

# SEXTUS EMPIRICUS

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

II

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS



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## CONTENTS OF VOLUME II

	PAGE
PREFATORY NOTE . . . . .	vii
AGAINST THE LOGICIANS:	
BOOK I . . . . .	2
BOOK II . . . . .	240

## PREFATORY NOTE

THE two books "Against the Logicians" contained in this volume form the first division of Sextus's treatise "Against the Dogmatists"; hence they are commonly cited as *Adversus Dogmaticos* i, ii, and also as *Adversus Mathematicos* vii, viii.

For the constitution of the text we still have the manuscripts L and E (see Vol. I. Introd. p. xliii), but neither M nor the Latin Translation (T) is any longer available. Instead, we have a new and important manuscript, designated N by the Teubner editor (after A. Nebe, the scholar who first investigated it), of which the central part, which contains the books *Adv. Log.*, is attributed to the thirteenth century. Among the modern scholars and critics who have contributed corrections of the text, quoted by the Teubner editor, are L. Kayser, R. Hirzel, V. Heintz, A. Kochalsky, A. Rüstow.

Here, as in Vol. I., the text is based on that of Bekker; and here, again, the chapter-headings, omitted by Bekker, are restored.

AGAINST THE LOGICIANS

## ΠΡΟΣ ΛΟΓΙΚΟΥΣ

### A

1 Ὁ μὲν καθόλου τῆς σκεπτικῆς δυνάμεως χαρακτηρ μετὰ τῆς προσηκούσης ἐξεργασίας ὑποδέδεικται, τὰ μὲν προηγουμένως τὰ δὲ καὶ κατὰ διορισμὸν τῶν παρακειμένων φιλοσοφιῶν ἐκτυπωθεῖς· ἀπολείπεται δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ χρήσιν διδάσκειν εἰς τὸ μήτε ἰδίᾳ περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων σκεπτομένους μήτε τοῖς δογματικοῖς  
2 ἀνταίροντας ῥαδίως προπίπτειν. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ ποικίλον τι χρήμα φιλοσοφία, δεήσει πρὸς τὸ κατὰ τάξιν καὶ ὁδῷ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὀλίγα περὶ τῶν ταύτης μερῶν διαλαβεῖν.

Αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μὲν μονομερῆ δοκοῦσιν αὐτὴν ὑποτεθεῖσθαι οἱ δὲ διμερῆ τινὲς δὲ τριμερῆ, καὶ τῶν ἐν μέρος ὑποστησαμένων οἱ μὲν τὸ φυσικὸν οἱ δὲ τὸ ἠθικὸν ἄλλοι δὲ τὸ λογικὸν ὑπεστήσαντο,  
3 καὶ ὡσαύτως τῶν κατὰ δυάδα διαιρούντων οἱ μὲν εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν διεῖλον, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰς τρία διαιροῦντες συμφώνως

## AGAINST THE LOGICIANS

### BOOK I

THE general character of Scepticism has now been 1 set forth by the appropriate method of description, as an Outline of it has been given partly by means of direct exposition and partly by distinguishing it from the philosophies which stand next to it.<sup>a</sup> It remains for us, in the next place, to explain how we apply it to the particular divisions of philosophy, so that we may be less prone to rashness either in our own sceptical investigations of things or in our contradictions of the Dogmatists. Since, however, 2 Philosophy is a complex affair, for the sake of an orderly and methodical inquiry into all its parts, we must first discuss briefly the question what its parts are.

Some, then, hold that it has but one part, others that it has two, and others that it has three parts; and of those who have supposed it to consist of one part, some have supposed this to be physics, others ethics, others logic; and so likewise of those who divide it 3 into two, some have made the divisions physics and logic, others physics and ethics, others logic and ethics; while those who divide it into three parts are 4

<sup>a</sup> The reference is to the "Outlines (*Hypotyposes*) of Pyrrhonism" contained in Vol. I. of this Translation.

εἰς τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ λογικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν διηγήρασιν.  
 5 φυσικὸν μὲν οὖν μόνον ὑπεστήσαντο μέρος Θαλῆς  
 τε καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος Ἐμπεδοκλῆς  
 τε καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος, ὧν Θαλῆς  
 μὲν καὶ Ἀναξίμενης καὶ Ἀναξίμανδρος κατὰ  
 πάντας καὶ ἀναμφιλόκτως, ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς κατὰ  
 Παρμενίδης ἔτι δὲ Ἡράκλειτος οὐ κατὰ πάντας.  
 6 Ἐμπεδοκλέα μὲν γὰρ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησὶ πρῶτον  
 ῥητορικὴν κεκωηκέναι, ἧς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν  
 διαλεκτικὴν, τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ  
 τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι, ὡς καὶ ἀντίθεον ὁ  
 7 ποιητῆς ἔφη τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα, ὅπερ ἦν ἰσόθεον. Παρ-  
 μενίδης δὲ οὐκ ἂν δόξαι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἀπείρους  
 ἔχειν, ἐπεὶ περὶ πάλιν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸν γνώριμον  
 αὐτοῦ Ζήνωνα διαλεκτικῆς ἀρχηγὸν ὑπέληφεν.  
 ἐζητεῖτο δὲ καὶ περὶ Ἡρακλείτου, εἰ μὴ μόνον  
 8 φυσικός ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἠθικός φιλόσοφος. πλὴν  
 οἱ μὲν τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους προστάντες εἰσὶν οἶδε,  
 τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ μόνου ἐπεμελείτο Σωκράτης κατὰ  
 γε τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτοῦ γνωρίμους, εἶγε καὶ ὁ  
 Ξενοφῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπομνημονεύμασι ῥητῶς φησὶν  
 ἀπαρνεῖσθαι αὐτὸν τὸ φυσικὸν ὡς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς καθ-  
 εστηκός καὶ μόνον σχολάζειν τῷ ἠθικῷ ὡς πρὸς  
 ἡμᾶς ὄντι. τοιοῦτον αὐτὸν οἶδε καὶ ὁ Τίμων, ἐν  
 οἷς φησὶν

ἐκ δ' ἄρα τῶν ἀπέκλιε λαοξόδος ἐνομολόσχης,  
 τουτέστιν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν

all agreed on the division into physics, logic, and ethics.<sup>a</sup> It has been supposed to consist of physics, 5 as its sole part, by Thales, Anaximenes, Anaximander, Empedocles, Parmenides, Heraclitus<sup>b</sup>: and of these, as regards Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander, all agree and there is no dispute, but all do not agree about Empedocles and Parmenides, nor yet Heraclitus. Thus Aristotle says<sup>c</sup> that “Em- 6 pedocles first cultivated the art of rhetoric, to which dialectic is *antistrophic* (or corresponding),” that is to say is *isostrophic* (or equivalent), inasmuch as it is *strophic* of (concerned with) the same subject matter—just as the Poet called Odysseus *antitheos* (god-like), which means *isotheos* (god-equal). And it would seem 7 that Parmenides was not unversed in dialectic since Aristotle, again, regarded his friend Zeno as “the pioneer of dialectic.” About Heraclitus, too, it was a question whether he was not merely a physicist but an ethical philosopher as well. But in any case 8 these are the leading exponents of the Physical division. The Ethical division alone was that which engaged Socrates, at least according to the rest of his friends<sup>d</sup>; for Xenophon in his *Memorabilia*<sup>e</sup> says expressly that “he rejected physics as a subject above our human powers and devoted himself solely to Ethics as the subject which concerns us men.” Timon also knows that this was his practice, for in one place he says—

But by the Stone-cutter,<sup>f</sup> prater of laws, such things were abjured.

That is to say, Socrates turned aside from physics to

<sup>a</sup> For this classification cf. *P.H.* ii. 12 ff.

<sup>b</sup> For these names see Vol. I. *Introd.*

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *Diog. Laert.* viii. 57.

<sup>d</sup> *i.e.* all except Plato (cf. § 9).

<sup>e</sup> *Xen. Mem.* i. 1. 11 ff.

<sup>f</sup> Socrates is said to have been, in his youth, a stone-cutter or quarry-man, like his father.

θεωρίαν· διὸ καὶ ἐνομολέσχης προσέθηκεν, ἅτε τοῦ ἠθικοῦ μέρους ὄντος τοῦ περὶ νόμων διαλέγεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων παντὸς μέρους φιλοσοφίας αὐτῷ μεταδίδωσιν, τοῦ μὲν λογικοῦ παρόσον περὶ ὄρων καὶ διαιρέσεων καὶ ἐτυμολογίας παρεισηκται ζητῶν, ἅπερ ἐστὶ λογικά, τοῦ δὲ ἠθικοῦ ὅτι περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ πολιτείας καὶ νόμων διασκέπτεται, τοῦ δὲ φυσικοῦ ὅτι καὶ περὶ κόσμου τι καὶ περὶ ζωογονίας καὶ ψυχῆς πεφιλοσόφηκεν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Τίμων αἰτιᾶται τὸν Πλάτωνα ἐπὶ τῷ οὕτω καλῶς πίζειν τὸν Σωκράτην πολλοῖς μαθήμασιν· ἡ γὰρ φησι τὸν οὐκ ἐθέλοντα μείναι ἠθολόγον.

11 Δοκοῦσι δὲ κατὰ τινὰς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης μόνον ἀσπάζεσθαι τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος, παραπέμπειν δὲ τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ τὸ λογικὸν ὡς μηδὲν πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως βιοῦν συνεργοῦντα. καίτοι περιτρέπεσθαι τούτους ἔνοιονε νομομίκασιν ἐξ ὧν τὸ ἠθικὸν διαιροῦσιν εἰς τε τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν τόπον καὶ εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν παθῶν καὶ ἔτι εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πράξεων καὶ ἤδη τὸν περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ τελευταῖον εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν πίστεων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ περὶ αἰτίων τόπος, φασίν, ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέρους ἐτύγχανεν, ὁ δὲ περὶ πίστεων ἐκ τοῦ λογικοῦ. καὶ Ἀρίστων δὲ ὁ Χίος οὐ μόνον, ὡς φασί, παρητέτο τὴν τε φυσικὴν καὶ λογικὴν θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ ἀνωφελές καὶ πρὸς κακοῦ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ τόπου τινὰς συμπεριέγραφεν, καθάπερ τὸν τε παραινετικὸν καὶ τὸν ὑποθετικὸν τόπον· τούτους γὰρ εἰς τίτθας καὶ παιδαγωγοὺς πίπτειν, ἀρκεῖν δὲ πρὸς

the study of Ethics; and on this account Timon gave him the name of "prater of laws," as the discussion of laws is a branch of Ethics. Plato, however, ascribes to him every division of philosophy,—Logic, in so far as he is introduced as an investigator of definitions and divisions and etymology, which are logical themes,—Ethics, because he discusses virtue and government and laws,—Physics, since he is made to philosophize about the Universe and animal creation and the Soul. Hence, too, Timon censures Plato for thus decking out Socrates with a host of sciences: for Plato, he says, "suffered him not to remain a simple teacher of Ethics."

The Cyrenaics,<sup>a</sup> too, are thought by some to embrace the Ethical division only, and to dismiss Physics and Logic as contributing nothing to the happiness of life. Some, however, have supposed that this view is refuted by the fact that they divide Ethics into sections—one dealing with objects of choice and aversion, another treating of the affections, yet another treating of actions, then a further section concerned with causes, and finally one dealing with arguments; for of these, the section treating of causes, they say, belongs to the Physical division of Philosophy, and that treating of arguments to the Logical. Ariston of Chios,<sup>b</sup> also, not only, they say, rejected the study of Physics and Logic on the ground that they are unprofitable and injurious to the philosophers who study them, but also proscribed some branches of Ethics, such as the hortatory and admonitory; for these, he held, are the business of nurses and pedagogues, whereas for securing happi-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 191 *infra*; Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xvii.

<sup>b</sup> A disciple of Zeno, the Stoic.

- τὸ μακαρίως βιώναι τὸν οἰκειοῦντα μὲν πρὸς ἀρετὴν λόγον, ἀπαλλοτριοῦντα δὲ κακίας, κατατρέχοντα δὲ τῶν μεταξύ τούτων, περὶ αἱ οἱ πολλοὶ
- 13 πτοηθέντες κακοδαιμονοῦσιν. περὶ δὲ τὸ λογικὸν κατηνέχθησαν μέρος οἱ περὶ Πανθοίδην καὶ Ἀλεξίνον καὶ Εὐβουλίδην καὶ Βρύσωνα Διονυσόδωρόν τε καὶ Εὐθύδημον [Θούριοι, ὧν μέμνηται καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Εὐθυδήμῳ].
- 14 Τῶν δὲ διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποσησαμένων Ξενοφάνης μὲν ὁ Κολοφώνιος τὸ φυσικὸν ἅμα καὶ λογικόν, ὡς φασί τινες, μετήρχετο, Ἀρχέλαος δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναῖος τὸ φυσικὸν καὶ ἠθικόν· μεθ' οὗ τινὲς καὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον τάττουσιν ὡς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν
- 15 θεωρίαν ἐκβάλλοντα. ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ φασὶ μὴ κοινῶς αὐτὸν τὴν λογικὴν παρητήσθαι, μόνην δὲ τὴν τῶν στωικῶν, ὥστε δυνάμει τριμερῆ πάλιν ἀπολείπειν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. ἀναφέρεται δὲ ὑπὸ τινῶν δόξα, καθὼ καὶ ὁ Σωτίων μεμαρτύρηκεν, εἰς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς Κυρήνης ὡς λέγοντας ἠθικὸν τι καὶ λογικὸν φιλοσοφίας εἶναι μέρος.
- 16 Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν ἑλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν [περὶ] πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθεῖς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτην καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται
- 17 τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως. ἐνθένδε πιθανῶς<sup>1</sup> ὁμοιοῦσι

<sup>1</sup> πιθανῶς cj. Bekk.: ἀπιθάνως MSS.

ness in life that doctrine is sufficient which attracts men to virtue and alienates them from vice and runs down those intermediate things which excite the admiration of most men and ruin their lives. Logic, on the other hand, was the sole division which 13 was cultivated by Panthoides and Alexinus, and Eubulides and Bryson, and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus.<sup>a</sup>

Of those who supposed Philosophy to consist of 14 two parts, Xenophanes of Colophon, as some say, pursued both Physics and Logic, but Archelaos of Athens Physics and Ethics; and some set Epicurus beside Archelaos as equally rejecting the study of Logic. But there have been others who say that 15 he did not set aside logic as a whole but merely that of the Stoics, so that he virtually allowed after all the three divisions of Philosophy. Some too—as Sotion<sup>b</sup> has testified—ascribe to the Cyrenaics the expression of the opinion that both Ethics and Logic are parts of Philosophy.

These thinkers, however, seem to have handled 16 the question incompletely, and, in comparison with them, the view of those who divide Philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic is more satisfactory. Of these Plato is, virtually, the pioneer, as he discussed many problems of physics and of ethics, and not a few of logic; but those who most expressly adopt this division are Xenocrates<sup>c</sup> and the Peripatetics, and also the Stoics. Hence they plausibly liken philo- 17

<sup>a</sup> Dionysodorus and his brother Euthydemus were fifth-century Sophists; Bryson and Eubulides, Logicians of the fourth century; Alexinus and Panthoides, Logicians or Eristics of the third century.

<sup>b</sup> Sotion of Alexandria, a historian of philosophy (circa 220 B.C.). <sup>c</sup> A disciple of Plato, see Vol. I. Introd. p. xix.



- τὴν φιλοσοφίαν παγκάρπῳ ἀλωῇ, ἵνα τῇ μὲν  
 ὑψηλότῃ τῶν φυτῶν εἰκάζηται τὸ φυσικόν, τῷ  
 δὲ νοστήμῳ τῶν καρπῶν τὸ ἠθικόν, τῇ δὲ ὀχυρό-  
 18 τητι τῶν τειχῶν τὸ λογικόν. οἱ δὲ ὧψ φασὶν  
 αὐτὴν εἶναι παραπλήσιον· ἐώκει γὰρ τῇ μὲν λεκίθῳ,  
 ἣν τινες νεοττόν ὑπάρχειν λέγουσι, τὰ ἠθικά, τῷ  
 δὲ λευκῷ, ὃ δὴ τροφή ἐστι τῆς λεκίθου, τὰ φυσικά,  
 19 τῷ δὲ ἔξωθεν ὀστρακῶδει τὰ λογικά. ὃ δὲ Ποσει-  
 δώνιος, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀχώριστα  
 ἐστὶν ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ φυτὰ τῶν καρπῶν ἕτερα  
 θεωρεῖται καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῶν φυτῶν κεχώριστα,  
 ζῶα μᾶλλον εἰκάζειν ἡξίου τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἷματι  
 μὲν καὶ σαρκί τὸ φυσικόν, ὀστέοις δὲ καὶ νεύροις  
 τὸ λογικόν, ψυχῇ δὲ τὸ ἠθικόν.  
 20 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τριμεροῦς οὐσης τῆς φιλοσοφίας οἱ  
 μὲν πρῶτον μέρος τάττουσι τὸ φυσικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ  
 χρόνῳ μὲν πρεσβυτάτη ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν φυσικὴν  
 πραγματεία ὡς καὶ μέχρι νῦν τοὺς πρώτους  
 φιλοσοφήσαντας φυσικοὺς καλεῖσθαι, τάξει δὲ, ὅτι  
 πρῶτον ἀρμόττει περὶ τῶν ὅλων διαλαβεῖν καὶ  
 τότε περὶ τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους καὶ τὰνθρώπου σκέ-  
 21 πτεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθικῶν κατήρξαντο ὡς  
 ἀναγκαιοτέρων καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπισπώντων,<sup>1</sup>  
 καθὸ καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης παρήγγελλε μηδὲν ἄλλο  
 ζητεῖν εἰ μὴ

ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε  
 τέτυκται.

- 22 οἱ δὲ Ἐπικούρειοι ἀπὸ τῶν λογικῶν εἰσβάλλουσιν·  
 τὰ γὰρ κανονικὰ πρῶτον ἐπιθεωροῦσιν, περὶ τε

<sup>1</sup> ἐπισπώντων Kayser: ἐπειγόντων Bekk.: ἐπιστώντων E;  
 ἐπιστώντων L.

sophy to a garden rich in fruits, comparing Physics to the height of the plants, Ethics to the richness of the fruits, Logic to the strength of the walls. And 18 others say that Philosophy resembles an egg, Ethics being like the yolk, which some identify with the chick, Physics like the white, which is nutriment for the yolk, and Logic like the outside shell. But 19 on the ground that the parts of Philosophy are inseparable one from another, whereas plants appear different from fruits and walls separated from plants, Poseidonius<sup>a</sup> preferred the comparison of Philosophy with an animal—Physics with the blood and flesh, Logic with the bones and sinews, Ethics with the soul.

Regarding Philosophy, then, as tripartite, some 20 put Physics as its first division since it holds first place both in point of time—seeing that even up till now the earliest philosophers have been called “physicists”—and also in natural order, as it is fitting to begin by discussing the Whole before we go on to investigate the particulars and Man himself. Others have begun with Ethics, as a more necessary 21 subject and one which invites to happiness; just as Socrates gave out that his only subject of inquiry was

Whatso of evil and good within these homes is enacted.<sup>b</sup>

The Epicureans start off with Logic, for they expound 22 “Canonic” first, treating of things evident and

<sup>a</sup> An Eclectic of the first century B.C.

<sup>b</sup> Homer, *Od.* iv. 392.

ἐναργῶν καὶ ἀδήλων καὶ τῶν τούτοις ἀκολουθῶν  
 ποιοῦνται τὴν ὑφήγησιν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς  
 καὶ αὐτοὶ ἄρχειν μὲν φασὶ τὰ λογικά, δευτερεύειν  
 δὲ τὰ ἠθικά, τελευταία δὲ τετάχθαι τὰ φυσικά.  
 23 πρῶτον γὰρ δεῖν καταρτισθῆναι τὸν νοῦν εἰς δυσ-  
 ἔκκρουστον τῶν παραδιδόμενων φυλακὴν, ὄχρω-  
 τικὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς διανοίας τὸν διαλεκτικὸν τόπον·  
 δεύτερον δὲ ὑπογράφειν τὴν ἠθικὴν θεωρίαν πρὸς  
 βελτίωσιν τῶν ἠθῶν· ἀκίνδυνος γὰρ ἡ παραδοχὴ  
 ταύτης ἐπὶ προϋποκειμένη τῇ λογικῇ δυνάμει·  
 τελευταίαν δὲ ἐπάγειν τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν·  
 θειοτέρα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ βαθυτέρας δεῖται τῆς ἐπι-  
 στάσεως.

24 Ταῦτα μὲν καὶ οὗτοι ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκριβὲς  
 ἐν τῷ πράγματι τὰ νῦν οὐ σκεπτόμεθα, ἐκεῖνο δὲ  
 φάμεν ὡς εἴπερ ἐν παντὶ μέρει φιλοσοφίας ζητητέον  
 ἐστὶ τἀληθές, πρὸ παντός δεῖ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τοὺς  
 τρόπους τῆς τούτου διαγνώσεως ἔχειν πιστούς.  
 ὁ δὲ γε λογικὸς τόπος τὴν περὶ τῶν κριτηρίων  
 καὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων θεωρίαν περιείχεν· ἀπὸ τούτου  
 25 ἄρα ποιητέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὴν ἀρχήν. καὶ ἵνα  
 εὐέφοδος γένηται πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ἢ ζήτησις,  
 ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν ἐναργῆ διὰ κριτηρίου τινὸς αὐτόθεν  
 γνωρίζεσθαι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ ἀδήλα διὰ σημείων καὶ  
 ἀποδείξεων κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶν μετάβασιν  
 ἐξιχνεύεσθαι, τάξει σκεπτόμεθα πρῶτον μὲν περὶ  
 τοῦ εἰ ἔστι τι κριτήριον τῶν αὐτόθεν κατ' αἴσθησιν  
 ἢ διάνοιαν προσπιπτόντων, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο περὶ  
 τοῦ εἰ ἔστι σημειωτικὸς ἢ ἀποδεικτικὸς τῶν  
 26 ἀδήλων τρόπος. οἴμαι γὰρ ὡς τούτων ἀναιρεθέν-  
 των οὐδεμία ἔτι καταλειφθήσεται ζήτησις περὶ τοῦ  
 δεῖν ἐπέχειν ἄτε μήτε ἐν τοῖς προφανέσι μήτε ἐν

non-evident and allied matters. The Stoics them-  
 selves, too, say that Logic comes first, and Ethics  
 second, while Physics occupies the last place. For 23  
 the mind must first be fortified for the task of  
 guarding its heritage impregnably, and what thus  
 makes the intellect secure is the Dialectical section ;  
 secondly we must subjoin Ethical doctrine for the  
 bettering of morals ; for when this is laid upon  
 an existing basis of logic, its reception is without  
 danger ; and finally we must add Physical doctrine, it  
 being a more divine subject and one which requires  
 more profound attention.

Such, then, are the views of these thinkers. We, 24  
 however, are not at present investigating this matter  
 with exactness ; but this we do affirm—that if truth  
 is to be sought in every division of Philosophy, we  
 must, before all else, possess trustworthy principles  
 and methods for the discernment of truth. Now  
 the Logical branch is that which includes the theory of  
 criteria and of proofs ; so it is with this that we ought  
 to make our beginning. And in order to facilitate 25  
 our inquiry, in its criticism of the Dogmatists, seeing  
 that things evident are held to be directly cognized  
 by means of a criterion, whereas the non-evident  
 things are discovered by means of signs and proofs  
 through inference from the evident, we shall take  
 them in this order, inquiring first whether there  
 exists a criterion of things directly perceived either  
 by sense or by reason, and, in the next place, whether  
 there exists a method capable of either signifying  
 or proving things non-evident. For I suppose that 26  
 if these shall be abolished there will no longer be any  
 question as to the duty of suspending judgement,  
 seeing that no truth is discovered either in things

τοῖς συνεσκιασμένοις εὐρισκομένον τινὸς ἀληθοῦς. ἀρχέτω οὖν ὁ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου λόγος, ἐπεὶ καὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς καταλήψεως τρόπων περιεκτικὸς εἶναι δοκεῖ.

## ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΚΡΙΤΗΡΙΟΝ ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑΣ

27 Ἡ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου ζήτησις οὐ μόνον διὰ τὸ φύσει φιλάληθες ζῶον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ <αὐτὸ><sup>1</sup> τὰς γενικωτάτας τῆς φιλοσοφίας αἰρέσεις περὶ τῶν κυριωτάτων βραβεύειν, πᾶσιν ἐστὶ περιμάχητος. ἢ γὰρ τὸ μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν τῶν δογματικῶν αὔχημα ἀναιρεῖσθαι ἄρδην δεήσει, μηδενὸς εὐρισκομένου κανόνος τῆς κατ' ἀλήθειαν τῶν πραγμάτων ὑπάρξεως, ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ὡς προπετεῖς ἐλέγχεσθαι τοὺς σκεπτικούς καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πίστεως κατατολμήσαντας, ἐὰν φαίνηται τι τὸ δυνάμενον ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κατάληψιν ὀδηγεῖν. καὶ γὰρ σχέτλιον εἶ τὰ μὲν ἐκτὸς κριτήρια μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἀναζητήσομεν, οἷον κανόνας καὶ διαβήτας σταθμῖα τε καὶ τρυτάνας, τὸ δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν δοκιμαστικὸν  
28 εἶναι δοκοῦν παρήσομεν. τάξει τοίνυν ὡς ἂν περὶ τῶν ὄλων οὔσης τῆς σκέψεως ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπεὶ δύο μέρη ἐμφέρεται τῇ προτάσει, τό τε κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐν μέρει τὸν περὶ ἑκατέρου τούτων λόγον ποιησόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε μὲν ἐξηγητικῶς ὑποδεικνύντες ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ κριτήριον καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια, καὶ τίνα ποτὲ κατὰ τοὺς δογματικούς εἶχε φύσιν, ὅτε δὲ καὶ ἀπορητικώτερον σκεπτόμενοι εἶ δύναται τι τούτων ὑπάρχειν.

<sup>1</sup> <αὐτὸ> addo.

plainly obvious or in things obscure. Let us begin, then, with the discussion of the criterion, since it is held to embrace all the modes of apprehension.

## DOES A CRITERION OF TRUTH EXIST ?

The problem of this Criterion is everywhere a 27 subject of controversy, not only because Man is by nature a truth-loving animal, but also because it pronounces judgement upon the most generic systems of Philosophy regarding the weightiest matters. For either the great and sublime theme of the Dogmatists' boasts will necessarily be utterly abolished if no Canon of the veritable existence of things is discovered, or conversely, if something appears which is able to point us to the apprehension of the truth, the Sceptics will be convicted of rashness and of defiant disregard for the general belief. It would indeed be monstrous if, while spending the utmost pains in investigating the external criteria—such as rules and compasses, weights and scales—we should neglect the Criterion within us—itsself the accepted test of those very externals. As our 28 inquiry, then, has to do with the whole subject, we shall proceed in an orderly way, and since two terms are involved in the proposition<sup>a</sup>—namely, “the Criterion” and “Truth”—we shall discuss each of these separately, our treatment consisting partly of an exposition of the various senses of the terms “Criterion” and “Truth” and of the kind of reality ascribed to them by the Dogmatists, and partly of a more critical inquiry as to the possibility of the real existence of any such things.

<sup>a</sup> i.e. the question “Does a Criterion of Truth exist?”

29 Αὐτίκα τοῖνυν τὸ κριτήριον (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἀπὸ τούτου) λέγεται πρῶτον μὲν διχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιοῦμεν τὰ δὲ οὐδαμῶς, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν φασὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι ταυτὶ δὲ ψευδῆ. ὦν τὸ μὲν πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς ἐξεθέμεθα· κατ' ἀνάγκην γὰρ ἔδει τὸν ἀπορητικῶς φιλοσοφούντα, μὴ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀνερέργητον ὄντα καὶ ἐν ταῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεσιν ἀπρακτον, ἔχειν τι κριτήριον αἰρέσεως ἅμα καὶ φυγῆς, τουτέστι τὸ φαινόμενον, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Τίμων μεμαρτύρηκεν εἰπὼν

ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινόμενον πάντη<sup>1</sup> σθένει, οὐπερ ἂν ἔλθῃ.

31 τὸ δ' ἕτερον, λέγω δὲ τὸ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ περὶ οὐ τὰ νῦν σκεπτόμεθα, λέγεσθαι δοκεῖ τριχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ ἰδίως καὶ ἰδιαίτατα. κοινῶς μὲν γὰρ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως, καθ' ὃ σημαίνόμενον καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ κριτήρια ταύτης ἤξιωται τῆς προσ-  
32 ηγορίας, ὅλον ὄρασις ἀκοή γεύσις· ἰδίως δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως τεχνικόν, καθ' ὃ πῆχυν μὲν καὶ ζυγὸν καὶ κανόνα καὶ διαβήτην εἴποι τις ἂν κριτήρια, παρόσον ἐστὶ τεχνικά, τὴν δὲ ὄρασιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν καὶ καθόλου τὰ λοιπὰ κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων, φυσικὴν ἔχοντα τὴν κατασκευήν,  
33 οὐδαμῶς· ἰδιαίτερον δὲ πᾶν μέτρον καταλήψεως

<sup>1</sup> πάντη *ej. Bekk.* : παντὶ *mss.*

<sup>a</sup> See *P.H.* i. 21 ff. *Cf. P.H.* ii. 14.

<sup>b</sup> For Timon, the Sceptic, see Vol. I. *Introd.* pp. xxx ff.

Well, then, the Criterion (for with it we must begin) 29 has, in the first place, two senses: in the one sense it is used of that in view of which we do these things and not those; in the other, it means the thing in view of which we assert that these things exist and those do not exist, and that these are true, those false. The former of these we have dealt with in our section "Concerning the Sceptic Way."<sup>a</sup> For the 30 sceptical philosopher, if he is not to be entirely inert and without a share in the activities of daily life, was necessarily obliged to possess some Criterion both of choice and of aversion—that is to say, the Appearance; even as Timon<sup>b</sup> also testified in his saying—

Yea, the Appearance is ev'rywhere strong, where'er it approacheth.

"Criterion," in the second of the two senses—that 31 of existence, I mean, which is the theme of our present inquiry—seems to be used with three meanings: the general, the special, and the most special.<sup>c</sup> As general it is used of every measure or standard of apprehension, and in this sense the physical criteria also—such as sight, hearing, taste—are thought worthy of the title; as special it includes 32 every technical measure of apprehension, so that in this sense one would call the cubit, the balance, the rule and the compass "criteria" inasmuch as they are technical, but not sight nor hearing nor in general the rest of the common sense-organs, the construction of which is natural; in the more special sense the 33 Criterion is every measure of apprehension of a non-

<sup>c</sup> With this passage *cf. P.H.* ii. 15, 16.

ἀδήλου πράγματος, καθ' ὃ τὰ μὲν βιωτικά οὐκέτι λέγεται κριτήρια, μόνα δὲ τὰ λογικά καὶ ἄπερ οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων παρεισάγουσι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας εὔρεσιν.

- 34 Πολλαχῶς δὴ λεγομένου τοῦ κριτηρίου, πρόκειται πάλιν τὸ σκέπτεσθαι προηγουμένως μὲν περὶ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις θρυλουμένου, κατ' ἐπακολούθημα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου  
35 τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον. πάρεστι μέντοι καὶ τὸ λογικὸν τοῦτο ὑποδιαιεῖσθαι, λέγοντας τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι κριτήριον ὡς ὑφ' οὐ, τὸ δὲ ὡς δι' οὐ, τὸ δὲ ὡς προσβολῆ καὶ σχέσις. ὑφ' οὐ μὲν ὡς ἄνθρωπος, δι' οὐ δὲ ὡς αἰσθησις, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὡς ἡ προσβολῆ  
36 τῆς φαντασίας. ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ἐν τῇ τῶν βαρέων καὶ κούφων ἐξετάσει τρία ἐστὶ κριτήρια, ὃ τε ζυγοστάτης καὶ ὁ ζυγὸς καὶ ἡ τοῦ ζυγοῦ θέσις, τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν ζυγοστάτης κριτήριον ἦν τὸ ὑφ' οὐ, ὁ δὲ ζυγὸς τὸ δι' οὐ, ἡ δὲ θέσις τοῦ ζυγοῦ ὡς σχέσις, καὶ πάλιν ὃν τρόπον πρὸς τὴν τῶν εὐθειῶν καὶ στρεβλῶν διάκρισιν τεχνίτου τε καὶ κανόνος καὶ τῆς τούτου προσβολῆς ἐστὶ χρεία, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶν τε καὶ ψευδῶν διάγνωσιν δεόμεθα τῶν προειρημένων  
37 ἡμῖν τριῶν κριτηρίων, καὶ ἔοικε τῷ μὲν ζυγοστάτῃ ἡ τέκτονι ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὑφ' οὐ γίνεται ἡ κρίσις, τῷ δὲ ζυγῷ καὶ κανόνι ἡ αἰσθησις καὶ ἡ διάνοια, δι' ἧς γίνεται τὰ τῆς κρίσεως, τῇ δὲ σχέσει τῶν προειρημένων ὀργάνων ἡ προσβολῆ τῆς φαντασίας, καθ' ἣν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐπιβάλλεται κρίνειν.  
Ἄλλὰ περὶ μὲν κριτηρίου ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος προλαβεῖν.

evident object, and in this sense the ordinary standards are no longer called criteria but only logical standards and those which the dogmatic philosophers introduce as means for the discovery of truth.

The term "Criterion," then, being used in many 34 senses, we again propose to examine in the first place the logical criterion, which the philosophers harp on, and subsequently each of the criteria of ordinary life. One may, however, subdivide this logical criterion 35 as well, by calling one form of it that of the agent, another the instrument, and a third the application and use. The agent, for instance, may be a man, the instrument sense-perception, and the third form of criterion the application of the sense-impression. For just as in the process of examining heavy and 36 light objects there are three criteria, the man who weighs, the scales, and the act of weighing, and of these the weigher is the criterion of the agent, the scales that of the instrument, and the act of weighing that of the use; and again, just as for the determination of things straight and crooked there is need of a craftsman and a rule and the application of the rule; so, in the same way, in philosophy also, for the determination of things true and false, we require the three criteria we have mentioned above; and here 37 the man, who is the agent in the judgement, corresponds to the weigher or carpenter; sense-perception or intelligence, as the instrument by which the judgement is effected, corresponds to the scales and the rule; and the application of the sense-impression, according to which the man proceeds to judge, corresponds to the use of the aforesaid instruments.

It was, in fact, necessary for our present purpose to begin with this explanation of the criterion.

38 Τὴν δὲ ἀλήθειαν οἴονται τινες, καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, διαφέρειν τᾶληθοῦς κατὰ τρεῖς τρόπους, οὐσία τε καὶ συστάσει καὶ δυνάμει, οὐσία μὲν παρόσον ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ἀσώματον ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ εἰκότως, φασὶν· τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα λεκτόν, τὸ δὲ λεκτόν ἀσώματον. ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἡ ἀλήθεια σῶμά ἐστι παρόσον ἐπιστήμη πάντων ἀληθῶν

39 ἀποφαντικῆ δοκεῖ τυγχάνειν, πᾶσα δὲ ἐπιστήμη πῶς ἔχον ἐστὶν ἡγεμονικόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ πῶς ἔχουσα χεὶρ πυγμῆ νοεῖται· τὸ δὲ ἡγεμονικόν σῶμα κατὰ τούτους ὑπῆρχεν· τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια

40 κατὰ γένος ἔσται σωματικῆ. συστάσει δὲ καθόσον τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὡς μονοειδὲς τι καὶ ἀπλοῦν τὴν φύσιν νενόηται, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ “ἡμέρα ἐστὶν” καὶ τὸ “ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι,” ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια ὡς ἂν ἐπιστήμη καθεστηκυῖα τοῦναντίον συστηματικῆ τε καὶ πλειόνων ἄθροισμα τυγχάνειν ὑπ-

41 εἰληπται. ᾧ οὖν λόγῳ ἕτερόν τί ἐστὶν ὁ δῆμος καὶ ἕτερον ὁ πολίτης, καὶ δῆμος μὲν τὸ ἐκ πολλῶν πολιτῶν ἄθροισμα πολίτης δὲ ὁ εἷς, τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ διενήνοχεν ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, καὶ ὁμοίωται ἢ μὲν ἀλήθεια τῷ δήμῳ τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τῷ πολίτῃ, διὰ τὸ τὴν μὲν εἶναι συστηματικὴν τὸ

42 δὲ ἀπλοῦν. δυνάμει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων κεχώρισται, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς οὐ πάντως ἐπιστήμης εἶχετο (καὶ γὰρ ὁ φαῦλος καὶ ὁ νήπιος καὶ ὁ μεμνηνὸς λέγει μὲν ποτέ τι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀληθοῦς), ἡ δὲ ἀλήθεια κατ’ ἐπιστήμην θεωρεῖται.

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 38-42 cf. P.H. ii. 80-83.

It is supposed by some, and especially by the 38 Stoics, that “truth” differs from “the true” in three ways, in essence and composition and potency,—in essence in so far as truth is a body whereas the true is incorporeal.<sup>a</sup> And naturally so, they say; for the latter is “judgement,” and the judgement is “expression,” and the expression is incorporeal. On the other hand, truth is a body in so far as it is held to be “knowledge declaratory of all true things,” and all knowledge is “a particular state of the regent 39 part,” just as the fist is conceived as a particular state of the hand, and, according to these thinkers, the regent part is a body, so that truth also will belong to the genus body. They differ in composition, 40 inasmuch as the true is conceived as uniform and simple in its nature,—as for instance, at the present moment, the propositions “It is day” and “I am conversing,”—whereas truth, as consisting in knowledge, is on the contrary conceived to be of composite nature and a collection of several elements. Thus, 41 just as “the people,” is one thing and “the citizen” another,—the collection composed of many citizens being “the people,” the one individual “the citizen,”—so, by the same reasoning, truth is distinguished from the true, and whereas truth corresponds to “the people,” the true corresponds to “the citizen,” because the former is composite but the latter simple. And they are distinct from one another in potency, 42 since the true is not altogether dependent on knowledge (for in fact the fool and the infant and the madman at times say something true, but they do not possess knowledge of the true), whereas truth is considered to involve knowledge. Hence, too, its

ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ἔχων ταύτην σοφός ἐστιν (ἐπιστήμην  
 γὰρ εἶχεν ἀληθῶν) καὶ οὐποτε ψεύδεται, κἂν  
 ψεύδος λέγῃ, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ κακῆς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ  
 43 ἀστείας αὐτὸ διαθέσεως προφέρεσθαι. καθὰ γὰρ  
 ὁ περὶ τῆς τοῦ κάμνοντος σωτηρίας ψεύδος τι  
 λέγων ἰατρός, καὶ ἐπαγγελλόμενος τι δώσειν μὴ  
 διδοῦς δέ, ψεύδος μὲν τι λέγει, οὐ ψεύδεται δέ  
 (πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιστατουμένου σωτηρίαν αὐτῷ  
 τὸ τοιοῦτο λαμβάνει τὴν ἀναφοράν), καὶ ὡς οἱ  
 ἄριστοι τῶν στρατηγῶν πρὸς εὐθυμίαν τῶν ὑπο-  
 ταττομένων αὐτοῖς στρατιωτῶν πολλάκις ἐπιστολὰς  
 ἀπὸ συμμαχίδων πόλεων πλασάμενοι<sup>1</sup> ψεύδος μὲν  
 τι λέγουσιν, οὐ ψεύδονται δέ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ  
 44 πονηρᾶς γνώμης τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ ὃν τρόπον γραμ-  
 ματικὸς σολοικισμοῦ τιθεὶς ὑπόδειγμα σολοικισμὸν  
 μὲν προφέρεται, οὐ σολοικίζει δέ (οὐ γὰρ παρὰ  
 ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τοῦτο πάσχει), ὧδε καὶ  
 ὁ σοφός, τουτέστιν ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμην  
 ἔχων, ἐρεῖ μὲν ποτε ψεύδος, ψεύσεται δέ οὐδέποτε  
 45 διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τὴν γνώμην ψεύδει συγκατατιθε-  
 μένην. ὅτι γὰρ, φασίν, ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ  
 οὐκ ἀπὸ ψιλῆς τῆς προφορᾶς κριτέον ἐστὶ τὸν  
 ψευδόμενον, πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῶν τεθησομένων  
 ὑποδειγμάτων. τυμβωρύχος γὰρ λέγεται καὶ ὁ  
 ἐπὶ τῷ σκυλεύειν τοὺς νεκροὺς τοῦτο πράττων  
 καὶ ὁ τύμβους τοῖς νεκροῖς ὀρύττων· ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν  
 πρῶτος κολάζεται ὡς ἀπὸ κακῆς διαθέσεως τοῦτο  
 πράσσειν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνει τῆς  
 ὑπηρεσίας διὰ τὴν ἀντικειμένην αἰτίαν. προφανές  
 τὸν ἐστὶν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ψεύδος λέγειν τοῦ ψεύ-

<sup>1</sup> πλασάμενοι LE: πλασάμενος N: παρασκευασάμενοι Bekk.

possessor is a Sage (for he possesses knowledge of  
 things true), and he never speaks falsely, even if he  
 says what is false, because he does not utter it from  
 an evil but from a kindly disposition. For just as the 43  
 doctor who says something false respecting the cure  
 of his patient, and promises to give him something  
 but does not give it, is not lying though he says  
 something false (for in saying it he has regard to  
 the cure of the person in his charge),—and just as  
 the best commanders, when, as often, they concoct  
 messages from allied States for the encouragement of  
 the soldiers under their command, say what is false  
 yet are not liars because they do not do this with a  
 bad intention,—and just as the grammarian, although 44  
 when giving an example of a solecism he utters a  
 solecism, is not guilty of bad grammar (for it is not  
 through ignorance of correct speech that he makes the  
 mistake),—so also the Sage (I mean the man who  
 possesses the knowledge of the true) will at times say  
 something false but will never lie because his mental  
 disposition is not assenting to what is false. For, as 45  
 they assert, the fact that the liar must be judged by  
 his disposition and not by his mere utterance may be  
 learnt from the examples now to be adduced. Thus  
 the name “grave-digger” is applied both to the  
 man who so acts in order to plunder the dead and  
 to the man who digs graves for the dead; but  
 whereas the first is punished as doing this from an  
 evil disposition, the second receives pay for his service  
 for the opposite cause. So then it is quite plain that  
 uttering a falsehood is vastly different from lying, in

δεσθαι κατὰ πολὺ διενήνοχεν, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ ἀστείας γίνεται γνώμης, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι ἀπὸ ποιηρᾶς.

- 46 Ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τινὰς προαποδόντες, ἀκολούθως καὶ τὴν γενομένην τοῖς δογματικοῖς φιλοσόφους διάστασιν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου σκοπῶμεν· ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστι ζητοῦντας περὶ τῆς τούτου ὑπάρξεως συνεπιθεωρεῖν καὶ ὃ τι ἔστιν.
- 47 Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ποικίλαι διαιρέσεις φέρονται κατὰ τὸν τόπον<sup>1</sup>. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀπόχρη πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγειν ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀνείλον τὸ κριτήριον οἱ δὲ ἀπέλιπον. καὶ τῶν ἀπολιπόντων τρεῖς αἱ ἀνωτάτω γεγόνασι στάσεις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν λόγῳ τοῦτο ἀπέλιπον, οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἀλόγοις ἐναργείαις,<sup>2</sup> οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις. καὶ δι' ἀνείλον μὲν αὐτὸ Ξενοφάνης τε ὁ Κολοφώνιος καὶ Ξενοφάνης ὁ Κορίνθιος καὶ Ἀνάχαρις ὁ Σκύθης καὶ Πρωταγόρας καὶ Διονυσόδωρος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Μητρόδωρος ὁ Χίος καὶ Ἀνάξαρχος ὁ εὐδαιμονικὸς καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων. [ἐν τούτοις δὲ 49 εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως.]<sup>3</sup> ὧν Ξενοφάνης μὲν κατὰ τινὰς εἰπὼν πάντα ἀκατάληπτα ἐπὶ ταύτης ἔστι τῆς φορᾶς, ἐν οἷς γράφει

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἶδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται  
εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·  
εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν,  
αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

<sup>1</sup> τόπον N, cj. Bekk. : τρόπον LE.

<sup>2</sup> ἐναργείαις Heintz : ἐνεργείαις mss., Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> ἐν . . . σκέψεως] secl. Mutsch.

that the former proceeds from a kindly intention but lying from an evil intention.

Having thus stated the views held by some con- 46  
cerning truth, let us next consider the divergent  
opinions which have arisen among the dogmatic  
philosophers concerning the criterion; for while we  
are investigating its existence we must also consider  
at the same time what, in its essence, it is. Now many 47  
divergent opinions of all sorts are propounded re-  
garding this subject, but for the present it is sufficient  
for us to say that some have rejected, others retained  
the criterion. Of those who have retained it the main  
views are three: some have retained it in rational  
discourse, some in non-rational self-evident facts,  
some in both. Moreover, it has been rejected by 48  
Xenophanes of Colophon and Xenias of Corinth  
and Anaxarchus the Scythian and Protagoras and  
Dionysodorus<sup>a</sup>; and besides these, by Gorgias of  
Leontini and Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus  
"the Eudaemonist" and Monimus the Cynic. [And  
amongst these are also the Sceptics.] And of these 49  
Xenophanes, according to some, took up this position  
by declaring all things to be non-apprehensible, as in  
this passage<sup>b</sup>:

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about  
all things,  
No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man  
know it.  
Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really  
existent,  
He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining.

<sup>a</sup> For the views of those here named see §§ 53 ff. *infra*,  
13 *supra*; P.H. ii. 18.

<sup>b</sup> Repeated in § 110 *infra*, and *Adv. Log.* ii. 326.



50 διὰ τούτων γὰρ σαφές μὲν ἔοικε λέγειν τάληθές  
καὶ τὸ γνώριμον, καθὸ καὶ λέγεται

ἀπλοῦς ὁ μῦθος τῆς ἀληθείας ἔφν,

ἄνδρα δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τῷ εἰδικῶ καταχρώμενος  
ἀντὶ τοῦ γένους· εἶδος γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθέστηκεν  
ὁ ἀνὴρ. σύνηθες δ' ἔστι τούτῳ χρῆσθαι τῷ τρόπῳ  
τῆς φράσεως καὶ Ἰπποκράτει, ὅταν λέγῃ “γυνή  
ἀμφιδέξιος οὐ γίνεται,” τούτεστι θήλεια ἐν τοῖς  
δεξιούσι μέρεσι τῆς μήτρας οὐ συνίσταται. ἀμφὶ  
θεῶν δὲ ὑποδειγματικῶς περὶ τίνος τῶν ἀδήλων,  
51 δόκον δὲ τὴν δόκησιν καὶ τὴν δόξαν. ὥστε τοιοῦ-  
τον εἶναι κατὰ ἐξάπλωσιν τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον  
“τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθές καὶ γνώριμον οὐθεὶς ἄνθρωπος  
οἶδε, τό γε ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοις πράγμασιν· κἂν γὰρ  
ἐκ τύχης ἐπιβάλλῃ τούτῳ, ὅμως οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι  
52 ἐπιβέβληκεν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' οἶεται καὶ δοκεῖ.” ὥσπερ  
γὰρ εἰ ἐν ζοφερῷ οἰκίματι καὶ πολλὰ ἔχοντι  
κειμήλια ὑποβοίμεθά τινας χρυσὸν ζητοῦντας, ὑπο-  
πεσεῖται διότι ἕκαστος μὲν τούτων λαβόμενός τινος  
τῶν ἐν τῷ οἰκίματι κειμένων οἰήσεται τοῦ χρυσοῦ  
δεδράχθαι, οὐδεὶς δὲ αὐτῶν ἔσται πεπεισμένος ὅτι  
τῷ χρυσῷ περιέπεσε, κἂν μάλιστα τύχῃ τούτῳ  
περιπεπτωκώς, ὧδε καὶ εἰς τουτοῖ τὸν κόσμον  
ὥσπερ τινὰ μέγαν οἶκον παρήλαθε πλήθος φιλοσόφων  
ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ζήτησιν, ἧς τὸν λαβόμενον  
εἰκός ἐστιν ἀπιστεῖν ὅτι εὐστόχησεν.

Οὗτος μὲν δὴ οὐ φησιν εἶναι κριτήριον ἀληθείας

<sup>a</sup> Eurip. *Phoen.* 469.

<sup>b</sup> A curious use of ἀμφιδέξιος (usually “ambidextrous”).  
That the “left” is the “female” side was an old Pythagorean idea. But the main point of the sentence is that

For here he seems to mean by “clear” what is true 50  
and known, just as in the saying

By nature simple is the word of truth.<sup>a</sup>

And by “man” he seems to mean “human being,”  
using the special term instead of the general; for  
man is a species of human being. The use of this  
mode of speech is customary also in Hippocrates,  
as when he says “A woman is not produced right-  
handed,”—that is to say, “a female is not com-  
pounded in the right-hand parts of the womb.”<sup>b</sup>  
The words “with respect to the gods” are used, by  
way of example, for “concerning any non-evident  
object”; and “opining” stands for surmise and  
opinion. Consequently his statement, when sim- 51  
plified, amounts to this—“Yet the true and known—  
at least in respect of non-evident things—no human  
being knows; for even if by chance he should hit  
upon it, still he knows not that he has hit upon it but  
imagines and opines.” For just as, if we were to 52  
suppose that certain people are searching for gold in  
a dark room containing many treasures, what happens  
will be that each of them whenever he lays hold of  
some one of the treasures in the room will imagine  
that he has grasped the gold, though none of them  
will be convinced that he has lighted on the gold,  
even though, in fact, he has lighted upon it; so  
also into this Universe, as into a great house, there  
has entered a host of philosophers bent on the search  
for truth, and it is quite likely that the one who has  
laid hold of it disbelieves that he has achieved his  
aim.

Thus Xenophanes denies that a criterion of truth

H. is here using the specific term γυνή (“woman”) in place  
of the generic θήλεια (“female”).

διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν  
 53 ζητουμένων. Ξενιάδης δὲ ὁ Κορίνθιος, οὐδὲ καὶ  
 Δημόκριτος μέμνηται, πάντ' εἰπὼν ψευδῆ, καὶ  
 πᾶσαν φαντασίαν καὶ δόξαν ψεύδεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ  
 μὴ ὄντος πᾶν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεσθαι, καὶ εἰς τὸ  
 54 μὴ ὄν πᾶν τὸ φθειρόμενον φθείρεσθαι, δυνάμει  
 τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται τῷ Ξενοφάνει στάσεως. μὴ  
 ὄντος γὰρ τινος ἀληθοῦς κατὰ διαφορὰν τοῦ ψεύ-  
 δους, ἀλλὰ πάντων ψευδῶν ὄντων καὶ διὰ τοῦτο  
 ἀκαταλήπτων, οὐδὲ διακριτικὸν τι τούτων ἔσται  
 κριτήριον. τὸ δ' ὅτι πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ καὶ διὰ  
 τοῦτο ἀκατάληπτα, οὐδὲ διακριτικὸν τούτων ἔσται  
 κριτήριον,<sup>1</sup> δείκνυται ἐκ τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων δια-  
 βολῆς· εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον πάντων  
 τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ ψευδές, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ  
 πάντα ἐστὶ ψευδῆ. τὸ δέ γε ἐπαναβεβηκὸς κριτή-  
 ριον πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων εἰσὶν αἱ αἰσθήσεις,  
 καὶ δείκνυνται ψευδεῖς· πάντα ἄρα τὰ πράγματα  
 ἐστὶ ψευδῆ.

55 Καὶ Ἀνάχαρσις, ὡς φασίν, ὁ Σκύθης πάσης  
 τέχνης τὴν κριτικὴν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖ, σφόδρα τε  
 ἐπιτιμᾷ τοῖς Ἕλλησι ταύτην ἀπολείπουσιν· τίς  
 γὰρ ἐστὶ, φησίν, ὁ κρίνων τι τεχνικῶς; ἄρα γε  
 ὁ ἰδιώτης ἢ ὁ τεχνίτης; ἀλλ' ἰδιώτην μὲν οὐκ  
 ἂν εἴποιμεν πεπῆρωται γὰρ πρὸς τὴν γνώσιν τῶν  
 τεχνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων, καὶ ὡς οὔτε τυφλὸς λαμ-  
 βάνει τὰ τῆς ὀράσεως ἔργα οὔτε κωφὸς τὰ τῆς  
 ἀκοῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ ὁ ἀτεχνος ὀξυωπεῖ πρὸς τὴν  
 κατάληψιν τοῦ τεχνικῶς ἀποτελεσθέντος, ἐπεὶ τοι  
 εἴαν καὶ τούτῳ μαρτυρῶμεν τὴν τινος πράγματος  
 τεχνικοῦ κρίσιν, οὐ διοίσει τῆς τέχνης ἢ ἀτεχνία,

<sup>1</sup> [οὐδὲ . . . κριτήριον] om. NLE.

exists because there is nothing apprehensible existing  
 in the nature of the objects of inquiry. And Xenias 53  
 the Corinthian<sup>a</sup>—who is mentioned by Democritus—  
 inasmuch as he asserts that all things are false, and  
 that every impression and opinion is false, and that all  
 that becomes becomes out of the non-existent, and  
 all that perishes perishes into the non-existent, virtu-  
 ally adopts the same position as Xenophanes. For if 54  
 nothing true, as opposed to false, exists, but all things  
 are false and therefore inapprehensible, neither will  
 there exist any criterion capable of judging between  
 things. And the fact that all things are false and  
 therefore inapprehensible is proved by disparagement  
 of the senses; <sup>b</sup> for if the supreme criterion of all  
 things is false, all things also are of necessity false.  
 But the senses are the supreme criterion of all things,  
 and they are proved to be false; therefore all things  
 are false.

Anacharsis the Scythian also, as they say, destroys 55  
 the apprehension which judges concerning every art,  
 and strongly censures the Greeks for accepting it.  
 "For who," says he, "is the man who judges a thing by  
 rules of art? Is he the non-expert or the expert artist?"  
 But surely we could not say that he is the non-expert;  
 for he is lacking in knowledge of the special features of  
 the art, and just as the blind man does not perceive  
 the effects of vision, nor the deaf those of hearing, so  
 neither is the non-expert keen of sight to apprehend  
 the result produced by artistic methods; since in fact,  
 were we to entrust to him the judgement of any pro-  
 duct of art, there will be no difference between lack

<sup>a</sup> See P.H. ii. 18; § 388 *infra*.

<sup>b</sup> See P.H. i. 44 ff., ii. 49 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. P.H. iii. 259.

56 ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· ὥστε οὐχ ὁ ἰδιώτης ἐστὶ  
 κριτῆς τῶν τεχνικῶν ἰδιωμάτων. λείπεται ἄρα  
 λέγειν τὸν τεχνίτην· ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον. ἦτοι  
 γὰρ ὁ ὁμόζηλος τὸν ὁμόζηλον ἢ ὁ ἀνομόζηλος τὸν  
 ἑτερόζηλον κρίνει. ἀλλ' ὁ ἑτερόζηλος οὐχ οἶός τε  
 57 ἐστὶ κρίνειν τὸν ἑτερόζηλον· τῆς γὰρ ἰδίας τέχνης  
 ἐστὶν ἐπιγνώμων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ἰδιώτης  
 καθέστηκεν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ ὁμόζηλος τὸν ὁμό-  
 ζηλον δύναται δοκιμάζειν· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο ἐζή-  
 τοῦμεν, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ τούτους κρίνων ἐν μιᾷ δυνάμει  
 τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ τέχνῃ καθεστῶτας. ἄλλως  
 τε, εἴπερ οὗτος ἐκείνον κρίνει, γενήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ  
 κρίνόν τε καὶ κρινόμενον πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον·  
 58 ἢ μὲν γὰρ ὁμόζηλός ἐστὶν ὁ ἕτερος τῷ κρινομένῳ,  
 κρινόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ἄπιστος ἔσται, ἢ δὲ κρίνει,  
 πιστός γενήσεται. οὐ δυνατὸν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ  
 κρίνον καὶ κρινόμενον καὶ πιστόν καὶ ἄπιστον  
 59 ὑπάρχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τις ὁ κρίνων τεχνικῶς.  
 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ κριτήριον· τῶν γὰρ κριτηρίων  
 τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ τεχνικά τὰ δὲ ἰδιωτικά, οὔτε δὲ τὰ  
 ἰδιωτικά κρίνει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ ἰδιώτης, οὔτε τὰ  
 τεχνικά, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ὁ τεχνίτης, διὰ τὰς ἔμ-  
 προσθεν εἰρημένας αἰτίας. τοίνυν οὐδέν ἐστι  
 κριτήριον.  
 60 Καὶ Πρωταγόραν δὲ τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην ἐγκατέλεξάν  
 τινες τῷ χορῷ τῶν ἀναιρουμένων τὸ κριτήριον  
 φιλοσόφων, ἐπεὶ φησι πάσας τὰς φαντασίας καὶ  
 τὰς δόξας ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι  
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν διὰ τὸ πᾶν τὸ φανὲν ἢ δόξαν τι

• Cf. P.H. i. 216; Vol. I. Introd. p. xiv.

of art and art, which is absurd. So that the non-expert  
 is not the judge of the special features of art. It 56  
 remains, then, to say that the expert artist is the  
 judge; and this again is improbable. For either the  
 fellow-craftsman judges the fellow-craftsman, or the  
 man of one craft the man of another craft. But the  
 man of one craft is incapable of judging the man of  
 another craft; for he is learned in his own art, but 57  
 in regard to another man's he is in the position of a  
 non-expert. Nor in fact can the fellow-craftsman pass  
 judgement on his fellow-craftsman; for precisely this  
 was our question—Who is he that judges those who  
 stand on the same level inasmuch as they are engaged  
 in the same art? And besides, if this fellow-craftsman  
 judges that one, the same thing will be both judging  
 and judged, both trusted and distrusted; for in so 58  
 far as the other man is a fellow-craftsman of the man  
 who is being judged, he himself also will be subject  
 to judgement and distrusted, whereas, in so far as he  
 is giving judgement, he will be trusted. But it is not  
 possible for the same thing to be both judging and  
 judged, trusted and distrusted. Therefore there is  
 none who judges by rules of art. And because of this 59  
 there is no criterion either; for of criteria some are  
 technical, others non-technical, but, for the reasons  
 already stated, neither the non-technical criteria judge  
 any more than the non-expert, nor the technical  
 any more than the expert artist. So then no criterion  
 exists."

Some, too, have counted Protagoras of Abdera<sup>a</sup> 60  
 among the company of those philosophers who  
 abolish the criterion, since he asserts that all sense-  
 impressions and opinions are true and that truth is  
 a relative thing inasmuch as everything that has

εὐθέως πρὸς ἐκεῖνον ὑπάρχειν. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν τῶν καταβαλλόντων ἀνεφώνησε “ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς 61 ἔστιν, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν.” καὶ μαρτυρεῖν φαίνεται τούτῳ ὁ ἀντικείμενος λόγος. εἰ γὰρ φήσει τις μὴ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, βεβαιώσει τὸ πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων κριτήριον εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ τοῦτο λέγων ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν τιθεὶς φαινόμενον ὁμολογεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν φαινομένων ὑπάρχειν. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ μεμνηνὸς τῶν ἐν μανίᾳ φαινομένων πιστόν ἐστι κριτήριον, καὶ ὁ κοιμώμενος τῶν ἐν ὕπνοις καὶ ὁ νήπιος τῶν ἐν νηπιότητι καὶ 62 ὁ γεγηρακὸς τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ προσπιπτόντων. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οἰκείον ἀπὸ τῶν διαφερουσῶν περιστάσεων τὰς διαφόρους περιστάσεις ἀθετεῖν, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν ἐν τῷ σωφρονεῖν ὑποπιπτόντων τὰ ἐν τῷ μεμνηνέαι φαινόμενα, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ὕπαρ τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνου, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐν γήρᾳ τὰ ἐν νηπιότητι. ὡς γὰρ αὐτὰ ἐκείνοις οὐ φαίνεται, οὕτω καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ τούτοις φαινόμενα ἐκείνοις οὐ προσ- 63 πίπτει. διόπερ εἰ ὅτι ὁ μεμνηνὸς ἢ ὁ κοιμώμενος ἐν ποιᾷ διαθέσει θεωρεῖται, οὐκ ἔστι βέβαιος τῶν φαινομένων αὐτῷ κριτής, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ σωφρονῶν καὶ ὁ ἐγρηγορῶν ἐν ποιᾷ καθέστηκεν διαθέσει, πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται πιστὸς πρὸς τὴν διάγνωσιν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῷ. μηδενὸς οὖν χωρὶς περιστάσεως λαμβανομένου, ἐκάστῳ πιστευτέον (περὶ)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <περὶ> addidi: <ἀποφαινομένῳ περὶ> cj. Mutsch.

appeared to someone or been opined by someone is at once real in relation to him. Certainly, at the opening of his book *The Down-Throwers* he has proclaimed that “ Of all things the measure is man, of existing things that they exist and of non-existing things that they exist not.” And to this statement 61 even the opposite statement appears to bear witness. For if anyone shall assert that man is not the criterion of all things he will be confirming the statement that man is the criterion of all things; since the very person who makes the assertion is himself a man, and in affirming what appears relatively to himself he confesses that this very assertion of his is one of the appearances relative to himself. Hence also the madman is a trustworthy criterion of the appearances which occur in madness, and the sleeper of those in sleep, and the infant of those in infancy, and the ancient of those in old age. Nor is it appropriate to 62 disallow one set of circumstances because of a different set of circumstances—that is to say, the appearances which occur in the state of madness because of the impressions received in the sane state of mind, and those of sleep because of those of the waking state, and those of infancy because of those of old age. For as the latter percepts do not appear to the former percipients, so also conversely the appearances perceived by these do not affect those. Consequently, 63 if the madman or the sleeper is not a reliable judge of the appearances he perceives because he is found to be in a certain state of mind, then since both the sane and the waking man are also in a certain state, they again will not be trustworthy for the determining of their percepts. Seeing, then, that no impression is received apart from circumstances, each man must

τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν περίστασιν λαμβανομένων.  
 64 καὶ τοῦτον<sup>1</sup> δὴ κινεῖν τινὲς ὑπενόησαν τὸ κριτήριον, ἐπεὶ περ τοῦτι μὲν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ὑποκειμένων δοκιμαστικὸν εἶναι βούλεται, τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους διοριστικὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὃ δὲ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ οὔτε καθ' αὐτό τι ὑπάρχον οὔτε ψεῦδος ἀπολέλοιπεν. τοιοῦτοι δὲ γεγονέναι λέγονται καὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν Εὐθύδημον καὶ Διονυσόδωρον· τῶν γὰρ πρὸς τι καὶ οὗτοι τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀπολελοίπασιν.

65 Γοργίας δὲ ὁ Λεοντίνος ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μὲν τάγματος ὑπῆρχε τοῖς ἀθηναίοσι τὸ κριτήριον, οὗ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν δὲ ἐπιβολὴν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Πρωταγόραν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως τρία κατὰ τὸ ἐξῆς κεφάλαια κατασκευάζει, ἐν μὲν καὶ πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἔστιν, δεύτερον ὅτι εἰ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀκατάληπτον ἀνθρώπων, τρίτον ὅτι εἰ καὶ καταληπτόν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε ἀνέξ-  
 66 οιστον καὶ ἀνερμήνευτον τῷ πέλας. ὅτι μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐπιλογίζεται τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι, ἦτοι τὸ ὄν ἔστιν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν. οὔτε δὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ὡς παραστήσει, οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς παραμυθήσεται, οὔτε τὸ ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο διδάξει.  
 67 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν μὴ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστιν, ἔσται τι ἅμα καὶ οὐκ ἔσται· ἢ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὄν νοεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται, ἢ δὲ ἔστι μὴ ὄν, πάλιν ἔσται. παντελῶς δὲ ἄτοπον τὸ εἶναι τι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἶναι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ μὴ

<sup>1</sup> τοῦτον Heintz: τοῦτῳ mss., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> Viz. Protagoras.

be trusted regarding those received in his own circumstances. And this man,<sup>a</sup> as some have sup- 64 posed, rejects the criterion, seeing that it purports to be a test of absolute realities and to discriminate between the true and the false, whereas the man just mentioned does not admit the existence either of anything absolutely real or of falsehood. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus also are said to have shared these views; for they too regarded both the existent and the true as relative things.

Gorgias of Leontini belonged to the same party as 65 those who abolish the criterion, although he did not adopt the same line of attack as Protagoras. For in his book entitled *Concerning the Non-existent* or *Concerning Nature* he tries to establish successively three main points—firstly, that nothing exists; secondly, that even if anything exists it is inapprehensible by man; thirdly, that even if anything is apprehensible, yet of a surety it is inexpressible and incommunicable to one's neighbour. Now that 66 nothing exists, he argues in the following fashion: If anything exists, either it is the existent that exists or the non-existent, or both the existent and the non-existent exist. But neither does the existent exist, as he will establish, nor the non-existent, as he will demonstrate, nor both the existent and the non-existent, as he will also make plain. Nothing, therefore, exists. Now the non-existent does not 67 exist. For if the non-existent exists, it will at one and the same time exist and not exist; for in so far as it is conceived as non-existent it will not exist, but in so far as it is non-existent it will again exist. But it is wholly absurd that a thing should both exist and exist not at one and the same time. Therefore

ὄν. καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι, τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔσται· ἐναντία γὰρ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις, καὶ εἰ τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ εἶναι, τῷ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ εἶναι. οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ ὄν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ <τοῖνυν><sup>1</sup> τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔσται.

- 68 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὄν ἔστιν, ἦτοι αἰδιόν ἐστιν ἢ γενητόν ἢ αἰδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· οὔτε δὲ αἰδιόν ἐστιν οὔτε γενητόν οὔτε ἀμφοτέρα, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν (ἀρκτέον γὰρ ἐντεῦθεν), οὐκ ἔχει τινα ἀρχήν· τὸ γὰρ γινόμενον πᾶν ἔχει τιν' ἀρχήν, τὸ δὲ αἰδιον ἀγέννητον καθεστὼς οὐκ εἶχεν ἀρχήν. μὴ ἔχον δὲ ἀρχήν ἀπειρόν ἐστιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ πού ἐστιν, ἕτερον αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἐκείνο τὸ [ὄν] ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, καὶ οὕτως οὐκέτ' ἀπειρον ἔσται τὸ ὄν ἐμπεριεχόμενον τινι· μείζον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐμπεριεχομένου τὸ ἐμπεριέχον, τοῦ δὲ ἀπειρου οὐδέν ἐστι μείζον,
- 70 ὥστε οὐκ ἔστι που τὸ ἀπειρον. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτῷ περιέχεται. ταῦτόν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ δύο γενήσεται τὸ ὄν, τόπος τε καὶ σῶμα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ᾧ τόπος ἐστίν, τὸ δ' ἐν αὐτῷ σῶμα. τοῦτο δέ γε ἄτοπον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν. ὥστ' εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀπειρόν ἐστιν, οὐδαμοῦ ἐστίν, εἰ δὲ μηδαμοῦ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἔστιν. τοῖνυν εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ὄν ἐστιν.
- 71 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γενητόν εἶναι δύναται τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ γέγονεν, ἦτοι ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος γέγονεν.

<sup>1</sup> οὐδὲ <τοῖνυν>: <τοῖνυν> οὐδὲ cj. Bekk., Mutsch.

the non-existent does not exist. Moreover, if the non-existent exists, the existent will not exist; for these are contrary the one to the other, and if existence is a property of the non-existent, non-existence will be a property of the existent. But it is not the fact that the existent does not exist; neither, then, will the non-existent exist.

Furthermore, the existent does not exist either. 68 For if the existent exists, it is either eternal or created or at once both eternal and created; but, as we shall prove, it is neither eternal nor created nor both; therefore the existent does not exist. For if the existent is eternal (the hypothesis we must take first), it has no beginning; for everything created 69 has some beginning, but the eternal being uncreated had no beginning. And having no beginning it is infinite. And if it is infinite, it is nowhere. For if it is anywhere, that wherein it is is different from it, and thus the existent, being encompassed by something, will no longer be infinite; for that which encompasses is larger than that which is encompassed, whereas nothing is larger than the infinite; so that the infinite is not anywhere. Nor, again, is it 70 encompassed by itself. For, if so, that wherein it is will be identical with that which is therein, and the existent will become two things, place and body (for that wherein it is is place, and that which is therein is body). But this is absurd; so that the existent is not in itself either. Consequently, if the existent is eternal it is infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist. So then, if the existent is eternal, it is not even existent at all.

Nor, again, can the existent be created. For if 71 it has been created, it has been created either out of

ἀλλ' οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος γέγονεν· εἰ γὰρ ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ γέγονεν ἀλλ' ἐστιν ἤδη· οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὄν οὐδὲ γεννησαί τι δύναται διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀφείλειν ὑπάρξεως μετέχειν τὸ γεννητικόν τινος. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ γενητόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν.

72 Κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ συναμφότερον, αἰδιον ἅμα καὶ γενητόν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἀναιρετικά ἐστιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ εἰ αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, οὐ γέγονεν, καὶ εἰ γέγονεν, οὐκ ἐστιν αἰδιον. τοῖνυν εἰ μήτε αἰδιόν ἐστι τὸ ὄν μήτε γενητόν μήτε τὸ συναμφότερον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν.

73 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἰ ἔστιν, ἦτοι ἔν ἐστιν ἢ πολλά· οὔτε δὲ ἔν ἐστιν οὔτε πολλά, ὡς παρασταθήσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ὄν. εἰ γὰρ ἔν ἐστιν, ἦτοι ποσὸν ἐστιν ἢ συνεχές ἐστιν ἢ μέγεθός ἐστιν ἢ σῶμά ἐστιν. ὃ τι δὲ ἂν ἦ τούτων, οὐχ ἔν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ ποσὸν μὲν καθεστῶς διαιρεθήσεται, συνεχές δὲ ὄν τμηθήσεται. ὁμοίως δὲ μέγεθος νοούμενον οὐκ ἔσται ἀδιαίρετον. σῶμα δὲ τυγχάνον τριπλοῦν ἔσται· καὶ γὰρ μήκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος ἔξει. ἄτοπον δὲ γε τὸ μηδὲν τούτων εἶναι λέγειν τὸ ὄν·

74 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἔν τὸ ὄν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐστιν ἔν, οὐδὲ πολλά ἐστιν· σύνθεσις γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἔν ἐστι τὰ πολλά, διόπερ τοῦ ἐνός ἀναιρουμένου συναίρεται καὶ τὰ πολλά.

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ ὅτι μὲν οὔτε τὸ ὄν ἐστιν οὔτε τὸ μὴ ὄν ἐστιν, ἐκ τούτων συμφανές· ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀμφότερα ἔστιν, τό τε ὄν καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν, εὐεπιλόγιστον.

the existent or out of the non-existent. But it has not been created out of the existent; for if it is existent it has not been created but exists already; nor out of the non-existent; for the non-existent cannot create anything because what is creative of anything must of necessity partake of real existence. Neither, then, is the existent created.

In the same way, it is not both together—at once 72 eternal and created; for these are destructive the one of the other, and if the existent is eternal it has not been created, while if it has been created it is not eternal. So then, if the existent is neither eternal nor created nor both at once, the existent will not exist.

Moreover, if it exists, it is either one or many; but, 73 as we shall show, it is neither one nor many; therefore the existent does not exist. For if it is one, it is either a discrete quantity<sup>a</sup> or a continuum or a magnitude or a body. But whichever of these it be, it is not one; but if it be a discrete quantity it will be divided, and if it be a continuum it will be cut in sections; and similarly, if it be conceived as a magnitude it will not be indivisible, while if it is a body it will be threefold, for it will possess length and breadth and depth. But it is absurd to say that the existent is none of these; therefore the existent is not one. Yet neither is it many. For if it is not 74 one, neither is it many; for the many is a sum of the ones, and hence if the one is destroyed the many also are destroyed with it.

Well, then, it is plain from this that neither does the existent exist nor the non-existent exist; and that 75 they do not both exist—both the existent and the non-existent—is easy to prove. For if the non-

<sup>a</sup> i.e. a quantity, or number, which is divisible.

εἴπερ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὄν ἔστι, ταῦτόν  
 ἔσται τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ εἶναι· καὶ διὰ  
 τοῦτο οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν ἔστιν. ὅτι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν  
 οὐκ ἔστιν, ὁμόλογον· δέδεικται δὲ ταῦτό τούτῳ  
 76 καθεστῶς τὸ ὄν· καὶ αὐτὸ τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔσται. οὐ  
 μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ταῦτόν ἔστι τῷ μὴ ὄντι τὸ ὄν,  
 οὐ δύναται ἀμφότερα εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ ἀμφότερα, οὐ  
 ταῦτόν, καὶ εἰ ταῦτόν, οὐκ ἀμφότερα. οἷς ἔπεται  
 τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μήτε τὸ ὄν ἔστι μήτε τὸ  
 μὴ ὄν μήτε ἀμφότερα, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν  
 νοεῖται, οὐδὲν ἔστιν.

77 "Ὅτι δὲ κἂν ἦ τι, τοῦτο ἀγνωστόν τε καὶ ἀνεπι-  
 νόητόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ, παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον.  
 εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενα, φησὶν ὁ Γοργίας, οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ φρονεῖται. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· ὥσπερ  
 γὰρ εἰ τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβέβηκεν εἶναι λευκοῖς,  
 κἂν συμβεβήκει τοῖς λευκοῖς φρονεῖσθαι, οὕτως εἰ  
 τοῖς φρονουμένοις συμβεβήκει μὴ εἶναι οὐσι, κατ'  
 ἀνάγκην συμβήσεται τοῖς οὐσι μὴ φρονεῖσθαι.

78 διόπερ ὑγιᾶς καὶ σώζον τὴν ἀκολουθίαν ἐστὶ τὸ  
 "εἰ τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, τὸ ὄν οὐ  
 φρονεῖται." τὰ δὲ γε φρονούμενα (προληπτέον  
 γάρ) οὐκ ἔστιν ὄντα, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα  
 τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται. καὶ ὅτι τὰ φρονούμενα οὐκ ἔστιν  
 79 ὄντα, συμφανές· εἰ γὰρ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα,  
 πάντα τὰ φρονούμενα ἔστιν, καὶ ὅπη ἂν τις αὐτὰ  
 φρονήσῃ. ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀπεμφαίνον· [εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ,  
 φαῦλον.] οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν φρονῇ τις ἀνθρωπον ἰπτά-  
 μενον ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα, εὐθέως

\* Cf. P. H. ii. 64.

existent exists and the existent exists, the non-  
 existent will be identical with the existent so far as  
 regards existing; and for this reason neither of them  
 exists. For it is admitted that the non-existent does  
 not exist; and it has been proved that the existent  
 is identical therewith; therefore it too will not exist.  
 And what is more, if the existent is identical with the  
 non-existent, both of them cannot exist; for if the  
 pair of them both exist, there is no identity, and if  
 there is identity, there is no longer a pair. From  
 which it follows that nothing exists; for if neither  
 the existent exists nor the non-existent nor both,  
 and besides these no other alternative is conceived,  
 nothing exists.

In the next place it must be shown that even if any-  
 77 thing exists it is unknowable and inconceivable by man.  
 If, says Gorgias, the things thought are not existent,  
 the existent is not thought.\* And this is logical; for  
 just as, if it is a property of the things thought to be  
 white it would be a property of white things to be  
 thought—so, if it is a property of things thought not  
 to be existent, it will necessarily be a property of  
 things existent not to be thought. Consequently, 78  
 this is a sound and consistent syllogism—"If the  
 things thought are not existent, the existent is not  
 thought." But the things thought (for we must  
 take them first) are not existent, as we shall establish;  
 therefore the existent is not thought. And, in fact,  
 that the things thought are not existent is plain;  
 for if the things thought are existent, all the things  
 79 thought exist, and in the way, too, in which one has  
 thought them. But this is contrary to sense. For  
 if someone thinks of a man flying or of a chariot run-  
 ning over the sea, it does not follow at once that a



ἄνθρωπος ἵπταται ἢ ἄρματα ἐν πελάγει τρέχει.  
 80 ὥστε οὐ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα. πρὸς τοῦτοις  
 εἰ τὰ φρονούμενά ἐστιν ὄντα, τὰ μὴ ὄντα οὐ  
 φρονηθήσεται. τοῖς γὰρ ἐναντίοις τὰ ἐναντία συμ-  
 βέβηκεν, ἐναντίον δὲ ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ μὴ ὄν· καὶ  
 διὰ τοῦτο πάντως εἰ τῷ ὄντι συμβέβηκε τὸ  
 φρονεῖσθαι, τῷ μὴ ὄντι συμβήσεται τὸ μὴ φρονεῖ-  
 σθαι. ἄτοπον δ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ Σκύλλα καὶ  
 Χίμαιρα καὶ πολλὰ τῶν μὴ ὄντων φρονεῖται. οὐκ  
 81 ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται. ὥσπερ τε τὰ ὀρώμενα διὰ  
 τοῦτο ὀρατὰ λέγεται ὅτι ὀρᾶται, καὶ τὰ ἀκουστὰ  
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀκουστὰ ὅτι ἀκούεται, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν  
 ὀρατὰ ἐκβάλλομεν ὅτι οὐκ ἀκούεται, τὰ δὲ ἀκουστὰ  
 παραπέμπομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὀρᾶται (ἐκαστον γὰρ ὑπὸ  
 τῆς ἰδίας αἰσθήσεως ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπ' ἄλλης ὀφείλει  
 κρίνεσθαι), οὕτω καὶ τὰ φρονούμενα καὶ εἰ μὴ  
 βλέποιο τῇ ὄψει μηδὲ ἀκούοιο τῇ ἀκοῇ ἔσται,  
 82 ὅτι πρὸς τοῦ οἰκείου λαμβάνεται κριτηρίου. εἰ  
 οὖν φρονεῖ τις ἐν πελάγει ἄρματα τρέχειν, καὶ εἰ  
 μὴ βλέπει ταῦτα, ὀφείλει πιστεύειν ὅτι ἄρματα  
 ἔστω ἐν πελάγει τρέχοντα. ἄτοπον δὲ τοῦτο· οὐκ  
 ἄρα τὸ ὄν φρονεῖται καὶ καταλαμβάνεται.  
 83 Καὶ εἰ καταλαμβάνοιο δέ, ἀνέξοιστον ἐτέρω.  
 εἰ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ὀρατὰ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκουστὰ καὶ  
 κοινῶς αἰσθητά, ἅπερ ἐκτὸς ὑπόκειται, τούτων τε  
 τὰ μὲν ὀρατὰ ὀράσει καταληπτά ἐστὶ τὰ δὲ  
 ἀκουστὰ ἀκοῇ καὶ οὐκ ἐναλλάξ, πῶς οὖν δύναται  
 84 ταῦτα ἐτέρω μνηνεσθαι; ᾧ γὰρ μνηνόμεν ἔστι

man is flying or a chariot running over the sea. So  
 that the things thought are not existent. Further-  
 80 more, if the things thought are existent, the non-  
 existent things will not be thought. For opposites  
 are properties of opposites, and the non-existent is  
 the opposite of the existent; and because of this, if  
 "to be thought" is a property of the existent, "not  
 to be thought" will most certainly be a property of  
 the non-existent. But this is absurd; for Scylla and  
 Chimaera and many non-existent things are thought.  
 Therefore the existent is not thought. And just 81  
 as the things seen are called visible because of the  
 fact that they are seen, and the audible termed  
 audible because of the fact that they are heard, and  
 we do not reject the visible things because they are  
 not heard, nor dismiss the audible things because they  
 are not seen (for each object ought to be judged by  
 its own special sense and not by another),—so also the  
 things thought will exist, even if they should not be  
 viewed by the sight nor heard by the hearing, because  
 they are perceived by their own proper criterion. If, 82  
 then, a man thinks that a chariot is running over the  
 sea, even if he does not behold it he ought to believe  
 that there exists a chariot running over the sea. But  
 this is absurd; therefore the existent is not thought  
 and apprehended.

And even if it should be apprehended, it is incom-  
 83 municable to another person. For if the existent  
 things are objects, externally existing, of vision  
 and of hearing and of the senses in general, and of  
 these the visible things are apprehensible by sight  
 and the audible by hearing, and not conversely,—how,  
 in this case, can these things be indicated to another  
 person? For the means by which we indicate is 84

λόγος, λόγος δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ὄντα μηνύομεν τοῖς πέλας ἀλλὰ λόγον, ὃς ἕτερός ἐστι τῶν ὑποκειμένων. καθάπερ οὖν τὸ ὄρατὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀκουστὸν καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ ὑπόκειται τὸ ὄν ἐκτός, οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο  
85 λόγος ὁ ἡμέτερος· μὴ ὡν δὲ λόγος οὐκ ἂν δηλωθεῖη ἐτέρῳ.

Ὁ γε μὴν λόγος, φησὶν, ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων συνίσταται, τοῦ-  
ἐστι τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ χυλοῦ ἐγκυρή-  
σεως ἐγγίνεται ἡμῖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτης τῆς ποιότητος ἐκφερόμενος λόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ χρώματος ὑποπτώσεως ὁ κατὰ τοῦ χρώματος. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐχ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐκτός παραστατικός ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ  
86 τὸ ἐκτός τοῦ λόγου μηνυτικὸν γίνεται. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐνεστι λέγειν ὅτι ὄν τρόπον τὰ ὄρατὰ καὶ ἀκουστὰ ὑπόκειται, οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὥστε δύνασθαι ἐξ ὑποκειμένου αὐτοῦ καὶ ὄντος τὰ ὑποκείμενα καὶ ὄντα μηνύεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὑπόκειται, φησὶν, ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῶν λοιπῶν ὑποκειμένων, καὶ πλείστῳ διενήροχε τὰ ὄρατὰ σώματα τῶν λόγων· δι' ἐτέρου γὰρ ὄργάνου ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ὄρατὸν καὶ δι' ἄλλου ὁ λόγος. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα τὴν ἀλλήλων διαδηλοῖ φύσιν.

87 Τοιούτων οὖν παρὰ τῷ Γοργία ἠπορημένων οἴχεται ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον· τοῦ γὰρ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γνωρίζεσθαι δυναμένου μήτε ἄλλῳ παρασταθῆναι πεφυκόςτος οὐδὲν ἂν εἶη κριτήριον.

Οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ ἦσαν, ὡς προείπον, οἱ καὶ τοὺς

<sup>a</sup> See § 48.

speech, and speech is not the real and existent things; therefore we do not indicate to our neighbours the existent things but speech, which is other than the existing realities. Thus, just as the visible thing will not become audible, and *vice versa*, so too, since the existent subsists externally, it will not become our speech; and not being speech it will not  
85 be made clear to another person.

Speech moreover, as he asserts, is formed from the impressions caused by external objects, that is to say the sensibles; for from the occurrence of flavour there is produced in us the speech uttered respecting this quality, and by the incidence of colour speech respecting colour. And if this be so, it is not speech that serves to reveal the external object, but the external object that proves to be explanatory of speech. Moreover, it is not possible to assert that  
86 speech subsists in the same fashion as the visible and audible things, so that the subsisting and existent things can be indicated by it as by a thing subsisting and existent. For, says he, even if speech subsists, yet it differs from the rest of subsisting things, and the visible bodies differ very greatly from spoken words; for the visible object is perceptible by one sense-organ and speech by another. Therefore speech does not manifest most of the subsisting things, just as they themselves do not make plain one another's nature.

Such, then, being the difficulties raised by Gorgias, 87 if we go by them the criterion of truth is swept away; for there can be no criterion of that which neither exists nor can be known nor is naturally capable of being explained to another person.

As I said above,<sup>a</sup> there have been not a few who

- περὶ Μητρόδωρον καὶ Ἀνάξαρχον ἔτι δὲ Μόνιμον  
 88 φήσαντες ἀνηρηκῆναι τὸ κριτήριον, ἀλλὰ Μητρό-  
 δωρον μὲν ὅτι εἶπεν “ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὐδ’ αὐτὸ  
 τοῦτο ἴσμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν ἴσμεν,” Ἀνάξαρχον δὲ καὶ  
 Μόνιμον ὅτι σκηνογραφία ἀπέικασαν τὰ ὄντα,  
 τοῖς τε κατὰ ὕπνου ἢ μαῖαν προσπίπτουσι ταῦτα  
 ὁμοιωῶσθαι ὑπέλαβον.
- 89 Ἄλλ’ οὗτοι μὲν τοιαύτης μετεσχῆκασι στάσεως,  
 πρῶτοι δ’ ἔδοξαν οἱ ἀπὸ Θάλεω φυσικοὶ τὴν περὶ  
 κριτηρίου σκέψιν εἰσηγήσασθαι. καταγνόντες γὰρ  
 τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν πολλοῖς ὡς ἀπίστου, τὸν λόγον  
 κριτὴν τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ἀληθείας ἐπέστησαν ἀφ’  
 οὗ ὁρμώμενοι περὶ τε ἀρχῶν καὶ στοιχείων καὶ  
 τῶν ἄλλων διετάσσοντο, ὡν ἡ κατάληψις διὰ τῆς  
 90 τούτου δυνάμεως περιγίνεται. ἔνθεν ὁ μὲν φυσι-  
 κώτατος Ἀναξαγόρας ὡς ἀσθενεῖς διαβάλλων τὰς  
 αἰσθήσεις “ ὑπὸ ἀφαιρότητος αὐτῶν ” φησὶν “ οὐ  
 δυνατοὶ ἔσμεν κρίνειν τὰληθές.” τίθησὶ τε πίστιν  
 αὐτῶν τῆς ἀπιστίας τὴν παρὰ μικρὸν τῶν χρωμάτων  
 ἐξαλλαγὴν· εἰ γὰρ δύο λάβοιμεν χρώματα, μέλαν  
 καὶ λευκόν, εἶτα ἐκ θατέρου εἰς θάτερον κατὰ  
 σταγόνα παρεκχέοιμεν, οὐ δυνήσεται ἡ ὄψις δια-  
 κρίνειν τὰς παρὰ μικρὸν μεταβολάς, καίπερ πρὸς  
 91 τὴν φύσιν ὑποκειμένης. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ δυνάμει  
 καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης εὐρίσκεται κατακεχρημένος ἐν  
 τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ οἴνου δόσεως, ἐνθα<sup>1</sup> ἐπὶ  
 ὄχρας καὶ μέλανος ἴσταται· “ μυχέντων γὰρ τού-  
 των ” φησὶν “ ἀδυνατεῖ διαγινώσκειν ἢ αἰσθησις  
 εἶτε ἐν ἔστι καὶ ἀπλοῦν χρῶμα τὸ ὑποκείμενον  
 εἶτε καὶ μή.”
- Ἔστω δὲ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας κωϊῶς τὸν λόγον ἔφη

<sup>1</sup> ἐνθα cj. Bekk.: ἐνθεν mss.

have asserted that Metrodorus and Anaxarchus, and also Monimus, abolished the criterion—Metrodorus 88 because he said “ We know nothing, nor do we even know the very fact that we know nothing ”; and Anaxarchus and Monimus because they likened existing things to a scene-painting and supposed them to resemble the impressions experienced in sleep or madness.

Such, then, was the view in which all these men 89 shared; but it is held that the Physicists, from Thales down, were the first to introduce the inquiry regarding the criterion. For when they had condemned sensation as being in many cases untrustworthy, they set up reason as the judge of the truth in existing things, and starting out from this they arranged their doctrines of principles and elements and the rest, the apprehension of which is gained by means of the faculty of reason. Hence the greatest of the Physi- 90 cists, Anaxagoras, in disparaging the senses on the ground of their weakness, says, “Owing to their infirmity we are unable to judge what is true.” And as an assurance of their lack of sureness he alleges the gradual change in colours: for if we were to take two colours, black and white, and pour some of the one into the other drop by drop, our sense of sight will be unable to distinguish the gradual alterations although they subsist as actual facts. Asclepiades, 91 too, is found using virtually the same argument in the First Book of his *Concerning Wine-giving*, where he is dealing with the pale and the dark—“ For when these,” he says, “ are mixed, the sense is unable to discern whether what subsists is a single and simple colour or not.”

Anaxagoras, accordingly, declared that reason in

92 κριτήριον εἶναι· οἱ δὲ Πυθαγορικοὶ τὸν λόγον μὲν φασιν, οὐ κοινῶς δέ, τὸν δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων περιγινόμενον, καθάπερ ἔλεγε καὶ ὁ Φιλόλαος, θεωρητικόν τε ὄντα τῆς τῶν ὄλων φύσεως ἔχειν τινὰ συγγένειαν πρὸς ταύτην, ἐπεὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὁμοίον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν·

γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαίαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διόν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δέ γε νεϊκέϊ λυγρῶ.

93 καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος, ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἢ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τῶν ὄλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου. ἦν δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὄλων ὑποστάσεως ἀριθμὸς· διὸ καὶ ὁ κριτῆς τῶν πάντων λόγος οὐκ ἀμέτοχος ὦν τῆς τούτου δυνάμεως καλοῖτο ἂν ἀριθμὸς.

94 καὶ τοῦτο ἐμφαίνοντες οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ ποτὲ μὲν εἰώθασι λέγειν τὸ

ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

ὅτε δὲ τὸν φυσικώτατον ὁμνῆσαι ὄρκον οὕτωςί,

οὐ μὰ τὸν ἀμέτερα κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν, πηγῇν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν,

τὸν μὲν παραδόντα λέγοντες Πυθαγόραν (τοῦτον γὰρ ἔθεοποιούον), τετρακτύν δὲ ἀριθμόν τινα, ὃς ἐκ τεσσάρων τῶν πρώτων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος τὸν τελειότατον ἀπήρτιζεν, ὥσπερ τὸν δέκα· ἐν γὰρ  
95 καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται. ἔστι τε οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρώτη τετρακτύς, πηγῇ δὲ ἀενάου φύσεως λέλεκται παρόσον κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ

general is the criterion. But the Pythagoreans de- 92  
clare that it is not reason in general but the reason  
which is attained from the sciences; even as Philolaus  
said that "It, being conversant with the nature of  
all things, possesses a certain kinship thereto, since  
it is the nature of like to be apprehended by like":

Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water,  
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,  
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.

And as Poseidonius says in his exposition of Plato's 93  
*Timaeus*, "Just as light is apprehended by the luci-  
form sense of sight, and sound by the aeriform sense  
of hearing, so also the nature of all things ought to be  
apprehended by its kindred reason." But the prin-  
ciple of the structure of all things is number; where-  
fore also the reason that is judge of all things may  
be called "number," seeing that it is not devoid of  
the potency thereof. And by way of indicating this 94  
the Pythagoreans are wont at one time to declare  
that "All things are like unto number," and at  
another time to swear the most natural of oaths in  
this form:

Nay, by the man I swear who bequeathed to our head the  
Tetraktys,  
Fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.

By "the man who bequeathed" they mean Pythagoras  
(for him they deified); and by "the Tetraktys" a cer-  
tain number which, being composed of the four primary  
numbers, makes up the most perfect number, namely  
the Ten; for one plus two plus three plus four amount  
to ten. And this number is the first Tetraktys, and 95  
it is termed the "fount of Nature ever-enduring" in

σύμπας κόσμος κατὰ ἄρμονίαν διοικεῖται, ἣ δὲ ἄρμονία σύστημά ἐστι τριῶν συμφωνιῶν, τῆς τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ τῆς διὰ πέντε καὶ τῆς διὰ πασῶν, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν συμφωνιῶν αἱ ἀναλογίαι ἐν τοῖς προειρημένοις τέτταρσιν ἀριθμοῖς εὐρίσκονται, ἐν τε τῷ ἐνὶ κᾶν τῷ δύο κᾶν τῷ τρία κᾶν τῷ  
 96 τέσσαρα. ἦν γὰρ ἡ μὲν διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνία ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ λόγῳ κειμένη, ἣ δὲ διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἣ δὲ διὰ πασῶν ἐν διπλασίονι. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς τοῦ τρία ἐπιτρίτος ὢν, ἐπειπερ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους αὐτοῦ συνίσταται, περιέσχηκε τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων συμ-  
 97 φωνίαν· ὁ δὲ τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος ὢν, ἣ ἐκεῖνόν τε περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἡμισυ αὐτοῦ, ἐμφαίνει τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν· ὁ δὲ τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ δύο τῆς μονάδος διπλασίον καθεστῶς περιληπτι-  
 98 κός ἐστι τῆς διὰ πασῶν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τετρακτὺς ἀναλογίαν τῶν λεχθειῶν συμφωνιῶν ὑποβάλλει, αἱ δὲ συμφωνίαι τῆς τελείου ἄρμονίας εἰσὶ συμπληρωτικάι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τέλειον ἄρμονίαν πάντα διοικεῖται, τοῦδε χάριν πηγῆν ἀενάου φύσεως ριζώματ' ἔχουσαν εἰρήκασιν αὐτήν.  
 99 Καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῶν τεσσάρων τούτων ἀριθμῶν τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον νοεῖται, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα. στιγμῆς γὰρ ρυείσης γραμμῆν φαντασιούμεθα, ἥτις ἐστὶ μῆκος ἀπλατές, γραμμῆς δὲ ρυείσης πλάτος ἐποιήσαμεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπιφάνειά τις ἀβαθῆς, ἐπιφανείας δὲ ρυείσης  
 100 στερεὸν ἐγένετο σῶμα. ἀλλ' ἦν γε ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς στιγμῆς ἡ μονὰς ἀδιαίρετος οὐσα, καθὼς καὶ ἡ

so far as the whole Universe, according to them, is arranged according to harmony, and harmony is a system composed of three symphonies—that of the “By-Fours,” and that of the “By-Fives,” and that of the “By-Alls”<sup>a</sup>; and the proportions of these three symphonies are found in the four numbers just mentioned—in the one and in the two and in the three and in the four. For the “By-Fours” symphony consists 96 in the “epitrite” (4 : 3) ratio, the “By-Fives” in the ratio 3 : 2, and the “By-Alls” in the ratio 2 : 1. Hence the number four being “epitrite” in relation to three (since it is composed of three plus a third part of three) comprises the symphony “By-Fours”; and 97 the number three, being one and a half times two (in that it comprises both the two and the half of the two), discloses the “By-Fives” symphony; and the four which is double of two, and the two double of one, are fitted to comprise the “By-Alls.” Seeing, 98 then, that the Tetraktys supplies the proportion of the symphonies mentioned, and the symphonies serve to make up the perfect harmony, and according to the perfect harmony all things are arranged, on this account they have described it as “the fount containing the roots of Nature ever-enduring.”

Again, they argue that it is according to the ratios of 99 these four numbers that both body and the incorporeal, from which come all things, are conceived—for it is by the flow of a point that we form a notion of a line, which is length without breadth, and by the flow of a line we construct breadth, which is surface without depth, and by the flow of surface solid body is produced. But over the point stands the monad which 100

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. iii. 155, where a similar account is given of the “harmonic ratios” of the Pythagorean musical system.

στιγμή, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς ὁ δύο ἀριθμός <, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ὁ τρία><sup>1</sup>. ποθέν γάρ <ποι><sup>2</sup> πάρεστιν ἢ γραμμῆ, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημείον καὶ πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ ἄλλο σημείον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος ὁ τέσσαρα· ἐὰν γὰρ τρισὶ σημείοις τέταρτον ἐπαιωρήσωμεν σημείον, πυραμὶς γίνεται, ὅπερ δὴ πρῶτόν ἐστι στερεοῦ σώματος σχῆμα. κατὰ λόγον οὖν ἢ τετρακτύς πηγὴ τῆς τῶν ὄλων φύσεως ἐστίν.

- 101 Καὶ ἄλλως, πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἀνθρώπων, φασίν, ἤτοι σώμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον· ἐάν τε δὲ σῶμα ἢ ἐάν τε καὶ ἀσώματον, οὐ χωρὶς τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται, τὸ μὲν σῶμα, ἐπεὶ τριχῆ διαστατὸν καθεστῶς τὸν τρία ἀριθμὸν  
 102 ὑπαγορεύει. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς πλοῖα καὶ ἀλύσεις καὶ πυργίσκοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἠνωμένων, ἅπερ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως συνέχεται, ὡς φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων ὡς χοροὶ καὶ στρατιαὶ καὶ ποιῖμαι. ἄλλ' ἐάν τε ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐάν τε ἐξ ἠνωμένων ἐάν τε ἐκ διεστώτων, ἀριθμοὺς ἔχει παρόσον ἐκ πλειόνων  
 103 συνέστηκεν. ἔτι τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀπλαῖς κείται ποιότησι τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀθρόαις, καθάπερ τὸ μῆλον· καὶ γὰρ ποιὸν<sup>3</sup> ἔχει χρῶμα πρὸς ὄρασιν καὶ χυλὸν πρὸς γεύσιν καὶ ὄσμην πρὸς ὄσφρησιν καὶ λειότητα πρὸς ἀφήν· ἃ δὴ τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐστὶ φύσεως.  
 104 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ λόγος,

<sup>1</sup> <ἐπὶ . . . τρία> cj. Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> <ποι> addo: <που> cj. Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> ποιὸν NE: ποικίλον Bekk.

is indivisible, as is also the point, and over the line the number two; <and over the surface stands the number three> (for the line has come from somewhere to somewhere), that is to say <the movement> from one point to another, and from this again to a third; and over the solid body stands the number four; for if upon the top of three points we place a fourth, there is formed a pyramid, which is in fact the first form of a solid body. Thus it is reasonable to hold that the Tetraktys is the fount of universal Nature.

Again, everything apprehended by man is, they 101 say, either body or incorporeal; but whether it be body or whether it be incorporeal, it is not apprehended apart from the conception of numbers, since, in the case of body, as it has three dimensions it involves the number three. Moreover, of bodies some are 102 composed of things joined together, like ships and cables and turrets, others of things unified, which are held together by a single mode of connexion, like plants and animals, others of separate units, like choruses and armies and herds.<sup>a</sup> But whether they consist of things joined or of things unified or of things separate, they contain numbers in so far as they are composed of a plurality of things. And further, some bodies are substances with single 103 qualities, others with numerous qualities, as is the apple; for it possesses a certain quality of colour to the sight and of flavour to the taste and of odour to the smell and of smoothness to the touch; and these belong to the nature of numbers.

The same argument applies to the case of incor- 104

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Adv. Phys.* i. 78 ff.

εἶγε καὶ χρόνος ἀσώματος τῷ ἀριθμῷ λαμβάνεται, ὡς ἔστι συμφανὲς ἀπὸ ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ ὥρων. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμαὴ καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπιφάνεια, καὶ τὰλλα περὶ ὧν καὶ μικρῷ πρόσθεν διελέχθημεν, συνάγοντες καὶ τὰς τούτων νοήσεις εἰς ἀριθμούς.

- 105 Συνάδειν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις φασὶ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν βίον, ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας πράγματα. ὁ τε γὰρ βίος ἕκαστον κρίνει κριτηρίοις ἅπερ ἔστιν ἀριθμοῦ μέτρα. εἴαν γοῦν ἀνέλωμεν τὸν ἀριθμόν, ἀναιρεθήσεται μὲν πῆχυς ἐκ δυοῖν ἡμιπηχείων καὶ παλαιστῶν ἕξ καὶ δακτύλων εικοσιτεσσάρων συγκείμενος, ἀναιρεθήσεται δὲ μέδιμος καὶ τάλαντον καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν κριτηρίων ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα ἐκ πλείονων συνεστῶτα εὐθὺς ἀριθμοῦ ἔστιν εἶδη. ὅθεν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τούτῳ συνέχεται, δάνεια μαρτυρίαι ψῆφοι συγγραφαὶ χρόνοι περίοδοι. καὶ καθόλου τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἔστιν εὐρεῖν τι κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀμοιροῦν τούτου.

- Πᾶσά γε μὴν τέχνη οὐ χωρὶς ἀναλογίας συνέστη, ἀναλογία δ' ἐν ἀριθμῷ κείται· πᾶσα ἄρα τέχνη δι' ἀριθμοῦ συνέστη. Ῥόδιοι γοῦν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπύθοντο Χάρητος τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος πόσον δαπανηθήσεται χρήμα πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ κολοσσοῦ. ὀρίσαντος δὲ αὐτοῦ τι, πάλιν ἐπηρώτων πόσον δέ, εἰ θέλοιεν διπλασίονα κατὰ μέγεθος αὐτὸν κατασκευάσαι. τοῦ δὲ τὸ διπλασίον αἰτήσαντος οἱ μὲν ἔδοσαν, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰ προκεντήματα δαπανήσας τὸ δοθὲν ἑαυτὸν ἀνεῖλεν. θανόντος δὲ αὐτοῦ συνείδον οἱ τεχνίται ὡς οὐ διπλασίον ἐχρῆν ἀλλ' ὀκταπλασίον αἰτῆσαι· οὐ γὰρ μῆκος μόνον

\* For this use of *βίος* cf. *P.H.* ii. 15.

poreals also, seeing that time, which is incorporeal, is perceived by number, as is plain from the years and months and days and hours. So likewise are the point and line and surface and the rest of the things we were discussing a moment ago, when we traced back the notions of them to numbers.

The practice of ordinary life<sup>a</sup> too, they assert, is 105 in unison with the views thus stated, as is also the practice of the arts. For ordinary life judges each thing by criteria, and these are numerical standards. And certainly, if we abolish number, the cubit will be abolished, which consists of two half-cubits and six palms and twenty-four fingers, and the bushel will be abolished and the talent and the rest of the criteria; for all these, as composed of a plurality of elements, are at once species of number. Hence all the other 106 things, too, are bound up with number—loans, evidences, votes, contracts, times, periods. And in general, it is impossible to find anything in ordinary experience that does not participate in number.

And assuredly there is no art or craft that has been built up without proportion, and proportion is based on number; so that every art is built up by means of number. Thus the Rhodians, it is said, asked Chares 107 the architect how much money it would cost to construct the Colossus. And when he had named a figure, they asked again how much it would be if they wished to construct it twice that size. And when he asked double the sum, they gave it to him; but he, when he had spent the sum given on the first stages of the work and the preliminary expenses, slew himself. And when he was dead the craftsmen 108 became aware that he ought to have asked not double but eight times the sum, for he was bound to enlarge

ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν διάστασιν ὄφειλε μεγεθοποιεῖν  
 τοῦ δημιουργήματος. ὥστε ἀναλογία τις ἔστιν ἐν  
 πλαστικῇ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν ζωγραφίᾳ, δι' ἣν  
 109 ὁμοιότης<sup>1</sup> κατ' ἀπαρραλλαξίαν κατορθοῦται. κοινῶ  
 τε λόγῳ πᾶσα τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων,  
 τὸ δὲ σύστημα ἀριθμός. τοῖνυν ὑγιὲς τὸ

ἀριθμῶ δέ τε πάντ' ἐπέοικεν,

τουτέστι τῶ κρίνοντι λόγῳ καὶ ὁμοιογενεῖ τοῖς τὰ  
 πάντα συνιστακόσιν ἀριθμοῖς.

110 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ Πυθαγορικοί· Ξενοφάνης δὲ κατὰ  
 τοὺς ὡς ἐτέρως αὐτὸν ἐξηγουμένους, ὅταν λέγῃ

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὐ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις  
 ἔσται

εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·  
 εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν,  
 αὐτὸς ὁμῶς οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται,

φαίνεται μὴ πᾶσαν κατάληψιν ἀναιρεῖν ἀλλὰ τὴν  
 ἐπιστημονικὴν τε καὶ ἀδιάπτωτον, ἀπολείπειν δὲ  
 τὴν δοξαστὴν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμφαίνει τὸ “δόκος δ'  
 ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.” ὥστε κριτήριον γίνεσθαι  
 κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν δοξαστὸν λόγον, τουτέστι τὸν  
 τοῦ εἰκότος ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν τοῦ παγίου ἐχόμενον.

111 Ὁ δὲ γνώριμος αὐτοῦ Παρμενίδης τοῦ μὲν  
 δοξαστοῦ λόγου κατέγνω, φημί δὲ τοῦ ἀσθενεῖς  
 ἔχοντος ὑπολήψεις, τὸν δ' ἐπιστημονικόν, τουτέστι  
 τὸν ἀδιάπτωτον, ὑπέβητο κριτήριον, ἀποστὰς καὶ  
 τῆς τῶν αἰσθήσεων πίστews. ἐναρχόμενος γοῦν  
 τοῦ περὶ φύσεως γράφει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

<sup>1</sup> ὁμοιότης LE (-τητος N): ὁμοιότητα Bekk.

not only the length but also every other dimension  
 of the structure. So that there exists in the plastic  
 art, and likewise in painting, a certain proportion  
 whereby unvarying resemblance is preserved. And, 109  
 to speak generally, every art is a system composed  
 of apprehensions, and system is number. Hence it  
 is a sound saying that “all things are like unto  
 number;”—that is, like unto the reason that judges  
 and is akin to the numbers which compose all things.

Such is the doctrine of the Pythagoreans. But 110  
 Xenophanes, according to those who interpret him  
 differently,<sup>a</sup> when he says—

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all  
 things,

No man has seen what is clear nor ever will any man  
 know it.

Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really  
 existent,

He himself knoweth it not; for all is swayed by opining,—

does not appear to be abolishing every apprehension,  
 but only that which is cognitive<sup>b</sup> and inerrant, while  
 admitting that which is opinionative; for this is what  
 the sentence “all is swayed by opining” indicates.  
 So that according to him the opinionative reason—  
 that is to say, the reason which holds to the probable  
 but not to the certain—is the criterion.

But his friend Parmenides rejected the opinionative 111  
 reason—I mean that which has weak conceptions,—  
 and assumed as criterion the cognitive—that is, the  
 inerrant—reason, as he also gave up belief in the  
 senses. Thus in the opening of his work *On Nature*  
 he writes in this fashion:

<sup>a</sup> *i.e.* who interpret X. otherwise than Sotion, as quoted in  
 § 49 *supra*.

<sup>b</sup> *i.e.* affording absolute knowledge of the truth.



ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ' ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἰκάνοι,  
πέμπων, ἐπεὶ μ' ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον  
ἄγουσαι

δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντα σαφῆ φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα.  
τῇ φερόμην· τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι  
ἄρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ' ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.  
ἄξων δ' ἐν χροίῃσιν ἴει σύριγγος αὐτὴν  
αἰθόμενος· δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπέιγετο δινωτοῖσιν  
κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν, ὅτε σπερχοῖατο πέμπειν  
Ἑλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα νυκτός,  
εἰς φάος, ὡσάμεναι κρατῶν ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας,  
ἔνθα πύλαι νυκτός τε καὶ ἡματός εἰσι κελεύθων,  
καὶ σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάϊνος οὐδός·  
αὐταὶ δ' αἰθέριαι πληνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις.  
τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολυπίουος ἔχει κληΐδας ἀμοιβούσας.  
τὴν δὴ παρφέαμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν  
πέισαν ἐπιφραδέως ὡς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὄχηα  
ἀπτερέως ὥσειε πυλέων ἄπο. ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων  
χάσμ' ἀχανές ποίησαν ἀναπτάμεναι, πολυχάλ-  
κους

ἄξονας ἐν σύριγγιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι,  
γόμεφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε· τῇ<sup>3</sup> ῥα δι' αὐτῶν  
ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ' ἀμαξιτὸν ἄρμα καὶ ἵππους.  
καὶ με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρὶ  
δεξιτερῆν ἔλεν, ὧδε δ' ἔπος φάτο καὶ με  
προσηΐδα.

ὦ κοῦρ' ἀθανάτησι συνήγορος ἠνιόχοισιν  
ἵπποις θ' αἶ σε φέρουσιν, ἰκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ

<sup>1</sup> πάντα σαφῆ Brandis: πάντα τῇ EL, Bekk.: πάντ' ἄστη N.

<sup>2</sup> ἀρηρότε· τῇ Bergk: ἀρηρότα· τῇ MSS.: ἀρηρότας. ἡ Bekk.

Far as the soul can aspire have the steeds that hurry me  
forward  
Brought me, seeing that now on the far-famed road they  
have set me,  
Road of the Daemon which all-whither leadeth the truth-  
witting mortal.  
By that road was I drawn; for the fam'd steeds drew me  
by that road  
Pulling the chariot amain; and damsels guided my going.  
Glowing within its nave the axle sang like a reed-pipe—  
Furnish'd on either side with a pair of wheels well-rounded—  
Whenas the Sun-born damsels in haste proceeded to bring  
me  
Into the sun-light, leaving behind them the chambers of  
Darkness,  
When with their hands they had stript from their heads  
the mantles that veiled them.  
There are the gates dividing the ways of Day-time and  
Night-time,  
Gates which are holden around by a lintel and threshold  
of marble;  
High in the air they stand and with doors immense are  
they furnish'd;  
Justice, dealer of dooms, doth keep the keys which unlock  
them.  
Her the damsels addressing with soft and flattering speeches  
Artfully won her consent to push the bolted cross-bar  
Back from the gates; and whenas the gates swung wide  
in the door-way,  
Vast was the chasm they caused as they set the hinges  
revolving,  
Each in its socket on either side,—of bronze were the hinges,  
Fitted with bolts and with nails of bronze. So then through  
the gate-way  
Straight did the damsels drive their horses and car on the  
high-road,  
Graciously then did the goddess receive me, taking my right  
hand  
Clasp'd in her own, and this was the speech wherewith she  
address'd me:  
" Youth, who hast for thy fellows immortal chariot-drivers,  
Now thou hast come to our halls, both thou and the horses  
that speed thee,

χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐτι σε μοῖρα κακῇ προύπεμπε  
 νέεσθαι  
 τήνδ' ὁδόν (ἢ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου  
 ἐστίν)  
 ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα  
 πυθέσθαι,  
 ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμῆς ἦτορ  
 ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς.  
 ἀλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἶργε νόημα,  
 μηδέ σ' ἔθος πολὺπειρον ὁδὸν κάτα τήνδε  
 βιάσθω  
 νωμῶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆεσαν ἀκουήν  
 καὶ γλώσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολὺπειρον<sup>1</sup> ἔλεγχον  
 ἐξ ἑμέθεν ῥηθέντα. μόνος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο  
 λείπεται.

- 112 Ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἵππους μὲν φησὶν  
 αὐτὸν φέρειν τὰς ἀλόγους τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρμάς τε καὶ  
 ὀρέξεις, κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολὺφήμον ὁδὸν τοῦ δαίμονος  
 πορεύεσθαι τὴν κατὰ τὸν φιλόσοφον λόγον θεωρίαν,  
 ὃς λόγος προπόμπου δαίμονος τρόπον ἐπὶ τὴν  
 ἀπάντων ὁδηγεῖ γνώσιν. κούρας δ' αὐτοῦ προάγειν  
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὧν τὰς μὲν ἀκοῆς αἰνίττεται ἐν τῷ  
 λέγειν "δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπέεγγο δινωτοῖσι κύκλοις,"  
 τουτέστι τοῖς τῶν ὠτων, τὴν φωνὴν δι' ὧν κατα-  
 113 δέχονται, τὰς δὲ ὀράσεις Ἡλιάδας κούρας κέκληκε,  
 δῶματα μὲν νυκτὸς ἀπολιπούσας, ἐς φάος δὲ ὠσα-  
 μένας διὰ τὸ μὴ χωρὶς φωτὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν χρῆσιν  
 αὐτῶν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν πολὺποινον ἐλθεῖν δίκην καὶ  
 ἔχουσιν κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς, τὴν διάνοιαν ἀσφαλεῖς  
 114 ἔχουσιν τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων καταλήψεις. ἦτις

<sup>1</sup> πολὺπειρον MSS.: πολὺδην Bekk.

Hail! since the doom was no evil doom that prompted thy  
 journey  
 Hither (for far does it lie from the ways that are trodden  
 of mortals),  
 Nay, but justice and right. Thy task is now to discover  
 Truth's unshakable heart, which fitly induces persuasion,  
 Mortals' opinions, to boot, which are empty of true con-  
 viction.  
 Nay, but I bid thee restrain thy mind from this path of  
 inquiry,  
 Nor let habit oft-tried along this pathway impel thee,  
 Eye unobservant to ply and tongue and echoing ear-drum,  
 But use reason to judge the oft-tried proof which refutes  
 them  
 Utter'd by me. For the heart when alone still misseth the  
 pathway."

In these verses Parmenides means that the steeds 112  
 which take him along are the irrational impulses and  
 appetites of the soul, and that "the far-famed road  
 of the Daemon" they travel is that of investigation  
 according to philosophical reason, which reason, like  
 a Divine conductor, points the way to the knowledge  
 of all things. And the damsels that lead him on are  
 the senses, the reports of which he indicates in  
 riddling wise by saying "It was furnish'd with a pair  
 of well-rounded wheels," that is with those of the  
 ears, by means of which they receive sound; and the 113  
 acts of vision he calls "Sun-born damsels," which  
 "leave the chambers of Darkness" and "thrust into  
 the light" because it is impossible to make use of  
 them without light. And the approach to "Justice,  
 dealer of dooms," which holds "the keys which unlock  
 them," is that to intelligence which holds safe the  
 apprehensions of things. And she, after welcoming 114

αὐτὸν ὑποδεξαμένη ἐπαγγέλλεται δύο ταῦτα διδά-  
 ξειν, ἡμὲν ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμές ἦτορ, ὅπερ  
 ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀμετακίνητον βῆμα, ἕτερον  
 δὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἐν πίστις ἀληθῆς,  
 τουτέστι τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον πᾶν, ὅτι ἦν ἀβέβαιοι.  
 καὶ ἐπὶ τέλει προσδιασαφεῖ τὸ μὴ δεῖν ταῖς  
 αἰσθήσεσι προσέχειν ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ· μὴ γάρ σε,  
 φησὶν, ἔθος πολῦπειρον ὁδὸν κατά τήνδε βιάσθω  
 νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον ὄμμα καὶ ἠχῆσσαν ἀκουήν καὶ  
 γλῶσσαν, κρῖναι δὲ λόγῳ πολῦπειρον ἐλεγχον ἐξ  
 ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα.

Ἄλλ' οὗτος μὲν καὶ αὐτός, ὡς ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων  
 συμφανές, τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον κανόνα τῆς ἐν  
 τοῖς οὐσιν ἀληθείας ἀναγορεύσας ἀπέστη τῆς τῶν  
 115 αἰσθήσεων ἐπιστάσεως· Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Ἄκρα-  
 γαντίνος κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀπλούστερον δοκοῦντας  
 αὐτὸν ἐξηγεῖσθαι ἐξ κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας παρα-  
 δίδωσιν. δύο γὰρ δραστηρίους τῶν ὄλων ἀρχὰς  
 ὑποθέμενος, φιλίαν καὶ νείκος, ἅμα τε τῶν τεσσά-  
 ρων μνησθεὶς ὡς ὕλικῶν, γῆς τε καὶ ὕδατος καὶ  
 ἀέρος καὶ πυρός, πάσας ταύτας ἔφη κριτήρια  
 116 τυγχάνειν. παλαιὰ γάρ τις, ὡς προεῖπον, ἄνωθεν  
 παρὰ τοῖς φυσικοῖς κυλίστα δόξα περὶ τοῦ τὰ  
 ὅμοια τῶν ὁμοίων εἶναι γνωριστικά· καὶ ταύτης  
 ἔδοξε μὲν καὶ Δημόκριτος κεκομικέναι τὰς παρα-  
 μυθίας, ἔδοξε δὲ καὶ Πλάτων αὐτῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ  
 117 παρεψαυκέναι. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος ἐπὶ τε τῶν  
 ἐμψύχων καὶ ἀψύχων ἴσθησι τὸν λόγον. καὶ γὰρ  
 ζῶα, φησὶν, ὁμογενεῖσι ζώοις συναγελάζεται, ὡς  
 περισσότεραὶ περιστεραῖς καὶ γέρανοι γεράνοις, καὶ  
 ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀλόγων· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν

him, promises to teach him two things—"Truth's  
 unshakable heart which fitly induces persuasion,"  
 which is the immovable seat of knowledge, and  
 secondly "mortal men's opinions which are empty of  
 true conviction," that is to say everything which  
 consists in opinion because all such things are unsure.  
 And at the end he again makes it clear that one  
 must not pay attention to the senses but to the  
 reason; for he says "Let not habit oft-tried along  
 this pathway impel thee, Eye unobservant to ply and  
 tongue and echoing ear-drum, But use reason to  
 judge the oft-tried proof which refutes them Utter'd  
 by me."

This man himself, then, as is plain from his state-  
 ments, proclaimed the cognitive reason to be the  
 standard of truth in things existing and gave up  
 paying attention to the senses. But Empedocles of 115  
 Acragas, according to those who seem to interpret  
 him most simply, offers us six criteria of truth. For  
 having laid down two efficient principles of all things,  
 Love and Strife, and having at the same time  
 designated as material principles the four—earth and  
 water and air and fire,—he declared that all these  
 are criteria. For, as I said before,<sup>a</sup> there is an old 116  
 opinion, dating from far back, which is prevalent  
 among the Physicists to the effect that like things  
 are cognitive of like; Democritus too seems to have  
 brought a confirmation of this opinion, and Plato also  
 seems to have introduced it in his *Timaeus*. But, on 117  
 the one hand, Democritus bases his argument on both  
 animate and inanimate things. "For animals," he  
 says, "flock together with animals of a like species, as  
 doves with doves and cranes with cranes, and so too  
 all other irrational animals." And it is the same with

<sup>a</sup> See § 92.

- ἀψύχων, καθάπερ ὄραν πάρεστω ἐπὶ τε τῶν κοσκινευομένων σπερμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ ταῖς κυματωγαῖς ψηφίδων· ὅπου μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ κοσκίνου δῖνον διακριτικῶς φακοὶ μετὰ φακῶν τάσσονται καὶ κριθαὶ μετὰ κριθῶν καὶ πυροὶ μετὰ 118 πυρῶν, ὅπου δὲ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κύματος κίνησιν αἱ μὲν ἐπιμήκεις ψηφίδες εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον ταῖς ἐπιμήκεσιν ὠθοῦνται, αἱ δὲ περιφερεῖς ταῖς περιφερέσιν, ὡς ἂν συναγωγὸν τι ἐχούσης τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς ἐν τούτοις ὁμοιότητος.
- 119 Ἄλλ' ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος οὕτως, Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ πρὸς παράστασιν τοῦ ἀσώματος εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει τῆς ἀποδείξεως κέχρηται. εἰ γὰρ ἢ μὲν ὄρασις, φησί, φωτὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένη εὐθύς ἐστὶ φωτοειδής, ἢ δὲ ἀκοή ἀέρα πεπληγμένον κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν φωνήν, εὐθύς ἀεροειδής θεωρεῖται, ἢ δὲ ὄσφρησις ἀτμοὺς γνωρίζουσα πάντως ἐστὶν ἀτμοειδής καὶ ἢ γεῦσις χυλοὺς χυλοειδής, κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ιδέας λαμβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν σωμάτων, γίνεται τις ἀσώματος.
- 120 Τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης παρὰ τοῖς προγενεστέροις δόξης, ἔοικε καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ταύτῃ συμπεριφέρεσθαι, ἕξ τε οὐσῶν τῶν τὰ πάντα συνεστακυῖων ἀρχῶν λέγειν ἰσάριθμα ταύταις ὑπάρχειν τὰ κριτήρια, δι' ὧν γέγραφε
- 121 γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπάπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα δῖον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον, στοργὴν δὲ στοργῇ, νεῖκος δὲ τε νεϊκέϊ λυγρῷ, ἐμφαίνων ὡς γῆν μὲν καταλαμβάνομεθα μετουσίᾳ

things inanimate, as one may see in the case of seeds that are being winnowed and in the case of pebbles along the beaches; for in the one case, by the whirling of the sieve lentils are ranged separately with lentils, barley with barley, and wheat with wheat; and in the other case, owing to the motion of 118 the waves, the oblong pebbles are pushed into the same place as the oblong, and the round as the round, as though the similarity in things had a certain force of attraction for them.

