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PLATO

REPUBLIC

BOOKS 6–10

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY

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AND

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INTRODUCTION TO BOOKS VI-X

1. OUTLINE OF CONTENTS AND ARGUMENT OF *REPUBLIC* VI-X

Book VI

The subject matter of this book continues seamlessly from Book 5: having established a distinction between *philodoxoi* ("lovers of belief") and *philosophoi* ("lovers of wisdom"), Socrates goes on to focus on the fitness of the philosopher to rule.¹ On Socrates' criteria, he possesses devotion to truth and is strongly inclined toward the pleasures of the soul, a natural harmony, from which flow all the other virtues: SOCRATES: "Is there any way then in which you would criticize such a practice which one would never be able to practice competently unless one were naturally retentive, good at learning, high-minded, elegant, a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, and temperance?" "Not even Momus would find fault with something like this," he [Glaucon] said (487a2-5).

(a) At this point Adeimantus makes his third important

¹ On the artificiality of some of the *Republic* book divisions, see vol. 1, General Introduction, n. 5.

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extended intervention in *Republic*,² questioning the fitness of philosophers, on Socrates' criteria, for ruling a state (487b1-d5). People of this sort are expert at playing with words, Adeimantus says, and trapping their opponents like those clever at board games, but when it comes to the real world—facts rather than words—they are either (the majority) strange, even depraved, or alternatively, utterly useless.

Socrates unexpectedly agrees with Adeimantus, and in the face of the latter's ironically expressed surprise, produces the first of the images (*eikones*) in Books 6 and 7 which describe the position of his ideal philosopher in the state. This is the "ship of state," in which the imagery is fairly transparent (one might call it an short allegory): the "ship's master" (*nauklēros*) is the state, and those quarreling about the control of the ship are those politicians who aspire to power, whose success, gained by overpowering and getting rid of other aspirants, is achieved by persuading, or otherwise incapacitating, the shortsighted, deaf master. Their aim is solely to get control, but they have no idea how they will then use their power. The real expert captain is the philosopher who can read the stars and the weather, but who is ridiculed by the others as a "stargazer" (*meteōroskopon*; see Book 6 n. 19). So his alleged uselessness, which Adeimantus highlighted, is generally proclaimed, and is predictable: among all the aspirants staking their claims, the ones who genuinely know how to

² For the previous two, see the beginning of Books 4 and 5, 419a and 449b (with Polemarchus). As at the beginning of Book 5, the more independent Adeimantus intervenes where Glaucon is again content to give his assent to S. (6.487a).

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rule are invariably rejected by the mass of aspiring politicians, while those with a popular reputation for wisdom have great success.

Having secured agreement to this, Socrates now passes to the question of why this should be so: why do the majority of so-called philosophers have such a bad reputation? In an extended passage Socrates outlines the pressures on the individual who has a philosophic nature: all the good qualities he possesses have their corresponding deficiencies and the philosophic soul will become exceptionally bad: "if it is not sown, grown, and nurtured in the right conditions, it will attain quite the opposite qualities, unless one of the gods happens to come to its rescue" (492a3-4). The social pressures of the public meeting at which the philosopher has to perform are overwhelming: "the stones and the place where they are echo and double the racket of the blame and praise. Indeed, in such a scene how do you think a youngster's heart, as the saying goes, would be affected?" (c2-3). The successful teacher treats the mass of people as if he is rearing a strong beast, whose habits and moods he learns to predict, a so-called craft (*technē*) which he calls "wisdom" but which is in reality simply a "knack" or "routine" based on experience (*empeiria*), and not on real knowledge of what is true.³ A very few, who have, like Socrates, kept out of conventional politics, lead a good life, "just as when in a duststorm or driving rain raised by the wind, someone having taken shelter under a wall sees the rest filled to the brim with lawlessness, and is delighted if he can somehow lead the

³ For an extended discussion of the Platonic distinction between *technē* and *empeiria*, see *Grg.* 462bff.

rest of his life free from injustice" (496d6-8). Yet there is no existing city which is actually able to foster the philosophic nature.

The ideal philosophical training will reverse the conventional habit of largely abandoning philosophy in old age; rigor in philosophical activity should increase with age. This leads to the notorious statement that no city or individual will ever become perfect until either the few real philosophers can get the city to obey them or the sons of existing rulers develop a true passion for philosophy.⁴ The constitution based on such an arrangement will be the best, provided that it is possible (502c4-6).

(b) Socrates now takes up from Book 3⁵ the subject of how the guardians are to be chosen and the kind of education they are to have. Their qualities, which need to match the four virtues of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom, will enable them to aim at something higher than just these—at the Good. In order to explain the Good, Socrates introduces the theory of Forms: the multiple manifestations of, for example, beautiful or good things have a single Form which is intelligible, not visible. He uses the analogy that as the light which enables us to see individual things and enables natural things to grow and flourish comes from the sun, so the power that enables objects of knowledge to exist and be known comes from a yet higher power, the (indefinable) Good. A further analogy, of an unequally divided line, demonstrates the as-

⁴ For a skeptical discussion of the relation between this idea in *Republic* and its appearance in the "biographical" and arguably spurious *7th Letter*, 326a-b, see Schofield, *Plato*, 15-17.

⁵ Book 3, 412b-14a.

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ending order of being, and the analogy between different aspects of the visible world and how these differences are mirrored in the intelligible world (see Diagram, Appendix to Book 6).

Book VII

(a) Just as in the link between Books 5 and 6, this book continues without a break the discussion of the nature and role of the philosopher by means of what is undoubtedly the best-known of Plato's images in *Republic*, that of the allegory of the cave. The basic interpretation is clear and obvious: the mass of individuals are so accustomed to looking at shadows that they are unable to see when they are first exposed to the fire which is casting the shadows; then finally they encounter the daylight outside the cave.⁶ The person who is able to see the light and finally to look on the sun would no longer wish for the conventional honors won by those who function best in the shadowy world: indeed he would be the least effective in such a world. Once the best natures have ascended to the light, they must be compelled to return to the cave, since their good is not to be found, as one might think, in their personal everlasting contemplation of perfection, but in ensuring the best condition of the city as a whole.⁷

(b) Socrates then resumes discussion of the kind of

⁶ For the progressive stages outlined by S. at 515c4-16a3, see nn. ad loc.

⁷ See Book 4.420b3ff. This point has already been hinted at in Book 1.347c3ff.: the punishment for refusing to rule is to be ruled by someone worse than yourself.

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education which will allow true philosophers to make the ascent, which will “transport the soul from what is coming-to-be to what is” (521d3). Conventional education in poetry (see Books 2–3) has been rejected; what needs to be studied is related to number and mathematics. This subject leads the inquiring soul from the world of becoming and contradiction toward the world of the Forms—numbers themselves, and the sciences of geometry, astronomy, and Pythagorean musical harmony, as opposed to their contradictory manifestation in physical objects. The culmination of this study is the science of dialectic, the form of discussion which represents the only road to what is eternal; everything else deals with the world of the senses, things that occur in the natural world or artificially (533b5). Socrates’ account of the ascent through dialectic explicitly and closely follows the image of the Line (6.509d6ff.): opinion and imagination are opposed as belief to the corresponding opposite pair, which are knowledge and thought, referred to jointly as understanding. These are the respective channels for grasping the worlds of becoming and being.⁸

To demonstrate knowledge of the Good, one has to be able to give an account of the Form of the Good, and not simply perceive some image of it through belief. Education for those who demonstrate the potential to become guardians must be carefully organized to this end: primary education in music, elementary mathematics, and physical training is to be followed by two or three years of physical education; then ten years of education in mathematical

⁸ See Appendix to Book 6.

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sciences (537c-d) and five years of training in dialectic; this must especially not be permitted to the very young, whose attempts swiftly degenerate into disputation (eristic) (537d-540a). Fifteen years of practical political training follow, with potential guardians compelled to descend again into the cave (see 516eff.) and take on the burdens of office, as well as command in war. At the end of this time, those who have survived all the tests to which they are subjected are in a position to see the Good itself and, as guardians, will alternate studying philosophy with helping to rule the state, an activity which they must undertake for the sake of the whole city.⁹

There is an interesting addendum to Book 7 in the last sections of the book: Socrates repeats his point that the constitution outlined would be difficult but not impossible to create. In reply to Glaucon's question of how true philosophers could come to power, Socrates describes a situation in which the philosophers would send all those over ten years old into the fields (*eis tous agrous*), this being the quickest way to remove the negative influences of parents and family and allow the ideal constitution to be established as quickly and easily as possible. Glaucon's immediate agreement is tempered by his final words: "... if it were ever possible." (541a8-b1).¹⁰

⁹ Note (540c5-7) the brief reference to women (those born with the appropriate natures) as included in the guardians' education.

¹⁰ On the *Republic* as practically realizable, see below, section 2 (iii).

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tween the poor and the rich, which leads to intemperance among those who have little, and since these are the many, they have the ability to be victorious over the wealthy few. The characteristic of this constitution is equality (*isonomia*) and freedom, with a free choice from a “supermarket” (*pantopōlion*) of constitutions, in which “there is no compulsion to be a ruler in this state, even if you’re competent to rule, nor again of being ruled, if you don’t want to be” (557e2–3). Socrates makes a distinction between necessary and unnecessary pleasures: having been reared in the strict and thrifty manner of the oligarch, the young man tastes complex and unnecessary pleasures which “end up by capturing the acropolis of the young man’s soul, which they [i.e., the pleasures] see is empty of both understanding and good habits and true reasoning which are the best guardians and protectors in the minds of men loved by the gods” (560b7–10).¹⁶ Having secured their base, these inferior impulses rename honorable impulses to fit with their worldview (560d).¹⁷ The democratic person is torn between good and evil impulses: “he lives and enjoys the desire that each day happens to bring along, sometimes indulging in wine to the sound of the flute, and at others drinking water and pining away. Again there are times when he takes exercise, but there are times when he’s idle and neglects everything, while at others he’s ap-

¹⁶ The whole of this section (559e4–61b7) is notable for its pervasive military metaphor of siege and capture in the clash between contradictory impulses in the young democrat.

¹⁷ A striking parallel with the renaming of moral values associated with *stasis* (“internal strife”) in Thucydides’ account of events in Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 3.82).

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parently engrossed in philosophy" (561c6-d2). His world is multifarious, beautiful, complex, and superficially attractive.

(d) The final transition is to the fifth political constitution, which, as far as Plato is concerned, is second in significance only to the first, being diametrically opposite to the ideal state, namely tyranny. Socrates analyzes a democratic city into three parts: a class of "drones," who, though excluded from the ranks of the rulers in an oligarchy, are the chief rulers in the democracy; next, a wealthy class whose substance is there for the rulers to plunder, and the third class, the most numerous, those who have few possessions. The wealthy class is driven into the position of behaving repressively, which brings a counterreaction: the masses set up a leader who initially behaves as a popular leader but eventually, being in danger from his enemies, asks the people for a bodyguard and is thus able to wield absolute power. To maintain the analogy with the individual: the tyrant "son" whom the people have "fathered" cannot be ejected from his rule and domination over his father.

Book IX

(a) Plato's obsession with the tyrannical soul as the anti-type to the true philosopher leads him to devote almost the whole of the first half of Book 9 to a minute examination of the pathology of the tyrant as an individual. Emphasis is on the total lack of control of passions and appetites, analogous to what happens to badly prepared souls when they are asleep and in their dreams give themselves up to the bestial part of themselves. The rational

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element in the potential tyrant has no resistance to the overwhelming force of the appetites, and the result is a person who behaves like a drunk or madman. Indulging these appetites involves great expenditure of money, with the result that the tyrant steals from parents, and if they resist, he uses force and enslavement. Yet as someone with no control over his passions, he is the most wretched of men, just as a state ruled over by such a man has the most wretched of constitutions (576e2-4).¹⁸ Just like the state, the man possesses all the most undesirable qualities. Ostensibly free and powerful, the tyrant is actually the least free of men. So in terms of happiness and justice, the types of rulers can be ranked "like choruses in the order of their entrances, in respect of virtue and evil, happiness and its opposite." (580b6-8).

(b) Socrates now produces a second argument, based on the threefold division of the soul, that the person governed by reason has greater pleasure than the tyrant. Reviewing these divisions of the soul and the type of pleasure peculiar to each, he argues that the possessor of the highest type of pleasure, the philosopher, is in the best position to know and make a reliable estimate of which life is the most pleasant and which the most painful. This is because the philosopher alone is in a unique position to judge the pleasures of those governed by the other types, whereas those governed by the other types, and especially the tyrant governed entirely by his appetites, cannot comprehend the pleasure of the philosophic soul.

¹⁸ This is S.'s answer to Thrasymachus' *controlled* tyrant of Book I.344a-c. S. argues here that *lack of inner control* is an inevitable and innate characteristic of the tyrant.

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(c) The third and most complex argument advanced by Socrates (actually a more detailed reinforcement of the second) also concerns different types of pleasure. Considering the transition from pain to the cessation of pain, and from pleasure to the cessation of pleasure, Socrates demonstrates that in the case of most pleasures, the belief that cessation leads to its opposite (pain from pleasure and vice versa) is an illusion. Those who do not experience truth think that in descending to the painful and ascending again to the middle state (absence of pain), they are reaching fulfillment and pleasure. Once again the only person who can attain real pleasure is the person who knows the higher pleasure.¹⁹ Moreover, "when the entire soul therefore follows the wisdom-loving element and is not at variance with it, its separate parts can deal with its other functions and be just, and what's more each part can reap the fruits of its own pleasures, both the best of them and, as far as possible, the truest" (586e3-87a1). In other words, all three parts of the soul partake in the rational part to the extent appropriate for them; when this happens, each part is "doing its own work." When, on the other hand, either the honor-loving or the appetitive parts gain the upper hand, the soul cannot discover its true pleasure.

It follows that the tyrannical soul (where the extreme of the appetitive element is in charge) will have the least genuinely pleasurable life and the philosopher-king (where the rational element is in charge) will have the most pleasant existence. Socrates, referring explicitly back to the

¹⁹ Plato pursues arguments concerning different types of pleasure in *Philebus*, probably composed during the later period, or at any rate later than *Republic*.

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argument of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2,²⁰ concludes that he has conclusively refuted their claim that the completely unjust person can be happy. Such a person would have to take care of a many-headed beast inside the apparent unity of his human shell, and permit himself to be dragged along wherever conflicting passions (lionlike and snakelike, representing the two nonrational elements) lead him. Moreover, the undetected unjust person, directly contrary to the hypothesis of Glaucon and Adeimantus, will fare worse than the one who is discovered and punished, since in the latter case there is the possibility that, through punishment, he may return to a better nature.

(d) There is a significant coda to this proof: Socrates' assertion that the true philosopher will have to avoid honors and pleasures which might threaten the condition of his soul leads Glaucon and Socrates to agree that the philosopher might function only in the context of a political state which may not exist or even be capable of existing in reality, but only in words (*en logois*, 592a10). This, Socrates says, makes no difference since there may be a model (*paradeigma*) of it in the heavens for whoever wishes to look (592a5-b7).²¹

Book X

Book 10 divides into three distinct parts: first, the attack on poetry and visual art, which has the appearance of an

²⁰ 2.360e1-61d3

²¹ On the practicability of Plato's Utopia, see below, section 2 (iii).

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appendix to the main argument.²² There is then a fairly abrupt transition to a proof of the immortality of the soul which leads naturally into the final section, the myth of Er and the diverse fates of souls in the afterlife, which concludes *Republic*.

(a) The attack on poetry starts at a different point from the discussion in Books 2 and 3: Socrates explores the idea of “imitation” (*mimēsis*) and different removes from reality. The table made by the carpenter imitates, and is an imperfect copy of, an ideal table, a Form (596b7). Another “craftsman” (b12) is able to imitate not only the table the carpenter makes but all things, simply by holding a mirror up to the world. This so-called handicraftsman (*cheirotechnēs*) is the painter or the poet, who can use this method to imitate all things in the world. But this kind of imitation is doubly removed from the truth, being an imitation of an imitation.

Poets (“holding up a mirror to the world”) claim to be able to pronounce on any subject, but what they produce is illusion. Homer, for example, unlike lawgivers, cannot be said to have produced anything which made the world a better place. Unlike the sophists, such as Protagoras and Prodicus, Homer did not attract faithful disciples who valued him.²³ Poets write about images of virtue but have no

²² For the place of Book 10 in the structure of *Republic* as a whole, see below, section 2 (iv).

²³ 600c2–e2 is not one of Plato’s more convincing arguments, in view of the existence of the Homeridae, followers of Homer; moreover, the wandering life was the stock-in-trade of a poetic bard (*aoidos*) rather than a sign of neglect. There is also an unusual slant on the sophists, of whom Plato is usually critical (e.g.,

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knowledge of what these really are. As something that appears in different guises when viewed, objects are not properly understood by simple sense perception but only by the rational element in the soul.²⁴ Poetry does not appeal to this element, since in the struggle between the opposing elements of rational control and indulgence of emotions, it chooses to exploit the latter. Poets, even one so celebrated as Homer, should not be admitted into the city unless they can demonstrate—in prose—that they can benefit human life. Meanwhile the admittedly strong attraction of poetry must be resisted by the kind of argument just put forward.

(b) This takes us to the second of the three parts of Book 10 (608c ff.), the proof of the immortality of the soul. There is for each material thing what is good and bad for it: natural badness makes the thing to which it attaches itself deficient, and ultimately it destroys it. The soul is certainly subject to what makes it bad, but this badness can never ultimately destroy it. This can be shown by looking at the way deterioration works: the body is destroyed by ingestion of bad things (foods, etc.) but ultimately by its own badness. Likewise, the soul could only be destroyed *through* the agency of its own peculiar deficiency, and certainly not through any badness which attacks the body. However, the soul is demonstrably not destroyed by its deficiencies (evil people do not die from their bad deeds)

the ironic reference to the “thoroughly wonderful sophist” (*sophistēs*) at 596d1).

²⁴ For the “slide” of the argument between visual art and poetry, see below, section 2 (iv) (a).

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and so it must be immortal.²⁵ The purpose of this argument is revealed at the end of it: it enables Socrates to present his answer to the thesis of Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2 (357a-68c); in addition to having demonstrated "for the sake of the argument" (612c9) that justice is the best choice for the soul itself irrespective of rewards (b2ff.), Socrates can now bring back all the conventional rewards in life and after death (originally excluded by Glaucon and Adeimantus).

(c) We then come to the final part of *Republic*, the myth of Er. This is the most famous and elaborate of Plato's myths. Er, Socrates claims, was in a unique position to tell his story: a man who was assumed dead but after twelve days came back to life and told everybody what he had witnessed.²⁶ Much of the topography of the Underworld and the detail of the journey of souls, as well as the different fates of those who had led good or evil lives, is drawn from mystery religions, Homer, and other sources,²⁷ but Plato adds his own details to relate his account to the main themes of *Republic*. Taking the circumstantial detail of a "near-death experience" (Er was on his funeral pyre and regained consciousness after twelve days), Plato presents the idea of a "messenger," rather like the *angelos* (messenger) in Greek tragedy, whose function it was to inform the audience (and those onstage) about events which have

²⁵ On the weakness of this argument, see below, section 2 (iv) (b).

²⁶ On the origins of Er, see Book 10 n. 42.

²⁷ See nn. ad loc, and on Plato's myths of the afterlife in general, see Annas, "Plato's Myths of Judgment."

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taken place offstage; in the same way Er tells his audience about things they cannot see or know about. There is further detail of the routes taken by souls to and from the sky and to and from the underworld (614c-d), and the vivid picture of weary travelers meeting and camping on the plain and exchanging information about their various experiences, "as if at a public festival" (e2). Plato also repeats, with variations, the idea of retribution over long periods of time for wrongs committed in life, as well as the corresponding rewards for the good life, and gives a detailed description of the penalties for the exceptionally wicked (predictably, tyrants, 615eff.).

The key innovation Plato appears to be making in the traditional picture, however, is refining and giving prominence, in the transmigration of souls, to the element of moral choice. Plato focuses sharply on this process in describing how souls cast lots as to who is to be the first to choose a new life (617e), but that nevertheless the last choice can be a good one: "Even for the one who comes last, provided he chooses intelligently and lives strictly, a contented life awaits, not a bad one. Let the first not be careless in his choice, nor the last despondent" (619b3-5).

However, Plato's vision here is not one of simple optimism; the cycle of the transmigration of souls is unending, and there is a technical passage (616b-17d) that strongly suggests the deterministic nature of the universe, the revolving of the spheres, the spindle of necessity, and the three Fates.²⁸ Moreover, souls are tied into a cycle of eternal choice of future lives and the possibility of punishment

²⁸ On the details of this picture, see Book 10 nn. ad loc.

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for what they have done in any particular life, and there is no guarantee that a simple life of virtue and long residence in the sky will lead to a good choice next time: Plato devotes some space to describing the process and the results of good and bad choices, emphasizing that those who had already suffered and seen others suffer did not make their choice “on the spur of the moment” (619d4–5). There is finally the act of drinking water from the River of Lethe (oblivion), which causes the souls to reenter life with no memory of past lives or what they have suffered.

A final paragraph sums up the thesis of *Republic*, that justice brings happiness both in this life and in the hereafter.

2. ISSUES IN *REPUBLIC* VI–X

(i) *Rulers, Knowledge/Belief, and the Form of the Good*

Implicit in the paradox of the third and biggest wave, Socrates’ contention that only philosophers or kings turned philosophers were fit to rule the properly run state (473c–d), is the tension in Plato’s philosophy between knowledge (*epistēmē*) and belief/opinion (*doxa*). This polarity has not only ontological and epistemological significance, i.e., what is and is not real, and how we have knowledge of it, but also important political implications. Adeimantus’ incredulity over the suitability of philosophers to undertake the practical business of ruling (487b–d) not only reflects the negative image of them in ordinary Athenian society, but also, in terms of Plato’s own worldview in *Republic*, raises the serious question of how, given their education

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in astronomy and mathematics, and their gaze fixed firmly on the absolutes of the Forms, which by their very nature are not subject to change, the guardians will be able or wish to cope with the changeable and everyday issues of government.

In the image of the Ship of State (6.488a–89a), the “true helmsman,” the man who really understands the stars, the winds, etc., will be derided by the sailors, ambitious to take over the ship themselves, as a “star-gazer” (*meteōroskopos*: 488e3), someone out of touch with practical issues.²⁹ If we transfer this image to the political world, the question arises how far those who have attained knowledge of the absolutes of justice, temperance, and so forth (the “stars” of the image), and have passed through the long and arduous training in mathematics, astronomy, and dialectic (7.539d–e), will have any real qualifications for the labor of politics, in which they will then be obliged to take their turn.

Behind this question lies a disputed issue, on which Plato himself seems never to have quite made up his mind: whether the realm of absolutes (the Forms) is the sole reality and quite separate from and independent of the world of the senses. According to a “two world” interpretation, the world apprehended by the senses is totally illusory, a dream world, of which any kind of knowledge is impossible, the inhabitants of which (presumably all of us) are like the blind (6.484c–d). By implication, then, the initiated philosophers will be no more effective in this world than the ignorant majority. On the other hand, some

²⁹ A charge alleged by Plato’s S. at his trial to have been made against himself (*Ap.* 18b).

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kind of gradation from seeming to reality appears to be implied by the simile of the cave, in which those who have left the cave, although on their return initially like the blind, will in time "see infinitely better than those who are down there and you will recognize every image that is there and what they are images of, because you have seen the truth about the beautiful, just and good" (520c3-5). At 7.540a Socrates says that once having seen the Good, the guardians must use it as a model or blueprint (*paradeigma*) when they have to take their turn in ordering the city. The implication of this is that there is a relationship between the objects of knowledge and those of belief; the latter are imperfect images (*eidōla*) of the former, but they still relate to the real thing, rather like the reflection of an object in water on a still, clear day.³⁰ Philosophers may not be said to have *knowledge* of particulars, but they have the ability to arrive at a correct opinion on a given issue depending on their previously acquired knowledge of the absolutes. If this were not the case, and if philosophers, having undergone the lengthy education prescribed, were still "like the blind" when they returned to the world of politics, it is hard to see what use they would be in ruling the state.³¹

Reigning supreme over the Forms, the end point of all philosophical endeavor, is the Form of the Good. The idea has its origins in the Socratic dictum that the good is what

³⁰ A comparison used by Guthrie, *History of Philosophy*, 4:490-91.

³¹ For contrasted views on the "two world" metaphysics, see Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 210-12; Sedley, "Philosophy, the Forms and the Art of Ruling," 259-61; Sayers, *Plato's Republic*, 106ff.

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all people really want when not ignorant about their goals (“nobody errs knowingly”),³² i.e., the ultimate aim of all activity; but *Republic* adds a metaphysical dimension, the Good as the head of the hierarchy of Forms—that upon which they all depend. What exactly is the Form of the Good, and how does it relate to everything else? This, Socrates claims, is beyond the range of their present discussion (6.506d–e) but can be illustrated by means of an analogy with the sun (507c ff.): as the sun is to the visible world, so the Form of the Good is to the intelligible. This analogy appears to work in a number of ways: the sun provides light by which the visible world can be seen; the sun supports the generation and growth of living things; the sun provides birth and growth without being part of that process itself. So the Form of the Good illuminates, generates, and sustains the intelligible world.

There is little doubt that study of the Good is by way of the “longer route,” which Socrates does not embark on in *Republic* but which potential guardians will have to pursue through their long-drawn-out mathematical and dialectical studies (539d ff.). That understanding the Good was closely related to mathematical studies in the Platonic Academy is shown by the story told by Aristotle, quoted by Aristoxenus (born ca. 370 BC), about the disappointment and disgust of the audience at Plato’s lecture “On the Good,” when they discovered it was all about astronomy and mathematics.³³

³² See *Ap.* 25d, *Hipp. Min.* 376b, *Prot.* 358c.

³³ Aristox. *Harm.* 2, p. 30 Meibom. For different views on the nature of the Good and how it relates to mathematical studies, see Burnyeat, “Plato on Why Mathematics Is Good for the Soul”;

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It is clear that the Rulers of Books 6 and 7 will be expected to have progressed well beyond the character-forming educational studies in improving literature, myths, and religion of Books 2-3. This makes it all the more significant that at the conclusion of their higher studies they are to be compelled to take their turn at practical ruling, "not as something fine, but something essential" (540b4-5). Why should they consent to return to the mundane world of politics? What is compelling them?

Part of the answer takes us back to the beginning of Book 4 (420aff.), where, in answer to Adeimantus' objection that, improbably, the rulers will be voluntarily foregoing their own happiness, Socrates establishes that as part of an organic whole, a unity, the happiness of the higher class in the city is implicated in the happiness of the whole population. This necessarily involves the guardians, as the group which is best able to estimate the happiness of all, in overseeing the conduct and activities of the other two classes. As Book 4 progresses, it becomes clear that Justice is each class "doing its own work" (433b). If we add the knowledge of Justice and other Forms which the potential guardians finally attain through their mathematical studies, it follows that their unique knowledge of the Forms makes them both uniquely qualified to rule and obliged to do it for their own happiness. A further clue is provided back in Book 1 (347b-d): Socrates' argument that any rule or practical skill (*technē*) is necessarily performed for the sake of its objects and not for the practitioners themselves leads to the point that by ruling, the

Sedley, "Philosophy, the Forms and the Art of Ruling"; Miller, "Beginning the 'Longer Way.'"

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guardians avoid the greatest penalty of all: being ruled by one's inferior. Unlike the other classes, they are motivated not by money or honor but solely by the good of the whole. So, while ruling is not the ideal activity for them, it is essential if the city is to operate properly and they themselves are to be happy.

The distinction between knowledge and belief is mirrored in the tension in the guardians' focus on philosophic absolutes and the need for them to apply practical wisdom, their "prudential role" as developed in Books 3–5. It is significant that in *Republic* any notion of exactly how the ideal ruler converts his knowledge of the absolutes into practical statesmanship is absent from the discussion. This was an issue Plato returned to in great detail in his later *Statesman* and *Laws*.³⁴

(ii) *The Structure of the State and the Soul* (2)

Socrates' contention in Book 4.441c–e that the analogy between state and soul can be precisely drawn now becomes in Books 8–9 the unargued premise of Plato's elaborately schematic account of the defective constitutions—schematic in the sense that each constitution in turn is considered in terms of first its political evolution (the "timocratic constitution," etc.) and then the corresponding individual (the "timocratic man," etc.). And each state/soul pairing is marked by an equivalent drive or desire: the timocratic aims for prestige, the oligarchic for wealth, the democratic for freedom, and the tyrannical for power.

³⁴ For a comparison of Plato's perspective on ruling in these three dialogues, see Schofield, *Plato*, 136–93.

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What all these drives all have in common is that they do not lead to happiness either in the individual or in the state.³⁵

These two books of *Republic* are distinctive in their employment of a series of concrete case studies which describe in political and psychological terms how the transitions from one political/psychological state to the other occur. The question arises how far these might be drawn from or reflect any real situations Plato might be taking from Greek history or social life. Superficially, the political analysis has some resemblance to political power struggles in the Greek world as reported by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Aristotle,³⁶ just as the struggles of the individual within the *oikos* (household) resemble and in some respects anticipate the New Comedy of Menander (342–290), involving intergenerational conflict and purporting to describe in detail tensions in domestic life between fathers, mothers, and sons (e.g., 549c–50b). However, Plato's purpose is not to open a window on real life, either politically or domestically, but to explore, in a highly structured sequence, what he perceives as the shifting dynamics of defective constitutions and psychological states. In doing this he also makes use of human/animal imagery found in earlier Greek poetry, especially the references to the economy of bees.³⁷

The markedly vivid rhetorical style which marks Books 8 and 9³⁸ masks (was perhaps designed to mask) further

³⁵ See Blössner, "The City-Soul Analogy," 353.

³⁶ See Book 8 nn. 36, 46, 63.

³⁷ E.g., Hesiod *Op.* 303, Plut. *Sol.* 23.8.

³⁸ See, e.g., 8.559e4–61b7.

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problems with the state/soul analogy.³⁹ In particular we are never confronted by Socrates with the contrast between the fixed and static conditions of the three-part soul and the possibility of political changes of allegiance in the city.⁴⁰ And there is a more basic point: why does one have to assume that the ideal state is subject to decline at all? The possibility of decline might have been a reasonable assumption if Socrates had been allowed to proceed with his outline of the defective constitutions as he planned at the beginning of Book 5; at this point the guardians are seen simply as morally superior people who exhibit the virtues in their soul. But can one envisage the failure of those who have undergone the philosophical training of Books 6 and 7? Is the progression of the defective constitutions historically inevitable, implying that the guardians cannot be expected ultimately to do their job properly? Or is Plato simply mapping as a historical sequence a description of the different states of the soul? Defective constitutions may indicate ways of life led as a result of mistaken views as to what constitutes happiness. The various examples demonstrate that all defective constitutions and psychological states attain happiness at the expense of each other: a zero-sum game. Only the true philosopher is concerned with the happiness of all.

In the balance/tension between political and psychological illustrations, it is significant that the culmination of the description of the worst constitution and psychological

³⁹ For earlier problems arising from the discussion in Books 3 and 4, see vol. 1, Introduction to Books I-V, section 2 (iii).

⁴⁰ See Blössner, "The City-Soul Analogy," 358.

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state of all, that of the tyrant, is Socrates' insistence that such a man is most wretched when he lives out his existence not as a private citizen but as a ruler: SOCRATES: "Perhaps you'll think the following is even more wretched than this one." "What sort is that?" "Anyone who, being a tyrannical man, doesn't live his life as a private individual, but has bad luck and as a result of some disaster contrives to make himself an actual tyrant" (578b11-c2). In concluding his sequence in Books 8-9 by insisting on the greater wretchedness of the actively ruling tyrant over the private individual, Socrates perhaps has in mind a direct answer on their own ground to Thrasymachus, Glaucon, and Adeimantus in Books 1-2, whose descriptions of the happiness of the tyrant were firmly fixed in the world of practical politics.

(iii) *Republic as Utopia*

This is a controversial issue, elements of which have already been touched on in the discussions of state and soul above, and particularly in the view that the "state" is not intended as a political construct at all but is essentially an image or metaphor for the human soul. It is established by Socrates that no society remotely like *Republic* exists, or has ever existed on earth, and its only current existence is *en logois* (9.592a, i.e., constructed entirely in the conversation Socrates is having with his respondents); but it remains unclear whether the ambiguous term "Utopia" (in *Republic*, *Kallipolis*) denotes an ideal society which, by its very nature, is unrealizable and can exist only in theory, or may indicate a blueprint (*paradeigma*) for a society which

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could and might exist in reality, however improbable or revolutionary the desired goal.⁴¹

A key argument against the practicality of *Republic* is the difficulty of envisaging circumstances in which it could ever conceivably come about. On the question of the practical steps to be taken to initiate progress which might result in his apparently far-fetched goals, which would involve a complete revolution in existing social structures—a sticking point for many doubters—Plato is reticent. In the only reference to the practical question of how Utopia might be realized (the end of Book 7: 540e–41b), Socrates says that the quickest and easiest way is for the philosopher-rulers to send everybody over ten years old into the country in order to give the young prospective guardians a suitable education uninfluenced by their parents' habits and ways of life.⁴² It is hard to imagine how anything less revolutionary would work, since the differences between *Republic* and any existing state in the Greek world are clearly fundamental. How would the potential philosopher-rulers, descending again into the cave and temporarily blinded in the unaccustomed darkness, have the ability to take the first practical steps toward the ideal state, or even

⁴¹ Cf. Thomas More's *Utopia* (Eu-topia = "good place") as "Ou-topia" ("no place"), an ambiguity which More himself recognized (see the addendum to the translation by Robynson). See *Resp.* 6.492e, 499c.

⁴² It is hard to see any obvious irony in the passage, as does Rowe, "Myth, History and Dialectic," 268, opposed by Morrison, "The Utopian Character of Plato's Ideal City," 241. Unless, of course, the whole *Republic* is seen as ironical (see n. 47 below).

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avoid the fate predicted by Socrates (517a5) and, of course, suffered in reality by the historical Socrates?

On the other hand, Socrates suggests that what they are striving for might be an approximation to an ideal rather than an absolute (5.473a). This would imply that the task is difficult but not impossible. Moreover, there are a number of occasions where Socrates, in considering how his state will react to external forces, seems to envisage it engaging with the other Greek *poleis* and the non-Greek world very much as they existed in his time, for example, in warfare (5.469a–71b), where a distinction is made between the behavior of the fighting class (the auxiliaries) toward “barbarians” and toward fellow Greeks, where Plato draws on conventional pan-Hellenic rhetoric concerning common language, religious traditions, and festivals binding Greeks of different *poleis* together (470e10).⁴³ The provisions for the social organization in Book 5, in particular the development of communal rearing of children and military organization, strongly resemble a real-life Spartan or Cretan model, as does the communal living of the ruling class and the absence of private land or private money.⁴⁴ These parallels suggest, then, some connection with existing political arrangements. Moreover, the necessity for military forces (2.373e8ff.) is directly related to enlargement of the city consequent on the abandonment, early on in the outline, of the first basic city (Glaucon’s “city of pigs,” 372d4–5) in favor of the luxurious city,

⁴³ See, e.g., Hdt. 8.144.2–3.

⁴⁴ See Xenophon, *Lac. Pol.* 7.6.

where there will be need for more land. Here, it can be argued, Socrates realistically settles for second best.

Most directly opposed to the “unrealizable Utopia” position outlined earlier is the view that Plato was actually proposing a practical program for action, possibly related to his experiences and hopes in Sicily, which he visited several times, with the vain hope, if we believe the *7th Letter*, that the son of the Syracusan tyrant, Dionysius, might, as absolute ruler, be in a position to be trained to become his “philosopher-king.”⁴⁵

The most prominent advocate of the position that Plato envisaged a definitely realizable Utopia has been K. Popper, whose key work, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, was published at the end of World War II, in reaction to the totalitarian ideologies of Marxism and Nazism.⁴⁶ Popper mounted an attack on *Republic* with the aim of bringing to prominence its sinister, coercive aspects as a prototype of the “closed” authoritarian society, in conscious opposition to the prevalent idealist interpretations of the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, to break the “spell of Plato,” as he expressed it.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ 338bff. The authenticity of the letters has long been disputed; the Seventh, if not by Plato, may well have been written in his lifetime. For a skeptical view of the relationship between the Letter and *Resp.* 6.473c–d, see Schofield, *Plato*, 16.

⁴⁶ Vol. 1, *The Spell of Plato*.

⁴⁷ For wide and varied reactions to Popper, see Bambrough, *Plato, Popper and Politics*. A distinctively different, and influential interpretation of *Republic* is that associated with Leo Strauss, *The City and Man*, and his followers (e.g., Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*), which argues that *Republic* is not intended as a serious Utopia at all but is created as quite the reverse, a comic fantasy,

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The matter remains unsettled largely because in *Republic* Plato himself is not always clear on the subject. In preparing for the “third wave” of argument in Book 5 (that a necessary condition of the ideal city coming into existence is that philosophers should gain power), Socrates admits his hesitation in putting an argument which is a *paradoxon logon* (5.472a6), following the lesser but still revolutionary arguments involving women as guardians and the abolition of the family. It is conceivable that Plato himself was exploring possibilities and using Socrates’ doubts and hesitations, as well as the critical interventions of Glaucon and Adeimantus, to signify his own uncertainties on the issue.⁴⁸

(iv) Problems Concerning Book X

The key issue with Book 10 taken as a whole is how it relates to the rest of *Republic*. The end of Book 9 appears to complete Socrates’ project to discuss the ideal state and soul and the defective states of each. The abrupt resumption at the beginning of Book 10 (595a) heralds the apparently arbitrary reintroduction of a number of loosely related topics: a discussion of the status of poetry, which in key respects does not tally with what has been argued

an “anti-Utopia,” which ironically demonstrates, to those with the intellect to perceive it, the impossible absurdity of its provisions as outlined by S., especially the social provisions of Book 5 (consciously recalling Aristophanes). For a penetrating critique of Strauss and his followers, see Burnyeat, “Sphinx Without a Secret.”

⁴⁸ On the inevitability of decay, see 8.546aff.

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in Books 2-3, with an equally unheralded transition (608c) to a series of arguments purporting to prove the immortality of the soul, followed by a discussion of rewards and punishments awarded in this life and after death, the latter described in detail in the myth of Er (614bff.), which, while following logically from what precedes, comprises an ending to the dialogue in a totally different mode from the rest of the work.

There are logical problems with the arguments of each of these individual topics, and the question arises also whether, taken as a whole, they constitute a kind of appendix to the main dialogue, possibly even composed at a different time from the main body of the work,⁴⁹ or have an organic relationship with each other and/or with the whole. In order to tackle this problem we shall consider each topic arising in Book 10 in order and then look at their general coherence.

(a) Poetry and *Mimēsis* (595a1-608b2)

Plato's second attack on poetry adds a metaphysical dimension to the ethical/psychological attack in Books 2-3. The place two removes from reality which poetry occupies (i.e., an imitation of the craftsman's imitation of the Form, 597e6-8) results in a much more sweeping attack: it would appear that not just unsuitable poetry but any kind of poetry at all is, by definition, eliminated from the state. The introduction of the Forms in Books 6-7 makes this kind of attack, based on the hierarchy of Forms and sensible things, possible at this late stage of the dialogue. It

⁴⁹ So Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 335.

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is apparent that here Plato is using “imitation” (*mimēsis*) in a very different sense from its more restricted use in Book 3 to indicate simply a particular form of poetic discourse, i.e., where the speaker becomes (“imitates”) the character, as in tragedy, as opposed to wholly narrated or “mixed” (e.g., epic) discourse (392d5ff.). In Book 10, in the light of the intervening books, all poetry, whatever its form, is *mimēsis* in this metaphysical sense.⁵⁰

A second problem, internal to Book 10, concerns the analogy Plato assumes between visual art and poetry. From 596d1, the “wonderful sophist” (*thaumaston sophistēn*) who creates the whole world by simply holding up a mirror to it (d8) is the painter (*zdōgraphos*); poetry, in the form of tragedy, is abruptly introduced at 597e6 with the assumption that it is strictly analogous to painting. It is, however, far from clear how poetry “holds up a mirror” to reality in the way that painting does. In order to reinforce the analogy, Plato reintroduces an argument which Socrates deployed in *Ion*,⁵¹ namely that the poet inevitably does not have knowledge about what he writes, which is essential for the production of good work (598e4). The argumentative “slide” from painting to poetry is continually visible in Book 10, where the analogy is assumed rather than argued for.

Socrates later states that there is a hierarchy of knowledge: the user of objects, such as a flute, is the person

⁵⁰ Having eliminated Homer, tragedy, and lyric from the state, S. states that “the only forms of poetry we are to allow in our state are hymns to the gods and eulogies of good men” (607a).

⁵¹ *Ion* 537ff.

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who really knows about them and gives instruction to the craftsman, the maker of the object, who has “correct belief” (*pistin orthēn*: 601e7), whereas the imitator, painter or poet, has neither knowledge nor correct belief. This looks rather like an attempt to graft the theory of art onto the ontological hierarchy of perception in the image of the Line in Book 6,⁵² which doesn’t work, for two main reasons: the higher levels of knowledge open to the guardian pursuers of mathematical and dialectical studies (Book 7. 539–40) cannot be compared to the practical knowledge demonstrated by the user of implements and other objects; second, the intermediate position of the maker (*ho poiētēs*) does not accord well with the status of the artisan class at the bottom of the hierarchy in the tripartite state/soul arrangement of Books 4 and 8–9.

In any case there is an indication in 603b10 that Plato is abandoning total reliance on the analogy with painting and reverting to the psychological and ethical arguments against poetry that he deployed in Book 3, namely that it appeals to the lowest, the uncontrolled elements in the soul (and, by analogy with the state, to the masses: 602b2). Looked at overall, Plato seems to be arguing at one moment for poetry’s triviality (two removes from reality, in the metaphysical theory at the beginning of Book 10) and at the same time its strong and potentially fatal seductive power (Book 3 and the latter part of the discussion in Book 10). The attempt to combine these two apparently opposed characteristics of poetry perhaps reflects Plato’s own ambivalent attitude toward poetry: intellectual disappro-

⁵² See Appendix to Book 6.

val together with strong emotional attraction, as in the “lover’s farewell” at 607e–8a.⁵³

(b) The Immortality of the Soul (608d3–12a5)

Plato had already argued extensively (for example, at *Phaedo* 105ff., *Meno* 85eff.) for the immortality of the soul and the separate nature of body and soul, the former perishable, the latter immortal, an idea possibly derived originally from the Pythagoreans⁵⁴ and in Plato based on the theory of recollection and the idea that the soul is unified and indestructible—all of which makes Glaucon’s amazement at Socrates’ sudden assertion of this established and surely well-known Platonic position (608d5) unexpected. The argument in *Republic* 10 is somewhat different from those in *Phaedo* and *Meno*, and is based on the assumption that the body and soul each has naturally good and bad things which respectively preserve and corrupt it. Socrates argues that the fates of body and soul are different: that the body’s badness can ultimately destroy it, whereas the soul, although corrupted by its specifically bad characteristic, namely injustice, remains essentially indestructible. One might at this point ask why one can assume the soul to be indestructible in view of all the bad accretions it acquires during the individual’s lifetime. Socrates states that the soul is like the sea god Glaucus, its original pristine nature

⁵³ Cf. S.’s confession of the love (*philia*) and reverence (*aidōs*) he has had for Homer since childhood, which makes him hesitant to speak (595b9). For the phrase “lover’s farewell,” see Moss, “What Is Imitative Poetry?” 443 n. 1.

⁵⁴ Cf. the Pythagorean or Orphic-based wordplay *sōma sēma* (“the body is the tomb”).

overlaid by the corruption which it has accumulated during its earthly life but remaining essentially inviolate (611c^{ff.}).⁵⁵ However, for the basic premise of the argument—that the soul is different in nature from the body and indestructible—Plato is relying heavily, as he comes close to admitting (b9–10), on arguments he has deployed elsewhere (e.g., *Phaedo* and *Meno*).

(c) The Rewards of Justice and Injustice (612b7–21d3) Having summed up Books 2–9 as an explicit answer to Glaucon and Adeimantus in Book 2, namely that justice is the best thing for the soul irrespective of actual consequences, Socrates' reintroduction of the consequences, the practical rewards of virtue and vice in this world and the next (612b7–c2), is unexpected and, on the face of it, unnecessary. However, it does correspond to the choice Socrates originally made at the beginning of Book 2 (358a): that one must love justice both for itself *and* for its consequences. The argument of the main body of *Republic* has effectively eliminated Glaucon's third suggestion (357c4–d1), the "consequentialist" argument, which he and Adeimantus develop as devil's advocates in Book 2, that all that matters is the appearance of, or reputation (*doxa*) for, justice, irrespective of the reality (*alētheia*). The explicit reference back to the ring of Gyges (612b4)⁵⁶ signals it

⁵⁵ This image of the soul overlaid by the damage of corrupting influences is possibly Plato's attempt to reconcile a unitary immortal soul with the internal complexity of the composite soul, as developed in Book 4, as he admits in 611b4–6 (see Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, 346).

⁵⁶ Called an ancestor of Gyges at 359d1, a notorious crux; see Book 2 n. 10.

and this passage as a frame for the whole argument of *Republic*.

There is a natural lead from here to the final section, a move to a different type of discourse in the Myth of Er (614b2ff.). The change from reasoned argument to description, although philosophically disconcerting, corresponds to the change in topic: what happens in the afterlife is beyond logical demonstration or human knowledge⁵⁷—hence it requires an eyewitness who, unlike Socrates, has been there and has unexpectedly returned to tell what he saw. Er's account has the authority of the revelation of someone who has actually experienced what it is like to pass into the afterlife.

Although therefore not expressed in argumentative form, the Myth of Er is nevertheless like the main body of the dialogue, closely bound up with Glaucon and Adeimantus' original challenge to Socrates, which involved accounts of the gods and the afterlife which argued that the gods either don't care about humans or are perfectly happy to be "bought" by lavish sacrifices (2.362c1–d1); therefore any possible penalty to be feared by the wrongdoer can be discounted. The Myth reveals that this is not the case, and that there is a close correlation between just/unjust behavior in life and fate after death; in this respect the myth resembles a similar account of the afterlife at the end of *Gorgias*.⁵⁸ However, the *Republic* myth introduces a further dimension: the transmigration of souls. The necessity for a soul to choose a new life in a cycle of reincar-

⁵⁷ See *Ap.* 40c5ff. for an earlier example of S.'s open-ended speculations on the nature of the afterlife.

⁵⁸ *Grg.* 523ff.

nation introduces the idea of free choice, with enough morally acceptable lives for all (see 619b3–5). This places firm emphasis on the “anti-tragic” element in the choice.⁵⁹ It is the individual, and not the gods or fate, who controls his or her choice. Nevertheless, Er is reported as saying of the person making a bad choice: “He didn’t blame himself for his misfortunes, but chance, heaven, and everything but himself” (619c5–6).

The technical passage at 616b–17e strongly suggests the deterministic nature of the universe (the revolving of the spheres, the spindle of necessity, the three Fates, etc.).⁶⁰ Moreover, souls are tied into a cycle of eternal choices of future lives and the possibility of punishment for what they have done in any particular life; there is moreover no guarantee that a simple life of virtue and long residence in the sky will lead to a good choice next time, after the draft from the River of Lethe (621a). This is notoriously hard to reconcile with a simple correlation between conduct and reward, and suggests that at the end, Plato’s conclusions are provisional and that he regards the whole question of consequent rewards to be of less significance than the rewards of maintaining intrinsic goodness in this life, a topic which he spends most of *Republic* discussing.⁶¹ Socrates’ concluding remarks, to which, as in the *Gorgias* myth, we get no reaction from the interlocu-

⁵⁹ Halliwell, “The Life-and-Death Journey of the Soul,” 451.

⁶⁰ See Book 10, nn. 45–50.

⁶¹ It is significant that S. at 618b6–19b1 intervenes in his recital of Er’s experiences to draw his own moral from the story—a strong and earnest recommendation to Glaucon to follow the life which is best for his own soul.

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tors (621b7–d3), while ending generally on an optimistic note, especially the final words *eu prattōmen* (“we shall do well”), still emphasize the thousand-year journey and the capability of enduring evil as well as good, while “we shall practice justice with intelligence in every way” (621c5–6).

Despite the problems we have encountered with individual topics in Book 10, from a broad perspective the coherence of its parts seems clear. The reintroduction of material rewards for justice following the extensive arguments for its intrinsic value relates closely to Book 2 as an answer providing a frame for the *Republic* as a whole. The return to poetry at the beginning, while throwing up problems in relation to discussion of that topic in Books 2–3, can also be seen as demonstrating how poetic discourse, in its ethical and psychological as well as its social implications, reveals and encourages the least virtuous elements in the human soul, as well as presenting, in the Myth of Er, an unsuitable paradigm for human (lack of) personal responsibility for moral choice, and the disastrous consequences for individuals of making the wrong choice.⁶²

3. RECEPTION OF *REPUBLIC*

The influence of *Republic* on subsequent Western culture⁶³ as Plato’s best-known dialogue is vast and would fill

⁶² Nb. the beating of the breast and the blaming of fate and the gods by those making a bad choice at 619c4–6, which comes close to a parody of the tragic.

⁶³ This short section is confined to *Western* culture. This is not, however, to ignore the vital role played by Arabic scholarship in the transmission of Greek philosophy.

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several books at least.⁶⁴ For purposes of this very brief survey some key periods and aspects are highlighted (for more detailed studies, see footnotes and bibliography). Much of what is said of *Republic* relates to reactions to Plato in general.⁶⁵ Perhaps more than with any other Classical author, his dialogues have been subject to radically diverging views based on fundamental disagreements over how his words are to be interpreted or which dialogues or periods of his writing career are to be emphasized. Disputes on these questions are generally reflected in the positions of subsequent organized Platonism in the ancient world, especially in the Platonic Academy, which survived as a school of philosophy in Athens until the first century BC and in less formal guise well after that in other ancient philosophical schools, especially Stoicism. In more recent reception of Plato, different interpretations of *Republic* have been a sounding board, as it were, for specific political, social, and religious developments.

Reactions to Plato relate roughly to three basic positions. First is the doctrinal or dogmatic, which takes what Plato says at face value in developing a political/ethical/psychological/metaphysical system, albeit one that changed in the course of his dialogues: the political theory of *Statesman* and *Laws*, for example, is significantly differ-

⁶⁴ See Trapp, *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*.

⁶⁵ Nb. A. N. Whitehead's famous comment (Whitehead, *Process and Reality*) that the European philosophical tradition "consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." "Responses to Plato" (as suggested by Blackburn, *Plato's Republic*, 4) would be a better phrase, incorporating as it does questioning and rejection as well as acceptance.

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ent from that of *Republic*. A particular aspect of this doctrinal position is the emphasis on Plato's idealism and the theory of Forms in which dialogues such as *Timaeus* are prominent. This idealist aspect is associated with Neoplatonist thought (third century AD onward) and includes the allegorical interpretations of the fifth-century AD Neoplatonist Proclus, for whom the "descent" (*katabasis*) of Socrates from Athens to the Piraeus (Book I.327a1) represents his symbolic descent from the ideal world of the philosopher into the shadow world of the cave.⁶⁶ Second is the skeptical interpretation, which derives largely from Socrates and the *aporetic* early dialogues and became important in the Platonic Academy of the third century BC, although this has least to do with *Republic* and Plato's subsequent political works, which, for all their considerable differences, advance definite doctrines and lines of argument. The third position, which has perhaps least to do with the ancient world and relates most to current interpretations, is the view that Plato's dialogues, including the *Republic*, should be viewed as "open texts," i.e., as the author's own explorations of matters on which he has not himself reached a definite conclusion, a position which is given a certain credence in *Republic* in particular by Socrates' numerous hesitations and uncertainties expressed in the course of the discussion.

Reactions of philosophers in the immediate aftermath of Plato's death clearly demonstrate that *Republic* was at that time largely understood literally as a political manifesto. Aristotle (384–322), originally a member of Plato's

⁶⁶ See, e.g., Burnyeat, "First Words," 6; Vegetti, *Platone*, 93–104.

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Academy in the founder's lifetime, radically dissented from key elements in Plato's thought, in particular the Theory of Forms; but on *Republic* specifically he was particularly concerned to criticize political details while nevertheless apparently making the assumption that Socrates was talking about a realizable *politeia*. From the standpoint of Aristotle's assumption of the naturalness of the *polis*, Socrates' "city of pigs" (369ff.) is strongly criticized for not accepting that even a simple association requires moral and judicial organization.⁶⁷ Elsewhere he criticizes, from a detailed empirical standpoint, Plato's account of the change and decline of constitutions in Books 8 and 9.⁶⁸

Political ideas associated with Stoicism in the third to second century BC were influenced by *Republic*, tempered with Cynicism and adverse reactions to Epicureanism. Zeno (335–263), the founder of Stoicism, wrote a *Republic*, partly preserved by Diogenes Laertius (Book 7.32–3), which apparently deliberately echoes elements of Plato's *Republic*, both in agreement and in dissent. While preserving Plato's radical transformation of the family, Zeno rejects Plato's social stratification of the city as a whole and focuses on the moral perfectibility of the individual. Cynic influence is clear in Zeno's abandonment of Plato's strict rules for sexual relations in favor of a free-for-all; the only important guideline is to practice virtue.⁶⁹

The influence of Plato on the Stoic-influenced political

⁶⁷ Arist. *Pol.* 1291a

⁶⁸ *Ib.* 1316a–b.

⁶⁹ For Zeno's *Republic*, see Schofield, *The Stoic Idea of the City*.

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ideas of later antiquity is particularly marked in, e.g., Cicero (106–43), whose *Republic* consciously echoes and diverges from Plato, and Plutarch (ca. AD 50–ca. 120). However, while accepting the importance of rule by an educated elite, Stoicism largely rejected the complex metaphysics of Plato's *Republic* in favor of attention to his later political dialogues, *Statesman* and *Laws*, with their theories of statesmanship and control by the wise ruler.

In contrast to the essentially empirically based practical political discussions mentioned above, the Renaissance saw attempts at genuine Utopias, for example, Thomas More's *Utopia*.⁷⁰ Reflecting Plato in its radicalism and explicitly citing *Republic*, More's is a thoroughly revisionary construct of an island with common ownership of property and land. It contains features which are not consonant with More's devout, if not to say intolerant, Catholicism, such as the ease of divorce, married and female priests, which leads to the possibility that the work is intended as a Swiftian type of satire.⁷¹ In the seventeenth century Francis Bacon's Utopia, *New Atlantis*,⁷² while referring back to Plato's *Timaeus* and *Critias*, looked forward to the development of science, to which Bacon saw Plato as an impediment. Rationalist trends in seventeenth-century Utopias were rebutted and satirized by Jonathan Swift in *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), an anti- or dystopia.

⁷⁰ The full Latin title: *De Optimo Rei Publicae Statu deque Nova Insula Utopia* ("Of a Republic's Best State and of the New Island of Utopia").

⁷¹ The name of the narrator, Raphael Hythloday (cf. Greek ὕθλος = "nonsense"), suggests this may be the case.

⁷² *Nova Atlantis*, 1624, English translation, 1627.

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During the nineteenth century Plato was a potent influence on several cultural and political developments. The Romantic movement, in particular the writings and poetry of, for example, Shelley, Byron, and Coleridge, was strongly influenced by Plato's idealism. The notion of the rule of an educated political elite, driven by strong and absolute moral principles and educated to lead an uneducated populace, a key principle of *Republic*, found an eloquent advocate in Benjamin Jowett, master of Balliol College Oxford, Greek scholar, and translator of Plato, who saw himself as educating the future British ruling class, "guardians" of the state, on Platonic lines. The strong advocacy of Plato by reforming liberals, such as J. S. Mill, illustrates the paradoxical relationship that Platonic works such as *Republic* had with Victorian intellectuals. The idea of a constitution based on the leadership of the intellectual and moral elite tended to override perceptions of Plato's intense dislike of democracy (the second worst constitution in *Republic* Books 8 and 9) and his advocacy of a fixed, hierarchical class system. While these ideas might have unconsciously resonated with the paternalism of political leaders such as Gladstone, the radical proposals in Book 5, such as the equality of women and the abolition of the family, seem to have passed many of the Victorian intellectuals and politicians by, or, like Jowett, they preferred to concentrate on the broad but vague picture of moral progress.⁷³

The potentially dangerous and sinister aspects of Plato's utopian vision became obvious in the early decades of

⁷³ On Plato and the Victorians, see Jenkyns, *The Victorians and Ancient Greece*, chap. 9 (pp. 227-63).

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the twentieth century with the rise of totalitarian regimes advocating wholesale social engineering which bore resemblance to that in *Republic*. In strong reaction to the prevailing 1920s–1930s idealistic advocacy of Plato, seen in such scholars as Paul Shorey, A. E. Taylor, and Ernest Barker,⁷⁴ the British politician Richard Crossman before World War II, and, more influentially, the Austrian philosopher Karl Popper immediately after it, related *Republic* in detail to the Fascist and Communist regimes in Germany and the Soviet Union.⁷⁵ Popper strongly argued for the “betrayal” of liberal free-thinking Socrates by the authoritarian Plato, whom he characterized as the originator of “closed societies” and whose “other-world” metaphysics had, he argued, cast a seductive spell over countless generations.⁷⁶

Some parts of Popper’s argument—for example the “libertarian” Socrates versus the “authoritarian” Plato—have not stood the test of time, owing, partly at least, to increased skepticism concerning how far the personality and views of Socrates can be established independently from those of Plato.⁷⁷ However, Popper’s general influ-

⁷⁴ Shorey, *What Plato Said*; Taylor, *Plato*; Barker, *Greek Political Theory*.

⁷⁵ See Crossman, *Plato Today*. For Popper, see above, n. 47. On *Republic* and totalitarianism, see the analysis of C. C. W. Taylor, “Plato’s Totalitarianism.”

⁷⁶ For a valuable detailed discussion of Popper and analysis of twentieth-century political reaction to *Republic*, to which this paragraph is indebted, see Lane, *Plato’s Progeny*, chap. 4 (97–134).

⁷⁷ See vol. 1, General Introduction, section 3 and n. 16.

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ence has provoked a reaction that takes us up to the present. The tension which preoccupied so many commentators on either side of the argument in the twentieth century—between *Republic* as a text which appears to be arguing for personal liberty and self-fulfillment and also simultaneously to be advocating highly authoritarian social and political arrangements for the state—has not been resolved. Instead the focus of the argument has changed. One way of explaining the apparent paradox has been to argue, with varying degrees of certainty, that *Republic* is not primarily a political text at all, but features the “state” as a metaphor for the human soul. It has already been suggested here that in its extreme form this position does not correspond with the text;⁷⁸ however, the fine balance which Plato maintains between the psychological and political aspects of *Republic* leaves room for varying degrees of emphasis on either side of the argument.

Related to this lack of dogmatism is the approach which perhaps suggests the most fruitful development in the immediate future study of *Republic*: the idea of the dialogue as essentially exploratory, reflecting the hesitations, uncertainties, and changes of direction of his main character, Socrates, as well as the agreements and doubts of his interlocutors. This approach enables readers to avoid some of the pitfalls of exclusive interpretations which tend to give prominence to some parts of the work at the expense of others. It also mirrors the form of the dialogue; Plato has Socrates participating in a conversation in a historical

⁷⁸ See vol. 1, Introduction to Books I-V, section 2 (iii).

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location and with recognizably historical characters.⁷⁹ The dramatic context, as we have seen, is not mere window dressing. Through his main character Plato is exploring ideas not only with his interlocutors but with us, his successive modern audiences.

⁷⁹ See Nails, *The People of Plato*.



REPUBLIC

484 Οἱ μὲν δὴ φιλόσοφοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ οἱ μὴ διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντες¹ λόγου μόγις πως ἀνεφάνησαν οἳ εἰσιν ἑκάτεροι.

Ἴσως γάρ, ἔφη, διὰ βραχέος οὐ ράδιον. |

Οὐ φαίνεται, εἶπον· ἐμοὶ γοῦν ἔτι δοκεῖ ἂν βελτιώως φανῆναι εἰ περὶ τούτου μόνου ἔδει ῥηθῆναι, καὶ
 b μὴ πολλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ διελθεῖν μέλλοντι κατοφθεσθαι τί διαφέρει βίος δίκαιος ἀδίκου.

Τί οὖν, ἔφη, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡμῖν;

Τί δ' ἄλλο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τὸ ἐξῆς; ἐπειδὴ φιλόσοφοι μὲν οἱ | τοῦ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντος δυνάμενοι ἐφάπτεσθαι, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἄλλ' ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ παντοίως ἴσχουσιν πλανώμενοι οὐ φιλόσοφοι, ποτέρους δὴ δεῖ πόλεως ἡγεμόνας εἶναι;

Πῶς οὖν λέγοντες ἂν αὐτό, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγομεν;

Ἄπότεροι ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δυνατοὶ φαίνονται φυλάξαι | νόμους τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα πόλεων, τούτους καθιστάναι φύλακας.

¹ διεξελθόντες F: διεξελθόντος AD

BOOK VI

“Now we have got through some lengthy discussion, Glaucon,” I said, “we have somehow, with a great effort, established who are philosophers and who are not.”

“Yes,” he said; “perhaps it would not have been easy in a shorter space.”

“It doesn’t look like it,” I said. “To me at any rate it seems that we would have done it still better if we had had to speak only about this topic and not go through the many others that remain if we plan to examine what difference there is between a just and an unjust life.”¹

“Then what do we need to discuss next?”

“What else but what comes next in order? Since philosophers are able to grasp what is eternal in all its aspects, but those who cannot and wander about among many things that have many guises are not philosophers: which of these should be the leaders of our state?”

“So how could we give a reasonable answer to this?” he asked.

“By establishing as our guardians which of the two groups appears capable of protecting our laws and the way of life of our states.”

¹ This has always been S.’s basic purpose, stated as far back as 1.353e–54a.

Ὅρθως, ἔφη.

c Τόδε δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄρα δῆλον, εἴτε τυφλὸν εἴτε ὄξυ ὀρώντα χρῆ φύλακα τηρεῖν ὅτιοῦν;

Καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, οὐ δῆλον;

Ἡ οὖν δοκοῦσί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν οἱ τῷ ὄντι τοῦ ὄντος ἐκάστου ἐστερημένοι τῆς γνώσεως, | καὶ μηδὲν ἐναργὲς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔχοντες παράδειγμα, μηδὲ δυνάμενοι ὥσπερ γραφῆς εἰς τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἀποβλέποντες κἀκέισε ἀεὶ ἀναφέροντές τε καὶ θεώμενοι ὡς οἷόν d τε ἀκριβέστατα, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νόμιμα καλῶν τε περίρι καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν τίθεσθαί τε, ἐὰν δέη τίθεσθαι, καὶ τὰ κείμενα φυλάττοντες σῶζεις;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ πολὺ τι διαφέρει.

Τούτους οὖν μᾶλλον φύλακας στησόμεθα ἢ τοὺς ἐγνωκότας | μὲν ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν, ἐμπειρία δὲ μηδὲν ἐκείνων ἐλλείποντας μηδ' ἐν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ μέρει ἀρετῆς ὑστεροῦντας;

Ἄτοπον μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἴη ἄλλους αἰρεῖσθαι, εἴ γε τᾶλλα μὴ ἐλλείποντο· τούτῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ σχεδόν τι τῷ μεγίστῳ ἂν προέχοιεν.

485 Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο δὴ λέγωμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἰοί τ' ἔσονται οἱ αὐτοὶ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα ἔχειν;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

² ἀποβλέπω = "contemplate": literally "look away (from many objects) at one in particular." The introduction of painters "contemplating" their models, as a parallel with those who have the capacity to "look away" and contemplate the Forms, although

BOOK VI

“That’s right,” he said.

“Surely this much is clear,” I said: “whether a guardian who is watching over anything should be blind or keensighted?”

“Of course it’s clear,” he said.

“Do you suppose, then, that those people are any different from the blind, who actually lack the knowledge of each thing that exists and have no distinct model of it in their soul and are not even able to contemplate what is truest, as painters do,² use it as a constant reference point and, studying it as accurately as possible, so establish the norms for the beautiful, the just, and the good, if they need establishing, and carefully preserve what has been laid down?”

“Zeus, no!” he said. “There is little difference between them.”

“So shall we appoint these blind people as our guardians, or rather those who know every individual thing that exists and don’t fall short of those others in experience, nor are they inferior to them in any other aspect of virtue?”

“It would be foolish to choose anyone else,” he said, “unless they were lacking in these other respects, since in this, just about their most significant point, they would be outstanding.”

“Shall we then discuss how these same people will be able to possess both types of qualities?”

“Certainly.”

only an analogy, does not correspond with the treatment of artists as “imitators” twice removed from the reality of the Forms, in Book 10.602ff.

Ὁ τοίνυν ἀρχόμενοι τούτου τοῦ λόγου ἐλέγομεν, τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν | πρῶτον δεῖ καταμαθεῖν· καὶ οἶμαι, ἔαν ἐκείνην ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσωμεν, ὁμολογήσειεν καὶ ὅτι οἰοί τε ταῦτα ἔχειν οἱ αὐτοί, ὅτι τε οὐκ ἄλλους πόλεων ἡγεμόνας δεῖ εἶναι ἢ τούτους.

Ἐκαὶ πῶς; |

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ τῶν φιλοσόφων φύσεων περὶ ὁμο-
 b λογήσθω ἡμῖν ὅτι μαθήματός γε αἰεὶ ἐρῶσιν ὃ ἂν αὐ-
 τοῖς δηλοῖ ἐκείνης τῆς οὐσίας τῆς αἰεὶ οὔσης καὶ μὴ
 πλανωμένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς.

Ὁμολογήσθω. |

Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὅτι πάσης αὐτῆς, καὶ οὔτε
 σμικροῦ οὔτε μείζονος οὔτε τιμιωτέρου οὔτε ἀτιμοτέ-
 ρου μέρους ἐκόντες ἀφίενται, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν
 περὶ τε τῶν φιλοτίμων καὶ ἐρωτικῶν διήλθομεν.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τόδε τοίνυν μετὰ τοῦτο σκόπει εἰ ἀνάγκη ἔχειν
 c πρὸς τούτῳ ἐν τῇ φύσει οἷ ἂν μέλλωσιν ἔσσεσθαι
 οἷους ἐλέγομεν.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὴν ἀψεύδειαν καὶ τὸ ἐκόντας εἶναι μηδαμῇ προσ-
 δέχεσθαι τὸ ψεῦδος ἀλλὰ μισεῖν, τὴν δ' ἀλήθειαν
 στέργειν. |

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

Οὐ μόνον γε, ὦ φίλε, εἰκός, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη
 τὸν ἐρωτικῶς του φύσει ἔχοντα πᾶν τὸ συγγενές τε
 καὶ οἰκείον τῶν παιδικῶν ἀγαπᾶν.

“Well, as we were saying when we began this discussion,³ we must first learn their nature and, I think, if we can agree sufficiently on that, we can also agree that these same people can possess these qualities, and that in fact we must choose no one but these as the leaders of our states.”

“And how do we do that?”

“Well, as to the natures of philosophers, let us agree that they are constantly devoted to that learning, which makes clear to them that part of existence which is eternal and does not wander round between growth and decay.”

“Yes, let’s agree on that.”

“And their devotion is to the whole of it,” I said, “and they do not willingly pass over anything that is insignificant, or larger, or of greater or less value, just like those we discussed earlier who are ambitious and lovers.”⁴

“You’re right,” he said.

“Now consider the next point, whether those who are to be the sort of people we were discussing must have something in their nature in addition to this.”

“Such as?”

“Not lying and under no circumstances be willing to accept falsehood, but rather detest it and be devoted to truth.”

“That’s fair enough,” he said.

“Not only is it fair enough, my friend, but one who is by nature a lover of something is under total obligation to love everything that belongs to and is akin to the objects of his love.”

³ At 5.474b3–c3.

⁴ At 5.474d3–75b2.

Ὅρθως, ἔφη. |

Ἔστι οὖν οἰκειότερον σοφία τι ἀληθείας ἢ εὖροις;
Καὶ πῶς; ἢ δ' ὅς.

Ἔστι οὖν δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν φιλόσοφόν
d τε καὶ φιλοψευδῆ;

Οὐδαμῶς γε.

Τὸν ἄρα τῷ ὄντι φιλομαθῆ πάσης ἀληθείας δεῖ
εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ὅτι μάλιστα ὀρέγεσθαι. |

Παντελῶς γε.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν ὅτω γε εἰς ἓν τι αἰ ἐπιθυμῖαι σφόδρα
ρέπουσιν, ἴσμεν που ὅτι εἰς τᾶλλα τούτῳ ἀσθενέστε-
ραι, ὥσπερ ρεῦμα ἐκείσε ἀπωχτευμένον.

Τί μὴν;

Ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον
ἐρρηήκασιν, περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οἶμαι ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς
καθ' αὐτὴν εἶεν ἄν, τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείπειν,
e εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἀλλ' ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφός τις εἴη.

Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη.

Σώφρων μὴν ὅ γε τοιοῦτος καὶ οὐδαμῆ φιλοχρήμα-
τος· ὧν γὰρ ἕνεκα χρήματα μετὰ πολλῆς δαπάνης
σπουδάζεται, ἄλλω τινὶ | μᾶλλον ἢ τούτῳ προσήκει
σπουδάζειν.

Οὕτω.

486 Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνουν
μέλλης φύσιν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μῆ.

⁵ For the idea of the philosopher as not concerned with bodily pleasures, see *Phd.* 64c10–67c3.

"You're right," he said.

"Could you find anything closer to wisdom than truth?"

"How could I?" he said.

"Can a lover of wisdom and a lover of lies have the same nature?"

"In no way!"

"Then he who is truly a lover of learning must search for the whole truth right from childhood as far as possible."

"Absolutely."

"Yet going on from this, I think that we know that whoever has passions that incline sharply toward one thing is weaker toward others, like a stream diverted from the main channel."

"Of course."

"If a person were a true philosopher and not a fake one, I think that when his passions have flowed into his learning and everything of this sort, he would be led to the pleasure of the soul by itself alone and leave aside those which arise through the body."⁵

"Yes, that must be right."

"Such a person is temperate and not at all passionate about money. Why money and high expenditure should be a serious matter is a subject more fit for someone else to worry about."

"So it is."

"Again, I think we must also consider the following point when you are going to distinguish between a nature which is a lover of wisdom and one which isn't."

Τὸ ποῖον;

Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευθερίας· ἐναντιώτατον γάρ | που σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς αἰεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Ἐπι οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοία μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἶε τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον;

Ἀδύνατον, ἦ δ' ὅς.

- b Οὐκοῦν καὶ θάνατον οὐ δεινόν τι ἠγήσεται ὁ τοιοῦτος;

Ἐκιστα γε.

Δειλῇ δὴ καὶ ἀνελευθέρῳ φύσει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἂν μετείῃ.

| Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Τί οὖν; ὁ κόσμος καὶ μὴ φιλοχρήματος μὴδ' ἀνελεύθερος μὴδ' ἀλαζῶν μὴδὲ δειλὸς ἔσθ' ὅπη ἂν δυσσύμβολος ἢ ἄδικος γένοιτο;

Οὐκ ἔστιν. |

Καὶ τοῦτο δὴ ψυχὴν σκοπῶν φιλόσοφον καὶ μὴ εὐθύς νέου ὄντος ἐπισκέψῃ, εἰ ἄρα δικαία τε καὶ ἡμερος ἢ δυσκοινωνήτος καὶ ἀγρία.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

- c Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε παραλείψεις, ὡς ἐγῶμαι.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Εὐμαθῆς ἢ δυσμαθῆς. ἢ προσδοκᾶς ποτέ τινα τι

“What’s that?”

“You must not overlook any trace of illiberality. Pettiness in my view is the extreme opposite to the nature of a soul which is constantly seeking to reach out for the sum total of things divine and human.”

“That is so true,” he said.

“Do you then think it is possible for the one who is high-minded and has the whole of time and existence in his view to regard human life as something great?”

“No, that’s impossible,” he replied.

“Such a person then will not consider death as something terrifying either?”

“No, not at all.”

“Then it would appear that a cowardly and niggardly nature would have nothing of true philosophy in it.”

“I don’t think so.”

“What then? Is there any way in which an orderly person, who is not passionate about money, or mean-minded, or a charlatan, or a coward, can turn into someone who drives a hard bargain and is unjust?”

“No, there isn’t.”

“And another thing: while you are looking at the philosophical soul and the one which isn’t, from earliest youth, look carefully to see if it is just and gentle, or intractable and undisciplined.”

“I certainly will.”

“And there’s something else I think you won’t overlook.”

“What’s that?”

“Whether he is quick or slow to learn. Or do you expect anyone to love something enough who does whatever he

ικανῶς ἂν στέρξαι, ὃ πρᾶττων ἂν ἀλγῶν τε πρᾶττοι
καὶ μόγισ σμικρὸν ἀνύτων; |

Οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο.

Τί δ' εἰ μηδὲν ὦν μάθοι σώζειν δύναίτο, λήθης ὦν
πλέως; ἄρ' ἂν οἴός τ' εἶη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι;

Καὶ πῶς; |

Ἄνόνητα δὴ πονῶν οὐκ οἶει ἀναγκασθήσεται τε-
λευτῶν αὐτόν τε μισεῖν καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πράξιν;

Πῶς δ' οὖ;

d Ἐπιλήσιμονα ἄρα ψυχὴν ἐν ταῖς ἱκανῶς φιλοσό-
φοις μὴ ποτε ἐγκρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ μνημονικὴν αὐτὴν
ζητῶμεν δεῖν εἶναι.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ἄλλ' οὐ μὴν τό γε τῆς ἀμούσου τε καὶ ἀσχήμονος
φύσεως | ἄλλοσέ ποι ἂν φαῖμεν ἔλκειν ἢ εἰς ἀμε-
τρίαν.

Τί μὴν;

Ἀλήθειαν δ' ἀμετρία ἡγήσεται συγγενὴ εἶναι ἢ ἐμ-
μετρία;

Ἐμμετρία.

Ἐμμετρον ἄρα καὶ εὐχαριν ζητῶμεν πρὸς τοῖς
ἄλλοις | διάνοιαν φύσει, ἣν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος ἰδέαν
ἐκάστου τὸ αὐτοφυὲς εὐάγωγον παρέξει.

Πῶς δ' οὖ;

e Τί οὖν; μὴ πη δοκοῦμέν σοι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἕκαστα
διεληλυθέναι καὶ ἐπόμενα ἀλλήλοις τῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ
ὄντος ἱκανῶς τε καὶ τελέως ψυχῇ μεταλήψεσθαι;

487 Ἀναγκαιότατα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

BOOK VI

does with painful effort and the little he achieves is done with great difficulty?"

"That couldn't happen."

"What if he were completely forgetful and couldn't retain whatever he learns? Could he fail to be empty of knowledge?"

"How could he fail to be?"

"So if he toils without profit, don't you think he'll be forced finally to despise himself and such activity?"

"Of course he will."

"Then let us never count a forgetful soul among competent philosophers, but insist that the one we're looking for be retentive."

"Certainly."

"Moreover, we would also agree that the unrefined, ill-formed nature would lead nowhere but to disorder?"

"What else?"

"Do you consider truth is akin to disorder, or proportion?"

"Proportion."

"Then, in addition to everything else, let's look for a mind with a natural sense of proportion and grace, whose innate disposition will make it easy to direct toward the concept of every aspect of reality."

"Of course."

"What then? I hope you don't think that the characteristics we have gone through are not essential and compatible with each other for the soul which is going to participate competently and fully in reality?"

"No, we have covered the most essential points," he said.

Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπη μέμψη τοιοῦτον ἐπιτηδεύμα, ὃ μὴ ποτ' ἂν τις οἶός τε γένοιτο ἱκανῶς ἐπιτηδεῦσαι, εἰ μὴ φύσει εἴη μνήμων, εὐμαθής, μεγαλοπρεπής, εὐχαρις, φίλος τε καὶ ἰσσυγενῆς ἀληθείας, δικαιοσύνης, ἀνδρείας, σωφροσύνης;

Οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος, ἔφη, τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο.

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τελειωθείσι τοῖς τοιούτοις παιδεία τε καὶ ἡλικία ἄρα οὐ μόνους ἂν τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτρέποις;

- b Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἂν οἶός τ' εἴη ἀντειπεῖν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε ἂ νῦν λέγεις: ἠγοῦνται δι' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἑκάστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἰσθροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τῶν πεττεύειν δεινῶν οἱ μὴ τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείονται καὶ οὐκ
- c ἔχουσιν ὅτι φέρωσιν, οὕτω καὶ σφείς τελευτῶντες ἀποκλείεσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἔχειν ὅτι λέγωσιν ὑπὸ πεττείας αὐτῆς τινὸς ἐτέρας, οὐκ ἐν ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἐν λόγοις: ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ταύτη ἔχειν. λέγω

⁶ Momus is the personified god of "blame."

⁷ Protest that S.'s style of argument confounds his associates is commonplace in Plato: see e.g., *Euthphr.* 11b-d, *Hipp. Min.* 369b-c, *Meno* 79e-80a. On this occasion Adeimantus' assertive intervention makes the specific point that the result of the question-and-answer method is that the interlocutor, despite hav-

BOOK VI

"Is there any way then in which you would criticize such a practice which one would never be able to practice competently unless one were naturally retentive, good at learning, high-minded, elegant, a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage, and temperance?"

"Not even Momus⁶ would find fault with something like this," he said.

"Well," I said, "when men of this sort have come to maturity in their education and in their time of life, wouldn't you entrust the state to them alone?"

And Adeimantus said: "No one could come back at you on any of this, Socrates. But the fact is something like this is what people experience every time they hear what you are now saying: they think that because of their inexperience in asking and answering questions, they are being misled a little at each question by the method of argument. With the accumulation of these little divergences the diversion is considerable by the end of the discussion and it seems to be the opposite of what was being discussed at the beginning, just like being misled by those who are clever at draughts; those who aren't clever end up by being boxed in and have nowhere to move, so they too end up by being hemmed in; and as a result of this other sort of draughts, played with words, not counters, they have nothing to say since they are no more convinced that it leads to the truth.⁷ I say this in view of our present

ing agreed to the individual steps of the argument, is nevertheless not convinced of the truth of what S. finally asserts. But Adeimantus also forces S. to turn aside, as it were, and meet the main objection that those who take up philosophy seriously are of no use to the state.

δ' εἰς τὸ παρὸν ἀποβλέψας. | νῦν γὰρ φαίη ἂν τίς σοι
 λόγῳ μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν καθ' ἕκαστον τὸ ἐρωτώμενον
 ἐναντιοῦσθαι, ἔργῳ δὲ ὀρᾶν, ὅσοι ἂν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν
 ὀρμήσαντες μὴ τοῦ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ἕνεκα ἀψάμενοι
 d νέοι ὄντες ἀπαλλάττωνται, ἀλλὰ μακρότερον ἐνδια-
 τρήσωσιν, τοὺς μὲν πλείστους καὶ πάννυ ἀλλοκότους
 γιγνομένους, ἵνα μὴ παμπονήρους εἴπωμεν, τοὺς δ'
 ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας ὅμως τοῦτο γε ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπι-
 τηδεύματος οὐδ' ἐπαινείς πάσχοντας, ἀχρήστους
 ταῖς πόλεσι γιγνομένους. |

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, Οἶε οὖν, εἶπον, τοὺς ταῦτα
 λέγοντας ψεύδεσθαι;

Οὐκ οἶδα, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀλλὰ τὸ σοὶ δοκοῦν ἡδέως ἂν
 ἀκούοιμι.

Ἀκούοις ἂν ὅτι ἔμοιγε φαίνονται τὰληθῆ λέγειν.

e Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν
 παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι
 ἀρξῶσιν, οὓς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι;

Ἐρωτᾶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον | ἀποκρί-
 σσεως δι' εἰκόνοσ λεγομένης.

Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὐκ εἴωθας δι' εἰκόνων λέ-
 γειν.

⁸ A view expressed by Callicles in *Grg.* 484c–86c. Cf. *Euthyd.* 306e.

⁹ “Telling the truth” in a sense which S. goes on to explain by resolving the paradox in e1–3 at 489b4; the philosophers’ “uselessness” is not their fault but that of those who do not make use of them.

position. In the present situation someone might say to you that he can't argue against each individual question theoretically, but that when it comes to facts he can see that whoever eagerly seizes upon philosophy—not those who do it when they are young as a set part of their education and then drop it, but those who spend longer on it—the majority become really strange, not to say utterly depraved,⁸ while those who seem the most estimable nevertheless turn out to be useless to their states, because they have been involved in the practice you approve of.”

“When I heard this, I said: Do you think then that people who say this are speaking falsely?”

“I don't know,” he said, “but I'd love to hear what you think.”

“You'd hear that they seem to me to be telling the truth.”⁹

“How is it right then,” he said, “to say that states will not be rid of evil until philosophers, whom we agree are of no use to them, rule in them?”

“The question you're asking,” I said, “needs an answer in the form of an allegory.”¹⁰

“Really?” he said, “I didn't think it was *your* practice to use images.”¹¹

¹⁰ *eikōn* = “image,” “likeness,” “simile”; “allegory” and “parable” are also translations which have been used, the translation here justified to some extent by the length and exact correspondence of the “image.”

¹¹ Adeimantus' sarcasm here perhaps indicates Plato's awareness of the difficulty of putting over some of his ideas in literal terms.

488 Εἶεν, εἶπον· σκώπτεις ἐμβεβληκῶς με εἰς λόγον
 οὕτω δυσαπόδεικτον; ἄκουε δ' οὖν τῆς εἰκόνας, ἴν' ἔτι
 μάλλον ἴδῃς ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω. οὕτω γὰρ χαλεπὸν
 πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικεστάτων, ὃ πρὸς τὰς πόλεις πεπόν-
 θασιν, ὥστε οὐδ' ἔστιν ἐν οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοιοῦτον πε-
 πουθός, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἐκ πολλῶν αὐτὸ | συναγαγεῖν εἰκά-
 ζοντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οἷον οἱ γραφῆς
 τραγελάφους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μειγνύντες γράφουσιν.

Νόησον γὰρ τοιοντονὶ γενόμενον εἴτε πολλῶν νεῶν
 πέρι εἴτε μιᾶς· ναύκληρον μεγέθει μὲν καὶ ῥώμῃ ὑπὲρ
 b τοὺς ἐν τῇ νηὶ πάντας, ὑπόκωφον δὲ καὶ ὀρώντα
 ὡσαύτως βραχὺ τι καὶ γιγνώσκοντα περὶ ναυτικῶν
 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, τοὺς δὲ ναύτας στασιάζοντας πρὸς
 ἀλλήλους περὶ τῆς κυβερνήσεως, ἕκαστον οἰόμενον
 δεῖν κυβερνᾶν, μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην |
 μήτε ἔχοντα ἀποδείξει διδάσκαλον ἑαυτοῦ μηδὲ χρό-
 νον ἐν ᾧ ἐμάνθανεν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις φάσκοντας μηδὲ
 c ετοίμους κατατέμνειν, αὐτοὺς δὲ αὐτῷ ἀεὶ τῷ ναυκλήρῳ
 περικεχύσθαι δεομένους καὶ πάντα ποιούντας ὅπως

¹² γλίσχρως is problematic here; LSJ gives the basic meaning of γλίσχρος as “sticky,” and the adverb as “carefully,” “with elaborate detail” (of painting). However, the word can = “strained”: “strain after” (Shorey): as in “strained etymology,” *Crat.* 414c) or “inadequate” (Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*), also possibly indicating how hard S. strains after imagery, cf. the “stag-goats” of a6. Adam suggests “greedy,” the idea being that a man “must be greedy of similes when he runs all over the world to find one.” (n.

“Well!” I said. “Are you mocking me after landing me in an argument which is so hard to prove? Anyway, listen then to my allegory, to appreciate all the more how aptly¹² I make the parallel. For the experience the best-educated have had in their states is so difficult that there is nothing at all quite like it, but in making the parallel and defending their cause one must draw from many sources, just as painters depict compound creatures such as stag-goats.

Imagine, then, the following happening whether you are talking about many ships or just one. You have a ship’s master¹³ who is bigger and stronger than all the crew, but he’s a bit deaf¹⁴ and somewhat shortsighted, and his knowledge of seamanship is of a similar order. The crew are at loggerheads with each other over the way to navigate the ship: each thinks he should be captain¹⁵ although he has never been taught the skill, nor can he say who taught him, nor even when he learned. Not only this but they claim it can’t be taught¹⁶ and also are ready to cut anyone to pieces who says that it can. They constantly crowd around the ship’s master himself, begging him and doing everything

ad loc.). The word can also mean “exact,” which is how it is taken here. The unusual word may indicate a (semi-apologetic) rejoinder to Adeimantus’ sarcasm; “aptly” seems to fit the careful detail of the subsequent image. See also 8.553c3.

¹³ *nauklēros*: the person who owned and financed the ship, as distinct from the *kubernētēs* (see below, n. 15).

¹⁴ For the image, see Ar. *Eq.* 40–44.

¹⁵ *kubernētēs*, literally “steersman,” “pilot,” combining the roles of captain, helmsman, and navigator.

¹⁶ As Plato himself argued (e.g., in *Gorgias*) with reference to the nature of ruling in an Athenian democracy: i.e., it was not a “skill” (*technē*) based on knowledge (*epistēmē*).

ἂν σφίσι τὸ πηδάλιον ἐπιτρέψῃ, ἐνίοτε δ' ἂν μὴ πεί-
 θωσιν ἀλλὰ ἄλλοι μᾶλλον, τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀπο-
 κτεινύοντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νεώς, τὸν δὲ γενναῖον
 ναύκληρον μανδραγόρα ἢ μέθη | ἢ τιμὴ ἄλλῃ συμ-
 ποδίσαντας τῆς νεώς ἄρχειν χρωμένους τοῖς ἐνούσι,
 καὶ πίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐωχουμένους πλείν ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς
 d τοὺς τοιοῦτους, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐπαινοῦντας ναυτικὸν
 μὲν καλοῦντας καὶ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ
 κατὰ ναῦν, ὃς ἂν συλλαμβάνειν δεινὸς ἦ ὅπως ἄρ-
 ξουσιν ἢ πείθοντες ἢ βιαζόμενοι τὸν ναύκληρον, τὸν
 δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον ψέγοντας ὡς ἄχρηστον, τοῦ δὲ ἀλη-
 θινοῦ | κυβερνήτου πέρι μηδ' ἐπαίοντες, ὅτι ἀνάγκη
 αὐτῷ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὠρῶν καὶ
 οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρον καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν
 τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων, εἰ μέλλει τῷ ὄντι νεὼς ἀρχικὸς
 ἔσεσθαι, ὅπως δὲ κυβερνήσει ἕαντε τινὲς βούλωνται
 ἕαντε μή, μήτε τέχνην τούτου μήτε μελέτην οἰόμενοι²
 e δυνατὸν εἶναι λαβεῖν ἅμα καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν. τοι-
 οῦτων δὴ περὶ τὰς ναῦς γιγνομένων τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς
 κυβερνητικὸν οὐχ ἡγῆ ἂν τῷ ὄντι μετεωροσκόπον τε
 489 καὶ ἀδολέσχην καὶ ἄχρηστον σφίσι καλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ
 τῶν ἐν ταῖς οὕτω κατεσκευασμέναις ναυσὶ πλωτήρων;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος.

Οὐ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶμαι δεῖσθαι σε ἐξεταζομένην
 τὴν εἰκόνα | ἰδεῖν, ὅτι ταῖς πόλεσι πρὸς τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς

² οἰόμενοι ADF: οἰομένῳ Sidgwick

BOOK VI

they can to get him to entrust the steering oar to them. But if they sometimes fail to persuade him while others succeed, these others they either kill or throw off the ship, and, befuddling the worthy¹⁷ master with mandrake,¹⁸ or alcohol, or something else, they take control of the ship and as they sail use up everything on board and drink and gorge themselves as you'd expect men like this to do. As well as this they sing the praises of anyone who is clever enough to rally them to persuade or compel the master to let them rule, calling him a seaman, helmsman, someone who understands ships, while they disparage the man who can't as useless. They have absolutely no knowledge of what a true captain is: that he must have a thorough grasp of the time of year, the seasons, the weather, the stars, the winds, and everything that is pertinent to his skills, if he is to be really fit for command, but as to how he will captain the ship (whether some want it or not), they do not think it is possible to gain either the skill or the practice of it, along with the art of captaincy. If this sort of thing goes on on board ship, don't you think the true helmsman would really be called a stargazer¹⁹ and idle-talking and useless to them, by those seamen on ships which are manned like this?"

"Certainly," said Adeimantus.

"I certainly don't think you need an analysis of my allegory," I said, "to see that it resembles the attitude of

¹⁷ *gennaios* = "noble," frequently, as here, with ironic emphasis; see *Resp.* 2.363a8, 8.544c6.

¹⁸ An intoxicant. ¹⁹ *meteōroskopon*: a frequent criticism, and, according to Plato, a popular accusation against S., alleged by him at his trial (*Ap.* 18b, *Pol.* 299b).

φιλοσόφους τὴν διάθεσιν ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν ὁ λέγω.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνον τὸν θαυμάζοντα ὅτι οἱ φιλόσοφοι οὐ τιμῶνται ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δίδασκέ τε τὴν
b εἰκόνα καὶ πειρῶ πείθειν ὅτι πολὺ ἂν θαυμαστότερον ἦν εἰ ἐτιμῶντο.

Ἄλλὰ διδάξω, ἔφη.

Καὶ ὅτι τοίνυν τὰ ληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς ἄχρηστοι τοῖς πολλοῖς οἱ ἐπιεικέστατοι τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ· τῆς μὲν-
τοι ἀχρηστίας τοὺς ἢ μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιάσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνή-
την ναυτῶν δεῖσθαι ἄρχεσθαι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἰέναι, ἀλλ' ὁ
τοῦτο κομψευσάμενος ἐψεύσατο, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν,
ἐάντε πλούσιος ἐάντε πένης κάμνη, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι
c ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεό-
μενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρχεν δυναμένου, οὐ τὸν ἄρχοντα δεῖσθαι τῶν ἀρχομένων ἄρχεσθαι, οὗ ἂν τῆ ἀληθείᾳ
τι ὄφελος ᾗ. ἀλλὰ τοὺς νῦν πολιτικούς ἄρχοντας ἀπεικάζων οἷς ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν ἢ ναύταις οὐχ ἀμαρτήσῃ,
καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων ἀχρήστους λεγομένους καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τοῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς κυβερνήταις.

Ὅρθότατα, ἔφη.

Ἐκ τε τοίνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ράδιον εὐ-
d δοκιμεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν τὰναντία

²⁰ Simonides (sixth century) claimed that it was better to be

states toward true philosophers, but you understand what I mean."

"Yes, indeed," he said.

"First of all, then, explain the allegory to that man who is surprised that philosophers are not valued in their cities and try to persuade him that it would be much more surprising if they were."

"Well, I shall," he said.

"And further that you are telling the truth when you say that those most highly regarded in philosophy are useless to the majority. However, tell him to accuse those who don't use philosophers of being useless, not those who are educated. Indeed it is not in the nature of a captain to beg his crew to be commanded by him, or wise men to approach the doors of the rich. But he who coined this clever phrase was lying;²⁰ the truth naturally is that if a rich or a poor man fall ill, he must go to the doors of his doctor and everyone who needs to be governed should go to the doors of the man capable of ruling, and the ruler, if in truth he is any good, should not beg those he rules to be ruled by him. But you will not be far wrong in comparing our present-day political rulers to the seamen we were just talking about, and those they call useless and stargazers with true helmsmen."

"You are quite right," he said.

"As a result of all this, then, and in this situation it's not easy for the best practice to be highly regarded by those

rich than wise "because the wise spend their time at the doors of the rich" (Arist. *Rhet.* 1391a7-12). This is Plato's second criticism of sayings of this poet, although here not named (see 1.331d5ff.).

ἐπιτηδεύοντων· πολὺ δὲ μεγίστη καὶ ἰσχυροτάτη
 διαβολὴ γίγνεται φιλοσοφία διὰ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα
 φάσκοντας ἐπιτηδεύειν, οὓς δὴ σὺ φῆς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα
 τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγειν ὡς παμπόνηροι | οἱ πλείστοι
 τῶν ἰόντων ἐπ' αὐτήν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικέστατοι ἄχρηστοι,
 καὶ ἐγὼ συνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν τῆς μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἀχρηστίας τὴν αἰτίαν
 διεληλύθαμεν;

Καὶ μάλα.

Τῆς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν πονηρίας τὴν ἀνάγκην βούλει
 e τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲ τούτου φιλο-
 σοφία αἰτία, ἂν δυνώμεθα, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Ἀκούωμεν δὴ καὶ λέγωμεν ἐκεῖθεν ἀναμνησθέντες,
 ὅθεν | διῆμιν τὴν φύσιν οἷον ἀνάγκη φῆναι τὸν καλόν
 490 τε κάγαθόν ἐσόμενον. ἠγείτο δ' αὐτῷ, εἰ νῶ ἔχεις,
 πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ
 πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλαζόνι ὄντι μηδαμῆ μετεῖναι φιλοσο-
 φίας ἀληθινῆς.

¹ Ἦν γὰρ οὕτω λεγόμενον. |

Οὐκοῦν ἔν μὲν τοῦτο σφόδρα οὕτω παρὰ δόξαν τοῖς
 νῦν δοκουμένοις περὶ αὐτοῦ;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

² Ἄρ' οὖν δὴ οὐ μετρίως ἀπολογησόμεθα ὅτι πρὸς

²¹ At 487d10.

²² *kalos k'agathos*: the standard description of an Athenian

who practice the opposite. Philosophy gets the greatest and strongest abuse because of the people who claim to practice such things. These are the people of whom you say that he who indicts philosophy claims that most of those who resort to it are utterly worthless, while the highest-minded are useless, and I agreed that you were stating the truth, didn't I?"²¹

"Yes."

"So have we finished discussing the reason why the educated are useless?"

"Indeed we have."

"Do you want us to discuss the next topic: the reason the majority are necessarily inferior and, if we can, to try to show that philosophy is not responsible for this either?"

"Certainly."

"Let's hear each other's arguments by reminding ourselves of the point where we discussed what kind of nature the man who is going to be fine and good²² must have from birth. First, if you remember, truth was his leading principle²³ to which he had to devote himself thoroughly in every way, or else, as an impostor, he could have no part in true philosophy whatsoever."

"Yes, that was what we said."

"And isn't this one point so very much contrary to the view about him currently held?"

"Indeed it is," he said.

"Shall we not then be defending him fairly if we say

aristocrat, adopted by Plato to represent the philosopher-ruler (see above, Book 4 n. 21).

²³ Stated at 485c3.

b τὸ ὄν πεφυκῶς εἶη ἀμιλλᾶσθαι ὃ γε ὄντως φιλομαθῆς,
καὶ οὐκ ἐπιμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς δοξαζομένοις εἶναι πολλοῖς
ἐκάστοις, ἀλλ' ἴοι καὶ οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι
τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἐκάστου τῆς φύσεως
ἄψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιού-
του—προσῆκει δὲ συγγενεῖ—ᾧ πλησιάσας | καὶ μι-
γεῖς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννήσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν,
γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῶη καὶ τρέφοιτο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι
ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' οὔ;

Ὡς οἷόν τ', ἔφη, μετριώτατα.

Τί οὖν; τούτῳ τι μετέσται ψεῦδος ἀγαπᾶν ἢ πᾶν
τοῦναντίον μισεῖν;

c Μισεῖν, ἔφη.

Ἐγουμενῆς δὴ ἀληθείας οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἶμαι φαιμέν
αὐτῇ χορὸν κακῶν ἀκολουθήσαι.

Πῶς γάρ; |

Ἄλλ' ὑγίης τε καὶ δίκαιον ἦθος, ᾧ καὶ σωφροσύνην
ἔπεσθαι.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

d Καὶ δὴ τὸν ἄλλον τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως χορὸν
τί δεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀναγκάζοντα τάττειν; μέμνησαι
γάρ που ὅτι συνέβη | προσῆκον τούτοις ἀνδρεία,
μεγαλοπρέπεια, εὐμάθεια, μνήμη καὶ σοῦ ἐπιλαβο-
μένου ὅτι πᾶς μὲν ἀναγκασθήσεται ὁμολογεῖν οἷς
λέγομεν, ἕστας δὲ τοὺς λόγους, εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀποβλέ-
ψας περὶ ὧν ὁ λόγος, φαίη ὀρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν

²⁴ A common Platonic metaphor: e.g., *Tht.* 148eff.

that as a true lover of learning, he was born to fight his way toward reality and not fritter away his time among those many individual subjects that are reckoned to be real; he moves on without losing heart or ceasing from his passion until he grasps the nature of each and every thing through that part of the soul which is fitted to grasp something of that sort through its kinship with it. Through this, after he has approached and immersed himself in what really exists, and given birth to intelligence and truth, he may gain knowledge and a true life, and be nourished and so be relieved of his labor pains,²⁴ but not before?"

"Put like that, it would be most fair," he said.

"What then? Will this man have some claim to love falsehood, or the complete opposite: will he hate it?"

"He'll hate it," he said.

"Indeed, when truth is the leading principle, I don't think we would ever say that a chorus of evils flows from it."

"No, how could we?"

"But a healthy, just character follows, accompanied also by temperance."

"That's right," he said.

"Furthermore, why must we necessarily compel the rest of the chorus of the philosopher's nature to line up all over again right from the beginning? I'm sure you can recall that it turned out that among them were courage, high-mindedness, aptitude for learning and memory, and when you interposed the point that, although anyone will be obliged to agree with what we say, leaving aside the arguments and looking at the actual people our discussion was about, he would claim that some of those he saw were

ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν, τῆς διαβολῆς τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπισκοποῦντες ἐπὶ τούτῳ νῦν γεγόναμεν, τί ποθ' οἱ πολλοὶ | κακοί, καὶ τούτου δὴ ἔνεκα πάλιν ἀνειλήφαμεν τὴν τῶν ἀληθῶς φιλοσόφων φύσιν καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὠρισάμεθα.

