse'). [5] Or another example: connect Pyrilampes with *pur* ('fire') and *lampain* ('to shine'). These examples are about names. [6]

⁴ σύνολον ὃ ἔμαθες post παρεγένετο transp. Diels

⁵ δευτέραν mss., corr. North

⁶ δεῖ Robinson

⁷ μελέταν mss., corr. North

⁸ τὸ mss., corr. Schanz

⁹ ἔπειτα mss., corr. Matth. de Varis

¹⁰ <τὸ> Blass

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY IX

τῶν ὀνυμάτων¹¹ [6] τὰ δὲ πράγματα οὕτως· περὶ ἀνδρείας¹² ἐπὶ τὸν Ἄρη καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλῆα, περὶ χαλκείας δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἡφαιστον, περὶ δειλίας ἐπὶ τὸν Ἐπειόν¹³

...

¹¹ ὀνυμάτων P3, ὀνομάτων cett.: corr. Trieber

¹² ἀνδρείας mss., corr. Stephanus

¹³ post Ἐπειόν hab. P3 Σῆ: ἔλλιπες οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀντίγραφον, ὡς ὀράτε, cett. Σῆ ὅτι τὸ ἐπίλοιπον οὐχ εὐρέθη

DISSOI LOGOI

For things, [scil. do] as follows: about manly valor, with Ares and Achilles; about smithery, with Hephaestus; about cowardice, with Epeius . . .¹

¹ The mss. indicate that the text breaks off at this point.

42. 'SOPHISTS' AND 'SOPHISTIC': COLLECTIVE REPRESENTATIONS AND GENERAL CHARACTERIZATIONS [SOPH.]

The present chapter gathers together a number of texts that illustrate how the loose group of fifth century intellectuals who were usually known as 'sophists' were collectively understood. It begins with passages in which the terms *sophos* ('wise man') or *sophistês* (originally 'man of learning,' 'expert') were applied to various figures—poets, sages, legislators—from the period before the fifth century, and then it goes on to illustrate some basic features attributed to most or all of the fifth-century 'sophists': the requirement that a fee be paid; travel from one city to another; personal charisma; interest in education, especially in the teaching of virtue (*aretê*) and rhetoric; various forms of oratorical disputation; writing. It also includes a number of passages in which Plato and Xenophon, in speeches they attribute to Socrates or to other characters, propose analogies intended to define, usually pejoratively, what a 'sophist' is: above all, as a prostitute, a hunter, a merchant, or a charlatan. It concludes with texts that put 'sophistic' in relation to atheism and, usually by con-

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trast, to philosophy. Beyond the chapters on the individual 'sophists' elsewhere in this volume, in which many of the same themes are found as they apply to one figure or another, the texts in this chapter show how the term came to be specialized in order to define—most often negatively—a definite group of thinkers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

See the titles listed in the General Introduction to Chapters 31–42.

OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

- The Earliest 'Sophists' (R1–R5)*
- A Group Portrait (R6)*
- The Sophists as Moneymakers, Travelers, and Charismatic Figures (R7–R8)*
- The Sophists as Educators (R9–R11)*
- The Sophists as Teachers of Virtue (R12–R13)*
- The Sophists as Teachers of Rhetoric (R14–R15)*
- Eristic, Antilogy, Opposed Speeches (R16–R22)*
- The Sophists and Writing (R23–R24)*
- Socratic Analogies for the Sophist (R25–R32)*
 - Prostitute (R25)*
 - Hunter (R26–R27)*
 - Merchant (R28–R29)*
 - Magician and Charlatan (R30–R31)*
 - Other Images (R32)*
- Sophistic and Atheism (R33)*
- Sophistic, Rhetoric, and Philosophy (R34–R36)*

'SOPHISTS' AND 'SOPHISTIC':
COLLECTIVE
REPRESENTATIONS AND
GENERAL
CHARACTERIZATIONS
[cf. 79 DK]

The Earliest 'Sophists' (R1-R5)

R1 (≠ DK) Isocr. *Ant.* 313

[. . .] τοὺς μὲν καλουμένους σοφιστὰς ἐθαύμαζον καὶ τοὺς συνόντας αὐτοῖς ἐζήλουν [. . .]. μέγιστον δὲ τεκμήριον Σόλωνα μὲν γάρ, τὸν πρῶτον τῶν πολιτῶν λαβόντα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν αὐτήν, προστάτην ἠξίωσαν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι [. . .].

R2 (≠ DK) Plut. *E ap. Delph.* 3 385D-E

[ΛΑ.] λέγουσι γὰρ ἐκείνους τοὺς σοφοὺς ὑπ' ἐνίων δὲ σοφιστὰς προσαγορευθέντας, αὐτοὺς μὲν εἶναι πέντε, Χίλωνα καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ Σόλωνα καὶ Βίαντα καὶ Πιπτακόν [. . .].

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The Earliest 'Sophists' (R1-R5)

R1 (≠ DK) Isocrates, *Antidosis*

[. . .] they [i.e. Athenians of earlier times] felt admiration for the people called 'sophists' and envy for their students [. . .]. And the greatest proof is this: they thought it right to make Solon, the first of their fellow citizens to bear this title, the head of the city [. . .].

R2 (≠ DK) Plutarch, *On the Letter E in Delphi*

[Lamprias:] For they say that those wise men (*sophoi*) whom some call 'sophists' are in fact five in number: Chilon, Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus [. . .] [cf. **MOR. T35; THAL. R2**].

R3 (≠ DK) Diog. Laert. 1.12

οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ἐκαλοῦντο· καὶ οὐ μόνον,¹
ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ σοφισταί, καθὰ καὶ Κρατῖνος ἐν
Ἀρχιλόχοις [cf. Frag. 2 K–A] τοὺς περὶ Ὅμηρον καὶ
Ἡσίοδον ἐπαινωῶν οὕτως καλεῖ.

¹ μόνον <οὔτοι> Reiske

R4 (79.1a Untersteiner) Plut. *Them.* 2.4

[. . .] μᾶλλον οὖν ἂν τις προσέχοι τοῖς Μνησιφίλου
τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα τοῦ Φρεαρρίου ζηλωτὴν γενέσθαι
λέγουσιν, οὔτε ῥήτορος ὄντος οὔτε τῶν φυσικῶν κλη-
θέντων φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ τὴν τότε καλουμένην σο-
φίαν, οὖσαν δὲ δεινότητα πολιτικὴν καὶ δραστήριον
σύνεσιν, ἐπιτήδευμα πεποιημένον καὶ διασώζοντος
ὡς περ αἵρεσιν ἐκ διαδοχῆς ἀπὸ Σόλωνος· ἢ οἱ μετὰ
ταῦτα δικανικαῖς μείξαντες τέχναις καὶ μεταγαγόντες
ἀπὸ τῶν πράξεων τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, σο-
φισταὶ προσηγορεύθησαν.

R5 (79.1) Ael. Arist. *Or.* 3 311

ἀρχὴν δὲ οὐδ' εἰδέναι μοι δοκοῦσιν οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦνομα
τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὅπως εἶχε τοῖς Ἑλλησι καὶ ὅτι ἡδύ-
νατο οὐδ' ὅλως τῶν περὶ ταῦτ' οὐδέν. οὐχ Ἡρόδοτος
Σόλωνα σοφιστὴν κέκληκεν, οὐ Πυθαγόραν πάλιν;
οὐκ Ἀνδροτίων [FCRHist 321 F69] τοὺς ἑπτὰ σοφιστὰς
προσεῖρηκε, λέγων δὴ τοὺς σοφούς, καὶ πάλιν αὖ Σω-

R3 (≠ DK) Diogenes Laertius

Wise men (*sophoi*) also used to be called 'sophists,' and
not only they, but the poets too were 'sophists.' And so
when Cratinus in his *Archilochuses* praises Homer, Hes-
iod, and their disciples, he calls them this.

R4 (≠ DK) Plutarch, *Themistocles*

[. . .] So one should rather pay attention to those people
who say that Themistocles was a disciple of Mnesiphilus
of Phrearrhi, who was neither an orator nor one of the
so-called 'natural philosophers,' but who, practicing some-
thing that at that time was called 'wisdom' (*sophia*) but
was really cleverness in political matters and pragmatic
shrewdness, made this his profession and preserved it in-
tact like a sect transmitted to him in succession from So-
lon. But those people who followed him mixed this with
forensic arts and transferred its sphere of application from
actions to speeches, and they were called 'sophists.'

R5 (79.1) Aelius Aristides, *Against Plato: In Defense of
the Four*

It seems to me that they [i.e. the critics of oratory] do not
even know anything at all either about how the very term
'philosophy' was used by the Greeks and what it signified,
or in general about anything connected with it. Did not
Herodotus call Solon, and again Pythagoras, a 'sophist'
[*Histories* 1.29, 6.95]? Did not Androtion speak of the
seven 'sophists,' meaning by that the sages (*sophoi*), and

κράτη σοφιστῆν τοῦτον τὸν πάνν; αὖθις δ' Ἴσοκράτης σοφιστὰς μὲν τοὺς περὶ τὴν ἔριν καὶ τοὺς ὡς ἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν διαλεκτικούς, φιλόσοφον δ' ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἔξω φιλοσόφους; ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν τούτῳ συγγενομένων ὀνομάζουσι τινες. οὐ Λυσίας Πλάτωνα σοφιστὴν καλεῖ [Frag. 449 Carey] καὶ ἄλιον Αἰσχίνην [VI A19 G²]; “κατηγορῶν οὗτός γε,” φαίη τις ἄν. ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷ γε ἄλλοι κατηγοροῦντες ἐκείνων τῶν ἄλλων ὁμῶς ταυτὸν τοῦτο προσειρήκασιν αὐτούς. ἔτι δ' εἰ καὶ Πλάτωνος ἔξῃν κατηγοροῦντα σοφιστὴν προσειπεῖν, τί τούτους γ' ἂν εἴποι τις; ἀλλ' οἶμαι καὶ σοφιστῆς ἐπιεικῶς κοινὸν ἦν ὄνομα καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία τοῦτ' ἠδύνατο, φιλοκαλία τις εἶναι καὶ διατριβὴ περὶ λόγους, καὶ οὐχ ὁ νῦν τρόπος οὗτος, ἀλλὰ παιδεία κοινῶς [. . .]. καὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν δοκεῖ μὲν πῶς κακίξειν αἰεὶ, καὶ ὅ γε δὴ μάλιστα ἐπαναστὰς τῷ ὀνόματι Πλάτων εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. αἴτιον δὲ τούτου καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὸν ὑπερφρονῆσαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ εἰς ἅπασαν εὐφημίαν τῇ προσηγορίᾳ κεχρημένους. ὃν γοῦν ἀξιοῖ σοφώτατον εἶναι θεὸν καὶ παρ' ᾧ πᾶν εἶναι τάληθές, τοῦτον δὴ πού τέλεον σοφιστὴν κέκληκεν.

then again [scil. did he not call] the great Socrates a 'sophist'? Or again, [scil. did not] Isocrates [scil. call] the eristic speakers and the dialecticians (as they themselves would say) 'sophists' [cf. e.g. *Against the Sophists*, 1–8], but himself a 'philosopher,' and rhetoricians and those men involved in political activity 'philosophers' [cf. e.g. *Paneg.* 47]? Some of his associates too use the term in the same way. Does not Lysias call Plato a 'sophist,' and again Aeschines? "Yes indeed—when he accuses him," someone might say—except that the other authors call those other men [scil. the sophists] by this same name, even though they are not accusing them. Furthermore, if it was permissible to call Plato a 'sophist' when accusing him, what could one call them [i.e. the sophists]? In fact, I think that 'sophist' was a fairly general term and that 'philosophy' signified a certain love of beauty and an activity involving speeches, not in this present way, but a kind of education in general. [. . .] And Plato seems to me always somehow to be denigrating the sophist, and it is he who seems to me to attack this word most of all. The reason for this was that he despised the multitude of the people as well as his contemporaries. But it is clear that he also uses this term in an entirely positive sense. Indeed the god whom he considers to be the wisest of all and who has at his disposal all the truth [i.e. Hades] he has even called 'a perfect sophist' [*Crat.* 403e].

A Group Portrait (R6)

R6 (cf. 84 A2, ad 86 A11) Plat. *Prot.* 314e–316a

[ΣΩ.] ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἰσῆλθομεν, κατελάβομεν Πρωταγόραν ἐν τῷ προστώφῳ περιπατοῦντα, ἐξῆς δ' αὐτῷ συμπεριπάτουσαν ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα Καλλίας ὁ Ἴππονίκου καὶ ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁμομήτριος, [315a] Πάραλος ὁ Περικλέους, καὶ Χαρμίδης ὁ Γλαύκωνος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἐπὶ θάτερα ὁ ἕτερος τῶν Περικλέους Ξάνθιππος, καὶ Φιλιππίδης ὁ Φιλομήλου καὶ Ἀντίμοιρος ὁ Μενδαῖος, ὅσπερ εὐδοκίμει μάλιστα τῶν Πρωταγόρου μαθητῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ μαθάνει, ὡς σοφιστῆς ἐσόμενος. τούτων δὲ οἱ ὄπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐπακούοντες τῶν λεγομένων τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο—οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ ὥσπερ [315b] Ὀρφεύς, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκληγμένοι—ἦσαν δέ τινας καὶ τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἐν τῷ χορῷ. τούτων τὸν χορὸν μάλιστα ἔγωγε ἰδὼν ἦσθην, ὡς καλῶς ἠύλαβοντο μηδέποτε ἐμποδῶν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν εἶναι Πρωταγόρου, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ αὐτὸς ἀναστρέφοι καὶ οἱ μετ' ἐκείνου, εὖ πως καὶ ἐν κόσμῳ περισχίζοντο οὗτοι οἱ ἐπήκοοι ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν, καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ περιόντες αἰεὶ εἰς τὸ ὄπισθεν καθίσταντο κάλλιστα.

“τὸν δὲ μετ' εἰσενόησα,” ἔφη Ὀμηρος [*Od.* 11.601], Ἴππιαν [315c] τὸν Ἡλείου, καθήμενον ἐν τῷ κατ' ἀντικρὺ προστώφῳ ἐν θρόνῳ· περὶ αὐτὸν δ' ἐκάθηντο ἐπὶ

A Group Portrait (R6)

R6 (cf. 84 A2, ad 86 A11) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] When we went in [scil. to Callias' house] we found Protagoras walking around in the portico, and walking around with him were on one side Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and his half brother [315a] Paralus, the son of Pericles, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon, and on the other Xanthippus, Pericles' other son, and Philippides, the son of Philomelus, and Antimoerus of Mende, who has the best reputation of Protagoras' pupils and is learning professionally so as to become a sophist. Those who were following behind these, listening to what was said, seemed to be foreigners for the most part—Protagoras leads them off from each of the cities he goes through, charming them with his voice like [315b] Orpheus, while they follow, spellbound by his voice—but there were also some locals [i.e. Athenians] in the chorus. I was extremely pleased when I saw how this chorus took such lovely care that no one ever got in Protagoras' way, but whenever he and his companions turned round, those who were listening to him divided themselves in an orderly fashion to one side and the other, and going around in a circle regrouped behind him every time in the most lovely way.

“And after him I perceived,” as Homer says [*Od.* 11.601], Hippias [315c] of Elis, sitting in the opposite portico on a throne. Around him, sitting on benches, were

βάθρων Ἐρυξίμαχος τε ὁ Ἄκουμενού καὶ Φαῖδρος ὁ Μυρρινούσιος καὶ Ἄνδρων ὁ Ἄνδροτίωνος καὶ τῶν ξένων πολῖται τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλοι τινές. ἐφαίνοντο δὲ περὶ φύσεώς τε καὶ τῶν μετεώρων ἀστρονομικὰ ἄττα διερωτῶν τὸν Ἰππῖαν, ὁ δ' ἐν θρόνῳ καθήμενος ἑκάστοις αὐτῶν διέκρινεν καὶ διεξήγει τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.

καὶ μὲν δὴ “καὶ Τάνταλόν” γε “εἰσεῖδον” [*Od.* 11.582]—ἐπεδήμει γὰρ [315d] ἄρα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος—ἦν δὲ ἐν οἰκῆματί τινι, ᾧ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ὡς ταμείῳ ἐχρήτη Ἰππόνικος, νῦν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν καταλυόντων ὁ Καλλίας καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκενώσας ξένοις καταλύσιν πεποίηκεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πρόδικος ἔτι κατέκειτο, ἐγκεκαλυμμένος ἐν κωδίῳ τισὶν καὶ στρώμασιν καὶ μάλα πολλοῖς, ὡς ἐφαίνετο· παρεκάθητο δὲ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλησίον κλίναις Πausανίας τε ὁ ἐκ Κεραμέων καὶ μετὰ Πausανίου νέον τι ἔτι μειράκιον, ὡς μὲν ἐγῶμαι καλόν τε κάγαθόν τὴν φύσιν, τὴν δ' οὖν ἰδέαν πάνν καλός. ἔδοξα ἀκοῦσαι ὄνομα αὐτῷ εἶναι Ἀγάθωνα, καὶ οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι εἰ παιδικὰ Πausανίου τυγχάνει ὄν. τοῦτό τ' ἦν τὸ μειράκιον, καὶ τῷ Ἀδειμάντῳ ἀμφοτέρῳ, ὃ τε Κήπιδος καὶ ὁ Λευκολοφίδου, καὶ ἄλλοι τινές ἐφαίνοντο· περὶ δὲ ὄν διελέγοντο οὐκ ἐδυνάμην ἔγωγε μαθεῖν ἕξωθεν, καίπερ λιπαρῶς ἔχων ἀκούειν τοῦ Προδίκου—πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι [316a] καὶ θεῖος—ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν βαρῦτητα τῆς φωνῆς βόμβος τις ἐν τῷ οἰκῆματι γυγνόμενος ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα.

Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus from Myrrinus, and Andron, the son of Androtion, and some foreigners, fellow citizens of his [i.e. Hippias] and others. They seemed to be asking Hippias a number of astronomical questions about nature and celestial phenomena, while he, sitting on his throne, answered each of them and replied to their questions in detail [cf. **HIPPIAS D34**].

And indeed “I also saw Tantalus” [cf. Homer, *Od.* 11.582], for [315d] Prodicus of Ceos too was in town. He was in a room that Hipponicus had previously used as a storeroom, but now because of the number of people staying Callias had cleared this out too and made it a guest room. Prodicus was still lying down, covered with some sheepskins and bedclothes, with a lot of them, as could be seen. On the beds next to his were sitting Pausanias from Cerameis, and with Pausanias a youth who was still quite young, fine-looking I thought and with a good (*kalos-kagathos*) build. I thought I heard that his name was Agathon, and I would not be surprised if he were Pausanias’ boyfriend. There was that youth, and the two Adeimantuses, the son of Cepis and the son of Leucolophides, and there seemed to be some others; but what they were talking about I was not able to understand from outside, although I was very eager to hear Prodicus—for the man seems to me to be surpassingly wise, [316a] and divine—but his deep voice produced a booming sound in the room that made what he was saying unclear [cf. **PROD. P3**].

*The Sophists as Moneymakers, Travelers,
and Charismatic Figures (R7–R8)***R7** (84 A4) Plat. *Apol.* 19e–20a

[ΣΩ.] ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἴός τ' εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἴππίας ὁ Ἥλειος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος [. . .] οἴός τ' ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους—οἷς ἕξεισι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται—τούτους πείθουσι [20a] τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσεδέσθαι.

R8 (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 311d–e

[ΣΩ.] παρὰ δὲ δὴ Πρωταγόραν νῦν ἀφικόμενοι ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἀργύριον ἐκείνῳ μισθὸν ἔτοιμοι ἐσόμεθα τελεῖν ὑπὲρ σοῦ, ἂν μὲν ἐξικνῆται τὰ ἡμέτερα χρήματα καὶ τούτοις πείθωμεν αὐτόν, εἰ δὲ μή, καὶ τὰ τῶν φίλων προσαναλίσκοντες. εἰ οὖν τις ἡμᾶς περὶ ταῦτα οὕτω σφόδρα σπουδαζόντας ἔροιτο· “εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ Ἰππόκρατες, ὡς τίνι ὄντι τῷ Πρωταγόρῃ ἐν νῶ ἔχετε χρήματα τελεῖν;” τί ἂν αὐτῷ ἀποκριναίμεθα; τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν; ὥσπερ περὶ Φειδίου ἀγαλματοποιὸν καὶ περὶ Ὀμήρου ποιητὴν, τί τοιούτων περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν;

*The Sophists as Moneymakers, Travelers,
and Charismatic Figures (R7–R8)***R7** (84 A4) Plato, *Apology*

[Socrates:] This seems to me a fine thing: to be capable of educating people, like Gorgias of Leontini, Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis. For each of these men [. . .] is able, going into each of the cities, to persuade the young men there—who have the possibility of associating, without paying, with any of their fellow citizens they wish—to stop associating with those people, to associate instead with them, to pay money for this—and, what is more, to feel grateful for this.

R8 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] You [i.e. Hippocrates] and I are going now to Protagoras, prepared to pay money to him as a fee for your sake, spending our money if that is enough to persuade him, and if not then spending our friends' money as well. If then someone were to ask us while we are rushing off so eagerly for this purpose, “Tell me, Socrates and Hippocrates, you have in mind to pay money to Protagoras—for his being what?” how would we answer him? What other term do we hear used for Protagoras? Just as we hear ‘sculptor’ for Phidias and ‘poet’ for Homer, what term like this do we hear for Protagoras?

[III.] σοφιστήν δὴ τοι ὀνομάζουσί γε, ᾧ Σώκρατες, τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι [. . .].

[ΣΩ.] ὡς σοφιστῆ ἄρα ἐρχόμεθα τελοῦντες τὰ χρήματα;

[III.] μάλιστα.

The Sophists as Educators (R9–R11)

R9 (≠ DK) Plat. *Rep.* 10 600c–d

[ΣΩ.] [. . .] Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παριστάναί ἰδίᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἰοί τ' ἔσονται, ἐὰν μὴ σφέεις αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσιν τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὕτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἐταῖροι.

R10 (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 312a–b

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλ' ἄρα, ᾧ Ἰππόκρατες, μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησιν [312b] ἔσσεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἴαπερ ἢ παρὰ τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ ἐγένετο καὶ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ παιδοτρίβου; τούτων γὰρ σὺ ἐκάστην οὐκ ἐπὶ τέχνῃ ἔμαθες, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἐσόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλεύθερον πρέπει.

[Hippocrates:] 'Sophist' certainly is the term that they apply to him, Socrates [. . .].

[Socrates:] So we are going to pay money to him for his being a sophist?

[Hippocrates:] Yes indeed.

The Sophists as Educators (R9–R11)

R9 (≠ DK) Plato, *Republic*

[Socrates:] [. . .] Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, and very many other men are able to convince their contemporaries, with whom they associate in private, that they will not be able to manage their home or their city unless it is they themselves who supervise their education, and they are so beloved because of this wisdom of theirs that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders.

R10 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] But then, Hippocrates, perhaps you think that the instruction you will receive from Protagoras is not this kind [i.e. learning how to become a sophist], but the kind you received from your grammar teacher, your cithara teacher, and your gymnastics teacher? For you did not study from these men technically so that you could become a practitioner yourself, but for the sake of your general education, as befits a layman and a free man.

[III.] πάνυ μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοιαύτη μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου μάθησις.

R11 (> 80 A5) Plat. *Prot.*

a 316d–e, 317c

[IIP.] ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημί μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν, τοὺς δὲ μεταχειριζομένους αὐτὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν, φοβουμένους τὸ ἐπαχθές αὐτῆς, πρόσχημα ποιείσθαι καὶ προκαλύπτεσθαι, τοὺς μὲν ποιῆσιν, οἷον Ὅμηρον τε καὶ Ἡσίοδον καὶ Σιμωνίδην, τοὺς δὲ αὖ τελετάς τε καὶ χρησμοφῶν, τοὺς ἀμφὶ τε Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον· ἐπίους δὲ τινὰς ἦσθημαι καὶ γυμναστικὴν, οἷον Ἴκκος τε ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ ὁ νῦν ἔτι ὢν οὐδενὸς ἤττων σοφιστῆς Ἡρόδικος ὁ Σηλυμβριανός, τὸ δὲ ἀρχαῖον Μεγαρεύς· μουσικὴν δὲ Ἀγαθοκλῆς τε ὁ ὑμέτερος πρόσχημα ἐποιήσατο, μέγας ὢν σοφιστῆς, καὶ Πυθοκλείδης ὁ Κεῖος καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί. οὗτοι πάντες, ὥσπερ λέγω, φοβηθέντες τὸν φθόνον ταῖς τέχναις ταύταις παραπετάσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἅπασιν κατὰ τοῦτο εἶναι οὐ συμφέρομαι. [. . .] ἐγὼ οὖν τούτων τὴν ἐναντίαν ἅπασαν ὁδὸν ἐλήλυθα, καὶ ὁμολογῶ τε σοφιστῆς εἶναι καὶ παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους [. . .].

b 318d–319a (= PROT. D37)

[IIP.] οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι λαβῶνται τοὺς νέους· τὰς γὰρ

[Hippocrates:] It seems to me, he said, that the instruction one receives from Protagoras is rather of this kind.