So says Democritus. But Plato, on the other hand, 119 in his *Timaeus*,<sup>a</sup> uses the same kind of proof to establish the fact that the soul is incorporeal. For if, says he, the sense of sight as perceiving light is thereby light-like, and hearing as discerning smitten air, which is sound, is thereby seen to be air-like, and smell as recognizing vapours is indisputably vapour-like, and taste as recognizing flavours flavour-like, then the soul also must of necessity be incorporeal as perceiving the incorporeal Ideas, those in numbers, for instance, and those in the limits of bodies.<sup>b</sup>

Such, then, being the opinion held by the earlier 120 thinkers, Empedocles also seems to be carried away by it, and to assert that as the principles which compose the Universe are six, so the criteria are equal to them in number, inasmuch as he writes c—

Verily earth by earth we behold, and water by water, 121  
Aether divine by aether, and fire the destructive by fire,  
Love, moreover, by love, and hate by dolorous hatred.

For thereby he indicates that we apprehend earth

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *Tim.* 45 b.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. the lines or surfaces by which solid bodies are bounded; cf. *P.H.* iii. 40 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 92.

γῆς, ὕδωρ δὲ κατὰ μετοχὴν ὕδατος, ἀέρα δὲ  
 μετουσία τοῦ ἀέρος, καὶ ἐπὶ πυρὸς τὸ ἀνάλογον.  
 122 ἄλλοι δὲ ἦσαν οἱ λέγοντες κατὰ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα  
 κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας οὐ τὰς αἰσθήσεις  
 ἀλλὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, τοῦ δὲ ὀρθοῦ λόγου τὸν  
 μὲν τινα θεῖον ὑπάρχειν τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον, ὦν  
 τὸν μὲν θεῖον ἀνέξοιστον εἶναι τὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπινον  
 123 ἐξοιστόν. λέγει δὲ περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐν ταῖς  
 αἰσθήσεσι τὴν κρίσιν τάληθοῦς ὑπάρχειν οὕτως·

στεινωποὶ μὲν γὰρ παλάμαι κατὰ γυῖα κέχυνται,  
 πολλὰ δὲ δεῖλ' ἔμψαια, τά τ' ἀμβλύνοσσι  
 μερίμνας.

παῦρον δὲ ζωῆς ἀβίου μέρος ἀθρήσαντες,  
 ὠκύμοροι καπνοῖο δίκην ἀρθέντες ἀπέπταν,  
 αὐτὸ μόνον πεισθέντες ὅτω προσέκυρσεν ἕκαστος,  
 πάντοσ' ἐλαυνόμενοι. τὸ δ' ὄλον (μάψ)<sup>1</sup> εὐχεται  
 εὐρεῖν.

οὔτως οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τὰδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπ-  
 ακουστά  
 οὔτε νόω περιληπτά.

124 περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀληπτον τὴν  
 ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἰκνέεται ὁ ἀνθρώπινος  
 λόγος ληπτὴν ὑπάρχειν, διασαφεῖ τοῖς προκειμέ-  
 νοις ἐπιφέρων

σὺ δ' οὖν ἐπεὶ ὄδ' ἐλάσθης,  
 πεύσαι, οὐ πλείον γε βροτεῖη μῆτις ὄπωπεν.<sup>2</sup>

καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξῆς ἐπιπλήξας τοῖς πλέον ἐπαγ-  
 γελλομένοις γινώσκειν, παρίστησιν ὅτι τὸ δι'  
 ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως λαμβανόμενον πιστόν ἐστι,  
 τοῦ λόγου τούτων ἐπιστατούντος, καίπερ πρό-

<sup>1</sup> <μάψ> Stein. <sup>2</sup> ὄπωπεν Panzerbieter: ὄρωρεν mss., Bekk.

by participation in earth and water by partaking in  
 water, and air by participation in air, and similarly  
 in the case of fire. But there have been others who 122  
 have asserted that according to Empedocles the  
 criterion of truth is not the senses but right reason,  
 and of right reason one sort is divine, the other  
 human. And of these the divine sort is inexpressible,  
 but the human sort expressible. As regards the fact 123  
 that the judgement of truth does not reside in the  
 senses he speaks thus :

Straiten'd in sooth are the powers which lie dispersed in  
 our members,

Many the plagues which thwart them, and blunt the edge  
 of our thinking.

Short is the span of unlivable life beholden by mortals,  
 Swift is their doom, as, whirl'd like smoke, they are lifted  
 and vanish,

Each persuaded only of what himself has encounter'd,  
 Carried about all ways ; yet each keeps foolishly boasting  
 How he has found the Whole. So far from human percep-  
 tion

Lie these things, out of reach of the sense of vision or  
 hearing,

And of the grasp of the mind.

And as regards the fact that truth is not altogether 124  
 unattainable, but is really attainable so far as the  
 reason of man can reach, he makes this clear when  
 to the foregoing verses he adds this :

But since thou hast hither retreated,  
 Thou shalt be told not more than mortal wit has discovered.

And in what follows, after rebuking those who pro-  
 fess they know more, he tries to establish that the  
 thing perceived by each sense is trustworthy, as the  
 reason is in control of them, although he had previ-

τερον καταδραμῶν τῆς ἀπ' αὐτῶν πίστεως.  
125 φησὶ γὰρ

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,  
ἐκ δ' ὀσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε  
πηγῆν.

καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε μούσα,  
ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,  
πέμπε παρ' εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσα' εὐήνιον ἄρμα·  
μηδὲ σέ γ' εὐδόξιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς  
πρὸς θνατῶν ἀνελέσθαι ἐφ' ᾧ θ' ὀσίης πλέον  
εἰπεῖν

θάρασῃ καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ' ἄκροισι θαάζειν.  
ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἄθρει πάση παλάμη πῆ δῆλον ἕκαστον,  
μήτε τι γ' ὄψιν ἔχων πιστὴν πλέον ἢ κατ' ἀκοιήν  
ἢ ἀκοιὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,  
μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόση πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,  
γυίων πιστῶν ἔρυκε, νόει δ' ἢ δῆλον ἕκαστον.

126 Τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς· ὁ δὲ Ἡρά-  
κλειτος, ἐπεὶ πάλιν ἐδόκει δυσὶν ὀργανώσθαι ὁ  
ἄνθρωπος πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν, αἰσθήσει  
τε καὶ λόγῳ, τούτων τὴν μὲν αἰσθησιν παρα-  
πλησίως τοῖς προειρημένοις φυσικοῖς ἀπιστον εἶναι  
νενομικεν, τὸν δὲ λόγον ὑποτίθεται κριτήριον.  
ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν αἰσθησιν ἐλέγχει λέγων κατὰ λέξιν  
"κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισιν ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὠτα  
βαρβάρους ψυχᾶς ἐχόντων," ὅπερ ἴσον ἦν τῷ βαρ-  
βάρων ἐστὶ ψυχῶν ταῖς ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσι πισ-  
127 τεύειν. τὸν δὲ λόγον κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπο-  
φαίνεται οὐ τὸν ὁποιοῦνδῆποτε ἀλλὰ τὸν κοινὸν καὶ  
68

ously run down the evidence supplied by them. For 125  
he says :

Nay, ye gods, avert from my tongue the madness of those  
men,  
And make flow pure rivers of speech from lips that are  
holy.

Thee, too, now I beseech, O Muse white-armed and virgin,  
Courtèd by many ; thy car well-reined from Piety's dwell-  
ing

Drive, and bring to me all that is meet to be told unto  
mortals ;

Nor shalt thou ever be forced to receive from hands that  
are mortal

Flores of glorious honour for uttering more than is holy  
Over-bold, and to gain thus a seat on the summits of  
wisdom.

Come, then, with each of thy powers discern each manifest  
object,

Putting no greater trust in the sight of the eye than in  
hearing,

Nor in the echoing ear above the clear witness of tongue's  
taste ;

Nor from the rest of the parts wherein are the channels  
of knowledge

Hold thou back thy trust, but mark each manifestation.

Such, then, are the views of Empedocles. And 126  
Heracleitus—since he again supposed that man is  
furnished with two organs for gaining knowledge of  
truth, namely sensation and reason—held, like the  
Physicists mentioned above, that of these organs  
sensation is untrustworthy, and assumes reason as  
the criterion. Sensation he convicts by saying ex-  
pressly, " Ill witnesses for men are eyes and ears  
when they have barbarous souls," which is equivalent  
to saying " To trust in the irrational senses is the part  
of barbarous souls." And he declares reason to be 127  
the judge of truth—not, however, any and every  
kind of reason, but that which is " common " and

θεῖον. τίς δ' ἐστὶν οὗτος, συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον.  
ἀρέσκει γὰρ τῷ φυσικῷ τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικόν  
128 τε ὃν καὶ φρενήρες. ἐμφαίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο πολὺ  
πρόσθεν Ὅμηρος εἰπὼν

τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων  
οἶον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγρησι πατῆρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος δέ φησι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοιαῦτα  
φρονεῖν

ὁποίην Ζεὺς ἐφ' ἡμέρην ἄγει.

εἴρηται δὲ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ τὸ αὐτό·

ὅστις ποτ' εἰ σὺ δυστόπατος εἰσιδεῖν  
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,  
ἐπευξάμην σε.

129 τοῦτον δὴ τὸν θεῖον λόγον καθ' Ἡράκλειτον δι'  
ἀναπνοῆς σπάσαντες νοεροὶ γινόμεθα, καὶ ἐν μὲν  
ὑπνοῖς ληθαῖοι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἔμφρονες.  
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὑπνοῖς μυσάντων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν  
πόρων χωρίζεται τῆς πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφυΐας  
ὁ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς, μόνῃς τῆς κατὰ ἀναπνοὴν προσ-  
φύσεως σωζομένης οἰονεῖ τινας ρίζης, χωρισθεῖς  
τε ἀποβάλλει ἢν πρότερον εἶχε μνημονικὴν δύνα-  
130 μιν· ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορόσι πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν  
πόρων ὡσπερ διὰ τινων θυρίδων προκύνθας καὶ τῷ  
περιέχοντι συμβαλὼν λογικὴν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν.  
ὄνπερ οὖν τρόπον οἱ ἄνθρακες πλησιάσαντες τῷ  
πυρὶ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν διάπυροι γίνονται, χωρισ-  
θέντες δὲ σβέννυνται, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιξενωθεῖσα  
τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῦρα  
70

divine. But what this is must be explained concisely.  
It is a favourite tenet of the Physicist that "What  
encompasses us is rational and intelligent." And, 128  
long before, Homer had expressed this when he says<sup>a</sup>:

As is the day which upon them is brought by the sire  
immortal,  
So are the minds of mortal men.

Archilochus, too, says that the thoughts men think  
are "Such as the day which Zeus doth bring about."  
And the same thing has also been said by Euripides<sup>b</sup>:

To see and know thee, who thou art, O Zeus,  
Doth baffle wit! Art thou Necessity  
Of Nature? Or mankind's Intelligence?  
Howbeit, I invoke thee.

It is then by drawing in by inspiration this divine 129  
reason that, according to Heraclitus, we become in-  
telligent, and while forgetful during sleep become  
sensible again on waking. For during sleep, as the  
passages of the senses are closed, the mind within us  
is cut off from its natural union with the envelop-  
ing substance—only the connexion by way of respira-  
tion, like that of a root, being preserved—and being  
thus parted it loses the power of memory which it  
previously possessed; but on waking it stretches out 130  
again through the passages of sense, as it were  
through windows, and by junction with the envelop-  
ing substance is invested with the power of reason.  
Thus, just as cinders when put close to the fire are  
altered and become ignited, but are extinguished  
when put at a distance, in like manner the fraction  
of the enveloping substance that stays as a stranger  
in our bodies becomes well-nigh irrational owing to

<sup>a</sup> Hom. *Odyss.* xviii. 136-137; cf. *P.H.* iii. 244.

<sup>b</sup> Eur. *Troad.* 885.

κατὰ μὲν τὸν χωρισμὸν σχεδὸν ἄλογος γίνεται, κατὰ δὲ τὴν διὰ τῶν πλείστων πόρων σύμφυσι  
 131 ὁμοιοειδῆς τῷ ὅλῳ καθίσταται. τοῦτον δὴ τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ θεῖον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν γινόμεθα λογικοί, κριτήριον ἀληθείας φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν κοινῇ πᾶσι φαινόμενον, τοῦτ' εἶναι πιστόν (τῷ κοινῷ γὰρ καὶ θεῖῳ λόγῳ λαμβάνεται), τὸ δὲ τινι μόνῳ προσπίπτον ἄπιστον  
 132 ὑπάρχειν διὰ τὴν ἐναντίαν αἰτίαν. ἐναρχόμενος οὖν τῶν περὶ φύσεως ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ, καὶ τρόπον τινα δεικνύς τὸ περιέχον, φησὶ "λόγον τοῦδε ἐόντος ἀξύνετοι γίνονται ἄνθρωποι, καὶ πρόσθεν ἢ ἀκούσαι, καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον. γινόμενων γὰρ κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἄπειροι εἰκόασι πειρώμενοι ἐπέων καὶ ἔργων τοιούτων ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι, κατὰ φύσιν διαιρέων ἕκαστον καὶ φράζων ὅπως ἔχει. τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει ὁκόσα ἐγερθέντες ποιούσιν,  
 133 ὅκωσπερ ὁκόσα εὐδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται." διὰ τούτων γὰρ ῥητῶς παραστήσας ὅτι κατὰ μετοχὴν τοῦ θεῖου λόγου πάντα πράττομέν τε καὶ νοοῦμεν, ὀλίγα προσδιελθὼν ἐπιφέρει "διὸ δεῖ ἐπεσθαι τῷ <ξυνῷ>", τουτέστι τῷ<sup>1</sup> κοινῷ. ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. "τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἐόντος ξυνοῦ, ζώουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν." ἢ δ' ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἀλλ' ἐξήγησις τοῦ τρόπου τῆς τοῦ παντός διοικήσεως. διὸ καθ' ὃ τι ἂν αὐτοῦ τῆς μνήμης κοινωνή-

<sup>1</sup> <ξυνῷ . . . τῷ> cj. Bekk.

\* i. e. Heraclitus uses ξυνός for κοινός ("common"). As

the separation, but through its union by means of its numerous passages it is made like in kind to the Whole. Heraclitus, then, asserts that this common 131 and divine reason, by participation in which we become rational, is the criterion of truth. Hence, that which appears to all in common is trustworthy (for it is perceived by the common and divine reason), but that which affects one person alone is, for the opposite cause, untrustworthy. Thus the man above-mentioned 132 declares at the beginning of his work *On Nature*, pointing in a fashion to the enveloping substance—"Of this existent Reason men are without comprehension, both before they have heard of it and when they have heard of it for the first time; for they are like unto men without experience of the things which happen according to this reason when they experience such words and deeds as I relate, when I define each thing according to its nature and declare what its condition is. But as to the rest of mankind, all the things which they do when awake escape their notice, even as they forget all when asleep." For having in these words expressly argued 133 that we do and think everything through participation in the divine reason, after proceeding a little further, he adds, "Wherefore one must follow the comprehensive," that is the "common" (for "comprehensive" means "common")<sup>a</sup>; "and though reason is comprehensive most people live as though they possessed a private intelligence of their own." And this is nothing else than an explanation of the mode of arrangement of the Whole. Therefore in so far as we share in the memory of that reason we say

H. evidently intends a play on the words ἀξύνετοι (in § 132) and ξυνός, I render the latter "comprehensive."



σωμεν, ἀληθεύομεν, ἃ δὲ ἂν ἰδιάσωμεν, ψευδόμεθα.  
 134 νῦν γὰρ ῥητότατα καὶ ἐν τούτοις τὸν κοινὸν λόγον  
 κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ τὰ μὲν κοινῇ φησὶ  
 φαινόμενα πιστὰ ὡς ἂν τῷ κοινῷ κρινόμενα λόγῳ,  
 τὰ δὲ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐκάστῳ ψευδῆ.  
 135 Τοιοῦδε μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἡράκλειτος· Δημόκριτος δὲ  
 ὄτε<sup>1</sup> μὲν ἀναιρεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι, καὶ  
 τούτων λέγει μηδὲν φαίνεσθαι κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀλλὰ  
 μόνον κατὰ δόξαν, ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσις ὑπ-  
 ἄρχειν τὸ ἀτόμους εἶναι καὶ κενόν. “νόμῳ” γάρ  
 φησὶ “γλυκὸν καὶ νόμῳ πικρὸν, νόμῳ θερμόν, νόμῳ  
 ψυχρόν, νόμῳ χροινῆ· ἔτεῃ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν.”  
 ὅπερ ἔστι, νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ  
 αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ  
 136 τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ τὸ κενόν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Κρατυν-  
 τηρίοις, καίπερ ὑπεσχημένος ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι τὸ  
 κράτος τῆς πίστεως ἀναθεῖναι, οὐδὲν ἦττον εὐρίσ-  
 κεται τούτων καταδικάζων. φησὶ γὰρ “ἡμεῖς δὲ  
 τῷ μὲν ἐόντι οὐδὲν ἀτρεκές συνίεμεν, μεταπίπτον  
 δὲ κατὰ τε σώματος διαθήκην καὶ τῶν ἐπι-  
 εισιόντων καὶ τῶν ἀντιστηριζόντων.” καὶ πάλιν  
 φησὶν “ἔτεῃ μὲν νῦν ὅτι οἶον ἕκαστον ἔστιν ἢ  
 137 οὐκ ἔστιν οὐ συνίεμεν, πολλαχῇ δεδηλωται.” ἐν  
 δὲ τῷ περὶ ἰδεῶν “γινώσκω τε χρῆ” φησὶν  
 “ἄνθρωπον τῷδε τῷ κανόνι ὅτι ἔτεῃς ἀπ-  
 ἡλλακται,” καὶ πάλιν “δηλοῖ μὲν δὴ καὶ οὗτος  
 ὁ λόγος ὅτι ἔτεῃ οὐδὲν ἴσμεν περὶ οὐδενός, ἀλλ'  
 ἐπιρυσμῆ ἐκάστοισιν ἢ δόξαις,” καὶ ἔτι “καίτοι

<sup>1</sup> ὅτε Usener: ὅτι mss., Bekk.

what is true, but whenever we utter our own private  
 thoughts, we lie. So here and in these words he 134  
 most expressly declares that the common reason is  
 the criterion, and that the things which appear in  
 common are trustworthy as being judged by the  
 common reason, whereas those which appear privately  
 to each man are false.

Such, then, is the attitude of Heraclitus. And 135  
 Democritus in some places abolishes the things that  
 appear to the senses and asserts that none of them  
 appears in truth but only in opinion, the true fact in  
 things existing being the existence of atoms and  
 void; for “By convention,” he says, “is sweet, by  
 convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention  
 cold, by convention colour; but by verity atoms  
 and void.” (This means: Sensible objects are con-  
 ventionally assumed and opined to exist, but they  
 do not truly exist, but only the atoms and the  
 void.) And in his *Confirmations*, although he had pro- 136  
 mised to ascribe the confirmatory evidence to the  
 senses, yet none the less he is found condemning  
 them. For he says: “But we in reality comprehend  
 nothing invariable, but what shifts about according  
 to the disposition of the body and of the things which  
 enter into it and the things which oppose it.” And  
 again he says: “Now verily that we do not compre-  
 hend what the nature of each thing is or is not, has  
 been oft-times made plain.” And in his book *Con-* 137  
*cerning Forms* he says, “Man must learn by this  
 rule that he is divorced from verity”; and again,  
 “This argument also makes plain that we know  
 nothing verily about anything, but each man’s opinion  
 is due to influx”; and yet again, “It will, however,

δῆλον ἔσται ὅτι ἐτεῆ οἶον ἕκαστον γινώσκειν ἐν ἀπόρῳ ἐστί.”

Καὶ δὴ ἐν μὲν τούτοις πᾶσαν σχεδὸν κινεῖ κατὰ-  
ληψιν, εἰ καὶ μόνων ἐξαιρέτως καθάπτεται τῶν  
138 αἰσθήσεων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς κανόσι δύο φησὶν εἶναι  
γνώσεις, τὴν μὲν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων τὴν δὲ διὰ  
τῆς διανοίας, ὣν τὴν μὲν διὰ τῆς διανοίας γνησίην  
καλεῖ, προσμαρτυρῶν αὐτῇ τὸ πιστὸν εἰς ἀληθείας  
κρίσιν, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων σκοτίην ὀνομάζει,  
ἀφαιρούμενος αὐτῆς τὸ πρὸς διάγνωσιν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς  
139 ἀπλανές. λέγει δὲ κατὰ λέξιν “ γνώμης δὲ δύο  
εἰσὶν ἰδέαι, ἡ μὲν γνησίη ἡ δὲ σκοτίη· καὶ σκοτίης  
μὲν τάδε σύμπαντα, ὅψις ἀκοή ὀδμη γέυσις ψαύσις,  
ἡ δὲ γνησίη, ἀποκεκριμένη δὲ ταύτης.” εἴτα  
προκρίνων τῆς σκοτίης τὴν γνησίην ἐπιφέρει λέγων  
“ ὅταν ἡ σκοτίη μηκέτι δύναται μῆτε ὄρῃν ἐπ’  
ἔλαττον μῆτε ἀκούειν μῆτε ὀδμάσθαι μῆτε γεύεσθαι  
μῆτε ἐν τῇ ψαύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ λεπτό-  
τερον.”<sup>1</sup> οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶ  
140 κριτήριον, ὃν γνησίην γνώμην καλεῖ. Διότιμος δὲ  
τρία κατ’ αὐτὸν ἔλεγεν εἶναι κριτήρια, τῆς μὲν  
τῶν ἀδήλων καταλήψεως τὰ φαινόμενα, (ὅψις γὰρ  
τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα,) <sup>2</sup> ὡς φησὶν Ἀναξ-  
αγόρας, ὃν ἐπὶ τούτῳ Δημόκριτος ἐπαινεῖ, ζητήσεως  
δὲ τὴν ἔννοιαν (περὶ παντὸς γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ  
τὸ εἰδέναι περὶ ὅτου ἔστιν ἡ ζήτησις), αἰρέσεως δὲ  
καὶ φυγῆς τὰ πάθη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ᾧ προσοικειού-

<sup>1</sup> Mutsch. (after Diels) marks a lacuna after λεπτότερον. Otherwise we might read ἄλλο τι <ληπτέον> λεπτ., “some other finer (more delicate) <instrument> must be adopted.”

<sup>2</sup> <ὅψις . . . φαινόμενα> add. N: om. cet., Bekk.

be plain that it is impracticable to learn the veritable nature of each thing.”

Now in these passages he almost rejects apprehension altogether, although it is the senses only that he specially attacks. But in his “Canons” he says 138 that there are two kinds of knowledge, one by means of the senses, the other by means of the intelligence; and of these he calls that by means of the intelligence “genuine,” ascribing to it trustworthiness in the judgement of truth, but that by means of the senses he terms “bastard,” denying it inerrancy in the distinguishing of what is true. He expressly declares— 139 “Of knowledge there are two forms, the genuine and the bastard: and to the bastard belong all these—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch; but the other form is distinct from this and genuine.” Then, while thus preferring the genuine to the bastard, he proceeds: “Whenever the bastard kind is unable any longer to see what has become too small, or to hear or smell or taste or perceive it by touch, (one must have recourse to) another and finer (instrument).” Thus, according to this man also, reason is the criterion, and he calls it “genuine knowledge.” But Diotimus used 140 to say that according to Democritus there are three criteria—namely, the criterion of the apprehension of things non-evident, which is the things apparent; for, as Anaxagoras says (and Democritus commends him for it), the things apparent are the vision of the things non-evident; and the criterion of investigation, which is the conception—“for in every case, my child, the one starting-point is to know what the subject of investigation is”<sup>a</sup>; and the criterion of choice and aversion, which is the affections—for that

<sup>a</sup> Quoted loosely from Plato, *Phaedr.* 237 B.

μεθα, τοῦτο αἰρετόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ ᾧ προσαλλοτριού-  
μεθα, τοῦτο φευκτόν ἐστιν.

Ἡ μὲν οὖν τῶν παλαιῶν περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου  
141 τῆς ἀληθείας ἱστορία τοιαύτη τις ἦν· ἀπτώμεθα  
δὲ ἐξῆς καὶ τῶν μετὰ τοὺς φυσικοὺς αἰρέσεων.

Πλάτων τοίνυν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ διελόμενος τὰ  
πράγματα εἰς τε τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ εἰπὼν  
περιληπτὰ μὲν λόγῳ εἶναι τὰ νοητὰ δοξαστὰ δὲ  
τυγχάνειν τὰ αἰσθητά, προδήλως κριτήριον ὤρισε  
τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσεως τὸν λόγον, συμ-  
περιλαβὼν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν-  
142 ἀργειαν. λέγει δὲ οὕτως· “τί τὸ ὄν αἰεί, γένεσιν  
δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέ-  
ποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν,

143 τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως.” περιληπτικὸν δὲ  
καλεῖσθαι φασι λόγον παρ’ αὐτῷ οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ  
τὸν κοινὸν τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δεῖ  
γὰρ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ κρίνειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ  
τῆς ἐναργείας ὀρμᾶσθαι, εἴπερ δι’ ἐναργῶν ἢ  
κρίσις γίνεται τῶν ἀληθῶν. ἀλλ’ ἢ τε ἐνάργεια  
οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης πρὸς γνώσιν ἀληθοῦς· οὐ γὰρ  
εἴ τι κατ’ ἐνάργειαν φαίνεται, τοῦτο καὶ κατ’  
ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχει· ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρῆναι τὸ κρίνον τί  
τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίεσθαι ἔτι  
καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται, τουτέστι τὸν λόγον.

144 ἀμφοτέρα τοίνυν συνελθεῖν δεήσει, τὴν τε ἐν-  
ἀργειαν ὡς ἂν ἀφετήριον οὖσαν τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν  
κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον πρὸς

which we feel is congenial to us is choiceworthy, but  
that which we feel is alien is to be regarded with  
aversion.

Such, then, was the account given by the old  
philosophers concerning the criterion of truth.  
Next let us treat of those who came after the 141  
Physicists.

Plato, then, in his *Timaeus*, after dividing things  
into intelligibles and sensibles and stating that the  
intelligibles are apprehensible by reason whereas the  
sensibles are objects of opinion, plainly specified  
reason as the criterion of the knowledge of things,  
though he included along with it the clear evidence  
of sense. These are his words<sup>a</sup>: “What is that 142  
which is Existent always and has no Becoming?  
And what is that which is Becoming always and  
never is Existent? Now the one of these is appre-  
hensible by thought with the aid of reasoning, but  
the other by opinion with the aid of sensation.”  
And the Platonists say that the reason which em- 143  
braces both sensible evidence and truth is termed by  
him “comprehensive reason.” For in the act of  
judging truth the reason must set out from the  
sensible evidence, if it be so that the judgement of  
things true is effected by means of things evident.  
But this evidence is not self-sufficient for knowledge  
of the true; for if a thing appears evidently, it does  
not therefore exist truly; but there must also be  
present an instrument which judges what thing  
merely appears and what, in addition to appearing,  
also subsists in truth—that is to say, reason. Thus it 144  
will be necessary for both to come together—both  
the sensible evidence as forming the starting-point  
for the reason in its judging of the truth, and the

<sup>a</sup> See *Tim.* 27 D.

διάκρισιν τῆς ἐναργείας. εἰς μέντοι τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ ἐναργείᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ ἀληθὲς διακρίνειν πάλιν συνεργοῦ δέεται ὁ λόγος τῆς αἰσθήσεως· διὰ ταύτης γὰρ τὴν φαντασίαν παραδεχόμενος ποιεῖται τὴν νόησιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τᾶλθηθούς, ὥστε περιληπτικὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τῆς τε ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ καταληπτικόν.

145 Ὡς δὲ καὶ Πλάτων· Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ τὰ δὲ νοητὰ, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπέιληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον 146 ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειομένην ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἤρμουςμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφνῆ ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἀπλανῆ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

147 Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησὶν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστὴν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ (τὴν) ἅπαντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ· ὁρατὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι'

<sup>1</sup> <τὴν> cj. Bekk.

reason itself for estimating the evidence. Yet for getting in touch with the evidence and estimating the truth it contains, the reason in turn needs sensation as a colleague ; for it is through it that the reason receives the presentation and produces the thought and the knowledge of what is true, so that it really is "comprehensive" both of evidence and of truth, which is equivalent to being "apprehensive."

Such, then, was the view of Plato. But Speusippus 145 declared that, since some things are sensible, others intelligible, the cognitive reason is the criterion of things intelligible and the cognitive sense of things sensible. And cognitive sense he conceived as being that which shares in rational truth. For just as the 146 fingers of the flute-player or harper possess an artistic activity, which, however, is not primarily brought to perfection by the fingers themselves but is fully developed as a result of joint practice under the guidance of reasoning,—and just as the sense of the musician possesses an activity capable of grasping the harmonious and the non-harmonious, this activity, however, not being self-produced but an acquisition due to reasoning,—so also the cognitive sense naturally derives from the reason the cognitive experience in which it shares, and which leads to unerring discrimination of subsisting objects.

But Xenocrates says that there are three forms of 147 existence, the sensible, the intelligible, and the composite and opinable ; and of these the sensible is that which exists within the Heaven, and the intelligible that which belongs to all things outside the Heaven, and the opinable and composite that of the Heaven itself ; for it is visible by sense but intelligible by

- 148 *ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι τούτον ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνεται τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἰσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθές μὲν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν· τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς μοίρας παραδεδοσθαι, Ἄτροπος μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθὴ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσις δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.*
- 149 *Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀρκεσίλαον προηγουμένως μὲν οὐδὲν ὥρισαν κριτήριον, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὠρικένοι δοκοῦντες τοῦτο κατὰ ἀντιπαρεξαγωγὴν τὴν ὡς πρὸς τοὺς στωικοὺς ἀπέδοσαν. τρία γὰρ εἶναι φασιν ἐκεῖνοι τὰ συζυγούντα ἀλλήλοις, ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν καὶ τὴν ἐν μεθωρίᾳ τούτων τεταγμένην κατάληψιν, ὣν ἐπιστήμην μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ ἀμετάθετον ὑπὸ λόγου κατάληψιν, δόξαν δὲ τὴν ἀσθενῆ καὶ ψευδῆ συγκατὰ θεσιν, κατάληψιν δὲ τὴν μεταξὺ τούτων, ἣτις ἐστὶ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις· καταληπτικὴ δὲ φαντασία κατὰ τούτους ἐτύγχανεν ἢ ἀληθῆς καὶ ταιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς. ὣν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην ἐν μόνοις ὑφίστασθαι λέγουσι τοῖς σοφοῖς, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐν μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις, τὴν δὲ κατάληψιν κοινήν ἀμφοτέρων εἶναι, καὶ ταύτην κριτήριον ἀληθείας καθεστάναι. ταῦτα δὲ λεγόντων τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος ἀντι-*

means of astronomy. This, then, being the condition 148 of things, he declared that the criterion of the existence which is outside the Heaven and intelligible is knowledge; and the criterion of that which is within the Heaven and sensible is sense; and the criterion of the mixed kind is opinion. And of these generally the criterion afforded by the cognitive reason is both firm and true, and that by sense is true indeed but not so true as that by the cognitive reason, while the composite kind shares in both truth and falsehood; for opinion is partly true and partly false. Hence, 149 too, we have by tradition three Fates—Atropos, the Fate of things intelligible, she being unchangeable, and Clotho of things sensible, and Lachesis of things opinable.

Arcesilaus<sup>a</sup> did not, to begin with, lay down any 150 definite criterion, and those who are thought to have laid one down produced it by way of counter-blast to that of the Stoics. For the latter assert that there 151 are three criteria—knowledge and opinion and, set midway between these two, apprehension; and of these knowledge is the unerring and firm apprehension which is unalterable by reason, and opinion is weak and false assent, and apprehension is intermediate between these, being assent to an apprehensive presentation; and an apprehensive presenta- 152 tion, according to them, is one which is true and of such a kind as to be incapable of becoming false. And they say that, of these, knowledge subsists only in the wise, and opinion only in the fools, but apprehension is shared alike by both, and it is the criterion of truth. It was these statements of the Stoics that 153

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *P.H.* i. 232; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxii.

καθίστατο, δεικνὺς ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι μεταξύ ἐπι-  
 στήμης καὶ δόξης κριτήριον ἢ κατάληψις. αὕτη  
 γὰρ ἦν φασὶ κατάληψιν καὶ καταληπτικῆ φαν-  
 τασία συγκατάθεσιν, ἧτοι ἐν σοφῷ ἢ ἐν φαύλῳ  
 γίνεται. ἀλλ' ἐάν τε ἐν σοφῷ γένηται, ἐπιστήμη  
 ἐστίν, ἐάν τε ἐν φαύλῳ, δόξα, καὶ οὐδέν ἄλλο παρὰ  
 154 ταῦτα ἢ μόνον ὄνομα μετείληπται. εἴπερ τε ἢ  
 κατάληψις καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις  
 ἐστίν, ἀνύπαρκτός ἐστι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἢ συγ-  
 κατάθεσις οὐ πρὸς φαντασίαν γίνεται ἀλλὰ πρὸς  
 λόγον (τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωματίων εἰσὶν αἱ συγκατα-  
 θέσεις), δεύτερον ὅτι οὐδεμία τοιαύτη ἀληθῆς φαν-  
 τασία εὐρίσκεται οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ψευδῆς, ὡς  
 155 διὰ πολλῶν καὶ ποικίλων παρίσταται. μὴ οὔσης  
 δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας οὐδὲ κατάληψις γενή-  
 σεται· ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία συγκατά-  
 θεσις. μὴ οὔσης δὲ καταλήψεως πάντ' ἔσται  
 ἀκατάληπτα. πάντων δὲ ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων ἀκο-  
 λουθήσει καὶ κατὰ τοὺς στωικοὺς ἐπέχειν τὸν σοφόν.  
 156 σκοπῶμεν δὲ οὕτως. πάντων ὄντων ἀκαταλήπτων  
 διὰ τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ στωικοῦ κριτηρίου, εἰ  
 συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, δοξάσει ὁ σοφός· μηδενὸς  
 γὰρ ὄντος καταληπτοῦ εἰ συγκατατίθεται τινι, τῷ  
 ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκαταθήσεται, ἢ δὲ τῷ ἀκατα-  
 157 λήπτῳ συγκατάθεσις δόξα ἐστίν. ὥστε εἰ τῶν  
 συγκατατιθεμένων ἐστίν ὁ σοφός, τῶν δοξαστῶν  
 ἔσται ὁ σοφός. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τῶν δοξαστῶν ἐστίν ὁ  
 σοφός (τοῦτο γὰρ ἀφροσύνης ἦν κατ' αὐτούς, καὶ  
 τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἴτιον)· οὐκ ἄρα τῶν συγκατα-  
 τιθεμένων ἐστίν ὁ σοφός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, περὶ πάν-

Arcesilaus controverted by proving that apprehension  
 is not a criterion intermediate between knowledge  
 and opinion. For that which they call "appre-  
 hension" and "assent to an apprehensive presenta-  
 tion" occurs either in a wise man or in a fool. But  
 if it occurs in a wise man, it is knowledge, and if in  
 a fool, opinion, and nothing else is acquired besides  
 these two save a mere name. And if apprehension 154  
 is in fact assent to an apprehensive presentation, it is  
 non-existent—firstly, because assent is not relative to  
 presentation but to reason (for assents are given to  
 judgements), and secondly, because no true presenta-  
 tion is found to be of such a kind as to be incapable  
 of proving false, as is shown by many and various  
 instances. But if the apprehensive presentation does 155  
 not exist, neither will apprehension come into  
 existence, for it was assent to an apprehensive  
 presentation. And if apprehension does not exist,  
 all things will be non-apprehensible. And if all  
 things are non-apprehensible, it will follow, even  
 according to the Stoics, that the wise man suspends  
 judgement. Let us consider the matter thus :—Since 156  
 all things are non-apprehensible owing to the non-  
 existence of the Stoic criterion, if the wise man shall  
 assent the wise man will opine ; for when nothing is  
 apprehensible, if he assents to anything he will be  
 assenting to what is non-apprehensible, and assent  
 to the non-apprehensible is opinion. So that if the 157  
 wise man is in the class of assenters, the wise man will  
 be in the class of those who opine. But the wise man,  
 to be sure, is not in the class of those who opine (for,  
 according to them, opinion is a mark of folly and a  
 cause of sins) ; therefore the wise man is not in the  
 class of assenters. And if this be so, he will neces-

των αὐτὸν δεήσει ἀσυγκαταθετεῖν. τὸ δὲ ἀσυ-  
καταθετεῖν οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ ἐπέχειν· ἐφέξει  
158 ἄρα περὶ πάντων ὁ σοφός. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μετὰ τοῦτο  
ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγῆς ζητεῖν,  
ἣτις οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου πέφυκεν ἀποδίδοσθαι, ἀφ'  
οὐ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τουτέστι τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος,  
ἡρτημένην ἔχει τὴν πίστιν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος  
ὅτι ὁ<sup>1</sup> περὶ πάντων ἐπέχων κανονιεῖ τὰς αἰρέσεις  
καὶ φυγὰς καὶ κοινῶς τὰς πράξεις τῷ εὐλόγῳ,  
κατὰ τοῦτό τε προερχόμενος τὸ κριτήριον κατ-  
ορθώσει· τὴν μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν περιγίνεσθαι διὰ  
τῆς φρονήσεως, τὴν δὲ φρόνησιν κείσθαι<sup>2</sup> ἐν τοῖς  
κατορθώμασιν, τὸ δὲ κατορθώμα εἶναι ὅπερ πραχ-  
θὲν εὐλογον ἔχει τὴν ἀπολογία. ὁ προσέχων οὖν  
τῷ εὐλόγῳ κατορθώσει καὶ εὐδαιμονήσει.

159 Ταῦτα καὶ ὁ Ἀρκεσίλαος· ὁ δὲ Καρνεάδης οὐ  
μόνον τοῖς στωικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸ αὐτοῦ  
ἀντιδιετάσσετο περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου. καὶ δὴ πρῶτος  
μὲν αὐτῷ καὶ κοινὸς πρὸς πάντας ἐστὶ λόγος καθ'  
ὃν παρίσταται ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀληθείας  
κριτήριον, οὐ λόγος, οὐκ αἴσθησις, οὐ φαντασία,  
οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὄντων· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συλ-  
160 λήβδην διαψεύδεται ἡμᾶς. δεύτερον δὲ καθ' ὃ  
δείκνυσιν ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἐστὶ τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο, οὐ  
χωρὶς τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθους ὑφίσταται.  
ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἰσθητικῇ δυνάμει διαφέρει τὸ ζῶον τῶν  
ἀψύχων, πάντως διὰ ταύτης ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν  
ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτικὸν γενήσεται. ἡ δὲ γε αἴσθησις  
ἀκίνητος μὲν οὐσα καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἄτρεπτος οὔτε  
161 αἴσθησις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἀντιληπτικὴ τινας, τραπέισα

<sup>1</sup> ὁ Hervetus: οὐ mss., Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> κείσθαι N: κινείσθαι cet., Bekk.

sarily refuse assent in all cases. But to refuse assent is nothing else than to suspend judgement; therefore the wise man will in all cases suspend judgement. But inasmuch as it was necessary, in the next place, 158 to investigate also the conduct of life, which cannot, naturally, be directed without a criterion, upon which happiness—that is, the end of life—depends for its assurance, Arcesilaus asserts that he who suspends judgement about everything will regulate his inclinations and aversions and his actions in general by the rule of “the reasonable,” and by proceeding in accordance with this criterion he will act rightly; for happiness is attained by means of wisdom, and wisdom consists in right actions, and the right action is that which, when performed, possesses a reasonable justification. He, therefore, who attends to “the reasonable” will act rightly and be happy.

Such was the doctrine of Arcesilaus. Carneades 159 arrayed his arguments concerning the criterion not only against the Stoics but against all his predecessors. In fact his first argument, aimed at all alike, is that by which he establishes that there is absolutely no criterion of truth—neither reason, nor sense, nor presentation, nor anything else that exists; for these things, one and all, play us false. Second comes the 160 argument by which he shows that even if a criterion exists, it does not subsist apart from the affection produced by the evidence of sense. For since the living creature differs from lifeless things by its faculty of sense, it will certainly become perceptive both of itself and of external things by means of this faculty. But when the sense is unmoved and unaffected and undisturbed, neither is it sense nor perceptive of anything; but when it is disturbed and 161

δὲ καὶ πως παθοῦσα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ὑπό-  
 πτωσιν, τότε ἐνδείκνυται τὰ πράγματα. ἐν ἄρα τῷ  
 ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας πάθει τῆς ψυχῆς ζητητέον ἐστὶ  
 τὸ κριτήριον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ πάθος αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸν  
 ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος αὐτὸ  
 φαινομένου, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐχ ἕτερον τῆς  
 162 φαντασίας. ὅθεν καὶ φαντασίαν ῥητέον εἶναι πάθος  
 τι περὶ τὸ ζῶον ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παρα-  
 στατικόν. οἷον προσβλέψαντές τι, φησὶν ὁ Ἄν-  
 τίοχος, διατιθέμεθά πως τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως  
 αὐτὴν διακειμένην ἴσχομεν ὡς πρὶν τοῦ βλέψαι  
 διακειμένην εἶχομεν· κατὰ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην  
 ἀλλοίωσιν δυοῖν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἐνὸς μὲν αὐτῆς  
 τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου  
 δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀλλοίωσιν ἐμποιήσαντος, τουτέστι τοῦ  
 ὄρατοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παρα-  
 163 πλήσιον. ὡσπερ οὖν τὸ φῶς ἑαυτὸ τε δείκνυσι καὶ  
 πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φαντασία, ἀρχηγὸς  
 οὖσα τῆς περὶ τὸ ζῶον εἰδήσεως, φωτὸς δίκην  
 ἑαυτὴν τε ἐμφανίζουσα ὀφείλει καὶ τοῦ ποιήσαντος  
 αὐτὴν ἐναργοῦς ἐνδεικτικὴ καθεστάναι. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ  
 οὐ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰεὶ ποτε ἐνδείκνυται, πολλάκις  
 δὲ διαψεύδεται καὶ διαφωνεῖ τοῖς ἀναπέμψασιν  
 αὐτὴν πράγμασιν ὡς οἱ μοχθηροὶ τῶν ἀγγέλων,  
 κατ' ἀνάγκην ἠκολούθησε τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν  
 δύνασθαι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν ἀληθείας, ἀλλὰ  
 164 μόνην, εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὴν ἀληθῆ. πάλιν οὖν ἐπεὶ  
 οὐδεμία ἐστὶν ἀληθὴς τοιαύτη οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο  
 ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πάση τῇ δοκούσῃ ἀληθεῖ καθεστάναι  
 εὑρίσκεται τις ἀπαράλλακτος ψευδῆς, γενήσεται τὸ  
 κριτήριον ἐν κοινῇ φαντασίᾳ τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς καὶ  
 ψεύδους. ἡ δὲ κοινὴ τούτων φαντασία οὐκ ἔστι  
 88

somehow affected owing to the impact of things  
 evident, then it indicates the objects. Therefore the  
 criterion must be sought in the affection of the soul  
 caused by the sensible evidence. And this affection  
 must be indicative both of itself and of the appear-  
 ance which caused it, which affection is nothing else  
 than the presentation. Hence we must say that the 162  
 presentation is an affection of the living creature  
 capable of presenting both itself and the other object.  
 Thus for example, says Antiochus,\* when we have  
 looked at an object we have our sense of sight in a  
 certain condition, and not in the same condition as  
 that in which we had it before we looked; and owing  
 to such an alteration we perceive, in fact, two things,  
 one the alteration itself, which is the presentation,  
 and, secondly, that which produced the alteration,  
 which is the visible object. And similarly in the case  
 of the other senses. So then, just as light shows both 163  
 itself and all things within it, so also presentation,  
 which is the primary factor in the cognition of the  
 living creature, must, like light, both reveal itself and  
 be indicative of the evident object which produced  
 it. But since it does not always indicate the true  
 object, but often deceives and, like bad messengers,  
 misreports those who dispatched it, it has necessarily  
 resulted that we cannot admit every presentation as  
 a criterion of truth, but—if any—only that which is  
 true. So then, once more, since there is no true 164  
 presentation of such a kind that it cannot be false,  
 but a false presentation is found to exist exactly  
 resembling every apparently true presentation, the  
 criterion will consist of a presentation which contains  
 the true and the false alike. But the presentation

\* Cf. P. H. i. 235.



καταληπτική, μη οὔσα δὲ καταληπτική οὐδὲ κριτή-  
 165 ριον ἔσται. μηδεμιᾶς δὲ οὔσης φαντασίας κριτικῆς  
 οὐδὲ λόγος ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· ἀπὸ φαντασίας γὰρ  
 οὗτος ἀνάγεται. καὶ εἰκότως· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ δεῖ  
 φανῆναι αὐτῷ τὸ κρινόμενον, φανῆναι δὲ οὐδὲν  
 δύναται χωρὶς τῆς ἀλόγου αἰσθήσεως. οὔτε οὖν ἡ  
 ἀλογος αἰσθησις οὔτε ὁ λόγος ἦν κριτήριον.  
 166 Ταῦτα μὲν [γὰρ] ἀντιπαρεξάγων τοῖς ἄλλοις  
 φιλοσόφοις ὁ Καρνεάδης εἰς τὴν ἀνυπαρξίαν τοῦ  
 κριτηρίου διεξήρχειτο· ἀπαιτούμενος δὲ καὶ αὐτός  
 τι κριτήριον πρὸς τε τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν καὶ  
 πρὸς τὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας περίκτησιν, δυνάμει  
 ἐπαναγκάζεται καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν περὶ τούτου δια-  
 τάττεσθαι, προσλαμβάνων τὴν τε πιθανὴν φαν-  
 τασίαν καὶ τὴν πιθανὴν ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον καὶ  
 167 διεξωδευμένην. τίς δὲ ἔστιν ἡ τούτων διαφορά,  
 συντόμως ὑποδεικτέον. ἡ τοίνυν φαντασία τινὸς  
 φαντασία ἔστιν, οἷον τοῦ τε ἀφ' οὗ γίνεται καὶ τοῦ  
 ἐν ᾧ γίνεται, καὶ ἀφ' οὗ μὲν γίνεται ὡς τοῦ ἐκτός  
 ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ, τοῦ ἐν ᾧ δὲ γίνεται καθάπερ  
 168 ἀνθρώπου. τοιαύτη δὲ οὔσα δύο ἂν ἔχοι σχέσεις,  
 μίαν μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ φανταστόν, δευτέραν δὲ ὡς  
 πρὸς τὸν φαντασιούμενον. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν πρὸς  
 τὸ φανταστόν σχέσιν ἡ ἀληθὴς γίνεται ἢ ψευδής,  
 καὶ ἀληθὴς μὲν ὅταν σύμφωνος ἢ τῷ φανταστῷ,  
 169 ψευδὴς δὲ ὅταν διάφωνος. κατὰ δὲ τὴν πρὸς τὸν  
 φαντασιούμενον σχέσιν ἡ μὲν ἔστι φαινομένη  
 ἀληθὴς ἢ δὲ οὐ φαινομένη ἀληθὴς, ὡν ἡ μὲν φαινο-

which contains them both is not apprehensive, and  
 not being apprehensive, it will not be a criterion.  
 And if no presentation capable of judging exists, 165  
 neither will reason be a criterion; for it is derived  
 from presentation. And naturally so; for that which  
 is judged must first be presented, and nothing can  
 be presented without sense which is irrational.  
 Therefore neither irrational sense nor reason is the  
 criterion.

These were the arguments which Carneades set 166  
 forth in detail, in his controversy with the other  
 philosophers, to prove the non-existence of the  
 criterion; yet as he, too, himself requires a criterion  
 for the conduct of life and for the attainment of  
 happiness, he is practically compelled on his own  
 account to frame a theory about it, and to adopt both  
 the probable presentation and that which is at once  
 probable and irreversible and tested.<sup>a</sup> What the dis- 167  
 tinction is between these must be briefly indicated.  
 The presentation, then, is a presentation of something  
 —of that, for instance, from which it comes and of  
 that in which it occurs; that from which it comes  
 being, say, the externally existent sensible object,  
 and that in which it occurs, say, a man. And, such 168  
 being its nature, it will have two aspects, one in its  
 relation to the object presented, the second in its  
 relation to the subject experiencing the presentation.  
 Now in regard to its aspect in relation to the object  
 presented it is either true or false—true when it is in  
 accord with the object presented, but false when it is  
 not in accord. But in regard to its aspect in relation 169  
 to the subject experiencing the presentation, the  
 one kind of presentation is apparently true, the other  
 apparently false; and of these the apparently true

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 166-189 cf. P.H. i. 226-231.

μένη ἀληθῆς ἔμφασις καλεῖται παρὰ τοῖς Ἀκαδημαῖκοις καὶ πιθανότης καὶ πιθανὴ φαντασία. ἡ δ' οὐ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς ἀπέμφασις τε προσαγορεύεται καὶ ἀπειθῆς καὶ ἀπιθανὸς φαντασία· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ αὐτόθεν φαινόμενον ψευδὲς οὔτε τὸ ἀληθὲς μὲν, μὴ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν πείθειν ἡμᾶς πέφυκεν.  
 170 τούτων δὲ τῶν φαντασιῶν ἡ μὲν φανερώς ψευδῆς καὶ μὴ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς παραγράψιμος ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ κριτήριον, ἐάν τε (ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος γίνηται ἐάν τε)<sup>1</sup> ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν, διαφώνως δὲ τῷ ὑπάρχοντι καὶ μὴ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ὅποια ἦν ἡ ἀπὸ Ἡλέκτρας προσπεσοῦσα τῷ Ὀρέστῃ, μίαν τῶν Ἐρινύων αὐτὴν δοξάζοντι καὶ κεκραγῶτι

μέθες μί' ὄσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων.

171 τῆς δὲ φαινόμενης ἀληθοῦς ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστὶν ἀμυδρά, ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ μικρότητα τοῦ θεωρουμένου ἢ παρὰ ἰκανὸν διάστημα ἢ καὶ παρὰ ἀσθένειαν τῆς ὀψεως συγκεχυμένως καὶ οὐκ ἐκτύπως τι λαμβανόντων, ἢ δὲ τις ἦν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἀληθῆς ἔτι καὶ σφοδρὸν ἔχουσα τὸ φαίνεσθαι αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ.  
 172 ὧν πάλιν ἡ μὲν ἀμυδρά καὶ ἔκλυτος φαντασία οὐκ ἂν εἴη κριτήριον· τῷ γὰρ μήτε αὐτὴν μήτε τὸ ποιῆσαν αὐτὴν τρανώς ἐνδείκνυσθαι οὐ πέφυκεν ἡμᾶς πείθειν οὐδ' εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἐπισπάσθαι.  
 173 ἡ δὲ φαινόμενη ἀληθῆς καὶ ἰκανῶς ἐμφαινόμενη κριτήριόν ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν

<sup>1</sup> <ἀπὸ . . . τε> cf. Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> I retain, perforce, the Greek terms in the absence of any good English equivalents. "Emphasis" means, roughly, the "appearance" or "reflection" in the mind caused by an external object which seems to correspond to that object

is termed by the Academics "emphasis" and probability and probable presentation, while the not apparently true is denominated "ap-emphasis"<sup>a</sup> and unconvincing and improbable presentation; for neither that which itself appears false, nor that which though true does not appear so to us, is naturally convincing to us. And of these presentations that which is 170 evidently false, or not apparently true, is to be ruled out and is not a criterion whether (it be derived from a non-existent object or) from an object which exists, but not in accord with that object and not representing the actual object—such as was the presentation derived from Electra which Orestes experienced, when he supposed her to be one of the Furies and cried out—

Avaunt! For of my Furies thou art one.<sup>b</sup>

And of the apparently true kind of presentation, 171 one sort is obscure—the sort, for instance, that is found in the case of those who have a perception that is confused and not distinct owing to the smallness of the object viewed or owing to the extent of the interval or even owing to the weakness of the sense of sight,—while the other sort, in addition to being apparently true, possesses this appearance of truth to an intense degree. And of these, again, the pre- 172 sentation which is obscure and vague will not be a criterion; for because of its not indicating clearly either itself or that which caused it, it is not of such a nature as to persuade us or to induce us to assent. But that which appears true, and appears so vividly, 173 is the criterion of truth according to the School of and thus is "apparently true"; but an "ap-emphasis" is apparently false.

<sup>b</sup> Eurip. *Orest.* 264; cf. § 249 *infra*.

Καρνεάδην. κριτήριον δὲ οὐσα πλάτος εἶχεν ἰκανόν, καὶ ἐπιτεινομένης αὐτῆς ἄλλη ἄλλης ἐν εἴδει πιθανωτέραν τε καὶ πληκτικωτέραν ἴσχει φαντασίαν. τὸ δὲ πιθανὸν ὡς πρὸς τὸ παρὸν λέγεται τριχῶς, καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον τὸ ἀληθές τε ὄν καὶ φαινόμενον ἀληθές, καθ' ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ψευδές μὲν καθεστῶς φαινόμενον δὲ ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τρίτον τὸ [ἀληθές] κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων. ὅθεν τὸ κριτήριον ἔσται μὲν ἢ φαινομένη ἀληθῆς φαντασία, ἢν καὶ πιθανὴν προσηγόρευον οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐμπίπτει δὲ ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ ψευδῆς, ὥστε ἀνάγκην ἔχειν καὶ τῇ κοινῇ ποτὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ ψευδοῦς φαντασία χρῆσθαι. οὐ μέντοι διὰ τὴν σπάνιον ταύτης παρέμπτωσιν, λέγω δὲ τῆς μιμουμένης τἀληθές, ἀπιστητέον ἔστι τῇ ὡς τὸ πολὺ ἀληθεύουσῃ· τῷ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰς τε κρίσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις κανονίζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον καὶ κοινὸν κριτήριον κατὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην ἔστι τοιοῦτον· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδέποτε φαντασία μονοειδῆς ὑφίσταται ἀλλ' ἀλύσεως τρόπον ἄλλη ἐξ ἄλλης ἠρτηγται, δεύτερον προσγενήσεται κριτήριον ἢ πιθανὴ ἅμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία. οἷον ὁ ἀνθρώπου σπάν φαντασίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λαμβάνει φαντασίαν καὶ τῶν ἐκτός, τῶν μὲν περὶ αὐτὸν ὡς χροῶς μεγέθους σχήματος κινήσεως λαλιᾶς ἐσθῆτος ὑποδέσεως, τῶν δὲ ἐκτός ὡς ἀέρος φωτὸς ἡμέρας οὐρανοῦ γῆς φίλων, τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. ὅταν οὖν μηδεμίᾳ τούτων τῶν φαντασιῶν περιέλκῃ ἡμᾶς τῷ φαίνεσθαι ψευδῆς, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαι συμφώνως φαίνων-

Carneades. And, being the criterion, it has a large extension,<sup>a</sup> and when extended one presentation reveals itself as more probable and more vivid than another. Probability, in the present instance, is used in three senses—in the first, of that which both is and appears true; in the second, of that which is really false but appears true; in the third, of that which is at once both true and false. Hence the criterion will be the apparently true presentation, which the Academics called "probable"; but sometimes the impression it makes is actually false, so that we are compelled at times to make use of the presentation which is at once both true and false. But the rare occurrence of this kind—the kind I mean which imitates the truth—should not make us distrust the kind which "as a general rule" reports truly; for the fact is that both our judgements and our actions are regulated by the standard of "the general rule."

Such then is the first and general criterion according to Carneades. But since no presentation is ever simple in form but, like links in a chain, one hangs from another, we have to add, as a second criterion, the presentation which is at once both probable and "irreversible." For example, he who receives the presentation of a man necessarily receives the presentation both of his personal qualities and of the external conditions—of his personal qualities, such as colour, size, shape, motion, speech, dress, foot-gear; and of the external conditions, such as air, light, day, heaven, earth, friends, and all the rest. So whenever none of these presentations disturbs our faith by appearing false, but all with one accord appear

<sup>a</sup> i.e. it is very comprehensive and includes many sub-species, or varieties, of presentations.

178 ται ἀληθείς, μᾶλλον πιστεύομεν. ὅτι γὰρ οὗτός  
 ἐστὶ Σωκράτης, πιστεύομεν ἐκ τοῦ πάντα αὐτῷ  
 προσεῖναι τὰ εἰωθότα, χρῶμα μέγεθος σχῆμα  
 διάλεξιν<sup>1</sup> τρίβωνα, τὸ ἐνθάδε εἶναι ὅπου οὐθείς ἐσ-  
 179 τιν αὐτῷ ἀπαράλλακτος. καὶ ὃν τρόπον τινὲς τῶν  
 ἰατρῶν τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν πυρέσσοντα οὐκ ἐξ ἐνὸς  
 λαμβάνουσι συμπτώματος, καθάπερ σφυγμοῦ σφο-  
 δρότητος ἢ δαψιλοῦς θερμασίας, ἀλλ' ἐκ συνδρομῆς,  
 οἶον θερμασίας ἅμα καὶ σφυγμοῦ καὶ ἐλκώδους  
 ἀφῆς καὶ ἐρυθρήματος καὶ δύψους καὶ τῶν ἀνάλογον,  
 οὕτως καὶ ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς τῇ συνδρομῇ τῶν φαν-  
 τασιῶν ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, μηδεμιᾶς  
 τε τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν περισπώσης  
 αὐτὸν ὡς ψευδοῦς λέγει ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ προσ-  
 180 πίπτων. καὶ ὅτι ἡ ἀπερίσπαστός ἐστι συνδρομὴ τοῦ  
 πίστιν ἐμποιεῖν, φανερόν ἀπὸ Μενελάου· καταλιπὼν  
 γὰρ ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὸ εἶδωλον τῆς Ἑλένης, ὅπερ ἀπὸ  
 Τροίας ἐπήγετο ὡς Ἑλένην, καὶ ἐπιβάς τῆς Φάρου  
 νήσου ὄρᾳ τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην, σπῶν τε ἀπ' αὐτῆς  
 ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν ὅμως οὐ πιστεύει τῇ τοιαύτῃ  
 φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' ἄλλης περισπᾶσθαι, καθ' ἣν  
 181 ἦδει ἀπολελοιπῶς ἐν τῇ νηὶ τὴν Ἑλένην. τοιαύτη  
 γοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπερίσπαστος φαντασία· ἦτις καὶ  
 αὐτὴ πλάτος ἔχειν ἔοικε διὰ τὸ ἄλλην ἄλλης μᾶλλον  
 ἀπερίσπαστον εὐρίσκεισθαι.

Τῆς δὲ ἀπερίσπαστου φαντασίας πιστοτέρα  
 μᾶλλον ἐστὶ καὶ τελειοτάτην ποιούσα τὴν κρίσιν, ἣ  
 σὺν τῷ ἀπερίσπαστος εἶναι ἐτι καὶ διεξωδευμένη  
 182 καθέστηκεν. τίς δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ ταύτης χαρακτήρ,  
 παρακειμένως ὑποδεικτέον. ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ἀ-

<sup>1</sup> διάλεξιν cj. Bekker : διάληψιν MSS.

true, our belief is the greater. For we believe that 178  
 this man is Socrates from the fact that he possesses  
 all his customary qualities—colour, size, shape, con-  
 verse, coat, and his position in a place where there is  
 no one exactly like him. And just as some doctors 179  
 do not deduce that it is a true case of fever from one  
 symptom only—such as too quick a pulse or a very high  
 temperature—but from a concurrence, such as that  
 of a high temperature with a rapid pulse and soreness  
 to the touch and flushing and thirst and analogous  
 symptoms ; so also the Academic forms his judgement  
 of truth by the concurrence of presentations, and  
 when none of the presentations in the concurrence  
 provokes in him a suspicion of its falsity he asserts  
 that the impression is true. And that the “ irrever- 180  
 sible ” presentation is a concurrence capable of im-  
 planting belief is plain from the case of Menelaus ;  
 for when he had left behind him on the ship the wraith  
 of Helen—which he had brought with him from Troy,  
 thinking it to be the true Helen—and had landed on  
 the island of Pharos, he beheld the true Helen, but  
 though he received from her a true presentation,  
 yet he did not believe that presentation owing to his  
 mind being warped by that other impression from  
 which he derived the knowledge that he had left  
 Helen behind in the ship. Such then is the “ irrever- 181  
 sible ” presentation ; and it too seems to possess  
 extension inasmuch as one is found to be more irre-  
 versible than another.

Still more trustworthy than the irreversible pre-  
 sentation and supremely perfect is that which creates  
 judgement ; for it, in addition to being irreversible, is  
 also “ tested.” What the distinctive feature of this 182  
 presentation is we must next explain. Now in the

περισπάστου ψιλὸν ζητεῖται τὸ μηδεμίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ φαντασιῶν ὡς ψευδῆ ἡμᾶς περισπᾶν, πάσας δὲ εἶναι ἀληθεῖς τε [καί]<sup>1</sup> φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ ἀπιθάνους· ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν περιωδευμένην συνδρομῆς<sup>2</sup> ἐκάστην τῶν ἐν τῇ συνδρομῇ ἐπιστατικῶς δοκιμάζομεν, ὁποῖόν τι γίνεται καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις, ὅταν ὁ δῆμος ἕκαστον τῶν μελλόντων ἄρχειν ἢ δικάζειν ἐξετάζη εἰ ἀξιὸς ἐστὶ τοῦ πιστευ-

183 θῆναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ τὴν κρίσιν. οἶον ὄντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς κρίσεως τόπον τοῦ τε κρίνοντος καὶ τοῦ κρινόμενου καὶ τοῦ δι' οὗ ἢ κρίσις, ἀποστήματός τε καὶ διαστήματος, τόπου χρόνου τρόπου διαθέσεως ἐνεργείας, ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων ὁποῖόν ἐστι φυλοκρινουῦμεν, τὸ μὲν κρίνον, μὴ ἢ ὄψις ἡμβλυται (τοιαύτη γὰρ οὐσα ἀθετός ἐστι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν), τὸ δὲ κρινόμενον, μὴ μικρὸν ἄγαν καθέστηκε, τὸ δὲ δι' οὗ ἢ κρίσις, μὴ ὁ ἄηρ ζοφερός ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ ἀπόστημα, μὴ μέγα λίαν ὑπόκειται, τὸ δὲ διάστημα, μὴ συγκέχυται, τὸν δὲ τόπον, μὴ ἀχανὴς ἐστὶ, τὸν δὲ χρόνον, μὴ ταχύς ἐστι, τὴν δὲ διάθεσιν, μὴ μανιώδης θεωρεῖται, τὴν δὲ ἐνεργείαν, μὴ ἀπρόσδεκτός ἐστιν.

184 Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα καθ' ἐν γίνεται κριτήριον, ἢ τε πιθανὴ φαντασία καὶ ἢ πιθανὴ ἄμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἢ πιθανὴ ἄμα καὶ ἀπερίσπαστος καὶ διεξωδευμένη. παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν ὄν

<sup>1</sup> [καί] secl. Heintz.

<sup>2</sup> συνδρομῆς Heintz: συνδρομῆν MSS., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> Literally, "poured together," "confused"; hence "shortened" or "telescoped."

case of the irreversible presentation it is merely required that none of the presentations in the concurrence should disturb us by a suspicion of its falsity but all should be apparently true and not improbable; but in the case of the concurrence which involves the "tested" presentation, we scrutinize attentively each of the presentations in the concurrence,—just as the practice is at assembly-meetings, when the People makes inquiry about each of those who desire to be magistrates or judges, to see whether he is worthy to be entrusted with the magistracy or the judgship. Thus, for example, as there are present 183 at the seat of judgement both the subject that judges and the object that is being judged and the medium through which judgement is effected, and distance and interval, place, time, mood, disposition, activity, we judge the distinctive character of each of these factors—as regards the subject judging, whether its vision be not dimmed (for vision of that kind is unfitted for judging); and as regards the object judged, whether it be not excessively small; and as regards the medium through which the judgement is effected, whether the atmosphere be not dark; and as to distance, whether it be not excessively great; and as to interval, whether it be not too short<sup>a</sup>; and as to place, whether it be not immense; and as to time, whether it be not brief; and as to disposition, whether it is not found to be insane; and as to activity, whether it be not unacceptable.

For all these factors together form the criterion— 184 namely, the probable presentation, and that which is at once both probable and irreversible and besides these that which is at once probable and irreversible and tested. And it is because of this that, just as

τρόπον ἐν τῷ βίῳ, ὅταν μὲν περὶ μικροῦ πράγματος  
ζητῶμεν, ἓνα μάρτυρα ἀνακρίνομεν, ὅταν δὲ περὶ  
μείζονος, πλείονας, ὅταν δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον περὶ ἀναγ-  
καιοτέρου, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν μαρτυρούντων ἐξετά-  
ζομεν ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθομολογήσεως, οὕτω,  
φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην, ἐν μὲν τοῖς τυχοῦσι  
πράγμασι τῇ πιθανῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ κριτηρίῳ  
χρῶμεθα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαφέρουσι τῇ ἀπερισπάστῳ,  
ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν συντείνουσι τῇ περι-  
185 ὠδευμένῃ. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων  
πραγμάτων τὴν διάφορόν φασι παραλαμβάνειν  
φαντασίαν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους περι-  
στάσεις μὴ τῇ αὐτῇ κατακολουθεῖν. τῇ μὲν γὰρ  
αὐτὸ μόνον πιθανῇ προσέχειν λέγουσιν ἐφ' ὧν οὐ  
δίδωσιν ἡμῖν καιρὸν ἢ περίστασις πρὸς ἀκριβῆ τοῦ  
186 πράγματος ἀναθεώρησιν. οἷον διώκεται τις ὑπὸ  
πολεμίων, καὶ ἐλθὼν εἰς τάφρον τινὰ φαντασίαν  
σπᾶ ὡς κἀνταῦθα πολεμίων αὐτὸν λοχώντων· εἶθ'  
ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας ὡς πιθανῆς συναρ-  
πασθεὶς ἐκκλίνεται καὶ φεύγει τὴν τάφρον, ἐπόμενος  
τῇ περὶ τὴν φαντασίαν πιθανότητι, πρὶν ἀκριβῶς  
ἐπιστῆσαι πρότερον εἰ τῷ ὄντι λόχος ἔστι πολεμίων  
187 κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἢ οὐδαμῶς. τῇ δὲ πιθανῇ καὶ  
περιωδευμένῃ ἔπονται ἐφ' ὧν χρόνος δίδεται εἰς τὸ  
μετὰ ἐπιστάσεως καὶ διεξόδου χρῆσθαι τῇ κρίσει  
τοῦ προσπίπτοντος πράγματος. οἷον ἐν ἀλαμπεῖ  
οἰκήματι εἰλημα σχοινίου θεασάμενός τις παραυ-  
τίκα μὲν ὄφιν ὑπολαβὼν τυγχάνειν ὑπερήλατο, τὸ  
δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο ὑποστρέψας ἐξετάζει τάληθές, καὶ  
εὐρῶν ἀκίνητον ἤδη μὲν εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ὄφιν ῥοπήν  
188 ἴσχει κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὁμῶς δὲ λογιζόμενος ὅτι  
καὶ ὄφεις ποτὲ ἀκίνητοῦσι χειμερινῶ κρύει παγέν-

in ordinary life when we are investigating a small  
matter we question a single witness, but in a greater  
matter several, and when the matter investigated is  
still more important we cross-question each of the  
witnesses on the testimony of the others,—so like-  
wise, says Carneades, in trivial matters we employ as  
criterion only the probable presentation, but in  
greater matters the irreversible, and in matters which  
contribute to happiness the tested presentation.  
Moreover, just as they adopt, they say, a different 185  
presentation to suit different cases, so also in different  
circumstances they do not cling to the same presenta-  
tion. For they declare that they attend to the  
immediately probable in cases where the circum-  
stances do not afford time for an accurate considera-  
tion of the matter. A man, for example, is being 186  
pursued by enemies, and coming to a ditch he receives  
a presentation which suggests that there, too,  
enemies are lying in wait for him; then being carried  
away by this presentation, as a probability, he turns  
aside and avoids the ditch, being led by the probability  
of the presentation, before he has exactly ascertained  
whether or not there really is an ambush of the enemy  
at the spot. But they follow the probable and tested 187  
presentation in cases where time is afforded for using  
their judgement on the object presented with delibera-  
tion and thorough examination. For example,<sup>a</sup> on  
seeing a coil of rope in an unlighted room a man  
jumps over it, conceiving it for the moment to be a  
snake, but turning back afterwards he inquires into  
the truth, and on finding it motionless he is already  
inclined to think that it is not a snake, but as he 188  
reckons, all the same, that snakes too are motionless

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 227.

τες, βακτηρία καθικνεῖται τοῦ σπειράματος, καὶ τότε οὕτως ἐκπεριδεύσας τὴν προσπίπτουσαν φαντασίαν συγκατατίθεται τῷ ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ ὄφιν ὑπάρχειν τὸ φαντασθὲν αὐτῷ σῶμα. καὶ πάλιν, ὡς προείπον, ὀρώντες τι περιφανῶς συγκατατιθέμεθα ὅτι τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, προδιεξοδεύσαντες ὅτι ἀρτίους μὲν ἔχομεν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ὕπαρ δὲ καὶ οὐ καθ' ὕπνου βλέπομεν, συμπάρεστι δὲ καὶ διαυγῆς ἀήρ καὶ ἀπόστημα σύμμετρον καὶ ἀκίνησία  
 189 τοῦ προσπίπτοντος, ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν, χρόνον ἡμῶν ἐσχηκότων αὐτάρκη πρὸς διέξοδον τῶν κατὰ τὸν τόπον αὐτῆς θεωρουμένων. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀπερισπάστου· προσίενται γὰρ αὐτὴν ὅταν μηδὲν ἦ τὸ ἀντιπεριέλκειν δυνάμενον, ὡς ἐπὶ Μενελάου προείρηται.  
 190 Ἄλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημαϊκῆς ἱστορίας ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀποδοθείσης, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλότριόν που καὶ τὴν τῶν Κυρηναϊκῶν στάσιν ἐπελθεῖν· δοκεῖ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων ἡ αἵρεσις ἀπὸ τῆς Σωκράτους ἀνεσχηκέναι διατριβῆς, ἀφ' ἧσπερ  
 191 ἀνέσχε καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα διαδοχῆ· φασὶν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖκοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν λέγειν ἀδιαψεύστως καὶ [βεβαίως] ἀνεξελέγκτως· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμποητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστίν ἢ γλυκύ ἐστίν, οὐχ  
 192 οἶόν τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι. εἰκὸς γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ λευκοῦ τινα λευκαντικῶς διατεθῆναι καὶ ὑπὸ μὴ

at times when numbed by winter's frost, he prods at the coiled mass with a stick, and then, after thus testing the presentation received, he assents to the fact that it is false to suppose that the body presented to him is a snake. And once again, as I said before, when we see a thing very plainly we assent to its being true when we have previously proved by testing that we have our senses in good order, and that we see it when wide awake and not asleep, and that there exists at the same time a clear atmosphere and a moderate distance and immobility on the part of the object perceived, so that because of these conditions  
 189 the presentation is trustworthy, we having had sufficient time for the scrutiny of the facts observed at the seat of the presentation. The same account is to be given of the irreversible presentation as well; for they accept it whenever there is nothing capable of controverting it, as was said above in the case of Menelaus.

But now that we have set forth the Academic  
 190 doctrine from Plato down, it is not, I fancy, out of place to deal also with the Cyrenaic position; for the Cyrenaic School appears to have arisen from the teaching of Socrates, from which also arose the School of Plato and his successors. The Cyrenaics, then,  
 191 assert that the affections are the criteria, and that they alone are apprehended and are infallible, but of the things that have caused the affections none is apprehensible or infallible. For, say they, that we feel whiteness or sweetness is a thing we can state infallibly and incontrovertibly; but that the object productive of the affection is white or is sweet it is impossible to affirm. For it is likely  
 192 that a man might be made to feel whiteness by what

γλυκῆς γλυκανθῆναι. καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς  
καὶ ἰκτεριῶν ὠχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ  
δὲ ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρυθθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπίεσας τὸν  
ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μεμηνῶς  
193 δισσᾶς ὄρᾳ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσοὺν φαντάζεται τὸν  
ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τὸδε τὶ  
πάσχουσιν, οἷον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθθαίνονται ἢ  
δυσάζονται, ἀληθῆς, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστι τὸ κινουῦν  
αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐνερευθῆς ἢ διπλοῦν ψεῦδος εἶναι νενόμι-  
σται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν  
οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. ὅθεν  
ἤτοι τὰ πάθη φαινόμενα θετέον ἢ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν  
194 παθῶν. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὰ πάθη φαιμέν εἶναι φαινόμενα,  
πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα λεκτέον ἀληθῆ καὶ καταληπτὰ·  
εἰ δὲ τὰ ποιητικὰ τῶν παθῶν προσαγορευόμενα  
φαινόμενα, πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ψευδῆ καὶ  
πάντα ἀκατάληπτα. τὸ γὰρ περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαῖνον  
πάθος ἑαυτοῦ πλέον οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυται. ἔνθεν  
καὶ, εἰ χρῆ τάληθῆς λέγειν, μόνον τὸ πάθος ἡμῖν  
ἐστὶ φαινόμενον· τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς καὶ τοῦ πάθους ποιη-  
τικὸν τάχα μὲν ἐστὶν ὄν, οὐ φαινόμενον δὲ ἡμῖν.  
195 καὶ ταύτη περὶ μὲν τὰ πάθη τὰ γε οἰκεία πάντες  
ἐσμὲν ἀπλανεῖς, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον  
πάντες πλανώμεθα· κακείνα μὲν ἐστὶ καταληπτὰ,  
τοῦτο δὲ ἀκατάληπτον, τῆς ψυχῆς πάνυ ἀσθενοῦς  
καθεστῶσης πρὸς διάγνωσιν αὐτοῦ παρὰ τοὺς  
τόπους, παρὰ τὰ διαστήματα, παρὰ τὰς κινήσεις,

\* Cf. P.H. i. 101, 126.

† Eurip. Bacch. 918:

καὶ μὴν ὄραν μοι δύο μὲν ἡλίους δοκῶ  
δισσᾶς δὲ Θήβας.

“The madman” is Pentheus.

is not white and sweetness by what is not sweet. For  
just as the sufferer from vertigo or jaundice <sup>a</sup> receives  
a yellowish impression from everything, and the  
sufferer from ophthalmia sees things red, and he who  
pushes his eye sideways gets as it were a double  
impression, and the madman beholds a “doubled  
Thebes,” and sees the image of a doubled sun,<sup>b</sup> and in 193  
all these cases, while it is true that they have this  
particular affection (have, for instance, a feeling of  
yellowness or of flushing or of doubleness), yet it is  
supposed to be false to say that the object which  
impresses them is yellow or reddish or double,—so  
also it is most reasonable to hold that we are not able  
to perceive anything more than our own immediate  
affections. Hence we must posit as apparent either  
the affections or the things productive of the affections.  
And if we assert that the affections are apparent, we 194  
must declare that all apparent things are true and  
apprehensible; but if we term the things productive  
of the affections apparent, all the apparent things are  
false and all non-apprehensible.<sup>c</sup> For the affection  
which takes place in us reveals to us nothing more  
than itself. Hence too (if one must speak the truth)  
our affection alone is apparent to us, and the external  
object which is productive of the affection, though it  
is perhaps existent, is not apparent to us. And in 195  
this way, whereas we are all unerring about our own  
affections, as regards the external real object we all  
err; and whereas the former are apprehensible, the  
latter is non-apprehensible, the soul being far too  
weak to discern it, owing to the positions, the

<sup>c</sup> i.e. on the Cyrenaic assumption (§ 191) that affections  
are apprehensible and true, their causes not so.



παρὰ τὰς μεταβολάς, παρὰ ἄλλας παμπληθεῖς  
 αἰτίας. ἔνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν  
 ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς χρή-  
 196 μασιν.<sup>1</sup> λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι  
 κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δὲ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ  
 ἔχουσι. ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμ-  
 βάνεται, τὸ δὲ εἰ τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἀπὸ λευκοῦ ἐγ-  
 γίνεται αὐτῷ καὶ τῷ πέλας, οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναται  
 λέγειν μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ τοῦ πέλας πάθος, οὔτε  
 197 ὁ πέλας μὴ ἀναδεχόμενος τὸ ἐκείνου. μηδενὸς δὲ  
 κοινοῦ πάθους περὶ ἡμᾶς γινομένου προπετές ἐστι  
 τὸ λέγειν ὅτι τὸ ἐμοὶ τοῖον φαινόμενον τοῖον καὶ  
 τοῦ παρεστῶτι φαίνεται. τάχα γὰρ ἐγὼ μὲν οὕτω  
 συγκρίμμαι ὡς λευκαίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔξωθεν  
 προσπίπτοντος, ἕτερος δὲ οὕτω κατεσκευασμένην  
 ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν ὥστε ἐτέρως διατεθῆναι. οὐ  
 198 πάντως οὖν κοινὸν ἐστὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν. καὶ  
 ὅτι τῷ ὄντι παρὰ τὰς διαφόρους τῆς αἰσθήσεως  
 κατασκευὰς οὐχ ὡσαύτως κινούμεθα, πρόδηλον ἐπί-  
 τε τῶν ἰκτεριῶντων καὶ ὀφθαλμιῶντων καὶ τῶν  
 κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένων· ὡς γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ οἰ-  
 μὲν ὠκρατικῶς οἱ δὲ φουικτικῶς οἱ δὲ λευκαν-  
 τικῶς πάσχουσι, οὕτως εἰκὸς ἐστὶ καὶ τοὺς κατὰ  
 φύσιν διακειμένους παρὰ τὴν διάφορον τῶν αἰ-  
 σθήσεων κατασκευὴν μὴ ὡσαύτως ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν  
 κινεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐτέρως μὲν τὸν λευκόν, ἐτέρως δὲ  
 τὸν χαροπὸν, μὴ ὡσαύτως δὲ τὸν μελανόφθαλμον.  
 ὥστε κοινὰ μὲν ἡμᾶς ὀνόματα τίθεναι τοῖς πράγ-  
 μασιν, πάθη δὲ γε ἔχειν ἴδια.

199 Ἐνάλογα δὲ εἶναι δοκεῖ τοῖς περὶ κριτηρίων

<sup>1</sup> χρήμασιν Natorp: κρίμασιν mss., Bekk.

intervals, the motions, the changes, and a host of  
 other causes. Hence they assert that there exists  
 no criterion common to mankind, but common names  
 are given to the objects. For all in common use the  
 terms "white" or "sweet," but they do not possess  
 in common anything white or sweet. For each man  
 perceives his own particular affection, but as to  
 whether this affection is produced by a white object  
 both in himself and in his neighbour, neither the  
 man himself can affirm without experiencing his  
 neighbour's affection, nor can the neighbour without  
 experiencing that of the man. But since there is no  
 affection which is common to us all, it is rash to assert  
 that the thing which appears of this kind to me  
 appears to be of this kind to the man next me as well.  
 For possibly while I am so constituted as to get a  
 feeling of whiteness from that which impresses me  
 from without, the other man has his sense so con-  
 structed as to be otherwise affected. So what appears  
 to us is not always common to all. And that we do  
 not, in fact, receive identical impressions, owing to the  
 different constructions of our senses, is obvious in the  
 case of sufferers from jaundice and ophthalmia and  
 of those who are in a normal condition. For just as  
 some have an affection of yellow, others of crimson,  
 others of white, caused by the same object, so also  
 it is likely that those who are in a normal condition  
 will not receive identical impressions from the same  
 objects owing to the differing construction of their  
 senses, but the grey-eyed one kind, the blue-eyed  
 another, and the black-eyed a different kind. So that  
 we give to things names that are common, but the  
 affections we have are peculiar to each of us.

Corresponding to the statements made by these 199

λεγομένοις κατὰ τούτους τοὺς ἄνδρας καὶ τὰ περὶ  
 τελῶν λεγόμενα. διήκει γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ  
 τέλη. τῶν γὰρ παθῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ  
 ἀλγεινὰ τὰ δὲ μεταξύ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀλγεινὰ κακὰ  
 φασὶν εἶναι, ὡν τέλος ἀλγηδῶν, τὰ δὲ ἡδέα ἀγαθὰ,  
 ὡν τέλος ἐστὶν ἀδιάρηστον ἡδονή, τὰ δὲ μεταξύ  
 οὔτε ἀγαθὰ οὔτε κακὰ, ὡν τέλος τὸ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν  
 οὔτε κακόν, ὅπερ πάθος ἐστὶ μεταξύ ἡδονῆς καὶ  
 200 ἀλγηδόνος. πάντων οὖν τῶν ὄντων τὰ πάθη  
 κριτήριά ἐστι καὶ τέλη, ζῶμέν τε, φασίν, ἐπόμενοι  
 ταῦτοις, ἐναργεία τε καὶ εὐδοκήσει προσέχοντες,  
 ἐναργεία μὲν κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα πάθη, εὐδοκήσει δὲ  
 κατὰ τὴν ἡδονήν.

Τοιαῦτα μὲν καὶ οἱ Κυρηναῖκοί, συστέλλοντες  
 μᾶλλον τὸ κριτήριον παρὰ τοὺς περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα·  
 ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ σύνθετον αὐτὸ ἐποίουν ἔκ τε ἐναρ-  
 γείας καὶ τοῦ λόγου, οὗτοι δὲ ἐν μόναις αὐτὸ ταῖς  
 ἐναργείαις καὶ τοῖς πάθεσιν δρίζουσιν.

201 Οὐκ ἄποθεν δὲ τῆς τούτων δόξης εὐκασιῶν εἶναι  
 καὶ οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν τῆς ἀλη-  
 θείας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐγένοντό τινες τὸ  
 τοιοῦτο ἀξιούντες, προὔπτον πεποίηκεν Ἀντίοχος  
 ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Κανονικῶν  
 ῥητῶς γράψας ταῦτα “ ἄλλος δὲ τις, ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν  
 οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἀπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας,  
 ἐπέθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς  
 ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὄλως ἡμᾶς κατα-  
 202 λαμβάνειν.” εἰκοι γὰρ διὰ τούτων ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν  
 προειρημένην τιθέναι στάσιν καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν

men regarding criteria are, as it seems, their state-  
 ments regarding Ends. For the affections reach even  
 as far as the Ends.<sup>a</sup> For of the affections some are  
 pleasant, some painful, some intermediate; and the  
 painful, they say, are evils, whereof the End is pain,  
 and the pleasant are goods, whereof the infallible  
 End is pleasure, and the intermediate are neither  
 goods nor evils, whereof the End is neither good nor  
 evil, this being an affection intermediate between  
 pleasure and pain. Of all things, therefore, that exist 200  
 the affections are the criteria and Ends, and we live,  
 they say, by following these, paying attention to  
 evidence and to approval—to evidence in respect of  
 the other affections, but to approval in respect of  
 pleasure.

Such are the views of the Cyrenaics, who thus, as  
 compared with the Platonists, restricted the nature  
 of the criterion more closely; for whereas the latter  
 made it to be a compound of both evidence and  
 reason,<sup>b</sup> the former confine it to evidences and affec-  
 tions.

Not far removed, it would seem, from the opinion 201  
 of the Cyrenaics are those who declare the senses to be  
 the criterion of truth. For that there have been some  
 who have maintained this view has been made clear  
 by Antiochus<sup>c</sup> the Academic, when in the Second  
 Book of his *Canonic*s he writes thus: “But a certain  
 other man, second to none in the art of medicine  
 and a student also of philosophy, believed that the  
 sensations are really and truly perceptions, and that  
 we apprehend nothing at all by the reason.” For in 202  
 these words Antiochus seems to be stating the view  
 mentioned above and to be hinting at Asclepiades the

<sup>a</sup> i.e. the ethical “ends” (good and evil); cf. *P.H.* i. 25.

<sup>b</sup> See §§ 141 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 162 *supra*; *P.H.* i. 235.

ιατρὸν αἰνίττεσθαι, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον αὐτῷ γενόμενον. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς τούτου φορᾶς ποικιλώτερον καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐν τοῖς ἱατρικοῖς ὑπομνήμασι διεξήλθομεν, ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν ἀνάγκην παλινωδεῖν.

203 Ἐπίκουρος δὲ δυοῖν ὄντων τῶν συζυγούντων ἀλλήλοις πραγμάτων, φαντασίας καὶ τῆς δόξης, τούτων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣν καὶ ἐνάργειαν καλεῖ, διὰ παντὸς ἀληθῆ φησὶν ὑπάρχειν. ὥς γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα πάθη, τουτέστιν ἡδονὴ καὶ πόνος, ἀπὸ ποιητικῶν τινῶν καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ποιητικὰ συνίσταται, οἷον ἢ μὲν ἡδονὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἢ δὲ ἀλγηδῶν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλγεινῶν, καὶ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ποιητικὸν ἐνδέχεται ποτε μὴ εἶναι ἡδὺ οὔτε τὸ τῆς ἀλγηδόνος παρεκτικὸν μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀλγεινόν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἡδον ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ἀλγύνον ἀλγεινὸν τὴν φύσιν ὑποκεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν, παθῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς οὐσῶν, τὸ ποιητικὸν ἐκάστου αὐτῶν πάντη τε καὶ πάντως φανταστὸν ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὄν φανταστὸν, μὴ ὑπάρχον κατ' ἀλήθειαν τοιοῦτον οἷον φαίνεται, ποιητικὸν φαντασίας καθεστάναι.

204 Καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος τὸ παραπλήσιον χρῆ λογίζεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὄρατὸν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ὄρατόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔστι τοιοῦτον ὅποιον φαίνεται· καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀκουστόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτον ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. γίνονται οὖν πᾶσαι  
205 αἱ φαντασίαι ἀληθεῖς. καὶ κατὰ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ ἀληθῆς λέγεται<sup>1</sup> φαντασία, φασὶν οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι,

<sup>1</sup> λέγεται N: φαίνεται cet., Bekk.

physician, who abolished the "ruling principle,"<sup>a</sup> and who lived at the same time as himself. But of this man's attitude we have given a more circumstantial and particular account in our *Medical Memoirs*,<sup>b</sup> so that there is no need to repeat the story.

Epicurus<sup>c</sup> asserts that there are two things 203 which are correlative—namely, presentation and opinion,—of which the presentation, which he also terms "evidence," is constantly true. For just as the primary affections—that is to say pleasure and pain—come about owing to certain agents and in accord with those agents (pleasure, for instance, from things pleasant and pain from things painful), and it is impossible for the agent productive of pleasure ever to be not pleasant, or that which is creative of pain to be not painful, but of necessity that which gives pleasure must in its real nature be pleasant and that which gives pain painful,—so also in the case of the presentations, which are affections of ours, the agent which is productive of each of them is always entirely presented, and, as being presented, it is incapable of being productive of the presentation without being in very truth such as it appears.

In the case, also, of the particular sensations one 204 must argue in like manner. Thus the visible object not only appears visible but actually is such as it appears; and the audible object not only appears audible but also really is so in truth; and so on with the rest. The presentations, then, which occur are all true. And reasonably so; for, say the Epicureans, 205

<sup>a</sup> *i.e.* denied the existence of that part of the soul which the Stoics termed the "ruling principle" or "regent part"; cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* p. xxv.

<sup>b</sup> This work of Sextus is no longer extant.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 368.

ὅταν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τε καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον γίνηται, πᾶσα δὲ φαντασία ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τοῦ φανταστοῦ καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ φανταστόν συνίσταται, πᾶσα κατ' ἀνάγκην φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής.

206 ἐξαπατᾶ δὲ ἐνίους ἢ διαφορὰ τῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ὄρατοῦ, δοκουσῶν προσπίπτει φαντασιῶν, καθ' ἣν ἢ ἀλλοιόχρουν ἢ ἀλλοιόσχημον ἢ ἄλλως πως ἐξηλλαγμένον φαίνεται τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ὑπενόησαν γὰρ ὅτι τῶν οὕτω διαφερουσῶν καὶ μαχομένων φαντασιῶν δεῖ τὴν μὲν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ψευδῆ τυγχάνειν. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐήθες, καὶ ἀνδρῶν μὴ συνωρώντων τὴν

207 ἐν τοῖς οὐσι φύσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὄλον ὄραται τὸ στερεμνιον, ἵνα ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρατῶν ποιῶμεθα τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ τὸ χρῶμα τοῦ στερεμνίου. τοῦ δὲ χρώματος τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ στερεμνίου, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν σύνεγγυς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μετρίου διαστήματος βλεπομένων, τὸ δ' ἐκτὸς τοῦ στερεμνίου κἂν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς τόποις ὑποκείμενον, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ μακροῦ διαστήματος θεωρουμένων. τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ ἐξαλλαττόμενον, καὶ ἴδιον ἀναδεχόμενον σχῆμα, τοιαύτην ἀναδίδωσι φαντασίαν ὅποιον καὶ

208 αὐτὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται. ὅπερ οὖν τρόπον οὔτε ἢ ἐν τῷ κρουμένῳ χαλκῷματι φωνῆ ἐξακουέται οὔτε ἢ ἐν τῷ στόματι τοῦ κεκραγῶτος, ἀλλ' ἢ προσπίπτουσα τῇ ἡμέτερα αἰσθήσει, καὶ ὡς οὐθείς φησι τὸν ἐξ ἀποστήματος μικρᾶς ἀκούοντα φωνῆς ψευδῶς ἀκούειν, ἐπεὶ περ σύνεγγυς ἐλθὼν ὡς μείζονος ταύτης ἀντιλαμβάνεται, οὕτως οὐκ ἂν εἴπομι ψεύδεσθαι τὴν ὄψιν, ὅτι ἐκ μακροῦ μὲν διαστήματος

if a presentation is termed " true " whenever it arises from a real object and in accord with that real object, and every presentation arises from a real presented object and in accord with that object, then every presentation is necessarily true. But some are de- 206 ceived by the difference in the presentations which seem to be derived from the same object of sense—for instance a visible object—because of which the object appears of another colour or of another shape, or altered in some other way. For they have supposed that, of the presentations thus differing and conflicting, one kind must be true and the kind derived from an opposite source false. But this is silly, and the notion of men who do not fully consider the real nature of things. Thus—to base our 207 argument on objects of sight—it is not the whole of the solid body that is seen, but the colour of the solid body. And of the colour, one part is on the solid (as in the case of objects seen close at hand or at a moderate distance), and another part outside the solid and existent in the spaces adjacent (as in the case of things viewed at a great distance).<sup>a</sup> And this being altered in the intervening space and receiving a special shape of its own gives rise to a presentation which is similar to its own real nature. For just as 208 neither the sound in the brass instrument that is struck, nor the sound in the mouth of the man who shouts, is heard but the sound which strikes on our own sense ; and just as no one says that he who hears a faint sound from a distance hears falsely because the same man, on coming close, perceives it as loud ;—just so I should decline to say that the eyesight is

ing that its colour is partly absorbed by the intervening space, and thus is " outside the solid " (body).

<sup>a</sup> The Epicureans explained the fact that our impressions of a coloured object vary with its distance from us by assum-

209 μικρὸν ὄρα τὸν πύργον καὶ στρογγύλον ἐκ δὲ τοῦ  
 σύνεγγυς μείζονα καὶ τετράγωνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον  
 ἀληθεύειν, ὅτι καὶ ὅτε φαίνεται μικρὸν αὐτῇ τὸ  
 αἰσθητὸν καὶ τοιούτῳ σχημον, ὄντως ἐστὶ μικρὸν  
 καὶ τοιούτῳ σχημον, τῇ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος φορᾷ ἀπο-  
 θραυομένων τῶν κατὰ τὰ εἶδωλα περάτων, καὶ ὅτε  
 μέγα πάλιν καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, πάλιν ὁμοίως μέγα  
 καὶ ἀλλοιόσχημον, ἤδη μέντοι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμφοτέρα  
 καθεστώς. τοῦτο γὰρ τῆς διαστρόφου λοιπὸν ἐστὶ  
 δόξης οἰεσθαι, ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἦν τό τε ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς  
 210 καὶ τὸ πόρρωθεν θεωρούμενον φανταστόν. αἰ-  
 σθήσεως δὲ ἴδιον ὑπῆρχε τοῦ παρόντος μόνον καὶ  
 κινούντος αὐτὴν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οἷον χρώματος,  
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνθάδε  
 ἄλλο δὲ τὸ ἐνθάδε ὑποκείμενον. διόπερ αἱ μὲν  
 φαντασίαι διὰ ταῦτα πᾶσαι εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, (αἱ δὲ  
 δόξαι οὐ πᾶσαι ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς,)<sup>1</sup> ἀλλ' εἶχόν τινα  
 διαφοράν. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν ἦσαν ἀληθεῖς αἱ  
 δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἐπεὶ κρίσεις καθεστᾶσιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ  
 ταῖς φαντασίαις, κρίνομεν δὲ τὰ μὲν ὀρθῶς τὰ  
 δὲ μοχθηρῶς ἤτοι παρὰ τὸ προστιθέναί τι καὶ  
 προσνέμειν ταῖς φαντασίαις ἢ παρὰ τὸ ἀφαιρεῖν  
 τι τούτων καὶ κοινῶς καταψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀλόγου  
 211 αἰσθήσεως. οὐκοῦν τῶν δοξῶν κατὰ τὸν Ἐπί-  
 κουρον αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ἀληθεῖς  
 μὲν αἱ τε ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρ-  
 τυρούμεναι πρὸς τῆς ἐναργείας, ψευδεῖς δὲ αἱ τε  
 ἀντιμαρτυρούμεναι καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτυρούμεναι πρὸς  
 212 τῆς ἐναργείας. ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπιμαρτύρησις μὲν κατὰ-  
 ληψις δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον τοιοῦτον

<sup>1</sup> <αἱ δὲ . . . ἀληθεῖς> add. Usener, Mutsch.: αἱ δὲ δόξαι  
 εἶχόν (om. ἀλλ') Bekk.

false because at a long distance it sees the tower as  
 small and round but from close at hand as large and  
 square, but I should say rather that it reports truly 209  
 because, when the object of sense appears to it small  
 and of a certain shape, it really is small and of a cer-  
 tain shape, as the limits belonging to the images<sup>a</sup> are  
 rubbed away by their passage through the air; and  
 again when it appears large and of a different shape  
 it is correspondingly large and of a different shape,  
 since it is no longer the same object that is both at  
 once. For it is left to the distorted opinion to imagine  
 that the presented object seen from close at hand is  
 the same as that seen from a distance. But it is the 210  
 special function of sense to perceive only that which  
 is present and affects it—colour, for instance—but  
 not to discern that the object here is one thing and  
 the object there another. Hence, for these reasons,  
 presentations are all true, (but opinions are not all  
 true) but possess certain distinctions. For some of  
 them are true, others false, since they are judgements  
 of ours concerning the presentations, and we judge  
 sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly either  
 because of adding and attaching something to the  
 presentations or because of subtracting something  
 from them and, in either case, falsifying the irrational  
 sensation. Of opinions, then, according to Epicurus, 211  
 some are true, others false; the true being those  
 which testify for, and not against, the evidence of  
 sense, and the false those which testify against, and  
 not for, that evidence. And confirmatory testimony 212  
 is apprehension by means of evidence that the thing

<sup>a</sup> Sensation, according to Epicurus, is caused by "images"  
 or "effluences," which issue forth from the external objects and  
 strike upon the organs of sense; cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxlii.

εἶναι ὁποῖόν ποτε ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον Πλάτωνος μα-  
 κρόθεν προσιόντος εἰκάζω μὲν καὶ δοξάζω παρὰ τὸ  
 διάστημα ὅτι Πλάτων ἐστί, προσπελάσαντος δὲ  
 αὐτοῦ προσεμαρτυρήθη ὅτι ὁ Πλάτων ἐστί, συν-  
 αιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος, καὶ ἐπεμαρτυρήθη δι'  
 213 αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας. οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις δὲ ἐστὶν  
 ἀκολουθία τοῦ ὑποσταθέντος καὶ δοξασθέντος  
 ἀδήλου τῷ φαινομένῳ, οἷον ὁ Ἐπίκουρος λέγων  
 εἶναι κενόν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδηλον, πιστοῦται δι' ἐναρ-  
 γοῦς πράγματος τοῦτο, τῆς κινήσεως· μὴ ὄντος  
 γὰρ κενοῦ οὐδὲ κίνησις ὄφειλεν εἶναι, τόπον μὴ  
 214 ἔχοντος τοῦ κινουμένου σώματος εἰς ὃν περιστή-  
 σεται διὰ τὸ πάντα πλήρη εἶναι καὶ ναστά, ὥστε  
 τῷ δοξασθέντι ἀδήλω μὴ ἀντιμαρτυρεῖν τὸ φαινό-  
 μενον κινήσεως οὔσης. ἢ μέντοι ἀντιμαρτύρησις  
 μαχόμενόν τί ἐστί τῇ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ  
 συνασκευὴ τοῦ φαινομένου τῷ ὑποσταθέντι ἀ-  
 δήλω, οἷον ὁ στωικὸς λέγει μὴ εἶναι κενόν, ἀδηλόν τι  
 ἀξιῶν, τούτῳ δὲ οὕτως ὑποσταθέντι ὀφείλει τὸ  
 φαινόμενον συνασκευάζεσθαι, φημι δ' ἢ κινήσις·  
 μὴ ὄντος γὰρ κενοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ κινήσις  
 γίνεται κατὰ τὸν ἤδη προδοδηλωμένον ἡμῖν  
 215 τρόπον. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἢ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις  
 ἀντίξου ἐστὶ τῇ ἐπιμαρτυρήσει· ἦν γὰρ ὑπόπτωσις  
 δι' ἐναργείας τοῦ τὸ δοξαζόμενον μὴ εἶναι τοιοῦτον  
 ὁποῖόν περ ἐδοξάζετο, οἷον πόρρωθεν τινος προσ-  
 ιόντος εἰκάζομεν παρὰ τὸ διάστημα Πλάτωνα εἶναι,  
 ἀλλὰ συναιρεθέντος τοῦ διαστήματος ἐγνωμεν δι'  
 ἐναργείας ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ Πλάτων. καὶ γέγονε τὸ  
 116

opined is of such a sort as it was opined to be—as  
 when, for example, on the approach of Plato from  
 afar I guess and opine, because of the distance, that  
 it is Plato, and when he has drawn near the fact that  
 he is Plato is further testified—the distance being  
 reduced—and is confirmed by actual evidence of  
 sense. And lack of contrary testimony is the con- 213  
 gruity of the supposed and opined non-evident object  
 with the apparent—as when Epicurus says that  
 void exists, which is a thing non-evident, and this is  
 supported by an obvious fact, namely motion ; for if  
 void does not exist, neither ought motion to exist, the  
 moving body having no place into which to pass over,  
 owing to the fact that all things are full and close-  
 packed ; so that, since motion exists, the apparent 214  
 does not give testimony that contradicts the opined  
 non-evident fact. But contrary testimony is some-  
 thing which conflicts with lack of contrary testimony ;  
 for it is the joint-refutation of the apparent fact and  
 the supposed non-evident fact,—as when, for instance,  
 the Stoic says that void does not exist, assert-  
 ing something non-evident, and jointly with this  
 supposed fact the apparent fact, by which I mean  
 motion, is necessarily refuted ; for if void does not  
 exist, of necessity motion does not exist either,  
 according to the argument we have already set out.  
 So likewise lack of confirmatory testimony is opposed 215  
 to confirmatory testimony ; for it is the impression  
 due to sense-evidence that the thing opined is not  
 such as it was opined to be ; as, for instance, when  
 someone is approaching from afar and we guess,  
 because of the distance, that it is Plato, but when  
 the distance is reduced we learn by evidence that  
 it is not Plato. Such an occurrence is lack of con-

τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιμαρτυρήθη  
 216 τῷ φαινομένῳ τὸ δοξαζόμενον. ὅθεν ἡ μὲν ἐπι-  
 μαρτύρησις καὶ οὐκ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ἀληθῆς  
 εἶναι τι ἔστι κριτήριον, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἐπιμαρτύρησις  
 καὶ ἀντιμαρτύρησις τοῦ ψεύδους εἶναι. πάντων δὲ  
 κρηπὶς καὶ θεμέλιος ἡ ἐνάργεια.  
 217 Τοιοῦτο μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἐπίκουρόν ἐστι κριτή-  
 ριον· οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη καὶ Θεόφραστον  
 καὶ κοινῶς οἱ περιπατητικοί, διττῆς οὔσης κατὰ τὸ  
 ἀνωτάτω τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων φύσεως, ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν,  
 καθὼς προείπον, αἰσθητὰ ἐστί τὰ δὲ νοητά, διττὸν  
 καὶ αὐτοὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, αἰσθησῶ μὲν  
 218 τῶν αἰσθητῶν νόησιν δὲ τῶν νοητῶν, κοινὸν δὲ  
 ἀμφοτέρων, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Θεόφραστος, τὸ ἐναργές.  
 τάξει μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν ἐστι τὸ ἄλογον καὶ ἀναπόδει-  
 κτον κριτήριον, ἡ αἰσθησις, δυνάμει δὲ ὁ νοῦς, εἰ καὶ  
 τῇ τάξει δευτερεύειν δοκεῖ παρὰ τὴν αἰσθησῶν.  
 219 ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν κινεῖται ἡ αἰσθησις,  
 ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς κατὰ ἐνάργειαν περὶ τὴν αἰσθησῶν  
 κινήσεως ἐπιγίνεται τι κατὰ ψυχὴν κίνημα τοῖς  
 κρείττοσι καὶ βελτίοσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν δυναμένοις  
 κινεῖσθαι ζῶοις. ὅπερ μνήμη τε καὶ φαντασία  
 καλεῖται παρ' αὐτοῖς, μνήμη μὲν τοῦ περὶ τὴν  
 αἰσθησῶν πάθους, φαντασία δὲ τοῦ ἐμποιήσαντος  
 220 τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ πάθος αἰσθητοῦ. διόπερ ἔχνει τὸ  
 τοιοῦτον ἀναλογεῖν κίνημα φασίν· καὶ ὃν τρόπον  
 ἐκεῖνο, φημί δὲ τὸ ἔχνος, ὑπὸ τινός τε γίνεται καὶ  
 ἀπὸ τινος, ὑπὸ τινος μὲν οἶον τῆς τοῦ ποδός ἐπ-  
 ερείσεως, ἀπὸ τινος δὲ ὡσπερ τοῦ Δίωνος, οὕτω καὶ  
 τὸ προειρημένον τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα ὑφ' οὗ μὲν  
 γίνεται ὡσπερ τοῦ περὶ τὴν αἰσθησῶν πάθους, ἀφ'

\* Cf. § 228.

firmatory testimony; for the thing opined was not  
 confirmed by the apparent fact. Hence confirmatory 216  
 testimony and lack of contrary testimony form a  
 criterion of the truth of a thing, but lack of con-  
 firmatory testimony and contradictory testimony of  
 its falsehood. And the base and foundation of all  
 is the evidence of sense.

Such, then, is the criterion according to Epicurus. 217  
 But Aristotle and Theophrastus and the Peripatetics  
 in general, seeing that the nature of things falls  
 into two main classes,—since, as I said before, some  
 things are sensible, others intelligible,—themselves  
 also admit a twofold criterion, sense of things sensible  
 and intellect of things intelligible, while common to 218  
 both, as Theophrastus said, is the plainly evident.  
 First, then, in order comes the irrational and non-  
 demonstrable criterion, sense, but first in potency  
 intellect, although it appears to come second in order  
 as compared with sense. For the sense is affected by 219  
 things sensible, and as a result of the affection of the  
 sense in an evident way there supervenes an affection  
 of the soul in such creatures as are superior and better  
 and able to move of themselves; and this is termed by  
 them memory and presentation—memory of the affec-  
 tion felt by the sense, and presentation of the sensible  
 object which has produced the affection in the sense.  
 Hence they say that an affection of this kind is com- 220  
 parable to a foot-mark<sup>a</sup>; and just as that (I mean  
 the foot-mark) is made both by something and from  
 something—by something as, for example, by the  
 pressure of the foot, and from something, as, say, from  
 Dion,—so also the affection of the soul mentioned  
 above is generated by something, as, say, the affection  
 of the sense, and from something, such as the sensible

οὐδὲ καθάπερ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, πρὸς ὃ καὶ ὁμοίωτητά  
 221 τινα σώζει. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν τὸ κίνημα, ὅπερ  
 μνήμη τε καὶ φαντασία καλεῖται, εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ  
 τρίτον ἐπιγινόμενον ἄλλο κίνημα τὸ τῆς λογικῆς  
 φαντασίας, κατὰ κρίσιν λοιπὸν καὶ προαίρεσιν τὴν  
 ἡμετέραν συμβαῖνον, ὅπερ κίνημα διάνοιά τε καὶ  
 νοῦς προσαγορεύεται, οἷον ὅταν τις προσπεσόντος  
 κατ' ἐνάργειαν Δίωνος πάθη πως τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ  
 τραπήῃ, ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ περι τὴν αἴσθησιν πάθους ἐγ-  
 γνήηται τις αὐτοῦ τῆ ψυχῆ φαντασία, ἣν καὶ μνήμη  
 222 πρότερον ἐλέγομεν καὶ ἴχνει παραπλήσιον ὑπάρχειν,  
 ἀπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς φαντασίας ἐκουσίως ἀνάζω-  
 γραφῆ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀναπλάσση φάντασμα, καθάπερ τὸν  
 γενικὸν ἄνθρωπον. τὸ γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτο κίνημα τῆς  
 ψυχῆς κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς οἱ περιπατητικοὶ  
 τῶν φιλοσόφων διάνοιάν τε καὶ νοῦν ὀνομάζουσι,  
 κατὰ μὲν τὸ δύνασθαι διάνοιαν, κατὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαν  
 223 νοῦν· ὅταν μὲν γὰρ δύνηται τοῦτον ποιῆσθαι τὸν  
 ἀναπλασμὸν ψυχῆ, τουτέστιν ὅταν πεφύκη, διάνοια  
 καλεῖται, ὅταν δὲ ἐνεργητικῶς ἤδη ποιῆ, νοῦς ὀνο-  
 μάζεται. ἀπὸ μέντοι τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς διανοήσεως  
 συνίσταται ἢ τε ἔννοια καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη.  
 διανόσεις μὲν γὰρ γίνεται ὅτε μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος  
 224 εἰδῶν ὅτε δὲ τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γενῶν· ἀλλ' ὃ  
 μὲν ἀθροισμὸς τῶν τοιούτων τοῦ νοῦ φαντασμάτων  
 καὶ ἡ συγκεφαλαίωσις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους εἰς τὸ  
 καθόλου ἔννοια καλεῖται, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀθροισμῷ τούτῳ  
 καὶ τῆ συγκεφαλαιώσει τελευταῖον ὑφίσταται ἢ τε  
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὸ ἀκριβὲς καὶ  
 ἀδιάπτωτον ἔχουσα, τέχνη δὲ ἢ μὴ πάντως τοιαύτη.  
 225 ὥσπερ δὲ ἢ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ τεχνῶν φύσις ἐστὶν  
 ὑστερογενής, οὕτω καὶ ἢ καλουμένη δόξα· ὅταν γὰρ

object, to which also it preserves a certain similarity.  
 And this affection, again, which is termed both 221  
 memory and presentation, possesses within itself a  
 third and separate supervenient affection—that of  
 rational presentation, which is an after-result con-  
 sequent on our judgement and preference; and this  
 affection is called mind and thought; as, for example,  
 when someone, on receiving an evident impression of  
 Dion, suffers a certain affection of sense and a certain  
 disturbance, and by the affection of his sense there is  
 produced in his soul a presentation (which is also, as  
 we said above, memory and similar to a foot-mark),  
 and from this presentation there is voluntarily limned 222  
 and represented by him an imagined object, such as  
 generic Man. Now this kind of affection of the soul  
 the Peripatetic philosophers call either mind or  
 thought according to the different ways in which it  
 occurs—mind in so far as it is a potency, thought in  
 so far as it is an actuality; for whenever the soul is 223  
 potentially able to form this representation—that is  
 to say, whenever it is of a nature to do so—it is called  
 mind, but whenever it is already actually doing so,  
 it is termed thought. Moreover, from thought and  
 the action of mind arise comprehension and science  
 and art. For mental action deals at one time with  
 particulars, at another with both particulars and  
 genera; but the aggregation of such images of the 224  
 thought and the summing-up of the particulars in  
 the universal is termed comprehension, and in this  
 process of aggregation and summing-up the last stage  
 constitutes science and art—science being that which  
 possesses accuracy and inerrancy, art that which  
 does not always possess them. And as the sciences 225  
 and arts are of later origin, so also is what is termed



εἴη ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐγγενομένη  
 226 φαντασίᾳ καὶ τῷ φανέντῳ πρόσθηται καὶ συγκατά-  
 μένων πρῶτα κριτήρια τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώ-  
 σεως ἢ τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ ὁ νοῦς, ἢ μὲν ὄργανον  
 τρόπον ἔχουσα ὁ δὲ τεχνίτου. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡμεῖς  
 οὐ δυνάμεθα χωρὶς ζυγοῦ τὴν τῶν βαρέων καὶ  
 κούφων ἐξέτασιν ποιῆσαι, οὐδὲ ἄτερ κανόνος τὴν  
 τῶν εὐθέων καὶ στρεβλῶν διαφορὰν λαβεῖν, οὕτως  
 οὐδὲ ὁ νοῦς χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως δοκιμάσαι πέφυκε τὰ  
 πράγματα.

Τοιοῦτοι μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰσι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ  
 227 τοῦ περιπάτου ἀπολειπομένης δ' ἔτι τῆς στωικῆς  
 δόξης παρακειμένως καὶ περὶ ταύτης λέγωμεν.  
 κριτήριον τοίνυν φασὶν ἀληθείας εἶναι οἱ ἄνδρες  
 οὗτοι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ταύτην δ'  
 εἰσόμεθα, πρότερον γνόντες τί ποτέ ἐστι κατ' αὐτοὺς  
 ἢ φαντασία καὶ τίνες ἐπ' εἶδους ταύτης διαφοραί.  
 228 φαντασία οὖν ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ.  
 περὶ ἧς εὐθύς καὶ διέστησαν. Κλεάνθης μὲν γὰρ  
 ἤκουσε τὴν τύπωσιν κατὰ εἰσοχὴν τε καὶ ἐξοχὴν,  
 ὥσπερ καὶ (τὴν)<sup>1</sup> διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων γυνομένην  
 229 τοῦ κηροῦ τύπωσιν, Χρύσιππος δὲ ἄτοπον ἡγείτο  
 τὸ τοιοῦτο. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ φησι, τῆς διανοίας  
 δεήσει ὑφ' ἐν ποτε τρίγωνόν τι καὶ τετράγωνον  
 φαντασιουμένης τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν  
 χρόνον διαφέροντα ἔχειν περὶ αὐτῷ σχήματα ἅμα  
 τε τρίγωνον καὶ τετράγωνον γίνεσθαι ἢ καὶ περι-  
 φερές, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον· εἶτα πολλῶν ἅμα φαν-

<sup>1</sup> <τὴν> add. Zeller.

<sup>o</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 70.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. the mind, or part of the soul which receives the

“opinion”; for whenever the soul yields to the  
 presentation produced in it by sense and inclines and  
 assents to the object which has appeared, this is  
 called “opinion.” It appears, then, from what has 226  
 been said that the primary criteria of the knowledge  
 of things are sensation and thought, the former  
 playing the part of the instrument, the latter that of  
 the craftsman. For just as we are unable to carry out  
 a test of things heavy and light without a balance,  
 or to grasp the difference between things straight  
 and crooked without a rule, so likewise thought is  
 naturally incapable of estimating objects when  
 divorced from sense.

Such, then, summarily stated, are the views of the  
 Peripatetics; and as there still remains the Stoic 227  
 doctrine, let us deal with it also in the next place.  
 These men, then, assert that the criterion of truth  
 is the apprehensive presentation. What this is we  
 shall understand when we have first learnt what, in  
 their view, presentation is and what are its specific  
 differences. Presentation then, according to them, 228  
 is an impression on the soul. But about this they at  
 once began to quarrel; for whereas Cleanthes under-  
 stood “impression” as involving eminence and  
 depression,<sup>a</sup> just as does the impression made in wax  
 by signet-rings, Chrysippus regarded such a thing as 229  
 absurd. For in the first place, he says, when the  
 mind imagines at one and the same moment a tri-  
 angular object and a quadrangular, the same body<sup>b</sup>  
 must needs be circumscribed by different forms at the  
 same time and become simultaneously both triangular  
 and quadrangular, or even circular, which is absurd;

<sup>a</sup> “impression,”—the Stoics regarding the soul as just as truly  
 “corporeal” as the body; cf. Vol. I. *Intro.* pp. xxiv f.

τασίων ὑφισταμένων ἐν ἡμῖν παμπληθεῖς καὶ τοὺς  
 σχηματισμοὺς ἕξειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ὃ τοῦ προτέρου  
 230 χείρόν ἐστιν. αὐτὸς οὖν τὴν τύπωσιν εἰρησθαι ὑπὸ  
 τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὑπενόει ἀντὶ τῆς ἑτεροιώσεως, ὥστ'  
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον τὸν λόγον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτε-  
 ροιώσις ψυχῆς," μηκέτι ἀτόπου ὄντος τοῦ τὸ αὐτὸ  
 σῶμα ὑφ' ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον πολλῶν περὶ  
 231 ἡμᾶς συνισταμένων φαντασιῶν παμπληθεῖς ἀνα-  
 πύσσονται ἑτεροιώσεις· ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ὅταν ἅμα  
 πολλοὶ φωνῶσιν, ἀμυθῆτους ὑπὸ ἓν καὶ διαφερούσας  
 ἀναδεχόμενος πληγὰς εὐθύς πολλὰς ἴσχει καὶ τὰς  
 ἑτεροιώσεις, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ποικίλως  
 φαντασιούμενον ἀνάλογόν τι τούτῳ πείσεται.  
 232 "Ἄλλοι δὲ οὐδὲ τὸν κατὰ διόρθωσιν ἐκείνου ἐξ-  
 ενεχθέντα ὅρον ὀρθῶς ἔχειν φασίν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔστι  
 τις φαντασία, αὕτη τύπωσις καὶ ἑτεροιώσις τῆς  
 ψυχῆς καθέστηκεν· εἰ δὲ τις ἐστὶ τύπωσις τῆς  
 ψυχῆς, ἐκείνη οὐ πάντως ἐστὶ φαντασία. καὶ γὰρ  
 προσπτώματα γενομένου περὶ τὸν δάκτυλον ἢ  
 κνησμοῦ περὶ τὴν χεῖρα συμβάντος τύπωσις μὲν  
 καὶ ἑτεροιώσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτελεῖται, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ  
 φαντασία, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ περὶ τῷ τυχόντι μέρει τῆς  
 ψυχῆς γίνεσθαι ταύτην συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆ  
 233 διανοίᾳ μόνον καὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ. πρὸς οὗς  
 ἀπαντῶντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς συνεμφαίνεσθαι φασὶ  
 τῆ τυπώσεως τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ, ὥστε εἶναι  
 τὸ πλήρες τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶ τύπωσις ἐν  
 ψυχῇ ὡς ἂν ἐν ψυχῇ." καθὰ γὰρ ἡ ἐφηλότης  
 λέγεται λευκότης ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ συνεμφαινόντων  
 ἡμῶν τὸ ὡς ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, τουτέστι τὸ κατὰ ποιόν

\* A disease of the eye, supposed to be derived from rays of the sun ("Helios").

and further, when many presentations occur in us  
 simultaneously, the soul will also receive innumerable  
 formations, which result is worse than the former.  
 He himself, therefore, suspected that the term 230  
 "impression" was used by Zeno in the sense of  
 "alteration," so that the definition runs like this—  
 "presentation is an alteration of the soul"; for it is  
 no longer absurd that, when many presentations  
 co-exist in us at the same moment, the same body  
 should admit of innumerable alterations; for just 231  
 as the air, when many people are speaking simul-  
 taneously, receives in a single moment numberless  
 and different impacts and at once undergoes many  
 alterations also, so too when the regent part is the  
 subject of a variety of images it will experience some-  
 thing analogous to this.

But others assert that not even the definition 232  
 thus put forth in accordance with the amendment  
 of Chrysippus is correct. For if a presentation exists,  
 it is an impression and alteration of the soul; but if  
 an impression of the soul exists, it is not in all cases  
 a presentation. For in fact when a knock happens to  
 the finger, or a scratch occurs in the hand, there is  
 produced indeed an impression and alteration of the  
 soul, but not a presentation as well; seeing that this  
 is a result which occurs not in any chance part of the  
 soul but only in the mind and the regent part.—By 233  
 way of meeting their objection the Stoics declare that  
 in the phrase "impression of the soul" there is im-  
 plied also the words "in so far as it is soul," so that  
 the full statement is this—"presentation is an  
 impression in the soul in so far as it is soul." For just  
 as "ephelotes" <sup>a</sup> is defined as "whiteness in the eye,"  
 wherewith we also imply that "in so far as it is eye"

μέρος τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, τὴν λευκότητα εἶναι, ἵνα μὴ πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐφηλότητα ἔχωμεν ὡς ἂν πάντες ἐκ φύσεως ἔχοντες λευκότητα ἐν ὀφθαλμῷ, οὕτως ὅταν λέγωμεν τὴν φαντασίαν τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, συνεμφαίνομεν καὶ τὸ περὶ ποιὸν μέρος γίνεσθαι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν τύπωσιν, τούτεστι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὥστε ἐξαπλούμενον γίνεσθαι τὸν ὄρον τοιοῦτον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἐν ἡγεμο-  
 234 νικῶν." ἄλλοι δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀρμώμενοι δυνάμειωσιν γλαφυρότερον ἀπελογήσαντο. φασὶ γὰρ ψυχὴν λέγεσθαι διχῶς, τό τε συνέχον τὴν ὅλην συγκρισιν καὶ κατ' ἰδίαν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὅταν γὰρ εἴπωμεν συνεστάναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, ἢ τὸν θάνατον εἶναι χωρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀπὸ  
 235 σώματος, ἰδίως καλοῦμεν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅταν διαιρούμενοι φάσκωμεν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι περὶ ψυχὴν τὰ δὲ περὶ σῶμα τὰ δ' ἐκτός, οὐ τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἐμφαίνομεν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ταύτης μόριον· περὶ τοῦτω γὰρ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ  
 236 ἀγαθὰ συνίσταται. διόπερ καὶ ὅταν λέγῃ ὁ Ζήνων φαντασίαν εἶναι τύπωσιν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἀκουστέον ψυχὴν οὐ τὴν ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὸ μόριον αὐτῆς, ἵνα ἢ τὸ λεγόμενον οὕτως ἔχον "φαντασία ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις περὶ  
 237 τὸ ἡγεμονικόν." ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ, φασὶ τινες, πάλιν ἡμάρτηται. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ὀρμὴ καὶ ἡ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις ἑτεροίωσις μὲν εἰσι τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, διαφέρουσι δὲ τῆς φαντασίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ πείσις τις ἦν ἡμετέρα καὶ διάθεσις, αὐταὶ δὲ πολλὰ μᾶλλον [ἢ ὀρμαὶ] ἐνέργειαι τινες ἡμῶν ὑπῆρχον. μοχθηρὸς ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ὄρος πολλοῖσι καὶ  
 238 διαφόροις πράγμασιν ἐφαρμοζόμενος· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὀρισάμενος, καὶ εἰπὼν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος

(that is to say, "in a certain portion of the eye") there exists whiteness, in order that all of us men may not have "ephelotes," seeing that we all naturally have whiteness in the eye,—so when we define presentation as "impression in the soul," we also imply therewith that it occurs in a certain part of the soul, to wit, the regent part, so that, stated explicitly, the definition is this—"presentation is alteration in the regent part."—Others, starting with the same 234 line of argument, have made a more subtle defence. For they say that soul is used in two senses, as denoting both that which holds together the whole framework and, in especial, the regent part. For when we say that man is composed of soul and body, or that death is a separation of soul from body, we are speaking specially of the regent part. So like- 235 wise, when we are classifying goods and say that some are goods of the soul, some of the body, and some external, we do not mean the whole soul but the regent part of it, for it is to this that the affections and the goods belong. Hence, when Zeno says that "pre- 236 sentation is an impression on the soul," we must understand by "soul" not the whole but that part of it, so that the statement may be in this form, "presentation is alteration of the regent part."—But even 237 when put in this form some say that it is wrong again. For, in fact, impulse and assent and apprehension are alterations of the regent part, but are different from presentation. For whereas this is a passivity of ours and a condition, the former are much rather activities. The definition, therefore, is a bad one, as it suits many different things; and just as he who defines "man" 238 and says that "man is a rational animal" <sup>a</sup> does not

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P. II. ii. 26 ff.