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, ταῦτα.

e Ταύτης δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς φύσεως δεῖ θεάσασθαι τὰς φθοράς, ὡς διόλλυται ἐν πολλοῖς, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἐκφεύγει, οὓς δὴ καὶ οὐ πονηροὺς, ἀχρήστους δὲ κα-
491 λούσι· καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο αὖ τὰς μιμουμένας ταύτην καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα καθισταμένας αὐτῆς, οἶαι οὔσαι φύσεις ψυχῶν εἰς ἀνάξιον καὶ μείζον ἑαυτῶν ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπιτήδευμα, πολλαχῆ πλημμελούσαι, πανταχῆ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα | δόξαν οἶαν λέγεις φιλοσοφία προσῆψαν.

Τίνας δέ, ἔφη, τὰς διαφθορὰς λέγεις;

Ἐγώ σοι, εἶπον, ἂν οἶός τε γένωμαι, πειράσομαι διελθεῖν. τόδε μὲν οὖν οἶμαι πᾶς ἡμῖν ὁμολογήσει, τοιαύτην φύσιν καὶ πάντα ἔχουσιν ὅσα προσετάξα-
b μεν νυνδὴ, εἰ τελέως μέλλοι φιλόσοφος γενέσθαι, ὀλιγάκις ἐν ἀνθρώποις φύεσθαι καὶ ὀλίγας. ἢ οὐκ οἶει;

Σφόδρα γε.

Τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων σκόπει ὡς πολλοὶ ὄλεθροι καὶ μεγάλοι. |

Τίνες δὴ;

Ὁ μὲν πάντων θαυμαστότατον ἀκοῦσαι, ὅτι ἐν ἕκαστον ὧν ἐπηρεάσαμεν τῆς φύσεως ἀπόλλυσι τὴν

BOOK VI

useless, and the majority were utterly evil. In examining the reason for this slander we have now come to the point of asking why are the majority evil, and for this reason we have again taken up the nature of genuine philosophers and defined it according to its essential meaning."

"That is the case," he said.

"So we must look at the ways this nature has deteriorated, how it is utterly destroyed in most people, although a small number escape: those whom they call useless rather than bad. And after this we must go on to look at those that imitate this nature and who set about putting it into practice; we must see what the natures of souls are like which come to a pursuit which they are not worthy of and which is greater than they are; creating disharmony everywhere; in every way and among all men they have saddled philosophy with the reputation you mention."

"What are these ways of deteriorating you're talking about?"

"I shall try to explain them to you," I said, "if I can. I think every one of us will agree on the following: such a nature, one that has everything we have just called for in the person who would develop into a complete philosopher, rarely appears among human beings, and there are few at that. Or don't you think so?"

"Oh yes, definitely."

"Think how many great sources of corruption exist for these few."

"What are they, then?"

"The most extraordinary thing of all that you'll hear of is that each one of the qualities in that nature which we

ἔχουσιν ψυχὴν καὶ ἀποσπᾶ φιλοσοφίας. λέγω δὲ ἀνδρείαν, σωφροσύνην καὶ πάντα ἃ διήλθομεν.

Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, ἀκούσαι.

- c Ἔτι τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ πάντα φθείρει καὶ ἀποσπᾶ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σώματος καὶ συγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεία· ἔχεις γὰρ τὸν τύπον ὧν λέγω. |

Ἔχω, ἔφη· καὶ ἡδέως γ' ἂν ἀκριβέστερον ἃ λέγεις πυθοίμην.

Λαβοῦ τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, καί σοι εὐδηλὸν τε φανέεται καὶ οὐκ ἄτοπα δόξει τὰ προειρημένα περὶ αὐτῶν.

Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, κελεύεις;

- d Παντός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φυτοῦ, εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, ἴσμεν ὅτι τὸ μὴ τυχὸν τροφῆς ἧς προσήκει ἐκάστῳ μῆδ' ὥρας μῆδὲ τόπου, ὅσῳ ἂν ἐρρωμενέστερον ἦ, τοσοῦτῳ πλείονων ἐνδεί τῶν πρεπόντων· | ἀγαθῷ γάρ που κακὸν ἐναντιώτερον ἢ τῷ μὴ ἀγαθῷ.

Πῶς δ' οὖν;

Ἔχει δὴ οἶμαι λόγον τὴν ἀρίστην φύσιν ἐν ἀλλοτριωτέρα οὖσαν τροφῇ κάκιον ἀπαλλάττειν τῆς φαύλης.

Ἔχει.

- e Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς οὕτω φῶμεν τὰς εὐφροσύνης κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχοῦσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι; ἢ οἶει τὰ μέγιστα ἀδικήματα καὶ τὴν ἄκρατον πονηρίαν ἐκ φαύλης

BOOK VI

praised corrupts the soul which possesses it and drags it away from philosophy. I mean courage, temperance, and everything we discussed."

"That sounds extraordinary," he said.

"And then on top of this," I said, "every so-called good destroys and tears it away: beauty, wealth, physical strength, powerful family links within the state, and everything connected with these things: you know the kind of thing I mean?"

"I do," he said, "and I'd love to learn what you mean in more detail."

"Well then, get the right meaning of all this, and it will be quite clear to you, and what I have told you about them won't seem absurd."

"How do you expect me to do that?" he asked.

"On the subject of every seed or growing thing," I said, "whether growing in the ground or living creatures, we know that any which does not get its proper food, or climate or environment, the stronger it grows, the more it lacks these essentials. Evil is more opposed to good to my mind than it is to what is not-good."

"Of course."

"It stands to reason then, I think, that the finest nature in a more alien environment will turn out worse than an inferior one."

"It does."

"Well then, Adeimantus," I said, "are we to agree that the naturally best souls which happen to have a bad upbringing become particularly bad, or do you think that great wrongdoings and pure villainy are the result of an

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκ νεανικῆς φύσεως τροφῇ διολομένης
γίγνεσθαι, ἀσθενῆ δὲ φύσιν μεγάλων οὔτε | ἀγαθῶν
οὔτε κακῶν αἰτίαν ποτὲ ἔσσεσθαι;

Οὐκ, ἀλλά, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

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Ἦν τοίνυν ἔθεμεν τοῦ φιλοσόφου φύσιν, ἂν μὲν
οἶμαι μαθήσεως προσηκούσης τύχῃ, εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρε-
τὴν ἀνάγκη αὐξανομένην ἀφικνεῖσθαι, ἔαν δὲ μὴ ἐν
προσηκούσῃ σπαρεῖσά τε καὶ φυτευθεῖσα τρέφῃται,
εἰς πάντα τάναντία αὖ, ἔαν μὴ | τις αὐτῇ βοηθήσας
θεῶν τύχῃ. ἦ καὶ σὺ ἡγή, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, δια-
φθειρομένους τινὰς εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νέους, δια-
φθείρουτας δὲ τινὰς σοφιστὰς ιδιωτικούς, ὅτι καὶ
b ἄξιον λόγου, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας
μεγίστους μὲν εἶναι σοφιστὰς, παιδεύειν δὲ τελεώτατα
καὶ ἀπεργάζεσθαι οἷους βούλονται εἶναι καὶ νέους
καὶ πρεσβυτέρους καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας; |

Πότε δῆ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ὅταν, εἶπον, συγκαθεζόμενοι ἄθροοι πολλοὶ εἰς
ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεκα
ἢ τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους σύλλογον σὺν πολλῷ
θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψέγωσι τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων,
c τὰ δὲ ἐπαινῶσιν, ὑπερβαλλόντως ἐκάτερα, καὶ ἐκ-
βοῶντες καὶ κροτοῦντες, πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς αἴ τε πέτραι
καὶ ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ὦσιν ἐπηχοῦντες διπλάσιον
θόρυβον παρέχωσι τοῦ ψόγου καὶ ἐπαίνου. ἐν δῆ τῷ
τοιούτῳ τὸν νέον, τὸ λεγόμενον, τίνα οἶε καρδίαν
ἴσχειν; ἢ ποίαν [ἂν] αὐτῷ παιδείαν ιδιωτικὴν | ἀνθέξειν,
ἣν οὐ κατακλυσθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιούτου ψόγου ἢ

inferior soul and not one from a vigorous nature ruined by its upbringing, while a weak nature will never be the cause of great good or evil?"

"No, it's as you say."

"If then the philosopher's nature which we proposed happens to get the right teaching, I think, it will necessarily grow and attain the highest virtue, but if it is not sown, grown, and nurtured in the right conditions, it will attain quite the opposite qualities, unless one of the gods happens to come to its rescue. Or do you too think, like most people, that there are some youngsters who are ruined by sophists, and that there are some sophists who, as private individuals, ruin them to a significant extent?²⁵ Don't you think that it's those who make these sort of claims who are the greatest sophists, who educate most thoroughly and produce the kind of person they want, young and old, male and female?"

"When?" he asked.

"When many sit down together, in the assemblies, or the law courts, or the theaters, or the camps or any other public meeting place, and amid much noise they criticize those who say and do certain things, and praise those who say and do other things, both to excess as they shout and clap, and so on top of their noise the stones and the place where they are echo and double the racket of the blame and praise. Indeed, in such a scene how do you think a youngster's heart, as the saying goes, would be affected? Or what kind of private education he has received could withstand this and, overwhelmed by such blame and

²⁵ I.e., individual sophists, as opposed to the sophistry of the masses.

ἐπαίνοῦ οἰχθήσεσθαι φερομένην κατὰ ῥοῦν ἢ ἂν οὗτος φέρῃ, καὶ φήσειεν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τούτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῖα εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύσειεν ἅπερ ἂν οὗτοι, καὶ ἔσεσθαι τοιοῦτον;

d Πολλή, ἢ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ μήν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐπω τὴν μεγίστην ἀνάγκην εἰρήκαμεν.

Ποίαν; ἔφη. |

Ἦν ἔργῳ προστιθέασι λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες οὗτοι οἱ παιδευταί τε καὶ σοφισταί. ἢ οὐκ οἴσθα ὅτι τὸν μὴ πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

Τίνα οὖν ἄλλον σοφιστὴν οἶε ἢ ποίους ἰδιωτικοὺς λόγους ἐναντία τούτοις τείνοντας κρατήσειν;

e Οἶμαι μὲν οὐδένα, ἢ δ' ὅς.

493 Οὐ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν πολλὴ ἄνοια. οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὐδὲ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος πρὸς ἀρετὴν παρὰ τὴν τούτων παιδείαν πεπαιδευμένον, | ἀνθρώπειον, ὦ ἑταῖρε—
θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγον· εὖ γὰρ χρὴ εἰδέναι, ὅτιπερ ἂν σωθῆ τε καὶ γένηται οἶον δεῖ ἐν τοιαύτῃ καταστάσει πολιτειῶν, θεοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὸ σῶσαι λέγων οὐ κακῶς ἐρεῖς.

²⁶ For Plato's presentation of crowd reactions, see *Euthyd.* 276b and d (cf. also 303b), where, at the sophists' success "almost the very columns of the Lyceum resounded with joyful acclamations."

praise, would not pass away borne downstream wherever it carries him? And will he agree with these people on what is good and what is shameful, will he adopt the same habits as they and become like one of them?"²⁶

"He will be under enormous pressure, Socrates," he said.

"What's more," I said, "we haven't yet mentioned the greatest compelling force."

"What's that?" he asked.

"It's the one these teachers and sophists actually apply when they can't persuade them by reasoning. Or don't you know that they punish the disobedient with disenfranchisement, fine, and death?"

"Yes, they certainly do that," he said.

"What other sophist, or what kind of private arguments, could be held out against these and win?"

"None, I suppose," he said.

"None indeed," I said, "but even to try would be very foolish. For no other kind of character educated for virtue exists, nor has done, nor ever will,²⁷ designed to counteract the teaching of these people among men, my friend. As for the gods, let's leave them out of the argument, as the saying goes. Now you should know for certain that in saying that it is the providence of the gods which saves whatever has been saved and turns out as it should in the condition of society such as we have now, you would not be far wrong."

²⁷ I.e., within the political world as it actually exists. On the realization of Plato's Utopia, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (iii).

Οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἄλλως, ἔφη, δοκεῖ.

Ἔτι τοίνυν σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τόδε δοξάτω. |

Τὸ ποῖον;

- Ἐκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ιδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν· οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ
- b τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργὰς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπῃ τε προσελθεῖν χρή καὶ ὅπῃ ἄψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅποτε χαλεπώτατον ἢ πραότατον καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ' οἷς ἐκάστας εἴωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἷας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε | καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθῶν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα συνουσία τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῆ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν
- c ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζώου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκείνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου | καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μῆτε ἑωρακῶς εἶη μῆτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι.

²⁸ The "private individuals" are the professional sophists who charge for instruction (for an ironically nuanced Socratic view of

"I don't think any differently, at any rate," he said.

"And there is yet another point," I said, "in addition to these which you ought to accept."

"What's that?"

"Each of those private individuals who work for a living, whom these people call sophists and consider as their rivals in trade, teaches nothing but the ordinary beliefs of the majority of people which they promulgate whenever they meet together, and which he calls wisdom.²⁸ For example: if a person were studying the moods and appetites of some huge strong creature he was rearing, how he should approach it, and handle it, and when it is most difficult, or most tame, and why this is so, on what occasions it usually makes the various noises it utters, and what kinds of sound, when uttered by someone else, calm it down and provoke it. Then when he has learned all of this by associating with the creature and spending time with it, he would call this wisdom and having established this as a skill he would turn to teaching it, knowing nothing in truth as to which of these beliefs and passions is beautiful or ugly, good or bad, or just and unjust. But he would label all these concepts according to the beliefs he had formed from the large animal, calling what the animal enjoyed good and what made it angry bad. He would have no other vocabulary to describe these things, but would call its compelling demands just and good, not having seen how far the nature of what is necessary and what is good in reality are different, nor would he be able to explain it to anybody else. I mean, in heaven's name, if that's the sort

their abilities and influence, see *Ap.* 19d-20c.). Their influence is compared with the sophistry of the masses.

τοιούτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν σοι δοκεῖ
εἶναι παιδευτής;

Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη.

d Ἡ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν
καὶ παντοδαπῶν συνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατα-
νενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ' ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτ' ἐν
μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ ἐν πολιτικῇ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ εἰάν τις
τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμενος, ἢ ποιήσῃ ἢ τινα ἄλλην
δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν, | κυρίου αὐτοῦ ποιῶν
τοὺς πολλούς, πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἢ Διομηδεῖα λε-
γομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὗτοι ἐπαι-
νῶσιν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ,
ἤδη πρόποτέ του ἡδουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ
καταγέλαστον;

e Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἀκούσομαι.

494 Ταῦτα τοίνυν πάντα ἐννοήσας ἐκείνο ἀναμνήσθητι
αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ, ἢ αὐτό τι
ἕκαστον καὶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, ἔσθ' ὅπως πλήθος
ἀνέξεται ἢ ἡγήσεται εἶναι;

Ἐκιστά γ', ἔφη.

Φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πλήθος ἀδύνατον
εἶναι.

Ἀδύνατον. |

²⁹ S. is drawing a distinction here between conclusions drawn from mere observation over time (*empeiria*) and real understanding, which is the characteristic of a real skill or craft (*technē*); for the distinction, see e.g., *Grg.* 462b–65a.

of person he is, wouldn't you think he was a strange teacher?"²⁹

"I would indeed."

"Do you think therefore that the person who considers it wisdom to have observed the temper and pleasures of many people of various sorts he has met, whether in painting, or the arts, or in administering a state, is at all different from this man? Because that means that if one mixes with these people and shows them some poetry, or some other handicraft, or service to the state, making the masses masters of himself beyond what is unavoidable, he will be under the so-called necessity of Diomedes³⁰ to make whatever these people approve of. But that these things are truly good and fine, have you ever yet heard of any one of them producing an argument that is not utterly ridiculous?"

"No, and I don't think I ever shall!" he said.

"Well now, having considered all this, call to mind our former point: is it possible for the majority of people to accept and consider that actual beauty, and not the many instances of it, or any actual concept, not the many instances of it, exists?"

"Definitely not," he said.

"So it's impossible for most people to be philosophers."

"It is."

³⁰ An inescapable compulsion. Origin obscure. The scholiast derives the expression from an incident in which Odysseus bound Diomedes after the latter had attempted to kill him.

Καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ὄχλῳ ἀρέσκουν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσι.

Δῆλον. |

Ἐκ δὴ τούτων τίνα ὀρᾶς σωτηρίαν φιλοσόφῳ φύσει, ὥστ' ἐν τῷ ἐπιτηδεύματι μείνασαν πρὸς τέλος ἐλθεῖν; ἐννοεῖ δ' ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν. ὠμολόγηται γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν εὐμάθεια καὶ μνήμη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ μεγαλοπρέπεια ταύτης εἶναι τῆς φύσεως.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν εὐθὺς ἐν πα(ι)σὶν ὁ τοιοῦτος πρῶτος ἔσται ἐν | ἅπασιν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τὸ σῶμα φυῆ προσφερῆς τῇ ψυχῇ;

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη.

Βουλήσονται δὴ οἶμαι αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτερος γίγνηται, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν πράγματα οἷ τε οἰκέοι καὶ οἱ πολῖται.

Πῶς δ' οὖν;

Ἐποκείσονται ἄρα δεόμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες, προκαταλαμβάνοντες καὶ προκολακεύοντες τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν.

Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

Τί οὖν οἶει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν τοιοῦτον | ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ποιήσεις, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τύχῃ μεγάλης πόλεως ὣν καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλούσιός τε καὶ γενναῖος, καὶ ἔτι εὐειδῆς καὶ μέγας; ἄρ' οὐ πληρωθῆσεσθαι ἀμη-

BOOK VI

“And so those who pursue philosophy are bound to be disparaged by them?”

“Yes, that must be so.”

“And indeed by those private individuals³¹ who are eager to associate with the crowd and please it.”

“That is clearly so.”

“As a result of all this then, what sanctuary do you see for the philosophical nature so as to stand firm in its pursuits and reach its goal? Consider this in the light of what we said before: for we agreed that an aptitude for learning, memory, courage, and high-mindedness are part of this nature.”³²

“Yes.”

“Does that mean that such a person will be first among all from earliest childhood, especially if the body grows like the soul?”

“What’s to prevent it?” he said.

“Then his friends and fellow citizens will want to employ him, I think, when he grows older to deal with their affairs.”

“Of course.”

“They will lavish attention on him with requests and honors, and anticipate and flatter his future capabilities.”

“Well, that’s the sort of thing that usually happens,” he said.

“What do you think then that such a man will do in such circumstances?” I asked, “especially if he actually comes from a large state and is wealthy and of high birth there, and yet again is handsome and tall? Won’t he be full of

³¹ See above, n. 28.

³² At 487a above.

d χάνου ἐλπίδος, ἡγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν ἔσεσθαι πράττειν, καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὑψηλὸν ἔξαρεῖν αὐτόν, σχηματισμοῦ καὶ φρονήματος κενοῦ ἄνευ νοῦ ἐμπιμπλάμενον;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη. |

Τῷ δὴ οὕτω διατιθεμένῳ ἐάν τις ἡρέμα προσελθὼν τάληθῆ λέγῃ, ὅτι νοῦς οὐκ ἔνεστιν αὐτῷ, δέεται δέ, τὸ δὲ οὐ κτητὸν μὴ δουλεύσαντι τῇ κτήσει αὐτοῦ, ἄρ' εὐπετὲς οἶε εἶναι εἰσακούσαι διὰ τοσούτων κακῶν;

Πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἐὰν δ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διὰ τὸ εὖ πεφικέαι καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς τῶν λόγων [εἰς]αἰσθάνηται³ τέ πη καὶ κάμ-
e πτηται καὶ ἔλκηται πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἴομεθα δράσειν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν χρείαν τε καὶ ἑταιρίαν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον, πᾶν δ' ἔπος λέγοντάς τε καὶ πράττοντας καὶ περὶ αὐτόν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῆ, καὶ περὶ τὸν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἴός τ' ἦ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ εἰς ἀγῶνας καθιστάντας; |

495 Πολλή, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη.

Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ὁ τοιοῦτος φιλοσοφήσει;

Οὐ πᾶν.

Ἄρα οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐ κακῶς ἐλέγομεν ὡς |

³ εἰς αἰσθάνηται F: εἰς αἰσθάνηται AD

³³ An allusion to such fifth-century statesmen as Alcibiades seems probable (see, e.g., Thuc. 6.16ff.)

impractical expectations and consider himself potentially capable of dealing with the affairs of Greeks and foreigners as well, and will raise himself high over them and be filled with senseless conceit and empty thought?"³³

"Yes, he certainly will," he said.

"If someone approaches a person with such a disposition calmly, and tells him the truth—that he has no sense, but needs it, and won't get it unless he works like a slave—do you think it would be easy for him to take this in through the great evils surrounding him?"

"It's hardly likely," he said.

"If then," I said, "because of his fine nature and his natural familiarity with reason, he somehow has insight and yields and is drawn toward philosophy, what do we think those people will do, who think they are losing the use of this man and his company? Won't they press every means and every argument on him, to prevent him being persuaded, and to prevent the one who is trying to persuade him from succeeding, and scheme against him privately and publicly haul him into court?"³⁴

"Yes, that's absolutely bound to happen," he said.

"Is it therefore possible for such a man to be a philosopher?"

"Of course not."

"Then can you see," I asked, "that ours was not a bad

³⁴ A probable reference here to S.'s fate at the hands of the Athenians at his trial for impiety (399). Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.12, suggests his association with Alcibiades, along with the sophist and oligarchic politician Critias, as key figures behind the charge against S. of corrupting the youth of Athens.

ἄρα καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φιλοσόφου φύσεως μέρη, ὅταν ἐν κακῇ τροφῇ γένηται, αἴτια τρόπον τινὰ τοῦ ἐκπεσεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος, καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, πλοῦτοί τε καὶ πᾶσα ἡ τοιαύτη παρασκευή;

Οὐ γάρ, ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, ἐλέχθη.

- b Οὗτος δὴ, εἶπον, ὦ θανμάσιε, ὄλεθρός τε καὶ διαφθορὰ τοσαύτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη τῆς βελτίστης φύσεως εἰς τὸ ἄριστον ἐπιτήδευμα, ὀλίγης καὶ ἄλλως γιγνομένης, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμεν. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγονται καὶ τοὺς ιδιώτας, καὶ οἱ | τὰγαθὰ, οἱ ἂν ταύτη τύχῃσι ῥύνετες· σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδὲν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ιδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν δρᾷ.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

- c Οὔτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἐκπίπτοντες, οἷς μάλιστα προσήκει, ἔρημον καὶ ἀτελῆ φιλοσοφίαν λείποντες αὐτοί τε βίον οὐ προσήκοντα οὐδ' ἀληθῆ ζῶσιν, τὴν δέ, ὥσπερ ὀρφανὴν συγγενῶν, ἄλλοι ἐπεισελθόντες ἀνάξιοι ἥσυχνάν τε καὶ ὀνειδίη περιῆψαν, οἷα καὶ σὺ φῆς ὀνειδίξειν τοὺς ὀνειδίζοντας, ὡς | οἱ συνόντες αὐτῇ οἱ μὲν οὐδενός, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ πολλῶν κακῶν ἄξιοί εἰσιν.

Καὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, τά γε λεγόμενα ταῦτα.

- d Εἰκότως γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λεγόμενα. καθορῶντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπίσκοι κενὴν τὴν χώραν ταύτην γιγνομένην, καλῶν δὲ ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μεστήν, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκουτες, ἄσμενοι καὶ οὔτοι ἐκ τῶν τεχνῶν ἐκπηδῶσιν εἰς

argument then,³⁵ that the very parts that make up a philosophical nature when wrongly brought up are the cause in some way of getting out of good habits, just as are the so-called good things, wealth and all such possessions?"

"No, it wasn't a bad argument, in fact it was right," he said.

"There, my good friend," I said: "such is the magnitude of the ruin and downfall of the finest nature considered from the point of view of the best practice, a nature which is rare enough, as we claim. And indeed from such men come those who do the greatest harm to states and individuals, just as those who flow in the other direction³⁶ do good. But the petty nature never did anything great for any individual or state."

"That's very true," he said.

"Indeed these people, those most suited to philosophy, fall by the wayside, and leave her abandoned and unwed, while they themselves lead a life that is neither suitable nor true; then others come in upon her, and abuse her unworthily, like an orphan bereft of her kinsfolk, and they attach such reproaches to her as you say her detractors do: namely, that of her consorts, some are worth nothing, others deserve every punishment."

"Yes indeed, that is what they say," he said.

"And they say it with good reason," I said. "For other little men, seeing this territory which has become empty, though stuffed with fine names and pretensions, leap gladly from their trades into philosophy, like those fleeing from their prison cells to take refuge in the sanctuaries—

³⁵ At 491b-c.

³⁶ For the metaphor, see above, 485d7-8.

τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἳ ἂν κομψότατοι ὄντες τυγχάνωσι
 περὶ τὸ αὐτῶν τεχνίον. ὅμως γὰρ δὴ πρὸς γε τὰς
 ἄλλας τέχνας | καίπερ οὕτω πραττούσης φιλοσοφίας
 τὸ ἀξίωμα μεγαλοπρεπέστερον λείπεται, οὗ δὴ ἐφι-
 ἔμενοι πολλοὶ ἀτελεῖς μὲν τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν
 τεχνῶν τε καὶ δημιουργιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώ-
 βηνται, οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς συγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ
 e ἀποτεθρυσμένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνουσιν— ἢ
 οὐκ ἀνάγκη;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Δοκεῖς οὖν τι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρειν αὐτοὺς ἰδεῖν
 ἀργύριον | κτησαμένου χαλκέως φαλακροῦ καὶ σμι-
 κροῦ, νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμῶν λελυμένου, ἐν βαλανείῳ
 δὲ λελουμένου, νεουογὸν ἱμάτιον ἔχοντος, ὡς νυμφίου
 παρεσκευασμένου, διὰ πενίαν καὶ ἐρημίαν τοῦ δεσπό-
 του τὴν θυγατέρα μέλλοντος γαμεῖν;

496 Οὐ πάνν, ἔφη, διαφέρει.

Ποῦ ἅττα οὖν εἰκὸς γεννᾶν τοὺς τοιούτους; οὐ νόθα
 καὶ φαῦλα;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη. |

Τί δέ; τοὺς ἀναξίους παιδεύσεως, ὅταν αὐτῇ πλη-
 σιάζοντες ὀμιλῶσι μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν, ποῦ ἅττα φῶμεν
 γεννᾶν διανοήματά τε καὶ δόξας; ἄρ' οὐχ ὡς ἀληθῶς
 προσήκοντα ἀκοῦσαι σοφίσματα, καὶ οὐδὲν γνήσιον
 οὐδὲ φρονήσεως [ἄξιον]⁴ ἀληθινῆς ἐχόμενον;

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

b Πάνσμικρον δὴ τι, ἔφη ἐγώ, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, λείπεται
 τῶν κατ' ἀξίαν ὀμιλούντων φιλοσοφία, ἣ που ὑπὸ

people who are actually most ingenious in their paltry skills. For it remains a fact that, set against the other trades and even though faring as it does now, philosophy retains a more magnificent reputation, desired by many with imperfect natures whose souls are stunted and crushed by their labor, just as their bodies are maimed by their crafts and trades. Or is that not necessarily true?"

"It certainly is," he said.

"Do you think these people are any different," I asked, "from a bald little blacksmith who has made some money, has just been released from prison, has had a bath in the wash house, is wearing a new cloak like a bridegroom all dressed up, and, owing to his master's lack of money and friends, is about to marry his daughter?"

"There isn't any difference at all," he said.

"What kind of children would you expect such people to have? Won't they be inferior bastards?"

"They must be."

"What about this point? When those who are not worth educating approach philosophy and associate with it in a way that does not accord with her worth, what kind of thoughts and beliefs can we say they will produce? Won't they really be claptrap and not worth hearing, since they contain nothing genuine or related to true thinking?"

"I agree entirely," he said.

"So it's only a tiny fraction, Adeimantus, of those who engage in philosophy according to her worth that are left,"

⁴ ἄξιον secl. Ast: ἄξιον ἀληθινῆς A: ἄξιον ὡς ἀληθινῆς D: ἀληθινῆς ὡς ἄξιον F

φυγῆς καταληφθὲν γενναῖον καὶ εὖ τετραμμένον ἦθος, ἀπορία τῶν διαφθερούντων κατὰ φύσιν μείναν ἐπ' αὐτῆ, ἣ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῆ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ. | βραχὺ δέ πού τι καὶ ἀπ' ἄλλης τέχνης δικαίως ἀτιμάσαν εὐφνὲς ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι. εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ ὁ τοῦ ἡμετέρου
 c ἑταίρου Θεάγουσ χαλινὸς οἷος κατασχεῖν· καὶ γὰρ Θεάγει τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα παρεσκευάσται πρὸς τὸ ἐκπεσεῖν φιλοσοφίας, ἣ δὲ τοῦ σώματος νοσοτροφία ἀπείργουσα αὐτὸν τῶν πολιτικῶν κατέχει. τὸ δ' ἡμέτερον οὐκ ἄξιον λέγειν, τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον· ἣ γὰρ πού τινι ἄλλῳ ἢ οὐδενὶ τῶν | ἔμπροσθεν γέγονεν. καὶ τούτων δὴ τῶν ὀλίγων οἱ γενόμενοι καὶ γευσάμενοι ὡς ἡδὺν καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αὖ ἱκανῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μανίαν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει οὐδ' ἔστι
 d σύμμαχος μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῷ δικαίῳ βοήθειαν σώζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἄνθρωπος ἐμπεσὼν, οὔτε συναδικεῖν ἐθέλων οὔτε ἱκανὸς ὢν εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρὶν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους ὀνήσαι προαπολόμενος ἀνωφελῆς | αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβῶν, ἡσυχίαν ἔχων καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων, οἷον ἐν χειμῶνι κοινορτοῦ καὶ ζάλης ὑπὸ πνεύματος φερομένου ὑπὸ

³⁷ For Theages, see *Ap.* 33e. The “bridle of Theages” became proverbial. ³⁸ For S.’s *daimonion*, his personal “spiritual sign” which always prevented him from taking wrong courses of action,

I said: “either, I imagine, a type of high-minded and well-brought-up person who finds himself in exile, stays faithful to his nature in the absence of those who will corrupt him; or, when a great soul is born in a small state and takes no notice of the state’s affairs as being beneath him; and a tiny group, I suppose, is justified in turning away from some other trade which they justly regard as beneath them, and would approach her, as being ideally suited. There would also be our friend Theages’ bridle, as it were, as a restraining influence: for him all other things have conspired to divert him away from philosophy, while nursing his sick body prevents him from getting involved in politics.³⁷ My own case isn’t worth mentioning: my divine sign;³⁸ I don’t suppose it’s happened to anyone else, or to anyone in the past. Now, those who have become part of these few and have tasted what a sweet and blessed thing they possess, have, moreover, seen the madness of the majority of people and the fact that no one does anything salutary, so to speak, for the state’s affairs, and that there is not even an ally with whom one could go to the aid of justice and rescue it; but like a man falling among wild beasts who is neither willing to join them in their criminal activities, nor, as he is on his own, is capable of holding out against all their savagery, he would be killed before he could benefit the state or his friends in any way and would become useless to himself and the rest. So taking all this into account, he holds his peace and attends to his own business, just as when in a dust storm or driving rain raised by the wind,

especially involvement in politics, see *Ap.* 31c–32a, *Euthyphr.* 3b. The following passage might be seen (along with *Ap.* 31eff.) as Plato’s S.’s apologia for abstention from state politics.

e τειχίον ἀποστάς, ὁρῶν τοὺς ἄλλους καταπιμπλαμένους ἀνομίας, ἀγαπᾷ εἴ πη αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἀδικίας τε καὶ ἀνοσιῶν ἔργων τόν τε ἐνθάδε βίον βιώσεται καὶ τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν αὐτοῦ μετὰ καλῆς ἐλπίδος ἰλεῶς τε καὶ εὐμενῆς ἀπαλλάξεται.

497 Ἄλλά τοι, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐ τὰ ἐλάχιστα ἂν διαπραξάμενος ἀπαλλάττοιο.

Οὐδέ γε, εἶπον, τὰ μέγιστα, μὴ τυχὼν πολιτείας προσηκούσης· ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτὸς τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται καὶ | μετὰ τῶν ἰδίων τὰ κοινὰ σώσει. Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ὦν ἔνεκα διαβολὴν εἴληφεν καὶ ὅτι οὐ δικαίως, ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ μετρίως εἰρηῆσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἔτ' ἄλλο λέγεις τι σύ.

Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτι λέγω περὶ τούτου· ἀλλὰ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῇ τίνα τῶν νῦν λέγεις πολιτειῶν;

b Οὐδ' ἠντινοῦν, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπαιτιῶμαι, μηδεμίαν ἀξίαν εἶναι τῶν νῦν κατάστασιν πόλεως φιλοσόφου φύσεως· διὸ καὶ στρέφεσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι αὐτήν, ὥσπερ ξενικὸν σπέρμα ἐν γῆ ἄλλῃ σπειρόμενον | ἐξίτηλον εἰς τὸ ἐπιχώριον φιλεῖ κρατούμενον ἰέναι, οὕτω καὶ τοῦτο τὸ γένος νῦν μὲν οὐκ ἴσχειν τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀλλότριον ἦθος
c ἐκπίπτειν· εἰ δὲ λήψεται τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸ ἀριστόν ἐστιν, τότε δηλώσει ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν τῷ ὄντι θεῖον ἦν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀνθρώπινα, τὰ τε τῶν φύσεων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων. δῆλος δὲ οὖν εἶ ὅτι μετὰ τοῦτο ἐρήση τίς αὐτῆ ἢ πολιτεία. |

someone having taken shelter under a wall, sees the rest filled to the brim with lawlessness and is delighted if he can somehow lead the rest of his life free from injustice and unsanctioned deeds and meet his end with good hope graciously and with equanimity.”

“Well I tell you,” he said, “he would end up having achieved a not inconsiderable amount.”

“But not a very great amount either,” I said, “since he has not found a state constituted in a fitting way. For in one that is fitting he will grow more and preserve the common interests along with his own. Well now, I think we have discussed the reasons why the subject of philosophy has received such condemnation, and unjustly at that, in sufficient detail, unless you still have something to say?”

“Well, I don’t want to say any more on this,” he said, “but which of today’s states do you say are suitable for philosophy?”

“None whatsoever,” I replied; “but that is what I do complain about: that none of the states constituted at present are worthy of the philosophical nature, because it is being twisted about and changed for the worse into something else: just as some foreign seed sown in unsuitable soil loses its properties and is usually crowded out and reverts to a native variety, so too this sort doesn’t retain its own powers, but degenerates into some alien type. But if it takes on the best constitution, as it is itself the best, then it will show that it would in fact be divine, while the rest are of human origin in terms of both their natures and their practices. So you are clearly going to ask me now what this constitution is.”

Οὐκ ἔγνωσ, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἔμελλον, ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῇ ἦν ἡμεῖς διεληλύθαμεν οἰκίζοντες τὴν πόλιν ἢ ἄλλη.

Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῇ τοῦτο δὲ αὐτὸ ἐρρήθη μὲν καὶ τότε, ὅτι δεήσοι τι αἰεὶ ἐν εἶναι ἐν τῇ πόλει λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὄνπερ καὶ σὺ ὁ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς νόμους ἐτίθης.

Ἐρρήθη γάρ, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' οὐχ ἰκανῶς, εἶπον, ἐδηλώθη, φόβω ὧν ὑμεῖς ἰ ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι δεδηλώκατε μακρὰν καὶ χαλεπὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οὐ πάντων⁵ ῥᾶστον διελεῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τίνα τρόπον μεταχειριζομένη πόλις φιλοσοφίαν οὐ διολεῖται. τὰ γὰρ δὴ μεγάλα πάντα ἐπισφαλῆ, καὶ τὸ λεγόμενον τὰ καλὰ τῷ ὄντι χαλεπά.

Ἄλλ' ὅμως, ἔφη, λαβέτω τέλος ἡ ἀπόδειξις τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου.

Οὐ τὸ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακωλύσει· παρὼν δὲ τὴν γ' ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἴση. ἰ σκόπει δὲ καὶ νῦν ὡς προθύμως καὶ παρακινδυνευτικῶς μέλλω λέγειν, ὅτι τοῦναντίον ἢ νῦν δεῖ τοῦ ἐπιτηδεύματος τούτου πόλιν ἄπτεσθαι.

Πῶς;

498 Νῦν μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι μειράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παίδων τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται,

⁵ πάντων Bekker: πάντως ADF

"You're wrong there," he said. "I wasn't intending to, but I shall ask if this state or another one is what we discussed when we were setting up ours."

"In other respects it is," I said, "but the real point we agreed even then³⁹ was that there would always have to be one thing in the state which would preserve the rationale of the constitution that you had when as a lawgiver you set down your laws."

"Yes, we did agree on that," he said.

"But it wasn't made sufficiently clear," I said, "for fear of what you by your criticisms have shown to be a long difficult presentation, since the rest is not the easiest of all to explain."

"What sort of thing?"

"How a state should undertake the study of philosophy without being destroyed. For all great enterprises are prone to fail and, as the saying goes, fine things are in fact difficult."

"Yet all the same," he said, "let's get to the end of this outline by getting all this cleared up."

"It's not the lack of will that will hold us back," I said, "but, if anything, the lack of ability. But you will see for yourself my serious intent. Observe even now that I'm going to stick my neck out and say in all seriousness that the state must adopt the practice opposite to the present one."

"How?"

"At present," I said, "those who do take up philosophy, being youths just emerging from childhood, are coming to it at the stage before setting up home and earning a living,

³⁹ See above, 3.412a-b.

οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιούμενοι—λέγω δὲ χαλεπώτατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους—ἐν δὲ ἰ τῷ ἔπειτα, εἴαν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλούμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἀκροαταὶ γίγνεσθαι, μεγάλα ἡγοῦνται, πάρεργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ δεῖν πράττειν· πρὸς δὲ τὸ γῆρας ἐκτὸς δὴ τινων ὀλίγων ἀποσβέννυνται πολὺ μᾶλλον τοῦ Ἡρακλειτείου ἡλίου, ὅσον αὖθις οὐκ ἐξάπτονται.

b Δεῖ δὲ πῶς; ἔφη.

Πᾶν τοῦναντίον· μεράκια μὲν ὄντα καὶ παῖδας μεираκιώδη παιδείαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν μεταχειρίζεσθαι, τῶν τε σωμάτων, ἐν ᾧ βλαστάνει τε καὶ ἀνδροῦται, εὖ μάλα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ἰ ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφία κτωμένους· προιούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας, ἐν ἧ ἡ ψυχὴ τελεοῦσθαι ἄρχεται, ἐπιτείνειν τὰ ἐκείνης γυμνάσια·
c ὅταν δὲ λήγη μὲν ἡ ῥώμη, πολιτικῶν δὲ καὶ στρατειῶν ἐκτὸς γίγνηται, τότε ἤδη ἀφέτους νέμεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττειν, ὅτι μὴ πάρεργον, τοὺς μέλλοντας εὐδαιμόνως βιώσεσθαι καὶ τελευτήσαντας τῷ βίῳ τῷ βεβιωμένῳ τὴν ἐκεῖ μοῖραν ἐπιστήσειν πρέπουσαν. ἰ

Ὡς ἀληθῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἔφη, λέγειν γε προθύμως, ᾧ Σώκρατες· οἶμαι μέντοι τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀκούοντων προθυμότερον ἔτι ἀντιτείνειν οὐδ' ὀπωσιτιοῦν πεισομένους, ἀπὸ Θρασυμάχου ἀρξαμένους.

⁴⁰ Heraclitus says that the sun is extinguished at night and rekindled the following morning (DK 22B6).

and, though regarded as the most accomplished philosophers, give it up just at the hardest point—and by the hardest, I mean the subject of reasoning. After this, if they are called upon and are willing to listen to others doing this subject, they consider it's great stuff, thinking they should do it as a sideline, but as they approach old age, with few exceptions, their fire goes out far more completely than Heraclitus' sun, inasmuch as it is never rekindled."⁴⁰

"Then how should it be done?" he asked.

"In entirely the opposite way. While they are youths and boys they should undertake an education in philosophy suitable for youngsters, just as in fact they do in physical education by which they flourish and become men. They should certainly take good care of their bodies and so gain support for their philosophy, and as they grow older, when the soul begins to reach its peak, they should increase their exercises with it. But when their strength begins to fade, and they give up political and military service, then they should range about freely and do nothing else, unless it be some sideline, if they intend to lead their lives happily and prepare a fitting destiny for the life they have lived in the other world after they die."⁴¹

"You really seem to me to be speaking from the heart, Socrates. However, I do think that the majority of your listeners will argue against you even more whole-heartedly and are not going to be convinced in any way whatsoever, starting with Thrasymachus."

⁴¹ S. here goes directly counter to the view, expressed by Callicles in *Grg.* 484c–d, that philosophy should be an exclusively youthful activity, to be put away on reaching maturity.

d Μὴ διάβαλλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐμὲ καὶ Θρασύμαχον ἄρτι φίλους γεγονότας, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροὺς ὄντας. πείρας γὰρ οὐδὲν ἀνήσομεν, ἕως ἂν ἡ πείσωμεν καὶ τοῦτον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἢ προὔργου τι ποιήσωμεν εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν βίον, ὅταν αὐθις γενόμενοι | τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐντύχωσι λόγοις.

Εἰς μικρόν γ', ἔφη, χρόνον εἴρηκας.

Εἰς οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὥς γε πρὸς τὸν ἅπαντα. τὸ μέντοι μὴ πείθεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις τοὺς πολλοὺς θαῦμα οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ πώποτε εἶδον γενόμενον τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον τοιαῦτ' ἄττα ῥήματα
 e ἐξεπίτηδες ἀλλήλοις ὠμοιωμένα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ὥσπερ νῦν συμπεσόντα. ἄνδρα δὲ ἀρετῇ
 499 παρισωμένον καὶ ὠμοιωμένον μέχρι τοῦ δυνατοῦ τελέως ἔργω τε καὶ λόγῳ, δυναστεύοντα ἐν πόλει ἐτέρα τοιαύτη, οὐ πώποτε ἐωράκασιν, οὔτε ἓνα οὔτε πλείους, ἢ οἶει;

Οὐδαμῶς γε.

Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων | ἰκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γεγονάσιν, οἷων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τοῦ γινῶναι χάριν, τὰ δὲ κομψά τε καὶ ἐριστικὰ καὶ μηδαμόσε ἄλλοσε τείνοντα ἢ πρὸς δόξαν καὶ ἔριν καὶ ἐν δίκαις καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις συνουσίαις πόρρωθεν ἀσπαζομένων.

Οὐδὲ τούτων, ἔφη.

42 Plato contrives a parody of a forced rhyme, which demonstrates the rhetorical trick of which he is making fun: *genomenon*

"Don't set me and Thrasymachus against each other," I said. "We've just become friends—not that we were enemies before. We shall leave nothing untried until we can persuade him and the rest, or we do something useful for them in that life when they'll be born again and get into another discussion like this one."

"It's a short time then you've decided!" he said.

"On the contrary, it's no time at all compared with eternity," I said. "However, it's no surprise that most people are not persuaded by what I'm saying: they have never yet seen what we are now talking about come into being,⁴² but all too frequently such words as these have been deliberately contrived to fit together and not tumble out unpremeditated as they do here and now. As for a man who has been made to equal and resemble virtue to the point of achievable perfection in word and deed and who holds power in some other state of this kind, they have never yet seen a single one, let alone many. Perhaps you don't agree."

"On the contrary."

"What's more, my good friend, they have not become sufficiently attentive to fine free discussions of the kind which rigorously seek out the truth from every angle for the sake of knowledge, but which acknowledge from afar the smart captious stuff from obscure sources aimed at nothing other than success and contention both in the law courts and at private gatherings."

"No, they haven't," he said.

to nun legomenon ("what we are now talking about come into being"), with balance of clauses and assonance.

- b Τούτων τοι χάριν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ταῦτα προορώμενοι ἡμεῖς τότε καὶ δεδιότες ὅμως ἐλέγομεν, ὑπὸ τάληθοῦς ἠναγκασμένοι, ὅτι οὔτε πόλις οὔτε πολιτεία οὐδέ γ' ἀνὴρ ὁμοίως μὴ ποτε γένηται τέλεος, πρὶν ἂν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις τούτοις τοῖς ὀλίγοις καὶ οὐ πονηροῖς, | ἀχρήστοις δὲ νῦν κεκλημένοις, ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης περιβάλῃ, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μὴ, πόλεως ἐπιμεληθῆναι, καὶ τῇ πόλει κατήκοοι γενέσθαι, ἢ τῶν νῦν ἐν δυναστείαις ἢ βασιλείαις ὄντων ὑέσιν ἢ αὐτοῖς ἕκ
- c τινος θείας ἐπιπνοίας ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινὸς ἔρως ἐμπέσῃ. τούτων δὲ πότερα γενέσθαι ἢ ἀμφοτέρα ὡς ἄρα ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐδένα φημὶ ἔχειν λόγον. οὔτω γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς δικαίως καταγελώμεθα, ὡς ἄλλως εὐχαῖς ὅμοια λέγοντες. ἢ οὐχ | οὔτως;

Οὔτως.

- Εἰ τοίνυν ἄκροισ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν πόλεως τις ἀνάγκη ἐπιμεληθῆναι ἢ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ ἀπίρῳ τῷ παρεληλυθότι χρόνῳ ἢ καὶ νῦν ἔστιν ἐν τινι βαρβαρικῷ τόπῳ,
- d πόρρω που ἐκτὸς ὄντι τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἢ καὶ ἔπειτα γενήσεται, περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι, ὡς γέγονεν ἢ εἰρημένη πολιτεία καὶ ἔστιν καὶ γενήσεται γε, ὅταν αὐτὴ Μοῦσα πόλεως ἐγκρατῆς γένηται. οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι, | οὐδ' ἡμεῖς ἀδύνατα λέγομεν· χαλεπὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται.

Καὶ ἐμοί, ἔφη, οὔτω δοκεῖ.

Τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οὐκ αὖ δοκεῖ, ἐρεῖς;

“It was for these reasons,” I said, “that we saw this before⁴³ and were afraid, and yet forced on by the truth we said that no state or constitution, nor any man likewise could ever become perfect before some compulsion by chance involves those few philosophers who are not corrupt, but who are now called useless, in looking after the state and being sensitive to its needs (whether they want to or not), or some true love of true philosophy latches on to the sons of those who are now in power or are kings, or even onto these latter themselves by some divine intervention. To claim that either or both of these situations are impossible, is, I maintain, unreasonable. For if it were so, we would rightly be laughed at for describing things like castles in the air. Or is this not so?”

“No, it is so.”

“If then some compulsion for those most highly qualified in philosophy to undertake the affairs of the state has either come about in the dim and distant past, or even exists today in some foreign place—somewhere far from our view, in fact—or if it happens in the future, we are prepared to fight to defend our argument that the said constitution has come into being and exists, and will indeed come into being when the Muse herself⁴⁴ takes power over the state. It’s not impossible for this to happen, you know; we are not talking about impossibilities, but they are difficult matters, and we are agreed about that.”

“I certainly think so,” he said.

“But you won’t agree,” I said, “that the majority of people think so?”

⁴³ E.g., at 489a.

⁴⁴ I.e., the philosophic Muse which guides the Platonic ruler.

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

ᾧ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ πάνυ οὕτω τῶν πολλῶν
 e κατηγορεῖ. ἀλλοίαν τοι δόξαν ἔξουσιν, ἐὰν αὐτοῖς μὴ
 φιλονικῶν ἀλλὰ παραμυθούμενος καὶ ἀπολυόμενος
 τὴν τῆς φιλομαθίας διαβολὴν ἐνδεικνύῃ οὓς λέγεις
 500 τοὺς φιλοσόφους, καὶ διορίζῃ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὴν τε φύ-
 σιν αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιτήδευσιν, ἵνα μὴ ἠγῶνταί σε
 λέγειν οὓς αὐτοὶ οἴονται. καὶ ἐὰν οὕτω θεῶνται, ἀλ-
 λοίαν τοι⁶ φήσεις αὐτοὺς δόξαν λήψεσθαι καὶ ἄλλα
 †ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἢ οἶετινὰ χαλεπαίνειν τῷ μὴ χαλεπῷ
 ἢ | φθονεῖν τῷ μὴ φθονερῷ ἄφθονόν τε καὶ πρᾶον
 ὄντα; ἐγὼ μὲν γάρ σε προφθάσας λέγω ὅτι ἐν ὀλίγοις
 τισὶν ἠγοῦμαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ πλήθει, χαλεπὴν οὕτω
 φύσιν γίγνεσθαι.

Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίομαι.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο συνοίει, τοῦ χαλεπῶς πρὸς
 φιλοσοφίαν τοὺς πολλοὺς διακεῖσθαι ἐκείνους αἰτίους
 εἶναι τοὺς ἔξωθεν οὐ προσῆκον ἐπεισκευμακότας,
 λοιδορομένους τε αὐτοῖς καὶ φιλαπεχθημόνως ἔχον-
 τας καὶ αἰεὶ | περὶ ἀνθρώπων τοὺς λόγους ποιουμένους,
 ἥκιστα φιλοσοφία πρέπον ποιοῦντας;

Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

c Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς
 ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω
 βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας, καὶ μαχόμενον

⁶ τοι ADF: τ'οὐ Baiter: 500a2-4 καὶ . . . ἀποκρίνεσθαι secl.
 Burnet

BOOK VI

"They probably don't," he said.

"Look, my good fellow," I said, "don't utterly condemn the majority in this way. They will have a different kind of belief, if, instead of being contentious, you encourage them do away with their prejudice against a love of learning, and make it clear whom you mean when you talk about philosophers, and again if you define their nature and business, as we did a little while ago, in such a way that they won't think you are talking about those whom they are thinking of. And even if they do regard them in this way, will you say they are not going to adopt a different view and answer differently?⁴⁵ Or do you think that anyone who is generous and mild-tempered will be annoyed at someone who is not difficult, or will resent someone who is ungrudging? For I shall forestall you by saying that such a resentful nature is found in a few people, but not in the majority."

"And I shall agree with you, of course," he said.

"Does that mean that you will also agree that the ones who are responsible for the majority being ill-disposed toward philosophy are those who rush in where they don't belong like a drunken rabble, abuse each other, and are quarrelsome and always stirring up gossip about personalities and acting in a way least fitting for philosophy?"

"Very much so," he said.

"I don't imagine, Adeimantus, that he who genuinely has his thoughts directed at what exists has the leisure to look down on people's activities and be filled with envy and

⁴⁵ There is a textual crux here. The sense seems to be the possibility of changing the minds of the masses. Burnet brackets the whole sentence a2-4.

αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ δυσμενείας ἐμπίμπλασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς τεταγμένα ἄττα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' αἰεὶ ἔχοντα ὀρώντας καὶ θεωμένους οὐτ' ἀδικοῦντα οὐτ' ἀδικούμενα | ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμείσθαι τε καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι. ἢ οἶε τινὰ μηχανὴν εἶναι, ὅτ' τις ὀμιλεῖ ἀγάμενος, μὴ μιμείσθαι ἐκείνο;

Ἄδύνατον, ἔφη.

- d Θείῳ δὴ καὶ κοσμίῳ ὃ γε φιλόσοφος ὀμιλῶν κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἀνθρώπῳ γίγνεται διαβολὴ δ' ἐν πάσι πολλή.

Παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν. |

Ἄν οὖν τις, εἶπον, αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἂ ἐκεῖ ὄργῃ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἡθῆ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἄρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἶε γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς; |

Ἐκιστά γε, ἢ δ' ὅς.

- e Ἄλλ' ἐὰν δὴ αἰσθωνται οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγομεν, χαλεπανοῦσι δὴ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις καὶ ἀπιστήσουσιν ἡμῖν λέγουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις, εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι;

- 501 Οὐ χαλεπανοῦσιν, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἐάνπερ αἰσθωνται. ἀλλὰ δὴ τίνα λέγεις τρόπον τῆς διαγραφῆς;

Λαβόντες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἡθῆ ἀνθρώπων, πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν, ὃ

BOOK VI

ill will as a result of fighting against them. Instead he sees and observes things which are regulated, always internally consistent, that do no wrong and are not wronged by each other, are orderly and rational, and these he imitates and models himself on as far as possible. Or do you think there is any way in which one would not imitate something one enjoys being associated with?"

"No, that's impossible," he said.

"The philosopher who allies himself with the divine and orderly becomes divine and orderly, as far as is possible for a human being. But there is a good deal of disparagement among everyone."

"Absolutely."

"If then," I said, "some compulsion comes upon him to put into practice what he sees in the divine realm in the private and public lives of men, and to mold not just his own character, do you think he would become a bad creator of temperance, justice, and every other common virtue?"

"Certainly not," he said.

"But if the majority see that we are telling the truth about him, will they get irritated with philosophers and refuse to believe us when we say that a state would never otherwise be successful, unless artists portray it using some divine model?"

"They won't be annoyed if in fact they realize it," he said, "and yet what kind of portrayal do you mean?"

"They would take a state," I said, "and people's way of life, rather as you do a writing tablet. First of all they

οὐ πάνυ ῥάδιον· ἀλλ' οὖν οἶσθ' ὅτι τούτῳ ἂν εὐθύς τῶν ἄλλων διενέγκει(α)ν, | τῷ μῆτε ἰδιώτου μῆτε πόλεως ἐθελῆσαι ἂν ἄψασθαι μηδὲ γράφειν νόμους, πρὶν ἢ παραλαβεῖν καθαρὰν ἢ αὐτοὶ ποιῆσαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ ταῦτα οἶει ὑπογράψασθαι ἂν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;

Τί μῆν;

- b Ἐπειτα οἶμαι ἀπεργαζόμενοι πυκνὰ ἂν ἐκατέρωσ' ἀποβλέποιεν, πρὸς τε τὸ φύσει δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ σῶφρον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ πρὸς ἐκείνο αὖ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐμποιοῖεν, συμμειγνύντες τε καὶ κεραυνύντες ἐκ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων | τὸ ἀνδρείκελον, ἀπ' ἐκείνου τεκμαιρόμενοι, ὃ δὴ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐκάλεσεν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγγιγνόμενον θεοειδές τε καὶ θεοείκελον.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

- c Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἂν οἶμαι ἐξαλείφοιεν, τὸ δὲ πάλιν ἐγγράφοιεν, ἕως ὅτι μάλιστα ἀνθρώπεια ἦθη εἰς ὅσον ἐνδέχεται θεοφιλῆ ποιήσειαν.

Καλλίστη γοῦν ἂν, ἔφη, ἡ γραφὴ γένοιτο. |

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείθομέν πη ἐκείνους, οὓς διατεταμένους ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ἔφησθα ἰέναι, ὡς τοιοῦτός ἐστι πολιτειῶν ζωγράφος ὃν τότε ἐπηνοῦμεν πρὸς αὐτούς, δι' ὃν ἐκείνοι ἐχαλέπαινον ὅτι τὰς πόλεις αὐτῷ παρεδίδομεν, καὶ τι μᾶλλον αὐτὸ νῦν ἀκούοντες πραῦνονται;

would wipe it clean—not an easy task. The point is, you know, they would immediately differ from other people in this: in not wanting to deal with either an individual or a state, or even draft laws, before they had taken over a clean slate, or had cleaned it themselves.”

“Indeed, and rightly so,” he said.

“So do you think that, after this, they would sketch out the outline of your state?”

“Of course.”

“Then, I think, as they complete the work, they would frequently look carefully⁴⁶ in each direction: toward what is naturally just, good, and temperate, and all suchlike, and on the other hand to what they would put into human beings, combining and blending from their regular occupations a human likeness using as their model what Homer called the image and nature of god engendered in men.”⁴⁷

“That’s right,” he said.

“Then I think they would rub out and redraw some parts until they had made human characteristics as much and as far as possible dear to the gods.”

“At any rate the painting would be very beautiful,” he said.

“Is there any way then,” I said, “that we are going to convince those you said were going to attack⁴⁸ us head on, that the person we commended to them is this sort of portrayer of political constitutions, on whose account they were annoyed with us because we were entrusting our state to him; and now that they have heard it, are they somewhat less aggrieved?”

⁴⁶ I.e., looking (away) at their models (see above, n. 2).

⁴⁷ Hom. *Il.* 1.131.

⁴⁸ At 5.474a.

Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἣ δ' ὅς, εἰ σωφρονοῦσιν.

d Πῆ γὰρ δὴ ἔξουσιν ἀμφισβητῆσαι; πότερον μὴ τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ ἀληθείας ἔραστας εἶναι τοὺς φιλοσόφους;

Ἄτοπον μεντᾶν, ἔφη, εἴη.

Ἄλλὰ μὴ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν οἰκείαν εἶναι τοῦ ἀρίστου, ἣν ἡμεῖς διήλθομεν;

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Τί δέ; τὴν τοιαύτην τυχοῦσαν τῶν προσηκόντων ἐπιτηδευμάτων οὐκ ἀγαθὴν τελέως ἔσεσθαι καὶ φιλόσοφον, εἴπερ τινα ἄλλην; ἢ ἐκείνους φήσειν μᾶλλον, οὓς ἡμεῖς ἀφωρίσαμεν;

Οὐ δῆπου.

e Ἐτι οὖν ἀγριανοῦσι λεγόντων ἡμῶν ὅτι πρὶν ἂν πόλεως τὸ φιλόσοφον γένος ἐγκρατὲς γένηται, οὔτε πόλει οὔτε πολίταις κακῶν παῦλα ἔσται, οὐδὲ ἡ πολιτεία ἣν μυθολογοῦμεν λόγῳ ἔργῳ τέλος λήψεται; ἢ

Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἦττον.

502 Βούλει οὖν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, μὴ ἦττον φῶμεν αὐτοὺς ἀλλὰ παντάπασι πράους γεγονέναι καὶ πεπεῖσθαι, ἵνα, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ αἰσχυρθέντες ὁμολογήσωσιν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὗτοι μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτο πεπεισμένοι ἔστων. ἢ τοῦδε δὲ πέρι τις ἀμφισβητήσει, ὡς οὐκ ἂν τύχοιεν γενόμενοι βασιλέων ἔκγονοι ἢ δυναστῶν τὰς φύσεις φιλόσοφοι;

Οὐδ' ἂν εἷς, ἔφη.

Τοιούτους δὲ γενομένους ὡς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη δια-

"Yes, very much so," he said, "if they have any sense."

"What aspects can they possibly dispute? It won't be over the fact that philosophers are lovers of reality and truth?"

"Oh no, that would be absurd," he said.

"Nor will it be over the fact that their nature, which we have discussed, is closely related to the best."

"No, not that either."

"Well then? Can they deny that such a nature which happens to find appropriate pursuits will not be as perfectly good and wisdom-loving if this can be said of any? Or will they rather say it's one of those we ruled out?"

"Surely not."

"Will they then be further incensed by our saying that until the philosophical class takes control of the state, there will be no respite from trouble for the state or its citizens, nor will its constitution which we have discussed in theory be fully realized in practice?"

"Less so, perhaps."

"Do you want us to say therefore not that they have become less angry, but completely acquiescent and convinced in order to agree with us out of a sense of shame, if for no other reason?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Well then, in that case let's assume they're convinced by this," I said. "But will anyone argue this next point: that there is no chance that the offspring of kings and potentates will be born philosophers by nature?"

"No, no one would argue that," he said.

"Can anyone argue that if anyone is born like this, they

φθαρῆναι, ἔχει τις λέγειν; ὡς μὲν γὰρ χαλεπὸν σω-
θῆναι, καὶ ἡμεῖς συγχωροῦμεν· ὡς δὲ ἐν παντὶ τῷ
b χρόνῳ τῶν πάντων οὐδέποτε οὐδ' ἂν εἰς σωθείη, ἔσθ'
ὅστις ἀμφισβητήσῃ;

Καὶ πῶς;

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς ἱκανὸς γενόμενος, πόλιν
ἔχων πειθομένην, πάντ' ἐπιτελέσαι τὰ νῦν ἀπιστού-
μενα. |

Ἰκανὸς γάρ, ἔφη.

Ἄρχοντος γάρ που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθέντος τοὺς νόμους
καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἃ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐ δήπου ἀδύ-
νατον ἐθέλειν ποιεῖν τοὺς πολίτας.

Οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν.

Ἄλλὰ δῆ, ἅπερ ἡμῖν δοκεῖ, δόξαι καὶ ἄλλοις θαν-
μαστόν τι καὶ ἀδύνατον;

c Οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε βέλτιστα, εἴπερ δυνατά, ἱκανῶς ἐν
τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, διήλθομεν.

Ἰκανῶς γάρ. |

Νῦν δῆ, ὡς ἔοικεν, συμβαίνει ἡμῖν περὶ τῆς νομο-
θεσίας ἄριστα μὲν εἶναι ἃ λέγομεν, εἰ γένοιτο, χαλεπὰ
δὲ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύνατά γε.

Συμβαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μόγις τέλος ἔσχεν, τὰ ἐπίλοιπα
d δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο λεκτέον, τίνα τρόπον ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τίνων
μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων οἱ σωτήρες ἐνέσου-
νται τῆς πολιτείας, καὶ κατὰ ποίας ἡλικίας ἕκαστοι
ἐκάστων ἀπτόμενοι;

will necessarily be corrupted? We too agree that it is difficult to save them, but is there anyone who will argue that in the whole of time out of all of them not even a single one would be saved?"

"Well, how could they?"

"But surely," I said, "if there were one competent person born controlling a compliant state, he would accomplish everything we now find unbelievable."

"Yes, one is enough," he said.

"For surely if there is a ruler," I said, "administering the laws and practices we have discussed, I don't suppose it's impossible that the citizens want to carry them out."

"No, no matter how you look at it."

"But there again, would it be at all surprising and impossible if others should believe as we do?"

"Well, speaking for myself, I don't think so," he said.

"And yet again, I think we have already argued adequately that if they are possible, these are the best arrangements."

"Yes, we have, quite adequately."

"Right, then, it looks as if the things we are saying about law-giving, if they could be realized, turn out to be the best, and, though difficult, yet not impossible."

"Yes, that is how it turns out," he said.

"In that case then, since we have reached this conclusion with some difficulty, we must discuss the rest that follows on from it, as to how and by means of what kinds of study and experience we shall acquire those who will preserve our constitution, and at what age each of them should take up these various activities, mustn't we?"

Λεκτέον μέντοι, ἔφη. |

Οὐδέν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ σοφόν μοι ἐγένετο τήν τε τῶν
 γυναικῶν τῆς κτήσεως δυσχέρειαν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν
 παραλιπόντι καὶ παιδογονίαν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων
 κατάστασιν, εἰδότει ὡς ἐπίφθονός τε καὶ χαλεπῆ
 e γίγνεσθαι ἢ παντελῶς ἀληθής· νῦν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἦττον
 ἦλθεν τὸ δεῖν αὐτὰ διελθεῖν. καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ τῶν γυ-
 ναικῶν τε καὶ παίδων πεπέρανται, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀρχόντων
 503 ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μετελθεῖν δεῖ. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μνη-
 μονεύεις, δεῖν αὐτοὺς φιλοπόλιδάς τε φαίνεσθαι,
 βασανιζομένους ἐν ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λύπαις, καὶ τὸ
 δόγμα τοῦτο μῆτ' ἐν πόνοις μῆτ' ἐν φόβοις μῆτ' ἐν
 ἄλλῃ μηδεμιᾷ μεταβολῇ φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλοντας, ἢ
 τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον, τὸν δὲ | πανταχοῦ ἀκή-
 ρατον ἐκβαίνοντα ὥσπερ χρυσὸν ἐν πυρὶ βασανι-
 ζόμενον, στατέον ἄρχοντα καὶ γέρα δοτέον καὶ
 ζῶντι καὶ τελευτήσαντι καὶ ἄθλα. τοιαῦτ' ἅττα ἦν τὰ
 λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ
 λόγου, πεφοβημένου κινεῖν τὸ νῦν παρόν.

b Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις· μέμνημαι γάρ.

Ὅκνος γάρ, ἔφην, ὦ φίλε, ἐγώ, εἰπεῖν τὰ νῦν ἀπο-
 τετολμημένα· νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι
 τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθ-
 ιστάναι. |

⁴⁹ At 4.423e. S.'s "cunning ploy" (*to sophon*) had already been uncovered by Polemarchus and Adeimantus at the beginning of Book 5.

“Yes, we must.”

“My cunning ploy came to nothing,” I said, “when I left out of our earlier discussion⁴⁹ the vexed question of the possession of women, childbirth, and the appointment of our rulers, since I knew that the complete truth would be difficult to establish and would cause resentment. Nonetheless, the time has now come when we must examine these topics. The question of the women and children has indeed been dealt with,⁵⁰ but we must go in search of the matter of the rulers more or less from the beginning. We were saying,⁵¹ if you recall, that they must be shown to be lovers of their city when evaluated in terms of their pleasures and pains and shown not to abandon their beliefs when in trouble, or in fear or any other setback. We must reject the man who is incapable of this, but the one who turns out to be altogether pure, like gold tested in fire, must be appointed as ruler and given rewards and prizes during his lifetime and after his death. Those were the sorts of things we were talking about when our discussion slipped through our fingers and veiled itself in fear of stirring up what now lies before us.”⁵²

“That’s very true,” he said. “I do remember.”

“You see, my friend,” I said, “I was hesitant to say what I have just had the courage to do. But now let’s have the courage to admit that we must establish philosophers as our guardians in the strictest sense.”

⁵⁰ At 5.451c–69a.

⁵¹ At 3.412b–14a.

⁵² Plato is suggesting that they should ideally have continued with the discussion of the education of the guardians, concluded at 412a.

Εἰρήσθω γάρ, ἔφη.

Νόησον δὴ ὡς εἰκότως ὀλίγοι ἔσονται σοι ἦν γὰρ διήλθομεν φύσιν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, εἰς ταῦτον συμφύεσθαι αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη ὀλιγάκις ἐθέλει, τὰ πολλὰ δὲ διεσπασμένη φύεται.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

c Εὐμαθείς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἔπεται οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ἅμα φύεσθαι †καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας (καὶ)⁷ οἶοι† κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιότητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι ὑπὸ ὀξύτητος φέρονται | ὅπη ἂν τύχωσιν, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἦθη καὶ οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς ἂν τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταῦτόν· δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς ὥσπερ ἀπονεναρκωμένα, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίμπλονται, ὅταν τι δέη τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν. |

Ἔστι ταῦτα, ἔφη.

Ἡμεῖς δέ γε ἔφαμεν ἀμφοτέρων δεῖν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς μετέχειν, ἢ μήτε παιδείας τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης δεῖν αὐτῷ μεταδιδόναι μήτε τιμῆς μήτε ἀρχῆς.

Ὅρθῶς, ἢ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν σπάνιον αὐτὸ οἶε ἔσεσθαι;

⁷ καὶ ante οἶοι Heindorf: alii alia

BOOK VI

"Yes, let's agree on that," he said.

"Remember it stands to reason that there will be few of them: they must have the nature we've discussed; its parts are rarely willing to grow together into a single whole; the majority grow scattered about the place."

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"You know that those who find learning easy, have a retentive memory, and are shrewd and sharp-witted, and their accompaniments, such as youthful spirit and high-mindedness—you know that these characteristics do not go together and are not willing to live alongside orderly lives in peace and security, but such people are carried by their quick wits wherever chance takes them and their stability disappears completely."

"That's true," he said.

"Doesn't this mean, on the other hand, that those secure characters which are not easy to change, whom one tends to treat as reliable, and are also not easily moved when faced by fear in warfare, do the same, moreover, when faced with study? They're hard to shift and find it hard to learn. As if completely torpid, they nod off and yawn whenever they have to exert themselves on this kind of thing."

"That is the case," he said.

"But we said⁵³ that someone must have a good proper share of both qualities, or we should not give him a share of education in the strictest sense, or honor or power."

"And rightly so," he said.

"So do you think there won't be much of this around?"

⁵³ At 485aff.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Βασανιστέον δὴ ἔν τε οἷς τότε ἐλέγομεν πόνοις τε
 e καὶ φόβοις καὶ ἡδοναῖς, καὶ ἔτι δὴ ὁ τότε παρῆμεν
 νῦν λέγομεν, ὅτι καὶ ἐν μαθήμασι πολλοῖς γυμνάζειν
 δεῖ, σκοποῦντας εἰ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα μαθήματα δυνατῆ
 504 ἔσται ἐνεγκεῖν εἴτε καὶ ἀποδειλιάσει, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς
 ἄλλοις ἀποδειλιῶντες.

Πρέπει γέ τοι δὴ, ἔφη, οὕτω σκοπεῖν. ἀλλὰ ποῖα
 δὴ λέγεις μαθήματα μέγιστα;

Μνημονεύεις μὲν που, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι | τριτὰ εἶδη
 ψυχῆς διαστησάμενοι συνεβιβάζομεν δικαιοσύνης τε
 πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας ὁ
 ἕκαστον εἶη.

Μὴ γὰρ μνημονεύων, ἔφη, τὰ λοιπὰ ἂν εἶην δίκαιος
 μὴ ἀκούειν.

Ἦ καὶ τὸ προρρηθὲν αὐτῶν;

Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

b Ἐλέγομέν που ὅτι ὡς μὲν δυνατὸν ἦν κάλλιστα
 αὐτὰ κατιδεῖν ἄλλη μακροτέρα εἶη περίοδος, ἦν
 περιελθόντι καταφανῆ γίγνοιτο, τῶν μέντοι ἔμπροσθεν
 προειρημένων ἐπομένας ἀποδείξεις οἷόν τ' εἶη προσ-
 ἄψαι. καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔξαρκεῖν ἔφατε, | καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐρρήθη
 τὰ τότε τῆς μὲν ἀκριβείας, ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐφαίνετο, ἑλλιπῆ,
 εἰ δὲ ὑμῖν ἀρεσκόντως, ὑμεῖς ἂν τοῦτο εἴποιτε.

Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἔφη, μετρίως· ἐφαίνετο μὴν καὶ τοῖς
 ἄλλοις.

“Of course.”

“So we must put him to the test in the troubles, fears, and pleasures we were talking about before that, and matters which we passed over before but are raising now, namely that he must get practice in many subjects and see if he will be able to bear the greatest lessons, or actually play the coward, as cowards do in other pursuits.”

“Indeed, I’m sure you’re right to look at it in this way,” he said, “but what do you mean by the greatest lessons?”

“I think you’ll remember,” I said, “that we distinguished three parts of the soul and compared what the function of each of them was in terms of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom.”⁵⁴

“If I didn’t remember that,” he said, “I would not be the right person to hear the rest!”

“Does that also apply to what was said before that?”

“What was that, then?”

“I think we said that in order to see these things in the best possible way, it would require another longer way round which would make these things quite clear if we took it,⁵⁵ but that it would be possible to add explanations in keeping with what had been said previously. And all of you said that it was enough, with the result that what we said then seemed to me to be somewhat lacking in precision; but if it satisfied you, you should say so.”

“Well, I was moderately satisfied,” he said, “and indeed so were the others, apparently.”

⁵⁴ At 434d–41e.

⁵⁵ The “longer way” mentioned at 4.435d is intended to initiate the guardian into a full vision of the Form of the Good.

c Ἄλλ', ὦ φίλε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μέτρον τῶν τοιούτων ἀπολείπον καὶ ὅτιοῦν τοῦ ὄντος οὐ πάνυ μετρίως γίγνεται. ἀτελὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς μέτρον. δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίοτέ τισιν ἰκανῶς ἤδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖ(ν) περαιτέρω ζητεῖν. |

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, συχνοὶ πάσχοσιν αὐτὸ διὰ ῥαθυμίας.

Τούτου δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ παθήματος ἤκιστα προσδεῖται φύλακι πόλεως τε καὶ νόμων.

Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς.

d Τὴν μακροτέραν τοίνυν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ἔφην, περιτέον τῷ τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ἦττον μανθάνοντι πονητέον ἢ γυμναζομένῳ ἢ, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, τοῦ μεγίστου τε καὶ μάλιστα προσήκοντος μαθήματος ἐπὶ τέλος οὐποτε ἤξει.

Οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα, ἔφη, μέγιστα, ἀλλ' ἔτι τι μείζον | δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ὧν διήλθομεν;

Καὶ μείζον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων οὐχ ὑπογραφήν δεῖ ὥσπερ νῦν θεάσασθαι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τελευτάτην ἀπεργασίαν μὴ παριέναι. ἢ οὐ γελοῖον ἐπὶ μὲν ἄλλοις σμικροῦ ἀξίοις πᾶν ποιεῖν συντετινομένους e ὅπως ὅτι ἀκριβέστατα καὶ καθαρώτατα ἔξει, τῶν δὲ μεγίστων μὴ μέγιστας ἀξιοῦν εἶναι καὶ τὰς ἀκριβείας;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, [ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα].⁸ ὃ μέντοι

⁸ ἄξιον τὸ διανόημα secl. Ast et al.

BOOK VI

"Well, my friend," I said, "a measure of such things, which falls in any way at all short of reality, is not at all a reasonable measure. For anything that is imperfect is not a measure of anything. Sometimes people think a thing is already sufficient and that they don't need to go any farther."

"Indeed," he said, "very often that's what they find through being slack."

"And that's the last sort of trait we want in any guardian of a state and its laws," I said.

"Evidently," he replied.

"So one must approach a subject like this by the longer route, my friend," I said, "and apply no less effort to one's study than to physical exercise, or, as we were saying just now, one will never reach the end of an important and most appropriate lesson."

"Are these not the most important," he asked, "or is there something greater than justice and the things we have talked about?"

"Not only greater," I said, "but even with these very things, we must not merely look at a sketch, as we are doing now, but we must not pass by the most finished product. Or isn't it ridiculous to spend all our energies on things of little worth to make them the most precise and pure, but not consider the most important things which are worth the greatest effort to determine with precision?"

"Certainly," he said, [a worthy thought];⁵⁶ however, as

⁵⁶ This phrase is bracketed by most editors as an interpolation.

μέγιστον μάθημα καὶ περὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ λέγεις, οἶει τιν' ἄν σε, ἔφη, ἀφεῖναι | μὴ ἐρωτήσαντα τί ἐστίν;

505 Οὐ πάνν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ καὶ σὺν ἐρώτα. πάντως αὐτὸ οὐκ ὀλιγάκις ἀκήκοας, νῦν δὲ ἢ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ἢ αἰ διανοῆ ἔμοι πράγματα παρέχειν ἀντιλαμβανόμενος. οἶμαι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας, ἢ δὴ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τᾶλλα προσχρησάμενα χρήσιμα καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται. καὶ νῦν σχεδὸν οἶσθ' ὅτι | μέλλω τοῦτο λέγειν, καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ ὅτι αὐτὴν οὐχ ἱκανῶς ἴσμεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἴσμεν, ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τᾶλλα ἐπισταίμεθα, οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν ὄφελος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' b εἰ κεκτημέθ' αὐτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. ἢ οἶει τι πλέον εἶναι πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι, μὴ μέντοι ἀγαθῆν; ἢ πάντα τᾶλλα φρονεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸν μηδὲν φρονεῖν;

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη. |

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε οἶσθα, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν πολλοῖς ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς δὲ κομψοτέροις φρόνησις.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Καὶ ὅτι γε, ὦ φίλε, οἱ τοῦτο ἡγούμενοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δεῖξαι ἤτις φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτώντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι. |

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, γελοίως.

c Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ὄνειδιζόντες γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθὸν λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσιν; φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτὸ φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αἰ συνιέντων ἡμῶν

to what is the most important study and what you mean by it, do you think anyone could let you off without asking what it is?"

"Certainly not," I said, "go ahead and ask me yourself. At any rate you have heard it quite a few times, but now either you don't understand, or more likely your intention is to cause me problems by your objections! However, I rather think it's the latter since in fact you have often heard that the Form of the Good is the most important thing to learn, in relation to which 'just' and other such terms become useful and beneficial. And now you know more or less that this is what I'm going to say, and that, in addition, we don't know it adequately. But if we don't know it, you know that, even if we were to understand everything else as fully as possible, nothing is of any use to us without this notion, any more than we could acquire anything without the Good. Or do you think there is any advantage in having gained every possession, apart from the Good? Or to hold everything in high regard without the Good, but have no regard for anything beautiful and good?"

"By Zeus, I certainly do not!" he exclaimed.

"But furthermore you know that to most people pleasure seems to be the Good, but to the more refined it is knowledge."

"Of course."

"And again, my friend, that those who believe this cannot point to what this knowledge is, but are forced to conclude that it is that concerned with the Good."

"And very silly it is too," he said.

"Of course it's silly, isn't it," I said, "if they reproach us because we don't know what the Good is, and in turn they speak to us as if we did know? They say, you know, that it

ὅτι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγγονται ὄνομα. |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Τί δὲ οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν ὀριζόμενοι; μὴν μὴ τι ἐλάττονος πλάνης ἔμπλεω τῶν ἐτέρων; ἢ οὐ καὶ οὗτοι ἀναγκάζονται ὁμολογεῖν ἡδονὰς εἶναι κακάς;

Σφόδρα γε.

Συμβαίνει δὴ αὐτοῖς οἶμαι ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι καὶ κακὰ ταῦτά. ἢ γάρ;

d Τί μῆν;

Οὐκοῦν ὅτι μὲν μεγάλαι καὶ πολλαὶ ἀμφισβητήσεις περὶ αὐτοῦ, φανερόν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; |

Τί δέ; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ὡς δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἔλοιτο τὰ δοκοῦντα, κἂν (εἰ) μὴ εἶη, ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτήσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτᾶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσιν, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτιμάζει;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

e Ὁ δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπαντα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστὶν οὐδὲ πίστει χρήσασθαι μονίμῳ οἷᾳ καὶ περὶ τᾶλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ | τῶν ἄλλων εἴ τι ὄφελος
506 ἦν, περὶ δὴ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ τοσοῦτον οὕτω φῶμεν δεῖν ἐσκοτῶσθαι καὶ ἐκείνους τοὺς βελτίστους ἐν τῇ πόλει, οἷς πάντα ἐγχειροῦμεν;

⁵⁷ An admission forced on Callicles at Grg. 499b.

is knowledge of the Good, as though we understand what they mean whenever they utter the word 'good.'"

"That's very true," he said.

"What about those who define pleasure as the Good? They are surely only slightly less full of misconceptions than the rest, aren't they? Or aren't even these people bound to agree that there are evil pleasures?"⁵⁷

"Absolutely."

"It turns out, I think, that they agree that the same things are both good and evil. Isn't that true?"

"Of course."

"So it is clear that there are many serious disputes about this, aren't there?"

"Of course."

"Well then? Isn't it clear that many would prefer things which are apparently just and fair, and even if they weren't, they would nevertheless choose to do these things, possess and have beliefs about them; but when it comes to good things, it's no longer enough for anyone to acquire the appearance, but they seek out the real good, and everyone then disparages what appears to be good?"

"Very much so," he said.

"Indeed, that is what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything, while sensing instinctively that there is something there, yet is at a loss and doesn't have sufficient means to grasp adequately what it may be, nor does it actually develop a stable belief about it, as it does with everything else. Because of this it fails to gain any benefit even from the other things. Indeed, concerning such an important issue of such a kind, are we to say that even those who are best in our state to whom we shall entrust everything, are in the dark?"

Ἦκιστα γ', ἔφη.

Οἶμαι γοῦν, εἶπον, δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπη ποτὲ | ἀγαθὰ ἔστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι ἂν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα· μαντεύομαι δὲ μηδένα αὐτὰ πρότερον γνώσεσθαι ἰκανῶς.

Καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, μαντεύη.

Οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία τελῶς κεκοσμήσεται, εἰάν
b ὁ τοιοῦτος αὐτὴν ἐπισκοπῆ φύλαξ, ὁ τούτων ἐπιστήμων;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. ἀλλὰ σὺ δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἐπιστήμην τὸ ἀγαθὸν φῆς εἶναι ἢ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ ταῦτα; |

Οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνὴρ, καλῶς ἦσθα καὶ πάλαι καταφανῆς ὅτι σοι οὐκ ἀποχρήσοι τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦν περὶ αὐτῶν.

Οὐδὲ γὰρ δίκαιόν μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνεται τὰ τῶν ἄλλων μὲν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν δόγματα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ
c μῆ, τοσοῦτον χρόνον περὶ ταῦτα πραγματευόμενον.

Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· δοκεῖ σοι δίκαιον εἶναι περὶ ὧν τις μὴ οἶδεν λέγειν ὡς εἰδότα;

Οὐδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, ὡς εἰδότα, ὡς μέντοι οἰόμενον ταῦθ' | ἂ οἶεται ἐθέλειν λέγειν.

Τί δέ; εἶπον· οὐκ ἦσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἰ βέλτισται τυφλαί—ἢ δοκοῦσί τί σοι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθῆς τι δοξάζοντες;

"Those least of all," he said.

"At least I think," I said, "if it isn't known in what respects justice and fairness may be good, then it wouldn't be worth very much to have secured a guardian for them who is equally ignorant about it. My guess is that no one will have a sufficient knowledge of these things until he knows this."

"I think that's a good guess," he said.

"So doesn't that mean our constitution will be organized and finished if such a guardian—one who understands these things—is in charge of it?"

"That must be the case," he said. "But what about you, Socrates? Do you maintain that good is understanding or pleasure, or something else other than these?"

"That's my man!" I said. "It's been perfectly obvious for a long time now that you couldn't be satisfied with what other people think about this."

"It certainly doesn't seem right to me, Socrates," he said, "to be able to repeat what other people think, but not one's own view when one has been occupied with these topics for such a long time."

"But then," I said, "do you think it's right for someone to talk about things he doesn't know as if he did?"

"Oh certainly not as someone who knows," he said, "but as someone who is willing to say what he believes as what he believes."

"But then," I said, "are you not aware that opinions formed without knowledge are all a disgrace, at best blind. Or do you think that those who hold an opinion without knowledge are any different from the blind who are traveling and get the road right?"⁵⁸

⁵⁸ I.e., those who have right opinion without knowledge.

Οὐδέν, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν αἰσχροῖα θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκο-
λιά, ἐξὸν παρ' ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;

d Μὴ πρὸς Διός, ἧ δ' ὅς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαύκων,
ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τέλει ὦν ἀποστῆς. ἀρκέσει γὰρ ἡμῖν, κἂν
ὥσπερ δικαιοσύνης πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων διήλθες, οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ διέλθης. |

Καὶ γὰρ ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, καὶ μάλα
ἀρκέσει· ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ οὐχ οἷός τ' ἔσομαι, προθυμού-
μενος δὲ ἀσχημονῶν γέλωτα ὀφλήσω. ἀλλ', ὦ μακά-
ριοι, αὐτὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὰγαθὸν ἐάσωμεν τὸ νῦν
e εἶναι—πλέον γάρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παροῦσαν
ὀρμὴν ἐφικέσθαι τοῦ γε δοκοῦντος ἐμοὶ τὰ νῦν—ὅς δὲ
ἐκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ὁμοιότατος ἐκείνω,
λέγειν ἐθέλω, εἰ καὶ ὑμῖν φίλον, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔαν.

Ἄλλ', ἔφη, λέγε· εἰς αὐθις γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀποτεί-
σεις τὴν διήγησιν. |

507 Βουλοίμην ἄν, εἶπον, ἐμέ τε δύνασθαι αὐτὴν ἀπο-
δοῦναι καὶ ὑμᾶς κομίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν
τοὺς τόκους μόνον. τοῦτον δὲ δὴ οὖν τὸν τόκον τε καὶ
ἐκγονον αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κομίσασθε. εὐλαβεῖσθε
μέντοι μὴ πη ἐξαπατήσω ὑμᾶς ἄκων, κίβδηλον | ἀπο-
διδούς τὸν λόγον τοῦ τόκου.

Εὐλαβησόμεθα, ἔφη, κατὰ δύναμιν· ἀλλὰ μόνον
λέγε.

Διομολογησάμενός γ' ἔφην ἐγώ, καὶ ἀναμνήσας
ὑμᾶς τά τ' ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ρηθέντα καὶ ἄλλοτε ἤδη
πολλάκις εἰρημένα.

Τὰ ποῖα; ἧ δ' ὅς.

BOOK VI

“Not at all.”

“Do you want to look at ugly, blind, and twisted things when it’s possible to hear good clear ones from others?”

“No, Socrates,” said Glaucon, “for heaven’s sake, don’t stop when you’re so near the end. We shall be satisfied if you discuss the Good in just the same way as you did justice, temperance, and the other topics.”

“I too shall be well and truly satisfied, my friend,” I said, “although I’m afraid I won’t be up to it: in my eagerness I’ll be a laughingstock for my disgraceful behavior. Well, good people, let’s give up trying to find out for the moment what the Good is in itself. You see, to get even as far as my present state of thinking seems more than our present approach can manage. I’m willing to say what I think is the offspring of the Good and what resembles it most closely, if you like the idea: if not, I’ll drop it.”

“Well, tell us,” he said. “You’ll pay for the tale of the father another time.”

“I wish I could pay it back,” I said, “and you receive it, rather than just the interest as at the moment. So take the child and offspring of the good itself. But take care that I *don’t unintentionally* mislead you in any way by giving you a false account of the offspring.”⁵⁹

“We’ll take good care,” he said, “as best we can. Just carry on.”

“Yes, once having agreed and reminded you,” I said, “of what we said earlier and what has already been said elsewhere many times.”

“What was that?” he asked.

⁵⁹ Throughout this interlude in the argument, S. plays on the double meaning of *tokos* = “(financial) interest on capital,” or “offspring.”

b Πολλὰ καλά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ ἕκαστα οὕτως εἶναί φαμέν τε καὶ διορίζομεν τῷ λόγῳ.

Φαμέν γάρ.

Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων | ἂ τότε ὡς πολλὰ ἐτίθεμεν, πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἐκάστου ὡς μιᾶς οὔσης τιθέντες, “ὃ ἔστιν” ἕκαστον προσαγορεύομεν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Καὶ τὰ μὲν δὴ ὀραῖσθαί φαμεν, νοεῖσθαι δ' οὐ, τὰς δ' αὖ ιδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὀραῖσθαι δ' οὐ.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

c Τῷ οὖν ὀρώμεν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὀρώμενα;

Τῇ ὄψει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀκοῇ τὰ ἀκουόμενα, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι πάντα τὰ αἰσθητά; |

Τί μήν;

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐννεόηκας τὸν τῶν αἰσθήσεων δημιουργὸν ὅσῳ πολυτελεστάτην τὴν τοῦ ὀρᾶν τε καὶ ὀραῖσθαι δύναμιν ἐδημιούργησεν;

Οὐ πάνυ, ἔφη. |

Ἄλλ' ὧδε σκόπει. ἔστιν ὅτι προσδεῖ ἀκοῇ καὶ φωνῇ γένους ἄλλου εἰς τὸ τὴν μὲν ἀκούειν, τὴν δὲ ἀκούεσθαι,

d ὃ εἰ μὴ παραγένηται τρίτον, ἢ μὲν οὐκ ἀκούσεται, ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἀκουσθήσεται;

“That many things are beautiful,” I said, “and many things good; we claim they are so and define them in our discussion.”⁶⁰

“Yes, we do.”

“Also that there is actual beauty, and actual good, and so concerning everything which we then classed as many, conversely we classed them in terms of a single Form of each of them on the grounds of there being one real one in each case: ‘that which is.’”

“That is so.”

“And that some of these we say can be seen, but not perceived by the mind, whereas the Forms can be perceived by the mind, but not seen.”

“I agree entirely.”

“By what part of ourselves then do we see what can be seen?”

“Our sight,” he said.

“So then we perceive what we hear by our hearing and everything else we perceive by our other senses?”

“Yes, of course we do.”

“Then have you noticed,” I said, “how very lavishly the creator of our senses has made our ability to see and be seen?”

“Not particularly,” he said.

“Well, look at it this way: is there anything which adds some other third element to our hearing and our voice so the one can hear and the other can be heard, which, if it were not there as a third element, the one won’t hear and the other won’t be heard?”

⁶⁰ E.g., at 5.475e. S. is here making a common Platonic distinction between the Form and the objects of sense (see, e.g., 10.596b5–10).

Οὐδενός, ἔφη.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδ' ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, ἵνα μὴ εἴπω | ὅτι οὐδεμιᾶ, τοιούτου προσδεῖ οὐδενός. ἢ σύ τινα ἔχεις εἰπεῖν;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τὴν δὲ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι προσδεῖται;

Πῶς; |

Ἐνούσης που ἐν ὀμμασιν ὄψεως καὶ ἐπιχειροῦντος τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῆσθαι αὐτῇ, παρουσίας δὲ χροᾶς ἐν αὐτοῖς, εἰ μὴ παραγένηται γένος τρίτον ἰδίᾳ ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεφυκός, οἶσθα ὅτι ἢ τε ὄψις οὐδὲν ὄψεται, e τὰ τε χρώματα ἔσται ἀόρατα.

Τίνος δὴ λέγεις, ἔφη, τούτου;

Ὁ δὴ σὺ καλεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶς.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐ σμικρᾶ ἄρα ἰδέα ἢ τοῦ ὁρᾶν αἴσθησις καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμις | τῶν ἄλλων συζεύξεων τιμιω- 508 τέρῳ ζυγῶ ἐζύγησαν, εἴπερ μὴ ἄτιμον τὸ φῶς.

Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, πολλοῦ γε δεῖ ἄτιμον εἶναι.

Τίνα οὖν ἔχεις αἰτιάσασθαι τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ θεῶν τούτου | κύριον, οὗ ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς ὄψιν τε ποιεῖ ὁρᾶν ὅτι κάλλιστα καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα ὁρᾶσθαι;

Ὅνπερ καὶ σύ, ἔφη, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι· τὸν ἥλιον γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι ἐρωτᾶς.

Ἄρ' οὖν ᾧδε πέφυκεν ὄψις πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν θεόν;

Πῶς;

"No, none," he said.

"I don't think," I said, "there are many other cases, not to say any, that stand in need of anything of this sort. Or have you anything to say on this?"

"No, I haven't," he said.

"But don't you think that sight and the visible have this need?"

"How do you mean?"

"Although I think there is sight in our eyes and its possessor sets about using it, and there is also color in them, yet, if there were not a third element built in especially for this purpose, you know that your sight would see nothing and colors would be imperceptible."

"What's this you're talking about?" he said.

"It's what you call light," I said.

"That's true," he said.

"It's by *no insignificant notion* that the sense of sight and the ability to be seen have been linked by a more valuable bond than all other combinations, unless light has no value."

"On the contrary, it's far from valueless," he said.

"Which of the gods in heaven would you claim is responsible for what causes our sight to see light as well as we do, and visible objects to be seen?"

"The same one as you and everyone else does. You're obviously asking about the sun."⁶¹

"As regards this god, is that where our sight comes from?"

"How do you mean?"

⁶¹ The sun was popularly regarded as a god, an idea which Plato expresses as convenient for his analogy.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἥλιος ἢ ὄψις οὔτε αὐτὴ οὔτ' ἐν ᾧ ἐγ-
 b γίγνεται, ὃ δὴ καλοῦμεν ὄμμα.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἄλλ' ἠλιωειδέστατόν γε οἶμαι τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθή-
 σεις ὀργάνων. |

Πολύ γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἣν ἔχει ἐκ τούτου ταμι-
 νομένην ὥσπερ ἐπίρρυτον κέκτηται;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ὁ ἥλιος ὄψις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, αἴτιος
 δ' ὢν αὐτῆς ὁράται ὑπ' αὐτῆς ταύτης;

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τούτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ
 ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τὰγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον
 c ἐαυτῷ, ὅτιπερ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τε νοῦν
 καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τε
 ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὀρώμενα.

Πῶς; ἔφη· ἔτι δῖελθέ μοι.

Ὁφθαλμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἶσθ' ὅτι, ὅταν μηκέτι | ἐπ'
 ἐκεῖνά τις αὐτοὺς τρέπη ὢν ἂν τὰς χροὰς τὸ ἡμερινὸν
 φῶς ἐπέχη, ἀλλὰ ὢν νυκτερινὰ φέγγη, ἀμβλυώττουςί
 τε καὶ ἐγγὺς φαίνονται τυφλῶν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνούσης
 καθαρᾶς ὄψεως;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

d Ὅταν δέ γ' οἶμαι ὢν ὁ ἥλιος καταλάμπει, σαφῶς
 ὀρώσι, καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς τούτοις ὄμμασιν ἐνούσα φαί-
 νεται.

Τί μήν;

Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧδε νόει· ὅταν μὲν

BOOK VI

“Sight itself is neither the sun nor the place where it’s found, which of course we call the eye.”

“It certainly isn’t.”

“Yet out of our organs of perception the eye is the one most like the sun.”

“Indeed it is.”

“So it has acquired the power it possesses dispensed from the sun like an infusion, hasn’t it?”

“Indeed it has.”

“And also the sun is not sight, is it, but as the cause of it, it can be seen by sight itself?”

“That is so,” he said.

“Then this is what I mean when I use the expression the offspring of the Good which the Good produced in proportion to itself: just as the good relates to the mind in the intelligible realm and what is perceived by the mind, so this body (the sun) relates to sight and what can be seen.”

“How do you mean?” he asked. “Just go through that for me once more.”

“Take the eyes,” I said: “you know that when someone can no longer direct them at those things whose colors daylight provides, but which appear as under the night sky, they become weak and seem, like the eyes of blind people, as if their sight is impaired?”

“Indeed,” he said.

“When they see clearly, I think, what the sun illuminates, sight seems to be in the very eyes themselves.”

“Yes, of course.”

“Then think about the function of the soul in this way.

οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν, | εἰς τοῦτο
ἀπερείσηται, ἐνόησέν τε καὶ ἔγνω αὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν ἔχειν
φαίνεται· ὅταν δὲ εἰς τὸ τῷ σκοτῶ κεκραμένον, τὸ
γιγνόμενόν τε καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, δοξάζει τε καὶ ἀμ-
βλυώττει ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον, καὶ
ἔοικεν αὖ νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντι.

Ἔοικε γάρ.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γι-
e γνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀπο-
διδὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν φάθι εἶναι· αἰτίαν δ'
ἐπιστήμης οὔσαν καὶ ἀληθείας, ὡς γινωσκομένης
μὲν διανοοῦ, οὕτω δὲ καλῶν ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων, γνώ-
σεώς τε καὶ ἀληθείας, ἄλλο καὶ | κάλλιον ἔτι τούτων
509 ἡγούμενος αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς ἡγήσῃ· ἐπιστήμην δὲ καὶ
ἀλήθειαν, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν
νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δ' ἡγείσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει,
οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτ'
ἀμφοτέρα ὀρθόν, ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγείσθαι ὀπότερον αὐτῶν
οὐκ ὀρθόν, ἀλλ' ἔτι | μειζρόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγα-
θοῦ ἔξιν.

Ἀμήχανον κάλλος, ἔφη, λέγεις, εἰ ἐπιστήμην μὲν
καὶ ἀλήθειαν παρέχει, αὐτὸ δ' ὑπὲρ ταῦτα κάλλει
ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις.

Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὦδε μᾶλλον τὴν εἰκόνα
αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐπισκόπει.

Πῶς;

b Τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ

Whenever it fixes upon what truth and reality illuminate, it observes and recognizes it and appears to have intelligence. But when it settles on anything mixed up in darkness, growth, and decay, it forms an opinion and seems weak; it changes its views this way and that, and appears to have no intelligence.”

“Yes, it seems to.”

“Then what gives the truth to what is known and the ability to know to the knower, you must say, is the Form of the Good. As it is the cause of knowledge and truth, consider it an object of knowledge. But beautiful as are both of these, knowledge and truth, if you think the Good as something even more beautiful than these, you will think about it in the right way. As for knowledge and truth, just as in the previous example it was right to think of light and sight as sunlike, but wrong to think of them as the sun, so in this instance it is right to think of both as ‘goodlike,’⁶² but wrong to think that either of them *is* the Good; the state of the Good should be valued much more highly.”

“You mean extraordinary beauty,” he said, “if it gives us understanding and truth, yet itself is beyond these in beauty. I’m sure you wouldn’t call that pleasure.”

“Hush! Be careful what you say,” I warned him, “but go on thinking further of the image in this way.”

“How do you mean?”

“You will agree, I think, that the sun not only gives

⁶² *agathoeidēs*: this word occurs only here in extant classical Greek, most likely coined by Plato for this context.

ορᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.

Πῶς γάρ; |

Καὶ τοῖς γινωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεία καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

c Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων μάλα γελοίως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς.

Σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. |

Καὶ μηδαμῶς γ', ἔφη, παύσῃ, εἰ μὴ τι, ἀλλὰ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον ὁμοιότητα αὖ διεξιὼν, εἴ πῃ ἀπολείπεις.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, εἶπον, συχνά γε ἀπολείπω.

Μηδὲ σμικρὸν τοίνυν, ἔφη, παραλίπῃς.

Οἶμαι μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ πολὺ ὅμως δέ, ὅσα γ' ἐν τῷ παρόντι δυνατὸν, ἐκὼν οὐκ ἀπολείψω.

Μὴ γάρ, ἔφη.

d Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύο αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν νοητοῦ γένους τε

⁶³ The point of the “amusement” of Glaucon’s sardonic comment on S.’s high-flown description is that he is punning on the latter’s previous words: *dunamei hyperechontos*—with his *daimonias hyperbolēs*: a wordplay impossible to reproduce in English.

things that can be seen the ability to be seen, but also their generation, growth, and nurture without being the generation itself.”

“No, for how could it be?”

“And that therefore in objects of knowledge, not only is the ability to be known present, thanks to the Good, but also being and reality is in them because of it, although the Good is not being, but reaches even farther beyond it in rank and power.”

Here Glaucon in great amusement said: “Apollo, what marvelous hyperbole!”⁶³

“You’re the one to blame,” I said: “you made me tell you what I think about these things.”

“And don’t, whatever you do, stop,” he said, “apart from explaining the similarity with the sun again, if you’re leaving anything out.”