R11 (> 80 A5) Plato, *Protagoras*

a

[Protagoras:] I say that the sophistic art is ancient, but that those ancient men who practiced it, because they feared the annoyance it caused, employed a screen and disguised it, some using poetry, like Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, and others initiatory rites and oracles, the followers of Orpheus and Musaeus; and certain ones, I have heard, under gymnastics too, like Iccus of Tarentum [cf. **PYTH. b T34**] and another one, still alive, as much a sophist as anyone: Herodicus of Selymbria, originally a Megarian colony. And music was the screen employed by your fellow citizen Agathocles, a great sophist, Pythocleides of Ceos, and many others. All these men, as I say, made use of these arts as façades because of their fear of ill will. But I am not in agreement with all of these. [. . .] So I myself have gone on the whole opposite path from these men, and I admit that I am a sophist and that I educate people [. . .].

b (= PROT. D37)

[Protagoras:] For the other people [scil. sophists] harm young men. Driving them back, despite their resistance,

τέχνας αὐτοὺς πεφευγότας ἄκουτας πάλιν αὖ ἄγοντες ἐμβάλλουσιν εἰς τέχνας, λογισμούς τε καὶ ἀστρονομίαν καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν διδάσκοντες—καὶ ἅμα εἰς τὸν Ἱππίαν ἀπέβλεψεν—παρὰ δ' ἐμὲ ἀφικόμενος μαθήσεται οὐ περὶ ἄλλου του ἢ περὶ οὗ ἦκει. τὸ δὲ μάθημά ἐστιν εὐβουλία περὶ τῶν οἰκείων, ὅπως ἂν ἄριστα τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν διοικοῖ, καὶ περὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως, ὅπως τὰ τῆς πόλεως δυνατώτατος ἂν εἴη καὶ πρᾶττει καὶ λέγειν.

The Sophists as Teachers of Virtue (R12–R13)

R12 (80 A5) Plat. *Prot.* 318a (= **PROT. D36**)

ὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ Πρωταγόρας εἶπεν· “ὦ νεανίσκε, ἔσται τοίνυν σοι, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ συνῆς, ἢ ἂν ἡμέρα ἐμοὶ συγγένη, ἀπίεσαι οἴκαδε βελτίονι γεγονότι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ ταῦτα ταῦτα· καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας αἰεὶ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον ἐπιδιδόναι.”

R13 (≠ DK) Plat. *Men.* 91a–b

[ΣΩ.] οὗτος γάρ, ὦ Ἄνυτε, πάλαι λέγει πρὸς με ὅτι ἐπιθυμῆι ταύτης τῆς σοφίας καὶ ἀρετῆς ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰς τε οἰκίας καὶ τὰς πόλεις καλῶς διοικοῦσι, καὶ τοὺς γονέας τοὺς αὐτῶν θεραπεύουσι, καὶ πολίτας καὶ ξένους ὑποδέξασθαί τε καὶ ἀποπέμψαι ἐπίστανται ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ. ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἀρετὴν¹ σκόπει παρὰ τίνας ἂν πέμποντες αὐτὸν ὀρθῶς πέμπομεν. ἢ

toward the arts that they have fled, they cast them upon those arts, teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music (and he cast a glance at Hippias) [cf. **HIPPIAS D14**]; whereas if he comes to me he will learn nothing else than what he came for. The object of my instruction is good deliberation about household matters, to know how to manage one’s own household in the best way possible, and about those of the city, so as to be most capable of acting and speaking in the city’s interests.

The Sophists as Teachers of Virtue (R12–R13)

R12 (80 A5) Plato, *Protagoras* (= **PROT. D36**)

Protagoras said in reply, “Young man [i.e. Hippocrates], if you study with me, this is what will happen to you: the very day that you start to study with me, you will go home having become a better man, and the same thing will happen the following day. And every day you will make progress continually toward what is better.”

R13 (≠ DK) Plato, *Meno*

[Socrates:] For he [i.e. Meno] has been telling me for some time, Anytus, that he desires to acquire that wisdom and virtue by which people manage their households and cities well, take care of their parents, and know how to welcome and send off their fellow citizens and foreigners in a manner worthy of a good man. Consider then to whom we would be right to send him to learn this virtue. Is it

¹ post ἀρετὴν lac. stat. Cobet, μαθησόμενον vel βουλόμενον αὐτὸν σοφὸν γενέσθαι intercidisse ratus

δῆλον δὴ κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ὅτι παρὰ τούτους τοὺς ὑπισχνουμένους ἀρετῆς διδασκάλους εἶναι καὶ ἀποφύναστας αὐτοὺς κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τῷ βουλομένῳ μαθάνειν, μισθὸν τούτου ταξαμένους τε καὶ πραττομένους;

[AN.] καὶ τίνας λέγεις τούτους, ᾧ Σώκρατες;

[ΣΩ.] οἶσθα δῆπου καὶ σὺ ὅτι οὗτοί εἰσιν οὓς οἱ ἄνθρωποι καλοῦσι σοφιστάς.

The Sophists as Teachers of Rhetoric (R14–R15)

R14 (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 312d

[ΣΩ.] εἰ δέ τις ἐκείνο ἔροιτο, “ὁ δὲ σοφιστῆς τῶν τί σοφῶν ἐστίν;” τί ἂν ἀποκρινοίμεθα αὐτῷ; ποίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης;

[ΠΙ.] τί ἂν εἴποιμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, ᾧ Σώκρατες, ἢ ἐπιστάτην τοῦ ποιῆσαι δεῖνδον λέγειν;

R15 (≠ DK) Isocr. *In soph.* 9–10

[. . . = **R17**] [9] οὐ μόνον δὲ τούτοις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς τοὺς πολιτικοὺς λόγους ὑπισχνουμένοις ἀξίον ἐπιτιμῆσαι καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοι τῆς μὲν ἀληθείας οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν, ἠγοῦνται δὲ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν τέχνην, ἣν ὡς πλείστους τῇ μικρότητι τῶν μισθῶν καὶ τῷ μεγέθει τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων προσαγάγονται καὶ λαβεῖν τι παρ' αὐτῶν δυνηθῶσιν· οὕτω δ' ἀναισθητῶς αὐτοὶ τε διάκεινται καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἔχειν ὑπειλήφασιν, ὥστε χεῖρον γρά-

not clear from the preceding argument that we should send him to those men who claim to be teachers of virtue, who declare that they are available to whoever among the Greeks wishes to learn, and who have established a fee for this and demand it?

[Anytus:] And who are these people you are talking about, Socrates?

[Socrates:] Surely you too know that these men are the ones whom people call 'sophists.'

The Sophists as Teachers of Rhetoric (R14–R15)

R14 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] If someone asked, “What is that field in which the sophist is one of the experts (*sophoi*)?” what would we answer him? What kind of thing is he in charge of making?

[Hippocrates:] What else would we say that he is, Socrates, than someone who is in charge of making one clever at speaking?

R15 (≠ DK) Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*

[. . .] [9] But it is not only these men [scil. those who devote themselves to eristic] who deserve to be criticized, but also those who promise to provide political orations. For the latter too have no thought at all for the truth, but they think that this is an art, if they can attract as many people as possible by the small size of their fees and the large size of their proclamations and are able to get something from them. For they are so stupid themselves and suppose that everyone else is too, that although the speeches they

φοντες τοὺς λόγους ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινες αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν, ὅμως ὑπισχνοῦνται τοιοῦτους ῥήτορας τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσῃν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἐνότων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παραλιπεῖν. [10] καὶ ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν οὔτε ταῖς ἐμπειρίαις οὔτε τῇ φύσει τῇ τοῦ μαθητοῦ μεταδιδόασιν, ἀλλὰ φασιν ὁμοίως τὴν τῶν λόγων ἐπιστήμην ὥσπερ τὴν τῶν γραμμάτων παραδῶσιν, ὡς μὲν ἔχει τούτων ἐκάτερον οὐκ ἐξετάσαντες, οἰόμενοι δὲ διὰ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων αὐτοὶ τε θαυμασθήσεσθαι καὶ τὴν παιδεύσιν τὴν τῶν λόγων πλέονος ἀξίαν δόξιν εἶναι, κακῶς εἰδότες ὅτι μεγάλας ποιοῦσι τὰς τέχνας οὐχ οἱ τολμῶντες ἀλαζονεύεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' οἷτινες ἂν, ὅσον ἔνεστιν ἐν ἐκάστη, τοῦτ' ἐξευρεῖν δυνηθῶσιν.

Eristic, Antilogy, Opposed Speeches (R16–R22)

R16 (≠ DK) Plat. *Theaet.* 154d–e

[ΣΩ.] οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἡμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, συνελθόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν.

R17 (≠ DK) Isocr. *In soph.* 7–8

[7] ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν τινες, ἅπαντα ταῦτα συλλογισάμενοι, κατίδωσι τοὺς τὴν σοφίαν διδάσκοντας

write are worse than the ones that some laymen improvise, nonetheless they promise that they will make their students such orators that they will lack nothing in the conduct of their affairs. [10] And they ascribe this ability neither to the student's experience nor to his natural talent, but they say that they will transmit the science of speeches in exactly the same way as that of letters, without having examined the character of either of them, but on the idea that, because of the exaggerations of their proclamations, they themselves will be admired and instruction in speeches will be thought to be more valuable, not recognizing that what makes the arts great are not the people who shamelessly boast about them but the ones who are able to discover what belongs to each one.

Eristic, Antilogy, Opposed Speeches (R16–R22)

R16 (≠ DK) Plato, *Theaetetus*

[Socrates:] If you [i.e. Theaetetus] and I were clever and wise, from having examined closely everything belonging to intelligence (*phrenes*), then from now on we would spend the rest of our lives testing each other on the basis of our resources, rushing against one another like sophists in the sort of combat that is typical of them, and smiting each other's arguments with other arguments.

R17 (≠ DK) Isocrates, *Against the Sophists*

[7] When therefore certain laymen, having considered all this [scil. the misdeeds for which those who practice eris-

καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν παραδιδόντας αὐτοὺς τε πολλῶν
 δεομένους καὶ τοὺς μαθητὰς μικρὸν πραττομένους,
 καὶ τὰς ἐναντιώσεις ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν λόγων τηροῦντας,
 ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἔργων μὴ καθορῶντας, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μὲν τῶν
 μελλόντων εἰδέναι προσποιουμένους, [8] περὶ δὲ τῶν
 παρόντων μηδὲν τῶν δεόντων μήτ' εἰπεῖν μήτε συμβ-
 βουλευσαί δυναμένους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὁμοιοῦντας
 καὶ πλείω κατορθοῦντας τοὺς ταῖς δόξαις χρωμένους
 ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπαγγελλομένους, εἰκό-
 τως οἶμαι καταφρονοῦσι, καὶ νομίζουσιν ἀδολεσχίαν
 καὶ μικρολογίαν ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι
 τὰς τοιαύτας διατριβάς [. . . = R15].

R18 (≠ DK) Arist. *SE* 11 171b25–34

οἱ μὲν οὖν τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ
 ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης
 χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοί· ἡ γὰρ σοφι-
 στική ἐστίν [. . .] χρηματιστική τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαι-
 νομένης· διὸ φαινομένης ἀποδείξεως ἐφίενται, καὶ τῶν
 λόγων τῶν αὐτῶν μὲν¹ οἱ φιλέριδες καὶ οἱ σοφισταί,
 ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἕνεκεν, καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν
 ἔσται σοφιστικός καὶ ἐριστικός, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ ταῦτόν,
 ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν νίκης φαινομένης <ἕνεκα>² ἐριστικός, ἢ δὲ
 σοφίας, σοφιστικός. καὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστική ἐστὶ φαι-
 νομένη σοφία τις ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσα.

¹ εἶσω post μὲν hab. mss., secl. Ross

² <ἕνεκα> Ross

tic are responsible], see that those men who teach wisdom
 and transmit happiness are themselves in need of many
 things and demand that their students pay them only a
 little, that they are on the lookout for contradictions in
 words but do not see the ones in actions, and that further-
 more about the future they pretend to possess knowledge
 [8] but about the present they are not able either to say or
 to counsel anything about what ought to be done, but that
 those men who have recourse to opinions are in greater
 agreement and are more successful than those who pro-
 claim that they possess scientific knowledge, then it is with
 good reason, I think, that they despise them and think
 that this kind of occupation is mere claptrap and small-
 mindedness, and not a way to care for the soul [. . .].

R18 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Sophistic Refutations*

Therefore people who are like this [scil. who will use any
 argument to win a debate] for the sake of victory are con-
 sidered to be eristic and contentious, and those who do so
 for the sake of reputation, in order to make money, to be
 sophistic. For the sophistic art is [. . .] a certain art of mak-
 ing money out of what is wisdom in appearance, and that
 is why they aim at what is proof in appearance. And the
 contentious and the sophists both [scil. use] the same argu-
 ments, but not for the same purposes. And that is why
 the sophistic argument and the eristic argument will be
 identical, but not in the same regard: if it is for the sake of
 what is victory in appearance, then it is eristic, but if for
 what is wisdom [scil. in appearance], sophistic. For sophis-
 tic is a wisdom in appearance but not in reality [cf. R34a].

R19

a (≠ DK) Plat. *Men.* 80d–e

[ME.] καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο ὁ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν ὅτι ἐστίν; ποῖον γὰρ ὄν οὐκ οἶσθα προθέμενος ζητήσεις; ἢ εἰ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐντύχοις αὐτῷ, πῶς εἴσῃ ὅτι τοῦτό ἐστιν ὃ σὺ οὐκ ᾔδησθα; [80e]

[ΣΩ.] μανθάνω οἶον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾶς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον καταγεις, ὡς οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ζητεῖν ἀνθρώπῳ οὔτε ὃ οἶδε οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδε; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν ὃ γε οἶδεν ζητοῖ—οἶδεν γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ τῷ γε τοιούτῳ ζητήσεως—οὔτε ὃ μὴ οἶδεν—οὐδὲ γὰρ οἶδεν ὅτι ζητήσει.

b (≠ DK) Arist. *Metaph.* 98 1049b29–1050a1

διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οἰκοδόμον εἶναι μὴ οἰκοδομήσαντα μηθὲν ἢ κιθαρῖστην μηθὲν κιθαρῖσαντα ὃ γὰρ μανθάνων κιθαρίζειν κιθαρίζων μανθάνει κιθαρίζειν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι. ὅθεν ὃ σοφιστικὸς ἔλεγχος ἐγίγνετο ὅτι οὐκ ἔχων τις τὴν ἐπιστήμην ποιήσει οὐδ' ἢ ἐπιστήμη· ὃ γὰρ μανθάνων οὐκ ἔχει. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου γεγενῆσθαι τι καὶ τοῦ

R19

a (≠ DK) Plato, *Meno*

[Meno:] And in what way will you search for this [e.g. virtue], Socrates, when you do not know at all what it is? What kind of thing, among those that you do not know, will you propose to yourself in order to be able to search for it? Or even if you are so lucky as to run into it, how will you know that it is this very thing that you did not know? [80e]

[Socrates:] I know what it is that you mean to say, Meno. You see that this is an eristic argument you are introducing, viz. that it is not possible for a person to search either for what he knows or for what he does not know? For neither could he search for what he knows—for he knows it, and such a person has no need for any search—nor for what he does not know—for he does not know what he will be searching for.

b (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

That [scil. because what is generated is identical in form to its efficient cause] is why it seems impossible for someone to be a builder if he has never built anything, nor a cithara player if he has never played the cithara; for someone who learns to play the cithara learns to play the cithara by playing the cithara, and so too in all the other cases. From this arose the sophistic refutation according to which someone will do what belongs to a science without possessing the science: for he who is learning it does not possess it. But because some part of what is being generated has already been generated and some part of what is being moved as a whole has already been moved

ὄλως κινουμένου κεκινήσθαι τι [. . .] [1050a1] καὶ τὸν
μανθάνοντα ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τι τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἴσως.

R20 (≠ DK) Arist. *EE* 1.8 1218b23–24

ἐτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεις ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ὑγίεια, ἀν μὴ
σοφιστῆς ἢ καὶ μὴ ἰατρός (οὔτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις
λόγοις σοφίζονται) [. . .].

R21 (≠ DK) Arist. *EN* 7.2 1146a22–27

ἐτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς λόγος¹ ἀπορία: διὰ γὰρ τὸ παρά-
δοξα βούλεσθαι ἐλέγχειν ἵνα δεινοὶ ᾧσιν, ὅταν ἐπιτύ-
χωσιν, ὁ γενόμενος συλλογισμὸς ἀπορία γίνεται
δέδεται γὰρ ἢ διάνοια, ὅταν μένειν μὴ βούληται διὰ
τὸ μὴ ἀρέσκειν τὸ συμπεραίνεθαι, προϊέναι δὲ μὴ δύ-
νηται διὰ τὸ λύσαι μὴ ἔχειν τὸν λόγον.

¹ ψευδόμενος post λόγος hab. mss., secl. Korais

R22 (≠ DK) Plat. *Soph.* 232b, e

[ΞΕ.] [. . .] ἀλλ' ἀναλάβωμεν <ἐν>¹ πρῶτον τῶν περὶ
τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰρημένων. ἐν γὰρ τί μοι μάλιστα κατ-
εφάνη αὐτὸν μνηνῶν.

[ΘΕ.] τὸ ποῖον;

[ΞΕ.] ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναί που. [. . .] ἀτὰρ
δὴ τὸ τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης ἄρ' οὐκ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ
περὶ πάντων πρὸς ἀμφισβήτησιν ἰκανὴ τις δύναμις
ἔοικ' εἶναι;

[. . .], [1050a1] then surely it is necessary that he too who
is learning possesses some part of the science.

R20 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*

No one demonstrates either that health is a good thing,
unless he is a sophist and not a physician—for the former
play tricks (*sophizesthai*) by means of irrelevant argu-
ments [. . .].

R21 (≠ DK) Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*

Again, the sophists' argument [scil. constitutes] an aporia.
For because they wish to make a refutation by means of
paradoxes, so that they will appear clever when they are
successful, the resulting chain of argument ends up as an
aporia: for the mind is blocked although it is not willing to
remain stuck (because it does not approve the conclusion
that has been reached) but it is not able to proceed further
(because it is not able to undo the argument).

R22 (≠ DK) Plato, *Sophist*

[The stranger from Elea:] [. . .] let us return first to one of
the things that we were saying about the sophist. For one
thing in particular seemed to me best to reveal his nature.

[Theaetetus:] Which one?

[Stranger:] We said [cf. 225b] that he is a contradictor
(*antilogikos*). [. . .] But in fact would not the art of contra-
diction seem, in brief, to consist in a certain ability to
dispute about all topics?

¹ <ἐν> Heindorf

*The Sophists and Writing (R23–R24)***R23** (≠ DK) Plat. *Phaedr.* 257d

[ΦΑ.] καὶ σύνοισθά που καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι οἱ μέγιστον
δυνάμενοί τε καὶ σεμνότατοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν αἰσχύ-
νουνται λόγους τε γράφειν καὶ καταλείπειν συγγράμ-
ματα ἑαυτῶν, δόξαν φοβούμενοι τοῦ ἔπειτα χρόνου,
μὴ σοφισταὶ καλῶνται.

R24 (≠ DK) Alcid. *In soph.* 1–2

ἐπειδὴ τινες τῶν καλουμένων σοφιστῶν ἱστορίας μὲν
καὶ παιδείας ἡμελήκασιν καὶ τοῦ δύνασθαι λέγειν
ὁμοίως τοῖς ιδιώταις ἀπίρως ἔχουσι, γράφειν δὲ με-
μελητηκότες λόγους καὶ διὰ βιβλίων δεικνύντες τὴν
αὐτῶν σοφίαν σεμνύνονται καὶ μέγα φρονούσι, καὶ
πολλοστὸν μέρος τῆς ῥητορικῆς κεκτημένοι δυνάμεως
τῆς ἄλλης τέχνης ἀμφισβητοῦσι, διὰ ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν ἐπιχειρήσω κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι τῶν γρα-
πτῶν λόγων, οὐχ ὡς ἀλλοτρίαν ἑμαυτοῦ τὴν δύναμιν
αὐτῶν ἡγούμενος, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐφ' ἑτέροις μείζον φρονῶν
καὶ τὸ γράφειν ἐν παρέργῳ μελετᾶν οἰόμενος χρῆναι,
καὶ τοὺς ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τὸν βίον καταναλίσκοντας
ἀπολελείφθαι πολὺ καὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ φιλοσοφίας
ὑπειληφώς, καὶ πολὺ δικαιότερον ἂν ποιητὰς ἢ σοφι-
στὰς προσαγορεύεσθαι νομίζω.

*The Sophists and Writing (R23–R24)***R23** (≠ DK) Plato, *Phaedrus*

[Phaedrus:] And you yourself [scil. Socrates] know well
that the men who are the most powerful and highly re-
garded in the cities are ashamed to write discourses and
to leave writings behind, out of fear that in later times they
will be called 'sophists.'

R24 (≠ DK) Alcidas, *On the Sophists*

Since some of the people who are called 'sophists,' al-
though they have neglected research and education and,
just like laymen, know nothing of the ability to speak,
nonetheless put on airs and think themselves high and
mighty for having practiced the writing of discourses and
shown their own wisdom by means of books, and although
they possess only a tiny part of the capacity of rhetoric,
nonetheless lay a claim to the entirety of the art, for this
reason I shall undertake to lodge an accusation against
written discourses: not because I believe that the ability
of these people is foreign to myself, but because I think
myself better on other grounds: I believe that one should
practice writing as a subsidiary activity, and I think that
those people who devote their lives to this one activity are
very lacking both in rhetoric and in philosophy, and I con-
sider that it would be more just for them to be called
'writers' (*poietai*, 'poets,' literally 'makers') rather than
'sophists.'

Socratic Analogies for the Sophist (R25–R32)
Prostitute (R25)

R25 (> 79.2a) Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.13

[ΣΩ.] ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, παρ' ἡμῖν νομίζεται τὴν ὥραν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμοίως μὲν καλόν, ὁμοίως δὲ αἰσχρὸν διατίθεσθαι εἶναι. τὴν τε γὰρ ὥραν ἔαν μὲν τις ἀργυρίου πωλῆ τῷ βουλομένῳ, πόρνον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ἔαν δέ τις, ὃν ἂν γινῶ καλόν τε κἀγαθὸν ἐραστὴν ὄντα, τοῦτον φίλον ἑαυτῷ ποιῆται, σῶφρονα νομίζομεν καὶ τὴν σοφίαν ὡσαύτως τοὺς μὲν ἀργυρίου τῷ βουλομένῳ πωλοῦντας σοφιστὰς ὡσπερ πόρνους¹ ἀποκαλοῦσιν, ὅστις δέ, ὃν ἂν γινῶ εὐφυῆ ὄντα, διδάσκων ὅ τι ἂν ἔχη ἀγαθόν, φίλον ποιεῖται, τοῦτον νομίζομεν, ἂ τῷ καλῷ κἀγαθῷ πολίτῃ προσήκει, ταῦτα ποιεῖν.