ἔστι ζῶον λογικόν, οὐχ ὑγιῶς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑπέγραψε διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸν θεὸν ζῶον εἶναι λογικόν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τὴν φαντασίαν ἀποφηνάμενος ἑτεροίωσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ διέπεισεν· οὐ μᾶλλον γὰρ ταύτης ἢ ἐκάστης τῶν κατηριθμημένων κινήσεων  
 239 ἔστιν ἀπόδοσις. τοιαύτης δ' οὔσης καὶ τῆσδε τῆς ἐνοστάσεως πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς συνεμφάσεις οἱ στωικοὶ ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες τῷ ὄρω δεῖν τῆς φαντασίας συνακούειν τὸ κατὰ πείσιν· ὡς γὰρ ὁ λέγων τὸν ἔρωτα ἐπιβολὴν εἶναι φιλοποιίας συνεμφαίνει τὸ νέων ὠραίων, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν τοῦτο ἐκφέρῃ (οὐθεὶς γὰρ γερόντων καὶ ἀκμῆς ὦραν μὴ ἐχόντων ἔρῃ), οὕτως ὅταν λέγωμεν, φασί, τὴν φαντασίαν ἑτεροίωσιν ἡγεμονικοῦ, συνεμφαίνομεν τὸ κατὰ πείσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν γίνεσθαι τὴν  
 240 ἑτεροίωσιν. δοκοῦσι δὲ μηδ' οὕτως ἐκπεφευγῆναι τὸ ἔγκλημα· ὅτε γὰρ τρέφεται τὸ ἡγεμονικόν καὶ νῆ Δία γε αὔξεται, ἑτεροιοῦται μὲν κατὰ πείσιν, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη ἑτεροίωσις αὐτοῦ, καίπερ κατὰ πείσιν οὐσα καὶ διάθεσις, φαντασία, ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ τι πάλιν λέγοιεν ἰδίωμα πείσεως εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν,  
 241 ὅπερ διενήνοχε τῶν τοιούτων διαθέσεων, ἢ ἐκεῖνό γε, ἐπεὶ ἡ φαντασία γίνεται ἥτοι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἢ τῶν ἐν ἡμῶν παθῶν, ὃ δὴ κυριώτερον διάκενος ἔλκυσμός παρ' αὐτοῖς καλεῖται, πάντως ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φαντασίας συνεμφαίνεσθαι τὸ τὴν πείσιν γίνεσθαι ἥτοι κατὰ τὴν ἐκτὸς προσβολὴν ἢ κατὰ τὰ ἐν ἡμῶν πάθη· ὅπερ οὐκέτ' ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς αὐξήσεις ἢ θρέψεως ἑτεροίωσεως συνεχαιρούμενον.

<sup>a</sup> i.e. a "presentation" without any real "presented" object (and so purely subjective and illusory) which "attracts" the mind to a "phantasma," or imaginary object.

give a sound description of the notion of "man" because "god" also is a rational animal, so also he who declares presentation to be "an alteration of the regent part" is at fault, since this is no more an account of presentation than of any one of the motions enumerated.—Such being this further objection, the  
 239 Stoics resort once again to their "implications," saying that we must understand, as implied in the definition, the words "by way of passivity." For just as he who says that love is "an impulse to win affection" implies therewith "of youths in their bloom," even though he does not state this expressly (for no one loves old men and those who are not in their first bloom), so when we describe presentation as "alteration of the regent part," we imply therewith, they say, that the alteration occurs "by way of passivity" and not by way of activity.—But not even so do they  
 240 seem to have escaped the charge; for when the regent part is being nourished and, in sooth, increased, it is altered by way of passivity, but this kind of alteration, although it is by way of passivity and condition, is not presentation—unless they should say once again that presentation is a special form of passivity which is distinct from the passive conditions, or else say this—that, since presentation is either of  
 241 things external or of our own internal affections (this being more precisely termed by them "vacuous attraction"), there is always implied in the definition of presentation that the "passivity" is either in respect of external impact or in respect of our internal affections; but this additional implication is no longer possible in the case of alteration due to processes of increase or nutrition.

Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν φαντασία κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς οὕτω δυσασπόμενος ἐστὶ τῶν δὲ φαντασιῶν πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλαι εἰσὶ διαφοραί, ἀπαρκέσουσι δὲ αἱ  
 242 λεχθησόμεναί. τούτων γὰρ αἱ μὲν εἰσι πιθαναί, αἱ δὲ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ πιθαναὶ ἅμα καὶ ἀπίθανοι, αἱ δὲ οὔτε πιθαναὶ οὔτε ἀπίθανοι. πιθαναὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἱ λείον κίνημα περὶ ψυχὴν ἐργαζόμεναι, ὥσπερ νῦν τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ πᾶν ὃ τῆς ὁμοίας ἔχεται περιφανείας, ἀπίθανοι δὲ αἱ μὴ τοιαῦται ἀλλ' ἀποστρέφουσαι ἡμᾶς τῆς συγκατα-  
 243 θέσεως, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ὑπὲρ γῆς; εἰ σκότος ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν." πιθαναὶ δὲ καὶ ἀπίθανοι καθεστᾶσιν αἱ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τι σχέσιν ὅτε μὲν τοιαῖα γινόμεναι ὅτε δὲ τοιαῖα [γινόμεναι], οἷον αἱ τῶν ἀπόρων λόγων, οὔτε δὲ πιθαναὶ οὔτε ἀπίθανοι καθάπερ αἱ τῶν τοιούτων πραγμάτων "ἄρτιοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες, περισσοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ἀστέρες." τῶν δὲ πιθανῶν [ἢ ἀπιθάνων]<sup>1</sup> φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν  
 244 εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς, αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ οὔτε ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς. ἀληθεῖς μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν ὧν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἢ τοῦ "φῶς ἔστι," ψευδεῖς δὲ ὧν ἔστι ψευδῆ κατηγορίαν ποιήσασθαι, ὡς τοῦ κεκλάσθαι τὴν κατὰ βυθοῦ κώπην ἢ μύουρον εἶναι τὴν στοάν, ἀληθεῖς δὲ καὶ ψευδεῖς, ὅποια προσέπιπτεν Ὀρέστη κατὰ  
 245 μανίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἡλέκτρας (καθὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντός τινος προσέπιπτεν, ἦν ἀληθής, ὑπῆρχε γὰρ Ἡλέκτρα, καθὸ δ' ὡς ἀπὸ Ἐρινύος, ψευδής,

<sup>1</sup> [ἢ ἀπιθάνων] secl. Arnim.

Thus presentation, in the doctrine of the Stoics, is hard to define. In presentations, also, there are many and various distinctions, of which it will be enough to record the following. Some of them are  
 242 probable, some improbable, some at once both probable and improbable, some neither probable nor improbable. "Probable," then, are those which produce a smooth motion in the soul—as, at the present moment, the impression that "it is day" and that "I am discoursing," and everyone which attains a similar degree of obviousness; "improbable" are those which do not do so but make us decline to assent, such as the judgement "if it is day,  
 243 the sun is not above the earth," "if it is dark, it is day." "Both probable and improbable" are those which, according to the relation in which they stand, are at one time of this kind and at another time of that kind, as for instance presentations of problematic statements. "Neither probable nor improbable" are such as are concerned with judgements of this sort—"the stars are even in number," "the stars are odd."<sup>a</sup> And of the probable presentations some are true, some false, some both true and false, some neither true  
 244 nor false. True, then, are those about which it is possible to make a true affirmation, as, at the present moment, "it is day" or "it is light"; false are those about which it is possible to make a false affirmation, as that the oar under the water is bent or that the porch narrows to a point; an example of both true and false is the impression of Electra experienced by Orestes in his madness (for in so far as his impres-  
 245 sion was of an existing object it was true, for Electra existed, but in so far as it was that of a Fury it was

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 97, ii. 90.

οὐκ ἦν γὰρ Ἐριώς), καὶ πάλιν εἴ τις ἀπὸ Δίωτος  
ζῶντος κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὡς ἀπὸ παρεστῶτος  
246 ὄνειροπολεῖται ψευδῆ καὶ διάκενον ἔλκυσμόν. οὔτε  
δὲ ἀληθεῖς οὔτε ψευδεῖς εἰσὶν αἱ γενικαί· ὦν γὰρ τὰ  
εἶδη τοῖα ἢ τοῖα, τούτων τὰ γένη οὔτε τοῖα οὔτε  
τοῖα, ὅσον τῶν ἀνθρώπων οἱ μὲν εἰσὼν Ἕλληνες οἱ  
δὲ βάρβαροι, ἀλλ' ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος οὔτε Ἕλλην  
ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ πάντες ἂν οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους ἦσαν Ἕλληνες,  
247 οὔτε βάρβαρος διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν. τῶν δὲ  
ἀληθῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶ καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὔ, οὐ  
καταληπτικαὶ μὲν αἱ προσπίπτουσαι τισὶ κατὰ  
πάθος· μυρῖοι γὰρ φρενιζόντες καὶ μελαγχολῶντες  
ἀληθῆ μὲν ἔλκουσι φαντασίαν, οὐ καταληπτικὴν δὲ  
ἀλλ' ἔξωθεν καὶ ἐκ τύχης οὕτω συμπεσοῦσαν, ὅθεν  
οὐδὲ διαβεβαιοῦνται περὶ αὐτῆς πολλάκις, οὐδὲ  
248 συγκατατίθενται αὐτῇ. καταληπτικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ  
ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπο-  
μεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν  
γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος· ἄκρως γὰρ ποιούμενοι  
ἀντιληπτικὴν εἶναι τῶν ὑποκειμένων τήνδε τὴν  
φαντασίαν, καὶ πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ περὶ αὐτοῖς  
ιδιώματα ἀναμεμαγμένην, ἕκαστον τούτων φασὶν  
249 ἔχειν συμβεβηκός. ὦν πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ ὑπ-  
άρχοντος γίνεσθαι· πολλαὶ γὰρ τῶν φαντασιῶν  
προσπίπτουσιν ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος ὡσπερ ἐπὶ  
τῶν μεμνηνόντων, αἰτίνας οὐκ ἂν εἴεν καταληπτικαί.  
δεύτερον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι καὶ κατ'  
αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον· ἔναι γὰρ πάλιν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος  
μὲν εἰσὼν, οὐκ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἰσὸδάλονται,  
ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ μεμνηνότος Ὀρέστου μικρῶ πρότερον

false, for there was no Fury); and again when a man  
experiences a false and "vacuous attraction" in  
his dreams, imagining that Dion is standing beside  
him when Dion is alive. Neither true nor false 246  
are the generic presentations; for the genera of  
things of which the particulars are of this kind or  
of that are neither of this kind nor of that kind; as,  
for instance, whereas some men are Greeks, others  
barbarians, the generic Man is neither a Greek (for  
then all particular men would have been Greeks),  
nor yet a barbarian (for the same reason).—And of 247  
true presentations some are apprehensive, others not,  
—not apprehensive being those which are experienced  
by persons in a morbid condition; for countless  
sufferers from frenzy and melancholia receive a  
presentation which though true is not apprehensive  
but occurs externally and fortuitously, so that often  
they make no positive affirmation about it and do not  
assent to it. An apprehensive presentation is one 248  
caused by an existing object and imaged and stamped  
in the subject in accordance with that existing object,  
of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-  
existent object. For as they deem that this presenta-  
tion is eminently perceptive of real objects and repro-  
duces with artistic precision all their characteristics,  
they declare that it possesses each one of these as  
an attribute. Of these the first is derivation from an 249  
existing object; for many presentations occur from  
what is non-existent, as in the case of madmen, and  
these will not be apprehensive. Second is derivation  
both from an existing object and according to that  
existing object; for some again, though they are  
derived from an existing object, do not resemble that  
object, as we showed a little while ago in the case of

εδείκνυμεν. εἴλκε μὲν γὰρ φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος τῆς Ἡλέκτρας, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· μίαν γὰρ τῶν Ἐρινύων ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, καθὼ καὶ προσιοῦσαν καὶ τημελεῖν αὐτὸν σπουδάζουσαν ἀπωθεῖται λέγων

μέθες μί' οὔσα τῶν ἐμῶν Ἐρινύων.

καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν ἐκινεῖτο τῶν Θηβῶν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχον· καὶ γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον δεῖ γίνεσθαι τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεςφραγισμένην τυγχάνειν, ἵνα πάντα τεχνικῶς τὰ ἰδιώματα τῶν φανταστῶν<sup>1</sup> ἀναμάττηται. ὡς γὰρ οἱ γλυφεῖς πᾶσι τοῖς μέρεσι συμβάλλουσι τῶν τελουμένων, καὶ ὃν τρόπον αἱ διὰ τῶν δακτυλίων σφραγίδες αἰεὶ πάντας ἐπ' ἀκριβῆς τοὺς χαρακτῆρας ἐναπομάττονται τῷ κηρῷ, οὕτω καὶ οἱ κατάληψιν ποιούμενοι τῶν ὑποκειμένων πᾶσιν ὀφείλουσι τοῖς ἰδιώμασιν αὐτῶν ἐπιβάλλειν. τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" προσέθεσαν, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ὡςπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἀδύνατον ὑπειλήφασι κατὰ πάντα ἀπαράλλακτόν τινα εὐρεθῆσεσθαι, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας. ἐκείνοι μὲν γὰρ φασι ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν τεχνικῶς προσβάλλει τῇ ὑπόψει τῶν πραγμάτων διαφορᾶ, ἐπέπερ καὶ εἶχε τι τοιοῦτον ἰδίωμα ἢ τοιαύτη φαντασία παρὰ τὰς ἄλλας φαντασίας καθάπερ οἱ κερᾶσαι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄφεις· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τούναντιόν φασι δύνασθαι τῇ κατα-

<sup>1</sup> φανταστῶν Apelt: φαντασιῶν mss., Bekk.

<sup>o</sup> Eurip. *Orest.* 264; cf. §§ 170, 245.

the mad Orestes. For though he derived a presentation from an existing object, Electra, it was not in conformity with that object; for he supposed that she was one of the Furies, and accordingly repulses her, as she approaches and eagerly seeks to tend him, with the words <sup>a</sup>—

Avaunt! For of my Furies thou art one.

Heracles, too, derived an impression of Thebes<sup>b</sup> from an existing object, but not according to that object; for the apprehensive presentation must also be in accord with the object itself. Moreover, it must also be imaged and stamped in the subject, in order that all the characteristics of the presented objects may be reproduced with artistic exactitude. For just as carvers set their hands to all the parts of the works they are completing, and as the seals on rings always imprint all their markings exactly on the wax, so likewise those who experience apprehension of real objects ought to perceive all their characteristics. And they added the clause "of such a kind as could not be derived from a non-existent object" because the Academics did not, like the Stoics, suppose it to be impossible that a presentation exactly similar in all respects should be found. For the Stoics assert that he who has the apprehensive presentation discerns with artistic exactitude the difference subsisting in the objects, since a presentation of that kind as compared with all other presentations has a special characteristic of its own, like the horned serpents as compared with all other serpents; but the Academics assert on the contrary that a false

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 192 (Heracles seems to be put for Pentheus, by oversight).

ληπτικῆ φαντασίᾳ ἀπαράλλακτον εὐρεθήσεσθαι ψεύδος.

253 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἀρχαιότεροι τῶν στωικῶν κριτήριόν φασιν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν καταληπτικὴν ταύτην φαντασίαν, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι κατα-  
 254 ἐτίθεσαν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνσημα. ἔσθ' ὅτε γὰρ καταληπτικὴ μὲν προσπίπτει φαντασία, ἀπιστος δὲ διὰ τὴν ἕξωθεν περίστασιν. οἶον ὅτε Ἀδμήτω ὁ Ἡρακλῆς τὴν Ἀλκηστὴν γῆθεν ἀναγαγὼν παρέστῃσε, τότε ὁ Ἀδμητος ἔσπασε μὲν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀλκῆστιδος,  
 255 ἠπίσται δ' αὐτῇ· καὶ ὅτε ἀπὸ Τροίας ὁ Μενέλαος ἀνακομισθεὶς ἑώρα τὴν ἀληθῆ Ἑλένην παρὰ τῷ Πρωτεί, [καὶ] καταλιπὼν ἐπὶ τῆς νεῶς τὸ ἐκείνης εἰδῶλον, περὶ οὗ δεκαετῆς συνέστη πόλεμος, ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος μὲν καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένην ἐλάμβανε  
 256 φαντασίαν, οὐκ εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ.<sup>1</sup> ὥσθ' ἡ μὲν καταληπτικὴ φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἔνσημα, αὐταὶ δὲ καταληπτικαὶ μὲν ἦσαν, εἶχον δὲ ἐνότασεις· ὁ τε γὰρ Ἀδμητος ἐλογίζετο ὅτι τέθηκεν ἡ Ἀλκηστὴς καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἀποθανὼν οὐκέτι ἀνίσταται, ἀλλὰ δαιμονία τινὰ ποτε ἐπιφοιτᾷ· ὁ τε Μενέλαος συνέωρα ὅτι ἀπολέλοιπεν ἐν τῇ νηὶ φυλαττομένην τὴν Ἑλένην, καὶ οὐκ ἀπίθανον μὲν ἔστω Ἑλένην μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς Φάρου εὐρε-  
 257 θείσαν, φάντασμα δέ τι καὶ δαιμόνιον. ἐνθένδε οὐχ ἀπλῶς κριτήριον γίνεται τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔνσημα ἔχη· αὕτη γὰρ ἐναργῆς οὖσα καὶ πληκτικὴ μόνον οὐχὶ τῶν τριχῶν, φασί, λαμβάνεται, κατασπῶσα ἡμᾶς

<sup>1</sup> εἶκε δὲ αὐτῇ Lachelier: εἶχε δὲ αὐτὴν mss., Bekk.

one exactly similar to the apprehensive presentation can be found.

But whereas the older Stoics declare that this 253 apprehensive presentation is the criterion of truth, the later Stoics added the clause "provided that it has no obstacle." For there are times when an 254 apprehensive presentation occurs, yet is improbable because of the external circumstances. When, for instance, Heracles presented himself to Admetus bringing back Alcestis from the grave,<sup>a</sup> Admetus then received from Alcestis an apprehensive presentation, but disbelieved it; and when Menelaus on 255 his return from Troy<sup>b</sup> beheld the true Helen at the house of Proteus, after leaving on his ship that image of her for which the ten years' war was waged, though he received a presentation which was imaged and imprinted from an existing object and in accordance with that object, he did not accept it as valid. So 256 that, whereas the apprehensive presentation is the criterion when it has no obstacle, these presentations, although they were apprehensive, yet had obstacles. For Admetus argued that Alcestis was dead and that he who is dead does not rise again, but certain daemons do rove about at times; and Menelaus also reflected that he had left Helen under guard in his ship and that it was not improbable that she who was discovered in Pharos might not be Helen but a phantom and supernatural. Hence the apprehensive presentation 257 is not the criterion of truth unconditionally, but only when it has no obstacle. For in this latter case it, being plainly evident and striking, lays hold of us, almost by the very hair, as they say, and drags us

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 228.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 180.



εἰς συγκατάθεσιν, καὶ ἄλλου μηδενὸς δεομένη εἰς  
 τὸ τοιαύτη προσπίπτει ἢ εἰς τὸ τὴν πρὸς τὰς  
 258 ἄλλας διαφορὰν ὑποβάλλειν. διὸ δὴ καὶ πᾶς ἄν-  
 θρωπος, ὅταν τι σπουδάζῃ μετὰ ἀκριβείας καταλαμ-  
 βάνεσθαι, τὴν τοιαύτην φαντασίαν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μετα-  
 διώκειν φαίνεται, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὄρατῶν, ὅταν  
 ἀμυδρὰν λαμβάνῃ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου φαντασίαν.  
 ἐντείνει γὰρ τὴν ὄψιν καὶ σύνεγγυς ἔρχεται τοῦ  
 ὀραμένου ὡς τέλος μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, παρατρίβει γὰρ  
 τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, καὶ καθόλου πάντα ποιεῖ μέχρι  
 ἂν τρανὴν καὶ πληκτικὴν σπάσῃ τοῦ κρινομένου  
 φαντασίαν, ὡς ἐν ταύτῃ κειμένην θεωρῶν τὴν τῆς  
 259 καταλήψεως πίστιν. καὶ γὰρ ἄλλως τοῦναντίον  
 ἀδύνατόν ἐστι λέγειν, καὶ ἀνάγκη<sup>1</sup> τὸν ἀφιστάμενον  
 τοῦ ἀξιούν ὅτι φαντασία κριτήριόν ἐστι, καθ' ἑτέρας  
 φαντασίας ὑπόστασιν τοῦτο πάσχοντα βεβαιοῦν τὸ  
 φαντασίαν εἶναι κριτήριον, τῆς φύσεως οἰονεὶ  
 φέγγος ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν  
 αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν ἀναδούσης καὶ τὴν δι' αὐτῆς  
 260 γινομένην φαντασίαν. ἄτοπον οὖν ἐστὶ τοσαύτην  
 δύναμιν ἀθετεῖν καὶ τὸ ὡσπερ φῶς αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖ-  
 σθαι. ὃν γὰρ τρόπον ὁ χρώματα μὲν ἀπολείπων καὶ  
 τὰς ἐν τούτοις διαφορὰς, τὴν δὲ ὄρασιν ἀναιρῶν ὡς  
 ἀνυπαρκτον ἢ ἀπιστον, καὶ φωνὰς μὲν εἶναι λέγων,  
 ἀκοὴν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀξιῶν, σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἄτοπος  
 (δι' ὧν γὰρ ἐνόησαμεν χρώματα καὶ φωνὰς, ἐκείνων  
 ἀπόντων οὐδὲ χρῆσθαι δυνατοὶ χρώμασιν ἢ φωναῖς),  
 οὕτω καὶ τὰ πράγματα μὲν ὁμολογῶν, τὴν δὲ  
 φαντασίαν τῆς αἰσθήσεως, δι' ἧς τῶν πραγμάτων  
 ἀντιλαμβάνεται, διαβάλλων τελέως ἐστὶν ἐμβρόντη-  
 τος, καὶ τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἴσον αὐτὸν ποιῶν.

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἀνάγκη Hirzel: κατ' ἀνάγκην mss., Bekk.

off to assent, needing nothing else to help it to be  
 thus impressive or to suggest its superiority over all  
 others. For this reason, too, every man, when he is 258  
 anxious to apprehend any object exactly, appears of  
 himself to pursue after a presentation of this kind—as,  
 for instance, in the case of visible things, when he  
 receives a dim presentation of the real object. For  
 he intensifies his gaze and draws close to the object  
 of sight so as not to go wholly astray, and rubs  
 his eyes and in general uses every means until he  
 can receive a clear and striking presentation of the  
 thing under inspection, as though he considered that  
 the credibility of the apprehension depended upon  
 that. Moreover it is impossible to affirm the opposite, 259  
 and he who abstains from asserting that presentation  
 is the criterion, since he does so owing to the existence  
 of another presentation, thereby of necessity confirms  
 the fact that presentation is the criterion,—nature  
 having kindled as it were a light for us, to aid in the  
 discernment of truth, in the faculty of sense and the  
 presentation which takes place by means thereof.  
 It is absurd, then, to set aside so great a faculty and 260  
 to rob ourselves as it were of our own daylight. For  
 just as the man who allows colours and the differences  
 in them but abolishes vision as unreal or improbable,  
 and while affirming the existence of sounds asserts  
 the non-existence of hearing, is utterly illogical (for  
 if the organs by which we perceive colours and sounds  
 were absent we should be unable to experience  
 colours or sounds),—so also he who admits the exist-  
 ence of objects, but inveighs against the presentation  
 of sense by means of which he apprehends the objects,  
 has completely lost his wits and puts himself on a level  
 with things that have no soul.

- 261 Τοιοῦτο μὲν καὶ τὸ τῶν στωικῶν ἐστὶ δόγμα·  
 πάσης δὲ σχεδὸν τῆς περὶ κριτηρίου διαφωνίας ὑπ'  
 ὄψιν κειμένης, καιρὸς ἂν εἴη τῆς ἀντιρρήσεως  
 ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ κριτήριον ἐπανάγειν. καθὼς  
 οὖν προείπον, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς  
 ἀλόγοις αἰσθήσεσιν οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις  
 ἀπέλιπον, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ ὡς τὸν ἄνθρωπον,  
 οἱ δὲ τὸ δι' οὗ ὡς τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ διάνοιαν,  
 262 οἱ δὲ τὸ ὡς προσβολὴν καθάπερ τὴν φαντασίαν.  
 πειρασόμεθα (οὖν)<sup>1</sup> κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκάστη τῶν  
 τοιούτων στάσεων τὰς ἀπορίας ἐφαρμόττειν, ἵνα  
 μὴ κατ' ἄνδρα πάντας τοὺς κατηγορημένους  
 φιλοσόφους ἐπιόντες ταυτολογεῖν ἀναγκαζώμεθα.

## ΠΕΡΙ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ

- 263 Τάξει τοίνυν πρῶτον σκοπῶμεν τὸ ὑφ' οὗ, τουτ-  
 ἐστι τὸν ἄνθρωπον· οἶμαι γὰρ ὡς τούτου προαπορη-  
 θέντος οὐδὲν ἔτι δεήσει περιττότερον περὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων κριτηρίων λέγειν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἢ μέρη ἐστὶν  
 ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐνεργήματα ἢ πάθη. εἶπερ οὖν κατα-  
 ληπτὸν ἐστὶ τουτί τὸ κριτήριον, πολὺ πρότερον  
 ὀφείλει ἐπινοεῖσθαι, παρόσον πάσης καταλήψεως  
 ἐπίνοια προηγείται. μέχρι δὲ τοῦ δεῦρο ἀνεπι-  
 νόητον εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὡς παρα-  
 264 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα καταληπτὸς πάντως ἐστὶν ὁ  
 ἄνθρωπος· ὃ ἔπεται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνώσιν  
 ἀνεύρετον ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ γνωρίζοντος αὐτὴν ἀκατα-  
 λήπτου καθεστῶτος. εὐθέως γὰρ τῶν περὶ τῆς  
 ἐπινοίας ζητησάντων Σωκράτης μὲν ἠπόρησε

<sup>1</sup> <οὖν> cj. Bekk.

Such, then, is the doctrine of the Stoics; and now 261  
 that practically all the controversy regarding the  
 criterion lies before our view, it will be a fitting time  
 to commence our counter-argument and to apply it  
 to the criterion. This, as I said above,<sup>a</sup> some have  
 supposed to reside in reason, some in the irrational  
 senses, some in both; and some have named "Man"  
 as the agent "by which"<sup>b</sup>; some the sense and  
 intellect as the instrument "by means of which";  
 some the impact as, for instance, the presentation.  
 We shall endeavour, then, so far as possible to state 262  
 the difficulties appropriate to each of these rival  
 views, that we may not be compelled to repeat our-  
 selves by assailing one by one all the philosophers  
 enumerated.

## CONCERNING MAN

First in order, then, let us examine the criterion 263  
 "by whom," or agent, that is to say Man<sup>c</sup>; for I  
 suppose that when we have cast doubt on this, to  
 begin with, there will no longer be any need to pro-  
 ceed to further discussion of the other criteria; for  
 these are either parts or actions or affections of Man.  
 If, then, this criterion is to be apprehended, it must  
 be conceived long before, inasmuch as conception in  
 every case precedes apprehension. But up till now  
 Man has proved to be inconceivable, as we shall  
 establish; therefore Man is certainly not appre- 264  
 hensible; and from this it follows that the knowledge  
 of truth is undiscoverable, seeing that the subject who  
 knows it is inapprehensible. Thus, for instance, of  
 those who investigated the conception, Socrates was

<sup>a</sup> See §§ 47 ff.<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 21.<sup>c</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 47.

- μείνας ἐν τῇ σκέψει καὶ εἰπὼν αὐτὸν ἀγνοεῖν τί τ' ἔστι καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸ σύμπαν· "ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐκ οἶδα" φησὶν "εἴτε ἀνθρωπὸς εἰμι εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο  
 265 τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον." Δημόκριτος δὲ ὁ τῇ Διὸς φωνῇ παρεικαζόμενος, καὶ λέγων τάδε περὶ τῶν ζυμπάντων, ἐπεχείρησε μὲν τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ἐκθέσθαι, πλείον δὲ ἰδιωτικῆς ἀποφάσεως οὐδὲν ἴσχυσεν, εἰπὼν "ἀνθρωπὸς ἔστιν ὁ πάντες ἴδμεν."  
 266 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ καὶ κύνα πάντες ἴσμεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ κύων ἀνθρωπὸς· καὶ ἵππον πάντες ἴσμεν καὶ φυτόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων ἦν ἀνθρωπὸς. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ζητούμενον συνήρπασεν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἐκ προχείρου δώσει γινώσκεισθαι τὸν ἀνθρωπον ὁποῖός ἐστιν, εἶγε ὁ Πύθιος ὡς μέγιστον ζήτημα προύθηκεν αὐτῷ τὸ γνῶθι σεαυτόν. εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίῃ, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπιτρέψει μόνον  
 267 τούτον ἐπίστασθαι. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ δεικτικῶς ᾤθησαν δύνασθαι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου παρίστασθαι, λέγοντες "ἀνθρωπὸς ἔστι τοιουτοῦνι μὸρφωμα μετ' ἐμψυχίας." οὐκ ἔγνωσαν δ' ὅτι εἰ τὸ δεικνύμενόν ἐστιν ἀνθρωπὸς, τὸ μὴ δεικνύμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνθρωπὸς. καὶ πάλιν ἢ τοιαυτῇ δεῖξις ἦτοι ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐκφέρεται ἢ γυναικός, ἢ πρεσβύτου ἢ μειρακίου, σιμοῦ γρυποῦ,  
 268 τετανότριχος οὐλοκόμου, τῶν ἄλλων διαφορῶν· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐκφέροιο, ἢ γυνῆ οὐκ ἔσται ἀνθρωπὸς, εἰ δ' ἐπὶ γυναικός, περιγραφῆσεται τὸ ἄρρεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ νέου, αἱ λοιπαὶ τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἐκπεσοῦνται τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος.  
 269 Ἦσαν δὲ τινες τῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ τὸν γενικὸν

a doubter, remaining undecided and declaring himself ignorant both of what he himself is and in what relation he stands to the Universe—"for I do not know," he says, "whether I am a man or some other kind of beast more complex than Typhon."<sup>a</sup> But 265 Democritus, who likened himself to the voice of Zeus, and spoke so about the sum of all things, attempted indeed to explain the conception, but was able to produce nothing more than a crude statement, in the words "Man is what we all ken." For, in the first 266 place, we all know Dog as well, but Dog is not Man. And Horse we all know and Plant, but none of these is Man. And further, he has begged the question; for no one will grant off-hand that the nature of Man is known, seeing that the Pythian propounded "Know thyself" as Man's chief problem. And even were one to grant this, one would not ascribe the knowledge of Man to all but only to the most exact philo- 267 sopher.—Epicurus and his followers supposed that the conception of Man could be conveyed by indication, saying that "Man is this sort of a shape combined with vitality." But they did not notice that if the thing indicated is Man, the thing not so indicated is not Man. And again, such an indication is made in the case of either a man or a woman, an elder or a youth, snub-nosed or hook-nosed, straight-haired or curly-haired, and all the other differences; and if it is made in the case of a man, a woman will 268 not be Man, and if in the case of a woman, the male will be ruled out, and if in the case of a youth, all the remaining ages will be debarred from Manhood.

Some philosophers there have been who have de- 269

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Plato, *Phaedr.* 230 A. With §§ 264-282 cf. *P.H.* ii. 22-28.

ἄνθρωπον διὰ λόγου διδάσκοντες, κἀντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι τὴν ἐπίνοιαν δύνασθαι τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων ἀνακλύσειν. τούτων δὲ οἱ μὲν οὕτως ἀπέδοσαν “ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητὸν, νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν.” οἱ καὶ αὐτοὶ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ 270 παρέδοσαν. διαφέρει δὲ τὸ τινὶ συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνου τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν, ἐπεὶ τοι εἰ μὴ διαφέρει, οὐκ ἂν ἦν συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ’ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο. ἀμέλει γοῦν τῶν συμβεβηκότων τὰ μὲν ἀχώριστά ἐστι τῶν οἷς συμβέβηκεν, ὡς μῆκος καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος σώμασι (δίχα γὰρ τῆς τούτων παρουσίας ἀμήχανόν 271 ἐστὶν ἐπινοῆσαι σῶμα), τὰ δὲ χωρίζεται τοῦ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν καὶ ἀπαλλασσομένων μένει ἐκείνο, ὅλον τρέχειν διαλέγεσθαι ἄπροϋν ἐργηγορέναι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα συμβέβηκε μὲν ἡμῖν, οὐ διὰ παντὸς δέ· καὶ γὰρ μὴ τρέχοντες μένομεν οἱ αὐτοὶ καὶ ἡσυχάζοντες, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως. διττῆς οὖν οὔσης τῶν συμβεβηκότων διαφορᾶς οὐδετέραν εὐρήσομεν τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ πράγματι, ἀλλ’ αἰεὶ διαφέρουσιν. μάταιοι 272 τοῖνυν εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ζῶον λέγοντες λογικὸν θνητὸν καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς· οὐ γὰρ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπέδοσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτῳ κατηρίθμισαν. ὦν τὸ μὲν ζῶον τῶν διὰ παντὸς αὐτῷ συμβεβηκότων ἐστίν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ μὴ ζῶον ὄντα ἄνθρωπον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ θνητὸν οὐδὲ συμβεβηκὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· ὅτε γὰρ 273 ἐσμὲν ἄνθρωποι, ζῶμεν καὶ οὐ τεθνήκαμεν. τὸ δὲ λογίζεσθαι καὶ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν συμβέβηκε μὲν, οὐ διὰ παντὸς δέ· καὶ γὰρ μὴ λογιζόμενοί τινες

fined by logic the generic Man, imagining that from this the conception of particular men will also emerge. Of these philosophers some have given this definition —“ Man is a rational mortal animal, receptive of thought and knowledge.” So they too have presented to us not Man but the properties of Man. But the property of a thing is different from the thing 270 of which it is a property, since of course if it were not different it would not have been a property but the actual thing itself. And, to be sure, while some properties are inseparable from the things to which they belong—as are length, breadth and depth from bodies, for without their presence it is impossible to conceive Body,—others are separated from the thing 271 to which they belong, and it still remains when they are removed—as, for instance, in the case of Man, running, talking, sleeping, waking; for all these properties belong to us, but not continuously; for we remain the same when we are not running and when we are silent, and so likewise as regards the rest of these properties. As, then, there are two distinct kinds of properties, we shall find that neither of them is the same as the substantial thing but always distinct. So then those who define Man as “ a rational 272 mortal animal,” and so on, achieve nothing; for they have not given a definition of Man but merely enumerated his properties. And of these “ animal ” is one of his constant properties, for it is impossible to be Man without being animal. But “ mortal ” is not even a property but something supervenient which occurs to Man; for when we are men we are alive and not dead. “ Reasoning and possessing 273 knowledge ” is indeed a property of his, but not constantly; for in fact some who are not reasoning are

ἄνθρωποι εἰσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ νηδύμω κατασχεθέντες ὑπνῳ, καὶ (οἱ)᾽ ἐπιστήμην μὴ ἔχοντες οὐκ ἐκπεπτώ-  
 κασι τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, ὥσπερ οἱ μεμνηότες.  
 ἕτερον οὖν ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἕτερον παρεστάκασιν.

274 "Ἐτι τὸ μὲν ζῶον οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἐπεὶ πᾶν  
 ζῶον ἔσται ἄνθρωπος. τὸ δὲ λογικὸν εἰ μὲν ἀντὶ  
 τοῦ λογιζεσθαι τάττειτο, καὶ οἱ θεοὶ λογιζόμενοι  
 ἄνθρωποι γενήσονται, τάχα δὲ καὶ τινα τῶν ἄλλων  
 ζῶων· εἰ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ σημαντικὰς προφέρεσθαι  
 φωνὰς, τοὺς κόρακας καὶ ψιττακοὺς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα  
 275 ἀνθρώπους εἶναι λέξομεν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. καὶ μὴν εἰ  
 τὸ θνητὸν φαίη τις ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, ἀκολουθήσει τὸ  
 καὶ τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζῶων θνητὰ ὄντα ἀνθρώπους  
 ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ ὁμοιον καὶ περὶ τοῦ νοῦ τε καὶ  
 ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν εἶναι χρῆ φρονεῖν. πρῶτον μὲν  
 γὰρ καὶ εἰς θεοὺς πίπτει τὰ τοιαῦτα· δεῦτερον δέ,  
 εἴπερ ἐπίδεκτικὸν ἔστι τούτων ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ  
 ἔστι ταῦτα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος τούτων ἐπι-  
 δεκτικὸς οὗ τὴν φύσιν οὐ παρέστησαν.

276 Καίτοι τινὲς τῶν συνετῶν εἶναι δοκούντων κατὰ  
 τὴν δογματικὴν αἴρεσιν πρὸς τοῦτο ὑπαντώντες φασὶν  
 ὅτι ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν κατηγορημένων οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ἄνθρωπος, πάντα δὲ εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντα ποιεῖ  
 τοῦτον, οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ μερῶν καὶ ὅλου θεωροῦμεν  
 277 γινόμενον· ὡς γὰρ χεὶρ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄν-  
 θρωπος, οὐδὲ κεφαλὴ, οὐδὲ πούς, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν  
 τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν σύνθετον ὅλον νοεῖται,  
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ζῶόν ἔστι ψιλὸς οὔτε  
 λογικὸν κατ' ἰδίαν οὔτε θνητὸν κατὰ περιγραφὴν,  
 ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄθροισμα, τουτέστι ζῶον ἅμα

<sup>1</sup> <ο> add. Heintz.

men, as for instance those that are "by slumber sweet o'ercome," and those who are not "possessing knowledge" have not lost manhood, as for instance madmen. Thus while we have been seeking one thing, they have offered us another.

Again, "Animal" is not "Man," since in that case 274 every animal would be a man. And if "rational" is put in place of "exercising reason," then the gods, too, when they reason will become men, and possibly some of the other animals as well; while if "rational" stands for "uttering significant sounds," we shall be saying that crows and parrots and the like are men, which is absurd. Moreover, if one should say that 275 "mortal" is Man, it will follow that the irrational animals also, being mortal, are men. And one must take a similar view of the words "receptive of thought and knowledge." For, firstly, this applies to gods as well; and secondly, if Man is receptive of these, Man is not these things but he who is receptive of these things, the real nature of whom they have not explained.

Some, however, of those who have a reputation for 276 cleverness in the Dogmatic School say, by way of reply to this, that it is not each of the properties enumerated that is "Man," but all of them combined together compose "Man"—the sort of thing we see happening in the case of parts and a whole.<sup>a</sup> For just 277 as a hand by itself is not a man, nor is a head, nor a foot, nor any other such part, but the compound made up of them is conceived as a whole,—so also "Man" is not barely "animal," nor solely "rational," nor "mortal" alone, but the aggregate of all these—that is to say, at once animal and mortal and rational.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. iii. 98 ff.

278 καὶ θνητὸν καὶ λογικόν. πρόχειρος δ' ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς  
τοῦτο ὑπάντησις. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πῶς, εἰ κατ'  
ἰδίαν ἕκαστον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἄνθρωπος, δύναται  
εἰς ταῦτὸ συναχθέντα ἄνθρωπον ποιεῖν, μήτε  
πλεονάσαντα παρὸ ἔστι, μήτε ἐλλιπόντα παρὸ  
ὑπόκειται, μήτε ἄλλως πως τραπέντα; εἴτ' οὐδὲ  
τὴν ἀρχὴν δύναται εἰς ταῦτὸ πάντα συνδραμεῖν, ἵνα  
279 καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄνθρωπος γένηται. τὸ γοῦν  
θνητὸν εὐθέως, ὅτ' ἐσμὲν ἄνθρωποι, οὐ συμβέβηκεν  
ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμμημόνευσιν λαμβάνεται.  
θεωροῦντες γὰρ Δίωνα καὶ Θέωνα καὶ Σωκράτη  
καὶ κοινῶς τοὺς κατὰ μέρος ἡμῖν ὁμοίους τετε-  
λευτηκέναι λογιζόμεθα ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν θνητοί,  
καὶ μηδέπω τοῦ θανεῖν παρόντος ἡμῖν ζῶμεν γὰρ  
280 δῆπουθεν. καὶ μὴν τὸ λογίζεσθαι ὅτ' ἐμὲν πάρεστιν  
ἡμῖν ὅτ' ἐμὲν οὐ πάρεστι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν  
πάλιν οὐ τῶν διὰ παντὸς συμβεβηκότων τῷ ἄν-  
θρώπῳ καθέστηκεν, ὡς ἤδη παρεστήσαμεν. λεκτέον  
οὖν μηδὲ τὴν κοινὴν τούτων σύνοδον ἄνθρωπον  
εἶναι.

281 Πλάτων δὲ χείρον παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὀρίζειται τὸν  
ἄνθρωπον, λέγων "ἄνθρωπός ἐστι ζῶον ἄπτερον  
δίπουν πλατυώνυχον, ἐπιστήμης πολιτικῆς δεκτι-  
κόν". ὅθεν καὶ προὑπτὰ ἐστὶ τὰ ὀφείλοντα πρὸς  
αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι. πάλιν γὰρ οὐ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκτέθει-  
ται, ἀλλὰ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καὶ ἀποσυμβεβηκότα  
282 τούτῳ καθήρηθηται. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄπτερον ἀποσυμ-  
βέβηκεν αὐτῷ, τὸ δὲ ζῶον καὶ τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ  
πλατυώνυχον συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἐπιστήμης πολιτι-  
κῆς δεκτικὸν ποτὲ μὲν συμβέβηκε ποτὲ δὲ ἀποσυμ-  
βέβηκεν. ὥστε ἡμῶν ἕτερόν τι μαθεῖν ζητούντων  
αὐτὸς ἕτερόν τι παρέστησεν.

But to this also there is an answer ready to hand. 278  
For, firstly, if each of these things separately is not  
"Man," how can they make "Man" when combined  
together so as neither to extend beyond what he is  
nor to fall short of his real extent nor to diverge in  
any other way? And, next, they cannot so much as  
congregate all together so that the sum of them all  
should form "Man." Thus "mortal," for instance, 279  
is not a property of ours when we are men but is  
derived from concurrent recollection. For from seeing  
that Dion and Theon and Socrates, and in general  
individuals similar to ourselves, have died we reason  
that we also are mortal, even though death is not yet  
present with us—for, to be sure, we are alive. More- 280  
over, reasoning, too, is at one time present with us,  
at another time not present; and "possessing know-  
ledge" again, as we have already explained,<sup>a</sup> is not  
one of the constant properties of Man. It must  
be said, then, that not even the union of all these  
properties is "Man."

Plato gives a worse definition of Man than the 281  
others when he states that "Man is a wingless  
animal, with two feet and broad nails, receptive of  
political science."<sup>b</sup> Hence the objections which  
should be brought against him are obvious. For, once  
again, he has not explained Man but has enumerated  
the positive and negative attributes of Man; for 282  
"wingless" is a negative attribute of his, while  
"animal" and "with two feet" and "with broad  
nails" are positive attributes, and "receptive of  
political science" is at one time a positive, at another  
a negative attribute. So that while we are seeking to  
learn one thing, he offers us another.

<sup>a</sup> See § 273.<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 28.

Ἄλλα γὰρ οὕτως ἀποδείξω τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι  
 283 τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ προχείρου νοεῖν. παρακειμένως  
 δὲ λεκτέον ὅτι καὶ ἡ κατάληψις αὐτοῦ τῶν ἀπόρων  
 ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα ὅτι ἀπὸ μέρους ἤδη τοῦτο  
 συμβεβίβασται. τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπινοούμενον οὐδὲ  
 καταληφθῆναι πέφυκεν· ἀνεπινόητος δὲ γε ὁ ἄν-  
 284 θρωπος δέδεικται τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν δογματικῶν  
 καὶ καθ' ἕτερον τρόπον ἐνέσται τὸ τοιοῦτο κατα-  
 σκευάζειν. εἴπερ καταληπτὸν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος,  
 ἤτοι ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν ζητεῖ τε καὶ καταλαμ-  
 βάνει, ἢ ὅλος ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν  
 κατάληψιν πίπτει, (ἢ μέρος μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ζητοῦν,  
 μέρος δὲ τὸ ζητούμενον,) ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ τὴν ὄρασιν  
 ὑπόβοιτό τις ἑαυτὴν ὀρώσων ἢ γὰρ ὅλη ἔσται ὀρώσα  
 ἢ ὀρωμένη ἢ μέρος μὲν ἑαυτὴν ὀρώσα μέρος δὲ ὑφ'  
 285 ἑαυτῆς ὀρωμένη. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅλος δι' ὅλου ὁ  
 ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτὸν ζητοῖ καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο, σὺν  
 τῷ ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἑαυτὸν νοεῖν, οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔσται τὸ  
 καταλαμβάνομενον, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ δὲ ὅλος εἴη  
 τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοοῖτο ὅλος, σὺν τῷ  
 ζητεῖσθαι, πάλιν οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται τὸ ζητοῦν  
 286 καὶ τὸ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιησόμενον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ  
 δυνατόν ἐστι παρὰ μέρος ὅτε μὲν ὅλον ὑποκείσθαι  
 τὸ ζητοῦν ὅτε δὲ ὅλον τὸ ζητούμενον. ὅτε γὰρ  
 ὅλος ὑπόκειται ζητῶν καὶ σὺν τούτῳ νοεῖται ὅλος,  
 σὺν τῷ ζητεῖν ὅλος, οὐδὲν ἀπολειφθήσεται ὁ ζητη-

<sup>1</sup> <ἢ . . . ζητ.> sic ego lacunam explevi: similiter Bekk.

Well, then, let us grant that it is thus proved that  
 it is not possible to form off-hand a conception of  
 Man. In like manner one must declare that the 283  
 apprehension of Man is a thing impracticable,  
 especially since this has been partially established  
 already (for what is not conceived is not capable of  
 being apprehended; and it has been shown that Man,  
 so far as the conceptions of the Dogmatists are  
 concerned, is inconceivable, and therefore also non-  
 apprehensible). All the same, it will be possible to 284  
 establish this point by another line of argument as  
 well. If Man is apprehensible either he as a whole  
 wholly seeks and apprehends himself, or as a whole  
 he is the object sought and coming under apprehen-  
 sion, (or he is partly the subject, partly the object  
 of apprehension,) just as if one were to imagine the  
 sense of sight seeing itself; for either it will be  
 wholly seeing or seen, or partly seeing itself and  
 partly seen by itself. But if man as a whole should 285  
 wholly seek himself and should be conceived there-  
 with (that is, with the fact that he as a whole wholly  
 conceives himself), there will no longer be any object  
 that is apprehended, which is absurd. And if, on the  
 other hand, he as a whole is the object sought and  
 as a whole is conceived therewith (that is, with the  
 fact that he is sought), then again we shall be left  
 with no subject that seeks or is about to effect the  
 apprehension. Moreover it is not possible to take 286  
 him in parts so that at one time he should be wholly  
 the subject seeking, and at another wholly the object  
 sought. For when as a whole he is seeking and as a  
 whole is conceived therewith (that is, with the fact  
 that as a whole he is seeking), no object will be left  
 for him to seek; and conversely, when as a whole

σει· καὶ ἀνάπαλιν, ὅτε ὅλος δι' ὅλου ἐστὶ τὸ ζητούμενον, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ζητοῦν.

- 287 Λείπεται ἄρα μὴ ὅλον αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ ἐπιβάλλειν, ἀλλὰ μέρει τινὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κατάληψιν ποιεῖσθαι. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀπόρων. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν
- 288 διάνοιαν, ὅθεν εἰ μέλλει τινὶ μέρει ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἤτοι τῷ σώματι τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν γνωριεῖ, ἢ ἐναλλάξ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ σῶμα καταλήψεται. τῷ μὲν οὖν σώματι οὐχ οἷον τέ ἐστὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν γνωρίζειν· ἄλογον γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο καὶ κωφὸν καὶ ἀφύες πρὸς τὰς τοιουτοτρόπους ζητή-
- 289 σεις. ἄλλως τε, εἰ τὸ σῶμα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἀντιληπτικὸν ἐστίν, ὀφείλει τὸ ταύτας καταλαμβάνον ὁμοιοῦσθαι ταύταις, τουτέστιν ὁμοίως διατίθεσθαι καὶ αἰσθησίς τε καὶ διάνοια γίνεσθαι. ὁράσεως γὰρ ἀντιλαμβανόμενον, καθὸ ὄρα, ὄρασις ἐστίν, καὶ γεύσεως γενομένης καταληπτικὸν ὑπάρχον γεύσις γενήσεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ
- 290 ἀνάλογον. καθὰ γὰρ τὸ θερμὸν ἀντιλαμβανόμενον ὡς θερμὸν θερμαινόμενον ἀντιλαμβάνεται, θερμαινόμενον δὲ εὐθύς ἐστὶ θερμόν, καὶ ὡς τὸ ψυχρὸν γνῶσιν ποιούμενον ὡς ψυχρὸν ψυχόμενον εὐθέως ἐστὶ ψυχρόν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ σάρκινος ὄγκος εἰ ἀντιλαμβάνεται τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὡς αἰσθήσεων, αἰσθάνεται,
- 291 αἰσθανόμενος δὲ πάντως αἰσθησίς γενήσεται, καὶ ταύτη οὐκέτι ὑποκείμεται τὸ ζητοῦν, ἀλλ' ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον, σὺν τῷ καὶ τελῶς καταγέλαστον εἶναι τὸ μὴ διαφέρειν τὸν ὄγκον τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας, πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν δογματικῶς

he is wholly the object sought, the subject which seeks will not exist.

We are left, then, with the alternative that Man 287 does not as a whole perceive himself but forms the apprehension of himself by means of some part of himself. But this again is a thing impracticable. For Man is nothing more than his substance and senses and intellect, so that, if he is to apprehend himself 288 with one of his parts, either he will perceive his senses and intellect with his body, or conversely he will apprehend his body with his senses and intellect. It is, however, impossible for him to perceive his senses and intellect with his body; for it is irrational and senseless and unsuited for suchlike investigations. And besides, if the body is capable of perceiving 289 the senses and the intellect, as apprehending these it must be similar to them, that is, it must be in a similar condition and become both sense and intellect. For when it perceives the sense of sight, in so far as it sees it will be sight, and when it is apprehensive of taste in the act of tasting it will become taste, and similarly with the other senses. For just as that which per- 290 ceives a hot thing as hot perceives it by being heated, and being heated is at once hot, and as that which acquires knowledge of a cold thing as cold by feeling cold is at once cold, so also if the fleshly substance perceives the senses as senses it has sense-perception, and having sense-perception it certainly will become sense, and in this way the seeking subject will no 291 longer subsist but it will be the object sought,— besides the fact that it is perfectly ridiculous to suppose that the body's substance does not differ from the senses and the intellect, when practically



φιλοσοφησάντων τὴν ἐν τούτοις διαφορὰν εἰσηγησαμένων.

- 292 Ὁ δ' αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διανοίας ἐστὶ λόγος· εἰ γὰρ ἀντιλαμβάνεται ταύτης ὁ ὄγκος ὡς διανοίας, τουτέστι νοούσης, ἔσται διάνοια ὁ ὄγκος, διάνοια δὲ ὢν οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ζητοῦν ἀλλὰ τὸ ζητούμενον. οὐ τοίνυν τὸ σῶμα καταληπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.
- 293 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ αἱ αἰσθήσεις. αὗται γὰρ πάσχουσι μόνον καὶ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦνται, ἄλλο δ' ἴσασι οὐδὲ ἔν, ἐπεὶ τοι ἔαν ζήτησί᾽ τινος αὐταῖς νείμωμεν, οὐκέτ' ἄλογοι γενήσονται ἀλλὰ λογικαὶ καὶ διανοίας ἔχουσαι φύσιν. ὅπερ οὐχ οὕτως εἶχεν· εἰ γὰρ τὸ λευκαίνεσθαι καὶ μελαίνεσθαι καὶ γλυκάζεσθαι καὶ πικράζεσθαι καὶ εὐωδίζεσθαι καὶ κωιδῶς πάσχειν ἰδίον ἐστὶν αὐτῶν, τὸ ζητεῖν ἐνεργητικῶς οὐκ ἔσται
- 294 ἴδιον αὐτῶν. εἶτα πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστι διὰ τούτων καταληφθῆναι τὸν ὄγκον οὐκ ἔχουσῶν σωματικὴν<sup>1</sup> φύσιν; οἷον εὐθέως ἢ ὄρασις σχήματος μὲν καὶ μεγέθους καὶ χροῶς ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ, οὔτε δὲ σχῆμα οὔτε μέγεθος οὔτε χρωμά ἐστὶν ὁ ὄγκος, ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ ἄρα, τὸ ᾧ ταῦτα συμβέβηκεν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸν μὲν ὄγκον οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν ἢ ὄρασις, μόνον δὲ ὄρα τὰ συμβεβηκότα τῷ ὄγκῳ, οἷον τὸ
- 295 σχῆμα, τὸ μέγεθος, τὴν χροάν. ναί, φήσει τις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ τούτων συνηραρισμένον ὁ ὄγκος ἐστίν. ὅπερ ἦν ληρώδες. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἰδείξαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲ ἡ κοινὴ σύννοδος τῶν τινὶ συμβεβηκότων
- 296 ἐκεῖνό ἐστι τὸ ᾧ τινὶ συμβέβηκεν· εἶτα κἂν τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχη, πάλιν τῶν ἀμηχάνων ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῆς

<sup>1</sup> σωματικὴν: τὴν mss., Bekk.: τὴν <αὐτὴν> cj. Mutsch.

all the dogmatic philosophers have made mention of the difference between them.

The same argument applies also to the intellect; 292 for if the bodily substance perceives it as intellect—that is, as thinking—the substance will be intellect, and being intellect it will be not the seeker but the sought. So, then, the body is not capable of apprehending Man.

Nor indeed are the senses. For these are solely 293 passive and are stamped like wax, and not a single thing else do they know, since, to be sure, if we ascribe to them a seeking for anything they will become no longer irrational but rational and endowed with the nature of intellect. But this is not the case; for if feeling the white and the black and the sweet and the bitter and the odorous, and passive feeling in general, is a peculiar property of theirs, active seeking will not be a peculiar property of theirs.— 294 Further, how is it possible for the bodily substance to be apprehended by them when they do not possess a corporeal nature? Thus the sense of sight, for instance, is perceptive of form and size and colour, but the substance is neither form nor size nor colour but, if anything, that whereof these are properties; and because of this sight is not able to perceive the substance and only sees the properties of the substance, such as its form, size, colour. “Yes,” 295 someone will say, “but the aggregate made up of these is the substance.” But this is fatuous. For, in the first place, we have shown<sup>a</sup> that not even the united combination of the properties of a thing is the thing of which they are properties. And further, 296 even were it so, it is again an impossibility for the

<sup>a</sup> See § 278.

ὄψεως ληφθῆναι τὸ σῶμα. εἰ γὰρ μήτε μήκος  
 ψιλόν ἐστι τὸ σῶμα μήτε σχῆμα κατ' ἰδίαν μήτε  
 χρῶμα χωρὶς, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τούτων σύνθετον, δεήσει  
 τὴν ὄρασιν τοῦ σώματος ἀντιλαμβανομένην συν-  
 τιθέναι ταῦτα καθ' ἕκαστον παρ' ἑαυτῆς, καὶ οὕτω  
 297 τὸν κοινὸν πάντων ἀθροισμὸν σῶμα λέγειν. ἀλλὰ  
 τὸ συντιθέναι τι μετὰ τινος, καὶ τὸ τοιούδε μέγεθος  
 μετὰ τοῦ τοιούδε σχήματος λαμβάνειν, λογικῆς  
 ἐστὶ δυνάμεως. ἄλογος δὲ γέ ἐστιν ἡ ὄρασις·  
 298 τοῖνον οὐ ταύτης ἔργον καθέστηκε τὸ ἀντιλαμ-  
 βάνεσθαι τοῦ σώματος. καίτοι οὐ μόνον τὴν  
 κοινὴν σύνθετον ὡς σῶμα νοεῖν ἐστὶν ἀφύνης, ἀλλὰ  
 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν τούτῳ συμβεβηκότων  
 κατάληψιν πεπῆρωται. οἷον εὐθέως μήκους· καθ'  
 ὑπέρθεσιν γὰρ μερῶν τοῦτο λαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν,  
 ἀπὸ τινος ἀρχομένων ἡμῶν καὶ διὰ τινος καὶ ἐπὶ τι  
 καταληγόντων, ὅπερ ποιεῖν ἄλογος φύσις οὐ δύνα-  
 299 ται. εἴτα καὶ βάθους· περὶ αὐτὴν γὰρ πλάζεται  
 τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν ἡ ὄρασις, εἰς βάθος δ' οὐκ ἐνδύνει.  
 λανθάνει γοῦν αὐτὴν καὶ τὰ περιχρῦσα τῶν χαλκῶν.  
 εἶρητο δὲ ὅτι καὶ πρὸς χρωμάτων γνώσιν ἢ ἀν-  
 επιτηδεις, ὅτε τὴν Κυρηναϊκὴν στάσιν ἀνήροῦμεν.  
 300 διόπερ εἰ μηδὲ τῶν συμβεβηκότων τῷ σώματι ἡ  
 ὄρασις ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτικὴ, πολὺ πλέον οὐδ' αὐτοῦ  
 τοῦ σώματος ἔσται θεωρητικὴ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ  
 ἀκοῆς ἐστὶν ἔργον τὸ τοιούτον ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἢ γεύ-  
 σεως ἢ ἀφῆς· ἑκάστη γὰρ τούτων τὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν  
 μόνον αἰσθητὸν ἐπίσταται, τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ  
 ὄγκος. ἡ γὰρ ἀκοὴ φωνῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἀντιληπτι-  
 κή, φωνῆ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ὄγκος. καὶ ἡ ὀσφρησις  
 εὐώδους μόνον ἢ δυσώδους ἐστὶ κριτήριον· ἀλλ'

body to be perceived by the sense of sight. For if  
 neither bare length, nor form by itself, nor colour in  
 isolation, is the body, but the compound made up of  
 them, it will be necessary for the sight which apprehends  
 the body to put these together one by one in  
 itself, and thus to call the general aggregate of them  
 all "body." But the act of putting together one 297  
 thing with another, and of perceiving such and such  
 a size together with such and such a form, belongs  
 to the rational faculty. And the sense of sight is  
 irrational, so that it is not its task to perceive the  
 body.—Moreover, it is not only unsuited by nature 298  
 to conceive the general aggregate as body, but it is  
 also disabled for the apprehension of each of the  
 body's properties. That of length, for instance; for  
 this is naturally perceived by passing over its parts,  
 as we commence at a point and proceed through a  
 point and end up at a point, which an irrational nature  
 cannot do. Again, take the property of depth; for 299  
 sight roams over the actual surface and does not  
 penetrate to the depth. Thus it fails to discover the  
 copper in coins that are gilded over. And when we  
 overthrew the Cyrenaic theory<sup>a</sup> it was stated that  
 sight is also unfitted for the discerning of colour.  
 Consequently, if the sense of sight is not even 300  
 perceptive of the properties of the body, much less  
 will it be capable of discerning the body itself. Nor,  
 indeed, is this a task for hearing or smell or taste  
 or touch; for each of these senses is only aware of  
 the percept proper to itself, and this will not be the  
 bodily substance. For hearing is perceptive of sound  
 only, and sound is not the substance. And smell is  
 a judge only of the odorous or mal-odorous; but no

<sup>a</sup> See §§ 190 ff.

οὐθεις οὕτως ἐστὶν ἄφρων ὡς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ περὶ ἡμᾶς σώματος ἐν τοῖς εὐώδεσιν ἢ δυσώδεσιν ἀπολείπειν. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων, ἵνα μὴ μακρολογώμεν. ὥστε αὐται μὲν τὸν ὄγκον οὐ καταλαμβάνονται.

- 301 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἑαυτάς. τίς γὰρ ὁράσει τὴν ὄρασιν εἶδεν; ἢ τίς ἀκοῇ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκήκοεν; τίς δὲ γεύσει ποτὲ τῆς γεύσεως ἐγεύσατο, ἢ ὀσφρήσει ὀσφρήσεως ὀσφρήσατο, ἢ ἀφῆς ἔθιγεν ἀφή; ταῦτα γὰρ διανοητὰ ἦν. τοίνυν μηδ' ἑαυτῶν ἀντιληπτικὰς λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις. οὕτωςι δὲ οὐδὲ ἀλλήλων. ὄρασις γὰρ ἀκούουσαν ἀκοὴν οὐ δύναται ὄραν, καὶ ἀνάπαλιν ἀκοὴ ὀρώσης ὀράσεως οὐ πέφυκεν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς ἐγχειρήσεως τρόπος, ἐπεὶ τοι κἂν λέγωμεν ὁράσει ληπτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀκοὴν ὡς ἀκοήν, τουτέστιν [ὡς] ἀκούουσαν, δώσομεν τὸ ὁμοιοπαθεῖν τὴν ὄρασιν ἐκείνη, ὥστε μηκέτι αὐτὴν ὄρασιν εἶναι ἀλλ' ἀκοήν.
- 302 πῶς γὰρ δύναται κρίναι ἀκούουσαν ἀκοὴν αὐτὴ μὴ ἔχουσα φύσιν ἀκουστικὴν; καὶ ἀναστροφῶς, ἵνα καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡς ὀρώσης ἀντιλάβηται τῆς ὄψεως, δεῖ πολὺ πρότερον ὄρασιν αὐτὴν γενέσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐδεμίαν ὑπερβολὴν ἔοικεν ἀτοπίας ἀπολείπειν. λεκτέον ἄρα μηδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἢ τοῦ σώματος ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ ἀλλήλων.
- 303 Ναί, φασὶν οἱ δογματικοί, ἀλλ' ἡ διάνοια καὶ τὸν ὄγκον καὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἑαυτὴν γνωρίζει. ὅπερ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐστίν. ὅταν γὰρ ἀξιώσῃ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀντιληπτικὴν γίνεσθαι τοῦ τε ὅλου σώματος καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, πευσόμεθα πότερον ὑφ' ἐν ὄλω ἐπιπεσοῦσα τῷ ὄγκῳ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιεί-

one is so witless as to class the substance of our body amongst things odorous or mal-odorous. And—not to make a long story of it—the same may be said regarding the rest of the senses. So that the senses do not apprehend the bodily substance.

Nor indeed do they apprehend themselves. For 301 who has beheld sight by sight? Or who has heard hearing by hearing? And who ever tasted taste by taste, or smelt smell by smell, or touched touch by touch? For these are objects for the intellect. Hence it must be declared that the senses are not even perceptive of themselves; nor, in consequence, of one another. For sight cannot see hearing as it hears, and conversely hearing is incapable of hearing sight as it sees,—and the same method of criticism applies to the other senses,—since, of course, if we assert that hearing as hearing (that is, as in act of hearing) is perceptible by sight, we shall be admitting that sight is like to the former in quality, so that it is no longer sight but hearing; for how can it discern hearing 302 in act of hearing unless it possesses itself a nature capable of hearing? And conversely, in order that hearing may perceive sight as in act of seeing it must itself have become vision long before. But this, it would seem, reaches the very height of absurdity. One must, therefore, declare that the senses do not perceive either the body or themselves or one another.

“Yes,” say the Dogmatists, “but the intellect 303 discerns both the bodily substance and the senses and itself.” But this, too, is a thing impracticable. For when they claim that the intellect is perceptive both of the whole body and of its contents, we shall inquire whether it apprehends by making contact all

304 ται, ἢ τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα συντιθεῖσα τὸ  
 ὅλον καταλαμβάνεται. καὶ τῷ μὲν ὅλῳ οὐκ ἂν  
 θελήσαιεν, ὡς ἔσται συμφανὲς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιφερο-  
 μένων· τὰ δὲ μέρη εἰ λέγοιεν αὐτὴν συντιθέναί  
 κἀντεῦθεν τὸ ὅλον γνωρίζειν, μείζονι συνειληθήσου-  
 νται ἀπορία. τῶν γὰρ τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν τινὰ ἔστιν  
 ἄλογα, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα ἀλόγως ἡμᾶς κινεῖ. τοῖνυν ἡ  
 διάνοια πρὸς τούτων ἀλόγως κινουμένη ἄλογος  
 γενήσεται, ἄλογος δὲ οὐσα οὐκ ἔσται διάνοια.  
 305 ὥστε οὐ καταλήψεται τὸν ὄγκον ἢ διάνοια. καὶ  
 μὴν οὐδὲ τὰς αἰσθήσεις δύναται κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν  
 τρόπον διαγινώσκειν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ σῶμα οὐ δύναται  
 [περι]λαβεῖν τῷ αὐτῇ μὲν λογικῆς μετέχειν δυνά-  
 μειος ἐκείνο δὲ ἄλογον εἶναι, οὕτω πάλιν ἀδυνατήσει  
 τὰς αἰσθήσεις καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ περ ἄλογοί  
 εἰσιν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀλόγως τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον  
 αὐτὰς ἐκίνουν. εἶτα τὰς αἰσθήσεις λαμβάνουσα  
 πάντως αὐτῇ αἰσθησις ἔσται. ἵνα γὰρ τὰς αἰσθή-  
 σεως ὡς αἰσθήσεις λάβῃ, τουτέστιν αἰσθανομένης,  
 καὶ αὐτῇ γενήσεται ὁμοιοειδῆς ἐκείναις· τὴν γὰρ  
 ὄρασιν ὄρωσαν καταλαμβανομένη πολὺ πρότερον  
 ὄρασις γενήσεται, καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἀκούουσαν κρι-  
 νουσα οὐχ ἕτερα γενήσεται τῆς ἀκοῆς. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς  
 καὶ ἐπὶ ὀσφρήσεως καὶ γεύσεως καὶ ἀφῆς ἔστι  
 306 λόγος. ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἡ γνωρίζουσα τὰς αἰσθήσεις  
 διάνοια εὐρίσκειται εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων μεταβεβηκυῖα  
 φύσιν, οὐδὲν ἔσται ἔτι ὑποκείμενον τὸ ζητοῦν τὰς  
 αἰσθήσεις· ὁ γὰρ ὑπεθέμεθα ζητεῖν, τοῦτο ἀναπέ-  
 φηγε τὸ αὐτὸ ταῖς ζητουμέναις, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ  
 307 χρῆζον τοῦ καταληψομένου. ναί φασιν, ἀλλὰ ταῦ-

at once with the substance as a whole, or with its  
 parts, and by combining these it apprehends the  
 whole. That it is with the whole they will not agree, 304  
 as will be evident from what follows; and if they  
 should say that it combines the parts and therefrom  
 discerns the whole, they will be plunged into diffi-  
 culties. For of the parts of the substance some are  
 irrational, and those that are irrational move us  
 irrationally. The intellect, therefore, being irration-  
 ally moved by these will become irrational, and being  
 irrational it will not be intellect. So that the intellect  
 will not apprehend the substance.—Nor, in fact, can 305  
 it distinguish the senses, according to the same argu-  
 ment. For just as it is unable to apprehend the  
 body owing to the fact that it has itself a share of  
 rational power whereas the body is irrational, so also  
 it will be unable to apprehend the senses since they  
 are irrational and therefore move what apprehends  
 them irrationally. Further, in perceiving the senses  
 it will certainly be sense itself. For in order that it  
 may perceive the senses as senses (that is, as exercis-  
 ing sense-perception) it will itself become of like  
 nature with them; for when it apprehends sight as  
 in act of seeing it will, long before, become sight, and  
 in discerning hearing in act of hearing it will become  
 no different from hearing. The same argument  
 applies to both smell and taste and touch.—But if 306  
 the intellect that discerns the senses is found to have  
 passed over into their nature, there will no longer  
 exist any subject which seeks to know the senses;  
 for that which we assumed to be seeking has turned  
 out to be identical with the senses sought, and  
 consequently in need of something to apprehend it.  
 "Yes," they say, "but the same thing is both intellect 307

τόν ἐστι διάνοια καὶ αἴσθησις, οὐ κατὰ ταυτό δέ, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν διάνοια κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις· καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ποτήριον κοῖλόν τε καὶ περίκυρτον λέγεται, οὐ κατὰ ταυτό δέ, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν κοῖλον, οἷον τὸ ἐντὸς μέρος, κατ' ἄλλο δὲ περίκυρτον, καθάπερ τὸ ἐκτὸς, καὶ ὡς ἡ αὐτὴ ὁδὸς ἀνάτης τε καὶ κατάντης νοεῖται, ἀνάτης μὲν τοῖς ἀνιούσι δι' αὐτῆς κατάντης δὲ τοῖς κατιούσιν, οὕτως ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις κατ' ἄλλο μὲν ἐστι νοῦς κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις, καὶ οὐκ εἴργεται ἡ αὐτὴ οὕσα τῆς

308 προειρημένης τῶν αἰσθήσεων καταλήψεως. πάνυ δ' εἰσὶν εὐήθεις, καὶ κενῶς μόνον πρὸς τὰς ἐκκειμένας ἀπορίας ἀντηχοῦσιν. φαμέν γάρ, εἰ καὶ συγχωρηθῶσιν αἱ διάφοροι αὗται δυνάμεις περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ὑποκείσθαι, πάλιν μένει τὸ μικρῶ

309 πρόσθεν ὑπὸ ἡμῶν κινήθην ἄπορον. ζητῶ γάρ, τοῦτο τὸ κατ' ἄλλο μὲν νοῦς εἶναι λεγόμενον κατ' ἄλλο δὲ αἴσθησις πῶς δύναται τῷ καθ' ὃ νοῦς ἐστὶν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ καθ' ὃ αἴσθησις ἐστίν; λογικὸν γάρ ὃν καὶ ἀλόγου ποιούμενον κατάληψιν ἀλόγως κινήσεται, ἀλόγως δὲ κινούμενον ἀλογόν ἐστι, τοιοῦτον δὲ ὃν οὐκ ἔσται καταλαμβάνον ἀλλὰ καταλαμβανόμενον. ὅπερ πάλιν ἦν ἄπορον.

310 Διὰ τούτων μὲν δὴ παρεστάσθω ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε διὰ τοῦ σώματος τὰς αἰσθήσεις δύναται λαβεῖν οὔτε ἀνάπαλιν διὰ τούτων τὸ σῶμα, <εἶγε> μηδὲ <αὐταὶ><sup>1</sup> αὐτὰς ἢ ἀλλήλας. ἐξῆς δὲ ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι οὐδ' ἑαυτῆς ἐπιγνώμων ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια, καθάπερ ἀξιοῦσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων. εἴπερ γάρ ὁ νοῦς ἑαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεται, ἥτοι ὅλος ἑαυτὸν καταλήψεται, ἢ ὅλος μὲν οὐδαμῶς

<sup>1</sup> <εἶγε> μ. <αὐταὶ> cj. Bekk.

and sense, but not in the same aspect, it being in one aspect intellect but in another sense; and just as the same drinking-cup is said to be both concave and convex, though not in the same aspect, but in one aspect concave, as is the inside part, and in another convex, as is the outside,—and as the same road is conceived as being both an incline and a decline, an incline for those ascending by it but a decline for those descending,—so likewise the same faculty is in one aspect thought but in another sense, and being the same it is not precluded from the aforementioned apprehension of the senses.” But they are utterly 308 simple-minded, and only make empty replies to the difficulties propounded. For we assert that, even if it be granted that these different faculties really belong to the same substance, there still remains the difficulty raised by us a little while ago. For I ask, 309 as regards this thing which is said to be thought in one aspect and sense in another, how by its aspect as thought can it perceive its aspect as sense? For it being rational and apprehending an irrational thing will be moved irrationally, and being moved irrationally it will be irrational, and being this it will not be apprehending but apprehended. And this again is absurd.

Let it be established, then, by these arguments that 310 Man is unable to perceive either the senses by means of the body or, conversely, the body by means of the senses, seeing that these cannot perceive either themselves or one another. Next we have to show that the intellect is not cognizant of itself, as the Dogmatic philosophers claim. For if the mind apprehends itself, either it as a whole will apprehend itself, or it will do so not as a whole but employing for the purpose

- 311 μέρει δέ τι ἐαυτοῦ πρὸς τοῦτο χρώμενος. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεσθαι οὐκ ἂν δυνηθεῖη. εἰ γὰρ ὅλος ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνεται, ὅλος ἔσται κατάληψις καὶ καταλαμβάνων, ὅλου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐδὲν ἔτι ἔσται τὸ καταλαμβάνόμενον· τῶν δὲ ἀλογωτάτων ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι μὲν τὸν καταλαμβάνοντα, μὴ εἶναι δὲ τὸ οὐ ἔστιν ἢ
- 312 κατάληψις. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μέρει τινὶ δύναται πρὸς τοῦτο χρῆσθαι ὁ νοῦς. αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ μέρος πῶς<sup>1</sup> ἐαυτὸ καταλαμβάνει; εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅλον, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ μέρει τινί, ἐκείνο πάλιν πῶς ἐαυτὸ γνώσεται; καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ὥστε ἀναρχον εἶναι τὴν κατάληψιν, ἥτοι μηδενὸς εὕρισκομένου πρώτου τοῦ τὴν κατάληψιν ποιησομένου ἢ μηδενὸς ὄντος τοῦ καταληφθησομένου.<sup>2</sup>
- 313 ἐπεὶ τὰ<sup>3</sup> εἰ ἐαυτὸν καταλαμβάνει ὁ νοῦς, καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλήφεται· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον<sup>4</sup> σὺν τινὶ τόπῳ καταλαμβάνεται. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸν τόπον ὁ νοῦς τὸν ἐν ᾧ ἔστι συγκαταλαμβάνει ἐαυτῷ, ἐχρῆν μὴ διαφωνεῖσθαι τοῦτον παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, τῶν μὲν κεφαλὴν λεγόντων εἶναι τῶν δὲ θώρακα, καὶ ἐπ' εἶδους τῶν μὲν ἐγκέφαλον τῶν δὲ μήνιγγα, τινῶν δὲ καρδίαν, ἄλλων δὲ ἥπατος πύλας ἢ τι τοιοῦτο μέρος τοῦ σώματος. διαφωνοῦσι δὲ γε περὶ τούτου οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων· οὐκ ἄρα καταλαμβάνει ἐαυτὸν ὁ νοῦς.
- 314 Καὶ δὴ οὕτω κουνότερον ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου

<sup>1</sup> πῶς Kayser: ὅπως mss.: αὐ πῶς cj. Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> καταληφθησομένου cj. Bekk.: καταληφσομένου mss.

<sup>3</sup> ἐπεὶ τὰ cj. Bekk.: ἐπεὶ τὰ πῶς N: ἐπεὶ περ cet., Bekk.

<sup>4</sup> καταλαμβανόμενον cj. Bekk.: καταλαμβάνον mss., Bekk.

a part of itself. Now it will not be able as a whole to 311 apprehend itself. For if as a whole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and apprehending, and, the apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehended object will no longer be anything; but it is a thing most irrational that the apprehending subject should exist while the object of the apprehension does not exist. Nor, in fact, can the 312 mind employ for this purpose a part of itself. For how does the part itself apprehend itself? If as a whole, the object sought will be nothing; while if with a part, how will that part in turn discern itself? And so on to infinity. So that apprehension is a thing without beginning, as either no first subject is found to apprehend or no object exists to be apprehended.—Further, if the mind apprehends itself it 313 will also apprehend therewith the place in which it exists; for everything that is apprehended is apprehended together with some place. And if the mind apprehends together with itself the place also wherein it exists, this ought not to have been a matter of dispute among the philosophers,<sup>a</sup> some of them declaring it to be the head, others the breast, and, in particular, some the brain, others the *pia mater*, some the heart, others the portals of the liver or some such part of the body. Regarding this the Dogmatic philosophers do actually dispute among themselves; therefore the mind does not apprehend itself.

Let this, then, stand as a statement of the diffi- 314

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *P.H.* i. 118.

διανοηθῆσθαι ἢ περὶ τοῦ κριτηρίου ζήτησις. ἐπειδὴ δὲ φιλαύτως οἱ δογματικοὶ ἄλλοις μὲν οὐ παραχωροῦσι τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας κρίσιν, μόνους δ' ἑαυτοὺς ταύτην εὐρηκέναι λέγουσιν, φέρε ἐπ' αὐτῶν στήσαντες τὸν λόγον διδάσκωμεν ὅτι οὐδὲ οὕτως εὐρεθῆναι τι δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀληθείας κρι-  
 315 τήριον. ἕκαστος τοίνυν τῶν ἀξιούντων τάλληθές εὐρηκέναι ἦτοι φάσει μόνον τοῦτο ἀποφαίνεται ἢ ἀπόδειξιν παραλαμβάνει. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν οὐκ ἐρεί- τῶν γὰρ ἀντικαθεζομένων αὐτῷ τις τὴν τούναντίον ἀξιούσαν προοίσαται φάσιν, καὶ οὕτως οὐ μᾶλλον ἐκείνος ἢ οὗτος ἔσται πιστός· ψιλῇ γὰρ φάσει ἴσον  
 316 φέρεται ψιλῇ φάσει. εἰ δὲ μετ' ἀποδείξεως κρι- τήριον αὐτὸν ἀποφαίνηται, πάντως ὑγιούς. ἀλλ' ἵνα μάθωμεν ὅτι ὑγιῆς ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶν ἢ προσ- χρώμενος κριτήριον ἑαυτὸν ἀποφαίνεται, ὀφείλομεν ἔχειν κριτήριον, καὶ τοῦτο προωμολογημένον· οὐκ ἔχομεν δὲ γε σύμφωνον κριτήριον, ζητεῖται δέ·  
 317 οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν κριτήριον. πάλιν ἐπεὶ οἱ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς κριτήρια λέγοντες τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπὸ διαφώνων αἰρέσεων ἀνάγονται καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις, δεῖ παρεῖναι τι ἡμῖν κριτήριον ᾧ προσχρώμενοι κρινοῦμεν τὴν διαφωνίαν εἰς τὸ τισὶ μὲν συγκατατίθεσθαι τισὶ δὲ μηδαμῶς.  
 318 τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἦτοι πᾶσι διάφωνόν ἐστι τοῖς διαφωνοῦσιν ἢ ἐνὶ μόνον σύμφωνον. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν πᾶσι διάφωνον, μοῖρα καὶ αὐτὸ γενήσεται τῆς διαφωνίας, μοῖρα δ' ὄν ταύτης οὐκ ἂν εἴη κρι- τήριον ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ παραπλησίως τῇ ὅλῃ δια-

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 314-316 cf. *P.H.* ii. 34-36.

culties which beset the inquiry about the criterion, in its larger aspect as Man in general.<sup>a</sup> But inas- much as the Dogmatists, in their self-conceit, do not pass over to others the judgement of truth but assert that they themselves alone have discovered it, come and let us base our argument upon them and demon- strate that not even so is it possible for any criterion of truth to be discovered. Now each of those who  
 315 claim to have discovered the truth either makes this declaration by merely asserting it or adduces a proof. But he will not utter it by assertion; for one of those who belong to the opposite side will utter an assertion claiming the opposite, and in this case the former will be no more trustworthy than the latter; for a bare assertion counterbalances a bare assertion. But if  
 316 his declaration of himself as criterion is accompanied by proof, it must be sound proof. But in order to ascertain that the proof which he employs in declaring himself as criterion is sound, we must possess a criterion, and one that is already agreed upon; but we do not possess an undisputed criterion, it being the object of inquiry; therefore it is not possible to discover a criterion.—Again, since those who call  
 317 themselves criteria of truth derive from discordant Schools of thought, and just because of this disagree with one another, we need to possess a criterion which we can employ to pronounce upon their dis- agreement so as to give assent to the one party and not to the other. This criterion, then, is either in  
 318 disagreement with all those who disagree or in agree- ment with only one. But if it disagrees with all, it will itself also be a party in the disagreement, and being a party in this it will not be a criterion but itself also, like the whole of the disagreement, in need of

φωνία κρίσεως δεόμενον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ δοκιμάζων  
 319 ἅμα καὶ δοκιμάζεσθαι τῶν ἀμηχάνων. εἰ δὲ μὴ  
 πᾶσι διαπεφώνηκεν ἀλλ' ἐνὶ συμφωνεῖ, (ὁ εἰς οὗτος  
 ᾧ συμφωνεῖ)<sup>1</sup> ἐκ τῆς διαφωνίας ὧν χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ  
 δοκιμάσοντος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῷ  
 κριτήριον μὴ ἕτερον ὄν παρ' ἐκείνου δεήσεται κρί-  
 σεως, δεόμενον δὲ κρίσεως οὐκ ἔσται κριτήριον.  
 320 τὸ δὲ πάντων κυριώτατον, εἶπερ τινὰ τῶν δογ-  
 ματικῶν λέγομεν εἶναι κριτὴν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ παρ'  
 αὐτῷ μόνω ταύτην ὑπάρχειν, ἥτοι τῇ ἡλικίᾳ αὐτοῦ  
 ἐνατενίζοντες τοῦτο ἐροῦμεν, ἢ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ μὲν οὐ-  
 δαμῶς τῷ πόνῳ δέ, ἢ οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἀλλὰ τῇ συνέσει  
 καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ἢ συνέσει μὲν οὐδαμῶς μαρτυρία δὲ  
 τῇ τῶν πολλῶν. οὔτε δὲ ἡλικία οὔτε φιλοπονία  
 οὔτ' ἄλλω τινὶ τῶν εἰρημένων προσέχειν οἰκειὸν  
 ἐστὶν ἐν τῇ περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ζητήσει, ὡς παρα-  
 στήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα τινὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ῥητέον  
 321 κριτήριον εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας. καὶ δὴ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ  
 μὲν οὐ προσεκτέον, ἐπεὶπερ οἱ πλείους τῶν δογ-  
 ματικῶν ὁμήλικες σχεδὸν ἦσαν ὅτε αὐτοὺς ἔλεγον  
 κριτήρια τῆς ἀληθείας· πάντες γὰρ πρεσβῦται  
 γεγόμενοι, οἷον Πλάτων, εἰ τύχοι, καὶ Δημόκριτος  
 καὶ Ἐπίκουρος καὶ Ζήνων, ἑαυτοῖς τὴν εὕρεσιν  
 322 τῆς ἀληθείας προσμαρτύρησαν. εἰτ' οὐκ ἀπέουκεν,  
 ὡς ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ θεωροῦμεν  
 ὅτι συνετώτεροι πολλάκις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰσὶ  
 νέοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φιλοσοφία εὐεπηβολω-  
 τέρους γεγόνενα παρὰ τοὺς πρεσβύτας τοὺς νέους.  
 323 ἐνιοὶ μὲν γάρ, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ ἰατρός,  
 διαρρήδην ἔλεξαν πολλῶν λείπεσθαι τῆς περὶ τοὺς  
 νέους συνέσεως καὶ ἀγχινοίας τοὺς πρεσβύτας,

<sup>1</sup> <ὁ . . . συμφωνεῖ> cj. Bekk.

a judgement; for that the same thing should be at  
 once both examining and examined is a thing im-  
 practicable. And if it does not disagree with all but 319  
 agrees with one, the one with whom it agrees, as  
 being involved in the disagreement, requires an  
 examiner. And on this account the criterion which  
 agrees with that one, being no different from it, will  
 need judgement, and needing judgement it will not  
 be a criterion.—But the most important argument of 320  
 all is this:—if we say that some one particular Dog-  
 matist is the judge of truth, and that this attribute  
 belongs to him alone, we shall make this statement  
 after looking intently either at his age, or not at his  
 age but at his labours, or not at these but at his  
 sagacity and intellect, or not at his sagacity but at the  
 testimony of the multitude. But in our inquiry into  
 the truth it is not appropriate, as we shall show, to  
 give attention either to age or to industry or to any  
 other of the points mentioned above; therefore it  
 should not be asserted that any one of the philo-  
 sopher is the criterion of truth. Now one should not 321  
 attend to age, seeing that most of the Dogmatists  
 were pretty much of the same age when they de-  
 clared themselves to be criteria of truth; for it was  
 when they had all become old—take Plato, for  
 instance, and Democritus and Epicurus and Zeno—  
 that they testified to their own discovery of truth.  
 Further, it is not unlikely that, just as in ordinary life 322  
 and common intercourse the young are often found  
 to be more intelligent than the old, so likewise in  
 philosophy the young may be more keen-witted than  
 the old. For some people, including Asclepiades the 323  
 physician, have asserted expressly that the old fall  
 far short of the young in intelligence and mental



παρὰ δὲ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ εἰκαιτέρων ψευδο-  
δοξίαν ἐναντίως ἔχειν ὑπελήφθη τὸ πρᾶγμα. διὰ γὰρ  
τὸ πολυπειρον τῶν πρεσβυτῶν ἔδοξαν οἱ νεώτεροι  
λείπεσθαι κατὰ σύνεσιν, τοῦ πράγματος ἐναντίως  
ἔχοντος· πολυπειρότεροι μὲν γάρ, ὡς ἔφη, εἰσὶν  
οἱ γεγηρακότες, οὐ συνετώτεροι δὲ παρὰ τοὺς  
νεούς. οὐκοῦν διὰ μὲν ἡλικίαν οὐ λεκτέον κρι-  
324 τήριον εἶναι τινα τῶν δογματικῶν. καὶ μὴν  
οὐδὲ διὰ φιλοπονίαν. πάντες γὰρ ἐπ' ἴσης εἰσὶ φιλό-  
πονοι, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς εἰς τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας  
ἀγῶνα κατελθὼν καὶ ταύτην εὐρηκέναι φήσας  
βραθύμως ἀνέστραπται. πάντων δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο  
ισότητα μαρτυρουμένων, τὸ ἐνὶ μόνῳ προσκλιθῆναι  
325 τῶν ἀδίκων ἔστιν. ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐκ ἂν τις  
ἄλλον ἄλλου προκρίναι ἔνεκα συνέσεως. πρῶτον μὲν  
γὰρ συνετοὶ πάντες ὑπήρχον, καὶ οὐχ οἱ μὲν νωθεῖς οἱ  
δὲ οὐ τοιοῦτοι. εἴτα πολλάκις οἱ συνετοὶ δοκοῦντες  
ὑπάρχειν οὐ τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ δὲ ψεύδους εἰσὶ  
συνήγοροι. τῶν γοῦν ῥητόρων τοὺς μὲν τῷ ψεύδει  
γενναίως<sup>1</sup> συλλαμβανομένους καὶ εἰς ἴσην αὐτὸ  
πίστιν ἀνάγοντας τῷ ἀληθεῖ δυνατούς τε καὶ  
νοερούς εἶναι φασί, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτους ἀνά-  
326 παλιν βραδεῖς τε καὶ ἀσυνέτους. τάχα τοῖνυν κἄν  
φιλοσοφία οἱ μὲν περινούστατοι τῶν ζητησάντων  
τὴν ἀλήθειαν τῷ εὐφρεῖς εἶναι πιθανοὶ καθεστάναι  
δοκοῦσι, κἄν τῷ ψεύδει συνηγορῶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀφρεῖς  
ἀπίθανοι, κἄν τῷ ἀληθεῖ συμμαχῶσιν. οὔτε οὖν  
διὰ ἡλικίαν οὔτε διὰ φιλοπονίαν οὔτε διὰ σύνεσιν  
οἰκειὸν ἔστι τινα τινὸς προκρίνειν καὶ τόνδε μὲν  
λέγειν εὐρηκέναι τὰληθῆς τόνδε δὲ μηδαμῶς.

<sup>1</sup> ψεύδει γενναίως Kalbfleisch: ψευδεῖς εἶναι ὡς mss.: ψεύδει  
πιθανῶς Bekk.

acumen, although the opposite was supposed to be  
the fact owing to the false opinion held by most  
thoughtless people. For the young are believed to  
fall short in intelligence because of the great experi-  
ence of the old, though the opposite is the fact; for  
while the aged are, as I said, more experienced, they  
are not more intelligent than the young. So, then,  
one must not say that, on the ground of age, any of  
the Dogmatists is the criterion.—Nor yet, surely, on 324  
the ground of industry. For they are all equally  
industrious, and there is none who, after competing  
in the race for truth and asserting that he has found  
it, conducts himself indolently. And when all give  
evidence of equality in this respect, it is a thing unjust  
to give the preference to one only.—So likewise no 325  
one could prefer one as superior to another on the  
ground of intelligence. For, in the first place, they  
are all intelligent, nor are some obtuse and others not  
so. Further, those who are reputed to be intelligent  
are frequently advocates not of truth but of falsehood.  
Thus we call those orators who ably support what is  
false, and raise it to equal the true in credibility, com-  
petent and brainy, and those who are not of this class  
we call, on the contrary, slow of wit and unintelligent.  
Possibly, then, in philosophy also the most sharp- 326  
witted of the seekers after truth seem to be convin-  
cing, even if they advocate what is false, owing to their  
natural ability, whereas those lacking this ability are  
unconvincing even when they contend for what is  
true. So, then, neither on the ground of age nor of  
industry, nor of intelligence, is it proper to prefer any-  
one to another and to say that this man has discovered  
the truth and that man has not.—It remains, then, 327

327 καταλείπεται τοῖνυν τῷ πλήθει τῶν συμφωνούντων  
 προσέχειν· τάχα γὰρ (ἄν)¹ τις τοῦτον ἄριστον  
 κριτὴν εἶναι τῆς ἀληθείας φήσειε τὸν ᾧ συμφώνως  
 οἱ πλείους μαρτυροῦσιν. ὅπερ ἐστὶ ληρώδες καὶ  
 τῶν προδιαβεβλημένων ἡμῖν κριτηρίων χείρον.  
 ἵνα γὰρ τὰλλα παρῶμεν, ἴσοι εἰσὶ τοῖς περὶ τινῶν  
 συμφωνοῦσιν οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀντιφωνοῦντες, οἷον  
 τοῖς Ἀριστοτελικοῖς οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι καὶ τοῖς Ἐπι-  
 328 κουρείοις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων  
 ὡσαύτως. εἰ οὖν ἄριστός ἐστιν ὁ συνεωρακῶς  
 τάληθές ἐπεὶ ταῦτ' ἄξιόυσι πάντες οἱ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ  
 ὀρμώμενοι, τί μᾶλλον τόνδε ἢ τόνδε ἄριστον εἶναι  
 φήσομεν καὶ κριτήριον ἀληθείας; οἷον εἰ Ἐπί-  
 329 κουρον διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς εἶναι τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ συμ-  
 φωνοῦντας ὅτι εὔρε τάληθές, τί μᾶλλον Ἐπίκουρον  
 ἢ Ἀριστοτέλην[; ἦ]² ὅτι οὐκ ἐλάσσους εἰσὶν οἱ καὶ  
 329 τούτῳ συνασπίζονται; οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ὡς πάλιν ἐν  
 τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον πράγμασιν οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν  
 ἓνα συνετὸν ἀμείνονα εἶναι πολλῶν ἀσυνέτων, οὕτω  
 καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐκ ἀπέοικεν ἓνα φρόνιμον εἶναι  
 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πιστόν, πολλοὺς δὲ χηνώδεις καὶ  
 διὰ τοῦτο ἀπίστους, κἄν συμφώνως τινὶ προσμαρ-  
 330 τυρῶσιν· σπάνιος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ συνετός, πολὺς δὲ  
 330 ὁ εἰκαῖος. εἶτα κἄν τῇ συμφωνίᾳ καὶ τῇ τῶν  
 πλείονων μαρτυρίᾳ προσέχωμεν, πάλιν εἰς τὸναν-  
 τίον τῇ προθέσει περιαιγόμεθα· κατ' ἀνάγκην γὰρ  
 τῶν περὶ τίνος συμφωνούντων πλείους εἰσὶν οἱ  
 περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφωνοῦντες. ὁ δὲ λέγω, σαφέστερον  
 γενήσεται οἰκείου τεθέντος ἡμῖν παραδείγματος.

¹ &lt;ἄ&gt; cj. Bekk.

² [; ἦ] secl. Heintz.

• With §§ 327-334 cf. P. H. ii. 43-44.

that we should attend to the majority of those in agreement; for possibly someone will assert that he is the best judge of truth with whom the testimony of the majority is in agreement.<sup>a</sup> But this is nonsensical and worse than the criteria which we have already rejected. For, to pass over all other points, those who disagree about any facts are equal in number to those who agree about the same facts—the Epicureans, for example, are equal to the Aristotelians, and the Stoics to the Epicureans, and so on with the rest. If, then, he that has discerned the 328 truth is the best because all those who derive from him maintain the same view, why should we say that this man rather than that man is the best and the criterion of truth? If, for instance, we name Epicurus because those who agree about him that he has found the truth are many in number, why Epicurus rather than Aristotle, since those who side with the latter are no less numerous? But, notwith- 329 standing, just as in the ordinary affairs of life it is not impossible that one intelligent person should be better than many unintelligent persons, so, once again, in philosophy it is not unlikely that one man should be sensible and on that account trustworthy, and many be like geese and on that account untrustworthy, even though they testify with one voice in someone's favour; for the intelligent man is rare, the thoughtless common.—Moreover, even if we attend to general agreement and the testimony of the 330 majority, we are brought round again to a position which contradicts our assumption; for of necessity those who disagree about a thing are more numerous than those who agree about it. What I mean will become clearer if we take a familiar example. Let 331

331 ἔστω γάρ, ὑποθέσεως χάριν, τῶν καθ' ἑκάστην αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντων πλείους εἶναι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν στωικὴν αἵρεσιν φιλοσοφούντας, λεγέτωσάν τε οὗτοι συμφώνως Ζήνωννα μόνον εὐρηκέναι τἀληθές, ἕτερον δὲ μηδένα. οὐκοῦν ἀντιφθέγγονται αὐτοῖς οἱ ἀπὸ Ἐπικούρου, ψευδεσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς ἐροῦσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου, ἀντεροῦσι δὲ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας καὶ καθόλου πάντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν

332 αἱρέσεων, ὥστε πάλιν τούτους τοὺς συμφώνως Ζήνωννα προκεκρικότας, συγκρινόμενος τοῖς συμφώνως λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι Ζήνωννα κριτήριον, κατὰ πολὺ ἐλάσσους εὐρίσκεσθαι. καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἰ τοῖς συμφώνως περὶ τινος ἀποφαινομένοις χρῆ γνωματεύειν ὅταν ὦσι πολλοί, οὐδένα ῥητέον τἀληθές εὐρηκέναι· παντὶ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ τινων ἐπινοουμένῳ πολὺς ἔστω ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων αἱρέσεων

333 ἀντιφθεγγόμενος. τὸ δὲ πάντων συνεκτικώτατον, οἱ περὶ τινος ὡς εὐρηκότος τἀληθές συμφωνοῦντες ἤτοι διάφορον ἔχουσι διάθεσιν καθ' ἣν συμφωνοῦσιν, ἢ διάφορον μὲν οὐδαμῶς μίαν δὲ καὶ τὴν αὐτήν· ἀλλὰ διάφορον μὲν οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἔχοιεν, ἐπεὶ πάντως αὐτοὺς δεήσει διαφωνεῖν· μίαν δὲ ἔχοντες εἰς ἰσότητα περιίστανται τῷ τούναντίον ἀποφαινομένῳ. ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνος μίαν ἔχει διάθεσιν καθ' ἣν ἀντι-

334 πέπτωκεν αὐτοῖς, οὕτω καὶ οὗτοι τὴν ἴσην ἔχουσιν ἐκείνῳ, παρέλκοντος λοιπὸν τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν πρὸς πίστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἰς ἣν

<sup>a</sup> i.e. all who agree about the matter are in the same "condition," or state of mind, respecting it. Thus, like their single opponent, they are in *one* state of mind, and their numbers go for nothing, so that his testimony is as weighty as theirs.

us suppose, for the sake of argument, that those who belong to the Stoic School of philosophy are more numerous than those who belong to each of the other Schools, and that the former agree in saying that Zeno alone has discovered the truth and no one else. Then the Epicureans will contradict them, and the Peripatetics will declare that they are liars, and the Academics will gainsay them, as will also all the members generally of the other Schools, so that once 332 again those who have unanimously given the preference to Zeno, when compared with those who unanimously declare that Zeno is not the criterion, are found to be far fewer in number. Here, too, is another reason: If one ought to vote for those who make an unanimous statement about any matter when they are numerous, it must be asserted that no one has found the truth; for everyone who is commended by a certain number has a multitude from the other 333 Schools who cry out against him. But the most convincing argument of all is this: Those who agree together about a certain person that he has found the truth are in a condition with respect to their agreement which is either different or not different at all but one and the same. But they will by no means be in a different condition since then they must certainly disagree; while if they are in one condition they are brought round into a state of equality with him who states the opposite.<sup>a</sup> For just as the latter is in one condition in respect of which he has opposed them, so also the former are in a condition equal 334 to his, their large numbers being henceforward redundant for ensuring belief; for, in fact, if it had been but one of them who was supposed to have made this

ἐξ αὐτῶν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων, ἴσον ἂν ἐδύνατο τοῖς πᾶσι.

335 Ἄλλ' εἴπερ ὁ τὴν ἀλήθειαν εὐρηκῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἢ διὰ ἡλικίαν ἢ διὰ φιλοπονίαν ἢ διὰ σύνεσιν ἢ τῷ πολλοῦς ἔχειν τοὺς μαρτυροῦντας εὐστοχηκέναι λέγεται, παρεστήσαμεν δὲ ἡμεῖς ὅτι δι' οὐδὲν τούτων ῥητέον κριτήριον αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν ἀληθείας, φαίνεται ὡς ἀνεύρετόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ κριτήριον.

336 Ἔτι ὁ λέγων αὐτὸν ἀληθείας εἶναι κριτήριον τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ λέγει, καὶ οὐδὲν πλεῖον. τοῖνυν ἐπεὶ καὶ ἕκαστος τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσόφων τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ λέγει καὶ ἐναντίον τῷ προενεχθέντι, δηλὸν ὡς ἴσου πᾶσιν ὄντος τοῦ τοιοῦτου οὐ δυνασόμεθα ὠρισμένως τινὰ κριτήριον εἶναι λέγειν. εἰ γὰρ οὗτος πιστὸς ὅτι φαίνεται αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν κριτήριον, πιστὸς ἔσται καὶ ὁ δεύτερος ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτῷ φαίνεται κριτήριον εἶναι αὐτόν, καὶ οὕτως ὁ τρίτος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ ὧ συνεισάγεται τὸ μηδένα

337 ὠρισμένως κριτήριον ἀληθείας ὑπάρχειν. πρὸς τοῦτοις ἢ φάσει τις ἑαυτὸν κριτήριον εἶναι λέγει ἢ κριτηρίῳ προσχρῶμενος. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν φάσει ἐπισχεθήσεται, κριτηρίῳ δὲ προσχρῶμενος περιτραπήσεται. ἦτοι γὰρ διάφωνόν ἐστιν αὐτῷ τὸ κριτήριον τοῦτο ἢ σύμφωνον. καὶ εἰ μὲν διάφωνον, ἄπιστον, ἐπεὶπερ διαπεφώνηκε τῷ οἰομένῳ

338 αὐτὸν κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν· εἰ δὲ σύμφωνον, χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ κρίνοντος. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὗτος ὁ κριτήριον αὐτὸν ἀποφανόμενος ἄπιστος ἦν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ

statement, he would have had as much weight as all of them.

But if he that has discovered the truth in philosophy 335 is said to have succeeded either because of his age or his industry or his intelligence, or through having many to testify for him, whereas we have established that for none of these reasons ought it to be said that he is really the criterion of truth, then it is evident that the criterion in philosophy is undiscoverable.

Further, he who declares himself to be the criterion 336 of truth says what appears to himself and nothing more. So then, since each of the other philosophers also says what appears to himself and is contrary to the previous statement, it is plain that, as each of them is on a level with all the others, we shall be unable to state definitely that any one of them is a criterion. For if the first man is trustworthy because it appears to him that he is the criterion, the second man too will be trustworthy, since to him also it appears that he himself is the criterion, and so likewise with the third, and the rest; wherefrom it follows that no one is definitely the criterion of truth.

—Furthermore, a man says he is the criterion either 337 by mere assertion or by employing a criterion. But if it be by assertion, he will be checked by assertion, while if it be by employing a criterion, he will be overthrown. For this criterion is either in disagreement with him or in agreement. And if it be in disagreement it is untrustworthy, since it is in disagreement with him who believes himself to be the criterion; and if it be in agreement, it will stand in need of a 338 judge. For just as the man who declares himself to be the criterion is not to be trusted, so also the criterion

σύμφωνον αὐτῷ κριτήριον, ἐπεὶ τρόπῳ τινὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔσχηκεν ἐκείνῳ δύναμιν, δεήσεται ἑτέρου τινὸς κριτηρίου. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ λεκτέον ἕκαστον τῶν φιλοσόφων εἶναι κριτήριον· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ κρίσεως 339 δέομενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. πάλιν ὁ λέγων ἑαυτὸν κριτήριον ἤτοι φάσει τοῦτο ἀξιοῖ ἢ ἀποδείξει. καὶ φάσει μὲν οὐ δύναται δι' ἃς προείπον αἰτίας· εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξει, πάντως ὕμει· τὸ δὲ ὅτι<sup>1</sup> ἐστὶν ὕμης ἢ τοιαύτη ἀπόδειξις, ἤτοι φάσει λέγεται ἢ ἀποδείξει, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἄπειρον. τοίνυν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον ἀνεύρετον εἶναι τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον.

340 Ἐρωτᾶται δὲ καὶ οὕτως. οἱ κρίνειν τάληθές ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κριτήριον ἔχειν ὀφείλουσι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐπικέκριται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστι, πόθεν ὅτι πιστόν; οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων χωρὶς κρίσεώς ἐστι πιστόν. εἰ δὲ ἐπικέκριται, πάλιν τὸ κρίναν αὐτὸ ἤτοι ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐπικέκριται. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνεπίκριτον, ἄπιστον· εἰ δὲ ἐπικέκριται, πάλιν τὸ ἐπικρίναν αὐτὸ ἤτοι ἐπικέκριται ἢ οὐκ ἐπικέκριται, καὶ 341 οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. πάλιν τὸ κριτήριον ἀμφισβητούμενον καθεστῶς δεῖται τινος ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀληθεῖς αἱ δὲ ψευδεῖς, ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ εἰς πίστιν τοῦ κριτηρίου παραλαμβανομένη ἀπόδειξις διὰ τινος κριτηρίου βεβαιοῦσθαι, ὥστε εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτειν τρόπον, τοῦ μὲν κριτηρίου τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως πίστιν περιμένοντος, τῆς δὲ ἀποδείξεως τὴν ἀπὸ 342 τοῦ κριτηρίου βεβαίωσιν ἀναμενούσης, μηδετέρου

<sup>1</sup> ὕμει· τὸ δὲ ὅτι Mutsch.: ἐπεὶ ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον mss., Bekk.

in agreement with him, since it possesses in a fashion the same quality as he, will require some second criterion. And if this be so, one must not assert that each of the philosophers is the criterion; for everything which requires judging is of itself untrustworthy.—Once again, he who declares himself to 339 be the criterion makes this claim either by assertion or by demonstration. Yet, for the reasons I have already given, he cannot do so by assertion; and if he does so by demonstration, it must by all means be a valid one. But the fact that such a demonstration is valid is stated either by assertion or by demonstration, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, then, on this ground also it must be declared that the criterion of truth is undiscoverable.

This argument also is propounded:—Those who 340 claim for themselves to judge the truth are bound to possess a criterion of truth. This criterion, then, either is without a judge's approval or has been approved. But if it is without approval, whence comes it that it is trustworthy? For no matter of dispute is to be trusted without judging. And if it has been approved, that which approves it, in turn, either has been approved or has not been approved, and so on *ad infinitum*.—Again, the criterion being a matter 341 of dispute requires a proof. But since some proofs are true, some false, the proof which is adduced to confirm the criterion must needs be supported by a criterion; so that we are plunged into circular reasoning, the criterion on the one hand awaiting confirmation by the proof, and, on the other hand, the proof waiting for the support of the criterion, and neither 342

δὲ αὐτῶν διὰ θατέρου πεπιστῶσθαι δυναμένου. καὶ ἄλλως γίνεται τὸ αὐτὸ πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον. πιστόν μὲν τὸ κριτήριον, ὅτι κρίνει τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ κριτήριον· ἄπιστον δὲ τὸ μὲν κριτήριον, ὅτι ἀποδείκνυται πρὸς τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἡ δὲ ἀπόδειξις, ὅτι κρίνεται πρὸς τοῦ κριτηρίου.

- 343 Ἄλλ' ἢ μὲν τοῦ πρώτου κριτηρίου ἀγνωσία, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τοῦ ὑφ' οὗ, διὰ τοσούτων παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς ἀπορεῖται· εὐαπόδοτος δὲ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ περὶ τοῦ δευτέρου λόγος, φημὶ δὲ τοῦ δι' οὗ. εἰ γὰρ εὐρίσκει τὰληθές ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἤτοι ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι μόνον προσχρῶμενος τοῦτο εὐρίσκει ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἢ τῷ συναμφοτέρῳ, ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ· οὔτε δὲ μόνον ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι προσχρῶμενος δύναται τὰληθές εὐρεῖν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὴν τῇ διανοίᾳ οὔτε κοινῶς ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα εὐρίσκειν τὰληθές ὁ ἄνθρωπος πέφυκεν. αἰσθήσεσι μὲν οὖν μόναις λαβεῖν τὰληθές οὐ δύναται, καθὼς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπεδείξαμεν, καὶ νῦν δὲ ἐπ' ὀλίγον παραμυθησόμεθα. φύσει γὰρ εἰσιν ἄλογοι, καὶ πλεον τοῦ τυποῦσθαι πρὸς τῶν φανταστῶν μὴ δυνάμεναι παντελῶς ἄθετοι καθεστᾶσι πρὸς εὔρεσιν τὰληθοῦς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον λευκαντικῶς ἢ γλυκαντικῶς δεῖ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ληψόμενον τὰληθές ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς φαντασίαν ἀχθῆναι τοῦ τοιούτου πράγματος " τοῦτο λευκόν ἐστὶ " καὶ " τοῦτο γλυκὺ ἐστίν." 344 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὸ παραπλήσιον. τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ πράγματι οὐκέτι τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἔργον ἐστὶν ἐπι- 180

of them being able to be confirmed by the other. And besides, the same thing becomes both trustworthy and untrustworthy—the criterion trustworthy because it judges the proof, and the proof trustworthy because it proves the criterion; but the criterion untrustworthy because it is proved by the proof, and the proof because it is judged by the criterion.

Well, then, it is by all these arguments that the 343 obscurity of the first criterion—that of the agent "By which"—is criticized amongst the Sceptics; and the argument regarding the second—I mean that "By means of which" or Instrument—is easy to set forth.<sup>a</sup> For if Man discovers the truth, he discovers it by employing either the senses only or the intellect or the combination of both the senses and the intellect; but, as we shall establish, he cannot discover the truth by employing either the senses only or the intellect by itself or both the senses and the intellect conjointly; therefore Man is not capable of discovering the truth. Now he is not able to grasp the 344 truth by the senses alone, as we have shown above,<sup>b</sup> and shall now briefly rehearse. For they are by nature irrational, and having no further capacity beyond that of being impressed by the objects imaged, they are wholly disqualified for discovering the truth. For that which is to perceive what is true in the real objects must not only be moved by a whitish or sweetish feeling but also must be brought to have an impression regarding such an object that "this thing is white" and "this thing is sweet." And similarly with the rest of the senses. But to perceive an object of 345 that kind is no longer the task of sense; for sense is

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 343-346 cf. *P.H.* ii. 48-50.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 293 ff.

βάλλειν· χρώμα γὰρ μόνον καὶ χυμὸν καὶ φωνὴν λαμβάνειν πέφυκε, τὸ δὲ “ τοῦτο λευκὸν ἐστὶν ” ἢ “ τοῦτο γλυκὺ ἐστὶν ” οὔτε χρώμα οὔτε χυμὸς τυγχάνον ἀνυπόπτωτόν ἐστιν αἰσθήσει. ψεύδονται τε ἐν πολλοῖς αἰ αἰσθήσεις καὶ διαφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλαις, καθάπερ ἐδείξαμεν τοὺς παρὰ τῷ Αἰνησιδήμῳ δέκα τρόπους ἐπιόντες. τὸ δὲ διάφωνον 346 καὶ ἑστασιασμένον οὐκ ἔστι κριτήριον ἀλλὰ τοῦ κρίνοντος αὐτὸ δεόμενον. τοῖνον οὐ δύναται καθ’ αὐτὰς αἰ αἰσθήσεις κρίνειν τάληθές. συνθέσεώς<sup>1</sup> τε δεῖ καὶ μνήμης πρὸς ἀντίληψιν τῶν ὑποκειμένων, ὅσον ἀνθρώπου, φυτοῦ, τῶν εὐκοκτῶν. χρώματος γὰρ μετὰ μεγέθους καὶ σχήματος καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ἰδιωμάτων σύνθεσις ἐστὶν ὁ ἀν- 347 θρωπος, συνθεῖναι δέ τι μνημονικῶς οὐ δύναται ἢ αἰσθησις διὰ τὸ μήτε χρώμα μήτε χυμὸν μήτε φωνὴν εἶναι τὴν ἐπισύνθεσιν,<sup>2</sup> ὧν μόνον ἀντιληπτική ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθησις.

348 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἡ διάνοια. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐπιγνώμων ἐστὶ τάληθοῦς ἢ διάνοια, πρότερον ὤφειλεν ἑαυτὴν ἐπιγνώσκειν· καὶ ὡς ὁ ἀρχιτέκτων κρίνει τὸ τε εὐθὺ καὶ στρεβλὸν οὐ<sup>3</sup> χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν κριτηρίων, ὅσον τῇ τοῦ κανόνος καὶ τῇ τοῦ διαβήτου, οὕτως ἔχρην καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, εἴπερ διακριτική ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, πολλῶ πρότερον τῇ ἑαυτῆς φύσει συνεπιβάλλειν, ὅσον<sup>4</sup> οὐσία τῇ ἐξ ἧς ἐστὶ, τόπω τῷ ἐν 349 ᾧ πέφυκε, τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. οὐ πάνυ δέ γε τὰ τοιαῦτα συννοῶν δύναται, εἴγε οἱ μὲν μηδὲν φασιν

<sup>1</sup> συνθέσεώς Kochalsky: συνέσεώς MSS., Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> ἐπισύνθεσιν N: ἐπίθεσιν cet., Bekk.: σύνθεσιν cj. Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> οὐ Heintz: καὶ MSS., Bekk.

<sup>4</sup> ὅσον Heintz: δι’ ἣν Bekk.: διον MSS.

of a nature to grasp only colour and flavour and sound, whereas the recognition that “ this is white ” or “ this is sweet,” being neither colour nor flavour, is incapable of being experienced by sense.<sup>a</sup> The senses, too, in many cases give false reports and disagree with one another, as we have shown when expounding the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus.<sup>b</sup> But that which is in 346 disagreement and at variance is not a criterion, but is itself in need of a judge. So then the senses are not able by themselves to judge the truth.—There is need, too, of combination and of memory for the perception of real objects such as man, plant, and the like. For man is a combination of colour and size and form and certain other peculiarities, whereas sense is 347 unable to combine anything by aid of memory owing to the fact that the combination is neither colour nor flavour nor sound, which things alone sense is capable of perceiving.

Nor, indeed, is the intellect.<sup>c</sup> For if the intellect is 348 cognizant of the truth, it ought previously to have been cognizant of itself; and just as the architect does not judge of the straight and the crooked without giving attention to the structure of his criteria—such as that of the rule and of the compasses,—so too the intellect, if it is capable of distinguishing falsehood and truth, should have been aware much earlier of its own nature—the substance, for instance, whereof it is composed, the place wherein it exists, and all the rest. But it cannot altogether comprehend such 349 things, seeing that some, like Dicaearchus, say that it

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 51-56.

<sup>b</sup> See P.H. i. 91 ff.

<sup>c</sup> With §§ 348-352 cf. P.H. ii. 57-60.

εἶναι αὐτὴν παρὰ τὸ πῶς ἔχον σῶμα, καθάπερ ὁ  
 Δικαίαρχος, οἱ δὲ εἶναι μὲν ἔλεγον, οὐκ ἐν τῷ  
 αὐτῷ δὲ τόπῳ περιέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἐκτὸς τοῦ  
 σώματος, ὡς Αἰνῆσιδημος κατὰ Ἡράκλειτον, οἱ  
 δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ τινὲς κατὰ Δημό-  
 350 κριτον, οἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει τοῦ σώματος, ὡν πάλιν  
 αὐτὴν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐ-  
 τὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διὰ τινων ὀπῶν  
 τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἥς στάσεως ἤρξε  
 Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνῆσιδημος. οὐκ ἄρα  
 351 κριτήριόν ἐστιν ἡ διάνοια. πλείους τέ εἰσιν  
 αἱ διάνοιαι, πλείους δὲ οὐσαὶ διάφωνοι καθεστᾶσιν,  
 διαφωνοῦσαι δὲ χρειαὶ ἔχουσι τοῦ ἐπικρινόντος  
 αὐτάς. τοῦτ' οὖν ἤτοι διάνοια πάλιν ἐστὶν ἡ  
 ἕτερόν τι παρ' αὐτὴν. καὶ διάνοια μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη·  
 μέρος γὰρ τῆς διαφωνίας γενόμενον κρίσεως δεῖ-  
 352 σεται καὶ οὐκέτι κριτήριον γενήσεται· ἕτερον δὲ  
 παρ' αὐτὴν ὑπάρχον τὸ μὴ εἶναι διάνοιαν κριτήριον  
 παρίστησι. ἐξέσται δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν  
 εἰρημένους ἐπιλογισμοῖς τὰ νῦν χρῆσθαι· ἡμῖν γὰρ  
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταυτολογεῖν. πρὸς τούτοις ἐπεὶ  
 οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν διανοητικὸν κατὰ τοὺς  
 πλείστους τῶν φιλοσόφων, ἀλλὰ σὺν τούτῳ καὶ  
 αἰσθητικόν, ὅπερ πρόκειται τοῦ διανοητικοῦ, ἐξ  
 ἀνάγκης τοῦτο αὐτοῦ<sup>1</sup> προκείμενον οὐκ ἑάσει τὴν

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοῦ Heintz: αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 210 f.; Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxviii.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 313.

<sup>c</sup> This sentence is obscure and the text probably corrupt. Heintz proposed τοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀν. ταυτ. I suggest τοῖς αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν . . . χρῆσθαι

is nothing more than a certain condition of body, while others have said that it exists, but have not all agreed that it is contained in the same place—some, like Aenesidemus “according to Heracleitus,”<sup>a</sup> placing it outside the body, others in the whole of the body (like some “according to Democritus”), and others in a part of the body, and the views of these last, again, are very diverse.<sup>b</sup> Also, while some 350 assert, as do the majority, that it is distinct from the senses, others say that it is the senses,—it peering out through the sense-organs as though through peep-holes,—which theory was first held by Strato the physicist and Aenesidemus. Therefore the intellect is not the criterion.—Intellects, too, are many in 351 number, and being many they are in disagreement, and as disagreeing they have need of one to pronounce judgement upon them. This, then, is either intellect again or something different from it. Now it will not be intellect; for if so, as being a party to the disagreement it will require judging and will no longer be a criterion; and if it be something different from intellect, it supports the view that the intellect is not the criterion. It would also be possible now to make 352 use of the conclusions stated by the Dogmatists; for there is no necessity for us to repeat ourselves.<sup>c</sup>—Furthermore, since there exists in us, according to most of the philosophers, not only an intellectual part but along with this also a sensitive part which is set in front of the intellectual, this, being set in front of the other, will of necessity prevent the intellect from ἡμῖν· πάλιν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ταυτολογεῖν, the sense being “we can employ (as an argument for distrusting the intellect) the divergent views of the Dogmatists themselves; but there is no need to repeat them again, as they have been described already.”



- 353 διάνοιαν τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ μεταξύ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὄρατου πεπτωκὸς σῶμα οὐκ ἔῃ τὴν ὄψιν ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ ὄρατου, οὕτως εἰ μεταξύ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὄρατου κείται ἡ ὄρασις ἀλογος οὕσα, οὐκ ἔάσει τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ ὄρασις τοῦ ἐκτὸς ὄρατου ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, καὶ εἰ μεταξύ τῆς διανοίας καὶ τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀκουστοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκοή, οὐ συγχωρήσει τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ<sup>1</sup> ἐπιγνώμονα γίνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παραπλήσιον. ἐνδον οὖν ἀποκεκλεισμένη ἡ διάνοια, καὶ ταῖς αἰσθήσεω ἐπισκοτουμένη, οὐδενὸς ἔσται τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀντιληπτική. οὐδὲ ταύτην τοίνυν ῥητέον καθ' αὐτὴν εἶναι κριτήριον.
- 354 Λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἀμφοτέρα, τουτέστι τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς ὑπουργῶ χρωμένην τῇ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐκτὸς. ὃ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθησις οὐ τὰ ἐκτὸς παρίστησι τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὸ δὲ ἴδιον ἀγγέλλει πάθος, οἷον ἡ ἀφή ἀπὸ πυρὸς θαλπομένη οὐ τὸ ἐκτὸς καὶ καίον πῦρ ἀναδίδωσι τῇ διανοίᾳ, τὴν δὲ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ θάλψιν, τουτέστι τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς πάθος. καίτοι οὐδὲ τοῦτο. εἰ γὰρ λήψεται ἡ νόησις τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος, αἰσθησις ἔσται. τὸ γὰρ ὄρατικὸν πάθος ἀναδεκτικὸν ὄρατικῶς κινεῖται, τὸ δὲ ὄρατικῶς κινούμενον ὄρασις ἐστὶν· καὶ τὸ ἀκουστικὸν πάθος ἀναδεκτικὸν ἀκουστικῶς κινεῖται, ὃ δὲ ἀκουστικῶς κινεῖται, ἀκοή ἐστὶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ
- 356 παραπλήσιον. διόπερ καὶ ἡ διάνοια, εἰ τὸ ἐκάστης αἰσθήσεως ἀναλαμβάνει πάθος, αἰσθητικῶς κινεῖται,

<sup>1</sup> ἐστὶν . . . ἀκουστοῦ N; om. cet., Bekk.

perceiving the external objects. For just as the body 353 which lies between the sight and the object of sight prevents the sight from perceiving the object of sight, so if the irrational sense of sight intervenes between the intellect and the external object of sight, the sight will prevent the intellect from perceiving the external object of sight, and if the hearing intervenes between the intellect and the external object of hearing, it will not permit the intellect to become cognizant of the object of hearing; and similarly with the rest of the senses. The intellect, then, being locked away inside, and being kept in the dark by the senses, will not be capable of perceiving any of the external objects. Neither, then, can it be said that it, taken by itself, is the criterion.