“Well,” I said, “there’s certainly a great deal I’m missing out.”

“Don’t leave anything out this time,” he said, “not even the tiniest bit.”

“I think there’s quite a lot,” I said. “Anyway, as far as the present circumstances permit, I’ll not miss anything out on purpose.”

“No, I’m telling you, don’t,” he said.

“Now, I said, “consider, as we have been saying, there are two entities and they govern first the type and place

Glaucon may be referring either to the description of the Good or S.’s “hyperbolic” style (or both); in his reply S. chooses to assume the latter. It is typical of Plato jokingly to undercut his own rhetoric at a climactic moment.

καὶ τόπον, τὸ δ' αὖ ΟΡΑΤΟ,⁹ ἵνα μὴ ΟΡΑΝΟ εἰπὼν
 δόξω σοι σοφίζεσθαι περὶ τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' οὖν ἔχεις
 ταῦτα διπτὰ εἶδη, ὀρατόν, νοητόν; |

Ἔχω.

Ἵσπερ τοίνυν γραμμὴν δίχα τετμημένην λαβὼν
 ἄνισα¹⁰ τμήματα, πάλιν τέμνε ἐκάτερον τμήμα ἀνὰ
 τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τό τε τοῦ ὀρωμένου γένους καὶ τὸ
 τοῦ νοουμένου, καὶ σοι ἔσται σαφηνεία καὶ ἀσαφεία
 πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν μὲν τῷ ὀρωμένῳ τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τμήμα
 510 εἰκόνες^{εἰκόνες}— | λέγω δὲ τὰς εἰκόνας^{εἰκόνας} πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς,
 ἔπειτα τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὄσα
 πυκνά τε καὶ λεῖα καὶ φανὰ συνέστηκεν, καὶ πᾶν τὸ
 τοιοῦτον, εἰ κατανοεῖς.

Ἀλλὰ κατανοῶ. |

Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον τίθει ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν, τά τε περὶ
 ἡμᾶς ζῶα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν
 ὄλον γένος.

⁹ ΟΡΑΤΟ Wilamowitz: ὀρατοῦ ADF: ΟΡΑΝΟ Wilamowitz:
 ὀρανοῦ D: οὐρανοῦ F: οὐρανὸν A

¹⁰ ἄνισα AD Plut: ἀν, ἴσα F: ἀν' ἴσα Stallbaum

⁶⁴ The similarity (whatever the correct textual reading) of *horatou* (“of the visible”) and *ouranou* (“of heaven”) gives S. another untranslatable pun (but see nb. Shorey’s ingenious “of the eyeball” and “of the skyball,” n. ad loc.). S. is trying to excuse himself from being guilty of yet more punning (see Glaucon above at c1–2). *Cratylus* is full of such quasi-etymological puns: cf. one similar to the one here at *Cra.* 396b–c: *ouranos* (“heaven”) and *horan anō* (“to look upward”).

that can be grasped mentally, and second of the visible, so I don't give the impression I'm trying to split hairs over the name by talking of 'heaven';⁶⁴ so have you then got these two concepts: visible and intelligible?"

"I have."

"Right then, imagine a line cut in two. Take two unequal segments and again cut each one in the same ratio, one for the visible class, the other for the intelligible; and you will have in the first segment of the visible section images in relation to each other by their clarity or obscurity— and by images I mean firstly shadows, the reflections in water and in those surfaces which are solid, smooth and shiny, and everything like this, if you get my meaning."⁶⁵

"Well yes, I do."

"Now take the second section which this one resembles to be the living creatures around us, all natural things and the whole class of artificial things."

⁶⁵ For 509d6–10b8 in diagrammatic form, see Appendix to Book 6. The question in which direction the inequality of the divisions of the line should go was disputed by the ancient commentators: Plutarch (*Qaest. Plat.* 1001 d–e), whom we follow here, argued that greater length represented greater obscurity, on the grounds that the multifarious nature of what is visible (and so intellectually less knowable) implies a greater length. Proclus, on the other hand (*In R.* 1.289.6–18) equated greater length with the greater intellectual clarity of the intelligible world. Modern commentators are similarly divided, and, on the arbitrariness of the choice, see Denyer, "Sun and Line," 292–93. The classes could, of course, also be arranged vertically, as S. implies at 511d8ff. (and as in Denyer). 7.534a5–8 suggests that Plato regarded the proportions as a subsidiary matter.

Τίθημι, ἔφη.

Ἡ καὶ ἐθέλοις ἂν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διηρηῆσθαι ἀληθεία τε καὶ μῆ, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὁμοιώθη;

b Ἐγώ, ἔφη, καὶ μάλα.

Σκόπει δὴ αὖ καὶ τὴν τοῦ νοητοῦ τομὴν ἧ τμητέον.

Πῆ;

Ἡ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ τοῖς τότε μιμηθείσιν ὡς εἰκόσιν ^{ὑποθέσεων} χρωμένη | ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτῆν, τὸ δ' αὖ ἕτερον ἐπ'¹¹ ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ^{ὑποθέσεως} ἰούσα καὶ ἄνευ τῶν περὶ ἐκεῖνο εἰκόνων, ^{εἰκόσιν} αὐτοῖς εἶδеси δι' αὐτῶν τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη.

Ταῦτ', ἔφη, ἃ λέγεις, οὐχ ἰκανῶς ἔμαθον. ἀλλ' αὐθις εἰπέ.

c Ἄλλ' ἐρῶ,¹² ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ῥᾶον γὰρ τούτων προειρημέων μαθήσῃ. οἶμαι γάρ σε εἶδέναι ὅτι οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοῦς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμενοι τό τε περιττὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γωνιῶν τριττὰ | εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καθ' ἐκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησάμενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιούσι περὶ αὐτῶν
d διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερώων, ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ

¹¹ ἐπ' Ast: τὸ ἐπ' ADF ¹² ἀλλ' αὐθις <εἰπέ> Glauconi
(Slings): <ἀλλ' ἐρῶ> ἦν δ' ἐγώ Socrati (Slings)

"I'll do that," he said.

"And would you be willing to agree that the division of truth to falsehood is in this ratio: as belief is to knowledge, thus resemblance is to what it resembles?"

"Yes, I agree entirely," he said.

"Now consider again in what way the section of the intelligible is to be divided."

"What way is that?"

"In the one section, the soul is forced to investigate from hypotheses, by using as images what were at the previous stage things imitated, not by working toward a first principle, but toward a conclusion. In the other section, by contrast, it moves from the hypothesis toward a first principle which transcends hypothesis, but without the images of the earlier section, and so constructs its way of operating from the very Forms by themselves."

"I don't really understand what you mean," he said, "but <tell me> again."

"<I will>," I said.⁶⁶ "I think you'll understand more easily after a few preliminary remarks. I think you know that those who study geometry and arithmetic and similar subjects postulate odd and even, geometrical figures and the three kinds of angles, and other relationships of this sort according to each system of inquiry. So, taking these things as known, they make them their hypotheses and don't think it worth their while to offer any justification for them to themselves or others, on the grounds that they are clear to everyone. And starting from these, they go on through

⁶⁶ There is a lacuna in the text here, and in particular uncertainty as to how words are divided between Glaucon and S. Our text and translation follow Slings' hypothetical reconstruction.

λοιπὰ ἤδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὀρμήσωσι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οἶδα. |

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι τοῖς ὀρωμένοις εἶδεσι προσχρῶνται καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων πέρι οἷς ταῦτα ἔοικε, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμενοι καὶ
 e διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν γράφουσιν, καὶ
 τᾶλλ' οὕτως, αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἅπλαττουςί τε καὶ
 γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσίν,
 511 τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὖ χρώμενοι, ζητοῦντές τε
 αὐτὰ ἐκεῖνα ἰδεῖν ἅ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἴδοι τις ἢ τῇ
 διανοίᾳ.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσει δ' ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν | χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰούσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δὲ χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν καὶ ἐκείνοις πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ὡς ἐναργέσι δεδοξασμένοις τε καὶ τετιμημένοις.

Μαυθάνω, ἔφη, ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ ταῖς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ
 b ταῖς ταύτης ἀδελφαῖς τέχναις λέγεις.

Τὸ τοίνυν ἕτερον μάθανε τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ λέγοντά με τοῦτο οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἄπτεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιοῦμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, | οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὀρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ

the remaining steps and end up in agreement at the point they set out to reach in their investigation.”

“Yes, of course,” he said, “I know all that!”

“So you’ll also know that they make use of the visible forms as well and make their arguments about them, although considering not the actual things, but those they resemble, making their arguments on the basis of the square itself and the diagonal itself, but not the line they are drawing, and similarly with everything else. These very things they are forming and drawing, of which shadows and reflections in water are images, they now in turn use as their images and aiming to see those very things which they could not otherwise see except in thought.”

“You’re right,” he said.

“This then is the class that is intelligible that I was talking about, where a soul is forced to use hypotheses in its search for it, without working toward a first principle because it is unable to escape from its hypotheses to a higher level, but by using as images the very same things of which images were made at a lower level and, in comparison with those images, were thought to be clear and valued as such.”

“I understand that you mean geometry and those arts related to it.”

“So understand, too, what I mean by the other section of the intelligible, which reason itself grasps by the power of dialectic, using hypotheses which are not first principles, but genuine hypotheses, like steps and starting points, in order to go as far as what is unhypothetical and

παντὸς ἀρχὴν ἰών, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὐ ἐχόμενος
 τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνη,
 c αἰσθητῶ παντάπασιν οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἴ-
 δεσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾶ εἰς
 εἶδη.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, ἱκανῶς μὲν οὐ—δοκεῖς γάρ μοι
 συχνὸν ἔργον λέγειν—ὅτι μέντοι βούλει διορίζειν |
 σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπι-
 στήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ
 ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἰ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαὶ
 καὶ διανοία μὲν ἀναγκάζονται ἀλλὰ μὴ αἰσθήσεσιν
 d αὐτὰ θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν
 ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, νοῦν οὐκ
 ἴσχειν περὶ αὐτὰ δοκοῦσί σοι, καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων
 μετὰ ἀρχῆς. διάνοιαν δὲ καλεῖν μοι δοκεῖς τὴν τῶν
 γεωμετρικῶν τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔξιν ἀλλ' οὐ νοῦν,
 ὡς μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ | τὴν διάνοιαν οὔσαν.

Ἰκανώτατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπεδέξω. καί μοι ἐπὶ τοῖς
 τέτταρσι τμήμασι τέτταρα ταῦτα παθήματα ἐν τῇ
 ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα λαβέ, νόησιν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνωτάτῳ,
 e διάνοιαν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ δευτέρῳ, τῷ τρίτῳ δὲ πίστιν ἀπόδος
 καὶ τῷ τελευταίῳ εἰκασίαν, καὶ τάξον αὐτὰ ἀνὰ λόγον,
 ὥσπερ ἐφ' οἷς ἐστὶν ἀληθείας μετέχειν, οὕτω ταῦτα
 σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν. |

Μανθάνω, ἔφη, καὶ συγχωρῶ καὶ τάττω ὡς λέ-
 γεις.

the first principle of everything. And, grasping this principle, it returns once again, keeping hold of what follows from it, and comes down to a conclusion in this way, using no sense perception in any way at all, but Forms themselves, going through Forms to Forms and ending up at the Forms."

"I understand," he said, "but not fully, as you seem to be talking about a difficult task. You want to distinguish the part of the real and intelligible—that which is contemplated by the science of dialectical discussion—as clearer than that part looked at by the so-called arts, for which hypotheses are first principles. And though those making the inquiry are forced to examine them by thought and not by using their sense perceptions, they do this not by working back to a first principle but from hypotheses, and so they don't appear to you to have any understanding of them, although they are intelligible objects when in conjunction with a first principle. It seems to me that you call the practice of geometers, and others of this sort, thought, but not understanding, as though thought lies somewhere between opinion and understanding."

"You have understood it very adequately," I said. "Now take these four functions which are found in the soul in addition to these four segments—understanding at the highest level, thought at the second, belief at the third, and apprehension by images at the bottom—and put them in proportion according as you think each contains a measure of clarity to the degree that its objects contain a measure of truth."

"I understand and agree," he said, "and I'll arrange them as you say."

APPENDIX

The intelligible and visible worlds as described at 509d6ff.
(The inequality of the divisions of the line—see p. 97, n.
65—is not reproduced in the diagram.)

VISIBLE WORLD *τὸ τοῦ ὁρωμένου*

εἰκόνας (images) *σκιαί* (shadows)
τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα
(reflections in water) *καὶ ἐν τοῖς*
ὄσα πικνὰ τε καὶ λεία καὶ φανὰ
κτλ (and [reflections in surfaces]
which are solid, smooth and shiny
etc.)

τὰ ζῶα (living
creatures)
τὸ φυτευτὸν
(natural things)
τὸ σκευαστὸν
(artificial things)

INTELLIGIBLE WORLD
τὸ τοῦ νοουμένου

(the soul is forced)
ζητεῖν ἐξ ὑποθέσεων
(based on the visible
world)
ἐπὶ τελευτῆν
to investigate from
hypotheses. . . .
toward a conclusion

(the soul moves)
ἐξ ὑποθέσεως
(transcending the
visible world)
ἐπ' ἀρχὴν (τὴν ἰδέαν)
from a hypothesis . . .
toward a first principle
(the Form)

Ζ

514 Μετὰ ταῦτα δὴ, εἶπον, ἀπέικασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμετέραν φύσιν παιδείας τε περί και ἀπαιδευσίας. ἰδὲ γὰρ ἀνθρώπους οἷον ἐν καταγείῳ οἰκήσει σπηλαιώδει, ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχούση μακρὰν παρὰ πᾶν τὸ | σπήλαιον, ἐν ταύτῃ ἐκ παίδων

b ὄντας ἐν δεσμοῖς και τὰ σκέλη και τοὺς ἀχένας, ὥστε μένειν τε αὐτοῦ¹ εἷς τε τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὄραν, κύκλω δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν, φῶς δὲ αὐτοῖς πυρὸς ἄνωθεν και πόρρωθεν καόμενον ὄπισθεν αὐτῶν, μεταξὺ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς και | τῶν δεσμωτῶν ἐπάνω ὁδόν, παρ' ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον παραφοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς πρὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόκειται τὰ παραφράγματα, ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ θαύματα δεικνύασιν.

Ὅρω, ἔφη.

c Ὅρα τοίνυν παρὰ τοῦτο τὸ τειχίον φέροντας ἀνθρώπους σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ τειχίου

515 και ἀνδριάντας και ἄλλα ζῶα λίθινά τε και ξύλινα και παντοῖα εἰργασμένα, οἷον εἰκὸς τοὺς μὲν φθειγομένους, τοὺς δὲ σιγῶντας τῶν παραφερόντων.

Ἄτοπον, ἔφη, λέγεις εἰκόνα και δεσμώτας ἀτόπους. |

BOOK VII

"After this, then," I said, "compare our own nature as regards both education and the lack of it to such experience as this. Imagine people as it were in an underground dwelling like a cave with a long wide entrance facing the light along the whole length of the cave. They have been there since childhood shackled by the legs and the neck, so that they remain in the same spot facing only forward, unable to turn their heads right round because of the chains. There is light from a fire burning from above a long way behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a path leading upward across which you should imagine there is a low wall built, just as puppeteers have a screen in front of the audience above which they present their entertainments."

"I can see it," he said.

"Now imagine people carrying props of all kinds along this wall above the top of it and statues and other creatures made of wood and stone and fashioned in all kinds of ways. Some of those carrying these objects speak, others are silent as you would expect."

"This image and prisoners you speak of are strange," he said.

¹ *ἀντοῦ* Hirschig: *ἀντοῦς* ADF

Ὅμοίους ἡμῖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τοὺς γὰρ τοιούτους πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ ἀλλήλων οἶε ἂν τι ἑωρακέναι ἄλλο πλὴν τὰς σκιάς τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς εἰς τὸ καταντικρὺ αὐτῶν τοῦ σπηλαίου προσπιπτούσας;

b Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, εἰ ἀκινήτους γε τὰς κεφαλὰς ἔχειν ἠναγκασμένοι εἶεν διὰ βίου;

Τί δὲ τῶν παραφερομένων; οὐ ταῦτ' οὗτο;

Τί μήν;

Εἰ οὖν διαλέγεσθαι οἰοί τ' εἶεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, οὐ | ταῦτα ἡγῆ ἂν τὰ ὄντα² αὐτοὺς ὀνομάζειν ἄπερ ὀρφῶεν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Τί δ' εἰ καὶ ἡχῶ τὸ δεσμωτήριον ἐκ τοῦ καταντικρὺ ἔχοι; ὅποτε τις τῶν παριόντων φθέγγαιτο, οἶε ἂν ἄλλο τι αὐτοὺς ἡγείσθαι τὸ φθεγγόμενον ἢ τὴν παριούσαν σκιάν; |

Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

c Παντάπασι δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθὲς ἢ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Σκόπει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῶν λύσιν τε καὶ ἴασιν τῶν τε δεσμῶν | καὶ τῆς ἀφροσύνης, οἷα τις ἂν εἴη, εἰ φύσει τοιάδε συμβαίνοι αὐτοῖς· ὅποτε τις λυθείη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περιάγειν

² ὄντα Iambl. Procl.: παρόντα ADF: παριόντα scr. recc.

ὀνομάζειν Iambl.: νομίζειν ὀνομάζειν AD: νομίζειν F Procl.

"Just like us," I said.¹ "Tell me, would you think at first that people in this situation have seen anything of themselves or each other except the shadows thrown by the fire onto the wall of the cave in front of them?"

"How could they," he said, "if they were forced to keep their heads still all their lives?"

"What about the objects being carried past them? Isn't it the same?"

"Of course."

"If they were able to talk to each other, wouldn't you think they would call what they saw real?"²

"They must do."

"And what if the prison chamber were to throw back echoes from the wall in front whenever any of the passersby spoke; do you think they would think this was anything but the passing shadows speaking?"

"Zeus, no! I'm sure they wouldn't," he said.

"Then in every respect," I said, "what people in this situation would consider the real world would be nothing other than the shadows of the objects making them."

"There's every reason to think that," he said.

"Now think about setting them free," I said, "loosing their chains and curing their foolishness. What would it be like if something like this should happen to them? Whenever anyone was freed and suddenly made to stand up,

¹ The unexpected reference to present company clearly marks the image out as intended by S. as an allegory of the human condition, though presumably thought of as temporary (*πρῶτον*, "at first") in the case of S. and his associates.

² Or (on another textual reading) "wouldn't you think that they would reckon that the words they uttered applied to the things they see passing in front of them?"

d τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν,
 πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ποιῶν ἀλγοῖ τε καὶ διὰ τὰς μαρ-
 μαρυγὰς ἀδυνατοῖ καθορᾶν ἐκείνα ὧν τότε τὰς σκιὰς
 ἑώρα, τί ἂν οἶε αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τις αὐτῷ λέγοι ὅτι
 τότε μὲν ἑώρα φλυαρίας, νῦν δὲ μᾶλλον τι ἐγγυτέρω
 τοῦ ὄντος καὶ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρ-
 θότερον βλέπει, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἑκάστον τῶν παριόντων
 δεικνὺς αὐτῷ ἀναγκάζει ἐρωτῶν ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὅτι
 ἐστίν; οὐκ οἶε αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἂν καὶ ἠγείσθαι τὰ
 τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα;

Πολύ γ', ἔφη.

e Οὐκοῦν κἂν εἰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν
 βλέπειν, ἀλγείν τε ἂν τὰ ὄμματα καὶ φεύγειν ἀπο-
 στρεφόμενον πρὸς ἐκείνα ἃ δύναται καθορᾶν, καὶ
 νομίζειν ταῦτα τῷ ὄντι σαφέστερα τῶν δεικνυμένων;

Οὕτως, ἔφη. ἰ

516 Εἰ δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βία διὰ
 τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάπτους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη
 πρὶν ἐξελκύσειεν εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ
 ὀδυνᾶσθαι τε ἂν καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ
 πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα
 μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων
 ἀληθῶν;

Οὐ γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, ἐξαίφνης γε. ἰ

³ This is the light from the fire (514b3) and not daylight, which, in the allegory, is not reached until 515e7 ("the light of the sun").

look around, walk, and look up toward the light,³ it would be painful doing all this and because of the glare he would be unable to see the object whose shadow he saw before. What do you think he would say if someone were to say to him that what he saw before was nonsense, but now he was a little closer to reality, and being turned more toward real things, he would see more correctly and, moreover, if the person showing him all that was passing in front of him were to compel him to answer when asked what they were? Don't you think he would be at a loss⁴ and think that what he had seen before was more real⁵ than what was being shown to him now?"

"Very much so," he said.

"Also, if that person forced him to look at the light itself, wouldn't his eyes hurt and wouldn't he turn and run back to what he can see and think that this was really clearer than what he's being shown?"

"That's right," he said.

"And if," I said, "someone were to drag him forcibly from there along the rough, steep uphill path and not let him go until he had hauled him out into the light of the sun, he would be in great pain and would complain about his being dragged along, and when he got to the light his eyes would be filled with the sun's rays, and he would not be able to see even a single one of what he is now being told are real things, wouldn't he?"

"No, or at least, not immediately," he said.

⁴ *aporein*, the characteristic mental state of S.'s associates at the conclusion of the Socratic *elenchus*, e.g., *Ap.* 23d, *Meno* 80a, *Tht.* 149a.

⁵ *alēthēstera* ("truer"), i.e., truer to reality (*alēthēs* implies, as one of its meanings, "real," "genuine").

Συνηθείας δὴ οἶμαι δέοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μέλλοι τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι. καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἂν ῥᾶστα καθορῶ, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι τὰ τε τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων εἶδωλα, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά· ἐκ δὲ τούτων τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν οὐρανὸν νύκτωρ ἂν
 b ῥᾶον θεάσαιτο, προσβλέπων τὸ τῶν ἄστρον τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς, ἢ μεθ' ἡμέραν τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου.

Πῶς δ' οὖν;

Τελευταῖον δὴ οἶμαι τὸν ἥλιον, οὐκ ἐν ὕδασιν οὐδ' | ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἔδρα φαντάσματα αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ χώρᾳ δύναιτ' ἂν κατιδεῖν καὶ θεάσασθαι οἷός ἐστιν.

Ἀναγκαῖον, ἔφη.

Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἂν ἤδη συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τὰς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ
 c πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὄρωμένῳ τόπῳ, καὶ ἐκείνων ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἷτιος.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐπὶ ταῦτα ἂν μετ' ἐκείνα ἔλθοι.

Τί οὖν; ἀναμιμνησκόμενον αὐτὸν τῆς πρώτης οἰκήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖ | σοφίας καὶ τῶν τότε συνδεσμοτῶν οὐκ ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν μὲν εὐδαιμονίζειν τῆς μεταβολῆς, τοὺς δὲ ἐλεεῖν;

Καὶ μάλα.

Τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ ἔπαινοι εἴ τινες αὐτοῖς ἦσαν τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα,
 d καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὕστερα εἰώθει καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ

BOOK VII

"Indeed, I think he would need to acclimatize himself if he's going to look at what is above. First of all he would see the shadows most easily and then the reflections of people and other things in water, and later on the things themselves. Then from this he could more easily contemplate what is in the sky and the sky itself at night when he gazes at the light of the stars and the moon, or by day, the sun and the light of the sun."

"Of course."

"Then finally he would be able to see the sun, I think, not its reflection in water or even any other surface, but by itself alone in its proper place and he would be able to contemplate what kind of a thing it is."

"That must be so," he said.

"And straight after this he would be able to infer about it that this is what provides the seasons, and the years, and governs everything in the visible world, and is somehow responsible for all those things which they themselves used to see."

"That would clearly be his conclusion after that," he said.

"Then what does this mean? When he recalls his first dwelling and the wisdom picked up there and his former fellow prisoners, don't you think he would be delighted by the transformation and pity the others?"

"He certainly would!"

"If they had any honors among them there, any accolades and rewards for anyone who could see the passing images most distinctly and could best recall which of them came first, which came last, and which came along together, and as a result of this was best at predicting what

δυνατώτατα ἀπομαντευομένω τὸ μέλλον ἤξειν, δοκεῖς
 ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς
 παρ' ἐκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας, ἢ
 τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἂν πεπονθέναι καὶ | σφόδρα βούλεσθαι
 “ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλω ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ”
 καὶ ὅτιοῦν [ἂν] πεπονθέναι μᾶλλον ἢ 'κεῖνά τε δοξάζειν
 καὶ ἐκείνως ζῆν;

e Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔγωγε οἶμαι, πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι
 ἂν δέξασθαι ἢ ζῆν ἐκείνως.

Καὶ τότε δὴ ἐνόησον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. εἰ πάλιν ὁ τοιοῦτος
 καταβὰς εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν θᾶκον καθίζοιτο, ἄρ' οὐ σκό-
 τους ἂν[α] πλέως σχοίη τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, | ἐξαίφνης
 ἤκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου;

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἔφη.

Τὰς δὲ δὴ σκιὰς ἐκείνας πάλιν εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν γνω-
 ματεύοντα διαμιλλᾶσθαι τοῖς αἰεὶ δεσμώταις ἐκείνοις,
 517 ἐν ᾧ ἀμβλυώττει, πρὶν καταστήναι τὰ ὄμματα, οὗτος
 δ' ὁ χρόνος μὴ πάνυ ὀλίγος εἶη τῆς συνηθείας, ἄρ' οὐ
 γέλωτ' ἂν παράσχοι, καὶ λέγοιτο ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς
 ἀναβὰς ἄνω διεφθαρμένος ἤκει τὰ ὄμματα, καὶ ὅτι
 οὐκ ἄξιον οὐδὲ πειρᾶσθαι ἄνω ἰέναι; καὶ τὸν ἐπι-
 χειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἴ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ
 δύναιντο λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκτείνειν,³ ἀποκτείνουσαι ἄν; |

³ ἀποκτείνειν AFD Iambl: secl. Drachmann

⁶ Hom. *Od.* 11.489–90: the dead shade of Achilles in Hades speaking to Odysseus. S.'s associates would have been able to supply the following line, 491, for themselves: “rather than rule

would come next, would you think he would long for them and envy those people among them who were honored and exercised power, or would he experience what Homer says and eagerly wish 'to be a slave tending a field for someone else, a person of no renown'⁶ and undergo anything rather than what he thought about down there and live in the way he did down there?"

"I think that's true," he said. "He would agree to undergo everything rather than live as they do down there."

"Bear this in mind too," I said. "If someone like him were to go down there again and settle down in the same place, wouldn't his eyes be filled with darkness coming suddenly out of the sun?"

"Definitely," he said.

"And if he had to make out those shadows again and compete with those who were permanently in chains, when his sight was impaired, before his eyes adjusted, and since the time for this recovery would be quite long, would he not set the others laughing, and would it not be said of him that in going up to the top he had come back with his eyesight ruined and that it wasn't worth even attempting to go up there? And, if they could somehow get their hands on him and kill him, wouldn't they put the man to death who had tried to free them and lead them upward?"⁷

over all the lifeless dead." Plato is likening the dwellers in the cave to the dead in Hades. 489-91 are also quoted in full at 3.386c6-8, but there with a contrary implication: preferring poverty above to existence in Hades is undesirable, as encouraging a fear of death, and so the lines are to be expunged in their entirety from the educational program of *Republic*.

⁷ A possible allusion to the actual fate of S. For other allusions, see *Grg.* 486c and 521c.

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

- b Ταύτην τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν εἰκόνα, ᾧ φίλε Γλαύκων, προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις, τὴν μὲν δι' ὄψεως φαινομένην ἔδραν τῆ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου οἰκῆσει ἀφομοιοῦντα, τὸ δὲ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐν αὐτῇ φῶς τῆ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θεῶν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν ἰ νοητὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἄνοδον τιθεὶς οὐχ ἁμαρτήσῃ τῆς γ' ἐμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀκούειν. θεὸς δὲ που οἶδεν εἰ ἀληθῆς οὐσα τυγχάνει. τὰ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁραῖσθαι, ὀφθείσῃ δὲ συλλογιστέα εἶναι ὡς ἄρα πᾶσι πάντων αὕτη ὀρθῶν τε καὶ καλῶν
- c αἰτία, ἔν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα, ἔν τε νοητῷ αὐτῇ κυρία ἀλήθειαν καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη, καὶ ὅτι δεῖ ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὸν μέλλοντα ἐμφρόνως πράξειν ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ. ἰ

Συνοίομαι, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅν γε δὴ τρόπον δύναμαι.

- Ἴθι τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τόδε συνοιήθητι καὶ μὴ θαυμάσῃς ὅτι οἱ ἐνταῦθα ἐλθόντες οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν τὰ
- d τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄνω ἀεὶ ἐπείγονται αὐτῶν αἱ ψυχαὶ διατρίβειν· εἰκὸς γάρ που οὕτως, εἶπερ αὖ κατὰ τὴν προειρημένην εἰκόνα τοῦτ' ἔχει.

Εἰκὸς μέντοι, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τόδε οἶε τι θαυμαστόν, εἰ ἀπὸ ἰ θείων, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, θεωριῶν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπειά τις ἐλθὼν κακὰ ἀσχημονεῖ τε καὶ φαίνεται σφόδρα γελοῖος ἔτι ἀμβλυώτων

"Absolutely," he said.

"So then, my dear Glaucon," I said, "we must fit this image in its entirety to what we were discussing before, comparing the place that appeared through our sight to the dwelling in the prison chamber and the light of the fire there to the power of the sun. If you take the upward journey and the seeing of what is above as the upward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, you will not mistake my intention, since you are keen to hear this. Only God knows, I suppose, if this is entirely true; but this is how these things appear to me: in the knowable region the form of the Good is last among the things perceived and is seen with difficulty, but once seen, then this is to be reckoned as the origin of all that is right and good for everyone. It gives birth to light and the source of light in the visible world, in the world of the intelligible it is the very thing which gives truth and understanding, and he who is going to act with good sense in private or public life must see this."

"Yes, I agree with this," he said, "in as far as I can."

"Come on, then," I said, "see if you can agree with this too; and don't be surprised that those who go there are not willing to engage in human affairs, but their souls constantly hurry upward to spend their time up there, and that is what we would surely expect, if the image we have talked about is right in this aspect too."

"It is indeed reasonable," he said.

"Now what about this? Do you think it at all surprising," I asked, "if, after contemplating the divine, someone comes to the evils of human affairs and behaves in an

καὶ πρὶν ἰκανῶς συνήθης γενέσθαι τῷ παρόντι σκότῳ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἐν δικαστηρίοις ἢ ἄλλοθί που ἀγωνίζεσθαι περὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαίου σκιῶν ἢ ἀγαλμάτων ὧν αἱ σκιαί, καὶ διαμιλλᾶσθαι περὶ τούτου, ὅπη ποτὲ
 e ὑπολαμβάνεται ταῦτα ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῆν δικαιοσύνην μὴ πώποτε ἰδόντων;

Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη.

518 Ἄλλ' εἰ νοῦν γε ἔχοι τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεμνήτ' ἂν ὅτι διτταὶ καὶ ἀπὸ διτῶν γίγνονται ἐπιταράξεις ὄμμασιν, ἔκ τε φωτὸς εἰς σκότος μεθισταμένων καὶ ἐκ σκότους εἰς φῶς. ταῦτ' αὖτὰ νομίσας γίνεσθαι καὶ περὶ ψυχῆν, ὅποτε ἴδοι | θορυβουμένην τινὰ καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσάν τι καθορᾶν, οὐκ ἂν ἀλογίστως γελῶ, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοποῖ ἂν πότερον ἐκ φανότερου βίου ἤκουσα ὑπὸ
 b ἀηθείας ἐσκότῳται, ἢ ἐξ ἀμαθίας πλείονος εἰς φανότερον ἰοῦσα ὑπὸ λαμπροτέρου μαρμαρυγῆς ἐμπέπλησται, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίσειεν ἂν τοῦ πάθους τε καὶ βίου, τὴν δὲ ἐλεήσειεν, καὶ εἰ γελᾶν ἐπ' αὐτῇ βούλοιτο, ἦττον ἂν καταγέλαστος ὁ γέλωσ αὐτῷ εἶη ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ ἄνωθεν | ἐκ φωτὸς ἠκούσῃ.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, μετρίως λέγεις.

Δεῖ δὴ, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ· τὴν παιδείαν οὐχ οἶαν τινὲς ἐπαγγελλόμενοί φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ

⁸ For Plato's perception of popular ridicule of philosophers in practical affairs, see, e.g., *Tht.* 172c–75b.

⁹ I.e., one would pity an ignorant soul dazzled by the light, but consider the enlightened soul happy, despite its being forced back

unseemly fashion and seems utterly ridiculous, since he is still dazzled, and, before getting sufficiently used to the darkness surrounding him, he is forced to plead in the law courts, or anywhere else, about the shadows of justice, or the images whose shadows they are, and dispute about it on the basis of how these things are understood by those who have never yet seen actual justice?"⁸

"It's not at all surprising," he said.

"But if one had any sense," I said, "one would remember that there are two ways in which the eyes become confused, and from two causes: when you move from light into darkness and from darkness into light. Bearing in mind that the very same thing happens in the soul, when you see it bewildered and unable to see something clearly, you would not laugh irrationally, but would inquire whether in coming in from a brighter life it is plunged into darkness because it's not used to this, or when moving out of greater ignorance into a clearer life it is overwhelmed by a more dazzling glare; and so one would consider the former happy as a result of his experience and life, and one would feel sorry for the latter, even if he wanted to laugh at him, his laughter would be less absurd than at the one which has moved from above out of the light."⁹

"What you say is very reasonable," he said.

"That's the way we have to think about these things," I said, "if they are true. Education is not what some people who desire to be authorities on it say it is. They claim, I

into the darkness; so laughter would be a more reasonable reaction ("less absurd," b4) if directed at the former. For the philosopher's amusement at the behavior of those who have not seen the light, see *Tht.* 175b-d.

c ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφείς ἐντιθέναι, οἶον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες.

Φασὶ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Ὁ δέ γε νῦν λόγος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, σημαίνει ταύτην τὴν ἐνούσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν | τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὄργανον ᾧ καταμανθάνει ἕκαστος, οἶον εἰ ὄμμα μὴ δυνατὸν ἦν ἄλλως ἢ σὺν ὄλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους, οὕτω σὺν ὄλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκ τοῦ γιγνομένου περιακτέον εἶναι, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὸ ὄν καὶ τοῦ
d ὄντος τὸ φανότατον δυνατὴ γένηται ἀνασχέσθαι θεωμένη· τοῦτο δ' εἶναί φαμεν τὰ γαθόν. ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἂν εἴη, τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾶστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα | μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὄραν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἱ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι.

Ἔοικεν γάρ, ἔφη.

Αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλούμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγύς τι τείνειν τῶν τοῦ σώματος— | τῷ ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ἐνούσαι πρότερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν—ἢ δὲ τοῦ φρονῆσαι παντὸς
e μᾶλλον θειοτέρου τινὸς τυγχάνει, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔσα, ὃ τὴν μὲν δύναμιν οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυσιν, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιαγωγῆς χρήσιμόν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἄχρηστον
519 αὐτὴ καὶ βλαβερὸν γίγνεται. ἦ οὐπω ἐννεόηκας, τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν, σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμύ μὲν

imagine, that if there is no understanding in the soul, they are supplying it, as if putting sight into the eyes of the blind."

"They certainly do claim that," he said.

"But however our present argument," I said, "indicates that this ability exists in everybody's soul, as does the organ by which each person learns: just as if the eye were unable to turn from the darkness toward the light in any way other than with the whole body, so it must turn about with the whole soul from the world of becoming until it is able to endure contemplating reality and the most brilliant part of reality. This is what we claim to be the Good, isn't it?"

"Yes."

"Of this very thing, therefore, there would be an art," I said, "that of turning the soul around: how it will most easily and effectively be changed in direction, not implanting the ability to see in the organ, but devising a way of making the organ see, which already has vision but is not properly orientated or looking where it should."

"So it seems," he said.

"Then it seems that the other so-called excellences of the soul are pretty much as extensive as those of the body. In actual fact, you know, where they are not there initially, they are later implanted into our habits and practices. On the other hand, the capacity to think is, above all, something more divine, it seems, which never loses its power, but becomes either useful and beneficial or useless and harmful, depending on its orientation. Or have you never noticed, in the case of those who are said to be inferior yet

βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾶ ταῦτα ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακία δ' ἠναγκασμένοι ὑπηρετεῖν, ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύτερον | βλέπη, τοσοῦτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς
 b γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὲ ἔδωδαῖς τε καὶ τοιούτων ἠδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφνεῖς γιγνόμεναι περικάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν ὦν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὴν περιστρέφετο εἰς τὰ ἀληθῆ, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἂν τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν | ἀνθρώπων ὀξύτατα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ' ἃ νῦν τέτραπται.

Εἰκός γε, ἔφη.

Τί δέ; τόδε οὐκ εἰκός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνάγκη ἐκ τῶν
 c προειρημένων, μήτε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους καὶ ἀληθείας ἀπίρους ἰκανῶς ἂν ποτε πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύσαι, μήτε τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους, τοὺς μὲν ὅτι σκοπὸν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἓνα, οὐ στοχαζομένους δεῖ ἅπαντα πράττειν ἃ ἂν πράττωσιν ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ δημοσίᾳ, τοὺς δὲ ὅτι ἐκόντες εἶναι | οὐ πράξουσιν, ἠγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπωκίσθαι;

¹⁰ The Isles of the Blessed were part of the Underworld traditionally reserved for those who had lived particularly virtuous lives. In this and the following sections S. revives the objection Adeimantus raised at the beginning of Book 4: what's in it for the guardians, to make them voluntarily embrace the chore of government? S.'s answer at e1ff. is essentially the same as it was at

clever, how keen the vision of their little soul is and how sharply it distinguishes the things it is turned toward; although its eyesight is not inferior, it is compelled to resort to villainy so that the more sharply it looks, the more evil it does?"

"That is very much the case," he said.

"However," I said, "if this part of such a nature had been hammered at in earliest childhood and had been knocked free of attachment to becoming, lead weights, as it were, which, grafted onto it through food and like pleasures and delicacies, turn the soul's sight downward—if it were rid of them, it would turn round toward the truth and this very same element of the same people would see these things most distinctly, just as it sees the objects it is now directed at."

"That is reasonable," he said.

"What then?" I said: "Isn't it probable, and doesn't it follow from what we have said before that the uneducated and those with no experience of the truth should never be guardians of a state, nor those who have been allowed to spend their time in education through to the end? The first group, because they have no single viewpoint in life at which they have to aim in all their activities in the private and public domain; and the second because they will not do what they have to do willingly, as they think they have been transported to the Isles of the Blessed while still alive."¹⁰

4.420b3ff., of which he has to remind Glaucon: that justice is the cooperation and interdependence of all sections of the community. That is why the guardians must leave their contemplation of the Good and descend again into the cave. On this issue, see further the introduction to this volume, section 2 (i).

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἔργον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν οἰκιστῶν τάς
 τε βελτίστας φύσεις ἀναγκάσαι ἀφικέσθαι πρὸς τὸ
 μάθημα ὃ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἔφαμεν εἶναι μέγιστον, ἰδεῖν
 d τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν,
 καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἀναβάντες ἰκανῶς ἴδωσι, μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν
 αὐτοῖς ὃ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται.

Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

Τὸ αὐτοῦ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταμένειν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν |
 πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ' ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας μηδὲ
 μετέχειν τῶν παρ' ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν, εἴτε
 φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι.

Ἐπει', ἔφη, ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν
 χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὄν ἄμεινον;

e Ἐπελάθου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι νόμῳ οὐ
 τοῦτο μέλει, ὅπως ἔν τι γένος ἐν πόλει διαφερόντως
 εὖ πράξει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τοῦτο μηχανᾶται
 ἐγγενέσθαι, συναρμόττων τοὺς πολίτας πειθοῖ τε καὶ
 520 ἀνάγκῃ, ποιῶν μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφελίας ἣν
 ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δυνατοὶ ὦσιν ὠφελεῖν καὶ αὐτὸς
 ἐμποιῶν τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἐν τῇ πόλει, οὐχ ἵνα ἀφιῆ
 τρέπεσθαι ὅπῃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ἀλλ' ἵνα καταχρηῆ-
 ται αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸν σύνδεσμον τῆς πόλεως. |

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, ἐπελαθόμεν γάρ.

Σκέψαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ἀδική-
 σομεν τοὺς παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσόφους γιγνομένους, ἀλλὰ
 δίκαια πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐροῦμεν, προσαναγκάζοντες τῶν
 b ἄλλων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τε καὶ φυλάττειν. ἐροῦμεν γάρ

"That's true," he said.

"Our job, then," I said, "that of founders, is to compel those with the best natures to approach the study of what we earlier claimed was the most important thing,¹¹ namely to see the Good and ascend that upward path, and when they have, and can see adequately, not allow them to do what they do now."

"What is that, then?"

"To remain where they are," I said, "and not be willing to go back down among the prisoners and share with them their labors and rewards they have, whether they are inferior or more worthy of serious attention."

"Then shall we be doing them a disservice," he asked, "and cause them to live a worse life, when they could have a better one?"

"You have forgotten again, my dear friend," I said, "that this is not the purpose of the law that a single section of the community will do exceptionally well, but the intention is that this will apply across the whole state by uniting the populace by persuasion and compulsion, and by making them share the services with each other which every individual can do for the common good; and the law itself can create such people in our state, not to allow each person to turn whichever way he wants, but so it can make full use of them in binding the whole state together."

"You're right," he said, "I had forgotten."

"Observe then, Glaucon," I said, "that we shall not be doing those among us who have become philosophers a disservice at all, but what we shall be telling them, when we compel them to look after and protect the rest, will be

¹¹ At 6.505a-b.

ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι τοιοῦτοι γιγνόμενοι εἰκότως οὐ μετέχουσι τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς πόνων· αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πολιτείας, δίκην δ' ἔχει τό γε αὐτοφυῆς μηδενὶ τροφήν ὀφείλου μηδ' ἐκτίειν τῷ προθυμῆσθαι τὰ τροφεῖα· |

Ἔμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τε αὐτοῖς τῇ τε ἄλλῃ πόλει ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἠγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν, ἄμεινόν τε καὶ τελεώτερον ἐκείνων πεπαιδευμένους καὶ μᾶλλον δυνατοὺς ἀμφοτέρων μετέχειν. καταβατέον οὖν ἐν μέρει ἐκάστῳ εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων συνοίκησιν καὶ συνεθιστέον τὰ σκοτεινὰ θεάσασθαι· συνεθιζόμενοι γὰρ μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ γνώσεσθε ἕκαστα τὰ εἶδωλα ἅττα ἐστὶ καὶ ὧν, διὰ τὸ τάληθῆ· | ἑωρακένοι καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι. καὶ οὕτω ἕπαρ ἡμῖν καὶ ὑμῖν ἢ πόλις οἰκῆσεται ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄναρ, ὡς νῦν αἱ πολλαὶ ὑπὸ σκιαμαχούντων
d τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ στασιαζόντων περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν οἰκοῦνται, ὡς μέγαλον τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος. τὸ δέ που ἀληθὲς ὧδ' ἔχει· ἐν πόλει ἢ ἥκιστα πρόθυμοι ἄρχειν οἱ μέλλοντες ἄρξειν, ταύτην ἄριστα καὶ ἀστασιαστότατα ἀνάγκη οἰκεῖσθαι, τὴν δ' ἐναντίους ἄρχοντας | σχοῦσαν ἐναντίως.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἀπειθήσουσιν οὖν ἡμῖν οἷοι οἱ τρόφιμοι ταύτ' ἀκούοντες, καὶ οὐκ ἐβελήσουσιν συμπονεῖν ἐν τῇ πό-

¹² I.e., the practical life of government and the theoretical study of philosophy.

just. Because we shall say that it is reasonable for those who get to such a position in other states not to share the difficulties there: for they have grown there spontaneously, without the consent of the state in each case, and what has grown spontaneously, owing its upbringing to nobody, and not eager to pay anyone for its nurture, has a just cause.

“But we have bred you to be leaders in the hive, as it were, and kings both for yourselves and for the rest of the state, since you are better and more fully educated than they are and more able to share both kinds of life.¹² Therefore you must go back down one by one to live with the others and get used once more to contemplating the darkness. When you have become acclimatized you will see infinitely better than those who are down there and you will recognize every image that is there and what they are images of, because you have seen the truth about the beautiful, just, and good. In this way our city will be administered by us and by you, awake and not as in a dream, not as the majority of states are now run, by men sparring with each other and disputing over who should rule, as though it were some great good. But I imagine the truth of the matter is this: in a state where those who intend to rule are least keen to do so, it must be true that it will be run in the best way and with the least equivocation, while the state with the opposite kind of rulers will be governed accordingly.”

“That is very much the case,” he said.

“Do you then think that our nurslings will disobey us when they hear this, and each be unwilling to work hard

λει ἕκαστοι ἐν μέρει, τὸν δὲ πολὺν χρόνον μετ' ἀλλή-
λων οἰκέειν ἐν τῷ καθαρῷ;

e Ἀδύνατον, ἔφη· δίκαια γὰρ δὴ δικαίοις ἐπιτάξομεν.
παντὸς μὴν μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπ' ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῶν ἕκαστος
εἴσι τὸ ἄρχειν, τοῦναντίον τῶν νῦν ἐν ἐκάστη πόλει
ἀρχόντων.

521 Οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ ἑταῖρε· εἰ μὲν βίον
ἐξευρήσεις ἀμείνω τοῦ ἄρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσι ἀρξείν,
ἔστι σοι δυνατὴ γενέσθαι πόλις εὖ οἰκουμένη· ἐν
μόνη γὰρ αὐτῇ ἀρξουσιν οἱ τῷ ὄντι πλούσιοι, οὐ
χρυσίου ἀλλ' οὐδεὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα πλουτεῖν, ζωῆς
ἀγαθῆς τε καὶ ἔμφρονος. εἰ δὲ πτωχοὶ καὶ ἰ πεινῶντες
ἀγαθῶν ἰδίων ἐπὶ τὰ δημόσια ἴασιν, ἐντεῦθεν οἰόμενοι
τάγαθὸν δεῖν ἀρπάζειν, οὐκ ἔστι περιμάχητον γὰρ τὸ
ἄρχειν γιγνόμενον, οἰκέιος ὦν καὶ ἔνδον ὁ τοιοῦτος
πόλεμος αὐτούς τε ἀπόλλυσι καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

b Ἔχεις οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν
ἀρχῶν καταφρονούντα ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσο-
φίας;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἦν δ' ὅς.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι δεῖ γε μὴ ἐραστὰς τοῦ ἄρχειν ἰέναι
ἐπ' αὐτό· ἰ εἰ δὲ μή, οἷ γε ἀντερασταὶ μαχοῦνται.

Πῶς δ' οὖν;

Τίνας οὖν ἄλλους ἀναγκάσεις ἰέναι ἐπὶ φυλακὴν
τῆς πόλεως ἢ οἱ περὶ τούτων τε φρονιμώτατοι δι' ὧν
ἄριστα πόλις οἰκεῖται, ἔχουσί τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ
βίον ἀμείνω ἰ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ;

in the state when their turn comes, but spend most of their time living together in the pure realm?"

"That's impossible," he said, "for we shall be giving just orders to just people. Yet every one of them will certainly approach government as an obligation, the opposite of those who now govern in every state."

"My friend, this is how it is, you know," I said. "If you discover a life better than ruling for those who are intending to govern, a well-run state becomes a possibility; for only there will the genuinely rich govern, rich not in monetary terms, but in that in which the happy man must be wealthy: a good, intelligent life. But if beggars and those starved of private resources enter public service thinking they must seize the good, it isn't possible, for when the government becomes a matter of contention, such civil and internal war destroys both them and the rest of the state."

"That's very true," he said.

"Do you have any other way of life that looks down on ruling for political motives," I asked, "than that of true philosophy?"

"Zeus, no!" he said.

"But surely it's those who are no lovers of government who must enter it; if not, rival lovers will fight over it."

"Of course they will."

"Who else then will you compel to go and guard the state other than those who possess the greatest discernment in such matters, through whom the state will be best run and who in fact have other distinctions and a better life than a political one?"

c Οὐδένας ἄλλους, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν τοῦτ' ἤδη σκοπῶμεν, τίνα τρόπον οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐγγενήσονται, καὶ πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ Ἄιδου λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ βούλομαι; ἔφη. |

Τοῦτο δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγή ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὄντος οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον, ἣν δὴ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθῆ φήσομεν εἶναι.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

d Οὐκ οὖν δεῖ σκοπεῖσθαι τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἔχει τοιαύτην δύναμιν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Τί ἂν οὖν εἴη, ὦ Γλαύκων, μάθημα ψυχῆς ὄλκον ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν; | τότε δ' ἐννοῶ λέγων ἅμα· οὐκ ἀθλητὰς μέντοι πολέμου ἔφαμεν τούτους ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι νέους ὄντας;

Ἐφαμεν γάρ.

Δεῖ ἄρα καὶ τοῦτο προσέχειν τὸ μάθημα ὃ ζητοῦμεν πρὸς ἐκείνῳ. |

Τὸ ποῖον;

Μὴ ἄχρηστον πολεμικοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶναι.

Δεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη, εἶπερ οἶόν τε.

¹³ Plato may here have in mind Amphiaraus, a seer who descended to the Underworld but was immortalized by Zeus (*Paus.* 1.34).

"No one else," he said.

"Do you then want us to examine how people of this sort will come to exist and how we shall lead them up to the light, as some are said to make their way up from Hades to the gods?"¹³

"Of course I do," he replied.

"Indeed, this would be no spinning of a potsherd,¹⁴ but the bringing of a soul round from day shrouded in a kind of darkness to the true day, an ascent to reality which we shall claim to be true philosophy."

"That is very much the case."

"Must we then examine which of our studies has the potential to achieve this?"

"Of course."

"Then what would be the study which would transport the soul from what is coming-to-be to what is? But I'm thinking this out as I speak; didn't we claim, however, that these people must be athletes in warfare when young?"¹⁵

"We did indeed."

"Then we must add this aspect of the study we are looking for to the previous one."

"Which is that?"

"It mustn't be useless to men engaged in warfare."

"Certainly," he said, "if it's possible."

¹⁴ I.e., a matter of chance; a game where a potsherd, white on one side, black on the other, was thrown into a space between two groups, and depending on how it fell, one group pursued the other. A possible implied criticism of the arbitrary nature of the mythological elevation described in c2-3.

¹⁵ At, e.g., 3.416d.

Γυμναστικῇ μὴν καὶ μουσικῇ ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν
ἐπαιδεύοντο ἡμῖν.

Ἦν ταῦτα, ἔφη.

- e Γυμναστικῇ μὲν που περὶ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμε-
νον τετεύτακεν· σώματος γὰρ αὔξης καὶ φθίσεως.
ἐπιστατεῖ.

Φαίνεται.

Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ ζητούμεν μάθημα.

- 522 Οὐ γάρ.

Ἄλλ' ἄρα μουσικὴ ὅσῃν τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν;

Ἄλλ' ἦν ἐκείνη γ', ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστι-
κῆς, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας,
κατά τε | ἀρμονίαν εὐαρμοστίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην,
παραδιδούσα, καὶ κατὰ ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς
λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη ἅττα ἔχουσα, καὶ
ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι ἀληθινώτεροι
ἦσαν· μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἄγον, οἷον σὺ νῦν
ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ.

- b Ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ
ὄντι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶχεν. ἀλλ', ὦ δαιμόνιε Γλαύκων,
τί ἂν εἴη τοιοῦτον; αἶ τε γὰρ τέχναι βάνασοί που
ἅπασαι ἔδοξαν εἶναι— |

Πῶς δ' οὐ; καὶ μὴν τί ἔτ' ἄλλο λείπεται μάθημα,
μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς καὶ τῶν τεχνῶν κεχωρισμέ-
νον;

Φέρε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μηδὲν ἔτι ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔχομεν
λαβεῖν, τῶν ἐπὶ πάντα τεινόντων τι λάβωμεν.

“However, in our earlier discussion they were educated in physical exercise and the arts.”

“That’s right,” he said.

“Physical education, as I see it, is concerned with coming into being and passing away: that is, it presides over the growth and decay of the body.”

“It seems so.”

“Then it wouldn’t be the subject we’re looking for.”

“Clearly not.”

“Was it then the arts to the extent we explored them previously?”

“But that was just the counterpart of physical education, if you recall,” he said: “training our guardians in good habits, passing them on in accordance with a well-coordinated structure, not knowledge: and a balance with an orderly movement. In its stories it contained the cultivation of other habits related to these, both those that were like myths and those which were nearer the truth; but as for a study which would lead to something like that which you’re now looking for, there was nothing of that in it.”

“You recall what I said most accurately,” I said, “for in actual fact it contained nothing like this. Well, my dear Glaucon, what sort of study would be of that sort? All the craftsmen’s skills seemed vulgar somehow.”¹⁶

“Of course they did, and yet what other subject is left apart from the arts, the physical pursuits, and the handicrafts?”

“Come,” I said, “if we have nothing outside these to take up, let’s take one that embraces all of them.”

¹⁶ See 6.495d–e.

Τὸ ποῖον;

- c Οἶον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται τέχναι τε καὶ διάνοιαι καὶ ἐπιστήμαι—ὃ καὶ παντὶ ἐν πρώτοις ἀνάγκη μανθάνειν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. |

Τὸ φαῦλον τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ ἐν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν· λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμὸν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω περὶ τούτων ἔχει, ὡς πᾶσα τέχνη τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀναγκάζεται αὐτῶν μέτοχος γίγνεσθαι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ πολεμική;

Πολλή, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

- d Παγγέλοιοι γοῦν, ἔφην, στρατηγὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις Παλαμῆδης ἐκάστοτε ἀποφαίνει. ἢ οὐκ ἐννεόηκας ὅτι φησὶν ἀριθμὸν εὐρῶν τὰς τε τάξεις τῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταστήσαι ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ ἐξ-αριθμῆσαι ναῦς τε καὶ | τᾶλλα πάντα, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ ἀναριθμῆτων ὄντων καὶ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδ' ὅσους πόδας εἶχεν εἰδότος, εἴπερ ἀριθμεῖν μὴ ἠπίστατο; καίτοι ποῖόν τιν' αὐτὸν οἶε στρατηγὸν εἶναι;

Ἄτοπόν τιν', ἔφη, ἔγωγε, εἰ ἦν τοῦτ' ἀληθές.

- e Ἄλλο τι οὔν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάθημα ἀναγκαῖον πολεμικῷ ἀνδρὶ θήσομεν λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ ἀριθμεῖν δύνασθαι;

Πάντων γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, εἰ καὶ ὀτιοῦν μέλλει

“What could that be?”

“One like this general one which all crafts, thinking, and knowledge make use of, and which everyone has to learn at the very beginning.”

“What is it?” he asked.

“It’s the simple one of distinguishing the numbers one, two, and three. In short, I mean counting and calculation, or isn’t it true of these numbers that every skill and expertise must contain something of them?”

“Indeed they must,” he said.

“And so must warfare, mustn’t it?”

“It certainly must.”

“In tragedies, at any rate, Palamedes exposes Agamemnon every time as a completely ridiculous commander.¹⁷ Or haven’t you noticed he claims that having invented number he drew up the ranks in the army at Troy and counted the ships and everything else as if they hadn’t been counted before this, and Agamemnon, it seems, if he didn’t know how to count, didn’t even know how many feet he had? Yet what kind of commander do you think he was?”

“I’d say a peculiar one,” he said, “if this were true.”

“Shall we then say that another subject essential for a military man is to be able to calculate and count?”

“Certainly, more than anything else,” he said, “if he’s

¹⁷ There are no extant versions, but Plato presents it as a popular topic, and Palamedes takes his place alongside Prometheus as a popular inventor-hero. Gorgias, the sophist (ca. 485–ca. 380), composed a celebrated *Defense of Palamedes* (DK 82 11a).

τάξεων ἐπαίειν, μᾶλλον δ' εἰ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἔσσεισθαι. |

Ἐννοεῖς οὖν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτο τὸ μάθημα ὅπερ ἐγώ;

Τὸ ποῖον;

523 Κινδυνεύει τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων φύσει εἶναι ὧν ζητοῦμεν, χρῆσθαι δ' οὐδεὶς αὐτῶ ὀρθῶς, ἐλκτικῶ ὄντι παντάπασι πρὸς οὐσίαν.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις; |

Ἐγὼ πειράσομαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τό γ' ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν δηλώσαι. ἅ γὰρ διαιροῦμαι παρ' ἐμαυτῶ ἀγωγὰ τε εἶναι οἱ λέγομεν καὶ μή, συνθεατῆς γενόμενος σύμφαθι ἢ ἄπειπε, ἵνα καὶ τοῦτο σαφέστερον ἴδωμεν εἰ ἔστιν οἶον μαντεύομαι.

Δείκνυ', ἔφη.

b Δείκνυμι δῆ, εἶπον, εἰ καθορᾶς, τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπίσκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα, τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελευόμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκέψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ποιούσης. |

Τὰ πόρρωθεν, ἔφη, φαινόμενα δῆλον ὅτι λέγεις καὶ τὰ ἐσκιαγραφημένα.

Οὐ πάνυ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔτυχες οὐ λέγω.

Ποῖα μὴν, ἔφη, λέγεις;

c Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἴσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθημι, ἐπειδὴν ἡ αἴσθησις μηδὲν μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον δηλοῖ, εἴτ' ἐγγύθεν προσ-

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going to have any sort of knowledge about the ordering of his forces, or if he is even going to be a human being.”

“Do you think the same as I do about this subject, then?” I asked.

“What do you think?”

“That it could well be one of those subjects that naturally lead to the understanding we’re looking for, but no one knows how to use it properly as something which in every way draws us toward reality.”

“How do you mean?” he asked.

“I’ll try and make clear at least what I think. I want you as my fellow explorer to say whether or not you agree with the things that to my mind lead toward what we are talking about, and those that don’t, in order for us to know more clearly if my guess is right.”

“Show them to me,” he said.

“Indeed,” I said, “I am demonstrating, if you can see it, first those things among our perceptions that do not require the mind to examine them because they are adequately apprehended by sense perception, and those that demand that it should be used to investigate in every way because the sense perception is producing nothing sound.”

“Clearly you mean objects perceived from a distance, and illusionist paintings.”

“No, you don’t quite understand what I am saying.”

“What exactly do you mean, then?”

“The things which don’t require the mind,” I said, “are those which don’t result in contrary sense impressions at the same moment; those that do, I am saying, need the mind when the sense organ indicates one thing just as much as its opposite, whether it strikes the sense organ

πίπτουσα εἴτε πόρρωθεν. ὦδε δὲ ἂ λέγω σαφέστερον εἶση. οὗτοί φαμεν τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν δάκτυλοι, ὃ ἰ τε σμικρότατος καὶ ὁ δεύτερος καὶ ὁ μέσος.

Πάνυ γ', ἔφη.

Ὡς ἐγγύθεν τοίνυν ὀρωμένους λέγοντός μου διαροοῦ. ἀλλά μοι περὶ αὐτῶν τόδε σκόπει.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Δάκτυλος μὲν αὐτῶν φαίνεται ὁμοίως ἕκαστος, καὶ
 d ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, εἴαντε ἐν μέσῳ ὀράται εἴαντ' ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ, εἴαντε λευκὸς εἴαντε μέλας, εἴαντε παχὺς εἴαντε λεπτός, καὶ πᾶν ὅτι τοιοῦτον. ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις οὐκ ἀναγκάζεται τῶν πολλῶν ἢ ψυχῇ τὴν νόησιν ἐπερέσθαι τί ποτ' ἐστὶ δάκτυλος· ἰ οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἢ ὄψις αὐτῇ ἅμα ἐσήμηνεν τὸ δάκτυλον τούναντίον ἢ δάκτυλον εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰκότως τό γε τοιοῦτον νοήσεως οὐκ ἂν παρακλητικὸν οὐδ' ἐγερτικὸν εἶη.

Εἰκότως.

e Τί δὲ δῆ; τὸ μέγεθος αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν σμικρότητα ἢ ὄψις ἄρα ἰκανῶς ὀρά, καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διαφέρει ἐν μέσῳ τινὰ αὐτῶν κείσθαι ἢ ἐπ' ἐσχάτῳ; καὶ ὡσαύτως πάχος καὶ λεπτότητα ἢ μαλακότητα καὶ σκληρότητα ἢ ἀφή; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις ἄρ' οὐκ ἰ ἐνδεῶς τὰ
 524 τοιαῦτα δηλοῦσιν; ἢ ὦδε ποιεῖ ἐκάστη αὐτῶν· πρῶτον μὲν ἢ ἐπὶ τῷ σκληρῷ τεταγμένη αἰσθησις ἠνάγκασται

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from nearby or far away. You'll see what I mean more clearly if I put it like this: take these three fingers, the smallest, the one next to it, and the middle one."¹⁸

"Yes indeed," he said.

"Bear in mind now, I'm talking about them as seen from close quarters. But now look at them in the following way."

"What is that?"

"Each of them is equally a finger, and as such there is no difference whether you look at it as the one in the middle or the one at the end, whether it's black or white, thick or thin, and so on and so forth. In all these instances the soul of most people is not obliged to ask the intelligence what a finger is; there is no instance where our sight indicates that a finger is at the same time the opposite of a finger."

"It certainly doesn't," he said.

"So it would be reasonable to say," I said, "that such an instance would not stimulate or arouse the intelligence?"

"It would."

"Well, what about their bigness and smallness? Can sight see this well enough and does it make no difference to it whether one of them is in the middle or at one end? And does the same go for touch, thickness and thinness, softness and hardness? And don't the other senses show that they are lacking in these respects, or does each of them work as follows? First of all, when the sense has been designed to identify something hard it has also been de-

¹⁸ This and subsequent passages on the problems of sense perception can be read in conjunction with similar discussions in *Phd.* 101aff. and *Th.* 154c.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μαλακῷ τετάχθαι, καὶ παραγγέλλει τῇ ψυχῇ ὡς ταῦτόν σκληρόν τε καὶ μαλακὸν αἰσθανομένη;

Οὕτως, ἔφη. |

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἢ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἡ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ κούφον καὶ βαρύν, εἰ τό τε βαρὺ κούφον καὶ τὸ κούφον βαρὺ σημαίνει;

b Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὐταὶ γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἰ ἐρμηνεύεται καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι.

Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειράται λογισμὸν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκοπεῖν | εἴτε ἐν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Οὐκοῦν ἐὰν δύο φαίνηται, ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἐν ἑκάτερον φαίνεται;

Ναί.

c Εἰ ἄρα ἐν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφοτέρα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστα γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ' ἓν.

Ὅρθως.

Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένοι ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένοι τι. ἦ γάρ; |

signed to make contact with something soft: it relays to the soul that it has sensed that the same thing is both hard and soft, doesn't it?"¹⁹

"That is so," he said.

"Must it not follow then," I said, "that the soul is again at a loss in such a situation as to what on earth this sense means by hardness if it's telling it that the same thing is also soft, and what the sense of light and heavy means by light and heavy, if it indicates that heavy is light and light is heavy?"

"To be sure, these interpretations are absurd as far as the soul is concerned and demand investigation."

"Then in such a situation it's reasonable," I said, "first for the soul, calling on calculation and understanding, to investigate whether each of the things reported is one or two."

"Of course."

"So if it appears to be two, then each of them appears to be both one thing and one of two things?"

"Yes."

"If each of them is one, but both of them make two, the soul will consider the two as divided: you see it wouldn't consider indivisible things as two, but as one."

"Yes, that's right."

"And yet, we agree that our sight saw large and small, but not as separate entities, but as mixed up together, don't we?"

¹⁹ At 5.478e–79a S. claimed that some things could also be seen as their opposites; in such cases sense perception is inadequate, and so the soul ultimately has to call on intelligence and thought.

Ναί.

Διὰ δὲ τὴν τούτου σαφήνειαν μέγα αὖ καὶ σμικρὸν ἢ νόησις ἠναγκάσθη ἰδεῖν, οὐ συγκεχυμένα ἀλλὰ διωρισμένα, τοῦναντίον ἢ 'κείνη.

Ἀληθῆ. |

Οὐκοῦν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεν πρῶτον ἐπέρχεται ἐρέσθαι ἡμῖν τί οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ μέγα αὖ καὶ τὸ σμικρὸν;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ μὲν νοητόν, τὸ δ' ὄρατόν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

Ὅρθότατ', ἔφη.

d Ταῦτα τοίνυν καὶ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν λέγειν, ὡς τὰ μὲν παρακλητικὰ τῆς διανοίας ἐστί, τὰ δ' οὐ, ἃ μὲν εἰς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐαυτοῖς ἐπίπτει, παρακλητικὰ ὀριζόμενος, ὅσα δὲ μὴ, οὐκ ἐγερτικὰ τῆς νοήσεως. |

Μανθάνω τοίνυν ἤδη, ἔφη, καὶ δοκεῖ μοι οὕτω.

Τί οὖν; ἀριθμὸς τε καὶ τὸ ἐν ποτέρων δοκεῖ εἶναι;

Οὐ συννοῶ, ἔφη.

e Ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων, ἔφην, ἀναλογίζου. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἰκανῶς αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὀράται ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ αἰσθήσει λαμβάνεται τὸ ἓν, οὐκ ἂν ὄλκον εἶη ἐπὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου ἐλέγομεν· εἰ δ' αἰεὶ τι αὐτῷ ἅμα ὀράται ἐναντίωμα, ὥστε μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἐν ἢ καὶ τοῦναντίον φαίνεσθαι, τοῦ ἐπικρινούντος δὴ δέοι ἂν ἤδη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ | ψυχὴ ἀπο-

“Yes.”

“But again, in order to get clear about this, the understanding has been forced to see large and small not as mixed up, but as separate entities which is the opposite of what we just said with regard to sight.”

“That is true.”

“So that means it’s from such a starting point as this that we shall set about asking what is large and again what is small, doesn’t it?”

“Yes I agree entirely.”

“And it is for this reason we called the one the ‘intelligible’ and the other the ‘visible.’”

“That’s very true,” he said.

“So this is what I was trying to say just now, that some things provoke thought, others don’t. The former impinge on the senses together with their opposites, which I defined as those that require understanding, while those that don’t do not.”

“Ah, now I understand,” he said, “and I think you’re right.”

“What then? Which class do you think number and the number one belong to?”

“I don’t understand,” he said.

“Well, work it out from what we’ve been saying,” I said. “If the number one itself can be seen sufficiently well by itself, or is grasped by some other sense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, it would not draw the soul toward reality. But if something is always seen at the same time with its own opposite, so that it appears to be *no more* one than its opposite, it would immediately need some means of making the distinction and the soul would be forced to be confused and to look for an answer, thereby

525 ρεῖν καὶ ζητεῖν, κινουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν, καὶ ἀνερωτᾶν τί ποτέ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ἔν, καὶ οὕτω τῶν ἀγωγῶν ἂν εἴη καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θέαν ἢ περὶ τὸ ἔν μάθησις.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, | τοῦτό γ' ἔχει οὐχ ἥκιστα ἢ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὄψις· ἅμα γὰρ ταῦτόν ὡς ἔν τε ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλήθος.

Οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τὸ ἔν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σύμπας ἀριθμὸς ταῦτόν πέπονθε τοῦτο;

Πῶς δ' οὔ; |

Ἄλλὰ μὴν λογιστικὴ τε καὶ ἀριθμητικὴ περὶ ἀριθμὸν πᾶσα.

Καὶ μάλα.

Ταῦτα δέ γε φαίνεται ἀγωγὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

Ἵπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

b Ὡν ζητοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, μαθημάτων ἂν εἴη πολεμικῶ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὰς τάξεις ἀναγκαῖον μαθεῖν ταῦτα, φιλοσόφῳ δὲ διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι, ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῶ γενέσθαι. |

Ἔστι ταῦτ', ἔφη.

Ὁ δέ γε ἡμέτερος φύλαξ πολεμικός τε καὶ φιλόσοφος τυγχάνει ὦν.

Τί μὴν;

c Προσῆκον δὴ τὸ μάθημα ἂν εἴη, ὧ Γλαῦκων, νομοθετῆσαι καὶ πείθειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν μεγίστων μεθέξειν ἐπὶ λογιστικὴν ἰέναι καὶ ἀνθάπτεσθαι αὐτῆς μὴ ἰδιωτικῶς, ἀλλ' ἕως ἂν ἐπὶ θέαν

rousing thought within itself and raising the question what is the number one exactly; and so its understanding of the number one would be one of those things which turn and lead it to the contemplation of reality."

"But surely," he said, "this is the key aspect of our visual perception of this: for we see the same number as one and an enormous number at the same moment."

"If this is true of unity," I said, "then isn't the same true of every number?"

"Yes, of course it is."

"And don't forget that all calculation and arithmetic is to do with number."

"That goes without saying."

"And it's these that seem to lead us toward truth."

"Oh yes, absolutely."

"It looks as if they would be among the subjects we're looking for," I said. "After all, anyone involved in warfare must learn all this for marshaling his troops and a philosopher must rise above the transient and grasp the substance of the real world, or he will never become a man of reason."

"That's right," he said.

"And our guardian is actually a man of both warfare and philosophy."

"Of course."

"Indeed, Glaucon, the subject would be suitable for prescribing in our legislation, and for persuading those who are going to share the most important roles in the city to take up practical arithmetic and employ it for reasons not personal, but until they reach the stage of contemplat-

τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν φύσεως ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ, οὐκ ὠνῆς οὐδὲ πράσεως χάριν ὡς ἐμπόρους ἢ καπηλοὺς μελετῶντας, ἀλλ' ἔνεκα πολέμου τε καὶ αὐτῆς | τῆς ψυχῆς ῥαστώνης μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀλήθειάν τε καὶ οὐσίαν.

Κάλλιστ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

d Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῦν καὶ ἐννοῶ, ῥηθέντος τοῦ περὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς μαθήματος, ὡς κομψόν ἐστι καὶ πολλαχῇ χρήσιμον ἡμῖν πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα, ἐὰν τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἔνεκά τις αὐτὸ ἐπιτηδεύῃ ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ καπηλεύειν.

Πῆ δὴ; ἔφη. |

Τοῦτό γε, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς σφόδρα ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἀναγκάζει διαλέγεσθαι, οὐδαμῇ ἀποδεχόμενον ἐὰν τις αὐτῇ ὄρατὰ ἢ ἀπτά σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς προτεινόμενος διαλέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ πον τοὺς περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὺς ὡς, ἐὰν τις αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν ἐπιχειρῇ τῷ λόγῳ e τέμνειν, καταγελῶσί τε καὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται, ἀλλ' ἐὰν σὺ κερματίζῃς αὐτό, ἐκείνοι πολλαπλασιούσιν, εὐλαβούμενοι μὴ ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἐν μὴ ἐν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

526 Τί οὖν οἶει, ὦ Γλαύκων, εἴ τις ἔροιτο αὐτούς: “Ὡ θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων ἀριθμῶν διαλέγεσθε, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν οἶον ὑμεῖς ἀξιούτέ ἐστιν, ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πάντων καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, μούριον τε ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν”; τί ἂν οἶει | αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι;

ing the nature of numbers through understanding itself, and not for buying and selling like merchants and those who are in the retail trade, but for the purpose of war, and turning the disposition of the soul itself away from transience to truth and reality."

"That is excellently put," he said.

"Furthermore," I said, "it's just occurred to me that, now we have mentioned the study of calculation, how neatly it fits and how useful for our purposes in every way if one practices it to gain knowledge and not for indulging in petty commerce."

"How, exactly?" he asked.

"It's what we were just talking about: how surely it leads the soul somewhere upward and compels it to discuss the numbers themselves. It refuses to accept in any way if one argues by proposing that numbers are physically visible or tangible. You see, I'm sure you know that those who are expert in this laugh at anyone who tries to split the number one up in argument and refuse to accept it, but if you chop it up, they multiply it taking good care in case one should appear to be not one but many pieces."²⁰

"What you say is very true," he said.

"What do you think then, Glaucon, if one were to ask them: 'My good fellows, what sort of numbers are you talking about in which there is unity of the sort you accept, where each and every one is equal to every other without the slightest difference, having no subdivisions within them?' What do you think their answer would be?"

²⁰ I.e., the mathematicians counter what they see as an attempt to make one thing into many things by division ("chop it up") by multiplying it.

Τούτο ἔγωγε, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ὦν διανοσηθῆναι μόνον ἐγχωρεῖ, ἄλλως δ' οὐδαμῶς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν.

- b Ὅρας οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν κινδυνεύει εἶναι τὸ μάθημα, ἐπειδὴ φαίνεται γε προσαναγκάζον αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει χρῆσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε ποιεῖ αὐτό. |

Τί δέ; τόδε ἤδη ἐπεσκέψω, ὡς οἷ τε φύσει λογιστικοὶ εἰς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀξεῖς φύνονται, οἷ τε βραδεῖς, ἂν ἐν τούτῳ παιδευθῶσιν καὶ γυμνάσωνται, κὰν μηδὲν ἄλλο ὠφεληθῶσιν, ὅμως εἷς γε τὸ ὀξύτεροι αὐτοὶ αὐτῶν γίγνεσθαι πάντες ἐπιδιδόασιν;

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτω.

- c Καὶ μὴν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἅ γε μείζω πόνον παρέχει μαθάνοντι καὶ μελετῶντι, οὐκ ἂν ῥαδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὖροις ὡς τούτο.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Πάντων δὴ ἔνεκα τούτων οὐκ ἀφετέον τὸ μάθημα, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄριστοι | τὰς φύσεις παιδευτέοι ἐν αὐτῷ.

Σύμφημι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τούτο μὲν τοίνυν, εἶπον, ἐν ἡμῖν κείσθω· δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἐχόμενον τούτου σκεψώμεθα ἄρα τι προσήκει ἡμῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἢ γεωμετρίαν, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Αὐτὸ τούτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ.

- d Ὅσον μὲν, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰ πολεμικὰ αὐτοῦ τείνει, δῆλον ὅτι προσήκει· πρὸς γὰρ τὰς στρατοπεδεύσεις

"I think it would be that they discuss only those numbers that can be conceived mentally, otherwise it's impossible to grasp them at all."

"So do you see, my friend," I said, "that in fact it is likely that we have to study this since it appears that the soul is forced to use intelligence itself to reach truth itself?"

"Yes, it certainly does that," he said.

"Another point: have you noticed how those who have a natural gift for calculation are quick to learn in more or less all branches of study, while those who are slow, if they are educated and drilled in it, even if they gain no other benefit from it, nevertheless they all improve and become quicker than they were?"

"That is the case," he said.

"And there's another point, I think; you would not easily find many subjects which give more labor to the student and practitioner than this one."

"I'm sure we wouldn't."

"Indeed, for all these reasons we must not abandon this subject, but those who are naturally the best must be educated in it."

"I agree," he said.

"Right then, we'll take that one as settled," I said. "Let's look at the next subject that's concerned with this and see if it suits our purpose."

"Which one's that? Oh, you mean geometry," he said.

"Indeed I do," I said.

"Insofar as some of it is relevant to warfare," he said, "it is clearly suitable for pitching camp, seizing territory,

καὶ καταλήψεις χωρίων καὶ συναγωγὰς καὶ ἐκτάσεις
στρατιάς καὶ ὅσα δὴ ἄλλα σχηματίζουσι τὰ στρατό-
πεδα ἐν αὐταῖς τε ταῖς μάχαις καὶ πορείαις διαφέρου-
σιν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ γεωμετρικός καὶ ἢ μὴ ὄν.

Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ, εἶπον, πρὸς μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ βραχύ
e τι ἂν ἔξαρκοῖ γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμοῦ μόνιον· τὸ
δὲ πολὺ αὐτῆς καὶ πορρωτέρω προῖον σκοπεῖσθαι δεῖ
εἴ τι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τείνει, πρὸς τὸ ποιεῖν κατιδεῖν ῥῆγον
τῆν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν. τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα αὐτόσε,
ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μετα-
στρέφεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ἢ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος,
ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν οὐσίαν ἀναγκάζει θεάσασθαι, προσ-
ήκει, εἰ δὲ γένεσιν, οὐ προσήκει.

Φαμέν γε δὴ.

527 Οὐ τοίνυν τοῦτό γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητήσουσιν
ἡμῖν ὅσοι καὶ σμικρὰ γεωμετρίας ἔμπειροι, ὅτι αὐτὴ
ἢ ἐπιστήμη πᾶν τούναντίον ἔχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῇ λόγοις
λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τῶν μεταχειριζομένων. ἢ

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Λέγουσι μὲν που μάλα γελοίως τε καὶ ἀναγκαίως·
ὡς γὰρ πράττοντές τε καὶ πράξεως ἕνεκα πάντας τοὺς
λόγους ποιούμενοι λέγουσιν τετραγωνίζειν τε καὶ
παρατείνειν καὶ προστιθέναι καὶ πάντα οὕτω φθεγγό-

²¹ Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.7.2, depicts the historical S. as advocating the practical use of geometry.

marshaling and deploying the army, and whatever other forms campaigns take in battle and on the march, someone trained in geometry would be a different person than he would if he were not."²¹

"Well, indeed," I said, "even a small amount of geometry and arithmetic would be enough in such matters. But we must look at the larger part of it and go on much farther to see if it is relevant to it and makes it easier for us to see the form of the Good. Everything is relevant, we say, insofar as it forces the soul to turn toward that place where the most blessed part of reality is, which it must see by every means possible."

"You are right," he said.

"If then it does make it contemplate reality, it is what we want, but if it makes it contemplate the temporal world, it isn't."

"We certainly agree."

"Therefore," I said, "those who are experienced in the finer points of geometry will not dispute with us this at least: that this knowledge contains everything that's the opposite to the arguments put forward in it by those who engage in it."

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"I think the way they argue is quite absurd and is forced on them:²² I mean, they talk as if they were doing something and making all their terms to fit their activity: they talk about making the square, applying and adding, and

²² "Forced" (*ἀναγκαίως*) because those practicing geometry inevitably use the language of sense perception, whereas the subject is essentially in the realm of pure knowledge.

μενοι, τὸ δ' ἔστι που πᾶν τὸ μάθημα γνώσεως ἔνεκα ἐπιτηδευόμενον.

b Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἔτι διομολογητέον;

Τὸ ποῖον;

Ὡς τοῦ ἀεὶ ὄντος γνώσεως, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ποτέ τι γιγνομένου καὶ ἁπολλυμένου.

Εὐομολόγητον, ἔφη· τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ ὄντος ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνώσις ἔστιν.

Ὅλκον ἄρα, ὦ γενναῖε, ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶη ἂν καὶ ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω σχεῖν ἂ ἢ κατὰ οὐδέον ἔχομεν.

Ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα, ἔφη.

c Ὡς οἷόν τ' ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μάλιστα προστακτέον ὅπως οἱ ἐν τῇ καλλιπόλει σοὶ μηδενὶ τρόπῳ γεωμετρίας ἀφέξονται. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πάρεργα αὐτοῦ οὐ μικρά.

Ποῖα; ἦ δ' ὅς. ἢ

Ἄ τε δὴ σὺ εἶπες, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον, καὶ δὴ καὶ πρὸς πάσας μαθήσεις, ὥστε κάλλιον ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἴσμεν που ὅτι τῷ ὄλῳ καὶ παντὶ διοίσει ἡμμένος τε γεωμετρίας καὶ μή.

Τῷ παντὶ μέντοι νῆ Δί', ἔφη.

Δεύτερον δὴ τοῦτο τιθῶμεν μάθημα τοῖς νέοις;

Τιθῶμεν, ἔφη.

similarly with everything else; but in my view the subject as a whole is studied for the sake of knowledge."

"I agree entirely," he said.

"So do we still need to agree fully on this?"

"In what respect?"

"That it is the knowledge of the eternally real and not what comes into being and then passes away."

"That's easy to do," he said. "Geometry after all is the knowledge of the eternally real."

"Then it would be the soul's transport to the truth, my good fellow, and be productive of philosophical thought by directing upward that which we now wrongly direct downward."

"That's as sure as can be," he said.

"Indeed it is as sure as can be," I said, "and we must require that the inhabitants of your fine city²³ do not hold back from their geometry in any way since its incidental topics are not insignificant."

"What are they?" he asked.

"They are in fact what you said about warfare," I said, "and what's more, we know, I think, that in all subjects, in being better able to understand them, the man who is conversant with geometry will be immeasurably superior to him who is not."

"Immeasurably, by Zeus," he said.

"So are we to make this the second subject for our young people?"

"We are," he said.

²³ Possibly an element of humor or affection here (*σοι*, "your fine city"); there were a number of Greek cities called Kal-lipolis.

d Τί δέ; τρίτον θῶμεν ἀστρονομίαν; ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ;
 Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη· τὸ γὰρ περὶ ὥρας εὐαισθητοτέρως
 ἔχειν καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν οὐ μόνον γεωργία οὐδὲ
 ναυτιλία προσήκει, ἀλλὰ καὶ στρατηγία οὐχ ἦτ-
 τον. |

Ἡδὺς εἶ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔοικας δεδιότι τοὺς πολλούς,
 μὴ δοκῆς ἄχρηστα μαθήματα προστάττειν. τὸ δ'
 ἐστὶν οὐ πᾶν φαῦλον ἀλλὰ χαλεπὸν πιστεῦσαι ὅτι
 ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐκάστου ὄργανόν τι ψυχῆς
 e ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἀπολλύμενον καὶ
 τυφλούμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδευμάτων, κρεῖττον
 ὄν σωθῆναι μυρίων ὀμμάτων· μόνῳ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀλήθεια
 ὁράται. οἷς μὲν οὖν ταῦτα συνδοκεῖ ἀμηχάνως ὡς εἶ
 δόξεις λέγειν, ὅσοι δὲ τούτου μηδαμῆ | ἠσθημένοι
 εἰσὶν εἰκότως ἠγγήσονται σε λέγειν οὐδέν· ἄλλην γὰρ
 ἀπ' αὐτῶν οὐχ ὀρώσιν ἀξίαν λόγου ὠφελίαν. σκόπει
 528 οὖν αὐτόθεν πρὸς ποτέρους διαλέγῃ· ἢ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἐτέ-
 ρους, ἀλλὰ σαυτοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ μέγιστον ποιῆ· τοὺς λό-
 γους, φθονοῖς μὴν οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλῳ, εἴ τίς τι δύναίτο ἀπ'
 αὐτῶν ὄνασθαι.

Οὕτως, ἔφη, αἰροῦμαι, | ἔμαντοῦ ἕνεκα τὸ πλείστον
 λέγειν τε καὶ ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

Ἄναγε τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰς τοῦπίσω· νῦν [δὴ] γὰρ
 οὐκ ὀρθῶς τὸ ἐξῆς ἐλάβομεν τῇ γεωμετρίας.

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“What’s next? Do we put astronomy third? Or do you not think so?”

“I certainly do,” he said, “since to have clearer perceptions of the seasons, the months, and the years is not only suitable for farming and seafaring, but also no less for warfare.”²⁴

“You are a splendid fellow,” I said, “because you’re like someone who is afraid of the masses in case you appear to be prescribing useless subjects. But the truth is that it is not a trivial but a difficult task to believe that in these subjects there is a faculty in everyone’s soul which, after being impaired and blinded by other activities, is cleansed and rekindled and is worth preserving more than any number of eyes, as only with this one can the truth be seen. So those who agree with you think that you seem to be speaking unbelievably well, while those who have in no way perceived any of this will most likely think you’re talking nonsense. For they cannot see any other benefit from these subjects worth mentioning. Consider then at once which group you are addressing: or perhaps you aren’t addressing either group, but are setting out your arguments chiefly for your own sake—not that you would hold it against anyone else if they were able to benefit from them in some way.”

“I’ll choose the latter,” he said, “to argue, ask and answer questions primarily for my own benefit.”

“Then go back a bit,” I said, “because we didn’t get the right subject to follow geometry just now.”

²⁴ As in the previous discussion of geometry (526d1), the practical application of astronomy is introduced by Glaucon, only to be corrected by S.

Πῶς λαβόντες; ἔφη.

Μετὰ ἐπίπεδον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν περιφορᾷ ὃν ἦδη
 στερεὸν λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβεῖν· ὀρθῶς
 b δὲ ἔχει ἐξῆς μετὰ δευτέραν αὐξην τρίτην λαμβάνειν.
 ἔστι δέ που τοῦτο περὶ τὴν τῶν κύβων αὐξην καὶ τὸ
 βάθους μετέχον.

Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ ταῦτά γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, δοκεῖ
 οὐπω ηὔρησθαι. |

Διτὰ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὰ αἷτια· ὅτι τε οὐδεμία πόλις
 ἐντίμως αὐτὰ ἔχει, ἀσθενῶς ζητεῖται χαλεπὰ ὄντα,
 ἐπιστάτου τε δέονται οἱ ζητοῦντες, ἄνευ οὗ οὐκ ἂν
 εὔροιεν, ὃν πρῶτον μὲν γενέσθαι χαλεπὸν, ἔπειτα καὶ
 c γενομένον, ὡς νῦν ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν πείθοντο οἱ περὶ
 ταῦτα ζητητικοὶ μεγαλοφρονούμενοι. εἰ δὲ πόλις ὅλη
 συνεπιστατοῖ ἐντίμως ἄγουσα αὐτά, οὐτοῖ τε ἂν πεί-
 θοντο καὶ συνεχῶς τε ἂν καὶ ἐντόνως ζητούμενα
 ἐκφανῆ γένοιτο ὅπῃ ἔχει· ἐπεὶ καὶ νῦν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν
 ἀτιμαζόμενα καὶ | κολουόμενα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ζητούντων
 λόγον οὐκ ἐχόντων καθ' ὅτι χρήσιμα, ὅμως πρὸς
 ἅπαντα ταῦτα βία ὑπὸ χάριτος αὐξάνεται, καὶ οὐδὲν
 θαυμαστὸν αὐτὰ φανῆναι.

d Καὶ μὲν δῆ, ἔφη, τό γε ἐπίχαρι καὶ διαφερόντως
 ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μοι σαφέστερον εἰπέ ἂ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες. τὴν
 μὲν γάρ που τοῦ ἐπιπέδου πραγματείαν γεωμετρίαν
 ἐτίθεις.

²⁵ We might conjecture that in this assertion Plato has in mind the geometrical and mathematical emphasis of the studies in his

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“How do you mean we didn’t get it right?”

“After the plane,” I said, “we went straight on to the solids of revolution before we took them by themselves. The right one to take in order after two dimensions is three dimensions. This I take to mean the generation of cubes and shapes that have depth.”

“That’s right,” he said, “but, Socrates, I don’t think we’ve investigated these topics yet.”

“Yes, and there are two reasons for this,” I said. “First because no state values them. They are researched in a feeble manner because they’re difficult and the researchers need a leader without whom they’d discover nothing, but who would be difficult to get hold of in the first place; and if they did get hold of one, as the situation is now, those with an aptitude to investigate such topics would not obey him in their arrogance. But if the whole state acted as a joint supervisor in showing respect for the topics, these people would comply and what they were constantly and eagerly looking for would become clear to them as to what they actually were. But although the subject is disparaged and discredited even now by most people, and because those who are researching it have no argument to prove it is useful, nevertheless, in spite of all this, the subject has burgeoned by the force of its charm, and it would be no surprise if this is coming to light.”²⁵

“Yes indeed,” he said, “its elegance is something quite exceptional. But explain to me more clearly what you were talking about just now. You were proposing that geometry is the study of the plane surface.”

Academy (see e.g., Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, 4:21–22).

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. |

Εἰτά γ', ἔφη, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀστρονομίαν μετὰ ταύτην, ὕστερον δ' ἀνεχώρησας.

Σπεύδων γάρ, ἔφην, ταχὺ πάντα διεξελθεῖν μᾶλλον βραδύνω· ἐξῆς γὰρ οὐσαν τὴν βάθους αὔξης μέθοδον, ὅτι τῇ ζητήσῃ γελοίως ἔχει, ὑπερβὰς αὐτὴν | μετὰ γεωμετρίαν ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὐσαν βάθους.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

e Τέταρτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τιθῶμεν μάθημα ἀστρονομίαν, ὡς ὑπαρχούσης τῆς νῦν παραλειπομένης, ἐὰν αὐτὴν πόλις μετίῃ.

Εἰκός, ἦ δ' ὅς. καὶ ὁ γε νυνδὴ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέπληξας | περὶ ἀστρονομίας ὡς φορτικῶς ἐπαινοῦντι,
529 νῦν ἦ σὺ μετέρχη ἐπαινώ· παντὶ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ δῆλον ὅτι αὕτη γε ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὄραν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε ἄγει.

Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παντὶ δῆλον πλὴν ἐμοί· ἐμοὶ γὰρ οὐ δοκεῖ οὕτως. |

Ἄλλὰ πῶς; ἔφη.

Ὡς μὲν νῦν αὐτὴν μεταχειρίζονται οἱ εἰς φιλοσοφίαν ἀνάγοντες, πάνν ποιεῖν κάτω βλέπειν.

Πῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις;

Οὐκ ἀγεῖνῶς μοι δοκεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν λαμβάνειν παρὰ σαυτῷ ἢ ἔστι κινδυνεύεις γὰρ καὶ εἴ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος
b ἀνακύπτων καταμανθάνοι τι, ἠγγεῖσθαι ἂν αὐτὸν νοή-

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“Yes,” I said.

“Then,” he said, “at first you put astronomy after that, but later on you retracted that one.”

“Yes,” I said; “in my eagerness to explain everything quickly the slower I went; because next in turn was the treatment of the dimension of depth, investigation of which is in an absurd state; and so I passed over it and talked about astronomy after geometry, as it entails the movement of solid bodies.”

“You’re right,” he said.

“Then let’s make astronomy our fourth subject,” I said, “as what we have just left aside²⁶ is available, if the state will go for it.”

“That’s fair enough,” he said. “As for you telling me off for commending astronomy in a crude sort of way, I now approve of your approach to it. You see, it seems clear to everyone that it forces the soul to look upward and leads us from this world to the world beyond.”

“Maybe it’s clear to everyone but me,” I said. “I certainly don’t think it is.”

“But how come?” he asked.

“Because as it is handled today by those who set out to lead it upward toward philosophy, it makes the soul look very much downward.”

“What do you mean?” he asked.

“You seem to me to be not ungenerous in your efforts to take on board what the ‘study of the world above’ is about! You see, if someone were to learn something by throwing his head back and looking at the decoration on the ceiling, you are likely to say he was studying it with his

²⁶ I.e., solid geometry (d8–9).

σει ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄμμασι θεωρεῖν. ἴσως οὖν καλῶς ἡγή, ἐγὼ δ' εὐθηκῶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιῶν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἦ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, | ἐάντε τις ἄνω κεχηνῶς ἢ κάτω συμμεμυκῶς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῆ μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ἂν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν—
 c ἐπιστήμην γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔχειν τῶν τοιούτων— οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν, κὰν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῆ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνη.

Δίκην, ἔφη, ἔχω· ὀρθῶς γάρ μοι ἐπέπληξας. ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ ἔλεγες δεῖν ἀστρονομίαν μανθάνειν παρὰ ἃ νῦν μανθάνουσιν, | εἰ μέλλοιεν ὠφελίμως πρὸς ἃ λέγομεν μαθήσεσθαι;

ᾠδε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ταῦτα μὲν τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ποικίλματα, ἐπεὶπερ ἐν ὀρατῷ πεποίκιλται, κάλλιστα μὲν
 d ἡγείσθαι καὶ ἀκριβέστατα τῶν τοιούτων ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἅς τὸ ὄν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὔσα βραδυτῆς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόητα φέρει, | ἃ δὴ λόγῳ μὲν καὶ διανοίᾳ ληπτὰ, ὄψει δ' οὐ· ἢ σὺ οἶε;

²⁷ A possible ironic reference to Aristophanes' satirical picture of S.'s study of the heavens and his pupils' study of the underworld in his *phrontisterion* (*Nub.* 171–73 and 191–92), a popular view of S.'s own activity, according to Plato's S. in *Ap.* 19b–c.

²⁸ In this difficult paragraph, Plato is envisaging an astronomical universe of concentric spheres, all revolving at different

intellect and not his eyes. Perhaps you are right and I'm being simpleminded. You see, again I cannot think there is any subject that would make the soul look upward other than the one which deals with what exists and the invisible world. Whether one attempts to learn something of the objects of our perception looking upward with mouth wide open, or down with lips sealed,²⁷ I would say he would never learn anything, as he has no understanding of such things, and his soul won't look up, but down, even if he is studying lying on his back on the ground or floating on the sea."

"I've got what I deserved," he said. "You were right to tick me off. But still, what did you mean when you said they must learn astronomy in the opposite way to the way they do it now if they are going to learn profitably for our present purposes?"

"The following," I said: "these stars that adorn the heavens, since they ornament the visible sky, we think they're the most beautiful and perfect examples of their kind. And yet they fall far short of the real ones—those courses, represented by real speed and real slowness in real number and in all the real geometrical shapes, which are conveyed in relation to each other and convey what is in them, all of which can be apprehended by reason and intellect, but not by sight.²⁸ Or do you have another view?"

speeds ("are conveyed in relation to each other") and themselves conveying around the various heavenly bodies ("and convey what is in them"). However, these are just visible manifestations of the invisible "real" astronomical system governed by real speed, etc. (d2-3), which is only apprehensible through the intellect.

Οὐδαμῶς γε, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, τῇ περὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλία παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, ὁμοίως ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐντύχοι ὑπὸ Δαιδάλου ἢ τινος ἄλλου δημιουργοῦ ἢ γραφέως διαφερόντως γεγραμμένοις καὶ ἐκπεπονημένοις διαγράμμασιν. ἡγήσαιο γὰρ ἂν πού τις ἔμπειρος γεωμετρίας, ἰδὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα, κάλλιστα μὲν ἔχειν ἀπεργασία, γελοῖον μὴν ἐπισκοπεῖν αὐτὰ σπουδῇ ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ληψόμενον ἴσων ἢ διπλασίων ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς συμμετρίας.

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει γελοῖον εἶναι; ἔφη.

Τῷ ὄντι δὴ ἀστρονομικόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὄντα οὐκ οἶει | ταῦτόν πεῖσεσθαι εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀστρῶν φορὰς ἀποβλέποντα; νομιεῖν μὲν ὡς οἶόν τε κάλλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα συστήσασθαι, οὕτω συνεστάναι τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ δημιουργῷ αὐτόν τε καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ· τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν συμμετρίαν καὶ τούτων πρὸς μῆνα καὶ μηνὸς πρὸς ἐνιαυτὸν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀστρῶν πρὸς τε ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλα, οὐκ ἄτοπον, οἶει, ἡγήσεται τὸν νομίζοντα γίγνεσθαί τε ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν, σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὀρώμενα, καὶ ζητεῖν παντὶ τρόπῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν αὐτῶν λαβεῖν; |

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, σοῦ νῦν ἀκούοντι.

Προβλήμασιν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρώμενοι ὥσπερ γεωμετρίαν οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μέτιμεν, τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐάσομεν, εἰ μέλλομεν ὄντως ἀστρονομίας

“Not at all,” he said.

“It therefore follows,” I said, “that we must use the splendor of the heavens as models for the purposes of our study regarding those other things,²⁹ just as if one might resort to figures elaborately drawn in various ways by Daedalus, or some other craftsman or artist. I imagine that anyone experienced in such matters would regard them as excellently executed, and yet it would be absurd to consider them seriously in order to apprehend within them the truth about equal, double, or any other proportion.”

“How could that not be absurd?” he said.

“Then,” I said, “don’t you think that anyone who is a real astronomer will have the same experience when he looks into the motions of the stars? That he’ll think that the most beautiful way to organize such works is the way used by the creator of the heavens to make them and all that is in them? But as to the ratio of night to day and of these to the month and the month to the year and the ratio of the other stars to these and each other, don’t you think he’ll consider the man is absurd who thinks these always occur in this way and don’t vary at all, and seeks to comprehend the truth of them in every way he can, although they are physical bodies that can be observed?”

“I certainly think so,” he said, “now I’ve heard what you’ve just said.”

“In that case,” I said, “as we approached geometry by making use of problems, so we shall approach astronomy. We’ll pass over what’s in the heavens if we’re really going

²⁹ I.e., the invisible universe, of which the visible heavens are a “model” (*paradeigma*, d7). For the basic idea, see above, 6.510d–e.

μεταλαμβάνοντες χρήσιμον τὸ φύσει φρόνιμον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξ ἀχρήστου ποιήσειν.

Ἡ πολλαπλάσιον, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ἢ ὡς νῦν ἀστρονομείται προστάτεις. |

Οἶμαι δέ γε, εἶπον, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον προστάξειν ἡμᾶς, ἐάν τι ἡμῶν ὡς νομοθετῶν ὄφελος ἦ. ἀλλὰ γάρ τι ἔχεις ὑπομνήσαι τῶν προσηκόντων μαθημάτων;

Οὐκ ἔχω, ἔφη, νῦν γ' οὕτωςί.

Οὐ μὴν ἔν, ἀλλὰ πλείω, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶδη παρέχεται
d ἡ φορά, ὡς ἐγῶμαι. τὰ μὲν οὖν πάντα ἴσως ὅστις σοφὸς ἔξει εἰπέιν ἃ δὲ καὶ ἡμῖν προφανῆ, δύο.

Ποῖα δῆ;

Πρὸς τούτῳ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀντίστροφον αὐτοῦ. |

Τὸ ποῖον;

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφην, ὡς πρὸς ἀστρονομίαν ὄμματα πέπηγεν, ὡς πρὸς ἐναρμόνιον φορὰν ὠτα παγήναι, καὶ αὐταὶ ἀλλήλων ἀδελφαί τινες αἱ ἐπιστήμαι εἶναι, ὡς οἷ τε Πυθαγόρειοί φασι καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὧ Γλαύκων, συγχωροῦμεν. ἢ πῶς ποιοῦμεν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ πολὺ τὸ ἔργον, ἐκείνων
e πεισόμεθα πῶς λέγουσι περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο πρὸς τούτοις. ἡμεῖς δὲ παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα φυλάξομεν τὸ ἡμέτερον.