¹ ὡσπερ πόρνους del. Ruhnken

Hunter (R26–R27)

R26 (> 79.2a) Xen. *Cyn.* 13.8–9

[8] οἱ σοφισταὶ δ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἑξαπατᾶν λέγουσι καὶ γράφουσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἑαυτῶν κέρδει, καὶ οὐδένα οὐδέν ὠφελοῦσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ σοφὸς αὐτῶν ἐγένετο οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρκεῖ ἐκάστῳ σοφιστὴν κληθῆναι, ὃ ἔστιν ὄνειδος παρά γε εἰ φρονοῦσι. [9] τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν σοφιστῶν παραγγέλματα παραινῶ φυλάττεσθαι, τὰ

Socratic Analogies for the Sophist (R25–R32)
Prostitute (R25)

R25 (> 79.2a) Xenophon, *Memorabilia*

[Socrates:] Antiphon, among us it is thought that it is possible to make use of youthful beauty and cleverness (*sophia*) in both a seemly way and an unseemly one. For if one sells one's youthful beauty for money to anyone who desires it, they call him a prostitute; but if one makes himself a friend to someone whom he knows to be a fine and honorable man, being a lover, we consider him to be temperate. And the same thing applies to cleverness (*sophia*): they call those people who sell it for money to whoever desires it 'sophists,' like prostitutes, while someone who makes himself a friend to a man whom he knows to be well endowed by nature, teaching him whatever he has that is good, we think that that man is doing what is fitting for a fine and honorable citizen.

Hunter (R26–R27)

R26 (> 79.2a) Xenophon, *On Hunting*

[8] The sophists speak in order to deceive and they write for their own profit, without doing anyone any good. For there has never been, and there is not now, any of them who is wise (*sophos*), but each one is satisfied to be called a 'sophist' (*sophistês*), which among sensible people is an insult. So my advice is to be on your guard against the declarations of the sophists, and not to disdain the reason-

δὲ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐνθυμήματα μὴ ἀτιμάζειν οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοφισταὶ πλουσίους καὶ νέους θηρώνται, οἱ δὲ φιλόσοφοι πᾶσι κοινὸι καὶ φίλοι· τύχας δὲ ἀνδρῶν οὔτε τιμῶσιν οὔτε ἀτιμάζουσι.

R27 (79.2) Plat. *Soph.* 231d

[ΞΕ.] [. . .] τὸ πρῶτον ἠρέθη νέων καὶ πλουσίων ἔμισθος θηρευτής.

Merchant (R28–R29)

R28 (≠ DK) Plat. *Prot.* 313c–314a

[ΣΩ.] ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ Ἰππόκρατες, ὁ σοφιστὴς τυγχάνει ὦν ἔμπορός τις ἢ κάπηλος τῶν ἀγωγίμων, ἀφ' ὧν ψυχὴ τρέφεται; φαίνεται γὰρ ἔμοιγε τοιοῦτός τις.

[III.] τρέφεται δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ψυχὴ τίτι;

[ΣΩ.] μαθήμασιν δήπου [. . .], καὶ ὅπως γε μὴ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὁ σοφιστὴς ἐπαινῶν ἃ πωλεῖ ἐξαπατήσῃ ἡμᾶς, ὡσπερ οἱ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος τροφήν, ὁ ἔμπορός τε καὶ κάπηλος. καὶ γὰρ οὗτοί που ὦν ἄγουσιν ἀγωγίμων οὔτε αὐτοὶ ἴσασι ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα, ἐπαινοῦσιν δὲ πάντα πωλοῦντες, οὔτε οἱ ἀνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τύχη γυμναστικός ἢ ἱατρὸς ὦν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες κατὰ τὰς πόλεις καὶ πωλοῦντες καὶ καπηλεύοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντι ἐπαινοῦσιν μὲν πάντα ἃ πωλοῦσιν, τάχα δ' ἂν τινας, ὦ ἄριστε, καὶ τούτων

ings of the philosophers. For the sophists hunt for rich men and young ones, while the philosophers are available to all and are the friends of all: and they neither admire men's fortunes nor disdain them.

R27 (79.2) Plato, *Sophist*

[The stranger from Elea:] [. . .] we have discovered that he [i.e. the sophist] was first of all a hired hunter of rich young men.

Merchant (R28–R29)

R28 (≠ DK) Plato, *Protagoras*

[Socrates:] Well then, Hippocrates, does the sophist turn out to be a wholesaler or retailer of the wares by which the soul is nourished? For this is the sort of person he seems to me to be.

[Hippocrates:] But what is it that the soul is nourished by, Socrates?

[Socrates:] By teachings, I suppose [. . .]. And watch out, my friend, lest the sophist deceive us by praising what he sells, just as do the wholesaler and the retailer who deal with the nourishment of the body. For even these people surely do not know which of the wares they offer are beneficial or harmful for the body, and yet they praise all of them when they sell them, and those who buy these from them do not [scil. know this] either, unless they happen to be an athletic trainer or a doctor. In the same way, those who transport teachings from city to city, and sell off and retail them to whoever desires to buy them each time, praise everything they sell, but perhaps, dear friend, some

ἀγνοοῖεν ὧν παλοῦσιν ὅτι χρηστὸν ἢ πονηρὸν πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν· ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ οἱ ὠνούμενοι παρ' αὐτῶν, ἐὰν μὴ τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπ' ἰατρικὸς ὧν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμων τούτων τί χρηστὸν καὶ πονηρὸν, ἀσφαλές σοι ὠνεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ὅτουσιν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὄρα, ὦ μακάριε, [314a] μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλάτοις κυβέυης τε καὶ κινδυνεύης.

R29 (79.2) Plat. *Soph.* 231d

[ΞΕ.] [. . . = **R27**] τὸ δέ γε δεύτερον ἔμπορός τις περὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μαθήματα. [. . .] τρίτον δὲ ἄρα οὐ περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κάπηλος ἀνεφάνη;

[ΘΕ.] ναί, καὶ τέταρτόν γε αὐτοπώλης περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡμῖν <ῆν>.¹

¹ <ῆν> Heindorf

Magician and Charlatan (R30–R31)

R30 (≠ DK) Plat. *Soph.* 268c–d

[ΞΕ.] τὸ¹ δὴ τῆς ἐναντιοποιολογικῆς εἰρωνικοῦ μέρους τῆς δοξαστικῆς μιμητικόν, τοῦ φανταστικοῦ γένους ἀπὸ τῆς εἰδωλοποικῆς οὐ θεῖον ἀλλ' ἀνθρωπικὸν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀφωρισμένον ἐν λόγοις τὸ θαυματοποικὸν μόριον, “ταύτης τῆς γενεᾶς τε καὶ αἵματος” ὅς ἂν φῆ τὸν ὄντως σοφιστὴν εἶναι, τάληθέστατα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐρέει.

of these people too do not know which of the wares they are selling is beneficial or harmful for the soul; and so too those people who buy from them, unless they happen to be a doctor of the soul. If then you happen to know which of these things is beneficial and harmful, you can safely buy teachings from Protagoras or from anyone else. But if not, watch out, my friend, [314a] lest you play dice and put at risk the things that are dearest to you.

R29 (79.2) Plato, *Sophist*

[The stranger from Elea:] [. . .] Secondly, [scil. we have discovered that the sophist was] a wholesaler of teachings for the soul. [. . .] Thirdly then, was he not revealed to be a retailer of the same things?

[Theaetetus:] Yes, and fourthly we saw him as a seller of his own teachings.

Magician and Charlatan (R30–R31)

R30 (≠ DK) Plato, *Sophist*

[Stranger from Elea:] Imitation of the ironic (*eirōnikos*) part of the art of contradicting within opinion, belonging to the phantasmic branch of the art of the simulacrum, not the divine part but the human one, productive of prodigies in the domain of discourse—whoever were to say that the real sophist is “of this descent and blood” [Homer, *Il.* 6.211] would, it seems, be stating the perfect truth.

¹ τὸν BT, corr. Schleiermacher

R31 (≠ DK) Plat. *Pol.*

a 291c

[ΞΕ.] [. . .] τὸν πάντων τῶν σοφιστῶν μέγιστον γόητα καὶ ταύτης τῆς τέχνης ἐμπειρότατον, ὃν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄντων ὄντων πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καίπερ παγγάλεπον ὄντα ἀφαιρεῖν ἀφαιρετέον [. . .].

b 303b–c

[ΞΕ.] οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ τοὺς κοινωνοὺς τούτων τῶν πολιτειῶν πασῶν πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος ἀφαιρετέον ὡς οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικοὺς ἀλλὰ στασιαστικούς, καὶ εἰδώλων μεγίστων προστάτας ὄντας καὶ αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοιούτους, μεγίστους δὲ ὄντας μιμητὰς καὶ γόητας μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.

*Other Images (R32)***R32** (79.2) Plat. *Soph.* 231d–e

[ΞΕ.] [. . . = R29] πέμπτον [. . .] τῆς γὰρ ἀγωνιστικῆς περὶ λόγους ἦν τις ἀθλητῆς, τὴν ἐριστικὴν τέχνην ἀφωρισμένος. [. . .] τό γε μὴν ἕκτον ἀμφισβητήσιμον μὲν, ὅμως δ' ἔθεμεν αὐτῷ συγχαρήσαντες δοξῶν ἐμοδίων μαθήμασιν περὶ ψυχὴν καθαρτὴν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

R31 (≠ DK) Plato, *Statesman*

a

[The stranger from Elea:] [. . .] the man who is the greatest charlatan of all the sophists and the most experienced in this art, the one who must be distinguished, difficult though this is, from those who are really statesmen and of a kingly nature [. . .].

b

[The stranger from Elea:] Therefore those men who participate in all these constitutions (except for the one based on scientific knowledge) must be distinguished as being not statesmen but sectarians, presiding over the greatest images, and themselves of the same sort, men who, since they are the greatest imitators and charlatans, turn out to also be the greatest sophists among the sophists.

*Other Images (R32)***R32** (79.2) Plato, *Sophist*

[The stranger from Elea:] [. . .] [. . .] fifth [scil. the sophist] was a kind of athlete in the art of contention regarding discourses, who had appropriated to himself the art of eristic. [. . .] Sixth, we had some doubts, but all the same we conceded to him and posited that he was a purifier of opinions that interfere with teachings in the soul [cf. **SOC. D29**].

*Sophistic and Atheism (R33)*R33 (≠ DK) Plat. *Leg.* 10 908 d–e

[AΘ.] [. . .] ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων μὲν καθάπερ ἄτερος, εὐφύης¹ δὲ ἐπικαλούμενος, δόλου δὲ καὶ ἐνέδρας πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν μάντις τε κατασκευάζονται πολλοὶ καὶ περὶ πάσαν τὴν μαγγανείαν κεκινημένοι, γίνονται δὲ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τύραννοι καὶ δημηγόροι καὶ στρατηγοί, καὶ τελεταῖς δὲ ἰδίαις ἐπιβεβουλευκότες, σοφιστῶν τε ἐπικαλουμένων μηχαναί. τούτων δὴ πολλὰ μὲν εἶδη γένοιτ' ἄν, τὰ δὲ νόμων ἄξια θέσεως δύο, ὧν τὸ μὲν εἰρωνικὸν οὐχ ἑνὸς οὐδὲ δυοῖν ἄξια θανάτου ἀμαρτάνον, τὸ δὲ νοθητήσεως ἅμα καὶ δεσμῶν δεόμενον.

¹ εὐφύης in mg. L²O²: εὐτυχής ALO

Sophistic, Rhetoric, and Philosophy (R34–R36)

R34 Arist.

a (79.3) SE. I 165a21

ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὐσα δ' οὐ, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσης.

*Sophistic and Atheism (R33)*R33 (≠ DK) Plato, *Laws*

[Athenian:] [. . .] He who has the same opinions as the first one [i.e. the one who does not believe in the existence of the gods], and may well be called 'well-endowed by nature,' but is full of guile and treachery, is one of those men from whom come many diviners and people who practice all kinds of trickery; and sometimes too there come from them tyrants, demagogues, and generals, and people who hatch plots in private mystery rites, and the devices of those men who are called 'sophists.' Of these last there are many species, but two in particular that require legislation: the ironic kind, whose crimes deserve more than only one death or two; and the other kind, who needs admonition together with imprisonment.

Sophistic, Rhetoric, and Philosophy (R34–R36)

R34 Aristotle

a (79.3) *Sophistic Refutations*

Sophistic (*sophistikê*) is a wisdom (*sophia*) in appearance but not in reality, and the sophist (*sophistês*) is someone who makes money from what is a wisdom in appearance but not in reality.

b (≠ DK) *Metaph.* Γ3 1004b17–26

οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν ὑποδύονται σχῆμα τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἢ γὰρ σοφιστικῆ φαινομένη μόνον σοφία ἐστὶ, καὶ οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ διαλέγονται περὶ ἀπάντων, κοινὸν δὲ πᾶσι τὸ ὄν ἐστίν, διαλέγονται δὲ περὶ τούτων δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τὸ τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἶναι ταῦτα οἰκεία. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος στρέφεται ἢ σοφιστικῆ καὶ ἢ διαλεκτικῆ τῆ φιλοσοφία, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῆ προαιρέσει· ἐστὶ δὲ ἢ διαλεκτικῆ πειραστικῆ περὶ ὧν ἢ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικῆ, ἢ δὲ σοφιστικῆ φαινομένη, οὔσα δ' οὔ.

R35 (≠ DK) Cic. *Brut.* 8.30–31

[30] sed ut intellectum est quantam vim haberet accurata et facta quodam modo oratio, tum etiam magistri dicendi multi subito exstiterunt. tum Leontinus Gorgias, Thrasy-machus Chalcedonius, Protagoras Abderites, Prodicus Cius, Hippias Elius in honore magno fuit; aliique multi temporibus eisdem docere se profitebantur, arrogantibus sane verbis, quem ad modum causa inferior—ita enim loquebantur—dicendo fieri superior posset. [31] his opposuit sese Socrates, qui subtilitate quadam disputandi refellere eorum instituta solebat.¹ huius ex uberrimis

¹ verbis post solebat hab. mss., secl. Haupt: urbanus Vitelli, alii alia

b (≠ DK) *Metaphysics*

Dialecticians and sophists clothe themselves in the same outward apparel as the philosopher does, for sophistic is wisdom only in appearance, and dialecticians discuss all subjects; and in common to all of these is what is (*to on*), and it is clear that they discuss these subjects because they belong to philosophy. For sophistic and dialectic revolve around the same kind of things as philosophy does, but it [i.e. philosophy] differs from the former in the kind of capability it possesses and from the latter in the way of life it chooses. Dialectic puts to the test the subjects about which philosophy brings knowledge, while sophistic is philosophy in appearance, but not in reality.

R35 (≠ DK) Cicero, *Brutus*

[30] But once it was understood how great a power was possessed by a discourse that had been prepared carefully and worked out in a certain way, many teachers of eloquence suddenly appeared. At that time Gorgias of Leontini, Thrasy-machus of Chalcedon, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis were honored greatly; and at the same time many other men announced, in quite arrogant terms, that they taught how the weaker case—for this is how they put it—could become the stronger one by means of speech. [31] Socrates set himself in opposition to these men; by employing a certain subtlety of argumentation, he was accustomed to refute their doctrines. From

sermonibus exstiterunt doctissimi viri; primumque tum philosophia non illa de natura, quae fuerat antiquior, sed haec, in qua de bonis rebus et malis deque hominum vita et moribus disputatur, inventa dicitur.

R36 (≠ DK) Philostr. *Vit. soph.* 1

a p. 2.1–11 Kayser

τὴν ἀρχαίαν σοφιστικὴν ῥητορικὴν ἠγέισθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφοῦσαν· διαλέγεται μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ ὧν οἱ φιλοσοφούντες, ἀ δὲ ἐκεῖνοι τὰς ἐρωτήσεις ὑποκαθήμενοι καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ τῶν ζητουμένων προβιβάζοντες οὐπω φασὶ γινώσκειν, ταῦτα ὁ παλαιὸς σοφιστὴς ὡς εἰδὼς λέγει. προοίμια γοῦν ποιεῖται τῶν λόγων τὸ 'οἶδα' καὶ τὸ 'γινώσκω' καὶ 'πάσαι διέσκεμμαι' καὶ 'βέβαιον ἀνθρώπῳ οὐδέν.' ἡ δὲ τοιαύτη ἰδέα τῶν προοιμίων εὐγένειάν τε προηγεῖ τῶν λόγων καὶ φρόνημα καὶ κατάληψιν σαφῆ τοῦ ὄντος [. . .].

b p. 2. 22–26 Kayser

ἡ μὲν δὴ ἀρχαία σοφιστικὴ καὶ τὰ φιλοσοφούμενα ὑποτιθεμένη διήκει αὐτὰ ἀποτάδην καὶ ἐς μῆκος, διελέγετο μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἀνδρείας, διελέγετο δὲ περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἠρώων τε πέρι καὶ θεῶν καὶ ὅπῃ ἀπεσχημάτιζται ἡ ἰδέα τοῦ κόσμου [. . .].

his richly abundant colloquies arose the most learned of men. It is reported that it was at this time that philosophy was discovered—not the kind that deals with nature, which had existed previously, but this other one, which discusses what is good, what is bad, and the life and character of men.

R36 (≠ DK) Philostratus, *Lives of the Sophists*

a

Ancient sophistic should be considered to be a rhetoric of a philosophical nature. For it discusses the same things as philosophers do; but whereas the latter, posing fundamental questions and making progress in the details of what they investigate, say that they have not yet attained knowledge, the ancient sophist speaks about these matters as being someone who knows them. At any rate he begins his speeches by saying, 'I know,' 'I recognize,' 'I have observed for a long time,' and 'Nothing is certain for a human being.' This kind of beginning suggests nobility in speeches, self-assurance, and a clear grasp of the subject [. . .].

b

Ancient sophistic, even when it proposed philosophical subjects, expounded them diffusely and at length; for it discussed manly valor, it discussed justice, heroes and gods, and in what way the form of the cosmos was shaped [. . .].

c (4.17-23)

δεινότητα δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ τοὺς σοφιστὰς ὁρῶντες ἐξείργον αὐτοὺς τῶν δικαστηρίων, ὡς ἀδίκῳ λόγῳ τοῦ δικαίου κρατοῦντας καὶ ἰσχύοντας παρὰ τὸ εὐθὺ, ὅθεν Αἰσχίνης καὶ Δημοσθένης προὔφερον μὲν αὐτὸ ἀλλήλοισι, οὐχ ὡς ὄνειδος δέ, ἀλλὰ ὡς διαβεβλημένον τοῖς δικάζουσιν, ἰδίᾳ γὰρ ἤξιον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θαυμάζεσθαι.

d (4.29-5.1)

σοφιστὰς δὲ οἱ παλαιοὶ ἐπωνόμαζον οὐ μόνον τῶν ῥητόρων τοὺς ὑπερφωνούντας τε καὶ λαμπροὺς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων τοὺς ξὺν εὐροίᾳ ἐρμηνεύοντας [. . .].

c

When the Athenians saw how clever the sophists were, they excluded them from the law courts because they were able to defeat a just speech by means of an unjust one and succeeded in prevailing against what was right. This is why Aeschines and Demosthenes call each other this term, not because it was an insult, but because it was suspect in the eyes of the jurors; for in private they thought they should be admired for this.

d

The ancients called 'sophists' not only those orators who were renowned for speaking surpassingly well, but also those philosophers who expressed themselves with fluency [. . .].

43. APPENDIX: PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS IN GREEK COMEDY AND TRAGEDY [DRAM.]

One striking measure of the impact of early Greek philosophy on contemporary culture is the frequency with which both the persons of philosophers and specific philosophical doctrines were represented on the stage. The present appendix gathers together a considerable number of passages drawn from Greek comic and tragic poets and thereby further documents the history of the reception of the thought of the early Greek philosophers that is presented from a doctrinal point of view in the R sections of the preceding chapters. Some other dramatic texts, which illustrate not the reception of early Greek philosophy but the cultural background for it, are found in chapter 3, "Reflections on Gods and Men," in volume 2 of the present edition.

The first section presents several passages in which the Sicilian comic poet Epicharmus (probably mid-sixth to mid-fifth century BC) seems to parody various concepts and modes of argumentation that can be attributed to early Greek philosophers. We also include a number of

passages (printed in italics) which modern scholars generally, but not universally, consider inauthentic; we have chosen not to exclude these in part because of the uncertainty of this judgment, in part because in any case these texts importantly illustrate one form of reception of early Greek philosophy.

The second section gathers together allusions to philosophical themes and to philosophers in Attic comedy; Old Comedy is represented particularly well in its persiflage of various natural philosophers and 'sophists,' but Middle and New Comedy also supply a number of striking texts, especially regarding the Pythagorean school.

The third section collects references to philosophical themes from fifth-century Attic tragedy. Most of these involve general topics that present a greater or lesser degree of similarity with conceptions that can be attributed to one or more early Greek philosophers; but Euripides in particular also likes to reflect closely the concepts and even the language of specific philosophers such as Xenophanes, perhaps Heraclitus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Socrates, and above all certainly Anaxagoras.

In this appendix, as in the chapters dedicated to the most ancient reflections on the world (chap. 2) and on gods and men (chap. 3), the Greek texts are furnished with only a minimal critical apparatus, indicating solely our divergences, if any, from the editions of reference indicated in the first volume. Furthermore, we have only given the reference to DK when their collection cites the text in question or mentions it in a significant way, without indicating when it is not included.

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OUTLINE OF THE CHAPTER

*Philosophical Themes in Sicilian Comedy: Epicharmus (T1–T9)**General Themes (T1)**Xenophanic Themes (T2–T3)**Texts of Disputed Attribution (T4–T9)**The Immortality of the Gods (T4)**Heraclitean Themes (T5–T8)**Pythagorean Themes (T9)**Allusions to Philosophers and Philosophical Themes in Attic Comedy (T10–T40)**Old Comedy (T10–T32)**The Study of Celestial and Meteorological Phenomena (T10)**Parody of an Orphic Cosmogony (T11)**A Parodic Zoogony (T12)**Thales (T13–T14)**Hippo (T15–T16)**Parmenides? (T17)**Protagoras (T18–T19)**Gorgias (T20–T21)**Prodicus (T22–T24)**Thrasymachus (T25)**Socrates (T26–T32)**Middle Comedy (T33–T39)**Heraclitus (T33)**Democritus (T34)**Pythagoreans (T35–T39)**New Comedy (T40)**Diogenes of Apollonia? (T40)**Philosophical References in Attic Tragedy (T41–T84)**General Themes (T41–T71)**Epistemological Considerations (T41–T42)**The Study of Nature (T43)**The Naturalization of the Gods (T44–T50)**The Gods and Chance (T51–T52)**Law (nomos) and Nature (phusis) (T53–T55)**The Progress of Civilization (T56–T63)**The Power of Speech (T64–T67)**The Relativity of Values (T68)**Can Virtue Be Taught? (T69–T71)**Reflections of Specific Doctrines in Euripides (T72–T84)**Reflections of Xenophanes (T72–T73)**Reflections of Heraclitus or of the Orphics (T74)**Reflections of Anaxagoras (T75–T80)**A Reflection of Diogenes of Apollonia (T81)**Reflections of Protagoras (PROT. P23)**Reflections of Socrates? (T82–T84)*

PHILOSOPHY AND
PHILOSOPHERS IN GREEK
COMEDY AND TRAGEDY
[≠ DK]

Philosophical Themes in Sicilian Comedy:
Epicharmus (T1–T9)¹
General Themes (T1)

T1 (23 B9) Ps.-Plut. *Cons. Ap.* 15 110A (Epich. Frag. 213 K–A)

συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη κάπηλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθεν
πάλιν,
γὰ μὲν εἰς γὰν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν;
οὐδὲ ἔν.

Xenophanic Themes (T2–T3)

T2 (23 B12) Plut. *Alex. Fort.* 2.3 336B (Epich. Frag. 214 K–A)

νοῦς ὀρῆ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τᾶλλα κωφὰ καὶ
τυφλά.

PHILOSOPHY AND
PHILOSOPHERS IN GREEK
COMEDY AND TRAGEDY

Philosophical Themes in Sicilian Comedy:
Epicharmus (T1–T9)¹
General Themes (T1)

¹ For the distinction between Epicharmus and Pseudo-Epicharmus, see the introduction to this chapter.

T1 (23 B9) Ps.-Plutarch, *Consolation to Apollonius*

There was unification and division and return again
to where it had come from,
Earth to earth, and air upward. What of these things
is difficult? Nothing at all!

Cf. e.g. EMP. D66–D72; ANAXAG. D30

Xenophanic Themes (T2–T3)

T2 (23 B12) Plutarch, *On Alexander's Fortune*

Mind sees and mind hears: but everything else is deaf
and blind.

Cf. XEN. D17

T3 (21 A15) Arist. *Metaph.* Γ5 1010a5–6 (Epich. Frag. 143 K–A)

διὸ εἰκότως μὲν λέγουσιν, οὐκ ἀληθῆ δὲ λέγουσιν·
οὕτω γὰρ ἀρμόττει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν ἢ ὥσπερ Ἐπίχαρ-
μος εἰς Ξενοφάνην.