It remains, therefore, to say "both of them,"— 354 meaning that the intellect, by employing sense as assistant, grasps external objects.<sup>a</sup> But this again is impossible. For sense does not furnish the intellect with the external objects, but each sense reports its own peculiar affection—touch, for instance, when warmed by fire, does not supply to the intellect the external and burning fire but the warmth therefrom, that is to say, its own peculiar affection. And yet 355 not even this. For if thought shall receive the affection of sense, it will be sense. For that which is receptive of visual affection is visually moved, and that which is visually moved is vision<sup>b</sup>; that also which is receptive of acoustic affection is acoustically moved, and that which is acoustically moved is the sense of hearing; and similarly with the other senses. Wherefore the intellect also, if it receives the affection 356 of each sense, is sensitively moved, and being sensi-

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 354-358 cf. P.H. ii. 72-75.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 305.

αἰσθητικῶς δὲ κινουμένη αἴσθησις ἐστίν, αἴσθησις δὲ οὐσα ἄλογός ἐστιν, ἄλογος δὲ γενομένη ἐκπεσεῖται τοῦ ἐπι νόησις ὑπάρχειν, μὴ οὐσα δὲ νόησις οὐ λήψεται τὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ὡς νόησις.

357 κὰν λάβῃ δὲ τὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πάθος, οὐκ εἴσεται τὰ ἐκτός. ἀνόμοια γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ ἐκτός τοῖς περι ἡμᾶς πάθεισιν, καὶ μακρῶ διαφέρει ἢ φαντασία τοῦ φανταστοῦ, ὅλον ἢ ἀπὸ πυρός φαντασία τοῦ πυρός· τὸ μὲν γὰρ καίει, ἢ δ' οὐκ ἔστι καυστική. ἄλλως τε, κὰν ὅμοια δῶμεν εἶναι τοῖς περι ἡμᾶς πάθεισιν τὰ ἐκτός, οὐ πάντως τὰ περι ἡμᾶς πάθη λαμβάνουσα ἢ διάνοια καταλήψεται τὰ ἐκτός. τὰ γὰρ ὁμοιά τισιν ἕτερα ἐστὶν ἐκείνων τῶν οἷς ὁμοιά 358 ἐστίν. διόπερ εἰ τὰ ὁμοιά τοῖς ἐκτός ἢ διάνοια γνωρίζει, οὐ τὰ ἐκτός γνωρίζει ἀλλὰ τὰ ὁμοιά ἐκείνοισι. καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ τὸν Σωκράτην ἀγνοῶν τὴν δὲ Σωκράτους εἰκόνα βλέπων οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ ὁμοίός ἐστι τῇ φαινομένη εἰκόνι ὁ Σωκράτης, οὕτως ἢ διάνοια τοῖς πάθεισιν ἐπιβάλλουσα, τὰ ἐκτός μὴ θεασαμένη, οὔτε ὅποιά ἐστὶ ταῦτα εἴσεται, οὔθ' ὅτι ὁμοιά ἐστὶ τοῖς πάθεισιν. μὴ γινώσκουσα δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα οὐδὲ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τούτων μετάβασιν ἀξιούμενα γνωρίζεσθαι ἀδηλα συνήσει, οὕτως δὲ οὐδὲ κριτήριον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας.

359 Ἄλλ' ἐνιοι τῶν δογματικῶν τὴν ἀνώτερον εἰρημένην ὑπότευξιν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος θρυλοῦσι, λέγοντες μὴ κεχωρίσθαι ταῦτα τὰ διαφέροντα τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη, τουτέστι τὸ λογικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ μέλι ὅλον δι' ὅλου ὑγρὸν ἅμα καὶ γλυκὺ

tively moved it is sense, and being sense it is irrational, and having become irrational it will cease from being any longer thought, and not being thought it will not receive as thought the affection of sense.—But even 357 if it receives the affection of the senses it will not know external objects. For external objects are unlike our affections, and the presentation is far different from the thing presented,—that of a fire, for instance, from the fire, for the latter burns whereas the former is not capable of burning. Besides, even if we grant that external objects are similar to our affections, it is not certain that by receiving our affections the intellect will apprehend external objects. For things similar to certain things are other than those things to which they are similar. Wherefore if the intellect is cognizant of 358 things similar to the external objects, it is not cognizant of the external objects but of things similar to them. And just as he who does not know Socrates but is looking at the likeness of Socrates does not know whether Socrates resembles the apparent likeness,<sup>a</sup> so the intellect, when it perceives the affections without having discerned the external objects, will not know either the nature of these objects or whether they resemble the affections. And not knowing the apparent things, neither will it understand the non-evident things which are assumed to be known by transition therefrom; and, consequently, it will not be the criterion of truth.

But some of the Dogmatists keep repeating in this 359 case also the rejoinder which was mentioned above, saying that these different parts of the soul—that is, the rational and the irrational—are not separated, but just as honey is at once, through and through,

\* Cf. P.H. ii. 75.

ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὅλη δι' ὅλου δύο ἔχει  
 τὰς ἀντιπαρηκούσας ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεις, ὧν ἡ μὲν  
 360 ἐστὶ λογικὴ ἢ δὲ ἄλογος· καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὴν μὲν  
 λογικὴν ὑπὸ τῶν νοητῶν, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἀντι-  
 ληπτικὴν γίνεσθαι τῶν αἰσθητῶν. ὅθεν καὶ μάταιον  
 εἶναι τὸ λέγειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ κοινῶς τὴν ψυχὴν  
 μὴ δύνασθαι τῆς ἐτέρας τούτων τῶν πραγμάτων  
 διαφορᾶς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· διάφορον γὰρ ἔχουσα  
 τὴν κατασκευὴν εὐθύς καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἔσται ἀντι-  
 361 ληπτικὴ. πάντων δὲ εἰσὶν εὐήθεις. αὐταὶ γὰρ αἱ  
 δυνάμεις, καὶ εἰ τὰ μάλιστα δοκοῦσι περὶ τὴν  
 αὐτὴν οὐσίαν συνίστασθαι καὶ ἀντιπαρῆκειν ἀλλή-  
 λαις καὶ δι' ὅλης πεφοιτηκέναι τῆς ψυχῆς, οὐδὲν  
 ἥσσον ἑτερογενῶς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἄλλο  
 μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἢδε ἄλλο δὲ ἦδε. καὶ τοῦτο πάρεστι  
 μαθεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν προδηλοτέρων εἶναι δοκούντων·  
 362 συχνὰ γὰρ ἦν ἂ περὶ μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην θεωρεῖται,  
 οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ εἶχε φύσιν. βάρος γοῦν καὶ  
 χρώμα περὶ μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ σῶμα ἀμφοτέρᾳ ἔστιν,  
 διενήνοχε δὲ ἀλλήλων· καὶ πάλιν σχῆμα καὶ  
 μέγεθος τῆς μὲν αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ συμβεβηκότα,  
 κεχωρισμένην δὲ εἶχε τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλου μὲν τοῦ  
 μεγέθους ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ σχήματος νοουμένου. οὕτω  
 τοῖνυν καὶ ἡ προειρημένη λογικὴ δύναμις, κἂν  
 ἀναμιξὺ ὑποκείται τῇ ἄλόγῳ δυνάμει, πάλιν αὐτῆς  
 363 διοίσει. ὧ λοιπὸν συνεισέρχεται τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι  
 τὴν ἐτέραν ὡσαύτως τῇ ἐτέρᾳ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ὁμοιο-  
 παθεῖν διὰ τὰς προκατηριθμημένας αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ  
 δεήσει μίαν ἀμφοτέρας γίνεσθαι, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν  
 ἄλογον, ἐὰν ἀλόγως πάσῃ, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον λογικὴν,  
 364 ἐὰν λογικῶς κινήθῃ. κἂν ὑποθώμεθα δὲ τὴν

<sup>1</sup> τῆ Heintz: τῷ mss., Bekk.

both liquid and sweet, so also the soul possesses  
 through and through these two faculties, co-extensive  
 with each other, of which the one is rational, the  
 other irrational; and that the rational is affected by 360  
 intelligible objects, while the irrational is perceptive  
 of sensible objects. Hence, too, it is vain to say  
 that the intellect, or the soul in general, is unable  
 to apprehend the other distinct class of such objects;  
 for as the apparatus it possesses is twofold, it will  
 inevitably be capable of apprehending both sorts of  
 object.—But they are extremely silly. For even if 361  
 these faculties seem ever so much to be combined in  
 the same substance and to be co-extensive with each  
 other and to range throughout the whole soul, none  
 the less they are generically different from each other,  
 this being one thing and that quite another. This  
 one can learn from facts which seem especially  
 obvious; for there are frequent instances of things 362  
 which are found attached to the same matter but  
 which have not the same nature. Thus weight and  
 colour are both attached to the same body but are  
 different from each other; and again, shape and  
 size are attributes of the same substance but have  
 separate natures, size being conceived as one thing,  
 shape as another. In this way, then, the afore-  
 mentioned rational faculty, even though it subsist in  
 fusion with the irrational faculty, yet will differ from  
 it. And this involves the further consequence that 363  
 the one faculty is not able to be moved like the other  
 and to have similar affections, for the reasons  
 enumerated above; since otherwise it would be  
 necessary for both to become one, the rational  
 irrational, if it has irrational affections, and the  
 irrational rational, if it has rational motions.—And 364

διάνοιαν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ τινῶν  
 ὁπῶν προκίπτουσιν καὶ χωρὶς τῶν προκειμένων  
 αὐτῆς αἰσθήσεων τοῖς ἐκτὸς πράγμασι προσ-  
 βάλλουσιν, ἄπορος οὐδὲν ἦσσαν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἡ  
 ὑπόθεσις εὐρεθήσεται. δεῖ γὰρ τὴν οὕτω τῶν ὑπο-  
 κειμένων ἀντιλαμβανομένην διάνοιαν ὡς ἐναργῶν  
 τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐδὲν δὲ ἐστὶν  
 ἐναργές, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνατόν ἐστι  
 τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις ἀληθὲς λαβεῖν. ἐναργές  
 γὰρ ἀξιοῦται τυγχάνειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸ ἐξ  
 365 εἰς παράστασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πέφυκε λαμ-  
 βάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἐκ πάθους, ὅπερ ἕτερον ἢ  
 τοῦ ποιούντος αὐτὸ φανταστοῦ· γλυκανθεὶς γὰρ  
 μέλιτος προσαχθέντος στοχάζομαι ὅτι γλυκύ ἐστι  
 τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον μέλι, καὶ ἀλεανθεὶς πυρὸς  
 προσαχθέντος σημειοῦμαι ἐκ τῆς περὶ ἐμέ δια-  
 θέσεως ὅτι τὸ ἐκτὸς ὑποκείμενον πῦρ ἀλεεινόν  
 ἐστὶ, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος.  
 366 ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ ἐξ ἑτέρου ληπτὸν συμφώνως κατὰ  
 πάντα ἀδηλόν ἐστι, πάντα δὲ ἐκ παθῶν ἡμετέρων  
 ἕτερα ὄντα τούτων λαμβάνεται, πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ  
 ἐκτὸς ἀδηλα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄγνωστα· δεῖ γὰρ  
 εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀφανῶν γνώσιν ἐναργές τι παρεῖναι,  
 καὶ τούτου μὴ παρόντος οἴχεται καὶ ἡ ἐκείνων  
 367 κατάληψις. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὡς ἐκεῖνα μὲν  
 ἐστὶν ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀδηλα, καταλαμβάνεται δὲ  
 ὑφ' ἡμῶν διὰ τὸ βέβαιον εἶναι τὴν ἐκ τῶν παθῶν  
 σημειώσιν. οὐ γὰρ εἰ γλυκαντικῶς διατίθεται

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 350.

<sup>b</sup> i. e. not perceptible directly but only through the medium of an "affection" of sense, or "feeling."

even if we assume that the intellect peers through the sensitive passages as through peep-holes<sup>a</sup> and makes contact with the external objects apart from the senses placed in front of it,—even on this assumption the theory will be found no less untenable. For the intellect which apprehends the real objects in this way must apprehend the real objects as self-evident; but, as we shall establish, nothing is self-evident; therefore it is not possible to grasp the truth of the real objects. For it is laid down by our opponents that the "self-evident" is "that which is perceived of itself and needs no second thing to establish it." But nothing is of a nature to be 365 perceived of itself, but all things through affection, and this is other than the object of presentation which produces it; for when I feel sweetness through the application of honey I guess that the external substance of honey is sweet, and when I feel warm through the approach of fire I take my own condition as a sign that the external substance of fire is warm, and the same may be said of the other objects of sense. Since, then, that which is perceptible 366 through another<sup>b</sup> is by universal agreement non-evident, and all things are perceived through our affections, than which they are other, all external objects are non-evident and on this account unknowable by us; for to ensure knowledge of things non-apparent there must be some self-evident fact present, and if this is not present, the apprehension of those things likewise vanishes. Nor is it possible to say 367 that, though those things are, so far as that goes, non-evident, yet they are apprehended by us owing to the fact that the indication derived from the affections is firm. For honey is not necessarily

μέλιτος τῇ γεύσει προσαχθέντος, γλυκὴ πάντως ἐστὶ τὸ μέλι, οὐδὲ εἰ πικραντικῶς ἀψίνθιον, πικρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀψίνθιον, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν περὶ ἡμᾶς συμβαινόντων παθῶν καὶ τοῖς ποιοῦσιν αὐτὰ αἰτίοις ὀφειλόντων συμβεβηκέναι. καθὰ γὰρ ἡ προσπεσοῦσα τῇ σαρκὶ μᾶστιξ ἀλγύνει μὲν τὴν σάρκα, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀλγηδῶν ἐστίν, καὶ ὡς τὸ σιτίον ἢ τὸ ποτόν ἤδει μὲν τὸν φαγόντα ἢ πίνοντα, οὐκ ἐστὶ δὲ ἡδονή, οὕτω καὶ τὸ πῦρ θερμαίνει μὲν δύναται, οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης θερμὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ μέλι γλυκάζει μὲν, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ γλυκὴ τυγχάνει· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἵνα γνῶμεν τὰληθές, δεῖ τι εἶναι ἐναργές, δέδεικται δὲ πάντα ἄδηλα, ὁμολογητέον ἄγνωστον εἶναι τὰληθές.

369 Πῶς δὲ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ περὶ τῶν ἀνωτάτω πραγμάτων διάστασις παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀφαιρεῖται τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας γνώσιν; εἰ γὰρ τῶν φυσικῶν οἱ μὲν πάντα ἀνηγήκασιν τὰ φαινόμενα, ὡς οἱ περὶ Δημόκριτον, οἱ δὲ πάντα ἔθεσαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἐπίκουρον καὶ Πρωταγόραν, οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν ἀνεῖλον τινὰ δὲ ἔθεσαν, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου, πάντη τε καὶ πάντως, ἕαν τε τὴν διάνοιαν ἕαν τε τὴν αἴσθησιν ἕαν τε τὸ συναμφότερον ὑπόθηται τις κριτήριον, δεῖ πρῶτον εἰς τὴν τοῦτων κρίσιν ἤτοι φαινόμενόν τι παραληφθῆναι ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μὲν οὐχ οἶδόν τε· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἀμφισβητουμένης ὕλης ὑπάρχον ἀμφισβητήσιμον ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ κριτήριον. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, ἀνέστραπται τὰ πράγματα, εἰ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ γιγνωσκομένου βεβαιούται τὸ δοκοῦν γιγνωσκέσθαι· ὅπερ ἄτοπον.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 72.

sweet if I have a feeling of sweetness when honey is applied to my sense of taste, nor is gall bitter if I have a bitter feeling on tasting it,<sup>a</sup> as though the feelings which belong to us ought necessarily to belong also to the causes which produce them. For just as the 368 lash that falls upon the flesh gives pain to the flesh but is not also pain, and as the food or the drink gives pleasure to him that eats or drinks but is not pleasure, so also the fire is able to give warmth and yet not be necessarily warm, and the honey to sweeten and yet not be sweet; and the same argument applies to the other objects of sense. But if, in order that we may know the truth, there must be something self-evident in existence, and it has been proved that all things are non-evident, it must be acknowledged that truth is unknowable.

And can it be denied that the controversy amongst 369 the philosophers regarding the highest matters does away with the knowledge of truth? For if some of the physicists, like Democritus, have abolished all phenomena, and others, like Epicurus and Protagoras, have established all, while others again, like the Stoics and Peripatetics, have abolished some and established others,—then, whether one assumes as criterion the intellect or the sense or both together, in every case it is by all means necessary that either some apparent or some non-evident thing should be adopted to judge between these thinkers. But to adopt an apparent thing is impossible; for as it is derived from the controverted matter it will be controverted and on this account not a criterion. While if a non-evident thing be adopted, things are turned upside down, when that which seems to be known is confirmed by what is not known—which is absurd.

- 370 Πλὴν συγκεχωρήσθω γε ἡ τάνθρώπου καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς διανοίας ὑπόστασις εἰς τὸ προβαίνειν τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν ἀξίωσιν. ἀλλ' ἵνα καὶ διὰ τούτων τι γνωσθῆ, δεῖ τὸ τρίτον ὁμολογήσαι κριτήριον, τουτέστι φαντασίαν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις οὔτε ὁ νοῦς δίχα τοῦ φανταστικῶς ἑτεροιοῦσθαι
- 371 δύνатаί τισιν ἐπιβάλλειν. καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τὸ κριτήριον πολλῆς ἀπορίας ἐστὶ πλήρες, ὡς πάρεστι σκοπεῖν τάξει τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἄνωθεν ποιησάμενοις. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῶν τῆ φαντασίᾳ τὰ πράγματα κανονιζόντων οἱ μὲν τῆ καταληπτικῆ προσέσχον οἱ δὲ τῆ πιθανῆ, τὸ κοινὸν ἀμφοτέρων γένος ἡμεῖς ἐκλαβόντες, τουτέστιν αὐτὴν τὴν φαντασίαν, ἀν-
- 372 αἰρῶμεν· ταύτης γὰρ ἀναιρεθείσης αἴρονται καὶ αἱ αἰεῖ εἶδους διαφοραὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν, καὶ ὡς μὴ ὄντος ζώου οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστω, οὔτω μὴ οὔσης φαντασίας οὐδὲ καταληπτικῆ ἢ πιθανῆ τις ὑφέστηκε φαντασία. εἰ γὰρ τύπωσίς ἐστιν ἐν ψυχῇ ἢ φαντασία, ἤτοι κατ' ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν τύπωσίς ἐστιν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Κλεάνθην νομίζουσιν, ἢ κατὰ ψιλὴν ἑτεροίωσιν γίνεται, καθάπερ οἱ περὶ τὸν
- 373 Χρυσίππον ἐδόξασαν. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατ' ἐξοχὴν καὶ εἰσοχὴν ὑφίσταται, ταῦτα ἀκολουθήσει τὰ ἀτοπα ἄπερ φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρυσίππον. εἰ γὰρ κηροῦ τρόπον τυποῦται ἡ ψυχὴ φανταστικῶς πάσχυσα, αἰεὶ τὸ ἔσχατον κίνημα ἐπισκοπήσει τῆ προτέρα φαντασία, ὡσπερ καὶ ὁ τῆς δευτέρας σφραγίδος τύπος ἐξαλειπτικός ἐστὶ τοῦ προτέρου. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, ἀναιρεῖται μὲν μνήμη, θησαυρισμὸς οὐσα

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 344. With §§ 370-379 cf. *P.H.* ii. 70. "Presentative alteration" means the alteration produced in the percipient (sense or intellect) by the percept, which constitutes "presentation."

However, let the substantiality of Man and of the 370 senses and the intellect be granted, so that the thesis of the Dogmatists may go forward. Yet in order that anything should be known even by means of these, one must needs agree about the third criterion, that is, presentation; for neither sense nor thought can possibly be aware of things without presentative alteration.<sup>a</sup> But this criterion too is beset by mani- 371 fold doubts, as we may see in detail when we have discussed it in a systematic way right from the beginning. For since some of those who make presentation the rule of things have had regard to the "apprehensive," others to the "probable" presentation,<sup>b</sup> we shall select the generic form that is common to both kinds—namely, presentation itself—and abolish it; for when this is abolished, the particular differ- 372 ences of the presentations are also abolished; and just as when Animal is non-existent Man does not exist either, so if presentation is non-existent neither does any apprehensive or probable presentation subsist. For if the presentation is "an impression on the soul," it is an impression either "by way of depression and eminence," as Cleanthes supposes, or "by way of mere alteration," as Chrysippus thought.<sup>c</sup> And if it subsists by way of depres- 373 sion and eminence, those absurd results will follow which are alleged by Chrysippus. If the soul when presentatively affected is impressed like wax, the last motion will always keep overshadowing the previous presentation, just as the impression of the second seal is such as to obliterate that of the first. But if this be so, memory is abolished, it being "a treasury of

<sup>b</sup> The former view is that of the Stoics, the latter that of the Academics; cf. §§ 227 ff., 174 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 228.

φαντασιῶν, ἀναιρεῖται δὲ πᾶσα τέχνη· σύστημα γὰρ ἦν καὶ ἄθροισμα καταλήψεων, πλείονας δὲ φαντασίας καὶ διαφόρους οὐ δυνατὸν ὑποστῆναι περὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ἄλλοτε ἄλλων νοουμένων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸ τύπων. οὐ τοίνυν ἡ κυρίως νοουμένη

374 τύπωσις ἐστὶ φαντασία. ἄλλως τε, εἰ ὅψις ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδήλων τὰ φαινόμενα, θεωροῦμεν δὲ τὰ πολὺ παχυμερέστερα τοῦ πνεύματος τῶν φαινομένων σώματα μηδ' ὄντινοῦν περὶ αὐτοῖς τύπον δυνάμενα τηρεῖν, εὐλογόν ἐστὶ μηδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα ἓνα μόνον τινὰ ἀπὸ φαντασίας τύπον φυλάττειν. καὶ μὴν τὸ ὕδωρ παχυμερέστερόν ἐστὶ πνεύματος· ἄλλ' οὐδέποτε δακτύλου ἐπεραιοθέντος αὐτῷ πέφηνε

375 τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπεραιοσεως τύπον φυλάττον. καίτοι τί λέγω τὸ ὕδωρ, ὅτε καὶ ὁ μαλακώτατος κηρός, στερρὸς ἤδη κατὰ σύγκρισιν ὑπάρχων, τυποῦται μὲν ὑπὸ τινος ἅμα νοήματι διὰ τὴν ὑγρότητα, οὐ συνέχει δὲ τὸν τύπον; εἰ οὖν αὐτὸ τὸ<sup>1</sup> κατὰ σύμβλησιν πεπηγὸς παρὰ τὸ ὕδωρ σῶμα καθεστῶς σφόδρα ἀδυνάτως ἔχει τύπους τινὰς περὶ αὐτῷ φυλάττειν, φανερόν δήπουθεν ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ πνεῦμα φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπιτήδειον, λεπτομερέστερον καὶ εὐρον παρὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων ὑπάρχων.

376 Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ κυρίως τύπωσις ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία, ψιλλὴ δὲ ἑτεροίωσις τῆς διανοίας. ὁ πάλιν τοῦ προτέρου χεῖρον ἦν. τῶν γὰρ ἑτεροιώσεων ἡ μὲν τίς ἐστὶ κατὰ πάθος ἡ δὲ ὡς ἀλλαγὴ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καὶ κατὰ πάθος μὲν οἶον εἰ ὁ αὐτὸς κατ'

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸ τὸ cj. Bekk.: τὸ αὐτὸ MSS.

presentations," and every art is abolished; for art is "a system and aggregation of apprehensions"<sup>a</sup>; but it is not possible for many and different presentations to subsist in the regent part, when its mental impressions vary from time to time. So then the impression foremost in the mind is not a presentation. —Again, if the things apparent are "a vision of the 374 things non-evident," and we find that the bodies of things apparent which are composed of far denser parts than is breath are unable to retain any impression at all that is made upon them, it is reasonable to infer that neither does breath<sup>b</sup> conserve any one single impression derived from a presentation. Moreover, water is of denser parts than breath, but when a finger is pressed upon it it is never found to conserve the impression made by the pressure. Yet why do 375 I speak of water, when even very soft wax, which by comparison is already firm, although because of its elasticity it takes an impression instantaneously, yet does not retain the impression? If, then, such a body as this—which, as compared with water, is in a solid state—is quite incapable of conserving any impressions made upon it, it is surely apparent that neither is breath endowed with a nature suited for this purpose, it being of finer parts and fluid as compared with those other bodies.

"Yes, but the presentation is not precisely an im- 376 pression, but a mere alteration of the intellect." But this again is worse than the previous definition. For of alterations one sort is by way of affection, the other consists in a change in the substance; and it is by

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *P.H.* iii. 241.

<sup>b</sup> "Breath" being the substance of the "regent part," cf. *P.H.* ii. 70, 81.

οὐσίαν καὶ μορφήν ὑποκείμενος ἀνδριάς παρὰ μέρος  
 ὅτε μὲν θερμαίνουτο τοῦ ἡλίου προσλάμψαντος,  
 ὅτε δὲ ψύχουτο νυκτὸς δρόσου καταπιπτούσης, ὡς  
 ἀλλαγὴ δὲ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καθάπερ εἰ χωνευθεῖς  
 377 οὗτος ὁ ἀνδριάς σφαῖρα χάλκειος γένοιτο. εἰ οὖν  
 ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία, ἦτοι  
 κατὰ πάθος ψιλῶς ἐστὶν ἑτεροίωσις ἢ κατὰ ἀλλαγὴν  
 τοῦ ὑποκειμένου. καὶ εἰ μὲν κατὰ πάθος, ἐπεὶ  
 κατὰ τὰς διαφόρους φαντασίας πάθος διάφορόν  
 ἐστὶ, τὸ νέον πάθος ἀλλάσσει τὸ ἀρχαιότερον, καὶ  
 οὕτως οὐκ ἔσται κατοχὴ τινοῦ πράγματος περὶ  
 τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅπερ ἄποπον· εἰ δὲ ὡς<sup>1</sup> ἀλλαγὴ τοῦ  
 ὑποκειμένου, ἅμα τῷ φαντασίαν τινὸς λαβεῖν ἢ  
 ψυχὴν ἑτεροιομένην ἐκβήσεται τοῦ ψυχῆς τυγχάνειν  
 καὶ φθαρῆσεται, καθάπερ καὶ ὁ εἰς σφαῖραν χωνευ-  
 θεῖς ἀνδριάς ἐξέβαινε τότε τοῦ ἀνδριάς ὑπάρχειν.  
 οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἑτεροίωσις ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἢ φαντασία,  
 378 σὺν τῷ καὶ τὴν περὶ μεταβολῆς ἀπορίαν αὐτοῦς  
 θλίβειν. εἰ γὰρ μεταβάλλει τι καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται,  
 ἦτοι τὸ μένον μεταβάλλει τε καὶ ἑτεροιοῦται ἢ τὸ  
 μὴ μένον. οὔτε δὲ τὸ μένον ἑτεροιοῦται καὶ μετα-  
 βάλλει, μένει γὰρ ἐν τῷ εἶναι οἶον ἦν, οὔτε τὸ μὴ  
 μένον· ἐφθαρταὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταβέβληται, ἀλλ' οὐ  
 μεταβάλλει. οἶον εἰ μεταβάλλει τὸ λευκόν, ἦτοι  
 379 μένον λευκόν μεταβάλλει ἢ μὴ μένον. οὔτε δὲ  
 μένον λευκόν μεταβάλλει, μένει γὰρ λευκόν, καὶ  
 ἐφ' ὅσον ἐστὶ λευκόν, οὐ μεταβάλλει· οὔτε μὴ  
 μένον, ἐφθαρταὶ γὰρ καὶ μεταβέβληται, ἀλλ' οὐ  
 μεταβάλλει. οὐκ ἄρα μεταβάλλει τὸ λευκόν. διό

<sup>1</sup> ὡς om. LE, Bekk.

way of affection when, for instance, the statue that  
 remains the same in respect of substance and shape  
 is alternately heated at one time by the sun shining  
 upon it, and at another time chilled by dew falling  
 upon it at night; but it consists in change in the sub-  
 stance, if, for example, this statue were to be melted  
 and become a brazen sphere. If, then, the presenta- 377  
 tion is an alteration of the soul, it is an alteration  
 either merely by way of affection or by way of change  
 in the substance. And if it be by way of affection,  
 then since the affection is different according as the  
 presentations are different, the new affection changes  
 the older, and thus there will be no retention of any-  
 thing in the intellect, which is absurd; while if it  
 consists in change of substance, at the very moment  
 of receiving a presentation the soul through being  
 altered will cease from being soul and will be de-  
 stroyed, just as also the statue that was melted into  
 a sphere ceased at the same time from being a statue.  
 Neither, then, is the presentation an alteration of  
 the soul; and besides they are crushed by the diffi- 378  
 culty about change. For if a thing changes and is  
 altered either what remains changes and is altered  
 or what does not remain. But neither what remains  
 is altered and changes—for it remains by being such  
 as it was,—nor what does not remain, for this has been  
 destroyed and been changed but does not change.  
 For example, if white changes it changes either while  
 remaining or while not remaining white. But it does 379  
 not change while remaining white, for it remains  
 white, and inasmuch as it is white it does not change;  
 nor while not remaining white, for it has been de-  
 stroyed and been changed but does not change.  
 Therefore white does not change. Wherefore also,



καὶ ἡ φαντασία εἰ μεταβολή τις ἐστὶ καὶ ἑτεροίωσις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀνυπόστατός ἐστιν.

380 Διδομένης τε τῆς ἑτεροίωσης οὐκ εὐθὺς καὶ ἡ τῆς φαντασίας ὑπόστασις συγχωρηθήσεται. ἐλέγγο γὰρ τύπωσις εἶναι ἡγεμονικοῦ, τοῦτο δὲ εἰ ἐστὶ [τὸ ἡγεμονικόν],<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐν τίνι τόπῳ ἐστίν, οὐχ ὠμολόγηται, ἄλλων μὲν οὐδ' ὅλως ὑπάρχειν τι λεγόντων ἡγεμονικόν, ὡς τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἀσκληπιάδην, τινῶν δὲ εἶναι μὲν νομιζόντων, οὐ συμφωνούντων δὲ περὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος αὐτὸ τόπου. διόπερ ἐφ' ὅσον ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη διαφωνία, μένειν ἐν ἐποχῇ δεῖ ὡς ἀσυγχώρητον τὸ τὴν φαντασίαν ἡγεμονικοῦ τύπωσιν εἶναι.

381 Δεδόσθω δὲ καὶ τὸ τύπωσιν ὑπάρχειν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ταύτην· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἀναγγέλλεται ἡ τοιαύτη τύπωσις τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ εἰ μὴ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ὁράσεως ἀκοῆς ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως, ζητῶ πότερον οἷα ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑτεροίωσις, τοιαύτη γίνεται καὶ ἡ περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ, ἢ διάφορος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ αὐτή, ἐπεὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἄλογός ἐστι, καὶ αὐτὸ<sup>2</sup> ἑτεροούμενον ἄλογον ἔσται καὶ οὐ

382 διαφέρον τῆς αἰσθήσεως· εἰ δὲ διάφορος, οὐ τοιοῦτον λήψεται τὸ φανταστὸν ὁποῖον ὑπόκειται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μὲν ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον, διαφέρουσα δὲ ἡ περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ συνισταμένη φαντασία. ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐδὲ ταύτη τοῖνυν τύπωσιν εἶναι ῥητέον ἡγεμονικοῦ καὶ ἑτεροίωσιν τὴν φαντασίαν.

383 Πρὸς τούτοις ἡ φαντασία ἀποτελεσματὸν ἐστὶ τοῦ

<sup>1</sup> [τὸ ἡγ.] secl. Heintz.

<sup>2</sup> αὐτὸ: τὸ mss., Bekk.: τὸ <ἡγεμονικόν> Heintz.

if presentation is a change and alteration of the soul, it is non-existent.

And even if alteration be granted, the real existence 380 of presentation will not be admitted right away. For it was declared to be an impression of the regent part, but it is not agreed whether this regent part exists or in what spot it exists, some saying (like Asclepiades) that no regent part has any existence at all, and others believing that it exists though not agreeing as to the place which contains it.<sup>a</sup> Wherefore, in so far as this controversy is unresolved, one must remain in a state of suspension, on the ground that it is not agreed that presentation is an impression of the regent part.

But let it be granted also that presentation is an 381 impression of the regent part; yet since such an impression is not announced to the regent part otherwise than through the sense—through sight, for instance, or hearing, or any other such faculty,—I want to know whether the alteration that takes place in the regent part is of the same sort as that of the sense, or different. And if it is the same, since each of the senses is irrational, the regent part too, being altered, will be irrational and in no respect different from sense; while if the alteration is different, it will 382 not receive the presented object exactly as it exists, but the existent object will be one thing and the presentation formed in the regent part something different. And this again is absurd. Neither in this way, then, can it be said that presentation is an impression and alteration of the regent part.

Furthermore, the presentation is an effect of the 383

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 313 ff., 349.

φανταστοῦ, καὶ τὸ φανταστὸν αἰτιὸν ἐστὶ τῆς φαντασίας καὶ τυπωτικὸν καθιεστήκει τῆς αἰσθητικῆς δυνάμεως, διενήνοχέ τε τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα τοῦ ποιούντος αὐτὸ αἰτίου. ὅθεν ἐπεὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις ἐπιβάλλει ὁ νοῦς, λήψεται τὰ ἀποτελέσματα τῶν φανταστῶν, ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ ἐκτὸς φανταστά. καὶ εἰ λέγοις 384 τας ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτῶ πείσεων καὶ παθῶν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ἐπιβάλλειν αὐτόν, τὰς ἀνώτερον εἰρημένας μετοίσομεν ἀπορίας. ἤτοι γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶ ταῖς ἡμετέραις φαντασίαις τὰ ἐκτός, ἢ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὅμοια δέ. <ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔσται><sup>1</sup> πῶς γὰρ δύναται τὸ αὐτὸ αἰτιὸν τε 385 καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖσθαι; εἰ δ' ὅμοια, ἐπεὶ τό τινι ὅμοιον ἕτερον ἐστὶν ἐκείνου τοῦ ὧ ὅμοιον ἐστίν, ἢ διάνοια τὰ ὅμοια τοῖς φανταστοῖς ἀλλ' οὐ τὰ φανταστά εἴσεται, σὺν τῷ καὶ τοῦτο ἄπορον εἶναι. πῶς γὰρ εἴσεται ἢ διάνοια ὅτι ὅμοιά ἐστὶ ταῖς φαντασίαις τὰ φανταστά; ἤτοι γὰρ χωρὶς φαντασίας τοῦτο αὐτὸ γνώσεται ἢ φαντασία τινί. καὶ χωρὶς μὲν φαντασίας ἀμήχανον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἢ διάνοια μὴ φαντασιουμένη πέφυκε λαμβάνειν. εἰ δὲ φαντασία, 386 πάντως αὕτη ἢ φαντασία ἵνα γνωσθῇ εἰ ὅμοια ἐστὶ τῷ ποιούντι αὐτὴν φανταστῷ, ὀφείλει ἑαυτὴν λαβεῖν καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον φανταστὸν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον φανταστὸν τάχα δυνήσεται λαβεῖν φαντασία οὔσα ἐκείνου· ἑαυτὴν δὲ πῶς λήψεται; ἵνα γὰρ τοῦτο γένηται, δεήσει ταῦτο καὶ φαντασίαν 387 καὶ φανταστὸν γίνεσθαι. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔστω ἕτερον

<sup>1</sup> <ἀλλὰ . . . ἔσται> cj. Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> i.e. in § 381.

object presented, and the object presented is the cause of the presentation and is capable of impressing the sensitive faculty, and the effect is different from the cause which produces it. Hence, since the mind apprehends the presentations, it will be receiving the effects of the presented objects but not the external objects themselves. And should anyone argue from 384 the feelings and affections it experiences that it apprehends the external objects, we shall adduce the difficulties previously stated.<sup>a</sup> For either the external objects are the same as our presentations, or they will not be the same but similar. <But they are certainly not the same ;> for how can a cause and its effect be conceived as the same? And if they are 385 similar, since what is similar to a thing is other than that to which it is similar, the intellect will know things similar to the presented objects but not the presented objects; and besides, this too is beset with difficulties. For how will the intellect know that the presented objects are similar to the presentations? It will know this either without a presentation or by means of a presentation. But without a presentation it is impracticable, for the intellect is naturally incapable of receiving anything unless by experiencing presentation. And if it knows it by means of a 386 presentation, this presentation ought certainly to perceive both itself and the presented object in order to ascertain whether it is itself similar to the presented object which produced it. Now the presentation will possibly be able to perceive the presented object, it being a presentation thereof; but how will it perceive itself? For in order that this should happen it will be necessary for the same thing to become both presentation and presented object. And since the presented 387

μὲν τὸ φανταστὸν (αἴτιον γὰρ ἔστιν) ἕτερον δὲ ἔστιν ἢ φαντασία (ἀποτέλεσμα γὰρ ἦν), ἔστιν τὸ αὐτὸ ἕτερον ἑαυτοῦ, αἰτιὸν τε ἅμα καὶ ἀποτέλεσμα· ὡν ἐκάτερόν ἐστιν ἄλογον.

- 388 Ἐπισημασμένων δὴ τούτων μεταβάτες, καὶ ἐπὶ συγχωρήσει τοῦ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν τοιαύτην ὁποῖαν ποτὲ θέλουσιν ὑπάρχειν οἱ δογματικοί, ἑτέρως ἀπορῶμεν. εἰ γὰρ κριτήριον ἀπολειπτόν τὴν φαντασίαν, ἦτοι πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ φαντασίαν λεκτέον εἶναι, καθὼς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, ἢ πᾶσαν ψευδῆ, ὡς ἔφασκε Ξενιάδης ὁ Κορίνθιος, ἢ τινὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς
- 389 καὶ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἔτι δὲ τοῦ περιπάτου. οὔτε δὲ πᾶσαν ἀληθῆ λεκτέον εἶναι οὔτε ψευδῆ οὔτε τινὰ μὲν ἀληθῆ τινὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, ὡς παραστήσομεν οὐκ ἄρα κριτήριον εἶναι ῥητέον τὴν φαντασίαν. πᾶσαν μὲν οὖν φαντασίαν οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τις ἀληθῆ διὰ τὴν περιτροπὴν, καθὼς ὁ τε Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἀντιλέγοντες τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ ἐδίδασκον·
- 390 εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς, καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, κατὰ φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, ἔστιν ἀληθές, καὶ οὕτω τὸ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ γενήσεται ψεῦδος. καὶ χωρὶς δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης περιτροπῆς παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενά ἐστι καὶ τὴν ἐνάργειαν τὸ λέγειν πᾶσαν φαντασίαν εἶναι ἀληθῆ, πολλῶν πάνυ ψευδῶν οὐσῶν.
- 391 οὐχ ὡσαύτως γὰρ κινούμεθα πρὸς τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος καὶ πρὸς τὸ "νῦν ἔστιν," τό τε ζῆν Σωκράτη καὶ τεθνάναι, οὐδὲ τὴν ἴσην ποτὲ ταῦτα προσβάλλει ἐνάργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἡμέραν νῦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ Σωκράτη τεθνάναι πιστόν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 60, 48, 53; P.H. ii. 18, 76, 86.

object is one thing (for it is cause) and the presentation another thing (for it is effect), the same thing will be other than itself (both cause and effect simultaneously); and both these conclusions are illogical.

From the difficulties now stated let us pass on 388 and mention other difficulties which occur even after conceding that presentation is of that nature, whatsoever it be, which the Dogmatists desire. If presentation is accepted as the criterion, we must assert either that every presentation is true, as Protagoras asserted, or that every one is false, as Xenias the Corinthian declared, or that some are true, some false, as the Stoics and Academicians said, and the Peripatetics as well.<sup>a</sup> But (as we shall 389 show) we ought not to assert either that every one is true or every one false or some true and some false; therefore we must not declare that presentation is the criterion. One cannot say that every presentation is true, because this refutes itself, as Democritus and Plato<sup>b</sup> taught in opposing Protagoras; for if 390 every presentation is true, the judgement that not every presentation is true, being based on a presentation, will also be true, and thus the judgement that every presentation is true will become false.—And even apart from self-refutation of this kind, it is contrary to apparent facts and to plain evidence to assert that every presentation is true, when very many are false. For our feelings do not respond in the 391 same way, at the present moment, to the judgement "it is day" and to the judgement "it is night," or to "Socrates is alive" and "Socrates is dead," nor do these judgements bring with them equally clear evidence, but "it is now day" and "Socrates is

<sup>b</sup> See Plato, *Theat.* 171 A, *Euthyd.* 286 B, C.

ἔοικεν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ νύκτα εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν  
 Σωκράτη οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ πιστὸν ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀν-  
 392 υπάρκτων φαίνεται. καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ τῆς  
 ἐν τισὶ πράγμασιν ἀκολουθίας τε καὶ μάχης  
 [ἀληθῆς τε καὶ ψευδῆς ἐστὶ].<sup>1</sup> τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἡμέραν  
 εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι καὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν σε τὸ κινεῖ-  
 σθαί σε ἐμφανῶς ἀκολουθεῖ, τῷ δὲ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ  
 νύκτα εἶναι καὶ τῷ περιπατεῖν σε τὸ μὴ κινεῖσθαι  
 σε προδήλως ἐμάχεται, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἑτέρου θέσις  
 ἄριστος ἦν τοῦ λοιποῦ, [εἰ συνακολουθεῖ τί τι καὶ  
 μάχεται πάντως ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ].<sup>2</sup> εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τί τι  
 μαχόμενον, οὐ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς· τὸ  
 γὰρ τι μαχόμενον ὡς ἀληθὲς ψεύδει ἢ ὡς ψεῦδος  
 393 ἀληθεῖ μάχεται. εἴπερ τε πάσας συμβέβηκε  
 τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς, οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν  
 ἄδηλον. ἀληθοῦς γὰρ τινος ὄντος καὶ ψεύδους,  
 εἴτ' ἀγνοουμένου τί τούτων ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς καὶ τί  
 ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀδηλούμενον ἡμῖν συνίσταται, καὶ ὁ  
 λέγων "ἀδηλὸν ἐστὶ μοι τὸ ἀρτίους ἢ περισσοῦς  
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας" δυνάμει λέγει μὴ ἐπίστασθαι  
 πότερον ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ καὶ πότερον ψεῦδος, τὸ ἀρτίους  
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοῦς. ὥστε εἰ πάντα  
 ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ καὶ πᾶσαι φαντασίαι εἰσὶν ἀληθεῖς,  
 οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ἄδηλον. εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἡμῖν  
 ἄδηλον, πάντ' ἔσται πρόδηλα. εἰ δὲ πάντ' ἔσται  
 πρόδηλα, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ ζητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν περὶ  
 τινος· ζητεῖ γὰρ τις καὶ ἀπορεῖ περὶ τοῦ ἀ-  
 δηλουμένου αὐτῷ πράγματος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ  
 φανεροῦ. ἀποπον δὲ γέ ἐστι τὸ ζήτησιν καὶ

<sup>1</sup> [ἀληθῆς . . . ἐστὶ] secl. Kochalsky.

<sup>2</sup> [εἰ . . . ἐτέρῳ] secl. Heintz.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 243.

dead " seem to be credible, whereas " it is night " and  
 " Socrates is alive " are not equally credible but  
 appear not to be actual facts.—The same argument 392  
 also applies to the sequence and conflict belonging  
 to certain things. For the existence of light is  
 plainly consequent on the existence of day, and the  
 fact of your motion on that of your walking, whereas  
 the existence of night obviously conflicts with the  
 existence of day, and the fact of your not moving with  
 that of your walking, and the affirmation of the one  
 is the negation of the other[ , if one thing is con-  
 sequent on another thing, certainly also one thing  
 is in conflict with another thing]. But if anything  
 conflicts with anything, not every presentation  
 is true ; for that which conflicts with a thing con-  
 flicts as truth with falsehood or as falsehood with  
 truth.—Also, if it is the fact that all presentations are 393  
 true, nothing is non-evident to us. For it is when  
 one is true and another false, and we do not know  
 which of them is true and which false, that we have  
 a case of the non-evident, and the man who says " it  
 is non-evident to me whether the stars are even in  
 number or odd " <sup>a</sup> is virtually saying that he does not  
 know whether it is true or whether it is false that  
 the stars are even or that they are odd. So that if  
 everything is true and all presentations are true,  
 nothing is non-evident to us. And if nothing is  
 non-evident, all things are quite evident. And if all  
 things are quite evident, there will be no such thing  
 as inquiring and doubting about anything ; for a  
 man inquires and doubts about a matter which is to  
 him non-evident, but not about what is apparent.  
 But it is absurd to abolish inquiry and doubt ; not

ἀπορίαν ἀναιρεῖν· οὐκ ἄρα πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οὐδὲ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ.

394 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής καὶ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, οὔτε ἀλήθευσις τις ἔστιν οὔτε ἀπλανησία, οὐ διδασκαλία, [οὐ πλάνησις,]<sup>1</sup> οὐ τέχνη, οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἀρετή, οὐκ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων. σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον. εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα φαντασία ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ ψεῦδος, μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος ψεύδους οὔτε τὸ ψεῦδεσθαι ἔσται οὔτε τὸ πλανᾶσθαι οὔτε τὸ ἀτεχνον εἶναι οὔτε τὸ φαῦλον ὑπάρχειν· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων τοῦ ψεύδους ἔχεται

395 καὶ περὶ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόστασιν λαμβάνει. μηδενὸς δὲ ψευδομένου οὐδ' ἀληθεύων τις ἔσται, καὶ μηδενὸς πλανωμένου οὐδ' ἀπλανῆς καταστήσεται τις. ὡσαύτως δὲ μὴ ὄντος ἀτεχνοῦ συναναίρεται καὶ ὁ τεχνίτης καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος φαύλου ὁ σοφός· ταῦτα γὰρ κατὰ σύμβλησιν νοεῖται, καὶ ὃν τρόπον μὴ ὄντος δεξιῶν οὐδὲ ἀριστερὸν ἔστι μηδὲ ὄντος τοῦ κάτω οὐδὲ τὸ ἄνω ἔστιν, οὕτω μὴ ὄντος τοῦ ἐτέρου τῶν ἀντικειμένων οὐδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ὑποστήσεται. οἰχθήσεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ

396 τὸ σημεῖον. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀληθῆς εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ ψεῦδος ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος ψεύδους οὐ χρεῖα τοῦ διδάξοντος ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος· τὸ δὲ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον ἐπηγγέλλετο ἐκκαλυπτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ ἀδηλουμένου, πάντων δὲ ἀληθῶν ὄντων καὶ δι' αὐτῶν προφανῶν οὐ χρήζομεν τοῦ μηνύοντος τὸ μὴ γνωσκόμενον, εἴτε ἀληθῆς ἔστιν εἴτε καὶ ψεῦδος.

397 Καίτοι τί περὶ τούτων διεξιμεν, ὅτε οὔτε ζῶων οὔτε κοινῶς κόσμος ὑποκείσεται συγχωρηθέντος

<sup>1</sup> [οὐ πλάνησις,] secl. Kayser.

every presentation, therefore, is true, nor are all things true.

Moreover, if every presentation is true and all 394 things are true, there is no veracity or inerrancy, no instruction, no art, no proof, no virtue, nor any other thing of the kind. Let us consider this statement. If every presentation is true, nothing is false, and nothing being false lying will not exist nor error nor lack of art nor vice; for each of these things is connected with falsehood and derives its existence therefrom. And if no one lies neither will anyone be telling 395 the truth, and if no one is in error neither will anyone be found to be inerrant. In the same way, if there is no one inartistic the artist likewise is abolished, and the sage if no vicious man exists. For these things are conceived by way of correlation, and just as, if there is no right hand neither is there a left, and if there is no below neither is there an above, so, if one of two contraries does not exist, neither will the other subsist. Proof also and sign will vanish. For the 396 former is proof that the true exists but not the false; but if no falsehood exists, there is no need for anything to instruct us that falsehood does not exist. As to the sign and token, it was claimed that they serve to reveal what is non-evident, but if all things are true and self-apparent we do not need anything to indicate either the truth or falsity of a thing not known.

Yet why do we dilate on these details when neither 397 animal nor universe in general<sup>a</sup> will exist if it be agreed

<sup>a</sup> Or "at large," "universe" being a more comprehensive notion than "animal."

τοῦ πάσας τὰς φαντασίας ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν; εἰ γὰρ πάντα ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πάντα ἡμῖν γενήσεται πρόδηλα, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔσται ὑγιές τε καὶ ἀληθές καὶ τὸ πάντα ἡμῖν εἶναι ἄδηλα, ἐν ἐκ τῶν πάντων καθεστώς· ἀληθοῦς δὲ ὄντος τοῦ πάντα ἄδηλα τυγχάνειν, οὔτε ζῶον οὔτε φυτὸν οὔτε κόσμον προσδεξόμεθα φαίνεσθαι ἡμῖν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.

398 λεκτέον ἄρα διὰ ταῦτα πάντα μὴ πάσας τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς καὶ πιστάς, καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πάσας ψευδεῖς διὰ τὰς ἀναλόγους αἰτίας· ἰσοδυναμεῖ γὰρ τῷ πάσας εἶναι ἀληθεῖς καὶ τὸ πάσας εἶναι ψευδεῖς. διὸ καὶ πάντα σχεδὸν τὰ προειρημένα ἡμῖν ἔσται καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην μεταφέρειν στάσιν.

399 εἰ γὰρ πάσαι αἱ φαντασίαι εἰσὶ ψευδεῖς καὶ οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ “οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές.” εἰ ἄρα μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἔστιν ἀληθές· καὶ οὕτως εἰς τούναντίον τῇ προθέσει περιήχθησαν οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενιάδην, λέγοντες πάσας τὰς φαντασίας εἶναι ψευδεῖς καὶ μηδὲν ὅλως ἐν τοῖς οὐσιν ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές. καθόλου γὰρ ἀμήχανόν ἐστὶ τὸν ἐπὶ μέρους τι λέγοντα ψεῦδος μὴ οὐχὶ καὶ ἀληθές ὀρίζειν. οἷον ὅτε λέγομεν ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ Α, τοῦ μέν Α τὸ ψεῦδος αὐτὸ ὑπάρχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, τὸ δὲ “ψεῦδος ἐστὶ τὸ Α” τίθεμεν, ὥστε δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν τι ἀποφαίνεσθαι “ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ ψεῦδος εἶναι τὸ Α.” ἅμα οὖν τῷ ψεῦδος τι λέγειν

400 καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἀληθές ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὀρίζομεν. ἔνεστι δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐνταυθοῖ διδάσκειν ὅτι ἐναργεῖς σχεδὸν εἰσι τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ διαφοραί, καθ’ ὅς αἱ μὲν ἐπισπῶνται ἡμῶν τὴν συγκατάθεσιν αἱ δ’ ἀποκροῦνται καὶ οὔτε ἅσασαι ἐπισπῶνται κοινῶς οὔτε ἅσασαι συλλήβδην ἀπο-

that all presentations are true? For if all things are true, all things will be quite evident to us, and if so, it will also be valid and true that all things are non-evident to us, this being one of the “all things”; and if it be true that all things are non-evident we shall not admit that either animal or plant or universe appears to us; which is absurd. For all these 398 reasons, therefore, one must declare that not all presentations are true and credible, and indeed, for analogous reasons, that not all are false. For the statement “all are false” is equipollent with “all are true.” Wherefore also it will be possible for us to adduce against a position of this kind nearly all the objections previously stated. For if all the presenta- 399 tions are false and nothing is true, it is true that “nothing is true.” If, therefore, nothing is true, a truth exists; and in this way Xenocrates<sup>a</sup> was driven round to the opposite of his original position, when he said that all presentations are false and that absolutely nothing true exists in the world. For, as a universal rule, it is impossible to assert that any particular thing is false without also affirming a truth. For example, when we assert that *A* is false, we are predicating the existence of that very falsity of *A*, and we are affirming that “*A* is false,” so that what we virtually declare is this—“It is true that *A* is false.” Simultaneously, then, with asserting a thing to be false we necessarily affirm the existence of truth. And in the same fashion one may here show that the 400 differences in presentations are well-nigh self-evident, owing to which some attract our assent while others repel it, and neither all alike attract nor all without

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 388.

κρούονται, ἐπεὶ τοὶ μηδεμιᾶς οὐσίας τῆς διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ πασῶν ἐπ' ἰσῆς ἀπίστων οὐσῶν ἢ πιστῶν, οὔτε τέχνη ποτ' ἂν οὔτε ἀτεχνία καθεισθῆκει, οὐκ ἔπαινος, οὐκ ἐπιτίμησις, οὐκ ἀπάτη· ἐνοεῖτο γὰρ ἢ μὲν τέχνη καὶ ἀποδοχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀνεξαπάτητον κατὰ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φαντασίας, ἢ δὲ ἀπάτη καὶ ἐπιτίμησις κατὰ τὰς ψευδεῖς. οὔτε οὖν πάσας ἀληθεῖς εἶναι ῥητέον καὶ πιστὰς οὔτε πάσας ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀπίστους.

401 Λεῖπεται ἄρα τὰς μὲν πιστὰς τὰς δὲ ἀπίστους ἀξιοῦν, ὅπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας ἔλεγον, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τὰς καταληπτικὰς φαντασίας ἀποδεχόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας τὰς πιθανὰς εἶναι δοκούσας. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἰσχυροῦς ἡμῖν ἀκριβῶς  
402 εὐχῆ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἀληθεία. ἦν γὰρ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ἵνα τις ἀπὸ ταύτης ἄρχηται, ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος. τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα λέγουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Καρνεάδην συγχωρήσειν τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ δὲ "οἷα οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος" ἀσυγχώρητον εἶναι. γίνονται γὰρ καὶ ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπαρχόντων φαντασίαι ὡς ἀπὸ  
403 ὑπαρχόντων. καὶ τεκμήριον τῆς ἀπαραλλαξίας τὸ ἐπ' ἰσῆς ταύτας ἐναργεῖς καὶ πληκτικὰς εὐρίσκεισθαι, τοῦ δὲ ἐπ' ἰσῆς πληκτικὰς καὶ ἐναργεῖς εἶναι τὸ τὰς ἀκολούθους πράξεις ἐπιζεύγνυσθαι. ὡσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὑπαρ ὁ μὲν διψῶν ἀρνούμενος ποτὸν ἤδεται, ὁ δὲ θηρίον ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν δευμαλέων φεύγων βοᾷ καὶ κέκραγεν, οὕτω καὶ κατὰ τοὺς

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸ cj. Bekk.: αὐτοὺς MSS.

exception repel, since, to be sure, if no difference existed but all were equally untrustworthy or trustworthy, there would exist no art nor lack of art, no praise, no blame, no deceit; for art and approval and lack of deceit are conceived through true presentations, but deceit and blame through false ones. One ought not, then, to assert either that all are true and trustworthy or that all are false and untrustworthy.

It remains, therefore, to affirm that some presenta- 401 tions are trustworthy, others untrustworthy, as the Stoics and the Academics have said, the Stoics approving the "apprehensive" presentations, and the Academics those which appear to be "probable." <sup>a</sup> But, on examining it closely, this view also seems to us more like a pious aspiration than the truth. For 402 an "apprehensive" presentation—to take this first—is one which is "imprinted and impressed by a real object and in accordance with that object itself, and such as could not be produced by anything not real." <sup>b</sup> As to the rest of this account Carneades <sup>c</sup> says that he will concede it to the Stoics, but the clause "Such as could not be produced by what is not real" should not be conceded. For presentations are produced by non-real objects just as by real ones. And the fact 403 that they are found equally self-evident and striking is a token of their indistinguishability, while the fact that corresponding actions are linked to them is a token of their being equally striking and self-evident. For as in waking life the thirsty man feels pleasure in indulging in drink, and the man who flees from a wild beast or any other object of terror shouts and cries aloud, so also in dreams delight is felt by the thirsty

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 227 ff., 174 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 248, 252.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 164.

ἕπνου ἢ μὲν διάχυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς διψῶσι καὶ ἀπὸ  
404 κρήνης πίνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἀνάλογον δὲ φόβος τοῖς  
δειματουμένοις·

ταφῶν γὰρ ἀνόρουσεν Ἀχιλλεύς  
χεροῖ τε συμπλατάγησεν, ἔπος τ' ὀλοφυδνόν  
ἔειπεν.

καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐν καταστάσει τοῖς τρανότατα φαινο-  
μένοις πιστεύομεν καὶ συγκατατιθέμεθα, ὅσον Δίῳ  
μὲν ὡς Δίῳ Θεῶν δὲ ὡς Θεῶν προσφερόμενοι,  
οὕτω καὶ ἐν μανίᾳ τὸ παραπλήσιον πάσχουσι τινές.  
405 ὁ γοῦν Ἡρακλῆς μανίᾳ, καὶ λαβῶν φαντασίαν  
ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὡς Εὐρυσθέως, τὴν ἀκό-  
λουθον πράξιν ταύτῃ τῇ φαντασίᾳ συνῆψεν. ἀκό-  
λουθον δὲ ἦν τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας ἀνελεῖν,  
ὅπερ καὶ ἐποίησεν. εἰ οὖν καταληπτικαὶ τινές  
εἰσι φαντασίαι παρόσον ἐπάγονται ἡμᾶς εἰς συγ-  
κατάθεσιν καὶ εἰς τὸ τὴν ἀκόλουθον αὐταῖς πράξιν  
συνάπτειν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ψευδεῖς τοιαῦται πεφήνασι,  
λεκτέον ἀπαραλλάκτους εἶναι ταῖς καταληπτικαῖς  
406 φαντασίαις τὰς ἀκαταλήπτους. καὶ μὴν ὃν τρόπον  
ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων (ὡς τόξων)<sup>1</sup> ἐλάμβανε φαντασίαν  
ὁ ἦρω, οὕτω καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὅτι  
Εὐρυσθέως εἰσὶ παῖδες. μία γὰρ καὶ ἡ αὐτῇ  
προὔπέκειτο καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντι φαντασία. ἀλλ'  
ἦν ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων ἀληθής, ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν  
407 παιδῶν ψευδής. ἐπ' ἴσης οὖν κινουσῶν<sup>2</sup> ἀμφο-  
τέρων ὁμολογητέον ἀπαραλλάκτον εἶναι τὴν ἐτέ-  
ραν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ· καὶ εἰ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν τόξων λέγεται  
καταληπτική, ὅτι ἀκόλουθος αὐτῇ πράξις ἐπέ-

<sup>1</sup> <ὡς τόξων> Heintz.

<sup>2</sup> κινουσῶν N: κλιουσῶν cet., Bekk.

when they think they are drinking from a spring, and 404  
similarly fear is felt by those in terror :

Achilles up-leapt in amazement,  
Smiting together his hands, and a doleful word did he utter.\*

And just as in a normal state we believe and assent to very lucid appearances, behaving, for instance, towards Dion as Dion, and towards Theon as Theon, so also in a state of madness some are similarly affected. Thus Heracles, when he was mad and had 405  
received a presentation of his own children as though they were those of Eurystheus,<sup>b</sup> followed up this presentation with corresponding action. And the corresponding action was to destroy his enemy's children, which he did. If, then, presentations are apprehensive in so far as they attract us to assent and to the following of them up with corresponding action, then, since false ones also are seen to be of this kind, we must declare that the non-apprehensive presentations are indistinguishable from the apprehensive. Moreover, just as the hero received a presentation 406  
of the bow and arrows, so also he received a presentation of his own children as being the children of Eurystheus. For the pre-existent presentation was one and the same and received by a man in the same condition ; yet while that of the bow and arrows was true, that of the children was false. So, since both 407  
affected him equally, one must admit that the one was indistinguishable from the other ; and if that of the bow is termed " apprehensive," because it was

\* Homer, *Iliad*, xxiii. 101.

<sup>b</sup> Heracles, in a fit of madness, slew his own children in mistake for those of his enemy, King Eurystheus, who had imposed upon him his " Twelve Labours." Cf. Eurip. *Here.* Fur. 969 ; *Adv. Log.* ii. 67.



ζεύχθη τοῖς τόξοις αὐτοῦ ὡς τόξοις χρησαμένον,  
 λεγέσθω καὶ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν παίδων μὴ διαφέρειν  
 ταύτης, παρόσον καὶ ταύτη τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐπε-  
 ζεύχθη ἔργον, τουτέστι τὸ τοὺς τοῦ ἐχθροῦ παῖδας  
 408 δεῖν ἀναερεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ αὕτη μὲν ἡ ἀπαραλλαξία  
 τῶν τε καταληπτικῶν καὶ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων φαν-  
 τασιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναργές καὶ ἔντονον ἰδίωμα παρ-  
 ἰσταται· οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον δείκνυται τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς  
 Ἀκαδημίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ χαρακτήρα καὶ [ἡ] κατὰ  
 τύπον. καλοῦσι δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τοὺς στωικούς.  
 409 ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων μὲν κατὰ μορφήν διαφερόν-  
 των δὲ κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμήχανόν ἐστι διορί-  
 ζειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ψευδοῦς  
 καὶ ἀκαταλήπτου· οἷον δυοῖν ὠν ἄκρως ἀλλήλοις  
 ὁμοίων (εἰ) ἐναλλάξ τῷ στωικῷ δίδωμι πρὸς  
 διάκρισιν, [εἰ] ἐπιβαλὼν ὁ σοφὸς (οὐκ)<sup>1</sup> ἰσχύσει  
 λέγειν ἀδιαπτῶς πότερον ἓν ἐστὶ τὸ δεικνύμενον  
 410 ὦν ἢ ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶ καὶ  
 ἐπὶ διδύμων· λήψεται γὰρ ψευδῆ φαντασίαν ὁ  
 σπουδαῖος καὶ [ὡς]<sup>2</sup> ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ'  
 αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένην καὶ ἐναπεσφρα-  
 γισμένην ἔχων τὴν φαντασίαν, ἐὰν ἀπὸ Κάστο-  
 ρος ὡς ἀπὸ Πολυδεύκου φαντασιωθῇ. ἐντεῦθεν  
 γοῦν καὶ ὁ ἐγκεκαλυμμένος συνέστη λόγος· ἐὰν  
 γὰρ προκύψαντος δράκοντος θέλωμεν τῷ ὑποκει-  
 μένῳ ἐπιστῆναι, εἰς πολλὴν ἀπορίαν ἐμπεσοῦμεθα,  
 καὶ οὐχ ἔξομεν λέγειν πότερον ὁ αὐτὸς ἐστὶ  
 δράκων τῷ πρότερον προκύψαντι ἢ ἕτερος, πολλῶν

<sup>1</sup> <εἰ> . . . [εἰ] . . . <οὐκ> Heintz.

<sup>2</sup> [ὡς] secl. Kayser: καίπερ cj. Bekk.

\* The statement of § 403 that false presentations may be as "self-evident and striking" as true ones, and therefore 218

followed by the corresponding action when he used  
 the bow as a bow, let it be said that the presentation  
 of the children does not differ therefrom, inasmuch  
 as it too was followed up by the corresponding action,  
 —namely, the duty of slaying the enemy's children.  
 Well then, this form of indistinguishability, in respect 408  
 of the characteristic of self-evidence and intensity,  
 is established.<sup>a</sup> And that in respect of stamp and im-  
 pression is proved no less surely by the Academics.  
 They summon the Stoics to face apparent facts. For 409  
 in the case of things similar in shape but differing in  
 substance it is impossible to distinguish the appre-  
 hensive presentation from the false and non-appre-  
 hensive. If, for example, of two eggs that are  
 exactly alike I offer each one in turn to the Stoic for  
 him to distinguish between them, will the Sage be  
 able on inspection to declare indubitably whether the  
 egg exhibited is this one or that other one? And the 410  
 same argument also holds good in the case of twins.  
 For the Good Man will receive a false presentation,  
 though he has that presentation "imprinted and im-  
 pressed both by a real object and according to that  
 very object," if the presentation he gets be one of  
 Castor as though it were of Polydeuces. It was this,  
 too, that led to the framing of "the Veiled" argu-  
 ment; when a snake has thrust out its head, if we  
 wish to examine the real object we shall be plunged  
 into great perplexity and shall not be able to say  
 whether it is the same snake that thrust its head out  
 before or another one, as there are many snakes

"indistinguishable," has now been proved. The next sentence introduces the proof (in §§ 409-410) that an unreal percept may produce in the percipient an "impression" indistinguishable from that caused by a real one.

411 ἐνεσπειραμένων τῷ αὐτῷ φωλεῷ δρακόντων. οὐ τοῖνυν ἔχει τι ἰδίωμα ἢ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία ᾧ διαφέρει τῶν ψευδῶν τε καὶ ἀκαταληπτῶν φαντασιῶν.

Πρὸς τοῦτοις, εἴ τι ἄλλο καταληπτικόν τινός ἐστι, καὶ ὄρασις. οὐχὶ δέ γ' αὕτη καταληπτικὴ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι

412 καταληπτικόν τινος. ἢ γὰρ ὄρασις λαμβάνειν μὲν δοκεῖ χρώματα καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις, τούτων δὲ οὐδὲν λαμβάνει, καθάπερ εὐθύς ἀπὸ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀρξαμένοις ἡμῖν φανεῖται. εἴπερ οὖν ἢ ὄρασις καταλαμβάνεται τι χρώμα, φαῖν οἱ ἐξ Ἀκαδημίας, καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καταλήψεται· οὐ καταλαμβάνεται δὲ τοῦτο· οὐδ'

413 ἄλλο τοῖνυν καταλήψεται χρώμα. καὶ ὅτι οὐ καταλαμβάνεται, πρόδηλον· μεταβάλλει γὰρ κατὰ ὥρας ἐνεργείας φύσεις ἡλικίας περιστάσεις νόσους ὑγίαν ὑπνον ἐγρήγορσιν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν οὕτως αὐτὸ ποικίλλεσθαι γινώσκειν ἡμᾶς, τὸ δὲ τί ἐστι τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγνοεῖν. ταύτη τε εἰ τοῦτο μὴ ἔστι καταληπτόν, οὐδ' ἄλλο τι γενήσεται γινώριμον.

414 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐπὶ σχήματος τὸ αὐτὸ γένος τῆς ἀπορίας εὐρήσομεν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λεῖον καὶ τραχὺ ὑποπίπτει ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν γραφῶν, στρογγύλον τε καὶ τετράγωνον ὡς ἐπὶ πύργων, εὐθύ τε καὶ κεκλασμένον ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἐξάλου τε καὶ ἐνάλου κώπης, καὶ ἐπὶ κινήσεως κινούμενον καὶ ἡρεμοῦν, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν νηὶ καθεζομένων ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰγιαλοῖς ἐσώτων.

415 Ἄλλως τε, εἴπερ προσαρμόζεται τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ ἢ ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία, οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον ἀληθείας ἢ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία.

coiled up in the same hole. So then the apprehensive 411 presentation possesses no characteristic whereby it differs from the false and non-apprehensive presentations.

Furthermore, if anything else is apprehensive of anything, the sense of sight is so. But in fact, as we shall establish, sight is not apprehensive of anything; therefore nothing is apprehensive of anything. For 412 sight is thought to perceive colours and sizes and forms and motions, but it perceives none of these things, as will be apparent to us at once if we commence with colours. If then, as the Academics say, sight apprehends any colour it will also apprehend that of man; but it does not apprehend this; neither then will it apprehend another colour. And that 413 it does not apprehend this is quite evident; for this changes according to the seasons, occupations, natures, ages, circumstances, diseases, health, sleeping, waking, so that while we know that it is thus varied we are ignorant of what in truth it is. And thus, if this colour is not apprehensible neither will any other become known. Moreover, we shall find 414 the same kind of difficulty in the case of form. For the same thing is perceived as both smooth and rough, as in the case of pictures; and as both round and square, as in the case of towers; and as both straight and bent, as in the case of the oar when out of and in the water; and, as regards motion, both in motion and at rest, as in the case of persons seated in a ship or standing on the beach.<sup>a</sup>

Again, if the non-apprehensive presentation coincides with the apprehensive presentation, the apprehensive presentation will not be the criterion of truth.

<sup>a</sup> For these examples cf. *P.H.* i. 92, 118, 119, 102.

ὡςπερ γὰρ τὸ προσαρμοττόμενον στρεβλῶ οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον εὐθέος, οὕτως εἰ προσαρμόττεται ψευδέσι καὶ ἀκαταλήπτους φαντασίαις ἢ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία, οὐκ ἂν εἶη κριτήριον. προσαρμόττεται δέ γε ἀκαταλήπτους καὶ ψευδέσι πράγμασιν ἢ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία, καθὼς παραστήσομεν· οὐ τοίνυν κριτήριόν ἐστι τῶν τε ἀληθῶν  
 416 καὶ τῶν ψευδῶν ἢ καταληπτικῆ φαντασία. ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῦ σωρίτου τῆς ἐσχάτης καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῇ πρώτῃ ἀκαταλήπτῳ παρακειμένης καὶ δυσδιορίστου σχεδὸν ὑπαρχούσης, φασὶν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὅτι ἐφ' ὧν μὲν φαντασιῶν ὀλίγη τις οὕτως ἔστι διαφορά, στήσεται ὁ σοφὸς καὶ ἡσυχάσει, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ πλείων προσπίπτει, ἐπὶ τούτων  
 417 συγκαταθήσεται τῇ ἑτέρα ὡς ἀληθεῖ. ἐὰν οὖν παραστήσωμεν ἡμεῖς πολλὰ ψευδῆ καὶ ἀκατάληπτα τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ παρακείμενα, δῆλον ὡς ἐσόμεθα κατεσκευακότες τὸ μὴ δεῖν συγκατατίθεσθαι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἵνα μὴ ταύτῃ συναιδέσαντες προπέσωμεν διὰ τὴν γειννίασιν καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων καὶ ψευδῶν συγκατάθεσιν, κἄν ὅτι μάλιστα πολλὴ περὶ  
 418 τὰς φαντασίας προσπίπτει δοκῆ διαφορά. τὸ δὲ λεγόμενον σαφές ἐσται ἐπὶ παραδείγματος. ὑποκείσθω γὰρ καταληπτικῆ μὲν φαντασία ἢ "τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," ἥτις καὶ κατὰ πολὺ φαίνεται κεχωρισμένη τῆς "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἑτέρας. οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ πλείστον ἀπέχει τῆς "τὰ πεντήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν" καταληπτικῆς ἢ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτος, οὐκ ἐφέξει ὁ σπουδαῖος μεγάλης προσπιπτούσης διαφορᾶς, ἀλλὰ

For just as that which coincides with the crooked will not be the criterion of the straight, so the apprehensive presentation will not be the criterion if it coincides with false and non-apprehensive presentations. But the apprehensive presentation does coincide with non-apprehensive and false things, as we shall establish; so then the apprehensive presentation is not the criterion of the true and the false. For in the case of the 416 Sorites, when the last apprehensive presentation lies beside the first non-apprehensive one and almost defies distinction therefrom, Chrysippus declares that, in the case of presentations where the difference is so small, the Sage will pause and keep silence,<sup>a</sup> but in cases where it appears greater he will assent to the former one as true. If, then, we shall establish that many false 417 and non-apprehensive things lie beside the apprehensive presentation, it is plain that we shall have shown that one ought not to assent to the apprehensive presentation, lest by approving of it we are driven on, because of their proximity, to give assent also to those which are non-apprehensive and false, even though the greatest possible difference may seem to exist between the presentations. What I mean will be clear 418 by an example. Let us assume as an apprehensive presentation "Fifty is few," which seems far apart from this other, "Ten thousand is few." Then, since the non-apprehensive presentation "Ten thousand is few" is very far removed from the apprehensive "Fifty is few," the Good Man will not suspend judgement on perceiving this great difference but

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 253 for the "Sorites" puzzle, and the Stoic rule of withholding assent and suspending judgement when a point is reached in the series where the difference between a true and a doubtful presentation, or judgement, becomes infinitesimal.

συγκαταθήσεται μὲν τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, οὐ συγκαταθήσεται δὲ τῇ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκαταλήπτῳ.  
 419 ἀλλ' εἰ τῇ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" οὐ συγκαταθήσεται ὁ σοφός, παρόσον πολλῶ κεχώρισται τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν," φανερόν δήπουθεν ὅτι συγκαταθήσεται τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστίν". οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστὶ μεταξὺ ταύτης καὶ τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστίν." ἦν δέ γε ἡ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῆς ἐσχάτως ὑποκειμένης τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" πρώτη ἀκατάληπτος. συγκαταθήσεται ἄρα ὁ σπουδαῖος ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστίν" καὶ εἰ ταύτη συγκαταθήσεται, μηδεμίαν ἐχούση διαφορὰν πρὸς τὴν "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ," συγκαταθήσεται καὶ τῇ  
 420 "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτῳ. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία (πάσῃ)<sup>1</sup> ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ ἐστὶν ἴση. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ μὲν "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτος ἴση ἐστὶ τῇ "τὰ πενήκοντα καὶ ἓν ὀλίγα ἐστίν," οὐδενὶ δὲ (ἦδε)<sup>2</sup> διέφερε καὶ ἐκεχώριστο τῆς "τὰ πενήκοντα ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῆς, ἴση γενήσεται τῇ "τὰ μύρια ὀλίγα ἐστίν" ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ ἢ "τὰ πενήκοντα  
 421 ὀλίγα ἐστὶ" καταληπτικῇ. καὶ οὕτω συνεξέρχεται τῇ ψευδεὶ καὶ ἀκατάληπτῳ φαντασίᾳ διὰ τὴν ἀπαραλλαξίαν ἢ καταληπτικῇ.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔνεστι λέγειν μὴ πᾶσαν ἀκατάληπτον φαντασίαν ἴσην πάσῃ ἀκατάληπτῳ τυγχάνειν φαντασίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν μάλλον εἶναι ἀκατάληπτον  
 422 τὴν δὲ ἦσον, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν μαχέσονται ἑαυτοῖς

<sup>1</sup> <πάσῃ> Heintz.

will assent to the apprehensive presentation "Fifty is few" and will not assent to the non-apprehensive "Ten thousand is few." But if the Sage will not  
 419 assent to the "Ten thousand is few" inasmuch as it is far apart from the "Fifty is few," it is plain, I presume, that he will assent to "Fifty-one is few"; for there is nothing between this presentation and that of "Fifty is few." But as "Fifty is few" was the apprehensive presentation placed last in order, "Fifty-one is few" is the first non-apprehensive one. The Good Man, therefore, will assent to the non-apprehensive presentation "Fifty-one is few." And if he will assent to this as being in no wise different from "Fifty is few," he will assent also to the non-apprehensive "Ten thousand is few"; for every  
 420 non-apprehensive presentation is equal to every other non-apprehensive presentation. Since, then, the non-apprehensive "Ten thousand is few" is equal to the "Fifty-one is few," and this was not at all different nor remote from the apprehensive "Fifty is few," the apprehensive "Fifty is few" will become equal to the non-apprehensive presentation "Ten thousand is few." And thus the apprehensive presentation,  
 421 because of its indistinguishability, passes out along with the false and non-apprehensive.

Nor indeed is it possible to argue that not every non-apprehensive presentation is equal to every non-apprehensive presentation, but this one is more, that one less non-apprehensive, since, in the first place, the  
 422 Stoics will be in conflict both with themselves and

<sup>2</sup> <ἦδε> addidi: διέφερον αὐτῇ ἢ ἐκ. Fabr.

καὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων οἱ στωικοί. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπου, καθὸ ἀνθρώπος ἐστίν, οὐ διαφέρει, οὐδὲ λίθος λίθου, οὕτως οὔτε ἀκατάληπτος φαντασία ἀκατάληπτου φαντασίας διενήνοχεν, ἢ ἀκατάληπτός ἐστιν, οὔτε<sup>1</sup> ψευδῆς ψευδοῦς, ἢ ψευδῆς ἐστίν. κἀντεῦθεν ὀρμώμενοι οἱ περὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα ἐδίδασκον ὅτι ἴσα ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμαρ-

423 τήματα. εἶτα ἔστω τὴν μὲν μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀκατάληπτον τὴν δὲ ἥσσον. τί τοῦτο αὐτοῖς βοηθεῖν δύναται; ἀκολουθήσει γὰρ τῇ μὲν μᾶλλον ἀκατάληπτῳ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, τῇ δὲ ἥσσον συγκατατίθεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. ἀπλανὲς γὰρ εἶχε κριτήριον κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ σοφός, καὶ κατὰ πάντα ἐθεοποιεῖτο διὰ τὸ μὴ δοξάζειν, τουτέστι ψεύδει συγκατατίθεσθαι, ἐν ᾧ ἔκειτο ἡ ἄκρα κακοδαιμονία καὶ ἡ τῶν φαύλων διάπτωσις.

424 Ἴνα γε μὴν αἰσθητικὴ γένηται φαντασία κατ' αὐτοὺς, οἷον ὀρατικὴ, δεῖ πέντε συνδραμεῖν, τό τε αἰσθητήριον καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τὸ πῶς καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὡς ἐὰν τῶν ἄλλων παρόντων ἐν μόνον ἀπῆ, καθάπερ διάνοια παρὰ φύσιν ἔχουσα, οὐ σωθήσεται, φασίν, ἢ ἀντιληψίς. ἐνθεν καὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔλεγον τινες μὴ κοινῶς κριτήριον, ἀλλ' ὅταν μηδὲν ἔχη

425 κατὰ τὸν τρόπον ἐνσθημα. τοῦτο μέντοι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν· καὶ γὰρ παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν πόρων καὶ παρὰ τὰς τοῦ ἐκτὸς περιστάσεις καὶ παρ' ἄλλους πλείους τρόπους οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ οὔτε ὡσαύτως ἰνδάλλεται ἡμῖν τὰ πράγματα, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ἐπελογισάμεθα, ὥστε εἰ μὲν φαίνεται πρὸς τῆδε τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῆδε τῇ περιστάσει

<sup>1</sup> οὔτε cj. Bekk.: οὐδὲ mss.

with the nature of things. For just as man, *qua* man, differs not from man, nor stone from stone, so neither does non-apprehensive presentation, *qua* non-apprehensive, differ from non-apprehensive presentation, nor false, *qua* false, from false. Zeno, too, setting out from this standpoint, taught that "Sins are equal."—Further, let it be granted that this presentation is 423 more and that less non-apprehensive. How can this assist them? For it will follow that the Sage will not assent to the more non-apprehensive, but will assent to the less, which is absurd; for, according to them, the Sage possesses an infallible criterion, and is counted in all respects divine because he never opines,<sup>a</sup> that is to say, assents to what is false, for therein consists the height of ill-fortune and the ruin of the foolish.

Moreover, in order that a sense-presentation, such 424 as that of sight, should take place, it is necessary, according to them, that five things should concur—the organ of sense, the object of sense, the place, the manner, the intellect—since if one only be absent though all the rest be present (if, for instance, the intellect is in an abnormal state), the perception, they say, will not be safely effected. Hence, too, some have said that the apprehensive presentation is not a criterion universally, but only when it has no obstacle present.<sup>b</sup> This, however, is a thing impossible; for 425 because of differences in the (sensory) passages and because of external circumstances and because of many other conditions things do not appear to us either the same or in the same way, as we argued above<sup>c</sup>; so that while we can say that a thing appears by this particular sense and in this particular

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 83.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 254 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 414.

δύνασθαι λέγειν, τὸ δ' εἰ ταῖς ἀληθείαις τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον καὶ φαίνεται, ἢ ἄλλοιον μὲν ἐστιν ἄλλοιον δὲ φαίνεται, μὴ ἔχειν ἡμᾶς διαυθεντεῖν, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο μηδεμίαν εἶναι φαντασίαν χωρὶς ἐνστήματος.

426 Πῶς δ' οὐχὶ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐπίπτουσι τρόπον; ζητούντων γὰρ ἡμῶν τίς ἐστιν ἡ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία, ὀριζόμενοι φασιν " ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος." εἶτα πάλιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν τὸ ὀρικῶς διδασκόμενον ἐκ γινωσκομένων διδάσκεται, προσανακρινόντων ἡμῶν τί ποτ' ἔστι καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἀναστρέψαντές φασιν ὅτι ὑπάρχον ἐστὶν ὃ κινεῖ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. ὥστε ἵνα μὲν μάθωμεν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, προεληφέναι ὀφείλομεν τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἵνα δὲ τοῦτο, ἐπὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν βαδίζειν φαντασίαν· καὶ οὕτω μηδέτερον γίνεσθαι σαφές, περιμένον τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου

427 πίστιν. ὥσπερ τε ἐπεὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν τὰ μὲν φαίνεται καὶ ὑπάρχει, τὰ δὲ φαίνεται μὲν οὐχὶ δέ γε καὶ ὑπάρχει, χρήζομέν τινος κριτηρίου τοῦ παραστήσοντος τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἅμα καὶ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ τίνα τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα,<sup>1</sup> οὕτως ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν φαντασιῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι καταληπτικαὶ αἱ δὲ οὐ, δεόμεθα κριτηρίου τοῦ διατάξοντος τίνες εἰσι τοιαῦται καὶ τίνες ἀκατά-

428 ληπτοὶ τε καὶ ψευδεῖς. τοῦτο οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἦτοι καταληπτικὴ γενήσεται φαντασία ἢ οὐ καταληπτικὴ. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ καταληπτικὴ, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ πάντων ἀπαξαιπῶς μὴ καταληπτικὴν φαν-

<sup>1</sup> καὶ τίνα . . . ὑπάρχοντα N: om. cet., Bekk.

circumstance, we cannot be quite sure whether it is in very truth such as it appears, or is of one sort and appears to be of another; and on this account no presentation exists without an obstacle.

And of course they fall into the fallacy of circular reasoning.<sup>a</sup> For when we inquire what the apprehensive presentation is, they define it as "That which is imprinted and impressed by a real object and according to that object itself, of such a kind as would not be produced by a non-real object." Then again, since everything that is definitely explained is explained by things known, when we inquire further what the "real object" is, they turn round and say that "A real object is that which excites an apprehensive presentation." So that, in order that we may understand the apprehensive presentation, we must first have grasped the real object, while in order to do this we must have recourse to the apprehensive presentation; and thus neither of them becomes clear as each awaits confirmation from the other.—And just as—since some objects of presentation both appear and are real, while others appear but are not also real—we need a criterion that will establish for us which are both apparent and real and which are apparent but unreal, so, since some presentations too are apprehensive and some not, we require a criterion which will discriminate which are of the former kind and which are non-apprehensive and false. This criterion, then, will be a presentation that is either apprehensive or not apprehensive. And if it is not apprehensive, it will follow that the not apprehensive presentation is the criterion once for

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 341.

τασίαν κριτήριον εἶναι, ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ καὶ τὴν  
 καταληπτικὴν ἐξετάζειν, ὅπερ οὐ θελήσουσιν· εἰ  
 δὲ καταληπτικὴ, πρῶτον μὲν εὐηθες (αὐτὴν γὰρ  
 ταύτην ἐζητοῦμεν κρίνειν πότε ἐστὶ καταληπτικὴ),  
 429 δευτέρον δέ, εἰ πρὸς τὸ διαγνῶναι τὰς καταληπτι-  
 κάς καὶ ἀκαταλήπτους φαντασίας κριτήριον παρα-  
 λαμβάνομεν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, δεήσει  
 καὶ τὸ ὅτι ἢ κρίνουσα αὐτὰς τῶ ὄντι καταληπτικὴ  
 ἐστὶ φαντασία δοκιμάζεσθαι διὰ καταληπτικῆς φαν-  
 τασίας, ἀκείνην πάλιν δι' ἄλλης, καὶ τοῦτο μέχρι  
 ἀπείρου.  
 430 Ἄλλ' ἴσως τις ἐρεῖ τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν  
 καὶ τοῦ φανταστοῦ, ὅτι κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται,  
 καὶ ἑαυτῆς, ὅτι καταληπτικὴ ἐστὶ, κριτήριον ὑπάρ-  
 χειν. ὅπερ οὐ διήνεγκε τοῦ φάναι κατὰ ἀναστροφὴν  
 καὶ τὸ φανταστόν ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῆς φαντασίας  
 εἶναι δοκίμιον. ὡς γὰρ τῶν φαινομένων ἐν δια-  
 φωνία καθεστώτων ζητεῖται τίνι κρινοῦμεν τὸ  
 ὑπάρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον, οὕτω τῶν φαντασιῶν  
 ἀσυμφώνων οὐσῶν σκεπτόμεθα τὸ τίνι κρινοῦμεν  
 431 τὴν τε καταληπτικὴν καὶ τὴν μὴ τοιαύτην. διόπερ  
 ὁμοίων ὄντων τῶν πραγμάτων, εἰ ἑαυτῆς κριτήριον  
 εἶναι δύναται ἢ φαντασία καίπερ ἀσύμφωνος οὐσα,  
 ἔσται καὶ τὸ φανταστόν ἐξ αὐτοῦ πιστόν, κἂν ὅτι  
 432 μάλιστα διαφωνήται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. ἢ εἴπερ τοῦτο  
 παρόσον ἐστὶ διάφωνον δεῖται τοῦ κρινοῦντος αὐτό,  
 δεήσει καὶ ἢ φαντασία τοῦ δοκιμάσοντος αὐτὴν  
 καὶ παραστήσοντος εἰ τῶ ὄντι καταληπτικὴ ἐστίν.  
 Ἄλλως τε, εἰ πάσα φαῦλου κατ' αὐτοὺς ὑπόληψις  
 ἄγνοιά ἐστὶ καὶ μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἀληθεύει καὶ ἐπι-  
 στήμην ἔχει ἀληθοῦς βεβαίαν, ἀκολουθεῖ μέχρι

all of everything, its function being to examine also  
 the apprehensive, a result they will not admit; and  
 if it is apprehensive, in the first place it is silly to say  
 so (for the object of our inquiry was to judge when  
 this particular presentation is apprehensive); and 429  
 secondly, if we adopt the apprehensive presentation  
 as the criterion for distinguishing the apprehensive  
 and non-apprehensive presentations, it will be neces-  
 sary also that the fact that the presentation which  
 judges them is really apprehensive should be tested  
 by means of an apprehensive presentation, and this  
 again by means of another, and so on *ad infinitum*.

But perhaps someone will say that the apprehensive 430  
 presentation is the criterion both of the presented  
 object, that it truly subsists, and of itself, that it is  
 apprehensive. But this is in nowise different from the  
 converse assertion that the presented object is the  
 test both of itself and of the presentation. For just  
 as, when apparent things are contradictory, the  
 question is by what shall we judge what is real and  
 what not real, so also, when presentations are not in  
 accord, we inquire by what we shall judge which of  
 them is apprehensive and which not so. Wherefore, 431  
 as the things are similar, if the presentation, although  
 not in accord, can be its own criterion, the presented  
 object also, be it ever so contradictory, will be of itself  
 trustworthy, which is absurd. Or if this latter, in so 432  
 far as it is contradictory, requires something to judge  
 it, the presentation also will require something to  
 test it, and to certify whether it is really apprehensive.

Again, if every conception of the fool is, according  
 to them, ignorance and only the Sage speaks the  
 truth and possesses firm knowledge of the true,<sup>a</sup> it

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 83.

δεῦρο ἀνευρέτου καθεστῶτος τοῦ σοφοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην καὶ τάληθές ἀνευρέτον εἶναι, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ πάντα ἀκατάληπτα τυγχάνειν, ἐπεὶ περ φαῦλοι πάντες ὄντες οὐκ ἔχουσι βεβαίαν τῶν ὄντων κατάληψιν. 433 τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀπολείπεται τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν στωικῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως λεγόμενα παρὰ μέρος καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σκεπτικῶν πρὸς ἐκείνους λέγεσθαι. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῖς φαύλοις κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐγκαταριθμοῦνται Ζήνων τε καὶ Κλεάνθης καὶ Χρυσίππος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς αἰρέσεως, πᾶς δὲ φαῦλος ἀγνοία κρατεῖται, πάντως ἡγνόει Ζήνων πότερον ἐν κόσμῳ περιέχεται ἢ αὐτὸς τὸν κόσμον περιέσχεκεν καὶ πότερον ἀνὴρ ἔστω ἢ γυνή, καὶ οὐκ ἡπίστατος Κλεάνθης εἴτε ἀνθρώπος ἔστω εἴτε τι θηρίον Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον. 434 καὶ μὴν ἢ ἐγίνωσκε τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο Χρυσίππος στωικὸν ὄν, φημί δὴ τὸ "πάντα ἀγνοεῖ ὁ φαῦλος," ἢ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἡπίστατο. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡπίστατο, ψεῦδος τὸ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο φαῦλος ὢν ἐγίνωσκεν ὁ Χρυσίππος, τὸ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν τὸν φαῦλον. εἰ δ' οὐδ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἦδει τὸ ὅτι πάντα ἀγνοεῖ, πῶς περὶ πολλῶν δογματίζει, τιθεὶς τὸ ἓνα εἶναι κόσμον καὶ προνοία τοῦτον διοικεῖσθαι καὶ διόλου τρεπτήν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἄλλα παμπληθῆ; 435 παρέστι δέ, εἴ τι φιλον ἐστί, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπορίας τὸν ἀντερωτῶντα, ὡς ἔθος ἔχουσιν αὐτοῖς τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς, προσάγειν· δεδηλωμένον μέντοι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν χαρακτηρισμοῦ οὐκ ἀνάγκη μακρηγορεῖν.

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοὶ Kayser: αὐτοῖς mss., Bekk. (ἀπορίας <κομίσει> . . . ἀσ ἔθος . . . οἱ σκεπτικὸι πρ. cj. Bekk.).

<sup>a</sup> Alluding to the saying of Socrates; cf. § 264.

follows that, since up till now the Sage has proved undiscoverable, the true also is necessarily undiscoverable; and because of this, all things are non-apprehensible, seeing that we all, being fools, do not possess a firm apprehension of existent things. And 433 this being so, it is open to the Sceptics to repeat in turn against the Stoics the objections made by the Stoics against the Sceptics. For since, according to themselves, Zeno and Cleanthes and Chrysippus and the rest of their School are numbered amongst the fools, and every fool is enslaved to ignorance, Zeno certainly was ignorant whether he was contained in the universe or himself contained the universe, and whether he was a man or a woman; and Cleanthes did not know whether he was a man or a beast more full of wiles than Typhon.<sup>a</sup> Moreover, Chrysippus either 434 knew this dogma, which is a Stoic one (I mean, that "The fool is ignorant of all things"), or he did not know even this. And if he knew it, it is false that the fool is ignorant of all things; for Chrysippus, who was a fool, perceived this very fact that the fool is ignorant of all things. But if he did not even know this very dogma that he is ignorant of all things, how does he dogmatize about many things, laying down that there is one universe, and that this is ordered by providence, and that its substance is to be wholly changed,<sup>b</sup> and a multitude of other things? And it is possible, should anyone so desire, for the 435 opponent to bring against them all the other difficulties which they themselves are accustomed to bring forward against the Sceptics; but now that the character of the argumentation has been made clear, there is no need for a lengthy exposition.

<sup>b</sup> i.e. resolved into Fire, the primal world-substance; see Vol. I. *Introductio*. p. xxiv.



Πρὸς δὲ τοὺς τὰς πιθανὰς ἀποδεχομένους φαν-  
 τασίας σύντομος ὁ λόγος. ταυτὶ γὰρ τὰ κριτήρια,  
 δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὴν  
 436 χρήσιμα αὐτοῖς ὑπέληπται ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὴν εὔρεσιν  
 τῆς ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀληθείας. καὶ εἰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτον  
 λέγοιεν, ἄτοποι γενήσονται· οὐδεμία γὰρ τούτων  
 τῶν φαντασιῶν δύναται κατ' ἰδίαν χρειοῦν πρὸς  
 τὰς τοῦ βίου διεξαγωγὰς, ἀλλὰ χρεία ἐστὶν ἐκάστη  
 καὶ τῆς τηρήσεως, καθ' ἣν ἦδε μὲν διὰ τὸδε ἐστὶ  
 πιθανή, ἦδε δὲ διὰ τὸδε διεξωδευμένη καὶ ἀπερί-  
 437 σπαστος. εἰ δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν τάληθοῦς εὔρεσιν,  
 διαπεσοῦνται. οὔτε γὰρ ἡ πιθανὴ μόνον κριτήριον  
 τάληθοῦς· δεῖ γάρ, ἵνα τοῦτο εὔρεθῆ, πολὺ πρότερον  
 αὐτὴν περιωδευμένην (εἶναι),<sup>1</sup> διὰ τὸ πάντως ἡμᾶς  
 ἐν τῷ διοδοεῦεν ἕκαστον τῶν κατὰ τὸν τόπον<sup>2</sup>  
 αὐτῆς θεωρουμένων [μὴ] εἰς ὑπόνοιαν ἀνάγεσθαι,  
 μήποτε (τι)<sup>3</sup> παραλείπεται τῶν ὀφειλόντων κατὰ  
 τὸν τόπον ἐξετάζεσθαι, εἶγε περισπασμοῦ περὶ  
 τὴν διάνοιαν συμβαίνοντος αἴρεται ἢ τῆς ἀληθείας  
 438 γινώσις. τὸ δὲ ὅλον μήποτε τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐλέγχους  
 κρατοῦνται. ὡς γὰρ διαβάλλοντες τὴν κατα-  
 ληπτικὴν φαντασίαν ἔφασκον μὴ εἶναι κριτήριον  
 ταύτην τῆς ἀληθείας τῷ καὶ ἄλλας ἀπαρράλλακτους  
 παρακείσθαι αὐτῇ ψευδεῖς, οὕτως οὐκ ἀπέοικε  
 καὶ τοῖς διεξωδευμένοις πράγμασιν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ  
 διαθεωρεῖν τὴν πιθανὴν φαντασίαν ἄλλα τινα  
 ψευδῆ παρακείσθαι, ὥστε λόγου ἕνεκεν δοκεῖν μὲν  
 ἡμᾶς ἔχειν ἀρτίαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα, μὴ  
 οὕτως δὲ ἔχειν, ἢ ὡς ἐκ συμμέτρον μὲν διαστή-

<sup>1</sup> <εἶναι> cj. Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> τὸν τόπον N: τρόπον cet., Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> <τι> Kayser (μὴ τι cj. Bekk.).

<sup>o</sup> Especially the Academics, cf. §§ 174 ff., 371, 401.

Against those who accept the "probable" presenta-  
 tions<sup>a</sup> the argument is brief. For of these criteria  
 one or other of two things must be true: they are  
 adopted by them as useful either for the conduct  
 of life or for the discovery of the truth of existing  
 things. And if the first is what they say, they will  
 436 be absurd; for none of these presentations is able of  
 itself to suffice for the conduct of life, but each of  
 them requires also that observation which certifies  
 that this one is for this reason "probable," and that  
 one for that reason "scrutinized and irreversible."<sup>b</sup>  
 But if they should pronounce them useful for the dis-  
 437 covery of truth, they will come to grief. For the  
 probable presentation alone is not the criterion of  
 truth; for it is necessary, for the discovery of truth,  
 that it should be scrutinized long before, owing to  
 the fact that in our scrutiny of each of the things ob-  
 served in connexion with it we are certainly brought to  
 suspect that possibly some one of the things that ought  
 to be tested in that connexion has been overlooked,  
 because, if a reversal occurs in the intellect, know-  
 ledge of the truth is done away. And in general, it  
 438 seems that they are defeated by their own criticisms.  
 For just as, in their disparagement of the appre-  
 hensive presentation, they kept saying that this is  
 not the criterion of truth since other indistinguishable  
 presentations lie beside it which are false, so it is not  
 unlikely that, during our examination of the probable  
 presentation, certain false things lie beside those  
 which have been scrutinized, so that it appears (let  
 us say) that we are in a fit condition of soul but we  
 are not really so, or it appears that the presented

<sup>b</sup> For these technical terms and the distinction between them cf. §§ 184 ff., P.H. i. 227 ff., Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxxvi.

ματος δοκεῖν βλέπεσθαι τὸ φανταστόν, ἄλλως δὲ  
 439 ἔχειν. πλὴν τό γε κεφάλαιον, εἰ μήτε πᾶσαι αἱ  
 φαντασίαι εἰσὶ πισταὶ μήτε πᾶσαι ἄπιστοι, μήτε  
 τινὲς μὲν πισταὶ τινὲς δὲ ἄπιστοι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη  
 κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας ἢ φαντασία. ᾧ ἀκόλουθον  
 τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον διὰ τὸ μήτε τὸ ὑφ' οὗ  
 μήτε τὸ δι' οὗ μήτε τὸ καθ' ὃ βεβαίαν ἔχειν τὴν  
 γνώσιν.

440 Ἄλλ' εἰώθασιν ἀνθυποφέροντες οἱ δογματικοὶ  
 ζητεῖν πῶς ποτὲ καὶ ὁ σκεπτικὸς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι  
 κριτήριον ἀποφαίνεται. ἦτοι γὰρ ἀκρίτως τοῦτο  
 λέγει ἢ μετὰ κριτηρίου· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκρίτως,  
 ἄπιστος γενήσεται, εἰ δὲ μετὰ κριτηρίου, περι-  
 τραπήσεται καὶ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ὁμο-  
 λογήσει εἰς τὴν τούτου παράστασιν κριτήριον

441 παραλαμβάνειν. πάλιν τε ἡμῶν συνερωτώντων  
 “ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον, ἦτοι κέκριται ἢ ἀκριτόν ἐστι,”  
 καὶ δυοῖν θάτερον συναγόντων, ἦτοι τὴν εἰς ἄπειρον  
 ἔκπτωσιν ἢ τὸ ἀτόπως ἑαυτοῦ τι κριτήριον εἶναι  
 λέγεσθαι, ἀντιπαρεξάγοντές φασι μὴ ἄτοπον ὑπ-

442 ἀρχειν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ τι κριτήριον ἀπολείπειν· καὶ γὰρ  
 ἑαυτοῦ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ ἄλλων ἐστὶ δοκιμαστικόν, καὶ  
 ὁ ζυγὸς τῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων ἰσότητος καὶ τῆς ἰδίας  
 σταθμητικὸς ὑπῆρχεν, καὶ τὸ φῶς οὐ μόνον τῶν  
 ἄλλων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκκαλυπτικὸν φαίνεται,  
 διόπερ καὶ τὸ κριτήριον δύναται καὶ ἄλλων καὶ

443 ἑαυτοῦ κριτήριον καθεστάναι. ῥητέον δὲ πρὸς μὲν  
 τὸ πρῶτον ὅτι σκεπτικόν ἐστὶν ἔθος τὸ τοῖς πε-  
 πιστευμένοις μὴ συνηγορεῖν, ἀρκεῖσθαι δ' ἐπ'  
 αὐτῶν ὡς αὐτάρκει κατασκευῇ τῇ κοινῇ προλήψει,

object is seen from a measurable distance, whereas  
 the fact is otherwise. However, to sum up, if 439  
 neither all presentations are trustworthy, nor all  
 untrustworthy, nor some trustworthy, others untrust-  
 worthy, the presentation will not be the criterion of  
 truth. Whereupon it follows that no criterion exists  
 because neither that of the agent, nor that of the  
 means, nor that “according to which,” provides  
 knowledge that is secure.

But the Dogmatists are accustomed to retort by 440  
 inquiring “How ever does the Sceptic show that  
 there is no criterion? For he asserts this either with-  
 out judging or with the help of a criterion; but if it is  
 without judging, he will not be trusted, while if it is  
 with a criterion, he will be self-refuted, and while  
 asserting that there is no criterion he will agree to  
 adopt a criterion in order to confirm that assertion.”  
 Again, when we pose the argument “If a criterion 441  
 exists it is either judged or unjudged,” and draw  
 one or other of two conclusions—either the regress  
*ad infinitum* or the absurdity of the statement that a  
 thing is its own criterion,—they, in hostile array,  
 declare that it is not absurd to admit that a thing is  
 its own criterion; for that which is straight is capable 442  
 of testing both itself and other things, and the balance  
 is capable of weighing both its own equality and that  
 of other things, and light appears capable of revealing  
 not only other things but itself as well, and conse-  
 quently the criterion can stand as a criterion both  
 of other things and of itself. But in reply to the 443  
 first point it should be stated that it is the Sceptic  
 practice not to advocate things that are believed, but  
 in their case to be satisfied with the general pre-  
 sumption as a sufficient ground in itself, but, on the

τοῖς δὲ ἀπίστοις εἶναι δοκοῦσι συναγορεύειν καὶ εἰς ἰσοσθένειαν αὐτῶν ἕκαστον ἀνάγειν τῇ περὶ τὰ παραδοχῆς ἡξιωμένα πίστει. τοῖνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος οὐκ ἀναιροῦντες τὸ κριτήριον τοὺς κατὰ τοῦτου χειρίζομεν λόγους, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενοι δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ πάντως πιστόν ἐστι τὸ εἶναι κριτήριον, διδομένων εἰς τοῦναντίον καὶ τῶν ἴσων ἀφορμῶν.

444 εἶτα κἂν τῷ ὄντι συναναιρεῖν δοκῶμεν τὸ κριτήριον, δυνάμεθα εἰς τοῦτο οὐχ ὡς κριτηρίῳ χρῆσθαι τῇ προχειρῷ φαντασίᾳ, καθ' ἣν τοὺς προσπίπτοντας ἡμῖν πιθανοὺς λόγους τιθέντες εἰς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι κριτήριον ἐκτιθέμεθα μὲν, οὐ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως δὲ τοῦτο ποιούμεν διὰ τὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀντικειμένους

445 λόγους ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι πιθανοὺς. νῆ Δία, ἀλλὰ δύναται τι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι κριτήριον, ὡς ἐπὶ τε κανόνος καὶ ζυγοῦ ἐγίνετο. ὅπερ ἐστὶ μειρακιῶδες. τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστου ἔστι τι ὑπεραναβεβηκὸς κριτήριον, ὡς αἰσθησις καὶ νοῦς, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν κατασκευὴν αὐτῶν ἐρχόμεθα· τοῦ δὲ νῦν ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν πεπτωκότος κριτήριον οὐδὲν θέλουσιν ὑπεράνω τυγχάνειν. τοῖνυν ἀπιστόν ἐστι περὶ αὐτοῦ τι λέγον καὶ μὴ ἔχον τὸ προσμαρτυροῦν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

446 Τοσαῦτα μὲν περὶ κριτηρίου· μέτρον δὲ ἔχοντος αὐταρκές τοῦ ὑπομνήματος, ἀπὸ ἄλλης ἀρχῆς πειρασόμεθα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ κατὰ ἀποτομὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διαπορεῖν.

other hand, to advocate the things which seem to be unworthy of belief and to bring each of these into a position of equipollence with the trust accorded to those which are deemed worthy of acceptance. So then, in the present case also, we do not employ the arguments against the criterion by way of abolishing it but with the object of showing that the existence of a criterion is not altogether to be trusted, equal grounds being presented for the opposite view. In 444 the next place, even if we seem to be really helping to abolish the criterion, we are able to use the presentation ready to hand, though not as a criterion; for when we state, in accordance with it, the probable arguments for the non-existence of the criterion that occur to us, we do indeed state them, but when we do this we do not add our assent, owing to the fact that the contrary arguments are equally probable. "But in sooth," say they, "a thing can also be its 445 own criterion, as was found in the case of the rule and the balance." But this is childish. For above each of these there stands a superior criterion, such as sense and mind, because of which we proceed to the task of constructing them; but the Stoics do not allow that anything stands above the criterion which is now under discussion. So then, when it makes any statement about itself and has no evidence for its truthfulness, it is untrustworthy.

Thus much, then, concerning the criterion; and 446 as this treatise is now sufficiently long, we shall make a fresh start and endeavour to discuss separately the subject of Truth itself.

## B

1 Ὅσα μὲν ἀπορητικῶς εἴωθε λέγεσθαι παρὰ τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς εἰς ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ κριτηρίου τῆς ἀληθείας, διὰ τοῦ προανυσθέντος ἡμῖν ὑπομνήματος ἐπεληλύθαμεν· συναποδόντες δὲ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῶν φυσικῶν μέχρι τῶν νεωτέρων καταγομένην ἱστορίαν, τούτι πάσιν ὑπεσχόμεθα καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ κατ' ἰδίαν ἐρεῖν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. ὅθεν νῦν τὴν ὑπόσχεσιν πληροῦντες ἐν πρώτοις σκεπτώμεθα εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

## A.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙ ΤΙ ΑΛΗΘΕΣ

2 Ὅτι μὲν μηδενὸς ὄντος σαφοῦς κριτηρίου κατ' ἀνάγκην συναδηλεῖται καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, πάσιν ἤδη φανερόν ἐστιν· ὅμως δὲ καὶ ἐξ ἐπιμέτρου παρέσται διδάσκειν ὅτι κἂν μηδὲν ἀντικρυς πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον λέγωμεν, ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ τᾶληθοῦς διάστασις ἰκανή  
3 ἐστὶν εἰς ἐποχὴν ἡμᾶς καταστήσασθαι, καὶ ὄν τρόπον μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων εὐθέως καὶ στρεβλοῦ οὐδὲ κανῶν ἔστι δοκιμαστικὸς τούτων, καὶ μηδενὸς ὄντος βαρέως καὶ κούφου σώματος συναναιρεῖται ἢ τοῦ ζυγοῦ κατασκευή, οὕτω μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀληθοῦς οἴχεται καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας κριτήριον. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος

## BOOK II

THE difficulties that are usually stated by the Sceptics 1 in order to abolish the criterion of truth have now been reviewed by us in the treatise already completed ; and after giving their account of the investigation from the time of the early physicists down to the later philosophers, we promised, in addition to all this, to discuss separately the subject of Truth itself. So now in fulfilling our promise let us consider first of all whether anything true exists.

## I.—DOES ANYTHING TRUE EXIST ?

That, if no clear criterion exists, Truth likewise is 2 rendered non-evident is at once apparent to everyone ; none the less it will be possible for us to show also—by way of further confirmation—that, even if we assert nothing directly against the criterion, the dissension which exists about Truth itself is enough to drive us to a position of suspended judgement ; and just as, if nothing straight nor crooked exists in 3 the nature of things, neither does there exist a rule capable of testing them ; and if no heavy or light body exists, the construction of the balance likewise is abolished ; so too, if nothing true exists, the criterion of truth also disappears. And the fact that there is nothing true or false—if we are to judge by

ὅσοι ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν δογματικῶν λόγοις, μάθοιμεν ἂν  
 τὴν γεγυῖαν αὐτοῖς περὶ τούτου διάστασιν προ-  
 4 τάξαντες. τῶν γὰρ σκεψαμένων περὶ ἀληθοῦς  
 οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν εἶναι φασιν ἀληθές οἱ δὲ εἶναι, καὶ τῶν  
 εἶναι φαιμένων οἱ μὲν μόνον ἔλεξαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ  
 νοητά, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰ αἰσθητά, οἱ δὲ κοινῶς τὰ  
 5 αἰσθητά τε καὶ νοητά. Ξενιάδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίν-  
 θιος, ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείκνυμεν, μηθὲν εἶναι φησὶν  
 ἀληθές· τάχα δὲ καὶ Μόνιμος ὁ κύων, τυφὸν εἰπὼν  
 τὰ πάντα, ὅπερ οἴησιν ἐστὶ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων ὡς  
 6 ὄντων. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ Δημόκριτον  
 μόνον τὰ νοητά ὑπενόησαν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν  
 Δημόκριτος διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσει αἰσθη-  
 τόν, τῶν τὰ πάντα συγκρινουσῶν ἀτόμων πάσης  
 7 αἰσθητῆς ποιότητος ἔρημον ἔχουσῶν φύσιν, ὁ δὲ  
 Πλάτων διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι μὲν αἰεὶ τὰ αἰσθητά  
 μηδέποτε δὲ εἶναι, ποταμοῦ δίκην ῥεούσης τῆς  
 οὐσίας, ὥστε ταῦτ' οὐ μὴ δύο τοὺς ἐλαχίστους χρό-  
 νους ὑπομένειν, μηδὲ ἐπιδέχεσθαι, καθάπερ ἔλεγε  
 καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης, δύο ἐπιδείξει διατὴν ὀξύτητα  
 8 τῆς ῥοῆς. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἰνησίδημον καθ' Ἡρά-  
 κλειτον καὶ τὸν Ἐπικουρον ἐπὶ τὰ αἰσθητά κοινῶς  
 κατενεχθέντες ἐν εἶδει διέστησαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ περὶ  
 τὸν Αἰνησίδημον λέγουσιν τινα τῶν φαινομένων  
 διαφορὰν, καὶ φασὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν κοινῶς πᾶσι  
 φαίνεσθαι τὰ δὲ ἰδίως τινί, ὧν ἀληθῆ μὲν εἶναι τὰ  
 κοινῶς πᾶσι φαινόμενα ψευδῆ δὲ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα·  
 ὅθεν καὶ ἀληθές φερωνύμως εἰρησθαι τὸ μὴ λήθον

<sup>1</sup> περὶ N, cj. Bekk.: om. cet., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 53, 388.

the statements of the Dogmatists—we shall learn  
 when we have first set out the controversy which  
 has arisen amongst them on this subject.—Of those 4  
 who have inquired concerning Truth, some say that  
 there is not, others that there is, something true ;  
 and of the latter, some have said that only intelligibles  
 are true, others that only sensibles, and others that  
 both sensibles and intelligibles alike are true. Thus 5  
 Xenocrates the Corinthian,<sup>a</sup> as we indicated above,  
 declares that nothing is true ; and so also, perhaps,  
 Monimus the Cynic when he said that “ All things  
 are vanity ”<sup>b</sup> (that is to say, a vain fancy that non-  
 existents are existent). Plato and Democritus sup- 6  
 posed that only intelligibles are true ; but whereas  
 Democritus did so because nothing sensible exists  
 by nature,—since the atoms which compose all things  
 possess a nature which is void of every sensible  
 quality,—Plato did so because sensibles are always 7  
 becoming and never being, as their substance keeps  
 flowing like a river, so that it does not remain the  
 same for two moments together, and (as Asclepiades  
 said) does not admit of being pointed out twice owing  
 to the speed with which it flows. Aenesidemus 8  
 “ according to Heraclitus ”<sup>c</sup> and Epicurus both alike  
 fell back on sensibles but differed as to details. For  
 Aenesidemus says that there is a difference in things  
 apparent, and asserts that some of them appear to all  
 men in common, others to one person separately, and  
 of these such as appear to all in common are true,  
 and the other sort false ; whence also that which does  
 not escape the common knowledge is by derivation

<sup>b</sup> “ Vanity ” (τῦφος), or “ folly ” (empty surmise) ; liter-  
 ally “ smoke.”

<sup>c</sup> Cf. i. 349, P.H. i. 210 ff.

- 9 τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔλεγεν ἀληθῆ καὶ ὄντα. οὐ διήνεγκε γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τι λέγειν ἢ ὑπάρχον· ἔνθεν καὶ ὑπογράφων τὰληθῆ καὶ ψεῦδος “ἔστι” φησὶν “ἀληθὲς τὸ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν,” καὶ “ψεῦδος ἔστι” φησὶ “τὸ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχον ὡς λέγεται ἔχειν.” τὴν τε αἰσθησὶν ἀντιληπτικὴν οὖσαν τῶν ὑποπιπτόντων αὐτῇ, καὶ μήτε ἀφαιροῦσάν τι μήτε προστιθεῖσάν μήτε μετατιθεῖσάν τῷ ἄλογον εἶναι, διὰ παντός τε ἀληθεύειν καὶ οὕτω τὸ ὄν λαμβάνειν ὡς εἶχε φύσεως αὐτὸ ἐκείνο. πάντων δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀληθῶν ὄντων, τὰ δοξαστὰ διαφέρειν καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, καθὼς
- 10 πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς λέγουσι μὲν τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν τινὰ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν ἀληθῆ, οὐκ ἐξ εὐθείας δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ, ἀλλὰ κατ’ ἀναφορὰν τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ παρακείμενα τούτοις νοητὰ. ἀληθὲς γὰρ ἔστι κατ’ αὐτοὺς τὸ ὑπάρχον καὶ ἀντικείμενόν τι, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχον καὶ [μὴ] ἀντικείμενόν τι· ὅπερ ἀσώματον ἀξίωμα καθεστῶς νοητὸν εἶναι.
- 11 Ἄλλ’ ἢ μὲν πρώτη περὶ τὰληθοῦς διαφωνία τοιαύτη τις ὑπῆρχεν· ἦν δὲ καὶ ἄλλη τις παρὰ τούτοις διάστασις, καθ’ ἣν οἱ μὲν περὶ τῷ σημαίνοντι τὸ ἀληθὲς τε καὶ ψεῦδος ὑπεστήσαντο, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῇ κινήσει τῆς διανοίας. καὶ δὴ τῆς μὲν πρώτης δόξης προεστήκασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τρία φάμενοι συζυγεῖν ἀλλήλοις, τό τε σημαίνονμενον καὶ τὸ σημαῖνον καὶ τὸ τυγχάνον,
- 12 ὧν σημαῖνον μὲν εἶναι τὴν φωνήν, οἷον τὴν Δίω, σημαίνονμενον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς

<sup>a</sup> i.e. ἀ-ληθές = μὴ λήθον (“not escaping notice”).

termed “true.”<sup>a</sup> But Epicurus asserts that all 9 sensibles are true and existent.<sup>b</sup> For there is no difference between saying that a thing is “true” and saying that it is “subsisting.” Hence too, in describing truth and falsity, he says “That is true which is in the state in which it is said to be,” and “False is that which is not in the state in which it is said to be.” And he says that sense, being perceptive of the objects presented to it and neither subtracting nor adding nor transposing ought through being irrational, constantly reports truly and grasps the existent object as it really is by nature. And whereas all the sensibles are true, the opinables differ, and some of them are true, others false, as we showed before.<sup>c</sup> But the 10 Stoics assert that some sensibles and some intelligibles are true, the sensibles, however, not directly so but by reference to the intelligibles associated with them. For according to them the True is “that which subsists and is opposed to something,” and the False “that which is not subsistent and is opposed to something”<sup>d</sup>; and this being an incorporeal judgement is an intelligible.

Such, then, was the first disagreement about Truth; 11 but there was also another controversy, and in this some placed truth and falsity in the thing signified, others in the sound, others in the motion of the intellect. The champions of the first opinion were the Stoics who said that “Three things are linked together, the thing signified and the thing signifying and the thing existing”; and of these the thing signifying is the sound (“Dion,” for instance); and the thing signified is the actual thing indicated thereby,

<sup>b</sup> Cf. i. 203 ff., 368; *infra*, 363 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. i. 210.

<sup>d</sup> For a discussion of these definitions see §§ 85, 88 ff.

οὐκ ἀληθεῖ μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἶπειν· ἄπιστον γάρ ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον. εἰ δὲ ἀληθεῖ, πόθεν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἀποδεικνύον τὸ εἶναι τι ἀληθές; εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν, 16 ἔσται καὶ αὐτόθεν αὐτὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται πάλιν πῶς ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἵνα μάθωμεν ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές, δεῖ ἄπειρα προληφθῆναι, ἀδύνατον δ' ἔστιν ἄπειρα ληφθῆναι, ἀδύνατον γίνεσθαι τὸ βεβαίως γνῶναι ὅτι ἔστι τι ἀληθές.

17 Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι ἀληθές, ἤτοι φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄδηλον ἢ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον κατὰ δὲ τι ἄδηλον. οὔτε δὲ φαινόμενον ἐστὶν, ὡς παραστήσομεν, οὔτε ἄδηλον, ὡς δείξομεν, οὔτε κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον κατὰ δὲ τι ἄδηλον, ὡς παραμυθησόμεθα.

18 οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. εἰ γὰρ φαινόμενον ἐστὶν, ἤτοι πᾶν φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ τι φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶν. ἀλλὰ πᾶν μὲν φαινόμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ὑπνοῦς ἢ τὸ κατὰ μανίαν προσπίπτόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές· ἐπεὶ δεήσει τῶν φαινομένων πολλὴν ἐχόντων μάχην ὁμολογεῖν τὰ μαχόμενα συνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. τοῖνυν οὐ πᾶν φαινόμενον 19 ἐστὶν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ τί μὲν ἀληθές φαινόμενον ἐστὶν τὸ ψεῦδος, ὀφείλομεν ἔχειν κριτήριον εἰς διάγνωσιν τοῦ τί ἐστὶν ἀληθές φαινόμενον καὶ τί ψεῦδος. τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ κριτήριον ἤτοι πᾶσι φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενον ἐστὶν, ἐπεὶ οὐ πᾶν φαινόμενον ἀληθές ἐστὶ, δεήσει καὶ τοῦτο φαινόμενον καθεστῶς ἐξ ἄλλου φαινομένου δοκιμάζεσθαι, κακείνῳ ἐκ διαφέροντος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον

true, for such a proof is not to be trusted. And if it is by a true proof, whence comes it that the proof which proves that something is true is itself true? If it is true of itself, it will be possible also to state as true of itself that truth does not exist; while if it is derived from 16 proof, the question will again be asked "How is it that this proof is true?" and so on *ad infinitum*. Since, then, in order to learn that there is something true, an infinite series must first be grasped, and it is not possible for an infinite series to be grasped, it is not possible to know for a surety that something true exists.

Moreover, if anything true exists it is either 17 apparent or non-evident or partly apparent and partly non-evident.<sup>a</sup> But it is neither apparent, as we shall establish, nor non-evident, as we shall prove, nor partly apparent and partly non-evident, as we shall demonstrate; therefore, there does not exist anything true. For if it is apparent, either every- 18 thing apparent is true or something apparent is true. But everything apparent is not true (for what is experienced in sleep or in madness is not true); since otherwise, as things apparent are frequently conflicting, we should have to allow that conflicting things are alike real and are equally true, which is absurd. So, then, not every apparent thing is true. And if something apparent is true and something 19 false, we ought to have a criterion for discerning which apparent thing is true and which false. This criterion, then, is either apparent to all or non-evident. But if it is apparent, since not every apparent thing is true, this too, being an apparent thing, will need to be tested by another apparent thing, and that again by a different one, and so we go on *ad infinitum*. And if 20

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 17-31 cf. *P.H.* ii. 88-93.