Ποῖον; |

BOOK VII

to take up astronomy and make the natural thinking faculty of the soul useful instead of useless.”

“My word, you’re proposing a subject far more complex than astronomy as it’s now practiced,” he said.

“Yes,” I said, “and I think we shall be prescribing the rest in the same way if there is to be any benefit from us as lawgivers. But come now, can you call to mind any appropriate subject?”

“I can’t,” he said, “just at this moment.”

“Yet motion possesses not just one but several forms, in my view. It may take a clever man to name them all, but there are two which are clear even to us.”

“What are they, then?”

“As well as the one we’ve just had, there’s its counterpart.”

“What’s that?”

“It’s possible,” I said, “that just as our eyes have fixed on astronomy, so our ears have fixed on harmonic motion and these sciences are related to each other, as the Pythagoreans claim,³⁰ and we too agree, Glaucon. Or how do we see it?”

“As you’ve just said,” he said.

“For this reason,” I said, “since this is a huge task, shall we ask them what their view is and see if there is anything they can add to it. But we shall guard our own interest throughout of all this.”

“What is that?”

³⁰ The link is the “harmony of the spheres,” the harmonic proportion which, it was claimed, produced the sound emitted by the heavenly bodies as they revolve (see below, 10.616b–17c and Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy*, 1:295).

Μή ποτ' αὐτῶν τι ἀτελὲς ἐπιχειρῶσιν ἡμῖν μανθά-
 νειν οὓς θρέβομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐξήκον ἐκείσε αἰεῖ, οἷ πάντα
 δεῖ ἀφήκειν, οἷον ἄρτι περὶ τῆς ἀστρονομίας ἐλέγομεν.
 531 ἢ οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι καὶ περὶ ἀρμονίας ἕτερον τοιοῦτον
 ποιούσι; τὰς γὰρ ἀκουόμενας αὖ συμφωνίας καὶ
 φθόγγους ἀλλήλοις ἀναμετροῦντες ἀνήνυτα, ὥσπερ
 οἱ ἀστρονόμοι, πονοῦσιν.

Νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἔφη, καὶ γελοῖως γε, | πυκνώματ'
 ἄττα ὀνομάζοντες καὶ παραβάλλοντες τὰ ὦτα, οἷον ἐκ
 γειτόνων φωνῆν θηρευόμενοι, οἱ μὲν φασιν ἔτι κατ-
 ακούειν ἐν μέσῳ τινα ἡχὴν καὶ σμικρότατον εἶναι
 τοῦτο διάστημα, ᾧ μετρητέον, οἱ δὲ ἀμφισβητοῦντες
 b ὡς ὅμοιον ἤδη φθειγγομένων, ἀμφότεροι ὦτα τοῦ νοῦ
 προστησάμενοι.

Σὺ μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς χρηστοὺς λέγεις τοὺς ταῖς
 χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας,
 ἐπὶ τῶν κολλόπων στρεβλοῦντας· ἵνα δὲ μὴ μακροτέρα
 ἢ εἰκὼν γίγνηται | πλήκτρῳ τε πληγῶν γιγνομένων
 καὶ κατηγορίας περὶ καὶ ἐξαρνήσεως καὶ ἀλαζονείας
 χορδῶν, πάνομαι τῆς εἰκόνοσ καὶ οὐ φημι τούτους
 λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνους οὓς ἔφαμεν νυνδὴ περὶ ἀρμονίας
 ἐρήσεσθαι. ταῦτόν γὰρ ποιούσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀστρονομίᾳ·
 c τοὺς γὰρ ἐν ταύταις ταῖς συμφωνίαις ταῖς ἀκουόμεναις
 ἀριθμοὺς ζητοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς προβλήματα ἀνίσσιν,

³¹ *puknōmata* = literally “concentrations”: intervals of sound very close together, less than a semitone.

³² The image is of the torture of slaves on the rack.

BOOK VII

"In case any of those we're going to bring up tries to learn anything incomplete and does not always reach the goal it should achieve, as we were saying about astronomy a little while ago. Or do you not know that they do something else like this also concerning harmony? Like astronomers they slave away to no effect remeasuring again and again audible concords and sounds against each other."

"Heavens, yes, and quite absurd the way they talk about 'condensed intervals'³¹ and press their ears close like someone trying to catch what their neighbors are saying, some claiming they can still hear a sound in between and that this is the smallest interval with which they must measure, others dispute this and say they are now the same note: both groups preferring their ears to their minds."

"Now," I said, "you're talking about those worthy fellows who give their strings what for, rack them up and screw them on their pegs. But just in case my image³² goes too far, with the blows being applied by the plectrum, and as a sort of accusation citing the reluctance or overreadiness of the strings to sound, I'm dropping the image and say that I'm not talking about these people, but those who we were saying just now we would ask about harmony,³³ since they do the same as they do in astronomy; for they are searching for number in the concord of sounds, but they do not rise to the challenge and inquire which num-

³³ S. is here making a distinction between empiricist musicians whom he satirizes (and whom Glaucon at 531a4 mistakenly thinks he is talking about), and the Pythagoreans, who identified musical intervals with arithmetical ratios.

ἐπισκοπεῖν τίνες σύμφωνοι ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τίνες οὐ, καὶ διὰ τί ἑκάτεροι. |

Δαιμόνιον γάρ, ἔφη, πρᾶγμα λέγεις.

Χρήσιμον μὲν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ζήτησιν, ἄλλως δὲ μεταδιωκόμενον ἄχρηστον.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ τούτων πάντων ὧν
d διεληλύθαμεν μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοι-
νωρίαν ἀφίκηται καὶ συγγένειαν, καὶ συλλογισθῇ
ταῦτα ἢ ἔστιν ἀλλήλοις οἰκεία, φέρειν τι αὐτῶν εἰς ἂ
βουλόμεθα τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οὐκ ἀνόνητα πονεῖ-
σθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀνόνητα.

Καὶ ἐγώ, ἔφη, οὕτω μαντεύομαι. ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ ἔργον λέγεις, | ὦ Σώκρατες.

Τοῦ προοιμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τίνος λέγεις; ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν ὅτι πάντα ταῦτα προοίμιά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ τοῦ νό-
μου ὃν δεῖ μαθεῖν; οὐ γάρ που δοκοῦσί γέ σοι οἱ
ταῦτα δεινοὶ διαλεκτικοὶ εἶναι.

e Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μάλα γέ τινες ὀλίγοι ὧν ἐγὼ ἐντετύχηκα.

Ἄλλὰ δῆ, εἶπον, μὴ δυνατοὶ τινες ὄντες δοῦναί τε καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι λόγον εἴσεσθαι ποτέ τι ὧν φαμεν δεῖν εἰδέναι; |

Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

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Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, οὗτος ἤδη αὐτός ἐστιν

bers are concordant and which aren't, and why the differences."

"That's a fiendish task you're talking about," he said.

"Yes, but a useful one in the search for beauty and goodness," I said, "though useless if investigated in any other way."

"That's fair enough," he said.

"I also think," I said, "that if our method of dealing with all these topics we've mentioned gets to their common relationship and works out how they relate to each other, it has some bearing on the direction in which we want our efforts to be spent, and is not wasted; but that if not, it is wasted."

"My thinking is on these lines too," he said. "But you are talking about an enormous task, Socrates."

"Do you mean the preliminaries, or what?" I asked. "Or are we not aware that all these things are preludes to the theme³⁴ itself which we must learn? I'm sure you don't think that those who are skilled in these matters are dialecticians."

"Zeus, no!" he exclaimed. "Apart from a very few whom I've met."

"Well, indeed," I said, "will those who are unable to present or accept an argument be able ever to know anything at all of what we say they should know?"

"Again, not even this last point."

"So, Glaucon," I said, "is this now the very theme that

³⁴ *prooimia tou nomou*: a wordplay on *nomos*: either "(musical or poetic) preludes to a song" or "preambles to a law." This image and play on *nomos* is a common feature in Plato (see below, 532d6-7) and very frequently in *Laws* (e.g., *Leg.* 4.722-23).

ὁ νόμος ὃν τὸ διαλέγεσθαι περαίνει; ὃν καὶ ὄντα νοη-
 τὸν μιμοῖτ' ἂν ἢ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις, ἣν ἐλέγομεν πρὸς
 αὐτὰ ἤδη τὰ ζῶα ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς
 αὐτὰ (τὰ) ἄστρα τε καὶ ἰ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν
 τὸν ἥλιον. οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἰ ἐπιχειρῇ
 ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ
 b ὃ ἐστὶν ἕκαστον ὀρμῆ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῆ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ
 ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῷ γίγνεται
 τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκείνος τότε ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ
 ὄρατοῦ.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν κα-
 λεῖς; ἰ

Τί μήν;

Ἡ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν καὶ
 μεταστροφή ἀπὸ τῶν σκιῶν ἐπὶ τὰ εἶδωλα καὶ τὸ φῶς
 καὶ ἐκ τοῦ καταγείου εἰς τὸν ἥλιον ἐπάνοδος, καὶ ἐκεῖ
 c πρὸς μὲν τὰ ζῶα τε καὶ φυτὰ καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς
 ἔτι ἀδυναμία βλέπειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ ἐν ὕδασι φαντάσματα
 θεῖα⁴ καὶ σκιᾶς τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδώλων σκιᾶς
 δι' ἑτέρου τοιούτου φωτὸς ὡς πρὸς ἥλιον κρίνειν
 ἀποσκιαζόμενας— ἰ πᾶσα αὕτη ἢ πραγματεία τῶν
 τεχνῶν ἃς διήλθομεν ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ
 ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ
 ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὐσι θέαν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σαφεστά-
 d του ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν τῷ σωματο-
 ειδεῖ τε καὶ ὄρατῷ τόπῳ.

⁴ φαντάσματα θεῖα ADF Iambl. φαντάσματα θεῖα Ast

dialectic brings to a conclusion, which our power of sight would imitate though it's part of the intelligible realm, the sight which we were saying attempts to concentrate its gaze on actual living creatures and on the stars themselves and ultimately indeed on the sun itself?³⁵ So too, whenever a person attempts to get at what each thing really is by dialectical methods through reason and without all the sense perceptions, and does not give up until he grasps what the real good is by pure intellect alone, he reaches the true goal of the intelligible world, just as the other man did previously in the visible world."

"I agree entirely," he said.

"What then? Don't you call this journey³⁶ dialectic?"

"Certainly."

"This," I said, "is the release then from the shackles and the turning away from the shadows toward the images which cast them, and the light, and also the ascent from the cavern to the sunlight and there the inability still to look directly at the living creatures and the plants and the light of the sun, but see the divine reflections in water and the shadows of real objects, but not the shadows of images cast by some other such light which is just as unreal as compared with the sun: all this activity in the skills which we have discussed has the ability to uplift the best part of the soul toward the contemplation of the best in things that are in the real world just as previously it directed the part of the body with the clearest perceptions toward what is clearest in the physical, visible sphere."

³⁵ As in the ascent from the cave at 516aff.

³⁶ Through a *poreia* ("journey") dialectic attempts to solve the *aporia* ("puzzle," literally "barrier on one's journey").

Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, ἀποδέχομαι οὕτω. καίτοι παντάπασί γέ μοι δοκεῖ χαλεπὰ μὲν ἀποδέχεσθαι εἶναι, ἄλλον δ' αὖ τρόπον χαλεπὰ μὴ ἀποδέχεσθαι. ὅμως δέ—οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ | νῦν παρόντι μόνον ἀκουστέα, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐθις πολλάκις ἐπανιτέον—ταῦτα θέντες ἔχειν ὡς νῦν λέγεται, ἐπ' αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν νόμον ἴωμεν, καὶ διέλθωμεν οὕτως ὥσπερ τὸ προοίμιον διήλθωμεν. λέγε οὖν τίς ὁ
 e τρόπος τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμεως, καὶ κατὰ ποῖα δὴ εἶδη διέστηκεν, καὶ τίνες αὖ ὁδοί· αὐταὶ γὰρ ἂν ἤδη, ὡς ἔοικεν, αἱ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἄγουσαι εἶεν, οἱ ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας.

533 Οὐκέτ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ' ἔσῃ ἀκολουθεῖν—ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν οὐδὲν ἂν προθυμίας ἀπολείποι—οὐδ' εἰκόνα ἂν ἔτι οὐ λέγομεν ἴδοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἀληθές, ὃ γε δὴ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται—εἰ δ' ὄντως ἢ μή, οὐκέτ' ἄξιον τοῦτο δισχυρίζεσθαι· ἀλλ' | ὅτι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτόν τι ἰδεῖν, ἰσχυριστέον. ἦ γάρ;

Τί μήν;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις μόνῃ ἂν φήνειεν ἐμπείρῳ ὄντι ὧν νυνδὴ διήλθωμεν, ἄλλη δὲ οὐδαμῇ δυνατόν;

Καὶ τοῦτ', ἔφη, ἄξιον δισχυρίζεσθαι.

b Τόδε γοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδεὶς ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητήσει λέγουσιν, ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἐκάστου περὶ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδῶ περιπλανητὸς λαμβάνειν. ἀλλ' αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι τέχναι ἢ πρὸς δόξας ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπιθυμίας εἰσὶν ἢ πρὸς γενέσεις τε καὶ

"I accept what you say as true," he said, "and although I think it's all very difficult to accept, yet from another angle it's difficult not to. Nevertheless we must listen to your arguments, not just at this present moment, but we must also go back to them again and again. Let's take all this as it now stands and move on to the actual theme and work our way through it as we did the prelude. So tell me, what is the character of the function of dialectic? What sections is it divided into, and what are its methods? You see it would now appear that these are what lead to the actual place which once we got there would be like a resting place and the end of our journey."

"My dear Glaucon," I said, "you won't be able to follow me any further, although my own effort would not be lacking in enthusiasm. And you'd no longer be looking at an image of what we're discussing, but the real thing; at any rate, as I see it. Though whether it really is or not, is not worth asserting anymore, but we must maintain rigorously that there is something like this to see, mustn't we?"

"Of course."

"And likewise the fact that the potential of the dialectic would only be revealed to someone with experience of what we've discussed, a thing that's possible in no other way, wouldn't it?"

"That's worth affirming too," he said.

"At least here is something no one will dispute with us, arguing that there is any other approach which attempts to grasp methodically in every case what each individual thing is in and of itself. In contrast, all the other arts have been developed either to deal with human beliefs and desires, or things which occur naturally or artificially, or

συνθέσεις, ἣ καὶ πρὸς θεραπείαν | τῶν φυομένων τε
 καὶ συντιθεμένων ἅπασαι τετράφαται αἱ δὲ λοιπαί,
 ἃς τοῦ ὄντος τι ἔφαμεν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, γεωμετρίας
 c τε καὶ τὰς ταύτῃ ἐπομένας, ὁρῶμεν ὡς ὀνειρώττουσι
 μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὕπαρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἕως ἂν
 ὑποθέσει χρώμεναι ταύτας ἀκινήτους ἕωσι, μὴ δυνά-
 μεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν. ᾧ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὁ μὴ
 οἶδεν, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδεν | συμ-
 πέπλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ
 ἐπιστήμην γενέσθαι;

Οὐδεμία, ἣ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη
 ταύτῃ πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν
 d τὴν ἀρχὴν ἵνα βεβαιώσῃται, καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ
 βαρβαρικῶ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορωρυγμένον
 ἠρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω, συνερίθους καὶ συμπερι-
 αγωγοῖς χρωμένῃ αἷς διήλθομεν τέχναις· ἃς ἐπιστήμας
 μὲν πολλάκις προσείπομεν διὰ τὸ ἔθος, | δέονται δὲ
 ὀνόματος ἄλλου, ἐναργεστέρου μὲν ἢ δόξης, ἀμυδρο-
 τέρου δὲ ἢ ἐπιστήμης-διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ
 πρόσθεν που ὠρισάμεθα-ἔστι δ', ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ
 περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσοῦτων πέρι
 σκέψις ὄσων ἡμῖν πρόκειται.

even the care of those things which occur naturally or artificially. But the rest, which we said had some bearing on reality, geometry and what follows on from it, we see that while they dream about reality, it is yet impossible for them to see the waking vision while they use assumptions which leave these topics undisturbed, for which they cannot offer an explanation. You see, where the starting point is what is not known and the end and what comes between is woven together out of what is not known, what means are there that such a set of premises can ever become knowledge?"

"None," he said.

"Does that mean, then," I asked, "that only the dialectical method, by removing those hypotheses, proceeds in this way to the actual first principle in order to be securely based, and when the eye of the soul is buried in a kind of barbaric filth,³⁷ it quietly draws and leads it upward using as fellow workers and assistants in conversion the arts we have described? We have often referred to these as types of knowledge out of habit, for want of another name clearer than belief, but less precise than knowledge. We defined it earlier on, I seem to remember, as 'thought,' but it seems to me there's no place for an argument about nomenclature when we have before us an investigation into matters of such great importance."³⁸

³⁷ A traditional punishment for the unjust in Orphic eschatology (see L.363d7–8).

³⁸ *dianoia* ("thought") was classed at 6.511d8–e1 as the second category of what is *noēton* ("intelligible"), with a higher category of knowledge revealed by dialectic, leading to knowledge of the Forms.

e Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν μόνον δηλοῖ †πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν σαφηνεῖα λέγει ἐν ψυχῇ.⁵

Ἀρέσκει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡσπερ τὸ πρότερον, τὴν μὲν πρώτην μοῖραν ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν, δευτέραν δὲ 534 διάνοιαν, τρίτην δὲ πίστιν καὶ εἰκασίαν τετάρτην καὶ συναμφότερα μὲν ταῦτα δόξαν, συναμφότερα δ' ἐκεῖνα νόησιν· καὶ δόξαν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, νόησιν δὲ περὶ οὐσίαν καὶ ὅτι οὐσία πρὸς γένεσιν, νόησιν πρὸς δόξαν, καὶ ὅτι νόησις πρὸς δόξαν, | ἐπιστήμην πρὸς πίστιν καὶ διάνοιαν πρὸς εἰκασίαν· τὴν δ' ἐφ' οἷς ταῦτα ἀναλογίαν καὶ διαίρεσιν διχῆ ἑκατέρου, δοξα- στοῦ τε καὶ νοητοῦ, ἐῶμεν, ὧ Γλαύκων, ἵνα μὴ ἡμᾶς πολλαπλασίῳ λόγων ἐμπλήσῃ ἢ ὅσων οἱ παρεληλυ- θότες.

b Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἔμοιγ', ἔφη, τά γε ἄλλα, καθ' ὅσον δύναμαι ἔπεισθαι, συνδοκεῖ.

Ἦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ λόγον | αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλῳ διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην;

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ὡσαύτως· ὅς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων

⁵ ἀλλ'—ψυχῇ secl. Bessarion: locus desperatus (Slings)

³⁹ This sentence is corrupt and is frequently omitted as an interpolation; it seems to mean something like “we should be

"There certainly isn't," he said, ["provided only that it states what corresponds to the state of clarity in the soul."] ³⁹

"We're happy, then," I said, "as we were before, to refer to the first part as knowledge and the second as thought, the third belief and the fourth conjecture by means of imagery. Again these last two can be grouped under opinion, the first two under understanding where opinion deals with the impermanent, understanding with the real; and just as reality is to impermanence, understanding is to opinion, and as understanding is to opinion, so knowledge is to belief and thought to conjecture by means of imagery.⁴⁰ Let's leave aside the relative proportions between all these and the division of both what is opinion and what is knowledge, Glaucon, so that we don't get ourselves embroiled in an argument many times longer than we had in some earlier topics."

"Well, I certainly agree with the rest," he said, "as far as I can follow what you're saying."

"Do you not also call the person who can grasp an account of the reality of each thing dialectical then? And anyone who doesn't embrace it—in as far as the person wouldn't be able to give an account of it to himself or any one else—will you claim that to that extent he has no understanding of it?"

"How could I not make such a claim?" he said.

"And does the same apply to the Good, therefore? Whoever is unable by his reasoning to distinguish and

content if the words we use express our meaning clearly" (Adam, Appendix XVI to Book 7, vol. 2, p. 193).

⁴⁰ See the diagram in the Appendix to Book 6.

- c ἀφελὼν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιὼν, μὴ κατὰ δόξαν ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν προθυμούμενος ἐλέγχειν, ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύηται, οὔτε αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν φήσεις εἰδέναι τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα οὔτε ἄλλο ἀγαθὸν οὐδέν, ἀλλ' εἴ πη εἰδώλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται, δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐφάπτεσθαι, καὶ τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπο-
 d λούντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, πρὶν ἐνθάδ' ἐξεγρέσθαι, εἰς Ἄιδου πρότερον ἀφικόμενον τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθά-
 νειν;

Νῆ τὸν Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα γε πάντα ταῦτα φήσω.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν τούς γε σταντοῦ παιῖδας, οὓς τῷ λόγῳ τρέφεις τε καὶ παιδεύεις, εἴ ποτε ἔργῳ τρέφοις, οὐκ ἂν ἐάσαις, ἢ ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, ἄρχοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει κυρίου τῶν μεγίστων εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἔφη.

Νομοθετήσεις δὴ αὐτοῖς ταύτης μάλιστα τῆς παιδείας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι, ἐξ ἧς ἐρωτᾶν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἐπιστημονέστατα οἰοί τ' ἔσονται;

- e Νομοθετήσω, ἔφη, μετὰ γε σοῦ.

Ἄρ' οὖν δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ διαλεκτικῇ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κείσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μάθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπι-
 535 τίθεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν ἤδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων;

Ἐμοιγ', ἔφη.

separate off the notion of the Good from everything else and, like one in battle, explore every counterargument and strive to examine it not by reference to what is generally believed, but by reference to reality, in all of which he makes his way by faultless logic—will you claim that a man in this position either knows the Good itself or any other good; but if he happens to come across any image anywhere, he does so by using his belief, not his knowledge, and he dreams his way through this present life fast asleep and before he wakes up here he'll first arrive in Hades and there fall permanently asleep?"

"Yes, by Zeus," he exclaimed, "I shall certainly agree with all of that."

"Then again these children of yours whom you are bringing up and educating in argument, if you were ever to do it for real you wouldn't allow them, I think, if they were irrational like the geometrical lines,⁴¹ to hold office in your state in charge of the most important affairs."

"I certainly would not," he said.

"You will certainly make them follow this kind of education by law, by which they'll be able to ask and answer questions in the most knowledgeable way, won't you?"

"I shall," he said, "at least with your help."

"Do you think, then," I asked, "that our dialectic, like a coping stone, lies at the top layer of our studies and that there is no other subject than this that you would rightly add farther up, and in fact the end point of our studies has now been reached?"

"I do," he said.

⁴¹ A joke based on the double meaning of *alogos* = "irrational" and "incommensurable" (as applied to geometrical lines).

Διανομὴ τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ λοιπὸν σοι, τίσιν ταῦτα τὰ μαθήματα δώσομεν καὶ τίνα τρόπον. |

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷους ἐξελέξαμεν;

Πῶς γάρ, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὔ;

Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκείνας τὰς φύσεις οἷον [δεῖν] ἐκλεκτέας εἶναι· τούς τε γὰρ βεβαιοτάτους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρειοτάτους προαιρετέον, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν τοὺς εὐειδεστάτους· πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ζητητέον μὴ μόνον γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἦθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἅ τῆδε τῇ παιδείᾳ τῆς φύσεως πρόσφορα ἐκτέον αὐτοῖς.

Ποῖα δὴ διαστέλλῃ; |

Δριμύτητα, ὦ μακάριε, ἔφην, δεῖ αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα ὑπάρχειν, καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς μαθάνειν. πολὺ γάρ τοι μᾶλλον ἀποδειλιώσι ψυχαὶ ἐν ἰσχυροῖς μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐν γυμνασίοις· οἰκειότερος γὰρ αὐταῖς ὁ πόνος, ἴδιος ἄλλ' οὐ κοινὸς ὢν μετὰ τοῦ σώματος.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Καὶ μνήμονα δὴ καὶ ἄρρατον καὶ πάντα φιλόπονον ζητητέον. ἣ τίμῃ τρόπῳ οἶε τά τε τοῦ σώματος ἐθελήσειν τινὰ διαπονεῖν καὶ τοσαύτην μάθησίν τε καὶ μελέτην ἐπιτελεῖν; |

Οὐδένα, ἣ δ' ὅς, εἰ μὴ παντάπασί γ' ἣ εὐφνῆς.

⁴² 3.412bff., 6.485eff., 503c.

"Then all that remains for you is to allocate whom we shall give this teaching to and how we do it."

"That is clearly the case," he said.

"So do you recall the sort of people we chose in our previous selection of rulers?"⁴²

"Of course," he said.

"In other respects, therefore," I said, "you have to consider that those kinds of people must be chosen: you see, we must prefer those who are very reliable and courageous and, as far as possible, the best-looking.⁴³ In addition to this we must look not only for those noble and virile in their behavior, but they must also have those attributes in their nature which are conducive to this kind of education."

"What characteristics do you have in mind precisely?"

"They must have a keenness of spirit for their studies, my good fellow," I said, "and not be reluctant to learn. For I tell you, souls tend to play the coward far more in rigorous study than in physical exercise. The hardship is more their own, you see, being personal and not shared with the body."

"That's true," he said.

"We must also look for someone with a good memory, persistent and no stranger to hard work. Or how else do you think someone will be willing to work hard at his physical education as well as complete so much study and mental exercise?"

"No one would," he said, "unless they have an entirely excellent nature."

⁴³ Based on the common Greek assumption that good looks reflected inner favorable qualities (see e.g., *Symp.* 209b-c).

Τὸ γοῦν νῦν ἀμάρτημα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἡ ἀτιμία φιλοσοφία διὰ ταῦτα προσπέπτωκεν, ὃ καὶ πρότερον εἶπον, ὅτι οὐ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτῆς ἄπτονται· οὐ γὰρ νόθους ἔδει ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλὰ γνησίους.

Πῶς; ἔφη.

d Πρῶτον μὲν, εἶπον, φιλοπονία οὐ χωλὸν δεῖ εἶναι τὸν ἀψόμενον, τὰ μὲν ἡμίσεια φιλόπονον, τὰ δ' ἡμίσεια ἄπονον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν τις φιλογυμναστῆς μὲν καὶ φιλόθηρος ἦ καὶ πάντα τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος φιλοπονῆ, φιλομαθῆς δὲ μή, | μηδὲ φιλήκοος μηδὲ ζητητικός, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις μισοπονῆ· χωλὸς δὲ καὶ ὁ τὰναντία τούτου μεταβεβληκῶς τὴν φιλοπονίαν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

e Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτ' οὗτο ἀνάπηρον ψυχὴν θήσομεν, ἣ ἂν τὸ μὲν ἐκούσιον ψευδὸς μισῆ καὶ χαλεπῶς φέρῃ αὐτὴ τε καὶ ἐτέρων ψευδομένων ὑπεραγανακτῆ, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον εὐκόλως προσδέχεται καὶ ἀμαθαίνουσά που ἀλισκομένη μὴ ἀγανακτῆ, ἀλλ' εὐχερῶς ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθία μολύνεται; |

536 Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Καὶ πρὸς σωφροσύνην, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ μεγαλοπρέπειαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρη οὐχ ἥκιστα δεῖ φυλάττειν τὸν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον. ὅταν γάρ τις μὴ ἐπίσθηται πάντῃ τὰ τοιαῦτα σκοπεῖν καὶ ιδιώτης | καὶ πόλις, λανθάνουσι χωλοῖς

"Anyhow, the present mistake, and the reason that philosophy has fallen into such ill repute, is, as I said before,⁴⁴ because it is unworthy people who take it up. It should not have been bastards who took it up, but people of genuine pedigree."

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"First of all," I said, "this keenness to work hard. No lame duck should take it up: half keen, half work-shy. This comes about whenever someone is keen on physical exercise and hunting and expends his efforts on everything physical. Keen on study he is not; he is neither attentive nor inquisitive, but hates every minute spent on such things. He who in his love of hard work has altered course to the opposite direction is also handicapped."

"Very true," he said.

"Then shall we say in the same way as regards the truth," I asked, "that the soul is mutilated if it hates the voluntary lie, and is upset by it in its own self, and is very angry at others who lie, but would be happy to allow the involuntary lie and not get upset if caught being ignorant, but comfortably wallow in ignorance like a wild boar?"⁴⁵

"I agree with that entirely," he said.

"And with regard to temperance," I said, "and courage and high-mindedness and all those aspects of excellence, we must not least watch out for the bastard and the genuine. You know whenever any one person or state does not altogether understand how to spot such things they fail to notice that they are dealing with cripples and bastards

⁴⁴ At 6.495cff.

⁴⁵ For the distinction between voluntary and involuntary lies, see 2.382a-c.

τε καὶ νόθοις χρώμενοι πρὸς ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι τούτων, οἱ μὲν φίλοις, οἱ δὲ ἄρχουσι.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχει.

- b Ἐμῶν δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διευλαβητέον ὡς ἔαν μὲν ἀρτιμελεῖς τε καὶ ἀρτίφρονας ἐπὶ τοσαύτην μάθησιν καὶ τοσαύτην ἄσκησιν κομίσαντες παιδεύωμεν, ἢ τε δίκη ἡμῶν οὐ μέμβεται αὐτή, τήν τε πόλιν καὶ πολιτείαν σώσομεν, ἢ ἀλλοίους δὲ ἄγοντες ἐπὶ ταῦτα τὰναντία πάντα καὶ πράξομεν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἔτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν.

Αἰσχρὸν μεντὰν εἶη, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, εἶπον, γελοῖον δ' ἐγωγε καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἔοικα παθεῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

- c Ἐπελαθόμεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐπαίζομεν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἐντεινάμενος εἶπον. λέγων γὰρ ἅμα ἔβλεψα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, καὶ ἰδὼν προπετηλακισμένην ἀναξίως ἀγανακτήσας μοι δοκῶ καὶ ὡσπερ θυμωθεῖς τοῖς αἰτίοις σπουδαιότερον εἰπεῖν ἢ εἶπον. ἢ

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί, ἔφη, οὐκ οὖν ὡς γ' ἐμοὶ ἀκροατῆ.

- d Ἄλλ' ὡς ἐμοί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ῥήτορι. τόδε δὲ μὴ ἐπιλανθανώμεθα, ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐκλογῇ πρεσβύτας ἐξελέγομεν, ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ οὐκ ἐγχωρήσει. Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μαυθάνειν, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

in whatever circumstances they encounter them, whether among their friends or those in authority.”

“That is certainly the case,” he said.

“We ourselves must take great care in all these instances since, if we bring those who are sound in body and mind to study and train on such a scale and educate them, justice itself will not reproach us and we shall preserve our state and its constitution. But if we introduce other types to all this, we shall achieve the complete opposite and we shall inundate philosophy with even greater ridicule.”

“That would be a disgrace,” he said.

“It certainly would,” I said. “I think I’m the object of ridicule even now.”

“In what way?” he asked.

“I forgot we were just having fun,” I said, “and I spoke with too much intensity. While I was talking I caught sight of philosophy and seeing her so unworthily being dragged through the mire I think I was irritated and, being angry with the perpetrators, as it were, said what I said too seriously.”

“Oh no, by Zeus,” he said, “not to my ears, anyway.”

“Well, that’s how it sounded to me as the speaker,” I said. “But let’s not forget that in our earlier selection we chose older men, but in this one there will be no room for them. You know we mustn’t believe Solon when he said growing older one is capable of learning a lot⁴⁶—in fact one is even less capable of this than running; no, it is on the shoulders of the young that all the many and important tasks belong.”

“They must do,” he said.

⁴⁶ Solon fr.18 Gerber

Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν λογισμῶν τε καὶ γεωμετριῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς προπαιδείας, ἢ ἢν τῆς διαλεκτικῆς δεῖ προπαιδευθῆναι, παισὶν οὖσι χρὴ προβάλλειν, οὐχ ὡς ἐπάναγκες μαθεῖν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς διδαχῆς ποιουμένων.

Τί δῆ;

Ὅτι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν
e ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μαθάνειν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος πόνοι βία πονούμενοι χεῖρον οὐδὲν τὸ σῶμα ἀπεργάζονται, ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα.

Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη.

537 Μὴ τοίνυν βία, εἶπον, ὦ ἄριστε, τοὺς παῖδας ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἀλλὰ παίζοντας τρέφε, ἵνα καὶ μάλλον οἷός τ' ᾗς καθορᾶν ἐφ' ὃ ἕκαστος πέφυκεν.

Ἐχει ὃ λέγεις, ἔφη, λόγον.

Οὐκοῦν μνημονεύεις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἢ καὶ εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφαμεν τοὺς παῖδας εἶναι ἀκτέον ἐπὶ τῶν ἵππων θεωρούς, καὶ ἐάν πον ἀσφαλὲς ᾗ, προσακτέον ἐγγὺς καὶ γευστέον αἵματος, ὥσπερ τοὺς σκύλακας;

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

Ἐν πᾶσι δῆ τούτοις, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τοῖς τε πόνοις καὶ μαθήμασι καὶ φόβοις ὃς ἂν ἐντρεχέστατος ἀεὶ φαίνεται, εἰς ἀριθμὸν τινα ἐγκριτέον.

Ἐν τίνι, ἔφη, ἡλικία;

b Ἠνίκα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, τῶν ἀναγκαίων γυμνασίων μεθίενται· οὗτος γὰρ ὁ χρόνος, ἐάντε δύο ἐάντε τρία ἔτη γίγνηται, ἀδύνατός τι ἄλλο πράξαι· κόποι γὰρ καὶ ὕπνοι μαθήμασι πολέμιοι. καὶ ἅμα μία καὶ αὕτη

“For a start then we must introduce them to arithmetic and geometry while they are young, and they must be taught all the preliminaries before they tackle dialectic, without making them learn the system of education compulsorily.”

“What do you mean?”

“No free man should learn any subject under forced labor,” I said. “While physical exertion undertaken by force has no adverse effect on the body, any exercise forced on the soul has no lasting value.”

“True,” he said.

“So don’t bring your youngsters up by force in their studies,” I said, “but in a playful way so that you are in a better position also to observe what the natural abilities of each pupil are.”

“What you say makes sense,” he said.

“So do you remember,” I asked, “that we also said we should take the youngsters to war to watch on horseback and, supposing it was safe, they should be taken in close and have a taste of blood, like puppies?”⁴⁷

“I do,” he said.

“Indeed,” I said, “in all these circumstances, in hard work, learning, or fear, whoever appears to be constantly at the ready must be enrolled into one of the units.”

“At what age?” he asked.

“When they give up their compulsory physical training, as it’s impossible for them during this period, whether it’s two or three years, to accomplish anything else. As you know, fatigue and sleep are the enemies of study. At the

⁴⁷ At 5.466e–67e.

τῶν βασάνων οὐκ ἐλαχίστη, τίς ἢ ἕκαστος ἐν τοῖς
 γυμνασίοις φανέεται.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἔφη.

Μετὰ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκ τῶν
 εἰκοσιετῶν οἱ προκριθέντες τιμὰς τε μείζους τῶν ἄλ-
 c λων οἴσονται, τά τε χύδην μαθήματα παισὶν ἐν τῇ
 παιδείᾳ γενόμενα τούτοις συνακτέον εἰς σύνοψιν οἰ-
 κειότητος τε ἀλλήλων τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ τῆς τοῦ
 ὄντος φύσεως.

Μόνη γοῦν, εἶπεν, ἢ τοιαύτη μάθησις βέβαιος, ἐν
 οἷς ἢ ἂν ἐγγένηται.

Καὶ μεγίστη γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πείρα διαλεκτικῆς
 φύσεως καὶ μή· ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικός διαλεκτικός, ὁ
 δὲ μὴ οὐ.

Συνοίκομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει σε ἐπισκοποῦντα
 d οἱ ἂν μάλιστα τοιοῦτοι ἐν αὐτοῖς ὧσι καὶ μόνιμοι μὲν
 ἐν μαθήμασι, μόνιμοι δ' ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
 νομίμοις, τούτους αὖ, ἐπειδὴν τὰ τριάκοντα ἔτη ἐκ-
 βαίνωσιν, ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων προκρινάμενον εἰς μεί-
 ζους τε τιμὰς καθιστάναι καὶ σκοπεῖν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ
 διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει βασανίζοντα τίς ὀμμάτων καὶ
 τῆς ἄλλης αἰσθήσεως δυνατὸς μεθιέμενος ἐπ' αὐτὸ τὸ
 ὄν μετ' ἀληθείας ἵεσθαι. καὶ ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλῆς
 φυλακῆς ἔργον, ὦ ἑταῖρε.

Τί μάλιστα; ἦ δ' ὅς.

e Οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ νῦν περὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι
 κακὸν γιγνόμενον ὅσον γίγνεται;

same time, too, one of the tests, and itself not the least important, is what sort of person each one will prove to be in their physical exercises."

"Of course it is," he said.

"After this time," I said, "those selected from the twenty-year-olds will win greater honors than the rest; in fact the lessons these children received indiscriminately during their education must be brought together to give an overview of the relationship of all their other studies to each other as well as of the nature of reality."

"This kind of learning, at any rate," he said, "is the only one which remains secure in those who receive it."

"It's also the best test," I said, "for whether one has an aptitude for dialectic or not. For he who can take a unified view can handle dialectic: he who can't, cannot."

"I agree," he said.

"These are the qualities you'll want to look out for among those who are particularly endowed with them and have staying power in their studies, are resolute in war and the other things laid down for them. Again, when these people get into their thirties, pick out some from those already selected and give them higher responsibilities and watch, using the dialectic process, and see who can dispense with the eyes and other senses and approach actual reality accompanied by truth. And that's where you'll need to be most circumspect, my friend."

"Why then especially?" he asked.

"Don't you see," I said, "what sort of damage is being done in the name of dialectic at the present?"

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

Παρανομίας που, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐμπίμπλονται.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. |

Θαυμαστὸν οὖν τι οἶει, εἶπον, πάσχειν αὐτούς, καὶ οὐ συγγιγνώσκεις;

Πῆ μάλιστα; ἔφη.

538 Οἶον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴ τις ὑποβολιμαῖος τραφείη ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν χρήμασι, πολλῶ δὲ καὶ μεγάλῳ γένει καὶ κόλαξι πολλοῖς, ἀνὴρ δὲ γενόμενος αἰσθοῖτο ὅτι οὐ τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν φασκόντων γονέων, τοὺς δὲ τῷ ὄντι γεννήσαντας μὴ εὖροι, τοῦτον ἔχεις μαντεύσασθαι πῶς ἂν διατεθείη πρὸς τε τοὺς | κόλακας καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὑποβαλλομένους ἐν ἐκείνῳ τε τῷ χρόνῳ ᾧ οὐκ ἤδει τὰ περὶ τῆς ὑποβολῆς, καὶ ἐν ᾧ αὖ ἤδει; ἢ βούλει ἐμοῦ μαντευομένου ἀκοῦσαι;

Βούλομαι, ἔφη.

Μαντεύομαι τοίνυν, εἶπον, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν τιμᾶν ἂν
b τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους δοκοῦντας ἢ τοὺς κολακεύοντας, καὶ ἦττον μὲν ἂν περιδεῖν ἐνδεεῖς τινος, ἦττον δὲ παράνομόν τι δρᾶσαι ἢ εἰπεῖν εἰς αὐτούς, ἦττον δὲ ἀπειθεῖν τὰ μεγάλα ἐκείνοις ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν, ἐν ᾧ | χρόνῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς μὴ εἰδείη.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Αἰσθόμενον τοίνυν τὸ ὄν μαντεύομαι αὖ περὶ μὲν τούτους ἀνεῖναι ἂν τὸ τιμᾶν τε καὶ σπουδάξαι, περὶ δὲ τοὺς κόλακας ἐπιτεῖναι, καὶ πείθεσθαι τε αὐτοῖς
c διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον καὶ ζῆν ἂν ἤδη κατ' ἐκείνους,

"What do you mean, damage?" he asked.

"I think those practicing it are filled with lawlessness," I said.

"Indeed they are," he said.

"So do you think there is anything surprising in what is happening to them, and won't you overlook this?"

"In what way in particular?" he asked.

"For example," I said, "if some suppositious child were brought up surrounded by material goods in a large distinguished family with many flatterers, and when he became an adult, he became aware that he was not the son of his supposed parents, and could find no way of discovering who his real parents were. Can you guess what his attitude would be toward these flatterers and those who substituted him both at the time when he knew nothing about the exchanging of children and again now that he does? Would you like to hear what my guess is?"

"I would," he said.

"My guess is," I said, "he would respect his supposed father and mother and the rest of the household more than the flatterers, and he would be less likely to overlook their needs, less likely to do or say anything improper to them, less likely to disobey them rather than the flatterers in important matters, during the time he was unaware of the truth."

"That sounds reasonable," he said.

"Now, on the other hand, on realizing how the situation really is, my guess is that he would lose his respect for them and no longer take them seriously, but he would take more interest in his flatterers, pay far more heed to them than before, and he would now begin to live as they do,

συνόντα αὐτοῖς ἀπαρακαλύπτως, πατὸς δὲ ἐκείνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ποιουμένων οἰκείων, εἰ μὴ πάνυ εἴη φύσει ἐπιεικής, μέλειν τὸ μηδέν.

Πάντ', ἔφη, λέγεις οἰάπερ ἂν γένοιτο. ἀλλὰ πῆ πρὸς τοὺς ἰ ἀπτομένους τῶν λόγων αὕτη φέρει ἢ εἰκόν;

Τῆδε. ἔστι που ἡμῖν δόγματα ἐκ παίδων περὶ δικαίων καὶ καλῶν, ἐν οἷς ἐκτεθράμμεθα ὥσπερ ὑπὸ γονεῦσι, πειθαρχοῦντές τε καὶ τιμῶντες αὐτά.

Ἔστι γάρ.

d Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλα ἐναντία τούτων ἐπιτηδεύματα ἡδονὰς ἔχοντα, ἃ κολακεύει μὲν ἡμῖν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἔλκει ἐφ' αὐτά, πείθει δ' οὐ τοὺς καὶ ὀπιοῦν μετρίους· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα τιμῶσι τὰ πάτρια καὶ ἐκείνοις πειθαρχοῦσιν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα. ἰ

e Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἐλθὸν ἐρώτημα ἔρηται· Τί ἔστι τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκριναμένου ὁ τοῦ νομοθέτου ἤκουεν ἐξελέγχῃ ὁ λόγος, καὶ πολ-
λάκις καὶ πολλαχῆ ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν καταβάλλῃ ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἦγεν ἐν τιμῆ, μετὰ τοῦτο τί οἶει ποιήσῃ αὐτὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τιμῆς τε πέρι καὶ πειθαρχίας; ἰ

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, μήτε τιμᾶν ἔτι ὁμοίως μήτε πείθεσθαι.

Ἄταν οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε ταῦτα ἡγήται τίμαι καὶ οἰκεία ὥσπερ πρὸ τοῦ, τά τε ἀληθῆ μὴ εὐρίσκη, ἔστι

associate with them unashamedly and show no concern for his father and the others who are supposedly his family, unless he was by nature of very high integrity."

"Everything would be likely to happen as you say," he said, "but what bearing does this illustration have on those who are taking up argument?"

"It's this: I'm sure we all have beliefs we've picked up in childhood about what is just and good, in which we've been brought up, as we are with our parents; we obey and respect them."

"Yes, we do."

"By the same token we have other habits which are the opposite of these, yet have elements of pleasures in them which flatter our soul and attract it to them, but which don't persuade those who are self-restrained in any way—they honor and obey their traditional beliefs."

"That's right."

"What does this mean, then?" I asked. "Whenever such a person as this comes up against the question 'What is the fine?' and he gives an answer he has heard from the law-giver, reason proves him wrong, and when he is refuted frequently in various situations, he retreats to the view that it is no more fair than shameful, and similarly as regards just, good, and what he holds in the highest respect. After this what do you think he will do about honor and obedience in these matters?"

"It has to be that he'll no longer respect and obey them in the same way," he said.

"When therefore he does not hold any respect for these things and considers them part of himself as he did before, and in fact cannot find the truth, is there any other kind

539 πρὸς ὁποῖον βίον ἄλλον ἢ τὸν κολακεύοντα εἰκότως
προσχωρήσεται;

Οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη.

Παράνομος δῆ, οἶμαι, δόξει γεγονέναι ἐκ νομίμου.

Ἀνάγκη. |

Οὐκοῦν, ἔφη, εἰκὸς τὸ πάθος τῶν οὕτω λόγων
ἀπτομένων καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, πολλῆς συγγνώμης
ἄξιον;

Καὶ ἐλέου γ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἴνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς
τριακοντούτας σοι, εὐλαβουμένῳ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν
λόγων ἀπτέον;

Καὶ μάλ', ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ μία μὲν εὐλάβεια αὕτη συχνή, τὸ μὴ
b νέους ὄντας αὐτῶν γεύεσθαι; οἶμαι γάρ σε οὐ λελη-
θέναι ὅτι οἱ μειρακίσκοι, ὅταν τὸ πρῶτον λόγων γεύ-
ωνται, ὡς παιδιᾷ αὐτοῖς καταχρῶνται, ἀεὶ εἰς ἀντι-
λογίαν χρώμενοι, καὶ μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἐξελέγχοντας
αὐτοὶ ἄλλους ἐλέγχουσι, | χαίροντες ὥσπερ σκυλάκια
τῷ ἔλκειν τε καὶ σπαράττειν τῷ λόγῳ τοὺς πλησίον
αεί.

Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

c Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ πολλοὺς μὲν αὐτοὶ ἐλέγξωσιν, ὑπὸ
πολλῶν δὲ ἐλεγχθῶσι, σφόδρα καὶ ταχὺ ἐμπίπτουσιν

of life he can reasonably resort to other than the one that appeals to his vanity?"

"None," he said.

"I think from being law-abiding he'll appear to have turned lawless."

"That must be so."

"Is this, then, likely to happen to those who take up arguments in this way, and do they deserve a good deal of indulgence, as I was saying just now?"

"Yes, and compassion," he said.

"So that means that to stop this compassion arising for the thirty-year-olds, you'll have to exercise very great care when they apply themselves to argument?"

"Indeed we will," he said.

"Surely this is the one constant concern: they should not taste the subject when they are young. You know I'm sure it hasn't escaped your notice that whenever the young get their first taste of argument they treat it as a plaything and always use it for disputation⁴⁸ and imitate those who prove them wrong by cross-examining others themselves,⁴⁹ and like puppies they enjoy constantly tugging at and tearing to shreds all those who come near them with argument."

"Yes, they go right over the top," he said.

"And so when they prove many people wrong, and they themselves are proved wrong by many, sure enough they

⁴⁸ *antilogia* = "disputation" or "eristic," i.e., arguing to win, as opposed to dialectic; see above, 5.454a-b.

⁴⁹ As Plato's S. claimed his followers did, at *Ap.* 23c.; S. would, of course, have claimed that his young followers should ideally be practicing dialectic rather than eristic.

εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἡγέισθαι ὧν περ πρότερον· καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὸ ὄλον φιλοσοφίας [πέρι] εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους διαβέβληνται.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη. |

Ὁ δὲ δὴ πρεσβύτερος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης
μανίας οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοι μετέχειν, τὸν δὲ διαλέγεσθαι
ἐθέλοντα καὶ σκοπεῖν τάληθές μᾶλλον μιμήσεται ἢ
τὸν παιδιᾶς χάριν παίζοντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα, καὶ αὐ-
d τός τε μετριώτερος ἔσται καὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα τιμιώτε-
ρον ἀντὶ ἀτιμοτέρου ποιήσει.

Ὅρθως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ προειρημένα τούτου ἐπ' εὐλαβείᾳ
πάντα προείρηται, τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ
στασίμους οἷς τις | μεταδώσει τῶν λόγων, καὶ μὴ ὡς
νῦν ὁ τυχὼν καὶ οὐδὲν προσήκων ἔρχεται ἐπ' αὐτό;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἄρκει δὴ ἐπὶ λόγων μεταλήψει μείναι ἐνδελεχῶς
καὶ συντόνως μηδὲν ἄλλο πράττοντι, ἀλλ' ἀντιστρό-
φως γυμναζομένῳ τοῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα γυμνασίοις, ἔτη
διπλάσια ἢ τότε;

e Ἐξ, ἔφη, ἢ τέτταρα λέγεις;

Ἄμελει, εἶπον, πέντε θές. μετὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καταβι-
βαστέοι ἔσονται σοι εἰς τὸ σπήλαιον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο,
καὶ ἀναγκαστέοι | ἄρχειν τά τε περὶ τὸν πόλεμον καὶ
ὄσαι νέων ἀρχαί, ἵνα μηδ' ἐμπειρία ὑστερῶσι τῶν
540 ἄλλων· καὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τούτοις βασανιστέοι εἰ ἐμμε-

quickly fall into violently disregarding what they accepted before, and as a result of all this they themselves indeed, and the whole of philosophy, are brought into disrepute in the eyes of others."

"Very true," he said.

"But the older man," I said, "would want to have no part in such madness, but will emulate the one who wishes to engage in a dialectical discussion and inquire after the truth rather than the one who plays about and is contentious for the fun of it, and himself will be more self-controlled and will make his pursuit more highly regarded instead of disparaged."

"That's right," he said.

"So then does that mean that everything we said before was said in view of the need for caution over this point: that the character of those with whom one will engage in arguments is to be orderly and stable, and not, as we do these days, have anyone approach the subject who comes across it by chance and is quite unsuited to it?"

"That is very much so," he said.

"Indeed, to participate in philosophical discussion, is it enough to stick with it and concentrate unremittingly to the exclusion of everything else, training in it in a way as a counterpart to physical exercises, but for twice the length of time spent previously?"

"Do you mean six years or four?" he asked.

"It doesn't really matter," I said. "Let's make it five, because after this you'll have to take them back down into that cave again, and they'll have to take up military posts and other positions of command suitable for the young in order not to fall behind the rest in experience. And a further point: they'll have to be tested to see if they are reso-

νοῦσιν ἐλκόμενοι πανταχόσε ἢ τι καὶ παρακινή-
σουσι.

Χρόνον δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, πόσον τοῦτον τίθης;

Πεντεκαίδεκα ἔτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. γενομένων δὲ πεντηκον-
τουτῶν | τοὺς διασωθέντας καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας πάντα
πάντη ἐν ἔργοις τε καὶ ἐπιστήμαις πρὸς τέλος ἤδη
ἀκτέον, καὶ ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον, καὶ
ιδόντας τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό, παραδείγματι χρωμένους
b ἐκείνῳ, καὶ πόλιν καὶ ιδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν τὸν
ἐπίλοιπον βίον ἐν μέρει ἐκάστους, τὸ μὲν πολὺ πρὸς
φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβοντας, ὅταν δὲ τὸ μέρος ἦκη, πρὸς
πολιτικοῖς ἐπιταλαιπωροῦντας καὶ ἄρχοντας ἐκάστους
τῆς πόλεως ἕνεκα, | οὐχ ὡς καλόν τι ἀλλ' ὡς ἀναγκαῖον
πράττοντας, καὶ οὕτως ἄλλους αἰεὶ παιδεύσαντας τοι-
ούτους, ἀντικαταλιπόντας τῆς πόλεως φύλακας, εἰς
μακάρων νήσους ἀπιόντας οἰκεῖν· μνημεῖα δ' αὐτοῖς
c καὶ θυσίας τὴν πόλιν δημοσίᾳ ποιεῖν, εἰ καὶ ἡ Πυ-
θία συναυραῖη, ὡς δαίμοσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς εὐδαίμοσί
τε καὶ θείοις.

Παγκάλους, ἔφη, τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ὦ Σώκρατες,
ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς ἀπείργασαι. |

Καὶ τὰς ἀρχούσας γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων· μηδὲν

⁵⁰ *paradeigma*. See above, 529d7 ⁵¹ A key point, constantly reiterated: see e.g., 1.346e–47d, 520e–21a. For the issue of the compulsion on guardians to take their turn at ruling, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (i).

⁵² On *daimones*, see above, Book 5 n. 51.

lute when pulled in every direction or if they deviate in any way.”

“How long a time do you set for this?” he asked.

“Fifteen years,” I said, “and when they get to fifty those who have come through all this and have altogether proved their excellence throughout in their work and understanding must now be brought to the final goal and be made to raise the radiance of their soul and look at that which brings light to all. And when they have seen the Good itself, using that as their model⁵⁰ they must each in turn put the state and its inhabitants and themselves in order, spending the majority of their time on philosophy, but when their turn comes, they must each labor at their civic duties, govern in the interests of the state, and carry out their work not as something fine but as something essential.⁵¹ They must constantly educate others to be like them and leave behind guardians for the state and then go off and dwell in the Islands of the Blessed. The state shall put up memorials to them at public expense and hold sacrifices, and, revere them as daimons⁵² if the Pythian priestess also sanctions it; if not, then as blessed and godlike.”

“Socrates, like a sculptor you have created exceedingly fine rulers,”⁵³ he said.

“That includes female rulers,⁵⁴ Glaucon,” I said. “Don’t

⁵³ For the image, see 2.361d4–6. ⁵⁴ Masculine linguistic forms for rulers have been used throughout *Republic* (as was common Greek practice: see Glaucon’s *archontas*, c3). S. reminds his audience that they agreed that women (feminine participle, *archousas*, c5) of suitable quality are also to be included among the guardians (see above, 5.451dff.). On the issue of women rulers, see vol. 1, Introduction to Books I–V, section 2 (iv).

γάρ τι οὔτου με περὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰρηκέναι μᾶλλον ἢ εἶρηκα ἢ καὶ περὶ γυναικῶν, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῶν ἱκαναὶ τὰς φύσεις ἐγγίγνωνται.

Ὁρθῶς, ἔφη, εἶπερ ἴσα γε πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς διήλθομεν.

- d Τί οὖν; ἔφη· συγχωρεῖτε περὶ τῆς πόλεως τε καὶ πολιτείας μὴ παντάπασιν ἡμᾶς εὐχὰς εἰρηκέναι, ἀλλὰ χαλεπὰ μὲν, δυνατὰ δέ πη, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλη ἢ εἶρηται, ὅταν οἱ ὡς ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι δυνάσται, ἢ πλείους ἢ εἷς, ἐν πόλει γενόμενοι τῶν μὲν νῦν τιμῶν καταφρονήσωσιν, ἢ ἡγησάμενοι ἀνελευθέρους εἶναι καὶ οὐδενὸς ἀξίας, τὸ δὲ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι
- e καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τούτου τιμὰς, μέγιστον δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖοτάτον τὸ δίκαιον, καὶ τούτῳ δὴ ὑπηρετοῦντές τε καὶ αὐξοῦντες αὐτὸ διασκευωρήσονται τὴν ἑαυτῶν πόλιν;

Πῶς; ἔφη.

- 541 Ὅσοι μὲν ἂν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρεσβύτεροι τυγχάνωσι δεκετῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, πάντας ἐκπέμφωσιν εἰς τοὺς ἀγρούς, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας αὐτῶν παραλαβόντες ἐκτὸς τῶν νῦν ἡθῶν, ἃ καὶ οἱ γοιῆς ἔχουσι, θρέψωνται ἐν τοῖς σφετέροις τρόποις καὶ νόμοις, οἷσιν οἷοις διεληλύθαμεν τότε· καὶ οὕτω τάχιστα τε καὶ ἰρᾶστα πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν, ἣν ἐλέγομεν, καταστᾶσαν αὐτὴν τε εὐδαιμονήσειν καὶ τὸ ἔθνος ἐν ᾧ ἂν ἐγγένηται πλείστα ὀνήσειν;

- b Πολύ γ', ἔφη· καὶ ὡς ἂν γένοιτο, εἶπερ ποτὲ γίγνοιτο, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εὖ εἰρηκέναι.

imagine that what I said referred to men rather than those women who are born with the requisite attributes.”

“That’s right,” he said, “if, as we discussed, they’re going to share everything equally with the men.”

“What does this mean, then?” I said. “Do you agree that what we have said about our state and its constitution is no idle dream which, though difficult, is possible in a way, and in no other way than we described: when one or more of those who are truly philosophers are in power?⁵⁵ And once in the state, they will look down on present-day honors thinking them to be illiberal and worthless, but they will value the right way the most highly along with those honors that derive from it: but the greatest and most essential will be justice, and by ministering to this and fostering it they will set their state in order won’t they?”

“How will they do that?” he asked.

“All those in the state who happen to be more than ten years old,” I said, “let them send them all out into the fields, but let them take over their children and keep them away from the traditions which their parents hold and bring them up according to their own ways and customs, these being those we have discussed before. And so this is the quickest and easiest way to establish the state and its constitution we have been talking about, make it successful and greatly benefit the people who come to be in it, can’t we?”

“Certainly,” he said, “and I think, Socrates, you have given an excellent description of how the state would come into being if it were ever possible!”⁵⁶

⁵⁵ See 6.499b.

⁵⁶ For discussion of how far Plato envisaged the state as practically realizable, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (iii).

REPUBLIC

Οὐκοῦν ἄδη ἤδη, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἔχουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι
περί τε τῆς πόλεως ταύτης καὶ τοῦ ὁμοίου ταύτη
ἀνδρός; δῆλος γάρ που καὶ οὗτος οἶον φήσομεν δεῖν
αὐτὸν εἶναι. |

Δῆλος, ἔφη· καὶ ὅπερ ἐρωτᾶς, δοκεῖ μοι τέλος
ἔχειν.

BOOK VII

“Are we now satisfied with our discussion about this state and the man who resembles it?” I said. “Because I think it’s clear he must be as we described him.”

“Clearly,” he said, “and to answer your question, I think we’ve reached the end.”

Η

543 Εἶεν ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὁμολόγηται, ὧ Γλαύκων, τῇ μελλούσῃ ἄκρως οἰκείν πόλει κοινὰς μὲν γυναικάς, κοινούς δὲ παῖδας εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν παιδείαν, ὡσαύτως δὲ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα κοινὰ ἐν πολέμῳ τε καὶ εἰρήνῃ, βασιλέας δὲ αὐτῶν εἶναι | τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον γεγονότας ἀρίστους.

Ἔμολόγηται, ἔφη.

b Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάδε συνεχωρήσαμεν, ὡς, ὅταν δὴ καταστῶσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἄγοντες τοὺς στρατιώτας κατοικιοῦσιν εἰς οἰκήσεις οἷας προείπομεν, ἴδιον μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ἐχούσας, κοινὰς δὲ πᾶσι πρὸς δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις οἰκήσεσι, καὶ τὰς κτήσεις, εἰ μνημονεύεις, | διωμολογησάμεθά που οἷαι ἔσονται αὐτοῖς.

Ἄλλὰ μνημονεύω, ἔφη, ὅτι γε οὐδὲν οὐδένα ὀόμεθα δεῖν κεκτῆσθαι ὧν νῦν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὥσπερ δὲ ἀθλητάς τε πολέμον καὶ φύλακας, μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς δεχομένους εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν τῆν εἰς ταῦτα τροφήν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτῶν τε δεῖν καὶ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.

¹ Strictly speaking, these social conditions apply only to the two classes of guardians and auxiliaries as far as *Republic* is con-

BOOK VIII

“Well then, Glaucon, this is what’s been agreed: in the state that is to be exceedingly well run, the women and children are held in common and the whole of the children’s education and their activities likewise will be shared in both war and peace,¹ and their kings are those who naturally excel in philosophy and war.”

“Yes, that was agreed,” he said.

“And furthermore we agreed that when the rulers have been appointed they shall lead the soldiers and settle them in the dwellings we have prescribed which have no privacy for anyone, but are shared by all. Again in addition to accommodation of this type we also agreed, if you recall, what kind of possessions they were to have.”

“Well, I do remember we thought that none of them were to have any of the possessions that those elsewhere have these days,” he said, “but that, as people trained in warfare and guardians, they should receive from the rest a year’s upkeep for their duties to provide them with the necessaries, and they must look after their own affairs as well as those of the state.”²

cerned. But at *Leg.* 5.739c, Plato appears to be applying the principle to the whole of society.

² Discussed at 3.415d6–20a7.

Ὅρθως, ἔφην, λέγεις. ἀλλ' ἄγ', ἐπειδὴ τοῦτ' ἀπετελέ-
σαμεν, | ἀναμνησθῶμεν πόθην δεῦρο ἐξετραπόμεθα,
ἵνα πάλιν τὴν αὐτὴν ἴωμεν.

Ὅν χαλεπὸν, ἔφη. σχεδὸν γάρ, καθάπερ νῦν, ὡς
διεληλυθὸς περὶ τῆς πόλεως τοὺς λόγους ἐποιοῦ, λέ-
γων ὡς ἀγαθὴν μὲν τὴν τοιαύτην, οἷαν τότε διῆλθες,
d τιθείης πόλιν, καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν ἐκείνη ὅμοιον, καὶ ταῦτα,
544 ὡς ἔοικας, καλλίω ἔτι ἔχων εἰπεῖν πόλιν τε καὶ ἄνδρα.
ἀλλ' οὖν δὴ τὰς ἄλλας ἡμαρτημένας ἔλεγες, εἰ αὕτη
ὀρθή. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πολιτειῶν ἔφησθα, ὡς μνημο-
νεύω, τέτταρα εἶδη εἶναι, ὧν καὶ περὶ λόγον ἄξιον εἶη
ἔχειν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτῶν τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τοὺς ἐκείναις
αὐ³ | ὁμοίους, ἵνα πάντας αὐτοὺς ἰδόντες, καὶ ἀνομολο-
γησάμενοι τὸν ἄριστον καὶ τὸν κάκιστον ἄνδρα, ἐπι-
σκευαίμεθα εἰ ὁ ἄριστος εὐδαιμονέστατος καὶ ὁ
κάκιστος ἀθλιώτατος, ἢ ἄλλως ἔχει καὶ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου
b τίνας λέγοις τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας, ἐν τούτῳ ὑπέλαβε
Πολέμαρχός τε καὶ Ἀδείμαντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ σὺ ἀνα-
λαβὼν τὸν λόγον δεῦρ' ἀφίξαι.

Ὅρθότατα, εἶπον, ἐμνημόνευσας.

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ὥσπερ παλαιστής, τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν
πάρεχε, | καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐμοῦ ἐρομένου πειρῶ εἰπεῖν
ἅπερ τότε ἔμελλες λέγειν.

Ἐάνπερ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύνωμαι.

³ This point is the end of Book 4 and the beginning of Book 5 (445c-e and 449a7ff.), where S. is about to enumerate the "de-

"You're right," I said, "but come on now, since we've finished with all that, let's go back to the point from which we digressed so we can trace the same path again."³

"That's not difficult," he said, "since you were arguing then, much the same as now, on the assumption you had finished the description of the state, saying that you would argue that a state of a kind such as you explained before is good and the man who is like it likewise, even though it seems as if you had an even finer state and man to talk about in these respects. Yet it followed, you were saying, that if this state were right, the rest were wrong. Also I remember you said that, of the remaining constitutions, there were four kinds worthwhile discussing and looking at their shortcomings as well as at the citizens who share their characteristics, in order that when we have looked at them all and agreed on the best and the worst inhabitant we can investigate whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched, or whether this is not the case at all. Then when I asked what you would say these four constitutions were, that's when Polemarchus and Adeimantus came in, and so you took up the argument and that's how we got to this point."

"Your memory is spot on!" I said.

"Well then, like a wrestler, take the same hold again and when I ask the question try and tell me what you were about to say at that point."

"If I can," I said.

ficent" constitutions. Books 5-7, into which he is "forced" by Adeimantus and Polemarchus (see Book 5 n. 1), is, in strictly formal terms, a digression, from which they now return.

Καὶ μὴν, ἣ δ' ὅς, ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀκούσαι τίνας ἔλεγεσ τὰς τέτταρας πολιτείας.

- c Οὐ χαλεπῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀκούσῃ. εἰσὶ γὰρ ἄς λέγω, αἵπερ καὶ ὀνόματα ἔχουσιν, ἣ τε ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαινουμένη, ἣ Κρητικὴ τε καὶ Λακωνικὴ αὕτη καὶ δευτέρα καὶ δευτέρως ἐπαινουμένη, καλουμένη δ' ὀλιγαρχία, | συχνῶν γέμονσα κακῶν πολιτεία· ἣ τε ταύτη διάφορος καὶ ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένη δημοκρατία, καὶ ἣ γενναία δὴ τυραννὶς καὶ πασῶν τούτων διαφεύγουσα,¹ τέταρτόν τε καὶ ἔσχατον πόλεως νόσημα.
- d ἣ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἣτις καὶ ἐν εἶδει δια φανεῖ τιμὴ κείται; δυναστεία γὰρ καὶ ὠνηταὶ βασιλείαι καὶ τοιαῦταί τινες πολιτεῖαι μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὖροι δ' ἂν τις αὐτὰς οὐκ ἐλάττους περὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἢ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Πολλὰ γοῦν καὶ ἄτοποι, ἔφη, λέγονται. |

- Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων εἶδη τοσαῦτα ἀνάγκη τρόπων εἶναι, ὅσαπερ καὶ πολιτειῶν; ἣ οἶε ἐκ δρυὸς ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ ἐκ τῶν ἡθῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, e ἃ ἂν ὥσπερ ῥέψαντα τᾶλλα ἐφελκύσῃται;

Οὐδαμῶς ἐγωγ', ἔφη, ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐντεῦθεν.

¹ διαφεύγουσα ADF: διαφέρουσα Stob.

⁴ I.e., kingship. The Laconian and Cretan constitutions were far from recognizing popular rights and so "admired by a majority"; they are, however, said by S., in the guise of "The Laws" at

"And furthermore," he said, "I'm keen to hear for myself what you were saying these four constitutions are."

"You'll understand quite easily," I said, "as the four I mean have names in common use: the first is admired by a majority of people, this is the one used in Crete and Laconia;⁴ the second is also the second most admired and known as oligarchy, a constitution full of bad points; the one which is both opposed to this and next in order is democracy; and tyranny, noble indeed, and leaving all others behind,⁵ is the fourth and ultimate disorder in the state. Or do you have any other concept of a constitution which has a distinct character of its own? I imagine there are ruling families and kingships that can be bought and other such constitutions somewhere in between all these,⁶ and one could find just as many among foreigners as among the Greeks."

"There are indeed a lot of strange ones you hear talked about," he said.

"Then do you know," I asked, "there must be as many kinds of human beings as there are constitutions? Or do you think constitutions grow somewhere 'from oak' or 'from stone,'⁷ but not from the practices of those who live in states which as it were tip the scales and drag everything with them?"

"In my view they come from nowhere but the place you just mentioned," he said.

Cri. 52e, to be his own model of good government (see also *Xen. Mem.* 3.5.15).

⁵ Clearly ironic (see also 562a4-5).

⁶ As enumerated by Aristotle, *Pol.* 4. 1288bff.

⁷ *Hom. Il.* 22.126, *Od.* 19.163.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πέντε, καὶ αἱ τῶν ιδιωτῶν κατασκευαὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πέντε ἂν εἶεν. |

Τί μήν;

Τὸν μὲν δὴ τῇ ἀριστοκρατίᾳ ὅμοιον διεληλύθαμεν ἤδη, ὃν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον ὀρθῶς φαμεν εἶναι.

545 Διεληλύθαμεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διυτέον τοὺς χείρους, τὸν φιλόνομον τε καὶ φιλότιμον, κατὰ τὴν Λακωνικὴν ἐστῶτα πολιτείαν, καὶ ὀλιγαρχικὸν αὖ καὶ δημοκρατικὸν καὶ τὸν τυραννικόν, ἵνα τὸν | ἀδικώτατον ἰδόντες ἀντιθῶμεν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ καὶ ἡμῖν τελέα ἢ σκέψις ἦ, πῶς ποτε ἢ ἄκρατος δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν τὴν ἄκρατον ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας τε περὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ
b ἀθλιότητος, ἵνα ἢ Θρασυμάχῳ πειθόμενοι διώκωμεν ἀδικίαν ἢ τῷ νῦν προφαινομένῳ λόγῳ δικαιοσύνην;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτω ποιητέον.

Ἄρ' οὖν, | ὥσπερ ἠρξάμεθα ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις πρότερον σκοπεῖν τὰ ἦθη ἢ ἐν τοῖς ιδιώταις, ὡς ἐναργέστερον ὄν, καὶ νῦν οὕτω πρῶτον μὲν τὴν φιλότιμον σκεπτέον πολιτείαν—ὄνομα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω λεγόμενον ἄλλο· ἢ τιμοκρατίαν ἢ τιμαρχίαν αὐτὴν κλητέον—
c πρὸς δὲ ταύτην τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα σκεψόμεθα, ἔπειτα ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ ἄνδρα ὀλιγαρχικόν, αὐθις δὲ εἰς δημοκρατίαν ἀποβλέψαντες θεασόμεθα ἄνδρα δημο-

⁸ On the assumption of parity between the types of constitution and the human soul, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (ii).

“So if there are five kinds of state then, there would also be five types of soul among the citizens?”⁸

“Certainly.”

“Indeed, we’ve already discussed the man who shares the characteristics of the aristocratic state whom we rightly said was good and just.”

“We have.”

“Are we then to go through the next stage and look at those who are inferior, the contentious and ambitious type corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and again look at the oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical type so we can identify the most unjust and set him against the most just; and our examination will be complete when we discover how perfect justice stands in relation to pure injustice in the matter of the possession of happiness and misery, so that we can either heed Thrasymachus and pursue injustice,⁹ or, the way our discussion is now developing, justice?”

“Without question that’s the thing to do,” he said.

“Are we then to examine first the characteristics of our constitutions as we did at the beginning, before we look for them in individuals, on the grounds that it’s clearer that way,¹⁰ and so now we must first look at the constitution based on love of honor? I can’t think of any other name in common use to give it other than timocracy or timarchy. In relation to this we shall examine the man of this type. Then oligarchy and the man of that type, and again when we’ve looked at democracy we’ll think about a person of

⁹ For Thrasymachus’ position on justice, see 1.343b–44c.

¹⁰ As argued at 2.368eff.

κρατικόν, τὸ δὲ τέταρτον εἰς τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἐλθόντες καὶ ἰδόντες, πάλιν εἰς τυραννικὴν ψυχὴν βλέποντες, πειρασόμεθα περὶ ὧν προυθέμεθα ἱκανοὶ κριταὶ γενέσθαι; |

Κατὰ λόγον γέ τοι ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνοιτο ἢ τε θέα καὶ ἡ κρίσις.

Φέρε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειρώμεθα λέγειν τίνα τρόπον τιμοκρατία γένοιτ' ἂν ἐξ ἀριστοκρατίας. ἢ
d τόδε μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι πᾶσα πολιτεία μεταβάλλει ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἔχοντος τὰς ἀρχάς, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ στάσις ἐγγένηται ὁμονοοῦντος δέ, καὶ πάνυ ὀλίγον ἦ, ἀδύνατον κινηθῆναι;

Ἔστι γὰρ οὕτω. |

Πῶς οὖν δὴ, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ πόλις ἡμῖν κινηθήσεται, καὶ πῆ στασιάζουσιν οἱ ἐπίκουροι καὶ οἱ ἄρχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους τε καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς; ἢ
e πείν ἡμῖν ὅπως δὴ πρῶτον στάσις ἔμπεσε, καὶ φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῆ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγειν;

Πῶς;

546 Ὡδέ πως. χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω συσταῶσαν· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον,

democratic characteristics. Fourth we'll come to the state ruled by the tyrant and look at that, and then again at the soul of the tyrant and we'll try to be competent judges about what we have so far proposed."

"So that means that both our observation and our judgment would develop consistently," he said.

"Come on, then," I said, "let's try and work out how timocracy would evolve from aristocracy. On the other hand, is it simply like this, that every constitution changes as a result of the actions of that element which holds power whenever revolution arises within it; but if there is general agreement, even if it's on a small scale, change is impossible?"

"That's true."

"How then will our state be stirred up, Glaucon," I said, "and in what way will our auxiliaries and rulers break into factions against each other and within themselves? Or do you want us, like Homer, to pray to the Muses to tell us 'how first revolt broke out,'¹¹ and have them speak to us in high tragic style, teasing and joking with us as if we were children, while apparently talking seriously?"

"How do you mean?"

"It goes something like this: it's difficult for a state so constituted to be thrown into disorder, but since everything that comes into being decays, not even a constitution such as ours remains for the whole of time, but it will

¹¹ A paraphrase of *Il.* 16.112–13. In attributing the following explanation to the Muses' "high tragic style, teasing and joking with us" (e1–2), Plato is possibly hinting that the mathematical detail of 546b4–c7 should not be taken too seriously (see n. 13 below).

ἀλλὰ λυθήσεται. λύσις δὲ ἦδε· οὐ μόνον φυτοῖς ἐγ-
 γείοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζώοις | φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία
 ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνεται, ὅταν περιτροπαὶ
 ἐκάστοις κύκλων περιφορὰς συνάπτωσι, βραχυβίοις
 b μὲν βραχυπόρους, ἐναντίοις δὲ ἐναντίας. γένους δὲ
 ὑμετέρου εὐγονίας τε καὶ ἀφορίας, καίπερ ὄντες
 σοφοί, οὓς ἠγεμόνας πόλεως ἐπαιδεύσασθε, οὐδὲν
 μᾶλλον λογισμῶ μετ' αἰσθήσεως τεύξονται, ἀλλὰ
 πάρεσιν αὐτοὺς καὶ γεννήσουσι παῖδάς ποτε οὐ δέον.
 ἔστι δὲ θείῳ μὲν γεννητῶ περίοδος ἣν ἀριθμὸς περι-
 λαμβάνει τέλειος, | ἀνθρωπέῳ δὲ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ ἀξήσεις
 δυνάμεναί τε καὶ δυναστευόμεναί, τρεῖς ἀποστάσεις,
 τέτταρας δὲ ὄρους λαβοῦσαι ὁμοιούντων τε καὶ ἀνο-
 c μοιούντων καὶ ἀξόντων καὶ φθινόντων, πάντα προσ-
 ἡγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν· ὧν ἐπίτριτος
 πυθμὴν πεμπάδι συζυγεῖς δύο ἀρμονίας παρέχεται
 τρεῖς ἀξηθείς, τὴν μὲν ἴσην ἰσάκις, ἑκατὸν τοσαυτάκις,
 τὴν δὲ ἰσομήκη μὲν τῇ, | προμήκη δέ, ἑκατὸν μὲν
 ἀριθμῶν ἀπὸ διαμέτρων ῥητῶν πεμπάδος, δεομένων

disintegrate. The disintegration happens like this: not only plants that grow in the ground, but also living creatures that roam the earth have times of fertility or infertility in both their soul and their body each time the revolution of their cycle is completed: those who are short-lived have a short span, and those who are long-lived the opposite. However, the class you've educated to be leaders of your state, although they may be clever, will no more achieve the periods of productiveness or sterility of your race by reasoning accompanying their sense perceptions, but will miss them and produce children at times when they should not. For the divine birth there is a cycle which a perfect number defines,¹² whereas for human beings it is the first number in which there are multiplications both of roots and of powers, comprising three intervals, and four terms causing similarity and dissimilarity, and increases and diminutions which demonstrate that all are in agreement with one another and rational. Of these factors the base number in the ratio 4:3 joined to the number 5 gives two harmonies when multiplied by three, the one equal to a square, so many times 100, the other of equal length one way, but oblong consisting on one side of 100 squares of the rational diameter of 5 each diminished by one, or 100 squares of the irrational diameter, each diminished by

¹² The "divine creature" whose birth is mentioned is the Universe (see *Tim.* 30b-d, 32d, 34a-b). The "perfect number" of the cycle, as well as the human number (see following note), was already notoriously obscure in Cicero's time (see *Epist. Ad Att.* 7.13), and Plato does not reveal it here.

ἐνὸς ἐκάστων, ἀρρήτων δὲ δυοῖν, ἑκατὸν δὲ κύβων
 τριάδος. σύμπας δὲ οὗτος ἀριθμὸς γεωμετρικός, τοι-
 d οὔτου κύριος, ἀμεινόνων τε καὶ χειρόνων γενέσεων, ἃς
 ὅταν ἀγνοήσαντες ὑμῖν οἱ φύλακες συνοικίωσιν νύμ-
 φας νυμφίοις παρὰ καιρόν, οὐκ εὐφυεῖς οὐδ' εὐτυχεῖς
 παῖδες ἔσονται ὧν καταστήσουσι μὲν τοὺς ἀρίστους
 οἱ πρότεροι, ὅμως δὲ ὄντες ἀνάξιοι, εἰς τὰς τῶν πα-
 τέρων αὖ δυνάμεις ἐλθόντες, | ἡμῶν πρῶτον ἄρξονται
 ἀμελεῖν φύλακες ὄντες, παρ' ἔλαττον τοῦ δέοντος
 ἡγησάμενοι τὰ μουσικῆς, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ γυμναστικῆς,
 e ὅθεν ἀμωσότεροι γενήσονται ὑμῖν οἱ νέοι. ἐκ δὲ τού-
 των ἄρχοντες οὐ πάνυ φυλακικοὶ καταστήσονται
 547 πρὸς τὸ δοκιμάζειν τὰ Ἡσιόδου τε καὶ τὰ παρ' ὑμῖν
 γένη, χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν καὶ

¹³ This passage, working out the somewhat contrived “nuptial number,” as it is known, is notoriously difficult to understand, and a number of interpretations have been offered. The following outlines a current consensus. For recent discussions, to which this note is indebted, see Reeve, n. ad loc; Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*, n. ad loc. A full study is Ehrhardt (“The Word of the Muses,” with bibliography). The number b5–c7 refers to is the human (as opposed to the perfect divine) geometrical number 12,960,000. In b5–c2 Plato appears to be working it out as follows: he refers to roots (*dunamenai*) with three intervals (*apostaseis*): 3, 4, and 5 are roots, and the three intervals are the roots multiplied together, i.e., $(3 \times 4 \times 5)$; powers (*dunasteuomenai*) are the increases. So one increase is $(3 \times 4 \times 5)^2$; three increases $(c3) = (3 \times 4 \times 5)$ raised to the power of 4, i.e., $(3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) \times (3 \times 4 \times 5) = 12,960,000$. “Terms of similarity and dissimilarity” (b7) are references to odd and even numbers (in Greek math-

two, and on the other side 100 cubes of 3.¹³ This whole geometrical number controls this process, namely of the better or worse types of birth. When your guardians, unaware of this, bring together brides and bridegrooms out of season, the offspring will not be of good breeding nor successful. Of these, those whom the previous generation decide are the best, even though they are not worthy of it, when they come to take over their fathers' authority, first of all will, despite being guardians, begin to pay no regard to us, attaching less value to the arts than they ought and second physical education, with the result our youngsters will be less cultured. The rulers chosen from them will prove themselves not very efficient guardians when it comes to the scrutiny of Hesiod's and your four races: gold, silver, bronze, and iron.¹⁴ When iron is mixed with silver

ematics odd numbers cause similarity and even ones dissimilarity). This is represented geometrically in two ways (c2-7): (1) as a square (c3-4) whose sides are "so many times 100," = $36 \times 100 = 3,600$, and $3,600^2 = 12,960,000$ (2) as an oblong ("100 squares of rational diameters"). The "rational diameter" of 5 is the nearest rational number to the real diameter of a square of side 5, which is $\sqrt{50} = 7$ (49 "diminished by one," = 48) (c5-6); so the longer side of the oblong is $48 \times 100 = 4,800$. The shorter side is 100 cubes of 3 (c6-7) = 2,700. $4,800 \times 2,700 = 12,960,000$. Estimates of Plato's reasons for the choice of 12,960,000 as the human geometrical number are speculative. A possible explanation is that he was relying on certain significant numbers: 100 years for the human life span (see 10.615b), 360 days in the year, the 360 degrees of the sun's path around the earth (though whether this was known in Plato's time is uncertain). So $100 \times 360 \times 360 = 12,960,000$.

¹⁴ *Op.* 109ff. For the selection, see above, 3.415a-b.

σιδηροῦν· ὁμοῦ δὲ μιγέντος σιδηροῦ ἀργυρῶ καὶ χαλκοῦ χρυσῶ ἀνομοιότης ἐγγενήσεται καὶ ἀνωμαλία ἀνάρμοστος, ἃ γενόμενα, οὗ ἂν ἐγγένηται, ἀεὶ ἢ τίκτει πόλεμον καὶ ἔχθραν. ταύτης τοι γενεᾶς χρῆ φάναί εἶναι στάσιν, ὅπου ἂν γίγνηται ἀεὶ.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη, αὐτὰς ἀποκρίνεσθαι φήσομεν.

Καὶ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη Μούσας γε οὔσας.

b Τί οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο λέγουσιν αἱ Μούσαι;

Στάσεως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, γενομένης εἰλκέτην ἄρα ἑκατέρω τὸ γενεῖ, τὸ μὲν σιδηροῦν καὶ χαλκοῦν ἐπὶ χρηματισμὸν καὶ γῆς κτήσιν καὶ οἰκίας χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου, τὸ δ' αὖ, ἢ τὸ χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν, ἅτε οὐ πενομένω ἀλλὰ φύσει ὄντε πλουσίω, τὰς ψυχὰς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν ἀρχαίαν κατάστασιν ἠγέτην βιαζομένων δὲ καὶ ἀντιτεινόντων ἀλλήλοις,

c εἰς μέσον ὠμολόγησαν γῆν μὲν καὶ οἰκίας κατανειμαμένους ιδιώσασθαι, τοὺς δὲ πρὶν φυλαττομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὡς ἐλευθέρους φίλους τε καὶ τροφείας, δουλωσάμενοι τότε περιοίκους τε καὶ οἰκέτας ἔχοντες, αὐτοὶ πολέμου τε καὶ φυλακῆς αὐτῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι. ἢ

Δοκεῖ μοι, ἔφη, αὕτη ἢ μετάβασις ἐντεῦθεν γίγνεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν μέσῳ τις ἂν εἴη ἀριστοκρατίας τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας αὕτη ἢ πολιτεία;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

¹⁵ Homer, *Il.*6.211.

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and bronze with gold, the result will be discrepancy and ill-matched inequality, and when this happens and wherever it occurs it always breeds war and hostility. Wherever this occurs we must always say that it's the dissension of 'this generation indeed.'"¹⁵

"And we shall say their answer is right," he said.

"Indeed, it has to be," I said: "they are the Muses, after all."

"So what do the Muses say next?" he asked.

"When revolution came about," I said, "each pair was then pulled in opposite directions by their type, the iron and bronze toward materialism and the acquisition of land and property, gold and silver; but the other pair, the gold and silver, inasmuch as they are not poor but naturally rich in their soul, led toward virtue and the old traditional ways. As they fought and strove against each other, as a compromise they agreed to divide up land and property and allocate it, and those who had previously been protected and regarded as free friends and maintained by them were now enslaved and treated as *perioikoi*¹⁶ and servants while they concerned themselves with warfare and protecting themselves against those they had enslaved."

"It seems to me that this is how the change began," he said.

"Do you then think that this type of constitution would lie between aristocracy and oligarchy?"

"Oh yes, certainly."

¹⁶ *perioikoi* = "those dwelling around," a term which denoted the inhabitants of towns and villages subject to Sparta and some other states (see *OCD*³, "*perioikoi*").

d Μεταβήσεται μὲν δὴ οὕτω μεταβάσα δὲ πῶς οἰκή-
 σαι; ἢ φανερόν ὅτι τὰ μὲν μιμῆσεται τὴν προτέραν
 πολιτείαν, τὰ δὲ τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἅτ' ἐν μέσῳ οὖσα,
 τὸ δέ τι καὶ αὐτῆς ἕξει ἴδιον;

Οὕτως, ἔφη. |

Οὐκοῦν τῷ μὲν τιμᾶν τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ γεωργιῶν
 ἀπέχεσθαι τὸ προπολεμοῦν αὐτῆς καὶ χειροτεχνιῶν
 καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου χρηματισμοῦ, συσσίτια δὲ κατεσκευ-
 ἀσθαι καὶ γυμναστικῆς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ πολέμου
 ἀγωνίας ἐπιμελείσθαι, πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις τὴν προ-
 τέραν μιμῆσεται;

Ναί.

e Τῷ δέ γε φοβείσθαι τοὺς σοφοὺς ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς
 ἄγειν, ἅτε οὐκέτι κεκτημένην ἀπλοῦς τε καὶ ἀτενεῖς
 τοὺς τοιούτους ἄνδρας ἀλλὰ μεικτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ θυμοει-
 δεῖς τε καὶ ἀπλουστέρους ἀποκλίνειν, τοὺς πρὸς πό-
 548 λεμον μᾶλλον πεφυκότας ἢ πρὸς εἰρήνην, καὶ τοὺς
 περὶ ταῦτα δόλους τε καὶ μηχανὰς ἐντίμως ἔχειν, καὶ
 πολεμοῦσα τὸν αἰὲ χρόνον διάγειν, αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς αὖ
 τὰ πολλὰ τῶν τοιούτων ἴδια ἕξει;

Ναί. |

Ἐπιθυμηταὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, χρημάτων οἱ τοιοῦτοι
 ἔσονται, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις, καὶ τιμῶντες
 ἀγρίως ὑπὸ σκότου χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον, ἅτε
 κεκτημένοι ταμιεῖα καὶ οἰκείους θησαυρούς, οἱ θέμε-
 νοι ἂν αὐτὰ κρύψειαν, καὶ αὖ περιβόλους οἰκήσεων,

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"This is how the transition will happen, but when it has happened, how will it be run? Or is it clear that in some respects it will mimic the former constitution, and in others an oligarchy, inasmuch as it lies in between, and yet it will also have some characteristics of its own?"

"Yes, that's what it'll be like," he said.

"Does that mean therefore that as far as their respect for the authorities goes and the fighting class's abstention from farming, manual trades, and other forms of earning a living, and in providing communal eating arrangements¹⁷ and occupying themselves with physical and military training, it will mimic the former constitution in all these respects?"

"Yes."

"But as far as its fear of bringing wise men into office goes, given that the state has no longer produced men of this type who are pure and single-minded, but mixed, it will be more favorable toward those who are both spirited and simpler people, those who are naturally predisposed to war rather than peace, and in honoring the cunning and strategy of war and spending its whole time in warfare—in these respects, for the most part, won't it be peculiar to itself?"

"Yes."

"Furthermore, people of this sort will be passionate about material wealth," I said, "like those in oligarchies, and will fiercely revere their gold and silver under cover of darkness inasmuch as they have collected storehouses and private treasures with places to deposit and hide them,

¹⁷ *sussitia* = "common messes," characteristic of the Spartan and Cretan constitutions.

b ἀτεχνῶς νεοττιὰς ἰδίας, ἐν αἷς ἀναλίσκοντες γυναιξί τε καὶ οἷς ἐθέλοιεν ἄλλοις πολλὰ ἂν δαπανῶντο.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ φειδωλοὶ χρημάτων, ἅτε τιμῶντες καὶ οὐ | φανερώς κτώμενοι, φιλαναλωταὶ δὲ ἀλλοτρίων δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ λάθρα τὰς ἡδονὰς καρπούμενοι, ὥσπερ παῖδες πατέρα τὸν νόμον ἀποδιδράσκοντες, οὐχ ὑπὸ πειθοῦς ἀλλ' ὑπὸ βίας πεπαιδευμένοι διὰ τὸ τῆς ἀλη-
c θινῆς Μούσης τῆς μετὰ λόγων τε καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἡμεληκέναι καὶ πρεσβυτέρως γυμναστικὴν μουσικῆς τετιμηκέναι.

Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, λέγεις μεμειγμένην πολιτείαν ἐκ κακοῦ τε καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. |

Μέμεικται γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἓν τι μόνον ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦν-
τος, φιλονικία καὶ φιλοτιμία.

Σφόδρα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὕτη μὲν ἡ πολιτεία οὕτω γε-
γονυῖα καὶ τοιαύτη ἂν τις εἶη, ὡς λόγῳ σχῆμα πολι-
d τείας ὑπογράψαντα μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀπεργάσασθαι διὰ τὸ ἐξαρκεῖν μὲν ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὑπογραφῆς τὸν τε δικαιοτάτον καὶ τὸν ἀδικώτατον, ἀμήχανον δὲ μήκει ἔργον εἶναι πάσας μὲν πολιτείας, πάντα δὲ ἦθη μηδὲν παραλιπόντα διελθεῖν. |

Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἔφη.

Τίς οὖν ὁ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν ἀνήρ; πῶς τε γενόμενος ποῖός τέ τις ὢν;

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and again walled up in their homes, literally private nests where they can spend and squander it on women and anyone else they choose."

"That's very true," he said.

"Similarly then they will be miserly with their money inasmuch as they revere it and do not possess it openly, but are prodigal with other people's money because of their appetites, and enjoy their pleasures in secret, fleeing the law like children who run away from their father, having been brought up, not by persuasive means, but under compulsion owing to their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of debate and philosophy, and having regarded physical activity as more important than intellectual pursuits."

"The constitution you're describing is a complete mixture of good and bad," he said.

"Yes, it is," I said, "and as a result of the dominance of the spirited element, one thing only stands out in it most clearly: contentiousness and ambition."

"Very much so," he said.

"For this reason," I said, "this constitution with this kind of origin would be of this sort, a brief sketch of a constitution in words, but not worked out in detail, because it is enough to see, even from the sketch, the most just and the most unjust person, as it would be a pointlessly long exercise to examine all constitutions, all dispositions, leaving nothing aside."

"And rightly so," he said.

"Who is the man, then, that fits in with this kind of constitution? What are his origins and what kind of person is he?"

Οἶμαι μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ἐγγύς τι αὐτὸν Γλαύκωνος τουτουὶ τείνειν ἔνεκά γε φιλονικίας.

e "Ἴσως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦτό γε· ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖ τάδε οὐ κατὰ τοῦτον πεφυκέναι.

Τὰ ποῖα;

549 Ἀνθαδέστερόν τε δεῖ αὐτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑποαμουσότερον, φιλόμουσον δέ, καὶ φιλήκοον μὲν, | ῥητορικὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς. καὶ δούλοις μὲν ἄν τις ἄγριος εἴη ὁ τοιοῦτος, οὐ καταφρονῶν δούλων, ὥσπερ ὁ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένος, ἐλευθέρους δὲ ἡμέρος, ἀρχόντων δὲ σφόδρα ὑπήκοος, φίλαρχος δὲ καὶ φιλότιμος, οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγειν ἀξιώων ἄρχειν | οὐδ' ἀπὸ τοιούτου οὐδενός, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ ἔργων τῶν τε πολεμικῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ πολεμικά, φιλογυμναστής τέ τις ὢν καὶ φιλόθηρος.

"Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο τὸ ἦθος ἐκείνης τῆς πολιτείας.

b Οὐκοῦν καὶ χρημάτων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τοιοῦτος νέος μὲν ὢν καταφρονοῖ ἄν, ὅσῳ δὲ πρεσβύτερος γίγνοιτο, μᾶλλον αἰεὶ ἀσπάζοιτο ἂν τῷ τε μετέχειν τῆς τοῦ φιλοχρημάτου φύσεως καὶ μὴ εἶναι εἰλικρινῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν διὰ τὸ ἀπολειφθῆναι τοῦ ἀρίστου φύλακος; |

Τίνος; ἦ δ' ὅς ὁ Ἀδείμαντος.

Λόγου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μουσικῇ κεκραμένον· ὅς μόνος

¹⁸ For Glaucon's *philonikia*, see Xen. *Mem.* 3.6. A dramatically adroit way of moving the conversation back to Adeimantus

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"I think," said Adeimantus, "he resembles our friend Glaucon here pretty closely, at least as far contentiousness is concerned."¹⁸

"Possibly in that respect," I said, "but there are other respects in which he is not like him."

"What are they?"

"He has to be more willful," I said, "and somewhat less familiar with culture, fond of the arts and listening to discourse, but by no means a rhetorician. And while such a person would be harsh on slaves, instead of looking down on them, as someone who has been quite well educated does, he would be civil to free men and very respectful to those in authority, keen to hold office and ambitious, one who does not think he should hold office because of his ability with words, or anything else of this sort, but because of his prowess in war and his success as a military man, as well as being a keen athlete and huntsman."

"That is certainly the character for that kind of constitution," he said.

"And likewise," I said, "when such a one is young he would look down on material goods, but the older he got he would be gradually more keen to have them owing to the share he has in the moneygrubbing nature, and not being pure as regards virtue owing to the lack in his personality of the best safeguard, wouldn't he?"

"What?" said Adeimantus.

"Reason combined with the arts," I said, "which is the

(Glaucon has been S.'s interlocutor since 6.506d). For the characters of the two associates, and their differing roles as S.'s interlocutors, see vol. 1, General Introduction, section 4.

ἐγγενόμενος σωτήρ ἀρετῆς διὰ βίου ἐνοικεῖ τῷ ἔχοντι.

Καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Καὶ ἔστι μὲν γ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιοῦτος ὁ τιμοκρατικὸς νεανίας, τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει εἰκῶς.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

c Γίγνεται δέ γ', εἶπον, οὗτος ὧδέ πως· ἐνίστε πατρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ὧν νέος υἱὸς ἐν πόλει οἰκοῦντος οὐκ εὖ πολιτευομένη, φεύγοντος τὰς τε τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ δίκας καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην πᾶσαν φιλοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐθέλοντος ἐλαττοῦσθαι ὥστε | πράγματα μὴ ἔχειν—

Πῆ δὴ, ἔφη, γίγνεται;

d Ὅταν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς μητρὸς ἀκούη ἀχθομένης ὅτι οὐ τῶν ἀρχόντων αὐτῇ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐστίν, καὶ ἐλαττουμένης διὰ ταῦτα ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις γυναιξίν, ἔπειτα ὀρώσης μὴ σφόδρα περὶ χρήματα σπουδάζοντα μὴδὲ μαχόμενον καὶ λαιδορούμενον ἰδίᾳ τε ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ ῥαθύμως πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα φέροντα, | καὶ ἑαυτῷ μὲν τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα αἰεὶ αἰσθάνηται, ἑαυτὴν δὲ μήτε πάνν τιμῶντα μήτε ἀτιμάζοντα, ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων ἀχθομένης τε καὶ λεγούσης ὡς ἀνανδρός τε αὐτῷ ὁ πατήρ καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ ὅσα καὶ οἷα φιλοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὑμνεῖν.

19 For the timocratic constitution, see above, 545b7.

20 *elattousthai*, as aptly translated by Lee, *The Republic*.

21 Plato is here employing a term which is politically loaded in the context of Athenian democratic politics: *philopragmosunē*,

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only thing born in you that is the preserver of virtue, living in its possessor throughout his life.”

“You’re right there,” he said.

“And this is also the character of the young man who is timocratic, just like the corresponding state.”¹⁹

“Very much so.”

“Again the background of such a person is something like this,” I said: “there are times when he is the young son of a good man who lives in a city that is not well run and who avoids honors and office and the law courts and all such enjoyment of involvement in public affairs and willingly takes a back seat²⁰ so that he has no trouble.”²¹

“How does this come about?” he asked.

“When he hears first,” I said, “that his mother is annoyed because her husband is not one of the rulers there and she is regarded as inferior among the other women because of this, then that she sees that he is not all that interested in money and he doesn’t put up a fight and exchange insults both in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but bears all this kind of thing with indifference. Again when he notices that his father’s thoughts are always on himself and he pays no particular respect or disrespect to her: as a result of all this she is annoyed at all this and says that his father is unmanly and too easygoing, and other things of this sort that women usually say when they go on about such men.”

a synonym for the more common *polupragmosunē* (“meddling in public affairs”), i.e., being a democratic politician (as opposed to *elattousthai*, implying holding aloof from politics); see Arist. *Pol.* 1319a3ff. See also below, 550a2, *ta hautōn prattontas* (“going about their own business”). See also *apragmones* (“those who don’t take part in politics”), at 565a2.

e Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, πολλά τε καὶ ὅμοια ἑαυταῖς.

οἶσθα οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι καὶ οἱ οἰκέται τῶν τοιούτων ἐνίοτε λάθρα πρὸς τοὺς ὑεῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσιν, οἱ δοκοῦντες εὖνοι εἶναι, καὶ ἔάν τινα ἴδωσιν ἢ ὀφείλοντα χρήματα, ᾧ μὴ ἰπέξερχεται ὁ πατήρ, ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀδικοῦντα, διακελεύονται ὅπως, ἐπειδὰν ἀνὴρ
 550 γένηται, τιμωρήσεται πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ἀνὴρ μᾶλλον ἔσται τοῦ πατρός. κὰν ἐξιὼν ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀκούη καὶ ὄρα, τοὺς μὲν τὰ αὐτῶν πράττοντας ἐν τῇ πόλει ἡλιθίους τε καλουμένους καὶ ἐν σμικρῷ λόγῳ ὄντας, τοὺς δὲ μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐπινοημένους. τότε δὴ ἰ ὁ νέος πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀκούων τε καὶ ὄρων, καὶ αὖ τοὺς τοῦ πατρός λόγους ἀκούων τε καὶ ὄρων τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα αὐτοῦ ἐγγύθεν παρὰ τὰ
 b τῶν ἄλλων, ἐλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, τοῦ μὲν πατρός αὐτοῦ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἄρδοντός τε καὶ αὔξοντος, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων τό τε ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές, διὰ τὸ μὴ κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ὀμιλίαις δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἄλλων κακαῖς κεχρηῆσθαι, εἰς ἰ τὸ μέσον ἐλκόμενος ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἦλθε, καὶ τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἀρχὴν παρέδωκε τῷ μέσῳ τε καὶ φιλονίκῳ καὶ θυμοειδεῖ, καὶ ἐγένετο ὑψηλόφρων τε καὶ φιλότιμος ἀνὴρ.

c Κομιδῆ μοι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς τὴν τούτου γένεσιν διεληλυθέναι.