Texts of Disputed Attribution (T4–T9)
The Immortality of the Gods (T4)

T4 (23 B1) Alcimus *Contra Amynt.* in Diog. Laert. 3.10–11 (Ps.–Epich. Frag. 275 K–A)

[A.] ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τοι θεοὶ παρῆσαν χυπέλιπον οὐ πά-
ποκα,
τάδε δ' αἰεὶ πάρεσθ' ὁμοῖα διὰ τε τῶν αὐτῶν
αἰεί.

[B.] ἀλλὰ λέγεται μὰν Χάος πρῶτον γενέσθαι
τῶν θεῶν.

[A.] πῶς δέ κα, μὴ ἔχον γ' ἀπὸ τίνος μηδ' ἐς ὅτι
πρῶτον μῶλοι;

[B.] οὐκ ἄρ' ἔμολε πρῶτον οὐδέν;

5 [A.] οὐδὲ μὰ Δία δεύτερον
τῶνδ' ἔγωγε ἄν ἄμες νυν ὦδε λέγομεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ
τάδ' ἦς.

T3 (21 A15) Aristotle, *Metaphysics*

That is why they [i.e. those who say that only what is perceptible exists] say things that are plausible but are not true—for it is more fitting to speak in this way than as Epicarmus did against Xenophanes.¹

¹ It is uncertain just what Epicarmus said; he may have claimed that Xenophanes' views were implausible but true, or that they were neither plausible nor true.

Texts of Disputed Attribution (T4–T9)
The Immortality of the Gods (T4)

T4 (23 B1) Alcimus, *Against Amyntas*, in Diogenes Laertius

[A:] *But the gods were always there and were never lacking,*
And those things are always there, similar and always in the same way.

[B:] *But Chaos is said to have been born as the first of the gods.*

[A:] *How could that be? Being first, he would have nothing from which or to which he could go.*

[B:] *So nothing came first?*

[A:] *And not second either, by Zeus,* 5
At least of those things we are talking about now in this way, but they always were.¹

¹ This citation continues in the manuscripts, without interruption, with T8.

Cf. e.g. COSM. T11 v. 116, T21, T22; XEN. D12, cf. P16

Heraclitean Themes (T5–T8)

T5 (23 B17) Stob. 3.37.18 (Ps.-Epich. Frag. 266 K–A)

ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώποισι δαίμων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ
κακός.

T6 (23 B4) Alcimus in Diog. Laert. 3.16 (Ps.-Epich. Frag. 278 K–A)

Εὔμαιε, τὸ σοφὸν ἐστὶν οὐ καθ' ἐν μόνον,
ἀλλ' ὅσσα περ ζῆ, πάντα καὶ γνῶμαν ἔχει.
καὶ γὰρ τὸ θῆλυ τῶν ἀλεκτοριδῶν γένος,
αἰ λῆς καταμαθεῖν ἀτενές, οὐ τίκτει τέκνα
5 ζῶντ', ἀλλ' ἐπῳζει καὶ ποιεῖ ψυχὰν ἔχειν.
τὸ δὲ σοφὸν ἂ φύσις τόδ' οἶδεν ὡς ἔχει
μόνα· πεπαίδευται γὰρ αὐτὰύτας ὑπο.

T7 (23 B5) Alcimus in Diog. Laert. 3.16 (Ps.-Epich. Frag. 279 K–A)

θαυμαστὸν οὐδὲν ἀμὲ ταῦθ' οὕτω λέγειν
καὶ ἀνδάνειν αὐτοῖσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ δοκεῖν
καλῶς πεφύκειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂ κύων κυνί
κάλλιστον εἶμεν φαίνεται καὶ βοῦς βοῖ,
5 ὄνος δ' ὄνω κάλλιστον, ὅς δέ θην υἷ.

Heraclitean Themes (T5–T8)

T5 (23 B17) Stobaeus, *Anthology*

*One's character (tropos) is for humans a good
divinity—but for some, also a bad one.*

Cf. **HER. D111**

T6 (23 B4) Alcimus, *Against Amyntas*, in Diogenes Laertius

*Eumaeus, what is wise is not in one thing alone,
But everything that lives also has thought.
For indeed the female race of hens,
If you are willing to observe intently, does not bear its
young*

*Already living, but broods clucking on them and
causes them to have a soul.* 5

*What is wise—this nature alone knows,
For it has been educated by itself alone.*

Cf. **HER. D43–D45**

T7 (23 B5) Alcimus, *Against Amyntas*, in Diogenes Laertius

*It is not at all surprising that we speak in this way,
And are pleasing to ourselves and suppose that we
Are beautiful by nature: for to a dog, the bitch
Seems to be the most beautiful thing of all, and a cow
to a bull,*

*And a she-ass to an ass is the most beautiful, and a
sow, obviously, to a hog.* 5

Cf. **XEN. D14; HER. D78–D81**

T8 (23 B2) Alcimus in Diog. Laert. 3.11 (Ps.-Epich. Frag. 276 K-A)

[A.] αἰ πὸτ ἀριθμόν τις περισσόν, αἰ δὲ λῆς πὸτ
ἀρτιον,
ποτθέμειν λῆ ψᾶφον ἢ καὶ τᾶν ὑπαρχουσᾶν
λαβεῖν,
ἢ δοκεῖ κα τοί γ' ἔθ' ωὐτὸς εἶμεν;

[B.] οὐκ ἐμίν γα κα.

[A.] οὐδὲ μὰν οὐδ' αἰ ποτὶ μέτρον παχυαῖον ποτ-
θέμειν

5 λῆ τις ἕτερον μᾶκος ἢ τοῦ πρόσθ' ἐόντος
ἀποταμείν,

ἔτι χ' ὑπάρχοι κῆρο τὸ μέτρον;

[B.] οὐ γάρ.

[A.] ὦδε νῦν ὄρη

καὶ τὸς ἀνθρώπους· ὁ μὲν γὰρ αὔξεθ', ὁ δὲ
γα μὰν φθίνει,

ἐν μεταλλαγᾷ δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν χρό-
νον.

ὁ δὲ μεταλλάσσει κατὰ φύσιν κοῦποκ' ἐν
τῶντῶ μένει,

10 ἕτερον εἶη κα τὸδ' ἤδη τοῦ παρεξιστακότος.

καὶ τὸ δὴ κἀγὼ χθὲς ἄλλοι καὶ νῦν ἄλλοι
τελέθομες,

καῦθις ἄλλοι κοῦποχ' ὡτοὶ καττὸν αὐτὸν αὐ
λόγον.

T8 (23 B2) Alcimus, *Against Amyntas*, in Diogenes Laer-
tius

[A:] *If to an odd number, or to an even one if you wish,
someone*

*Wants to add a unit [literally: a counter] or take one
away from those present,*

Do you think it will still be the same?

[B:] *I certainly don't!*

[A:] *Or then if to the measure of a cubit someone*

Wants to add another length or cut it off from what 5
was there before,

Then would that measure still remain?

[B:] *No.*

[A:] *Now look in this way*

*At humans too. The one grows, the other decreases,
They are all in a state of change the whole time.*

*But what changes by its nature and never remains
in the same condition,*

This would be different from what has been changed, 10
*And you and I were different yesterday, and today
have become different,*

*And again [scil. will be] different and never the
same, according to this very argument.*

Pythagorean Themes (T9)

T9 (23 B56) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5.118.1 (Ps.-Epich. Frag. 240.1-2 K-A)

ὁ βίος ἀνθρώποις λογισμοῦ κἀριθμοῦ δέεται
πάνν.
ζῶμεν ἀριθμῶ καὶ λογισμῶ· ταῦτα γὰρ σφύζει
βροτούς.

*Allusions to Philosophers and Philosophical
Themes in Attic Comedy (T10-T40)
Old Comedy (T10-T32)
The Study of Celestial and Meteorological
Phenomena (T10)*

T10 Aristoph. *Nub.*

a (< 64 C1) 225-34

[ΣΩ.] ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ τὸν ἥλιον.
[ΣΤ.] ἔπειτ' ἀπὸ ταρροῦ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑπερφρονεῖς,
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, εἴπερ;
[ΣΩ.] οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε
ἔξηῦρον ὀρθῶς τὰ μετέωρα πράγματα,
εἰ μὴ κρεμάσας τὸ νόημα καὶ τὴν φροντίδα
λεπτὴν καταμείξας εἰς τὸν ὅμοιον ἀέρα.
εἰ δ' ἂν χαμαὶ τᾶνω κάτωθεν ἐσκόπουν,
οὐκ ἂν ποθ' ἠῦρον οὐ γὰρ ἀλλ' ἢ γῆ βία

230

Pythagorean Themes (T9)

T9 (23 B56) Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*

*Human life stands in great need of calculation
(logismos) and number.
We live by number and calculation. This is what
provides safety to mortals.*

Cf. ARCHY. D4

*Allusions to Philosophers and Philosophical
Themes in Attic Comedy (T10-T40)
Old Comedy (T10-T32)
The Study of Celestial and Meteorological
Phenomena (T10)*

T10 Aristophanes, *Clouds*

a (< 64 C1)

[SOCRATES:] I walk upon the air, and I scrutinize the sun.
[STREPSIADES:] So from your basket you look down on
the gods?

But why not from the ground, in that case?

[SOC.:] I would never
Have discovered the exact nature of the celestial
phenomena

If I had not suspended my mind and mixed
My rarefied thought with what is similar to it, air.

If I had been on the ground and examined from
below what is on high,

I would never have discovered anything: for the
earth forcibly

230

ἔλκει πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν ἰκμάδα τῆς φροντίδος.
πάσχει δὲ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ κάρδαμα.

b 264–66

[ΣΩ.] ὦ δέσποτ' ἀναξ, ἀμέτρητ' Ἀήρ, ὃς ἔχεις τὴν
γῆν μετέωρον,
265 λαμπρός τ' Αἰθήρ, σεμναὶ τε θεαὶ Νεφέλαι
βροντησικέραυνοι,
ἄρθητε, φάνητ', ὦ δέσπουναι, τῷ φροντιστῇ
μετέωροι.

c (cf. Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 420.14) 365–411

[ΣΩ.] αὐται γάρ τοι μόναι εἰσὶ θεαί, τᾶλλα δὲ
πάντ' ἐστὶ φλύαρος.
[ΣΤ.] ὁ Ζεὺς δ' ὑμῖν, φέρε, πρὸς τῆς γῆς, οὐλύμ-
πιος οὐ θεός ἐστιν;
[ΣΩ.] ποῖος Ζεὺς; οὐ μὴ ληρήσεις. οὐδ' ἔστι Ζεὺς.
[ΣΤ.] τί λέγεις σύ;
ἀλλὰ τίς ἔναι; τουτὶ γὰρ ἔμοιγ' ἀπόφνηαι
πρῶτον ἀπάντων.
[ΣΩ.] αὐται δὴ πον μεγάλοις δέ σ' ἐγὼ σημείους
αὐτὸ διδάξω.
370 φέρε, ποῦ γὰρ πώποτ' ἀνευ νεφελῶν ἕοντ'
ἤδη τεθέασαι;
καίτοι χρῆν αἰθρίας ἕναι αὐτόν, ταύτας δ'
ἀποδημεῖν.

Attracts to itself the moisture of thought.
This is what happens to watercress too.

Cf. DIOG. D44

b

[SOCRATES:] Oh sovereign lord, boundless Air, you who
hold the earth suspended on high,
And shining Aether, and you, venerable goddesses, 265
thundering-lightning Clouds,
Arise, appear, oh mistresses, on high to this thinker!

c (cf. Nachtrag, vol. II, p. 420.14)

[SOC.:] That's because only they [i.e. the Clouds] are god-
desses; everything else is just claptrap.
[STREPS.:] But tell me, by Earth, isn't Olympian Zeus a
god for you people?
[SOC.:] What Zeus? Don't say stupid things. Zeus doesn't
even exist!
[STREPS.:] What are you saying?
But then who makes it rain? Explain this to me
before anything else.
[SOC.:] These do, obviously! And I will teach you how,
with great proofs.
Tell me: have you ever seen it rain without clouds? 370
And yet [scil. according to you] Zeus would have to
make it rain on a clear day, when the clouds are
away.

- [ΣΤ.] νῆ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, τοῦτό γέ τοι τῷ νυνὶ λόγῳ
εἶ προσέφυσας·
καίτοι πρότερον τὸν Δί' ἀληθῶς ᾤμην διὰ
κοσκίνου οὐρεῖν.
ἀλλ' ὅστις ὁ βροντῶν ἐστὶ φράσον, τοῦθ' ὁ
με ποιεῖ τετραμαίνειν.
- [ΣΩ.] αὐταὶ βροντῶσι κυλινδόμεναι.
- 375 [ΣΤ.] τῷ τρόπῳ, ᾧ πάντα σὺ τολ-
μῶν;
[ΣΩ.] ὅταν ἐμπλησθῶσ' ὕδατος πολλοῦ κάναγκα-
σθῶσι φέρεσθαι
κατακριμνάμεναι πλήρεις ὄμβρου δι' ἀνάγκη-
κην, εἴτα βαρεῖαι
εἰς ἀλλήλας ἐμπίπτουσαι ῥήγνυνται καὶ πα-
ταγούσιν.
- [ΣΤ.] ὁ δ' ἀναγκάζων ἐστὶ τίς αὐτάς—οὐχ ὁ
Ζεὺς;—ὥστε φέρεσθαι;
- [ΣΩ.] ἦκιστ', ἀλλ' αἰθέριος δῖνος.
- 380 [ΣΤ.] δῖνος; τουτί μ' ἐλελήθει,
ὁ Ζεὺς οὐκ ᾶν, ἀλλ' ἀντ' αὐτοῦ δῖνος νυνὶ
βασιλεύων.
ἀτὰρ οὐδέν πω περὶ τοῦ πατάγου καὶ τῆς
βροντῆς μ' ἐδίδαξας.
- [ΣΩ.] οὐκ ἤκουσάς μου τὰς νεφέλας ὕδατος μεστὰς
ὅτι φημί
ἐμπιπτούσας εἰς ἀλλήλας παταγεῖν διὰ τὴν
πυκνότητα;
- [ΣΤ.] φέρε, τουτί τῷ χρῆ πωστεύειν;

- [STREPS.:] By Apollo, you have joined this point very well
with what you said just now.
And to think that I really used to suppose that Zeus
was pissing through a sieve!
But tell me, who produces the thunder that makes
me tremble?
- [SOC.:] These produce the thunder by rolling around.
- [STREPS.:] In what way, you 375
whose audacity knows no limits?
- [SOC.:] When they are filled up with a lot of water and
drift, suspended,
Full of water, by the effect of necessity, they smash
into one another by their weight
And they burst and make a crashing noise.
- [STREPS.:] But the necessity that makes them drift, who
is it? Isn't it Zeus?
- [SOC.:] Not at all; it is the vortex of the aether.
- [STREPS.:] The vortex? I had not noticed 380
That Zeus does not exist and that in his place a
vortex is now king.
But you still have not taught me anything about the
crashing and thunder.
- [SOC.:] Didn't you hear me? What I say is that when the
clouds are full of water
And smash into one another, they make a crashing
noise because of their density.
- [STREPS.:] Come on, why should anyone believe that?

- 385 [ΣΩ.] ἀπὸ σαυτοῦ ἄγω σε διδάξω.
 ἤδη ζωμοῦ Παναθηναίους ἐμπλησθεὶς εἶτ'
 ἐταράχθης
 τὴν γαστέρα, καὶ κλόνος ἐξαίφνης αὐτὴν δι-
 εκορκορύγησεν;
- [ΣΤ.] νῆ τὸν Ἀπόλλω, καὶ δεινὰ ποεῖ γ' εὐθύς μοι
 καὶ τετάρακται,
 ᾧσπερ βροντῆ τὸ ζωμίδιον παταγεῖ καὶ
 δεινὰ κέκραγεν,
- 390 ἀτρέμας πρῶτον "παππᾶξ παππᾶξ," κᾶπειτ'
 ἐπάγει "παπαπαππᾶξ,"
 χῶταν χέζω, κομιδῆ βροντᾶ "παπαπαππᾶξ,"
 ᾧσπερ ἐκείναι.
- [ΣΩ.] σκέψαι τοίνυν ἀπὸ γαστριδίου τυννουτοῦ οἷα
 πέπορδας
 τὸν δ' ἀέρα τόνδ' ὄντ' ἀπέραντον πῶς οὐκ
 εἰκὸς μέγα βροντᾶν;
- [ΣΤ.] ταῦτ' ἄρα καὶ τῶνόματ' ἀλλήλων βροντῆ καὶ
 πορδῆ ὁμοίω.
- 395 ἀλλ ὁ κεραυνὸς πόθεν αὖ φέρεται λάμπων
 πυρί, τοῦτο δίδαξον,
 καὶ καταφρύγει βάλλων ἡμᾶς, τοὺς δὲ ζῶ-
 ντας περιφλεύει;
 τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ φανερώς ὁ Ζεὺς ἴησ' ἐπὶ τοὺς
 ἐπιόρκους.
- [ΣΩ.] καὶ πῶς, ᾧ μῶρε σὺ καὶ Κρονίων ὄζων καὶ
 βεκκεσέληνε,

- [SOC.:] I'll teach you on the basis of your 385
 own person.
 Have you ever stuffed yourself with soup at the
 Panathenaea and then had
 An upset stomach, thrown into turmoil by a sudden
 agitation?
- [STREPS.:] By Apollo, yes! It has a terrible effect on me at
 once and upsets me
 And that little bit of soup crashes like thunder and
 roars terribly,
 At first gently, *pappax, pappax*, and then mightily, 390
papapappax;
 And when I shit, it absolutely thunders, *papapap-*
pax, just like them!
- [SOC.:] Consider then what farts you set off from your
 little belly;
 Isn't it only natural that this air, which is limitless,
 thunders mightily?
- [STREPS.:] So that's why the words *brontê* ('thunder') and
porde ('fart') are similar!
 But now explain this to me: where does the light- 395
 ning bolt blazing with fire
 Come from that incinerates us when it hits us and
 burns the survivors?
 It is obvious that it is Zeus who is hurling it against
 perjurers.
- [SOC.:] What, you idiot with your antediluvian air, you
 superannuated fool!

εἴπερ βάλλει τοὺς ἐπιόρκους, δῆτ' οὐχὶ Σί-
 μων' ἐνέπρησεν
 400 οὐδὲ Κλεώνυμον οὐδὲ Θέωρον; καίτοι σφόδρα
 γ' εἶσ' ἐπιόρκου
 ἀλλὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ γε νεὼν βάλλει καὶ Σούνιον,
 ἄκρον Ἀθηνέων,
 καὶ τὰς δρυὺς τὰς μεγάλας· τί μαθῶν; οὐ γὰρ
 δὴ δρυὺς γ' ἐπιορκεῖ.
 [ΣΤ.] οὐκ οἶδ'· ἀτὰρ εὖ σὺ λέγεις φαίνει. τί γάρ
 ἐστὶν δῆθ' ὁ κεραυνός;
 [ΣΩ.] ὅταν εἰς ταύτας ἄνεμος ξηρὸς μετεωρισθεὶς
 κατακλησθῆ,
 405 ἔνδοθεν αὐτὰς ὥσπερ κύστιν φυσαῖ, κᾶπειθ'
 ὑπ' ἀνάγκης
 ῥήξας αὐτὰς ἔξω φέρεται σοβαρὸς διὰ τὴν
 πυκνότητά,
 ὑπὸ τοῦ ροίβδου καὶ τῆς ῥύμης αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν
 κατακαίω.
 [ΣΤ.] νῆ Δί' ἐγὼ γοῦν ἀτεχνῶς ἔπαθον τουτί ποτε
 Διασίοισιν,
 ὀπτῶν γαστέρα τοῖς συγγένεσιν, κᾶτ' οὐκ
 ἔσχω ἀμελήσας·
 410 ἦ δ' ἄρ' ἐφυσάτ', εἰτ' ἐξαίφνης διαλακήσασα
 πρὸς αὐτῶ
 τῶφθαλμῶ μου προσετίλησεν καὶ κατέκαυ-
 σεν τὸ πρόσωπον.

If he is really hitting perjurers, why hasn't he burned
 up Simon,
 Or Cleonymus, or Theorus, given that they're the 400
 worst perjurers?
 On the contrary, he hits his own temple, and Su-
 nium, the headland of Athens,
 And the great oaks. What does he know? Certainly
 an oak tree doesn't commit perjury.
 [STREPS.:] I don't know; but what you say seems right.
 But then what is the thunderbolt?
 [SOC.:] When a dry wind arises and becomes enclosed in
 these clouds,
 It inflates them from inside like a bladder, and then, 405
 having made them burst
 By the effect of necessity, it is expelled violently
 because of their density,
 Igniting itself by reason of its impetuosity and force.
 [STREPS.:] By Zeus, that's exactly the same thing as what
 happened to me one time at the Diasia festival:
 When I was cooking a paunch for my family, I forgot
 to make a slit in it.
 So it got inflated, and when it suddenly exploded 410
 directly into my eyes
 It soiled and burned my face.

Cf. e.g. ANAXIMAND. D33

d 329-34

- [ΣΩ.] ταύτας μέντοι σὺν θεᾶς οὔσας οὐκ ἤδεις οὐδ' ἐνόμιζες;
- [ΣΤ.] μὰ Δί', ἀλλ' ὀμίχλην καὶ δρόσον αὐτὰς ἠγούμην καὶ καπνὸν εἶναι.
- [ΣΩ.] οὐ γὰρ μὰ Δί' οἶσθ' ὅτι πλείστους αὐταὶ βόσκουσι σοφιστάς, Θουριομάντις, ἰατροτέχνας, σφραγιδονυχαρ-γοκομήτας· κυκλίων τε χορῶν ἄσματοκάμπτας, ἄνδρας μετεωροφένακας, οὐδὲν δρῶντας βόσκουσ' ἀργούς, ὅτι ταύτας μουσοποιούσιν.

Parody of an Orphic Cosmogony (T11)

T11 (1 A12) Aristoph. *Av.* 693-702

- [ΧΟ.] Χάος ἦν καὶ Νύξ Ἐρεβός τε μέλαν πρῶτον καὶ Τάρταρος εὐρύς· γῆ δ' οὐδ' ἀῆρ οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν· Ἐρέβους δ' ἐν ἀπέιροσι κόλπῳσι
- 695 τίκτει πρῶτιστον ὑπηνέμιον Νύξ ἢ μελανό-πτερος ῥόν, ἐξ οὗ περιτελλομένας ὦραις ἐβλασταν Ἐρως ὁ ποθεινός, στίλβων νῶτον πτερύγων χρυσαῖν, εἰκῶς ἀνεμώκεσι δίναις.

d

- [SOC.:] And as for you, you didn't know that they are goddesses, and you did not honor them?
- [STREPS.:] No, by Zeus; I thought they were mist, dew, and steam.
- [SOC.:] That's because, by Zeus, you did not know that they nourish a crowd of experts (*sophistai*): Diviners from Thurii, medical technicians, long-haired idlers who wear onyx rings, And tune-bending composers of dithyrambic choruses, fraudulent astronomers, whom, though they do nothing, they feed because they compose music about them.

Parody of an Orphic Cosmogony (T11)

T11 (1 A12) Aristophanes, *Birds*

- [CHORUS LEADER:] In the beginning, there were Chaos, Night, black Erebus, and broad Tartarus; Neither earth nor air nor sky existed. But in the limitless bosom of Erebus,
- 695 Black-winged Night produced in the very beginning a wind-egg, From which, when the seasons had completed their revolution, lovely Eros Blossomed, his back gleaming with golden wings, like swift whirlwinds.

οὗτος δὲ Χάει περὸντι μυχίως νύχιος κατὰ
 Τάρταρον εὐρύν
 ἐνεόττευσεν γένος ἡμέτερον, καὶ πρῶτον ἀνή-
 γαγεν εἰς φῶς.
 700 πρότερον δ' οὐκ ἦν γένος ἀθανάτων, πρὶν
 Ἔρωσ ξυνέμειξεν ἅπαντα·
 ξυμμειγνυμένων δ' ἐτέρων ἐτέροις γένετ'
 Οὐρανὸς Ὠκεανὸς τε
 καὶ Γῆ πάντων τε θεῶν μακάρων γένος ἄφθι-
 τον.