20 ἐκπίπτομεν. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, οὐκ ἔσται μόνα τὰ φαινόμενα ἀληθῆ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἄδηλα. εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἰς τὴν τοῦ φαινομένου πίστιν παραλαμβανόμενον ἄδηλον λαμβάνομεν, τί ἄδηλον ὀφείλει ἀληθές εἶναι·  
 21 οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε ψεύδει κρίνεται τὰληθές. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ τι ἄδηλον ἀληθές, οὐ μόνον τὸ φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ὡς ἀρχῆθεν ὑπέκειτο. εἶτα πόθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἄδηλον τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστὶν; εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτόθεν, ἔσται καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄδηλα τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτόθεν ἀληθῆ. εἰ δ' ὡς ἀποδειχθέν, πάντως ἢ ἐξ ἀδήλου ἢ ἐκ φαινομένου ἀποδειχθέν ἔσται ἀληθές. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἀδήλου, ἐκείνο πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς δεῖσει κекρίσθαι, καὶ τὸ τρίτον ἐκ τετάρτου, καὶ οὕτως εἰς  
 22 ἄπειρον· εἰ δὲ ἐκ φαινομένου, εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐκπεσούμεθα τρόπον, τὸ μὲν φαινόμενον ἐξ ἀδήλου πιστούμενοι, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἀναστρόφως πάλιν ἐκ  
 23 τοῦ φαινομένου βεβαιούμεντες. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε πᾶν φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἀληθές μήτε τι φαινόμενον, οὐδὲν φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ [τὸ]<sup>1</sup>  
 24 ἄδηλον. πάλιν γὰρ εἰ ἄδηλόν ἐστι τὰληθές, ἦτοι πᾶν ἄδηλόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές ἢ οὐ πᾶν· οὔτε δὲ πᾶν ἄδηλόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές οὔτε τι ἄδηλον, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδὲ ἄδηλόν ἐστὶ τὰληθές.<sup>2</sup> εἰ γὰρ πᾶν ἄδηλον ἐστὶν ἀληθές, πρῶτον μὲν ἐχρήν μὴ στασιάζειν τοὺς δογματικούς, οἷον τοὺς μὲν ἐν εἶναι λέγοντας στοιχείων τοὺς δὲ δύο καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἀριθμητὰ τοὺς δὲ ἄπειρα, οὐδὲ τὰς ἀλλήλων ψευδο-

<sup>1</sup> [τὸ] om. MSS.<sup>2</sup> τὰληθές Kochalsky: τι ἀληθές MSS., Bekk.

it be non-evident, it is not the apparent things alone that will be true but the non-evident things as well. For if we accept the non-evident thing which is adopted for confirming the apparent thing, something non-evident must be true; for assuredly the true is not judged by the false. But if something non-  
 21 evident is true, not the apparent only is true, as was originally assumed. Further, how comes it that this non-evident thing is true? For if it is so of itself, then all things which are non-evident will be true of themselves. But if it is so because of proof, it will certainly be either by means of a non-evident or by means of an apparent proof that it is proved to be true. And if it is by means of a non-evident proof, that in turn will need to be judged by means of some other proof, and the third by a fourth, and so on  
*ad infinitum*. But if it is by means of an apparent  
 22 proof, we shall be wrecked on the fallacy of circular reasoning, when we confirm the apparent by the non-evident, and again conversely establish the non-evident by means of the apparent. But if  
 23 neither every apparent thing is true nor something apparent, then nothing apparent is true.—Nor, indeed, is (the true) non-evident. For, again, if  
 24 the true is non-evident, either everything non-evident is true, or not everything; but neither is everything non-evident true nor something non-evident, as we shall establish; therefore the true is not non-evident. For if everything non-evident is true, then, in the first place, the Dogmatists ought not to have quarrelled—some of them, for example, saying that there is one element, others two, some a definite number, others an infinite number,—nor ought they to have given the lie to one another's



25 ποιεῖν δόξας. παντός τε ἀδήλου ἀληθοῦς ὄντος  
 ἔσται τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθῆ, καθάπερ τὸ ἀρτίους  
 εἶναι τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸ περισσοῦς· ἐπ' ἴσης γάρ  
 ἔστιν ἄδηλα, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἀδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ.  
 οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ μαχόμενα δύναται εἶναι ἀληθῆ· οὐκ  
 26 ἄρα πάντα τὰ ἀδηλά ἐστιν ἀληθῆ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ  
 τινὰ τῶν ἀδηλῶν ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ. τὸ γὰρ τουτί μὲν  
 τὸ ἀδηλον ἀληθές εἶναι τουτί δὲ ψεῦδος ἦτοι αὐτό-  
 θεν λέγεται καὶ χωρὶς κριτηρίου ἢ σὺν κριτηρίῳ.  
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἑτοίμου λέγεται, οὐδὲν ἔξομεν λέγειν  
 27 πρὸς τὸν τοῦναντίον ἀληθές ἀποφαινόμενον. εἰ δὲ  
 σὺν κριτηρίῳ, πάντως τοῦτο τὸ κριτήριον ἢ φαινό-  
 μενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν φαινόμενόν ἐστι,  
 ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ ἀρχῆθεν ὑποκείμενον, τὸ μόνον  
 28 ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ ἀδηλον. εἶτα καὶ τὸ ὧ κρίνομεν τὸ  
 φαινόμενον, πόθεν ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν; εἰ μὲν αὐτό-  
 θεν, καὶ τὸ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές αὐτόθεν λεγόμενον  
 ἔσται πιστόν· εἰ δὲ ἐκ φαινομένου, κάκεινο τὸ  
 φαινόμενον ἐξ ἄλλου ληφθήσεται φαινομένου, καὶ  
 29 μέχρῃς ἀπείρου· εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀδήλου, ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων  
 συστήσεται τρόπος, μήτε τὸ φαινόμενον δυναμένων  
 ἡμῶν ἔχειν πιστὸν δίχα τοῦ ἀδήλου μήτε τὸ ἀδηλον  
 βέβαιον χωρὶς τοῦ φαινομένου. τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ  
 ἀδηλον δύναται εἶναι ἀληθές.  
 30 Λέπεται ἄρα λέγειν τὸ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινόμενον  
 κατὰ δέ τι ἀδηλον ἀληθές (< ὅπερ εὐθηές >).<sup>1</sup> εἰ γὰρ τὸ  
 φαινόμενον, καθὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστι, τοῦτο ὑποτιθέ-  
 μεθα ἀληθές, ἦτοι καθὸ πᾶν φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἀληθές

<sup>1</sup> < ὅπερ εὐθηές > Kochalsky: < ὅπερ ἀδύνατον > cj. Bekk.

opinions. And if everything non-evident is true, 25  
 things which conflict will be true—for instance the  
 statement that the stars are even in number and  
 that they are odd; for they are equally non-evident,  
 and all non-evident things are true. But of course  
 conflicting things cannot be true; therefore not all  
 non-evident things are true.—Nor, again, are some 26  
 non-evident things true. For the statement that  
 this non-evident thing is true and that false is made  
 either of itself and without a criterion or with a  
 criterion. And if it is so stated off-hand, we shall  
 have no answer to make to him who declares that  
 the opposite is true. But if it is stated with a 27  
 criterion, certainly this criterion is either apparent or  
 non-evident. And if it is apparent the original  
 assumption that only the non-evident is true will be  
 false. Furthermore, whence comes it that the cri- 28  
 terion itself whereby we judge the apparent thing is  
 true? If it is so of itself, then the (opponent's) state-  
 ment that it is not true will also of itself be trust-  
 worthy; and if it is so because of an apparent thing,  
 then that apparent thing too will be derived from  
 another apparent thing, and so on *ad infinitum*; and if 29  
 it is so because of a non-evident thing, the argument  
 will take the form of circular reasoning, as we are  
 neither able to count the apparent thing trustworthy  
 apart from the non-evident nor the non-evident  
 well-founded without the apparent. So, then, the  
 non-evident cannot be true either.

It remains, therefore, to say that what is partly 30  
 apparent and partly non-evident is true (< but this  
 is silly >). For if we assume that this apparent thing,  
 in so far as it is apparent, is true, we assume it to be  
 true either in so far as every apparent thing, or in so

ὑποτιθέμεθα αὐτὸ ἀληθές, ἢ καθὸ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ εἰ τὸ  
 ἄδηλον, καθὸ ἄδηλόν ἐστιν, ὑπόκειται ἀληθές, ἥτοι  
 καθὸ πᾶν ἄδηλον ἀληθές ἐστὶν ὑπόκειται ἀληθές,  
 ἢ καθὸ οὐ πᾶν. καὶ λοιπὸν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀπορίας  
 31 ἐπισυνθήσομεν. ὅθεν εἰ μήτε τὸ φαινόμενόν ἐστιν  
 ἀληθές μήτε τὸ ἄδηλον μήτε τὸ κατὰ μὲν τι φαινό-  
 μενον κατὰ δέ τι ἄδηλον, ἄλλο δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν  
 ἐστὶν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθές.  
 32 Τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ γενικωτάτου[ τοῦ ὄντος,]<sup>1</sup>  
 ἐπάγουσιν ἀπορίαν. τουτὶ γὰρ πάντων μὲν ἐστὶν  
 ἐπαναβεβηκὸς γένος, αὐτὸ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἐτέρῳ ὑπέσταλ-  
 κεν. ἥτοι οὖν ἀληθές ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ ψεῦδος ἢ ἀληθές  
 33 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε ψεῦδος. καὶ εἰ  
 μὲν ἀληθές ἐστὶ, πάντα γενήσεται ἀληθῆ, παρόσον  
 ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ εἶδη· καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἐπεὶ τὸ γένος τῶν  
 ἀνθρώπων ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ οἱ ἐπ' εἶδους εἰσὶν  
 ἀνθρωποι, καὶ ἐπεὶ λογικός, πάντες οἱ ἐπὶ μέρους  
 εἰσὶ λογικοί, καὶ ἐπεὶ θνητός, ὡσαύτως θνητοί,  
 οὕτως εἰ τὸ τῶν πάντων γένος ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ἀνάγκη  
 34 καὶ πάντα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ. πάντων δὲ ὄντων  
 ἀληθῶν οὐδὲν ἔσται ψεῦδος, ψεύδους δὲ μὴ ὄντος  
 οὐδὲ ἀληθές τι γενήσεται, ὡς πρότερον ὑπεμνήσα-  
 μεν, δεικνύντες ἑκάτερον τούτων κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς  
 θάτερον σύμβλησιν νοούμενον. καὶ ἄλλως, πάντων  
 ὄντων ἀληθῶν θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα ἀληθῆ, τοῦτο  
 δὲ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. οὐ τοίουν ἀληθές ἐστὶ τὸ γενικώ-  
 35 τατον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ψεῦδος διὰ τὰς ὁμοίας  
 ἀπορίας. εἰ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐστὶ, πάντα ἔσται τὰ μετ-  
 ἔχοντα αὐτοῦ ψευδῆ· πάντα δὲ αὐτοῦ μετέχει τὰ

<sup>1</sup> [ τοῦ ὄντος, ] secl. Heintz.

<sup>a</sup> For this all-inclusive class, or highest category, of the Stoic logic (τὸ τι, "Something") see Vol. I. Introd. p. xxvi. With §§ 32-36 cf. *P.H.* ii. 86-87.

far as not every such thing, is true; and if the non-evident thing, in so far as it is non-evident, is assumed to be true, it is assumed to be true either in so far as every non-evident thing, or in so far as not every such thing, is true. And, for the rest, we shall continue to raise the same difficulties. Hence 31 if neither the apparent thing is true nor the non-evident, nor that which is partly apparent and partly non-evident, and besides these no other alternative exists, then of necessity nothing is true.

Some people also bring up the difficulty about the 32 *summum genus*.<sup>a</sup> For this is a genus which stands above all others and is itself subordinate to no other. This, then, is either true or false or at once both true and false or neither true nor false. And if it is true, 33 all things will be true, inasmuch as they are particular specimens of it; and just as, because the genus of men is Man, the particulars are men, and because it is Rational, all the individuals are rational, and because it is Mortal, they likewise are mortal;—so too, if the all-inclusive genus is True, all existing things will necessarily be true also. And if all things 34 are true, nothing will be false, and if there exists nothing false neither will there be anything true, as we pointed out above <sup>b</sup> when we showed that each of these opposites is conceived as in correlation with the other. Besides, if all things are true we shall be affirming that conflicting things are true, and this is absurd. So then the *summum genus* is not true.— 35 Nor indeed is it false, because of the like difficulties. For if it is false, all things that partake of it will be false; but all things, both corporeal and incorporeal,

<sup>b</sup> Cf. i. 395.

τε σώματα καὶ τὰ ἀσώματα· πάντα ἄρα γενήσεται  
 ψευδῆ. τῷ δὲ πάντα εἶναι ψευδῆ αἰ ἀνάλογον  
 36 ἀπορίας ἀκολουθήσουσιν. λείπεται οὖν ἀληθές  
 ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος λέγειν αὐτὸ εἶναι, ἢ οὔτε ἀληθές οὔτε  
 ψεῦδος. ὁ χεῖρόν ἐστι τῶν πρότερον ὑποδεδειγ-  
 μένων διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τούτῳ τὸ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ  
 μέρους ἀληθῆ ἅμα καὶ ψευδῆ ἢ οὔτε ἀληθῆ οὔτε  
 ψευδῆ γίνεσθαι· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀτοπον. οὐ τοῦνν ἐστι  
 τι ἀληθές.

37 Καὶ μὴν τὸ ἀληθές ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ  
 φύσει ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ἐστίν,  
 ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τὰληθές. κατὰ  
 διαφορὰν μὲν οὖν καὶ φύσει οὐκ ἐστὶ τὰληθές  
 παρόσον τὸ κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένον  
 ὡσαύτως τοὺς ὁμοίως διακειμένους κινεῖ, οἷον τὸ  
 θερμὸν οὐ πρὸς ἄλλον μὲν ἐστὶ θερμὸν πρὸς ἄλλον  
 δὲ ψυχρὸν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ὡσαύτως διακει-  
 38 μένους θερμὸν. τὸ δὲ ἀληθές οὐχ ὁμοίως πάντας  
 κινεῖ, ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν ὡς μὲν πρὸς τόνδε ἀληθές εἶναι  
 φαίνεται, ὡς δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον ψεῦδος. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν  
 κατὰ διαφορὰν καὶ φύσει ὑποκειμένων ἐστὶ τὰληθές.

εἰ δὲ τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ τὰ πρὸς τι νοεῖται  
 μόνον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει, πάντως καὶ τὰληθές  
 39 ἐπινοητὸν ἐστὶ μόνον, οὐχ ὑπάρξει δέ. καὶ ἄλλως,  
 εἰ τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές, ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ  
 ἀληθές ἅμα καὶ ψεῦδος· ὡς γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ δεξιὸν τε  
 καὶ ἀριστερόν ἐστι, πρὸς τῷδε μὲν δεξιὸν πρὸς  
 τῷδε δὲ ἀριστερόν, καὶ ὃν τρόπον τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ  
 κάτω λέγεται, ἄνω μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑποκειμένον  
 κάτω δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκειμένον, οὕτω ταυτὸ

partake of it; all things, therefore, will be false  
 And analogous difficulties will follow on the statement  
 that all things are false.—It remains, then, to say 36  
 that it is at once both true and false or that it is  
 neither true nor false. But this is worse than the  
 alternatives already stated, because it results from  
 this that all the particulars are at once both true  
 and false, or neither true nor false, which is absurd.  
 There does not, then, exist anything true.

Again, the true is either an absolute <sup>a</sup> and natural 37  
 thing or a relative thing; but it is neither of these,  
 as we shall establish; therefore the true does not  
 exist. The true does not exist absolutely and by  
 nature inasmuch as what subsists absolutely and by  
 nature moves those who are in a like condition in the  
 same way—the hot, for instance, is not hot to one  
 man and cold to another but hot to all who are in the  
 same condition. But the true does not move all alike, 38  
 but the same thing in relation to this man seems  
 to be true, but in relation to that other man false.  
 Therefore the true does not belong to the class of  
 things which subsist absolutely and by nature.—And  
 if it belongs to the class of things relative, then, since  
 relatives are only conceived and have no real exist-  
 ence, the true also will certainly be only a concept  
 and will not really exist. Besides, if the true is a 39  
 relative thing, the same thing will be at once both  
 true and false; for just as the same thing is both right  
 and left—right relatively to this object, left relatively  
 to that,—and just as the same thing is said to be both  
 above and beneath—above relatively to what lies  
 below it, and beneath relatively to what lies above

<sup>a</sup> Literally, "(existing) differentially," having a distinct  
 and independent existence; cf. *P.H.* i. 37; §§ 161 ff. *infra*.

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 κάτω λέγεται, ἄνω μὲν ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑποκειμένον  
 κάτω δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ὑπερκειμένον, οὕτω ταῦτό  
 256

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<sup>a</sup> Literally, "(existing) differentially," having a distinct  
 and independent existence; cf. P.H. i. 37; §§ 161 ff. *infra*.

ἀληθές ἄμα καὶ ψεῦδος ἐροῦμεν. καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, οὐ  
 μᾶλλον ἀληθές γενήσεται ἢ ψεῦδος, οὐ μὴν ἀληθές.  
 40 Δυνάμει δὲ καὶ ὁ Αἰνησιδῆμος τὰς ὁμοιοτρόπους  
 κατὰ τὸν τόπον ἀπορίας τίθησιν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι  
 ἀληθές, ἥτοι αἰσθητόν ἐστιν ἢ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ  
 νοητόν ἐστι καὶ αἰσθητόν ἐστιν. [ἦ] οὔτε δὲ<sup>1</sup> αἰσθητόν  
 ἐστιν οὔτε νοητόν ἐστιν, οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερον, ὡς  
 41 παρασταθῆσεται· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀληθές. ὅτι μὲν  
 οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητόν, οὕτως ἐπιλογιούμεθα. τῶν  
 αἰσθητῶν τὰ μὲν ἐστι γένη τὰ δὲ εἶδη, καὶ γένη  
 μὲν αἰ ἐνδιήκουσαι ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος κοινότητες,  
 ὡς ἄνθρωπος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώπων  
 πεφοιτηκῶς καὶ ἵππος ὁ διὰ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἵππων,  
 εἶδη δὲ αἰ καθ' ἕκαστον ιδιότητες, ὡς Δίωνος,  
 42 Θέωνος, τῶν ἄλλων. εἴπερ οὖν αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ  
 ἀληθές, καὶ τοῦτο πάντως κοινόν (<ὄν><sup>2</sup> πλειόνων ἢ  
 ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον ἔσται [αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές].<sup>3</sup>  
 οὔτε δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν οὔτε ἐν ιδιότητι κείμενον· οὐκ  
 43 ἄρα αἰσθητόν ἐστι τὸ ἀληθές. ἔτι δὲν τρόπον τὸ  
 μὲν ὄρατόν ὄρασει ληπτόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστόν  
 ἀκοῇ γνῶριμόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ὄσφρητόν ὄσφρησει,  
 οὕτω καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν κοινῶς αἰσθήσει γνωρίζεται.  
 οὐ γνωρίζεται δὲ κοινῶς αἰσθήσει· ἢ γὰρ αἰσθησις  
 ἀλογός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές οὐκ ἀλόγως γνωρί-  
 44 ζεται. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητόν τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν  
 οὐδὲ νοητόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν αἰσθητῶν  
 ἀληθές· ὁ πάλιν ἀποπον. ἥτοι γὰρ πᾶσι κοινῶς  
 ἔσται νοητόν ἢ τισὶν ιδίως. οὔτε δὲ πᾶσι κοινῶς  
 45 οἶόν τε εἶναι νοητόν τὸ ἀληθές οὔτε τισὶν ιδίως· τὸ

<sup>1</sup> δὲ N: om. cet., Bekk.: [ἦ] secl. Kochalsky.

<sup>2</sup> <ὄν> cj. Bekk. (et <ἦτοι> ante κοινόν).

<sup>3</sup> [αἰσθ. . . ἀληθές] secl. Kochalsky (τὸ ἀληθές secl. Bekk.).

it,—so we shall call the same thing both true and false. And if so, it will be no more<sup>a</sup> true than false, and certainly not true.

Aenesidemus, too, virtually states difficulties of a 40 similar kind regarding this topic. If anything true exists it is either sensible or intelligible or both intelligible and sensible. But it is neither sensible nor intelligible nor both at once, as shall be established; therefore there does not exist anything true. Now 41 that it is not sensible, we shall argue in this way:— Of things sensible some are genera, some particulars, and genera are the common qualities which pervade the particulars—as Man is that which ranges through the particular men, and Horse through the particular horses,—whereas particulars are the separate individual qualities—of Dion, Theon, and the rest. If, 42 then, the true is sensible, it too will either be the common property of many or it will constitute an individual quality; but it is neither a common nor an individual property; therefore the true is not sensible.—Again, just as the visible object is per- 43 ceptible by vision, and the audible is known by hearing, and the odorable by smell, so too what is sensible is known by sense in general. But the true is not known by sense in general, for sense is irrational and the true is not known irrationally. Therefore the true is not sensible.—Nor, indeed, is it intelligible, 44 for if so none of the sensibles will be true; and this again is absurd. For either it will be intelligible to all in common or to some separately. But the true is not capable of being intelligible either to all in common or to some separately; for it is impossible 45

<sup>a</sup> For the Sceptic formula “No more” see *P.H.* i. 188 ff.

τε γὰρ κοινῶς πᾶσι νοεῖσθαι ἀδύνατον, τό τε ἰδίως  
 τινὲ ἢ τισὶν ἄπιστον καὶ μάχιμον. οὐδὲ νοητὸν ἄρα  
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἀληθές. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ αἰσθητὸν ἄμα  
 καὶ νοητόν. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν καὶ πᾶν νοητὸν  
 46 ἀληθές ἐστὶν ἢ τὶ αἰσθητὸν καὶ τὶ νοητόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ  
 μὲν φάσκειν πᾶν αἰσθητὸν καὶ πᾶν νοητὸν ἀληθές  
 εἶναι τῶν ἀμηχάνων· μάχεται γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς  
 αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ  
 τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς [καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς αἰσθη-  
 τοῖς], καὶ δεήσει πάντων ἀληθῶν ὄντων τὸ αὐτὸ  
 εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ψεῦδος.  
 τί δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἀληθές καὶ τὶ νοητὸν ἀληθές ἀξιοῦν  
 47 πάλιν τῶν ἀπόρων· ζητεῖται γὰρ τί τοῦτο. καὶ  
 ἄλλως ἀκόλουθόν ἐστὶν ἢ πάντα λέγειν ἀληθῆ ἢ  
 πάντα λέγειν ψευδῆ τὰ αἰσθητὰ· ἐπ' ἴσης γὰρ ἐστὶν  
 αἰσθητὰ, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἥττον, καὶ  
 τὰ νοητὰ πάλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ νοητὰ, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν  
 μᾶλλον τὸ δὲ ἕλαττον. οὐ πάντα δὲ τὰ αἰσθητὰ  
 λέγεται ἀληθῆ, οὐδὲ πάντα ψευδῆ· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ  
 τι ἀληθές.  
 48 Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ καθὸ φαίνεται ἢ ἀλήθεια, κατ'  
 ἄλλην δὲ αἰτίαν λαμβάνεται. τίς οὖν ἐστὶν αὕτη  
 ἢ αἰτία; θέτωσαν εἰς τὸ μέσον οἱ δογματικοί, ἵνα  
 ἢ εἰς συγκατάθεσιν ἡμᾶς ἐπισπάσῃται ἢ εἰς φυγὴν  
 49 ἀποτρέψῃται. εἶτα ταύτην αὐτὴν τὴν αἰτίαν πῶς  
 λαμβάνουσιν; ὡς φαινομένην αὐτοῖς ἢ ὡς μὴ  
 φαινομένην; εἰ μὲν ὡς φαινομένην, ψεύδονται  
 λέγοντες τὴν ἀλήθειαν μὴ ὑπάρχειν καθὸ φαίνεται·  
 εἰ δ' ὡς μὴ φαινομένην, πῶς τὸ μὴ φαινόμενον  
 50 αὐτοῖς εἰλήφασιν; ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ δι' ἄλλου; καὶ ἐξ  
 αὐτοῦ μὲν ἀδύνατον· οὐδὲν γὰρ μὴ φαινόμενον ἐξ

for it to be thought by all in common, and it becomes  
 untrustworthy and debatable if thought by one or  
 more persons separately. Therefore the true is not  
 intelligible either.—Nor yet is it at once both sensible  
 and intelligible. For either everything sensible and  
 everything intelligible is true or something sensible  
 and something intelligible. But to assert that every- 46  
 thing sensible and everything intelligible is true is  
 a thing impracticable; for sensibles conflict with  
 sensibles and intelligibles with intelligibles, and con-  
 versely sensibles with intelligibles; and, if all things  
 are true, it will necessarily follow that the same thing  
 both is and is not existent, and that it is both true and  
 false. Nor again is it feasible to hold that something  
 sensible is true and something intelligible true; for 47  
 this is the point at issue. And besides it is logically  
 consistent either to say that all sensibles are true or to  
 say that all are false; for sensibles are on an equality,  
 not one more and one less sensible, and intelligibles  
 again are equally intelligible and not one more and  
 one less intelligible. But not all sensibles are termed  
 true, nor all false; therefore there is not anything true.

“Yes, but the truth is perceived not in so far as it 48  
 appears but owing to another cause.” What, then,  
 is this cause? Let the Dogmatists state it openly  
 so that it may either attract us to assent or repel us  
 to avoidance. Further, how do they perceive this 49  
 cause itself? As appearing to them or as not appear-  
 ing? If as appearing, they lie when they say that  
 truth does not exist in so far as it appears; but if as  
 not appearing, how have they perceived what is not  
 appearing to them? Through itself or by means of  
 another? To perceive it through itself is impossible, 50  
 for nothing which does not appear is perceptible

αὐτοῦ ληπτὸν ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ δι' ἄλλου, ἐκεῖνο πάλιν πότερον φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ φαινόμενον; καὶ οὕτως εἰς ἄπειρον οἰχομένης τῆς ζητήσεως ἀνεύρετον γίνεται τὸ ἀληθές.

- 51 Τί οὖν; τὸ πείθον ἡμᾶς, τὸ πιθανὸν ῥητέον ἀληθές, ὅποιαν ποτὲ ἂν ἔχη οὐσίαν, εἴτε αἰσθητὴν εἴτε νοητὴν εἴτε τὸ συναμφότερον, αἰσθητὴν ἅμα  
52 καὶ νοητὴν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀπόρων. εἰ γὰρ τὸ πιθανὸν ἀληθές ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ πάντας πείθει οὐδὲ διὰ παντός τοὺς αὐτούς, δώσομεν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀληθές ἅμα εἶναι καὶ ψεῦδος· ἢ μὲν γὰρ πείθει τινάς, ἀληθές ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπάρχον, ἢ δὲ ἑτέρους οὐ πείθει, ψεῦδος καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον. ἀδύνατον δέ γε τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἀληθές τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ  
53 ψεῦδος· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πιθανόν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. ἐκτός ἐἴ μή τι τὸ πολλοὺς πείθον, τοῦτ' ἐροῦμεν ἀληθές· τὸ γοῦν μέλι πολλοὺς μὲν πείθον ὑγιαίνοντας ὡς γλυκύ, καὶ ἕνα μὴ πείθον ἰκτερικόν, ἀληθῶς λέγομεν γλυκύ. ὅπερ ἦν ληρώδες. ὅταν γὰρ περὶ ἀληθείας σκεπτώμεθα, τότε οὐκ εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τῶν συμφωνούντων δεῖ ἀποβλέπειν ἀλλ' εἰς τὰς διαθέσεις. μιᾷ δὲ διαθέσει κέχρηται ὁ νοσῶν καὶ μιᾷ  
54 κατασκευῇ πάντες οἱ ὑγιαίνοντες. οὐ μᾶλλον οὖν τῆδε τῇ διαθέσει ἢ τῆδε πιστευτέον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ ἀναστροφῶς ὑποτεθέντος τοῦ πολλοὺς μὲν πικράζεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ μέλιτος οἶον πυρέσσοντας, ἕνα δὲ γλυκάζεσθαι τὸν ὑγιαίνοντα, πάντως ἀκολουθήσει μικρὸν λέγειν τὸ μέλι· ὅπερ ἀτοπον. τοίνυν ὡς

\* For this Academic term cf. i. 174 ff.

† Cf. P.H. i. 101.

• Cf. i. 333; P.H. ii. 44.

through itself; while if it is by means of another, is this in turn appearing or not appearing? And as the inquisition thus proceeds *ad infinitum*, the true becomes undiscussable.

What then? Is that which persuades us, "the probable,"<sup>a</sup> to be termed "true" whatever be the nature it possesses, whether sensible or intelligible or a combination of both sensible and intelligible at once? But neither is this feasible. For if the probable is 52 true, then because the same thing does not convince all men nor the same men always, we shall be granting that the same thing both does and does not exist, and that the same thing is at once both true and false; for in so far as it convinces some it will be true and existent, but in so far as it does not convince others it will be false and non-existent. But it is impossible that the same thing should both exist and not exist, and be both true and false; so, then, the 53 probable is not true either. That is, unless we shall declare that what convinces many is true; thus, honey,<sup>b</sup> which convinces many healthy people of its sweetness but does not convince one man who suffers from jaundice, we truly describe as sweet. But this is nonsensical. For when we are investigating truth we ought not to pay regard to the numbers of those who are in agreement but to their conditions. And the diseased person is in one condition, and all the healthy persons in one bodily state.<sup>c</sup> One ought not, 54 then, to trust the one condition more than the other, since if we assume, conversely, that many get a bitter taste from the honey (feverish people, for instance), while one man who is healthy gets a sweet taste, it will certainly follow that we must call the honey bitter, which is absurd. As, then, in this case we set

ἐνθάδε παρέντες τὴν κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος μαρτυρίαν οὐδὲν ἤσσαν γλυκὺ φάμεν τὸ μέλι, οὕτω καὶ ὅταν πολλοὶ γλυκάζωνται εἰς δὲ πικράζηται, παρέντες τὸ διὰ πλῆθος τῶν οὕτω πασχόντων γλυκὺ καλεῖν τὸ μέλι, ἄλλως τάληθές ἐξετάζωμεν.

55 Αἱ μὲν καθόλου ἀπορίαι περὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τοιαῦται τινές εἰσιν· ἀκολουθῶν δὲ ἔλθωμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ μέρος. καὶ δὴ τοὺς μὲν πάντα λέγοντας ψευδῆ ἐδείξαμεν πρόσθεν περιτρεπομένους. εἰ γὰρ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ, ψεῦδος ἔσται καὶ τὸ "πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ," ἐκ πάντων ὑπάρχον. ψεύδους δὲ ὄντος τοῦ "πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ," τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ ἀληθές ἔσται, τὸ "οὐ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ." εἰ ἄρα 56 πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ, οὐ πάντ' ἐστὶ ψευδῆ. οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Πλάτωνα ἀθετοῦντες μὲν τὰς αἰσθήσεις, ἀναιροῦντες δὲ τὰ αἰσθητά, μόνους δ' ἐπόμενοι τοῖς νοητοῖς, συγχέουσι τὰ πράγματα, καὶ οὐ μόνον τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀλήθειαν σαλεύουσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν. πᾶσα γὰρ νόησις ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως γίνεται ἢ οὐ χωρὶς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἢ 57 ἀπὸ περιπτώσεως ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ περιπτώσεως. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὰς λεγομένας ψευδεῖς φαντασίας, οἷον τὰς καθ' ὕπνου ἢ τὰς κατὰ μανίαν, εὐρήσομεν ἀπηρητημένας τῶν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατὰ περίπτωσιν ἡμῖν ἐγνωσμένων. καὶ γὰρ ὁ κατὰ μανίαν Ἐρινύας αὐτῷ ἀναπλάσσαν.

τὰς αἱματώδεις καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας

ἐκ τῶν πεφνησμένων αὐτῷ σύνθετον μορφήν νοεῖ· ὡσαύτως δὲ ὁ πτηνὸν ἄνθρωπον καθ' ὕπνου

aside the evidence of the multitude and none the less declare honey to be sweet, so also when many taste it sweet and one tastes it bitter, let us give up calling honey sweet because of the numbers of those who experience it as such, and let us investigate the truth in another way.

Of some such kind are the general difficulties 55 raised about "the true": let us pass on next to the particular difficulties. Now as to those who assert that all things are false, we proved above <sup>a</sup> that they are confuted. For if all things are false, the statement "All things are false," being one of the "all things," will be false. And if the statement "All things are false" is false, its contradictory, "Not all things are false," will be true. Therefore, if all things are false, not all things are false. And Democritus and 56 Plato,<sup>b</sup> by rejecting the senses and abolishing sensibles and following intelligibles only, throw things into confusion and shake to pieces not only the truth of existing things but even the conception of them. For every thought occurs either owing to sensation or not apart from sensation, and either owing to experience or not without experience. Hence we shall find that not even the so-called false 57 presentations—such as those in dreams or madness—are detached from things known to us by experience through sense. And in fact when the hero in his madness imagines as his Furies

Maids shaped like dragons and all blood-besprent,<sup>c</sup> he is conceiving a shape compounded of things that have appeared to his senses. And in the same way he who in his sleep dreams of a winged man does not

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 390, 398.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 6 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Eurip. *Orest.* 256.



58 *ὄνειροπολούμενος οὐ δίχα τοῦ πτηνόν τι ἑωρακέναι  
καὶ ἄνθρωπον ὄνειροπολεῖται. καὶ καθόλου οὐδὲν  
ἔστιν εὐρεῖν κατ' ἐπίνοιαν ὃ μὴ ἔχει τις αὐτῷ κατὰ  
περίπτωσιν ἐγνωσμένον. τοῦτο γὰρ ἢ κατὰ ὁμοιό-  
τητα τῶν ἐν περιπτώσει πεφηνότων ληφθήσεται ἢ  
κατὰ παραύξησην ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν ἢ κατ' ἐπισύν-  
59 θεσιν. καθ' ὁμοιότητα μὲν οὖν οἶον ὅταν ἀπὸ τῆς  
θεωρηθείσης Σωκράτους εἰκόνας τὸν μὴ ἑωραμένον  
Σωκράτην ἐπινοῶμεν, κατὰ παραύξησην δὲ ὅταν  
ἀπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπου κινούμενοι νοῶμεν οἶον  
ὅς οὐκ ἐώκει*

*ἀνδρὶ γε σιτοφάγῳ ἀλλὰ ρίψι ὑλήεντι  
ὑψηλῶν ὄρέων,*

60 *κατὰ μείωσιν δὲ ἐπειδὴν συνελόντες πάλιν τὸ  
μέγεθος τοῦ κοινοῦ ἀνθρώπου νόησιν λαμβάνωμεν  
πυγμαίου, κατ' ἐπισύνθεσιν δὲ ὅταν ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπου  
καὶ ἵππου τὸν μηδέποτε ὑποπεπτωκότα ἡμῖν  
Ἴπποκένταυρον νοῶμεν. πάσης οὖν ἐπινοίας προ-  
ηγείσθαι δεῖ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως περίπτωσιν, καὶ  
διὰ τοῦτ' ἀναιρουμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
61 συναναίρεται πᾶσα νόησις. ὃ τε λέγων πάντ'  
εἶναι τὰ φαινόμενα ψευδῆ καὶ ἔτεῃ μόνον ὑπάρχειν  
τὰ νοητά, τοῦτ' ἔστι κατ' ἀλήθειαν, ἥτοι φάσει  
μόνον χρώμενος τοῦτ' ἐρεῖ ἢ καὶ ἀποδεικνύς. ἀλλὰ  
φάσει μὲν λέγων φάσει ἐπισχεθήσεται, ἀπόδειξιν  
62 δὲ παραλαμβάνειν πειρώμενος περιτραπήσεται. ἢ  
γὰρ φαινομένῳ τινὶ διδάξει τὸ ἔτεῃ μόνον εἶναι τὰ  
νοητά ἢ ἀδήλω. οὔτε δὲ φαινομένῳ τοῦτο διδάξει,*

\* Homer, *Od.* ix. 191, describing the Cyclops.

dream so without having seen some winged thing and a man. And in general it is impossible to find in 58 conception anything which one does not possess as known by experience. For such a thing will be grasped either by way of resemblance to things which have been presented in experience, or by way of enlargement thereof, or of diminution, or of composition. Thus, by way of resemblance, as when because of the 59 likeness of Socrates which has been seen we conceive Socrates who has not been seen; and by way of enlargement, when starting from the common man we move on to a conception of one of such a kind that he was

Less like a corn-eating man than a forest-clad peak of the mountains  
Towering high; \*

and by way of diminution. when, on the contrary, we 61 decrease the size of the common man and grasp a conception of the pygmy; and by way of composition, when from man and horse we derive the conception of a thing we have never perceived—the Hippocentaur. Every conception, then, must be preceded by experience through sense, and on this account if sensibles are abolished all conceptual thought is necessarily abolished at the same time.—Further, he 61 who declares that all apparent things are false and that only intelligibles exist “in sooth”—that is, in truth—will, in saying so, either use mere assertion or will prove it. But if he is stating it by assertion he will be checked by assertion, and if he tries to adduce proof he will be overthrown. For he will show that 62 only intelligibles exist “in sooth” by means of either an apparent thing or a non-evident. But he will show this neither by an apparent thing, for such

οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει, οὔτε ἀδήλω, ἐκ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει προπεπιστώσθαι τὸ ἀδηλον. οὐ τοίνυν ὑγιής ἐστὶν ἡ στάσις τῶν περὶ Δημόκριτόν τε καὶ Πλάτωνα.

63 Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγε μὲν πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι ἀληθῆ, καὶ πᾶσαν φαντασίαν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος εἶναι, καὶ τοιαύτην ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ κινεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, πλανᾶσθαι δὲ τοὺς τινὰς μὲν τῶν φαντασιῶν λέγοντας ἀληθεῖς τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς παρὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι χωρίζειν δόξαν ἀπὸ ἐναργείας. ἐπὶ γούν τοῦ Ὀρέστου, ὅτε ἐδόκει βλέπειν τὰς Ἐρινύας, ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ὑπ' εἰδώλων κινουμένη ἀληθῆς ἦν (ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὰ εἰδῶλα), ὁ δὲ νοῦς οἰόμενος ὅτι  
64 στερεμνιοὶ εἰσὶν Ἐρινύες ἐψευδοδόξει. καὶ ἄλλως, φησὶν, οἱ προειρημένοι τῶν φαντασιῶν διαφορὰν εἰσάγοντες οὐκ ἰσχύουσι πιστώσασθαι τὸ τινὰς μὲν αὐτῶν ἀληθεῖς ὑπάρχειν τινὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς· οὔτε γὰρ φαινομένῳ διδάξουσι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ζητεῖται γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα, οὔτε ἀδήλω, διὰ φαινομένου γὰρ ὀφείλει  
65 τὸ ἀδηλον ἀποδείκνυσθαι. τοιαῦτα δὲ λέγων ὁ Ἐπίκουρος ἄκων εἰς τὴν ὁμοίαν ἐκπέπτωκεν ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖ τῶν φαντασιῶν τὰς μὲν ἀπὸ στερεμνίων γίνεσθαι σωμάτων τὰς δὲ ἀπὸ εἰδώλων, καὶ δίδωσι τὸ μὲν τι εἶναι ἐνάργειαν τὸ δὲ δόξαν, ζητῶ πῶς κρίνει τὰς ἀπὸ στερεμνίου σώματος φαντασίας καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ εἰδώλου προσπιπτούσας; οὔτε γὰρ ἐναργεία, ζητεῖται γὰρ, οὔτε δόξη, δι' ἐναργείας γὰρ ὀφείλει πεπιστώσθαι.  
66 ἄλλως τε καὶ ἄτοπός ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ζητούμενων τὰ ἦττον ζητούμενα δεικνύναι πειρώμενος·

\* *i.e.* according to his own original assumption.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* Eurip. *Orest.* 255.

does not exist,<sup>a</sup> nor by a non-evident, for the non-evident must be confirmed beforehand by an apparent. So, then, the view of Democritus and Plato is not logically sound.

Epicurus asserted that "All sensibles are true and every presentation is of a real object and is of the same kind as is the object which excites the sensation, and those who say that some presentations are true, others false, are led astray owing to their inability to separate opinion from clear evidence. Thus in the case of Orestes, when he fancied he saw the Furies,<sup>b</sup> his sense excited by images<sup>c</sup> was true (for the images really existed), but his mind, in thinking that the Furies were solid, formed a false opinion. And  
64 besides," he says, "the persons mentioned above, when introducing a difference in the presentations, are not capable of confirming the view that some of them are true, others false. For neither by means of an apparent thing will they prove such a statement, since it is apparent things that are in question, nor yet by a non-evident, since the non-evident must needs be proved by means of an apparent." In  
65 saying this Epicurus has unwittingly fallen into a similar difficulty. For if he allows that some presentations come from solid bodies and others from images, and grants that clear evidence is one thing, opinion another, how, I ask, does he distinguish the presentations which occur from a solid body and those from an image? For he can do so neither by evidence, this being in question, nor by opinion, for this must be confirmed by means of evidence. Besides, it is absurd of him to try to prove the less  
66 questionable things by the more questionable. For

\* *Cf.* i. 209 n.; Vol. I. *Introduct.* p. xxiii; Lucret. iv. 34 ff.

ἡμῶν γὰρ σκεπτομένων περὶ τῆς τῶν φαινομένων πίστεως, αὐτὸς τὴν περὶ τῶν εἰδώλων τερατολογουμένην καὶ μυθώδη δόξαν ἐπεισάγει.

67 Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τοῖς στωικοῖς εὐδοεῖ ὁ λόγος· θέλουσι μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε αἰσθητῶν καὶ νοητῶν εἶναι διαφορὰν, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἔστιν ἀληθῆ τὰ δὲ ψευδῆ, οὐκ ἰσχύουσι δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον συνάγειν. διακένους γὰρ εἶναι τινὰς φαντασίας ὠμολογήκασιν, ὅποια προσέπιπτον τῷ Ὀρέστη ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑρινύων, καὶ ἄλλας παρατυπωτικὰς τὰς ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων μὲν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα, ὅποια ἦν ἡ κατὰ μανίαν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων παιδῶν ὡς Εὐρυσθέως ὑποπεσοῦσα. ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων γὰρ ἐγένετο τῶν παιδῶν, οὐ κατ' αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ ὑποκείμενα· οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἰδίου ἐβλεπε παῖδας, ἀλλὰ φησὶν

εἰς μὲν νεοσσὸς ὄδε θανῶν Εὐρυσθέως  
ἔχθραν πατρῶαν ἐκτίνων πέπτωκέ μοι.

68 τούτου δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντος ἀδιάκριτοι γίνονται αἱ φαντασίαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσι λέγειν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς τίνες τε ταῖς ἀληθείαις καταληπτικαὶ εἰσι καὶ ἀπὸ ὑποκειμένων καὶ κατ' αὐτὰ τὰ ὑποκείμενα γίνονται, καὶ τίνες οὐκ εἰσὶ τοιαῦται, καθάπερ διὰ πλείονων ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείξαμεν.

69 Οἷος δὲ ἔστιν ὁ περὶ ταύτης τῆς στάσεως λόγος, τοιοῦτος γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς λειπομένης, καθ' ἣν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῷ σηματομένῳ, τουτέστιν ἀσωμάτῳ λεκτῷ, τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὑπο-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 209 n.; Vol. I. *Introd.* p. xxiii; *Lucret.* iv. 34 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. i. 241. <sup>c</sup> *Eurip. Herc. Fur.* 982; cf. i. 405 ff.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. i. 402 ff.

<sup>e</sup> For *lekton*, "meaning" or "expression," cf. *P.H.* ii. 81.

when we are inquiring about the trustworthiness of things apparent, he introduces that marvellous and mythical doctrine of his about the images.<sup>a</sup>

Nor, indeed, is the Stoic theory free from difficulty. 67 For while they urge that a difference exists in both sensibles and intelligibles, by which some of them are true, others false, they are unable to deduce this by logic. For they have allowed that some presentations are "vacuous"—such as those which Orestes received from the Furies,<sup>b</sup>—and that others are "distorted," being derived from real objects but not in conformity with those objects themselves,—as was that which came to Heracles in his madness from his own children as though from those of Eurystheus; for it came from the children who really existed, but not in conformity with the actual real objects; for he did not see the children as his own, but declares<sup>c</sup>—

This nestling of Eurystheus slain by me  
Pays for his father's enmity by death.

And this being so, the presentations are indistinguish- 68 able and the Stoics are unable to say which are in truth apprehensive and are derived from real objects and in conformity with those objects themselves, and which are not of this kind, as we have already shown more at length.<sup>d</sup>

What we have said regarding this view is very 69 much the same as what we have to say about the remaining view, according to which some assume truth and falsity to lie in the thing signified—that is to say in the incorporeal "expression,"<sup>e</sup>

Regarding language and thought as both corporeal, the Stoics interpolated between them an incorporeal something, termed *lekton*, which is the subject matter of Logic; and thus they treated propositions, syllogisms, etc., as incorporeal.

τίθενται, οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ φωνῇ, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς  
 70 διανοίας. αὐτίκα γάρ, ἵνα ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἀρξήται  
 τις, ἠξίουσι οἱ στωικοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθές  
 εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος. λεκτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασι τὸ  
 κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν ὑφιστάμενον, λογικὴν δὲ  
 εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι λόγῳ  
 παραστήσαι. τῶν δὲ λεκτῶν τὰ μὲν ἑλλιπῆ καλοῦσι  
 τὰ δὲ αὐτοτελή· ὧν τὰ μὲν ἑλλιπῆ παρεῖσθαι νῦν,  
 τῶν δὲ αὐτοτελῶν πλείους εἶναι φασι (διαφοράς)<sup>1</sup>.  
 71 καὶ γὰρ προστακτικὰ καλοῦσι τινα, ἅπερ προσ-  
 τάσσοντες λέγομεν, οἶον

δεῦρ' ἴθι, νύμφα φίλη,

καὶ ἀποφαντικά, ἅπερ ἀποφαινόμενοι φάμεν, οἶον  
 "ὁ Δίων περιπατεῖ," καὶ πύσματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες  
 72 πυνθανόμεθα, οἶον "ποῦ οἰκεῖ Δίων;" ὀνομά-  
 ζεται δὲ τινα παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀρατικά, ἅπερ  
 λέγοντες ἀρώμεθα,

ὦδέ σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὄδε οἶνος,  
 καὶ εὐκτικά, ἅπερ λέγοντες εὐχόμεθα,

Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ἰδηθεν μεδέων, κύνιδιτε μέγιστε,  
 δὸς νίκην Αἴαντι καὶ ἀγλαὸν εὐχος ἀρέσθαι.

73 προσαγορεύουσι δὲ τινα τῶν αὐτοτελῶν καὶ ἀξιώ-  
 ματα, ἅπερ λέγοντες ἤτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα.  
 ἔστι δὲ τινα καὶ πλείονα ἢ ἀξιώματα, οἶον τὸ μὲν  
 τοιοῦτο

Πριαμίδησιν ἐμφερῆς ὁ βουκόλος

<sup>1</sup> <διαφοράς> cf. Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> Homer, *Il.* iii. 130.

<sup>b</sup> Homer, *Il.* iii. 300.

<sup>c</sup> Homer, *Il.* vii. 202.

—others in the sound, others in the motion of  
 the intellect. Thus, for instance, to start with the 70  
 first view, the Stoics maintained that truth and  
 falsity exist in the "expression." And they say that  
 "expression" is "that which subsists in conformity  
 with a rational presentation," and that a rational  
 presentation is one in which it is possible to establish  
 by reason the presented object. And of expressions  
 they term some "defective," others "self-complete";  
 the defective we may now pass over, but of the self-  
 complete there are, as they assert, several varieties;  
 for in fact they call some "jussive," such as we utter 71  
 in giving an injunction, as for example—

Come thou hither, O lady dear; <sup>a</sup>

others "declaratory," such as we utter when making  
 a statement, as for example—"Dion is walking  
 about"; and others "interrogations," which we utter  
 when asking a question, as for instance—"Where  
 does Dion dwell?" And some, too, are named by 72  
 them "imprecatory," which we utter when we curse—

E'en as this wine is spilt, so may their brains be spilt  
 earthwards; <sup>b</sup>

also "precatory," which we utter in prayer, of which  
 this is an example—

Zeus, my Father, who rulest from Ida, majestic and mighty,  
 Victory grant unto Ajax and crown him with glory and  
 honour. <sup>c</sup>

And they also term some of the self-complete ex- 73  
 pressions "propositions," in uttering which we either  
 speak the truth or lie. Some, too, are more than  
 propositions. The following, for instance, is a pro-  
 position—

The cowherd doth resemble Priam's sons;

ἀξιώμα ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ ἀληθεύομεν λέγοντες αὐτὸ ἢ  
ψευδόμεθα· τὸ δὲ οὕτως ἔχον

ὡς Πριαμίδαισιν ἐμφορῆς ὁ βουκόλος

74 πλέον τι ἀξιώματός ἐστι καὶ οὐκ ἀξίωμα. πλὴν  
ικανῆς οὔσης ἐν τοῖς λεκτοῖς διαφορᾶς, ἵνα τι,  
φασίν, ἀληθές ἢ ἢ ψεῦδος, δεῖ αὐτὸ πρὸ παντὸς  
λεκτὸν εἶναι, εἶτα καὶ αὐτοτελές, καὶ οὐ κοινὸς  
ὁποιονδήποτε οὖν ἀλλ' ἀξίωμα· μόνον γὰρ τοῦτο,  
καθὼς προεῖπον, λέγοντες ἦτοι ἀληθεύομεν ἢ  
75 ψευδόμεθα. οὐκοῦν φασίν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τὸ  
εἶναι τι λεκτὸν ἀσώματον, ὃ κεχώρισται τῆς τε  
σημαινούσης φωνῆς, οἷον τῆς Δίων, καὶ [τῆς] τοῦ  
τυγχάνοντος, καθάπερ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Δίωνος, πότεν  
ἔχομεν παραστήσει; ἢ γὰρ αὐτόθεν ἐρούσι τοῦθ'  
ὑπάρχειν οἱ στωικοί, ἢ δι' ἀποδείξεως τὴν ὑπαρξίν  
76 αὐτοῦ πιστώσονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν αὐτόθεν λέγοιεν  
τὸ ἀσώματον τοῦτο λεκτὸν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ἡμῖν  
ἐξέσται λέγειν αὐτόθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἐστίν· ὡς γὰρ  
ἐκεῖνοι χωρὶς ἀποδείξεώς εἰσι πιστοί, οὕτω καὶ οἱ  
ἀπορητικοὶ τούναντίον διὰ ψιλῆς προφερόμενοι  
φάσεως γενήσονται πιστοί, ἢ εἴπερ ἀπιστοῦνται,  
καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁμοίως ἀπιστοὶ γενήσονται.  
77 εἰ δὲ δι' ἀποδείξεως τὸ τοιοῦτον πιστώσονται,  
χείρον αὐτοῖς ἄπορον ἐπακολουθήσει. ἢ γὰρ ἀπό-  
δείξις λόγος ἐστίν, ὃ δὲ λόγος ἐκ λεκτῶν συν-  
έστηκεν. τοῖς λεκτοῖς οὖν παραστήσουσι τὸ εἶναι  
τι λεκτὸν οἱ στωικοί, ὅπερ ἀπεμφαῖνον, ἐπεὶ περ ὃ  
μὴ διδοῦς εἶναι τι λεκτὸν οὐδὲ πολλὰ δώσει λεκτὰ  
78 εἶναι. ζητουμένων τε καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀποδείξει

for in uttering it we are either telling the truth or  
lying; but a phrase like this—

How like to Priam's sons the cowherd is,<sup>a</sup>

is somewhat more than a proposition and is not  
a proposition. As, however, there is considerable 74  
difference in the expressions in order that a thing  
may be true or false it must first of all, they say, be  
an expression, and next self-complete, and that, too,  
not of any and every kind but a proposition; for, as  
I said before, it is only when we utter this that  
we speak a truth or a falsehood. How then, say the 75  
Sceptics, can they establish that there exists any  
incorporeal expression which is separate both from  
the signifying sound, such as "Dion," and from the  
actual object, such as Dion himself? For the Stoics  
will either declare offhand that this subsists or they 76  
will demonstrate its existence by proof. And if they  
shall declare offhand that this incorporeal expression  
subsists, it will be possible for us also to declare off-  
hand that it does not exist; for just as they are to  
be trusted without proof, so likewise the Doubters are  
to be trusted when by means of bare assertion they  
maintain the opposite, or, if they are distrusted, the  
Stoics also will become similarly distrusted. And 77  
if they shall support the statement by proof, they  
will find themselves faced in consequence with a  
worse difficulty. For proof is speech, and speech is  
composed of expressions. The Stoics, then, will be  
establishing by expressions the existence of an  
expression, which is nonsensical, since the man who  
does not grant that any expression exists will not  
grant either that many expressions exist. Also, when 78  
the existence of the expressions of the proof is in

<sup>a</sup> *Frag. Trag. adesp.* 286 (Nauck).

λεκτῶν εἰ ἔστιν, εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἐτοίμου λαμβάνωσι τὸ εἶναι ταῦτα, ἐξ ἐτοίμου καὶ οἱ ἀπορητικοὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι λήψονται, τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὑποπιπτούσης πίστεως ἢ ἀπιστίας, εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, εἰς ἀπειρον ἐκπεσοῦνται· ἀπόδειξιν γὰρ ἀπαιτηθῆσονται τῶν ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ ἀποδείξει ἐμπεριεχομένων λεκτῶν, καὶ τρίτην κομίσαντες τῶν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ, καὶ τετάρτην τῶν ἐν τῇ τετάρτῃ, ὥστε ἀναρχον αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ εἶναι λεκτόν.

79 Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πλείω ἔστιν εἰς τὸν τόπον λέγειν, περὶ ὧν εὐκαιρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ἀποδείξεως διεξελευσόμεθα. τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐκείνο ρητέον ὅτι τὸ αὐτοτελὲς ἀξίωμα σύνθετον εἶναι θέλουσιν, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστι" σύγκειται ἐκ τε τοῦ ἡμέρα καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν. ἀσώματον δὲ οὐδὲν οὔτε συντεθῆναι οὔτε μερισθῆναι δύναται· ἴδια γὰρ σωμάτων ἐστὶ ταῦτα. τοῖνυν οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτοτελὲς [πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ] ἀξίωμα.

80 πᾶν τε λεκτὸν λέγεσθαι δεῖ, ὅθεν καὶ ταύτης ἔτυχε τῆς προσηγορίας· οὐδὲν δὲ λεκτὸν λέγεται, ὡς παριστάσιν οἱ ἀπορητικοί· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι λεκτόν. ᾧ ἔπεται μηδὲ ἀξίωμα εἶναι μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. λέγειν γὰρ ἔστι, καθὼς αὐτοὶ φασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς, τὸ τὴν τοῦ νοουμένου πράγματος σημαντικὴν προφέρεσθαι φωνήν, οἷον τοῦδε τοῦ στίχου,

μῆνιν ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληϊάδεω Ἀχιλῆος.

81 ἀλλὰ τούτου γε τὴν σημαντικὴν φωνὴν ἀμύχανόν ἐστι προφέρεσθαι διὰ τὸ οὐ τὰ μέρη μὴ συνπάρχει, μηδὲ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο ὑπάρχειν, τούτου δὲ τοῦ πράγ-

<sup>1</sup> [πρᾶγμα οὐδὲ] secl. Kayser.

question, if they shall perceive their existence directly, the Doubters also will perceive their non-existence directly, and if they perceive it as a result of proof, they will fall into the fallacy of regress *ad infinitum*; for they will be asked for a proof of the expressions contained in the second proof, and of those in the third when they bring forward a third, and of those in the fourth when they bring forward a fourth, so that their proof of the existence of expression is without a starting-point.

Many other arguments regarding this topic might 79 be adduced, but it will be more opportune to go through them in our chapter "Concerning Proof." For the present, let this one be stated: They hold that the self-complete proposition is a compound—"day exists," for example, is compounded of both "day" and "exists." But no incorporeal thing can be either compounded or divided; for these are things peculiar to bodies. So, then, there is no self-complete [object or] proposition.—Further, every 80 expression must be expressed, since from this it has got its name; but no expression is expressed, as the Doubters establish; therefore no expression exists. Whereupon it follows that no proposition, true or false, exists. For "to express" is, as the Stoics themselves declare, "to utter the sound capable of signifying the object conceived"—this verse, for instance,

Sing, O goddess, the fury of Peleus' offspring Achilles.\*

But it is not feasible to utter the sound capable of 81 signifying this, because that object whose parts do not co-exist does not exist itself, and the parts of this

\* Homer, *Il.* i.

ματος τὰ μέρη μὴ συνυπάρχειν, ὥστε μὴδ' αὐτὸ ὑπαρκτὸν εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὅτι ἀσυνυπαρκτὰ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὰ μέρη, αὐτόθεν δείκνυται. ὅτε γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἡμιστίχιον προφερόμεθα, οὕτω ἐστὶ τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτ' ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε τὸν μὲν ὅλον στίχον οὐ προ-  
 82 φερόμεθα. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον· ὅταν γὰρ πάλιν τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ ἡμιστίχιου μέρος λέγωμεν, τότε οὕτω τὸ δεύτερον αὐτοῦ μέρος προφερόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε τὸ δεύτερον προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτι λέγομεν τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ἡμιστίχιον ὑπάρχει. κἂν δὲ σκοπῶμεν, οὐδὲ μία λέξις, οἷον ἡ “μῆνιν”<sup>1</sup>. ὅτε γὰρ τὴν “μη” συλλαβὴν λέγομεν, οὐδέπω τὴν “νιν” προφερόμεθα, καὶ ὅτε τὴν “νιν”  
 83 προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτι τὴν “μη.” εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τι οὐ τὰ μέρη ἀσυνυπαρκτὰ ἐστὶ, δέδεικται δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ μιᾶς λέξεως ἀσυνυπαρκτα τὰ μέρη, ῥητέον μηδεμίαν ὑπάρχειν λέξιν. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲ ἀξίωμα, ὃ φασι σύνθετον εἶναι, οἷον τὸ τοιοῦτο “Σωκράτης ἐστίν.” ὅτε γὰρ λέγεται “Σωκράτης,” οὕτω ἐστὶ τὸ “ἐστίν,” καὶ ὅτε τὸ “ἐστίν” λέγεται, τὸ “Σωκράτης” οὐ λέγεται. οὐδέποτε ἄρα ὅλον ὑπάρχει τὸ ἀξίωμα, ἀλλὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου· τὰ δὲ μέρη τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματα.  
 84 οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ τι ἀξίωμα. καίτοι τί περὶ ὅλου τοῦ ἀξιώματος διέξιμεν τοῦ “Σωκράτης ἐστίν,” ὅτε καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἴδιαν τὸ πτωτικὸν τὸ Σωκράτης οὐ δύναται ἐν ὑπάρξει νοεῖσθαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν; φημί δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ συνυπάρχειν τὰ συστατικὰ αὐτοῦ μόρια.

<sup>1</sup> μῆνιν Rüstow: μῆνις mss., Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ Heintz: ὁ mss., Bekk.

object do not co-exist, so that neither is it capable of existing itself. And the fact that its parts are not capable of co-existing is proved directly. For when we utter the first half-verse, the second is not yet in existence; and when we utter the second, the first is no longer in existence; so that we do not utter the whole verse. Nor, indeed, even the half-verse. 82 For when, once more, we are saying the first part of the half-verse, we are not then uttering as yet the second part of it; and when we utter the second, we are no longer saying the first; so that the half-verse does not exist either. Nor, if we consider it, does even a single expression, such as “fury,” exist; for when we are saying the syllable “fu” we are not as yet uttering the “ry,” and when we utter the “ry” we are no longer saying the “fu.” If, then, 83 it is impossible for anything to exist if its parts are incapable of co-existence, and it has been proved in the case of one locution that its parts are incapable of co-existence, we must declare that no locution exists. And for the same reason, also, no proposition exists either; for they assert it to be a compound, as for instance “Socrates exists.” For when “Socrates” is being said, “exists” does not yet exist; and when “exists” is being said, “Socrates” is not being said. Therefore the whole proposition never exists, but parts of the whole; and its parts are not propositions. Therefore no proposition exists. Yet why should 84 we discuss the whole proposition “Socrates exists,” when even its nominative case, “Socrates,” taken by itself cannot be conceived as in existence for the same reason—I mean, for the reason that its component parts do not co-exist?

- 85 Διδομένου τε τούτου,<sup>1</sup> ἀξίωμα εἶναι τι ἀληθές καί τι ψεύδος οὐ συγχωρήσουσι οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως διὰ τὸ μὴ εὐαπόδοτον αὐτὸ καθεστάναι τοῖς πρὸς οὓς ἔστιν ὁ λόγος. φασὶ γὰρ ἀληθές μὲν εἶναι ἀξίωμα ὃ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι, ψεύδος δὲ ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δέ τινι. ἐρωτώμενοι δὲ τί ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, λέγουσι τὸ
- 86 καταληπτικὴν κινουὺν φαντασίαν· εἶτα περὶ τῆς καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας ἐξεταζόμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον, ἐπ' ἴσης ὄν ἄγνωστον, ἀνατρέχουσι, λέγοντες “καταληπτικὴ ἐστὶ φαντασία ἢ ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον.” ὅπερ ἦν ἴσον τῷ δι' ἀγνοουμένου τὸ ἀγνοουμένον διδάσκου καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων ἐμπίπτειν τρόπον. ἵνα γὰρ τὸ ὑπάρχον μάθωμεν, ἐπὶ τὴν καταληπτικὴν ἡμῶς φαντασίαν ἀποστέλλουσι, λέγοντες ὑπάρχον εἶναι τὸ κινουὺν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν· ἵνα δὲ τὴν καταληπτικὴν γνῶμεν φαντασίαν, ἐπὶ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἀναποστέλλουσι. μήτε οὖν ἐκεῖνο μήτε ταύτην γινώσκοντες οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπ' αὐτῶν διδάσκόμενον ἀληθές καὶ ψεύδος ἀξίωμα συνήσομεν.
- 87 Κἂν ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀπορίας ἀφίστηται τις, μείζων ἄλλη παρ' αὐτὴν ἀνακίψει τοῖς τὴν στωικὴν τεχνολογίαν ἀποδεχομένοις. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰ βουλοίμεθα μαθεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, πρότερον ὀφείλομεν ἐγνωκέναι τί τὸ ζῶον καὶ τί τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τί τὸ θνητόν (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ συνέστηκεν ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου νόησις), καὶ ὄν τρόπον εἰ προαιρούμεθα γινώσκειν τί ἐστὶ κύων, προκατεληφέναι δεήσει

<sup>1</sup> τούτου: τοῦ mss., Bekk. (lacunam ante ἀληθές indic. Kochalsky).

But if it be granted that a proposition exists, the 85 Sceptics will not admit that a true or a false proposition exists, because this is not easy of explanation for those with whom they are arguing. For these assert that a true proposition is that which subsists and is opposed to something, and a false one that which is not subsisting but is opposed to something. And when asked “What is that which subsists?”<sup>a</sup> they reply “That which excites an apprehensive presentation” ; next, when examined concerning the apprehensive 86 presentation they have recourse again to “the subsistent,” which is equally unknown, saying “An apprehensive presentation is that derived from a subsisting object in conformity with that object itself.” And this is equivalent to teaching the unknown thing by means of an unknown thing and falling into the fallacy of circular reasoning. For in order that we may learn the subsistent they send us off to the apprehensive presentation, saying that the subsistent is that which excites an apprehensive presentation ; and in order that we may get to know the apprehensive presentation they send us back to the subsistent. As we know, then, neither the latter nor the former, neither shall we understand the true or false proposition which is explained through them.

And even if one sets aside this difficulty, another 87 will pop up, greater than this, for those who accept the logical system of Stoicism. For just as, if we wish to learn what Man is, we ought to know first what Animal is, and what Rational is, and what Mortal is (for the concept of Man is compounded of these),—and just as, if we desire to know what Dog is, it will first be necessary for us to have grasped

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. iii. 242.



πάλιν τὸ ζῶον καὶ τὸ ὑλακτικόν (ἐκ τούτων γὰρ  
 88 ἐνοεῖτο ὁ κύων), οὕτως εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς  
 στωικούς ὁ ὑπάρχει τε καὶ ἀντίκειται τινι καὶ  
 ψεῦδος ὁ μὴ ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀντίκειται δὲ τινι, κατ'  
 ἀνάγκην ὀφείλομεν γινώσκειν εἰς τὴν τούτων  
 νόησιν τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. οὐ πάνυ δέ γε  
 δύνανται παραστήσαι τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἡμῖν οἱ  
 στωικοί· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθές ἢ ψεῦδος ἔσται  
 89 γινώριμα. φασὶ γὰρ “ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν ὧν τὸ  
 ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει,” οἷον  
 “ἡμέρα ἔστιν—οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν.” τοῦ γὰρ  
 “ἡμέρα ἔστιν” ἀξιώματος τὸ “οὐχ ἡμέρα ἔστιν”  
 ἀποφάσει πλεονάζει τῇ οὐχί, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀντι-  
 κείμενόν ἐστὶν ἐκείνω. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀντι-  
 κείμενον, ἔσται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀντικείμενα, τὸ τε  
 “ἡμέρα ἔστι (καὶ φῶς ἔστιν)” καὶ τὸ “ἡμέρα  
 ἔστιν” καὶ “οὐχί φῶς ἔστιν.” τοῦ γὰρ “ἡμέρα  
 ἔστιν (καὶ φῶς ἔστιν)” ἀξιώματος ἀποφάσει  
 πλεονάζει τὸ “(ἡμέρα ἔστιν καὶ) οὐχί φῶς ἔστιν.”  
 οὐχὶ δέ γε κατ' αὐτοὺς ταῦτα ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν·  
 οὐκ ἄρα ἀντικείμενά ἐστι (τῷ)<sup>2</sup> τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ  
 90 ἑτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζειν. ναὶ φασιν, ἀλλὰ σὺν  
 τούτῳ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι, σὺν τῷ τὴν ἀπόφασιν  
 προτετάχθαι τοῦ ἑτέρου· τότε γὰρ καὶ κυριεύει  
 τοῦ ὅλου ἀξιώματος, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ “ἡμέρα ἔστιν  
 καὶ οὐχί φῶς ἔστιν,” μέρος οὐσα τοῦ παντός, οὐ  
 κυριεύει πρὸς τὸ ἀποφατικὸν ποιῆσαι τὸ πᾶν.  
 ἐχρῆν οὖν, ἐροῦμεν, προσκεῖσθαι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν  
 ἀντικειμένων ὅτι τότε ἀντικείμενά ἐστιν, ὅταν μὴ  
 ψιλῶς τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀποφάσει πλεονάζῃ,

<sup>1</sup> <καὶ . . . ἔστιν> . . . <καὶ φῶς ἔστιν> . . . <ἡμέρα . . . καὶ>  
 Arnim.

<sup>2</sup> <τῷ> Hervet.

again what Animal is, and what “Capable of bark-  
 ing” is (for out of these was formed the concept of  
 Dog),—so likewise if the True is, according to the 88  
 Stoics, that which subsists and is opposed to some-  
 thing, and the false that which is not subsistent but is  
 opposed to something, in order to conceive these things  
 we must necessarily know what the “opposed” thing  
 is. But the Stoics are certainly not able to explain  
 to us the “opposed”; neither, then, will the true  
 or the false become known. For they say that 89  
 “Opposed things are those of which the one exceeds  
 the other by a negative,”—for instance “It is day—  
 it is not day.” For the proposition “It is not day”  
 exceeds the proposition “It is day” by the negative  
 “not,” and because of this it is opposed thereto.  
 But if this is “opposed,” such propositions as the  
 following will also be opposed—“It is day and it is  
 light” and “It is day and it is not light”; for the  
 proposition “It is day and it is not light” exceeds  
 “It is day and it is light” by the negative. But in  
 fact, according to them, these are not “opposed”;  
 therefore things are not “opposed” through the one  
 exceeding the other by the negative. “Yes,” they 90  
 reply, “but they are opposed with this (added con-  
 dition) that the negative is prefixed to one of the  
 propositions; for then it controls the whole proposi-  
 tion, whereas in the case of “It is day and it is not  
 light,” the negative, being a part of the whole, does  
 not control the whole so as to render it negative.  
 In that case, we will reply, to the concept of “things  
 opposed” it should have been added that they are  
 opposed not when the one simply exceeds the other

ἀλλ' ὅταν ἡ ἀπόφασις προάττηται τοῦ ἀξιώ-  
ματος.

91 Ἄλλος δέ τις καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνος παραλήφεται  
λόγον, ὃ κέχρηται ἐν τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ διδάξει  
ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τέ ἐστι μετουσίᾳ τῆς ἀποφάσεως  
πλεονάζειν τὸ ἀξίωμα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχον τὴν ἀπό-  
φασιν. ὡς γὰρ οὐδὲν μετουσίᾳ θερμοῦ γίνεται  
ψυχρόν, οὕτως οὐδὲν μετουσίᾳ μικροῦ γίνεται μέγα  
ἀλλὰ μικρόν· καὶ ὡς μετοχῇ τοῦ μείζονος γίνεται  
τι μέγα, οὕτω καὶ μετοχῇ τοῦ μικροῦ ἔσται τι  
μικρόν. διὸ καὶ τὴν ἐννεάδα κατὰ τὴν τῆς μονάδος  
πρόσληψιν μὴ γίνεσθαι μείζονα. τὸ γὰρ ἐν ἡττόν  
92 ἐστι τῶν ἐννέα· τοῦτ' οὖν προσλαβούσα ἡ ἐννεὰς  
οὐ γενήσεται πλείων τῶν ἐννέα, ἐλάττων δὲ μᾶλλον.  
[τῇ γὰρ προσλήψει ταύτης οὐ γενήσεται ἡ ἐννεὰς  
τῆς ἐννεάδος μείζων, ἀλλὰ ἐλάσσων μᾶλλον.]  
ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ἡ οὐχὶ ἀπόφασις μικρότερόν τι ἐστι  
τοῦ ἀξιώματος, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἀξίωμα μείζον, διὰ  
τό, ὡς μεγέθους τινὸς μετουσίᾳ γίνεται τι μείζον,  
οὕτω καὶ ἐλάττωνος μετουσίᾳ ἕλαττον ἀποτελεῖται.

93 Ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτωνος λόγος οὕτως εἰς τὸν τόπον  
ὑπὸ τινων μεταχθήσεται· ἐπισυνάπτοντες δὲ ἡμεῖς  
τοῖς προκειμένοις κάκεινο λέγωμεν ὡς εἶπερ τὸ  
ἀληθὲς ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ, πάντως ἢ ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶν  
ἀξίωμα ἢ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἢ καὶ ἀπλοῦν καὶ οὐχ  
ἀπλοῦν. τῶν γὰρ ἀξιωμάτων πρώτην σχεδὸν καὶ  
κυριωτάτην ἐκφέρουσι διαφορὰν οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ  
καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἀπλᾶ τὰ δ' οὐχ  
ἀπλᾶ. καὶ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ὅσα μῆτ' ἐξ ἐνὸς ἀξιώματος  
δὶς λαμβανομένου συνέστηκεν, μῆτ' ἐξ ἀξιωμάτων

<sup>1</sup> τῇ N: εἰ cet., Bekk.—[τῇ . . . μᾶλλον] secl. Kochalsky.

by the negative, but when the negative is prefixed  
to the proposition.

Some other man, too, will adopt the argument of 91  
Plato, which he uses in his book *On the Soul*,<sup>a</sup> and  
will show that it is not possible for the proposition by  
participation in the negative to exceed that which  
has no negative. For as nothing becomes cold by  
participation in the hot, so nothing becomes great,  
but small, by participation in the small; and as a  
thing becomes great by participation in the greater,  
so also a thing will be small by participation in the  
small. And because of this, too, the nine does not  
become greater through the addition of the monad.  
For the one is less than the nine; so by the addition 92  
of it the nine will not become more than nine, but  
rather less. Since, then, the negative "not" is a  
smaller thing than the proposition, it will not make  
the proposition greater, seeing that, just as a thing  
becomes greater by participation in a magnitude, so  
also it is rendered smaller by participation in a smaller  
thing.

By some, then, the argument of Plato will be trans-  
ferred in this wise to our topic; but let us supplement the 93  
arguments already put forward by stating this further  
argument: If the true is a proposition, it certainly  
is either a simple proposition or a not simple or both  
a simple and a not simple. For the Dialecticians pro-  
claim that almost the first and most important dis-  
tinction in propositions is that by which some of them  
are simple, others not simple. And simple are all  
those which are neither compounded of one proposi-  
tion twice repeated,<sup>b</sup> nor of different propositions, by

<sup>a</sup> See Plato, *Phaedo* 103 c.

<sup>b</sup> For the "duplicated" proposition cf. *P.H.* ii. 112.

διαφερόντων διὰ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν συνδέσμων, οἷον  
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν, νύξ ἔστιν, Σωκράτης διαλέγεται,"  
 94 πᾶν ὁ τῆς ὁμοίας ἐστὶν ιδέας. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸν  
 στήμονα ἀπλοῦν λέγομεν καίπερ ἐκ τριχῶν συν-  
 εστῶτα, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐκ στημόνων, οὔτινές εἰσιν ὁμο-  
 γενεῖς,πέπλεκται, οὕτως ἀπλᾶ λέγεται ἀξιώματα,  
 ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀξιωμαίων συνέστηκεν ἀλλ' ἐξ ἄλλων  
 τινῶν. οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ  
 παρόσον οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἀξιώματος δις  
 λαμβανομένου οὔτε ἐκ διαφερόντων συνέστηκεν,  
 ἐξ ἄλλων δὲ τινῶν συγκέκριται, οἷον τοῦ ἡμέρα  
 καὶ τοῦ ἔστιν. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ σύνδεσμός ἐστιν ἐν  
 95 αὐτῷ. οὐχ ἀπλᾶ δὲ ἐτύγγχανε τὰ οἷον διπλᾶ, καὶ  
 ὅσα δ' ἐξ ἀξιώματος δις λαμβανομένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιω-  
 μάτων διαφερόντων συνέστηκεν διὰ συνδέσμου τε ἢ  
 συνδέσμων, οἷον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν· εἰ  
 νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς  
 ἔστιν· ἦτοι ἡμέρα ἔστιν ἢ νύξ ἔστιν."  
 96 τῶν δὲ ἀπλῶν τινὰ μὲν ὠρισμένα ἐστὶν τινὰ δὲ  
 ἀόριστα τινὰ δὲ μέσα, ὠρισμένα μὲν τὰ κατὰ  
 δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενα, οἷον "οὗτος περιπατεῖ, οὗτος  
 κάθηται". δείκνυμι γάρ τινα τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους  
 97 ἀνθρώπων. ἀόριστα δὲ ἐστὶ κατ' αὐτοὺς ἐν οἷς  
 ἀόριστόν τι κυριεύει μόριον, οἷον "τις κάθηται,"  
 μέσα δὲ τὰ οὕτως ἔχοντα "ἄνθρωπος κάθηται"  
 ἢ "Σωκράτης περιπατεῖ." τὸ μὲν οὖν "τις περι-  
 πατεῖ" ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀφώρικέ τινα  
 τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους περιπατούντων· κοινῶς γὰρ ἐφ'  
 ἐκάστου αὐτῶν ἐκφέρεσθαι δύναται· τὸ δὲ "οὗτος  
 κάθηται" ὠρισμένον ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀφώρικε τὸ  
 δεικνύμενον πρόσωπον. τὸ δὲ "Σωκράτης κάθ-

means of some one or more conjunctions; as for  
 example "It is day," "It is night," "Socrates is con-  
 versing," and every proposition of similar form. For 94  
 just as we call the web "simple," although it is com-  
 posed of threads, since it is not woven of webs, which  
 are homogeneous with itself, so propositions are  
 called "simple" since they are not compounded of  
 propositions but of certain other things. For ex-  
 ample, "It is day" is a simple proposition inas-  
 much as it is neither formed from the same proposi-  
 tion twice repeated nor compounded of different  
 propositions, but is constructed of certain other  
 elements, namely "day" and "it is." Moreover, 95  
 there is no conjunction in it either. And "not  
 simple" are those which are, so to say, double, and  
 all such as are compounded of a proposition twice  
 repeated, or of different propositions, by means of  
 one or more conjunctions, as for example—"If it  
 is day, it is day"; "If it is night, it is dark";  
 "Both day exists and light exists"; "Either day  
 exists or night exists."—And of the simple some are 96  
 "definite," some "indefinite," some "intermediate";  
 the definite are those uttered indicatively, for ex-  
 ample "This man is walking," "This man is sitting"  
 (for I am indicating some particular person). "In- 97  
 definite," according to them, are those in which some  
 indefinite part is dominant, as for example "Someone  
 is sitting"; and "intermediate" those like this, "A  
 man is sitting" or "Socrates is walking." Now  
 "Someone is walking" is indefinite since it does not  
 define any one of the individuals who are walking;  
 for it can be applied in common to each one of them;  
 but "This man is sitting" is definite because it  
 defines the person indicated. And "Socrates is is

ηται" μέσον ὑπῆρχεν, ἐπεὶ περ οὔτε ἀόριστόν ἐστιν, ἀφώρικε γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, οὔτε ὠρισμένον, οὐ γὰρ μετὰ δείξεως ἐκφέρεται, ἀλλ' ἔοικε μέσον ἀμφοτέρων ὑπάρχειν, τοῦ τε ἀορίστου καὶ τοῦ ὠρισμένου. 98 γίνεσθαι δέ φασι τὸ ἀόριστον ἀληθές, τὸ "τίς περιπατεῖ" ἢ "τίς κάθηται," ὅταν τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εὐρίσκηται, τὸ "οὗτος κάθηται" ἢ "οὗτος περιπατεῖ." μηδενὸς γὰρ τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους καθημένου οὐ δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ "τίς κάθηται" ἀόριστον.

99 Τοιαῦτα μὲν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων λεγόμενα τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὑπῆρχεν. οἱ δὲ ἀπορητικοὶ ζητοῦσι πρῶτον εἰ δύναται τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀληθές εἶναι· τούτου γὰρ ἀναιρεθέντος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόριστον δύναται ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές, ἀναιρουμένου δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἀορίστου οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον τούτων ὑποστήσεται. ταῦτα δ' ἦν ὡς περ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωμαίων· τοίνυν ἀθετουμένων αὐτῶν οἰχθήσεται καὶ τὰ ἀπλᾶ ἀξιώματα, καὶ οὐκ ἐνέσται λέγειν τὰ ληθές ἐν τοῖς ἀπλοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἀξιώμασιν.

100 καὶ δὴ τὸ ὠρισμένον τοῦτο ἀξίωμα, τὸ "οὗτος κάθηται" ἢ "οὗτος περιπατεῖ," τότε φασὶν ἀληθές ὑπάρχειν ὅταν τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δείξιν πίπτοντι συμβεβήκη τὸ κατηγορήμα, οἷον τὸ καθῆσθαι ἢ τὸ περιπατεῖν. ἀλλ' ἐν τε τῷ λέγειν "οὗτος περιπατεῖ" δεικνυμένου τινὸς τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀνθρώπων, ἥτοι Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λόγου χάριν ὁ ὑπὸ τὴν δείξιν πίπτων ἢ μέρος τι τοῦ Σωκράτους· οὔτε δὲ Σωκράτης ἐστὶν ὁ ὑπὸ τὴν δείξιν πίπτων οὔτε μέρος τι Σωκράτους, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα 101 δύναται ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ ὠρισμένον ἀξίωμα. καὶ Σωκράτης μὲν οὐχ ὑποπίπτει τῇ δείξει, παρῶσον

sitting" is intermediate, because it is neither indefinite (for it defines the particular object), nor definite (for it is not uttered indicatively), but seems to be intermediate between these two, the indefinite and the definite. And they say that the indefinite— 98 "Someone is walking" or "Someone is sitting"—becomes true when the definite—"This man is sitting" or "This man is walking"—is found to be true; for if no one particular person is sitting the indefinite proposition "Someone is sitting" cannot be true.

Such then, to speak summarily, are the statements 99 made by the Dialecticians regarding the "simple" propositions. But the Doubters inquire, firstly, whether the "definite" can be true; for if this is abolished, the "indefinite" cannot be true either; and if the indefinite also is abolished, neither will the "intermediate" subsist. But these are elements, as it were, of the simple propositions; so that if they are rejected the simple propositions also will disappear, and it will not be possible to assert that the true exists in the simple propositions.—Now as to 100 this definite proposition "This man is sitting" or "This man is walking," they declare that it is true when the thing predicated, such as "sitting" or "walking," belongs to the object indicated. But when, in the statement "This man is walking," some one particular man is indicated, the person indicated is either (let us say) Socrates or a part of Socrates; but the person indicated is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates, as we shall establish; therefore the definite proposition cannot be true. Now Socrates 101 is not the object indicated inasmuch as (he being

αὐτοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστῶτος οὐθ' ἢ ψυχῆ δεικνυται οὔτε τὸ σῶμα, ὥστε οὐδὲ τὸ ὅλον ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτου ἔσται.<sup>1</sup> καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ μῦριόν τι Σωκράτους ὑπέπιπτε τῇ δείξει· εἰ γὰρ τῷ ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν πίπτουτι συμβεβηκέναι φασὶ τὸ κατηγορήματα τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι, οὐδέποτε δὲ τῷ δεικνυμένῳ μορίῳ ὄντι ἐλαχίστῳ συμβεβηκε τὸ κατηγορήματα, ὅλον τὸ περιπατεῖν ἢ τὸ καθῆσθαι, κατ' ἀνάγκην οὐδὲ τὸ μῦριον ἔσται πίπτου  
 102 ὑπὸ τὴν δεῖξιν. ἀλλ' εἰ μήτε τοῦτο μήτε Σωκράτους, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστιν, οἴχεται τὸ κατὰ δεῖξιν ἐκφερόμενον ὠρισμένον ἀξίωμα, σὺν τῷ καὶ ἀόριστον αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι σχεδόν· εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὲν τοῦτ' εἶναι τὸ δεικνύμενον τοῦ Σωκράτους μέρος, ἐνδέχεται δὲ μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀόριστον γίνεται τὸ ὅλον. μὴ ὄντος οὖν τοῦ ὠρισμένου ἀξιωματος οὐδὲ τὸ ἀόριστον ἔσται. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὸ μέσον ὑποστήσεται.

103 Πρὸς τούτοις ὅταν λέγωσι τὸ μὲν "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀξίωμα ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ "νῦξ ἔστι" ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸ μὲν "οὐχὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι" ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ "οὐχὶ νῦξ ἔστιν" ἀληθές, ἐπιστήσῃ τις πῶς μία οὐσα καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπόφασις τοῖς μὲν ἀληθέσι προσελθοῦσα ψευδῆ ταῦτα ποιεῖ, τοῖς δὲ ψευδέσιν ἀληθῆ. ὁμοιον γὰρ ἔστι τοῦτο τῷ κατὰ τὸ Αἰσώπειον αἰνίγμα Σειληνῶ, ὃς ὀρών τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνθρωπον χειμῶνος ὥρα καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ ψύχεσθαι τὰς χεῖρας [ἐμφυσῶντα] καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ καίεσθαι ἐμφυσῶντα τῷ στόματι, ἔφη μὴ ἂν ὑπομεῖναι τοιοῦτῳ θηρίῳ συζῆν ἐξ οὗ

<sup>1</sup> ὥστε οὐδὲ . . . πίπτου ἔσται: οὔτε . . . πίπτουτα MSS., Bekk. (εἴθ' ἢ ψ. δ. εἶτε τὸ σ., οὐχὶ καὶ . . . πίπτει c). Mutsch.)

compounded of soul and body) neither his soul nor his body is indicated, so that he will not be indicated as a whole either. Nor yet is a part of Socrates the object indicated; for if they assert that the thing predicated (walking or sitting) belongs to the object indicated, while the thing predicated, such as walking or sitting, never belongs to the part indicated, it being very small, it necessarily follows that the part will not be the object indicated. But if neither this nor  
 102 Socrates (is indicated), and besides these there is no other alternative, then the definite proposition as indicatively stated disappears—in addition to the fact that it also becomes practically indefinite. For if the thing indicated admits of being this part of Socrates, and admits also of being not this part but another, then the whole necessarily becomes indefinite. If, then, the definite proposition is non-existent, neither will the indefinite exist. And because of this the intermediate will not subsist either.

Furthermore, when they say that the proposition  
 103 "It is day" is at present true but "It is night" false, and "It is not day" false but "It is not night" true, one will ponder how a negative, which is one and the same, when attached to things true makes them false, and attached to things false makes them true. For this is like the Silenus in the riddle of Aesop who, on seeing the same man in the winter season blowing with his mouth both to save his hands from being cold, and to save himself from being burnt, declared that he could not endure to live with a beast of a kind such that out of him proceed

104 τὰ ἐναντιώτατα προέρχεται. ὧδε γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ ἢ ἀπόφασις τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα ἀνύπαρκτα ποιοῦσα, τὰ δὲ ἀνύπαρκτα ὑπαρκτά, τεραστίου φύσεως μετέλιπεν. ἢ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν θέλουσιν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἢ (μήτε ὑπάρχειν μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἢ)<sup>1</sup> ὑπάρχειν ἅμα καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν, πῶς ὑπάρχοντι προσελοῦσα ἀνύπαρκτον τὸ ὅλον ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχον; ὑπάρχον γὰρ ὑπάρχοντι προσγενόμενον βεβαιοὶ μᾶλλον τὴν ὑπάρχοντι προσελοῦσα ὑπαρκτὸν αὐτὸ ποιεῖ καὶ οὐ μᾶλλον ἀνύπαρκτον; ἀνύπαρκτῳ γὰρ ἀνύπαρκτον προστεθὲν οὐχ ὑπαρξῖν ἀλλ' ἀνυπαρξίαν ἀπεργάζεται. ἢ πῶς ἀνύπαρκτος οὐσα μετατίθησι τὸ ὑπαρκτὸν εἰς ἀνυπαρξίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ μὲν τι ὑπαρκτὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀνύπαρκτον αὐτὸ ποιεῖ; ὡς γὰρ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν συντεθέντα οὐ μέλαν ἢ λευκὸν ποιεῖ ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τι λευκὸν κατὰ δέ τι μέλαν, οὕτω καὶ ἀνύπαρκτον ὑπαρκτῷ συνελθὼν τὸ ὅλον ποιήσει κατὰ μὲν τι ὑπαρκτὸν κατὰ δέ τι ἀνύπαρκτον. ἄλλως τε τὸ ἀνύπαρκτὸν τι ποιοῦν ποιεῖ τι, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ἔστι καὶ ὑπάρχει· ἢ ἄρα ἀπόφασις μὴ ὑπάρχουσα οὐδὲ ποιήσει τι ἀνύπαρκτον.<sup>2</sup> λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν μήτε ὑπάρχειν αὐτὴν μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχειν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοιαύτη ἔστι, πῶς πάλιν μήτε ὑπάρχουσα μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχουσα τῷ μὲν ὑπάρχοντι προσελοῦσα ἀνυπαρξίαν ποιεῖ, τῷ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχοντι ὑπαρξῖν; ὡς γὰρ τὸ μήτε θερμὸν μήτε ψυχρὸν τῷ θερμῷ προσελθὼν οὐ δύναται ποιῆσαι ψυχρὸν, οὐδὲ τῷ ψυχρῷ θερμὸν, οὕτως

<sup>1</sup> <μήτε . . . ἢ> Heintz.

<sup>2</sup> ἀνύπαρκτον Kalbfleisch: ὑπαρκτὸν mss., Bekk.

things most opposite. Thus, too, the negative itself, 104 by making existing things non-existent and non-existents existent, partakes of the miraculous. For they claim that it either exists or exists not, or (neither exists nor exists not, or) both exists and exists not. And if it exists, how, by its attachment to an existing thing, does it make the whole non-existent and not, rather, existent? For an existing thing attached to an existing thing further strengthens its existence. But if it is non-existent, for what reason when 105 attached to what does not exist does it make it existent and not, rather, non-existent? For a non-existent attached to a non-existent produces, not existence, but non-existence. Or how when it is non-existent does it transform the existent into non-existence, instead of making it partly existent and partly non-existent? For just as white and black, when put together, do not make black or white but what is partly white and partly black, so also the non-existent combined with the existent will make the whole partly existent and partly non-existent. Besides, that which makes something non-existent 106 makes something, and that which makes is and exists; the negative, therefore, as not existing, will not make anything non-existent. It remains, therefore, to say that it neither exists nor exists not. But if such is its nature, how, once more, when it neither exists nor exists not, does it cause non-existence when attached to what exists and existence when attached to what does not exist? For just as that which 107 is neither hot nor cold when attached to what is hot cannot make it cold, nor the cold hot, so it is

ἀλογόν<sup>1</sup> ἔστι τὸ μήτε ὑπάρχον μήτε μὴ ὑπάρχον τῷ μὲν ὑπάρχοντι προσελθόν ἀνυπαρξίαν ποιεῖν, τῷ δὲ ἀνυπαρκτῷ ὑπαρξίω. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ἐνέσται ἀπορεῖν καὶ εἴαν κατὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπάρχειν λέγωσι τὴν ἀπόφασιν, κατὰ δὲ τι ἀνυπαρκτον εἶναι.

- 108 Νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν ψηλαφηθείσης τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν ἀξιωματῶν παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς νομοθεσίας, μετῴωμεν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν. καὶ δὴ οὐχ ἀπλᾶ μὲν ἔστιν ἀξιώματα τὰ ἀνώτερον προειρημένα, ἅπερ ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἀξιωματῶν διαφερόντων συνέστηκε καὶ ἐν οἷς
- 109 σύνδεσμος ἢ σύνδεσμοὶ ἐπικρατοῦσιν. λαμβανέσθω δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος τὸ καλούμενον συνημμένον. τοῦτο τοῖνυν συνέστηκεν ἐξ ἀξιώματος διαφορουμένου ἢ ἐξ ἀξιωματῶν διαφερόντων διὰ τοῦ "εἰ" ἢ "εἴπερ" συνδέσμου, οἷον ἐκ διαφορουμένου μὲν ἀξιώματος καὶ τοῦ "εἰ" συνδέσμου συνέστηκε τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐκ διαφερόντων δὲ ἀξιωματῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦ "εἴπερ" συνδέσμου τὸ οὕτως ἔχον "εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν." τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ ἀξιωματῶν τὸ μετὰ τὸν εἰ ἢ τὸν εἴπερ σύνδεσμον τεταγμένον ἡγούμενον τε καὶ πρῶτον καλεῖται, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν λήγόν τε καὶ δεύτερον, καὶ εἴαν ἀναστροφῶς ἐκφέρηται τὸ ὅλον συνημμένον, οἷον οὕτως "φῶς ἔστιν εἴπερ ἡμέρα ἔστιν." καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ λήγον μὲν καλεῖται τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν" καίπερ πρῶτον ἐξενεχθέν, ἡγούμενον δὲ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" καίπερ δεύτερον λεγόμενον, διὰ τὸ μετὰ τὸν εἴπερ σύνδεσμον τετάχθαι.
- 111 ἢ μὲν οὖν σύστασις τοῦ συνημμένου, ὡς ἐν συν-

<sup>1</sup> ἀλογον Kalbfleisch: ἀνάλογον mss., Bekk.

contrary to reason that what is neither existent nor non-existent when attached to the existent should produce non-existence, and when attached to the non-existent, existence. And it will also be open to us to raise the same difficulties if they should declare that the negative is partly existent and partly non-existent.

And now that we have in some degree handled 108 the legislation of the Dialecticians regarding simple propositions, let us proceed also to that which concerns the non-simple. Now non-simple propositions are those already mentioned above, being such as are composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, and are controlled by a conjunction or conjunctions. Of these let us take for the present 109 the hypothetical proposition so-called. This, then, is composed of a duplicated proposition or of differing propositions, by means of the conjunction "if" or "if in fact"; thus, for example, from a duplicated proposition and the conjunction "if" there is composed such a hypothetical proposition as this—"If it is day, it is day"; and from differing propositions, and by 110 means of the conjunction "if in fact," one in this form—"If in fact it is day, it is light." And of the propositions contained in the hypothetical proposition that which is placed after the conjunction "if" or "if in fact" is called both "antecedent" and "first," and the other one both "consequent" and "second," even if the whole proposition is reversed in order of expression, as thus—"It is light, if in fact it is day"; for in this, too, the proposition "it is light" is called "consequent" although it is uttered first, and "it is day" antecedent, although it is spoken second, owing to the fact that it is placed after the conjunction "if in fact." Such then—to put it briefly—is the con- 111

τόμῳ εἰπεῖν, ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι δὲ δοκεῖ  
 τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξίωμα ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ  
 τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον καὶ ὄντος τοῦ ἡγουμένου  
 ἔσεσθαι τὸ λήγον. ὅθεν σωζομένης μὲν τῆς  
 τοιαύτης ἐπαγγελίας καὶ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἡγου-  
 μένῳ τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθὲς γίνεται καὶ τὸ συν-  
 112 ημιμένον, μὴ σωζομένης δὲ ψεύδος. διόπερ ἀπὸ  
 τούτου εὐθὺς ἀρξάμενοι σκοπῶμεν εἰ δύναται  
 ἀληθὲς τι συνημμένον καὶ σῶζον τὴν εἰρημένην  
 ἐπαγγελίαν εὐρεθῆναι.

Κοινῶς μὲν γάρ φασιν ἅπαντες οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ  
 ὑγιᾶν εἶναι συνημμένον ὅταν ἀκολουθῆ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ  
 ἡγουμένῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον· περὶ δὲ τοῦ πότε  
 ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ πῶς στασιάζουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους,  
 καὶ μαχόμενα τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκτίθενται κριτήρια.  
 113 οἷον ὁ μὲν Φίλων ἔλεγεν ἀληθὲς γίνεσθαι τὸ συν-  
 ημιμένον ὅταν μὴ ἀρχῆται ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγῃ  
 ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ὥστε τριχῶς μὲν γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτὸν  
 ἀληθὲς συνημμένον, καθ' ἓνα δὲ τρόπον ψεύδος.  
 καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπ' ἀληθὲς  
 λήγῃ, ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς  
 ἔστιν"· καὶ ὅταν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ  
 ψεύδος λήγῃ, πάλιν ἀληθὲς, οἷον τὸ "εἰ πέταται  
 114 ἡ γῆ, πτέρυγας ἔχει ἡ γῆ," ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ  
 ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθὲς δὲ λήγον ἐστὶν  
 ἀληθὲς, ὡς τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ."  
 μόνως δὲ γίνεται ψεύδος ὅταν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ  
 ἀληθοῦς λήγῃ ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ "εἰ  
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, νύξ ἔστιν"· ἡμέρας γὰρ οὐσης τὸ μὲν  
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἀληθὲς ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἦν ἡγούμενον,  
 τὸ δὲ "νύξ ἔστι" ψεύδος ἐστίν, ὅπερ ἦν λήγον.

struction of the hypothetical proposition, and a  
 proposition of this kind seems to promise that its  
 second logically follows its first, and that if the  
 antecedent exists the consequent will exist. Hence,  
 if this sort of promise is fulfilled and the consequent  
 follows the antecedent, the hypothetical proposition  
 is true; but if it is not fulfilled, it is false. Accord- 112  
 112 ings, let us begin at once with this problem, and  
 consider whether any hypothetical proposition can  
 be found which is true and which fulfils the promise  
 described.

Now all the Dialecticians agree in asserting that a  
 hypothetical proposition is valid when its consequent  
 follows (logically) its antecedent; but as to when and  
 how it so follows they disagree with one another and  
 propound conflicting criteria of this "following."  
 Thus Philo<sup>a</sup> declared that "the hypothetical is true 113  
 whenever it does not begin with what is true and end  
 with what is false"; so that, according to him, the  
 hypothetical is true in three ways and false in one  
 way. For whenever it begins with truth and ends in  
 truth it is true, as thus—"If it is day, it is light."  
 And whenever it begins with what is false and ends  
 in what is false, once more it is true, as for instance  
 "If the earth flies, the earth has wings." Likewise 114  
 114 also that which begins with what is false and ends  
 with what is true is true, as thus—"If the earth flies,  
 the earth exists." And it is false only in this one way,  
 when it begins with truth and ends in what is false,  
 as in a proposition of this kind—"If it is day, it is  
 night"; for when it is day the clause "It is day"  
 is true, and this was the antecedent, but the clause  
 "It is night," which was the consequent, is false.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 110; Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxvi.



- 115 Διόδωρος δὲ ἀληθὲς εἶναι φησι συνημμένον ὅπερ μήτε ἐνεδέχετο μήτε ἐνδέχεται ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος. ὅπερ μάχεται τῇ Φίλωνος θέσει. τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι" ἡμέρας οὐσης ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος κάμου διαλεγομένου κατὰ μὲν τὸν Φίλωνα ἀληθὲς ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ περ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," κατὰ δὲ τὸν Διόδωρον ψεύδος. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ποτὲ ἀρξάμενον τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγειν τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡσυχάσαντος ἐμοῦ. καὶ ἐνδέχεται ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγειν τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι"· πρὶν γὰρ ἀρξῶμαι διαλέγεσθαι, ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς μὲν ἤρχετο τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐπὶ ψεύδος δὲ ἔληγε τὸ "ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι." πάλιν τὸ οὕτως ἔχον "εἰ νύξ ἔστιν, ἐγὼ διαλέγομαι," ἡμέρας οὐσης καὶ σιωπῶντος ἐμοῦ κατὰ μὲν Φίλωνα ὡσαύτως ἀληθὲς, ἀπὸ γὰρ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγει, κατὰ δὲ τὸν Διόδωρον ψεύδος· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀρξάμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς λῆξαι εἰς ψεύδος νυκτὸς ἐπελθούσης, καὶ πάλιν ἐμοῦ μὴ 117 διαλεγομένου ἀλλ' ἡσυχάζοντος. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ "εἰ νύξ ἔστιν, ἡμέρα ἔστιν" ἡμέρας οὐσης κατὰ μὲν Φίλωνα διὰ τοῦτ' ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον τοῦ "νύξ ἔστιν" εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," κατὰ δὲ Διόδωρον διὰ τοῦτο ψεύδος ὅτι ἐνδέχεται νυκτὸς ἐπισχούσης, ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον αὐτὸ τοῦ "νύξ ἔστιν," ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγειν τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν."
- 118 Τοιαύτης οὖν οὐσης ὡς ἐν παραδείγματος μέρει τῆς ἐν τοῖς κριτηρίοις τοῦ συνημμένου ἀξιώματος 298

—But Diodorus<sup>a</sup> asserts that "the hypothetical proposition is true which neither admitted nor admits of beginning with truth and ending in falsehood." And this is in conflict with the statement of Philo. For a hypothetical of this kind—"If it is day, I am conversing," when at the present moment it is day and I am conversing, is true according to Philo since it begins with the true clause "It is day" and ends with the true "I am conversing"; but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits of beginning with a clause that is, at one time, true and ending in the false clause "I am conversing," when I have ceased speaking; also it admitted of beginning with truth and ending with the falsehood "I am conversing," for before I began to converse it began with the truth "It is day" and ended in the falsehood "I am conversing." Again, a proposition in this form—"If it is night, I am conversing," when it is day and I am silent, is likewise true according to Philo, for it begins with what is false and ends in what is false; but according to Diodorus it is false, for it admits of beginning with truth and ending in falsehood, after night has come on, and when I, again, am not conversing but keeping silence. Moreover, the proposition "If it is night, it is day," when it is day, is true according to Philo for the reason that it begins with the false "It is night" and ends in the true "It is day"; but according to Diodorus it is false for the reason that it admits of beginning, when night comes on, with the truth "It is night" and ending in the falsehood "It is day."

Such, then, being the contradictory character (as these examples show) of the criteria of the hypo-

<sup>a</sup> For Diodorus Cronos cf. *P.H.* ii. 110.

ὑπεναντιώσεως, μήποτε ἄπορος γίνεται ἢ τοῦ  
 ὑγιούς συνημμένου διάγνωσις· ἵνα γὰρ μάθωμεν  
 τοῦτο, πρὸ παντὸς δεῖ ἐπικριθῆναι τὴν περὶ τῆς  
 ὑγιότητος αὐτοῦ τῶν διαλεκτικῶν διάστασιν. ἐφ'  
 ὅσον δὲ ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστι, μένεω ἀνάγκη καὶ αὐτὸ  
 119 ἐν ἐποχῇ· καὶ εἰκότως. ἦτοι γὰρ πᾶσι τοῖς κρι-  
 τηρίοις τῶν διαλεκτικῶν προσέξομεν ἢ τινι τούτων.  
 ἀλλὰ πᾶσι μὲν οὐχ οἶόν τέ ἐστι προσέχειν· μάχεται  
 γάρ, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων δυοῖν ὑπέδειξα, τὰ  
 δὲ μαχόμενα οὐ δύναται ἐπ' ἴσης εἶναι πιστά. εἰ  
 δὲ τινι τούτων, ἦτοι αὐτόθεν καὶ ἀκρίτως προσ-  
 ἔξομέν τινι, ἢ μετὰ λόγου τοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι ὑγιές  
 120 ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον κριτήριον. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκρίτως  
 καὶ αὐτόθεν συγκαταθησόμεθ' αὐτὸ κριτηρίω, τί  
 μᾶλλον τῷδε ἢ τῷδε συγκαταθησόμεθα; ὅπερ  
 ἴσον ἦν τῷ μηδενὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι διὰ τὴν μάχην.  
 εἰ δὲ μετὰ λόγου τοῦ δεικνύντος ὅτι ὑγιές ἐστι τὸ  
 παραλαμβανόμενον ὑφ' ἡμῶν τοῦ συνημμένου κρι-  
 τήριον, ἦτοι οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀσύνακτός ἐστι καὶ  
 121 ἀπέραντος ἢ συνακτικός καὶ περαίνων. ἀλλ'  
 ἀσύνακτος μὲν καθεστὼς καὶ ἀπέραντος ἄπιστός  
 ἐστι καὶ μοχθηρὸς ἐν τῷ προκρίνειν τι τοῦ συν-  
 ημμένου κριτήριον. εἰ δὲ συνακτικός ὑπάρχει, πάν-  
 τως διὰ τοῦτο συνακτικός τυγχάνει ὅτι ἀκολουθεῖ  
 αὐτοῦ τοῖς λήμμασιν ἢ ἐπιφορά, ὥστε δι' ἀκολουθίαν  
 122 θίας τινὸς αὐτὸν δοκιμάζεσθαι. τὴν δὲ ἀκολουθίαν  
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς ζητουμένην ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου λόγῳ<sup>1</sup>  
 ἔδει δοκιμάζεσθαι. τοίνυν ἴσον ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτον τῷ  
 εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα γὰρ τὸ

<sup>1</sup> λόγῳ Heintz : λόγου mss., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> i.e. Philo and Diodorus, §§ 113-117.

thetical proposition, it is to be feared that the task of  
 distinguishing the valid hypothetical is impracticable ;  
 for in order that we may perceive this, there must  
 first of all be a decision of the controversy of the Dia-  
 lecticians regarding its validity. And so long as this  
 remains undecided, the valid proposition itself must  
 also of necessity remain in suspense. And naturally 119  
 so. For we shall either give heed to all the criteria  
 of the Dialecticians, or to some one of them. But  
 it is not possible to give heed to them all ; for—as  
 I have pointed out in the case of the two mentioned  
 above<sup>a</sup>—they are conflicting, and things which con-  
 flict cannot be equally trustworthy. And if we give  
 heed to some one of them, we shall give heed to it  
 either at once and uncritically, or with the support  
 of reasoning which proves that a criterion of this kind  
 is valid. And if we shall assent to any one criterion 120  
 uncritically and at once, why shall we assent to this  
 one rather than to that one? And this is equivalent  
 to giving one's assent to none, because of the conflict.  
 But if we assent with the support of reasoning which  
 proves that the criterion of the hypothetical adopted  
 by us is valid, then this reasoning is either incon-  
 clusive and indecisive or conclusive and decisive.  
 But if it is inconclusive and indecisive it is un- 121  
 trustworthy and unsound when preferring a certain  
 criterion of the hypothetical. And if it is conclusive,  
 certainly it is conclusive for the reason that its con-  
 clusion follows its premisses, so that it is approved  
 because of a certain consistency. But the consist- 122  
 ency sought in the case of the hypothetical ought to  
 have been approved by reasoning. So, then, a result  
 of this kind is equivalent to falling into the fallacy  
 of circular reasoning ; for in order to perceive the

συνημμένον ἐξ ἀκολουθίας ὀφείλον δοκιμάζεσθαι μάθωμεν, ἐπὶ λόγον τινα δεῖ δραμεῖν, καὶ ἵνα οὗτος ὁ λόγος ὑγιής ᾖ, τὴν ἀκολουθίαν δεῖ προπεπι-  
 123 τῶσθαι, ἀφ' ἧς ὅτι ἔστιν ὑγιής κρίνεται. μὴ ἔχοντες οὖν τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀπορίᾳ, οὐδὲ συνακτικὸν ἔξομεν λόγον. τοῦτον δὲ μὴ ἔχοντες οὐδὲ ἀπόδειξιν ἔξομεν λόγος γάρ ἐστι συνακτικὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἀποδείξεως δὲ μὴ παρουσίας ἀναιρείται ἢ δογματικὴ φαντασία.  
 124 Ἐνέσται δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ συμπεπλεγμένα καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ διεzeugμένα κοινῶς ἐπὶ τε τὰ λοιπὰ εἶδη τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν ἀξιωματῶν διαβαίνειν. τὸ γὰρ συμπεπλεγμένον ἐξ ἀπλῶν ὀφείλει ἢ οὐκ ἐξ ἀπλῶν ἢ ἐκ μικτῶν συνεστάναι, πάντα δὲ  
 125 ταῦτα ἠπόρηται τῶν ἀπλῶν προσηπορημένων. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν λέγωσιν ὑγιές εἶναι συμπεπλεγμένον τὸ πάντ' ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθῆ, οἷον τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ φῶς ἔστιν," ψεῦδος δὲ τὸ (ἐν)<sup>1</sup> ἔχον ψεῦδος, πάλιν νομοθετοῦσιν αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς. ἀκόλουθον γὰρ ἦν, εἰ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἐκ πάντων ἀληθῶν σύνθετον εὐθὺς ἀληθές εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐκ πάντων ψευδῶν συγκείμενον ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ ἐκ ψευδῶν ἅμα καὶ ἀληθῶν μὴ μᾶλλον ἀληθές εἶναι  
 126 ἢ ψεῦδος. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεστιν αὐτοῖς ἃ θέλουσι νομοθετεῖν καὶ ὡς προαιροῦνται περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διατάττεσθαι, ἐπιτρεπτέον μὲν τὸ ἐν ἔχον ψεῦδος συμπεπλεγμένον λέγεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῖς ψεῦδος, ἔξέσται δὲ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀντιδιατάττεσθαι καὶ λέγειν τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων ἀληθῶν ἐνὸς δὲ ψεῦδους

<sup>1</sup> (ἐν) Heintz.

<sup>a</sup> "Parade," or "outward show," seems the only possible  
 302

hypothetical which requires to be approved by its consistency, we are obliged to have recourse to a form of reasoning, and in order that this reasoning may be valid, the consistency by which its validity is judged must be confirmed beforehand. If then, judging by  
 123 this *impasse*, we do not possess the valid hypothetical, neither shall we possess conclusive reasoning; and not possessing this, we shall not possess proof either; for proof is conclusive reasoning. And if proof is absent, the parade <sup>a</sup> of Dogmatism is destroyed.

From these we may pass over both to the conjunctive and to the disjunctive, and generally to all the remaining forms of non-simple propositions. For the conjunctive must be composed either of simple or of non-simple or of mixed propositions, and all these are subject to doubt when the simple sort are already doubted. Moreover, when they declare that the  
 124 conjunctive which has all its parts true is valid—as, for instance, "It is day and it is light,"—and that that which has a false part is false, they are again laying down the law for themselves. For it should have followed at once that, if the compound with all its parts true is true, the compound with all its parts false is false, but that which has some parts false and at the same time some true is no more true than false. For if it is open to them to lay down what laws they  
 126 please and to make rules about these matters just as they choose, we must allow their assertion that the conjunctive which contains one false clause is false; but it will be open also to others to make a contrary rule and assert that the conjunctive with several true

sense of *φαντασία* here. Very probably the text is corrupt, but Heintz's *φιλοσοφία*, adopted by Mutschmann, is not convincing. One might suggest *παντά<π>ασι*.

- 127 συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθὲς ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων προσεκτέον ἐστίν, ἀκόλουθον δῆπουθεν τὸ τι μὲν ψεῦδος ἔχον τι δὲ ἀληθὲς συμπεπλεγμένον μὴ μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος εἶναι λέγειν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ἐκ μέλανος μειγμένον οὐ μᾶλλον λευκὸν ἐστὶν ἢ μέλαν (τὸ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸν λευκὸν ἦν καὶ τὸ μέλαν μέλαν ὑπῆρχεν), οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς μόνον ἀληθὲς εἶναι συμβέβηκεν, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος μόνον ψεῦδος ὑπάρχει, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων οὐ μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς ἢ
- 128 ψεῦδος προσαγορευτέον. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, φασί, τὸ κατὰ μὲν τὰ πλεῖστα μέρη ὑγιὲς ἰμάτιον κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ διερρωγὸς οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν πλείστων καὶ ὑγιῶν μερῶν ὑγιὲς εἶναι λέγομεν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλίγου καὶ διερρωγότητος διερρωγός, οὕτω καὶ τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον, κἂν ἐν μόνον ἔχη ψεῦδος πλείονα δὲ ἀληθῆ, λεχθήσεται τὸ ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ
- 129 ἐνὸς ψεῦδος. ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐθὴς. τῷ μὲν γὰρ βίῳ συγχωρητέον καταχρηστικοῖς ὀνόμασι χρῆσθαι, μὴ πάντως τὸ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ἀληθὲς ζητοῦντι ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν. φρέαρ γοῦν ὀρύσσειν φαιμέν καὶ χλαμύδα ὑφαίνειν καὶ οἰκίαν οἰκοδομεῖν, οὐ κυρίως· εἰ γὰρ φρέαρ ἐστίν, οὐκ ὀρύσσεται ἀλλ' ὀρύρκεται, καὶ εἰ χλαμύς ἐστίν, οὐχ ὑφαίνεται ἀλλ' ὑφανταί. ὥστε ἐν μὲν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ κοινῇ συνηθείᾳ τόπον εἶχεν ἢ κατάχρησις· ὅταν δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ζητῶμεν πράγματα, τότε ἔχουσι δεῖ τῆς ἀκριβείας.
- 130 Ἄλλ' ὅτι μὲν ἀπορός ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος καὶ πολλὴν ἔχων τὴν ταραχὴν τοῖς ἐν ἀσωμάτῳ τινὶ λεκτῷ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ψεῦδος ἀπολείπουσιν, ἐκ τούτων αὐτάρκως ὑποδέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἐν φωνῇ

clauses and one false is true. But if we ought to give heed to the real nature of these things, it is surely logical to say that the conjunctive which has one part true and one part false is no more true than false; for just as what is compounded of white and black is no more white than black (for the white was white and the black was black), so also the true is in fact only true and the false is only false, and the compound of the two must be described as no more true than false.—But, they say, just as in ordinary speech<sup>a</sup> we do not say that the garment which is in most parts sound, but in a small part torn, is sound because of its more numerous and sound parts, but we call it torn because of its small part which is torn, so also with the conjunctive,—if it has only one part false and several true, the whole will be named after the one false part. But this is silly. For we must allow ordinary speech to make use of inexact terms, as it does not seek after what is really true but what is supposed to be true. Thus we speak of digging a well and weaving a cloak and building a house, but not with exactness; for if there is a well, it is not being dug but it has been dug; and if there is a cloak, it is not being woven but it has been woven. So that in ordinary life and common conversation inexact speech is in place, but when we are inquiring into real facts, then we must stick to accuracy.

By all this it has been made sufficiently clear that the argument of those who make truth and falsehood to lie in incorporeal "expression" is hopeless and full of confusion; and it is easy also to see that

<sup>a</sup> Lit. "in life."

- ταῦθ' ὑποσησαμένοις οὐκ ἔστιν εὐπορος, ῥάδιον  
 131 μαθεῖν. πᾶσα γὰρ φωνή, εἴ ἔστιν, ἤτοι γινομένη  
 ἔστιν ἢ σιωπωμένη· οὔτε δὲ ἡ γινομένη ἔστι τῷ  
 μὴ ὑφ'εστάναι οὔτε ἡ σιωπωμένη τῷ μήπω γίνε-  
 σθαι· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡ φωνή. ἡ μὲν οὖν γινομένη  
 οὐκ ἔστιν, καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων δείκνυται· οὔτε  
 γὰρ οἰκία γινομένη οἰκία ἔστιν, οὐ ναῦς, οὐκ ἄλλο  
 τι τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστ' οὐδὲ φωνή. ὅτι δ' οὐδ' ἡ  
 σιωπωμένη ὑφέστηκεν, ὁμόλογον. εἴπερ οὖν ἡ  
 γίνεται φωνή ἢ σιωπάται, κατ' οὐδέτερον δὲ  
 τούτων τῶν χρόνων ἔστιν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη φωνή.
- 132 Καὶ ἄλλως, εἴ ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθές, ἤτοι ἐν  
 ἐλαχίστῃ ἔστι φωνῇ ἢ ἐν μακρᾷ· οὔτε δὲ ἐν ἐλα-  
 χίστῃ, ἀμερές γάρ ἔστι τὸ ἐλάχιστον, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές  
 οὐκ ἀμερές· οὔτε ἐν μακρᾷ, ἀνυπόστατος γάρ ἔστιν  
 αὕτη διὰ τὸ, ὅτε μὲν τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς προφέρεται  
 μέρος, μήπω εἶναι τὸ δεύτερον, ὅτε δὲ τὸ δεύτερον,  
 μηκέτι εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον. οὐ τοίνυν ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι  
 133 τὸ ἀληθές. πρὸς τούτοις, εἴ ἐν φωνῇ ἔστιν,  
 ἤτοι ἐν σημαίνουσῃ ἢ μὴ ἐν σημαίνουσῃ. ἀλλ'  
 ἐν μὲν τῇ μὴ σημαίνουσῃ τι, ὅλον τῇ βλίτυρι καὶ  
 τῇ σκιυδαψός, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τι· πῶς γὰρ τοῦ μὴ  
 σημαινομένου πράγματος οἶόν τέ ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθοῦς  
 134 ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι; λείπεται ἄρα λέγειν ἐν τῇ σημα-  
 νούσῃ. ὃ δὴ πάλιν ἔστιν ἀδύνατον· οὐδεμία γὰρ  
 φωνή ὡς φωνή σημαντικὴ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ ἐχρῆν πάν-  
 τας τοὺς ἀντιλαμβανομένους φωνῆς Ἑλληνας καὶ  
 βαρβάρους ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ τοῦ σημαινομένου  
 ὑπ' αὐτῆς. ὥστε οὐδὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐν φωνῇ θετέον  
 135 τὰ ληθές. τῶν τε φωνῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσὶν ἀπλαῖ

the argument of those who place them in speech is not satisfactory. For every speech, if it exists, is 131 either coming to be or silenced; but neither does that which is coming to be exist, owing to its non-subsistence, nor that which is silenced, owing to its not as yet coming to be. Speech, therefore, does not exist. Now that which is coming to be does not exist, as is shown by parallel instances; for a house when coming to be is not a house, nor is a ship, nor anything else of the sort; nor, consequently, speech. And that silent speech has no existence either is admitted. If, then, speech is either becoming or silenced, and at neither of these periods exists, speech will not exist.

Another objection,—if the true resides in speech, 132 it is either in a minimal or in a long speech; but it is not in a minimal, for the minimal object is indivisible and the true is not indivisible; nor is it in a long speech, for this is not really existent because, when the first part of it is being uttered, the second does not as yet exist, and when the second is being uttered the first no longer exists. So, then, the true does not reside in speech.—Furthermore, if it resides in speech, 133 it is either in significant or in non-significant speech. But it will not exist in that which has no significance, such as the words "Blituri" and "Skindapsos"; for how is it possible to accept as true a thing which is not significant? It only remains, therefore, to say 134 that it resides in significant speech. But this again is impossible; for no speech as speech is significant, for, were it so, all the Greeks and barbarians on perceiving speech ought also to have perceived what is signified by it. So that on this ground, too, the true must not be located in speech.—Also, some forms of 135

- αἱ δὲ σύνθετοι, ἀπλαῖ μὲν οἶον ἢ Δίῳ, σύνθετοι δὲ ὡσπερ ἢ “ Δίῳ περιπατεῖ.” εἰ οὖν ἐν φωνῇ ἔστι τάληθές, ἤτοι ἐν ἀπλῇ ἔστιν ἢ ἐν συνθέτῳ. ἀλλ’ ἐν μὲν ἀπλῇ καὶ ἀσυνθέτῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀξίωμα γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ τάληθές, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀξίωμα ἀσύνθετον.
- 136 ἐν συνθέτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ μηδεμίαν σύνθετον ὑφεστάναι λέξιν, οἶον τὴν “ Δίῳ ἔστιν.” ὅτε γὰρ λέγομεν τὴν Δίῳ, οὕτω λέγομεν τὴν ἔστιν, καὶ ὅτε ταύτην προφερόμεθα, οὐκέτ’ ἐκείνην λέγομεν. ὡστ’ οὐδ’ ἐν φωνῇ τάληθές.
- 137 Καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας, ὡς ὑπενόησαν τινες. εἰ γὰρ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἔστι τάληθές, οὐδὲν ἔσται τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀληθές· τὸ γὰρ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐκτὸς. ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ λέγειν μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀληθές· ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπολείπειν τάληθές.
- 138 Τῶν τε κινήματων τῆς διανοίας ἰδίων ὄντων ἐκάστου οὐδὲν ἔσται κοινὸν ἀληθές, μηδενὸς δὲ ὄντος κοινοῦ τινὸς ἀληθοῦς πάντ’ ἔσται ἀσαφὴ καὶ διάφωνα· ὁ γὰρ ἔχει οὗτος ἀληθές, τουτέστι τὸ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας, τοῦθ’ ἕτερος οὐκ ἔχει, καὶ ἀναστροφῶς, ὁ ἐκείνος ἔχει, τοῦθ’ οὗτος οὐκ εἴληφεν. ἄτοπον δὲ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι λέγειν συμφώνως ἀληθές· τοίουν καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ὑποκεῖσθαι τάληθές ἀτοπὸν ἔστι καὶ οὐχ ὑγιές.
- Ἀκολουθὸν τέ ἐστι τοῖς ἐν τῷ κινήματι τῆς διανοίας ἀπολείπουσι τάληθές πάνθ’ ὁμολογεῖν ἀληθῆ εἶναι, οἶον τὸ κίνημα τῆς Ἐπικούρου διανοίας καὶ Ζήνωνος καὶ Δημοκρίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων· πᾶσι

speech are simple, others composite—simple as, for instance, “ Dion ” ; and composite, as “ Dion walks.” If, then, the true exists in speech, it exists either in simple or in composite speech ; but it does not exist in the simple and non-composite ; for the true must be a proposition, and no proposition is non-composite. And it will not exist in composite speech because no composite expression (such as “ Dion exists ”) subsists ; for when we are saying “ Dion ” we are not as yet saying “ exists,” and when we are uttering the latter we are no longer saying the former. So that the true is not in speech.

Nor yet is it in the motion of the intellect, as some have surmised. For if the true is in the motion of the intellect, none of the external things will be true ; for the motion of the intellect is within us and not external. But it is absurd to say that none of the external things is true ; therefore it is also absurd to locate the true in the motion of the intellect.

Also, as the motions of the intellect are peculiar to each individual, there will be nothing generally true, and when there is nothing that is true for all in common everything will be doubtful and discordant ; for what this man holds as true (that is the motion of his intellect), that another man does not hold ; and conversely, what that man holds, this man has not experienced. But it is absurd to say that there is nothing which by common consent is true ; hence also it is absurd and unsound to assert that the true resides in the motion of the intellect.

It follows, also, that those who locate the true in the motion of the intellect must agree that all such motions are true—the motion, for instance, of the intellects of Epicurus and of Zeno and of Democritus

γὰρ αὐτοῖς συμβέβηκεν ἐπ' ἴσης κινήμασιν εἶναι τῆς διανοίας ἀδύνατον δέ γέ ἐστι τὸ πάντα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ὡς καὶ τὸ πάντα ψευδῆ· τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ κίνημα τῆς διανοίας τάληθές ἐστιν.

- 140 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ διὰ τοσοῦτων περὶ τε κριτηρίου καὶ περὶ ἀληθοῦς ἀπορήσαντες, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτώμεθα καὶ περὶ τῶν συντιθεμένων ἐφόδων ἀπὸ τοῦ κριτηρίου πρὸς κατάληψιν τοῦ μὴ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντος ἀληθοῦς, τουτέστι τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως. καὶ τάξει γε πρῶτον περὶ σημείου λέγωμεν· μετουσία γὰρ τούτου ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἐκκαλυπτική γίνεται τοῦ συμπεράσματος.