Ἔχομεν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν τε δευτέραν πολιτείαν καὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἄνδρα.

"Indeed, and also many other things just as you'd expect with them," said Adeimantus.

"So you know then," I said, "that the slaves of such men, the ones who seem to be well disposed, sometimes tell tales to the sons in confidence, and if they see anyone who either owes money whom the father doesn't chase up, or does anything else wrong, they exhort him when he grows up to punish all such people and he will be more of a man than his father, and if he goes out and hears and sees other things like this, some people going about their own business in the city being called fools and being of little account, others who don't, being respected and praised—then indeed, when the young man sees and hears everything of this sort, and again when he listens to what his father says and sees his activities from near at hand alongside those of the others he is pulled each way by both these forces: those of his father nurturing his powers of reasoning that are growing in his soul, and the others fostering his desire and passion, not because he is bad by nature, but because he associates himself with the company of bad men, and being pulled by both sides, he reaches a compromise and hands control of himself to the ambitious and passionate coterie and becomes arrogant and glory-seeking."

"I think you've explained the development of this man exactly," he said.

"So there we have the second type of constitution," I said, "and our second man."

Ἔχομεν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο, τὸ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου, λέγωμεν,
“ἄλλον ἢ ἄλλη πρὸς πόλει τεταγμένον,” μᾶλλον δὲ
κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν προτέραν τὴν πόλιν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Εἴη δέ γ' ἄν, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ὀλιγαρχία ἢ μετὰ τὴν
τοιαύτην πολιτεία[ν]. ἢ

Λέγεις δέ, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ποίαν κατάστασιν ὀλιγαρχίαν;

Τὴν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτείαν, ἐν ἣ ὀί
μὲν πλούσιοι ἄρχουσιν, πένητι δὲ οὐ μέτεστιν ἀρχῆς.

d Μανθάνω, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐκοῦν ὡς μεταβαίνει πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τιμαρχίας εἰς
τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν, ῥητέον;

Ναί. ἢ

Καὶ μὴν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τυφλῶ γε δῆλον ὡς μεταβαίνει.

Πῶς;

Τὸ ταμιεῖον, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐκεῖνο ἐκάστῳ χρυσίου
πληρούμενον ἀπόλλυσι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. πρῶτον
μὲν γὰρ δαπάνας αὐτοῖς ἐξευρίσκουσιν, καὶ τοὺς νόμους
ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἢ παράγουσιν, ἀπειθοῦντες αὐτοῖ τε
καὶ γυναιῖκες αὐτῶν.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

"We do," he said.

"So next shall we say in the words of Aeschylus 'another man drawn up before another city,' or rather deal with the city first according to our hypothesis?"²²

"Certainly the latter," he said.

"Well, in my view, the one to follow this kind of constitution would be an oligarchy."

"What kind of setup do you mean by oligarchy?" he asked.

"The constitution which derives from one's property in which the rich rule, the poor have no share in government."

"I understand," he said.

"So are we to discuss how it first changes from timarchy into oligarchy?"

"Yes."

"And, you know," I said, "it's clear surely even to a blind man how it changes."

"How?"

"The treasury, that one which each man has stuffed with gold,²³ destroys a constitution like this. First of all you see they discover they have expenses to pay off and they pervert the law to deal with this, since both they themselves and their womenfolk ignore it."

"That makes sense," he said.

²² An adaptation of *Sept.* 451, "Tell of another, assigned to another gate," with *polei* ("city") substituted for *pulais* ("gate"). On examining the state before the individual, see the initial plan at 2.368c8-d7.

²³ A reference back to the *tamieia* ("storehouses") mentioned at 548a7-8.

e Ἐπειτά γε οἶμαι ἄλλος ἄλλον ὁρῶν καὶ εἰς ζῆλον
 ἰὼν τὸ πλῆθος τοιοῦτον αὐτῶν ἀπηργάσαντο.

Εἰκός.

Τοῦντεῦθεν τοίνυν, εἶπον, προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν
 τοῦ | χρηματίζεσθαι, ὅσῳ ἂν τοῦτο τιμιώτερον ἡγῶν-
 ται, τοσοῦτῳ ἀρετὴν ἀτιμότεραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλούτου
 ἀρετὴ διέστηκεν, ὥσπερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ κειμένου
 ἑκατέρου, ἀεὶ τοῦναντίον ῥέποντε;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

551 Τιμωμένοι δὴ πλούτου ἐν πόλει καὶ τῶν πλουσιῶν
 ἀτιμότερα ἀρετὴ τε καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοί.

Δῆλον.

Ἀσκεῖται δὴ τὸ ἀεὶ τιμώμενον, | ἀμελεῖται δὲ τὸ
 ἀτιμαζόμενον.

Οὔτω.

Ἄντι δὴ φιλονίκων καὶ φιλοτίμων ἀνδρῶν φιλοχρη-
 ματισταὶ καὶ φιλοχρήματοι τελευτῶντες ἐγένοντο, καὶ
 τὸν μὲν πλούσιον ἐπαινοῦσίν τε καὶ θαυμάζουσι καὶ
 εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς ἄγουσι, | τὸν δὲ πένητα ἀτιμάζουσι.

Πάνυ γε.

b Οὐκοῦν τότε δὴ νόμον τίθενται ὅρον πολιτείας
 ὀλιγαρχικῆς ταξάμενοι πλῆθος χρημάτων, οὗ μὲν
 μᾶλλον ὀλιγαρχία, πλέον, οὗ δ' ἦττον, ἔλαττον, προ-
 ειπόντες ἀρχῶν μὴ μετέχειν ᾧ ἂν μὴ ἦ οὐσία εἰς τὸ
 ταχθὲν τίμημα, ταῦτα δὲ ἢ βία μεθ' ὅπλων διαπράτ-
 τονται, ἢ καὶ πρὸ τούτου φοβήσαντες | κατεστήσαντο
 τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως;

Οὔτω μὲν οὖν.

"Then, I think, they take a look at one another, they become envious and end up making the majority of them like themselves."

"That makes sense."

"Then after this they go even further in their moneygrubbing, and the more respectable they think this is, the more dishonorable they consider virtue to be. Or is virtue not so distinct from wealth that if each of them were lying in the pan of a pair of scales, the two would constantly be tipping in opposite directions?"

"Indeed," he said.

"When wealth and the rich are honored in the state, virtue and the good people are less valued."

"Clearly."

"So what is regularly valued becomes the standard practice, what is not is neglected."

"So it is."

"Instead of being honor- and ambition-lovers, they end up becoming lovers of making and possessing money, and they praise and admire the rich man and put him in office, while the poor they despise."

"Very much so."

"So then they pass a law as the defining characteristic of an oligarchic constitution setting the level of money required. Where it's more oligarchic, the level is higher, where it's less so, lower; and they don't allow anyone to hold office whose property is below the established qualifying point. This they achieve either by force of arms, or, even before they get that far, they set up this kind of constitution by using intimidation. Or is this not the case?"

"It certainly is."

Ἡ μὲν δὴ κατάστασις ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν αὕτη.

Ναί, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τίς δὴ ὁ τρόπος τῆς πολιτείας; καὶ
c ποῖά ἐστιν ἃ ἔφαμεν αὐτὴν ἀμαρτήματα ἔχειν;

Πρῶτον μὲν, ἔφη, τοῦτο αὐτό, ὄρος αὐτῆς οἶός
ἐστιν. ἄθρει γάρ, εἰ νεῶν οὕτω τις ποιοῖτο κυβερνήτας,
ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, τῷ δὲ πένητι, εἰ καὶ κυβερνητικώτερος
εἴη, μὴ ἐπιτρέποι— |

Ποιηράν, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὴν ναυτιλίαν αὐτοὺς ναυτί-
λεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ ἄλλον οὕτως ὄτουτοῦν ἢ τινος²
ἀρχῆς;

Οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

Πλὴν πόλεως; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἦ καὶ πόλεως πέρι;

Πολύ γ', ἔφη, μάλιστα, ὅσω χαλεπωτάτη καὶ με-
γίστη ἢ ἀρχή.

d Ἐν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο τοσοῦτον ὀλιγαρχία ἂν ἔχοι
ἀμάρτημα.

Φαίνεται.

Τί δέ; τόδε ἄρά τι τούτου ἔλαττον;

Τὸ ποῖον; |

Τὸ μὴ μίαν ἀλλὰ δύο ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην
πόλιν, τὴν μὲν πενήτων, τὴν δὲ πλουσίων, οἰκοῦντας
ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, αἰεὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντας ἀλλήλοισι.

Οὐδὲν μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ἔλαττον.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τόδε καλόν, | τὸ ἀδυνάτους εἶναι
πόλεμόν τινα πολεμεῖν διὰ τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἢ χρω-

² ἢ τινος ADF Stob.: secl. Stallbaum, Burnet, Slings

BOOK VIII

"So this is the setup, more or less."

"Yes," he said, "but what is the character of this constitution, and what kind of faults that we've talked about does it have?"²⁴

"First," I said, "there is this very matter of the nature of the defining characteristic. Consider: if one were to appoint ships' captains on the basis of property-rating and did not entrust the job to a poor man, even if he were better qualified as a captain."²⁵

"They would make a bad voyage of it!" he said.

"And the same would apply to anyone else in any other position of responsibility?"

"Well, I think so anyway."

"Except in the case of the state, or there as well?"

"Especially there," he said, "to the extent that it is the most difficult and important kind of rule."

"Then this is one glaring fault oligarchy would have."

"So it seems."

"What about this then: is what follows any lesser fault?"

"Which is that?"

"The fact that such a state would of necessity be not one but two states: that of the poor, that of the rich, living in the same place continually plotting against each other."

"No, by Zeus, it would not be a lesser fault."

"Yet again this would not be good either, that they would not be able to fight any war because in using and

²⁴ Mentioned at 544c4-5.

²⁵ Compare the image of the deaf ship's owner at 6.488aff.

μένους τῷ πλήθει ὀπλισμένῳ δεδιέναι μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς
πολεμίους, ἢ μὴ χρωμένους ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς
e φανῆναι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μάχεσθαι, καὶ ἅμα χρήματα μὴ
ἐθέλειν εἰσφέρειν, ἅτε φιλοχρημάτους.

Οὐ καλόν.

552 Τί δέ; ὁ πάλαι ἐλοιδοροῦμεν, τὸ πολυπραγματεῖν
γεωργοῦντας καὶ χρηματιζομένους καὶ πολεμοῦντας
ἅμα τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ, ἢ δοκεῖ
ὀρθῶς ἔχειν;

Οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν.

Ὅρα δὴ, τούτων πάντων τῶν κακῶν εἰ τόδε μέγιστον
αὕτη πρώτη | παραδέχεται.

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὸ ἐξεῖναι πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀποδόσθαι, καὶ ἄλλω
κτήσασθαι τὰ τούτου, καὶ ἀποδόμενον οἰκεῖν ἐν τῇ
πόλει μηδὲν ὄντα τῶν τῆς πόλεως μερῶν, μήτε χρη-
b ματιστὴν μήτε δημιουργὸν μήτε ἵππέα μήτε ὀπλίτην,
ἀλλὰ πένητα καὶ ἄπορον κεκλημένον.

Πρώτη, ἔφη.

Οὐκουν διακωλύεται γε ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις τὸ
τοιούτον· | οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἱ μὲν ὑπέρπλουτοι ἦσαν, οἱ δὲ
παντάπασι πένητες.

Ὅρθῶς.

Τόδε δὲ ἄθρει· ἄρα ὅτε πλούσιος ὢν ἀνήλισκεν ὁ
τοιούτος, μᾶλλον τι τότε ἢν ὄφελος τῇ πόλει εἰς ἃ

²⁶ Because there would be so few of them, they really would be "oligarchs"; a wordplay on *oligos* = "few."

BOOK VIII

arming the common people they would either be forced to fear them more than the enemy, or, if the commons were not employed they would be seen as true oligarchs in the fighting itself,²⁶ and at the same time as being unwilling to contribute money to a war fund, as they are hoarders of it.”

“That is not good.”

“What about this point? This is something we criticized some time ago, that the same people in such a state as this are meddling in many jobs at the same time: farming, making money, fighting: does that seem to be right?”²⁷

“No, not in any way.”

“Consider then whether out of all these evils this constitution is the first to admit this as the greatest.”

“Which evil?”

“Allowing someone to sell all his possessions and for another person to acquire them from him, and when he has sold them to live in the city without being a member of any section of the community either as a moneymaker, or craftsman, cavalryman, or hoplite, but simply known as a destitute pauper.”

“It is the first one,” he said.

“So there is nothing to prevent such a situation among those states ruled by an oligarch, since some would not be overwealthy, others would be altogether poor.”

“That’s right.”

“Consider also the following: when a man such as this was rich and spent his money, was it more of a benefit for

²⁷ Contravening “one man, one job,” a basic principle established at 2.374b6-c2.

νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν; ἢ ἢ ἐδόκει μὲν τῶν ἀρχόντων εἶναι, τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ οὔτε ἄρχων οὔτε ὑπηρέτης ἦν αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐτοιμῶν ἀναλωτῆς;

c Οὕτως, ἔφη· ἐδόκει, ἦν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἀναλωτῆς.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφήν ἐγγίγνεται, σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφήνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; ἢ

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφήνας πάντας ἀκέντρος ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τούτους ἐνίοις μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρος, ἐνίοις δὲ δεινὰ
d κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων πάντες ὅσοι κέκληνται κακοῦργοι;

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Δῆλον ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν πόλει οὐδ' ἂν ἴδης πτωχοὺς, ὅτι εἰσὶ ἢ πον ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἀποκεκρυμμένοι κλέπται τε καὶ βαλλαντιατόμοι καὶ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν δημιουργοί.

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχουμέναις πόλεσι πτωχοὺς οὐχ ὀρᾶς ἐνόησας;

Ὅλιγον γ', ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἐκτὸς τῶν ἀρχόντων.

e Μὴ οὖν οἰόμεθα, ἔφη ἐγώ, καὶ κακοῦρους πολ-

the state when he spent it on those things we were just talking about? Or did he give the appearance of being one of the rulers, but in actual fact he was neither ruler, nor servant of the state, but a spender of his ready cash?"

"A ruler is what he appeared to be," he said, "but he was was nothing other than a spender."

"Do you mean," I asked, "that just as a drone in a honeycomb is a canker in the hive, we should describe such a person who is a drone in his household as a canker in the state?"²⁸

"Absolutely, Socrates," he said.

"Does that mean, Adeimantus, that god made all winged drones stingless, but made some of the walking drones without stings, others with terrible ones? And those who end up as beggars in old age come from the stingless, while of all those known as doers of evil come from those with stings?"

"That is very true," he said.

"Then it's clear," I said, "whenever you see beggars in a city, that there are, I suppose, hidden somewhere in this place thieves and muggers, temple robbers and perpetrators of all misdeeds of this kind."

"Obviously," he said.

"Then what does that mean? Don't you see beggars in cities ruled by oligarchs?"

"Practically all of them are beggars except the rulers," he said.

"Are we not to think then that there are also many

²⁸ A frequent analogy, e.g., Hes. *Op.* 304ff.

λοὺς ἐν αὐταῖς εἶναι κέντρα ἔχοντας, οὓς ἐπιμελεία βία κατέχουσιν αἱ ἀρχαί;

Οἰόμεθα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν καὶ κακὴν τροφήν καὶ κατάστασιν τῆς πολιτείας φήσομεν τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτόθι ἐγγίγνεσθαι;

Φήσομεν.

Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ τοιαύτη γέ τις ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀλιγαρχουμένη πόλις καὶ τοσαῦτα κακὰ ἔχουσα, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πλείω.

Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη.

553 Ἀπειργάσθω δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ αὕτη, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ πολιτεία, ἣν ὀλιγαρχίαν καλοῦσιν, ἐκ τιμημάτων ἔχουσαν τοὺς ἄρχοντας· τὸν δὲ ταύτῃ ὁμοιον μετὰ ταῦτα σκοπῶμεν, ὡς τε γίγνεται οἷός τε γενόμενός ἐστιν. |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει;

Πῶς;

Ἄρ' οὖν ὧδε μάλιστα εἰς ὀλιγαρχικὸν ἐκ τοῦ τιμοκρατικοῦ ἐκείνου μεταβάλλει; Ὅταν αὐτοῦ παῖς γενόμενος τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ζηλοῖ τε τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἴχνη διώκῃ, ἔπειτα αὐτὸν ἴδῃ ἐξαίφνης πταίσαντα ὡσπερ πρὸς ἔρματι πρὸς τῇ πόλει, καὶ ἐκχέαντα τά τε αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑαυτόν, ἢ στρατηγήσαντα ἢ τιν' ἄλλην μεγάλην ἀρχὴν ἄρξαντα, εἶτα εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμπεσόντα βλαπτόμενον³ ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκπεσόντα | ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἅπασαν ἀποβαλόντα.

³ βλαπτόμενον secl. Badham

BOOK VIII

evildoers there with stings," I said, "whom the authorities control by deliberate force?"

"That's what we think," he said.

"Are we then going to agree that such types come to exist in the state because of a lack of education, bad upbringing, and the setup of the constitution?"

"We are."

"Well then, that's the kind of place an oligarchic state would be and those are the kinds of faults it would have, and perhaps even more."

"Quite," he said.

"Then we've finished with this constitution too," I said, "which they call oligarchy because it takes its rulers from those with property qualifications. Let's look at the inhabitant who is similar to it who comes next, what sort of person he is and comes to be how he is."

"Certainly," he said.

"Does he then change from a timocratic person into an oligarch mostly in the following way?"

"How do you mean?"

"Suppose he has a son, first the son emulates his father and follows in his footsteps. Then he sees him suddenly come up against the state, as if he has crashed against a reef and spilled all his possessions and himself overboard, and, having been a commander or holder of some other high office, then lands up in the law courts prosecuted by informers,²⁹ and is either put to death, exiled, or disenfranchised and loses everything he has."

²⁹ "Informer" = *sukophantes* ("sycophant"): for an explanation, see Book I n. 45.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη.

Ἰδὼν δέ γε, ὦ φίλε, ταῦτα καὶ παθὼν καὶ ἀπολέσας τὰ ὄντα, δείσας οἶμαι εὐθὺς ἐπὶ κεφαλὴν ὠθεῖ ἐκ τοῦ
 c θρόνου τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ φιλοτιμίαν τε καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς ἐκείνο, κἂν ταπεινωθεῖς ὑπὸ πενίας πρὸς χρηματισμὸν τραπόμενος γλίσχρως καὶ κατὰ σμικρὸν φειδόμενος καὶ ἐργαζόμενος χρήματα συλλέγεται. ἂρ' οὐκ οἶει τὸν τοιοῦτον τότε εἰς μὲν τὸν θρόνον ἐκείνον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τε καὶ φιλοχρήματον ἢ ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τιάρας τε καὶ στρεπτοὺς καὶ ἀκινάκας παραζωννύντα;

Ἐγωγ', ἔφη.

d Τὸ δέ γε οἶμαι λογιστικὸν τε καὶ θυμοειδὲς χαμαὶ ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἐκείνῳ καὶ καταδουλωσάμενος, τὸ μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐᾷ λογίζεσθαι οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἄλλ' ἢ ὀπόθεν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων χρημάτων πλείω ἔσται, τὸ δὲ αὖ θαυμάζειν καὶ τιμᾶν μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ πλουσίους, ἢ καὶ φιλοτιμείσθαι μηδ' ἐφ' ἐνὶ ἄλλῳ ἢ ἐπὶ χρημάτων κτήσει καὶ εἰάν τι ἄλλο εἰς τοῦτο φέρῃ.

e Οὐκ ἔστ' ἄλλη, ἔφη, μεταβολὴ οὕτω ταχεῖά τε καὶ ἰσχυρά ἐκ φιλοτίμου νέου εἰς φιλοχρήματον.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὗτος, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλιγαρχικός ἐστιν;

Ἦ γοῦν μεταβολὴ αὐτοῦ ἐξ ὁμοίου ἀνδρός ἐστι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, ἐξ ἧς ἡ ὀλιγαρχία μετέστη.

Σκοπῶμεν δὴ εἰ ὁμοῖος ἂν εἴη. ἢ

554

Σκοπῶμεν.

"I can imagine that," he said.

"And when the son has seen and been through all this, my friend, and lost his livelihood, out of fear, I think, he chucks his former ambition and passion headlong from its throne within his soul, and, brought down by poverty, he turns thriftily to making money³⁰ and saving up little by little, he works and builds up his property: don't you think such a man would then install the ambitious and money-making principle on that throne and create the Great King within himself, adorned with tiaras, gold chains and Persian swords?"³¹

"I do," he said.

"Then, I suppose, with reason and passion enslaved sitting on the ground on either side beneath the throne, he allows neither the one to reason and investigate, other than how less money can be increased into more, nor the other to admire and respect anything but wealth and the wealthy and to be ambitious for anything other than the accumulation of money and anything else that contributes to it."

"There's no other change so swift and certain as from an ambitious young man to a moneygrubber."

"So is this then the oligarchic character?" I asked.

"At least his transformation is from a man resembling the constitution from which oligarchy came."

"Let's see then if he would be like it."

"Yes, let's."

³⁰ Or "greedily." For the various translations of *γλίσχωρος*, see Book 6 n. 12.

³¹ The "Great King," the Greek title of the king of Persia, was proverbial for absolute rule and costly adornment.

Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν τῷ χρήματα περὶ πλείστου ποιείσθαι ὅμοιος ἂν εἶη;

Πῶς δ' οὐ; |

Καὶ μὴν τῷ γε φειδωλὸς εἶναι καὶ ἐργάτης, τὰς ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας μόνον τῶν παρ' αὐτῷ ἀποπιμπλάς, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀναλώματα μὴ παρεχόμενος, ἀλλὰ δουλούμενος τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ὡς ματαίους.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν. |

Ἀὐχμηρὸς γέ τις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦν καὶ ἀπὸ παντὸς περιουσίαν ποιούμενος, θησαυροποιὸς ἀνὴρ—οὐς δὴ
 b καὶ ἐπαινεῖ τὸ πλῆθος—ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ἂν εἶη ὁ τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ὅμοιος;

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν, ἔφη, δοκέει χρήματα γοῦν μάλιστα ἐντιμα τῇ τε πόλει καὶ παρὰ τῷ τοιούτῳ.

Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παιδείᾳ ὁ τοιοῦτος προσέσχηκεν. |

Οὐ δοκῶ, ἔφη. οὐ γὰρ ἂν τυφλὸν ἡγεμόνα τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτί(μα) μάλιστα.

Εὐ (***)⁴ ἦν δ' ἐγώ. τότε δὲ σκόπει κηφηνώδεις ἐπιθυμίας ἐν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν ἀπαιδευσίαν μὴ φῶμεν
 c ἐγγίγνεσθαι, τὰς μὲν πτωχικὰς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους, κατεχομένας βία ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης ἐπιμελείας;

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

⁴ ἐστήσατο καὶ ἐτί(μα) μάλιστα. Eὐ³ Schneider: post Eὐ³ (Socrati) lacunam statuit Slings, <γε> vel <λέγεις> vel simil. supplemendam

BOOK VIII

"First of all, then, the similarity would be his high regard for money, wouldn't it?"

"Of course."

"What's more, by being thrifty and hardworking and having satisfied only those basic desires that he had, and by not incurring other expenditure, but rather subjugating his other desires as being futile."

"Yes, very much so."

"Being a squalid type, making a profit out of everything, our hoarder, one of those indeed the majority admire: would this not be the sort of person to share the characteristics of such a constitution?"

"Well, I certainly think so," he said. "Money is especially highly regarded in this kind of state and by this kind of person."

"I don't think such a man has shown much interest in education," I said.

"I don't think so," he replied, "otherwise he would not have made a blind man leader of the chorus and rated him highly."³²

"Well put," I said. "But consider this point: shall we not agree that though these dronelike desires arise in him as a result of his lack of education, some beggarly, others criminal, they are forcibly held in check by his attentiveness in other areas?"

"Indeed," he said.

³² Plutus, god of wealth, was traditionally represented as being blind; "leader of the chorus" suggests a reference to a comic drama. (Cf. Aristophanes' play of that name, which, however, does not feature a blind chorus leader).

Οἷσθ' οὖν, εἶπον, οἱ ἀποβλέψιας κατόψει αὐτῶν τὰς
κακουργίας;

Ποῖ; ἔφη.

Εἰς τὰς τῶν ὀρφανῶν ἐπιτροπεύσεις, καὶ εἴ πού τι
αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει, ὥστε πολλῆς ἐξουσίας
λαβέσθαι τοῦ ἀδικεῖν. |

Ἀληθῆ.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τούτῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις συμ-
βολαίοις ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἐν οἷς εὐδοκιμῆι δοκῶν δίκαιος
d εἶναι, ἐπιεικεῖ τινὶ ἑαυτοῦ βία κατέχει ἄλλας κακὰς
ἐπιθυμίας ἐνούσας, οὐ πείθων ὅτι οὐκ ἄμεινον, οὐδ'
ἡμερῶν λόγῳ, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καὶ φόβῳ, περὶ τῆς ἄλλης
οὐσίας τρέμων;

Καὶ πάνυ γ', ἔφη. |

Καὶ νῆ Δία, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, τοῖς πολλοῖς γε
αὐτῶν εὐρήσεις, ὅταν δέη τὰλλότρια ἀναλίσκειν, τὰς
τοῦ κηφήμος συγγενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς, σφόδρα.

Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἶη ἀστασίαστος ὁ τοιοῦτος ἐν ἑαυτῷ,
e οὐδὲ εἰς ἀλλὰ διπλοῦς τις, ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὡς
τὸ πολὺν κρατούσας ἂν ἔχοι βελτίους χειρόνων.

Ἔστιν οὕτω.

Διὰ ταῦτα δῆ, οἶμαι, | εὐσχημονέστερος ἂν πολλῶν
ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶη· ὁμοιοσητικῆς δὲ καὶ ἡρμουςμένης τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀληθῆς ἀρετῆ πόρρω ποι ἐκφεύγοι ἂν αὐτόν.

³³ For the frequency of guardians' unjust treatment of orphans in Athens, see Dem. *In Aphobum*. See also Hes. *Op.* 330.

"So you know then," I said, "where you must look when you are observing their villainous behavior?"

"Where's that?" he asked.

"At their guardianship of orphans or any other situation where they have a lot of opportunity for doing injustice."³³

"True."

"Isn't it clear therefore from this that such a man, in all the other business transactions in which he gains a high reputation for being apparently just, by some element of fairness within himself restrains by force other wrong desires he has in him, not from any persuasion that it is better not, or civilizing them by reason, but through necessity and fear, from anxiety about the rest of his accumulated wealth?"

"Very much so," he said.

"And by Zeus, my friend," I said, "when the majority have to spend other people's money, you'll find inside them desires akin to those of the drone."

"You can say that again!"

"This type wouldn't be free of inner turmoil, being not one but some kind of twofold person, but he would have better desires which had for the most part taken control of the worse ones."³⁴

"That's right."

"Indeed, for these reasons, I think, this kind of person would be more outwardly decent than many, but the true virtue of a balanced and well-adjusted soul would escape him by some long way."

On the topic in general, see Harrison, *The Law of Athens*, 115-21.

³⁴ For such internal tensions, see above, 4.440b.

Δοκέι μοι.

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Καὶ μὴν ἀνταγωνιστῆς γε ἰδίᾳ ἐν πόλει ὁ φειδωλὸς φαῦλος ἢ τινος νίκης ἢ ἄλλης φιλοτιμίας τῶν καλῶν, χρήματά τε οὐκ ἐθέλων εὐδοξίας ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγῶνων ἀναλίσκειν, δεδιὼς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἀναλωτικὰς ἐγείρειν καὶ ἰ συμπαρακαλεῖν ἐπὶ συμμαχίαν τε καὶ φιλονικίαν, ὀλίγοις τισὶν ἑαυτοῦ πολεμῶν ὀλιγαρχικῶς τὰ πολλὰ ἠττάται καὶ πλουτεῖ.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

Ἔτι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀπιστοῦμεν μὴ κατὰ τὴν ὀλιγαρχουμένην πόλιν ὁμοιότητι τὸν φειδωλὸν τε καὶ χρηματιστὴν τετάχθαι;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη.

Δημοκρατίαν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἢ τίνα τε γίγνεται τρόπον, γενομένη τε ποῖόν τινα ἔχει, ἢν' αὖ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀνδρὸς τρόπον γνόντες παραστησώμεθ' αὐτὸν εἰς κρίσιν.

Ὅμοίως γοῦν ἂν, ἔφη, ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς πορευοίμεθα.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβάλλει μὲν τρόπον τινὰ τοιούδε ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας εἰς δημοκρατίαν, δι' ἀπληστίαν τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ, τοῦ ὡς πλουσιώτατον δεῖν γίνεσθαι;

Πῶς δὴ;

Ἄτε οἶμαι ἄρχοντες ἐν αὐτῇ οἱ ἄρχοντες διὰ τὸ πολλὰ κεκτῆσθαι, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν εἶργειν νόμῳ τῶν νέων ὅσοι ἂν ἀκόλαστοι γίγνωνται, μὴ ἐξεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἀναλίσκειν τε καὶ ἀπολλύναι τὰ αὐτῶν, ἵνα ὠνούμενοι

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"I think so."

"And again the thrifty man is privately a worthless competitor in the state either for some triumph, or some other ambition for something good, unwilling to spend his money to win him fame and suchlike things of a competitive nature, afraid to arouse extravagant desires and to call them into alliance with love of victory; like an oligarch he goes on campaign with a few of his resources³⁵ and for the most part he loses, while yet remaining rich."

"Very much so," he said.

"Do we still doubt," I said, "that the thrifty man and moneygrubber has all the features of an oligarchic state?"

"No, not at all."

"So it looks as if we must consider the democratic constitution after this, how it comes about, and, when it has come into existence, what kind of person it embraces, so that when we have discovered the character of this kind of person, we can place him beside the others for judgment."

"At any rate we would be proceeding in a way consistent for us," he said.

"Therefore, does he change from oligarchy to democracy in some such way as this," I said, "through the insatiable desire for the good lying within reach—the need to become as wealthy as possible?"

"What do you mean?"

"Inasmuch as those who rule there, I think, because they have acquired so much, are unwilling to prevent by law those of the young who are getting away scot-free from spending and wasting their wealth, so that by buying the

³⁵ See above, n. 26.

τὰ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἰ εἰσδανείζοντες ἔτι πλουσιώτεροι
καὶ ἐντιμότεροι γίγνωνται.

Παντός γε μᾶλλον.

Οὐκοῦν δῆλον ἤδη τοῦτο ἐν πόλει, ὅτι πλοῦτον
τιμᾶν καὶ σωφροσύνην ἅμα ἰκανῶς κτᾶσθαι ἐν τοῖς
d πολίταις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου ἀμελεῖν
ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου;

Ἐπιεικῶς, ἔφη, δῆλον.

Παραμελοῦντες δὴ ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις καὶ ἐφιέν-
τες ἀκολασταίνειν οὐκ ἀγεννεῖς ἐνίοτε ἀνθρώπους πέ-
νητας ἰ ἠνάγκασαν γενέσθαι.

Μάλα γε.

Κάθηνται δὴ οἶμαι οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι
τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι, οἱ μὲν ὀφείλοντες χρέα, οἱ δὲ
ἄτιμοι γεγονότες, οἱ δὲ ἀμφότερα, μισοῦντές τε καὶ
e ἐπιβουλεύοντες τοῖς κτησαμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς
ἄλλοις, νεωτερισμοῦ ἐρῶντες.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

Οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματισταὶ ἐγκύψαντες, οὐδὲ δοκοῦντες
τούτους ὁρᾶν, ἰ τῶν λοιπῶν τὸν αἰὲ ὑπέικοντα ἐνιέντες
556 ἀργύριον τιτρώσκοντες, καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκγόνοὺς τό-
κους πολλαπλασίους κομιζόμενοι, πολὺν τὸν κηφήνα
καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει.

Πῶς γάρ, ἔφη, οὐ πολύν;

36 Cf. Arist. Pol. 1305b40 for a more circumstantial version of
this process.

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property of such people and lending out at interest too, they become even richer and more highly regarded.”

“More than anything.”

“So isn’t it clear by now that it’s impossible for citizens to honor wealth in the state and at the same time show sufficient good sense, but inevitably they must neglect either the one or the other?”

“That’s pretty clear,” he said.

“By neglecting this situation in the oligarchies and allowing people who are sometimes not of noble origin to be licentious, they force them into poverty.”

“Very much so!”

“Indeed, I think they sit around the town equipped with stings and fully armed, some with debts to pay, others disfranchised, others both, full of hatred and plotting against those who have bought up their property and the others as well, craving for revolution.”³⁶

“That’s right.”

“And indeed the moneymakers, with their heads down,³⁷ apparently not even seeing these men, continue to inject the poison of their money³⁸ into any of the rest who give in to them, and so they walk off with the interest, the offspring of the parent sum,³⁹ multiplied many times over and fill the state with many a drone and beggar.”

“How could the place not be full of them?” he said.

³⁷ “heads down” because their souls, because of their appetite for money, are compelled to look downward (see 7.518c4ff.).

³⁸ Plato maintains the metaphor of stinging: literally “injecting their money and wounding”

³⁹ For the pun on *tokos* = “offspring” and “interest on capital,” see above, Book 6 n. 59.

Καὶ οὔτε γ' ἐκείνη, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, | τὸ τοιοῦτον κακὸν
ἐκκαόμενον ἐθέλουσιν ἀποσβεννύναι, εἵργοντες τὰ
αὐτοῦ ὅπῃ τις βούλεται τρέπειν, οὔτε τῆδε, ἣ αὖ κατὰ
ἕτερον νόμον τὰ τοιαῦτα λύεται.

Κατὰ δὴ τίνα;

Ἄς μετ' ἐκείνον ἐστὶ δεύτερος καὶ ἀναγκάζων ἀρε-
τῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τοὺς πολίτας. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτοῦ
κινδύνῳ τὰ πολλά τις τῶν ἐκουσίων συμβολαίων
b προστάτῃ συμβάλλειν, χρηματίζονται μὲν ἂν ἦττον
ἀναιδῶς ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐλάττω δ' ἐν αὐτῇ φύοιτο τῶν
τοιούτων κακῶν οἴων νυνδὴ εἵπομεν. |

Καὶ πολὺ γε, ἣ δ' ὅς.

Νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην ἐγώ, διὰ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς
μὲν δὴ ἀρχομένους οὕτω διατιθέασιν ἐν τῇ πόλει οἱ
ἄρχοντες· σφᾶς δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς αὐτῶν—ἄρ' οὐ
τρυφῶντας μὲν τοὺς νέους καὶ ἀπόνους καὶ πρὸς τὰ
c τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς, μαλακοὺς δὲ
καρτερεῖν πρὸς ἡδονάς τε καὶ λύπας καὶ ἀργούς;

Τί μήν;

Αὐτοὺς δὲ πλὴν χρηματισμοῦ τῶν ἄλλων ἡμελη-
κότας, καὶ οὐδὲν πλείω ἐπιμέλειαν πεποιημένους ἀρε-
τῆς ἢ τοὺς πένητας; |

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι ὅταν παραβάλλωσιν
ἀλλήλοις οἱ τε ἄρχοντες καὶ οἱ ἀρχόμενοι ἢ ἐν ὁδῶν
πορείαις ἢ ἐν ἄλλαις τισὶ κοινωνίαις, ἢ κατὰ θεωρίας
ἢ κατὰ στρατείας, ἢ σύμπλοι γιγνόμενοι ἢ συστρατι-
d ῶται, ἢ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κινδύνοις ἀλλήλους θεώμενοι

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"And," I said, "they're unwilling to quench such an evil when it flares up there, either by preventing anyone from doing what he likes with his own affairs, or in this way, by another law, by which such abuses are done away with."

"Which law is that?"

"The one which comes second to the first one and compels citizens to turn their attention to virtue. You see if people arranged to draw up the majority of their voluntary contracts at their own risk, they would make money less shamelessly in the state and less of the evil characteristics we've just been talking about would proliferate."

"Considerably less," he said.

"But now," I said, "owing to all these kinds of activities the rulers in the state deal with their subjects as we described. As for themselves and their associates, aren't the young licentious and work-shy in both body and soul, and persist in being lackadaisical where both pleasure and pain are concerned, and lazy?"

"Of course."

"Apart from making money, haven't they themselves lost interest in all else and made virtue no more their concern than the poor do?"

"Certainly."

"Having got to this state, whenever rulers and their subjects encounter one another on journeys or in some other public activities, either as fellow travelers to some festival, or on some campaign, or as shipmates or fellow soldiers, or when they eye each other up and down in the face of danger itself, it's not here that the poor are dispar-

μηδαμῆ ταύτη καταφρονῶνται οἱ πένητες ὑπὸ τῶν πλουσίων, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ἰσχυρὸς ἀνὴρ πένης, ἠλιωμένος, παραταχθεὶς ἐν μάχῃ πλουσίῳ ἐσκιατροφηκότι, πολλὰς ἔχοντι σάρκας ἀλλοτρίας, ἴδη ἄσθματός | τε καὶ ἀπορίας μεστόν, ἀρ' οἶει αὐτὸν οὐχ ἠγείσθαι
 e κακία τῇ σφετέρᾳ πλουτεῖν τοὺς τοιούτους, καὶ ἄλλον ἄλλῳ παραγγέλλειν, ὅταν ἰδίᾳ συγγίγνωνται, ὅτι
 "Ἄνδρες⁵ ἡμέτεροι εἰσὶ γὰρ οὐδέν";

Εὖ οἶδα μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε, ὅτι οὕτω ποιούσιν.

Οὐκοῦν ὥσπερ σῶμα νοσῶδες μικρᾶς ῥοπῆς ἐξῶθεν δεῖται προσλαβέσθαι πρὸς τὸ κάμνειν, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἐξῶ στασιάζει αὐτὸ αὐτῷ, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἡ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐκείνῳ διακειμένη πόλις ἀπὸ σμικρᾶς προφάσεως, ἐξῶθεν ἐπαγομένων ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐξ ὀλιγαρχουμένης πόλεως συμμαχίαν ἢ τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ δημοκρατουμένης, νοσεῖ τε καὶ αὐτὴ αὐτῇ μάχεται, | ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἄνευ τῶν ἐξῶ στασιάζει;

557 Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

Δημοκρατία δὲ οἶμαι γίγνεται ὅταν οἱ πένητες νικήσαντες τοὺς μὲν ἀποκτείνωσι τῶν ἐτέρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐκβάλωσι, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς ἐξ ἴσου μεταδώσι πολιτείας τε καὶ ἀρχῶν, καὶ ὡς τὸ πολὺ | ἀπὸ κλήρων αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν αὐτῇ γίγνονται.

"Ἔστι γάρ, ἔφη, αὕτη ἡ κατάστασις δημοκρατίας, εἴαντε καὶ δι' ὄπλων γένηται εἴαντε καὶ διὰ φόβον ὑπεξελθόντων τῶν ἐτέρων.

⁵ Ἄνδρες ADF: ἄνδρες Adam: γὰρ ADF: παρ' Baiter

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aged by the rich, but frequently a poor man, sinewy and sunburned, drawn up in line of battle beside a rich man who's kept himself in the shade, with a great deal of excess flesh on him, sees him panting heavily and not knowing which way to turn—don't you think he'll think that such people have grown rich because of the cowardice of the poor, and the message will pass from one man to the next when they're in private: "These men are ours for the taking; they're nothing!"⁴⁰

"I know perfectly well," he said, "that that's what they do."

"So, just as a sick body only needs a slight shift from an external source to cause illness, and sometimes even without external pressure to be involved in internal faction, so too by the same token a state finding itself in that position, from some slight pretext—one party from an oligarchic state or another from a democracy introducing an alliance from outside—falls sick and civil war breaks out, and sometimes there is rebellion even without external influence, isn't there?"

"Very much so!"

"I think a democracy emerges when the poor are victorious and put some of their opponents to death and exile others and give those left an equal share of the state and its government, and for the most part the positions of responsibility are allocated by ballot."

"Yes, this is the basis of a democracy," he said, "whether it comes about by force of arms or through intimidation, the opponents go into exile."

⁴⁰ For the general political situation, see Arist. *Pol.* 1310a24.

Τίνα δὴ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοι τρόπον οἰκοῦσι; καὶ
 b ποία τις ἢ τοιαύτη αὐτῆ πολιτεία; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ
 τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ δημοκρατικός τις ἀναφανήσεται.

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν πρῶτον μὲν δὴ ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἡ
 πόλις | μεστή καὶ παρρησίας γίγνεται, καὶ ἐξουσία
 ἐν αὐτῇ ποιεῖν ὅτι τις βούλεται;

Λέγεται γε δὴ, ἔφη.

Ὅπου δέ γε ἐξουσία, δῆλον ὅτι ἰδίαν ἕκαστος ἂν
 κατασκευῆν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βίου κατασκευάζοιτο ἐν αὐτῇ,
 ἥτις ἕκαστον ἀρέσκοι.

Δῆλον.

c Παντοδαποὶ δὴ ἂν οἶμαι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πολιτεία
 μάλιστα ἐγγίγνουντο ἄνθρωποι.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν
 εἶναι | ὥσπερ ἰμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποι-
 κιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἥθεσιν πεποικιλμένη
 καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. καὶ ἴσως μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ
 ταύτην, ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδές τε καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες τὰ ποικίλα
 θεώμενοι, καλλίστην ἂν πολλοὶ κρίνειαν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Καὶ ἔστιν γε, ὦ μακάριε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιτήδειον
 ζητεῖν ἐν αὐτῇ πολιτείαν.

d Τί δὴ;

Ὅτι πάντα γένη πολιτειῶν ἔχει διὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν,
 καὶ κινδυνεύει τῷ βουλομένῳ πόλιν κατασκευάζειν, ὃ
 νυνδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐποιοῦμεν, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι εἰς δημοκρα-

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"How do these people live, then?" I said. "And again, what are the characteristics of such a constitution? I'm sure it's clear that a man to suit it will be shown to be a democrat."

"Clearly," he said.

"First of all, aren't people free, and doesn't the state abound in freedom and freedom of speech, and isn't there the means to do whatever one wishes?"

"Well, anyway, that's what is said," he said.

"And where there is the means it's clear that each individual would make whatever arrangements he likes for his own life there."

"Yes, it's clear."

"Then to be sure, a wide variety of people would come to live under this constitution."

"Of course."

"There's a good chance," I said, "this will be the finest of the constitutions. Just like a cloak brightly embroidered with all kinds of flowers, so this state adorned with all kinds of characters would appear to be the finest. Perhaps too," I said, "many would judge it to be so, just as children and women do when they see intricate embroideries."

"Indeed, that is very much so," he said.

"And there is the the useful place, my good fellow," I said, "to look for the constitution."

"Why is that, then?"

"Because it contains all kinds of constitutions owing to the freedom allowed, and it's likely when a person wants to build such a state, which we were doing just now, that

τουμένην ἐλθόντι πόλιν, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸν ἀρέσκη τρόπος, τούτου ἐκλέξασθαι, ἢ ὥσπερ εἰς παντοπώλιον ἀφικομένην πολιτειῶν, καὶ ἐκλεξαμένῳ οὕτω κατοικίξειν.

Ἴσως γοῦν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἂν ἀποροῖ παραδειγμάτων.

e Τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ἀνάγκην, εἶπον, εἶναι ἄρχειν ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει, μηδ' ἂν ἦς ἰκανὸς ἄρχειν, μηδὲ αὖ ἄρχεσθαι, εἰ μὴ βούλη, μηδὲ πολεμεῖν πολεμούντων, μηδὲ εἰρήνην ἄγειν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγόντων, εἰ μὴ ἐπι-
558 θυμῆς εἰρήνης, μηδὲ αὖ, εἰάν τις ἄρχειν νόμος σε διακωλύῃ ἢ δικάζειν, μηδὲν ἤττον καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ δικάζειν, εἰάν αὐτῷ σοι ἐπίη, ἄρ' οὐ θεσπεσία καὶ ἡδεῖα ἢ τοιαύτη διαγωγὴ ἐν τῷ παρατύκῃ;

Ἴσως, ἔφη, ἐν γε τούτῳ.

Τί δέ; ἢ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψή; ἢ ἢ οὐπω εἶδες, ἐν τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ ἀνθρώπων καταψηφισθέντων θανάτου ἢ φυγῆς, οὐδὲν ἤττον αὐτῶν μερόντων τε καὶ ἀναστρεφόμενων ἐν μέσῳ, [καὶ] ὡς οὔτε φροντίζοντος οὔτε ὀρώοντος οὐδενὸς περιουστῆ ὥσπερ ἦρως;

Καὶ πολλοὺς γ', ἔφη.

b Ἡ δὲ συγγνώμη καὶ οὐδ' ὀπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ καταφρόνησις ὧν ἡμεῖς ἐλέγομεν σεμνύοντες, ὅτε τὴν πόλιν ᾤκίζομεν, ὡς εἰ μὴ τις ὑπερβεβλημένην φύσιν ἔχοι, οὐποτ' ἂν γένοιτο ἀνήρ

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he will have to go to a democratic state and choose whichever aspects of it please him, just like going to a bazaar displaying constitutions, and make one's choice and so establish it."

"At any rate he would not be short of a few models to choose from!"

"But the fact is that there is no compulsion to be a ruler in this state, even if you're competent to rule, nor again of being ruled, if you don't want to be, or to take up arms in a time of war, nor keep the peace when everyone else is doing so, unless you have a desire for peace. Nor again, if some law prevents you from holding office or being a jurymen, are you any less free to serve or be a jurymen all the same if you feel like doing so: isn't this way of life marvelous and pleasant, in the short term?"

"Perhaps, while it lasts," he said.

"What then? Isn't the mildness of some who are convicted civilized? Or have you never seen, when people are condemned to death or exile in a state like this, they still remain there and move about in public just the same, and no one worries nor looks at them roaming round like a heroic spirit from the dead."⁴¹

"Indeed, I've seen plenty of them," he said.

"It's tolerance and complete failure to concern itself with detail and its contempt for those things we were talking about in solemn terms when we were founding our state, saying that if someone didn't have an outstanding character he would never become a good man, unless

⁴¹ Because to all intents and purposes invisible, in S.'s ironic picture. Dead heroes were worshipped in Greek religion at shrines which their spirits were thought to haunt.

ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ παῖς ὢν εὐθύς παίζει ἐν καλοῖς καὶ ἐπιτηδεύοι τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὡς μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἢ καταπατήσασα πάντα ταῦτα οὐδὲν φροντίζει ἐξ ὁποῖων ἂν τις ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ τὰ πολιτικὰ ἰὼν πράττη, ἀλλὰ τιμᾶ, ἐὰν φῆ μόνον εὖνους εἶναι τῷ πλήθει;

Πάνν γ', ἔφη, γενναία.

- c Ταῦτά τε δὴ, ἔφην, ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τούτων ἄλλα ἀδελφὰ δημοκρατία, καὶ εἴη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡδεῖα πολιτεία καὶ ἄναρχος καὶ ποικίλη, ἰσότητά τινα ὁμοίως ἴσοις τε καὶ ἀνίσοις διανέμουσα. ἢ

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, γνώριμα λέγεις.

Ἄθρει δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τίς ὁ τοιοῦτος ἰδίᾳ. ἢ πρῶτον σκεπτέον, ὥσπερ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐσκεψάμεθα, τίνα τρόπον γίγνεται;

Ναί, ἔφη.

- d Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὧδε; τοῦ φειδωλοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γένοιτ' ἂν οἶμαι ὑὸς ὑπὸ τῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος ἐν τοῖς ἐκείνου ἡθεσι;

Τί γὰρ οὔ;

Βία δὴ καὶ οὗτος ἄρχων τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδονῶν, ὅσαι ἢ ἀναλωτικαὶ μὲν, χρηματιστικαὶ δὲ μή· αἱ δὴ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται—

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἵνα μὴ σκοτεινῶς διαλεγόμεθα, πρῶτον ὀρισώμεθα τάς τε ἀναγκαίους ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τὰς μῆ;

Βούλομαι, ἦ δ' ὅς. ἢ

BOOK VIII

right from early childhood he played surrounded by good things, and he made a habit of such pursuits. How magnificently it tramples down all this and gives no thought to what sort of activities someone went in for before going into politics, but honors him only if he claims he is affectionate toward the people, isn't that so?"

"Noble sentiments, indeed," he said.

"These are indeed the qualities democracy would have," I said, "as well as others akin to them, and it seems it would be a pleasant constitution, anarchic and richly varied, which doles out a kind of equality to the equal and unequal alike."

"What you're saying is very familiar to us," he said.

"So, consider what kind of person this is in private life. Or should we first consider how he came to be, just as we did when we examined the constitution?"

"Yes," he said.

"It goes something like this, doesn't it: he would turn out to be the son of that thrifty oligarchic type, I think, raised under his father's care in his father's own ways?"

"Certainly."

"And this boy would certainly control the pleasures inside himself by force: the ones that are extravagant, but not conducive to making money: the ones called inessential."

"Clearly," he said.

"Do you want us, then," I said, "to define first essential desires and those that aren't, so we won't be wandering about in the dark in our discussion?"

"I do," he said.

Οὐκοῦν ἄς τε οὐκ ἂν οἰοί τ' εἶμεν ἀποτρέψαι, δικαίως (ἂν) ἀναγκαῖαι καλοῦντο, καὶ ὅσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ὠφελούσιν ἡμᾶς; τούτων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφίεσθαι ἡμῶν τῇ φύσει ἀνάγκη. ἢ οὐ;

Καὶ μάλα.

559 Δικαίως δὴ τοῦτο ἐπ' αὐταῖς ἐροῦμεν, τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

Δικαίως.

Τί δέ; ἄς τέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῶ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρώσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τούναντίον, | πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν;

Καλῶς μὲν οὔν.

Προελώμεθα δὴ τι παράδειγμα ἑκατέρων αἷ εἰσιν, ἵνα τύπῳ λάβωμεν αὐτάς;

Οὐκοῦν χρή.

b Ἄρ' οὔν οὐχ ἢ τοῦ φαγεῖν μέχρι ὑγιείας τε καὶ εὐεξίας καὶ αὐτοῦ σίτου τε καὶ ὄψου ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἶη;

Οἶμαι.

Ἡ μὲν γέ που τοῦ σίτου κατ' ἀμφότερα ἀναγκαῖα, ἢ τε ὠφέλιμος ἢ τε παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή.⁶ |

Ναί.

Ἡ δὲ ὄψου, εἴ πῃ τινα ὠφελίαν πρὸς εὐεξίαν παρέχεται.

⁶ παῦσαι ζῶντα δυνατή ADF; παῦσαι ζῶντα οὐ δυνατή Hermann; παῦσαι ζῶντα ἀδυνατόν Baiter; alii alia

BOOK VIII

"Then those desires that can't be diverted and any whose satisfaction is completely beneficial to us would rightly be called essential, as we must naturally desire both of these sorts; or is that not so?"

"Very much so."

"Then we shall be right to use this word essential for these desires."

"Yes."

"What about those someone would get rid of, if he practiced from an early age, the possession of which does no good, but even the opposite; if we were to say these are all nonessential, would we not be right?"

"We would."

"Then shall we choose an example of both sorts so we can establish a point of reference?"

"We must do that, mustn't we?"

"So the desire to eat would be essential to health and well-being, meaning bread and relishes, wouldn't it?"⁴²

"I think so."

"The desire for bread is essential on both counts as it's beneficial and if it ceases we cannot stay alive."⁴³

"Yes."

"And so is the desire for relishes if it contributes in any way to one's well-being?"

⁴² See Book 2 n. 48. This diet was prescribed by S. for the first nonluxurious "city of pigs" (2.372c3ff.).

⁴³ Text and precise meaning uncertain here; but the basic meaning is clear—bread is essential for life.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τί δὲ ἢ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, | βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τε φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν; ἄρα γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαία ἂν καλοῖτο;

Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀναλωτικὰς φῶμεν εἶναι ταύτας, ἐκείνας δὲ χρηματιστικὰς διὰ τὸ χρησίμους πρὸς τὰ ἔργα εἶναι; |

Τί μῆν;

Οὕτω δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φήσομεν;

Οὕτω.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὃν νυνδὴ κηφήνα ὠνομάζομεν, τοῦτον ἐλέγομεν τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν γέμοντα καὶ | ἀρχόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων φειδωλόν τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν;

Ἄλλὰ τί μῆν;

Πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγωμεν ὡς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικῆς δημοκρατικὸς γίγνεται. φαίνεται μοι τά γε πολλὰ ὧδε γίνεσθαι.

Πῶς; |

Ὅταν νέος, τεθραμμένος ὡς νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ἀπαιδύτως τε καὶ φειδωλῶς, γεύσῃται κηφήν ὧν⁷ μέλιτος,

⁷ κηφήν ὧν Naber: κηφήμων ADF

BOOK VIII

"Very much so."

"But what about the desire going beyond this, for foods of a different sort from these, which, when it is disciplined and trained from an early age, most people can get rid of, and is harmful both to the body and to the soul's capacity for intelligence and temperance? It would be right to call it inessential, wouldn't it?"

"Absolutely right."

"Are we to agree, then, that these are extravagant, whereas the former are conducive to making money because they are useful for purposes of work?"

"Certainly."

"And shall we say the same about sexual and other desires?"

"Yes."

"And the man we referred to a while ago as a drone we were saying is awash with such pleasures and desires and is ruled by the inessentials, while the one ruled by the essentials is *thrifty and like an oligarch?*"

"Yes, of course."

"Let's discuss again," I said, "how he becomes a democratic sort from an oligarchic sort. It seems to me this is how most things develop."

"How?"

"When a young man is brought up meanly and without education, as we were saying just now, and being a drone⁴⁴

⁴⁴ For a defense of *κηφῆν ὄν*, see Slings, *Critical Notes on Plato's Politeia*, n. ad loc.

καὶ συγγένηται αἴθωσι θηροσὶ καὶ δεινοῖς, παντοδα-
 πὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ ποικίλας καὶ παντοίως ἐχούσας δυνα-
 e μένοις σκευάζειν, ἐνταυθὰ που οἶον εἶναι ἀρχὴν αὐτῷ
 μεταβολῆς (πολιτείας)⁸ ὀλιγαρχικῆς τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἰς
 δημοκρατικὴν.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἡ πόλις μετέβαλλε βοθηθῆσάσης
 τῷ ἑτέρῳ | μέρει συμμαχίας ἕξωθεν, ὁμοίας ὁμοίῳ,
 οὕτω καὶ ὁ νεανίας μεταβάλλει βοθηθούτος αὐτῷ εἶδους
 ἐπιθυμιῶν ἕξωθεν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τῶν παρ' ἐκείνῳ, συγγενοῦς
 τε καὶ ὁμοίου;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε οἶμαι ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ
 ὀλιγαρχικῷ | συμμαχία, ἢ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ
 καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων νουθετούντων τε καὶ κακιζόν-
 560 των, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη ἐν αὐτῷ
 πρὸς αὐτὸν τότε γίγνεται.

Τί μὴν;

Καὶ ποτὲ μὲν οἶμαι τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε |
 τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καὶ τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἱ μὲν δι-
 εφθάρησαν, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς τινοσ ἐγγενο-
 μένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη πάλιν.

Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη.

Αὐθις δὲ οἶμαι τῶν ἐκπεσοῦσῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄλλα
 ὑποτροφόμεναι συγγενεῖς δι' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τρο-
 b φῆς πατρὸς πολλάι τε καὶ ἰσχυραὶ ἐγένοντο.

tastes the honey and mixes with wild and dangerous creatures which can produce all kinds of varied pleasures that can be enjoyed in all kinds of ways, I think you should regard that as the beginning of the change from an oligarchic to a democratic constitution in him."

"That must be absolutely true," he said.

"So just as the state changed when an alliance from outside aided one of the parties, like helping like, so doesn't the young man change too when the similar and related kinds of desires from the outside come to the aid of one of the parties within him?"

"Absolutely," he said.

"And, I think, if in the same vein some alliance in response helps the oligarchic spirit in him in turn which counters the warnings and reproaches of either his father or other members of his family, then indeed revolt and counterrevolt and civil war will break out inside him against himself."

"Of course."

"And sometimes, I think, the democrat in him gives ground to the oligarch and some of his desires are destroyed, others rejected, and when a kind of shame comes over the young man's soul, he is once more brought to order."

"It happens sometimes," he said.

"But again, I think, when desires have been cast aside other related ones are stealthily nurtured through the father's ignorance of how to bring a child up, and grow in both number and strength."

⁸ μεταβολῆς <πολιτείας> Slings: <πολιτείας> post εἰαυτῶ inseruit Adam: μεταβολῆς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικῆς <κατασκευῆς> τῆς ἐν εἰαυτῷ εἰς δημοκρατικὴν Waterfield

Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἔφη, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

Οὐκοῦν εἴλκυσάν τε πρὸς τὰς αὐτὰς ὁμιλίας, καὶ
λάθρα συγγιγνόμεναι πλήθος ἐνέτεκον. |

Τί μήν;

Τελευτῶσαι δὴ οἶμαι κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε
καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἳ δὴ
ἄριστοι φρουροὶ τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν
εἰσι διανοίαις.

c Καὶ πολὺ γ', ἔφη.

Ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες οἶμαι λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι
αὐτ' ἐκείνων ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον
τοῦ τοιούτου. |

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους
ἐλθὼν φανερώς κατοικεῖ, καὶ ἂν παρ' οἰκείων τις
βοήθεια τῷ φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται,
κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι ἐκείνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλι-
d κοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε αὐτὴν τὴν συμμαχίαν
παριᾶσιν, οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων λόγους ἰδιω-
τῶν⁹ εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοὶ τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι, καὶ
τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἡλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἕξω
ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές
τε καὶ | προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ
καὶ κοσμίαν δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν
οὔσαν πείθοντες ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνω-
φελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν;

⁹ ἰδιωτῶν ADF: δι' ὧτων Badham

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"That is what usually happens, at any rate," he said.

"And don't they drag him back into the same associations, link up secretly, and breed a multitude?"

"Of course."

"Indeed, I suppose, they end up by capturing the acropolis of the young man's soul which they see is empty of both understanding and good habits and true reasoning, which are the best guardians and protectors in the minds of men loved by the gods."

"Very much so," he said.

"Indeed, false, specious reasoning and opinion come rushing up and take over the same place in such a person instead of the others."

"Absolutely," he said.

"In fact doesn't he then return to those Lotus-eaters⁴⁵ and openly live with them, and if any reinforcement comes from his family to the thrifty part of the soul, don't those specious arguments close the gates of the royal defenses within him and neither admit the allied forces nor receive the representations of older private individuals? Won't they both fight and win, call his self-respect folly, throw it out like an exile in disgrace, call his temperance cowardice,⁴⁶ drag it through the mud, throw it out and persuade him that his moderation and orderly expenditure are boorish and stingy habits and join up with many unprofitable desires to banish them over the border?"

⁴⁵ See Hom. *Od.* 9.82–104. Proverbial for forgetfulness of everything but the pleasures of the moment.

⁴⁶ For a very similar account of the changed meanings of value terms under the influence of political factions in Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. 3.82.

Σφόδρα γε.

Τούτων δέ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν
 e τοῦ κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν
 μεγάλοισι τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρ-
 χίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολ-
 λῷ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες
 καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν ἢ μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦν-
 561 τες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσωτίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέ-
 πειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. ἄρ' οὐχ οὕτω πως, ἦν δ'
 ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις ἐπι-
 θυμίαις τρεφομένου εἰς τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ
 ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν; ἢ

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναργῶς.

Ζῆ δὴ οἶμαι μετὰ ταῦτα ὁ τοιοῦτος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον
 εἰς ἀναγκαίους ἢ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἡδονὰς ἀναλίσκων
 καὶ χρήματα καὶ πόνους καὶ διατριβάς· ἀλλ' ἐὰν
 b εὐτυχῆς ἦ καὶ μὴ πέρα ἐκβακχευθῆ, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ
 πρεσβύτερος γενόμενος τοῦ πολλοῦ θορύβου παρελ-
 θόντος μέρη τε καταδέξῃται τῶν ἐκπεσόντων καὶ τοῖς
 ἐπεισελθοῦσι μὴ ὄλον ἐαυτὸν ἐνδῶ, εἰς ἴσον δὴ τι
 καταστήσας τὰς ἡδονὰς διάγει, τῇ παραπιπτούσῃ αἰεὶ
 ὥσπερ ἢ λαχούσῃ τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδιδούς ἕως
 ἂν πληρωθῆ, καὶ αὐθις ἄλλῃ, οὐδεμίαν ἀτιμάζων ἀλλ'
 ἐξ ἴσου τρέφω.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

“Absolutely!”

“And I suppose that when they have emptied and purged these from his soul, which has been occupied and made ready for the great mysteries,⁴⁷ immediately afterward they bring back from exile violence and anarchy and profligacy and shamelessness brilliantly garlanded with a large chorus, they extol and flatter him, call violence culture, anarchy freedom, profligacy magnificence, shamelessness manliness.⁴⁸ Isn’t this the way,” I said, “as a young man he changes from his upbringing based on desires for what is basically essential, to licentiousness and indulgence in unnecessary and unprofitable pleasures?”

“A vivid description!” he said.

“After this, I think, such a young man lives and wastes his money and efforts and time on essential no more than inessential pleasures. But if he’s lucky and doesn’t get too carried away by the excitement, and when he is somewhat older and most of the turmoil is passed, he’ll receive back some of those banished desires and won’t give himself over entirely to the invaders; he’ll put all his pleasures on an equal footing, and live, always giving rule over himself to the one that happens to have cropped up, chosen by lot, as it were,⁴⁹ until it is satisfied. And again on to another one; he won’t reject any of them, but foster them all equally.”

“Very much so.”

⁴⁷ A sarcastic parody of the religious preparation for the Eleusinian Mysteries, the imagery extending to 561a1. Cf. *Grg.* 497c.

⁴⁸ See above, n. 46.

⁴⁹ The method of election of most state officials in fifth- and fourth-century democratic Athens.

Καὶ λόγον γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀληθῆ οὐ προσδεχόμενος οὐδὲ παριεῖς εἰς τὸ φρούριον, εἴαν τις λέγῃ ὡς αἱ μὲν
 c εἰσι τῶν καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἡδοναί, αἱ δὲ τῶν πονηρῶν, καὶ τὰς μὲν χρῆ ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ τιμᾶν, τὰς δὲ κολάζειν τε καὶ δουλοῦσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις ἀνανεύει τε καὶ ὁμοίας φησὶν ἀπάσας εἶναι καὶ τιμητέας ἐξ ἴσου. |

Σφόδρα γάρ, ἔφη, οὕτω διακείμενος τοῦτο δρᾶ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ διαζῆ τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν οὕτω
 d χαριζόμενος τῇ προσπιπτούσῃ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, τοτὲ μὲν μεθύων καὶ καταυλούμενος, αὐθις δὲ ὑδροποτῶν καὶ κατισχναινόμενος, τοτὲ δ' αὖ γυμναζόμενος, ἔστιν δ' ὅτε ἀργῶν καὶ πάντων ἀμελῶν, τοτὲ δ' ὡς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ διατρίβων. πολλάκις δὲ πολιτεύεται, καὶ ἀναπηδῶν ὅτι ἂν τύχῃ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει· | κἄν ποτέ τινας πολεμικοὺς ζηλώσῃ, ταύτῃ φέρεται, ἢ χρηματιστικούς, ἐπὶ τοῦτ' αὖ, καὶ οὔτε τις τάξις οὔτε ἀνάγκη ἔπεστιν αὐτοῦ τῷ βίῳ, ἀλλ' ἡδύν τε δὴ καὶ ἐλευθέριον καὶ μακάριον καλῶν τὸν βίον τοῦτον χρῆται αὐτῷ διὰ παντός.

e Παντάπασι, ἦ δ' ὅς, διελέλυθας βίον ἰσονομικοῦ τινος ἀνδρός.

Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστων ἡθῶν μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλόν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥσπερ | ἐκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι· ὃν

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“And,” I said, “he won’t accept a true account nor admit it to his stronghold if anyone tells him that some pleasures belong to good, worthwhile desires, others to bad ones, and that he must practice and respect the former, and hold the latter in check and control them. But he denies all of this and says they are all alike and must be treated as equals.”⁵⁰

“This is certainly his attitude and the way he behaves,” he said.

“Therefore he lives and enjoys the desire that each day happens to bring along, sometimes indulging in wine to the sound of the flute, and at others drinking water and pining away. Again there are times when he takes exercise, but there are times when he’s idle and neglects everything, while at others he’s apparently engrossed in philosophy. He frequently takes part in politics and leaps up and says and does whatever occurs to him. And if he can ever admire some military men, that’s the side he inclines toward; or if businessmen, then again he inclines that way; and there is no order or necessity in his life, but he calls this existence truly pleasant and free and blessed and applies himself to it throughout the whole of his life.”

“You’ve described perfectly the life of a man devoted to equality in law,”⁵¹ he said.

“I certainly think,” I said, “this is a man of all sorts, full of so many characteristics, both fine and varied, just like that city.”⁵² Many men and women would envy him his way

⁵⁰ For the argument that there are good and bad pleasures, see *Gr.* 494eff. ⁵¹ *isonomia* = “legal equality,” a key democratic value (see, e.g., *Hdt.* 3.80).

⁵² I.e., the one described at 557d.

πολλοὶ ἂν καὶ πολλαὶ ζηλώσειαν τοῦ βίου, παραδείγματα πολιτειῶν τε καὶ τρόπων πλείοστα ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχοντα.

Οὗτος γάρ, ἔφη, ἔστιν.

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Τί οὖν; τετάχθω ἡμῖν κατὰ δημοκρατίαν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ, ὡς δημοκρατικὸς ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορευόμενος;

Τετάχθω, ἔφη.

Ἡ καλλίστη δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολιτεία τε καὶ ὁ κάλλιστος | ἀνὴρ λοιπὰ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴη διελθεῖν, τυραννίς τε καὶ τύραννος.

Κομιδῆ γ', ἔφη.

Φέρε δὴ, τίς τρόπος τυραννίδος, ᾧ φίλε ἑταῖρε, γίγνεται; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ δημοκρατίας μεταβάλλει σχεδὸν δῆλον.

Δῆλον. |

Ἄρ' οὖν τρόπον τινα τὸν αὐτὸν ἔκ τε ὀλιγαρχίας δημοκρατία γίγνεται καὶ ἐκ δημοκρατίας τυραννίς;

Πῶς;

b

ἌΟ προύθεντο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀγαθόν, καὶ δι' ὃ ἡ¹⁰ ὀλιγαρχία καθίστατο—τούτο δ' ἦν πλοῦτος· ἡ γάρ;

Ναί.

Ἡ πλούτου τοίνυν ἀπληστία καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια διὰ | χρηματισμὸν αὐτὴν ἀπόλλυ.

Ἄληθῆ, ἔφη.

¹⁰ δι' ὃ ἡ Adam: δι' οὗ ἡ DF: δι' οὗ A

BOOK VIII

of life with all the many examples of constitutions and traditions it contains.”

“Yes, that’s the one,” he said.

“What then? Should a man such as this be classed with a democratic state, as being rightly called a democrat?”

“Yes, let him be,” he said.

“Then it would leave us with the task of exploring the finest state and the finest man: tyranny and the tyrant.”⁵³

“Absolutely,” he said

“Come now: how does a tyranny come into being, my dear friend? You see it’s fairly clear that it’s a development from democracy.”

“Clearly.”

“Does democracy then in fact evolve from oligarchy, and tyranny from democracy in virtually the same way?”

“How do you mean?”

“The thing which they proposed for themselves as being good and through which oligarchy was established was wealth, wasn’t it?”

“Yes.”

“The insatiable desire for it, then, and the neglect of all else due to moneymaking destroyed it.”

“True,” he said.

⁵³ Deeply ironic; tyranny is ranked by Plato as the worst of the five constitutions under discussion. It was introduced, also ironically, as “noble” at 544c6. Discussion of the tyrannical state and individual tyrant is particularly extensive and takes S. up to 9.580a.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ ὁ δημοκρατία ὀρίζεται ἀγαθόν, ἢ
τούτου ἀπληστία καὶ ταύτην καταλύει;

Λέγεις δ' αὐτὴν τί ὀρίζεσθαι;

Τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, εἶπον. τοῦτο γάρ που ἐν δημοκρα-
c τουμένῃ πόλει ἀκούσαις ἂν ὡς ἔχει τε κάλλιστον καὶ
διὰ ταῦτα ἐν μόνῃ ταύτῃ ἄξιον οἰκῆν ὅστις φύσει
ἐλεύθερος.

Λέγεται γὰρ δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ πολὺ τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἦα νυνδὴ ἐρών, ἢ τοῦ
τοιούτου ἀπληστία | καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων ἀμέλεια καὶ
ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν μεθίστησίν τε καὶ παρασκευάζει
τυραννίδος δεθηθῆναι;

Πῶς; ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἦα νυνδὴ ἐρών, ἢ τοῦ
d διψήσασα κακῶν οἰνοχόων προστατούντων τύχη, καὶ
πορρωτέρω τοῦ δέοντος ἀκράτου αὐτῆς μεθυσθῆ, τοὺς
ἄρχοντας δὴ, ἂν μὴ πάνν πρᾶοι ὦσι καὶ πολλὴν
παρέχωσι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, κολάζει αἰτιωμένη ὡς μαι-
ρούς τε καὶ ὀλιγαρχικούς. |

Δρώσιν γάρ, ἔφη, τοῦτο.

Τοὺς δέ γε, εἶπον, τῶν ἀρχόντων κατηκόους προ-
πηλακίζει ὡς ἐβελοδούλους τε καὶ οὐδὲν ὄντας, τοὺς
δὲ ἄρχοντας μὲν ἀρχομένοις, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἄρχουσιν
ὁμοίους ἰδία τε καὶ δημοσία ἐπαινεῖ τε καὶ τιμᾶ. Ἄρ'
οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἐν τοιαύτῃ πόλει ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐλευθερίας
ἰέναι; |

e Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Καὶ καταδύεσθαί γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, εἰς τε τὰς

BOOK VIII

"So isn't it that which democracy defines as good, its insatiable desire for it, which destroys it?"

"What are you defining as 'it'?"

"Freedom," I said: "because I imagine that what you would hear in a democratically run state is how very good it is and for this reason is the only place worthy for a naturally free man to live in."

"Yes, I can tell you this is often said."

"So then, as I was about to say just now, the insatiable desire for such a state and the neglect of all else makes this constitution change too and brings about the need for a tyranny, doesn't it?"

"How?" he asked.

"I think it's when a democratically run state has a taste of freedom, when by chance bad wine stewards are in charge, and gets drunk because of its excessive need to have the wine unmixed. It punishes its rulers if they are not very easygoing and don't give them a good measure of freedom, and accuses them of being disgusting oligarchs."

"Yes, it does that," he said.

"And again it abuses those who show deference to their rulers as willing slaves and nobodies; it approves and respects in both private and public life those rulers who are like their subjects and the subjects who are like their rulers. Surely in such a state the course of freedom must go all the way?"

"Of course."

"And, my dear friend," I said, "it must permeate into

ιδίας οἰκίας καὶ τελευτᾶν μέχρι τῶν θηρίων τὴν ἀναρχίαν ἐμφυομένην. |

Πῶς, ἦ δ' ὅς, τὸ τοιοῦτον λέγομεν;

563 Οἶον, ἔφη, πατέρα μὲν ἐθίζεσθαι παιδὶ ὅμοιον γίνεσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς νεῖς, ὕν δὲ πατρί, καὶ μήτε αἰσχύνεσθαι μήτε δεδιέναι τοὺς γονέας, ἵνα δὴ ἐλεύθερος ἦ· μέτοικον δὲ ἀστῶ καὶ ἀστὸν μετοίκῳ ἐξισοῦσθαι, καὶ ξένον ὡσαύτως.

Γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτως, ἔφη.

Ταῦτά τε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ σμικρὰ τοιάδε ἄλλα γίγνεται. | διδάσκαλός τε ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ φοιτητὰς φοβεῖται καὶ θωπεύει, φοιτηταί τε διδασκάλων ὀλιγορῶσιν, οὕτω δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγῶν· καὶ ὅλως οἱ μὲν νέοι πρεσβυτέροις ἀπεικάζονται καὶ διαμιλλῶνται καὶ ἐν b λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἔργοις, οἱ δὲ γέροντες συγκαθιέντες τοῖς νέοις εὐτραπέλιος τε καὶ χαριεντισμοῦ ἐμπίμπλονται, μιμούμενοι τοὺς νέους, ἵνα δὴ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀηδεῖς εἶναι μηδὲ δεσποτικοί.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. |

Τὸ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔσχατον, ὦ φίλε, τῆς ἐλευθερίας τοῦ πλήθους, ὅσον γίγνεται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πόλει, ὅταν δὴ οἱ ἐωνημένοι καὶ αἱ ἐωνημένοι μηδὲν ἤττον ἐλεύθεροι ᾧσι τῶν πριαμένων. ἐν γυναιξὶ δὲ πρὸς ἀνδρας καὶ ἀνδράσι πρὸς γυναῖκας ὄση ἡ ἰσονομία καὶ ἐλευθερία γίγνεται, ὀλίγον ἐπελαθόμεθ' εἰπέιν.

every private household until finally it infects even animals with anarchy."

"What do you mean by that?" he asked.

"For example," I said, "a father gets into the habit of becoming like a child and is afraid of his sons, a son becomes like his father and neither respects nor fears his parents, just in order to be free. Resident aliens are equal to citizens and citizens to resident aliens, and foreigners likewise."⁵⁴

"Yes, that's what is happening," he said.

"This and other trivial things like it are happening," I said. "A teacher in such circumstances is afraid of and panders to his pupils; the pupils show contempt for their teachers and likewise for their minders.⁵⁵ And in general the young ape their elders and compete with them verbally and in their behavior, while old men humor the young with banter and are full of wisecracks and imitate the young so as not to appear disagreeable and authoritarian."

"Absolutely," he said.

"Further, the ultimate in freedom for the masses in my view, my friend, is what happens in such a city when men and women bought as slaves are no less free than those who bought them. We almost forgot to mention how great equality before the law and freedom there is for women in relation to men and men to women."

⁵⁴ For the alleged equality of citizens and *metoikoi* ("resident aliens") in Athens, see [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* ("Old Oligarch") 1.10-12.

⁵⁵ "Minders" = *paidagōgoi*; slaves whose job it was to attend children to and from school (see also 2.373c2-3).

c Οὐκοῦν κατ' Αἰσχύλον, ἔφη, “ἐροῦμεν ὅτι νῦν ἦλθ' ἐπὶ στόμα”;

Πάνυ γε, εἶπον· καὶ ἔγωγε οὕτω λέγω· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τῶν θηρίων τῶν ὑπὸ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅσῳ ἐλευθερώτερὰ | ἐστὶν ἐνταῦθα ἢ ἐν ἄλλῃ, οὐκ ἄν τις πείθοιτο ἄπειρος. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ αἱ τε κύνες κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οἰαίπερ αἱ δέσποναι γίνονται τε δὴ καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι, πάνυ ἐλευθέρως καὶ σεμνῶς εἰθισμένοι πορεύεσθαι, κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐμβάλλοντες τῷ ἀεὶ ἀπαντῶντι, εἰ μὴ ἐξίστηται, καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα οὕτω μεστὰ ἐλευθερίας γίνονται.

d Τὸ ἐμόν γ', ἔφη, ἐμοὶ λέγεις ὄναρ· αὐτὸς γὰρ εἰς ἀγρὸν πορευόμενος θαμὰ αὐτὸ πάσχω.

Τὸ δὲ δὴ κεφάλαιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάντων τούτων συνηθροισμένων, ἐννοεῖς ὡς ἀπαλὴν τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν πολιτῶν ποιεῖ, | ὥστε καὶ ὅτιοῦν δουλείας τις προσφέρηται, ἀγανακτεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι; τελευτῶντες γὰρ που οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν νόμων φροντίζουσιν γεγραμμένων ἢ ἀγράφων, ἵνα δὴ μηδαμῇ μηδεὶς αὐτοῖς
e ἦ δεσπότης.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, οἶδα.

Αὕτη μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, ἡ ἀρχὴ οὕτως ἰ καλὴ καὶ νεανικῆ, ὅθεν τυραννὶς φύεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. |

Νεανικὴ δῆτα, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο;

Ταυτόν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅπερ ἐν τῇ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ νόσημα ἐγγενόμενον ἀπώλεσεν αὐτήν, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ πλεόν τε καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐκ τῆς ἐξουσίας ἐγγενόμενον

BOOK VIII

“So shall we go along with Aeschylus,” he said, “and say ‘what now comes to our lips?’”⁵⁶

“Certainly,” I said, “and what I say is: how much freer the lot of domesticated animals is here than elsewhere has to be seen to be believed. For bitches, just as in the proverb, become like their mistresses, as indeed horses and mules are accustomed to go about in total freedom, always haughtily barging into those who get in their way, unless they step aside, and everything else is full of freedom like this.”

“You don’t have to tell me,”⁵⁷ he said, “for I frequently come across this when I go out into the countryside.”

“Indeed, when you put these things together, the main thing you notice is how it makes the souls of the citizens sensitive, so that if they come close to anything with a whiff of slavery, they become resentful and won’t put up with it. I’m sure you know that they end up with no respect at all for the law, written or unwritten, in order that no one will ever be their master in any way.”

“Yes, I do know that,” he said.

“This then, my friend,” I said, “is the beginning, so beautiful and vigorous, from which it seems to me tyranny grows.”

“Vigorous indeed,” he said, “but what follows from this?”

“The same sickness,” I said, “which in oligarchy infected and destroyed it; so too in this political system when it has infected it more vehemently as a result of this license

⁵⁶ Fr. 351 Nauck. S. takes up what he said about animals immediately above at 562e3.

⁵⁷ Literally, “It’s my own dream you’re telling me.”

καταδουλοῦται δημοκρατίαν. καὶ τῷ ὄντι τὸ ἄγαν τι
 ποιεῖν μεγάλην φιλεῖ | εἰς τοῦναντίον μεταβολὴν αὐτ-
 564 αποδιδόναι, ἐν ὧραις τε καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν σώμασιν,
 καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν πολιτείαις οὐχ ἥκιστα.

Εἰκός, ἔφη.

Ἡ γὰρ ἄγαν ἐλευθερία ἔοικεν οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο τι ἢ εἰς
 ἄγαν δουλείαν μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἰδιώτη καὶ πόλει. |

Εἰκὸς γάρ.

Εἰκότως τοίνυν, εἶπον, οὐκ ἔξ ἄλλης πολιτείας
 τυραννὶς καθίσταται ἢ ἐκ δημοκρατίας, ἔξ οἶμαι τῆς
 ἀκροτάτης ἐλευθερίας δουλεία πλείστη τε καὶ ἀγρι-
 ωτάτη.

Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτ' οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡρώτας, ἀλλὰ ποῖον
 b νόσημα ἐν ὀλιγαρχίᾳ τε φυόμενον ταῦτόν καὶ ἐν
 δημοκρατίᾳ δουλοῦται αὐτήν.

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἐκείνο τοίνυν, ἔφην, ἔλεγον τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ |
 δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, τὸ μὲν ἀνδρειότατον ἡγού-
 μενον αὐτῶν, τὸ δ' ἀνανδρότερον ἐπόμενον· οὓς δὴ
 ἀφομοιοῦμεν κηφήσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ
 ἀκέντροις.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

c Τούτῳ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ταραττετον ἐν πάσῃ
 πολιτείᾳ ἐγγιγνομένῳ, οἶον περὶ σῶμα φλέγμα τε καὶ
 χολή· ὧ δὴ καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἱατρόν τε καὶ νομοθέτην

BOOK VIII

it turns democracy to slavery. And in actual fact overdoing anything usually brings about great change to the opposite as a repayment in both seasons and plants and living things, and, what is more, especially in political institutions."

"That's probable," he said.

"You see it seems that excessive freedom both in our private lives and public evolves into nothing other than excessive slavery."

"Yes, that's likely."

"So it's likely then that tyranny is based on no other political system than democracy; out of the highest freedom, I believe, comes the most widespread and savage slavery."

"Indeed, that is logical," he said.

"But I don't think that is what you were asking me, but what kind of disease that infects an oligarchy and democracy alike enslaves the latter?"

"You're right," he said.

"It's that group of lazy prodigal men I was talking about," I said, "the bravest of them leading, the more cowardly following, whom we compared to drones, those with and those without stings."⁵⁸

"And rightly so," he said.

"These two groups, then," I said, "arise in every state and create havoc, just like phlegm and bile in the body,⁵⁹ which to be sure the good doctor and the city's law-

⁵⁸ At 552c2-e3.

⁵⁹ Two opposed humors in the human body thought to be responsible for cold/wet and hot/dry states, respectively, which caused health and disease; see Hippoc. *Aer.* 10.

πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν
 εὐλαβεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν ὅπως μὴ ἐγγενήσεσθον,
 ἀν δὲ ἐγγένησθον, ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα | σὺν αὐτοῖσι
 τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον.

Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε.

ᾠδε τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λάβωμεν, ἕν' εὐκρινέστερον
 ἴδωμεν ὁ βουλόμεθα.

Πῶς;

Τριχῆ διαστησώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ δημοκρατουμένην
 d πόλιν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ἔχει. ἐν μὲν γάρ που τὸ τοιοῦτον
 γένος ἐν αὐτῇ ἐμφύεται δι' ἐξουσίαν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἢ ἐν
 τῇ ὀλιγαρχουμένην.

Ἔστιν οὕτω.

Πολὺν δέ γε δριμύτερον ἐν ταύτῃ ἢ ἐν ἐκείνῃ. |

Πῶς;

Ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔντιμον εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀπελαύνεσθαι
 τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἀγύμναστον καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένον γίγνεται
 ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ δὲ τοῦτό που τὸ προεστὸς αὐτῆς, ἐκτὸς
 ὀλίγων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δριμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ
 πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ
 e τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος, ὥστε πάντα
 ὑπὸ τοῦ τοιοῦτου διοικεῖται ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ πολιτείᾳ
 χωρὶς τινων ὀλίγων.

Μάλα γε, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Ἄλλο τοίνυν τοιόνδε αἰεὶ ἀποκρίνεται ἐκ τοῦ πλή-
 θους. |

Τὸ ποῖον;

BOOK VIII

giver, no less than an experienced beekeeper, must take in hand well in advance to prevent them first and foremost from arising, but if they do, to ensure that they can be eradicated as quickly as possible with the honeycombs and all."

"Yes, by Zeus, by every possible means."

"Let's take it this way, then," I said, "so we can see what we want more precisely."

"How?"

"Let's divide our democratically run state into three, as it is in fact. I imagine you can see one group like the one above arises in it through license no less than in the oligarchic state."

"That is so."

"But much more fiercely in this one than the other."

"How?"

"Because in the latter it is not respected, but excluded from office, it gets out of practice and lacks strength; but in the democracy I take this to be the dominant class there, with a few exceptions, and the keenest part of it talks and takes action while the rest sit round the platform buzzing, and will not tolerate anyone who talks about anything else, so that in such a political system, with a few exceptions,⁶⁰ everything is administered by such a group."

"Indeed," he said.

"Now there is another group who can be distinguished from the crowd."

"Which one?"

⁶⁰ I.e., some holders of offices at Athens who were elected on the basis of expertise, for example, military leaders and financial officials.

Χρηματιζομένων που πάντων, οί κοσμιώτατοι φύσει ὡς τὸ πολὺ πλουσιώτατοι γίγνονται.

Εἰκός.

Πλείστον δὴ οἶμαι τοῖς κηφήσι μέλι καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλέπεται.¹¹ |

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἔφη, παρά γε τῶν σμικρὰ ἐχόντων τις βλίσσειεν;

Πλούσιοι δὴ οἶμαι οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται κηφήνων βοτάνη.

Σχεδόν τι, ἔφη. |

565 Δῆμος δ' ἂν εἶη τρίτον γένος, ὅσοι αὐτουργοί τε καὶ ἀπράγμονες, οὐ πάννυ πολλὰ κεκτημένοι· ὁ δὴ πλείστον τε καὶ κυριώτατον ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ὅτανπερ ἀθροισθῆ.

Ἔστιν γάρ, ἔφη, ἄλλ' οὐ θαμὰ ἐθέλει ποιεῖν τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ | μέλιτός τι μεταλαμβάνη.

Οὐκοῦν μεταλαμβάνει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰεὶ, καθ' ὅσον δύνανται οἱ προεστῶτες, τοὺς ἔχοντας τὴν οὐσίαν ἀφαιρούμενοι, διανέμοντες τῷ δήμῳ, τὸ πλείστον αὐτοὶ ἔχειν.

b Μεταλαμβάνει γὰρ οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὕτως.

Ἀναγκάζονται δὴ οἶμαι ἀμύνεσθαι, λέγοντές τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ πράττοντες ὅπη δύνανται, οὗτοι ὦν ἀφαιροῦνται.

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; |

¹¹ βλέπεται Ruhnkenius; βλέπτε ADF; βλέπτειν Adam

BOOK VIII

“In my view where everyone is aiming to make money those naturally best organized generally become the richest.”

“That’s probably the case.”

“Then this, I think, is the most plentiful supply of honey for the drones and is most easily extracted from that source.”

“Yes,” he said, “for how could one extract the honeycomb from those who have little?”

“Indeed, men like this, known as the rich, are the drones’ feeding ground.”

“Pretty well,” he said.

“The ordinary people would be the third group, those who work for themselves and don’t take part in politics,⁶¹ who haven’t acquired much, and which in fact is the most populous and powerful group in the democracy whenever it is gathered together.”

“Yes, it is,” he said, “but it doesn’t often want to do this unless it gets a share of the honey.”

“So,” I said, “doesn’t it always get its share to the extent that its leaders, in taking the livelihood of those who have it, distribute it among the people, while being able to keep most of it themselves.”

“Yes, that’s how it gets its share,” he said.

“Then those whose livelihood is taken away are forced to defend themselves by speaking in the assembly and taking action in whichever way they can.”

“Of course.”

⁶¹ *apragmones*. The condition of the “ordinary people,” the *dēmos*, in Plato’s judgment. See above, n. 21.

Αἰτίαν δὴ ἔσχον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐτέρων, κὰν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι νεωτερίζειν, ὡς ἐπιβουλεύουσι τῷ δήμῳ καὶ εἰσιν ὀλιγαρχικοί.

Τί μήν;

οὐκοῦν καὶ τελευτῶντες, ἐπειδὰν ὀρώσι τὸν δῆμον, οὐχ ἐκόντα ἀλλ' ἀγνοήσαντά τε καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντα ὑπὸ τῶν διαβαλλόντων, ἐπιχειροῦντα σφᾶς ἀδικεῖν, τὸτ' ἦδη, εἴτε βούλονται εἴτε μή, ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικοί γίνονται, οὐχ ἐκόντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκείνος ὁ κηφήν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν αὐτούς. |

Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν.

Εἰσαγγελίαι δὴ καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ἀγῶνες περὶ ἀλλήλων γίνονται.

Καὶ μάλα.

οὐκοῦν ἓνα τινὰ ἀεὶ δῆμος εἴθην διαφερόντως προϊόστασθαι | ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ τοῦτον τρέφειν τε καὶ αὔξειν μέγαν;

Εἴωθε γάρ.

Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δῆλον, ὅτι, ὅταν περὶ φύηται τύραννος, ἐκ προστατικῆς ρίζης καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοθεν ἐκβλαστάνει.

Καὶ μάλα δῆλον.

Τίς ἀρχὴ οὖν μεταβολῆς ἐκ προστάτου ἐπὶ τύραννον; ἢ | δῆλον ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ταῦτὸν ἄρξῃται δρᾶν ὁ προστάτης τῷ ἐν τῷ μύθῳ ὃς περὶ τὸ ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ τὸ τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερόν λέγεται;

Τίς; ἔφη.

Ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχχνου,

BOOK VIII

“The upshot being that they’re accused by the others, even if they have no stomach for revolution, of plotting against the people and of being oligarchs.”

“Yes, certainly.”

“That means, doesn’t it, that when they see the assembly unwillingly and unwittingly misled by their accusers, who are trying to do them wrong, that’s when they end up becoming true oligarchs whether they want to or not, not willingly, but this is the very evil that that drone causes when it stings them?”

“Oh yes, absolutely.”

“Indeed, impeachments, trials, and lawsuits arise on both sides.”

“They certainly do.”

“And doesn’t this mean that the people habitually appoint someone outstanding to take charge of them, nurturing him and making him great?”

“Yes, it does.”

“This, then, is clear,” I said, “that when a tyrant emerges he comes from leadership stock and sprouts from no other source.”

“That is definitely clear.”

“What begins the change, then, from leader to tyrant? Or is it clear that it happens whenever the tyrant begins to behave like the man in the story which tells of the sanctuary of Lycian Zeus in Arcadia?”⁶²

“Which one’s that?” he asked.

“How whoever tastes human entrails when a man had

⁶² Lycian Zeus = Zeus in wolf form, worshipped particularly in the mountain areas of Arcadia in the central Peloponnese.

e ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἐνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου,
ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν
λόγον;

Ἔγωγε.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὅς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν
σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχῃται ἐμφυλίου
αἵματος, ἀλλ' ἰ ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν,
εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μαιφονῆ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων,
γλώττη τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίῳ γεύομενος φόνου
566 συγγενοῦς, καὶ ἀνδρηλατῆ καὶ ἀποκτεινύη καὶ ὑποση-
μαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἅρα
τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τούτο καὶ εἴμαρται ἢ
ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ
ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι; ἰ

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Οὗτος δὴ, ἔφη, ὁ στασιάζων γίγνεται πρὸς τοὺς
ἔχοντας τὰς οὐσίας.

Οὗτος.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐκπεσῶν μὲν καὶ κατελθῶν ἰ βία τῶν
ἐχθρῶν τύραννος ἀπειργασμένος κατέρχεται;

Δῆλον.

b Ἐὰν δὲ ἀδύνατοι ἐκβάλλειν αὐτὸν ὧσιν ἢ ἀποκτεῖ-
ναι διαβάλλοντες τῇ πόλει, βιαίῳ δὴ θανάτῳ ἐπι-
βουλεύουσιν ἀποκτεινῆναι λάθρα.

Φιλεῖ γοῦν, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.

Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ

BOOK VIII

been cut up among the innards of various other victims would inevitably turn into a wolf. Or haven't you heard the story?"

"Yes, I have."

"So isn't it the same with the man who leads the people who, having taken over a really docile crowd, does not withhold his hand from shedding the blood of his fellow tribesmen, but unjustly brings charges of murder to the law courts, as indeed usually happens, thereby wiping out a man's life, tasting kindred blood with impious tongue and mouth, and exiles, executes, and hints at debt cancellations and redistributions of land: must it not of necessity follow for such a man that he is destined either to die at the hands of his enemies or become tyrant and turn from man into wolf?"

"That has to be the case," he said.

"This, then, is he who becomes the agitator against those who own property."

"He does."

"So if he is thrown out and comes back in spite of his enemies, he returns from exile as a fully fledged tyrant, doesn't he?"⁶³

"Clearly."

"But if they can't throw him out, or denounce him to the state or have him put to death, they plot to have him secretly done away with by a violent death."

"That is certainly what usually happens," he said.

"Thus at this stage comes the notorious demand made

⁶³ A probable allusion to the Athenian tyrant Pisistratus, who, after being expelled, eventually returned to Athens in 555 and ruled with the support of armed force (Hdt. 1.59-64).

τούτω | πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκου-
σιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος,
ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾗ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Διδόασι δὴ οἶμαι δείσαντες μὲν ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου, θαρ-
ρήσαντες δὲ | ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν.

Καὶ μάλα.

- c Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ὅταν ἴδῃ ἀνὴρ χρήματα ἔχων καὶ
μετὰ τῶν χρημάτων αἰτίαν μισόδημος εἶναι, τότε δὴ
οὔτος, ὃ ἑταῖρε, κατὰ τὸν Κροίσῳ γενόμενον χρη-
σμὸν—

πολυψήφίδα παρ' Ἑρμον |
φεύγει, οὐδὲ μένει, οὐδ' αἰδεῖται κακὸς εἶναι.

Οὐ γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δεύτερον αὐθις αἰδεσθείη.

Ὅ δέ γε οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καταληφθεὶς θανάτῳ
δίδοται.

Ἀνάγκη.

- d Ὅ δὲ δὴ προστάτης ἐκείνος αὐτὸς δῆλον δὴ ὅτι
μέγας μεγαλωστὶ οὐ κείται, ἀλλὰ καταβαλὼν ἄλλους
πολλοὺς ἔστηκεν ἐν τῷ δίφρῳ τῆς πόλεως, τύραννος
ἀντὶ προστάτου ἀποτετελεσμένος.

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη. |

BOOK VIII

by the tyrant, as all those who have got this far discover, when he asks the people for personal bodyguards in order that the people's mainstay may be kept safe for their sake."

"Indeed so," he said.

"And so they grant it, I think, out of fear for him and confident in their own power."

"Indeed."

"Therefore, when a man with money sees this and that his possession of it is the reason for his being known as an enemy of the people, then truly, my friend, according to the oracle given to Croesus:

He flees along the pebbled shore of Hermus
he does not tarry, he is not ashamed to be a
coward."⁶⁴

"Well, he wouldn't have the chance to be ashamed a second time," he said.

"Indeed, if he's caught, I think he'll be handed over for execution," I said.

"Inevitably."

"And indeed that same champion quite clearly does not lie 'mightily in his might,'⁶⁵ but having cast down many others he stands in the 'chariot of the state'⁶⁶ having ended up as an absolute tyrant instead of people's champion."

"What's to stop him?" he said.

⁶⁴ Hdt. 1.55 (Plato alters the context and turns Herodotus' imperatives into the present tense). Croesus was asking the Delphic oracle if his reign would be a long one.

⁶⁵ Hom. *Il.* 16.776.

⁶⁶ Quoted from an unknown poetical source.

Διέλθωμεν δὴ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς καὶ τῆς πόλεως, ἐν ἧ ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος βροτὸς ἐγγένηται;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, διέλθωμεν.

Ἄρ' οὖν, εἶπον, οὐ ταῖς μὲν πρώταις ἡμέραις τε καὶ χρόνῳ προσγελᾷ τε καὶ ἀσπάζεται πάντας, ᾧ ἂν περιτυγχάνῃ, καὶ οὔτε τύραννός φησιν εἶναι ὑπισχνεῖται τε πολλὰ καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, χρεῶν τε ἠλευθέρωσσε καὶ γῆν διένειμε δῆμῳ τε καὶ τοῖς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ πᾶσιν ἰλιώσ τε καὶ πρᾶος εἶναι προσποιεῖται; |

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ὅταν δέ γε οἶμαι πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω ἐχθροὺς τοῖς μὲν καταλλαγῇ, τοὺς δὲ καὶ διαφθείρῃ, καὶ ἡσυχία ἐκείνων γένηται, πρῶτον μὲν πολέμους τινὰς αἰεὶ κινεῖ, ἵν' ἐν χρεῖα ἡγεμόνος ὁ δῆμος ᾗ.

Εἰκόσ γε. |

567 Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἵνα χρήματα εἰσφέροντες πένητες γιγνώμενοι πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι καὶ ἦττον αὐτῷ ἐπιβουλεύωσι;

Δῆλον. |

Καὶ ἂν γέ τινας οἶμαι ὑποπτεῦν ἑλεύθερα φρονήματα ἔχοντας μὴ ἐπιτρέψειν αὐτῷ ἄρχειν, ὅπως ἂν τούτους μετὰ προφάσεως ἀπολλύῃ ἐνδοὺς τοῖς πολεμίοις; τούτων πάντων ἕνεκα τυράννῳ αἰεὶ ἀνάγκη πόλεμον ταραττεῖν;

Ἀνάγκη.

Ταῦτα δὴ ποιῶντα ἔτοιμον μᾶλλον ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τοῖς πολίταις; |

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"Shall we discuss the happiness then," I said, "both of the man and the state in which such a mortal arises?"

"Most certainly, let's do that," he said.

"At the beginning, in his early days, he smiles and welcomes everyone, doesn't he, no matter whom he meets, and says he is no tyrant and promises a great deal to individual and state; he'll cancel debts and redistribute land both to the people and those close to him, and he'll give the impression to everyone that he is a gracious kindly man?"

"That must be so."

"But, I think, when he comes to an arrangement with some of his exiled enemies and destroys others and has no further trouble from them, his first concern is always to be stirring up various conflicts so that the people will need a leader."

"That seems to be so."

"And also so that, when they've become impoverished through handing money over to him, they may be forced to think only of their day-to-day affairs and less about plotting against him?"

"Clearly."

"And, I believe, if he thinks that some free-thinking individuals won't entrust him with authority, in order to have an excuse to get rid of them won't he hand them over to the enemy? For these reasons isn't a tyrant always forced to instigate war?"

"He has to."

"So by doing this, he is likely to be more detested by his subjects, isn't he?"

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

- b Οὐκοῦν καὶ τινες τῶν συγκαταστησάντων καὶ ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐπιπλήττοντας τοῖς γιγνομένοις, οἳ ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἀνδρικότατοι ὄντες; †

Εἰκός γε.

Ἵπεξαιρεῖν δὴ τούτους πάντας δεῖ τὸν τύραννον, εἰ μέλλει ἄρξειν, ἕως ἂν μήτε φίλων μήτ' ἐχθρῶν λίπη μηδένα ὅτου τι ὄφελος.

Δῆλον.

- c Ὅξέως ἄρα δεῖ ὄραν αὐτὸν τίς ἀνδρείος, τίς μεγαλόφρων, τίς φρόνιμος, τίς πλούσιος· καὶ οὕτως εὐδαίμων ἐστίν, ὥστε τούτοις ἅπασιν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ, εἴτε βούλεται εἴτε μή, πολεμῖω εἶναι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύειν, ἕως ἂν καθήρη τὴν πόλιν.