698 νύχιος Halbertsma, van Herwerden: νυχίω fere mss.
 (μυχίω Su. χ 84 mss. SC); μύχιος West

A Parodic Zoogony (T12)

T12 (cf. ad 64 A19) Aristoph. *Thesm.* 9–18

10 [KH.] πῶς μοι παραινεῖς; δεξιῶς μέντοι λέγεις·
 οὐ φῆς σὺν χρηναί μ' οὐτ' ἀκούειν οὐθ' ὄραν.
 [ET.] χωρὶς γὰρ αὐτοῖν ἑκατέρου ἴστιν ἡ φύσις.
 [KH.] τοῦ μήτ' ἀκούειν μήθ' ὄραν;
 [ET.] εἶ ἴσθ' ὅτι.
 [KH.] πῶς χωρὶς;
 [ET.] οὕτω ταῦτα διεκρίθη τότε.
 αἰθήρ γὰρ ὅτε τὰ πρῶτα διεχωρίζετο

12 versum del. van Herwerden

And, uniting at night with winged Chaos in broad
 Tartarus,
 He hatched our race and brought us first to the light
 of day.
 The race of immortals did not exist previously, be- 700
 fore Eros mixed together all things.
 But when different things were mixed together with
 each other, the sky and the ocean were born,
 And the earth and the immortal race of the blessed
 gods.

Cf. COSM. T13–T18

A Parodic Zoogony (T12)

T12 (cf. ad 64 A19) Aristophanes, *Thesmophoriazusae*

[RELATIVE OF EURIPIDES:] What are you recommending
 to me? You certainly talk cleverly!

You say that I must neither hear nor see?

[EURIPIDES:] Yes, for the nature of each of these two is
 different.

[RELATIVE:] That of neither hearing nor seeing?

[EUR.:] Yes indeed.

[RELATIVE:] But how are they different?

[EUR.:] This is how they were distin-
 guished back then:

For when the aether separated the elements

- 15 καὶ ζῷ' ἐν αὐτῷ ξυνετέκνου κινούμενα,
 ᾧ μὲν βλέπειν χρῆ πρῶτ' ἐμηχανήσατο
 ὀφθαλμὸν ἀντίμιμον ἡλίου τροχῷ,
 ἀκοῆς δὲ χοάνην ὄτα διετετρήματο.

*Thales (T13–T14)***T13** Aristoph. *Nub.* 177–180

- [MA.] κατὰ τῆς τραπέζης καταπάσας λεπτήν τέ-
 φραν,
 κάμψας ὀβελίσκον, εἶτα διαβήτην λαβῶν
 ἐκ τῆς παλαιστρας θοιμάτιον ὑφέιλετο.
 [ST.] τί δῆτ' ἐκείνον τὸν Θαλῆν θαυμάζομεν;

T14 Aristoph. *Av.* 1004–9

- 1005 [ME.] ὀρθῷ μετρήσω κανόνι προστιθείς, ἵνα
 ὁ κύκλος γένηταί σοι τετράγωνος κὰν μέσῳ
 ἀγορά, φέρονσαι δ' ὦσιν εἰς αὐτὴν ὁδοί
 ὀρθαὶ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ μέσον, ὥσπερ δ' ἀστέρος

- And engendered within itself the animals endowed 15
 with motion,
 It constructed first for the one that was supposed to
 see
 The eye, an imitation of the wheel of the sun,
 And perforated a funnel for hearing as the ears.

Thales (T13–T14)¹

¹ Thales seems to have been a popular emblem of scientific genius in Roman comedy too: see Plautus, *Captives* 62, *Rope* 1003, *Bacchides* 122.

T13 Aristophanes, *Clouds*

- [PUPIL OF SOCRATES:] Over the table he [i.e. Socrates]
 spread out fine ashes
 And bent a skewer, then taking up a spread-legged
 compass—
 From the wrestling school he stole the cloak.¹
 [STREPSIADES:] Then why do we admire the great Thales?

¹ The verse is obscure.

T14 Aristophanes, *Birds*

- [METON:]¹ I will measure it, setting a straight ruler along-
 side, so that
 Your circle will be squared, with in the center 1005
 A marketplace, and running into it there will be
 streets,
 Straight ones, toward the very center, and just as
 from a star,

αὐτοῦ κυκλοτεροῦς ὄντος ὄρθαι πανταχῆ
ἀκτῖνες ἀπολάμπωσιν.

[ΠΕ.]

ἄνθρωπος Θαλῆς.

Hippo (T15–T16)

T15 (38 A2) Cratin. Πανόπται Frag. 167 K–A = Schol. in Clem. Alex. *Protr.* 24.2 (vol. 1, p. 304.28–29 Stählin)

τοῦ δὲ Ἴππωνος [. . .] ὡς ἀσεβοῦς γενομένου μέμνηται ὁ Κρατῖνος.

T16 (38 A2)

a Aristoph. *Nub.* 94–97

95 [ΣΤ.] ψυχῶν σοφῶν τοῦτ' ἔστι φροντιστήριον.
ἐνταῦθ' ἐνοικοῦσ' ἄνδρες, οἳ τὸν οὐρανόν
λέγοντες ἀναπαίθουσιν ὡς ἔστιν πυργεύς,
κάστιν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὗτος, ἡμεῖς δ' ἄνθρακες.

b Cratin. Πανόπται Frag. 167 K–A = Schol. in Aristoph. *Nub.* 96d

ταῦτα πρότερος Κρατῖνος ἐν Πανόπταις δράματι περὶ Ἴππωνος τοῦ φιλοσόφου κωμῶδων αὐτὸν λέγει.

Which itself is circular, in every direction straight
Rays will beam outward.

[PISTHETAERUS:] The man is a Thales!

¹ A celebrated geometer and astronomer.*Hippo (T15–T16)*

T15 (38 A2) Scholia on Clement of Alexandria, *Protreptic*
Cratinus mentions Hippo [. . .] and the fact that he was
impious [scil. in his *Panoptai*, i.e. *Those Who See Every-*
thing].

T16 (38 A2)

a Aristophanes, *Clouds*

[STREPSIADES:] This is the think-tank of wise souls;
This is where those men live who, speaking
About the heavens, persuade people that it is an
oven,
And that it surrounds us, and that we are embers.

95

b Scholia on Aristophanes' *Clouds*

Cratinus said this earlier in his play *Panoptai* [i.e. *Those Who See Everything*] about the philosopher Hippo in order to make fun of him.

Parmenides? (T17)

T17 Cratin. Πανόπται Frag. 161 K–A

κρανία διςσὰ φορεῖν, ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' οὐκ ἀριθματοί

Protagoras (T18–T19)

T18 Eupol. Κόλακες

a (< 80 A11) Testim. ii. K–A = Athen. *Deipn.* 5.218Cἐν οὖν τούτῳ τῷ δράματι Εὐπολις τὸν Πρωταγόραν
ὡς ἐπιδημοῦντα εἰσάγει [. . .].

b (< 80 A1, A11) Frag. 157 K–A

ἔνδον μὲν ἐστὶ Πρωταγόρας ὁ Τήσιος
ὃς ἀλαζονεύεται μὲν ἀλιτήριος
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων, τὰ δὲ χαμᾶθεν ἐσθίει.

c (< 80 A11) Frag. 158 K–A

πίνειν γὰρ αὐτὸν Πρωταγόρας ἐκέλευ', ἵνα
πρὸ τοῦ κυνὸς τὸν πλεύμον' ἔκπλυτον φορῇ.*Parmenides?* (T17)T17 Cratinus, fragment from *Panoptai* [i.e. *Those Who See Everything*]

To have two heads—and innumerable eyes

Cf. PARM. D7.4–5

Protagoras (T18–T19)T18 Eupolis, *The Flatterers*a (< 80 A11) Athenaeus, *Deipnosophists*In this play, Eupolis brings Protagoras onto the stage as
having arrived [scil. at Athens, cf. PROT. P9] [. . .].b (< 80 A1, A11) Eupolis, Fragment from *Flatterers*Inside is Protagoras of Teos,
Who boasts, the scoundrel,
About celestial phenomena, but eats what comes
from the ground.c (< 80 A11) Eupolis, Fragment from *Flatterers*Then Protagoras told him [i.e. Callias] to drink
So that before the Dogstar rose
His lungs would be thoroughly moistened.

T19 Aristoph. *Nub.*

a (80 C2) 112–15

[ΣΤ.] εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῖς φασὶν ἄμφω τῶ λόγῳ,
τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἐστί, καὶ τὸν ἥττονα.
τούτου τὸν ἕτερον τοῖν λόγῳ, τὸν ἥττονα,
νικᾶν λέγοντά φασι τὰδικώτερα.

b 882–85

[ΣΤ.] ὅπως δ' ἐκείνῳ τῶ λόγῳ μαθήσεται,
τὸν κρείττον' ὅστις ἐστί καὶ τὸν ἥττονα,
ὃς τὰδικα λέγων ἀνατρέπει τὸν κρείττονα.
ἐὰν δὲ μή, τὸν γοῦν ἄδικον πάσῃ τέχνῃ.

885

c (> 80 C3) 658–93

[ΣΩ.] ἀλλ' ἕτερα δέῃ σε πρότερα τούτου μαθάνειν,
τῶν τετραπόδων ἅπτι' ἐστὶν ὀρθῶς ἄρρυνα.

660 [ΣΤ.] ἀλλ' οἶδ' ἔγωγε τᾶρρην', εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι
κρίως, τράγος, ταῦρος, κύων, ἀλεκτρυών.

288

T19 Aristophanes, *Clouds*

a (80 C2)

[STREPSIADES:] They say that there are both kinds of
speeches among them,
The stronger one, whatever that is, and the weaker
one,
And that of these two speeches the one that is
weaker,
They say, prevails by saying what is more unjust.

b

[STREPSIADES:] Make sure that he [i.e. Pheidippides]
learns these two arguments,
The stronger one, whatever that is, and the weaker
one,
The one that defends injustice and overturns the
stronger one.
And if not, then by all means teach him at least the 885
unjust one!¹

¹ See also the long dispute between Just Discourse and Unjust
Discourse in *Clouds* 889–1113.

Cf. PROT. D28

c (> 80C3)

[SOCRATES:] But there are other things that you need to
learn before that one:
Among the quadrupeds, which ones are strictly
speaking masculine?

[STREPSIADES:] But I know the masculine ones, unless I 660
am crazy:
Ram, billy goat, bull, dog, poultry.

289

- [ΣΩ.] ὀρᾶς ἃ πάσχεις; τὴν τε θήλειαν καλεῖς
ἀλεκτρούνα κατὰ ταῦτόν καὶ τὸν ἄρρενα.
- [ΣΤ.] πῶς δὴ, φέρε;
- [ΣΩ.] πῶς; ἀλεκτροῶν κάλεκτροῶν.
- 665 [ΣΤ.] νῆ τὸν Ποσειδῶ. νῦν δὲ πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν;
- [ΣΩ.] ἀλεκτρούαιναν, τὸν δ' ἕτερον ἀλέκτορα.
- [ΣΤ.] ἀλεκτρούαιναν; εἶ γε, νῆ τὸν Ἄερα
ὥστ' ἀντὶ τούτου τοῦ διδάγματος μόνου
διαλφιδάσω σου κύκλω τὴν κάρδοπον.
- 670 [ΣΩ.] ἰδοὺ μάλ' αὖθις, τοῦθ' ἕτερον τὴν κάρδοπον
ἄρρενα καλεῖς θήλειαν οὖσαν.
- [ΣΤ.] τῷ τρόπῳ;
ἄρρενα καλῶ γὰρ κάρδοπον;
- [ΣΩ.] μάλιστά γε,
ὥσπερ γε καὶ Κλεώνυμον.
- [ΣΤ.] πῶς δὴ; φράσον.
- [ΣΩ.] ταῦτόν δύναται σοι κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμω.
- 675 [ΣΤ.] ἀλλ', ὦγάθ', οὐδ' ἦν κάρδοπος Κλεωνύμω,
ἀλλ' ἐν θυεῖα στρογγύλῃ γ' ἀνεμάττετο.
ἀτὰρ τὸ λοιπὸν πῶς με χρὴ καλεῖν;
- [ΣΩ.] ὅπως;
τὴν καρδόπην, ὥσπερ καλεῖς τὴν Σωστρά-
την.
- [ΣΤ.] τὴν καρδόπην, θήλειαν;
- [ΣΩ.] ὀρθῶς γὰρ λέγεις.
- 680 [ΣΤ.] ἐκείνο δ' ἦν ἂν 'καρδόπη Κλεωνύμῃ'.

- [SOC.:] Do you see what is happening to you? You call the female 'poultry' just like the male.
- [STREPS.:] What's that? Let's see!
- [SOC.:] What's that? Poultry and poultry.
- [STREPS.:] Quite so, by Poseidon. But just what am I supposed to call them? 665
- [SOC.:] 'Poultress,' and the other one 'poultry.'
- [STREPS.:] 'Poultress'? Very good, by Air!
So that, for this lesson alone,
I'll fill up your bowl (*kardopos*) with barley all around.
- [SOC.:] You see? Here's another one. You call the bowl 670
masculine,
Though the word is feminine.
- [STREPS.:] How so?
Do I call the bowl masculine?
- [SOC.:] Absolutely, just like when you say, "Cleonymus."
- [STREPS.:] What's that? Tell me.
- [SOC.:] For you, 'bowl' and 'Cleonymus' have the same value.
- [STREPS.:] But, my dear fellow, Cleonymus didn't even 675
have a bowl;
It was in a round mortar that he did *his* kneading!
But how am I supposed to say it from now on?
- [SOC.:] How? 'Bowless' (*kardopê*), just as you say 'Sostatê.'
- [STREPS.:] *Kardopê* in the feminine?
- [SOC.:] Indeed: that is how to speak correctly.
- [STREPS.:] So this is what I should say: *kardopê*, *Cleonymê*. 680

- [ΣΩ.] ἔτι δέ γε περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων μαθεῖν σε δεῖ,
 ἅττ' ἄρρεν' ἐστίν, ἅττα δ' αὐτῶν θήλεα.
 [ΣΤ.] ἀλλ' οἷδ' ἔγωγ' ἃ θήλε' ἐστίν.
 [ΣΩ.] εἰπέ δή.
 [ΣΤ.] Λύσιλλα, Φίλινα, Κλειταγόρα, Δημητρία.
 685 [ΣΩ.] ἄρρενα δὲ ποῖα τῶν ὀνομάτων;
 [ΣΤ.] μυρία.
 Φιλόξενος, Μελησίας, Ἀμυνίας.
 [ΣΩ.] ἀλλ' ὦ πόνηρε, ταῦτά γ' ἔστ' οὐκ ἄρρενα.
 [ΣΤ.] οὐκ ἄρρεν' ὑμῖν ἐστίν;
 [ΣΩ.] οὐδαμῶς γ', ἐπεὶ
 πῶς ἂν καλέσειας ἐντυχῶν Ἀμυνία;
 690 [ΣΤ.] ὅπως ἂν; ὠδὶ "δεῦρο δεῦρ', Ἀμυνία."
 [ΣΩ.] ὀρᾶς; γυναῖκα τὴν Ἀμυνίαν καλεῖς.
 [ΣΤ.] οὐκ οὐν δικαίως, ἥτις οὐ στρατεύεται;
 ἀτὰρ τί ταῦθ' ἃ πάντες ἴσμεν μανθάνω;

Gorgias (T20–T21)

T20 (82 A5a) Aristoph. Av. 1694–705

- [ΧΟ.] ἔστι δ' ἐν Φάναισι πρὸς τῇ
 1695 Κλεψύδρα πανούργων Ἑγ-
 γλωττογαστρῶν γένος,

- [SOC.:] But you still have to learn, regarding proper names,
 Which ones are masculine and which ones feminine.
 [STREPS.:] But I know which ones are feminine.
 [SOC.:] Then tell me.
 [STREPS.:] Lysilla, Philinna, Cleitagora, Demetria.
 [SOC.:] And the masculine ones, which names are they? 685
 [STREPS.:] Innumerable ones:
 Philoxenus, Melesias, Amynias.
 [SOC.:] But those are not masculine, you fool!
 [STREPS.:] Those don't count as masculine for you people?
 [SOC.:] Not in the least. For
 How would you call Amynias if you ran into him?
 [STREPS.:] How I would call him? Like this: "Over here, 690
 over here, Amynia!"
 [SOC.:] You see? You're calling that 'Amynia' by a woman's name.
 [STREPS.:] But isn't that appropriate, since she doesn't
 serve in the army?
 But why do I have to learn these things? We all
 know them.

Cf. PROT. D23–D25

*Gorgias (T20–T21)*T20 (82 A5a) Aristophanes, *Birds*

- [CHORUS:] There exists in Phanae by the
 Clepsydra a race of wicked people 1695
 That live by their tongues,

- οὐ θερίζουσιν τε καὶ σπεί-
 ρουσι καὶ τρυγῶσι ταῖς γλώτ-
 ταισι συκάζουσί τε
 1700 βάρβαροι δ' εἰσὶν γένος,
 Γοργίαί τε καὶ Φίλιπποι,
 κάπῳ τῶν Ἑγγλωττογαστό-
 ρων ἐκείνων τῶν Φιλίππων
 πανταχοῦ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἢ
 1705 γλώττα χωρὶς τέμνεται.

T21 (82 A5a) Aristoph. *Vesp.* 420–21

- [ΞΑ.] Ἡράκλεις, καὶ κέντρ' ἔχουσιν. οὐχ ὄρας, ὦ
 δέσποτα;
 [ΒΔ.] οἷς γ' ἀπώλεσαν Φίλιππον ἐν δίκῃ τὸν Γορ-
 γίου.

Prodicus (T22–T24)

T22 (> 84 A5) Aristoph. *Nub.* 360–61

- [ΧΟ.] [. . .] οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλῳ γ' ὑπακούσαιμεν τῶν
 νῦν μετεωροσοφιστῶν
 πλὴν ἢ Προδίκῳ, τῷ μὲν σοφίας καὶ γνώμης
 οὐνεκα [. . . = T28].

- Who with their tongues
 Reap and sow
 And gather in grapes and figs:
 They are a race of people who do not speak good 1700
 Greek (*barbaroi*),
 Gorgias and Philippuses,
 And it is by reason of those Phillipuses
 That live by their tongues
 That everywhere in Attica
 The tongue is cut off separately [scil. in sacrifices]. 1705

T21 (82 A5a) Aristophanes, *Wasps*

- [ΧΑΝΘΙΑΣ:] By Heracles, they have stings too, don't you
 see, master?
 [ΒΔΕΛΥΚΛΕΟΝ:] Yes, and with these they destroyed Gor-
 gias' son Philippus in a trial.

Prodicus (T22–T24)

T22 (> 84 A5) Aristophanes, *Clouds*

- [CHORUS LEADER:] [. . .] For we would not listen to any
 other one of our present-day meteorosophists
 Except for Prodicus, on account of his wisdom and
 intelligence [. . .].

T23 (cf. 84 A5) Aristoph. *Av.* 690–92

[XO.] [. . .] ἴν' ἀκούσαντες πάντα παρ' ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς
περὶ τῶν μετεώρων,
φύσιν οἰωνῶν γένεσίν τε θεῶν ποταμῶν τ'
Ἐρέβους τε Χάους τε
εἰδότες ὀρθῶς, Προδίκῳ παρ' ἐμοῦ κλάειν
εἴπητε τὸ λοιπόν. [. . . = T11]

T24 (84 A5) Aristoph. *Ταγηνισταί* Frag. 506 K–A

τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ' ἢ βιβλίον διέφθορεν
ἢ Πρόδικος ἢ τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν εἰς γέ τις.

1 τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρ' ἢ Hermann: τὸν ἄνδρα τόνδ' ἢ Schol.
in *Nub.* 361a, *Suda* II.2366.

Thrasymachus (T25)

T25 (85 A4) Aristoph. *Δαιταλῆς* Frag. 205.3–9 K–A

[A.] ἢ μὴν ἴσως σὺ καταπλιγῆσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ.
[B.] τὸ καταπλιγῆσθαι τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ῥητόρων.
5 [A.] ἀποβήσεται σοι ταῦτά ποι τὰ ῥήματα.
[B.] παρ' Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦτο τὰποβήσεται.
[A.] τί ὑποτεκμαίρη καὶ κακῶς ἄνδρας λέγεις
καλοκάγαθίαν ἀσκούοντας;
[B.] οἴμ', ὦ Θρασύμαχε,
τίς τοῦτο τῶν ξυνηγόρων τερατεύεται;

T23 (cf. 84 A5) Aristophanes, *Birds*

[CHORUS OF BIRDS:] [. . .] So that, once you have heard correctly everything we say about celestial phenomena,
And know correctly the nature of birds, the birth of the gods, rivers, Erebus, and Chaos,
you [i.e. humans] can tell Prodicus from me henceforth to go to hell! [. . .]

T24 (84 A5) Fragment from *Fry Cooks*

This man here—either a book ruined him,
Or else Prodicus, or some one of those idle talkers.

Thrasymachus (T25)

T25 (85 A4) Aristophanes, Fragment from *Banqueters*

[A:] You will certainly be tripped up sooner or later.
[B:] This 'tripped up' you have gotten from the orators.
[A:] Where will these words finish up for you? 5
[B:] This 'finish up' you have gotten from Alcibiades.
[A:] What are these insinuations and slanders against gentlemen
Who cultivate refinement?
[B:] Well, Thrasymachus,
Who among the lawyers uses this extreme subtlety?

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY IX

Socrates (T26–T32)

T26 (I A 3 G²) Aristoph. *Nub. prior*. Frag. 392 K–A

Εὐριπίδῃ δ' ὁ τὰς τραγωδίας ποιῶν
τὰς περιλαλούσας οὕτως ἔστι, τὰς σοφάς.

T27 (I A 5 G²) Aristoph. *Av.* 1280–83

1280 [KH.] πρὶν μὲν γὰρ οἰκίσαι σε τήνδε τὴν πόλιν,
ἐλακωνομάνουν ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε,
ἐκόμων, ἐπέινων, ἐρρῦπων, ἐσωκράτων,
σκυτάλι' ἐφόρουν [. . .].

T28 (> 64 C1) Aristoph. *Nub.*

a 361–63

[xo.] [. . . = **T22**] σοὶ δέ,
ὄτι βρενθῖναι τ' ἐν ταῖσιν ὁδοῖς καὶ τῶφθαλμῶ
παραβάλλεις
κάνυπόδητος κακὰ πόλλ' ἀνέχει κἀφ' ἡμῶν
σεμνοπροσωπεῖς.

DRAMATIC APPENDIX

*Socrates (T26–T32)*¹

¹ For some other brief jibes at Socrates, cf. Aristophanes, *Birds* 1553–55, *Frogs* 1491–99.

T26 (I A 3 G²) Aristophanes, Fragment from the first version of *Clouds*

This is the man [scil. Socrates] who makes the tragedies
for Euripides, the ones that chatter excessively, the clever ones.

T27 (I A 5 G²) Aristophanes, *Birds*

[HERALD:] Before you [i.e. Pisthetaerus] built this city 1280
[i.e. Cloudcuckooland],
The people were all crazy about the Spartan way of life:
They grew their hair long, they went hungry, they were filthy, they Socratized,
They carried little cudgels [. . .].

T28 (> 64 C1) Aristophanes, *Clouds*

a

[CHORUS LEADER:] [. . .] and you [i.e. Socrates] too,
Because you go strutting along through the streets and casting your eyes to the sides
And go barefoot and endure lots of sufferings and look down solemnly on us.

b 826-37

- [ΣΤ.] ὀρᾶς οὖν ὡς ἀγαθὸν τὸ μανθάνειν;
οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Φειδιππίδη, Ζεύς.
[ΦΕ.] ἀλλὰ τίς;
[ΣΤ.] Δίνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δί' ἐξεληλακῶς.
[ΦΕ.] αἰβού· τί ληρεῖς;
[ΣΤ.] ἴσθι τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχον.
830 [ΦΕ.] τίς φησι ταῦτα;
[ΣΤ.] Σωκράτης ὁ Μήλιος
καὶ Χαηρεφῶν, ὃς οἶδε τὰ ψυλλῶν ἔχνη.
[ΦΕ.] σὺ δ' εἰς τοσοῦτον τῶν μανιῶν ἐλήλυθας
ὥστ' ἀνδράσιν πείθει χολῶσιν;
[ΣΤ.] εὐστόμει
καὶ μηδὲν εἶπης φλαῦρον ἄνδρας δεξιούς
καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντας, ὧν ὑπὸ τῆς φειδωλίας
ἀπεκείρατ' οὐδεὶς πάποτ' οὐδ' ἠλείψατο
835 οὐδ' εἰς βαλανεῖον ἦλθε λουσόμενος [. . .].

c 627

- [ΣΩ.] μὰ τὴν Ἀναπνοήν, μὰ τὸ Χάος, μὰ τὸν Ἄερα
[. . .].