## B.—EI ESTI TI SHMEION

- 141 Ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διττὴ τις ἔστι κατὰ τὸ ἀνωτάτω διαφορά, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ἐστι πρόδηλα τὰ δὲ ἄδηλα, καὶ πρόδηλα μὲν τὰ αὐτόθεν ὑποπίπτοντα ταῖς τε αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἄδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ ἐξ αὐτῶν ληπτὰ, μεθοδικώτερον [δὲ] εἰς μὲν τὴν τῶν ἐναργῶν ἀπορίαν ὁ περὶ κριτηρίου λόγος 142 ἡμῖν ἀποδέδοται· τούτου γὰρ ἀβεβαίου δειχθέντος ἀδύνατον γίνεται καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν φαινομένων δυσχυρίζεσθαι ὅτι τοιαῦτά ἐστι πρὸς τὴν φύσιν ὁποῖα φαίνεται. λειπομένης δὲ ἔτι τῆς τῶν ἀδήλων διαφορᾶς, καλῶς ἔχων ἡγοῦμεθα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ταύτης ἀθέτησιν συντόμῳ τινὶ χρῆσασθαι ἐφόδῳ, τῇ τὸ τε σημεῖον καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἀναιρούσῃ· τούτων γὰρ πάλιν ἀναιρουμένων ἀβέβαιοι

• Cf. P.H. i. 138.

and of the rest; for it happens that all alike are motions of the intellect. But it is impossible that they should all be true, as likewise that they should all be false; neither, then, is the true the motion of the intellect.

And now that we have presented all these 140 difficulties concerning the criterion and concerning the true, let us consider in the next place the methods, based on the criterion, which are devised for the apprehension of the true that is not immediately presented—that is to say, Sign and Proof. And first in order let us speak of Sign; for it is by participation in it that Proof becomes capable of revealing the conclusion.

## II.—DOES A SIGN EXIST?

Since there is a certain twofold distinction of a most 141 general kind in things by which some are pre-evident,<sup>a</sup> others non-evident—those being pre-evident which are immediately and of themselves presented to the senses and the intellect, and those non-evident which are not apprehensible of themselves,—our discussion of the criterion has been given its due place,<sup>b</sup> as serving to show the doubtfulness of things evident; for if the criterion is proved to be 142 precarious, it also becomes impossible to affirm, regarding things apparent, that they are in reality such as they appear. And as the distinct class of things non-evident is still left, we deem it well, for the purpose of refuting it also, to employ a concise method of attack which destroys both sign and proof; for when these in turn are abolished, the apprehension of the

<sup>b</sup> *i.e.* the criterion has been discussed first (lit. "more methodically," *i.e.* observing the proper order of treatment).

γίνεται καὶ ἡ δι' αὐτῶν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς κατάληψις.  
βραχεία δ' ἴσως οἰκείον ἐστὶ πρὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος  
διελθεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ σημείου φύσεως.

- 143 Λέγεται τοίνυν τὸ σημεῖον διχῶς, κοινῶς τε καὶ  
ιδίως, κοινῶς μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν τι δηλοῦν, καθὸ καὶ  
τὸ πρὸς ἀνανέωσιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ  
πράγματος χρησιμεῖον εἰώθαμεν καλεῖν σημεῖον,  
ιδίως δὲ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν τοῦ ἀδηλουμένου πρᾶγ-  
ματος, περὶ οὗ καὶ πρόκειται ζητεῖν ἐπὶ τοῦ  
144 παρόντος. εἰ δέ τις τρανότερον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῦ  
τῇ φύσει, πάλιν προληπτέον ὅτι, ὡς ἀνώτερον  
ἐλέγομεν, τῶν πραγμάτων πρόδηλα μὲν ἐστὶ τὰ  
ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς γνώσιν ἡμῖν ἐρχόμενα, οἷον ἦν ἐπὶ  
τοῦ παρόντος τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἐμὲ δια-  
λέγεσθαι, ἄδηλα δὲ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα.

## Γ.—ΠΟΣΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΑΔΗΛΩΝ ΔΙΑΦΟΡΑΙ

- 145 Τῶν δὲ ἀδῆλων τὰ μὲν τινα ἦν καθάπαξ ἄδηλα,  
τὰ δὲ φύσει ἄδηλα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς καιρὸν ἄδηλα. ὧν  
πρὸς καιρὸν μὲν ἄδηλα καλεῖται ἅπερ τὴν φύσιν  
[μὲν] ἔχοντα ἐναργῆ παρὰ τινος ἔξωθεν περι-  
στάσεις κατὰ καιροὺς ἡμῖν ἀδηλεῖται, οἷον νῦν ἡ  
τῶν Ἀθηναίων πόλις ἡμῖν· φύσει μὲν γὰρ ἐναργῆς  
ἐστὶ καὶ πρόδηλος, παρὰ δὲ τὸ μεταξὺ διάστημα  
146 ἀδηλεῖται. φύσει δὲ ἦν ἄδηλα τὰ δι' αἰῶνος ἀπο-  
κεκρυμμένα καὶ μὴ δυνάμενα ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 100.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 98.

true by means of them likewise becomes precarious.  
But it is, perhaps, fitting, before going into particulars,  
to discuss briefly the nature of sign.

The term "sign," then, has two senses, the general 143  
and the particular.<sup>a</sup> In the general sense it is that  
which seems to make something evident—in which  
sense we are accustomed to call that a sign which  
serves to effect the renewal of the object observed in  
conjunction with it,—and in the particular sense it  
means that which is indicative of a non-evident object;  
and it is this latter which we propose at present to  
investigate. But if one is to understand its nature 144  
clearly, one must, again, grasp first the fact that, as  
we said above, those things are pre-evident which  
come to our knowledge of themselves—such as, at  
the present moment, the fact that "it is day" and  
that "I am conversing,"—and those things are non-  
evident which are not of this character.

III.—HOW MANY ARE THE DISTINCT CLASSES OF  
THINGS NON-EVIDENT ?

Of things non-evident some are absolutely non- 145  
evident, some naturally non-evident, and some  
temporarily non-evident. And of these, those are  
called "temporarily" non-evident which are in their  
nature manifest but are at certain times rendered  
non-evident to us owing to certain external circum-  
stances—as for instance the city of Athens is to us  
at the present moment <sup>b</sup>; for though it is naturally  
manifest and pre-evident, owing to the intervening  
distance it is rendered non-evident. "Naturally" 146  
non-evident are the things which are everlastingly  
hidden away and are not capable of presenting



πεσεῖν ἐνάργειαν, καθάπερ οἱ νοητοὶ πόροι καὶ τὸ  
 ἀξιούμενον ἐκτὸς εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου τισὶ φυσικοῖς  
 147 ἄπειρον κενόν. καθάπαξ δὲ ἄδηλα λέγεται τυγ-  
 χάνειν τὰ μηδέποτε ὑπ' ἀνθρωπίνην κατάληψιν  
 πεφυκότεα πίπτειν, οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἀρτίους εἶναι τοὺς  
 ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοὺς καὶ τὸ τοσσάδε ὑπάρχειν ἐν  
 148 Λιβύῃ ψάμμους. τεσσάρων οὖν οὐσῶν ἐν τοῖς  
 πράγμασι διαφορῶν, μιᾶς μὲν τῆς τῶν ἐναργῶν,  
 δευτέρας δὲ τῆς τῶν καθάπαξ ἀδήλων, τρίτης δὲ  
 τῆς τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων, τετάρτης τῆς τῶν πρὸς  
 καιρὸν, οὐ πᾶσάν φαμεν διαφορὰν σημείου δεῖσθαι  
 149 ἀλλὰ τινά. εὐθέως γὰρ οὔτε τὰ καθάπαξ ἀδηλα  
 ἐπιδέχεται τι σημεῖον οὔτε τὰ ἐναργῆ, ἀλλὰ τὰ  
 μὲν ἐναργῆ ὅτι ἐξ αὐτῶν προσπίπτει καὶ οὐδενὸς  
 ἑτέρου δεῖται πρὸς μήνυσιν, τὰ δὲ καθάπαξ ἀδηλα  
 ὅτι κοινῶς πᾶσαν ἐκπεφυγότεα κατάληψιν οὐδὲ  
 150 τὴν διὰ σημείου ἐπιδέχεται. τὰ δὲ φύσει ἀδηλα  
 καὶ τὰ πρὸς καιρὸν χρεῖαν ἔχει τῆς ἐκ τοῦ σημείου  
 παρατηρήσεως, τὰ μὲν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδηλα ὅτι  
 κατὰ τινὰς περιστάσεις αἰρεται ἐκ τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς  
 ἐναργείας, τὰ δὲ φύσει ἀδηλα ὅτι διὰ παντός ἔστιν  
 151 ἀφανῆ. διττῆς οὖν οὐσης διαφορᾶς τῶν σημείου  
 δεομένων πραγμάτων διττὸν ἀνεφάνη καὶ τὸ ση-  
 μείον, τὸ μὲν τι ὑπομνηστικόν, ὅπερ μάλιστα ἐπὶ  
 τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων φαίνεται χρησιμεῖον, τὸ  
 δὲ ἐνδεικτικόν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἀξιούται  
 152 παραλαμβάνεσθαι. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνηστικόν  
 συμπαρατηρηθὲν τῷ σημειωτῷ δι' ἐναργείας, ἄμα

\* *i.e.* excretory ducts, called "intelligible" because not perceptible by sense but only by an intellectual act of inference; *cf.* *P.H.* ii. 98, 140.

<sup>b</sup> *Cf.* i. 243.

themselves clearly to our perception, such as the intelligible pores <sup>a</sup> and the existence (maintained by certain physicists) of an infinite Void outside the universe. And "absolutely" non-evident are said to be 147 those things whose nature it is never to be presented to human apprehension, as is the fact that the stars are even in number or odd,<sup>b</sup> and that the grains of sand in Libya are of a certain definite number. Since, 148 then, there are four distinct classes of objects—one being that of things manifest, the second of things absolutely non-evident, the third of things naturally non-evident, the fourth of things temporarily so, we assert that not every distinct class, but some of them, require a sign. For obviously neither the absolutely 149 non-evident nor the manifest things admit of a sign—the manifest because they strike on the senses of themselves and require no other thing to announce them, and the absolutely non-evident because they elude every kind of apprehension without exception and thus do not admit of apprehension by means of sign. But things naturally non-evident, and things 150 temporarily so, have need of the kind of observation effected by sign—the temporarily non-evident because, in certain circumstances, they are removed from our clear perception, and the naturally non-evident because they are for ever non-apparent. As, 151 then, there are two distinct classes of things which require sign, Sign also has revealed itself as twofold—the "commemorative," which appears to be chiefly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the "indicative," which is deemed proper for adoption in the case of things naturally non-evident.—Thus the commemorative sign, when observed 152 in conjunction with the thing signified in a clear

- τῷ ὑποπεσεῖν ἐκεῖνου ἀδηλουμένου, ἄγει ἡμᾶς εἰς ὑπόμνησιν τοῦ συμπαρατηρηθέντος αὐτῷ, νῦν δὲ ἐναργῶς μὴ προσπίπτοντος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ καπνοῦ καὶ τοῦ πυρός· ταῦτα γὰρ πολλάκις ἀλλήλοις συν-εξευγμένα παρατηρήσαντες ἅμα τῷ τὸ ἕτερον ἰδεῖν, τούτέστι τὸν καπνόν, ἀνανεούμεθα τὸ λοιπόν,
- 153 τούτέστι τὸ μὴ βλεπόμενον πῦρ. ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τῷ ἔλκει ἐπιγινόμενης οὐλῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ θανάτου προηγουμένης καρδίας τρώσεως· οὐλήν τε γὰρ ἰδόντες προηγησάμενον ἔλκος ἀνανεούμεθα, καρδίας τε τρώσιν θεασάμενοι μέλλοντα θάνατον προγινώσκομεν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνη-
- 154 στικὸν σημεῖον τοιαύτην εἶχε τὴν ιδιότητα, τὸ δὲ ἐνδεικτικὸν διέφερε τούτου. οὐκέτι γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ συμπαρατήρησιν τῷ σημειωτῷ ἐπιδέχεται (ἀρχῆθεν γὰρ ἀνυπόπτωτόν ἐστι τὸ φύσει ἀδηλον πρᾶγμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναται τινι τῶν φαινομένων συμπαρατηρηθῆναι), ἀλλ' ἀντικρυς ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς μόνον οὐχὶ φωνῆν ἀφιέν
- 155 λέγεται σημαίνειν τὸ οὐ ἐστὶν ἐνδεικτικόν. οἶον ἢ ψυχῇ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων· οὐδέποτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τὴν ἡμετέραν πέφυκε πίπτειν ἐν-ἀργεῖαν. τοιαύτη δὲ οὐσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα κινήσεων ἐνδεικτικῶς μνησεται· λογιζόμεθα γὰρ ὅτι δυνάμεις τις ἐνδεδυκυῖα τῷ σώματι τοιαύτας αὐτῷ κινήσεις ἐνδίδωσιν.
- 156 Ἄλλὰ γὰρ δυσὶν ὄντων σημείων, τοῦ τε ὑπομνηστικοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρὸς καιρὸν ἀδήλων τὰ πολλὰ χρησιμεύειν δοκοῦντος, καὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν φύσει ἀδήλων ἐγκρίνεται, μελλήσομεν πᾶσαν ποιείσθαι ζήτησιν καὶ ἀπορίαν οὐ

perception, brings us, as soon as it is presented and when the thing signified has become non-evident, to a recollection of the thing observed along with it and now no longer clearly perceived—as in the case of smoke and fire; for as we have often observed these to be connected with each other, as soon as we see the one—that is to say, smoke—we recall the other—that is to say, the unseen fire. The same 153 account applies to the scar which follows on the wound, and to the puncture of the heart which precedes death; for on seeing the scar we recall the wound which preceded it, and on viewing the puncture of the heart we foretell the imminence of death.—Such, then, is the special character of the “commemorative” sign; but the “indicative” is of a 154 different kind. For it does not, like the former, admit of being observed in conjunction with the thing signified (for the naturally non-evident object is, from the start, imperceptible and therefore cannot be observed along with any of the things apparent), but entirely of its own nature and constitution, all but uttering its voice aloud, it is said to signify that whereof it is indicative. The soul, for instance, 155 is one of the things naturally non-evident; for such is its nature that it never presents itself to our clear perception; and being such, it is announced “indicatively” by the bodily motions; for we argue that it is a certain power residing within the body which inwardly excites in it such motions.

So then, as there are two signs—that which is 156 “commemorative” and held to be mainly of use in the case of things temporarily non-evident, and the “indicative” which is employed in the case of things naturally non-evident—we propose to devote all our

περὶ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ, τοῦτο γὰρ παρὰ πᾶσι κοινῶς τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ βίου πεπίστευται χρησιμεύειν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἰατρῶν, ὡς δυνάμενον τὴν ἀναγκαιοτάτην αὐτοῖς παρέχειν  
 157 χρεῖαν, πέπλασται. ὅθεν οὐδὲ μαχόμεθα ταῖς κοιναῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων προλήψεσιν, οὐδὲ συγγέομεν τὸν βίον, λέγοντες μὴθὲν εἶναι σημεῖον, καθάπερ τινὲς ἡμᾶς συκοφαντοῦσιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν ἀνηροῦμεν σημεῖον, τάχ' ἴσως ἂν καὶ τῷ βίῳ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐμαχόμεθα· νυνὶ δὲ οὕτω καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔγνωμεν, ἐκ μὲν καπνοῦ πῦρ, ἐκ δὲ οὐλῆς προηγησάμενον ἔλκος, ἐκ δὲ προηγουμένης καρδίας τρώσεως θάνατον, ἐκ δὲ προκειμένης ταινίας  
 158 ἀλειμμα λαμβάνοντας. νῦν οὖν ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομνηστικὸν σημεῖον τίθεμεν, ᾧ χρῆται ὁ βίος, τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ψευδῶς δοξασθέν ἀναιροῦμεν, μήποτε πρὸς τῷ μὴ μάχεσθαι τῷ βίῳ ἔτι καὶ συναγορεύομεν αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ περ τοὺς κατέξαστάντας τῆς κοινῆς προλήψεως δογματικούς καὶ τὰ φύσει ἀδηλα γινώσκων λέγοντας σημειωτικῶς ἐκ φυσιολογίας ἐλέγχωμεν.  
 159 Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίοις περὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τὴν ζήτησιν πίπτοντος σημείου λελέχθω· χρῆ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος διὰ μνήμης ἔχειν τὸ σκεπτικὸν ἔθος. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ μετὰ πείσματος καὶ συγκαταθέσεως ἐκτίθεσθαι τοὺς κατὰ τῆς ὑπάρξεως τοῦ σημείου λόγους (ἴσον γὰρ ἦν τὸ τοιοῦτο ποιεῖν τῷ ἀξιοῦν εἶναι τι σημεῖον παραπλησιῶς τοῖς δογματίζουσιν), ἀλλ' ὥστε εἰς ἰσοσθένειαν τὴν ζήτησιν

\* The "Logical," or "Dogmatic," was one of the chief Schools of Medicine in the Hellenistic age. Cf. *P.H.* i. 236 n. 318

investigation and criticism not to the commemorative sign (for this is generally believed by all ordinary folk to be useful) but to the indicative ; for this has been devised by the Dogmatic philosophers and by the Logical physicians,<sup>a</sup> as capable of affording them most necessary assistance. Hence we are not attacking 157 the common preconceptions of mankind, nor are we turning life upside down by asserting that no sign exists, as some slanderously affirm of us. For if we were abolishing every sign we might, perhaps, have been attacking ordinary life and all mankind ; but as it is, we ourselves also are of the same mind and infer fire from smoke, and a previous wound from a scar, and death from a previous puncture of the heart, and oil from a previous fillet.<sup>b</sup> As it is, then, 158 seeing that we affirm the commemorative sign which ordinary folk employ, but abolish the sign falsely imagined by the Dogmatists, one should rather say that not only do we not attack ordinary life but we even act as its advocates, inasmuch as we refute by means of natural science the Dogmatists who have risen up against the common judgement and declared that they discern by means of signs things naturally non-evident.

Let this, then, serve as a summary account of the 159 sign now under investigation ; and at this point it is right to keep in mind the practice of the Sceptics.<sup>c</sup> This is to set out the arguments against the existence of the sign, but not with conviction or assent (for to do it with assent would be on a par with maintaining, like the Dogmatists, that a sign exists), but so as to

<sup>b</sup> Alluding to the custom of athletes to wear fillets and anoint themselves.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 79, 103.

ἀγειν, καὶ δεικνύναι ὅτι ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶ πιστὸν τῷ εἶναι τι σημεῖον τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἢ ἀνάπαλιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἄπιστον τῷ μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ὑπάρχειν τι σημεῖον· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἢ ἀρρεψία καὶ ἢ ἐποχὴ γίνεται τῇ  
 160 *διανοίᾳ*. ἀμέλει γοῦν διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ δοκῶν ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν φάσκουσι μηδὲν εἶναι ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον βοηθός ἐστιν, καὶ τὸ ὀφείλον κατασκευάζεσθαι μέρος σκεπτικῶς, τοῦτ' αὐτὸς προλαβὼν κατασκευάζει· εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τοῦ σημείου κομιζόμενοι παρὰ τοῖς ἀπορητικοῖς λόγοι σφόδρ' εἰσι σθεναροὶ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀναντίρρητοι, τούτων δὲ οὐ λείπονται καὶ οἱ παρὰ τοῖς δογματικοῖς τὴν ὑπαρξίν αὐτοῦ κατασκευάζοντες, αὐτόθεν ἐφεκτέον ἐστὶ περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως καὶ μὴ ἀδίκως τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει  
 161 προσθετέον. πλὴν καὶ τοῦ σκεπτικοῦ ἔθους παρασταθέντος, χωρῶμεν λοιπὸν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου κατασκευήν.

Τῶν οὖν ὄντων, φασὶν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, τὰ μὲν ἐστὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι πῶς ἔχοντα. καὶ κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν ὅποσα κατ' ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοεῖται, οἷον λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, πᾶν τὸ τούτοις παραπλήσιον· ψιλοῖς γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ κατὰ περιγραφὴν ἐπιβάλλομεν καὶ δίχα  
 162 τοῦ ἑτερόν τι συνεπινοεῖν. πρὸς τι δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν νοούμενα καὶ οὐκέτι ἀπολελυμένως λαμβανόμενα, τούτέστι κατ' ἰδίαν, οἷον τὸ λευκότερον καὶ μελάντερον καὶ γλυκύτερον καὶ πικρότερον, καὶ πᾶν εἴ τι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ιδέας. οὐ γὰρ ὄν τρόπον τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μέλαν κατ' ἰδίαν ἐνοεῖτο περιγραφὴν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ λευκότερον ἢ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 130.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 190.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 135, 137.

bring the inquiry to a position of equipollence,<sup>a</sup> and prove that the non-existence of a sign is equally credible with its existence, or, conversely, that the existence of a sign is equally incredible with its non-existence; for thereby there is produced in the intellect neutrality and suspension of judgement.<sup>b</sup> Moreover, on this account even the man who appears  
 160 to contradict us, when we assert that no indicative sign exists, is actually supporting us, and by already adopting it himself he establishes the view that ought to be established sceptically; for if the arguments brought against the sign by the Doubters are exceedingly strong and almost incontrovertible, and those of the Dogmatists establishing its existence are not less weighty, we must at once suspend judgement regarding its existence and must not attach ourselves unjustly to either side. And now  
 161 that the practice of the Sceptics has been set forth, let us next proceed to develop the theme before us.

Of existing things, then, some, as the Sceptics assert, have an absolute, others a relative, existence. Absolutely existing are all such things as are perceived with a subsistence of their own and absolutely,<sup>c</sup> as for instance white, black, sweet, bitter, and everything of a similar kind; for we apprehend these by themselves alone and separately and without the accompaniment of any other percept. But those things are relative which are perceived as standing in some relation to another thing and no longer apprehended absolutely (that is, separately by themselves); as, for example, the whiter and blacker and sweeter and bitterer, and whatever else is of the same character. For the whiter or blacker is not perceived separately in the same way as the white or black; but in order

μελάντερον· ἀλλ' ἵνα τοῦτο νοήσωμεν, συνεπιβάλλειν δεῖ καὶ ἐκείνῳ τῷ οὐ λευκότερον ἔστιν ἢ τῷ οὐ μελάντερον ἔστιν. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ γλυκυτέρου καὶ 163 πικροτέρου ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. ἐπεὶ οὖν δύο εἰσὶ τῶν πραγμάτων διαφοραὶ, μία μὲν ἢ τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν δευτέρα δὲ ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι πῶς ἐχόντων, δεήσει καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τό γε ἐνδεικτικὸν ἦτοι τῶν κατὰ διαφορὰν ἢ τῶν πρὸς τι ὑπάρχειν· τρίτη γὰρ μεταξὺ τούτων ἰδέα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τῶν 164 κατὰ διαφορὰν μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ὡς αὐτόθεν συγκεχώρηται καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἑτεροδόξων. τοίνυν τῶν πρὸς τι γενήσεται. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σημειωτὸν κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς τὸ σημεῖον σχέσιν νοούμενον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν (οὕτω καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν)<sup>1</sup>· τινὸς γάρ ἐστι σημεῖον, καθάπερ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ. εἰ γοῦν τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν καθ' ὑπόθεσιν ἀνέλωμεν, καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον συναιρεθήσεται, οἷον τι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δεξιῦ καὶ ἀριστεροῦ φαίνεται γιγνόμενον· μηδενὸς γὰρ ὄντος δεξιῦ οὐδὲ ἀριστερόν τι ἔσται διὰ τὸ τῶν πρὸς τι εἶναι τούτων ἑκάτερον, καὶ 165 μηδενὸς ὄντος ἀριστεροῦ συμπεριγράφεται καὶ ἡ τοῦ δεξιῦ ἐπίνοια. ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ πρὸς τι συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις· οὔτε γὰρ λευκότερόν τι, ὡς ἔφην, δυνατόν ἐστι γνωρίζειν μὴ συνυποπίπτοντος τοῦ οὐ λευκότερόν ἔστιν, οὐδὲ μελάντερόν (μὴ συνεπινοουμένου τοῦ οὐ μελάντερόν)<sup>2</sup> ἔστιν. τοίνυν ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ σημεῖον τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστιν, ὡς παρεμυθησάμεθα, συγκαταληφθήσεται τῷ σημείῳ τὸ οὐ ἔστιν σημεῖον. τὸ συγκαταλαμβανόμενον δὲ αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔσται σημεῖον αὐτοῦ. τὸ γὰρ ὑπονοεῖν ὅτι

<sup>1</sup> <οὕτω . . . ἔστιν> cj. Bekk.

<μὴ . . . μελάντερον> add. N: similiter cj. Bekk.

to perceive the former, one must also apprehend along with it the object than which it is whiter, or than which it is blacker. And the same account applies to the sweeter and the bitterer. Since, then, there 163 are two distinct classes of things, one being that of things absolute, the second that of things relative, the indicative sign must belong either to the class of absolutes or to that of relatives; for there is no third class of things between these two. But it will not belong to the absolutes, as is at once agreed even by those of the other persuasion. So, then, it will belong 164 to the relative class. For just as the thing signified, because it is perceived as standing in relation to the sign, is a relative thing, (so too the sign is a relative thing,) for it is a sign of something, namely, of the thing signified. Certainly, if we take away, let us suppose, one of the two, the remaining one also will be taken away along with it, a thing which plainly happens also in the case of right and left; for if there is no right, neither will there be a left, owing to the fact that each of these is a relative; and if there is no left, the notion of right also is cancelled at the same time. —Further, relatives are apprehended together; for, 165 as I said, it is impossible to be aware of a whiter thing without a joint perception of that than which it is whiter, or of a blacker thing (without a joint apprehension of that than which it is blacker). So then, since the sign is, as we showed,<sup>a</sup> a relative thing, that whereof it is a sign will be apprehended along with the sign. But the thing apprehended along with it will not be a sign of it. For to imagine that what is

<sup>a</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 118 ff.

δύναται τό τινι συγκαταλαμβανόμενον σημεῖον ἐκείνου γίνεσθαι τελέως ἀπερρωγός· ἀμφοτέρων γὰρ ὑπὸ μίαν προθεσμίαν λαμβανομένων οὔτε τόδε τοῦδε ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστίν οὔτε τόδε τοῦδε μηνυτικόν, ἐκάτερον δὲ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπίπτον ἀποδεί τῆς 166 τοιαύτης δυνάμεως. συνθείη δ' ἂν τις ἀνάπαλιν λόγον τοιοῦτον. τὸ σημεῖον εἴπερ καταληπτόν ἐστιν, ἤτοι προκαταλαμβάνεται τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ἢ συγκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ ἢ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται αὐτῷ· οὔτε δὲ προκαταλαμβάνεται οὔτε συγκαταλαμβάνεται οὔτε ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται, ὡς παραστή- 167 σομεν· οὐκ ἄρα καταληπτόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν λέγειν ὅτι ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τῷ σημειωτῷ τὸ σημεῖον, αὐτόθεν φαίνεται ἄτοπον· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι δύναται ἐκκαλυπτικόν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον, ὅτε οὐ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι, τὸ σημειωτόν, προκαταλαμβάνεται αὐτοῦ; ἄλλως τε καὶ μαχόμενόν τι προσδέξονται οἱ δογματικοὶ τῷ συνήθως ὑπ' αὐτῶν δογματιζομένῳ, ἐὰν τοῦτο λέγωσιν. φασὶ γὰρ τὸ σημειωτόν ἀδηλον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐξ αὐτοῦ καταληπτόν· εἰ δέ γε μετὰ τὴν τούτου κατάληψιν ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον, οὐκ ἔσται τοῦτ' ἀδηλον ὃ γε πρὸ τῆς τοῦ μηνύοντος αὐτὸ παρουσίας πεφύραται. ὥστε οὐκ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεται τῷ ση- 168 μειωτῷ τὸ σημεῖον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ συγκαταλαμβάνεται διὰ τὴν μικρῷ πρόσθεν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν· τὰ γὰρ συγκαταλαμβανόμενα ἀλλήλοις οὐ δέεται τῆς ἐξ ἀλλήλων μηνύσεως ἀλλ' ὑφ' ἐν ἐξ αὐτῶν προσπίπτει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε τὸ σημεῖον λέγοιτ' ἂν εἶναι σημεῖον οὔτε τὸ σημειωτόν ἔτι ὑπάρχειν 169 σημειωτόν. καταλείπεται οὖν λέγειν ὅτι προκαταλαμβάνεται τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ. ὃ

apprehended along with a thing can be a sign of that thing is perfectly absurd; for when both are perceived at one and the same moment, neither does this serve to reveal that nor that serve to indicate this; and each, when it is presented by itself, lacks any such efficacy.—Again, one might construct an 166 argument of this sort: The sign, if it is apprehensible, is either apprehended before the thing signified, or apprehended along with it, or apprehended after it; but, as we shall establish, it is not apprehended either before, or along with, or after it; therefore the sign is not apprehensible. Now to state that the sign is 167 apprehended after the thing signified is seen at once to be absurd; for how can the sign still be capable of revealing when that which it serves to reveal—the thing signified—is apprehended before it? And, besides, if they make this statement, the Dogmatists will be accepting something which is in conflict with one of their usual dogmas. For they assert that the thing signified is non-evident and not apprehensible of itself; but if, after the apprehension of this, the sign is apprehended subsequently, this thing, which was detected before the presence of that which announces it, will not be non-evident. So that the sign is not apprehended after the thing signified.—Nor yet, indeed, is it apprehended along with it, 168 for the reason stated a little while ago<sup>a</sup>; for things apprehended along with one another do not require announcement by one another but are presented of themselves simultaneously; and because of this, neither will the sign be said to be a sign, nor the thing signified to be any longer signified.—It only remains, 169 then, to declare that the sign is apprehended before

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 165.

πάλιν εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐλέγχους κυλίεται. πρότερον γὰρ ὀφείλουσιν οἱ δογματικοὶ δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐ τῶν πρὸς τι ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον ἢ ὅτι οὐ συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις τὰ πρὸς τι, εἶτα τότε καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνειν τὸ δύνασθαι τοῦ σημειωτοῦ προκατα-  
 170 λαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημεῖον. ἀμετακινήτων δὲ ὄντων τῶν πρώτων οὐχ οἷόν τε ἔστι τὴν προκατάληψιν τῷ σημείῳ μαρτυρεῖν ἐκ τοῦ γένους ὄντι τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ὀφείλουσι συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τῷ οὐ ἔστι σημεῖον. ἀλλ' εἴπερ, ἵνα καταληφθῆ τὸ σημεῖον, δεῖ ἢ προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι αὐτὸ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ ἢ συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τούτῳ ἢ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεσθαι, δέδεικται δὲ μηδὲν τούτων δυνατὸν. ῥητέον ἢν' ἀκατάληπτον εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον.

171 "Ἐτι ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς δυνάμεως ἄλλον λόγον συνερρωτώσι τινας τοὺς δογματικούς, οὕτως ἔχοντα. εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἐνδεικτικὸν τινος σημείου, ἧτοι φαινόμενον φαινομένου σημείον ἔστιν ἢ ἀφανὲς ἀφανοῦς ἢ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς ἢ ἀφανὲς φαινομένου· οὔτε δὲ φαινόμενον φαινομένου σημείον ἔστιν οὔτε ἀφανοῦς ἀφανὲς οὔτε φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς οὔτε [δὲ]  
 172 ἐναλλάξ· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι σημεῖον. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, πρόδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτου κατασκευὴ ἔστιν. καὶ προδηλοτέρα μᾶλλον γενήσεται ὑποδειξάντων ἡμῶν τὴν κομιζομένην πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν δογματικῶν ἐνστασιν. φασὶ γὰρ μόνον τὰς δύο συγχωρεῖσθαι συζυγίας, περὶ δὲ τῶν λειπομένων  
 173 δυοῖν διίστασθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαινόμενον φαινομένου καὶ ἀφανοῦς φαινομένου γίγνε-

<sup>1</sup> ἢν: οὖν mss., Bekk. (secl. Mutsch.).

\* Cf. P.H. ii. 124 ff.

the thing signified. And this, again, lies open to the same criticisms. For the Dogmatists ought first to prove that the sign is not a relative thing, or that relatives are not apprehended along with each other, and then in the next place get us to admit that the sign can be apprehended before the thing signified. But as our primary assumptions remain unaltered, 170 it is impossible to get evidence for the anterior apprehension of the sign, owing to the fact of its belonging to the class of relatives and having necessarily to be apprehended along with that whereof it is a sign.—But if it be so that the sign, in order to be apprehended, must either be apprehended before the thing signified, or apprehended along with this, or apprehended after it, and it has been proved that none of these alternatives is possible, one must declare that the sign is non-apprehensible.

Further, some confront the Dogmatists with 171 another argument, to the same effect, in this form: If there exists an indicative sign, either it is an apparent sign of an apparent thing, or a non-apparent of a non-apparent, or an apparent of a non-apparent, or a non-apparent of an apparent<sup>a</sup>; but it is neither an apparent sign of an apparent thing, nor a non-apparent of a non-apparent, nor an apparent of a non-apparent, nor the converse; therefore no sign exists. Such is the argument, and its demonstrative 172 force is quite evident. And it will become yet more evident when we have indicated the objection brought against it by the Dogmatists. For they declare that they allow only two of these combinations, and as regards the remaining two they are at variance with us. For, (say they,) whereas it is true 173 that the apparent is a sign of the apparent and the

σθαι σημεῖον ἀληθές ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ μὴ φαινόμενον φαινόμενον ἢ μὴ φαινόμενον ἀφανοῦς ὑπάρχειν δηλωτικὸν ψεύδος ἦν.<sup>1</sup> αὐτίκα γὰρ φαινόμενον μὲν φαινόμενον σημεῖον ἐστίν, <οἶον><sup>2</sup> ἢ σκιά τοῦ σώματος· αὐτὴ τε γὰρ σημεῖον οὕσα φαινόμενον ἐστίν, τὸ τε σώμα σημειωτὸν καθεστῶς ἐναργές ὑπάρχει. φαινόμενον δὲ ἀφανοῦς δηλωτικὸν καθ-  
 174 εἰστήκει, καθάπερ τὸ ἔρευθος τῆς αἰδοῦς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐναργές καὶ αὐτοφώρατον ἦν, ἡ δὲ αἰδῶς ἀ-  
 φαντος. τελέως δὲ εἰσιν εὐήθεις οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. ὁμολογηθέντος γὰρ τοῦ πρὸς τι εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι ἀλλή-  
 175 λους τὰ πρὸς τι, οὐ δύναται τῶν ἐπ' ἴσης συνυποπι-  
 πτόντων ἀλλήλοις τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι τὸ δὲ σημει-  
 ωτόν, ἀλλὰ πάντη τε καὶ πάντως διὰ τὴν ἐναργῆ ἀμφοτέρων συνυπόπτωσιν μήτε σημεῖον τι ἐξ αὐ-  
 τῶν ὑπάρχειν μήτε σημειωτόν, τοῦ μὲν μὴ ἔχον-  
 176 τος ὃ ἐκκαλύπτει, τοῦ δὲ μὴ χρῆζοντος τοῦ ἐκκαλύ-  
 πτοντος. τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ περὶ τῆς λειπο-  
 μένης συζυγίας, καθ' ἣν ἤξιον τὸ φαινόμενον τοῦ ἀφανοῦς εἶναι σημεῖον· δεῖ γὰρ, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, προκαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημεῖον τοῦ σημειωτοῦ καὶ ἐπικαταλαμβάνεσθαι τὸ σημειωτὸν τῷ σημείῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἀδύνατον διὰ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ γένους εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τι καὶ ὀφείλειν ἀλλήλοις συγκαταλαμβάνεσθαι.  
 176 Τῶν γε μὴν καταλαμβανομένων ἀνθρώπῳ πραγ-  
 μάτων τὰ μὲν δι' αἰσθήσεως καταλαμβάνεσθαι δοκεῖ τὰ δὲ διανοία, καὶ δι' αἰσθήσεως μὲν ὡς λευκὸν μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν, διανοία δὲ καλὸν αἰσχρόν, νόμιμον παράνομον, εὐσεβές ἀσεβές. καὶ τὸ σημεῖον οὖν εἴπερ καταληπτὸν ἐστίν, ἦτοι τῶν

<sup>1</sup> ἦν cf. Bekk.: εἶναι mss.<sup>2</sup> <οἶον> Heintz.

apparent of the non-apparent, it is false that the non-apparent is indicative of the apparent or the non-apparent of the non-apparent. Thus, for example, an apparent thing is a sign of an apparent thing, as the shadow of the body; for it, being a sign, is an apparent one, and the body, being a thing signified, is an evident thing. And an apparent thing may really be indicative of a non-apparent, as blushing of shame; for the former is obvious and self-detected, but shame is invisible. But those who speak thus are perfectly  
 174 stupid. For if it be agreed that the sign is a relative thing and that relatives must necessarily be apprehended together, then, of the things thus simultane-  
 175 ously presented, it is not possible that one should be the sign, the other the thing signified; but always and in every case, because of the evident joint-pre-  
 176 sentation of the two together, neither one of them can be either sign or thing signified, as the one has nothing to reveal, and the other requires nothing to reveal it. And the same may also be said about the  
 175 remaining combination, in which they claim that the apparent is a sign of the non-apparent; for, if this is so, the sign must be apprehended before the thing signified and the thing signified apprehended after the sign, which is impossible because they belong to the class of relatives and must be apprehended along with each other.

Now, of the objects apprehended by man, some  
 176 appear to be apprehended by means of sense, others by the intellect,—by means of sense, as white, black, sweet, bitter; and by intellect, fair, foul, lawful, lawless, pious, impious. So the sign also, if it is apprehensible, is one of the sensible or of the intelligible



αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ πραγμάτων ἢ τῶν νοητῶν, ὡς ἐὰν  
 μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ἐτέρου γένους τούτων ὑπάρχη, οὐδ' ὄλως  
 177 ἔσται τὴν ἀρχὴν ὑπάρχον. ἀμέλει γέ τοι τοῦτ'  
 εὐθὺς τεκμήριόν ἐστι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν,  
 φημί δὲ τὸ μέχρι δεῦρο διέλκεσθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ,  
 τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν ὑπολαμβάνοντων τοῦτο εἶναι τῶν  
 δὲ νοητῶν. Ἐπικουρος μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ προεστῶτες  
 αὐτοῦ τῆς αἰρέσεως ἔλεξαν αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ  
 σημεῖον, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς νοητὸν. μένει δ' ἡ  
 τοιαύτη διάστασις σχεδὸν ἀνεπίκριτος δι' αἰῶνος,  
 καὶ μενούσης αὐτῆς ἀνεπίκριτου πᾶσα ἀνάγκη καὶ  
 τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάσσεσθαι, ὀφείλον ἢ  
 178 αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοητὸν ὑπάρχειν. καὶ τὸ πάντων δεινότατον  
 ὅτι μεταπέπτωκεν ἡ ὑπόσχεσις αὐτοῦ, εἴγε  
 ὑπισχνεῖται μὲν ἐκκαλυπτικὸν ἔσεσθαι τινος ἐτέρου,  
 ἀνάπαλι δὲ αὐτὸ νῦν εὐρηται χρῆζον ἐτέρου τοῦ  
 ἐκκαλύφοντος· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ διάφωνον ἄδηλόν ἐστι,  
 τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἐκ σημείου ληπτόν, πάντως καὶ τὸ  
 σημεῖον διαφωνούμενον δεήσεται τινος σημείου  
 179 πρὸς παράστασιν ὡς ἄδηλον. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ  
 δύνανται λέγειν ὅτι τὸ διαφωνούμενον αὐτοῖς<sup>1</sup>  
 ἐνεστιν ἀποδείξει καταστήσασθαι καὶ πιστὸν ἔχειν.  
 πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὅταν ἀποδείξωσιν, τότε ὡς πιστὸν  
 αὐτὸ λαμβανέτωσαν· ἐφ' ὅσον δὲ ψιλὴ μόνον αὐτοῖς  
 ἐστὶν ὑπόσχεσις ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ἔστηκε καὶ τὰ  
 180 τῆς ἐποχῆς. εἴτα καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν ἀμφι-  
 σβητουμένων ἐστίν, διαφωνουμένη δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ  
 χρεῖαν ἔχει τοῦ τὴν πίστιν περιθήσοντος· διὰ δὲ  
 ζητουμένου τὸ ζητούμενον δεικνύναι θέλειν τελῶς  
 ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. ἄλλως τε καὶ τῷ γένει σημείων  
 ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις· ἐκκαλυπτικὴ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ συμ-

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοῖς : αὐτὸ mss., Bekk.

objects, so that if it does not belong to either of these  
 classes it will have absolutely no existence at all.  
 And, what is more, we have here at once a direct 177  
 evidence that it is non-apprehensible,—I mean in  
 the fact that hitherto its nature has been rent in  
 twain, some supposing it to be sensible, others in-  
 telligible. Thus Epicurus and the leaders of his  
 School have stated that the sign is sensible, but the  
 Stoics that it is intelligible. And this controversy  
 remains, as one may say, eternally undecided, and  
 while it remains undecided there is every necessity  
 to keep the sign in suspense, since it is bound to be  
 either sensible or intelligible. Most serious of all 178  
 is the fact that the promise it makes has become void,  
 inasmuch as it promises that it will serve to reveal  
 some other thing, but is itself now found, conversely,  
 to require that other thing to reveal it ; for if every-  
 thing which is controverted is non-evident, and the  
 non-evident is apprehensible through a sign, then  
 certainly the sign too, being controverted, will re-  
 quire a sign to make it manifest, as it is non-evident.  
 —Moreover, they cannot assert that it is possible for 179  
 them to establish it, when controverted, by proof and  
 hold it trustworthy.<sup>6</sup> For when they have first  
 proved it, then let them accept it as trustworthy ; but  
 so long as they have only a mere promise and not  
 proof, the case for suspension stands. Further, proof 180  
 also is a debatable thing, and being controverted it  
 has need itself of something to lend it cogency ; but  
 to try to prove the thing in question by a thing in  
 question is perfectly absurd. And, moreover, proof is,  
 generically, a sign ; for it serves to reveal its conclusion.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. i. 293 ff.

- 181 *περάσματος. ἵνα οὖν τὸ σημεῖον βεβαιωθῆ, δεῖ πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις πιστὴ γένηται, δεῖ προβεβαιωθῆναι τὸ σημεῖον, ὥστε ἑκάτερον τὴν ἐκ θατέρου πίστιν περιμένον*
- 182 *ἐπ' ἴσης τῷ λοιπῷ ἐστὶν ἄπιστον. πρὸς τοῦτοις τὸ ἐν ἀποδείξεως μέρει λαμβανόμενον εἰς τὴν τοῦ σημείου βεβαίωσιν ἤτοι αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶν ἢ νοητὸν. καὶ εἰ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, πάλιν ἡ ἀρχῆθεν μένει ζήτησις τῷ τὰ αἰσθητὰ κοινῶς διαπεφωνῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ νοητὸν, ὁμοίως ἄπιστον καθέστηκεν· οὐ χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν αἰσθητῶν δύναται τοῦτο ληπτὸν ὑπάρχειν.*
- 183 *Πλὴν συγκεχωρήσθω τε καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας δεδόσθω τὸ ἤτοι αἰσθητὸν ἢ νοητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλὰ καὶ οὕτως ἀδύνατον τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πιστὴν ὑπάρχειν. λεκτέον δὲ ἐν μέρει περὶ ἑκατέρου, καὶ εὐθέως γε περὶ τοῦ [μῆ]<sup>1</sup> αἰσθητὸν αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν. ἵνα τοίνυν τοῦθ' ὁμολογὸν ἦ, δεῖ προσυμφωνῆσθαι τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπαρξίν καὶ ὁμολογὸν εἶναι παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς, ἵνα<sup>2</sup> ὡς ἀπὸ ὁμολόγου ταύτης ἢ περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἀνάγκηται*
- 184 *σκέψις. οὐ συμφεφώνηται δέ, ἀλλ'*

ἔστ' ἂν ὕδωρ τε ῥέῃ καὶ δένδρεα μακρὰ τεθήλῃ

οὔποτε πεπαύσονται περὶ αὐτῆς οἱ φυσικοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους πολεμοῦντες, ἐπεὶπερ ὁ μὲν Δημόκριτος μηδὲν ὑποκείσθαι φησι τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀλλὰ κενοπαθείας τινὰς αἰσθήσεων εἶναι τὰς ἀντιλήψεις αὐτῶν, καὶ οὔτε γλυκὺ τι περὶ τοῖς ἐκτὸς ὑπάρχειν, οὐ πικρὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν, οὐκ

<sup>1</sup> [μῆ] secl. Kochalsky.

<sup>2</sup> ἵνα cj. Bekk.: καὶ mss.

• With §§ 179-181 cf. *P.H.* ii. 121, 122.

In order, then, that the sign may be established, the 181 proof must be trustworthy; and in order that the proof may be trustworthy, the sign must be pre-established; so that each one of the two, as awaiting its confirmation from the other, is just as untrustworthy as the other. Besides this, that which is 182 taken as a proof for the establishment of sign is either sensible or intelligible. And if it is sensible, the original inquiry remains once more, by reason of the general disagreement about sensibles<sup>a</sup>; while if it is intelligible, it is equally untrustworthy, for this latter cannot be apprehended apart from things sensible.

However, let it be agreed and granted, into the 183 bargain, that the sign is either sensible or intelligible. Yet, even so, it is impossible that its real existence should be worthy of confidence. We must discuss in turn each of these alternatives, and, first and at once, the view that it is sensible. In order, then, that this may be admitted, the real existence of sensibles must first be unanimously allowed and be admitted by all the Physicists, so that the investigation of the sign may proceed from this as admitted. This, however, is 184 not unanimously allowed, but

Long as the waters flow and the tall trees cease not to burgeon,<sup>b</sup>

the Physicists will never stop warring with one another about it; for Democritus<sup>c</sup> asserts that none of the sensibles really exists, but our perceptions of them are certain empty affections of the senses, and in things external there exists nothing sweet or bitter or hot or cold or white or black or any other of the

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 37.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. i. 135 ff.; *P.H.* i. 213 ff.

ἄλλο τι τῶν πᾶσι φαινομένων· παθῶν γὰρ ἡμετέρων  
 185 ἦν ὀνόματα ταῦτα. ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος πάντα ἔλεγε  
 τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοιαῦτα ὑποκείσθαι ὅποια φαίνεται καὶ  
 κατ' αἴσθησιν προσπίπτει, μηδέποτε ψευδομένης  
 τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν<sup>1</sup> ψεῦδεσθαι ταύτην  
 δοκούντων. οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου  
 μέσσην ὁδὸν τέμνοντες ἓνια μὲν ὑποκείσθαι τῶν  
 αἰσθητῶν ἔλεξαν ὡς ἀληθῆ ἓνια δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν,  
 186 ψευδομένης περὶ αὐτῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἀλλὰ τό  
 γε κεφάλαιον, εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν εἶναι θέλομεν τὸ  
 σημεῖον, πρὸ παντὸς ὁμολογηθῆναι δεῖ καὶ βεβαίως  
 παραστῆναι τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑπόστασιν, ἵνα καὶ  
 τοῦτο δοθῆ παγίως καταληπτὸν εἶναι· ἢ εἴπερ ἐκεί-  
 νην δι' αἰῶνος ἔστασιάζεσθαι συμβέβηκεν, ὁμολογεῖν  
 δεήσει καὶ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς ἀσυμφωνίας ἔχουσαν.  
 187 ὡς περ γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα οὐ δύναται ἀπτότως  
 καταληφθῆναι μὴ ὁμολογηθείσης τῆς τῶν αἰσθη-  
 τῶν ὑποστάσεως, διὰ τὸ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν  
 ὑπάρχειν, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ σημεῖον, εἴπερ κατὰ γένος  
 αἰσθητὸν, λεχθήσεται πάγιον καθεστάναι μενούσης  
 τῆς περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μάχης. ἔστω δὴ καὶ συμ-  
 πεφωνῆσθαι τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ μηδ' ἠντινοῦν γεγονέναι  
 περὶ αὐτῶν διάστασιν. ζητῶ πῶς δύναται οἱ  
 ἑτερόδοξοι ἡμᾶς διδάσκειν ὅτι τῷ ὄντι αἰσθητὸν  
 ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον; πᾶν γὰρ αἰσθητὸν πᾶσι τοῖς  
 ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν <ὁμοίως><sup>2</sup> ὑποπίπτειν πέφυκε καὶ  
 ἐπ' ἴσης λαμβάνεσθαι. οἷον τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος  
 οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν οἱ Ἕλληνας ἀντιλαμβάνονται ἄλλως  
 δὲ οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ διαφερόντως μὲν οἱ τεχνῖται ἐξ-  
 ηλλαγμένως δὲ οἱ ἰδιῶται, ἀλλ' ὡσαύτως πάντες οἱ  
 188 γε ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντες τὰς αἰσθήσεις. τοῦ τε

things apparent to all; for these are names for our  
 affections. But Epicurus declared that all sensibles 185  
 really exist such as they appear and present them-  
 selves in sensation, as sense never lies, though we  
 think that it lies. And the Stoics and Peripatetics,  
 pursuing a middle course, have said that some  
 sensibles really exist, as being true, and some do not  
 exist, as sensation lies about them. But now, to sum 186  
 up: If we claim that the sign is sensible, it must  
 first of all be agreed and firmly established that  
 sensibles have substantial existence, in order that it  
 may be granted that the sign also is definitely appre-  
 hensible; or else, if it is the case that their existence  
 has been quarrelled over eternally, we shall have to  
 admit that the sign also partakes of the same contro-  
 versial character. For just as white colour cannot 187  
 be apprehended securely if the substantial existence  
 of sensibles be not admitted, because it is itself one  
 of the sensibles, so neither can the sign—if it belongs  
 to the class of sensibles—be said to have stable  
 existence so long as the conflict regarding sensibles  
 continues. Let us suppose now that there is unanim-  
 ity about sensibles and that there exists no dispute  
 whatsoever regarding them. How, I ask, can our  
 opponents show us that the sign is in reality sensible?  
 For every sensible thing ought naturally to present  
 itself alike to all who are in a like condition and  
 be similarly apprehended. Take white colour, for  
 instance: it is not apprehended in one way by Greeks,  
 in another by barbarians; or in a special way by  
 craftsmen and differently by ordinary folk; but  
 in one and the same way by all those who have their  
 senses unimpeded. Bitter and sweet, again, are not 188

<sup>1</sup> ἀλλ' ἡμῶν Heintz: ἄλλων mss., Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> <ὁμοίως> add. Heintz.

πικροῦ πάλιν ἢ γλυκεῶς οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν ὄδε γεύεται καθ' ἕτερον δὲ γρόπον ὄδε, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ὁμοίον ἕκαστος τῶν ὁμοίως διακειμένων. τὸ δέ γε σημείον ὡς σημείον οὐχ ὡσαύτως πάντας τοὺς ὁμοίως διακειμένους φαίνεται κινεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷς μὲν οὐδ' ὄλως ἐστὶ σημεῖόν τινος, καίπερ δι' ἐναργείας αὐτοῖς προσπίπτον, τισὶ δὲ σημεῖον μὲν ἐστίν, οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀλλὰ διαφέροντος· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ φαινόμενα λόγου χάριν ἐν ἰατρικῇ ἄλλου μὲν ἐστὶ σημεῖα τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἐρασιστράτῳ, ἄλλου δὲ τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἡροφίλῳ, ἄλλου δὲ τῶδε, καθάπερ Ἀσκληπιάδῃ. οὐ τοίνυν λεκτέον αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν πάντας ὁμοίως κινεῖ, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον οὐ πάντας ὁμοίως  
 189 κινεῖ, οὐκ ἂν εἶη αἰσθητὸν τὸ σημεῖον. πάλιν εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἐχρῆν, ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ αἰσθητὸν ὄν πάντας τοὺς καίεσθαι δυναμένους καίει καὶ ἡ χιών αἰσθητὴ καθεστηκυῖα πάντας τοὺς ψύχεσθαι δυναμένους ψύχει, ὥδε καὶ αὐτὸ εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ, πάντας ὀφείλειν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄγειν σημειωτόν. οὐκ ἄγει δέ γε· οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθη-  
 190 τὸν ἐστίν. πρὸς τούτοις εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, ἥτοι καταληπτὰ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὰ ἀδηλα ἢ ἀκατάληπτα. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀκατάληπτα ἡμῖν ἐστίν, οἴχεται τὸ σημεῖον· δυοῖν γὰρ ὄντων πραγμάτων, τῶν μὲν ἐναργῶν τῶν δὲ ἀδηλῶν, εἰ μήτε τὸ ἐναργές ἔχει σημεῖον διὰ τὸ αὐτοφώρατον εἶναι μήτε τὰ ἀδηλα διὰ τὸ ἀκατάληπτα τυγχάνειν, οὐδὲν ἐστὶ  
 191 σημεῖον. εἰ δὲ καταληπτὰ, πάλιν ἐχρῆν, ἐπεὶ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, τὸ δὲ αἰσθητὸν ἐπ' ἴσης πάντας κινεῖ, πᾶσι τὰ ἀδηλα καταλαμβάνεσθαι.

tasted in this way by this man and in a different way by that man, but similarly by each of those who are in a similar condition. But the sign, as sign, does not seem to affect in the same way all those who are in a similar condition; but to some it is not a sign of anything at all, although it presents itself to them plainly, while to some it is a sign, yet not of the same thing but of something different; thus in medicine, for instance, the same appearances are signs of one thing to this man (such as Erasistratus), but of another to that man (say, Herophilus), and of another to a third (such as Asclepiades).<sup>6</sup> We must not, then, say that the sign is sensible; for if the sensible affects all similarly, but the sign does not affect all similarly, the sign will not be sensible.—Again, if 189 the sign is sensible, it ought to follow that, just as fire, which is sensible, burns all those capable of being burnt, and snow, being sensible, chills all those capable of being chilled, so also the sign, if it belongs to the sensibles, leads all to the same signified thing. But, in fact, it does not so lead them; therefore it is not sensible.—Furthermore, if the sign is sensible, the 190 things non-evident are either apprehensible by us or non-apprehensible. If, then, they are non-apprehensible by us, the sign disappears; for things being of two kinds, some evident, others non-evident, if neither the evident thing possesses a sign owing to its being self-revealed, nor the non-evident things because they are non-apprehensible, there is no sign. But if the non-evident things are apprehensible, it 191 ought to follow again that, since the sign is sensible and the sensible affects all men alike, the things

<sup>6</sup> These three were physicians of the Dogmatic (or "Logical") School of Medicine, cf. § 156 *supra*; P.H. i. 236 n.

ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν φασι αὐτὰ μὴ καταλαμβάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἰατροὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως φιλόσοφοι, οἱ δὲ καταλαμβάνεσθαι μὲν, οὐχ ὁμοίως δέ. οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον.

192 *Ναὶ φασι, ἀλλ' ὡς τὸ πῦρ αἰσθητὸν καθεστὼς παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὑλῶν διαφερούσας ὑποφαίνει δυνάμεις, καὶ πρὸς μὲν κηρῷ τῆκει πρὸς δὲ πηλῷ πήσσει πρὸς δὲ ξύλῳ καίει, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἰκὸς ἔστι καὶ τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ὑπάρχον παρὰ τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν ἀντιλαμβανομένων*

193 *αὐτοῦ διαφορῶν εἶναι πραγμάτων μηνυτικόν. καὶ οὐ παράδοξον, ὅτε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑπομνηστικῶν σημείων θεωρεῖται οὕτω γιγνόμενον· ὁ γὰρ ἀνατεινόμενος πυρὸς τισὶ μὲν πολεμίων ἔφοδον σημαίνει τισὶ δὲ φίλων ἄφιξιν δηλοῦ, καὶ ὁ τοῦ κώδωνος ψόφος οἷς μὲν <σημεῖον><sup>1</sup> ὄψου πράσεως ἔστιν οἷς δὲ τοῦ δεῖν ραίνειν τὰς ὁδοὺς. καὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν ἄρα σημεῖον δυνήσεται φύσει αἰσθητὴν ἔχον ἄλλων*

194 *καὶ ἄλλων εἶναι μηνυτικόν. ἀξιώσει δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοὺς μὲν τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς μεταβάσει χρωμένους τοῦτο [δὲ] δεικνύναι γινόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ σημείου ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πυρὸς γίνεσθαι συμβέβηκεν. τουτὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁμολόγους ἔχει τὰς προειρημένας δυνάμεις, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἔστιν ὃς διαφέρεται περὶ <τοῦ ὑπ'><sup>2</sup> αὐτοῦ τὸν μὲν κηρὸν τῆκεσθαι τὸν*

195 *δὲ πηλὸν πήσσεσθαι τὸ δὲ ξύλον καίεσθαι. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνδεικτικοῦ σημείου ἔαν τὸ ἀνάλογον προσδεχόμεθα γίνεσθαι, εἰς τὴν μεγίστην ἀπέμψασιν περισησόμεθα, λέγοντες ἕκαστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένων ὑπάρχειν, ὥστε εἰ οὕτω τύχοι, καὶ πλήθος νοσοποιεῖν καὶ δριμύτητα καὶ σωματικὴν*

<sup>1</sup> <σημεῖον> post ἔστιν add. Mutsch.

<sup>2</sup> <τοῦ ὑπ'> cj. Bekk.

non-evident are apprehended by all. But some—like the Empirical doctors and the Sceptic philosophers<sup>a</sup>—assert that they are not apprehended, and others that they are apprehended but not equally. The sign, therefore, is not sensible.

"Yes," they reply, "but just as fire, being sensible, 192 exhibits different potencies owing to differences in the material subjected to it, and when applied to wax melts it, to clay hardens it, to wood burns it; so likewise it is probable that the sign also, being sensible, should serve to indicate different things according to the differences in those who apprehend it. Nor is this paradoxical, since this is also 193 seen to happen even in the case of commemorative signs; for the raising high of a torch signifies to some the approach of enemies, but to others indicates the arrival of friends; and the sound of a bell is to some a sign of the selling of meat, but to others of the need for watering the roads. Therefore the indicative sign also, having a sensible nature, will be capable of revealing things of different sorts."—But here, too, one 194 might require those who make use of the inference from fire to prove that what happens to take place in the case of fire takes place also in the case of the sign. For the former possesses potencies, as stated above, which are undisputed, and there is nobody who differs about the fact that wax is melted by it, clay hardened, and wood burned. But in the case of the 195 indicative sign, if we allow that a similar result takes place we shall find ourselves in the most absurd position—that of asserting that each of the things indicated by it exists, so that, let us say, plethora and acrid humours and bodily constitution

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 156.

196 κατασκευήν. ὅπερ ἄτοπον· τὰς γὰρ οὕτω μαχο-  
 μένας καὶ ἀνασκευαστικὰς ἀλλήλων αἰτίας οὐχ  
 οἶόν τε συνυπάρχειν. ἢ τοῦτο οὖν ὁμολογεῖταισαν,  
 καίπερ ὃν ἀδύνατον, οἱ δογματικῶς φιλοσοφούντες,  
 ἢ ὅτι τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν ὃν οὐδενὸς τὸ ὅσον ἐφ'  
 197 ἑαυτῷ ἐνδεικτικόν ἐστιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ διαφόρους ἔχον-  
 τες διαθέσεις οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἐπ' αὐτῷ κινούμεθα.  
 ὅπερ οὐκ ἂν ὑπομείναιεν ὁμολογεῖν, πρὸς τῷ καὶ  
 τὰς τοιαύτας τοῦ πυρὸς δυνάμεις μὴ εἶναι συμ-  
 198 φώνους ἀλλ' ἠπορήσθαι. εἰ γὰρ καυστικὴν ἔχει φύσιν  
 τὸ πῦρ, ὄφειλε πάντα καίειν καὶ μὴ τινὰ μὲν καίειν  
 τινὰ δὲ μηδαμῶς· καὶ εἰ τηκτικὴν εἶχε δύναμιν, πᾶν  
 199 ὄφειλε διαλύειν καὶ μὴ τινὰ μὲν τινὰ δ' οὐ. νῦν δὲ  
 ταῦτα ἔοικε ποιεῖν οὐ παρά τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν ἀλλὰ  
 παρά τὰς προσομιλούσας αὐτῷ τῶν ὑποκειμένων  
 ὕλας, οἷον τὸ ξύλον καίει οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὸ καυστικόν  
 ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὸ ξύλον ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει συνεργοῦ  
 λαβόμενον ἐκείνου καῆναι, καὶ τήκει τὸν κηρὸν οὐχ  
 ὅτι τηκτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι ὁ κηρὸς ἐπιτη-  
 200 δειότητα ἐκέκτητο πρὸς τὸ συνεργοῦ λαβόμενος<sup>1</sup>  
 ἐκείνου τήκεσθαι. ἀκριβέστερον δὲ περὶ τούτων δι-  
 δάξομεν, ὅταν περὶ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων ὑπάρξεως  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου καὶ τὸν πυρσὸν  
 παραλαμβάνοντας, ἔτι δὲ τὸν τοῦ κώδωνος ψόφον,  
 λεκτέον ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ὅτι οὐ παράδοξον εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα

<sup>1</sup> λαβόμενος N, cj. Bekk. ; λαβόμενον E; λαμβανόμενον L, Bekk.

\* The text here is doubtful: read perhaps *συνυπάρχειν. ὥστε, . . . πλήθος νοσοποιῶν <μηνύειν> κτλ.* ("the sign indicates morbid plethora" etc.). Fabr. gives *πλ. νόσων ποιεῖν*, "(quo fiet ut . . . ignis) multitudinem morborum faciat"; Her- vetus, "multitudinem unum faciant" (= ἐνοσοποιεῖν); Kayser, *πλ. νόσων μηνύειν*.

are all causes of disease.<sup>a</sup> But this is absurd; for it is 196  
 not possible for causes so conflicting and mutually  
 destructive to co-exist. Let the dogmatizing philo-  
 sophers, then, agree either to this, impossible though  
 it be, or that the sign, being sensible, is indicative of  
 nothing, so far as its own power goes, but that we with 197  
 our differing dispositions are not all affected alike by  
 it. But this they would not endure to agree to; and  
 besides, these potencies of fire are not unanimously  
 allowed but are matters of doubt. For if fire was of a 198  
 nature capable of burning, it ought to burn every-  
 thing and not burn some things and not others; and if  
 it had a power of melting, it ought to dissolve every-  
 thing instead of dissolving some and not others. But 199  
 as it is, it seems to do these things not on account of  
 its own nature but on account of the materials of the  
 substances with which it is brought into contact; for  
 instance, it burns wood, not because it is itself capable  
 of burning, but because wood is in a fit state to be  
 burnt when it receives the co-operation of fire; and it  
 melts wax, not because it has a power of melting,  
 but because wax possesses a fitness for being melted  
 when it receives the co-operation of fire. But this we  
 shall explain more exactly when we come to consider  
 the existence of such substances.<sup>b</sup> For the present, 200  
 in reply to those who draw inferences from the com-  
 memorative sign and quote the case of the torch, and  
 also of the sound of the bell, we must declare that  
 it is not paradoxical for such signs to be capable

The argument seems to be that if the same sign (or symptom) indicates a number of different things (such as diseases, the "causes" of the symptoms) these things must co-exist; but the diseases mentioned cannot co-exist; therefore a sign cannot indicate different things.

<sup>b</sup> See *Adv. Phys.* i. 237 ff.

τῶν σημείων πλείονων ἐστὶ δηλωτικά· θεμένων γὰρ νόμους, ὡς φασίν, ὀρίσαι<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν κεῖται, ἕαν τε ἐν θέλωμεν αὐτὰ μηνύειν ἕαν τε καὶ πλείονων  
 201 ὑπάρχειν δηλωτικά. τὸ δὲ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον ἐκ φύσεως ὑπαγορευτικὸν εἶναι δοκοῦν τοῦ σημειωτοῦ κατ' ἀνάγκην ἐνὸς δεῖ πράγματος ἐνδεικτικὸν εἶναι, καὶ τούτου πάντως μονοειδοῦς, ἐπεὶ τοι ἕαν κοινὸν πολλῶν ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἔσται σημεῖον. ἀμήχανον γὰρ ἐν βεβαίως διὰ τινος λαμβάνεσθαι, πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν δηλουμένων. οἷον τὸ ἐκ πλουσιῶν πένητα γενέσθαι κοινὸν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ ἡσωτεῦσθαι καὶ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν ἐπταικεῖναι καὶ τοῦ φίλοις μεταδεωκέναι, πολλῶν δὲ κοινὸν ὑπάρχον οὐκέτι τινὸς αὐτῶν ἐξαιρέτως μηνυτικὸν εἶναι δύναται· εἰ γὰρ τούτου, τί μᾶλλον τούτου ἢ ἐκείνου; καὶ εἰ ἐκείνου, τί μᾶλλον ἐκείνου ἢ τούτου; καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντων· ἀσυνύπαρκτα γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ πάντα. διαφέρει τοίνυν τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου τὸ ἐνδεικτικόν, καὶ οὐ μεταβατέον ἐστὶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐπὶ τούτου, παρόσον τὸ μὲν ἐνὸς μόνου δεῖ μηνυτικὸν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πλείονων δύναται εἶναι παραστατικόν καὶ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς θεματίσωμεν σημαίνειν.  
 203 Ἔτι πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ὡς αἰσθητὸν ἀδιδάκτον ἐστίν. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα διδάσκεται τις ὄραν οὔτε τοῦ γλυκεῶς μαθάνει γεύεσθαι, οὐ θερμοῦ ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, οὐκ ἄλλου τινὸς τοιούτου· ἀλλ' ἐκ φύσεως καὶ ἀδιδάκτως πάντων αὐτῶν πάρεστιν ἡμῖν ἢ γνώσις. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημεῖον μετὰ πολλῶν, ὡς φασί, μόχθων διδάσκεται, οἷον τὸ κατὰ

<sup>1</sup> ὀρίσαι Fabr.: ὄρισται mss., Bekk.

of announcing more things than one. For they are determined, as they say, by the lawgivers and lie in our power, whether we wish them to indicate one thing or to be capable of announcing several things. But as the indicative sign is supposed to be essentially 201 suggestive of the thing signified, it must necessarily be indicative of one thing; and this must certainly be a thing of single form, since of course, if it is common to many things, it will not be a sign. For it is impossible for one object to be firmly apprehended by means of anything when the things indicated thereby are many. For example, a man's fall from wealth to poverty is a sign alike of a life of dissipation, and of disaster by sea, and of contributions to friends; and being thus common to many things, it can no longer be indicative of any one of them in special; for if it is indicative of this one, why of this one rather than of that one? And if of that one, why of that one rather than of this one? Nor, indeed, can it be indi- 202 cative of all; for they are not all capable of co-existing. So, then, the indicative sign differs from the commemorative, and one must not draw inferences about the former from the latter, inasmuch as the one ought to serve to indicate one object alone, whereas the other can serve to manifest several objects, and to possess such significations as we ourselves may determine.

Further, every sensible thing, *qua* sensible, is 203 incapable of being taught. For a man is not taught to see a white colour, nor does he learn to taste sweetness, nor to feel heat, nor anything else of the kind; but it is from nature and without teaching that the knowledge of all these things comes to us. But the sign, *qua* sign, is taught, as they say, with much

- κυβερνητικῆν, ὅτι ἀνέμων ἐστὶ δηλωτικὸν καὶ  
 204 χειμῶνων ἢ εὐδίας. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς τὰ  
 οὐράνια πραγματευσαμένοις, καθάπερ Ἀράτω καὶ  
 Ἀλεξάνδρῳ τῷ Αἰτωλῷ. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς  
 ἐμπειρικῶς ἰατροῦσιν, οἷον τὸ ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ  
 κυρτότης τῶν ἀγγείων<sup>1</sup> καὶ τὸ δίψος καὶ τὰ ἄλλα,  
 ὧν ὁ μὴ διδαχθεὶς οὐκ ἀντιλαμβάνεται ὡς σημείων.  
 205 οὐκ ἄρα αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ μὲν  
 αἰσθητὸν ἀδίδακτον, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημείον ἐστὶ  
 διδακτὸν, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σημεῖον αἰσθητὸν.  
 206 Τὸ τε αἰσθητὸν, ἢ αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ, κατὰ διαφορὰν  
 νοεῖται, οἷον τὸ λευκόν, τὸ μέλαν, γλυκὺ πικρὸν,  
 πᾶν τὸ τοιουτῶδες. τὸ δὲ σημεῖον, ἢ σημείον ἐστὶ,  
 τῶν πρὸς τι καθέστηκεν· κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὡς πρὸς  
 τὸ σημειωτὸν σχέσιν ἐθεωρεῖτο. οὐκ ἄρα τῶν  
 αἰσθητῶν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον.  
 207 Καὶ μὴ πᾶν αἰσθητὸν, ὡς ἡ κλήσις παρίστησιν,  
 αἰσθήσει ληπτὸν ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ σημεῖον ὡς σημεῖον  
 οὐκ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται ἀλλὰ διανοίᾳ. λέγομεν  
 γοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς  
 καὶ ψεῦδος οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθητὸν· ἀξίωμα γὰρ ἐκά-  
 τερον, τὸ δὲ ἀξίωμα οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν  
 νοητῶν ὑπῆρχεν. λεκτέον ἄρα μὴ εἶναι τῶν  
 αἰσθητῶν τὸ σημεῖον.  
 208 Ἐπιχειρητέον δὲ καὶ οὕτως. εἴπερ αἰσθητὸν  
 ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον, πολὺ πρότερον ὀφείλει  
 τὸ αἰσθητὸν τινος ἐνδεικτικὸν ὑπάρχειν· ὅπερ οὐχ  
 οὕτως εἶχεν. εἰ γὰρ ἐνδείκνυται τι τὸ αἰσθητὸν,  
 ἦτοι τὸ ὁμογενὲς τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἔσται ἐνδεικτικὸν  
 ἢ τὸ ἀνομογενὲς τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς· οὔτε δὲ τὸ

<sup>1</sup> ἀγγείων Kalbfleisch: αἰτῶν LE, Bekk.: ὠτίων N.

labour—that, for example, in navigation, which serves  
 to indicate winds and storms or fine weather. So 204  
 likewise the signs dealt with by those who treat of  
 things in the heavens, like Aratus and Alexander  
 the Aetolian<sup>a</sup>; and similarly those of the Empiric  
 physicians, such as blushing and swelling of the  
 vessels and thirst and so on, which the uninstructed  
 person does not apprehend as signs. The sign, there- 205  
 fore, is not sensible; for if the sensible is incapable  
 of being taught, but the sign, *qua* sign, is capable of  
 being taught, the sign will not be sensible.

The sensible, too, *qua* sensible, is conceived as 206  
 absolute<sup>b</sup>—white, for instance, and black, sweet and  
 bitter, and everything of that sort. But the sign,  
*qua* sign, is a relative thing; for it is viewed in regard  
 to its relation to the thing signified. Therefore the  
 sign does not belong to the class of sensibles.

Moreover, every sensible—as the term shows—is 207  
 apprehensible by sense, but the sign, *qua* sign, is  
 apprehended not by sense but by intellect. Thus  
 we say that a sign is true or false, but the true and  
 the false are not sensible; for each of them is a  
 judgement, and the judgement belongs not to the  
 sensibles but to the intelligibles. We must declare,  
 therefore, that the sign does not belong to the class  
 of sensibles.

We may also use this argument: If the indicative 208  
 sign is sensible, the sensible ought, long before, to  
 be indicative of something; but this is not the case.  
 For if the sensible indicates anything, either the  
 homogeneous will be indicative of the homogeneous or  
 the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous; but neither

<sup>a</sup> Greek poets of 3rd century B.C., who wrote on astro-  
 nomical themes.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 163.



ὁμογενές τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς οὔτε τὸ ἀνομογενές τοῦ  
 ἀνομογενοῦς· οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδεικτικὸν τινός ἐστι τὸ  
 209 αἰσθητόν. οἷον ἔστω μηδέποτε ἡμᾶς καθ' ὑπό-  
 θεοῖν λευκῶ περιπεπτωκέναι χρώματι, μηδὲ μέλανι,  
 πρώτως δὲ ὄραν τὸ λευκόν. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν ἰσχύσαι-  
 210 μεν ἀπὸ τῆς τούτου καταλήψεως τὸ μέλαν κατα-  
 λαμβάνεσθαι χρώμα· ἔννοϊαν μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν τοῦ  
 ἕτερον εἶναι χρώμα τὸ μέλαν, καὶ μὴ τοιοῦτο οἶόν  
 ἐστι τὸ λευκόν, τάχα δυνατὸν ἐστι, κατάληψιν δὲ  
 ποιῆσθαι τοῦ μέλανος χρώματος ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ  
 παρουσίας τῶν ἀμηχάνων. καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς φωνῆς ὁ  
 αὐτός ἐστι λόγος, καὶ κοινῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰ-  
 σθητῶν. οὐκοῦν τὸ ὁμογενές αἰσθητόν οὐκ ἂν εἴη  
 τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς ἐνδεικτικόν, τοὔτεστι τὸ ὄρατόν τοῦ  
 ὄρατοῦ ἢ τὸ ἀκουστόν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ ἢ τὸ γευστόν  
 211 τοῦ γευστοῦ. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀνομογενές  
 τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς, οἷον τὸ ὄρατόν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ  
 ἢ τὸ ἀκουστόν τοῦ γευστοῦ ἢ ὀσφραντοῦ· οὐ γὰρ  
 ἂν ὀσφραίνηται τις εὐώδους τινός, εἰς κατάληψιν  
 ἔρχεται τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος, οὐδὲ φωνῆς ἀντι-  
 λαμβανόμενος γλυκαίνεται τὴν γεῦσιν.  
 212 Καίτοι μακρόν ἐστι ζητεῖν εἰ δύναται τὸ  
 ὁμογενές τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς καὶ τὸ ἀνομογενές τοῦ  
 ἀνομογενοῦς εἶναι σημείον, ὅτε καὶ τὸ τούτου  
 ἔγγιον ἀπελπίσειεν ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων, φημί δὲ  
 τὸ μηδὲ ἑαυτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐνδεικτικὸν εἶναι τὸ  
 213 αἰσθητόν. τῶν γὰρ περὶ τούτου σκεψαμένων, ὡς  
 πολλάκις ἐδείξαμεν, οἱ μὲν φασι αὐτὸ μὴ τοιοῦτο  
 λαμβάνεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἶόν ἐστι φύσει·  
 οὔτε γὰρ λευκόν οὔτε μέλαν, οὔτε θερμόν, οὐ ψυ-  
 χρόν, οὐ γλυκύ, οὐ πικρόν, οὐκ ἄλλην τοιαύτην ἔχον

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 135, 293; P.H. i. 49, 213 ff.

is the homogeneous indicative of the homogeneous  
 nor the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous;  
 therefore the sensible is not indicative of anything.  
 Suppose, for instance, that we had never experienced  
 209 white colour or black, and were to see white for  
 the first time. Then, from our apprehension of the  
 white we would not be able to apprehend black; for  
 210 though it is, perhaps, possible to form a notion that  
 black is another colour, and not of the same sort as  
 white, yet to arrive at an apprehension of black  
 colour through the presence of white is a thing  
 impossible. And the same account may be given  
 of voice, and in general of all the other sensibles.  
 So, then, the homogeneous sensible will not be indica-  
 tive of the homogeneous—that is to say, the visible of  
 the visible, or the audible of the audible, or the gust-  
 able of the gustable.—Nor, again, is the heterogeneous  
 211 indicative of the heterogeneous—as, for example, the  
 visible of the audible, or the audible of the gustable  
 or odorable; for one does not by smelling a sweet  
 scent arrive at an apprehension of white colour, nor  
 get a sweet taste by perceiving a voice.

However, it is far-fetched to inquire whether the  
 212 homogeneous can be a sign of the homogeneous, or  
 the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous, when any  
 man of sense would despair of a thing much nearer to  
 hand—I mean the fact that the sensible is not even  
 able to be indicative of its own self. For, as we have  
 213 often pointed out,<sup>a</sup> of those who have investigated  
 the sensible, some <sup>b</sup> assert that, as apprehended by  
 sense, it is not the same as it is by nature; for it is  
 not white or black, hot or cold, sweet or bitter, or  
 possessed of any other such quality, but appears to

<sup>b</sup> e.g. Democritus, cf. § 184.

ποιότητα αὐτὸ καθεστάναι, κενοπαθούσης δὲ καὶ  
 ψευδομένης ἡμῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως τοιοῦτο δοκεῖν  
 ὑποκείσθαι· οἱ δὲ τινὰ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔδοξαν  
 κατ' ἀλήθειαν ὑποκείσθαι τινὰ δὲ μηδαμῶς, ἄλλοι  
 δὲ πᾶσι τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἐπ' ἴσης προσεμαρτύρησαν.  
 214 τοσαύτης οὖν καὶ ἀδιακρίτου στάσεως οὐσης περὶ  
 τῆς τῶν αἰσθητῶν ὑποστάσεως, πῶς οἷόν τε λέγειν  
 αὐτοῦ παραστατικὸν εἶναι τὸ αἰσθητόν; ὅτε οὐδέ-  
 πω γινώσκεται τίς ἐστὶν ἡ ἀληθὴς τῶν οὕτως  
 διαφωνούντων στάσις. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γε κρατεῖν χρῆ,  
 ὡς εἴπερ οὔτε τὸ ὁμογενὲς αἰσθητόν τοῦ ὁμογενοῦς  
 αἰσθητοῦ οὔτε τὸ ἀνομογενὲς τοῦ ἀνομογενοῦς οὐτ'  
 αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐνδεικτικὸν ἐστίν, ἀδύνατον ἄρα λέγειν  
 αἰσθητόν εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον.  
 215 Ὁ δὲ Αἰνησίδημος ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῶν Πυρ-  
 ρονείων λόγων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς  
 αὐτῆς σχεδὸν δυνάμειος λόγον ἐρωτᾷ τοιοῦτον. εἰ  
 τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παρα-  
 πλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ  
 σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως  
 φαίνεται. οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως  
 διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινό-  
 216 μενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως  
 φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστὶ τὰ σημεῖα. καὶ  
 δὴ τοῖνυν φαινόμενα μὲν εἶκοι καλεῖν ὁ Αἰνησίδημος  
 τὰ αἰσθητά, λόγον δὲ ἐρωτᾷ καθ' ὃν δευτέρως  
 ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιβάλλει τρίτῳ, οὐ τὸ σχῆμά ἐστὶ  
 τοιοῦτο "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον·  
 οὐχὶ δὲ τὸ τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ  
 217 δεύτερον." καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οὕτως ἔχει, μικρὸν  
 ὑστερον διδάξομεν· νῦν δ' ὡς ὑγιῆ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ τὰ

be really such when our sense has empty affections and gives false reports; but others<sup>a</sup> have thought that some sensibles are truly existent and some not; while others, again, have attributed existence to all equally. Since, then, there exists an unsettled dispute 214 of this magnitude regarding the real existence of sensibles, how is it possible to assert that the sensible is capable of manifesting itself, when it is not known as yet which of the discordant views is the true one? But this fact, at least, ought to stand fast—that if neither the homogeneous sensible is indicative of the homogeneous sensible, nor the heterogeneous of the heterogeneous, nor the sensible itself of itself, it is, consequently, impossible to declare that the sign is sensible.

Aenesidemus, in the Fourth Book of his *Pyrrhon-* 215  
*ean Discourses*, propounds an argument on the same subject and to much the same effect in the following form: "If apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition, and signs are apparent things, signs appear alike to all those in a similar condition. But signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar condition; and apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition; therefore signs are not apparent things." Now Aenesidemus seems here to 216 be terming sensibles "apparent things," and he propounds an argument in which a second non-demonstrable<sup>b</sup> is superadded to a third, the scheme of it being this: "If the first and the second, then the third; not the third, but the first; therefore not the second." That this is really so we shall show a 217 little later on<sup>c</sup>; at the moment we shall prove more

<sup>a</sup> i.e. Aristotle and the Stoics; the third view is that of Epicurus; cf. §§ 9, 10, 185.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 157 ff.

<sup>c</sup> See §§ 234 ff.

λήμματα καὶ ἔπεται τούτοις ἢ ἐπιφορά, ἀπλούστερον ἀποδείξομεν. αὐτίκα τοῖνυν τὸ συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστιν. ἔπεται γὰρ τῷ κατ' αὐτὸ συμπεπλεγμένῳ τὸ λήγον, τουτέστι τῷ "τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνονται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα" τὸ τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνονται. εἰ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ χρώματος πάντες οἱ ἀπαραποδίστους ἔχοντες τὰς ὄψεις ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνονται ἀλλ' οὐ διαφόρως, καὶ εἰ τοῦ γλυκέος πάντες οἱ κατὰ φύσιν τὴν γεῦσιν ἔχοντες γλυκαντικῶς ἀντιλαμβάνονται, κατ' ἀνάγκην ὀφείλουσι καὶ τοῦ σημείου, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καθάπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ, πάντες οἱ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν ὄντες 218 διάθεσιν ὁμοίως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι. ὥστε τὸ μὲν συνημμένον ὑγιές ἐστίν· ἀληθές δέ γε καὶ τὸ δεύτερον λήμμα, τὸ "οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται." τὸ γοῦν ἐπὶ τῶν πυρεσσόντων ἔρευθος καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγγείων<sup>1</sup> προπάλεια καὶ ὁ ἔνικμος χρῶς καὶ ἡ πλείων θερμασία καὶ ἡ σφοδρότης τῶν σφυγμῶν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ σημεῖα τοῖς ὁμοίως κατὰ τε τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σύγκρισιν διακειμένοις οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσπίπτει σημεῖα, οὐδ' 220 ὡσαύτως πᾶσι φαίνεται, ἀλλ' Ἐροφίλῳ μὲν λόγον χάριν ὡς ἀντικρυς χρηστοῦ<sup>2</sup> αἵματος σημεῖα, Ἐρασιστράτῳ δὲ ὡς μεταπτώσεως τῆς ἐκ φλεβῶν εἰς ἀρτηρίας, Ἀσκληπιάδῃ δὲ ὡς ἐνστάσεως νοητῶν ὄγκων ἐν νοητοῖς ἀραιώμασιν. τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον 221 λήμμα ὑγιές ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τὸ τρίτον, τὸ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως

<sup>1</sup> ἀγγείων Kalbfleisch: αἰτίων LE, Bekk.: ὤτιων N.

<sup>2</sup> An ἀχρήστου?

simply that the premisses of the argument are sound and that the conclusion follows from them. Thus, to start with, the major premiss is true; for the consequent follows from the conjunctive clause—that is, from "Apparent things appear alike to all those in a similar condition, and signs are apparent things," there follows "Signs appear alike to all those in a similar condition." For if all those who have 218 unimpeded sight perceive white colour similarly and not differently; and if all whose taste is in a natural state apprehend what is sweet as sweet; then all who are in a similar condition ought of necessity to apprehend the sign similarly, if it is a sensible thing like the white and the sweet. So that the major 219 premiss is sound. And the second premiss is also true, namely "But signs do not appear alike to all those in a similar condition." Thus, in the case of fever patients, flushing and prominence of the vessels and a moist skin and increased temperature and quickening of the pulses and all the other signs do not manifest themselves as signs of the same thing to those who are in a similar condition as regards their senses and the rest of their bodily constitution, nor do they appear alike to all; but to Herophilus, 220 for instance, they seem to be definite signs of good blood, and to Erasistratus of the transference of the blood from the veins to the arteries, and to Asclepiades of the lodgement of intelligible molecules<sup>a</sup> in intelligible interstices. So, then, the second premiss also is sound. But so is the third as well, namely 221 "Apparent things appear alike to all those in a

<sup>a</sup> i.e. non-sensible (invisible) molecules of matter in non-sensible passages of the body. Cf. P.H. iii. 32.

φαίνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ λευκόν, εἰ τύχοι, χρῶμα τῷ μὲν ἰκτεριῶντι καὶ τῷ ὑφαίμους ἔχοντι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένῳ οὐχ ὡσαύτως προσπίπτει (ἀνομοίως γὰρ διέκειντο, παρ' ἣν αἰτίαν τῷ μὲν φαίνεται ὠχρὸν τῷ δὲ ἐνερευθὲς τῷ δὲ λευκόν), τοῖς μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν διάθεσιν οὖσι, τούτέστι τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι, λευκόν μόνον φαίνεται. 222 τούτων ἀληθέσιν οὖσι τοῖς λήμμασι συνεισαχθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά ἢ "οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενόν ἐστι τὸ σημεῖον."

Αὐτόθεν μὲν οὖν ἐφοδεύσασι ἡμῖν ἀληθῆς ὁ 223 λόγος ὑποδέδεικται· ὅτι δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτός ἐστι καὶ συλλογιστικός, ἀναλύσασιν αὐτὸν φανήσεται. εὐθέως γάρ, ἵνα μικρὸν ἄνωθεν προλάβωμεν, ἀναπόδεικτοι λέγονται διχῶς, οἱ τε μὴ ἀποδεδειγμένοι καὶ οἱ μὴ χρεῖαν ἔχοντες ἀποδείξεως τῷ αὐτόθεν εἶναι περιφανῆς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν. ἐπεδείξαμεν δὲ πολλάκις ὡς κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον ταύτης ἠξίωνται τῆς προσηγορίας εἰ κατ' ἀρχὴν τῆς πρώτης περὶ συλλογισμῶν εἰσαγωγῆς 224 παρὰ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τεταγμένοι. νυνὶ δὲ ἐφ' ὁμολόγῳ τούτῳ γνωστέον ὅτι πρῶτος μὲν ἐστὶν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τὸ λῆγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ ἔχων συμπέρασμα. τούτέστιν, ὅταν λόγος δύο ἔχη λήμματα, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερόν ἐστι συνημμένον τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἔχη δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ συνημμένῳ, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος πρῶτος ἀναπόδεικτος καλεῖται, οἷον ὁ οὕτως

similar condition." Thus, for example, white colour does not present itself in the same way to the man with jaundice, and to one who has blood-shot eyes,<sup>a</sup> and to him who is in a natural condition (for their conditions are dissimilar, and because of this it appears yellow to the first, reddish to the second, and white to the third); yet to those who are in the same condition, that is to say in sound health, it appears white only. So from 222 these true premisses there will be drawn the conclusion "Therefore the sign is not an apparent thing."

This argument, then, has been shown by our examination of it to be true; and that it is both non- 223 demonstrable and syllogistic<sup>b</sup> will appear when we have analysed it. For—to go back to first principles—the term "non-demonstrable," to start with, has two senses, being used both of arguments which are not demonstrated, and of those which have no need of demonstration owing to its being at once obvious in their case that they are conclusive. And we have often pointed<sup>c</sup> out that the arguments set out by Chrysippus, at the beginning of his first *Introduction to Syllogisms*, are given this title in the second sense. So now, this being assumed, one must understand 224 that the first non-demonstrable argument is that composed of a hypothetical major premiss and its antecedent, having as its conclusion the consequent in the major.<sup>d</sup> That is to say, when an argument has two premisses, of which the one is a hypothetical major and the other the antecedent in the major, and also has as its conclusion the consequent in the same major, then such an argument is called a "first non-demonstrable," for example one in this form—"If it is day,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 44.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 149 n., 146 ff.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 156.

<sup>d</sup> With §§ 224-226 cf. P.H. ii. 157, 158.

ἔχων "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." οὗτος γὰρ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῶν λημμάτων ἔχει συνημμένον, τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι," τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ "ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" τρίτον τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, τὸ λήγον τοῦ  
 225 συνημμένου. δεύτερος δ' ἔστιν ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐκ συνημμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου τῷ λήγοντι ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ ἔχων συμπέρασμα. τουτέστιν, ὅταν λόγος πάλιν ἐκ δυοῖν (<ῆ><sup>1</sup>) συνεστῶς λημμάτων, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον ἔστι συνημμένον τὸ δὲ ἕτερον ἀντικείμενον τῷ λήγοντι ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἔχη δὲ καὶ ἐπιφορὰν τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ ἡγούμενῳ, τότε ὁ τοιοῦτος γίνεται δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ὡς τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· οὐχὶ δὲ γε φῶς ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν ἡμέρα." τὸ τε γὰρ "εἰ ἔστιν ἡμέρα, φῶς ἔστιν," τὸ ἕτερον λῆμμα τοῦ λόγου, συνημμένον ἐστί, τὸ τε "οὐχὶ δὲ γε φῶς ἔστιν," λοιπὸν λῆμμα τοῦ λόγου καθεστῶς, ἀντικείμενον ἔστι τῷ λήγοντι ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ· ἢ τε ἐπιφορὰ ἢ "οὐκ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν" τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἦν τοῦ ἡγούμενου.  
 226 τρίτος δὲ ἔστι λόγος ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ ἐξ ἀποφατικῆς συμπλοκῆς καὶ ἐνὸς τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ λοιποῦ τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ ἔχων συμπέρασμα, οἷον "οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δὲ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι νύξ." τὸ μὲν γὰρ "οὐχὶ καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν" ἀποφατικὸν ἦν συμπεπλεγμένου τοῦ "καὶ ἡμέρα ἔστι καὶ νύξ ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" τὸ ἕτερον ἐτύγχανε τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ, τὸ δὲ "οὐκ ἄρα

<sup>1</sup> <ῆ> cj. Bekk.

it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light." For this has a hypothetical major as one of its premisses, namely, "If it is day, it is light" ; and as the second, the antecedent of the major, "But in fact it is day" ; and thirdly, as its conclusion, the consequent of the major, "Therefore it is light."—The second non-demonstrable is that composed of a 225 hypothetical major premiss and the contradictory of the consequent in that major, and having as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent. That is to say, when an argument, composed once more of two premisses, of which the one is a hypothetical major and the other the contradictory of the consequent in that major, has also as its conclusion the contradictory of the antecedent, then such an argument is a "second non-demonstrable"—as for example "If it is day, it is light ; but it is not light ; therefore it is not day." For the one premiss of the argument—namely, "If it is day, it is light"—is a hypothetical major ; and "But it is not light," which is the other premiss of the argument, is the contradictory of the consequent in the major ; and the conclusion, "Therefore it is not day," is the contradictory of the antecedent.—The third non-demonstrable argument is 226 that composed of a negative conjunctive premiss and one of the clauses of that conjunctive, and having as its conclusion the contradictory of the other clause in the conjunctive premiss ; for example, "It is not both day and night ; but it is day ; therefore it is not night." For the premiss "It is not both day and night" is the negative of the conjunctive, "It is both day and night," and "It is day" is one of the clauses in the conjunctive, and "Therefore it is not night"

ἔστι νύξ" τὸ ἀντικείμενον ἦν τῷ λοιπῷ τῶν ἐν τῇ συμπλοκῇ.

227 Οἱ μὲν οὖν λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι, τρόποι δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὡσπερὶ σχήματα ἐν οἷς ἠρώτηται οἱ οὕτως ἔχοντες, τοῦ μὲν πρώτου ἀναποδείκτου " εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον," τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου " εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὸ δεύτερον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον," τοῦ δὲ τρίτου " οὐχὶ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· τὸ δέ γε πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."

228 Ἔτι χρῆ γινώσκειν ὅτι τῶν ἀναποδείκτων οἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἀπλοὶ οἱ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλοὶ. ὧν ἀπλοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ αὐτόθεν σαφῆς ἔχοντες τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ὅτι συνεισάγεται αὐτῶν τοῖς λήμμασιν ἢ ἐπιφορά. ὁποῖοι εἰσιν οἱ ἐκκείμενοι· εἴαν γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ πρώτου εὐθὺς δῶμεν ἀληθές εἶναι τὸ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστι," λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ὑποθώμεθα δὲ ἀληθές τὸ πρῶτον τὸ ἡμέραν εἶναι, ὅπερ ἦν ἡγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸ φῶς εἶναι, ὅπερ ἦν συμπέρασμα τοῦ λόγου.

229 οὐχ ἀπλοὶ δὲ εἰσιν οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἀπλῶν πεπλεγμένοι καὶ ἔτι χρεῖαν ἔχοντες τῆς εἰς ἐκείνους ἀναλύσεως, ἵνα γνωσθῶσιν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ συνάγουσιν. τούτων δὲ τῶν οὐχ ἀπλῶν οἱ μὲν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν εἰσὶν συν-εστῶτες οἱ δὲ ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν, καὶ ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν ὡσπερ οἱ ἐκ δυῶν πρώτων ἀναποδείκτων πε-  
230 πλεγμένοι ἢ ἐκ δυῶν δευτέρων, ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν δὲ ὡσπερ οἱ ἐκ πρώτου <καὶ τρίτου><sup>1</sup> ἀναποδείκτου

is the contradictory of the other clause in the conjunctive.

Such, then, are these arguments; and the "moods" 227 or "schemes," so to say, in which the arguments of this kind are propounded are as follows: Of the first non-demonstrable—"If the first, then the second (is true); but the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)." Of the second—"If the first, then the second (is true); but the second is not (true); therefore the first is not (true)." Of the third—"The first and the second are not both (true); but the first is (true); therefore the second is not (true)."

Further, one should observe that some of the non- 228 demonstrables are simple, others not simple. Simple ones are those which at once clearly declare that they draw a conclusion—that is to say, that the inference is introduced together with the premisses themselves. The arguments stated above are of this kind; for, in the case of the first, if we grant it to be true that "If it is day, it is light,"—true, I mean, that the existence of light follows on that of day,—and if we assume as true the first clause, that "it is day," which is the antecedent in the major premiss, it will necessarily follow that it is also light, which is the conclusion of the argument. Not simple are those which are 229 woven together out of simple ones, and which require to be broken up first into simple ones before it can be known that they, too, draw conclusions. And of these not simple arguments, some are composed of homogeneous parts, others of heterogeneous—of homogeneous, as in the case of those woven out of two first non-demonstrables, or of two second; and of 230 heterogeneous, as in the case of those compounded of a first non-demonstrable (and a third), or of a

<sup>1</sup> <καὶ τρίτου> Kochalsky.

231 *συνεστῶτες ἢ ἐκ δευτέρου καὶ τρίτου, καὶ κοινῶς οἱ τούτοις παραπλήσιοι. ἐξ ὁμογενῶν μὲν οὖν συνέστηκεν οἶον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." πέπλεκται γὰρ ἐκ πρώτων δυοῖν ἀναποδείκτων, ὡς ἀναλύσαντες αὐτὸν εἰσόμεθα. γνωστότερον γὰρ ὅτι θεώρημα διαλεκτικὸν ἔστιν εἰς τὰς τῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀναλύσεις παραδιδόμενον τοιοῦτον "ὅταν τὰ τινος συμπεράσματος συνακτικὰ λήμματα ἔχωμεν, δυνάμει κἀκείνου ἐν τούτοις ἔχομεν τὸ συμπέρασμα, κἂν κατ' ἐκφορὰν μὴ λέγηται."*  
 232 *ἐπεὶ οὖν δύο ἔχομεν λήμματα, τὸ τε συνημμένον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν," ὅπερ ἀρχεται μὲν ἀπὸ ἀπλοῦ ἀξιώματος τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," λήγει δὲ εἰς οὐχ ἀπλοῦν συνημμένον τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν," καὶ ἔτι τὸ ἡγούμενον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἐκ τούτων συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν πρῶτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ τὸ "εἰ ἄρα ἡμέρα ἔστιν, φῶς ἔστιν." τοῦτ' οὖν δυνάμει μὲν ἔχομεν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συναγόμενον, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκφορὰν παραλελειμμένον τάξαντες μετὰ τῆς τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου προσλήψεως<sup>1</sup> τῆς "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ἔξομεν συναγόμενον τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν" πρῶτῳ ἀναποδείκτῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἐπιφορὰ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου λόγου. ὥστε δύο γίνεσθαι πρώτους ἀναποδείκτους, ἓνα μὲν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν," ἕτερον δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."*  
 234 *Τοιοῦδε μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ χαρακτήρ τῶν ἐξ ὁμογενῶν τὴν πλοκὴν ἐχόντων λόγων· ἐξ ἀνομογενῶν*

<sup>1</sup> προσλήψεως Heintz: πολλήψεως MSS., Bekk.

second and a third, and in general such as are similar to these. Thus an argument such as the following is composed of homogeneous parts—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light." For it is woven out of two first non-demonstrables, as we shall learn when we analyse it. For one should 231 observe that there is a dialectical rule handed down for the analysis of syllogisms, namely this—"When we know the premisses which imply a certain conclusion, we know also potentially the conclusion involved in them, even though it be not explicitly stated." Since, then, we have two premisses,—232 the major "If it is day, it is light," which begins with the simple proposition "it is day" but ends with the not-simple major "if it is day, it is light," and also its antecedent "it is day,"—from these we shall infer, by the first non-demonstrable, the consequent of that major, namely "Therefore if it is day, it is light." Potentially, then, we have this 233 inference drawn in the argument, but as it is omitted in the explicit statement, when we have put it beside the minor premiss of the expressed argument "it is day" we shall have the clause "it is light" deduced by the first non-demonstrable, which clause is the conclusion of the expressed argument. So that two first indemonstrables are formed, the one being of this sort—"If it is day, it is light," and the other of this—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light."

Such then is the type of the arguments which are 234 woven out of homogeneous parts. Next come those

δὲ λοιπὸν ἔστι καθάπερ ὁ παρὰ τῷ Αἰνσιδῆμῳ  
 περὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐρωτηθεῖς, ἔχων δὲ οὕτως "εἰ  
 τὰ φαινόμενα ἅπασιν τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις  
 παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεία ἔστι φαινό-  
 μενα, τὰ σημεία πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις  
 παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς  
 ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ  
 δὲ γε σημεία οὐ πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις  
 παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα φαινόμενά ἐστι  
 235 τὰ σημεία." συνέστηκε γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος λόγος ἐκ  
 δευτέρου τε ἀναποδείκτου καὶ τρίτου, καθὼς  
 πάρεστι μαθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀναλύσεως, ἥτις σαφεστέρα  
 μᾶλλον γενήσεται ἐπὶ τοῦ τρόπου ποιησαμένων  
 ἡμῶν τὴν διδασκαλίαν, ἔχοντος οὕτως "εἰ τὸ  
 πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ τρίτον· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ  
 τρίτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."  
 236 ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔχομεν συνημμένον ἐν ᾧ ἡγείται συμ-  
 πλεγμένον τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, λήγει δὲ  
 τὸ τρίτον, ἔχομεν δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ  
 λήγοντος τὸ "οὐ τὸ τρίτον," συναχθήσεται ἡμῖν  
 καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τοῦ ἡγουμένου, τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα  
 τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον," δευτέρῳ ἀναπο-  
 δείκτῳ. ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο αὐτὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν  
 δύναμιν ἔγκειται τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπεὶ ἔχομεν τὰ συν-  
 εκτικὰ αὐτοῦ λήμματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν προφορὰν  
 παρέται. ἅπερ τάξαντες μετὰ τοῦ λειπομένου  
 λήμματος τοῦ πρώτου ἔξομεν συναγόμενον τὸ  
 συμπέρασμα τὸ "οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον" τρίτῳ  
 ἀναποδείκτῳ. ὥστε δύο εἶναι ἀναποδείκτους, ἕνα  
 μὲν τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ  
 τρίτον· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ τρίτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶτον

with heterogeneous parts, such as that concerning the  
 Sign propounded by Aenesidemus,<sup>a</sup> which runs thus :  
 "If the things apparent appear in like manner to all  
 those in a similar condition, and the signs are things  
 apparent, the signs appear in like manner to all those in  
 a similar condition; and the things apparent appear in  
 like manner to all those in a similar condition; but the  
 signs do not appear in like manner to all those in a  
 similar condition; therefore the signs are not things  
 apparent." For an argument like this is compounded 235  
 of the second non-demonstrable and the third, as one  
 may learn from its analysis; and this will become  
 clearer when we have given instruction as to its  
 "scheme," which goes thus: "If the first and the  
 second, the third (is true); but the third is not (true),  
 whereas the first is; therefore the second is not (true)."  
 For when we have a major premiss in which the ante- 236  
 cedent consists of the first and second conjoined, while  
 the third is the consequent, and have also the clause  
 "the third is not (true)" as the contradictory of the  
 consequent, we shall also get for our conclusion the  
 contradictory of the antecedent, namely "therefore  
 the first and the second are not (true)," by the second  
 non-demonstrable. But, in fact, this very conclusion is  
 potentially contained in the argument, since we possess  
 the premisses which go to prove it, but in the explicit  
 statement it is omitted. And when we have placed  
 these alongside of the remaining premiss, the first,  
 we shall have deduced the conclusion, "therefore the  
 second is not (true)," by the third non-demonstrable.  
 So that there are two non-demonstrables, one in the  
 form "If the first and the second, the third (is  
 true); but the third is not (true); therefore the

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 215.



καὶ τὸ δεύτερον," ὅς ἐστι δεύτερος ἀναπόδεικτος, ἕτερον δὲ τρίτον τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα "οὐχὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τὸ δεύτερον· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον."

237 Ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ τρόπου ἢ ἀνάλυσις ἐστὶ τοιαύτη, ἀναλογεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου· παραλείπεται γὰρ τὸ τρίτον τὸ "οὐχὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα," ὃ μετὰ τοῦ τὰ φαινόμενα ἅπασιν τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεσθαι συνάγει τὸ τοῦ ἐκκειμένου τρίτῳ ἀναποδείκτω. ὥστε δεύτερον μὲν γίνεσθαι ἀναπόδεικτον τοιοῦτον "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ σημεῖα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· τὰ σημεῖα ἄρα οὐκ  
238 ἐστὶ φαινόμενα," τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον "οὐχὶ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται καὶ τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι τοῖς ὁμοίως διακειμένοις παραπλησίως φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ σημεῖα ἐστὶ φαινόμενα."

239 Κατὰ δὲ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν τῆς συναγωγῆς καὶ τοιοῦτός τις προταθήσεται λόγος "εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεῖα, τὰ ἀδήλα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται· οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὰ ἀδήλα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης  
362

first and the second are not (true)," which is a second non-demonstrable<sup>a</sup>; and the other, which is a third non-demonstrable, in the form "The first and the second are not (true); but in fact the first is (true); therefore the second is not (true)."

Such, then, is the analysis in the case of the 237 "scheme," and in the case of the argument it is analogous; for the third premiss is missing, namely, "It is not (true) both that apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and that the signs are apparent," which, taken in conjunction with the premiss that "apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition," proves the (conclusion) of the expressed (argument) by the third non-demonstrable. Hence there is brought about a second non-demonstrable in this form: "If apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition, and the signs are apparent, then the signs appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; but the signs do not appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; therefore the signs are not apparent"; and a third in this form: "It is not 238 (true both that) apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition and that the signs are apparent; but in fact apparent things appear in like manner to all those in a similar condition; therefore the signs are not apparent."

The same method of deduction will be employed 239 in propounding such an argument as this: "If apparent things appear equally to all, and things apparent are signs of things non-evident then things non-evident appear equally to all; but things

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 225-227.

φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται· οὐκ ἄρα τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶ σημεῖα." τούτου δὴ τοῦ λόγου ἡ μὲν ἀνάλυσις ἐστὶν ὁμοία, [καθ' ἣν δεῦτερος ἀναπόδεικτος ἐπιβάλλει τρίτῳ,]<sup>1</sup> ἡ δὲ παραμυθία τῶν λημμάτων προὔπτος. ὅτι γὰρ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐπ' ἴσης φαίνεται τοῖς ἀπαρποδίστους ἔχουσι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, συμφανές· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις ἄλλως τὸ λευκὸν φαίνεται, οὐδὲ ἄλλοις ἄλλως τὸ μέλαν, οὐδὲ διαφερόντως τὸ γλυκύ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως πάντα κινεῖ. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ἐπ' ἴσης πᾶσι φαίνεται καὶ ἐνδεικτικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν τῶν ἀδήλων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ ἀδηλα ἐπ' ἴσης πᾶσι προσπίπτειν ὡς ἂν καὶ τῶν αἰτίων τῶν αὐτῶν ὄντων καὶ τῆς ὕλης ὁμοίας ὑποκειμένης. οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πάντες ὡσαύτως τὰ ἀδηλα γινώσκουσι, καίπερ κατ' ἴσον τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐγκυροῦντες, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν οὐδ' εἰς ἔννοιαν αὐτῶν ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ ἔρχονται μὲν, εἰς ποικιλίαν δὲ καὶ πολυτρόπους καὶ μαχομένας ὑποσύρονται ἀποφάσεις. ἀκόλουθον ἄρα μὴ αἰσθητὰ λέγειν τὰ σημεῖα, ἵνα μὴ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν τὸ ἄτοπον ἔπηται.

242 Ἐνέσται δὲ καὶ βραχέως τὰ προειρημένα περιλαμβάνοντας τοιουτουσί τινας προτείνειν λόγους. εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα πᾶσι φαίνεται, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα οὐ πᾶσι φαίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα σημεῖα.

243 ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεῦτερον. καὶ πάλιν, εἰ τὰ φαινόμενα, καθόσον ἐστὶ φαινόμενα, διδασκαλίας οὐκ ἔχει χρεῖαν, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα, παρόσον ἐστὶ σημεῖα, διδασκαλίας ἔχει χρεῖαν, τὰ σημεῖα οὐκ ἔστι φαινόμενα. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεῦτερον.

<sup>1</sup> [καθ' ἣν . . . τρίτῳ] secl. Heintz.

non-evident do not appear equally to all, though things apparent do appear equally to all; therefore things apparent are not signs of things non-evident." Now the analysis of this argument is similar, [for in 240 it a second non-demonstrable is superimposed on a third,] and the logical force of the premisses is obvious. For it is plain at once that apparent things appear equally to all who have their senses unimpeded; for white does not appear differently to different people, nor black differently to different people, nor sweet in distinct ways, but they affect all similarly. So if 241 these things appear equally to all and possess the power of indicating things non-evident, then the non-evident things also must necessarily be perceived equally by all, as the causes are the same and the material substrate is similar. But this is not so; for all do not cognize non-evident things alike, although they experience sense-objects equally; some, indeed, do not even arrive at a conception of them, while others do so arrive, but are swept off into a variety of complex and conflicting pronouncements. Therefore, in order that we may avoid this absurd consequence, it follows that the signs are not sensible.

It will also be possible by compressing the foregoing 242 to propound concise arguments such as these: "If apparent things appear to all, but the signs do not appear to all, the apparent things are not signs. But in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)." And again: "If apparent things, in so 243 far as they are apparent, do not require explanation, but the signs, in so far as they are signs, require explanation, the signs are not apparent. But in fact the first (is true), therefore the second (is true)."

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἀξιούοντας αἰσθητὸν εἶναι τὸ  
 244 σημεῖον τοσαῦτα ἠπορήσθω· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ  
 τὴν ἀντικειμένην τούτοις στάσιν, φημὶ δὲ τῶν  
 νοητὸν αὐτὸ προειληφόντων καθεστάναι. βραχεία  
 δὲ ἴσως δεήσει καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀρέσκοντος αὐτοῖς  
 245 προλαβεῖν, καθ' ὃ ἀξίωμα θέλουσιν εἶναι τὸ  
 σημεῖον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν. ὑπογράφοντες  
 τοῖνυν φασὶ σημεῖον εἶναι ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεὶ συν-  
 ημμένῳ καθηγούμενον, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τοῦ λήγοντος.  
 κρίσεις δὲ τοῦ ὑγιούς συνημμένου πολλὰς μὲν καὶ  
 ἄλλας εἶναι φασιν, μίαν δ' ἐξ ἀπασῶν ὑπάρχειν,  
 καὶ ταύτην οὐχ ὁμόλογον, τὴν ἀποδοθησομένην.  
 πᾶν γὰρ συνημμένον ἢ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον εἰς  
 ἀληθὲς λήγει, ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος  
 λήγει, ἢ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους  
 246 ἐπ' ἀληθές. ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπ'  
 ἀληθὲς λήγει τὸ "εἰ εἰσὶ θεοί, προνοία θεῶν  
 διοικεῖται ὁ κόσμος," ἀπὸ ψεύδους δὲ ἐπὶ ψεύ-  
 δος τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ γῆ, πτέρυγας ἔχει ἡ γῆ,"  
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους δὲ ἐπ' ἀληθές τὸ "εἰ πέταται ἡ  
 γῆ, ἔστιν ἡ γῆ," ἀπὸ δὲ ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ  
 "εἰ κινεῖται οὗτος, περιπατεῖ οὗτος," μὴ περι-  
 247 πατοῦντος μὲν αὐτοῦ, κινουμένου δέ. τεσσάρων  
 οὖν οὐσῶν τοῦ συνημμένου συζυγιῶν, ὅταν ἀπ'  
 ἀληθοῦς τε ἄρχηται καὶ εἰς ἀληθὲς λήγη, ἢ ὅταν  
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους, ἐπὶ ψεύδος, ἢ ὅταν ἀπὸ ψεύδους  
 ἐπ' ἀληθές ἢ ἀναστρόφως ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἐπὶ ψεύδος,  
 κατὰ μὲν τοὺς πρώτους τρεῖς τρόπους φασὶν ἀλη-  
 θές τοῦτο γίνεσθαι (εἴαν τε γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρ-  
 χόμενον ἐπ' ἀληθὲς λήγη, ἔστιν ἀληθές, εἴαν τε  
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπὶ ψεύδος, πάλιν ἀληθές· ὡσαύτως  
 δὲ κἂν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές), καθ' ἓνα δὲ

In reply, then, to those who maintain that the sign  
 is sensible let thus much be said by way of objection ;  
 but let us also examine the view opposed to theirs— 244  
 I mean that of those who conceive it to be intelligible.  
 But perhaps it will be proper for us first to deal  
 shortly with the view they accept, according to which  
 the sign is, they maintain, a proposition, and on this  
 account an intelligible. Thus, in describing it, they 245  
 say that " The Sign is an antecedent proposition in  
 a valid hypothetical major premiss, which serves to  
 reveal the consequent." <sup>a</sup> And while there are, they  
 say, many other tests of such a valid major, there is  
 one above all—and even it not agreed upon—which  
 shall be described. Every hypothetical major either  
 begins with truth and ends in truth, or begins with  
 falsehood and ends in falsehood, or (proceeds) from  
 truth to falsehood or from falsehood to truth. The 246  
 premiss " If there are gods, the world is ordered by  
 the gods' providence " begins with truth and ends in  
 truth ; and " If the earth flies, the earth has wings "   
 (proceeds) from falsehood to falsehood ; and " If the  
 earth flies, the earth exists " from falsehood to truth ;  
 and " If this man moves, this man walks " from truth  
 to falsehood, when he is not walking but is moving.  
 As, then, there are four combinations of the major 247  
 premiss—when it begins with truth and ends in truth,  
 or when (it proceeds) from falsehood to falsehood, or  
 when (it proceeds) from falsehood to truth, or con-  
 versely from truth to falsehood,—in the first three  
 modes the premiss, they say, is true (for if it begins  
 with truth and ends in truth it is true, and if it begins  
 with falsehood and ends in falsehood it is again true,  
 and so likewise when (it passes) from falsehood to

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 245-253 cf. P. H. ii. 104-106.

μόνον γίνεσθαι ψεύδος, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον  
 248 λήγη ἐπὶ ψεύδος. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἀνα-  
 ζητητέον, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον οὐκ ἐν τῷ μοχθηρῷ  
 τούτῳ συνημμένῳ ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιεῖ· εἴρηται γὰρ  
 ἀξίωμα τὸ ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον.  
 ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἐν ἡν ὑγιές συνημμένον, τρία δέ,  
 καθάπερ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές  
 λήγον καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπὶ ψεύδος καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ  
 ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές, σκεπτέον πότερον ποτε ἐν  
 249 ἡ ἐν τισὶν ἢ ἐν τινί. οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀληθές  
 εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ἀληθοῦς παραστατικόν, οὔτε ἐν τῷ  
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγοντι  
 οὔτε ἐν τῷ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές ὑποκείμεται.  
 λείπεται οὖν ἐν ἐκείνῳ μόνον αὐτὸ τυγχάνειν τῷ  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές  
 λήγοντι, ὡς ἂν καὶ αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ τοῦ  
 250 σημειωτοῦ συνυπάρχειν ὀφείλοντος αὐτῷ. τοίνυν  
 ὅταν λέγεται τὸ σημεῖον ἀξίωμα εἶναι ἐν ὑγιεῖ  
 συνημμένῳ καθηγούμενον, δεήσει ἐν μόνῳ ἀκούειν  
 αὐτὸ καθηγούμενον συνημμένῳ τῷ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τε  
 ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές λήγοντι. καὶ μὴν οὐκ  
 εἴ τι ἡγείται ἀξίωμα ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ ἀπ'  
 ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ' ἀληθές λήγοντι,<sup>1</sup>  
 251 τοῦτό ἐστι σημεῖον. αὐτίκα γέ τοι τὸ τοιοῦτο  
 συνημμένον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀπ'  
 ἀληθοῦς μὲν ἀρχεται τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν" καὶ ἐπ'  
 ἀληθές λήγει τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," οὐκ εἶχε δέ τι ἐν  
 αὐτῷ ἡγούμενον ἀξίωμα σημεῖον τοῦ λήγοντος· οὐδὲ  
 γὰρ ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστι τοῦ "φῶς ἔστιν" τὸ

<sup>1</sup> ἀρχομένῳ . . . λήγοντι Arnim: ἀρχόμενον . . . λήγον  
 mss., Bekk.

truth); and in one mode only is it false, namely, when  
 it begins with truth and ends in falsehood. And this 248  
 being so, one should not look, they say, for the sign in  
 this unsound major premiss but in the sound one; for  
 it is called "a proposition which is the antecedent in  
 a valid major premiss." But since there is not one  
 valid major but three—namely, that which begins  
 with truth and ends with truth, and that which (pro-  
 ceeds) from falsehood to falsehood, and that which  
 (proceeds) from falsehood to truth—one has to  
 inquire whether possibly the sign should be sought  
 in all the valid premisses, or in some, or in one. So 249  
 then, if the sign must be true and indicative of truth,  
 it will not reside either in that which begins with  
 falsehood and ends in falsehood or in that which  
 (passes) from falsehood to truth. Thus it only re-  
 mains for it to exist in that which both begins with  
 truth and ends in truth, since it really exists itself and  
 the thing signified also must co-exist with it. So then, 250  
 when the sign is said to be "a proposition which is the  
 antecedent in a valid major premiss," one shall have  
 to understand that it is an antecedent in that valid  
 major only which begins with truth and ends in truth.  
 Moreover, not every proposition which is an ante-  
 cedent in a valid major beginning with truth and  
 ending in truth is a sign. Such a major premiss as 251  
 this, for instance—"If it is day, it is light,"—begins  
 with the truth "it is day" and ends in the truth "it  
 is light," but it does not contain any antecedent pro-  
 position which is a sign of the consequent; for "it  
 is day" does not serve to reveal that "it is light";

“ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,” ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸ δι’ αὐτοῦ προσ-  
 ἐπιπτεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ “ φῶς ἔστιν ” ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας  
 252 ἐλαμβάνετο περιφανείας. δεῖ ἄρα τὸ σημεῖον οὐ  
 μόνον ἐν ὑγιεὶ εἶναι συνημμένῳ ἡγούμενον, τουτ-  
 ἔστι τῷ ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ἐπ’ ἀληθές  
 λήγοντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικὴν ἔχει φύσιν τοῦ  
 λήγοντος, οἷον ἔστι τὸ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις συνημμέ-  
 νους “ εἰ γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε, κεκύηκεν ἦδε ”  
 καὶ “ εἰ βρογχεῖον ἔπτυκεν οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔχει ἐν  
 253 πνεύμονι οὗτος.” τουτὶ γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον ὑγιές  
 ἔστιν, ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπ’ ἀληθοῦς τοῦ “ βρογχεῖον  
 ἔπτυκεν οὗτος,” λήγον δὲ ἐπ’ ἀληθές τὸ “ ἔλκος  
 ἔχει οὗτος ἐν πνεύμονι,” μετὰ τοῦ ἐκκαλυπτικόν  
 εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον τοῦ δευτέρου· ἐκείνῳ γὰρ προσ-  
 βάλλοντες κατάληψιν τούτου ποιούμεθα.  
 254 “ Ἐτι, φασί, τὸ σημεῖον παρὸν παρόντος εἶναι δεῖ  
 σημεῖον. ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐξαπατώμενοι καὶ παρὸν παρ-  
 ωχημένον θέλουσιν εἶναι σημεῖον, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ “ εἰ  
 οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος.” εἰ μὲν  
 γὰρ οὐλὴν ἔχει, παρὸν ἔστι, φαίνεται γάρ, τὸ δὲ  
 ἔλκος ἔσχηκεῖναι παρωχημένον, οὐκέτι γὰρ ἔστιν  
 ἔλκος· καὶ παρὸν μέλλοντος, ὡς τὸ περιεχόμενον  
 τῷ τοιούτῳ συνημμένῳ “ εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται  
 οὗτος, ἀποθανεῖται οὗτος.” τὸ μὲν γὰρ τραῦμα  
 255 τῆς καρδίας εἶναι φασιν ἤδη, τὸν δὲ θάνατον μέλ-  
 λειν. ἀγνοοῦσι δὴ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ὅτι  
 ἀλλ’ ἔστι τὰ παρωχημένα καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα, τὸ  
 μέντοι σημεῖον [καὶ σημειωτὸν]<sup>1</sup> κὰν τούτοις παρὸν  
 παρόντος ἔστιν. ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ προτέρῳ τῷ “ εἰ  
 οὐλὴν ἔχει οὗτος, ἔλκος ἔσχηκεν οὗτος ” τὸ μὲν  
 ἔλκος γέγονεν ἤδη καὶ παρώχηκεν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκος

for just as the latter truth was perceived by means  
 of itself, so also “ it is light ” was comprehended  
 owing to its own obviousness. The sign, therefore, 252  
 must not only be the antecedent in a valid major  
 premiss—that is, in one that begins with truth and  
 ends in truth—but must also possess a character which  
 serves to reveal the consequent ; as, for example, the  
 antecedent in premisses such as these—“ If this  
 woman has milk in her breasts, she has conceived ” ;  
 and “ If this man has had a viscid bronchial discharge,  
 he has a wound in his lungs.” For this premiss is 253  
 valid, as it begins with the truth “ This man has had a  
 viscid bronchial discharge,” and ends in the truth  
 “ he has a wound in his lungs ” ; and, besides, the first  
 serves to reveal the second ; for by observing the  
 former we come to an apprehension of the latter.

Further, they say, the sign must be a present sign 254  
 of a present thing. For some people erroneously  
 claim that a present thing may also be a sign of a past  
 thing, as in the case of “ If this man has a scar, he has  
 had a wound ” (for if he has a scar it is present, for  
 it is apparent, but his having had a wound is past, for  
 there is no longer a wound), and that a present thing  
 (may be the sign) of a future thing, as for instance  
 that included in such a premiss as this—“ If this man  
 is wounded in the heart, he will die,” for they say  
 that the wound in the heart exists already, but death  
 is in the future. But those who make such state- 255  
 ments are ignorant of the fact that though things  
 past and things future are different, yet even in these  
 cases the sign is a present (sign) of a present thing.  
 For in the former (premiss)—“ If this man has a  
 scar, he has had a wound ”—the wound has existed  
 already and is past, but the (statement) that this

<sup>1</sup> [καὶ σημειωτὸν] secl. Heintz (et add. σημεῖον post ἔστιν).