Καλόν γε, ἔφη, καθαρμόν. †

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν ἐναντίον ἢ οἱ ἰατροὶ τὰ σώματα οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὸ χεῖριστον ἀφαιροῦντες λείπουσιν τὸ βέλτιστον, ὁ δὲ τούναντίον.

Ὅς ἔοικε γάρ, αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ ἄρξει.

- d Ἐν μακαρίᾳ ἄρα, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀνάγκη δέδεται, ἢ προστάττει αὐτῷ ἢ μετὰ φαύλων τῶν πολλῶν οἰκεῖν, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων μισούμενον, ἢ μὴ ζῆν.

Ἐν τοιαύτῃ, ἦ δ' ὄς. †

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον τοῖς πολίταις ἀπεχθάνηται ταῦτα δρῶν, τοσοῦτῳ πλειόνων καὶ πιστοτέρων δορυφόρων δεήσεται;

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"Of course."

"And so do some of those who helped to establish him and who are themselves in positions of power speak openly to him and each other, reproaching him for what's going on: the ones who are actually the bravest."

"Yes, it's likely."

"So the tyrant must remove all of these by stealth if he is going to rule, until he is left with no one, friend or enemy, who is of any use to him."

"Evidently."

"So he must observe shrewdly who is courageous, who is high-minded, who is wise, who is rich. And so he is so fortunate, that he must be an enemy to all these people, whether he wants to be or not, and plot against them until he has purged the whole state."

"A right good clear out!" he said.

"Yes," I said, "the opposite of doctors purging our bodies, because they clear out the worst and leave the best behind: he does the opposite."

"He has to do it, it seems, if he is to rule."

"He's tied himself," I said, "in a happy quandary which obliges him either to live with a lot of inferior people and be hated by them, or not live at all!"

"That's what he's got himself into," he said.

"So the more he does this and becomes abhorred by his citizens, the greater number of more trustworthy bodyguards he'll need, won't he?"

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Τίνες οὖν οἱ πιστοί; καὶ πόθεν αὐτοὺς μεταπέμψεται; |

Αὐτόματοι, ἔφη, πολλοὶ ἤξουσι πετόμενοι, ἐὰν τὸν μισθὸν διδῶ.

Κηφῆνας, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν κύνα, δοκεῖς αὖ τινάς
e μοι λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς.

Ἄληθῆ γάρ, ἔφη, δοκῶ σοι.

Τίς δὲ αὐτόθεν; ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν ἐβελήσειεν πως τοὺς δούλους ἀφελόμενος τοὺς πολίτας, ἐλευθερώσας, | τῶν περὶ ἑαυτὸν δορυφόρων ποιήσασθαι.

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη, ἐπεὶ τοι καὶ πιστότατοι αὐτῷ οὗτοί εἰσιν.

Ἡ μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τυράννου χρῆμα,
568 εἰ τοιούτοις φίλοις τε καὶ πιστοῖς ἀνδράσι χρήται, τοὺς προτέρους ἐκείνους ἀπολέσας.

Ἄλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, τοιούτοις γε χρήται.

Καὶ θαυμάζουσι δῆ, εἶπον, οὗτοι οἱ ἐταῖροι αὐτὸν | καὶ σύνεισιν οἱ νέοι πολῖται, οἱ δ' ἐπιεικεῖς μισοῦσί τε καὶ φεύγουσι;

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλουσιν;

Οὐκ ἐτός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ τε τραγωδία ὅλως σοφὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ὁ Εὐριπίδης διαφέρων ἐν αὐτῇ. |

Τί δῆ;

Ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο πυκνῆς διανοίας ἐχόμενον ἐφθέγγατο,

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"Of course."

"So who are these trustworthy types, and where will he summon them from?"

"A lot of volunteers will come flocking in," he said, "if he pays them!"

"I think you mean some drones again, by the dog!"⁶⁷ I said, "foreign ones of every description."

"Yes, you've understood me correctly," he said.

"But who could you get from here? Wouldn't he be willing to take the slaves from his citizens somehow, free them and make them part of his personal guard?"

"Undoubtedly," he said, "since they are the most trustworthy as far as he's concerned."

"Why what a wondrous thing your tyrant-business is," I said, "if these are the sort of people he employs as friends and confidants once he has destroyed his former ones."

"Well that's the sort he'll resort to," he said.

"And these companions will certainly adore him," I said, "and the new citizens will form his coterie while decent folk hate him and shun him."

"Why shouldn't they?"

"It's no idle claim," I said, "that tragedy seems to be a thing full of wisdom, and Euripides is outstanding in it."

"What do you mean?"

"Because one thing he said showed shrewd insight

⁶⁷ On this oath, characteristic of S., see Book 3 n. 65.

b ὡς ἄρα “σοφοὶ τύραννοί” εἰσι “τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία.”
καὶ ἔλεγε δῆλον ὅτι τούτους εἶναι τοὺς σοφοὺς οἷς
σύνεστιν.

Καὶ ὡς ἰσόθεόν γ', ἔφη, τὴν τυραννίδα ἐγκωμιάζει,
καὶ ἕτερα πολλά, καὶ οὗτος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταί. |

Τοιγάρτοι, ἔφη, ἅτε σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τῆς τραγωδίας
ποιηταὶ συγγιγνώσκουσιν ἡμῖν τε καὶ ἐκείνοις ὅσοι
ἡμῶν ἐγγὺς πολιτεύονται, ὅτι αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν
οὐ παραδεξόμεθα ἅτε τυραννίδος ὑμνητάς.

c Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη, συγγιγνώσκουσιν ὅσοιπέρ γε
αὐτῶν κομποί.

Εἰς δέ γε οἶμαι τὰς ἄλλας περιούτους πόλεις, συλ-
λέγοντες τοὺς ὄχλους, καλὰς φωνὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ
πιθανὰς μισθωσάμενοι, | εἰς τυραννίδας τε καὶ δημο-
κρατίας ἔλκουσι τὰς πολιτείας.

Μάλα γε.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ προσέτι τούτων μισθοὺς λαμβάνουσι
καὶ τιμῶνται, μάλιστα μὲν, ὥσπερ τὸ εἶκός, ὑπὸ
τυράννων, | δεύτερον δὲ ὑπὸ δημοκρατίας· ὅσῳ δ' ἂν
d ἀνωτέρω ἴσῳ πρὸς τὸ ἄναυτες τῶν πολιτειῶν, μάλ-
λον ἀπαγορεύει αὐτῶν ἢ τιμῇ, ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ἄσθματος
ἀδυνατούσα πορεύεσθαι.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

⁶⁸ Also attributed to Sophocles (fr. 13 Nauck). Plato is imply-
ing that the tyrant's associates are wise to “keep in with” him. His
praise of Euripides is clearly ironic, and he is likely to be twisting
the dramatist's meaning here (whatever it was); in any case, “ty-
rant” in the mythical stories of Athenian tragedy did not have the

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namely: 'Wise tyrants keep wise company' and he meant that these are the wise men he associates with."⁶⁸

"And among many other things he, as well as other poets, eulogizes tyranny as 'on a par with the gods,'" he said.⁶⁹

"That's the reason, I tell you," I said, "since tragic poets are wise, they will forgive us and those whose view of politics is rather like ours for not letting them into our state because they celebrate tyranny."

"At any rate I think those of them who are discerning⁷⁰ will pardon us," he said.

"And they'll go round other cities, I think, gathering the crowds and hiring men with their fine, loud, plausible voices, and drag the states into tyranny and democracy."

"Quite."

"So on top of this they'll take the money and be revered by tyrants in particular, as you'd expect, but second by democracy too, won't they? But the higher they go in the rising series of political systems, the more their reputation falters, as if from lack of breath, and they can't go on."⁷¹

"That is very much so."

pejorative associations it acquired in Classical Greek politics and philosophy.

⁶⁹ See e.g., Eur. *Tro.* 1169. S.'s ironic treatment of tragic poets at b5ff. as using their eloquence to promote tyranny and democracy in cities (recognized as a digression at d3) can be related to Plato's condemnation of poetry in Books 2, 3, and 10.

⁷⁰ *kompsoi* = "subtle," "refined," frequently used, as here, ironically.

⁷¹ I.e., the better the constitution, the less effective are the tragic poets.

Ἄλλὰ δὴ, εἶπον, ἐνταῦθα μὲν ἐξέβημεν· λέγωμεν δὲ πάλιν ἐκείνο τὸ τοῦ τυράννου στρατόπεδον, τὸ καλόν τε καὶ πολὺ καὶ ἰ ποικίλον καὶ οὐδέποτε ταυτόν, πόθεν θρέφεται.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι, εἰάν τε ἱερὰ χρήματα ἦ ἐν τῇ πόλει, ταῦτα ἀναλώσει, ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ¹² ἐξάρκῃ τὰ τῶν ἀποδομένων, ἐλάττους εἰσφορὰς ἀναγκάζων τὸν δῆμον εἰσφέρειν.

Τί δ' ὅταν δὴ ταῦτα ἐπιλίπη;

Δῆλον, ἔφη, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν πατρῶων θρέφεται αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ συμπόται τε καὶ ἑταῖροι καὶ ἑταῖραι. ἰ

Μαιθάνω, ἔφη [δ'] ἐγώ· ὅτι ὁ δῆμος ὁ γεννήσας τὸν τύραννον θρέφει αὐτόν τε καὶ ἑταίρους.

Πολλὴ αὐτῷ, ἔφη, ἀνάγκη.

Πῶς λέγεις; εἶπον· εἰάν δὲ ἀγανακτῇ τε καὶ λέγῃ ὁ δῆμος ὅτι οὔτε δίκαιον τρέφεσθαι ὑπὸ πατρὸς ὕον ἡβῶντα, ἀλλὰ τούναντίον ἰ ὑπὸ ὑέος πατέρα, οὔτε 569 τούτου αὐτὸν ἕνεκα ἐγέννησέν τε καὶ κατέστησεν, ἵνα, ἐπειδὴ μέγας γένοιτο, τότε αὐτὸς δουλεύων τοῖς αὐτοῦ δούλοις τρέφοι ἐκείνόν τε καὶ τοὺς δούλους μετὰ συγκλύδων ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἵνα [ὑπὸ] τῶν πλουσίων τε καὶ καλῶν καγαθῶν λεγομένων ἐν τῇ πόλει ἰ ἐλευθερωθείη ἐκείνον προστάντος, καὶ νῦν κελεύει ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἑταίρους, ὥσπερ πατήρ ὕον ἐξ οἰκίας μετὰ ὀχληρῶν συμποτῶν ἐξελαύνων;

Ἔγνωσται γε, νῆ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, τότ' ἤδη ὁ δῆμος οἶος οἶον θρέμμα γεννῶν ἡσπάζετό τε καὶ ἠῦξεν, καὶ ὅτι ἀσθενέστερος ὢν ἰσχυροτέρους ἐξελαύνει.

BOOK VIII

“But look,” I said, “we’re off the point. Let’s talk about the tyrant’s camp once again, how he’s going to provision this fine large motley crew constantly on the drift.”

“Clearly,” he said, “if there is any temple treasure in the state, he’ll spend it, as long as the money paid out lasts, so making less demands on the populace to pay taxes.”

“And what happens when this gives out?”

“Then obviously,” he said, “he and his fellow tipplers and his cronies and his mistresses will be nurtured out of his father’s funds.”

“I understand,” I said, “you mean the people who fathered the tyrant will support him and his entourage.”

“They’re under a serious obligation to do so.”

“What do you mean?” I asked. “What if the people are annoyed and say that it is not right for a son in his prime to be supported by his father, but it should be the other way round: the father by the son, and that they didn’t beget him and bring him up so that when he grew up they could be enslaved to their own slave and feed both him and his slaves along with the rest of the rabble; but so that, under his leadership, they should be set free from the rich and the so-called great and the good in the city; and now they bid him and his companions to leave the city, like a father driving his son out of the house along with his troublesome fellow revelers?”

“Then indeed, by Zeus,” he said, “the people will realize what kind of a creature it has cherished and fostered, and it’s a case of the weaker driving out the stronger.”

¹² ὅποι ποτὲ ἂν ἀεὶ ADF: ὅποι ἂν μὴ Sauppe: ἀποδομένων ADF: ἀπολομένων A (lectio supra versum addita)

REPUBLIC

Πῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις; τολμήσει τὸν πατέρα ἢ βιάζεσθαι, κὰν μὴ πείθεται, τύπτειν ὁ τύραννος;

Ναί, ἔφη, ἀφελόμενός γε τὰ ὄπλα.

Πατραλοίαν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις τύραννον καὶ χαλεπὸν γηροτρόφον, καὶ ὡς ἔοικε τοῦτο δὴ ὁμολογουμένη ἂν ἤδη τυραννὶς εἴη, καί, τὸ λεγόμενον, ὁ δῆμος
 c φεύγων ἂν καπνὸν δουλείας ἐλευθέρων εἰς πῦρ δούλων δεσποτείας ἂν ἐμπεπτωκῶς εἴη, ἀντὶ τῆς πολλῆς ἐκείνης καὶ ἀκαίρου ἐλευθερίας τὴν χαλεπωτάτην τε καὶ πικροτάτην δούλων δουλείαν μεταμπισχόμενος. ἢ

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, ταῦτα οὕτω γίγνεται.

Τί οὖν; εἶπον· οὐκ ἐμμελῶς ἡμῖν εἰρήσεται, ἐὰν φῶμεν ἱκανῶς διεληλυθέναι ὡς μεταβαίνει τυραννὶς ἐκ δημοκρατίας, γενομένη τε οἷα ἐστί;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἱκανῶς, ἔφη.

BOOK VIII

"What do you mean?" I asked. "Will the tyrant have the nerve to do violence to his father and, if he doesn't submit, beat him?"

"Yes," he said, "once he has disarmed him!"

"You mean the tyrant is a parricide and a cruel nurse of old age⁷² and, so it seems, at this point we have now agreed on what tyranny is and, as the saying goes, the people fleeing and freeing themselves from the smoke of enslavement would have fallen into the fire of despotism and in place of that vast importunate freedom⁷³ have re-clothed themselves in the most harsh and bitter slavery under slaves."

"It certainly does happen like that," he said.

"What then?" I said. "Will it not be inappropriate if we agree that we've discussed adequately how tyranny develops out of democracy, and what it is like, once it exists?"

"Yes, we've done it very adequately," he said.

⁷² *gērotrophon*, a poetic word from Pindar, quoted, in a very different context, by Cephalus at 1.331a6 (for reference see Book 1 n. 19).

⁷³ I.e., democracy.

571 Αὐτὸς δὴ λοιπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ τυραννικὸς ἀνὴρ σκέ-
ψασθαι, πῶς τε μεθίσταται ἐκ δημοκρατικοῦ, γενό-
μενός τε ποῖός τις ἔστιν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζῆ, ἄθλιον
ἢ μακάριον.

Λοιπὸς γὰρ οὖν ἔτι οὗτος, ἔφη. |

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ ποθῶ ἔτι;

Τὸ ποῖον;

Τὸ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν, οἶαί τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰσὶν, οὗ μοι
δοκοῦμεν ικανῶς διηρηῆσθαι. τούτου δὴ ἐνδεῶς ἔχον-
τος, ἀσαφεστέρα ἔσται ἢ ζήτησις οὗ ζητοῦμεν.

b Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔτ' ἐν καλῶ;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν καὶ σκόπει γε ὁ ἐν αὐταῖς βούλομαι
ιδεῖν. ἔστιν δὲ τόδε. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ
ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσί τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἱ κιν-
δυνεύουσι μὲν | ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ
ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ
λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττε-
c σθαι ἢ ὀλίγα λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, τῶν δὲ ἰσχυ-
ρότεροι καὶ πλείους.

¹ The latter part of Book 8 considered the tyrannical man in a sociopolitical context. Book 9 focuses primarily on “the tyran-

BOOK IX

"It remains," I said, "to look at the tyrannical man himself: how he evolves from a democratic type, and when he has done so, what kind of a person he is and the way he lives: wretchedly or happily."¹

"That's right, he's the one remaining," he said.

"Do you know, then, what I'm still anxious to do?"

"What's that?"

"I don't think we have adequately defined the nature and number of our desires.² Indeed, without doing so our inquiry into what we're looking for will be less precise."

"Isn't this a good place to do that, then?"

"It certainly is. Now consider what it is about them I want to look at. The following points: some of the unnecessary pleasures and desires seem to me to be unlawful and there is a chance that they may be inborn in everyone. For some people they are held in check by the law and the nobler desires along with reason, and are either got rid of altogether, or a few weak ones remain; for others those remaining are stronger and more numerous."

nical man himself," i.e., as an individual (the state of his soul); "himself" (*autos*) is the first word of the book.

² The nature of desires was a topic briefly introduced at 8.558d4ff.

Λέγεις δὲ καὶ τίνας, ἔφη, ταύτας;

Τὰς περὶ τὸν ὕπνον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐγειρομένας, ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἄλλο τῆς ψυχῆς εὐδῆ, ὅσον λογιστικὸν καὶ ἡμερον καὶ ἄρχον | ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ θηριῶδες τε καὶ ἄγριον, ἢ σίτων ἢ μέθης πλησθέν, σκιρτᾷ τε καὶ ἀπωσάμενον τὸν ὕπνον ζητῆ ἵεναὶ καὶ ἀποπιμπλάναι τὰ αὐτοῦ ἤθη· οἷσθ' ὅτι πάντα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τολμᾷ ποιεῖν, ὡς ἀπὸ πάσης λελυμένον τε καὶ ἀπηλλαγμένον
 d αἰσχύνῃς καὶ φρονήσεως. μητρί τε γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖν μείγνυσθαι, ὡς οἴεται, οὐδὲν ὀκνεῖ, ἄλλω τε ὄψου ἄνθρώπων καὶ θεῶν καὶ θηρίων, μαιφονεῖν τε ὀτιοῦν, βρώματός τε ἀπέχεσθαι μηδενός· καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ οὔτε ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει οὔτ' ἀναισχυντίας.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἵταν δέ γε οἶμαι ὑγιεινῶς τις ἔχῃ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ σωφρόνως, καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕπνον ἵη τὸ λογιστικὸν μὲν ἐγείρας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ ἐστίασας λόγων καλῶν καὶ σκέ-
 e ψεων, εἰς σύννοιαν αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἀφικόμενος, τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν δὲ μήτε ἐνδεία δούς μήτε πλησμονῆ, ὅπως
 572 ἂν κοιμηθῆ καὶ μὴ παρέχῃ θόρυβον τῷ βελτίστῳ χαίρον ἢ λυπούμενον, ἀλλ' ἐᾷ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μόνον καθαρὸν σκοπεῖν καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι του αἰσθάνεσθαι ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ἢ τι τῶν γεγονότων ἢ ὄντων ἢ καὶ μελλόντων, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς πραῦνας καὶ μὴ τισιν εἰς ὀργὰς ἐλθὼν κεκινημένῳ | τῷ θυμῷ καθεύδῃ, ἀλλ' ἡσυχάσας μὲν τῷ δύο εἶδη, τὸ τρίτον δὲ κινήσας ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγγίγνεται, οὕτως ἀναπαύηται, οἷσθ' ὅτι τῆς τ' ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ μάλιστα ἄπτεται καὶ

BOOK IX

“Which ones do you mean?”

“Those that are aroused in our sleep,” I said. “When the the rest of the soul is asleep, that is to say the rational, civilized, controlling side of it, the untamed savage side, full of food or drink, darts about and when it has shaken sleep off seeks to go and satisfy its own natural tendencies. You know that in such circumstances it is emboldened to do everything, as it’s free and rid of a sense of all shame and intelligence. It does not shrink from trying to have sex with a mother, as it fancies, or with any other human being, or god, or wild beast; it will commit any kind of blood-thirsty murder, and there is no food it won’t touch. In a word, it isn’t lacking in any folly or shamelessness.”

“What you’re saying is very true,” he said.

“But on the other hand, I suppose, when someone is healthy and temperate in himself, and when he goes to sleep, having previously aroused his rational element, and having feasted it on higher reasoning and speculation, having arrived at concord within himself, he does not starve or overindulge the element of desire, so it may fall asleep without arousing any joyful or painful feeling in the best element in his soul, but allows it to investigate on its own by itself unsullied, and reach out for a perception of what it does not know: something of the past, the present, or the future; and in the same way too, having soothed his passionate spirit and without getting angry with anyone and so sleeping with his heart stirred up, but with both elements calmed, he sets the third one in motion in which the thinking faculty is found. So he takes his rest; you know that in such circumstances he grasps the truth more

ἥκιστα παράνομοι τότε αἱ ὄψεις φαντάζονται τῶν ἐνυπνίων.

b Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οἶμαι οὕτω.

Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν ἐπὶ πλέον ἐξήχθημεν εἰπεῖν ὃ δὲ βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τόδ' ἐστίν, ὡς ἄρα δεινόν τι καὶ ἄγριον καὶ ἄνομον ἐπιθυμιῶν εἶδος ἐκάστω ἔνεστι, καὶ πάνν δοκοῦσιν ἡμῶν ἢ ἐνίοις μετρίοις εἶναι τοῦτο δὲ ἄρα ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γίγνεται ἔνδηλον. εἰ οὖν τι δοκῶ λέγειν καὶ συγχωρεῖς, ἄθρει.

Ἄλλὰ συγχωρῶ.

c Τὸν τοίνυν δημοτικὸν ἀναμνήσθητι οἷον ἔφαμεν εἶναι. ἦν δέ που γεγονὼς ἐκ νέου ὑπὸ φειδωλῷ πατρὶ τεθραμμένος, τὰς χρηματιστικὰς ἐπιθυμίας τιμῶντι μόνας, τὰς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους ἀλλὰ παιδιᾶς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἕνεκα γιγνομένας ἀτιμάζοντι. ἦ γάρ; ἢ
Ναί.

d Συγγενόμενος δὲ κομψότεροις ἀνδράσι καὶ μεστοῖς ὧν ἄρτι διήλθομεν ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὀρμήσας εἰς ὕβριν τε πᾶσαν καὶ τὸ ἐκείνων εἶδος μίσει τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φειδωλίας, φύσιν δὲ τῶν διαφθειρόντων βελτίω ἔχων, ἀγόμενος ἀμφοτέρωσε κατέστη εἰς μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν τρόποιν, καὶ μετρίως δῆ, ὡς ᾤετο, ἐκάστων ἀπολαύων οὔτε ἀνελεύθερον οὔτε παράνομον βίον ζῆ, δημοτικὸς ἐξ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ γεγονώς. ἢ

BOOK IX

readily and the visions appearing in his dreams are least lawless."

"I certainly think that this is how it is," he said.

"Well now, look, in talking about this we've digressed rather too much, but what we want to note is this: that there is therefore a group of desires within each of us of a terrifying, wild, and unlawful kind, even in those of us who appear to be very moderate, and this becomes clear in our dreams. Consider whether you think there is something in what I'm saying and you agree."

"Yes, I do agree."

"Well now, recall the kind of person we said is inclined toward democracy³ who was born, we supposed, and raised from his earliest years by a niggardly father who only had regard for desires for money and no time for unnecessary ones which are intended for fun and show. Isn't that right?"

"Yes."

"But having associated himself with smarter people full of the desires we were talking about just now, and launching himself into every kind of outrageous behavior, and adopting their way of life out of hatred for his father's miserly ways, yet because he has a better nature than those who are trying to ruin him, although he is attracted to both extremes, he takes his stance in the middle of these two ways of living, and while enjoying each of them, as he thought, in a controlled way, he lives his life which is neither profligate nor unlawful, becoming a democratic type from being an oligarchic type."

³ At 8.558cff.

Ἦν γάρ, ἔφη, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ δόξα περὶ τὸν τοιούτον.

Θές τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πάλιν τοῦ τοιούτου ἤδη πρεσβυτέρου γεγονότος νέον ὕδν ἐν τοῖς τούτου αὐτῆσιν τεθραμμένον.

Τίθημι.

Τίθει τοίνυν καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνα περὶ αὐτὸν γιγνόμενα ἄπερ καὶ περὶ τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ, ἰ ἀγόμενόν τε
 e εἰς πᾶσαν παρανομίαν, ὀνομαζομένην δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγόντων ἐλευθερίαν ἄπασαν, βοηθοῦντά τε ταῖς ἐν μέσῳ ταύταις ἐπιθυμίαις πατέρα τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἰκείους, τοὺς δ' αὖ παραβοηθοῦντας· ὅταν δ' ἐλπίσωσιν οἱ δεινοὶ μάγοι τε καὶ τυραννοποιοὶ οὗτοι ἰ μὴ ἄλλως τὸν νέον καθέξειν, ἔρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανω-
 573 μένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν ἀργῶν καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφῆνά τινα—ἢ τί ἄλλο οἶει εἶναι τὸν τῶν τοιούτων ἔρωτα;—

Οὐδὲν ἔγωγε, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἄλλ' ἢ τοῦτο.

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δὴ περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, ἰ θυμαμάτων τε γέμουσαι καὶ μύρων καὶ στεφάνων καὶ οἴνων καὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις συνουσίαις ἡδονῶν ἀνειμένων, ἐπὶ τὸ ἔσχατον αὔξουσαι τε καὶ τρέφουσαι πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κη-
 b φῆνι, τότε δὴ δορυφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρᾶ οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐν αὐτῷ

⁴ This precise transformation was described, with political

BOOK IX

“Yes, this was and is our view about this kind of person,”⁴ he said.

“Now,” I said, “take again the young son of such a man who has now grown older, a son who has been brought up in his father’s ways.”

“I’ve got that.”

“And now take the same events surrounding him as surrounded his father, leading him into all kinds of lawlessness, called total freedom by those who led him astray, while his father and the other members of the family are lending support to these moderate desires, but again there are those coming and supporting from the opposite direction. When these terrible wizards and tyrant-makers can hope to take control of the young man in no other way, they do it by contriving some passion in him to become champion of these idle desires which divide up whatever is ready to hand, a huge winged drone; or do you think the passion of such people is for anything else?”

“I can’t imagine anything else it could be,” he said.

“That means that when the other desires are humming about him laden with incense and myrrh and garlands and wines and the pleasures that run wild in such gatherings, growing and nurturing the sting of longing to the full, they plant it in the drone. Then indeed this champion of the soul⁵ has madness as its bodyguard and runs amok, and if

metaphor, at 8.559d7ff. Here S. is going over old ground from a different angle.

⁵ The transformation of “the champion of the people” (*ho prostatēs tou dēmou*) in a political context (8.565c9ff.) here becomes internalized as the corruption instigated by “the champion of the soul” (*ho prostatēs tēs psuchēs*).

δόξας ἢ ἐπιθυμίας λάβη ποιουμένας χρηστὰς καὶ ἔτι ἐπαισχυνομένας, ἀποκτείνει τε καὶ ἔξω ὠθεῖ παρ' αὐτοῦ, ἕως ἂν καθήρη σωφροσύνης, μανίας δὲ πληρώσῃ ἐπακτοῦ. |

Παντελῶς, ἔφη, τυραννικοῦ ἀνδρὸς λέγεις γένεσιν.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τὸ πάλαι διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον τύραννος ὁ Ἔρως λέγεται;

Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ὦ φίλε, εἶπον, καὶ μεθυσθεὶς ἀνὴρ τυραννικόν τι φρόνημα ἴσχει;

Ἴσχει γάρ.

Καὶ μὴν ὃ γε μαινόμενος καὶ ὑποκεκινηκῶς οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ καὶ θεῶν ἐπιχειρεῖ τε καὶ ἐλπίζει δυνατὸς | εἶναι ἄρχειν.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη.

Τυραννικὸς δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ἀνὴρ ἀκριβῶς γίγνεται, ὅταν ἢ φύσει ἢ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν ἢ ἀμφοτέροις μεθυστικὸς τε καὶ ἐρωτικὸς καὶ μελαγχολικὸς γένηται. |

Παντελῶς μὲν οὖν.

Γίγνεται μὲν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὕτω καὶ τοιοῦτος ἀνὴρ· ζῆ δὲ δὴ πῶς;

Τὸ τῶν παιζόντων, ἔφη, τοῦτο σὺν καὶ ἐμοὶ ἐρεῖς.

Λέγω δὴ, ἔφην. οἶμαι γὰρ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἑορταὶ γίγνονται παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κῶμοι καὶ θάλειαι καὶ ἑταῖραι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὧν ἂν Ἔρως τύραννος ἔνδον οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ | τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα.

BOOK IX

it should lay hold of any wholesome beliefs or desires in him that still make him feel guilty, it kills them and thrusts them away from him until he is purged of good sense and filled with an alien madness."

"You describe the origin of a tyrant perfectly," he said.

"Is that then the reason Eros has long been known as a tyrant?"⁶ I asked.

"It could well be," he said.

"So does that mean a drunkard too possesses a tyrannical mind of some sort?"

"He certainly does."

"Again a madman with a deranged mind attempts to rule and expects he's capable of ruling not only humans, but gods as well."

"Very much so," he said.

"A man becomes a tyrant, my good man," I said, "precisely when through nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunk and lustful and depressive."⁷

"Absolutely."

"That's how such a man comes to be, it seems, but how does he live?"

"This is one of your riddles," he said. "You'd better tell me!"

"I shall," I said, "as I think that following on from this, feasting and reveling and festivities and mistresses and all those kinds of thing arise among those in whom the tyrant Eros dwells and directs all the affairs of the soul."

⁶ *Erōs* = "lust," "passion." ⁷ *melancholikos* = literally, "affected by black bile," one of the four humors in the body, thought to produce depression; see, e.g., Hippoc. *Aph.* 3.20.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πολλαὶ καὶ δειναὶ παραβλαστάνουσιν ἐπιθυμίαι ἡμέρας τε καὶ νυκτὸς ἐκάστης, πολλῶν δεόμεναι;

Πολλαὶ μέντοι.

Ταχὺ ἄρα ἀναλίσκονται ἂν τινες ὄσι πρόσοδοι. |

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

e Καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ δανεισμοὶ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας παραιρέσεις.

Τί μήν;

Ὅταν δὲ δὴ πάντ' ἐπιλείπη, ἄρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδράς ἐννενοοτευμένας, | τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλαννομένους τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ διαφερόντως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ Ἔρωτος, πάσαις ταῖς ἄλλαις ὥσπερ δορυφόροις ἡγουμένου, οἰστρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν τίς τι ἔχει, ὃν
574 δυνατὸν ἀφελέσθαι ἀπατήσαντα ἢ βιασάμενον;

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ πανταχόθεν φέρειν, ἢ μεγάλας ὠδίσι τε καὶ ὀδύναις συνέχεσθαι. |

Ἀναγκαῖον.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ὥσπερ αἱ ἐν αὐτῷ ἡδοναὶ ἐπιγιγνώμεναι τῶν ἀρχαίων πλέον εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐκείνων ἀφηροῦντο, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὸς ἀξιῶσει νεώτερος ὢν πατρός τε καὶ μητρὸς πλέον ἔχειν, καὶ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἂν τὸ αὐτοῦ μέρος ἀναλώσῃ, | ἀπονειμάμενος τῶν πατρῶων;

Ἄλλὰ τί μήν; ἔφη.

BOOK IX

"That must be so," he said.

"So many terrible desires which make great demands sprout up alongside it every day and night, don't they?"

"Yes, many."

"If there is money coming in, it's soon spent, then."

"Of course."

"And after this, borrowing and drawing on the estate."

"Certainly."

"And further, when it's all gone, then the desires must come thronging round, clamoring like newly hatched chicks, mustn't they, and when they're driven by the stings of their other desires, but particularly by Eros himself, leading all the others as if they were a bodyguard, stung to a frenzy, don't they see who has anything which can be taken from him by stealth or by force?"

"Absolutely," he said.

"Again he'll have to get it from every source, or be overwhelmed by pain and anguish."

"That must be so."

"So just as the pleasures which rise up in him subsequently got the better of the former ones and stole from them, so he himself, despite being younger, will think it's right to take advantage of both his father and his mother and take from them, if he spends his own portion by taking his share of his inheritance, won't he?"⁸

"Well, yes, of course."

⁸ See Book I.349bff. for the argument between Thrasymachus and S. over "taking advantage of" or "doing better than" (*pleon echein*) someone else as a characteristic of injustice.

b Ἄν δὲ δὴ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἄρ' οὐ τὸ μὲν
 πρῶτον ἐπιχειροῖ ἂν κλέπτειν καὶ ἀπατᾶν τοὺς γο-
 νέας;

Πάντως.

Ὅποτε δὲ μὴ δύναίτο, ἢ ἀρπάξοι ἂν καὶ βιάζοιτο
 μετὰ τοῦτο;

Οἶμαι, ἔφη.

Ἄντεχομένων δὴ καὶ μαχομένων, ὦ θαυμάσιε, γέ-
 ροντός τε καὶ γραός, ἄρ' εὐλαβηθείη ἂν καὶ φείσαιο
 μή τι δρᾶσαι τῶν τυραννικῶν;

Οὐ πάνν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε θαρρῶ περὶ τῶν γονέων
 τοῦ τοιούτου. ἢ

c Ἄλλ', ὦ Ἀδείμαντε, πρὸς Διός, ἔνεκα νεωστὶ φίλης
 καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαίας ἐταίρας γεγυυίας τὴν πάλαι φί-
 λην καὶ ἀναγκαίαν μητέρα, ἦ ἔνεκα ὠραίου νεωστὶ
 φίλου γεγονότος οὐκ ἀναγκαίου τὸν ἄωρόν τε καὶ
 ἀναγκαῖον πρεσβύτην πατέρα καὶ τῶν φίλων ἀρχαι-
 ὄτατον δοκεῖ ἂν σοι ὁ τοιοῦτος πληγαῖς τε δοῦναι
 καὶ ἢ καταδουλώσασθαι ἂν αὐτοὺς ὑπ' ἐκείνοις, εἰ εἰς
 τὴν αὐτὴν οἰκίαν ἀγάγοιτο;

Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Σφόδρα γε μακάριον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν εἶναι τὸ
 τυραννικὸν ὑὸν τεκεῖν.

Πάνν γ', ἔφη. ἢ

d Τί δ', ὅταν δὴ τὰ πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς ἐπιλείπη τὸν
 τοιοῦτον, πολὺ δὲ ἤδη συνειλεγμένον ἐν αὐτῷ ἦ τὸ

BOOK IX

"If they won't give it to him, the first thing he'll do is to try to steal it and deceive his parents, won't he?"

"Absolutely."

"Whenever he couldn't do this, the next thing he'd do would be to seize it forcibly, wouldn't he?"

"I think so," he said.

"If the old man and old woman resist and put up a fight, my good fellow, would he be careful to hold back from doing anything a tyrant would do?"

"I don't give much for the chances of the parents of a man like this," he said.

"By Zeus, Adeimantus, do you think that for the sake of a newly found love and mistress bound by no necessary relationship, such a man would beat up his mother, his by necessity, a long-standing friend and kinswoman, or, for the sake of a recent young friend in the prime of life from outside the family and not necessary to him, he would beat up his aging father and kinsman bound to him by necessity and oldest of his friends, and subject them to these people, if he brought them into the same house?"⁹

"Zeus, yes!" he said.

"A pretty fine thing it seems," I said, "to father a tyrannical son!"

"All too true!" he replied.

"But what about when such a man runs out of his father's and mother's money, and the swarm of pleasures gathered inside him has already grown large? Won't he

⁹ Throughout this speech, S. is playing on the double meaning of *anagkaios* = "necessary" and "kin" (i.e., "closely related"), and *ouk anagkaios* = "not necessary" and "outside the family," "unrelated."

τῶν ἡδονῶν σμῆνος, οὐ πρῶτον μὲν οἰκίας τινὸς ἐφάψεται τοίχου ἢ τινος ὀψὲ νύκτωρ ἰόντος τοῦ ἱματίου, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἱερόν τι νεωκορήσει; | καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πάσιν, ἃς πάλαι εἶχεν δόξας ἐκ παιδὸς περὶ καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχροῶν, τὰς δικαίας ποιουμένας, αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμένοι, δορυφοροῦσαι τὸν Ἔρωτα, κρατήσουσι μετ' ἐκείνου, αἱ πρότερον μὲν ὄναρ ἐλύοντο
 e ἐν ὕπνῳ, ὅτε ἦν αὐτὸς ἔτι ὑπὸ νόμοις τε καὶ πατρὶ δημοκρατούμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ· τυραννευθεὶς δὲ ὑπὸ Ἔρωτος, οἷος ὀλιγάκις ἐγίγνετο ὄναρ, ὕπαρ τοιοῦτος αἰεὶ γενόμενος, οὔτε τινὸς φόνου δεινοῦ ἀφέξεται οὔτε βρώματος οὔτ' ἔργου, ἀλλὰ τυραννικῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ
 575 Ἔρωτος ἐν πάσῃ ἀναρχίᾳ καὶ ἀνομίᾳ ζῶν, ἅτε αὐτὸς ὢν μόναρχος, τὸν ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν ὥσπερ πόλιν ἄξει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τόλμαν, ὅθεν αὐτόν τε καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτὸν θόρυβον θρέψει, | τὸν μὲν ἔξωθεν εἰσεληλυθότα ἀπὸ κακῆς ὀμιλίας, τὸν δ' ἐνδοθεν ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἀνεθέντα καὶ ἐλευθερωθέντα· ἢ οὐχ οὗτος ὁ βίος τοῦ τοιούτου;

Οὗτος μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

b Καὶ ἂν μὲν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὀλίγοι οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἐν πόλει ὧσι καὶ τὸ ἄλλο πλῆθος σωφρονῆ, ἐξελθόντες ἄλλον τινὰ δορυφοροῦσι τύραννον ἢ μισθοῦ ἐπικουροῦσιν, εἰάν που πόλεμος ᾗ· εἰάν δ' ἐν εἰρήνῃ τε καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ γένωνται, | αὐτοῦ δὴ ἐν τῇ πόλει κακὰ δρῶσι σμικρὰ πολλά.

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first resort to housebreaking, or snatch someone's cloak as he passes by late at night, and after that clean out some sanctuary?¹⁰ And to be sure, in all of these activities, the beliefs which he used to have in childhood about what is good and shameful, beliefs he considered just, will be overmastered by new ones, recently freed from slavery, and, as escorts of Eros, these will hold sway alongside him. These are the ones which were formerly only released in sleep, when he himself, when he was still subject to the laws and his father, had a democratic constitution within him. But once under the tyranny of Eros, what he seldom became in a dream, he has now permanently become while awake, and he will not hold back from any kind of dreadful murder, or food, or action; but Eros lives within him like a tyrant in full anarchy and lawlessness, in that it is itself the sole ruler and will lead him in whom it dwells, as if he were a city, into all manner of daring from which it will derive sustenance for itself and the rabble around it, part of which has come into him from bad company from the outside, and part from inside himself, released and freed under the influence of his very own habits. Or is the life of such a man not like this?"

"No, this is what it's like," he said.

"And if," I said, "there are few such people in a city and the rest of the population is temperate, the few go off and join the bodyguard of some other tyrant, or serve him as mercenaries, if there is a war somewhere perhaps. But if there happens to be peace and quiet, then they commit a lot of petty crimes right there in the city."

¹⁰ A typically serious crime: see 1.344b2, and for the general scenario, see 8.568d7.

Τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;

Οἷα κλέπτουσι, τοιχωρυχοῦσι, βαλλαντιοτομοῦσι, λωποδυτοῦσιν, ἱεροσυλοῦσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται· ἔστι δ' ὅτε συκοφαντοῦσιν, εἰάν δυνατοὶ ᾧσι λέγειν, καὶ ψευδομαρτυροῦσι καὶ ἰ δωροδοκοῦσιν.

Σμικρά γ', ἔφη, κακὰ λέγεις, εἰάν ὀλίγοι ᾧσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι.

c Τὰ γὰρ σμικρά, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, πρὸς τὰ μεγάλα σμικρά ἔστιν, καὶ ταῦτα δὴ πάντα πρὸς τύραννον πονηρία τε καὶ ἀθλιότητι πόλεως, τὸ λεγόμενον, οὐδ' ἵκταρ βάλλει. ὅταν γὰρ δὴ πολλοὶ ἐν πόλει γένωνται οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἄλλοι οἱ συνεπόμενοι ἰ αὐτοῖς, καὶ αἴσθωνται ἑαυτῶν τὸ πλήθος, τότε οὗτοί εἰσιν οἱ τὸν τύραννον γεννῶντες μετὰ δήμου ἀνοίας ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν αὐτῶν μάλιστα αὐτὸς ἐν αὐτῷ μέγιστον καὶ πλείστον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τύραννον ἔχη.

d Εἰκότως γ', ἔφη, τυραννικώτατος γὰρ ἂν εἴη.

Οὐκοῦν εἰάν μὲν ἐκόντες ὑπέικωσιν· εἰάν δὲ μὴ ἐπιτρέπη ἡ πόλις, ὥσπερ τότε μητέρα καὶ πατέρα ἐκόλαζεν, οὕτω πάλιν τὴν πατρίδα, εἰάν οἰός τ' ἦ, κολάσεται ἐπεισαγόμενος νέους ἰ εταίρους, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις δὴ δουλεύουσιν τὴν πάλαι φίλην μητρίδα τε, Κρήτες e φασι, καὶ πατρίδα ἔξει τε καὶ θρέψει. καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τὸ τέλος ἂν εἴη τῆς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἀνδρός.

Τοῦτο, ἦ δ' ὅς, παντάπασί γε.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτοί γε τοιοῖδε γίγνονται ἰδίᾳ καὶ πρὶν ἄρχειν· πρῶτον μὲν οἷς ἂν συνῶσιν, ἢ κόλαξιν ἑαυτῶν συνόντες ἰ καὶ πᾶν ἐτοίμοις ὑπηρετεῖν, ἢ

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"What kind of thing do you mean?"

"For example, they steal, break into homes, mug people, rob them, plunder temples, and kidnap. Sometimes they act as informers¹¹ if they are effective speakers, commit perjury, and take bribes."

"You can call those petty crimes," he said, "if there are few such people."

"Well yes, petty crimes," I said, "are petty when set against the major ones, and yet all of these do not come within a mile of the tyrant, as the saying goes, in producing corruption and misery in the state. You see, when there are many such people in a city and others who follow them and see just how large their own numbers are, then these are the people who with the mindlessness of the masses make that man tyrant who among them has particularly the greatest and most tyrantlike qualities in his soul."

"With good reason!" he said. "For he would be the most tyrannical of them."

"If they concede willingly, that is; but if the state does not put itself in his hands, just as he punished his mother and father before, so again he'll punish his home city, if he can, by bringing in new cronies, and will hold and maintain in slavery both his erstwhile beloved mother-state, as the Cretans call it, and his father-state under them. And this would certainly be the height of such a man's desire."

"That's it, absolutely," he said.

"So this is how these people develop in their private lives even before they come to power. First, either they associate with their flatterers, who are ready to serve them

¹¹ "Sycophants"; see Book I n. 45.

576 ἔάν τού τι δέωνται, αὐτοὶ ὑποπεσόντες, πάντα σχήματα τολμῶντες ποιεῖν ὡς οἰκέοι, διαπραξάμενοι δὲ ἀλλότριοι;

Καὶ σφόδρα γε.

Ἐν παντὶ ἄρα τῷ βίῳ ζῶσι φίλοι μὲν οὐδέποτε οὐδενί, αἰεὶ ἢ δέ του δεσπόζοντες ἢ δουλεύοντες ἄλλω, ἐλευθερίας δὲ καὶ φιλίας ἀληθοῦς τυραννικὴ φύσις αἰεὶ ἄγευστος.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἂν τοὺς τοιοῦτους ἀπίστους καλοῖμεν;

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

Καὶ μὴν ἀδίκους γε ὡς οἶόν τε μάλιστα, εἴπερ
b ὀρθῶς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὠμολογήσαμεν περὶ δικαιοσύνης οἶόν ἐστιν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὀρθῶς γε.

Κεφαλαιωσώμεθα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸν κάκιστον. ἔστιν δέ που, οἶον ὄναρ διήλθομεν, ὃς ἂν ἕπαρ τοιοῦτος ᾖ. ἢ ἢ.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν οὗτος γίγνεται ὃς ἂν τυραννικώτατος φύσει ᾖ μοναρχήσῃ, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν πλείω χρόνον ἐν τυραννίδι βιῶ, τοσοῦτω μᾶλλον τοιοῦτος.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη διαδεξάμενος τὸν λόγον ὁ Γλαῦκων.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃς ἂν φαίνηται πονηρότατος,
c καὶ ἀθλιώτατος φανήσεται; καὶ ὃς ἂν πλείστον χρόνον καὶ μάλιστα τυραννεύσῃ, μάλιστα τε καὶ πλείστον

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in every way, or if they themselves want something from someone, they'll grovel themselves and be brazen enough to carry out all kinds of plans as though they're on the side of these people, but once they've accomplished them, they disown them; isn't that so?"

"It certainly is!"

"They live their entire lives a friend to no one ever, constantly lordling it over one, or groveling to another. But a tyrant's nature has never had a taste of freedom or true friendship."

"Indeed so."

"So would we be right in calling people like this untrustworthy?"

"Of course."

"And again as unjust as can be if in our previous discussion about justice we were right in agreeing what justice is like."

"We were right: there's no question about it."

"So let's sum up," I said, "the worst sort, the type, I think, who in waking life would be such as we described in a dream."¹²

"Very much so."

"That means that he develops from the person who, since he is naturally most like a tyrant, achieves sole rule, and the longer he spends time as tyrant, so the more he gets like that."

"That must be so," said Glaucon, taking up the argument.

"Is it true, then," I asked, "that whoever appears most wicked will also appear to be most wretched? And whoever rules most like a tyrant for the longest time will in

¹² At 571c-d.

χρόνον τοιοῦτος γεγονὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ; τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλὰ καὶ δοκεῖ.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ταῦτα γοῦν οὕτως ἔχει. |

Ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ γε τυραννικὸς κατὰ τὴν τυραννουμένην πόλιν ἂν εἶη ὁμοιότητι, δημοτικὸς δὲ κατὰ δημοκρατουμένην, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οὕτω;

Τί μήν;

Οὐκοῦν, ὅτι πόλις πρὸς πόλιν ἀρετῇ καὶ εὐδαιμονία, τοῦτο καὶ ἀνὴρ πρὸς ἄνδρα;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Υἷ οὖν ἀρετῇ τυραννουμένη πόλις πρὸς βασιλευμένην οἷαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν; |

Πᾶν τοῦναντίον, ἔφη· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρίστη, ἡ δὲ κακίστη.

Οὐκ ἐρήσομαι, εἶπον, ὅποτέραν λέγεις· δῆλον γάρ. ἀλλ' εὐδαιμονίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὡσαύτως ἢ ἄλλως κρίνεις; καὶ μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα πρὸς τὸν τύραννον ἕνα ὄντα βλέποντες, μηδ' εἴ τινας ὀλίγοι περὶ ἐκείνον, ἀλλ' ὡς χρῆ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν εἰσελθόντας θεάσασθαι, καταδύντες εἰς ἅπασαν καὶ ἰδόντες, οὕτω δόξαν ἀποφαινώμεθα.

Ἄλλ' ὀρθῶς, ἔφη, προκαλῆ· καὶ δῆλον παντὶ ὅτι τυραννουμένης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθλιωτέρα, βασιλευόμενης δὲ οὐκ | εὐδαιμονεστέρα.

¹³ A point already argued by S. at Grg. 473c–e.

¹⁴ For critical examination of the analogy between soul and state, assumed here by Plato (c5ff.) and accepted by his interlocutors, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (ii).

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truth have been like this for the longest time?¹³ Although many people have many different views.”

“Well, this at least has to be as you say,” he said.

“So therefore,” I said, “would the tyrant type correspond to a state ruled as a tyranny and a democratic type to a democratically ruled state, and similarly with others?”¹⁴

“Certainly.”

“Well, it means the relationship of one state to another in terms of virtue and happiness is the same as the relationship between one man and another, doesn't it?”

“Of course.”

“What then is the relationship of a state ruled by a tyrant to one ruled by a king in terms of virtue as we first discussed them?”

“The complete opposite,” he answered: “one is the best, the other the worst.”

“I won't ask which way round you mean,” I said: “it's obvious. But would you also make the same distinction regarding their happiness and misery, or a different one? And let's not get carried away by looking at the tyrant who is on his own, nor even if he has a few men around him, but, as is necessary, go in and examine the whole state, so that, when we have immersed ourselves fully and looked at the whole thing, we can thus produce evidence for our belief.”

“Well, you're right to propose that,” he said. “Indeed, it's clear to everyone that there's nothing more wretched than a state ruled by a tyrant, nor happier than one ruled by a king.”

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Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα προκαλούμενος ὀρθῶς ἂν προκαλοίμην, ἀξιῶν κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνον, ὃς δύναται τῇ διανοίᾳ εἰς ἀνδρὸς ἦθος ἐνδύς διιδεῖν καὶ μὴ καθάπερ παῖς ἔξωθεν ὁρῶν ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν τυραννικῶν προστάσεως ἦν πρὸς τοὺς ἔξω σχηματίζονται, ἢ ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς διορᾷ; εἰ οὖν οἰοίμην δεῖν ἐκείνου πάντας ἡμᾶς ἀκούειν, τοῦ δυνατοῦ μὲν κρίναι, συνωκηκότος δὲ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ παραγεγονότος ἔν τε ταῖς κατ' οἰκίαν πράξεσιν, ὡς πρὸς ἐκάστους τοὺς οἰκείους ἔχει, ἐν οἷς
 b μάλιστα γυμνὸς ἂν ὀφθείη τῆς τραγικῆς σκευῆς, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τοῖς δημοσίοις κινδύνοις, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἰδόντα κελεύοιμεν ἐξαγγέλλειν πῶς ἔχει εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ὁ τύραννος πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους; ἢ

Ὅρθότατ' ἂν, ἔφη, καὶ ταῦτα προκαλοῖο.

Βούλει οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, προσποιησώμεθα ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ἂν κρίναι καὶ ἡδὴ ἐντυχόντων τοιούτοις, ἵνα ἔχωμεν ὅστις ἀποκρινεῖται ἃ ἐρωτῶμεν;

Πάν γε.

c Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἔφη, ὧδε σκόπει. τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός, οὕτω καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν μέρει ἀθρῶν, τὰ παθήματα ἐκατέρου λέγε.

Τὰ ποῖα; ἔφη.

15 In 388 Plato experienced briefly the household of Dionysius I of Syracuse (see *Epist.* 7.326bff.).

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“So would I be right, then,” I asked, “to make the same proposal about the men: that only that person is fit to judge them who is able to enter in his thought into the character of a man and see it clearly, and not look from the outside, as a child would, and be astonished by the outward show of tyrants, which they affect for the benefit of those observing from the outside, but see the reality sufficiently clearly?⁹ So what if I were to suppose that we should all listen to that man: the one who is capable of making a judgment, who has lived in the same house and has been involved in the tyrant’s domestic activities, how he deals with each of the members of the household,¹⁵ among whom in particular he would be observed stripped of his theatrical trappings, and again how he deals with public crises?¹⁶ And since this observer will have seen all, shouldn’t we tell him to report back to us how the tyrant stands in relation to the others in matters of happiness and wretchedness?”

“This too would be a very proper proposal,” he said.

“Do you want us to pretend we’re among those who are capable of making judgments and have already met the sort we’re talking about so we’ve got someone to answer our questions?”

“Certainly.”

“In that case, look at it this way: recalling the similarity between the state and the man, and looking at each of them in turn, tell me what is the condition of each of them.”

“What kind of things do you mean?” he said.

¹⁶ S. occasionally associates “theatrical trappings” with tyranny (see, e.g., 8.568a8ff.).

Πρώτον μὲν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς πόλιν εἰπέιν, ἐλευθέραι
 ἢ | δούλην τὴν τυραννουμένην ἐρεῖς;
 Ὡς οἶόν τ', ἔφη, μάλιστα δούλην.

Καὶ μὴν ὁρᾶς γε ἐν αὐτῇ δεσπότας καὶ ἐλευ-
 θέρους.

Ὅρῶ, ἔφη, σμικρόν γε τι τοῦτο· τὸ δὲ ὅλον, ὡς ἔπος
 εἰπέιν, ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικέστατον ἀτίμως τε καὶ
 ἀθλίως δοῦλον.

d Εἰ οὖν, εἶπον, ὅμοιος ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν
 ἐκείνῳ ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ἐνεῖναι, καὶ πολλῆς
 μὲν δουλείας τε καὶ ἀνελευθερίας γέμειν τὴν ψυχὴν
 αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα αὐτῆς τὰ μέρη δουλεύειν, ἅπερ ἦν
 ἐπιεικέστατα, μικρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ | μοχθηρότατον καὶ
 μαυικώτατον δεσπόζειν;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τί οὖν; δούλην ἢ ἐλευθέραι τὴν τοιαύτην φήσεις
 εἶναι ψυχὴν;

Δούλην δήπου ἔγωγε. |

Οὐκοῦν ἢ γε αὖ δούλη καὶ τυραννουμένη πόλις
 ἦκιστα ποιεῖ ἂ βούλεται;

Πολύ γε.

e Καὶ ἢ τυραννουμένη ἄρα ψυχὴ ἦκιστα ποιήσει ἂ
 ἂν βουληθῆ, ὡς περὶ ὅλης εἰπέιν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ
 οἴστρου αἰεὶ ἐλκομένη βία ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας
 μεστή ἔσται.

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

Πλουσίαν δὲ ἢ πενομένην ἀνάγκη τὴν τυραννουμέ-
 νην πόλιν | εἶναι;

BOOK IX

"First, talking about the state," I said, "will you say the one ruled by a tyrant is free, or in slavery?"

"As enslaved as can be," he said.

"And yet you see masters and free men in it."

"I see a small part of it like that," he said. "But as to the whole, so to speak, even the best element in it is dishonorably and wretchedly in slavery."

"If a man, then," I said, "is like the state in character, then mustn't he have in him the same kind of constituent parts, and his soul be wallowing in slavery and lack of freedom, and those parts, those that are the best, enslaved, while a small part, the most villanous and manic sector, will be master?"

"That must be so," he said.

"What then? Will you say such a soul is slave or free?"

"It's enslaved, of course, I should say."

"Again, does that mean moreover an enslaved state ruled by a tyrant can do very little of what it wants?"

"Certainly."

"Then the soul ruled by a tyrant would be least able to do what it wants, speaking of the soul as a whole; being forcibly dragged about this way and that by the gadfly, it'll be full of confusion and regret."

"Of course."

"Must the tyrant state be rich or poor?"

Πενομένην.

578 Καὶ ψυχὴν ἄρα τυραννικὴν πενιχρὰν καὶ ἄπληστον
ἀνάγκη αἰεὶ εἶναι.

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς.

Τί δέ; φόβου γέμειν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὴν τε τοιαύτην
πόλιν ἢ τὸν τε τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα;

Πολλή γε.

Ὀδυρμούς δὲ καὶ στεναγμούς καὶ θρήνους καὶ
ἀλγηδόνας οἶε ἔν τινι ἄλλῃ πλείους εὐρήσειν;

Οὐδαμῶς. ἢ

Ἐν ἀνδρὶ δὲ ἡγῆ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ πλείω
εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ μαινομένῳ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμιῶν τε καὶ ἐρώτων
τούτῳ τῷ τυραννικῷ;

Πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ἔφη.

b Εἰς πάντα δὴ οἶμαι ταῦτά τε καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα
ἀποβλέψας τὴν γε πόλιν τῶν πόλεων ἀθλιωτάτην
ἔκρινας.

Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς; ἔφη.

Καὶ μάλα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἢ αὖ
τοῦ τυραννικοῦ τί λέγεις εἰς ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀποβλέ-
πων;

Μακρῶ, ἔφη, ἀθλιώτατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάν-
των.

Τοῦτο, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

Πῶς; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Οὐπω, ἔφη, οἶμαι, οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος μάλι-
στα. ἢ

BOOK IX

"Poor."

"And must the tyrant soul always be impoverished and insatiable?"¹⁷

"Yes," he said.

"What then? Mustn't we conclude that this kind of state and this kind of person is full of fear?"

"A great deal."

"Do you think you will find more lamentation, wailing, dirges and pain in any other?"

"Not at all."

"Then in the case of an individual man, do you think there is more of this sort of thing in any other person than in this tyrant driven mad by his desires and passions?"

"How could I?" he said.

"Then after looking at all this, and similar matters, I think, you judged this to be the most wretched of states."

"And I'd be right, wouldn't I?" he said.

"Yes indeed," I said, "but what can you say more about the man of tyrannical character when you consider these same points?"

"He's by far the most wretched compared with all the others."

"Saying this you're no longer right," I said.

"How come?" he asked.

"I don't think this man," I said, "is yet like one at the extreme."

¹⁷ "Insatiable" (*aplēston*) recalls the image of the foolish soul as a leaky sieve in *Grg.* 493a-d, illustrating the need for it continually to renew bad desires (see also 586b3). The insatiable yet impotent tyrant reflects a key idea developed in *Gorgias* (468ff.).

Ἄλλα τίς μήν;

Ὅδε ἴσως σοι ἔτι δόξει εἶναι τούτου ἀθλιώτερος.

Ποῖος;

- c Ὅς ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τυραννικὸς ὢν μὴ ἰδιώτην βίον κατα βιωῶ, ἀλλὰ δυστυχήῃς ἧ καὶ αὐτῷ ὑπὸ τινος συμφοράς ἐκπορισθῆ ὥστε τυράννω γενέσθαι.

Τεκμαίρομαί σε, ἔφη, ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ἀληθῆ λέγειν. |

Ναί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶεσθαι χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ' εἶ μάλα τῷ τοιούτῳ¹ λόγῳ σκοπεῖν· περὶ γάρ τοι τοῦ μεγίστου ἢ σκέψις, ἀγαθοῦ τε βίου καὶ κακοῦ.

Ὅρθότατα, ἦ δ' ὅς.

- d Σκόπει δὴ εἰ ἄρα τι λέγω. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι δεῖν ἐννοῆσαι ἐκ τῶνδε περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοποῦντας.

Ἐκ τίνων;

Ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐκάστου τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι πλούσιοι ἐν πόλεσιν ἀνδράποδα | πολλὰ κέκτηνται. οὗτοι γὰρ τοῦτό γε προσόμοιον ἔχουσιν τοῖς τυράννοις, τὸ πολλῶν ἄρχειν· διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἐκείνου πλήθος.

Διαφέρει γάρ.

Οἶσθ' οὖν ὅτι οὗτοι ἀδεῶς ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐ φοβοῦνται τοὺς | οἰκέτας;

¹ τῷ τοιούτῳ ADF: τὸ τοιούτῳ Adam

¹⁸ At 8.566dff.

¹⁹ Or "these two individuals" (with Adam's conjectural reading), the tyrannical man who lives as a private individual and the man who becomes a political tyrant.

BOOK IX

“Well, who is, then?”

“Perhaps you’ll think the following is even more wretched than this one.”

“What sort is that?”

“Anyone who, being a tyrannical man, doesn’t live his life as a private individual, but has bad luck, and as a result of some disaster contrives to make himself an actual tyrant.”

“I can tell that you’re telling the truth from what has already been said.”¹⁸

“Yes,” I said. “But we mustn’t assume such things, but examine a person carefully by an argument such as this,¹⁹ because, I tell you, our inquiry is about a most important subject—the good and the bad life.”²⁰

“Absolutely right,” he said.

“Consider whether I have a point here. You see I think we must shape our ideas about him as we look at him in the light of the following.”

“What?”

“Considering each private individual who is rich and has acquired many slaves in his state. For these men share with tyrants this common characteristic: they control many people, although the size of the tyrant’s group is different.”

“Yes, they do differ.”

“You know, then, that these men own their slaves without fear and aren’t afraid of them?”

²⁰ That the basis of all inquiry about “how one ought to live” (*hontina tropon chrē sdēn*) is the leitmotif of Plato’s moral philosophy (see, e.g., 1.344e1–3, 352d6–7).

Τί γὰρ ἂν φοβοῖντο;

Οὐδέν, εἶπον· ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτιον ἐννοεῖς;

Ναί, ὅτι γε πᾶσα ἡ πόλις ἐνὶ ἐκάστω βοηθεῖ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν.

e Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. τί δέ; εἴ τις θεῶν ἄνδρα ἕνα, ὅτῳ ἔστιν ἀνδράποδα πεντήκοντα ἢ καὶ πλείω, ἄρας ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αὐτόν τε καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ παῖδας θείῃ εἰς ἐρημίαν μετὰ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τε καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν, ὅπου αὐτῷ μηδεὶς ἢ τῶν ἐλευθέρων μέλλοι βοηθήσειν, ἐν ποίῳ ἂν τιμὴν καὶ ὀπόσῳ φόβῳ οἶε γενέσθαι αὐτὸν περὶ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ παίδων καὶ γυναικός, μὴ ἀπόλοιτο ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκετῶν;

Ἐν παντί, ἦ δ' ὅς, ἔγωγε.

579 Οὐκοῦν ἀναγκάζοιτο ἂν τις αἴδη ἠδὲ θωπεύειν αὐτῶν τῶν δούλων καὶ ὑπισχνεῖσθαι πολλὰ καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν οὐδὲν δεόμενος, καὶ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἂν θεραπεύωντων ἀναφανείη;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, αὐτῷ, ἢ ἀπολωλέναι. ἢ

Τί δ', εἰ καὶ ἄλλους, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ θεὸς κύκλω κατοικίσειεν γείτονας πολλοὺς αὐτῷ, οἳ μὴ ἀνέχοντο εἴ τις ἄλλος ἄλλου δεσπόζειν ἀξιοῖ, ἀλλ' εἴ πού τινα τοιοῦτον λαμβάνοιεν, ταῖς ἐσχάταις τιμωροῦντο τιμωρίαις;

b Ἐτι ἂν, ἔφη, οἶμαι, μᾶλλον ἐν παντὶ κακοῦ εἴη, κύκλω φρουρούμενος ὑπὸ πάντων πολεμίων.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἐν τοιούτῳ μὲν δεσποτηρίῳ δέδεται ὁ τύραννος, φύσει ὦν οἶον διεληλύθαμεν, πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν φόβων καὶ ἐρώτων μεστός· λίχνῳ δὲ

BOOK IX

"Yes, for what should they be afraid of?"

"Nothing," I said, "but can you think of the reason why?"

"Yes, because the state helps each one of its individual citizens."

"Well said," I replied. "But what if one of the gods were to remove one man who owns fifty slaves, or even more, himself together with his wife and children, and put them in a deserted spot with the rest of his possessions and household, where none of the free citizens would be in the position of coming to help him? In what and how great a state of fear do you think he'd get himself into, that he, his children and wife would be killed by their slaves?"

"Very great, I'd say," he said.

"So at that point he'd be forced to ingratiate himself with some of the slaves, make them many promises and set them free, though there's nothing he wants less, and so show himself as a flatterer of his servants?"

"He would be under great compulsion," he said, "or perish."

"What if the god settled others round him so he has many neighbors who wouldn't tolerate anyone who thought he was fit to be master of another, but supposing they did get hold of such a person, they'd punish him with the ultimate sanctions, wouldn't they?"

"I still think he'd be in still worse trouble," he said, "blockaded by nothing but enemies."

"So is this not, then, the kind of jail our tyrant is chained up in, he being naturally the type of person we've described, full of many fears and lusts of every kind? As he's

ὄντι | αὐτῷ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνῳ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει οὔτε
 ἀποδημῆσαι ἕξεστιν οὐδαμόσῃ, οὔτε θεωρηῆσαι ὄσων
 c δὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐλεύθεροι ἐπιθυμηταὶ εἰσιν, κατα-
 δεδουκῶς δὲ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς γυνὴ ζῆ, φθονῶν
 καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πολίταις, ἕάν τις ἕξω ἀποδημῆ καὶ τι
 ἀγαθὸν ὄρᾳ;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς πλείω καρποῦται
 ἀνὴρ ὃς ἂν κακῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ πολιτευόμενος, ὃν νυνδὴ
 σὺν ἀθλιώτατον ἔκρινας, | τὸν τυραννικόν, ὡς μὴ ἰδι-
 ώτης καταβιῶ, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκασθῆ ὑπὸ τινος τύχης
 τυραννεῦσαι καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ὦν ἀκράτωρ ἄλλων ἐπιχειρήσῃ
 ἀρχεῖν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις κάμνοντι σώματι καὶ ἀκράτορι
 d ἑαυτοῦ μὴ ἰδιωτεύων ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζόμενος πρὸς ἄλλα
 σώματα καὶ μαχόμενος ἀναγκάζεται διαγείν τὸν
 βίον.

Παντάπασι, ἔφη, ὁμοιώτατά τε καὶ ἀληθέστατα
 λέγεις, | ὦ Σώκρατες.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε Γλαῦκων, παντελῶς τὸ
 πάθος ἄθλιον, καὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ σοῦ κριθέντος χαλεπώτατα
 ζῆν χαλεπώτερον ἔτι ζῆ ὁ τυραννῶν;

Κομιδῆ γ', ἔφη. |

Ἔστιν ἄρα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, καὶ εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεῖ, ὁ τῷ
 ὄντι τύραννος τῷ ὄντι δούλος τὰς μεγίστας θωπείας
 e καὶ δουλείας καὶ κόλαξ τῶν πονηροτάτων, καὶ τὰς
 ἐπιθυμίας οὐδ' ὅπωςτιοῦν ἀποπιμπλάς, ἀλλὰ πλεί-
 στων ἐπιδεέστατος καὶ πένης τῇ ἀληθείᾳ φαίνεται,
 ἕάν τις ὄλην ψυχὴν ἐπίστηται θεάσασθαι, καὶ φόβου

BOOK IX

greedy in his soul, he's the only one of those in the state who cannot go anywhere abroad, or visit festivals which the rest of the free population long to see, as he's hidden away in his house, and lives most of his life like a woman, even envying the rest of the citizens if any of them go abroad and see something good."

"Yes, absolutely," he said.

"So does this mean that the man who is badly governed within himself, whom you yourself judged to be the most wretched just now, the tyrannical type, reaps more from these kinds of evils when he doesn't live out his life as a private citizen, but is compelled by some misfortune to become a tyrant and, while being unable to master himself, tries to rule others? Just as if someone who is sick in body and with no self-control, instead of keeping himself to himself, were to take issue against others physically and be forced to spend his life at war."

"What you say, Socrates, is spot on and very true in every respect," he said.

"So, my dear Glaucon," I said, "his condition is utterly wretched and the tyrant lives a life even more wretched than he whom you judged to be living most wretchedly, isn't that so?"

"Absolutely," he said.

"In truth, then, even if he doesn't seem so to some people, the actual tyrant is in actual fact a slave to the greatest fawning and servility, and a flatterer of the meanest sort. There is no way at all he can satisfy his desires, but he appears as one desperately in need of most things and truly a pauper, if anyone understands how to look at the whole soul; and he is plagued by fear the whole of his

γέμων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου, σφαδασμῶν τε | καὶ ὀδυνῶν πλήρης, εἶπερ τῇ τῆς πόλεως διαθέσει ἧς ἄρχει ἔοικεν. ἔοικεν δέ· ἦ γάρ;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

580 Οὐκοῦν καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι ἀποδώσομεν τῷ ἀνδρὶ καὶ ἂ τὸ πρότερον εἶπομεν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον γίγνεσθαι αὐτῷ ἢ πρότερον διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν φθονερῶ, ἀπίστῳ, ἀδίκῳ, ἀφίλῳ, ἀνοσίῳ καὶ πάσης κακίας πανδοκεῖ τε καὶ | τροφεῖ, καὶ ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων μάλιστα μὲν αὐτῷ δυστυχεῖ εἶναι, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοὺς πλησίον αὐτῷ τοιούτους ἀπεργάζεσθαι.

Οὐδεῖς σοι, ἔφη, τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἀντερέϊ.

b Ἴθι δὴ μοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, νῦν ἤδη ὥσπερ ὁ διὰ πάντων κριτῆς ἀποφαίνεται, καὶ σὺ οὕτω, τίς πρῶτος κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονία καὶ τίς δεύτερος, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξῆς πέντε ὄντας κρίνε, βασιλικόν, τιμοκρατικόν, ὀλιγαρχικόν, | δημοκρατικόν, τυραννικόν.

Ἄλλα ῥαδία, ἔφη, ἡ κρίσις. καθάπερ γὰρ εἰσῆλθον ἔγωγε ὥσπερ χοροὺς κρίνω ἀρετῇ καὶ κακία καὶ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ.

c Μισθωσώμεθα οὖν κήρυκα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἀνείπω ὅτι ὁ Ἀρίστωνος υἱὸς τὸν ἄριστόν τε καὶ δικαιοτάτον εὐδαιμονέστατον ἔκρινε, τούτον δ' εἶναι τὸν βασιλικώτατον καὶ βασιλεύοντα αὐτοῦ, τὸν δὲ κάκιστόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτατον ἀθλιώτατον, τούτον δὲ αὐ

²¹ A reference to the judgment of plays in the competitive dramatic festival at Athens. For the dramatic imagery, see also the

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life, racked with convulsions and pains, if his condition at all resembles the setup of the state he rules. And he is like it, isn't that true?"

"Yes, very much," he said.

"And in addition to this, shall we further grant this man the qualities we also attributed to him earlier, that he must be, and will become through his rule, even more than before, detested, distrusted, unjust, friendless, impious, a host and breeder of evil, and as a result of all of these things, he'll be a particular victim of ill-fortune and he'll make those who associate with him like this too?"

"No one with any sense will contradict you," he said.

"Come on, then," I said, "now is the moment; just like a judge making his final judgment,²¹ so you too decide who in your opinion is first in happiness, who is second, and so on with the rest in order, there being five of them, king, timocrat, oligarch, democrat, and tyrant."

"Well, the decision is easy," he said. "I judge them, like choruses in order of their entrances, in respect of virtue and evil, happiness and its opposite."

"Let's hire ourselves a herald, then," I said, "or shall I myself declare that the son of Ariston judged the best²² and most just man to be the happiest, and it is he who is most fit to be king and controls himself like a king, and the worst and most unjust man is the most wretched, who,

references to choruses (b7) and the herald who announced the result (b9). On the possible (and obscure) significance of "final judgment," see Adam, n. ad loc.

²² A pun on Glaucon's (and, of course, also Plato's father's) name and the Greek *ariston* ("the best") in c1.

τυγχάνειν ὄντα ὅς ἂν τυραννικώτατος ὦν ἑαυτοῦ τε ὅτι | μάλιστα τυραννῆ καὶ τῆς πόλεως;

Ἄνειρήσθω σοι, ἔφη.

Ἦ οὖν προσαναγορεύω, εἶπον, ἑάντε λανθάνωσιν τοιοῦτοι ὄντες ἑάντε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς;

Προσαναγόρευε, ἔφη. |

Εἶεν δῆ, εἶπον· αὕτη μὲν ἡμῖν ἢ ἀπόδειξις μία ἂν εἴη, δευτέραν δὲ ἰδὲ τήνδε, ἑάν τι δόξῃ εἶναι.

d Τίς αὕτη;

Ἐπειδή, ὥσπερ πόλις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διήρηται κατὰ τρία εἶδη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου τριχῆ, [λογιστικὸν]² δέξεται, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἑτέραν ἀπόδειξιν. |

Τίνα ταύτην;

Τήνδε. τριῶν ὄντων τριτταὶ καὶ ἡδοναί μοι φαίνονται, ἐνὸς ἐκάστου μία ἰδίᾳ· ἐπιθυμίαι τε ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀρχαί.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

e Τὸ μὲν, φαμέν, ἦν ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος, τὸ δὲ ᾧ θυμοῦται, τὸ δὲ τρίτον διὰ πολυειδίαν ἐνὶ οὐκ ἔσχομεν ὀνόματι προσειπεῖν ἰδίῳ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ ὃ μέγιστον καὶ ἰσχυρότατον εἶχεν ἐν αὐτῷ, τούτῳ ἐπωνομάσαμεν ἐπιθυμητικὸν γὰρ αὐτὸ κεκλήκαμεν διὰ σφοδρότητα

² λογιστικὸν DF; τὸ λογιστικὸν A; del. recs.

²³ S. here recalls and implicitly meets the challenge of Adeimantus in 2.366e and 367e, that he was required to demon-

BOOK IX

moreover, being actually most like a tyrant within himself, is the greatest tyrant over himself and his state?"

"Yes you make the proclamation," he said.

"Shall I also make the proclamation then whether all, both human beings and the gods, fail to notice what kind of people these are or not?" I asked.²³

"Yes, do," he said.

"Well then," I said, "this would be one proof for us, but have a look at this second one and see if there's anything in it."

"What is it?"

"Just as the state has been split up into three classes," I said, "and so too the soul of each individual is divided into three, it will, it seems to me, also allow a second proof."²⁴

"What is that?"

"As follows: as there are three classes, I think there are three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and the same goes for the desires and the ruling principles."

"How do you mean?" he said.

"One we say is the one a person uses to learn, the second when he becomes angry, and the third we didn't have one individual name for, because it takes many forms, but from its largest and strongest element we have given it the following name: and that is the appetitive element, on ac-

strate that the just person is happier than the unjust, whether mortals and gods observe this or not (see the idea also recalled at 4.427d5-7).

²⁴ Omitting *logistikon* = "the ability to reason" vel sim., which is deleted by most editors.

581 τῶν τε περὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ πόσιν καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τούτοις ἀκόλουθα, | καὶ φιλοχρήματον δὴ, ὅτι διὰ χρημάτων μάλιστα ἀποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦται ἐπιθυμῖαι.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ φιλίαν εἰ φαῖμεν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους, μάλιστα ἂν εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπηρεδοίμεθα | τῷ λόγῳ, ὥστε τι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς δηλοῦν, ὅποτε τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ μέρος λέγοιμεν, καὶ καλοῦντες αὐτὸ φιλοχρήματον καὶ φιλοκερδὲς ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοῖμεν;

Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη.

b Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι φαμέν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν αἰεὶ ὄλον ὠρμηῆσθαι;

Καὶ μάλα.

Εἰ οὖν φιλόνηκον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύομεν ἢ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; |

Ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ᾧ γε μανθάνομεν, παντὶ δήλον ὅτι πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναί τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὅπη ἔχει πᾶν αἰεὶ τέταται, καὶ χρημάτων τε καὶ δόξης ἤκιστα τούτων τούτῳ μέλει.

Πολύ γε. |

Φιλομαθὲς δὴ καὶ φιλόσοφον καλοῦντες αὐτὸ κατὰ τρόπον ἂν καλοῖμεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

c Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ἄρχει ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν μὲν τοῦτο, τῶν δὲ τὸ ἕτερον ἐκείνων, ὀπότερον ἂν τύχη;

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count of the vehemence of its desires for food, drink, sex and whatever follows on from these, including the love of money because it's through money especially that such desires are fulfilled."

"And we were right," he said.

"Does that mean then that if we were to say its pleasure and love are for profit-making, would that not be the best way of bringing it together under one main heading in our discussion, so that we could be clear among ourselves, whenever we're discussing this part of the soul, and we'd be right in calling it the love of money and the love of profit?"

"I think so, at any rate," he said.

"What about the passionate part? Don't we agree that it always wholly strives after control, success and a high reputation?"

"Very much so."

"If then we were to call it love of success and love of honor, would that fit in?"

"It would fit very well."

"Well again, as to the part which we use to learn, it's clear to everybody that the whole of it is constantly directed at knowing what truth is and the last thing it's concerned with out of these is money and reputation."

"Very much so."

"Then we could appropriately call this love of learning and love of wisdom."

"Of course."

"Does this mean," I said, "that one of these is what governs the soul of some people, and one of the other two those of others, whichever way it happens to go?"

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Διὰ ταῦτα δὴ καὶ ἀνθρώπων λέγομεν τὰ πρῶτα
τριτὰ ἢ γένη εἶναι, φιλόσοφον, φιλόνομον, φιλοκερ-
δές;

Κομιδῆ γε.

Καὶ ἡδονῶν δὴ τρία εἶδη, ὑποκείμενον ἐν ἐκάστῳ
τούτων;

Πάνν γε.

Οἴσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι εἰ θέλοισ τρεῖς τοιοῦτους ἢ
ἀνθρώπους ἐν μέρει ἕκαστον ἀνερωτᾶν τίς τούτων τῶν
d βίων ἡδιστος, τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστος μάλιστα ἐγκωμιάσε-
ται; ὁ τε χρηματιστικὸς πρὸς τὸ κερδαίνειν τὴν τοῦ
τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονὴν ἢ τὴν τοῦ μαθάνειν οὐδενὸς ἀξίαν
φήσει εἶναι, εἰ μὴ εἴ τι αὐτῶν ἀργύριον ποιεῖ;

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. ἢ

Τί δέ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν
χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικὴν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν
ἀπὸ τοῦ μαθάνειν, ὅτι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν φέρει,
καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει.

Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας
ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέναι τὰληθῆς ὅπη
e ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μαθάνοντα; οὐ³
πάνν πόρρω; καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίαις, ὡς οὐδὲν
τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν;

Εὖ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέναι. ἢ

³ ante οὐ legunt τῆς ἡδόνης ADF: τῆς ἡδόνης post ἐν
τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ Adam

"Yes," he said.

"Then is this the reason we say that the three prime classes of men are the lover of wisdom, the lover of success and the lover of profit?"

"Absolutely."

"And also three kinds of pleasure, one for each of these?"

"Certainly."

"Then are you aware," I said, "that if you should choose to ask three such men each in turn which of these three life-styles is the most pleasant, each will eulogize his own, so the moneymaker will say that, compared with making a profit, the pleasure of being honored or of learning is worth nothing unless it makes him some money."

"True," he said.

"And what about the lover of honor?" I said. "Doesn't he think the pleasure derived from money to be vulgar and again the pleasure from learning, unless it brings respect, to be smoke and nonsense?"

"That's how it is," he said.

"And as for the philosopher," I said, "what are we to imagine he thinks of the other pleasures in relation to knowing what truth is and to be contently engaged in some aspect of it as he learns? Won't he consider them far removed from pleasure?²⁵ And won't he use the term 'essential' in a real sense, as he wouldn't need any of the others, unless they were essential for existence?"²⁶

"We may be perfectly sure about that," he said.

²⁵ With ADF read τῆς ἡδόνης ("pleasure") as genitive depending on πόρρω ("far removed from").

²⁶ See 8.559a1-b7.

582 Ὅτε δὴ οὖν, εἶπον, ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἐκάστου τοῦ εἶδους αἰ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος, μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἡδιον καὶ ἀλυπότερον, πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;

Οὐ πάννυ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε ἔχω εἰπεῖν.

Ἄλλ' ὥδε σκόπει τίνη χρῆ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθῆσεσθαι; ἄρ' οὐκ ἐμπειρία τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ ἢ τούτων ἔχει ἂν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον;

Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη.

Σκόπει δὴ τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀνδρῶν τίς ἐμπειρότατος πασῶν ὧν εἵπομεν ἡδονῶν; πότερον ὁ φιλοκερδῆς, μανθάνων αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν οἷόν ἐστιν, ἐμπειρότερος δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδέναί ἡδονῆς, ἢ ὁ φιλόσοφος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ κερδαίνειν;

Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη γεέεσθαι τῶν ἐτέρων ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξαμένῳ· τῷ δὲ φιλοκερδεῖ, ὅπῃ πέφυκε τὰ ὄντα μανθάνοντι, τῆς ἡδονῆς ταύτης, ὡς γλυκεῖά ἐστιν, οὐκ ἀνάγκη γεέεσθαι οὐδ' ἐμπείρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἢ μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ προθυμουμένῳ οὐ ῥάδιον.

Πολὸν ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διαφέρει τοῦ γε φιλοκερδοῦς ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐμπειρία ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἡδονῶν.

c Πολὸν μέντοι.

Τί δὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου; ἄρα μᾶλλον ἄπειρός ἐστι τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι ἡδονῆς ἢ ἐκεῖνος τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φρονεῖν;

Ἀλλὰ τιμὴ μὲν, ἔφη, εἰς ἀνὰ πᾶσι ἐξεργάζονται ἐπὶ ὁ

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"So when the pleasures of each kind and the life itself are in contention, not in relation to living a finer or more shameful life, or a worse or better one, but in relation to which is actually more pleasant and less painful, how would we know which one of them is most truthful?"

"I can't answer that at all," he said.

"Well, look at it this way: how must things be judged if they are to be judged correctly? It'll be by experience, intelligence, and reason, won't it? Or would anyone have a better means of judging than these?"

"How could they?" he said.

"Consider then: given we have these three men, which of them will be most experienced in all the pleasures we've talked about? Do you think the lover of profit learning the nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure derived from learning than the philosopher from his pleasure derived from making profits?"

"There's a big difference," he said. "The latter has to get a flavor of the other sorts starting from childhood, but the lover of profit is not obliged to taste or experience how sweet is the pleasure of learning the nature of reality, which would not be easy for him, even if he were keen."

"Then the philosopher is far superior to the profit-maker," I said, "through his experience of both sorts of pleasure?"

"Considerably, I'd say."

"What about compared with the lover of honor? Is he, the philosopher, more inexperienced in the pleasure derived from being honored than the other in the pleasure of thinking?"

"But honor comes to all of them," he said, "if each one

ἕκαστος ὄρμηκε, | πᾶσιν αὐτοῖς ἔπεται—καὶ γὰρ ὁ πλούσιος ὑπὸ πολλῶν τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ ἀνδρείος καὶ σοφός—ὥστε ἀπὸ γε τοῦ τιμᾶσθαι, οἷόν ἐστιν, πάντες τῆς ἡδονῆς ἔμπειροι· τῆς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος θέας, οἷαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλῳ γεγεῦσθαι πλὴν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ.

d Ἐμπειρίας μὲν ἄρα, εἶπον, ἔνεκα κάλλιστα τῶν ἀνδρῶν κρίνει οὗτος.

Πολύ γε.

Καὶ μὴν μετὰ γε φρονήσεως μόνος | ἔμπειρος γεγονῶς ἔσται.

Τί μήν;

Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ δι' οὗ γε δεῖ ὄργανον κρίνεσθαι, οὐ τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς τοῦτο ὄργανον οὐδὲ τοῦ φιλοτίμου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ φιλοσόφου. |

Τὸ ποῖον;

Διὰ λόγων που ἔφαμεν δεῖν κρίνεσθαι. ἦ γάρ;

Ναί.

Λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον.

Πῶς δ' οὗ; |

e Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν πλούτῳ καὶ κέρδει ἄριστα ἐκρίνετο τὰ κρινόμενα, ἃ ἐπῆναι ὁ φιλοκερδῆς καὶ ἔψεγεν, ἀνάγκη ἂν ἦν ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

Πολλή γε.

Εἰ δὲ τιμῇ τε καὶ νίκη καὶ ἀνδρεία, ἄρ' οὐχ ἃ ὁ φιλοτίμος | τε καὶ ὁ φιλόνομος;

Δῆλον.

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achieves what he sets out to do. After all, the rich man is held in high regard by many, as well as the courageous and the wise man. Consequently they all experience the kind of pleasure that comes from being highly regarded, but as to the pleasure that comes from contemplating reality, no one can taste that except the philosopher."

"Then as far as experience is concerned," I said, "he is the best of these men to judge."

"By far!"

"And furthermore he alone will have gained his experience by using his intelligence."

"Oh yes."

"And moreover, the faculty you need for making judgments is not that of the lover of profit, nor even that of the lover of honor, but that of the philosopher."

"Which one is that?"

"We say, surely, that we must make our judgment by using argument. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"And reason is above all the faculty which the philosopher uses."

"Of course."

"That means that if wealth and profit were the best yardstick by which things being judged were best judged, then what the lover of profit approves and disapproves would have to be the truest, wouldn't it?"

"Very much so!"

"And if by honor, success, and courage, then the lover of honor and the lover of success will give the truest judgment?"

"Clearly."

Ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐμπειρία καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ;

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, ἃ ὁ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἐπαινεί, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι.

583 Τριῶν ἄρ' οὐσῶν τῶν ἡδονῶν ἢ τούτου τοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ μαυθάνομεν ἡδίστη ἂν εἴη, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡμῶν τοῦτο ἄρχει, ὁ τούτου βίος ἡδιστος;

Πῶς δ' οὐ μέλλει; ἔφη· κύριος γοῦν ἐπαινέτης ὢν ἐπαινεί | τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος.

Τίνα δὲ δεύτερον, εἶπον, βίον καὶ τίνα δευτέραν ἡδονὴν φησιν ὁ κριτῆς εἶναι;

Δῆλον ὅτι τὴν τοῦ πολεμικοῦ τε καὶ φιλοτίμου· ἐγγυτέρω γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ ἡ τοῦ χρηματιστοῦ. |

Ἵστατήν δὴ τὴν τοῦ φιλοκερδοῦς, ὡς ἔοικεν.

Τί μὴν; ἢ δ' ὅς.

b Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω δὴ ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἴη καὶ δις νενικηκῶς ὁ δίκαιος τὸν ἄδικον· τὸ δὲ τρίτον ὀλυμπικῶς τῷ σωτηρὶ τε καὶ τῷ Ὀλυμπίῳ Δί, ἄθρει ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ' | ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀκηκοέναι. καίτοι τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων.

Πολύ γε· ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεις;

²⁷ The third toast at a banquet was to "Zeus the Savior," emphasizing the decisive importance of the approaching third argument, which is also the third of the "competitive falls" (b6-7) in the wrestling match, which is the decisive one in the contest.

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"But when judged by experience, intelligence, and reason?"

"Then what the philosopher and lover of reason approves of has to be the truest."

"As there are these three kinds of pleasure, wouldn't the pleasure of that section of the soul by which we learn be the most pleasant and wouldn't the life of the one of us in whom this is the ruling principle be most pleasant?"

"How could it not be?" he said. "The intelligent man at least speaks with authority, when he praises his own lifestyle."

"What lifestyle does the judge say is second," I asked, "and which pleasure is second?"

"Clearly those of the warrior and lover of honor, as they are closer to him than those of the moneymaker."

"Then those of the lover of profit are last, it seems."

"Oh yes! What else?" he said.

"Then these would make two in succession, and twice the just man has been victorious over the unjust man; but the third is for Olympian Zeus the savior as in the Olympic games:²⁷ notice that apart from the pleasure of the intellect, that of the others is not entirely true, nor even pure, but a kind of illusionist painting, as I think I heard one of the wise men say.²⁸ And yet this would be the greatest and most decisive of the competitive falls."

"By far! But what do you mean?"

²⁸ Plato frequently uses the metaphor from artistic representation as illusion to indicate kinds of falsity (see e.g., 1.365c4, 7.523b6, 9.586b8, 10.602d3). It is not known who "one of the wise men" is, unless a covert reference to Plato himself.

c Ἔδ', εἶπον, ἐξευρήσω, σοῦ ἀποκρινομένου ζητῶν
ἅμα.

Ἐρώτα δὴ, ἔφη.

Λέγε δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐκ ἐναντίον φαμὲν λύπην
ἡδονῇ;

Καὶ μάλα. |

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ μῆτε χαίρειν μῆτε λυπέισθαι εἶναί
τι;

Εἶναι μέντοι.

Μεταξὺ τούτων ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ὃν ἡσυχίαν τινὰ
περὶ ταῦτα τῆς ψυχῆς; ἢ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὸ λέγεις;

Οὕτως, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Ἄρ' οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόν-
των λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν;

Ποίους;

d Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡδίων τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ
σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἡδιστον ὄν.

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνία τινὲς ἐχομένων ἀκούεις
λεγόντων ὡς οὐδὲν ἡδίων τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμε-
νον; |

Ἀκούω.

Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε οἶμαι πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνη
γιγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται,
τὸ μὴ λυπέισθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγ-
κωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἡδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. |

²⁹ Plato's later dialogue *Philebus* deals with pain and pleasure

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"I'll find that out if you answer my questions as I put them."

"Ask away, then!" he said.

"Tell me," I said, "don't we agree pain is the opposite of pleasure?"²⁹

"We do indeed."

"And is there, then, some point where you feel neither joy nor pain?"

"Yes, there is."

"And being in between these two, it's a sort of quiet spot for the soul in this respect. Or don't you put it that way?"

"Yes, I do," he said.

"Do you remember the words sick people say, when they're ill?" I asked.

"What are they?"

"That there is nothing more pleasant than being in good health, but they hadn't realized it was the most pleasant thing before they fell ill."

"I remember," he said.

"So do you hear people suffering from some extreme pain say that there is nothing more pleasant than the pain stopping?"

"I do."

"And you notice, I think, when people get into many other similar situations in which, when they're in pain, they praise not the feeling of joy but not being in pain and the relief from that sort of thing as the most pleasant sensation."

in greater detail. For a discussion of this third argument as a whole, see the introduction to this volume, section 1 (Book 9).

Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἤδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία.

e Καὶ ὅταν παύσῃται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται.

Ἴσως, ἔφη.

Ὁ μεταξὺ ἄρα νυνδὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἔφαμεν εἶναι, | τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτό ποτε ἀμφοτέρα ἔσται, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή.

Ἐοικεν.

Ἡ καὶ δυνατὸν τὸ μηδέτερα ὄν ἀμφοτέρα γίγνεσθαι;

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἤδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησίς τις ἀμφοτέρω ἔστόν ἢ οὐ; |

Ναί.

584 Τὸ δὲ μήτε λυπηρὸν μήτε ἤδὺ οὐχὶ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτοις ἐφάνη ἄρτι;

Ἐφάνη γάρ.

Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἤδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ | χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἤδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἤδὺ ἀλγεῖν τότε ἢ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, | ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.

Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.

b Ἴδὲ τοῖσιν, ἔφη ἐγώ, ἡδονάς, αἶ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις οἰθηῆς ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὕτω

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"Yes, this is perhaps what then becomes pleasant and desirable: the relief," he said.

"And when one stops feeling delight then," I said, "the respite from the pleasure will be painful."

"Perhaps," he said.

"So what we just said about the halfway stage between the two, this respite, sometimes will be both: pain and pleasure."

"It looks like it."

"Does that mean that something which is neither one thing or the other can become both?"

"I don't think so."

"And again, the pleasure and the pain that occur in the soul are a kind of motion, are they not?"

"Yes."

"But didn't we show just now,³⁰ however, that what is not painful or pleasant is a quiet spot and lies between these?"

"Yes, we did."

"So how can we be right in thinking that not being in pain is pleasant and not feeling joy is painful?"

"It's not right at all."

"Then this quiet spot we had just now is not a reality, but when it is next to what is painful it seems pleasant, and when next to what is pleasant it seems painful, and there's nothing sound in these illusions regarding the truth of pleasure, but a kind of wizardry."

"So at least our argument indicates," he said.

"Then take a look at pleasures," I said, "that don't come from pains, in order not to go on thinking for the present

³⁰ At 583c7-8.

τούτο πεφνκέναι, ἡδονὴν μὲν παῦλαν λύπης εἶναι, λύπην δὲ ἡδονῆς.

Ποῦ δὴ, ἔφη, καὶ ποίας λέγεις;

Πολλαὶ μὲν, εἶπον, καὶ ἄλλαι, μάλιστα δ' ἰ εἰ
 'θέλεις ἐννοῆσαι τὰς περὶ τὰς ὁσμάς ἡδονάς. αὗται
 γὰρ οὐ προλυπηθέντι ἐξαίφνης ἀμήχανοι τὸ μέγεθος
 γίνονται, παυσάμεναί τε λύπην οὐδεμίαν καταλεί-
 πουσιν.

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

c Μὴ ἄρα πειθώμεθα καθαρὰν ἡδονὴν εἶναι τὴν λύ-
 πης ἀπαλλαγὴν, μηδὲ λύπην τὴν ἡδονῆς.

Μὴ γάρ.

Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπον, αἶ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ τὴν
 ψυχὴν τείνουσαι καὶ λεγόμεναι ἡδοναί, σχεδὸν αἶ ἰ
 πλείσταί τε καὶ μέγισται, τούτου τοῦ εἶδους εἰσὶ,
 λυπῶν τινες ἀπαλλαγαί.

Εἰσὶ γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἶ πρὸ μελλόντων τούτων ἐκ προσδο-
 κίας γιγνόμεναι προησθήσεις τε καὶ προλυπήσεις
 κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχουσιν;

Κατὰ ταῦτά. ἰ

d Οἷσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαί εἰσιν καὶ ᾧ μάλιστα
 εὐόικασιν;

Τῷ; ἔφη.

Νομίζεις τι, εἶπον, ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω,
 τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον; ἰ

Ἐγωγε.

Οἷει οὖν ἄν τινα ἐκ τοῦ κάτω φερόμενον πρὸς μέσον

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that this is the nature of things, that pleasure is a respite from pain and pain from pleasure."

"Where do I look," he asked, "and what sort of pleasures do you mean?"

"A lot of different ones, but in particular, of the pleasures of smell, if you want to think about them.³¹ You see they come upon you without any previous sense of pain and overwhelm you and when they cease they leave no sense of pain behind."

"That's very true," he said.

"So let us not believe that pure pleasure is a relief from pain, nor pure pain a relief from pleasure."

"No."

"While on the other hand," I said, "the so-called pleasures which spread through the body toward the soul are mostly the greatest in size and number and are of this form: a kind of getting rid of pains."

"Yes, they are."

"So does that mean that by the same process the anticipation of pleasure and pain comes about through expectation, before they actually occur?"

"Yes, it's the same."

"So then you are aware what sort they are like?"

"What?" he said.

"Do you reckon that there is in nature a top, a bottom, and a middle?"

"I do."

"Then do you think anyone being carried from below

³¹ On the pleasure of smell unconditioned by pain, see *Phlb.* 51bff.

ἄλλο τι οἶεσθαι ἢ ἄνω φέρεσθαι; καὶ ἐν μέσῳ στάντα, ἀφορῶντα ὅθεν ἐνήνεκται, ἄλλοθί που ἂν ἠγγεῖσθαι εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἄνω, μὴ ἑωρακότα τὸ ἀληθῶς ἄνω; †

Μὰ Δί', οὐκ ἔγωγε, ἔφη, ἄλλως οἶμαι οἰηθῆναι ἂν τὸν τοιοῦτον.

Ἄλλ' εἰ πάλιν γ', ἔφην, φέροιο, κάτω τ' ἂν οἴοιτο
e φέρεσθαι καὶ ἀληθῆ οἴοιτο;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα πάσχοι ἂν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω; †

Δῆλον δῆ.

Θαυμάζοις ἂν οὖν εἰ καὶ οἱ ἄπειροι ἀληθείας περὶ
πολλῶν τε ἄλλων μὴ ὑγιεῖς δόξας ἔχουσιν, πρὸς τε
ἡδονῆν καὶ λύπην καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων οὕτω διάκειν-
585 ται, ὥστε, ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρωνται, ἀληθῆ
τε οἴονται καὶ τῷ ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης
ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξύ, σφόδρα μὲν οἴονται πρὸς πληρώσει τε
καὶ ἡδονῇ γίνεσθαι, ὥσπερ (δὲ) πρὸς μέλαν φαιὸν
ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς † τὸ ἄλυπον
οὕτω λύπην ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρία ἡδονῆς ἀπατῶνται;

Μὰ Δία, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ
μᾶλλον, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει.

(***) ὧδε γοῦν, εἶπον, ἐννόει· οὐχὶ πείνα καὶ δίψα
b καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα κενώσεις τινές εἰσιν τῆς περὶ τὸ σῶμα
ἕξως;

Τί μῆν;

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toward the middle is aware he's being conveyed any way but upward? And when he's standing in the middle looking at where he's come from, could he think he's anywhere but at the top, even though he hasn't seen the real top?"

"No, by Zeus, I myself don't think anyone in this position would think otherwise."

"But if he were brought back down again, he would think he was being conveyed downward and he'd be right in so thinking?"

"Of course."

"So he'd experience all this because he's not had experience of the true top, middle, and bottom?"

"Obviously."

"Would you be surprised, then, if people who have no experience of the truth also have no sound opinions of many other things and are so conditioned in their minds as to pleasure and pain and what lies between that when they are moved toward the painful they think it's real and actually feel pain, and when they move away from pain toward the center, they seriously think they've found gratification and pleasure? But just as they are misled by looking at gray against black in their inexperience of white, so too aren't they also misled when they compare pain against painlessness in their inexperience of pleasure?"

"No, by Zeus, I wouldn't be surprised, but I would be much more surprised if this weren't the case."

"Then think about it this way," I said: "aren't hunger and thirst and the like a kind of emptiness in the state of your body?"

"Certainly."

Ἄγνοια δὲ καὶ ἀφροσύνη ἀρ' οὐ κενότης ἐστὶ τῆς
περὶ ψυχὴν αὐτῆς ἕξως; |

Μάλα γε.

Οὐκοῦν πληροῖτ' ἂν ὁ τε τροφῆς μεταλαμβάνων
καὶ ὁ νοῦν ἴσχωρ;

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεστέρα τοῦ ἡττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον
ὄντος; |

Δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον.

Πότερα οὖν ἡγήσῃ τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρᾶς οὐσίας
μετέχειν, τὰ οἶον σίτου τε καὶ ποτοῦ καὶ ὄψου καὶ
c συμπάσης τροφῆς, ἢ τὸ δόξης τε ἀληθοῦς εἶδος καὶ
ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ συλλήβδην αὐτῆς πάσης ἀρετῆς;
Ὡδε δὲ κρίνε· τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀθανάτου
καὶ ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον ὄν καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ
γιγνόμενον, μᾶλλον εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ, ἢ | τὸ μηδέποτε
ὁμοίου καὶ θνητοῦ, καὶ αὐτὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐν τοιούτῳ
γιγνόμενον;

Πολύ, ἔφη, διαφέρει τὸ τοῦ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου.

Ἦ οὖν †ἀεὶ ὁμοίου⁴ οὐσία οὐσίας τι μᾶλλον ἢ
ἐπιστήμης† μετέχει; |

Οὐδαμῶς.

Τί δ'; ἀληθείας;

⁴ ἀεὶ ὁμοίου ADF: ἀεὶ <ἀν>ομοίου Adam: alii alia, locus desperatus (Slings)

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“And again aren’t ignorance and thoughtlessness a void in the state of your soul?”

“They are indeed.”