T29 (I A 10 G²) Diog. Laert. 2.28 = Ameips. Κόννος (?)
Frag. *9 K-A

Ἀμειψίας δ' ἐν τρίβωνι παράγων αὐτὸν φησὶν οὕτως·

b

- [STREPSIADES:] Now do you see that learning is a good
thing?
Zeus does not exist, Phidippides.
[PHEIDIPPIDES:] Then who does exist?
[STREPS.:] Vortex (*Dinos*) is king, he has kicked out Zeus.
[PHEID.:] Bah! What is this nonsense?
[STREPS.:] You should know that that's
how it is.
[PHEID.:] Who says this? 830
[STREPS.:] Socrates the Melian,
And Chaerephon, who's an expert on the footsteps
of fleas.
[PHEID.:] Have you become so crazy
That you trust these bilious guys?
[STREPS.:] Watch what you say,
And don't denigrate these clever
And intelligent men, who are so frugal 835
That none of them has ever cut his hair or oiled
himself
Or gone to the baths to wash himself [. . .].

Cf. e.g. **ANAXAG. D27; EMP. D73.289, D116-D117; ATOM. D13, D80b**

c

- [SOCRATES:] By Respiration, by Chaos, by Air [. . .].

T29 (I A 10 G²) Diogenes Laertius

Ameipsias brings him [i.e. Socrates] onto the stage in
threadbare clothes [in *Connus*?] and says:

a

Σώκρατες ἀνδρῶν βέλτιστ' ὀλίγων, πολλῶν δὲ
ματαιόταθ', ἦκεις
καὶ σὺ πρὸς ἡμᾶς; καρτερικός γ' εἶ. πόθεν ἂν σοὶ
χλαῖνα γένοιτο;

b

τοῦτ' ἐπὶ τὸ κακὸν τῶν σκυτοτόμων κατ' ἐπήρειαν
γεγένηται.

c

οὗτος μέντοι πεινῶν οὕτως οὐπάποτ' ἔτλη
κολακεύσαι.

T30 (I A 2 G²) Callias Πεδῆται Frag. 15 K–A

[A.] τί δὴ σὺ σεμνὴ καὶ φρονεῖς οὕτω μέγα;

[B.] ἔξεστι γάρ μου Σωκράτης γὰρ αἴτιος.

T31 (I A 12 G²) Eupol. Frag. 386 K–A

μισῶ δὲ καὶ <τὸν> Σωκράτην
τὸν πτωχὸν ἀδολέσχην,
ὃς τᾶλλα μὲν πεφρόντικεν,
ὀπόθεν δὲ καταφαγεῖν ἔχει
τούτου κατημέληκεν.

1 μισῶ δὲ καὶ <τὸν> Σωκράτην Dindorf: μισῶ δὲ καὶ
Σωκράτην Asclep. In *Metaph.*, p. 135.23–24 Hayduck, Procl.
In *Parm.*, p. 656.18–19: τί δῆτα ἐκείνον Olymp. In *Parm.* 70B
(p. 137.5–7 Westerink)

a

Socrates, the best of the few, the most foolish of the
many, have you come,
You too, to us? You're pretty courageous. Where will
you get yourself a cloak from?

b

This wretchedness [probably: Socrates' notorious
habit of going barefoot] is an insult to the
shoemakers.

c

And yet this man, poor as he is, has never submitted
to flattering people.

T30 (I A 2 G²) Callias, Fragment from *Men in Shackles*

[A:] Why are you so solemn and so pompous?

[B:] Because I can be—for Socrates is the reason.

T31 (I A 12 G²) Eupolis, Fragment from an unidentified
play (the *Flatterers*?)

And I hate Socrates too,
That beggarly chatterbox,
Who has figured out everything else,
But where he could get something to eat from—
To this he has paid no attention.

T32 (IA 1 G²) Telecl.

a Frag. 41 K-A

Μνησίλοχος ἔστ' ἐκεῖνος ὅς φρύγει τι δράμα
 καινόν
 Εὐριπίδῃ, καὶ Σωκράτης τὰ φρύγαν' ὑποτίθῃσιν.

b Frag. 42 K-A

Εὐριπίδης σωκρατογόμφος
 σωκρατογόμφους mss., corr. Casaubon

Middle Comedy (T33–T39)
Heraclitus (T33)

T33 (T136 Mouraviev) Antiphon. Kâpes Frag. 111.1–3
K-A

οὐχ ὄρας ὀρχούμενον
 ταῖς χερσὶ τὸν βάκηλον; οὐδ' αἰσχύνεται
 ὁ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον πᾶσιν ἐξηγούμενος [. . .].

T32 (IA 1 G²) Telecleides, Fragments from unidentified
plays

a

Mnesilochus¹ is that man, who is roasting some
 newfangled drama
 For Euripides, and Socrates is putting firebrands
 under it.

¹ Euripides' father-in-law.

b

Euripides, bolted together by Socrates

Middle Comedy (T33–T39)
Heraclitus (T33)

T33 (T136 Mouraviev) Antiphanes, fragment from *Car-*
ians

Don't you see him dancing,
 That eunuch, on his hands? Is he not ashamed,
 He who explains Heraclitus¹ to everyone [. . .]?

¹ Some scholars take this to be an allusion to Heraclides of
Pontus; cf. **HER. R1a, b.**

Democritus (T34)

T34 (68 C1) Damox. Σύντροφοι Frag. 2.12–34 K–A

- [A.] διόπερ μάγειρον ὅταν ἴδῃς ἀγράμματον
 μὴ Δημόκριτόν τε πάντα διανεγνωκότα,
 μᾶλλον δὲ κατέχοντα καταγέλα ὡς κενού,
 15 καὶ τὸν Ἐπικούρου Κανόνα, μινθώσας ἄφες
 ὡς ἐκ διατριβῆς. τοῦτο δεῖ γὰρ εἰδέναί,
 τίς ἔχει διαφορὰν πρῶτον, ᾧ βέλτιστε σύ,
 γλαυκίσκος ἐν χειμῶνι καὶ θέρει, πάλιν
 ποῖος περὶ δύσιν Πλειάδος συνειδέναι
 20 ἰχθὺς ὑπὸ τροπᾶς τ' ἐστὶ χρησιμώτατος.
 αἱ μεταβολαὶ γὰρ αἱ τε κινήσεις κακὸν
 ἡλίβατον ἀνθρώποισιν ἀλλοιώματα
 ἐν ταῖς τροφαῖς ποιοῦσι, μανθάνεις; τὸ δέ
 ληφθὲν καθ' ὥραν ἀποδίδωσι τὴν χάριν.
 25 τίς παρακολουθεῖ ταῦτα; τοιγαροῦν στράφοι
 καὶ πνευμάτια γινόμενα τὸν κεκλημένον
 ἀσχημονεῖν ποιοῦσι. παρὰ δ' ἔμοι τρέφει
 τὸ προσφερόμενον βρῶμα καὶ λεπτύνεται,
 ὀρθῶς τε διαπνέει. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τοὺς πόρους
 30 ὁ χυμὸς ὁμαλῶς πανταχοῦ συνίσταται—

14 versum cacometrum del. Hermann

Democritus (T34)

T34 (68 C1) Damoxenus, Fragment from *The Foster Brothers*

- [A:] And that is why, when you see an unlettered cook
 Who has not read through all of Democritus—
 Or rather, even though he possesses him, laughs at
 him as being void—
 And Epicurus' *Canon*, then cover him with shit and 15
 send him away
 As if from school: for you must know this,
 First what the difference is, dear sir,
 Between a grayfish in winter and in summer, and
 then
 You must understand what kind of fish is best
 Around the setting of the Pleiades and near the 20
 solstices.
 For transformations and changes, which are a pre-
 cipitous evil
 For human beings, bring about alterations
 In foodstuffs, you understand? But what is
 Consumed in the right season produces pleasure.
 Who pays close attention to these matters? And so 25
 indigestion
 And flatulence occur and make the invited guest
 Disgrace himself; but in my case
 The food that is consumed nourishes, makes a man
 slender,
 And passes through correctly. And so the humor
 Is composed homogeneously everywhere in the 30
 pores.

- [B.] χυμός;
 [A.] λέγει Δημόκριτος—οὐδ' ἐμφράγματα
 γινόμενα ποιεῖ τὸν φαγόντ' ἀρθριτικόν.
 [B.] καὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς τι μετέχειν μοι δοκεῖς.
 [A.] καὶ πᾶς ὁ φύσεως ἐντός. [. . .]

*Pythagoreans (T35–T39)***T35** (58E.1) Alexis**a** Πυθαγορίζουσα Frag. 201 K–A

- (a) [A.] ἡ δ' ἐστίασις ἰσχάδες καὶ στέμφυλα
 καὶ τυρὸς ἔσται· ταῦτα γὰρ θύειν νόμος
 τοῖς Πυθαγορείοις.
 [B.] νῆ Δι', ἱερεῖον μὲν οὖν
 ὁποῖον ἂν κάλλιστον, ᾧ βέλτιστ', ἔχη.
 (b) ἔδει θ' ὑπομῆναι μικροσιτίαν, ῥύπον,
 ῥίγος, σιωπήν, στυγνότητ', ἀλουσίαν.

b Ταραντῖνοι Frag. 223 K–A

- (a) [A.] οἱ πυθαγορίζοντες γάρ, ὡς ἀκούομεν,
 οὔτ' ὄψον ἐσθίουσιν οὔτ' ἄλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν
 ἔμφυλον, οἶνον τ' οὐχὶ πίνουσιν μόνοι.
 [B.] Ἐπιχαρίδης μέντοι κύνας κατεσθίει,
 τῶν Πυθαγορείων εἰς.

- [B:] The humor?
 [A:] That's what Democritus says: the obstructions
 don't occur
 That give the man who eats a case of gout.
 [B:] To me you seem to have some knowledge of medi-
 cine too.
 [A:] And [scil. so does] every expert on nature. [. . .]

*Pythagoreans (T35–T39)***T35** (58E.1) Alexis**a** Fragments from *The Female Pythagorean*

- (a) [A:] The banquet will consist of dried figs, pressed
 olives,
 And cheese: for it is the Pythagoreans' custom
 To sacrifice these things.
 [B:] By Zeus, dear sir,
 That is the finest sacrifice there is!
 (b) A meager diet, filth, cold, silence, gloominess,
 And grime—all this had to be endured.

b Fragments from *Men from Tarentum*

- (a) [A:] For the Pythagoreans, according to what we are
 told,
 Eat neither fish nor anything else
 That has a soul, and they are the only people who
 do not drink wine.
 [B:] But Epicharides eats dogs,
 And he is one of the Pythagoreans!

- [A.] ἀποκτείνας γέ που
οὐκέτι γάρ ἐστ' ἔμφυχον.
- (b) [A.] πυθαγορισμοὶ καὶ λόγοι
λεπτοὶ διεσμυλευμέναι τε φροντίδες
τρέφουσ' ἐκείνους, τὰ δὲ καθ' ἡμέραν τάδε·
ἄρτος καθαρὸς εἰς ἑκατέρῳ, ποτήριον
ὑδατος· τοσαῦτα ταῦτα.
- [B.] δεσμωτηρίου
λέγεις δίαιταν. πάντες οὕτως οἱ σοφοὶ
διάγουσι καὶ τοιαῦτα κακοπαθοῦσιν;
- [A.] οὐ·
τρυφῶσιν οὗτοι πρὸς ἑτέρους. ἄρ' οἴσθ' ὅτι
Μελανιππίδης ἐταῖρός ἐστι καὶ Φάων
καὶ Φυρόμαχος καὶ Φᾶνος, οἳ δι' ἡμέρας
δειπνοῦσι πέμπτης ἀλφίτων κοτύλην μίαν;

T36 (58E.1) Antiphan.**a** Μνήματα Frag. 158 K–A

τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν δ' ἔτυχον ἄθλιοί τινες
ἐν τῇ χαράδρᾳ τρώγοντες ἄλιμα καὶ κακά
τοιαῦτα συλλέγοντες ἐν τῷ κωρύκῳ.

b Κώρυκος Frag. 133 K–A

πρῶτον μὲν ὥσπερ πυθαγορίζων ἐσθίει
ἔμφυχον οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ πλείστης τοῦβολοῦ
μάζης μελαγχρῆ μερίδα λαμβάνων λέπει.

- [A:] But he kills it first—
For that way there is no longer any soul in it.
- (b) [A:] Pythagorisms, subtle discourses,
And finely chiseled meditations
Are what nourish those men, but their daily diet is
this:
One plain loaf of bread for each one and a cup
Of water. And that is all.
- [B:] That's prison fare
You're talking about. Do all those wise men
Spend their lives in this way and endure such evils?
- [A:] No:
Compared to the others, these men revel in luxury.
Don't you know that
Melanippides is a disciple, as well as Phaon,
And Phyromachus and Phanus, and that every four
days
They dine on a half-pint of barley meal?

T36 (58E.1) Antiphanes**a** *The Tombs*

Some of those wretched Pythagoreans happened
To be gnawing purslanes in a torrent and
Gathering together awful things like this in their
leather sack.

b *The Leather Sack*

First, being a Pythagorean, he eats
Nothing that has a soul, but from the cheapest barley
cake he can find
He takes the blackened part and eats that.

T37 Aristophon Πυθαγοριστής

a (58E.2) Frag. 9 K-A

πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, οἰόμεθα τοὺς πάλαι ποτέ,
 τοὺς Πυθαγοριστὰς γυνομένους ὄντως ῥυπᾶν
 ἐκόντας ἢ φορεῖν τρίβωνας ἡδέως;
 οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὐδέν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ
 5 ἄλλ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐκ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ ἓν,
 τῆς εὐτελείας πρόφασιν εὐρόντες καλήν
 ὄρους ἔπηξαν τοῖς πένησι χρησίμους.
 ἐπεὶ παράθες αὐτοῖσιν ἰχθύς ἢ κρέας,
 κἂν μὴ κατεσθίωσι καὶ τοὺς δακτύλους,
 10 ἐθέλω κρέμασθαι δεκάκις.

b (58E.3) Frag. 12 K-A

(a) [A.] ἔφη καταβὰς εἰς τὴν δίαιταν τῶν κάτω
 ἰδεῖν ἐκάστους, διαφέρειν δὲ πάμπου
 τοὺς Πυθαγοριστὰς τῶν νεκρῶν· μόνουσι γὰρ
 5 τοῦτοισι τὸν Πλούτωνα συσσιτεῖν ἔφη
 δι' εὐσέβειαν.

[B.] εὐχερῆ θεὸν λέγεις
 εἰ τοῖς ῥύπου μεστοῖσιν ἡδεται συνῶν.

(b) ἐσθίουσί τε
 λάχανά τε καὶ πίνουσιν ἐπὶ τούτοις ὕδωρ·

T37 Aristophon, Fragments from *The Pythagorean*

a (58E.2)

By the gods, do we suppose that those men of old,
 Those who were really Pythagoreans, were voluntarily
 Filthy or took pleasure in wearing threadbare
 clothes?

Not at all, in my opinion!

They did this by necessity, since they possessed
 5 absolutely nothing:

Having found a fine pretext for their shabbiness,
 They established standards appropriate for beggars.

For if you set before them fish or meat
 And they don't eat it up, and their fingers too,

Then I am willing to be hanged ten times!

5

10

b (58E.3)

(a) [A:] He said that he descended to observe the way of
 life

Of those below, each one, and that the Pythagoreans

Were completely different from the [scil. other?] dead: for, he said,

Pluto dines together with them alone

Because of their piety.

[B:] You are speaking of a tolerant god,
 If he takes pleasure in the company of people full
 of filth.

5

(b) And they eat
 Vegetables and drink water to top them off;

φθείρας δὲ καὶ τρίβωνα τὴν τ' ἀλουσίαν
οὐδείς ἂν ὑπομείνειε τῶν νεωτέρων.

T38 (58E.3) Cratinus Junior

a Diog. Laert. 8.37 (Πυθαγορίζουσα Frag. 6 K–A)

ἔσκωψε δ' αὐτὸν Κρατῖνος μὲν ἐν Πυθαγορίζούσῃ
[. . .].

b Ταραντῖνοι Frag. 7 K–A

ἔθος ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς, ἄν τιν' ἰδιώτην ποθέν
λάβωσιν εἰσελθόντα, διαπειρωμένοις
τῆς τῶν λόγων ῥώμης ταραττεῖν καὶ κυκᾶν
τοῖς ἀντιθέτοις, τοῖς πέρασι, τοῖς παρισώμασιν,
τοῖς ἀποπλάνοις, τοῖς μεγέθεσιν νουβυστικῶς.

T39 (58E.3) Mnesim. Ἀλκμαίων Frag. 1 K–A

ὡς Πυθαγοριστὶ θύομεν τῷ Λοξίῳ,
ἔμψυχον οὐδὲν ἐσθίοντες παντελῶς.

New Comedy (T40)

Diogenes of Apollonia? (T40)

T40 (64 C4) Philemo Frag. 95 K–A

ὄν οὐδὲ εἰς λέληθεν οὐδὲ ἐν ποιῶν,
οὐδ' αὖ ποιήσων οὐδὲ πεποιηκὼς πάλαι,

And their lice, their threadbare clothes, and their
grime—
None of the younger people could stand that!

T38 (58E.3) Cratinus the Younger

a Diogenes Laertius

Cratinus made fun of him [i.e. Pythagoras] in *The Female Pythagorean* [. . .].

b Fragment from *Men from Tarentum*

They have a custom: if they catch a private person
Who arrives from somewhere else, they cause him
trouble and confusion

By testing the strength of his reasonings,
By using antitheses, limits, equations,
Fallacies, magnitudes—all full of ingenuity.

T39 (58E.3) Mnesimachus, Fragment from *Alcmaeon*

In accordance with the Pythagorean way, we sacrifice
to Loxias,
We who eat nothing whatsoever that is living.

New Comedy (T40)

Diogenes of Apollonia? (T40)

T40 (64 C4) Philemon, Fragment from an unidentified
play

He who does not fail to notice whatever any man does,
In the present or in the future or formerly in the
past,

οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε γ' ἐσθλόν, οὐτός εἰμ' ἐγώ,
 Ἀήρ, ὃν ἄν τις ὀνομάσειε καὶ Δία.
 5 ἐγὼ δ', ὁ θεοῦ ἔστιν ἔργον, εἰμὶ πανταχοῦ,
 ἐνταῦθ' ἐν Ἀθήναις, ἐν Πάτραις, ἐν Σικελίᾳ,
 ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πάσαισι, ἐν ταῖς οἰκίαις
 πάσαις, ἐν ὑμῖν πᾶσιν οὐκ ἔστιν τόπος,
 οὐ μὴ ἔστιν Ἀήρ· ὁ δὲ παρῶν ἀπανταχοῦ
 10 πάντ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶδε πανταχοῦ παρῶν.

*Philosophical References in
 Attic Tragedy (T41–T84)
 General Themes (T41–T71)
 Epistemological Considerations (T41–T42)*

T41 Soph. *Aleax.* Frag. 86.3 R

τό τοι νομισθὲν τῆς ἀληθείας κρατεῖ.

T42 Eur. *Helen*

a 117–19, 121–22

[HA.] εἶδες σὺ τὴν δύστηνον, ἣ κλύων λέγεις;
 [TE.] ὥσπερ σέ γ', οὐδὲν ἦσσαν, ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄρω.

Whether evil or good—that is what I am,
 Air, whom one could also call Zeus.
 I am everywhere—what is a god's job— 5
 Here in Athens, in Patras, in Sicily,
 In all the cities, in all the dwellings,
 And in all of you. There is no place
 In which Air does not exist; and, being present ev-
 erywhere,
 By necessity he knows all things, being everywhere 10
 present.

Cf. **DIOG. D10**

*Philosophical References in
 Attic Tragedy (T41–T84)
 General Themes (T41–T71)
 Epistemological Considerations (T41–T42)*

T41 Sophocles, Fragment from *The Sons of Aleus*

What is believed prevails over the truth.

T42 Euripides, *Helen*

a

[HELEN:] Did you see the wretched woman,¹ or are you
 speaking from hearsay?

[TEUCER:] I saw her with my eyes, just as I see you, not
 less.

¹ Teucer thinks that it was the real Helen whom the Greeks
 captured in Troy at the end of the war; the real Helen, who is
 speaking with him, knows that it was only a phantom.

- [HA.] σκοπέιτε μὴ δόκησιν εἶχετ' ἐκ θεῶν. [. . .]
 [HA.] οὕτω δοκεῖτε τὴν δόκησιν ἀσφαλῆ;
 [TE.] αὐτὸς γὰρ ὄσσοις εἰδόμην, καὶ νοῦς ὄρῃ.

119 σκοπέιτε ms.: σκόπει δὲ A. Y. Campbell
 121-22 del. W. Ribbeck

b 1138-42

- 1140 [XO.] ὅτι θεὸς ἢ μὴ θεὸς ἢ τὸ μέσον
 τίς φησ' ἐρευνήσας βροτῶν;
 μακρότατον πέρας ἤνυρεν ὃς τὰ θεῶν ἐσορᾷ
 δεῦρο καὶ ἀθις ἐκέισε καὶ πάλιν ἀντιλόγοις
 πηδῶντ' ἀνεπίστοις τύχαις.

The Study of Nature (T43)

T43 Eur.

a (59 A30) Frag. 910 K

- [XO.] ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
 ἔσχε μάθησιν,
 μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνη
 μήτ' εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὁρμῶν,
 ἀλλ' ἀθανάτου καθαρῶν φύσεως
 κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῆ τε συνέστη
 καὶ ὅπη καὶ ὅπως.
 τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ' αἰσχρῶν
 ἔργων μελέτημα προσίξει.

- [HELEN:] Watch out, you might have received some appearance sent by the gods. [. . .]
 [HELEN:] And so you think that this appearance is reliable?
 [TEUCER:] Yes, for I myself saw her with my own eyes.
 And the mind (*nous*) sees.

b

- [CHORUS:] What is god, or not god, or in the middle—
 Who of mortals can search this out and say it?
 That man has discovered the farthest limit, he who 1140
 sees that what comes from the gods
 Is here, then there, then in turn leaps
 With contradictory, unexpected turns of fortune.

The Study of Nature (T43)

T43 Euripides

a (59 A30) Fragment from an unidentified play (*Anti-ope?*)

- [CHORUS:] Happy the man who, having attained
 The knowledge deriving from inquiry,
 Aspires neither to trouble for his fellow citizens
 Nor to unjust deeds,
 But observes immortal nature's
 Unaging order, where it was formed,
 In what way, and how.
 Never to men like this does the practice
 Of shameful actions come near.

b (59 A20) Frag. 913 K

τίς [. . .] . . . οθεος [κ]αί [. . .] ραδαίμω[ν];
 ὃς τάδε λεύσσω οὐ προδιδάσκει,
 ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ θεόν ἠγείσθαι,
 μετεωρολόγων δ' ἐκὰς ἔρριψεν
 σκολιὰς ἀπάτας; ὧν τολμηρά
 γλώσσ' εἰκοβολεῖ περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν
 οὐδὲν γνώμης μετέχουσα;

*The Naturalization of the Gods (T44–T50)*T44 (cf. 22 A16, 59 A48, 64 C2) Eur. *Tro.* 884–88

885 [HK.] ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κατὰ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν,
 ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
 Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἶτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
 προσηυξάμην σε πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀνόφου
 βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις.

T45 Eur.

a Frag. 877 K

ἀλλ' αἰθῆρ τίκτει σε, κόρα,
 Ζεὺς ὃς ἀνθρώποις ὀνομάζεται.

b (59 A20) Fragment from an unidentified play

Who †. . . †,
 Who when he sees these things does not begin by
 teaching
 His soul to conceive of god,
 And casts far away the crooked deceptions of those
 who study the heavens,
 Whose audacious tongue guesses at random about
 invisible matters
 without having any share in judgment?

*The Naturalization of the Gods (T44–T50)*T44 (cf. 22 A16, 59 A48, 64 C2) Euripides, *The Trojan Women*

[HECUBA:] Oh you, who sustain the earth and are en-
 throned on the earth,
 Whoever you are, most unfathomable to know, 885
 Zeus, whether you are the necessity of nature or the
 intelligence of mortals,
 I pray to you: for it is you who, walking along a silent
 path,
 Lead all mortal affairs according to justice.