ἔσχηκέναι τοῦτον ἀξίωμα καθεστηκὸς ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ γεγονότος τινὸς λεγόμενον· ἐν τε τῷ “εἰ καρδίαν τέτρωται οὗτος, ἀποθανεῖται οὗτος” ὁ μὲν θάνατος μέλλει, τὸ δὲ ἀποθανεῖσθαι τοῦτον ἀξίωμα ἐνέστηκεν, περὶ μέλλοντος λεγόμενον, 256 παρὸ καὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἀληθές. ὥστε καὶ ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἐν ὑγιεὶ συνημμένῳ καθηγείται τῷ ἀρχομένῳ ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήγοντι ἐπὶ ἀληθές, ἐκκαλυπτικὸν τέ ἐστὶ τοῦ λήγοντος, καὶ διὰ παντὸς παρὸν παρόντος ἐστὶ σημεῖον.

257 Τούτων δ’ ὑποδεδειγμένων κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ἐκείνων τεχνολογίας πρῶτον μὲν ἄξιόν ἐστὶ τὸ τοσοῦτον εἰπεῖν πρὸς αὐτούς. εἰ καθ’ οὗς μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον καθ’ οὗς δὲ νοητὸν, καὶ ἢ περὶ τούτου διαφωνία μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνεπίκριτός ἐστιν, ἄδηλον εἶναι ῥητέον ἀκμὴν τὸ σημεῖον, ἄδηλον δὲ ὄν χρήζει τῶν ἐκκαλυψόντων, ἀλλ’ οὐκ 258 αὐτὸ ἑτέρων δεῖ ὑπάρχειν ἐκκαλυπτικόν. καὶ μὴν εἰ τὸ σημεῖον κατ’ αὐτούς ἐν λεκτῷ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ λεκτὰ εἰ ἐστὶ ζητεῖται, ἄποπον, πρὶν ὁμολογηθῆναι τὸ γένος, ὡς βέβαιον λαμβάνειν τὸ εἶδος. ὀρώμεν δὲ ὡς εἰσὶ τινες οἱ ἀνηρηκότες τὴν ὑπαρξίν τῶν λεκτῶν, καὶ οὐχ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι μόνον, οἷον οἱ Ἐπικούρειοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ στωικοί, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Βασιλεῖδην, οἷς ἔδοξε μηδὲν εἶναι ἀσώματον. τοίνυν ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλα- 259 κτέον ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον. ἀλλ’ ἀποδείξαντες, φασί, πρότερον τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν ὑπαρξίν ἔξομεν βεβαίαν

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 177 ff., 244.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 12, 76, 77; P.H. ii. 107, 108.

man has had a wound, which is a proposition, is present, being stated about a thing which has existed. And in the premiss “If this man is wounded in the heart, he will die,” his death is in the future, but the proposition “he will die” is present, though a statement about the future, inasmuch as it is true even now. So that the sign is a proposition, and also it is the 256 antecedent in a valid major premiss which begins with truth and ends in truth, and it serves to reveal the consequent, and always it is a present sign of a present thing.

Now that these things have been explained accord- 257 ing to their own rules of logic, it is proper to reply to them, first, in this wise: If the sign is sensible according to some, but intelligible according to others,<sup>a</sup> and the dispute on this point is undecided up till now, we must declare that the sign is as yet non-evident. And being non-evident, it needs things to reveal it and ought not to be capable itself of revealing other things.—Moreover, if the sign is, according 258 to them, classed, as to its “substance,” under the head of “expression,” and if the existence of “expressions” is a matter of inquiry,<sup>b</sup> it is absurd to take the particular as securely fixed before the genus is agreed upon. And we see that there are some who have denied the real existence of “expressions,” and these not only men of other Schools, such as the Epicureans, but even Stoics like Basileides<sup>c</sup> who held that nothing incorporeal exists. So, then, we must preserve suspension of judgement regarding Sign. But, say they, when we have first proved the real 259 existence of “expressions” we shall have the reality

<sup>c</sup> A Stoic of this name is said to have given instruction to Marcus Antoninus.

καὶ τὴν τοῦ σημείου φύσιν. οὐκοῦν ὅταν ἀπο-  
δείξητε, ἔρει τις, τότε καὶ τὸ πιστὴν εἶναι τὴν  
τοῦ σημείου ὑπαρξίν λαμβάνετε· ἄχρι δὲ ἐπὶ ψιλλῆς  
μένετε τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐν ἐποχῇ  
260 μένειν. εἶτα καὶ πῶς οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀποδεικνύναι  
τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν ὑπαρξίν; ἢ γὰρ διὰ σημείου  
δεῖσαι τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ δι' ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλ' οὔτε  
διὰ σημείου τινός οὔτε δι' ἀποδείξεως δυνατὸν  
τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ αὐτὰ λεκτὰ ὄντα  
261 παραπλησίως τοῖς ἄλλοις λεκτοῖς ἐζήτῃται, καὶ  
τοσοῦτον ἀπέχει τοῦ δύνασθαι βεβαίως τι παριστᾶν  
ὡς καὶ ἀνάπαλιν αὐτὰ χρῆζειν τοῦ παραστήσοντος.  
λελήθασί τε αὐτοὺς οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς εἰς τὸν δι'  
ἀλλήλων ἐμπύπτοντες τρόπον. ἵνα γὰρ τὰ λεκτὰ  
ὁμολογηθῆ, ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ σημείον· ἵνα  
δὲ ἡ ἀπόδειξις καὶ τὸ σημείον προῦφεστήκη, προ-  
πεπιστώσθαι ἀνάγκη τὴν τῶν λεκτῶν φύσιν. εἰς  
ἄλληλα οὖν συννεύοντα καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων περι-  
μένοντα πίστιν ἐπ' ἴσης ἐστὶν ἄπιστα.

262 Ἄλλ' ἔστω γε καὶ ἐκ περιουσίας συγκεχωρησθω,  
ἐνεκα τοῦ προβαίνειν τὴν ζήτησιν, ἐν ὑπάρξει τυγ-  
χάνειν τὰ λεκτὰ, καίπερ ἀνηνύτου καθεστώσης τῆς  
περὶ αὐτῶν μάχης. οὐκοῦν εἰ ταῦτα ἐστίν, ἦτοι  
σώματα ἢ ἀσώματα λέξουσιν εἶναι. καὶ σώματα  
μὲν οὐκ ἂν φαίεν· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματα, ἦτοι ποιεῖ τι  
κατ' αὐτοὺς ἢ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ. καὶ ποιεῖν μὲν οὐκ  
263 ἂν ἀξιώσειαν· τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματος κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε  
ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν. μηδὲν δὲ ποιοῦντα  
οὐδὲ οὐ ἐστὶ σημεία ἐνδείξεται τε<sup>1</sup> καὶ δηλώσει·

<sup>1</sup> τε N: τι cet., Bekk. (ἔτι cj. Bekk.).

of the sign also securely established. "Yes," one will  
reply, "when you have proved it, then assume also  
that the existence of the sign is to be believed; but  
so long as you remain merely promising, we too must  
necessarily remain in an attitude of suspension." And 260  
further, how is it possible to prove the existence of  
"expressions"? For one will have to do this either  
by means of a sign or by proof. But neither by means  
of a sign nor by proof is it possible to do this; for  
these, being themselves "expressions," are matters  
of inquiry like the other "expressions," and are so 261  
far from being capable of establishing anything  
firmly that, on the contrary, they themselves require  
something to establish them. The Stoics, too, have  
unwittingly fallen into the fallacy of circular reason-  
ing. For in order that "expressions" may be agreed  
to, proof and sign must exist; and in order that proof  
and sign may really pre-exist, the reality of "expres-  
sions" must be previously confirmed. As these lean,  
then, on one another and await confirmation from  
one another, they are equally untrustworthy.

But let it be supposed and gratuitously con- 262  
ceded, for the sake of advancing our inquiry, that  
"expressions" are in existence, although the battle  
regarding them remains unending. If, then, they  
exist, the Stoics will declare that they are either  
corporeal or incorporeal. Now they will not say that  
they are corporeal; and if they are incorporeal,  
either—according to them—they effect something,  
or they effect nothing. Now they will not claim that  
they effect anything; for, according to them, the 263  
incorporeal is not of a nature either to effect anything  
or to be affected. And since they effect nothing, they  
will not even indicate and make evident the thing of

τὸ γὰρ ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι καὶ δηλοῦν ἔστι ποιεῖν τι.  
264 ἄτοπον δέ γε τὸ σημεῖον μήτε ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι  
μήτε δηλοῦν· οὐκ ἄρα νοητόν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἀξίωμα,  
τὸ σημεῖον.

Ἄλλως τε, καθὼς ἐν πολλοῖς πολλάκις ὑπεδεί-  
ξαμεν, ἃ μὲν σημαίνει ἃ δὲ σημαίνεται. σημαίνουσι  
μὲν αἱ φωναί, σημαίνεται δὲ τὰ λεκτά, ἐν οἷς ἔστι  
καὶ τὰ ἀξιώματα. πάντων δὲ τῶν ἀξιωμαίων  
σημαινομένων ἀλλὰ μὴ σημαινόντων οὐκ ἂν εἴη  
τὸ σημεῖον ἀξίωμα.

265 Πάλιν παρακεχωρήσω τὰ λεκτὰ φύσιν ἔχειν  
ἀσώματον. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συν-  
ημμένῳ καθηγεῖσθαι φασι, δεήσει προσηκεκρίσθαι  
τὸ ὑγιές συνημμένον καὶ προσεξήτάσθαι, εἴτε τὸ  
κατὰ Φίλωνά ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον εἴτε κατὰ Διόδωρον  
ἢ τὴν συνάρτησιν ἢ ἄλλως πως κρινόμενον· πολλῶν  
γὰρ καὶ περὶ τούτου διαστάσεων οὐσῶν οὐκ ἔνεστι  
λαβεῖν βεβαίως τὸ σημεῖον ἀνεπικρίτου τυγα-  
νούσης τῆς διαφωνίας.

266 Ἐτι πρὸς τοῖς εἰρημένους, κἂν δῶμεν σύμφωνον  
εἶναι τὸ ὑγιές κριτήριον, καὶ ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν  
ἐκεῖνοι θέλωσι, τοιοῦτο ἀμάχως ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν  
ἦν τὸ περιεκτικὸν τοῦ σημείου ἀνεπίκριτον  
ὁμολογεῖν ἔστιν ἀνάγκη. τὸ γὰρ σημειωτὸν ἦτοι

267 πρόδηλον θέλουσιν εἶναι ἢ ἄδηλον. καὶ εἰ μὲν  
πρόδηλον, οὐκ ἔσται σημειωτόν, οὐδὲ σημαθήσε-  
ται ὑπό τινας, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπεσείται·  
εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον, πάντως ἄγνωστον ἔσται τοῦτο εἴτε  
ἀληθές ἐστιν εἴτε ψευδές, ἐπεὶ γνωσκόμενον ὃ τι  
268 ποτὲ τούτων ἐστί, γενήσεται πρόδηλον. τὸ οὖν

\* Cf. § 12.

† With § 265 cf. §§ 70 ff. *supra*; P.H. II. 110-112.

which they are signs; for to indicate anything and  
make it evident is to effect something. But it is 264  
absurd that the sign should neither indicate nor make  
evident anything; therefore the sign is not an in-  
telligible thing, nor yet a proposition.

Moreover, as we have frequently shown in many  
places,<sup>a</sup> some things signify, others are signified.  
Vocal sounds signify, but "expressions" are signified,  
and they include also propositions. And as proposi-  
tions are signified, but not signifying, the sign will not  
be a proposition.

Again, let it be conceded that "expressions" are 265  
of an incorporeal nature.<sup>b</sup> Yet, since they assert that  
the sign is the antecedent in a valid major premiss,  
the valid major will have to be tested and scrutinized  
beforehand, whether it be what is valid according to  
Philo, or according to Diodorus,<sup>c</sup> or through con-  
gruence, or judged by some other criterion; for since  
on this point also there are many rival views it is  
impossible to have a firm grasp of the sign so long as  
the dispute remains unsettled.

Further, in addition to the foregoing arguments, 266  
even if we grant that the valid criterion is agreed upon  
and that it is incontestably of the kind the Stoics  
claim, none the less they must necessarily agree that  
the premiss containing the sign is uncertain. For they  
hold that the thing signified is either pre-evident or  
non-evident. And if it is pre-evident, it will not 267  
admit of being signified, nor will it be signified by  
anything but will be perceived of itself; while if it is  
non-evident, it certainly cannot be known whether it is  
true or false, since when it is known which of these it is  
it will become pre-evident. The premiss, then, which 268

\* Cf. § 115.



περιεκτικὸν τοῦ τε σημείου καὶ τοῦ σημειωτοῦ  
 συνημμένον, λήγον ἐπὶ ἄδηλον. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστιν  
 ἀνεπίκριτον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεται,  
 γνωρίμῳ ἐστι, λήγει δὲ εἰς ἄγνωστον. δεῖ δὲ  
 πρὸ παντὸς ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐπίκρισιν αὐτοῦ γινώσκειν  
 τὸ εἰς τί λήγει, ἵνα εἰάν μὲν εἰς ἀληθές λήγη,  
 θώμεθα τοῦτ' ἀληθές διὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τε ἀρ-  
 χεσθαι καὶ εἰς ἀληθές λήγειν, εἰάν δὲ εἰς ψεῦδος,  
 ἀνάπαλιν λέγωμεν ψεῦδος διὰ τὸ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρ-  
 χεσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ ψεῦδος λήγειν. οὐ τοίνυν ἀξίωμα  
 ῥητέον εἶναι τὸ σημείον, οὐδὲ ἐν ὑγίει συνημμένῳ  
 καθηγούμενον.

- 269 Προσθετόν δὲ τούτοις ὅτι καὶ ταῖς ἐναργείαις  
 μάχονται οἱ ταύτης προσετώτες τῆς δόξης. εἰ  
 γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστι τὸ σημείον καὶ ἐν ὑγίει συ-  
 ημμένῳ καθηγείται, ἐχρῆν τοὺς μηδ' ἀρχὴν ἔχοντας  
 ἔννοιαν ἀξιώματος μηδὲ τὰς διαλεκτικὰς τέχνας  
 ἐπεληλυθότας ἐκτὸς εἶναι πάσης σημειώσεως.
- 270 οὐχὶ δὲ γε τοῦτο· καὶ γὰρ ἀγράμματοι πολλάκις  
 κυβερνῆται καὶ ἄπειροι [πολλάκις] τῶν διαλεκτικῶν  
 θεωρημάτων γεωργοὶ ἄκρως σημειοῦνται, οἱ μὲν  
 τὰ κατὰ θάλασσαν, ἀνέμους τε καὶ νηνεμίας χει-  
 μῶνάς τε καὶ γαλήνας, οἱ δὲ κατὰ γεωργίαν,  
 ὥσπερ εὐκαρπίαν καὶ ἀκαρπίαν αὐχμούς τε καὶ  
 ἐπομβρίας. καίτοι τί περὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν,  
 ὅτε καὶ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζώοις τινὲς αὐτῶν μετα-
- 271 δεδώκασι τῆς τοῦ σημείου νοήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ὁ  
 κύων ὅτε ἐκ τοῦ ἵχνους στιβεύει τὸ θηρίον σημειοῦ-  
 ται· ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ἀξιώματος ἔλκει φαντασίαν  
 τοῦ "εἴπερ ἵχνος ἐστὶ τοῦτο, θηρίον ἔστιν ἐνθάδε."  
 καὶ ὁ ἵππος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μύωπος προσβολὴν ἢ  
 τὴν τῆς μᾶστιγος ἐπανάτασιν ἐξάλλεται μὲν καὶ  
 378

contains the sign and the thing signified, as it ends  
 in what is non-evident, is of necessity uncertain. For  
 that it begins with truth is known, but it ends in the  
 unknown. But in order to pass judgement upon it we  
 must first of all learn wherein it ends, so that if it  
 ends in truth we may pronounce it true because it  
 begins with truth and ends in truth, but if it ends  
 in falsehood, we may, contrariwise, declare it to be  
 false because it begins with truth and ends in false-  
 hood. So then, the sign should not be said to be a  
 proposition, or an antecedent in a sound premiss.

To these (objections) it should be added that those 269  
 who champion this opinion are in conflict with evident  
 facts. For if the sign is a judgement and an antecedent  
 in a valid major premiss, those who have no concep-  
 tion at all of a judgement, and have made no study of  
 logical technicalities, ought to have been wholly in-  
 capable of interpreting by signs. But this is not the 270  
 case; for often illiterate pilots, and [often] farmers  
 unskilled in logical theorems, interpret by signs  
 excellently—the former on the sea (prognosticating)  
 squalls and calms, stormy weather and fair, and the  
 latter on the farm (foretelling) good crops and bad  
 crops, droughts and rainfalls. Yet why do we talk of  
 men, when some of the Stoics have endowed even  
 irrational animals with understanding of the sign?  
 For, in fact, the dog,<sup>a</sup> when he tracks a beast by 271  
 its footprints, is interpreting by signs; but he does  
 not therefore derive an impression of the judgement  
 "if this is a footprint, a beast is here." The horse,  
 too, at the prod of a goad or the crack of a whip

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 63 ff.

δρούει πρὸς δρόμον, οὐκ ἐπικρίνει δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον συνημμένον διαλεκτικῶς "εἰ μάστιξ ἐπανατέταται, δραμητέον ἐστὶ μοι." οὐκ ἄρα ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγουμένον.

272 Ταῦτα μὲν ἰδιαιτέρον πρὸς τοὺς νοητὸν ἀξιούοντας εἶναι τὸ σημεῖον εἰρήσθω· κοινότερον δὲ ἐνέσται πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν καὶ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς αἰσθητὸν αὐτὸ φάσκοντας εἶναι εἰρημένα. εἴπερ γὰρ ἀξίωμα ἐστὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἐν ὑγιεῖ συνημμένῳ καθηγουμένον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ συνημμένῳ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ λήγον τῷ ἡγουμένῳ, αἷ τε ἀκολουθία παρόντων εἰσὶ πραγμάτων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ σημειωτὸν ὑφ' ἑνα καιρὸν παρόντα συνυπάρξει ἀλλήλοις, καὶ οὐδέτερον οὐδετέρου γενήσεται μηνυτικόν, ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα ἐξ αὐτῶν γνώριμα καταστήσεται.

273 Ἐπι τὸ σημεῖον ἐκκαλυπτικόν ἐστὶ τοῦ [λήγοντος] σημειωτοῦ, τὸ δὲ σημειωτὸν ἐκκαλύπτεται πρὸς τοῦ σημείου. ταῦτα δὲ οὐ τῶν ἀπολύτων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι· πρὸς γὰρ τῷ ἐκκαλύπτοντι νοεῖται τὸ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον, καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἐκκαλυπτομένῳ νοεῖται τὸ ἐκκαλύπτον. εἰ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα πρὸς τι ὄντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν πάρεστι χρόνον, ἀμφοτέρα συνυφέστηκεν ἀλλήλοις· εἰ δὲ συνυφέστηκεν, ἐκάτερον ἐξ αὐτοῦ καταληπτὸν ἐστὶ

274 καὶ οὐδέτερον ἐκ θατέρου. λεκτέον δὲ κακείνο ὅτι ὁποῖόν ποτ' ἂν ᾖ τὸ σημεῖον, ἤτοι αὐτὸ φύσιν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι καὶ μηνύειν τὸ ἀδηλον, ἢ ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν μηνυτικοὶ τῶν συναναγνυμωθέντων αὐτῷ. οὐχὶ δὲ ἐκείνο φύσιν ἔχει ἐνδεικτικῆν τῶν ἀδήλων, ἐπεὶ ὄφειλε πᾶσιν ἐπ' ἕσσης ἐνδείκνυσθαι τὰ ἀδηλα. ἡμεῖς ἄρα ὡς ἂν ἔχωμεν

\* Cf. § 174.

leaps forward and starts to run, but he does not frame a judgement logically in a premiss such as this—"If a whip has cracked, I must run." Therefore the sign is not a judgement, which is the antecedent in a valid major premiss.

Let these special arguments be stated against those 272 who hold that the sign is intelligible; but it will be possible also to use against them the general arguments we have brought against those who assert that it is sensible.<sup>a</sup> For if the sign is an antecedent proposition in a valid major premiss, and in every major the consequent follows the antecedent, and these connexions are between things present, then the sign and the thing signified, both being present at one and the same time, will necessarily co-exist and neither of them will serve to disclose the other, but both will be known of themselves.

Further, the sign serves to reveal the thing 273 signified, and the thing signified is revealed by the sign. And these are not absolute things but relative; for the thing revealed is conceived in relation to that which reveals, and that which reveals is conceived in relation to that which is revealed. But if both, being relative things, are present at the same time, both co-exist; and if they co-exist, each of them is apprehensible of itself and neither of them through the other.—This, too, may be said: Whatever be 274 the character of the sign, either it is itself of such a nature as to indicate and disclose the non-evident, or we are capable of remembering the things laid bare together with it. But it does not possess a nature capable of indicating non-evident things, since, (if so), it ought to indicate non-evident things to all men equally. Therefore it depends upon the state

μνήμης, οὕτω περὶ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ὑποστά-  
σεως φερόμεθα.

- 275 Ἄλλ' εἶπερ οὔτε αἰσθητὸν ἔστι τὸ σημεῖον, ὡς  
ἔδειξαμεν, οὔτε νοητὸν, ὡς κατεστησάμεθα, παρὰ  
δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον, λεκτέον τι μὴ εἶναι  
σημεῖον. οἱ δὲ δογματικοὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον μὲν τῶν  
οὕτως ἐπικειρημένων πεφίμωται, τοῦναντίον δὲ  
κατασκευάζοντες φασὶν ὅτι ἄνθρωπος οὐχὶ τῷ  
προφορικῷ λόγῳ διαφέρει τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων (καὶ  
γὰρ κόρακες καὶ ψιττακοὶ καὶ κίτται ἐνάρθρους  
276 προφέρονται φωνάς) ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδιαθέτῳ, οὐδὲ τῇ  
ἀπλῇ μόνον φαντασίᾳ (ἐφαντασιούτο γὰρ ἀκείνα)  
ἀλλὰ τῇ μεταβατικῇ καὶ συνθετικῇ. διόπερ ἀκο-  
λουθίας ἔνοιαν ἔχων εὐθὺς καὶ σημείου νόησιν  
λαμβάνει διὰ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ  
σημεῖον ἔστι τοιοῦτον "εἰ τόδε, τόδε." ἔπεται ἄρα  
τῇ φύσει καὶ κατασκευῇ τᾶνθρώπου τὸ καὶ σημεῖον  
277 ὑπάρχειν. ἀνωμολόγηται τε ἡ ἀποδείξις τῷ  
γένει σημεῖον εἶναι. δηλωτικὴ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ συμ-  
περάσματος, καὶ ἔσται ἢ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτῆς  
συμπλοκῆ σημεῖον τοῦ ὑπάρχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα.  
οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν·  
ἔστι δὲ κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν" τὸ τοιοῦτον  
συμπεπλεγμένον ("ἔστι κίνησις, καὶ" εἰ ἔστι κίνη-  
σις, ἔστι κενόν," [διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπεπλεγ-  
μένων,]<sup>1</sup> εὐθὺς καὶ σημείον ἔστι τοῦ συμπεράσματος  
278 τοῦ "ἔστι κενόν." ἦτοι οὖν ἀποδεικτικοὶ εἰσι  
λόγοι, φασίν, οἱ κατὰ τοῦ σημείου κομισθέντες  
ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπορητικῶν ἢ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικοί. καὶ εἰ  
μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀποδεικτικοί, ἄπιστοι καθεστᾶσιν,

<sup>1</sup> συμπεπλεγμένον MSS.: συνημμένον Bekk.: <ἔστι . . . καὶ> add. Heintz. <sup>2</sup> [διὰ . . . συμπ.] secl. Heintz.

of our memory what view we take about the real nature of things.

But if the sign is neither sensible, as we have shown, 275 nor intelligible, as we have established, and besides these there is no third (possibility), one must declare that no sign exists. But the Dogmatists remain muzzled as regards each of these objections, and by way of establishing the opposite they assert that Man does not differ in respect of uttered reason from the irrational animals (for crows and parrots and jays utter articulate sounds), but in respect of internal reason; nor (does he differ) in respect of the merely 276 simple impression (for the animals, too, receive impressions), but in respect of the transitive and constructive impression.<sup>a</sup> Hence, since he has a conception of logical sequence, he immediately grasps also the notion of sign because of the sequence; for in fact the sign in itself is of this form—"If this, then this." Therefore the existence of sign follows from the nature and structure of Man.—Also, it is generally agreed 277 that proof is of the genus sign.<sup>b</sup> For it serves to make evident the conclusion, and the combination formed by its premisses will be a sign of the existence of the conclusion. For example, in the case of this proof—"If motion exists, void exists; but motion exists; therefore void exists,"<sup>c</sup> this combination "Motion exists, and if motion exists, void exists" is at once also a sign of the conclusion "void exists." The 278 arguments, then, brought against the sign by the Doubters are, they say, either probative or non-probative. And if they are non-probative they are

<sup>a</sup> i.e. a compound impression (or presentation) which involves mental "transition" from one "presented" idea to another (cf. "association of ideas").

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 122.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. i. 213.

ὅπου γε καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ τυγχάνοντες μόλις ἂν  
 ἐπιστεύθησαν· εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικτικοί, δηλὸν ὅτι ἔστι  
 τι σημεῖον· ἢ γὰρ ἀποδειξίς σημεῖον ἦν κατὰ τὸ  
 279 γένος. εἴπερ δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδενός ἐστι σημεῖον,  
 ἥτοι σημαίνουσί τι αἰ κατὰ τοῦ σημεῖου ἐκφερό-  
 μεναι φωναὶ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν. καὶ εἰ μὲν  
 οὐδέν, οὐδέ τὴν τοῦ σημεῖου ὑπαρξίν ἀνελοῦσιν·  
 πῶς γὰρ οἷόν τε τὰς μηδὲν σημαίνουσας πιστεύε-  
 σθαι περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον; εἰ δὲ σημαί-  
 νουσι, μάταιοι καθεστᾶσι οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως,  
 λόγῳ μὲν ἐκβάλλοντες τὸ σημεῖον, ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο  
 280 παραλαμβάνοντες. καὶ μὴν εἰ μηδὲν ἔστι  
 θεώρημα τέχνης ἴδιον, οὐ διοίσει τῆς ἀτεχνίας ἢ  
 τέχνη. εἰ δ' ἔστι θεώρημα τέχνης ἴδιον, ἥτοι  
 φαινόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἄδηλον. ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον μὲν  
 οὐκ ἂν εἴη· τὰ γὰρ φαινόμενα πᾶσι ὁμοίως καὶ  
 ἀδιδάκτως φαίνεται. εἰ δὲ ἄδηλον τυγχάνει, διὰ  
 σημεῖου θεωρηθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ἔστι τι διὰ σημεῖου  
 θεωρούμενον, ἔσται τι καὶ σημεῖον.  
 281 Τινὲς δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν· “εἰ ἔστι τι  
 σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον· εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι  
 σημεῖον. ἥτοι δ' οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον ἢ ἔστιν·  
 ἔστιν ἄρα.” ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, τούτου δὲ τὸ  
 μὲν πρῶτον λῆμμα ὑγιὲς εἶναι φασίν· ἦν γὰρ δια-  
 φορούμενον, καὶ τῷ εἶναι σημεῖον ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ  
 εἶναι σημεῖον, παρόσον εἰ ἔστι τὸ πρῶτον, ἔσται  
 καὶ τὸ δεύτερον, μηδενὶ διαφέρον τοῦ πρώτου τὸ  
 δεύτερον. καὶ τὸ “εἰ μὴ ἔστι σημεῖον, ἔστι  
 σημεῖον” καὶ αὐτὸ ἦν ὑγιὲς. τῷ γὰρ λέγοντι μὴ  
 εἶναι σημεῖον, ἀκολουθεῖ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον.  
 εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον, αὐτοῦ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι

untrustworthy, seeing that they would hardly have  
 been trusted, even had they been probative; while if  
 they are probative it is plain that a sign exists, for  
 proof is, as regards its genus, a form of sign.—And if 279  
 nothing is a sign of anything, the words uttered  
 against the sign either signify something or signify  
 nothing.<sup>a</sup> And if nothing, neither will they destroy  
 the existence of sign; for how can words that signify  
 nothing possibly be trusted regarding the non-  
 existence of a sign? And if they signify (something),  
 the Sceptics are fools in that they verbally reject the  
 sign while actually accepting it.—Moreover, if there 280  
 exists no special rule of art, art will not differ from  
 lack of art. And if a special rule of art exists, it is  
 either apparent or non-evident. But it will not be  
 apparent, for things apparent appear to all similarly  
 and without teaching. And if it is non-evident, it  
 will be discerned by means of a sign. But if there  
 exists anything discerned by means of a sign, there  
 will also exist a sign.

Some also argue thus<sup>b</sup>: “If a sign exists, a sign 281  
 exists; if a sign does not exist, a sign exists. But a  
 sign either exists not or exists; therefore it exists.”  
 Such is the argument, and they declare that its first  
 premiss is valid; for it is duplicated, and “a sign  
 exists” follows from “a sign exists” inasmuch as the  
 second also will be (true) if the first is (true), since  
 it differs in no respect from the first. And the premiss  
 “If a sign does not exist, a sign exists” is also valid in  
 itself; for he who states that a sign does not exist is  
 stating, consequently, that a sign does exist. For if  
 no sign exists, there will be some sign that no sign

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 130.

<sup>b</sup> With §§ 281-284 cf. §§ 466-469, and P.H. ii. 131, 188.

σημείον ἔσται τι σημείον. καὶ εἰκότως. ὁ γὰρ λέγων μὴ εἶναι τι σημείον ἤτοι φάσει μόνον τοῦτ' ἀξιῶν ἢ ἀποδείξει. καὶ φάσει μὲν ἀξιῶν φάσιν  
 282 ἔξει τὴν ἀντιτιθεμένην· ἀποδεικνύς δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγόμενον, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι σημείον, σημειώσεται τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι σημείον, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ὁμολογήσει τὸ εἶναι τι σημείον. ἀληθῆ οὖν τὰ πρῶτα δύο λήμματα, φασίν. ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ τρίτον. διεξευγμένον γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τοῦ τε εἶναι σημείον καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν<sup>1</sup> σύμπαν διεξευγμένον τότε ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ὅταν τὸ ἐν ἔχῃ ἀληθές, θεωρεῖται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀντικειμένων τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές, ῥητέον τὸ τοιοῦτον συνεστὼς εὐθὺς ὑπάρχειν ἀληθές. ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ ὁμολογουμένοις τοῖς λήμμασι συνεισάγεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τὴν  
 "ἔστιν ἄρα σημείον."

283 \*Ἔσται δέ, φασί, καὶ οὕτως ἐφοδεύειν. δύο γὰρ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ συνημμένα καὶ ἐν διεξευγμένον· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν συνημμένα ὑπισχνεῖται τοῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ οὐμ' οἷς ἀκολουθεῖν τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς λήγοντα, τὸ δὲ διεξευγμένον ἐν ἔχει τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές, ὡς εἰάν ἀμφότερα ἢ ἀληθῆ ἢ ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ,  
 284 ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ ὅλον. τοιαύτης δ' οὕσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς λήμμασι δυνάμεως, ὑποθέμενοι τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐν τῷ διεξευγμένῳ ἀληθές ἴδωμεν πῶς συναγεται τὰ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς. καὶ δὴ πρῶτον ὑποκείσθω ἀληθὲς τὸ "ἔστι τι σημείον." οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τοῦθ' ἡγούμενον ἔστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ συνημμένῳ, ἔξει τὸ ἀκόλουθον αὐτῷ τὸ λήγον ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συνημμένῳ. ἔληγε δὲ τὸ εἶναι σημείον, ὅπερ ταυτόν ἔστι τῆ ἐπιφορᾶ. συναχθήσεται ἄρα ἡ ἐπιφορᾶ,  
 386

exists. And reasonably so; for he who states that no sign exists affirms this either by mere assertion or by proof. And if he affirms it by assertion he will have (against him) the contrary assertion; while if 282 he tries to prove the truth of his statement, then by his argument proving the non-existence of a sign he will be signifying the non-existence of a sign, and in doing so he will be acknowledging the existence of a sign. So the first two premisses are, they say, true. And the third also is true; for it is a disjunctive, composed of contradictories (the existence and non-existence of sign). Since, then, if every disjunctive is true when it has one clause true, and of contradictories one clause is regarded as true, one must declare that a premiss thus constructed is indisputably true. So that the conclusion, "sign therefore exists," is inferred along with the agreed premisses.

It will also be possible, they say, to argue thus: In 283 the argument there are two hypothetical premisses and one disjunctive; and of these, the hypothetical promise that their consequents follow from their antecedents, while the disjunctive has one of its clauses true, since if both be true or both false the whole will be false. Such then being the quality of 284 the premisses, let us assume that one of the clauses of the disjunctive is true and see how the conclusion is deduced. And let it be assumed first that "a sign exists" is true: then, since this is the antecedent in the first hypothetical premiss, it will have as following from it the consequent in that premiss. And that consequent was "a sign exists," which is the same as the conclusion. The conclusion,

<sup>1</sup> οὖν cj. Bekk.: *ei* mss.

ὑποθεέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι ἐν τῷ διεζευγμένῳ τοῦ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. καὶ μὴν ἀνάπαυιν ὑποκείσθω τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθές τὸ μὴ εἶναι σημεῖον. τοῖνυν ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενον ἔστιν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ, ἔξει ἀκολουθοῦν αὐτῷ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ. ἡκολούθει δέ γε αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὃ καὶ ἐπιφορά ἔστιν. καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἄρα συνάγεται ἡ ἐπιφορά.

285 Ταῦτα μὲν οἱ δογματικοί· τάξει δὲ ῥητέον πρὸς τὸ πρῶτον εὐθύς, καθ' ὃ ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς συνήγον τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον ζητουμένου τὸ ἦττον ζητούμενον ἐθέλουσι διδάσκειν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι σημεῖον, καὶ εἰ πρὸς τινων ἀντειρήται, καθάπερ τῶν σκεπτικῶν, ἀλλὰ τοί γε παρὰ πᾶσι τοῖς δογματικοῖς σύμφωνόν ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ προνοητικῶς κατασκευάσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον παρ' οὐκ ὀλίγοις αὐτῶν διαπεφύνηται. σφόδρα δ' ἦν βίαιον τὸ ἐκ τῶν μᾶλλον ἀσυγχωρήτων θέλειν τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα διδάσκειν. καὶ μὴν ῥητῶς ὁ Ἡράκλειτός φησι τὸ μὴ εἶναι λογικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φρενήρες τὸ περιέχον. ὃ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔτι παραδοξότερον πάντα ἡξίου λογικὰ τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐ ζῶα μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φυτά, ῥητῶς γράφων

πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νύματος αἴσαν.

287 μετὰ τοῦ καὶ πιθανὸν εἶναι λόγον εἰς τὸ μὴ ἄφρονα τυγχάνειν τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων. εἰ γὰρ πάρεστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ἐνδιάθετον αὐτοῖς παρεῖναι· δίχα γὰρ τούτου ἀνυπό-

therefore, will be deduced if it be assumed that the clause "a sign exists," in the disjunctive, is true. Again, let it be assumed, conversely, that the other clause, "a sign does not exist," is true. Then, since this is the antecedent in the second hypothetical premiss, it will have as following from it the consequent in the second hypothetical. And what followed from it was "a sign exists," which is also the conclusion. Therefore in this way also the conclusion is deduced.

Such are the contentions of the Dogmatists; and 285 to the first of them, (taking them) in order, in which they inferred the existence of a sign from the structure of Man, one must straightway reply that they try to explain the less questionable by the more questionable. For the existence of a sign, even if it is controverted by some, such as the Sceptics, is nevertheless generally accepted by all the Dogmatists; but that 286 Man is providentially constructed is disputed by not a few of them. And it is extremely violent to try to explain by what is more generally controverted what is less so. Moreover, Heraclitus expressly affirms that "Man is not rational, and only the circumambient is intelligent." But Empedocles, still more paradoxically, held that all things are rational, and not animals only but plants as well, as he writes expressly—

Wisdom and power of thought, know thou, are shared in by all things.

Besides, there is a plausible argument to show that 287 the irrational animals are not unwise.<sup>b</sup> For if they possess "uttered reason," they must necessarily possess also "internal reason"; for apart from this

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 127, 349: "the circumambient" is the fiery world-substance ("Logos") of H., see Vol. I. Intro. p. viii.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 62 ff.

288 στατός ἐστὶν ὁ προφορικός. κἄν δῶμεν δὲ δια-  
 φέρειν τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸν ἄνθρωπον λόγῳ τε  
 καὶ μεταβατικῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ ἐννοίᾳ ἀκολουθίας,<sup>1</sup>  
 ἀλλ' οὐ τοί γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀδήλοισι καὶ ἀνεπι-  
 κρίτως διαπεφωνημένοις συγχωρήσομεν αὐτὸν  
 εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαινομένοις τηρητικῇ  
 τινα ἔχειν ἀκολουθίαν, καθ' ἣν μνημονεύων τίνα  
 μετὰ τίνων τεθεώρηται καὶ τίνα πρὸ τίνων καὶ  
 τίνα μετὰ τίνα, ἐκ τῆς τῶν προτέρων ὑποπτώσεως  
 289 ἀνανεοῦται τὰ λοιπά. ἀλλὰ συνομολογηθέν-  
 τος, φασίν, ὅτι ἡ ἀπόδειξις κατὰ γένος ἐστὶ  
 σημεῖον, εἰ μὲν οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀποδείξεις οἱ κατὰ τοῦ  
 σημείου κομισθέντες λόγοι, ἄπιστοι καθεστῶσιν,  
 εἰ δὲ ἀποδείξεις εἰσὶν, ἔστι τι σημεῖον. ἡμεῖς δὲ  
 προειρηκότες ὅτι οὐ τῷ ὑπομνηστικῷ ἐνιστάμεθα  
 σημεῖω ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνδεικτικῷ, δυνάμεθα τοὺς κατὰ  
 τοῦ σημείου κομισθέντας λόγους παραχωρεῖν τι  
 σημαίνειν, ἤδη δὲ οὐκ ἐνδεικτικῶς ἀλλ' ὑπο-  
 μνηστικῶς· ἡμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς κινούμεθα καὶ  
 ἀναλαμβάνομεν τῇ μνήμῃ τὰ δυνάμενα λέγεσθαι  
 290 πρὸς τὸ ἐνδεικτικὸν σημεῖον. τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ  
 περὶ τῆς ἀκολουθίου ῥητέον ὑπομνήσεως, καθ' ἣν  
 ἐπυνθάνοντο πότερον σημαίνουσί τι αἱ κατὰ τοῦ  
 σημείου προφερόμεναι φωναὶ ἢ οὐδὲν σημαίνουσιν.  
 εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶν σημεῖον ἀνηροῦμεν, ἔδει κατ'  
 ἀνάγκην ἢ μηδὲν σημαίνειν τὰς κατὰ τοῦ σημείου  
 προφερομένας φωνὰς καθ' ἡμᾶς, ἢ σημαίνουσῶν  
 αὐτῶν δίδοσθαι τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. νῦν δὲ τῇ  
 διαιρέσει χρώμενοι τὶ μὲν ἀναιροῦμεν σημεῖον τὶ  
 δὲ τίθεμεν, οὐδ' ἐν τῷ σημαίνειν τι τὰς κατὰ τοῦ  
 ἐνδεικτικοῦ σημείου προφερομένας φωνὰς παρακε-

<sup>1</sup> ἐννοία ἀκολουθίας Kayser: ἐν τῇ ἀκολουθίᾳ mss., Bekk.

latter the uttered reason is non-existent. And 288  
 even if we grant that Man differs from the other  
 animals in reason and transitive impression and  
 conception of logical sequence, yet certainly we shall  
 not agree that he is as described as regards things  
 non-evident and matters of unsettled controversy,  
 whereas in respect of things apparent he possesses a  
 retentive sense of sequence, by which he remembers  
 what things he has observed together with what, and  
 what before what, and what after what, and from his  
 experience of previous things revives the rest.—But, 289  
 they say, when it is agreed that proof is, in respect  
 of its genus, a sign, if the arguments brought against  
 the sign are not proofs they are untrustworthy, while  
 if they are proofs a sign exists. But as we have  
 previously stated that we do not object to the  
 commemorative sign but to the indicative, we are  
 able to admit that the arguments brought against  
 the sign signify something, but not as yet in an  
 indicative but in a commemorative way; for we are  
 affected by them and we recall in memory the things  
 that can be said against the indicative sign.—And the 290  
 same may be said regarding their next contention,  
 in which they inquired whether the words uttered  
 against the sign signify something or signify nothing.  
 For if we abolished every sign it would necessarily  
 result either that the words uttered by us against the  
 sign signify nothing, or, if they are significant, that  
 the existence of a sign is conceded. But as it is,  
 since we make use of the distinction, and abolish one  
 kind of sign but affirm the other, by (our allowing  
 that) the words spoken against the indicative sign

- χώρηται τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐνδεικτικὸν τι σημεῖον.  
 291 ἐπι ἐλέγετο ὡς εἶπερ ἴδιον τέχνης ἐστὶ θεώρημα,  
 δεήσει τοῦτο μὴ πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ἀδηλον  
 καὶ διὰ σημείου ληπτὸν, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι τῆς  
 μὲν τῶν ἄλλων θεωρητικῆς τέχνης οὐδὲν ἐστὶ  
 θεώρημα, καθάπερ ὕστερον διδάξομεν, τῆς δὲ  
 ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις στρεφομένης ἔστιν ἴδιόν τι  
 θεώρημα. διὰ γὰρ τῶν πολλάκις τετηρημένων ἢ  
 ιστορημένων ποιεῖται τὰς τῶν θεωρημάτων συ-  
 στάσεις· τὰ δὲ πολλάκις τηρηθέντα καὶ ιστορηθέντα  
 ἴδια καθειστήκει τῶν πλειστάκις τηρησάντων, ἀλλ'  
 οὐ κοινὰ πάντων.  
 292 Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τέλει συνερωτηθεὶς αὐτοῖς λόγος  
 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοιούτῳ "εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πρῶτον· εἰ  
 οὐ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ πρῶτον· ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον ἢ οὐ  
 τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ πρῶτον ἄρα" τάχα μὲν καὶ κατὰ  
 παρολκίην τὴν ἐν τοῖς λήμμασι μοχθηρὸς ἐστίν,  
 ἀναμφιλέκτως δὲ καὶ αὐτοὺς φαίνεται θλίβειν.  
 293 ῥητέον δὲ τάξει περὶ τοῦ πρώτου, τουτέστι τῆς  
 παρολκίης. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ  
 διεξευγμένον, ἐν ἔχειν ἀληθές ὀφείλει, καθὼς καὶ  
 αὐτοὶ πρότερον ἔλεγον. ἐν δὲ ἔχον ἀληθές τὸ  
 ἕτερον τῶν συνημμένων ὡς παρέλκον διελέγχει.  
 294 εἴαν τε γὰρ ἀληθές ὑποκείται τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ  
 "ἔστι τι σημεῖον," ἀναγκαῖον γίνεται πρὸς τὴν  
 τούτου συναγωγὴν τὸ διαφορούμενον συνημμένον  
 τὸ "εἰ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον," παρέλκον  
 δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν τὸ "εἰ μὴ ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι τι  
 σημεῖον"· εἴαν τε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον ὑποκείται  
 τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές, τὸ μὲν διαφορούμενον παρ-

are significant it is not admitted that an indicative sign exists.—Further, it was argued that if there is a 291 special rule of art, this ought not to be pre-evident but non-evident and apprehensible by means of a sign. But this is to ignore the fact that (as we shall show later) while there is no rule of the art concerned with other cases, of the art which deals with things apparent there is a special rule ; for (this art) effects the framing of its rules by means of things frequently observed or investigated ; and the things frequently observed and investigated are peculiar to those who have made the most frequent observations, and are not the common property of all.

Then, as to the final argument propounded by them 292 in this form <sup>a</sup>—"If the first, the first ; if not the first, the first ; either the first or not the first ; therefore the first"—it is, perhaps, unsound also because of the redundancy <sup>b</sup> in its premisses, and it indisputably appears to cause worry even to them. First one should 293 speak of what comes first in order, that is to say, the redundancy. If the disjunctive premiss in the argument is true, it is bound to have one clause true, just as they themselves previously stated.<sup>c</sup> And having one clause true it convicts one of the hypothetical premisses of redundancy. For, on the one hand, if 294 one of its clauses, namely "a sign exists," be assumed as true, then for its deduction the duplicated <sup>d</sup> hypothetical premiss, "if a sign exists, a sign exists," becomes necessary, but the remaining premiss, "if a sign does not exist, a sign exists," becomes redundant. And, on the other hand, if its clause "a sign does not exist" is assumed to be true, the duplicated premiss is redundant for the purpose

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 281.<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 147.<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 282.<sup>d</sup> Cf. §§ 109, 181.



ἔλκει πρὸς τὴν τούτου κατασκευήν, τὸ δὲ “ εἰ μὴ  
 ἔστι τι σημεῖον, ἔστι σημεῖον ” ἀναγκαῖον γίνεσθαι.  
 295 μοχθηρὸς οὖν κατὰ παρολκὴν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ’  
 ἵνα μὴ νῦν εἰς τὰ κατὰ λεπτόν συμβαίνωμεν τοῖς  
 ἐναντίοις, πάρεστιν ἕτερον συνερωτᾶν λόγον ἔχοντα  
 τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἴπερ περιτρέπεται ὁ λέγων  
 μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον εἰς τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον,  
 περιτρέπεται καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι τι σημεῖον εἰς τὸ  
 λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον. ὁ δὲ λέγων μὴ εἶναι  
 τι σημεῖον σκεπτικῶς περιτρέπετο κατ’ αὐτοὺς  
 εἰς τὸ λέγειν εἶναι τι σημεῖον· καὶ ὁ λέγων ἄρα  
 δογματικῶς εἶναι τι σημεῖον περιτραπήσεται εἰς  
 τὸ λέγειν μὴ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, ὡς παραστήσομεν.  
 296 αὐτίκα γὰρ [εἰς] τὸν λέγοντα εἶναι τι σημεῖον  
 σημείω δεῖ τὴν ἀπόφανσιν πιστώσασθαι, ἀσυγ-  
 χωρήτου δὲ ὄντος τοῦ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, πῶς ἂν  
 οὗτος χρήσεται τῷ σημείῳ πρὸς πίστιν τοῦ εἶναι  
 τι σημεῖον; μὴ δυνάμενος δὲ ἀποδείξει σημεῖω  
 τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον, περιτραπήσεται εἰς τὸ ὁμο-  
 λογεῖν μηδὲν εἶναι σημεῖον. ἔστω δὲ καὶ ἐκ περι-  
 ουσίας<sup>1</sup> τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ μόνον ὁμολογεῖσθω<sup>2</sup> σημεῖον, τὸ  
 τοῦ [μὴ]<sup>3</sup> εἶναι σημεῖον μηνυτικόν· τί τοῦτ’ ὄφελος  
 αὐτοῖς μηδὲν ἔχουσι τῶν ἰδίων εἰπεῖν δογμάτων  
 297 σημεῖον; ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν ἀνόνητον αὐτοῖς, φημί  
 δὲ τὸ κοινῶς ὁμολογεῖσθαι εἶναι τι σημεῖον· ἐκέينو  
 δ’ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον, τὸ ὑποτάξαι τῷ “ ἔστι τι  
 σημεῖον ” ἀορίστω τὸ “ τοῦτο δ’ ἔστι σημεῖον ”  
 ὀρισμένως ἐκφερόμενον. ὅπερ οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτοῖς  
 ποιεῖν. πᾶν γὰρ σημεῖον ἐπ’ ἴσης τῷ σημειωτῷ  
 δοξαστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνεπικρίτως διαφωνούμενον.  
 ὡς οὖν τὸ “ τίς διὰ πέτρας πλεῖ ” ψεῦδός ἐστιν,

<sup>1</sup> περιουσίας Heintz: περιτροπῆς mss., Bekk.

of establishing this, whereas the premiss “ if a sign  
 does not exist, a sign exists ” becomes necessary.  
 The argument, therefore, is unsound because of  
 redundancy.—But, not to follow our adversaries into 295  
 minute points, one may propound another argument  
 of the following kind: If he who states that a sign  
 does not exist is converted to stating that a sign  
 exists, he also who states that a sign exists is con-  
 verted to stating that a sign does not exist. But he  
 who stated, sceptically, that a sign does not exist was  
 converted, according to them, to stating that a sign  
 exists; therefore he who states, dogmatically, that  
 a sign exists will be converted to saying, as we shall  
 show, that a sign does not exist. For instance, it is 296  
 necessary that he who states that a sign exists should  
 confirm his assertion by a sign, but as it is not agreed  
 that a sign exists, how can he use the sign for confirm-  
 ing the existence of a sign? And if he cannot prove  
 by a sign that a sign exists he will be converted to  
 agreeing that no sign exists.—But let it be granted  
 and agreed, into the bargain, that only this particular  
 sign exists which serves to inform us that a sign  
 exists: of what advantage to them is this, when they  
 are unable to mention any sign of their own special  
 doctrines? So that this does not profit them at all— 297  
 the general agreement, I mean, that a sign exists; it is  
 probably necessary for them to subjoin to the indefinite  
 statement “ a sign exists ” the definitely expressed  
 “ this sign exists.” And this it is not possible for them  
 to do. For every sign, equally with the thing signified,  
 is a matter of opinion and of unsettled controversy.  
 Thus, just as the clause “ Someone is sailing through

<sup>2</sup> ὁμολογεῖσθω Heintz: ὁμολογεῖσθαι mss., Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> [μὴ] secl. Kochalsky.

- ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αὐτῷ ὠρισμένον ὑποτάττειν ἀληθές τὸ " οὗτος διὰ πέτρας πλεῖ," οὕτως ἐπεὶ τῷ " ἔστι τι σημεῖον " ἀορίστῳ οὐδὲν ἔχομεν ὠρισμένον ἀληθές ὑποτάττειν " τοῦτο δὲ ἔστι σημεῖον," ψεῦδος ἄρα γίνεται τὸ " ἔστι τι σημεῖον," καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον αὐτῷ ἀληθές, τὸ " οὐδὲν ἔστι σημεῖον."
- 298 Πλήν ἔστω γε καὶ τούτους τοὺς ὑπ' αὐτῶν κομισθέντας λόγους εἶναι σθεναροῦς, μεμενηκέναι δὲ καὶ τοὺς τῶν σκεπτικῶν ἀναντιρρήτους· τί ἀπολείπεται τῆς καθ' ἑκάτερον μέρος προσπιπτούσης ἰσοσθενείας εἰ μὴ τὸ ἐπέχειν καὶ ἀοριστεῖν περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, οὔτε τὸ εἶναι τι σημεῖον λέγοντας οὔτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι, τὸ δὲ οὐ μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι μετὰ ἀσφαλείας προφερομένους;
- 299 Ἄλλ' ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις δοκεῖ κατὰ γένος εἶναι σημεῖον καὶ διὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτειν τὸ ἀδηλούμενον συμπέρασμα, μὴ τι οἰκείον ἔστι τῇ περὶ σημεῖου σκέψει καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτῆς ζήτησιν συνάπτειν.

## Δ.—ΠΕΡΙ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΕΩΣ

- 300 Τίνος μὲν ἕνεκεν περὶ ἀποδείξεως ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ζητοῦμεν πρότερον ὑποδέδεικται, ὅτε περὶ τε τοῦ κριτηρίου καὶ τοῦ σημείου ἐσκεπτόμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀμεθόδως γίνεσθαι τὴν ὑφήγησιν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ τὴν ἐποχὴν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δογματικούς ἀντίρρησιν προβαίνειν, ὑποδεικτέον τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῆς. ἡ τοίνυν ἀπόδειξις κατὰ μὲν 301 τὸ γένος ἐστὶ λόγος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε αἰσθητὸν ἦν πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ διανοίας τις κίνησις καὶ συγκατά-

\* Cf. P.H. i. 8.

\* Cf. P.H. i. 188.

a rock" is false, since it is impossible to subjoin to it as a definite truth " This man is sailing through a rock," so also, since we are unable to subjoin to the indefinite " a sign exists " a definite and true " this sign exists," the clause " a sign exists " becomes false and its contradictory, " no sign exists," true.

Let it be granted, however, both that the argu- 298 ments brought forward by the Stoics are strong and that those of the Sceptics remain uncontroverted: what remains for us, with this equipollence<sup>a</sup> of the two parties, except to suspend judgement and avoid definition regarding the matter in question, not affirming either that a sign exists or that it does not exist, but cautiously pronouncing that it is " no more " <sup>b</sup> existent than non-existent?

But since proof seems to come under the genus 299 sign<sup>c</sup> and to reveal the non-evident conclusion by means of the agreed premisses, it is perhaps fitting to attach our inquiry about proof to our examination of sign.

## IV.—CONCERNING PROOF

The reason why we are at present inquiring about 300 proof has been shown before,<sup>d</sup> when we were investigating the Sign and the Criterion; but in order that our treatment may not be unmethodical and that our suspension<sup>e</sup> and our controversy with the Dogmatists may go forward, we must indicate the meaning of proof. Proof, then, in point of genus is an argument; 301 for it is not, of course, a sensible thing, but a certain

\* With § 299 cf. P.H. i. 60, ii. 134, 135.

\* Cf. i. 27.

\* i.e. the Sceptics' doctrine of " suspension of judgement "; f. P.H. i. 8 ff.

θεσις, ἄπερ ἦν λογικὰ λόγος δὲ ἐστίν, ὡς ἀπλού-  
 στερον εἰπεῖν, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ  
 302 ἐπιφορᾶς. λήμματα δὲ καλοῦμεν οὐ θέματα τινα,  
 ἃ συναρπάζομεν, ἀλλ' ἄπερ ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος τῷ  
 ἐμφανῇ εἶναι δίδωσι καὶ παραχωρεῖ. ἐπιφορὰ δὲ  
 ἐτύγχανε τὸ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λημμάτων κατασκευα-  
 ζόμενον. οἶον λόγος μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο σύ-  
 στημα "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἔστιν" ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα  
 ἐστίν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν," λήμματα δὲ αὐτοῦ καθέστηκε  
 τό τε "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς ἔστιν" καὶ τὸ "ἀλλὰ  
 μὴν ἡμέρα ἐστίν," ἐπιφορὰ δὲ τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."  
 303 τῶν δὲ λόγων οἱ μὲν εἰσι συνακτικοὶ οἱ δὲ οὐ,  
 καὶ συνακτικοὶ μὲν ἐφ' ὧν συγχωρηθέντων ὑπάρχειν  
 τῶν λημμάτων παρὰ τὴν τούτων συγχώρησιν  
 ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορὰ, ὡς εἶχεν ἐπὶ  
 τοῦ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἐκτεθέντος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ συν-  
 ἔστηκεν ἐκ συνημμένου τοῦ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς  
 ἔστιν," ὅπερ ὑπισχνεῖτο ὄντος τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτου  
 ἀληθοῦς ἔσεσθαι καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ  
 304 ἀληθές, καὶ ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἐστίν," ὅπερ ἦν  
 ἠγούμενον ἐν τῷ συνημμένῳ, φημί ὅτι δοθέντος μὲν  
 ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ συνημμένου, ὥστε ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ  
 ἐν αὐτῷ ἠγούμενῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ λήγον, δοθέντος δὲ  
 ὑπάρχειν καὶ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ "ἡμέρα  
 ἔστιν," κατ' ἀνάγκην συνεισαχθήσεται διὰ τὴν  
 τούτων ὑπαρξίν καὶ τὸ δεύτερον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ, τουτ-  
 305 ἐστὶ τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," ὅπερ ἦν ἐπιφορὰ. καὶ δὴ  
 οἱ μὲν συνακτικοὶ λόγοι τοιοῦτοί τινές εἰσι κατὰ  
 τὸν χαρακτήρα, ἀσύνακτοι δὲ ὑπάρχουσιν οἱ μὴ  
 οὕτως ἔχουσιν. τῶν δὲ συνακτικῶν οἱ μὲν πρό-  
 398

motion and assent of the mind, and these are rational.<sup>a</sup>  
 And an argument is, speaking in general terms, what  
 is constructed of premisses and a conclusion. We give 302  
 the name of "premisses," not to certain assumptions  
 which we take by force, but to those which, because  
 they are obvious, the interlocutor grants and con-  
 cedes. A conclusion is that which is established from  
 the premisses. For example, this whole structure is  
 an argument: "If it is day, it is light; but in fact  
 it is day; therefore it is light"; and its premisses  
 are "If it is day, it is light," and "but in fact it is  
 day"; while its conclusion is "therefore it is light."  
 —And of arguments some are conclusive, some not; 303  
 and conclusive are those in which, when it is agreed  
 that the premisses are true, owing to this agreement  
 the conclusion also appears to follow, as was the case  
 with that set out a moment ago. For since it is com-  
 posed of the hypothetical major premiss "If it is day,  
 it is light," which promises that, if its first clause  
 is true, the second also of its clauses will be true; and 304  
 also of the premiss "it is day," which is the ante-  
 cedent in the major; I assert that if it is granted that  
 the major premiss is true, so that its consequent  
 follows from its antecedent, and granted also that  
 the first of its clauses, "it is day," is a fact,—then,  
 because of the actuality of these, the second also of  
 its clauses, namely "it is light," will be deduced, and  
 this is the conclusion. Such, then, in respect of their 305  
 type, are the conclusive arguments, and those which  
 are not of this kind are inconclusive.<sup>b</sup>—Of the con-  
 clusive arguments some deduce something pre-

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 301-304 cf. *P.H.* ii. 135-138. "Argument" (λόγος) = Syllogism.

<sup>b</sup> With §§ 305-310 cf. *P.H.* ii. 140-143.

δηλόν τι συνάγουσιν οἱ δὲ ἄδηλον, καὶ πρόδηλον μὲν καθάπερ ὁ ἐκκείμενος καὶ οὕτως ἔχων " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τὸ γὰρ " φῶς ἔστιν " ἐπ' ἴσης φαινόμενον τῷ " εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν." καὶ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ περιπατεῖ Δίῳν, κινεῖται Δίῳν· περιπατεῖ δὲ Δίῳν· κινεῖται ἄρα Δίῳν." τὸ γὰρ " κινεῖται Δίῳν," ὅπερ ἔστι συμπέρασμα, τῶν αὐτοφωράτων ὑπῆρχεν.

308 ἄδηλον δὲ συνάγει οἶον ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ ἰδρώτες ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ ἄρα δεύτερον." τὸ γὰρ νοητοὺς εἶναι τῆς σαρκὸς πόρους τῶν ἀδήλων ὑπῆρχεν. καὶ πάλιν " οὐ ἐκκριθέντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τελευτῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἐκείνο· αἵματος δὲ ἐκκριθέντος ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τελευτῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι· ψυχὴ ἄρα ἔστι τὸ αἷμα." τὸ γὰρ ἐν αἵματι κεῖσθαι τὴν ὑπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἐν-  
307 αργές. τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀδηλόν τι συναγόντων οἱ μὲν ἐφοδευτικῶς μόνον ἐπάγουσιν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν λημμάτων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἱ δὲ ἐφοδευτικῶς  
308 ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς. ὧν ἐφοδευτικῶς μὲν μόνον ἐπάγουσιν οἱ ἐκ πιστεως καὶ μνήμης ἠρτήσθαι δοκοῦντες, οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος " εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτοσι δὲ ὁ θεός " (δείκνυμι δὲ γε τὸν Δία καθ' ὑπόθεσιν) " εἰπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος." ἐνθάδε γὰρ παραδεχόμεθα τὸ συμπέρασμα, τὸ πλουτήσῃ τούτου, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ προταθέντος λόγου δυνάμεως κατασκευασθέν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πιστεύειν  
309 τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀποφάνσει. ἐφοδευτικῶς δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἐκκαλυπτικῶς ἐπήγειν ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν λημμάτων

evident, others something non-evident,—pre-evident, as in the case of the argument set forth in this form: " If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light "; for " it is light " is just as apparent as " it is day." And again one like this: " If Dion walks, Dion moves; but Dion walks; therefore Dion moves "; for " Dion moves," which is the conclusion, is a thing patent of itself. But an argument such as 306 this deduces what is non-evident: " If sweat pours through the surface, intelligible pores<sup>a</sup> of the flesh exist; but in fact the first (is true); therefore the second (is true)"; for the existence of intelligible pores of the flesh is a thing non-evident. And again: " That by the separation of which from the body men die is the soul; but it is by the separation of blood from the body that men die; therefore the blood is soul." For it is not manifest that the substance of the soul consists in blood. And of these arguments 307 which deduce something non-evident some lead us on from the premisses to the conclusion by way of progression only, others both by way of progression and by way of discovery as well. And of these such as 308 seem to depend on belief and memory lead us on by way of progression only, as, for example, " If a god has said to you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this god (assume that I point to Zeus) has said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich." For here we accept the conclusion, that this man will be rich, not as established by the power of the argument set forth, but owing to our belief in the statement of the god. But 309 an argument such as that propounded regarding the intelligible pores leads us from the premisses to the

<sup>a</sup> i. e. invisible excretory ducts; cf. P.H. ii. 90.

ἐπὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα καθάπερ ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν νοητῶν πόρων συνερωτηθείς. τὸ γὰρ "εἰ ρέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι" καὶ τὸ ρεῖν διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἰδρώτας, ἐκ τῆς αὐτῶν φύσεως κατασκευάσαι ἐδίδασκεν ἡμᾶς τὸ ὅτι εἰσὶ νοητοὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πόροι, κατὰ τινα τοιαύτην ἔφοδον "διὰ ναστοῦ καὶ ἀποροποιήτου σώματος ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ὑγρὸν ρεῖν· ρεῖ δέ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἰδρώς· τούτων οὐκ ἂν εἴη ναστὸν τὸ σῶμα ἀλλὰ πεποροποιημένον."

310 Τούτων δὴ οὕτως ἐχόντων ἡ ἀπόδειξις πρὸ παντὸς ὀφείλει λόγος εἶναι, δεύτερον συνακτικὸς, τρίτον καὶ ἀληθῆς, τέταρτον καὶ ἄδηλον ἔχων συμπέρασμα, πέμπτον καὶ ἐκκαλυπτόμενον τοῦτο

311 ἐκ τῆς δυνάμεως τῶν λημμάτων. ὁ γοῦν τοιοῦτος λόγος ἡμέρας οὐσης "εἰ νῦξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν νῦξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν" συνακτικὸς μὲν καθειστική, δοθέντων γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων ὑπάρχειν συνάγεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, οὐκ ἀληθῆς δέ γε ἦν, εἶχε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ λῆμμα ψεῦδος τὸ "νῦξ ἔστιν". διόπερ οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔστιν.

312 πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα δ' ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" πρὸς τῷ συνακτικῷ ἔτι καὶ ἀληθῆς ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ δοθέντων αὐτοῦ τῶν λημμάτων δίδονται καὶ τῆ ἐπιφορά, καὶ δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς τι δείκνυσιν. τοιοῦτος δὲ ὢν πάλιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τῷ πρόδηλον ἔχειν τὸ συμπέρασμα

313 τὸ "φῶς ἔστιν," ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄδηλον. κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ὁ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ τίς σοι θεῶν εἶπεν ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος, πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· οὗτοσὶ δὲ ὁ θεὸς εἶπέ σοι ὅτι πλουτήσῃ οὗτος· πλουτήσῃ ἄρα οὗτος" ἄδηλον μὲν ἔχει συμπέρασμα τὸ πλου-

conclusion both by way of progression and by way of discovery. For the premisses "If sweat flows through the surface, intelligible pores of the flesh exist," and "Sweat flows through the surface," teach us to conclude from their own nature that intelligible pores of the flesh exist, in virtue of a progression such as this—"Through a solid body of non-porous formation it is impossible for a liquid to flow; but sweat flows through the body; so the body will not be solid but of porous formation."

This being so, proof must first of all be an argument; 310 secondly, conclusive; thirdly, also true; fourthly, having also a non-evident conclusion; fifthly, having also this conclusion discovered through the power of the premisses. Thus an argument such as this,<sup>a</sup> 311 when it is day,— "If it is night, it is dark; but in fact it is night; therefore it is dark"—is conclusive in form (for its premisses being granted its conclusion also is inferred to exist), but it certainly is not true (for it contains the false premiss "it is night"); and on this account it is not probative. Again, such an 312 argument as this—"If it is day it is light; but it is day; therefore it is light,"—besides being conclusive is also true, since, its premisses being granted, its conclusion also is granted, and by means of true premisses it proves something true. But though it does so, still it is not a proof owing to its having as its conclusion what is pre-evident and not non-evident. In the same way one like this<sup>b</sup>—"If a god said to 313 you that this man will be rich, this man will be rich; but this particular god said to you that this man will be rich; therefore he will be rich"—has a non-evident conclusion, that "this man will be rich," but is not

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 139.<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 141.

τήσιν τούτων, οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἀποδεικτικὸς<sup>1</sup> διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐκ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων δυνάμεως ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ πίστεως παραδοχῆς τυγχά-  
 314 νειν. συνδραμόντων οὖν πάντων τούτων, τοῦ τε συνακτικὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀδήλου παραστατικόν, ὑφίσταται ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἔνθεν καὶ οὕτως αὐτὴν ὑπογράφουσιν "ἀπόδειξις ἔστι λόγος δι' ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἐκκαλύπτων ἀδήλων," οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." τὸ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ἀδήλόν τ' ἔστι, καὶ δι' ἀληθῶν δοκεῖ, τοῦ τε "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν" καὶ τοῦ "ἔστι δὲ κίνησις," κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐκκαλύπτεσθαι.

315 "Ἄ μὲν οὖν οἰκείον ἦν προλαβεῖν περὶ τῆς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος ἐπινοίας, ἔστι τοιαῦτα· τάξει δὲ ὑποδεικτέον καὶ τὸ ἐκ τίνος ὕλης ἔστίν.

## E.—EK TINOΣ TAΗΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ Η ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

316 Τῶν πραγμάτων, ὡς πολλάκις προείπομεν, τὰ μὲν πεπίστευται ἐναργῆ εἶναι τὰ δὲ ἀδήλα, καὶ ἐναργῆ μὲν τὰ ἐκ φαντασίας ἀβουλήτως καὶ ἐκ πάθους λαμβανόμενα, οἷόν ἐστι νῦν τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," τό τε<sup>2</sup> "τοῦτ' ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν," ἕκαστον  
 317 τῶν τοιούτων, ἀδήλα δὲ τὰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχοντα. καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων, ὡς τινες διαιρούμενοί φασιν, τὰ μὲν ἔστι φύσει ἀδήλα, τὰ δ' ὁμώνυμως λεγόμενα τῷ γένει ἀδήλα. καὶ φύσει μὲν ἔστιν ἀδήλα τὰ μήτε

<sup>1</sup> ἀποδεικτικὸς Heintz: ἀποδεικτικὸν mss. (οὐκέτι δ' ἀποδεικτικὸν Bekk.).

<sup>2</sup> τό τε: ὅτι mss., Bekk.: τὸ Mutsch.

probative because it is not discovered by the power of the premisses but meets with acceptance through trust in the god. When, then, all these things concur 314—that the argument is at once conclusive and true and making manifest a non-evident—then proof really exists. Hence also they describe it thus: "A proof is an argument which by means of agreed premisses reveals by way of deduction a non-evident conclusion";—for example, this: "If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void exists." <sup>a</sup> For the existence of void is non-evident, and also it appears to be revealed by way of deduction by means of the true premisses "If motion exists, void exists" and "but motion exists."

Such, then, are the points regarding the notion 315 of the object of our inquiry which it was fitting to deal with first; and, next in order, we must explain its subject matter.

## V.—THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PROOF

Some things—as we frequently said before <sup>b</sup>—are 316 believed to be manifest, others non-evident; and manifest are those which are perceived involuntarily through presentation and through affection, such as, at the present moment, "It is day," "This is a man," and everything of the kind; but non-evident are those which are not of this sort. And of things 317 non-evident—according to the distinction which some people make—some are naturally non-evident, but others are given the same name, "non-evident," as their genus. And naturally non-evident are the things

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 277; i. 213.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 141. With §§ 316-320 cf. §§ 145-160; P.H. II. 97-103.

πρότερον καταληφθέντα μήτε νῦν καταλαμβάνόμενα μήτε αὖθις καταληφθησόμενα, αἰώνιον δὲ ἔχοντα τὴν ἀγνωσίαν, οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἀπίους εἶναι  
 318 τοὺς ἀστέρας ἢ περισσοῦς. διὸ καὶ φύσει ἀδηλα λέγεται, οὐχ ὅτι αὐτὰ φύσιν ἔχει ἀδηλον ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτὰ, ἐπεὶ μαχόμενόν τι ἐροῦμεν, τουτέστιν ἅμα καὶ ἀγνοεῖν αὐτὰ φάσκοντες καὶ τίνα ἔχει φύσιν ὁμολογοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῇ ἡμῶν φύσει ἀδηλείται.  
 319 ὁμωνύμως δὲ τῷ γένει ἀδηλα προσαγορεύεται ἅπερ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀποκρύπται, διὰ δὲ σημείων ἢ ἀποδείξεων ἀξιοῦται γνωρίζεσθαι, οἷον τὸ ἄτομα εἶναι στοιχεῖα ἐν ἀπείρῳ φερόμενα κενῷ.  
 320 πλὴν τοιαύτης οὔσης ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι διαφορᾶς φαμὲν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὔτε πρόδηλον εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ κατηναγκασμένου πάθους ἐγνωρίζετο) οὔτε φύσει ἀδηλον (οὐ γὰρ ἀπήλπισται ἢ κατάληψις αὐτῆς) ἀλλὰ τῆς λειπομένης τῶν ἀδήλων εἶναι διαφορᾶς, ἅπερ δεδουκυῖαν μὲν καὶ συνεσκιασμένην ἡμῖν ἔχει τὴν φύσιν, τῷ δ' ἐκ  
 321 φιλοσοφίας λόγῳ δοκεῖ καταλαμβάνεσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ βεβαίως λέγομεν, ἐπεὶ γελοῖον παραχωρήσαντας τὴν ὑπαρξίν ἔτι ἐπιζητεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι κατ' ἐπίνοιαν τοιαύτη τυγχάνει· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπινόιας καὶ προλήψεως ἀνακύνει ὁ  
 322 περὶ τῆς ὑπάρξεως λόγος. ὅτι τοῖνυν τῶν ἀδήλων κατὰ τὴν ἐπινόιαν ἔστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις καὶ οὐ δύναται δι' αὐτῆς γνωρίζεσθαι, ἐπιλογιστέον οὕτως.

Τὸ μὲν πρόδηλον καὶ ἐναργὲς πάντῃ πρόδηλόν ἐστι καὶ ἐναργὲς, συμπεφώνηται τε παρὰ πᾶσι, καὶ

which neither have been previously apprehended, nor are now being apprehended, nor will hereafter be apprehended, but are eternally unknowable, as for instance that the stars are even in number or odd. Hence they are termed naturally non-evident, not 318 because they possess in relation to themselves a non-evident nature, since this would be to state a contradiction (by saying, that is, that we do not know them and at the same time agreeing as to what nature they possess), but because they are non-evident to our nature. Termed after their genus non-evident 319 are the things which in their own proper nature are hidden but are made known, it is claimed, by means of signs and proofs, as for instance that there exist indivisible elements which move in infinite void.—If, 320 however, such a difference in the things exists, we assert that proof is neither pre-evident (for it is not made known of itself and by a necessitated affection), nor naturally non-evident (for the apprehension of it is not despaired of), but belongs to the remaining species of things non-evident, which have their nature submerged and obscured for us, but are thought to be apprehended by philosophic argument. This, how- 321 ever, we do not positively affirm, since it would be ridiculous to keep on inquiring about proof after conceding its real existence, but only that, in regard to its notion, it is of the kind described; for in this way, from this notion and preconception, the argument about its existence will emerge. So, then, that proof 322 is, in its notion, one of the non-evident things and cannot be made known through itself must be argued as follows.

What is pre-evident and manifest is in all ways pre-evident and manifest and is agreed by all and

οὐδεμίαν διολκὴν ἐπιδέχεται· τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον δια-  
 323 πεφύνηται τε καὶ εἰς διολκὴν πίπτειν πέφυκεν. καὶ  
 εἰκότως. πᾶς γὰρ λόγος κρίνεται ὅτι ἀληθὴς ἔστιν  
 ἢ ψευδής, κατὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ οὐ κεκό-  
 μισται ἀναφοράν· ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ εὐρίσκηται σύμ-  
 φωνος τῷ πράγματι τῷ περὶ οὐ κεκόμισται, ἀληθὴς  
 εἶναι δοκεῖ, ἐὰν δὲ διάφωνος, ψευδής. οἷον ἀπο-  
 φαίνεται τις ὅτι ἡμέρα ἔστιν· οὐκοῦν ἀναπέμφαντες  
 τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ γνόντες τὴν  
 324 τούτου ὑπαρξίν συνεπιμαρτυροῦσαν τῷ λόγῳ,  
 φαμέν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον. διόπερ ὅταν  
 μὲν ἐναργὲς ἢ καὶ πρόδηλον τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ  
 οὐ ὁ λόγος κομίζεται, ῥᾶδιον ἀναπέμφαντας ἐπὶ  
 αὐτὸ τὸ λεγόμενον, τόθ' οὕτως ἢ ἀληθῆ λέγειν  
 εἶναι τὸν λόγον ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον τῷ πράγματι ἢ  
 ψευδῆ ἀντιμαρτυρούμενον. ὅταν δὲ ἄδηλον καθ-  
 εστήκη τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένον ἡμῖν,  
 τότε μηκέτι δυναμένης ἐπὶ τοῦτο βεβαίως γίνεσθαι  
 τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀναπομπῆς λείπεται τὸ καταπιθα-  
 νεῦσθαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐπισπᾶσθαι τὴν διά-  
 νοιαν εἰς συγκατάθεσιν. ἄλλου δὲ ἄλλως εἰκά-  
 ζοντος καὶ διαπιθανεομένου φύεται ἢ διαφωνία,  
 μήτε τοῦ ἀποτυχόντος εἰδότες ὅτι ἀπέτυχεν, μήτε  
 325 τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος εἰδότες ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν. ταῦτά  
 γέ τοι καὶ σφόδρα χαριέντως ἀπεικάζουσιν οἱ σκε-  
 πτικοὶ τοὺς περὶ ἀδήλων ζητοῦντας τοῖς ἐν σκότῳ  
 ἐπὶ τινα σκοπὸν τοξεύουσιν· ὥσπερ γὰρ τούτων  
 εἰκός ἐστι τινὰ μὲν τυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ τινὰ δ'  
 ἀποτυχεῖν, τὸ δὲ τίς ἐπέτυχεν ἢ ἀπέτυχεν ἀγνω-  
 στον, οὕτως ἐν βαθεῖ σχεδὸν σκότῳ τῆς ἀληθείας  
 ἀποκεκρυμμένης ἀφίενται μὲν ἐπὶ ταύτην πολλοὶ  
 λόγοι, τὸ δὲ τίς ἐξ αὐτῶν σύμφωνός ἐστιν αὐτῇ καὶ

admits of no dispute; but the non-evident is dis-  
 agreed about and naturally tends to fall into dis-  
 pute. And reasonably so; for every argument is 323  
 judged to be either true or false according to its  
 reference to the thing concerning which it is  
 brought forward; for if it is found to be in accord  
 with the thing concerning which it is brought forward,  
 it is held to be true, but if at variance, false. For  
 example, someone declares that it is day. Then  
 by referring the statement to the fact and learning  
 that the fact's existence is confirmatory of the state-  
 ment, we say that the statement is true. Conse- 324  
 quently, when the fact concerning which the argument  
 is brought forward is manifest and pre-evident, it is  
 easy to refer the statement to it and then, in this  
 way, to declare either that the argument is true as  
 confirmatory of the fact, or false if contradictory. But  
 when the fact is non-evident and hidden from us, then,  
 as there can no longer be any secure reference of the  
 argument to it, it only remains for the mind to be  
 persuaded and drawn into assent by probabilities.  
 But when one man guesses and tries to persuade in  
 one way, another in another, disputation springs up,  
 since neither he who has missed the mark knows that  
 he has missed it, nor he who has hit it knows that he  
 has hit it.—Accordingly, the Sceptics very neatly 325  
 compare those who inquire about things non-evident  
 to men shooting at a mark in the dark; for just as it  
 is probable that one of these hits the mark and another  
 misses, but which has hit or missed is unknowable, so,  
 with the truth hidden almost in the depths of darkness,  
 many arguments are shot at it, but which of them is  
 in accord with it, and which at variance, it is impossible



326 τίς διάφωνος οὐχ οἶόν τε γινώσκειν, ἀρθέντος ἐκ τῆς ἐναργείας τοῦ ζητουμένου. καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον εἶπε Ξενοφάνης,

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφές οὗ τις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται

εἰδώς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών, αὐτὸς ὁμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

327 ὥστε εἰ μὲν τὸ πρόδηλον διὰ τὴν προειρημένην αἰτίαν ἔστι σύμφωνον, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον διαπεφώνηται, δεήσει καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν διαφωνουμένην ἄδηλον εἶναι. ὅτι δὲ τῷ ὄντι διαπεφώνηται, οὐ πολλῶν ἡμῖν λόγων δεῖ, βραχείας δὲ τινος καὶ προχείρου ὑπομνήσεως, εἰ γε οἱ μὲν δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ οἱ λογικοὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν τιθέασιν αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐμπειρικοὶ ἀναιροῦσιν, τάχα δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος (ἰσχυρῶς γὰρ αὐτῇ διὰ τῶν κανόνων ἀντι-  
328 εἶρηκεν), οἱ δὲ σκεπτικοὶ ἐν ἐποχῇ ταύτῃ ἐφύλαξαν, τῇ “μὴ μᾶλλον” ἀποφάνσει χρώμενοι. τῶν τε τιθέντων αὐτήν πάλιν ἰκανή τις ἔστι διαφωνία, καθὼς προβαίνοντος τοῦ λόγου διδάσκομεν. τοῖνυν ἄδηλόν τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

329 Καὶ μὴν εἰ πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις δόγμα ἐν τοῖς λήμμασιν αὐτῆς περιέχουσα εὐθύς ἐστὶ δόγμα, πᾶν δὲ δόγμα διαπεφώνηται, κατ' ἀνάγκην πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις διαπεφώνηται καὶ τῶν ζητουμένων ἐστὶ πραγμάτων. οἶον Ἐπίκουρος δοκεῖ ἰσχυροτάτην τεθεικέναι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς τὸ εἶναι κενὸν τοιαύτην “ εἰ

to learn, as the object of inquiry is removed from (the sphere of) the manifest. And this was first stated by 326 Xenophanes<sup>a</sup> :

Yet, with respect to the gods and what I declare about all things,

No man has seen and no man will know the truth in its clearness.

Nay, for e'en should he chance to affirm what is really existent,

He himself knoweth it not; but opinion holds sway over all things.

So that if the pre-evident is, for the reason already 327 stated, agreed, whereas the non-evident is in dispute, it must be that proof also, being in dispute, is non-evident.<sup>b</sup> And that it really is a matter of dispute it does not need many arguments to show us but only a short reminder, which lies ready to hand, seeing that the dogmatic philosophers and the logical doctors affirm it, but the Empirics<sup>c</sup> deny it, and perhaps Democritus also (for he has spoken against it strongly in his *Canons*), while the Sceptics have 328 cautiously suspended judgement about it, making use of the formula “not more.”<sup>d</sup> And amongst those who affirm it, again, there is no little dissension, as we shall explain as our discourse proceeds. So, then, proof is a thing non-evident.

Furthermore, if every proof which contains an 329 opinion in the premisses is indisputably an opinion, and every opinion is disputed, necessarily every proof is disputed and is one of the objects of inquiry. Epicurus, for instance, opines that he has put forward a very strong argument for the existence of void,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 49, 110; P.H. ii. 18.

<sup>b</sup> With §§ 327-334 cf. P.H. ii. 180, 181.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 191. For Democritus cf. i. 138.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 188, 213.

330 ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις·  
 ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἀποδείξεως τὰ  
 λήμματα εἰ μὲν συνεχωρεῖτο πρὸς πάντων, ἐξ  
 ἀνάγκης ἂν καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν εἶχεν ἀκολουθοῦσαν  
 331 αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑπὸ πάντων παραχωρουμένην. νῦν δ'  
 ἐνέστησάν τινες τούτῳ, φημί δὲ τῷ [μῆ]<sup>1</sup> συν-  
 ἀγεσθαι τοῖς λήμμασι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, οὐ διὰ τὸ μὴ  
 ἀκολουθεῖν αὐτὴν ἐκείνοις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἐκεῖνα  
 332 εἶναι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀνομόλογα. ἵνα γὰρ μὴ πολλὰς  
 ἐπιτρέχωμεν συνημμένους κρίσεις, λέγωμεν δ' αὐτό-  
 θεν ἕγιες εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ μὴ ἀρχόμενον ἀπ'  
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος, τὸ [δ'] "εἰ ἔστι  
 κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν" κατὰ μὲν Ἐπίκουρον ἀρχό-  
 μενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τοῦ "[εἰ] ἔστι κίνησις" καὶ  
 λῆγον ἐπ' ἀληθές ἔσται ἀληθές, κατὰ δὲ τοὺς  
 περιπατητικοὺς ἀρχόμενον ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς τοῦ "[εἰ]  
 ἔστι κίνησις" καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ "ἔστι  
 333 κενόν" ἔσται ψεύδος, κατὰ δὲ Διόδωρον ἀρχόμενον  
 ἀπὸ ψεύδους τοῦ "ἔστι κίνησις" καὶ λῆγον ἐπὶ  
 ψεύδος τὸ "ἔστι κενόν" αὐτὸ μὲν ἔσται ἀληθές,  
 τὴν δὲ πρόσληψιν τὴν "ἔστι δέ γε κίνησις" ὡς  
 334 ψευδῆ διελέγχει, κατὰ μέντοι τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς  
 λῆγον ἐπ' ἀδηλον ἔσται ἀδηλον· τὸ γὰρ "ἔστι  
 κενόν" κατ' αὐτοὺς τῶν ἀγνώστων ἐτύγχανεν. φα-  
 νερόν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι διαπεφώνηται τὰ λήμματα  
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διάφωνα δὲ ὄντα<sup>2</sup> ἀδηλά ἐστιν,  
 ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξις πάντως ἀδηλος.  
 335 Καὶ μὴν τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἀπόδειξις· οὐ γὰρ  
 καθ' ἑαυτὴν φαίνεται, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἀποδεικνυμένῳ  
 θεωρεῖται. τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι εἰ ἔστιν ἐξήγηται, καὶ

<sup>1</sup> [μῆ] secl. Kochalsky (τῶν N).

<sup>2</sup> ὄντα: καὶ τὰ MSS., Bekk. (ὄντα καὶ Kochalsky).

namely this—"If motion exists, void exists; but in  
 fact motion exists; therefore void exists." But if the 330  
 premisses of this proof had been agreed to by all, it  
 would necessarily have had a conclusion also following  
 from them and admitted by all. But as it is, some 331  
 have objected to it—I mean, to the deduction of the  
 conclusion from the premisses—not because it does  
 not follow from them, but because they are false and  
 not admitted. For—not to run over a great number 332  
 of judgements about it, but to state at once (the view)  
 that a valid hypothetical premiss<sup>a</sup> is one that does  
 not begin with truth and end in falsehood,—then,  
 according to Epicurus, the premiss "If motion exists,  
 void exists," as it begins with the truth "motion  
 exists" and ends in truth, will be true; but according  
 to the Peripatetics, as it begins with the truth  
 "motion exists" and ends in the falsehood "void  
 exists," it will be false; and according to Diodorus,<sup>b</sup> 333  
 as it begins with the falsehood "motion exists" and  
 ends in the falsehood "void exists," it will in itself  
 be true, but the minor premiss, "But motion in fact  
 exists," he criticizes as false; according to the 334  
 Sceptics, however, as it ends in a non-evident, it will  
 be non-evident; for according to them "void  
 exists" is one of the things unknowable. From this,  
 then, it is plain that the premisses of the proof are  
 matters of dispute. And matters of dispute are also  
 non-evident, so that proof based on them is also  
 wholly non-evident.

Moreover, proof is a relative thing, for it does not 335  
 appear by itself but is seen in relation to the thing  
 proved. And the existence of relatives is a matter

<sup>a</sup> For this Stoic definition cf. §§ 114, 268.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 245.

πολὺς ἦν ὁ λέγων μὴ εἶναι αὐτά. τὸ δὲ διολκῆν  
 ἔχον ἔστιν ἄδηλον. καὶ ταύτη τοίνυν ἄδηλός ἐστιν  
 336 ἢ ἀπόδειξις. πρὸς τούτοις ἦτοι ἐκ φωνῆς  
 συνέστηκεν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις  
 εἴρηται, ἢ ἐξ ἀσωμάτων λεκτῶν, ὡς τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς  
 στοᾶς. ἐξ ὁποτέρων δ' ἂν συνεστήκη, πολλὴν  
 ἐπιδέχεται ζήτησιν· τὰ τε γὰρ λεκτὰ εἰ ὑφέστηκε  
 ζητεῖται, καὶ πολὺς ὁ περὶ τούτου λόγος, αἶ τε  
 φωναὶ εἰ σημαίνουσι τι διηπόρηται. εἰ δὲ ἐξ  
 ὁποτέρας ἂν ὕλης ὑπάρχη ἢ ἀπόδειξις ζητεῖται, τὸ  
 δὲ ζητούμενόν ἐστιν ἄδηλον, πάντως ἢ ἀπόδειξις  
 ἐστιν ἄδηλος.

Τοῦτο μὲν ὄν ὥσπερ τι στοιχεῖον τῆς μελλούσης  
 ἀντιρρήσεως ὑποκείσθω· μετελθόντες δὲ ἐξῆς  
 σκοπῶμεν καὶ περὶ τοῦ εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις.

## 5.—ΕΙ ΕΣΤΙΝ ΑΠΟΔΕΙΞΙΣ

337 Παρεστακότες καὶ τὸ ἐκ τίνος ὕλης ἐστὶν ἢ  
 ἀπόδειξις, ἀκολουθῶς πειρασόμεθα καὶ τοὺς σα-  
 λεύοντας αὐτὴν λόγους προχειρίσασθαι, σκεπτόμενοι  
 πότερον ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ καὶ προλήψει ταύτης  
 ἢ ὑπαρξίς ἢ οὐδαμῶς. καίτοι τινὲς εἰώθασιν ἡμῶν,  
 καὶ μάλιστα οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἐπικούρου αἰρέσεως,  
 ἀγροικότερον ἐνίστασθαι, λέγοντες “ ἦτοι νοεῖτε τί  
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, ἢ οὐ νοεῖτε. καὶ εἰ μὲν νοεῖτε  
 καὶ ἔχετε ἔννοιαν αὐτῆς, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ δὲ  
 οὐ νοεῖτε, πῶς ζητεῖτε τὸ μὴδ' ἀρχὴν νοούμενον  
 331 α ὑμῖν; ” ταῦτα γὰρ λέγοντες ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν σχεδὸν περι-  
 τρέπονται, ἐπεὶ περὶ τὸ μὲν παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου

\* Cf. §§ 453 ff.  
 ° Cf. P.H. ii. 107.

° Cf. §§ 12, 13, 404.  
 ° Cf. P.H. ii. 214.

of inquiry,<sup>a</sup> and there are many who say that they do  
 not exist. And what is subject to dispute is non-  
 evident. So in this way also proof is non-evident.—  
 Besides this, proof is composed either of sound, as is 336  
 said by the Epicureans, or of incorporeal expressions,  
 as is said by the Stoics.<sup>b</sup> But, whichever of these it  
 is composed of, it is open to serious question. For it  
 is a question whether “ expressions ” really exist,<sup>c</sup> and  
 there is much argument on the point; and whether  
 sounds have any significance is also a matter of doubt.<sup>d</sup>  
 But if it is a question what subject matter is the basis  
 of proof, and what is questioned is non-evident, cer-  
 tainly proof is non-evident.

Let this, then, be laid down as the basis of our  
 counter-argument; and let us pass on to consider  
 next the question of the existence of proof.

## VI.—DOES PROOF EXIST ?

Now that we have explained what is the matter of 337  
 which proof consists, we shall in the next place attempt  
 to deal with the arguments which render it precarious,  
 and consider whether its real existence follows from  
 its notion and preconception or not.<sup>e</sup> Some people,  
 to be sure,—and especially those of the Epicurean  
 School—are wont to withstand us rather rudely and  
 say—“ Either you understand what proof is, or you  
 do not understand; and if you understand and have  
 a notion of it, proof exists; but if you do not under-  
 stand, how do you inquire into a thing of which you  
 have no understanding at all? ” For in saying this 331 a  
 they are pretty well overthrown by their own selves,  
 since it is agreed that a preconception and notion

\* With §§ 337 ff. cf. P.H. ii. 1 ff.

πρόληψιν καὶ ἔννοιαν δεῖν προηγείσθαι δμολογόν  
 ἔστιν. πῶς γάρ τις καὶ ζητῆσαι δύναται μηδεμίαν  
 ἔννοιαν ἔχων τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος; οὔτε  
 γὰρ ἐπιτυχῶν εἴσεται ὅτι ἐπέτυχεν οὔτε ἀστοχίας  
 332 a ὅτι ἡστόχησεν. ὥστε τοῦτο μὲν δίδομεν, καὶ  
 τοσοῦτόν γε ἀπέχομεν τοῦ λέγειν ἔννοιαν μὴ ἔχειν  
 παντὸς τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος, ὡς καὶ ἀνά-  
 παλιν πολλάς γ' ἔννοιᾶς αὐτοῦ καὶ προλήψεις ἔχειν  
 ἀξιούσιν, καὶ χάριν τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι ταύτας δια-  
 κρίνειν καὶ τὴν ἐξ αὐτῶν κυριωτάτην ἀνευρεῖν εἰς  
 333 a ἐποχὴν καὶ ἀρρεψίαν περιίστασθαι. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μίαν  
 εἴχομεν τοῦ ζητουμένου πράγματος πρόληψιν, κἂν  
 ταύτῃ συνεξακολουθήσαντες τοιοῦτ' ἐπιστεύομεν  
 ὑπάρχειν ὁποῖον κατὰ μίαν προσέπιπτεν ἔννοιαν·  
 νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ πολλὰς ἔχομεν τοῦ ἐνὸς ἔννοιᾶς καὶ  
 πολυτρόπους μαχομένας καὶ ἐπ' ἴσης πιστὰς διά-  
 τε τὴν ἐν αὐταῖς πιθανότητα καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν  
 προϋσταμένων ἀνδρῶν ἀξιοπιστίαν, μήτε πάσαις  
 πιστεῦσαι δυνάμενοι διὰ τὴν μάχην, μήτε πάσαις  
 ἀπιστῆσαι τῷ μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἔχειν αὐτῶν πιστο-  
 τέραν, μήτε τινὶ μὲν πιστεῦσαι τινὶ δὲ ἀπιστεῖν διὰ  
 τὴν ἰσότητα, κατ' ἀνάγκην ἤλθομεν εἰς τὸ ἐπέχειν.  
 334 a ἀλλὰ γὰρ προλήψεις ἔχομεν τῶν πραγμάτων κατὰ  
 τὸν ὑποδεικνυμένον τρόπον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο, εἰ μὲν  
 ἢ πρόληψις κατάληψις ὑπήρχεν, ἴσως ἂν ἐν τῷ  
 διδόναι τὸ πρόληψιν ἔχειν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ τὴν  
 κατάληψιν τούτου συνωμολογοῦμεν· νῦν δ' ἐπεὶ ἢ  
 πρόληψις καὶ ἢ ἔννοια τοῦ πράγματος οὐχ ὑπαρξίς  
 ἔστιν, ἐπινοεῖν μὲν αὐτὸ φαμεν, καταλαμβάνεσθαι  
 335 a δὲ μηδαμῶς διὰ τὰς προεκκειμένας αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ τοι  
 εἰ αἰ πρόληψις εἰσι κατάληψις, παρὰ μέρος καὶ

\* Cf. P.H. i. 190.

must precede every object of inquiry. For how can  
 anyone even begin to inquire if he has no notion of  
 the object of inquiry? For neither if he has hit the  
 mark will he know that he has hit it, nor if he has  
 missed it, that he has missed it. Consequently we grant 332 a  
 this point, and in fact so far are we from saying that  
 we have not a notion of the whole object of inquiry  
 that, on the contrary, we claim to have many notions  
 and preconceptions of it, and that it is because of our  
 inability to decide between them and to discover  
 the most cogent amongst them that we revert to  
 suspension and indecision.\* For if we had possessed 333 a  
 but one preconception of the object of inquiry, then,  
 by following this closely, we would have believed that  
 the object was such as we felt it to be owing to that  
 one notion; but now, since we have many notions  
 of the one object, and these manifold and conflicting  
 and equally trustworthy both because of their in-  
 herent probability and because of the trustworthiness  
 of the men who champion them,—as we are unable  
 either to believe them all because of the conflict; or  
 to disbelieve all, as we do not possess any other notion  
 more trustworthy than they; or to believe one and  
 disbelieve another, owing to their equality,—we are  
 necessarily reduced to suspending judgement. But 334 a  
 we do, in fact, possess preconceptions in the way  
 that has been indicated. And because of this, if  
 preconception was apprehension, in granting that  
 we have a preconception of the thing we should prob-  
 ably have been admitting also apprehension of it;  
 but as it is, since the preconception and notion of the  
 thing is not its existence, we say that we have a notion  
 of it but do not apprehend it for the reasons already  
 set forth; for, to be sure, if preconceptions are appre- 335 a

ἡμεῖς πευσόμεθα αὐτῶν πότερον ἔχει πρόληψιν καὶ  
 ἐπίνοιαν Ἐπίκουρος τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων ἢ οὐκ  
 ἔχει, καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἀντιλήψεται τοῦ  
 ζητουμένου πράγματος, καὶ τοῦτο ζητήσει οὐ μηδὲ  
 336 a τέσσαρα εἶναι στοιχεῖα; ἀλλ' οἶμαι ὅτι ἀπολογου-  
 μενοι φήσουσιν ὡς ἐπινοεῖ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος τὰ  
 τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα, οὐ κατείληφε δὲ πάντως· ψιλὸν  
 γὰρ κίνημά ἐστι τῆς διανοίας ἢ ἐπίνοια, ἧς ἐχό-  
 μενος ἀντιλέγει τῷ εἶναι τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα. τοῖνυν  
 καὶ ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν ἐπίνοιαν τῆς ἀποδείξεως, καὶ ἀπὸ  
 ταύτης ἐξετάσομεν εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε καὶ μή, ταύτην  
 δὲ ἔχοντες οὐχὶ καὶ τὴν κατάληψιν ὁμολογήσομεν.  
 337 a Ἄλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τούτους καὶ αὐθὶς ποτε λεχθή-  
 σεται· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐμμεθόδους προσήκει ποιεῖσθαι τὰς  
 ἀντιρρήσεις, ζητητέον τίνι μάλιστα δεῖ ἀποδείξει  
 ἐνίστασθαι. καὶ δὴ ἐὰν μὲν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ  
 καθ' ἐκάστην τέχνην ἀποδείξεσιν ἐνίστασθαι θέλω-  
 μεν, ἀμέθοδον ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἔνστασιν, ἀπειρῶν  
 338 οὐσῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἀποδείξεων· ἐὰν δὲ τὴν γενικὴν  
 ἀπόδειξιν ἀνέλωμεν, ἥτις δοκεῖ πασῶν τῶν ἐπ'  
 εἶδους εἶναι περιεκτικὴ, δῆλον ὅτι ἐν ταύτῃ πάσας  
 ἔχομεν ἀνηρημένας. ὡσπερ γὰρ ζώου μὴ ὄντος  
 οὐδὲ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι καὶ ἀνθρώπου μὴ ὑπάρχοντος  
 οὐδὲ Σωκράτους ὑφέστηκεν, συνανααιρουμένων τοῖς  
 γένεσι τῶν εἰδῶν, οὕτω μὴ οὐσης γενικῆς ἀπο-  
 δείξεως οἴχεται καὶ ἀπαντα ἢ ἐπ' εἶδους ἀποδείξει·  
 339 τῷ μὲν γὰρ εἶδει οὐ πάντως συναναεῖται τὸ γένος,  
 καθάπερ τῷ Σωκράτει ὁ ἀνθρώπος, τῷ γένει δ',  
 ὡσπερ εἶπον, συμπεριγράφεται τὸ εἶδος. ἀναγ-  
 καῖον οὖν ἔστι καὶ τοῖς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν σαλεύουσι μὴ

hensions, we too in our turn will ask them whether  
 Epicurus has or has not a preconception and notion  
 of the four elements; and if he has not, how will he  
 apprehend the object of inquiry and inquire into a  
 thing of which he has not even a notion? While if  
 he has, how is it that he did not apprehend the fact  
 that there are four elements? But they will, I sup- 336 a  
 pose, say in defence that Epicurus has a notion of the  
 four elements, but has not, certainly, apprehended  
 them; for a notion is a bare movement of the mind,  
 holding to which he denies that there are four ele-  
 ments. So then we, too, possess a notion of proof,  
 and starting from it we shall inquire whether it exists  
 or not; but though we possess the notion we shall  
 not also admit the apprehension.

To these people, however, a reply will be made at 337 a  
 some later time; but since it behoves us to produce  
 our counter-arguments in a methodical way, we must  
 inquire which proof one should object to most. Now  
 if we propose to object to the special proofs and those  
 belonging to each art, we shall be making our objec-  
 tion in an unmethodical way, as such proofs are end-  
 less; whereas, if we abolish generic proof, which is 338  
 held to be inclusive of all the particular proofs, it is  
 evident that thereby we shall have all included therein  
 abolished. For just as if Animal exists not, neither  
 does Man exist, and if Man subsists not, neither does  
 Socrates subsist,—the particulars being abolished  
 along with the genera,—so if generic proof does not  
 exist, particular proof wholly disappears as well. For 339  
 although the genus is not wholly abolished along with  
 the particular,—Man with Socrates, for example,—  
 yet, as I said, the particular is cancelled along with  
 the genus. It is necessary, then, for those who throw

ἄλλην τιὰ κινεῖν ὅτι μὴ τὴν γενικὴν, ἢ καὶ τὰς  
λοιπὰς ἀκολουθεῖν συμβέβηκεν.

- 340 Ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν ἀδελόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὡς ἐπ-  
ελογοισάμεθα, ὀφείλει ἀποδεδείχθαι πᾶν γὰρ ἀδελον  
ἀναποδείκτως λαμβανόμενον ἐστιν ἀπιστον. ἦτοι  
οὖν ὑπὸ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως καταστήσεται τὸ εἶναι  
341 τι ἀπόδειξιν ἢ ὑπὸ εἰδικῆς. ἀλλ' ὑπὸ μὲν εἰδικῆς  
οὐδαμῶς· οὐπω γὰρ οὐδεμία καθίσταται εἰδικὴ  
ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ μῆπω ὠμολογηθῆναι τὴν γενικὴν.  
ὡς γὰρ μηδέπω σαφοῦς ὄντος τοῦ ὅτι ἐστι ζῶον,  
οὐδὲ ὅτι ἵππος ἐστι γνώριμον καθέστηκεν, οὕτω  
μηδέπω συνομολογηθέντος τοῦ ὅτι ἐστι γενικὴ  
ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τις τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀπο-  
342 δείξεων πιστὴ, μετὰ τοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων  
τρόπον ἡμᾶς ἐμπίπτειν· ἵνα μὲν γὰρ ἡ γενικὴ  
ἀπόδειξις βεβαιωθῆ, τὴν εἰδικὴν ἡμᾶς ἔχειν δεῖ  
πιστὴν, ἵνα δὲ ἡ εἰδικὴ ὁμολογηθῆ, τὴν γενικὴν  
ἔχειν βέβαιον, ὥστε μήτε ἐκείνην πρὸ ταύτης ἔχειν  
δύνασθαι μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνης. οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ  
μὲν εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀμήχανον τὴν γενικὴν  
343 ἀποδειχθῆναι. καὶ μὴν οὐδ' ὑπὸ γενικῆς· αὕτη  
γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ ζητουμένη, ἀδελος δὲ οὐσα καὶ ζητουμένη  
οὐκ ἂν εἴη κατασκευαστικὴ ἐαυτῆς, ἢ γε καὶ τῶν  
ἐκκαλυπτόντων αὐτὴν ἔχρηζεν. ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ ἐξ  
ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσα λέγεται τινος εἶναι κατα-  
σκευαστικὴ. εἰ δὲ ἀπαξ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνεται  
ταυτα καὶ ἐστι πιστά, τίς ἔτι χρεία ἀποδεικνύει  
αὐτά, αὐτόθεν δυναμένων ἡμῶν λαμβάνειν ταῦτα  
καὶ ἀναποδείκτως διὰ γε τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχειν πιστά;  
344 πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις παρα-  
στατικὴ ἐστὶ τῆς γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἔσται ἡ αὕτη

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 322 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 173.

doubt on proof to impugn no other proof save only  
the generic, since actually all the rest follow it.

Since, then, proof is, as we have argued,<sup>a</sup> a thing 340  
non-evident, it ought to have been proved; for every  
non-evident thing, if it is received without proof, is  
untrustworthy. Therefore the fact that proof is  
something will be established either by a generic or  
by a particular proof. But certainly not by a par- 341  
ticular proof; for as yet particular proof does not  
even exist, because generic proof is not admitted as  
yet. For just as, if it is not yet clear that Animal  
exists, neither is it known that Horse exists, so when  
it is not yet agreed that generic proof exists, none of  
the particular proofs will be trustworthy; and, in 342  
addition, we shall be involved in circular reasoning;  
for in order to establish the generic proof we must  
have the particular trustworthy, and in order that the  
particular may be admitted we must have the generic  
established, so that we can neither have the former  
before the latter, nor the latter before the former. So,  
then, it is not possible for the generic proof to be  
proved by the particular proof.—Nor yet by the 343  
generic proof; for this is the object of inquiry, and  
being non-evident and an object of inquiry it will  
not be capable of establishing itself, seeing that it  
itself needs things which reveal it. Unless, indeed,  
when accepted by assumption, it is said to be capable  
of establishing something. But if once things are  
accepted by assumption<sup>b</sup> and are trustworthy, what  
further need is there to prove them, since we are  
able to accept them on the spot and consider them  
trustworthy without proof because of the assump-  
tion?—Furthermore, if the generic proof is capable 344  
of establishing the generic proof, the same proof will

περιφανής ἅμα καὶ ἄδηλος, καὶ ἥ μὲν ἀποδείκνυσι, περιφανής, ἥ δὲ ἀποδείκνυται, ἄδηλος. ἔσται θ' ὁμοίως πιστὴ τε καὶ ἄπιστος, πιστὴ μὲν ὅτι ἐκκαλυπτικὴ τινός ἐστιν, ἄπιστος δὲ ὅτι ἐκκαλύπτεται. πάνυ δὲ ἄτοπον ταυτὸ λέγειν πρόδηλον ἅμα καὶ ἄδηλον, πιστόν τε καὶ ἄπιστον. τοῖνυν καὶ τὸ ἀξιούν τὴν γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἑαυτῆς εἶναι παραστατικὴν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.

345 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον οὐχ οἶον ἀπόδειξιν ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἕτερόν τι τῶν ὄντων διὰ γενικῆς ἀποδείξεως δυνατόν ἐστι παρασταθῆναι. ἦτοι γὰρ τάδε τινα ἔχει λήμματα καὶ τήνδε τινα ἐπιφορὰν ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις (ἡ οὐκ ἔχει).<sup>1</sup> τάδε γάρ τινα ἔχουσα λήμματα καὶ τήνδε τινα ἐπιφορὰν μία γέγονε τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει λήμματα καὶ ἐπιφορὰν, ἐπεὶ οὐ χωρὶς λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς συνάγει ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲν συνάξει ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις, μηδὲν δὲ συνάγουσα οὐδὲ τὸ ἑαυτὴν εἶναι

346 συνάξει. εἰ οὖν τὸ μὲν ὅτι δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναι τὴν πρώτην ἀπόδειξιν ὠμολόγηται, αὕτη δὲ οὔτε ἐκ γενικῆς οὔτε ἐξ εἰδικῆς ἀποδείξεως δύναται ἀποδειχθῆναι, δῆλον ὡς ἄλλου μηδενὸς εὐρισκομένου παρὰ ταύτας ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάττειν ὀφείλομεν τὴν περὶ

347 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ζήτησιν. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ ἡ πρώτη ἀπόδειξις ἀποδείκνυται, ἦτοι ὑπὸ ζητουμένης ἀποδείξεως ἀποδείκνυται ἡ ὑπὸ ἀζητήτου. οὔτε δὲ ὑπὸ ἀζητήτου· πᾶσα γὰρ ἀπόδειξις τῆς πρώτης ὑπ' ἀμφισβήτησιν πεπωκυίας ζητεῖται· οὔτε ὑπὸ ζητουμένης· πάλιν γὰρ ἐκεῖνη εἰ ζητεῖται, ὑπ' ἄλλης ἀποδείξεως ὀφείλει κατασταθῆναι, καὶ ἡ τρίτη ὑπὸ

<sup>1</sup> <ἡ οὐκ ἔχει> Mutsch.

<sup>o</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 172.

be at once quite apparent and non-evident—quite apparent in so far as it proves, but non-evident in so far as it is proved. And it will be equally trustworthy and untrustworthy—trustworthy because it serves to reveal something, but untrustworthy because it is revealed. But it is extremely absurd to term the same thing at once both pre-evident and non-evident, both trustworthy and untrustworthy. Therefore also the claim that the generic proof is capable of establishing itself is absurd.

Moreover, there is also another way of showing 345 that neither proof nor any other existing thing can be established by means of generic proof. For generic proof either possesses (or does not possess) these particular premisses and this particular conclusion.<sup>o</sup> If, then, it possesses these particular premisses and this particular conclusion, it is a particular proof. But if it does not possess premisses and a conclusion, since proof does not deduce without premisses and a conclusion, generic proof will deduce nothing, and deducing nothing it will not even deduce its own existence. —If, then, it is agreed that the first proof ought to be 346 proved, and it cannot be proved either by generic or by particular proof, it is plain that, as nothing else beside these (proofs) is discovered, we ought to suspend judgement about the problem of proof. Moreover, if the 347 first proof is being proved, it is being proved either by a questioned proof or by an unquestioned proof. But not by an unquestioned, for when the first has come to be disputed, every proof is questioned; nor by a questioned proof, for, again, that proof, if questioned, must be established by another proof, and the third by a fourth, and

τετάρτης, καὶ ἡ τετάρτη ὑπὸ πέμπτης, καὶ τοῦτ' εἰς ἀπειρον. τοῖνυν οὐκ ἔστι βεβαίως ἔχειν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.

348 Δημήτριος δὲ ὁ Λάκων, τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἐπικουρείου ἀίρεσιν ἐπιφανῶν, εὐαπόλυτον ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην ἔνστασιν. μίαν γάρ, φησί, τῶν ἐπ' εἶδους ἀποδείξεων (οἷον τὴν<sup>1</sup> συνάγουσαν ὅτι ἄτομα ἔστι στοιχεῖα ἢ ὅτι κενόν ἔστι), καταστησάμενοι καὶ βεβαίαν δείξαντες αὐτόθεν ἔξομεν ἐν ταύτῃ καὶ τὴν γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν πιστὴν· ὅπου γὰρ ἔστι τό τινος γένους εἶδος, ἐκεῖ πάντως εὐρίσκεται καὶ γένος οὐ ἔστι τὸ εἶδος, καθάπερ ἀνώτερον ὑπεμνήσαμεν.

349 τοῦτο δὲ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι πιθανόν, ἔστι δ' ἀδύνατον. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἕασει τὸν Λάκωνα τὴν εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν καταστήσασθαι τῆς γενικῆς μὴ προὔφεστώσης· καὶ ὡς αὐτὸς ἀξιοῖ ἔχων τὴν εἰδικὴν ἀπόδειξιν εὐθέως ἔχειν καὶ τὴν γενικὴν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ σκεπτικοὶ ἀξιώσουσι προαποδειχθῆναι τὸ γένος αὐτῆς, ἵνα πιστευθῇ τὸ εἶδος. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐκεῖνοι ἐπιτρέψωσιν αὐτῷ τὸ τοιοῦτο, λέγω δὲ εἰδικὴν τινα καταστήσασθαι ἀπόδειξιν εἰς βεβαίωσιν τῆς γενικῆς, οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμογενῶν αἰρέσεων οὐχ ἡσυχάσουσιν ἀλλ' ὅποιαν ἂν προχειρίσῃται ὡς πιστὴν ἀπόδειξιν, ταύτην ἀνατρέψουσι, πολὺ τε πλήθος ἔξει τῶν οὐκ ἐώντων ταύτην τεθῆναι. οἷον εἰ τὴν περὶ ἀτόμων λαμβάνοι, ἀμύθητοι ἀντιφθέγγονται αὐτῷ· εἰ τὴν περὶ κενοῦ, παμπληθεῖς ἐνστήσονται· εἰ τὴν

351 περὶ εἰδώλων, ὡσαύτως. κἂν τὰ μάλιστα οὖν συντρέχωσιν αὐτοῦ τῇ προαιρέσει οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, οὐ δυνήσεται μίαν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων πιστώσασθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν μάχην.

<sup>1</sup> οἷον τὴν cj. Bekk.: τινα mss.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. iii. 137.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 338.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. § 65.

the fourth by a fifth, and so on *ad infinitum*. So, then, it is not possible for proof to be firmly established.

But Demetrius the Laconian,<sup>a</sup> one of the notables 348 of the Epicurean School, used to declare that this sort of objection is easy to dispose of, "for," says he, "when we have established one of the particular proofs (for example, that which deduces that indivisible elements exist, or that void exists) and shown that it is sure, we shall at once have secured, as included in this, the trustworthiness of generic proof; for where there exists the particular of a genus, there we certainly find also the genus of which it is the particular," as we mentioned above.<sup>b</sup> But this, 349 though it seems to be plausible, is in fact impossible. For, in the first place, no one will allow the Laconian to establish his particular proof when his generic proof does not pre-exist; and just as he himself claims that, if he possesses the particular proof, he at once possesses also the generic, so too the Sceptics will claim that, to gain credence for the particular, its genus must first be proved. And, what is more, even 350 if they allow him to do this (I mean, to establish a certain particular proof in order to confirm the generic), some of the kindred Schools will not stay quiet, but will overturn whatever proof he produces as trustworthy, and he will have a large host of men who refuse to allow its acceptance. For instance, if he takes the proof concerning atoms, a countless number will contradict him; if that concerning void, a vast crowd will object; and so likewise with the proof concerning images.<sup>c</sup> And even though the 351 Sceptics may concur ever so much with his choice, he will be unable to establish a single one of his proofs owing to the conflict of the Dogmatists.



Ἄλλως τε τίνα ποτὲ καὶ λέγει βεβαίαν ἕξειν  
 εἰδικήν ἀπόδειξιν; ἤτοι γὰρ τὴν αὐτόθεν ἐξ  
 ἀπασῶν ἀρεσκομένην αὐτῷ ἢ τὴν ὁποιαυδηπο-  
 τοῦν ἢ τὴν ἀποδεικνυμένην. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τὴν  
 ἐξ ἀπασῶν ἀρεσκομένην αὐτῷ λαμβάνειν αὐθαδῆς  
 352 καὶ ἀποκληρώσει μᾶλλον εὐικός ἐστίν· εἰ δὲ τὴν  
 ὁποιαοῦν, πάσας θήσει τὰς ἀποδείξεις, τοῦτο  
 μὲν τὰς τῶν Ἐπικουρείων τοῦτο δὲ τὰς τῶν  
 στωικῶν καὶ ἤδη περιπατητικῶν ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἰ  
 δὲ τὴν ἀποδεικνυμένην, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· εἰ γὰρ  
 ἀποδείκνυται ζητεῖται, καὶ ζητουμένη οὐκ ἂν εἴη  
 πιστὴ ἀλλὰ τῶν βεβαιωσόντων δεομένη. οὐκ ἄρα  
 δυνατὸν ἐστὶ μίαν τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἀποδείξεων ἔχειν  
 353 πιστήν. καὶ μὴν τὰ λήμματα ἧς λέγει ἀπο-  
 δείξεως ὁ Λάκων ἤτοι ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἀπιστά  
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀναμφισβήτητά ἐστὶ καὶ πιστά. ἀλλ' εἰ  
 μὲν ἀμφισβητεῖται καὶ ἀπιστά ἐστίν, πάντως καὶ  
 ἢ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἀπόδειξις ἀπιστος γενήσεται πρὸς τὴν  
 τινος κατασκευήν. τὸ δὲ πιστά αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ  
 354 ἀναμφισβήτητα εὐχὴ μᾶλλον ἐστὶν ἢ ἀλήθεια. εἰ  
 γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ἤτοι αἰσθητά ἐστὶν ἢ νοητά,  
 ὀφείλει καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἤτοι  
 αἰσθητά εἶναι ἢ νοητά. ἐάν τε δὲ αἰσθητά ἐάν τε  
 νοητά ἢ, ἐζήτῃται. τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητά ἢ ὑπό-  
 κείται τοιαῦτα ὅποια φαίνεται, ἢ κενοπαθήματα  
 ἐστὶ καὶ ἀναπλάσματα τῆς διανοίας, ἢ τινὰ μὲν  
 αὐτῶν σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἔστι, τινὰ δὲ φαίνεται  
 μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ γε καὶ ὑπόκειται. καὶ πάρεστιν  
 ἐπισήμους ἰδεῖν ἄνδρας, τοὺς ἐκάστης στάσεως προ-  
 355 εστῶτας, (διαφωνοῦντας)<sup>1</sup> εἶγε Δημόκριτος μὲν  
 πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν ὑπαρξίν κεκίνηκεν, Ἐπίκουρος δὲ

<sup>1</sup> <διαφωνοῦντας> cf. Kayser.

Besides, what sort of firm particular proof does he  
 say that he will possess? It will be either that one  
 of them all which pleases him of itself, or any one  
 whatsoever, or the one which is being proved. But  
 to take that one out of them all which pleases him is  
 self-willed and choosing at random; and if he takes  
 352 any one whatsoever, he will be adopting all the proofs,  
 on the one hand those of the Epicureans, and on the  
 other those of the Stoics, and of the Peripatetics as  
 well; which is absurd. And if he takes the one  
 which is being proved, it is not a proof; for if it is  
 being proved, it is in question, and being in question  
 it will not be trustworthy but needing things to  
 confirm it. Therefore it is not possible to hold as  
 trustworthy one of the particular proofs.—Moreover, 353  
 the premisses of the proof which the Laconian men-  
 tions are either controverted and untrustworthy or  
 are uncontroverted and trustworthy. But if they  
 are controverted and untrustworthy, the proof also  
 which they compose will certainly be untrustworthy  
 for establishing anything. And that they are trust-  
 worthy and uncontroverted is a vain hope rather than  
 the truth. For if all existing things are either sensible  
 354 or intelligible, the premisses also of the proof must be  
 either sensible or intelligible. And whether they be  
 sensible or intelligible, they are subjects of inquiry.  
 For sensible things either really exist such as they  
 appear; or they are empty affections<sup>a</sup> and con-  
 ceptions of the mind; or some of them not only  
 appear but also exist, while others only appear and  
 do not really exist as well. And one may see notable  
 men, the leaders of every School, (disagreeing,) since 355  
 Democritus threw over all sensible reality, but

<sup>a</sup> Cf. § 213.

πᾶν αἰσθητὸν ἔλεξε βέβαιον εἶναι, ὁ δὲ στωικὸς  
 Ζήνων διαίρει εἰς ἐχρήσατο, ὥστ' ἐὰν ᾗ αἰσθητὰ τὰ  
 λήμματα, διάφωνα ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως δὲ κἄν  
 νοητὰ τυγχάνη· καὶ γὰρ περὶ τούτων, τοῦτο μὲν ἐν  
 τῷ βίῳ τοῦτο δὲ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, πλείστην πάρεστιν  
 356 ἰδεῖν μάχην, ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἀρεσκομένων. εἶτα πρὸς  
 τοῖς λεχθεῖσιν, εἰ πᾶν νοητὸν τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει καὶ  
 πηγὴν τῆς βεβαιώσεως ἐξ αἰσθήσεως, τὰ δὲ δι'  
 αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζόμενα, ὡς ἐπελογισάμεθα, διά-  
 φωνά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν,  
 ὥστε καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἐξ ὁποτέρας  
 ἂν ᾗ μοίρας, ἄπιστά ἐστι καὶ ἀβέβαια. διὰ δὲ  
 τοῦτο καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις οὐ πιστή.  
 357 Καὶ ἵνα καθολικώτερον εἴπωμεν, τὰ λήμματα  
 φαινόμενά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ φαινόμενα ἐζήτῃται εἰ  
 ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ ζητούμενα οὐκ αὐτόθεν ἐστὶ  
 λήμματα, ἀλλὰ ὀφείλει διὰ τίνος βεβαιωθῆναι. τὸ  
 οὖν φαινόμενον ὅτι ὅποιον φαίνεται καὶ ὑπόκειται,  
 358 διὰ τίνος ἔχομεν παραστήσαι; ἢ γὰρ δι' ἀδήλου  
 πράγματος πάντως ἢ διὰ φαινομένου. ἀλλὰ τὸ  
 μὲν δι' ἀδήλου ἄτοπον· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέχει τὸ  
 ἄδηλον τοῦ δύνασθαι τι ἐκκαλύπτειν ὡς καὶ ἀνά-  
 359 παλιν αὐτὸ δεῖσθαι τοῦ παραστήσοντος. διὰ φαινο-  
 μένου δὲ πολλῶ ἄτοπώτερον· αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι  
 τὸ ζητούμενον, καὶ οὐδὲν τῶν ζητουμένων ἑαυτοῦ  
 βεβαιωτικόν. ἀμήχανον ἄρα τὰ φαινόμενα κατα-  
 στήσασθαι, ἵνα καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὕτως ἔχωμεν  
 360 πιστήν. ἀλλὰ τὰ φαινόμενα, φασὶν οἱ δογ-  
 ματικοί, πάντως δεῖ τιθέναι, πρῶτον ὅτι οὐδὲν

\* *i.e.* he regarded some sensibles as real, but rejected  
 others, *cf.* § 10 *supra*. For Democritus *cf.* § 6; for Epicurus,  
 §§ 8 f. <sup>b</sup> *Cf.* § 58.

Epicurus declared that every sensible thing has stable  
 existence, while Zeno the Stoic employed a distinction<sup>a</sup>;  
 so that if the premisses are sensible, they are matters  
 of dispute.—So likewise if they are intelligible; for  
 concerning these also one may see a vast deal of  
 conflict amongst ordinary folk on the one hand, and  
 amongst philosophers on the other, as men's tastes  
 differ. And further, in addition to what has been said, 356  
 if every intelligible thing derives its origin and source  
 of confirmation from sensation,<sup>b</sup> and the things made  
 known through sense are, as we have argued, disput-  
 able, the intelligibles also will necessarily be of the  
 same sort; so that the premisses, too, of the proof, to  
 whichever class they belong, are untrustworthy and  
 unsure. And because of this, proof also is not trust-  
 worthy.