“So the person eating some food and the one strengthening his mind would be filled?”

“Of course.”

“And is the gratification of what is less real or more real the truer one?”

“The more real, clearly.”

“Which of the classes, then, do you think has a greater share in pure reality: those made up of things such as food and drink and sauces and all kinds of foodstuffs, or the kind of true opinion and knowledge and intellect and, to sum up, the whole of virtue? Judge it this way: that which comprises what is always the same, immortal and true and is itself of that kind and occurs in such an environment: doesn’t that seem more real to you than that which is never consistent and is transient and is itself of that kind and occurs in that kind of environment?”

“The one which is always consistent is far superior,” he said.

“Then does the reality of what is always consistent have a larger measure of the real than it does of knowledge?”³²

“Not at all.”

“And what about its share of truth?”

³² I.e., that which is always the same is equally real and knowable. Adam amends ἀεὶ ὁμοίου (“always consistent”) to <ἀν>ομοίου (“inconsistent”), giving “Does the reality of that which is inconsistent share in real essence any more than it does of knowledge?” Slings obelizes ἀεὶ . . . ἐπιστήμης (c8).

Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

Εἰ δὲ ἀληθείας ἦττον, οὐ καὶ οὐσίας;
Ἀνάγκη.

- d Οὐκοῦν ὅλως τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν
γένη γῶν γενῶν αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θεραπείαν
ἦττον ἀληθείας τε καὶ οὐσίας μετέχει;

Πολύ γε. |

Σῶμα δὲ αὐτὸ ψυχῆς οὐκ οἶει οὕτως;

Ἐγωγε.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ τῶν μᾶλλον ὄντων πληρούμενον καὶ
αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ὄντως μᾶλλον πληροῦται ἢ τὸ τῶν
ἦττον ὄντων καὶ αὐτὸ ἦττον ὄν; |

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

- e Εἰ ἄρα τὸ πληροῦσθαι τῶν φύσει προσηκόντων
ἡδύ ἐστι, τὸ τῶ ὄντι καὶ τῶν ὄντων πληρούμενον
μᾶλλον μᾶλλον ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθεστέρως χαίρειν ἂν
ποιοῖ ἡδονῇ ἀληθεί, τὸ δὲ τῶν ἦττον ὄντων μεταλαμ-
βάνον ἦττόν τε ἂν ἀληθῶς καὶ βεβαίως πληροῖτο καὶ
ἀπιστοτέρας | ἂν ἡδονῆς καὶ ἦττον ἀληθοῦς μεταλαμ-
βάνοι.

Ἀναγκαιότατα, ἔφη.

- 586 Οἱ ἄρα φρονήσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς ἄπειροι, εὐωχίαις δὲ
καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις αἰεὶ συνόντες, κάτω, ὡς εἴκειν, καὶ
μέχρι πάλιν πρὸς τὸ μεταξὺ φέρονται τε καὶ ταύτη
πλανῶνται διὰ βίου, ὑπερβάντες δὲ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ
ἀληθῶς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν | πῶποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν,
οὐδὲ τοῦ ὄντος τῶ ὄντι ἐπληρώθησαν, οὐδὲ βεβαίου

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"Not that either."

"If it had a smaller measure of truth, would it not also have a smaller measure of reality?"

"It would have to."

"That means, then, that generally the classes of things which are to do with looking after our physical needs have a smaller measure of truth and reality than those which are to do with looking after the soul?"

"Very much so."

"And don't you think this is true of the body itself compared with the soul?"

"I do."

"Does this mean, then, that that which is filled by things which have a larger share of reality and is itself more real is truly more satisfied than what is filled by what is less real, and is itself less real?"

"Of course."

"If it's a pleasure, then, to be filled with the things that are appropriate to one's nature, satisfying those things which are in actual fact more real would make us rejoice with true pleasure in greater reality and more truly. But that which has a smaller share of reality would be less truly and assuredly filled and would have a less trustworthy and less true pleasure."

"Most certainly that must be the case," he said.

"Then those who have no experience of intelligence and virtue and always spend their time feasting and such-like are carried down, it seems, and back to the middle again and stray about in this way throughout their lives. They go neither beyond this point nor ever look up toward what is truly the upper region, nor are they conveyed that way. They are never filled with reality, nor have a taste of

τε καὶ καθαρᾶς ἡδονῆς ἐγεύσαντο, ἀλλὰ βοσκημάτων
 δίκην κάτω αἰεὶ βλέποντες καὶ κεκυφότες εἰς γῆν καὶ
 εἰς τραπέζας βόσκονται χορταζόμενοι καὶ ὀχεύοντες,
 b καὶ ἔνεκα τῆς τούτων πλεονεξίας λακτίζοντες καὶ
 κυρίττοντες ἀλλήλους σιδηροῖς κέρασί τε καὶ ὀπλαῖς
 ἀποκτείνουσι δι' ἀπληστίαν, ἅτε οὐχὶ τοῖς οὖσι οὐδὲ
 τὸ ὄν οὐδὲ τὸ στέγον ἑαυτῶν πιμπλάντες. |

Παντελῶς, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων, τὸν τῶν πολλῶν, ὦ
 Σώκρατες, χρησμοδεῖς βίον.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐκ ἀνάγκη καὶ ἡδοναῖς συνείναι με-
 μειγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοισ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ
 c ἐσκιαγραφημέναις, ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως
 ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδρούς ἐκατέρας φαίνε-
 σθαι, καὶ ἔρωτας ἑαυτῶν λυττῶντας τοῖς ἄφροσιν ἐν-
 τίκτειν καὶ περιμαχήτους εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης |
 εἰδώλου ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Τροίᾳ Στησίχορος φησι γενέσθαι
 περιμάχητον ἀγνοία τοῦ ἀληθοῦς;

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, τοιοῦτόν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι.

Τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη
 γίνεσθαι, ὃς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ
 διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βία διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ διὰ
 d δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ
 διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ;

Τοιαῦτα, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι.

³³ An element of mockery of an extended speech by S. in high-flown style, which he often affects to mistrust (see, e.g., *Prt.* 329a ff.). For similar reaction to S.'s speeches, see 6.509c, 7.540b-c.

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steadfast pure pleasure, but like cattle they are always looking downward, stooping toward the ground, and they eat at table and fatten themselves up and copulate, and in order to gain advantage in such things, they trample over and butt each other and kill each other with horns and hooves of iron on account of their insatiable desire, in that they are not filling the part of themselves which is real and continent with reality."

"All in all, you're pronouncing on the life of the majority of people, Socrates, like an oracle,"³³ said Glaucon.

"But it must be, mustn't it, that they live with pleasures which exist side by side with pains, as images and painted illusions³⁴ of true pleasure, colored by being set alongside each other so that they each appear utterly convincing, beget struggling passions among the foolish, and are fought over, just as Stesichorus describes the image of Helen being fought over by those at Troy, out of ignorance of the truth?"³⁵

"It certainly has to be something like this," he said.

"But what about the passionate side? Aren't there other things like this which must motivate anyone who succeeds in satisfying this part; ambition motivated by envy, or craving for success motivated by force, or passion motivated by peevishness, as he pursues the gratification of his ambition, success, and passion without reason or thought?"

"Something similar is bound to happen in the case of this element too," he said.

³⁴ See 583b5 and n. 28 above.

³⁵ The version of the Trojan Cycle which has not Helen herself but her phantom going to Troy and being fought over (see Stesich. 192 Campbell).

Τί οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· θαρροῦντες λέγωμεν ὅτι καὶ περὶ τὸ ἰ φιλοκερδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόνικον ὅσαι ἐπιθυμίαι εἰσὶν, αἱ μὲν ἂν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι καὶ μετὰ τούτων τὰς ἡδονὰς διώκουσαι, ἃς ἂν τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγήται, λαμβάνωσι, τὰς ἀληθεστάτας τε λήψονται, ὡς οἶόν τε αὐταῖς ἀληθεῖς λαβεῖν, ἅτε ἀληθεία ἐπομέ-
 e νων, καὶ τὰς ἑαυτῶν οἰκείας, εἴπερ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκάστω, τοῦτο καὶ οἰκειότατον;

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, οἰκειότατόν γε.

Τῷ φιλοσόφῳ ἄρα ἐπομένης ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ μὴ στασιαζούσης ἐκάστω τῷ μέρει ὑπάρχει εἶς τε
 587 τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς βελτίστας καὶ εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν τὰς ἀληθεστάτας καρποῦσθαι.

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

Ὅταν δὲ ἄρα τῶν ἐτέρων τι κρατήσῃ, ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ μῆτε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἡδονὴν ἰ ἐξευρίσκειν, τά τε ἄλλ' ἀναγκάζειν ἀλλοτρίαν καὶ μὴ ἀληθῆ ἡδονὴν διώ-
 κειν.

Οὕτως, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν ἂ πλεῖστον φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ λόγου ἀφέστηκεν, μάλιστ' ἂν τοιαῦτα ἐξεργάζοιτο; ἰ

Πολύ γε.

Πλεῖστον δὲ λόγου ἀφίσταται οὐχ ὅπερ νόμου τε καὶ τάξεως;

Δῆλον δῆ.

b Ἐφάνησαν δὲ πλεῖστον ἀφεστῶσαι οὐχ αἱ ἐρωτικαὶ τε καὶ τυραννικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι;

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"What's the implication of this?" I asked. "Can we be confident and say that of those desires which are aimed at the love of profit and the love of success, those which follow knowledge and reason and so pursue with their help the pleasures which intelligence prescribes will, as far as their capacity allows, seize upon the truest inasmuch as they follow the truth and what is appropriate for them, if what is best for each thing is also the most appropriate?"

"Indeed, most appropriate!"

"When the entire soul therefore follows the wisdom-loving element and is not at variance with it, its separate parts can deal with its other functions and be just, and what's more, each part can reap the fruits of its own pleasures, both the best of them and, as far as possible, the truest."

"Absolutely!"

"Whenever one of the other parts gains control, it cannot find its own pleasure: in fact it forces the others to pursue a pleasure which is alien to them and not a true one."

"That's right," he said.

"Do you then agree that what stands furthest away from philosophy and reason would be most likely to cause such results?"

"Very much so."

"And that what stands furthest from reason is what stands furthest from law and order?"

"Clearly."

"And didn't we demonstrate that it's the desires of the passionate and tyrannical sort that stand furthest away?"

Πολύ γε.

Ἐλάχιστον δὲ αἱ βασιλικαὶ τε καὶ κόσμιαι; †

Ναί.

Πλείστον δὴ οἶμαι ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ οἰκείας ὁ
τύραννος ἀφεστήξει, ὁ δὲ ὀλίγιστον.

Ἀνάγκη.

Καὶ ἀηδέστατα ἄρα, εἶπον, ὁ τύραννος βιώσεται,
ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς † ἡδιστα.

Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη.

Οἶσθ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ ἀηδέστερον ζῆ τύραννος
βασιλέως;

Ἄν εἴπῃς, ἔφη. †

Τριῶν ἡδονῶν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐσῶν, μιᾶς μὲν γνησίας,
δυοῖν δὲ νόθαιν, τῶν νόθων εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα ὑπερβᾶς
c ὁ τύραννος, φυγῶν νόμον τε καὶ λόγον, δούλαις τισὶ
δορυφόροις ἡδοναῖς συνοικεῖ, καὶ ὀπόσῳ ἐλαττοῦται
οὐδὲ πάνυ ράδιον εἰπεῖν, πλὴν ἴσως ᾧδε.

Πῶς; ἔφη. †

Ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ τρίτος που ὁ τύραννος ἀφ-
ειστήκει· ἐν μέσῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν ὁ δημοτικὸς ἦν.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡδονῆς τρίτῳ εἰδώλῳ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν
ἀπ' ἐκείνου συνοικοῖ ἄν, εἰ τὰ πρόσθεν ἀληθῆ;

Οὕτω. †

³⁶ Three stages removed, because the Greeks counted the first and last number of a series.

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"We did indeed."

"And the least removed are those of the kingly and orderly type?"

"Yes."

"Indeed, I think that the tyrannical type is at furthest remove from true appropriate pleasure, and the latter least distant."

"That has to be so."

"The tyrant will also live a most unpleasant life," I said, "and the king a most pleasant one."

"That must be true."

"Do you realize how much more unpleasantly a tyrant lives than a king?"

"I shall if you tell me!" he said.

"There are three pleasures, it seems, one genuine, the other two spurious; the tyrant, in fleeing law and reason, has passed beyond the spurious ones, and lives with a bodyguard of slavish pleasures, and it's not at all that easy to say by how much he is inferior, except perhaps as follows."

"How?" he said.

"The tyrant was three stages removed from the oligarch, I think, as in between we had the democratic type."³⁶

"Yes."

"Then that means, doesn't it, he would be living with an image of pleasure at third remove from that one (i.e., the oligarch) in relation to the truth, if what we said before is right?"

"That's right."

Ὁ δέ γε ὀλιγαρχικὸς ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ αὖ τρίτος,
 d εἶς εἰς ταῦτὸν ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν τιθώ-
 μεν.

Τρίτος γάρ.

Τριπλασίον ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τριπλάσιον ἀριθμῶ
 ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς ἀφέστηκεν τύραννος.

Φαίνεται.

Ἐπίπεδον ἄρ', ἔφην, ὡς ἔοικεν, τὸ εἶδωλον κατὰ
 τὸν τοῦ μήκους ἀριθμὸν ἡδονῆς τυραννικῆς ἂν εἴη.

Κομιδῆ γέ.

Κατὰ δὲ δύναμιν καὶ τρίτην αὔξην δῆλον δὴ ἰ
 ἀπόστασιν ὄσσην ἀφεστηκῶς γίγνεται.

Δῆλον, ἔφη, τῷ γε λογιστικῷ.

Οὐκοῦν εἴαν τις μεταστρέψας ἀληθεία ἡδονῆς τὸν
 e βασιλέα τοῦ τυράννου ἀφεστηκῶτα λέγῃ ὅσον ἀφ-
 ἔστηκεν, ἐννεακαικαικοσικαιεπτακοσιοπλασιάκις ἡδιον
 αὐτὸν ζῶντα εὐρήσει τελειωθείσῃ τῇ πολλαπλασιώ-
 σει, τὸν δὲ τύραννον ἀνιαιρότερον τῇ αὐτῇ ταύτῃ ἀπο-
 στάσει. ἰ

Ἀμήχανον, ἔφη, λογισμὸν καταπεφόρηκας τῆς δια-
 588 φορότητας τοῖν ἀνδροῖν, τοῦ τε δικαίου καὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου,
 πρὸς ἡδονῆν τε καὶ λύπην.

³⁷ I.e., the timocrat is between.

³⁸ In order to make "three times three," S. here: (1) counts the oligarch twice: i.e., tyrant—democrat—oligarch—oligarch—timocrat—king, in order to make two three-term series = 6; (2) takes the number of times the oligarch is removed from the tyrant and multiplies it by the number of times the oligarch is removed from the king (3 × 3) rather than adding them (3 + 3). Glaucon's

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"And the oligarch would be three stages away from the king if we make aristocrat and king the same."³⁷

"Three, yes."

"Numerically, then, the tyrant is three times three stages away from true pleasure."³⁸

"So it seems."

"Then it seems the tyrant's image of pleasure," I said, "according to the measurement of its length would be two-dimensional."

"Absolutely."

"By the square and the cube dimension it's quite clear just how far away he is."

"It is clear at any rate to someone skilled in reckoning!"

"This means that if one turns it round and says how far the king is from the tyrant in the true kind of pleasure, he'll find when he's done the multiplication that he lives seven hundred and twenty-nine times more pleasantly, and the tyrant less pleasantly by the same amount."³⁹

"You've spouted forth a fantastic stream of calculation of the difference between the two men, the just and the unjust, with respect to pleasure and pain."

"so it seems" might indicate growing skepticism at S.'s mathematics?

³⁹ It is not clear how far Plato intends S.'s calculations to be taken seriously here (n.b. Glaucon's replies at d5, d11, and e5 suggest that he suspects that S. may be pulling their legs). The particular significance of 729 may be that, in a sequence of threes, as the Pythagoreans pointed out, 729 is the first number which is both a square and cube (see Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*, n. ad loc). Moreover, in a year of 364½ days, the number of days and nights = 729, and there are 729 months in the Pythagorean "Great Year" (588a4-5).

Καὶ μέντοι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ προσήκοντά γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, βίοις ἀριθμόν, εἴπερ αὐτοῖς προσήκουσιν ἡμέραι καὶ νύκτες καὶ ἡ μῆνες καὶ ἐνιαυτοί.

Ἄλλὰ μὴν, ἔφη, προσήκουσιν.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ τοσοῦτον ἡδονῇ νικᾷ ὁ ἀγαθός τε καὶ δίκαιος τὸν κακόν τε καὶ ἄδικον, ἀμηχάνω δὴ ὅσῳ πλείονι νικήσει εὐσχημοσύνη τε βίου καὶ κάλλει καὶ ἀρετῇ;

Ἀμηχάνω μέντοι νῆ Δία, ἔφη.

- b Εἶεν δὴ, εἶπον· ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα λόγον γεγόναμεν, ἀναλάβωμεν τὰ πρῶτα λεχθέντα, δι' ἃ δεῦρ' ἤκομεν. ἦν δέ που λεγόμενον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν τῷ τελείως μὲν ἀδίκῳ, δοξαζομένῳ δὲ δικαίῳ· ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἐλέχθη; ἢ Οὕτω μὲν οὖν.

Νῦν δὴ, ἔφην, αὐτῷ διαλεγώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ διωμολογησάμεθα τό τε ἀδικεῖν καὶ τὸ δίκαια πράττειν ἦν ἑκάτερον ἔχει δύναμιν.

Πῶς; ἔφη. ἢ

Εἰκόνα πλάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς λόγῳ, ἵνα εἰδῆ ὁ ἐκεῖνα λέγων οἷα ἔλεγεν.

- c Ποίαν τινά; ἢ δ' ὅς.

Τῶν τοιούτων τινά, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οἷαι μυθολογοῦνται παλαιαὶ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἣ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἡ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβέρον, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται συμπεφυκυῖαι ἰδέαι πολλαὶ ἢ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι.

⁴⁰ This was actually Glaucon himself at 2.360c8–61d3, restating the position of Thrasymachus at 1.348b9–10.

BOOK IX

"And yet it's a number," I said, "both true and appropriate to our lives, if days and nights and months and years are appropriate to them."

"Yes, they certainly are appropriate," he said.

"Does this mean, then, that if the good and just man surpasses the evil unjust man in pleasure this much, then he'll truly surpass him to an infinitely greater degree in the refinement, beauty, and virtue of his life?"

"Infinitely greater, by Zeus!" he said.

"Well now," I said, "as we've reached this point in our discussion, let's pick up the first arguments we made through which we got here. I think someone said that it was profitable for a completely unjust man who is reputed to be just to do wrong; or was that not the claim?"⁴⁰

"Yes, it was."

"Now then," I said, "let's interview him, since we've agreed what effect both doing wrong and doing just deeds has."

"How?" he asked.

"By creating an image of the soul in argument, so that he who made those assertions can see what he meant."

"What kind of image?" he asked.

"One of those like the creatures whose nature is recorded in ancient myth," I said, "such as Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus,⁴¹ and the numerous other cases where many forms are said to have grown together into one."

⁴¹ The Chimera was a combination of goat, lion, and snake (see *Hom. Il.* 6.179-82); Scylla had the top half of a beautiful woman, but the lower half had a fish tail and around her waist were heads of snakes and doglike monsters (*Hom. Od.* 12.85ff.); Cerberus was the three-headed dog which guarded Hades (*Hes. Theog.* 311-12).

Λέγονται γάρ, ἔφη.

Πλάττε τοίνυν μίαν μὲν ιδέαν θηρίου ποικίλου καὶ πολυκεφάλου, ἡμέρων δὲ θηρίων ἔχοντος κεφαλὰς κύκλω καὶ ἀγρίων, καὶ δυνατοῦ μεταβάλλειν καὶ φύειν | ἐξ αὐτοῦ πάντα ταῦτα.

d Δεινοῦ πλάστου, ἔφη, τὸ ἔργον ὅμως δέ, ἐπειδὴ εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγος, πεπλάσθω.

Μίαν δὴ τοίνυν ἄλλην ιδέαν λέοντος, μίαν δὲ ἀνθρώπου· πολὺ δὲ μέγιστον ἔστω τὸ πρῶτον καὶ δεύτερον τὸ δεύτερον.

Ταῦτα, ἔφη, ῥάω, καὶ πέπλασται. |

Σύναπτε τοίνυν αὐτὰ εἰς ἓν τρία ὄντα, ὥστε πη συμπεφυκέναι ἀλλήλοις.

Συνηῆπται, ἔφη.

e Περίπλασον δὴ αὐτοῖς ἐξῶθεν ἐνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὀρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὀρῶντι, ἐν ζῶον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον.

Περιπέπλασται, ἔφη.

Λέγωμεν δὴ τῷ λέγοντι ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τούτῳ ἀδικεῖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, | δίκαια δὲ πράττειν οὐ συμφέρει, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο φησὶν ἢ λυσιτελεῖν αὐτῷ τὸ παντοδαπὸν θηρίον εὐωχοῦντι ποιεῖν ἰσχυρὸν καὶ τὸν λέοντα καὶ 589 τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον λιμοκτονεῖν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀσθενῆ, ὥστε ἔλκεσθαι ὅπῃ ἂν ἐκείνων πότερον ἄγῃ, καὶ μηδὲν ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ συνεθίζειν μηδὲ φίλον

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"Yes, they are told of," he said.

"Now then, put together a single form of a complex many-headed animal, but with a circle of heads of both tame and wild beasts, capable of changing and growing all these parts out of itself."

"A work of a clever modeler," he said, "and yet since words are more malleable than wax and suchlike, consider it done."

"And now put together another in the shape of a lion, and one in the shape of a human being; let the first one be by far the biggest and the second one second in size."

"This is easier," he said, "and it's done."

"Now join these three into one so that they are somehow fused together."

"Done!" he said

"Now put the figure of a single creature on the outside of them, the image of a human being so that to someone who can't see what's on the inside, only the covering on the outside, it looks like a single creature—a human being."

"I've done that," he said.

"Let's say, then, to the speaker who argues that it's profitable for this person to do wrong and there's no advantage in doing just deeds, that he means nothing more than that it's profitable for him to feed the compound creature well and make it strong, as well as the lion and what's related to it, but to starve the man and make him weak, so that he's dragged about wherever either of them leads him, and not to get either of them used to each other

ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ἔάν αὐτὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς δάκνεσθαί τε καὶ
μαχόμενα ἐσθίειν ἄλληλα. |

Παρτάπασι γάρ, ἔφη, ταῦτ' ἂν λέγοι ὁ τὸ ἀδικεῖν
ἐπαινῶν.

Ὀυκοῦν αὖ ὁ τὰ δίκαια λέγων λυσιτελεῖν φαίη ἂν
b δεῖν ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅθεν τοῦ ἀνθρώ-
που ὁ ἐντὸς ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ἐγκρατέστατος, καὶ τοῦ
πολυκεφάλου θρέμματος ἐπιμελήσεται ὥσπερ γεωρ-
γός, τὰ μὲν ἡμέρα τρέφων καὶ τιθασεύων, τὰ δὲ ἄγρια
ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι, σύμμαχον ποιησάμενος τὴν τοῦ
λέοντος φύσιν, καὶ | κοινῇ πάντων κηδόμενος, φίλα
ποιησάμενος ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ αὐτῷ, οὕτω θρέψει;

Κομιδῇ γὰρ αὖ λέγει ταῦτα ὁ τὸ δίκαιον ἐπαινῶν.

Κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δὴ ὁ μὲν τὰ δίκαια ἐγκωμιά-
c ζων ἀληθῆ ἂν λέγοι, ὁ δὲ τὰ ἄδικα ψεύδοιτο. πρὸς τε
γὰρ ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδοξίαν καὶ ὠφελίαν σκοπου-
μένῳ ὁ μὲν ἐπαινέτης τοῦ δικαίου ἀληθεύει, ὁ δὲ
ψέκτης οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδ' εἰδὼς ψέγει ὅτι ψέγει. |

Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐδαμῇ γε.

Πείθωμεν τοίνυν αὐτὸν πρῶως, οὐ γὰρ ἐκὼν ἀμαρ-
τάνει, ἐρωτῶντες· ὦ μακάριε, οὐ καὶ τὰ καλὰ καὶ
αἰσχρὰ νόμιμα διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτ' ἂν φαίμεν γεγονέναι
d τὰ μὲν καλὰ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἴσως τὰ
ὑπὸ τῷ θεῷ τὰ θηριώδη ποιῶντα τῆς φύσεως, αἰσχρὰ

⁴² This passage recalls the conflict between *thumos* and *epithumia* within the individual illustrated by the Leontius story at 4.439eff.

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and become friends, but leave them to bite each other, fight, and eat each other."⁴²

"Yes, that's exactly what someone praising wrongdoing would say," he said.

"And on the other hand does this mean that he who claims that justice is profitable would say that one must do and say those things from which the man within the man will be the strongest and will look after the many-headed beast, like a farmer, by feeding and domesticating the tame animals and preventing the wild ones from breeding, and, making an ally of the lion's nature, and, caring for them all in common, will bring them up in such a way as to make them friendly to each other and himself?"

"Again, this is entirely what he who commends the just says."

"Every way you look at it, then, he who commends justice would be telling the truth, he who commends injustice would be lying. For anyone looking at pleasure and honor and profit, the one who commends the just is telling the truth, whereas its detractor disparages what he disparages because he has no sound knowledge."

"None whatsoever, I would say," he said.

"Then let's persuade him gently, since he's not intentionally making a mistake, and ask him: 'My good fellow, would we not agree that good and bad habits come about for some such reason as: the good ones by making the animal part of our nature subject to man, or rather to the divine perhaps, and the bad ones by making the tame

δὲ τὰ ὑπὸ τῷ ἀγρίῳ τὸ ἡμερον δουλούμενα; συμφήσει
ἢ πῶς;

Ἐάν μοι, ἔφη, πείθεται. ἰ

Ἔστιν οὖν, εἶπον, ὅτῳ λυσιτελεῖ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ
λόγου χρυσίον λαμβάνειν ἀδίκως, εἴπερ τοιόνδε τι
γίγνεται, λαμβάνων τὸ χρυσίον ἅμα καταδουλοῦται
e τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτοῦ τῷ μοχθηροτάτῳ; ἢ εἰ μὲν λαβὼν
χρυσίον ὑὸν ἢ θυγατέρα ἐδουλοῦτο, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς
ἀγρίων τε καὶ κακῶν ἀνδρῶν, οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐλυσιτελεῖ
590 οὐδ' ἂν πάμπολυ ἐπὶ τούτῳ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δὲ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ
θειότατον ὑπὸ τῷ ἀθροτάτῳ τε καὶ μιαιωτάτῳ δου-
λοῦται καὶ μηδὲν ἔλεει, οὐκ ἄρα ἄθλιός ἐστι καὶ πολλὴ
ἐπὶ δεινότηρῳ ὀλέθρῳ χρυσὸν δωροδοκεῖ ἢ Ἐριφύλη
ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ψυχῇ τὸν ὄρμον δεξαμένη;

Πολὺ μέντοι, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων· ἰ ἐγὼ γάρ σοι
ὑπὲρ ἐκείνον ἀποκρινοῦμαι.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀκολασταίνειν οἶει διὰ τοιαῦτα πά-
λαι ψέγεσθαι, ὅτι ἀνίεται ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ τὸ δεινόν, τὸ
μέγα ἐκείνο καὶ πολυειδὲς θρέμμα, πέρα τοῦ δέον-
τος;

Δῆλον, ἔφη.

Ἡ δ' ἀνθάδεια καὶ δυσκολία ψέγεται οὐχ ὅταν τὸ
λεοντῶδές τε καὶ ὀφεῶδες αὐξῆται καὶ συντείνηται
ἀναρμόστως;

⁴³ Eriphyle was the wife of Amphiarus, whom she betrayed in order to acquire a necklace, which carried a curse: in revenge

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subject to the wild?' Will he agree, or how will he respond?"

"He'll agree if I can persuade him," he said.

"Therefore, is it possible," I said, "for anyone, as a result of this argument, to profit by taking money unjustly, if something like this can happen: at the same time as taking the money he subjects the best part of himself to the most wicked? Or if by accepting money he enslaved his son or daughter and put them into the hands of wild evil men, it would not be to his advantage even to receive a very large sum for this. But if he subjects the most godlike part of himself to the most godless and disgusting part of himself and shows no pity, then isn't he a wretch and has accepted gold as an exchange for a far more terrible fate than Eriphyle, who received the necklace as a price for the soul of her husband?"⁴³

"Far more terrible," said Glaucon: "I'll answer your question for him."

"Do you then think that licentiousness has long been censured for reasons such as these, because that dread creature, with its size and many forms, is unleashed beyond what should be?"

"Obviously," he said.

"And aren't stubbornness and peevishness censured when they foster and extend the lion and snakelike⁴⁴ elements disproportionately?"

for the death of his father, her son murdered her (see *Hom. Od.* 11.326–27).

⁴⁴ "Snakelike" elements have not previously been mentioned (unless they are included in "what's related to" the lion in 588e6). They may signify the negative aspects of the spirited element.

b Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τρυφή δὲ καὶ μαλθακία οὐκ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ τούτου χαλάσει τε καὶ ἀνέσει ψέγεται, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ δειλίαν ἐμποιῇ; |

Τί μήν;

Κολακεία δὲ καὶ ἀνελευθερία οὐχ ὅταν τις τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τὸ θυμοειδές, ὑπὸ τῷ ὀχλώδει θηρίῳ ποιῇ καὶ ἔνεκα χρημάτων καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀπληστίας προπηλακιζόμενον ἐθίξῃ ἐκ νέου ἀντὶ λέοντος πίθηκον γίγνεσθαι;

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη.

c Βαναυσία δὲ καὶ χειροτεχνία διὰ τί οἶει ὄνειδος φέρει; ἢ δι' ἄλλο τι φήσομεν ἢ ὅταν τις ἀσθενές φύσει ἔχῃ τὸ τοῦ βελτίστου εἶδος, ὥστε μὴ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θρεμμάτων, ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκείνα, | καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μαυθάνειν;

Ἔοικεν, ἔφη.

d Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἷονπερ ὁ βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῇ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύμαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ θεοῦ καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκείον ἔχοντος ἐν | αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες ὅμοιοι ᾤμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι;

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“Very much so.”

“Are luxury and moral lassitude not condemned for the slackness and indulgence of this same element, when they produce cowardliness in it?”

“Certainly.”

“And are not fawning and servility condemned, when we put this same thing, passion, under the control of the unruly beast and make this element, subjected to abuse on account of money and the insatiable desires of that creature, accustomed from its earliest years to become a monkey instead of a lion?”

“Certainly,” he said.

“Why do you think common manual trades incur censure? Shall we say it’s exclusively when the best element in a person is naturally weak, so as not to be able to control the brood of creatures within himself, but cultivates them and can only understand how to flatter them?”

“It seems so,” he said.

“Does this mean that in order for such a man to be ruled by the kind of thing the best man is ruled by, we say that he himself must be the slave of that best kind of person who has the divine principle in him? It is not because we think that he has to be governed to his detriment as a slave, as Thrasymachus thought the ruled are,⁴⁵ but on the grounds that that it’s better for all to be governed by the divine and the intelligent mind, preferably what he has within himself, but if not, one imposed from outside in order that we may all be as alike and as friendly as possible, being directed by the same thing?”

⁴⁵ At 1.343b–c.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.

- e Δηλοὶ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον
 βούλεται,⁵ πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχος ὢν· καὶ ἡ
 591 τῶν παιδῶν ἀρχή, τὸ μὴ εἶν ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἕως ἂν
 ἐν αὐτοῖς ὡσπερ ἐν πόλει πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν,
 καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύσαντες τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιοῦτῳ
 ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὅμοιον καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐν
 αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεμεν.

Δηλοὶ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Πῆ δὴ οὖν φήσομεν, ὦ Γλαύκων, καὶ κατὰ τίνα
 λόγον λυσιτελεῖν ἀδικεῖν, ἢ ἀκολασταίνειν ἢ τι
 αἰσχροὺν ποιεῖν, ἐξ ὧν πονηρότερος μὲν ἔσται, πλείω
 δὲ χρήματα ἢ ἄλλην τινα δύναμιν κεκτήσεται;

Οὐδαμῆ, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

- b Πῆ δ' ἀδικοῦντα λανθάνειν καὶ μὴ διδόναι δίκην
 λυσιτελεῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ ὁ μὲν λανθάνων ἔτι πονηρότερος
 γίγνεται, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λανθάνοντος καὶ κολαζομένου τὸ
 μὲν θηριῶδες κοιμίζεται καὶ ἡμεροῦται, τὸ δὲ ἡμερον
 ἐλευθεροῦται, καὶ ὅλη ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὴν βελτίστην φύ-
 σιν καθισταμένη τιμιωτέραν ἕξι λαμβάνει, | σωφρο-
 σύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως κτωμένη,
 ἢ σῶμα ἰσχύν τε καὶ κάλλος μετὰ ὑγείας λαμβάνον,
 τοσοῦτῳ ὅσῳπερ ψυχὴ σώματος τιμιωτέρα;

Παντάπασιν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

- c Οὐκοῦν ὁ γε νοῦν ἔχων πάντα τὰ αὐτοῦ εἰς τοῦτο
 συντείνας βιώσεται, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ μαθήματα τιμῶν,

⁵ βούλεται Iambl. Stob.: βουλεύεται ADF

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"Yes, that's right," he said.

"And on this point the law too shows that this is its intention, as an ally to all those in the state, and the governance of children, not allowing them to be free, until we establish a constitution, as it were, in them, as in the state, and by cultivating the best in them like the best in ourselves, we set a similar guardian and ruler in them, and only then we let them free."

"Yes, clearly," he said.

"So, Glaucon, in what circumstances and following what argument shall we say it's profitable to be unjust, or licentious, or do something shameful, as a result of which someone will be more wicked, but will have acquired more money or some other resource?"

"None at all."

"And in what circumstances can we say that he gets away with doing wrong and profiting without being punished for it? Or doesn't the one who gets away with it become even worse, while the animal side in the one who doesn't get away with it and is punished is lulled and tamed, and the gentle side is set free and the whole of his soul is naturally made the best and gains a position, by acquiring temperance and justice along with wisdom, more highly valued than the body when it gains strength and beauty along with health by just as much as the soul is valued more highly than the body."

"I agree with all of that," he said.

"So will he who has sense then live with every part of him straining toward this end, first of all valuing those

ἂ τοιαύτην αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπεργάσεται, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἀτιμάζων;

Δῆλον, ἔφη. |

Ἔπειτά γ', εἶπον, τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἕξι καὶ τροφήν οὐχ ὅπως τῇ θηριώδει καὶ ἀλόγῳ ἡδονῇ ἐπιτρέψας ἐνταῦθα τετραμμένος ζήσει, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ πρὸς ὑγίειαν βλέπων, οὐδὲ τοῦτο πρεσβεύων, ὅπως ἰσχυρὸς ἢ ὑγιής ἢ καλὸς ἔσται, εἰ μὴ καὶ σωφρονήσειν μέλλῃ
 d ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι ἁρμονίαν τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕνεκα συμφωνίας ἁρμοττόμενος φανέται.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, εἴπερ μέλλῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μουσικὸς εἶναι. |

Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτήσει σύνταξίν τε καὶ συμφωνίαν; καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλήθους οὐκ ἐκπληττόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ ἄπειρον αὐξήσει, ἀπέραντα κακὰ ἔχων;

Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη.

Ἄλλ' ἀποβλέπων γε, εἶπον, πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν, καὶ φυλάττων μὴ τι παρακινήσῃ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλήθος οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότητα, οὕτως κυβερνῶν προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλώσει τῆς οὐσίας καθ' ὅσον ἂν οἶός τ' ᾖ.
 e

Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. |

592 Ἄλλὰ μὴν καὶ τιμάς γε, εἰς ταῦτόν ἀποβλέπων, τῶν

46 "Culturally attuned" = *mousikos* (for Plato's special definition of this word, see e.g., 3.412aff.).

BOOK IX

things it learns which will make his soul like this, and disregarding the rest?"

"Obviously," he said.

"Then," I said, "with regard to his physical condition and his regime, he'll not only not give himself over to any irrational animal-like pleasure and live with his attention turned in that direction, but he won't regard his health either, or even pay it special attention as to how he can be strong, healthy, and handsome, unless he's going to gain temperance from these qualities. Instead, it will constantly be clear that he's adjusting the balance in his body for the sake of the harmony in his soul."

"I agree in every way," he said, "if he's going to be truly culturally attuned."⁴⁶

"Does this also apply then to arrangement and concord in acquiring his possessions?" I asked. "And he won't increase beyond measure the mass of his wealth, carried away by the adulation of the crowd, and so acquire countless faults, will he?"

"I don't think so," he said.

"But by paying attention to his inner constitution⁴⁷ and by taking care not to disturb any of those elements in him on account of the size of his wealth, or lack of it, in this way, as far as he can, he'll steer and accumulate and spend his resources."

"Absolutely," he said.

"And what's more, keeping his eye on this same prin-

⁴⁷ On the relationship in the philosopher between his "inner constitution" (*politeia*) and his political and moral role as a guardian, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (i).

μὲν μεθέξει καὶ γεύσεται ἐκὼν, ἄς ἂν ἡγήται ἀμείνω αὐτὸν ποιήσειν, ἄς δ' ἂν λύσειν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἕξειν, φεύξεται ἰδία καὶ δημοσία. |

Οὐκ ἄρα, ἔφη, τὰ γε πολιτικὰ ἐθελήσει πράττειν, εἴανπερ τούτου κήδηται.

Νῆ τὸν κύνα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἔν γε τῇ πατρίδι, εἴαν μὴ θεία τις συμβῆ τύχη.

Μανθάνω, ἔφη· ἐν ἣ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη, ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμῶ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι. |

b Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῶ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὄραν καὶ ὄρωντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. διαφέρει δὲ οὐδὲν εἴτε που ἔστιν εἴτε ἔσται τὰ γὰρ ταύτης μόνης ἂν πράξειεν, ἄλλης δὲ οὐδεμιᾶς.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη. |

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inciple, he'll willingly partake of and sample some of the rewards which he thinks will make him a better person, but those which will disturb his existing state he'll avoid in his private and public life."

"Then he won't want to have anything to do with public life, if this is what he cares about," he said.

"Yes, by the dog!"⁴⁸ I said. "Certainly in his own state, although perhaps not in his native city, unless by some heaven-sent chance."

"I understand," he said, "you mean in the state we've been founding and discussing, the one existing in words, since I don't think it exists anywhere on earth."

"Well, perhaps there's a model up in heaven for anyone willing to look and if he sees it, found himself on it."⁴⁹ But it makes no difference whether it exists anywhere or will do. You see, he'd only involve himself in its affairs, not those of anywhere else."

"That's likely," he said.

⁴⁸ For this Socratic oath, see Book 3 n. 65.

⁴⁹ "Found" = *katoikisdein*. Plato keeps the image of the internal *politeia* ("found a city in himself," Adam, n. ad loc). On the state as *paradeigma* ("model"), see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (iii).

595 Καὶ μὴν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα περὶ αὐτῆς ἐννοῶ, ὡς παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ὠκίζομεν τὴν πόλιν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ ἐνθυμηθεὶς περὶ ποιήσεως λέγω.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη. ἰ

Τὸ μηδαμῆ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὄση μιμητική· παντὸς γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐ παραδεκτέα νῦν καὶ ἐναργέστερον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ χωρὶς ἕκαστα διήρηται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδη.

Πῶς λέγεις;

Ὡς μὲν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήσθαι—οὐ γάρ μου κατερεῖτε πρὸς τοὺς τῆς τραγωδίας ποιητὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας τοὺς ἰ μιμητικούς—λώβη ἔοικεν εἶναι πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς τῶν ἀκούοντων διανοίας, ὅσοι μὴ ἔχουσι φάρμακον τὸ εἰδέναι αὐτὰ οἶα τυγχάνει ὄντα.

Πῆ δὴ, ἔφη, διανοούμενος λέγεις;

¹ The smooth transition implied in the first words of Book 10 (the connectives *kai mēn*) disguises the "addendum" appearance of Book 10, with unexpected return to a discussion of poetry (*poiēsis* (a3)). On the whole question of the relationship of Book

BOOK X

"Well now,"¹ I said, "I have in mind many other things about the state which more than anything lead me to believe that we were right in the way we founded it, but I say that with poetry in mind especially."

"What about it?" he asked.

"Not to allow in anything which is in any way imitative,² because it now appears even clearer that we must not allow it in, especially, so it seems to me, now that each of the parts of the soul have been defined."

"How do you mean?"

"Speaking between ourselves, for you won't denounce me to the tragic poets and all the rest of the writers who use imitation, all this kind of thing seems to me to be a corruption of the minds of their audiences who don't have the remedy³ of knowing exactly what it is really like."

"Can you explain your thinking then?" he asked.

10 to the remainder of *Republic* and especially Books 2 and 3, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (iv) (a).

² In this extreme form not strictly in line with 3.398b1-2, where the poet who can "reproduce . . . the diction of a decent man" is allowed into the city. S. goes on to suggest (a5-7) that the stronger line on poetry is as a result of the intervening discussion of the constitution of the soul.

³ "Remedy" = *pharmakon*, "a (physical) antidote," "drug."

ῥητέον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· καίτοι φιλία γέ τις με καὶ αἰδῶς
 c ἐκ παιδὸς ἔχουσα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀποκωλύει λέγειν.
 ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ τῶν καλῶν ἀπάντων τούτων τῶν τραγι-
 κῶν πρῶτος διδάσκαλός τε καὶ ἡγεμὼν γενέσθαι.
 ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνὴρ,
 ἀλλ', ὃ λέγω, ῥητέον. |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Ἄκουε δὴ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀποκρίνου.

Ἐρώτα.

Μίμησιν ὅλως ἔχους ἂν μοι εἰπεῖν ὅτι ποτ' ἐστίν;
 οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι αὐτὸς πάνυ τι συννοῶ τί βούλεται
 εἶναι. |

Ἡ που ἄρ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ συννοήσω.

596 Οὐδέν γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ πολλά τοι ὀξύτε-
 ρον βλεπόντων ἀμβλύτερον ὀρῶντες πρότεροι εἶδον.

Ἔστιν, ἔφη, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ σοῦ παρόντος οὐδ' ἂν
 προθυμηθῆναι οἶός τε εἶην εἰπεῖν, εἰ τί μοι καταφαίνε-
 ται, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὄρα. |

Βούλει οὖν ἐνθένδε ἀρξώμεθα ἐπισκοποῦντες, ἐκ
 τῆς εἰωθυίας μεθόδου; εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἕκαστου
 εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταῦτόν
 ὄνομα ἐπιφέρομεν. ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις;

Μανθάνω. |

Θῶμεν δὴ καὶ νῦν ὅτι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν. οἶον, εἰ
 'θέλεις, πολλάί ποῦ εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι.

Πῶς δ' οὔ;

b Ἀλλὰ ἰδέαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκεύη δύο, μία
 μὲν κλίνης, μία δὲ τραπέζης.

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"I must," I said, "And yet I've had a kind of love and respect for Homer since my childhood, which makes me reluctant to speak. You see, I think he's been the first teacher and guide to all the good tragic poets of today. But the fact is that a man mustn't be respected above truth; so, as I say, I must speak out."

"Certainly you must," he said.

"Then listen. Or rather, answer this question."

"Fire away!"

"Would you be able to tell me in general what imitation is? You see I myself don't fully understand what it is supposed to mean."

"Meaning, I suppose, that I shall!"

"It's no silly question," I said, "since people with poorer vision do see many things before those with sharper eyes."

"That's true," he said, "but with you here I couldn't be too eager to speak, even if something seems clear to me, but see it for yourself."

"Then do you want us to begin looking from this point as we usually do? I think we've got into the habit of positing some *single individual Form*⁴ when we're dealing with each of the many groups of things to which we can apply the same term. Or don't you understand?"

"I do."

"Then let's do that now too, whichever one you want out of the many possibilities. For example, if you like, there are many kinds of bed and table, I think."

"Of course."

"But the Forms connected with these two items are surely just two, one of a bed, the other of a table."

⁴ *eidōs* or *idea*. See, e.g., 507b6.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰώθαμεν λέγειν ὅτι ὁ δημιουργὸς ἑκατέρου τοῦ | σκεύους πρὸς τὴν ἰδέαν βλέπων οὕτω ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν τὰς κλίνας, ὁ δὲ τὰς τραπέζας, αἷς ἡμεῖς χρώμεθα, καὶ τᾶλλα κατὰ ταῦτά; οὐ γάρ που τὴν γε ἰδέαν αὐτὴν δημιουργεῖ οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν.

Πῶς γάρ; |

Οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόνδε τίνα καλεῖς τὸν δημιουργόν.

c Τὸν ποῖον;

Ἄς πάντα ποιεῖ, ὅσαπερ εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν χειροτεχνῶν.

Δεινόν τινα λέγεις καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἄνδρα.

Οὕτω γε, ἀλλὰ τάχα μᾶλλον φήσεις. ὁ αὐτὸς γὰρ οὗτος | χειροτέχνης οὐ μόνον πάντα οἷός τε σκευὴ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα ἅπαντα ποιεῖ καὶ ζῶα πάντα ἐργάζεται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ ἑαυτόν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις γῆν καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου ὑπὸ γῆς ἅπαντα ἐργάζεται.

d Πάνν θαυμαστόν, ἔφη, λέγεις σοφιστήν.

Ἄπιστεῖς; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ μοι εἶπέ, τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἂν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτος δημιουργός, ἢ τινὶ μὲν τρόπῳ γενέσθαι ἂν τούτων ἀπάντων ποιητής, τινὶ δὲ οὐκ ἂν; ἢ οὐκ αἰσθάνη | ὅτι κἂν αὐτὸς οἷός τ' εἴης πάντα ταῦτα ποιῆσαι τρόπῳ γέ τιμι;

⁵ *sophistēs* = a wise and clever person, a "pundit," as well as a designation of a particular group of teachers active in Athens in

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“Yes.”

“And so we usually say that one craftsman makes the beds and another the tables we use by looking to a pattern of each type of furniture, and other things according to the same principle, but I don’t think any craftsman makes the actual Form.”

“How could he?”

“There’s no way he could. But now consider what you would call the following kind of craftsman.”

“Which one?”

“The one who makes all the things each individual craftsman does.”

“Some wonderfully skilled man, you mean.”

“Not yet, though you will soon have still more reason to say so. Since this same craftsman is able to make not only all artifacts there are, but also makes everything that grows in the ground and all living creatures, and that includes himself as well as the rest, and in addition to this, earth and sky and gods as well as everything in the sky and down below in Hades.”

“That’s a thoroughly wonderful sophist⁵ you’re talking about,” he said.

“Don’t you believe me?” I asked. “Yet tell me, would you say that such a craftsman as this doesn’t exist at all, or could the maker all these things exist in one respect, but not in another? Or don’t you see that there is a way in which you yourself could make all these things?”

the fifth century; the term is not always pejorative, but usually so in Plato, and here so by implication, in view of the unreality of the “objects” created.

Καὶ τίς, ἔφη, ὁ τρόπος οὗτος;

Οὐ χαλεπός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλὰ πολλαχῆ καὶ ταχὺ
 e δημιουργούμενος, τάχιστα δέ που, εἰ θέλεις λαβῶν
 κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν πανταχῆ· ταχὺ μὲν ἥλιον ποι-
 ῆσεις καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ταχὺ δὲ γῆν, ταχὺ δὲ
 σαυτὸν τε καὶ τᾶλλα ζῶα καὶ σκεύη καὶ φυτὰ καὶ
 πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο.

Ναί, ἔφη, φαινόμενα, οὐ μέντοι ὄντα γέ που τῆ
 ἀληθείᾳ. |

Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ εἰς δέον ἔρχη τῷ λόγῳ. τῶν
 τοιούτων γὰρ οἶμαι δημιουργῶν καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος
 ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

Ἄλλὰ φήσεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ οἶμαι αὐτὸν ποιεῖν ἂ ποιεῖ.
 καίτοι τρόπῳ γέ τι καὶ ὁ ζωγράφος κλίην ποιεῖ ἢ
 οὐ; |

Ναί, ἔφη, φαινομένην γε καὶ οὗτος.

597 Τί δὲ ὁ κλινοποιός; οὐκ ἄρτι μέντοι ἔλεγες ὅτι οὐ
 τὸ εἶδος ποιεῖ, ὃ δὴ φαμεν εἶναι ὃ ἔστι κλίην, ἀλλὰ
 κλίην τινά;

Ἔλεγον γάρ.

Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ ὃ ἔστιν ποιεῖ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὄν ποιοῖ,
 ἀλλά τι τοιούτου | οἷον τὸ ὄν, ὄν δὲ οὐ· τελέως δὲ εἶναι
 ὄν τὸ τοῦ κλινοουργοῦ ἔργον ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χειροτέχνου
 εἴ τις φαίη, κινδυνεύει οὐκ ἂν ἀληθῆ λέγειν;

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"And what would that be?" he asked.

"Not difficult," I said: "one that can be done quickly and anywhere. The quickest perhaps is to take a mirror, if you like, and carry it round with you everywhere.⁶ In no time you will make a sun and the heavenly bodies, the earth, yourself, and all the other living creatures, objects and plants and everything we've just been talking about."

"Things we can perceive, yes," he said, "but not, I think, the things that are real in the true sense."

"Well done!" I said. "You've got the point of my argument. You see, I think the painter too is one of these types of craftsman. Isn't that so?"

"Of course."

"But I think you'll say that what he makes isn't the real thing, although in one sense the painter does make a bed, or is that not so?"

"Yes, he too makes something that is an appearance of a bed."

"What about the maker of beds? Weren't you saying just now that he doesn't make the Form, I mean the thing we say is the actual bed, but just a particular bed?"

"Yes, I was."

"So that means unless he makes something that really exists, he's not making the real thing, but something that's like it, but not actually it. But if one were to say that the product of the bed-maker, or any other craftsman, is completely real, it's probable he would not be telling the truth."

⁶ Or "turn it around in all directions." (The Greek *peripherein* can have either meaning.)

Οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη, ὥς γ' ἂν δόξειεν τοῖς περὶ τοὺς τοι-
οῦσδε λόγους διατρίβουσιν. ἰ

Μηδὲν ἄρα θαυμάζωμεν εἰ καὶ τοῦτο ἀμυδρόν τι
τυγχάνει ὄν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν.

Μὴ γάρ.

b Βούλει οὖν, ἔφη, ἐπ' αὐτῶν τούτων ζητήσωμεν τὸν
μιμητὴν τούτου, τίς ποτ' ἐστίν;

Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τριτταί τινες κλῖναι αἷται γίνονται· μία
μὲν ἢ ἰ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσα, ἣν φαίμεν ἄν, ὡς ἐγῶμαι,
θεὸν ἐργάσασθαι. ἢ τίν' ἄλλον;

Οὐδένα, οἶμαι.

Μία δέ γε ἦν ὁ τέκτων.

Ναί, ἔφη. ἰ

Μία δὲ ἦν ὁ ζωγράφος. ἢ γάρ;

Ἔστω.

Ζωγράφος δὴ, κλινοποιός, θεός, τρεῖς οὗτοι ἐπι-
ιστάται τρισὶν εἵδεσι κλινῶν.

Ναὶ τρεῖς.

c Ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, εἴτε οὐκ ἐβούλετο, εἴτε τις ἀνάγκη
ἐπῆν μὴ πλέον ἢ μίαν ἐν τῇ φύσει ἀπεργάσασθαι
αὐτὸν κλίνην, οὕτως ἐποίησεν μίαν μόνου αὐτὴν ἐκεί-
νην ὃ ἔστιν κλίνη· δύο δὲ τοιαῦται ἢ πλείους οὔτε
ἐφυτεύθησαν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ οὔτε μὴ ἰ φυῶσιν.

Πῶς δὴ; ἔφη.

Ὅτι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ δύο μόνας ποιήσειεν, πάλιν ἂν
μία ἀναφανείη ἥς ἐκεῖναι ἂν αὐ ἀμφότεραι τὸ εἶδος

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"No he wouldn't be," he said. "At any rate, that's what it would appear to be to those who engage in these kinds of argument."

"Then let's not be in the least surprised if this too is actually obscure relative to the truth."

"No, I realize that."

"Do you want us then to look into who this imitator actually is in these same examples?"

"If you want," he said.

"So it turns out we've actually got three beds as follows: one that really exists in nature, which I think we would agree was made by god: or would it be someone else?"

"No one else, I imagine" he said.

"One which was made by a carpenter."

"Yes," he said.

"And one created by the painter. That's right, isn't it?"

"Let it be so."

"Painter, bed-maker, god: these three are experts, then, in the three kinds of bed?"

"Yes, the three of them."

"Now the god, whether he didn't wish to or he was under some compulsion not to make more than one bed in the natural order of things, made only one actual Form which is a bed. Two or more such things were neither created by the god, nor could they ever come into being."

"How come?" he asked.

"Because if he were to make only two beds, a single one would be discovered beyond them whose Form both of

ἔχοιεν, καὶ εἴη ἂν ὁ ἔστιν κλίμη ἐκείνη ἀλλ' οὐχ αἰ
 δύο. |

Ὅρθως, ἔφη.

Ταῦτα δὴ οἶμαι εἰδὼς ὁ θεός, βουλόμενος εἶναι
 d ὄντως κλίνης ποιητῆς ὄντως οὔσης, ἀλλὰ μὴ κλίνης
 τινὸς μηδὲ κλινοποιός τις, μίαν φύσει αὐτὴν ἔφυσεν.

Ἔοικεν.

Βούλει οὖν τοῦτον μὲν φυτουργὸν τοῦτου προσαγο-
 ρεύωμεν, | ἢ τι τοιοῦτον;

Δίκαιον γοῦν, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ φύσει γε καὶ τοῦτο
 καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα πεποίηκεν.

Τί δὲ τὸν τέκτονα; ἄρ' οὐ δημιουργὸν κλίνης;

Ναί. |

Ἦ καὶ τὸν ζωγράφον δημιουργὸν καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ
 τοιοῦτου;

Οὐδαμῶς.

Ἄλλὰ τί αὐτὸν κλίνης φήσεις εἶναι;

e Τοῦτο, ἢ δ' ὅς, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ μετριώτατ' ἂν προσαγο-
 ρεύεσθαι, μιμητῆς οὗ ἐκείνοι δημιουργοί.

Εἶεν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· τὸν τοῦ τρίτου ἄρα γεννήματος
 ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως μιμητὴν καλεῖς; |

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Τοῦτ' ἄρα ἔσται καὶ ὁ τραγωδοποιός, εἴπερ μιμη-

⁷ Plato takes this matter further in *Prm.* 132a-b in what has come to be known as the "Third Man" argument: with one Form a further Form is needed to explain the connection between the Form and its particulars and so on, in an infinite regress; this

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these beds would share, and that would be the actual bed, not these two.”⁷

“You’re right,” he said.

“Knowing this, I think, as the god wanted to be the real creator of the bed which exists in reality, not a particular bed, nor a particular bed-maker, he created the one which in its nature is unique.”

“It looks like it.”

“So do you want us to refer to the god as the natural creator of this, or something like it?”

“It would be right at any rate,” he said, “since it’s by nature that he’s made this and everything else.”

“And the carpenter: shouldn’t we call him a craftsman who makes beds?”

“Yes.”

“And the painter too, isn’t he a craftsman and maker of such a thing?”

“In no way!”

“Well, what do you say he has to do with the bed?”

“It seems to me,” he said, “it would be most reasonable to refer to him as an imitator of what the others manufacture.”

“Well,” I said, “so you’re calling him who is three stages away from nature an imitator?”

“That’s absolutely right,” he said.

“Then the tragedian will be this too, if he’s an imitator,

eventuality is not developed in *Resp.* (see Annas, *An Introduction to Plato’s Republic* 230–32; Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the *Parmenides*”).

τῆς ἐστὶ, τρίτος τις ἀπὸ βασιλέως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας πεφυκώς, καὶ πάντες οἱ ἄλλοι μιμηταί.

Κινδυνεύει.

598 Τὸν μὲν δὴ μιμητὴν ὠμολογήκαμεν. εἰπέ δέ μοι περὶ τοῦ ζωγράφου τόδε· πότερα ἐκείνο αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει ἕκαστον δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιχειρεῖν μιμεῖσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἔργα;

Τὰ τῶν δημιουργῶν, ἔφη. |

Ἄρα οἷα ἐστὶν ἢ οἷα φαίνεται; τοῦτο γὰρ ἔτι διόρισον.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη.

ᾧδε κλίνη, εἴαντε ἐκ πλαγίου αὐτὴν θεᾷ εἴαντε καταντικρὺ ἢ ὀπηοῦν, μή τι διαφέρει αὐτῇ εἰαυτῆς, ἢ διαφέρει μὲν οὐδέν, φαίνεται δὲ ἀλλοῖα; καὶ τᾶλλα ὡσαύτως;

Οὕτως, ἔφη· φαίνεται, διαφέρει δ' οὐδέν. |

b Τοῦτο δὴ αὐτὸ σκόπει· πρὸς πότερον ἢ γραφικὴ πεποιήται περὶ ἕκαστον; πότερα πρὸς τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἔχει, μιμήσασθαι, ἢ πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον, ὡς φαίνεται, φαντάσματος ἢ ἀληθείας οὔσα μίμησις; |

Φαντάσματος, ἔφη.

Πόρρω ἄρα πον τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἢ μιμητικὴ ἐστὶν καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, διὰ τοῦτο πάντα ἀπεργάζεται, ὅτι σμικρόν τι ἕκάστου ἐφάπτεται, καὶ τοῦτο εἶδωλον. οἷον ὁ

⁸ This abrupt, unmotivated, and brief transition to dramatic art as a parallel to painting slides over problems with the analogy, and perhaps Glaucon's less-than-convinced answer (e9) is meant

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being three stages away from the king and the truth, along with all the other imitators?"⁸

"I suppose so."

"We're agreed on the imitator, then. As to the painter, tell me this: do you think that the artist attempts in each case to imitate that actual reality in the natural order, or the works of the craftsmen?"

"The works of the craftsmen," he said.

"As they actually are, or as they appear to be? You see, you still have to make the distinction."

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"Like this: take a bed. If you examine it from an angle, or straight on, or any other way, does it vary within itself, or does it not vary at all, but just look different, and similarly with the rest?"

"It looks different," he said, "but there is no difference at all."

"Then consider this point: what is the purpose of painting as regards individual objects? Is it to imitate what the real object is, or how its appearance looks? Is it the imitation of the apparent or the true?"

"The apparent," he said.

"Then I think the imitation is at a far remove from reality, and it seems it succeeds in creating everything because it latches on to some small aspect of each object

to indicate this, although S. is obviously anxious to secure the point in 598a1 ("We're agreed . . ."), and he tackles the issue head-on only at 603b10ff. The insertion here actually anticipates the real discussion of tragedy at 598d8ff. On the painting/drama analogy, see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (iv) (a).

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ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ζωγραφήσει ἡμῖν σκυτοτόμον,
 c τέκτονα, τοὺς ἄλλους δημιουργούς, περὶ οὐδενὸς τού-
 των ἐπαίων τῶν τεχνῶν· ἀλλ' ὁμως παῖδάς γε καὶ
 ἄφρονας ἀνθρώπους, εἰ ἀγαθὸς εἴη ζωγράφος, γράψας
 ἂν τέκτονα καὶ πόρρωθεν ἐπιδεικνὺς ἕξαπατῶ ἂν τῷ
 δοκεῖν ὡς ἀληθῶς τέκτονα εἶναι. |

Τί δ' οὖν;

Ἄλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ὦ φίλε, τόδε δεῖ περὶ πάντων τῶν
 τοιούτων διανοεῖσθαι· ἐπειδὴν τις ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλῃ
 περὶ του, ὡς ἐνέτυχεν ἀνθρώπῳ πάσας ἐπισταμένῳ
 d τὰς δημιουργίας καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ὅσα εἰς ἕκαστος
 οἶδεν, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐχὶ ἀκριβέστερον ὁπουοῦν ἐπιστα-
 μένῳ, ὑπολαμβάνειν δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ ὅτι εὐήθης τις
 ἀνθρώπος, καί, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐντυχὼν γόητί τιμι καὶ μι-
 μητῇ ἐξηπατήθη, ὥστε ἔδοξεν | αὐτῷ πάσσοφος εἶναι,
 διὰ τὸ αὐτὸς μὴ οἶός τ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀνεπιστη-
 μοσύνην καὶ μίμησιν ἕξετάσαι.

Ἄληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον τήν τε
 τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, ἐπειδὴ
 e τινων ἀκούομεν ὅτι οὗτοι πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπίσταν-
 ται, πάντα δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπεια τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ
 κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεία; ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποι-
 ητῆν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ καλῶς ποιήσῃν,
 εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι ποιεῖν. | δεῖ δὴ
 ἐπισκέψασθαι πότερον μιμηταῖς τ(οι)ούτοις¹ οὗτοι ἐν-

¹ τ(οι)ούτοις Richards: τούτοις ADF Procl.

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and this is an image. For example, a painter, let's say, will paint a cobbler, a carpenter, all the other artisans without any understanding of any of their crafts. Nevertheless, if he were a good painter and painted a carpenter and showed it to some children or mindless people from a distance, he would trick them by its appearance into believing it was a real carpenter."

"Of course."

"But the fact is, my friend, I think, this is what you should bear in mind in all such cases. Whenever someone tells us that he has met some fellow who is expert in all crafts and everything else that single individuals know about, and there's nothing he does not understand more precisely than anyone else, then we must take him for a simpleton, and it seems he's been duped by some magician and imitator he's met whom he considered to be all-knowing on account of his being unable to evaluate knowledge, ignorance, and imitation."⁹

"Very true," he said.

"Does this mean, then," I said, "that we must next examine tragedy and its leader, Homer, since we hear from some that these people understand all arts and crafts and all matters human in relation to virtue and vice and even to matters divine? For the good poet, if he aspires to write well about whatever he does write about, must do so, they argue, with full knowledge, or he won't be able to. So we must investigate whether those who say this have been deceived in their meetings with such imitators, and when

⁹ The claim of omniscience was made by the sophist Hippias of Elis (later fifth century), according to Plato (*Hipp. Min.* 368bff.).

599 τυχόντες ἐξηπάτηνται καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὀρώντες οὐκ αἰσθάνονται τριττὰ ἀπέχοντα τοῦ ὄντος καὶ ῥάδια ποιεῖν μὴ εἰδότι τὴν ἀλήθειαν—φαντάσματα γὰρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄντα ποιούσιν—ἢ τι καὶ λέγουσιν καὶ τῷ ὄντι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ποιηταὶ ἴσασιν περὶ ὧν δοκοῦσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς | εὖ λέγειν.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἐξεταστέον.

Οἷοι οὖν, εἴ τις ἀμφότερα δύναίτο ποιεῖν, τό τε μιμηθησόμενον καὶ τὸ εἰδῶλον, ἐπὶ τῇ τῶν εἰδῶλων δημιουργίᾳ ἑαυτὸν ἀφεῖναι ἂν σπουδάζειν καὶ τοῦτο
b προστήσασθαι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ βίου ὡς βέλτιστον ἔχοντα;

Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

Ἄλλ' εἴπερ γε οἶμαι ἐπιστήμων εἶη τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων πέρι ἅπερ καὶ μιμείται, | πολὺ πρότερον ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις ἂν σπουδάσειεν ἢ ἐπὶ τοῖς μιμήμασι, καὶ πειρῶτο ἂν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα ἑαυτοῦ καταλιπεῖν μνημεῖα, καὶ εἶναι προθυμοῦτ' ἂν μᾶλλον ὁ ἐγκωμιαζόμενος ἢ ὁ ἐγκωμιάζων.

Οἶμαι, ἔφη· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἴσου ἢ τε τιμὴ καὶ ἡ ὠφελία.

Τῶν μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλων πέρι μὴ ἀπαιτῶμεν λόγον
c Ὅμηρον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντινούν τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐρωτῶντες εἰ ἱατρικὸς ἦν τις αὐτῶν ἀλλὰ μὴ μιμητῆς μόνου ἱατρικῶν λόγων, τίνας ὑγιεῖς ποιητῆς τις τῶν παλαιῶν ἢ τῶν νέων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὡς περ Ἀσκληπιός, ἢ

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they see their works they don't realize that they're three stages removed from reality, and easy to create for someone who doesn't know the truth since they make apparent objects, not real ones; or there is something in what they say and the good poets in fact know something about the topics about which most people think that they speak well."

"We must certainly look at that carefully," he said.

"Do you therefore think that if someone were able to make both the object that will be imitated and the image, he'd throw himself wholeheartedly into the craft of producing images and make them his priority for life on the grounds that it's the best thing to do?"

"Well, I myself don't."

"But, I think, if he were expert in the truth about the objects he also imitates he would much rather take the real objects of his work seriously than the imitations and would try to leave behind many fine works as a memorial to himself, and he'd be more eager to be the recipient of praise than the one who gives it."

"I think so," he said, "as the honor and the usefulness aren't on the same level."

"So then, as for the rest, let's not demand an account from Homer or any of the other poets whatsoever¹⁰ by asking if one of them were skilled in the art of medicine and not just a portrayer of medical lore, or who is there that any of the poets past and present is said to have restored to health, as Asclepius did, or what medical stu-

¹⁰ This challenge to poets, and in particular Homer, to demonstrate expert knowledge of the topics they treat is reminiscent of *Ion*. 536eff.

τίνας μαθητὰς ἰατρικῆς κατελίπετο, | ὥσπερ ἐκείνος
 τοὺς ἐγγόνους, μῆδ' αὖ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας αὐτοὺς
 ἐρωτῶμεν, ἀλλ' ἐῷμεν· περὶ δὲ ὧν μεγίστων τε καὶ
 d καλλίστων ἐπιχειρεῖ λέγειν Ὅμηρος, πολέμων τε πέρι
 καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ διοικήσεων πόλεων, καὶ παιδείας
 πέρι ἀνθρώπου, δίκαιόν ποιν ἐρωτᾶν αὐτὸν πυνθανο-
 μένους· ὦ φίλε Ὅμηρε, εἴπερ μὴ τρίτος ἀπὸ τῆς
 ἀληθείας εἶ ἀρετῆς πέρι, εἰδώλου δημιουργός, ὃν δὴ
 μιμητὴν ὠρισάμεθα, | ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερος, καὶ οἶός τε
 ἦσθα γινώσκεις ποῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα βελτίους ἢ χεί-
 ρους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, λέγε ἡμῖν τίς
 τῶν πόλεων διὰ σὲ βέλτιον ᾤκησεν, ὥσπερ διὰ Λυ-
 κούργου Λακεδαίμων καὶ δι' ἄλλους πολλοὺς πολλαὶ
 e μεγάλαι τε καὶ σμικραί; σὲ δὲ τίς αἰτιᾶται πόλις
 νομοθέτην ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι καὶ σφᾶς ὠφεληκέναι;
 Χαρώνδαν μὲν γὰρ Ἰταλία καὶ Σικελία, καὶ ἡμεῖς Σό-
 λωνα· σὲ δὲ τίς; ἔξει τινὰ εἰπεῖν; |

Οὐκ οἶμαι, ἔφη ὁ Γλαύκων· οὐκ οὐκ λέγεταί γε οὐδ'
 ὑπ' αὐτῶν Ὀμηριδῶν.

600 Ἄλλὰ δὴ τις πόλεμος ἐπὶ Ὀμήρου ὑπ' ἐκείνου
 ἄρχοντος ἢ συμβουλευόντος εὖ πολεμηθεὶς μνημο-
 νεύεται;

Οὐδέίς.

Ἄλλ' οἶα δὴ εἰς τὰ ἔργα | σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς πολλαὶ
 ἐπίνοιαί καὶ εὐμήχανοι εἰς τέχνας ἢ τινὰς ἄλλας

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dents did he leave behind, as Asclepius left his descendants. And again let's not ask them about other crafts, but pass them by. However, as for the greatest and noblest topics Homer aspires to speak about—war, military command, the administration of states, the education of man—I imagine it would be right for anyone looking at these to ask: 'My dear Homer, if you're not three stages removed from the truth as regards virtue, a maker of images, whom we've defined as an imitator, but you're even two stages away, and able to recognize what essential characteristics make men better or worse in their private and public lives, tell us which state has been better governed because of you, as Lacedaemon was by Lycurgus and many states large and small were by many others? What state gives you the credit of having been a good lawgiver and having benefited it? Italy and Sicily would claim Charondas, we would claim Solon.¹¹ Who would claim you?' Will he be able to answer?"

"I don't think so," said Glaucon. "Nothing is said on the matter even by the Homeridae themselves."¹²

"There again, what war is on record as being well fought in Homer's time under his leadership or on his advice?"

"None."

"Or again, as would be expected of the deeds of a wise man, are there many ingenious inventions and clever con-

¹¹ Lycurgus, Charondas, Solon: all traditional lawgivers (Solon was from Athens, hence "we would claim").

¹² The guild of poets dedicated to reciting and expounding the Homeric poems and telling stories about the life of the poet; they originated in Chios and were said to be his descendants.

πράξεις λέγονται, ὡσπερ αὖ Θάλεώ τε πέρι τοῦ Μιλησίου καὶ Ἀναχάρσιος τοῦ Σκύθου;

Οὐδαμῶς τοιοῦτον οὐδέν.

Ἄλλὰ δὴ εἰ μὴ δημοσία, ἰδίᾳ τισὶν ἡγεμῶν παιδείας αὐτὸς ζῶν λέγεται Ὅμηρος γενέσθαι, οἳ ἐκείνον ἡγάπων ἐπὶ συνουσίᾳ ἢ καὶ τοῖς ὑστέροις ὁδόν τινα παρέδοσαν βίου Ὀμηρικῆν, ὡσπερ Πυθαγόρας αὐτὸς τε διαφερόντως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἡγαπήθη, καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι ἔτι καὶ νῦν Πυθαγόρειον τρόπον ἐπονομάζοντες τοῦ βίου διαφανεῖς πη δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις; ἢ

Οὐδ' αὖ, ἔφη, τοιοῦτον οὐδέν λέγεται. ὁ γὰρ Κρεώφυλος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἴσως, ὁ τοῦ Ὀμήρου ἐταῖρος, τοῦ ὀνόματος ἂν γελοιότερος ἔτι πρὸς παιδείαν φανείη, εἰ τὰ λεγόμενα περὶ Ὀμήρου ἀληθῆ. λέγεται γὰρ ὡς πολλή τις ἀμέλεια περὶ αὐτὸν ἦν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου,² ὅτε ἔζη.

Λέγεται γὰρ οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἀλλ' οἶε, ὃ Γλαύκων, εἰ τῷ ὄντι οἷός τ' ἦν παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους καὶ βελτίους ἀπεργάζεσθαι Ὅμηρος, ἢ ἄτε περὶ τούτων οὐ μίμεισθαι ἀλλὰ γιγνώσκειν δυνάμενος, οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν πολλοὺς ἐταῖρους ἐποίησατο καὶ ἐτιμᾶτο καὶ ἡγαπάτο ὑπ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ Πρωταγόρας μὲν ἄρα ὁ Ἀβδηρίτης καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ ἄλλοι πάμπολλοι δύνανται τοῖς

² ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνον ADF: ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου Ast

¹³ Thales of Miletus (early sixth century) was credited with early scientific speculations and discoveries (see Waterfield, 11-

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trivances in crafts or any other activities that are mentioned, as they are with the Milesian Thales and the Scythian Anacharsis?"¹³

"Nothing of that sort at all."

"And yet again, if not in public life, in private life is Homer himself said to have been a leading educator in his own lifetime for some who delighted in his company and passed on a kind of Homeric way of life to their successors, as Pythagoras himself was particularly loved for this, and even today his successors seem to be distinguished among the rest for a way of life they call Pythagorean?"¹⁴

"There's nothing said on those lines at all," he said. "You see, Socrates, Homer's companion Creophylus would, regarding his education, seem more ridiculous than his name,¹⁵ if the stories about Homer are true. The story goes, you see, that Homer in his lifetime was ignored by him completely."

"Well, at any rate, that's the story," I said. "But, Glaucon, do you think that if Homer was in fact able to educate people and make them better insofar as he was able not just to imitate but really to know about these things, wouldn't he have surrounded himself with many followers and have been revered and loved by them? And yet Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos¹⁶ and very many

13). Anacharsis of Scythia, a legendary figure (ca. sixth century; see *OCD*³).

¹⁴ On Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism, see Waterfield, 87–115.

¹⁵ This etymology suggests that the name comes from *kreas* = "meat" and *phulon* = "tribe." The point of Glaucon's joke is that *meat* was associated with *gumnastikē* rather than *mousikē*.

¹⁶ On Protagoras, see *Prt.* 315–16, and on Prodicus, *Hipp. Maj.* 282c1–6.

ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν παριστάναί ἰδίᾳ συγγιγνόμενοι ὡς οὔτε οἰκίαν οὔτε πόλιν τὴν αὐτῶν διοικεῖν οἰοί τ' ἔσονται, ἂν μὴ σφεῖς αὐτῶν ἐπιστατήσωσιν τῆς παιδείας, καὶ ἐπὶ ταύτῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ οὔτω σφόδρα φιλοῦνται, ὥστε μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἰ κεφαλαῖς περιφέρουσιν αὐτοὺς οἱ ἑταῖροι. Ὅμηρον δ' ἄρα οἱ ἐπ' ἐκείνου, εἶπερ οἷός τ' ἦν πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὀνεινᾶναι ἀνθρώπους, ἢ Ἡσίοδον ραψωδεῖν ἂν περιμόντας εἶων, καὶ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἂν αὐτῶν ἀντίεχοντο ἢ τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἡνάγκαζον παρὰ σφίσιν οἴκοι εἶναι, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἔπειθον, αὐτοὶ ἂν ἐπαιδαγώγουν ὅπῃ ἦσαν, ἕως ἰκανῶς παιδείας μεταλάβοιεν;

Παντάπασι, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀληθῆ λέγειν.

Οὐκοῦν τιθῶμεν ἀπὸ Ὅμηρου ἀρξαμένους πάντας τοὺς ἰ ποιητικούς μιμητὰς εἰδῶλων ἀρετῆς εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ποιοῦσιν, τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας οὐχ ἄπτεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὁ ζωγράφος
601 σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα εἶναι, αὐτὸς τε οὐκ ἐπαῖων περὶ σκυτοτομίας καὶ τοῖς μὴ ἐπαῖουσι, ἐκ τῶν χρωμάτων δὲ καὶ σχημάτων θεωροῦσιν;

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

Οὔτω δὴ οἶμαι καὶ τὸν ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματα ἅττα ἰ ἐκάστων τῶν τεχνῶν τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ ῥήμασι ἐπιχρωματίζειν αὐτὸν οὐκ ἐπαῖοντα ἀλλ' ἢ μιμῆσθαι, ὥστε ἐτέροις τοιοῦτοις ἐκ τῶν λόγων θεωροῦσι δοκεῖν, ἕαντε περὶ σκυτοτομίας τις λέγῃ ἐν μέτρῳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ, πάνν εὖ δοκεῖν λέγεσθαι, ἕαντε περὶ

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others can impress upon those who gather round them in private that they won't be able to run their homes nor their cities unless they themselves are put in charge of their education, and they are so very much adored for their wisdom that their companions all but carry them round on their shoulders. But if Homer was able to benefit his fellow men by promoting their virtue, would his contemporaries have allowed him or Hesiod to go round reciting and not have held on to them more tightly than to their gold, and have compelled them to live among them, or if they couldn't persuade them, they themselves would have followed them round wherever they went until they had received a sufficient level of education?"

"I think what you're saying is true, Socrates, in every respect."

"So shall we agree then that, starting with Homer, all composers of poetry are imitators of images of virtue and of every other subject they deal with, but they don't grasp the truth; yet, as we were saying just now, a painter, who himself has no knowledge of shoemaking, will portray a cobbler who seems to be real to those who have as little knowledge of it as he does, since they look at it in terms of the colors and the shapes."

"Certainly."

"In the same way, I think, we'll say that the poet, without understanding anything except how to imitate, paints the colors, so to speak, of each of the crafts with his words and phrases, so that to other people of similar sort, looking at how things seem from words, if one is talking about shoemaking in meter, rhythm, and harmony, it will appear

b στρατηγίας εάντε περι ἄλλου ὄτουοῦν· οὔτω φύσει αὐτὰ ταῦτα μεγάλην τινὰ κήλησιν ἔχειν. ἐπεὶ γυμνωθέντα γε τῶν τῆς μουσικῆς χρωμάτων τὰ τῶν ποιητῶν, αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὐτῶν λεγόμενα, οἶμαί σε εἰδέναι οἷα φαίνεται. τεθέασαι γάρ που. |

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔοικεν τοῖς τῶν ὠραίων προσώποις, καλῶν δὲ μή, οἷα γίγνεται ἰδεῖν ὅταν αὐτὰ τὸ ἄνθος προλίπη;

Παντάπασιν, ἦ δ' ὅς.

c Ἴθι δῆ, τόδε ἄθρει· ὁ τοῦ εἰδώλου ποιητῆς, ὁ μιμητῆς, φαμέν, τοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδὲν ἐπαίει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου οὐχ οὔτως;

Ναί.

Μὴ τοίνυν ἡμίσεως αὐτὸ καταλίπωμεν ῥηθέν, ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ἴδωμεν. |

Λέγε, ἔφη.

Ζωγράφος, φαμέν, ἡγίας τε γράψει καὶ χαλινόν;

Ναί.

Ποιήσει δέ γε σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; |

Πάνν γε.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐπαίει οἷας δεῖ τὰς ἡγίας εἶναι καὶ τὸν χαλινὸν ὁ γραφεύς; ἢ οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας, ὃ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς, ἀλλ' ἐκείνος ὅσπερ τούτοις ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, μόνος ὁ ἵππικός;

Ἀληθέστατα. |

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ περι πάντα οὔτω φήσομεν ἔχειν;

Πῶς;

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to be well expressed: similarly on the subject of military command or anything else at all, so great a charm these things naturally exert. When the poet's words are stripped of their poetical colors and spoken on their own, I think you know what they appear to be. You've surely observed this."

"I have," he said.

"Isn't it like the faces of people who are in their prime," I said, "but not beautiful: what they're like to look at when the bloom passes away?"

"Yes, entirely," he said.

"Come on, then, consider this: we're saying that the maker of an image, our imitator, understands nothing of reality, but only about appearance. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"Then let's not leave it half told, but make an adequate job of it."

"Do go on," he said.

"A painter paints some reins and a bridle, let's say."

"Yes."

"But a leathersmith and a blacksmith will make them."

"Certainly."

"Does the painter then understand what kind of objects the reins and the bridle have to be? Or is it not even the makers, the blacksmith and the leathersmith, but he who understands how to use them: the rider?"

"Very true."

"Shall we not agree that this is so with everything?"

"How do you mean?"

d Περὶ ἕκαστον ταύτας τινὰς τρεῖς τέχνας εἶναι,
 χρησομένην, ποιήσουσαν, μιμησομένην;

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ἀρετὴ καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὀρθότης ἑκάστου
 σκεύους καὶ ἰζύου καὶ πράξεως οὐ πρὸς ἄλλο τι ἢ
 τὴν χρείαν ἐστίν, πρὸς ἣν ἂν ἕκαστον ἦ πεποιημένον
 ἢ πεφυκός;

Οὕτως.

Πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπει-
 ρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίνεσθαι τῷ ποιητῇ
 οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρῆται· οἷον
 e αὐλητῆς που αὐλοποιῶ ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ τῶν αὐλῶν,
 οἷ ἂν ὑπηρετῶσιν ἐν τῷ αὐλεῖν, καὶ ἐπιτάξει οἴους δέι
 ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ὑπηρετήσῃ.

Πῶς δ' οὐ;

Οὐκοῦν ὁ μὲν εἰδὼς ἐξαγγέλλει περὶ χρηστῶν καὶ
 πονηρῶν ἢ αὐλῶν, ὁ δὲ πιστεύων ποιήσῃ;

Ναί.

602 Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρα σκεύους ὁ μὲν ποιητῆς πίστιν ὀρθὴν
 ἔξει περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ πονηρίας, συνῶν τῷ εἰδότι
 καὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκούειν παρὰ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁ δὲ
 χρώμενος ἐπιστήμην.

Πάνυ γε.

Ὁ δὲ μιμητῆς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην
 ἔξει ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ
 δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι
 καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρῆ γράφειν;

Οὐδέτερα.

BOOK X

“For each and everything there are these three skills: how to use them, how to make them, how to imitate them?”

“Yes.”

“Doesn't that then mean that the excellence, beauty, and correctness of each piece of equipment, living creature, and activity has no other purpose than the usage for which each of them has been created or developed by nature?”

“That's right.”

“Then it's absolutely essential that the user be the most experienced in the use of each thing and inform the maker how good or bad his product is for its purpose. For example, the pipe player I imagine tells the pipe maker about his pipes, how they work when played, and orders the kind of pipes to make, and the other obliges.”

“Of course.”

“So the one with the knowledge reports on the good and bad pipes, the other takes his word for it and will make them accordingly?”

“Yes.”

“Then the maker of this same instrument will have a correct opinion about its good and bad points through his cooperation with the expert and his being obliged to listen to him, but it's the user who has the knowledge?”

“Very much so.”

“But will the imitator get his knowledge of the objects he portrays, whether they're good and correct or not, from using them, or will he gain the right opinion because he has to cooperate with the expert and be instructed what to paint?”

“No, neither.”

REPUBLIC

Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητῆς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν. |

Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

Χαρίεις ἂν εἶη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ.

Οὐ πάνν.

- b Ἄλλ' οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε μιμῆσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστὸν· ἀλλ', ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσιν, τοῦτο μιμῆσεται.

Τί γὰρ ἄλλο; |

Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ, ὡς γε φαίνεται, ἐπιεικῶς ἡμῖν διωμολόγηται, τὸν τε μιμητικὸν μηδὲν εἰδέναι ἄξιον λόγου περὶ ὧν μιμεῖται, ἀλλ' εἶναι παιδιάν τινα καὶ οὐ σπουδὴν τὴν μίμησιν, τοὺς τε τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ἀπτομένους ἐν ἱαμβείοις καὶ ἐν ἔπεσι πάντας εἶναι μιμητικοὺς ὡς οἷον τε μάλιστα.

Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

- c Πρὸς Διός, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὸ δὲ δὴ μιμείσθαι τοῦτο [οὐ] περὶ τρίτον μὲν τί ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας; ἢ γάρ;

Ναί.

Πρὸς δὲ δὴ ποῖόν τί ἐστὶν τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔχον | τὴν δύναμιν ἦν ἔχει;

Τοῦ ποίου τινὸς πέρι λέγεις;

BOOK X

"Then the imitator will have neither knowledge nor correct belief about the goodness or badness of the objects he's portraying."

"It doesn't look like it."

"The poetic imitator would be in a fine position with regard to his wisdom about whatever he is creating!"

"Hardly."¹⁷

"Nevertheless he'll imitate all the same without knowing in what respects the object is good or bad, but, it seems, the way it appears good to the ignorant masses is how he'll imitate it."

"What else can he do?"

"This, then, is what we have agreed more or less: that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning about the objects he's portraying, but that imitation is a kind of game and not serious. Second, that those who take up tragic poetry, whether in iambic or epic verse,¹⁸ are above all imitators."

"Very much so."

"Zeus!" I said "Then this business of imitation is to do with the third stage from the truth, isn't it?"

"Yes."

"Which one of our human faculties is the power it has related to?"

"Which one are you talking about?"

¹⁷ Glaucon appears to take S.'s irony seriously in a11.

¹⁸ "Epic verse" is the hexameter, the meter of the Homeric poems, and iambic the meter of tragedy proper. "Tragic poetry" at b8 is used in the broad sense to include Homer.

Τοῦ τοιοῦδε ταῦτόν που ἡμῖν μέγεθος ἐγγύθεν τε καὶ πόρρωθεν διὰ τῆς ὄψεως οὐκ ἴσον φαίνεται.

Οὐ γάρ. |

d Καὶ ταῦτὰ καμπύλα τε καὶ εὐθέα ἐν ὕδατι τε θεω-
 μένοις καὶ ἔξω, καὶ κοῖλά τε δὴ καὶ ἐξέχοντα διὰ τὴν
 περὶ τὰ χρώματα αὐτὴ πλάνην τῆς ὄψεως, καὶ πᾶσά τις
 ταραχὴ δῆλη ἡμῖν ἐνοῦσα αὕτη ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· ᾧ δὴ
 ἡμῶν τῷ παθήματι τῆς φύσεως ἢ σκιαγραφία ἐπι-
 θεμένη γοητείας οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει, καὶ ἡ θαυματοποιία
 καὶ ἄλλαι πολλαὶ τοιαῦται μηχαναί. |

Ἀληθῆ.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ἰστάναι
 βοήθειαι χαριέσταται πρὸς αὐτὰ ἐφάνησαν, ὥστε μὴ
 ἄρχειν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φαινόμενον μείζον ἢ ἔλαττον ἢ
 πλέον ἢ βαρύτερον, ἀλλὰ τὸ λογισάμενον καὶ μετρή-
 σαν ἢ καὶ στήσαν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

e Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἐν
 ψυχῇ ἔργον.

Τούτου γὰρ οὖν.

Τούτω δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι
 μείζω ἅττα εἶναι ἢ | ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα
 τὰναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά.

Ναί.

Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά ἐναντία
 δοξάζειν ἀδύνατον εἶναι;

BOOK X

"The following: the dimensions of one and the same object presumably don't appear equal to us when viewed from nearby or far away."¹⁹

"No, they don't."

"And the same objects look bent and straight when seen in and out of water, and a surface looks concave and convex, again because of errors of vision related to colors, and every kind of deception like this is clearly present in our soul. So illusionist painting, by exploiting our natural shortcoming, is nothing short of wizardry, likewise conjuring and many other such tricks."

"That's true."

"Then haven't measuring, counting, and weighing proved to be most agreeable aids in all this so that apparent differences in size, number, and weight don't rule in us, but what has counted, measured, and weighed?"

"Of course."

"But this of course would be the function of our reasoning faculty in the soul."

"It would indeed."

"But often when it has measured and indicates that some things are bigger or smaller than one another, or equal, the opposite appears at the same time within the same objects."

"Yes."

"And didn't we agree that it's impossible for the same thing to form contradictory opinions about the same objects at the same time?"²⁰

¹⁹ S. slides back from poetry to visual representation again (see above, n. 8).

²⁰ At 4.436b9-c2, and see Book 4 n. 47.

- Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν. |
- 603 Τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ
τὰ μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἶη ταυτόν.
Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
Ἄλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεύον |
βέλτιστον ἂν εἶη τῆς ψυχῆς.
Τί μήν;
Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἂν τι εἶη
ἐν ἡμῖν.
Ἀνάγκη.
Τοῦτο τοίνυν διομολογήσασθαι βουλόμενος ἔλεγον
b ὅτι ἡ γραφικὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ μιμητικὴ πόρρω μὲν τῆς
ἀληθείας ὄν τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, πόρρω δ'
αὐτῆς φρονήσεως ὄντι τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν προσομιλεῖ τε καὶ
ἐταίρα καὶ φίλη ἐστὶν ἐπ' οὐδενὶ ὑγιεῖ οὐδ' ἀληθεῖ.
Παντάπασι, ἧ δ' ὅς. |
Φαύλη ἄρα φαύλῳ συγγιγνομένη φαῦλα γεννᾷ ἡ
μιμητικὴ.
Ἐοικεν.
Πότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἡ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν μόνον, ἡ καὶ
κατὰ τὴν ἀκοήν, ἦν δὴ ποίησιν ὀνομάζομεν;
Εἰκόσ γ', ἔφη, καὶ ταύτην.
Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τῷ εἰκότι μόνον πιστεύσωμεν
c ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπ' αὐτὸ αὐτῶν ἔλθωμεν τῆς
διανοίας τοῦτο ᾧ προσομιλεῖ ἡ τῆς ποιήσεως μιμη-
τικὴ, καὶ ἴδωμεν φαῦλον ἢ σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν.

²¹ A polarity of rational and irrational in which the *thumos* and

BOOK X

"Yes, and we were right to say it."

"So the part of the soul which forms its opinion contrary to what it has measured would not be the same as the part which forms its view according to what it has measured."

"No, it can't be."

"Yet again, that part of the soul which relies on measurement and calculation would be the best."

"Certainly."

"Then the part which opposes this would be one of the inferior ones in us."²¹

"It has to be."

"That, then, was what I was wanting to get agreement about, when I was saying that the art of painting and imitation as a whole accomplish what is their function far from the truth, while as companion and friend it associates itself with that part in us which is far from the intellect and has no healthy nor even true purpose."

"I agree in every way," he said.

"Being inferior and rubbing shoulders with the inferior, imitation produces the inferior."

"It seems to."

"Does that apply only to what we see, or also to what we hear—what we call poetry?"

"The latter also seems likely," he said.

"Then let's not trust solely on a similarity with painting," I said, "but let's also approach that aspect of thought with which the imitative aspect of poetry consorts, and see if it's trivial or serious."

epithumia appear to be lumped together for the present argument, in contrast to the more complex tripartite division of Books 4–9.

Ἄλλὰ χρή. |

᾿Ωδε δὴ προθώμεθα πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμῆται ἢ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἔκουσίας πράξεις, καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγῆναι, καὶ ἐν τούτοις δὴ πάσιν ἢ λυπουμένους ἢ χαίροντας. μὴ τι ἄλλο ἦν παρὰ ταῦτα;

Οὐδέν.

Ἄρ' οὖν ἐν ἅπασιν τούτοις ὁμοιοητικῶς ἄνθρωπος
 d διαίκεται; ἢ ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν ὄψιν ἐστασίαζεν καὶ ἐναντίας εἶχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ δόξας ἅμα περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν στασιάζει τε καὶ μάχεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι δὲ ὅτι τοῦτό γε νῦν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἡμᾶς διομολογεῖσθαι. ἐν γὰρ | τοῖς ἄνω λόγοις ἱκανῶς πάντα ταῦτα διωμολογησάμεθα, ὅτι μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἢ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν.

Ὅρθῶς, ἔφη.

e Ὅρθῶς γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ἀλλ' ὁ τότε ἀπελίπομεν, νῦν μοι δοκεῖ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διεξελθεῖν.

Τὸ ποῖον; ἔφη.

Ἀνήρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπιεικῆς τοιαύσδε τύχης μετασχών, ἴδὼν ἀπολέσας | ἢ τι ἄλλο ὦν περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖται, ἐλέγομέν πον καὶ τότε ὅτι ῥᾶστα οἶσει τῶν ἄλλων.

Πάνν γε.

Νῦν δέ γε τόδ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, πότερον οὐδὲν ἀχθέσεται, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἀδύνατον, μετριάσει δέ πως πρὸς λύπην.

BOOK X

“Well, yes, we must.”

“Then let’s make this our proposal: imitation, we say, copies people engaging in compulsory or voluntary tasks, and if as a result of their activities they consider that they have performed well or badly, they are sad or happy in all these situations: are you sure there’s nothing beyond this?”

“No, nothing.”

“Is a person of one mind with himself in all of this? Or just as he was in internal conflict about what he saw and had contradictory beliefs within himself about the same things at one and the same time, so too is he in conflict in his activities and fights against himself? I’m reminded that we don’t need to make an agreement on this point now at all, as we agreed on all this adequately earlier in our discussion, when we said that the soul is teeming with countless such contradictions all arising together.”²²

“That’s right,” he said.

“Yes, I know it’s right,” I said, “but now is the time, I think, to examine what we left out before.”

“What was that?” he asked.

“A decent man,” I said, “who experiences misfortune such as losing a son, or something else he values most highly, I think we agreed then that he’ll bear this much more easily than anyone else.”²³

“Very much so.”

“So now let’s consider whether he’ll feel no grief, or, if this is impossible, will he somehow keep his grief under control?”

²² At 4.439c2–41c2.

²³ At 3.387d4–e8

604 Οὕτω μᾶλλον, ἔφη, τό γε ἀληθές. |
 Τόδε νῦν μοι περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰπέ· πότερον μᾶλλον
 αὐτὸν οἶει τῇ λύπῃ μαχεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἀντιτείνειν, ὅταν
 ὁράται ὑπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων, ἢ ὅταν ἐν ἐρημίᾳ μόνος αὐτὸς
 καθ' αὐτὸν γίγνηται;

Πολύ που, ἔφη, διοίσει, ὅταν ὁράται. |

Μονωθεὶς δέ γε οἶμαι πολλὰ μὲν τολμήσει φθέγγασθαι, ἃ εἴ τις αὐτοῦ ἀκούοι αἰσχύνοιτ' ἄν, πολλὰ δὲ ποιήσει, ἃ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτό τινα ἰδεῖν δρώντα.

Οὕτως ἔχει, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον λόγος καὶ νόμος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος;

Ἀληθῆ.

b Ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα, δύο φαμέν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

Πῶς δ' οὖν;

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἔτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ἢ | ὁ νόμος ἐξηγείται;

Πῶς;

c Λέγει που ὁ νόμος ὅτι κάλλιστον ὅτι μάλιστα ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν ἐν ταῖς συμφοραῖς καὶ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὡς οὔτε δήλου ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ τῶν τοιούτων, οὔτε εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν οὐδὲν προβαῖνον τῷ χαλεπῶς φέροντι, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἄξιον ὄν μεγάλῃ σπουδῆς, ὃ τε δεῖ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὅτι τάχιστα παραγίγνεσθαι ἡμῖν, τούτῳ ἐμποδῶν γιγνόμενον τὸ λυπεῖσθαι.

BOOK X

"More likely the latter," he said, "to tell the truth."

"Well now, tell me this about him: do you think he's more likely to fight against and hold out against his grief when he is seen by his equals, or when he's alone by himself in some deserted place?"

"I think he'll behave quite differently when he is being seen," he said.

"When he is alone I think he'll dare to come out with a great deal that he'd be ashamed to do if anyone were to hear him, and would do a great deal he wouldn't allow anyone to see him doing."

"That is the case," he said

"Does this mean, then, that what spurs him on to hold out against this is reason and convention, while the actual experience draws him toward grief?"

"That's true."

"When opposing inclinations over the same thing arise at one and the same time in a person, then we say there must be two aspects to him."

"Of course."

"Isn't one of them ready to obey the law where the law leads?"

"How do you mean?"

"The law says, surely, that it's best to face misfortunes calmly as far as possible and not get agitated, as neither the good side nor the bad side of such situations is clear, nor is it of any benefit for the future to him who takes these things badly, nor are any of man's activities worth serious attention; and in fact grief gets in the way of what must come to our aid as soon as possible in those circumstances."

Τίνι, ἢ δ' ὅς, λέγεις; |

Τῷ βουλευέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, περὶ τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ ὡσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὅπη ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστ' ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπταίσαντας καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βοᾶν διατρίβειν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐθίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν ὅτι τάχιστα γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τὸ
d ἰᾶσθαι τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ πεσόν τε καὶ νοσήσαν, ἰατρικῇ θρηνηδίαν ἀφανίζοντα.

Ὁρθότατα γοῦν ἂν τις, ἔφη, πρὸς τὰς τύχας οὕτω προσφέροιο.

Οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, τὸ μὲν βέλτιστον | τούτῳ τῷ λογισμῷ ἐθέλει ἔπασθαι.

Δῆλον δῆ.

Τὸ δὲ πρὸς τὰς ἀναμνήσεις τε τοῦ πάθους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὄδυρμους ἄγον καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχον αὐτῶν ἄρ' οὐκ ἀλόγιστόν τε φήσομεν εἶναι καὶ ἄργὸν καὶ δειλίας φίλον;

Φήσομεν μὲν οὖν.

Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν πολλὴν μίμησιν καὶ ποικίλην ἔχει,
e τὸ ἀγανακτητικόν, τὸ δὲ φρόνιμόν τε καὶ ἡσύχιον ἦθος, παραπλήσιον ὃν αἰεὶ αὐτὸ ἀντῷ, οὔτε ῥάδιον μιμῆσασθαι οὔτε μιμουμένου εὐπετὲς καταμαθεῖν, ἄλλως τε καὶ πανηγύρει καὶ παντοδαποῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰς θέατρα συλλεγομένοις· | ἀλλοτρίου γάρ που πάθους ἢ μίμησις αὐτοῖς γίγνεται.

BOOK X

"What thing do you mean?" he asked.

"The ability to ponder over what has happened," I said, "and as in the fall of a dice arranging one's affairs according as things have fallen out, in the way that reason determines what would be best; yet without stumbling, like children holding on to the place where they've been hurt while they scream the place down; and instead always get the soul used to coming in as quickly as possible to heal the illness and setting upright the part that has fallen and is sick, thereby removing the lamentation by medical means."

"At least this would be the most correct way to address your misfortunes," he said.

"Does this mean, then, we say, that the best element wants to follow this kind of reasoning?"

"Yes, clearly."

"While shall we not say that that which leads us to recall our sufferings and grievances and can't get enough of them is irrational, idle, and is a friend of cowardice?"

"We shall indeed."

"So does that mean that the part which causes irritation involves a good deal of elaborate imitation, while the calm, thoughtful disposition, which is almost always fully consistent within itself, is neither easy to imitate, nor when it is imitated is it easy to understand, especially when people of every sort are gathered in the theaters in large numbers? For the imitation is of a kind which is an alien experience for them."²⁴

²⁴ Plato's association of irrational emotions with mass audiences (*plēthos*) at the theater is typical (see, e.g., *Leg.* 3.701a).

605 Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

Ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητῆς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν, εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἰ ἀγανακτικόν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι.

Δῆλον.

Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἂν αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐπιλαμβανοίμεθα, καὶ τιθεῖμεν ἀντίστροφον αὐτὸν τῷ ζωγράφῳ; καὶ γὰρ τῷ φαῦλα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἔοικεν αὐτῷ, καὶ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ μὴ
 b πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, καὶ ταύτη ὁμοίωται. καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκῃ οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσαν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν, ὅτι τοῦτο ἐγείρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τρέφει καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ποιῶν ἀπόλλυσι τὸ λογιστικόν, ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει ὅταν τις μοχθηροὺς ἐγκρατεῖς ποιῶν παραδιδῷ ἰ τὴν πόλιν, τοὺς δὲ χαριεστέρους φθείρη ταῦτόν τε καὶ τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ ἐμποιεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ
 c αὐτῆς χαριζόμενον καὶ οὔτε τὰ μείζω οὔτε τὰ ἐλάττω διαγινώσκοντι, ἀλλὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοτὲ μὲν μεγάλα ἠγουμενῶ, τοτὲ δὲ σμικρά, εἶδωλα εἰδωλοποιούντα, τοῦ δὲ ἀληθοῦς πόρρω πάνυ ἀφεστῶτα.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ἰ

Οὐ μέντοι πῶ τό γε μέγιστον κατηγορήκαμεν αὐτῆς. τὸ γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἱκανὴν εἶναι λωβάσθαι, ἐκτὸς πάνυ τινῶν ὀλίγων, πάνδεινόν που.

Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, εἴπερ γε δρᾷ αὐτό;

BOOK X

"Oh yes, in every respect."

"Indeed, it's clear the poet who is imitating does not by nature relate to this aspect of the soul and his wisdom is not designed to satisfy this, but if he is to enjoy a high reputation with the masses, he must address the irritable, many-faceted character because it's easy to imitate."

"Clearly."

"So should we now rightly lay hold of this man and put him up as a counterpart to our painter? You see, the fact is that he resembles him in creating things which are worthless as regards truth, and also, another point of resemblance is his association with another similar part of the soul, but not with the best part. And so we would finally be justified in not allowing him into a state which is going to be well run, because he arouses and fosters this part of the soul, and by strengthening it he destroys the rational part, just as when in the state someone betrays it by putting scoundrels in power and destroys the more civilized element. Shall we say that in the same way also the poet who imitates implants a bad constitution in the soul of each individual, fashioning images which are far removed from the truth, and indulging the senseless element in the soul which cannot distinguish between the greater and the lesser, but considers the same things as great at one moment and small at another?"

"He certainly does."

"However, I don't think we've yet delivered the greatest part of our indictment against it, namely that its capability of harming even decent people, apart from a very few, is in my view most damning."

"What's to prevent it, if it actually has this effect?"

Ἀκούων σκόπει. οἱ γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκρο-
 ὤμενοι Ὅμηρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν μι-
 μουμένου τινὰ τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν
 ῥῆσιν ἀποτείνοντα ἐν τοῖς ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε
 καὶ κοπτομένους, οἶσθ' ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες
 ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζον-
 τες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι
 μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῆ.

Οἶδα· πῶς δ' οὐ;

Ὅταν δὲ οἰκείον τι ἡμῶν κῆδος γένηται, ἐννοεῖς
 αὐτὸ ὅτι ἐπὶ τῷ ἐναντίῳ καλλωπιζόμεθα, ἂν δυνώμεθα
 ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν καὶ καρτερεῖν, ὡς τοῦτο μὲν ἀνδρὸς ὄν,
 ἐκεῖνο δὲ γυναικός, ὃ τότε ἐπηροῦμεν.

Ἐννοῶ, ἔφη.

Ἡ καλῶς οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὗτος ὁ ἔπαινος ἔχει, τὸ
 ὀρῶντα τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα, οἷον ἑαυτὸν τις μὴ ἀξιοῖ εἶναι
 ἀλλ' αἰσχύνοιτο ἂν, ἢ μὴ βδελύττεσθαι ἀλλὰ χαίρειν
 τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν;

Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί', ἔφη, οὐκ εὐλόγῳ ἔοικεν.

606 Naί, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ ἐκείνη γ' αὐτὸ σκοποίης.

Πῆ;

Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βίᾳ κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς
 οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρυῦσαί τε
 καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἰκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, ἢ φύσει
 ὄν τοιοῦτον οἷον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότε ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ
 ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαίρον· τὸ δὲ φύ-
 σει βέλτιστον ἡμῶν, ἅτε οὐχ ἰκανῶς πεπαιδευμένον
 λόγῳ οὐδὲ ἔθει, ἀνίσχιν τὴν φυλακὴν τοῦ θρηνώδους

BOOK X

"Listen to this and think about it: you see the best of us, I imagine, listen to Homer and any of the other tragic poets representing the grief of one of the heroes as they pour forth a long speech in their lamentation, even singing and beating their breasts, and, you know, we enjoy it, we surrender ourselves to it and suffer along with the characters as we follow and eagerly applaud whoever thus affects us in this way the most as a good poet."

"Of course I know," he said.

"But whenever a private affliction arises in any of us, do you again notice that we are proud of ourselves on doing the opposite, if we can stay calm and resolute as this is the manly thing to do, while what we approved of before is what women do."

"I am aware of that," he said.

"Then is this approval truly good," I asked, "when we see such a man as we would not accept in ourselves, but would rather be ashamed of, and yet we don't feel a loathing toward the sight but enjoy and commend it?"

"No, by Zeus," he said, "it doesn't seem reasonable."

"Yes," I said, "if you look at it from this point of view."

"How?" he said.

"If you bear in mind what was forcibly suppressed in the case of our personal misfortunes and craved for tears and the satisfaction of a good cry, since it is its nature to desire these things, this is precisely what is satisfied and gratified by the poets. That which is naturally the best part of us, because it has not been sufficiently educated by reason and habit, relaxes its restraint on the lamenting part, in that it is watching the suffering of other people,

τούτου, ἅτε ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦν καὶ ἑαυτῷ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν ὄν εἰ ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς φάσκων εἶναι ἀκαίρως πενθεῖ, τοῦτον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ἐλεεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐκείνο κερδαίνειν ἡγεῖται, τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν δέξαιτο αὐτῆς στέρηθῆναι | καταφρονήσας ὅλου τοῦ ποιήματος. λογίζεσθαι γὰρ οἶμαι ὀλίγοις τισὶν μέτεστιν ὅτι ἀπολαύειν ἀνάγκη ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων εἰς τὰ οἰκεία· θρέψαντα γὰρ ἐν ἐκείνοις ἰσχυρὸν τὸ ἐλεινὸν οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῦ πάθεσι κατέχειν.

c Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ γελοίου; ὅτι, (ἂν ἂ) ἂν αὐτὸς αἰσχρῆνοιο γελωτοποιῶν, ἐν μιμῆσει δὲ κωμωδικῇ ἢ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἀκούων σφόδρα χαρῆς καὶ μὴ μισῆς ὡς πονηρά, ταῦτόν ποιεῖς | ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐλέοις; ὃ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ αὐτῷ κατέειχε ἐν σαυτῷ βουλόμενον γελωτοποιεῖν, φοβούμενος δόξαν βωμολοχίας, τότ' αὐτῷ ἀνιεῖς, καὶ ἐκεῖ νεανικὸν ποιήσας ἔλαθες πολλάκις ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐξενεχθεὶς ὥστε κωμωδοποιὸς γενέσθαι.

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη. |

d Καὶ περὶ ἀφροδισίων δὴ καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν τε καὶ λυπηρῶν καὶ ἡδέων ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἃ δὴ φαμεν πάσῃ πράξει ἡμῶν ἐπείσθαι, ὅτι τοιαῦτα ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιητικὴ μίμησις ἐργάζεται· τρέφει γὰρ ταῦτα ἄρδουσα, | δέον αὐχμεῖν, καὶ ἄρχοντα ἡμῶν καθίστησιν, δέον ἄρχεσθαι αὐτὰ ἵνα βελτίους τε

BOOK X

and there is nothing shameful for it in praising and pitying another person who claims to be good, but grieves inappropriately; but it thinks that the pleasure it gets is profit, and it wouldn't let itself be deprived of it by renouncing the whole poetical performance. You see, I think only a few people have it in them to calculate that enjoyment from the sufferings of others is bound to strike nearer home, since having fostered a strong sense of pity in viewing the former, it's not easy to control it in one's own emotions."²⁵

"That's very true," he said.

"And doesn't the same argument apply to the comical? Because, if there are jokes you would be ashamed to tell yourself, but which you would enjoy very much if you heard them in a comic imitation or even in private, and you would enjoy them and not revile them as worthless, aren't you doing the same as you would where pity is invoked? You see again that part of you that wants to play the fool and which you repressed through reason for fear of being thought of as a buffoon, you now let out freely and making it strong you often don't realize you have been betrayed into creating the comedy yourself."

"Indeed, that's very much the case," he said.

"And the same is true of sex and passion and all the painful and enjoyable emotions in the soul which we indeed say accompany us in all our activities, because poetical imitation produces such effects in us. You see it feeds and waters these things when they should be made to wither, and makes them control us when they should be

²⁵ On the emotions exhibited by audiences aroused by the poet, see *Ion*. 535e.

καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ ἀθλιωτέρων
γιγνώμεθα.

Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι, ἦ δ' ὅς.

e Οὐκοῦν, εἶπον, ὦ Γλαύκων, ὅταν Ὀμήρου ἐπαινε-
ταις ἐντύχης λέγουσιν ὡς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαιδεύκειν
οὗτος ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ πρὸς διοίκησίν τε καὶ παιδείαν
τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων | ἄξιος ἀναλαμβάνει μαν-
θάνειν τε καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν ποιητὴν πάντα τὸν αὐ-
607 τοῦ βίον κατασκευασάμενον ζῆν, φιλεῖν μὲν χρῆ καὶ
ἀσπάζεσθαι ὡς ὄντας βελτίστους εἰς ὅσον δύναται,
καὶ συγχωρεῖν Ὀμηρον ποιητικώτατον εἶναι καὶ πρῶ-
τον τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν, εἰδέναι δὲ ὅτι ὅσον μόνον
ἕμους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ποιήσεως
παραδεκτέον εἰς πόλιν; εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μούσαν
παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονὴ σοι καὶ λύπη
ἐν | τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσεται ἀντὶ νόμον τε καὶ τοῦ
κοινῆ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

b Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη.

Ταῦτα δὴ, ἔφη, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖ-
σιν περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος
ἡμᾶς ἤρει. | προσεῖπόμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καὶ τινα σκλη-
ρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῶ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μὲν
τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφία τε καὶ ποιητικῆ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ
“λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων” ἐκείνη “κραυγάζουσα”
c καὶ “μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι” καὶ ὁ “τῶν

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controlled in order for us to become better, happier people instead of worse and more wretched.”

“I can’t disagree,” he said.

“So, Glaucon,” I said, “does that mean whenever you come across Homer’s admirers claiming that this poet has educated Greece and that it’s worth anyone’s while who takes him up to learn what he has to say about the administration and teaching of human affairs, and to live the whole of one’s life organized in accordance with what this poet says, you should love and embrace them as being the best they can be and agree that Homer is the most accomplished and foremost of the tragic poets, while recognizing that the only forms of poetry we are to allow in our state are hymns to the gods and eulogies of good men? But if you allow the Muse of delight in lyric and epic, then both pleasure and pain will rule in your state instead of law and the thing which appears to be the best for the common interest at all times, namely reason.”

“Very true,” he said.

“Well now, let that be our defense for our review of poetry,” I said, “since for good reason indeed we dismissed it from our state earlier for being what it is. You see our argument demanded it. But let us add, in case it condemns us for some kind of harshness or boorishness, that there’s been a long-standing dispute between philosophy and poetry: take ‘The bitch yapping and barking at her master,’ and ‘great amid the idle chatter of the ignorant,’ and ‘The crowd which overcomes the very wise,’²⁶ and ‘Those subtly

²⁶ The text is suspect here; we follow MSS DF, with Burnet.

διασοφῶν³ ὄχλος κρατῶν” καὶ οἱ “λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες,” ὅτι ἄρα “πέπονται,” καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἢ μίμησις, ἢ ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομου-
 μένη, ἄσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνοισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπ’ αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δο-
 κοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ
 d κηλῆ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν δι’ Ὀμήρου
 θεωρῆς αὐτήν;

Πολύ γε.

Οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησα-
 μένη ἐν ἢ μέλει ἢ τιμῇ ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Δοῖμεν δὲ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφε-
 λίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινον
 e ἐστίν· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα. κερδανοῦμεν γάρ που
 εἰ μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα φανῆ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη.

Πῶς δ’ οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν;

Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἐταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρα-
 σθέντες, εἰ μὴ ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα,

³ διασοφῶν DF Burnet: δία σοφῶν A: κρατῶν ADF: κράτων Adam

²⁷ The context of these quotations is unknown. In *Leg.* 12.967c

meditating,' because indeed 'they are poor,' and countless other signs of the ancient antipathy between them.²⁷ Nevertheless, let it be said that as far as we're concerned, if poetry written for pleasure and imitation has any defense to put forward that she should exist in a well-run state, we'd welcome her gladly, as we're aware that we're beguiled by her ourselves. But the fact is that it is not right to abandon what we believe to be the truth. Why, my friend, isn't it true that even you are beguiled by her, especially when you see her through Homer's eyes?"

"Very much so."

"So it's right for her to return from exile when she has defended herself in lyric, or some other meter?"

"Absolutely."

"And I'm sure we'd grant her champions, not those who are actual poets, but lovers of poetry, the right to make a defense on her behalf in prose, on the grounds that she is not only pleasing but also beneficial to political systems and human life, and we'll listen to her kindly. You see, I think we shall profit from her if she appears to be not only pleasant but also useful."

"How could we not profit from her?" he said.

"And yet if she isn't, my dear friend, like those who were once passionate about her, but nevertheless abstain

the speaker describes poets' denunciation of philosophers in earlier times as like "dogs baying at the moon." Fragments of the Presocratics Xenophanes and Heraclitus (late sixth–early fifth century) criticize the poets, in particular Homer and Hesiod, on moral grounds (see Waterfield, 27, 38: DK 21B11 and 22B42). For a sustained critique of philosophers, and especially S., as subverters of traditional values, see Aristophanes, *Clouds*.

βία μὲν, ἢ ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ
 608 τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως
 ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, εἶνοι μὲν ἐσό-
 μεθα φαινῆναι αὐτὴν ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην,
 ἕως δ' ἂν μὴ οἶα τ' ἢ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροσαόμεθ'
 αὐτῆς ἐπάδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν
 λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπωδὴν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν
 ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν
 ἔρωτα. ἢ αἰσθόμεθα⁴ δ' οὖν ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον ἐπὶ τῇ
 τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἀπτομένη καὶ σπου-
 b δαία, ἀλλ' εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν ὃν τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ
 τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ
 εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιήσεως.

Παντάπασι, ἢ δ' ὅς, σύμφημι.

Μέγας γάρ, ἔφη, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, ἢ
 οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε
 οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασι, οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδέ-
 μιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμεληῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε
 καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς.

Σύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν οἶμαι δὲ
 c καὶ ἄλλον ὄντινόν.

Καὶ μὴν, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς
 καὶ προκείμενα ἄθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν.

Ἀμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ ἢ τῶν εἰρημέ-
 νων μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα.

⁴ αἰσθόμεθα ADFprF: αἰθόμεθα Fpc (lectio e correctione
 introducta): ἀσόμεθα Madvig

BOOK X

from their passion, albeit by force, if they consider it's not useful, so we too, on account of our passion for such poetry nurtured in us by the upbringing of our fine political systems, will be well disposed toward her, to have her appear the best and truest possible. Yet as long as she cannot defend herself, while we listen to her we will use the argument we are now making to charm ourselves against her spell, taking care not to fall back into our childish ways and the passion of the majority. So we can see that we mustn't indulge in such poetry as touching on the truth and as something serious, and whoever fears for the ordered constitution inside himself must take care that it does not come over as something real to the listener, and he must believe what we've said about poetry."

"I agree with you in every respect," he said.

"It's a great struggle, my dear Glaucon," I said, "a greater struggle, than people suppose, to become good rather than bad, so that being exalted by honor, or money, or any office, or even poetry, should not make it worth neglecting justice and the rest of virtue."

"I agree with you," he said, "from what we've discussed, and I think anyone else would too."

"And yet again," I said, "we haven't discussed the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes that lie ahead."

"You mean something of enormous size, if the rest is greater than what we've been talking about."²⁸

²⁸ "What we've been talking about": a reference, it seems, to the discussion of the happiness of the truly just man, established at the end of Book 9. The transition out of the discussion of poetry here seems as abrupt as its introduction at 595a (see n. 1).

Τί δ' ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔν γε ὀλίγω χρόνῳ μέγα γέ-
νοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου
χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη.

Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. †

Τί οὖν; οἷει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσοῦτου δεῖν
χρόνου ἐσπονδακέναι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός;

d Οἶμαι ἔγωγ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις;

Οὐκ ἤσθησαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ
ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται;

Καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θανμάσας εἶπε· Μὰ Δί', †
οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτ' ἔχεις λέγειν;

Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γ', ἔφη. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σὺ· οὐδὲν γὰρ
χαλεπὸν.

Ἔμοιγ', ἔφη· σοῦ δ' ἂν ἠδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ
χαλεπὸν τοῦτο.

Ἀκούεις ἄν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ. †

Λέγε μόνον, ἔφη.

Ἀγαθὸν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς;

e Ἔγωγε.

Ἄρ' οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοῆ;

Τὸ ποῖον;

²⁹ Glaucon seems to reflect the common view that the soul disintegrates at death, or exists in an insubstantial form in Hades according to the Homeric account (see, e.g., *Od.* 11). At 6.498d1–5 there was a passing allusion to reincarnation, when S. semi-jokingly undertakes to help Thrasymachus and the others understand his arguments and so benefit them if they meet these arguments in a later incarnation. Glaucon's surprise at d4–5 is

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"What could become great in just a short time?" I said. "You see the whole period from childhood to old age would presumably be short in comparison with the whole of time."

"It would be nothing," he said.

"So what does that imply? Do you think that an immortal thing should take such a period of time seriously rather than the whole of time?"

"I think the whole," he said. "But what do you mean by this?"

"Haven't you observed," I said, "that our soul is immortal and never perishes?"

He looked at me in surprise and said: "By Zeus, I haven't! Can you defend this?"²⁹

"Yes, unless I'm wrong," I said. "And I think you can too. It's not difficult, you know."

"It is for me," he said, "but I'd gladly hear you on this 'not difficult' subject."

"Please listen," I said.

"Just speak!" he said.

"You call a thing good and a thing bad, don't you?" I said.

"I do."

"Do you think the same as I do about them?"

"What's that?"

therefore unexpected for this reason, and also because the subject was extensively discussed in other Platonic dialogues, notably *Phaedo* and *Phaedrus*, as well as being a well-documented aspect of Mystery religion of the sixth and fifth centuries. Here it serves as an effective introduction to the last great theme of *Republic*—the fate of souls after death.

Τὸ μὲν ἀπολλῶν καὶ διαφθείρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῶζον καὶ ὠφελούν τὸ ἀγαθόν. |

Ἔγωγε τοῦτό γ', ἔφη.

609 Τί δέ; κακὸν ἐκάστω τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν λέγεις; οἶον ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθαλμίαν καὶ σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι νόσον, σίτω τε ἐρυσίβην, σπηπεδόνα τε ξύλοις, χαλκῷ δὲ καὶ σιδήρῳ ἰόν, καί, ὅπερ λέγω, σχεδὸν πᾶσι σύμφυτον ἐκάστω κακόν τε καὶ νόσημα;

Ἔγωγ', ἔφη. |

Οὐκοῦν ὅταν τῷ τι τούτων προσγένηται, πονηρόν τε ποιῇ ᾧ προσεγένετο, καὶ τελευτῶν ὅλον διέλυσεν καὶ ἀπώλεσεν;

Πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

610 Τὸ σύμφυτον ἄρα κακὸν ἐκάστου καὶ ἡ πονηρία ἕκαστον ἀπόλλυσιν, ἢ εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἀπολεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἄλλο γε αὐτὸ ἔτι διαφθείρειεν. οὐ γὰρ τό γε ἀγαθὸν μή ποτέ τι ἀπολέσῃ, οὐδὲ αὖ τὸ μήτε κακὸν μήτε ἀγαθόν.

Πῶς γὰρ ἂν; ἔφη.

Ἐὰν ἄρα τι εὐρίσκωμεν τῶν ὄντων, ᾧ ἔστι μὲν κακὸν ὃ | ποιῇ αὐτὸ μοχθηρόν, τοῦτο μέντοι οὐχ οἷόν τε αὐτὸ λύειν ἀπολλύν, οὐκ ἤδη εἰσόμεθα ὅτι τοῦ πεφυκότος οὕτως ὀλεθρος οὐκ ἦν;

Οὕτως, ἔφη, εἰκός.

611 Τί οὖν; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· ψυχῇ ἂρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ ποιῇ αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κακῆν; |

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"Everything that's corrosive and destructive is bad, and what preserves and is beneficial is good."

"I do think that," he said.

"What then? Do you say that there is bad or good for each individual thing? For example, ophthalmia for the eyes, disease for the whole body, blight for corn, rot for wood, rust for bronze and iron, and, as I say, for almost everything there is something naturally harmful and a disease?"

"Yes, I do," he said.

"So does that mean when any of these attaches itself to anything it makes each one to which it attaches itself weak and ends up by breaking down and destroying it entirely?"

"Of course."

"Then the innate badness and evil of each corrupts the individual thing, or if it's not going to do this, nothing else at all ever will destroy it. You see, of course, good will never destroy anything, and again that which is neither good nor evil will not either."

"How could it?" he said.

"So if we find something among existing things which contains an evil element which makes it weak, but yet is unable to break it up by destroying it, wouldn't we then know that by its very nature it cannot be destroyed?"

"That seems reasonable," he said.

"So what does this mean?" I asked. "Doesn't the soul contain something that will make it evil?"

Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη· ἃ νυνδὴ διήμμεν πάντα, ἀδικία τε καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀμαθία.

- c Ἡ οὖν τι τούτων αὐτὴν διαλύει τε καὶ ἀπόλλυσι; καὶ ἐννόει μὴ ἔξαπατηθῶμεν οἰηθέντες τὸν ἄδικον ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνόητον, ὅταν ληφθῇ ἀδικῶν, τότε ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῆς ἀδικίας, πονηρίας οὕσης ψυχῆς. ἀλλ' ὧδε ποίειν ὥσπερ σῶμα ἢ σώματος πονηρία ἢ νόσος οὔσα τήκει καὶ διόλλυσι καὶ ἄγει εἰς τὸ μηδὲ σῶμα
- d εἶναι, καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν ἅπαντα ὑπὸ τῆς οἰκείας κακίας, τῷ προσκαθῆσθαι καὶ ἐνεῖναι διαφθειρούσης, εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀφικνεῖται—οὐχ οὕτω;

Ναί.

Ἴθι δὴ, καὶ ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον σκόπει. ἢ ἄρα ἐνοῦσα ἐν αὐτῇ ἀδικία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κακία τῷ ἐνεῖναι καὶ προσκαθῆσθαι φθείρει αὐτὴν καὶ μαραίνει, ἕως ἂν εἰς θάνατον ἀγαγοῦσα τοῦ σώματος χωρίσῃ;

Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι ἐκεῖνό γε ἄλογον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τὴν μὲν ἄλλου πονηρίαν ἀπολλύναι τι, τὴν δὲ αὐτοῦ μή. ἢ

Ἄλογον.

- e Ἐννόει γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαῦκων, ὅτι οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν σιτίων πονηρίας, ἢ ἂν ἦ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων, εἴτε παλαιότης εἴτε σαπρότης εἴτε ἠτισοῦν οὔσα, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν σῶμα ἀπόλλυσθαι· ἀλλ' ἐὰν μὲν ἐμποιῇ ἡ αὐτῶν πονηρία τῶν σιτίων ἢ τῷ σώματι σώματος

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"Indeed it does," he said, "all those things we discussed a while back: injustice, licentiousness, cowardice, and ignorance."³⁰

"Then do any of these break it up and destroy it? And think carefully in case we're misled into thinking that when the unjust and mindless fellow is caught doing something wrong, that's when he's brought down by his injustice, which is a deficiency of the soul. But treat it as follows: we see how the deficiency of the body, that is disease, wastes and destroys the body and reduces it to a state of not being a body at all, and all the things we were talking about just now³¹ come to a state of nonexistence, as a result of their own particular wickedness, which attaches itself to a thing, indwells and destroys. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

"Come on, then, and consider the soul in the same way. Do injustice and all the other evils dwelling in it destroy and waste it away by their presence and attachment to it, until they lead to death and separation from the body?"

"No, that, at least, never happens," he said.

"And yet that would be an absurd thing," I said, "if the deficiency of something else could destroy a thing, but not its own."

"It would be absurd."

"Now consider, Glaucon: we don't think a body has to perish by the deficiency of its foods, whatever may be intrinsic to those things, be it age, rottenness, or whatever. But if the badness of those foods themselves causes the

³⁰ I.e., the opposites of the four cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, bravery, and wisdom (see 4.427e10).

³¹ At 608e7ff.

610 μοχθηρίαν, φήσομεν αὐτὸ δι' ἐκεῖνα ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ
κακίας νόσου οὔσης ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ δὲ σιτιῶν πονη-
ρίας ἄλλων ὄντων ἄλλο ὄν τὸ σῶμα, ὑπ' ἄλλοτρίου
κακοῦ μὴ ἐμποιήσαντος τὸ ἔμφυτον κακόν, οὐδέποτε
ἀξιόσομεν διαφθείρεσθαι.

Ὅρθότατ' [ἄν], ἔφη, λέγεις. |

Κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν λόγον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐὰν μὴ
σώματος πονηρία ψυχῇ ψυχῆς πονηρίαν ἐμποιῇ, μὴ
ποτε ἀξιῶμεν ὑπὸ ἄλλοτρίου κακοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ἰδίας
πονηρίας ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, τῷ ἑτέρου κακῷ ἕτε-
ρον.

Ἔχει γάρ, ἔφη, λόγον.

Ἡ τοίνυν ταῦτα ἐξελέγξωμεν ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγο-
μεν, ἢ ἕως ἄν ἦ ἀνέλεγκτα, μήτε φῶμεν ὑπὸ πυρετοῦ
b μῆδ' αὖ ὑπ' ἄλλης νόσου μῆδ' αὖ ὑπὸ σφαγῆς, μῆδ'
εἴ τις ὅτι σμικρότατα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κατατέμοι, ἔνεκα
τούτων μῆδὲν μᾶλλον ποτε ψυχὴν ἀπόλλυσθαι, πρὶν
ἄν τις ἀποδείξῃ ὡς | διὰ ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα τοῦ σώ-
ματος αὐτῇ ἐκείνῃ ἀδικωτέρα καὶ ἀνοσιωτέρα γίνε-
ται ἄλλοτρίου δὲ κακοῦ ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένου, τοῦ δὲ
c ἰδίου ἐκάστῳ μὴ ἐγγιγνομένου, μήτε ψυχὴν μήτε
ἄλλο μῆδὲν ἐῶμεν φάναι τινὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

Ἄλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε οὐδεὶς ποτε δείξει, ὡς
τῶν ἀποθνησκόντων ἀδικώτεραι αἱ ψυχαὶ διὰ τὸν θά-
νατον γίνονται. |

Ἐὰν δέ γέ τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὁμόσε τῷ λόγῳ τολμᾶ
ιέναι καὶ λέγειν ὡς πονηρότερος καὶ ἀδικώτερος

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body physical distress, we'll say that it perished *through them* as a result of its own badness, which is disease. But we shall never allow ourselves to say that the body, being one thing, is destroyed *by* the badness of its food, which is something else, except as a result of the badness of something entirely separate implanting the innate badness in it."

"You're absolutely right," he said.

"Therefore, by the same argument," I said, "if the deficiency of the body does not introduce the deficiency of the soul into the soul, then we cannot say the soul in the absence of its own badness can perish as the result of badness belonging to something else, the one perishing by the badness of the other."

"Yes, that stands to reason."

"Let us therefore examine these points closely and demonstrate that our argument is not sound, or, as long as they are unrefuted, let's not say that under the influence of fever, or any other illness, or even by slaughter, or even if someone cuts the whole of the body up into the smallest pieces possible, that the soul is more likely to be destroyed for these reasons, until someone demonstrates that that soul itself becomes more unjust and more profane because of these physical sufferings. When some external evil arises in another thing, but its own particular evil doesn't arise in it, let's not allow anyone to say that either the soul or anything else perishes."

"But you may be sure," he said, "that no one will ever prove this, that the souls of the dying become more unjust on account of their death."

"And on top of that," I said, "if anyone has the courage to come to grips with our argument and, in order of course

γίγνεται ὁ ἀποθνήσκων, ἵνα δὴ μὴ ἀναγκάζεται θανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς ὁμολογεῖν, ἀξιώσομέν που, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγει ὁ ταῦτα λέγων, τὴν ἀδικίαν εἶναι θανάσιμον τῷ ἔχοντι ὥσπερ νόσον, καὶ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ἀποκτεινύντος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ φύσει, ἀποθνήσκειν τοὺς
 d λαμβάνοντας αὐτό, τοὺς μὲν μάλιστα θάπτον, τοὺς δ' ἥττον σχολαίτερον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥσπερ νῦν διὰ τοῦτο ὑπ' ἄλλων δίκην ἐπιτιθέντων ἀποθνήσκουσιν οἱ ἄδικοι. |

Μὰ Δί', ἦ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄρα πάνδεινον φανέεται ἡ ἀδικία, εἰ θανάσιμον ἔσται τῷ λαμβάνοντι—ἀπαλλαγῆ γὰρ ἂν εἶη κακῶν—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οἶμαι αὐτὴν φανή-
 e σεσθαι πᾶν τούναντίον τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποκτεινύσαν, εἶπερ οἷόν τε, τὸν δ' ἔχοντα καὶ μάλα ζωτικὸν παρέχουσαν, καὶ πρὸς γ' ἔτι τῷ ζωτικῷ ἄγρυπνον· οὕτω πόρρω που, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐσκήνηται τοῦ θανάσιμος εἶναι. |

Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, λέγεις. ὁπότε γὰρ δὴ μὴ ἱκανῆ ἦ γε οἰκεία πονηρία καὶ τὸ οἰκείον κακὸν ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἀπολέσαι ψυχὴν, σχολῆ τό γε ἐπ' ἄλλον ὀλέθρω τεταγμένον κακὸν ψυχὴν ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀπολεῖ, πλην ἐφ' ᾧ τέτακται.

Σχολῆ, ἔφη, ὡς γε τὸ εἰκός.

611 Οὐκοῦν ὁπότε μηδ' | ὑφ' ἐνὸς ἀπόλλυται κακοῦ, μήτε οἰκείου μήτε ἀλλοτρίου, δῆλον ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτὸ αἰεὶ ὄν εἶναι· εἰ δ' αἰεὶ ὄν, ἀθάνατον.

Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη.

Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτως ἐχέτω· εἰ δ' ἔχει, | ἐννοεῖς ὅτι αἰεὶ ἂν εἶεν αἱ αὐταί. οὔτε γὰρ ἂν

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not to be forced to admit that our souls are immortal, says that the dying person does become more depraved and unjust, we will surely maintain that, if the person saying this is telling the truth, injustice is fatal to him who has it, like a disease, and those who catch it will die since it kills by its own inherent nature, some more serious more quickly, others less so more slowly; but it is not as now happens, that the unjust die because of their injustice, but through the agency of others who apply the sentence."

"By Zeus," he said, "then injustice does not appear so utterly terrible if it's going to be fatal to him who takes it up: for it would be a release from his evil ways. But I rather think that it'll be shown to be completely the opposite and be the cause of death in others, if it can, but make its possessor very much alive, and as well as being live, sleepless: that's how far it has pitched camp, in my opinion, from being fatal."

"That's a good point," I said. "For, let's face it, since its own deficiency and evil is not sufficient to kill and destroy the soul, that evil which is meant to destroy something else will hardly destroy a soul or anything else but that for which it was intended."

"Hardly," he said, "as would seem reasonable here."

"Does this then mean that whenever something doesn't die as a result of some single evil, either internal or from outside, then it must clearly remain alive forever, and if so it is immortal?"

"It must be," he said.

"Well now, let's leave that as it is," I said. "If it is so, you realize that the number of souls is constant. You see, I

που ἐλάττους γένοιτο μηδεμιᾶς ἀπολλυμένης, οὔτε αὖ πλείους· εἰ γὰρ ὅτιοῦν τῶν ἀθανάτων πλέον γίγνοιτο, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θνητοῦ ἂν γίγνοιτο καὶ πάντα ἂν εἶη τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατα.

Ἄληθῆ λέγεις. |

Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, μήτε τοῦτο οἰώμεθα—ὁ γὰρ λόγος
b οὐκ ἑάσει—μήτε γε αὖ τῇ ἀληθεστάτῃ φύσει τοιοῦτον εἶναι ψυχὴν, ὥστε πολλῆς ποικιλίας καὶ ἀνομοιοτήτος τε καὶ διαφορᾶς γέμειν αὐτὸ πρὸς αὐτό.

Πῶς λέγεις; ἔφη. |

Οὐ ράδιον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰδιδιον εἶναι σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ μὴ τῇ καλλίστῃ κεχρημένον συνθέσει, ὡς νῦν ἡμῖν ἐφάνη ἢ ψυχῇ.

Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. |

Ἵτι μὲν τοίουν ἀθάνατον ψυχῇ, καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος
καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἂν· οἷον δ' ἐστὶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ,
οὐ λελωβημένον δεῖ αὐτὸ θεάσασθαι ὑπὸ τε τῆς τοῦ
c σώματος κοινωνίας καὶ ἄλλων κακῶν, ὥσπερ νῦν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα, ἀλλ' οἷόν ἐστιν καθαρὸν γιγνόμενον, τοιοῦτον ἱκανῶς λογισμῶ διαθεατέον,⁵ καὶ πολὺ κάλλιον αὐτὸ εὐρήσει καὶ ἐναργέστερον δικαιοσύνας τε καὶ ἀδικίας διόψεται καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν. νῦν |
d δὲ εἶπομεν μὲν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ, οἷον ἐν τῷ παρόντι φαίνεται τεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακείμενον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θαλάττιον Γλαῦκον ὄρωντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ραδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ

⁵ διαθεατέον scr. recc.: διαθέτεον ADF

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don't think they could diminish in number as none of them dies, nor again do they increase. You see if anything immortal increases, you know that it would come from the mortal and everything would end up immortal."

"What you say is true."

"Well," I said, "we mustn't think this, since reason prevents it, nor, what's more, is the soul in its truest nature the kind of thing which is full of diversity, dissimilarities, and differences itself within itself."

"How do you mean?" he asked.

"It's not easy for a thing to be everlasting," I said, "when it's made up of many parts and is not put together in the finest manner, which is how our soul appeared to us just now."³²

"That's certainly not likely."

"It follows, then, that both our recent argument and others³³ would compel us to say that our soul is immortal. As to what it is in truth, we must view it not harmed by its association with the body and other evil things, as we are doing now; but what it's like when it is purified—that is the sort of thing which, to be viewed adequately, must be seen by means of reason. Then one will find it much more beautiful and will see justice and injustice more distinctly, as well as everything we have now discussed. Now we're telling the truth about it, as it appears at the present time. But we have looked at its condition like those who, when they look at the sea god Glaucus, would not easily see his original state, as a result of some of the original parts of

³² At 603d.

³³ E.g., *Phd.* 105ff., *Phdr.* 245cff.

τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συν-
 τετριφῆθαι καὶ πάντως λελωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων,
 ἄλλα δὲ προσπεφυκέναι, ὄστρεά τε καὶ φυκία καὶ
 πέτρας, ὥστε παντὶ μᾶλλον θηρίῳ εἰκέναι ἢ οἶος ἦν |
 φύσει, οὕτω καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμεῖς θεώμεθα διακειμέ-
 νην ὑπὸ μυρίων κακῶν. ἀλλὰ δεῖ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἐκείσε
 βλέπειν.

Ποῖ; ἦ δ' ὅς.

Εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐννοεῖν ὧν ἀπτεται
 e καὶ οἶον ἐφίεται ὀμιλιῶν, ὡς συγγενῆς οὖσα τῷ τε
 θείῳ καὶ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ αἰεὶ ὄντι, καὶ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο τῷ
 τοιούτῳ πᾶσα ἐπισπομένη καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ὀρμῆς
 ἐκκομισθεῖσα ἐκ τοῦ πόντου ἐν ᾧ νῦν ἐστίν, καὶ περι-
 612 κρουσθεῖσα πέτρας τε καὶ ὄστρεα ἃ νῦν αὐτῇ, ἅτε
 γῆν ἐστιωμένη, γεηρὰ καὶ πετρώδη πολλὰ καὶ ἄγρια
 περιπέφυκεν ὑπὸ τῶν εὐδαιμόνων λεγομένων ἐστι-
 ἄσεων. καὶ τότε ἂν τις ἴδοι αὐτῆς τὴν ἀληθῆ φύσιν,
 εἴτε πολυειδῆς εἴτε μονοειδῆς, εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως·
 νῦν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ βίῳ | πάθη τε καὶ εἶδη,
 ὡς ἐγῶμαι, ἐπιεικῶς αὐτῆς διεληλύθαμεν.

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τά τε ἄλλα ἀπελυσάμεθα ἐν τῷ
 λόγῳ, καὶ οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύ-
 b νης ἐπηνέκαμεν, ὥσπερ Ἡσίοδόν τε καὶ Ὅμηρον

³⁴ Glaucus was a sea god traditionally depicted as encrusted with barnacles and shells (see Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* l.1310–28). Paus.

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his body having been broken off and others having been eroded and completely damaged by the waves, while other parts have grown on him, oyster shells, seaweed, and coral, so that he looks more like a wild creature than what he was naturally.³⁴ In a similar way we view the soul, beset by countless evils. But we must look elsewhere, Glaucon.”

“Where?” he asked.

“At its love of wisdom, and think about the things it latches on to and what associations it desires, as it’s akin to the divine, the immortal, and the eternal. Also what it would turn into if it entirely followed this kind of association, and by this impulse was carried out of the sea where it is now, and all the rocks and oyster shells had been completely knocked off, which now, in as much as the earth is its host, have encrusted it in an earthy, rocky, and wild profusion, as a result of the so-called happy feasting.³⁵ And then you’d see its true nature, whether it has multiple forms, or a single one, or what position and state it’s in. Now to my mind we’ve discussed adequately its experiences and the forms it takes in human life.”

“Yes, we have, in all respects,” he said.

“Does that mean then we’ve discharged the other aspects in our discussion, and we’ve not commended the rewards, nor even the renown that come from justice as

9.22.6–7 says that Aeschylus made him the subject of a whole play, from which Plato possibly drew his description here (see fr. 34 TrGF).

³⁵ I.e., the physical indulgences which were said to mar the soul’s upward progress at 7.519a8ff.

ὕμεις ἔφατε, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δικαιοσύνην αὐτῇ ψυχῇ ἄριστον ἤρομεν, καὶ ποιητέον εἶναι αὐτῇ τὰ δίκαια, ἕαντ' ἔχη τὸν Γύγου δακτύλιον, ἕαντε μῆ, καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτῳ δακτυλίῳ τὴν Ἄϊδος κυνήν; |

Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη, λέγεις.

Ἄρ' οὖν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, νῦν ἤδη ἀνεπίφθονόν ἐστιν πρὸς ἐκείνοις καὶ τοὺς μισθοὺς τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρετῇ ἀποδοῦναι, ὅσους τε καὶ οἴους τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει παρ' ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ θεῶν, ζῶντός τε ἔτι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐπειδὰν τελευτήσῃ;

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἦ δ' ὅς. |

Ἄρ' οὖν ἀποδώσετέ μοι ἃ ἐδανείσασθε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ;

Τί μάλιστα;

Ἔδωκα ὑμῖν τὸν δίκαιον δοκεῖν ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἄδικον δίκαιον· ὑμεῖς γὰρ ἠτέισθε, κὰν εἰ μὴ δυνατὸν εἶη ταῦτα λανθάνειν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους, ὅμως δοτέον εἶναι τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα, ἵνα αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνῃ πρὸς ἀδικίαν αὐτὴν κριθείη. ἢ οὐ μνημονεύεις;

Ἀδικοίην μέντ' ἄν, ἔφη, εἰ μῆ.

Ἐπειδὴ τοῖνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κεκριμένα εἰσί, | πάλιν ἀπαιτῶ ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης, ὥσπερ ἔχει δόξης καὶ

³⁶ It was Adeimantus who asserted this at 2.363b–c; here S.'s plural "you" addresses both interlocutors. S. maintains the plural address throughout the following exchanges, with the exception of d2, where it is Claucon's particular assertion at 360bff. which he is recalling

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you said Homer and Hesiod do?³⁶ Haven't we instead discovered that justice is the best thing for the soul itself and that it ought to perform just deeds, whether it has Gyges' ring or not, and in addition Hades' magic helmet?"³⁷

"What you say is very true," he said.

"Well then, Glaucon," I said, "is it now at last unobjectionable to restore to justice and all other aspects of virtue, in addition to what has gone before, their rewards, of the number and quality they give the soul both from men and gods while the human being is still alive and after death?"

"Certainly," he said.

"Are you therefore going to pay me back what you borrowed during the discussion?"

"What in particular had you in mind?"

"I granted to you that the just man should seem to be unjust and the unjust just. You see, you asked even if it were not possible to do these things without being observed by both gods and men, I should grant you this nevertheless for the sake of the argument in order to make a direct comparison between justice itself and injustice itself: or had you forgotten that?"

"Well, I'd be the unjust one, if I had!"

"Then, since they have been judged." I said, "on behalf of justice, I demand by way of return the reputation that

³⁷ For Gyges' ring, see 2.359c7-60d7. Hades' helmet of invisibility is donned by the goddess Athena at Hom. *Il.* 5.845; a common folktale motif, it may be associated with Hades through an etymology which interprets his name as *a-widēs*, "the unseen one."

παρὰ θεῶν καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων, καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁμολογεῖν
περὶ αὐτῆς δοκεῖσθαι οὕτω, ἵνα καὶ τὰ νικητήρια
κομίσηται, ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένη ἃ δίδωσι τοῖς
ἔχουσιν αὐτήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθὰ
διδούσα ἐφάνη καὶ οὐκ ἐξαπατῶσα τοὺς τῷ ὄντι λαμ-
βάνοντας αὐτήν. †

e Δίκαια, ἔφη, αἰτῆ.

Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἀποδώσετε,
ὅτι θεοὺς γε οὐ λανθάνει ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οἶός ἐστιν;
Ἀποδώσομεν, ἔφη. †

Εἰ δὲ μὴ λανθάνετον, ὁ μὲν θεοφιλῆς ἂν εἴη, ὁ δὲ
θεομισῆς, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁμολογοῦμεν.

Ἔστι ταῦτα.

613 Τῷ δὲ θεοφιλεῖ οὐχ ὁμολογήσομεν, ὅσα γε ἀπὸ
θεῶν γίγνεται, πάντα γίγνεσθαι ὡς οἶόν τε ἄριστα, εἰ
μὴ τι ἀναγκαῖον αὐτῷ κακὸν ἐκ προτέρας ἀμαρτίας
ὑπήρχεν;

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Οὕτως ἄρα ὑποληπτέον περὶ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός,
εἶαντ' ἢ ἐν πενίᾳ γίγνηται εἶαντ' ἐν νόσοις ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ
τῶν δοκούντων κακῶν, ὡς τούτῳ ταῦτα εἰς ἀγαθόν τι
τελευτήσει ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε
θεῶν ποτε ἀμελεῖται ὅς ἂν προθυμείσθαι ἐθέλῃ δι-

³⁸ For Adeimantus' original assertion that the gods don't know or care about justice, see 1.365d–e.

³⁹ Asserted by S. at 1.352b2–3. Tacitly accepted there by Thrasymachus in the last section of Book 1, but only formally “agreed” (see Book 1 n. 69).

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it actually has among both gods and men, and we should agree that that is how it is seen, in order that the prizes can be awarded which it acquires from its reputation, and which it gives to those who have it, since it has been shown that that it bestows the good things which come from the real justice and does not mislead those who in actual fact adopt it."

"That's a fair demand," he said.

"Can I take it, then," I said, "that you'll first let me have my point back that each of the two, the just and the unjust, cannot disguise from the gods what sort of person he is?"³⁸

"We'll give you that one," he said.

"If they cannot remain hidden, then as we agreed at the beginning, one of them will be loved by the gods, the other will be hated by them."³⁹

"That is so."

"As to the one who is loved by the gods, did we not agree that all that comes from the gods is the best possible, unless there existed in him some basic evil resulting from a previous failing?"⁴⁰

"Certainly."

"Similarly then as regards the just man, whether he becomes poor, or falls ill, or suffers any other of those things that seem evil, we must so take it that these things will end up in something good for him while he lives, or when he dies. You see, you can be sure that whoever sincerely wishes to become just and by practicing virtue make

⁴⁰ An anticipation of the doctrine of reincarnation introduced at 614bff.

b καιος γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῶ.

Εἰκός γ', ἔφη, τὸν τοιοῦτον μὴ ἀμελείσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου.

Οὐκοῦν περὶ τοῦ ἀδίκου τάναντία τούτων δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι;

Σφόδρα γε. |

Τὰ μὲν δὴ παρὰ θεῶν τοιαῦτ' ἄττ' ἂν εἶη νικητήρια τῷ δικαίῳ.

Κατὰ γοῦν ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἔφη.

Τί δέ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρ' ἀνθρώπων; ἄρ' οὐχ ᾧδε ἔχει, εἰ δεῖ τὸ ὄν τιθέναί; οὐχ οἱ μὲν δεινοὶ τε καὶ ἄδικοι δρῶσιν ὅπερ οἱ δρομῆς ὅσοι ἂν θέωσιν εὖ ἀπὸ τῶν κάτω, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἄνω μή; | τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὀξέως
c ἀποπηδῶσιν, τελευτῶντες δὲ καταγέλαστοι γίγνονται, τὰ ὦτα ἐπὶ τῶν ὤμων ἔχοντες καὶ ἀστεφάνωτοι ἀποτρέχοντες· οἱ δὲ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δρομικοὶ εἰς τέλος ἐλθόντες τά τε ἄθλα λαμβάνουσιν καὶ στεφανοῦνται. οὐχ | οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνει; πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης πράξεως καὶ ὁμιλίας καὶ τοῦ βίου εὐδοκιμοῦσί τε καὶ τὰ ἄθλα παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φέρονται;

Καὶ μάλα.

Ἄνεξ ἄρα λέγοντος ἐμοῦ περὶ τούτων ἅπερ αὐτὸς
d ἔλεγε περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων; ἐρῶ γὰρ δὴ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι, ἐπειδὴν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται, ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν πόλει ἄρχουσὶ τε ἂν βούλωνται τὰς ἀρχάς, γαμοῦσί τε ὁπόθεν ἂν βούλωνται, ἐκδιδοῦσιν τε εἰς οὓς ἂν ἐθέλωσι.

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himself like a god (as far as it's possible for a man), will never be overlooked by the gods."

"It's reasonable that such a person shouldn't be overlooked by his like."

"And that means we must hold the opposite view to this as regards the unjust man, doesn't it?"

"Absolutely."

"These, then, would be the sort of rewards a just man would receive from the gods."

"In my view, at any rate," he said.

"Then what about those he gets from his fellow men?" I said. "If we must posit what actually is the case, doesn't it go like this? Don't cunning unjust men do what runners do who run well on the outward stretch of the course but not on the return? The first half they sprint away smartly, but they end up as laughingstocks, their heads drooping on their shoulders, and slink away without a garland, but those who are truly runners reach the finishing line, take the prizes, and are crowned as victors. Doesn't this turn out to be the case with just people for the most part? At the end of every activity, their dealings with others and their lives, they win a fine reputation for themselves and carry off the prizes from their fellow human beings?"

"Indeed they do."

"Then can you bear it if I say about the just the things you were saying about the unjust? You see, I'm going to say that, when they grow older, the just hold office in their own states, if that's what they want, they marry a woman from whatever family they choose and give their children

καὶ πάντα ἃ σὺ περὶ ἐκείνων, | ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω περὶ
 τῶνδε. καὶ αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ
 αὐτῶν, καὶ ἂν νέοι ὄντες λάθωσιν, ἐπὶ τέλος τοῦ
 δρόμου αἰρεθέντες καταγέλαστοί εἰσιν καὶ γέροντες
 γιγνόμενοι ἄθλιοι προπηλακίζονται ὑπὸ ξένων τε καὶ
 ἀστῶν, μαστιγούμενοι καὶ ἃ ἄγροικα ἔφησθα σὺ εἶ-
 ναι, ἀληθῆ λέγων εἶτα στρεβλώσονται καὶ ἐκκαυθή-
 e σονται,⁶ πάντα ἐκεῖνα οἴου καὶ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοέναι ὡς
 πάσχουσιν. ἀλλ' ὃ λέγω, ὅρα εἰ ἀνέξει.

Καὶ πάνυ, ἔφη, δίκαια γὰρ λέγεις.

Ἄ μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ζῶντι τῷ δικαίῳ | παρὰ
 614 θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀθλά τε καὶ μισθοὶ καὶ δῶρα
 γίγνεται πρὸς ἐκείνοις τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οἷς αὐτὴ παρεί-
 χετο ἢ δικαιοσύνη, τοιαῦτ' ἂν εἴη.

Καὶ μάλ', ἔφη, καλὰ τε καὶ βέβαια. |

Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐδέν ἐστι πλήθει οὐδὲ
 μεγέθει πρὸς ἐκεῖνα ἃ τελευτήσαντα ἐκάτερον περι-
 μένει· χρὴ δ' αὐτὰ ἀκοῦσαι, ἵνα τελέως ἐκάτερος αὐ-
 τῶν ἀπειλήφῃ τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ὀφειλόμενα ἀκού-
 σαι.

b Λέγοις ἄν, ἔφη, ὡς οὐ πολλὰ ἄλλ' ἥδιον ἀκού-
 οντι.

Ἄλλ' οὐ μέντοι σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, Ἀλκίνου γε ἀπόλογον
 ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμου μὲν ἀνδρός, Ἡρὸς τοῦ Ἀρμενίου,

⁶ εἶτα . . . ἐκκαυθήσονται Jowett-Campbell, Burnet: secl.
 Ast, Slings

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in marriage to whomever they want; and whatever you said about the unjust, I now say about the just. And then again on the subject of the unjust: the majority of them, even if they get away with it when they're young, at the end of the course they're caught, become objects of ridicule, and when they grow old they're wretchedly reviled by foreigners and fellow citizens alike, beaten with whips and everything which you rightly described as crude: then they will be tortured on the rack and by fire.⁴¹ Imagine you have heard from me that they suffer all these things. Anyway, see if you can accept what I'm saying."

"I certainly can," he said, "since what you say is just."

"Then all the prizes, money, and gifts which the just man receives in his lifetime from both gods and men, in addition to those things that justice itself provided, would be of this kind."

"Indeed, they're both good and sure," he said.

"In number and size," I said, "these are nothing in comparison with what awaits each one at the end. You must hear about this too, in order that each of them may receive a complete account of what is due to them as a result of our discussion."

"Please tell us," he said, "as there are not many other things I would more gladly hear."

"Mind you, I'm not going to give you an Alcinous' tale," I said, "but the story of a brave man, Armenius' son Er, by

⁴¹ Glaucon attributes these punishments to the just person at 1.361e4ff.

τὸ γένος Παμφύλου· ὅς ποτε ἐν πολέμῳ τελευτήσας, | ἀναιρεθέντων δεκαταίων τῶν νεκρῶν ἤδη διεφθαρμέ-
νων, ὑγιῆς μὲν ἀνηρέθη, κομισθεὶς δ' οἴκαδε μέλλων
θάπτεσθαι δωδεκαταῖος ἐπὶ τῇ πυρᾷ κείμενος ἀνεβίω,
ἀναβιοὺς δ' ἔλεγεν ἂ ἐκεῖ ἴδοι.

Ἔφη δέ, ἐπειδὴ οὐ̄ ἐκβῆναι, τὴν ψυχὴν πορεύεσθαι
c μετὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι σφᾶς εἰς τόπον τινὰ
δαιμόνιον, ἐν ᾧ τῆς τε γῆς δὴ εἶναι χάσματα ἐχομένῳ
ἀλλήλοισιν καὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ αὖ̄ ἐν τῷ ἄνω ἄλλα
καταντικρὺ. δικαστὰς δὲ μεταξὺ τούτων καθῆσθαι,
οὓς, ἐπειδὴ διαδικάσειαν, | τοὺς μὲν δικαίους κελεύειν
πορεύεσθαι τὴν εἰς δεξιάν τε καὶ ἄνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ,
σημεῖα περιάψαντας τῶν δεδικασμένων ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν,
τοὺς δὲ ἀδίκους τὴν εἰς ἀριστεράν τε καὶ κάτω,
d ἔχοντας καὶ τούτους ἐν τῷ ὀπισθεν σημεῖα πάντων ὧν
ἔπραξαν. ἑαυτοῦ δὲ προσελθόντος εἰπεῖν ὅτι δέοι
αὐτὸν ἄγγελον ἀνθρώποις γενέσθαι τῶν ἐκεῖ καὶ δια-
κελεύοντό οἱ ἀκούειν τε καὶ θεᾶσθαι πάντα τὰ ἐν τῷ
τόπῳ.

Ὅρᾶν δὴ ταύτῃ μὲν καθ' ἑκάτερον τὸ χάσμα τοῦ
οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπιούσας τὰς ψυχάς, | ἐπειδὴ
αὐταῖς δικασθείη, κατὰ δὲ τῷ ἐτέρῳ ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἀνιέναι

⁴² Alcinoüs' tale (*apologos Alkinou*) was a traditional name for Hom. *Od.* 9–12, Odysseus' tales to King Alcinoüs at the Phaeacian court, also proverbial for a lengthy story. In Book 11 Odysseus describes his encounter with the dead, which has obvious relevance here. There is also a pun on *Alkinou/alkimou*, the latter word, "brave," describing Er, a fictional character. His native country, Pamphylia, a district of south Asia Minor, can also be

race from Pamphylia.⁴² Once upon a time he was killed in battle, and when the bodies of those who had already decayed were collected up ten days later, his was found to be sound, and when he'd been taken home for burial, on the twelfth day, as he lay on the pyre, he came to. Having done so, he described what he had seen on the other side.

“He said that his soul left him and made its way with many others and they came to a sacred spot where there were two openings in the ground next to each other, and two others opposite them in the sky above. Between them sat judges⁴³ who, when they had passed sentence, ordered the just to make their way to the opening on the right leading up through the sky, and they fixed placards on the front of their bodies indicating their judgments, while the unjust were sent to the left-hand downward path and they also had indications of all they had done attached to their backs. But when he himself came forward, they said that he must become the messenger to mankind of what was happening there, and they ordered him to listen to and observe everything in that place.

“In this way, then, he said he saw the souls, when judgment had been passed, leaving by one of the openings in the sky and one in the ground, while by the other two, out

interpreted as “of the tribe of Everyman” and is the origin of the tyrant Ardiaeus, also, as far as we know, a fictitious character (see 615c5). Many details of the topography and experiences of the afterlife are prefigured in *Grg.* 523a–26d and *Phd.* 113d–14c. For the whole episode, see the introduction to this volume, section 1 (Book 10) and section 2 (iv) (c).

⁴³ Traditionally three: Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, specified in *Grg.* 523e–24a.

ἐκ τῆς γῆς μεστὰς ἀνχμοῦ τε καὶ κόνεως, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
 e ἐτέρου καταβαίνειν ἐτέρας ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καθαρὰς. καὶ
 τὰς αἰεὶ ἀφικνουμένας ὥσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πορείας
 φαίνεσθαι ἤκειν, καὶ ἀσμένας εἰς τὸν λειμῶνα ἀπι-
 ούσας οἶον ἐν πανηγύρει κατασκηναῖσθαι, καὶ ἀσπά-
 ζεσθαί τε ἀλλήλας ὄσαι γνώριμοι, καὶ ἰπυθάνεσθαι
 τὰς τε ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἠκούσας παρὰ τῶν ἐτέρων τὰ ἐκεῖ
 καὶ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ παρ' ἐκείναις. διηγεῖσθαι
 615 δὲ ἀλλήλαις τὰς μὲν ὀδυρομένας τε καὶ κλαούσας,
 ἀναμιμνησκομένας ὅσα τε καὶ οἶα πάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν
 ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ—εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιέτη—
 τὰς δ' αὖ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εὐπαθείας διηγεῖσθαι καὶ
 θέας ἀμηχάνους τὸ κάλλος. ἰ

Τὰ μὲν οὖν πολλὰ, ὧ Γλαῦκων, πολλοῦ χρόνου
 διηγῆσασθαι τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον ἔφη τόδε εἶναι,
 ὅσα πρόποτέ τινα ἠδίκησαν καὶ ὅσους ἕκαστοι, ὑπὲρ
 ἀπάντων δίκην δέδωκέναι ἐν μέρει, ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου δε-
 κάκις—τοῦτο δ' εἶναι κατὰ ἑκατονταετηρίδα ἐκάστην,
 b ὡς βίου ὄντος τοσοῦτου τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου—ἵνα δεκα-
 πλάσιον τὸ ἔκτεισμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος ἐκτίνοιεν, καὶ
 οἶον εἴ τινες πολλοῖς θανάτων ἦσαν αἴτιοι, ἢ πόλεις
 προδόντες ἢ στρατόπεδα, καὶ εἰς δουλείας ἐμβεβλη-
 κότες ἢ τινος ἄλλης κακουχίας μεταίτιοι, πάντων
 τούτων δεκαπλασίας ἀλγηδόνας ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου ἰ
 κομίσαιντο, καὶ αὖ εἴ τινας εὐεργεσίας εὐεργετηκότες
 καὶ δίκαιοι καὶ ὅσιοι γεγονότες εἶεν, κατὰ ταῦτα τὴν
 c ἀξίαν κομίζουσιντο. τῶν δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένων καὶ ὀλίγων

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of the one coming up from the ground, were souls covered in filth and dust, and down from the other one from the sky came others purified. Those arriving in a steady stream seemed to have come from a long journey and gladly came into the meadow and settled themselves down as if at a public festival, and those who were acquainted greeted each other. And those coming up out of the ground asked the others about what was up there above, while those coming down from the sky asked the others about where they had been. They conversed with each other, the former lamenting and weeping when they recalled how much and what kind of things they had suffered and seen on their journey underground, and that the journey took a thousand years. And those coming from the sky described in their turn their pleasant experiences and the sights overwhelming in their beauty.

“Now he said that most of this, Glaucon, would need a long time to describe, but the main thing was this: whatever wrongs they had committed, and however many people they had individually wronged, they had paid for them all in turn, ten times over for each one, that is each one a hundred years on the grounds that such was the life span of a human being, so that they might pay a tenfold penalty for their wrongdoing. For example, if any of them had been responsible for the deaths of many people, or they had betrayed cities, or armies, or thrown people into slavery, or had been responsible for any other maltreatment, they would bring upon themselves ten-fold pain for every one of these, and again if they had performed some good services and become just and devout, by the same token they would gain a worthy reward. He made some other remarks not worth mentioning about those who had

χρόνον βιούντων πέρι ἄλλα ἔλεγεν οὐκ ἄξια μνήμης. εἰς δὲ θεοὺς ἀσεβείας τε καὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ γονέας καὶ αὐτόχειρος φόνου μείζους ἔτι τοὺς μισθοὺς διηγείτο.

Ἔφη γὰρ δὴ παραγενέσθαι ἐρωτωμένῳ ἐτέρῳ ὑπὸ ἐτέρου | ὅπου εἶη Ἄρδιαῖος ὁ μέγας. ὁ δὲ Ἄρδιαῖος οὗτος τῆς Παμφυλίας ἔν τινι πόλει τύραννος ἐγεγόνει, ἤδη χιλιοστὸν ἔτος εἰς ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον, γέροντά
 d τε πατέρα ἀποκτείνας καὶ πρεσβύτερον ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλά τε καὶ ἀνόσια εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἐλέγετο. ἔφη οὖν τὸν ἐρωτώμενον εἰπεῖν, “Οὐχ ἦκει,” φάναι, “οὐδ’ ἀνήξει δεῦρο. ἐθεασάμεθα γὰρ οὖν δὴ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν δεινῶν θεαμάτων· ἐπειδὴ | ἐγγὺς τοῦ στομίου ἦμεν μέλλοντες ἀνιέναι καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα πεπονθότες, ἐκείνόν τε κατείδομεν ἐξαίφνης καὶ ἄλλους—
 e σχεδόν τι αὐτῶν τοὺς πλείστους τυράννους· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἰδιῶταί τινες τῶν μεγάλα ἡμαρτηκότων—οὓς οἰομένους ἤδη ἀναβήσεσθαι οὐκ ἐδέχετο τὸ στόμιον, ἀλλ’ ἐμυκάτο ὅποτε τις τῶν οὕτως ἀνιάτως ἐχόντων εἰς πονηρίαν ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδωκῶς δίκην ἐπιχειροῖ ἀνιέναι. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄνδρες, ἔφη, ἄγριοι, διάπυροι ἰδεῖν, παρεστῶτες καὶ καταμανθάνοντες τὸ φθέγμα, | τοὺς μὲν διαλαβόντες ἦγον, τὸν δὲ Ἄρδιαῖον καὶ ἄλ-
 616 λους συμποδίσαντες χεῖράς τε καὶ πόδας καὶ κεφαλὴν, καταβαλόντες καὶ ἐκδείραντες, εἴλκον παρὰ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκτὸς ἐπ’ ἀσπαλάθων κνάμπτοντες, καὶ τοῖς αἰετοῖσι σημαίνοντες ὧν ἕνεκά τε καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον ἐμπεσούμενοι ἄγοντο.” ἔνθα δὴ φόβων, ἔφη, |

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just been born and only lived a short time. He explained the still greater rewards and punishments for those impious and pious toward the gods or their parents, and for murder.

“He said, you see, that he was there when someone asked another where Ardiaeus the Great was. This man Ardiaeus had made himself tyrant in one of the cities in Pamphylia⁴⁴ (it was already a thousand years back to that time), and it was said that he had killed his aged father and his elder brother, and committed many other wicked deeds. So he said that the man questioned answered, ‘He hasn’t come, nor will he ever come up here. For we saw the following among the terrifying sights: when we were near the entrance waiting to come up when all our other sufferings were over, we suddenly saw him and others: nearly all of them had been tyrants, but there were also some private individuals from those who had committed great misdeeds. They already thought they would be on their way up, but the exit didn’t let them through, but roared whenever any of those who were so incorrigible as regards their depravity, or hadn’t sufficiently paid the penalty, tried to go up. Thereupon,’ he said, ‘men wild and fiery to look at who were standing by and paying attention to the noise, took hold of some and led them away, but they tied Ardiaeus and others up by their hands, feet, and necks, threw them down and flayed them. They dragged them away by the side of the road, carding them on thorns and indicating to those who were continually passing by the reasons for this and the fact that they were being led off to be thrown into Tartarus.’ Then, he said, of the many

⁴⁴ See above, n. 42.

πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν σφίσιν γεγονότων, τοῦτον
 ὑπερβάλλειν, μὴ γένοιτο ἐκάστῳ τὸ φθέγμα ὅτε ἀνα-
 βαίνοι, καὶ ἀσμενέστατα ἕκαστον σιγήσαντος ἀνα-
 βῆναι. καὶ τὰς μὲν δὴ δίκας τε καὶ τιμωρίας τοιαύτας
 b τινὰς εἶναι, καὶ αὖ τὰς εὐεργεσίας ταύταις ἀντιστρό-
 φους.

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἕκαστοις ἑπτὰ ἡμέραι
 γένοιτο, ἀναστάντας ἐντεῦθεν δεῖν τῇ ὀγδόῃ πορεύ-
 εσθαι, καὶ ἀφικνεῖσθαι τεταρταίους ὅθεν καθορᾶν
 ἄνωθεν διὰ παντὸς | τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς τεταμένον
 φῶς εὐθύ, οἶον κίονα, μάλιστα τῇ ἴριδι προσφερές,
 λαμπρότερον δὲ καὶ καθαρώτερον· εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι
 c προελθόντες ἡμερησίαν ὁδόν, καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ
 μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν
 δεσμῶν τεταμένα—εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς σύνδεσμον
 τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, οἶον τὰ ὑποζώματα τῶν τριηρῶν, οὕτω
 πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφορᾶν—ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἄκρων
 τεταμένον Ἀνάγκης ἄτρακτον, | δι' οὗ πάσας ἐπι-
 στρέφεσθαι τὰς περιφοράς· οὗ τὴν μὲν ἡλακᾶτην τε
 καὶ τὸ ἄγκιστρον εἶναι ἐξ ἀδάμαντος, τὸν δὲ σφόν-
 d δυλον μεικτὸν ἐκ τε τούτου καὶ ἄλλων γενῶν. τὴν δὲ
 τοῦ σφονδύλου φύσιν εἶναι τοιάνδε· τὸ μὲν σχῆμα
 οἷαπερ ἡ τοῦ ἐνθάδε, νοῆσαι δὲ δεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἔλεγεν
 τοιόνδε αὐτὸν εἶναι, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐν ἐνὶ μεγάλῳ

⁴⁵ Interpretation of what this passage describes is far from certain. Er is describing how things look from his position at the center of a geocentric and spherical universe: the “shaft of light” (b5) is the central axis of the universe, within which appears also

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fears of every kind they experienced there, the one that predominated was in case the sound should break out when each one went up: indeed, each one went up most gladly when there was silence. So these were the various kinds of punishment and retribution, and again their counterparts the rewards for the good.

“When seven days had passed for each group in the meadow, on the eighth they had to move on. After four days they arrived at a place from where they could see clearly a straight shaft of light stretched out from above through the whole of the sky and the earth like a pillar, closely resembling the rainbow, but brighter and purer. They reached this after a day’s journey and there they saw in the center of the light the ends of its bonds stretched from the sky: for this light was what bound the sky together, like the braces of triremes, so holding together the whole revolution. Stretching down from either end was the spindle of Necessity by means of which all the circles turn.⁴⁵ Both its shaft and the hook were made of adamant, while the whorl is a mixture of this and other sorts of material. The nature of the whorl⁴⁶ is as follows: its shape is like the ones we use, but you have to imagine what it’s like from his description of it, just as if in a large hollow whorl

to be the “spindle of Necessity” (c4–5); it also seems that its ends extend upward and outward, undergirding the sky. Like the ropes which hold together the planks of a trireme (either running along the inside of the trireme’s hull or around the exterior), the spindle’s rotation tightens the extremities of the light’s bonds and so holds the universe together (see further on this passage Adam, and Halliwell, *Plato Republic 10*, nn. ad loc).

⁴⁶ *sphondulon* = “the circular weight” of the spindle, which causes the rotation and helps the balance.

σφονδύλω κοίλῳ καὶ ἐξεγλυμμένῳ διαμπερὲς ἄλλος τοιοῦτος ἐλάττων | ἐγκέοιτο ἀρμόττων, καθάπερ οἱ κάδοι οἱ εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀρμόττοντες, καὶ οὕτω δὴ τρίτον ἄλλον καὶ τέταρτον καὶ ἄλλους τέτταρας. ὁκτῶ
 e γὰρ εἶναι τοὺς σύμπαντας σφονδύλους, ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐγκειμένους, κύκλους ἄνωθεν τὰ χεῖλη φαίνοντας, νῶτον συνεχῆς ἐνὸς σφονδύλου ἀπεργαζομένους περὶ τὴν ἡλακάτην· ἐκείνην δὲ διὰ μέσου τοῦ ὀγδόου διαμπερὲς ἐληλάσθαι.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν πρῶτόν τε καὶ ἐξωτάτῳ σφόνδυλον πλατύτατον | τὸν τοῦ χεῖλους κύκλον ἔχειν, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἕκτου δεύτερον, τρίτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τετάρτου, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ὀγδόου, πέμπτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ ἐβδόμου, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν τοῦ πέμπτου, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸν τοῦ τρίτου, ὀγδοον δὲ τὸν τοῦ δευτέρου. καὶ τὸν μὲν τοῦ μεγίστου ποικίλον, τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐβδόμου λαμπρότατον, | τὸν δὲ
 617 τοῦ ὀγδόου τὸ χρῶμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐβδόμου ἔχειν προσλάμποντος, τὸν δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ πέμπτου παραπλήσια ἀλλήλοις, ξανθότερα ἐκείνων, τρίτον δὲ λευκότατον χρῶμα ἔχειν, τέταρτον δὲ ὑπέρυθρον, δεύτερον δὲ λευκότητι τὸν ἕκτον. κυκλεῖσθαι δὲ δὴ στρεφόμενον | τὸν ἄτρακτον ὅλον μὲν τὴν αὐτὴν φοράν, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὄλῳ περιφερομένῳ τοὺς μὲν ἐντὸς ἑπτὰ κύκλους τὴν ἐναντίαν τῷ ὄλῳ ἡρέμα περιφέρεσθαι, αὐτῶν δὲ
 b τούτων τάχιστα μὲν ἰέναι τὸν ὀγδοον, δευτέρους δὲ καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλοις τὸν τε ἕβδομον καὶ ἕκτον καὶ πέμπτον· τρίτου δὲ φορῆ ἰέναι, ὡς σφίσι φαίνεσθαι, ἐπανακυκλούμενον τὸν τέταρτον, τέταρτον δὲ τὸν

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scooped out right through, another one of the same sort lies fitted inside it, and so on, just like boxes that fit into one another, with a third and a fourth and four more. The total number of whorls is eight, each lying inside the other. Their edges seen from above are circles, forming from the back a *continuous single whorl* around the shaft, the latter being driven right through the center of the eighth.⁴⁷

“The first and outermost whorl is the broadest in the circle of its rim, that of the sixth is second, that of the fourth is third, that of the eighth is fourth, that of the seventh is fifth, that of the fifth is sixth, that of the third is seventh, and that of the second is eighth. Furthermore, that of the largest is star-studded, that of the seventh is brightest, and the color of the eighth comes from the shining of the seventh. The colors of the second and fifth are nearly the same as each other, more yellow than the others; the third has the whitest light, the fourth is reddish, and the sixth is second in brightness. The whole of the spindle revolves in a circle on the same course, but in the whole revolution the seven inner circles revolve silently in the opposite direction to the whole and the fastest of these is the eighth, second the seventh, sixth, and fifth all moving together. The third fastest, so it seemed to them, was the fourth, and the third was fourth, and the fifth

⁴⁷ The whorls fit inside each other like concentric cups, with the eighth being the smallest. Hence “their edges seen from above are circles” (e1).

τρίτον καὶ πέμπτον τὸν δεύτερον. στρέφεσθαι | δὲ
αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς τῆς Ἀνάγκης γόνασιν.

Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ ἄνωθεν ἐφ' ἐκάστου
βεβηκέναι Σειρήνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν
ἰείσαν, ἓνα τόνον· ἐκ πασῶν δὲ ὀκτὼ οὐσῶν μίαν
ἄρμονίαν συμφωνεῖν. ἄλλας δὲ καθημένας περίξ δι'
c ἴσου τρεῖς, ἐν θρόνῳ ἐκάστην, θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνά-
γκης, Μοίρας, λευχειμονούσας, στέμματα ἐπὶ τῶν
κεφαλῶν ἔχούσας, Λάχεσιν τε καὶ Κλωθῶ καὶ Ἄτρο-
πον, ὑμνεῖν πρὸς τὴν τῶν Σειρήνων ἄρμονίαν, Λάχεσιν
μὲν | τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ
μέλλοντα. καὶ τὴν μὲν Κλωθῶ τῇ δεξιᾷ χειρὶ ἐφ-
απτομένην συνεπιστρέφειν τοῦ ἀτράκτου τὴν ἔξω
d περιφορᾶν, διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, τὴν δὲ Ἄτροπον τῇ
ἀριστερᾷ τὰς ἐντὸς αὐῆ ὡσαύτως· τὴν δὲ Λάχεσιν ἐν
μέρει ἐκατέρας ἐκατέρα τῇ χειρὶ ἐφάπτεσθαι.

Σφᾶς οὖν, ἐπειδὴ ἀφικέσθαι, εὐθύς δεῖν ἰέναι πρὸς
τὴν Λάχεσιν. προφήτην οὖν τινα σφᾶς πρῶτον μὲν
ἐν τάξει διαστήσαι, ἔπειτα λαβόντα ἐκ τῶν τῆς
Λαχέσεως γονάτων κλήρους τε καὶ βίων παραδείγματα,
ἀναβάνα ἐπὶ τι βῆμα ὑψηλὸν | εἰπεῖν—“Ἀνάγκης
θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος. Ψυχαὶ ἐφήμεροι,
ἀρχὴ ἄλλης περιόδου θνητοῦ γένους θανατηφόρου.
e οὐχ ὑμᾶς δαίμων λήξεται, ἀλλ' ὑμεῖς δαίμονα αἰρή-

⁴⁸ The variations in the broadness of the rims of the circles seem to relate to Plato's conception of the appearance of stars and known planets and their speeds and the distances between them conceived in terms of mathematical ratios.

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second. The spindle itself revolved on the knees of Necessity.⁴⁸

“On top of each of the its circles stood a Siren revolving around with it producing a single sound on one note, and from all eight of them the sounds blended into a single harmony.⁴⁹ Three others, each sitting on a throne spaced equally around, the daughters of Necessity, the Fates Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos⁵⁰ dressed in white with garlands on their heads, sang in response to the harmony of the Sirens: Lachesis the past, Clotho the present, Atropos the future. Clotho helped in turning the outer circle of the spindle by touching it with her right hand at intervals, and Atropos did likewise touching the inner circles with her left, while Lachesis in her turn touched both with either hand.

“Now when they arrived there they had to make their way immediately toward Lachesis. So a sort of interpreter⁵¹ first made them stand in ranks, then took from Lachesis’ lap allocations and samples of lives. Then going up to a high platform he said: “The word of the maiden Lachesis, daughter of Necessity. Souls of a day, this is the beginning of another round of mortal kind that ends in death. No divine spirit will select you by lot, but you will

⁴⁹ I.e., the “harmony of the spheres,” produced by the movement of the whorls, all revolving at different speeds, with size, velocity, and distance related to Pythagorean musical ratios (see further, Waterfield, *Plato, Republic*, n. ad loc).

⁵⁰ Lachesis (“she who allots” the portion of human life), Clotho (“the spinner” of the thread of human life), and Atropos (“the implacable one,” who cuts the thread when the point of death is reached).

⁵¹ Or “spokesman” (*prophētēs*).

σεσθε. πρῶτος δ' ὁ λαχὼν πρῶτος αἰρείσθω βίον ᾧ
 συνέσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. ἀρετὴ δὲ ἀδέσποτον, ἦν τιμῶν
 καὶ ἀτιμάζων πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον αὐτῆς ἕκαστος ἔξει.
 αἰτία ἐλομένου θεὸς ἀναίτιος.” |

Ταῦτα εἰπόντα ρῦψαι ἐπὶ πάντας τοὺς κλήρους, τὸν
 δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν πεσόντα ἕκαστον ἀναιρείσθαι πλὴν οὐ,
 618 ἐ δὲ οὐκ ἔαν' τῷ δὲ ἀνελομένῳ δῆλον εἶναι ὀπόστος
 εἰλήχεν. μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο αὐθις τὰ τῶν βίων παραδείγματα
 εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν σφῶν θείναι ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, πολὺ πλείω
 τῶν παρόντων. εἶναι δὲ παντοδαπά· ζῶων τε γὰρ πάν-
 των βίους καὶ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους ἅπαντας. |
 τυραννίδας τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶναι, τὰς μὲν διατελεῖς,
 τὰς δὲ καὶ μεταξὺ διαφθειρομένας καὶ εἰς πενίας τε
 καὶ φυγὰς καὶ εἰς πτωχείας τελευτώσας· εἶναι δὲ καὶ
 δοκίμων ἀνδρῶν βίους, τοὺς μὲν ἐπὶ εἵδεσιν καὶ κατὰ
 b κάλλη καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἰσχύν τε καὶ ἀγωνίαν, τοὺς δ'
 ἐπὶ γένεσιν καὶ προγόνων ἀρεταῖς, καὶ ἀδοκίμων κατὰ
 ταῦτα, ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν. ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν οὐκ
 ἐνεῖναι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν ἄλλον ἐλομένην βίον
 ἀλλοίαν γίνεσθαι· τὰ δ' ἄλλα | ἀλλήλοις τε καὶ
 πλούτοις καὶ πενίαις, τὰ δὲ νόσοις, τὰ δ' ὑγιείαις με-
 μίχθαι, τὰ δὲ καὶ μεσοῦν τούτων.

Ἔνθα δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾧ φίλε Γλαύκων, ὁ πᾶς
 κίνδυνος ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα μάλιστα ἐπιμελητέον
 c ὅπως ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀμελήσας

⁵² The *daimōn*, the personal spirit which watches over one's life, which S. claimed (Ap. 31b) always dissuaded him from mis-

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be the one to choose a divine spirit.⁵² Let the one who draws the first lot be the first to choose a life to which he will adhere of necessity. But virtue has no master; by honoring or dishonoring it, each will have a greater or lesser share of it. The responsibility is the chooser's; god is not to be blamed.'

"When he had said this he threw the lots out among them all, and each picked up the one which fell beside him, except Er himself: he was not allowed to. It was clear to them as they picked them up which number they had chosen. After this he again placed samples of lives on the ground in front of them—many more than the number of those present. They were of all kinds; for there were the lives of all animals as well as all sorts of human beings. There were lives of tyrants among them, some uninterrupted, others cut off in midcourse and ending up in poverty, exile, and beggary. There were lives of notable people, some famous for their beauty of appearance and for other strength and prowess; others for their distinguished families and the virtues of their ancestors; and there were lives of men undistinguished in these same areas, and likewise for women. There was no arrangement of the soul in all this because the choice of a different life inevitably implied a soul's different constitution. But the other qualities were combined together: with wealth, poverty, sickness and health, and states in between.

"This indeed then, my dear Glaucon, seems to be where the overall danger to humankind lies, and for this reason especially we must pay heed to how each of us,

taken life choices. The word is enshrined in *eudaimōn* = "fortunate," "happy" (having a good *daimōn*).

τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος καὶ ζητητῆς καὶ μαθητῆς
 ἔσται, εἴαν ποθεν οἶός τ' ἦ μαθεῖν καὶ ἐξευρεῖν τίς
 αὐτὸν ποιήσει δυνατόν καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, βίον χρηστὸν
 καὶ πονηρὸν διαγιγνώσκοντα, | τὸν βελτίω ἐκ τῶν
 δυνατῶν ἀεὶ πανταχοῦ αἰρεῖσθαι ἀναλογιζόμενον
 πάντα τὰ νυνδῆ ρηθέντα [καὶ] συντιθέμενα ἀλλήλοις
 καὶ διαιρούμενα πρὸς ἀρετὴν βίου πῶς ἔχει, εἶδέναι
 τί κάλλος πενία ἢ πλοῦτῳ κραθὲν καὶ μετὰ ποίας
 d τινὸς ψυχῆς ἔξεως κακὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἐργάζεται, καὶ τί
 εὐγένειαι καὶ δυσγένειαι καὶ ἰδιωτεῖαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ
 ἰσχυεῖς καὶ ἀσθένειαι καὶ εὐμαθῖαι καὶ δυσμαθῖαι καὶ
 πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν φύσει περὶ ψυχῆν ὄντων καὶ
 τῶν ἐπικτήτων τί συγκεραννύμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα
 ἐργάζεται, | ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων αὐτῶν δυνατόν εἶναι
 συλλογισάμενον αἰρεῖσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς
 e φύσιν ἀποβλέποντα, τὸν τε χείρω καὶ τὸν ἀμείνω
 βίον, χείρω μὲν καλοῦντα ὃς αὐτὴν ἐκέισε ἄξει, εἰς τὸ
 ἀδικωτέραν γίγνεσθαι, ἀμείνω δὲ ὅστις εἰς τὸ
 δικαιοτέραν. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα χαίρειν εἴσει·
 ἐωράκαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ζῶντί τε καὶ τελευτήσαντι αὕτη
 619 κρατίστη αἴρεσις. ἀδαμαντίνως δὴ δεῖ ταύτην τὴν
 δόξαν ἔχοντα εἰς Ἄιδον ἰέναι, ὅπως ἂν ἦ καὶ ἐκεῖ
 ἀνέκπληκτος ὑπὸ πλοῦτων τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων κακῶν,
 καὶ μὴ ἐμπεσῶν εἰς τυραννίδας καὶ ἄλλας τοιαύτας
 πράξεις πολλὰ μὲν ἐργάσθαι καὶ ἀνήκεστα | κακά,
 ἔτι δὲ αὐτὸς μείζω πάθῃ, ἀλλὰ γνῶ τὸν μέσον ἀεὶ τῶν
 τοιούτων βίον αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν τὰ ὑπερβάλλοντα
 ἐκατέρωσε καὶ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βίῳ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν καὶ

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having neglected all other lessons, will become a searcher and student of this one, if by some means he can learn and discover who will give him the ability and understanding, by *distinguishing the good and bad life*, always and everywhere to be able to choose the better one out of those that are possible; by considering all that has been said up to now and putting it all together and analyzing how it makes for virtue in life, to know how beauty combined with poverty or wealth and the possession of what kind of state of what kind of soul achieves good or evil; and what can be achieved by high or low birth, one's personal life, political offices, and physical strengths and weaknesses, and a readiness or reluctance to learn, and all such things which belong to the soul, naturally or are acquired, when blended together. The result of all this is that he can, by taking thought, choose, with regard to the nature of the soul, the worse and better life, calling the worse the one which will lead to becoming more unjust, the better the one which will lead to becoming more just. All the rest he'll say goodbye to, for we have seen that this is the supreme choice in life and death. One must approach Hades unshakable in this belief, in order that even there one will be undaunted by wealth and suchlike evils, and avoid committing many intolerable evils by falling into tyrannical and other such practices and oneself suffer even more, but will know how to choose the life that lies midway between such things and avoid excess in either direction, both in this life as far as is possible, and the whole of the life here-

b ἐν παντὶ τῷ ἔπειτα· οὕτω γὰρ εὐδαιμονέστατος γίγνεται ἄνθρωπος.

Καὶ δὴ οὖν καὶ τότε ὁ ἐκεῖθεν ἄγγελος ἠγγελλε τὸν μὲν προφήτην οὕτως εἰπεῖν· “Καὶ τελευταίῳ ἐπιόντι, σὺν νῶ ἐλομένῳ, συντόνως ζῶντι κείται βίος ἀγαπητός, οὐ κακός. | μήτε ὁ ἄρχων αἰρέσεως ἀμελείτω μήτε ὁ τελευτῶν ἀθυμείτω.”

Εἰπόντος δὲ ταῦτα τὸν πρῶτον λαχόντα ἔφη εὐθύς
 c ἐπιόντα τὴν μεγίστην τυραννίδα ἐλέσθαι, καὶ ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης τε καὶ λαιμαργίας οὐ πάντα ἱκανῶς ἀνασκειψάμενον ἐλέσθαι, ἀλλ’ αὐτὸν λαθεῖν ἐνοῦσαν εἰμαρμένην παίδων αὐτοῦ βρώσεις καὶ ἄλλα κακά· ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν σκέψασθαι, κόπτεσθαί τε καὶ ὀδύρεσθαι τὴν αἴρεσιν, οὐκ ἐμμένοντα τοῖς προρηθείσιν | ὑπὸ τοῦ προφήτου· οὐ γὰρ ἑαυτὸν αἰτιάσθαι τῶν κακῶν, ἀλλὰ τύχην τε καὶ δαίμονας καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ἀνθ’ ἑαυτοῦ. εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ
 d βίῳ βεβιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. ὡς δὲ καὶ εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἐλάττους εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀλισκομένους τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἠκοντας, ἅτε πόνων ἀγυμνάστους· τῶν δ’ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἅτε αὐτούς τε πεπονηκότας ἄλλους τε ἑωρακότας, οὐκ | ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς τὰς αἰρέσεις ποιεῖσθαι. διὸ δὴ καὶ μεταβολὴν τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ταῖς πολλαῖς τῶν ψυχῶν γίγνεσθαι καὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ κλήρου τύχην·

⁵³ As did the legendary Thyestes.

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after. For this is the way a human being becomes most happy.

“And at that point our messenger from the other side also said the interpreter spoke as follows: ‘Even for the one who comes last, provided he chooses intelligently and lives strictly, a contented life awaits, not a bad one. Let the first not be careless in his choice, nor the last despondent.’

“When he had announced this, Er said, the first to choose his lot came forward and immediately chose the most absolute tyranny and made his choice through thoughtlessness and greed without considering all its aspects adequately, but what he failed to notice was that in among this it was fated that he would devour his children⁵³ and commit other evil deeds. But when he thought about it at his leisure, he beat his breast and bewailed his choice and did not keep to what had been said before by the interpreter. You see, he didn’t blame himself for his misfortunes, but chance, heaven, and everything but himself. Yet he was one of those who had come down from the sky and in his previous life had been living under a well-run constitution, where he shared in virtue out of habit, without philosophy. Generally speaking, a number not less than the others, caught in such circumstances were those who came down from the sky, in that they were unfamiliar with suffering; but the majority of those from the earth, in that they had both suffered themselves and seen others suffering, did not make their choice on the spur of the moment. For these reasons, then, as well as through the chance of the lottery, the majority of souls made the exchange between evil and good lives. Yet if an individual,

e ἐπεὶ εἴ τις αἰεί, ὅποτε εἰς τὸν ἐνθάδε βίον ἀφικνοῖτο, ὑγιῶς φιλοσοφοῖ καὶ ὁ κλῆρος αὐτῷ τῆς αἰρέσεως μὴ ἐν τελευταίοις πίπτει, κινδυνεύει ἐκ τῶν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπαγγελλομένων οὐ μόνον ἐνθάδε εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε καὶ δεῦρο πάλιν πορείαν οὐκ ἂν | χθονίαν καὶ τραχεῖαν πορεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ λείαν τε καὶ οὐρανίαν.

620 Ταύτην γὰρ δὴ ἔφη τὴν θεάν ἀξίαν εἶναι ἰδεῖν, ὡς ἕκασται αἱ ψυχαὶ ἤρουντο τοὺς βίους· ἐλεινὴν τε γὰρ ἰδεῖν εἶναι καὶ γελοίαν καὶ θαυμασίαν. κατὰ συνήθειαν γὰρ τοῦ προτέρου βίου τὰ πολλὰ αἰρείσθαι. ἰδεῖν μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴν ἔφη τὴν ποτε Ὀρφέως γενομένην κύκνου βίον αἴρουμένην, μίσει | τοῦ γυναικείου γένους διὰ τὸν ὑπ' ἐκείνων θάνατον οὐκ ἐθέλουσαν ἐν γυναικὶ γεννηθεῖσαν γενέσθαι· ἰδεῖν δὲ τὴν Θαμύρου ἀηδόνας ἐλομένην· ἰδεῖν δὲ καὶ κύκνον μεταβάλλοντα εἰς ἀνθρωπίνου βίου αἵρεσιν, καὶ ἄλλα ζῶα μουσικὰ ὡσαύτως. εἰκοστὴν δὲ λαχοῦσαν ψυχὴν ἐλέσθαι λέοντος βίον· εἶναι δὲ τὴν Αἴαντος τοῦ Τελαμωνίου, φεύγουσαν ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι, μεμνημένην τῆς τῶν ὄπλων κρίσεως. τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ Ἀγαμέμνονος· ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ταύτην τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου γένους | διὰ τὰ πάθη ἀετοῦ διαλλάξαι βίον. ἐν μέσοις δὲ λαχοῦσαν τὴν Ἀταλάν-

⁵⁴ According to the myth, Orpheus was dismembered and killed by Thracian Maenads (see *Ov. Met.* 11.66).

⁵⁵ Thamyras (or Thamyris) was a legendary singer who was deprived of his sight and his musicianship as a result of contending with the Muses in song (see *Hom. Il.* 2.594–600).

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whenever he arrived at the life in this world, constantly practiced sound philosophy and the lot he chose did not fall out among the last, there is a chance, from all that has been reported from the other world, that not only he may be happy here, but also that his journey from here to there and back again will not be a rough one through the earth, but a smooth one through the sky.

“This sight was worth seeing, he said, how each of the souls chose its life: you see, it was pitiful and laughable and astounding. For the majority of choices were made through familiarity with their previous existence. He said he saw the soul of the erstwhile Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of hatred for the female sex on account of its death at their hands, and so refusing to be conceived and born in a woman.⁵⁴ He saw the soul of Thamyras choose the life of a nightingale,⁵⁵ and a swan exchange its life for a human one and other musical creatures doing likewise. The twentieth soul chose the life of a lion. It was that of Telamon’s son Ajax avoiding becoming a human being, remembering the judgment of the weapons.⁵⁶ After him Agamemnon’s soul, also through its enmity with the human race because of what it had suffered, made an exchange for the life of an eagle.⁵⁷ In the middle of them

⁵⁶ Ajax was a notable warrior who, when the armor of the dead Achilles was awarded to Odysseus, killed himself, as dramatized in Sophocles *Ajax* (see also Hom. *Il.* 15.674ff., *Od.* 11.543–67).

⁵⁷ Agamemnon, commander of the Greeks at Troy, on returning home was murdered by his wife, Clytemnestra, and her lover, Aegisthus (Aesch. *Agamemnon*, and Hom. *Od.* 4.512ff.).

της ψυχῆν, κατιδοῦσαν μεγάλας τιμὰς ἀθλητοῦ ἀν-
 δρός, οὐ δύνασθαι παρελθεῖν, ἀλλὰ λαβεῖν. μετὰ δὲ
 c ταύτην ἰδεῖν τὴν Ἐπειοῦ τοῦ Πανοπέως εἰς τεχνικῆς
 γυναικὸς ἰοῦσαν φύσιν· πόρρω δ' ἐν ὑστάτοις ἰδεῖν
 τὴν τοῦ γελωτοποιοῦ Θερσίτου πίθηκον ἐνδουμένην.
 κατὰ τύχην δὲ τὴν Ὀδυσσεῶς λαχοῦσαν πασῶν
 ὑστάτην αἵρησομένην ἰέναι, μνήμη δὲ | τῶν προτέρων
 πόνων φιλοτιμίας λελωφηκυῖαν ζητεῖν περιουσοῦσαν
 χρόνον πολὺν βίον ἀνδρὸς ἰδιώτου ἀπράγμονος, καὶ
 μόγις εὐρεῖν κείμενόν που καὶ παρημελημένον ὑπὸ
 d τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ εἰπεῖν ἰδοῦσαν ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἔπραξεν
 καὶ πρώτη λαχοῦσα, καὶ ἀσμένην ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ἐκ τῶν
 ἄλλων δὴ θηρίων ὡσαύτως εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἰέναι καὶ
 εἰς ἄλληλα, τὰ μὲν ἄδικα εἰς τὰ ἄγρια, τὰ δὲ δίκαια
 εἰς τὰ ἡμερα μεταβάλλοντα, καὶ | πάσας μείξεις
 μείγνυσθαι.

Ἐπειδὴ δ' οὖν πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς τοὺς βίους ἡρῆ-
 σθαι, ὡσπερ ἔλαχον ἐν τάξει προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν
 Λάχεσιν· ἐκείνην δ' ἐκάστῳ ὃν εἴλετο δαίμονα, τοῦτον
 e φύλακα συμπέμπειν τοῦ βίου καὶ ἀποπληρωτὴν τῶν
 αἰρεθέντων. ὃν πρῶτον μὲν ἄγειν αὐτὴν πρὸς τὴν
 Κλωθῶ ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνης χεῖρά τε καὶ ἐπιστροφὴν τῆς
 τοῦ ἀτράκτου δίνης, κυροῦντα ἦν λαχὼν εἴλετο μοῦ-
 ραν· ταύτης δ' ἐφαιψάμενον | αὐθις ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς Ἀτρό-

⁵⁸ Atalanta was a mythical female athlete who was tricked into defeat by Hippomenes, who dropped golden apples in her path (Apollod. *Bibl.* 3.9.2).

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Atalanta's soul drawing its lot, seeing the great honors of the male athlete, was unable to pass by, but took it.⁵⁸ After her he saw the soul of Panopeus' son Epeius entering the nature of a female craftworker.⁵⁹ Further on among the last he saw the soul of the absurd Thersites taking on the life of a monkey.⁶⁰ And as chance would have it, last of all the soul of Odysseus came forward to make its choice and, mindful of its previous toils and taking a rest from ambition, went around for a long time looking for the life of a private citizen with no interest in public affairs, and it found it with difficulty, lying somewhere and passed over by the rest, and when it saw it, it said that it would have done the same even if it had been the first to draw the lot, and was glad to choose it. Similarly, of other wild animals, some passed into human beings and some into each other, the unjust ones changing into wild animals, the just into tame ones, and all possible combinations.

"So when all the souls had chosen their lives, according to the draw they approached Lachesis in order and she gave each the spirit⁶¹ they had chosen to escort them as protector through their lives and as fulfiller of their choices. This spirit led it first toward Clotho, under her hand and the spinning of the whirling spindle, ratifying the fate it had chosen by lot. After receiving her touch it again led the soul toward Atropos' spinning, which made

⁵⁹ Epeius built the wooden horse of Troy; also distinguished himself at Achilles' funeral games as a champion boxer (Hom. *Il.* 23.664ff.).

⁶⁰ In the *Iliad*, Thersites is beaten by Odysseus after daring to challenge Agamemnon (see Hom. *Il.* 2.212ff.).

⁶¹ *daimōn*: see above, n. 52.

621 που ἄγειν νῆσι, ἀμετάστροφα τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα ποι-
 οὔντα· ἐντεῦθεν δὲ δὴ ἀμεταστρεπτὴ ὑπὸ τὸν τῆς
 Ἀνάγκης ἰεναὶ θρόνον, καὶ δι' ἐκείνου διεξελθόντα,
 ἐπειδὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διῆλθον, πορεύεσθαι ἅπαντας εἰς
 τὸ τῆς Λήθης πεδῖον διὰ καύματός τε καὶ πνίγους
 δεινοῦ· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὸ κενὸν δένδρων τε καὶ ὅσα
 γῆ φύει. Ἰ σκηναῖσθαι οὖν σφᾶς ἤδη ἐσπέρας γιγνο-
 μένης παρὰ τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμὸν, οὗ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀγ-
 γείου οὐδὲν στέγειν. μέτρον μὲν οὖν τι τοῦ ὕδατος
 πᾶσιν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ φρονήσει μὴ
 b σφζομένους πλέον πίνειν τοῦ μέτρον· τὸν δὲ αἰεὶ πι-
 όντα πάντων ἐπιλαυθάνεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ κοιμηθῆναι
 καὶ μέσας νύκτας γενέσθαι, βροντὴν τε καὶ σεισμὸν
 γενέσθαι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἐξαπίνης ἄλλον ἄλλη φέρεσθαι
 ἄνω εἰς τὴν γένεσιν, ἄττοντας ὡσπερ ἀστέρας. Ἰ αὐτὸς
 δὲ τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος κωλυθῆναι πιεῖν ὅπη μέντοι καὶ
 ὅπως εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀφίκοιτο, οὐκ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἐξαίφνης
 ἀναβλέψας ἰδεῖν ἤδη ἔωθεν αὐτὸν κείμενον ἐπὶ τῇ
 πυρᾷ.

Καὶ οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη ἀλλ' οὐκ
 c ἀπώλετο, καὶ ἡμᾶς ἂν σώσειεν, ἂν πειθώμεθα αὐτῷ,
 καὶ τὸν τῆς Λήθης ποταμὸν εὖ διαβησόμεθα καὶ τὴν
 ψυχὴν οὐ μιανθησόμεθα. ἀλλ' ἂν ἐμοὶ πειθώμεθα,
 νομίζοντες ἀθάνατον ψυχὴν καὶ δυνατὴν πάντα μὲν
 κακὰ ἀνέχεσθαι, πάντα δὲ ἀγαθὰ, ἢ τῆς ἄνω ὁδοῦ αἰεὶ
 ἐξόμεθα καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως παντὶ
 τρόπῳ ἐπιτηδεύσομεν, ἵνα καὶ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς φίλοι ὦμεν

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the assignment irreversible.⁶² And then, without turning round, it went beneath the throne of Necessity, and after passing through it, when the rest had also passed through, they all made their way to the plain of Lethe through terrifying choking fire: for the place was empty of trees and anything else that grows in the earth. So as evening was already approaching they encamped beside the river of Forgetfulness, whose water no vessel can hold. Now they all had to drink a measure of this water, but those who did not have enough sense to be moderate drank more than their measure, while each one, as he drank, forgot everything. When they had fallen asleep and it was midnight there was a thunderbolt and an earthquake, and then suddenly they were taken up, one this way, another that, to their birth, like shooting stars. But Er himself was prevented from drinking the water. However, where and how he returned to his body, he did not know, but suddenly he looked up and saw it was now dawn and that he was lying on the pyre.

“And so, Glaucon, the story has been preserved and has not been lost, and it would save us if we follow it and we shall make a successful crossing of the river Lethe and shall not pollute our souls. But if we follow what I say and consider that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring everything evil and everything good, we shall always keep to the upward path and we shall practice justice with intelligence in every way in order to be dear to ourselves

⁶² “Irreversible” as to the time of *ending* of life; Plato’s whole moral theory assumes the possibility of moral self-improvement *during* life; see the introduction to this volume, section 2 (iv) (c).

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καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς, αὐτοῦ τε μένοντες ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἐπειδὴν
d τὰ ἄθλα αὐτῆς κομιζόμεθα, ὥσπερ οἱ νικηφόροι περι-
αγειρόμενοι, καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν τῇ χιλιέτει πορεία, ἣν
διεληλύθαμεν, εὖ πράττωμεν.

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and to the gods, both while we remain here below, and when we reap its prizes like victors in the games collecting their rewards, both here and on our thousand-year journey which we have discussed, we shall do well."

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