T45 Euripides, Fragments from unidentified plays

a

But you, maiden [scil. Helen?], were born from the
 aether,
 Which is called Zeus by humans.

b Frag. 941 K

ὄρας τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ' ἄπειρον αἰθέρα
καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχουθ' ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις;
τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.

T46 Soph. Frag. 752 R

Ἥλι, οἰκτίροις ἐμέ,
ὄν οἱ σοφοὶ λέγουσι γεννητὴν θεῶν
πατέρα τε πάντων.

T47 Eur. Frag. 919 K

κορυφὴ δὲ θεῶν ὁ περὶ χθόν' ἔχων
φαεινὸς αἰθήρ

T48 (59 A20b) Eur. Frag. 944 K

[. . .]
καὶ Γαῖα μήτηρ Ἔστιαν δέ σ' οἱ σοφοὶ
βροτῶν καλοῦσιν ἡμένην ἐν αἰθέρι.

T49 Critias (?) *Peirithous* Frag.**a** (88 B18) Frag. 43 F 3 Snell

ἀκάμας τε χρόνος περὶ τ' ἀενάω
ρέυματι πλήρης φοιτᾷ τίκτων
αὐτὸς ἑαντόν, δίδυμοί τ' ἄρκτοι

b

Do you see this unlimited aether up on high,
Which holds the earth all around in its moist
embrace?

Consider this to be Zeus, think that this is a god.

T46 Sophocles, Fragment from an unidentified play

Sun, take pity on me,
You whom wise man call the begetter of the gods
And the father of all things.

T47 Euripides, Fragment from an unidentified play

Summit of the gods, that which surrounds the earth:
Bright aether

T48 (59 A20b) Euripides, Fragment from an unidentified play

[. . .]
And mother Earth; the wise among mortals
Call you Hestia, you who are seated in the aether.

T49 Critias (?), Fragments from *Peirithous*¹

¹ The ancient authors who cite these lines attribute them to Euripides.

a (88 B18)

Time, indefatigable and filled with an ever-flowing
Stream, moves along, himself bringing to birth
Himself; and the twin Bears,

ταῖς ὠκυπλάνοισι πτερούγων ῥιπαῖς
τὸν Ἀτλάντειον τηροῦσι πόλον.

b (88 B19) Frag. 43 F 4 Snell

σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
ρύμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξασθ',
ὃν πέρι μὲν φῶς, πέρι δ' ὀρφναία
νύξ αἰολόχρως ἄκριτός τ' ἄστρων
ὄχλος ἐνδεδεχῶς ἀμφιχορεύει.

T50 Eur. *Bacch.* 274–83

[TE.]

δύο γάρ, ᾧ νεανία,

275

τὰ πρῶτ' ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν Δημήτηρ θεά—
Γῆ δ' ἐστίν, ὄνομα δ' ὀπότερον βούλει κάλει
αὐτῆ μὲν ἐν ξηροῖσιν ἐκτρέφει βροτούς·
ὅς δ' ἦλθ' ἔπειτ', ἀντίπαλον ὁ Σεμέλης γόνος
βότρυος ὑγρὸν πᾶμ' ἠΐθε κείσσηνέγκατο
280 θνητοῖς, ὃ παύει τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτούς
λύπης, ὅταν πλησθῶσιν ἀμπέλου ῥοῆς,

With the swift beating of their wings,
Observe the celestial pole of Atlas [i.e. which Atlas
holds up].

b (88 B19)

You [i.e. the world?],¹ the self-generated, you who
have woven
The nature of all things in the vortex of the aether,
You around whom the light, around whom the
gloomy
Spangled night and the innumerable
Swarm of stars perpetually dance!

¹ Clement, who cites these lines, says that the invocation is addressed to Mind, the demiurge of the world.

T50 Euripides, *Bacchae*

[TEIRESIAS:]

For, young man [scil. Pentheus],

two things

Are of first importance among humans: the goddess 275
Demeter—

She is Earth, but you can call her by whichever of
these two names you wish—

She nourishes mortals with dry food;

And the one who came after, the son of Semele [i.e.
Dionysus], discovered

A counterpart, the moist drink of the grapevine, and
introduced it

To mortals—it relieves wretched humans 280

Of their pain, whenever they are full of the liquid
of the grapevine,

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY IX

ὑπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν κακῶν
 δίδωσιν, οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρμακον πόνων.

The Gods and Chance (T51–T52)

T51 Eur. *Phrixus* B Frag. 820b K

ὦ θνητὰ παραφρονήματ' ἀνθρώπων, μάτην
 οἷ φασιν εἶναι τὴν τύχην, ἀλλ' οὐ θεούς·
 ὡς οὐδὲν ἴστε, κεῖ λέγειν δοκεῖτέ τι·
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τύχη ἴστυ, οὐδὲν δεῖ θεῶν,
 εἰ δ' οἱ θεοὶ σθένουσιν, οὐδὲν ἡ τύχη.

T52 Eur. Frag. 901 K

[χο.] πολλάκι μοι πραπίδων διήλθε φροντίς,
 εἴτε τύχα τις εἴτε δαίμων τὰ βρότεια κραίνει
 παρά τ' ἐλπίδα καὶ παρά δίκαν
 τοὺς μὲν ἀπ' οἴκων †δ' ἐναπίπτοντας
 ἀτὰρ θεοῦ†, τοὺς δ' εὐτυχοῦντας ἄγει

DRAMATIC APPENDIX

And it gives sleep, forgetfulness of the evils of the
 day,
 And there is no other remedy for pains.

Cf. **PROD. D15–D16**

The Gods and Chance (T51–T52)

T51 Euripides, Fragment from *Phrixus* B

Oh, the mortal delusions of humans, who say
 In vain that chance exists, but not the gods!
 For you [scil. men] know nothing, even if you think
 you are saying something.
 For if chance exists, there is no need of gods;
 But if the gods are strong, then chance is nothing.

T52 Euripides, Fragment from an unidentified play

[CHORUS:] Often this worry has passed through my mind
 (*prapides*):
 Whether it is some chance or a divinity that brings
 mortal affairs to accomplishment
 Against expectation and against justice,
 The ones from their homes †. . .
 . . . † and leads others to prosperity

Cf. also **SOC. P27**

*Law (nomos) and Nature (phusis) (T53–T55)***T53** Eur. *Bacch.* 893–96

[XO.] κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νομί-
 ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν,
 ὅτι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιμόνιον,
 τό τ' ἐν χρόνῳ μακρῷ νόμιμον
 ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός.

895

T54 Eur. *Auge* Frag. 265a.1 K

ἢ φύσις ἐβούλεθ', ἢ νόμων οὐδὲν μέλει.

T55 Eur. *Dictys* Frag. 346 K

εἷς γάρ τις ἔστι κοινὸς ἀνθρώποις νόμος—
 καὶ θεοῖσι τοῦτο δόξαν, ὡς σαφῶς λέγω—
 θηρσίην τε πᾶσι τέκν' ἀτίκτουσιν φιλεῖν.
 τὰ δ' ἄλλα χωρὶς χρώμεθ' ἀλλήλων νόμοις.
 τέκν' ἂ Paris. 1985 (B) teste Gaisford: τέκνα cett.

*The Progress of Civilization (T56–T63)***T56** Aesch. *Palamedes* Frag. **181a R

[ΠΑ.] ἔπειτα πάσης Ἑλλάδος καὶ ξυμμάχων
 βίον διώκησ' ὄντα πρὶν πεφυρμένον
 θηρσίην θ' ὅμοιον πρῶτα μὲν τὸν πάνσοφον
 ἀριθμὸν ἡῦρηκ' ἔξοχον σοφισμάτων.

328

*Law (nomos) and Nature (phusis) (T53–T55)***T53** Euripides, *Bacchae*

[CHORUS:] For slight is the expense to think
 That this it is that possesses strength:
 Everything that is divine, whatever it is,
 What over long time has always possessed
 The sanction of law and exists by nature.

895

T54 Euripides, Fragment from *Auge*

It was the wish of nature, which does not care at all
 about laws.

T55 Euripides, Fragment from *Dictys*

For there is a single law in common for humans—
 And this is approved by the gods, as I assert clearly—
 And for all animals: to love the offspring they bring to
 birth.
 For the rest, we make use of various laws that differ
 from one another.

*The Progress of Civilization (T56–T63)***T56** Aeschylus, Fragment from *Palamedes*

[PALAMEDES:] Then I organized the life, which earlier
 had been confused
 And similar to that of the animals.
 Of all of Greece and its allies. First I discovered
 supremely ingenious (*pansophos*)
 Number, the most eminent of all artifices (*sophis-
 mata*).

329

T57 Aesch. (?), *Prom.* 442–44, 447–68, 476–506

[III.] τὰν βροτοῖς δὲ πῆματα
 443 ἀκούσαθ', ὡς σφας νηπίους ὄντας τὸ πρῖν
 ἔννοος ἔθηκα καὶ φρενῶν ἐπηβόλους. [. . .]
 447 οἱ πρῶτα μὲν βλέποντες ἔβλεπον μάτην,
 κλύοντες οὐκ ἤκουον, ἀλλ' ὄνειράτων
 ἀλίγκιοι μορφῆσι τὸν μακρὸν βίον
 450 ἔφυρον εἰκῆ πάντα, κοῦτε πλιυθυφεῖς
 δόμους προσείλους ἦσαν, οὐ ξυλουργίαν,
 κατάρυχες δ' ἔναιον ὥστ' ἀήσυροι
 μύρμηκες ἀντρῶν ἐν μυχοῖς ἀνηλίους.
 ἦν δ' οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς οὔτε χεῖματος τέκμαρ
 455 οὔτ' ἀνθεμῶδους ἦρος οὔτε καρπίμου
 θέρους βέβαιον, ἀλλ' ἄτερ γνώμης τὸ πᾶν
 ἔπρασσον, ἔστε δὴ σφιν ἀντολὰς ἐγὼ
 ἄστρων ἔδειξα τὰς τε δυσκρίτους δύσεις.
 καὶ μὴν ἀριθμόν, ἕξοχον σοφισμάτων,
 460 ἐξηῦρον αὐτοῖς, γραμμάτων τε συνθέσεις,
 μνήμην ἀπάντων, μουσομήτορ' ἐργάνην.
 κᾶζευξα πρῶτος ἐν ζυγοῖσι κνώδαλα,
 ζεύγλησι δουλεύοντα σώμασιν θ' ὅπως
 465 θνητοῖς μεγίστων διάδοχοι μοχθημάτων
 γένωνθ'. ὑφ' ἄρμᾶ τ' ἤγαγον φιληνίους

¹ Scholars disagree on whether or not *Prometheus Bound* is to be attributed to Aeschylus, among whose works it is transmitted.

T57 Aeschylus (?), *Prometheus Bound*¹

[PROMETHEUS:] Hear the sufferings
 That prevailed among men, how they had earlier 443
 been foolish,
 But I made them mindful and possessed of think-
 ing. [. . .]
 For at first, though they saw, they saw in vain, 447
 Though they heard, they did not listen, but,
 Like the shapes of dreams, throughout a long life
 They mixed everything up at random, and they 450
 knew
 Neither bricked sun-warmed houses nor wood-
 working;
 They dwelt underground like nimble
 Ants in the sunless recesses of caves.
 They had no certain sign for winter
 Nor for flowering spring nor for crop-laden 455
 Summer, but they did everything
 Without a plan, until I taught them the risings
 Of the stars and their settings, hard to distinguish.
 And further, number, the most eminent of all arti-
 fices (*sophismata*),
 I discovered for them, and the combinations of let- 460
 ters—
 Memory of all things, mother of the Muses, crafts-
 woman.
 And I was the first to yoke for them beasts in harness
 As slaves to yoke loops and pack saddles, so that
 They would be the substitutes for mortals
 In grievous toils, and I harnessed to the chariot 465

ἵππους, ἄγαλμα τῆς ὑπερπλούτου χλιδῆς.
 θαλασσόπλαγκτα δ' οὔτις ἄλλος ἀντ' ἐμοῦ
 λινόπτερ' ἠῦρε ναυτίλων ὀχήματα. [. . .]
 476 τὰ λοιπὰ μου κλύουσα θανμάση πλέον,
 οἷας τέχνας τε καὶ πόρους ἐμησάμην.
 τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, εἴ τις ἐς νόσον πέσοι,
 οὐκ ἦν ἀλέξῃμ' οὐδέν, οὔτε βρώσιμον,
 480 οὐ χριστόν, οὐδὲ πιστόν, ἀλλὰ φαρμάκων
 χρεῖα κατεσκελλόντο, πρὶν γ' ἐγὼ σφισιν
 εἶδειξα κράσεις ἡπίων ἀκεσμάτων
 αἷς τὰς ἀπάσας ἐξαμύνονται νόσους.
 τρόπους τε πολλοὺς μαντικῆς ἐστοίχισα,
 485 κᾶκρινα πρῶτος ἐξ ὄνειράτων ἃ χρεῖ
 ὑπαρ γενέσθαι, κληδόνας τε δυσκρίτους
 ἐγνώριον αὐτοῖς ἐνοδίους τε συμβόλους,
 γαμφωνύχων τε πτήσιν οἰωνῶν σκεθρῶς
 490 διώρισ', οἴτινές τε δεξιῶι φύσιν
 εὐωνύμους τε, καὶ δίαιταν ἦντινα
 ἔχουσ' ἕκαστοι, καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τίνες
 ἔχθραι τε καὶ στέργηθρα καὶ ξυνεδρίαί,
 σπλάγχων τε λειότητα, καὶ χροῖαν τίνα
 495 ἔχουσ' ἂν εἴη δαίμοσιν πρὸς ἡδονῆν
 χολή, λοβοῦ τε ποικίλην εὐμορφίαν
 κνίσση τε κῶλα ξυγκαλυπτὰ καὶ μακρὰν

Rein-loving horses, the pride of over-wealthy lux-
 ury.
 And no one other than myself discovered the sea-
 struck
 Sail-winged conveyances of ships. [. . .]
 When you hear the rest you [i.e. the Chorus] will be 476
 even more astonished,
 What crafts and resources I devised.
 The greatest of all: if someone fell ill,
 There was no protection at all, neither food
 Nor ointment, nothing that would be reliable, but 480
 for lack of drugs
 They were withering away—until I showed them
 The compounding of soothing remedies,
 By which they warded off all illnesses.
 And I cataloged all the forms of divination,
 And I was the first to separate from dreams what 485
 must
 Come to pass as waking visions; and ominous utter-
 ances,
 Hard to distinguish, I identified for them, and
 omens on the road.
 And the flight of crooked-taloned birds I defined
 With precision, which ones are propitious by nature
 And good-omened, and what way of life 490
 Each one possesses, and what are the antagonisms
 Of each for each, their love charms, and their as-
 sociations;
 And the smoothness of their entrails, and what color
 Their bile should be to please the deities,
 And the varieties of the well-shaped liver lobe. 495
 And by burning thighs wrapped in fat and the long

500 ὄσφῦν πυρώσας δυστέκμαρτον εἰς τέχνην
 ὤδωσα θνητούς, καὶ φλογωπὰ σήματα
 ἐξωμμάτωσα πρόσθεν ὄντ' ἐπάργεμα.
 τοιαῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτ'· ἔνερθε δὲ χθονός
 κεκρυμμέν' ἀνθρώποισιν ὠφελήματα,
 χαλκόν, σίδηρον, ἄργυρον χρυσόν τε, τίς
 φήσειεν ἂν πάροιθεν ἐξευρεῖν ἐμοῦ;
 505 οὐδεῖς, σάφ' οἶδα, μὴ μάτην φλῦσαι θέλων.
 βραχεὶ δὲ μύθῳ πάντα συλλήβδην μάθε·
 πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῦσιν ἐκ Προμηθέως.

T58 Soph. Ant. 332-75

[XO.] 335 πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κούδεν ἀν-
 θρώπου δεινότερον πέλει·
 τοῦτο καὶ πολιού πέραν
 πόντου χειμερίῳ νότῳ
 χωρεῖ, περιβρυχίοισιν
 περῶν ὑπ' οἴδμασιν, θεῶν
 τε τὰν ὑπερτάταν, Γᾶν
 340 ἄφθιτον, ἀκαμάταν ἀποτρύεται,
 ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος,
 ἱππέῳ γένει πολεῶν.
 κουφονόων τε φῦλον ὀρ-
 νίθων ἀμφιβαλῶν ἄγει
 καὶ θηρῶν ἀγρίων ἕθνη

Loins, I set mortals on the path of this enigmatic
 craft;
 And I opened their eyes to the blazing constella-
 tions,
 Which earlier had been veiled to their sight.
 So much for these things. But hidden 500
 Beneath the earth, what provides benefits for hu-
 mans,
 Bronze, iron, silver, and gold—who
 Could claim to have discovered these before I did?
 No one, I know it well, who does not want to prattle
 in vain.
 Learn the whole thing briefly in a few words: 505
 All crafts came to mortals from Prometheus.

T58 Sophocles, *Antigone*

[CHORUS:] Many are the things that are eerie,
 And nothing is eerier than man.
 This thing travels beyond the gray
 Sea with its wintery blast, 335
 Making his crossing
 On its engulfing swells.
 And the greatest of the gods, Earth,
 The indestructible, the unwearied—her he wears
 down
 As the plows move back and forth, year after year, 340
 Turning up the soil with the aid of the equine race.
 And the tribe of light-minded birds
 He snares and leads off,
 And the nations of wild beasts

- 345 πόντον τ' εἰναλίαν φύσιν
 σπείραισι δικτυοκλώστοις,
 περιφραδῆς ἀνήρ· κρατεῖ
 δὲ μηχαναῖς ἀγραύλου
- 350 θηρὸς ὀρεσσιβάτα, λασιαύχενά θ'
 ἵππον ὀχμάζεται ἀμφὶ λόφον ζυγῶ
 οὐρειὸν τ' ἀκμήτα ταῦρον.
- 355 καὶ φθέγμα καὶ ἀνεμόεν φρόνημα καὶ ἀστυ-
 νόμους
 ὀργὰς ἐδιδάξατο καὶ δυσαύλων
 πάγων ὑπαίθρεια καὶ
 δύσομβρα φεύγειν βέλη
- 360 παντοπόρος· ἄπορος ἐπ' οὐδὲν ἔρχεται
 τὸ μέλλον· Ἄϊδα μόνον
 φεῦξιν οὐκ ἐπάξεται·
 νόσων δ' ἀμηχάνων φυγὰς
 ξυμπέφρασται.
- 365 σοφὸν τι τὸ μηχανόεν τέχνας ὑπὲρ ἐλπίδ'
 ἔχων
 τοτὲ μὲν κακόν, ἄλλοτ' ἐπ' ἐσθλὸν ἔρπει.
 νόμους παρείρων χθονός
 θεῶν τ' ἔνορκον δίκαν
- 370 ὑψίπολις· ἄπολις ὅτῳ τὸ μὴ καλόν
 ξύνεστι τόλμας χάριν·
 μήτ' ἐμοὶ παρέστιος
 γένοιτο μήτ' ἴσον φρονῶν
- 375 ὃς τὰδ' ἔρδοι.

- And the salty progeny of the sea, 345
 With the twisted coils of his nets—
 Surpassingly ingenious man! He rules
 With his devices the mountain-roaming
 Wild animal, the shaggy-maned 350
 Horse he harnesses, yoking it around the neck,
 And the tireless mountain bull.
- And utterance, wind-swift thought, and the disposi- 355
 tions
 That govern the city, he has learned,
 And how to flee the open-sky,
 Stormy shafts of inhospitable frosts—
 Man full of resources! Without resources toward 360
 nothing
 That might happen does he set forth.
 For Hades alone will he find for himself no escape;
 But he has contrived means of escape from incur-
 able diseases.
- Possessing what he has ingeniously devised beyond 365
 any expectation,
 His crafts, he moves at one time toward evil, at
 another toward good:
 When he inserts [scil. into his actions?] the laws of
 the land
 And the gods' oath-bound justice,
 He soars high with his city; but cityless he, whom- 370
 ever depravity
 Joins because of his rashness.
 He who does such things—may he not
 Share my hearth nor think thoughts equal [scil. to 375
 mine].

T59 Soph. *Nauplius* Frag. *432 R

[NA.] οὗτος δ' ἐφηῦρε τείχος Ἀργείων στρατῶ,
 σταθμῶν, ἀριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων εὐρήματα
 τάξεις τε ταύτας οὐράνια τε σήματα.
 κάκείν' ἔτευξε πρῶτος, ἐξ ἑνὸς δέκα
 5 κάκ τῶν δέκ' αὐθις ἠῦρε πεντηκοντάδας
 †ὁς χίλι(α) εὐθὺς ὄσ' στρατοῦ φρυκτωρίαν
 ἔδειξε κἀνέφηρεν οὐ δεδειγμένα.
 ἐφηῦρε δ' ἄστρον μέτρα καὶ περιστροφάς,
 ὕπνου †φυλάξει(ς) (στι)θόα† σημαντήρια
 10 νεῶν τε ποιμαντήρησιν ἐνθαλασσίους
 ἄρκτου στροφάς τε καὶ κυνὸς ψυχρὰν δύσιν.

T60 Soph. *Palamedes* Frag. 479 R

οὐ λιμὸν οὗτος τῶνδ' ἔπαυσε, σὺν θεῶ
 εἰπέιν, χρόνον τε διατριβάς σοφωτάτας
 ἐφηῦρε φλοίσβου μετὰ κόπον καθημένους,
 πεσσοῦς κύβους τε, τερπνὸν ἀργίας ἄκος;

T59 Sophocles, Fragment from *Nauplius*

[NAUPLIUS:] It was he [i.e. Palamedes] who invented the
 wall for the Argives' army,
 And the inventions of weights, numbers, and mea-
 sures,
 These military formations and the celestial signs.
 And these things too he was the first to make: ten
 from one
 And from ten in turn he discovered fifty 5
 †He who a thousand straightaway† the army's signal
 beacon
 He showed, and he revealed what before had not
 been revealed.
 He discovered the measures and revolutions of the
 celestial bodies,
 Of sleep †guardings† signs
 And for the seafaring shepherds of ships 10
 The turnings of the Bear and the chilly setting of
 the Dog Star.

T60 Sophocles, Fragment from *Palamedes*

Did he not stop their famine—to say it
 With god's permission—and did he not discover for
 them,
 Resting after their exertions with the waves, the
 cleverest pastimes:
 Drafts and dice, an enjoyable remedy for inaction?

T61 Soph. Frag. 843 R

τὰ μὲν διδασκὰ μανθάνω, τὰ δ' εὐρετά
ζητῶ, τὰ δ' εὐκτὰ παρὰ θεῶν ἤτησάμην.

T62 Eur. *Palamedes* Frag. 578 K

[ΠΑ.] τὰ τῆς γε λήθης φάρμακ' ὀρθώσας μόνος,
ἄφωνα καὶ φωνοῦντα, συλλαβὰς τιθείς,
ἔξηϋρον ἀνθρώποισι γράμματ' εἰδέναι,
ὥστ' οὐ παρόντα ποντίας ὑπὲρ πλακός
τάκεῖ κατ' οἴκους πάντ' ἐπίστασθαι καλῶς,
παισίν τ' ἀποθνήσκοντα χρημάτων μέτρον
γράψαντα λείπειν, τὸν λαβόντα δ' εἰδέναι.
ἂ δ' εἰς ἔριν πίπτουσιν ἀνθρώποις κακά,
δέλτος διαιρεῖ, κοῦκ ἐῖψεν ψευδῆ λέγειν.

T63 (88 B25) Critias (?) *Sisyphus* Frag. 43 F 19 Snell

ἦν χρόνος ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος
καὶ θηριώδης ἰσχύος θ' ὑπηρέτης,
ὅτ' οὐδὲν ἄθλον οὔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν
οὔτ' αὐ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίγνετο.
5 κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀνθρώποι νόμους
θέσθαι κολαστάς, ἵνα δίκη τύραννος ἦ

¹ Some of the ancient authors who cite these lines attribute them to Critias, some to Euripides; modern scholars disagree on whom they are to be assigned to.

T61 Sophocles, Fragment from an unidentified play

What can be taught, I learn; what can be discovered,
I seek; but for what is the object of prayer, I asked
this of the gods.

T62 Euripides, Fragment from *Palamedes*

[PALAMEDES:] I alone, establishing remedies for forgetting,
Speechless and speaking [i.e. consonants and vowels?], creating syllables,
I invented for men the knowledge of writing,
So that a man who was absent beyond the sea's plain
Could know exactly everything back there in his house,
And a man who was dying could write the measure
of his wealth
And leave it to his sons, and the man who inherited
it would know.
And men's evils, when they fall to quarreling—
A written tablet decides them and does not allow
people to tell lies.