To speak more generally, premisses are things 357  
 apparent, and it is a question whether things apparent  
 really exist; and things questioned are not at once  
 (accepted) premisses but must be confirmed by some-  
 thing. By what means, then, can we establish that  
 the apparent thing is really such as it appears? 358  
 Either, certainly, by means of a non-evident fact or by  
 means of an apparent one. But to do so by means of  
 a non-evident fact is absurd; for the non-evident is  
 so far from being able to reveal anything that, on the  
 contrary, it is itself in need of something to establish  
 it. And to do so by means of an apparent fact is 359  
 much more absurd; for it is itself the thing in question,  
 and nothing that is in question is capable of confirming  
 itself. It is not feasible, therefore, to establish things  
 apparent, in order, by this means, to have proof made  
 trustworthy.—“But,” say the Dogmatists, “one must 360  
 certainly posit things apparent, because, firstly, we

ἔχομεν πιστότερον αὐτῶν, εἴθ' ὅτι ὁ κινῶν αὐτὰ λόγος αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ περιτρέπεται. ἤτοι γὰρ φάσει μόνον χρώμενος ταῦτα ἀναιρεῖ ἢ φαινόμενοις ἢ μὴ φαινόμενοις. ἀλλὰ φάσει μὲν χρώμενος ἀπιστός ἐστίν· ῥᾶδιον γὰρ τὴν ἀντικειμένην ἐκ-  
 361 θέσθαι φάσιν. εἰ δὲ μὴ φαινόμενοις, πάλιν ἀπιστος θέλων διὰ μὴ φαινόμενων τὰ φαινόμενα περιτρέπειν. εἰ δὲ φαινόμενοις κινεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα, πάντως πιστοῖς, καὶ οὕτως αὐτόθεν ἔσται τὰ φαινόμενα πιστά. ὥστε ὁ λόγος καὶ κατ' αὐτῶν χωρεῖ.<sup>1</sup>  
 362 ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅτι μὲν τὰ φαινόμενα, εἴτε αἰσθητὰ εἴη εἴτε νοητά, πλείστης γέμει μάχης τῆς τε παρὰ φιλοσόφους καὶ τῆς παρὰ τῷ βίῳ, πρότερον ἐπελογοσάμεθα· τὸ δὲ νῦν ἔχον πρὸς τὴν ἐκκειμένην διαστολὴν ἐκείνο ῥητέον ὅτι οὔτε φάσει χρώμενοι κινούμεν τὰ φαινόμενα οὔτε μὴ φαινόμενοις, συγκρίνοντες δὲ αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς. εἰ μὲν γὰρ σύμφωνα εὐρίσκετο τὰ αἰσθητὰ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ τὰ νοητὰ τοῖς νοητοῖς καὶ ἐναλλάξ, ἴσως ἂν παρεχωροῦμεν  
 363 αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα τυγχάνειν ὅποια φαίνεται· νῦν δὲ ἐν τῇ συγκρίσει ἀνεπίκριτον εὐρίσκοντες μάχην, καθ' ἣν τὰ ἕτερα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκβάλλεται, τῷ μήτε πάντα θείναι δύνασθαι διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην μάχην μήτε τινὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἰσοσθένειαν, μήτε πόντ' ἐκβαλεῖν διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν τοῦ φαίνεσθαι  
 364 πιστότερον, ἐπὶ τὸ ἐπέχειν κατηντήσαμεν. ἀλλ' ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φαινόμενων τὴν πίστιν λαμβάνων ἐν τῷ ταῦτα κινεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συνεκβάλλει. ὅπερ

<sup>1</sup> χωρεῖ N: χῥῆται cet., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> i.e. against the Sceptics (the "ourselves" of the next sentence).

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 354 ff.

have nothing more trustworthy than they, and, next, because the argument which attacks them is overthrown by itself. For it destroys them by employing either assertion only, or things apparent, or things not apparent. But if it employs assertion, it is untrustworthy; for it is easy to put forward the opposite assertion. And if it employs things not apparent, once again it is untrustworthy, since it attempts to overthrow apparent things by things not apparent. And if it attacks things apparent by things apparent, these must certainly be trustworthy, and in this way, too, the things apparent will at once be trustworthy. So that the argument goes against them.<sup>a</sup> But as to our-  
 362 selves—that the question whether things apparent are sensible or intelligible is one fraught with contention both amongst philosophers and amongst ordinary folk we have already argued.<sup>b</sup> So, for the moment, in reply to the dilemma set forth, we must assert that we do not attack things apparent by employing either assertion or things not apparent, but by comparing them amongst themselves. For if sensibles had been found to be in accord with sensibles and intelligibles with intelligibles, and conversely, we might probably have conceded that they are such as they appear; but now, because on comparing them we find insoluble  
 363 contradictions, through which some are expelled by others; and because we are unable either to posit all owing to this contradiction, or to posit some owing to the equipollence of the opposites, or to reject all owing to our having nothing more trustworthy than appearance; we have fallen back on suspension of judgement.—But, (say they,) the argument which de-  
 364 rives its credibility from things apparent, in the act of attacking these wrecks itself as well. But this is

ἦν συναρπαζόντων τὸ ζητούμενον ἀνδρῶν. οὐ γὰρ  
 ὁ λόγος ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων βεβαιούται, ἀλλὰ τὰ  
 365 φαινόμενα ἐκ τοῦ λόγου κρατύνεται. καὶ εἰκότως·  
 εἰ γὰρ διαφωνία ἔστι τινῶν μὲν λεγόντων αὐτὰ  
 ὑποκείσθαι τινῶν δὲ μηδαμῶς, ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ὀφείλει  
 κατασταθῆναι. τούτου τε μάρτυρές εἰσιν οὐκ ἄλλοι  
 τινές ἢ οἱ ἑτερόδοξοι, λόγῳ [δ']<sup>1</sup> ἀποδείξαι θέλοντες  
 ὅτι ἀληθῆ ἔστι τὰ φαινόμενα. καὶ ἄλλως, πόθεν ὅτι  
 366 τοῖς φαινομένοις δεῖ πιστεῦναι; οὐκ ἄρα<sup>2</sup> τὰ φαινόμενα  
 τοῦ λόγου ἄλλ' ὁ λόγος τῶν φαινομένων βεβαιότερός  
 ἔστιν, ὃ γε καὶ ἑαυτὸν κάκεινα πιστούμενος.

Εἰ δὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἔστιν ἄδηλα,  
 ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀδηλῶν συνεστὼς  
 πάλιν ἄδηλον, ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν ἀδηλος καὶ ἐπιζητεῖ  
 τὸ παραστήσον αὐτῆς τὴν πίστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστιν  
 ἀποδείξεως.

367 Ἄλλ' οὐ δεῖ, φασί, πάντων ἀποδείξιν αἰτεῖν, τινὰ  
 δὲ καὶ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, ἐπεὶ οὐ δυνήσεται  
 προβαίνειν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δοθῇ τι πιστόν  
 ἐξ αὐτοῦ τυγχάνειν. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν καὶ ἡμεῖς  
 ἐροῦμεν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον τὰς ἐκεῖνων  
 δογματολογίας προβαίνειν, πλασματώδεις ὑπ-  
 368 ἀρχούσας. εἶτα καὶ ποῖ προβήσονται; τῶν γὰρ  
 φαινομένων αὐτὸ μόνον παριστάντων ὅτι φαίνεται,  
 τὸ δ' ὅτι καὶ ὑπόκειται μηκέτι προσισχυόντων  
 διδάσκειν, τιθέσθω καὶ τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως  
 ὅτι φαίνεται, καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά ὁμοίως. ὦδε δὲ οὐ<sup>3</sup>  
 συναχθήσεται τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ οὐ παραχθήσεται  
 ἡ ἀλήθεια, μενόντων ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ψιλῆς φάσεως καὶ

<sup>1</sup> [δ'] secl. ego (ante λόγῳ lacunam notat Mutsch.).

<sup>2</sup> οὐκ ἄρα Heintz: οὐ γὰρ V, Bekk. (οὐ τὰ φ. γὰρ cet. mss.).

<sup>3</sup> δὲ οὐ N: γὰρ cet., Bekk.

the plea of men who hastily assume the point at issue. For it is not the argument that is established by the things apparent, but the things apparent that are confirmed by the argument. And naturally so: for 365 if they are disputed (some saying that they really exist, some that they do not), they must be established by the argument. And those who bear witness to this are none other than those of the rival School who try to prove by argument that apparent things are true. And besides, on what grounds ought one to trust things apparent? Instead, therefore, of appar- 366 ent things being more certain than the argument, the argument is more certain than apparent things since it supports both itself and them.

Now if the premisses of the proof are non-evident and the conclusion also non-evident, and again if that which is composed of non-evident things is non-evident, then proof is non-evident and requires something else to support it, which is not the character of proof.

But, say they, one ought not to ask for proof of 367 everything, but accept some things by assumption, since the argument will not be able to go forward unless it be granted that there is something which is of itself trustworthy. But we shall reply, firstly, that there is no necessity for their dogmatic argumentations to go forward, fictitious as they are. And, 368 further, to what conclusion will they proceed? For as apparent things merely establish the fact that they appear, and are not capable also of showing that they subsist, let us assume also that the premisses of the proof appear, and the conclusion likewise. But even so the matter in question will not be deduced, nor will the truth be introduced, so long as we abide by our

τοῦ οἰκείου πάθους. τὸ δ' ὅτι οὐ μόνον φαίνεται ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπόκειται θέλει παριστᾶν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶ μὴ τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν ἀρκουμένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ δυνατόν συναρπάζειν ἐσπουδακῶτων.

369 Καθόλου τε ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἢ ἀπόδειξις μόνον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως προκόπτειν ἀξιούται τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλη σχεδὸν φιλοσοφία, πειρασόμεθα κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὀλίγα διεξελεθῆναι πρὸς τοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως

370 τινα λαμβάνοντας. ταῦτα γὰρ ἂ φασιν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως λαμβάνειν, εἰ μὲν πιστά ἐστι διὰ τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως εἰληφθαι, πιστὰ φανήσεται καὶ τὰναντία τούτοις ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντα, καὶ ταύτη θήσομεν τὰ μαχόμενα· εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων, φημί δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων, πρὸς πίστιν ἢ ὑπόθεσιν ἀσθενῆς, ἀσθενῆς καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων γενήσεται, ὥστε οὐδέτερα πάλιν

371 ὑποθησόμεθα. τοῦτό τε δ' ὑποτίθεται τις, ἥτοι ἀληθές ἐστι καὶ τοιοῦτον οἶον αὐτὸ ὑποτίθεται, ἢ ψεῦδος. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀληθές, ἑαυτὸν ἀδικεῖ ὁ ὑποτιθέμενος τοῦτο, εἶγε δυνάμενος αὐτὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ἀλλ' αὐτόθεν λαμβάνειν ὡς ἀληθές εἰς πρᾶγμα συμφεύγει ὑποψίας πλήρες, εἰς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, αἰτούμενος τὸ αὐτόθεν ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ ψεῦδος ἐστίν, οὐκέτι αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ τὴν φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων ἀδικεῖ ὁ τῇ ὑποθέσει χρώμενος, τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀξίῶν αὐτῷ αὐτόθεν συγχωρηθῆναι ὡς ὄν, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος

372 βιαζόμενος λαμβάνειν ὡς ἀληθές. καὶ μὴν εἴπερ πᾶν τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἀξιοῖ τις βέβαιον εἶναι, ὅλην συγχέει τὴν φιλόσοφον ζήτησιν. εὐθέως γὰρ ὑποθησόμεθα τὰ

bare assertion and our own affection. And the attempt to establish that apparent things not merely appear but also subsist is the act of men who are not satisfied with what is necessary for practical purposes but are eager also to assume hastily what is possible.

And in general—seeing that it is maintained by 369 the Dogmatists that not only proof but practically the whole of philosophy proceeds from assumption—we shall endeavour so far as possible to make answer briefly to those who accept a thing by assumption. If the things which they say they accept by assumption 370 are trustworthy because accepted by assumption, their opposites also will appear trustworthy when accepted by assumption, and thus we shall be positing things that conflict; but if in the case of the latter—the opposites, I mean—the assumption is too weak to support them, it will be too weak also in the case of the former; so that, once again, we shall assume 371 neither.—Further, that which a man assumes is either true and such as he assumes it to be, or it is false. And if it is true, he that assumes it is wronging himself, seeing that, when it was possible for him not to postulate it but to take it as true of itself, he has recourse to a thing that is gravely suspected—to assumption, that is—when he postulates what is true of itself. But if it is false, the man who employs assumption is no longer wronging himself, but the real nature of the things, when he claims that the non-existent should of itself be conceded to him as 372 existent, and compels one to accept what is false as true.—Again, if a man maintains that everything which follows from the things accepted by assumption is certain, he confounds the whole of philosophic inquiry. For we shall assume, for instance, that 3 is

τρια τέσσαρα εἶναι, καὶ συνάξομεν ὡς ἀκολουθοῦν  
 τὸ τὰ ἐξ ὀκτώ ὑπάρχειν· ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές τὸ  
 373 τὰ ἐξ ὀκτώ<sup>1</sup> ὑπάρχειν. εἰ δὲ λέγοιεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς  
 ὅτι ἀτοπὸν ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτο (δεῖ γὰρ βέβαιοι εἶναι  
 τὸ ὑποτεθέν, ἵνα συνομολογηθῆ καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν  
 τούτῳ), καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ἀκούσονται, [τὸ] μηδὲν  
 αὐτόθεν ἀξιούντων λαμβάνειν, πᾶν δὲ τὸ τιθέμενον  
 374 μετ' ἀκριβείας τίθεσθαι. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ τὸ  
 ὑποτιθέμενον, ἢ ὑποτίθεται, βέβαιον ἔστι καὶ  
 ἀσφαλές, μὴ ταῦτα ὑποτιθέσθωσαν οἱ δογματικῶς  
 φιλοσοφούντες τὰ ἐξ ὧν συνάγουσι τὸ ἀδηλον, ἀλλ'  
 αὐτὸ τὸ ἀδηλον, τουτέστι μὴ τὰ λήμματα τῆς  
 ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν. ἀλλὰ κἂν μυριάκις  
 τοῦθ' ὑποθῶνται, οὐκ ἔστι πιστὸν διὰ τὴν ἀδηλόγητα  
 καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ζήτησιν. φανερόν δὴ πούθεν ὅτι,  
 οὐδὲ ἂν τὰ λήμματα τῆς ἀποδείξεως δίχα ἀπο-  
 δείξεως αἰτήσωνται, ἀνύουσί τι πρὸς πίστιν διὰ τὸ  
 καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἀμφισβητησίμων ὑπάρχειν.  
 375 Νῆ Δία, ἀλλ' εἰώθασιν ὑποτυγχάνοντες λέγειν  
 ὅτι πίστις ἔστι τοῦ ἐρρῶσθαι τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τὸ  
 ἀληθές εὐρίσκεσθαι ἐκεῖνο τὸ τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως  
 ληφθεῖσιν ἐπιφερόμενον· εἰ γὰρ τὸ τούτοις ἀκολου-  
 θοῦν ἔστιν ὑγιές, κἀκεῖνα οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ ἀληθῆ καὶ  
 376 ἀναμφίλεκτα καθέστηκεν. καὶ πόθεν ἔχομεν, ἐρεῖ  
 τις, δεῖξαι ὅτι τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τῷ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως  
 ληφθέντι ἀληθές ἐστιν; ἀρὰ γε ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τῶν  
 λημμάτων οἷς ἀκολουθεῖ; ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὐκ  
 ἂν εἴη· ἀδηλον γὰρ ἔστιν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν λημμάτων;  
 οὐδ' οὕτως· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔστιν ἡ μάχη, καὶ δεῖ  
 377 αὐτὰ<sup>2</sup> πρότερον κατασταθῆναι. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἔστω

<sup>1</sup> τὸ . . . ὀκτώ MSS.: τῷ . . . δις τρία Fabr., Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> τούτων . . . αὐτὰ Heintz: τούτου . . . αὐτὸ MSS., Bekk.

4, and deduce as a consequence that 6 is 8; and this  
 —that 6 is 8—will be true. And if they should say 373  
 to us that such a case is absurd (for the thing assumed  
 must be certain, in order that its consequence also  
 may be admitted), they shall hear us, in reply, main-  
 taining that nothing should be accepted of itself and  
 everything affirmed should be affirmed with precision.  
 —Furthermore, if the thing assumed, in that it is 374  
 assumed, is certain and sure, let the dogmatic philo-  
 sophers assume, not the things from which they de-  
 duce the non-evident, but the non-evident itself—  
 that is to say, not the premisses of the proof but the  
 conclusion. But even were they to assume this ten  
 thousand times, it is not trustworthy, owing to its  
 being non-evident and the subject of inquiry. Thus  
 it is, to be sure, apparent that if they postulate the  
 premisses of the proof without proof, they effect  
 nothing in support of it since the premisses them-  
 selves are matters of dispute.

Yes, by Zeus; but they are wont to interrupt with 375  
 the reply that a guarantee of the strength of the  
 assumption is the fact that what is concluded by the  
 premisses accepted by assumption is found to be true;  
 for if what follows from the premisses is sound, the pre-  
 misses from which they follow are true and indisput-  
 able. But, someone will say, how can we show that 376  
 what follows from the premiss accepted by assump-  
 tion is true? By means of itself or by means of the  
 premisses from which it follows? But it will not be by  
 means of itself, for it is non-evident. Is it, then, by  
 means of the premisses? Not in this way either; for  
 it is about these that the conflict exists, and it is they  
 that must first be established. Notwithstanding, 377

γε καὶ τὸ ἀκολουθοῦν τοῖς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθεῖσιν ἀληθές· οὐ μὴν παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντα γενήσεται ἀληθῆ. εἰ μὲν γὰρ μόνον κατ' αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀληθεί εἶπετο ἀληθές, προὔβαινε (ἀν)<sup>1</sup> ὁ λόγος, ὡς<sup>2</sup> τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦντος τῷ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ληφθέντι ὄντος ἀληθοῦς γίνεσθαι τὸ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως  
378 ληφθὲν ἀληθές· νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ ψεύδει ψεύδος, φασίν, ἀκολουθεῖ καὶ ψεύδει ἀληθές, οὐ κατ' ἀνάγκην, εἰ τὸ λήγόν ἐστιν ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ ἡγούμενον ἔσται ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐνδέχεται τοῦ λήγοντος ἀληθοῦς ὄντος τὸ ἡγούμενον ὑπάρχειν ψεύδος.

Ἄλλο δὲ οὖν παρέργον, ὡς φασί, καὶ παρενθήκη<sup>3</sup> τοσαῦτα εἰρήσθω περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως κατάρχεσθαι τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἀκολουθῶν δ'  
379 ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι καὶ εἰς τὸν δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπον ἐμπέπτωκεν, ὃ ἐστὶν ἀπορώτερον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀδήλων ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπόδειξις προκατεστησάμεθα, πᾶν δὲ ἀδελον ἐπικρίσεως δεῖται, τὸ δὲ ἐπικρίσεως δεόμενον κριτηρίου χρήζει τοῦ παραστήσοντος εἴτε ὑγιές ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ τοιοῦτον· ὡσπερ γὰρ τὸ μετρηθῆναι ὀφείλον οὐ χωρὶς μέτρου μετρεῖσθαι πέφυκε καὶ πᾶν τὸ κανονιζόμενον οὐ χωρὶς κανόνος κανονίζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κρινόμενον οὐ χωρὶς κριτηρίου  
380 δοκιμάζεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τὸ εἰ ἔστι κριτήριον ἐζήτηται, τῶν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι φαιμένων τῶν δὲ εἶναι, τῶν δὲ ἐν ἐποχῇ τοῦτο φυλαξάντων, πάλιν δεήσει τὸ ὅτι ἔστι κριτήριον ἀποδειχθῆναι διὰ τίνος ἀποδείξεως. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἵν' ἔχωμεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν

<sup>1</sup> <ἀν> Kayser.

<sup>2</sup> ὡς Kochalsky: καὶ mss., Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> παρενθήκη Kochalsky: παρενθήκης mss., Bekk.

let it be granted that what follows from the assumed premisses is true; all the same, the assumed premisses will not on this account become true. For if, according to them, the true had followed the true only, the argument would have gone forward, so that the assumed premiss would be true since the consequence of the premiss is true; but as it is, since they  
378 assert that both falsehood follows from falsehood and truth from falsehood,<sup>a</sup> it is not necessary that if the consequent is true the antecedent also should be true, but it is possible for the antecedent to be false though the consequent is true.

Let thus much be said, then,—as “a bywork of our journey,” as they say,<sup>b</sup> and an appendix—regarding the wrongfulness of founding proof on assumption. Next one must point out that it also  
379 involves itself in circular reasoning,<sup>c</sup> which is still more hopeless. For we have already established that proof is a non-evident thing, and every non-evident thing requires scrutiny, and what requires scrutiny needs a criterion to determine whether it is valid or not; for just as a thing which needs to be measured cannot be measured without a measure, and nothing that is being ruled is ruled without a rule, so also what is being scrutinized is not tested without a criterion. Since, then, the existence of a criterion  
380 also is questioned,<sup>d</sup> some declaring that none exists, others that it does exist, and others again suspending judgement about it, the fact that a criterion exists will, in turn, have to be proved by means of some proof. But in order to have the proof confirmed, we

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 113, 114.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. Eurip. *Electra*, 509 ἦλθον γὰρ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τάφον παρέργ' ἄλλο.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 183.

<sup>d</sup> Cf. i. 47 ff.

πιστήν, ἀναστρέφειν ἐπὶ τὸ κριτήριον δεήσει, καὶ οὕτω μήτε ταύτην πρὸ ἐκείνου ἔχοντας πιστήν μήτε ἐκεῖνο πρὸ ταύτης βέβαιοι ὁμολογεῖν τὴν περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἐποχὴν.

381 Ἐνέσται οὖν σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τῆς ἐπινοίας κινεῖν τὴν ἀποδείξιν. καίτοι εἰ ἐπεισοῖτο, οὐ πάντως ἂν ὑπῆρχεν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπερ ἐπινοεῖται μὲν, ὡς ἔφην, οὐ μετέχει δέ τινος ὑπάρξεως. νῦν δὲ ὅταν καὶ ἡ ἐπίνοια εὐρίσκηται ἀδύνατος ἢ τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ἀναμφιλέκτως καὶ ἡ τῆς ὑπάρξεως  
382 ἐλπίς ἀποκόπτεται. δυοῖν οὖν οὐσῶν ἀποδείξεων, τῆς τε γενικῆς καὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς, τὴν μὲν γενικὴν αὐτόθεν εὐρήσομεν ἀνεπινόητον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν οἶδε γενικὴν ἀπόδειξιν, οὐδὲ διὰ ταύτης πώποτε τι  
383 δεδύνηται παραστήσαι. καὶ ἄλλως ἄξιον πυθέσθαι πότερον λήμματα ἔχει καὶ ἐπιφορὰν ἢ τοιαύτη ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει, πῶς ἔτι δύναται νοηθῆναι ἀποδείξεις, εἴγε ἡ πάσης ἀποδείξεως νόησις οὐ χωρὶς τῶν αὐτῆς λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς συνίσταται; εἰ δὲ ἔχει ἐκάτερα, τουτέστι τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, εἰδικὴ τίς ἐστίν  
384 ἀπόδειξις· εἰ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύμενον καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀποδεικνύον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν μίαν εἶναι τῶν εἰδικῶν. ἦν δὲ γε ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος οὐ περὶ τῆς εἰδικῆς ἀλλὰ τῆς γενικῆς·  
385 οὐκ ἄρα ἐπινοεῖται ἡ γενικὴ ἀπόδειξις. καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ γε ἡ εἰδική. ἐλέγετο γὰρ τοῖς δογματικοῖς ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος εἶναι κατὰ συναγωγὴν διὰ τινῶν φαινομένων ἐκκαλύπτων τι ἄδηλον. ἦτοι οὖν τὸ πᾶν σύστημα, τουτέστι τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων

\* Cf. § 334.   <sup>b</sup> With §§ 383-384 cf. § 345; P.H. ii. 172.

<sup>c</sup> With §§ 385-390 cf. P.H. ii. 173-176.

shall have to turn back to the criterion, and thus, as we neither have the latter trustworthy before the former nor the former certain before the latter, we must agree to suspension of judgement about both.

In addition to what has been said, it will be possible 381 also to attack proof on the ground of its conception. Though even were it conceived, it would not necessarily be existent; for, as I said,<sup>a</sup> there are many things which are conceived but have no share in real existence. But as it is, when even the conception of proof is found to be impossible, the hope also of its existence is cut off beyond dispute. As, then, there 382 are two kinds of proof, the generic and the particular, we shall find the generic to be of itself inconceivable; for none of us knows generic proof nor has ever yet been able to establish anything by means of it. Besides, one may well ask whether this kind of proof 383 has, or has not, premisses and a conclusion.<sup>b</sup> And if it has not, how can it still be conceived as a proof, seeing that no conception of any proof is framed apart from its premisses and conclusion? And if it has both—that is to say, the premisses and the conclusion,—it is a particular proof; for if everything that is proved 384 and everything that proves belongs to the class of particulars, it is necessary that proof also should be one of the particulars. But our argument was not concerned with the particular but with the generic; therefore generic proof is not conceived.—Nor, in fact, 385 is particular proof.<sup>c</sup> For proof was stated by the Dogmatists to be “an argument which reveals something non-evident through deduction by means of certain apparent things.”<sup>d</sup> Either, then, the whole structure—that is, the thing conceived as a compound

<sup>d</sup> Cf. §§ 301 ff.; P.H. ii. 135 ff.



καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς νοούμενον, ἀπόδειξις ἦν, ἢ τὰ μὲν  
 λήμματα μόνον ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἢ δὲ ἐπιφορὰ τὸ  
 ἀποδεικνύμενον. ὁπότερον δ' ἂν εἴπωσι τούτων,  
 386 σαλεύεται ἢ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἐπίνοια. εἰ μὲν γὰρ  
 τὸ σύνθετον ἔκ τε τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς  
 ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις, ἀνάγκη ἄδηλόν τι περιέχουσιν τὴν  
 ἀπόδειξιν εὐθύς ἄδηλον εἶναι, τοιαύτην δὲ καθ-  
 εστηκυῖαν δεῖσθαι τινος ἀποδείξεως, ὅπερ ἄτοπον.  
 τοῖνυν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἔκ τῶν λημμάτων καὶ τῆς  
 ἐπιφορᾶς συνεστῶς ἀπόδειξις, εἴγε οὔτε ἄδηλον  
 οὔτε ἀποδείξεως δεομένην νοούμεν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν.  
 387 ἔτι ἢ ἀπόδειξις τῶν πρὸς τι ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ εἰς  
 ἑαυτὴν νεύει, οὐδὲ κατὰ περιγραφὴν νενόηται, ἀλλ'  
 ἔχει τι οὐ ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις. εἰ οὖν ἢ ἐπιφορὰ ἐμ-  
 περιέληται αὐτῇ, πᾶν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τι ἐκτός ἐστιν  
 ἐκείνου τοῦ πρὸς ᾧ λέγεται πρὸς τι, πρὸς οὐδὲν  
 ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις νοουμένη, ἐπεὶπερ ἢ ἐπιφορὰ  
 388 ἐμπεριείχετο αὐτῇ. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἑτέραν ὑποστησώ-  
 μεθα ἐπιφορὰν ἐκτός, πρὸς ἣν ἢ ἀπόδειξις νοηθή-  
 σεται, δύο γενήσονται ἐπιφοραὶ κατὰ τὸν τόπον,  
 μία μὲν ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀποδείξει περιεχομένη, δευτέρα δὲ  
 ἢ ἐκτός, πρὸς ἣν νοεῖται ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἄτοπον δέ  
 γε μίας ἀποδείξεως δύο λέγειν ἐπιφορᾶς· οὐκ ἄρα  
 τὸ ἔκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς συνεστῶς ἐστὶν  
 389 ἀπόδειξις. λείπεται τοῖνυν τὸ ἔκ τῶν λημμάτων  
 λέγειν μόνον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι. ὅπερ ἦν εὐθες·  
 τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα  
 ἐλλιπὲς καὶ ἀδιανοήτον, εἴγε οὐθεὶς φησι τῶν νοῦν  
 ἐχόντων τὸ τοιοῦτον κατ' ἰδίαν " εἰ ἐστὶ κίνησις,  
 ἐστὶ κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐστὶ κίνησις " ἢ λόγον εἶναι  
 390 ἢ διανοίαν τινα σώζειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε τὸ ἔκ τῶν  
 λημμάτων καὶ [τὸ ἔκ] τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς σύνθετον νοεῖ-

of the premisses and the conclusion—is proof, or the  
 premisses only are proof, and the conclusion is what  
 is proved. But whichever of these they declare for,  
 the conception of proof is upset. For if, on the one 386  
 hand, the compound of premisses and conclusion is  
 proof, proof must at once, of necessity, be non-  
 evident as containing something non-evident; and  
 being such, it must need a proof, which is absurd.  
 So then the compound of premisses and conclusion  
 will not be proof, since we conceive of proof as neither  
 non-evident nor needing proof.—Again, proof is a 387  
 relative thing; for it does not refer to itself, nor is it  
 conceived as isolated, but it has something whereof  
 it is a proof. If, then, its conclusion is included  
 within it, whereas every relative thing is outside of  
 the thing whereto it is said to be in relation, then  
 proof is conceived as relative to nothing, since its con-  
 clusion is contained within it. If, however, we assume 388  
 another conclusion outside, in relation to which the  
 proof will be conceived, there will then be two con-  
 clusions in the argument—first, the conclusion in-  
 cluded in the proof, and secondly the outside one,  
 as relative to which proof is conceived. But it is  
 absurd to state two conclusions of one proof. Proof,  
 therefore, is not the compound of premisses and con-  
 clusion.—It only remains, then, to declare that proof 389  
 is composed of the premisses only, which is silly.  
 For then it is not even an argument at all, but a defective  
 thing and meaningless, since no sensible man asserts  
 that a combination such as this—" If motion exists,  
 void exists; but in fact motion exists"—when taken  
 by itself either is an argument or contains any mean-  
 ing. If, therefore, proof is conceived neither as the 390

ται ἀπόδειξις μήτε τὸ ἐκ τῶν λημμάτων μόνον, ἀνεπινοήτος ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

- 391 Ἔτι ἢ ἀποδεικνύουσα ἀπόδειξις ἦτοι πρόδηλος οὐσα προδήλου ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις ἢ ἀδηλος ἀδήλου ἢ ἀδηλος προδήλου ἢ πρόδηλος ἀδήλου· οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι τι ἀπόδειξις. καὶ δὴ πρόδηλος μὲν προδήλου οὐ δύναται ἀποδείξεως ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ γνώριμον καθέστηκεν. ἀδηλος δὲ ἀδήλου πάλιν οὐκ ἂν εἶη ἀπόδειξις, παρόσον αὐτῇ χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ παριστάντος ἀδηλος οὐσα, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρου τινὸς γενήσεται παραστατική.
- 393 ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδὲ ἀδηλος προδήλου. ἀμφοτέρω γὰρ συνδραμεῖται ἄπορα· τό τε γὰρ ἀποδεικνύμενον οὐ δεῖσεται τινος ἀποδείξεως πρόδηλον ὄν, ἢ τε ἀπόδειξις χρεῖαν ἔξει τοῦ καταστήσοντος αὐτὴν ἀδηλος οὐσα. ὥστε οὐδὲ ἀδηλος προδήλου γένοιτ' ἂν ποτε ἀπόδειξις. λείπεται λέγειν ὅτι πρόδηλος ἀδήλου, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ τῶν ἀπόρων ἐτύγχανεν· εἰ γὰρ οὐ τῶν κατὰ περιγραφὴν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοουμένων ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τι, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τι, ὡς ἐδείξαμεν ἐν τῇ περὶ σημείου ζητήσῃ, συγκαταλαμβάνεται ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ συγκαταλαμβανόμενα οὐκ ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἐκκαλύπτεται ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πρόδηλα, οὐκ ἔσται ἢ ἀπόδειξις πρόδηλος ἀδήλου ἀπόδειξις διὰ τὸ κάκεινον συγκαταλαμβανόμενον
- 395 αὐτῇ δι' αὐτοῦ προσπίπτειν. εἰ οὖν μήτε ὡς φαινόμενον φαινόμενον ἐστὶν ἀπόδειξις μήτε ὡς ἀδηλον ἀδήλου μήτε ὡς ἀδηλον φαινόμενον μήτε

compound of premisses and conclusion, nor as that of the premisses only, proof is inconceivable.

Again,<sup>a</sup> the proof that is proving is either a pre-<sup>391</sup> evident proof of a pre-evident thing, or a non-evident of a non-evident, or a non-evident of a pre-evident, or a pre-evident of a non-evident; but it is none of these, as we shall establish; therefore, proof is not anything. Now a proof cannot be a pre-evident one of a pre-<sup>392</sup> evident thing, since the pre-evident has no need of proof, but is known of itself. Nor, again, will a proof be a non-evident one of a non-evident thing, inas-<sup>393</sup> much as, being non-evident, it will itself have need of something that establishes it and will not be capable of establishing any other thing. And in the same way <sup>394</sup> it will not be a non-evident one of a pre-evident thing; for here both difficulties will meet in one; for the thing proved will need no proof, as it is pre-evident, while the proof, being non-evident, will have need of something to establish it. So that a proof could never be a non-evident one of a pre-evident thing. All that is left is to say that it is a pre-evident <sup>394</sup> one of a non-evident thing; and this, too, is doubtful. For if proof is not one of the things conceived as in isolation and absolute,<sup>b</sup> but is one of the relatives, and relatives—as we showed in our inquiry regarding Sign <sup>c</sup>—are apprehended together with one another, and things apprehended together are not revealed by one another but are of themselves pre-evident,—then proof will not be a pre-evident proof of a non-evident thing, owing to the fact that that thing, as apprehended together with the proof, is perceived by means of itself. If, then, proof is neither such a <sup>395</sup> thing as an apparent of an apparent, nor a non-evident of a non-evident, nor a non-evident of an

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 391-395 cf. P.H. ii. 177-179.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 387, 273.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. §§ 174 ff.

ὡς φαινόμενον ἀδήλου, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν.

- 396 Ἀκολουθῶν δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ στωικοὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦσιν ἐξηκριβωκέναι τοὺς ἀποδεικτικούς τρόπους, φέρε καὶ πρὸς τούτους ὀλίγα διεξέλθωμεν, παριστάντες ὅτι τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑποθέσεσιν αὐτῶν τάχα μὲν πάντα ἐστὶν
- 397 ἀκατάληπτα, ἰδιαίτερον δὲ ἢ ἀπόδειξις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ κατάληψις,<sup>1</sup> ὡς ἔστι παρ' αὐτῶν ἀκούειν, καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας συγκατάθεσις, ἣτις διπλοῦν ἔοικεν εἶναι πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν τι ἔχει ἀκούσιον τὸ δὲ ἐκούσιον καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἡμετέρα κρίσει κείμενον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ φαντασιωθῆναι ἀβούλητον ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ πάσχοντι ἔκειτο ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ φαντασιοῦντι τὸ οὕτωςι διατεθῆναι, οἷον λευκαντικῶς λευκοῦ ὑποπεσόντος χρώματος ἢ γλυκαντικῶς γλυκέος τῇ γεύσει προσαχθέντος· τὸ δὲ συγκαταθέσθαι τούτῳ τῷ κινήματι ἔκειτο ἐπὶ τῷ
- 398 παραδεχομένῳ τὴν φαντασίαν. ὥστε ἡ κατάληψις προηγουμένην ἔχει τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, ἣς ἐστὶ συγκατάθεσις. ἡ δὲ καταληπτικὴ φαντασία προάγουσαν εἶχε τὴν φαντασίαν, ἣς ἐστὶν εἶδος. φαντασίας γὰρ μὴ οὔσης οὐδὲ καταληπτικῆς ἔστι φαντασία, παρόσον τοῦ γένους μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἔστιν· καὶ καταληπτικῆς μὴ οὔσης φαντασίας οὐδὲ συγκατάθεσις ἔστιν αὐτῆς. τῆς δὲ καταληπτικῆς φαντασίας τῆς συγκαταθέσεως αἰρομένης αἴρεται καὶ ἡ κατάληψις. ἔνθεν, ἂν ἐπιδειχθῇ [διὰ] τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὅτι οὐ δύναται φαντασία γενέσθαι κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, δῆλον ἔσται ὡς οὐδὲ

<sup>1</sup> κατάληψις Hirzel: ἀπόδειξις mss., Bekk.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 227.

apparent, nor an apparent of a non-evident, and besides these there is no other possibility, one must declare that proof is nothing.

As a sequel to what has been said, seeing that the 396 Stoics seem to have elaborated most precisely the modes of proof, come and let us argue the matter briefly in reply to them, and show that, so far as depends on their assumptions, all things probably are non-apprehensible, and more particularly proof. Now apprehension, as one may learn from them, is 397 "assent to the apprehensive presentation"<sup>a</sup>; and this seems to be a twofold thing, and to be partly involuntary, and partly voluntary and dependent on our judgement. For the experience of a presentation is involuntary, and it does not depend on the person affected, but on the cause of the presentation, that he is affected in this particular way—as, for instance, with a sense of whiteness when a white colour presents itself, or with a sense of sweetness when something sweet is offered to his taste; but the act of assenting to this affection lies in the power of the person who receives the presentation. So that apprehension has 398 as its antecedent the apprehensive presentation, to which it is the assent. And the apprehensive presentation has as antecedent the presentation, of which it is a species. For if presentation does not exist, neither does apprehensive presentation exist, inasmuch as when the genus does not exist, the species does not exist either; and if apprehensive presentation does not exist, neither does assent thereto exist. And when assent to the apprehensive presentation is taken away, apprehension also is taken away. Hence, 399 if it be shown that, according to the Stoics, a presentation of proof cannot come into existence, it will be

καταληπτικὴ φαντασία τις ὑποστήσεται τῆς ἀποδείξεως, ταύτης δὲ μὴ οὔσης οὐδ' ἢ συγκατάθεσις αὐτῆς, ὅπερ ἦν ἡ κατάληψις.

400 Ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδείξεως φαντασία κατὰ τοὺς στωικούς, δέικνυται πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τοῦ κοινότερον παρ' αὐτοῖς διαπεφωνῆσθαι τὸ τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἡ φαντασία· μέχρι γὰρ τοῦ τύπωσιν αὐτὴν λέγειν ἐν ἡγεμονικῷ συμφωνήσαντες περὶ αὐτῆς διαφέρονται τῆς τυπώσεως, Κλεάνθους μὲν κυρίως ἀκούοντος τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς νοουμένην, Χρυσίππου δὲ καταχρηστικώτερον ἀντὶ τῆς ἀλ-  
401 λουώσεως. εἰ δὴ καὶ κατ' ἐκείνους αὐτοὺς ἡ τύπωσις μέχρι τοῦ νῦν οὐχ ὁμολογεῖται, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν ἄχρι δεῦρο διαφωνουμένην ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάσσεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐξηρητημένην αὐτῆς  
402 ἀπόδειξιν. εἶτα δεδόσθω καὶ εἶναι τὴν φαντασίαν ὁποῖαν ποτὲ θέλουσιν, εἴτε κυρίως τύπωσιν τὴν μετὰ εἰσοχῆς καὶ ἐξοχῆς εἴτε ἑτεροίωσιν· ἀλλὰ τὸ πῶς αὕτη γίνεται τῆς ἀποδείξεως τῶν ἀπορωτάτων. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τὸ μὲν φανταστὸν ὀφείλει ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ φαντασιούμενον ἡγεμονικὸν πάσχειν, ἐκείνο μὲν ἵνα τυπώσῃ, τοῦτο δ' ἵνα τυπωθῇ·  
403 ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ εἰκὸς συμβαίνειν φαντασίαν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἡγεμονικὸν τάχα συγχωρήσει τις δύνασθαι πάσχειν, καίπερ ἀσυγχώρητον οὖν τὴν δὲ ἀπόδειξιν πῶς εἰκὸς ἐστι ποιεῖν; ἦτοι γὰρ σῶμα κατ'  
404 αὐτοῦς ἔστιν ἡ ἀσώματον. σῶμα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐξ ἀσωμάτων γὰρ λεκτῶν συνέστηκεν· εἰ δὲ ἀσώματον, ἐπεὶ τὰ ἀσώματα κατ' αὐτοὺς οὔτε ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν οὔτε πάσχειν, καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις

evident that no apprehensive presentation of proof will subsist, and, this being non-existent, assent to it will not exist either, and this is apprehension.

That a presentation of proof, according to the 400 Stoics, does not exist is shown, firstly, by the general dissension amongst them as to what presentation is ; for when they have agreed so far as to say that it is "an impression on the regent part," they are at variance about "impression" itself, Cleanthes understanding it to mean literally "that conceived as involving depression and eminence," but Chrysippus more loosely as a synonym for "alteration."<sup>a</sup> If, 401 then, even amongst themselves there is no agreement up till now about "impression," presentation too, as being in dispute up till the present, must necessarily be treated with suspension, and also the proof which depends thereon. Next, let it be granted that 402 presentation exists, be it of whatsoever sort they wish, whether literal "impression" with depression and eminence or alteration ; yet how this (impression) comes about is a most doubtful question. For evidently the presented object ought to be the active agent, and the regent part, as receiving the presentation, the passive subject, so that the former may impress and the latter be impressed ; for it is not likely that presentation occurs in any other way. Now, that the regent part can be passive someone, 403 perhaps, will admit, although it is inadmissible ; but how is proof likely to be the agent ? For, according to them, it is either corporeal or incorporeal. Now, it is not corporeal, for it is composed 404 of incorporeal "expressions"<sup>b</sup> ; while if it is incorporeal, then, since incorporeals, according to them, can neither affect anything nor be affected,

<sup>a</sup> Cf. i. 228, 372 ; P.H. ii. 70.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. §§ 262, 336.

ἀσώματος οὐσα οὐδὲν δυνήσεται ποιεῖν, μηδὲν δὲ  
 ποιούσα οὐδὲ τυπώσει τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, μὴ τυπούσα  
 δὲ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ φαντασίαν αὐτῆς ποιήσει περὶ αὐτῶ,  
 405 εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν. μὴ  
 οὐσης δὲ αὐτῆς περὶ τῷ ἡγεμονικῷ καταληπτικῆς  
 406 φαντασίας, οὐδὲ κατάληψις αὐτῆς γενήσεται. κατὰ  
 τὰς τῶν στωικῶν ἄρα τεχνολογίας ἀκατάληπτὸς  
 ἔστω ἢ ἀπόδειξις.

Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ ἔνεστι λέγειν ὅτι τὰ ἀσώματα οὐ  
 ποιεῖ τι οὐδὲ φαντασιοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν οἱ  
 ἐπ' ἐκείνοις φαντασιούμενοι. εἰ γὰρ ὁμολογεῖται  
 ὅτι πᾶν ἀποτέλεσμα οὐ χωρὶς γε τοῦ δρῶντος καὶ  
 τοῦ πάσχοντος συνίσταται, ὀφείλει καὶ ἡ φαντασία  
 τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀποτέλεσμα καθεστηκυῖα μὴ χωρὶς  
 407 τοῦ δρῶντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος νοεῖσθαι. τὸ μὲν  
 οὖν πάσχον ὅτι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἐστι, δεδώκασιν οἱ  
 ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι· τὸ δὲ τυποῦν καὶ ποιοῦν  
 τί ἂν εἴη κατ' αὐτούς, ἄξιον μαθεῖν. ἤτοι γὰρ  
 ἀπόδειξις ἔστω ἢ τυπούσα τὸ ἡγεμονικόν καὶ κινού-  
 σα τὴν ἑαυτῆς φαντασίαν, ἢ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν αὐτὸ  
 τυποῖ καὶ φαντασιοὶ. ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἂν  
 εἴη τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τυπωτική· ἀσώματος γὰρ ἐστι,  
 τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον κατ' αὐτούς οὔτε ποιεῖ τι οὔτε  
 408 πάσχει. εἰ δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικόν ἑαυτὸ τυποῖ, ἤτοι  
 οἷός ἐστιν ὁ τύπος τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τυποῦν, ἢ ἄλλοιον  
 μὲν τι ὁ τύπος ἀνόμοιον δέ τι τούτου τὸ τυποῦν.  
 καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀνόμοιον, ἄλλων ὑποκειμένων ἄλλων  
 γενήσονται αἱ φαντασίαι· ὅπερ πάλιν εἰς τὴν περὶ  
 ἀπάντων ἀκαταληψίαν συγκλείει τοὺς στωικούς.  
 εἰ δὲ ὁμοίός ἐστιν ὁ τύπος τῷ τυποῦντι, ἐπεὶ τὸ

proof also, being incorporeal, will not be able to affect  
 anything; and, as affecting nothing, it will not im-  
 press the regent part; and, as not impressing this,  
 neither will it produce therein a presentation of itself,  
 nor, if this is so, an apprehensive presentation. But 405  
 if there exists no apprehensive presentation of it in  
 the regent part, neither will there be an apprehension  
 of it. Therefore, according to the technical rules of 406  
 the Stoics' logic, proof is non-apprehensible.

Moreover, it is not allowable to say that incorporeals  
 do not affect anything nor produce in us presentations,  
 but it is we who form presentations from them. For  
 if it is agreed that no effect is brought about without  
 an agent and a passive subject, then the presentation  
 of proof also, being an effect, should not be conceived  
 without both agent and patient. That the patient, 407  
 then, is the regent part has been granted by the  
 Stoics; but what the agent is which, according to  
 them, makes the impression is worth considering.  
 For either it is proof which impresses the regent part  
 and excites its own presentation, or it is the regent  
 part which impresses itself and causes presentation.  
 But proof will not be capable of impressing the regent  
 part; for it is incorporeal, and the incorporeal,  
 according to them, neither effects nor suffers anything.  
 And if the regent part impresses itself, either what 408  
 impresses is the same sort of thing as the impression,  
 or else the impression is one sort of thing and what  
 impresses something dissimilar. And if it is dis-  
 similar, as the underlying objects are different, the  
 presentations will be of different things; and this  
 again forces the Stoic to admit the non-apprehensi-  
 bility of all things. But if the impression is similar to  
 what impresses, since the regent part impresses itself,

- ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτὸ τυποῖ, λήψεται φαντασίαν οὐ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀλλὰ ἑαυτοῦ· ὁ πάλιν ἐστὶν ἄτοπον.
- 409 Οἱ δὲ καὶ δι' ὑποδειγμάτων πειρῶνται τὸ ἀξιούμενον παραμυθεῖσθαι. ὥσπερ γάρ, φασίν, ὁ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁ ὄπλομάχος ἔσθ' ὅτε μὲν λαβόμενος τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ παιδὸς ῥυθμίζει καὶ διδάσκει τινὰς κινήσθαι κινήσεις, ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ ἄπωθεν ἐστῶς καὶ πως κινούμενος ἐν ῥυθμῷ παρέχει ἑαυτὸν ἐκείνῳ πρὸς μίμησιν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φανταστῶν ἔνια μὲν οἰοεὶ ψάλλοντα καὶ θιγγάνοντα τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ποιεῖται τὴν ἐν τούτῳ τύπωσιν, ὁποῖόν ἐστι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν καὶ κοινῶς τὸ σῶμα, ἔνια δὲ (οὐ)<sup>1</sup> τοιαύτην ἔχει φύσιν, τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς φαντασιουμένου καὶ οὐχ ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ὅποιά
- 410 ἐστὶ τὰ ἀσώματα λεκτά. οἱ δὲ τοῦτο λέγοντες πιθανῶ μὲν χρῶνται παραδείγματι, οὐ συνάγουσι δὲ τὸ προκειμένον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ παιδοτρίβης καὶ ὁ ὄπλομάχος εἰσὶ σῶμα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐδύναντο φαντασίαν ἐμποιεῖν τῷ παιδί· ἢ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἀσώματος καθειστήκει, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἐζητέτο εἰ δύναται φανταστικῶς τυποῦν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. ὥστε μὴ ἀποδεδείχθαι αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀρχήθεν ζητούμενον.
- 411 Ὅθεν τούτων ὑποδεδειγμένων<sup>2</sup> σκοπῶμεν μεταελθόντες εἰ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν θεωρίαν δύναται ἢ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτοῖς ὑπόσχεσις σώζεσθαι. οἴονται τοίνυν τρεῖς τινὰς ἀλλήλοις συζυγεῖν λόγους, τὸν τε συνακτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν
- 412 ἀποδεικτικόν, ὧν τὸν μὲν ἀποδεικτικὸν πάντως ἀληθῆ τε καὶ συνακτικόν, τὸν δὲ ἀληθῆ πάντως συνακτικὸν μὲν ὑπάρχειν, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης δὲ καὶ

<sup>1</sup> <οὐ> ego (lacunam post φύσιν stat. Kochalsky).

<sup>2</sup> ὑποδεδειγμένων Fabr.: ἀποδεδειγμένων mss., Bekk.

it will receive a presentation not of the proof but of itself; which again is absurd.

But they endeavour also to render their view 409 plausible by means of illustrations. For, say they, just as the trainer or sergeant sometimes takes hold of the boy's hands when he is teaching him rhythm and how to make certain motions, and at other times stands at a distance and offers himself as a pattern for the boy's imitation by making certain rhythmical motions, so also some of the objects presented produce the impression in the regent part as it were by touching and contact with it—such as white and black and body generally,—whereas others are not of this nature, since the regent part receives the presentation as a result of them but not by their agency, as is the case with incorporeal expressions. But those who argue thus, though they use a plausible 410 illustration, do not prove the matter in question. For the trainer or sergeant is corporeal, and because of this he was able to produce a presentation in the boy; but proof is incorporeal, and because of this it was questioned whether it is able to impress, as a presentation, the regent part. So that the original point in question has not been proved by them.

These arguments, therefore, having been indicated, 411 let us pass on to consider whether the promise they ascribe to proof can be made good by their logical theory. Now they suppose that there are three forms of argument connected with one another<sup>a</sup>—the conclusive and the true and the probative, and of these 412 the probative is always both true and conclusive, and the true is always conclusive but not necessarily

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 137-143.

ἀποδεικτικόν, τὸν δὲ συνακτικὸν οὔτε πάντως  
 413 ἀληθῆ οὔτε πάντως ἀποδεικτικόν. καὶ ὁ μὲν  
 τοιοῦτος ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν·  
 ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνάγει  
 μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι, οὐκ ἔστι  
 δὲ ἀληθῆς, τὸ δεύτερον λήμμα ἔχων ψεῦδος, τὴν  
 414 πρόσληψιν, τὸ “ ἀλλὰ μὴν νύξ ἔστιν. ” ὁ δὲ οὕτως  
 ἔχων ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν·  
 ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν ” συνακτικὸς  
 ἅμα ἦν καὶ ἀληθῆς τῷ καὶ ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτησθαι  
 415 σχήματι καὶ δι’ ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγειν. κρίνε-  
 σθαι δὲ φασι τὸν συνακτικὸν λόγον ὅτι συνακτικὸς  
 ἔστιν, ὅταν τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῇ  
 ἔπηται τὸ συμπέρασμα, οἷον τὸν τοιοῦτον λόγον  
 ἡμέρας οὔσης “ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν  
 νύξ ἔστιν· σκότος ἄρα ἔστιν, ” καίπερ μὴ ὄντα  
 ἀληθῆ διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ ψεῦδος ἄγειν, συνακτικὸν εἶναι  
 416 φαμέν. συμπλέξαντες γὰρ οὕτω τὰ λήμματα,  
 “ νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος ἔστι, ” ποιούμεν  
 συνημμένον [συλλογισμόν],<sup>1</sup> ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς  
 τοιαύτης συμπλοκῆς, λήγον<sup>2</sup> δὲ εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα  
 τοιοῦτον, “ [νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι,]<sup>3</sup> σκότος  
 ἔστι. ” τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον ἀληθές ἐστι διὰ  
 τὸ μηδέποτε ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς λήγειν ἐπὶ  
 ψεῦδος. ἡμέρας μὲν γὰρ οὔσης ἀρχεται ἀπὸ  
 ψεῦδους τοῦ “ νύξ ἔστι, καὶ εἰ νύξ ἔστι, σκότος  
 ἔστι, ” καὶ λήξει ἐπὶ ψεῦδος, “ σκότος ἔστι, ” καὶ  
 οὕτως ἔσται ἀληθές· νυκτὸς δὲ ἀρξεται τε ἀπ’  
 ἀληθοῦς καὶ λήξει ἐπ’ ἀληθές, καὶ ἔσται παρ’ αὐτὸ  
 417 τοῦτο ἀληθές. οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν συνακτικὸς τότε ἐστὶν  
 ὑγιής, ὅταν συμπλεξάντων ἡμῶν τὰ λήμματα καὶ

<sup>1</sup> [συλλογισμόν] secl. Arnim.

probative as well, while the conclusive is not always true nor always probative. Thus an argument such 413 as this, when it is day—“ If it is night, it is dark ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is dark ”—draws a conclusion because it is propounded in a valid form, but is not true as it has a false second premiss, the minor “ but in fact it is night.” But one of this kind, 414 when it is day—“ If it is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day ; therefore it is light ”—is at once both conclusive and true, as being not only propounded in a valid form but also drawing a true conclusion by means of true premisses. And they say that the 415 conclusive argument is judged to be conclusive when the conclusion follows from the combination of the premisses ; for example, an argument such as this, when it is day—“ If it is night, it is dark ; but in fact it is night ; therefore it is dark ”—we declare to be conclusive, although it is not true because it leads us to a falsehood. For when we have combined the 416 premisses thus, “ It is night, and if it is night it is dark, ” we frame a hypothetical syllogism which begins with this form of combination and ends in this form of conclusion “ it is dark. ” For this hypothetical syllogism is true, as it never begins with truth and ends in falsehood.<sup>a</sup> For when it is day, it will begin with the falsehood “ It is night, and if it is night, it is dark, ” and will end in the falsehood “ it is dark, ” and thus will be true ; and in the night, it will both begin with truth and end in truth, and for this very reason it will be true. So, then, the conclusive argument is 417 sound when, after we have combined the premisses

• Cf. §§ 114, 268, 331.

<sup>2</sup> λήγον Arnim : λήγοντα mss., Bekk.

<sup>3</sup> [νύξ . . . ἔστι] secl. Kochalsky.

συνημμένον ποιησάντων τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς  
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς λήγον δ' εἰς τὸ  
 συμπέρασμα, εὐρίσκηται τοῦτο αὐτὸ συνημμένον  
 418 ἀληθές. ὁ δ' ἀληθῆς λόγος κρίνεται ὅτι ἔστιν  
 ἀληθῆς οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μόνου τὸ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχό-  
 μενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ  
 λήγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα εἶναι ἀληθές, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 ἐκ τοῦ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον ὑπ-  
 ἀρχειν ὑγιές· ὡς ἂν τὸ ἕτερον τούτων εὐρίσκηται  
 ψεῦδος, καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεσθαι ψευδῆ,  
 ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον νυκτὸς οὐσης "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν,  
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν"  
 419 διὰ τὸ λήμμα ἔχειν ψεῦδος τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν,"  
 ψεῦδος ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν συμπεπλεγμένον διὰ  
 τῶν λημμάτων, ἐν ἔχον τῶν λημμάτων ψεῦδος τὸ  
 "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," ψεῦδος ἔστιν· τὸ δὲ συνημμένον  
 τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμ-  
 πλοκῆς καὶ λήγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα ἀληθές ἔσται.  
 οὐδέποτε γὰρ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς λήγει ἐπὶ  
 ψεῦδος, ἀλλὰ νυκτὸς μὲν ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἀρχεται τῆς  
 συμπλοκῆς, ἡμέρας δέ, ὡς περ ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχεται,  
 420 οὕτω καὶ εἰς ἀληθές λήγει. καὶ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος  
 "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· φῶς δέ γε ἔστιν· ἡμέρα  
 ἄρα ἔστιν" ψευδῆς ἔστιν, δυνάμενος ἡμᾶς δι'  
 421 ἀληθῶν λημμάτων ἄγειν ἐπὶ ψεῦδος. ἀλλὰ δὴ ἂν  
 ἐξετάζωμεν, δύναται τὸ μὲν διὰ τῶν λημμάτων  
 συμπεπλεγμένον ἀληθές εἶναι ἡμέρας οὐσης, οἶον  
 τὸ τοιοῦτο "φῶς ἔστιν, καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς  
 ἔστιν," τὸ δὲ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς  
 διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ λήγον ἐπὶ τὸ  
 συμπέρασμα ψεῦδος, οἶον τὸ τοιοῦτον "εἰ φῶς ἔστι  
 καὶ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν."<sup>1</sup>

and framed a hypothetical syllogism which begins  
 with the combination formed by the premisses and  
 ends in the conclusion, this syllogism itself is found  
 to be true. And the true argument is judged to be 418  
 true not solely from the fact that the hypothetical  
 syllogism which begins with the combination formed  
 by the premisses and ends with the conclusion is true,  
 but also from the fact that the combination formed  
 by the premisses is valid; since, if either of these  
 is found to be false, the argument also necessarily  
 becomes false; just as the following, when it is night,  
 "If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day;  
 therefore it is light," is false because it contains the  
 false premiss "it is day." And the combination 419  
 formed by the premisses is false, as it has one of its  
 premisses—"it is day"—false; but the hypothetical  
 syllogism, which begins with the combination formed  
 by the premisses and ends in the conclusion, will be  
 true. For never when beginning with truth does it  
 end in falsehood, but, in the night, it begins the  
 combination with falsehood, and, in the day, as it  
 begins with truth so also it ends in truth. And again, 420  
 an argument such as this is false—"If it is day, it is  
 light; but it is light; therefore it is day," as it can  
 lead us by means of true premisses to falsehood. But 421  
 in fact, if we examine it, the combination formed by  
 the premisses can be true when it is day—as for  
 instance "It is light, and if it is day, it is light,"—  
 but the hypothetical syllogism, which begins with the  
 combination formed by the premisses and ends in the  
 conclusion, may be false, as for instance this—"If it is  
 light and if it is day, it is light (< therefore it is day >)."

<sup>1</sup> <ἡμέρα ἄρα ἔστιν> add. Kochalsky.



δύναται γὰρ τὸ συνημμένον τοῦτο νυκτὸς οὔσης ἀπὸ ἀληθοῦς ἄρχεσθαι τῆς συμπλοκῆς, λήγειν ἐπὶ ψεύδος τὸ "ἡμέρα ἔστιν," καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ψεύδος. ὥστε γίνεται ἀληθῆς ὁ λόγος οὔτε ὅταν τὸ συμπεπλεγμένον μόνον ᾗ ἀληθές οὔτε ὅταν τὸ συνημμένον, 422 ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀμφότερα ἀληθῆ. ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς διαφέρει, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἀληθῆς δύναται ἐναργῆ ἔχειν πάντα, φημί δὲ τὰ τε λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὁ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς πλεόν τι ἔχειν βούλεται, λέγω δὲ τὸ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἄδηλον οὔσαν ἐκκαλύ- 423 πτεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν λημμάτων. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν" ἐναργῆ ἔχειν τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἀληθῆς ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἀποδεικτικὸς, ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος "εἰ γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε, κεκύηκεν ἦδε· ἀλλὰ μὴν γάλα ἔχει ἐν μαστοῖς ἦδε· κεκύηκεν ἄρα ἦδε" σὺν τῷ ἀληθῆς εἶναι ἔτι καὶ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔστιν· ἄδηλον γὰρ ἔχων τὸ συμπέρασμα τὸ "κεκύηκεν ἄρα ἦδε," τοῦτο διὰ τῶν λημμάτων ἐκκαλύπτει.

424 Τριῶν οὖν ὄντων λόγων, τοῦ τε συνακτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ, εἰ μὲν τίς ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικὸς, οὗτος πολὺ πρότερόν ἐστιν ἀληθῆς καὶ συνακτικὸς· εἰ δὲ τις ἀληθῆς, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποδεικτικὸς, πάντως δὲ συνακτικὸς· εἰ δὲ τις συνακτικὸς, οὐ πάντως ἀληθῆς ὡς οὐδὲ πάντως 425 ἀποδεικτικὸς. κοινῶς οὖν ὀφείλοντος πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς συμβεβηκέναι τοῦ συνακτικοῦ ιδιώματος, ἐὰν παραστήσωμεν ὅτι ἀνεύρετός ἐστι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος, ἐσόμεθα παρεστακότες ὅτι οὐδὲ 426 ἀληθῆς οὐδὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς δύναται εὐρεθῆναι. ὅτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι συνακτικὸς λόγος τις, ῥάδιον γυνῶναι.

458

For this syllogism can, when it is night, begin with its combination which is true and end in the falsehood "it is day," and on this account be false. So that the argument becomes true neither when the combination only, nor when the syllogism only, is true but when both are true.—But the probative argument <sup>a</sup> differs from 422 the true because, while the true can have all its parts manifest (both the premisses, I mean, and the conclusion), the probative purports to have something more—namely, the discovery of the conclusion, which is non-evident, by means of the premisses. Hence, an 423 argument like this—"If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light," which has both premisses and conclusion manifest, is true and not probative; but one such as this <sup>b</sup>—"If she has milk in her breasts, she has conceived; but in fact she has milk in her breasts; therefore she has conceived," besides being true is also probative, for it has a non-evident conclusion, "therefore she has conceived," and discovers this by means of its premisses.

As there are, then, three kinds of argument, the 424 conclusive and the true and the probative, if an argument is probative it must previously be true and conclusive; but one that is true is not necessarily probative, but it certainly is conclusive; and one that is conclusive is not always true, just as it is not always probative. Since, then, the conclusive character 425 must appertain to them all in common, if we shall establish that the conclusive argument is undiscoverable by the Stoics, we shall have established that the true and the probative cannot be discovered either. And that there does not exist any conclusive argument 426

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 312, 452; P.H. ii. 140 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 252.

εἰ γὰρ συνακτικὸν εἶναι λέγουσι λόγον, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχόμενον μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν λημμάτων αὐτοῦ συμπλοκῆς λήγον δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, δεῖσαι προεπικεκρίσθαι τὸ ἀληθὲς συνημμένον καὶ τότε βεβαίως λαμβάνεσθαι τὸν ἐκ τούτου ἠρτησθαι  
 427 δοκοῦντα συνακτικὸν λόγον. ἀνεπίκριτον δὲ γέ ἐστι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ὁ συνακτικὸς λόγος δύναται γνώριμος ὑπάρχειν. ὥσπερ γὰρ μέτρου μὴ ἐστῶτος ἀλλ' ἄλλοτ' ἄλλως μεταβαλλομένου οὐδὲ τὸ μετρούμενον ἔστηκεν, οὕτως ἐπεὶ οἰονεὶ μέτρον ἐστὶ τοῦ συνάγειν τὸν λόγον τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, ἀκολουθήσει τούτου ἀνεπικρίτου καθεστῶτος μηδὲ ἐκεῖνον εἶναι σαφῆ.  
 428 ὅτι δ' ἀνεπίκριτόν ἐστι τὸ ὑγιὲς συνημμένον, αἱ εἰσαγωγαὶ τῶν στωικῶν διδάσκουσιν, ἐν αἷς πολλὰς καὶ διαφάνους καὶ μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνεπικρίτους ἐκτίθενται τούτου κρίσεις. ὅθεν τοῦ συνακτικοῦ τοιοῦτου τυγχάνοντος πάντως καὶ ὁ ἀληθής, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς, ὀφείλει ἐν ἐποχῇ φυλάττεσθαι.

Κἂν ἀποστάντες δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἐνστάσεως ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν περαιόντων καὶ ἀπεράντων χωρῶμεν τεχνολογίαν, ἀδύνατος εὑρεθήσεται ἢ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου σύστασις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν περαιόντων πολλῆς καὶ ἀκριβοῦς οὔσης ζητήσεως οὐκ ἀνάγκη νῦν διεξελθεῖν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπεράντων λόγων ἐπὶ ποσὸν ὑποδεικτέον. τοίνυν φασι τετραχῶς γίνεσθαι τὸν ἀπέραντον λόγον, ἤτοι κατὰ διάρτησιν ἢ κατὰ παρολκῆν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 223, 443.

is easy to perceive. For if they assert that a conclusive argument exists whenever there exists a true hypothetical syllogism, beginning with the combination formed by its premisses and ending in its conclusion, the truth of the syllogism will have to be judged beforehand, and after that the conclusive argument which seems to depend on it must be accepted with certainty. But the valid syllogism has  
 427 not been determined up till now; neither, then, can the conclusive argument be ascertained. For just as, when a standard measure does not remain constant but varies from time to time, the thing measured also is not constant, so likewise, since the valid syllogism is, as it were, the standard for deducing the argument, when the former is undetermined it will follow that the latter too is not clear. And that the  
 428 valid syllogism is undetermined is taught us by the "Introductions" of the Stoics,<sup>a</sup> in which they propose many determinations of it, which are contradictory and up till now undetermined. Hence, as the conclusive argument is of this sort, certainly the true also, and therefore also the probative, ought to be regarded with suspension.

But even if we leave this objection and proceed to the logical rules about "definite" and "indefinite" arguments, the construction of the probative argument will be found impossible. Now concerning the  
 429 definite arguments there is much close investigation, and there is no necessity to discuss them now, but we must give some account of the indefinite.<sup>b</sup> They say, then, that the indefinite argument comes about in four ways—either through inconsistency, or through redundancy, or through being propounded in a bad

<sup>b</sup> With §§ 429-434 cf. P.H. ii. 146-150.

430 ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι ἢ κατὰ ἔλλειψιν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ  
 διάρτησιν μὲν ὅταν μηδεμίαν ἔχη κοινωνίαν καὶ  
 συνάρτησιν τὰ λήμματα πρὸς ἀλλήλα τε καὶ πρὸς  
 τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου “ εἰ  
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ  
 πωλοῦνται· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” ὀρώμεν γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ  
 τούτου οὔτε τὸ “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστιν ” ἔχει τινὰ σύμ-  
 πνοιαν καὶ συμπλοκὴν πρὸς τὸ “ πυροὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ  
 πωλοῦνται,” οὔτε ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸ “ φῶς  
 ἄρα ἔστιν,” ἀλλ’ ἑκάστον ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων διήρτη-  
 431 ται. κατὰ δὲ παρολικὴν ἀπέραντος γίνεται ὁ λόγος  
 ὅταν ἐξωθέν τι καὶ περισσῶς παραλαμβάνηται τοῖς  
 λήμμασι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ οὕτως ἔχοντος “ εἰ  
 ἡμέρα ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,  
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.” τὸ γὰρ  
 τὴν ἀρετὴν ὠφελεῖν περισσῶς συμπαρείληπται τοῖς  
 ἄλλοις λήμμασιν, εἶγε δυνατόν ἔστιν ἐξαιρεθέντος  
 αὐτοῦ διὰ τῶν περιλειπομένων, τοῦ τε “ εἰ ἡμέρα  
 ἔστι, φῶς ἔστιν ” καὶ τοῦ “ ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν,”  
 συνάγεσθαι τὴν ἐπιφορὰν τὸ “ φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν.”  
 432 διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι ἀ-  
 πέραντος γίνεται λόγος ὅταν ἐν τινι τῶν παρὰ τὰ  
 ὑγῆ σχήματα θεωρουμένων ἐρωτηθῆ σχήματι  
 οἷον ὄντος ὑγιούς σχήματος τοῦ τοιούτου “ εἰ τὸ  
 πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, τὸ δὲ γε πρῶτον, τὸ ἄρα  
 433 δεύτερον,” ὄντος δὲ καὶ τοῦ “ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ  
 δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ δεύτερον, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ πρῶ-  
 τον,”<sup>1</sup> φάμεν τὸν ἐν τοιούτῳ σχήματι ἐρωτηθέντα  
 “ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον, τὸ δεύτερον, οὐχὶ δὲ γε τὸ πρῶτον,  
 οὐκ ἄρα τὸ δεύτερον ” ἀπέραντον εἶναι, οὐχ ὅτι

<sup>1</sup> δεύτερον, οὐκ . . . πρῶτον Mutsch. : πρῶτον, οὐκ . . . δεύτερον  
 mss., Bekk.

form, or through deficiency. Thus it is through 430  
 inconsistency when the premisses have no connexion  
 and consistency with each other and with the con-  
 conclusion, as in an argument such as this—“ If it is day,  
 it is light ; but in fact wheat is being sold in the  
 market ; therefore it is light.” For we see that in  
 this instance neither the clause “ if it is day ” has any  
 relevance and connexion with the clause “ wheat is  
 being sold in the market,” nor either of these with the  
 clause “ therefore it is light,” but each of them is  
 inconsistent with the others. And the argument is 431  
 indefinite through redundancy when something is  
 included, extrinsically and superfluously, along with  
 the premisses, as is the case with one like this—“ If it  
 is day, it is light ; but in fact it is day, and also virtue  
 benefits ; therefore it is light ” ; for the fact that  
 virtue benefits is superfluously introduced along with  
 the other premisses, seeing that, when it is excluded,  
 it is possible for the conclusion, “ therefore it is light,”  
 to be deduced by means of the remaining premisses,  
 “ if it is day, it is light ” and “ but in fact it is day.”  
 And the argument becomes indefinite owing to being 432  
 propounded in a bad form whenever it is propounded  
 in any form that differs from the valid forms ; for  
 example, when a form such as this is valid—“ If the  
 first, the second ; but in fact the first ; therefore the  
 second ” ; and also this—“ If the first, the second ; 433  
 but not the second ; not, therefore, the first,”—we  
 say that the argument propounded in this form—“ If  
 the first, the second ; but not the first ; not, therefore,  
 the second,” is indefinite, not because it is impossible

ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ σχήματι λόγον  
 συνερωτᾶσθαι δι' ἀληθῶν ἀληθῆς συνάγοντα (δύ-  
 ναται γάρ, οἷον ὁ τοιοῦτος "εἰ τὰ τρία τέσσαρά  
 ἐστίν, τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστίν· οὐχὶ δέ γε τὰ τρία τέσ-  
 σαρὰ ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἕξ ὀκτώ ἐστίν"), τῷ δὲ  
 δύνασθαι τινὰς λόγους ἐν αὐτῷ τάττεσθαι μοχ-  
 θηρούς, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστι,  
 φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐκ ἐστίν ἡμέρα· οὐκ ἄρα  
 434 ἐστὶ φῶς." κατ' ἔλλειψιν δὲ ἀπέραντος ἐγένετο ὁ  
 λόγος ὅταν ἐλλείπη τι τῶν συνακτικῶν λημμάτων.  
 οἷον "ἤτοι κακόν ἐστίν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστίν  
 ὁ πλοῦτος· οὐχὶ δέ γε κακόν ἐστίν ὁ πλοῦτος·  
 ἀγαθόν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦτος." ἐλλείπει γὰρ ἐν  
 τῷ διεξευγμένῳ τὸ ἀδιάφορον εἶναι τὸν πλοῦτον,  
 ὥστε τὴν ὑγιῆ συνερώτησιν τοιαύτην μᾶλλον  
 ὑπάρχειν "ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐστίν ὁ πλοῦτος ἢ κακόν  
 ἐστίν ἢ ἀδιάφορον· οὔτε δέ γ' ἀγαθόν ἐστίν ὁ  
 πλοῦτος οὔτε κακόν· ἀδιάφορον ἄρα ἐστίν."

435 Τοιαύτης δὴ παρὰ τοῖς στωικοῖς κειμένης τεχνο-  
 λογίας μήποτε τὸ ὅσον ἐπ' αὐτῇ οὐ δύναται ἀ-  
 πέραντος ἐπικριθῆναι λόγος, καὶ γε εὐθέως ὁ κατὰ  
 διάρτησιν καὶ οὕτως ἔχων "εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστίν, φῶς  
 ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν ἀγορᾷ πυροὶ πωλοῦνται· φῶς  
 ἄρα ἐστίν." τὸ γὰρ διηρηθῆσθαι τὰ λήμματα, καὶ  
 μήτε πρὸς ἄλληλα μήτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν ἔχειν  
 τινὰ κοινῶν, ἤτοι ψιλῆ λέγουσι φάσει ἢ διά-  
 τνος τεχνικῆς καὶ διδασκαλικῆς ἐφόδου τὸ τοιοῦτο

436 παριστάντες. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἀναποδείκτω χρώμενοι  
 φάσει, ῥάδιον φάσιν αὐτοῖς ἀντιθεῖναι, πάντα τὸν  
 λεγόμενον κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπέραντον λόγον φάσκου-

for an argument which deduces what is true by means  
 of true premisses to be propounded in this form (for  
 this is possible, as for instance "If 3 is 4, 6 is 8 ; but  
 3 is not 4 ; therefore 6 is not 8"), but because it is  
 possible for some bad arguments to be arranged in  
 this form, such as this, for example—"If it is day  
 it is light ; but in fact it is not day ; therefore it is  
 not light." And the argument becomes indefinite 434  
 through deficiency when one of its deductive pre-  
 misses is deficient. For example, "Either wealth is  
 an evil or wealth is a good ; but wealth is not an evil ;  
 therefore wealth is a good" ; for in the disjunctive  
 premiss there is an omission of "wealth is indifferent,"  
 so that the valid statement ought rather to run thus—  
 "Wealth is either a good or an evil or indifferent ; but  
 wealth is neither a good nor an evil ; therefore it is  
 indifferent."

Such, then, being the logical theory laid down by 435  
 the Stoics, one suspects that, if we go by it, an  
 argument cannot be judged to be indefinite,<sup>a</sup>—for  
 example, that through inconsistency which takes the  
 form—"If it is day it is light ; but in fact wheat  
 is being sold in the market ; therefore it is light."  
 For the fact that the premisses are inconsistent and  
 possess no connexion either with each other or with  
 the conclusion is stated by them either by bare asser-  
 tion or by establishing the fact by means of some  
 technical and doctrinal method. But if they are 436  
 employing bare assertion, it is easy to reply with an  
 opposite assertion, which asserts that every argument  
 termed indefinite through inconsistency is definite ;

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 435-437 cf. *P.H.* ii. 146 ff., 152-153, where, for  
 indefinite (ἀπέραντος), the term "inconclusive" (ἀσύνακτος) is  
 used.

τας περαίνει· εἰ γὰρ ἐκ ψιλῆς φάσεως ἐκεῖνοι  
 δύνανται πιστεῦσθαι, δυνήσονται καὶ οἱ τοῦναν-  
 τίων λέγοντες εἶναι πιστοί· τὴν ἰσοσθενῆ γὰρ προ-  
 φέρονται φάσιν. εἰ δὲ μεθόδῳ τοῦτο διδάσκοντες,  
 ἐπιζητήσομεν τίς ποτέ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη μέθοδος.  
 437 καὶ λέγωσιν ὅτι τοῦ κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντου  
 λόγου τεκμήριόν ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ πάντως ἀκολουθεῖν  
 αὐτοῦ τῇ διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῇ τὸ συμ-  
 πέρασμα, μηδὲ ὑγιῆς εἶναι συνημμένον τὸ ἀρχό-  
 μενον ἀπὸ τῆς διὰ τῶν λημμάτων συμπλοκῆς καὶ  
 λήγον εἰς τὸ συμπέρασμα, πάλιν εἰς τὴν ἀρχὴν  
 φήσομεν αὐτοὺς ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτειν· εἰ γὰρ ἵνα  
 τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντον λόγον μάθωμεν, δεῖ  
 ἔχειν ἐπικεκριμένον τὸ ὑγιῆς συνημμένον, τοῦτο  
 δ' οὐκ ἔχομεν μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἐπικεκριμένον, πάντως  
 οὐδὲ τὸν κατὰ διάρτησιν ἀπεράντον λόγον δυνά-  
 438 μεθα γινώσκειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος ἦν  
 τρόπος ἀπεράντων ὁ κατὰ παρολκῆν, ὅταν ἔξω-  
 θεν παραλαμβάνηται τι τοῖς λήμμασι παρέλκον ὡς  
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμπεράσματος κατασκευήν. ὅσον  
 δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ δεήσει τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ [καὶ τῷ  
 δευτέρῳ]<sup>1</sup> τρόπῳ συνεργωτῶμενον λόγον κατὰ παρ-  
 ολκῆν εἶναι ἀπεράντον, ἐπεὶ παρέλκει ἐν αὐτῷ  
 τροπικόν. καὶ τοῦτ' εἰσόμεθα παρατεθέντων ἡμῶν  
 439 τῶν λόγων. τὸν<sup>2</sup> γὰρ δὴ τοιοῦτόν φασιν ἀπεράν-  
 τον “ εἰ ἡμέρα ἐστὶ, φῶς ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα  
 ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ· φῶς ἄρα ἐστίν.”  
 παρέλκει γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ “ ἡ ἀρετὴ ὠφελεῖ ”  
 πρὸς τὴν κατασκευήν τοῦ συμπεράσματος, διὰ

<sup>1</sup> [καὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ] secl. Mutsch.

<sup>2</sup> τὸν Kochalsky: τὸ mss., Bekk.

for if these men can be trusted on a bare assertion, those too who say the opposite will be able to be trusted; for they utter an equipollent assertion. And if they are expounding this by method, we shall inquire further what this method can possibly be. And if they allege that the sign of the argument 437 indefinite through inconsistency is the fact that the conclusion does not always follow from the combination of its premisses, and that the syllogism which begins with the combination formed by the premisses and ending in the conclusion is not valid, we shall assert that they are falling again into the original difficulty; for if, in order to discern the argument which is indefinite through inconsistency, we must have the valid syllogism determined, and up till now we have not got this determined, we certainly cannot ascertain the argument which is indefinite through inconsistency.—But there exists also a second 438 type of indefinite arguments—that through redundancy,—in which something from without is introduced into the premisses which is redundant for establishing the conclusion.<sup>a</sup> But, to judge by this, an argument propounded according to the first type will have to be indefinite through redundancy, since in it the hypothetical premiss is redundant. This we shall learn when we have compared the arguments. For they assert that an argument such as this is 439 indefinite—“ If it is day, it is light; but in fact it is day, and also virtue benefits; therefore it is light.” For in this case “ virtue benefits ” is redundant for the deduction of the conclusion, because when this

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 438-443 cf. *P.H.* ii. 156; and for the (five) Stoic “ modes ” or “ types ” of non-demonstrable arguments cf. §§ 224 ff. *supra*.

τὸ ἀρθέντος αὐτοῦ δύνασθαι ἐκ τῶν περι-  
 λειπομένων δυοῖν λημμάτων ἀνελλιπῶς συνάγεσθαι  
 410 τὴν ἐπιφοράν. τοῖνυν ὑποτιγχάνοντες οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς  
 σκέψεως ἐροῦσιν ὡς εἴπερ ἀπέραντός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος  
 κατὰ παρολκὴν ἐφ' οὗ ἀρθέντος τινὸς λήμματος ἐκ  
 τῶν περιλειπομένων συνάγεται ἡ ἐπιφορά, ῥητέον  
 ἀπέραντον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ  
 ἐρωτώμενον, ἔχοντα δὲ οὕτως "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,  
 φῶς ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἡμέρα ἔστιν· φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν."  
 παρέλκει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ συμπερά-  
 σματος κατασκευὴν τὸ τροπικὸν τὸ "εἰ ἡμέρα ἔστι,  
 (φῶς ἔστι)"<sup>1</sup> καὶ δύναται ἐκ τοῦ "ἡμέρα ἔστι"  
 441 μόνου συνάγεσθαι τὸ "φῶς ἄρα ἔστιν." τοῦτο δὲ  
 πρόδηλον μὲν ἦν καὶ αὐτόθεν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐκ  
 τῆς ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο<sup>2</sup> ἀκολουθίας παραμυθεῖσθαι.  
 ἥτοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν φήσουσι τῷ ἡμέραν εἶναι τὸ  
 φῶς εἶναι, ἢ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀκολουθεῖ,  
 αὐτόθεν ὁμολογηθέντος ἀληθοῦς εἶναι τοῦ "ἡμέρα  
 ἔστι" συνάγεται καὶ τὸ "φῶς ἔστι," κατ' ἀνάγ-  
 442 κην ἐπόμενον αὐτῷ· ὅπερ ἦν συμπέρασμα. εἰ δὲ  
 οὐκ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τοῦ συνημμένου ἀκολου-  
 θήσει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔσται ψεῦδος τὸ συνημμένον,  
 μὴ ἀκολουθοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ λήγοντος τῷ ἡγου-  
 μένῳ. ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ προ-  
 ειρημένη τεχνολογίᾳ, ἢ ἀπέραντον εὐρίσκεσθαι τὸν  
 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τρόπῳ ἡρωτημένον παρέλκοντος ἐν  
 αὐτῷ τοῦ τροπικοῦ, ἢ ψευδῆ πάντως διὰ τὸ ψεῦδος  
 443 ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι τὸ τροπικόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν  
 μὴ ἀρέσκειν τῷ Χρυσίππῳ μονολημμάτων εἶναι  
 λόγους, ὃ τάχα τινὲς ἐροῦσι πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην

<sup>1</sup> <φῶς ἔστι> Kochalsky.

<sup>2</sup> ἐκεῖνο Heintz: ἐκείνους mss., Bekk.

clause is removed the conclusion can be deduced,  
 with no deficiency from the two remaining premisses.  
 The Sceptics, then, will say in reply that if that 440  
 argument is indefinite through redundancy in which,  
 when one premiss is removed, the conclusion is de-  
 duced from the remaining premisses, then we must  
 declare that the argument propounded in the first  
 mode is also indefinite,<sup>a</sup> namely this—"If it is day,  
 it is light; but in fact it is day; therefore it is light."  
 For in this the hypothetical premiss "If it is day,  
 (it is light)" is redundant for the establishing of the  
 conclusion, and "therefore it is light" can be de-  
 duced from the clause "it is day" by itself. And this 441  
 is pre-evident even of itself, but it is also possible to  
 argue it from its logical relation to the latter clause.  
 For they will say that "it is light" either follows or  
 does not follow from "it is day." And if it follows,  
 when the clause "it is day" is allowed of itself to  
 be true, the clause "it is light" is also deduced, as  
 necessarily following it; and this is the conclusion.  
 But if it does not follow, neither will it follow in the 442  
 case of the hypothetical premiss, and because of this  
 the hypothetical premiss will be false, as the conse-  
 quent in it does not follow the antecedent. So that,  
 to judge by the logical theory stated above, one of  
 two things must result—either that the argument  
 propounded in the first mode is found to be indefinite,  
 as its hypothetical premiss is redundant, or that it is  
 wholly false because its hypothetical premiss is false.  
 For to say that Chrysippus does not approve of argu- 443  
 ments having but one premiss—which some, perhaps,  
 will say in reply to this objection—is utterly non-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P. II. ii. 159.

ἔνστασι, τελῶς ληρώδες. οὔτε γὰρ ταῖς Χρυσίππου φωναῖς ὡς πυθοχρήστοις παραγγέλμασιν ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι, οὔτε μαρτυρία προσέχειν ἀνδρῶν ἐστὶν ἴεις οἰκείαν ἀπόρρησιν<sup>1</sup> ἐκ μάρτυρος τοῦ τὸ ἐναντίον λέγοντος. Ἀντίπατρος γάρ, τῶν ἐν τῇ στωικῇ αἰρέσει ἐπιφανεστάτων ἀνδρῶν, ἔφη δύνασθαι καὶ μονολημμάτους λόγους συνίστασθαι.

444 Ἔτι κατὰ τρίτον τρόπον ἀπέραντος ἐλέγετο λόγος παρὰ τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι. πάλιν οὖν ἢ φάσει μόνον ἀρκούμενοι λέξουσιν ἐν μοχθηρῷ τιμὴ σχήματι λόγον συνηρωτησθαι, ἢ ὑπόμνησιν εἰς τοῦτο παραλήφονται. καὶ εἰ μὲν φάσει ἀρκοῦνται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀντιθήσομεν φάσιν τὴν λέγουσαν ὅτι οὐκ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρώτηται σχήματι.  
445 εἰ δὲ λόγον παραλαμβάνουσι, πάντως ἀληθῆ. τὸ δ' ὅτι ἐστὶν ἀληθῆς οὗτος ὁ λόγος, φημι δὲ ὁ δεικνύς τὸ ἐν μοχθηρῷ σχήματι ἠρωτησθαι τινα λόγον, πόθεν δείκνυται; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι; οὐκοῦν ἵνα μὲν ὁ ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἐρωτηθεὶς σχήματι λόγος γνωσθῆ ὅτι ἐν μοχθηρῷ ἠρώτηται σχήματι, δεῖ λόγον ὑγιῆ παραλήφθῆναι. ἵνα δὲ οὗτος ὑγιῆς ἦ, ἔδει αὐτὸν ἐν ὑγιεὶ ἠρωτησθαι σχήματι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τοῦ ὑγιούς λόγου πρὶν τοῦ σχήματος πιστωθῆναι δυναμένου ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑγιῆς, μήτε τοῦ σχήματος, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὑγιῆς σχῆμα, πρὶν τοῦ ἐπικρίναντος αὐτὸ λόγου, συνίσταται ὁ δι' ἀλλήλων τρόπος, ὅς ἐστιν ἀπορώτατος.

<sup>1</sup> ἴεις οἰκ. ἀπόρρησιν† dubia videntur: ἀπόρρησιν LE: ἀπορρησιν N: ? οἰς οἰκέα (vel οἰκοί) ἦν ἀπόρρησις.

sensical.<sup>a</sup> For it is neither necessary to believe in the utterances of Chrysippus as though they were pronouncements of the Delphic oracle, nor to pay attention to the witness of men (who are contradicted)<sup>b</sup> by a witness (of their own) who says the opposite; for Antipater, one of the most eminent men in the Stoic school, asserted that arguments with a single premiss can be constructed.

Again, in the third mode an argument is said to be indefinite owing to its being propounded in a bad form.<sup>c</sup> So, once again, they will either state that an argument is propounded in a bad form by contenting themselves with assertion only or they will bring in also an argument to support it. But if they content themselves with assertion, we too will make the opposite assertion which declares that it has not been put in a bad form. And if they bring in an argument, 445 it must certainly be a true one. But how is it proved that this argument is true (I mean, that which proves that an argument has been propounded in a bad form)?<sup>b</sup> Evidently by the fact that it is propounded in a valid form. So, then, in order that it may be known that the argument propounded in a bad form has been propounded in a bad form, a valid argument must be brought in; and in order that this may be valid, it must be propounded in a valid form. And for this reason, since neither the valid argument can be confirmed as being valid before the form, nor the form, as being a valid form, before the argument which determines it, the mode of circular reasoning, which allows no escape, is brought about.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 167.

<sup>b</sup> I give the apparent sense, as the Greek of mss. and Bekk. is (as Mutsch. says) hardly intelligible.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. P.H. ii. 154.

446 Καὶ πρὸς τὴν λειπομένην δὲ διαφορὰν τῶν ἀπεράντων λόγων, τουτέστι τὴν παρ' ἑλλειψιν, ἥδη [μέν] σχεδὸν ἀντειρηκάμεν. εἰ γὰρ ἀνεύρετός ἐστιν ὁ ἀπηρητισμένος λόγος, ὡς ἀνώτερον ὑπεδείξαμεν, ἄγνωστος ὀφείλει τυγχάνειν καὶ ὁ ἑλλιπής· ἀνεύρετος δὲ γέ ἐστιν ὁ ἀπηρητισμένος, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν· τοίνυν καὶ ὁ ἑλλιπής ἄγνωστος γενήσεται.

447 Εἰ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς στωικοὺς τεσσάρων ὄντων τρόπων καθ' οὓς ἀπέραντος γίννεται λόγος, ἐδείξαμεν καθ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν μὴ γνωσκομένους τοὺς ἀπεράντους λόγους, ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὸν περαίνοντα ἄγνωστον εἶναι. τούτου δὲ μὴ γνωσκομένου καὶ ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται λόγος τῶν ἀνευρέτων.

448 Πρὸς τούτοις ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀληθοῦς λόγου δεῖ ἐπικεκρίσθαι τὰ λήμματα (τούτων γὰρ συγχωρομένων δίδοται ἢ ἐπιφορὰ ἀκολουθῶς αὐτοῖς), ἐπὶ δὲ γὰρ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀνεπικριτά ἐστὶ τὰ λήμματα, καθὼς παρεστήσαμεν· οὐκ ἄρα δυνήσεται ἀληθῆς

449 λόγος εἶναι ἢ ἀπόδειξις. τὸ γὰρ συνημμένον, ὡς ἔμπροσθεν ἐδείκνυμεν, ὑγιὲς ἀξιοῦσι τυγχάνειν ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον (ἐπ' ἀληθές ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους)<sup>1</sup> ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγη ἢ ἀπὸ ψεύδους ἐπ' ἀληθές, καὶ καθ' ἓνα τρόπον ψεύδος, ὅταν ἀπ' ἀληθοῦς ἀρχόμενον ἐπὶ ψεύδος λήγη. τούτων δ' οὕτως ἐχόντων εὔρεθῆσεται ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀνεπικριτον. ὡς ἐπίπαν γὰρ ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς προσλήψεως λήγει εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν, ὡς ἔχει ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων "εἰ ἔστι κίνησις, ἔστι κενόν· ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔστι κίνησις· ἔστιν ἄρα κενόν." ἐνταῦθα γὰρ

<sup>1</sup> <ἐπ' . . . ψεύδους> add. Fabr., Bekk.: om. mss.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 435 ff., 411 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. § 429.

The species of indefinite arguments which still 446 remains—namely, that through deficiency—we have pretty well criticized already. For if the fully completed argument is undiscoverable, as we have shown above,<sup>a</sup> the deficient also must be unknowable; but the fully completed is undiscoverable, as we have established; so then the deficient also will be unknowable.

But if there are, according to the Stoics, four 447 modes<sup>b</sup> in which an argument is indefinite, and we have proved that in each of them the indefinite arguments are not known, it will follow that the definite argument also is unknowable. And if this is not known, the probative argument also will be undiscoverable.

Furthermore, in the case of every true argument 448 the premisses must be approved (for when these are agreed, the conclusion is granted as following from them), but in the case of proof the premisses are not approved, as we have established<sup>c</sup>; therefore proof will not be able to be a true argument. For, as we 449 showed above,<sup>d</sup> they maintain that the hypothetical premiss is valid whenever it begins with truth (and ends in truth, or begins with falsehood) and ends in falsehood, or begins with falsehood and ends in truth; and is false in one mode—namely, when it begins with truth and ends in falsehood<sup>e</sup>; and this being so, it will be found to be undetermined in the case of proof. For in all cases it begins with the 450 minor premiss and ends in the conclusion, as is the case with arguments such as this—"If motion exists, void exists; but in fact motion exists; therefore void

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 267 ff., 331 ff.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 112 ff., 247.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. §§ 114, 268, 331, 416.



τὸ συνημμένον ἄρχεται τε ἀπὸ τῆς προσλήψεως  
 τῆς "ἔστι κίνησις," καὶ λήγει εἰς τὴν ἐπιφορὰν  
 451 τὴν "ἔστι κενόν." ἤτοι οὖν πρόδηλόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα  
 ἢ ἐπιφορὰ καὶ γνωσκόμενον ἡμῖν ἢ ἀδηλον καὶ  
 ἄγνωστον. καὶ εἰ μὲν πρόδηλον καὶ γνωστόν,  
 οὐκέτι ἀποδεικτικὸς γίνεται ὁ λόγος, ἐκ πάντων  
 προδήλων συνεστῶς, τοῦτο μὲν τῶν λημμάτων  
 452 τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ἐπιφορᾶς. εἰ δὲ ἀδηλον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης  
 ἀνεπίκριτον γίνεται τὸ συνημμένον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ  
 ἀπὸ τίνος ἄρχεται γνώριμόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν (πρόδηλον  
 γάρ), τὸ δὲ εἰς τί λήγει ἀγνωεῖται διὰ τὴν ἀδηλό-  
 τητα. μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πότερον ἀληθές ἢ  
 ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, οὐδ' ἐπικρίνειν δυνη-  
 σόμεθα τὸ συνημμένον. ἀνεπικρίτου δὲ ὄντος  
 αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ λόγος γίνεται μοχθηρός.  
 453 \*Ἐπι τῶν πρὸς τί ἐστὶν ἢ ἀπόδειξις, τὰ δὲ πρὸς  
 τι ἐπινοεῖται μόνον, οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχει· τοῖνυν  
 καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἐν ἐπινοίᾳ μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐν  
 ὑπάρξει. καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἐπινοία μόνον σώζεται  
 τὰ πρὸς τί πως ἔχοντα, ὑπαρξίς δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶν  
 454 αὐτοῖς, πάρεστι διδάσκειν ἐκ τῆς τῶν δογματικῶν  
 ἀνθομολογήσεως. ὑπογράφοντες γὰρ τὸ πρὸς τι  
 συμφώνως φασὶ "πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρω  
 νοούμενον." εἰ δὲ γε ὑπάρξεως μετείχεν, οὐκ ἂν  
 οὕτως αὐτὸ ἀπεδίδοσαν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνως μᾶλλον  
 "πρὸς τί ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς ἑτέρω ὑπάρχον." οὐκ  
 455 ἄρα ὑπόκειται τι ἐν τοῖς οὐσι τὸ πρὸς τι. καὶ  
 ἄλλως, πᾶν τὸ ὑπάρχον οὐ δύναται ἀλλαγὴν τινα  
 καὶ ἑτεροίωσιν ἀναδέξασθαι χωρὶς πάθους, οἷον  
 τὸ λευκὸν χρῶμα οὐ δύναται μέλαν γενέσθαι μὴ  
 τραπὲν καὶ μεταβαλόν, καὶ τὸ μέλαν οὐ δύναται

\* With §§ 451-452 cf. P.H. ii. 167-168.

exists." For there the hypothetical major both  
 begins with the minor premiss "motion exists," and  
 ends in the conclusion "void exists." Either, then, 451  
 the conclusion is a fact that is pre-evident and known  
 by us, or it is non-evident and unknowable.<sup>a</sup> And  
 if it is pre-evident and knowable, the argument is no  
 longer probative, being composed of parts that are all  
 pre-evident, the premisses on the one side, and the  
 conclusion on the other. But if it is non-evident,  
 the major premiss is necessarily undetermined. For 452  
 what it begins with is known to us (for it is pre-  
 evident), but what it ends in is not known owing to  
 its being non-evident. But when we do not under-  
 stand whether this is true or false, we shall also be  
 unable to pass judgement on the major premiss. And  
 when it is undetermined the argument, too, is bad.

Again, proof is a relative thing, and relatives are 453  
 conceived only and do not really exist as well; so,  
 then, proof too exists only in conception and not in  
 reality. And that relative things are, in truth, only  
 preserved by conception, and that they have no real  
 existence, one may show by the admission of the  
 Dogmatists. For in describing the relative they say 454  
 with one accord: "Relative is that which is con-  
 ceived in relation to another;" whereas if it had  
 participated in real existence they would not have  
 given that account of it but rather this: "Relative  
 is that which exists in relation to another." There-  
 fore the relative is not among the things that are really  
 existent.—Moreover, nothing which really exists can 455  
 admit of any modification and alteration without  
 being affected—just as white colour cannot become  
 black unless it has been converted and changed, and  
 black cannot change to another colour while it re-

εἰς ἕτερον μεταβαλεῖν χρώμα μένον μέλαν, καὶ  
 ὡσαύτως τὸ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο πικρὸν ἀπαθὲς  
 456 καὶ ἀνετεροίωτον ὑποκείμενον. ὥστε πᾶν τὸ ὑπ-  
 ἄρχον οὐ χωρὶς πάθους τινὸς τὴν εἰς ἕτερον ἀνα-  
 δέχεται μεταβολήν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι ἀλλάσσεται  
 χωρὶς πάθους καὶ μηδεμιᾶς περὶ αὐτὸ γινομένης  
 ἑτεροιώσεως. οἷον τὸ πηχυαῖον ξύλον πηχυαίου  
 μὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιπαρατεθέντος λέγεται ἴσον ἐκείνῳ  
 τυγχάνειν, διπήχους δὲ οὐκέτι ἴσον ἀλλ' ἄνισον,  
 μηδεμιᾶς περὶ αὐτὸ γενομένης τροπῆς καὶ ἄλ-  
 λωιώσεως. καὶ εἰ νοήσαιεν τινα ἐξ ἄγγους ὕδωρ  
 προχέοντα, ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑποτεθέντος μὲν τινος ἑτέρου  
 ἄγγους λεχθήσεται ἐγγέειν, μὴ ὑποτεθέντος δὲ  
 ἐκχέειν, καίπερ μηδεμίαν αὐτὸς τροπήν καὶ  
 457 ἀλλοίωσιν ἀναδεξάμενος. ὥστε εἰ τῷ μὲν ὑπ-  
 ἄρχοντι συμβέβηκε τὸ μὴ χωρὶς πάθους ἀλλαγὴν  
 ὑπομένειν, τῷ δὲ πρὸς τι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν συμ-  
 458 βέβηκεν, ῥητέον μὴ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρὸς τι. σὺν  
 τούτοις τοῦ χωρὶς ἐστὶ τὸ πρὸς τι· τοῦ γὰρ ἄνω  
 459 τὸ κάτω χωρὶς ἐστίν. εἴπερ δ' ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς  
 τι καὶ μὴ ψιλὴν ἔχει ἐπίνοιαν, ἔσται τὸ ἐν τάναντία.  
 ἄτοπον δὲ γέ ἐστι λέγειν τὸ ἐν τάναντία· οὐκ ἄρα  
 ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἀλλ' ἐπινοεῖται μόνον. πάλιν  
 γὰρ τὸ πηχυαῖον σῶμα κατὰ μὲν τὴν τοῦ ἡμι-  
 πηχυαίου παράθεσιν λέγεται μείζον κατὰ δὲ τὴν δι-  
 πηχυαίου μικρότερον. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν  
 χρόνον καὶ μείζον καὶ μικρότερον ὑπάρχειν, τουτ-  
 ἐστὶ τάναντία, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐπινοεῖσθαι μὲν  
 γὰρ τάχ' ἴσως δυναθήσεται κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο  
 (καὶ ἄλλο)<sup>1</sup> σύμβλησιν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ὑπάρχειν  
 οὐχ οἷόν τε. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει τὰ πρὸς τι.

<sup>1</sup> <καὶ ἄλλο> Heintz.

mains black, and in the same way what is sweet will  
 not become bitter while it subsists unaffected and  
 unaltered. So that no real existent admits of change 456  
 into something else without some affection. But the  
 relative is modified without affection and when no  
 alteration takes place in it. For example, when the  
 stick of a cubit's length is compared with one of a  
 cubit's length, it is said to be equal to it, but as com-  
 pared with one of two cubits it is no longer equal but  
 unequal, although no conversion or alteration has  
 happened to it. And were we to conceive of a man  
 pouring forth water out of a jug, if another jug is  
 placed underneath this man will be said to pour in,  
 but if there is no jug underneath, to pour out, although  
 the man himself has undergone no conversion or  
 alteration. So that, if it is an attribute of the really 457  
 existent not to submit to modification without being  
 affected, and the relative has no such attribute, one  
 must declare that the relative does not really exist.—  
 Besides this, the relative is relative to what is apart 458  
 from it; for "above" is apart from "below." But if 459  
 the relative has real existence and not mere conception,  
 the one thing will be both opposites. But it is absurd  
 to call the one the opposites; therefore the relative  
 does not really exist but is only conceived. For, once  
 again, the body of a cubit's length is called greater  
 in comparison with one of half a cubit, but smaller  
 as compared to one of two cubits. But that the same  
 thing at the same time should really be both greater  
 and smaller—that is, two opposites—is a thing im-  
 possible. For it may possibly, perhaps, be conceived  
 as such on account of the reference being to different  
 objects, but it cannot be such in reality. Therefore  
 relatives do not really exist.

- 460 Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἔστι τὰ πρὸς τι, ἔστι τι ταῦτο ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ· οὐχὶ δέ γε τοῦτο· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ ταύτη ρητέον ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρὸς τι. ἔτι εἰ ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι, ἔσται τι ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον· οὐκ εὐλογον δέ γέ ἐστιν εἶναι τι αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίον· τοῖνυν οὐδὲ τὸ πρὸς τι ὑπάρχειν εὐλογόν ἐστιν.
- 461 τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τῷ κάτω ἐστὶν ἐναντίον, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνω ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον κάτω. εἰ δ' ἔσται τρία, ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ μέσον τοῦ ἄνω καὶ τοῦ κάτω, τὸ μέσον ἔσται πρὸς μὲν τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἄνω πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὑπερκείμενον κάτω, καὶ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω· ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα ὑπάρχει τὸ πρὸς τι. εἰ δ' ἄρα τὸ πρὸς τι ὑπάρχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται ἄνω καὶ κάτω. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ εἰ ἔστι, λέγεται τὸ αὐτὸ κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο σχέσιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω. τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα χωρὶς ἑαυτοῦ γενήσεται, ὃ πάντων ἀτοπώτατον.
- 462 Ἄλλ' εἴπερ τὰ πρὸς τι ἀνύπαρκτά ἐστι, πάντως καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις τῶν πρὸς τι οὔσα ἀνύπαρκτος γενήσεται· τὰ δέ γε πρὸς τι δέδεικται ἀνύπαρκτα· καὶ ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἄρα τῶν ἀνυπαρκτῶν γενήσεται.
- 463 Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν τοιαῦτά τινα καθέστηκεν· σκοπῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀντικείμενον λόγον. οἴονται γὰρ οἱ δογματικοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων λόγον τὸν ἀξιούντα μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν αὐτὸν ὑφ' αὐτοῦ περιτρέπεσθαι, καὶ δι' ὧν ἀναირεῖ ταύτην, διὰ τούτων αὐτὴν ὀρίζουν. ὄθεν

<sup>a</sup> i.e. "above" and "below" are things "apart from" each other; but they are also identical ("the same thing") since both are "relatives."

Nevertheless, if the relative does exist, there exists 460 an identical thing which is opposite to itself; but there is not such a thing; so neither in this way can we say that the relative really exists.—Again, if the relative really exists, there will be something opposite to itself; but it is not reasonable that there should be anything opposite to itself; neither, then, is it reasonable that the relative should really exist. For 461 "above" is opposite to "below," and the same thing is "above" relatively to what lies beneath it, and "below" relatively to what lies above it. And if there are to be three things, "above" and "below" and "midway" between "above" and "below," "midway" will be "above" relatively to what lies beneath it, and "below" relatively to what lies above it, and the same thing will be above and below; which is impossible. Therefore the relative does not really exist.—But if, after all, the relative does exist, the same thing will be above and below. And for this reason, even if it exists, the same thing is called "above" and "below" in respect of its relation to different things. The same thing, therefore, will come to be apart from itself,<sup>a</sup> which is the greatest absurdity of all.

But if relatives are, in fact, non-existent, proof also, 462 being a relative thing, will certainly be non-existent; but relatives have been proved to be non-existent; proof, therefore, will also be a non-existent thing.

Such, then, are the arguments for the non-existence 463 of proof. Let us also examine the argument brought against them. The Dogmatic philosophers imagine that the argument which maintains the non-existence of proof is overthrown by itself, and that it affirms proof by the very means by which it abolishes it.

καὶ ἀντικαθιστάμενοι τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς φασίν, ὁ λέγων μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἤτοι ψιλῆ καὶ ἀναποδείκτω χρώμενος φάσει λέγει μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀπόδειξιν, ἢ λόγῳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀποδεικνύς. καὶ εἰ μὲν ψιλῆ φάσει προσχρώμενος, οὐθὲς αὐτῷ πιστεύσει τῶν τὴν ἀπόδειξιν παραδεχομένων, ψιλῆ φάσει χρωμένῳ, ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς ἀντικειμένης ἐπισηθήσεται φάσεως, εἰπόντος τινὸς εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀποδεικνύς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν (τοῦτο γὰρ φασιν), αὐτόθεν ὠμολόγησε τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ὁ γὰρ δεικνύς λόγος τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις τοῦ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. καὶ καθόλου ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος ἤτοι ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπιστός ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπίστος ἐστιν. ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτω συνερωτῶσιν. εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν· εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν. ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· ἀπόδειξις ἄρα ἔστιν. καὶ δὴ ἢ μὲν τῶν λημμάτων τοῦ λόγου τούτου παραμυθία προὔπτω ἔστιν. τό τε γὰρ πρῶτον συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” διαφορούμενον καθεστῶς ἀληθές ἐστιν· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ δεύτερον, μὴ ἕτερον ὄν ἐκείνου. τό τε δεύτερον συνημμένον τὸ “εἰ μὴ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις” πάλιν ὑγιές ἐστιν· τῷ γὰρ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, ἡγουμένῳ ὄντι, ἔπεται τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· αὐτὸς γὰρ ὁ δεικνύς λόγος τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδεικτικὸς ἂν βεβαιοῖ τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. τό τε διεξευγμένον τὸ “ἤτοι δὲ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις,” ἐξ ἀντικειμένων διεξευγ-

480

Hence in withstanding the Sceptics they say: “He who states that proof is nothing states that proof is nothing either by using a bare and unproved assertion or by proving his statement by argument.<sup>a</sup> And 464 if it is by using bare assertion, none of those who are receiving the proof will trust him when using bare assertion, but he will be checked by the opposite assertion, when someone declares that proof exists. But if it is by proving the non-existence of proof (for this is what they say), he has thereby confessed that proof exists; for the argument which proves the non-existence of proof is a proof of the existence of proof. And, in general, the argument against proof either 465 is proof or is not proof; and if it is not proof, it is untrustworthy, but if it is proof, proof exists.”—And some, too, argue thus <sup>b</sup>: “If proof exists, proof 466 exists; if proof exists not, proof exists; but proof either exists or exists not; therefore proof exists.” And indeed the convincing character of the premisses of this argument is manifest. For the first hypothetical premiss, “If proof exists, proof exists,” being duplicated, is true; for its second clause follows from its first as it does not differ from it. And the second hypothetical premiss—“if proof exists not, proof exists”—is also valid; for the existence of proof follows from the non-existence of proof, which is its antecedent; for the very argument which proves the 467 non-existence of proof, being probative, certifies the existence of proof. And the disjunctive, “either proof exists or proof exists not,” being a disjunctive

<sup>a</sup> Cf. §§ 282 ff.

<sup>b</sup> Cf. *P.H.* ii. 3, 186; also § 281 *supra*. The second premiss (“if proof exists not, proof exists”) sounds absurd, but it really stands for “if proof is proved not to exist, proof exists” as is implied in § 467.

μένον τοῦ τε εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, ἐν  
 ὀφείλει ἔχειν ἀληθές καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἶναι ἀληθές  
 ὥστε ἀληθῶν ὄντων τῶν λημμάτων συνεισάγεται  
 468 καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά. πάρεστι δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως διδά-  
 σκειν θι ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς. εἰ γὰρ τὸ διεzeug-  
 μένον ἀληθές ἐστιν ἐν ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές,  
 ὁπότερον ἂν ἐκ τούτων [ἂν] ὑποθώμεθα ἀληθές,  
 συνεισαχθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιφορά. ὑποκείσθω δὲ  
 πρῶτον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἀληθές τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν  
 οὐκοῦν ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἡγούμενον ἐστιν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ  
 συνημμένῳ, ἀκολουθήσει αὐτῷ τὸ λῆγον ἐν τῷ  
 πρώτῳ συνημμένῳ· ἔληγε δὲ τὸ “ἐστιν ἀπό-  
 δεῖξις,” ὅπερ ἦν καὶ ἐπιφορά. δοθέντος ἄρα τοῦ  
 εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀληθοῦς ἐν τῷ διεzeugμένῳ, ἀκο-  
 469 λουθήσει ἡ τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφορά. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς τῆς  
 παραμυθίας τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ λειπομένου ἀξιώ-  
 ματος τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἡγείτο γὰρ καὶ  
 τοῦτο<sup>1</sup> ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ συνημμένῳ (καὶ)<sup>2</sup> εἶχεν ἀκο-  
 λουθοῦσαν τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐπιφορὰν.  
 470 Τοιαύτης δὲ οὐσης τῆς τῶν δογματικῶν ἐν-  
 στάσεως σύντομός ἐστι καὶ ἡ πρὸς ταύτην τῶν  
 σκεπτικῶν ἀπάντησις. λέξουσιν γὰρ, εἰ μὲν οὐκ  
 ἐνδέχεται ἀποκρίνασθαι πρὸς τὴν πεῦσιν καθ’  
 ἣν ἐπελήθουσι πότερον ἀπόδειξις ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τῆς  
 ἀποδείξεως λόγος ἢ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὀφείλουσι συγ-  
 γνωμονεῖν εἰ μὴ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄπορον οὕτω πεῖσιν  
 471 ἀποκρίνασθαι. εἰ δὲ εὐχερές ἐστιν αὐτοῖς ὁ προσ-  
 τὰπτουσι τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς, ὡς εὐχερές ὄν ποιεί-  
 τωσαν, ἀποκρινόμενοι πότερον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι  
 λέγουσι τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον ἢ οὐκ

τοῦτο Kochalsky: τοῦτο δ mss., Bekk.

<sup>2</sup> <καὶ> Kochalsky.

formed of the contradictories “proof exists” and  
 “exists not,” must have one clause true and must  
 therefore be true. So that, as the premisses are true,  
 the conclusion also is deduced therewith.—And in 468  
 another way, also, one can show that the conclusion  
 follows from the premisses. For if the disjunctive  
 premiss is true when it has one of its clauses true,  
 then whichever one of them we assume to be true the  
 conclusion also will be deduced therewith. Let it  
 be assumed that the first of its clauses—“proof  
 exists”—is true. Then, since this is the antecedent  
 in the first hypothetical premiss, the consequent in  
 that first premiss will follow from it; but the conse-  
 quent was “proof exists,” which is also the con-  
 clusion. Therefore, if it be granted that the clause  
 “proof exists” is true in the disjunctive premiss, the  
 conclusion of the argument will follow. And the 469  
 same method of argumentation applies also to the  
 remaining proposition—“proof exists not”; for this  
 was the antecedent in the second hypothetical pre-  
 miss and, following from it, it had the conclusion of  
 the argument.

Such being the objection of the Dogmatists, the 470  
 Sceptics’ way of meeting it is short. For they will  
 reply that if the Stoics are unable to answer the  
 question in which they inquired whether the argu-  
 ment against proof is a proof or is not a proof, they  
 ought to be indulgent towards the Sceptics if they  
 are not prepared to answer so difficult a question.  
 But if what they demand of the Sceptics is easy for 471  
 themselves, let them do what is easy and tell us in  
 answer whether they assert that the argument  
 against proof is proof or is not proof. For if it is not

ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, οὐκ ἐνέσται ἐξ αὐτοῦ διδάσκειν ὅτι [οὐκ]<sup>1</sup> ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, οὐδὲ λέγειν ὅτι οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ἀπόδειξις ὅτι [οὐκ]<sup>1</sup> ἔσται ἡ ἀπόδειξις· ὠμολογήκασι γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὸ  
 472 μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. εἰ δὲ ἀπόδειξις ἐστὶ, πάντως ἀληθῆ ἔχει τὰ λήμματα καὶ τὴν ἐπιφορὰν· σὺν γὰρ τῇ τούτων ἀληθότητι νοεῖται ἡ ἀπόδειξις. ἦν δὲ γε ἐπιφορὰ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν· ἀληθὲς ἄρα ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τὸ ἀντικείμενον τούτῳ ψεῦδος, τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὸν θέλοντες ἀποδείξει τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον, οὐ μᾶλλον αὐτὴν τιθέασιν  
 473 ἢ ἀναιροῦσιν. ὅμως δὲ καὶ τοὺς σκεπτικοὺς ἂν δέη ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀσφαλῶς ἀποκρινούνται. φήσουσι γὰρ τὸν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγον πιθανὸν εἶναι μόνον καὶ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν πείθειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπάγεσθαι συγκατάθεσιν, ἀγνοεῖν δὲ εἰ καὶ αὐθις ἔσται τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ πολύτροπον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης διανοίας. οὕτω γὰρ γενομένης τῆς ἀποκρίσεως οὐδὲν ἔτι δυνήσεται λέγειν ὁ δογματικός. ἡ γὰρ τοῦτο διδάξει ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθὴς ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως κομισθεὶς λόγος, ἡ τοῦτο παραστήσει ὅτι οὐ πείθει  
 474 τὸν σκεπτικόν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δευκνὺς οὐ τῷ σκεπτικῷ μάχεται διὰ τὸ μηδὲ ἐκείνον διαβεβαιοῦσθαι περὶ τούτου τοῦ λόγου ὡς ἀληθοῦς,  
 475 μόνον δὲ λέγειν ὅτι πιθανὸς ἐστίν. τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ποιῶν προπετῆς γενήσεται, ἀλλότριον πάθος θέλων λόγῳ καταπαλαῖσαι· καθὰ γὰρ τὸν χαίροντα οὐθεὶς δύναται λόγῳ πείσαι ὅτι οὐ χαίρει καὶ τὸν λυπούμενον ὅτι οὐ λυπείται, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν πειθόμενον

<sup>1</sup> [οὐκ] secl. Heintz.

proof, it will not be possible to show by it that proof exists, nor to affirm that, because this argument is proof, proof must exist; for they have agreed that it is not proof. But if it is proof, it certainly has its pre- 472 misses and its conclusion true; for proof is conceived as involving the truth of these. But its conclusion was "proof exists not"; therefore it is true that proof exists not, and the contradictory of this, that proof exists, is false. For by trying in this way to prove that the argument against proof is probative they no more affirm than deny proof. Yet if the 473 Sceptics are obliged to answer on their own behalf, they will give a safe answer. For they will say that the argument against proof is merely probable<sup>a</sup> and that at the moment it convinces them and draws them on to assent, but that they do not know whether it will still do so later on owing to the variableness of the human mind. For when our answer is framed thus, the Dogmatist will no longer be able to say anything. For either he will make it clear that the argument brought against proof is not true, or else he will establish the fact that he does not convince the Sceptic. But if he proves the first, he is not in 474 conflict with the Sceptic, since neither does the latter positively assert the truth of this argument, but merely says that it is probable. And if he does the 475 second he will show himself rash, by trying to upset another man's mental impression by argument; for just as nobody can by argument convince the joyful man that he is not joyful, or the man in pain that he is not in pain, so nobody can convince the man who

<sup>a</sup> With §§ 473-478 cf. P .ii. 187.

476 ὅτι οὐ πείθεται. πρὸς τούτοις, εἰ μὲν δισχυρίζοντο οἱ σκεπτικοὶ μετὰ συγκαταθέσεως περὶ τοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, τάχα ἂν διετρέποντο ὑπὸ τοῦ διδάσκοντος ὅτι ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· νῦν δὲ ἐπεὶ ψιλὴν θέσιν λόγων ποιοῦνται τῶν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως χωρὶς τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαι τούτοις, τοσοῦτον ἀπέχουσι τοῦ βλάπτεσθαι πρὸς τῶν τούναντιον

477 κατασκευαζόντων ὡς ὠφελείσθαι μᾶλλον. εἰ γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως κομισθέντες λόγοι μεμενήκασιν ἀναντίρρητοι, οἱ δὲ εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν παραληφθέντες λόγοι πάλιν εἰσὶν ἰσχυροί, μήτε ἐκείνοις μήτε τούτοις προσθέμενοι τὴν ἐποχὴν

478 ὁμολογῶμεν. κἂν συγχωρηθῆ δὲ ἀποδεικτικὸς εἶναι ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο ὠφελοῦνται τι εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν οἱ δογματικοί, καθὼς ἤδη ὑπεμνήσαμεν· συνάγει γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ τούτου ἀληθοῦς ὄντος ψεῦδος γίνεται

479 τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. ναὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ὁ συνάγων τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἀποδεικτικὸς ὦν ἑαυτὸν ἐκβάλλει. πρὸς δὲ ῥητέον ὅτι οὐ πάντως ἑαυτὸν ἐκβάλλει. πολλὰ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγεται, καὶ ὡς τὸν Δία φαρμέν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶναι πατέρα καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν αὐτοῦ τούτου (οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἦν πατήρ), οὕτω καὶ ὅταν λέγωμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν, καθ' ὑπεξαίρεσιν λέγομεν τοῦ δεικνύντος λόγου ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις· μόνος γὰρ οὗτός ἐστιν ἀπόδειξις.

480 κἂν αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκβάλλῃ, οὐ διὰ τοῦτο κυροῦται τὸ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν. πολλὰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἅπερ ὁ ἄλλα ποιεῖ, τοῦτο καὶ ἑαυτὰ διατίθησιν. οἷον ὡς τὸ πῦρ δαπανῆσαν τὴν ὕλην καὶ ἑαυτὸ συμφθίρει,

is convinced that he is not convinced.—Furthermore, 476 if the Sceptics had asseverated, together with assent, that proof is nothing, they might, perhaps, have been confuted by him who shows that proof exists; but as it is, seeing that they only make a bare statement of the arguments against proof without assenting to them, so far from being injured by those who establish the opposite, they are benefited rather. For if the 477 arguments brought against proof have remained uncontradicted, and the arguments adopted in favour of proof's existence are likewise strong, let us adhere neither to the former nor to the latter but agree to suspend judgement. And if it be conceded that the 478 argument against proof is probative, the Dogmatists will not gain any help thereby towards the existence of proof, as we have already shown; for it deduces the non-existence of proof, and if this is true the existence of truth becomes false.—Yes, say they, but 479 the argument which deduces that proof does not exist, being probative itself, banishes itself. To which it must be replied that it does not entirely banish itself. For many things are said which imply an exception; and just as we declare that Zeus is "the Father of both gods and men," implying the exception of this god himself (for, to be sure, he is not his own father), so also when we say that no proof exists we imply in our statement the exception of the argument which proves that proof does not exist; for this alone is proof. And even if it does banish itself, 480 the existence of proof is not thereby confirmed.\* For there are many things which produce the same effect on themselves as they produce on other things. Just as, for example, fire after consuming the fuel destroys

\* Cf. P.H. ii. 188.

καὶ ὄν τρόπον τὰ καθαρτικά, ἐξελάσαντα τῶν  
σωμάτων τὰ ὑγρά, καὶ αὐτὰ συνεκτίθησιν, οὕτω  
δύναται καὶ ὁ κατὰ τῆς ἀποδείξεως λόγος μετὰ  
τὸ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν ἀνελεῖν καὶ ἑαυτὸν συμπερι-  
481 γράφειν. καὶ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ ἀδύνατόν ἐστι τὸν διὰ  
τινος κλίμακος ἐφ' ὑψηλὸν ἀναβάντα τόπον μετὰ  
τὴν ἀνάβασιν ἀνατρέψαι τῷ ποδὶ τὴν κλίμακα,  
οὕτως οὐκ ἀπέοικε τὸν σκεπτικόν, ὡς διὰ τινος  
ἐπιβάθρας τοῦ δεικνύοντος λόγου τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀπό-  
δειξιν χωρήσαντα ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ προκειμένου κατα-  
σκευήν, τότε καὶ αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἀνελεῖν.  
Ἄλλὰ γὰρ τσαῦτα καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν  
λογικὸν τόπον ἐφόδων ἀπορήσαντες τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο  
καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς φυσικοὺς ζήτησιν χωρή-  
σομεν.

also itself, and like as purgatives <sup>a</sup> after driving the  
fluids out of the bodies expel themselves as well,  
so too the argument against proof, after abolishing  
every proof, can cancel itself also. And again, just 481  
as it is not impossible for the man who has ascended to  
a high place by a ladder to overturn the ladder with  
his foot after his ascent, so also it is not unlikely that  
the Sceptic after he has arrived at the demonstration  
of his thesis by means of the argument proving the  
non-existence of proof, as it were by a step-ladder,  
should then abolish this very argument.

Well, then, now that we have raised all these diffi-  
culties regarding the doctrines which belong to the  
division of Logic, we will proceed next to our criticism  
of the Physicists.

<sup>a</sup> Cf. P.H. i. 206, ii. 188.