T63 Critias (?), Fragment from the satyr-play *Sisyphus*¹

There was a time when the life of humans was
disordered
And animal-like, and subservient to force,
When neither was there any prize for good men
Nor inversely any punishment for evil ones.
And then, it seems to me, humans established laws
To punish, so that justice would be the absolute ruler
(*turannos*)

< . . . > τήν θ' ὕβριν δούλην ἔχῃ
 ἐζημιούτο δ' εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
 ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τὰ μφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
 10 ἀπίργον αὐτοὺς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βία,
 λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τῆνικαὐτά μοι δοκεῖ
 < . . . > πυκνός τις καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην ἀνήρ
 θεῶν δέος θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρεῖν, ὅπως
 εἶη τι δαίμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, κἄν λάθρα
 15 πράσσωσιν ἢ λέγωσιν ἢ φρονῶσι τι.
 ἐντεύθεν οὖν τὸ θείον εἰσηγήσατο,
 ὡς ἔστι δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ
 νόῳ τ' ἀκούων καὶ βλέπων, φρονῶν τε καὶ
 προσέχων τε ταῦτα καὶ φύσιν θείαν φορῶν,
 20 ὃς πᾶν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκούσεται,
 τὸ δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσεται.
 εἰδὼν δὲ σὺν σιγῇ τι βουλευῆς κακόν,
 τοῦτ' οὐχὶ λήσει τοὺς θεοὺς· τὸ γὰρ φρονοῦν
 < . . . > ἐνεστι. τοῦσδε τοὺς λόγους λέγων
 25 διδαγμάτων ἡδιστον εἰσηγήσατο
 ψευδεὶ καλύψας τὴν ἀλήθειαν λόγῳ.
 ναίειν δ' ἔφασκε τοὺς θεοὺς ἐνταῦθ' ἵνα
 μάλιστ' ἂν ἐξέπληξεν ἀνθρώπους ἄγων,
 ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τοὺς φόβους ὄντας βροτοῖς
 30 καὶ τὰς ὀνήσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ,
 ἐκ τῆς ὑπερθε περιφορᾶς, ἵν' ἀστραπᾶς

< > and it would hold arrogance enslaved;
 And if anyone committed a transgression he would be
 punished.
 Then, as the laws prevented them
 From committing acts of violence in public 10
 But they did commit them in secret, at that time, it
 seems to me,
 < > some man who was shrewd and wise in his
 planning
 Discovered for mortals fear of the gods, so that
 There would be an object of terror for evil men, even
 if it was in secret
 That they committed, said, or thought something. 15
 And that was how the divine was introduced,
 [scil. The idea] that there is a divinity flourishing with
 immortal life
 Who listens and watches with his mind (*noos*), and
 thinks and
 Pays attention to these things and is possessed of a
 divine nature,
 Who will hear everything that is said among mortals, 20
 And will be able to see everything that is done.
 And if you plan some evil deed in silence,
 This will not escape the gods' notice: for thought
 < > is present. By saying these things,
 He introduced the most delightful of teachings, 25
 Concealing the truth in a false speech.
 He said that the gods live in the place where
 He could most terrify humans by setting them there,
 From where, he knew, fears come for mortals
 And benefits for their miserable life, 30
 From the circumference up above, where, he saw,

κατείδον οὔσας, δεινὰ δὲ κτυπήματα
 βροντῆς τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας,
 Χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ,
 35 ὅθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀστέρος στείχει μῦδρος
 ὃ θ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὄμβρος ἐκπορεύεται.
 τοίους πέριξ ἔστησεν ἀνθρώπους φόβους,
 δι' οὓς καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατόκισεν
 τὸν δαίμον' οὗτος ἐν πρέποντι χωρίῳ,
 40 τὴν ἀνομίαν τε τοῖς νόμοις κατέσβεσεν.
 < . . . >
 οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἴομαι πείσαι τινα
 θνητοὺς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

*The Power of Speech (T64–T67)*T64 Soph. *Phil.* 96–99

[OI.] ἐσθλοῦ πατρὸς παῖ, καὐτὸς ὢν νέος ποτέ
 γλώσσαν μὲν ἄργον, χεῖρα δ' εἶχον ἐργάτιν
 νῦν δ' εἰς ἔλεγχον ἐξῶν ὀρώ βροτοῖς
 τὴν γλώσσαν, οὐχὶ τάργα, πάνθ' ἡγουμένην.

There are lightning flashes, and terrifying crashes
 Of thunder, and the starry expanse of the heavens,
 The lovely embroidery of Time, that wise builder,
 From where the gleaming mass of the heavenly body 35
 [i.e. the sun] proceeds
 And the moist rain rushes toward the earth.
 These were the kinds of terrors with which he
 surrounded humans,
 By means of which this man established divinity,
 By a well-made speech, in a suitable place,
 And extinguished lawlessness by means of the laws 40
 < . . . >
 And it was in this way, I think, that someone first
 persuaded
 Mortals to believe that there exists a race of
 divinities.

*The Power of Speech (T64–T67)*T64 Sophocles, *Philoctetes*

[ODYSSEUS:] You [i.e. Neoptolemus], child of a noble father,
 when I was young,
 I too would keep my tongue inactive and my hand
 busy;
 But now when I go out to put things to the test, I
 see that for mortals
 It is the tongue, not deeds, that rules all things.

T65 Eur. *Hec.* 814–19

815 [HK.] τί δῆτα θνητοὶ τᾶλλα μὲν μαθήματα
μοχθοῦμεν ὡς χρῆ πάντα καὶ ματεύομεν,
πειθῶ δὲ τὴν τύραννον ἀνθρώποις μόνην
οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐς τέλος σπουδάζομεν
μισθοὺς διδόντες μανθάνειν, ἕν' ἦν ποτε
πέιθειν ἅ τις βούλοιο τυγχάνειν θ' ἅμα;

T66 (ad 90 l.1) Eur. *Antiope* Frag. 189 K

[AM.?] ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσωὼν λόγων
ἀγῶνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός.

T67 (88 B22) Critias (?) *Peirithous* Frag. 43 F 11 Snell

τρόπος δὲ χρηστὸς ἀσφαλέστερος νόμου
τὸν μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄν διατρέψαι ποτέ
ρήτωρ δύναιτο, τὸν δ' ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω
λόγοις ταρασσῶν πολλάκις λυμαίνεται.

T65 Euripides, *Hecuba*

[HECUBA:] Why do we mortals exert ourselves to study
All the other fields of knowledge as we should, 815
But persuasion, the sole absolute ruler (*turannos*)
for human beings—
We take no further trouble, by paying a fee,
To learn this thoroughly, so that it would be possible
someday
To persuade whatever one wished and at the same
to achieve it!

Cf. e.g. GORG. D24 [8–14]

T66 (ad 90 l.1) Euripides, Fragment from *Antiope*

[AMPHION?:] On every subject a man could establish a
contest
Between two arguments, if he were skilled at speak-
ing.

Cf. e.g. PROT. D26; DISS.

T67 (88 B22) Critias (?), Fragment from *Pirithous*

An honest character is surer than the law:
For the former, no orator could ever pervert it;
While the latter, he often ruins it
By agitating it up and down with his speeches.

The Relativity of Values (T68)T68 Eur. *Phoen.* 499–502

[ET.] εἰ πάσι ταῦτόν καλὸν ἔφν σοφόν θ' ἄμα,
 οὐκ ἦν ἂν ἀμφίλεκτος ἀνθρώποις ἔρις·
 500 νῦν δ' οὐθ' ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἴσον βροτοῖς
 πλὴν ὀνόμασιν· τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἔστιν τόδε.

Can Virtue Be Taught? (T69–T71)T69 Eur. *Hipp.* 79–81

[III.] [. . .]
 ὅσοις διδακτὸν μηδὲν ἄλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει
 80 τὸ σωφρονεῖν εἴληχεν ἐς τὰ πάντ' αἰεί,
 τούτοις δρέπεσθαι, τοῖς κακοῖσι δ' οὐ θέμις.

T70 Eur. *Hec.* 592–602

[HK.] οὐκουν δεινόν, εἰ γῆ μὲν κακῇ
 τυχοῦσα καιροῦ θεόθεν εἰς στάχυν φέρει,
 χρηστῇ δ' ἁμαρτοῦσ' ὦν χρεῶν αὐτῇν τυχεῖν
 595 κακὸν δίδωσι καρπὸν, ἀνθρώποι δ' αἰεί
 ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακός,
 ὁ δ' ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλὸς οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὑπο

The Relativity of Values (T68)T68 Euripides, *Phoenician Women*

[ETEOCLES:] If for all men the same thing were by nature
 fine and wise,
 There would be no disputatious contention among 500
 humans:
 But as it is, nothing is similar or equal for mortals
 Except for the name—but this is not the thing itself
 (*ergon*).

Cf. DISS. [2]

Can Virtue Be Taught? (T69–T71)T69 Euripides, *Hippolytus*

[HIPPLYTUS:] [. . .]
 For all those who have received temperance in all
 regards
 Not from instruction, but in their nature, forever, 80
 For these it is lawful to pluck [scil. flowers from the
 meadow of Reverence], but for the wicked it is
 not.

T70 Euripides, *Hecuba*

[HECUBA:] Is it not dreadful that poor soil
 Bears a good crop if a god provides favorable cir-
 cumstances,
 While good land, if it lacks what it needs to receive,
 Produces a bad harvest—and yet that among hu- 595
 mans
 The wicked one is always nothing else than evil,

600 φύσιν διέφθειρ' ἀλλὰ χρηστός ἐστ' αἰεί;
 ἄρ' οἱ τεκόντες διαφέρουσιν ἢ τροφαί;
 ἔχει γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς
 δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τούτο δ' ἦν τις εὖ μάθη,
 οἶδεν τό γ' αἰσχρὸν κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μα-
 θῶν.

599–602 del. Sakorraphos

T71 (> ad 80 B3) Eur. *Suppl.* 911–17

[AA.] τὸ γὰρ τραφῆναι μὴ κακῶς αἰδῶ φέρει·
 αἰσχύνεται δὲ τὰ γὰθ' ἀσκήσας ἀνὴρ
 κακὸς γενέσθαι πᾶς τις· ἢ δ' εὐανδρία
 915 διδακτόν, εἶπερ καὶ βρέφος διδάσκειται
 λέγειν ἀκούειν θ' ὦν μάθησιν οὐκ ἔχει.
 ἂ δ' ἂν μάθη τις, ταῦτα σῶζεσθαι φιλεῖ
 πρὸς γῆρας· οὕτω παῖδας εὖ παιδεύετε.

*Reflections of Specific Doctrines
 in Euripides (T72–T84)
 Reflections of Xenophanes (T72–T73)*

T72 (21 C1) Eur. *Her. Fur.* 1341–46

[HP.] ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς οὔτε λέκτρ' ἂ μὴ θέμις
 στέργειν νομίζω δεσμά τ' ἐξάπτειν χερῶν

The noble one noble, and that misfortune
 Does not ruin his nature, but he remains always
 virtuous?
 Is it the parents that differ, or the upbringing?
 Surely, a good upbringing teaches what is noble too; 600
 And whoever has learned this well knows
 What is shameful, since he has learned it by the
 criterion of the good.

T71 (> ad 80 B3) Euripides, *Suppliant Women*

[ADRASTUS:] To be educated correctly brings a sense of
 shame;
 And every man who has been trained in good things
 is ashamed
 To behave badly. Manly courage
 Is something that can be taught, since even an in-
 fant is taught
 To speak and to hear things about which he is igno- 915
 rant.
 And what someone learns, he tends to preserve this
 Until old age. So teach your children well.

*Reflections of Specific Doctrines
 in Euripides (T72–T84)
 Reflections of Xenophanes (T72–T73)*

T72 (21 C1) Euripides, *Heracles*

[HERACLES:] I myself believe that the gods do not desire
 unlawful sexual unions
 Or bind one another's hands with fetters—

οὐτ' ἠξίωσα πάποτ' οὔτε πείσομαι
 οὐδ' ἄλλον ἄλλον δεσπότην πεφυκέναι.
 1345 δέεται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἔστ' ὀρθῶς θεός,
 οὐδενός· αἰοιδῶν οἶδε δύστηνοι λόγοι.

T73 (21 C2) Eur. *Autolycus* Frag. 282 K

κακῶν γὰρ ὄντων μυρίων καθ' Ἑλλάδα
 οὐδὲν κάκιόν ἐστιν ἀθλητῶν γένους.
 οἱ πρῶτον οἰκεῖν οὔτε μαυθάνουσιν εὖ
 οὔτ' ἂν δύναιντο· πῶς γὰρ ὅστις ἔστ' ἀνὴρ
 5 γνάθου τε δούλος νηδύος θ' ἠσσημένος
 κτήσασαι' ἂν ὄλβον εἰς ὑπερβολὴν πατρός;
 οὐδ' αὖ πένεσθαι κάξυνηρετεῖν τύχαις
 οἰοί τ'· ἔθη γὰρ οὐκ ἐθισθέντες καλά
 σκληρῶς μεταλλάσσουσιν εἰς τὰμήχανον.
 10 λαμπροὶ δ' ἐν ἡβῃ καὶ πόλεως ἀγάλματα
 φοιτῶσ'· ὅταν δὲ προσπέσῃ γῆρας πικρόν,
 τρίβωνες ἐκβαλόντες οἴχονται κρόκας.
 ἐμεμφάμην δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἑλλήνων νόμον,
 οἱ τῶνδ' ἕκατι σύλλογον ποιούμενοι

I have never believed this, and never will I be per-
 suaded,
 Nor that one god is naturally ruler over another.
 For a god, if he rightly is a god, has no need
 1345 Of anything. These are the miserable tales of singers.

Cf. XEN. D8-D9

T73 (21 C2) Euripides, Fragment from the satyr-play
Autolycus

For of the countless evils that afflict Greece,
 None is worse than the race of athletes.
 First, they neither learn how to run a household well,
 Nor would they be capable of doing so: for how could
 a man
 Who is slave to his jaws and is subservient to his
 5 stomach
 Acquire wealth surpassing that of his father?
 Nor, again, are they capable of being poor or sub-
 mitting to misfortune;
 For since they have not been trained to have good
 habits,
 They find it hard to fall into a condition of being
 without resources.
 In their youth, they strut around illustriously, the
 10 idols of the city;
 But when bitter old age falls upon them, they are
 goners,
 Threadbare tatters whose nap has worn off.
 I have also criticized the custom among the Greeks,
 Who assemble together to show respect to these men

- 15 τιμῶσ' ἀχρείους ἠδονὰς δαιτὸς χάριν.
 τίς γὰρ παλαίσας εὖ, τίς ὠκύπους ἀνήρ
 ἢ δίσκον ἄρας ἢ γνάθον παίσας καλῶς
 πόλει πατρώα στέφανον ἤρκεσεν λαβῶν;
 20 πότερα μαχοῦνται πολεμίοισιν ἐν χεροῖν
 δίσκους ἔχοντες ἢ δι' ἀσπίδων χερὶ
 θείνοντες ἐκβαλοῦσι πολεμίους πάτρας;
 οὐδεὶς σιδήρον ταῦτα μωραίνει πέλας
 ἴστας. ἄνδρας χρὴ σοφούς τε κἀγαθούς
 φύλλοις στέφεσθαι, χῶστις ἠγείται πόλει
 25 κάλλιστα σῶφρων καὶ δίκαιος ὢν ἀνὴρ,
 ὅστις τε μύθοις ἔργ' ἀπαλλάσσει κακὰ
 μάχας τ' ἀφαιρῶν καὶ στάσεις· τοιαῦτα γὰρ
 πόλει τε πάσῃ πᾶσι θ' Ἐλλησιν καλά.

Reflections of Heraclitus or of the Orphics (T74)

T74 Eur.

a *Polyidus* Frag. 638 K

τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἐστι κατθανεῖν,
 τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν κάτω νομίζεται;

- And honor useless pleasures for the benefit of a 15
 banquet.
 For even if a man has wrestled well, or is swift of
 foot,
 Or has thrown the discus or punched someone's jaw
 well—
 How has he ever defended the city of his fathers by
 winning a garland?
 Will they fight against enemies by holding in their
 hands
 A discus, or is it by striking with shields in their hand 20
 That they will drive away the enemies from their
 fatherland?
 When the weapon approaches, no one is such a fool.
 Men who are wise and virtuous should be crowned
 With garlands, and the man who guides the city
 Best of all, as someone who is temperate and just, 25
 And the man who wards off evil deeds by his words,
 By banishing contention and civic strife. For this is
 what
 Is good for the whole city and for all the Greeks.

Cf. XEN. D61

Reflections of Heraclitus or of the Orphics (T74)

T74 Euripides, Fragments

a from *Polyidus*

Who knows whether to be alive is to be dead,
 While to be dead is considered to be alive down
 below?

b *Phrixus* A aut B Frag. 833.1–2 K

[ΦΡ.] τίς δ' οἶδεν εἰ ζῆν τοῦθ' ὃ κέκληται θανεῖν,
τὸ ζῆν δὲ θνήσκειν ἐστί; [. . .]

Reflections of Anaxagoras (T75–T80)

T75

a (59 A20) Schol. in Pind. *Ol.* 1.91 (1.38.10–39.1 Drachmann)

περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἡλίου οἱ φυσικοί φασιν ὡς λίθος καλεῖται
ὁ ἥλιος· καὶ Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ γενόμενον τὸν Εὐριπίδην
μαθητὴν πέτρον εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἥλιον διὰ τῶν προεκ-
κειμένων

[ΗΛ.] ὁ γὰρ μακάριος, κοῦκ ὄνειδίζω τύχας,
Διὸς πεφυκῶς, ὡς λέγουσι, Τάνταλος
κορυφῆς ὑπερέλλοντα δειμαίνων πέτρον
ἀέρι ποτᾶται καὶ τίνει ταύτην δίκην.

καὶ πάλιν δι' ἄλλων βῶλον λέγοντα οὕτως·

[ΗΛ.] μόλοιμι τὰν οὐρανοῦ
μέσον χθονός τε τεταμέναν
αἰωρήμασι
πέτραν ἀλύσει χρυσείαισι,
φερομένην δίναισι,
βῶλον ἐξ Ὀλύμπου [. . .].

b from *Phrixus* A or B

[PHRIXUS:] Who knows whether what is called death
is life,
And life is death? [. . .]

Cf. **HER. D70**; cf. **MOR. T32–T34**

Reflections of Anaxagoras (T75–T80)

T75

a (59 A20) Scholia on Pindar's *Olympians*

Concerning the sun, the natural philosophers say that
what is called 'the sun' is a stone, and Euripides, who was
Anaxagoras' student, said that the sun is a rock in the open-
ing verses [scil. *Orestes* 4–7]:

[ELECTRA:] For the prosperous (and I do not blame
chance)
Tantalus, born of Zeus, as they say,
Suspended in the air, dreads the rock
Hanging over his head and pays his penalty.

And again in other verses [scil. *Orestes* 982–84] he calls it
a clod, speaking as follows:

[ELECTRA:] If only I could go
To the stone that extends,
Suspended
In the middle between heaven and earth,
Carried by golden chains, in vortices,
A clod from Olympus [. . .].

Cf. **ANAXAG. D4[6]**

b (< 59 A1) Diog. Laert. 2.10 (*Phaethon* Frag. 783 K)

[. . .] ὄθεν καὶ Εὐριπίδην μαθητὴν ὄντα αὐτοῦ, 'χρυσέαν βῶλον' εἰπεῖν τὸν ἥλιον ἐν τῷ Φαέθοντι.

T76 (59 A91) Eur. *Hel.* 1–3

[HA.] Νείλου μὲν αἶδε καλλιπάρθενοι ῥοαί,
ὃς ἀντὶ δίας ψακάδος Αἰγύπτου πέδον
λευκῆς τακείσης χιόνος ὑγραίνει γύας.

T77 (59 A62) Eur. *Μελανίππη* ἢ *Σοφὴ* Frag. 484 K

κοῦκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρὸς πάρα,
ὡς οὐρανός τε γαῖά τ' ἦν μορφῇ μία·
ἐπεὶ δ' ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀλλήλων δίχα,
τίκτονσι πάντα κἀνέδωκαν εἰς φάος·
δένδρη, πετεινά, θήρας, οὓς θ' ἄλμη τρέφει
γένος τε θνητῶν.

T78 (59 A112) Eur. *Chrysisippus* Frag. 839 K

[ΧΟ.] Γαῖα μεγίστη καὶ Διὸς Αἰθέρ,
ὁ μὲν ἀνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν γενέτωρ,

b (59 A1) Diogenes Laertius

. . . [scil. they say] that this is why Euripides, who was his [i.e. Anaxagoras'] student, called the sun "golden clod" in his *Phaethon*.

T76 (59 A91) Euripides, *Helen*

[HELEN:] These are the streams of the Nile with its beautiful nymphs,
Which, instead of divine rain, waters the lands
Of the plain of Egypt when the white snow has melted.

Cf. ANAXAG. D66

T77 (59 A62) Euripides, Fragment from *The Wise Melanippe*

And the tale is not mine, but it comes from my
mother [i.e. Hippo, a mythical astrologer]:
That heaven and earth once had a single form;
But when they were separated from each other,
They gave birth to all things and sent them up into
the light—
Trees, birds, wild beasts, and the ones that the salt
sea nourishes
And the race of mortals.

Cf. ANAXAG. D9

T78 (59 A112) Euripides, Fragment from *Chrysisippus*

[CHORUS:] Mightiest Earth, and Aether, son of Zeus—
The latter is the begetter of humans and of gods,

T80 (59 A33) Eur. Frag. 964 K

[ΘΗ.] ἔγὼ δὲ παρὰ σοφοῦ τινος μαθὼν
εἰς φροντίδας νοῦν συμφορὰς τ' ἐβαλλόμεν
φυγὰς τ' ἐμαυτῷ προστιθεὶς πάτρας ἐμῆς
θανάτους τ' ἀώρους καὶ κακῶν ἄλλας ὁδοὺς,
ἴν' εἴ τι πάσχομι ὧν ἐδόξαζον φρενί,
μή μοι νεώρες προσπεσὼν μᾶλλον δάκοι

A Reflection of Diogenes of Apollonia (T81)

T81 (59 A48) Eur. Frag. 1018 K

ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεός.

Reflections of Protagoras

See **PROT. P23**

T80 (59 A33) Euripides, Fragment from an unidentified play

[THESEUS:] Having learned from a certain wise man,
I would habitually set my mind upon anxieties and
misfortunes,
Imagining for myself exiles from my country,
Untimely deaths, and other ways of evils,
So that if I suffered any of the things I was imagin-
ing in my mind,
It would not gnaw me more by falling upon me
unexpected.

Cf. **ANAXAG. D15**

A Reflection of Diogenes of Apollonia (T81)

T81 (59 A48) Euripides, Fragment from an unidentified play

For our intelligence (*nous*) is a god in each of us.

Cf. **DIOG. D13**

Reflections of Protagoras

See **PROT. P23**

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY IX

Reflections of Socrates^p (T82–T84)

T82 Eur. *Med.* 1078–80

1080 [ΜΗ.] καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἶα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά,
θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων,
ὅσπερ μεγίστων αἴτιος κακῶν βροτοῖς.

versus 1078–80 cum 1056–77 del. Bergk ut interpolatos

T83 Eur. *Hippol.* 380–83

380 [ΦΑ.] τὰ χρήστ' ἐπιστάμεσθα καὶ γινώσκομεν,
οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ', οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὕπο,
οἱ δ' ἠδονὴν προθέυτες ἀντὶ τοῦ καλοῦ
ἄλλην τιν'.

T84 Eur. *Chrysippus* Frag. 841 K

αἰαί! τόδ' ἤδη θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν,
ὅταν τις εἰδῆ τὰγαθόν, χρήται δὲ μή.

DRAMATIC APPENDIX

Reflections of Socrates^p (T82–T84)

T82 Euripides, *Medea*

[MEDEA:] And I know full well what evils I am going to
commit,
But my ardor (*thumos*) is stronger than my plans—
Ardor, the cause of the greatest evils for mortals. 1080

T83 Euripides, *Hippolytus*

[PHAEDRA:] We know and understand what is virtuous 380
But we do not put it into practice, some out of laziness,
Others because they set something else above virtue,
Some pleasure.

T84 Euripides, Fragment from *Chrysippus*

Alas! This is truly an evil for humans sent by the
gods,
When one knows what is good, but does not make
use of it.

See also **SOC. P27.1**